natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Again, the Commission considers that this statement of 30 April 2007, made in connection with a State aid procedure, cannot in itself suffice to establish to the requisite legal standard that a court would have considered that the national authorities committed the alleged errors, or, especially, the degree of probability of such an eventuality.
Komisija opet smatra da izjava od 30. travnja 2007., donesena u okviru postupka koji se odnosi na državne potpore, ne može biti dostatna da bi se u zadovoljavajućoj mjeri utvrdilo može li sud smatrati da su nacionalna tijela počinila navodne pogreške i posebno, stupanj vjerojatnosti takve mogućnosti.
This is all the more so since the French authorities deny the very existence of acts of mismanagement, which are, however, a sine qua non for the bringing of an action ‘en comblement de passif’.
Štoviše, francuska tijela osporavaju i samo postojanje pogrešaka u upravljanju koje su ipak potrebne za provedbu tužbe za nadoknadu manjka imovine.
More fundamentally, SNCM, like the French authorities, relies to a large extent on very old management decisions.
Još važnije, možemo primijetiti da i SNCM i francuska tijela u velikoj mjeri pribjegavaju dobro utvrđenim upravljačkim odlukama.
Thus the Baker & McKenzie report focuses on […] [60] Confidential information.
Stoga se izvješće Baker & McKenzie usredotočuje na […] [60] Dôverné informácie.
There was, therefore, at least implicit acceptance of the risk associated with this type of management.
Stoga su, barem implicitno, prihvatili rizik povezan s tom vrstom upravljanja.
There is nothing to indicate that the State’s liability for making good the asset shortfall can reasonably be incurred in such a situation.
Ništa ne ukazuje da se odgovornost države može korisno uporabiti u okviru nadoknade manjka imovine u sličnoj situaciji.
Furthermore, these alleged acts of mismanagement can be explained by political choices made by the public authorities and there is nothing to indicate either that these political choices can be classed as mismanagement within the meaning of the case-law on making good a shortfall in assets.
Štoviše, te navodne pogreške u upravljanju mogu se objasniti političkim odlukama javnih tijela i ništa ne pokazuje da se te političke odluke mogu smatrati pogreškama u upravljanju u smislu sudske prakse koja se odnosi na nadoknadu manjka imovine.
Finally, the Baker & McKenzie report lacks credibility, particularly when it maintains that SNCM’s situation was attributable to external communication errors committed by the State with regard to that situation.
Naposljetku, izvješću Baker & McKenzie nedostaje vjerodostojnosti osobito jer je njime procijenjeno da bi se položaj SNCM-a mogao pripisati pogreškama u vanjskoj komunikaciji koje je država počinila s obzirom na taj položaj.
All that emerges from this report is that the State mentioned a situation which was already public knowledge.
Iz tog izvješća proizlazi samo da je država spomenula položaj koji je već bio poznat.
The State’s conduct therefore has nothing in common with an act of mismanagement.
Ponašanje države ne može se stoga povezati s pogreškom u upravljanju.
The finding of a shortfall in assets
Potvrda o manjku imovine
In this case, the Commission remarks that the Oddo-Hastings report points up an asset shortfall of EUR 134,4 million at 30 September 2005, calculated as the difference between the value of SNCM’s assets (EUR 190,3 million) and the value of the undertaking’s liabilities (preferential and non-preferential debts valued respectively at EUR 153,8 million and EUR 170,9 million).
U ovom slučaju Komisija tvrdi da je u izvješću Oddo-Hastings 30. rujna 2005. utvrđen manjak imovine u iznosu od 134,4 milijuna EUR, izračunan kao razlika između, s jedne strane, vrijednosti imovine SNCM-a (190,3 milijuna EUR) te, s druge strane, vrijednosti obveza poduzeća (povlašteni i nepovlašteni dugovi procijenjeni na 153,8 milijuna EUR, odnosno 170,9 milijuna EUR).
The Commission previously estimated the shortfall in SNCM’s assets at EUR 123,5 million at 30 September 2005 (see recital 264).
Komisija je prethodno procijenila manjak imovine SNCM-a na 123,5 milijuna EUR na dan 30. rujna 2005. (vidjeti uvodnu izjavu 264.).
The existence of a causal link between the mismanagement and the established shortfall in assets
Utvrđeno postojanje uzročno-posljedične veze između pogrešaka i manjka imovine
According to the French authorities, the manager of a legal person may be declared liable, on the basis of Article L.624-3 of the Commercial Code, even if his act of mismanagement is only one of the causes of the shortfall in assets, and may be ordered to bear in whole or in part the social debts, even if his mismanagement is the cause of only a part of them [146].
Prema mišljenju francuskih tijela, direktor pravne osobe može biti, na temelju članka L. 624-3 Trgovačkog zakonika, proglašen odgovornim, čak i ako je pogreška u upravljanju koju je počinio tek jedan od uzroka za manjak imovine i može mu biti izrečena kazna da potpuno ili djelomično snosi dugove za socijalno osiguranje, čak i ako je on odgovoran za samo dio tih dugova.
According to the French authorities, the French State would be called upon to bear a proportion estimated at between 85 % and 100 % of the established shortfall in assets, i.e. between EUR 114,3 million and EUR 134,4 million.
Prema mišljenju francuskih tijela, francuska država mogla bi snositi dio procijenjen na između 85 %i 100 % utvrđenog manjka imovine, odnosno dio u rasponu od 114,3 milijuna EUR do 134,4 milijuna EUR.
There is no sound basis for this analysis.
Ta se analiza ne zasniva ni na jednom čvrstom temelju.
In so far as the alleged acts of mismanagement are based on decisions taken in the mid-1990s which immediately generated additional costs for SNCM, it is very difficult to attribute the problem to an asset shortfall in 2005, particularly since a lot of things happened between the two dates.
Naime, u mjeri u kojoj se navodne pogreške u upravljanju zasnivaju na odlukama donesenima sredinom devedesetih godina i u kojoj su SNCM-u prouzročile trenutačne dodatne troškove, jako je teško u njima vidjeti uzrok manjka imovine iz 2005., posebno stoga što se između ta dva datuma zbio niz događaja.
Furthermore, if there seems to be no automatic link between the amount of compensation granted to make good the asset shortfall and the amount of the increase in liabilities caused by the manager’s mismanagement (if this were to be established), this also means that the courts may decide to set the amount to be paid by the manager at a much lower level than the established asset shortfall [147].
Štoviše, ako u stvari izgleda da ne postoji automatska veza između iznosa odštete dodijeljene u okviru nadoknade manjka imovine i povećanja obveza uzrokovanog lošim upravljanjem direktora (pod pretpostavkom da je potonje dokazano), to znači i da sud može utvrditi kaznu za direktora u iznosu mnogo manjem od utvrđenog manjka imovine [147].
Contrary to what the French authorities (and SNCM) seem to believe, there is nothing to indicate that the decisions at issue here would be considered by the courts looking into the matter to be serious enough to warrant placing the burden of a major part of the asset shortfall on the shoulders of the public authorities.
Suprotno onome što naizgled smatraju francuska tijela (i SNCM), ništa ne ukazuje na to da bi sud u tužbi za nadoknadu manjka imovine te odluke smatrao toliko pogrešnim da bi njima opravdao terećenje javnih tijela velikim dijelom navedenih obveza.
According to the allegations under investigation, the decisions were taken for protectionist purposes in a political context (what is more, 10 years earlier for the most part) or were more recent decisions taken to spare employees from having to make productivity gains or as part of efforts to improve industrial relations.
Što se tiče ispitanih navoda, radilo bi se u stvari o zaštitničkim odlukama donesenima u političkom kontekstu (većina njih i prije deset godina) ili o novijim odlukama donesenima kako bi se zaposlenici poštedjeli obveze povećanja produktivnost ili kako bi se pokušala ponovno uspostaviti bolja socijalna klima.
Possible payment of the additional redundancy payments in the event of SNCM’s compulsory liquidation
v. Utvrđivanje moguće odgovornosti za dodatne naknade za otpremninu pod pretpostavkom prisilne likvidacije SNCM-a
According to the French authorities, in addition to the asset shortfall, and in the light of the relevant case-law [148], a court would definitely be compelled to order the French State to make the additional redundancy payments (between EUR [200-210] [60] Confidential information.
Osim manjka imovine, prema mišljenju francuskih tijela, uzevši u obzir sudsku praksu u tom području [148], sud bi državi sigurno izrekao kaznu da snosi dodatne naknade za otpremninu (odnosno između [200 – 210] [60] Dôverné informácie.
The French authorities consider the actual costs to be paid by the French State as shareholder as falling somewhere in the region of EUR 212,1 million to EUR 361 million.
Prema mišljenju francuskih tijela, svi realni troškovi koje bi snosila država kao dioničar bili bi u rasponu od 212,1 milijun EUR do 361 milijun EUR.
The French authorities point out that, in recent judgments, the French courts have ordered the de facto or de jure manager to defray, as well as the asset shortfall, additional redundancy payments calculated on the basis of a social plan drawn up by the undertaking before it was put into liquidation.
Francuska tijela navode da su, u novijim presudama, francuski sudovi dosudili de iure ili de facto direktoru da snosi, osim manjka imovine,i dodatne naknade za otpremninu izračunane na temelju socijalnog plana koji je poduzeće donijelo prije svoje likvidacije.
The French authorities state in particular that, in the Aspocomp case, the French company Aspocomp SAS, a 99 % subsidiary of the Finnish company Aspocomp Group Oyj, signed a company-level agreement on 18 January 2002 describing the conditions for indemnification of a social plan relating to 210 employees out of a total of 550.
Francuska tijela posebno ukazuju na to da je, u predmetu Aspocomp, francusko društvo Aspocomp SAS, društvo kći u 99-postotnom vlasništvu finskog društva Aspocomp Group Oyj, 18. siječnja 2002. potpisalo ugovor na razini poduzeća u kojem su opisani uvjeti plaćanja odštete iz socijalnog plana koji se odnose na 210 od ukupno 550 zaposlenika.
That agreement described, in particular, the amount of compensation and additional payments as well as assistance in the case of voluntary redundancy.
U tom je ugovoru posebno opisan iznos naknada i dodatnih odšteta te potpore za dobrovoljni odlazak.
Following a change in group strategy, the parent company Aspocomp Group Oyj decided on 21 February 2002 to stop financing its subsidiary Aspocomp SAS, thereby forcing the latter into voluntary liquidation.
Nakon promjene strategije grupe, matično je društvo Aspocomp Group Oyj 21. veljače 2002. odlučilo da više neće financirati svoje društvo kćer Aspocomp SAS i time uzrokovalo njegovu dobrovoljnu likvidaciju.
That decision prevented the subsidiary from fulfilling its obligations under the company-level agreement and forced it to lay off all of its remaining employees.
Ta je odluka u stvari spriječila društvo kćer da poštuje svoje obveze preuzete u okviru ugovora na razini poduzeća i primorala ga da otpusti sve svoje druge zaposlenike.
In these circumstances, the judgment of the Rouen Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment of the Evreux labour court and ordered Aspocomp Group Oyj, which had 99 % control of its subsidiary, to pay (i) the employees affected by the company-level agreement the entire compensation and additional payments provided for in that agreement, as well as damages for dismissal without due and just cause and (ii) the employees laid off under the voluntary liquidation of Aspocomp equivalent payments given that, by not honouring the commitments made, the parent company had acted unfairly and with a culpable lack of concern.
U tim je okolnostima presudom Prizivnog suda u Rouenu potvrđena presuda conseil des Prud’hommes (radnog suda) iz Evreuxa i društvu Aspocomp Group Oyj, koje je imalo 99-postotnu kontrolu nad svojim društvom kćeri, naloženo je da plati: i. zaposlenicima obuhvaćenima ugovorom na razini poduzeća, puni iznos naknade i dodatnih odšteta predviđenih samo tim ugovorom i naknadu štete za otkaz bez stvarnog i ozbiljnog uzroka te ii. zaposlenicima otpuštenima zbog dobrovoljne likvidacije Aspcompa, ekvivalentne odštete, imajući u vidu da se ne poštujući preuzete obveze, matično društvo ponašalo nepravično i na nepromišljen i pokudan način.
Although France also referred, in support of its theory, to a judgment of the commercial division of the Court of Cassation [149] handed down on 19 April 2005, the Commission does not see any decisive element in that judgment with any bearing on the present dispute.
Iako se Francuska pozvala i na presudu od 19. travnja 2005. trgovačkog odjela Kasacijskog suda [149] podržavajući njihovu teoriju, Komisija u toj presudi ne vidjeti nikakav odlučujući element s obzirom na ovu kontroverzu.
The only relevant observation made by the Court of Cassation is that an appeal court did not set out adequate grounds in law to settle confusion over ownership between a parent company and its subsidiary.
Kasacijski sud samo primjećuje da prizivni sud nije dostatno pravno okarakterizirao miješanje imovine između matičnog društva i njegova društva kćeri.
At all events, the Commission notes that the facts in Aspocomp are not comparable to those in the case under examination.
U svakom slučaju, Komisija utvrđuje da činjenice koje se odnose na sudsku praksu u predmetu Aspocomp nisu jednake kao činjenice u ovom slučaju.
In the present case, CGMF did not fail to honour its commitments to make additional redundancy payments.
Naime, u ovom slučaju nije bilo propusta CGMF-a u poštovanju njegove obveze isplate dodatnih naknada za otpremninu.
It is to be noted that both SNCM and the French authorities seem to attribute importance to the fact that a social plan […] [60] Confidential information.
Valja napomenuti da se čini da i SNCM i francuska tijela pridaju važnost činjenici da socijalni plan […] [60] Dôverné informácie.
It is extremely doubtful that […] [60] Confidential information.
Izrazito je sumnjivo da se […] [60] Dôverné informácie.
can be considered mismanagement such as to incur the liability of the State towards the employees […] [60] Confidential information.
može smatrati lošim upravljanjem koje država može postati odgovorna za zaposlenike […] [60] Dôverné informácie.
Even in the unlikely event that […] [60] Confidential information.
Čak i pod pretpostavkom da je, u izvanrednom slučaju, […] [60] Dôverné informácie.
the State was liable towards the employees and had entitled them to compensation payable by the State [150], the granting of such an entitlement would itself constitute an advantage accorded to SNCM, and hence State aid, for reasons similar to those set out below concerning aid to individuals totalling EUR 38,5 million, as this measure was capable of improving somewhat industrial relations in the undertaking.
, država mogla preuzeti odgovornost u pogledu zaposlenika te im dati pravo na državnu naknadu [150], dodjela takvog prava bi sama po sebi bila pogodnost za poduzeće SNCM, a stoga i državna potpora, iz razloga koji su analogni onima predstavljenima dalje u tekstu u pogledu potpora pojedincima od 38,5 milijuna EUR. Naime, tom se mjerom može donekle ublažiti socijalna klima u poduzeću.
Conclusion on taking account of action to make good the asset shortfall
Zaključak o uzimanju u obzir tužbe za nadoknadu manjka imovine
It has not been established to the requisite legal standard that the French authorities would, with a sufficient degree of probability, have been ordered by a national court to pay damages to make good the asset shortfall, and still less that the monies to be paid would have exceeded the negative price at which SNCM was ‘sold’.
S pravnog gledišta nije dostatno dokazano da je nacionalni sud, s dostatnim stupnjem vjerojatnosti, donio presudu prema kojoj francuska tijela moraju platiti odštetu i kamate u okviru nadoknade manjka imovine, a još manje da bi jedna takva presuda bila viša od negativne cijene po kojoj je SNCM „prodan”.
Account should also be taken of the fact that the State’s actions, assuming that it was indeed guilty of mismanagement, were intended to protect national industries and services, including SNCM and its employees, notably by avoiding imposing a situation on them which could have provoked social unrest.
U obzir treba uzeti i činjenicu da bi cilj tužbe protiv države, čak i pod pretpostavkom da je u ovom slučaju bila loš upravitelj, bio zaštititi nacionalne industrije i službe, uključujući SNCM i njegove zaposlenike, te posebno istodobno izbjeći da im se nametne promjena koja bi u socijalnom smislu mogla biti loše prihvaćena.
In reality, even if public bodies, including the State, can be considered in certain circumstances to be de facto managers of an undertaking, there is nothing to indicate that the measure to make good the shortfall can be used to gain insight into the State’s policy decisions, particularly in such circumstances.
Čak i ako se javne osobe, uključujući državu, mogu u određenim okolnostima smatrati de facto upraviteljima nekog poduzeća, ništa ne pokazuje da bi se tužba za nadoknadu manjka imovine mogla iskoristiti i za procjenu političkih odabira države, posebno u sličnim okolnostima.
This is a far cry from the circumstances of the Aspocomp case, which was in no way concerned with such matters.
U tom smo se pogledu jako udaljili od okolnosti predmeta Aspocomp koji se ni na koji način nije odnosio na tu problematiku.
The Commission considers in any event that the French authorities cannot now avail themselves of political choices made in the past to justify public intervention intended to remedy the effects of those earlier choices.
Komisija u svakom slučaju smatra da se francuska tijela danas ne mogu koristiti prošlim političkim odabirima kako bi opravdala javne intervencije čiji je cilj popraviti učinke prethodnih intervencija.
On the contrary, both cases of intervention, i.e. the interference of the past and the more recent public intervention, should be regarded as cumulative distortions of competition.
Nasuprot tome, te dvije intervencije, odnosno uplitanja iz prošlosti i nove javne intervencije, analiziraju se kao kumulativna narušavanja tržišnog natjecanja.
Accepting the State’s liability for making good the asset shortfall would be tantamount to allowing the State to admit to mismanagement of the undertaking so as to be able to make a financial contribution without its being classed as state aid, thereby engendering a fresh distortion of competition.
Naime, prihvatiti državnu odgovornost za nadoknadu manjka imovine, državi bi omogućilo da prizna da je počinila pogreške u upravljanju poduzećem kako bi dokazala da financijski ulog nije državna potpora, što bi dovelo do novog narušavanja tržišnog natjecanja.
The State would effectively be ‘using’ its own mismanagement as justification for granting an additional financial contribution in contradiction with the general principle of ‘nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans’ [151].
Država bi se dakle koristila svojim vlastitim pogreškama u upravljanju kako bi opravdala dodatni financijski ulog, što je u suprotnosti s općim načelom prema kojemu se nitko ne može koristiti svojom vlastitom pogreškom [151].
It would also be totally contrived to portray the State simultaneously as saint and sinner, i.e. as a ‘bad manager’ (assuming this were proven to be the case) stepping in to bail out the undertaking which it has mismanaged.
Bilo bi i potpuno neprirodno razdvojiti ponašanje države kao „lošeg upravitelja” (čak i pod pretpostavkom da je ta činjenica utemeljena) od ponašanja države koja spašava poduzeće kojim je loše upravljala.
Management errors do not constitute normal behaviour on the part of the prudent private investor in a market economy.
Pogreške u upravljanju nisu dio normalnog ponašanja razumnog privatnog ulagača u tržišnom gospodarstvu.
Accordingly, bail-out mechanisms to set right such errors are not normal behaviour either.
Stoga ni mehanizam financijskog spašavanja koji se ne može odvojiti od te pogreške nije dio tog posljednjeg ponašanja.
Accepting the theory advanced by the French authorities and by SNCM would pave the way for the State to award guarantees to undertakings by knowingly ‘making management errors’. This is hardly acceptable in terms of aid discipline.
Nadalje, prihvaćanje teorije koju su iznijela francuska tijela i SNCM posljedično bi državi omogućilo da poduzeću dodijeli jamstvo svjesno čineći „pogrešku u upravljanju”, što nije prihvatljivo ni u pogledu pravila o potporama.
In this case, the conduct that would incur the liability of the State according to the theory expounded by SNCM and the French authorities would in fact only apply to the State’s actions as a public authority, not as a shareholder.
U ovom konkretnom slučaju, ponašanja koja bi dovela do odgovornosti države bila bi, prema teoriji koju brane SNCM i francuska tijela, u stvari ponašanja države kao javnog tijela, a ne kao dioničara.
Given that a prudent private investor would not have taken decisions based on these political and public considerations, the risk of having to make good an asset shortfall resulting from such decisions does not come into play for a ‘prudent private investor in a market economy’ test [152].
Budući da razuman privatni dioničar ne bio donosio odluke na temelju političkih i javnih izjava, rizik od nadoknade manjka imovine koji proizlazi iz tih odluka ne može se uzeti u obzir u testu razumnog privatnog ulagača u tržišnom gospodarstvu [152].
The French authorities point out that in its ABX decision of 7 December 2005 the Commission was willing to take account of the fact that ‘in certain exceptional cases, some national legislation provides for the possibility of third parties to bring proceedings against the shareholders of a liquidated company, in particular if these shareholders may be considered [deleted in the text] and/or as being guilty of mismanagement.’ [153].
Francuska tijela podsjećaju da je u svojoj Odluci ABX od 7. prosinca 2005. Komisija predvidjela da će u obzir uzeti činjenicu da „u određenim iznimnim slučajevima nekim nacionalnim zakonodavstvima predviđena mogućnost da treće osobe pokrenu postupak protiv dioničara likvidiranog društva, posebno ako se ti dioničari mogu smatrati [izostavljeno iz teksta] i/ili ako su počinili pogreške u upravljanju” [153].
However, the Commission underlines that the concept of aid must be assessed objectively and notes that the decision to open proceedings in the same case stipulated that ‘even in the unlikely event that all of these conditions required by national law to hold them accountable … were fulfilled, this would still not rule out the presence of state aid in the measures for the benefit of the subsidiary.’ [154].
Međutim, Komisija podsjeća da se pojam potpore mora procijeniti objektivno i napominje da je odlukom o otvaranju postupka koja se odnosi na isti predmet navedeno da „[n]aposljetku, čak i pod slabo vjerojatnom pretpostavkom da su ispunjeni svi zahtjevi za aktiviranje odgovornosti predviđeni nacionalnim pravom […], to ipak ne bi isključilo karakter državne potpore tih intervencija u korist društva kćeri” [154].
In the present case, the Commission considers that the French authorities have not adequately dispelled its doubts surrounding the assertion that SNCM’s shareholder was at risk, with a sufficient degree of certainty, of being held to account.
U ovom konkretnom slučaju, Komisija smatra da francuska tijela nisu u dovoljnoj mjeri uklonila sumnje Komisije u činjenicu da bi dioničar SNCM-a postao izložen, na dovoljno siguran način, preispitivanju svoje odgovornosti.