natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
‘Publicly owned airports have traditionally been considered by public authorities as infrastructures for facilitating local development and not as undertakings operating in accordance with market rules.
Vt 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste punkt 53.
Those airports' prices consequently tend not to be determined with regard to market considerations and in particular sound ex ante profitability prospects, but essentially having regard to social or regional considerations.
Vt 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste punkt 59.
In those circumstances, the Commission has strong doubts that at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports.
Vt 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste punktid 57–59.
Ryanair essentially argued that the MEO test can be applied based on a comparison with the commercial arrangements of other European airports.
Vt 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste punkt 63.
In particular, it compared charges paid by Ryanair at Bournemouth, Grenoble, Knock, Maastricht, Nîmes and Prestwick airports with the charges paid by Ryanair under the agreements at Lübeck airport.
Vt 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste punkt 64.
The study did not assess whether the sample of benchmark airports fulfilled all the criteria spelled out in the 2014 Aviation guidelines, as it only assessed traffic volumes, type of airport traffic and prosperity of the surrounding area [62].
Vt 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste punkt 64; komisjoni 23. juuli 2014. aasta otsus (EL) 2015/1226 riigiabi SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) kohta, mida Prantsusmaa on andnud Angoulême'i kaubandus-tööstuskojale ning ettevõtjatele SNC-Lavalin, Ryanair ja Airport Marketing Services (ELT L 201, 30.7.2015, lk 48); komisjoni 1. oktoobri 2014. aasta otsus (EL) 2015/1584 riigiabi SA.23098 (C 37/07) (ex NN 36/07) kohta, mida Itaalia rakendas ettevõtja Società di Gestione dell'Aeroporto di Alghero So.Ge.A.AL S.p.A. ja mitme Alghero lennujaamas tegutseva lennuettevõtja suhtes (ELT L 250, 25.9.2015, lk 38); komisjoni 1. oktoobri 2014. aasta otsus (EL) 2016/2069 meetmete SA.14093 (C76/2002) kohta, mida Belgia võttis Brussels South Charleroi Airporti ja Ryanairi kasuks (ELT L 325, 30.11.2016, lk 63).
In its 2012 Opening decision, the Commission compared the charges laid down in the March and October 2010 Side letters with charges at Hamburg airport, which led to doubts as to the market conformity of the charges laid down in the Side letters.
Kohtuotsus, Esimese Astme Kohtu otsus, 17. detsember 2008, Ryanair vs. komisjon, T-196/04 ECLI:EU:T:2008:585, punkt 59.
Hamburg is used for all segments of air transport, whereas Lübeck was specialised in low cost carriers which required fewer check-incounters and facilities for transfer passengers, no passenger busses, less luggage handling personnel and facilities, less cleaning personnel, and allowed for a shorter circulation time.
Vt otsus (EL) 2015/1226.
In addition to those considerations, the airport infrastructure must be open to all airlines and not dedicated to a specific airline in order to exclude that the advantage resulting from compatible aid to the airport operator is passed on to a specific airline.
Kohtuotsus, Euroopa Kohus, 21. detsember 2016, komisjon vs. Hansestadt Lübeck, C-524/14 P ECLI:EU:C:2016:971, punkt 62.
The Commission also notes in this context that price differentiation is a standard business practice.
7. novembril 2005 palus komisjon Saksamaalt teavet, mille Saksamaa edastas 7. veebruari 2006. aasta kirjaga.
Such differentiated pricing policies should, however, be commercially justified.
Lisateavet paluti 22. märtsi 2006. aasta kirjaga, millele Saksamaa vastas 12. juunil 2006.
The Commission considers that arrangements concluded between airlines and an airport can be deemed to satisfy the MEO test when they incrementally contribute, from an ex ante point of view, to the profitability of the airport.
14. oktoobril ja 4. detsembril 2006 toimusid komisjoni talituste, lennujaama käitaja enamusosaniku Infratili ja Lübecki linna kohtumised.
The airport should demonstrate that, when setting up an arrangement with an airline (for example, an individual contract or an overall scheme of airport charges), it is capable of covering all costs stemming from the arrangement, over the duration of the arrangement, with a reasonable profit margin on the basis of sound medium-term prospects [64].
10. juuli 2007. aasta kirjaga teatas komisjon Saksamaale oma otsusest algatada Lübecki lennujaama rahastamise, Lübecki linna ja Infratili rahaliste suhete ning lennujaama ja Ryanairi rahaliste suhete alusel menetlus vastavalt Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikele 2 (edaspidi „2007. aasta algatamisotsus“).
In order to assess whether an arrangement concluded by an airport with an airline satisfies the MEO test, expected non-aeronautical revenues stemming from the airline's activity must be taken into consideration together with airport charges, net of any rebates, marketing support or incentive schemes.
Ametlik uurimismenetlus registreeriti numbriga SA.21877 (C 24/2007).
Similarly, all expected costs incrementally incurred by the airport in relation to the airline's activity at the airport have to be taken into account.
2007. aasta algatamisotsust parandati 24. oktoobril 2007.
Such incremental costs may encompass all categories of expenses or investments, such as incremental personnel, equipment and investment costs induced by the presence of the airline at the airport [65].
Algatamisotsus avaldati 29. novembril 2007 Euroopa Liidu Teatajas [5].
The Commission considers in its constant decision making practice that costs which the airport would have to incur anyway, independently from the arrangement with the airline, should not be taken into account in the MEO test [66].
Parandus avaldati 7. detsembril 2007 [6].
According to the Charleroi judgement [67] when assessing the measures in question the Commission has to take into account all the relevant features of the measures and their context.
Komisjon kutsus huvitatud isikuid üles esitama kõnealuste meetmete kohta märkusi ühe kuu jooksul alates otsuse avaldamise kuupäevast.
In other words, the Commission has to analyse the expected impact of the agreement with Ryanair on FLG, taking into account all relevant features of the measure in question.
Komisjonile esitasid selles asjas märkused Ryanair, Air Berlin, Infratil, FLG, kaks vabaühendust, [7] Lübecki Kaubandus-Tööstuskoda (edaspidi „IHK Lübeck“), [8] Saksamaa Lennuettevõtjate Ühendus (Bundesverband der Deutschen Fluggesellschaften, edaspidi „BDF“) ja eraisikud [9].
The Court declared in the Stardust Marine judgment that, ‘[…] in order to examine whether or not the State has adopted the conduct of a prudent investor operating in a market economy, it is necessary to place oneself in the context of the period during which the financial support measures were taken in order to assess the economic rationality of the State's conduct, and thus to refrain from any assessment based on a later situation.’ [68].
Saksamaa vastas nendele märkustele 17. aprillil 2008.
In order to apply the MEO test, the Commission has to place itself at the time when the agreement was concluded.
Komisjoni sõltumatu nõustamisettevõte Ecorys nõudis Saksamaalt 24. juulil 2008 teavet, et koostada selles asjas aruanne.
The Commission has also to base its assessment on the information and assumptions which were at the disposal of FLG when the agreement was concluded.
Saksamaa pöördus 1. augustil 2008 komisjoni poole, et vaidlustada Ecorysi õigus hankida teavet ja dokumente.
Application of the MEO principle to the 2000 Agreement
Seejärel laekus nõutud teave 18. septembril 2008.
Preliminary remarks
16. aprillil 2009 nõudis komisjon Saksamaalt lisateavet.
The Commission notes that Air Berlin argued that the agreements between Ryanair and Lübeck airport were not profitable as the losses of FLG increased continuously (see Table 8) after the arrival of Ryanair.
Saksamaa taotles tähtaja pikendamist 21. aprillil 2009 ja teist korda 7. juulil 2009.
As Ryanair and Wizz Air were the only airlines flying regular lines from the airport, Air Berlin concluded that FLG's losses must be attributable to these airlines.
Nõutud teave edastati 30. oktoobril 2009.
The Commission notes that even if a significant correlation between the number of Ryanair passengers at Lübeck airport and the losses incurred by FLG could be established, such correlation would not necessarily imply that the losses result from the operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport.
Komisjon nõudis 29. oktoobril 2009 lisateavet, mille Saksamaa edastas 16. detsembril 2009.
Germany stated that more than […] % of the losses between 2000 and 2005 resulted from investments necessary to adapt the airport to increased passenger numbers.
17. oktoobril 2010 sai komisjon teavet Air Berlinilt.
Such investments were necessary to increase the airport value in the event of the envisaged privatisation and to prepare the airport to attract any airline.
20. aprillil 2011 pikendas komisjon Saksamaa tähtaega.
In addition, the Commission recalls that the MEO test is based on an ex ante assessment.
21. aprillil 2011 taotles Saksamaa veel kord tähtajapikendust, mille komisjon andis 27. aprillil 2011.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, the conduct of a private market operator, which is used to assess the conduct of a public operator, does not need to be aimed at short-term profitability but can be guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term [69].
Komisjon vastas 15. juunil 2011 ja nõudis puuduvat teavet.
Even where an airport is loss-making over the period of Ryanair's operation, it is still possible that an airport airline agreement is incrementally profitable to an airport on an ex ante basis.
8. aprillil 2011 edastas komisjon Ryanairile küsimustiku.
As a final remark, the Commission notes that in the context of the present investigation, Ecorys was asked to compile a report on the profitability of the 2000 Agreement between FLG and Ryanair [70].
Vastused laekusid komisjonile 4. juulil 2011.
However, the report was based on a total cost approach, rather than an incremental cost approach and will therefore not be taken into consideration.
Komisjon edastas need vastused 18. juulil 2011 Saksamaale ja nõudis märkusi 18. augustiks 2011.
Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
7. veebruaril 2012 nõudis komisjon Ryanairilt lisateavet Oxera analüüsi kohta, mille Ryanair esitas 4. juulil 2011.
As a time frame for assessing the agreement in question a MEO would have chosen as a starting point the date of the signature of the agreement, i.e. 29 May 2000.
Oxera palus 16. veebruaril 2012 komisjonilt ühe esitatud küsimuse kohta selgitust.
As an end date a MEO would have taken the end date as stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, i.e. 31 May 2010.
Komisjon edastas selgituse 17. veebruaril 2012.
For the purpose of assessing the agreement in question and given the findings in recitals 282 to 301, both the existence and the amount of possible aid in this agreement have to be assessed in the light of the situation prevailing at the time it was signed and, more specifically, in the light of the information available and developments foreseeable at that time.
Ryanair saatis komisjonile oma märkused 13. aprillil 2012.
At the time of the negotiation of the agreement, FLG expected the business of Ryanair at Lübeck airport to lead to increased passenger numbers, thereby increasing non-aeronautic revenues, to the expansion of non-aeronautic services, as well as to the attraction of further airlines.
Komisjon edastas need märkused 27. juunil 2012 Saksamaale.
Even though FLG was making losses in the years preceding the agreement, Ryanair's business at the airport was expected to lead to moderate profits in the medium- to long-term.
10. septembri 2012. aasta kirjaga esitas Saksamaa oma märkused Ryanairi vastuse kohta.
Germany provided data on the ex ante expected growth of passenger numbers as well as the expected incremental costs and revenues, in a best-case and worst-case scenario.
Ecorysi 29. märtsi 2011. aasta lõpparuanne esitati Saksamaale 29. juunil 2011 koos palvega esitada oma märkused.
Incremental revenues that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement include:
24. augustil 2011 sai Saksamaa aruande tõlke koos palvega esitada oma märkused 26. septembriks 2011.
additional aeronautical revenues from passengers and landing charges paid by Ryanair and
Saksamaa edastas oma märkused 10. oktoobril 2011.
additional non-aeronautical revenues from, for example, car parking, franchised shops, or directly operated shops.
30. juunil 2011 saatis Saksamaa teise poole komisjoni nõutud teabest.
Applying the ‘single-till’ principle, the Commission takes the view that both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues should be taken into account [71].
Saksamaa vastas komisjoni 15. juuni 2011. aasta kirjale 29. juunil 2011.
Germany submitted that based on the charges stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, the airport expected to have average aeronautical revenues of EUR […] per passenger.
5. juulil 2011 nõudis komisjon Saksamaalt puuduva teabe esitamist.
FLG estimated revenues from non-aviation business as representing […] % of aviation business income.
Saksamaa tegi seda 15. juulil 2011.
Incremental costs that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement would include:
4. juulil 2011 edastas Ryanair komisjonile märkused, mis saadeti 8. augustil 2011 edasi Saksamaale.
incremental operational costs directly caused by the Ryanair agreement,
Saksamaa esitas oma märkused selle vastuse kohta 8. oktoobril 2011.
costs for marketing services,
Saksamaa taotles 19. märtsil 2012 vastamistähtaja pikendamist kuni 17. aprillini 2012.
investment costs directly linked to the Ryanair agreement.
Komisjon rahuldas taotluse 21. märtsil 2012.
Germany stated that it was necessary to increase the number of staff of FLG to handle the expected passenger numbers.
18. aprillil 2012 nõudis komisjon Saksamaalt puuduva teabe esitamist 28. aprilliks 2012 ilma pikendamisvõimaluseta.
FLG expected incremental operational and personnel costs of EUR […] per passenger.
Komisjon märkis lisaks, et kui tähtajast kinni ei peeta, antakse teabe esitamise korraldus vastavalt nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 10 lõikele 3 [10].
Based on the 2000 Agreement, FLG expected incremental marketing costs for the period 2000-2012 of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
2. mail 2012 peeti komisjoni ja Saksamaa kohtumine.
Regarding investment costs, Germany stated that the airport infrastructure already existed prior to the agreement with Ryanair and that the initially planned operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport did not require any additional infrastructure investments.
3. mail 2012 pikendas komisjon tähtaega kuni 11. maini 2012.
Germany submitted the following revenues and operating costs for the best case (Table 11) and the worst case (Table 12):
10. aprilli 2013. aasta kirjaga edastas Ryanair komisjonile aruande, mis käsitles Oxera arusaama turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva ettevõtja põhimõttest.
Table 11
See aruanne edastati Saksamaale 3. mail 2013.
Best-case costs and revenues
Ryanairi lisamärkused saadeti komisjonile 20. detsembril 2013.
year
24. veebruari 2014. aasta kirjaga nõudis komisjon Ryanairilt märkuste esitamist 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste [11] kohaldamise kohta.
passengers
21. märtsil 2014 nõudis komisjon Infratililt märkuste esitamist 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste kohta.
aeronautic revenues
Ametlik kutse kõikidele huvitatud isikutele esitada märkused 2014. aasta lennundussuuniste kohta avaldati 15. aprillil 2014 Euroopa Liidu Teatajas [12].
non-aeronautic revenues
Saksamaa edastas oma märkused 12. mail 2014.
operating costs
Märkusi esitasid veel Air Berlin, Infratil ja Schutzgemeinschaft gegen Fluglärm Lübeck und Umgebung eV (edaspidi „SGF“ või „kaitseühing“) [13].
Table 12
Saksamaa taotles vastamistähtaja pikendamist kuni 15. juulini 2011.
Worst-case costs and revenues
20. aprilli 2011. aasta kirjaga kutsus komisjon Saksamaad üles avaldama oma arvamust kõnealuste kaebuste kohta 28. aprilliks 2011.
FLG estimated positive financial effects from the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
21. aprilli 2011. aasta kirjaga palus Saksamaa veel tähtaega pikendada.
In this regard, Table 13 summarises the revenues from aeronautic and non-aeronautic activities, as well as the costs directly attributable to the operation of Ryanair at the airport and marketing costs.
27. aprilli 2011. aasta kirjaga pikendas komisjon tähtaega 16. maini 2011.
Table 13
Saksamaa edastas teabe 16. mail 2011.
Ex ante profitability assessment
20. mail 2011 saatis komisjon meeldetuletuse vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 10 lõikele 3, milles märkis, et edastatud teave ei ole täielik.
profitability assessment
Vastuse tähtaeg oli 7. juuni 2011.
marketing costs
Saksamaa vastas 7. juuni 2011. aasta kirjaga, milles ei nõustunud, et 20. mai 2011. aasta kiri on meeldetuletus määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 tähenduses, sest kaks küsimust näisid olevat ümber sõnastatud ja üks küsimus oli Saksamaa väitel uus.
In the best case, Germany rounded passenger numbers to […], leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
15. juuni 2011. aasta kirjaga edastas komisjon Saksamaale teise meeldetuletuse vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 10 lõikele 3 ja andis võimaluse esitada teave 29. juuniks 2011.
In the worst-case scenario, a total of […] passengers was expected, leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Meeldetuletuse täitmata jätmise korral kaalub komisjon teabe andmise korralduse esitamist.
Since non-aeronautic revenues were expected to amount to […] % of aeronautic revenues, non-aeronautic revenues were calculated to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
5. juuli 2011. aasta kirjaga saatis komisjon Saksamaale kolmanda meeldetuletuse vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 10 lõikele 3 ja andis võimaluse vastata veel ülejäänud küsimustele 15. juuliks 2011.
It was calculated that operating costs would amount to a total of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Saksamaa vastas 15. juuli 2011. aasta kirjaga.
Marketing costs were not calculated on a per passenger basis, but were estimated, in total, to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
14. märtsi 2012. aasta kirjaga edastatud vastuses palus Saksamaa komisjonil teatava algatamisotsuses sisalduva teabe katta musta värviga.
(315) Table 13 shows that revenues stemming from the 2000 Agreement were expected to exceed costs, leading to an annual surplus of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
20. märtsi 2012. aasta kirjaga rahuldas komisjon selle palve osaliselt, kuid ei näinud võimalust katta teatavat teavet musta värviga.
The Commission finds the approach taken by Germany sound.
3. aprilli 2012. aasta kirjaga vaidlustas Saksamaa lisaks komisjoni seisukoha seoses konfidentsiaalsusega.
The estimated average aeronautical revenues were based on the terms of the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Komisjon edastas Saksamaale 25. aprillil 2012 selles küsimuses kirja, millele lisas 2012. aasta algatamisotsuse järgmise versiooni ja esitas lisaargumente.
The non-aeronautical revenues were expected to be […] % of the aeronautical revenue, which seems to be in line with general expectations as regards non-aeronautical revenues at other airports (see Table 6).
Pärast pikemat arvamustevahetust Ryanairi, komisjoni ja Saksamaa vahel esitas Ryanair 27. aprillil 2012 mitu taotlust konfidentsiaalse teabe kustutamiseks ja väljendas menetluse suhtes kriitikat.
The assumption that the staff number would need to be increased when passenger numbers increase also seems reasonable.
Lisaks esitas Saksamaa 30. aprillil 2012 komisjonile järgmised Ryanairi taotlused teatava teabe katmiseks musta värviga.
The Commission notes that investments related to the expansion of Lübeck airport were not specific to Ryanair but could potentially be exploited by other airlines.
29. juunil 2012 edastati Ryanairile 2012. aasta algatamisotsuse musta värviga kaetud versioon.
This indicates that investment costs did not have to be included in the incremental costs of the Ryanair agreement.
Nagu komisjon 7. veebruaril 2012 nõudis, esitas Ryanair 13. aprilli 2012. aasta kirjaga märkused.
In this respect, the Commission notes that Germany emphasised that FLG continuously attempted to attract other airlines and succeeded in this attempt by attracting other airlines (such as Wizz Air).
Komisjon edastas need märkused 27. juunil 2012 Saksamaale.
In addition, according to Germany, Lübeck airport unsuccessfully tried to initiate negotiations for an agreement with Air Berlin for years.
10. septembri 2012. aasta kirjaga esitas Saksamaa oma märkused Ryanairi vastuse kohta.
Germany submitted that in order to successfully privatise Lübeck airport, it was necessary to significantly increase passenger numbers.
24. veebruari 2012 kirjaga palus komisjon Saksamaad esitada 20 päeva jooksul asja kohta lisateavet.
The Commission accepts that investments were made to prepare Lübeck airport for higher passenger numbers [72].
Saksamaa taotles 19. märtsil 2012 tähtaja pikendamist kuni 20. aprillini 2012.
The Commission further notes that the 2000 Agreement did not require FLG to make investments [73].
21. märtsi 2012. aasta kirjaga pikendas komisjon tähtaega 17. aprillini 2012.
FLG could have fulfilled its obligations under the contract without investing in an expansion of the airport.
Saksamaa esitas nõutud teabe 17. aprillil 2012.
In the light of those considerations, the Commission concludes that Germany's approach not to attribute investments made at Lübeck airport to the agreement with Ryanair is reasonable.
18. aprilli 2012. aasta kirjaga teatas komisjon, et ei pea Saksamaa esitatud teavet täielikuks, ja nõudis puuduolevat teavet 28. aprilliks 2012.
Having analysed the information provided by Germany, the Commission disagrees however on one point of the analysis and amends it accordingly.
Lisaks märkis komisjon, et kui tähtajast kinni ei peeta, antakse teabe esitamise korraldus vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 10 lõikele 3.
The 2000 Agreement sets out as its end date 30 May 2010.
3. mail 2012 kutsus komisjon Saksamaad järgmise kirjaga tungivalt üles esitama puuduva teabe 11. maiks 2012.
Germany took into account incremental costs and revenues for the years 2011 and 2012 when calculating the incremental profitability of the 2000 Agreement.
14. mail 2012 esitas Saksamaa komisjonile märkused 2012. aasta algatamisotsuse kohta.
The Commission considers that it is appropriate to take only into account the incremental costs and revenues generated over the duration of the contract.
2012. aasta algatamisotsus avaldati 10. augustil 2012 Euroopa Liidu Teatajas [15].
In view of this necessary amendment, the Commission has carried out its own analysis by using directly the incremental profitability analysis submitted by Germany and amending this analysis where necessary as summarised in Tables 14, 15 and 16:
Kõikidele huvitatud isikutele anti võimalus esitada ühe kuu jooksul otsuse kohta märkusi.
Table 14
Ryanair taotles kahe, vastavalt 16. augusti 2012 ja 22. augusti 2012. aasta kirjaga, vastamistähtaja pikendamist 24. septembrini 2012.
Table 15
Wizz Air taotles 24. augustil 2012 pikendust kuni 24. septembrini 2012.
Table 16
31. augustil 2012 taotles Infratil pikendust 10. oktoobrini 2012.
The Commission has taken out the revenues and operating costs expected for the years 2011 and 2012, as in those years, the 2000 Agreement was expected to have expired already (see Tables 14 and 15).
5. septembril 2012 taotlesid Lübecki linn ja FLG komisjonilt tähtaja pikendamist 10. oktoobrini 2012.
The Commission relied instead on the revenues and operating costs expected for the years 2000-2010, resulting in the revenues and operating costs presented in Table 16.
7. septembril 2012 taotles Saksamaa Kommertslennujaamade Liit (edaspidi „ADV“) [16] tähtaja pikendamist 10. oktoobrini 2012.