natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On the other hand, the Commission recalls that at the time the first State loan and the BAS loan were granted, the Agreement stipulated that the conditions of both were identical and linked, and therefore any change in one of the loans would result in an identical change on the other loan.
S druge strane, Komisija podsjeća da je u trenutku kada su odobreni prvi državni zajam i zajam BAS, u Sporazumu bilo propisano da su uvjeti oba zajma jednaki i povezani i stoga bi promjena jednog zajma uzrokovala istovjetnu promjena u drugom zajmu.
The reduction of the interest rate is therefore mirrored for both loans and the very significant level of collateralisation of the loan and the fact that the BAS loan was not collateralised remain unchanged.
Smanjenje kamatne stope stoga se odražava u oba zajma i vrlo visoka razina osiguranja zajma i činjenica da za zajam BAS-a nije bilo jamstva ostale su iste.
Since BAS had agreed up front to link the conditions of the BAS loan to those of the first State loan, the Commission has no reasons to consider that this would not be a market-conform decision.
Budući da je BAS unaprijed pristao povezati uvjete zajma BAS-a s uvjetima prvog državnog zajma, Komisija nema razloga smatrati da ta odluka ne bi bila spojiva s tržištem.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that even taking into account the reduction of the interest rate, measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and the presence of state aid can be excluded.
Na temelju toga, Komisija zaključuje da čak i ako se uzme u obzir smanjenje kamatne stope, 1. mjerom nije pružena selektivna prednost društvu airBaltic i može se isključiti postojanje državne potpore.
The second State loan (measure 2)
Drugi državni zajam (2. mjera)
The second State loan was provided directly by Latvia through the State Treasury, by means of a decision of the Latvian Government of 13 December 2011 authorising the Ministry of Finance to provide in the State budget for a convertible loan to airBaltic of LVL 67 million (EUR 94,86 million).
Drugi državni zajam pružila je izravno Latvija putem Državne riznice, odlukom latvijske vlade od 13. prosinca 2011. kojom se Ministarstvo financija ovlašćuje da iz državnog proračuna isplati konvertibilni zajam društvu airBaltic u iznosu od 67 milijuna LVL (94,86 milijuna EUR).
Therefore, measure 2 entails State resources and is imputable to the State.
Stoga je jasno da 2. mjera uključuje državna sredstva i da se može pripisati državi.
The Commission observes that at the time when the second State loan was provided, i.e. 13 December 2011, BAS had lost its entire shareholding in airBaltic, with the exception of one share, and the State now owned 99,8 % of the company.
Komisija primjećuje da je u trenutku kada je odobren drugi državni zajam, odnosno 13. prosinca 2011., BAS izgubio svoj cijeli vlasnički udio u društvu airBaltic, osim jedne dionice, te da država sada posjeduje 99,8 % društva.
Therefore, the State and BAS were no longer in a comparable position as shareholders.
Stoga država i BAS više nisu bili u jednakom položaju kao dioničari.
Latvia argues that pursuant to Article 7.2 of the Agreement, which states that Latvia would provide a loan to airBaltic ‘in proportion to its shareholding’, BAS was obliged to provide funds to airBaltic in an amount corresponding to its number of shares.
Latvija tvrdi da je, u skladu s člankom 7. stavkom 2. Sporazuma, u kojem je navedeno da će Latvija odobriti zajam društvu airBaltic „razmjerno svom vlasničkom udjelu”, BAS morao društvu airBaltic osigurati sredstva u iznosu koji odgovara broju dionica koje posjeduje.
This was to be done by BAS at the time of the capital injection of December 2011 in the form of cash.
BAS je to učinio u trenutku injekcije kapitala u prosincu 2011. u obliku gotovine.
The Commission notes, however, that on 13 December 2011 BAS only had one share in airBaltic.
Komisija primjećuje, međutim, da je 13. prosinca 2011. BAS imao samo jednu dionicu u društvu airBaltic.
It follows that the State should have adopted the position of a prudent market economy investor and assessed whether, given the change in circumstances concerning the shareholdings, BAS had any incentive to inject cash into the company at the time of the capital increase.
Na temelju toga može se zaključiti da je država trebala zauzeti stav mudrog ulagača u tržišnom gospodarstvu i ocijeniti ima li BAS, s obzirom na promjenu okolnosti u pogledu vlasničkog udjela, poticaj da uloži gotovinu u poduzeće u trenutku povećanja kapitala.
In fact, the State had foreseen this possibility and included in the Agreement several contingency measures — in particular in Article 7.4 — in case BAS failed to fulfil its commitments.
Štoviše, država je predvidjela tu mogućnost i u Sporazum je uključila nekoliko mjera za nepredviđene situacije, posebno članak 7. stavak 4., za slučaj da BAS ne ispuni svoje obveze.
Moreover, as Latvia acknowledges, the second tranche of the second State loan was to be released in the event that BAS failed to provide additional funds.
Nadalje, kao što je potvrdila Latvija, drugi obrok drugog državnog zajma trebao je biti pušten u slučaju da BAS ne osigura dodatna sredstva.
Article 7.4 of the Agreement gave the State the right to purchase from BAS all its shares in airBaltic for LVL 1.
Člankom 7. stavkom 4. Sporazuma državi je osigurano pravo da kupi sve svoje dionice u društvu airBaltic od BAS-a za 1 LVL.
At the time the Agreement was signed, this meant a guarantee for the State that BAS would fulfil its commitments or else would lose all its shares in airBaltic.
U trenutku kada je potpisan Sporazum, to je državi predstavljalo jamstvo da će BAS ispuniti svoje obveze ili inače izgubiti svoje dionice u društvu airBaltic.
However, the situation changed radically on 30 November 2011, when Latvijas Krājbanka sold all except one of the airBaltic shares owned by BAS to the Latvian State (see recital 21 above).
Međutim, situacija se bitno promijenila 30. studenoga 2011., kada je društvo Latvijas Krājbanka prodalo latvijskoj državi sve dionice društva airBaltic u vlasništvu BAS-a osim jedne (vidjeti prethodnu uvodnu izjavu 21.).
In this new context, Article 7.4 was deprived of its meaning.
U ovom novom kontekstu, članak 7. stavak 4. izgubio je svoje značenje.
Indeed, with only one share, BAS had little incentive to fulfil its obligations: the consequence of not doing so would simply mean losing its only share in airBaltic.
Zaista, budući da je imao samo 1 dionicu, BAS nije imao poticaja ispuniti svoje obveze: posljedica neispunjenja obveza bio bi gubitak samo jedne dionice u društvu airBaltic.
A prudent market operator would have carefully considered providing additional funds to airBaltic under those new circumstances and, at the very least, would have asked the other party (i.e. BAS) for assurance that it would indeed commit funds to the company.
Razuman tržišni subjekt pažljivo bi razmotrio mogućnost ulaganja dodatnih sredstava u društvo airBaltic u tim novim okolnostima i, u najmanju ruku, tražio bi od druge stranke (tj. BAS-a) jamstvo da će zaista uložiti sredstva u poduzeće.
The Commission notes in addition that it seems unlikely that such assurance would have been given since BAS would have needed to inject a very high amount of money — much more than it could have originally estimated — in order to regain its former shareholding of 47,2 % or any other meaningful level of shares in airBaltic.
Komisija također napominje da se ne čini vjerojatnim da bi to jamstvo i dobio jer bi BAS trebao zaista uložiti veliki iznos novca – znatno više od izvorno predviđenog – kako bi vratio svoj izvorni udio od 47,2 % ili bilo koji značajni broj dionica u društvu airBaltic.
Latvia also indicates that the second State loan was granted at market terms, thereby excluding any undue advantage to airBaltic.
Latvija također navodi da je drugi državi zajam odobren pod tržišnim uvjetima, čime isključuje mogućnost da je pružena neopravdana prednost društvu airBaltic.
As regards the collateral, Latvia noted that the second State loan had the same collateral as the first State loan, i.e. receivables and the trademarks of airBaltic.
U pogledu jamstva, Latvija je napomenula da drugi državni zajam ima istovjetno jamstvo kao prvi državni zajam, odnosno, potraživanja i žigove društva airBaltic.
As explained in paragraph (101) above, the liquidation value of the collateral was estimated at LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million).It thus appears that the level of collateralisation available for the second State loan would be low.
Kao što je objašnjeno u prethodnoj uvodnoj izjavi 101., procijenjena likvidacijska vrijednost jamstva iznosila je [15 – 25] milijuna LVL ([21,3 – 35,5] milijuna EUR). Stoga se čini da bi za drugi zajam bila dostupna niska razina osiguranja.
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that a private market operator would accept that security already in place on the first State loan would be reduced below at least 100 %.
Osim toga, nema razloga pretpostaviti da bi privatni tržišni subjekt prihvatio da bi se postojeće jamstvo prvog državnog zajma smanjilo ispod najmanje 100 %.
In order to ascertain the market conformity of the rate applied to the first tranche of the second State loan, the Commission will use as the best available proxy the rate resulting from the application of the Reference Rate Communication.
Kako bi se osigurala spojivost stope prvog obroka drugog državnog zajma s tržištem, Komisija će upotrijebiti kao najbližu vrijednost stopu koja slijedi iz primjene Komunikacije o referentnoj kamatnoj stopi.
The base rate for Latvia on 13 December 2011 was 2,2 %.
Osnovna stopa za Latviju na dan 13. prosinca 2011. iznosila je 2,2 %.
To this figure, a margin should be added depending on the rating of the beneficiary and the collateralisation of the loan.
Toj bi se brojci trebala dodati marža ovisno o rejtingu korisnika i osiguranju zajma.
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the level of collateralisation is low.
Kako je navedeno u prethodnom stavku, razina osiguranja bila je niska.
Given the difficulties of airBaltic at the time, it follows from the Reference Rate Communication that a margin of 1000 basis points should be added to the base rate, resulting in a rate of 12,2 %.
S obzirom na poteškoće društva airBaltic u tom trenutku, iz Komunikacije o referentnoj kamatnoj stopi može se zaključiti da bi osnovnoj stopi trebalo dodati maržu od 1000 osnovnih bodova te bi stopa na kraju trebala iznositi 12,2 %.
It therefore appears that the interest rate of [9 — 11] % on the first tranche of the second State loan cannot be considered to be market conform.
Stoga se čini da se kamatna stopa od [9 – 11] % za prvi obrok drugog državnog zajma ne može smatrati spojivom s tržištem.
The second tranche of the second State loan was made available to the company on 14 December 2012 at an interest rate of [6 — 8] %.
Drugi je obrok drugog državnog zajma postao dostupan društvu 14. prosinca 2012. uz kamatnu stopu od [6 – 8] %.
Latvia argues that this interest rate is above the one resulting from the Reference Rate Communication and is therefore MEIP-conform.
Latvija tvrdi da je ta stopa iznad stope utvrđene primjenom Komunikacije o referentnoj kamatnoj stopi i stoga je sukladna s MEIP-om.
According to the Reference Rate Communication, the applicable base rate for Latvia on 14 December 2012 was 1,91 %.
U skladu s Komunikacijom o referentnoj kamatnoj stopi, primjenjiva osnovna stopa za Latviju iznosila je 14. prosinca 2012. ukupno 1,91 %.
The margin to be added to that base rate depends on the rating of the beneficiary and the level of collateralisation.
Marža koju treba dodati na tu osnovnu stopu ovisi o rejtingu korisnika i o razini osiguranja.
As explained in section 7.1 above, the Commission is of the view that airBaltic was a firm in difficulty since at least 2011.
Kako je objašnjeno u prethodnom odjeljku 7.1, Komisija smatra da je društvo airBaltic bilo poduzeće u teškoćama barem od 2011.
In addition, the second tranche had as collateral the receivables and the trademarks of airBaltic.
Osim toga, jamstvo za drugi obrok bila su potraživanja i žigovi društva airBaltic.
The arguments about the insufficiency of the collateral would apply mutatis mutandis, and thus a margin of 1000 basis points should be added.
Argumenti o nedovoljnosti jamstva primjenjivali bi se mutatis mutandis i stoga treba dodati maržu od 1000 baznih bodova.
The resulting reference rate would therefore be 11,91 %, well above the [6 — 8] % actually applied.
Posljedična referentna kamatna stopa stoga bi iznosila 11,91 %, što je znatno iznad stope od [6 – 8] % koja se stvarno primjenjivala.
Bearing all of the above in mind, the Commission considers that a prudent market economy operator would not have provided the second State loan to airBaltic.
Imajući na umu sve navedeno, Komisija smatra da razuman subjekt u tržišnom gospodarstvu društvu airBaltic ne bi odobrio drugi državni zajam.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that measure 2 conferred an undue advantage on airBaltic.
Na osnovu toga Komisija zaključuje da je 2. mjerom društvu airBaltic osigurana neopravdana prednost.
This advantage was selective in nature given that its sole beneficiary was airBaltic.
Ta je prednost bila selektivne prirode jer je njezin jedini korisnik bio airBaltic.
The Commission must also consider whether measure 2 was likely to distort competition and affect trade between Member States, by providing airBaltic with an advantage over competitors not receiving public support.
Komisija mora također razmotriti hoće li se 2. mjerom narušiti tržišno natjecanje i hoće li ona utjecati na trgovinu između država članica pružajući društvu airBaltic prednost pred konkurentima koji ne dobivaju javnu potporu.
It seems clear that measure 2 was able to affect intra-EU trade and competition as airBaltic competes with other EU airlines, in particular since the entry into force of the third stage of liberalisation of air transport (‘third package’) on 1 January 1993.
Razvidno je da je 2. mjera mogla utjecati na trgovinu unutar EU-a i na tržišno natjecanje jer se društvo airBaltic natječe s drugim zrakoplovnim prijevoznicima u EU-u, posebno od stupanja na snagu treće faze liberalizacije zračnog prijevoza („treći paket”) 1. siječnja 1993.
In addition, for travel of relatively shorter distances within the EU, air travel is in competition with road and rail transport, and therefore road and rail carriers might also be affected.
Osim toga, na relativno kraćim putovanjima unutar EU-a zračni promet natječe se s cestovnim i željezničkim prometom i stoga bi to moglo utjecati i na cestovne i željezničke prijevoznike.
Measure 2 thus enabled airBaltic to continue operating so that it did not have to face the consequences normally deriving from its difficult financial situation.
Zahvaljujući 2. mjeri društvo airBaltic moglo je nastaviti s radom i nije se moralo suočiti s posljedicama koje bi obično proizašle iz njegove teške financijske situacije.
Based on the considerations set out above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that measure 2 involved state aid for the benefit of airBaltic within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Na temelju prethodno navedenih razmatranja, Komisija je došla do zaključka da 2. mjera predstavlja državnu potporu u korist društva airBaltic u smislu članka 107. stavka 1. UFEU-a.
The capital increase agreed on 22 December 2011 (measure 3)
Povećanje kapitala dogovoreno 22. prosinca 2011. (3. mjera)
As indicated above, the first State loan and the first tranche of the second State loan entail State resources and are imputable to the State.
Kako je prethodno navedeno, prvi državni zajam i prvi obrok drugog državnog zajma uključuju državna sredstva i pripisuju se državi.
Their conversion into capital was decided by the Ministry of Transport of Latvia, i.e. 99,8 % shareholder in airBaltic since 30 November 2011.
O njihovoj konverziji u kapital odlučilo je Ministarstvo prometa Latvije, koje je od 30. studenoga 2011. dioničar s 99,8 % udjela u društvu airBaltic.
Therefore, measure 3 also entails State resources and is imputable to the State.
Prema tome, 3. mjera uključuje državna sredstva i može se pripisati državi.
The Commission does not share the views of the Latvian authorities that measure 3 does not entail aid.
Komisija se ne slaže sa stajalištem latvijskih nadležnih tijela da 3. mjera ne predstavlja državnu potporu.
In the first place, the Commission reiterates that the conclusions reached in section 7.2.1 above are applicable to measure 3.
Komisija u prvom redu ponavlja da se zaključci iz prethodnog odjeljka 7.2.1. primjenjuju na 3. mjeru.
In addition, the Commission considers that measure 3 was granted not on 22 December 2011 (i.e. the date of the shareholders' meeting of airBaltic) but on 29 December 2011, date on which the State converted its loans.
Osim toga, Komisija smatra da 3. mjera nije odobrena 22. prosinca 2011. (tj. na dan sastanka dioničara društva airBaltic) već 29. prosinca 2011., odnosno, na dan kada je država izvršila konverziju zajmova.
Indeed, according to the information provided by the Latvian authorities during the formal investigation procedure, according to the applicable rules BAS and the State had until 30 January 2012 to formalise the conversion decided at airBaltic's shareholders meeting.
Prema informacijama koje su latvijska nadležna tijela dostavile za vrijeme formalnog istražnog postupka, BAS i država morali su do 30. siječnja 2012., u skladu s primjenjivim pravilima, formalizirati konverziju o kojoj je donesena odluka na sastanku dioničara društva airBaltic.
The Commission also notes that on 29 December 2011, Latvia could have had reasonable doubts as to the willingness of BAS to fulfil its commitments.
Komisija također napominje da je 29. prosinca 2011. Latvija već mogla razumno sumnjati u spremnost BAS-a da ispuni svoje obveze.
Indeed, BAS had already given indications that it would not convert its loan: Latvia itself admits that the second tranche of the second State loan, decided on 13 December 2011, was foreseen precisely to account for the eventuality that BAS would not fulfil its commitments.
BAS je već naznačio da neće reprogramirati svoj zajam: Latvija sama priznaje da je drugi obrok drugog državnog zajma, o kojem je odluka donesena 13. prosinca 2011. predviđen za slučaj da BAS neće ispuniti svoje obveze.
Moreover, since 30 November 2011 the State and BAS were no longer in a comparable position as shareholders since BAS had lost its entire shareholding in airBaltic with the exception of one share and the State owned 99,8 % of the company.
Osim toga od 30. studenoga 2011. država i BAS više nisu bili u sličnom položaju kao dioničari jer je BAS izgubio sve svoje dionice u društvu airBaltic osim jedne te je država bila vlasnik 99,8 % društva.
In view of those developments, the State, before actually converting the State loans, should have inferred — or at least had reasons to suspect — from BAS' actions that it did not intend to fulfil its obligations (see recital 35 above).
S obzirom na to, država je, prije konverzije državnih zajmova, trebala zaključiti – ili je barem imala razloga sumnjati – iz BAS-ovih postupaka da on ne namjerava ispuniti svoje obveze (vidjeti prethodnu uvodnu izjavu 35.).
Moreover, since BAS had lost all its shares in airBaltic except one, the remedy provided for in Article 7.4 of the Agreement — i.e. the right for the State to purchase from BAS all its shares in airBaltic for LVL 1 — had been deprived of meaning: the State had lost the means by which it could have forced BAS to abide by what it had agreed to.
Osim toga, budući da je BAS izgubio sve dionice u društvu airBaltic osim jedne, pravni lijek predviđen u članku 7. stavku 4. Sporazuma, odnosno, pravo države da kupi od BAS-a sve svoje udjele u društvu airBaltic za 1 LVL – više nije imao smisla: država je izgubila sredstvo kojim bi mogla prisiliti BAS da ispuni svoje obveze.
Bearing the elements indicated above in mind, the Commission comes to the conclusion that a prudent market economy operator would not have converted its loans into capital before being sure that the other party would convert its loan and inject the cash, and in that context would have carefully assessed the incentives of the other party to fulfil its commitments.
Imajući na umu prethodno navedene elemente, Komisija zaključuje da razuman subjekt u tržišnom gospodarstvu ne bi konvertirao svoje zajmove u kapital prije nego što je siguran da će druga stranka pretvoriti svoj zajam i uložiti gotovinu te bi u tom kontekstu pažljivo ocijenio koje poticaje druga stranka ima za ispunjenje svojih obveza.
Moreover, the Commission observes that, even if it had respected the agreement reached at the shareholders meeting, BAS would not have regained its former shareholding in airBaltic.
Osim toga, Komisija primjećuje da, čak i da je poštovao dogovor postignut na sastanku dioničara, BAS ne bi mogao vratiti svoje bivše udjele u društvu airBaltic.
In order to reach a 47,2 % stake, BAS would have had to invest much more than the amounts agreed to at that meeting.
Kako bi ostvario udio od 47,2 %, BAS bi morao uložiti puno više od iznosa dogovorenog na tom sastanku.
Therefore, the Commission is of the view that the State, had it acted in accordance with the MEIP, should have carefully considered whether BAS would invest significant amounts of money — the BAS loan and cash amounting to LVL 37,7 million (EUR 53,38 million) — in order to get a minority shareholding in airBaltic.
Prema tome, Komisija smatra da bi država, da je postupala u skladu s MEIP-om, trebala pažljivo razmotriti bi li BAS uložio velik iznos novca – zajam BAS-a i gotovinu u iznosu 37,7 milijuna LVL (53,38 milijuna EUR) – u stjecanje manjinskog udjela u društvu airBaltic.
As an additional argument, Latvia explains that BAS' obligation to inject the cash and convert the BAS loan was confirmed by the existence of a guarantee by a Russian entrepreneur, Mr Vladimir Antonov, who agreed to make the necessary payments on behalf of BAS.
Kao dodatni argument, Latvija objašnjava da je obveza BAS-a da uloži gotovinu i konvertira zajam BAS-a potvrđena postojanjem jamstva ruskog poduzetnika, g. Vladimira Antonova, koji je pristao izvršiti nužna plaćanja u ime BAS-a [35].
However, it appears from the information available to the Commission that the guarantee was never in fact provided.
Međutim, iz podataka dostupnih Komisiji čini se da jamstvo zapravo nikada nije dostavljeno.
Latvia also indicates that the preconditions for the capitalisation of the State loans required by Article 7.2 of the Agreement were met on 13 December 2011, when it was presented with a business plan showing a return to profitability of airBaltic in 2015 and suggests that the decision to convert the State loans into capital was therefore MEIP-conform.
Latvija također ističe da su preduvjeti za kapitalizaciju državnih zajmova propisani člankom 7. stavkom 2. Sporazuma ispunjeni 13. prosinca 2011. kada joj je dostavljen poslovni plan u kojem je opisano kako će društvo airBaltic u 2015. opet postati profitabilno i navodi se da je odluka o konverziji državnih zajmova u kapital stoga bila u skladu s MEIP-om.
The Commission however remains unconvinced of Latvia's arguments, since the plan was not complete and would not have ben relied upon by a rational private operator in order to inject significant amounts of capital into a firm in difficulty.
Međutim, Latvija svojim argumentima nije uvjerila Komisiju jer plan nije bio potpun i razuman privatni subjekt u tržišnom gospodarstvu ne bi se oslanjao na takav plan kada treba donijeti odluku o ulaganju velikih iznosa kapitala u poduzeća u teškoćama.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that Latvia did not act on pari passu terms when converting its loans and therefore increasing airBaltic's capital.
Na temelju navedenog, Komisija zaključuje da Latvija prilikom konverzije svojih zajmova nije postupala u skladu s ravnopravnim uvjetima i tako je povećala kapital društva airBaltic.
The State's behaviour was moreover not in line with the MEIP test.
Osim toga, postupanje države nije bilo u skladu s provjerom MEIP-a.