natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission issued an invitation to tender only when the conditions of equality between the applicants had defini¬ tively ceased to exist, even though that meant squandering the experience acquired over the previous two years.· Furthermore, the 'brother' programmes subsequently launched as part of the peace process in the Middle East were also entrusted to the ARTM by private treaty contracts as was the technical monitoring, for example, of a Peace programme concluded by private contract with FERE Consultants on 18 January 1995. 
The Commission issued an invitation to tender only when the conditions of equality between the applicants had defini¬ tively ceased to exist, even though that meant squandering the experience acquired over the previous two years.· Furthermore, the 'brother' programmes subsequently launched as part of the peace process in the Middle East were also entrusted to the ARTM by private treaty contracts as was the technical monitoring, for example, of a Peace programme concluded by private contract with FERE Consultants on 18 January 1995.
The Commission justified the awarding of contracts by private treaty (by way of derogation from Article 56 of (2) See, for example. 
The Commission justified the awarding of contracts by private treaty (by way of derogation from Article 56 of (2) See, for example.
Article 1 57, paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty and paragraph 12, second indent of the Staff Regulations.' 
Article 1 57, paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty and paragraph 12, second indent of the Staff Regulations.'
Competent authority 42. 
Competent authority 42.
The decision to entrust the management of the programmes to an external body is unquestionably a decision of principle, which implies important choices regarding the way in which a policy is to be implemented. 
The decision to entrust the management of the programmes to an external body is unquestionably a decision of principle, which implies important choices regarding the way in which a policy is to be implemented.
Such a decision may only be taken by the Members of the Commission(') together, and must necessarily lay down precise provisions governing the procedures for delegating the powers in question, in particular as regards the question of scrutiny and the responsibilities incumbent on the delegates. 
Such a decision may only be taken by the Members of the Commission(') together, and must necessarily lay down precise provisions governing the procedures for delegating the powers in question, in particular as regards the question of scrutiny and the responsibilities incumbent on the delegates.
In its reply to the observations of the Court, the Commission argues that 'the arrangement [with ARTM] flows from the financing decisions taken for the MED programmes adopted by the Commission'. 
In its reply to the observations of the Court, the Commission argues that 'the arrangement [with ARTM] flows from the financing decisions taken for the MED programmes adopted by the Commission'.
These decisions, however, are insufficient and do not define the conditions under which ARTM is to exercise powers delegated by the Commission. 
These decisions, however, are insufficient and do not define the conditions under which ARTM is to exercise powers delegated by the Commission.
Conditions of delegation 44. 
Conditions of delegation 44.
Lastly, the Court of Justice, in its ruling in re Meroni v. the High Authority of 13 June 1958 (which has since become the standard case-law reference for such matters), lists the conditions that must be satisfied if power is to be delegated in a regular manner. 
Lastly, the Court of Justice, in its ruling in re Meroni v. the High Authority of 13 June 1958 (which has since become the standard case-law reference for such matters), lists the conditions that must be satisfied if power is to be delegated in a regular manner.
One of these conditions states that discretionary power may not be delegated, and that only clearly defined powers of implementation may be delegated. 
One of these conditions states that discretionary power may not be delegated, and that only clearly defined powers of implementation may be delegated.
However, it was noted that the utilization by the Commit¬ ment Committees of the reservations contained in the Commission's financing decision had resulted in the defacto amendment of several decisions (see paragraphs 73 to 74 below). 
However, it was noted that the utilization by the Commit¬ ment Committees of the reservations contained in the Commission's financing decision had resulted in the defacto amendment of several decisions (see paragraphs 73 to 74 below).
An irregularity was therefore committed, either because the Commitment Committees had overstepped its powers or because the Commission had delegated the discretionary power of amending a decision. 
An irregularity was therefore committed, either because the Commitment Committees had overstepped its powers or because the Commission had delegated the discretionary power of amending a decision.
This power cannot be described as a clearly defined power of implementation. (') Court of Justice ruling of 23 September 1986, Case No 5/85, AKZO Chemie v. Commission, Ree. p. 
This power cannot be described as a clearly defined power of implementation. (') Court of Justice ruling of 23 September 1986, Case No 5/85, AKZO Chemie v. Commission, Ree. p.
2585, 2614 et seq. 
2585, 2614 et seq.
, 19. 
, 19.
96 I EN I Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/9 the FR(')) to the ARTM by citing the absence on the market of a body with the requisite qualifications. 
96 I EN I Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/9 the FR(')) to the ARTM by citing the absence on the market of a body with the requisite qualifications.
However, there is no evidence in the Commission's files to show that the Management Department carried out any research in respect of the market in order to check the situation, and the fact that several candidates applied when the invitation to tender was issued in 1994 would seem to indicate that firms with these qualifications already existed at the time. 
However, there is no evidence in the Commission's files to show that the Management Department carried out any research in respect of the market in order to check the situation, and the fact that several candidates applied when the invitation to tender was issued in 1994 would seem to indicate that firms with these qualifications already existed at the time.
Furthermore, in the Court's opinion, the ARTM had no particular responsibilities either at the technical level or in terms of administrative and financial management which could have provided unre¬ stricted justification for its being chosen. 
Furthermore, in the Court's opinion, the ARTM had no particular responsibilities either at the technical level or in terms of administrative and financial management which could have provided unre¬ stricted justification for its being chosen.
Until December 1993, the contracts awarded to the BATs were also awarded by private treaty. 
Until December 1993, the contracts awarded to the BATs were also awarded by private treaty.
The table in Annex 3 shows for the period concerned that, out of 12 contracts awarded, in more than half of the cases no invitation to tender had been issued. 
The table in Annex 3 shows for the period concerned that, out of 12 contracts awarded, in more than half of the cases no invitation to tender had been issued.
Confusion of interests 50. 
Confusion of interests 50.
Two of the four administrators of the ARTM were, untilApril1995,alsomanagersoftheBATs(thefirmsFERE Consultants and Ismeri) responsible for monitoring the MED programmes. 
Two of the four administrators of the ARTM were, untilApril1995,alsomanagersoftheBATs(thefirmsFERE Consultants and Ismeri) responsible for monitoring the MED programmes.
These same BATs participated in the planning of the MED programmes, including the stage at which draft financing proposals were prepared, a task which is the exclusive responsibility of the Commissioni2). 
These same BATs participated in the planning of the MED programmes, including the stage at which draft financing proposals were prepared, a task which is the exclusive responsibility of the Commissioni2).
In order to carry out this work, FERE Consultants, as part of the preparation of the MED-Urbs programmes and component Β of the MED-Invest programme, and Ismeri Europa with regard to MED-Campus, obtained ECU 323 000 and ECU 199 960 respectively. 
In order to carry out this work, FERE Consultants, as part of the preparation of the MED-Urbs programmes and component Β of the MED-Invest programme, and Ismeri Europa with regard to MED-Campus, obtained ECU 323 000 and ECU 199 960 respectively.
These contracts were also awarded by direct negotiation with these bodies. 
These contracts were also awarded by direct negotiation with these bodies.
The conditions for awarding thè contracts and the involvement of the same firms of consultants in preparing the programmes, drawing up financing proposals, on the Management Board of the ARTM and in monitoring the programmes resulted in a situation where there was a conflict of interests that was prejudicial to the sound management of Community funds and contrary to the principle of equality of access to public contracts. 
The conditions for awarding thè contracts and the involvement of the same firms of consultants in preparing the programmes, drawing up financing proposals, on the Management Board of the ARTM and in monitoring the programmes resulted in a situation where there was a conflict of interests that was prejudicial to the sound management of Community funds and contrary to the principle of equality of access to public contracts.
Two particularly serious cases must be highlighted: respectively. 
Two particularly serious cases must be highlighted: respectively.
The first case was a contract dated 14 December 1992 between the .ARTM and FERE Consultants. 
The first case was a contract dated 14 December 1992 between the .ARTM and FERE Consultants.
The second case concerned a contract dated 21 December 1992 between the ARTM and Ismeri. 
The second case concerned a contract dated 21 December 1992 between the ARTM and Ismeri.
In both cases, the signatory managers occupied, when they signed the contract with the ARTM, two of the four administrator posts on the ARTM's Management Board. 
In both cases, the signatory managers occupied, when they signed the contract with the ARTM, two of the four administrator posts on the ARTM's Management Board.
It must also be noted that both of the firms to which the aforementioned contracts were awarded took part in the meetings of the Commitment Committee which approved the contracts in question; (b) in the context of the implementation of the MED-Invest programme, these same two BATs were awarded the contract to carry out two projects even though there was no tender or selection procedure. 
It must also be noted that both of the firms to which the aforementioned contracts were awarded took part in the meetings of the Commitment Committee which approved the contracts in question; (b) in the context of the implementation of the MED-Invest programme, these same two BATs were awarded the contract to carry out two projects even though there was no tender or selection procedure.
The sums in question totalled ECU 270 000 ECU in one case and ECU 405 000 ECU in the other; 53. 
The sums in question totalled ECU 270 000 ECU in one case and ECU 405 000 ECU in the other; 53.
The risks that such errors might occur were inherent in the logic of the system that the Commission envisaged introducing and in the situations of the various parties involved. 
The risks that such errors might occur were inherent in the logic of the system that the Commission envisaged introducing and in the situations of the various parties involved.
Even at the drafting stage, these risks were so evident that the Commission should have called die system into question immediately. 
Even at the drafting stage, these risks were so evident that the Commission should have called die system into question immediately.
The awarding of the contract to monitor the MED-Urbs programme gave rise to a further confusion of interests. 
The awarding of the contract to monitor the MED-Urbs programme gave rise to a further confusion of interests.
Following the invitation to tender issued during the first quarter of 1994, the Conseil des Communes et Régions d'Europe (CCRE) and the Cités Unies Development (CUD) were instructed to monitor the MED-Urbs programme. 
Following the invitation to tender issued during the first quarter of 1994, the Conseil des Communes et Régions d'Europe (CCRE) and the Cités Unies Development (CUD) were instructed to monitor the MED-Urbs programme.
The legal status of these two bodies is that of a non-profit-making association, set up, inter alia, for the purpose of defending its members' interests. 
The legal status of these two bodies is that of a non-profit-making association, set up, inter alia, for the purpose of defending its members' interests.
To award them, as the Commission did, the contract to monitor the implementation of a programme which consists of granting subsidies to regional authorities may place the loyalty which the CCRE/CUD owe contractually to the Commission at odds with their statutory obligations in respect of their principals. 
To award them, as the Commission did, the contract to monitor the implementation of a programme which consists of granting subsidies to regional authorities may place the loyalty which the CCRE/CUD owe contractually to the Commission at odds with their statutory obligations in respect of their principals.
This situation may also give rise to unfair discrimination against regional authorities which adhere to neither of these associations, all the more so since they belong to other organizations. 
This situation may also give rise to unfair discrimination against regional authorities which adhere to neither of these associations, all the more so since they belong to other organizations.
Furthermore, one BAT which had received financing to implement a project in the context of the implementation ofcomponentΒ oftheMED-Investprogrammewasawarded the contract to monitor this programme before the Commission had even given its opinion on the final implementation report which it had submitted as part of this operation. 
Furthermore, one BAT which had received financing to implement a project in the context of the implementation ofcomponentΒ oftheMED-Investprogrammewasawarded the contract to monitor this programme before the Commission had even given its opinion on the final implementation report which it had submitted as part of this operation.
Once the Commission had realized the danger of this situation, it asked the managers of the BATs responsible (a) once the Committee had given its approval, the ARTM directly signed (see paragraph 34) private treaty contracts to BATs that were managed by two of its administrators for ECU 547 750 and ECU 748 900 (') Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities. 
Once the Commission had realized the danger of this situation, it asked the managers of the BATs responsible (a) once the Committee had given its approval, the ARTM directly signed (see paragraph 34) private treaty contracts to BATs that were managed by two of its administrators for ECU 547 750 and ECU 748 900 (') Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities.
(2) Commission manual of operational procedures, paragraph 9.2, pages 17 and 18. 
(2) Commission manual of operational procedures, paragraph 9.2, pages 17 and 18.
Nò C 240/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 
Nò C 240/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19.
96 for monitoring to resign from the ARTM's Management Board. 
96 for monitoring to resign from the ARTM's Management Board.
The minutes of the meetings of the Agency's Management Board show how vigorously those concerned resisted the Commission's requests. 
The minutes of the meetings of the Agency's Management Board show how vigorously those concerned resisted the Commission's requests.
Thus, the minutes of the meeting of 11 October 1994 of the Agency's Management Board show that the two adminis¬ trators concerned 'would resign if: FERE Consultants were chosen by 'the European Commission · to provide technical assisance for the MED-Invest programme, [or if] ' Ismeri Europa were reselected as Technical Assistance Bureau (BAT) for the MED Campus programme'. 
Thus, the minutes of the meeting of 11 October 1994 of the Agency's Management Board show that the two adminis¬ trators concerned 'would resign if: FERE Consultants were chosen by 'the European Commission · to provide technical assisance for the MED-Invest programme, [or if] ' Ismeri Europa were reselected as Technical Assistance Bureau (BAT) for the MED Campus programme'.
Furthermore, both of these managers asked to be able to propose a candidate of their choice to replace them in the event of their resignation. 
Furthermore, both of these managers asked to be able to propose a candidate of their choice to replace them in the event of their resignation.
Once all of these conditions were fulfilled, both administrators resigned from.the ARTM's Management Board in April 1995. 
Once all of these conditions were fulfilled, both administrators resigned from.the ARTM's Management Board in April 1995.
In view of the seriousness of these findings, the Court immediately informed the Commission of them, só that it could take appropriate measures and examine, in particular, the need to take legal action against those responsible. 
In view of the seriousness of these findings, the Court immediately informed the Commission of them, só that it could take appropriate measures and examine, in particular, the need to take legal action against those responsible.
At the end of November 1995, the responsible Commission departments informed the Court that they intended· not to renew contracts signed with the ARTM when they expired in January 1996 and to wind up the ARTM. 
At the end of November 1995, the responsible Commission departments informed the Court that they intended· not to renew contracts signed with the ARTM when they expired in January 1996 and to wind up the ARTM.
They were also minded not to renew contracts signed with the BATs and to open an enquiry so as to establish responsibilities and to examine, in cooperation with the Commission's Legal Service, whether it was appropriate to take legal action. 
They were also minded not to renew contracts signed with the BATs and to open an enquiry so as to establish responsibilities and to examine, in cooperation with the Commission's Legal Service, whether it was appropriate to take legal action.
Budgetary and financial observations concerning the implementation of the programmes to TAOs and experts) was paid by the Commission from these commitments. 
Budgetary and financial observations concerning the implementation of the programmes to TAOs and experts) was paid by the Commission from these commitments.
Annex 4 provides a detailed analysis of available funds and their use. 
Annex 4 provides a detailed analysis of available funds and their use.
That shows that out of the total available funds of ECU 40,9 million, ECU 33,3 million was disbursed, leaving ECU 7,6 million unused at 31 December 1994. 
That shows that out of the total available funds of ECU 40,9 million, ECU 33,3 million was disbursed, leaving ECU 7,6 million unused at 31 December 1994.
This amount, which represented almost 20 % of the Commission's payments to ARTM, was well in excess of the cash requirements for the programmes. 
This amount, which represented almost 20 % of the Commission's payments to ARTM, was well in excess of the cash requirements for the programmes.
Cost of managing the system 61. 
Cost of managing the system 61.
Annex 4 also shows that, of the ECU 33,3 million paid out by ARTM, only ECU 26,9 million (80,8%) was contributions to projects. 
Annex 4 also shows that, of the ECU 33,3 million paid out by ARTM, only ECU 26,9 million (80,8%) was contributions to projects.
The rest was used to pay for the services of ARTM itself (ECU 1,3 million) and the TAO's (ECU 3,7 million) and to finance committees (ECU 0,3 million), conferences (ECU 0,1 million ) and evaluations (ECU 0,5 million). 
The rest was used to pay for the services of ARTM itself (ECU 1,3 million) and the TAO's (ECU 3,7 million) and to finance committees (ECU 0,3 million), conferences (ECU 0,1 million ) and evaluations (ECU 0,5 million).
Another ECU 0,2 million for other costs and ECU 0,3 million for financing costs aire overheads. 
Another ECU 0,2 million for other costs and ECU 0,3 million for financing costs aire overheads.
These items, representing the costs necessary for the management of the programmes, total ECU 6,4 million, i.e. more than 19% of funds actually used. 
These items, representing the costs necessary for the management of the programmes, total ECU 6,4 million, i.e. more than 19% of funds actually used.
These costs of actually managing the programmes do not include expenditure specific to the functioning of each of the networks subsidized. 
These costs of actually managing the programmes do not include expenditure specific to the functioning of each of the networks subsidized.
Checks in respect of the ARTM's finan¬ cial data 62. 
Checks in respect of the ARTM's finan¬ cial data 62.
The progress reports sent by the ARTM to the Commission are not based directly on its accounts but are drawn up on the basis of non-accounting data compiled from spreadsheets kept on computer by ARTM staff. > 63. , These nòn-accounting documents do not comply with the rules for submitting information which were observed in' respect of the keeping of the ARTM's accounts by an independent expert. 
The progress reports sent by the ARTM to the Commission are not based directly on its accounts but are drawn up on the basis of non-accounting data compiled from spreadsheets kept on computer by ARTM staff. > 63. , These nòn-accounting documents do not comply with the rules for submitting information which were observed in' respect of the keeping of the ARTM's accounts by an independent expert.
The Court drew attention to a number of discrepancies between these two sources which should be analysed and regularly justified. 
The Court drew attention to a number of discrepancies between these two sources which should be analysed and regularly justified.
The Court was unable to find any evidence that these comparisons had been made either by the ARTM or the Commission. 
The Court was unable to find any evidence that these comparisons had been made either by the ARTM or the Commission.
Regularity from the point of view of budgetary principles Administrative expenditure covered by operating appropriations 64. 
Regularity from the point of view of budgetary principles Administrative expenditure covered by operating appropriations 64.
Although it is irregular, entrusting the administrative and financial management of the MED programmes to the Rate of implementation of the budget 58. . 
Although it is irregular, entrusting the administrative and financial management of the MED programmes to the Rate of implementation of the budget 58. .
An analysis of the utilization of the appropriations under budget heading Β 7-4 0 8 0, which was introduced into the budget by Regulation (EEC) No 1763/92, shows that, on ' 31 December 1994, a total of-ECU. 
An analysis of the utilization of the appropriations under budget heading Β 7-4 0 8 0, which was introduced into the budget by Regulation (EEC) No 1763/92, shows that, on ' 31 December 1994, a total of-ECU.
169,7 million was committed, on the basis of which ECU 62,4 million was disbursed. 
169,7 million was committed, on the basis of which ECU 62,4 million was disbursed.