natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Box 2 Redirecting an institution building project Ń Integrated Border Management in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia The Annual Programme for CARDS 2003 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia envisaged, among other things, to strengthen control of the green border and allocated 2,8 million euro for this purpose. 
2. selgitus Institutsioonide vljaarendamise projekti mbersuunamine Đ integreeritud piirihaldus endises Jugoslaavia Makedoonia Vabariigis Endise Jugoslaavia Makedoonia Vabariigi aastaprogramm CARDS 2003 ngi muu hulgas ette kontrolli tugevdamist rohelisel piiril ja eraldas selleks 2,8 miljonit eurot.
According to the Annual Programme, there were a number of short-term actions needed in this area: (1) set-up a dedicated border guard service, (2) improve recruitment procedures, (3) provide basic training and in-depth course on border control and (4) supply equipment for detection of forged or falsified documents and for high-tech vehicle searches, together with corresponding training tools. 
Aastaprogrammi kohaselt oli selles valdkonnas vaja ellu viia hulk lhiajalisi meetmeid: 1) seada sisse spetsiaalne piirivalveteenistus, 2) tiustada vrbamismenetlusi, 3) pakkuda piirikontrolli alast algkoolitust ja svakursusi ning 4) tarnida vltsdokumentide tuvastamise ja sidukite krgtehnoloogilise lbiot-simise seadmed koos asjakohaste vljappevahenditega.
(5) A project fiche is a short description (4 to 5 pages in average) without specific terms of reference. 
(5) Projektikirjeldus on lhike iseloomustus (keskmiselt 4Đ5 lk) ilma tpsema juhendita.
The initial description includes the foreseen project intervention logic, project objectives, results and activities. 
See esialgne kirjeldus hlmab kavandatud projekti sekkumisphimtet, projekti eesmrke, tulemusi ja tegevusi.
It assesses the project risks and defines objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) and means to verify these indicators. DEL EAR 
Selles hinnatakse projekti riske ja mratakse objektiivselt kontrollitavad nitajad ning vahendid nende nitajate kontrollimiseks. DEL EAR
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/9 Objectives for this initiative were twofold: (1) To enhance the co-operational capacity of government border services within the existing organisational framework, to fulfil immediate requirements, and (2) to develop a new organisational structure for the border police and operational capacities in compliance with European Union standards. 
27.11.2007 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 285/9 Sellel algatusel oli kaks erinevat eesmrki: 1) suurendada riikliku pii-riteenistuse koostvimet olemasoleva organisatsioonilise raamistikuga, rahuldada kiireloomulised vajadused, ning 2) luua piiripolitsei uus organisatsioonistruktuur ja arendada vlja toimimissuutlikkus koosklas Euroopa Liidu normidega.
Instead of consistently addressing the above needs, objectives and priorities, the EAR used the whole amount to purchase vehicles. 
Selle asemel, et jrjekindlalt tegeleda eespool nimetatud vajaduste ra-huldamisega, kasutas EAR kogu summa sidukite ostmiseks.
The Court found no evidence of on-going monitoring of projects by the Management Committee after the approval stage. 
Kontrollikoda ei leidnud mingeid tendeid selle kohta, et korralduskomitee teostaks projektide le prast nende heakskiitmist pidevat jrelevalvet.
In other words the Management Committee did not concern itself with changes to projects once implementation had started. Efficient management structures ensured speedy delivery of aid but national administrative capacity challenged Management structures not always appropriate 28. 
Thusad haldusstruktuurid tagasid abi kiire kohalejudmise, kuid see pani proovile riikide haldussuutlikkuse Haldusstruktuurid ei olnud alati asjakohased 28.
In July 1998 the Court published Special Report No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (period 1996 to 1997). 
Juulis 1998 avaldas kontrollikoda eriaruande nr 5/98 lesehitust kohta endises Jugoslaavias (ajavahemikul 1996Đ1997).
The audit covered two countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina and to a lesser extent Croatia. 
Audit hlmas kahte riiki: Bosnia ja Hertsegoviinat ning vhemal mral Horvaatiat.
The report criticised that despite the EUŐs clear declarations of intent, the Commission was not successful in deploying sufficient human resources to the task of reconstruction in former Yugoslavia, neither at its headquarters nor in the areas under reconstruction. 
Aruanne sisaldas kriitikat selle kohta, et vaatamata ELi selgele tahteavaldusele ei nnestunud komisjonil suunata endise Jugoslaavia lesehituse ksimustega tegelema piisavalt inimesi, ei oma peakorteris ega ka kohapeal.
The Court concluded the following: (a) Implementation of the appropriations allocated by the EU for reconstruction was slowed by the lack of an implementation programme, shortage of staff, excessive headquarter centralisation and the institutional weaknesses of the local authorities. (b) In 1997, the disbursement rate of the EUŐs reconstruction programme (29 %) was relatively low compared with the average of other donors (52 %). (c) The co-existence of three separate regulations governing the budget articles used to finance the reconstruction measures hampered the CommissionŐs management. 
Kontrollikoda tegi jrgmised jreldused: a) ELi eraldatud summade kasutamine lesehituses aeglustus ra-kendusprogrammi puudumise, personali vhesuse, tegevuse liigse tsentraliseerituse tttu peakorterisse ja kohalike ametivimude institutsioonilise nrkuse tttu; b) 1997. aastal oli ELi lesehitusprogrammi vljamaksete mr (29 %) suhteliselt madal vrreldes teiste rahastajatega (52 %); c) kolme eri mruse heaegne eksisteerimine, mis kik regu-leerisid lesehitusmeetmete rahastamiseks kasutatavaid eel-arvepositsioone, raskendas komisjonipoolset haldamist.
To overcome the deficiencies in EU aid delivery, the Court recommended the Commission should devolve management for its aid effort to its Delegations and focus on a smaller number of sectors. 
ELi abi kohaletoimetamisega seotud puudustest lesaa-miseks soovitas kontrollikoda komisjonil volitada abi haldama oma delegatsioonid ja keskenduda viksemale arvule valdkondadele.
While taking into account the above-mentioned weaknesses, the CourtŐs current audit assessed the extent to which the CARDS management structures were efficient and whether the aid was delivered with sufficient rapidity. 
Vttes arvesse eespool nimetatud puudusi, hindas kontrollikoda kesolevas auditis seda, kui thusad olid CARDSi haldusstruktuurid ja kas abi judis piisavalt kiiresti kohale.
The audit revealed significant improvement in the efficiency of EU operations in the western Balkans since 1998. 
Auditi kigus leiti, et ELi tegevuse thusus Lne-Balkani riikides oli alates 1998. aastast tunduvalt paranenud.
Major changes took place. Firstly, the CARDS regulation unified the legal basis for similar operations. 
Esiteks htlustas CARDSi mrus sarnaste tegevuste iguslikud alused.
Secondly the devolution process was introduced to improve the speed and quality of EC external aid(1). 
Teiseks oli kivitatud haldusfunktsioonide leandmise protsess, et kiirendada ELi vlisabi kohaletoimetamist ja parandada selle kvaliteeti (1).
Thirdly the Commission delegated part of the implementation of the assistance to a new organisation specially created for this purpose the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
Kolmandaks delegeeris komisjon osa abi rakendamisest uuele, spetsiaalselt selleks loodud organisatsioonile Đ Euroopa lesehitusametile.
All these actions speeded up aid delivery and improved the efficiency of the assistance (see Box 3). 
Kik need meetmed kiirendasid abi kohalejudmist ja suurendasid selle thusust (vt 3. selgitus).
Box 3 Example of high contracting rates under CARDS EAR was created as a response to the need to act quickly and efficiently when addressing the urgent post-conflict needs of the population in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 crisis. 
3. selgitus CARDSi raames slmitud lepingute krge mra nited EAR loodi selleks, et Kosovo elanikkonna konfliktijrgsete kiireloomuliste vajaduste rahuldamiseks vahetult prast 1999. aasta kriisi oleks vimalik tegutseda kiiresti ja thusalt.
The Court has in its earlier audits concluded that EAR actions in Kosovo immediately after the crisis met the ambitious objectives in the fields of basic services. 
Kontrollikoda on judnud varasemates auditites jreldusele, et EARi tegevus Kosovos vahetult prast kriisi titis oma ambitsioonikad eesmrgid phiteenuste valdkonnas.
The high contracting rates have been maintained in Kosovo throughout the CARDS programme. 
Lepingute slmimise krge mr on Kosovos psinud kogu programmi CARDS vltel.
As of November 2006, the EAR has in Kosovo managed over 1 100 million euro on behalf of the Commission, some 91 % of that money has been contracted and some 86 % disbursed. 
2006. aasta novembri seisuga oli EARi poolt Kosovos komisjoni nimel hallatud vahendite maht 1 100 miljonit eurot, kusjuures umbes 91 % osas sellest olid lepingud slmitud ja umbes 86 % rahast oli vlja makstud.
Along with the KFOR troops, the EUŐs assistance helped normalise life in Kosovo. 
Koos NATO juhitavate rahutagamisjududega aitas ELi abi normaliseerida elu Kosovos.
In total CARDS was implemented using four different methods and structures (see Graph 2), most of which left little room for involvement of the recipient states. 
Kokku kasutati CARDSi rakendamisel nelja erinevat meetodit ja struktuuri (vt diagramm 2), millest enamik jttis vhe vimalusi abisaajariikide kaasamiseks.
This was done in order to ensure speedy delivery of aid and reflected the weaknesses of the national administrations. 
Seda tehti abi kiire kohaletoimetamise tagamiseks ning see kajastas ka knealuste riikide haldusstruktuuride nrkust.
(1) As a result of devolution EC Delegations are responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation. 
(1) Volituste leandmise tulemusena vastutavad Euroopa Komisjoni delegatsioonid projektide ettevalmistamise, lepingute slmimise ning rakendamise eest nii rahastamise poolest kui tehnilises osas.
As a consequence the role of the central services in Brussels evolved away from direct management of projects towards monitoring and supporting Delegations. 
Brsselis asuvate kesktalituste roll on projektide otsese haldamise asemel jrjest enam suunatud delegatsioonide jrelevalvele ja toetamisele.
C 285/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.11.2007 Graph 2 CARDS management structures CARDS management methods COMMISSION Centralised management from HQ in Brussels Ń Regional pr. Ń Customs Ń Other Devolved management Delegations in Ń Albania Ń Bosnia H. Ń Croatia Decentralised management Ń Albania (ADF) Ń Croatia (CFCU) 33. 
C 285/10 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 27.11.2007 Diagramm 2 CARDSi haldusstruktuurid CARDSi haldusmeetodid KOMISJON Tsentraliseeritud haldamine peakorterist Brsselis Ń Piirkondlikud programmid Ń Toll Ń Muud leantud haldusvolitused Delegatsioonid Ń Albaania Ń Bosnia ja Hertsegoviina Ń Horvaatia Detsentraliseeritud haldamine Ń Albaania (AAF) Ń Horvaatia (CFCU) 33.
The main characteristics of the different management structures are as follows: (a) Centralised management by DG Enlargement (and earlier EuropeAid): DG ELARG manages the regional programmes directly from the headquarters. 
Erinevate haldusstruktuuride peamised iseloomulikud jooned on jrgmised: a) tsentraliseeritud haldamine laienemise peadirektoraadis (varem EuropeAidis): laienemise peadirektoraat haldab piirkondlikke programme otse oma peakorterist.
Regional programmes focus on strengthening administrative capacity e.g. in customs, the fight against organised crime and supporting civil society. (b) Devolved management: The EC Delegations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were devolved (1). 
Piirkondlikud programmid on suunatud haldussuutlikkuse suurendamisele Đ nt tollis, vitlusele organiseeritud kuritegevusega ja kodanikuhiskonna toetamisele; b) leantud haldusvolitused: volitused anti Euroopa Komisjoni delegatsioonidele Albaanias, Bosnia ja Hertsegoviinas ning Horvaatias (1).
As a result of devolution, Delegations became responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation. (c) Decentralised implementation: involves the Commission delegating implementation of some programmes to the recipient country Government in Albania and in Croatia. (d) Indirect centralised management: The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) (2), an independent agency of the EU, manages the programme in Kosovo (3), Serbia, Montenegro and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
Volituste leandmise tulemusena hakkasid delegatsioonid vastutama projektide ettevalmistamise, lepingute slmimise ning rakendamise eest nii rahastamise kui tehnilises osas; c) detsentraliseeritud rakendamine: kaasatud on komisjon, kes delegeerib mne programmi rakendamise abisaajariikide Albaania ja Horvaatia valitsustele; d) kaudne tsentraliseeritud haldamine: ELi sltumatu agentuur Euroopa lesehitusamet (EAR) (2) haldab programme Kosovos, (3) Serbias, Montenegros ja endises Jugoslaavia Makedoonia Vabariigis.
The EAR is administratively accountable to the European Council and to the European Parliament, but not to the European Commission. 
EAR on aruandekohustuslik Euroopa lemkogu ja Euroopa Parlamendi ees, kuid mitte Euroopa Komisjoni ees.
(1) The devolution process had started in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998, even before the Commission announcement in May 2000 of the major reform of the management of its external aid programme. 
(1) Haldusfunktsioonide leandmise protsess algas Bosnia ja Hertsegoviinas 1998. aastal Đ juba enne seda, kui komisjon 2000. aasta mais oma vlisabiprogrammi suure haldusreformi vlja kuulutas.
The Delegation in Croatia was devolved in 2001 and the Delegation in Albania in 2003. 
Delegatsioon Horvaatias sai vastavad volitused 2001 ja delegatsioon Albaanias 2003.
(2) The EAR was established in February 2000, its predecessor, the task force for Kosovo, started operation in 1999. 
(2) EARloodiveebruaris2000,temaeelkija,Kosovotrhm,alustaste-gevust 1999.
In 2001, the agencyŐs mandate was extended to Serbia and Montenegro and in 2002 to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
2001. aastal laiendati agentuuri volitusi Serbia ja Montenegrole ning 2002 endise Jugoslaavia Makedoonia Vabariigile.
(3) Kosovo is presently under UNMIK administration as defined by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 
(3) Kosovo on kesoleval ajal RO Kosovo missiooni (UNMIK) halduse all, nagu on mratletud RO Julgeolekunukogu resolutsioonis 1244.
The Court found that devolved and indirect centralisation (EAR) ensured efficient delivery of aid, whereas weaknesses were noted with the other two structures (i.e. centralised and decentralised) (4). 
Kontrollikoda leidis, et leantud haldusvolitused ja kaudne tsentraliseeritus (EAR) tagasid abi thusa kohaletoimetamise, kuid kahe lejnud struktuuri korral (st tsentraliseeritud ja detsentraliseeritud haldamine) theldati puudusi (4).
In both Delegations and the EAR, the speed of project management benefited from the increased capacity in the operational units and from having finance and contracts staff available on the ground. 
Nii delegatsioonides kui ka EARis kasvas projektijuhtimise kiirus operatiivksuste ressursi suurenemise ning finantseerimise ja lepinguliste ttajate kohapealse kttesaadavuse tttu.
The increased contacts with the beneficiary and other relevant parties and better understanding of local conditions, risks and opportunities improved performance while reducing the time needed to solve problems (5). 
Parem kontakt abisaaja ja teiste asjaomaste osapooltega ning kohalike tingimuste, ohtude ja vimaluste parem mistmine parandasid ttulemusi, lhendades samas probleemide lahendamisele kuluvat aega (5).
For centralised management Ń centrally managed regional inter-state programme Ń there were several shortcomings: (a) funds allocated to regional cooperation comprised a very small proportion of total expenditure (around 5 %). 
Tsentraliseeritud haldamise puhul Đ st tsentraliseeritult hallatavate piirkondlike riikidevaheliste programmide puhul Đ leiti mitmeid puudusi: a) piirkondlikule koostle eraldatud vahendid moodustasid kogukuludest vga vikese osa (umbes 5 %).
Some of this was managed at national rather than regional level, e.g. integrated border management; (b) similarly most of the refugee return programmes which, by definition, have cross-border characteristics were managed separately in each country; (4) The shortcomings are also confirmed by the mid-term CARDS evaluation. 
Osa sellest, nt integreeritud piirihalduse vahendeid hallati riikide, mitte aga piirkonna tasandil; b) sarnaselt hallati igas riigis eraldi ka enamikku pagulaste tagasiprdumise programme, millel mratluse kohaselt on pii-rilene iseloom; (4) Vajakajmisi kinnitas ka CARDSi vahehindamine.
(5) Reference is made to Special Report No 10/2004 concerning the devolution of EC external aid to the Commission delegations (OJ C 72, 22.3.2005). 
(5) Viide eriaruandele nr 10/2004 E vlisabi korraldamise komisjoni delegatsioonidele leandmise kohta (ELT C 72, 22.3.2005).
EAR Indirect Centralisation Operational Centres in Ń FYROM Ń Kosovo Ń Montenegro Ń Serbia 
EAR Kaudne tsentraliseeritus Rakenduskeskused Ń Makedoonia Ń Kosovo Ń Montenegro Ń Serbia
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/11 (c) while steps were taken in 2003 to involve beneficiary countries more in the programming of CARDS regional allocations, countries generally did not receive sufficient information of the regional projects. account practical operational realities in the Croatian Ministry of Finance. 
27.11.2007 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 285/11 c) kuigi 2003. aastal astuti samme selleks, et abisaajariike senisest enam CARDSi piirkondlike eraldiste kasutamise programmide kavandamisse kaasata, ei saanud riigid piirkondlike projektide kohta reeglina piisavalt teavet. tegutsema.
As a result the decentralisation process was halted between 2003 to 2005. 
Selle tulemusena detsentraliseerimisprotsess aastail 2003Đ2005 seiskus.
Once the CARDS programme moved from EuropeAid to DG ELARG in early 2005, the Commission re-evaluated the situation and decided in February 2006 to restart decentralisation in Croatia (1). 
Kui programm CARDS lks 2005. aasta alguses EuropeAidilt le laienemise peadirektoraadile, hindas komisjon olukorda uuesti ja otsustas veebruaris 2006 Horvaatias detsentraliseerimise taaskivitada (1).
The European Court of Auditors has in its reports concerning external actions (for instance Special Report No 6/2006 on the environmental aspects of the CommissionŐs development cooperation (2)) repeatedly criticised the Commission of delays in contracting and implementation. 
Euroopa Kontrollikoda on vlistegevust ksitlevates aruannetes (nt eriaruanne nr 6/2006 komisjoni arengukoost keskkonnaaspektide kohta) (2) korduvalt kritiseerinud komisjoni viivituste tttu lepingute slmimisel ja titmisel.
In contrast the CARDS programme had a very high contracting speed (see Graph 3) in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia but due to the backlog of earlier programmes a relatively slow start in Albania and Croatia. 
Vastupidiselt sellele on lepingute slmimine programmi CARDS puhul kulgenud Kosovos, Bosnia ja Hertsegoviinas ning Serbias vga kiiresti (vt diagramm 3), samas kui Albaanias ja Horvaatias on see varasemate programmide vlgnevuste tttu kivitunud suhteliselt aeglaselt.
37. and in Croatia also had problems: The decentralised implementation structures in Albania (a) in Albania, programmes involving the Albanian Development Fund (ADF) continued without the Commission having assessed whether the ADF was capable of meeting its responsibilities, according to the provisions of the Financial Regulation applicable in 2003. 
37. Horvaatias oli samuti probleeme: Detsentraliseeritud rakendusstruktuuridel Albaanias ja a) Albaanias jtkati Albaania Arengufondi (AAF) osalusega programme, ilma et komisjoni oleks andnud hinnangut, kas AAF suudab oma kohustusi vastavalt 2003. aastal kohaldatavale finantsmrusele tita.
Due to the problems encountered with the ADF, the Commission decided to strongly reduce the decentralised part of the Albanian CARDS programme and devolved it to the Delegation; (b) in 2002, in Croatia, specific steps were taken towards formal decentralisation. 
AAFiga tekkinud probleemide tttu otsustas komisjon tunduvalt vhendada Albaania CARDSi detsentraliseeritud osa ja andis selle le delegatsioonile; b) 2002. aastal astuti Horvaatias konkreetseid samme ametliku detsentraliseerimise suunas.
However, the speed at which EuropeAid considered it appropriate to decentralise did not take into 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Graph 3 Contracting rates in CARDS countries Commitments 2002-2004 contracted within one year Albania Bosnia H. Croatia FYROM Kosovo Serbia (1) Reference made to Article 2 in Commission Decision C(2006) 264 (E/148/2006): ÔFor CARDS, this Decision shall apply to a number of projects agreed between the Commission and Croatia in the CARDS Financing Agreement 2003 (signed on 2 September 2003) and in the CARDS Financing Agreement 2004 (signed on 29 November 2004).Ő (2) OJ C 235, 29.9.2006. 
Detsentraliseerimise tempo puhul, mida EuropeAid pidas asjakohaseks, ei arvestatud olu-dega, milles Horvaatia rahandusministeerium pidi praktiliselt 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Diagramm 3 Lepingute slmimise mrad CARDSi riikides Kulukohustused 2002Đ2004, vetud he aasta jooksul Albaania Bosnia ja Hertsegoviina Horvaatia Makedoonia Kosovo Serbia (1) Viide komisjoni otsuse K(2006) 264 (E/148/2006) artiklile 2: ăCARDSi osas kohaldatakse kesolevat otsust komisjoni ja Horvaatia vahel CARDSi 2003. aasta rahastamislepingus (allkirjastatud 2. septembril 2003) ja CARDSi 2004. aasta rahastamislepingus (allkirjastatud 29. novembril 2004) kokkulepitud arvule projektidele.Ó (2) ELT C 235, 29.9.2006.
C 285/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.11.2007 39. 
C 285/12 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 27.11.2007 39.
In Albania the need to compensate this delay led, later on, to a very high concentration of contract signatures: 63 % of the CARDS contracts signed in the period from 2001 to 2005 were signed in 2004, thus leading to the simultaneous implementation of a high number of contracts and an increased challenge to the beneficiariesŐ absorption capacity (1) (see Box 4). 
Vajadus seda viivitust tasa teha tekitas Albaanias hiljem lepingute allkirjastamise suure kontsentreerumise teatud perioo-di: 63 % perioodil 2001Đ2005 slmitud CARDSi lepingutest allkirjastati 2004. aastal, mistttu tuli hel ja samal ajal tita palju lepinguid ning see pani tugevalt proovile abisaajate suutlikkuse abi vastu vtta (vt 4. selgitus) (1).
Delays in the 2001 annual programme meant that in Croatia two annual programmes were implemented at the same time. 
2001. aasta programmi viivitused thendasid, et Horvaatias rakendati kahte aastaprogrammi heaegselt.
Box 4 Overstretched national administrative capacity in Albania In Albania in addition to high concentration of projects in a short period of time, most of the assistance was concentrated in the Justice and Home Affairs sector. 
4. selgitus Albaania lekoormatud haldusressursid Lisaks projektide suurele kontsentreerumisele lhikesele perioodile oli Albaanias suurem osa abist suunatud justiits-ja siseksimuste valdkonda.
At the time of the audit, there were at least 48 different, simultaneously on-going projects in the Justice and Home AffairsŐ area. 
Auditi lbiviimise ajal oli selles valdkonnas heaegselt kimas vhemalt 48 projekti.
13 of them were financed by the EU and 35 by other donors. 
13 nendest finantseeris EL ja 35 teised rahastajad.
For example in the Euralius project in Albania (European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System), the audit found out that the level of ambition of the project design was very high. 
Niteks projekti EURALIUS puhul Albaanias (Euroopa abimissioon Albaania justiitsssteemi edendamiseks) leidis audit, et projekt oli koostatud vga ambitsioonikalt.