natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Key aspects of that assessment were missing, like for instance the effect of the club's different possible placements in the championships final ranking, changes in the prices in the real estate market, in the sponsoring market or in the broadcasting market, potential risks regarding the ability of fans to pay season or single-match tickets, injury risks of players, changes in the market of players' transfers etc.
Seetõttu arvab komisjon, et 2004. aasta päästmise ja ümberkorraldamise suuniste punkti 10 alapunkti a kriteeriumid on siinsel juhul täidetud.
Moreover, the financial results forecasted by the viability plan were below a level, which could be considered as adequate for the restoration of Valencia CF's long-term viability.
Veel täheldab komisjon, et hoolimata sellest, et Valencia CFi võla ja omakapitali suhe muutus 2010. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastal positiivseks, jäi see samal aastal kõrgele tasemele, mis viitab klubi suurtele võlgadele.
Indeed, as demonstrated in Table 4 above, the 2009 viability plan presented operating losses until the economic year ending in June 2013, i.e. in the 4 years following the granting of measure 1.
Lisaks oli Valencia CF suurendanud 2011. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastal (aastal, mil rakendati 4. meedet) käivet ja teatanud tulust.
In addition, the operating profits forecasted for the economic years ending in June 2014 and June 2015 were at very low operating margins, of 1 % and 4 % respectively.
Sellegipoolest jäi klubi kasum nulli lähedale, samal ajal kui võlg oli endiselt märkimisväärne.
Finally, as regards the club's forecasted earnings before taxes until the economic year ending in June 2015, the same analysis stands as for the operating results above, whereas the significantly high results of EUR 50,5 million in the year ending in June 2011 and EUR 154,8 million in June 2012 are not representative of the club's financial performance but constitute extraordinary results stemming from the sale of land plots.
Eespool kirjeldatust on näha, et juba alates 2007. aasta juunist ning 1. ja 4. meetme rakendamise ajal oli Valencia CF raskustes 2004. aasta päästmise ja ümberkorraldamise suuniste punkti 11 kohaselt, kus on öeldud, et äriühingut võib pidada raskustes olevaks, juhul kui eksisteerivad tavapärased […] tunnused, näiteks suurenev kahjum, vähenev käive, kasvav laoseis, ülevõimsus, kahanev rahakäive, kasvav võlg, suurenevad intressinõuded ning vähenev või puuduv varade puhasväärtus.
On the basis of the above, the Commission considers that the 2009 viability plan did not demonstrate any prospect of Valencia CF for the repayment of the 2009 guaranteed loan, since it did not include any elements of recovery of Valencia CF from its annual losses or significantly high levels of debt and lacked credible and elaborated financial forecasts that a sound and credible viability plan should include.
Hercules CFi finantsandmete kohaselt (vt eespool tabel 3) suurenes 2008., 2009. ja 2010. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastatel Hercules CFi kahjum (5,7 miljonilt eurolt 2008. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastal 17,6 miljoni euroni 2010. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastal).
In addition, Valencia CF argues that the open bidding process launched by Fundacion Valencia, the high number of bidders and the purchase price paid by Meriton Holdings Limited confirmed that the real economic value of Valencia CF goes beyond the net value reflected in Valencia CF's annual accounts and includes the market value of its players, the club's brand name and its international projection.
Selle kahjumi tulemusel oli omakapital kõnealustel aastatel negatiivne (vastavalt 22,6 miljonit eurot, 29,6 miljonit eurot ja 29,4 miljonit eurot).
The Commission cannot accept this argument since the sale of the club's shares to Meriton Holdings Limited took place in 2014, i.e. 5 years after 2009, the time at which measure 1 was granted, and more than 3 years after measure 4 was granted, therefore it is not relevant for the assessment of the financial situation of Valencia CF in 2009.
See näitab, et Hercules CF oli enne 2. meetme rakendamist rahalistes raskustes 2004. aasta päästmise ja ümberkorraldamise suuniste punkti 10 alapunkti a (samadel põhjustel kui Valencia CF, vt põhjendused 74 ja 75) ja punkti 11 tähenduses.
Valencia CF also claims that the sale of the shares that Fundacion Valencia had acquired in 2009 — which were sold at a price above the acquisition price of EUR 48,08 per share — and the fact that those shares were pledged by IVF for its guarantee, show that IVF as a guarantor acted following the market economy investor principle because the value of those shares would cover IVF's risk as a guarantor.
Elche CFi finantsaruannetest (vt eespool tabel 5) ilmneb, et klubil oli 2009. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastal vähenev käive (2008–2010), 2007., 2008., 2009. ja 2010. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastatel negatiivne maksueelne kasum ning 2009. ja 2010. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastatel negatiivne omakapital (mõlemal eelarveaastal – 10,2 miljonit eurot).
The Commission cannot accept this claim because the sales of the shares in question took place after their pledging by IVF, in the financial years 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2013-2014.
See näitab, et Elche CF oli 3. meetme rakendamise ajal rahalistes raskustes 2004. aasta päästmise ja ümberkorraldamise suuniste punkti 10 alapunkti a ja punkti 11 tähenduses.
Therefore the prices at which those sales took place cannot be considered as indicative of the value of the shares in question in 2009.
Samal ajal märgib komisjon, et Valencia CF, Hercules CF ja Elche CF ei olnud uuritavate meetmete rakendamisele eelnenud aastatel väga keerulises olukorras 2008. aasta garantiiteatise punkti 2.2 ja punkti 4.1 alapunkti a tähenduses.
As regards measure 4 and in particular its part related to the alleged increase of the existing guarantee in February 2013, on which the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure, the Commission notes that the Spanish authorities clarified during the formal investigation procedure that this was a payment by IVF of EUR 4,9 million in February 2013 in order to cover Bankia's partial invocation of the State guarantee, due to the non-payment of the interest instalment of 26 August 2012.
Ei ole võimalik eirata asjaolu, et Valencia CF teenis 2008. aasta juunis lõppenud eelarveaastal 12,4 miljonit eurot kasumit ja omas suure väärtusega immateriaalset vara jalgpallurite lepingute kujul.
Thus, the Commission considers that this payment of February 2013 did not confer an additional advantage to the beneficiary and therefore does not constitute State aid.
Peale selle märgib komisjon, et reitinguagentuuride standardmetoodika kohaselt jääb makseviivituses olevate võlgnike reiting allapoole taset CCC (või ükskõik millist C-kategooria reitingut).
As regards the identification of the beneficiaries, the Commission notes that, according to settled case-law, an entity owning controlling shareholdings in a company must be regarded as taking part in the latter's economic activity if it actually exercises that control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the management thereof, if: (a) members of its board(s) are appointed to the board(s) of the controlled company; and (b) funding arrangements are in place between the two entities [19].
Näiteks reitinguagentuuri Standard & Poor's reitingu C määratlus, [22] mida kohaldatakse lühiajaliste võlakohustuste emitentidele, hõlmab haavatavaid võlgnikke, [23] samal ajal kui aste madalamate reitingute R ja SD-D määratlus hõlmab vastavalt võlgnikke, kes on reguleerivate asutuste järelevalve all, [24] või võlgnikke, kes on jätnud oma kohustused osaliselt või täielikult täitmata [25].
In particular, Fundacion Valencia became the shareholder of 72 % (against 1,6 % that it controlled before the capital injection).
Lõpetuseks märgib komisjon, et Valencia CFi mängijate (vara) suhteliselt suur bilansiline väärtus ei tähenda seda, et klubi ei olnud rahalistes raskustes.
Also, the annual report of Valencia CF (June 2012) states that Valencia CF belongs to a group of companies whose parent or holding company is Fundacion Valencia.
Ehkki mängijate bilansiline väärtus oli märkimisväärne, nagu on kirjeldatud klubi finantsaruannetes, oleks samade mängijate väärtus kiirmüügi korral olnud suhteliselt väike, sest ostjad oleksid müüja (Valencia CF) kõigile teada olevaid rahalisi raskusi arvesse võttes pakkunud väikest hinda.
As regards Fundacion Hercules, it acquired 81,96 %, with the second-ranked shareholder owning 16,99 % (before the capital injection Fundacion Hercules did not hold shares).
Peale selle oleneb mängijate turuväärtus suuresti juhuslikku laadi asjaoludest, nagu vigastused jms, mis muudab mängija turuväärtuse võrdlemisi kõikuvaks.
Finally, Fundacion Elche acquired 63,45 % and became the only shareholder of Elche CF with more than 10 % (before the capital injection it did not hold shares).
Eespool öeldu põhjal väidab komisjon, et Valencia CF oli 1. ja 4. meetme rakendamise ajal raskustes.
As regards members of the boards of the Fundaciones and the football clubs, the Commission notes that: (a) all members of the Board of Directors of Valencia CF were also members of the Board of Fundacion Valencia; (b) the majority of the members of Elche CF's Board of Directors were also members of the Board of Fundacion Elche; and (c) as foreseen by the statutes and by-laws of Fundacion Hercules, the members of the Board of Directors of Hercules CF are legally members of the governing body of Fundacion Hercules (‘Patronato’).
Kokkuvõttes leiab komisjon, et kuna kolm klubi olid enne meetmete rakendamist rahalistes raskustes, võib neid pidada kuuluvaks reitingukategooriasse CCC [26].
Therefore the Fundaciones had an active and ongoing role in funding the clubs, not only as the parties that had funded the clubs' capital increases but also as the parties that serviced the loans through which those capitals were obtained by the clubs.
Garantiiteatises (2008) on sätestatud, et riigiabi olemasolu välistamiseks võib komisjonile piisata sellest, kui on täidetud teatavad tingimused, näiteks laenuvõtja ei ole rahalistes raskustes ja garantii ei kata üle 80 % tasumata laenust või muudest rahalistest kohustustest.
The above indicates that the three Fundaciones, as parent or holding entities, were involved in the management of their respective football clubs.
Samas, kui laenuvõtja ei maksa garantii eest riskiga seotud hinda, saab ta eelise.
At the same time, the Commission notes that, as stated in the loan and guarantee contracts, the guarantees for the loans of EUR 75 million to Fundacion Valencia, EUR 18 million to Fundacion Hercules and EUR 14 million to Fundacion Elche were granted by IVF with the sole purpose of the acquisition by the Fundaciones of shares in Valencia CF, Hercules CF and Elche CF, respectively.
Lisaks, kui laenuvõtja on rahalistes raskustes olev äriühing, ei leia ta ilma riigigarantiita rahastamisasutust, kes oleks nõus talle ükskõik millistel tingimustel laenu andma.
The Commission notes that this financial construction aimed at facilitating the funding of the football clubs' capital increases by using the Fundaciones as financial vehicles, therefore the purpose of the measures was not to benefit the Fundaciones, but rather the respective clubs.
Seetõttu ei ole komisjon nõus Hispaania väitega, et 2008. aasta garantiiteatise tingimused on täidetud.
In addition, despite the fact that the Fundaciones were the borrowers-debtors of the loans and the entities covered by the guarantees, the risk for the triggering of the guarantees was linked to the performance of the clubs, since the guaranteed loans' repayment (capital and interest) was foreseen to take place through the sale of the acquired shares in the football clubs.
Valencia CF, Hercules CF ja Elche CF olid 1., 2., 3. ja 4. meetme rakendamise ajal rahalistes raskustes (vt põhjendused 70–82);
This is true also for measure 4, since the latter was caused by the delay in Phase 1 of the sale of the acquired shares in Valencia CF, which was planned to fund the loan's amortisation.
garantiid katsid üle 100 % aluseks olevatest laenudest, nagu on selgitatud põhjendustes 7–9;
On the basis of the above, the Commission considers that the beneficiaries of the aid measures in question are Valencia CF for measures 1 and 4, Hercules CF for measure 2, Elche CF for measure 3.
iga-aastastes 0,5–1 % suurustes garantiipreemiates, mida tuli kõnealuste garantiide tõttu tasuda, ei kajastu garanteeritud laenudega seotud kohustuste täitmata jäämise risk, võttes arvesse Valencia CFi, Hercules CFi ja Elche CFi raskusi ning eelkõige nende suurt võla ja omakapitali suhet või asjaolu, et nende omakapital oli kõnealuste meetmete rakendamise ajal negatiivne.
On the basis of the above, the analysis that follows is based on the financial data of Valencia CF, Hercules CF and Elche CF, taking into account the individual merits of each individual beneficiary.
Eespool öeldut silmas pidades leiab komisjon, et 1., 2., 3. ja 4. meetmega, mida riik rakendas 2009., 2010. ja 2011. aastal, anti abisaajatele põhjendamatu eelis.
Spain did not provide information about the credit rating of the beneficiaries, which applied at the time the measures were granted.
Riigi esimeses või teises liigas mängivale professionaalsele klubile antav eelis võib mõjutada konkurentsi ja liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
However, the Commission observes that, as set out in detail in Tables 1, 3 and 5 above Valencia CF, Hercules CF and Elche CF were in financial difficulty before the measures under scrutiny were implemented.
Esimese ja teise liiga klubid konkureerivad võimaluse nimel osaleda Euroopa tasandi võistlustel, mis Hispaanias saadakse osalemise kaudu Hispaania karikasarjas (Copa del Rey), kus löövad kaasa La Liga ning Segunda A ja Segunda B meeskonnad ning mille võitja osaleb UEFA Euroopa liigas (välja arvatud juhul, kui klubi kvalifitseerub UEFA meistrite liigasse).
The 2004 R&R Guidelines provide for the definition of undertakings in difficulty applied in the period the measures were granted.
Uuritavate meetmete rakendamise ajal osales Valencia CF rahvusvahelistel võistlustel (lüües hooajal 2008–2009 ja hooajal 2009–2010 kaasa Euroopa liigas), samal ajal kui Hercules CF oli just kvalifitseerunud teisest liigast kõrgliigasse ja Elche CF mängis teises liigas (hooajal 2013–2014 mängis klubi kõrgliigas).
Point 10(a) of the 2004 R&R Guidelines stipulates that a company is in difficulty when ‘more than half of its registered capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 months’.
ja 3. meetme rakendamise ajal osalesid Hercules CF ja Elche CF ka Hispaania karikasarjas.
Valencia CF
Ülekandeõigused, reklaam ja sponsorlus on tuluallikad, mille nimel sellised klubid konkureerivad teiste klubidega nii oma kodumaal kui ka sellest väljaspool.
In the case of Valencia CF, as it appears in its financial statements, in the period June 2007-June 2009 its registered capital was not lost but remained stable.
Mida rohkem on klubidel vahendeid võimalikult heade mängijate ligimeelitamiseks, seda edukamad võivad nad olla spordivõistlustel, mis tõotab rohkem tulu nimetatud tegevusest.
However, the financial statements of Valencia CF for the 3 fiscal years preceding the granting of the State guarantee (fiscal years ending June 2007, June 2008 and June 2009) show that the company had negative total equity in June 2007 and in June 2009 due to substantial losses in the respective years.
Seepärast on komisjon seisukohal, et hinnatavad meetmed võivad kahjustada või ähvardavad kahjustada konkurentsi ja kahjustavad liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
For this reason the Commission considers that point 10(a) of the 2004 R&R Guidelines applies, because all of the capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of it had been lost in the fiscal year ending June 2009.
Järeldus abi olemasolu kohta
In earlier cases [20], the Commission concluded that, where a company has negative equity, there is an a priori assumption that the criteria of point 10(a) are met.
Eespool nimetatud põhjustel on komisjon jõudnud järeldusele, et 1., 2., 3. ja 4. meede hõlmasid riigiabi Valencia CFile (1. ja 4. meede), Hercules CFile (2. meede) ja Elche CFile (3. meede).
The General Court also concluded in a recent judgment [21] that a company with negative equity can be considered as a company in difficulty in the sense of the 2004 R&R Guidelines: ‘the existence of negative own capital which […] may be considered to be an important indicator that an undertaking is in a difficult financial situation’.
Abi suuruse väljaselgitamine
The Commission considers that in the period June 2007-June 2009 the registered capital of Valencia CF appears to be stable because during that period the club did not adopt any appropriate measures aiming at turning its own equity from negative to positive and, at the same time, at increasing it to an adequate level.
Komisjon on sätestanud garantiide abielemendi arvutamise üldpõhimõtted 2008. aasta garantiiteatises.
Such appropriate measures could be either the capitalisation of losses or a capital increase or both.
Komisjon sõnul võimaldasid uuritavad meetmed abisaajatel jätkata oma tegevust nii, et erinevalt rahalistes raskustes olnud konkurentidest ei tulnud neil silmitsi seista negatiivsete tagajärgedega, mille oleksid nende finantstulemused kaasa toonud tavaolukorras.
For this reason the Commission considers that the criteria in point 10(a) of the Rescue and R&R Guidelines have been met in this case.
Komisjon märgib, et kuna tähelepanekuid sarnaste tehingute kohta turul on piiratud arvul, ei võimalda selline võrdlusalus mõttekat võrdlust.
In addition, as regards the criteria in point 11 of the R&R Guidelines, the Commission notes that Valencia CF incurred significant losses in the financial years ending in June 2007 and June 2009, with losses of EUR 26,1 million and EUR 59,2 million, respectively.
Seepärast kasutab komisjon asjakohast viitemäära, [27] mis on kolme jalgpalliklubi raskusi ja laenude tagatiste väga väikest väärtust arvesse võttes 1000 baaspunkti, millele lisandub 124–149 baaspunkti kui Hispaania baasmäär abimeetmete rakendamise ajal.
Furthermore, Valencia CF's turnover decreased more than 20 % from EUR 107,6 million in fiscal year ending June 2007 to EUR 99,4 million in June 2008 down to EUR 82,4 million in June 2009.
Iga laen oli tagatud klubides omandatud aktsiatele pandi seadmisega.
In addition, Valencia CF had significant levels of debt, as can be seen by its debt-to-equity ratio which was 73,5 in June 2008 and negative in 2007 and 2009.
Paraku olid klubid raskustes, st nende tegevuse tulemus oli kahjum, ja neil ei olnud kehtestatud usutavat elujõulisuse kava, millest oleks olnud näha, et klubide tegevus hakkab tootma klubide aktsionäridele kasumit.
On the same topic, the Commission notes that Valencia CF's debt/equity ratio turned positive in June 2010 and further, whereas in the previous fiscal years it was negative: however, that development was only due to the capital injection that took place in 2009 thanks to the State guarantee in question and not as a result of the club's operations.
Klubide kahjum kajastus klubide aktsiate väärtuses ja seega oli nende aktsiate kui laenu tagatise väärtus nullilähedane.
In addition, the Commission notes that despite Valencia CF's debt/equity ratio turning positive in the year ending in June 2010, it remained at high level in the same year, thus demonstrating the club's high debt level.
Komisjoni arvutuste põhjal on hinnatavate meetmete abisumma Valencia CFi puhul 20,381 miljonit eurot (19,193 miljonit eurot 1. meetme alusel ja 1,188 miljonit eurot 4. meetme alusel), Hercules CFi puhul 6,143 miljonit eurot ja Elche CFi puhul 3,688 miljonit eurot.
Furthermore, in the year ending in June 2011 (the year when measure 4 was granted) Valencia CF had increased turnover and presented earnings.
Komisjoni tegi järgmised arvutused:
However, the club's level of profits remained close to zero, whereas its debt remained at significant levels.
meetme puhul lahutati kohaldatud intressimäär 6,5 % kohaldatavast turuintressimäärast, mis oli 11,45 %, st 1000 baaspunkti Valencia CFi puhul pluss 145 baaspunkti kui Hispaania baasmäär 2009. aasta novembris [28].
The elements above demonstrate that already since June 2007 and at the time when measures 1 and 4 were granted, Valencia CF was in difficulty in the sense of point 11 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines, which states that a firm may be considered to be in difficulty ‘where the usual signs […] are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value’.
Tulemus korrutati laenusummaga 75 miljonit eurot ja laenu tegeliku kestusega, milleks oli 5,17 aastat.
Hercules CF
Lõpptulemuseks saadi 19,193 miljonit eurot;
As regards Hercules CF, according to its financial data (see Table 3 above), in the financial years ending in June 2008, 2009 and 2010 it had increasing losses (from EUR 5,7 million in the year ending in June 2008 to EUR 17,6 million in the year ending in June 2010).
meetme puhul lahutati kohaldatud intressimäär 4,41 % kohaldatavast turuintressimäärast, mis oli 11,24 %, st 1000 baaspunkti Hercules CFi puhul pluss 124 baaspunkti kui Hispaania baasmäär 2010. aasta juulis [29].
Those losses led to negative equity in the same years (of EUR 22,6 million, EUR 29,6 million and EUR 29,4 million, respectively).
Tulemus korrutati laenusummaga 18 miljonit eurot ja laenu kestusega, mis oli 5 aastat.
This demonstrates that Hercules CF was in financial difficulty in the sense of point 10(a) (in the same vein as for Valencia CF, see recitals 74-75 above) and 11 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at the time before measure 2 was implemented.
Lõpptulemuseks saadi 6,143 miljonit eurot;
Elche CF
meetme puhul lahutati kohaldatud intressimäär 6,22 % kohaldatavast turuintressimäärast, mis oli 11,49 %, st 1000 baaspunkti Elche CFi puhul pluss 149 baaspunkti kui Hispaania baasmäär 2011. aasta veebruaris [29] Vt joonealune märkus 27.
As regards Elche CF, as it appears in its financial statements (see Table 5 above), the club has diminishing turnover (from 2008 to 2010) in the financial year ending in June 2009, negative EBT in the financial years ending in June 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, and negative own equity in the years ending in June 2009 and 2010 (EUR – 10,2 million in both financial years).
Tulemus korrutati laenusummaga 14 miljonit eurot ja laenu kestusega, mis oli 5 aastat.
The club's financial data improved during the financial year ending in June 2011, when it presented profits for the first time since June 2007 and its own equity turned from negative to positive (EUR 4,3 million) for the first time since June 2009.
Lõpptulemuseks saadi 3,688 miljonit eurot;
However that improvement was due to the capital injection that took place in the same financial year thanks to the State guarantee in question (measure 3).
meetme puhul lahutati kohaldatud intressimäär 6,5 % kohaldatavast turuintressimäärast, mis oli 11,45 %, st 1000 baaspunkti Valencia CFi puhul pluss 145 baaspunkti kui Hispaania baasmäär 2010. aasta novembris [29] Vt joonealune märkus 27.
These elements demonstrate that Elche CF was in financial difficulty in the sense of points 10(a) and 11 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at the time of measure 3.
Tulemus korrutati laenusummaga 6 miljonit eurot ja allesjäänud osaga laenu tegelikust kestusest, mis oli 4 aastat.
At the same time, the Commission notes that Valencia CF, Hercules CF and Elche CF were not in an extreme difficult situation, in the sense of point 2.2 and point 4.1 letter (a) of the 2008 Guarantee Notice, in the years preceding the time when the measures under scrutiny were granted.
Lõpptulemuseks saadi 1,188 miljonit eurot.
One cannot ignore that Valencia CF had profits of EUR 12,4 million in the financial year ending in June 2008 and held intangible assets of significant value in the form of football players' contracts.
Eespool öeldu põhjal on 1., 2., 3. ja 4. meetme abielement kokku 30,212 miljonit eurot.