natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The decrease in the average monthly Chinese import volumes from July 2016-September 2016 (compared to 2015) can be explained by:
Samas kohandati neid arvusid hiljem sama organisatsiooni poolt järgmiselt: „terase nõudluse vähenemiseks Hiinas prognoositakse 4,0 % 2016. aastal, millele järgneb 3,0 % vähenemine 2017. aastal.
the chilling effect of the request for registration by the complainant on 5 April 2016 and its update in June 2016 on financial data in the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned (which, though, was withdrawn only in mid-August 2016);
See osutab, et 2017. aastal peaks terase nõudlus olema 626,1 tonni (15 % langus võrreldes 2013. aastaga), vähenedes 41,9 %ni maailma terase tarbimisest.
the adoption by the Commission of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1329 of 29 July 2016 levying the definitive anti-dumping duty on the registered imports of certain cold-rolled flat steel products originating in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation [63], under which anti-dumping duties were collected retroactively for the first time and;the knowledge of the intention of the Commission to decide on provisional measures within 8 months of initiation (instead of 9 months).
2009. aastal oli vastav tase 47,9 % ja 2015. aastal 44,8 %.“ [84].
The significant decrease in the average monthly Chinese import volumes from October 2016-February 2017 can be explained by the imposition of provisional anti-dumping measures in the parallel ongoing anti-dumping proceeding on 7 October 2016 [64].
Hiina RV kasutussuutlikkusega seotud andmeid, mis tehti kättesaadavaks pärast 2016. aasta juulit, on vähe.
Concerning the rationale why the Chinese exports decreased mainly from the second half of 2016 onwards, the Commission pointed to the following four facts as probable explanation:
Sellest hoolimata oli komisjon seisukohal, et prognoosi kohaselt on Hiina omamaise terase nõudluse kasv järgmisel neljal kuni viie aastal (2015–2020) väike või puudub, sest investeeringud (näiteks ehitustööstuses) on väikesed ja see mõjutab märgatavalt Hiina valmis terasetoodete tarbimist [85].
As a result, due to the initiation of the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned on 13 February 2016, they had been aware that provisional measures could be imposed early October 2016 in the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned;
Ta väitis, et selline üldine teave ei oleks ilmtingimata representatiivne kuumvaltsitud lehtterastoodete sektori kohta ning seepärast on võimatu selle väite kohta märkusi esitada, mistõttu ta leiab, et see väide tuleks tühistada.
On 2 June 2016, the complainant updated the request by providing more recent information.
Lisaks ei suutnud Hiina valitsus ise, kuigi tal on selleks parimad võimalused, esitada ajakohasemaid andmeid Hiina kasutussuutlikkuse kohta seoses kuumvaltsitud lehtterastoodetega ja/või realistlikku alternatiivset selgitust Hiina kasutussuutlikkuse kohta.
As a result, well-informed exporting producers and exporters knew that there was a risk that — if they shipped the product concerned from the second half of 2016 onwards — their exported like products could become subject to retroactive duties 90 days prior to the potential imposition of provisional duties in October 2016 in the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned, i.e. by July 2016;
Järeldus tootmisvõime kohta
On 29 July 2016, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1329 [66], under which anti-dumping duties were collected retroactively for the first time on certain cold-rolled steel products, also a steel product.
Kokkuvõttes on tõenäoline, et liidu turule suunatakse jätkuvalt olulises mahus olemasolevat massiivset üleliigset terase tootmisvõimsust, sh samasuguse toote puhul.
As a result, the risk that measures would apply as of early July 2016 in the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned became even more certain because of the retroactive collection in this case involving a steel product;On 7 October 2016, provisional anti-dumping measures were imposed in the parallel ongoing anti-dumping proceeding.
Praegune liigne tootmisvõimsus ja kolmandate riikide või Hiina RV enda ebapiisav kasutussuutlikkus osutab tõenäosusele, et liitu suunatud Hiina subsideeritud eksport suureneb, kui meetmeid ei võeta.
The decrease of Chinese import volumes after July 2016 can be explained by the chilling effect of the registration request in the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned, the knowledge of intention of the Commission to decide on provisional measures within eight months of initiation in the anti-dumping proceeding against dumped imports from China on the product concerned, and finally the effective imposition of anti-dumping measures in the parallel ongoing anti-dumping case early October 2016.
Subsideeritud impordi hinnatase
As shown in the table at recital (481), the absolute level of Chinese import volumes for the period July 2016-September 2016 onwards remains very high when compared to 2014.
Komisjon ei analüüsinud Hiina impordihindade suundumust eraldi tegurina, vaid võttis tervikliku lähenemisviisi.
However, the absolute level of Chinese import volumes for the periods October-December 2016 and January-February 2017 significantly decreased as a result of the imposition of measures in the parallel ongoing anti-dumping proceeding.
Ta ei kaalunud ega hinnanud mitte ainult kõiki alusmääruse artikli 3 lõike 9 teises lõigus loetletud tegureid, vaid peale selle ka mõningaid lisategureid, nagu vastu võetud tellimused ja kasumlikkus (vt põhjalikumalt allpool), et tagada oma üldhinnangule tugev faktiline alus.
This significant decrease during the periods October-December 2016 and January-February 2017 alone evidences that, taking into consideration the existing overcapacity in China (see below point 5.2.3.1.), it is likely that this decrease in subsidised import volumes would be only temporarily, and that the import volume trend observed for the period October 2016-February 2017 in particular would revert if no definitive countervailing measures are imposed.
Vaatlusaluse perioodi jooksul, nagu sätestatud põhjenduses 421, vähenesid keskmised impordihinnad vaatlusalusest riigist 33 % võrra tasemelt 600 eurot/t 2012. aastal tasemele 404 eurot/t 2015. aastal.
Therefore, this consideration did not change the Commission's assessment that there was a clear and imminent threat of injury at the end of the investigation period.
Alljärgnev tabel võrdleb Hiina impordi keskmiseid ühikuhindu viie valimisse kaasatud liidu tootja ühiku müügihindadega.
Sufficient freely disposable capacity
Tabel 17
Capacity in the PRC (crude steel and the like product)
Müügihinnad liidu vabaturul, võrreldes Hiina impordihindadega vaatlusaluse perioodi jooksul
Concerning Chinese crude steel capacity, the available information indicates that the Chinese steel capacity has been increasing rapidly for a long time.
Allikas: Valimisse kaasatud liidu tootjate ja eksportivate tootjate vastused küsimustikule ning Eurostati andmed
Whereas the PRC accounted for 25,6 % of the total world crude steel production in 2004 [67], it almost doubled its actual production and accounted for 50,3 % in 2015.
Vt põhjendus
In this respect, the Steel Communication from the Commission states the following: ‘… the spare production capacity in certain third countries, notably in China, has increased dramatically.
5 valimisse kaasatud liidu tootja müügihind (eurot/t)
The overcapacity in China alone has been estimated at around 350 million tonnes, almost the double of the Union's annual production.
Hiina impordi keskmine hind Eurostati andmetel
[68]’
(eurot/t)
In this respect, the OECD estimated the total Chinese steelmaking capacity to be 1140 million tonnes [69] in 2014, whereas the actual Chinese production was calculated to be 822,8 million tonnes [70].
Erinevus (eurot/t)
For 2015, the available Chinese crude steel excess capacity is around 350 million tonnes, as shown in the table below.
Keskmised Hiina hinnad olid 2012. aastal oluliselt kõrgemad kui liidu tootjate hinnad.
Table 16
Samas muutusid 2015. aastal Hiina impordihinnad oluliselt madalamaks (404 eurot/t) kui liidu tootmisharu hinnad (427 eurot/t).
Actual production of the like product by third countries (in thousands of tonnes)
Seda kinnitab hindade allalöömise analüüs eelmainitud põhjenduses 425.
Crude steel capacity estimated for the year 2015 [71]
Hiina ühikuhindade jätkuvat langust uurimisjärgsel perioodil 2016. aasta jaanuarist kuni juunini liidu turule sisenedes;
Crude steel production in 2015 [72]
Tabel 18
Theoretical excess capacity in 2015
Hiina subsideeritud impordihinnad uurimisperioodijärgsel perioodil
HRF actual production in 2014
Hiina impordi keskmised impordihinnad (2016. aasta esimene pool)
HRF actual production in 2015
(eurot/t)
Russia
Hiina impordi keskmised hinnad
PRC
aasta teine pool ja 2017. aasta kaks esimest kuud)
Ukraine
Jaan 16
Iran
juuli 16
Brazil
veebr 16
The above updated 2015 production figures for the like product show that the country concerned outnumbers by far all other large exporting countries; the above updated 2015 capacity figures for crude steel also indicate that only the PRC has such a massive crude steel excess capacity (amounting to almost 350 million tonnes in 2015, compared to 317 million tonnes in 2014).
aug 16
Accordingly, the Commission reiterated that the overcapacity in steel production in the PRC constitutes an important indicator for the existence of a threat of an imminent injury to the Union industry.
märts 16
Such steel overcapacity is also not in line with the demand for the like product in the PRC or in other countries.
sept 16
In fact there is a slowing demand growth in global markets and the capacity/demand gap has been widening, according to a recent OECD study [73].
apr 16
The fact that the country concerned has a massive steel overcapacity is not challenged by the Chinese authorities: First, the Chinese State Council issued on 1 February 2016 an ‘Opinion for the steel industry to resolve excess capacity’ which lays down the overall Chinese approach for tackling more resolutely the overcapacity in the Chinese steel industry.
okt 16
Measures would inter alia be a reduction of the crude steel capacity by 100-150 million tonnes over five years and the strict prohibition of new production capacity.
mai 16
Second, CISA also mentioned in its submission that ‘in the last few years the Chinese government and the Chinese steel association have taken effective measures….
nov 16
Since 2011 China has actively eliminated obsolete capacities and reinforced energy saving measures.’ [74] Furthermore, the Commission received anecdotal information that the PRC apparently started to reduce its overcapacity: In this respect, the EU Delegation in Beijing reported that a Deputy Director of CISA declared that the PRC is likely to cut off 70 millions of tonnes of steel overcapacity during 2016 (announcement on 28 October 2016).
juuni 16
Furthermore, Baosteel Group and Wuhan Steel Group also announced that they completed their targeted capacity cuts for 2016 already in October 2016 (announcement on 24 October 2016).
dets 16
Moreover, regard should be had to a recent OECD report, which states that two important Chinese steel makers scrapped facilities in the Jilin and in the Anshan provinces, amounting to a total of 2,68 million tonnes [75].
jaan 17
However, there are also developments pointing to the opposite direction, as follows:
veebr 17
There are reports that the country concerned suffers from a phenomenon of ‘zombie’ steel mills [76]: these are mills that are forever said to be dying but never actually die.
Hiina impordi madalal hinnal uurimisperioodi jooksul ja 2016. aasta esimeses pooles on kahetine negatiivne toime:
Another source also reported that 41 blast furnaces have been reopened, and more recent reports even indicate that over 50 million tonnes of steel capacity has been restarted in the PRC since the start of 2016 [77].
esiteks annab oluline hinnavahe subsideeritud impordile (täiendava) eelise, sest on tõenäoline, et kasutajad hakkavad üha enam ostma madalama hinnaga kaupa; ning
The World Steel Association states the following on the world crude steel production for the first six months of 2016: ‘World crude steel production in the first six months of 2016 was 794,8 Mt, a decrease of – 1,9 % compared to the same period of 2015...
teiseks annab selliste madalate hindade olemasolu turul ostjaile aluse taotleda liidu tootmisharult ja muudelt tarneallikatelt madalamat hinda, avaldades sellega täiendavat negatiivset mõju, mis väljendub nii vähenenud mahtudes kui ka madalamates hindades.
Crude steel production … decreased by – 6,1 % in the EU 28… China's crude steel production for June 2016 was 69,5 Mt, an increase of 1,7 % compared to June 2015….
Nimetatud mõju ei tarvitse avalduda olukorras, kus hinnaerinevused ei ole suured, ent praegusel juhul, pidades silmas hindade allalöömise ulatust, on liidu tootmisharule tekitatav kahju eelduste kohaselt oluline.
[78]’ A 2016 OECD projection [79] estimated that the Chinese capacity would even further increase in 2016, 2017 and 2018.
Hiina impordihindade tõusu perioodil 2016. aasta juulist kuni 2017. aasta veebruarini tuleb käsitleda järgmises kontekstis: Hiina impordihinnad ei olnud ainsad, mis pärast 30. juunit 2016 tõusid.
A recent 2017 OECD report [80] mentioned that Chinese steelmaking capacity is expected to have stabilised at 1,16 billion tonnes per year (2016 compared to 2015).
Teiste peamiste liitu eksportivate riikide impordihinnad tõusid samuti pärast 30. juunit 2016; perioodil 2016. aasta juulist kuni septembrini saavutatud tase oli endiselt madalam kui ELi tootmisharu keskmine tootmiskulu (ligikaudu 431 eurot tonni kohta uurimisperioodi lõpul).
The Chinese side continued to avoid engaging in a bilateral platform between the Union and the PRC to monitor steel excess capacity.
teisest küljest oli perioodil 2016. aasta oktoobrist kuni 2017. aasta veebruarini saavutatud tase kaugelt kõrgem kui ELi tootmisharu keskmine tootmiskulu.
In addition, the 13th Five-Year Plan in relation to ‘Steel industry adjustment and upgrading plan’ (2016-2020) assumes crude steel production volume forecast at 750-800 million tonnes in 2020 and crude steel production capacity reduction by 100-150 million till 2020.
Selle perioodi hinnatasemed puudutavad siiski tähtsusetut impordimahtu (1460 tonni perioodil 2016. aasta oktoobrist kuni detsembrini ja 5024 tonni 2017. aasta esimesel kahel kuul, vt tabel 15 eespool).
It also encourages steel enterprises being in a good position to go overseas and set up steel production bases as well as processing and distribution centres.
Võimalik, et see import puudutab piiratud kogust kõrge hinnaga tooteid.
In conclusion, the issue of overcapacity in the steel sector in the PRC is widely-known and also acknowledged by the Chinese authorities.
Seega ei saa tähtsusetut Hiina ekspordimahtu perioodil 2016. aasta oktoobrist kuni 2017. aasta veebruarini pidada piisavalt representatiivseks; ning
Despite some announcements by the latter, this issue is not likely to be resolved in the near future: the Chinese overcapacity is so large that it realistically cannot disappear in the short or medium-term period.
vaatlusaluse toote üleilmsete hindade tõusu üheks seletuseks on tooraine hinnatõus.
Following disclosure, the GOC commented that CISA's submission of 21 March 2016 specified that around 77,8 million tonnes of capacity have been taken out of operation since 2011 and that Chinese steel producers have also taken action and decreased their output by more than 15 million tonnes between January and October 2015.
Eelkõige tõusid 2016. aasta viimases kvartalis koksisöe hinnad peaaegu kaks korda (kuni umbes 200 USA dollarini tonni kohta) võrreldes hindadega 2016. aasta esimesel poolel.
Therefore, it concluded that any overcapacity of HRF will likely decrease, rather than substantially increase as is required to establish a threat of injury within the meaning of subparagraph 2(c) of Article 8(8) of the basic Regulation.
Isegi kui Hiina subsideeritud impordihinnad tõusid alates 2016. aasta juulist, ei muuda andmed uurimisperioodijärgsete hindade kohta tervikuna kehtetuks järeldust, et Hiina hindade langus on põhjustanud kahju ohtu.
The Commission reiterated its previous findings, namely that despite some announcements by the Chinese authorities, the Chinese overcapacity issue is not likely to be resolved in the near future.
Seda kahju ohtu ei aidanud kõrvaldada Hiina impordihindade hiljutine tõus alates 2016. aasta juulist.
The spare capacity is so large that it realistically cannot disappear in the short or medium-term period.
Isegi see kõrgem hinnatase ei peatanud suurt hinnasurvet, mis asetab ELi tootmisharu jätkusuutmatusse seisundisse, kui võrrelda Hiina suuremaid hindu liidu tootjate tootmiskuludega uurimisperioodi lõpus.
Moreover, subparagraph 2(c) of Article 8(8) of the basic Regulation refers either to sufficient freely disposable capacity of the exporting producer on the part of the exporter or to an imminent and substantial increase in such capacity indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidised exports to the Union.
Viimaseks järeldas komisjon, et impordihindade tõus võib olla ajutine nähtus ja et see lakkab tõenäoliselt, kui kaovad tooraine hinnatõusu volatiilsust põhjustanud tegurid.
The like product is assessed to be a large portion of the total crude steel production for the following reason: whereas the total Chinese crude steel production was 822000 million tonnes and 822698 million tonnes, the total Chinese production of hot-rolled flat products was 311564 million tonnes (or about 37,9 % of overall crude steel production) and 317387 million tonnes (or about 38,6 % of overall crude steel production) in respectively the years 2013 and 2014 [81].
Hiina eksportivate tootjate hinnakäitumine oli liidu turul agressiivne, eriti 2015. aasta teisel poolel ja 2016. aasta esimesel poolel.
Therefore, the above data on crude steel provide a good indication as well on the overcapacity of the like product in the PRC.
Pärast avalikustamist osutas Hiina valitsus esiteks asjaolule, et kolmandate riikide impordihinnad muutusid samal viisil ja et Hiina hindade langus lihtsalt kajastas üldist hinnasuundumust liidu turul ega tähendanud Hiina eksportivate tootjate agressiivset hinnastrateegiat.
After disclosure, the GOC commented that the Commission relied on statistics for only 2013 and 2014 without providing any more recent data.
Teiseks väitis ta, et Hiina hinnad on muutunud kooskõlas liidu tootmisharu tootmiskuludega.
Therefore, it questioned the reliability of the Commission conclusion on the extent of China's overcapacities of HRF because would largely be based on data of crude steel in general that are not necessarily representative.
Kolmandaks väitis Hiina valitsus, et erinevalt Hiina tootjatest, ei kajastuks liidu tootmisharu selline langus toormaterjali kuludes vaatlusalusel perioodil nende müügihindades, kuna need ei suuda kontrollida oma kulusid.
The Commission rejected this claim for the following reasons.
Neljandaks ei nõustunud Hiina valitsus komisjoniga, et just Hiina hinnad avaldasid survet liidu tootmisharule.
First, the statistics for 2013 and 2014 were the last available data.
Komisjon lükkas kõik need väited tagasi, nagu on üksikasjalikult sätestatud järgmistes põhjendustes.
Therefore, the Commission was not able to take more recent data into account.
Esiteks märkis komisjon põhjenduses 571, et samasuguse toote import mõnest muust riigist, nagu Iraan, Venemaa ja Ukraina, toimus hindadega, mis on isegi madalamad kui hind, mis on impordil vaatlusalusest riigist.
Furthermore, the GOC itself, even if it is the best placed, failed to provide in its most recent submission more updated figures on capacities and/or a plausible alternative explanation.
Kuid Hiina valitsus ei võtnud oma argumentides arvesse seda, nagu eespool põhjenduses 571 mainitud, et uurimisperioodi jooksul oli Iraanist pärit impordi tase palju madalam kui Hiina RVst pärineva impordi tase.
Second, reference is made to the table at recital (571) where the actual production of the like product of the PRC is compared to the actual production of other countries for the years 2014 and 2013.
Vaatlusaluse perioodi jooksul Venemaalt ja Ukrainast pärit impordi mahud küll suurenesid, kuid see toimus oluliselt aeglasemalt kui Hiina RVst pärit impordi puhul.
This table shows for instance that the 2014 actual production of the like product in the PRC (317,4 million tonnes) is about 5 times the total aggregate production of Russia, Ukraine, Iran and Brazil combined (57,4 million tonnes).
Samuti erinevalt Hiina RVst pärit impordiga juhtunule kaotas Venemaalt ja Ukrainast pärit import olulise osa liidu impordi kogumahtudest vaatlusaluse perioodi jooksul.
This is an indication of the enormous production capacity of the like product in the PRC.
Teiseks arvestades väidet, et Hiina hinnad muutusid vastavalt liidu tootmisharu tootmiskulule, osutas komisjon eespool põhjenduses 451 esitatud järeldustele: isegi kui tunnistada, et Hiina impordihindade ja liidu tootmisharu tootmiskulude vahel oleks sarnane suundumus, on tõsiasi see, et liidu tootmisharu tootmiskulu jäi üldiselt kõrgemaks kui müügihindade langus.
Third, the investigation confirmed that during the investigation period, three out of the four sampled Chinese exporting producers run on average, at a capacity utilisation rate of 65 %.
Kolmandaks seoses väitega, et liidu tootjad ei suuda oma kulusid kontrollida, tõi komisjon esile vastuolu Hiina valitsuse argumentides.
The fourth one had though a capacity utilisation rate which was higher than 80 %.
Kui Hiina valitsus väitis oma dokumendi punktis 267 ühelt poolt, et liidu tööstus ei suuda oma kulusid kontrollida, siis teiselt poolt märkis ta oma dokumendi punktis 239, et vaatlusalusel perioodil suurenes tootlikkus 7 %.
In total, there is more than 15 million metric tonnes of freely disposable capacity of the product concerned among only four companies.
Lisaks osutas komisjon ka tootlikkuse kasvule, nagu on märgitud eespool põhjenduses 450.
This is another indicator of the spare capacity of the like product.
Neljandaks osutas komisjon veel kord põhjenduses 571 esitatud väidetele tuginedes, et samasuguse toote import mõnest muust riigist, nagu Iraan, Venemaa ja Ukraina, toimus hindadega, mis on isegi madalamad kui hind, mis on impordil vaatlusalusest riigist.
Assuming similar ratios from other Chinese HRF producers, a high total HRF spare capacity in China can be deduced.
Samas põhjenduses kinnitas komisjon, et uurimisperioodi jooksul oli Iraanist pärit impordi tase palju madalam kui Hiina RVst pärineva impordi tase.
Furthermore, the Union market is an open market with a lot of imports from several countries, as shown in the table at recital (564).
Lõpuks lükkas komisjon tagasi väite selle kohta, et ta kasutas järjepidevalt hüpoteetilisi väiteid või tegi üldisi järeldusi, lisamata täiendavat teavet, mis oleks neid väiteid kinnitanud.
As shown in table 4 at recital (419), the Chinese exporting producers have been exporting to the Union market from mainly 2012 onwards and gaining rapidly market shares with low-priced imports at the expense of other economic actors, including the Union producers.
Komisjon tugines kindlaksmääramisel faktidele, mitte vihjetele, oletustele ega kaudsetele võimalustele.
This proves that penetration has proven relatively easy and very successful during the period considered for the Chinese exporting producers and is as such an indication of the attractiveness of the Union market for Chinese and other exporting producers.
Seda nõutakse temalt kui sõltumatult uurimisasutuselt ja see tuleneb inter alia alusmääruse artikli 6 lõike 8 kohasest kohustusest.
Absorption capacity of third countries
Igatahes ei analüüsinud komisjon Hiina impordihindade suundumust eraldi tegurina, vaid võttis tervikliku lähenemisviisi.