natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, it is common practice in many advanced economies and in EU Member States for banking supervision to be subject to external public audit, even if the banking supervision is performed by a central bank.19 This proves not only that public external audit is compatible with the independence of central banks and the Basel principles for bank supervisors, but also that it is a fundamental principle of good public administration. 
Siiski on paljude arenenud majandusega riikide ja ELi liikmesriikide levinud praktika, et pangandusjrelevalve suhtes tehakse avaliku sektori vlisaudit, isegi kui pangandusjrelevalvet teostab 14 Finantsmruse (EL, Euratom) nr 2018/1046 artikli 33 kohaselt ksitleb efektiivsuse (finantsmruses ăthususeŇ) phimte ăparimat vimalikku suhet kasutatud vahendite, lbiviidud tegevuse ja eesmrkide saavutamise vahelŇ.
In line with these facts, 15 The ECA considers that the interpretation of efficiency in banking supervision is not necessarily the same as in monetary policy. 
15 Kontrollikoda leiab, et pangandusjrelevalve thusust ei pea tingimata tlgendama samamoodi nagu rahapoliitika thusust.
ISA 200, ISSAI 1 and 10. 
16 Nt ISA 200, ISSAI 1 ja 10.
17 ISSAI 1, Section 10; and ISSAI 10, Principle 4 as recognized by the United Nations in resolution A/66/209. 
17 ISSAI 1, jaotis 10 ja ISSAI 10, phimte nr 4, mida tunnistas RO resolutsioonis A/66/209.
18 Article 287(3) TFEU, which fully applies to the ECAŐs mandate regarding the ECB. 
18 ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 287 lige 3, mida kohaldatakse ties ulatuses kontrollikoja volitustele seoses EKPga.
7 a Member of the Governing Council of the ECB has also acknowledged the need for adequate accountability requirements, including external public audit (see Box 1).20 Box 1 Extracts from Yves MerschŐs keynote address on ŇCentral bank independence revisitedÓ "Article 130 of the Treaty and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union make it clear that the independence the ECB enjoys is limited to the performance of the tasks conferred on the Eurosystem [...]. 
Koosklas nende faktidega on ka ks EKP nukogu liige tunnistanud vajadust piisavate aruandlusnuete, sealhulgas avaliku sektori vlisauditi jrele (vt 1. selgitus)20. 7 1. selgitus Vljavtteid Yves Merschi phisnavtust teemal ăKeskpanga iseseisvuse lbivaatamineŇ ăAluslepingu artikli 130 ja Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika kohaselt on selge, et EKP sltumatus on piiratud eurossteemiga seotud lesannete titmisega [---].
Tasks and functions conferred on the ECB by secondary legislation [such as banking supervision] do not, therefore, fall within the scope of the principle of independence in Article 130 of the Treaty [...].Ó "The ECBŐs accountability for its supervisory tasks is different from and more enhanced than that for its monetary policy task owing to the potential impact on taxpayers [...]Ó 17 Moreover, the Court of Justice of the European Union made it clear that, while the ECB enjoys great independence to perform the tasks conferred on it by the Treaty, this does not "separate it entirely from the EU and exempt it from every rule of EU law". 
EKP-le teiseste igusaktidega antud lesanded ja funktsioonid [niteks pangandusjrelevalve] ei kuulu seega aluslepingu artiklis 130 stestatud sltumatuse phimtte kohaldamisalasse [---].Ň ăEKP aruandekohustus jrelevalvelesannete titmisel on teistsugune ja suurem kui rahapoliitika puhul, mis tuleneb vimalikust mjust maksumaksjatele [---]Ň. 17 Lisaks sellele selgitas Euroopa Liidu Kohus, et kuigi EKP-l on suur sltumatus talle aluslepinguga antud lesannete titmisel, ăei eralda see teda tielikult EList ega vabasta kigist ELi igusnormidestŇ.
In particular, the Court of Justice stated that the ECB is subject to "review by the Court of Justice and control by the ECA"21. 
Eelkige mrkis Euroopa Kohus, et ăEKP suhtes kohaldatakse Euroopa Kohtu jrelevalvet ja Euroopa Kontrollikoja kontrolliŇ21.
It also stated that while these tasks may overlap, they are completely different: "[...] the Court of Justice does base its decision in general on the subject-matter of the proceedings. 
Samuti sedastas kohus, et need lesanded vivad kll kattuda, kuid on omavahel tiesti erinevad: ă[---] Euroopa Kohus tugineb oma otsuses ldiselt hagi esemele.
The Court of Auditors, on the other hand, may also act on its initiative [...] and, in doing so, determine the object of the audit itself, having regard to its powers."22 18 In a statement to a Member of the European Parliament23, the ECB argued that it was not in a position to provide certain information to the ECA due to its confidentiality requirements. 
Kontrollikoda vib aga tegutseda ka omal algatusel [---] ning seda tehes auditi objekti ise kindlaks mrata, tuginedes oma volitustele22. 19 Nt USAs ja Kanadas (vt kontrollikoja eriaruanne nr 29/2016, V lisa), samuti Saksamaal, Prantsusmaal, Hispaanias ja Madalmaades (vt Euroopa pangandusliidu trhma aruanne krgeimate kontrolliasutuste kontaktkomiteele, 1. lisa).
However, the primary law requires any EU institution to "forward to the 20 Keynote address by Yves Mersch on "Central bank independence revisited" on 30 March 2017. 
20 Yves Merschi phisnavtt teemal ăKeskpanga sltumatuse lbivaatamineŇ 30. mrtsil 2017.
21 Judgment of 10 July 2003, Commission/ECB, C-11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, paragraph 135. 
21 10. juuli 2003. aasta otsus kohtuasjas C-11/00, komisjon/EKP, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, punkt 135.
22 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 25 May 2011, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, paragraph 71. 
22 Kohtujurist Trstenjaki ettepanek, 25. mai 2011, Euroopa Komisjon vs Saksamaa Liitvabariik, punkt 71.
Court of Auditors, at its request, any document or information necessary to carry out its task."24 Accordingly, the ECA has a broad right to have direct access to all the information it considers necessary in order to perform its audit tasks, including, where necessary, confidential documents and bank-specific information. 
Esmaste igusaktide kohaselt peavad aga ELi institutsioonid andma ăkontrollikojale viimase nudmisel le dokumendid vi teabe, mida see oma lesande titmiseks vajabŇ24. Seega on kontrollikojal ldine igus pseda juurde kogu teabele, mida ta oma auditilesannete titmiseks vajalikuks peab, sealhulgas vajaduse korral konfidentsiaalsetele dokumentidele ja pangaspetsiifilisele teabele.
If in the course of a future audit the ECB refuses to provide audit information to the ECA or takes no action with respect to a request by the ECA to provide it with audit information, the ECA has the option to bring the issue before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Kui EKP keeldub tulevikus mne auditi kigus audititeavet esitamast vi ei vta meetmeid seoses kontrollikoja taotlusega audititeabe esitamiseks, on kontrollikojal vimalus prduda asjaga Euroopa Liidu Kohtusse.
19 It is therefore standard practice for the ECA to assess and safeguard confidential information. 
19 Konfidentsiaalse teabe hindamine ja kaitsmine on kontrollikoja jaoks tavaprane.
This has been the case in many audits, including audits of the European Securities and Markets Authority or the Single Resolution Board. 
Seda on tehtud mitmes auditis, sealhulgas Euroopa Vrtpaberiturujrelevalve ja htse Kriisilahendusnukogu auditites.
It should also be highlighted that the ECA and its staff are bound by clear professional secrecy obligations arising directly from the Treaty, the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the ECAŐs ethical framework.25 These provisions provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that confidential documents received by the ECA from its auditees are not shared with any unauthorised parties.26 20 In the past, the ECB has stated that other accountability requirements, such as its annual reports or reviews of the Commission, compensate for the absence of adequate public audit. 
Samuti tuleks rhutada, et kontrollikoda ja selle ttajad on kohustatud titma selgeid ametisaladuse hoidmise kohustusi, mis tulenevad otseselt aluslepingust, Euroopa Liidu ametnike personalieeskirjadest ja kontrollikoja eetikaraamistikust25. Need stted pakuvad piisavaid tagatisi, kindlustamaks, et konfidentsiaalseid dokumente, mille kontrollikoda on auditeeritavatelt saanud, ei jagata selleks mittevolitatud isikutele26. 20 Varem on EKP vitnud, et muud aruandlusnuded, nagu tema aastaaruanded vi komisjoni lbivaatamised, kompenseerivad asjakohase avaliku sektori auditi puudumise.
It should be noted that annual reports, reviews by legislators and replies to their inquiries are not unique to the EU, as they are common in countries that fully allow performance audits of banking supervisors. 
Tuleb mrkida, et aastaaruanded, seadusandjate lbivaatamised ja vastused nende jreleprimistele ei ole ELile ainuomased, olles ldlevinud riikides, mis vimaldavad pangandusjrelevalveasutuste tiemahulisi tulemusauditeid.
Only performance audits with full access to information, conducted by independent professional auditors, based on international standards can provide effective accountability. 
Thusa aruandluse saavad tagada ainult sltumatute professionaalsete audiitorite poolt lbiviidavad tulemusauditid, millel on tielik juurdeps teabele ja mis phinevad rahvusvahelistel standarditel.
25 Article 339 TFEU and Article 17 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Section 4 of the Ethical Guidelines for the European Court of Auditors (Decision No 66-2011). 
25 ELi toimimise lepingu artikkel 339, Euroopa Liidu ametnike personalieeskirjade artikkel 17 ning Euroopa Kontrollikoja eetikajuhiste 4. jagu (otsus nr 66Đ2011).
26 In addition, some ECA staff have security clearance (obtained by the Member States) that permits them to access EU classified information up to Confidential or SECRET level. 
26 Lisaks on mnel kontrollikoja ttajal olemas (liikmesriikide saadud) juurdepsuluba, mis vimaldab neil ligi pseda ELi salastatud teabele kuni konfidentsiaalse vi salastatud tasemeni.
The ECA also has a robust physical, logical and organisational information security policy in place. 8 
Kontrollikojal on ka thus fsiline, loogiline ja korralduslik infoturvapoliitika. 8
that concerns the financial interests of citizens as much as the adequate supervision of banks. 
Muud aruandlusviisid ei saa asendada kodanike ja parlamentide igust asjakohastele avaliku sektori audititele, eelkige valdkonnas, mis puudutab kodanike finantshuve nii palju nagu pankade piisav jrelevalve.
Public audits provide assurance and information on the use of public funds and the risks to which taxpayers are exposed. 
Avaliku sektori auditid annavad kindlust ja teavet avaliku sektori vahendite kasutamise ning seoses sellega maksumaksjale avalduvate riskide kohta.
Summary and call for action 22 The ECA has made extensive efforts to fulfil its role and promote accountability and transparency in the area of banking supervision and resolution. 
Kokkuvte ja leskutse meetmete vtmiseks 22 Kontrollikoda on teinud suuri jupingutusi, et tita oma rolli ning edendada aruandekohustust ja lbipaistvust pangandusjrelevalve ja kriisilahenduse valdkonnas.
However, the ECBŐs current position regarding the ECAŐs access to audit documents and information prevents the ECA from properly carrying out its statutory responsibilities. 
EKP praegune seisukoht seoses kontrollikoja juurdepsuga auditidokumentidele ja teabele ei vimalda kontrollikojal aga tita oma seadusjrgseid kohustusi.
Therefore, in the area of banking supervision, which entails significant risks to the public purse, adequate public audit is still unfeasible and accountability is still insufficient. 
Seetttu on pangandusjrelevalve valdkonnas, millega kaasnevad mrkimisvrsed riskid avaliku sektori vahenditele, nuetekohase auditi tegemine endiselt vimatu ja aruandekohustuse titmine ebapiisav.
23 Therefore, especially the ECA calls the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to the lack of progress in discussions with the ECB and asks for: Ľ full support for the ECAŐs tasks and rights to access documents with regard to the ECB and banking supervision in particular Ľ amend Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, establishing the SSM, with a view to clearly stipulating that the ECA is empowered to perform performance audits of the ECBŐs supervisory functions and that, in line with the Treaty, the ECA enjoys full rights to access any document it considers necessary for this purpose. 9 
23 Seetttu juhib kontrollikoda eelkige Euroopa Parlamendi, nukogu ja komisjoni thelepanu tulemuste puudumisele EKP-ga peetavates aruteludes ning palub Ľ tielikult toetada kontrollikoja lesannete titmist ja dokumentidele juurdepsu igusi, eriti seoses EKP ja pangandusjrelevalvega Ľ muuta mrust (EL) nr 1024/2013, millega luuakse htne jrelevalvemehhanism, et stestada selgelt kontrollikoja igus teostada EKP jrelevalvefunktsioonide tulemusauditeid, ning koosklas aluslepinguga kontrollikoja tielik igus pseda juurde mis tahes dokumendile, mida ta peab sellel eesmrgil vajalikuks. 9
It emphasised that the principles of sufficient transparency, appropriate accountability and adequate public audit were essential. 
Ta rhutas, et piisava lbipaistvuse, asjakohase aruandekohustuse ja piisava avaliku sektori auditi phimtted on keskse thtsusega.
May 2013 CC published statement on EMU legislative proposals The CC recognised the clear proposals for a deeper EMU. 
Mai 2013 Kontaktomitee avaldus majandus-ja rahaliidu seadusandlike ettepanekute kohta Kontaktkomitee tunnustas selgeid ettepanekuid majandus-ja rahaliidu svendamiseks.
In this context, it emphasised again the importance of a coherent audit and accountability framework as well as the importance of external audit in EU legislation, in particular regarding the establishment of a Banking Union. 
Sellega seoses rhutas ta taas, kui oluline on sidus auditi-ja aruandlusraamistik ning vlisaudit ELi igusaktide puhul, eelkige seoses pangandusliidu loomisega.
October 2013 SSM Regulation was published in the OJ June 2014 ECA informed the ECB that it intended to start a performance audit Audit of the operational efficiency of the SSM. 
Oktoober 2013 Euroopa Liidu Teatajas avaldati htse jrelevalvemehhanismi mrus Juuni 2014 Kontrollikoda teatas EKP-le, et kavatseb alustada tulemusauditit htse jrelevalvemehhanismi tegevuse thususe audit.
June 2015 ECA informed the ECB that it had adopted an Audit Planning Memorandum The APM on the SSM was delayed significantly following lengthy discussions with the ECB about the ECA mandate. 
Juuni 2015 Kontrollikoda teatas EKP-le, et on vtnud vastu auditiplaani htset jrelevalvemehhanismi puudutav auditiplaan hilines oluliselt EKP-ga kontrollikoja volituste le peetud pikkade arutelude tttu.
June 2015 CC published statement on potential audit gap and mapping of SAIs' audit rights on banking supervision The EU SAIs warned that an audit gap regarding banking supervision in Europe might have arisen and called for adequate accountability. Furthermore, the mapping of audit rights regarding banking supervision was published, emphasising that similar audit rights were necessary for the ECA, given the establishment of the SSM. 
Juuni 2015 Kontaktkomitee avaldus, milles ksitletakse vimalikku auditilnki ja kaardistatakse krgeimate kontrolliasutuste ELi krgeimad kontrolliasutused hoiatasid, et Euroopas vib olla tekkinud lnk pangandusjrelevalve auditeerimisel, ning kutsusid les kehtestama asjakohast
11 July 2016 Joint letter from the German and Dutch SAIs on behalf of the CC to the European Commission Call for the European Commission to address the problems faced in its review of the SSM Regulation. 
Juuli 2016 Saksamaa ja Madalmaade krgeimate kontrolliasutuste hiskiri kontaktkomitee nimel Euroopa Komisjonile leskutse Euroopa Komisjonile lahendada tekkinud probleemid htse jrelevalvemehhanismi mruse lbivaatamise kigus.
November 2016 ECA published special report 29/2016 on the SSM The report highlighted the ECBŐs refusal to provide essential documents. 
November 2016 Kontrollikoda avaldas eriaruande nr 29/2016 htse jrelevalvemehhanismi kohta Aruandes juhiti thelepanu EKP keeldumisele esitada olulisi dokumente.
October 2017 European Commission published review of the SSM Regulation The Commission reiterated the ECAŐs right to access documents and called on the ECB and the ECA to conclude a MoU. December 2017 Task Force Banking Union of the CC published its report on the parallel audit conducted on banking supervision in the EU The Task Force concluded that an "effective" audit gap had arisen due to the ECBŐs behaviour. December 2017 ECA published special report 23/2017 on the SRB The ECA stated that its access to documents was partially restricted as the SRB redacted information originating from the ECB or failed to provide information. 
Oktoober 2017 Euroopa Komisjon avaldas htse jrelevalvemehhanismi mruse lbivaatamise tulemused Komisjon rhutas taas kontrollikoja igust dokumentidele juurde pseda ning kutsus EKP-d ja kontrollikoda slmima vastastikuse mistmise memorandumit. Detsember 2017 Kontaktkomitee pangandusliidu trhm avaldas aruande ELi pangandusjrelevalve paralleelse auditi kohta Trhm tegi jrelduse, et EKP hoiaku tttu on tekkinud reaalne auditeerimislnk. Detsember 2017 Kontrollikoda avaldas eriaruande nr 23/2017 htse Kriisilahendusnukogu kohta Kontrollikoda mrkis, et tema juurdeps dokumentidele oli osaliselt piiratud, kuna htne Kriisilahendusnukogu krpis EKP-lt saadavat teavet vi jttis teabe esitamata.
January 2018 ECA published special report 02/2018 on the ECBŐs crisis management As the ECB refused to provide access to important documents, the ECA concluded that scope would have to be limited and that on certain parts of the ECBŐs work only provisional conclusions were possible. 
Jaanuar 2018 Kontrollikoda avaldas eriaruande nr 2/2018 EKP kriisijuhtimise kohta Kuna EKP keeldus andmast juurdepsu thtsatele dokumentidele, leidis kontrollikoda, et auditi ulatus on piiratud ning EKP t teatud osade kohta saab teha vaid esialgseid jreldusi.
February 2018 ECA provided the ECB with a draft proposal for a MoU The ECA provided the ECB with a five-page draft MoU to clarify access to documents, as proposed by the Commission. March 2018 ECB provided replies to an MEP on questions regarding the ECAŐs access to documents The ECB stated that it only shared limited documents with the ECA as it interpreted the ECAŐs mandate as being very limited. 
Veebruar 2018 Kontrollikoda esitas EKP-le vastastikuse mistmise memorandumi ettepaneku Kontrollikoda esitas EKP-le viielehekljelise vastastikuse mistmise memorandumi ettepaneku, et selgitada dokumentidele juurdepsu vastavalt komisjoni ettepanekule.
April 2018 European Parliament statement within the 2016 discharge procedure The European Parliament acknowledged that the ECB did not respect the ECAŐs right to access information and asked the ECB to cooperate fully. 
12 Aprill 2018 Euroopa Parlamendi avaldus 2016. aasta eelarve titmisele heakskiidu andmise menetluse raames Euroopa Parlament nentis, et EKP on rikkunud kontrollikoja igust teabele juurde pseda ning kutsus EKP-d les igaklgset koostd tegema.
It also asked the ECA to update it on the situation by end 2018. 
Samuti palus ta kontrollikojal end olukorrast 2018. aasta lpus teavitada.
The ECB also said that it intended to consult stakeholders. 
Samuti mrkis EKP, et kavatseb konsulteerida sidusrhmadega.
12 July 2018 ECB informed the ECA that it was still consulting stakeholders The ECB informed the ECA that it was still consulting stakeholders and was awaiting a reply from the Commission in particular. 
Juuli 2018 EKP teatas kontrollikojale, et peab endiselt nu sidusrhmadega EKP teatas kontrollikojale, et peab ikka veel sidusrhmadega nu ning ootab eelkige komisjoni vastust.
October 2018 ECB informed the ECA that a reply was still not possible The ECB informed the ECA that it was still not able to respond to the proposed draft MoU, as it was still consulting stakeholders. 
Oktoober 2018 EKP teatas kontrollikojale, et ei saa ikka veel vastata. EKP teatas kontrollikojale, et tal ei ole ikka veel vimalik vastastikuse mistmise memorandumi ettepanekule vastata, kuna konsulteerib endiselt sidusrhmadega.
November 2018 CC published statement The CC called on decision-makers to strengthen accountability and audit arrangements in the area of banking supervision, and ensure that the ECA had a clear, broad mandate. 
November 2018 Kontaktkomitee avaldus Kontaktkomitee kutsus otsustajaid les tugevdama pangandusjrelevalve valdkonnas aruandlus-ja auditeerimiskorda ning tagama, et kontrollikojal oleks selge ja laiaulatuslik mandaat.
December 2018 ECA published a communication to the European Parliament The ECA published its reply to the European Parliament's request (from April 2018). 
Detsember 2018 Kontrollikoja teatis Euroopa Parlamendile Kontrollikoda avaldas oma vastuse Euroopa Parlamendi 2018. aasta aprilli pringule.
It informed the European Parliament of its efforts and explained that the issues remained unresolved. 
Ta teavitas Euroopa Parlamenti oma jupingutustest ja selgitas, et probleemid on endiselt lahendamata.
It therefore remained impossible to adequately audit the ECBŐs banking supervision and accountability remained limited. 
Seetttu ei olnud vimalik EKP pangandusjrelevalvet nuetekohaselt auditeerida ja aruandluskohustuse titmine oli puudulik.
Source: ECA. 
Allikas: kontrollikoda.
30.12.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union REPORT on the annual accounts of the Community Plant Variety Office for the 2003 financial year together with the OfficeŐs replies C 324/99 (2004/C 324/14) CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 
30.12.2004 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 324/99 ARUANNE henduse Sordiameti raamatupidamise aastaaruande kohta 2003. eelarveaasta osas koos ameti vastustega (2004/C 324/14) SISUKORD SISSEJUHATUS .............................................................
6-10 Tables1to4 .......................................................................... 
2Đ5 THELEPANEKUD ..........................................................
TheOfficeŐsreplies .................................................................... 
Ametivastused .......................................................................
Paragraph Page 100 100 100 101 105 1 2-5 
Punkt Leheklg 100 100 100 101 105
C 324/100 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.12.2004 INTRODUCTION 1. The Community Plant Variety Office (hereinafter referred to as the Office) was created by Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 (1). 
C 324/100 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 30.12.2004 SISSEJUHATUS 1. henduse Sordiamet (edaspidi ŇametÓ) loodi nukogu 27. juuli 1994. aasta mrusega (E) nr 2100/94.
Its main purpose is to register and examine applications for the grant of Community industrial property rights for plant varieties and to ensure that the necessary technical examinations are carried out by the competent offices in the Member States. 
(1) Selle peamiseks eesmrgiks on registreerida ja lbi vaadata taotlused taimesortidega seotud henduse tstusomandi kaitse osas ning tagada vajalike registreerimiskatsete lbiviimine liikmesriikide pdevate asutuste poolt.
Table 1 summarises the powers and responsibilities of the Office on the basis of the information supplied by it. 
Tabelis 1 esitatakse ameti poolt edastatud teabe phjal kokkuvtlikult selle volitused ja tegevused.
This opinion is addressed to the Administrative Council of the Office, pursuant to Article 111(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94. 
Kesolev jreldusotsus on adresseeritud ameti haldusnukogule koosklas nukogu mruse (E) nr 2100/94 artikli 111 likega 2.
The Court has examined the OfficeŐs annual accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 2003. 
Kontrollikoda kontrollis ameti raamatupidamise aastaaruannet 31. detsembril 2003 lppenud eelarveaasta osas.
In accordance with Article 110 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, the OfficeŐs budget was implemented on the responsibility of its President. 
Koosklas nukogu mruse (E) nr 2100/94 artikliga 110 tideti eelarvet juhataja vastutusel.