natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the Commission’s opinion, the distribution of powers between the first and the first pillar should be as follows: the provisions of criminal law required ‘for the effective implementation of Community law’ should be adopted under the first pillar, while 'horizontal' criminal law provisions (to encourage police and judicial cooperation, including measures on the harmonisation of criminal law in the context of the area of freedom, security and justice) should be adopted under the third pillar.
In the Commission’s opinion, the distribution of powers between the first and the first pillar should be as follows: the provisions of criminal law required ‘for the effective implementation of Community law’ should be adopted under the first pillar, while 'horizontal' criminal law provisions (to encourage police and judicial cooperation, including measures on the harmonisation of criminal law in the context of the area of freedom, security and justice) should be adopted under the third pillar.
The Commission undertakes, therefore:
The Commission undertakes, therefore:
• where the deadline for introducing an appeal for annulment has not yet passed, to challenge any legislative act adopted on the wrong legal basis
• where the deadline for introducing an appeal for annulment has not yet passed, to challenge any legislative act adopted on the wrong legal basis
For example, Council framework decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution. ;
For example, Council framework decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July 2005 to strengthen the criminal law framework for the enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution. ;
• where the deadline for appealing has passed, to review the legislation in force, and possibly to submit proposals aimed at rectifying the legal basis without altering the substance of the legislation.
• where the deadline for appealing has passed, to review the legislation in force, and possibly to submit proposals aimed at rectifying the legal basis without altering the substance of the legislation.
This would only be possible with the prior agreement of the European Parliament and the Council;
This would only be possible with the prior agreement of the European Parliament and the Council;
• in the case of legislative proposals which have not yet been adopted, to make the necessary changes to them.
• in the case of legislative proposals which have not yet been adopted, to make the necessary changes to them.
The Commission concludes its communication with the list of the texts which, in its opinion, are affected by the Court’s judgment in Case C-176/03, proposing in each case a new legal basis under the first pillar rather than the third pillar.
The Commission concludes its communication with the list of the texts which, in its opinion, are affected by the Court’s judgment in Case C-176/03, proposing in each case a new legal basis under the first pillar rather than the third pillar.
The rapporteur’s position
The rapporteur’s position
As a general principle, the position taken by the Court of Justice, as re-interpreted by the Commission, is to be welcomed as it endorses the position already taken by the European Parliament in its resolution on legal bases and compliance with Community law (Koukiadis report)
As a general principle, the position taken by the Court of Justice, as re-interpreted by the Commission, is to be welcomed as it endorses the position already taken by the European Parliament in its resolution on legal bases and compliance with Community law (Koukiadis report)
Resolution of the European Parliament on legal bases and compliance with Community law ( 2001/2151(INI) ), OJ C 76E of 25.3.2004 and consequently gives the European Parliament the power of codecision in this area also.
Resolution of the European Parliament on legal bases and compliance with Community law ( 2001/2151(INI) ), OJ C 76E of 25.3.2004 and consequently gives the European Parliament the power of codecision in this area also.
The legitimacy and democratic accountability of Community action in criminal matters is thereby guaranteed.
The legitimacy and democratic accountability of Community action in criminal matters is thereby guaranteed.
We should, therefore, look more closely into the grounds for, and implications of, this latest development in the process of European integration, partly to strengthen the Commission’s position.
We should, therefore, look more closely into the grounds for, and implications of, this latest development in the process of European integration, partly to strengthen the Commission’s position.
In particular, we should carefully consider the possibility of extending the conclusions of the Court of Justice to other fields in addition to environmental protection, and define more accurately the grounds of 'necessity and consistency' on which any such extension of the Court’s conclusions should be based.
In particular, we should carefully consider the possibility of extending the conclusions of the Court of Justice to other fields in addition to environmental protection, and define more accurately the grounds of 'necessity and consistency' on which any such extension of the Court’s conclusions should be based.
One awkward fact is that the Court’s judgment annuls only the act challenged by the Commission, and no other.
One awkward fact is that the Court’s judgment annuls only the act challenged by the Commission, and no other.
That being so, the replacement of other acts adopted under the third pillar by acts adopted under the first pillar could be problematic, particularly if one takes the view that it would be preferable to revise the treaties accordingly.
That being so, the replacement of other acts adopted under the third pillar by acts adopted under the first pillar could be problematic, particularly if one takes the view that it would be preferable to revise the treaties accordingly.
A further problem arises from the fact that replacing the legal basis of legislation in force without affecting its substance, as proposed by the Commission, in effect means depriving the European Parliament of its power of codecision.
A further problem arises from the fact that replacing the legal basis of legislation in force without affecting its substance, as proposed by the Commission, in effect means depriving the European Parliament of its power of codecision.
It is difficult to accept such an outcome, given that opting for the legal bases available under the first pillar implies opting for the democratic oversight which the European Parliament, as the elected body representing Europe’s citizens, exercises in that domain.
It is difficult to accept such an outcome, given that opting for the legal bases available under the first pillar implies opting for the democratic oversight which the European Parliament, as the elected body representing Europe’s citizens, exercises in that domain.
It appears somewhat inconsistent, therefore, to seek to invoke the first pillar while at the same time requesting the European Parliament to abdicate its role.
It appears somewhat inconsistent, therefore, to seek to invoke the first pillar while at the same time requesting the European Parliament to abdicate its role.
The distribution of criminal provisions between the first and the third pillar also requires closer consideration.
The distribution of criminal provisions between the first and the third pillar also requires closer consideration.
Here it would seem to be appropriate to endorse the Commission’s view that the provisions of criminal law required for the effective implementation of Community law are fall within the scope of the first pillar, while ‘horizontal’ provisions aimed at encouraging police and judicial cooperation, and harmonisation measures in connection with the area of freedom, security and justice, should be adopted under the third pillar.
Here it would seem to be appropriate to endorse the Commission’s view that the provisions of criminal law required for the effective implementation of Community law are fall within the scope of the first pillar, while ‘horizontal’ provisions aimed at encouraging police and judicial cooperation, and harmonisation measures in connection with the area of freedom, security and justice, should be adopted under the third pillar.
However, it would be helpful to consider whether it is necessary to establish, once and for all, whether provisions relating to criminal matters adopted under the first pillar should be confined to establishing that a given type of conduct constitutes a criminal offence, or if they may actually specify the type and severity of the penalties to be imposed.
However, it would be helpful to consider whether it is necessary to establish, once and for all, whether provisions relating to criminal matters adopted under the first pillar should be confined to establishing that a given type of conduct constitutes a criminal offence, or if they may actually specify the type and severity of the penalties to be imposed.
The case law of the Court of Justice (for example, its judgment of 21 September 1989 in case C-68/88, Commission v Greece ; judgment of 27 March 1990, in case C-9/89 Spain v Council , and judgment of 1 February 2001, in case C-333/99, Commission v France ) only authorises the so-called assimilation method; the Community legislation may provide that domestic criminal provisions designed to protect certain national interests should apply also to protect the corresponding Community interests, thus combining the two sets of provisions in a new piece of legislation establishing a criminal offence.
The case law of the Court of Justice (for example, its judgment of 21 September 1989 in case C-68/88, Commission v Greece ; judgment of 27 March 1990, in case C-9/89 Spain v Council , and judgment of 1 February 2001, in case C-333/99, Commission v France ) only authorises the so-called assimilation method; the Community legislation may provide that domestic criminal provisions designed to protect certain national interests should apply also to protect the corresponding Community interests, thus combining the two sets of provisions in a new piece of legislation establishing a criminal offence.
This means that Community law may establish that certain types of conduct should be regarded as a criminal offence, but must not encroach on the Member States’ competence with regard to prescribing and applying penalties in practice.
This means that Community law may establish that certain types of conduct should be regarded as a criminal offence, but must not encroach on the Member States’ competence with regard to prescribing and applying penalties in practice.
If Community legislation were to embrace those aspects also - although it would be difficult to justify any such extension of Community powers in the absence of a corresponding revision of the EC Treaty - it would cause considerable problems of coordination with Title VI of the EU Treaty.
If Community legislation were to embrace those aspects also - although it would be difficult to justify any such extension of Community powers in the absence of a corresponding revision of the EC Treaty - it would cause considerable problems of coordination with Title VI of the EU Treaty.
V. The rule of law (‘riserva di legge’) and other basic principles of criminal law
V. The rule of law (‘riserva di legge’) and other basic principles of criminal law
Your rapporteur draws attention to the fact that the introduction of Community obligations in relation to criminal sanctions must comply with the principle of legality and the principle that the executive is subject to the rule of law.
Your rapporteur draws attention to the fact that the introduction of Community obligations in relation to criminal sanctions must comply with the principle of legality and the principle that the executive is subject to the rule of law.
The Court of Justice has ruled that the principle of legality of penalties is one of the Member States’ shared constitutional traditions and is enshrined not only in various international instruments (including the ECHR), but also in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The Court of Justice has ruled that the principle of legality of penalties is one of the Member States’ shared constitutional traditions and is enshrined not only in various international instruments (including the ECHR), but also in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
In accordance with its settled case law, the Court guarantees compliance with fundamental rights, which form an integral part of the general principles of Community law.
In accordance with its settled case law, the Court guarantees compliance with fundamental rights, which form an integral part of the general principles of Community law.
In so doing, the Court is guided by the Member States' shared constitutional traditions and the principles laid down in the international treaties on human rights which the Member States have jointly drawn up or to which they have subscribed (see, in particular, the Court's judgment of 12 June 2003, in case C-112/00, Schmidberger, reports p.
In so doing, the Court is guided by the Member States' shared constitutional traditions and the principles laid down in the international treaties on human rights which the Member States have jointly drawn up or to which they have subscribed (see, in particular, the Court's judgment of 12 June 2003, in case C-112/00, Schmidberger, reports p.
I-5659, point 71, and the case law cited therein, and its judgment of 10 July 2003, in cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood , reports p.
I-5659, point 71, and the case law cited therein, and its judgment of 10 July 2003, in cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture and Hydro Seafood , reports p.
I-7411, point 65, and the case law cited therein.
I-7411, point 65, and the case law cited therein.
The principle of the rule of law in criminal matters forms part of the shared constitutional traditions of the Member States.
The principle of the rule of law in criminal matters forms part of the shared constitutional traditions of the Member States.
It follows that that principle must be regarded as an integral part of the general principles of Community law, and consequently compliance with that principle must be guaranteed.
It follows that that principle must be regarded as an integral part of the general principles of Community law, and consequently compliance with that principle must be guaranteed.
The principle of democracy gives Parliament the exclusive power to decide whether, how and to what extent it may restrict the personal liberty of the citizens it represents: this, in a nutshell, is the meaning of the principle of the rule of law.
The principle of democracy gives Parliament the exclusive power to decide whether, how and to what extent it may restrict the personal liberty of the citizens it represents: this, in a nutshell, is the meaning of the principle of the rule of law.
The absolute nature of the rule of law in criminal matters provides a safeguard in relation to both procedural and substantive provisions.
The absolute nature of the rule of law in criminal matters provides a safeguard in relation to both procedural and substantive provisions.
The procedural element reflects the democratic nature of legal systems, which must be particularly evident in relation to criminal matters in view of the kind of penalties involved.
The procedural element reflects the democratic nature of legal systems, which must be particularly evident in relation to criminal matters in view of the kind of penalties involved.
With regard to substantive issues, the principle of the rule of law requires parliamentary ('majority') decisions to be capable of being checked, not only by the formal method of scrutiny by the parliamentary opposition ('minorities') but also, and above all, by virtue of the transparency of the information processed in the course of the procedure and of the procedures themselves, and the clarity of the objectives which Parliament's decisions in relation to criminal matters are intended to achieve.
With regard to substantive issues, the principle of the rule of law requires parliamentary ('majority') decisions to be capable of being checked, not only by the formal method of scrutiny by the parliamentary opposition ('minorities') but also, and above all, by virtue of the transparency of the information processed in the course of the procedure and of the procedures themselves, and the clarity of the objectives which Parliament's decisions in relation to criminal matters are intended to achieve.
These inalienable safeguards are intended to protect individual freedom and subject the exercise of any power to the constraints of the law; this includes decisions as to what actions should be punishable and what penalties should be applied.
These inalienable safeguards are intended to protect individual freedom and subject the exercise of any power to the constraints of the law; this includes decisions as to what actions should be punishable and what penalties should be applied.
These safeguards have as their corollary:
These safeguards have as their corollary:
(1) the principle of the retrospective application of the most favourable criminal law (judgment of 3 May 2005, in conjoined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, point 68);
(1) the principle of the retrospective application of the most favourable criminal law (judgment of 3 May 2005, in conjoined cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, point 68);
(b) a prohibition on interpreting criminal provisions in a broad sense which is detrimental to the person concerned, the imposition of strict limits as the interpretation of compliance with directives in criminal proceedings (cf. the Court's judgment of 12 December 1996, in conjoined cases C-74/95 and C-129/95).
(b) a prohibition on interpreting criminal provisions in a broad sense which is detrimental to the person concerned, the imposition of strict limits as the interpretation of compliance with directives in criminal proceedings (cf. the Court's judgment of 12 December 1996, in conjoined cases C-74/95 and C-129/95).
Pursuant to the principle of the rule of law in criminal matters, the Court of Justice has also recently ruled (in its judgment of 3 May 2005, cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02) that a directive 'cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that directive' (judgment of the Court of 8 October 1987, Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nilmegen , reports page 3969, point 13, and judgment of 7 January 2004, in cases C-60/02, X, not yet published in the reports, point 61, and the case law cited therein).
Pursuant to the principle of the rule of law in criminal matters, the Court of Justice has also recently ruled (in its judgment of 3 May 2005, cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02) that a directive 'cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that directive' (judgment of the Court of 8 October 1987, Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nilmegen , reports page 3969, point 13, and judgment of 7 January 2004, in cases C-60/02, X, not yet published in the reports, point 61, and the case law cited therein).
The EC Treaty provides the legal basis for requiring Member States generally to uphold Community law by means of penal sanctions.
The EC Treaty provides the legal basis for requiring Member States generally to uphold Community law by means of penal sanctions.
A legal basis also exists for the Community to prescribe which conduct should be subjected to criminal penalties and to indicate what actions should be regarded as criminal offences.
A legal basis also exists for the Community to prescribe which conduct should be subjected to criminal penalties and to indicate what actions should be regarded as criminal offences.
However there does not appear to be any legal basis in the EC Treaty for the harmonisation of criminal offences or criminal penalties.
However there does not appear to be any legal basis in the EC Treaty for the harmonisation of criminal offences or criminal penalties.
It necessarily follows, in your rapporteur's opinion. that we should welcome the confirmation that the European Community has a potential, albeit partial, competence in relation to criminal matters provided the prerequisite conditions for, and the scope of, any such competence is clearly established; that the Commission is right to withdraw pending proposals and to resubmit legislation that has already been adopted, if such legislation must be regarded as unlawful in the light of the judgment in question; and that, in any event, there can be no question of excluding the European Parliament from participating actively in the relevant decision-making process.
It necessarily follows, in your rapporteur's opinion. that we should welcome the confirmation that the European Community has a potential, albeit partial, competence in relation to criminal matters provided the prerequisite conditions for, and the scope of, any such competence is clearly established; that the Commission is right to withdraw pending proposals and to resubmit legislation that has already been adopted, if such legislation must be regarded as unlawful in the light of the judgment in question; and that, in any event, there can be no question of excluding the European Parliament from participating actively in the relevant decision-making process.
kodanikuvabaduste, justiits- ja siseasjade komisjoNI ARVAMUS
OPINIONOF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
(*) Komisjonidevaheline tõhustatud koostöö – kodukorra artikkel 47
(*) Enhanced cooperation between committees (Rule 47)
Kodanikuvabaduste, justiits- ja siseasjade komisjon palub vastutaval õiguskomisjonil lisada oma resolutsiooni ettepanekusse järgmised ettepanekud (komisjonidevaheline tõhustatud koostöö – kodukorra artikkel 47):
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Legal Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution (rule 47 - Enhanced cooperation between committees):
A. olles teadlik, et aastakümnete jooksul on Euroopa projekti elluviimisega kaasnenud ühise õigusruumi teke, mille raames riigisisesed õigussüsteemid ja Euroopa õigussüsteem on järk-järgult asetunud uude ja originaalsesse süsteemi, mis põhineb mitte üksnes ühistel väärtustel, vaid ka ühenduse õiguse ülimuslikkusel ning liikmesriikide ja ühenduse institutsioonide lojaalsel koostööl (EÜ asutamislepingu artikkel 10);
A. mindful of the fact that over the decades the construction of Europe has brought with it the establishment of a common judicial area, within which the national and European legal systems have gradually become intertwined, forming a new and original structure based not only on shared values, but also on the principles of the primacy of Community law and cooperation in good faith between the Member States and the European institutions (Article 10 of the EC Treaty),
B. arvestades, et iga ühenduse tegevus on allutatud asutamislepingu artiklis 5 sätestatud subsidiaarsuse põhimõttele;
B. whereas all action taken by the Community is subject to the subsidiarity principle set out under Article 5 of the Treaty,
C. arvestades, et ühenduse õiguse ülimuslikkuse ja lojaalse koostöö põhimõtted võivad mõjutada liikmesriikide riigisisest kriminaalseadusandlust selles osas, et selle puhul kohustutakse Euroopa Kohtu kohtupraktikast lähtuvalt:
C. whereas the principles of the primacy of Community law and cooperation in good faith can affect the national criminal legislation of the Member States in so far as the latter are obliged, in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice: