natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 37 provides that the President of the Tribunal can designate another judge to replace him at full bench hearings (the Vice-President is not mentioned).
Rakendusseadusega välistatakse aga ikkagi teatavate kohtu tehtud otsuste, sealhulgas eespool nimetatud otsuste avaldamine [72].
Furthermore, if the term of the President of the Tribunal ends, certain key functions are assumed by the judge with the ‘greatest aggregate seniority’ (Article 11(2)), or by the ‘most junior’ judge (Article 11(4)) and not by the Vice-President.
Põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve tulemuslikkusega seoses leiab komisjon, et kuigi võrreldes 22. juuli 2016. aasta seadusega on märgata teatavaid edusamme, sisaldavad 2016. aasta detsembris vastu võetud kolm seadust mitut sätet, millega ei täideta konstitutsioonikohtu varasemaid otsuseid ja mis lisavad 27. juuli 2016. aasta soovituses esitatud kartustele veel uusi juurde.
Also, the Law no longer foresees that the Vice-President can preside the General Assembly, contrary to the Law of 22 July 2016.
Eelkõige leiab komisjon, et konstitutsioonikohtu legitiimsust ja järelikult ka põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve tulemuslikkust ohustab tõsiselt kogu koosmõju, mida avaldavad konstitutsioonikohtu esimehe kohusetäitja ametissenimetamise sätted, esimehe ametikohale kandidaatide valimise menetlus ja keeldumine Seimi 7. koosseisu valitud kohtunike ametissevannutamisest, nähes samal ajal ette, et ametiülesandeid asuvad täitma kolm kohtunikku, kelle Seimi 8. koosseis nimetas ametisse ilma kehtiva seadusliku aluseta.
In addition, Article 17(1) of the Implementing Law provides that for the period after the publication of the law until the formal appointment of the new President of the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall be headed by the judge whom the President of the Republic has tasked with performing the duties of the President of the Tribunal (see section 5.3 below).
Peale selle leiab komisjon, et senikaua, kuni kolm kohtunikku, kelle Seimi 7. koosseis 2015. aasta oktoobris seaduslikult ametisse nimetas, ei saa asuda täitma konstitutsioonikohtuniku ametiülesandeid, on kohtu uue esimehe valimise protsess endiselt läbinisti ebakorrektne.
The combined effect of these provisions denies the specific position of the Vice-President as the deputy of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Veel märgib komisjon, et kõnealuse kolme seaduse vastuvõtmise ajastus ning seaduse avaldamise ja jõustumise vahele jääva sobiva ajavahemiku puudumine jätavad mitme peamise sätte puhul konstitutsioonikohtu ilma võimalusest teha enne nende jõustumist nende põhiseaduslikkuse üle järelevalvet.
The position of Vice-President of the Tribunal is recognised in the constitution.
Lisaks jätkuvad Poola ametiasutuste meetmed ja avalikud avaldused, sealhulgas kriminaaluurimise algatamine konstitutsioonikohtu esimehe suhtes, mis õõnestavad konstitutsioonikohtu legitiimsust ja tõhusust.
Even if the constitution does not specify the role of the Vice-President, the provisions referred to in the previous paragraph undermine the position of Vice-President and potentially raise an issue of constitutionality which requires an effective constitutional review.
Komisjon tuletab meelde riigiorganite lojaalse koostöö põhimõtet, mis on demokraatliku õigusriigi põhiseaduslik eeldus, nagu on rõhutatud Veneetsia komisjoni arvamustes.
The appointment of an ‘acting President of the Tribunal’
Iseäranis mures on komisjon tagajärgede pärast, mis kaasnevad süsteemse ohuga õigusriigi toimimisele.
Article 17(1) of the Implementing Law provides: ‘If it is necessary to implement the procedure for submitting candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal referred to in Article 21, for the period between the day after the date on which this Act is published and the appointment of the President of the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall be headed by the judge of the Tribunal whom the President of the Republic, by way of a decision, has tasked with performing the duties of the President of the Tribunal.’
Asjaolu, et konstitutsioonikohus ei saa täielikult tagada tulemuslikku põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalvet, kahjustab tema usaldusväärsust, stabiilsust ja nõuetekohast toimimist, mis on üks olulisi õigusriigi tagatisi Poolas.
Article 21 establishes a specific procedure for the selection of the candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to be presented by the General Assembly to the President of the Republic (see above).
Kui on kehtestatud põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve süsteem, on selle tulemuslikkus oluline osa õigusriigi toimimisest.
Article 17(2) provides: ‘The President of the Republic shall select the judge of the Tribunal tasked with performing the duties of the President of the Tribunal from among the judges of the Tribunal with the longest period of service in the ordinary courts or in central government posts involving application of the law.’
Praeguses olukorras ei saa Poola seaduste põhiseaduslikkust [73] enam tulemuslikult tagada.
Article 17(3) provides that the new procedure established in the Law on organisation and proceedings for selecting the candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal would not apply in this case.
Poola valitsuse keeldumine konstitutsioonikohtu otsuste avaldamisest on tõsiselt kahjustanud usaldust Poola õigussüsteemi vastu.
Article 16(1) of the implementing Law provides: ‘If, on the day of publication of this Act, the General Assembly: 1) has not been convened by the President of the Tribunal, or 2) has been convened by the President of the Tribunal in a manner incompatible with the requirements of the Act referred to in Article 3, or 3) has not submitted candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to the President of the Republic, or 4) has submitted candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to the President of the Republic, but the President of the Republic has not appointed the President of the Tribunal, or 5) has selected candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal in violation of the Act referred to in Article 3, — the procedure for submitting candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal shall be carried out in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 21 of this Act.’
Seda kinnitab asjaolu, et ülemkohus pidas vajalikuks välja anda resolutsiooni, [74] milles kinnitatakse, et konstitutsioonikohtu otsused on siduvad isegi siis, kui neid ei ole avaldatud.
Article 16(2) provides: ‘In the cases referred to in paragraph 1(1)-(5), all actions and instruments implemented within the framework of the procedure for submitting candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal to the President of the Republic shall be repealed.’
Sarnaseid avaldusi on teinud kõrgema halduskohtu ülemkogu [75] ja teised ametiasutused, eelkõige Poola kohtute nõukogu, [76] riiklik advokatuur [77] ning riiklik õigusnõunike ühendus [78].
The acting President of the Tribunal is given a wide range of powers as long as there is no new President of the Tribunal.
Õigusriigi põhimõtete järgimine ei ole üksnes Euroopa Liidu lepingu artiklis 2 loetletud põhiväärtuse tagamise eeldus.
In particular, according to Article 18 of the Implementing Law the acting President shall enable the unlawfully elected ‘December judges’ to perform their duties as judge (see section 2 above) and lead the new selection process and exercise fully the powers of the President of the Tribunal as long as there is no formally appointed new President [69].
Selle eesmärk on tagada ka kõigi aluslepingutest ja rahvusvahelisest õigusest tulenevate õiguste ja kohustuste järgimine ning kodanike, ettevõtjate ja ametiasutuste vastastikune usaldus kõigi teiste liikmesriikide õigussüsteemide vastu.
These provisions which allow the President of the Republic to directly appoint an acting President raise serious concerns as regards the principles of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as protected by the Polish constitution.
Komisjon täheldab, et ühe aasta jooksul on vastu võetud kuus järjestikust õigusakti konstitutsioonikohtu kohta.
In particular, the constitution does not provide for the function of acting President of the Tribunal.
Niisugune seadusandlik aktiivsus ilma kõigi asjaomaste sidusrühmadega korrektselt konsulteerimata ja seda olukorras, kus riigiasutused ei tegutse nõutava lojaalse koostöö vaimus, kahjustab konstitutsioonikohtu stabiilsust, usaldusväärsust ja nõuetekohast toimimist.
Moreover, the power given to the President of the Republic to appoint an acting President of the Tribunal appears to be contrary to Article 194(2) of the constitution which provides that the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic ‘from amongst candidates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal’, while the procedure in the Implementing Law denies any such role to the General Assembly.
SOOVITATAVAD MEETMED
The judgment of the Tribunal of 7 November 2016 confirms that candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal should be proposed by the General Assembly.
Komisjon soovitab Poola ametiasutustel võtta kiiremas korras asjakohaseid meetmeid, et kõrvaldada süsteemne oht õigusriigi toimimisele.
Furthermore, the criteria to be used by the President of the Republic to choose the acting President appear arbitrary.
Eelkõige soovitab komisjon Poola ametiasutustel võtta juba 27. juuli 2016. aasta soovituses nõutud järgmised meetmed:
The choice should be made from amongst the judges of the Tribunal with the longest period in ordinary courts or in central government posts.
rakendada täielikult konstitutsioonikohtu 3. detsembri ja 9. detsembri 2015. aasta otsused, milles nõutakse, et kolm kohtunikku, kelle nimetas 2015. aasta oktoobris seaduslikult ametisse seadusandja eelmine koosseis, saaksid asuda täitma konstitutsioonikohtuniku ametiülesandeid, ning et seadusandja uue koosseisu poolt ilma kehtiva õigusliku aluseta nimetatud kolm kohtunikku ei asuks kohtuniku ametikohale, ilma et neid oleks õiguspäraselt sinna valitud; seetõttu nõutakse vabariigi presidendilt, et ta võtaks kiiremas korras ametivande eelmise seadusandja valitud kolmelt kohtunikult;
These criteria appear arbitrary as someone with no meaningful experience in the judiciary but only in central government could be selected, while someone with a long experience in the Tribunal itself but not in ordinary courts could not be selected.
avaldada ja rakendada täielikult konstitutsioonikohtu 9. märtsi 2016. aasta otsus ja 22. juuli 2016. aasta konstitutsioonikohtu seadust käsitlev 11. augusti 2016. aasta otsus ning sellele järgnenud konstitutsioonikohtu otsused ning tulevased otsused;
These provisions also disregard any prior steps in the selection process taken by the Tribunal before the entry into force of the new law.
tagada, et konstitutsioonikohtu seaduse mis tahes reformi käigus järgitakse konstitutsioonikohtu otsuseid, võetakse täiel määral arvesse Veneetsia komisjoni arvamusi ja kindlustatakse, et konstitutsioonikohtu tegevuse tulemuslikkust põhiseaduse täitmise tagamisel ei õõnestataks;
Article 16(3) of the Law of 22 July 2016 required the Tribunal to initiate the selection process of the candidate between the 30th and the 15th day before the end of the term of office of the incumbent.
hoiduda tegevusest ja avaldustest, mis võivad õõnestada konstitutsioonikohtu legitiimsust ja tema tegevuse tõhusust.
Article 16(2) of the Implementing Law repeals any steps taken by the Tribunal to fulfil this obligation.
Lisaks nendele meetmetele soovitab komisjon Poola ametiasutustel teha järgmist:
Such interference by the legislative power with any possible decision taken previously by the Tribunal raises concerns as regard the independence of the judiciary and the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs.
tagada, et konstitutsioonikohus saaks kiiremas korras teha tulemuslikku põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalvet kohtunike staatuse seaduse, korralduse ja menetluste seaduse ning rakendusseaduse üle ning et asjaomased kohtuotsused avaldatakse viivitamata ja neid rakendatakse täielikult;
The appointment of a President of the Tribunal on 21 December 2016
tagada, et uut konstitutsioonikohtu esimeest ei nimetata ametisse enne, kui konstitutsioonikohtu otsused uute seaduste põhiseaduslikkuse kohta on avaldatud ja neid rakendatakse täielikult, ning enne, kui kolm kohtunikku, kelle Seimi 7. koosseis oktoobris 2015 seaduslikult ametisse nimetas, ei ole asunud täitma konstitutsioonikohtuniku ametiülesandeid;
On 19 December 2016, the President of the Republic appointed judge Julia Przylębska, to the position of acting President of the Constitutional Tribunal.
tagada, et kuni konstitutsioonikohtu uus esimees ei ole seaduslikult ametisse nimetatud, asendab teda kohtu aseesimees, mitte esimehe kohusetäitja ega isik, kes nimetati kohtu esimehe ametisse 21. detsembril 2016.
The Commission considers that this procedure which led to the appointment of a new President of the Tribunal is fundamentally flawed as regards the rule of law.
Komisjon rõhutab, et õigusriigi põhimõtte kohaldamisega seotud küsimustes nõutav eri riigiasutuste lojaalne koostöö on praeguse olukorra lahendamiseks hädavajalik.
As explained above, the procedure was led by an acting President whose appointment raises serious concerns as regards the principles of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as protected by the Polish constitution.
Komisjon soovitab Poola valitsusel käesolevas soovituses tuvastatud probleemid lahendada kahe kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva soovituse kättesaamist ja teavitada komisjoni sel eesmärgil võetud meetmetest.
Furthermore, the fact that the procedure allowed the three ‘December judges’ unlawfully nominated by the new legislature of the Sejm to participate in the process rendered the entire selection process unconstitutional (see section 2 below).
Samuti tuletab komisjon meelde, et õigusriigi raamistiku alusel vastu võetud soovitused ei takista Euroopa Liidu lepingu artiklis 7 sätestatud mehhanismide otsest käivitamist, kui olukorra ootamatu halvenemine mõnes liikmesriigis nõuab ELi jõulisemat reageerimist [79].
Similarly, the fact that the lawfully elected ‘October judges’ could not participate in the process equally had an impact on the outcome, and therefore vitiated the process.
Komisjon on valmis pidama Poola valitsusega käesoleva soovituse põhjal konstruktiivset dialoogi.
Moreover, the very short notice for the convocation of the General Assembly and the refusal to postpone the meeting raise serious concerns.
Brüssel, 21. detsember 2016
Finally, the election of candidates by six judges only is incompatible with the judgment of the Tribunal of 7 November 2016 according to which Article 194(2) of the constitution must be understood as providing that the President of the Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from amongst candidates which have obtained a majority vote in the General Assembly of the Tribunal.
Komisjoni nimel
For these reasons, the Commission considers that these provisions on the appointment of an acting President of the Tribunal and of an President of the Tribunal, and their implementation on 19, 20 and 21 December 2016 seriously threaten the legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal and consequently the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
Frans Timmermans
FINDING OF A SYSTEMIC THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
Komisjoni 27. juuli 2016. aasta soovitus (EL) 2016/1374, mis käsitleb õigusriigi olukorda Poolas (ELT L 217, 12.8.2016, lk 53).
For the reasons set out above, the Commission considers that whereas some of the issues addressed in its recommendation of 27 July 2016 have been addressed, important issues remain unresolved, and new concerns have arisen in the meantime.
Teatis „ELi uus õigusriigi tugevdamise raamistik“, COM(2014) 158 final.
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland presented in its Recommendation of 27 July 2016 remains.
Vt COM(2014) 158 final, 2. jagu, I lisa.
In particular:
22. juuli 2016. aasta seaduse artikli 38 lõiked 3–6, artikli 61 lõige 6, artikli 83 lõige 2, artiklid 84–87 ja artikkel 89.
As regards the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, its judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015 have still not been implemented; as a result, the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm cannot take up their judicial functions in the Constitutional Tribunal.
22. juuli 2016. aasta seaduse artikli 26 lõike 1 punkti 1 alapunkt g, artikli 68 lõiked 5–7.
A solution is all but forthcoming as the three new laws adopted in November and December 2016 [70] require that the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis take up their judicial functions.
22. juuli 2016. aasta seaduse artikli 38 lõiked 3–6, artikli 61 lõige 3, artikli 61 lõige 6, artikli 68 lõiked 5–7, artikli 83 lõige 2.
Moreover, the absence of the three judges lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm, taken together with the attendance requirements which remain high, have at different occasions threatened the effectiveness of the Tribunal because of a lack of quorum for the adoption of resolutions by the General Assembly or of judgments in full bench.
Euroopa Parlamendi 14. septembri 2016. aasta resolutsioon viimase aja sündmuste kohta Poolas ja nende mõju kohta Euroopa Liidu põhiõiguste hartas sätestatud põhiõigustele (2016/2774(RSP)).
As regards the publication of judgments, the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2016 has still not been published in the Official Journal.
Arvamus nr 860/2016, CDL-AD(2016)026.
In addition, the Polish Government refuses to publish the judgment of 11 August 2016 concerning the Law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal and all other judgments rendered after that date, including the judgement of 7 November 2016 concerning the provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 on the selection of the candidates for the post of President of the Tribunal.
Vt konstitutsioonikohtu esimehe 7. novembri 2016. aasta määrus.
As a result, the uncertainty continues on the legal basis on which the Tribunal must act and on the legal effects of its judgments.
jagu.
The Commission notes that the Law on the organisation and proceedings contains a provision which gives the power to the President of the Tribunal to order publication of the judgments [71].
Vt ka artikli 6 lõige 7.
However, the Implementing Law still precludes the publication of certain judgments rendered by the Tribunal, including the judgments referred to above [72].
Arvamus nr 860/2016, CDL-AD(2016)026, punkt 106.
As regards the effectiveness of the constitutional review, the Commission considers that even if certain improvements can be noted as compared to the Law of 22 July 2016, the three new laws adopted in December 2016 contain a number of provisions which do not respect earlier judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal and added new concerns as compared to those identified in the Recommendation of 27 July 2016.
Vt artikkel 5.
These new concerns relate in particular to the disciplinary proceedings, the possibility of early retirement, the new requirements for judges of the Tribunal, the significant changes to the internal organisation of the Tribunal, the selection procedure for candidates to the post of President and Vice-President of the Tribunal, the role of the Vice-President of the Tribunal and the appointment of an acting President of the Tribunal.
Vt artikli 6 lõige 1 ja artikli 11 lõige 5.
The Commission considers in particular that the combined effect of the provisions on the appointment of an acting President of the Tribunal, the selection procedure for the candidates to the post of President and the refusal to swear in the judges elected by the 7th Sejm while providing for the taking up of office of the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis, seriously threaten the legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal and consequently the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
Vt artikli 18 lõige 2 ja artikli 21 lõige 2.
In addition, as long as the the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm cannot take up their judicial functions in the Constitutional Tribunal, the Commission considers that the selection process of the new President of the Tribunal remains fundamentally flawed.
Arvamus nr 833/2015, CDL-AD(2016)001, punkt 136.
The Commission also notes that the timing of the adoption of these three laws and the lack of an appropriate vacatio legis for a number of key provisions denies the possibility to the Constitutional Tribunal to review their constitutionality before their entry into force.
Vt punkti 7 joonealused märkused.
In addition, actions and public statements by the Polish authorities undermining the legitimacy and efficiency of the Constitutional Tribunal continue to occur, including the launching of a criminal investigation against the President of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Vt soovituse punkt 23.
The Commission recalls the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs which is, as underlined in the opinions of the Venice Commission, a constitutional precondition in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Arvamuse nr 860/2016 punkt 101; arvamuse nr 833/2015 punktid 43, 142 ja 143.
The Commission is particularly concerned by the consequences of this situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law:
Põhiseaduse artikkel 188.
The fact that the Constitutional Tribunal is prevented from fully ensuring an effective constitutional review adversely affects its integrity, stability and proper functioning, which is one of the essential safeguards of the rule of law in Poland.
Põhiseaduse artikkel 189.
Where a constitutional justice system has been established, its effectiveness is a key component of the rule of law.
Põhiseaduse artiklis 198 nimetatakse vabariigi presidenti, peaministrit ja ministrite nõukogu liikmeid, Poola keskpanga presidenti, riigikontrolli esimeest, avalik-õigusliku raadio- ja televisiooniringhäälingu nõukogu liikmeid, isikuid, kellele peaminister on andnud ministeeriumi juhtimise õiguse, ning relvajõudude ülemjuhatajat.
Under the current circumstances, the constitutionality of Polish laws [73] can no longer be effectively guaranteed.
Põhiseaduse artikkel 126.
The trust in the Polish legal system, in its integrity and coherence is seriously damaged by the refusal of the Polish Government to publish the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Vt soovituse punkt 4.2.1.
This is confirmed by the fact that the Supreme Court considered it necessary to issue a resolution [74] stating that judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal are binding even if they are not published.
Vt soovituse punkt 4.2.3.
Similar statements have been expressed by the Chief Council of the Supreme Administrative Court [75] and other authorities, in particular the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland, [76] the National Bar Association, [77] and the National Solicitor Association [78].
Vt soovituse punkt 4.2.7.
Respect for the rule of law is not only a prerequisite for the protection of all the fundamental values listed in Article 2 TEU.
Vt soovituse punkt 4.2.6.
It is also a prerequisite for upholding all rights and obligations deriving from the Treaties and from international law, and for establishing mutual trust of citizens, businesses and national authorities in the legal systems of all other Member States.
Vt soovituse punkt 4.2.8.
The Commission observes that within a period of 1 year six consecutive legislative acts have been enacted regarding the Constitutional Tribunal.
Vt soovituse punkt 43.
Such legislative activism without proper consultation of all the stakeholders concerned and without a spirit of loyal cooperation required between state authorities, is detrimental to the stability, integrity and proper functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Vt põhjendus 19.
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