natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
First, only the first State loan and the BAS loan were quantified in the Agreement, at respectively LVL 16 million and LVL 14 million.
Selle tulemusel oli BASi laen riskantsem kui riigilaen, ent selle andmisel kohaldati sama intressimäära.
The figure of LVL 100 million was merely a forecast, an estimate of what might be required or expected in terms of equity increase by the end of the year; the amount of the equity increase was not clearly determined in the Agreement.
Võttes arvesse tagatise suurust ja kohaldatud intressimäära, on komisjon jõudnud järeldusele, et 1. meetmega ei antud airBalticule valikulist eelist ning et riigiabi olemasolu saab välistada ilma vajaduseta täiendavalt hinnata, kas ülejäänud ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 kumulatiivsed tingimused on täidetud [34].
Indeed, the actual amount of the equity increase agreed in December 2011 was in fact LVL 110 million (see recital 33 above), i.e. in excess of what had been foreseen in the Agreement.
Esimese riigilaenu intressimäära alandamine [11–13] %-lt [2–4] %-le
The Commission is of the view that the amounts of Measures 2 and 3 were not determined or ascertainable on 3 October 2011.
13. detsembril 2011, st pärast seda, kui Läti osalus airBalticus oli suurenenud 99,8 %-le (vt põhjendus 21), otsustas Läti valitsus anda loa alandada esimese riigilaenu ja sellega ka BASi laenu intressimäära riskipreemiale vastava [9–11] protsendipunkti võrra ehk [11–13] %-lt [2–4] %-le.
In addition, the State was not obliged to assign to airBaltic the claims resulting from syndicated loan 2.
Komisjoni ei veena Läti väited selle kohta, et riik vähendas intressimäära alandamise teel tollal peaaegu riigi ainuomandisse (99,8 % ulatuses) kuulunud airBalticu rahastamiskulusid (kuna alandati ka BASi laenu intressimäära).
The assignment of the claims of private investors to the State was a mere eventuality subject to BAS not fulfilling its obligations under the Agreement, something which was not known and which there was no reason to suspect on 3 October 2011.
Läti sõnul oli see riigi seisukohast mõistlik otsus, sest riigi jaoks intressi kujul saamata jäänud tulu korvas eelis, mille riik kui airBalticu enamusaktsionär sai tänu sellele, et ettevõtja pidi maksma madalamat intressi.
For this reason, measure 6 cannot be considered as having been granted at the moment the Agreement was signed and cannot therefore be considered as pari passu with the first State loan and the BAS loan.
Teisalt tuletab komisjon meelde, et esimese riigilaenu ja BASi laenu andmise ajal nähti lepingus ette, et mõlema laenu tingimused on identsed ja omavahel seotud, mistõttu ühe laenuga seotud mis tahes muudatus tooks kaasa samasuguse muudatuse ka teise laenu puhul.
In addition, Latvia argues that most of the claims of the private investors which were supposed to be novated in the two syndicated loans were unsecured, and that had the State let the company go bankrupt, the private investors would have sued the State for damages, which would have been more costly for the State than providing the rest of measures to airBaltic.
Seepärast kajastub intressimäära alandamine mõlemas laenus ning laenu tagatise märkimisväärne suurus ja asjaolu, et BASi laenu ei tagatud, püsib muutumatuna.
In the Commission's view, the claim that the private investors would have sued the State asking for damages is purely hypothetical and not supported by any evidence.
Kuna BAS oli juba ette nõus siduma BASi laenu tingimused esimese riigilaenu tingimustega, ei ole komisjonil mingit põhjust pidada seda otsust turutingimustele mittevastavaks.
In addition, nothing shows that Latvia actually took into account these considerations when providing support to airBaltic.
Selle põhjal on komisjon jõudnud järeldusele, et isegi intressimäära alandamist arvesse võttes ei antud 1. meetmega airBalticule valikulist eelist ja et riigiabi olemasolu saab välistada.
In view of the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that the argument of concomitance raised by the Latvian authorities does not stand.
Teine riigilaen (2. meede)
For this reason, the Commission concludes that measures 1, 2, 3 and 6 cannot be considered as constituting a single transaction decided on 3 October 2011 and will therefore assess them separately.
Teise riigilaenu andis rahandusministeeriumi kaudu otse Läti riik, tuginedes Läti valitsuse 13. detsembri 2011. aasta otsusele, millega anti rahandusministeeriumile luba näha riigieelarves airBalticule ette 67 miljoni lati (94,86 miljoni euro) suuruse konverteeritava laenu andmine.
The first State loan (measure 1)
Seepärast hõlmab 2. meede riigi ressursse ja on seostatav riigiga.
The Commission notes that the first State loan was provided directly by Latvia through the State Treasury upon request of the Ministry of Transport.
Komisjon täheldab, et teise riigilaenu andmise ajaks, st 13. detsembriks 2011, oli BAS ilma jäänud kogu oma osalusest airBalticus, välja arvatud üks aktsia, ja et 99,8 % ettevõtjast kuulus nüüd riigile.
This is expressly stated in the Agreement.
Seepärast ei olnud riik ja BAS enam aktsionäridena võrreldavas olukorras.
It is therefore clear that measure 1 entails State resources and that it is imputable to the State.
Läti väidab, et vastavalt lepingu punktile 7.2, kus on öeldud, et Läti annab airBalticule laenu proportsionaalselt oma osaluse suurusega, oli BAS kohustatud andma airBalticule vahendeid summas, mis vastas tema aktsiate arvule.
Latvia does not contest this point.
BAS pidi eraldama rahalised vahendid kapitalisüsti tegemise ajal 2011. aasta detsembris.
In order to assess whether measure 1 entailed an undue selective advantage to airBaltic, the Commission first observes that the first State loan and the BAS loan were agreed on 3 October 2011, i.e. the date of signature of the Agreement.
Komisjon märgib, et 13. detsembril 2011 oli BASil vaid üks airBalticu aktsia.
At that moment in time, Latvia and BAS were the major shareholders of the company and the loans were provided in proportion to their shareholding (52,6 % and 47,2 % respectively), and with identical and linked conditions.
Seepärast oleks riik pidanud lähtuma turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva aruka investori seisukohast ja hindama, kas BASil oli osalusega seotud asjaolude muutumist arvesse võttes olemas stiimul paigutada ettevõtjasse kapitali suurendamise ajal raha.
As indicated in recital 45 above, the Commission had observed in the opening decision that BAS' decision to invest in airBaltic may have been influenced by the willingness of the public authorities to financially support the company.
Riik oli seda võimalust tegelikult ette näinud ja lisanud lepingusse, eelkõige selle punkti 7.4, mitu eriolukorra meedet, juhuks kui BAS jätab oma kohustused täitmata.
However, while it is true that the Latvian Government had expressed its interest in maintaining airBaltic as the national carrier, [31] the Commission observes that the support of the Latvian State was under negotiation and was still undetermined and subject to conditions.
Peale selle – nagu tunnistab Läti – oleks juhul, kui BAS ei oleks eraldanud lisavahendeid, tulnud vabastada teise riigilaenu teine osa.
On this basis, the Commission cannot exclude that the first State loan and the BAS loan were provided concomitantly, thereby excluding the presence of aid.
Lepingu punktiga 7.4 anti riigile õigus osta BASilt kõik tema airBalticu aktsiad ühe lati eest.
As the General Court has clarified, ‘simultaneity cannot in itself, even where significant private investments have been made, suffice for a finding that there has been no aid within the meaning of Article [107(1) TFEU] without taking into consideration the other relevant facts and points of law’ [32].
Lepingu sõlmimise ajal tähendas see riigi jaoks tagatist, et BAS täidab oma kohustusi või jääb muidu ilma oma kõikidest airBalticu aktsiatest.
The Commission has therefore also assessed whether the agreed interest rate of [11 — 13] % for the first State loan (and the BAS loan) can be considered to be at market level.
Olukord muutus täielikult 30. novembril 2011, mil Latvijas Krājbanka müüs kõik BASile kuulunud airBalticu aktsiad peale ühe Läti riigile (vt põhjendus 21).
During the course of the formal investigation procedure, Latvia submitted evidence regarding the value of the collateral (trademarks and receivables) which was assessed by the independent auditor […] as part of an audit of the company initiated in the summer of 2011.
Selles uues kontekstis kaotas lepingu punkt 7.4 tähenduse.
As the receivables (as of 30 September 2011) were part of the relevant financial information, they were also subject to evaluation by […].
Ühe aktsiaga ei olnud BASil tõepoolest erilist indu täita oma kohustusi, sest nende täitmata jätmise tagajärg oleks olnud vaid ilmajäämine oma ainukesest airBalticu aktsiast.
As regards the trademarks, their value was based on the price at which airBaltic had bought back the trademarks from BAS.
Kaalutlev turuosaline oleks hoolikalt vaaginud, kas anda sellistel uutel asjaoludel airBalticule lisavahendeid, ning oleks vähemalt küsinud teiselt poolelt (st BASilt) kinnitust selle kohta, et too tõepoolest eraldab ettevõtjale vahendeid.
In order to determine the liquidation value of the collateral, Latvia applied a […] % discount rate in accordance with the Latvian Treasury's internal collateral valuation methodology, which the Commission considers to be adequate in view of the nature of the collateral.
Komisjoni meelest tundub olevat ebatõenäoline, et selline kinnitus oleks antud, sest BAS oleks pidanud paigutama ettevõtjasse väga suure summa raha – märksa suurema, kui ta võis alguses prognoosida –, et taastada oma varasem 47,2 % osalus või saada tagasi mis tahes muu märkimisväärne arv airBalticu aktsiaid.
On this basis, the liquidation value of the collateral was LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million) which was [15 — 25] % higher than the amount of the first State loan.
Läti märgib ka seda, et teine riigilaen anti turutingimustel, välistades sellega mis tahes põhjendamatu eelise andmise airBalticule.
In addition, the Commission observes that in view of the significant collateral on the first State loan, applying an interest rate of [11 — 13] % would be in line with the Reference Rate Communication.
Läti leidis, et teisel riigilaenul oli sama tagatis mis esimesel riigilaenul, st airBalticu nõuded ja kaubamärgid.
The assertion that an interest rate of [11 — 13] % was market confirm is moreover reinforced by the fact that BAS (a private investor) had waived its right to have the BAS loan collateralised (see recital 26 above): the BAS loan was therefore more risky than the State loan but was granted at the same interest rate.
Nagu on selgitatud põhjenduses 101, oli tagatise hinnanguline likvideerimisväärtus [15–25] miljonit latti ([21,3–35,5] miljonit eurot).
Bearing in mind the level of collateralisation and the interest rate applied, the Commission concludes that measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and that the presence of state aid can be excluded, without it being necessary to assess further whether the rest of the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU would be met [34].
Seega ilmneb, et teise riigilaenu jaoks olemas olev tagatis oli väike.
The reduction of the interest rate of the first State loan from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] %
Pealegi ei ole mingit põhjust eeldada, et eraõiguslik turuosaline oleks nõus esimese riigilaenu puhul juba kindlaks määratud tagatise vähendamisega alla 100 %.
On 13 December 2011, i.e. once Latvia's shareholding in airBaltic had increased to 99,8 % (see paragraph (21) above), the Latvian Government decided to authorise a cut in the interest rate on the first State loan — and thus also of the BAS loan — of [9 — 11] percentage points corresponding to the risk premium, from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] %.
Et kindlaks teha teise riigilaenu esimese osa suhtes kohaldatud määra vastavus turutingimustele, kasutab komisjon parima olemasoleva lähtepunktina viitemäärade teatise kohaldamisest tulenevat määra.
Latvia considers that the reduction of the interest rate was justified because the loan was risk-free, given that the liquidation value of the collateral was estimated to be LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million), i.e. [15 — 25] % higher than the amount of the first State loan (see recital 101 above).
13. detsembril 2011 oli Läti baasmäär 2,2 %.
The Commission is not convinced by the arguments of Latvia when it claims that by lowering the interest rate, the State reduced the funding costs of airBaltic (since the interest rate of the BAS loan was also reduced), which at the time was almost exclusively owned by the State at 99,8 %.
Sellele näitajale tuleks lisada sõltuvalt abisaaja reitingust ja laenu tagatisest marginaal.
This was — according to Latvia — a rational decision for the State since the foregone revenues for the State in the form of interest were compensated by the advantage that the State, as a majority shareholder of airBaltic, derived from the company having to pay lower interest.
Nagu eelmises põhjenduses märgitud, oli tagatis väike.
On the other hand, the Commission recalls that at the time the first State loan and the BAS loan were granted, the Agreement stipulated that the conditions of both were identical and linked, and therefore any change in one of the loans would result in an identical change on the other loan.
Võttes arvesse airBalticu tollaseid raskusi, tuleks viitemäärade teatise järgi lisada baasmäärale 1000 baaspunkti suurune marginaal, mille tulemusel on kohaldatav määr 12,2 %.
The reduction of the interest rate is therefore mirrored for both loans and the very significant level of collateralisation of the loan and the fact that the BAS loan was not collateralised remain unchanged.
Seega selgub, et teise riigilaenu esimese osa intressimäära [9–11] % ei saa pidada turutingimustele vastavaks.
Since BAS had agreed up front to link the conditions of the BAS loan to those of the first State loan, the Commission has no reasons to consider that this would not be a market-conform decision.
Teise riigilaenu teine osa tehti ettevõtjale kättesaadavaks 14. detsembril 2012 intressimääraga [6–8] %.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that even taking into account the reduction of the interest rate, measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and the presence of state aid can be excluded.
Läti väitel on see intressimäär viitemäärade teatisest tulenevast määrast kõrgem ja on seetõttu kooskõlas turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva investori põhimõttega.
The second State loan (measure 2)
Viitemäärade teatise kohaselt oli Läti puhul 14. detsembril 2012 kohaldatav baasmäär 1,91 %.
The second State loan was provided directly by Latvia through the State Treasury, by means of a decision of the Latvian Government of 13 December 2011 authorising the Ministry of Finance to provide in the State budget for a convertible loan to airBaltic of LVL 67 million (EUR 94,86 million).
Sellele baasmäärale lisatav marginaal sõltub abisaaja reitingust ja tagatise suurusest.
Therefore, measure 2 entails State resources and is imputable to the State.
Nagu on selgitatud eespool punktis 7.1, on komisjon seisukohal, et airBaltic oli vähemalt alates 2011. aastast raskustes olev äriühing.
The Commission observes that at the time when the second State loan was provided, i.e. 13 December 2011, BAS had lost its entire shareholding in airBaltic, with the exception of one share, and the State now owned 99,8 % of the company.
Peale selle olid teise osa tagatiseks airBalticu nõuded ja kaubamärgid.
Therefore, the State and BAS were no longer in a comparable position as shareholders.
Väited tagatise ebapiisavuse kohta kehtivad mutatis mutandis ja seepärast tuleks lisada 1000 baaspunkti suurune marginaal.
Latvia argues that pursuant to Article 7.2 of the Agreement, which states that Latvia would provide a loan to airBaltic ‘in proportion to its shareholding’, BAS was obliged to provide funds to airBaltic in an amount corresponding to its number of shares.
Selle tulemusel oleks baasmäär 11,91 %, mis ületab tublisti tegelikult kohaldatud [6–8] % määra.
This was to be done by BAS at the time of the capital injection of December 2011 in the form of cash.
Kõike eespool öeldut silmas pidades leiab komisjon, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev kaalutlev ettevõtja ei oleks airBalticule teist riigilaenu andnud.
The Commission notes, however, that on 13 December 2011 BAS only had one share in airBaltic.
Selle põhjal järeldab komisjon, et 2. meetmega anti airBalticule põhjendamatu eelis.
It follows that the State should have adopted the position of a prudent market economy investor and assessed whether, given the change in circumstances concerning the shareholdings, BAS had any incentive to inject cash into the company at the time of the capital increase.
See eelis oli laadilt valikuline, sest sellest sai kasu üksnes airBaltic.
In fact, the State had foreseen this possibility and included in the Agreement several contingency measures — in particular in Article 7.4 — in case BAS failed to fulfil its commitments.
Komisjon peab kaaluma ka seda, kas 2. meetme puhul esines tõenäosus, et airBalticule eelise andmisega avaliku sektori toetust mittesaavate konkurentide ees kahjustatakse konkurentsi ja liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
Moreover, as Latvia acknowledges, the second tranche of the second State loan was to be released in the event that BAS failed to provide additional funds.
Näib olevat selge, et 2. meetmega võidi kahjustada ELi-sisest kaubandust ja konkurentsi, sest airBaltic konkureerib teiste ELi lennuettevõtjatega, eriti pärast lennutranspordi liberaliseerimise kolmanda etapi (nn kolmas pakett) kehtima hakkamist 1. jaanuaril 1993.
Article 7.4 of the Agreement gave the State the right to purchase from BAS all its shares in airBaltic for LVL 1.
ELi-siseste võrdlemisi lühikeste vahemaade läbimisel konkureerib lennutranspordisektor maantee- ja raudteetranspordisektoriga, mistõttu see võib mõjutada ka maantee- ja raudteeveoettevõtjaid.
At the time the Agreement was signed, this meant a guarantee for the State that BAS would fulfil its commitments or else would lose all its shares in airBaltic.
Seega võimaldas 2. meede airBalticul jätkata oma tegevust nii, et tal ei tulnud silmitsi seista keerulisest finantsolukorrast tulenevate tavaliste tagajärgedega.
However, the situation changed radically on 30 November 2011, when Latvijas Krājbanka sold all except one of the airBaltic shares owned by BAS to the Latvian State (see recital 21 above).
Eespool nimetatud kaalutluste põhjal järeldab komisjon, et 2. meetmega anti airBalticule riigiabi ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
In this new context, Article 7.4 was deprived of its meaning.
22. detsembril 2011 kokku lepitud kapitali suurendamine (3. meede)
Indeed, with only one share, BAS had little incentive to fulfil its obligations: the consequence of not doing so would simply mean losing its only share in airBaltic.
Nagu eespool märgitud, hõlmasid esimene riigilaen ja teise riigilaenu esimene osa riigi ressursse ning on seostatavad riigiga.
A prudent market operator would have carefully considered providing additional funds to airBaltic under those new circumstances and, at the very least, would have asked the other party (i.e. BAS) for assurance that it would indeed commit funds to the company.
Nende kapitaliks ümberarvestamise otsuse tegi Läti transpordiministeerium, kellele kuulus alates 30. novembrist 2011 airBalticu aktsiatest 99,8 %.
The Commission notes in addition that it seems unlikely that such assurance would have been given since BAS would have needed to inject a very high amount of money — much more than it could have originally estimated — in order to regain its former shareholding of 47,2 % or any other meaningful level of shares in airBaltic.
Seepärast hõlmab ka 3. meede riigi ressursse ja on seostatav riigiga.
Latvia also indicates that the second State loan was granted at market terms, thereby excluding any undue advantage to airBaltic.
Komisjon ei jaga Läti ametiasutuste seisukohta, et 3. meede ei kujuta endast abi.
As regards the collateral, Latvia noted that the second State loan had the same collateral as the first State loan, i.e. receivables and the trademarks of airBaltic.
Kõigepealt kordab komisjon, et järeldused, milleni jõuti eespool punktis 7.2.1, on kohaldatavad ka 3. meetme puhul.
As explained in paragraph (101) above, the liquidation value of the collateral was estimated at LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million).It thus appears that the level of collateralisation available for the second State loan would be low.
Lisaks leiab komisjon, et 3. meedet ei kohaldatud mitte 22. detsembril 2011 (st airBalticu aktsionäride koosolekul), vaid 29. detsembril 2011 ehk kuupäeval, mil riik arvestas oma laenud ümber.
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that a private market operator would accept that security already in place on the first State loan would be reduced below at least 100 %.
Vastavalt teabele, mille Läti ametiasutused esitasid ametliku uurimismenetluse käigus, oli BASil ja riigil kohaldatavate eeskirjade järgi airBalticu aktsionäride koosolekul otsustatud ümberarvestamise vormistamiseks aega tegelikult kuni 30. jaanuarini 2012.
In order to ascertain the market conformity of the rate applied to the first tranche of the second State loan, the Commission will use as the best available proxy the rate resulting from the application of the Reference Rate Communication.
Komisjon märgib ka seda, et Lätil oleksid võinud olla 29. detsembril 2011 põhjendatud kahtlused BASi valmisoleku suhtes täita oma kohustusi.
The base rate for Latvia on 13 December 2011 was 2,2 %.
BAS oli tõepoolest juba andnud vihjeid selle kohta, et ta ei arvesta oma laenu ümber: Läti tunnistab ka ise, et 13. detsembril 2011 otsustatud teise riigilaenu teine osa oli ette nähtud just selle võimaluse arvessevõtmiseks, et BAS ei täida oma kohustusi.
To this figure, a margin should be added depending on the rating of the beneficiary and the collateralisation of the loan.
Peale selle ei olnud riik ja BAS alates 30. novembrist 2011 enam aktsionäridena võrreldavas olukorras, sest BAS oli ilma jäänud kogu oma osalusest airBalticus peale ühe aktsia, samal ajal kui riigile kuulus 99,8 % ettevõtjast.
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the level of collateralisation is low.
Neid muudatusi silmas pidades oleks riik pidanud enne riigilaenude ümberarvestamist BASi tegevuse põhjal järeldama – või tal oleks vähemalt olnud põhjust kahtlustada –, et BASil ei ole kavas oma kohustusi täita (vt põhjendus 35).
Given the difficulties of airBaltic at the time, it follows from the Reference Rate Communication that a margin of 1000 basis points should be added to the base rate, resulting in a rate of 12,2 %.
Kuna BAS oli liiatigi ilma jäänud kõikidest oma airBalticu aktsiatest peale ühe, kaotas lepingu punktiga 7.4 ette nähtud õiguskaitsevahend – riigi õigus osta BASilt kõik tema airBalticu aktsiad ühe lati eest – tähenduse: riik oli kaotanud vahendi, millega ta oleks saanud sundida BASi kokkulepitust kinni pidama.
It therefore appears that the interest rate of [9 — 11] % on the first tranche of the second State loan cannot be considered to be market conform.
Eespool nimetatud asjaolusid arvesse võttes järeldab komisjon, et turutingimustes tegutsev arukas ettevõtja ei oleks arvestanud oma laene kapitaliks ümber enne, kui ta oleks olnud kindel, et teine pool arvestab oma laenu ümber ja teeb rahasüsti, ning oleks sellega seoses hoolikalt hinnanud teise poole tahet täita oma kohustusi.
The second tranche of the second State loan was made available to the company on 14 December 2012 at an interest rate of [6 — 8] %.
Veel täheldab komisjon, et isegi kui BAS oleks aktsionäride koosolekul saavutatud kokkuleppest kinni pidanud, ei oleks ta tagasi saanud oma endist osalust airBalticus.
Latvia argues that this interest rate is above the one resulting from the Reference Rate Communication and is therefore MEIP-conform.
47,2 % osaluseni küündimiseks oleks BAS pidanud investeerima märksa enam kui summad, milles lepiti kokku kõnealusel koosolekul.