natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Arion Bank intends to make up for this by means of issuing covered bonds on the domestic market.
Äriühing ja selle kapitali omanikud peaksid ümberkorralduskulud katma võimalikult suures ulatuses oma ressurssidest.
It is recalled that Arion Bank has been granted a license to issue covered bonds and subsequently completed a EUR 1 billion covered bond program.
See on vajalik tagamaks, et päästetud pangad vastutaksid piisaval määral oma tegevuse tagajärgede eest ning et motiveerida neid oma tegevuspõhimõtteid tulevikus parandama”.
In February 2012 Arion Bank completed its first covered bond offering, issuing 2,5 billion ISK worth of bonds, and in May 2012, the Bank completed its first non-indexed fixed rate covered bond offering, to the value of 1,2 billion ISK [83].
Seoses sellega tuletab järelevalveamet meelde käesoleva juhtumi otsustavat aspekti.
For the remainder of the restructuring period, the bank intends to issue bonds in various formats, including covered bonds and senior unsecured bonds.
Kui Arion Bank Kaupthingi riigisiseste tehingute pinnalt asutati, hävinesid Kaupthing Banki aktsionäride investeeringud täielikult ning see aitas maksimaalselt kaasa Arion Banki restruktureerimisele.
The Authority considers that, based on the facts submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the Bank's funding situation appears to be sound until the end of the restructuring period.
Lisaks kandsid Kaupthingi võlausaldajad tohutut kahju [84] või pidid vähemalt võtma riski, et nende investeering sõltub Arion Banki kasumlikkusest.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the deposit guarantee and the capital controls, as well as the ambiguous future developments of (sovereign) debt markets, it cannot conclude on whether Arion Bank's funding strategy will materialise as foreseen in the long run.
Seega võib vähemalt Kaupthingi omanike ja võlausaldajate suhtes märkida, et kulude jagamise kriteerium on optimaalselt täidetud ja moraalse ohu küsimus lahendatud.
As regards the assets side of the balance sheet, the international assets remain in Kaupthing's estate.
Mis puutub kapitaliseerimismeetmetesse, siis kuni hetkeni, mil kokkulepe Kaupthingi võlausaldajatega vähendas riigi osaluse 13 %-l-e, piisas Arion Banki algkapitalist vaevu finantsjärelevalveameti kapitalinõuete täitmiseks.
As a result, the balance sheet has shrunk by 88 %.
2009. aastal, pärast seda, kui saavutati kokkulepe Kaupthingi omandamise kohta Arion Banki poolt ning Arion Bankile eraldati teise taseme omavahendeid, tõusis kapitali adekvaatsuse määr ligikaudu 18 %-le, mis on 2 % rohkem kui finantsjärelevalveameti kehtestatud miinimummäär.
A main weakness of Kaupthing's business model — the reliance on risky international assets without appropriate risk assessment — has thus been remedied.
Siinkohal märgib järelevalveamet, et kapitalimäär sõltus peamiselt sellest, kas Kaupthingist Arion Banki üle kantud vara hindamine oli täpne.
The Authority welcomes that pursuant to the restructuring plan, the Bank will not engage in similar business in the future, but rather focus on its traditional core business.
Lisaks ei tohi unustada, et tolleaegne Islandi majanduse väljavaade koostati ebakindluse õhkkonnas.
A considerable challenge for the Bank as regards its asset portfolio remains the restructuring of the loans that were transferred from Kaupthing.
Eespool nimetatut silmas pidades leiab järelevalveamet, et Arion Bankile Islandi riigi poolt eraldatud kapitali puhul piirduti vajaliku miinimumiga, kuna see ei olnud suurem kui sätestatud miinimum pluss mõistlik puhver.
In this regard the Authority notes positively that this restructuring process has been and remains a key priority for the Bank, as illustrated by the many generic and tailor-made proposals that the Bank has made to its overleveraged customers.
Seda asjaolu ei olnud võimalik kuidagi ette näha ning kapitali adekvaatsuse määra hilisem positiivne areng ei anna järelevalveameti arvamusel alust väita, et Arion Bank oli algusest peale riigi poolt ülekapitaliseeritud [85].
While work still remains to finalise the restructuring progress, information from the Bank appears to confirm that good progress has been made, particularly as from 2011, as is demonstrated by the fact that of the 986 companies which had entered recovery programs at the Bank, conclusion was reached at the end of 2011 in 871 cases, whereas conclusions had only been reached for 416 companies at the end of the first quarter in 2011.
Ümberkorraldamissuuniste punktis 26 on nähtud ette, et „pangad peaksid olema suutelised maksma oma tegevusest saadud tulust kapitali eest hüvitist, muu hulgas dividendide ja tagastamata allutatud laenude eest tasutavate kupongimaksete kaudu”.
Good progress has also lately been achieved with regard to restructuring of household debt, and the Bank aims to complete its corporate and individual debt recovery projects by the end of 2012.
Seoses sellega tasub meenutada, et kokkulepete sõlmimise ajal selle kohta, et Kaupskil võtab üle 87 % Arion Banki aktsiatest, lepiti kokku, et valitsusele makstakse õiglane osa jaotamata kasumist seni, kuni uus kokkulepe omandilise kuuluvuse kohta jõustub.
The Authority considers the above to be an indicator of the soundness of Arion Bank's restructuring methods.
Arvestades riigi 13 % osalust Arion Bankis, tundub rahuldav tagastus olevat siiski tõenäoline, vaadates Arion Banki üldist head toimimist alates selle asutamisest.
Moreover, based on the data submitted by Arion Bank, it appears realistic that the bank can meet its target of completing the restructuring of its corporate and household loan portfolios by year-end 2012.
Lisaks tuleb rõhutada, et teise taseme omavahendite hüvitamine erineb järelevalveameti rekapitaliseerimissuunistest [88].
Overall, barring unexpected developments in the macroeconomic environment in Iceland or abroad, this would mean that at the latest at the end of the restructuring period, Arion Bank will, in the Authority's view, have a relatively healthy balance sheet and well-performing loan portfolios.
Nagu Islandi ametiasutused on õigesti märkinud, koosneb vastavalt rekapitaliseerimissuunistele nõutav hüvitis valitsuse rahastamiskulust (8 %), Kaupthingi kriisieelsest krediidiriski vahetustehingu riskimarginaalist ja lisatasust (2 %).
As indicated above, the weak capitalisation of Kaupthing was one of the factors that lead to its downfall.
Võttes arvesse Kaupthingi kriisieelse krediidiriski vahetustehingute väga kõrgeid riskimarginaale, jääb Arion Banki makstav hüvitis, EURIBOR pluss 4 %-line lisatasu, kõvasti alla selle piirmäära.
Arion Bank's restructuring plan predicts that the bank will stay well above the minimum CAD ratio of 16 % required by the FME throughout the restructuring period.
Kuigi SPRONi vahetusleping sisaldab eespool kirjeldatud kujul riigiabi tunnuseid, leiab järelevalveamet, et see on töötatud välja viisil, millega püütakse piirata või isegi välistada vahetut finantskasu Arion Bankile.
This ratio is well above the future Basel III minimum of 10,5 %.
Vahetusleping kujutab peamiselt läbirääkimiste teel kehtestatud hüvitist Arion Bankile vastutasuks SPRONi hoiusekohustuste ülevõtmise eest ja Arion Bank saab tõenäoliselt vastu ülevõetud kohustustega samas väärtuses vara.
Even pursuant to the stress case, which Arion Bank has submitted, the CAD ratio will continue to remain significantly above this high benchmark, at [> 20] %.
Järelevalveamet ei leia, et abi mõjutaks oluliselt tekkivate kulude jagamise hindamist.
As for the capital assessment of this year's ICAAP report which Arion Bank has submitted in conjunction with the restructuring plan, the Authority considers it prudent and comforting that having taken into account the various risk factors, the Bank holds a capital buffer of […] billion ISK, which, in an operating environment as described above, provides Arion Bank with a significant capacity to deal with unexpected adversities.
Lõpuks — seoses hoiuste tagamisega on järelevalveamet oma ametliku uurimismenetluse algatuse otsuses juba märkinud, et tolleaegsete erakorraliste asjaolude taustal võib see kujutada proportsionaalset vahendit finantsstabiilsuse tagamiseks Islandil.
As for the bank's liquidity position, the Authority notes that the current situation, pursuant to the restructuring plan, appears sufficiently robust, and that there are no indications that the situation could deteriorate substantially during the restructuring period.
Samas on selge, et sellist abi ei saa kiita heaks määramata ajaks.
This is also of high significance, given the fact that it was necessary for the state in 2010 to provide the Bank with a special liquidity facility in order for it to comply with the FME's liquidity requirements and that this liquidity facility terminates at the end of 2014.
Seega peab järelevalveamet kiiduväärseks Islandi ametiasutuste kavatsust võtta kasutusele teistsugune hoiuste tagamise süsteem.
The Authority also welcomes the changes to Arion Bank's organisational structure and risk management, as described above, which address a weakness in Kaupthing's business and will contribute to a more objective and professional risk assessment in the Bank's operation.
See loodetakse kehtestada enne kapitalikontrollide kaotamist, seega hiljemalt 2013. aasta lõpus.
As regards profitability, the Restructuring Guidelines also provide that the restructuring plan should demonstrate how the bank will restore its long-term viability without state aid as soon as possible.
Lisaks peaks elujõuline pank olema järelevalveameti arvamuse kohaselt suuteline konkureerima turul ilma kõikehõlmava tagatiseta hoiustele, mistõttu lubatakse tagada hoiuseid üksnes kuni 2014. aasta lõpuni [89].
In particular, point 13 of the Restructuring Guidelines indicates that long-term viability is achieved when a bank is able to cover all its costs including depreciation and financial charges and provide an appropriate return on equity, taking account of the risk profile of the bank.
Eespool nimetatud tegurite alusel teeb järelevalveamet järelduse, et Arion Banki restruktureerimiskava tagab abi piiramise vajaliku miinimumiga ning et abisaaja, aktsionärid ja endise panga võlausaldajad on osalenud märkimisväärses ulatuses kulude jagamises.
At this point, the Authority recalls what was already mentioned above, namely that the economic environment in which Arion Bank operates would be challenging for any bank.
Seega on restruktureerimisabi kokkusobiv ümberkorraldamissuuniste 3. jaotisega.
With this in mind, the Authority is satisfied with the restructuring plan's forecast profitability, which, in spite of the high capital ratio, will be adequate throughout most of the restructuring period and beyond.
Konkurentsimoonutuste piiramine
The return on equity, which was particularly high in 2009-2010, will vary between [> 10] % and [< 15] %.
Ümberkorraldamissuuniste 4. jaotise punktides 29–32 on sätestatud järgmist.
An important driver of future profitability according to the restructuring plan is greater fee and commission income, which is forecast to […] over the planning period.
[…] Konkurentsimoonutusi piiravaid meetmeid tuleks kohandada vastavalt konkreetsetele moonutustele sellistel turgudel, kus abi saanud pangad tegutsevad pärast seda, kui nende elujõulisus on ümberkorraldamise tulemusena taastunud, ning meetmete rakendamisel tuleks kinni pidada ühisest poliitikast ja ühistest põhimõtetest.
Commission fee yielding business such as stock market related transactions and foreign currency trade virtually came to a standstill after the collapse and as a result of the capital controls.
Nimetatud meetmete vajalikkuse hindamisel lähtub järelevalveamet panga tegevuse mahust, ulatuslikkusest ja reguleerimisalast juhul, kui rakendatakse usaldusväärset restruktureerimiskava, nagu on nähtud ette käesoleva peatüki 2. jaotises.
However, once the restructuring of the corporate sector nears completion and capital controls will be lifted, it appears realistic to expect a substantial increase in stock exchange activity and currency trade.
[…] Selliste meetmete olemus ja vorm sõltuvad kahest kriteeriumist: esiteks abisumma suurusest ja selle andmise tingimustest ning teiseks selle turu või nende turgude iseloomust, kus abi saanud pank tegutseb.
Hence, the Authority does not question the plausibility of these figures.
Esimese kriteeriumi puhul erinevad konkurentsimoonutusi piiravad meetmed märkimisväärselt vastavalt abisumma suurusele ning kulude jagamise ja hinnakujunduse tasemele.
The Bank has taken a number of initiatives, as described above, to achieve cost efficiency, amongst others to rationalise its branch network and has closed a total of 15 branches.
Üldiselt on moraalsest ohust tulenevaid negatiivseid tagajärgi kulude jagamise ja omapanuse kõrgema taseme puhul vähem.
According to the Bank's commitments, […].
Teise kriteeriumi puhul analüüsib järelevalveamet abi tõenäolist mõju sellistele turgudele, kus abi saanud pank pärast ümberkorraldamist tegutseb.
A reduction of staff by approximately 10 % took place in 2011.
Kõigepealt uuritakse panga osakaalu ja suhtelist tähtsust kõnealusel turul või kõnealustel turgudel pärast panga elujõulisuse taastamist.
The Authority welcomes these efforts as they imply that the Bank has already managed to contain its costs and maintain its cost-to-income ratio at 45 % in 2011.
Tõhusa konkurentsi säilitamiseks kavandatakse meetmeid vastavalt konkreetse turu iseloomule.
According to the restructuring plan, the Bank intends to ensure that this ratio will be reduced slightly further to […] % for the remainder of the restructuring period.
[…] Konkurentsimoonutusi piiravate meetmetega ei tohiks piirata panga väljavaateid elujõulisuse taastamiseks.
In addition to the above, it is evident that the restructuring plan is based on a large number of other assumptions.
Selle põhjal võib järeldada, et abi suurus (eriti suhteline) ja turu iseloom on otsustavad tegurid, mille alusel järelevalveamet hindab konkurentsimoonutuste piiramiseks võetavaid meetmeid.
The Authority has aimed to scrutinise those that seem most pertinent and of greatest influence to the future viability of Arion Bank.
Samas on selge, et sellised meetmed ei tohi seada ohtu restruktureerimisabi saaja elujõulisust ning et konkurentsiküsimuste käsitlemisel tuleb pidada silmas üldist eesmärki saavutada praeguses kriisis finantsstabiilsus.
As regards the macroeconomic assumptions, they appear broadly in line with the forecasts of Statistics Iceland and the CBI, although the Bank predicts slightly stronger growth and higher inflation.
Eespool välja toodud õigusraamistiku taustal esitab järelevalveamet kaalutlused, mis on konkurentsimoonutuste piiramiseks võetavate meetmete hindamisel kõige olulisemad.
Overall the assumptions on which the restructuring plan is based appear to be sufficiently prudent to allow, in conjunction with the considerations set out by the Authority above, the conclusion that the restructuring measures undertaken by the Bank are sufficient to ensure its long-term viability, barring unexpected adverse events of unforeseen scale and consequences.
Ennekõike leiab järelevalveamet, et võttes arvesse eelmistes peatükkides kirjeldatud Islandi finantsturu erilist olukorda ning majanduslikke tingimusi, on vaja hinnata põhjalikult turutingimusi ja konkurentsikeskkonda.
Taking into account the above elements, the Authority considers that the restructuring plan comprises sufficient elements contributing to the restoration of the long-term viability of the bank for the Authority to conclude that the provisions of section 2 of the Restructuring Guidelines are complied with.
Konkurentsimoonutuste piiramiseks võetavad meetmed peaksid kajastama praeguseid keerulisi asjaolusid ning samal ajal tagama konkurentsimoonutuste miinimumini viimise nii lühikeses kui ka pikas perspektiivis.
Own contribution/burden-sharing
Teiseks on käsitletud Kaupthingi endiste omanike suurimat võimalikku panust (mida on kirjeldatud kulude jagamist käsitlevas jaotises eespool) ning vähesel määral ka Kaupthingi võlausaldajaid.
Paragraph 22 of the Restructuring Guidelines reads as follows: ‘In order to limit distortions of competition and address moral hazard, aid should be limited to the minimum necessary and an appropriate own contribution to restructuring costs should be provided by the aid beneficiary.
Sellest tulenevalt piirati vajadust täiendavate konkurentsimeetmete järele.
The bank and its capital holders should contribute to the restructuring as much as possible with their own resources.
Kolmandaks, seoses vastava turu iseloomuga ja nagu on kirjeldatud eespool, viis Islandi finantssüsteemi kokkuvarisemine, ning selle järgnenud Islandi ametiasutuste sekkumised (sealhulgas Arion Banki asutamine Kaupthingi riigisiseste tehingute pinnalt) finantsteenuste suuremale koondumisele Islandi turul ning kolme suurpanga (Landsbankinn, Íslandsbanki ja Arion Bank) turuosa kasvamisele.
This is necessary to ensure that rescued banks bear adequate responsibility for the consequences of their past behaviour and to create appropriate incentives for their future behaviour’.
Lisaks nendele jääb järele vaid mõni üksik väike turuosaline, peatne uute turule tulijate võimalus on kaduvväike ning seda juba mainitud turuletuleku tõkete ja turu väiksuse, aga lisaks ja ennekõike kehtestatud kapitalikontrollide tõttu.
The Authority recalls in this regard a decisive aspect of the case at hand.
Arion Bankil on sellisel koondunud turul väga tugev positsioon turuosaga 30 % ja rohkem kõige olulisemates ja majanduslikult olulistes segmentides.
When Arion Bank was established on the basis of the domestic operations of Kaupthing, the investments of shareholders in Kaupthing Bank were fully wiped out and have thus contributed the maximum possible to the restructuring of Arion Bank.
Neljandaks tekitas kriis palju väga spetsiifilisi probleeme, nagu suurpankade väga suur otsese ja kaudse omandi osakaal reaalmajanduses.
Moreover, the creditors of Kaupthing had to take considerable losses [84], or at least had to take on the risk of their investment depending on the profitability of Arion Bank.
Veel üks konkurentsimure on pangandusalaste IT-teenuste faktiline monopol (RB), kuna enamusosalus IT-ettevõtjas kuulub kolmele Islandi suurpangale.
Therefore, as far as the owners and creditors of Kaupthing are concerned, the criterion of burden-sharing is optimally satisfied and the issue of moral hazard addressed.
Viiendaks on Arion Bankile antud abi suhteline suurus märkimisväärne.
In addition to the above, the Authority needs to assess whether the state aid that Arion Bank has received was limited to the minimum necessary.
Seoses sellega märgib järelevalveamet, et algusest peale on panga kogu kapitali andnud riik.
As regards the capitalisation measures, the initial capitalisation of Arion Bank, until the agreement with the creditors of Kaupthing reduced the State's stake to 13 %, was just sufficient to meet the FME's capital requirements.
Lisaks sai pank kasu mitmesugustest abimeetmetest — eriotstarbeline likviidsusvahend, SPRONi vahetusleping ning kõikehõlmav hoiuste tagatis.
In 2009, after the agreement on Kaupthing's acquisition of Arion Bank had been reached, and the Tier-II capital had been granted to Arion Bank, the CAD ratio reached approximately 18 %, 2 percentage point more than the minimum ratio set forth by the FME.
Samas jääb Arion Bank vähemalt rahvusvaheliste standardite kohaselt väikeseks pangaks.
In this context, the Authority notes that the capital ratio depended mainly on whether valuation of the assets that had been transferred from Kaupthing to Arion Bank had been done accurately.
Seda arvesse võttes märgib järelevalveamet, et paljud võetud ja võetavad meetmed piiravad Arion Bankile antud riigiabist põhjustatud konkurentsimoonutusi.
Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that at the time the economic outlook for Iceland was cast in uncertainty.
Islandi ametiasutuste tehtud õiguslikud algatused ja võetud meetmed/kohustused
In view of the foregoing, the Authority considers that the amount of capital provided by the Icelandic state to Arion Bank was limited to the minimum necessary, as it amounted to nothing more than the regulatory minimum plus a reasonable buffer.
Islandi valitsus on võtnud eelkõige kaks järgmist kohustust (vt lisa), mis võivad järelevalveameti arvamusel aidata luua finantsturgudel konkurentsi soodustavat regulatiivset keskkonda.
This conclusion is not undone by the fact that Arion Bank's CAD ratio has subsequently grown somewhat, to 19 % in 2010 and 21 % in 2011.
Esiteks nimetati ametisse töörühm, mille ülesanne on vaadata läbi seadus nr 36/1978 tempelmaksu kohta.
The increase of the CAD ratio was to a significant extent due to the writing up of the book value of the assets that had been transferred from Kaupthing to Arion Bank.
Eriti uuritakse seda, kas kaotada tempelmaks võlausaldajate vahel üle kantavatelt eraisikute võlakirjadelt (nt kui eraisikud kannavad oma laenud ühest laenuasutusest teise).
It could not have been predicted with any certainty that this would happen, and the fact that the CAD ratio developed so favourably later is in the Authority's view no reason to consider that Arion Bank was overcapitalised by the State at the outset [85].
Järelevalveamet leiab, et praegune seadus, mis kohustab kliente muu hulgas maksma vastava võlakirja summa pealt laenuandja vahetamise korral tempelmaksu, [90] võib olla konkurentsi takistava iseloomuga, kuna aheldab kliendid olemasolevate pikaajaliste laenulepingute külge.
Paragraph 26 of the Restructuring Guidelines provides that banks in receipt of restructuring aid ‘should be able to remunerate capital, including in the form of dividends and coupons on outstanding subordinated debt, out of profits generated by their activities’.
Seega peab järelevalveamet selle seaduse läbivaatamise kohustust tervitatavaks.
In this context, it is worth recalling that at the time when agreements were concluded on the takeover of Kaupskil of 87 % of shareholdings in Arion Bank, it was agreed that the Government would be paid a fair share of the bank's returned earnings over the period until the new agreement on ownership took effect.
Teiseks võtab järelevalveamet teadmiseks, et kooskõlas Islandi parlamendis 21. märtsil 2012 heaks kiidetud resolutsiooniga nimetab valitsus ametisse komisjoni, mille ülesanne on vaadata läbi tarbijakaitse finantsurul.
The amount agreed upon was 6,5 billion ISK [86], corresponding to an annualised return for the State of almost 9 % on the capital which was redeemed already in the autumn of 2009.
See sisaldab erilisi volitusi teenuseosutaja vahetamise võimaluse läbivaatamiseks ja vahetamiskulude vähendamiseks ning komisjoni tihedaks sellealaseks koostööks Islandi konkurentsiametiga.
It is clear that this amount falls 2,3 billion ISK short of the accrued interest on the government bond for this time and is also significantly below the ECB benchmark interest of 15,3 % for this period as set out in the Authority's Recapitalisation Guidelines.
Vahepeal peaks Arion Banki võetud pangapoolne kohustus (käsitletakse allpool) aitama muuta teenuseosutaja vahetamist lihtsamaks ja suurendama seeläbi konkurentsi.
However, as for the 13 % stake that the State retained in Arion Bank, the prospect of a satisfactory return appears promising, given the overall good performance of Arion Bank since its establishment.
Mis puutub järelevalveameti tõstatatud konkurentsiküsimusse seoses Islandi serverikeskusega, peab järelevalveamet kiiduväärseks Islandi konkurentsiameti ja serverikeskuse omanike (sealhulgas kolme suurpanga) vahel saavutatud kokkulepet.
However, it also should be stressed that the remuneration for the Tier-II capital deviates from the Authority's Recapitalisation Guidelines.
Nii püütakse tagada mittediskrimineeriv juurdepääs põhilisele IT-infrastruktuurile mõistliku hinnaga väikekonkurentidele ja võimalikele uutele turuletulijatele.
As correctly submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the required remuneration pursuant to the Recapitalisation Guidelines consists of the government's funding cost of 8 %, Kaupthing's pre-crisis CDS-spread and an add-on fee of 2 %.
Järelevalveamet usub, et nimetatud kokkuleppe näol on asjaomase küsimusega tegeletud rahuldaval viisil ning ametil ei ole vaja enam seda käesolevas otsuses käsitleda.