natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING THE FIRST BRIDGE RECAPITALISATION
Komisjon avaldas kahtlust seoses sellega, kas oli võetud piisavalt meetmeid põhjendamatute konkurentsimoonutuste piiramiseks ning väljendas seisukohta, et vajalik võib olla hinnaliidrina tegutsemise keelu või muude toimimisalaste meetmete kehtestamine [112].
On 27 July 2012, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure in order to verify whether the conditions of the 2008 Banking Communication [100] were met regarding the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of the first bridge recapitalisation provided by the HFSF in favour of the Bank (measure B1).
MÄRKUSED HUVITATUD ISIKUTELT ESIMESE AJUTISE REKAPITALISEERIMISE SUHTES AMETLIKU UURIMISMENETLUSE ALGATAMISE KOHTA
Regarding the appropriateness of the measure, given the fact that the aid came after prior recapitalisation and liquidity aid and given the protracted rescue period, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether all actions possible had been taken by the Bank to avoid a need for aid in the future [101].
KREEKA KESKPANGA MÄRKUSED
In addition, the Commission was not clear who would control the Bank once the first bridge recapitalisation was replaced by a permanent recapitalisation [102] as the Bank might come under the control either of the State or of minority private owners.
3. jaanuaril 2013 esitas üks Kreeka pank komisjonile märkused Eurobanki uurimise algatamise otsuse kohta.
The Commission noted that it would wish to ensure that the quality of the Bank’s management and notably its lending process should not deteriorate in either case.
Nimetatud Kreeka panga arvates kujutas Kreeka pankade rekapitaliseerimine Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist põhimõtteliselt tervitatavat sammu tervema ja elujõulisema pangandussüsteemi poole ning pank ei väljendanud vastuseisu Eurobanki rekapitaliseerimisele.
Regarding the necessity of the first bridge recapitalisation, in recital 66 of the Eurobank Opening Decision the Commission questioned whether all the measures possible had been taken to avoid that the Bank again would need aid in the future.
Olles avaldanud täielikku toetust Kreeka pankade rekapitaliseerimisele Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist, selgitas asjaomane pank, et konkurentsi moonutamise minimeerimiseks ja diskrimineerimise ärahoidmiseks loodetakse, et rekapitaliseerimine Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist on avatud kõigile Kreeka turul sarnastel tingimustel tegutsevatele Kreeka pankadele.
Moreover, since the duration of the bridge recapitalisation period was uncertain the Commission could not conclude whether it was sufficient and complied with the remuneration and burden-sharing principles under State aid rules.
KREEKA MÄRKUSED AMETLIKE UURIMISMENETLUSTE ALGATAMISE KOHTA
Furthermore, as the terms of the conversion of the first bridge recapitalisation into a permanent recapitalisation were not known at the time the Eurobank Opening Decision was adopted, the Commission could not assess them.
KREEKA AMETIASUTUSTE MÄRKUSED ESIMESE AJUTISE REKAPITALISEERIMISE SUHTES AMETLIKU UURIMISMENETLUSE ALGATAMISE KOHTA
Regarding the proportionality of the measure, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the safeguards (advertisement ban, coupon and dividend ban, call option ban and buy-back ban as described in recital 71 of the Eurobank Opening Decision) were sufficient in relation to the first bridge recapitalisation.
5. septembril 2012 esitasid Kreeka ametiasutused Eurobanki uurimise algatamise otsuse kohta oma märkused, mille olid koostanud Kreeka keskpank ja Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond.
Furthermore, in recital 72 of the Eurobank Opening Decision the Commission stated that distortions of competition could be caused by the lack of rules preventing the HFSF from coordinating all the four largest Greek banks (namely, the Bank, Alpha Bank, NBG and Piraeus) and the absence of adequate safeguards to avoid them sharing commercially sensitive information.
Kreeka keskpanga koostatud märkused
The Commission, therefore, proposed the appointment of a monitoring trustee who would be physically present in the Bank.
Esimese ajutise rekapitaliseerimise asjakohasuse kohta märkis Kreeka keskpank, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist 2012. aasta mais Kreeka nelja suurima panga rekapitaliseerimiseks eraldatud 18 miljardi euro suurune kapital oli väiksem kui lõplik summa, mida pangad vajasid esimese taseme omavahendite 10 % suhtarvu saavutamiseks ja säilitamiseks 2012. aasta juunis ning esimese taseme omavahendite 7 % suhtarvu saavutamiseks ja säilitamiseks kolmeaastase ebasoodsa stressistsenaariumi korral.
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING NEA PROTON BANK
Samuti märkis komisjon, et esimene rekapitaliseerimine oli ajutine, kuna rekapitaliseerimisprotsessi sai lõpule viia nimetatud nelja panga aktsiakapitali suurendamisega.
On 26 July 2012, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure in order to verify whether the EUR 1122 million intervention by the Resolution Scheme of the HDIGF (measure NP1), as well as the EUR 250 million capital injection by the HFSF and the capital injections by the HFSF amounting to a total of EUR 300 million (measure NP2), in favour of Nea Proton Bank complied with the general criteria for compatibility and the requirements of the 2008 Banking Communication, the Recapitalisation Communication [103] and the Restructuring Communication [104] (restoration of long-term viability, burden-sharing and limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, and limitation of distortions of competition).
Samuti märkis Kreeka keskpank, et Kreeka suurimate pankade rekapitaliseerimine on osa Kreeka pangandussektori pikemaajalisest ümberkorraldamisest.
Regarding the appropriateness of the measures, the Commission stated that those measures were appropriate as rescue aid.
Keskpank osutas, et erakätesse jääva panga korral jääb selle juhtimine tõenäoliselt samaks, aga kui pank läheb riigi (st Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi) omandisse, võib fond nimetada ametisse uue juhatuse, mille tegevusele annab igal juhul hinnangu Kreeka keskpank.
Regarding the necessity of the measures, the Commission noted that the intervention of the Resolution Scheme of the HDIGF was necessary in both its amount and form, while the capital injections by the HFSF were necessary only in their form.
Kreeka keskpanga sõnul hindab viimane korrapäraselt üldjuhtimise raamistikku, juhtimise korrektsust ja iga panga riskiprofiili, et tagada liigsete riskide ärahoidmine.
However, as regards the amount of capital injections by the HFSF, in recital 59 of the Nea Proton Opening Decision the Commission expressed doubts as to whether Nea Proton Bank would be able to restore its long-term viability on a stand-alone basis and whether a stand-alone restructuring was the cheapest option available.
Samuti juhiti tähelepanu asjaolule, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond oli juba nimetanud esindajaid rekapitaliseeritud pankade juhatusse.
Furthermore, in recitals 60 and 61 of the Nea Proton Opening Decision the Commission stated that the inability of Nea Proton Bank to sufficiently remunerate the recapitalisation by the HFSF created doubts as to whether it was a fundamentally sound bank and therefore triggered the need for in-depth restructuring.
Mis puutub esimese ajutise rekapitaliseerimise vajalikkusesse, siis märkis Kreeka keskpank, et panga rekapitaliseerimine oli piiratud määraga, mis kindlustas tol ajal kehtivate miinimumkapitalinõuete (8 %) täitmise.
As regards the proportionality of the measures, the Commission considered that they were proportionate as rescue aid.
Samuti sedastati, et enne rekapitaliseerimist kulunud pikem aeg oli tingitud Kreeka tegevuskeskkonna järsust halvenemisest ja erasektori kaasamise programmi tagajärgedest, kogu projekti keerukusest ja vajadusest maksimeerida erainvestorite osalemist kapitali suurendamises.
Regarding the restoration of long-term viability of Nea Proton Bank, in recital 65 of the Nea Proton Opening Decision the Commission expressed doubts as to whether that bank could be made viable on a stand-alone basis.
Seoses esimese ajutise rekapitaliseerimise proportsionaalsusega rõhutas Kreeka keskpank, et komisjonile esitatava ümberkorralduskava täielik elluviimine on tagatud asjaoluga, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi hääleõiguste peatamine lõpetatakse juhul, kui muu hulgas rikutakse oluliselt ümberkorralduskava.
The Commission doubted that the restructuring proposed was sufficient compared to the depth of the restructuring required given the absence of sufficient remuneration.
Ühtlasi märkis Kreeka keskpank, et panga raskused ei olnud põhjustatud ei panga juhtkonna poolsest riskide alahindamisest ega agressiivsest müügitegevusest.
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING NEW TT BANK
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi koostatud märkused
On 6 May 2013, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure in order to verify whether the EUR 4,1 billion financing of the funding gap to the transferred activities from TT Bank to New TT Bank (measure NTT1), the EUR 500 million capital injection by the HFSF into New TT Bank (measure NTT2),the EUR 224,96 million capital injection in the form of preference shares under the Greek Banks Support Scheme to TT Bank (measure TT) and the EUR 0,68 billion intervention by the Resolution Scheme of the HDIGF in favour of T Bank’s assets which were transferred to TT Bank (measure T) complied with the general criteria for compatibility and the requirements of the 2008 Banking Communication, the Recapitalisation Communication and the Restructuring Communication (restoration of long-term viability, burden-sharing and limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, and limitation of distortions of competition).
Mis puutub esimese ajutise rekapitaliseerimise asjakohasusse, siis sätestas Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond riigi võimaliku sekkumise küsimuses (juhul, kui riik eraldab finantsstabiilsuse fondi kaudu suuri abisummasid ja fondil on sellest tulenevalt täielikud hääleõigused), et finantsstabiilsuse fondi rahastatavaid panku ei käsitleta avaliku sektori üksustena ega riigi kontrolli all olevana ning et pärast püsivat rekapitaliseerimist finantsstabiilsuse fondist ei ole need riigi kontrolli all.
The Commission considered that both measures NTT2 and NTT1 were appropriate and necessary in their form as rescue aid.
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond väitis, et fond on täiesti iseseisev eraõiguslik juriidiline üksus, kes on oma otsustes sõltumatu.
As regards the necessity of measure NTT2 in terms of its amount, the Commission, doubting the long-term viability of New TT Bank on a stand-alone basis, considered that restructuring on a stand-alone basis might not be the only and the cheapest option available [105].
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond ei kuulu valitsuse kontrolli alla vastavalt kõnealust fondi käsitleva seaduse artikli 16C lõikele 2, mille kohaselt ei ole fondist kapitalitoetust saanud krediidiasutused laiema avaliku sektori osad.
As regards the remuneration of both measures, the Commission stated that the coverage of the funding gap was a definitive cost without offsetting future revenues which triggered a need for in-depth restructuring [106].
Samuti viidati Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi juhtimisstruktuurile.
Regarding the proportionality of both measures, the Commission considered that measures NTT2 and NTT1 were proportionate as rescue aid in the short-term but in recital 79 of the New TT Opening Decision required measures to be introduced rapidly that would limit negative spill-over effects.
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi sekkumise kohta panga juhtimisse märkis fond, et kavatseb austada panga sõltumatust ega kavatse sekkuda igapäevajuhtimisse, arvestades, et fondi roll on määratletud Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi käsitlevas seaduses.
Regarding the compatibility of measure T, the Commission had already temporarily approved it as rescue aid on 16 May 2012 in its Decision on the resolution of T Bank (‘T Bank Decision’) [107] but could not give a definitive approval of the aid to T Bank’s activities which were transferred to TT Bank.
Fondi kohaselt ei toimu mingit riigi sekkumist ega kooskõlastamist ning Eurobanki otsused seoses laenuprotsessiga (sh tagatiste, hinnastamise ja laenuvõtjate maksejõulisusega) tehakse ärikriteeriumide alusel.
The Commission prolonged in the New TT Opening Decision [108] the authorisation of the measure as rescue aid until such time as it would take a final decision on an updated version of the restructuring plan for TT Bank.
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond juhtis tähelepanu asjaolule, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi käsitlevas seaduses ja aktsiate märkimise eellepingus on sätestatud asjakohased tagatised, mis takistavad olemasolevatel erainvestoritel võtta liigseid riske.
Regarding the compatibility of those measures with the Restructuring Communication, the Commission doubted whether New TT Bank would restore its long-term viability on a stand-alone basis.
Välja toodi järgmised tegurid:
That scepticism was based on the limited number of the proposed measures to be taken by New TT Bank to generate profits in the future, the uncertainty of the voluntary retirement scheme as regards the timing and the acceptance rate by the employees, the absence of further measures to reduce personnel costs, the lack of measures for rationalisation of the branch network after the acquisition of T Bank and a concomitant failure to exploit potential synergies [109].
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi esindajate nimetamine sõltumatute mittejuhtivate liikmetena panga juhtkonda ja nende osalemine komisjonides, ii) Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi teostatav panga hoolikas analüüsimine ning iii) asjaolu, et pärast lõplikku rekapitaliseerimist piiratakse selle hääleõigust vaid seni, kuni Eurobank tegutseb kooskõlas ümberkorralduskava tingimustega.
In recitals 90 and 91 of the New TT Opening Decision the Commission raised concerns about whether the ambitious decrease in interest margins on existing deposits and increase in loan margins on new loan production could be implemented without New TT Bank losing a significant amount of customers and without making risky lending.
Esimese ajutise rekapitaliseerimise vajalikkusega ja eeskätt abihüvitise tasemega seoses märkis Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond, et hüvitis oli lepitud kokku komisjoni, Euroopa Keskpanga ja Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi esindajatega.
Moreover, the Commission doubted whether New TT Bank would double its corporate loan book as planned and whether, given the lack of expertise, it could achieve the planned strong growth rate of the net interest income.
Kokku lepitud hüvitistaseme puhul võeti arvesse asjaolu, et esimene ajutine rekapitaliseerimine konverteeritakse püsivaks rekapitaliseerimiseks hiljemalt 30. septembriks 2012 ehk tähtajaks, mis oli sätestatud 2012. aasta märtsis komisjoni, Euroopa Keskpanga, Rahvusvahelise Valuutafondi ja Kreeka ametiasutuste vahel sõlmitud Kreeka teise kohandamiskava majandus- ja rahanduspoliitika memorandumis.
Therefore, in recital 95 of the New TT Opening Decision the Commission took the view that the reintegration of TT Bank into a larger viable financial company would increase the viability prospects of the New TT Bank, as it would allow for rationalisation of costs, repricing of deposits and new loans, and the offer of a wider range of products.
Esimese ajutise rekapitaliseerimise proportsionaalsuse kohta märkis Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond, et võetud meetmed, nagu need, millele on osutatud käesoleva otsuse põhjenduses (165), kujutavad piisavaid tagatisi märkimisväärsete eraldatud abisummade ja pika päästmisperioodi seisukohast.
As New TT Bank harboured the economic activities previously carried out within TT Bank, including those of T Bank, the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure regarding whether measures T and TT offered a long-term solution for the viability of New TT Bank and invited interested parties to submit comments.
Lisaks märkis Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond, et kehtivad asjakohased meetmed tagamaks, et finantsstabiilsuse fondi osalusega pangad ei jagaks omavahel tundlikku äriteavet.
Regarding burden-sharing, the Commission considered that restructuring on a stand-alone basis inflated the restructuring costs and therefore it doubted that State aid was limited to the minimum.
Need hõlmavad näiteks finantsstabiilsuse fondi eri esindajate nimetamist asjaomastesse pankadesse, nimetatud esindajate volitamist spetsiaalselt selleks, et nad hoiaksid ära esindajate vahelise teabevoolu, samuti asjaomastele ametnikele selgete sisejuhiste andmist, millega keelatakse pankade tundliku äriteabe levitamine.
Moreover, the Commission noted that, despite the fact that sufficient burden-sharing of shareholders and subordinated debt holders was achieved, which was probably the maximum feasible, the absence of remuneration triggered the need for in-depth restructuring, both in terms of viability measures and in terms of measures to limit distortions of competition.
Ühtlasi märkis finantsstabiilsuse fond, et ta ei kasuta pankadega seotud õigusi viisil, mis võib takistada, piirata, moonutada või oluliselt vähendada või tõkestada tõhusat konkurentsi.
The Commission also observed that the fact that a large part of the losses incurred stemmed from the waiver of debt in favour of the State justified a lower remuneration [110].
Lõpuks rõhutas finantsstabiilsuse fond, et fondi juhatuse liikmete ja töötajate suhtes kehtivad ranged konfidentsiaalsuseeskirjad ja usaldussuhtest tulenevad kohustused, samuti ärisaladust käsitlevad sätted.
Regarding distortions of competition, the Commission noted that the huge amount of aid received by TT Bank and transferred activities of T Bank and the lack of remuneration called for a deep restructuring and reduction of the market presence of New TT Bank.
KREEKA AMETIASUTUSTE MÄRKUSED NEA PROTON BANKI SUHTES AMETLIKU UURIMISMENETLUSE ALGATAMISE KOHTA
Moreover, while the losses stemmed mainly from the holding of GGBs, the Commission observed that TT Bank had held more GGBs than other Greek banks in proportion to its size and considered that it reflected inappropriate risk taking [111].
5. septembril 2012 esitasid Kreeka ametiasutused Nea Proton Bankiga seotud menetluse algatamise otsuse kohta oma märkused, mille olid koostanud Kreeka keskpank ja Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond.
Lastly, it noted that, although New TT Bank remained on the market almost as TT Bank had been before, the distortions of competition would be limited given the former’s relatively small size and the absence of foreign activities.
Kreeka keskpanga väite kohaselt ei saa Nea Proton Bank ega Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi omandis olev ajutine krediidiasutus esitada iseseisvalt pikemaajalist äriplaani.
However, the Commission doubted whether sufficient measures had been taken to limit undue distortions of competition and took the view that a price leadership ban and other behavioural measures might be necessary [112].
Lisaks märkis Kreeka keskpank, et ta teostab hoolikat järelevalvet finantsstabiilsuse fondi poolt Nea Proton Banki kohta koostatud ja komisjonile esitatud äriplaani üle, et tagada Nea Proton Banki müümine seaduses sätestatud ajavahemikus.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES ON THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING THE FIRST BRIDGE RECAPITALISATION
Mis puutub kasumlikkuse kasvu määra, siis juhtis Kreeka keskpank tähelepanu asjaolule, et suurimat kasvu ennustati 2013. aastaks (kui loodeti, et netointressitulu kasvab 55,3 miljonile eurole võrreldes 22,7 miljoni euroga 2012. aastal) ning et see pidi peamiselt tekkima koguintressikulude vähendamisest ning olema kahe teguri tulemus:
COMMENTS FROM A GREEK BANK
Nea Proton Banki suhtes võetud meetmete vajalikkuse kohta märkis Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond, et igasuguste kriisilahendusmeetmete üle otsustav pädev asutus on Kreeka keskpank ning et finantsstabiilsuse fond tegi regulatiivsete eesmärkide täitmiseks vajaliku minimaalse kapitalisüsti.
On 3 January 2013, the Commission received comments submitted by a Greek bank on the Eurobank Opening Decision.
Nea Proton Banki pikaajalise elujõulisuse taastamise küsimuses viitas finantsstabiilsuse fond kriisilahendusmeetmete raamistikule, mille alusel oli finantsstabiilsuse fond sunnitud müüma Nea Proton Banki kahe aasta jooksul, ning nõustus komisjoniga, et Nea Proton Bank võiks moodustada osa laiemast ja elujõulisest üksusest.
That Greek bank commented that the recapitalisation of Greek banks by the HFSF constituted, in principle, a welcome step towards a healthier and more viable banking system and expressed no objection to the recapitalisation of Eurobank.
Olgugi et Nea Proton Banki ümberkorraldamiskava põhines eraldiseisvuse mudelil, selgitas finantsstabiilsuse fond, et tema eesmärk on hõlbustada panga müüki seeläbi, et suurendatakse viimase atraktiivsust investorite jaoks ja parandatakse lõpptulemusi.
However, while expressing its entire support for the principle of the recapitalisation of Greek banks by the HFSF, that Greek bank explained that, in order to minimise distortions of competitions and to avoid discrimination, it expected that recapitalisation by the HFSF to be open to all banks operating in Greece under similar conditions.
Finantsstabiilsuse fondi arvamuse kohaselt ei võimaldanud kapitalisüstid Nea Proton Bankil mitte ainult täita minimaalset kapitali adekvaatsuse määra, vaid parandasid ka selle finantspositsiooni ja atraktiivsust mis tahes tulevaseks ühinemiseks muude väikepankadega.
COMMENTS FROM GREECE ON THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES
Finantsstabiilsuse fond märkis ka, et täiendav kapitalisüst oli vajalik erasektori kaasamise programmiga seotud väärtuse langusest tekkinud kahju ja kasvanud laenukulude katmisega.
COMMENTS FROM GREECE ON THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING THE FIRST BRIDGE RECAPITALISATION
Fondi hinnangul oli Nea Proton Bank optimeerinud oma rahastamiskulusid ja suurendanud usaldust hoiustajate silmis.
On 5 September 2012, Greece submitted comments which had been prepared by the Bank of Greece and the HFSF on the Eurobank Opening Decision.
2012. aastal vähenes Nea Proton Banki sõltuvus eurosüsteemist ja pank parandas oma likviidsuspositsiooni.
Comments prepared by the Bank of Greece
Täiendav kapitalisüst aitas langetada hoiuste intressimäärasid ja parandada intressimarginaale.
It also noted that the first bridge recapitalisation was temporary, given that the recapitalisation process would be concluded with share capital increases by those four banks.
Lisaks toimuks netointressitulu kavandatud kasvumäära saavutamine konservatiivse suurenemise kaudu äriettevõtete turul ja portfelli kvaliteedi parandamise abil.
The Bank of Greece also observed that the recapitalisation of the largest Greek banks is part of the longer term restructuring of the Greek banking sector.
Finantsstabiilsuse fondi väite kohaselt vähendas Nea Proton Bank 2012. aastal märkimisväärselt tegevuskulusid, selle kaks ainsat tütarettevõtjat peatasid tegevuse, oluliselt vähendati osalemist kindlustusmaaklerite turul ning lõpetati oma arvel kauplemine.
It noted that where a bank remains in private hands, the management will most probably remain the same, while if a bank becomes State-owned (that is to say, owned by the HFSF), the HFSF may appoint new management which, in any case, will be assessed by the Bank of Greece.
Lõpuks märkis finantsstabiilsuse fond, et konkurentsi moonutamine on piiratud, kuna Nea Proton Banki osakaal Kreeka pangandussüsteemi varades on väike ja pank ei kaalu agressiivse hoiusepoliitika kasutamist.
The Bank of Greece noted that it assesses the corporate governance framework, the adequacy of management and the risk profile of every bank on an ongoing basis in order to ensure that excessive risks are not taken.
KREEKA AMETIASUTUSTE MÄRKUSED NEW TT BANKI SUHTES AMETLIKU UURIMISMENETLUSE ALGATAMISE KOHTA
It also pointed out that the HFSF had already appointed representatives in the Board of Directors of the recapitalised banks.
19. juulil 2013 esitas Kreeka rahandusministeerium märkused New TT uurimise algatamise otsuse kohta.