natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Regarding the necessity of the first bridge recapitalisation, the Bank of Greece observed that the Bank’s recapitalisation was limited so as to ensure that the then applicable minimum capital requirements (8 %) were met.
Mis puutub meetme NTT1 vajalikkusesse, lisas rahandusministeerium, et New TT Banki üle kantud vara ja kohustuste täpne väärtus määrati kindlaks välisaudiitorite aruande alusel vastavalt seaduse 3601/2007 artikli 63E lõikele 6.
It also stated that the protracted period of time prior to the recapitalisations was due to the sharp deterioration of the operating environment in Greece and the impact of the PSI programme, to the complexity of the whole project and to the need to maximise private investors’ participation in the share capital increases.
Meetme NTT2 vajalikkusega seoses ütles rahandusministeerium, et Kreeka teine kohandamiskava (teine läbivaatamine, mai 2013) sisaldab nõuet, mille kohaselt tuli New TT Bank müüa kolmandale isikule hiljemalt 15. juuliks 2013.
Regarding the proportionality of the first bridge recapitalisation, the Bank of Greece pointed out that the full implementation of the restructuring plan to be submitted to the Commission is safeguarded by the fact that the suspension of the voting rights of the HFSF will be lifted if, inter alia, the restructuring plan is substantively violated.
Meetmete NTT1 ja NTT2 hüvitamise kohta märkis rahandusministeerium, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond, kes katab Kreeka hoiuste ja investeeringute tagamise fondi asemel rahastamispuudujäägi kuni 31. detsembrini 2013, saab TT Banki valdusesse jäänud varade likvideerimise korral teiste tagatiseta võlausaldajate ees kõrgema nõudeõiguse järguga võlad ning üksnes töötajate hüvitisnõudeid (50 % ulatuses) eelistatakse Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi omadele.
The Bank of Greece also observed that the Bank’s difficulties were not due either to an underestimation of risks by the Bank’s management or to commercially aggressive actions.
Seetõttu märkis rahandusministeerium, et asjaomase vara likvideerimise tulemist saab peamiselt kasu Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond, mis vähendab riigi kantavat kulu.
Comments prepared by the HFSF
New TT Banki pikaajalise elujõulisuse taastamise kohta märkis rahandusministeerium, et New TT Bank kui ajutine krediidiasutus tuli müüa kahe aasta jooksul alates selle asutamisest, kooskõlas seaduse 3601/2007 artikliga 63E.
Regarding the appropriateness of the first bridge recapitalisation, to address the issue of potential State interference if the State provides high amounts of State aid through the HFSF and the HFSF has full voting rights, the HFSF stated that the HFSF-funded banks are not considered to be public entities or under State control and that they would not be controlled by the State after they have been permanently recapitalised by the HFSF.
New TT Banki müük pidi kooskõlas Kreeka teise kohandamiskava majandus- ja rahanduspoliitika memorandumiga olema toimunud 15. juuliks 2013, et oleks tagatud selle tegevuse pikaajaline elujõulisus.
The HFSF pointed out that it is a fully independent private-law legal entity with autonomy of decision.
OMANDATUD ETTEVÕTJATEGA SEOTUD ABI HINDAMINE
It is not subject to government control, pursuant to Article 16C, paragraph 2 of the HFSF Law, according to which the credit institutions to which the HFSF has provided capital support are not part of the broader public sector.
NEA PROTON BANKIGA SEOTUD ABI HINDAMINE
It also referred to the governing structure of the HFSF.
Abi olemasolu ja suurus
As regards the intervention of the HFSF in the Bank’s management, the HFSF noted that it would respect the Bank’s autonomy and not interfere with its day-to-day management given that its role is limited to that laid down in the HFSF Law.
Komisjon peab tegema kindlaks riigiabi olemasolu aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
It stated that there would not be any State interference or coordination and that the decisions of the Bank regarding the lending process (inter alia on collateral, pricing and solvency of borrowers) would be taken on the basis of commercial criteria.
Asjaomase sätte kohaselt on igasugune EÜ liikmesriikide poolt või riigi ressurssidest ükskõik missugusel kujul antav abi, mis kahjustab või ähvardab kahjustada konkurentsi, soodustades teatud ettevõtjaid või teatud kaupade tootmist, kokkusobimatu niivõrd, kuivõrd see mõjutab liikmesriikide vahelist kaubandust.
The HFSF pointed out that the HFSF Law and the pre-subscription agreement set appropriate safeguards in order to prevent existing private shareholders from excessive risk-taking.
Abi olemasolu Kreeka pankade toetuskava raames võetud meetmete (meetmed Pr1, Pr2 ja Pr 3) puhul
It pointed to elements such as (i) the appointment of HFSF representatives as independent non-executive members of the Board of Directors of the Bank and their presence at committees, (ii) the HFSF carrying out due diligence in the Bank and (iii) the fact that, after the final recapitalisation, its voting rights would be restricted only for as long as the Bank complied with the terms of the restructuring plan.
Kreeka pankade toetuskava [113] hõlmas järgmisi meetmeid: 2009. aasta mai 80 miljoni euro suurune kapitalisüst Kreeka riigilt Proton Bankile (meede Pr1), 2009. aasta aprillis Proton Bankile antud Kreeka riigiväärtpaberid summas 78 miljonit eurot (meede Pr2) ja 2010. aasta juulis väljastatud riigi tagatud võlakirjad nominaalväärtusega 149,4 miljonit eurot (meede Pr3).
Regarding the necessity of the first bridge recapitalisation and specifically regarding the level of the remuneration of aid, the HFSF stated that the remuneration had been agreed with the representatives of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF.
Otsuses, millega kava heaks kiideti, järeldas komisjon, et kava raames võetud meetmed kujutavad riigiabi.
That agreed level took into account that the first bridge recapitalisation would be converted into a permanent recapitalisation before 30 September 2012, a deadline which was set in March 2012 in the MEFP between the Commission, the ECB and the IMF and Greece.
Nagu on sedastatud põhjenduses 38 Nea Protoni uurimise algatamise otsuse kohta, võttis Nea Proton Bank üle Proton Banki majandustegevuse.
Regarding the proportionality of the first bridge recapitalisation, the HFSF noted that the measures it adopted, such as those described in recital 165 of the present decision, are sufficient safeguards in view of the large amounts of aid received and the protracted rescue period.
Nea Proton Bank sai meetmetest Pr1, Pr2 ja Pr3 kasu, kuna need aitasid kaasa kõnealusesse panka üle kantud majandustegevuse stabiliseerimisele ja paremale järjepidevusele.
Moreover, the HFSF stated that there are appropriate measures in place in order to ensure that banks in which the HFSF participates do not share commercially sensitive information between them.
Vastasel korral oleks see majandustegevus lakanud.
Such measures include the appointment of different HFSF representatives to those banks, the mandates addressed to those representatives which specifically safeguard against the flow of information from one representative to another and clear internal instructions to those officers not to transmit commercially sensitive information of the banks.
Seepärast leiab komisjon, et Nea Proton Bank sai kasu üle kantud majandustegevusest.
Moreover, the HFSF stated that it does not exercise its rights in relation to the banks in a manner which may prevent, restrict, distort or significantly lessen or impede effective competition.
Abi olemasolu Nea Proton Banki rahastamispuudujäägi katmisel (meede NP1)
Lastly, the HFSF pointed out that the members of its Board of Directors and its employees are subject to strict confidentiality rules and fiduciary duties and are bound by provisions concerning professional secrecy with regards to its affairs.
Nea Protoni uurimise algatamise otsuse põhjendustes 31–37 on komisjon juba sätestanud, et meede NP1 ning Kreeka hoiuste ja investeeringute tagamise fondi kriisilahenduskava kohane sekkumine ja rahastamispuudujäägi katmine finantsstabiilsuse fondist kujutab riigiabi aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
COMMENTS FROM GREECE ON THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING NEA PROTON BANK
Sama otsuse põhjenduses 38 sätestas komisjon, et meetmest sai majanduslikku kasu Nea Proton Bank, kes säilitas Proton Banki majandustegevuse, mis jätkus tänu saadud abile.
On 5 September 2012, Greece submitted comments which had been prepared by the Bank of Greece and the HFSF on the Nea Proton Opening Decision.
Abi olemasolu Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist Nea Proton Banki kantud algkapitali ning Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi 2012. aasta täiendava kapitalisüsti puhul (meede NP2)
The Bank of Greece observed that Nea Proton Bank, as an interim credit institution owned by the HFSF, could not provide a longer term business plan on a stand-alone basis.
Nea Protoni uurimise algatamise otsuse põhjendustes 41–43 on komisjon juba sätestanud, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist tehtud kapitalisüst 250 miljonit eurot ja täiendavad, 300 miljoni euroni ulatuvad kapitalisüstid, mis nähti ette kõnealuse otsuse vastuvõtmise ajal, kujutasid endast riigiabi aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
Moreover, the Bank of Greece noted that it is closely following the implementation of the business plan prepared by the HFSF for Nea Proton Bank and submitted to the Commission in order to ensure that Nea Proton Bank could be sold within the period laid down by law.
Nagu on osutatud käesoleva otsuse põhjenduses (93), tegi finantsstabiilsuse fond võimalikule täiendavale 300 miljoni euro suurusele kapitalisissemaksele lisaks 2012. aastal 265 miljoni euro suuruse sissemakse, mis teeb rekapitaliseerimise jaoks eraldatud abisummaks 2011. ja 2012. aasta peale kokku 515 miljonit eurot (meede NP2).
Regarding the profitability growth rate, the Bank of Greece pointed out that the biggest part of the growth was anticipated to occur during 2013 (when net interest income was expected to rise to EUR 55,3 million, compared to EUR 22,7 million for 2012), would stem mainly from the reduction of total interest expenses and would be the result of two factors:
Abi olemasolu Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist Nea Proton Banki tehtud kapitalisüsti puhul enne selle müüki Eurobankile (meede NP3)
a roll-over of term deposits that used to bear high yields at better terms and a reduction by 30 % of the total outstanding amount of deposits during the first half of 2012.
Komisjoni leiab, et Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondist Nea Proton Banki tehtud 395 miljoni euro suurune kapitalisüst enne nimetatud panga müüki Eurobankile kujutab endast riigiabi aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
Moreover, the Bank of Greece stressed the fact that from 2013 onwards net interest income figures would move quite smoothly and would raise no doubts about the ability of Nea Proton Bank to meet the target.
Kapitalisüsti tegi Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fond kui Kreeka riigi asutatud ja rahastatud üksus pankade toetamiseks ning seega on see tehtud riigi vahenditest.
Regarding the necessity of the measures in favour of Nea Proton Bank, the HFSF noted that the Bank of Greece is the pertinent authority to decide on any resolution measure and that the HFSF injected the minimum capital required for regulatory purposes.
Lisaks on meede oma olemuselt valikuline, kuna kapitalisüstist sai kasu üksnes Nea Proton Bank.
Regarding the restoration of long-term viability of Nea Proton Bank, the HFSF referred to the resolution framework under which the HFSF had to sell Nea Proton Bank within two years and agreed with the Commission that Nea Proton Bank could be a part of larger and viable entity.
Lisaks anti meetmega Nea Proton Bankile selge eelis, kuna see võimaldas panga majandustegevuse säilitada.
Although the restructuring plan for Nea Proton Bank was based on a ‘stand-alone basis’ model, the HFSF explained that its objective was to facilitate the sale of that bank by improving its attractiveness to investors and its financial results.
Ilma kapitalisüstita oleks suure kapitalipuudujäägiga Nea Proton Bank pankrotistunud.
The HFSF commented that the capital injections not only allowed Nea Proton Bank to respect the minimum capital adequacy ratio but also improved its financial position and its attractiveness for any future merger with other small banks.
Sellistes tingimustes ei oleks olnud võimalik Nea Proton Banki müüa ega seda suurema üksusega ühendada.
The HFSF also noted that the additional capital injection had been needed to cover impairment losses related to the PSI programme and the increased provision charges for loans.
Lisaks ei ole rekapitaliseerimine kooskõlas turutingimustes tegutseva investori põhimõttega.
The HFSF observed that Nea Proton Bank had improved its cost of funding and the loyalty of deposits.
Tegelikult võimaldas 395 miljoni suurune rekapitaliseerimine müüa Nea Proton Banki ühe euro eest.
Nea Proton Bank’s reliance on the Eurosystem fell during 2012 and it had improved its liquidity position.
Erainvestor ei oleks läinud rekapitaliseerimise teed ning oleks lasknud Nea Proton Bankil pankrotistuda ning seega säästnud 395 miljonit eurot.
The additional capital injection had helped to reduce interest rates on deposits and to improve interest rate margins.
Nea Proton Bank konkureerib muude pankadega, sealhulgas välismaiste pankade Kreeka tütarettevõtjatega ning sellistega, kes olid huvitatud Kreeka turule sisenemisest.
Nea Proton Bank had already re-priced some of its loan portfolio, using risk-based pricing with interest rates well above the cost of funding.
Seega mõjutab kapitalisüst liikmesriikide vahelist kaubandust ja võimalik, et moonutab konkurentsi.
Moreover, the planned growth rate of the net interest income would occur with a conservative expansion in the corporate market segment and by enhancing portfolio quality.
Seepärast järeldab komisjon, et 395 miljoni euro suurune kapitalisüst Nea Proton Banki kujutab riigiabi aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
The HFSF observed that in 2012 Nea Proton Bank had significantly reduced its operating costs, that its two only subsidiaries would cease operations, that its participation in insurance brokers was being greatly reduced and that its proprietary trading activities would end.
Abisaaja seoses meetmega NP3
Finally, the HFSF noted that distortions of competition would be limited given the small share of Nea Proton Bank in total banking assets in Greece and the fact that it was not considering aggressive deposit-taking.
Nagu põhjenduses (188) juba selgitatud, käsitleb komisjon 395 miljoni euro suuruse kapitalisüsti saajana Nea Proton Banki, kuna abi võimaldas viimasel jätkata oma majandustegevust Eurobanki grupi liikmena.
COMMENTS FROM GREECE ON THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE REGARDING NEW TT BANK
Lahendamaks küsimust, kas Nea Proton Banki müügiga kaasnes riigiabi Eurobankile, peab komisjon 2008. aasta pangandusteatise punkti 49 kohaselt hindama teatavate tingimuste täitmist.
On 19 July 2013, the Ministry of Finance submitted comments on the New TT Opening Decision.
Selleks tuleb hinnata järgmist:
Regarding the necessity of measure NTT1, the Ministry of Finance added that the exact value of the assets and liabilities that were transferred to New TT Bank was defined based on the external auditors’ report in accordance with Article 63E, paragraph 6, of Law 3601/2007.
Eurobank omandas Nea Proton Banki aktsiad tänu sellele, et ta esitas mittediskrimineeriva ja muudele pankadele ja finantsasutustele avatud hankemenetluse raames ainsa kehtiva pakkumuse.
Regarding the necessity of measure NTT2, the Ministry of Finance commented that the Second Adjustment Programme for Greece (second Review-May 2013) required the sale of New TT Bank to a third party by 15 July 2013.
Kreeka finantsstabiilsuse fondi finantsnõustaja võttis ühendust mitmete pankade, finantsasutuste ja sponsoritega, kuid neist vaid neli näitasid üles huvi Nea Proton Banki ostmise vastu ning vaid kaks, Eurobank ja üks riskifond, [114] esitasid lõpliku pakkumuse.
Regarding the remuneration of measures NTT1 and NTT2, the Ministry of Finance noted that the HFSF, which fills the funding gap until 31 December 2013 instead of the HDIGF, obtains a preferential claim ahead of other unsecured creditors in case of the liquidation of the assets that remained in the ownership of TT Bank and that only the claims of employees to receive 50 % of their compensation rank before the HFSF’s claim.
Eurobanki pakkumus oli ainus, mis vastas finantsstabiilsuse fondi pakkumiskutse tingimustele.
Therefore, it observed that the product of the liquidation of those assets will benefit the HFSF mainly and so reduce the cost borne by the State.
Et finantsnõustaja võttis ühendust paljude pankadega ja oli juba varakult kehtestanud pakkumuste suhtes nõuded ja ajakava kvalifitseerumiseks, leiab komisjon, et hange oli avatud ja mittediskrimineeriv.
Regarding the restoration of long-term viability of New TT Bank, the Ministry of Finance observed that, as an interim credit institution, New TT Bank had to be sold within two years of its establishment, in accordance with Article 63E of Law 3601/2007.
Seepärast järeldab komisjon, et hankemenetlus võimaldab välistada ostjale abi andmise.
The sale of New TT Bank would, in line with the MEFP of May 2013, be completed by 15 July 2013, thus ensuring the long-term viability of its activities.
Eurobank maksis tasu ühe euro ning finantsstabiilsuse fond võttis kohustuse rekapitaliseerida Nea Proton Bank enne selle müüki.
ASSESSMENT OF AID RELATED TO THE ACQUIRED BUSINESSES
Negatiivne hind (st võttes arvesse Nea Proton Banki rekapitaliseerimist vahetult enne müüki) ei takista müügihinda kajastamast ettevõtte turuväärtust, [115] kuna Nea Proton Banki netokapital oli selgelt negatiivne ja oli teada, et kahjum jätkub.
ASSESSMENT OF AID RELATED TO NEA PROTON BANK
Komisjonil ei ole põhjust uskuda, et tehtud pakkumus ja makstud hind ei kajastanud ettevõtja turuväärtust.
Existence of aid in the measures granted under the Greek Banks Support Scheme (measures Pr1, Pr2 and Pr3)
Meetmete Pr1, Pr2 ja Pr3 kohta järeldab komisjon, et kuna need aitasid kaasa Proton Banki majandustegevuse säilimisele, mis kanti hiljem üle Nea Proton Banki, võib väita, et nendest sai kasu ka Nea Proton Bank, kes nimetatud majandustegevuse üle võttis.
The EUR 80 million capital injection by the Greek State into Proton Bank in May 2009 (measure Pr1), the Greek government securities amounting to EUR 78 million obtained by Proton Bank in April 2009 (Measure Pr2) and the State guarantee given to Proton Bank for issued bonds with a nominal value of EUR 149,4 million in July 2010 (Measure Pr3) were granted under the Greek Banks Support Scheme [113].
Nagu on juba osutatud põhjenduses 184, on meetme NP1 abisaaja Nea Proton Bank, kes jätkas Proton Bankist üle kantud tegevusvaldkondadega.
In the Decision approving that scheme, the Commission concluded that measures granted under that scheme would constitute State aid.
Lisaks sai Nea Proton Bank abi meetmetest NO2 ja NP3.
As concluded in recital 38 of the Nea Proton Opening Decision, Nea Proton Bank harbours the economic activities of Proton Bank.
Seepärast järeldab komisjon, et nagu on osutatud tabelis 9, on Nea Proton Bank saanud oma tegevuseks riigiabi 2111,6 miljoni euro suuruse kapitalitoetuse vormis (meetmed Pr1, NP1, NP2 ja NP3) ning lisaks riigi tagatisi summas 149,4 miljonit eurot (meede Pr3) ja Kreeka riigiväärtpabereid summas 78 miljonit eurot (meede Pr2).
Measures Pr1, Pr2 and Pr3 have benefited Nea Proton Bank, as they contributed to the stabilisation and the continuance of the economic activities which were transferred to it and would otherwise no longer exist.
Tabel 9
Therefore, the Commission considers that they have benefited the economic activities transferred to Nea Proton Bank.
Ülevaade Proton Banki ja Nea Proton Banki saadud koguabist
Existence of aid in the coverage of the funding gap of Nea Proton Bank (measure NP1)
Abisumma (mln eurodes)
In recitals 31 to 37 of the Nea Proton Opening Decision the Commission has already established that measure NP1, the intervention by the Resolution Scheme of the HDIGF and the HFSF to cover the funding gap, constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Proton Banki tegevus
In recital 38 of the same decision the Commission considered Nea Proton Bank to be the economic beneficiary of that measure as Nea Proton Bank harbours the economic activity of Proton Bank which continues to exist because of the aid received.
Rekapitaliseerimine
Existence of aid in the initial share capital injection by the HFSF and additional share capital injection by the HFSF in 2012 (measure NP2)
Proton Bankist ettevõtjasse Nea Proton Bank ülekandmisel tekkinud rahastamispuudujäägi katmine
In recitals 41 to 43 of the Nea Proton Opening Decision the Commission has already established that the capital injection by the HFSF of EUR 250 million and the additional capital injections anticipated at the time of that Decision, amounting to a total of EUR 300 million, were State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Finantsabi kokku
As mentioned in recital 93 of the present Decision, out of the possible additional EUR 300 million in capital, HFSF eventually contributed an additional EUR 265 million in 2012, which brings the total recapitalisation aid in 2011 and 2012 to EUR 515 million (measure NP2).
Obligatsioonilaen
Existence of aid in capital injection from the HFSF into Nea Proton Bank prior to its sale to the Bank (NP3)
Tagatis
The Commission considers the capital injection by the HFSF into Nea Proton Bank prior to its sale to the Bank, amounting to EUR 395 million, to be State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Likviidsusabi kokku
The capital injection was provided by the HFSF, which is an entity set up and financed by Greece to support banks, and so was made by using State resources.
Kokkusobivuse hindamise õiguslik alus
Furthermore, the measure is selective in nature, since the capital injection only benefits Nea Proton Bank.
Aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punktiga b volitatakse komisjoni tegema kindlaks, kas siseturuga on kokkusobiv abi, mis on antud mõne liikmesriigi majanduses tõsise häire kõrvaldamiseks.
Moreover, the intervention provides Nea Proton Bank with a clear advantage since it enables its banking activities to remain alive.
Komisjon on möönnud, et ülemaailmne finantskriis või tekitada mõne liikmesriigi majanduses tõsise häire ning et abimeetmed pankadele võivad selle häire kõrvaldada.
Without the capital injection, Nea Proton Bank, which had deeply negative capital, would have gone bankrupt.
Seda kinnitati ka 2008. aasta pangandusteatises, rekapitaliseerimisteatises ja ümberkorraldamisteatises.
In such circumstances, it would not have been possible to sell Nea Proton Bank and integrate it into a larger entity.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et tingimused riigiabi heakskiitmiseks aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punkti b alusel on täidetud, sest finantsturgudel on taas täheldatud pingeid.
Furthermore, that recapitalisation does not comply with the market investor principle.
Komisjon kinnitas oma seisukohta pikendusteatise [117] vastuvõtmisega 2011. aastal ja pangandusteatise [118] vastuvõtmisega 2013. aastal.
On the contrary, the EUR 395 million recapitalisation allowed the sale of Nea Proton Bank to take place for a price of one euro.
Seoses Kreeka majandusega on komisjon oma otsustes Kreeka pankade toetuskava heakskiitmise ja pikendamise kohta, aga ka Kreeka riigi poolt eraldi pankadele antud riigiabi [119] heakskiitmiste raames tunnistanud, et Kreeka majandust valitseb tõsise häire oht ning et riigi toetus pankadele on häire kõrvaldamiseks sobiv.
A private investor would have chosen not to proceed with the recapitalisation and to let Nea Proton Bank go bankrupt, therefore saving EUR 395 million.
Seega peaks abimeetmete hindamise õiguslik alus olema aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punkt b.
Nea Proton Bank competes with other banks, including subsidiaries of foreign banks, which are active in Greece or potentially interested in entering the Greek market.
Aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punkti b alusel on kokkusobiv abi, mis vastab järgmistele kokkusobivuse üldkriteeriumidele: