natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Finally, as regards the 2011 DGTF loan, the Commission observes that, as in the case of the 2010 DGTF loan, there is strictly speaking no collateralisation but merely a promise by ENVC to use the revenues resulting from a given framework-contract with the Ministry of National Defence to repay the loan, which moreover had to be confirmed by the Administration Board of ENVC and approved by the Ministry of National Defence.
Naposljetku, u pogledu kredita DGTF-a iz 2011. Komisija napominje da, kao i u slučaju kredita DGTF-a iz 2010., strogo govoreći ne postoji osiguranje jamstva, već samo obećanje ENVC-a da će za otplatu kredita koristiti prihode od predmetnog okvirnog ugovora s Ministarstvom nacionalne obrane, koji je osim toga trebala potvrditi Uprava ENVC-a i odobriti Ministarstvo nacionalne obrane.
It is thus highly doubtful that this level of collateralisation could be considered adequate by a market-oriented lender.
Stoga je vrlo dvojbeno da bi tržišno usmjeren zajmodavac tu razinu osiguranja jamstva smatrao odgovarajućom.
Therefore, given that ENVC was at the time a firm in difficulty, the Commission considers that the applicable margin should be at least 1000bp, which would result in a reference rate of at least 11,49 %, much higher than the interest rates actually applied to ENVC (5,568 % in April 2011 and 5,241 % in June 2011).
Stoga Komisija smatra, s obzirom na to da je ENVC u tom trenutku bio poduzeće u teškoćama, da bi primjenjiva marža trebala iznositi najmanje 1000 baznih bodova, što bi dovelo do referentne stope od najmanje 11,49 %, što je znatno više od kamatnih stopa koje su se stvarno primjenjivale na ENVC (5,568 % u travnju 2011. i 5,241 % u lipnju 2011.).
Bearing in mind the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that the DGTF loans provided ENVC with an undue advantage.
Imajući to u vidu, Komisija zaključuje da su krediti DGTF-a ENVC-u osigurali neopravdanu prednost.
In what relates to the comfort letters issued by EMPORDEF between 2007 and 2011, the Commission first observes that they appear to have a very similar nature to a guarantee, since in most of these letters EMPORDEF specifically stated that it would do everything necessary to make sure that ENVC would have the necessary means available to honour the underlying loan agreement.
Kada je riječ o pismima namjere koje je EMPORDEF izdao od 2007. do 2011., Komisija prvo napominje da se čini da su po prirodi vrlo slična jamstvu jer je u većini tih pisama EMPORDEF posebno naveo da će učiniti sve što je potrebno kako bi osigurao da ENVC ima dostupna sredstva potrebna za izvršenje osnovnog ugovora o kreditu.
However, the comfort letters dated 8 January 2007 and 26 June 2008 have a different wording.
Međutim, pisma namjere od 8. siječnja 2007. i 26. lipnja 2008. različito su formulirana.
In these letters, EMPORDEF notes that it owns ENVC at 100 % and that this shareholding will not be diminished; otherwise the granting bank is allowed to ask ENVC to pay back the loan before maturity.
EMPORDEF u tim pismima navodi da je stopostotni vlasnik ENVC-a i da se njegovo vlasništvo neće smanjiti; u protivnome, banci koja odobrava kredit dopušteno je od ENVC-a zatražiti otplatu kredita prije dospijeća.
This statement alone does not allow the Commission to consider that EMPORDEF would be liable for ENVC's default on the respective loans and therefore it does not appear adequate to assimilate them to guarantees.
Na temelju same te izjave Komisija ne može smatrati da bi EMPORDEF bio odgovoran za ENVC-ovo neispunjavanje obveza u pogledu osnovnih kredita te stoga nije primjereno smatrati ih jamstvom.
It is therefore not established that these letters have provided an advantage to ENVC.
Stoga nije utvrđeno da su ta pisma ENVC-u osigurala prednost.
As regards the rest of the comfort letters (i.e. the ones provided in 2009, 2010 and 2011), given that EMPORDEF declares to be ready to step in if ENVC does not honour the underlying loan contract, it appears clear that they are equivalent to a guarantee, since EMPORDEF reassures the granting financial institution by undertaking to do everything necessary for ENVC to have the means available to pay back the loans.
U pogledu ostalih pisama namjere (tj. onih izdanih 2009., 2010. i 2011.), s obzirom na to da EMPORDEF izjavljuje da je spreman uskočiti ako ENVC ne izvrši osnovni ugovor o kreditu, čini se jasnim da su ona istovrijedna jamstvu jer EMPORDEF financijskoj instituciji koja odobrava kredit jamči da će poduzeti sve što je potrebno kako bi ENVC imao dostupna sredstva za otplatu kredita.
A normal market operator would have asked a premium in exchange for providing this type of ‘guarantee’, which however EMPORDEF never did despite the significant risk that ENVC would not be able to repay the loans in view of its difficulties at the time.
Uobičajeni tržišni subjekt zatražio bi premiju u zamjenu za osiguranje te vrste „jamstva”, što EMPORDEF međutim nije nikada učinio usprkos značajnom riziku da ENVC neće biti u mogućnosti otplatiti kredite s obzirom na teškoće koje je u tom trenutku imao.
The Commission observes that the comfort letters were not remunerated and that ENVC did not pay to EMPORDEF any premium.
Komisija napominje da pisma namjere nisu financijski nadoknađena i da ENVC nije EMPORDEF-u platio premiju.
Therefore, the risk incurred by EMPORDEF was not remunerated.
Stoga rizik koji je snosio EMPORDEF nije bio financijski nadoknađen.
This in itself is sufficient to conclude that the comfort letters, which have very similar features to a guarantee, provided ENVC with an undue advantage.
Na temelju toga može se zaključiti da su pisma namjere, koja imaju svojstva vrlo slična jamstvu, ENVC-u osigurala neopravdanu prednost.
As regards the argument of Portugal that EMPORDEF would in any case be considered liable in the last instance for the debts of ENVC given that it was its sole shareholder, the Commission refers to its reasoning in recital 88 above, which applies mutatis mutandis.
U pogledu tvrdnje Portugala da bi se EMPORDEF u svakom slučaju u zadnjoj instanci smatrao odgovornim za dugove ENVC-a jer je bio njegov jedini dioničar, Komisija upućuje na svoje obrazloženje u prethodnoj uvodnoj izjavi 88., koje se primjenjuje mutatis mutandis.
Therefore, the Commission is of the view that the comfort letters of 2009, 2010 and 2011 provided ENVC with an undue advantage.
Stoga Komisija smatra da su pisma namjere iz 2009., 2010. i 2011. ENVC-u osigurala neopravdanu prednost.
As regards the loan for the Atlântida vessel, the Commission observes that in December 2009, EMPORDEF provided ENVC with EUR 37 million obtained from CGD for terminating the legal proceedings with Atlanticoline.
U pogledu kredita za brod Atlântida Komisija napominje da je EMPORDEF u prosincu 2009. ENVC-u dodijelio 37 milijuna EUR koje je dobio od CGD-a za završetak pravnog postupka s Atlanticolineom.
At that point in time, when ENVC was already a firm in difficulty, a rational market operator would have assessed the situation of the company and its capacity to repay the loan, instead of simply transferring the funds to ENVC.
U tom trenutku, kada je ENVC već bio poduzeće u teškoćama, razuman tržišni subjekt procijenio bi stanje društva i njegovu sposobnost otplate kredita, umjesto da jednostavno prebaci sredstva ENVC-u.
Also, a rational market operator would have assessed the risks associated to the operation and the possibility of selling the vessel to a different buyer — something which eventually happened in September 2014 (see recital 30 above).
Razuman tržišni subjekt procijenio bi rizike povezane s poslovanjem i mogućnost prodaje broda drugom kupcu, što se na kraju i dogodilo u rujnu 2014. (vidi prethodnu uvodnu izjavu 30.).
The Commission moreover observes that the loan was provided to EMPORDEF at an annual interest rate of 6-month EURIBOR plus 2 %, which at the time of the contract meant 2,993 %.
Komisija osim toga napominje da je kredit dodijeljen EMPORDEF-u po godišnjoj kamatnoj stopi jednakoj 6-mjesečnom EURIBOR-u uvećanom za 2 %, što je u trenutku ugovora značilo 2,993 %.
However, in accordance with the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 2008, applicable at the time, the base rate applicable for Portugal in December 2009 was 1,45 % to which a margin of at least 1000bp should be added in view of the difficulties of ENVC and the absence of strict collateralisation.
Međutim, u skladu s Komunikacijom Komisije o reviziji metode utvrđivanja referentnih i diskontnih stopa iz 2008., važećih u to vrijeme, osnovna stopa primjenjiva za Portugal u prosincu 2009. iznosila je 1,45 %, kojoj bi trebalo dodati maržu od najmanje 1000 baznih bodova s obzirom na teškoće ENVC-a i nedostatak strogog osiguranja jamstva.
Therefore, the applicable reference rate would be at least 11,45 %.
Tako bi primjenjiva referentna stopa iznosila najmanje 11,45 %.
Distortion of competition and affectation of intra-EU trade
Narušavanje tržišnog natjecanja i učinak na trgovinu u EU-u
The past measures are likely to affect trade between Member States as ENVC is in competition with shipyards from other Members States of the European Union as well as from the rest of the world.
Prethodne mjere vjerojatno će utjecati na trgovinu među državama članicama jer se ENVC tržišno natječe s brodogradilištima iz ostalih država članica Europske unije i iz ostatka svijeta.
The past measures in question thus enabled ENVC to continue operating so that it did not have to face, as other competitors, the consequences that would normally follow from its poor financial results.
Predmetne prethodne mjere tako su ENVC-u omogućile nastavak poslovanja tako da se nije morao suočiti, kao drugi konkurenti, s posljedicama koje bi uobičajeno uslijedile zbog njegovih loših financijskih rezultata.
Therefore, the past measures also distorted competition.
Stoga prethodne mjere narušavaju i tržišno natjecanje.
Conclusion on existence of State aid and quantification
Zaključak o postojanju državne potpore i kvantifikacija
On the basis of the assessment above, the Commission concludes that the past measures constitute State aid, since they meet the necessary requirements of the definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU, with the exception of the comfort letters of dated 8 January 2007 and 26 June 2008 (see recital 103 above).
Na temelju prethodne procjene Komisija zaključuje da prethodne mjere predstavljaju državnu potporu jer ispunjavaju potrebne zahtjeve definicije državne potpore iz članka 107. stavka 1. UFEU-a, osim pisama namjere od 8. siječnja 2007. i 26. lipnja 2008. (vidi prethodnu uvodnu izjavu 103.).
As indicated in recitals 68 and 69 above, the totality of the shipbuilding subsidies and of the professional training subsidies constitute State aid for an amount of EUR 27129933,20 and EUR 257791, respectively.
Kako je navedeno u prethodnim uvodnim izjavama 68. i 69., ukupnost subvencija u brodogradnji u iznosu od 27129933,20 EUR i subvencija za profesionalnu izobrazbu u iznosu od 257791 EUR predstavljaju državnu potporu.
As regards the rest of the past measures, the Commission reiterates that in view of the difficulties of ENVC at the time, no market-oriented operator would have provided them to the company.
U pogledu ostalih prethodnih mjera Komisija naglašava da zbog teškoća ENVC-a u tom trenutku nijedan tržišno usmjeren subjekt ne bi ih odobrio društvu.
For this reason, the Commission is of the view that ENVC received State aid in an amount equal to the totality of the 2006 capital increase (EUR 24,875 million).
Zbog toga Komisija smatra da je ENVC primio državnu potporu u iznosu koji je jednak ukupnom povećanju kapitala iz 2006. (24,875 milijuna EUR).
As regards the comfort letters of 2009, 2010 and 2011, the Commission reiterates that they have a very similar nature to guarantees (see recitals 103 and 104 above).
U pogledu pisama namjere iz 2009., 2010. i 2011., Komisija naglašava da su po prirodi vrlo slična jamstvima (vidi prethodne uvodne izjave 103. i 104.).
In this respect, the Guarantee Notice states the following in section 4.1: ‘The Commission notes that for companies in difficulty, a market guarantor, if any, would, at the time the guarantee is granted charge a high premium given the expected rate of default. If the likelihood that the borrower will not be able to repay the loan becomes particularly high, this market rate may not exist and in exceptional circumstances the aid element of the guarantee may turn out to be as high as the amount effectively covered by that guarantee’.
U vezi s tim, u odjeljku 4.1 Obavijesti o jamstvima navodi se sljedeće: „Komisija navodi da bi za društva u teškoćama tržišni davatelj jamstva, ako postoji, u vrijeme davanja jamstva zaračunao visoku premiju s obzirom na očekivanu stopu neizvršavanja ugovornih obveza. Ako vjerojatnost da zajmoprimac neće moći otplatiti kredit postane posebno visoka, ova tržišna stopa možda neće postojati, a u izuzetnim okolnostima vrijednost jamstva može biti onolika koliki je i iznos koji je učinkovito pokriven tim jamstvom.”
The Commission observes that the banks provided the loans to ENVC only because of the existence of the ‘guarantees’ (in the form of comfort letters) of EMPORDEF reassuring the banks that it would do the necessary to ensure that ENVC would pay back the loans.
Komisija napominje da su banke ENVC-u dodijelile kredite samo zbog postojanja „jamstava” (u obliku pisama namjere) EMPORDEF-a kojima jamči da će poduzeti što je potrebno kako bi osigurao da ENVC otplati kredite.
Moreover, the Commission notes that the comfort letters were provided for free at a time when ENVC was in difficulty and despite the significant risk that it would not be able to honour its commitments.
Osim toga, Komisija navodi da su pisma namjere dodijeljena besplatno u trenutku kada je ENVC bio u teškoćama i usprkos značajnom riziku da ne bi mogao ispuniti svoje obveze.
The Commission moreover observes that ENVC had been in at least three occasions in a situation of technical bankruptcy (see recital 64 above) and despite this, EMPORDEF decided to issue the comfort letters without a premium.
Komisija osim toga napominje da je ENVC najmanje u tri navrata bio u tehničkom stečaju (vidi prethodnu uvodnu izjavu 64.), a EMPORDEF je usprkos tome odlučio izdati pisma namjere bez premije.
In this context, the Commission concludes that there is no possible market rate that could be used as a reasonable comparator and therefore takes the view that ENVC received State aid in an amount equal to the totality of the amounts guaranteed by the comfort letters of 2009, 2010 and 2011 (i.e. EUR 51280000).
U tom kontekstu Komisija zaključuje da ne postoji moguća tržišna stopa koja bi se mogla koristiti kao razumno sredstvo usporedbe te stoga zauzima stajalište da je ENVC primio državnu potporu u iznosu koji je jednak ukupnim iznosima za koje su jamčila pisma namjere iz 2009., 2010. i 2011. (tj. 51280000 EUR).
A similar logic applies to the case of the loans provided to ENVC, i.e. the 2012 and 2013 loans, the DGTF loans and the loan for the Atlântida vessel.
Slična logika primjenjuje se u slučaju kredita dodijeljenih ENVC-u, tj. kredita iz 2012. i 2013., kredita DGTF-a i kredita za brod Atlântida.
EMPORDEF and the DGTF provided these loans to ENVC at a time when the company was in difficulty and no rational market operator would have provided them.
EMPORDEF i DGTF dodijelili su te kredite ENVC-u u trenutku kada je društvo bilo u teškoćama i kada ih nijedan razuman tržišni subjekt ne bi dodijelio.
This is particularly obvious for the case of the 2012 and 2013 loans, since as indicated in recital 21 above, the banks had ceased providing loans to ENVC and were only willing to do so in relation to EMPORDEF.
To je osobito očigledno u slučaju kredita iz 2012. i 2013. jer, kako je navedeno u prethodnoj uvodnoj izjavi 21., banke su prestale dodjeljivati kredite ENVC-u, te su jedino bile spremne to učiniti u odnosu na EMPORDEF.
Also, the Commission observes that the DGTF loans and the loan for the Atlântida vessel were provided between 2006 and 2011: during these years, private banks were willing to lend to ENVC only on the basis of a guarantee (in the form of a comfort letter) from EMPORDEF.
Komisija napominje i da su krediti DGTF-a i kredit za brod Atlântidu dodijeljeni od 2006. do 2011.: tijekom tih godina privatne banke bile su spremne kreditirati ENVC samo na temelju jamstva (u obliku pisma namjere) EMPORDEF-a.
This indicates that no market operator was willing to provide a loan to ENVC alone.
To ukazuje na to da nijedan tržišni subjekt nije bio spreman dodijeliti kredit samo ENVC-u.
Therefore, in view of the above, Commission concludes that ENVC received State aid in an amount equal to the totality of the 2012 and 2013 loans (EUR 101118066,03), the DGTF loans (EUR 30 million, EUR 8 million, EUR 5 million and EUR 13 million, respectively) and the loan for the Atlântida vessel (EUR 37 million).
Stoga s obzirom na navedeno Komisija zaključuje da je ENVC primio državnu potporu u iznosu koji je jednak ukupnim iznosima kredita iz 2012. i 2013. (101118066,03 EUR), kredita DGTF-a (30 milijuna EUR, 8 milijuna EUR, 5 milijuna EUR i 13 milijuna EUR svaki pojedinačno) i kredita za brod Atlântida (37 milijuna EUR).
Unlawful aid
Nezakonite potpore
Article 108(3) TFEU states that a Member State shall not put an aid measure into effect before the Commission has adopted a decision authorising this measure.
Prema članku 108. stavku 3. UFEU-a država članica ne primjenjuje mjeru potpore prije nego što Komisija donese odluku kojom se ta mjera odobrava.
The Commission observes that Portugal granted the past measures to ENVC without notifying them to the Commission for approval (with the exceptions indicated in recital 125 below).
Komisija napominje da je Portugal odobrio prethodne mjere ENVC-u a da o njima nije obavijestio Komisiju radi odobrenja (uz izuzetke navedene u uvodnoj izjavi 125. u nastavku).
The Commission regrets that Portugal did not comply with the stand-still obligation and therefore violated its obligation according to Article 108(3) TFEU.
Komisija izražava žaljenje što Portugal nije ispunio obvezu neprimjenjivanja mjera i stoga je prekršio svoju obvezu u skladu s člankom 108. stavkom 3. UFEU-a.
Compatibility of the past measures with the internal market
Spojivost prethodnih mjera s unutarnjim tržištem
Insofar as the measures identified above constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, their compatibility must be assessed in the light of the exceptions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that provision.
Ako prethodno utvrđene mjere predstavljaju državnu potporu u smislu članka 107. stavka 1. UFEU-a, njihova spojivost mora se procijeniti u odnosu na izuzetke iz stavaka 2. i 3. te odredbe.
According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds of compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions for such compatibility are met [42].
U skladu sa sudskom praksom Suda EU-a država članica može se pozvati na moguće osnove spojivosti i dokazati da su ispunjeni uvjeti za takvu spojivost [42].
The Portuguese authorities consider that most of the past measures do not constitute State aid and have therefore not provided any possible grounds for compatibility.
Portugalska nadležna tijela smatraju da većina prethodnih mjera ne predstavlja državnu potporu pa stoga nisu dostavila moguće osnove za spojivost.
The Commission has nonetheless assessed whether any of the possible compatibility grounds laid down in the TFEU would be applicable to the past measures.
Komisija je ipak procijenila bi li neke od mogućih osnova za spojivost utvrđenih u UFEU-u bile primjenjive na prethodne mjere.
As regards the shipbuilding subsidies, Portugal argues that they were provided under Decree-Law 296/89 implementing Directive 87/167/EEC (see recital 68 above).
U pogledu subvencija u brodogradnji Portugal tvrdi da su one dodijeljene prema Zakonskom dekretu 296/89 kojim se provodi Direktiva 87/167/EEZ (vidi prethodnu uvodnu izjavu 68.).
However, as the Commission already noted in the opening Decision, this Directive has ceased to apply since 31 December 1990 (see Article 13 thereof).
Međutim, kako je Komisija već navela u Odluci o pokretanju postupka, ta Direktiva prestala se primjenjivati od 31. prosinca 1990. (vidi njezin članak 13.).
In addition, Portugal has not provided any evidence that the shipbuilding subsidies would be compatible with any of the subsequent legal bases for declaring compatible aid for shipbuilding purposes.
Osim toga, Portugal nije dostavio dokaze da bi subvencije u brodogradnji bile spojive s naknadnim pravnim osnovama za prijavu spojive potpore u korist brodogradnje.
The sole exception concerns two shipbuilding subsidies granted to ENVC in 2003 and 2005 for the construction of two vessels (contracts C224 and C225 — see Annex II).
Jedino izuzeće odnosi se na dvije subvencije u brodogradnji odobrene ENVC-u 2003. i 2005. za izgradnju dva broda (ugovori C224 i C225 – vidi Prilog II).
These subsidies were authorised by Commission Decision in case C 33/2004 [43] on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Te subvencije odobrene su Odlukom Komisije u predmetu C 33/2004 [43] na osnovi Uredbe (EZ) br. 1540/98.
The Commission therefore concludes according to the information provided that the subsidies for contracts C224 and C225 amounting to EUR 2675275 each (or a total of EUR 5350550) constitute aid to shipbuilding compatible with the internal market.
Komisija stoga zaključuje, u skladu s dostavljenim informacijama, da subvencije za ugovore C224 i C225 u pojedinačnom iznosu od 2675275 EUR (ili ukupno 5350550 EUR) predstavljaju potporu brodogradnji spojivu s unutarnjim tržištem.
The Commission nonetheless comes to the view that the rest of shipbuilding subsidies (amounting to EUR 21779383,21) — for which Portugal does not discuss their State aid character — are incompatible with the internal market.
Komisija ipak smatra da su preostale subvencije u brodogradnji (u iznosu od 21779383,21 EUR), a za koje Portugal ne razmatra njihov karakter državne potpore, nespojive s unutarnjim tržištem.
In relation to the rest of the past measures (with the exclusion of the comfort letters dated 8 January 2007 and 26 June 2008), as already indicated in the opening decision, in view of the nature of the measures and of the difficulties of ENVC, the only relevant compatibility criteria appear to be those concerning aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU on the basis of the 2004 R&R Guidelines [44].
U vezi s ostalim prethodnim mjerama (osim pisama namjere od 8. siječnja 2007. i 26. lipnja 2008.), kako je već navedeno u odluci o pokretanju postupka, a s obzirom na prirodu mjera i teškoća ENVC-a čini se da su jedini relevantni kriteriji spojivosti oni koji se odnose na potpore za sanaciju i restrukturiranje poduzeća u teškoćama prema članku 107. stavku 3. točki (c) UFEU-a na osnovi Smjernica za sanaciju i restrukturiranje iz 2004. [44].
In the first place, the Commission reiterates its findings of the opening decision that that the conditions for rescue aid laid down in section 3.1 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines are not met.
U prvom redu, Komisija naglašava svoje nalaze iz odluke o pokretanju postupka da uvjeti za potporu za sanaciju utvrđeni u odjeljku 3.1 Smjernica za sanaciju i restrukturiranje iz 2004. nisu ispunjeni.
According to point 25(a) of the 2004 R&R Guidelines, the rescue aid must consist of liquidity support in the form of loans or loan guarantees; in both cases, the loan must be granted at an interest rate at least comparable to those observed for loans to healthy firms.
Prema točki 25. podtočki (a) Smjernica za sanaciju i restrukturiranje iz 2004. potpora za sanaciju mora se sastojati od potpore za likvidnost u obliku zajma ili jamstva za zajam; u oba slučaja zajam se mora odobriti uz kamatnu stopu koja je barem usporediva s onima za zajmove zdravim poduzećima.
For instance the 2006 capital increase would already not meet this requirement.
Na primjer, povećanje kapitala iz 2006. već ne bi ispunilo taj zahtjev.