natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On this basis, it seems that investment decisions which a private investor would have taken cannot be seen as having an influence on the decisions of the private tourist agencies to invest into Adria.
2 %.
The Commission also notes that the private tourist agencies subscribed the shares of Adria on the same date as PDP, they paid the same price, their investment was made under the same terms and conditions, and the increase from PDP and the private tourist agencies was done in cash.
AUKN asutati Sloveenia Vabariigi kapitaliinvesteeringute üldjuhtimise seadusega; [34] selle juhatuse liikmed nimetas ametisse Sloveenia Riigikogu.
In any event, even if the Commission were to conclude that PDP's participation would entail State resources and be imputable to the State (see in this sense recitals 89 to 91), a private participation of 20 % cannot be considered negligible by comparison to the public intervention in the sense of settled case-law [33].
AUKN kasutas Sloveenia riigieelarve vahendeid ning selle töötajad olid riigiametnikud [35].
Moreover, bearing in mind the above, the Commission cannot conclude that the decision of the private tourist agencies to invest into Adria was actually influenced by the conduct of PDP.
Seega on selge, et AUKNi tegevust saab seostada riigiga ning see hõlmas riigi vahendeid; seda ei vaidlusta ka Sloveenia.
The fact that Adria was considered as being in difficulty in 2010 (see Section 7.1) does not alter this conclusion.
Täiendava elemendina juhib komisjon tähelepanu Sloveenia riigikantselei 23. juuni 2011. aasta pressiteatele: „Tänasel istungil otsustas valitsus, et [AUKN] teeb ettevõtja Adria Airways d.d. omakapitali 49,5 miljoni euro suuruse sissemakse ja äriühing [PDP] maksab 500000 eurot […].
In addition, from the evidence submitted by Slovenia it does not appear that the private tourist agencies had motivations to invest in Adria other than profit-seeking.
Sloveenia osaleb selles protsessis aktiivselt, kuna tema huvides on, et Sloveenias asuv lennuettevõtja pakuks ka tulevikus regulaarlende.” [36].
In this respect, the Commission points out to a report provided by Slovenia on the strategic orientations of Adria for the period 2009-2014 — which apparently was at the disposal of the investors at the time of taking their investment decision — according to which Adria was expected to make profits between 2010 and 2104, on the basis a capital injection of approximately EUR 2,5 million and the implementation by Adria of certain measures, including higher average income on passenger and cost reductions.
Seoses PDPga leiab komisjon, et Stardust Marine'i kohtuasja [37] silmas pidades leidub mitu tõendit, mis lubavad järeldada, et PDP asutati Sloveenia riigiasutuste poliitiliste otsuste elluviimiseks ning et PDP otsust investeerida 4. meetmesse saab seostada riigiga ning see hõlmab riigi vahendeid.
This report could be seen as an additional indication that the private tourist agencies were indeed convinced of the profitability of their investment.
Esiteks märgib komisjon, et Sloveenia riik omab kaudselt (KADi, SODi ja DSU kaudu) 100 % PDPst.
Therefore, the Commission is of the view that the decision of the private tourist agencies to invest in Adria was made pari passu with that of PDP and that their investment was significant.
Seoses sellega juhib komisjon tähelepanu oma otsusele ELANi juhtumi kohta, [38] milles komisjon jõudis järeldusele, et PDP kahe omaniku, KADi ja DSU tegevust saab seostada riigiga.
In addition, the Commission has no reasons to doubt that the private tourist agencies decided to invest in Adria for profit-seeking motives.
Lisaks kontrollib riik kõiki hääli ettevõtja nõukogus, kes omakorda määrab ametisse juhatuse.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that measure 3 did not entail an undue advantage to Adria and therefore excludes the presence of State aid, without it being necessary to assess further whether the rest of the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU would be met.
PDP põhikirja artikli 19 kohaselt peab juhatus väärtpaberite ostu heaks kiitma, kui tehingu väärtus ületab 500000 eurot.
On 30 September 2011, Slovenia subscribed in cash 70 % (EUR 49,5 million) of the 2011 capital increase of Adria.
Komisjon tuletab kooskõlas menetluse algatamise otsusega meelde ka Sloveenia endise rahandusministri avaldust tema ametiaja lõppedes 28. oktoobril 2011 (st pärast 4. meetme rakendamist): „Restruktureerimisettevõtja PDP asutamisega võimaldasime Sloveenia ettevõtjatele juurdepääsu uutele rahastamisallikatele, uuele oskusteabele ja asjatundlikkusele, mis põhineb ettevõtjate restruktureerimise headel tavadel.
Slovenia invested the money through the Capital Assets Management Agency of Slovenia (AUKN).
Kõige suuremad edulood on kahtlemata Adria Airways ja Unior” [39].
In addition, PDP subscribed in cash an additional 1 % (EUR 0,5 million).
Seda avaldust saab pidada kaudseks tõendiks, mis näitab, et ettevõtja tegevust saab seostada riigiga Stardust Marine'i kohtuasja tähenduses.
The rest of the increase (i.e. EUR 19,7 million) took the form of debt-to-equity swap by several banks: 20 % by NLB, 5 % by Abanka Vipa d.d., 2 % by Unicredit Bank of Slovenia d.d. and 2 % by Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank d.d.
Sloveenia väide, et seda avaldust tuleks vaadelda rahandusministri ametiaja lõppemise poliitilises kontekstis „ulja ja lihtsa [avaldusena], mis pääseks meedias mõjule”, ei ole veenev.
The AUKN was established by the Law on Corporate Governance of Capital Investments of the Republic of Slovenia [34], its Management Board was appointed by the National Assembly, it was a direct user of the budget of the Republic of Slovenia and it was staffed with public employees.
Veel üheks kaudseks tõendiks peab komisjon ka Sloveenia riigikantselei 23. juuni 2011. aasta pressiteadet (vt põhjendus 88), millest nähtub, et Sloveenia valitsus otsustas, et PDP teeb 2011. aasta kapitalisuurendamisel 0,5 miljoni euro suuruse sissemakse.
It is thus clear that AUKN's actions were imputable to the State and that they entailed State resources, which moreover is not contested by Slovenia.
Eespool toodut arvesse võttes leiab komisjon, et PDP osalemine 2010. aasta kapitalisuurendamises hõlmas riigi vahendeid ning et PDP tegevust saab seostada riigiga.
As an additional element, the Commission highlights a press release of 23 June 2011 of the Office of the Prime Minister of Slovenia: ‘At today's session, the Government […] decided that [AUKN] would contribute EUR 49,5 million to the equity of Adria Airways, d. d., and the joint stock company [PDP] would pay EUR 500000 […].
Pankade kohta märgib komisjon kooskõlas menetluse algatamise otsusega, et Abanka Vipa d.d., Unicredit Bank of Slovenia d.d. ja Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank d.d. on täielikult eraomandis olevad ettevõtjad.
With its active engagement in this process, the Republic of Slovenia would also in the future like to meet its interests in the field of scheduled air services provided by a carrier with the seat in Slovenia’ [36].
NLB oli 4. meetme rakendamise ajal riigi enamusomandis; riik omas ettevõtja aktsiatest otse 45,62 % ja kaudselt SODi kaudu 4,07 % ja KADi kaudu 4,03 % aktsiatest [40].
In relation to PDP, the Commission considers that there are a number of indicators in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law [37] which allows it to conclude that PDP was set up to carry out policies decided by the Slovenian public authorities and that its decision to invest in measure 4 is imputable to the State and entails State resources.
Ainus oluline aktsionär riigi kõrval oli KBC Bank (25 %).
In the first place, the Commission notes that the Slovenian State indirectly owns 100 % of PDP (through KAD, SOD and DSU).
Riigi enamusosalus, millest tulenes häälteenamus juhatuses ja nõukogus, näitab, et meetmeid saab seostada riigiga.
In this sense, the Commission reminds its decision in the ELAN case [38] in which it concluded that the actions of KAD and DSU, two of the owners of PDP, were imputable to the State.
NLB põhikirjast ei saa komisjon siiski kindlalt järeldada, kas otsust Adriasse investeerida saab riigiga seostada.
In addition, the State has the totality of votes in the shareholders' committee, which in turn appoints the Board of Directors of the company.
Samuti ei ole komisjon NLB juhtimisstruktuuris kindlaks teinud riigiasutuste sekkumist.
Following Article 19 of the Articles of Association of PDP, the Board of Directors must authorise the purchase of securities when the value of the transaction exceeds EUR 500000.
Komisjon ei ole leidnud selle kohta ka kaudseid tõendeid Stardust Marine'i kohtuasja tähenduses.
The Commission also reminds, in line with its opening decision, the statement of former Slovenian Minister of Finance at the end of his term on 28 October 2011 (i.e. after measure 4 had taken place): ‘With the establishment of the special restructuring company (PDP) we provided Slovenian firms with new sources of finance, knowhow and expertise based on cases of good practice for the restructuring of firms.
Eespool kirjeldatud põhjustel leiab komisjon, et NLB otsust 4. meetmes osaleda ei saa Sloveenia riigiga seostada.
Adria Airways and Unior are definitely the most resounding successes’ [39].
Olles kindlaks teinud, et AUKNi ja PDP tegevust saab riigiga seostada, peab komisjon hindama, kas sellise tegevusega anti Adriale põhjendamatu valikuline eelis.
This statement can be considered indirect evidence of imputability to the State in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law.
Esiteks väidab Sloveenia, et pankade otsus Adriasse investeerida tehti riigi otsusega samal ajal, mis välistab eelise andmise.
The arguments provided by Slovenia that this statement should be seen in the political context of the end of term of the Minister of Finance as a ‘bold and simple enough [statement] to be successfully communicated through the media’ do not appear convincing.
Komisjon juhib esiteks tähelepanu oma järeldusele, et 2011. aastal, 4. meetme rakendamise ajal, oli Adria raskustes olev ettevõtja (vt põhjendus 66).
Finally, the Commission adds as an additional indirect evidence the press release of 23 June 2011 of the Office of the Prime Minister of Slovenia (see recital 88), which shows that the Slovenian Government had decided that PDP would contribute EUR 0,5 million to the 2011 capital increase.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et pankade osalemine 2011. aasta kapitalisüstis toimus võla (26 % nende olemasolevatest nõuetest Adria vastu) vahetamisena omakapitali vastu.
In light of the above, the Commission is of the view that the participation of PDP to the 2010 capital increase entailed State resources and that PDP's actions are imputable to the State.
Riik ja PDP tegid aga rahasüste.
With regard to the banks, the Commission observes, in line with its opening decision, that Abanka Vipa d.d., Unicredit Bank of Slovenia d.d. and Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank d.d. are purely private entities.
Sloveenia väidab, et omakapitali vastu vahetatud kogusummast, mis oli 19,7 miljonit eurot, võrduks [10–20] miljonit eurot rahasüstiga, kuna see osa laenudest oli täielikult tagatud.
In relation to NLB, at the time when measure 4 took place, it was majority-owned by the State, either directly (45,62 % of the shares) or indirectly through SOD (4,07 %) and KAD (4,03 %) [40], with KBC Bank as the only other significant shareholder (25 %).
Sloveenia väitel oleksid pangad võla vahetamisega omakapitali vastu võtnud uue riski, mida saaks käsitada samaväärsena [10–20] miljoni euro suuruse rahasüstiga.
The State's majority ownership of NLB, which translates into majority of votes in the Management Board and Supervisory Board, is an indication of the imputability of the measures to the State.
Komisjon on hinnanud Sloveenia esitatud teavet ning jõudnud järeldusele, et omakapitali vastu vahetatud 19,7 miljonist eurost oli tõepoolest [10–20] miljonit eurot täielikult ja piisavalt tagatud, peamiselt Adria õhusõidukite pantidega.
However, from the Articles of Association of NLB the Commission cannot conclude with certainty that its decision to invest in Adria was imputable to the State.
Nende õhusõidukite väärtuse kindlakstegemisel tugines Adria sõltumatu ettevõtja AVAC (Aircraft Value Analysis Company) 2011. aasta aprillis avaldatud aruandele „Aircraft Value Reference”.
Also, the Commission has not identified from the management structure of NLB any interference on the side of the public authorities.
Aruandes esitatakse mitmesugust tüüpi õhusõidukite praegune ja tulevane väärtus, rendimaksumus ja väärtuse ülem- ja alampiir.
The Commission did not find either any indirect evidence in this respect in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law.
Tagatiseks panditud õhusõidukite hindamisel kasutatud väärtus jäi oluliselt alla AVACi ülempiiri.
For the reasons above, the Commission considers that NLB's decision to participate in measure 4 is not imputable to Slovenia.
Komisjon leiab, et aruanne on usaldusväärne alus õhusõidukite väärtuse kindlaksmääramiseks, arvestades AVACi sõltumatust ja AVACi andmete üldlevinud kasutamist lennundussektoris.
Once clarified that the actions of AUKN and PDP are imputable to the State, the Commission must assess whether they entailed a selective undue advantage to Adria.
[0–10] miljonit eurot omakapitali vastu vahetatud võlast ei olnud siiski täielikult tagatud.
Slovenia first claims that the decision of the banks to invest into Adria was concomitant to the decision of the State, which per se would exclude the presence of advantage.
Selles osas ei saa komisjon järeldada, et see oli samaväärne rahasüstiga ning et pangad võtsid uue riski.
The Commission first reminds its conclusion that Adria was a firm in difficulty in 2011, at the time when measure 4 was granted (see recital 66).
Pealegi paranesid allesjäänud võla tingimused ning üldine riskitase vähenes oluliselt, pidades silmas, et võla (omakapitaliks muutmata) jäägi tagatis jäi samale tasemele kui enne konverteerimist.
In addition, the Commission notes that the participation of the banks to the 2011 capital injection took the form of a conversion into equity of 26 % of their existing claims against Adria.
Üldist riskitaset vähendab veelgi asjaolu, et võla omakapitali vastu vahetamise eeltingimusena tuli Adrial […].
On the other hand, the State and PDP injected cash.
Lisaks olid mõnel juhul võlajäägi tingimused (intressimäär, tagasimaksegraafik jne) […].
According to Slovenia, the banks would have assumed new risk with the conversion, which could be seen as equivalent to an injection of fresh money of EUR [10-20] million.
Samuti ei saa välistada, et pankade otsust Adriasse investeerida mõjutas riigi käitumine.
The Commission has assessed the information provided by Slovenia and concludes that indeed EUR [10-20] million out of the EUR 19,7 million converted into equity were fully and adequately collateralised with pledges mainly on aircrafts owned by Adria.
Adria 2011. aasta aruandes märgitakse, et „Sloveenia […] valitsus sõnastas 20. jaanuaril 2011 selgelt oma arvamuse ja võttis seisukoha Adria Airwaysi kui riikliku lennuettevõtja tähtsuse kohta Sloveenia majanduse, Sloveenia kodanike ja väliskülaliste jaoks.
In order to establish the value of these aircraft, Adria relied on the ‘Aircraft Value Reference’ report published in April 2011 by the independent company Aircraft Value Analysis Company (‘AVAC’).
Oma otsuses visandas valitsus kava, mis võimaldab Adria Airwaysil jääda Sloveenia riiklikuks lennuettevõtjaks […]”.
This report provides current and future values and lease rentals of multiple types of aircraft, with high and low value boundaries.
Kõnealune otsus, mis võeti vastu palju varem kui 2011. aasta septembri restruktureerimiskava, võis innustada panku investeerima, arvestades et riik oli juba üles näidanud suurt huvi Adria toetamise vastu [41].
In order to assess the aircraft pledged as security, values considerably below the AVAC high value were used.
Eespool toodud väidete põhjal välistab komisjon Sloveenia väited, et riik ja pangad investeerisid pari passu tingimustel.
The Commission is of the opinion that the report constitutes a reliable basis for determining the value of the aircraft, given the independent character of AVAC and its widespread use in the sector.
Komisjon peab siiski analüüsima, kas Sloveenia investeering Adriasse vastas turutingimustele.
However, EUR [0-10] million of debts converted into equity were not fully collateralised.
Sloveenia väidab, et riik otsustas 4. meetmes osaleda 2011. aasta restruktureerimiskava alusel, seega lähtudes turumajandusliku investori põhimõttest.
For this part, the Commission cannot conclude that it was equivalent to a cash injection and that the banks assumed new risk.
Komisjon märgib, et erinevalt varasematest kapitalisuurendamistest toimus 2011. aasta kapitalisuurendamine ilma hindamisaruandeta.
Moreover, the terms of the remaining debt improved and the overall level of risk significantly decreased, given that the outstanding (unconverted) part of the debts remained with the same level of collateral as before the conversion.
Lisaks oleks suurte võlgadega ettevõtja rekapitaliseerimist kaaluv erainvestor nõudnud restruktureerimiskava, mis suudaks taastada ettevõtja elujõulisuse [42].
This overall risk is further reduced by the fact that as a pre-condition for the debt-to-equity conversion, Adria had to […].
Vaatlusalusel juhul väidavad Sloveenia ametiasutused, et nad otsustasid 2011. aasta kapitalisuurendamises osaleda septembris 2011 koostatud restruktureerimiskava alusel.
In addition, in some cases, the conditions of the outstanding debt (interest rate, repayment schedule, etc.) […].
Komisjon oli siiski juba jõudnud järeldusele, et Adria oli 2011. aastal raskustes (vt põhjendus 66).
On the other hand, Slovenia assumed full risk for at least EUR 49,5 million since it only became shareholder of Adria upon the 2011 capital injection.
Seega on ebatõenäoline, et riik võis oodata Adriasse investeeritud kapitalilt mõistliku ajaga tavapärast tasuvust.
The banks assumed new risk but not at the same level as Slovenia, given that they saw their position improved as a result of the debt conversion.
Pealegi jääb komisjon menetluse algatamise otsuses väljendatud seisukoha juurde, et turumajandusliku investeerimise põhimõttest lähtudes ei saa restruktureerimiskava pidada 2011. kapitalisuurendamise õigustamiseks piisavaks.
On this basis, it appears that when the banks decided to invest into Adria they were not in a comparable position to the State.
Esiteks prognoositi restruktureerimiskavas (selle 2011. aasta septembris valminud esialgses versioonis) 2013. aastaks elujõulisust väga väikese (maksueelse) kasumimarginaaliga (realistlikus stsenaariumis prognoositi 2013. aasta kasumimarginaaliks […] %, 2014. aastal […] % ja 2015. aastal […] %).
Adria's 2011 annual report notes that ‘[t]he Government of […] Slovenia clearly formulated its opinion on 20 January 2011 and took a position on the importance of Adria Airways as the national air carrier for the Slovenian economy, Slovenian citizens and guests from abroad.
Komisjon märgib siiski, et vahearuannetes käsitletakse ajavahemikku 2011–2012, samas kui restruktureerimiskavas sisaldus prognoose kuni 2015. aastani […].
In its decision the Government set out its plan for Adria Airways to remain Slovenia's national air carrier […]’.
Sellest lähtudes on komisjon arvamusel, et vahearuannetes ei esitatud puuduvat teavet, mis oli vajalik selleks, et restruktureerimiskava vastaks turumajandusliku investeerimise kriteeriumile.
This decision, taken well before the adoption of the restructuring plan in September 2011, could have eased the decision of the banks to invest, given that they State had already signalled its strong interest in supporting Adria [41].
Seepärast järeldab komisjon, et 2011. aasta kapitalisuurendamisega anti Adriale põhjendamatu eelis.
On the basis of the arguments above, the Commission excludes the arguments of Slovenia that the State and the banks invested on pari passu terms.
Eelis oli valikuline, kuna Adria oli ainus abisaaja.
However, the Commission must analyse whether Slovenia's investment in Adria would be market-conform.
Komisjon peab kaaluma ka seda, kas 4. meetmega moonutati tõenäoliselt konkurentsi ja mõjutati liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust, andes Adriale eelise konkurentide ees, kes riigilt toetust ei saanud.
Slovenia claims that it decided to participate in measure 4 on the basis of the restructuring plan of September 2011, which should be considered MEIP-conform.
Seega võimaldas 4. meede Adrial tegevust jätkata, pidamata erinevalt konkurentidest tundma muret raske finantsolukorra tavapäraste tagajärgede pärast.
In addition, according to the case-law, a private investor contemplating a recapitalisation of an undertaking with significant debts would have required a restructuring plan capable of making the company viable [42].
meede: AAT müük aastatel 2010–2011
In the case at hand, the Slovenian authorities claim that they decided to participate in the 2011 capital increase on the basis of the restructuring plan of September 2011.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses jõudis komisjon põhjendustes 41 ja 42 kirjeldatud põhjustel esialgsele järeldusele, et AAT aktsiate omandamisega PDP ja Aerodrom Ljubljana poolt anti Adriale põhjendamatu eelis.
However, the Commission has already concluded that Adria was in difficulty in 2011 (see recital 66).
Võttes arvesse PDP ja Aerodrom Ljubljana osalemise erinevat laadi (raha vs. võla vahetamine omakapitali vastu) ning 4. meetmega seotud arutluskäiku (vt põhjendused 94–101), leiab komisjon, et pari passu võib 5. meetme puhul mutatis mutandis välistada.
In itself, this makes it unlikely that the State could expect Adria to produce a normal return on the capital invested within a reasonable time.
Sellest hoolimata peab komisjon hindama, kas PDP ja Aerodrom Ljubljana investeerimisotsused olid majanduslikult ratsionaalsed – kas turumajanduse tingimustes arukalt tegutsev ettevõtja oleks sarnastel tingimustel toiminud samal viisil.
Moreover, the Commission maintains its views of the opening decision that the restructuring plan cannot be deemed sufficient to justify the 2011 capital increase as MEIP-conform.
Seoses sellega märgib komisjon kõigepealt, et koguhind, mis Aerodrom Ljubljana ja PDP maksid, st 14,7 miljonit eurot, jäi AAT hindamisaruandes kindlaks määratud väärtusvahemikku.
First, the restructuring plan (in its original version of September 2011) foresaw viability in 2013 with very low profit (EBT) margins (the realistic scenario foresaw profit margins of […] % in 2013, […] % in 2014 and […] % in 2015).
Komisjonil oli hindamisaruande suhtes siiski kahtlusi, kuna komisjon leidis, et AAT (kõnealusel ajal Adria hooldusüksus SVL) väärtuse hindamisel oleks tulnud lähtuda ettevõtjast kui eraldiseisvast üksusest, jättes kõrvale kontsernisisese sünergia.
The insufficient return for the shareholders is also demonstrated by the fact that the plan forecasted particularly low levels of equity for the same period, in the range of EUR […] in 2011 to EUR […] in 2015.
Komisjon märkis veel. et AAT/SVL hindamise ([…]) ja AAT müügi (november 2010 – märts 2011) vahele jäi märkimisväärne ajavahemik.
This would mean that the capital injected in September 2011 — EUR 69,7 million — was significantly reduced during the restructuring period and thus would not bring any actual return.
Esiteks peab komisjon märkima, et hindamisaruande koostas sõltumatu ekspert (KPMG) ning ei ole põhjust arvata, et ekspert ei täitnud oma ülesannet täiesti sõltumatult.
Slovenia provided a number of interim reports prepared by Airconomy and Adria dated April-September 2011 (i.e. predating the restructuring plan of September 2011), which were supposed to include the quantifications missing in the restructuring plan and which apparently were provided to all shareholders of Adria at the time as well as to the State.
Hindamishetke ja aktsiate müügi vahele jääva ajavahemiku kohta on Sloveenia selgitanud, et hindamisaruanne põhines Adria finantsolukorral 31. detsembri 2009. aasta seisuga, st kõige hilisematel välisaudiitori poolt auditeeritud andmetel.