natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Iga liikmesriik otsustab ise oma üksuse struktuuri ja personali üle vastavalt siseriiklikele õigusaktidele.
It shall be up to each Member State to decide on the organization and staffing of the national units, in accordance with its national legislation.
CEPOLi siseriiklikud üksused võivad koosneda vajaduse korral ühest isikust, kui on tagatud üksuste toimimine vastavalt käesolevale otsusele.
CEPOL national units may consist of a single person, if necessary, as long as their proper functioning in accordance with this Decision is ensured.
Liikmesriigid kohustuvad võtma kõik vajalikud meetmed, tagamaks toimiv teabevahetus ja koostöö kõikide asjaomaste koolitusasutuste, sealhulgas asjaomaste teadusasutuste ja CEPOLi siseriikliku/siseriiklike üksuse/üksuste vahel.
The Member States agree to undertake all necessary measures to ensure good communication and cooperation of all relevant training institutes, including relevant research institutes, with the CEPOL national unit(s).
Juhul kui mõnes liikmesriigis on rohkem kui üks CEPOLi siseriiklik üksus, otsustab vastav liikmesriik ise, milline neist on keskne koordineeriv üksus, kes on suuteline tagama vajaliku teabevahetuse ja koordineerimise oma territooriumil paiknevate üksuste ja teistes liikmesriikides olevate üksuste vahel.
Where there is more than one CEPOL national unit in a single Member State, it shall be up to each Member State to designate one of them as the central coordinating unit responsible for ensuring the necessary communication and coordination with the other CEPOL national units within its territory and with those in other Member States.
Artikli 12 lõike 4 sissejuhatav osa
Article 12, paragraph 4, introductory part
CEPOLi siseriiklikud üksused vastutavad siseriiklikul tasandil juhatuse vastuvõetud koolitus- ja õppekavade täideviimise eest ning peaksid ühtlasi aktiivselt osalema nimetatud koolituskavade väljatöötamises ning nende kasutamise hindamises.
The CEPOL national units shall be responsible at national level for implementing the training, teaching and learning tools adopted by the Governing Board, and should also participate actively in their development and the evaluation of their use.
Iga CEPOLi siseriiklik üksus vastutab eelkõige järgmiste ülesannete täitmise eest:
In particular, each CEPOL national unit shall be responsible for the following tasks:
Kontaktüksused peavad tegema CEPOLi direktoriga tihedat koostööd ja andma CEPOLile aru koolitusprogrammide riiklikul tasandil rakendamise kohta.
The liaison units shall cooperate closely with the Director of CEPOL and shall report to CEPOL on the implementation of the training programmes at national level.
Iga kontaktüksus vastutab eelkõige järgmiste ülesannete täitmise eest:
In particular, each liaison unit shall be responsible for the following tasks:
Artikli 14 lõige 3
Article 14, paragraph 3
Direktor koostab CEPOLi järgmise eelarveaasta tulude ja kulude kalkulatsiooni ning edastab selle koos ametikohtade loeteluga juhatusele.
The Director shall draw up an estimate of the revenues and expenditure of CEPOL for the following financial year and shall forward it to the Governing Board together with an establishment plan.
Direktor koostab CEPOLi järgmise eelarveaasta tulude ja kulude kalkulatsiooni ning edastab selle koos esialgse ametikohtade loeteluga juhatusele.
The Director shall draw up an estimate of the revenues and expenditure of CEPOL for the following financial year and shall forward it to the Governing Board together with a provisional establishment plan.
The establishment plan will remain provisional until the adoption by the budgetary authority.
The establishment plan will remain provisional until the adoption by the budgetary authority.
Artikli 15 lõige 3
Article 15, paragraph 3
Kui kontrollikojalt on saadud vastavalt üldise finantsmääruse artiklile 129 esitatud märkused CEPOLi esialgse raamatupidamisaruande kohta, koostab direktor oma vastutusel CEPOLi lõpliku raamatupidamisaruande ning edastab selle juhatusele arvamuse saamiseks .
On receipt of the Court of Auditors' observations on CEPOL's provisional accounts, pursuant to Article 129 of the general Financial Regulation, the Director shall draw up CEPOL's final accounts under his own responsibility and forward them to the Governing Board for an opinion .
Kui kontrollikojalt on saadud vastavalt üldise finantsmääruse artiklile 129 esitatud märkused CEPOLi esialgse raamatupidamisaruande kohta, koostab juhatus direktori poolt ette valmistatud raamatupidamisaruande projekti alusel CEPOLi lõpliku raamatupidamisaruande ning edastab selle juhatusele arvamuse saamiseks.
On receipt of the Court of Auditors' observations on CEPOL's provisional accounts, pursuant to Article 129 of the general Financial Regulation, the Governing Board shall draw up CEPOL's final accounts on the basis of the draft accounts prepared by the Director.
Juhatus võtab pärast komisjoniga konsulteerimist vastu CEPOLi suhtes kohaldatavad finantseeskirjad.
The financial rules applicable to CEPOL shall be adopted by the Governing Board after having consulted the Commission.
Need ei või kalduda kõrvale asutuste finantsraammäärust käsitlevast komisjoni 23. detsembri 2002 määrusest (EÜ, Euratom) nr 2343/2002, millele viidatakse Euroopa ühenduste üldeelarve suhtes kohaldatavat finantsmäärust käsitleva nõukogu määruse (EÜ, Euratom) nr 1605/2002 artiklis 185, välja arvatud siis, kui CEPOLi tegevus seda konkreetselt nõuab ja komisjon on andnud eelneva nõusoleku.
They may not depart from the Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 2343/2002 of 23 December 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, unless specifically required for CEPOL’s operation and with the Commission’s prior consent.
Eelarvepädevaid institutsioone teavitatakse nendest kõrvalekaldumistest.
The budgetary authority shall be informed of these derogations.
Hiljemalt kuue kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva otsuse jõustumist peavad liikmesriigid olema moodustanud CEPOLi siseriikliku(d) üksuse(d) ja olema edastanud kogu asjakohase teabe nõukogu peasekretariaadile ja komisjonile .
At the latest six months after this Decision takes effect, the Member States shall have set up their CEPOL national unit(s) and transmitted all the relevant information to the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission.
Kuue kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva otsuse jõustumist peavad liikmesriigid määrama eelpoololevas artiklis 12 osutatud kontaktüksused ja edastama kogu asjakohase teabe CEPOLi direktorile ja juhatusele .
Within six months after this Decision takes effect, the Member States shall designated their liaison units as referred to in Article 12 and shall transmit all the relevant information to the Director and the Governing Board of CEPOL .
Iga aasta lõpus esitab juhatus komisjonile, nõukogule ja Euroopa Parlamendile aastaaruande kooskõlas käesoleva otsuse artikli 9 lõike 7 punktiga d.
At the end of each year the Governing board shall submit an annual report to the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament as specified by Article 9 (7) (d) of this Decision.
Samuti esitab juhatus Euroopa Parlamendi või nõukogu nõudmisel aruandeid ja muud teavet.
The Governing Board shall also submit any report or any further information that may be required of it by the European Parliament or the Council.
Viie aasta jooksul pärast käesoleva otsuse jõustumist ja edaspidi iga viie aasta tagant peab juhatus tellima välisekspertide sõltumatu hinnangu käesoleva otsuse täitmise ning CEPOLi tegevuse kohta.
Within five years after this Decision takes effect and every five years thereafter, the Governing Board shall commission an independent external evaluation of the implementation of this Decision as well as of the activities carried out by CEPOL.
Kolme aasta jooksul pärast käesoleva otsuse jõustumist ja edaspidi iga kolme aasta tagant peab juhatus tellima välisekspertide sõltumatu hinnangu käesoleva otsuse täitmise ning CEPOLi tegevuse kohta.
Within three years after this Decision takes effect and every three years thereafter, the Governing Board shall commission an independent external evaluation of the implementation of this Decision as well as of the activities carried out by CEPOL.
Artikkel 22 a
Article 22 a (new)
I. Context of the proposal
I. Context of the proposal
eelarvekomisjoni ARVAMUS
OPINION of the Committee on Budgets
ettepaneku üle nõukogu otsuse kohta, millega luuakse Euroopa politseikolledž (CEPOL) kui Euroopa Liidu organ
on the proposal for a Council decision on establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) as a body of the European Union
Eelarvekomisjon kutsub kodanikuvabaduste, justiits- ja siseasjade komisjoni kui vastutavat komisjoni üles lisama oma raportisse järgmised muudatusettepanekud:
The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
Õigusloomega seotud resolutsiooni ettepanek
Draft legislative resolution
Euroopa Komisjoni ettepanek
Text proposted by the Commission
Euroopa Parlamendi muudatusettepanekud
Amendments by Parliament
Eelarvepädevaid institutsioone teavitatakse nendest kõrvalekaldumistest.
The budgetary authority shall be informed about these derogations.
Ettepanek nõukogu otsuse kohta, millega luuakse Euroopa politseikolledž (CEPOL) kui Euroopa Liidu organ
Proposal for a Council decision on establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) as a body of the European Union
Ettepanek nõukogu otsuse kohta, millega luuakse Euroopa politseikolledž (CEPOL) kui Euroopa Liidu organ
Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police College (CEPOL) as a body of the European Union
art 39 lg 1 (EÜ)
Article 39(1) EU
art 93 ja 51
Rules 93and 51
Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse ettepanek, millega moodustatakse arengukoostöö ja majanduskoostöö rahastamisvahend
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
David Martin , rahvusvahelise kaubanduse komisjon
David Martin , Committee on International Trade
VÄLISASJADE KOMISJONI ARVAMUS..............................................................................11
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.................................................11
rahvusvahelise KAUBANDUSE KOMISJONI ARVAMUS.........................................14
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (*)................................14
eELARVEKOMISJONI ARVAMUS.......................................................................................17
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS.................................................................17
– võttes arvesse Euroopa Komisjoni ettepanekut Euroopa Parlamendile ja nõukogule ( KOM(2004)0629 )
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council ( COM(2004)0629 )
ELTs seni avaldamata. ;
Not yet published in OJ.. ,
– võttes arvesse EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 251 lõiget 2 ja artikli 179 lõiget 1, mille alusel esitas Euroopa Komisjon parlamendile ettepaneku ( C6‑0128/2004 );
– having regard to Article 251(2) and Articles 179(1) and 181a(2) of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament ( C6‑0128/2004 ),
– võttes arvesse arengukomisjoni raportit ning välisasjade komisjoni, rahvusvahelise kaubanduse komisjoni ja eelarvekomisjoni arvamusi ( A6‑0060/2005 );
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Budgets, ( A6‑0060/2005 ),
However, in 2001 they themselves proposed under the development legal base (Art. 179 TEC) a regulation for cooperation with Asia and Latin America which included provision for cooperation to "promote economic and trade cooperation, strengthen investment relations, and foster the integration of Asian and Latin American countries into the multilateral trading system and the implementation of WTO agreements".
However, in 2001 they themselves proposed under the development legal base (Art. 179 TEC) a regulation for cooperation with Asia and Latin America which included provision for cooperation to "promote economic and trade cooperation, strengthen investment relations, and foster the integration of Asian and Latin American countries into the multilateral trading system and the implementation of WTO agreements".
VÄLISASJADE KOMISJONI ARVAMUS
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse ettepaneku kohta, millega moodustatakse arengukoostöö ja majanduskoostöö rahastamisvahend
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
Arvamuse koostaja: Irena Belohorská
Draftswoman: Irena Belohorská
After a careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.
After a careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.
A number of the ideas contained in the Commission proposal are of considerable interest and, if properly implemented, could grant a new dynamism and provide far more concrete results for the EU's external action policy, and as such they will deserve a proper debate at a later time.
A number of the ideas contained in the Commission proposal are of considerable interest and, if properly implemented, could grant a new dynamism and provide far more concrete results for the EU's external action policy, and as such they will deserve a proper debate at a later time.
However, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument as it stands, the rapporteur recommends that the committee vote against the proposal, specifically for the following reasons:
However, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument as it stands, the rapporteur recommends that the committee vote against the proposal, specifically for the following reasons:
The Commission is proposing "a new framework for planning and delivery assistance ..... in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective", and is presenting several new financial instruments to do this.
The Commission is proposing "a new framework for planning and delivery assistance ..... in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective", and is presenting several new financial instruments to do this.
The proposed new regulation before the committee is "the third general instrument providing direct support for the European Union's external policies".
The proposed new regulation before the committee is "the third general instrument providing direct support for the European Union's external policies".
(The others are: the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Stability Instrument).
(The others are: the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Stability Instrument).
It is clear, however, that the four new regulations on external financial instruments have to be seen and treated as part of a package.
It is clear, however, that the four new regulations on external financial instruments have to be seen and treated as part of a package.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs recognises the importance of having in place a rationalised/consolidated approach so that external assistance can be better co-ordinated.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs recognises the importance of having in place a rationalised/consolidated approach so that external assistance can be better co-ordinated.
However, it also draws attention to the fact that the instruments, as proposed, would erode Parliament's policy-making role very considerably.
However, it also draws attention to the fact that the instruments, as proposed, would erode Parliament's policy-making role very considerably.
The result would be that Parliament would no longer be able to exercise its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funding to specific programmes.
The result would be that Parliament would no longer be able to exercise its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funding to specific programmes.
It is imperative that the European Parliament be able to exercise the powers accorded it under the Treaties, thus providing any new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.
It is imperative that the European Parliament be able to exercise the powers accorded it under the Treaties, thus providing any new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.
A further - and major - concern is that the new regulations are open-ended as regards timing.
A further - and major - concern is that the new regulations are open-ended as regards timing.
Art. 26 of the proposed Regulation under examination here (the financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation) refers to the possibility of a review, but it should be noted that this is only a possibility ("The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council by 31 December 2011 any proposals concerning the future of this Regulation and any amendments that may be necessary").
Art. 26 of the proposed Regulation under examination here (the financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation) refers to the possibility of a review, but it should be noted that this is only a possibility ("The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council by 31 December 2011 any proposals concerning the future of this Regulation and any amendments that may be necessary").
What is needed is a clear specification of a fixed period of application for the regulation so that, when it expires, Parliament will be able to participate fully in a review of the instrument(s).
What is needed is a clear specification of a fixed period of application for the regulation so that, when it expires, Parliament will be able to participate fully in a review of the instrument(s).
As the above elements are clearly far from satisfactory, the Committee on Foreign Affairs proposes to endorse the position of the lead committee, the Committee on Development, and recommend that Parliament reject the Commission proposal.
As the above elements are clearly far from satisfactory, the Committee on Foreign Affairs proposes to endorse the position of the lead committee, the Committee on Development, and recommend that Parliament reject the Commission proposal.
At the same time, it calls on the Commission to re-examine the entire "package" without delay, and to take full account of Parliament's concerns.
At the same time, it calls on the Commission to re-examine the entire "package" without delay, and to take full account of Parliament's concerns.
ÕIGUSAKTI ETTEPANEK
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Välisasjade komisjon soovitab Euroopa Komisjoni ettepaneku tagasi lükata.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.
Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse ettepanek, millega moodustatakse arengukoostöö ja majanduskoostöö rahastamisvahend
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
Arvamuse koostaja(d) nimetamise kuupäev
Drafts(wo)man Date appointed
rahvusvahelise KAUBANDUSE KOMISJONI ARVAMUS
OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
After careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument, the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.
After careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument, the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.
While welcoming the overall objective of simplifying and rationalising the legislative instruments relating to external policy, the draftsman believes that the new Commission proposal seriously impinges on the powers currently exercised by Parliament in conformity with the Treaties under the co-decision and the annual budgetary procedures.
While welcoming the overall objective of simplifying and rationalising the legislative instruments relating to external policy, the draftsman believes that the new Commission proposal seriously impinges on the powers currently exercised by Parliament in conformity with the Treaties under the co-decision and the annual budgetary procedures.
The four new proposals on external financial instruments which, according to the very logic of the Commission, should be understood as a package, curb Parliament's role very considerably.
The four new proposals on external financial instruments which, according to the very logic of the Commission, should be understood as a package, curb Parliament's role very considerably.
In their current form, the new instruments prevent Parliament from exercising its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funds to concrete programmes.
In their current form, the new instruments prevent Parliament from exercising its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funds to concrete programmes.
Moreover, compared with past and standard practice, the new regulations are open-ended and would therefore prevent Parliament from participating in future reviews of the instruments.
Moreover, compared with past and standard practice, the new regulations are open-ended and would therefore prevent Parliament from participating in future reviews of the instruments.
Parliament should maintain the possibility of fully co-determining, on a regular basis, the objectives, scope and methods to be employed by the different instruments.
Parliament should maintain the possibility of fully co-determining, on a regular basis, the objectives, scope and methods to be employed by the different instruments.
A fixed period of application is therefore needed.
A fixed period of application is therefore needed.
It is, in short, imperative that, in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective, the European Parliament continues to be able to exercise the powers that have been accorded to it by the Treaties, thus providing the new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.
It is, in short, imperative that, in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective, the European Parliament continues to be able to exercise the powers that have been accorded to it by the Treaties, thus providing the new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.
For all these reasons the Committee on International Trade proposes that the Commission proposal be rejected.
For all these reasons the Committee on International Trade proposes that the Commission proposal be rejected.