– Euroopan syyttäjän ja apulaissyyttäjän riippumattomuudesta: vaatii, että riippumattomuus on ehdottomasti taattava toimivallan jakoa kunnioittaen ja että laillisuusperiaatteen toteutuminen on varmistettava; apulaissyyttäjän perussäännön eri vaihtoehdoista: katsoo, että apulaissyyttäjän velvoittaminen hoitamaan yksinomaan kyseistä tointa ehkäisisi tehokkaasti eturistiriitoja ja riippuvuutta hierarkiasta, vaikka kahden toimen samanaikainen hoitaminen saattaisi sekatapauksissa, joita saattaa olla eniten, tuoda mukanaan tiettyjä käytännön etuja; pohtii, miten Euroopan syyttäjän alaisuudessa toimimisen periaate saadaan käytännössä toteutettua ja turvattua, myös apulaissyyttäjään sovellettavien kurinpitomenettelyiden osalta; kehottaa komissiota selvittämään, miten apulaissyyttäjien henkilöstötarpeet ja toimintakustannukset pääosin rahoitetaan; – katsoo, että Euroopan syyttäjän ja apulaissyyttäjien on toimittava yhteistyössä jäsenvaltioiden kansallisten syyttäjäviranomaisten kanssa siten, että yhteistyöllä pyritään parantamaan tutkimusten tehokkuutta ja edistämään jäsenvaltioiden oikeusjärjestelmiin liittyvien kaikkien mahdollisten käytännön ongelmien ratkaisemista;
- regarding the independence both of the European Prosecutor and of his/her deputy: insists that such independence be unconditionally guaranteed, with due regard for the separation of powers, and that it be accompanied by the principle of mandatory prosecution; as regards the various possible statutes for deputy prosecutors, permitting such individuals to hold one office only would certainly exclude any possible conflict of interest or hierarchical dependence, even though there would be practical advantages in allowing them to wear ‘two hats’ in the event of cases falling under more than one jurisdiction, a category into which most cases are likely to fall; wonders, therefore, how the principle of subordination to the European Prosecutor would actually be applied and protected, inter alia as regards the disciplinary procedures applying to the Prosecutor’s deputy; calls, likewise, on the Commission to clarify the funding of the major portion of the deputy prosecutors’ human resources and operating costs; - takes the view that the European Public Prosecutor and his deputies must work in conjunction with the national public prosecutors in the Member States, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of their inquiries and of working out all sorts of practical problems related to the judicial systems of the Member States. - as regards reviewing the Prosecutor’s activities, either in the case of investigations carried out under the Prosecutor’s authority (judge of freedoms) or with regard to committals for trial (national judge), any practical advantages to be derived from recourse to the national system (swifter procedure) must be set against the need for a uniform approach in the application and interpretation of Community law, for fairness in determining which court has jurisdiction and for fundamental rights (which could be guaranteed by means of a Preliminary Chamber within the Court of Justice) to be upheld; believes that it is necessary for the future European Prosecutor to be placed under a judicial control which would make it possible to lodge subsequent appeals against his decisions and better monitor his work; considers that it must be clearly established that any acts of the European Prosecutor which relate to people's fundamental rights must be subject to judicial review; - believes that the Prosecutor should not have a discretionary right to close cases, but that this decision should be subject to judicial control; also takes the view that detailed criteria should be established governing the choice of the Member State where the trial is to be held, in order to avoid the risks of ‘forum shopping’; - also calls upon the Commission to consider the case of illegal investigations by the Prosecutor and possible means of redress through the courts; - as regards evidence: if the principle of mutual recognition is fundamental it must be underpinned by common standards relating to prosecution and punishment; on account of the differences in the Member States’ systems for gathering evidence, wonders whether consideration should not be given to a harmonised EU procedure for the admission of evidence and also to a body of common EU rules on evidence; considers that the Commission proposal to devise an EU police or witness statement should be taken up; - as regards area of competence: considers that the existing system should initially prove itself in the field of financial interests before being extended - if appropriate - to other crimes; envisages that an evolutionary approach could be considered whereby the European Prosecutor becomes competent to deal with offences which are already the subject of an agreement between the Member States and a further series of offences could be added, as set out in the Corpus Juris; takes the view that this will largely depend upon the proposals from the Convention and the decisions in the IGC as concerns communitarisation of the instruments under the third pillar;