natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I think it's time to start talking about it because we'll be asked by the EU what we think about it.
Mislim da je vrijeme da o tome progovorimo jer će nas EU pitati što mislimo.
I'll give you the first idea of where we are in our ideas about the banking union today.
Dat ću vam prve naznake o našim trenutačnim razmišljanjima o bankarskoj uniji.
So, this is what I'll talk about today.
Dakle, o tome ću vam danas govoriti.
And then I'll talk about the idea of how to solve some problems that we have in the banking system in Europe through the creation of the banking union, what in our view are the benefits, and what the potential problems for a country that has an opt-in clause, like Croatia as well as what are the reasons to join the banking union or not to join it?
Potom ću govoriti o rješavanju problema koje imamo u bankarskom sustavu u Europi kroz stvaranje bankarske unije, o po našem mišljenju prednostima i potencijalnim problemima za zemlju s opt-in klauzulom, kao što je Hrvatska, kao i o razlozima da se pridružimo bankarskoj uniji, odnosno da joj se ne pridružimo.
That's the plan.
To je plan.
First, on the credit activity of the EU area.
Počinjem s kreditnim aktivnostima na području Europske unije.
What we have seen since the beginning of the crises is that the loans to the private sector in the EU area have stagnated.
Od početka krize, krediti privatnom sektoru na području EU stagniraju.
There has been a 0.8 % increase since the beginning of the crisis, which means an effective decrease.
Od početka krize imali smo povećanje od 0,8%, što znači efektivan pad.
But if you look at different countries, you see huge differences.
Ali pogledamo li različite zemlje, uočit ćemo goleme razlike.
Some countries have seen an increase in the stock of loans while others have seen a huge decrease.
U nekim zemljama došlo je do povećanja u stanju kredita, dok je u drugima došlo do ozbiljnog pada.
Basically, a serious credit crunch.
Uglavnom, do značajnog smanjenja kreditne aktivnosti.
Here you see the data for different countries.
Ovdje možete vidjeti podatke za različite zemlje.
Ireland comes here, of course, because of the big crisis of the banking sector, but you see that there are countries like Finland, which has seen the cumulative credit growth of 30 %, and you also see other countries, which have seen the cumulative decrease of the credit growth from 10 to 20 %.
Irska se nalazi ovdje, naravno, zbog velike krize bankarskog sektora, ali vidite da postoje zemlje poput Finske, u kojoj se dogodio kumulativni kreditni rast od 30%, a mogu se vidjeti i druge zemlje, u kojima je došlo do kumulativnog smanjenja stope rasta od 10 do 20%.
There are huge differences, but on average, there is stagnating growth in the EU area.
Postoje velike razlike, ali u prosjeku, na području Europske unije taj rast stagnira.
There was some increase in the outstanding amount of the credit to the corporate sector.
Imali smo blago povećanje u rastu kredita korporativnom sektoru.
There has been a deleveraging in the household sector, but the only real growth of credit extended by the banks during the crisis was to the government.
Došlo je do smanjenja kreditne aktivnosti u sektoru građanstva, ali jedini pravi rast kredita tijekom krize je onaj državnom sektoru.
That leads us to something else we have seen during the crisis and it is not confined only to this crisis.
To nas dovodi do nečega drugog što smo vidjeli tijekom krize i to ne samo ove.
If you look at the history of the economic crises, what has been a fil rouge of all of them is that in the crisis, there is an increasing orientation of the banks towards their own sovereigns.
Pogledamo li povijest gospodarske krize, ponavlja se sve veća usmjerenost banaka na vlastite vladare.
The home country bias increases and the exposure of banks toward their own governments increases too.
Povećava se sklonost prema domaćem tržištu, kao i izloženost banaka prema državi.
This is something we have seen once again during this crisis.
U to smo se uvjerili i tijekom ove krize.
The banking market has actually become increasingly fragmented in the sense that there was an increase in the home bias, which means withdrawal of banks from other markets and focus on the domestic market.
Bankarsko tržište zapravo je postalo više rascjepkano u smislu da je došlo do povećanja sklonosti domaćem tržištu, što znači povlačenja banaka s drugih tržišta i usmjerenosti na domaće.
All banks in your area increase shares of domestic bond holding with the bulk of them going to government bonds, which in a sense seems like a logical response to the crisis because it supports the capital adequacy ratio of banks as the government bonds are still zero risk.
Banke na svom području povećaju udio u domaćim obveznicama, s time da većina njih odlazi na državne obveznice, što se u određenom smislu čini kao logičan odgovor na krizu jer podupire koeficijent adekvatnosti kapitala banaka budući da državne obveznice i dalje znače nultu stopu rizika.
In that sense, it is logical.
U tom smislu, to je logično.
Also, if the risk increases, it's logical to expect the banks to again turn towards government bonds, which have a zero risk waiting, at least on paper.
Isto tako, ako se rizik povećava, logično je očekivati da će se banke ponovno okrenuti državnim obveznicama, koje, barem na papiru, imaju nultu stopu rizika.
Also, at the same time, you have a low private sector demand, so you would expect something like that to happen, but you always think whether there was the invisible hand of the government, extended over the banks, as is usually the case in the crisis.
Također, potražnja privatnog sektora istovremeno je niska, što je to očekivano, ali uvijek sumnjamo da je nad bankama nevidljiva ruka vlasti, kao što to obično biva u slučaju krize.
There is asking for more money and banks being happy to provide.
Veća je potražnja za novcem, a banke ga rado daju.
We have seen this kind of development in history and it always seems like the same process all over again.
Takav razvoj situacije smo već vidjeli kroz povijest i uvijek se čini da se sve ponavlja.
If you look at the home bias of the bank towards the domestic market versus the external one, you can see that the exposure of the banks towards the domestic market in Europe, when it comes to the bond market, is extremely high.
Pogledamo li početnu sklonost banaka domaćem tržištu u, uočavamo da je izloženost banaka prema domaćem tržištu u Europi, kada je u pitanju tržište obveznica, iznimno visoka.
You have a group of countries where almost a hundred percent of bond holdings are home country bonds.
Imamo skupinu zemalja u kojima su obveznice gotovo sto posto domaće.
From this already, you can see that there is not really an integration of the banking market, at least when it comes to the holdings of bonds by banks in Europe.
Iz ovoga je već jasno vidljivo da zapravo ne postoji integracija bankarskog tržišta, barem kada je u pitanju posjed obveznica među bankama u Europi.
You have a group of countries which has a smaller home bias in terms of bond holdings, but in all countries except for Finland you actually have an increase of the home bias from 2008 to 2013, including also Croatia, where domestic bond holdings are on the increase.
Postoji skupina zemalja koja ima manju sklonost domaćem tržištu u smislu posjeda obveznica, ali u svim zemljama, osim u Finskoj, zapravo imate rast sklonosti domaćem tržištu od 2008. do 2013., uključujući i Hrvatsku, gdje se povećava udio domaćih obveznica.
If you look at the government securities as a share of government securities to loans to private sector growth, you can see the same development.
Pogledamo li državne vrijednosne papire u smislu omjera državnih vrijednosnih papira u odnosu na rast kredita privatnom sektoru, vidljiv je isti razvoj situacije.
In each and every country, you have an increase in banks' exposure toward the domestic government sector.
U svakoj zemlji dolazi do povećanja izloženosti banaka prema državi.
So banks are ever more funding their own government's debt, again, including Croatia.
Tako banke sve više financiraju državni dug, ponovno, uključujući i Hrvatsku.
This leads us to the question we are going to talk about more later, which is the exposure of the banks towards the sovereigns or the negative feedback loop between the weak sovereigns and weak banks, and the attempt to break that negative feedback loop with the creation of the banking union.
To nas dovodi do teme o kojoj ćemo više govoriti kasnije, a to je izloženost banaka prema državi ili negativna povratna sprega između slabih vladara i slabih banaka, i pokušaj da se toj negativnoj povratnoj sprezi stane na kraj stvaranjem bankarske unije.
Meanwhile, what is happening with asset quality?
Što se, u međuvremenu, događa s kvalitetom aktive?
Of course, we are talking about the time of crisis, and in a crisis, asset quality deteriorates, non-performing loans increase, making the value adjustment costs decrease very unlikely.
Naravno, govorimo o vremenu krize, a kvaliteta aktive u krizi se pogoršava, loši krediti, tzv. NPL-ovi u porastu su, tako da je vjerojatnost da se trošak ispravka vrijednosti potraživanja smanji malena.
There is a clear difference here between the eurozone and the US.
Ovdje postoji jasna razlika između eurozone i SAD-a.
In Eurozone, we have a continued increase in non- performing loans while in the United States, you have a tendency of a decrease there.
U eurozoni imamo stalni porast loših kredita, dok u SAD-u imate tendenciju smanjenja.
In East-Central Europe, there is a much greater increase in non-performing loans, Croatia being among the countries with the highest level of non-performing loans, after, as we know, basically five years of recession or stagnation in this country.
U srednjoj i istočnoj Europi, porast NPL-ova mnogo je veći, Hrvatska je među zemljama s najvišom razinom loših zajmova, nakon, kao što znamo, pet godina recesije ili stagnacije u ovoj zemlji.
We have still not recovered from recession.
Još se nismo oporavili od recesije.
If you look at non-performing loans coverage, you can see a startling difference between the US banks and eurozone banks, with the US banks having a much higher coverage ratio than eurozone banks.
Pogledamo li pokrivenost loših kredita, uočavamo zapanjujuću razliku između američkih banaka i onih eurozone, pri čemu američke banke imaju znatno veću pokrivenost.
Here, Croatia is again underperforming compared to the peer group of Central and Eastern European countries.
Hrvatska je ponovno lošija od zemalja srednje i istočne Europe.
As we explained earlier this year, this was one of the main reasons why we decided on the introduction of the new provisioning rules for domestic banks with the view of increasing provisioning.
Kao što smo objasnili ranije ove godine, to je i bio jedan od glavnih razloga zašto smo uveli nova pravila za rezervacije za domaće banke s ciljem povećanja rezervacija.
Again, if you compare the eurozone with the US, we see that bank performance in eurozone remains subdued, while the performance of the US banks has recovered relatively well since 2009.
Kako se budu objavljivali novi podaci o profitabilnosti banaka, vidjet ćemo da gospodarska situacija napokon nagriza i banke, koje sada imaju znatno lošije portfelje.
Now, if you look at the bank return on assets, including value adjustment costs, Croatian banks are again looking quite well compared to other banks, and eurozone banks again underperforming compared to the US banks.
Pogledamo li povrat na aktivu, uključujući i trošak ispravka vrijednosti potraživanja, hrvatske banke ponovno stoje dobro u odnosu na druge banke, dok su banke eurozone ponovno lošije od američkih banaka.
Capital adequacy ratio is relatively high in Europe if you look at it, but the leverage in Europe is much higher than in the US.
Stopa adekvatnosti kapitala relativno je visoka u Europi, ali je stupanj financijske poluge u Europi puno viši nego u SAD-u.
One of the problems we are talking about these days is that we are not seeing the leverage in Europe declining in crisis while the leverage in the US banks has declined significantly since the beginning of the crises.
Jedan od problema o kojima se ovih dana govori jest da stupanj financijske poluge u Europi u krizi ne pada, dok se u američkim bankama od početka krize on značajno smanjio.
Many people are asking themselves when and how the banks in Europe will decrease their leverage.
Mnogi se pitaju kada i kako će banke u Europi smanjiti stupanj financijske poluge.
In Croatia, we are doing well in this regard, having the highest capital adequacy ratio in Europe, which, as we know, is a consequence of very tight countercyclical regulatory policies we were running before the crisis, and is in particular due to the capital inflow tax that we had before the crises when we were taxing the borrowing of the banks, or deposit taking of the banks and not taxing the equity, so the banks were to a large extent financing their credit growth from the increase of equity.
U Hrvatskoj, mi u tom pogledu dobro stojimo, imamo najviši koeficijent adekvatnosti kapitala u Europi, koji je, kao što znamo, posljedica vrlo stroge anticiklične regulatorne politike koju smo vodili prije krize, a osobito poreza na kapital koji smo imali prije krize, kada smo oporezivali zaduživanje banaka, ili uzimanje depozita, a ne kapital, tako da su banke u velikoj mjeri financirale svoj kreditni rast iz povećanja kapitala.
That has led to the banking sector being highly capitalized once the crisis struck and makes it very resilient to the prolonged recession that we are observing.
Bankarski sektor tako je krizu dočekao visoko kapitaliziran i vrlo je otporan na produljenu recesiju u kojoj se nalazimo.
Leverage in Croatia is again much lower than in the eurozone, Central European countries or even the US banks, but the problem again is really how to lower the leverage of European banks.
Stupanj financijske poluge u Hrvatskoj je opet znatno niži nego u eurozoni, srednjoj Europski, pa čak i američkim bankama, no problem je ponovno u tome kako smanjiti stupanj financijske poluge europskih banaka.
A few words now on the cost of financial aid by the European Union from 2008 to 2011, for which we have the latest data.
A sada nekoliko riječi o trošku financijske pomoći koju je Europska unija davala od 2008. do 2011., do kada imamo podatke.
As it turns out, this crisis has actually been quite costly.
Čini se da je ova kriza zapravo bio prilično skupa.
According to the European Commission data, 27 EU members approved around 4.6 trillion euro of financial aid with 1.7 trillion approximately spent until the end of 2011.
Prema podacima Europske komisije, 27 zemalja članica EU-a odobrilo je oko 4,6 trilijarde eura financijske pomoći, od čega je oko 1,7 trilijarde potrošeno do kraja 2011.
The UK, Germany, Denmark approved more than 500 billion euro while there was only a handful of countries which didn't provide any help to their banks.
Velika Britanija, Njemačka, Danska odobrile su više od pola milijarde eura, dok tek nekolicina zemalja nije pružila nikakvu pomoć svojim bankama.
Bulgaria, Malta, the Check Republic, Estonia, Romania and Croatia, as the 28th member of the EU.
Bugarska, Malta, Češka, Estonija, Rumunjska i Hrvatska, kao 28. članica EU-a.
Relative to the 2011 GDP, the highest bank support was provided by Ireland, 328 %, and Denmark, 258 %.
U odnosu na BDP 2011., najvišu potporu bankama dala je Irska, 328%, i Danska, 258%.
It's interesting how Ireland became a very big case.
Zanimljivo je što je Irska postala poznati slučaj.
Everybody has been talking about Ireland, and Denmark somehow went under the radar.
Svi govorimo o Irskoj, a Danska je nekako prošla ispod radara, nezapaženo.
However, the cost was really very high.
Ipak, cijena je bila uistinu vrlo visoka.
There was a serious banking crisis.
Došlo je do ozbiljne bankarske krize.
Belgium and the Netherlands also had a serious banking crisis, committing more than 50 % of GDP as well.
Belgija i Nizozemska također su je imale, utrošivši više od 50% BDP-a.
If you look at the structure of the support, it was mostly in the form of guarantees, 27.3 %, and recapitalization, buying trouble assets, liquidity measures amounted to 5, 3.6 and 1.7 % of GDP.
Ako pogledate strukturu potpore, ona je uglavnom bila u obliku jamstava, 27,3%, a dokapitalizacija, otkup problematične imovine, mjere likvidnosti dosegle su 5, 3,6 i 1,7% BDP-a.
So, not negligible, but not high either.
Dakle, nije zanemarivo, ali nije ni visoko.
This is a graph that depicts the amount of state aid as a yearly average of 2011 GDP.
Ovo je grafikon koji prikazuje iznos državnih potpora kao godišnji prosjek BDP-a 2011.
Here we have Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, significant amount, and the UK as well.
Ovdje su Belgija, Danska, Irska, Nizozemska, Švedska, značajan iznos, te Velika Britanija.
Here is the brake down according to the types of aid, mostly in the form of guarantees, but also quite a lot of recapitalization.
Ovdje su razložene vrste potpora, uglavnom u obliku jamstava, ali ima i dosta dokapitalizacije.
Lithuania and the Baltic states also, banks acquiring trouble assets.
U Litvi i baltičkim državama, banke su se također odlučile na otkup problematične imovine.
Significant risks still remain.
Značajni rizici i dalje su s nama.
The banking crisis is not over.
Bankarska kriza nije gotova.
What we are seeing is that we have a further continuous increase in non-performing loans across Europe so that trend has pretty much not been stopped yet.
Vidimo da imamo daljnji kontinuirani rastloših kredita u cijeloj Europi, tako da taj trend još nije zaustavljen.
The worsening of banks' portfolio dents into any kind of buffers they might still have.
Pogoršanje portfelja banaka nagriza njihove rezerve.
The risks which arise from the worsening of the bank asset quality are fiscal risks which might arise from the resolution of NPLs or, in other words, from the potential need for the recapitalization of European banks after the asset quality review, and also from the dampening of the potential growth of banks in the following years.
Rizici koji proizlaze iz pogoršanja kvalitete aktive banaka su fiskalni rizici, koji bi mogli proizaći iz sanacije loših kredita ili, drugim riječima, iz potrebe za dokapitalizacijom europskih banaka, nakon pregleda kvalitete aktive, ali i iz smirivanja potencijalnog rasta banaka u narednim godinama.
In Croatia, we are on much safer ground with the very high buffers of capital adequacy in the banks.
U Hrvatskoj smo na mnogo sigurnijem tlu s vrlo visokim rezervama u bankama.
Basically, we will be watching what happens in the countries from which our main eurozone banks are coming into the Croatian market more than being worried about what's happening on the Croatian market itself.
Više ćemo pratiti što se događa u zemljama iz kojih naše glavne banke eurozone dolaze na hrvatsko tržište, a manje biti zabrinuti glede onoga što se događa na hrvatskom tržištu.
This is an interesting graph which shows how capital ratios that are reported at the moment are sensitive to non-performing loans coverage.
Ovo je zanimljiv grafikon koji prikazuje kako su udjeli kapitala iskazani u ovome trenutku osjetljivi na pokrivenost loših kredita.
Here you can see the blue bars which show capital ratios in 2012.
Ovdje možete vidjeti plave crte koje pokazuju udjele kapitala u 2012.
The red squares show what capital ratios look like when you deduct uncovered non-performing loans.
Crvene kockice pokazuju kako udjeli kapitala izgledaju kad se oduzmu nepokriveni NPL-ovi.
Here you see that we shouldn't be too worried because Croatia looks relatively healthy, together with the US, Slovakia, Estonia.
Ovdje vidite da mi ne bismo trebali biti previše zabrinuti jer Hrvatska izgleda relativno zdravo, zajedno sa SAD-om, Latvijom, Slovačkom, Estonijom.
If they are listed banks on the equity market, a lot can happen in between.
Ako su na popisu banaka na tržištu kapitala, mnogo toga može se dogoditi između tih procesa.
Another fact is that European banks are still to a large extent reliant on wholesale funding.
Još jedna činjenica je i da se europske banke još uvijek u velikoj mjeri oslanjaju na velefinanciranje.
This is also something everyone expected would change more quickly, than it actually did.
To je nešto za što su svi mislili da će se promijeniti brže nego što zapravo jest.
If you look at the loan to deposit ratio, you can see it is still much higher in eurozone banks than either in the group of Central and Eastern European banks or the US.
Pogledamo li omjer kredita i depozita, vidimo da je on još uvijek mnogo veći u bankama eurozone nego u skupini banaka srednje i istočne Europe ili SAD-u.
You can also see that in the US, the already low loan to deposit ratio has been declining from the beginning of the crisis, while this has not happened in eurozone.
Također možemo vidjeti da je već nizak omjer kredita i depozita u SAD-u u padu od početka krize, što se nije dogodilo u eurozoni.
Also, if you look at the change of equity to assets, you can see that in eurozone banks, not much has changed.
Također, pogledamo li omjer kapitala i aktive, vidjet ćemo da se u bankama eurozone nije mnogo toga promijenilo.
They were unable to increase the ratio of the equity to assets so they remain very much reliant on the whole sale funding, and they increasingly became reliant on the funding with the Central European Bank.
One nisu bile u stanju povećati omjer kapitala i aktive pa se i dalje oslanjaju na velefinanciranje, a sve više i na financiranje kod Europske središnje banke.
That can obviously go on for some time and the ECB can provide funding for the banks.
To očito može trajati neko vrijeme i ESB može osigurati sredstva za banke.
If necessary, unlimited, for a prolonged period of time, but it can't go on forever.
Bude li potrebno, i neograničeno, tijekom duljeg vremenskog razdoblja, ali to ne može trajati vječno.
At some point, banks should move from to being so exposed towards whole sale funding and the central bank to the market.
U nekom trenutku, banke bi se trebale preusmjeriti od izloženosti prema velefinanciranju i Središnjoj banci prema tržištu.
However, it is not looking like it is going to happen any time soon.
Međutim, ne čini se da će se to dogoditi u skorije vrijeme.
Unlike the eurozone, in Central-Eastern Europe, if you break it down, you can see a more logical development of the situation where banks which had a high loan to deposit ratios, in the first place the Baltic banks, adjusted very quickly as the crises started.
Za razliku od eurozone, u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi, ako je razložite, možete uočiti logičniji razvoj situacije u kojoj su se banke koje su imale visok omjer kredita i depozita, prije svega baltičke banke, vrlo brzo prilagodile kad je kriza počela.
They have not been able to reduce loan to deposit ratios.
Te zemlje nisu bile u mogućnosti smanjiti omjer kredita i depozita.
The change in the banks external debt between March 2013 and the beginning of the crisis, the so called leveraging, has also been the function of the initial state of the problem that the banks saw so, basically, the countries that had a higher loan to deposit ratios were those that had to deleverage faster.
Promjena u vanjskom dugu banaka između ožujka 2013. i početka krize, tzv. promjena u razini financijske poluge, također je dio početnih problema banaka, pa su zemlje koje su imale veći omjer kredita i depozita one koje su morale smanjiti razinu financijske poluge brže.
Croatia, although it has seen a significant deleveraging in the second half of 2012, actually saw an increase in the leverage compared to the beginning of the crisis, if you look at the whole period as such.
Premda je u Hrvatskoj došlo do značajnog smanjivanja financijske poluge u drugoj polovici 2012., zapravo je riječ o povećanju poluge u odnosu na početak krize, pogledamo li cijelo razdoblje.
The idea we discussed in Europe a long time ago was to think about the harmonization of the supervision in Europe.
Ono o čemu smo još davno razgovarali u Europi jest usklađen nadzor.