natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Did projects implemented by DG ECHOŐs partners achieve their expected results and were short-term rehabilitation actions adequately sustainable? 21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/7 Table 2 Humanitarian aid projects visited on the spot in Indonesia and Sri Lanka Financial decision 10 million euro 80 million euro Type of partner UN agency NGO NGO NGO NGO NGO Project description INDONESIA Response to children, water and sanitation Psychosocial support Safe water Enhancing community care and support Recovery of fisheries livelihoods Water and sanitation SRI LANKA Water and sanitation Water, sanitation, food and non-food Psychosocial support Shelter, registration and livelihood Fisheries and agriculture Commission funding (euro) 4 000 000 528 798 550 000 484 820 476 792 1 336 266 7 376 676 571 534 1 200 000 672 720 2 067 480 3 900 000 8 411 734 Total value of projects visited in Indonesia 10 million euro 80 million euro NGO NGO NGO International organisation UN agency Total value of projects visited in Sri Lanka OBSERVATIONS Rapidity and appropriateness of the CommissionŐs response Rapid response with an appropriate budget 12. 
21.7.2006 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 170/7 2. tabel Indoneesias ja Sri Lankal kohapeal klastatud humanitaarabiprojektid Rahastamisotsus 10 miljonit eurot 80 miljonit eurot Partneri liik RO agentuur VVO VVO VVO VVO VVO Projekti kirjeldus INDONEESIA Laste abistamine, vee-ja sanitaarssteemid Pshhosotsiaalne toetus Puhas vesi hiskondlike teenuste ja toe thustamine Kalandusvaldkonna elujulisuse taastamine Vee-ja sanitaarssteemid Komisjoni rahastamine (eurot) 4 000 000 528 798 550 000 484 820 476 792 1 336 266 7 376 676 571 534 1 200 000 672 720 2 067 480 3 900 000 8 411 734 Indoneesias klastatud projektide koguvrtus 10 miljonit eurot 80 miljonit eurot VVO VVO VVO Rahvusvaheline organisatsioon RO agentuur SRI LANKA Vee-ja sanitaarssteemid Vee-ja sanitaarssteemid, toidu-ja muu abi Pshhosotsiaalne toetus Varjupaigad, registreerimine, toimetuleku toetamine Kalandus ja pllumajandus Sri Lankal klastatud projektide koguvrtus THELEPANEKUD Komisjoni tegevuse kiirus ja asjakohasus Kiire tegutsemine olukorrale vastava eelarve raames 12.
Procedures for streamlining humanitarian decisions were adopted by the Commission in 2001 (1) giving the Director-General of DG ECHO the power to take decisions for primary emergency humanitarian aid up to 3 million euro for a period of three months. 
Komisjon vttis 2001. aastal vastu humanitaarabi puudutavate otsuste tegemise uuendatud korra, (1) millega anti humanitaarabi peadirektoraadile ECHO volitused vtta vastu otsuseid esmase hdaolukorras antava humanitaarabi kohta suurusjrgus kuni 3 miljonit eurot kolme kuu jooksul.
The Commissioner responsible for humanitarian aid was given the power to take emergency decisions up to 30million euro directly for operations lasting up to six months. 
Humanitaarabi eest vastutavale komisjoni volinikule anti volitused vtta vastu hdaolukorra otsuseid suurusjrgus kuni 30 miljonit eurot kuni kuus kuud vltavate abioperatsioonide osas.
These procedures, combined with DG ECHOŐs system of permanent cover during holiday periods, enabled the Commission to respond rapidly to the tsunami. 
Selline kord koos ECHO ssteemiga, mis tagab pideva tsoleku ka phade ajal, vimaldas komisjonil tsunamile kiiresti reageerida.
A primary emergency decision for 3 million euro with a three-month timescale was taken on 26 December 2004, the same day as the disaster. 
Esmase hdaabi otsus suuruses 3 miljonit eurot kolmeks kuuks veti vastu 26. detsembril 2004 Ń katastroofi toimumise peval.
This decision covered the emergency response for shelters, non-food aid and medical supplies to be provided by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 
Otsus hlmas hdaabi varjupaikade rajamise, muu abi kui toiduabi, samuti me-ditsiinitarvete osas, millega varustamine oli Punase Risti ja Punase Poolkuu hingute Rahvusvahelise Fderatsiooni lesanne.
This was followed by a decision of 10 million euro for Sri Lanka and the (1) SEC(2001) 873. 
Sellele jrgnes 30. detsembril 2004 otsus anda 10 miljoni euro (1) SEK(2001) 873. suuruses abi Sri Lankale ja Maldiividele ning 31. detsembril 2004 otsus eraldada10 miljonit eurot Indoneesiale.
On 6 January 2005, the Commission pledged an additional 100 million euro for humanitarian aid at the Jakarta Tsunami Aid Conference and therefore requested this amount from the budgetary authority (Parliament and Council). 
6. jaanuaril 2005 Jakartas toimunud tsunami abi konverentsil otsustas komisjon eraldada humanitaarabiks veel 100 miljonit eurot ning esitas vastava summa taotluse eelarvepdevatele institutsioonidele (parlament ja nukogu).
This amount was approved on 19 January 2005 enabling an 80 million euro decision to be taken on 9 February 2005, and a 20 million euro decision to be taken on 15 December 2005, both with an 18-month timescale. 
Summa kinnitati 19. jaanuaril 2005, mis vimaldas otsuse 80 miljoni euro kohta vastu vtta 9. veebruaril 2005 ning 20 miljoni euro kohta 15. detsembril 2005. Mlemad otsused hlmasid 18 kuu pikkust ajavahemikku.
The first 23 million euro was used to fund emergency activities including health care, medical supplies, shelter, epidemic early warning systems, safe water and sanitation facilities, food relief items, psychosocial assistance, child protection and logistical support such as satellite phone services. 
Esimesed 23 miljonit eurot kasutati hdaabimeetmete rahastamiseks, nagu tervishoid, meditsiinitarbed, varjupaigad, varajased epideemiast hoiatamise ssteemid, turvalised vee-ja sanitaarssteemid, toiduabi, pshhosotsiaalne abi, lastekaitse ja logistiline toetus, nagu satelliittelefoni teenused.
C 170/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 15. 
C 170/8 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja 21.7.2006 15.
The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, agreed in Stockholm in June 2003, state that humanitarian funding should be allocated in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments. 
2003. aasta juunis Stockholmis vastu vetud heade humanitaarabi osutamise phimtete kohaselt tuleks humanitaarabi eraldada proportsionaalselt vajadustega ning tuginedes vajaduste analsile.
In this uncertain context the CommissionŐs pledge demonstrated its commitment, and the high level of funding proved appropriate, due partly to the following factors: (a) the financial decision for 20million euro taken on 15 December 2005 was to meet remaining needs for 18 months from January 2006. 
Sellises ebakindlas olukorras nitas komisjon raha eraldamisega les vastutustunnet ning suur toetussumma osutus igustatuks osaliselt jrgmistel phjustel: a) 15. detsembril 2005 vastu vetud rahastamisotsus 20 miljoni euro vrtuses oli meldud vajaduste katmiseks 18 kuu jooksul alates 2006. aasta jaanuarist.
The transitional phase between relief and reconstruction, initially expected to be over before the end of 2005, was longer than expected because the major part of the reconstruction work had yet to start at the end of 2005; (b) in August 2005 the 80 million euro decision was modified to include also the conflict affected population (see box 1). arrangement enabled DG ECHO to fund the implementation of relevant projects in spite of the situation of overfunding and overcrowding caused by the large number of newly arrived NGOs with private funding determined to start a project in districts overwhelmed with aid. 
Hdaabi ja lesehitustde vaheline leminekuetapp, mis esialgsete prognooside kohaselt pidi lppema enne 2005. aasta lppu, kujunes oodatust pikemaks, kuna suurema osaga lesehitustdest ei oldud veel 2005. aasta lpus algust tehtud; b) 2005. aasta augustis muudeti 80 miljoni euro otsust, laiendades seda konfliktides kannatanud elanikkonnale (vt 1. selgitus).
In contrast to Sri Lanka, DG ECHO did not have a presence in Aceh prior to the tsunami as access to international staff of humanitarian organisations (with the exception of a few representatives of UN organisations and the Red Cross) was not allowed under the civil emergency status declared by the Indonesian Government. 
Erinevalt Sri Lankast ei olnud ECHO-l Acehis enne tsunamit esindust, kuna Indoneesia valitsuse poolt vljakuulutatud eriolukorra tttu oli rahvusvaheliste humanitaarorganisatsioonide ttajatele (mned RO organisatsioonide ja Punase Risti esindajad vlja arvatud) piirkonda juurdeps keelatud.
Following the tsunami, free access to Aceh was allowed from 28 December 2004. 
Prast tsunamit vimaldati Acehisse vaba juurdeps alates 28. detsembrist 2004.
DG ECHO therefore selected partners able to work immediately in the field and with expertise in the different areas to be covered, such as UN agencies in child protection, water supply, sanitation and health. 
Seetttu valis ECHO vlja partnerid, kes olid suutelised kohe kohapeal td alustama ning kellel oli vajalik pdevus erinevates valdkondades, nagu RO agentuurid lastekaitse, vee-ja sanitaarssteemide ning tervishoiu alal.
All the agreements with partners for the two 10 million euro emergency decisions had been signed by 18 January 2005 for Sri Lanka and by 27 January 2005 for Indonesia. 
Kik lepingud partneritega kahe 10 miljoni euro suuruse hdaabi otsuse osas olid allkirjastatud 18. jaanuariks 2005 Sri Lanka puhul ja 27. jaanuariks 2005 Indoneesia puhul.
High level of international funding exceeds financial needs of partners 18. 
Rahvusvahelise rahastamise krge mr letab partnerite rahalised vajadused 18.
The high level of international funding available in response to the tsunami exceeded the absorption capacity of some partners (see box 2). 
Tsunami ohvritele rahvusvaheliselt eraldatud abi summad letasid mningate partnerite suutlikkuse abi vastu vtta (vt 2. selgitus).
The competition for resources contributed to inflation and difficulties in obtaining goods and in recruiting qualified staff. 
Konkurents ressursside prast aitas kaasa inflat-sioonile ja raskendas kaupade kohalejudmist ning pdeva personali vrbamist.
The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Office (BRR (1)) report one year after the tsunami described how prices and wages in Aceh rose by 30 to 40 % in 2005. 
Taastus-ja lesehitusameti (BRR) (1) aruandes aasta prast tsunamit tuuakse esile, et hinnad ja palgad tusid Acehis 2005. aastal 30Đ40 %.
Box 1 High level of funding helps to meet the need for a conflict sensitive response The armed conflict in Sri Lanka caused the displacement of 800 000 people between 1983 and 2002. 
1. selgitus Krge rahastamismr aitab paremini konfliktijrgsete vajadustega kohanduda Relvastatud konfliktide tttu tuli aastatel 1983Đ2002 Sri Lankal mber asuda 800 000 inimesel.
A massive wave of return started after the ceasefire in February 2002 resulting in almost 400 000 returnees by the time of the tsunami at the end of 2004. 
Massiliselt hakati koju tagasi prduma prast 2002. aasta veebruaris vljakuulutatud relvarahu ning tsunami toimumise ajaks 2004. aasta lpus oli kodudesse naasnud ligikaudu 400 000 inimest.
However, only about 15 % of the conflict affected population were directly affected by the tsunami and could therefore benefit from the generous response of the donor community to the tsunami. 
Ainult 15 % konfliktides kannatada saanud elanikkonnast puudutasid aga tsunami tagajrjed otseselt ning sai seetttu osa ulatuslikust rahalisest abist tsunami ohvritele.
The cost of a tsunami related temporary shelter, for example, was in the order of 450 euro compared with 125 euro for a conflict related temporary shelter. 
Niteks tsunamijrgselt rajatud ajutise varjupaiga maksumus oli 450 eurot, kui konfliktide tttu rajatud ajutise varjupaiga pstitamiseks kulus 125 eurot.
Monthly food support for a tsunami affected family was 70 euro compared with 10 euro for a conflict affected family. 
Igakuise toiduabi maksumus tsunamis kannatada saanud perekonna kohta oli 70 eurot, konfliktides kannatada saanud perekonna kohta aga 10 eurot.
In order to avoid discrimination against vulnerable people displaced prior to the tsunami, the Commission modified the 80 million euro decision in August 2005 to include also the conflict affected population living in the tsunami districts. 
Vltimaks enne tsunamit mberasustatud ja kaitsetus olukorras olevate inimeste diskrimineerimist, muutis komisjon 2005. aasta augustis 80 miljoni euro otsust, et kaasata ka tsunami piirkonnas elavad konfliktides kannatanud inimesed.
Box 2 General context of funds exceeding partnersŐ financial needs In Sri Lanka, because of the high level of private funding, some of DG ECHOŐs existing partners have not had the capacity to absorb available Commission funding. 
2. selgitus Abi letas partnerite rahalised vajadused Sri Lankal ei ole erarahastamise krge mra tttu mned ECHO olemasolevad partnerid olnud suutelised komisjoni abi vastu vtma.
For example, a project of only 570 000 euro was agreed with an NGO although DG ECHO initially intended to allocate 1 million euro of the 10 million euro decision to them. 
Niteks he VVO-ga lepiti kokku ainult 570 000 euro suuruses projektis, ehkki algselt kavatses ECHO 10 miljoni euro otsuse raames neile miljon eurot eraldada.
Despite increasing their capacity in Sri Lanka since the tsunami this NGO has not submitted a proposal in the context of the 80 million euro decision. 
Kuigi antud VVO on prast tsunamit Sri Lankal oma suutlikkust tstnud, ei ole ta esitanud projektitaotlusi seoses 80 miljoni euro otsusega.
From October 2005, DG ECHO therefore worked with four partners new in Sri Lanka (out of a total of 21 partners). 
Seetttu tegi ECHO alates 2005. aasta oktoobrist Sri Lankal koostd nelja uue partneriga (partnereid on kokku 21).
Selection of partners 16. 
Partnerite valik 16.
After coordinating with the UN and other donors, DG ECHO decided to work with existing partners mainly in the north and east of Sri Lanka where it had been working with the conflict-affected population prior to the tsunami since 1994. 
Prast koosklastamist RO ja teiste abiandjatega otsustas ECHO teha koostd olemasolevate partneritega peamiselt Sri Lanka phja-ja idaosas, kus ECHO oli enne tsunamit alates (1) BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi) loodi Indoneesia valitsuse poolt aprillis 2005, et aidata koordineerida taastus-ja lesehitustid Acehis ja Niasis.
21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/9 In Indonesia, a UN agency did not have the capacity to spend all Commission funds during the six-month implementing period of the emergency decision. 
21.7.2006 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja C 170/9 Indoneesias ei suutnud ks RO agentuur kasutada kogu komisjoni abi hdaabiotsuse kuuekuise rakendusperioodi jooksul.
Many usual partners of DG ECHO did not submit project proposals in Indonesia because the funding they had received from other donors already exceeded their absorption capacity. 
Mitmed ECHO traditsioonilised koostpartnerid ei esitanud Indoneesias projektitaotlusi, kuna nad olid juba teistelt rahastajatelt saanud rohkem abi, kui nad suutsid vastu vtta.
This analysis concerning the lack of capacity to absorb available funding is reinforced by the position of one NGO which stressed that its programmes should be driven by need alone, not by a desire to spend surplus funds. 
Suutmatust abi ra kasutada kinnitab ka he VVO seisukoht, mis rhutab, et selle programmid peaksid lhtuma ainult reaalsetest vajadustest, mitte soovist vahendite lejke ra kasutada.
Although it stopped accepting funds for victims of the tsunami less than a week after the disaster, it nevertheless received 110 million euro compared with the 25 million euro needed to run tsunami programmes for 2005. 
Ehkki antud VVO lpetas tsunami ohvritele antava abi vastuvtmise vhem kui ndal prast katastroofi toimumist, sai ta ikkagi 110 miljonit eurot, samas kui 2005. aasta tsunami programmide elluviimiseks lks vaja 25 miljonit eurot.
Donors were asked for their permission to remove restrictions on donations so that they could be used for other emergencies, and 99 % agreed. 
Rahastajalt ksiti luba kasutada anne-tusi teistel hdaabieesmrkidel ja 99 % oli nus.
By the end of 2005, 65 million euro of donations originally intended for the tsunami had been used to meet needs elsewhere such as the nutritional crisis in Niger, the conflict in Darfur and the earthquake in Pakistan. 
2005. aasta lpuks oli algselt tsunami ohvritele meldud annetustest 65 miljonit eurot kasutatud abi andmiseks muudes hdaolukordades, nagu Nigeri nljahda, Darfuri konflikt ja Pakistani maavrin.
Contrasting situations for accurate needs assessments 19. 
Vajaduste tpseks analsiks tehtav olukordade vrdlus 19.
DG ECHOŐs project cycle management approach emphasises the importance of project planning, design and needs analysis in order to ensure that the project will meet the needs of the target group. 
ECHO projektitskli juhtimise lhenemisviis rhutab projekti planeerimise, kava ja vajaduste analsi thtsust tagamaks, et projekt vastab sihtrhma vajadustele.
Project proposals submitted by partners were analysed by the DG ECHO field expert (1) and also by the desk officer in Brussels prior to their approval. 
Partnerite esitatud projektiettepanekuid analsis enne heakskiidu andmist ECHO kohapealne ekspert, (1) samuti projekti vastutav ametnik Brsse-lis.
DG ECHOŐs decision to work with existing partners in Sri Lanka ensured that project proposals were prepared by organisations with knowledge of the country who were well placed to carry out needs assessments (see box 3). 
ECHO otsus teha koostd olemasolevate partneritega Sri Lankal tagas selle, et projektiettepanekuid koostasid riigist phja-likke teadmisi omavad organisatsioonid, kellel olid vajaduste analsi tegemiseks head vimalused (vt 3. selgitus).
Some partners included a needs assessment as part of the project itself. 
Mned partnerid llitasid vajaduste analsi projekti selle osana.
In Indonesia, accurate needs assessments were difficult in the situation immediately following the tsunami due to the general confusion and lack of reliable information. 
Indoneesias oli vajaduste tpne analsimine keeruline, kuna vahetult prast tsunamit valitses ldine segadus ja usaldusvrset teavet oli raske hankida.
The lack of access to affected areas, mainly because of the large scale destruction and partly because of the security situation, slowed the deployment in the field of humanitarian organisations. 
Juurdepsu puudumine kannatada saanud piirkondadesse, peamiselt ulatusliku hvingu ja osaliselt turvaprobleemide tttu aeglustas humanitaarorganisatsioonide td kohapeal.
It was not until the end of January that most organisations were well established on the west coast of Sumatra, which had an impact on the quality and timeliness of needs assessments. 
Enamik organisatsioone sai Sumatra lnerannikul td alustada alles jaanuari lpus, mis avaldas mju vajaduste analsi kvaliteedile ja ajakohasusele.
Some project proposals financed under the 10 million euro emergency decision presented a standard emergency response proposal rather than a response to specific findings based on a more accurate needs assessment. 
Mnin-gad 10 miljoni euro hdaabi otsuse alusel rahastatavad projektiettepanekud esitasid standardse eriolukorra ettepaneku, mitte tpsemal vajaduste analsil phinevaid konkreetseid leide ksitleva taotluse.
In June 2005, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) held a regional workshop on lessons learned from the tsunami which highlighted the lack of consultation with communities regarding relief and recovery work undertaken by the humanitarian community as a whole. 
2005. aasta juunis korraldas RO Humanitaarksimuste Koordineerimise Talitus (RO HKT) piirkondliku trhmade kohtumise tsunamijrgsest tegevusest saadud kogemuste kohta, kus rhutati vhest suhtlemist kohaliku kogukonnaga kigi hdaabi ja taastamistde osas.
The needs assessments of projects agreed from February 2005 were more reliable due to the availability of more information and more time to prepare proposals. 
Alates 2005. aasta veebruarist heakskiidetud projektide vajaduste anals oli usaldusvrsem, kuna saadaval oli rohkem teavet ja ettepanekute ettevalmistamiseks oli rohkem aega.
For example, in preparing their boat building project in Aceh, an NGO worked closely with the community and succeeded in designing a project which met the needs of the beneficiaries. 
Niteks Acehis paadiehitusprojekti ette valmistades tegi ks VVO tihedalt koostd kohaliku kogukonnaga ning sel viisil ttati vlja projekt, mis vastas abisaajate vajadustele.
Livelihood assistance: fishing boats in Aceh, Indonesia (Source: ECA) One NGO had a strong team on the ground in Sri Lanka and good knowledge due to their presence there during over 20 years of conflict. Another NGO was already present in eastern Sri Lanka, implementing a DG ECHO funded project in relation to the conflict. 
Toimetuleku toetamine: kalapaadid Indoneesias Acehi provintsis (Allikas: kontrollikoda.). hel VVO-l oli tugev kohapealne meeskond Sri Lankal, samuti phjalikud teadmised tnu oma kohalolekule le 20 aasta vldanud konflikti ajal. ks teine VVO oli juba esindatud Sri Lanka idaosas, viies ellu ECHO rahastatud ja konfliktiga seonduvat projekti.
Box 3 Partners in Sri Lanka were well placed to prepar eproject proposals A Red Cross organisation was ideally placed to prepare the psychosocial support project because since 2003 it had supported the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society to implement a psychosocial support programme in the northern province of Jaffna, also supported by the Commission, targeting the internally displaced people uprooted as a result of the conflict. 
3. selgitus Partneritel Sri Lankal olid projektitaotluste ettevalmistamiseks head vimalused hel Punase Risti organisatsioonil olid ideaalsed tingimused pshhosotsiaalse toetuse projekti ettevalmistamiseks, kuna organisatsioon oli alates 2003. aastast aidanud Sri Lanka Punasel Ristil lbi viia samasugust programmi phjapoolses Jaffna provintsis, mida toetas ka komisjon ja mis oli suunatud konflikti tttu riigisiseselt mberasustatud ja kodu kaotanud inimestele.
(1) Field expert is the term used to refer to the CommissionŐs humanitarian aid technical support personnel. 
(1) Terminit Ňkohapealne ekspertÓ kasutatakse komisjoni humanitaarabi tehnilise abipersonali kohta.
C 170/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 Effectiveness of coordination DG ECHO provided funding to an NGO in Aceh to gather data concerning internally displaced people and integrate them into the Humanitarian Information Centre. 
C 170/10 ET Euroopa Liidu Teataja Koosklastuse thusus Arvukate humanitaarorganisatsioonide tegevuse koosklastamine 22. RO HKT vttis enda kanda abiorganisatsioonide tegevuse koosklastamise ning teda toetasid erinevates valdkondades muud RO asutused.
In Sri Lanka, DG ECHO funded a project implemented by an international organisation to establish a central beneficiary database aimed to address the problem of lack of clear information. 
Sri Lankal rahastas ECHO he rahvusvahelise organisatsiooni poolt elluviidavat projekti abisaajate andmeid koondava keskse andmebaasi loomiseks eesmrgiga lahendada selge teabe puudumise probleem.
However, although the project was originally encouraged by the Centre for National Operations, established by the Government of Sri Lanka to manage the response to the tsunami, it was not supported by the government agencies which took over responsibility for relief and recovery from February 2005. 
Ehkki projekti toetas algselt Sri Lanka valitsuse poolt tsunamijrgsete meetmete juhtimiseks loodud riiklike operatsioonide keskus, ei toetanud seda valitsusasutused, kelle vastutusse lksid hdaabi-ja taastamismeetmed 2005. aasta veebruaris.
The database was therefore put on hold until September 2005 when the registration process restarted under the leadership of the Government of Sri Lanka. 
Seetttu peatati andmebaasi loomine 2005. aasta septembrini, mil registreerimisprotsessi Sri Lanka valitsuse juhtimisel taasalustati.