natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In addition, since the losses sustained by the applicant after 14 September 2001 flow directly from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the applicant is in a different situation compared with other airlines with regard to which that fact had not been established.
Lisaks, kuna hagejale pärast 14. septembrit 2001 tekkinud kahju tuleneb otseselt 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakutest, erineb hageja olukord teiste lennuettevõtjate omast, kelle puhul sellise asjaolu esinemine ei ole tõendatud.
Finally, the applicant points out that the Greek authorities requested, in their letter of 24 September 2002 (see paragraph 5 above), authorisation to pay certain sums to compensate as well losses which arose after 14 September 2001 on the basis of Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Lõpuks rõhutab hageja, et Kreeka ametiasutused taotlesid oma 24. septembri 2002. aasta kirjas (vt eespool punkt 5) luba summade maksmiseks, et hüvitada ka pärast 14. septembrit 2001 tekkinud kahju EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b alusel.
Therefore, the Hellenic Republic never accepted the restrictive approach suggested by the Commission in the Communication of 10 October 2001, as is also borne out by Law No 2992/2002, which provides for a broader framework of compensation.
Sellele vaatamata ei ole Kreeka Vabariik kunagi nõustunud komisjoni poolt 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatises väljapakutud kitsa lähenemisega, ning seda kinnitab muu hulgas seadus nr 2992/2002, mis näeb ette laiemad hüvitamise alused.
Furthermore, it should be accepted that the closure of the airspace was the consequence of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which were an exceptional occurrence within the meaning of Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Lisaks tuleb nõustuda sellega, et õhuruumi sulgemine kujutab endast 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakute tagajärge, nende rünnakute puhul on aga tegemist erakorralise sündmusega EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b tähenduses.
The applicant disputes the Commission’s argument that it carried out an analysis of the aid not only on the basis of the Communication of 10 October 2001, but also in the light of Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Hageja vaidleb vastu komisjoni seisukohale, mille kohaselt viimane ei analüüsinud abi mitte ainult 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatise alusel, vaid ka EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punktist b lähtuvalt.
On the contrary, the contested decision is characterised by an automatic application of the criterion according to which any loss which arose after 14 September 2001 had no causal connection with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 which provoked the closure of the airspace.
Vastupidi, vaidlustatud otsust iseloomustab automaatselt rakendatav kriteerium, mille kohaselt pärast 14. septembrit 2001 tekkinud kahju ei ole otseses põhjuslikus seoses 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakutega, mis tingisid õhuruumi sulgemise.
However, all the losses for which the applicant received compensation had a direct causal connection, for the purposes of Article 87(2)(b) EC, with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Samas on kogu kahjul, mille eest hageja sai hüvitist, EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b tähenduses otsene põhjuslik seos 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakutega.
The losses in respect of the applicant’s North Atlantic network
Hageja Põhja-Atlandi võrgustikku puudutav kahju
As regards the cancellation of the return flight to New York initially scheduled for 15 September 2001, the applicant points out that, in spite of its requests, John F. Kennedy international airport (‘JFK’) did not give it a slot for that day, but only for 16 September, as is evidenced by a telex from the United States Federal Aviation
Hageja rõhutab seoses esialgu 15. septembriks 2001 planeeritud edasi-tagasi lennuga New Yorki, et hoolimata tema taotlustest ei eraldanud John F. Kennedy (JFK) rahvusvaheline lennuväli talle teenindusaega selleks kuupäevaks, vaid üksnes 16. septembriks, mida kinnitab Federal Aviation Authority (Ameerika tsiviillennunduse
Authority of 14 September 2001.
KOMISJON föderaalamet) 14. septembri 2001. aasta faks.
The unavailability of a slot was due only to the exceptionally high demand from airlines immediately after the gradual reopening of the airspace, and because of the disruption caused by its closure for four days.
Teenindusaegade puudumine tulenes üksnes lennuettevõtjate erakordselt suurest nõudlusest nende järele kohe pärast õhuruumi järkjärgulist avamist, ja seda õhuruumi neljaks päevaks sulgemisest tingitud häirete tõttu.
In those circumstances, JFK was not in a position to satisfy all the applications for slots, a situation which is comparable for the applicant to the closure of the airspace.
Neil asjaoludel ei olnud JFK lennuväli võimeline rahuldama kõiki teenindusaegade taotlusi, ning see asjaolu tähendas hageja jaoks sedasama, mis õhuruumi sulgemine.
The fact that the telex was not produced by the Greek authorities during the administrative procedure is not decisive, having regard to the fact that the Commission based its determination, in accordance with the Communication of 10 October 2001, on the lack of any causal connection between the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the cancellation of the return flight to New York initially scheduled for 15 September 2001.
Asjaolu, et Kreeka ametiasutused ei esitanud seda faksi haldusmenetluse käigus, et ole määrav, arvestades asjaolu, et komisjon rajas oma hinnangu põhjusliku seose puudumisele 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakute ja esialgu 15. septembriks 2001 planeeritud edasi-tagasi lennu New Yorki tühistamise vahel, kohaldades 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatist.
As regards the cancellation of the two return flights to Toronto via Montreal on 15 and 16 September 2001, the applicant points out that the Canadian authorities required the aircraft which provided that service on 11 September 2001 to land that day at Halifax and to remain there until 15 September 2001 inclusive.
Seoses kahe edasi-tagasi lennu Montréali kaudu Torontosse tühistamisega 15. ja 16. septembril 2001 rõhutab hageja, et Kanada ametiasutused kohustasid lennukit, mis sellel liinil 11. septembril 2001 lendas, maanduma sel päeval Halifaxis ja seal peatuma kuni 15. septembrini 2001 (kaasa arvatud).
That aircraft could not return to Athens until 16 September 2001 at 5.30.
See lennuk sai Ateenasse naasta alles 16. septembril 2001 kell 5:30.
The applicant’s three other Airbus A 340/400s, which were the only aircraft capable of making transatlantic flights, served other destinations, which required the cancellation of the 15 September 2001 flight to Toronto via Montreal.
Hageja ülejäänud kolm ainsana üleatlandilisi lende sooritada võivat lennukit Airbus A 340/400, teenindasid samal ajal teisi liine, ning see sundis hagejat tühistama 15. septembri 2001. aasta lennu Montréali kaudu Torontosse.
For the same reason, the applicant was obliged to cancel the 16 September 2001 flight also to Toronto via Montreal.
Samal põhjusel pidi hageja tühistama ka 16. septembri 2001. aasta lennu, mille sihtkoht oli samuti Montréali kaudu Toronto.
Indeed, because of the immobilisation of the aircraft until 15 September 2001 at Halifax, it was impossible, for the purposes of providing that flight, to carry out the major technical inspection, prepare the aircraft, notify the passengers and reserve slots at Montreal and Toronto airports, in the light, particularly, of the fact that the Canadian authorities gave no prior notice of the exact time at which the aircraft was authorised to take off on 15 September 2001.
Kuna lennuk paiknes kuni 15. septembrini 2001 Halifaxis, ning arvestades eelkõige asjaolu, et Kanada ametiasutused ei teatanud ette täpset kellaaega, mil kõnealusel lennukil lubati 15. septembril 2001 õhku tõusta, osutus võimatuks teostada selle lennu toimumise tagamiseks põhjalikku tehnilist kontrolli, lennuk ette valmistada, teavitada reisijaid ning reserveerida teenindusajad Montréali ja Toronto lennuväljadel.
In those circumstances, the Commission’s argument that the cancellation of those two flights was the applicant’s choice is manifestly erroneous.
Neil asjaoludel on komisjoni seisukoht, mille kohaselt nende kahe lennu tühistamine oli hageja enda valik, ilmselgelt ekslik.
Those cancellations were, on the contrary, the direct consequence of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 which gave rise to the closure of the airspace and were therefore outside its control.
Lendude tühistamine oli vastupidi 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakute otsene tagajärg, kuna need rünnakud tingisid õhuruumi sulgemise ning ei sõltunud seega hageja tahtest.
The insufficiency of aircraft relied upon by the Commission did not cause the cancellation of the flights in question but was a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Kõnealuste lendude tühistamise põhjuseks ei olnud mitte komisjoni väidetav lennukite ebapiisavus, vaid tühistamine oli 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakute otsene tagajärg.
OLYMPIAKI AEROPORIA YPIRESIES v COMMISSION for compensation under Article 87(2)(b) EC, irrespective of the fact that they arose on 15 and 16 September 2001.
KOHTUOTSUS 25.7.2008 – KOHTUASI T-268/06 tamisega seotud kahju pidada hüvitatavaks EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b tähenduses, sõltumata asjaolust, et see kahju tekkis 15. ja 16. septembril 2001.
The applicant also draws attention to the fact that the aircraft which should have made the flight to New York on 15 September 2001 was not used to make the flights to Canada because it was used for the 16 September 2001 flight to New York.
Hageja märgib ka, et lennukit, millega pidi lennatama 15. septembri 2001. aasta lennul New Yorki, ei kasutatud Kanada lendudeks, kuna seda kasutati 16. septembri 2001. aasta lennuks New Yorki.
Furthermore, the Canadian authorities did not allow it to make flights to Canada until after 16 September 2001.
Lisaks andsid Kanada ametiasutused talle võimaluse Kanada suunal lennata alles alates 16. septembrist 2001.
Finally, the applicant submits that flights to South-East Asia and Australia are made by a single aircraft which makes a stop in Asia and continues to Australia, which is its final destination.
Lõpuks lendab hageja väitel Kagu-Aasia ja Austraalia lendudel ainult üks lennuk, mis teeb vahemaandumise Aasias ja jätkab seejärel lendu oma lõpp-sihtkoha Austraalia suunas.
Accordingly, the five destinations (Africa, South-East Asia, Australia, the United States and Canada) could be served by four aircraft.
Seetõttu saavad neli lennukit teenindada viit sihtkohta (Aafrika, Kagu-Aasia, Austraalia, Ühendriigid ja Kanada).
As regards the ‘ferry flights’ to New York (on 18 September 2001) and to Toronto via Montreal (on 20 and 26 September 2001), the applicant points out that the operation of those flights is also directly connected with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and was not caused by pressure by the Governments of the United States and Canada for the repatriation of their nationals.
Seoses ferry flight’idega New Yorki (18. septembril 2001) ja Montréali kaudu Torontosse (20. ja 26. septembril 2001) märgib hageja, et nende lendude korraldamine oli samuti otseselt seotud 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakutega, mitte ei tulene Ühendriikide ja Kanada valitsuse survest oma kodanike kodumaale tagasiviimiseks.
In fact, the length of the waiting lists for scheduled flights, because of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, prevented those passengers from making reservations on the latter flights, which obliged the applicant to operate the ‘ferry flights’.
Regulaarlendude ootejärjekordade pikkus, mis oli tingitud 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakutest, takistas neil reisijatel saamast kohta neile lendudele, mis kohustaski hagejat ferry flight’e korraldama.
The losses in respect of the rest of the applicant’s network
Hageja ülejäänud võrgustikku puudutav kahju
The applicant submits that while the Commission decided that the payment of EUR 1 921 203 on account of the cancellation of the seven return flights to New York, to Tel Aviv, to Toronto via Montreal and to Boston constituted aid compatible with the common market (see paragraph 12 above), it did not, however, approve the compensation for the losses in respect of the rest of its network for the period from 11 to 15 September 2001.
Hageja rõhutab, et kuigi komisjon pidas 1 921 203 euro maksmist seetõttu, et tühistati seitse edasi-tagasi lendu New Yorki, Tel-Avivi, Montréali kaudu Torontosse, ning Bostonisse, ühisturuga kokkusobivaks abiks (vt eespool punkt 12), ei kiitnud ta siiski heaks hüvitise maksmist kahju eest, mis puudutas hageja ülejäänud võrgustikku asjavahemikul 11.–15. septembrini 2001.
Those losses amounted to around EUR 1 212 032.
Samas on selle kahju suurus umbes 1 212 032 eurot.
In that regard, the applicant notes that, according to the foregoing considerations, the losses due to the disruption to its schedule of flights on 15 September 2001 should be held to be eligible for compensation under Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Selles osas meenutab hageja, et vastavalt eespool toodud kaalutlustele tuleb häireid tema 15. septembri 2001. aasta lennuplaanis pidada hüvitise saamiseks kõlblikeks EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b tähenduses.
That approach is supported by the Communication of 10 October 2001 and by the letter of 14 November 2001 (see paragraph 4 above).
Seda lähenemist kinnitab nii 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatis kui 14. novembri 2001. aasta kiri (vt eespool punkt 4).
The applicant points out that the losses in respect of the rest of its network amount to half of the damage suffered in the North Atlantic and Israel network.
Hageja rõhutab, et tema ülejäänud võrgustikku puudutava kahju suuruseks on pool Põhja-Atlandi ja Iisraeli võrgustikus kantud kahjust.
Therefore, they cannot be disregarded on the sole basis of the arbitrarily restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘causal connection’ made in the Communication of 10 October 2001.
Seetõttu ei saa neid kõrvale jätta üksnes põhjusliku seose mõiste sellise meelevaldselt kitsa tõlgendamise tõttu, mis sisaldub 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatises.
In any event, the Commission should have approved the amounts paid as compensation for the losses in respect of the rest of the applicant’s network for the period from 11 to 14 September 2001.
Igal juhul oleks komisjon pidanud heaks kiitma summad, mis maksti hüvitisena hageja ülejäänud võrgustikule ajavahemikul 11.–14. septembrini 2001 tekitatud kahju eest.
As regards the evidence submitted by the Greek authorities during the formal investigation procedure, the applicant argues that it could not have known of the exact content of the letter of 20 November 2003 nor, particularly, of the fact that the Greek authorities were providing additional information which did not concern all the losses sustained following the events of 11 September 2001.
Seoses Kreeka ametiasutuste poolt ametlikus uurimismenetluses esitatud asjaoludega märgib hageja, et ta ei saanud teada 20. novembri 2003. aasta kirja täpset sisu ning eelkõige asjaolu, et Kreeka ametiasutused esitasid lisateavet, mis ei puudutanud mitte kogu 11. septembri 2001. aasta sündmuste järgselt tekkinud kahju.
Furthermore, the aid scheme in question was implemented by the Greek authorities on the basis of the information with which the applicant had provided them.
Lisaks rakendasid Kreeka ametiasutused kõnealuse abikava andmete põhjal, mida hageja oli neile esitanud.
Nor could it have anticipated that the Commission’s analysis would be based solely on the fragmentary evidence contained in the letter of 20 November 2003.
Ta ei oleks oodanud, et komisjon rajab oma analüüsi üksnes 20. novembri 2003. aasta kirjas toodud mittetäielikele asjaoludele.
The applicant also points out that the information, production of which had been mentioned by the Greek authorities in the letter of 20 November 2003, concerned the amounts mentioned in paragraph 17.2 of the decision to open the formal investigation procedure (reproduced in the second to ninth indents of paragraph 5 above) and not the losses in respect of the rest of the applicant’s network to which the Commission was referring in paragraph 17.1 of that decision.
Hageja märgib ka, et andmed, mida Kreeka ametiasutused 20. novembri 2003. aasta kirjas esitada lubasid, puudutasid ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse punktis 17.2 (need on nimetatud eespool, punkti 5 teises kuni üheksandas taandes) märgitud ja mitte hageja ülejäänud võrgustikuga seotud kahju, millele komisjon viitab nimetatud otsuse punktis 17.1.
Furthermore, the letter of 20 November 2003 states clearly that it did not concern the losses relating to the cancellations of tickets on other flights for which the cancelled flights served as connections.
Lisaks on 20. novembri 2003. aasta kirjas selgelt öeldud, et see ei puuduta nende lennupiletite tühistamisega seotud kahju, millele tühistatud lendudelt pidi ümber istutama.
To identify the amount of those losses, it would be sufficient to subtract the amount to which reference is made in the letter of 20 November 2003 from the amount mentioned in the letter of 24 September 2002.
Selle kahjusumma kindlaks tegemiseks oleks piisanud 20. novembri 2003. aasta kirjas viidatud summa lahutamisest 24. septembri 2002. aasta kirjas mainitud summast.
In any event, the information provided by the Greek authorities concerns an amount greater than that declared compatible with the common market in the contested decision.
Igal juhul puudutavad Kreeka ametiasutuste poolt esitatud andmed suuremat summat kui see, mida vaidlustatud otsus ühisturuga kokkusobivaks peab.
In addition, the applicant submits that the Commission’s file contained sufficient information for all the amounts constituting the damage suffered because of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, as set out in the letter of 24 September 2002.
Lisaks leiab hageja, et komisjoni toimik sisaldas kohaseid andmeid kõigi summade kohta, mis vastavad 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakute tagajärjel tekkinud kahjule, nii nagu need on toodud 24. septembri 2002. aasta kirjas. Neil asjaoludel palub hageja
In those circumstances, the applicant requests the Court to evaluate the completeness of the evidence submitted by the Greek authorities to the Commission during the administrative procedure in the light of the materials contained in the file of the present case.
Esimese Astme Kohtul hinnata ametliku uurimismenetluse käigus Kreeka ametiasutuste poolt komisjonile esitatud asjaolude ammendavust, arvestades käesoleva kohtuasja toimikus olevaid tõendeid.
Therefore, the Commission’s determination with regard to the losses in respect of the rest of the applicant’s network is manifestly erroneous and infringes Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Seetõttu on komisjoni hinnang seoses hageja ülejäänud võrgutikku puudutava kahjuga ilmselgelt ekslik ning rikub EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b.
Commission’s arguments
Komisjoni argumendid
The Commission denies that the applicant’s arguments are well founded.
Komisjon leiab, et hageja argumendid ei ole põhjendatud.
It states that, according to settled case-law, the guidelines in State aid matters bind it in the same way as the Member States which have accepted them.
Ta märgib, et väljakujunenud kohtupraktika kohaselt on riigiabi suunised talle samamoodi siduvad kui need vastu võtnud liikmesriikidele.
The Greek authorities repeatedly stated, during the administrative procedure, that they would examine the claims for compensation submitted by the airlines within the framework of the guidelines and of the Communication of 10 October 2001.
Kreeka ametiasutused väitsid ametliku uurimismenetluse käigus korduvalt, et nad kontrollisid lennuettevõtjate hüvitisetaotlusi lähtuvalt suunistest ja 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatisest.
In addition, the Commission points out that, contrary to the applicant’s allegation, it analysed the aid paid to the applicant not only on the basis of the Communication of 10 October 2001, but also in the light of Article 87(2)(b) EC, as is borne out by recital 59 in the contested decision.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et vastupidi hageja väidetele analüüsis ta makstud abi mitte üksnes 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatise alusel, vaid samuti lähtuvalt EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punktist b, millest annab tunnistust vaidlustatud otsuse põhjendus 59.
To that end, the Commission took into account all the evidence submitted to it during the administrative procedure.
Seda tehes arvestas komisjon kõiki talle ametliku uurimismenetluse käigus esitatud asjaolusid.
The Commission rejects the interpretation of the Communication of 10 October 2001 suggested by the applicant, according to which even the losses which arose after 14 September 2001 could come within the scope of Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Komisjon ei ole nõus hageja poolt 10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatisele antud tõlgendusega, mille kohaselt võib ka pärast 14. septembrit 2001 tekkinud kahju kuuluda EÜ artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b kohaldamisalasse.
The terms of the Communication of 10 October 2001 exclude that eventuality.
10. oktoobri 2001. aasta teatise sõnastus välistab sellise tõlgenduse võimalikkuse.
As for the identification of the exceptional occurrence in this case, the Commission emphasises that
Komisjon rõhutab seoses erakorraliste sündmuste määratlemisega antud asjas, et nimetatud sündmuseks on 11. septembri
2008 — CASE T-268/06 it is the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 which constitute that occurrence and not the closure of the airspace, which was the consequence of those attacks.
2001. aasta rünnakud, mitte õhuruumi sulgemine, mis toimus nende rünnakute tagajärjel.
The Commission contends that neither the Greek authorities nor the applicant submitted, during the administrative procedure, evidence showing that the losses which arose after 14 September 2001 were causally connected with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Komisjon toob välja, et ei Kreeka ametiasutused ega hageja esitanud haldusmenetluse käigus tõendeid, mis näitaksid, et pärast 14. septembrit 2001 tekkinud kahjul oleks otsene seos 11. septembri 2001. aasta rünnakutega.
Finally, the Commission refutes the argument that the applicant’s situation was different from that of other airlines which were not awarded amounts of aid corresponding to losses which arose after 14 September 2001.
Lõpuks lükkab komisjon ümber argumendi, mille kohaselt hageja olukord erines teiste lennuettevõtjate omast, kellel ei olnud õigust pärast 14. septembrit 2001 tekkinud kahjule vastavate summade saamiseks.
As regards the cancellation of the return flight of 15 September 2001 to New York, the Commission submits that, contrary to the Greek authorities’ statement in their letter of 20 November 2003, they did not produce, during the administrative procedure, evidence of the impossibility of reserving a slot at JFK.
Komisjon rõhutab seoses 15. septembri 2001. aasta edasi-tagasi lennu New Yorki tühistamisega, et vastupidi Kreeka ametiasutuste 20. novembri 2003. aasta kirjas lubatule ei esitanud viimased haldusmenetluse käigus tõendeid, mis näitaksid, et neis tingimustes oli JFK lennuväljal võimatu teenindusaega reserveerida.
In those circumstances, the Commission repeats the determination it made in recital 55 in the contested decision.
Neil asjaoludel kordab komisjon vaidlustatud otsuse punktis 55 antud hinnangut.
The Federal Aviation Authority’s telex (see paragraph 29 above) was produced for the first time before the Court and, on any view, makes no reference to 15 September 2001 and provides no explanation of why the applicant did not succeed in reserving a slot although other airlines succeeded in doing so.
Federal Aviation Authority faks (vt eespool punkt 29) esitati esimest korda alles Esimese Astme Kohtus, ning igal juhul ei viita see 15. septembrile 2001 ega võimalda seletada, miks hageja ei olnud võimeline teenindusaega reserveerima, samas kui teised lennuettevõtjad olid.