natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In its comments on the opening decision, the Banca d'Italia denies that the FITD's support measures are imputable to the State, because:
Banka Italije u svojim primjedbama o odluci o pokretanju postupka niječe da su FITD-ove mjere podrške pripisive državi jer:
in supporting credit institutions the FITD is not complying with a public policy mandate;
pružajući podršku kreditnim institucijama FITD ne izvršava ovlasti javne politike;
the Banca d'Italia does not decide jointly with the FITD to intervene in support of a given undertaking, either generally or in the case at issue, and does not check to see that the FITD is acting consistently with any public policy mandate given to it;
Banka Italije ne odlučuje zajedno s FITD-om o sudjelovanju u pružanju podrške određenom poduzeću, ni općenito ni u predmetnom slučaju, i ne provjerava djeluje li FITD u skladu s ovlastima javne politike koje su mu dodijeljene;
the case at issue is significantly different from the State aid measures taken by Denmark, Spain and Poland cited in footnote 28 to the opening decision, where the Commission found that the resources used in measures regarding deposit guarantee schemes were at the disposal of the public authorities and the measures were therefore imputable to the State.
predmetni slučaj znatno se razlikuje od mjera državne potpore koje su poduzele Danska, Španjolska i Poljska i koje su navedene u bilješci 28. u odluci o pokretanju postupka, kada je Komisija utvrdila da su sredstva upotrijebljena u mjerama u vezi sa sustavima osiguranja depozita bila na raspolaganju tijelima javne vlasti te da su te mjere stoga bile pripisive državi.
As regards the first point, according to the Banca d'Italia, the sole public mandate of deposit guarantee schemes is to reimburse depositors: the last sentence of Article 96-bis(1) of the Banking Act, which allows the FITD to intervene in ways other than directly reimbursing covered depositors in the event of liquidation, cannot be construed either as evidence of the imputability to the State of measures taken by the FITD, other than reimbursements of depositors, or as conferring a public mandate on the FITD.
U pogledu prve točke, prema Banci Italije, jedina javna ovlast sustava osiguranja depozita jest isplata naknade deponentima: posljednja rečenica u članku 96.-bis stavku 1. Zakona o bankama, kojom se FITD-u dopuštaju intervencije koje nisu izravna plaćanja naknade osiguranim deponentima u slučaju likvidacije, ne može se smatrati dokazom pripisivosti FITD-ovih mjera državi, osim isplata naknade deponentima, ni dodjelom javnih ovlasti FITD-u.
That provision merely allows for recourse to other forms of intervention.
Tom se odredbom samo dopuštaju drugi oblici intervencije.
The reference in Directive 2014/49/EU to the failure of credit institutions merely indicates that the role of the measures is generally to contain the costs of intervention on the part of deposit guarantee schemes, by avoiding the need to reimburse depositors, and hence preventing bank failures.
Upućivanjem u Direktivi 2014/49/EU na propast kreditnih institucija samo se naznačuje da je mjerama općenito potrebno ograničiti troškove intervencije za sustave osiguranja depozita na način da se izbjegne potreba za isplatom naknade deponentima te da se tako spriječi propast banke.
The fact that Directive 2014/49/EU does not impose a condition requiring that deposit guarantee scheme support measures be notified to the Commission means that the exercise of discretion with respect to such measures does not by itself show that the deposit guarantee scheme has thereby had a public mandate conferred on it.
Činjenica da u Direktivi 2014/49/EU nije utvrđen zahtjev u pogledu obavješćivanja Komisije o mjerama podrške sustava osiguranja depozita znači da izvršavanje diskrecijske ovlasti u pogledu tih mjera samo po sebi ne dokazuje da su sustavu osiguranja depozita time dodijeljene javne ovlasti.
The Banca d'Italia also submits that Article 29 of the FITD's constitution, under which the FITD may intervene in support of a bank placed under special administration only ‘if there are reasonable prospects for recovery and if the costs may be presumed to be less than would be incurred in the event of liquidation’, indicates something quite different from the Commission's assertion in the opening decision that Italy chose to allow its deposit guarantee scheme to intervene ‘to prevent the failure of a credit institution’.
Banka Italije iznijela je i primjedbu da članak 29. FITD-ova statuta, na temelju kojeg FITD može intervenirati pružanjem podrške banci koja je pod posebnom upravom samo „ako postoje razumni izgledi za oporavak i ako se može pretpostaviti da će troškovi biti manji od troškova koji bi nastali u slučaju likvidacije”, upućuje na nešto sasvim drugačije od tvrdnje Komisije u odluci o pokretanju postupka da je Italija odlučila dopustiti intervenciju svojeg sustava osiguranja depozita „kako bi se spriječila propast kreditne institucije”.
Finally, the fact that the Banca d'Italia must approve support measures taken by the FITD does not show that the FITD is pursuing an objective in the public interest.
Naposljetku, činjenica da Banka Italije mora odobriti FITD-ove mjere podrške ne dokazuje da FITD nastoji ostvariti cilj od javnog interesa.
To consider otherwise would mean that all banking activities subject to the supervision of the ECB or the Banca d'Italia were activities driven by public policy.
Drugačije stajalište značilo bi da se sve bankarsko poslovanje koje podliježe nadzoru ESB-a ili Banke Italije sastojalo od aktivnosti temeljenih na javnoj politici.
In addition, the Banca d'Italia is required to act independently from the State by Article 19 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 [30].
Osim toga, na temelju članka 19. Uredbe Vijeća (EU) br. 1024/2013 [30] Banka Italije dužna je djelovati neovisno o državi.
As regards the second point, the Banca d'Italia exercises supervisory powers only with respect to the objectives of protecting depositors, the stability of the banking system, and sound and prudent management of the banks (Article 5 of the Banking Act).
U pogledu druge točke, Banka Italije izvršava nadzorne ovlasti samo u vezi s ciljevima zaštite deponenata, stabilnosti bankarskog sustava te stabilnog i razboritog upravljanja bankama (članak 5. Zakona o bankama).
Article 96-ter(1)(b) of the Banking Act, which states that the Banca d'Italia ‘coordinates the activity of the guarantee schemes by making rules for banking crises and by conducting supervisory activities’, merely confers on the Banca d'Italia a general power intended to guarantee that the activities of deposit guarantee schemes are compatible with the exercise of its own supervisory power; that power is exercised only by means of authorisation of the measures taken.
Člankom 96.-ter stavkom 1. točkom (b) Zakona o bankama, u kojem se navodi da Banka Italije „koordinira aktivnosti sustava osiguranja depozita donošenjem pravila za bankarske krize i provođenjem nadzornih aktivnosti” na Banku Italije samo se prenose opće ovlasti kojima je cilj zajamčiti usklađenost aktivnosti sustava osiguranja depozita s izvršenjem vlastitih nadzornih ovlasti; te se ovlasti izvršavaju samo odobravanjem poduzetih mjera.
As the Banca d'Italia is required to act independently from the State, the exercise of its powers over the FITD when the FITD takes steps to support a bank cannot be regarded as State control over the use of resources or as being tied to any public mandate.
S obzirom na to da je Banka Italije dužna djelovati neovisno o državi, izvršenje njezinih ovlasti nad FITD-om kada FITD poduzima korake u potporu nekoj banci ne može se smatrati državnim nadzorom upotrebe sredstava ni povezanim s bilo kojim javnim ovlastima.
The case at issue is therefore clearly analogous to Doux Élevage [31].
Stoga je predmetni slučaj jasno usporediv s predmetom Doux Élevage [31].
Moreover, the Banca d'Italia submits that it did not contribute to the design or to the implementation of the FITD's support measures, and that any contact between itself and the FITD prior to formal submission of the FITD's application for Banca d'Italia authorisation cannot be classified as a contribution to those measures.
Štoviše, Banka Italije iznijela je primjedbu da nije pridonijela izradi ni provedbi FITD-ovih mjera podrške te da se nijedan kontakt između nje i FITD-a prije podnošenja FITD-ova službenog zahtjeva za odobrenje Banke Italije ne može smatrati doprinosom tim mjerama.
The Banca d'Italia merely provided initial guidance, entirely on the basis of the legislative parameters that would govern the subsequent authorisation procedure.
Banka Italije samo je dala početne upute i to u cijelosti na osnovi zakonskih parametara kojima se uređuje naknadni postupak odobrenja.
The fact that the Banca d'Italia appointed and supervised the special administrator had no bearing on the case at issue, as the tasks and aims of a special administrator's activities do not differ greatly from those of a ‘normal’ director of a private undertaking in a state of crisis, so that the special administrator did not act on behalf of the Banca d'Italia.
Činjenica da je Banka Italije imenovala i nadzirala posebnog upravitelja nije povezana s ovim predmetom jer se zadaće i ciljevi aktivnosti posebnog upravitelja ne razlikuju znatno od zadaća i ciljeva „normalnog” direktora privatnog poduzeća u kriznom stanju, tako da posebni upravitelj nije djelovao u ime Banke Italije.
The Banca d'Italia representative attending the meetings of the FITD Board and Executive Committee sat only as an observer and had no voting rights.
Predstavnik Banke Italije koji je prisustvovao sastancima Upravnog i Izvršnog odbora FITD-a bio je samo promatrač bez prava glasa.
The fact that a dispute between the FITD and BPB regarding the scale of Tercas's negative equity was settled by an arbitrator nominated by the Banca d'Italia is irrelevant, because it was the parties, on a fully independent basis and by mutual agreement, that asked the Banca d'Italia to suggest an individual, whom they then proceeded to appoint as arbitrator.
Činjenica da je spor između FITD-a i BPB-a u pogledu razmjera Tercasova negativnog kapitala riješio arbitar kojeg je imenovala Banka Italije nije relevantna jer su stranke potpuno samostalno i sporazumno zatražile da Banka Italije predloži osobu koju su one zatim imenovale arbitrom.
BPB would not have agreed to ask the Banca d'Italia to nominate an arbitrator if the Banca d'Italia played a management and strategic role in the FITD.
BPB ne bi pristao na to da se od Banke Italije zatraži imenovanje arbitra da je Banka Italije imala upravljačku i stratešku ulogu u FITD-u.
As regards the third point, the case at issue differs from those cited in recital 44 to the opening decision, in which the Commission found that intervention by a deposit guarantee scheme in the restructuring and liquidation of banks constituted State aid.
U pogledu treće točke, ovaj predmet razlikuje se od onih koji su navedeni u uvodnoj izjavi 44. odluke o pokretanju postupka, u kojoj je Komisija utvrdila da se intervencija sustava osiguranja depozita u restrukturiranju i likvidaciji banaka smatra državnom potporom.
In the case of the Danish winding-up scheme [32], (1) the national legislation regulated the conditions for support measures in detail; (2) the committee responsible for assessing the costs of the various options was appointed by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance; (3) the same committee was required to assess whether the purchaser would be able to operate the bank in difficulty and whether the solution was commercially sustainable; (4) the decision made by the deposit guarantee scheme was based on the assessment and recommendation made by that committee; (5) the board of directors of the deposit guarantee scheme was appointed by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance; and (6) the agreement between the purchaser bank and the deposit guarantee scheme was to be approved by the Minister.
U predmetu danskog programa likvidacije [32] 1. uvjeti mjera podrške detaljno su uređeni nacionalnim zakonodavstvom; 2. ministar gospodarstva i financija imenovao je odbor nadležan za procjenu troškova različitih opcija; 3. isti je odbor bio dužan procijeniti hoće li kupac moći upravljati poslovanjem banke u teškoćama te je li to rješenje poslovno održivo; 4. odluka sustava osiguranja depozita temeljila se na procjeni i preporuci tog odbora; 5. ministar gospodarstva i financija imenovao je odbor direktora sustava osiguranja depozita i 6. ministar je trebao odobriti sporazum između banke kupca i sustava osiguranja depozita.
In the case of the Polish credit unions liquidation scheme [33], the incentives provided by the deposit guarantee scheme constituted an integral part of a liquidation scheme for credit unions, which was designed by the Polish authorities and notified to the Commission as State aid.
U predmetu poljskog programa likvidacije kreditnih unija [33] poticaji sustava osiguranja depozita činili su sastavni dio programa likvidacije za kreditne unije koji su izradila poljska nadležna tijela i koja su ga Komisiji prijavila kao državnu potporu.
The deposit guarantee scheme was controlled by the government through voting rights on the board of the fund, and in a number of cases the Minister for Finance was entitled to intervene and take direct decisions affecting the functioning of the fund.
Država je glasačkim pravima u odboru fonda nadzirala sustav osiguranja depozita, a ministar financija u brojnim je slučajevima imao pravo intervenirati i donositi izravne odluke koje su utjecale na funkcioniranje fonda.
In addition, the chairman of the board of the fund, who was appointed by the Minister for Finance, had a casting vote in the event of a tie.
Osim toga, predsjednik uprave fonda, kojeg je imenovao ministar financija, imao je odlučujući glas u slučaju jednakog broja glasova.
As for the decision on the restructuring of CAM and Banco CAM in Spain [34], the Spanish authorities made use of the financial assistance of the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring [35], a fund dedicated to aid for liquidation and controlled by the State and by the Spanish deposit guarantee fund.
U pogledu odluke o restrukturiranju banaka CAM i Banco CAM u Španjolskoj [34], španjolska su tijela iskoristila financijsku pomoć Fonda za uredno restrukturiranje banaka [35], fonda namijenjenog pružanju potpore pri likvidaciji pod nadzorom države i španjolskog fonda za osiguranje depozita.
The Fund's decision to intervene was not an independent decision by the Fund, but was part of a wider restructuring and rescue operation decided upon and implemented by the Spanish authorities.
Odluka Fonda o intervenciji nije bila neovisna odluka Fonda, nego je bila dio šire operacije restrukturiranja i sanacije o kojoj su odlučila i koju su provodila španjolska nadležna tijela.
Observations from other interested parties
Primjedbe ostalih zainteresiranih strana
First, the other interested parties, namely the FITD, BPB and Tercas, make the general remark that the public character of the resources and imputability to the State are two distinct conditions, both of which must be fulfilled.
Prvo, ostale zainteresirane strane, odnosno FITD, BPB i Tercas, iznijele su opću primjedbu da su javni karakter sredstava i pripisivost državi dva različita uvjeta te da oba moraju biti ispunjena.
Hence, resources of private origin cannot be considered public as a result of an assessment that the use of those resources is imputable to the State.
Stoga se sredstva privatnog podrijetla ne mogu smatrati javnim sredstvima slijedom ocjene da je upotreba tih sredstava pripisiva državi.
These three interested parties submit that the Commission erred in stating that deposit guarantee schemes are extremely likely to provide State aid, since they act under a public mandate and remain under the control of the public authorities.
Tri navedene zainteresirane strane iznijele su primjedbu da je Komisija pogriješila navodeći da će sustavi osiguranja depozita vrlo vjerojatno pružati državnu potporu jer djeluju u skladu s javnim ovlastima i pod nadzorom su tijela javne vlasti.
They point out that in the 2013 Banking Communication there is no mention of deposit guarantee schemes constituting State aid, that Directive 94/19/EC says nothing on the compatibility with the State aid rules of measures taken as an alternative to reimbursement of depositors, and that Directive 2014/49/EU takes a neutral position with regard to the compatibility of such measures with the State aid rules.
Naglašavaju da u Komunikaciji o bankarstvu iz 2013. nije navedeno da se sustavi osiguranja depozita smatraju državnom potporom, da se u Direktivi 94/19/EZ ne spominje spojivosti mjera koje se poduzimaju kao zamjena za isplate naknade deponentima s pravilima o državnim potporama te da je u Direktivi 2014/49/EU zauzeto neutralno stajalište u pogledu spojivosti takvih mjera s pravilima o državnim potporama.
These interested parties consider that the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the action taken by the FITD was imputable to the State on the mere ground that such action was required by law, while in PreussenElektra [36] and Doux Élevage [37] the Court of Justice expressly ruled that the fact that a measure was imposed by national law was not capable of conferring upon it the character of State aid.
Zainteresirane strane smatraju da je Komisija došla do privremenog zaključka da je FITD-ovo djelovanje pripisivo državi samo stoga što je takvo djelovanje propisano zakonom, iako je Sud u predmetima PreussenElektra [36] i Doux Élevage [37] izričito presudio da se mjera ne može smatrati državnom potporom zbog činjenice da je ta mjera propisana nacionalnim pravom.
In the case of the Austrian Green Electricity Act [38], the General Court took into account many additional elements which indicated the pervasive influence and control of the State over ÖMAG, the public limited company in charge of controlling the measure at issue.
U predmetu Austrijski zakon o zelenoj električnoj energiji [38], Opći sud uzeo je u obzir brojne dodatne elemente koji su upućivali na sveprisutni utjecaj i nadzor države nad ÖMAG-om, javnim dioničkim društvom nadležnim za nadzor predmetne mjere.
These interested parties consider that a correct reading of the Italian legislation and of the FITD's decision-making mechanisms for support measures aimed at averting irreversible bank crises shows the insubstantial nature of the evidence cited by the Commission in support of its preliminary conclusion that the action taken by the FITD responds to a public mandate.
Navedene zainteresirane strane smatraju da se pravilnim tumačenjem talijanskog zakonodavstva i FITD-ova mehanizma odlučivanja o mjerama podrške kojima je cilj izbjegavanje nepovratnih kriza banaka dokazuje nematerijalnost dokaza koje je Komisija navela u prilog svojem privremenom zaključku da FITD-ovo djelovanje odgovara javnim ovlastima.
They base their argument on the fact that Article 96-bis of the Banking Act provides only that guarantee schemes ‘may engage in other types and forms of intervention.’ [39].
Svoj argument temelje na činjenici da je člankom 96.-bis Zakona o bankama predviđeno samo da sustavi osiguranja depozita „mogu poduzimati intervencije drugih vrsta i oblika” [39].
The measures are not mandatory, which severs the link between the FITD's action and the mission set out in its constitution.
Mjere nisu obvezne, što prekida poveznicu između FITD-ova djelovanja i misije utvrđene u njegovu statutu.
The three interested parties point out that forms of action other than the reimbursement of depositors have been available since the establishment of the FITD in 1987, prior to the entry into force of Article 96-bis of the Banking Act.
Tri zainteresirane strane naglašavaju da su oblici djelovanja koji nisu isplata naknade deponentima bili na raspolaganju još od osnivanja FITD-a 1987., prije stupanja na snagu članka 96.-bis Zakona o bankama.
The FITD argues that it is a private-law entity controlled and managed by its member banks, and that it acts as a vehicle for measures that are directly attributable to the member banks using resources that continue to belong to the member banks.
FITD navodi da je subjekt privatnog prava te da ga nadziru i njime upravljaju banke članice, da djeluje kao fond za provođenje mjera koje su izravno pripisive bankama članicama upotrebom sredstava koja i dalje pripadaju bankama članicama.
Moreover, the decision to support Tercas was taken by the FITD's governing bodies, which are made up entirely of representatives of the member banks.
Štoviše, odluku o pružanju podrške Tercasu donijela su FITD-ova upravljačka tijela, koja u cijelosti čine predstavnici banaka članica.
The documentary evidence shows that the FITD's governing bodies carefully assessed the possible alternatives and the application of the least-cost requirement in order better to protect the interests of member banks by reducing the costs and risks of the intervention.
Dokazna dokumentacija pokazuje da su FITD-ova upravljačka tijela pažljivo procijenila moguća alternativna rješenja i primjenu zahtjeva najmanjeg troška radi bolje zaštite interesa banaka članica smanjenjem troškova i rizika intervencije.
The FITD contends that its governing body decided in its own discretion whether, when and how to take support measures, the only requirement being that the action must be less costly than reimbursing depositors.
FITD zaključuje da je njegovo upravljačko tijelo po vlastitu nahođenju donijelo odluku o tome hoće li, kada i kako poduzeti mjere podrške, pri čemu je jedini zahtjev bio da djelovanje mora biti isplativije od plaćanja naknade deponentima.
When it takes support measures the FITD does not act under any public mandate.
Kada poduzima mjere podrške FITD ne izvršava javne ovlasti.
The FITD's constitution is fully in line with the legislation governing the sector, even in so far as it does not provide for any form of alternative action or expressly prohibits any such action.
FITD-ov statut potpuno je usklađen sa sektorskim zakonodavstvom čak i u dijelu kojim se njime ne predviđa nikakav oblik alternativnog djelovanja niti izričito zabranjuje takvo djelovanje.
No public body can oblige the FITD to intervene, and the Banca d'Italia's subsequent authorisation is intended only to ensure verification that the action taken for the beneficiary bank is appropriate from the viewpoint of prudential supervision and that it is compatible with the need to protect depositors and with the stability of the banking system.
Nijedno tijelo javne vlasti ne može FITD-u nametnuti obvezu interveniranja, a naknadnim odobrenjem Banke Italije samo se želi osigurati da je djelovanje za banku korisnicu primjereno u smislu bonitetnog nadzora te da je usklađeno s potrebom zaštite deponenata i stabilnosti bankarskog sustava.
In addition, the three interested parties point out that according to its constitution membership of the FITD is not mandatory, and that banks can choose to establish an alternative deposit guarantee scheme to which to belong.
Osim toga, tri zainteresirane strane naglašavaju da članstvo u FITD-u u skladu s njegovim statutom nije obvezno te da banke mogu osnovati alternativni sustav osiguranja depozita kojem će pripadati.
They point to the existence of a deposit guarantee scheme, the Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo, specifically for mutual banks [40], which are not members of the FITD.
Upućuju na postojanje sustava za osiguranje depozita, Fondo di Garanzia dei Depositanti del Credito Cooperativo, posebno za zadružne banke [40], koje nisu članice FITD-a.
These interested parties submit that there is no interference by the State either with the appointment of the members of the FITD's governing bodies or with its decision-making (the fact that the Banca d'Italia participates as an observer, without voting rights, does not affect the independent decision-making of the FITD).
Navedene zainteresirane strane iznijele su primjedbu da se država ne upliće ni u imenovanje članova FITD-ovih upravljačkih tijela ni u njegovo odlučivanje (činjenica da Banka Italije sudjeluje kao promatrač bez glasačkih prava ne utječe na FITD-ovo neovisno odlučivanje).