natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
That reason alone should have sufficed for it to question, if not the legality then, at least, the validity of the delegation of powers to ARTM. 
That reason alone should have sufficed for it to question, if not the legality then, at least, the validity of the delegation of powers to ARTM.
The fact that the project coordinators signed contracts containing clauses with which they could not 'comply can undoubtedly be explained partly by the probable unenforceability of the choice of. the Brussels civil court as the court to which any disputes are to be referred. 
The fact that the project coordinators signed contracts containing clauses with which they could not 'comply can undoubtedly be explained partly by the probable unenforceability of the choice of. the Brussels civil court as the court to which any disputes are to be referred.
In fact, it is not clear whether that court is competent to deal with contracts which concern the implementation of a Commu¬ nity policy where the parties to the contract may include a public-law body in a member country of the European Union. 
In fact, it is not clear whether that court is competent to deal with contracts which concern the implementation of a Commu¬ nity policy where the parties to the contract may include a public-law body in a member country of the European Union.
Weakness of the financial control system 128. 
Weakness of the financial control system 128.
Apart from the unreliability of the financial information that has been discussed above, there was another major weakness in ARTM's financial monitoring. 
Apart from the unreliability of the financial information that has been discussed above, there was another major weakness in ARTM's financial monitoring.
It is essentially based on a comparison of the expenditure statements forwarded by the network coordinator and the budget documents annexed to the contracts. 
It is essentially based on a comparison of the expenditure statements forwarded by the network coordinator and the budget documents annexed to the contracts.
The two sets of documents have been structured in a way which makes such comparison easy. 
The two sets of documents have been structured in a way which makes such comparison easy.
In fact, in the absence of the supporting documents for the amounts of expenditure shown, the comparison can be used only to form an opinion of their plausibility and cannot be used to establish their existence or accuracy. 
In fact, in the absence of the supporting documents for the amounts of expenditure shown, the comparison can be used only to form an opinion of their plausibility and cannot be used to establish their existence or accuracy.
The limits of BAT monitoring 129. 
The limits of BAT monitoring 129.
The objective of the. 
The objective of the.
BATs' involvement was twofold: to assist the networks and to provide the Commission with information concerning the progress 'of projects. 
BATs' involvement was twofold: to assist the networks and to provide the Commission with information concerning the progress 'of projects.
From this point, of view, the overall results achieved are mediocre given their cost, although there is some slight variation between programmes. 
From this point, of view, the overall results achieved are mediocre given their cost, although there is some slight variation between programmes.
On the other hand, the quality of monitoring for the MED-Avicenne programmes, which is carried out directly by the Commission, is high. university year. 
On the other hand, the quality of monitoring for the MED-Avicenne programmes, which is carried out directly by the Commission, is high. university year.
The management tools Impossibility of tract clauses . . , applying important con¬ 1 24. 
The management tools Impossibility of tract clauses . . , applying important con¬ 1 24.
As reported above, the contractual clauses on which ARTM wished to construct its monitoring system have not been generally respected by the networks. 
As reported above, the contractual clauses on which ARTM wished to construct its monitoring system have not been generally respected by the networks.
The explanation for this lies less in any lack of goodwill on the part of the managers than in the legal impossibility of complying with them on account of prohibitions imposed by national legislation. 
The explanation for this lies less in any lack of goodwill on the part of the managers than in the legal impossibility of complying with them on account of prohibitions imposed by national legislation.
However, the coordinators cannot be exonerated completely, because the audit visits showed that they were fully aware of this conflict of legislation and, therefore, of the impossibility of complying with the clauses in question. 
However, the coordinators cannot be exonerated completely, because the audit visits showed that they were fully aware of this conflict of legislation and, therefore, of the impossibility of complying with the clauses in question.
However, not only did that not prevent them from signing 
However, not only did that not prevent them from signing
96 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/19 130. 
96 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/19 130.
The terms of reference of the contracts concluded with the BATS do not include any obligation to assess the justification for the sums which are the subject 'of refund applications. 
The terms of reference of the contracts concluded with the BATS do not include any obligation to assess the justification for the sums which are the subject 'of refund applications.
CONCLUSIONS 131. 
CONCLUSIONS 131.
The system for the administration and management of the MED programmes was established with insufficient analysis by the various services of the Commission of what could be done within the existing regulatory framework, and without examining properly the implications of what was being proposed. 
The system for the administration and management of the MED programmes was established with insufficient analysis by the various services of the Commission of what could be done within the existing regulatory framework, and without examining properly the implications of what was being proposed.
Thus, basic administrative procedures of the Commission which are designed to ensure that an irregular situation is avoided failed to function correctly (paragraphs 39 to 45). 
Thus, basic administrative procedures of the Commission which are designed to ensure that an irregular situation is avoided failed to function correctly (paragraphs 39 to 45).
The structure and procedures of the Commission to oversee and monitor the implementation of the MED programmes, and to exercise control over their decentralized administration, were inadequate and deficient. 
The structure and procedures of the Commission to oversee and monitor the implementation of the MED programmes, and to exercise control over their decentralized administration, were inadequate and deficient.
In part, this was because insufficient resources were available for the formulated, managed and implemented. 
In part, this was because insufficient resources were available for the formulated, managed and implemented.
The Court is, therefore, pleased to note that, in response to the Court's findings, the Commission intends to take a number of measures which would go in this direction. 
The Court is, therefore, pleased to note that, in response to the Court's findings, the Commission intends to take a number of measures which would go in this direction.
New programmes or instruments should not, be undertaken until adequate resources are available for their management and the structures and procedures for their implementation have been properly evaluated. 
New programmes or instruments should not, be undertaken until adequate resources are available for their management and the structures and procedures for their implementation have been properly evaluated.
The Commission must ensure that it does not give to external organizations called upon to assist in the implementation of a programme functions and responsibili¬ ties which it should exercise itself: in particular, the Commission must remain responsible for the execution of the programmés and the budgetary resources devoted to them, and recourse to external organizations should not lead to a loss of control. 
The Commission must ensure that it does not give to external organizations called upon to assist in the implementation of a programme functions and responsibili¬ ties which it should exercise itself: in particular, the Commission must remain responsible for the execution of the programmés and the budgetary resources devoted to them, and recourse to external organizations should not lead to a loss of control.
Considerable strengthening in the concept and status of the networks is necessary if the implementation of projects is to be improved. 
Considerable strengthening in the concept and status of the networks is necessary if the implementation of projects is to be improved.
The obligations of the members of the networks should be defined in a contract, and their respect should be a condition for the granting of funds to networks. 
The obligations of the members of the networks should be defined in a contract, and their respect should be a condition for the granting of funds to networks.
Generally, networks should have a legal personality and financial autonomy so that a specific bank account and financial accounts can be maintained, with full supporting documentation. 
Generally, networks should have a legal personality and financial autonomy so that a specific bank account and financial accounts can be maintained, with full supporting documentation.
Provision should be made to ensure that the accounts of all the organizations involved at all levels in the implementation of the programmes are audited annually by independent external audit bodies, whether from the private sector or from the public sector. · 143. 
Provision should be made to ensure that the accounts of all the organizations involved at all levels in the implementation of the programmes are audited annually by independent external audit bodies, whether from the private sector or from the public sector. · 143.
The Commission needs to examine more closely the question of the longer-term viability of the networks. 
The Commission needs to examine more closely the question of the longer-term viability of the networks.
In this regard, the Commission should decide clearly whether or not to maintain the principle of co-financing, and if it decides to maintain it, to ensure that it applies to real co-financing, with the effective payment of funds allocated by the members of the networks. 
In this regard, the Commission should decide clearly whether or not to maintain the principle of co-financing, and if it decides to maintain it, to ensure that it applies to real co-financing, with the effective payment of funds allocated by the members of the networks.
As regards the implementation of the MED programmes, the Court noted the Commission's inability to complete its tasks with the resources, in particular,in terms of staff, available to the departments concerned. 
As regards the implementation of the MED programmes, the Court noted the Commission's inability to complete its tasks with the resources, in particular,in terms of staff, available to the departments concerned.
Conse¬ quently, the Court can only reiterate the recommendation it made in the conclusions to Chapter 10 of the Annual Report concerning the financial year 1994('); the Commission should '... state whether it believes it has adequate human resources to cope with its obligations without systematically entrusting to third parties or staff not subject to the Staff (') Paragraph 10.70 of Chapter 10 'Measures in favour of the countries of central and eastern Europe, the newly independent States (former Soviet Union) and Mongolia'. task. 
Conse¬ quently, the Court can only reiterate the recommendation it made in the conclusions to Chapter 10 of the Annual Report concerning the financial year 1994('); the Commission should '... state whether it believes it has adequate human resources to cope with its obligations without systematically entrusting to third parties or staff not subject to the Staff (') Paragraph 10.70 of Chapter 10 'Measures in favour of the countries of central and eastern Europe, the newly independent States (former Soviet Union) and Mongolia'. task.
133. implementation of the MED programmes which, the Commission failed to put án end to in a timely manner (paragraphs 50 to 57). 
133. implementation of the MED programmes which, the Commission failed to put án end to in a timely manner (paragraphs 50 to 57).
The risks of such situations arising were evident from, the outset and should have led the Commission to call the system itself into question. 
The risks of such situations arising were evident from, the outset and should have led the Commission to call the system itself into question.
134. .There was. excessive recourse to private-treaty contracts, without proper tendering. 
134. .There was. excessive recourse to private-treaty contracts, without proper tendering.
Private-treaty contracts have permeated the whole structure. of the MED pro¬ grammes. 
Private-treaty contracts have permeated the whole structure. of the MED pro¬ grammes.
This was one of the elements contributing to the development of conflicts of interest referred to above' (paragraphs 46 to 49). 
This was one of the elements contributing to the development of conflicts of interest referred to above' (paragraphs 46 to 49).
At all levels of the financial management of the MED programmes there are serious shortcomings and irregularities (paragraphs 62 to 63; 64 to 80). 
At all levels of the financial management of the MED programmes there are serious shortcomings and irregularities (paragraphs 62 to 63; 64 to 80).
At the level of network coordinators and the projects themselves, basic requirements of proper financial manage¬ ment and control of public funds were frequently, not respected, and many of the conditions in. the contracts between the Commission, ARTM and the network coordi¬ nators have not been respected in part because they are inapplicable under the terms of national law (paragraphs 87 to 108 and 124 to 127). .'.·· 137. 
At the level of network coordinators and the projects themselves, basic requirements of proper financial manage¬ ment and control of public funds were frequently, not respected, and many of the conditions in. the contracts between the Commission, ARTM and the network coordi¬ nators have not been respected in part because they are inapplicable under the terms of national law (paragraphs 87 to 108 and 124 to 127). .'.·· 137.
On the basis of the data currently available and its own observations in the field, the Court considers that the impact of the MED programmes remains to be proven. 
On the basis of the data currently available and its own observations in the field, the Court considers that the impact of the MED programmes remains to be proven.
RECOMMENDATIONS Serious confusions of interest developed 'in the The Commission should take immediate action to 138. redesign the manner in which these programmes are 
RECOMMENDATIONS Serious confusions of interest developed 'in the The Commission should take immediate action to 138. redesign the manner in which these programmes are
No C 240/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 8. 
No C 240/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19. 8.
96 Regulations tasks that should be executed by a public service body'. 
96 Regulations tasks that should be executed by a public service body'.
Furthermore, the Court must draw the Budgetary Authority's attention to the dangers to the sound use of public funds and the legislation of the Community (and sometimes of the Member States) posed by the gap which has widened between the volume and the complexity of the work needed to implement the policies which the Commission, through DG IB, must manage and the resources placed at its disposal. 
Furthermore, the Court must draw the Budgetary Authority's attention to the dangers to the sound use of public funds and the legislation of the Community (and sometimes of the Member States) posed by the gap which has widened between the volume and the complexity of the work needed to implement the policies which the Commission, through DG IB, must manage and the resources placed at its disposal.
This point should be taken into account in the context of the considerable increase in the funds allocated to the Mediterranean non-member States as part of the MED programmes. 
This point should be taken into account in the context of the considerable increase in the funds allocated to the Mediterranean non-member States as part of the MED programmes.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 30 May 1996. - For the Court of Auditors Bernhard FRIEDMANN President 
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 30 May 1996. - For the Court of Auditors Bernhard FRIEDMANN President
19. 8. 96 ΓΕΤΓ Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/21 ANNEX 1 NEW MEDITERRANEAN POLICY COOPERATION CONCERNING ALL MEDITERRANEAN NON-MEMBER STATES Area of intervention 1. 
19. 8. 96 ΓΕΤΓ Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/21 ANNEX 1 NEW MEDITERRANEAN POLICY COOPERATION CONCERNING ALL MEDITERRANEAN NON-MEMBER STATES Area of intervention 1.
Environment 1.1. 
Environment 1.1.
Interest rate subsidies (EIB loans) 1.2. 
Interest rate subsidies (EIB loans) 1.2.
Imphos-Decad. 
Imphos-Decad.
IEE training 1.4. 
IEE training 1.4.
Decentralized cooperation 2.1. 
Decentralized cooperation 2.1.
MED-Campus 2.4. 
MED-Campus 2.4.
MED-Avicenne 2.7. 
MED-Avicenne 2.7.
Others - 3. 
Others - 3.
Regional cooperation 3.1. 
Regional cooperation 3.1.
Framework contract 3.2. 
Framework contract 3.2.
Demography 3.3. 
Demography 3.3.
Risk capital 3.5. 
Risk capital 3.5.
Micro-measures/studies 3.6. 
Micro-measures/studies 3.6.
Peace process 4. 
Peace process 4.
Transferred 5. 
Transferred 5.
Not committed Source: Commission. 
Not committed Source: Commission.
Total 2 Total 3 Grand total Budget heading B7-4080 Total 1 Commitments (million ECU) 20. 
Total 2 Total 3 Grand total Budget heading B7-4080 Total 1 Commitments (million ECU) 20.
(') Source: ARTM. 
(') Source: ARTM.
Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General for External Economic Relations (DG I) ARTM Agency for Trans-Mediterranean Networks Signing of contracts Payments and management checks ANNEX 2 THEORETICAL MANAGEMENT DIAGRAM(') z o η ρ N> m Ζ o 3 o c 3 pi rr m c O α Ρ 3 η o 3 3 c 3 oo 
Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General for External Economic Relations (DG I) ARTM Agency for Trans-Mediterranean Networks Signing of contracts Payments and management checks ANNEX 2 THEORETICAL MANAGEMENT DIAGRAM(') z o η ρ N> m Ζ o 3 o c 3 pi rr m c O α Ρ 3 η o 3 3 c 3 oo
96 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/23 Bodies ARTM Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 others Total Ismeri Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Total FERE Contract 1 Contract 2 J V Total CCRE Contract 1 Contract 2 . 
96 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 240/23 Bodies ARTM Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 others Total Ismeri Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Total FERE Contract 1 Contract 2 J V Total CCRE Contract 1 Contract 2 .
Total TVE Contract 1 Procedure (private treaty/ call for tenders ) Private treaty Private treaty Call for tenders A Call for tenders Β Date signed 12. 
Total TVE Contract 1 Procedure (private treaty/ call for tenders ) Private treaty Private treaty Call for tenders A Call for tenders Β Date signed 12.
1994 1.9.1994 6. 
1994 1.9.1994 6.
1994 Period covered' 15.6.1994 15. 
1994 Period covered' 15.6.1994 15.
1994 15.4.1995 15. 
1994 15.4.1995 15.
1995 1992-1993 1994 1995 1992-1993 1994-1995 1994 1995 1993-1994 Programmes covered Amount (in ECU) 159 250 47 785 '406 695 312 150 925 880 - 748 900 619 800 720 000 2 088 700 547 750 592 900 1 140650 Total Source: Court of Auditors. , . 
1995 1992-1993 1994 1995 1992-1993 1994-1995 1994 1995 1993-1994 Programmes covered Amount (in ECU) 159 250 47 785 '406 695 312 150 925 880 - 748 900 619 800 720 000 2 088 700 547 750 592 900 1 140650 Total Source: Court of Auditors. , .
479 617 549 990 029 607 300 300 ' 300 300 ANNEX 3 INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGING THE NETWORKS 21.12.1992 1.1994 Renewal 1.1995 Private treaty ' Call for tenders '-·.'·· Private treaty Call for tenders Call for tenders , Renewal Private treaty 14. 
479 617 549 990 029 607 300 300 ' 300 300 ANNEX 3 INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTATION CONCERNING CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MANAGING THE NETWORKS 21.12.1992 1.1994 Renewal 1.1995 Private treaty ' Call for tenders '-·.'·· Private treaty Call for tenders Call for tenders , Renewal Private treaty 14.
1992 23.11.1994 11.2.1994 Under way 15. 
1992 23.11.1994 11.2.1994 Under way 15.
1993 ' MED-Urbs MED-Invest MED-Urbs MED-Urbs MED-Media . ' 
1993 ' MED-Urbs MED-Invest MED-Urbs MED-Urbs MED-Media . '
MED management MED management MED management MED management MED-Campus MED-Campus MED-Campus : - . 1 
MED management MED management MED management MED management MED-Campus MED-Campus MED-Campus : - . 1
Receipts Paid by Commission Received by ARTM Interest generated Available ARTM Direct payments Total available Uses Project payments Paid via reserve Project reimburse¬ ments Project contributions Overhead costs ARTM Via overall contract Via contrat de gestione) TAO Paid by ARTM Paid by reserve account 96% 2% 2% 94% 1 % -5% 5 967 768 5 967 768 53 535 6 021303 168 550 6189 853 4 734 575 81 156 271 394 4 544 337 206 484 180000 26 484 769 018 653 559 115 459 96% 1% 3% 92% 5% 3% 3 528 000 3 528 000 77 929 3 605 929 3 605 929 1592472 1592 472 93 448 30 000 63 448 98% 2% 0% 93% 1% 5% 557 539 51847 3 - Total 39 228 640 39 126 486C) 707 900 39 936 540 977 324 40913 864 27 184490 89 002 376582 26 896910 1311 136 701 750 609 386 3 731297 2 663 246 334 503 Urbs 1 5 177 496 5 177 496 63 680 5 241 176 292 660 5 533 836 3 904002 7 846 41 188 3 870 660 162 258 137 500 24 758 825 820 477 905 55 255 Campus 1 Invest 6500000 6 500 000 350 133 6 850 133 187 500 7 037 633 2 600 943 2 600943 150901 149000 1901 . 
Receipts Paid by Commission Received by ARTM Interest generated Available ARTM Direct payments Total available Uses Project payments Paid via reserve Project reimburse¬ ments Project contributions Overhead costs ARTM Via overall contract Via contrat de gestione) TAO Paid by ARTM Paid by reserve account 96% 2% 2% 94% 1 % -5% 5 967 768 5 967 768 53 535 6 021303 168 550 6189 853 4 734 575 81 156 271 394 4 544 337 206 484 180000 26 484 769 018 653 559 115 459 96% 1% 3% 92% 5% 3% 3 528 000 3 528 000 77 929 3 605 929 3 605 929 1592472 1592 472 93 448 30 000 63 448 98% 2% 0% 93% 1% 5% 557 539 51847 3 - Total 39 228 640 39 126 486C) 707 900 39 936 540 977 324 40913 864 27 184490 89 002 376582 26 896910 1311 136 701 750 609 386 3 731297 2 663 246 334 503 Urbs 1 5 177 496 5 177 496 63 680 5 241 176 292 660 5 533 836 3 904002 7 846 41 188 3 870 660 162 258 137 500 24 758 825 820 477 905 55 255 Campus 1 Invest 6500000 6 500 000 350 133 6 850 133 187 500 7 037 633 2 600 943 2 600943 150901 149000 1901 .