natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Kaupthing) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [16].
IMFi laenust muudeti kohe kättesaadavaks 827 miljonit USA dollarit, kusjuures ülejäänud laenusumma maksti välja kaheksas võrdses osas vastavalt majanduskava kvartalipõhisele ülevaatamisele.
The policy followed by the Icelandic Government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [17] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
IMFiga koostatud majanduskava näol oli tegemist laiapõhjalise stabiliseerimiskavaga, milles keskenduti kolmele järgmisele põhieesmärgile.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
Esiteks Islandi krooni stabiilsuse ja usaldusväärsuse taastamine, et pidurdada kriisi halba mõju majandusele.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
Meetmed hõlmasid kapitali kontrollimist, eesmärgiga takistada kapitali väljavoolu.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
Teiseks sisaldas kava laiapõhjalist strateegiat pankade restruktureerimiseks, mille põhieesmärk oli elujõulise finantssüsteemi taastamine Islandil ning riigi rahvusvaheliste finantssuhete säilitamine.
The Government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
Kõrvaleesmärgid olid tagada pankade vara õiglane hindamine, maksimeerida vara sissenõudmist ja tugevdada järelevalvetegevust.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
Kolmandaks oli kava eesmärk tagada jätkusuutlik riigi rahandus, piirates pankrotistunud pankade kahjumite ühiskonna õlule lükkamist ning rakendades eelarve konsolideerimise kava keskmises perspektiivis.
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
Islandi ametiasutused on rõhutanud, et erakordse olukorra tõttu, mille põhjustas pangandussüsteemi suurus riigikassa finantssuutlikkuse küündimatuse valguses, olid võimalikud poliitilised valikud piiratud.
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
Seetõttu olid lahendused paljuski erinevad teiste riikide valitsuste meetmetest, kelle finantsstabiilsus oli ohus.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
Erakorraliste olukordade seadusest lähtuvalt jagati kolm suurt kommertspanka Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands ja Kaupthing Bank „endisteks” ja „uuteks” pankadeks.
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
Rahandusminister asutas kolm piiratud vastutusega äriühingut, mis võtsid üle endiste pankade riigisisesed tehingud ning nimetasid ametisse nende juhatused.
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
Finantsjärelevalveamet võttis endised pangad üle, kandis peamiselt nende riigisisesed varad ja kohustused (hoiused) üle uutele pankadele, kes jätkasid pangatehinguid Islandil, samas kui endised pangad läksid vastavate kriisilahenduskomisjonide järelevalve alla [18].
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
Välismaine vara ja kohustused paigutati peamiselt endistesse pankadesse, mille suhtes kohaldati hiljem likvideerimismenetlust ja kõigi välistehingute võimalikku lõpetamist [19].
Secondly, the program included a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy, ultimately aimed at rebuilding a viable financial system in Iceland as well as safeguarding the country's international financial relations.
14. novembril 2008 kolme uue panga kohta koostatud algbilansi kohaselt moodustas pankade koguvara kokku 2886 miljardit Islandi krooni, sealhulgas riigi eraldatav omakapital 385 miljardit Islandi krooni.
Among subsidiary goals was to ensure fair valuation of the banks' assets, maximise asset recovery and strengthen supervisory practices.
Uute pankade poolt endiste pankade kasuks emiteeritavate võlakirjade hulka prognoositi 1153 miljardile Islandi kroonile.
Thirdly, the program aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances, by limiting the socialisation of losses in the failed banks and implementing a medium-term fiscal consolidation program.
See oli mõeldud ülemääraste kohustuste eest üle kantud vara hüvitamiseks.
The Icelandic authorities have underlined that due to the exceptional circumstances linked to the large size of the banking system in relation to the financial capacity of the Treasury, the policy options available to the authorities were limited.
Finantsjärelevalveamet määras ülekantud varade ja kohustuste hindamist teostama ettevõtja Deloitte LLP.
The solutions relied upon were therefore in many ways different to the measures taken by the governments of other countries facing threats to financial stability.
Protsessi käigus ilmnes, et sõltumatu hindamise tulemus ei kajasta ülekantud puhasvara fikseeritud väärtusi, vaid teatavate varaliikide väärtusi.
On the basis of the Emergency Act, the three large commercial banks, Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank, were split into ‘old’ and ‘new’ banks.
Ühtlasi väljendasid pankade võlausaldajad hindamisprotsessi suhtes rahulolematust — leiti, et see ei ole erapooletu ning et võlausaldajatel on võimatu oma huve kaitsta.
The Minister of Finance founded three limited liability companies to take over the domestic operations of the old banks and appointed them boards of directors.
Nimetatud probleemide tõttu muudeti endiste ja uute pankade arvepidamiste vastastikuse kooskõlastamise strateegiat, st sõltumatu eksperdi teostatud hindamise asemel püüdsid pooled saavutada ülekantud puhasvara väärtuse suhtes kokkulepped läbirääkimiste teel.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland, while the old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees [18].
Oli selge, et pooltel oli raske saavutada hindamise suhtes kokkuleppeid, kuna oli palju oletusi ja eeldusi, milles pooled üksteisega nõus ei olnud.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations [19].
Riik püüdis saavutada kokkuleppeid baashindamistest lähtuvalt, mis panid tugeva aluse uute pankade algkapitalile.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Baashindamisest üle jääva vara hinnaväärtust sooviti võlausaldajatele välja maksta teatavatel tingimustel konverteeritavate võlakirjade vormis või pankade osakapitali väärtust tõstes.
The total amount of bonds to be issued by the new banks in favour of the old banks as payment for the value of the assets transferred in excess of liabilities was estimated at 1153 billion ISK.
Nimelt oli läbirääkimiste käigus selgunud, et nii Glitniri kui ka Kaupthingi kriisilahenduskomisjonid ja enamik võlausaldajaid võivad olla huvitatud hoiustamisest uutes pankades, mis võimaldaks neil saada kasu üle kantud vara väärtuse võimalikust kasvust.
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
20. juulil 2009 avalikustati kolme uue panga täielik kapitaliseerimine ja endiste pankade võlausaldajatega saavutatud kokkulepete sisu.
In this process it transpired that the independent assessment would not result in fixed values of net assets transferred but valuations within certain ranges.
Valitsus kui kolme uue panga ainuomanik sõlmis endiste pankade kriisilahenduskomisjonidega vastastikuse mõistmise memorandumi selle kohta, millised on uutesse pankadesse puhasvara ülekandmise eest arvestatavad hüvitised ja kuidas toimub nende väljamaksmine.
It also emerged that the banks' creditors raised disagreements concerning the valuation process, which they considered not to be impartial, and complained that they were unable to protect their interests.
Mis puutub kahte uude panka — Íslandsbanki ja Arion Bank — hõlmas see tingimuslike kokkulepete sõlmimist endiste pankadega, mille kohaselt pidid viimased osalema suures osas uute pankade aktsiakapitalis.
These complications resulted in a change of policy for settling the accounts between the old and the new banks, entailing that instead of relying on valuations by an independent expert, the parties would try through negotiations to reach agreements on the value of the net assets transferred.
Nimetatud esialgsete kokkulepete põhjal otsustasid endiste pankade kriisilahenduskomisjonid 2009. aasta oktoobris (Glitnir) ja 2009. aasta detsembris (Kaupthing Bank ja Landsbanki Islands) viia ellu läbirääkimiste käigus tehtud valikud ning osaleda uute pankade aktsiakapitalis.
It was clear that it would be difficult for the parties to reach agreements on the valuations as they were evidently subject to numerous assumptions on which the parties were likely to disagree.
18. detsembril 2009 teatas valitsus pankade restruktureerimise lõpuleviimisest ning kokkulepete saavutamisest ühelt poolt Islandi valitsuse ja uute pankade ning teiselt poolt Glitnir Banki, Landsbanki Íslands ja Kaupthing Banki kriisilahenduskomisjoni (kes esindas võlausaldajaid) vahel seoses endistest pankadest uutesse üle kantud varaga ja uute pankade täieliku rahastamisega,
The state aimed to reach agreements on base evaluations providing a firm foundation for the initial capitalisation of the new banks.
Selgus, et riigikassa panust uute pankade omakapitali oli märkimisväärselt vähendatud — algselt kavandatud 385 miljardilt Islandi kroonilt 135 miljardile Islandi kroonile osakapitalina ning kahe puhul kolmest pangast (Íslandsbanki ja Arion Bank) teise taseme omavahenditena (55 miljardit Islandi krooni) allutatud laenude kujul kokku 190 miljardit Islandi krooni.
Price performance of assets in excess of the base evaluation could be attributed to the creditors in the form of contingent bonds or increases in the value of the banks' share capital, as it had emerged in the negotiations that the resolution committees of Glitnir and Kaupthing and a majority of their creditors could be interested to acquire holdings in the new banks, and this would allow them to benefit from potential increases in the values of the assets transferred.
Lisaks eraldati riigikassast Íslandsbankile ja Arion Bankile teatavaid likviidsusvahendeid.
The full capitalisation of the three new banks and the basis of agreements with the creditors of the old banks was announced on 20 July 2009.
Endistest pankadest pärit osakapital moodustas kokku ligikaudu 156 miljardit Islandi krooni.
The Government, as the sole owner of the three new banks, reached heads of agreements with the resolution committees of the old banks in relation to how compensation for the transfer of net assets into the new banks would be achieved and paid for.
Uued pangad olid seega kapitaliseeritud kokku umbes 346 miljardi Islandi krooniga.
With regard to two of the new banks, Íslandsbanki and Arion Bank, this included conditional agreements for the old banks to subscribe for majority equity interests in the new banks.
Seega vähendati kokkulepete alusel riigi täielikku osalust kolmes pangas umbes 5 %-le ettevõtjas Íslandsbanki, 13 %-le ettevõtjas Arion Bank ja 81 %-le ettevõtjas Landsbankinn.
On the basis of the above tentative agreements, the resolution committees of the old banks decided in October 2009 (Glitnir) and December 2009 (Kaupthing Bank and Landsbanki Islands) to exercise the negotiated options and subscribe to shareholding in the new banks.
Olgugi et kahe puhul kolmest pangast võtsid osaluse üle endiste pankade võlausaldajad ning see tähendas põhiprobleemide lahendamist finantssektori taastamise juures ning tugevama regulatiivse kapitali rajamist uutes pankades, esines endiselt arvukaid puudusi, mis vajasid likvideerimist.
On 18 December 2009 the Government announced that bank reconstruction had been concluded and that agreements had been reached between the Icelandic authorities and the new banks, on the one hand, and the resolution committees of Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank on behalf of their creditors, on the other hand, on settlements concerning assets which were transferred from the old banks to the new ones, and that the new banks were then fully financed.
Alates 2009. aastast on pangad keskendunud peamiselt oma siseküsimustele — määratlenud tegevuse üldstrateegia ning teinud eeskätt ümberkorraldusi oma laenuportfellides, mis kujutavad suurimat riskitegurit tegevuse ja pikaaegse elujõulisuse jaoks.
As it turned out, the Treasury's contribution to the new banks' equity was reduced substantially, from 385 billion ISK as originally envisaged to 135 billion ISK in the form of share capital and, in the case of two of the three banks, Íslandsbanki and Arion Bank, approximately 55 billion ISK of Tier II capital in the form of subordinated loans or a total of 190 billion ISK.
Ümberkorraldamisprotsess oli keerukas seoses mitmete raskendavate asjaoludega, näiteks ülemkohtu otsus välisvaluutasse indekseeritud, kuid Islandi kroonides antud laenude ebaseaduslikkuse kohta.
In addition, the Treasury provided Íslandsbanki and Arion Bank with certain liquidity facilities.
Arion Banki restruktureerimise küsimust käsitletakse allpool.
The share capital provided by the old banks to the new ones amounted in total to approximately 156 billion ISK.
Makromajanduslik keskkond
Total capitalisation of the new banks therefore amounted to approximately 346 billion ISK.
Pangandussüsteemi kokkuvarisemisele 2008. aasta oktoobris järgnes suur majanduslik ebastabiilsus.
Thus, instead of maintaining full ownership of the three banks, the agreements implied that the state's holdings would be reduced to approximately 5 % in the case of Íslandsbanki, 13 % in the case of Arion Bank and 81 % in the case of Landsbankinn.
Islandi finantssüsteemi raskustega kaasnes usalduse kadumine riigi omavääringu suhtes.
While this takeover of two of the three banks by the creditors of the old banks resolved major issues in the rebuilding of the financial sector and established firmer capital foundation for the new banks, numerous weaknesses remained which needed to the addressed.
Islandi krooni väärtus langes 2008. aasta esimeses kvartalis järsult, seejärel taas sama aasta sügisel, seega enne ja pärast kolme kommertspanga kokkuvarisemist.
Since the autumn of 2009, the banks have concentrated their efforts mostly on internal issues, determining the overall strategy for their operations and in particular restructuring their loan portfolios, which represent the greatest risk factor to their operations and long-term viability.
Hoolimata 2008. aasta sügisel kehtestatud kapitalikontrollidest oli krooni kurss terve 2009. aasta jooksul volatiilne [20].
The restructuring process has been complex due to various complicating factors, including Supreme Court rulings on illegality of loans granted in ISK but indexed to foreign currencies.
Kriis viis Islandi majanduse tõsisesse langusesse ning SKP kahanes 2009. aastal 6,8 ja 2010. aastal 4 % võrra.
As for Arion Bank, in so far as relevant for its restructuring, these matters are discussed further below.
Lisaks kasvas järsult äriühingute ja kodumajapidamiste võlakoormus ja viivislaenude osakaal pankade laenuportfellides, samuti rahalistes raskustes olevate ettevõtjate ülevõtmine uute pankade poolt.
The difficulties in Iceland's financial system were coupled with a breakdown of confidence in its currency.
2011. aasta majanduskasv toimus peamiselt tänu sisenõudluse kasvule, eeskätt tarbimise 4 %-lisele kasvule majapidamissektoris.
The króna depreciated sharply in the first quarter of 2008 and again in the autumn, before and after the failure of the three commercial banks.
Seda toetas töötasude ja sotsiaaltoetuste kasv ning teatavad poliitilised algatused kodumajapidamiste võlakoormuse vähendamiseks, sealhulgas ajutised intressitoetused, laenumaksete külmutamine ja erasektori pensionihoiuste varajane hüvitamine.
Despite capital controls imposed in the autumn of 2008, currency volatility prevailed in the course of 2009 [20].
2011. aastat kajastava esialgse statistika kohaselt tõusid veidi ka investeeringud, olgugi et väga madalalt tasemelt [21].
This turmoil resulted in a severe recession in Iceland's economy, with a contraction of GDP by 6,8 % in 2009 and 4 % in 2010.
Avaliku sektori tarbimine on viimase kolme aasta jooksul jäänud murettekitavale tasemele.
Among the implications of the economic crisis was a sudden increase in unemployment from 1,6 % in 2008 to 8 % in 2009, a hike in inflation and a drop in real wages.
Üldine makromajandusstatistika varjab aga olulisemat ebavõrdsust sektorite vahel.
Moreover, there was a sharp rise in corporate and household debt and of the share of non-performing loans in the banks' loan portfolios as well as a large scale takeover by the new banks of businesses in financial distress.
Lisaks finantssektori kokkuvarisemisele kuivas kokku ehitussektor ning paljud muud kodumaised tootmissektorid ja teenused.
At the same time the high fiscal cost of restructuring the banking system led to a sharp rise in the fiscal deficit and a major surge in public sector debt.
Teatavates ekspordivaldkondades toimus see-eest tõus.
Following the deep recession provisional data from Statistics Iceland indicates a turnaround in the second half of 2011 and for the whole year a growth of GDP of 3,1 % compared to the previous year.
Tänu Islandi krooni madalale vahetuskursile ning kala- ja alumiiniumtoodete suhteliselt stabiilsele hinnale välisvaluutas tõusis pärast majanduskriisi puhkemist eksporditulu, seda ka turismi ja teenuste ekspordi osas.
Economic growth in 2011 was mostly due to an increase in domestic demand, particularly a 4 % rise in private household consumption.
Prognoos tekitab aga mitmeid küsimusi.
This was supported by increases in wages and social benefits as well as certain policy initiatives undertaken to ease the payment burden of household debt, including a temporary interest rate subsidy, the freezing of payments on loans and the early reimbursement of private pension savings.
Kavandatud laiaulatuslikud tööstusinvesteeringud võivad veelgi venida.
Provisional data for 2011 also indicate a slow increase in investments, however from a particularly low level [21].
Islandi kaubandustingimustele võib mõjuda halvasti kestev majandussurutis kaubanduspartnerriikides, mis toob kaasa madalama kasvumäära Islandil.
In addition to the collapse in the financial sector a major contraction has taken place in construction and many other domestic production and service activities.
Finantsjärelevalve ja reguleeriva raamistiku tõhustamine
Growth has on the other hand taken place in certain export sectors.
Olles asutanud uued pangad ja analüüsinud endistest pankadest üle kantud puhasvara väärtust, teostas finantsjärelevalveamet 2009. aasta kevadel uute pankade tegevuse ja äriplaanide, finantsvõimekuse ja kapitalivajaduse kohta auditi nn tõendamisprojekti kujul.
Due to the low exchange rate of the króna and relatively stable prices in foreign currency for both marine and aluminium products, export revenue rose following the onset of the economic crisis, also with respect to tourism and other services exports.
See viidi läbi rahvusvahelise juhtimiskonsultandi Oliver Wymani kaasabil.
At the same time, imports fell sharply, turning the trade balance [22] temporarily to a surplus of approximately 10 % of GDP in 2010.
Pärast kirjeldatud protsessi lõpuleviimist väljastas finantsjärelevalveamet pankadele tegevusloa teatavatel tingimustel.
However, with increased domestic demand in 2011, imports have grown again, leading to an overall smaller trade surplus of 8,2 % of GDP.
Seoses varaportfellide kvaliteediga ja arvatava eelseisva majandusliku ebakindlusega peeti vajalikuks esitada kolme panga kapitalile seadusjärgsest miinimumist suuremad nõudmised.
Statistics Iceland forecast for 2012-2017 assumes that gradual economic recovery will continue with 2,6 % growth in 2012.
Määratleti ka likviidsustingimused, mille kohaselt peavad likviidsed vahendid moodustama igal ajahetkel vähemalt 20 % ning sularaha ja sularaha ekvivalendid vähemalt 5 % hoiustest.
A similar growth rate is expected throughout the forecast period.
Lisaks esitati nõudmisi muudele valdkondadele, nagu laenuportfellide ümberkorraldamine, riskihindamine, ettevõtete juhtimine ja vastutus.
This forecast is however subject to several uncertainties.
Finantsjärelevalveamet kehtestas sarnaseid kapitalinõudeid ka muude finantsettevõtjate suhtes.
Planned large scale industrial investments might be further delayed.
Koostöös IMFiga koostatud majanduse stabiliseerimise kavas sätestati kogu finantsteenuste reguleeriva raamistiku läbivaatamine ja järelevalve, et olla paremini kaitstud tulevaste finantskriiside eest.
Iceland's terms of trade would be negatively affected by a prolonged recession in the main trading countries, implying a lower growth rate in Iceland.
Valitsus tegi Soome finantsjärelevalveameti endisele peadirektorile Kaarlo Jännärile ettepaneku viia läbi kehtiva reguleeriva raamistiku ja järelevalvetegevuse hindamine.
Growth could also be threatened by continued price instability linked to currency volatility in the context of removal of capital controls.
Seejärel esitas valitsus Islandi parlamendile seaduseelnõu, mis põhines muu hulgas Jännäri tehtud ettepanekutel ning samuti EMP lepingusse seoses 2009. aasta järgse finantstegevusega tehtud muudatustel, mis võeti vastu ja jõustusid 1. juulil 2010 (seadus nr 75/2010).
Financial supervision and improvements in regulatory framework
Uue seadusega tehti olulisi muudatusi finantsasutusi käsitlevasse seadusesse.
Having concluded the above process, the FME granted the banks operating licenses subject to various conditions.
Suurimad väljakutsed [23]
Liquidity conditions were also specified, requiring that available liquid funds should at any point amount to a minimum of 20 % of deposits and that cash or cash equivalents should amount to at least 5 % of deposits.
Islandi ametiasutused on rõhutanud, et uute eeskirjade sätestamisel tuleb olla äärmiselt ettevaatlik.
Furthermore, requirements were made regarding other matters such as restructuring of loan portfolios, risk assessment, corporate governance and ownership.
Veel üks oluline väljakutse on vajadus kohandada senisest enam õigus- ja reguleerivat raamistikku, et see toetaks kindlat ja tõhusat finantssüsteemi, mis oleks ka kooskõlas EMP ja rahvusvahelise õiguse arenguga [25].
Comparable capital requirements were introduced by the FME regarding other financial undertakings.
Islandi finantssektori konkurentsiolukord
The economic stabilisation program established in consultation with the IMF provided for a review of the entire regulatory framework of financial services and supervision to improve defence against future financial crisis.
Islandi ametiasutuste hiljutise teabe kohaselt [26] muutus konkurents finantsturul pärast panganduskrahhi kardinaalselt.
The Government invited the former Director-General of the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority, Mr Kaarlo Jännäri, to carry out an assessment of the existing regulatory framework and supervisory practices.
Finantsasutuste arv on vähenenud, [27] sest mitmed hoiu- ja kommertspangad ja spetsialiseerunud laenuandjad on kas likvideeritud või ühinenud teiste ettevõtjatega.