natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission required that normal commercial conditions should be obtained for such amounts which should respect a satisfactory level of security. 
Komisjon nõudis selliste summade puhul tavapäraste kaubandustingimuste järgimist nii, et turvalisuse tase oleks rahuldav.
The Court found that this was not the case, as higher interest rates could have been obtained with the same level of security in three of the four countries audited because national rules were applied. 
Kontrollikoda avastas, et seda ei oldud tehtud, kuna samal turvalisuse tasemel oleks kohalike eeskirjade kohaldamise tõttu võinud neljast auditeeritud riigist kolmes saada kõrgemat intressi.
In Bulgaria, different commercial banks were asked to offer conditions in order to select the bank which was to hold the Sapard accounts. 
Bulgaarias paluti Sapardi arve hoidmiseks panga valimisel eri kommertspankadel teha oma pakkumised.
After the Commission had made the advance payment, the Bulgarian authorities placed unused funds on time deposits. 
Kui komisjon oli oma avansilise makse sooritanud, panid Bulgaaria ametivõimud kasutamata summad tähtajalisele hoiusele.
This best practice was not applied in Lithuania, Poland and Romania, where national legislation obliged the authorities to use the national bank. 
Seda head meetodit ei kasutatud Leedus, Poolas ja Rumeenias, sest kohalikus õigusaktis oli sätestatud ametivõimude kohustus kasutada riigi-panka.
These banks offered lower interest rates than commercial banks, and funds could not be placed on time deposits. 
Sellised pangad maksavad kommertspankadest madalamat intressi ja vahendeid ei saadud panna tähtajalisele hoiusele.
The largest difference was found in Romania where approximately 650 000 euro more interest could have been earned up to the end of 2003 if available higher rates had been applied to unused Community funds. 
Suurim erinevus avastati Rumeenias, kus ühenduse kasutamata vahenditele kõrgemaid intressimäärasid kohaldades oleks võinud 2003. aasta lõpuks saada 650 000 eurot rohkem intressi.
Problems were also noted in other countries, for instance in Poland, where the interest was booked on a sub account which was not interest-bearing. 
Probleeme täheldati ka teistes riikides, näiteks Poolas, kus intressid kanti intressi mittekandvale alamkontole.
Different practices were noted in the Sapard countries, and the Commission did not ensure that best practices were applied in all 10 countries. 
Sapardi riikides toimiti erinevalt ja komisjon ei taganud parima tava kohaldamist kõigis kümnes riigis.
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS IN SAPARD COUNTRIES Potential beneficiaries lack own resources and have difficulties in obtaining credit 81. 
PROGRAMMI RAKENDUSPROBLEEMID SAPARDI RIIKIDES Potentsiaalsetel abisaajatel jääb puudu omavahenditest ja neil on raskusi krediidi saamisega 81.
For projects which do not generate substantial net revenues (such as local roads) the aid rate is up to 100 % as infrastructure is a necessary pre-condition for any development in rural areas. 
Olulisi netotulusid mittetootvate projektide (näiteks kohalikud teed) abimäär on 100 %, sest infrastruktuur on maapiirkondade arengu oluline eeltingimus.
High numbers of applications were received for such projects, and the high rate of aid financing is one of the principle reasons frequently stated for this success. 
Selliste projektide kohta esitati rohkem taotlusi ja sellise edu üheks peamiseks põhjuseks peetakse abivahendite kaudu rahastamise kõrget määra.
For all other projects, as the aid rate is limited to 50 %, beneficiaries are required to finance at least 50 % of the project costs from their own funds or through loans. 
Kõigi teiste projektide puhul, kus abimäär on piiratud 50 %ga, nõutakse abisaajatelt nende omavahendite või laenukapitali arvelt kaasfi-nantseeringut 50 % ulatuses projekti maksumusest.
Sapard payments to beneficiaries must be based on declarations of expenditure incurred. 
Sapardi maksed abisaajatele peavad põhinema tehtud kulutuste deklareerimisel.
This means that they have to pre-finance the expenditure, often for a period of several months, which is the time it takes for the Sapard Agency to handle the payment claim and make the payment. 
See tähendab, et abisaajad peavad kulutusi eelfinantseerima ja seda sageli mitme kuu vältel, seni kuni Sapardi agentuur käsitleb maksenõuet ja sooritab makse.
Heavy administrative procedures have prolonged this period (see paragraph 93). 
Keerukad haldusprotseduurid pikendasid seda ajavahemikku (vt punkt 93).
An enquiry by the Sapard Agency amongst farmers and agricultural advisors in Poland investigated the main obstacles in applying for Sapard aid (1). 
Sapardi agentuuri korraldatud küsitlus talupidajate ja põl-lumajandusnõunike seas Poolas uuris peamisi takistusi Sapardi abi taotlemisel.
This showed that the three main difficulties were the high cost of bank credit, the requirement to pre-finance and the lack of own resources for the investment. 
(1) See näitas, et kolm peamist takistust olid pan-gakrediidi suur maksumus, eelfinantseerimise nõue ja investeeringuteks kasutatavate omavahendite puudus.
The potential for Sapard is nevertheless high, which can be seen by the success of the Polish national aid scheme, under which the State provides loans to farmers of up to 80 % of the project. 
Sellele vaatamata on Sapardi potentsiaal suur ja see kajastub ka Poola riikliku abiprogrammi edus, mille raames andis riik talupidajatele laenu kuni 80 % ulatuses projekti maksumusest.
In 2002, more than 24 000 farmers were supported under this scheme, which is 10 times that of the Sapard programme (2). 
2002. aastal toetati selle programmi raames üle 24 000 talupidaja, mis on Sapardi programmist kümme korda rohkem.
84. 
(2) 84.
Applicants have major problems in securing advance financing and complementary funding. 
Taotlejatel on suuri probleeme eelfinantseerimise ja täiendava finantseerimise tagamisega.
This is mainly because of the lack of working and investment capital, combined with a restrictive credit policy of banks, which is exacerbated by an underdeveloped property market and banking system. 
Selle peamine põhjus on käibe-ja investeerimiskapitali puudus ja sellega kaasnev pankade piirav krediidipoliitika, mida teravdab vähearenenud kinnisvara-turg ja pangandussüsteem.
This is a general problem in all Sapard countries, and has been one of the bottlenecks for implementing Sapard and one of the main reasons for lower-than-expected project implementation. 
See on Sapardi riikide üldine probleem ja see on olnud Sapardi rakendamise üks kitsaskohtadest ning üks peamisi põhjuseid, miks projekt on oodatust vähem rakendunud.
The Sapard programme itself does not include the possibility of addressing this problem, and the countries have tried to solve this themselves in different ways. 
Sapardi programmil iseenesest ei ole võimalik seda probleemi kõrvaldada ja riigid on püüdnud seda ise teha, igaüks eri viisil.
(1) Opinions on the Sapard Measure 2 programme expressed by Agricultural Advisory Centres and potential beneficiaries of the programme, Warsaw, 30 November 2002. 
(1) Põllumajanduse nõuandekeskuste ja programmi potentsiaalsete abisaajate arvamused Sapardi 2. meetme programmi kohta, Varssavi, 30. november 2002.
(2) 2 377 contracts were signed with farmers in the period September 2002-November 2003. 
(2) Ajavahemikul septembrist 2002 novembrini 2003 sõlmiti talupidaja-tega 2 377 lepingut.
C 295/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.11.2004 85. 
C 295/14 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 30.11.2004 85.
The Bulgarian authorities were of the opinion that a credit scheme would help to solve these problems, and thus facilitate the implementation of Sapard. 
Bulgaaria ametivõimud olid seisukohal, et krediidiprog-ramm aitaks neid probleeme lahendada ja seega ka Sapardi rakendamist hõlbustada.
Consequently, a scheme which would provide credit to Sapard beneficiaries was approved, and 60 million euro was allocated to it in the 2003 national budget. 
Seetõttu kiideti heaks Sapardi abisaajatele krediiti pakkuv programm ja 2003. aasta riigieelarves eraldati selleks 60 miljonit eurot.
The scheme was notified by the Bulgarian Minister of Agriculture to the Commission in June 2003. 
Bulgaaria põllumajandusminister teatas komisjonile sellest programmist juunis 2003.
In its reply in July 2003, the Commission stated that it was of the opinion that the scheme might include certain elements of state aid and that in that case certain changes were required in order to respect competition rules (1). 
Oma vastuses juulis 2003 teatas komisjon, et tema arvates võib see programm olla teatud riigiabi tunnustega ning et sellisel juhul tuleb konkurentsieeskirjade järgimiseks teha teatud muudatusi.
Apart from questioning the financial details of the Bulgarian scheme by letter, no urgent assistance or advice was provided and, in the event, Bulgaria withdrew the proposal. 
(1) Peale Bulgaaria programmi kohta kirjalikult finantsüksikasjade küsimise ei pakutud mingisugust kiiret abi ega nõustamist ja lõpuks võttis Bulgaaria selle ettepaneku tagasi.
Thus, the 60 million euro available to address a key implementation problem in Sapard was not used because the Commission did not actively follow up the problem. 
Seega jäid olemasolevad 60 miljonit eurot Sapardi peamise rakendamisprobleemi lahendamiseks kasutamata, sest komisjon ei tegelenud selle probleemiga aktiivselt.
Other countries have already implemented similar schemes, which were, however, not examined by the Commission. 
Teised riigid on juba rakendanud sarnaseid programme, mida aga komisjon ei ole analüüsinud.
The Lithuanian authorities, for example, have set up a guarantee fund which issues guarantees to potential Sapard (and non-Sapard) beneficiaries for loans. 
Leedu ametivõimud näiteks moodustasid garantiifondi, mis annab potentsiaalsetele Sapardi (ja muudele) abisaajatele laenude jaoks garantii.
Elements of this scheme might also be considered as state aid. 
Selle programmi elemente võib samuti pidada riigiabiks.
Romanian municipalities faced considerable difficulties in making payments to contractors, as the amounts concerned were frequently greater than their whole annual budget. 
Rumeenia omavalitsustel oli suuri raskusi maksete tegemisel töövõtjatele, sest vastavad summad olid nende aastaeelarvest sageli suuremad.
The rules prevented the Sapard Agency from paying contractorsŐ invoices directly. 
Eeskirjad takistasid Sapardi agentuuril töövõtjate arveid otse tasuda.
Faced with a similar situation, the Lithuanian Sapard Agency did make such payments directly to municipalities, thus violating the Sapard rules for an amount of around 1 million euro (2). 
Samasuguse probleemi ees seistes sooritas Leedu Sapardi agentuur ühe miljoni euro ulatuses makseid otse omavalitsustele, rikkudes nii Sapardi eeskirju.
88. 
(2) 88.
In order to reduce the financial burden of pre-financing on the beneficiary, Lithuania and Romania made interim payments to beneficiaries as projects progressed. 
Abisaajate eelfinantseerimise finantskohustuse vähendamiseks tegid Leedu ja Rumeenia projektide edasi arenedes abisaajatele vahemakseid.
This practice was not applied in all countries as this was considered to increase the administrative workload. 
Kõikides riikides nii ei tehtud, sest seda peeti halduse töökoormust suurendavaks.
An additional problem which exists in Romania is the commitment for municipalities to bear maintenance costs after project completion which is a condition of eligibility for the measure concerned. 
Rumeenias on veel üks lisaprobleem: nimelt on omavalitsus kohustatud pärast projekti lõpetamist katma hoolduskulud ja see on asjaomase meetme puhul abikõlblikkuse tingimus.
Most projects concerned roads and the actual extent of this future commitment to maintenance was not properly calculated by the municipalities or questioned by the Sapard Agency. 
Enamik projektidest oli seotud teedega ja selle tulevase hoolduskohustuse ulatust ei olnud omavalitsused põhjalikult arvutanud ega Sapardi agentuur kahtluse alla seadnud.
Even provisional figures were not known and when questioned by the CourtŐs auditors the municipalities were unable to give a reasoned estimate or indicate how these costs might be realistically funded from their limited budgets. 
Ei teatud isegi esialgseid summasid ja kui kontrollikoja audiitorid omavalitsustelt seda küsisid, ei suutnud omavalitsused anda põhjendatud hinnangut või näidata, kuidas saaks neid kulusid reaalselt nende piiratud eelarvetest katta.
Most (1) A ceiling of 50 % of public aid from all sources cannot be exceeded. 
Enamik omavalitsustest pidas hooldusküsimust (1) 50 % riikliku abi ülemmäära kõikidest allikatest ei tohi ületada.
Since Bulgaria applied a grant rate of 50 %, any subsidy element in the grant scheme would exceed this ceiling. 
Kuna Bulgaaria rakendas 50 % toetusmäära, oleks iga subsiidiumiosa selles toetuskavas selle määra ületanud.
(2) As at 31 March 2003. municipalities considered the question of maintenance as being of secondary importance. 
(2) 31. märtsi 2003 seisuga. teisejärguliseks.
The current system in Romania thus does not guarantee the sustainability of the investments which is a major weakness. 
Seega ei taga praegune süsteem Rumeenias investeeringute jätkusuutlikkust ja see on suur puudus.
The Commission did not identify such implementation problems and so was unable to address them in a consistent manner. 
Komisjon selliseid rakendamisprobleeme ei tuvastanud ega olnud seega suuteline neid sihikindlalt kõrvaldama.
Because the Sapard programme itself does not have the means to solve them, ad hoc solutions were arrived at. 
Kuna Sapardi programmil endal ei ole vahendeid nende probleemide kõrvaldamiseks, jõuti ajutiste lahendusteni.
The result was that different practices were adopted by the Sapard countries, some of which were good, while others violated the rules. and there were heavy administrative procedures 91. 
Tulemuseks oli Sapardi riikides eri lahenduste kasutamine, millest mõned olid head, teised aga rikkusid eeskirju. Ning haldusprotseduurid olid keerukad 91.
After the first nine months of Sapard implementation in Poland, 977 applications were received, of which 472 (48 %) were rejected. 
Pärast Sapardi rakendamise esimest üheksat kuud oli Poolas esitatud 977 taotlust, millest 472 (48 %) oli tagasi lükatud.
An analysis of these figures showed that the main reason for rejection was that the applications were not prepared properly. 
Nende arvude analüüs näitas, et peamine tagasilükkamise põhjus oli taotluste vale koostamine.
The difficulties relate mainly to the large number of documents to be provided and the difficulty in obtaining them. 
Probleemid olid seotud peamiselt esitamisele kuuluvate dokumentide rohkusega ja nende saamise raskusega.
The same problem was found in Bulgaria, which can be illustrated by one of the projects reviewed by the Court. 
Bulgaarias oli sama probleem, mida võib kirjeldada ühe kontrollikoja poolt ülevaadatud projekti vahendusel.
For this relatively simple project for the purchase of a combine harvester and a plough, the number of pages in the application file was 2 477 and for the file with the payment request 601 pages. 
Selle suhteliselt lihtsa, kombaini ja adra ostmise projekti taotluse toimikus oli 2 477 lehekülge ja maksetaotluse toimikus 601 lehekülge.
The relevance of some of these documents is not always clear, and there is a need to simplify the procedures and relieve the burden for beneficiaries, which will, in turn, speed up implementation. 
Osa dokumentide tähtsus ei ole alati selge ja menetlusi tuleks lihtsustada ning kergendada abisaajate koormat, mis omakorda kiirendaks rakendamist.
Another example of this is that when the Sapard Agencies find that an application is incomplete, beneficiaries are given the opportunity to provide the missing documents. 
Teine näide selle kohta: kui Sapardi agentuur leidis, et taotlus on poolik, anti abisaajatele võimalus esitada puuduvad dokumendid.
The time available for this is often insufficient. 
Selleks antud aeg ei olnud sageli piisav.
Consequently, the application is rejected. 
Seetõttu lükati taotlus tagasi.
For instance, only one document was missing for the application for a project to upgrade a local road in Poland. 
Näiteks puudus Poolas kohaliku tee parandamise projekti taotluses vaid üks dokument.
This document, the budget for the following year, required a meeting of the municipalityŐs Council, which could not be held within the time allowed. 
Selle dokumendi, nimelt järgmise aasta eelarve saamiseks pidi toimuma omavalitsuse volikogu istung, mida ei suudetud ettenähtud aja jooksul korraldada.
The project was rejected. 
Projekt lükati tagasi.
The length of time often taken for processing applications also discourages potential applicants. 
Potentsiaalseid taotlejaid hirmutab ka taotluste töötlemiseks sageli kuluv aeg.
The delays in processing payment requests further extend the period of pre-financing and deter possible beneficiaries. 
Viivitused maksetaotluste töötlemisel piken-davad eelfinantseerimise aega veelgi ja heidutavad võimalikke abisaajaid.
The time from the payment claim to the actual day of payment is two to three months for the countries visited. 
Külastatud riikides kulus maksetaotluse esitamisest makse tegeliku sooritamiseni kaks kuni kolm kuud.
Apart from the time for evaluation of the payment claim the total time also includes the waiting time after the payment order has been prepared. 
Lisaks maksenõude hindamiseks kulunud ajale sisaldab kokku kulunud aeg ooteaega pärast maksekorralduse tegemist.
In Poland, one farmer had to wait almost six months to be reimbursed because he completed the project before the expected completion date stated in his application. 
Poolas pidi üks talupidaja hüvitist ootama peaaegu kuus kuud, sest ta lõpetas projekti enne taotluses märgitud eeldatavat projekti lõpukuupäeva.
The Polish officials stated that they could not accept a payment request before the date forecast. 
Poola ametnikud teatasid, et nad ei saa maksetaotlust enne ettenähtud kuupäeva vastu võtta.
In all the cases where the Court identified that procedures cause difficulties in implementation, Sapard countries have applied stricter procedures than those required by the Commission. 
Kõikidel juhtudel, kus kontrollikoda tuvastas, et protseduurid tekitavad rakendamisel probleeme, olid Sapardi riigid kohaldanud komisjoni poolt nõututest rangemaid protseduure.
30.11.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 295/15 even if they hampered an efficient implementation of Sapard. 
30.11.2004 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 295/15 bürokraatiast tingitud probleeme sageli lahendada isegi siis, kui need takistasid Sapardi tõhusat rakendamist.
Furthermore, best practices were not applied, which hampered a more speedy implementation of Sapard. which had as an effect that only financially strong beneficiaries are supported 96. 
Pealegi ei kohaldatud parimat tava, mis takistas Sapardi kiiremat rakendamist. Mis viis olukorrani, kus toetust saavad vaid majanduslikult tugevad abitaotlejad 96.
Due to the requirement on beneficiaries to pre-finance projects and the heavy administrative procedures, the Sapard system favours the financially strong and the better organised with sufficient capital or access to loans. 
Nõude tõttu, et abisaajad peavad projekte eelfinantseeri-ma, ja keerukate haldusprotseduuride tõttu soosib Sapardi süsteem neid, kes on majanduslikult tugevad ja paremini organiseeritud ning kellel on piisavalt kapitali või kes saavad laenu.
For smaller farms and firms which have the greatest efforts to make in meeting standards to modernise and increase efficiency this is a major handicap. 
Väiksematele taludele ja ettevõtetele, kes peavad tegema kõige suuremaid pingutusi, et standarditele vastata, vahendeid moderniseerida ja tõhusust suurendada, oli see abi saamisel suureks takistuseks.
Based on the 13 farms visited on the spot by the Court in the four countries, the auditors found that the farmers generally prefinanced the project and financed their own contribution from their own resources, which other, poorer, farmers were unable to do. 
Tuginedes kontrollikoja poolt neljas riigis kohapeal üle vaadatud 13 talumajapidamisele, leidsid audiitorid, et talupidajad üldiselt eelfinantseerisid projekte ja andsid oma panuse omavahendite arvelt, milleks vaesemad talupidajad ei oleks olnud suu-telised.
This was particularly the case in Lithuania, where this was a key element which has led to all the farmer beneficiaries visited being granted aid for more than one project. 
Eelkõige oli see nii Leedus, kus see oli peamine põhjus, miks kõigile üle vaadatud talupidajatele-abisaajatele anti abi rohkem kui ühe projekti jaoks.
ACTION REQUIRED BY THE COMMISSION because insufficient rules and checks result in expenditure on general costs being misspent 98. 
VAJA ON KOMISJONI TEGUTSEMIST, SEST Ebapiisavad eeskirjad ja kontrollid viivad üldkulutusi puudutavate kulude väärkasutuseni 98.
Sapard rules allow that general costs of up to 12 % of total eligible costs may be charged to the project (1). 
Sapardi eeskirjad lubavad projekti vahenditest katta üldkulusid kuni 12 % ulatuses abikõlblikke kulude kogusummast.
These costs can be architectsŐ, engineersŐ and consultantsŐ fees, legal fees, feasibility studies and acquisition of patents and licences for preparing and implementing a project. 
(1) Need kulud võivad olla arhitektide, inseneride ja konsultantide tasud, õigusabi tasud, teostatavusuuringud ja patentide ning tegevuslubade hankimine projekti ettevalmistamiseks ja rakendamiseks.
To date, the general costs charged were largely for the costs of preparing beneficiariesŐ business plans. 
Siiamaani olid projektide raames kaetud üldkulud suures osas abisaaja äriplaani koostamise kulud.
The highest amounts were found in Bulgaria and in Lithuania, where the relevant amount paid by the EU up to the end of 2003 is estimated by the Court to be 700 000 euro. 
Suurimad summad tuvastati Bulgaarias ja Leedus, kus vastavad ELi poolt 2003. aasta lõpuni makstud summad olid kontrollikoja hinnangul suuruses 700 000 eurot.
In other countries very little was charged for business plans. 
Teistes riikides läks äriplaanidele väga väike osa vahenditest.
The difference in the amounts charged between the countries should alone have led the Commission to examine this matter. 
Ainuüksi see erinevus eri riikide küsitud summades oleks pidanud panema komisjoni seda asjaolu uurima.
The risk related to these costs is high, in particular for consultancy costs for the preparation of business plans, because there is no direct relationship between the cost of the project (equipment etc.) and preparing a business plan, whether it relates to a small or large investment. 
Nende kuludega, eelkõige äriplaani koostamise konsul-tatsioonikuludega seotud risk on suur, sest projekti maksumuse (seadmed jne) ja äriplaani koostamise vahel otsene seos puudub, olenemata sellest, kas on tegemist väikese või suure investeeringu-ga.
Basing the reimbursement on a percentage of the project does not ensure economy. The risk is further increased because the rules allow that this expenditure is (1) Bulgaria reduced the general costs for the preparation of business plans to 5 %, and Romania in certain cases (for projects which do not include construction and for two measures only) to 3 % or 5 % depending on the measure. paid in cash. 
Risk suureneb veelgi, sest eeskirjad võimaldavad nende kulutuste maksmist sularahas. Kontrollikoja (1) Bulgaaria vähendas äriplaanide koostamise üldkulusid 5 %ni ja Rumeenia teatud juhtudel (projektide osas, mis ei hõlma ehitustöid, ja üksnes kahe meetme osas) sõltuvalt meetmest 3 või 5 %ni. auditi käigus leiti, et hoolimata sellest riskist ei kontrollitud neid kulusid piisavalt.
There was typically no justification or explanation for the amounts charged, and no checks were made that the costs were in relation to the services provided or indeed that the services were provided in the first place. 
Tüüpiline oli, et hüvitatud summade kohta ei olnud mingisugust tõendusmaterjali või selgitusi ja mingit kontrolli ei toimunud selle üle, kas need kulud on seotud osutatud teenustega või kas üldse mingisuguseid teenuseid osutati.