natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When this is not possible, for instance in cases of debtors in financial difficulty, the private creditor will seek assurances of maximum compensation should the financial condition of the debtor later improve.
Kada to nije moguće, na primjer u slučajevima dužnika u financijskim poteškoćama, privatni vjerovnik tražit će jamstva za naknadu u najvećem mogućem iznosu nakon poboljšanja financijskog stanja dužnika.
If insufficient securities or commitments are made by the debtor, a private creditor would generally not accept to conclude debt rescheduling agreements or provide the debtor with additional loans.
S dužnikom koji ne dostavi dovoljne instrumente osiguranja ili ne preuzme odgovarajuće obveze, privatni vjerovnik obično ne bi pristao na sklapanje sporazuma o reprogramiranju duga niti bi dužniku odobrio dodatne kredite.
With respect to the initial delay in settling payments, the CBI argues that settling payments with ISB in September 2009 and with Kaupthing in November 2009 cannot be considered a delay given the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Iceland after the collapse of the banking system in October 2008.
Kad je riječ o početnom kašnjenju plaćanja, CBI tvrdi da se dogovor o plaćanju s ISB-om iz rujna 2009. i s Kaupthingom iz studenoga 2009. ne može smatrati kašnjenjem i to zbog iznimnih okolnosti koje su na Islandu prevladavale nakon urušavanja bankovnog sustava u listopadu 2008.
During the period from the collapse until the settlement of the claims, Iceland was undergoing a comprehensive bank restructuring with the assistance of the IMF and there was considerable uncertainty about the fair valuation of the banks' assets.Therefore, the CBI as the creditor of the banks needed time to properly evaluate the assets that served as collateral.
Tijekom razdoblja od urušavanja do namirenja potraživanja na Islandu se provodilo sveobuhvatno restrukturiranje banaka uz pomoć MMF-a, uz veliku nesigurnost u pogledu fer vrednovanja imovine banaka. Stoga je CBI-ju kao vjerovniku banaka trebalovremena za odgovarajuću ocjenu imovine koja je poslužila kao kolateral.
The Authority has assessed these arguments and considers that the CBI acted in line with the private creditor test concerning the initial delay.
Nadzorno je tijelo ocijenilo te argumente i smatra da je postupanje CBI-ja u pogledu početnog kašnjenja u skladu s testom privatnog vjerovnika.
Further, the Authority needs to assess whether a private creditor holding similar short-term claims on the defaulting banks would have agreed to the transfer of the housing loan portfolios under the conditions set out above and to the subsequent conclusion of loan agreements with the new banks according to the same conditions.
Nadalje, Nadzorno tijelo treba ocijeniti bi li privatni vjerovnik sa sličnim kratkoročnim potraživanjima od banaka koje su u statusu neispunjavanja obveza pristao na prijenos portfelja stambenih kredita u prethodno utvrđenim uvjetima i bi li nakon toga s novim bankama sklopio ugovore o kreditu s istim uvjetima.
The Authority notes that in the wake of Glitnir's and Kaupthing's collapse in the autumn of 2008, the CBI found itself in a position where it was unrealistic to expect to enforce collateral like the ones in question in the case of Arion and ISB.
Nadzorno tijelo smatra da u situaciji u kojoj se CBI našao ujesen 2008., nakon propasti banaka Glitnir i Kaupthing, nije bilo realno očekivati naplatu kolaterala poput predmetnih u slučaju Ariona i ISB-a.
Taking into account that the loan portfolios constituted a large share of Arion's and ISB's customer base, appropriating such collateral could have jeopardised the financial stability of Arion and ISB and driven these financial undertakings into bankruptcy.
Uzimajući u obzir da se poslovanje Ariona i ISB-a velikim dijelom odnosilo na kreditiranje klijenata, namirenje iz tih kolaterala ugrozilo bi financijsku stabilnost Ariona i ISB-a i odvelo ih u stečaj.
Enforcing the collateral would have also entailed additional administrative expenses for the CBI.
Postupak naplate kolaterala uzrokovao bi i dodatne administrativne troškove za CBI.
Moreover, if the loan portfolios had been offered for sale, the CBI would also have had no assurance of acceptable recovery, and it was highly unlikely that investors with sufficient capital strength would have been available to buy the portfolios, given the market situation in Iceland at the time.
Štoviše, da su kreditni portfelji ponuđeni na prodaju, ni CBI ne bi mogao ponuditi jamstvo za prihvatljivu naplatu i vrlo je vjerojatno da ulagatelji s dovoljno kapitala ne bi ni bili spremni kupiti te portfelje s obzirom na tadašnje stanje islandskog tržišta.
Therefore, appropriating the housing loan portfolios — either by enforcing the collateral or following bankruptcy — would have resulted in the CBI recovering a lower amount of the short-term debt in the end.
Stoga bi CBI namirenjem iz portfelja stambenih kredita, bilo pokretanjem postupka naplate kolaterala bilo u postupku stečaja, u konačnici naplatio manji iznos kratkoročnog duga.
Faced with this situation, the CBI therefore chose to enter into the loan agreements to ensure full payment of its claims, with interest and without having to incur administrative expenses.
CBI je stoga u toj situaciji odlučio sklopiti ugovore o kreditiranju kako bi osigurao naplatu svojih potraživanja u cijelosti, s kamatama i bez administrativnih troškova.
The loan agreements were thus entered into to achieve maximum possible recovery at that time.
Ugovori o kreditu sklopljeni su da bi se naplatio što veći iznos potraživanja.
Based on these elements, the Authority considers that the CBI endeavoured to maximise the recovery of its claims when entering into the loan agreements.
Nadzorno tijelo na temelju tih elemenata smatra da je CBI sklapanjem ugovora o kreditu pokušao naplatiti što veći iznos svojih potraživanja.
The Authority also must assess whether the conditions attached to the loan agreements, and in particular the applicable interest rates, would have been sufficiently valuable to a private creditor to meet the requirement of the private creditor test.
Nadzorno tijelo mora ocijeniti bi li uvjeti ugovora o kreditu, a posebno primijenjene kamatne stope, bili dovoljno dobri za privatnog vjerovnika kako bi se ispunili zahtjevi testa privatnog vjerovnika.
In Decision No 208/15/COL, the Authority noted that it was difficult to determine the appropriate benchmarks for interest rates during the financial crisis.
Nadzorno tijelo navelo je u Odluci br. 208/15/COL da je bilo teško utvrditi odgovarajuće referentne vrijednosti za kamatne stope tijekom financijske krize.
In response to this, ISB, Arion and the CBI have submitted additional information and comments.
Zbog toga su ISB, Arion i CBI dostavili dodatne informacije i komentare.
ISB argues that the interest rates are in line with the interest rates of similar asset-backed bonds at the time.
ISB tvrdi da su kamatne stope u skladu s ondašnjim kamatnim stopama za slične obveznice osigurane imovinom.
The ISB bond's maturity is 10 years, with an interest rate of 4,5 %, CPI linked (consumer price-indexed), and is over-collateralised with a LTV ratio of 70 %.
Obveznica ISB-a izdana je s rokom dospijeća od deset godina, kamatnom stopom od 4,5 % povezanom s indeksom potrošačkih cijena, vrlo visokog stupnja kolateralizacije s koeficijentom LTV od 70 %.
The interest rate was set at about 50 bps on top of the state-guaranteed HFF bonds on the date of issue.
Kamatna stopa utvrđena je na dan izdanja na razini od oko 50 baznih bodova uz obveznice Fonda za financiranje stanogradnje osigurane državnim jamstvom.
In comparison, common rates in Europe at the time for similar asset-backed securities were at 40–80 bps above state-guaranteed papers.
Usporedbe radi, u to su vrijeme u Europi uobičajene stope za slične vrijednosne papire osigurane imovinom bile na razini 40 – 80 baznih bodova više od vrijednosnica osiguranih državnim jamstvom.
ISB also provided a graph which shows that the spread differences for France, Germany and Spain were in the range of 40–160 bps in 2009.
ISB je dostavio i grafički prikaz razlika u kamatama u Francuskoj, Njemačkoj i Španjolskoj, koje su se u 2009. kretale u rasponu od 40 do 160 baznih bodova.
Similarly, Arion argues that its loan agreement with the CBI was concluded on market terms.
Slično i Arion tvrdi da je njegov ugovor o kreditu s CBI-jem sklopljen pod tržišnim uvjetima.
Arion compares it, inter alia, to a comparable agreement concluded between NBI and LBI.
Arion ga među ostalim uspoređuje s ugovorom koji su sklopili NBI i LBI.
Both agreements were concluded around the same time, i.e. end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, and involved similar settlements of claims.
Oba su ugovora sklopljena otprilike u isto vrijeme, odnosno krajem 2009. i početkom 2010., i odnose se na sličan postupak naplate potraživanja.
The comparison shows that the terms of Arion's loan agreement were more stringent than those in the LBI agreement, involving a private lender.
Usporedba upućuje na to da su uvjeti Arionova ugovora o kreditu bili stroži od uvjeta LBI-jeva ugovora, u kojem je sudjelovao privatni vjerovnik.
Indeed, it appears that the LBI agreement required lower interest rates, involved a higher principal amount and had weaker and less diversified collateral than the Arion loan agreement.
Sve upućuje na to da su u LBI-jevu ugovoru kamatne stope bile niže, da je glavnica bila veća, da je vrijednost kolaterala bila manja i da su ti instrumenti bili u manjoj mjeri diversificirani nego u Arionovu ugovoru u kreditu.
Asmentioned above, according to the dataset provided by Arion, funding spreads European banks were paying ranged from 0,1 % to 1,90 % over interbank rates, with a median spread of 0,72 %.
Kako je prethodno navedeno, prema podacima koje je Arion dostavio, razlikai zmeđu kamatnih stopa koje su europske banke plaćale i kamatnih stopa za međubankovne pozajmice kretala se u rasponu od 0,1 % do 1,90 % i pritom je medijan te razlike iznosio 0,72 %.
The highest rates for covered bonds were paid by Bank of Ireland in September 2009 (1,9 % over interbank rates) and EBS Mortgage from Ireland (1,75 % over interbank rates) in November 2009.
Najvišu kamatnu stopu za pokrivene obveznice platili su Bank of Ireland u rujnu 2009. (1,9 % veća od kamatne stope za međubankovne pozajmice) te EBS Mortgage Finance iz Irske u studenome 2009.
The CBI also argues that the terms of the loan agreements, i.e. the interest rates and collateral, were favourable to the CBI.
(1,75 % veća od kamatne stope za međubankovne pozajmice). (75) CBI tvrdi i da su uvjeti ugovora o kreditu, odnosno kamatne stope i instrumenti osiguranja, bili povoljni za CBI.
According to the CBI, this is evident from the available information on issued instruments worldwide (as documented by Arion, see above) and also from the terms of other instruments entered into at the time, including the LBI agreement.
CBI smatra da na to upućuju dostupne informacije o instrumentima izdanima u svijetu (prema prethodno navedenoj dokumentaciji koju je dostavio Arion), ali i uvjeti ugovora o drugim instrumentima koji su sklopljeni u to vrijeme, uključujući i LBI-jev ugovor.
The Authority notes that the loan agreements concluded between the CBI and the banks bear an interest rate of LIBOR + 3,00 % and are collateralised with mortgages and other assets.
Nadzorno tijelo napominje da su CBI i banke sklopili ugovore o kreditu s kamatnom stopom LIBOR + 3,00 % te da su oni bili osigurani hipotekom na nekretnine i drugom imovinom.
As the information provided by ISB and Arion shows, this interest rate is well above the average interest rates for comparable debt instruments concluded at the time, and even exceed the highest funding cost of any other European banks at the time that had mortgages as collateral (i.e. Bank of Ireland, interbank rates + 1,9 %).
Informacije koje su dostavili ISB i Arion upućuju na to da je ta kamatna stopa znatno viša od prosječnih kamatnih stopa za ugovore o usporedivim dužničkim instrumentima koji su sklopljeni u to vrijeme te da čak premašuje tadašnje najveće troškove financiranja u svim drugim europskim bankama s hipotekom kao instrumentom osiguranja (npr. Bank of Ireland, stope za međubankovne pozajmice +1,9 %).
The Authority considers that the information concerning comparable debt instruments provided by the banks is reliable and that it presents and accurate picture of market conditions at the time the loan agreements were concluded.
Nadzorno tijelo smatra da su informacije o usporedivim dužničkim instrumentima koje su dostavile banke pouzdane te da vjerno oslikavaju tržišne uvjete koji su postojali u vrijeme sklapanja ugovora o kreditu.
Moreover, since these interest rates were agreed to by private parties, the Authority considers that they represent a more appropriate benchmark for determining market rates at the time than the CDS spreads and interest rates on HFF bonds cited by the complainant.
Štoviše, budući da su te kamatne stope dogovorile privatne stranke, Nadzorno tijelo smatra da su primjerenije referentne vrijednosti za utvrđivanje tržišnih kamatnih stopa u to vrijeme nego što su to kreditne marže na osnovi nastanka statusa neispunjavanja obveza na ugovore o razmjeni i kamatne stope na obveznice Fonda za financiranje stanogradnje koje je naveo podnositelj pritužbe.
Concerning the loan agreement concluded with Arion, the Authority notes that the loan was denominated in foreign currencies instead of ISK.
Kad je riječ o ugovoru o kreditu sklopljenom s Arionom, Nadzorno tijelo napominje da je kredit bio u inozemnim valutama, a ne u ISK.
However, as noted by Arion, this change of denomination was in line with the terms of the settlement agreement, which provided that Arion should pay interest and instalments in foreign currencies to the extent the bank was able to and that Arion could, with the permission of the lender, change the denomination of the debt in part or full.
Međutim, kako je Arion napomenuo, ta promjena valute bila je u skladu s uvjetima ugovora o namiri kojim je bilo predviđeno da Arion plati kamate i rate kredita u inozemnim valutama u mjeri u kojoj su banka i Arion, uz odobrenje zajmodavca, mogli mijenjati valutu dijela ili cijelog iznosa duga.
As previously noted, the Authority has already reviewed and approved the terms of the settlement agreement in the Arion restructuring aid decision.
Kao što je prethodno navedeno, Nadzorno je tijelo odlukom o potpori za restrukturiranje Ariona već preispitalo i odobrilo uvjete ugovora o namiri.
Moreover, as noted by Arion, due to the stringent limitations in Iceland on cross-border movement of capital and related foreign exchange transactions, a private creditor would in all likelihood have preferred a denomination in foreign currencies rather than in ISK.
Štoviše, kako je Arion naveo, zbog strogih ograničenja prekograničnog kretanja kapitala i s time povezanih deviznih transakcija nametnutih Islandu privatni bi vjerovnik najvjerojatnije dao prednost inozemnim valutama, a ne ISK.
Considering the market parameters at the time and the evidence presented, the Authority concludes that the lending terms in general, and the interest rates in particular, of the loan agreements would have been equally acceptable to a private creditor finding himself in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Uzimajući u obzir tadašnje tržišne parametre i predočene dokaze, Nadzorno tijelo zaključuje da bi uvjeti kreditiranja općenito, a kamatne stope posebno, iz ugovora o kreditu bili jednako prihvatljivi privatnom vjerovniku koji bi se našao u usporedivoj činjeničnoj i pravnoj situaciji.
In light of the above, the Authority concludes that the loan agreements between the CBI and, respectively, ISB and Arion did not confer an economic advantage upon ISB and Arion.
U svjetlu navedenoga, Nadzorno tijelo zaključuje da ugovorima o kreditu sklopljenim između CBI-ja i ISB-a, odnosno Ariona, ni ISB-u ni Arionu nije dodijeljena gospodarska prednost.
SELECTIVITY, DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN CONTRACTING PARTIES
SELEKTIVNOST, NARUŠAVANJE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA I UČINAK NA TRGOVINU IZMEĐU UGOVORNIH STRANAKA
In order to qualify as state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, the measure must be selective as well as liable to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the Agreement.
Mjera se smatra državnom potporom u smislu članka 61. stavka 1. Sporazuma o EGP-u ako je selektivna i ako se njome narušava tržišno natjecanje te ako ona utječe na trgovinu između ugovornih stranaka.
However, given that the Authority concludes that no economic advantage was granted in the present case, and as the cumulative conditions for the existence of state aid are therefore not fulfilled, the Authority does not have to make any further assessment in this regard.
Međutim, s obzirom na to da je Nadzorno tijelo zaključilo da u predmetnom slučaju nije dodijeljena gospodarska prednost te da stoga nisu ispunjeni kumulativni uvjeti za postojanje državne potpore, Nadzorno tijelo u tom smislu ne mora provoditi dodatne ocjene.
On the basis of the foregoing assessment, the Authority considers that the loan agreements the CBI concluded with ISB and Arion do not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Na temelju navedene ocjene, Nadzorno tijelo smatra da ugovori o kreditu koje je CBI sklopio s ISB-om i Arionom ne čine državnu potporu u smislu članka 61. stavka 1. Sporazuma o EGP-u.
The loan agreements concluded between the CBI and, respectively, Íslandsbanki hf. and Arion banki hf. do not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Ugovori o kreditu koje je CBI sklopio s bankama Íslandsbanki hf. i Arion banki hf. ne smatraju se državnom potporom u smislu članka 61. stavka 1. Sporazuma o EGP-u.
The formal investigation is hereby closed.
Time se formalni istražni postupak zatvara.
Done in Brussels, 23 November 2016.
Sastavljeno u Bruxellesu 23. studenoga 2016.
Document No 684053.
Dokument br. 684053.
Document No 685741.
Dokument br. 685741.
The reply from the Icelandic authorities contained letters from the CBI (Document No 696093), ISB (Document No 696092) and Arion (Document No 696089).
Odgovoru islandskih tijela priloženi su dopisi CBI-ja (dokument br. 696093), ISB-a (dokument br. 696092) i banke Arion (dokument br. 696089).
Document No 709261.
Dokument br. 709261.
Document No 745267.
Dokument br. 745267.
The reply from the Icelandic authorities contained letters from the CBI (Document No 753104) and Arion (Document No 753101).
Odgovoru islandskih tijela priloženi su dopisi CBI-ja (dokument br. 753104) i banke Arion (dokument br. 753101).
Document No 771173.
Dokument br. 771173.
Document No 771174.
Dokument br. 771174.
Document No 775870.
Dokument br. 775870.
Document No 808042.
Dokument br. 808042.
Documents No 819287, 819289, 819291, 819293 and 819295.
Dokumenti br. 819287, 819289, 819291, 819293 i 819295.
Glitnir had set up a covered bond programme, according to which a mortgage loan portfolio was sold into the Glitni banka (GLB) Fund which in turn guaranteed the Notes (Glitnir's obligations) issued under the covered bond programme.
Glitnir je uspostavio program kupnje pokrivenih obveznica prema kojem je portfelj hipotekarnih kredita prodan fondu Glitni banke (GLB), koji je zauzvrat izdao jamstvo za mjenice (obveze banke Glitnir) izdane u okviru programa pokrivenih obveznica.
The covered bonds were not sold to investors but used as collateral in repurchase transactions with the CBI.
Pokrivene obveznice nisu prodane ulagačima, nego su se upotrebljavale kao kolateral u repo transakcijama s CBI-jem.
By decision of the FME on 14 October 2008, among other things, all unit shares in the Fund were transferred to ISB.
Odlukom FME-a od 14. listopada 2008., među ostalim, svi paketi udjela u Fondu preneseni su na ISB.
Outstanding covered bonds were held by the CBI as collateral for Glitnir's outstanding debt with the CBI, now appropriated to ISB and amounting to approximately 55 billion ISK at the time of the FME's decision.
CBI je nepodmirene obveze koje proizlaze iz pokrivenih obveznica držao kao instrument osiguranja za nepodmireno dugovanje banke Glitnir prema CBI-ju, sada dodijeljen ISB-u, koji je u trenutku odluke FME-a iznosio oko 55 milijardi ISK.
ISB had to operate the Fund and honor all payments on the original debt in order to protect the assets (the mortgage loan portfolio) and pay fees to all relevant parties to the original debt programme.
Da bi zaštitio imovinu (portfelj hipotekarnih kredita) i isplatio naknade svim relevantnim sudionicima u izvornom dužničkom programu ISB je morao upravljati radom Fonda i podmiriti sav izvorni dug.
As there were foreseeable costs and complications involved in operating the Fund and servicing the loans through the Fund, ISB sought to renegotiate the debt with the CBI in order to seek, inter alia, to extend the term of the debt.
S obzirom na to da su se mogli predvidjeti troškovi i komplikacije pri upravljanju Fondom i servisiranju kredita s pomoću Fonda, ISB je nastojao ponovno pregovarati s CBI-jem o uvjetima duga kako bi zatražio, među ostalim, odgodu datuma dospijeća duga.
The loan-to-value ratio is a financial term used by lenders to express the ratio of a loan to the value of an asset purchased.
Omjer kredita i kolaterala financijski je termin kojim zajmodavci iskazuju omjer kredita i vrijednosti kupljene imovine.
See the Minister of Finance's Report on the restructuring of the commercial banks, pages 13-17.
Vidjeti Izvješće Ministarstva financija o restrukturiranju komercijalnih banaka, str. 13.
Available online at: http://www.althingi.is/altext/pdf/139/s/1213.pdf.
Dostupno na internetu na: http://www.althingi.is/altext/pdf/139/s/1213.pdf.
The information in square brackets is covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.
Podaci navedeni u uglatim zagradama zaštićeni su obvezom čuvanja poslovne tajne.
Public version of EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 244/12/COL of 27 June 2012 on restructuring aid granted to Íslandsbanki (‘ISB restructuring aid decision’) ( OJ L 144, 15.5.2014, p. 70 and EEA Supplement No 28, 15.5.2014, p. 1); and Public version of EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 291/12/COL of 11 July 2012 on restructuring aid to Arion Bank (‘Arion restructuring aid decision’) ( OJ L 144, 15.5.2014, p. 169 and EEA Supplement No 28, 15.5.2014, p. 89), paragraphs 86, 149, 168 and 238.
Odluka Nadzornog tijela EFTA-e br. 244/12/COL od 27. lipnja 2012. o potpori za restrukturiranje dodijeljenoj banci Íslandsbanki („Odluka o potpori ISB-u za restrukturiranje”) ( SL L 144, 15.5.2014., str. 70. i Dodatak o EGP-u br. 28., 15.5.2014., str. 1.) i odluka Nadzornog tijela EFTA-e br. 291/12/COL od 11. srpnja 2012. o potpori za restrukturiranje banci Arion Bank („Odluka o potpori za restrukturiranje banci Arion”) ( SL L 144, 15.5.2014., str. 169. i Dodatak o EGP- u br. 28, 15.5.2014., str. 89.), stavci 86., 149., 168. i 238.
Guidelines on the application, from 1 December 2013, of state aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘2013 Banking Guidelines’) ( OJ L 264, 4.9.2014, p. 6 and EEA Supplement No 50, 4.9.2014, p. 1), paragraph 62, which replaced the Guidelines on the application of state aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions (‘the 2008 Banking Guidelines’) ( OJ L 17, 20.1.2011, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 3, 20.1.2011, p. 1), paragraph 51.
Smjernice o primjeni pravila o državnim potporama za poticajne mjere u korist banaka u kontekstu financijske krize počevši od 1. prosinca 2013.(„Smjernice o bankarstvu za 2013.”) ( SL L 264, 4.9.2014., str. 6. i Dodatak o EGP-u br. 50, 4.9.2014., str. 1.), stavak 62., kojima se zamjenjuju Smjernice o primjeni pravila o državnim potporama na mjere povezane s financijskim institucijama („Smjernice o bankarstvu za 2008.”) ( SL L 17, 20.1.2011., str. 1. i Dodatak o EGP-u br. 3, 20.1.2011., str. 1.), stavak 51.
Document No 819287.
Dokument br. 819287.
See: http://www.almchf.com/new-and-events/nr/121.
Vidjeti: http://www.almchf.com/new-and-events/nr/121.
Case E-03/11 Pálmi Sigmarsson v Seðlabanki Íslands [2011] EFTA Ct. Rep. 430.
Predmet E-03/11 Pálmi Sigurðsson protiv Seðlabanki Íslands [2011.] Izvješće Suda EFTA-e 430.