natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The scope for “catch-up” economic growth depends on where Croatia stands in the
U kojoj je mjeri moguće postići ekonomski rast, ovisi o trenutačnoj poziciji Hrvat
Using the above estimates and the latest values of the independent variables for Croatia, as indicated in the Appendix, gives estimates for Croatia's potential growth.
Primjenom navedenih procjena i najnovijih vrijednosti nezavisnih varijabli za Hrvatsku dobiva se procjena potencijalnog rasta.
The simulations imply that Croatia's potential growth would be 5.1 percent (in terms of both real GDP and real GDP per capita terms).
Simulacije otkrivaju da bi potencijalni rast Hrvatske bio 5,1% (mjereno realnim BDP-om i realnim BDP-om po stanovniku).
However, assuming that the growth “bonus” from transition will not continue to the same extent in the years ahead changes this estimate to a potential growth of 4.2 percent, if the growth “bonus” is reduced by half, or to 3.2 percent, if it is eliminated completely.
Ipak, uz pretpostavku da se “bonus” rast iz tranzicijskog razdoblja neće nastaviti istom brzinom i u idućem razdoblju, mijenja se procjena potencijalnog rasta na 4,2%, ako se “bonus” smanji za pola, ili 3,2% ako se potpuno eliminira.
Since the transition process is still under way, the mid-estimate of 4.2 percent seems to be a more reliable potential growth estimate for Croatia.
Kako tranzicijski proces u Hrvatskoj još uvijek traje, srednja procjena potencijalnog rasta Hrvatske od 4,2% čini se mnogo pouzdanijom.
This growth model can help forecast the impact of reforms on Croatia's economic
Taj model rasta može pomoći pri prognoziranju utjecaja reformi na ekonomski rast u
Using the potential growth estimate of 4.2 percent as the starting point, we focus on the impact of changes in the economic freedom index and in the cost of starting a new business, which are areas in which Croatia lags behind the CEE and the euro area.
Korištenjem procjene potencijalnog rasta od 4,2% kao početne točke valja se orijentirati na utjecaj promjena na indeks ekonomske slobode i troškove pokretanja posla, što su područja u kojima Hrvatska zaostaje za zemljama srednje i istočne Europe te eurozone.
The growth diagnostic approach seeks to identify binding constraints on growth.
Za Hrvatsku je moguće odmah isključiti činitelje s desne strane stabla odlučivanja.
It is also consistent with relatively low levels of FDI, since foreign investors are much less
Analiza se stoga detaljnije fokusira na niske prinose na ekonomsku aktivnost (lijeva
Low social returns - stemming from human capital problems - are one candidate
Niski društveni prinosi, nastali zbog problema ljudskog kapitala, jedno su od objaš
Three factors can explain low social returns, though the first two can be readily ruled out for Croatia:
Niski društveni prinosi mogu se objasniti trima činiteljima, iako prva dva u vezi s Hrvatskom mogu biti odmah isključena.
Croatia's location gives it ready access to central, Mediterranean and
Položaj Hrvatske omogućuje joj lak pristup srednjoj, mediteranskoj i ju
southeastern Europe; and its long (and beautiful) coastline underpins the vital tourism industry (tourist receipts account for over 20 percent of GDP).
goistočnoj Europi, a njezina dugačka (i prekrasna) obala podupire vitalnu turističku djelatnost (prihodi od turizma iznose više od 20% BDP-a).
Croatia's infrastructure compares favorably by regional standards
Infrastruktura Hrvatske dobra je u usporedbi s regionalnim standar
Thus, infrastructure does not appear to be constraining growth.
Dakle, infrastruktura ne ograničava rast.
Although education and literacy levels are in line with regional
Iako su stupanj obrazovanja i pismenosti u skladu s regionalnim
standards, the Institute for Public Finance (2004) finds that “employees in the Republic of Croatia do not have the skills, knowledge, and abilities necessary to develop globally
standardima, Institut za javne financije (2004) otkriva da “zaposlenici u Republici Hrvatskoj ne posjeduju vještine, znanje i sposobnosti nužne za razvitak globalno konkurentnih proizvoda i natjecanje na tržištu Europske unije”.
In principle, low activity rates could reflect low demand for labor.
Pristup dijagnostike rasta dijeli moguće uzroke na tržišne pogreške i probleme javnog sektora te na neefikasnost.
The growth diagnostic approach divides the possible causes between market failures and public sector problems and inefficiencies.
• Inovacije, mjerene brojem novih patenata, također su u skladu s onima u promatranim zemljama (tabl.
The public sector is not generating “macro risks” that obviously constrain growth.
Ipak, javni je dug prema regionalnim standardima visok, unatoč tome što je manji od prosjeka eurozone.
The estimates thus imply that eleven countries reformed faster than Croatia during this period, simply because Croatia's increase in external indebtedness reduced pressures for economic reforms.
Procjene govore da je tijekom navedenog razdoblja jedanaest zemalja provodilo reformu brže od Hrvatske samo zato što je povećanje vanjske zaduženosti umanjilo nužnost ekonomskih reformi.
Croatia and Selected European Countries: Identified Cases of “Inside-TheFrontier” Innovation, 1997-2002
Hrvatska i neke europske zemlje: identificirani primjeri inovacija “unutar granice”, 1997-2002.
Innovation in Croatia and Selected European Countries: Patents Granted in United States and Europe
Inovacije u Hrvatskoj i promatranim zemljama EU: patenti dodijeljeni u SAD-u i Europi
US Patent and Trademark Office European PO
US ured za patente i zaštitne znakove Europski ured za patente
• Property rights and contract enforcement.
• Prava vlasništva i provedba ugovora.
Although the Doing Business survey
Iako anketa Doing Business rangira Hrvat
ranks Croatia favorably on contract enforcement - with the number of procedures required to enforce contracts being in line with the OECD average - contract enforcement remains slow.
sku povoljno u smislu provedbe ugovora - s podjednakim brojem procedura potrebnih za provedbu ugovora kao prosjekom u zemljama OECD-a, provedba ugovora ostaje spora.
According to the European Commission (2006): “The judicial system has continued to suffer from slow and inefficient court proceedings, poor case management and low administrative and professional capacity.
Prema Europskoj komisiji (2006), “pravni je sustav nastavio trpjeti zbog sporog i neefikasnog odvijanja sudskih sporova, slabog upravljanja slučajevima i niskim administrativnim i profesionalnim kapacitetima.
These circumstances may discourage economic actors from taking cases to court and undermine an effective enforcement of creditor and property rights.”
Te okolnosti mogu obeshrabriti sudionike poslovnih aktivnosti u podizanju tužbi te narušiti djelotvornu provedbu prava vlasništva”.
• Administrative and regulatory burden.
• Administrativni i regulatorni teret.
Although measures are under way at the cen
Bez obzira na buduće mjere na razini središnje
tral government level, problems at the local level remain.
vlasti, ostaju problemi na lokalnim razinama vlasti.
The latest IMF country report notes that investors often face uncertainties and delays in obtaining necessary permits and numerous and nontransparent fees, with complex local government regulations seen as conducive to corruption.
Najnoviji country report MMF-a izvještava o činjenici da se investitori često suočavaju s nesigurnošću i kašnjenjima u dobivanju potrebnih dozvola, s brojnim netransparentnim naknadama te s kompleksnim regulacijama lokalne vlasti naizgled pogodnima za korupciju.
23 In addition, employment protection legislation (EPL) is strict.
23 Uz to, zaštita prava radnika vrlo je striktna.
most important binding constraint on growth, because of their impact on the business environment.
Hodrick-Prescottov filtar, proizvodna funkcija i metodologije regresije rasta daju vrlo slične rezultate.
This is consistent with the results from the previous section.
Usporedba odrednica rasta i regresijske procjene za odabrane zemlje upućuju na
The diagnostic also points to human capital problems as an additional constraint on growth.
područja na kojima su ekonomske reforme nužne za povećanje potencijalnog rasta Hrvatske.
growth regression suggest areas where economic reforms are needed to increase Croatia's potential growth.
Točnije, Hrvatska još nije tako dobro mjesto za poslovanje kakvo bi mogla biti.
The growth diagnostic reinforces the importance of improving the business envi
Izvor: IMF-ova baza podataka World Economic Outlook
Exports of goods and services
Izvoz dobara i usluga
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database.
Izvor: IMF-ova baza podataka World Economic Outlook
Source: UNCTAD; and authors' calculations (population data from IMF World Economic Outlook database).
Izvor: UNCTAD i autorovi izračuni (podaci o veličini populacije uzeti su iz baze podataka IMF-ova World Economic Outlooka)
(Number of greenﬁ eld FDI projects, total, 2002-2005)a
(ukupan broj greenﬁ eld ISU projekata, 2002-2005)a
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Izvor: Europska banka za obnovu i razvoj
NMS-8 average EU-14 averagea
prosjek NMS-8 prosjek EU-14a
Serbia and Mont.
Srbija i Crna Gora
NMS-8 average EU-14a average
prosjek NMS-8 prosjek EU-14a
a No ranking available for Luxembourg.
a Rang za Luksemburg nije dostupan.
Sources: World Bank; World Economic Forum; Heritage Foundation.
Izvori: World Bank, World Economic Forum, Heritage foundation
Real GDP growth HP growth
realna stopa rasta BDP-a HP rast
Source: WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007.
Izvor: WEF Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007.
Romania Serbia & Mont.
Srbija i Crna Gora
Source: Transparency International.
Indeks percepcije korupcije
Working Document SEC (2006) 1385.
Work ing Document SEC (2006) 1385.
A. R., Oxley, L. and Carlaw, K.
“The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth.”
tion Function Method.
Zagreb: Središnji državni ured
Growth Real GDP growth, 2002-2005
Rast Realna stopa rasta BDP-a, 2002-2005.
Population Age dependency ratio, 2004
Stanovništvo Koeficijent starosne ovisnosti, 2004.
Population growth (in %), 2002-2004
Rast stanovništva (u %), 2002-2004.
Foreign direct investment, inflows (in % of GDP), 2002-2005
Izravna strana ulaganja, priljevi (u % BDP-a), 2002-2005.
General government, total expenditure and net lending (in % of GDP), 2005
Opća država, ukupni troškovi i neto zajmovi (u % BDP-a), 2005.
General government, gross debt (in percent of GDP), 2005
Opća država, bruto dug (u % BDP-a), 2005.
Monetary policy CPI inflation (in %), 2005
Monetarna politika CPI inflacija (u %), 2005.
Economic freedom index (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004
Indeks ekonomske slobode (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Size of government (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004
Veličina vlade (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Financial sector development M2 (in % of GDP), 2004
Razvijenost financijskog sustava M2 (u % BDP-a), 2004.
Domestic credit to private sector (in % of GDP), 2004
Domaći krediti privatnom sektoru (u % BDP-a), 2004.
Business environment Business regulations (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004
Poslovno okruženje Poslovne regulacije (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Overall infrastructure reform (index, increasing from 1 to 5), 2005
Ukupne infrastrukturne reforme (indeks, raste od 1 do 5), 2005.
International trade Trade (% of GDP), 2005
Međunarodna trgovina Trgovina (% BDP-a), 2005.
Freedom to trade internationally (index, increasing from 1 to 10), 2004
Sloboda međunarodnog trgovanja (indeks, raste od 1 do 10), 2004.
Primary school enrollment ratio (in % of relevant age group), 2003
Koeficijent upisanih u osnovnu školu (u % relevantne dobne skupine), 2003.
Secondary school enrollment ratio (in % of relevant age group), 2003
Koeficijent upisanih u srednju školu (u % relevantne dobne skupine), 2003.
Expenditure per student, primary (in % of GDP per capita), 2002
Troškovi po učeniku, osnovna škola (u % BDP-a po stanovniku), 2002.
Expenditure per student, secondary (in % of GDP per capita), 2002
Troškovi po učeniku, srednja škola (u % BDP-a po stanovniku), 2002.
Labor market Unemployment rate (in %), 2005
Tržište rada Stopa nezaposlenosti (u %), 2005.
Long-term unemployment (in % of total unemployment), 2002
Dugoročna nezaposlenost (u % ukupne nezaposlenosti), 2002.
Josip Franić, Institute of Public Finance
Josip Franić, Institut za javne financije
The Project start date is 1 October 2013 and its duration is 48 months.
Projekt je započeo 1. listopada 2013. i traje 48 mjeseci.
The main goal is to provide concrete policy recommendations about what policies may work better, based on rigorous empirical evidence, for those seeking to tackle the undeclared economy in mentioned countries.
Glavna svrha projekta je na temelju čvrstih empirijskih pokazatelja, pružiti konkretne preporuke za politike i mjere o tome što može biti učinkovito u suzbijanju neprijavljenog rada u promatranim zemljama.
Conduct a comprehensive review of the policy approaches and measures being used to tackle undeclared work.
Provesti sveobuhvatni pregled politika i mjere koje se provode u suzbijanju neprijavljenog rada.
Empirically evaluate the measures for facilitating the shift of undeclared work into the declared economy in the selected target region.
Empirijski evaluirati mjere za lakši prijelaz iz neprijavljenog u prijavljeno gospodarstvo u odabranim ciljanim područjima.
Based on the results of the first two objectives, the final objective is to recommend possible new policy approaches and measures (or endorse old ones) that will facilitate the shift of undeclared work into the declared
Na temelju spoznaja iz prva dva cilja, konačni cilj je preporučiti nove pristupe i mjere (ili pojačati postojeće) za olakšanje prijelaza iz neprijavljenog rada u prijavljeni.
LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCETHE CASE FOR COMMON LAW, Svetozar Pejovich, 2008, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 178 p.
LAW, INFORMAL RULES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE - THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW, Svetozar Pejovich, 2008, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 178 str.
In the preface to his book Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - The Case
U predgovoru svoje knjige Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - The
for Common Law Pejovich states that the book is about capitalism and its economic performance.
Case for Common Law Pejovich navodi kako je u knjizi riječ o kapitalizmu i njegovoj ekonomskoj uspješnosti.
He describes capitalism as the “only system in recorded history that has been successful in pulling the average person above the subsistence level and sustaining a steady, if cyclical, rate of economic development”.
Kapitalizam opisuje kao “jedini sustav u dosadašnjoj povijesti koji je bio uspješan u izvlačenju prosječne osobe iznad egzistencijalnog minimuma i u postizanju stabilne, premda ciklične, stope ekonomskog razvoja”.
However, Pejovich adds that his book is not concerned with advocating capitalism on philosophical or ideological grounds.
Međutim, Pejovich dodaje kako u njegovoj knjizi nije riječ o zagovaranju kapitalizma na filozofskim ili ideološkim osnovama.
Rather, his purpose is to explain why the system has done so well.
Umjesto toga, njegov je cilj objasniti zašto je taj sustav bio tako uspješan.
In order to do so, the analysis goes in two directions: 1) analysis of the incentive effects of formal and informal institutions on the economic behaviour of individuals or, put differently, analysis of the effects of capitalist rules on the game itself, and 2) examination of adjustments in the rules over time.
Kako bi to učinio, njegov postupak ide u dva smjera: 1. analizira učinke poticaja formalnih i neformalnih institucija na ekonomsko ponašanje pojedinaca ili, drugim riječima, analizira učinke kapitalističkih pravila na samu igru te 2. ispituje prilagodbu pravila tijekom vremena.
In his analysis Pejovich differentiates two major types of capitalism - Anglo-American and Continental, whereby he focuses on the two legal systems upon which the two types depend - common and civil law.
Pejovich razlikuje dva osnovna tipa kapitalizma - angloamerički i kontinentalni, pri čemu se usredotočuje na dva pravna sustava na kojima se oni temelje - na običajno i građansko pravo.
His goal is to explain how and why different versions of capitalism have led to different socioeconomic results.
Autorov je cilj objasniti kako su i zašto različite verzije kapitalizma dovele do različitih društveno-ekonomskih rezultata.
The author defines informal institutions as “traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all the other norms of behaviour that have emerged spontaneously, survived the test of time and served to bind generations”.
Pritom definira neformalne institucije kao “tradicije, običaje, moralne vrijednosti, vjerska uvjerenja i sve ostale norme ponašanja koje su nastale spontano, preživjele test vremena i služile povezivanju generacija”.
Formal institutions are “constitutions, statutes, common laws and other governmental regulations”.
Formalne su institucije “ustavi, statuti, zakoni i drugi državni propisi”.
As the author states, the major premise of the book is that the changes in institutions affect the economy, and that changes in the economy have predictable effects on the development and modifications of institutions.
Kao što autor navodi, glavno je polazište knjige da promjene u institucijama utječu na gospodarstvo i da promjene u gospodarstvu imaju predvidive učinke na razvoj i modificiranje institucija.
nal economics, the fist part of this book will provide a good introduction.
S. Pejovich: Law, Informal Rules and Economic Performance - the Case for Common Law
sm and its dependence on the rule of law.
ovisnosti o vladavini prava.
He also stresses the importance of individualism, which “rewards competitive performance, promotes risk taking and views income inequalities as desirable results of entrepreneurship and free trade”.
Također naglašava važnost individualizma, koji “nagrađuje konkurentsko ponašanje, promiče preuzimanje rizika i dohodovne nejednakosti smatra poželjnim rezultatom poduzetništva i slobodne trgovine”.
Apart from the rule of law and the culture of individualism, the third cornerstone of capitalism is competitive markets.
Osim vladavine prava i kulture individualizma, treći je temelj kapitalizma konkurentsko tržište.
The four basic institutions of capitalism are, according to the author, private property rights, the law of contract, an independent judiciary and a constitution.
Prema autoru, četiri su temeljne institucije kapitalizma: privatna vlasnička prava, ugovori, nezavisno sudstvo i ustav.
They are all embodied in the rule of law.
Te su institucije utkane u vladavinu prava.
The second part of the book also contains a reprint of Buchanan's paper “Afraid to be free: dependency as desideratum”.
U drugom dijelu knjige nalazi se pretisak Buchananova članka Afraid to be free: dependancy as desideratum.
In the third part Pejovich proposes and develops “a theory of efficiently-friendly institutional changes that are consistent with both the culture of capitalism and sustainable economic development”.
U trećem dijelu knjige Pejovich predlaže i razvija “teoriju institucionalnih promjena koje podržavaju učinkovitost, a koje su konzistentne kako s kulturom kapitalizma, tako i s održivim ekonomskim razvojem”.
The theory is based on three major factors: the rule of law, the carriers of change (individuals), and the interaction between formal and informal institutions.
Teorija se temelji na tri glavna čimbenika: vladavini prava, nositeljima promjena (pojedinci) i interakciji između formalnih i neformalnih institucija.
The gist of the theory (the interaction thesis) is that the rule of law provides incentives for the carriers of change to narrow the gap between the culture of capitalism and the prevailing culture in the community.
Bit teorije (interakcijske teze) jest da vladavina prava daje poticaje nositeljima promjena da smanje jaz između kulture kapitalizma i prevladavajuće kulture u društvu.
Pejovich actually attempts to introduce culture into the model of institutional changes.
Pejovich zapravo nastoji uvesti kulturu u model institucionalnih promjena.
There are several things worth pointing out regarding Pejovich's views.
Potrebno je istaknuti nekoliko detalja vezanih za Pejovicheva stajališta.
believes that, contrary to the English and American experiences, the “role of a powerful state has never been seriously questioned on the European continent, not even by its prominent classical liberals”.
tra da se, suprotno engleskome i američkom iskustvu, “na europskom kontinentu nikad nije ozbiljno sumnjalo u ulogu moćne države, čak to nisu činili ni najistaknutiji europski klasični liberali”.
In Anglo-American capitalism the government is a predator which the rule of law is to tame, and in Continental capitalism the government is a partner in the economic game.
U angloameričkom kapitalizmu država je predator kojega treba ukrotiti vladavina prava, dok je u kontinentalnom kapitalizmu država partner u ekonomskoj igri.
Secondly, the author stresses that an expansion of the role of the state in economic affairs makes the economy less efficient.
Drugo, autor naglašava da upletanje države u ekonomske aktivnosti čini gospodarstvo manje učinkovitim.
In the overregulated European Union phenomena like Bill Gates and John Dell are not happening.
U odveć reguliranoj Europskoj uniji ne događaju se fenomeni poput Billa Gatesa i Johna Della.
Thirdly, Continental capitalism privileges social justice over freedom of choice, while in Anglo-American capitalism the system is about freedom of choice and private property rights.
Treće, kontinentalni kapitalizam daje prednost društvenoj pravednosti pred slobodom izbora, dok su u angloameričkom kapitalizmu najvažniji sloboda izbora i vlasnička prava.
Generally, according to Pejovich, Anglo-American capitalism is better at protecting the institutions of capitalism.
Općenito, angloamerički kapitalizam bolje štiti institucije kapitalizma.
Fourthly, Pejovich makes a clear distinction between common law and civil law.
Četvrto, autor jasno razlikuje sustav običajnoga i građanskog prava.
Common law judges can choose either to stick with the prevailing precedents or to ignore them and “legislate from the bench”.
Suci u sustavu običajnog prava mogu birati hoće li se držati prevladavajućih prošlih presuda ili će ih ignorirati i donijeti nove.
This means that the judges have discretionary power to make decisions that are not consistent with either the wisdom of the past or existing procedures.
To znači da suci imaju diskrecijsku moć za donošenje odluka koje nisu u skladu s nečim što je u prošlosti ili u postojećim pravilima bilo općeprihvaćeno.
In civil law countries legislators debate scholars' propositions and enact those that pass their scrutiny.
U zemljama građanskog prava zakonodavci raspravljaju o prijedlozima stručnjaka i prihvaćaju one koji prođu njihovu kontrolu.
Bureaucrats and courts then implement and enforce new formal rules.
Državni službenici i sudovi zatim primjenjuju i provode nova formalna pravila.
Furthermore, the legislative process is influenced by various interest groups.
Nadalje, zakonodavni je proces pod utjecajem različitih interesnih skupina.
Formal rules in civil law countries are also made in response to changes in the game, but legislators have incentives to enact formal rules that promise to push human interactions towards the results desired by a majority of voters, the median voter, rent-seeking groups, or all of these.
Formalna pravila u zemljama građanskog prava također nastaju kao odgovor na promjene u igri, ali zakonodavci su motivirani primijeniti ona formalna pravila koja usmjeravaju interakcije među ljudima prema ishodu koji želi većina glasača, medijanski glasač, skupine koje traže rentu ili svi zajedno.
Pejovich believes that the transaction costs of merging the two legal systems are very high.
Pejovich smatra da su transakcijski troškovi spajanja tih dvaju pravnih sustava vrlo visoki.
Secondly, in the US there are presently fifteen federal cabinet departments and more than one hundred federal agencies and commissions.
Drugo, u SAD-u trenutačno postoji petnaest ministarstava i više od stotinu državnih agencija i komisija.