natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In early 2010, it was according to the Icelandic authorities no longer possible to accept offers from other bidders in the 2008 process as their offers had expired and it was obvious that market conditions had changed dramatically to the worse after the financial crisis.
Islandska nadležna tijela tvrde da se početkom 2010. više nisu mogle prihvaćati ponude drugih ponuditelja iz postupka iz 2008. jer su njihove ponude istekle i bilo je očito da su se uvjeti na tržištu naglo promijenili na gore nakon financijske krize.
Article 1
Članak. 1.
Case E-1/13 Míla ehf. v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2014] EFTA Ct.
Predmet E-1/13 Míla ehf. protiv Nadzornog tijela EFTA-e [2014.] EFTA Ct.
Email of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the EFTA Surveillance Authority of 16 November 2012.
Poruka e-pošte Ministarstva vanjskih poslova Nadzornom tijelu EFTA-e od 16. studenoga 2012.
A more detailed description of these arrangements can be found in Decision No 299/14/COL.
Podrobniji opis tih mehanizama nalazi se u Odluci br. 299/14/COL.
Rep. 4, paragraph 101.
Rep. 4, stavak 101.
For the application of the ‘private vendor test’, see Case E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2012] EFTA Ct.
Za primjenu „testa privatnog prodavatelja”, vidjeti predmet E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2012.] EFTA Ct.
Rep. 536 and judgment in Land Burgenland and Others v Commission, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.
Rep. 536 i presudu u predmetu Land Burgenland i ostali protiv Komisije, C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P i C-223/12 P, EU:C:2013:682.
Case E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2012] EFTA Ct.
Predmet E-12/11 Asker Brygge [2012.] EFTA Ct.
Rep. 536, paragraph 81.
Rep. 536, stavak 81.
That Act implements the EU Public Procurement Directive into Icelandic law, i.e. Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114), incorporated as point 2 of Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement by Joint Committee Decision No 68/2006 (OJ L 245, 7.9.2006, p. 22 and EEA Supplement No 44, 7.9.2006, p. 18), e.i.f.
Tim se Zakonom u islandsko zakonodavstvo prenosi Direktiva EU-a o javnoj nabavi, odnosno Direktiva 2004/18/EZ Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 31. ožujka 2004. o usklađivanju postupaka za sklapanje ugovora o javnim radovima, ugovora o javnoj nabavi robe te ugovora o javnim uslugama (SL L 134, 30.4.2004., str. 114.), koja je ugrađena kao točka 2. Priloga XVI. Sporazumu o EGP-u Odlukom Zajedničkog odbora br. 68/2006 (SL L 245, 7.9.2006., str. 22. i Dodatak EGP-u br. 44, 7.9.2006., str. 18.,), e.i.f.
No 204/16/COL
br. 204/16/COL
concerning alleged unlawful state aid granted to Íslandsbanki hf. and Arion Bank hf. through loan agreements on allegedly preferential terms (Iceland) [2017/1950]
o navodnim protupravnim državnim potporama koje su ugovorima o kreditu pod navodno povlaštenim uvjetima dodijeljene bankama Íslandsbanki hf. i Arion Bank hf.
THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘the Authority’),
(Island) [2017/1950] NADZORNO TIJELO EFTA-e („Tijelo”),
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26 thereof,
UZIMAJUĆI U OBZIR Sporazum o Europskom gospodarskom prostoru („Sporazum o EGP-u”), a posebno njegov članak 61. i Protokol 26.,
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 7(2) and Article 13 of Part II,
UZIMAJUĆI U OBZIR Protokol 3. uz Sporazum o nadzoru i sudu („Protokol 3.”), a posebno dio II., članak 7. stavak 2. i članak 13.,
HAVING called on interested parties to submit their comments and having regard to their comments,
NAKON ŠTO JE pozvalo zainteresirane strane da dostave svoje primjedbe i uzimajući u obzir te primjedbe,
On 23 September 2013, the Authority received a complaint alleging that Íslandsbanki hf.
Tijelo je 23. rujna 2013. zaprimilo pritužbu u kojoj se tvrdi da su bankama Íslandsbanki hf.
(‘ISB’) and Arion Bank hf.
(„ISB”) i Arion Bank hf.
(‘Arion’) had been granted unlawful state aid through long-term funding at favourable interest rates by the Central Bank of Iceland (‘CBI’) [1].
(„Arion”) dugoročnim kreditom Središnje banke Islanda („CBI”) s povoljnim kamatnim stopama dodijeljene protupravne državne potpore [1].
By letter dated 23 October 2013, the Authority sent a request for information to the Icelandic authorities [2], to which the Icelandic authorities replied on 17 January 2014 [3].
Tijelo je dopisom od 23. listopada 2013. poslalo zahtjev za informacije islandskim tijelima [2], a islandska su tijela odgovorila 17. siječnja 2014.
By Decision No 208/15/COL of 20 May 2015, the Authority initiated the formal investigation procedure into alleged unlawful state aid granted to ISB and Arion through loan conversion agreements on allegedly preferential terms.
Tijelo je Odlukom br. 208/15/COL od 20. svibnja 2015. pokrenulo formalni istražni postupak o navodnim protupravnim državnim potporama koje su ISB-u i Arionu dodijeljene ugovorima o konverziji kredita pod navodno povlaštenim uvjetima.
By letter dated 28 August 2015 [7], the Icelandic authorities commented on the Authority's decision.
Islandska su tijela dopisom od 28. kolovoza 2015. [7] dostavila primjedbe na odluku Tijela.
On the same date, the Authority also received comments from one of the two alleged beneficiaries, i.e. Arion [8].
Istog je dana Tijelo zaprimilo primjedbe banke Arion, jednog od dvaju navodnih korisnika potpore [8].
On 24 September 2015, the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union and in the EEA Supplement to it [9].
Odluka o pokretanju formalnog istražnog postupka objavljena je 24. rujna 2015. u Službenom listu Europske unije i njegovu Dodatku o EGP-u [9].
By letter dated 5 October 2015, the CBI submitted comments to the opening decision [10].
CBI je dopisom od 5. listopada 2015. dostavio primjedbe na odluku o pokretanju postupka [10].
By letter dated 14 June 2016, the Authority requested additional information from the CBI, ISB and Arion [11].
Tijelo je dopisom od 14. lipnja 2016. zatražilo dodatne podatke od CBI-ja, ISB-a i Ariona [11].
The Icelandic authorities provided the requested information by letter dated 20 September 2016 [12].
Islandska su tijela dopisom od 20. rujna 2016. dostavila tražene podatke [12].
The measures in question are linked to the CBI's collateral and securities lending.
Predmetne su mjere povezane s kreditima CBI-ja osiguranim kolateralima i vrijednosnim papirima.
As part of its role as a central bank and lender of last resort, and in line with the monetary policy of other central banks, the CBI provides short-term credit facilities to financial undertakings in the form of collateral loans, in accordance with the provisions of CBI rules pertaining thereto.
CBI kao središnja banka u ulozi zajmodavca u krajnjoj nuždi te u skladu s monetarnom politikom drugih središnjih banaka odobrava financijskim poduzećima instrumente kratkoročnog kreditiranja u obliku kredita osiguranih kolateralom u skladu s odredbama propisa CBI-ja koje se na njih odnose.
Financial institutions have the option of requesting overnight loans or seven-day loans against collateral considered to be eligible by the CBI.
Financijske institucije mogu zatražiti prekonoćne ili sedmodnevne kredite osigurane kolateralom koji CBI smatra prihvatljivim.
In 2007 and 2008, collateral lending increased steadily, and the CBI became a major source of liquidity for financial undertakings.
Takvo kreditiranje stalno se povećavalo tijekom 2007. i 2008. te je CBI postao važan izvor likvidnosti za financijska poduzeća.
Collateral loans peaked on 1 October 2008, just before the collapse of the banks, when the CBI had loaned ISK 520 billion to financial institutions.
Odobravanje kredita osiguranih kolateralom doseglo je vrhunac 1. listopada 2008., neposredno prije kraha banaka, kada su krediti CBI-ja financijskim institucijama iznosili 520 milijardi ISK.
Thus, at the time of the collapse of the three commercial banks (Landsbankinn, Glitnir and Kaupthing) in October 2008, the CBI had acquired considerable claims against these domestic financial undertakings, which were backed by collateral of various types.
Tako je CBI u vrijeme kraha triju komercijalnih banaka (Landsbankinn, Glitnir i Kaupthing) u listopadu 2008. imao znatna potraživanja od tih domaćih financijskih poduzeća, koja su bila osigurana raznim kolateralima.
At that time, nearly 42 % of the collateral for CBI loan facilities took the form of Treasury guaranteed securities or asset-backed securities, while some 58 % of the underlying collateral consisted of bonds issued by Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbankinn [13].
U to je vrijeme gotovo 42 % kolaterala kojima su bili osigurani krediti CBI-ja bilo u obliku vrijednosnih papira s jamstvom državne riznice ili vrijednosnih papira osiguranih imovinom, dok su oko 58 % temeljnih kolaterala činile obveznice u izdanju banaka Glitnir, Kaupthing i Landsbankinn. [13]
LOAN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH ISB
UGOVOR O KREDITU SKLOPLJEN S ISB-OM
With the collapse of Glitnir in 2008, the CBI's claims became due and payable, thus making the CBI a creditor of the failed bank.
Nakon kraha banke Glitnir 2008. istekao je rok dospijeća i plaćanja potraživanja CBI-ja te je CBI postao vjerovnikom propale banke.
By decision of the Financial Supervisory Authority (‘FME’) in October 2008, in principle all domestic assets and liabilities (save for some excluded assets and liabilities) of Glitnir's were transferred to ISB, including Glitnir's outstanding liabilities to the CBI, which amounted to approximately ISK 55,6 billion, as well as indirectly the ownership of the underlying collateral (the mortgage loan portfolio) [14].
Odlukom Financijskog nadzornog tijela („FME”) iz listopada 2008. u načelu su sva domaća imovina i obveze (osim neke isključene imovine i obveza) banke Glitnir preneseni na ISB, uključujući nepodmirene obveze banke Glitnir prema CBI-ju u iznosu od oko 55,6 milijardi ISK te, neizravno, vlasništvo nad temeljnim kolateralom (portfelj hipotekarnih kredita) [14].
As the debt with the CBI consisted of short-term collateralised lending, instant repayment would have had a serious impact on ISB's liquidity position and could have jeopardised the restructuring of the bank.
Budući da se dug prema CBI-ju sastojao od kratkoročnih kolateraliziranih kredita, njegova trenutačna otplata mogla je ozbiljno utjecati na poziciju likvidnosti ISB-a i ugroziti restrukturiranje banke.
According to the CBI, the alternative would have been for the CBI to collect the debt, which would have left the CBI with the mortgage loan portfolio.
Prema CBI-ju, druga je mogućnost bila da CBI naplati dug i pritom zadrži portfelj hipotekarnih kredita.
This would have been difficult for a central bank to manage.
S tim bi se okolnostima središnja banka teško nosila.
Selling the mortgage loan portfolio at the time was also not considered an option, taking into account the financial crisis and the very few potential purchasers on the market.
S obzirom na financijsku krizu i vrlo mali broj potencijalnih kupaca na tržištu, u tom se trenutku nije ni razmatrala prodaja portfelja hipotekarnih kredita.
Therefore, ISB sought to renegotiate the debt with the CBI, in order to convert it into a long-term debt with a reasonable amortisation profile, to avoid a further negative impact on ISB's liquidity position.
Kako bi izbjegao daljnji negativan utjecaj na svoju poziciju likvidnosti, ISB je nastojao ponovno pregovarati s CBI-jem o uvjetima duga u cilju njegove pretvorbe u dugoročni dug s razumnim planom otplate.
Following negotiations between ISB and the CBI, an agreement was reached on 11 September 2009, resulting in ISB issuing a stand-alone bond to the CBI in the amount of ISK 55,6 billion.
Na temelju pregovora između ISB-a i CBI-ja 11. rujna 2009. postignut je dogovor prema kojem je ISB CBI-ju izdao obveznicu izvan programa u iznosu od 55,6 milijardi ISK.
The bond was asset-backed with the same, or similar, mortgage loan portfolio as the covered bonds that were issued by Glitnir in the past.
Obveznica je bila osigurana imovinom i s istim ili sličnim portfeljem hipotekarnih kredita kao i pokrivene obveznice koje je prethodno izdao Glitnir.
The bond is over-collateralised with a loan-to-value (‘LTV’) ratio of 70 % [15].
Obveznica je bila prekomjerno kolateralizirana s omjerom kredita i kolaterala („LTV”) od 70 % [15].
The bond's maturity is 10 years, with an interest rate of 4,5 %, CPI linked (i.e. consumer price-indexed).
Rok dospijeća obveznice bio je deset godina uz kamatnu stopu od 4,5 % povezanu s indeksom potrošačkih cijena.
LOAN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH ARION
UGOVOR O KREDITU SKLOPLJEN S ARIONOM
In October 2008, it was clear that Kaupthing could no longer be saved and the FME therefore took over the operations of the bank.
U listopadu 2008. bilo je jasno da se banka Kaupthing više ne može spasiti i stoga je FME preuzeo operacije banke.
In line with the Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (the ‘Emergency Act’), which was passed on 6 October 2008, the FME decided to split Kaupthing into an old and a new bank.
U skladu sa Zakonom br. 125/2008 o nadležnosti za isplate iz državne riznice zbog neuobičajenih financijskih tržišnih okolnosti itd. („Zakon o hitnim slučajevima”) donesenim 6. listopada 2008., FME je odlučio podijeliti Kaupthing na staru i novu banku.
The new bank, which later became Arion, in principle took over most domestic assets and liabilities.
Nova banka, koja je naknadno postala banka Arion, u načelu je preuzela najveći dio imovine i obveza u tuzemstvu.
However, the secured liabilities towards the CBI and the respective collateral, including the housing loan portfolio, were not transferred [16].
Međutim, osigurane obveze prema CBI-ju i odgovarajući kolaterali, uključujući portfelj stambenih kredita, nisu preneseni [16].
The old bank was placed under the supervision of a resolution committee and later became subject to winding-up procedures, with the aim of eventually closing all operations.
Stara je banka stavljena pod nadzor sanacijskog odbora, a zatim je proveden postupak njezine likvidacije u cilju konačnog prekida svih operacija.
Kaupthing, the Government and Arion reached an agreement on 3 September 2009 regarding the capitalisation of Arion and the basis for compensation from Kaupthing to Arion (the ‘Kaupthing capitalisation agreement’).
Kaupthing, vlada i Arion 3. rujna 2009. postigli su dogovor o dokapitalizaciji banke Arion i osnovici za isplatu naknade banke Kaupthing banci Arion („Sporazum o dokapitalizaciji banke Kaupthing”).
According to this agreement, Kaupthing had the option of acquiring control of Arion by subscribing to new share capital and was to pay for the new share capital with the old bank's own assets (i.e. the assets that had not been transferred pursuant to the FME decision as described above).
U skladu s tim dogovorom Kaupthing je mogao steći kontrolu nad bankom Arion uplatom novog temeljnog kapitala i to iz vlastite imovine stare banke (tj. imovine koja nije prenesena u skladu s odlukom FME-a kako je prethodno opisano).
Before Kaupthing could decide whether it would acquire a majority stake in Arion, an agreement needed to be reached with the CBI on the settlement of the outstanding claims as some of the assets it would need to pay for the new share capital had been placed as collateral against loans provided by the CBI to Kaupthing, including the housing loan portfolio.
Prije odluke Kaupthinga o mogućem stjecanju većinskog udjela u banci Arion, trebalo je postići dogovor s CBI-jem o namirenju nepodmirenih potraživanja s obzirom na to da je dio imovine koja mu je bila potrebna za uplatu novog temeljnog kapitala bio upotrijebljen kao kolateral za kredite koje je CBI odobrio banci Kaupthing, uključujući portfelj stambenih kredita.
Therefore, on 30 November 2009, the Ministry of Finance, the CBI and the Kaupthing Resolution Committee entered into an agreement on the settlement of the CBI's claims against Kaupthing (the ‘settlement agreement’).
Stoga su Ministarstvo financija, CBI i Sanacijski odbor banke Kaupthing 30. studenoga 2009. sklopili ugovor o namirenju potraživanja CBI-ja od banke Kaupthing („ugovor o namiri”).
The settlement of overnight loans was the subject of Article 3 of the settlement agreement and there the parties agreed that Arion Bank would assume Kaupthing's debt towards the CBI by issuing a bond in the amount of approximately ISK […] [17] billion, in a specific form attached to the agreement as Appendix II, with the CBI in turn assigning the housing loan portfolio to Arion.
Namirenje prekonoćnih kredita uređeno je člankom 3. ugovora o namiri te su se stranke dogovorile da će banka Arion preuzeti dug banke Kaupthing prema CBI-ju izdavanjem obveznice u iznosu od oko […] [17] milijardi ISK, u posebnom obrascu priloženom ugovoru kao Dodatak II., a CBI je zauzvrat dodijelio banci Arion portfelj stambenih kredita.
On 22 January 2010, Arion and the CBI concluded a loan agreement, which, according to the CBI and Arion, represented the formal completion of Article 3 of the settlement agreement and the capitalisation agreement, i.e. when the creditors of Kaupthing became owners of Arion.
Arion i CBI sklopili su 22. siječnja 2010. ugovor o kreditu, kojim su, prema CBI-ju i banci Arion, službeno dopunjeni članak 3. ugovora o namiri i ugovor o dokapitalizaciji, tj. nakon što su vjerovnici banke Kaupthing postali vlasnici banke Arion.
The loan agreement replaced the aforementioned bond.
Prethodno navedena obveznica zamijenjena je ugovorom o kreditu.
The loan agreement essentially reflected the terms of the bond, except that the principal amount of the loan agreement was denominated in EUR, USD and CHF instead of ISK.
U suštini, u ugovoru o kreditu navedeni su uvjeti obveznice, osim što je glavnica izražena u EUR, USD i CHF umjesto u ISK.
This change in currency denomination was in line with the terms of the settlement agreement which provided that, despite the denomination of the principal, Arion should pay interest and instalments in foreign currencies to the extent the bank was able to.
Ta promjena valute bila je u skladu s uvjetima ugovora o namiri kojim je bilo predviđeno da bi Arion, ako je moguće, bez obzira na valutu glavnice, kamate i rate kredita trebao plaćati u inozemnim valutama.
The settlement agreement also stipulated that if Arion was not able to pay in foreign currencies, and wished instead to pay in ISK, it had to submit a written reasoned application to the CBI.
U ugovoru o namiri utvrđeno je i da Arion treba podnijeti pisani obrazloženi zahtjev CBI-ju ako ne bude mogao plaćati u inozemnim valutama nego u ISK.
The loan agreement provided for a seven-year loan, extendable by two three-year terms, for an amount of EUR […] million, USD […] million and CHF […] million.
Ugovorom o kreditu odobren je kredit na sedam godina, uz mogućnost produljenja dva puta po tri godine, u iznosu od […] milijuna EUR, […] milijuna USD i […] milijuna CHF.
Arion was permitted to change the combination of the currencies in which the loan was to be repaid.
Arion je mogao izmijeniti kombinaciju valuta u kojima će otplatiti kredit.
The interest payable was EURIBOR/LIBOR + 300 bps.
Ugovorena je kamata EURIBOR/LIBOR + 300 baznih bodova.
The housing loan portfolio of Arion served as collateral to the CBI.
Portfelj stambenih kredita banke Arion CBI-ju je poslužio kao kolateral.
According to the complainant, the loan agreements between ISB, Arion and the CBI were not assessed in the Authority's decisions approving restructuring aid to ISB and Arion [18].
Prema podnositelju pritužbe, ugovori o kreditu između ISB-a, Ariona i CBI-ja nisu ocijenjeni u odluci Tijela o odobravanju potpore za restrukturiranje ISB-ju i Arionu [18].
Since the measures were not addressed in these cases, the complainant considers it important to obtain the opinion of the Authority on (i) the compatibility of these additional alleged aid measures with the EEA Agreement, and (ii) the consequences of the failure by the Icelandic authorities to notify these measures.
S obzirom na to da u tim predmetima mjere nisu ocijenjene, podnositelj pritužbe smatra da je važno dobiti mišljenje Tijela o i. spojivosti tih dodatnih navodnih mjera potpore sa Sporazumom o EGP-u te ii. posljedicama činjenice da islandska tijela te mjere nisu prijavila.
The complainant alleges that, at the time the CBI entered into the loan agreements with Arion and ISB, other banks in Iceland were not given the opportunity to receive such financing from the CBI or other government agencies.
Podnositelj pritužbe navodi da u vrijeme kad je CBI sklopio ugovore o kreditu s bankom Arion i ISB-om druge banke na Islandu nisu mogle dobiti takvo financiranje od CBI-ja ili druge državne agencije.
The complainant therefore argues that the aid was selective as it was granted exclusively to certain financial institutions competing on the Icelandic banking market.
Podnositelj pritužbe stoga tvrdi da je potpora bila selektivna jer je dodijeljena samo određenim financijskim institucijama koje su u tržišnoj utakmici na islandskom bankarskom tržištu.
According to the complainant, by granting a loan to ISB, the bank was granted aid to avoid enforcement by the CBI on the covered bond issue; and in Arion's case, the loan was granted to secure an appropriate balance on the bank's currency risk.
Prema podnositelju pritužbe, ISB-u je odobravanjem kredita dodijeljena potpora kako bi se izbjeglo da CBI naplati svoja potraživanja iz izdanja pokrivenih obveznica, a u slučaju banke Arion kredit je odobren kako bi se osigurala valutna uravnoteženost bilance banke.
The complainant argues that other financial institutions, which did not receive such aid, were forced to sell off assets in markets that favoured buyers.
Podnositelj pritužbe tvrdi da su druge financijske institucije koje nisu primile takvu potporu bile prisiljene prodavati imovinu na tržištima koja su bila povoljna za kupce.
According to the complainant, the loan agreements gave ISB and Arion a clear advantage in the form of long-term funding with favourable interest rates below market rates and which were not available to other market participants.
Prema podnositelju pritužbe, ISB i Arion stekli su ugovorima o kreditu jasnu prednost u obliku dugoročnog financiranja s povoljnim kamatnim stopama nižima od tržišnih stopa koja nije bila dostupna drugim sudionicima na tržištu.
According to the complainant, no private investor would have entered into such agreements at this turbulent time on the financial markets.
Prema podnositelju pritužbe, u tom turbulentnom razdoblju za financijska tržišta ni jedan privatni ulagač ne bi sklopio takav ugovor.
In order to substantiate its claim that the interest rates were below market rates at the time, the complainant submitted credit default swap (‘CDS’) spreads of the Icelandic government in 2009 and interest rates in 2009 on bond issues HFF150224 and HFF150434 by the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund (‘HFF’).
Kako bi potkrijepio svoju tvrdnju da su kamatne stope u tom trenutku bile niže od tržišnih stopa, podnositelj pritužbe dostavio je razlike između kamatnih stopa iz ugovora o razmjeni na osnovi nastanka statusa neispunjavanja obveza („CDS”) islandske vlade iz 2009. i kamatnih stopa iz 2009. na izdanje obveznica HFF150224 i HFF150434 islandskog fonda za financiranje stanogradnje („HFF”).
The complaint maintains that the measures strengthened ISB and Arion on the banking market and therefore affected the position of other market participants.
Podnositelj pritužbe smatra da su mjere ojačale položaj ISB-a i Ariona na bankarskom tržištu te da su stoga utjecale na položaj drugih sudionika na tržištu.