natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
Seega olid olemas kõik eeldused finantskriisi puhkemiseks.
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
2007. aasta lõpus oli Islandi kroon languses ning krediidiriski vahetustehingud Islandi ja pankade suhtes kasvasid hüppeliselt.
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
Pangandussektori restruktureerimiseks võetud meetmed
The report concludes that the FME and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
Pärast kolme suurima kommertspanga (sealhulgas Glitnir) kokkuvarisemist 2008. aasta oktoobris olid Islandi ametiasutused enneolematu probleemi ees — kuidas tagada pangatehingute järjepidevus Islandil [18].
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
Rahandusministeerium andis rahandusministrile loa riigikassa väljamaksete tegemiseks uute finantsasutuste asutamise eesmärgil.
The report is also critical of the government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [16].
Lisaks oli kavas eelistada finantsasutuste pankrotimenetluses hoiuste väljamaksmist muudele nõuetele.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Valitsus teatas, et riigi kommerts- ja hoiupankades ning nende Islandi filiaalides olevatele hoiustele tagatakse täielik kaitse.
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Poliitilised prioriteedid olid esialgu kodumaise panganduse põhifunktsioonide, maksete ja arvelduste tagamine.
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Kriisi puhkemise järgsetel nädalatel koostas Islandi valitsus koostöös Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondiga (edaspidi „IMF”) majanduskava, mis päädis Islandi poolt IMFilt taotletud kaheaastase tugilaenu heakskiitmisega 20. novembril 2008.
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [17].
IMFilt saadud laenusumma oli 2,1 miljardit USA dollarit ning see oli mõeldud Islandi valuutareservide suurendamiseks.
The report is also critical of the ease with which the banks were able to borrow from the CBI, with the stock of CBI short-term collateral loans increasing from 30 billion ISK in the autumn of 2005 to 500 billion ISK by the beginning of October 2008.
Põhjamaadest ja teatavatelt kaubanduspartneritelt võeti täiendavaid laene kokku summas 3 miljardit USA dollarit.
The report notes that in 2006, the value of the Icelandic króna was unsustainably high, the Icelandic current account deficit was over 16 % of GDP, and liabilities in foreign currencies less assets neared total annual GDP.
IMFiga koostatud majanduskava näol oli tegemist laiapõhjalise stabiliseerimiskavaga, milles keskenduti kolmele järgmisele põhieesmärgile.
The prerequisites for a financial crisis were in place.
Esiteks Islandi krooni stabiilsuse ja usaldusväärsuse taastamine, et pidurdada kriisi halba mõju majandusele.
By the end of 2007 the value of the króna was depreciating and credit default swap spreads (CDS) on Iceland and the banks rose exponentially.
Meetmed hõlmasid kapitali kontrollimist, eesmärgiga takistada kapitali väljavoolu.
Measures taken to reconstruct the banking sector
Teiseks sisaldas kava laiapõhjalist strateegiat pankade restruktureerimiseks, mille põhieesmärk oli elujõulise finantssüsteemi taastamine Islandil ning riigi rahvusvaheliste finantssuhete säilitamine.
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Glitnir) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [18].
Kõrvaleesmärgid olid tagada pankade vara õiglane hindamine, maksimeerida vara sissenõudmist ja tugevdada järelevalvetegevust.
The policy followed by the Icelandic government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [19] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
Kolmandaks oli kava eesmärk tagada jätkusuutlik riigi rahandus, piirates pankrotistunud pankade kahjumite ühiskonna õlule lükkamist ning rakendades eelarve konsolideerimise kava keskmises perspektiivis.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
Islandi ametiasutused on rõhutanud, et erakordse olukorra tõttu, mille põhjustas pangandussüsteemi suurus riigikassa finantssuutlikkuse küündimatuse valguses, olid võimalikud poliitilised valikud piiratud.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
Seetõttu olid lahendused paljuski erinevad teiste riikide valitsuste meetmetest, kelle finantsstabiilsus oli ohus.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
Erakorraliste olukordade seadusest lähtuvalt jagati kolm suurt kommertspanka Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands ja Kaupthing Bank „endisteks” ja „uuteks” pankadeks.
The government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
Rahandusminister asutas kolm piiratud vastutusega äriühingut, mis võtsid üle endiste pankade riigisisesed tehingud ning nimetasid ametisse nende juhatused.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
Finantsjärelevalveamet võttis vanad pangad üle, kandis peamiselt nende riigisisese vara ja kohustused (hoiused) üle uutele pankadele, kes jätkasid pangatehinguid Islandil, samas kui endised pangad läksid vastavate kriisilahenduskomisjonide järelevalve alla [20].
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
Välismaine vara ja kohustused paigutati peamiselt endistesse pankadesse ning hiljem kohaldati nende suhtes likvideerimismenetlust ja kõigi välistehingute võimalikku sulgemist [21].
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
14. novembril 2008 kolme uue panga kohta koostatud algbilansi kohaselt moodustas pankade koguvara kokku 2886 miljardit Islandi krooni, sealhulgas riigi eraldatav omakapital 385 miljardit Islandi krooni.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
Uute pankade poolt endiste pankade kasuks emiteeritavate võlakirjade hulka prognoositi 1153 miljardile Islandi kroonile.
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
See oli mõeldud ülemääraste kohustuste eest üle kantud vara hüvitamiseks.
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
Finantsjärelevalveamet määras ülekantud varade ja kohustuste hindamist teostama ettevõtja Deloitte LLP.
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
Protsessi käigus ilmnes, et sõltumatu hindamise tulemus ei kajasta ülekantud puhasvara fikseeritud väärtusi, vaid teatavate varaliikide väärtusi.
Secondly, the program included a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy, ultimately aimed at rebuilding a viable financial system in Iceland as well as safeguarding the country's international financial relations.
Ühtlasi väljendasid pankade võlausaldajad hindamisprotsessi suhtes rahulolematust — leiti, et see ei ole erapooletu ning et võlausaldajatel on võimatu oma huve kaitsta.
Among subsidiary goals was to ensure fair valuation of the banks' assets, maximise asset recovery and strengthen supervisory practices.
Nimetatud probleemide tõttu muudeti endiste ja uute pankade arvepidamiste vastastikuse kooskõlastamise strateegiat, st sõltumatu eksperdi teostatud hindamise asemel püüdsid pooled saavutada ülekantud puhasvara väärtuse suhtes kokkulepped läbirääkimiste teel.
Thirdly, the program aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances, by limiting the socialisation of losses in the failed banks and implementing a medium-term fiscal consolidation program.
Oli selge, et pooltel oli raske saavutada hindamise suhtes kokkuleppeid, kuna oli palju oletusi ja eeldusi, milles pooled üksteisega nõus ei olnud.
The Icelandic authorities have underlined that due to the exceptional circumstances linked to the large size of the banking system in relation to the financial capacity of the Treasury, the policy options available to the authorities were limited.
Riik püüdis saavutada kokkuleppeid baashindamistest lähtuvalt, mis panid tugeva aluse uute pankade algkapitalile.
The solutions relied upon were therefore in many ways different to the measures taken by the governments of other countries facing threats to financial stability.
Baashindamisest üle jääva vara hinnaväärtust sooviti võlausaldajatele välja maksta teatavatel tingimustel konverteeritavate võlakirjade vormis või pankade osakapitali väärtust tõstes.
On the basis of the Emergency Act, the three large commercial banks, Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank, were split into ‘old’ and ‘new’ banks.
Nimelt oli läbirääkimiste käigus selgunud, et nii Glitniri kui ka Kaupthingi kriisilahenduskomisjonid ja enamik võlausaldajaid võivad olla huvitatud hoiustamisest uutes pankades, mis võimaldaks neil saada kasu üle kantud vara väärtuse võimalikust kasvust.
The Minister of Finance founded three limited liability companies to take over the domestic operations of the old banks and appointed them boards of directors.
20. juulil 2009 avalikustati kolme uue panga täielik kapitaliseerimine ja endiste pankade võlausaldajatega saavutatud kokkulepete sisu.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland, while the old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees [20].
Valitsus kui kolme uue panga ainuomanik sõlmis endiste pankade kriisilahenduskomisjonidega vastastikuse mõistmise memorandumi selles, millised on uutesse pankadesse puhasvara ülekandmise eest arvestatavad hüvitised ja kuidas toimub nende väljamaksmine.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations [21].
Mis puutub kahte uude panka — Íslandsbanki ja New Kaupthing (hiljem Arion Bank) — hõlmas see tingimuslike kokkulepete sõlmimist endiste pankadega, mille kohaselt pidid viimased osalema suures osas uute pankade aktsiakapitalis.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Nimetatud esialgsete kokkulepete põhjal otsustasid endiste pankade kriisilahenduskomisjonid 2009. aasta oktoobris (Glitnir) ja 2009. aasta detsembris (Kaupthing Bank ja Landsbanki Islands) viia ellu läbirääkimiste käigus tehtud valikud ning osaleda uute pankade aktsiakapitalis.
The total amount of bonds to be issued by the new banks in favour of the old banks as payment for the value of the assets transferred in excess of liabilities was estimated at 1153 billion ISK.
18. detsembril 2009 teatas valitsus pankade restruktureerimise lõpuleviimisest ning kokkulepete saavutamisest ühelt poolt Islandi valitsuse ja uute pankade ning teiselt poolt Glitnir Banki, Landsbanki Íslands ja Kaupthing Banki kriisilahenduskomisjoni (kes esindas võlausaldajaid) vahel seoses endistest pankadest uutesse üle kantud varaga ja uute pankade täieliku rahastamisega,
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
Selgus, et riigikassa panust uute pankade omakapitali oli märkimisväärselt vähendatud — algselt kavandatud 385 miljardilt Islandi kroonilt 135 miljardile Islandi kroonile osakapitalina ning kahe puhul kolmest pangast (Íslandsbanki ja Arion Bank) teise taseme omavahenditena 55 miljardit Islandi krooni allutatud laenude kujul, kokku 190 miljardit Islandi krooni.
In this process it transpired that the independent assessment would not result in fixed values of net assets transferred but valuations within certain ranges.
Lisaks eraldati riigikassast Íslandsbankile ja Arion Bankile teatavaid likviidsusvahendeid.
It also emerged that the banks' creditors raised disagreements concerning the valuation process, which they considered not to be impartial, and complained that they were unable to protect their interests.
Endistest pankadest pärit osakapital moodustas kokku ligikaudu 156 miljardit Islandi krooni.
These complications resulted in a change of policy for settling the accounts between the old and the new banks, entailing that instead of relying on valuations by an independent expert, the parties would try through negotiations to reach agreements on the value of the net assets transferred.
Uued pangad olid seega kapitaliseeritud kokku umbes 346 miljardi Islandi krooniga.
It was clear that it would be difficult for the parties to reach agreements on the valuations as they were evidently subject to numerous assumptions on which the parties were likely to disagree.
Seega vähendati kokkulepete alusel riigi täielikku osalust kolmes pangas umbes 5 %le ettevõtjas Íslandsbanki, 13 %le ettevõtjas Arion Bank ja 81 %le ettevõtjas Landsbankinn.
The state aimed to reach agreements on base evaluations providing a firm foundation for the initial capitalisation of the new banks.
Olgugi et kahe puhul kolmest pangast võtsid osaluse üle endiste pankade võlausaldajad ning see tähendas põhiprobleemide lahendamist finantssektori taastamise juures ning tugevama regulatiivse kapitali rajamist uutes pankades, esines endiselt arvukaid puudusi, mis vajasid likvideerimist.
Price performance of assets in excess of the base evaluation could be attributed to the creditors in the form of contingent bonds or increases in the value of the banks' share capital, as it had emerged in the negotiations that the resolution committees of Glitnir and Kaupthing and a majority of their creditors could be interested to acquire holdings in the new banks, and this would allow them to benefit from potential increases in the values of the assets transferred.
Alates 2009. aastast on pangad keskendunud peamiselt oma siseküsimustele — määratlenud tegevuse üldstrateegia ning teinud eeskätt ümberkorraldusi oma laenuportfellides, mis kujutavad suurimat riskitegurit tegevuse ja pikaaegse elujõulisuse jaoks.
The full capitalisation of the three new banks and the basis of agreements with the creditors of the old banks were announced on 20 July 2009.
Ümberkorraldamisprotsess oli keerukas seoses mitmete raskendavate asjaoludega, näiteks ülemkohtu otsus välisvaluutasse indekseeritud, kuid Islandi kroonides antud laenude ebaseaduslikkuse kohta.
The Government, as the sole owner of the three new banks, reached heads of agreements with the resolution committees of the old banks in relation to how compensation for the transfer of net assets into the new banks would be achieved and paid for.
Arion Banki restruktureerimise küsimust käsitletakse allpool.
With regard to two of the new banks, Íslandsbanki and New Kaupthing (later named Arion Bank), this included conditional agreements for the old banks to subscribe for majority equity interests in the new banks.
Makromajanduslik keskkond
On the basis of the above tentative agreements, the resolution committees of the old banks decided in October 2009 (Glitnir) and December 2009 (Kaupthing Bank and Landsbanki Islands) to exercise the negotiated options and subscribe to shareholding in the new banks.
Pangandussüsteemi kokkuvarisemisele 2008. aasta oktoobris järgnes suur majanduslik ebastabiilsus.
On 18 December 2009 the Government announced that bank reconstruction had been concluded and that agreements had been reached between the Icelandic authorities and the new banks, on the one hand, and the resolution committees of Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank on behalf of their creditors, on the other hand, on settlements concerning assets which were transferred from the old banks to the new ones, and that the new banks were then fully financed.
Islandi finantssüsteemi raskustega kaasnes usalduse kadumine riigi vääringu suhtes.
As it turned out, the Treasury's contribution to the new banks' equity was reduced substantially, from 385 billion ISK as originally envisaged to 135 billion ISK in the form of share capital and, in the case of two of the three banks, Íslandsbanki and Arion Bank, approximately 55 billion ISK of Tier II capital in the form of subordinated loans or a total of 190 billion ISK.
Islandi krooni väärtus langes 2008. aasta esimeses kvartalis järsult, seejärel taas sama aasta sügisel, seega enne ja pärast kolme kommertspanga kokkuvarisemist.
In addition, the Treasury provided Íslandsbanki and Arion Bank with certain liquidity facilities.
Hoolimata 2008. aasta sügisel kehtestatud kapitalikontrollidest oli krooni kurss terve 2009. aasta jooksul volatiilne [22].
The share capital provided by the old banks to the new ones amounted in total to approximately 156 billion ISK.
Lisaks kasvas järsult äriühingute ja kodumajapidamiste võlakoormus ja mittetoimivate laenude osakaal pankade laenuportfellides, samuti rahalistes raskustes olevate ettevõtjate ülevõtmine uute pankade poolt.
Total capitalisation of the new banks therefore amounted to approximately 346 billion ISK.
Samal ajal tõi pangandussüsteemi restruktureerimise suur eelarvekulu kaasa hüppelise eelarvepuudujäägi kasvu ja valitsemissektori võla kerkimise.
Thus, instead of maintaining full ownership of the three banks, the agreements implied that the state's holdings would be reduced to approximately 5 % in the case of Íslandsbanki, 13 % in the case of Arion Bank and 81 % in the case of Landsbankinn.
Pärast sügavat majanduslangust nähtub Islandi statistikaameti esialgsetest andmetest, et 2011. aasta esimesel poolaastal ja kogu aasta jooksul toimus pööre paremuse suunas, kui SKP kasvas võrreldes eelnenud aastaga 3,1 %.
While this takeover of two of the three banks by the creditors of the old banks resolved major issues in the rebuilding of the financial sector and established firmer capital foundation for the new banks, numerous weaknesses remained which needed to the addressed.
2011. aasta majanduskasv toimus peamiselt tänu sisenõudluse kasvule, eeskätt kodumajapidamiste tarbimise 4 %lisele kasvule.
Since the autumn of 2009, the banks have concentrated their efforts mostly on internal issues, determining the overall strategy for their operations and in particular restructuring their loan portfolios, which represent the greatest risk factor to their operations and long-term viability.
Seda toetas töötasude ja sotsiaaltoetuste kasv ning teatavad poliitilised algatused kodumajapidamiste võlakoormuse vähendamiseks, sealhulgas ajutised intressitoetused, laenumaksete külmutamine ja erasektori pensionihoiuste varajane hüvitamine.
As for Íslandsbanki, in so far as relevant for its restructuring, these matters are discussed further below.
Avaliku sektori tarbimine on viimase kolme aasta jooksul jäänud murettekitavale tasemele.
Macroeconomic environment
Üldine makromajandusstatistika varjab aga olulisemat ebavõrdsust sektorite vahel.
Major economic turbulence followed the collapse of the banking system in October 2008.
Lisaks finantssektori kokkuvarisemisele kuivas kokku ehitussektor ning paljud muud kodumaised tootmissektorid ja teenuste pakkumine.
The difficulties in Iceland's financial system were coupled with a breakdown of confidence in its currency.
Teatavates ekspordivaldkondades toimus jällegi tõus.
The króna depreciated sharply in the first quarter of 2008 and again in the autumn, before and after the failure of the three commercial banks.
Tänu Islandi krooni madalale vahetuskursile ning kala- ja alumiiniumtoodete suhteliselt stabiilsele hinnale välisvaluutas tõusis pärast majanduskriisi puhkemist eksporditulu, seda ka turismist ja teenuste ekspordist.
Despite capital controls imposed in the autumn of 2008, currency volatility prevailed in the course of 2009 [22].
Prognoos tekitab aga mitmeid küsimusi.
This turmoil resulted in a severe recession in Iceland's economy, with a contraction of GDP by 6,8 % in 2009 and 4 % in 2010.
Kavandatud laiaulatuslikud tööstusinvesteeringud võivad veelgi venida.
(35) Among the implications of the economic crisis was a sudden increase in unemployment from 1,6 % in 2008 to 8 % in 2009, a hike in inflation and a drop in real wages.
Islandi kaubandustingimustele võib mõjuda halvasti kestev majandussurutis suurimates kaubanduspartnerriikides, mis toob kaasa madalama kasvumäära Islandil.
Moreover, there was a sharp rise in corporate and household debt and of the share of non-performing loans in the banks' loan portfolios as well as a large scale takeover by the new banks of businesses in financial distress.
Arvatust aeglasem areng kodumajapidamiste ja äriühingute laenukoorma vähendamisel võib veelgi piirata sisenõudlust ja majanduskasvu perspektiivi.
At the same time the high fiscal cost of restructuring the banking system led to a sharp rise in the fiscal deficit and a major surge in public sector debt.
Kasvu võib ohustada kestev hindade ebastabiilsus, mis tuleneb kapitalikontrollide kaotamise järgsest krooni volatiilsusest.
Following the deep recession provisional data from Statistics Iceland indicates a turnaround in the second half of 2011 and for the whole year a growth of GDP of 3.1 % compared to the previous year.
Finantsjärelevalve ja reguleeriva raamistiku tõhustamine
Provisional data for 2011 also indicate a slow increase in investments, however from a particularly low level [23].
Pärast kirjeldatud protsessi lõpuleviimist väljastas finantsjärelevalveamet pankadele tegevusloa teatavatel tingimustel.
Public consumption has remained at a subdued level during the past three years.
Seoses varaportfellide kvaliteediga ja arvatava eelseisva majandusliku ebakindlusega peeti vajalikuks esitada kolme panga kapitalile seadusjärgsest miinimumist suuremad nõudmised.
The general macroeconomic data disguise more significant sectoral differences.
Määratleti ka likviidsustingimused, mille kohaselt peavad likviidsed vahendid moodustama igal ajahetkel vähemalt 20 % ning sularaha ja sularaha ekvivalendid vähemalt 5 % hoiustest.
In addition to the collapse in the financial sector a major contraction has taken place in construction and many other domestic production and service activities.
Lisaks esitati nõudmisi muudele valdkondadele, nagu laenuportfellide ümberkorraldamine, riskihindamine, ettevõtete juhtimine ja vastutus.
Growth has on the other hand taken place in certain export sectors.
Finantsjärelevalveamet kehtestas sarnaseid kapitalinõudeid ka muude finantsettevõtjate suhtes.