natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, in view of differences as to the governing law and of the overall requisite legal structure that would have to be put in place extending the subordinated loan to which the EBRD was also a party while at the same time extending a part of the subordinated debt held by Latvia alone would have required convoluted legal arrangements.
Nadalje, s obzirom na razlike u pogledu mjerodavnog prava i cjelokupnu potrebnu pravnu strukturu koja bi se morala uspostaviti, produljenje podređenog zajma u kojem je EBRD stranka uz istodobno produljenje dijela podređenog duga u vlasništvu Latvije zahtijevalo bi složena pravna rješenja.
Latvia underlines that at the time of the extension, it also considered that a maturity extension of the subordinated debt held by the EBRD would render the divestment of Citadele more burdensome, as more interrelated contracts on the subordinated debt would exist at the time of the sale.
Latvija naglašava da je u trenutku produljenja također smatrala da bi produljenje roka dospijeća podređenog duga kod EBRD-a otežalo prodaju banke Citadele jer bi u trenutku prodaje postojalo više međusobno povezanih ugovora o podređenom dugu.
It considered that such a possibility would complicate the sale of Citadele as it could have repercussions on the relevant closing conditions and could probably increase the relevant transactional costs.
Smatrala je da bi se time zakomplicirala prodaja banke Citadele jer bi mogla imati posljedice na uvjete za zatvaranje i vjerojatno bi utjecala na povećanje povezanih transakcijskih troškova.
Furthermore, Latvia notes that the EBRD's status vis-à-vis Citadele could have made it a more complex decision for the EBRD to consent to the extension.
Nadalje, Latvija napominje da bi zbog položaja EBRD-a prema banci Citadele donošenje odluke o produljenju bilo još složenije za EBRD.
It states in its submission of 23 June 2014 that it firmly believed that, in principle, the EBRD would have been inclined to agree to the maturity prolongation of the relevant instrument.
U svom podnesku od 23. lipnja 2014. navodi da je bila čvrsto uvjerena da bi EBRD u načelu pristao na produljenje dospijeća mjerodavnog instrumenta.
However, it also acknowledges that the EBRD's position differed from Latvia's in that the latter was the majority shareholder of Citadele and in that capacity it could exercise decisive influence over the sale process and could negotiate various options with respect to the payment of the subordinated loans with the bidders.
Međutim, također potvrđuje da se položaj EBRD-a razlikuje od Latvijina jer je ona većinski dioničar banke Citadele i s obzirom na to može imati odlučujući utjecaj na postupak prodaje i pregovarati s ponuđačima o raznim mogućnostima u pogledu plaćanja podređenih zajmova.
Therefore, Latvia recognized that the EBRD's lack of control over the sale of Citadele could have constituted a disincentive for extending the maturity term of the respective loan or in any event lead to lengthy negotiations.
Stoga je Latvija priznala da je manjak kontrole EBRD-a nad prodajom banke Citadele mogao imati odvraćajući utjecaj na produljenje roka dospijeća predmetnog zajma ili bi u svakom slučaju uzrokovao dugotrajne pregovore.
Regarding the un-notified liquidity support granted to Reverta (the Third Measure)
O neprijavljenoj potpori za likvidnost odobrenoj Reverti (treća mjera)
Latvia and Reverta recognize that since December 2010 the liquidity support granted by Latvia to Parex banka (and then to Reverta) has exceeded the authorized liquidity cap set forth in recital 55 of the Final Parex Decision.
Latvija i Reverta priznaju da je od prosinca 2010. potpora za likvidnost koju je Latvija odobrila Parex banci (i zatim Reverti) premašila odobrenu gornju granicu likvidnosti koja je propisana u uvodnoj izjavi 55. Konačne odluke o banci Parex.
The Opening Decision indicated that the outstanding liquidity support to Reverta as of 31 December 2013 was LVL 362,52 million, which exceeded by LVL 55,52 million the LVL 307 million liquidity cap set forth for the ‘worst case’ scenario.
U Odluci o pokretanju postupka navedeno je da je neotplaćena potpora za likvidnost Reverti na dan 31. prosinca 2013. iznosila 362,52 milijuna LVL, čime se gornja granica likvidnosti od 307 milijuna LVL koja je utvrđena za „najgori” scenarij premašuje za 55,52 milijuna LVL.
Latvia contends that the Commission had originally authorized in the Final Parex Decision the conversion into capital of LVL 218,7 million liquidity support to Parex banka.
Latvija tvrdi da je Komisija u Konačnoj odluci o banci Parex prvobitno odobrila pretvaranje u kapital iznosa od 218,7 milijuna LVL potpore za likvidnost Parex banci.
That amount to be converted was later reduced in the Amended Decision to LVL 118,7 million.
Iznos za pretvaranje kasnije je smanjen u Izmijenjenoj odluci na 118,7 milijuna LVL.
Had LVL 118,7 million of liquidity support been converted into capital, then the liquidity support would have been reduced and would have complied with the authorized limits.
Da je iznos od 118,7 milijuna LVL potpore za likvidnost pretvoren u kapital, potpora za likvidnost smanjila bi se i bila bi u skladu s odobrenim granicama.
However, only LVL 49,5 million out of LVL 118,7 million of liquidity support were actually converted into capital.
Međutim, stvarno je pretvoreno u kapital samo 49,5 milijuna LVL od 118,7 milijuna LVL potpore za likvidnost.
That factor is brought forward by Latvia as the main cause for the excessive level of liquidity.
Taj je čimbenik Latvija navela kao glavni razlog za prekomjernu razinu likvidnosti.
In addition, Latvia contends that the excess support was also caused by delays in cash generation compared to rates of cash generation envisaged at the time of the Parex Final Decision.
Osim toga, Latvija tvrdi da je prekomjerni iznos potpore također rezultat kašnjenja u stvaranju likvidnosti u usporedbi sa stvaranjem likvidnosti predviđenim u trenutku donošenja Konačne odluke o banci Parex.
Bad debtors have delayed payments and hence cash recovery has been delayed by about two years.
Dužnici koji ne otplaćaju na vrijeme svoje obveze odgađali su plaćanje i zato je naplata gotovine odgođen za oko dvije godine.
Latvia considers that phenomenon to be temporary and expects the excessive liquidity support to cease in the years 2015-16.
Latvija smatra da je ta pojava privremena i očekuje da će se prekomjerna potpora za likvidnost smanjiti u razdoblju 2015. – 2016.
Nevertheless, Latvia and Reverta recognize the deviation from the authorized aid amounts resulting from the difficulties they encountered in appropriately allocating the State support between the authorized liquidity support and capital contributions following the adoption of the Amendment Decision.
Latvija i Reverta svejedno priznaju odstupanje od odobrenih iznosa potpore kao rezultat poteškoća s odgovarajućom dodjelom državnih potpora između odobrene potpore za likvidnost i kapitalnih doprinosa nakon donošenja Odluke o izmjeni.
Further the Latvian authorities explain that had the banking license of Parex banka (now Reverta) been maintained, Latvia would have had to inject more capital into Parex banka than was originally envisaged (indeed the minimum level of capital required under the solvency rules was more than the maximum capital support of LVL 218,7 million authorized by the Final Parex Decision).
Nadalje, latvijska nadležna tijela objašnjavaju da bi, u slučaju da je Parex banka (sadašnja Reverta) zadržala svoju bankarsku licencu, Latvija morala ubrizgati više kapitala u Parex banku nego što je izvorno predviđeno (minimalna razina kapitala potrebna u skladu s pravilima o solventnosti bila je veća od maksimalne kapitalne potpore od 218,7 milijuna LVL koja je odobrena u Konačnoj odluci o banci Parex).
On the basis of the original restructuring plan submitted to the Commission, the economic value realized from asset disposals and the conversion of LVL 218,7 million would have been insufficient for Parex banka (Reverta) to comply with the regulatory capital adequacy requirements.
Na temelju prvobitnog plana restrukturiranja koji je dostavljen Komisiji, gospodarska vrijednost ostvarena raspolaganjem imovinom i pretvaranjem 218,7 milijuna LVL ne bi bila dovoljna Parex banci (Reverti) da ispuni regulatorne zahtjeve adekvatnosti kapitala.
Therefore, had the licence been maintained, Parex banka (Reverta) would have needed additional capital.
Stoga bi, u slučaju da je zadržala licencu, Parex banci (Reverti) bio potreban dodatni kapital.
Following the withdrawal of the banking license, the level of additional aid was limited to the amount necessary for the winding down process.
Nakon oduzimanja bankarske licence, razina dodatne pomoći bila je ograničena na iznos koji je nužan za postupak likvidacije.
Latvia had communicated its plan not to convert liquidity support into capital to the Commission after 31 December 2011 during exchanges preceding the adoption of the Amendment Decision, though it did not confirm its intention to actually do so and did not expressly identify and share with the Commission the technical consequences of the non-conversion.
Za vrijeme razmjene informacija prije donošenja Odluka o izmjenama, Latvija je Komisiji priopćila svoj plan da neće pretvoriti potporu za likvidnost u kapital nakon 31. prosinca 2011. iako nije potvrdila svoju namjeru da to stvarno učini i nije izričito utvrdila i podijelila s Komisijom tehničke posljedice nepretvaranja u kapital.
In particular, Latvia did not mention that as a result of their ‘non-conversion’ into capital the funds that had already been granted as liquidity support would not fall as fast as they were required to do by the Final Parex Decision.
Latvija posebno nije spomenula da se kao rezultat „nepretvaranja” u kapital sredstava koja su već odobrena kao potpora za likvidnost neće smanjiti brzinom koja je propisana u Konačnoj odluci o banci Parex.
Since only LVL 49,5 million of liquidity support had been actually converted into capital by 31 December 2011 and LVL 69,2 million of liquidity support was not converted into capital, the level of liquidity support remained higher than approved by approximately the same amount.
Budući da je samo 49,5 milijuna LVL potpore za likvidnost stvarno pretvoreno u kapital do 31. prosinca 2011., a 69,2 milijuna LVL potpore za likvidnost nije pretvoreno u kapital, razina potpore za likvidnost ostala je viša od odobrene za otprilike isti iznos.
According to Latvia, keeping the liquidity support and avoiding converting it into capital was therefore the least onerous measure for the Latvian authorities and in fact reduces the State aid to the minimum necessary.
Prema navodima Latvije, zadržavanje potpore za likvidnost i izbjegavanje njezina pretvaranja u kapital bila je najmanje opterećujuća mjera za latvijska nadležna tijela i njome se zapravo državna potpora smanjuje na nužan minimum.
Latvia and Reverta confirm than Reverta no longer needs ‘fresh money’.
Latvija i Reverta potvrđuju da Reverti više nije potreban „svježi novac”.
Given the lower amount of liquidity support converted into capital, Latvia expects that Reverta will retain LVL [300-350] million in liquidity support at the end of 2014, LVL [250-300] million at the end of 2015, and LVL [200-250] million at the end of 2016 and 2017 (upon liquidation of Reverta).
S obzirom na nižu iznos potpore za likvidnost koja je pretvorena u kapital, Latvija očekuje da će Reverta zadržati [300-350] milijuna LVL u obliku potpore za likvidnost na kraju 2014., [250-300] milijuna LVL na kraju 2015. i [200-250] milijuna LVL na kraju 2016. i 2017. (nakon likvidacije Reverte).
According to Latvia that liquidity support will therefore exceed the originally authorized cap, because: (i) less liquidity support has been converted into capital; and (ii) the running off of Reverta is expected to yield fewer cash proceeds than initially planned.
Prema navodima Latvije, ta potpora za likvidnost stoga će premašivati prvobitno odobrenu gornju granicu jer je: i. manji iznos potpore za likvidnost pretvoren u kapital; i ii. očekuje se da će likvidacija Reverte donijeti manje novčanih primitaka od izvorno planiranog.
Following the new cash projection reflecting the difficulties in the assets recovery Latvia expects Reverta to have a negative capital position of LVL [250-300] million at the end of the liquidation process (31 December 2017).
Nakon nove novčane projekcije u kojoj se odražavaju poteškoće s povratom imovine, Latvija očekuje da će Reverta na kraju postupka likvidacije (31. prosinca 2017.) imati negativno stanje kapitala od [250-300] milijuna LVL.
On the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business (the Fourth measure)
O obvezi prodaje Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom (četvrta mjera)
Latvia started the sale process of Citadele in 2011, to respect the commitments it had undertaken which were recorded in the Final Parex Decision.
Latvija je započela postupak prodaje banke Citadele u 2011. kako bi ispoštovala obveze koje je preuzela i koje su zabilježene u Konačnoj odluci u banci Parex.
The first sale attempt was undertaken with Nomura International as advisor but due to significant turmoil in the Eurozone caused by the economic and financial crisis in Greece, as well as collapse of Snoras and Krajbanka in Lithuania and Latvia, that attempt was not successful.
U prvom pokušaju prodaje savjetnik je bilo društvo Nomura International, ali zbog značajnih previranja u europodručju uzrokovanih gospodarskom i financijskom krizom u Grčkoj, te zbog pada banaka Sonoras i Krajbanka u Litvi i Latviji, taj pokušaj nije bio uspješan.
In addition, in February 2013 Latvia ordered a specific study by an independent expert […] on, inter alia, the impact of the sale of the Wealth Management Business at the date specified in the commitments.
Osim toga, u veljači 2013. Latvija je od neovisnog stručnjaka naručila posebnu studiju […] o, između ostalog, učinku prodaje Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom na dan naveden u obvezama.
The expert demonstrated that the value of the two single entities (Wealth Management Business and the remaining part of Citadele) was worth less than the value of Citadele as a whole.
Stručnjak je pokazao da je vrijednost dvaju zasebnih subjekata (Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom i preostali dio Citadele) manja od vrijednosti Citadele u cjelini.
As a consequence, depriving Citadele of its Wealth Management Business would diminish the book value of the bank and would thus impair shareholders' value.
Zbog toga bi se prodajom Jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvo smanjila računovodstvena vrijednost Citadele i to bi utjecalo na vrijednost dioničara.
Through different projections the expert demonstrated that without the Wealth Management Business the bank's ‘operating profit would tumble, […]’ and that its […] would have deteriorated.
Različitim projekcijama stručnjak je pokazao da bi se bez Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom „operativna dobit banke smanjila, […]” i da bi se njezin […] pogoršao.
According to Latvia, on the basis of the expert's study, the divestment of the Wealth Management Business separately from the rest of Citadele within 2013 would have impaired the viability of Citadele, and consequently, its marketability.
Prema navodima Latvije, na temelju studije stručnjaka, prodajom Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom zasebno od ostatka banke Citadele u 2013. ugrozila bi se održivost banke Citadele i, posljedično, njezina utrživost.
It would have significantly reduced the bank's ability to attract private players to invest in Citadele at a reasonable price.
Time bi se značajno smanjila sposobnost banke za privlačenje privatnih ulagača u Citadele po razumnoj cijeni.
Therefore, a second sales process for the whole Citadele commenced in 2013 with the assistance of Société Générale and Linklaters LLP as external advisors.
Stoga je drugi postupak prodaje cjelokupne banke Citadele započeo u 2013. uz pomoć društava Société Générale i Linklaters LLP kao vanjskih savjetnika.
The two sale methods currently being contemplated are a Merger & Acquisition (‘M&A’) or an Initial Public Offering (‘IPO’).
Dvije metode prodaje o kojima se trenutačno razmišlja uključuju spajanje i preuzimanje („M&A”) i početnu javnu ponudu dionica („IPO”).
Compensatory measures proposed by Latvia
Kompenzacijske mjere koje je predložila Latvija
In order to ensure the compatibility with the internal market under the Union State aid rules of the additional aid measures granted by Latvia to Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta through the First, Second and Third Measures, as well as the failure to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by the committed deadline (the Fourth Measure), Latvia has proposed a series of commitments which are set out in recitals 64 to 73.
Kako bi se osigurala spojivost s unutarnjim tržištem dodatnih mjera potpore koje je Latvija odobrila bankama Parex banka, Citadele i Reverta putem prve, druge i treće mjere u skladu s pravilima Unije o državnim potporama te zbog neuspješne prodaje Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom u okviru banke Citadele do propisanog roka (četvrta mjera), Latvija je predložila niz obveza koje su propisane u uvodnim izjavama 64. do 73.
Deadline for the sale of Citadele and for the divestment of the Wealth Management Business
Rok za prodaju banke Citadele i Poslovne jedinice za upravljanje bogatstvom
Latvia and Citadele undertake to apply their best efforts to obtain as soon as possible and in any event before […] binding bids for the sale of the entire stake of the Republic of Latvia in Citadele (including the Wealth Management Business).
Latvija i banka Citadele obvezuju se uložiti najveće napore kako bi što prije, a u svakom slučaju prije […] prikupile obvezujuće ponude za prodaju cijelog udjela Republike Latvije u banci Citadele (uključujući Poslovnu jedinicu za upravljanje bogatstvom).
The sale shall be completed by […]at the latest.
Prodaja će biti završena najkasnije do […].
It shall be let to the discretion of the Republic of Latvia (and its advisor) to decide what the appropriate structure and modalities of the sale transaction are (e.g. a trade sale or IPO), as long as the Republic of Latvia eventually divests its entire stake in Citadele by […]at the latest.
Republika Latvija (i njezin savjetnik) moći će po vlastitom nahođenju odlučiti koja je odgovarajuća struktura i načini prodaje (npr. trgovinska prodaja ili IPO), ako Republika Latvija na kraju proda cijeli svoj udio u banci Citadele najkasnije do […].
In case of an IPO, the Republic of Latvia commits to agree on a binding prospectus with the FCMC by […].
U slučaju IPO-a, Republika Latvija obvezuje se dogovoriti obvezujući prospekt s FMCM-om do […].
Latvia and Citadele also commit that a divestiture trustee will be appointed if, by […], no binding bids have been received or, in case of an IPO, having the same objective, no prospectus has been agreed with the FCMC.
Latvija i Citadele također se obvezuju osigurati imenovanje povjerenika za prodaju ako do […] ne zaprime obvezujuće ponude, ili u slučaju IPO-a, i s istim ciljem, nije dogovoren prospekt s FCMC-om.
In such case the Republic of Latvia will take the necessary steps so as to ensure that the divestiture trustee is appointed and is operational as of […].
U tom će slučaju Republika Latvija poduzeti nužne korake kako bi osigurala da povjerenik za prodaju bude imenovan i aktivan od […].
It is understood that the financial advisor for the sale of Citadele could also be appointed as divestiture trustee as of […].
Podrazumijeva se također da se financijski savjetnik za prodaju banke Citadele također može imenovati povjerenikom za prodaju od […].
If a divestiture trustee is appointed, Latvia and Citadele commit to receive binding and irrevocable for all parties bids by […]and enter into a binding and irrevocable agreement for the sale of the full stake of the Republic of Latvia in Citadele by […], to be closed by […]at the latest.
U slučaju imenovanja povjerenika za prodaju, Latvija i Citadele obvezuju se da će do […] primiti obvezujuće i za sve stranke neopozive ponude i sklopiti obvezujući i neopozivi ugovor o prodaji cijelog udjela Republike Latvije u banci Citadele do […], koja mora biti zaključena najkasnije […].
Further Latvia and Citadele commit that as of […] Citadele will […] new business and the remaining business of Citadele will […], if the Republic of Latvia has not entered by […]into a binding and irrevocable agreement, providing for the closing of the sale by […] of the full stake of the Republic of Latvia in Citadele, or if the IPO does not allow for the Republic of Latvia to sell its entire stake in Citadele by […].
Latvija i Citadele se nadalje obvezuju da će od […] Citadele […] novu poslovnu djelatnost i preostale poslovne djelatnosti Citadele će […], ako Republika Latvija do […] ne sklopi obvezujući i neopozivi sporazum u kojem je predviđena prodaja do […] cijelog udjela Republike Latvije u banci Citadele ili ako Republika Latvija na temelju IPO-a ne bude mogla prodati cijeli svoj udio u banci Citadele do […].
Latvia and Citadele commit to close the sale and purchase transaction for the sale of the full stake in Citadele of the Republic of Latvia by […].
Latvija i Citadele obvezuju se zaključiti kupoprodajnu transakciju za prodaju cjelokupnog udjela Republike Latvije u banci Citadele do […].
If the sale of that stake has not been completed by […], they commit that Citadele will […] new business and the remaining business of Citadele will be […].
Ako prodaja tog udjela ne bude dovršena do […], obvezuju se da će Citadele […] novu poslovnu djelatnost i preostale poslovne djelatnosti banke Citadele bit će […].
If Citadele is […] in any of the events mentioned in recitals 64 to 67, any parts of the business of Citadele, for which there is an interest of third parties, can be sold and transferred by the Republic of Latvia and/or Citadele to such a third party (without prejudice to the principles […] and no new State aid).
Ako je Citadele […] u nekoj od situacija iz uvodnih izjava 64. do 67., bilo koji dio poslovanja Citadele za koji postoji interes trećih strana može se prodati i Republika Latvija i/ili Citadele mogu ga prenijeti na tu treću stranu (ne dovodeći u pitanje načela […] i bez novih državnih potpora).
Further reduction of the amount of the authorized capital contributions
Daljnje smanjenje iznosa odobrenih kapitalnih doprinosa
As regards Reverta, the Amendment Decision authorized the conversion into capital of State deposits and interest (the liquidity support) for the total amount of LVL 118,7 million.
U odnosu na Revertu, Odlukom o izmjeni odobreno je pretvaranje državnih depozita i kamata (potpore za likvidnost) u kapital u ukupnom iznosu od 118,7 milijuna LVL.
Because until now only LVL 49,5 million of liquidity support has been converted into capital, Latvia proposes to immediately and permanently reduce the maximum total amount of capital that can be provided to Reverta by Latvia to LVL 49,5 million, from LVL 118,7 million previously.
Budući da je do danas u kapital pretvoreno samo 49,5 milijuna LVL potpore za likvidnost, Latvija predlaže da se najveći ukupni iznos kapitala koji Latvija može dodijeliti Reverti s prethodnih 118,7 milijuna LVL odmah i trajno smanji na 49,5 milijuna LVL.
Commitment to enhance burden-sharing measures by preventing any cash outflows to Reverta's Legacy Subordinated Creditors
Obveza jačanja mjera podjele obveza sprječavanjem odljeva novca prema vjerovnicima naslijeđenih podređenih zajmova Reverte
Latvia acknowledges that enhanced burden-sharing measures are necessary to ensure the compatibility of the First, Second and Third Measures with the internal market.
Latvija potvrđuje da su nužne pojačane mjere podjele obveza kako bi se osigurala spojivost prve, druge i treće mjere s unutarnjim tržištem.
Such measures would ensure, inter alia, that no third parties unduly benefit from the additional State aid provided to Reverta and Citadele.
Takvim bi se mjerama,među ostalim osiguralo da treće stranke nemaju neopravdanu korist od dodatne državne potpore dodijeljene bankama Reverta i Citadele.