natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The number of passengers using high-speed rail in Europe is growing steadily: from roughly 15 billion passenger-kilometres1 (pkm) in 1990, demand reached more than 124 billion pkm in 2016. 
Suurnopeusjunia käyttävien matkustajien määrä kasvaa Euroopassa tasaisesti: noin 15 miljardista henkilökilometristä1 vuonna 1990 yli 124 miljardiin henkilökilometriin vuonna Henkilökilometri saadaan yhdistämällä suurnopeusjunien vuosittainen matkustajamäärä ja matkojen pituus suurnopeusjunien käytön mittaamisen optimoimiseksi.
In 2015, high-speed rail services accounted for more than a quarter (26 %) of all rail passenger travel in the Member States where high-speed services are available. 
1 Suurnopeusrautatieliikenteen osuus ylitti vuonna 2015 neljäsosan (26 prosenttia) kaikesta rautateiden matkustajaliikenteestä niissä jäsenvaltioissa, joissa on käytettävissä suurnopeusjunia. 6. 20
EU policies for high-speed rail Transport policy 5. 
5
The latest Commission 2011 Transport White Paper (WP)3 has set the following specific passenger traffic targets for high-speed rail4: (i) By 2030, the length of the existing high-speed rail network should be tripled so that, by 2050, most medium-distance passenger transport should be by rail (a 50 % shift of medium-distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail). 
50 1 4 5
1). COM(2011) 144 final of 28.3.2011 ŇRoadmap to a Single European Transport Area Đ Towards a competitive and resource-efficient systemÓ. 
3. 1 4 11
13 2 3 4 5 
32 1 4
Member States, to remove bottlenecks that still hamper the smooth functioning of the internal market, and to overcome technical barriers (e.g. incompatible standards for railway traffic). 
1 5
The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) instrument6, adopted at the same time, supports these objectives financially. 
6
Since 2000, the Structural Funds have been required to operate in a manner consistent with other EU policies, such as transport7. 
7
From 2000 to 201710, the EU provided 23.7 billion euro in grants to co-finance high-speed rail infrastructure investments, as well as 4.4 billion euro in support to install ERTMS Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 
2. 1 4 5 11
129). 
1
Article 2(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 
61 6. 1 26. 5 6
1). 
1
Article 2(1) (b) of Regulation (EC) No 1783/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 1999 on the European Regional Development Fund (OJ L 213, 13.8.1999, p. 
3. 1 7
Article 3(1) and annex to Annex II Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund (OJ L 130, 25.5.1994, p. 
1 4 5 6 2. 5.
14 6 7 8 9 10 Data include the latest (2017) CEF call. All figures provided are expressed in nominal terms. 
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on high-speed rail lines. Some 14.6 billion euro of co-funding, or 62 % of the total, was provided under shared-management funding mechanisms (the ERDF and the CF), while the directly managed investment schemes (e.g. the CEF) provided 9.1 billion euro, or 38 %. 
38 62 1 4 6
11. 
1 1.
12. 
2.
Almost half of the EU funding made available for high-speed rail investments (more than 11 billion euro) was allocated to investments in Spain. 
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13. 
3.
On average, EU co-funding covered around 11 % of total construction cost. 
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AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH 14. 
4.
We assessed: (i) whether high-speed lines in the EU had been built according to a long-term strategic plan; (ii) whether high-speed rail projects had been implemented in a cost-efficient manner (by assessing construction costs, delays, cost overruns and use of high-speed lines which received investment support); (iii) whether the investments were sustainable after project completion (including the impact of high-speed rail on competing transport modes), and (iv) whether EU co-funding had added value. 
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15. 
5.
We used a series of audit procedures, such as document reviews and analyses of EU and national long-term strategic development plans for high-speed rail; interviews with staff from the Commission and from Member States; meetings with rail operators and infrastructure managers; and a survey of key stakeholders11. 
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16 11 12 13 Paris-Brussels-Amsterdam (PBA) high-speed line14, and (iv) the prices, travel times and number of connections using different modes of transport15. 
5.
22. 
2.
The CommissionŐs powers are limited, and its plan to triple the length of the high-speed rail network is unlikely to be achieved 23. 
3.
The CommissionŐs current long-term plan, set out in the 2011 White Paper and the CEF Regulation (Recital No 11), to triple the length of high-speed rail lines in the EU by 2030 (from 9 700 km in 200819 to 30 750 km by 2030) is not supported by credible analysis. 
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24. 
4.
The WP 2011 figure quoted is doubtful, as our data indicates that only 9 067 km of HSL was available by the end of 2017. 
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20 17 18 19 
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Table 2 - Assessment of time from planning to operation 21 Audited high-speed rail lines and Munich-Verona stretch Planning started Work started In operation* Years since planning Duration of work in years Berlin - Munich 1991 1996 2017** 26 21 Stuttgart - Munich 1995 2010 2025* 30 15 Rhin - Rhne 1992 2006 2011 19 5 LGV Est Europenne 1992 2002 2016 24 14 Madrid - Barcelona Đ French Border 1988 1997 2013 25 16 Eje Atlntico 1998 2001 2015 17 14 Madrid - Len 1998 2001 2015 17 14 Madrid - Galicia 1998 2001 2019* 21 18 Milan - Venice 1995 2003 2028* 33 25 Turin - Salerno 1987 1994 2009 22 15 Munich - Verona 1986 2003 2040* 54 37 * Expected. ** 52 km not before 2018. 
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25. 
5.
The Commission has no say in decision-making, and it has no legal tools and no powers to hold Member States to their earlier commitments to build the high-speed lines needed to complete the core network. 
5.
These indicators point that France is in the lead when it comes to use of high-speed lines (ratios of passenger km per capita and passenger kilometres per km of high speed lines); that Spain has the highest construction cost per capita (1 159 euro) and the highest EU co-funding for high-speed rail per capita (305 euro); and that Italy has the highest construction costs per km per capita (0.46 euro). 
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To support it in doing so, the EU has invested more than 14 billion euro in Spanish high-speed lines already since 1994. 
4.
The CommissionŐs mid-term evaluation report on the CEF confirmed this observation22. 
2.
32. 
2.
33. 
3.
Source: Fraunhofer ISI, Final Report of 15.6.2015, p. 
5.
14. 
4.
Unlike Austria and Italy, Germany sees little interest in destinations such as Innsbruck or Verona, which do not play a key role for Germany for everyday working traffic. 
2.
This means that it will take more than half a century before the investments are actually used, and that more than 1,5 billion euro is considered largely ineffective for more than two decades. 2. 
2.
34. 
4.
35. 
5.
42. 
2.
43. 
3.
Figure 5 - Differences in construction costs of high-speed lines 30 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 100 % 95 % 95 % 92 % 91 % 87 % 350 KM/H M I X E D 350 KM/H P A S S E N G ER 300 KM/H M I X E D 250 KM/H M I X E D 300 KM/H P A S S E N G ER 250 KM/H P A S S E N G ER Source: 2009 RAVE Study of 5.8.2009 of the University of Lisbon; comparison with a mixed 350 km/h high-speed line (100 baseline). 
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44. 
4.
Even if the travel time should come down to around 3.5 hours once the Brenner high-speed line is completed, the average speed on this line will still be just 115 km/h, still too low to provide a convincing argument for building a fully fledged high-speed line. 
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Cost-efficiency checks are rare 45. 
5.
Table 4 - Cost of the audited high-speed line per km and per minute saved 32 Audited line Length (km) Total cost (million euro) Travel time saved (minutes) Cost per minute saved (million euro) Berlin-Munich 671 14 682 140 104.87 Stuttgart-Munich 267 13 273 36 368.69 Rhin-Rhne 138 2 588 75 34.51 LGV Est Europenne 406 6 712 130 51.63 Madrid-Barcelona - French Border 797 12 109 305 39.70 Eje Atlntico 165 2 596 75 34.61 Madrid-Galicia 549 7 684* 110 69.85 Madrid-Len 345 5 415 95 57.00 Milan-Venice 273 11 856 49 241.96 Turin-Salerno 1 007 32 169 192 167.55 Total/average 4 618** 109 084 1 207 90.38 * The analysis of cost estimate for the entire line, and travel time include the overlapping 133 km of Madrid-Len HSL (excluding the Guadarrama tunnel). ** The Munich-Verona stretch, with its length of 445 km, brings the total km of lines audited to 5 063 km. 
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Cost overruns, construction delays and delayed entry into service: a norm instead of an exception 52. 
2.
53. 
3.
54. 
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55. 
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Air travel (from take-off to landing) is faster than high-Eleven of the thirty audited projects are either still ongoing, or were not implemented properly, leading to significant decommitments of EU funding. 
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62. The Ňcity centre to city centreÓ analysis told us the following: (i) Between Madrid and Barcelona, the high-speed rail connection is the fastest travel option: even air travel takes longer from door to door, and is more expensive. 
2.
63. 
3.
65. 
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Rail ticketing compares poorly with that of the airline industry. For example, single e-ticketing solutions, such as those allowing booking trips involving more than one operator or crossing borders, are much easier for air travel than for rail. 
4.
Having the right number of stations is vital to a lineŐs success and to its operational sustainability35. 
5.
72. 
2.
73. 
3.
44 74. 
4.
75. 
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Judging by a benchmark arising from academic and institutional sources, a high-speed line should ideally have nine million passengers, or at least six million in the opening year to The research study Ç Retour sur les effets conomiques du TGV. 
3.
On three of the seven completed high-speed lines we audited (Eje Atlntico, Rhin-Rhne and Madrid-Len), the number of passengers carried was far lower44. 
4.
82. 
2.
The competitiveness of high-speed rail compared to other modes of transport: there is no Ňpolluter-paysÓ principle yet 83. 
3.
84. 
4.
85. 
5.
Article 55 paragraph 13 of Law No 449/1997 of 27 December 1997, published in Supplement to OJ 302 of 30.12.1997, p. 5-113. 
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Even after that point, if the lines are deemed to operate as public-service obligations, these Member States will be able to grant a 10-year postponement under certain conditions, meaning that truly open competition may be deferred as far as 2035. 
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50 47 48 G. Adinolfi, ŇLa guerra dei prezziÓ, La Repubblica, 15 October 2017. 
5.
ThemissinginteroperabilityontheMunich-Veronastretchcausesastopanddelaysatthe Brenner station There are over 11 000 national rules in rail, which the ERA is currently categorising with a view to Ňcleaning them upÓ at a later stage. 
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Such delays are very significant, considering that the multi-billion infrastructure investment on the Munich-Verona high-speed line has an overall time-gain target of 114 minutes. 
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The national authorities in the visited Member States told us that cross-border problems caused by varying national rules on employment or working languages could best be solved by the introduction of harmonised rules across the EU. Air transport, for example, uses only one working language (English); this helps to reduce barriers between continents, and could resolve similar issues between Member States. 2. 
2.
92. 
2.
A strong and independent regulator: necessary, but not always a reality 93. 
3.
94. 
4.
95. 
5.
High-speed rail supports the EUŐs sustainable mobility policy objectives, because its carbon footprint is lower than other forms of transport53. 
3.
102. 
2.
103. 
3.
Seamless and competitive cross-border high-speed rail operations are still some way off 104. 
4.
With the current rules, competition may be delayed until as long as 2035. 
5.
105. 
5.
Target implementation date: when preparing the new legislative proposals for TEN-T. 2. 
2.
Target implementation date: initiate the work as soon as possible to ensure work is completed by 2023. 2. 
2.
3.During the programming of cohesion policy, together with the Member States, focus its funding for high-speed rail lines to those high-speed rail lines that form part of the core network corridors. 
3.
Target implementation date: when preparing the programmes for the post-2020 period. 4. 
4.
5. Link EU co-funding to beneficiaries not only to the delivery of outputs but also to the achievement of results announced. 
5.
2. Create, or facilitate the creation of, Ňone-stop shopsÓ, which are single bodies streamlining the various formalities to be complied with on both sides of the border. 
2.
3. Accelerate the lifting of all administrative and regulatory barriers to interoperability. 
3.
Provide support to the rail sector to actively develop single e-ticketing solutions, including for high-speed rail operations. 2. 
2.
Monitor Member States to ensure that they take all possible measures to implement EU rules for calculating track access charges fully and correctly, in particular in respect of the obligation to coordinate mark-ups to facilitate cross-border high-speed rail operations. 3. 
3.
Subtramos XI-A y XI-B (Sant Sadurn D'Anoia - Gelida) 78.1 48.5 73.3 43.3 6.3 11.7 Yes partially, there was a delay but no cost overrun Yes, partially Yes, partially Spain Madrid - Len 2002ES16CPT002 Nuevo acceso ferroviario al Norte y Noroeste de Espaa, Madrid - Segovia - Valladolid / Medina del Campo. 
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Tnel de Guadarrama (Infraestructura y va) 1380.3 1001,4 1702.5 1001.4 32.5 52.4 No, there were a delay and a cost overrun Yes Yes Spain Madrid - Len 2009ES162PR011 Lnea de Alta Velocidad Venta de Baos-Palencia-Len Plataforma Fase I 365.8 102.7 384.8 125.6 92.9 4.1 No, there were a delay and a cost overrun Yes, partially Yes, partially Spain Eje Atlntico 2003ES161PR008 Eje Atlntico. 
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Tramo Santiago-Oroso (Variante de Berdia) 85.5 55.2 101.8 49.5 9.1 11.2 Yes partially, there were a small delay and a cost overrun No Yes Spain Madrid - Galicia 2009-ES-19091-E Lnea de alta velocidad Madrid-Galicia para trfico mixto. 
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Phase 1 1165.1 459.3 N/A N/A 67.8 17.2 Too early to say but delays are to be expected Too early to assess Too early to assess France Est-Europenne 2009-FR-17044-E Seconde phase de la LGV Est Europenne entre Baudrecourt et Strasbourg - Ralisation du gnie civil de laLGV 2 340 76 2 130 76 106 20.1 Yes partially, there was a delay but no cost overrun Yes, partially Yes France Est-Europenne 2005-FR-401-b-P Ligne  grande vitesse Est - section Vair es - Baudrecourt : installations et projets d'accompagnement dans rtelier de maintenance de l'OURCQ et gares nouvelles 92.3 3 93.4 1 n/a n/a No, there were a delay and a cost overrun Yes Yes France Rhin-Rhne 2007-FR-24070-P Ligne  grande vitesse (LGV) Rhin - Rhne Branche Est 2 312 198 2 610 198 137.5 19 No, there were a delay and a cost overrun No Yes, partially France Rhin-Rhne 2010-FR-92204-P Adaptation de la ligne existante entre Mulhouse et la frontire en vue de la circulation de trains  grande vitesse (TGV) ou dŐintercity express (ICE) sur lŐaxe Mulhouse-Mullheim (Fribourg) 4,1 0,7 3,4 0,6 4 0.9 Yes Yes Yes, partially . 
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644 123 644.2 114.2 51.3 12.6 Partially,delays not affecting the expected opening of the line Yes Yes, but results will only be visible once the whole line is put into operation Italy Milano - Venezia 2011-IT-93095-P Tratta AV/AC Treviglio - Brescia: opere civili (fase) 26.4 5 26.4 4.9 0.3 87.1 Partially, delays not affecting the expected opening of the line Yes Yes, but results will only be visible once the whole line is put into operation Italy Torino - Salerno 2006IT161PR003 Tratta Campana della linea AV/AC Roma-Napoli 273 118.7 273 118.7 14.8 18.5 Partially, project on time but 3-year delay for opening the line Yes Yes Italy Torino - Salerno Activity 6 OP 1994-1999 Linea AV/AC Roma Đ Napoli (tratta campana): realizzazione di parte del I lotto e del II lotto 712.7 146.3 713 234.6 58 12.3 No, there were significant delays in completion Yes Yes Italy Mnchen - Verona 2007-IT-01030-M Southern access line to Brenner 422.3* 58.8 82.2** 14.5 n/a** n/a** No, there were major delays and reduction of scope. 
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Stuttgart 21 2894.5 135.1 6 526 128.8 57 114.5 No, there were major cost overruns and delays Too early to assess Too early to assess Germany Stuttgart - Mnchen 2007-DE-17010-P Neubaustrecke Wendlingen - Ulm 2065.5 117.2 3 259 117.2 59.6 54.7 No, there were major cost overruns and delays Too early to assess Too early to assess Portugal Lisboa - Madrid 2014-PT-TM-0627-M Ligao Ferroviaria Sines/Elvas (Espanha): Troco Evora-Caia e Estao Tcnica ao km 118 da Linha do Sul (Railway connection Sines/Elvas (Spain): vora-Caia Section and Technical Station at km 118 of the South Line) 814.7 127.7 N/A N/A 130 6.3 Too early to asseess Too early to assess Too early to assess * The figure relates to total eligible cost. ** The project suffered a severe reduction in scope. *** Estimated at the time of the audit for the global Brenner Base Tunnel project. 
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Input data Spain France Italy Germany 2 675 2 548 1 144 2 141 3 827 2 628 1 280 2 331 31 015 38 395 31 812 28 506 53 554 40 382 41 912 34 105 14 071 1 406 724 2 694 13.4 46.2 49.0 67.0 20.0 60.6 27.2 82.8 68 ANNEX IV Key high-speed-rail data per Member State HSR Đ completed (km) HSR - completed and in construction (km) Total Cost Đ completed (million euro) Total Cost - completed and in construction (million euro) EU co-funding - completed and in construction (million euro) Pass-km (billion) Population (million) Calculated Key performance indicators Spain 12 14 671 573 525 344 1 159 603 692 412 0.25 0.22 0.46 0.16 0.30 0.23 0.54 0.18 305 5.0 290 21 19.2 731 12 17.5 330 33 12.7 329 Total Cost - completed / km Total Cost - completed and in construction / km Total Cost - completed / capita Total Cost - completed and in construction / capita Total Cost - completed / km / capita Total Cost - completed and in construction / km / capita EU co-funding / capita Pass-km (mil) / km HSR Pass-km / capita France 15 Italy 28 Germany 13 15 33 15 Note: Source: For France and Italy, the numbers exclude cross-border connections Brenner Base and Lyon - Turin tunnels; Pass-km for Italy is the latest publicly available estimate. 
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Speed yield analysis ANNEX V 69 Km/h 350 300 209 188 350 300 350 350 350 350 54 % % 1 50 % 43 % 2 63 % 47 % % 1 29 % 38 % 38 % 164 39 155 129 166 250 200 50 250 250 135 24 124 127 127 10 103 113 113 94 300 300 300 300 186 162 54 % 300 300 300 320 320 198 222 200 108 36 Madrid - Barcelona - FF Eje-Atlntico Maximum operating speed Torino-Salerno* Real speed fastest train Madrid - Galicia** Stuttgart-Munich*** Milano - Venezia** Speed yield (real speed slowest train to maximum design speed) Madrid - Len Maximum design speed Berlin-Leipzig Halle-Munich LGV Est Europenne Real speed slowest train LGV Rhin - Rhne Figueras - Perpignan * Real speeds measured on a Milano - Napoli trip. ** Includes HSL stretches still in construction or planning phase. *** Includes HSL stretches still in construction or planning phase; the maximum operating speed is assumed equal to the maximum design speed. 
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The detailed scope of work was as follows: o Number of different types of transportation: 3: High-speed train, Conventional train and Air (long distance coaches analysed by ECA separately); o Number of destinations / routes: 9 as indicated above; o Number of directions (every route is bi-directional; e.g. MAD-BCN and BCN-MAD): 2 but limited to origin and destination points; o Number of different starting days in week: 2 (a return ticket from Monday to Wednesday attracting usually business clients; a return ticket from Friday to Sunday, attracting usually leisure passengers); o Travel dates: 4 weeks with approximate dates (5 to 9 June 2017; 3 to 7 July 2017; 31 July to 4 August 2017, and 28 August to 3 September 2017); o Travel times in combination with the above travel days: (Business travel: departure between 7 and 9 a.m. and return between 4 and 6 p.m.; Leisure travel: departure between 10 and 12 a.m. and return between 5 to 7 p.m.); o Number of booking times: 3 (3 months in advance of the first day of the travel; 2 weeks in advance of the first day of the travel; ŇLast-minuteÓ: the working day before the first day of travel); o The data to be gathered: Date of departure and arrival; Price in euro of the return ticket; Duration of the trip in minutes. 
5.
Impact of stations on travel time and speed ANNEX VII 75 HSL Origin-Destination Length in km Number of stations Average distance between stations (km) Shortest distance between stations (km) Longest distance between stations (km) Most direct trip (min) Least direct trip (min) Difference (min) "Time cost" of each intermediate station Average speed on most direct trip (km/h) Average speed on least direct trip (km/h) Difference (km/h) "Average speed cost" of each intermediate station (km/h) Madrid-Barcelona-FF Madrid - Figueres Vilafant 797 9 100 35 157 215 255 40 10 209 188 21.49 5.37 Madrid-Len Madrid - Len 345 5 86 51 114 126 153 27 9 164 135 28.99 7.2 Eje Atlantico Vigo - A Corua 165 5 41 26 61 80 80 N/A N/A 124 124 N/A N/A Torino-Salerno Torino - Salerno* 1 007 14 77 4 253 255* 292* 37* 7* 186* 162* 23.55* 4.71* Milano-Venezia Milano - Venezia 273 7 46 8 84 145 145 N/A N/A 113 113 N/A N/A LGV Est Europenne Paris - Strasbourg 441 5 110 68 137 106 119 13 7 250 222 27.27 13.64 LGV Rhin-Rhne Dijon - Mulhouse 205 4 68 46 82 62 74 12 6 198 166 32.17 16.09 Stuttgart-Mnchen Stuttgart - Mnchen 267 8 38 6 191 134 154 20 4 108 94 14.00 2.74 Berlin - Leipzig/Halle - Erfurt - Nurnberg - Mnchen Berlin - Mnchen 672 15 48 2 94 240 312 72 12 155 129 25.77 4.28 * Station impact on travel time and speed is computed on a Milano - Napoli trip. 
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High-Speed Line Eje Atlantico 78 High-Speed Line Madrid Đ Galicia 79 Length Total cost EU (ex VAT) funding Line capacity saturation HSR trains (daily avg) Stations Avg dist between stations Speeds max max real average as of max design operational design km mil euro mil euro % nr nr km km/h km/h km/h % 549 5 714* 440* 36%** 22 8 78 350 200 103-110 29-31% * Total Cost & EU funding relate to Medina del Campo - Galicia stretch. ** Relate to completed high-speed stretches. 
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The Commission remains committed to the conclusions and the identified measures following from the strategy outlined in the 2011 White Paper and continues to put forward and implement the actions necessary to fulfil the objectives set out in the document. 
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High-speed railways are defined in the TEN-T Regulation, vide point (a) of the art. 
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However, the TEN-T Regulation translates the strategy developed by the Commission in the White Paper 2011 into concrete objectives, specific targets and appropriate measures. 
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This has been done for the first time with the implementing decision on the Evora-Merida project adopted on 25 April 2018. 
5.
Also, the Commission made a series of proposals to limit the emissions from transport and provide incentives for modal shift and decarbonisation especially of the road sector. Moreover, in 2017 the Commission launched a comprehensive study on the internalisation of external costs with the aim of assessing the extent to which the "user pays" and "polluter pays" are implemented in the EU countries across modes, and as contribution to the relevant policy debate. 
Komissio käynnisti vuonna 2017 laajan selvityksen ulkoisten kustannusten sisällyttämisestä hintoihin. Tarkoituksena on arvioida, missä määrin käyttäjä maksaa -periaate ja aiheuttamisperiaate pannaan täytäntöön jäsenvaltioissa eri liikennemuodoissa.
The Ňclean-upÓ of the huge barrier imposed by over 11 000 national rules by ERA is underway, thanks to the IV Railway package provisions. Separately a proactive approach along corridors on the Issues Log has started to proceed in the same direction, and following identification and characterisation of the rules, we expect most of them to be either eliminated or harmonised at European level, though this work will take several years to complete. 
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The TEN-T Regulation sets out concrete objectives, targets and measures which translate from the CommissionŐs 2011 White Paper strategy. 
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