natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards the level of such funding, the CDS spreads and bond yields indicated in recitals 58 and 59 confirm that certain financially high risk companies had access to financial markets in the 2004-2006 period under consideration and provide an order of magnitude of the conditions at which such companies could obtain funding.
Komisjon märgib ühtlasi, et mõned 1. meetme alla kuuluvad garantiid nõuti sisse ja seega sai riigist HDSi võlausaldaja (3. meede).
Such market data suggests that, absent the State guarantees, HDS would still have had access to funding from the market, but at a guarantee premium significantly higher than 1 %.
Kuna aga laenukohustused jäeti täitmata pärast asjaomase garantii andmist, pole see meetme puhul asjakohane riigiabi olemasolu hindamise ega majandusliku eelise kogusuuruse arvutamise seisukohast.
Yet such differences were not translated into higher guarantee fees.
Teisisõnu, majanduslik eelis, mis kaasneb turutingimusi arvestades liiga madala hinnaga riigigarantiiga, seisneb erinevuses riigi nõutava garantiipreemia vahel ja selle preemia vahel, mida nõuaks turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev garantii andja, kui selline garantii andja üldse garantii annaks.
It follows that the fixed fee of 1 % provided by HDS to remunerate the State for the guarantees does not constitute a market based rate, as it does not reflect the increased risk of the guaranteed loans in case of default.
Seega võib garantiipreemiaga kaasneda eelis olenemata sellest, kas garantii nõutakse sisse, või isegi siis, kui aluseks olev laen makstakse nõuetekohaselt tagasi ja laenuandja garantiid sisse ei nõua.
Therefore, the guarantees granted in 2004-2006 conferred an economic advantage on HDS, which it would not have obtained at market conditions.
Kuna aga laenukohustuse täitmata jätmine oli uute garantiide andmise ajal juba toimunud, oleks turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev garantii andja HDSi varasemat kohustuste täitmata jätmist arvesse võtnud ja vähemalt kajastanud suurenenud riski garantiitasus, mida HDS peaks uutelt laenudelt maksma, või ei oleks üldse garantiid ega laenu andnud.
The amount of the advantage corresponds to the difference between the cost of funding that HDS would have obtained from the market without the State guarantees and the price (base rate plus premiums) actually paid for those State guarantees and the respective loans.
Komisjon leiab, et Kreeka ametiasutuste esitatud argument, et HDS ei saanud anda asjaomastele laenudele tagatist julgeolekupõhjustel, pole asjakohane riigiabi olemasolu hindamisel garantiide puhul, mida 1. meede hõlmab.
However, the investigation has not revealed specific contemporary quotes of interest rates for loans to HDS without the State guarantee or market quotes for the latter guarantee.
Kuna riigiabi mõiste on objektiivne, pole oluline, miks HDS ei saanud tagatist anda, vaid üksnes see, et HDS poleks saanud tabelis 2 kirjeldatud laene samadel tingimustel ilma garantiideta.
The market data available (recitals 58 and 59) portrays financial instruments which are different from the loans and guarantees contracted by HDS, notably as to maturity and amount and has been retrieved from companies which did not have financial data similar to those shown for HDS in Table 1 above (for 2004-2006) and a history of default similar to that of HDS as shown in Table 3 above (for 2004-2006).
Tagatiseta laenud on ka riskantsemad kui tagatisega laenud ja neil on võetud riski hüvitamiseks seega kõrgemad intressimäärad.
Furthermore, in contrast to those companies, the nature of HDS' military production and the activity of its main client, namely the Greek Armed Forces, could have been seen by Greek banks as an additional commercial reason to provide funding to HDS.
Seda objektiivset fakti väljendab 2008. aasta teatise kohaselt arvutatud intressimäär, mis on pöördvõrdeline antud tagatise väärtusega.
It follows that the market data in this case does not provide of itself a robust indication and precise benchmark of the cost at which HDS could have obtained the same loans between 2004 and 2006 at market conditions.
Seetõttu leiab komisjon, et 1. meede andis HDSile neile summadele vastava eelise, mis arvutati meetodite abil, mida on selgitatud 2004.–2006. aastal võetud laenudele antud garantiide puhul põhjenduses 89 ja 2007.–2011. aastal võetud laenudele antud garantiide puhul põhjenduses 91.
Therefore, in order to determine that hypothetical cost of funding from the market for the six loans granted during the years 2004-2006 (i.e. loans 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 shown in Table 2), the Commission has taken into account also the indications in the Communication on the reference and discount rates (‘the 2008 Communication’).
Seoses Kreeka ametiasutuste väidetega, mis on kokkuvõtlikult esitatud käesoleva otsuse põhjendustes 33 ja 34, leiab komisjon, et ettevõtte rahalisi raskusi tuleb hinnata objektiivselt selle konkreetse ettevõtte finants- ja majandusnäitajate põhjal.
Given HDS' financial situation in 2004-2006 as portrayed in HDS' financial data in Table 1 and the fact that the Greek authorities were unable to provide the Commission with any plan credibly showing positive developments for the future of the company, HDS' creditworthiness (rating) must be considered the lowest of the five possible ratings provided for in the 2008 Communication, namely ‘Bad/Financial difficulties (CCC and below)’.
Seega ei tohiks rahaliste raskuste põhjused iseenesest vähendada rahaliste raskuste olulisust, mida näitavad asjakohased finants- ja majandusnäitajad.
Furthermore, the loans in question had no collateral and have therefore to be qualified as ‘low collateral’ in the three step scale provided for in the 2008 Communication.
Konkurentsi ja liikmesriikidevahelise kaubanduse kahjustamine
The market interest rate must therefore be calculated for each loan as the result of the sum of the 1-year IBOR at the time the loan was granted plus 1000 basis points as defined in the 2008 Communication.
Kõnealused meetmed võimaldasid HDSil rahastada nii oma sõja- kui ka tsiviilotstarbelist tootmist tavapärasest madalamate turuintressimääradega.
The reliability of the result of the above calculation is further confirmed in the present case by the fact that such result is within the ranges of CDS spreads and bond yields identified in recitals 58 and 59.
Kõnealused meetmed võisid seega konkurentsi kahjustada, sest muud samadel turgudel tegutsevad ettevõtted pidid oma tegevust rahastama turutingimustel ja tegutsema ilma sellise riigitoetuseta.
Therefore, the amount of the advantage linked to the guarantees granted by the State for the loans obtained by HDS during the years 2004-2006 (as identified in recital 87 above) must be calculated separately for each loan according to the following methodology: the difference between: (i) the market interest rate based on the 2008 Communication calculated as explained in recital 87 applied to the loan principal, and (ii) the actual financing cost due by HDS taking into account the interest rate applied by the banks to the loan principal and the 1 % guarantee premium applied by the State (see Table 2), calculated and charged for the period during which the different amounts were made available to HDS.
Vaatamata sellele, et HDSi sõjaotstarbeline tootmine oli tähtis Kreeka oluliste julgeolekuhuvide kaitsmiseks, tegutses HDS ka sektoris, kus kaubeldakse liikmesriikide vahel tsiviilotstarbeliste toodetega.
On the other hand, HDS' financial situation was substantially different in the period from 2007 to 2011.
Seetõttu võis 1. meede kahjustada liikmesriikidevahelist konkurentsi ja kaubandust.
According to Table 1, in 2007, HDS lost a third of its turnover as compared to previous years, had losses (negative earnings before tax ‘EBT’) double its turnover, a negative equity more than quadruple its turnover and losses of previous years almost 9-fold its turnover.
Järeldus riigiabi olemasolu kohta ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses 1. meetme puhul
HDS' negative own equity in 2007 became almost four times higher than in 2006, thus not only stabilising that negative development but also largely increasing its intensity.
Eeltoodut arvestades järeldab komisjon, et 1. meetmena määratletud garantiid, mille Kreeka andis HDSile ning mida on kirjeldatud põhjendustes 15 ja 16, on ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses riigiabi, sest nendega kaasnes kasu HDSi tsiviilotstarbelisele tegevusele.
After 2007, the financial data only further significantly deteriorated.
Komisjon märgib, et kõnealusel juhul suurendas kapitali Kreeka riik.
HDS' turnover gradually shrank to EUR 39 million in 2011 from EUR 95 million in 2006, while losses of previous years accumulated to EUR 1131 million in 2011, as compared to EUR 443 million in 2006.
Seetõttu on 3. meetme võtmine Kreeka riigiga seostatav ja seda rahastatakse riigi ressurssidest.
In 2011 HDS had a negative equity almost 14-fold its turnover and losses of previous years almost 29-fold its turnover.
Kaasatud riigi ressursside summa asjus ei nõustu komisjon Kreeka ametiasutustega, et osa kapitali suurendamisest ei tohiks 3. meetme alla kuuluvaks lugeda, kuna tegemist oli riigigarantiide (1. meede) sissenõudmisest tulenevate võlgade kapitaliseerimisega.
In addition, Table 3 shows that the amounts on which HDS defaulted reached double-digit EUR million amounts as of 2007, consistently rising from EUR 15 million in 2007 to EUR 90 million in 2011.
Seda seetõttu, et garantii sissenõudmisest tuleneva võla kapitaliseerimine pole automaatne ümberarvestamine, vaid pigem riigi aktiivne otsus seda võlga mitte sisse nõuda.
In light of this evidence, the Commission considers that as of 2007, HDS' risk of default on loans which were not collateralised was so high that, absent the State guarantees, it could not have obtained such a loan from the market at any rate.
Selline ümberarvestamine tähendab võimalikku väärtuse vähenemist, sest riik vahetas oma võlausaldajarolli aktsionärirolli vastu, kaotades seeläbi riigi ressursse võlgade vormis, mille ta otsustas sisse nõudmata jätta.
Indeed, no market lender presented with HDS' financial data in the period 2007-2011 and its history of default would have agreed to provide any funding without a solid guarantee or collateral to HDS, since every market lender would anticipate that such funding would eventually be lost.
Ettevõtte võimaliku likvideerimise korral saaks aktsionär oma olemuse tõttu vähem tõenäoliselt oma kapitali tagasi kui võlausaldaja, seega kaotaks riigile võlgnetavate summade kapitaliks ümberarvestamine võimalikke riigi ressursse.
In turn, no market guarantor would have provided to the lenders any guarantee on the loans to HDS after 2007 without upfront one-off premiums of 100 % of the loan principals, which would be fully securing the loss that the guarantor would face with certainty when HDS would default on the loans, sooner or later.
Kuna meede võimaldati ühele ettevõtjale, nimelt HDSile, järeldab komisjon, et see oli valikuline.
Therefore, the aid element in the State guarantees granted to HDS in the period 2007-2011 is equivalent to a one-off guarantee premium equal to the full amount of the principal of the guaranteed loans and charged upfront when each guarantee was granted, minus the guarantee premium actually paid by HDS on each loan.
Nagu eespool mainitud, on eelis ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses iga majanduslik kasu, mida ettevõtja ei oleks saanud tavapärastes turutingimustes.
The Commission takes note of the clarification of the Greek authorities with regard to the amount that was actually made available to HDS in relation to the loan of EUR 30 million by the National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and EFG Eurobank in 2011 (guarantee number 10 in Table 2 above) which was EUR 7095858, instead of EUR 30000000 originally mentioned in the decision of 6 March 2013.
Sellega seoses pole komisjon saanud Kreeka ametiasutustelt veenvaid tõendeid, mis õigustaksid nende väidet, et kuna riik tegutses nagu mõistlik turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev investor, suurendati kapitali kõnealustel juhtudel tavapärastel turutingimustel ja see ei saanud seetõttu endast eelist kujutada.
The Commission also takes note of the clarification of the Greek authorities with regard to the State guarantee for the loan of EUR 10 million by Tbank in 2011 (guarantee number 11 in Table 2 above), according to which the bond loan was never issued.
Komisjon märgib, et kapitali suurendamisi, mida Kreeka riik kui aktsionär tegi 2011. aastal mai ja detsembri vahel, ei toetatud ühegi tulevikuanalüüsiga võimalike investeeringute tasuvuse kohta, mida mõistlik investor oleks enne investeerimise kohta otsuse tegemist uurinud ja arvesse võtnud.
The Commission also observes that, even if only EUR 7095858 of loan 10 and EUR zero of loan 11 in Table 2 above have been actually made available to HDS, the State guarantees were granted for the full amount of EUR 40 million.
Nagu Kreeka riik selgitas, oli kapitali suurendamise eesmärk tagada HDSi elujõulisus, arvestades ettevõtte otsustavat osa riigikaitses ja julgeolekus.
However, only the amounts of the loans actually disbursed play a role for the determination of the amount of aid to be recovered, as explained in recital 135 of the present decision.
Igal juhul ei piisanud kapitalisüstide summast HDSi negatiivse omakapitali katmiseks ning seega ei saa seda pidada meetmeks, mis ettevõtja väärtust kaitses ja ümberkorraldamist toetas.
As regards the granting dates, they are provided in Table 2 above.
Sellega seoses järeldub Kreeka edastatud teabest, et polnud tõendeid majandusliku eelanalüüsi kohta, mille riik oleks ellu viinud välja selgitamaks, kas garantiide sissenõudmisest tulenevate nõuete ümberarvestamine kapitaliks oli majanduslikult kasulikum kui nende nõuete alleshoidmine või sissenõudmine.
The Commission in addition notes that some of the guarantees under measure 1 were called and thus the State became creditor of HDS (measure 3).
Turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev võlausaldaja uuriks tavaliselt enne otsustamist, milline tegutsemisviis on majanduslikult kasulikum.
However, to the extent those defaults occurred after the relevant guarantee had been provided, this is irrelevant for the State aid qualification of the measure and for the total amount of economic advantage.
Et hinnata, kas riik andis HDSile kõnealuste kapitali suurendamistega eelise, tuleb kindlaks teha, kas riik käitus nii, nagu turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja oleks sarnases olukorras käitunud.
This is because the calling of a guarantee is a natural consequence of the provision of such a guarantee by a guarantor.
Selline turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja ei arvestaks avaliku korraga seotud kaalutlusi.
In other words, the economic advantage of a State guarantee priced below market conditions lies in the difference between the guarantee premium charged by the State and the premium that a market guarantor, if any, would have charged.
Kreeka ametiasutuste esitatud väidet riigi oluliste julgeolekuhuvide kaitsmiseks vajaliku ettevõtte säilitamise kohta ei saa seetõttu arvestada kaalutlusena, mida arvestaks turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev investor, ja see pole seega kõnealuste kapitali suurendamiste hindamisel asjakohane.
A possible advantage in the guarantee premium may exist, therefore, independently of whether the guarantee is called and even if the underlying loan is duly repaid and the guarantee is not called by the lender.
Kuigi puuduvad ajakohased tõendid selle kohta, et Kreeka ametiasutused põhjenduses 108 mainitud analüüsi ellu viisid, ilmneb kättesaadavatest arvnäitajatest, et ümberarvestamine polnud nii kasulik kui olukorra säilitamine ehk võlanõuete alleshoidmine.
Nevertheless, to the extent the defaults had already occurred when new guarantees would be provided, a market guarantor would have taken into account those past defaults of HDS and would have at least reflected the increased risk in the guarantee fee to be paid by HDS on new loans, or would not have provided any guarantee or loan.
HDSi bilansis esitatud andmete põhjal oli ettevõtte pika- ja lühiajaliste kohustiste summa 2011. aastal 1,008 miljardit eurot.
Finally, the Commission considers that the argument put forth by the Greek authorities that HDS could not provide collateral for the relevant loans due to security reasons is irrelevant for the qualification as State aid of the guarantees constituting measure 1.
Arvestades sama aasta juba negatiivset omakapitali summas 537 miljonit eurot ja võimetust müüa ettevõtte sõjaotstarbelist vara, poleks riik ettevõtte likvideerimise korral või kehvade tasuvusväljavaadetega jätkamise korral tõenäoliselt saanud tagasi mingit osa omakapitali suurendamise summast 154,19 miljonit eurot.
Since the notion of State aid is an objective notion, it is not relevant why HDS could not provide any collateral, but merely that HDS could not have obtained the loans described in Table 2 on the same terms without the guarantees.
Turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev võlausaldaja oleks seega säilitanud võlanõuded, sest selle tõenäosus tulu tuua oli omakapitaliks ümberarvestamisega võrreldes kahtlemata suurem, kuigi väike.
In turn, non-collateralised loans are riskier for the lender than collateralised ones and, thus, attract a higher interest rate remunerating the risk taken.
Võlanõuetel (isegi kui need on tagamata) on aktsionäride nõuetest suurem väärtus, arvestades võlausaldajate eesõigust.
This objective fact is captured by the interest rate calculated in accordance with the 2008 Communication, which is inversely proportional to the quality of the collateral provided.
Samad kaalutlused kehtivad mutatis mutandis värske lisakapitali eraldamise puhul summas 4 miljonit eurot.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that measure 1 conferred an advantage on HDS corresponding to the amount calculated on the basis of the methodology explained, for the guarantees granted for loans obtained in the period 2004-2006, in recital 89 above and, for guarantees granted for loans obtained in the period 2007-2011, in recital 91 above.
Ükski turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev investor ei loobuks märgitud summadest, kui puudub prognoos tasuvuse kohta.
With respect to the arguments by the Greek authorities summarised in recitals 33 and 34 of the present decision, the Commission considers that the financial difficulties of a firm have to be assessed objectively on the basis of the financial and economic indicators of the specific firm in question.
See on seotud asjaoluga, et Kreeka ametiasutused ei suutnud esitada majanduslikku eelanalüüsi tulevase kasumlikkuse kohta, ning tabelis 1 esitatud HDSi varasemate ja praeguste finantstulemuste uurimisega aktsionäri tegeliku ja võimaliku tasuvuse seisukohast.
Therefore, the reasons behind the financial difficulties should not, as such, alleviate the level of seriousness of those financial difficulties, as shown by the relevant financial and economic indicators.
HDSi finantstulemused alates 2004. aastast näitavad tõepoolest, et ettevõte ei tootnud investeeritud kapitalist dividendidena mingit tulu.
Effect on competition and trade between Member States
Enne 2011. aastat muutus omakapital pigem positiivsest (41 miljonit eurot) tugevalt negatiivseks (miinus 537 miljonit eurot), kaotades seeläbi kogu aktsionäride investeeritud kapitali, ja kuna ettevõttel polnud usaldusväärset ümberkorralduskava, siis ka hüpoteetilise ootuse, et osaluse väärtus tulevikus suureneb.
The measures in question enabled HDS to finance both its military and its civil production below normal market rates.
Seetõttu leiab komisjon, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev mõistlik investor poleks osalenud HDSi aktsiakapitali suurendamises selliste tingimuste korral, eelkõige kuna puudus ettevõtte usaldusväärne ümberkorralduskava, mis näitaks prognoosi HDSi elujõulisuse taastumise kohta ja piisavat investeeringutasuvust riigile kui aktsionärile, ning kuna Kreeka esitatud arvnäitajate põhjal sellise tasuvuse väljavaade puudus.
The measures in question are thus liable to distort competition, as other companies active in the same markets needed to finance their operations at market conditions and operate without similar State support.
Seetõttu järeldab komisjon, et riigi osalemine 2011. aasta kapitali suurendamises andis abisaajale eelise, mis vastas kapitali suurendamiste kogusummale.
Also, irrespective of the relevance of the military production of HDS for the essential security interests of Greece, HDS was active in a sector in which products for civil use are traded among Member States.
Kapitali suurendamiste summad ja kuupäevad on esitatud tabelis 4.
Consequently, measure 1 was capable of affecting competition and trade between Member States.
Komisjon leiab, et põhjendustes 99 ja 100 esitatud põhjustel võis 3. meede konkurentsi ja liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust kahjustada.
Conclusion with regard to the existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU for measure 1
Järeldus riigiabi olemasolu kohta ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses 3. meetme puhul
In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the guarantees defined as measure 1, granted to HDS by Greece and described in recitals 15 to 16, constitute, to the extent that they benefitted the civil activities of HDS, State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Eeltoodut arvestades järeldab komisjon, et 3. meetmena määratletud HDSi kapitali suurendamine, mida Kreeka teostas ning mida on kirjeldatud põhjendustes 42 ja 47, on ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses riigiabi, sest sellega kaasnes kasu HDSi tsiviilotstarbelisele tegevusele.
The Commission notes that the capital increases in question were provided by the Greek State.
Järeldus riigiabi olemasolu kohta
As such the granting of measure 3 is imputable to the Greek State and it is financed through State resources.
Arvestades eeltoodut ja asjaolu, et 1. ja 3. meetmega kaasnes kasu HDSi tsiviilotstarbelisele tootmisele, leiab komisjon, et need kujutavad endast riigiabi ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
As to the amount of State resources involved, the Commission does not agree with the Greek authorities that a part of the capital increases should not be counted in measure 3, because it was the capitalisation of debts stemming from the calling of State guarantees (measure 1).
Ebaseaduslik abi
That is because the capitalisation of debt stemming from the calling of a guarantee is not an automatic conversion, but rather an active decision by the State not to enforce that debt.
ja 3. meede kujutavad endast riigiabi ning nende võtmisel rikuti ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikes 3 sätestatud teatamiskohustust ja kohustust mitte rakendada meedet enne lõpliku otsuse tegemist.
Such a conversion implies a potential loss of value, considering that the State exchanged its position as creditor to that of shareholder, thereby foregoing State resources in the form of debts it decided not to enforce.
Seega on nende meetmete puhul tegemist ebaseadusliku riigiabiga.
In addition, in case of a potential liquidation of the company, a shareholder would by definition be less likely to collect its capital than a creditor, so that the conversion of debt owed to the State into capital has the effect of foregoing potential State resources.
Abi kokkusobivus siseturuga
Since the measure was provided to an individual undertaking, namely HDS, the Commission concludes that it was selective.
ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõikes 1 osutatud riigiabi keeld ei ole ei absoluutne ega tingimusteta.
As stated above, an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions.
ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõiked 2 ja 3 kujutavad endast õiguslikku alust, mis võimaldab pidada teatavaid abimeetmeid siseturuga kokkusobivaks.