natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
90 — See the judgment in Case C-210/98 P Salzgitter v Commission [2000] ECR I-5843, paragraphs 49 to 55 and the caselaw cited there.
90 – Vt 13. juuli 2000. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-210/98 P: Salzgitter vs. komisjon (EKL 2000, lk I-5843, punktid 49–55 ja nendes viidatud kohtupraktika).
87 — See points 149 to 152 of this Opinion.
87 – Vt käesoleva ettepaneku punktid 149–152.
COMMISSION v SALZGITTER or in accordance with a general aid scheme authorised on the basis of the EC Treaty, until the Commission has approved them.
KOMISJON VS. SALZGITTER kohustatud kõnesolevast abist teatama, ning abi andmine sõltub komisjoni otsusest, olenemata sellest, kas abi peetakse riigiabiks”.
As the Court stated with regard to Article 88(3) EC, that control is essential to ensure the functioning of the common market. 91
Nagu Euroopa Kohus EÜ artikli 88 lõike 3 raames märkis, on kontroll ühisturu õige toimimise tagamiseks peamine. 91
It is clear from the wording of the second sentence of Article 6(1) of the Third Code that, after the entry into force of that code on 1 January 1986, the obligation to notify financial measures such as those at issue in this case was clear and unconditional.
Kolmanda koodeksi artikli 6 lõike 1 teise lause sõnastusest tuleneb selgesti, et pärast selle koodeksi jõustumist 1. jaanuaril 1986 kehtib selge ja tingimusteta kohustus teatada sellistest finantsmeetmetest nagu käesolevas kohtuvaidluses.
Consequently, contrary to the findings of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 174 of the judgment under appeal, I consider that the obligation to notify introduced by the Commission into the second sentence of Article 6(1) of the Third Code clearly applied to aid such as that at issue in this case.
Sellest tulenevalt ma arvan, vastupidiselt Esimese Astme Kohtu seisukohale vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 174, et komisjoni kehtestatud teatamiskohustus kolmanda koodeksi artikli 6 lõike 1 teises lauses käsitleb selgelt sellist abi nagu käesolevas kohtuvaidluses.
The Federal Republic of Germany, as a member of the ECSC Consultative Committee, and Salzgitter, as a major economic operator, were both well placed to be aware of the introduction of that obligation into the Third Code and of its retention in subsequent steel aid codes.
Saksamaa Liitvabariik, arvestades tema osalemist ESTÜ nõuandekomitees, ja Salzgitter, arvestades tema tähtsat majanduspositsiooni, olid mõlemad võimelised märkama selle kohustuse kehtestamist kolmandas koodeksis ja selle säilitamist järgnevates teraseabikoodeksites.
Consequently, contrary to the finding of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 181 of the judgment under appeal, I do not consider that the Commission was required to provide any clarification of the rules under the Third Code or the subsequent codes.
Järelikult, vastupidiselt sellele, mida Esimese Astme Kohus otsustas vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 181, ei arva ma, et komisjon oleks pidanud selgitama kolmanda või hilisemate koodeksite eeskirju.
That obligation appears, in identical terms, in Article 6(1) of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Codes.
Nimelt on see kohustus esitatud samas sõnastuses neljanda, viienda ja kuuenda koodeksi artikli 6 lõikes 1.
Asked to rule on a question relating to the scope of such a provision under the Fifth Code, the Court held that, as it was worded, that provision ‘[left] the public authorities in no doubt regarding their obligation to notify the loans at issue and to make their grant subject to a prior decision of the Commission, irrespective of whether or not they may be classified as aid’. 92
Nii leidis ühenduse kohus, kui talle esitati küsimus selle sätte ulatuse kohta viienda koodeksi raames, et sõnastust arvestades „ei jää ametivõimudele selles sättes mingit kahtlust, et nad on
Accordingly, I take the view that Salzgitter and the Federal Republic of Germany were well placed to know the precise scope of their obligations and had been so since the adoption of the Third Code in 1986.
Nendel tingimustel arvan ma, et Salzgitter ja Saksamaa Liitvabariik teadsid täpselt oma kohustuste ulatust juba alates kolmanda koodeksi vastuvõtmisest 1986. aastal. Seega oli vastupidiselt Esimese Astme Kohtu
There was therefore, contrary to the finding of the Court of First Instance, a clear and unequivocal obligation to notify the aid at issue under Article 6 of the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Codes.
91 – Vt 14. veebruari 1990. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-301/87: Prantsusmaa vs. komisjon (EKL 1990, lk I-307, punkt 17) ja 11. juuli 1996. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-39/94: SFEI jt (EKL 1996, lk I-3547, punkt 70).
92 — Order in Case C-399/95 R (paragraph 55).
92 – Eespool viidatud määrus Saksamaa vs. komisjon (punkt 55).
OPINION OF MR BOT — CASE C-408/04 P had therefore failed to discharge its duty of diligence.
KOHTUJURIST BOT’ ETTEPANEK — KOHTUASI C-408/04 P aastat enne, kui ta reageeris, ega täitnud seega oma hoolsuskohustust.
In the light of all of the foregoing, I therefore consider that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in the analysis relating to the clarity of the legal framework applicable.
Neid asjaolusid arvestades leian ma, et Esimese Astme Kohus rikkus kohaldatava õigusliku raamistiku selguse hindamisel õigusnormi.
That finding would, in principle, form a sufficient basis for upholding the appeal brought by the Commission and for proposing that the Court should set aside the judgment under appeal.
Sellisest tuvastusest põhimõtteliselt piisab komisjoni apellatsioonkaebuse vastuvõtmiseks ja Euroopa Kohtule ettepaneku tegemiseks tühistada vaidlustatud kohtuotsus.
I consider, none the less, that it is appropriate to proceed with the examination of the fifth and third limbs of this plea in order to determine the conclusions to be drawn in this case from that error of law.
Ma arvan siiski, et tuleb veel uurida ka esimese väite viiendat ja kolmandat osa, et hinnata, mis järeldusi teha käesolevas kohtuasjas sellest õigusnormi rikkumisest.
The Commission submits that, in paragraphs 175 to 179 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance merely lists the documents which were sent to the Commission, but does not specify whether they contained information on aid which had not been notified.
Komisjon väidab, et vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktides 175–179 nimetab Esimese Astme Kohus vaid, mis dokumendid komisjonile edastati, aga ta ei täpsusta, kas need sisaldasid teavet abi kohta, millest ei olevat teatatud.
Furthermore, the Court of First Instance makes no reference to any legal provision requiring the Commission’s administration to take account of those documents outside the procedure in the context of which they were sent to it.
Peale selle ei maini Esimese Astme Kohus ühtegi õigusnormi, mis kohustab komisjoni haldusaparaati võtma arvesse neid dokumente väljaspool menetlust, mille raames need talle edastati.
The fifth limb of the first plea, alleging an error of assessment as to whether the Commission was aware that the aid at issue had been granted
Esimese väite viies osa, mis tuleneb sellest, et hinnati ekslikult komisjoni teadlikkust kõnesoleva abi andmisest
By the fifth limb of the first plea, the Commission submits that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in taking the view, in paragraph 179 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission had been aware that the ZRFG was being applied to Salzgitter several years before it reacted and
Esimese väite viiendas osas väidab komisjon, et Esimese Astme Kohus rikkus õigusnormi, kui ta hindas vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 179, et komisjon teadis ZRFG kohaldamisest Salzgitteri suhtes mitu
The Commission states that the very existence of the scheme of State aid to the steel industry means that there is no provision nor any necessity for information to be transferred between the Commission departments responsible for monitoring the system of steel production quotas and those responsible for controlling State aid.
Komisjon täpsustab, et juba sellepärast, et on olemas terasetööstusele antava riigiabi süsteem, ei ole ette nähtud ega vajalik, et toimuks teabeedastus terasetootmiskvootide järelevalve ja riigiabi kontrollimisega tegelevate komisjoni talituste vahel.
It adds that the Federal Republic of Germany failed to comply with the obligation, under Article 7 of the steel aid codes in force between 1986 and 2002, to provide a record of any aid granted,
Ta lisab, et Saksamaa Liitvabariik ei täitnud riigiabi suhtes aruandekohustust, mis on ette nähtud
COMMISSION v SALZGITTER and that no information was sent to the departments responsible for implementing those codes.
KOMISJON VS. SALZGITTER aastatel 1986–2002 kehtinud teraseabikoodeksite artiklis 7, ning et kõnesolevate koodeksite kohaldamise eest vastutavatele talitustele teavet ei edastatud.
The Commission considers that the Court of First Instance does not refer to any provision which would show that it has an obligation to take cognisance of documents outside the procedure in the context of which they were sent to it.
Komisjon leiab, et Esimese Astme Kohus ei nimeta sätet, millest võiks nähtuda, et tal on kohustus tutvuda dokumentidega väljaspool menetlust, mille raames talle need dokumendid edastati.
It adds that Salzgitter’s spontaneous transmission of documents cannot serve to prove that the Commission took cognisance of their content.
Ta lisab, et dokumentide spontaanne edastamine Salzgitteri poolt ei tõenda, et komisjon nende sisuga tutvus.
Furthermore, the recipient undertaking has not proved that that is the case.
Abi saanud ettevõtja ei ole muide sellist asjaolu tõestanud.
The Commission points out that steel undertakings are not required to submit their annual reports or accounts to it under the system of steel production quotas, which means that it is not, in principle, required to read those documents.
Komisjon rõhutab, et teraseettevõtjad ei ole kohustatud edastama talle oma tegevusaruandeid või aastaaruandeid terasetootmiskvootide süsteemi raames, nii et ta ei ole põhimõtteliselt kohustatud neid dokumente lugema.
In its written and oral observations, the Commission stressed the risks potentially associated with the analysis by the Court of First Instance both to the system for controlling State aid and its administrative organisation.
Komisjon rõhutas oma kirjalikes ja suulistes märkustes riske, mis võivad kaasneda Esimese Astme Kohtu järeldustega nii riigiabi suhtes kehtestatud kontrollisüsteemi kui ka selle haldusliku korralduse kohta.
It stated that, if the spontaneous transmission of documents to any Commission department — which may contain no more than vague observations on the grant of State aid — were sufficient to prohibit its only means of recourse against the grant of unlawful aid or aid incompatible with the common market, then State aid control, which is based on the obligation to notify, would be in danger of collapsing.
Ta märkis ühelt poolt, et kui riigiabi andmise kohta hajusaid märkusi sisaldavate dokumentide spontaansest edastamisest komisjoni mis tahes talitusele piisaks selle ainsa vahendi keelamiseks, mis on komisjoni käsutuses ebaseadusliku või ühisturuga kokkusobimatu abi andmise vastu tegutsemiseks, siis variseks teatamiskohustusele üles ehitatud riigiabi kontroll kokku.
The Commission disputes the finding by the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 179 of the judgment under appeal, that the annual reports and accounts which Salzgitter sent to the Commission indicated that it had had the benefit of exceptional reserves.
Komisjon vaidlustab Esimese Astme Kohtu tuvastuse vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 179, mille kohaselt nähtus komisjonile edastatud Salzgitteri tegevusaruandest ja raamatupidamise aastaaruandest, et viimane oli saanud kasutada erireserve.
The Commission adds that, in any event, it is not the amounts or the reserves used for investments which are decisive in the quota system, but the effects which the investments have had on production capacity and, subsequently, on production itself.
Komisjon lisab, et igal juhul ei ole kvoodisüsteemis määravad summad ega investeerimiseks kasutatud reservid, vaid investeeringute mõju tootmisvõimsusele ja lõpuks toodangule.
It states that, even if the statement made by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 178 of the judgment under appeal, to the effect that the sources of financing did indeed have to be communicated to the Commission under the quota system, is true, the reserves at issue are not sources of financing but a deferment of tax granted in respect of specific investments.
Ta täpsustab, et isegi kui nõustuda Esimese Astme Kohtu kinnitusega vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktis 178, mille kohaselt tuleb kvoodisüsteemi raames tõepoolest rahastamisallikatest komisjonile teatada, ei ole kõnesolevad reservid rahastamisallikas, vaid maksu ajatamine konkreetsete investeeringute puhul.
OPINION OF MR BOT — CASE C-408/04 P fact that that citizen sent correspondence to a department not competent to deal with it.
KOHTUJURIST BOT’ ETTEPANEK — KOHTUASI C-408/04 P igal juhul tugineda kodaniku vastu asjaolule, et viimane olevat teatise edastanud ebapädevale osakonnale.
of the Commission’s modern administrative organisation, that is to say the clear and unambiguous division of responsibilities, in favour of an administrative system under which every Commission officer would immediately have to notify the competent authority of any infringement of the legal order detected by him.
peamise põhimõtte, nimelt pädevuste selge ja hästi piiritletud jagunemise, kui iga komisjoni töötaja peaks viivitamatult teavitama pädevat ametiasutust kõikidest täheldatud õiguskorra rikkumistest.
The Federal Republic of Germany submits that, as the authority responsible for controlling State aid, the Commission must take account of any information that may be sent to it.
Saksamaa Liitvabariik väidab, et komisjon kui riigiabi kontrolli organ peab arvesse võtma kogu talle edastatud teavet.
It adds that the administrative departments responsible for managing steel quotas are capable, by virtue of their sphere of responsibility, of recognising information received that relates to controls on aid to the steel sector and that they are required to forward any relevant information to the departments responsible for controlling aid.
Ta lisab, et terasekvootide haldamisega tegelevad haldustalitused on oma pädevuses võimelised ära tundma terasetööstusele antava abi kontrollimiseks saadud teavet ning et nad on kohustatud edastama asjassepuutuva teabe abi kontrollimisega tegelevatele talitustele.
Contrary to Salzgitter’s submissions, I take the view that this fifth limb is admissible.
Vastupidiselt Salzgitterile arvan mina, et väite viies osa on vastuvõetav.
Salzgitter takes the view that this limb is concerned with considerations of fact which the Court of Justice should not hear and determine on appeal.
Salzgitter leiab, et see väite osa puudutab faktiliste asjaolude tuvastamist, mida Euroopa Kohus ei pea apellatsioonkaebuse raames käsitlema.
In the alternative, it submits that implicit in the obligation incumbent on the Commission, under the system for monitoring steel quotas, to take account of aid granted previously is the obligation to take cognisance of the annual reports which have been sent to it.
Teise võimalusena väidab ta, et terasekvootide järelevalve süsteemis ette nähtud komisjoni kohustus võtta arvesse eelnevalt antud abi eeldab, et komisjon on kohustatud tutvuma talle edastatud tegevusaruannetega.
It adds that the annual accounts contained in those reports showed clearly that Salzgitter had benefited from the tax measures provided for by the ZRFG and that it was in fact on the basis of those annual reports that the Commission sent it a request for information in 1998.
Ta lisab, et nendes aruannetes sisalduvad raamatupidamise aastaaruanded näitasid selgelt, et Salzgitterile oli võimaldatud ZRFG-s ette nähtud maksumeetmeid ja et just nende tegevusaruannete alusel oligi komisjon saatnud talle 1998. aastal teabetaotluse.
It submits that this matter was also addressed during a meeting with the Commission in 1982 which was also attended by representatives from the departments responsible for managing steel quotas and from those responsible for controlling State aid.
Ta väidab, et seda teemat käsitleti ka 1982. aastal ühel koosolekul komisjoniga, kus osalesid ka terasekvootide ning riigiabi kontrolliga tegelevad talitused.
It considers that the obligation on the Commission to take cognisance of information sent to it arises from the right to be heard 93and that the Commission cannot, in any event, rely as against a citizen on the
Ta leiab, et komisjoni kohustus tutvuda talle edastatud teabega tuleneb õigusest ärakuulamisele 93 ning et komisjon ei saa
93 — Judgment in Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859.
93 – 21. septembri 1989. aasta otsus liidetud kohtuasjades 46/87 ja 227/88: Hoechst vs. komisjon (EKL 1989, lk 2859).
It is true that, under Article 32d of the ECSC Treaty, which is identical to Article 225 EC, an appeal must be restricted to points of law, since the Court of First Instance has, in
Ma tean, et ESTÜ asutamislepingu artikli 32d – mis on sama mis EÜ artikkel 225 – kohaselt piirdub apellatsioonkaebus õigusküsimustega, kuna asja-
COMMISSION v SALZGITTER principle, exclusive jurisdiction to assess the facts.
KOMISJON VS. SALZGITTER olusid hindama on põhimõtteliselt ainsana pädev Esimese Astme Kohus.
94 relation to any obligation as to the transfer of information between Commission departments are specific to the case at issue.
94 kohtuotsuses seoses võimaliku teabeedastamise kohustusega komisjoni talituste vahel on antud juhule eripärased.
This point was made by the Court of First Instance repeatedly, in particular in paragraphs 179 and 182 of that judgment.
Esimese Astme Kohus rõhutas seda korduvalt, eelkõige nimetatud kohtuotsuse punktides 179 ja 182.
Its conclusions are drawn from the specific obligations which the Commission imposed on steel undertakings with a view to overcoming the manifest crisis in which the European steel industry found itself.
Tema järeldused tulenevad erilistest kohustustest, mis komisjon pani teraseettevõtjatele Euroopa terasetööstuses valitseva ilmse kriisi ületamiseks.
I am nevertheless of the view that the analysis of this limb is not concerned merely with an assessment of the facts.
Ma leian siiski, et väite selle osa analüüsimisel ei ole küsimus lihtsalt asjaolude hindamises.
It is my opinion that, in the light of the conclusions drawn under the first limb, the examination of the merits of this limb actually raises a point of law.
Minu arvates on selle põhjendatuse uurimine, arvestades väite esimese osa kohta tehtud järeldusi, tõeline õigusküsimus.
The question is whether the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in finding that the Commission had not discharged its duty of diligence by failing to observe the existence of the aid at issue and the failure to notify it, even though the Member State had a clear and unconditional obligation to notify it.
Küsimus on selles, kas Esimese Astme Kohus rikkus õigusnormi, otsustades, et komisjon oli jätnud täitmata hoolsuskohustuse, kui ta ei märganud kõnesoleva abi olemasolu ja sellest abist teatamata jätmist, kuigi liikmesriigil oli selge ja tingimusteta teatamiskohutus.
In paragraphs 176 and 177 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance describes the obligations on steel undertakings arising from the establishment of a system to monitor their steel production.
Vaidlustatud kohtuotsuse punktides 176 ja 177 kirjeldas Esimese Astme Kohus kohustusi, mis pandi teraseettevõtjatele seoses terasetoodangu järelevalve süsteemi loomisega 95.
95For the application of that system, introduced in 1980, the Court of First Instance pointed out, in particular, that the Commission possessed regular information concerning production and deliveries by the undertakings concerned.
Esimese Astme Kohus märkis, et selle 1980. aastal sisseseatud süsteemi kohaldamiseks sai komisjon regulaarselt teavet asjaomaste ettevõtjate toodangu ja tarnete kohta.
It also noted that the Commission had established, when adapting that system, a clear link between the granting of unauthorised aid and the production quotas so as to avoid a cumulation of those measures.
Ta märkis samuti, et komisjon oli kõnesolevat süsteemi kohandanud, seostades lubamatu abi andmise ja tootmiskvoodid, et vältida nende meetmete kumuleerumist.
Thus, Article 15A(1) of Commission Decision No 2177/83/ECSC, 96
Nii võis komisjon oma otsuse nr 2177/83/ESTÜ 96 artikli 15A lõike 1
First, it should be pointed out that the conclusions drawn by the Court of First Instance in the judgment under appeal in
Kõigepealt tuleks märkida, et Esimese Astme Kohtu järeldused vaidlustatud
95 — This system was established, on the basis of Article 58 CS, by Commission Decision No 2794/80/ECSC of 31 October 1980 establishing a system of steel production quotas for undertakings in the iron and steel industry (OJ 1980 L 291, p. 1).
95 – See süsteem kehtestati ST artikli 58 alusel komisjoni 31. oktoobri 1980. aasta otsusega nr 2794/80/ESTÜ terasetootmiskvootide süsteemi kehtestamise kohta teraseettevõtjate jaoks (EÜT L 291, lk 1).
It was extended on numerous occasions until 30 June 1988.
Seda süsteemi pikendati mitu korda kuni 30. juunini 1988.
94 — In accordance with settled caselaw, the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts.
94 – Tahan meelde tuletada, et väljakujunenud kohtupraktika kohaselt on Esimese Astme Kohus ühelt poolt ainsana pädev fakte tuvastama, välja arvatud juhul, kui tema tuvastatu sisuline ebaõigsus tuleneb talle esitatud toimikumaterjalidest, ja teiselt poolt fakte hindama.
Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, the assessment of the facts does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice on appeal.
Faktiliste asjaolude hindamine iseenesest ei ole seega apellatsioonkaebuse raames Euroopa Kohtu kontrolli alla kuuluv küsimus, välja arvatud siis, kui talle esitatud andmeid on moonutatud.
None the less, when the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them.
Sellegipoolest on Euroopa Kohus pädev, kui Esimese Astme Kohus on fakte tuvastanud või hinnanud, kontrollima nende faktide õiguslikku kvalifikatsiooni ja Esimese Astme Kohtu poolt neist tuletatud õiguslikke tagajärgi.
See, in particular, the judgment in Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173, paragraphs 51 and 52.
Vt näiteks 6. aprilli 2006. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-551/03 P: General Motors vs. komisjon (EKL 2006, lk I-3173, punktid 51 ja 52).
OPINION OF MR BOT — CASE C-408/04 P authorised the Commission to ‘make a reduction in an undertaking’s quotas if it establish[ed] that the undertaking in question [had] received aids not authorised by the Commission pursuant to [the Second Code] or if the conditions under which aids were authorised [had] not been complied with’.
KOHTUJURIST BOT’ ETTEPANEK — KOHTUASI C-408/04 P alusel „vähendada ettevõtja kvoote, kui ta tuvastab, et ettevõtja on saanud abi, milleks komisjon ei ole andnud luba [teise teraseabikoodeksi] alusel, või kui ei ole täidetud riigiabi loaga seostatud tingimusi”.
In is in the light of those factors and the caselaw of the Court of Justice 97that
Neid elemente ja Euroopa Kohtu praktikat 97arvestades otsustaski Esimese Astme