natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
36. in poland, the amount granted varies according to the number of jobs that the beneficiary commits himself to creating, while in italy the cost per job is only assessed under measure 312 and all expenditure (i.e. the entire investment cost) is taken into account compared to an average value determined by the authorities. 
36. Poolas varieerub toetuse suurus vastavalt töökohtade arvule, mille loomise kohustuse toetusesaaja endale võtab, samas kui Itaalias hinnatakse töökoha maksumust vaid meetme 312 raames ja kõik kulutused (st kogu investeeringu maksumus) võetakse arvesse vastavalt ametiasutuste määratud keskmisele väärtusele.
37. only poland, the czech republic and the united Kingdom made the grant conditional upon achieving job creation where the latter was foreseen by the project. in poland and the united Kingdom evidence had to be submitted together with the payment claim (although the uK also accepted expected results), while in the czech republic, project promoters were subject to targeted checks after the implementation of the projects. clear rules on the commitment period for maintaining the created jobs were set out in poland and the czech republic — respectively two years after the final payment and up to the end of the five-year commitment period.17 38. conversely, the authorities in italy — campania only relied on the estimate of jobs to be created as stated by the beneficiary in his/her application. the creation of these jobs was not a condition of payment and was not checked at final payment nor during later monitoring activities. the audit revealed that only four of the nine projects audited sought to create jobs and for two of those job creation was well below the expected realisation. 
37. Vaid Poolas, Tšehhi Vabariigis ja Ühendkuningriigis muudeti projektide puhul, mis hõlmasid töökohtade loomist, toetus sõltuvaks töökohtade loomise õnnestumisest. Poolas ja Ühendkuningriigis tuli tõendid esitada koos maksetaotlusega (kuigi Ühendkuningriik arvestas ka oodatud tule-musi), samas kui Tšehhi Vabariigis kontrolliti projektide elluviijaid sihipäraselt pärast projektide rakendamist.
16 calculated as the total public support paid to the beneficiary, divided by the number of jobs created (in full-time equivalents). 
16 Selle arvutamiseks jagatakse toetusesaajale makstud riikliku toetuse kogusumma loodud töökohtade arvuga (täistööaja ekvivalentides).
17 article 72 of regulation (Ec) no 1698/2005. 
17 Määruse (EÜ) nr 1698/2005 artikkel 72.
21 Special report No 6/2013 – Have the Member States and the Commission achieved value for money with the measures for diversifying the rural economy? 
21 Eriaruanne nr 6/2013 – Kas liikmesriigid ja komisjon saavutasid maamajanduse mitmekesistamise meetmetega kulutustele vastavat tulu?
22 no proactIVE manaGEmEnt of thE mEasurEs 39. 
22 puudus MeetMete ennetaV juhtiMine 39.
Even when the monitoring and evaluation information showed that measures’ targets were not met, the Member states authorities did not redesign the interventions in order to maximise their impact, supporting more effective and efficient projects that could deliver real results vis-à-vis the targets set. 
Isegi kui järelevalve ja hindamisteave näitas, et meetmete eesmärke ei saavutatud, ei kavandanud liikmesriikide ametiasutused sekkumisi ümber, et maksimeerida nende toimet mõjusamate ja tõhusamate projektide toetamise kaudu, mis võinuks tuua seatud eesmärke arvestades reaalseid tulemusi. 40.
40. this was particularly visible in the czech republic, where despite the significant underachievement of the job creation target, partly due to the unrealistic/ambitious targets set by the authorities, no action was taken to increase the preference for projects that created jobs. in sweden, reallocation of part of the axis 3 budgets between counties took account of the level of expenditure but not the progress in achieving results. in italy, a high aid rate was offered to increase take-up, but without any link to the achievement of results (see Box 8). box 8 ExamplEs of lack of proactIVE manaGEmEnt czech republic: the mid-term evaluation, issued in 2010, highlighted the limited effect of the three measures audited. the evaluator found that measure 311 only achieved 0,8 % of the indicator for gross jobs to be created. 
See torkas silma ennekõike Tšehhi Vabariigis, kus vaatamata töökohtade loomise eesmärgi ilmselgele saavutamata jätmisele, mida põhjustasid osaliselt ametiasutuste seatud ebarealistlikud või ambitsioonikad eesmärgid, ei võetud midagi ette, et eelistada edaspidi töökohti loovaid projekte. Rootsis jagati osa 3. telje eelarvest maakondade vahel ümber, võttes arvesse kulutuste mahtu, mitte edusamme tulemuste saavutamisel.
Measure 312 achieved only 1,4 % of the job creation target initially set and measure 313 only achieved 1 % after three years of programme implementation. despite this lack of success, the czech republic had not adapted the measures. instead, the czech authorities, whilst maintaining the same level of programmed expenditure per measure, have reduced their targets for the result indicator ‘Gross number of jobs created’ by over 90 %, from 29 000 to 2 700. italy — campania: in order to boost the financial implementation of the measures, in 2010, the authorities increased the maximum public aid rate to 100 % for project amounts up to 50 000 euro for measures 311 and 312. this removal of the obligation of a beneficiary to contribute to the project was not linked to an increased value for money of the projects in terms of results to be achieved. sweden: despite the fact that the cMEf result indicator for jobs created only reached 6,6 % of the target in 2010, the measures or selection criteria were not adapted to make them more effective so as to ensure that the target would be met. furthermore the counties were informed that if they had not committed at least 50 % by october 2011, their budgets would be reallocated to other counties that were able to spend faster. 
Meetme 312 raames saavutati vaid 1,4% algselt seatud töökohtade loomise eesmärgist ja meetme 313 raames vaid 1% eesmärgist programmi rakendamise kolme aasta jooksul.
23 thE commIssIon has not suffIcIEntly usEd pErformancE InformatIon to ImproVE thE EffIcIEncy and EffEctIVEnEss of dIVErsIfIcatIon mEasurEs 41. the commission monitors and supervises the implementation of the programmes, notably through participation in monitoring committee meetings18, the examination of annual progress reports and audit visits to Member states. in addition, the commission’s responsibility for sound financial management also requires it to improve the implementation of the programme accordingly. article 77(2) of regulation (Ec) no 1698/2005 provides the commission the opportunity to participate in meetings of the Monitoring committee ‘in an advisory capacity’. 
Lisaks näeb komisjoni usaldusväärse finantsjuhtimise vastutus ette, et komisjon parandab vastavalt sellele programmi rakendamist. Määruse (EÜ) nr 1698/2005 artikli 77 lõige 2 näeb ette, et komisjoni esindajad võivad osaleda seirekomisjoni töös nõuandva pädevusega.
42. the commission has insisted, throughout the programming period, on the need for greater selectivity and targeting in the implementation of the measure, regardless of ‘budgetary sufficiency’. 
42. Komisjon on rõhutanud vajadust suurema valivuse ja meetme rakendamise täpsema suunamise järele kogu programmitöö perioodi vältel, ka siis, kui eelarvet jagub.
However, the audit revealed that the commission did not always ensure that Member states defined adequate selection criteria and/or applied them consistently. indeed, the commission did not take effective action despite the fact that france, poland, and the czech republic (in 2009) did not apply any selection criteria. 
Ometi tõi audit esile, et komisjon ei taganud alati seda, et liikmesriigid määratleksid asjakohased valikukriteeriumid või rakendaksid neid järjepidevalt. Komisjon ei võtnud tõhusaid meetmeid, vaatamata sellele, et Prantsusmaa, Poola ja Tšehhi Vabariik (2009. aastal) ei kohaldanud ühtegi valikukriteeriumi.
However, in respect of other rural development measures, the commission has taken action for similar weaknesses by proposing financial corrections. 
Siiski on komisjon teiste maaelu arengu meetmete puhul astunud finantskorrektsioonide väljapakkumi-sega samme sarnaste puudustega tegelemiseks. 43.
43. furthermore, the commission did not take adequate steps during the Monitoring committee or the annual examination of programmes’ pro-gress19 to ensure that Member states were effective in selecting and approving projects that contributed towards achieving the objectives set. 
Komisjon ei võtnud sobivaid meetmeid ka seirekomisjoni koosolekutel osaledes ega programmide edusammude iga-aastasel läbivaatamisel19, tagamaks, et liikmesriikide tegevus seatud eesmärkide saavutamisse panustavate projektide valimisel ja heakskiitmisel oleks mõjus.
With reference to the case shown in Box 8, the commission has not required an improvement in the effectiveness of diversification measures in the czech republic, but rather it has accepted a simple reduction in the targets for gross number of jobs to be created. 
Viidates juhtumile, mis on välja toodud 8. selgituses, ei ole komisjon Tšehhi Vabariigis nõudnud mitmekesistamismeetmete mõjususe parandamist, vaid leppinud loodavate töökohtade koguarvu sihtnäitajate vähendamisega.
18 article 78 of regulation (Ec) no 1698/2005 states ‘the Monitoring committee shall satisfy itself as to the effectiveness of the implementation of the rural development programme’. this is done by considering and revising selection criteria, monitoring progress toward objectives, achievement of targets, etc. 
18 Määruse (EÜ) nr 1698/2005 artiklis 78 on sätestatud: „Seirekomisjon vastutab maaelu arengu programmi rakendamise tõhususe eest.” Selleks kaalutakse valikukriteeriumeija vaadatakse need läbi, kontrollitakse eesmärkide ja sihtide saavutamist jne.
19 article 83 of regulation (Ec) no 1698/2005 states ‘Each year, on presentation of the annual progress report, the commission and the Managing authority shall examine the main results of the previous year, in accordance with procedures to be determined in agreement with the Member state and Managing authority concerned’. 
19 Määruse (EÜ) nr 1698/2005 artiklis 83 on sätestatud: „Igal aastal arenguaruande esitamisel vaatavad komisjon ja korraldusasutus läbi eelmise aasta peamised tulemused vastavalt asjaomase liikmesriigi ja korraldusasutuse kokkuleppel kindlaksmääratavale korrale.”
45. the risk to efficiency is the possibility that an activity: — does not maximise output for a given input or that it does so without paying due regard to appropriate quality; or — does not minimise input for a given output, or that it does so without paying due regard to appropriate quality. 
Üldised ohud usaldusväärsele finantsjuhtimisele ohustavad lisaks mõjususele ka tõhusust ja säästlikkust. 45. Oht tõhususele tähendab seda, et mõni tegevus: — ei maksimeeri antud sisendi väljundit või teeb seda asjakohasele kvaliteedile piisavat tähelepanu pööramata; või — ei minimeeri antud väljundi sisendit või teeb seda asjakohasele kvaliteedile piisavat tähelepanu pööramata.
46. the risk to economy is the possibility that an activity: — does not minimise the cost of resources, or that it does so without having regard to appropriate quality. 
46. Oht säästlikkusele tähendab seda, et mõni tegevus: — ei minimeeri vahendite kulukust või teeb seda asjakohasele kvaliteedile tähelepanu pööramata.
However, this does not relieve the authorities of the responsibility for performing the relevant checks on implementation. 
Siiski ei vabasta see ametiasutusi rakendamise asjakohase kontrollimise vastutusest. 48.
48. for this reason, and in accordance with the principles of efficiency and economy set out in article 30(2) of regulation (Eu, Euratom) no 966/201220 the court considers that Member states should: — ensure, prior to granting funding, that applicants have been able to show that their projects are financially viable and sustainable; — apply procedures to mitigate the risk of deadweight and displacement21; — ensure that the projects have reasonable costs; — ensure that the projects can be implemented within a reasonable time frame and without unjustified ‘red tape’ and costs. 
Seepärast ning kooskõlas tõhususe ja säästlikkuse põhimõttega, mis on välja toodud määruse (EL, Euratom) nr 966/201220 artikli 30 lõikes 2, on kontrollikoda seisukohal, et liikmesriikidel tuleks: — tagada, et taotlejad on enne toetuse eraldamist tõendanud oma projektide rahanduslikku elujõulisust ja jätkusuutlikkust; — kohaldada meetmeid, mis vähendavad tühimõju ja tegevuse ümberpaiknemise ohtu21 ; — tagada, et projektide kulud on mõistlikud; — tagada, et projekte saaks rakendada piisava ajavahemiku jooksul, ilma põhjendamatute kulude ja bürokraatiata.
20 regulation (Eu, Euratom) no 966/2012 of the European parliament and of the council of 25 october 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the union and repealing council regulation (Ec, Euratom) no 1605/2002 (oJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 
20 Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 25. oktoobri 2012. aasta määrus (EL, Euratom) nr 966/2012, mis käsitleb Euroopa Liidu üldeelarve suhtes kohaldatavaid finantseeskirju ning millega muudetakse nõukogu määrust (EÜ, Euratom) nr 1605/2002 (ELT L 298, 26.10.2012, lk 1).
21 for definitions, see paragraphs 51 and 58. 
21 Mõisted leiate punktidest 51 ja 58.
24 Special report No 6/2013 – Have the Member States and the Commission achieved value for money with the measures for diversifying the rural economy? 
24 Eriaruanne nr 6/2013 – Kas liikmesriigid ja komisjon saavutasid maamajanduse mitmekesistamise meetmetega kulutustele vastavat tulu?
25 EffIcIEncy mEmbEr statEs chEcks GIVE lImItEd assurancE of thE fInancIal sustaInabIlIty of projEcts 49. in order to avoid that public funding is not wasted on projects that fail prematurely, Member states should, through proportionate viability checks, analyse the soundness of the applicant’s financial situation and business planning and document their appraisal. 
Selleks, et vältida riiklike vahendite kulutamist projektidele, mis enneaegselt ebaõnnestuvad, peaksid liikmesriigid vastavate elujõulisuse kontrollidega analüüsima taotleja finantsolukorra ja äritegevuse kavandamise usaldusväärsust ning koostama nende kohta hinnangud. 50.
However, particularly in poland and sweden, the audit found a number of shortcomings, mainly in relation to superficial and unreliable assessments, and weak documentation. the other Member states audited did not perform any systematic viability check (france (aquitaine) and italy — campania) or had suspended them (czech republic) (see Box 9). 
Auditi käigus leiti ennekõike Poolas ja Rootsis mitu puudust peamiselt pealiskaudsete ja ebausaldusväärsete hinnangute ning nõrga tõendusmaterjali näol. Teised auditeeritud liikmesriigid ei teinud mingit korrapärast elujõulisuse kontrolli (Prantsusmaa (Akvitaania) ja Itaalia (Campania)) või olid need peatanud (Tšehhi Vabariik) (vt 9. selgitus).
22 However, article 72 of regulation (Ec) no 1698/2005 requires that all supported projects need to be sustainable in the sense that Member states shall ensure that an investment operation does not, within five years of the funding decision, undergo a substantial modification, including the cessation or relocation of a productive activity. in addition, the commission recognised that such criteria should be part of project appraisal in the Eu rural review no 1: ‘care is being taken to ensure maximum value for money from the significant sums of axis 3 funding and economic sustainability forms a key criterion during assessment of all Eafrd project proposals’ (page 31) (see: http://enrd. ec.europa.eu/publications-and-media/eu-rural-review/ en/eu-rural-review_en.cfm). box 9 VIabIlIty chEcks: ExamplEs of Good practIcE and wEaknEssEs united kingdom — england: the authorities apply several procedures, depending on the size of the grant, that can be seen as good practice: financial ratios are calculated on the basis of accounting information and projections of cash flow, an independent opinion is provided by an accountant and a business plan with sales projections and a market analysis must be supplied. the underlying assumptions are critically reviewed by the appraiser and management and delivery risks taken into account. 
22 Määruse (EÜ) nr 1698/2005 artiklis 72 nähakse siiski ette, et kõik toetust saanud projektid peavad olema jätkusuutlikud ning liikmesriik peab tagama, et viie aasta jooksul alates korraldusasutuse otsusest vahendite eraldamise kohta ei tee investeering läbi olulist muutust, mis tuleneb muu hulgas tootliku tegevuse lakkamisest või ümberpaigutamisest.
Poland: in one case, the beneficiary’s initial business plan showed a negative net present value (npV), which would have rendered the project ineligible. 
Poola. Ühel juhul näitas toetusesaaja algne äriplaan negatiivset nüüdispuhasväärtust (NPV), mis oleks muutnud projekti toetuskõlbmatuks.
Special report No 6/2013 – Have the Member States and the Commission achieved value for money with the measures for diversifying the rural economy? 26 mEmbEr statEs’ proGrammInG and ImplEmEntatIon of thE mEasurE do not EffEctIVEly mItIGatE rIsks of dEadwEIGht ... 
Eriaruanne nr 6/2013 – Kas liikmesriigid ja komisjon saavutasid maamajanduse mitmekesistamise meetmetega kulutustele vastavat tulu? 26 MeetMe KaVandaMine ja raKendaMine liiKMesriiKides ei Vähenda tuleMusliKult tühiMõju ohte ...
51. deadweight refers to the extent to which a beneficiary would have undertaken the investment even without grant funding. 
51. Tühimõju viitab määrale, mille ulatuses oleks toetusesaaja investeeringu teinud isegi ilma eraldatud toetuseta.
Giving grants in such cases reduces the efficiency of Eu and national budget funds, as public expenditure is not needed to achieve the desired effect. 
Toetuse andmine sellistes olukordades, kus avaliku sektori kulutusi ei ole soovitud tulemuse saavutamiseks vaja, vähendab ELi ja riiklike eelarvevahendite tõhusust.
52. the primary means of reducing the risk of deadweight is to design and programme measures 311–313 in such a way that public funding is directed where there is an identified need (e.g. market failures) or to encourage the provision of positive externalities and public goods (e.g. through assistance with the costs of introducing environmentally sustainable technologies or projects providing wider public benefits). 
52. Peamine tühimõju vähendamise vahend on meetmete 311–313 kujundamine ja kavandamine nii, et riiklik rahastamine suunataks kindlakstehtud vajadustele (nt turutõrgetele) või positiivse välismõju ja avalike hüvede pakkumise edendamisele (nt keskkonnahoidlike tehnoloogiate kasutuselevõtmise või laiemaid avalikke hüvesid pakkuvate projektide kulude toetamise kaudu).
However, even when the system was designed to encourage the delivery of public goods through support for private beneficiaries, the potential positive impact was, in some cases, nullified in practice (see Box 10). 
Kuid isegi siis, kui süsteem oli kavandatud edendama avalike hüvede pakkumist eraisikust toetusesaajate toetamise kaudu, oli potentsiaalne positiivne mõju mõnel juhul tegelikkuses olematu (vt 10. selgitus).
Member states can also mitigate the risk of deadweight through the project selection process. the Member states could have asked the applicants to demonstrate that they need a grant with reference to the financial, marketing and management information obtained for the viability check. if an applicant had sufficient capital or access to capital to finance the entire project or if the project’s prospects for success were high, the investment would normally be made anyway with or without the aid. this would represent an inefficient use of scarce public funds. box 10 an ExamplE of potEntIal posItIVE Impact nullIfIEd In practIcE italy — campania: the system of project assessment provided for the calculation of a score related to environmental criteria. 
Liikmesriigid saavad tühimõju ohtu vähendada ka projektide valikumenetluse käigus. Liikmesriigid oleksid võinud paluda taotlejatel tõestada vajadust toetuse järele, viitades elujõulisuse kontrolli tarbeks kogutud finants-, turu-ja juhtimisteabele. Kui taotlejal oli piisavalt kapitali või juurdepääs kapitalile, millega tervet projekti rahastada, või kui projekti eduväljavaated olid suured, oleks investeering tehtud niikuinii, olenemata toetuse saamisest.
However, the audit found that 10 points could be attributed for the criterion ‘water saving’ or five points for ‘going beyond normal waste treatment’ by only promising to make the most basic investments like dual flush toilets or a low-cost compost bin (cost of a compost bin: 350 euro as against total project cost of 247 000 euro in one example). no overall water saving needed to be promised, nor was it assessed. 
Auditi käigus leiti aga, et projekt võis saada kümme punkti vee säästmise kriteeriumi täitmise eest või viis punkti tavapärasest jäätmekäitlusest põhjalikuma jäätmekäitluse kriteeriumi täitmise eest, pelgalt lubades teha kõige elementaarsemaid investeeringuid, nagu seda on kahesüsteemse loputusega WC-pottide või odava kompostikasti soetamine (ühes projektis maksis näiteks kompostikast 350 eurot, samas kui projekti kogumaksumus oli 247 000 eurot).
15 points (a decisive number in many cases) could thus be obtained with no meaningful water saving or environmental impact being envisaged by the project. Special report No 6/2013 – Have the Member States and the Commission achieved value for money with the measures for diversifying the rural economy? 
15 punkti (mitmel juhul otsustav punktisumma) oli seega võimalik saada projektis märkimisväärset veesäästu või keskkonnamõju ette nägemata. Eriaruanne nr 6/2013 – Kas liikmesriigid ja komisjon saavutasid maamajanduse mitmekesistamise meetmetega kulutustele vastavat tulu?
54. the rural development programmes of two out of the six Member states audited (sweden and the uK — England) highlight the fact that deadweight implies a serious risk to sound financial management. 
54. Kuuest auditeeritud liikmesriigist kahe (Rootsi ja Ühendkuningriigi, Ing-lismaa) maaelu arengukavad toovad esile tõsiasja, et tühimõjuga kaasneb suur oht usaldusväärsele finantsjuhtimisele.
However, only in the united Kingdom did the authorities require beneficiaries to demonstrate the need for the grant, rejecting projects where the need for public funding was not proven. the following elements were taken into account by the united Kingdom authorities during the projects appraisal: how convincing the application was in justifying why a grant is needed, the market failures the project addresses, the existence of a funding gap (for example comparing alternative cash flow projections between a ‘borrowing scenario’ and a ‘public intervention scenario’), and value of the project outputs to the region by estimating the proportion of the outputs that would have been delivered without the grant. 
Siiski palusid ametiasutused vaid Ühendkuningriigis toetusesaajatel tõendada vajadust toetuse järele, lükates tagasi projektid, mille vajadust avaliku rahastamise järele ei tõendatud. Ühendkuningriigi ametiasutused võtsid projektide hindamisel arvesse järgmisi elemente: kui veenvalt põhjendati taotluses vajadust toetuse järele; projekti käsitletavad turutõrked; rahastamise puudujäägi olemasolu (võrreldes näiteks alternatiivsete rahavoogude prognoose laenustsenaariumi ja avaliku sekkumise stsenaariumi korral) ja projekti väljundite väärtus piirkonnale, hinnates ilma toetuseta saavutatavate väljundite osakaalu.