natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denmark points out that neither that Member State nor any other public authority was involved in the negotiation of the agreements.
Danska ističe da u pregovore o tim ugovorima nisu bili uključeni ni ta država članica ni bilo koje drugo javno tijelo.
With regard to the negotiations of the 1999 agreements, Denmark clarifies that the 1999 agreements were negotiated directly by the airport's director and the public owners neither proposed nor approved the conditions included in the agreements.
U pogledu pregovora o ugovorima iz 1999., Danska pojašnjava da u ugovorima iz 1999. koji su vođeni izravno s ravnateljem zračne luke i javnim vlasnicima, nisu ni predloženi, niti odobreni uvjeti sadržani u ugovorima.
According to Denmark, the director negotiating the agreements, including the provided discounts, had contacts neither with the board of directors nor with any other local authority.
Prema Danskoj, direktor koji je pregovarao o ugovorima i dogovarao pružene popuste, nije bio u kontaktu ni sa upravnim odborom, ni s bilo kojim članom lokalnih vlasti.
Denmark further clarifies that the 1999 agreements were signed directly by the airport's director negotiating the agreements.
Danska dodatno pojašnjava da je ugovore iz 1999. potpisao izravno ravnatelj zračne luke koji je pregovarao o ugovorima.
Denmark explains further that the 1999 agreements were neither submitted for approval to the Danish civil aviation authorities, nor were the airport's charges approved by Denmark in the form of a schedule of charges or otherwise.
Danska nadalje objašnjava da ugovori iz 1999. nisu bili podneseni na odobrenje danskim tijelima za civilno zrakoplovstvo, niti je Danska odobrila pristojbe zračne luke u obliku cjenika ili na neki drugi način.
In order to support these statements (see recitals 15 to 19), Denmark provided a copy of the minutes of board meetings with the representatives of local authorities and also minutes of the annual general meetings.
Kao dokaz za ove izjave (vidjeti uvodne izjave 15. do 19.), Danska je dostavila primjerak zapisnika sastanaka odbora s predstavnicima lokalnih tijela i zapisnike sa godišnjih skupština.
As one of the cumulative conditions for the notion of State aid is not complied with, Denmark is of the opinion that the 1999 Ryanair agreements do not constitute State aid.
Kako jedan od kumulativnih uvjeta za dobivanje državne potpore nije ispoštovan, Danska je mišljenja da ugovori s Ryanairom iz 1999. ne predstavljaju državnu potporu.
The 1999 agreements between Aarhus airport and Ryanair
Ugovori iz 1999. između Zračne luke Aarhus i društva Ryanair
Denmark provided a copy of two agreements concluded between Aarhus airport and Ryanair in 1999 and further clarifications.
Danska je dostavila kopiju dvaju ugovora sklopljenih između Zračne luke Aarhus i društva Ryanair u 1999. i daljnja pojašnjenja.
The 1999 principal agreement
Glavni ugovor iz 1999.
Denmark clarifies that on 2 November 1999, Aarhus airport entered into an agreement with Ryanair (‘principal agreement’).
Danska pojašnjava da je 2. studenog 1999. Zračna luka Aarhus sklopila ugovor s Ryanairom („glavni ugovor”).
Denmark further states that the agreement was planned to be in force until 31 October 2009 (i.e. for a period of 10 years).
Danska dalje navodi da bilo planirano da Ugovor bude na snazi do 31. listopada 2009. (odnosno tijekom razdoblja od 10 godina).
Denmark states that the principal agreement obliged Ryanair to carry out at least […] [6] operation from Aarhus airport to London Stansted with a B737-type aircraft (allowing for a reduction in service only during public holiday periods, such as Christmas, New Year and Easter).
Danska navodi da je prema glavnom ugovoru Ryanair dužan provesti barem […] [6] operaciju od Zračne luke Aarhus do London Stansteda s tipom zrakoplova B737 (s mogućnošću smanjenja usluga samo tijekom razdoblja državnih praznika, kao što su Božić, Nova godina i Uskrs).
Denmark clarifies that according to the principal agreement Ryanair was obliged to generate at least […] passengers per annum at Aarhus airport between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2001.
Danska pojašnjava da je prema glavnom ugovoru Ryanair bio dužan u Zračnu luku Aarhus između 1. siječnja 2001. i 31. prosinca 2001. dovesti najmanje […] putnika godišnje.
With regard to the fees to be paid by Ryanair, Denmark explains that, according to the principal agreement, Ryanair was obliged to pay to Aarhus airport the following fees summarised in Table 2.
S obzirom na naknade koje Ryanair treba platiti, Danska pojašnjava da je, prema glavnom ugovoru, Ryanair Zračnoj luci Aarhus bio dužan platiti sljedeće naknade navedene u tablici 2.
Airport charges to be paid by Ryanair to Aarhus airport according to the principal agreement concluded in 1999
Pristojbe zračne luke koje Ryanair plaća Zračnoj luci Aarhus prema glavnom ugovoru sklopljenom 1999.
Airport charges to be paid by Ryanair
Pristojbe zračne luke koje plaća Ryanair
Landing/Take off fee per rotation (including noise surcharge and local air traffic control)
Naknada za slijetanje/uzlijetanje po rotaciji (uključujući dodatnu naknadu za buku i lokalnu kontrolu zračnog prometa)
DKK […]
[…] DKK
Passenger Service Charge per departing passenger
Pristojba zračne luke po putniku koji odlazi
Night fee
Noćna naknada
As per standard tariff
Prema standardnoj tarifi
Passenger and ramp handling charge per rotation
Putnička pristojba i pristojba za rukovanje rampom po rotaciji
Denmark points out that according to the principal agreement Aarhus airport was obliged to give Ryanair a rebate of DKK […] (for the first […] years, i.e. […]), or DKK […] (for the last […] years, i.e. […]) of passenger service charge (this means […] discount on the applicable passenger service charge), if Ryanair collects a net revenue of DKK […] or less per one-way passenger on the London Stansted route.
Danska ističe da je prema glavnom ugovoru Zračna luka Aarhus bila dužna Ryanairu dati popust od […] DKK (za prvih […] godina, to jest […]), ili […] DKK (za posljednjih […] godina, odnosno […]) na pristojbe zračne luke (to znači popust od […] na pristojbu zračne luke), ako Ryanair prikupi neto prihod od […] DKK ili manje po jednosmjernom putniku na liniji prema London Stanstedu.
Denmark clarifies that this was the case from 1999 onwards.
Danska pojašnjava da je to bio slučaj od 1999. nadalje.
The 1999 marketing agreement
Ugovor o marketingu iz 1999.
Denmark points out that on the same day, 2 November 1999, Ryanair and Aarhus airport concluded a second agreement (‘marketing agreement’).
Danska ističe da su na isti dan, 2. studenoga 1999. Ryanair i Zračna luka Aarhus sklopili i drugi ugovor („ugovor o marketingu”).
Denmark explains that the marketing agreement obliged Aarhus airport to pay to Ryanair:
Danska pojašnjava da se ugovorom o marketingu Zračna luka Aarhus obvezala Ryanairu platiti:
an amount equal to […] incurred by Ryanair in accordance with the principal agreement and
i. iznos jednak […] koje je Ryanair trebao platiti u skladu s glavnim ugovorom; i
all increases in the level of passenger service charge at Aarhus airport over DKK […] and over DKK […].
sva uvećanja razine pristojbi zračne luke u Zračnoj luci Aarhus veća od […] DKK po putniku te veća od […] DKK.
Denmark explains further that, according to the marketing agreement, the reduction of landing/take-off/night fee charges was deemed to be marketing support.
Danska nadalje objašnjava da se, prema ugovoru o marketingu, smanjenje naknada slijetanja/polijetanja/noćne naknade smatralo marketinškom potporom.
Denmark states that Aarhus airport did not know the purpose of the marketing support paid but assumed that it was to share the costs for the Aarhus/London-Stansted route.
Danska navodi da Zračna luka Aarhus nije znala svrhu plaćanja marketinške potpore, ali pretpostavljalo se da je njena namjena podjela troškova rute Aarhus/London-Stansted.
Application of the Market Economy Operator Principle and selectivity
Primjena načela subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu i selektivnosti
Regarding the application of the Market Economy Operator Principle (‘MEOP’), Denmark is of the opinion that the Commission should compare the behaviour of Arhus airport with the supposed conduct of a private operator guided by prospects of long-term profitability and pursuing a sectoral policy.
Što se tiče primjene načela subjekta u tržišnom gospodarstvu („MEOP” – Market economy Operator Principle), Danska smatra da bi Komisija trebala usporediti ponašanje Zračne luke Aarhus s pretpostavljenim ponašanjem privatnog subjekta vođenog izgledima dugoročne profitabilnosti koji slijedi sektorsku politiku.
Denmark states that the profitability of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair needs to be assessed for the entire expected duration of the agreements in questions (this means a period of 10 years).
Danska navodi da profitabilnost ugovora iz 1999. s Ryanairom treba procijeniti za cijelo očekivano trajanje predmetnog ugovora (to znači razdoblje od 10 godina).
Denmark states that the 1999 agreements had a positive impact on the airport's finances for the period 1999 to 2009.
Danska tvrdi da su ugovori iz 1999. imali pozitivan učinak na financije zračne luke za razdoblje od 1999. do 2009.
Denmark clarifies that, at the time of the conclusion of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair, Aarhus airport was facing the following challenges: First, it was competing for airlines and passengers with Billund airport, which had as the largest airport in the Jutland region a strategically stronger competitive position.
Danska pojašnjava da je, u trenutku sklapanja ugovora iz 1999. s Ryanairom, Zračna luka Aarhus bila suočena sa sljedećim izazovima: prvo, natjecala se za zračne prijevoznike i putnike sa zračnom lukom Billund, koja je kao najveća zračna luka u regiji Jutland imala strateški jači konkurentan položaj.
Second, Aarhus airport was only operating at 40 % of its capacity and had already suffered from a decrease in passengers from approximately 860000 to approximately 596000 from 1996 to 1999, with a further decrease expected in the coming years.
Drugo, Zračna luka Aarhus radila je na samo 40 % svojih kapaciteta i već je patila od smanjenja broja prevezenih putnika s otprilike 860000 putnika 1996. na otprilike 596000 putnika 1999., uz očekivano daljnje smanjenje u narednim godinama.
Third, the military activity of the airport, Tirstrup Air Base, had ceased, which meant that the Aarhus annual net costs associated with air traffic control, fire and rescue services, technical and ground services had risen by DKK 10-12 million.
Treće, vojna aktivnost zračne luke Tirstrup Air Base ugašena je, što je značilo da su godišnji neto troškovi Aarhusa u pogledu kontrole zračnog prometa, vatrogasne i spasilačke službe, tehničkih usluga i zemaljskih usluga porasli za 10 do 12 milijuna DKK.
Fourth, a new motorway (namely, the Djursland motorway) providing a faster and easier transport link with Tirstrup, was scheduled to open in 2004.
Četvrto, 2004. se trebala otvoriti nova autocesta (naime, autocesta Djursland) kao brža i lakša transportna veza s Tirstrupom.
Denmark explains further that the Great Belt Bridge had been opened (giving travellers the option of driving from Aarhus to Copenhagen) and the SAS route to London had been closed.
Danska nadalje objašnjava da je most Great Belt Bridge bio otvoren (omogućujući putnicima vožnju od Aarhusa do Kopenhagena), a SAS-ova ruta za London bila je zatvorena.
Denmark points out that the opening of the Great Belt Bridge reduced the journey time between Aarhus and Copenhagen from approximately five hours to approximately three hours for alternative means of transport (car/train/express ferry).
Danska ističe da je otvaranjem mosta Great Belt Bridge vrijeme potrebno za putovanja između Aarhusa i Copenhagena alternativnim prijevoznim sredstvima (automobil/vlak/brzi trajekt) skraćeno s otprilike pet sati na približno tri sata.
Denmark points out that against this background (see recitals 32 and 33) Aarhus airport had to provide incentives in order to attract new clients and fill the idle capacity.
Danska ističe da je zbog ovakvih okolnosti (vidjeti uvodne izjave 32. i 33.) Zračna luka Aarhus morala davati poticaje kako bi privukla nove klijente i popunila kapacitete praznog hoda.
Denmark clarifies that Aarhus airport's director estimated that Ryanair would be able to attract to the airport around […] additional passengers per annum.
Danska pojašnjava da je direktor Zračne luke Aarhus procijenio da će Ryanair biti u stanju u zračnu luku privući otprilike […] dodatnih putnika godišnje.
Denmark states that, on the basis of these passenger forecasts, the agreements were expected to generate a net income of approximately DKK […] (EUR […]) in 2001.
Danska navodi da su, na osnovu tih putničkih prognoza, ugovori trebali 2001. generirati neto prihod od otprilike […] DKK ([…] EUR).
Denmark explains that the reliability of the director's forecasts was confirmed by the actual results, such as for example in 2001 the net income generated by the 1999 agreements was DKK […] (EUR […]).
Danska objašnjava da su pouzdanost prognoze direktora potvrdili i stvarni rezultati, kao na primjer, kada je 2001. zabilježen neto prihod u iznosu od […] DKK ([…] EUR) od ugovora iz 1999.
Denmark stresses that all costs (such as, for example, marketing, ground handling and other costs) incurred by the airport in connection with the entry into the agreement with Ryanair are financed directly through the revenue generated by that agreement.
Danska naglašava da su svi ti troškovi (kao što su, na primjer, marketing, zemaljske usluge i drugi troškovi) koje je zračna luka imala zbog sklapanja ugovora s Ryanairom financirani izravno iz prihoda proizašlih iz tog ugovora.
In addition, Denmark states that the net income generated by the agreement contributes to the overall profitability of the airport.
Osim toga, Danska navodi da neto prihod generiran ugovorom doprinosi ukupnoj profitabilnosti zračne luke.
Denmark points out that the 1999 Ryanair agreements did not require any investments from Aarhus airport, because the airport was only operated at 40 % of its capacity.
Danska ističe da ugovori s Ryanairom iz 1999. nisu zahtijevali nikakve investicije od strane Zračne luke Aarhus, jer je zračna luka radila samo na 40 % svojih mogućnosti.
Denmark clarifies that also with regard to Aarhus airport's operating costs the 1999 agreements with Ryanair provided that the staff could cover up to 60 % of the capacity, for example the ground handling staff had already been financed from the airport's other income.
Danska pojašnjava da su u vezi s operativnim troškovima Zračne luke Aarhus ugovori iz 1999. s Ryanairom omogućili da osoblje pokriva i do 60 % kapaciteta, na primjer osoblje zemaljskih usluga već se financiralo iz drugih prihoda te zračne luke.
With regard to the marketing support to be paid by Aarhus airport to Ryanair according to the marketing agreement, Denmark points out that the management of the airport expected that Ryanair would assist the airport by increasing its exposure.
S obzirom na marketinšku potporu koju Zračna luka Aarhus prema ugovoru o marketingu plaća Ryanairu, Danska ističe da je uprava zračne luke očekivala da će Ryanair pomoći zračnoj luci povećanjem njene izloženosti.
Denmark further clarifies that at the same time Aarhus airport decided to downsize its other marketing activities as these were replaced by Ryanair, such as among others the advertising of Aarhus airport on Ryanair's website and at the airports served.
Danska dodatno pojašnjava da je Zračna luka Aarhus istodobno smanjila svoje druge marketinške aktivnosti jer ih je zamijenio Ryanair, kao što su među ostalima oglašavanje zračne luke Aarhus na internetskoj stranici Ryanaira i u zračnim lukama koje opslužuje.
Denmark clarifies that Aarhus airport's intention was to increase its revenues through the increase in passengers and non-aeronautical revenue (such as shopping or parking revenue).
Danska pojašnjava da je Zračna luka Aarhus namjeravala povećati svoje prihode kroz povećanje broja putnika i ne-zrakoplovnih prihoda (kao što su prihodi od kupovine ili parkinga).
Denmark clarifies further that, at the time when the 1999 Ryanair agreements were concluded, Aarhus airport expected the paid parking to be a major potential income generator.
Danska nadalje pojašnjava da je u vrijeme kada su 1999. sklopljeni ugovori s Ryanairom Zračna luka Aarhus očekivala da će plaćanje parkiranja biti glavni potencijalni izvor prihoda.
With regard to the shopping revenue, Denmark clarifies that only 30 % of the airport's available capacity was being leased out.
Što se tiče prihoda od kupovine, Danska pojašnjava da je samo 30 % raspoloživih kapaciteta zračne luke bilo u zakupu.
For these reasons, Denmark is of the opinion that the 1999 agreements with Ryanair were concluded in accordance with the MEOP as these agreements were expected to contribute in 1999 to 2009 around DKK […] to the profitability of the airport and increased thus the financial viability of the airport operator.
Iz tih razloga, Danska je mišljenja da su ugovori iz 1999. s Ryanairom sklopljeni u skladu s MEOP-om budući da se od ugovora očekivalo da će od 1999. do 2009. doprinijeti otprilike […] danskih kruna (DKK) te će tako utjecati na profitabilnost zračne luke, a time i na povećanje financijske održivosti upravitelja zračne luke.
In order to support this position, Denmark provided the business plan and profitability assumptions of the management of the airport operator.
Kao dokaz toga, Danska je dostavila poslovni plan i pretpostavke o profitabilnosti uprave upravitelja zračne luke.
Table 3 summarises the expected profitability of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair provided by Denmark:
Tablica 3 sažima očekivanu profitabilnost ugovora iz 1999. s Ryanairom koje je dostavila Danska:
Overview of the expected profitability of the 1999 Ryanair agreements for Aarhus airport in 1000 DKK
Pregled očekivane profitabilnosti ugovora s Ryanairom iz 1999. za zračnu luku Aarhus u tisućama DKK
Total (nominal)
Ukupno (nominalno)
Aeronautical revenue
Zrakoplovni prihodi
Non-aeronautical revenue
Ne-zrakolovni prihodi
Ground handling
Zemaljske usluge
Results from 1999 Ryanair agreements
Rezultati ugovora s Ryanairom iz 1999.
Denmark clarifies that Ryanair does not receive a selective advantage as the discounts granted on the basis of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair have been previously granted also to SAS.
Danska pojašnjava da Ryanair ne prima selektivnu prednost jer su popusti iz ugovora s Ryanairom iz 1999. prethodno bili odobreni i SAS-u.
Further, Denmark pointed out that in 1999, Cimber Air A/S and Maersk Air A/S were also granted the same 50 % discount as Ryanair.
Nadalje, Danska ističe da su 1999., društva Cimber Air A/S i Maersk Air A/S također dobila isti popust od 50 % kao i Ryanair.
Denmark further states that also the regional airline Sunair and EasyJet (previously Go) received offers for a similar discount agreement.
Danska nadalje navodi da su i regionalni zračni prijevoznici Sunair i EasyJet (prethodno Go) također primili ponude za ugovor sa sličnim popustom.
In order to support this Denmark provided copies of these letters.
U svrhu dokaza Danska je dostavila kopije tih dopisa.
Denmark takes the view that the 1999 agreements concluded between Aarhus airport and Ryanair were concluded on market terms and do not confer an advantage on Ryanair, and thus do not constitute State aid.
Stajalište Danske jest da su ugovori iz 1999. sklopljeni između Zračne luke Aarhus i Ryanaira sklopljeni po tržišnim uvjetima i da se njima Ryanairu ne daje prednost te stoga ne predstavljaju državnu potporu.
Moreover, Denmark clarifies that the expected profitability was also confirmed by actual financial results of the airport manager.
Nadalje, Danska pojašnjava da je očekivana profitabilnost potvrđena i stvarnim financijskim rezultatima upravitelja zračne luke.
Denmark states further that for example Aarhus airport achieved net profits of around DKK 2 million in 2010, also for the next years positive results are expected.
Danska dalje navodi da je na primjer 2010. Zračna luka Aarhus ostvarila neto dobit od otprilike dva milijuna DKK, a i za naredne se godine očekuju pozitivni rezultati.
Denmark points out that the profits are the result of the gradual increase in passengers and the long-term switch from domestic to international flights following the opening of the Great Belt Bridge.
Danska ističe da je profit rezultat postupnog povećanja broja putnika i dugoročnog prelaska s domaćih na međunarodne letove nakon otvaranja mosta The Great Belt Bridge.
The Commission has received observations from three interested parties.
Komisija je zaprimila komentare tri zainteresirane strane.
Ryanair began its observations dated 29 May 2008 by stating that in its opinion the initiation of a formal investigation procedure was unjustified and unnecessary.
Ryanair je počeo svoje očitovanje od 29. svibnja 2008. navodeći da je prema njegovom mišljenju pokretanje postupka formalne istrage neopravdano i nepotrebno.
It also stated that it regrets that the Commission did not give Ryanair the possibility to engage itself in the preliminary examination.
Također navodi da mu je žao što mu Komisija nije dala mogućnost da sudjeluje u preliminarnom ispitivanju.
On the substance of the case Ryanair is of the opinion that the Commission should have based itself on standard commercial arrangements and on this basis it should have decided that the 1999 agreements comply with the MEOP, hence it does not involve State aid.
O biti predmeta Ryanair smatra da se Komisija trebala temeljiti na standardnim trgovačkim ugovorima i na temelju odlučiti da su ugovori iz 1999. u skladu s MEOP-om i stoga ne uključuju državnu potporu.
Ryanair is of the opinion that the manager of Aarhus airport is benefiting from its presence at the airport.
Ryanair je mišljenja da direktor Zračne luke Aarhus ima koristi od njegove prisutnosti u zračnoj luci.
With regard to the MEOP, Ryanair states that on the revenue side, both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues must be taken into account.
S obzirom na MEOP, Ryanair tvrdi da se sa strane prihoda, u obzir moraju uzeti zrakoplovni i ne-zrakoplovni prihodi.
On the costs side, Ryanair points out that the relevant costs to be taken into account are the incremental costs of entering the respective agreements with an airline.
Što se tiče troškova, Ryanair ističe da su relevantni troškovi koje treba uzeti u obzir dodatni troškovi sklapanja predmetnih ugovora sa zračnim prijevoznikom.
Ryanair is of the opinion that neither sunk costs nor fixed overhead costs should be taken into account.
Ryanair je mišljenja da ni nepovratne troškove, niti fiksne režijske troškove ne treba uzeti u obzir.
Ryanair states that if an airline enters into an agreement with an airport which is incrementally profitable, the agreement does not contain any aid.
Ryanair navodi da ako zračni prijevoznik sa zračnom lukom stupa u ugovor koji je postupno isplativ, ugovor ne sadrži potpore.
Ryanair states that, in general, a market economy operator is not expected to enter into agreements which are incrementally loss-making.
Ryanair tvrdi da, općenito, subjekt u tržišnom gospodarstvu ne sklapa ugovore koji će postupno stvarati gubitke.
On the other hand, Ryanair states that an exception should be made if an airport is inefficient at the time the agreement is concluded, but believes the agreement will, in some way, help it to improve its efficiency.
S druge strane, Ryanair tvrdi da je potrebno napraviti iznimku ako je zračna luka neučinkovita u vrijeme kada je ugovor sklopljen, ali vjeruje da će ugovor, na neki način, pomoći da se poboljšanju njezine učinkovitosti.
In that case, according to Ryanair, the deal could be profitable even if at the time of signing the agreement it appears to be below its incremental costs.
U tom slučaju, prema Ryanairu, ugovor bi mogao biti profitabilan, čak i ako se u vrijeme sklapanja ugovora čini da je on ispod njegovih dodatnih troškova.