natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On 31 October 2016, the UN Human Rights Committee adopted Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Poland.
UN-ov Odbor za ljudska prava donio je 31. listopada 2016. Zaključna opažanja u okviru sedmog periodičnog izvješća za Poljsku.
It expressed concerns about the negative impact of legislative reforms, including the amendments to the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal of November and December 2015 and July 2016, and the disregard of the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal; the functioning and independence of the Tribunal and the implementation of the Covenant.
Izrazio je zabrinutost zbog negativnog utjecaja zakonodavnih reformi, uključujući izmjene Zakona o Ustavnom sudu iz studenog i prosinca 2015. te srpnja 2016., nepoštovanja odluka Ustavnog suda, funkcioniranja i neovisnosti Suda te načina provedbe Pakta.
The Committee also expressed its concerns about the refusal of the Prime Minister to publish the judgments of March and August 2016 of the Tribunal and efforts of the government to change the Tribunal's composition in ways which the Tribunal has regarded as unconstitutional, and about the legal proceedings initiated against the President of the Tribunal for alleged abuse of power.
Odbor je izrazio zabrinutost i zbog odbijanja predsjednika vlade da objavi odluke Ustavnog suda iz ožujka i kolovoza 2016., pokušaja vlade da izmijeni sastav Ustavnog suda na način koji Sud smatra neustavnim te zbog sudskog postupka pokrenutog protiv predsjednika Ustavnog suda zbog navodne zlouporabe ovlasti.
The Committee concluded that Poland should ensure respect for and protection of the integrity and independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and its judges and ensure the implementation of all its judgments.
Odbor je zaključio da bi Poljska trebala osigurati poštovanje Ustavnog suda, zaštitu integriteta i neovisnosti Ustavnog suda i njegovih sudaca te osigurati provedbu svih njegovih odluka.
The Committee urged Poland to immediately publish officially all the judgments of the Tribunal, to refrain from introducing measures that obstruct its effective functioning and to ensure a transparent and impartial process for the appointment of its members and security of tenure, which meets all requirements of legality under domestic and international law.
Odbor je od Poljske zatražio da odmah službeno objavi sve odluke Ustavnog suda, suzdrži se od uvođenja mjera koje ometaju njegov učinkovit rad i osigura transparentan i nepristran proces imenovanja njegovih članova te sigurnost trajanja mandata, što je u skladu sa zahtjevima zakonitosti prema nacionalnom i međunarodnom pravu.
On 7 November 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal rendered a judgment on the constitutionality of the provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 regarding the selection of the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal [10].
Ustavni sud donio je 7. studenoga 2016. odluku o ustavnosti odredaba Zakona od 22. srpnja 2016. o izboru predsjednika i potpredsjednika Ustavnog suda [10].
It should be noted that due to the refusal of three judges of the Tribunal to participate in the case [11] and in view of the fact that the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm had not taken up their judicial functions in the Tribunal, the Constitutional Tribunal had to change its composition from the full bench into a bench of five judges.
Valja napomenuti da je zbog odbijanja tri suca Ustavnog suda da sudjeluju u radu na predmetu [11] i zbog činjenice da tri suca koja je u listopadu 2015. zakonito predložio 7. saziv Sejma nisu preuzela svoju dužnost sudaca na Ustavnom sudu Ustavni sud morao promijeniti svoj sastav iz opće sjednice u sjednicu s pet sudaca.
Since 11 August 2016 the Constitutional Tribunal has not been able to sit in full bench to render judgments.
Od 11. kolovoza 2016. Ustavni sud nije mogao donositi odluke na općoj sjednici.
On 10 November 2016 the hearing of a case in full bench had to be adjourned as the quorum for the full bench could not be reached.
Saslušanje predmeta na općoj sjednici 10. studenoga 2016. moralo se odgoditi jer nije postignut kvorum potreban za opću sjednicu.
In addition, on 30 November and on 8 December 2016, the General Assembly was unable to adopt a resolution on presenting candidates to the post of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal as the quorum prescribed by law could not be reached.
Usto, 30. studenoga i 8. prosinca 2016. Glavna skupština nije mogla donijeti rezoluciju o predstavljanju kandidata za mjesto predsjednika Ustavnog suda jer nije bilo moguće postići zakonom utvrđen kvorum.
On 1 December 2016, the Senate adopted the Law of 30 November 2016 on the legal status of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (‘Law on the status of judges’).
Senat je 1. prosinca 2016. donio Zakon od 30. studenoga 2016. o pravnom statusu sudaca Ustavnog suda („Zakon o statusu sudaca”).
On 2 December 2016, the Senate adopted the Law of 30 November 2016 on organisation and proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal (‘Law on organisation and proceedings’).
Senat je 2. prosinca 2016. donio Zakon od 30. studenoga 2016. o organizaciji Ustavnog suda i postupcima koji se vode pred Ustavnim sudom („Zakon o organizaciji i postupcima”).
On 14 December 2016, the European Parliament held a debate on the situation of the rule of law in Poland.
Europski parlament održao je 14. prosinca 2016. raspravu o situaciji u vezi s vladavinom prava u Poljskoj.
During this debate, the Commission urgently called on the Polish authorities not to put into force the new laws before the Constitutional Tribunal has had the occasion to examine their constitutionality.
Komisija je tijekom te rasprave hitno pozvala poljske vlasti da ne stavljaju na snagu nove zakone prije nego Ustavni sud dobije priliku ocijeniti njihovu ustavnost.
On 15 December 2016, the Senate adopted the Law of 13 December 2016 implementing the Law on organisation and proceedings and the Law on the status of judges (‘Implementing Law’).
Senat je 15. prosinca 2016. donio Zakon od 13. prosinca 2016. kojim se provode Zakon o organizaciji i postupcima te Zakon o statusu sudaca („Provedbeni zakon”).
On 20 December 2016, judge Julia Przylębska admitted the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis to take up their function in the Tribunal and convened a meeting of the General Assembly for the same day.
Sutkinja Julia Przyłębska primila je 20. prosinca 2016. tri suca koja je 8. saziv Sejma predložio bez valjane pravne osnove da preuzmu funkcije na Ustavnom sudu i sazvala sjednicu Glavne skupštine za isti datum.
In view of the short notice, one judge was unable to participate and requested to postpone the meeting for the next day.
Zbog prekratkog roka jedan sudac nije mogao sudjelovati i zahtijevao je odgodu sjednice za sljedeći dan.
Judge Julia Przyłębska refused and seven other judges also did not participate in the meeting.
Sutkinja Julia Przyłębska to je odbila pa sedam drugih sudaca također nije sudjelovalo na sjednici.
Only six judges, including the three judges unlawfully nominated, took part in the meeting and elected two candidates, Julia Przyłębska and Mariusz Muszyński, who were presented as candidate to the President of the Republic.
Samo je šest sudaca, uključujući tri predložena na nezakonit način, sudjelovalo na sjednici i izabralo dvoje kandidata, Juliju Przyłębsku i Mariusza Muszyńskog, koji su predstavljeni kao kandidati predsjedniku Republike.
On 21 December 2016, the President of the Republic appointed judge Julia Przyłębska to the post of President of the Constitutional Tribunal.
21. prosinca 2016. predsjednik Republike imenovao je sutkinju Juliju Przyłębsku na mjesto predsjednice Ustavnog suda.
The Republic of Poland should duly take into account the Commission's analysis set out hereafter and take the measures figuring in section 7 of this Recommendation so that the problems identified are solved within the time limit set.
Republika Poljska treba uzeti u obzir analizu Komisije izloženu dalje u tekstu i poduzeti mjere navedene u odjeljku 7. ove Preporuke kako bi se utvrđeni problemi riješili unutar utvrđenog vremenskog roka.
On this basis, it makes recommendations to the Polish authorities on how to address these concerns.
Na temelju toga se poljskim vlastima daju preporuke kako ih riješiti.
These concerns relate to the following issues:
Te su zabrinutosti povezane sa sljedećim pitanjima:
the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal and the lack of implementation of the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 and of 11 August 2016 relating to these matters;
imenovanjem sudaca Ustavnog suda i neprovedbom odluka Ustavnog suda od 3. i 9. prosinca 2015. te 11. kolovoza 2016. koje se odnose na ta pitanja;
the lack of publication and of implementation of a number of judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal since March 2016, including the judgments of 9 March and 11 August relating to legislative acts on the Constitutional Tribunal;
neobjavljivanjem i neprovedbom nekoliko odluka Ustavnog suda donesenih od ožujka 2016., uključujući odluke od 9. ožujka i 11. kolovoza koje se odnose na zakonodavne akte o Ustavnom sudu;
the effective functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal and the effectiveness of Constitutional review of new legislation, in particular in view of newly adopted legislation concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, in particular the Law on the status of judges, the Law on organisation and proceedings and the Implementing Law;
učinkovitim radom Ustavnog suda i učinkovitošću ocjene ustavnosti novih zakonodavnih akata, posebno s obzirom na nedavno donesene zakone koji se tiču Ustavnog suda, točnije Zakon o statusu sudaca, Zakon o organizaciji i postupcima te Provedbeni zakon;
the rules applicable to the selection of candidates for the post of President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal and to the appointment of an acting President of the Constitutional Tribunal in the Law on organisation and proceedings and the Implementing Law.
pravilima primjenjivima na odabir kandidata za mjesto predsjednika i potpredsjednika Ustavnog suda te imenovanjem vršitelja dužnosti predsjednika Ustavnog suda iz Zakona o organizaciji i postupcima te Provedbenog zakona.
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016 [12], the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities implement fully the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 which requires that the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm can take up their judicial functions in the Constitutional Tribunal, and that the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis do not take up their judicial functions.
U svojoj Preporuci od 27. srpnja 2016. [12] Komisija je preporučila da poljske vlasti u potpunosti provedu odluke Ustavnog suda od 3. i 9. prosinca 2015. prema kojima tri suca koja je u listopadu 2015. zakonito predložio 7. saziv Sejma mogu preuzeti svoju dužnost sudaca na Ustavnom sudu, a tri suca koja je bez valjane pravne osnove predložio 8. saziv Sejma ne preuzimaju dužnost sudaca.
As regards the law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal the Commission noted that this law is contrary to the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December.
Kad je riječ o Zakonu o Ustavnom sudu od 22. srpnja 2016., Komisija je primijetila da je taj zakon suprotan odlukama Ustavnog suda od 3. i 9. prosinca.
Article 90 [13] requires the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to assign cases to all judges who have taken the oath before the President of the Republic but have not yet taken up their duties as judges.
Prema članku 90. [13] predsjednik Ustavnog suda dužan je dodjeljivati predmete svim sucima koji su položili prisegu pred predsjednikom Republike, ali nisu još preuzeli svoje dužnosti sudaca.
In its judgment of 11 August 2016 the Constitutional Tribunal found Article 90 of the Law of 22 July 2016 unconstitutional and the Venice Commission in its opinion of 14 October 2016, confirmed that that provision is not a solution in line with the principle of the rule of law [14].
U svojoj odluci od 11. kolovoza 2016. Ustavni sud utvrdio je da je članak 90. Zakona od 22. srpnja 2016. neustavan, a Venecijanska komisija u svojem je Mišljenju od 14. listopada 2016. potvrdila da ta odredba nije u skladu s načelom vladavine prava [14].
However, the Polish Government continues to refuse to recognise the validity of the judgment of 11 August 2016 and to publish it in the Official Journal (see section 3 below).
Međutim, poljska vlada i dalje odbija priznati valjanost odluke od 11. kolovoza 2016. i objaviti je u Službenom listu (vidjeti odjeljak 3. u nastavku).
In its reply of 27 October 2016 the Polish Government considers that the judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015 of the Tribunal did not specify which judges were to take up their function and considers that the new legislature of the Sejm has lawfully nominated the five judges in December 2015.
U svojem odgovoru od 27. listopada 2016. poljska vlada smatra da se u odlukama Ustavnog suda od 3. i 9. prosinca 2015. ne navodi koji suci stupaju na dužnost i smatra da je nova zakonodavna vlast Sejma na zakonit način predložila pet sudaca u prosincu 2015.
The reply concedes that in the operative part of the judgment of 3 December 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal addressed the duty of the President of the Republic to immediately take an oath from a judge elected to the Tribunal by the Sejm.
U odgovoru se prihvaća da u izreci odluke od 3. prosinca 2015. Ustavni sud spominje dužnost predsjednika Republike da odmah uzme prisegu suca kojeg je Sejm izabrao za člana Ustavnog suda.
It takes however the view that that judgment cannot bind other authorities to apply provisions in the manner specified in a given case.
Međutim, zauzima se stav da ta odluka ne može obvezati druga tijela da primjenjuju odredbe na način utvrđen za pojedini slučaj.
This interpretation limits the impact of the judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015 to a mere obligation for the Government to publish them but would deny them any further legal and operational effect, in particular as regards the obligation for the President of the Republic to take the oath of the judges in question.
Takvo tumačenje ograničava učinak odluka od 3. i 9. prosinca 2015. tek na obvezu vlade da ih objavi, ali osporava njihov daljnji pravni i operativni učinak, posebno u pogledu obveze predsjednika Republike da uzme prisegu dotičnih sudaca.
This interpretation goes against the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs which is, as underlined in the opinions of the Venice Commission, a constitutional precondition in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Takvo je tumačenje u suprotnosti s načelom lojalne suradnje državnih organa, koja je, kako je naglašeno u mišljenjima Venecijanske komisije, ustavni preduvjet u demokratskoj državi uređenoj vladavinom prava.
The Commission furthermore notes that also the Venice Commission considers that a solution to the current conflict over the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal ‘must be based on the obligation to respect and fully implement the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal’ and ‘therefore calls on all State organs and notably the Sejm to fully respect and implement the judgments’ [18].
Komisija nadalje napominje da i Venecijanska komisija smatra da rješenje postojećeg sukoba u pogledu sastava Ustavnog suda „mora biti temeljeno na obvezi poštovanja i potpune provedbe odluka Ustavnog suda” te „stoga poziva sve državne organe, a ponajprije Sejm, da u potpunosti poštuju i provedu te odluke” [18].
In addition, provisions [19] aiming at producing a similar result included in the Law on the status of judges, the Law on organisation and proceedings and in the Implementing Law are also inconsistent with these judgments and must not be applied.
Usto, odredbe [19] kojima se želi postići sličan učinak, uvrštene u Zakon o statusu sudaca, Zakon o organizaciji i postupcima te Provedbeni zakon također su nesukladne s navedenim odlukama i ne smiju se primjenjivati.
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016, the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities publish and implement fully the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2016 and its subsequent judgments and ensure that the publication of future judgments is automatic and does not depend on any decision of the executive or legislative powers.
U svojoj Preporuci od 27. srpnja 2016. Komisija preporučuje da poljske vlasti objave i u potpunosti provedu odluku Ustavnog suda od 9. ožujka 2016. i njegove kasnije odluke te osiguraju da se buduće odluke objavljuju automatski, neovisno o odlukama izvršnih ili zakonodavnih vlasti.
Furthermore, none of the 16 judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal rendered after 11 August 2016 have so far been published.
Nadalje, dosad nije objavljena nijedna od 16 odluka Ustavnog suda donesenih nakon 11. kolovoza 2016.
Article 89 of the Law of 22 July 2016 was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 11 August 2016 because of its inconsistency with the principles of the separation and balance of powers and the independence of courts and tribunals from other branches of power.
14. Članak 89. Zakona od 22. srpnja 2016. Ustavni je sud odlukom od 11. kolovoza 2016. proglasio neustavnim zbog kršenja načela diobe i ravnoteže vlasti te neovisnosti sudova od drugih grana vlasti.
The reply of the Polish Government of 27 October confirms that the Government still considers to have the power to check the lawfulness of judgments of the Tribunal and that the automatic publication of judgments cannot be ensured.
U odgovoru od 27. listopada poljska vlada potvrđuje da još smatra da ima ovlast provjeravanja zakonitosti odluka Ustavnog suda te da ne može osigurati automatsko objavljivanje odluka.
Article 114(1) and (2) of the Law on organisation and procedure provides that ‘Adjudications are published in the appropriate official journal, in accordance with the principles and in the manner laid down in the Constitution and the act of 20 July 2000 on the publication of the normative acts and certain other legal acts […]’.
U članku 114. stavcima 1. i 2. Zakona o organizaciji i postupcima stoji da se „odluke objavljuju u odgovarajućem službenom listu, u skladu s načelima i na način predviđen Ustavom i Zakonom od 20. srpnja 2000. o objavljivanju normativnih akata i određenih drugih pravnih akata […]”.
Moreover it is provided that ‘The President of the Tribunal orders publication of the adjudications.’ This provision is as such a step in the right direction.
Nadalje, predviđeno je da „predsjednik Ustavnog suda nalaže objavljivanje odluka”. U tom je smislu ta odredba korak u pravom smjeru.
Also the Venice Commission confirmed this position in its two opinions [21].
To je stajalište Venecijanska komisija potvrdila u svoja dva mišljenja [21].
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Article 114(2) of the Law on organisation and procedure will ensure that the future President of the Tribunal publishes all the judgments which have been adopted prior to his term of office.
Isto tako, nema jamstva da će se člankom 114. stavkom 2. Zakona o organizaciji i postupcima osigurati da budući predsjednik Ustavnog suda objavi sve odluke koje su donesene prije njegova imenovanja.
In conclusion, the fact that the Polish Government has so far refused to publish in the Official Journal the judgments of 9 March 2016 and 11 August 2016 relating to legislative acts on the Constitutional Tribunal, and all other judgments rendered by the Constitutional Tribunal since 11 August 2016, creates uncertainty as to the legal basis for the Tribunal's judicial activity and as to the legal effects of its decisions.
Kao zaključak, činjenica da je poljska vlada dosad odbila u Službenom listu objaviti odluke od 9. ožujka 2016. i 11. kolovoza 2016. koje se odnose na zakonodavne akte o Ustavnom sudu, kao i sve ostale odluke koje je Ustavni sud donio nakon 11. kolovoza 2016., stvara nesigurnost u pogledu pravne osnove za sudbene aktivnosti Ustavnog suda te pravnih učinaka njegovih odluka.
Compliance with final judgments is an essential requirement inherent in the rule of law.
Poštovanje konačnih odluka neophodan je uvjet neodvojiv od vladavine prava.
The refusal to publish a binding and final judgment denies the latter's automatic legal and operational effect and breaches the principles of legality and separation of powers.
Odbijanjem objavljivanja obvezujuće i konačne odluke osporava se njezin automatski pravni i operativni učinak te se krše načela zakonitosti i diobe vlasti.
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016, the Commission considered in detail the Law of 22 July 2016 and its impact, taking into account the effect of the provisions both individually and collectively, as well as the previous case law of the Constitutional Tribunal and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
U Preporuci od 27. srpnja 2016. Komisija je detaljno razmotrila Zakon od 22. srpnja 2016. i njegov učinak, uzimajući u obzir kako pojedinačan tako i zajednički učinak odredaba, kao i prethodnu sudsku praksu Ustavnog suda i mišljenje Venecijanske komisije.
However, this argument is irrelevant because the Tribunal has been able to do so precisely by not applying the procedural requirements at stake (judgment of 11 August 2016) and the Government is refusing to publish these same rulings of the Tribunal in an attempt to prevent them from taking legal effect.
Međutim, taj argument nije relevantan jer je Ustavni sud mogao donositi oduke upravo zato što nije primjenjivao dotične proceduralne zahtjeve (odluka od 11. kolovoza 2016.), a vlada odbija objaviti odluke Suda iz tog razdoblja u pokušaju da spriječi njihovo stupanje na snagu.
The reply also presents brief explanations on the compliance of the legislation mentioned above with fundamental rights.
Odgovor sadrži i kratko objašnjenje usklađenosti navedenih zakonodavnih propisa s temeljnim pravima.
The Commission observes that these explanations by the Government do not remove the need for a genuinely effective constitutional review by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Komisija primjećuje da ta objašnjenja vlade ne uklanjaju potrebu da Ustavni sud provede zaista učinkovito ocjenjivanje ustavnosti.
The reply also denies the fundamental role of the Constitutional Tribunal in ensuring the rule of law in Poland.
U odgovoru se također niječe temeljna uloga Ustavnog suda u osiguravanju vladavine prava u Poljskoj.
The Commission contests that statement.
Komisija osporava tu tvrdnju.
The Constitutional Tribunal is indeed one of the main guarantors of the rule of law in Poland, in particular as it is bestowed with the task of ruling on the constitutionality of Polish laws.
Ustavni je sud uistinu jedan od glavnih jamaca vladavine prava u Poljskoj, osobito jer mu je povjeren zadatak da odlučuje o ustavnosti poljskih zakona.
It clearly appears from the Polish constitution that the Constitutional Tribunal is competent to rule on the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the constitution, on the conformity of a statute to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute, on the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes, on the conformity to the constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties, and on complaints concerning constitutional infringements [22].
Iz poljskog Ustava jasno proizlazi da je Ustavni sud nadležan za odlučivanje o usklađenosti zakona i međunarodnih sporazuma s Ustavom, usklađenosti zakona s ratificiranim međunarodnim sporazumima čija ratifikacija zahtijeva prethodnu suglasnost koju dodjeljuje zakon, usklađenosti pravnih odredaba koje izdaju središnji državni organi s Ustavom, ratificiranim međunarodnim sporazumima i zakonima, usklađenosti s Ustavom svrhe ili aktivnosti političkih stranaka te o žalbama koje se tiču ustavnih povreda [22].
The Constitutional Tribunal shall also settle disputes over authority between central constitutional organs of the State [23].
Ustavni sud rješava i sporove o nadležnosti između središnjih ustavnih organa države [23].