natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
While there is a wide spread belief that the current code should become legally binding, some argue that is not necessary as far as its dispositions are consistently being respected and put into practice - referring to the assumption that is in the interest of lobbyists themselves to maintain good relationships with the EU institutions and not to be suspected of bad practices.
Dok u određenim krugovima prevladava mišljenje da bi postojeći Kodeks trebao postati pravno obvezujući, drugi smatraju da to nije nužno sve dok se njegove odredbe konzistentno poštuju i provode, naglašavajući pritom da je u interesu lobista da ih se ne sumnjiči za zakulisne prakse i da održe dobre odnose s institucijama EU.
Although still weak, the level of regulation of lobbying at the European Parliament is still much better than at the European Commission or the Council.
Iako još uvijek slaba, razina reguliranosti lobiranja u Europskom parlamentu znatno je bolja od one u Komisiji ili Vijeću.
For more than six years, a series of initiatives for the introduction of a regulatory framework for lobbying in the European Parliament have been launched without success.
Pokušaji uvođenja regulativnog okvira za lobiranje u Europskom parlamentu bezuspješno su trajali sedam godina.
Lobbyists, defined as people who wish to enter Parliament frequently to provide members of the European Parliament (MEPs) with information relating to their parliamentary duties, in their own interests or those of third parties, are required to register and are granted special passesviii which distinguish them from occasional visitors.
Od lobista, koji se definiraju kao osobe koje žele češće ulaziti u prostorije Parlamenta radi kontaktiranja i informiranja članova Parlamenta, traži se da se registriraju te da im se izdaju posebne propusnice™ po kojima će se razlikovati od ostalih posjetitelja.
The reason a consensus on lobbying regulation has taken so long to be found probably lies in the longstanding national differences of political culture and the diverging cultural and judicial attitudes towards lobbying in general.
Razlozi tako dugotrajnog traženja konsenzusa o regulaciji lobiranja obično se pronalaze u trajnim nacionalnim razlikama u političkoj kulturi te u divergentnim kulturnim i pravosudnim stajalištima prema lobiranju općenito.
There are three key components of the initiative.
31 Tri su ključne komponente te inicijative.
The first requires a stronger involvement of member states and deals with the proposal to improve information on beneficiaries of EU funds, especially on EU agricultural subsidies and EU structural funds payments.
Prva zahtijeva angažman vlada država članica, a odnosi se na prijedlog da se javno obznane svi krajnji korisnici fondova EU, pogotovo primatelji poljoprivrednih poticaja i potpora iz strukturnih fondova, uz navođenje primljenih iznosa.
The second component is focused on stepping up the ethical standards and accountability of EU institutions, with special emphasis on the members of the European Parliament and officials of the Commission.
Druga je komponenta uvođenje strožih kodeksa ponašanja i izjava o imovinskom stanju i interesima službenika institucija EU, osobito za članove Europskog parlamenta i službenike Komisije.
The third concerns the increased transparency of the activities of lobbyists and the need for disclosing the interests they represent, their mission and the sources of their financing.
Treća se odnosi na povećanu transparentnost u djelovanju lobista i nevladinih organizacija u smislu interesa koje zastupaju i izvora njihova financiranja.
The document makes three proposals in that area: a voluntary registration system run by the Commission with incentives for lobbyists to register; common codes of conduct for all lobbyists developed by the lobbyist profession and possibly consolidating and improving the existing codes; and a new system of external monitoring and sanctions for cases of incorrect registration and/or breach of the code of conduct.
S tim u vezi dokument donosi tri prijedloga: dobrovoljni sustav registracije putem web stranice, kodeks ponašanja odnosno minimalni standardi koji bi bili zajednički za sve lobiste te novi sustav vanjskog nadzora i sankcija u slučaju kršenja kodeksa.
The main criticism of the Green Paper is related to the lack of credible incentives for the registration of lobbyists, the failure to propose mandatory rules for disclosing full details about funding and the inadequate solution of the problem of employment of the Commission officials in the private sector after leaving their duty (the revolving doors phenomenon)x.
Najveći dio zamjerki na prijedloge iznesene u Zelenoj knjizi odnosi se na nedovoljno poticajan sustav za registraciju lobista, kao i na neodgovarajuće rješavanje problema zapošljavanja službenika Komisije u privatnom sektoru odnosno angažmana u lobističkim aktivnostima nakon odlaska iz te institucije (tzv. fenomen revolving doors).xi
Several new EU member states opted for regulating lobbying activities by special legally binding acts.
Nove države članice EU prednjače u reguliranosti lobističkih aktivnosti zakonskim aktima.
Lithuania and Poland were the first countries to introduce special laws on lobbying, which largely draw on the model accepted in the USA (Wiszowaty, 2005).
Litva i Poljska među prvima su uvele poseban zakon o lobiranju koji se uvelike oslanja na model prihvaćen u SAD-u (Wiszowaty, 2005).
The Hungarian Lobbying Act was finally adopted in February 2006, after years of unsuccessful attempts and disputes caused by the first draft of the law.
U Mađarskoj je nacrt zakona o lobiranju konačno usvojen u veljači 2006, nakon neuspješnog pokušaja i niza nesuglasica koje je izazvao prvi nacrt.
Lobbying acts have been proposed, for example, in Ireland and Italy, but did not meet sufficient support of the governments of those countries.
Zakonski akti o lobiranju predloženi su, primjerice, i u Irskoj i Italiji, ali još uvijek nisu naišli na prihvaćanje tamošnjih vladajućih struktura.
Germany and Great Britain have been usually mentioned among the old EU member states that have introduced a certain regulatory framework for lobbyists and interest group representatives in the Parliament.
Među “starijim” državama članicama Unije koje su uvele određeni regulativni okvir za lobiste i predstavnike interesnih skupina obično se kao paradigmatični primjeri spominju Njemačka i Velika Britanija.
Bundestag Rules of Procedure implement a system of mandatory registration of interest groups that want to represent their interests at Bundestag or Federal Government institutions.
Pravilnik njemačkog Bundestaga predviđa sustav registracije svih interesnih skupina koje žele zastupati svoje interese pri Bundestagu ili institucijama federalne Vlade.
The content of the Register is published and updated once a year in the Official Gazette.
Registar je javan i njegov se sadržaj objavljuje jedanput u godini u njihovu službenom listu.
In 1996 Great Britain introduced a code of conduct for parliamentary deputies which regulates their interaction with lobbyists.
U Velikoj Britaniji je 1996. usvojen Kodeks ponašanja parlamentarnih zastupnika koji regulira uvjete njihove interakcije s lobistima.
A similar proposal has been under consideration in Slovakia.
Nacrt sličnog kodeksa razmatra se i u Slovačkoj.
Generally, current global trends open up new possibilities for better regulation of transparency and monitoring of lobbying activities in other EU member states as well.
Općenito, postojeća globalna tendencija otvara prostor za bolje reguliranje transparentnosti i nadzora lobističke djelatnosti i u drugim članicama Unije.
While considering the problem of regulating lobbying in the EU, it should be stressed that the regulatory tendency has not been focussed on eliminating the phenomenon, rather on fighting corruption and introducing a clear set of lobbying rules.
Pri razmatranju problematike regulacije lobiranja u EU ipak treba naglasiti da regulativna tendencija nije usmjerena na eliminiranje tog fenomena nego na suzbijanje korupcije i primjenu jasnih pravila u lobističkoj igri.
As the open competition of interest groups is an important component of democratic policy processes, lobbying regulation should aim at raising the awareness of the accountability of all the participants of democratic decision-making and the transparency of the process.
Otvoreno natjecanje interesnih skupina važan je element svakoga demokratskog procesa, pa je uloga lobističke regulative potaknuti svijest o odgovornosti svih sudionika demokratskog procesa donošenja odluka i važnosti transparentnog djelovanja u tom procesu.
CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN UNION POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES
KANALI UTJECAJA NA PROCESE POLITIČKOG ODLUČIVANJA U EUROPSKOJ UNIJI
The development of the multi-level system of governance and the new institutional architecture with a growing number of public actors and institutions have considerably changed the target structures (Grande, 2001) and possibilities of influence of interest groups on the policy-making processes in the EU.
Razvoj višerazinskog sustava upravljanja i novo institucionalno okruženje sa sve većim brojem javnih aktera i institucija znatno su izmijenili ciljnu strukturu (Grande, 2001) i mogućnosti utjecaja interesnih skupina na proces političkog odlučivanja u EU.
The new differentiated institutional environment of the EU provides interest groups with a wide spectrum of potential channels of influence on the shaping of public policies.
Novo diferencirano institucionalno okruženje EU nudi interesnim skupinama širok raspon potencijalnih kanala utjecaja (channels of influence) na oblikovanje europskih javnih politika.
Generally speaking, two major channels of influence might be pointed out: national and European (or Brussels) - each of them implying an interaction with a series of institutional and political actors the importance of which depends on the modalities of decision-making processes.
Općenito se mogu izdvojiti dvije glavne vrste kanala utjecaja: nacionalni i europski (odnosno bruxelleski), pri čemu svaki od njih podrazumijeva interakciju s nizom institucionalnih i političkih aktera čija važnost ovisi o modalitetima procesa odlučivanja.
Interest-group lobbying through national channels of influence depends largely on the role of the national level bodies and member states in the decision making in certain areas, as well as on the openness of national institutions to interaction with organised interests.
Lobiranje interesnih skupina putem nacionalnih kanala utjecaja, dakako, ovisi o važnosti uloge nacionalne razine odnosno država članica u procesu odlučivanja u EU, ali i o stupnju odgovarajućeg pristupa što ga nacionalne institucije pružaju organiziranim interesnim skupinama.
According to Greenwood, the main factors determining the European, Brussels strategy of lobbying are: (i) the level of competence of the EU and supranational institutions in the relevant field; (ii) the role of the Commission in initiating the policy proposals and enhancing the development of the EU interest groups settled in Brussels; (iii) presence of formal institutionalised structures for representing interests such as consultative committees and (iv) the need for networking and gathering the information.
Prema Greenwoodu, glavni čimbenici koji utječu na europsku, bruxellesku strategiju lobiranja jesu: 1. stupanj nadležnosti EU i ovlasti nadnacionalnih institucija, 2. uloga Komisije u iniciranju prijedloga politika i poticanju razvoja europskih interesnih skupina sa sjedištem u Bruxellesu, 3. postojanje formalnih institucionaliziranih struktura zastupanja interesa kao što su savjetodavni odbori i sl., te 4. potreba za umrežavanjem i prikupljanjem informacija.
Results of some research projects show that the national strategy and the use of national channels of influence dominated until the adoption of the Single European Act which paved the way for the creation of the EU Single European Market.
Istraživanja pokazuju da su nacionalni kanali utjecaja prevladavali do usvajanja Jedinstvenoga europskog akta kojim je sredinom osamdesetih pokrenuto stvaranje unutarnjeg tržišta u EU.
Nevertheless, various actors clearly show different preferences and patterns of action with respect to certain lobbying strategies.
Ipak, neprijeporno je da različiti akteri pokazuju različite preferencije i obrasce djelovanja u odnosu prema pojedinim lobističkim strategijama.
Empirical research conducted among British business and trade associations shows that 42% of these associations opt for national channels of influence, 27% use the services of European umbrella interest groups, 17% decide to lobby directly in Brussels, while 11% of them rely on individual activities of enterprises (Bennet, 1997).
Empirijsko istraživanje provedeno u Velikoj Britaniji (Bennet, 1997) na poslovnim, trgovačkim udruženjima pokazuje da 42% njih odabire nacionalne kanale utjecaja, 27% koristi se uslugama europske krovne interesne skupine, 17% odlučuje izravno lobirati u Bruxellesu, dok se njih 11% oslanja na individualne aktivnosti poduzeća.
The research showed, among other things, that human and financial resources usually prove to be crucial in selecting the type of strategy, and it is the financially stronger groups with the biggest number of members that tend to use European channels more often.xii
Spomenuto je istraživanje pokazalo, između ostaloga, da su u britanskom primjeru ljudski i financijski potencijali interesnih skupina presudni u odabiru vrste strategije, pri čemu se brojnije i financijski snažnije interesne skupine češće koriste europskim lobističkim putovima.xl11
On the other hand, according to the research carried out among a great number of German, British, French and European umbrella trade associations during 1998 and 1999, most trade associations follow a double strategy of European interests representation (Kohler Koch and Quitkatt, 1999).
S druge strane, istraživanje provedeno na velikom broju njemačkih, britanskih i francuskih, kao i krovnih europskih trgovačkih udruženja tijekom 1998. i 1999. godine (Kohler Koch i Quitkatt, 1999) pokazuje da se većina trgovačkih udruženja opredjeljuje za dvostruku strategiju u zastupanju svojih “europskih'' interesa.
Sixty-nine per cent of all interviewed national trade associations focus on both European and national institutions, while only 18% of them still follow only the national approach.
Naime, 69% svih ispitanih nacionalnih trgovačkih udruženja istodobno je usmjereno na europske i nacionalne institucije, dok samo 18% njih još uvijek slijedi samo nacionalnu strategiju.
The same research shows that even European trade associations follow the double strategy by maintaining regular contacts with European and national political institutions.
Isto istraživanje pokazuje da se čak i europska trgovačka udruženja služe dvostrukom strategijom održavajući redovite veze s europskim i nacionalnim političkim institucijama.
Also, 62% of European trade associations have continuous contacts with their national governments, 42% develop cooperation with their national parliaments, and 41% contact their national regulatory agencies.
Pritom 62% ispitanih europskih trgovačkih udruženja ima veze s nacionalnim vladama, 42% s nacionalnim parlamentima, dok njih 41% kontaktira s nacionalnim regulativnim tijelima.
These data clearly confirm the assumption that the progress of the process of European integration makes the process of interest representation more complex, requiring interest groups to develop a multi-dimensional strategy of parallel action at several political levels and the use of multiple channels of influence.
Takvi podaci nedvosmisleno potvrđuju pretpostavku da je s napretkom procesa europske integracije proces zastupanja interesa postao znatno složeniji i da od interesnih skupina zahtijeva višedimenzionalnu strategiju istodobnog djelovanja na nekoliko političkih razina, odnosno putem nekoliko kanala utjecaja.
The already existing complexity of the concept “channels of influence” has been made even more complex by the fact that EU member states and EU institutions are not only targets and objects of interest representation but also their subjects, since they actively participate in lobbying for various policy initiatives.
Već postojeću složenost koncepta “kanala utjecaja'' dodatno usložnjava činjenica da države članice i nadnacionalne europske institucije nisu samo objekti zastupanja interesa, nego i subjekti jer i same aktivno sudjeluju u lobiranju za neke politike.
In general, due to the role of the Commission in proposing legislative initiatives and the dependency of that institution on the input of external interests, the Commission has been considered the first target of lobbying at the EU level.
Općenito, zbog uloge Komisije u izradi zakonodavstva i njezine ovisnosti o vanjskim interesima, ta je institucija prva meta zastupanja interesa na europskoj razini.
In its early stages, the policy-making process implies the possibility of influencing the definition of the problem at stake, creating an adequate contextual framework and drafting the content of new polices.
Naime, u ranim stadijima proces oblikovanja politika podrazumijeva mogućnost utjecaja na definiciju problema, njegovo stavljanje u poseban kontekst te na oblikovanje nacrta sadržaja novih politika.
This allows interest groups with specialised, technical knowledge to gain a privileged position, especially in cases when the Commission does not have enough resources and depends on organisations that enjoy almost a monopoly on a very special type of information and expertise.
U tom su smislu u posebno povoljnom položaju interesne skupine koje posjeduju vrlo specijalizirana tehnička znanja čiji utjecaj znatno raste onda kad Komisija nema dovoljno resursa i kad ovisi o izvorima koji imaju svojevrsni monopol nad informacijama i određenom vrstom ekspertize.
The third pillar of the EU institutional triangle and an important lobbying target is the Council of Ministers which has a final say in decision-making processes.
Kao treći cilj po važnosti obično se navodi Vijeće ministara, koje ima konačne ovlasti odlučivanja na kraju procesa oblikovanja politika.
Clearly, at the very end of the legislative process, it is very difficult to exert any influence, as most key questions have been already defined and each intervention would actually imply changes in positions taken by certain institutional actors.
Dakako, na samom kraju procesa vrlo je teško ostvariti određeni utjecaj, ponajprije zbog činjenice da su glavna pitanja već definirana, pa bi svaka intervencija zapravo značila izmjene u već utvrđenim pozicijama pojedinih institucionalnih aktera.
The growing numbers of experts dealing with interest representation dynamics at the EU level describe the interaction between the interest groups and the EU institutions as a process of exchange of information and analyse the logic of access as an important component of potential influence on policy-making procedures.
Sve veći broj stručnjaka koji se bave dinamikom interesne intermedijacije i lobiranja na razini EU opisuju interakciju između interesnih skupina i institucija EU kao proces razmjene informacija i analiziraju logiku pristupa institucijama Unije kao važnu komponentu potencijalnog utjecaja na procese političkog odlučivanja.
According to Bouwen (2002), a potential level of access of certain interest groups to EU institutions may be explained by the theory of supply and demand of the so-called “access-goods”.
Prema Bouwenu, potencijalni stupanj pristupa pojedinih interesnih skupina institucijama EU može se objasniti teorijom ponude i potražnje tzv. pristupne robe (access goods).
In other words, the access of interest groups to policy-making processes is largely dependent on their capacities and potential to provide various forms of access goods to the EU institutions (Bouwen, 2003).
Drugim riječima, pristup interesnih skupina procesima kreiranja politika na razini EU uvjetovan je njihovom sposobnošću i potencijalom da pruže različite oblike “pristupne robe” koju traže institucije EU (Bouwen, 2003).
Access goods comprise information of key importance for the Union agenda setting and policy shaping: specific expert knowledge in the subject matter of decision-making processes, needed for preparing an effective and realistic legislative act; information about the encompassing interest and needs of the sector in which the private actors operate in the European internal market and which is likely to be affected by a decision taken (European encompassing interest), and information about the legislative situation in the respective member states, and the related needs and interests of certain sectors in domestic markets (European domestic encompassing interest).xiii
“Pristupna roba” odnosi se na informacije koje imaju ključnu važnost za strateške prioritete na agendi Unije: specifično ekspertno i tehničko znanje određene skupine potrebno za izradu učinkovitoga i provedivog zakonodavnog akta, informacije o u kojemu interesne skupine djeluju na europskom unutarnjem tržištu, a na koje odluke institucija EU mogu utjecati (European encompassing interest), te informacije o potrebama i obuhvatnom interesu određenog sektora na domaćem tržištu odnosno na nacionalnoj razini (European domestic encompassing interest).xiv
In order to gain access and a potential influence, interest groups use different forms of lobbying and try to position themselves as providers of specific expertise, depending on the needs of certain institutions.
Kako bi ostvarili pristup, a time i potencijalni utjecaj, interesne se skupine koriste različitim oblicima lobiranja te se nastoje pozicionirati kao pružatelji specifične ekspertize, ovisno o potrebama pojedinih institucija EU.
This encourages the development of the informal exchange process based on supply and demand principle which enables access to those agents who are the most able to adapt to the institutional needs for external input.
U tom se smislu razvija proces neformalne razmjene ponude i potražnje koji omogućuje pristup onim akterima koji su najsposobniji prilagoditi se institucionalnim potrebama za vanjskim inputom.
Such a system of interest representation, based on the exchange of information and influence within a closed circle of expert elites leaves little room for contributions of new participants.
Teorijska i empirijska istraživanja pokazuju da takav sustav zastupanja interesa temeljen na razmjeni informacija i utjecaja unutar zatvorenog kruga ekspertne elite, ne ostavlja puno prostora za doprinos novih sudionika.
LOGIC OF ACCESS OF CROATIAN INTEREST GROUPS TO EUROPEAN UNION DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
LOGIKA PRISTUPA HRVATSKIH INTERESNIH SKUPINA PROCESIMA DONOŠENJA ODLUKA U EUROPSKOJ UNIJI
During last several years, as a response to a number of political and economic factors, Croatian interest groups have increasingly started to develop their activities in a new, European context.
Niz je političkih i ekonomskih čimbenika proteklih godina utjecalo na to da interesne skupine u Hrvatskoj počnu promatrati svoje djelovanje u novom, europskom kontekstu.
The signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the opening of new EU programmes of financial aid, continuous strengthening of economic cooperation with the Union, gaining the status of candidate country for EU membership and the opening of the EU accession negotiations these are only some circumstances that have contributed to a gradual strengthening of the European dimension in the strategies of Croatian interest groups.
Potpisivanje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SSP) s EU, otvaranje novih programa pomoći EU, kontinuirano jačanje gospodarske suradnje s Unijom te, konačno, stjecanje kandidatskog statusa za članstvo u EU i otvaranje pregovora o pristupanju, samo su neke okolnosti koje pridonose postupnom jačanju europske dimenzije u strategijama hrvatskih interesnih skupina.