natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In essence, their argument here is that the Court of First Instance ruled, in paragraphs 159 to 162 of its judgment, that the Community had been unjustly enriched because the aid had not been paid in full to the applicants, but (rather) the security had been entered by AIMA in the EAGGF accounts.
Seoses sellega seisneb nende väide põhiliselt selles, et Esimese Astme Kohus leidis oma otsuse punktides 159–162, et ühendus on alusetult rikastunud, kuna abi ei makstud täielikult välja mitte hagejatele, vaid (pigem) kandis AIMA garantii üle EPATF-ile.
Time could accordingly not start to run before that unjust enrichment occurred (in 1991).
Sellest tulenevalt ei oleks saanud aegumistähtaeg kulgema hakata enne kõnealuse alusetu rikastumise juhtumi toimumist (1991).
However, the applicants could not have known that had happened until 1997, when the Commission notified them of the relevant facts.
Siiski ei saanud hagejad olla teadlikud sellest, mis toimus enne 1997. aastat, kui komisjon neid vastavatest asjaoludest teavitas.
of this action.
analüüsiga.
It is clear that Community law does not intend a wine producer who has complied with his obligations under Regulation No 2499/82 to be deprived of his aid through an error of the distiller’s for which he can in no way be held to blame.
Selge on see, et ühenduse õiguse eesmärk ei saa olla see, et veinitootja, kes on täitnud kõik määrusest nr 2499/82 tulenevad kohustused, jäetakse ilma abist destilleerija süülise tegevuse tõttu, milles ei saa mitte mingil juhul veinitootjat süüdistada.
In that connection, I also recall that in Lingenfelser 39the Court declared the third subparagraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 2499/82 invalid because it penalised with total loss of the aid any failure by the distiller to meet the timelimit for paying the producer.
Siinkohal meenub mulle, et kohtuotsusega Lingenfelser 39 tunnistas Euroopa Kohus kehtetuks määruse nr 2499/82 artikli 9 lõike 2 kolmanda lõigu, kuna see karistas abi täieliku minetamisega olukorda, kus destilleerija tootjatele tähtaegselt ei tasunud.
In so doing, the Court clearly attached considerable importance to the fact that the purpose of Regulation No 2499/82 in general and Article 9(1) in particular is to ensure that the producer can obtain a profit comparable to that which he would have obtained from a commercial sale. 40
Seda tehes omistas Euroopa Kohus suurt tähtsust asjaolule, et määruse nr 2499/82 ja eeskätt artikli 9 lõike 1 üldine eesmärk on tootjale sellise tulu tagamine, mis oleks samaväärne kaubanduslikust müügist saadud tuluga. 40
In the specific circumstances of the present case, I do not accept that the damage suffered by the applicants at the end of June 1983 as a result of DAI’s failure to pay them can be regarded as being certain (that is to say, imminent and foreseeable) from that date on.
Käesoleva asja erilisi asjaolusid arvesse võttes ei saa ma nõustuda, et 1983. aasta juuni lõpus hagejatele tekkinud kahju, mis tulenes neile DAI poolt maksmata jätmisest, saaks pidada konkreetseks (st vahetuks ja ootuspäraseks) alates sellest kuupäevast.
It seems to me, rather, that — in the context of their quasi-contractual relations with AIMA — the applicants had what an outside observer would have characterised as an objective legitimate expectation that the national court would appreciate that they were intended to be the beneficiaries of the Community aid and would make some appropriate order to ensure that they got paid.
Pigem olen arvamusel, et olukorras, kus hagejate suhted AIMA-ga sarnanesid lepingulistele suhetele, oli hagejatel, nagu kõrvalseisjale tundub, õiguspärane ootus, et siseriiklik kohus tunnustab neid kui kavandatava ühenduse abi saajaid ning teeb vastava otsuse hagejatele abi maksmise tagamiseks.
They had, after all, complied with all their obligations under Regulation No 2499/82 and preventive distillation had duly been carried out.
Lõppude lõpuks olid hagejad täitnud kõik neile määrusest nr 2499/82 tulenevad kohustused ja eeldestilleerimine oli toimunud nõuetekohaselt.
41In consequence, I reject the idea that time began to run against the applicants even before the proceedings in which they were subsequently involved had started before the national court.
41Järelikult ei saa ma nõustuda arvamusega, et hagejate jaoks hakkas tähtaeg kulgema isegi enne siseriikliku kohtu menetlust, milles nad hiljem osalesid.
In the present case, it is similarly an omission on the part of the distiller that gives rise to the applicants’ action.
Käesolevas asjas oli hagejate menetluse algatamise põhjuseks samuti destilleerija tegevusetus.
Indeed, the failure to pay them the aid to which they were entitled lay at the heart of all three breaches of the regulation identified by the national court in dismissing DAI’s action.
Tõepoolest, õigustatud hagejatele abi maksmata jätmine tulenes kõigist kolmest määruse rikkumisest, mille tuvastas siseriiklik kohus, kui ta jättis DAI hagi rahuldamata.
The applicants failed before the national court because there is a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82, inasmuch as wine producers are, without objective justification, treated differently depending upon whether their Member State has opted for the procedure under Article 9 or Article 10 of Regulation No 2499/82. That
Hagejad kaotasid siseriikliku kohtu vaidluse määruses nr 2499/82 esineva lünga tõttu, millest tulenes veinitootjate erinev kohtlemine, millel puudus objektiivne alus ja mis sõltus sellest, kas liikmesriik oli valinud määruse nr 2499/82 artiklis 9 või artiklis 10
In order to decide what is the correct point from which the fiveyear timelimit for bringing this action started to run, it is therefore in my view essential to analyse with some care the decision of the national court at first instance (the Tribunale civile di Roma).
Selleks et otsustada, milline on nimetatud nõude viieaastase aegumistähtaja kulgemise õige algushetk, on minu arvates oluline hoolikalt analüüsida siseriikliku esimese astme kohtu (Rooma Tribunale civile) otsust.
I have set out above (at point 29) the central passage from its judgment.
Eespool (punkt 29) ma esitasin selle otsuse keskse osa.
41 — See paragraph 141 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
41 – Vt Esimese Astme Kohtu otsuse punkt 141.
The national court first observed that ‘Regulation No 2499/82 confers entitlement to aid on condition that the strictly-imposed time limits and conditions are observed; failure to observe those timelimits and conditions entails recovery in whole or in part of the aid paid in advance.
Eeskätt leidis siseriiklik kohus, et „[l]õ -puks annab määrus […] nr 2499/82 õiguse saada abi tingimusel, et täpselt sätestatud tähtaegu ja tingimusi järgitakse; tähtaegade ja tingimuste järgimata jätmine toob kaasa ettemaksu korras tasutud abi täieliku või osalise tagasinõudmise.
The distillers are … the intended recipients of the aid whilst the wine and grape producers are the intended ultimate recipients’.
Destilleerijad on […] abi saajad, samas on veini- ja viinamarjatootjad abi lõplikud saajad.”
The national court then said, dismis -sively, that ‘[i]t is clear from this that [Regulation No 2499/82] is easy to interpret and that it is not necessary to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruing’.
Seejärel vastas siseriiklik kohus eitavalt, et „[e]elnevast tulenevalt on kõnealust määrust kerge tõlgendada ning Euroopa Kohtule ei ole vaja eelotsuse küsimust esitada”.
That is quite true, provided that one concentrates exclusively — as the national court clearly did — on the various timelimits within which the distiller was required to take various steps in order to avoid forfeiting the security that it had lodged in return for advance payment of Community aid.
Tegelikult on see tõsi, kui keskenduda ainult erinevatele tähtaegadele – nagu tegi ilmselgelt siseriiklik kohus –, mille jooksul DAI pidi astuma erinevaid samme, et ta ei minetaks garantiid, mille ta oli seadnud ühenduse abi ettemakse saamiseks.
In so saying, the national court made two correct statements and one significant error.
Selliselt väljendades esitas siseriiklik kohus kaks õiget väidet ning tegi ühe olulise vea.
The Community arrangements for market support in the agricultural sector do indeed all depend, correctly, upon making sure that those claiming support comply with the necessary conditions laid down by the Community regulations.
On tõsi, et kõik ühenduse põllumajandussektori toetusmeetmed sõltuvad sellest, kas abi taotleja vastab nõutavatele tingimustele, mis tulenevad ühenduse määrustest.
42 The wine and grape producers were indeed the ‘intended ultimate recipients of the aid’.
42Veini- ja viinamarjatootjad olid tõepoolest „abi lõplikud saajad”.
However, it seems to me that, on a proper construction of Regulation No 2499/82, the distillers (DAI) were not, in any true sense, the ‘intended recipients of the aid’ in so far as concerns the minimum buyingin price.
Mulle tundub siiski, et määruse nr 2499/82 õigesti tõlgendamisel ei ole destilleerijad (DAI) mitte mingil juhul „abi saajad” minimaalset ostuhinda silmas pidades.
Rather, they were the conduit through which that aid was intended — provided that the wine duly entered the distillery and was distilled — to be transmitted to the wine producers. 43
Pigem on nad kanaliks, mille kaudu kavandatakse abi jõudmist veinitootjateni tingimusel, et vein on nõuetekohaselt piiritusetehasesse jõudnud ja destilleeritud. 43
42 — As may be seen in the numerous judgments in which the Court has upheld the Commission’s withholding of aid provided for by the EAGGF on the ground that the Member State concerned has not ensured compliance with those conditions.
42 – Nagu nähtub mitmest kohtuotsusest, kus Euroopa Kohus on õigeks mõistnud komisjoni poolt EPATF-i kaudu abi maksmata jätmise põhjendusel, et asjaomane liikmesriik ei ole taganud kõikide nimetatud tingimuste täitmist.
Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that the national court ignored Community law in reaching its decision.
Seega on vale järeldada, et otsuse tegemisel ei võtnud siseriiklik kohus arvesse ühenduse õigust.
It did look at Regulation No 2499/82, but only to the extent of examining the timelimits in Article 9 of that regulation for DAI to act and to supply relevant proofs of its actions.
Ta küll arvestas määrusega nr 2499/82, kuid üksnes ulatuses, mis oli vajalik selleks, et uurida nimetatud määruse artiklis 9 sätestatud DAI-le kohaldatavaid tähtaegu nii erinevate toimingute tegemiseks kui ka oma tegevuse tõendamiseks.
It concentrated exclusively upon the relationship between DAI and AIMA (as reflected by the lodging of the security provided by Assedile).
Siseriiklik kohus keskendus üksnes DAI ja AIMA suhtele (mida väljendab Assedile antud garantii).
It proceeded (quite correctly) to identify three separate ways in which DAI had failed to meet its obligations under the regulation: (i) it had failed, apart from payments totalling ITL 110 795 870 (EUR 57 221), 44 to pay the producers the minimum price; (ii) it had failed to pay them within the 90-day timelimit and (iii) it had failed to provide proof before 1 June 1984 that it had made the payments.
Ta tuvastas (üsna õigesti) DAI-le kõnealusest määrusest tuleneva kolme kohustuse rikkumise: esiteks ei tasunud ta tootjatele miinimumhinda lisaks minimaalse ostuhinna tasumata jätmisele kogusummas 110 795 870 Itaalia liiri (57 221 eurot); 44teiseks ei pidanud ta maksmisel kinni 90-päevasest tähtajast ning kolmandaks ei tõendanud ta tehtud makseid enne 1. juunit 1984.
(All three are, of course, different strands of the same basic breach by DAI of its obligations: namely, that it had not paid the wine producers the full amount of the minimum buyingin price due to them for their wine delivered for distillation.)
(Need kolm on muidugi DAI ühe ja sama põhikohustuse rikkumise erinevad aspektid, mis seisneb selles, et ta ei maksnud tootjatele minimaalse ostuhinna kogusummat, mille ta oli kohustatud neile tasuma piiritusetehasesse tarnitud veini eest).
43 — Even if there were any doubt about this, it is important to note that the Commission has not challenged the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance.
43 – Isegi kui selle osas esineks vähimgi kahtlus, on oluline märkida, et komisjon ei vaidlustanud Esimese Astme Kohtu otsust seoses põhiküsimusega.
It would accordingly be neither appropriate nor indeed in accordance with this Court’s power of review on appeal for it to question the interpretation of the legislation by the Court of First Instance.
Järelikult ei ole kohane ega ka kooskõlas Euroopa Kohtu pädevusega apellatsiooniastmes, kui ta seaks kahtluse alla Esimese Astme Kohtu õigusnormide tõlgendamise.
44 — See point 26 above.
44 – Vt eespool punkt 26.
In so doing, the national court failed to focus at all upon the underlying (and fundamental) issue, who should end up receiving the Community aid in question?
Sellist arutluskäiku kasutades ei keskendunud siseriiklik kohus üldse peamisele (ja põhimõttelisele) küsimusele: kes on asjaomase ühenduse abi lõplik saaja?
It is evident that it regarded the intervening wine producers (the intended recipients of the minimum buyingin price; and the only players intended, under the Community regime, to benefit financially from that buyingin price) as being on a par with everyone else who was owed money by DAI as it went under.
On ilmselge, et siseriiklik kohus käsitas menetlusse astujaid veinitootjaid (kavandatud minimaalse ostuhinna saajad; ühenduse korra kohaselt ainsad subjektid, kes peaks saama minimaalsest ostuhinnast rahalist kasu) samaväärselt nendega, kelle suhtes DAI-l oli maksujõu etusest tingituna rahuldamata nõudeid.
The sums owing to them as that element of Community aid were equated to DAI’s other debts in the insolvency.
Veinitootjate saamata jäänud summasid, mille puhul oli tegemist ühenduse abiga, käsitleti samaväärselt teiste DAI maksejõuetusest tingitud rahuldamata nõuetega.
This is abundantly clear from the only paragraph of the judgment that specifically addresses their interests: likely that it would have reached the same conclusion as has the Court of First Instance, namely that there was a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82 leading to different treatment of wine producers depending upon whether their Member State had chosen the Article 9 or the Article 10 procedure; that the difference in treatment was not justified; and that responsibility for that violation lay with the Community institution that had drafted Regulation No 2499/82, i.e. the Commission.
Juhul kui ta oleks seda teinud, siis mulle tundub, et tõenäoliselt oleks Euroopa Kohus jõudnud Esimese Astme Kohtuga samale järeldusele, et määruses nr 2499/82 esineb lünk, mille tulemusel koheldakse veinitootjaid erinevalt sõltuvalt sellest, kas liikmesriik on valinud artiklis 9 või artiklis 10 sätestatud menetluse; et erinev kohtlemine on alusetu ning et selle õigusrikkumise eest vastutab ühenduse institutsioon, kes koostas määruse nr 2499/82, st komisjon.
45 Although the answers given to the national court would (inevitably) have led to the applicants failing to recover the Community aid due to them through their intervention in the national proceedings, they would then objectively have known that the claim lay against the Commission.
45Kuigi vastused siseriiklikule kohtule oleksid (paratamatult) viinud selleni, et hagejatele ei oleks menetlusse astujatena siseriiklikes menetlustes osalemise kaudu välja mõistetud ühenduse abi, mida neil oli õigus saada, oleksid nad objektiivselt teada saanud, et nõue tuleb esitada komisjoni vastu.
Time would clearly, therefore, have run against them from that point for the purposes of bringing an action for compensation under Article 235 EC.
Seega oleks ilmselgelt sellest hetkest alates hakanud nende jaoks kulgema kahju hüvitamise hagi esitamise tähtaeg vastavalt EÜ artiklile 235.
‘The cooperative wine-cellars may — as may the guarantor [Assedile] if it decides to take the applicant’s place — obtain satisfaction of their rights to receive payment in the course of the insolvency proceedings, together with all the other creditors and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment of creditors.’
„Veinitootmisühistud, nagu ka tagatise seadja [Assedile], kui ta otsustab nende asemele astuda, võivad nõuda oma nõuete rahuldamist pankrotimenetluses koos kõigi teiste võlausaldajatega, järgides võlausaldajate võrdsuse põhimõtet.”
It is possible that the national court paid less than full attention to the wine producers’ interests because they were interveners in DAI’s action, rather than applicants in their own name.
Võib-olla ei pööranud siseriiklik kohus veinitootjate huvidele täielikku tähelepanu, kuna nad olid pigem menetlusse astujad DAI algatatud menetluses kui oma nimel menetluses osalevad hagejad.
It seems to me that it would be rather harsh to fault the producers, in the circumstances, for not bringing separ- ate proceedings, presumably against DAI (since it was the distiller who actually owed them the balance of the Community aid payable) with AIMA and perhaps Assedile as additional defendants.
Ma leian, et antud olukorras oleks ülekohtune panna hagejatele süüks, et nad ei algatanud eraldi menetlust eeldatavalt DAI vastu (kuna tegemist oli destilleerijaga, kes ei olnud neile ühenduse abi tegelikult tasunud), kus AIMA ja ehk ka Assedile on täiendavad kostjad.
As it was, there was already a relevant action (between DAI and AIMA) that was ‘live’ before the national
Siseriiklikus kohtus oli juba vastav menetlus (DAI ja AIMA vahel) käimas. Menetluse tõhususe ja ökonoomia seisukohalt oleks olnud loomulik
45 — See the careful discussion of the merits at paragraphs 151 to 178, in particular paragraphs 164 to 172.
45 – Vt hoolikat arutelu põhiküsimuse kohta punktides 151–178, eeskätt punktides 164–172.
It is to be noted that the Commission does not seek to appeal the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance.
Tuleb märkida, et komisjon ei esitanud põhiküsimuses apellatsioonkaebust Esimese Astme Kohtu otsuse peale.
It relies solely upon the limitation point.
Komisjoni apellatsioon tugineb üksnes aegumistähtajale.
In so saying, the national court failed to understand the whole thrust and purpose of the Community aid regime.
Seda väites ei saanud siseriiklik kohus aru ühenduse abikorra suunast ja eesmärgist.
Crucially, it had also declined to make a reference.
Oluline on ka see, et ta otsustas eelotsust mitte küsida.
There was, of course, no obligation on it to do so, not being a final court bound by the stricter requirements of the final paragraph of Article 234 EC (and it also seems likely that the Tribunal civile di Roma was directing its mind to the wrong part of the issue in asking itself whether a reference was ‘necessary’).
Siseriiklikul kohtul ei olnud muidugi ka kohustust seda teha, kuna tegemist ei ole kõrgeima astme kohtuga, kelle jaoks kehtivad rangemad nõuded, mis tulenevad muudetud numeratsiooni järgi EÜ artiklist 234 (tundub ka tõenäoline, et Rooma Tribunal civile käsitles seda küsimust ekslikult, küsides endalt, kas eelotsuse küsimine on „vajalik”).
As a result, this Court was not given the opportunity, at that stage, of examining the structure and purpose of Regulation No 2499/82. Had it done so, it seems to me
Selle tulemusel ei olnud Euroopa Kohtul võimalik tolles staadiumis uurida määruse nr 2499/82 ülesehitust ja eesmärki seoses kõnealuste menetlustega.
OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-51/05 P its subsequent reimbursement by AIMA to EAGGF when a Member State (such as Italy) had chosen the procedure laid down in Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82.
KOHTUJURIST SHARPSTONI ETTEPANEK – KOHTUASI C-51/05 P garantii minetamist ning sellele järgnenud garantii ülekandmist EPATF-ile AIMA poolt, kui liikmesriik (nagu Itaalia) oli valinud määruse nr 2499/82 artiklis 9 sätestatud menetluse.
In consequence, I do not read that judgment as placing them in a position in which, objectively, they ought to have realised that their only recourse was to abandon the national proceedings and, without further ado, to bring proceedings against the Commission as the author of the defective legislation.
Järelikult ei nähtu kohtuotsusest, et veinitootjad oleksid seatud olukorda, milles nad oleksid objektiivsetest alustest lähtuvalt aru saanud, et nende ainus väljapääs on lõpetada osalemine siseriiklike kohtute menetlustes ning esitada ilma pikemalt mõtlemata hagi komisjoni kui puuduliku õigusakti autori vastu.
courts. It would have seemed rather natural, in the interests of procedural efficiency and economy, to intervene in that action and to place the wine producers’ entitlement to payment of their Community aid before the national court in that way.
osaleda nimetatud menetluses menetlusse astujatena ja esitada sel viisil siseriiklikule kohtule veinitootjate nõue ühenduse abi maksmise kohta.
Had DAI succeeded, or lost following a reference, they would (respectively) have either had a better chance of being paid the aid by DAI or at least known where they stood.
Kui DAI oleks eelotsuse tulemusel vaidluse võitnud või kaotanud, siis oleks veinitootjatel olnud vastavalt kas palju paremad väljavaated abi maksmise osas DAI poolt või nad oleksid vähemalt teada saanud, mida neil teha tuleb.
If it was an error to intervene in those proceedings rather than to commence separate proceedings, it seems to me that that error was objectively excusable.
Kui selles menetluses osalemine menetlusse astujatena – võrreldes eraldi menetluse algatamisega – oli pigem viga, siis mulle tundub, et see on objektiivselt andestatav.
As interveners, the wine producers (and their clear interests) were given short shrift by the national court.
Menetlusse astujatena käsitles siseriiklik kohus veinitootjaid (ja nende ilmseid huve) põgusalt.
Save with the (undoubted) benefit of hindsight, I find it difficult to read into the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma any clear (let alone express) indication to them that they had a good claim but were in the wrong place to pursue it.
Selge on see, et Rooma Tribunale civile otsuses puudub otsene (veelgi vähem sõnaselge) vihje veinitootjatele seoses sellega, et neil on õigustatud nõue, kuid nad kasutavad oma menetlusõigusi vales kohtus.
On the contrary, they were told that they were in no better and no worse position than any other person to whom DAI owed money.
Vastupidi, neile öeldi, et nende seisund on samaväärne teiste isikutega, kellel on rahuldamata nõudeid DAI suhtes.
They stretched from 27 January 1986 (the date of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma) via the judgment of the Corte d’appello on 19 November 1991 through to the final dismissal of the appellants’ appeal by the Corte di Cassazione on 28 November 1994.
Need menetlused algasid 27. jaanuaril 1986 (Rooma Tribunale civile otsuse kuupäev) – vahepeal tegi Corte d’appello (apellatsioonikohus) 19. novembril 1991 oma otsuse – ning kestsid kuni 28. novembrini 1994, kui lõpuks Corte di Cassazione (kassatsioonikohus) jättis rahuldamata nende kassatsioonkaebuse.
It is impossible to ascertain from the file before this Court whether the applicants drew attention to the substance of their claim under EC law within that procedural appeal, or raised again the question of whether this Court should be asked for guidance in understanding the workings of Regulation No 2499/82, with a view to unravelling the mess left behind by DAI’s insolvency.
Euroopa Kohtule esitatud toimikust on võimatu kindlaks teha, kas hagejad juhtisid tähelepanu Euroopa Ühenduse õiguse alusel esitatud nõude sisule kassatsioonimenetluses või tõstatasid taas küsimuse, et Euroopa Kohtult peaks paluma juhtnööre määruse nr 2499/82 tõlgendamiseks eesmärgiga lahendada DAI maksejõuetusest tingitud keeruline olukord.
It may not have been possible for them to do so to any significant extent, or at all.
Neil ei pruukinud selleks olla märkimisväärset või üldse mingit võimalust.
For my part, I am most reluctant to presume against them that they should never have appealed and that time should be said to have started to run from a point earlier than 28 November 1994.
Ma keeldun eeldamast hagejate kahjuks seda, et nad ei oleks üldse pidanud edasi kaebama ning et tähtaeg peaks hakkama kulgema enne 28. novembrit 1994.