natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Norwegian authorities therefore concluded that the aid to Finnfjord had to be individually notified as it, in cumulation with the aid from Enova, exceeded the threshold for which individual awards of aid are subject to the notification obligation [36].
Järelevalveamet kiitis pärast abi kokkusobivuse hindamist vastavalt suuniste peatükile 5 otsusega nr 39/11/COL heaks Energiafondi abikava esialgse abi Finnfjordi energia tagasisaamise projektile.
On the basis of the above, the Authority concludes that the Norwegian authorities have complied with their obligations stemming from Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.
Järelevalveamet järeldas, et Enova teatatud abi aitas kaasa keskkonnakaitsele, andes Finnfjordile stiimuli võtta energiasäästumeetmeid, mis oleksid ilma abita jäänud võtmata.
Compatibility — Legal basis
16. juulil 2014, pärast ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamist kiitis järelevalveamet heaks uued keskkonna- ja energiaalase riigiabi suunised aastateks 2014–2020 (edaspidi „keskkonnaabi suunised“), [37] millega asendati seni kehtinud suunised [38].
IN argues that the aid to Finnfjord is compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement as aid for environmental protection.
Järelevalveamet kohaldab keskkonnaabi suuniseid alates nende vastuvõtmise kuupäevast [39] ka enne keskkonnaabi suuniste vastuvõtmist teavitatud üksikabi suhtes, kui otsus tuleb teha pärast keskkonnaabi suuniste vastuvõtmist [40].
IN stresses that the aid at hand does not represent a form of rescue aid.
Järelevalveamet kiitis Enova abi heaks energiasäästumeetmena.
On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement ‘aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas’ may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.
Keskkonnaabi suunised ei sisalda energiasäästu käsitlevat peatükki, selle asemel on suunistes energiatõhusust käsitlev peatükk [41].
By Decision No 39/11/COL the Authority approved the initial aid from the Energy Fund Scheme to Finnfjord's energy recovery project after having carried out a detailed assessment of that aid in accordance with chapter 5 of the EAG.
Järelevalveamet hindab teatatud abi kokkusobivust keskkonnaabi suuniste energiatõhusust käsitleva peatüki alusel.
The Authority concluded that the notified aid from Enova contributed to the protection of the environment by incentivising Finnfjord to carry out an energy saving measure that it would not have carried out without the aid.
Järelevalveamet märgib, et teatatud meetme kokkusobivuse hindamine käesoleval juhul ei oleks oluliselt erinevam, kui oleks kohaldatud suuniseid.
On 16 July 2014, after having opened the formal investigation, the Authority adopted a new set of Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 (the ‘EEAG’) [37], replacing the EAG [38].
Seetõttu osutatakse järgnevalt nii keskkonnaabi suuniste kui ka suuniste asjaomastele põhimõtetele.
The Authority applies the EEAG from the date of their adoption [39], also to awards of individual aid notified prior to the adoption of the EEAG where it is called upon to take a decision after the date of adoption [40].
Ametliku uurimismenetluse ulatus
The Authority approved the aid from Enova as an energy saving measure.
Otsuses algatada ametlik uurimismenetlus ning hinnates teatatud meedet sel hetkel kohaldatud suuniste alusel, rõhutas järelevalveamet, et kuna Enova poolt Finnfjordi energia tagasisaamise projektile antud abi kokkusobivust on juba hinnatud, ei olnud kahtlust, et täiendav abi, mille summa oli võrreldes esialgse abiga suhteliselt väike, oli suunatud turutõrkele.
The EEAG do not contain a chapter on energy savings, instead a chapter on energy-efficiency has been introduced [41].
Lisaks sellele, oletades, et abil oleks ergutav mõju ja see oleks vajalik, ei olnud järelevalveametil kahtlust, et konkurentsimoonutused ning mõju kaubandusele oleks piiratud selliselt, et abi kogumõju oleks positiivne.
The Authority assesses the compatibility of the notified aid on the basis of the energy-efficiency chapter of the EEAG.
Nimetatud küsimusi seetõttu järgnevalt ei käsitleta.
The Authority notes that its assessment of the compatibility of the notified measure in the case at hand would not have been materially different had it applied the EAG.
Järgneva hindamise eesmärk on hinnata, kas teatatud abi omab ergutavat mõju ning kas see abi on vajalik.
To demonstrate this, the relevant principles of both the EEAG and the EAG are referred to in the following.
Kokkusobivuse hindamine
Scope of the formal investigation procedure
Abil ei ole ergutavat mõju ning see ei ole ka vajalik
In the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, and assessing the notified measure under the then applicable EAG, the Authority stressed that, given the fact that it has already assessed the compatibility of the aid from Enova to the Finnfjord energy recovery project, it did not doubt that the additional aid, due to its relatively small amount compared to the initial aid, is aimed at a market failure.
Vastavalt keskkonnaabi suunistele [42] peab riigiabil EMP lepingu toimimisega vastavuses olemiseks olema ergutav mõju.
Furthermore, on the assumption that the aid would have incentive effect and would be necessary, the Authority had no doubts that the distortions of competition and effect on trade would be limited so that the overall balance would be positive.
Keskne tegur abi kokkusobivuse hindamisel on teha selgeks, kas teatatud abi on vajalik ning tegelik stiimul investeeringute tegemiseks, mida ilma abita ei tehtaks.
These issues will therefore not be dealt with in the following.
Tuleb kontrollida, kas abi on vajalik selleks, et anda investeeringutele ergutavat mõju, st kas abi aitab ka tegelikult kaasa abisaaja käitumise muutmisele nii, et keskkonnakaitse tase tõuseb [43].
The subject matter of the following assessment is whether the notified aid has incentive effect and is necessary.
Reeglina on järelevalveamet seisukohal, et kui projekt on alanud enne abisaaja poolt riigiabi taotluse esitamist, siis ergutav mõju puudub [44].
Compatibility assessment
Kuna käesolev juhtum on seotud täiendava abi andmisega, et katta käimasoleva projekti kasvavaid kulusid, ei saa järelevalveamet usaldada oletust, et ergutav mõju on olemas juba enne tööde algust esitatud abitaotlusel.
The aid does not have incentive effect nor is it necessary
2011. aasta veebruaris alustas Finnfjord 175 miljoni Norra krooni suuruse abi alusel 700 miljoni Norra krooni suurust projekti.
According to the EEAG [42], in order to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, aid needs to provide an incentive effect.
Samal ajal ei välista järelevalveamet riigiabi ergutavat mõju juba alanud projektile, kui toetus tagab selgelt selliste projektide valmimise, mis oleksid muudel juhtudel jäänud lõpetamata, või parandab keskkonnakaitset, mis jääks muidu saavutamata [45].
Whether the notified aid is necessary to produce a real incentive to undertake investment which would not otherwise be made is a crucial element in the compatibility assessment.
Abi ergutavat mõju selle taustal hinnates tuleb tähelepanelikult uurida ka vastupidist olukorda ehk seda, mida äriühing teeks ilma abi saamata.
It has to be verified whether the aid is necessary to provide an incentive effect for the investment, i.e. whether the aid actually contributes to changing the behaviour of the recipient so that the level of environmental protection is increased [43].
Äriühing lõpetas projekti 2012. aasta oktoobris ilma, et abi oleks välja makstud.
As a general rule, the Authority will consider that no incentive effect exists when the project has started before the submission by the recipient of an application requesting the aid [44].
Juhatuse 25. septembri 2012. aasta koosoleku protokollist selgub, et Finnfjord kavatses taotleda täiendavat laenu SNNilt ja täiendavat riigiabi Enovalt ja INilt ning et iga potentsiaalset toetust oleks kasutatud otseselt SNNilt taotletava laenu vähendamiseks.
In February 2011, Finnfjord initiated the NOK 700 million project on the basis of NOK 175 million granted in aid.
Kuigi äriühing osutab vajadusele saada [80–95] miljoni Norra krooni ulatuses täiendavat abi ning väidab, et äriühingu olukord on selline, mis paneb teda kaaluma projekti katkestamist, on see siiski vastuolus äriühingu teiste avaldustega, kus osutatakse „vaba tahte“ puudumisele (vt põhjendus 42), ning eelkõige asjaoluga, et Finnfjord viis projekti lõpule ilma, et talle oleks abi välja makstud.
However, the Authority does not exclude the incentive effect of aid to a project that has started when the grant of aid unequivocally ensures the completion of projects that would otherwise not have been completed or adding environmental protection that would otherwise not come to fruition [45].
Juhul kui äriühing oli ise seisukohal, et tal ei ole muud võimalust kui projekti jätkata, ei oleks abi äriühingule ergutavat mõju avaldanud, kuna äriühing oleks nii abi saades kui ka ilma selleta projekti ikka lõpuni viinud.
In assessing the incentive effect of the aid in this light, the counterfactual situation, i.e. what the company would do without the aid, needs to be closely examined.
Teisisõnu on vastupidine stsenaarium selline, et Finnfjord viiks projekti viivitamata ja ilma selle ulatust piiramata lõpule ka ilma abi saamata.
The company completed the project in October 2012 without the aid having been disbursed.
Järelevalveametit ei veena seisukoht, et abi oli ajendiks [80–95] miljoni Norra krooni suurusele rahastamispaketile ning vältimatu eelkõige SNNilt [45–60] miljoni Norra krooni suuruse laenu saamiseks.
On the basis of the information and evidence provided, the Authority does not consider that Finnfjord realistically considered stopping, reducing the scope of or halting the project after February 2011 until its completion in October 2012.
Isegi kui SNNi laenu tingimuseks oli INilt saadav 16 miljoni Norra krooni suurune abi, maksti vahendid (nii SNNilt kui ka INilt) välja enne, kui järelevalveametilt saadi luba täiendava abi andmiseks.
More specifically and with reference to the conclusions drawn in the board meeting of 25 September 2012, it appears that the company, due to the prohibitive cost involved, did not seriously consider stopping nor postponing the project, as a whole or in part, nor reducing its scope.
See näitab, et laenud ei olnud abiga seotud.
The board meeting protocol from 25 September 2012 states that Finnfjord intended to seek additional loan financing from SNN and additional aid from Enova and IN, and that any potential aid would be used directly to reduce the loan Finnfjord would seek to obtain from SNN.
Võlausaldaja, kes seadis edasise rahastamise tingimuseks tegeliku väljamakse, oleks enne laenukapitali edasist väljamaksmist oodanud ära järelevalveameti kinnituse, kas viimane määratleb rahastamispaketi olemasolu.
This finding has arguably been supported by the company in its comments to the Authority's decision to open the formal investigation procedure.
Lisaks sellele ei nähtu järelevalveametile esitatud teabest, et Finnfjord peaks laenud viivitamata tagasi maksma juhul, kui järelevalveamet laene heaks ei kiida.
Although the company refers to its need for an additional NOK [80-95] million in funding and appears to state that the very situation in which it found itself indicates that the company considered abandoning the project, this is contradicted by other statements made by the company where reference is made to the absence of ‘free will’ (see recital 42 above) and, most of all, by the fact that Finnfjord completed the project without the aid having been disbursed.
Selleks et olla vastavuses EMP lepingu toimimisega, peab abi olema vajalik.
If the company did not consider itself to have any option other than continuing the project, the aid would not provide the company with any incentive because the company would — with or without the aid — have completed the project.
Abiga ei tohi subsideerida sellise tegevuse kulusid, mida äriühing teeks niisamagi, ning sellega ei tohi hüvitada majandustegevuse tavalist äririski [46].
In other words, the counterfactual scenario is that Finnfjord would finalise the project without delays and without reducing its scope also without the aid.
Siiski võib EMP lepingu toimimisega kokkusobivaks pidada abi, mida antakse selliste ettenägematutest välistest asjaoludest tulenevate täiendavate kulude katteks, mida ei saa pidada majandustegevuse tavaliseks äririskiks [47].
The Authority is unconvinced by the argument that the aid was the trigger for the NOK [80-95] million financing package and necessary for, in particular, the NOK [45-60] million loan from SNN.
Järelevalveamet märgib, et 2011. aasta veebruaris otsustas Finnfjord, olles teadlik kulude kasvust 511,66 miljonilt Norra kroonilt 700 miljoni Norra kroonini, jätkata projektiga ilma täiendavat abi taotlemata.
Even if the SNN loan provides as a condition that the NOK 16 million aid be granted by IN, the funds (both from SNN and IN) were disbursed without the Authority's prior approval of the additional aid.
Seega on käesoleva uurimise asjaomane kulu suurendamine [80–95] miljoni Norra krooni võrra (700 miljonilt Norra kroonilt [ligikaudu 800] miljoni Norra kroonini).
This demonstrates the severability of the loans from the aid grant.
See kujutab endast ligikaudu […] % kasvu.
A creditor setting the actual disbursement of aid as a condition for further financing would have awaited for the Authority's clearance prior to disbursing further loan capital if this determines the existence of the financing package.
Esitatud teabe alusel vastavalt põhjenduses 22 kirjeldatule olid kulude suurenemise põhjused järgmised: olemasolevate masinate kohandamine, kolme olemasoleva ahju kohandamine, suitsutorustike kohandamine, turbiinihoone ja teiste hoonete seadmed, arvatust pikemad tootmispuudujäägid ning tööde ja seadmete paigaldamise lõpuleviimine.
Additionally, the information provided to the Authority does not indicate that Finnfjord would have to immediately repay the loans in the event that the Authority would not approve the aid.
Tegemist on kulude suurenemise liikidega, mida äriühing peaks sellist projekti kavandades arvesse võtma ning mis kujutab endast kõnealuse majandustegevuse puhul tavalist äririski.
In order to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, aid must be necessary.
Kulude suurenemise põhjustajaks ei saa pidada välistegureid ja kulud ei tundu olevat oma laadilt ettenägematud.
The aid must not subsidise the costs of an activity that an undertaking would anyhow incur and must not compensate for the normal business risk of an economic activity [46].
Käesolevat juhtumit võib seetõttu pidada Finnfjordi osutatud juhtumist Helguvík Aluminium Smelter [48] erinevaks.
However, aid for additional costs incurred due to unforeseeable external factors, which cannot be seen as part of the normal business risk of the economic activity at issue, could be held to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement [47].
Nimetatud juhtumis oli abisaajal raskusi saada erandliku 2008. aasta finantskriisi ajal Islandil laenu.
The Authority notes that Finnfjord in February 2011, when faced with the cost increase from NOK 511,66 million to NOK 700 million, decided to move forward with the project without applying for any further aid.
Finantskriisi võib õigusega pidada ettenägematuks välisteguriks.
Thus, the relevant cost for this investigation is the NOK [80-95] million increase from NOK 700 million to NOK [approximately 800] million.
Eelneva alusel on järelevalveamet seisukohal, et see, mida Norra ametiasutused teatatud abimeetmega kavandavad, kujutab endast Finnfjordile alustatud projektiga kaasnenud tavalise äririski hüvitamist.
This represents an increase of approximately […] %.
Järelevalveamet teadvustab, et tema hinnangu tulemus oleks võinud olla erinev, kui Norra ametiasutused, selle asemel, et pakkuda kahte kindlasummalist abi väljamakset (Enovalt ja hiljem INilt), oleks andnud abi, millega oleks kaetud teatav osa projekti abikõlblikest kuludest.
Based on the information provided, as described in recital 22 above, the cost increases stemmed from: adaptations of existing machinery, adaptations of three existing furnaces, adaptations of smoke ducts, installations in the turbine building and other buildings, longer production shortfalls than expected, and finalisation of the work and the installations.
See oleks nii eelkõige juhul, kui ettenägematute lisakulude suurus on märkimisväärne ning seotud projekti uuenduslikkusega, ning sellega, et kulusid on seetõttu oma laadi tõttu keeruline prognoosida.
These represent the types of cost increases that the company would be expected to take into account when planning for this type of project, and constitute the normal business risk of the economic activity at issue.
Käesolev väide ei ole siiski oluline asjaolude puhul, mida järelevalveamet käesoleva juhtumi puhul käsitlema pidi.
They cannot be considered to be caused by external factors and do not appear unforeseeable in nature.
Järelevalveamet rõhutab, et on Norra ametiasutuste ülesanne tõendada, et EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 erandi tingimused on täidetud [49].
The case at hand can therefore be distinguished from the Helguvík Aluminium Smelter case [48], referred to by Finnfjord.
Norra ametiasutuste (ja Finnfjordi) esitatud faktid ja väited ei ole veennud järelevalveametit, et INilt saadud teatatud abil on ergutav mõju või et tegemist on vajaliku abiga.
In that case the aid beneficiary had difficulties in obtaining financing during the exceptional 2008 financial crisis in Iceland, a circumstance that can rightly be classified as an unforeseeable external factor.
Eelneva põhjal järeldab järelevalveamet, et teatatud abil INilt Finnfjordile puudub ergutav mõju ning see ei ole vajalik.
On the basis of the above, it is the view of the Authority that what the Norwegian authorities are proposing with the notified aid measure is to compensate Finnfjord for the normal business risk of the project that it undertook.
Kuna abi ei ole ainuüksi nimetatud põhjustel EMP lepingu toimimisega kokkusobiv, ei hinda järelevalveamet abi asjakohasust ega selle proportsionaalsust.
The Authority acknowledges that the outcome of its assessment may potentially have been different had the Norwegian authorities, instead of proposing two fixed amount aid disbursements (from Enova and then later from IN), granted aid to cover a certain percentage of the eligible costs of the project.
Kokkuvõte – abi ei ole ühisturuga kokkusobiv
This would especially be the case when the scope of the unforeseeable additional costs is substantial and linked to the fact that the project is innovative and the fact that the costs thereby, by their very nature are difficult to estimate in advance.
Norra ametiasutuste esitatud teabe alusel teeb järelevalveamet järelduse, et 16 miljoni Norra krooni suurune pakutud rahaline toetus INilt Finnfjordile kujutab endast riigiabi EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses.
However, this contention is not relevant for the set of facts that the Authority faces in the case at hand.
Järelevalveamet järeldab, et kõnealune abi ei ole EMP lepingu toimimisega kokkusobiv.
The Authority stresses that it is up to the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied [49].
Seetõttu ei lubata Norra ametiasutustel seda rakendada.
The facts and arguments presented by the Norwegian authorities (and Finnfjord) have not convinced the Authority that the notified aid from IN has incentive effect or that it is necessary.
Järelevalveamet palub Norra ametiasutustel käesoleva otsuse koopia Finnfjordile viivitamata edasi saata,
On the basis of the above, the Authority has concluded that notified aid to Finnfjord from IN lacks incentive effect and that it is not necessary.
ON VASTU VÕTNUD KÄESOLEVA OTSUSE:
As the aid for those reasons alone is not compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the Authority will not assess the appropriateness of the aid nor its proportionality.
Artikkel 1
Conclusion — the aid is not compatible
Norra ametiasutuste poolt 26. juunil 2013 teatatud 16 miljoni Norra krooni suurune otsetoetus Finnfjordile ei ole EMP lepingu toimimisega kokkusobiv.
Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the Authority has concluded that the proposed NOK 16 million cash grant from IN to Finnfjord constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Seetõttu ei tohi seda rakendada.
The Authority has concluded that this aid is not compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Ametlik uurimismenetlus on käesolevaga lõpetatud.
Consequently, the Norwegian authorities are not authorised to implement it.
Artikkel 2
The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Finnfjord immediately.
Käesolev otsus on adresseeritud Norra Kuningriigile.
Article 1
Ainult otsuse ingliskeelne versioon on autentne.
The NOK 16 million direct grant to Finnfjord notified by the Norwegian authorities on 26 June 2013 is incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Brüssel, 8. aprill 2015
It may therefore not be implemented.
EFTA järelevalveameti nimel
The formal investigation procedure is hereby closed.
Oda Helen Sletnes
Article 2
Helga Jónsdóttir
This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.
Otsuse käesolevas mittekonfidentsiaalses versioonis on välja jäetud teave, mille suhtes kehtib ametisaladuse hoidmise kohustus.
Article 3
Välja jäetud teave on märgitud nurksulgudega […].
Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.
Arvnäitajate väljajätmisel on võimaluse korral märgitud vastav vahemik.
Done at Brussels, 8 April 2015.
ELT C 278, 22.9.2011, lk 6 ja EMP kaasanne nr 51, 22.9.2011, lk 1.
For the EFTA Surveillance Authority
Toimingud nr 676810, 676812, 676814-676816, 676819, 676822, 676823, 676825-676827, 676829 ja 676832-676834.
President
Toiming nr 677212.
College Member
Toimingud nr 680603-680605 ja 680866-680868.
In this non-confidential version of the decision, information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy has been taken out.
Toiming nr 681073.
Where information has been taken out, this is marked with […].
Toimingud nr 683806, 683807, 683809, 683810, 683813, 683814, 683817 ja 683819.
Where figures have been excluded, a range within which the figure exists, has, where appropriate, been indicated.
Toiming nr 686086.
OJ C 278, 22.9.2011, p. 6 and EEA Supplement No 51, 22.9.2011, p. 1.
Toiming nr 700230.
Events Nos 676810, 676812, 676814-676816, 676819, 676822, 676823, 676825-676827, 676829 and 676832-676834.
ELT C 108, 10.4.2014, lk 2 ja EMP kaasanne nr 22, 10.4.2014, lk 19.
Event No 677212.
Finnfjordi dateerimata kiri, registreeritud järelevalveametis 16. aprillil 2014 (toiming nr 705906).
Events Nos 680603-680605 and 680866-680868.
Toiming nr 708022.
Event No 681073.
Toiming nr 710453.
Events Nos 683806, 683807, 683809, 683810, 683813, 683814, 683817 and 683819.
Toimingud nr 723413-723421 ja 723424.
Event No 686086.
Toiming nr 725001.
Event No 700230.
Toimingud nr 726975-726980 ja 726985.
OJ C 108, 10.4.2014, p. 2 and EEA Supplement No 22, 10.4.2014, p. 19.
Toiming nr 726981.
Letter from Finnfjord, undated, registered by the Authority on 16 April 2014 (Event No 705906).
Toiming nr 729928.
Event No 708022.
Norra keeles Statsforetak.
Event No 710453.
Enovat juhitakse vastavalt riigiettevõtteid käsitlevale 30. augusti 1991. aasta seadusele nr 71.
Events Nos 723413-723421 and 723424.
EFTA järelevalve 3. mai 2006. aasta otsus nr 125/06/COL Norra Energiafondi kohta (Norra) (ELT L 189, 17.7.2008, lk 36, ja EMP kaasanne nr 43, 17.7.2008, lk 1).
Event No 725001.
ELT C 314, 27.10.2011, lk 4 ja EMP kaasanne nr 58, 27.10.2011, lk 2.
Events Nos 726975-726980 and 726985.
Energiafondi abikava raames korraldatavaid abikonkursse on kirjeldatud järelevalveameti otsuse nr 248/11/COL (vt eespool) punktides 27–36.
Event No 726981.
Vt järelevalveameti otsus nr 248/11/COL (tsiteeritud eespool), punkt 37.
Event No 729928.
Kättesaadav Finnfjordi veebisaidil http://www.finnfjord.no/weve_got_the_power.