natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It cannot be considered as an airport operator, all the more so since the Region only controls one of the airport operators concerned.
Lennujaamakäitajaid tuleks käsitada de jure (tulenevalt seaduse 10/2010 sätetest) ja de facto (tulenevalt komisjoni analüüsitud tegelikest rahavoogudest) vahendina, keda kasutati avaliku sektori vahendite edastamiseks lennuettevõtjatele.
Thus the ‘ex ante incremental profitability analysis’ presented in points 61 to 66 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines cannot be applied in this case.
Komisjon märgib, et lennujaamakäitajad võivad kasu saada kava alusel lennuettevõtjatele antud abi tulemusel suurenenud lennuliiklusest.
According to that method, in order to assess whether an airport operator, when entering into arrangements with an airline, behaved as a market economy operator guided by profitability prospects would have done under similar circumstances, it should be assessed whether the arrangements in question could be expected, when they were concluded, to incrementally contribute to the profitability of the airport and are part of an overall strategy leading to profitability in the long term.
Samas sarnaneb selline mõju positiivse mõjuga, mis avaldub muude sektorite, iseäranis turismisektori ettevõtjatele, kelle tulu on seotud lennureisijate arvuga (autorendiettevõtjad, hotellid, restoranid, toitlustusettevõtjad, tanklad, jaemüügiettevõtjad jne).
However, this test is not applicable in this case because the measures under assessment are a scheme established by a public authority, for reasons of public policy, that covers several airports, and not an individual arrangement between an airport and an airline.
Kõnealused sektorid sõltuvad suurel määral Sardiinia lennujaamadesse saabuvate ja sealt lahkuvate reisijate arvust.
When granting the financing concerned to airlines in the context of activity 1 and activity 2, the Region could not expect any return that a profit-driven market economy operator would have taken into consideration in similar circumstances.
Seepärast leiab komisjon, et kava ei ole kavandatud nii, et suunata selle teisene mõju lennujaamakäitajateni, vaid on pigem mõeldud kasu tooma Sardiinia peamistele turismiga seotud sektoritele.
The expected effects of the financing was an increase in the number of passengers travelling by air to Sardinia, which as such does not give rise to dividends, capital gains or any other form of profit for the Region.
Lisaks on meetmete mõju lennujaamadele lahutamatult seotud kava laadiga ja eesmärgiga suurendada Sardiiniasse suunatud lennuliiklust, pakkudes lennuettevõtjatele asjakohaseid stiimuleid.
Italy has failed to identify any profitability element expected to arise for the Region as a result of the financing at issue.
See, et lennuettevõtjad ostavad kolme asjaomase Sardiinia lennujaama käitajatelt lennujaamateenuseid, on kava lahutamatu osa, kuna kava seisneb lennuettevõtjatele rahaliste stiimulite pakkumises, et suurendada lennuliiklust.
The main effect of the increase in air traffic is to stimulate economic development in the region, particularly at the level of certain sectors such as tourism, retail, restaurants etc., with positive effects on regional economic development and employment.
Seega ei ole tegemist kaupade või teenuste omandamisega seotud eraldiseisva lisatingimusega, mille maakond on lisanud oma kavva eesmärgiga saavutada muu mõju kui kava eeldatav põhimõju ehk Sardiiniasse suunatud lennuliikluse suurenemine.
However, according to settled case law [114], such ‘public policy benefits’ would not be taken into consideration by a profit-driven market economy operator and are thus to be disregarded when applying the MEOP.
Eespool öeldut arvesse võttes järeldab komisjon, et 1., 2. ja 3. meetmega ei anta lennujaamakäitajatele kaudset eelist.
For the same reasons, a benchmarking exercise, as described in points 54 to 60 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, is not relevant in the present case.
Samuti järeldab komisjon, et kuna üks riigiabi olemasolu kumulatiivsetest tingimustest on täitmata, ei kaasne 1. ja 2. meetmega riigiabi.
In any event, Italy has not submitted any business plan, ex ante profitability analysis or internal documents showing clearly that an analysis conducted before the granting of the public financing revealed that financial returns such that a profit-driven market economy operator would take into consideration could be expected by the Region as a result of the financing in question.
Eespool nimetatud põhjustel järeldab komisjon, et asjaomased lennujaamakäitajad ei saanud riigiabi ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
Nor did the Region carry out a benchmarking exercise, as defined in points 54 to 60 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines.
LENNUETTEVÕTJATELE ANTUD ABI SEADUSLIKKUS
Italy failed in particular to provide a comparison of airport charges, net of any benefits provided to the airlines (such as marketing support, discounts or any other incentive), across a sufficient number of suitable ‘comparator airports’, whose operators behave as market economy operators.
Maakond andis lennujaamakäitajatele seaduse 10/2010 alusel rahalisi vahendeid ja lennujaamakäitajad andsid need lennuettevõtjatele kogu ajavahemiku 2010–2013 jooksul [118].
This confirms that the Region did not behave vis-à-vis airlines as a market economy operator guided by profitability prospects.
Peale selle ei ole vaatlusalune kava hõlmatud ühegi grupierandi määrusega.
In addition, despite the provisions of Law 10/2010, no tender procedure was put in place with a view to selecting airlines and funding the activity plans.
Eelkõige ei ole kohaldatav üldist majandushuvi pakkuvaid teenuseid käsitlev otsus, sest lennuettevõtjate rahastamist kõnealuse kava alusel ei saa pidada hüvitise maksmiseks lennuettevõtjatele ülesandeks tehtud tõelise üldist majandushuvi pakkuva teenuse osutamise eest [119].
Airport operators published notices on their respective websites and they chose the best offer, meaning that the financial support provided to airlines did not follow an open and transparent tender procedure.
Seega ei ole Itaalia täitnud oma ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 108 kohaseid kohustusi, mistõttu peetakse lennuettevõtjate rahastamist kõnealuse kava alusel vastavalt ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikele 3 ebaseaduslikuks.
In addition, as already explained, the scheme is conceived in the first place to disburse public funds to airlines and this financing does not correspond either to compensation for genuine public service obligations or to remuneration for products or services fulfilling genuine needs of the Region.
LENNUETTEVÕTJATELE ANTUD ABI KOKKUSOBIVUS SISETURUGA
As a consequence, even if proper tender procedures had been followed to select airlines, this could not have ruled out the existence of an advantage.
Kohustus tõendada, et abi on erandina ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõikest 1 siseturuga kokkusobiv, lasub peamiselt asjaomasel liikmesriigil.
Under these circumstances, there is also no scope for assessing the individual financial relationship between the airports and the airlines that result from the application of the scheme in the manner foreseen in points 53-66 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines.
KOHALDATAV ÕIGUSRAAMISTIK
Those points provide guidance to determine whether the prices charged by an airport that has public resources comply with the MEOP.
Kuna meetmeid ei saa käsitada lennuettevõtjatele hüvitise andmisena tõelise üldist majandushuvi pakkuva teenuse osutamise eest, ei saa käesoleva juhtumi puhul kohaldada ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 106 lõikel 2 põhinevat üldist majandushuvi pakkuvaid teenuseid käsitlevat raamistikku.
In the present case, however, it is clear that the airport operators were not acting as market economy operators when entering into the various contracts with the airlines.
Mis puudutab stardiabi, siis 2014. aasta lennundussuunistes on sätestatud, et „[l]ennuettevõtjatele antava stardiabi puhul kohaldab komisjon käesolevate suuniste põhimõtteid kõigi teatatud stardiabimeetmete suhtes, mille kohta ta peab võtma vastu otsuse, alates 4. aprillist 2014, isegi kui meetmetest teatati enne nimetatud kuupäeva.
They were implementing an aid scheme devised by the Region to increase air transport for the general benefit of the territory).
Vastavalt ebaseadusliku riigiabi hindamise suhtes kohaldatavate eeskirjade kindlaksmääramist käsitlevale komisjoni teatisele kohaldab komisjon lennujaamadele antava ebaseadusliku investeerimisabi suhtes abi andmise ajal kehtinud eeskirju.
In view of all the above, the Commission concludes that the funding provided by the Region to airlines through airport operators for the financing of activities 1 and 2 in the framework of the scheme conferred an economic advantage on the airlines concerned.
Nii ei kohalda ta käesolevate suuniste põhimõtteid ebaseadusliku stardiabi suhtes, mida anti lennuettevõtjatele enne 4. aprilli 2014 [122].“
In the present case, the financing of the scheme by the Region cannot be seen as a scheme of general application.
JA 2.
The Commission considers indeed that the design and the implementation of the scheme was for the exclusive benefit of certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity, namely airlines funded by the Region through airport operators under the scheme under scrutiny [115].
MEETME RAHASTAMISEKS (SEADUSE 10/2010 ALUSEL) AJAVAHEMIKUS 2010–2013 ANTUD RAHALISE HÜVITISE SISETURUGA KOKKUSOBIVUSE HINDAMINE
Airlines flying to Sardinia, which have not concluded these agreements, did not benefit from the same financial support from the Region, or not under the conditions provided for by Law 10/2010.
Arvestades, et 2005. aasta lennundussuuniste punktis 79 ette nähtud stardiabi kokkusobivuse tingimused on kumulatiivsed, tuleb selle tõendamiseks, et lennuettevõtjale antud abi on siseturuga kokkusobimatu, vaid näidata, et üks nendest tingimustest ei ole täidetud.
Since the beneficiaries of the economic advantage concerned are limited to some specific undertakings of a specific one sector (air transport), the measures are selective.
Et hinnata vaatlusaluste abimeetmete kokkusobivust, uurib komisjon sellegipoolest mitut 2005. aasta lennundussuunistes sätestatud kriteeriumi.
Distortion of competition and effect on trade
2005. aasta lennundussuuniste punkti 79 alapunktiga e lisandub lisanduvate tegevuse alustamise kulude hüvitamise kriteerium: abi summa peab olema rangelt seotud lisanduvate tegevuse alustamise kuludega, mis on seotud uue liini või uue sageduse loomisega ning mida lennuettevõtja enam ei pea tegevuse tavataseme saavutamisel kandma.
When aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Union trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid.
Piirkondlikud rahastamisvahendid ei ole seotud konkreetsete tegevuse alustamise kuludega ja miski seadusega 10/2010 kehtestatud süsteemis ei taga, et abisumma piirdub selliste kuludega.
The compensation paid to airline companies through airport operators is an economic advantage for the airlines in question, which is capable of strengthening their position on the market.
Maakonnal oli kavas arendada lennujaamakäitajate rahastamisega lennuliiklust, avades uusi liine, suurendades olemasolevatel liinidel lendude sagedust ja vähendades olemasolevate liinide hooajalisust, ning edendada lennuettevõtjate turundusmeetmete kaudu piirkonnas arengut ja turismi.
The air transport sector is characterised by intense competition between operators from different Member States, in particular since the entry into force of the third stage of liberalisation of air transport (‘third package’) on 1 January 1993.
Seega ei olnud maakonnal kunagi kavas hüvitada lennuettevõtjatele lisandunud tegevuse alustamise kulud.
It follows that the measures affect trade between Member States and distorts or threatens to distort competition in the air transport sector.
Seetõttu ei ole see kriteerium täidetud.
Therefore, the financial compensation provided through airport operators to airline companies for the financing of activities 1 and 2 (Law 10/2010) in the period 2010-2013 distorts or threatens to distort competition and affects trade between Member States.
Peale selle on 2005. aasta lennundussuuniste punkti 79 alapunktis f sätestatud osatähtsuse ja kestuse tingimus: „[A]bi summa ei või ületada igal aastal 50 % selle aasta abikõlblike kulude summast ning abi kestuse ajal keskmiselt 30 % abikõlblikest kuludest.“ Itaalia ei ole kordagi kasutanud mõistet „abikõlblikud kulud“, nagu see on ära seletatud suunistes, ega ole viidanud selliste kulude künnisele.
EXISTENCE OF STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF THE AIRPORT OPERATORS
Seejärel määras maakond kindlaks igale lennujaamakäitajale aastas antava summa, kuid selle piirmäär ei olnud kunagi 50 % aastas tekkivatest kuludest.
In this subsection, the question is whether the funding provided by the Region to the operators of Sardinian airports under Law 10/2010 constitutes State aid to those airports.
Ei ole ühtki tõendit selle kohta, et 1. ja 2. meetmega seoses piirkonnas tehtud kulutused oleksid olnud abisummast kaks korda suuremad.
The Commission will now assess whether the criterion related to the presence of an economic advantage is fulfilled.
Komisjoni ei ole teavitatud ühestki lennujaamakäitajate korraldatud hankest ja Itaalia sõnul võeti lennuettevõtjate väljavalimisel aluseks kõige atraktiivsemad äripakkumised, mis olid esitatud lennujaamakäitajatele nende veebisaitidel avaldatud teadete peale.
As explained in Section 7.2.1, under Law 10/2010, the airport operators passed on in full funds received from the Region to finance financial incentives for the expansion of air transport services as well as marketing agreements, which they co-financed through their own resources.
Kuna punktis 79 sätestatud kokkusobivuskriteeriumid ei ole täidetud, ei ole abi siseturuga kokkusobiv.
The airport operators were thus intermediaries and did not retain the funds received from the Region.
Rahalist hüvitist, mille lennujaamakäitajad andsid ajavahemikus 2010–2013 lennuettevõtjatele 1. ja 2. meetme rahastamiseks seaduse 10/2010 alusel, ei saa pidada siseturuga kokkusobivaks, sest 2005. aasta lennundussuuniste punktis 79 nimetatud kokkusobivuskriteeriumid ei ole täidetud.
Hence, they cannot be considered as the direct beneficiaries of the aid scheme.
Seepärast on riigiabi, mille maakond andis lennuettevõtjatele, ebaseaduslik riigiabi, mis on siseturuga kokkusobimatu.
However, since the financial incentives and marketing payments to the airlines were intended and had the effect of increasing air traffic, it must be assessed whether that increase in air traffic confers an indirect advantage to the airports concerned.
ABI TAGASINÕUDMINE
In its recent notice on the notion of State aid [116], the Commission indicated that ‘[…] indirect advantages should be distinguished from mere secondary economic effects that are inherent in almost all State aid measures (for example through an increase of output).
ELi toimimise lepingu ja Euroopa Kohtu väljakujunenud praktika kohaselt võib komisjon juhul, kui ta leiab, et abi ei ole siseturuga kokkusobiv, nõuda, et asjaomane riik peab abi andmise lõpetama või seda muutma [125].
For this purpose, the foreseeable effects of the measures should be examined from an ex ante point of view.
Samuti on Euroopa Kohus korduvalt sedastanud, et liikmesriigi kohustus lõpetada sellise abi andmine, mida komisjon peab siseturuga kokkusobimatuks, on kehtestatud selleks, et taastada varasem olukord [126].
An indirect advantage is present if the measures are designed in such a way as to channel its secondary effects towards identifiable undertakings or groups of undertakings.
Sellega seoses on Euroopa Kohus leidnud, et kõnealune eesmärk on saavutatud, kui abisaaja on ebaseadusliku abina saadud summad tagasi maksnud ja seega loobunud eelisest, mis tal turul konkurentide ees oli, ning kui on taastatud abi väljamaksmisele eelnenud olukord [127].
This is the case, for example, if the direct aid is, de facto or de jure, made conditional on the purchase of goods or services produced by certain undertakings only (for example only undertakings established in certain areas).’
Kooskõlas kohtupraktikaga on määruse (EL) 2015/1589 artikli 16 lõikes 1 sätestatud, et „[k]ui ebaseadusliku abi korral tehakse negatiivne otsus, nõuab komisjon, et kõnealune liikmesriik peab võtma kõik vajalikud meetmed, et abisaajalt abi tagasi saada“.
The notice continues in a footnote [117] to that passage: ‘By contrast, a mere secondary economic effect in the form of increased output (which does not amount to indirect aid) can be found where the aid is simply channelled through an undertaking (for example a financial intermediary) which passes it on in full to the aid beneficiary.’
Seega, võttes arvesse, et kõnealused meetmed võeti, rikkudes ELi toimimise lepingu artiklit 108, ning et neid meetmeid tuleb käsitada ebaseadusliku ja siseturuga kokkusobimatu abina, tuleb asjaomased abisummad tagasi nõuda, et taastada enne abi andmist turul valitsenud olukord.
The activities under assessment in this case have not been designed to channel their secondary effects towards the Sardinian airports.
Abi tuleks tagasi nõuda alates kuupäevast, mil abisaaja sai eelise, st alates ajast, mil abi anti abisaaja käsutusse, kuni tegeliku tagasimaksmiseni, ning abisaajal tuleb tasuda abisumma pealt intressi kuni abi tegeliku tagasimaksmiseni.
Under the mechanism put in place by the Region through Law 10/2010 (as described in Section 2.7.2), the Region transfers the corresponding public funds to airport operators, which should in turn pass them on to third parties in accordance with the detailed specifications of the activity plans approved by the Region.
Vastavad andmed on kokku võetud tabelis 14.
The Commission therefore concludes that the aid is channelled through the airport operators which pass it on in full to the airlines, which are the only real beneficiaries of the scheme.
Tabel 14
The airport operators should be considered de jure (because of the provisions of Law 10/2010) and de facto (because of the effective financial flows analysed by the Commission) as vehicles used to pass on public funding to airlines
Seoses 1. ja 2. meetmega lennuettevõtjatele tegelikult makstud summa ning maakonnalt saadud ja GEASARi ja SOGAERi edastatud rahaliste vahendite vahe
The Commission notes that the airport operators may benefit from the increase in air traffic that is brought about by the aid to airlines under the scheme.
Lennujaamakäitajate maakonnalt tegelikult saadud netosumma (B)
Such effects are, however, similar to the positive effects on economic operators in other sectors whose revenues are linked to the number of air passengers, in particular tourism (car rental, hotels, restaurants, catering, fuelling, retail etc.…).
Lennujaamakäitajatelt lennuettevõtjatele 1. ja 2. meetme jaoks makstud kogusumma (C)
Those sectors are highly dependent on the number of passengers arriving at/departing from the Sardinian airports.
Tabel 15
Therefore, the Commission considers that the scheme has not been designed in such a way as to channel its secondary effects towards the airport operators, but rather so as to benefit the many tourism-related sectors in Sardinia.
Olbia ja Cagliari lennujaama käitajate maksed lennuettevõtjatele
Furthermore, the effect of the measures on airports is inherent in the nature and objective of the scheme, which is to increase air traffic to Sardinia by providing appropriate incentives to airlines.
SUMMA
The fact that the airlines purchase airport services from the operators of the three Sardinian airports concerned is an inherent feature of the scheme and cannot be detached from it, given that the scheme consists in providing airlines with financial incentives to increase air traffic.
MAKSE KUUPÄEV
It is thus not an additional, independent condition concerning the acquisition of goods or services that the Region added to the design of its scheme in order to produce an effect other than the main expected effect of the scheme, namely the increase in air traffic to Sardinia.
[8–20 miljonit eurot]
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that activities 1, 2 and 3 do not confer an indirect advantage on airport operators.
[0–10 miljonit eurot]
Since one of the cumulative conditions for the presence of State aid is not fulfilled, the Commission also concludes that activities 1 and 2 do not constitute State aid.
[0–1 miljonit eurot]
For the reasons set out above, it is concluded that the airport operators concerned did not receive State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
& 4.1.12
LAWFULNESS OF THE AID TO THE AIRLINES
[2–10 miljonit eurot]
The measures were notified to the Commission on 30 November 2011.
[0–7 miljonit eurot]
However, Italy implemented the scheme without the Commission having approved it.
& 23.5.2011 & 2.8.2011
Financing pursuant to Law 10/2010 was provided from the Region to airport operators and from airport operators to airlines throughout the period 2010-2013 [118].
Summa, mille kaks lennujaamakäitajat maakonnalt said, on kasutatud tervikuna 1., 2. ja 3. meetme rahastamiseks.
In addition, no block exemption regulation covers the scheme at stake.
Komisjon ei ole saanud Itaalialt mingit teavet piirkondlike vahendite täpse jagunemise kohta meetmete ja lennuettevõtjate vahel.
In particular, the SGEI Decision is not applicable as the financing of airlines under the scheme cannot be considered as compensation for a genuine SGEI entrusted to airlines [119].
Seepärast võtab komisjon kõnealuse jaotuse esitamisel aluseks tabelis 16 esitatud summadest tuletatud protsendimäärad.
Thus, Italy has not complied with its obligations under Article 108 of the Treaty and therefore the financing of airlines under the scheme is considered as unlawful pursuant to Article 108(3) of the Treaty.
Nagu on näha põhjenduses 91 esitatud tabelist 7 ja samuti tabelist 16, on 1. ja 2. meetme raames (lennuettevõtjatele) ja 3. meetme raames (muudele teenuseosutajatele) antud summad märgitud protsendina kogusummast.
The burden of proof regarding the compatibility of aid with the internal market, by way of derogation from Article 107(1) of the Treaty, is borne principally by the Member State concerned.
GEASARilt ja SOGAERilt lennuettevõtjatele ja muudele teenuseosutajatele 1., 2. ja 3. meetme rahastamiseks suunatud rahavood
Italy notes [120] that Law 10/2010 has not been conceived as a scheme to support start-up routes and that the scheme does not fulfil all the compatibility criteria for start-up aid as defined in Article 79 of the 2005 Aviation Guidelines.
Komisjon kohaldab iga lennujaamakäitaja puhul protsendimäära, mis kajastab 1. ja 2. meetme osakaalu lennujaamakäitaja antud rahaliste vahendite kogusummas, netosumma suhtes, mille kaks lennujaamakäitajat maakonnalt tegelikult said.
Italy nevertheless suggests that the Commission should, in this case, apply point 81 of the 2005 Aviation Guidelines, which states that ‘The Commission may carry out a case-by-case assessment of aid or a scheme which fails to fully comply with these criteria [those of point 79], but the end result of which would be comparable.’ [121].
Saadud tulemused peaksid viitama tegelikule maakonnalt saadud ning 1. ja 2. meetme jaoks kulutatud avaliku sektori vahendite summale (vt tabel 17).
APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Tabel 17
As regards start-up aid, the 2014 Aviation Guidelines state that ‘As regards start-up aid to airlines, the Commission will apply the principles set out in these guidelines to all notified start-up aid measures in respect of which it is called upon to take a decision from 4 April 2014, even where the measures were notified prior to that date.
Lennujaamakäitajate maakonnalt tegelikult saadud ning 1. ja 2. meetme jaoks kulutatud netosumma
Accordingly, it will not apply the principles set out in these guidelines in the case of unlawful start-up aid to airlines granted before 4 April 2014’ [122].
Tabel 18