natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Red Cross World Disasters Report 2005 describes how some communities in Aceh were overwhelmed with aid while others were neglected. 
Punase Risti 2005. aasta maailma katastroofide aruandes kirjeldatakse, kuidas mned Acehi kogukonnad said abi rohkem, kui nad vajasid, teised aga jeti unarusse.
Furthermore, in December 2005, one year after the disaster, some 67 000 people were still living in tents in Aceh. 
Lisaks elas veel detsembris 2005 Ń aasta prast katastroofi Ń umbkaudu 67 000 inimest Acehis telkides.
Good coordination between DG ECHO and other Commission services except for immediate response 24. 
ECHO ja teiste komisjoni talituste vaheline koosklastus oli hea, vlja arvatud viivitamatu hdaabi osas 24.
The Civil Protection Mechanism deployed teams of experts to the areas most affected by the tsunami to help assess the situation and coordinate the arrival and distribution of civil protection assistance offered by Member States. 
Kodanikukaitse mehhanism saatis ekspertrhmi kige enam tsunamist kannatada saanud piirkondadesse, et aidata olukorda analsida ning koordineerida liikmesriikide pakutava kodanikukaitse alase abi kohalejudmist ja jagamist.
The Memorandum of Understanding of 16 March 2003 between DG ECHO and the Directorate-General for Environment states that enhanced coordination of Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid interventions, both at headquarters and in the field, is paramount to achieve coherent synergies of Community action. 
16. mrtsil 2003. aastal ECHO ja keskkonna peadirektoraadi vahel slmitud vastastikuse mistmise memorandumi kohaselt on thustatud koosklastus kodanikukaitse ja humanitaarabi sekkumisvormide vahel nii peakontoris kui kohapeal keskse thtsusega, saavutamaks henduse meetmete vaheline htne snergia.
Procedures should ensure a mutual exchange of information at all stages of the crisis and meetings in the field between DG ECHO and the Civil Protection Coordination team should ensure that activities are complementary. 
Menetlused peaksid tagama vastastikuse teabevahetuse kriisi kigis etappides ning ECHO ja kodanikukaitse koordineerimismehhanismi rhma vahelised koosolekud kohapeal peaksid tagama selle, et tegevused ksteist vastastikku tiendaksid.
However, in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia the Civil Protection Mechanism was insufficiently coordinated with humanitarian aid. 
Siiski oli nii Sri Lankal kui Indoneesias kodanikukaitse mehhanismi ja humanitaarabi vaheline koosklastus ebapiisav.
The Humanitarian Aid Committee of 27 January 2005 focused on the weaknesses in coordination between DG ECHO and the Civil Protection Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) Box 4 DG ECHO recognised and worked to address problems of coordination DG ECHOŐs strategy in Indonesia and Sri Lanka was to support the coordination role of the United Nations. In this context DG ECHO granted 1 million euro to support UNOCHAŐs Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) in order to provide information tools for planning, implementing and monitoring humanitarian assistance. A joint OCHA and ECHO evaluation of the HIC in April 2005 made recommendations to help it to provide a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian response and to highlight gaps in needs. 
Humanitaarabi komitee keskendus 27. jaanuaril 2005 puudustele ECHO ning kodanikukaitse seire-ja teabekeskuse vahelises koosklastamises ning leidis, et seire-ja teabekeskuse Koosklastusraskuste tttu on rahvusvahelise kogukon-4. selgitus ECHO oli teadlik RO koosklastusprobleemidest ja pdis neid lahendada ECHO strateegia Indoneesias ja Sri Lankal oli toetada RO koos-klastavat rolli. ECHO eraldas 1 miljon eurot RO HKT humanitaarinfokeskuse toetuseks, et hankida teabevahendeid humanitaarabi planeerimiseks, rakendamiseks ja jrelevalveks. RO HKT ja ECHO hises hinnangus humanitaarinfokeskuse kohta, mis prineb 2005. aasta aprillist, antakse soovitusi, kuidas esitada huma-nitaarabist terviklik levaade ja tuua esile titmata vajadused.
Discussion paper for High-level Meeting Brussels, 20 December 2005, hosted by the European Commission and the EU Presidency. 
20. detsembril 2005. aastal Brsselis Euroopa Komisjoni ja ELi eesistujariigi juhtimisel toimunud krgetasemelise koosoleku aruteludokument.
21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/11 and considered that the MIC had not confined itself to civil protection activities, but had overlapped with the humanitarian field which is beyond their role and given the impression that it was coordinating all EU assistance (1). 
21.7.2006 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 170/11 tegevus ei piirdunud kodanikukaitsega, vaid kattus ka humani-taarvaldkonnaga, mis ei kuulu keskuse lesannete hulka, ja jttis mulje, nagu koordineeriks ta kogu ELi abi.
26. 
(1) 26.
The high level of DG ECHO funding helped to bridge the longer than expected transitional phase between relief and reconstruction (see paragraph 15(a)). 
ECHO krge rahastamismr vimaldas letada kavandatust pikemaks veninud leminekufaas hdaabitde ja lesehituse vahel (vt punkti 15 alapunkt a).
The strategy for linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in Indonesia and Sri Lanka involves the use of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism to provide satellite imaging of tsunami damages that could be useful for reconstruction planning and disaster preparedness. 
Hdaabi, taastamis-ja arendustegevuse hendamise strateegia Sri Lankal ja Indoneesias neb ette kiirreageerimise korra rakendamist, et teha tsunami tekitatud kahjudest satelliitpilte, mis aitaks kaasa lesehitustde kavandamisele ja katastroofiks valmisolekule.
The Rapid Reaction Mechanism also helped finance mediation efforts which led to a peace agreement in August 2005 between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), strengthening the foundations for reconstruction efforts. 
Kiirreageerimise kord vimaldas ka rahastada vahendusprotsessi, mis viis augustis 2005 rahukokkuleppe slmimisele Indoneesia valitsuse ja Vaba Acehi Liikumise (GAM) vahel, tugevdades tingimusi lesehitustde lbiviimiseks.
Role of monitoring systems in ensuring relevance, timeliness and efficiency of implementation A fairly comprehensive monitoring and control system 27. 
Seiressteemide osa projektide rakendamise asjakohasuse, igeaegsuse ja thususe tagamisel Suhteliselt phjalik seire-ja kontrollissteem 27.
In order to monitor and control project implementation, DG ECHO relies on the following mechanisms: (a) DG ECHO field expertsŐ monitoring visits and reports supplemented by supervisory monitoring visits of desk officers; (b) DG ECHOŐs partnersŐ reports; (c) on-the-spot visits of the DG ECHO Finances and Audit Unit; (d) checks prior to final payment and later external audits of partners. 
Projektide rakendamise seireks ja kontrolliks kasutab ECHO jrgmisi elemente: a) ECHO kohapealsete ekspertide kontrollkigud ja aruanded, mida tiendavad projektiametnike kontrollklastused; b) ECHO partnerite aruanded; c) ECHO finants-ja auditiksuse kohapealsed klastused; d) lppmaksele eelnevad kontrollid ja hilisemad partnerite vlisauditid.
DG ECHO field experts carried out monitoring visits of projects being implemented by partners to ensure the relevance, timeliness and efficiency of implementation. 
ECHO kohapealsed eksperdid klastasid partnerite poolt rakendatavaid projekte, et tagada rakendamise asjakohasus, i-geaegsus ja thusus.
On the basis of monitoring visits, appropriate action can be taken at local or headquarters level. 
Klastuste phjal saab vtta vajalikke meetmeid kohalikul vi peakontori tasandil.
For example, the April 2005 monitoring report of a psychosocial support programme in Sri Lanka highlighted problems in recruiting local staff. 
Niteks hes 2005. aasta aprilli seirearuandes pshhosotsiaalse toetuse programmi kohta Sri Lankal toodi esile kohaliku personali vrbamisel esinevad probleemid.
The DG ECHO desk officer in Brussels therefore contacted the concerned Red Cross headquarters to obtain assurance that a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sri Lanka Red Cross would be signed to allow the recruitment of local staff for the next phase of the project. 
ECHO projektiametnik Brsselis vttis seepeale hendust vastava Punase Risti peakontoriga veendumaks, et Sri Lanka Punase Ristiga slmitakse vastastikuse mistmise memorandum, mis vimaldab kohaliku personali vrbamist projekti jrgmises etapis.
Following the tsunami on 26 December 2004, DG ECHO staff were in Sri Lanka on 27 December 2004 and in Jakarta, Indonesia on 28 December 2004. 
Prast 26. detsembril 2004 toimunud tsunamit olid ECHO ttajad Sri Lankal kohal 27. detsembril 2004 ja Indoneesia pealinnas Jakartas 28. detsembril 2004.
On 1 January 2005, the first DG ECHO experts arrived in Aceh. 
Esimesed ECHO eksperdid judsid Acehisse 1. jaanuaril 2004.
DG ECHO redeployed technical assistants from other regions e.g. South America, Africa and the Middle East in order to assist in the initial response to the tsunami. 
ECHO ti le tehnilisi ttajaid teistest piirkondadest, nt Luna-Ameerikast, Aafrikast ja Lhis-Idast, et aidata anda tsunami ohvritele esmast abi.
Following the tsunami, the Commission made a commitment to increase the number of DG ECHO field experts from 69 to 150 (2). 
Prast tsunamit vttis komisjon kohustuse suurendada ECHO kohapealsete ekspertide arvu 69-lt 150-le.
In Sri Lanka, 23 monitoring visits were carried out for the nine projects funded by the 10 million euro emergency decision. 
(2) Sri Lankal tehti 10 miljoni euro hdaabi eraldamise otsuse alusel rahastatava heksa projekti osas 23 kontrollklastust.
In Indonesia 13 monitoring visits were carried out for the 10 projects funded by the 10 million euro emergency decision, mostly after the arrival of the current field experts in April 2005. 
Indoneesias tehti sama otsuse alusel rahastatava kmne projekti osas 13 kontrollklastust, suuremas osas prast praeguste kohapealsete ekspertide kohalejudmist aprillis 2005.
(2) COM(2005) 153 Ń Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries. 
(2) KOM(2005) 153 Ń ELi katastroofideks ja kriisideks valmisoleku tugevdamine kolmandates riikides.
C 170/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 30. 
C 170/12 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 21.7.2006 30.
At the end of each monitoring mission DG ECHO field experts have a debriefing meeting with the partnerŐs field team. However, DG ECHO does not systematically provide written feedback to the partner showing matters arising during the monitoring visit and action agreed. 
Prast iga klastust peavad ECHO kohapealsed eksperdid koos partneri kohapealse meeskonnaga teabekoosoleku. ECHO ei anna partneritele aga sstemaatiliselt kirjalikku tagasisidet, kus oleks ra toodud k-lastuse kigus esile kerkinud ksimused ja kokkulepitud meetmed.
For projects with a duration of six months, partners are required to send to DG ECHO a preliminary final report one month before the end of the project and a final report within six weeks after the end of the project, or three months for UN projects. 
Kuuekuuliste projektide puhul peavad partnerid ECHOle esialgse lpparuande saatma kuu enne projekti lppu ja lpliku aruande kuue kuu jooksul prast projekti lppemist, RO projektide puhul kolme kuu jooksul.
For the 10 million euro emergency decisions in Sri Lanka and Indonesia with a six-month duration, most partners submitted their preliminary final reports on time, but there were delays of one or two months for most of the final reports. 
Kuuekuulise thtajaga 10 miljoni euro hdaabiotsuste puhul Sri Lankal ja Indoneesias esitas enamik partnereid esialgse lpparuande igeaegselt, kuid suurem osa lplikest aruannetest esitati he-vi kahekuulise hilinemisega.
In addition to the monitoring visits of DG ECHO field experts and desk officers and the information contained in partnersŐ reports, project implementation is also monitored by staff of DG ECHO Finances and Audit Unit who carry out on-the-spot checks of a selection of projects. 
Lisaks ECHO kohapealsete ekspertide ja projektiametnike kontrollklastustele ning partnerite aruannetes sisalduvale teabele kontrollib projektide rakendamist ka ECHO finants-ja auditiksus, kes teostab projektide valikulisi kohapealseid kontrolle.
In 2005, DG ECHO on-the-spot checks focused on the tsunami response and the value of projects examined in Sri Lanka and Indonesia was 19 million euro or 18 % of the 103 million euro of projects contracted by DG ECHO relating to the tsunami response by the end of 2005. The on-the-spot verification of the projects implemented by a UN agency in Indonesia highlighted problems of access to documentation which, although overcome, will need to be clarified in working meetings on the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) (see box 5). 
2005. aastal keskendusid ECHO kohapealsed kontrollid tsunami-jrgsele tegevusele; Sri Lankal ja Indoneesias kontrollitud projektide vrtus oli 19 miljonit eurot ehk 18 % 103 miljoni euro suurusest kogusummast, mis ECHO oli 2005. aasta lpuks tsunamijrgsetele abimeetmetele eraldanud. he VVO poolt Indoneesias elluviidavate projektide kohapealne kontroll ti ilmsiks dokumentidele juurdepsuga seonduvad probleemid, mis on kll lahendatud, kuid mida tuleb selgitada finants-ja haldusraamistiku lepingut ksitlevatel tkohtumistel (vt 5. selgitus).
The final check prior to final payment is also carried out by the DG ECHO Finances and Audit Unit. 
Lppmakse sooritamisele eelnevat viimast kontrolli teostab samuti ECHO finants-ja auditiksus.
This control takes into account the comments of the DG ECHO field expert and desk officer on the final report of the partner and their recommendation whether or not to proceed with payment. 
Kontrollimisel vetakse arvesse ECHO kohapealse eksperdi ja projektiametniku mrkusi partneri lpparuande kohta ning nende soovitust selle kohta, kas makset sooritada vi mitte.
In addition this payment control is also based on a list of expenditure, stock details, procurement procedures, staff lists and copies of invoices when considered appropriate. 
Lisaks phineb makse kontroll kulude loetelul, varude andmetel, hankemenetlustel, ttajate nime-kirjal ja vajadusel arvete koopiatel.
Adapting the initial response in order to ensure relevance 34. 
Esialgsete abimeetmete kohandamine asjakohasuse tagamiseks 34.
DG ECHOŐs procedures recognise the need to be flexible and Article 10 of the Framework Partnership Agreement contains simple procedures for modifying projects to enable them to remain relevant in response to evolving needs. 
ECHO menetlustes vetakse arvesse vajadust olla paindlik ja partnerluse raamlepingu artikkel 10 sisaldab projektide muutmise lihtsat korda, et nad vastaksid muutuvatele vajadustele.
Flexible procedures generally enabled projects to be modified to meet evolving needs and ensure the relevance of implementation (see box 6). 
Paindlik kord vimaldas ldjuhul projekte muuta vastavalt esilekerkinud vajadustele ja tagada abimeetmete asjakohasus (vt 6. selgitus).
Box 6 Modification of projects to address evolving needs In June 2005, in Sri Lanka a UN agency warned of the overprovision of small fishing boats which could contribute to over-fishing and long-term damage to the coastal fisheries resource. 
6. selgitus Projektide kohandamine vastavalt muutunud vajadustele Sri Lankal hoiatas ks RO agentuur 2005. aasta juunis vikeste kalapaatide lepakkumise eest, mis tooks kaasa liiga ulatusliku ka-lapgi ja kahjustaks pikaajaliselt rannalhedasi kalavarusid.
In August 2005, their project was modified to reduce the number of boats to be repaired or manufactured and to provide 15 000 sets of fishing gear instead. Within the first month following the tsunami it was clear that the Government of Sri Lanka had received enough donations of medicines to cover all existing needs. 
2005. aasta augustis projekti muudeti, vhendades remonditavate vi toodetavate paatide arvu; selle asemel hlmas projekt 15 000 kalapgivahendite komplekti kohaletoimetamist. he kuu jooksul prast tsunamit oli selge, et Sri Lanka valitsus oli saanud piisavalt ravimiannetusi kigi vajaduste katmiseks.
An NGO project funded by DG ECHO was therefore amended in order to reallocate funding to psychosocial support and support to the local health structures. Another project in Sri Lanka included 21 500 dry rations of highly nutritional biscuits for under-five children as part of a contingency plan. 
Seetttu muudeti ht ECHO rahastatavat VVO projekti, et suunata abi pshhosotsiaalsele toetusele ja kohalike tervishoiustruktuuride toetamiseks. ks teine projekt Sri Lankal sisaldas osana hdaolukorra plaanist 21 500 kuivportsjonit vga krge toitevrtusega kpsiseid alla viieaastastele lastele.
These biscuits were not required and the 28 000 euro initially planned for food security was reallocated to livelihood support. 
Kpsiseid ei vajatud, nii et 28 000 eurot, mis algselt oli meldud toiduainetega kindlustamiseks, suunati mber toimetuleku toetamiseks.
Box 5 Access to UN documentation DG ECHO encountered problems in obtaining access to relevant financial information requested for an on-the-spot control visit in June 2005 of a UN agency project of 500 000 euro for emergency health actions in Indonesia, contrary to the requirements of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA). 
5. selgitus Juurdeps RO dokumentidele ECHO-l oli raskusi olulisele finantsteabele juurdepsu saamisel, mida taotleti seoses kohapealse kontrolliga 2005. aasta juunis eesmrgiga kontrollida he RO agentuuri 500 000 euro suurust projekti, mis ksitles tervishoiualaseid hdaabimeetmeid Indoneesias. Juurdepsu keelamine oli vastuolus finants-ja haldusraamistiku lepingu nuetega.
Following discussions with the UN agency this matter was clarified and DG ECHO gained access to the relevant documentation in November 2005. 21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/13 One partner in Indonesia replaced tents with kitchens in order to respond to the evolving needs of beneficiaries. 
Prast asja arutamist RO agentuuriga probleem lahenes ja ECHO-le vimaldati juurdeps vajalikele dokumentidele 2005. aasta novembris. 21.7.2006 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 170/13 he koostpartneri projektis Indoneesias asendati telgid kkide-ga, et vastata abivajajate muutunud vajadustele. he VVO projekti Indoneesias muudeti, kui rahvusvahelise laiaulatusliku abiga suudeti toidukriis ra hoida.
The emergency nutritional programme was no longer required and was therefore replaced with a nutritional education and supplementary feeding programme. 
Toiduainete hdaabiprog-rammi ei linud enam vaja ning see asendati toitmisalase koolituse ja lisatoidu alase programmiga.
Delays resulting from saturation of capacity and other external constraints 35. 
Abi vastuvtmisvime ammendumisest ja muudest vlistest teguritest phjustatud viivitused 35.
For example, in Indonesia the May 2005 monitoring report on a UN agency project highlighted the lack of experts to implement activities. 
Niteks 2005. aasta mai seirearuandes he RO agentuuri projekti kohta Indoneesias toonitatakse tegevuste rakendamiseks vajalike ekspertide puudumist.
However, other delays identified in monitoring reports were not addressed by the partner during the timescale of the project (see box 7). 
Muid seirearuannetes ratoodud viivitusi partnerid aga projekti thtaja jooksul ei ksitlenud (vt 7. selgitus).
In Sri Lanka delays were also due to other external constraints such as the withdrawal of duty exemptions on humanitarian goods in February 2005 and building restrictions in the government imposed buffer zone, waived in late 2005 invalidating most of the assessments and many projects. 
Sri Lankal esines viivitusi ka muude vlistegurite tttu, nagu maksuvabastuse thistamine humanitaarkaupadele 2005. aasta veebruaris ja ehitus-tegevuse piiramine valitsuse kehtestatud puhvervndis, millest loobuti 2005. aasta lpus.
Information on the efficiency of project implementation 36. 
Teave projektide rakendamise thususe kohta 36.
Monitoring the efficiency of implementation requires information on costs, organisational arrangements and on the reality of outputs. 
Rakendamise thususe kontrollimiseks on vaja teavet kulude, organisatoorse korralduse ning tegelike vljundite kohta.
Concerning costs, in order to enable a timely response, the selection of partnersŐ proposals is not the result of a competitive tendering procedure. 
Vimaldamaks igeaegset reageerimist, ei phine partnerite ettepanekute valik kulude osas pakkumismenetluse konkursil.
The procurement procedures of DG ECHO partners are examined during the external audits of partners at their headquarters and in the course of on-the-spot verifications of the DG ECHO Finances and Audit Unit. 
ECHO partnerite hankemenetlusi vaadeldi partnerite peakontorites toimunud vlisauditite ning ECHO finants-ja auditiksuse kohapealsete kontrollide kigus.
In addition, the analysis of project proposals by DG ECHO field experts contains an analysis of unit costs as a factor in deciding whether partners are offering goods and services at a fair price. 
Lisaks sisaldab ECHO kohapealsete ekspertide anals projektiettepanekute kohta ka hikuhinna analsi kui ht tegurit otsustamaks, kas partnerid pakuvad kaupu ja teenuseid iglase hinnaga.
However, this analysis is of limited value in providing assurance on efficiency and could be improved with comparative information and systematic follow up monitoring. 
See anals annab aga vaid piiratud mral kindlust thususe osas ning seda viks parandada vrdleva teabe ning sstemaatilise jrelseirega.
Particularly following an unpredictable disaster, this information reinforces the assurance that goods and services are being obtained at a fair price. 
Selline teave suurendaks eelkige prast etteennustama-tu katastroofi toimumist kindlust, et kaupadel ja teenustel on iglane hind.
Some monitoring reports provide insufficient details of the sometimes complex organisational arrangements to show whether the partner is carrying out project tasks directly or whether it has subcontracted activities to other NGOs or private enterprises (see box 8). 
Mnes seirearuandes ei ole toodud piisavalt ksikasjalikku teavet keeruka organisatoorse korralduse kohta, nitamaks, kas partner teostab projektilesandeid otse vi on esitanud all-hankeid teistele VVOdele vi eraettevtetele (vt 8. selgitus).
Since it is only signatories of the Framework Partnership Agreements and the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement which have been assessed as suitable partners, it is important to identify those organisations implementing DG ECHO funded projects which have not been assessed in this way. 
Kuna sobivateks partneriteks hinnatakse ainult partnerluse raamlepingu ning finants-ja haldusraamistiku lepingu allkirjastanuid, on oluline kindlaks teha need ECHO rahastatavaid projekte rakendavad organisatsioonid, keda ei ole sel viisil hinnatud.
Box 7 Examples of delays in the implementation of projects by partners The water treatment plant at Pramuka, Jantho, Indonesia could not function until June 2005, four months after its arrival, due to the lack of chlorine tablets resulting from slow procurement procedures. 
7. selgitus Niteid viivitustest projektide partneritepoolsel elluviimisel Veepuhastusjaam Pramukas Janthos (Indoneesia) alustas td alles 2005. aasta juunis ehk neli kuud prast kohalesaabumist, kuna ae-glaste hankemenetluste tttu puudusid klooritabletid.
Land allocated to an international organisation for construction was later allocated by local authorities to other actors. 
Kohalikud ametivimud eraldasid algselt hele rahvusvahelisele organisatsioonile ehitamiseks eraldatud maa hiljem teistele osapooltele.
This led to further delays because the NGO had to carry out new needs assessments. 
See tekitas edasisi viivitusi, kuna VVO pidi lbi viima uusi vajaduste hindamisi.
These specific arrangements were not described in the monitoring reports. 
Sellist erandlikku tkorraldust seirearuannetes ei kirjeldatud.
C 170/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 38. 
C 170/14 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 21.7.2006 38.