natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission also submits that the Court of First Instance vitiated its judgment by a contradiction in the grounds thereof.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et Esimese Astme Kohus on kohtuotsuses esitanud vastuolulised põhjendused.
First, it refused to consider the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition for admissibility of the action for compensation brought by the Cantine against the Commission and, second, it linked the point from which the limitation period applicable to that action started to run to the date of a definitive judgment delivered at national level, in this case the judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione of 28 November 1994.
Ühelt poolt keeldus Esimese Astme Kohus käsitlemast siseriiklike õiguskaitsevahendite ammendamist kui Cantine poolt komisjoni vastu algatatud lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi vastuvõetavuse ühte tingimust ja teiselt poolt sidus sellele hagile kohaldatava aegumistähtaja alguspunkti siseriiklikul tasemel tehtud lõpliku kohtuotsuse kuupäevaga, käesolevas asjas Corte suprema di cassazione 28. novembri 1994. aasta otsusega.
For their part, the Cantine submit that the appeal is unfounded and that the Court of First Instance correctly held in the judgment under appeal that the conditions
Cantine omakorda väidab, et apellatsioonkaebus ei ole põhjendatud ja et Esimese Astme Kohus leidis vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses õigesti, et komisjoni vastu esitatud
The Cantine take the view that it was necessary for them to await the outcome of the litigation at national level before referring the matter to the Community authorities, taking account, in particular, of the absence in this case of any provision regulating the position of the insolvent distiller.
Cantine leiab, et ta pidi ootama siseriiklike kohtuvaidluste lahendust enne ühenduse institutsioonide poole pöördumist, võttes eeskätt arvesse, et käesolevas asjas puudus igasugune norm, mis reguleeris maksejõuetu destilleerija olukorda.
In that connection, they add that the Court of First Instance would undoubtedly have dismissed their action claiming liability on the ground that the domestic rights of action had not been exhausted.
Sellega seoses lisab ta, et Esimese Astme Kohus oleks jätnud tingimata tema lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi läbi vaatamata, kuna siseriiklikud õiguskaitsevahendid ei olnud ammendatud.
The Cantine submit that the action is therefore not timebarred because the limitation period for proceedings against the Commission for noncontractual liability began to run only when the Corte suprema di cassazione dismissed their appeals, thereby rendering the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma res judicata.
Cantine sõnul ei ole hagi seetõttu aegunud, kuna komisjoni vastu esitatud lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi aegumistähtaeg hakkas kulgema alles siis, kui Corte suprema di cassazione jättis tema kaebuse rahuldamata, mille tagajärjel jõustus Tribunale civile di Roma kohtuotsus.
Furthermore, the Cantine reply to the Commission that its argument that the judgment under appeal contains a contradiction as regards the admissibility of the action against the Commission for noncontractual liability and the time from which the limitation period applicable to that action starts to run is, in any event, unfounded inasmuch as it is based on the juxtaposition of two parts of that judgment dealing with distinct legal concepts and events.
Lisaks märgib Cantine, et komisjoni argumendid, mille kohaselt vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses esineb vastuolu ühelt poolt komisjoni vastu esitatud lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi vastuvõetavuse ja teiselt poolt sellele hagile kohalduva aegumistähtaja kulgemahakkamise kuupäeva vahel, on igal juhul põhjendamata, kuna neis kõrvutatakse selle kohtuotsuse kaht osa, mis käsitlevad erinevaid õigusmõisteid ja fakte.
If the Court accepts the Commission’s arguments that the proceedings against the Commission for noncontractual liability are timebarred, and if it were to set another point from which the limitation period for those proceedings began to run, the Cantine submit that such a limitation period cannot start to run against them before the unjust enrichment of the Community occurred by virtue of AIMA’s reassignment in 1991 to the EAGGF of the security provided by Assedile.
Juhul kui Euroopa Kohus on nõus komisjoni argumentidega, mis käsitlevad komisjoni vastu esitatud lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi aegumist, ja kui ta määrab selle hagi aegumistähtaja uue lähtepunkti, siis väidab Cantine, et see tähtaeg ei saa hakata kulgema enne, kui toimus ühenduse alusetu rikastumine tema arvelt Assedile seatud garantii ülekandmisega 1991. aastal AIMA poolt EPATF-ile.
The Cantine submit that they learned of that reassignment to the EAGGF, and therefore of the unjust enrichment of the Community, only after receiving the Commission’s letter of 8 December 1997.
Cantine väidab, et ta sai garantii ülekandmisest EPATF-ile ja seega ka ühenduse alusetust rikastumisest teada alles komisjoni 8. detsembri 1997. aasta kirjast.
The limitation period for those proceedings should therefore start to run from that date.
Seega peaks nimetatud hagi aegumistähtaeg hakkama kulgema sellest kuupäevast.
The Cantine rely, in that connection, on the settled caselaw of the Court of Justice and, in particular, Adams v Commission, according to which the expiry of a limitation period cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to that damage and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to bring an action.
Cantine tugineb sellega seoses Euroopa Kohtu väljakujunenud praktikale ja eeskätt eespool viidatud kohtuotsusele Adams vs. komisjon, mille kohaselt ei saa aegumist kohaldada kahju kannatanud isikule, kes sai kahju tekitavast asjaolust palju hiljem teada ja kellel ei olnud seega mõistlikku tähtaega hagi esitamiseks.
The Cantine also state that they did not cease to safeguard their rights by applying to AIMA to obtain payment of the debts owed to them by DAI by way of the security provided by Assedile, and subsequently to the Commission in order to make a complaint concerning the irregularity committed by AIMA.
Cantine rõhutab samuti, et ta ei lõpetanud oma õiguste kaitsmist, pöördudes AIMA poole, et tema nõuded DAI suhtes makstaks Assedile seatud garantii kaudu, ja pöördudes seejärel komisjoni poole, et kaevata AIMA toimepandud rikkumise peale.
No culpable delay can therefore be attributed to them in this case.
Seega ei saa talle süüks panna mingit tahtlikku viivitust.
It must be recalled, as a preliminary point, that the right to bring an action before the Community Courts can be exercised only under the conditions laid down in that regard by the provisions governing each specific action, in this case, an action for damages under Article 235 EC.
Kõigepealt tuleb meenutada, et õigust esitada ühenduse kohtusse hagi saab kasutada üksnes tingimustel, mis on märgitud iga konkreetset hagitüüpi reguleerivates õigusnormides, käesolevas asjas EÜ artiklis 235, mis käsitleb kahju hüvitamise hagi.
As a consequence, that right will have been properly exercised before the Court of First Instance only if the latter correctly applied, in particular, the provisions governing the limitation rules specific to that action (see, to that effect, order in Case C-136/01 P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission [2002] ECR I-6565, paragraph 26).
Järelikult sai seda õigust Esimese Astme Kohtus kehtivalt kasutada üksnes siis, kui see kohus kohaldas õigesti eeskätt selle hagiliigi aegumist reguleerivaid sätted (vt selle kohta 18. juuli 2002. aasta määrus kohtuasjas C-136/01 P: Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi vs. komisjon, EKL 2002, lk I-6565, punkt 26).
In accordance with Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, proceedings against the Community in matters relating to noncontractual liability are barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto.
Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklile 46 vastavalt on ühenduse lepinguvälise vastutusega seotud asjade aegumistähtaeg viis aastat vastutuse aluseks olevast sündmusest.
The fiveyear limitation period referred to in that provision cannot begin to run until all the requirements governing the obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialised.
Selles sättes märgitud viieaastane aegumistähtaeg hakkab kulgema siis, kui on täidetud kõik hüvitamiskohustuse eelduseks olevad tingimused ja eriti kui hüvitamisele kuuluv kahju on muutunud konkreetseks.
Therefore, in cases where, as in this instance, the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, that period of limitation does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen and, therefore, until the time at which the persons concerned were bound to have suffered certain damage (see, in
Seega juhtudel, kui ühenduse vastutuse aluseks on õigustloov akt, hakkab aegumistähtaeg kulgema siis, kui on tekkinud selle akti kahjulikud tagajärjed ja seega kui huvitatud isikutel tekkis kindel kahju (vt eeskätt 27. jaanuari 1982. aasta otsus liidetud kohtuasjades 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80, 5/81: Birra Wührer jt vs. nõukogu ja komisjon, EKL 1982, lk 85, punkt 10,
In the present case the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 131 of the judgment under appeal, that the limitation period began to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid was suffered for certain by the Cantine.
Käesolevas asjas leidis Esimese Astme Kohus vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 131, et aegumistähtaeg hakkas kulgema hetkest, kui Cantine koges ühenduse abi täieliku või osalise maksmatajätmise tagajärgi konkreetselt.
It also stated, in paragraph 132 thereof, that it was not contested that DAI should have paid them the minimum buyingin price for wine not later than the end of June 1983 under Article 9(1) of Regulation No 2499/82.
Lisaks märkis ta selle kohtuotsuse punktis 132, et vaidlust ei olnud selles, et DAI oleks pidanud määruse nr 2499/82 artikli 9 lõike 1 alusel maksma Cantinele veini minimaalse ostuhinna hiljemalt 1983. aasta juuni lõpuks.
However, in the specific circumstances of the case, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 133 of the judgment under appeal, that the damage suffered by the Cantine at the end of June 1983 could not be regarded as being certain, that is to say, imminent and foreseeable, from that date on.
Siiski leidis Esimese Astme Kohus vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 133, et vaidluse asjaolude juures ei saa Cantinele 1983. aasta juuni lõpus tekkinud kahju lugeda sellel kuupäeval konkreetseks, st vahetuks ja ootuspäraseks.
In order to assess whether the damage was certain, the Court of First Instance found, in paragraphs 136 and 145 of the judgment under appeal, that it was necessary to take into consideration the proceedings brought by DAI before the Italian courts specifically concerning the fate of the security provided by Assedile, in the light of the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 and the exceptional circumstances of the case, in which it was extremely difficult for a prudent and wellinformed trader to be certain, before the outcome of those proceedings, that he could not obtain payment of the aid concerned by way of that security before a national court.
Esimese Astme Kohus otsustas vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktides 136 ja 145, et kahju konkreetsuse hindamisel tuleb arvesse võtta menetlusi, mis DAI algatas Itaalia kohtutes ja mis käsitlevad täpsemalt Assedile seatud garantii saatust, võttes arvesse määrusega nr 2499/82 kehtestatud süsteemi keerukust ja käesoleva juhtumi erakorralisi asjaolusid, mille puhul oli ettevaatlikul ja mõistlikul ettevõtjal väga raske enne nende menetluste lõppemist saada teadlikuks sellest, et talle ei maksta siseriiklikus kohtus garantii vahendusel kõnealust abi.
The Court of First Instance accordingly held, in paragraphs 145 to 147 of the judgment under appeal, that it was only after the judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione of 28 November 1994 that the Cantine could have become aware that they would not obtain payment of the aid in question by way of that security and that the damage which they had suffered could therefore not have been certain before that date, with the result that the fiveyear limitation period laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice could not have begun to run before that date.
Seetõttu järeldas Esimese Astme Kohus vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktides 145–147, et Cantine sai alles pärast Corte suprema di cassazione 28. novembri 1994. aasta otsust teadlikuks sellest, et talle ei maksta garantii vahendusel kõnealust abi, ja seega muutus Cantinele tekkinud kahju konkreetseks alles pärast seda kuupäeva, nii et Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 kehtestatud viieaastane aegumistähtaeg ei saanud hakata kulgema enne seda kuupäeva.
In that regard it must be stated that, in proceeding in that manner, the Court of First Instance adopted a subjective approach to the question whether the conditions giving rise to the noncontractual liability of the Community had been established, according to which the damage caused by an unlawful legislative act cannot be regarded as certain as long as the allegedly injured party does not perceive it as such.
Sellega seoses tuleb sedastada, et nii toimides kasutas Esimese Astme Kohus ühenduse lepinguvälise vastutuse tekkimise tingimuste esinemise tuvastamisel subjektiivset lähenemisviisi, mille kohaselt ei saa õigusvastase õigusaktiga tekitatud kahju lugeda konkreetseks, kuni väidetavalt kahju kannatanud pool ei taju kahju sellisena.
In the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance made the assessment of whether the damage caused to the Cantine was certain contingent on their becoming aware that they would not obtain compensation for their damage before the national courts.
Esimese Astme Kohus seadis vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses Cantinele tekitatud kahju konkreetsuse hindamise sõltuvusse sellest, millal Cantine sai teadlikuks, et tema kahju siseriiklikes kohtutes ei hüvitata.
The conditions to which the obligation to make good the damage referred to in the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is subject, and, therefore, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions for compensation in respect of that damage may be based only on strictly objective criteria.
EÜ artikli 288 teises lõigus märgitud kahju hüvitamise kohustuse tingimused ja seega selle kahju hüvitamise nõuete aegumist käsitlevad eeskirjad saavad tugineda üksnes objektiivsetele tingimustele.
If it were otherwise, there would be a risk of undermining the principle of legal certainty on which the rules on limitations periods specifically rely and which require that legal rules be clear and precise in order that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).
Vastupidisel juhul rikutaks nende eeskirjade aluseks olevat õiguskindluse põhimõtet, mis nõuab, et ühenduse õigusnormid oleksid selged ja täpsed, selleks et huvitatud isikud saaksid ühenduse õiguskorda kuuluvates olukordades ja õigussuhetes nendest juhinduda (vt eeskätt 15. veebruari 1996. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-63/93: Duff jt, EKL 1996, lk I-569, punkt 20).
Furthermore, it must be observed that preventing the limitation period for proceedings against the Community for noncontractual liability from starting to run as long as the party who has allegedly been harmed is not personally convinced that he has suffered damage has the result that the point in time at which those proceedings become timebarred varies according to the individual perception that each party may have as to the reality of the damage, something which is at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods.
Lisaks tuleb märkida, et ühenduse lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi aegumistähtaja kulgemise takistamine kuni hetkeni, kui väidetavalt kahju kannatanud isik on isiklikult veendunud, et talle on kahju tekkinud, muudab selle hagi aegumise hetke sõltuvaks iga poole isiklikust teadlikukssaamisest kahju konkreetsusest; see on aga vastuolus õiguskindluse nõudega, mis on vajalik nende aegumistähtaegade kohaldamiseks.
In that connection, it must also be observed that the Court has rejected the argument that the limitation period referred to in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice cannot begin to run until the victim has specific and detailed knowledge of the facts of the case, since knowledge of the facts is not one of the conditions which must be met in order for the limitation period to begin running (see order in Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission, paragraph 31).
Sellega seoses tuleb ka märkida, et Euroopa Kohus on tagasi lükanud väite, et Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 märgitud aegumistähtaeg hakkab kulgema alles hetkest, kui ohvril on täpne ja üksikasjaline arusaam kõnealustest asjaoludest, sest arusaam asjaoludest ei ole nende asjaolude hulgas, mis peavad esinema aegumistähtaja kulgemiseks (vt eespool viidatud kohtumäärus Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi vs. komisjon, punkt 31).
The subjective appraisal of the reality of the damage cannot therefore be taken into consideration in order to determine the moment at which the limitation period begins in proceedings being brought against the Community for noncontractual liability.
Kahju tegelikkuse subjektiivset hindamist ei saa seega arvesse võtta ühenduse lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi aegumistähtaja alguse kindlaksmääramisel.
It follows that, in the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance was unable to establish whether the damage caused to the Cantine was certain and therefore it could not determine the time at which the limitation period for their action for compensation began to run by relying on the perception of the Cantine with regard to the harmful effects of Regulation No 2499/82.
Sellest tuleneb, et Esimese Astme Kohus ei saanud vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses tuvastada Cantinele tekkinud kahju konkreetsust ja seega lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi aegumistähtaja algust, tuginedes Cantine tajule määruse nr 2499/82 kahju tekitavatest tagajärgedest.
The Court of First Instance ought, on the contrary, to have based itself for that purpose on exclusively objective criteria.
Esimese Astme Kohus oleks pidanud hoopis tuginema täiesti objektiivsetele kriteeriumidele.
It is on precisely such criteria that the Court has already relied for the purpose of determining the date on which the limitation period provided for in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice begins to run.
Neile kriteeriumidele ongi Euroopa Kohus juba tuginenud, et kindlaks määrata Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 märgitud aegumistähtaja algust.
As is clear from paragraph 33 of Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, the Court has held that that limitation period begins to run from the moment at which the financial loss suffered by the victim actually materialised.
Euroopa Kohus leidis eespool viidatud kohtuotsuse Holcim (Deutschland) vs. komisjon punktis 33, et see tähtaeg hakkab kulgema hetkest, kui ohvrile tekkis tegelikult varaline kahju.
It follows therefore that the start of that period is linked to the objective loss actually caused to the assets of the party which claims to have suffered harm.
Seega tuleneb sellest, et see tähtaeg on seotud väidetavalt kahju kannatanud poole varale konkreetselt tekitatud objektiivse kahjuga.
In the present case, the Court of First Instance ought therefore, in the judgment under appeal, to have made the fiveyear limitation period for the action for compensation brought before it by the Cantine under Article 235 EC start to run from the date on which the damage caused by Regulation No 2499/82 objectively materialised in the form of an adverse impact on their assets.
Käesolevas asjas oleks Esimese Astme Kohus seega pidanud hakkama lugema vaidlustatud kohtuotsuses EÜ artikli 235 alusel Cantine esitatud lepinguvälise kahju hagi aegumistähtaega kuupäevast, kui määrusega nr 2499/82 tekitatud kahju objektiivselt materialiseerus, tekitades Cantine varale kahju.
The Court of First Instance ought, in particular, to have held that the limitation period had started to run when the application of the unlawful system for payment of Community aid provided for in Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82 had actually and objectively caused damage to the Cantine by failing to guarantee them direct payment of the Community aid at the time of DAI’s insolvency.
Eeskätt oleks Esimese Astme Kohus pidanud leidma, et see aegumistähtaeg hakkas kulgema hetkest, kui määruse nr 2499/82 artiklis 9 sätestatud ühenduse abi tasumise õigusvastane kord oli tekitanud Cantinele tegelikult ja objektiivselt kahju, jättes talle tagamata ühenduse abi otsese maksmise DAI maksejõuetuse korral.
That time should therefore have been fixed as the day on which the Cantine were unable to obtain that payment within 90 days from the entry of the wine into the distillery referred to in that provision, that is, at the end of June 1983, as is clear in particular from paragraph 132 of the judgment under appeal.
Seega oleks tulnud selleks hetkeks määrata päev, kui Cantinele ei makstud seda abi 90 päeva jooksul pärast selles artiklis märgitud veini jõudmist piiritusetehasesse, st 1983. aasta juuni lõpus, nagu ilmneb eeskätt vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktist 132.
By holding, in paragraph 147 of the judgment under appeal, that the limitation period laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice could not have begun to run before 28 November 1994 and therefore, in paragraph 150 thereof, declaring
Kuna Esimese Astme Kohus leidis vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 147, et Euroopa Kohtu põhikirja artiklis 46 kehtestatud aegumistähtaeg ei saanud hakata kulgema enne 28. novembrit 1994, ja tunnistas seetõttu viidatud kohtuotsuse punktis 150
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS admissible, on the ground that it was not out of time, the action for compensation brought before it on 12 October 1998, that is to say, more than 15 years after the damage actually occurred, the Court of First Instance misapplied the provisions governing the rules on limitation contained in that article.
KOMISJON VS. CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA JT sellesse kohtusse esitatud lepinguvälise vastutuse hagi vastuvõetavaks, kuna see oli tähtaegselt esitatud 12. oktoobril 1998 – teisisõnu enam kui 15 aastat pärast kahju tegelikku tekkimist –, siis on Esimese Astme Kohus ekslikult kohaldanud nimetatud artiklis esitatud aegumisnorme.
Furthermore, the Cantines’ argument based on Adams v Commission, in which the Court held that the expiry of a limitation period cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage where that person could only belatedly have become aware of the event giving rise to it, must be rejected.
Lisaks tuleb jätta kõrvale Cantine argumendid, mis tuginevad eespool viidatud kohtuotsusele Adams vs. komisjon, milles Euroopa Kohus leidis, et aegumist ei saa kohaldada kahju kannatanu suhtes, kes sai kahju tekitavast asjaolust palju hiljem teada.
Unlike the case which gave rise to the Adams judgment, the Cantine cannot claim in the present case that they were not aware, from the end of June 1983, of the event giving rise to their damage, as they knew perfectly well from that time that Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82 did not provide them with any guarantee whatsoever of direct payment of the Community aid in question in the event of the distiller’s insolvency.
Vastupidi nimetatud kohtuotsuse aluseks olnud juhtumile ei saa Cantine käesolevas asjas väita, et ta ei olnud teadlik 1983. aasta juuni lõpus talle kahju tekitanud asjaolust, kuna talle oli tollel ajal hästi teada, et määruse nr 2499/82 artikkel 9 ei taga talle kõnealuse ühenduse abi otsest maksmist destilleerija maksejõuetuse korral.