natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Germany further argued that this was proven by Ryanair's comparator analysis.
Njemačka je nadalje tvrdila da je to dokazano analizom usporedivih subjekata zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair.
Germany argued that low-cost carriers, such as Ryanair and Wizz Air, have fewer demands with regards to ground handling services and infrastructure services.
Njemačka je tvrdila da niskotarifni prijevoznici, kao što su Ryanair i Wizz Air, imaju manje zahtjeve kad je riječ o zemaljskim uslugama i uslugama infrastrukture.
Firstly, at Lübeck airport fewer check-in counters were needed because check-in with Ryanair is available to passengers online.
Prvo, u zračnoj luci Lübeck bilo je potrebno manje šaltera za prijavu putnika jer Ryanair putnicima omogućuje prijavu internetom.
Secondly, there were no passenger buses.
Drugo, nije bilo autobusa za prijevoz putnika.
Thirdly, since walking distances are shorter at Lübeck airport, the time for Ryanair airplanes on the ground was shorter.
Treće, budući da su udaljenosti u zračnoj luci Lübeck koje je potrebno prijeći pješice kraće, kraće je bilo i vrijeme koje su zrakoplovi prijevoznika Ryanair provodili na tlu.
Fourthly, there were no transfer flights and fewer pieces of luggage per person, which meant that there did not have to be facilities for such purposes.
Četvrto, nije bilo transfernih letova i količina prtljage po putniku bila je manja, zbog čega nisu bili potrebni objekti namijenjeni tim svrhama.
Fifthly and finally, since the flight crew often took charge of cleaning in the airplane, there was less demand for ground cleaning services.
Peto i posljednje, budući da je letačko osoblje često na sebe preuzimalo čišćenje unutar zrakoplova, bila je manja potražnja za uslugama čišćenja na tlu.
As regards Side Letter No 2, Germany pointed out that this agreement was an extension, without substantial changes, of the 2000 Agreement.
Kad je riječ o drugom popratnom pismu, Njemačka je istaknula da je njime produljen ugovor iz 2000. bez znatnih promjena.
Germany took the view that the 2000 Agreement complied with the Market Economy Operator test.
Njemačka je smatrala da je ugovor iz 2000. bio u skladu s testom subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu.
Furthermore, Germany is of the opinion that the alleged advantages in favour of Ryanair could not be imputed to the State based on the ruling in Stardust Marine.
Nadalje, Njemačka smatra da se navodne prednosti za Ryanair nisu mogle pripisati državi na temelju presude u predmetu Stardust Marine.
According to Germany, FLG acted with autonomy and without any exertion of influence by the State.
Njemačka je tvrdila da je FLG djelovao autonomno i bez utjecaja države.
Germany stated that FLG was not integrated into the structures of the public administration.
Njemačka je navela da FLG nije bio integriran u strukture javne uprave.
In addition, Germany stated that the supervision by the public authorities of the management of FLG was limited to aviation and public remit matters and did not include business management activities.
Osim toga, Njemačka je navela da je nadzor tijela javne vlasti nad upravljanjem FLG-om bio ograničen na zrakoplovstvo i pitanja javne politike te nije uključivao djelatnosti upravljanja poslovanjem.
FLG stated that the measures were not imputable to Germany, since the agreements were negotiated by it autonomously.
FLG je naveo da mjere nisu bile pripisive Njemačkoj jer je autonomno pregovarao o ugovorima.
Ryanair argued that the 2010 Agreements were not imputable to the State.
Ryanair je tvrdio da ugovori iz 2010. nisu bili pripisivi državi.
Lübeck airport was seen as a viable secondary airport to Hamburg airport and Lübeck itself was regarded as a valuable cultural destination.
Zračna luka Lübeck smatrala se održivom sekundarnom zračnom lukom uz zračnu luku Hamburg, a sam se grad Lübeck smatrao vrijednim kulturnim odredištem.
Even though Ryanair could not offer a business plan to substantiate its decision to start services at Lübeck airport, Ryanair emphasised that such a business plan was not generally required for a private sector investor.
Iako Ryanair nije mogao ponuditi poslovni plan kojim bi potkrijepio svoju odluku o početku pružanja usluga u zračnoj luci Lübeck, taj je prijevoznik istaknuo da se takav poslovni plan obično nije zahtijevao za ulagatelja iz privatnog sektora.
Therefore, airport revenues from both aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities had to be taken into consideration, which is referred to as the ‘single-till approach’.
Stoga je u obzir trebalo uzeti prihode zračne luke od zrakoplovnih i nezrakoplovnih djelatnosti, što je poznato kao „pristup jedne blagajne”.
Since contracts with Ryanair typically promise a large number of passengers, such business relations often help to raise the airport's recognisability and to attract other airlines as well as retail outlets and other service providers.
Budući da ugovori sa zračnim prijevoznikom Ryanair obično obećavaju velik broj putnika, zahvaljujući takvim poslovnim odnosima često se povećava prepoznatljivost zračne luke i privlače se drugi zračni prijevoznici te maloprodajne trgovine i pružatelji drugih usluga.
Ryanair argued that, from a Market Economy Operator viewpoint, any commercial offer would normally be an improvement over the existing situation, as long as it expected marginal benefits to exceed its marginal costs.
Ryanair je tvrdio da bi, sa stajališta subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu, svaka komercijalna ponuda obično bila poboljšanje u odnosu na postojeće stanje, sve dok se očekuje da će granične koristi premašiti njegove granične troškove.
Furthermore, Ryanair argued that it had to be considered that Ryanair has significantly reduced needs compared to other airlines given its business model and operational efficiency.
Nadalje, Ryanair je tvrdio da je trebalo uzeti u obzir da taj prijevoznik ima znatno manje potrebe u odnosu na druge zračne prijevoznike s obzirom na njegov poslovni model i operativnu učinkovitost.
Ryanair conducted a comparison between airports of comparable size and situation as Lübeck airport.
Ryanair je proveo usporedbu zračnih luka slične veličine i u sličnoj situaciji kao što je zračna luka Lübeck.
Comparator airports are Bournemouth Airport, Grenoble Airport, Knock Airport, Maastricht Airport, Nîmes Airport and Prestwick Airport.
Usporedive su zračne luke zračna luka Bournemouth, zračna luka Grenoble, zračna luka Knock, zračna luka Maastricht, zračna luka Nîmes i zračna luka Prestwick.
A comparison of charges paid by Ryanair at the comparator airports showed that costs paid by Ryanair at Lübeck airport were higher in general than the average level at the comparator airports on both a per-passenger and a per-turnaround basis.
Usporedba naknada koje je Ryanair plaćao u usporedivim zračnim lukama pokazala je da su troškovi koje je Ryanair plaćao u zračnoj luci Lübeck bili općenito veći od prosječne razine troškova u usporedivim zračnim lukama, ne samo po putniku nego i po operaciji prihvata i otpreme.
According to Oxera, this would even be the case if the marketing services agreement with AMS were to be considered jointly with the 2010 Side Letters and the costs but not the AMS-related revenues were included.
Oxera navodi da bi to bio slučaj čak i da se ugovor o marketinškim uslugama s AMS-om razmatra zajedno s popratnim pismima iz 2010. i da su uključeni troškovi, ali ne i prihodi povezani s AMS-om.
With regards to the marketing services agreement with AMS, Ryanair argued that such agreements are mutually beneficial due to the popularity of Ryanair's website and the consequent increases in international recognition, brand building and passengers, which was substantiated by another Oxera report of 26 September 2014.
Kad je riječ o ugovoru o marketinškim uslugama s AMS-om, Ryanair je tvrdio da su takvi ugovori korisni za obje stranke zbog popularnosti web-mjesta zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair i povezane povećane međunarodne prepoznatljivosti, jačanja trgovačke marke i povećanja broja putnika, što je potvrđeno drugim izvješćem društva Oxera od 26. rujna 2014.
Air Berlin stated that the routes offered by Ryanair from Lübeck airport were in direct competition with those offered by Air Berlin at Hamburg airport.
Air Berlin je naveo da su linije koje Ryanair nudi iz zračne luke Lübeck u izravnom tržišnom natjecanju s onima koje Air Berlin nudi u zračnoj luci Hamburg.
In particular, the destinations of London, Milan and Barcelona were concerned, since both airlines had them in their portfolio.
Konkretno, riječ je o Londonu, Milanu i Barceloni jer oba zračna prijevoznika u svojem portfelju imaju ta odredišta.
Air Berlin argued that the purpose of Ryanair's marketing strategy was to poach potential clients of, amongst others, Air Berlin.
Air Berlin je tvrdio da je tržišna strategija zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair usmjerena na vrbovanje potencijalnih klijenata zračnog prijevoznika Air Berlin i drugih.
Due to the low prices of Ryanair, customers moved from Hamburg to Lübeck airport.
Zbog niskih cijena zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair klijenti su iz zračne luke Hamburg prešli u zračnu luku Lübeck.
Air Berlin had to discontinue some of its flights due to the parallel offer by Ryanair at Lübeck airport.
Air Berlin je morao ukinuti neke svoje letove zbog slične ponude zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair u zračnoj luci Lübeck.
In addition, Air Berlin stated that it found it difficult to open new destinations from Hamburg airport as long as similar destinations were offered by Ryanair from Lübeck airport at excessively low prices.
Osim toga, Air Berlin je naveo da mu je bilo teško uspostavljati letove prema novim odredištima iz zračne luke Hamburg dok je Ryanair nudio slična odredišta iz zračne luke Lübeck po pretjerano niskim cijenama.
Additionally, Air Berlin stated that the agreement with Ryanair was imputable to Germany.
Air Berlin je naveo i da se ugovor sa zračnim prijevoznikom Ryanair može pripisati Njemačkoj.
According to the articles of association of FLG, the supervisory board had to give its approval for charges resulting from the use of the airport (paragraph 12 of the articles of association).
U skladu sa statutom FLG-a nadzorni odbor morao je odobriti troškove koji proizlaze iz upotrebe zračne luke (članak 12. statuta).
Four of the six members of the supervisory board were elected by Hansestadt Lübeck.
Hansestadt Lübeck birao je četiri od šest članova nadzornog odbora.
According to Air Berlin, a further point of concern was the marketing services agreement between AMS and FLG, since the benefits from ‘marketing support’ appear to be unrelated to the actual marketing expenditures incurred by Ryanair.
Air Berlin navodi da je još jedan razlog za zabrinutost bio ugovor o marketinškim uslugama između AMS-a i FLG-a jer se čini da koristi od „marketinške podrške” nisu povezane sa stvarnim marketinškim troškovima koje je zabilježio Ryanair.
COMMENTS OF GERMANY ON THIRD PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS
PRIMJEDBE NJEMAČKE NA PODNESKE TREĆIH STRANA
Comments on Ryanair's submissions
Primjedbe na podneske zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair
According to Germany, Ryanair's submissions reveal that airport Lübeck acted in accordance with the Market Economy Operator principle.
Njemačka navodi da podnesci zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair otkrivaju da je zračna luka Lübeck postupala u skladu s načelom subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu.
Germany particularly highlights the usefulness of Ryanair's approach of proving the market conformity of the agreements through a profitability analysis and a comparator analysis.
Njemačka posebno ističe koliko je koristan pristup zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair koji uključuje dokazivanje usklađenosti ugovorâ s tržištem analizom profitabilnosti i analizom usporedivih zračnih luka.
According to Germany, the 2010 Side Letters were not imputable to the State since they were autonomously negotiated and entered into by FLG, without interference of Hansestadt Lübeck.
Njemačka smatra da popratna pisma iz 2010. nisu bila pripisiva državi jer je FLG o njima autonomno pregovarao i sklopio ih, bez uplitanja grada Hansestadt Lübeck.
Furthermore, with regard to Side Letter No 2, Germany pointed out that it merely constituted an extension of the 2000 Agreement, without containing any material change.
Nadalje, u pogledu drugog popratnog pisma Njemačka je istaknula da je njime samo produljen ugovor iz 2000. i da ne sadržava nikakve bitne promjene.
Therefore, all arguments put forward in relation to the 2000 Agreement were relevant.
Stoga su bili relevantni svi argumenti izneseni s obzirom na ugovor iz 2000.
Germany stated that it does not understand why the marketing services agreement between FLG and AMS was included in the State aid investigation, since FLG did not spend any public funds in the framework of this agreement.
Njemačka je navela da ne razumije zašto je ugovor o marketinškim uslugama između FLG-a i AMS-a uključen u istražni postupak u pogledu državne potpore jer FLG u okviru tog ugovora nije trošio nikakva javna sredstva.
Moreover, Germany commented that the marketing services agreement with AMS could be regarded as conforming to market standards.
Nadalje, Njemačka je navela da se ugovor o marketinškim uslugama sklopljen s AMS-om može smatrati usklađenim s tržišnim standardima.
This is supported by the observation that FLG was charged with lower costs than other airports with a similar agreement.
To potkrepljuje primjedba da je FLG plaćao manje troškove od drugih zračnih luka koje su sklopile slične ugovore.
What is more, the marketing agreement in question was based on the promise of Ryanair to expand its flight portfolio by two destinations.
Osim toga, predmetni ugovor o marketinškim uslugama temeljio se na obećanju zračnog prijevoznika Ryanair da će svoj portfelj letova proširiti za dva odredišta.
Another point added by Germany is the function of Lübeck airport as a back-up airport for Hamburg airport and as a necessary transport infrastructure for northern Germany.
Njemačka je kao dodatni argument navela i funkciju zračne luke Lübeck kao pomoćne zračne luke za zračnu luku Hamburg i kao nužne prometne infrastrukture za sjevernu Njemačku.
Comments on Air Berlin's submissions
Primjedbe na podneske prijevoznika Air Berlin
According to Germany, Air Berlin would have been granted the same advantages as Ryanair if it had fulfilled the same criteria concerning passenger numbers and flight frequency.
Njemačka navodi da bi Air Berlin bio dobio iste prednosti kao Ryanair da je ispunio iste kriterije u pogledu broja putnika i učestalosti letova.
Instead, Air Berlin refused any offer for negotiations with FLG, since it never intended to take up services at Lübeck airport.
Umjesto toga, Air Berlin je odbio sve ponuđene pregovore s FLG-om jer nikad nije namjeravao početi pružati usluge u zračnoj luci Lübeck.
Air Berlin never objected to the conditions under which Ryanair operated at Hamburg airport.
Air Berlin se nikad nije usprotivio uvjetima u kojima je Ryanair poslovao u zračnoj luci Hamburg.
In addition, several airlines had complained (amongst others to the Commission) that Air Berlin had been benefitting from substantial State aid by the United Arabic Emirates.
Osim toga, nekoliko zračnih prijevoznika uputilo je pritužbe (među ostalim i Komisiji) da je Air Berlin ostvarivao koristi od znatne državne potpore Ujedinjenih Arapskih Emirata.
Therefore, it cannot present itself as a victim vis-à-vis its main competitor Ryanair.
Stoga se ne može predstavljati kao žrtva u odnosu na Ryanair, svojeg glavnog konkurenta.
Germany disagreed with Air Berlin's comments concerning the existence of competition between Lübeck airport and Hamburg airport.
Njemačka se nije složila s primjedbama prijevoznika Air Berlin o postojanju tržišnog natjecanja između zračnih luka Lübeck i Hamburg.
In particular, Germany referred to the fact that Hamburg had 70 times as many passengers as Lübeck airport in 2000.
Konkretno, Njemačka je uputila na činjenicu da je 2000. u zračnoj luci Hamburg bilo 70 puta više putnika nego u zračnoj luci Lübeck.
The absence of complaints by other airports showed that there was no competition between the two airports.
Izostanak pritužbi drugih zračnih luka pokazao je da nije bilo tržišnog natjecanja između tih dviju zračnih luka.
Furthermore, Germany rejected Air Berlin's argument that there was an economic advantage for Ryanair.
Nadalje, Njemačka je odbila argument zračnog prijevoznika Air Berlin da je postojala gospodarska prednost za Ryanair.
Germany stated that Air Berlin used inaccurate calculations and that the only test relevant for assessing whether an airport-airline agreement was market conform was the Market Economy Operator principle.
Njemačka je navela da je Air Berlin upotrijebio netočne izračune i da je načelo subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu jedini test primjeren za ocjenu tržišne usklađenosti ugovora između zračne luke i zračnog prijevoznika.
Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Člankom 107. stavkom 1. Ugovora propisano je da je svaka potpora koju dodijeli država članica ili koja se dodjeljuje putem državnih sredstava u bilo kojem obliku koja narušava ili prijeti da će narušiti tržišno natjecanje stavljanjem određenih poduzetnika ili proizvodnje određene robe u povoljniji položaj nespojiva s unutarnjim tržištem u mjeri u kojoj utječe na trgovinu među državama članicama.
Therefore, in order to determine whether a measure constitutes State aid, the following conditions have to be fulfilled:
Stoga, kako bi se odredilo čini li neka mjera državnu potporu, moraju biti ispunjeni sljedeći uvjeti:
the beneficiary is an undertaking,
korisnik je poduzetnik,
the measure confers an advantage,
mjerom se daje prednost,
the advantage is granted through State resources,
prednost se dodjeljuje iz državnih sredstava,
the advantage is selective, and
prednost je selektivna, i
the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and is liable to affect trade between Member States.
mjerom se narušava ili prijeti da će se narušiti tržišno natjecanje i ona može utjecati na trgovinu među državama članicama.
Since Ryanair is a private company that provides air transport services for remuneration with the aim of making profits, Ryanair is an undertaking that is engaged in an economic activity.
Budući da je Ryanair privatno društvo koje pruža usluge zračnog prijevoza u zamjenu za naknadu kako bi ostvarilo dobit, Ryanair je poduzetnik koji obavlja gospodarsku djelatnost.
It is therefore an undertaking within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Stoga se smatra poduzetnikom u smislu članka 107. stavka 1. Ugovora.
An advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention.
Prednost u smislu članka 107. stavka 1. Ugovora svaka je gospodarska korist koju poduzetnik ne bi mogao ostvariti u uobičajenim tržišnim uvjetima, odnosno bez intervencije države.
Where an airport has public resources at its disposal, aid to an airline can, in principle, be excluded where the relationship between the airport and the airline is carried out in line with normal market conditions.
Ako zračna luka ima na raspolaganju javna sredstva, potpora zračnom prijevozniku može, u načelu, biti isključena kada je odnos između zračne luke i zračnog prijevoznika u skladu s uobičajenim tržišnim uvjetima.
This so-called ‘Market Economy Operator test’ (‘MEO test’) follows the basic concept that the behaviour of public authorities should be compared to that of similar private economic operators under normal market conditions to determine whether an agreement grants an advantage to its counterpart.
Taj takozvani „test subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu” slijedi osnovni koncept da bi ponašanje javnih tijela trebalo usporediti s ponašanjem sličnih privatnih gospodarskih subjekata u uobičajenim tržišnim uvjetima kako bi se odredilo daje li se nekim ugovorom prednost drugoj strani.
Preliminary remarks with regard to the MEO test
Uvodne napomene o testu subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu
In accordance with point 53 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, the existence of aid to an airline using a particular airport can, in principle, be excluded if the price charged for the airport services corresponds to the market price (‘first approach’ — comparison with the market price).
U skladu s točkom 53. Smjernica za zračni prijevoz iz 2014. postojanje potpore za zračnog prijevoznika koji upotrebljava određenu zračnu luku može se, u načelu, isključiti kad cijena koja se zaračunava za usluge zračne luke odgovara tržišnoj cijeni („prvi pristup” – usporedba s tržišnom cijenom).
A second approach is to demonstrate through an ex ante analysis — that is to say, an analysis founded on information available when the aid is granted and on developments foreseeable at the time — that the arrangement will lead to a positive incremental profit contribution for the airport and is part of an overall strategy leading to profitability at least in the long term (‘second apporach’ — ex ante profitability analysis).
Drugi je pristup da se ex ante analizom, odnosno analizom koja se temelji na informacijama dostupnima u trenutku dodjeljivanja potpore i na događajima koje je u to vrijeme bilo moguće predvidjeti, dokaže da će dogovor dovesti do pozitivnog dodatnog doprinosa dobiti za zračnu luku i da je on dio cjelokupne strategije koja bi barem dugoročno dovela do profitabilnosti („drugi pristup” – ex ante analiza profitabilnosti).
As regards the first approach, the Commission does not consider that, at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports.
Kad je riječ o prvom pristupu Komisija ne smatra da se trenutačno može utvrditi odgovarajuća referentna vrijednost koja bi omogućila određivanje istinske tržišne cijene usluga koje pružaju zračne luke.
It therefore considers an ex ante incremental profitability analysis to be the most relevant approach for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines.
Stoga ex ante analizu dodatne profitabilnosti smatra najrelevantnijim pristupom za ocjenu dogovora koje zračne luke zaključuju s pojedinačnim zračnim prijevoznicima.
It should be noted that, in general, the application of the MEO principle based on an average price on other similar markets may prove helpful if such a price can be reasonably identified or deduced from other market indicators.
Trebalo bi napomenuti da se primjena načela subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu na bazi prosječne cijene na drugim sličnim tržištima u načelu može pokazati korisnom ako se ta cijena može razumno utvrditi ili izvesti iz drugih pokazatelja na tržištu.
However, this method is of limited relevance for airport services, as the structure of costs and revenues tends to differ greatly from one airport to another.
Međutim, relevantnost te metode ograničena je u slučaju usluga zračnih luka jer se zračne luke međusobno obično znatno razlikuju po strukturi troškova i prihoda.
This is because costs and revenues depend on how developed an airport is, the number of airlines which use the airport, its capacity in terms of passenger traffic, the state of the infrastructure and related investments, the regulatory framework which can vary from one Member State to another, and any debts or obligations entered into by the airport in the past.
To je zato što troškovi i prihodi ovise o stupnju razvijenosti zračne luke, o broju zračnih prijevoznika koji upotrebljavaju zračnu luku, njezinu kapacitetu u pogledu putničkog prometa, stanju infrastrukture i povezanih ulaganja, regulatornom okviru koji se može razlikovati od jedne države članice do druge i dugovanjima ili obvezama koje je zračna luka preuzela u prošlosti.
As can be seen in this case, commercial practices between airports and airlines are not always based exclusively on a published schedule of charges.
Kako se može vidjeti u ovom predmetu, poslovne prakse između zračnih luka i zračnih prijevoznika ne temelje se uvijek isključivo na objavljenom cjeniku.