natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In particular, I do not deduce from the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma any straightforward judicial guidance that the wine producers would get nowhere in the national courts (either within the context of DAI’s action or, indeed, in separate proceedings) because there was no mechanism for protecting their interests by preventing the forfeiture of DAI’s security to AIMA and
Iseäranis ei suuda ma Rooma Tribunale civile otsusest tuletada seda, et kohus oleks andnud veinitootjatele selge juhtnööri, et siseriiklike kohtute menetluste (ei DAI algatatud menetluse ega nende endi algatatud menetluste) kaudu ei saa nad põhimõtteliselt oma õigusi kaitsta, kuna puudus nende huvisid kaitsev mehhanism, mis oleks takistanud DAI poolt AIMA kasuks seatud
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS were bound to incur damage which was certain in character. 48
KOMISJON VS. CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA JT kui asjaomane isik kogeb kahju, mis on oma olemuselt konkreetne. 48
It seems to me, moreover, likely that, had the applicants sought to bring proceedings against the Commission before the Court of First Instance without first going to the national court, the Commission would have argued that they ought to be pursuing their claim before the national courts, which were perfectly capable of granting them an effective remedy.
Liiatigi tundub mulle, et juhul kui hagejad oleksid esitanud komisjoni vastu hagi Esimese Astme Kohtusse eelnevalt siseriiklikesse kohtutesse pöördumata, siis oleks komisjon väitnud, et hagejad peaksid taotlema oma õiguste kaitset siseriiklikes kohtutes, kus on neile tagatud tõhusad õiguskaitsevahendid.
It would, in all likelihood, have deployed arguments similar to those that it presented in the context of these proceedings. 47
Tõenäoliselt oleks komisjon sellisel juhul esitatud argumente, mis on sarnased nimetatud menetluses esitatud argumentidega. 47
Against that background, I turn to consider the analysis of the Court of First Instance of the timelimit provided for by Article 46 of the Statute.
Eeltoodut arvesse võttes käsitlen ma järgnevalt Esimese Astme Kohtu analüüsi Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 sätestatud aegumistähtaja kohta.
In the present case the Court of First Instance ruled that the period of limitation began to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid was suffered for certain by the applicants.
Käesolevas asjas sedastas Esimese Astme Kohus, et aegumistähtaeg hakkab kulgema hetkest, kui hagejad kogesid ühenduse abi täieliku või osalise maksmata jätmise tagajärgi konkreetselt.
49That court considered that in the exceptional circumstances (i) a prudent and wellinformed trader could reasonably expect to obtain payment of the aid and (ii) (given in particular the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 50 and the exceptional nature of the situation relating to the lacuna in that regulation) it was extremely difficult for such a trader to be aware that he could not obtain such payment before a national court.
49 Nimetatud kohus leidis, et erandjuhtudel, esiteks, võib ettevaatlik ja informeeritud tootja õigustatult eeldada, et talle makstakse kõnealust abi, ning teiseks, et on täiesti võimatu, et see tootja teaks, et tal puudub siseriiklike kohtute kaudu võimalus seda makset saada (iseäranis määruses nr 2499/82 50sätestatud mehhanismi keerukuse ning seal esinevast lüngast tingitud erandliku olukorra tõttu).
Consequently, in order to assess whether damage was certain, it was necessary to take into consideration the national proceedings, concerning specifically the fate of the security.
Järelikult tuleb kahju konkreetsuse hindamisel arvesse võtta siseriiklikke menetlusi, mis käsitlevad eeskätt garantii saatust.
It seems to me that those two limbs could equally well have been phrased (and might perhaps have been more felicitously phrased) in terms of what a reasonable bystander,
Mulle tundub, et nimetatud kaks punkti võiks sama hästi sõnastada (võibolla palju õnnestunumalt) selle järgi, mida olukorda vaatlev mõistlik kõrvalseisja oleks
According to the caselaw of the Court of Justice, time starts to run in cases of noncontractual liability originating in a legislative measure when the injurious effects of that measure have been produced, and consequently when the persons concerned
Vastavalt Euroopa Kohtu praktikale hakkab õigustlooval aktil põhinevate lepinguvälise vastutuse juhtudel aegumistähtaeg kulgema siis, kui on tekkinud kõik selle akti kahjulikud tagajärjed, ning järelikult siis,
48 — Birra Wührer, cited in note 31, paragraph 10.49 — Paragraph 131.
48 – 31. joonealuses märkuses viidatud kohtuotsus Birra Wührer, punkt 10.
47 — See paragraph 89 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
47 – Vt Esimese Astme Kohtu otsuse punkt 89.
The Court of First Instance explains cogently at paragraph 118 that the applicants did not, in fact, enjoy any effective judicial protection before the national courts; a conclusion with which (in the light of just over 10 years of litigation before the national courts) it is hard to disagree.
Esimese Astme Kohus selgitab veenvalt punktis 118, et hagejatel tegelikult puudus tõhus kohtulik kaitse siseriiklikes kohtutes; selle järeldusega tuleb aga nõustuda (arvestades üle kümne aasta siseriiklikes kohtutes kestnud vaidlust).
However, it is not so clear that that would necessarily have been equally apparent had the litigation started in the Court of First Instance rather than in the national courts.
Ei ole teada, kas see oleks olnud sama ilmne, kui vaidluse lahendamiseks oleks siseriiklike kohtute asemel pöördutud Esimese Astme Kohtusse.
OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-51/05 P the point at which ‘all the injurious effects of the [lacuna in the Community] measure [were] produced’.
KOHTUJURIST SHARPSTONI ETTEPANEK – KOHTUASI C-51/05 P tekkisid „selle [ühenduse] akti [lünga] kõik kahjulikud tagajärjed”.
With that gloss, I fully endorse the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance, at least with regard to the four applicants who appealed against the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma. 51
Sellest põhjendusest lähtuvalt nõustun ma täielikult Esimese Astme Kohtu seisukohaga, mis puudutab vähemalt nelja hagejat, kes esitasid apellatsioonkaebuse Rooma Tribunale civile otsuse peale.
observing the situation, would have supposed the objective situation to be. Objectively, looking at the Community legislation, the quasi-contractual relations between AIMA and the wine producers, the fact that the wine producers had complied with their obligations and the apparent purpose of the Community legislation as expressed in the recitals to Regulation No 2499/82, it seems to me that such a bystander would have supposed that the proper course of redress was by way of proceedings before the national court to obtain payment of the Community aid with, in all probability, a reference under Article 234 EC.
Objektiivselt võetuna tundub mulle, et võttes arvesse ühenduse õigusnorme; AIMA ja veinitootjate lepingulistele suhetele sarnanevaid suhteid; asjaolu, et veinitootjad olid täitnud kõik oma kohustused, ning määruse nr 2499/82 põhjendustes äratoodud ühenduse õigusnormide ilmselget eesmärki, oleks see kõrvalseisja leidnud, et kõige õigem oleks taotleda ühenduse abi siseriiklike kohtute kaudu ja suure tõenäosusega eelotsust EÜ artikli 234 alusel.
Such payments are generically made at national level, and are claimed (if necessary) via national proceedings, with the Member State then accounting to the Community through the procedure for the clearance of EAGGF accounts.
Üldreeglina tehakse selliseid makseid liikmesriigi tasandil ning nende tasumist taotletakse (vajadusel) siseriiklike kohtute menetluste kaudu ning sellisel juhul esitab liikmesriik ühendusele taotluse EPATF-i arvelt tasumise kohta.
I find it difficult to accept the idea that a reasonable bystander, viewing the situation objectively, would have jumped to the conclusion in 1983 that the wine producers should launch a damages claim against the Commission.
Mul on raske nõustuda arvamusega, et olukorda objektiivselt jälgiv mõistlik kõrvalseisja oleks 1983. aastal leidnud, et veinitootjad peaksid esitama komisjoni vastu kahju hüvitamise hagi.
The present case, like Adams, is, for the reasons given by the Court of First Instance, an exceptional case.
Käesolevas asjas, nagu ka Adamsi kohtuasjas, on tegemist erandjuhtumiga Esimese Astme Kohtu nimetatud põhjustel.
In Adams, the applicant had notified the Commission of anti-competitive practices engaged in by his employer Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG (‘Roche’). He subsequently brought an action against the Commission for compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of wrongful acts or omissions on its part which led to his arrest, detention and conviction in Switzerland for 51 — See points 30 and 32 above and 107 below.52 — Cited in footnote 34.
51 – Vt eespool punktid 30 ja 32 ning allpool punkt 107.52 – Viidatud 34. joonealuses märkuses.
Rather, applying the test (as set out by the Commission) that ‘the limitation period cannot begin to run before all the injurious effects of the measure have been produced and consequently before the time when the applicants were bound to incur damage which was certain in character’, I consider that such a bystander would have said that, although the general nature of the damage that the applicants were likely to suffer if they were not paid the Community aid might be obvious in June 1983, its unavoidable nature was not.
Pigem olen ma arvamusel, et nimetatud kõrvalseisja oleks leidnud seoses väitega (komisjoni sõnastuses) – et „[…] ei saa aegumistähtaeg hakata kulgema enne selle akti kõikide kahjulike tagajärgede tekkimist ning järelikult mitte enne, kui hagejad kogevad kahju, mis on oma olemuselt konkreetne” –, et juunis 1983 ilmnes hagejatele ühenduse abi maksmata jätmisest tuleneva kahju üldine, kuid mitte vältimatu olemus.
The applicants were ‘bound to incur damage which was certain in nature’ only when it became objectively clear that proceedings before the national court would not result in their receiving the aid.
Hagejad „koge[sid] kahju, mis on oma olemuselt konkreetne” alles siis, kui objektiivsetest alustest lähtuvalt oli kindel, et siseriiklike kohtute menetlused ei vii abi maksmiseni. Alles siis
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS economic espionage arising out of that notification.
KOMISJON VS. CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA JT nimetatud teadaandega.
The Court found that, following a visit by Roche’s lawyer to the Commission on 8 November 1974, the Commission’s knowledge of the gravity of the risk to which it had exposed Mr Adams by its earlier conduct 53was sufficient to give rise to liability.
Euroopa Kohus leidis, et pärast Roche’i advokaadi külaskäiku komisjoni novembris 1974 oli see institutsioon teada saanud, millisesse ohtlikku olukorda oli Adams sattunud komisjoni varasema tegevuse tõttu 53ja et see oli piisav komisjoni vastutuse tekkimiseks.
By failing to make all reasonable efforts to pass on to Mr Adams the information available to it following that visit, the Commission incurred liability towards him in respect of the damage which was likely to result from the discovery of his identity.
Kuna komisjon ei teinud mõistlikke katseid selleks, et edastada Adamsile nimetatud külaskäigu tulemusel temani jõudnud teavet, siis tekkis komisjonil vastutus Adamsi ees seoses kahjuga, mis tõenäoliselt tulenes Adamsi isikust teadasaamisest.
of the limitation cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to it and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to submit his application to the Court or to the relevant institution before the expiry of the limitation period.
eesmärgil kahju kannatanud isiku suhtes, kui kahju kannatanud isik sai hilinemisega teada sündmusest, mille tulemusel oli tal tekkinud nõudeõigus, ning seetõttu ei saanud ta mõistliku aja jooksul esitada hagi kas Euroopa Kohtule või muule vastavale asutusele enne tähtaja lõppemist.
In this case it must be borne in mind that the Court has based its conclusion in regard to the Community’s liability on the fact that the Commission had not attempted to inform and to consult the applicant following [Roche’s lawyer’s] visit of 8 November 1974.
Kõnealuse kohtuasja puhul tuleb meeles pidada, et Euroopa Kohus tugines oma järelduses seoses ühenduse vastutusega asjaolule, et komisjon ei püüdnudki pärast 8. novembrit 1974 hagejat teavitada ega temaga nõu pidada.
It is clear from the information before the Court that the applicant could not have become aware of that fact until the preparatory inquiry in these proceedings, since [Roche’s lawyer’s] visit was mentioned for the first time in the Commission’s defence.
Euroopa Kohtule esitatud teabest nähtub, et hageja ei saanud sellest asjaolust teada enne Euroopa Kohtu menetlust ettevalmistavat järelpärimist, kuna esimest korda mainiti [Roche’i advokaadi] külaskäiku komisjoni kostja vastuses.
Therefore, he could not have sought to establish the Community’s liability on that basis before the normal date of expiry of the limitation period’. 54
Seepärast ei olnud Adamsil võimalik nimetatud asjaolule tuginedes esitada enne tähtaja lõppemist hagi komisjoni vastutuse tuvastamiseks”. 54
Mr Adams brought his action in July 1983.
Adams esitas hagi juulis 1983.
The Commission argued that it was timebarred by virtue of Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the predecessor to the present Article 46.
Komisjon väitis, et hagi oli aegunud Euroopa kohtu põhikirja artikli 43 (nüüd artikkel 46) alusel.
Mr Adams argued that the events had not become known to him until 1980, when his new lawyer had had the opportunity to study the documents relating to the criminal proceedings.
Adamsi sõnul sai ta nendest sündmustest teada alles 1980. aastal, kui tema uuel advokaadil tekkis võimalus uurida kriminaalmenetlusega seotud dokumente.
He had not believed the information supplied by the Swiss police and had been unable to read the Swiss judgments which were in German.
Ta ei uskunud Šveitsi politsei esitatud andmeid ning tal ei olnud võimalik lugeda Šveitsi kohtuotsuseid, kuna need olid saksa keeles.
Nor could he possibly have known of the events relating to the visit by Roche’s lawyer to the Commission on 8 November 1974.
Samuti ei saanud ta teadlik olla sündmustest, mis olid seotud Roche’i advokaadi külaskäiguga komisjoni 8. novembril 1974.
The Court stated that Article 43 ‘must be interpreted as meaning that the expiry
Euroopa Kohus sedastas, et artiklit 43 „tuleb tõlgendada nii, et aegumistähtaja möödumisele ei saa tugineda õigusliku kaitse
Adams is, of course, and as Commission implicitly argues, distinguishable in various respects from the present case (although I confess to some puzzlement over the Commission’s argument that it concerns not the determination of when time starts to run but rather when the limitation period expires, since the one surely depends on the other).
Adamsi kohtuasi, nagu kahtlemata leiab ka komisjon, on muidugi mitmes mõttes käesolevast asjast erinev (kuigi ma pean tunnistama oma hämmeldust seoses komisjoni väitega, et see kohtuasi ei puuduta tähtaja kulgemise alguse määratlemist, vaid pigem tähtaja lõppemist, sest tegelikult on need omavahel seotud).
It does, however, demonstrate that the Court is prepared to depart from the normal application of the rules of prescription in an exceptional case.
Siiski nähtub nimetatud kohtuotsusest, et Euroopa Kohus on erandjuhtudel valmis normidest kõrvale kalduma.
In such rare, exceptional cases I consider that it may be necessary to approach those rules more sympathetically in order to prevent prescription from being relied on as a defence in circumstances where that would be manifestly unjust.
Minu arvates tuleb normide kohaldamisel niisugustel erandjuhtudel olla mõistev vältimaks aegumisele tuginemist olukorras, kus see oleks ilmselgelt ebaõiglane.
53 — Namely, handing over to Roche staff edited photocopies of memoranda supplied to it by Mr Adams which had enabled Roche to identify him as the main suspect in the complaint that it had lodged with the Swiss Public Prosecutor’s Office, and which had therefore led to his arrest and supplied the police and the Swiss courts with substantial evidence against him.
53 – Nimelt edastas komisjon Roche’i juhtkonnale koopia märgukirjast, mille oli esitanud Adams, mille tulemusel oli Roche’il võimalik esitada Šveitsi prokuratuuri Adamsi isiku kui peamise kahtlusaluse vastu süüdistus, mis viis omakorda Adamsi vahistamiseni ning andis tema vastu olulisi tõendeid nii politseis kui ka Šveitsi kohtutes.
54 — Paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment.
54 – Kohtuotsuse punktid 50 ja 51.
With regard to the fifth applicant, the analysis I have proposed above leads to the conclusion that time began to run on the date of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma, that is to say on 27 January 1989.
Mis puudutab viiendat hagejat, siis järeldub minu eeltoodud analüüsist, et tema jaoks hakkas tähtaeg kulgema Rooma Tribunale civile otsuse kuupäeval, st 27. jaanuaril 1989.
The fifth applicant’s action against the Commission is accordingly timebarred.
Järelikult on viienda hageja nõue komisjoni vastu aegunud.
That would be otherwise only if the Court were to take the view that, as in Adams, it would in the exceptional circumstances of the present case be appropriate for it essentially to rule that the timelimit laid down in Article 46 of the Statute is inapplicable to any of the applicants.
See oleks vastupidi üksnes juhul, kui Euroopa Kohus sedastaks samuti nagu kohtuotsuses Adams, et käesoleva asja erandlikku olukorda arvestades on tal kohane sisuliselt otsustada, et Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 sätestatud aegumistähtaeg ei ole kohaldatav ühegi hageja suhtes.
In the present case, the applicants took the decision, entirely reasonably at the time and in the context, to intervene in the proceedings brought by DAI against Assedile and AIMA in September 1984 before the Tribunale civile di Roma.
Käesolevas asjas otsustasid hagejad – mis oli sel ajal ja selles olukorras täiesti mõistlik – osaleda DAI poolt menetlusse astujatena 1984. aasta septembris Rooma Tribunale civiles algatatud menetluses Assedile ja AIMA vastu.
The duration of those proceedings was not, and could not have been, within the applicants’ control.
Nende menetluste kestvus ei olnud ega saanudki olla hagejate kontrolli all.
That court refused to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.
Kohus keeldus esitamast eelotsusetaotlust Euroopa Kohtule.
Had it done so, the matter would have become clear at that stage.
Juhul kui ta oleks seda teinud, oleks selles etapis asjas selgust saadud.
In the context of such a reference, the Court would necessarily have reviewed the structure of Regulation No 2499/82.
Niisuguse eelotsusetaotluse puhul oleks Euroopa Kohus kindlasti kontrollinud määruse nr 2499/82 ülesehitust.
In so doing, it would have identified the lacuna in that regulation (as the Court of First Instance subsequently did), namely that if a Member State took one of the two available options for channelling aid, funds earmarked for the producers as ultimate recipients would in circumstances such as those of the present case be refunded to the Community rather than paid to the producers.
Seda tehes oleks nimetatud kohus kindlasti tuvastanud lünga kõnealuses määruses (nagu hiljem tuvastas Esimese Astme Kohus), mis seisnes nimelt selles, et juhul, kui liikmesriik valis ühe kahest abi andmise võimalusest, siis tagastati tootjatele kui abi lõplikele saajatele reserveeritud summad käesoleva asjaga sarnastel juhtudel pigem ühendusele, kui maksti tootjatele.
For the sake of completeness, I should add that the applicants subsequently brought an action against AIMA before the national courts for unjust enrichment.
Terviklikkuse mõttes sooviksin lisada, et seejärel esitasid hagejad siseriiklikusse kohtusse hagi AIMA vastu alusetu rikastumise tuvastamiseks.
56 As the applicants themselves realised, once they had approached the Commission and ascertained that the funds derived from the Assedile security had been transferred by AIMA to the Commission and credited to the EAGGF account, 57 that claim was also bound to fail: there had been no unjust enrichment of AIMA.
56Pärast seda, kui hagejad olid pöördunud komisjoni poole ning saanud teada, et AIMA oli Assedile antud garantii üle kandnud komisjonile ja et see on laekunud EPATF-i arvele, 57 mõistsid nad, et ka see nõue on kaotatud, kuna AIMA ei olnud alusetult rikastunud.
An argument could be made out for saying that it was only at that point that the last, flickering hope of success via the national courts was extinguished.
Võib ju väita, et alles seejärel kadus viimanegi lootus saavutada edu siseriiklikes kohtutes.
I do not think it necessary or appropriate to go that far.
Kuid ma leian, et ei ole vajalik ega kohane nii kaugele minna.
That seems to me to be the appropriate point to hold that time had begun to run for the purposes of Article 46 of the Statute.
Mulle tundub, et siinkohal on tegemist asjaomase hetkega, millest alates hakkas tähtaeg kulgema Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artikli 46 tähenduses.
56 — On 16 February 1996: see paragraph 38 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, mentioned above at point 34.
56 – 16. veebruaril 1996: vt Esimese Astme Kohtu otsuse punkt 38, millele on viidatud eespool punktis 34.
57 — See paragraphs 39 and 40 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
57 – Vt Esimese Astme Kohtu otsuse punktid 39 ja 40.
It therefore seems to me that, objectively, the failure of the appeal to the Corte di Cassazione spelled the end of any realistic chance that the applicants could succeed before the national courts.
Corte di Cassaziones lõpetas objektiivses mõttes kõik realistlikud ootused, et hagejad võiksid siseriiklikes kohtutes edukad olla. 58
58It follows that that was when the damage suffered could be regarded as ‘certain’.
Järelikult saab sellest hetkest alates pidada kahju „konkreetseks”.
At that point, the damage was indeed both imminent and foreseeable, even if it could not yet be accurately determined. 59
Alles nüüdsest oli kahju nii vahetu kui ka ootuspärane, kuigi seda ei olnud võimalik täpselt määratleda. 59
Here, if the applicants had brought a claim against the Commission at the outset it is highly likely that the Commission would have taken the view that the correct forum was the national court, both because Community aid in the agricultural sector is normally paid via the national intervention board and because national insolvency proceedings were under way.
Juhul kui hagejad oleksid kohe alguses komisjoni vastu hagi esitanud, siis oleks komisjon tõenäoliselt leidnud, et õigem oleks kaitsta oma menetlusõigusi siseriiklikus kohtus, kuna põllumajandussektoris makstakse ühenduse abi tavaliselt siseriikliku sekkumisameti kaudu ning kuna siseriiklik pankrotimenetlus oli pooleli.
In that context, I find it significant that, even in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, the Commission continued to argue that national procedures did provide the applicants with an effective remedy.
Kujunenud olukorras pean ma märkimisväärseks, et isegi Esimese Astme Kohtu menetluses kordas komisjon, et siseriiklikes menetlustes olid hagejatel tõhusad õiguskaitsevahendid.
I accept that the present case does not fit neatly into the existing caselaw, referred to by both the Court of First Instance in its judgment and the Commission in its appeal.
Ma nõustun, et käesoleva asja suhtes ei saa täpselt kohaldada väljakujunenud kohtupraktikat, millele on viidanud nii Esimese Astme Kohus oma otsuses kui ka komisjon oma apellatsioonkaebuses.
That caselaw was not, however, developed in the context of circumstances such as those giving rise to the present case, where the situation falls uncomfortably between the national and Community legal systems.
Nimetatud kohtupraktika ei ole kujunenud käesoleva kohtuasja tinginud asjaoludel, mis jäävad kahetsusväärselt siseriikliku ja ühenduse õiguse vahele.