natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Conclusions 23.The biennial anti-corruption report is an opportunity for the Commission to start an EU-wide dialogue and establish substantive links between transparency, integrity, corruption, fraud and accountability. 
Järeldused 23.Iga kahe aasta tagant koostatav korruptsioonivastase võitluse aruanne kujutab endast komisjoni jaoks võimalust alustada üleeuroopalist dialoogi ning tuua välja läbipaistvuse, aususe, korruptsiooni, pettuste ja aruandekohustuse vahelised sisulised seosed.
The ECA welcomes this first anti-corruption report, which contains information on trends concerning corruption and provides details of good practices being applied in the field of anti-corruption measures. 
Kontrollikojal on hea meel komisjoni esimese korruptsioonivastast võitlust käsitleva aruande üle, mis sisaldab teavet korruptsioonialaste suundumuste kohta ja kirjeldab korruptsioonivastaste meetmete valdkonna head tava.
24.However, the report is overly descriptive, offers little analysis and does not present substantive findings, relying instead on the results of corruption perception polls, which are an instrument whose usefulness is limited. 
24.Samas on aruanne aga liigselt kirjeldav, sisaldab vähe analüüsi ja mitte ühtegi konkreetset leidu, põhinedes selle asemel piiratud kasulikkust pakkuvatel tunnetatud korruptsiooni uuringutel.
The ECA 16 COM(2014) 38, final, pp. 35 and 36. 
Kontrollikoda on seisukohal, et 16 KOM(2014) 38 lõplik, lk 35 ja 36.
12 identifies a need for more operationally relevant research and rigorous evaluations, including an analysis of actual risk areas. 
12 aruanne peaks sisaldama rohkem praktiliselt asjakohast uurimistööd ja põhjalikke hindamisi, sealhulgas tegelike riskivaldkondade analüüsi.
This would establish an evidential basis, currently missing, for the objectives and results of different anti-corruption measures, and shine a light onto the interactions between different anti-corruption interventions in Member States and by EU institutions like OLAF on behalf of the Commission. 
See aitaks luua korruptsioonivastase võitluse meetmete eesmärkide ja tulemuste hindamiseks faktidel põhineva aluse (mis praegu puudub) ning heita valgust liikmesriikide ja ELi institutsioonide (nt OLAFi) poolt komisjoni ülesandel võetavate korruptsioonivastaste meetmete koosmõjule.
25.EU institutions should have been included in the Commission’s first anti-corruption report. 
25.Komisjoni esimene korruptsioonivastase võitluse aruanne oleks pidanud hõlmama ELi institutsioone.
Any information from the Commission would still be most welcome, even at this late stage. 
Komisjoni antav mistahes lisateave oleks ka protsessi praeguses hilises etapis väga tervitatav.
No convincing reasons are provided why the European Union does not yet participate in the Council of Europe of Group of States against corruption (GRECO). 
Esitatud ei ole mõjuvaid põhjuseid selle kohta, miks ei osale Euroopa Liit Euroopa Nõukogu riikide korruptsioonivastase ühenduse (GRECO) töös.
The European Union should engage with GRECO with the aim of gaining full membership, the objective being to bring the EU administration onto the same level as the governments of its 28 Member States, whose compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption standards is already subject to evaluation. 
Euroopa Liit peaks osalema GRECO töös ja seadma endale eesmärgi saada ühenduse täisliikmeks, mis võimaldaks ELil olla võrdses olukorras oma 28 liikmesriigi valitsustega, kelle vastavust Euroopa Nõukogu korruptsioonivastastele standarditele GRECO juba hindab.
Communication to the European Parliament concerning the European ParliamentŐs request to be kept informed regarding the problem of access to information in relation to the European Central Bank, as laid down in paragraph 29 of the 2016 discharge procedure (2017/2188(DEC)) Adopted by Chamber IV at its meeting of 13 December 2018 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi Đ L-1615 Luxembourg T +352 4398-1 E eca-info@eca.europa.eu eca.europa.eu 
Teatis Euroopa Parlamendile vastavalt Euroopa Parlamendi palvele, et teda informeeritaks Euroopa Keskpangaga seotud teabele juurdepsu probleemist, nagu osutatud 2016. aasta eelarve titmisele heakskiidu andmise menetluse (2017/2188(DEC)) punktis 29 IV auditikoda vttis kesoleva teatise vastu 13. detsembri 2018. aasta koosolekul 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi Đ L-1615 Luxembourg T +352 4398 Đ 1 E eca-info@eca.europa.eu eca.europa.eu
Background 01 The European Court of Auditors (ECA) is the European UnionŐs independent external auditor and the independent guardian of the financial interests of the citizens of the Union. 
Taust 01 Euroopa Kontrollikoda on Euroopa Liidu sltumatu vlisaudiitor ja liidu kodanike finantshuvide sltumatu kaitsja.
In this capacity, the ECA conducts performance audits1 to improve sound financial management, accountability and transparency. 
Selles funktsioonis teeb kontrollikoda tulemusauditeid1, et parandada finantsjuhtimist ning edendada aruandekohustuse titmist ja lbipaistvust.
The ECA publishes the results of these performance audits as special reports. 
Mainitud tulemusauditite tulemused avaldatakse kontrollikoja eriaruannetena.
02 In November 2016, the ECA published its first special report (29/2016)2 on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
02 2016. aasta novembris avaldas kontrollikoda oma esimese eriaruande (29/2016)2 htse jrelevalvemehhanismi kohta. htne jrelevalvemehhanism teeb jrelevalvet euroala pankade usaldatavusnuete titmise le.
During this audit, the ECA faced severe difficulties in obtaining audit evidence from the European Central Bank (ECB), the central supervisor of the SSM. 
Auditi kigus oli kontrollikojal tsiseid raskusi auditi tendusmaterjali saamisega Euroopa Keskpangalt (EKP), kes on htse jrelevalvemehhanismi keskne jrelevalveasutus.
As the ECB did not provide many of the required documents3, the scope of the audit was of necessity limited and, thus, a number of important areas remained unaudited. 
Sellest tulenevalt, et EKP ei esitanud paljusid vajalikke dokumente3, oli auditi ulatus piiratud ja mitu olulist valdkonda ji auditeerimata.
03 In December 2017, the ECA published its first special report (23/2017)4 on the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The SRB is the resolution authority for large banks in the Eurozone. 
03 2017. aasta detsembris avaldas kontrollikoda oma esimese aruande (23/2017)4 htse Kriisilahendusnukogu kohta. htne Kriisilahendusnukogu on suurte euroala pankade kriisilahendusasutus.
During this audit, the SRB insisted on removing any data originating from the ECB from the audit evidence provided to the ECA and did not provide any documents it possessed that originated from the ECB. 
Auditi vltel nudis htne Kriisilahendusnukogu kigi EKP-st prit andmete eemaldamist kontrollikojale esitatud auditi tendusmaterjalidest ning ei andnud vlja mingeid enda valduses olevaid dokumente, mis prinesid EKP-st.
This prevented the ECA from assessing the completeness of resolution plans and the accuracy of much of the information originating from recovery plans. 
Seetttu ei saanud kontrollikoda hinnata kriisilahenduskavade tielikkust ja suure osa finantsseisundi taastamise kavades sisalduva teabe korrektsust.
04 In January 2018, the ECA published its second special report (02/2018), this time on the ECBŐs crisis management in relation to its banking supervision tasks5. 
04 2018. aasta jaanuaris avaldas kontrollikoda oma teise eriaruande (2/2018), sedapuhku EKP kriisijuhtimise kohta seoses tema pangandusjrelevalve lesannetega5.
Again, the ECB denied access to the documents needed for the ECA to perform its task. 
Taas keeldus EKP juurdepsu andmisest dokumentidele, mida kontrollikoda oma lesande titmiseks vajas.
Therefore, the ECA only published provisional conclusions on some aspects of the ECBŐs crisis Based on International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI) 300. 
Seetttu avaldas kontrollikoda vaid esialgsed jreldused EKP Vastavalt krgeimate kontrolliasutuste rahvusvahelisele standardile (ISSAI) 300.
ECA special report 29/2016: Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed. 
Euroopa Kontrollikoja eriaruanne nr 29/2016: htne jrelevalvemehhanism Đ hea algus, kuid vaja on tiendavaid parandusi.
See in particular paragraph 19 and Annex II of ECA special report 29/2016. 
Vt eelkige kontrollikoja eriaruande nr 29/2016 punkt 19 ja II lisa.
ECA special report 23/2017: Single Resolution Board: Work on a challenging Banking Union task started, but still a long way to go. 
Euroopa Kontrollikoja eriaruanne nr 23/2017: htne Kriisilahendusnukogu: keeruka pangandusliiduga seotud t on alanud, kuid pikk tee on veel ees.
ECA special report 02/2018: The operational efficiency of the ECBŐs crisis management for banks. 
Euroopa Kontrollikoja eriaruanne nr 2/2018: EKP tehtava pankade kriisijuhtimise toimimise thusus.
management in relation to banking supervision tasks. 
kriisijuhtimise teatavate aspektide kohta seoses pangandusjrelevalve lesannetega.
As a result, the ECA was not able to confirm the efficiency of the ECBŐs crisis management in practice. 
Seetttu ei saanud kontrollikoda kinnitada EKP kriisijuhtimise tegelikku thusust.
05 In April 2018, in the context of the 2016 Commission discharge, the European Parliament acknowledged the ECAŐs efforts and the problems faced. 
05 2018. aasta aprillis tunnistas Euroopa Parlament komisjoni 2016. aasta eelarve titmisele heakskiidu andmise raames kontrollikoja jupingutusi ja tema ees seisvaid probleeme.
The Parliament concluded in particular that it was unacceptable from an accountability point of view for the auditee to decide single-handedly to which documents the external auditor may have access. 
Eelkige tegi parlament jrelduse, et aruandekohustuse seisukohast ei ole vastuvetav, kui auditeeritav otsustab ainuisikuliselt, millistele dokumentidele on vlisaudiitoril juurdeps.
It called on the ECB to cooperate with the ECA and to provide full access to documents required. 
Ta kutsus EKP-d les kontrollikojaga koostd tegema ja tagama tieliku juurdepsu vajalikele dokumentidele.
Furthermore, the Parliament asked the ECA to inform it by November 2018 as to whether a solution was found to the problem of access to information. 
Lisaks palus parlament kontrollikojal ennast 2018. aasta novembriks teavitada, kas teabele juurdepsu probleemile on lahendus leitud.
The problem and the ECAŐs efforts 06 External public audit is an essential element of a democratic society and the rule of law in the EU. 
Probleem ja kontrollikoja jupingutused 06 Avaliku sektori vlisaudit on ELi demokraatliku hiskonna ja igusriigi phimtte keskne element.
It plays an important role in ensuring efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of public administration.6 The rule of law is a key principle of democracy that guarantees that all members of society (including those in government) are equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes. 
Sel on thtis osa avaliku halduse thususe, aruandekohustuse, tulemuslikkuse ja lbipaistvuse tagamisel6. Íigusriik on demokraatia alusphimte, mis tagab, et kigi hiskonnaliikmete (kaasa arvatud riigi valitsemisega tegelejate) suhtes kehtivad hetaolised igusnormid ja menetlused.
Accountability and transparency enable citizens and their parliament to hold their representatives and those who are implementing decisions accountable for their actions. 
Aruandekohustus ja lbipaistvus vimaldavad kodanikel ja nende parlamentidel vtta oma esindajaid ja otsuste elluviijaid nende tegevuse eest vastutusele.
The independent reports produced by the external auditor are an important contribution to this accountability process. 
Vlisaudiitori koostatud sltumatud aruanded on oluline panus knealusesse aruandlusprotsessi.
07 In the European Union, accountability is particularly important in banking supervision. 
07 Euroopa Liidus on aruandekohustus eriti oluline pangandusjrelevalve vallas.
Risks materialising in this area can endanger the stability of financial systems and the single market. 
Selles valdkonnas realiseeruvad riskid vivad ohustada finantsssteemide stabiilsust ja htset turgu.
Following the financial crisis, the legislator entrusted banking supervision to the SSM under the legal umbrella of the ECB. 
Prast finantskriisi tegi seadusandja pangandusjrelevalve lesandeks EKP struktuuri kuuluvale htsele jrelevalvemehhanismile.
Supervisory powers were delegated to the ECB because the Meroni doctrine7 limits the powers that can be transferred to EU agencies. 
Jrelevalvevolitused delegeeriti EKP-le, sest Meroni doktriin7 piirab ELi asutustele antavaid volitusi.
While the ECB provides the legal framework and delegates five representatives to the SSM Supervisory Board, the competent national authorities also participate by delegating 19 of their own representatives to the board. 
EKP loob htse jrelevalvemehhanismi igusliku raamistiku ja delegeerib viis esindajat selle jrelevalvenukogusse, aga selles osalevad ka riiklikud pdevad asutused, kelle esindajaid on nukogus 19.
They also provide staff resources, play an important role in on-site inspections and supervise smaller banks directly. 
Samuti eraldavad nad ttajaid, mngivad olulist rolli kohapealses kontrollis ja teostavad otsest jrelevalvet viksemate pankade le.
The result is a complex system, in which the ECB enjoys a high degree of discretion based on expert judgement in a very technical and complex area, As recognized by the United Nations in resolution A/66/209. 
Tulemuseks on keeruline ssteem, milles EKP-l on suur kaalutlusigus, tuginedes oma Nagu on mrkinud RO oma resolutsioonis A/66/209.
As established in cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
Vastavalt otsustele kohtuasjades 9/56 ja 10/56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche vs. lemamet, [1957Đ1958] EKL 133.
although it also relies on collaboration with competent national authorities. 
ekspertteadmistele vga tehnilises ja keerulises valdkonnas, tehes kll ka koostd riiklike pdevate asutustega.
The lack of accountability and transparency of such a complex system could have a huge negative impact on public finances. 
Sellise keeruka ssteemi aruandekohustuse ja lbipaistvuse puudumine vib avaldada rmiselt negatiivset mju riikide rahandusele.
Even now that the Single Resolution Mechanism has been established, under certain conditions the legal framework still allows state aid or resolution aid for banks. 
Isegi nd, kus on loodud htne kriisilahenduskord, vimaldab igusraamistik ikkagi anda teatavatel tingimustel pankadele riigiabi vi kriisilahendusabi.
Examples include precautionary recapitalisations, the government stabilisation tool and the use of the Single Resolution Fund. 
Nited hlmavad ennetavat rekapitaliseerimist, valitsuse stabiliseerimisvahendit ja htse kriisilahendusfondi kasutamist.
08 Since 2015, as described in paragraphs 2 and 4, the ECA has made a significant effort to promote the accountability of banking supervision in the Euro area with a view to providing information to the legislators and the public about the level of efficiency achieved in the newly established system of EU-wide banking supervision. 
08 Nagu kirjeldatud punktides 2 ja 4, on kontrollikoda alates 2015. aastast teinud mrkimisvrseid jupingutusi, et edendada euroalal pangandusjrelevalve aruandekohustust, eesmrgiga anda seadusandjatele ja ldsusele teavet selle kohta, kui thus on hiljuti loodud ELi pangandusjrelevalve ssteem.
However, the ECB refused to provide important information. 
EKP on aga keeldunud esitamast olulist teavet.
09 In June 2015, the Contact Committee (CC) of Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union warned that an audit gap regarding banking supervision had emerged after many supervisory tasks were transferred to the ECB.8 In response, in December 2015, the president of the Euro group stated in a letter to the CC that no audit gap had emerged, as the ECA had sufficient audit rights. 
092015. aasta juunis hoiatas Euroopa Liidu krgeimate kontrolliasutuste kontaktkomitee, et prast seda, kui paljud jrelevalvelesanded anti le EKP-le, on pangandusjrelevalve auditeerimisel tekkinud lngad8. Vastuseks mrkis eurorhma esimees 2015. aasta detsembris kontaktkomiteele saadetud kirjas, et auditilnki ei esine, kuna kontrollikojal on piisavad auditivolitused.
Nevertheless, he invited the European Commission to explore the legal feasibility of a possible framework agreement between the ECA and the ECB. 
Sellegipoolest kutsus ta Euroopa Komisjoni les uurima raamlepingu slmimise vimalust kontrollikoja ja EKP vahel.
This call for action was followed up in July 2016 in a joint letter to the European Commission from the presidents of the Supreme Audit Institutions of Germany and the Netherlands in their capacity as chairs of the CC Task Force on Banking Union. 
Knealusele leskutsele jrgnes 2016. aasta juulis Saksamaa ja Madalmaade krgeimate kontrolliasutuste presidentide kui kontaktkomitee pangandusliidu trhma esimeeste hiskiri Euroopa Komisjonile.
In December 2017, the Contact CommitteeŐs Task Force on European Banking Union published a report9 concluding that an effective audit gap resulting from the ECBŐs behaviour still existed. 
2017. aasta detsembris avaldas kontaktkomitee Euroopa pangandusliidu trhm aruande9, milles leidis, et EKP hoiaku tttu auditilngad psivad.
Report of the Task Force on European Banking Union to the Contact Committee of Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union and the European Court of Auditors (14/12/2017). 
Euroopa pangandusliidu trhma aruanne Euroopa Liidu krgeimate kontrolliasutuste ja Euroopa Kontrollikoja kontaktkomiteele (14/12/2017).
10 CC statement (CC 1/2018) from 13 November 2018: https://www.eca.europa.eu/sites/cc/Lists/CCDocuments/CC_STATEMENT_2018/CC-STATEMENT-SSM-DEFICIENCIES-EN.pdf 11 Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
10 Kontaktkomitee 13. novembri 2018. aasta avaldus (CC 1/2018): https://www.eca.europa.eu/sites/cc/Lists/CCDocuments/CC_STATEMENT_2018/CC-STATEMENT-SSM-DEFICIENCIES-EN.pdf.
4 8 9 
4 8 9
document or information necessary for the ECA to carry out the tasks corresponding to its legal mandate. 
10 Euroopa Komisjon rhutas 2017. aasta oktoobris avaldatud htse jrelevalvemehhanismi mruse11 lbivaatamises, et EKP on kohustatud esitama kontrollikojale mis tahes dokumendi vi teabe, mis on kontrollikojale vajalik tema iguslikust mandaadist tulenevate lesannete titmiseks.
The Commission review also called on the ECB and the ECA to conclude an inter-institutional agreement to specify the procedures for information exchange to allow the ECA access to any information needed for performing its audit mandate. 
Komisjoni lbivaatamises kutsuti ka EKP-d ja kontrollikoda les slmima institutsioonidevahelist kokkulepet, et tpsustada teabevahetuse kord, mis vimaldaks kontrollikojal pseda juurde mis tahes teabele, mida ta vajab oma auditivolituste titmiseks.
11 Following the CommissionŐs proposal, in February 2018 the ECA provided the ECB with a draft version of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would facilitate the ECAŐs access to any information required for its tasks and provide assurance to the ECB regarding the processing of confidential information. 
11 Vastavalt komisjoni ettepanekule esitas kontrollikoda 2018. aasta veebruaris EKP-le vastastikuse mistmise memorandumi ettepaneku, mis lihtsustaks kontrollikoja juurdepsu tema lesannete titmiseks vajalikule teabele ja annaks EKP-le kindluse konfidentsiaalse teabe ttlemise kohta.
12 As at November 2018, the ECB has not provided answers or comments on the MoU proposed by the ECA. 
12 2018. aasta novembri seisuga ei olnud EKP kontrollikoja koostatud vastastikuse mistmise memorandumi kohta vastuseid ega kommentaare esitanud.
Following an inquiry by the ECA, the ECB informed the ECA in April 2018 that it was consulting the relevant stakeholders. 
Vastuseks kontrollikoja jreleprimisele teavitas EKP 2018. aasta aprillis kontrollikoda, et konsulteerib asjaomaste sidusrhmadega.
Following another inquiry in June 2018, the ECB informed the ECA that it was awaiting a reply from the Commission on the issue (see Annex I). 
Prast veel ht jreleprimist sama aasta juunis teatas EKP kontrollikojale, et ootab komisjoni vastust knealuse ksimuse kohta (vt I lisa).
The ECAŐs position 13 The ECAŐs mandate to conduct independent external audits of the ECB is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.12 It is specified in Art. 27(2) of Protocol No 4, which states: "The provisions of Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall only apply to an examination of the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB". 
Kontrollikoja seisukoht 13 Kontrollikoja volitused EKP sltumatute vlisauditite tegemiseks on stestatud Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingus12. Neid on tpsustatud protokolli nr 4 artikli 27 likes 2, mis klab jrgmiselt: ăEuroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 287 stteid kohaldatakse ainult EKP juhtimise efektiivsuse [ingl k ăoperational efficiencyŇ] kontrollimiseksŇ.
Furthermore, the Regulation establishing the SSM specifically asks the ECA to "[...] take into account the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation".13 While the word "operational" does not exist in the French and German versions of the Treaty and is not defined in international audit standards, the concept of efficiency has long been clearly defined in international audit standards as well as in the financial regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union and in the ECAŐs publicly available Performance Audit Manual.14 12 Articles 285 and 287(2) TFEU. 
Lisaks peab kontrollikoda htse jrelevalvemehhanismi asutamismruse kohaselt vtma ă[---] arvesse ka kesoleva mrusega EKP-le antud jrelevalvelesandeid.Ň13 Ehkki miste ăoperationalŇ ei sisaldu aluslepingu prantsus-ja saksakeelses versioonis ja seda ei ole mratletud rahvusvahelistes auditeerimisstandardites, on efektiivsuse miste pikka aega olnud selgelt mratletud nii rahvusvahelistes auditeerimisstandardites kui ka liidu 11 Mrus (EL) nr 1024/2013. 12 ELi toimimise lepingu artikkel 285 ja artikli 287 lige 2.
13 Article 20(7) Regulation (EU) 1024/2013. 
13 Mruse (EL) nr 1024/2013 artikli 20 lige 7.
5 
5 6 ldeelarve suhtes kohaldatavas finantsmruses ning kontrollikoja avalikult kttesaadavas tulemusauditi ksiraamatus14.
Similarly, financial audits will continue to be conducted by independent private auditors, as envisaged in the legislation. 
Samamoodi jtkavad finantsauditite tegemist sltumatud erasektori audiitorid, nagu igusaktides ette nhtud.
15 Based on all applicable international standards, it is the responsibility of the auditor to establish the information it needs to perform their tasks and draw conclusions.16 Furthermore, there is international recognition of the importance for Supreme Audit Institutions to have unrestricted access to information.17 This also applies to the ECA, which has the right to request from the ECB "any document or information necessary to carry out its task"18, as enshrined in the Treaty It would therefore be unacceptable if any auditee were to determine the extent of access to documents or restrict access to documents in any way. However, since 2015 the ECB, as auditee, has single-handedly decided which information it deems necessary for the ECA to perform its tasks. 
See kehtib ka kontrollikoja kohta, kellel on igus nuda EKP-lt dokumente vi teavet, ămida see oma lesande titmiseks vajabŇ18, nagu on stestatud aluslepingus. Seetttu oleks vastuvetamatu, kui auditeeritav mraks kindlaks oma dokumentidele juurdepsu ulatuse vi piiraks mis tahes viisil juurdepsu dokumentidele. Alates 2015. aastast on aga EKP auditeeritavana ainuisikuliselt otsustanud, millist teavet ta kontrollikoja lesannete titmiseks vajalikuks peab.
16 In the past, the ECB has argued that being subject to external performance audit would not be compatible with its independence as central bank. 
16 Varem on EKP vitnud, et tulemuslikkust ksitleva vlisauditi tegemine tema suhtes ei oleks koosklas tema kui keskpanga sltumatusega.