natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selline teave edastatakse siseriiklike üksuste kaudu asjaomaste liikmesriikide pädevatele asutustele kooskõlas Europoli konventsiooniga.
Such information shall be communicated to the competent authorities of the Member States concerned through the intermediary of the national units in accordance with the Europol Convention.”
La formulation présentée ci-dessus rend plus contraignant le rôle confié à Europol quant à la transmission d'informations lorsque des menaces graves sont dirigées contre les Etats membres.
The above wording makes the role conferred on Europol more binding as regards the forwarding of information in cases where the Member States are the target of serious threats.
La décision 2003/170/JAI du Conseil:
Council decision 2003/170/JHA
Les Positions du rapporteure:
The rapporteur’s views
Suurbritannia ja Põhja-Iiri Ühendkuningriigi algatus võtta vastu nõukogu otsus, millega muudetakse otsust 2003/170/JSK liikmesriikide õiguskaitseorganite välismaale lähetatud kontaktametnike ühise kasutamise kohta
Initiative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with a view to adopting a Council Decision amending Decision 2003/170/JHA on the common use of liaison officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member States
Konsulteerimine Euroopa Majandus- ja Sotsiaalkomiteega – istungil otsuse tegemise kuupäev
Parliament to consult European Economic and Social Committee – date decided in plenary
Konsulteerimine Regioonide Komiteega – istungil otsuse tegemise kuupäev
Parliament to consult Committee of the Regions – date decided in plenary
Komisjoni 2004. aasta konkurentsipoliitika aruanne
on the Commission report on competition policy 2004
komisjoni 2004. aasta konkurentsipoliitika aruande kohta
on the Commission report on competition policy 2004
– võttes arvesse komisjoni 2004. aasta konkurentsipoliitika aruannet ( SEK(2005)0805 );
– having regard to the Commission report on Competition Policy 2004 ( SEC(2005)0805 ),
- võttes arvesse 23.–24. märtsi 2000. aasta Lissaboni, 15.–16. juuni 2001. aasta Göteborgi, 14.–15. detsembri 2001. aasta Laekeni, 15.–16. märtsi 2002. aasta Barcelona, samuti 20.–21. märtsi 2003. aasta, 25.–26. märtsi 2004. aasta ja 22.–23. märtsi 2005. aasta Brüsseli Euroopa Ülemkogu eesistuja järeldusi;
– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000, the Göteborg European Council of 15 and 16 June 2001, the Laeken European Council of 14 and 15 December 2001, the Barcelona European Council of 15 and 16 March 2002, and the Brussels European Councils of 20 and 21 March 2003, 25 and 26 March 2004, and 22 and 23 March 2005,
- võttes arvesse Lissaboni strateegia kõrgetasemelise töörühma, mille tööd juhtis hr Wim Kok, 2004. aasta novembris koostatud aruannet "Võtta vastu väljakutse – Lissaboni strateegia majanduskasvuks ja tööhõiveks";
– having regard to the report of November 2004 entitled 'Facing the challenge - The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment' from the High Level Group chaired by Mr Wim Kok,
- võttes arvesse nõukogu 16. detsembri 2002. aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 1/2003 asutamislepingu artiklites 81 ja 82 sätestatud konkurentsieeskirjade rakendamise kohta
– having regard to Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 January 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty
- võttes arvesse nõukogu 20. jaanuari 2004. aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 139/2004 kontrolli kehtestamise kohta ettevõtjate koondumiste üle;
– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
- võttes arvesse komisjoni 21. aprilli 2004. aasta määrust (EÜ) nr 794/2004, millega rakendatakse nõukogu määrust (EÜ) nr 659/1999, millega kehtestatakse üksikasjalikud eeskirjad EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 93 kohaldamiseks
– having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty
Euroopa Kohtu 24. juuli 2003. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-280/00: Altmark Trans ja Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark, EKL 2003, lk I‑7747.
Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747. ,
- võttes arvesse kodukorra artiklit 45 ja artikli 112 lõiget 2;
– having regard to Rule 45 and Rule 112(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
– võttes arvesse majandus- ja rahanduskomisjoni raportit ( A6‑0065/2006 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A6‑0065/2006 ),
3. toetab üldiselt ELi järgitavat konkurentsipoliitikat ning väljendab heakskiitu komisjoni poolt läbi viidud ajakohastavale reformile konkurentsi valdkonnas;
Supports the competition policy pursued by the EU in general, and expresses its appreciation of the modernising reform which the Commission has carried out in the field of competition;
10. õnnitleb komisjoni kindla ja professionaalse lähenemise puhul võitluses turgu valitseva seisundi kuritarvitamisega ning tervitab artikli 82 tõhusama rakendamise alast komisjoni nõustamistegevust;
Congratulates the Commission on its firm and professional approach to the fight against abuses of dominant positions and welcomes the Commission's consultation on a more effective implementation of Article 82;
12. nõuab tungivalt, et komisjon teeks jõupingutusi konkurentsieeskirjade õige kohaldamise edendamiseks kõikides liikmesriikides ning sekkuks aegsasti, kui konkurentsieeskirju kohaldatakse mitterahuldavalt või diskrimineerivalt;
Urges the Commission to make an effort to promote the correct application of the competition rules in all Member States, and to intervene in good time where the competition rules are being applied unsatisfactorily or in a discriminatory manner;
18. soovitab, et suurte avalike teenuste võrgu korral peavad konkurentsi juhtima kindlad avaliku teenindamise kohustused, et tagada vajalikud investeeringud ning takistada uute monopolide teket;
Suggests that, in the case of major networked public services, competition must be guided by strong public service obligations so as to ensure necessary investment and to prevent the emergence of new monopolies;
22. rõhutab tarbija teavitamise tõhustamise tähtsust, juhib tähelepanu tarbijateabe olulisele osale tõelise konkurentsikultuuri olemasolu tagamisel ning juhib tähelepanu vajadusele kaaluda ühenduse tasandil eraviisilist kahjude hüvitamist konkurentsivastase tegevuse korral;
Highlights the importance of encouraging consumer information, draws attention to the fundamental role of consumer information in ensuring that there is a genuine competition culture, and points out the need to consider at Community level private compensation in cases of anti-competitive conduct;
27. tervitab komisjoni positiivset vastust parlamendi soovitustele Euroopa konkurentsipäevade edasiarendamise kohta, sealhulgas tarbijaorganisatsioonide ja riikide meedia kaasamisele Euroopa konkurentsipäevade planeerimisprotsessi;
Welcomes the Commission's positive response to Parliament's recommendations concerning the further development of European Competition Days, including the integration of consumer organisations and the national media in the planning process of European Competition Days;
General features of the report
General features of the report
2004 was the first year to see the application of the 2002 and 2003 reforms concerning the control of mergers, cartels and State aids which sought to return to national level the examination of many cases which were burdening the Directorate-General for Competition, despite not having genuinely European implications.
2004 was the first year to see the application of the 2002 and 2003 reforms concerning the control of mergers, cartels and State aids which sought to return to national level the examination of many cases which were burdening the Directorate-General for Competition, despite not having genuinely European implications.
Accordingly, the report has a fairly technical (and highly instructive) aspect: the new regulatory framework is gone through, chapter by chapter; this is followed by an analysis of the main cases, and by a few judgments of the Court of Justice which have thus developed case law.
Accordingly, the report has a fairly technical (and highly instructive) aspect: the new regulatory framework is gone through, chapter by chapter; this is followed by an analysis of the main cases, and by a few judgments of the Court of Justice which have thus developed case law.
The lack of the searching analyses which were such a feature of the reports drafted under the responsibility of Commissioner Monti is to be regretted.
The lack of the searching analyses which were such a feature of the reports drafted under the responsibility of Commissioner Monti is to be regretted.
In addition, as frequently happens there is a lamentable lack of references to possible empirical checks on the effects of competition policy.
In addition, as frequently happens there is a lamentable lack of references to possible empirical checks on the effects of competition policy.
For instance, it is reaffirmed that the purpose of competition policy is to ensure fair and relatively lively competition which is considered to benefit consumers by reducing excessive margins (abuse of dominant positions) and by stimulating technological emulation.
For instance, it is reaffirmed that the purpose of competition policy is to ensure fair and relatively lively competition which is considered to benefit consumers by reducing excessive margins (abuse of dominant positions) and by stimulating technological emulation.
This line of argument bears the mark of common sense.
This line of argument bears the mark of common sense.
However, as the report comments in passing there are 'market failures', which are not detailed and any thinking about which thus does not contribute to adjusting competition policy.
However, as the report comments in passing there are 'market failures', which are not detailed and any thinking about which thus does not contribute to adjusting competition policy.
This is regrettable.
This is regrettable.
An examination of the relative size of the different parts of the report shows that competition policy focuses mainly on the fight against secret agreements and mergers which might result in abuses of dominant positions.
An examination of the relative size of the different parts of the report shows that competition policy focuses mainly on the fight against secret agreements and mergers which might result in abuses of dominant positions.
Relatively little space is devoted to the policing of State aid.
Relatively little space is devoted to the policing of State aid.
It also emerges that the number of cases in which the Court in Luxembourg invalidates a Commission decision is in decline.
It also emerges that the number of cases in which the Court in Luxembourg invalidates a Commission decision is in decline.
It appears that the Commission's practices and case law are finally in step with each other, following the discord over previous years which culminated, in particular, in the Altmark judgment.
It appears that the Commission's practices and case law are finally in step with each other, following the discord over previous years which culminated, in particular, in the Altmark judgment.
Combating cartels and abuses of dominant positions
Combating cartels and abuses of dominant positions
The Commission is to be congratulated on the courage and tenacity with which it fights abuses of monopoly situations.
The Commission is to be congratulated on the courage and tenacity with which it fights abuses of monopoly situations.
A few significant examples are detailed, including the condemnation of Microsoft.
A few significant examples are detailed, including the condemnation of Microsoft.
However, appeals are once more under way, so there will be further developments here.
However, appeals are once more under way, so there will be further developments here.
One chapter is devoted to the establishment of the European Competition Network, a form of cooperation between national bodies responsible for regulating competition.
One chapter is devoted to the establishment of the European Competition Network, a form of cooperation between national bodies responsible for regulating competition.
It is still far too soon to determine the effectiveness of this system.
It is still far too soon to determine the effectiveness of this system.
The obvious risk is of complicity (even unconscious complicity) between national authorities and their 'national champions'.
The obvious risk is of complicity (even unconscious complicity) between national authorities and their 'national champions'.
The example of the agreement between the three main French mobile telephony operators (including the historic operator, France Telecom, and its subsidiary, Orange), a secret agreement which was only revealed by the press in 2005, shows that it is not necessarily wise to entrust this kind of supervision to national authorities.
The example of the agreement between the three main French mobile telephony operators (including the historic operator, France Telecom, and its subsidiary, Orange), a secret agreement which was only revealed by the press in 2005, shows that it is not necessarily wise to entrust this kind of supervision to national authorities.
The decentralisation of competition policy is therefore not without risk.
The decentralisation of competition policy is therefore not without risk.
We need to think about establishing a '(European) regulator of (national) regulators'.
We need to think about establishing a '(European) regulator of (national) regulators'.
Merger supervision
Merger supervision
Here again, the Commission is to be congratulated on the vigilance that it generally demonstrates.
Here again, the Commission is to be congratulated on the vigilance that it generally demonstrates.
The example of the merger between the leading French book publishing and distribution operators is particularly illuminating.
The example of the merger between the leading French book publishing and distribution operators is particularly illuminating.
However, the Commission cannot be encouraged enough to embark on genuine studies of the real effect of this policy of 'maintained competition'.
However, the Commission cannot be encouraged enough to embark on genuine studies of the real effect of this policy of 'maintained competition'.
Can it really be proved that competition brings down prices?
Can it really be proved that competition brings down prices?
Intuition says that, if supply is there, then competition, by squeezing margins and stimulating research, results in greater purchasing power for consumers in the sector in question and in the growth of the sector and even of employment in it.
Intuition says that, if supply is there, then competition, by squeezing margins and stimulating research, results in greater purchasing power for consumers in the sector in question and in the growth of the sector and even of employment in it.
Yet another sequence of events is entirely possible: in an oligopolistic situation no competitor has any interest in increasing supply, because there is more to be gained from higher prices in a situation of shortage.
Yet another sequence of events is entirely possible: in an oligopolistic situation no competitor has any interest in increasing supply, because there is more to be gained from higher prices in a situation of shortage.
We may wonder whether this sequence did not win out in the case of the deregulation of major networked public services.
We may wonder whether this sequence did not win out in the case of the deregulation of major networked public services.
With good reason, the Commission is determined to prevent private monopolies being re-established on the corpses of the former public monopolies (Portuguese electricity and gas), but at least the big old national undertakings, vested with public service obligations, took care to anticipate growth in demand by making the corresponding investments.
With good reason, the Commission is determined to prevent private monopolies being re-established on the corpses of the former public monopolies (Portuguese electricity and gas), but at least the big old national undertakings, vested with public service obligations, took care to anticipate growth in demand by making the corresponding investments.
On the electricity market it seems that this is no longer the case.
On the electricity market it seems that this is no longer the case.
The case of Rhodia
The case of Rhodia
This case tarnishes the Commission's reputation for a rigorous approach to mergers.
This case tarnishes the Commission's reputation for a rigorous approach to mergers.
It was the subject of a rectifying decision (a unique case among 3000) in January 2004.
It was the subject of a rectifying decision (a unique case among 3000) in January 2004.
This modified Decision 1378 of August 1999, which authorised the merger between Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst in return for the divestiture of Rhodia, which was authorised, in parallel, to absorb Albright & Wilson (Decision 1517).
This modified Decision 1378 of August 1999, which authorised the merger between Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst in return for the divestiture of Rhodia, which was authorised, in parallel, to absorb Albright & Wilson (Decision 1517).
There is no retrospective analysis of this rectification; what is worse is that Decisions 1378 and 1517 disappeared from the website while this report was being drafted, thereby hampering parliamentary work.
There is no retrospective analysis of this rectification; what is worse is that Decisions 1378 and 1517 disappeared from the website while this report was being drafted, thereby hampering parliamentary work.
Rhodia's shares, after a surge caused by the absorption of A & W, have since done nothing but nosedive, bringing ruin on shareholders and workers.
Rhodia's shares, after a surge caused by the absorption of A & W, have since done nothing but nosedive, bringing ruin on shareholders and workers.
It appears that Rhône-Poulenc had loaded on to Rhodia all the liabilities hidden in A & W or resulting from environmental disasters such as Cubatao and Silver Bow.
It appears that Rhône-Poulenc had loaded on to Rhodia all the liabilities hidden in A & W or resulting from environmental disasters such as Cubatao and Silver Bow.
On this point, the Commission has also failed to exercise the duty of control arising from the initial Decision 1378.
On this point, the Commission has also failed to exercise the duty of control arising from the initial Decision 1378.
Given these anomalies, Parliament should decide to set up a committee of inquiry into the way in which the Commission took Decisions 1378 and 1517 and has handled them.
Given these anomalies, Parliament should decide to set up a committee of inquiry into the way in which the Commission took Decisions 1378 and 1517 and has handled them.
Control of State aid
Control of State aid
This chapter is characterised by a divergence between, on the one hand, the stated call for State aid efforts to be focused on horizontal aid designed to promote the Lisbon strategy and, on the other, the strictly legalistic approach to managing this issue, a course which has now been marked out by the Altmark judgment and, since July 2005, by the Commission's new regulatory decisions stemming from that judgment.
This chapter is characterised by a divergence between, on the one hand, the stated call for State aid efforts to be focused on horizontal aid designed to promote the Lisbon strategy and, on the other, the strictly legalistic approach to managing this issue, a course which has now been marked out by the Altmark judgment and, since July 2005, by the Commission's new regulatory decisions stemming from that judgment.
Since the public purse is not bottomless, the focus actually has to be on supporting the Lisbon strategy, and this also needs to be taken as a whole: promoting the knowledge-based economy, ensuring social and territorial integration and protecting the environment.
Since the public purse is not bottomless, the focus actually has to be on supporting the Lisbon strategy, and this also needs to be taken as a whole: promoting the knowledge-based economy, ensuring social and territorial integration and protecting the environment.
While the first objective (a knowledge-based economy) does indeed appear to have prompted the Commission's benevolent approach with regard to public aid for research and training, the issues of social and territorial integration and protection of the environment have not been handled systematically.
While the first objective (a knowledge-based economy) does indeed appear to have prompted the Commission's benevolent approach with regard to public aid for research and training, the issues of social and territorial integration and protection of the environment have not been handled systematically.
If we consider the third component, for instance, we cannot but regret a degree of eclecticism on the part of the Commission.
If we consider the third component, for instance, we cannot but regret a degree of eclecticism on the part of the Commission.
It first notes, quite correctly, that State aid for revitalising rail transport must be encouraged, because this fits in with the policy of combating climate change.
It first notes, quite correctly, that State aid for revitalising rail transport must be encouraged, because this fits in with the policy of combating climate change.
Yet a few pages later, we are somewhat surprised (Ryanair/Charleroi) to find the Directorate-General for Competition encouraging the development of regional airports ... by means of subsidies (which distort competition between cities and between firms) for low-cost airlines, which produce far more greenhouse gases than trains!
Yet a few pages later, we are somewhat surprised (Ryanair/Charleroi) to find the Directorate-General for Competition encouraging the development of regional airports ... by means of subsidies (which distort competition between cities and between firms) for low-cost airlines, which produce far more greenhouse gases than trains!
Similarly, where energy production is concerned, the objective of environmental protection is overlooked, whereas this is an important criterion for the European Investment Bank.
Similarly, where energy production is concerned, the objective of environmental protection is overlooked, whereas this is an important criterion for the European Investment Bank.
A special sub-chapter is devoted to State aid for restructuring and rescuing firms.
A special sub-chapter is devoted to State aid for restructuring and rescuing firms.
This issue is the one which generates the most reservations among the public.
This issue is the one which generates the most reservations among the public.
The workers and regions concerned often perceive the Commission's objections as a bureaucratic obstacle which appears out of the blue and jeopardises the solution to a disastrous situation.
The workers and regions concerned often perceive the Commission's objections as a bureaucratic obstacle which appears out of the blue and jeopardises the solution to a disastrous situation.
It is vital that the Commission learns to conduct a dialogue on this point, first by explaining that the key aspect of its work is the fight against monopolies, but also by showing that it knows how to take the human aspects into account.
It is vital that the Commission learns to conduct a dialogue on this point, first by explaining that the key aspect of its work is the fight against monopolies, but also by showing that it knows how to take the human aspects into account.
Helping a firm to survive obviously wrongs its competitors, but it would be welcome to have at least some assessment of the effect that the collapse of one of the few remaining firms in an already concentrated sector would have.
Helping a firm to survive obviously wrongs its competitors, but it would be welcome to have at least some assessment of the effect that the collapse of one of the few remaining firms in an already concentrated sector would have.