natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
What are the prospects for achieving the GDP growth necessary for the convergence of per capita income to the average of the less developed EU countries?
Kakve su realne mogućnosti hrvatskoga gospodarstva da ostvari rast potreban da se dohodak po stanovniku u razumnom roku (10-15 godina) približi prosjeku manje razvijenih europskih zemalja, uz pretpostavku da vlada provodi optimalnu ekonomsku politiku?
The answer to this depends on the degree of convergence one wishes to achieve.
Odgovor na to pitanje ovisi o stupnju konvergencije koji se želi postići.
In an earlier paper by this author it was shown that with an average growth rate of 5.5%, in the next 13 years, Croatia could double its current real per capita income to 10,000, USD and thus reach 50% (instead of 33% at present) of the average per capita income of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (Mihaljek, 2000).
U autorovu ranijem radu pokazano je da uz prosječnu godišnju stopu rasta od 5,5% Hrvatska u idućih 13 godina može udvostručiti sadašnji realni dohodak po stanovniku na 10 000 USD i time dosegnuti polovicu (umjesto sadašnje trećine) prosječnog dohotka po stanovniku Grčke, Irske, Portugala i Španjolske (Mihaljek, 2000).
This test is important for the credibility of the previous estimates because in 1999 Croatia went through a recession, while in a revision of GDP data published in September 2002 earlier growth estimates for 1999-2001 were reduced.
Ta je provjera važna za vjerodostojnost prijašnjih procjena jer je Hrvatska tijekom 1999. prošla kroz recesiju, a revizijom u rujnu 2002. stope rasta za 1999-2001. dodatno su smanjene.
Together with Slovakia and Slovenia, Croatia is thus in the group of the economies with the highest potential for long-term growth in CE.
Hrvatska se, dakle, zajedno sa Slovačkom i Slovenijom, nalazi u skupini gospodarstava s višim potencijalom dugoročnog rasta u središnjoj Europi.
Potential growth rate of the Croatian economy, 1994-2002.
Potencijalna stopa rasta hrvatskoga gospodarstva
Outlook for inflation
Izgledi za inflaciju
Recent academic and policy discussions have challenged the rationale for the Maastricht criterion of inflation for the transition economies.
U stručnim raspravama posljednjih su se godina pojavile sumnje u opravdanost kriterija niske inflacije za tranzicijske zemlje.
Doubts about this criterion derive from the observation that less developed countries have a considerably higher growth rate of productivity in the process of catching up with the developed economies.
Te sumnje polaze od opažanja da manje razvijene zemlje ostvaruju znatno viši rast produktivnosti u procesu dosezanja razvijenih gospodarstava.
Faster productivity growth, especially in the advanced sectors exposed to international competition (“tradables”), enables a rapid rise in wages and, since labour is mobile, wages will also rise in protected sectors (or “non-tradables”, such as personal services, construction, domestic transport).
Viši rast produktivnosti, osobito u "naprednim" sektorima izloženima međunarodnoj konkurenciji, omogućuje brži porast plaća, a budući da je tržište rada jedinstveno, plaće rastu i u "zaštićenim" sektorima (osobne usluge, graditeljstvo, domaći transport).
In order to retain profitability, the less productive sectors are forced to increase the prices of their products, which results in a higher inflation than in the developed countries (assuming that the prices of advanced products are determined on the world market).
Da bi održali profitabilnost, manje produktivni sektori prisiljeni su povećati cijene svojih proizvoda, što rezultira višom inflacijom nego u razvijenim zemljama (cijene naprednih proizvoda određene su na svjetskom tržištu).
In such conditions, if inflation resulting from the rapid productivity growth was relatively high, transition economies would be forced to increase interest rates and hence temporarily slow down economic growth in order to achieve the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
U takvim uvjetima tranzicijska bi gospodarstva bila prisiljena povećati kamate i time privremeno usporiti ekonomski rast da postignu maastrichtsku razinu inflacije.
Accordingly, if the CE countries have problems meeting the inflation criterion, the reason will probably be poor economic policy and not the operation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Dakle, ako srednjoeuropske zemlje budu imale problema s ispunjavanjem kriterija inflacije, razlog će najvjerojatnije biti neadekvatna ekonomska politika a ne djelovanje Balassa-Samuelsonova efekta.
Price increases in these sectors will probably raise inflation over the medium term.
Povećanja tih cijena najvjerojatnije će ubrzati inflaciju u srednjem roku.
Therefore, there are strong reasons for monetary policy to remain prudent with regard to inflation.
Monetarna politika, dakle, s punim opravdanjem i dalje mora ostati vrlo oprezna.
External stability
Vanjska stabilnost
Croatia has certain advantages in the following indicators:
Određene prednosti Hrvatska ima u sljedećim pokazateljima.
• Exchange rate stability.
• Stabilnost tečaja.
The real effective exchange rate of the kuna increased by less than 4% between 1995 and 2001, compared with a 25% increase for the Czech koruna and the Hungarian forint, almost 50% increase for the Polish zloty, and 20% increase for the Slovak koruna.
Realni efektivni tečaj kune povećao se između 1995. i 2001. za manje od 4%, u usporedbi s 25% u Češkoj i Mađarskoj, gotovo 50% u Poljskoj i 20% u Slovačkoj.
Only the Slovenian tolar has depreciated in real effective terms (and then only slightly) in the last five years.
Samo je Slovenija neznatno poboljšala konkurentnost tečaja u posljednjih sedam godina.
• Improving exports and current account.
• Tendencija poboljšanja izvoza i bilance tekućih plaćanja.
Contrary to the widespread beliefs, Croatian exports of goods and services have been rising relatively fast in the last few years: by almost 9% pa in dollar terms during 2000-2001, and about 3% in the first five months of 2002 due to the slowdown in the world economy.
Nasuprot uvriježenom uvjerenju, hrvatski izvoz roba i usluga posljednjih godina raste relativno brzo: gotovo 9% godišnje u dolarskom iznosu tijekom 2000-2001, te oko 3% zbog usporavanja svjetskoga gospodarstva u prvih pet mjeseci 2002.
The current account balance has improved considerably, with the deficit of about 3% of GDP in 2001 being much lower than in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (5-6% of GDP).
Znatno je poboljšana bilanca tekućih plaćanja tako da je deficit te bilance (3,1% BDP-a u 2001) mnogo niži nego u Češkoj, Poljskoj i Slovačkoj (5-6% BDP-a).
• Relatively large inflows of foreign direct investment (FID).
• Relativno visokpritokdirektnih stranih ulaganja.
As in other CE countries, the current account deficit in Croatia has been easily covered by FDI inflows.
Kao i u drugim srednjoeuropskim zemljama, deficit bilance tekućih plaćanja u Hrvatskoj lako se pokriva direktnim stranim ulaganjima.
Moreover, FDI has increased in Croatia in recent years to 6.2% of GDP, larger amounts having been drawn in only by the Czech Republic (9.2% of GDP).
Štoviše, u Hrvatskoj su direktna strana ulaganja u tendenciji porasta (6,2% BDP-a), a veće iznose privukla je u 2000-2001. samo Češka (9,2% BDP-a).
• High official reserves.
• Visoke devizne pričuve.
At the end of 2001, disposable foreign currency reserves of the CNB covered more than five months of imports of goods and services, the same as in Poland.
Krajem 2001. raspoložive devizne pričuve Hrvatske narodne banke pokrivale su više od pet mjeseci potrebnog uvoza roba i usluga, jednako kao i u Poljskoj.
In 2002, the import coverage rose to 6.7 months, the highest in the region.
Pokrivenost uvoza deviznim pričuvama povećala se tijekom 2002. na čak 6,7 mjeseci, po čemu je Hrvatska prva u regiji.
High foreign currency reserves along with low inflation, a sound growth in exports and further foreign direct investment provide solid insurance for continued exchange rate stability.
Visoke devizne pričuve uz nisku inflaciju, solidan rast izvoza i daljnji pritok direktnih stranih ulaganja najbolje su jamstvo stabilnosti tečaja.
However, foreign indebtedness and credit rating indicators are less favourable than those of the other CE countries, with the exception of Slovakia.
Međutim, pokazatelji vanjske zaduženosti i kreditnog boniteta nepovoljniji su u odnosu prema ostalim srednjoeuropskim zemljama, osim u Slovačkoj.
• Total foreign debt as percentage of GDP is the second highest in the region and came to 56% of GDP at the end of 2001; only Hungary was more indebted (65% of GDP).
• Ukupni inozemni dug u postotku BDP-a drugi je po visini u regiji i iznosio je 56% BDP-a na kraju 2001; zaduženija je za sada samo Mađarska (65% BDP-a).
A particular concern is the tendency for the external debt to increase rapidly, by 7% of GDP during 1999 and 2001.
Osobito zabrinjava tendencija porasta vanjskoga duga, za 7% BDP-a između 1999. i 2001.
The external debt increased at a faster pace only in Slovenia in this period (i.e., by 9% of GDP); however, this increase occurred from a much lower level of total debt (36% of GDP).
Samo je u Sloveniji vanjska zaduženost brže porasla u tom razdoblju (za 9% BDP-a), ali je to povećanje nastalo na nižoj razini ukupnog duga (36% BDP-a).
The structure of foreign debt in terms of domestic sectors is relatively even.
Struktura inozemnog duga prema domaćim sektorima relativno je ravnomjerna.
The public sector is the biggest debtor (43% of total foreign debt); followed by the non-financial sector (27%) and domestic commercial banks (19%); while 10% of the foreign debt derives from direct investment.
Najveći je dužnik država (43% ukupnog inozemnog duga); slijedi nefinacijski sektor (27%) i domaće poslovne banke (19%); a 10% inozemnog duga proistječe iz izravnih ulaganja.
This debt structure leaves some room for the reduction of the total level of indebtedness in the medium term without any negative consequences to economic growth.
Takva struktura duga ostavlja određeni prostor za smanjivanje ukupne razine zaduženosti u srednjem roku bez negativnih posljedica za gospodarski rast.
For example, while lower public debt is necessary for the sake of attaining fiscal sustainability and the reinforcement of external stability, the private sector debt and indebtedness deriving from foreign direct investment can be increased without any threat to macroeconomic and external stability.
Primjerice, dok je smanjivanje razine zaduženosti države potrebno radi postizanja fiskalne održivosti i jačanja vanjske otpornosti, dug privatnog sektora i zaduživanje po osnovi stranih direktnih ulaganja mogu se povećati bez ugrožavanja makroekonomske i vanjske stabilnosti.
• Capacity to repay the foreign debt is lower than in the other CE countries except in Poland, as 20% of export income has to be used for principal and interest payments, as against 15% in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, and less than 9% in the Czech Republic.
• Kapacitet otplate inozemnog duga niži je nego u ostalim srednjoeuropskim zemljama, osim u Poljskoj: na otplatu dospjelih kamata i glavnica inozemnog duga u Hrvatskoj odlazi 20% prihoda ostvarenih izvozom roba i usluga, u Mađarskoj, Slovačkoj i Sloveniji oko 15%, a u Češkoj manje od 9%.
• The coverage of short-term foreign debt by foreign currency reserves is relatively low: foreign debt falling due within one year would absorb 60% of disposable international reserves of the CNB if the public and the private sector were to become insolvent.
• Pokrivenost kratkoročnog inozemnog duga deviznim pričuvama relativno je niska: inozemni dug s dospijećem unutar jedne godine apsorbirao bi 60% bruto raspoloživih međunarodnih pričuva HNB-a u slučaju devizne nelikvidnosti države i privatnog sektora.
This indicator is even more unfavourable in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (75-80% of reserves) and reveals potential problems with the servicing of short-term debt in the event of a sudden depreciation of the domestic currency.
Taj je pokazatelj još nepovoljniji u Češkoj i Slovačkoj (75-80% pričuva) i očituje potencijalne probleme sa servisiranjem kratkoročnog duga u slučaju iznenadne deprecijacije domaće valute.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia, however, have greater capacities to service the foreign debt.
Češka i Slovačka, međutim, imaju veći kapacitet otplate inozemnog duga.
• Although in the last few years the spread on Croatian government bonds has been reduced, it is still considerably above the average for the region: about 190 basis points (1.9 percentage points) in compared to only 40 basis points in Slovenia and 100-120 points in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
• Iako je posljednjih godina smanjen, kamatni raspon na državne obveznice Hrvatske još je uvijek znatno iznad prosjeka u regiji: otprilike 190 postotnih bodova (1,9 postotaka) u usporedbi sa samo 40 bodova u Sloveniji i 100-120 bodova u Češkoj, Mađarskoj i Slovačkoj.
This shows that foreign investors continue to have certain reservations about the credibility of the overall economic policy of the Croatian government.
Taj pokazatelj odražava određene nedoumice koje kupci državih obveznica RH još uvijek imaju glede kredibilnosti ukupne ekonomske politike hrvatske Vlade.
Along with Slovakia, the credit rating of the government debt of Croatia is the lowest in the region, and lies at the border between speculative and mature forms of investment.
Uz Slovačku, kreditni rejting državnog duga Hrvatske najniži je u regiji i nalazi se na rubu između špekulativnih i zrelih oblika ulaganja.
By contrast, the government bonds of Slovenia and Hungary are considered investment grade, entailing a risk similar to that of the bonds of most of the countries of the EU.xvi A further negative factor is that the credit rating of Croatia has not improved since it was first quoted in January 1997, while the ratings of Hungary and Slovenia have improved since 1999.
Nasuprot tome, državne obveznice Slovenije i Mađarske smatraju se "zrelim" financijskim ulaganjima (investment grade), sličnog rizika kao i obveznice većine zemalja EU.xvii Nepovoljan je i podatak da se kreditni rejting Hr-vatske nije popravio otkako je prvi put uveden u siječnju 1997, dok se već ionako povoljniji rejting Mađarske i Slovenije od 1999. poboljšao.
What are the implications of these vulnerabilities for the sustainability of external equilibrium in the medium term?
Koje su implikacije tih "točaka ranjivosti" za održivost vanjske ravnoteže u srednjem roku?
With the current rate of interest of 4.6% on a ten-year German government bond and an interest spread of 190 points for Croatian government bonds, about 97 million USD would have to be spent each year on servicing the new borrowings projected for 2002-04.
Uz sadašnju kamatu od 4,6% na 10-godišnje obveznice njemačke vlade i kamatni raspon od 190 postotnih bodova za obveznice RH, na otplatu kamata na novi dug svake godine odlazilo bi dodatnih 97 mil. USD.
If the interest spread increased by one percent (100 points), because of the perception of increased risk of investing in Croatia, servicing would cost another 15 million USD pa.
Ako bi se kamatni raspon povećao za jedan postotak (100 postotnih bodova), zbog percepcija o većem riziku ulaganja u Hrvatsku otplata kamata povećala bi se za dodatnih 15 mil. USD godišnje.
This amount, of course, would not threaten Croatia's external stability, but it is not insignificant for public finances: 15 million USD amounts to almost 10% of the annual budgetary resources spent on science and technology.
Taj iznos, naravno, ne bi ugrozio vanjsku stabilnost, ali nije beznačajan za javne financije: 15 mil. USD čini gotovo 10% godišnjih proračunskih sredstava za znanost i tehnologiju.
Under such circumstances, new borrowing is impossible regardless of the interest rate, because international investors seek liquidity and are not at all prepared to invest in risky securities.
U takvim uvjetima novo zaduživanje ni uz kakve kamate nije moguće jer međunarodni investitori zahtijevaju isključivo likvidnost i uopće nisu spremni ulagati u riskantnije vrijednosnice.
New issues markets can dry up completely for several months, with serious consequences for the highly indebted emerging economies.
Na tržištima novih izdanja obveznica zbog toga mjesecima može vladati potpuna "suša", što za visokozadužene zemlje može imati vrlo teške posljedice.
Developments since the Turkish and Argentine crises of 2001-2002 indicate that investors in the meantime have started to distinguish better those economies that are good risks from those that are bad, so that extreme cases of contagion on the financial markets (like the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998) are generally no longer expected (see BIS, 2002).
Razvoj događaja nakon turske i argentinske krize 2001-2002. pokazao je da su investitori u međuvremenu počeli znatno bolje razlikovati gospodarstva dobroga od onih lošega kreditnog rizika, tako da se ekstremni slučajevi "zaraze" na financijskim tržištima (poput azijske i ruske krize 1997-1998.) uglavnom više ne očekuju (v. BIS, 2002).
For Croatia this is good news because currently it has found favour with foreign investors.
Za Hrvatsku je to dobra vijest jer trenutačno ima naklonost stranih ulagača.
But at the same time one should bear in mind that, given the greater ability of investors to distinguish among emerging economies, any threats to macroeconomic stability would be costly for the Croatian economy and would have long-term negative consequences for economic development.
No istodobno treba imati na umu da bi zbog veće sposobnosti investitora da procijene rizik ulaganja eventualno narušavanje makroekonomske stabilnosti hrvatsko gospodarstvo skupo koštalo i imalo bi dugotrajne negativne posljedice za ekonomski razvoj.
The budget deficit and the public debt
Proračunski deficit i javni dug
Apart from Croatia, the CE countries were closer to having a budget deficit of 3% of GDP in 1999 than in 2001 (Table 3).
Osim Hrvatske, srednjoeuropske su zemlje bile bliže ostvarenju proračunskog deficita od 3% BDP-a 1999. nego 2001. godine (tabl.
All this will create a pressure on the budgets of central governments and local units in both Croatia and the other CE countries.
Sve će to stvarati pritisak na proračune središnje vlade i lokalnih jedinica kako u Hrvatskoj, tako i u drugim srednjoeuropskim zemljama.
The Czech Republic is expected, for instance, to record a budget deficit in the region of 6-7% of GDP in 2002, and Hungary of 7-8%.
Za Češku se npr. u 2002. očekuje proračunski deficit od 6-7% BDP-a, a za Mađarsku od 7-8% BDP-a.
Some public finance experts have argued that reducing the budget deficit is essentially a matter of political will, and have referred to the experience of Italy, which has managed to reduce its long-standing deficits of 9-10% of GDP to less than 3% since 1997 (Gros, 2001).
Mnogi poznavatelji fiskalnih kretanja u Europi smatraju da je postizanje proračunskog deficita u osnovi pitanje političke volje i upućuju na spomenuto iskustvo Italije, koja je od 1997. uspjela smanjiti dugogodišnje deficite sa 9-10% BDP-a na manje od 3% (Gros, 2002).
The case of Italy is, however, rather specific.
Međutim, primjer Italije je specifičan.
Extensive development of a welfare state and economic subsidies can be reduced in the short term without negative consequences for growth, but not the expenditures for structural reforms necessary for long-term sustainable growth in the transition economies.
Snažan rast države blagostanja i ekonomske subvencije moguće je u kratkom roku smanjiti bez negativnih posljedica za rast, ali ne i izdatke za strukturne reforme nužne za dugoročno održivi rast u tranzicijskim zemljama.
The financial markets, on the other hand, look upon large deficits with suspicion, irrespective of the possible justification of temporarily higher deficits in the transition economies.
Financijska tržišta, međutim, sa sumnjom gledaju na visoke deficite, bez obzira na eventualnu opravdanost privremeno viših deficita u tranzicijskim gospodarstvima.
As a result, there is considerable market pressure to reduce high deficits.
Stoga je tržišni pritisak na smanjenje deficita vrlo velik.
Croatia and many other CE countries will thus have to choose between alternatives that are politically equally unattractive: a significant fiscal adjustment in the short term (e.g., reducing the deficit by 3-4% of GDP in two years), or more moderate but disciplined adjustment spread out over several years (e.g., reduction of the budget deficit by 1% of GDP during 3-4 consecutive years), which in practice can mean during the term of office of several different governments.
Hrvatska i većina drugih srednjoeuropskih zemalja zbog toga će morati birati između politički podjednako neprivlačnih alternativa: velikog fiskalnog prilagođavanja u kratkom roku (npr. smanjenjem deficita za 3-4% BDP-a u dvije godine), odnosno umjerenijega ali discipliniranog prilagođavanja raspoređenog na nekoliko godina (npr. smanjenje deficita za 1% BDP-a tijekom 3-4 uzastopne godine), što u praksi može značiti tijekom mandata nekoliko različitih vlada.
In both cases the key question will be whether the reduction of the deficit is sustainable over the long term.
U oba slučaja ključno će pitanje biti je li smanjenje deficita održivo u dugom roku.
In Croatia, retaining public debt below 60% of GDP could also require considerable efforts.
Zadržavanje javnog duga ispod 60% BDP-a moglo bi u Hrvatskoj također iziskivati znatne napore.
Between 1999 and 2001, the amount of guarantees issued also rose considerably.
Između 1999. i 2001. znatno je porastao i iznos izdanih jamstava.
Debt servicing absorbed about 2% of GDP in recent years.
Na otplatu kamata posljednjih godina odlazi oko 2% BDP-a.
The proportions of foreign and internal debt stabilised in 2001 at the level of 31% and 22% of GDP, respectively (Figure 5, right panel).
Udjeli inozemnog i unutarnjeg duga stabilizirali su se u 2001. godine na razini od 31% odnosno 22% BDP-a (sl.
A similar conclusion has been reached in a recent CNB analysis (Kraft and Stucka, 2002).
Slična se ocjena iznosi u analizi HNB-a (Kraft i Stučka, 2002).
The IMF estimates that in order for the public debt to stabilise at 53% of GDP, it is necessary to reduce the budget deficit to 3.8% of GDP by 2005 at the latest, while maintaining real growth of 3.8% pa and average interest rate of 5%.
MMF ocjenjuje da je za stabiliziranje javnog duga na razini od 53% BDP-a nužno smanjiti proračunski deficit na 3,8% BDP-a najkasnije do 2005. godine, uz održavanje realnog rasta po stopi od 3,5% godišnje i zadržavanje prosječne kamate od 5%.
And in order for the level of the debt to be reduced long-term to less than 50% of GDP, the budget deficit should be cut to 3.3% of GDP by 2004, and to 2.6% by 2009.
A da bi se razina duga trajno smanjila na manje od 50% BDP-a, deficit proračuna trebalo bi smanjiti na 3,3% BDP-a do 2004. te na 2,6% do 2009.
This calculation, however, assumes an acceleration of the rate of growth from 4.5% in 2003 to as much as 7% in 2006-2010, which is unrealistic when compared with the estimated potential growth rate of at most 5-6%.
Ta računica, međutim, pretpostavlja ubrzavanje stope rasta sa 4,5% u 2003. na čak 7% u 2006-2010, što nije realno s obzirom na ocijenjenu potencijalnu stopu rasta od najviše 5-6%.
What are the dangers, from a macroeconomic perspective, of too great a reliance on foreign borrowing?
Koje su opasnosti, iz makroekonomske perspektive, vezane za preveliko oslanjanje na vanjski dug?
Currently the conditions for borrowing are favourable.
Trenutačno su uvjeti zaduživanja povoljni.
On the international capital market, interest rates are low; Croatia and other countries in the region have a very low interest spread; and there is investor demand for their government bonds.
Kamate su na međunarodnom tržištu kapitala niske, Hrvatska i druge zemlje u ovoj regiji imaju vrlo niski raspon kamata i postoji potražnja investitora za njihovim državnim obveznicima.
This, naturally, encourages the public sector to borrow.
To, naravno, privlači javni sektor da se zadužuje.
But one should take into account the fact that the conditions for financing can quickly change.
Ali treba voditi brigu o tome da se uvjeti financiranja mogu brzo promijeniti.