natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The European Parliament will certainly not accept an Inter-institutional Agreement with a flexibility mechanism reduced to one heading, especially if combined with a restrictive financial framework.
The European Parliament will certainly not accept an Inter-institutional Agreement with a flexibility mechanism reduced to one heading, especially if combined with a restrictive financial framework.
Consolidating the current agricultural reforms
Consolidating the current agricultural reforms
The EP negotiating position is also very clear concerning the respect of the 2002 agreement.
The EP negotiating position is also very clear concerning the respect of the 2002 agreement.
It can be reminded that the EP resolution has proposed the possibility to cover the cost for agriculture for Bulgaria and Romania within the so called "Brussels ceiling".
It can be reminded that the EP resolution has proposed the possibility to cover the cost for agriculture for Bulgaria and Romania within the so called "Brussels ceiling".
49, 1st indent reads as follows:
49, 1st indent reads as follows:
49. [...]; is concerned that, in the absence of political and financial agreement, the funding of market-related measures and direct payments for Bulgaria and Romania above the ceiling agreed by the Council in 2002 for EU-25 remains in doubt, and proposes therefore that, in order to guarantee the level of support set by the decision of the European Council of October 2002, the possibility of a phasing-in process of compulsory co-financing should be initiated within EU-15 if the needs exceed the forecasts;
49. [...]; is concerned that, in the absence of political and financial agreement, the funding of market-related measures and direct payments for Bulgaria and Romania above the ceiling agreed by the Council in 2002 for EU-25 remains in doubt, and proposes therefore that, in order to guarantee the level of support set by the decision of the European Council of October 2002, the possibility of a phasing-in process of compulsory co-financing should be initiated within EU-15 if the needs exceed the forecasts;
This proposal is not contradictory with EP's negotiating position in favour of ring-fencing the funding for Natura 2000.
This proposal is not contradictory with EP's negotiating position in favour of ring-fencing the funding for Natura 2000.
22 reads as follows:
22 reads as follows:
22. [...] insists in this context on a legally binding mechanism which guarantees proper implementation and EU funding for Natura 2000 at the level of the EU's estimated contribution to the envisaged overall amount, which is approximately EUR 6.1 billion for the EU-25 per year; insists that an amount of EUR 21 billion for Natura 2000 should therefore be earmarked ("ring-fenced") in the Financial Perspective within the respective areas; calls for the funding of measures to implement Natura 2000 under Heading 2 of the Financial Perspective; calls for the funding of Natura 2000 activities and management which cannot be financed by other instruments within the Life+ programme; calls on the Commission in this context to examine the possible integration of Natura 2000 in other funds;
22. [...] insists in this context on a legally binding mechanism which guarantees proper implementation and EU funding for Natura 2000 at the level of the EU's estimated contribution to the envisaged overall amount, which is approximately EUR 6.1 billion for the EU-25 per year; insists that an amount of EUR 21 billion for Natura 2000 should therefore be earmarked ("ring-fenced") in the Financial Perspective within the respective areas; calls for the funding of measures to implement Natura 2000 under Heading 2 of the Financial Perspective; calls for the funding of Natura 2000 activities and management which cannot be financed by other instruments within the Life+ programme; calls on the Commission in this context to examine the possible integration of Natura 2000 in other funds;
The acceleration of the modulation (shift between market measures and income support and rural development), even if it will have a limited effect on financial terms, will increase the part of co-financing of agriculture but at the same time it will reduce the direct support to farmers.
The acceleration of the modulation (shift between market measures and income support and rural development), even if it will have a limited effect on financial terms, will increase the part of co-financing of agriculture but at the same time it will reduce the direct support to farmers.
The rapporteur agrees on the fact that the Lisbon strategy should not be limited to heading 1a and 1b.
The rapporteur agrees on the fact that the Lisbon strategy should not be limited to heading 1a and 1b.
However, he considers that, as stressed in the EP's negotiating position, without additional co-financing, the Commission's proposal would imply a reduction of revenue for the EU farmers.
However, he considers that, as stressed in the EP's negotiating position, without additional co-financing, the Commission's proposal would imply a reduction of revenue for the EU farmers.
This measure appears to be a stealth method of reneging on the 2002 agreement.
This measure appears to be a stealth method of reneging on the 2002 agreement.
Modernising the budget: a roadmap for review
Modernising the budget: a roadmap for review
Several reviews are foreseen during the period for agriculture, for Lisbon.
Several reviews are foreseen during the period for agriculture, for Lisbon.
The Commission considers that a global review should take place in two phases and without involving the Member States:
The Commission considers that a global review should take place in two phases and without involving the Member States:
a. early 2009: presentation of a White Paper followed by a debate in the institutions (EP and Council)
a. early 2009: presentation of a White Paper followed by a debate in the institutions (EP and Council)
2010-2013: Second phase for implementation under the mandates of a newly elected European Parliament and newly appointed Commission.
2010-2013: Second phase for implementation under the mandates of a newly elected European Parliament and newly appointed Commission.
This proposal does not contradict the European Parliament's negotiating position.
This proposal does not contradict the European Parliament's negotiating position.
33 reads as follows:
33 reads as follows:
Notes that the Commission has proposed a financial framework of 7 years' duration ; reiterates, for reasons of democratic responsibility and accountability, its position in favour of a parallelism between the duration of the Financial Perspective and the five-year mandates of the European Parliament and of the Commission, and recalls that the Constitution provides for a duration for the future MFF of a minimum of five years, which would allow for co-ordination with the terms of office of the Commission and of the European Parliament; points out that the duration of the legislative proposals could remain independent from the timeframe of the Financial Perspective
Notes that the Commission has proposed a financial framework of 7 years' duration ; reiterates, for reasons of democratic responsibility and accountability, its position in favour of a parallelism between the duration of the Financial Perspective and the five-year mandates of the European Parliament and of the Commission, and recalls that the Constitution provides for a duration for the future MFF of a minimum of five years, which would allow for co-ordination with the terms of office of the Commission and of the European Parliament; points out that the duration of the legislative proposals could remain independent from the timeframe of the Financial Perspective
The rapporteur underlines that such a proposal which would allow the new Commission to propose some adjustments in the White Paper and the newly elected Parliament to have a say on the current Financial Perspective would have no effect on the Financial Perspective.
The rapporteur underlines that such a proposal which would allow the new Commission to propose some adjustments in the White Paper and the newly elected Parliament to have a say on the current Financial Perspective would have no effect on the Financial Perspective.
The proposed review is an ineffective tool to be able to re-orient or adjust the FP if necessary.
The proposed review is an ineffective tool to be able to re-orient or adjust the FP if necessary.
EP would prefer a genuine revision clause or a shorter period.
EP would prefer a genuine revision clause or a shorter period.
At the same time this proposal will reduce the credibility of the Financial Perspective after 2010.
At the same time this proposal will reduce the credibility of the Financial Perspective after 2010.
This could therefore open a reflection, coherent with par.
This could therefore open a reflection, coherent with par.
33 of the EP resolution, on the possibility to shorten the period of FP even if part of the legislation could be adopted until 2013 and by way of example, with specific provisions for agricultural cohesion and research.
33 of the EP resolution, on the possibility to shorten the period of FP even if part of the legislation could be adopted until 2013 and by way of example, with specific provisions for agricultural cohesion and research.
V. Increasing democratic scrutiny and coherence of our external action
V. Increasing democratic scrutiny and coherence of our external action
Concerning EDF, the European Parliament's position is in favour of 'budgetisation' but not to the detriment of other (including new) policies.
Concerning EDF, the European Parliament's position is in favour of 'budgetisation' but not to the detriment of other (including new) policies.
49 reads:
49 reads:
49 [...] recalls that the European Parliament has strongly supported the integration of the EDF into the general budget on the basis of the principle of the unity of the budget and for reasons of transparency, but observes that, in financial terms, the budgetisation should not jeopardise other policies ; [...]
49 [...] recalls that the European Parliament has strongly supported the integration of the EDF into the general budget on the basis of the principle of the unity of the budget and for reasons of transparency, but observes that, in financial terms, the budgetisation should not jeopardise other policies ; [...]
The Commission seems to support EP's position for more money and greater EP involvement, as requested by EP in par.
The Commission seems to support EP's position for more money and greater EP involvement, as requested by EP in par.
28 and 30.
28 and 30.
The rapporteur has often mentioned that the link between the two should be a strong point for the negotiations.
The rapporteur has often mentioned that the link between the two should be a strong point for the negotiations.
Insists on a level of funding for external actions sufficient to enable the EU to become a real "global partner" in the world and to provide it with the means for its political ambitions and its international commitments ; [...]
Insists on a level of funding for external actions sufficient to enable the EU to become a real "global partner" in the world and to provide it with the means for its political ambitions and its international commitments ; [...]
Calls for coherence between the provisions of proposed legislative instruments and the likely forthcoming provisions of the Constitution, enhancing in all cases effective democratic participation of the European Parliament in decision-making , including the adoption and revision of multi-annual strategic frameworks; points to the particular need for greater participation of the European Parliament in decisions on CFSP actions, especially where these have budgetary implications ; in this regard, considers it indispensable to develop further the current practices for information and consultation of Parliament in the context of CFSP; considers that allocation of funding should fall under the "normal" EU budget and thus under the discharge authority of the EP;
Calls for coherence between the provisions of proposed legislative instruments and the likely forthcoming provisions of the Constitution, enhancing in all cases effective democratic participation of the European Parliament in decision-making , including the adoption and revision of multi-annual strategic frameworks; points to the particular need for greater participation of the European Parliament in decisions on CFSP actions, especially where these have budgetary implications ; in this regard, considers it indispensable to develop further the current practices for information and consultation of Parliament in the context of CFSP; considers that allocation of funding should fall under the "normal" EU budget and thus under the discharge authority of the EP;
The shortage of appropriations of the Council's last compromise is put in evidence.
The shortage of appropriations of the Council's last compromise is put in evidence.
The EDF should be budgetised: some instruments giving more power (control) to the EP on implementation will be proposed for the Inter-institutional Agreement.
The EDF should be budgetised: some instruments giving more power (control) to the EP on implementation will be proposed for the Inter-institutional Agreement.
Parliament has emphasised that the reduction of the number of instruments for external actions from 38 to 4 combined with the non-entry into force of the Constitution, which would extend EP's powers in this area, is not acceptable.
Parliament has emphasised that the reduction of the number of instruments for external actions from 38 to 4 combined with the non-entry into force of the Constitution, which would extend EP's powers in this area, is not acceptable.
The rapporteur has often raised the need for a sort of call-back clause and an Inter-institutional Agreement to make the new presentation of external instruments acceptable for EP.
The rapporteur has often raised the need for a sort of call-back clause and an Inter-institutional Agreement to make the new presentation of external instruments acceptable for EP.
The negotiating position could be: 'more money, more power'.
The negotiating position could be: 'more money, more power'.
The Commission proposals could be considered as a positive move towards the European Parliament's negotiating position on a limitative number of aspects, notably, the need for flexibility, for revision and for ensuring EP's rights over external programmes, although they still trail behind that of the EP.
The Commission proposals could be considered as a positive move towards the European Parliament's negotiating position on a limitative number of aspects, notably, the need for flexibility, for revision and for ensuring EP's rights over external programmes, although they still trail behind that of the EP.
They are not taking into account the different flexibility reserves for covering unforeseen needs nor of the qualitative conditions proposed by Parliament (par.
They are not taking into account the different flexibility reserves for covering unforeseen needs nor of the qualitative conditions proposed by Parliament (par.
46 and 50, see annex) such as the Financial Regulation, simplification of administrative burden, certification by Member States, simplification of the new instruments of financing and co-financing.
46 and 50, see annex) such as the Financial Regulation, simplification of administrative burden, certification by Member States, simplification of the new instruments of financing and co-financing.
The rapporteur recalls that these elements are a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the Financial Perspective/Inter-institutional Agreement.
The rapporteur recalls that these elements are a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the Financial Perspective/Inter-institutional Agreement.
The rapporteur regrets that until now it has been impossible to open the negotiations on figures and the provisions of the IIA which will certainly not facilitate the agreement with the European Parliament.
The rapporteur regrets that until now it has been impossible to open the negotiations on figures and the provisions of the IIA which will certainly not facilitate the agreement with the European Parliament.
Both the Commission and the Council should be aware that there can be no agreement on the next FP/IIA without agreement with the European Parliament, and that EP agreement will be conditional on its agreement on the IIA, which should take on board qualitative elements as well.
Both the Commission and the Council should be aware that there can be no agreement on the next FP/IIA without agreement with the European Parliament, and that EP agreement will be conditional on its agreement on the IIA, which should take on board qualitative elements as well.
The rapporteur already mentioned that the Commission could propose a revised version of the IIA to facilitate the negotiations.
The rapporteur already mentioned that the Commission could propose a revised version of the IIA to facilitate the negotiations.
P6_TA(2005)0224 from 8 June 2005
P6_TA(2005)0224 from 8 June 2005
At the European Council of 15-16 December 2005, the European Council finally reached an agreement on the next Financial Perspective.
At the European Council of 15-16 December 2005, the European Council finally reached an agreement on the next Financial Perspective.
Funding incentives should be increased through EIB-EIF facilities for TEN's.
Funding incentives should be increased through EIB-EIF facilities for TEN's.
The introduction of new or the variation of existing co-financing mechanisms should be envisaged to fine-tune the balance between Member states and to gain some additional margin of manoeuvre in the budget.
The introduction of new or the variation of existing co-financing mechanisms should be envisaged to fine-tune the balance between Member states and to gain some additional margin of manoeuvre in the budget.
TÖÖDOKUMENT NR 4 "EsimeNe reageering komisjoni poolt 1. veebruaril 2006 esitatud institutsioonidevahelise kokkuleppe parandatud versioonile"
WORKING DOCUMENT N° 4: ON FIRST REACTION TO THE REVISED VERSION OF THE INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION ON 1 FEBRUARY 2006
Euroopa Parlamendi poolt 1. detsembril 2005 vastu võetud resolutsioonis esitatud taotlusele vastavalt võttis komisjon 1. veebruaril 2006 vastu institutsioonidevahelise kokkuleppe parandatud versiooni.
Following the request made by the European Parliament in its resolution voted on 1 December 2005, the Commission has adopted a revised version of the Interinstitutional Agreement on 1 February 2006.
Sellele dokumendile lisati juurde president Barroso kiri president Borrellile ja kantsler Schüsselile.
This document was accompanied by a letter from President Barroso to President Borrell and to Chancellor Schüssel.
Institutsioonidevahelise kokkuleppe üle peetavate läbirääkimistele kaasaaitamiseks esitas raportöör töödokumendis nr 3
With a view to facilitating the negotiations on the Interinstitutional Agreement, the rapporteur in his working document no 3
PE 367.953v01-00 üksteist põhipunkti, mis kajastavad Euroopa Parlamendi läbirääkimispositsioonist tulenevaid poliitilisi prioriteete.
PE 367.953v01-00 , has presented 11 key points reflecting the Parliament's political priorities based on its negotiating position.
Samas dokumendis tuletas raportöör ka meelde, et Euroopa Parlamendi järgmise finantsperspektiivi ja institutsioonidevahelise kokkuleppe (IIA) prioriteedid on nii kvantitatiivset kui ka kvalitatiivset laadi.
In the same document, the rapporteur has also recalled that the European Parliament's priorities for the next FP-IIA are both of a quantitative and qualitative nature.
Institutsioonidevahelise kokkuleppe „võtmeküsimused” omavad põhjapanevat tähtsust üleüldise kokkuleppe jaoks, mida Euroopa Parlament tahab saavutada.
The 'key points' for the IIA are of fundamental importance in terms of the global agreement the European Parliament wants to achieve.
Nimetatud küsimused moodustavad vaid osa Euroopa Parlamendi taotlustest.
These points are only a part of the European Parliament's requests.
Euroopa Parlament tahab esitada kokkuleppe teksti osas muidki muudatusettepanekuid.
The European Parliament will have other amendments on the text of the agreement.
Raportöör võtab arvesse asjaolu, et kogu institutsioonidevaheline kokkulepe kujutab endast finantsperspektiivi täiendust.
The rapporteur is mindful that the whole Interinstitutional Agreement is a complement of the Financial Perspective.
Mida piiratum on finantsraamistik, seda suuremaid nõudeid peab Euroopa Parlament esitama IIA sisu ja menetluste tõhususele.
The more the financial framework is limited the more the European Parliament must insist on effectiveness of the procedures and contents of the IIA.
Euroopa Parlament ei toeta seisukohta, et IIA muutmata jäetud osad võetakse automaatselt vastu.
The approach that the parts of the IIA which are not changed would be automatically accepted, will not be supported by the European Parliament.
Oluliste arvuliste ja kvalitatiivsete küsimustega seotud 11 põhipunktist on parandatud IIA projekti
Out of 11 key points relating to major quantitative and qualitative elements, the revised draft IIA
KOM(2006)0036 jäetud osalisel kujul vaid kaks:
COM(2006)0036 has taken on board only two of them in partial form:
· paindlikkusvahend: selle mahtu suurendatakse vaadeldaval ajavahemikul 200 miljonilt 700 miljonile eurole aastas ja kasutusala laiendatakse nii, et see hõlmab ka ettenägematuid vajadusi ja mitmeaastaseid taotlusi (4,9 miljardit eurot kogu ajavahemiku peale).
· flexibility: the annual amount of which is increased from 200 to 700 million per year over the period and a broader scope covering unforeseen needs but also multi-annual requirements (4,9 billion over the period).
Nimetatud summa jääb kaugele sellest, mida pani ette Euroopa Parlament.
This amount is far from what the European Parliament had proposed.
Üldse ei ole puudutatud vahendite intensiivse kasutuselevõtu menetluse hõlbustamist.
No mention is made regarding facilitation of the heavy mobilisation procedure.
Sellised paindlikkusvahendid ei võimalda süstemaatiliselt alarahastatud programme ellu viia.
Such flexibility instruments will not enable to implement systematically underfinanced programmes.
· finantsraamistikust on välja võetud solidaarsusfond (kuni 1 miljard eurot aastas).
· the Solidarity Fund (up to 1 billion per year) has been taken out of the financial framework.
Välja on jäänud ka nõukogu taotletud globaliseerumisfond (kuni 500 miljonit eurot aastas).
The Globalisation Fund (up to 500 million per year) which is a request from the Council also remains outside.
Ülejäänud „põhipunktid” IIA parandatud versioonis ei kajastu.
Concerning the other 'key points', they are not reflected in the revised version of the IIA.
Enamikku neist on suhteliselt nõrgas sõnastuses nimetatud dokumendi avalõigus tsiteeritud kirjas, kusjuures tekstis ei kajastu komisjoni selge kohustus võtta arvestada Euroopa Parlamendi taotlusi või eelisõigus nõukogu prioriteetidega võrreldes.
Most of them are mentioned in the letter referred to in the opening paragraph with a rather weak formulation and no clear commitment by the Commission in favour of Parliament's requests or prerogatives compared to Council's priorities.
Sama kehtib ka läbivaatamisklausli kohta, mille komisjon esitab ajavahemikus 2008–2009 valge raamatu kujul ja mis hõlmab ELi vahendite ja kulutuste kõiki aspekte.
This also applies to the review clause which will take the form of a White Paper to be presented by the Commission in 2008-2009 covering all aspects of EU spending and resources.
Üldse ei ole nimetatud Euroopa Parlamendi osa kehtivate õigusaktide muutmise, kinnitamise või nende kehtivusaja pikendamise küsimuste otsustamisel.
No mention is made of the European Parliament's role in the decision of extension, modification or confirmation of the provisions in place.
Lisaks ei ole üldse nimetatud siduvat tegevuskava.
Furthermore no mention is made of a binding roadmap.