natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Under that distribution they obtained payment of 39% of the acknowledged debts owed to them by DAI.
Selle jagamise käigus rahuldati tema vastuvõetud nõuetest DAI suhtes 39%.
By letter of 22 January 1996 the Cantine called on AIMA to honour the debts owed to them by DAI, contending that AIMA had benefited from unjust enrichment through receipt of the security provided by Assedile.
Cantine palus 22. jaanuari 1996. aasta kirjas AIMA-l täita oma nõuded DAI suhtes, väites, et AIMA oli Assedile seatud garantii omandamisega alusetult rikastunud.
AIMA rejected that complaint, pointing out that it was entitled to the security and that the producers had no right
AIMA jättis selle kaebuse rahuldamata, märkides, et garantii kuulus talle ja et tootjad ei saa tema vastu esitada mingit otsest hagi, et rahuldataks nende nõudeid DAI vastu.
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS to bring a direct action against it for payment of the debts owed to them by DAI.
KOMISJON VS. CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA JT
On 16 February 1996, the Cantine brought an action before the Tribunale civile di Cagliari (Civil District Court, Cagliari) (Italy), against AIMA on the ground of unjust enrichment, which was, however, subsequently stayed in order to enable the parties to reach an amicable agreement.
Cantine esitas 16. veebruaril 1996 Tribunale civile di Cagliari’le (Itaalia) alusetu rikastumise tuvastamise hagi AIMA vastu; siiski peatati see menetlus hiljem, et lahendada vaidlus poolte vahel kohtuväliselt.
On 13 November 1996 the Cantine lodged a complaint with the Commission in which they alleged that AIMA had infringed Community legislation, in particular Regulation No 2499/82, and requested the Commission, inter alia, to call on AIMA and the Italian Republic to pay them the amounts which they had not received by way of Community aid for the 1982/1983 wine year.
Cantine esitas 13. novembril 1996 kaebuse komisjonile, milles ta väitis, et AIMA rikkus väidetavalt ühenduse õigusnorme, eeskätt määrust nr 2499/82, ja palus komisjonilt eelkõige nõuda AIMA-lt ja Itaalia Vabariigilt nende summade hüvitamist Cantinele, mida ta ei olnud ühenduse abina veiniaasta 1982/1983 eest saanud.
By letter of 25 June 1997, the Commission indicated to the Cantine that Assedile had paid the amount of security provided by it, plus interest, to AIMA on 16 January 1990.
Komisjon märkis 25. juuni 1997. aasta kirjas Cantinele, et Assedile tasus garantii summa koos intressidega AIMA-le 16. jaanuaril 1990.
Subsequently, by letter of 8 December 1997, it informed them of the fact that AIMA had redeemed that security in February 1991 and had entered that amount into the accounts of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) in the course of the 1991 financial year.
Seejärel teatas komisjon Cantinele 8. detsembri 1997. aasta kirjas, et AIMA oli saanud selle garantii summa 1991. aasta veebruaris ja et ta oli kandnud selle summa raamatupidamisse Euroopa Põllumajanduse Arendus- ja Tagatisfondi (edaspidi „EPATF”) kasuks eelarveaastal 1991.
By letter of 23 January 1998, which reached the Commission on 5 February 1998, the Cantine requested the Commission to pay them the sum corresponding to the amount of the debts owed to them by DAI on the ground that the security acquired by AIMA had been refunded to the EAGGF.
23. jaanuari 1998. aasta kirjas, mis laekus komisjonile 5. veebruaril 1998, taotles Cantine, et see institutsioon tasuks talle summa, mis vastab tema nõuetele DAI suhtes, kuna AIMA saadud garantii tagastati EPATF-ile.
They argued that it was clear from the purpose of Regulation No 2499/82, which was to benefit wine producers, that the latter should be regarded as the actual and sole recipients of the aid provided for in that regulation.
Ta väitis, et veinitootjate toetuseks vastuvõetud määruse nr 2499/82 eesmärgist ilmneb, et veinitootjad tuleb lugeda tegelikeks ja ainsateks selles määruses sätestatud abi saajateks.
By letter of 31 July 1998, signed by the Director-General of the Commission’s Dir -ectorate-General for Agriculture, which reached the Cantine on 14 August 1998, the Commission rejected that request.
Komisjon jättis selle taotluse rahuldamata komisjoni põllumajanduse peadirektoraadi peadirektori allkirja kandvas 31. juuli 1998. aasta kirjas, mille Cantine sai kätte 14. augustil 1998.
It maintained that, in the present case, the aid was primarily for the benefit of the distiller in order to enable it to offset the high buyingin price of the wine.
Ta väitis, et käesoleval juhul on abi esmaseks saajaks destilleerija, kellele hüvitatakse veini kõrge ostuhind.
The security was provided by Assedile for the benefit of AIMA, and the producers could not claim any rights to that security.
Garantii seati Assediles AIMA kasuks ja tootjad ei saa pretendeerida mingile osale sellest summast.
In that letter, the Commission also pointed out that the approval by AIMA of the contracts entered into between the Cantine and DAI did not alter the private-law nature of those contracts, with the result that the Commission’s alleged obligations towards the applicants were of a noncontractual nature.
Samas kirjas märgib komisjon lisaks, et Cantine ja DAI vahel sõlmitud lepingute tunnustamine AIMA poolt ei muuda nende lepingute eraõiguslikku laadi, nii et komisjoni väidetavad kohustused Cantine suhtes on lepinguvälist laadi.
Consequently, any action against the Community was henceforth timebarred, under Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, as the amount of the security provided by Assedile was paid to AIMA on 16 January 1990 and refunded to the EAGGF during the 1991 financial year.
Seetõttu on igasugune hagi Euroopa Ühenduse vastu Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artikli 46 alusel aegunud, kuna Assedile seatud garantii tasuti AIMA-le 16. jaanuaril 1990 ja tagastati EPATF-ile eelarveaastal 1991.
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 12 October 1998, the Cantine brought an action seeking, first, annulment of the Commission’s letter of 31 July 1998 under Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 230 EC), second, a declaration that the Commission’s failure to adopt a decision regarding the grant of the Community aid to the Cantine which should have been paid to them by DAI was an unlawful failure to act contrary to Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now Article 232 EC) and, third, an order that the Commission pay to the Cantine, on the ground of unjust enrichment and/or pursuant to Article 178 of the EC Treaty (now Article 235 EC), compensation equivalent to the outstanding amounts owed to them by DAI.
Cantine esitas 12. oktoobril 1998 Esimese Astme Kohtu kantseleisse hagi, milles ta palus esiteks komisjoni tühistada 31. juuli 1998. aasta kiri EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 173 (muudetuna EÜ artikkel 230)¹ alusel; teiseks tuvastada, et see institutsioon on toime pannud EÜ asutamislepingu artiklit 175 (nüüd EÜ artikkel 232) rikkuva tegevusetuse, mis seisnes selles, et see institutsioon ei võtnud vastu otsust seoses Cantinele antava ühenduse abiga, mille DAI oleks pidanud talle tasuma, ja kolmandaks tuvastada, et komisjon on alusetult rikastunud, ja/või kohustada komisjoni EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 178 (nüüd EÜ artikkel 235) alusel maksma talle hüvitist summas, mis vastab tema rahuldamata nõuetele DAI suhtes.
The Commission contended that the action should be dismissed as being inadmissible and, in the alternative, as unfounded.
Komisjon palus jätta hagi vastuvõetamatuse tõttu läbi vaatamata ja teise võimalusena põhjendamatuse tõttu rahuldamata.
By the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance, in paragraphs 80 and 83 thereof respectively, dismissed as inadmissible the Cantines’ requests for annulment of the Commission’s letter of 31 July 1998 and for a declaration that the Commission had unlawfully failed to act.
Vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 80 jättis Esimese Astme Kohus vastuvõetamatuse tõttu läbi vaatamata Cantine taotluse komisjoni 31. juuli 1998. aasta kirja tühistamiseks ja punktis 83 taotluse institutsiooni tegevusetuse tuvastamiseks.
It also rejected, in paragraph 84 of that judgment, the request that the Court find against the Commission on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Selle kohtuotsuse punktis 84 lükkas Esimese Astme Kohus vastuvõetamatuse tõttu tagasi taotluse mõista komisjonilt välja alusetu rikastumise alusel saadu.
On the other hand, the Court of First Instance found, in paragraph 150 of the judgment under appeal, that the claim for compensation under Article 235 EC was admissible and held, in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the judgment, that ‘[t]he Commission is required to make good the damage sustained by the [Cantine] following the bankruptcy of [DAI], as a result of the absence of a procedure that would guarantee, under the system introduced by Article 9 of Regulation [No 2499/82], payment to the producers concerned of the Community aid provided for in that regulation.’
Seevastu leidis Esimese Astme Kohus vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 150, et EÜ artikli 235 alusel esitatud kahju hüvitamise taotlus on vastuvõetav, ja kuulutas selle kohtuotsuse resolutiivosa punktis 1, et „[k]omisjon peab hüvitama [Cantinele] kahju, mis tekkis pärast [DAI] pankrotti, kuna määruse […] nr 2499/82 […] artik -li 9 alusel kehtestatud korra alusel ei nähtud ette mehhanismi, mis tagaks asjaomastele tootjatele selles määruses sätestatud ühenduse abi maksmise”.
In particular, with regard to the admissibility of the claim under Article 235 EC, the Court of First Instance, in the context of the plea raised by the Commission alleging that the proceedings against the Community for noncontractual liability were timebarred, first stated, in paragraph 129 of the judgment under appeal, that the limitation period laid down by Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice could not begin to run before all the requirements governing the obligation to make good the damage had been satisfied, namely the existence of unlawful conduct on the part of the Community institutions, the fact of the damage alleged and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damage claimed.
Mis puudutab EÜ artikli 235 alusel esitatud taotluse vastuvõetamatust, siis meenutas Esimese Astme Kohus esmalt vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 129 seoses komisjoni väitega, mis tulenes ühenduse lepinguvälise kahju hüvitamise hagi aegumisest, et Euroopa Kohtu kodukorra artiklis 46 sätestatud aegumistähtaeg saab hakata kulgema üksnes siis, kui on täidetud kõik kahju hüvitamise kohustuse tingimused, milleks on ühenduse institutsioonide õigusvastane käitumine, kahju olemasolu ning selle käitumise ja kahju vahelise põhjusliku seose olemasolu.
The Court of First Instance then stated, in paragraph 130 of the judgment under appeal, that in cases in which the Community’s liability stemmed from a legislative measure, as in this instance, the limitation period could not begin to run before the injurious effects of the measure had been produced and hence before the time at which the persons concerned had suffered certain damage.
Esimese Astme Kohus täpsustas seejärel nimetatud kohtuotsuse punktis 130, et sellistes olukordades nagu käesolevas asjas, kus ühenduse vastutus tuleneb õigustloovast aktist, hakkab aegumistähtaeg kulgema üksnes siis, kui selle akti kahju tekitavad tagajärjed on tekkinud, ja seega hetkest, kui huvitatud isikutele on tekkinud konkreetne kahju.
The Court of First Instance then held, in paragraph 131 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the case under examination, the limitation period had begun to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid had been suffered for certain by the Cantine.
Siis leidis Esimese Astme Kohus vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 131, et käesolevas asjas hakkas aegumistähtaeg kulgema hetkest, kui hagejad kogesid ühenduse abi täieliku või osalise maksmatajätmise tagajärgi konkreetselt.
It observed, in paragraph 132 thereof, that it was not disputed in the case that the last deliveries of wine by the Cantine took place in March 1983 and that DAI should have paid them the minimum buyingin price for wine under Article 9(1) of Regulation No 2499/82 not later than 90 days after the entry of the wine into the distillery, that is to say, not later than the end of June 1983.
Ta märkis selle kohtuotsuse punktis 132, et käesolevas asjas ei olnud vaidlust selles, et Cantine viimased veinitarned toimusid 1983. aasta märtsis ja et DAI oleks pidanud selle määruse nr 2499/82 artikli 9 lõike 1 alusel maksma neile veini minimaalse ostuhinna hiljemalt 90 päeva pärast veini jõudmist piiritusetehasesse, st hiljemalt 1983. aasta juuni lõpuks.
In paragraph 133 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held, however, that, in the specific circumstances of the case, the damage suffered by the Cantine at the end of June 1983 due to the total or partial absence of payment of the minimum buyingin price within the timelimit laid down could not be regarded as being certain, that is to say, imminent and foreseeable from that date on.
Vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 133 leidis Esimese Astme Kohus siiski, et selle vaidluse asjaolude juures ei saa hagejatele 1983. aasta juuni lõpus tekkinud kahju, mis tulenes minimaalse ostuhinna täielikust või osalisest maksmatajätmisest ettenähtud tähtajal, lugeda sellel kuupäeval konkreetseks, st vahetuks ja ootuspäraseks.
The Court of First Instance added, in paragraphs 136 and 145 of the judgment under appeal, that, in order to assess whether damage was certain, it was necessary to take account of the proceedings brought by DAI before the Italian courts specifically concerning the fate of the security provided by Assedile, in light of the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 and the exceptional circumstances of the case, in which it was extremely difficult for a prudent and wellinformed economic operator to be certain, before the outcome of those proceedings, that he could not obtain payment of the aid concerned by means of that security before a national court.
Esimese Astme Kohus lisas vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktides 136 ja 145, et kahju konkreetsuse hindamisel tuleb arvesse võtta menetlusi, mis DAI algatas Itaalia kohtutes ja mis käsitlevad täpsemalt Assedile seatud garantii saatust, võttes arvesse määrusega nr 2499/82 kehtestatud süsteemi keerukust ja käesoleva juhtumi erakorralisi asjaolusid, mille puhul oli ettevaatlikul ja mõistlikul ettevõtjal väga raske enne nende menetluste lõppemist saada teadlikuks sellest, et talle ei maksta siseriiklikus kohtus garantii vahendusel kõnealust abi.
In paragraph 146 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that, in the case before it, the beneficiary of the security provided by Assedile was not finally decided by the national courts until after the Corte suprema di Cassazione had delivered its judgment on 28 November 1994 and that, therefore, the damage suffered by the Cantine could not have been certain before that date.
Vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 146 leidis Esimese Astme Kohus, et käesolevas asjas tuvastasid siseriiklikud kohtud lõplikult garantii saaja alles pärast Corte suprema di cassazione 28. novembri 1994. aasta otsust ja et seega muutus Cantinele tekkinud kahju konkreetseks alles pärast seda kuupäeva.
The Court of First Instance concluded, in paragraph 147 of the judgment under appeal, that the fiveyear limitation period provided for in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice could not have begun to run before 28 November 1994, with the result that the action under Article 235 EC brought in 1998 could not be considered to be out of time.
Esimese Astme Kohus leidis selle kohtuotsuse punktis 147, et Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 kehtestatud viieaastane aegumistähtaeg ei saanud hakata kulgema enne 28. novembrit 1994, seega ei saanud EÜ artikli 235 alusel 1998. aastal esitatud taotlust lugeda hilinenult esitatuks.
It therefore stated, in paragraph 148 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission’s plea that the action was timebarred had to be dismissed and, in paragraph 150 of that judgment, ruled that the claim for compensation was admissible.
Seetõttu leidis Esimese Astme Kohus vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 148, et komisjoni esitatud väide hagi aegumisest tuleb tagasi lükata, ja selle kohtuotsuse punktis 150, et kahju hüvitamise taotlus on vastuvõetav.
Forms of order sought before the Court of Justice
Poolte nõuded Euroopa Kohtus
— set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it upholds the claim for compensation against it;
– tühistada vaidlustatud kohtuotsus osas, milles sellega rahuldatakse tema vastu esitatud kahju hüvitamise hagi;
— by giving final judgment in the matter, dismiss the appeal as inadmissible; and
– teha vaidluses lõplik otsus jätta hagi vastuvõetamatuse tõttu läbi vaatamata ja
— order the Cantine to pay the costs of the present proceedings and of those incurred before the Court of First Instance.
– mõista käesoleva menetluse ja Esimese Astme Kohtus toimunud menetluse kohtukulud välja Cantinelt.
The Cantine contend that the Court should:
Cantine palub Euroopa Kohtul:
— dismiss the appeal;
– lükata apellatsioonkaebus vastuvõetamatuse tõttu tagasi;
— in the alternative, if the appeal is allowed, uphold the judgment under appeal in so far as it orders the Commission to pay compensation for damage by dismissing the objection of limitation raised by the latter; and
– teise võimalusena, kui apellatsioonkaebus kuulutatakse vastuvõetavaks, kinnitada vaidlustatud kohtuotsus osas, milles komisjoni kohustatakse hüvitama tekitatud kahju, lükates tagasi selle institutsiooni esitatud väite hagi aegumisest, ja
In support of its appeal the Commission raises a single plea alleging infringement, in paragraphs 129 to 150 of the judgment under appeal, of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and of the principle of legal certainty.
Oma apellatsioonkaebuse toetuseks esitab komisjon ühe väite, mis käsitleb seda, et vaidlustatud otsuse punktides 129–150 rikuti Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklit 46 ja õiguskindluse põhimõtet.
The Commission submits that the settled caselaw of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance lays down the principle that the fiveyear limitation period for proceedings against the Community for noncontractual liability provided for in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice does not begin to run until the damage to be made good has materialised.
Komisjon märgib, et Euroopa Kohtu ja Esimese Astme Kohtu väljakujunenud praktikast tuleneb põhimõte, mille kohaselt Euroopa Kohtu kodukorra artiklis 46 sätestatud viieaastane aegumistähtaeg ühenduse lepinguvälise vastutusega seotud asjades hakkab kulgema alates hetkest, kui hüvitatav kahju on konkreetne.
If that liability has its origin in a legislative measure, the limitation period can begin to run only once the persons concerned were bound to have incurred damage which was certain in character.
Kui sellise vastutuse allikas on õigusakt, siis saab see aegumistähtaeg hakata kulgema üksnes hetkest, kui huvitatud isikutel tekkis konkreetne kahju.
In particular, the Commission criticises the Court of First Instance for failing to take account, in the judgment under appeal, of the fact that since 1983 Regulation No 2499/82 had caused actual damage to the Cantine by failing to provide for the possibility of Community aid being paid directly to the producer if the distiller became insolvent.
Eeskätt heidab komisjon Esimese Astme Kohtule ette seda, et ta ei võtnud vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses arvesse asjaolu, et alates 1983. aastast oli määrus nr 2499/82 tekitanud konkreetselt kahju Cantinele, kuna seal ei olnud ette nähtud võimalust maksta destilleerija maksejõuetuse korral ühenduse abi vahetult tootjale.
The point at which that limitation period began to run should therefore have been fixed as the day on which, because of DAI’s insolvency, the Cantine were unable to obtain payment of that aid within the 90-day period after the entry of the wine into the distillery provided for by that regulation.
Selle aegumistähtaja algus oleks seega pidanud olema päev, kui DAI maksejõuetuse tõttu jäi tootjatele maksmata nimetatud abi 90 päeva jooksul pärast veini jõudmist piiritusetehasesse, nagu on märgitud kõnealuses määruses.
According to the Commission, the Court of First Instance based its judgment, to the contrary, on the perception that the Cantine had suffered harmful effects from Regulation No 2499/82.
Komisjoni sõnul tugines Esimese Astme Kohus oma otsuses seevastu sellele, kuidas Cantine tajus määruse nr 2499/82 kahjulikke tagajärgi.
In that regard, it submits that the Court of First Instance, which considered as being insufficient the fact that the Cantine knew that they had suffered damage stemming from the application of that regulation, held that a wholly subjective element was required, namely that the Cantine should be aware that they
Sellega seoses väidab ta, et kuna Esimese Astme Kohus luges ebapiisavaks asjaolu, et Cantine teadis, et tal tekkis selle määruse kohaldamise tagajärjel kahju, pidas see kohus vajalikuks täiesti subjektiivse asjaolu esinemist – Cantine teadlikukssaamist sellest, et ta saab nõuda kahju hüvitamist üksnes lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi esitamisega komisjoni vastu,
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS could obtain redress only by way of an action for compensation brought against the Commission after the failure in this case of their attempts to obtain in the national courts payment of the Community aid by means of the attribution to them of the security provided by Assedile.
KOMISJON VS. CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA JT kui käesolevas asjas olid läbi kukkunud tema katsed taotleda ühenduse abi maksmist siseriiklikes kohtutes nii, et tema kasuks määratakse Assedile seatud garantii.
The Commission also submits that the judgment under appeal does not even comply with the principles laid down in Case 145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539.
Komisjon väidab ühtlasi, et vaidlustatud kohtuotsus ei vasta isegi Euroopa Kohtu 7. novembri 1985. aasta otsuses 145/83: Adams vs. komisjon (EKL 1985, lk 3539) märgitud põhimõtetele.
It takes the view that the Cantine cannot rely on that judgment since it takes account of involuntary ignorance of the event giving rise to the damage.
Ta leiab, et Cantine ei saanud tugineda sellele kohtuotsusele, kuna seal võetakse arvesse kahju tekitamise aluseks olnud asjaolu tahtmatut eiramist.
As held in paragraphs 139 and 140 of the judgment under appeal, there is no doubt that the Cantine were aware of the procedure under Regulation No 2499/82.
Nagu märgitakse vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktides 139 ja 140, ei olnud mingit kahtlust, et Cantine oli teadlik määruse nr 2499/82 rakendamise korrast.
The Commission also claims that the Court of First Instance failed to respect, in the judgment under appeal, the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods.
Komisjon heidab Esimese Astme Kohtule ette ka seda, et ta ei arvestanud vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses aegumistähtaegade kohaldamisel vajalikku õiguskindluse nõuet.
Linking the determination of the point at which the fiveyear limitation period laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice starts to run to the subjective perception that any interested party may have of the certainty of the harm suffered would amount to leaving it up to the injured party to decide when the action for compensation would be finally timebarred.
Kui Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 märgitud viieaastase aegumistähtaja alguspunkt siduda subjektiivse arusaamaga, mis võib huvitatud isikul olla tekkinud kahju konkreetsusest, siis on kahju kannatanud isiku meelevallas otsustada hetke üle, kui lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi lõpuks aegub.
The Commission adds, in that connection, that the appeal proceedings brought by the Cantine could not, moreover, have had any influence on their conviction as to the certainty of the damage.
Komisjon lisab sellega seoses, et Cantine algatatud apellatsiooni- ja kassatsioonimenetlused ei saanud muu hulgas kuidagi mõjutada käesolevas asjas Cantine veendumust kahju konkreetsuse kohta.