natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The reasons are as follows:
NEUWOGES leiab ka, et erinevad väidetavalt sarnased lepingud, mille BAVARIA võrdluseesmärgil esitas, ei tõenda GVV vastavust tavapärastele turutingimustele ja et NEUWOGES nõustus selle selgelt ebasoodsa lepinguga ainult poliitilistel põhjustel, mis on turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva ettevõtja kriteeriumi kohaldamise seisukohast tähtsusetud.
The debt write-off pursuant to the Inherited Debt Support Law is a benefit conferred on NEUWOGES by a third party (the Bank for Reconstruction), which has no connection with the buyer.
GVV turu ootusi arvestades
There is no reason why a vendor should accept a price below the market price simply because the transaction will result in some additional benefits granted by a third party.
NEUWOGES väidab, et GVV kesksed sätted – kindel igakuine rent, mida suurendatakse igal aastal […] % võrra, indekseerimata kulude mahaarvamine esialgu ligikaudu […] % ulatuses (kaasa arvatud […] % üüri saamata jäämise risk) ja 30aastane lepinguperiood – ei vasta tingimustele, millega turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja oleks nõustunud.
BAVARIA did not assume any responsibilities under the Inherited Debt Support Law that were previously incumbent on NEUWOGES and that would merit remuneration in the form of a lower sale price.
NEUWOGES põhjendab seda järgmiselt.
While BAVARIA did formally assume the obligation to attempt to sell a number of apartments to the tenants, it charged NEUWOGES with actually carrying out the privatisation at NEUWOGES’ own expense, and hence did not assume any real responsibility.
Kuna üüri saamata jäämise risk on väikeseks hinnatud ja moodustab ainult […] % üüritulu netosummast, kannab NEUWOGES finantsriski vähemalt […] % suuruse täituvusmäära saavutamise eest.
Nor was BAVARIA at risk of being held liable if the privatisation efforts were to fail.
Kindla rendi indekseerimine […] %ga aastas tähendab, et NEUWOGES kannab finantsriski, et ei suuda saavutada vähemalt sellele määrale vastavat iga-aastast üüri tõstmist.
Because the debt write-off was linked to NEUWOGES’ fulfilling its obligation to privatise 15 % of its apartments and the BAVARIA deal satisfied only 20 % of the total privatisation obligation, a proportional allocation of the debt write-off facilitated by the deal is not realistically (as opposed to mathematically) possible.
Kuna kulud on indekseerimata, kannab NEUWOGES haldus- ja hoolduskulude suurenemisega seotud finantsriski ning kulude kasvu suudaks korvata võib-olla ainult üüri tõstmine üle […] % aastas.
In other words: if NEUWOGES had not fulfilled its total privatisation obligation, it would not have received any benefit under the Inherited Debt Support Law from the BAVARIA deal.
Pikka, 30aastast lepinguperioodi arvestades on need finantsriskid märkimisväärsed.
At most, the sale-and-lease-back transaction meant that NEUWOGES had to transfer only a comparatively low percentage (45 %, rather than 50 % or 55 %) of the revenue to the inherited debt relief fund, whereas not concluding the contract and searching for an alternative buyer would have involved the risk of having to divert a larger share of the sales revenue into the fund.
NEUWOGESi väitel oli algusest peale selge, et need riskid tekivad ja toovad kaasa suure kahjumi ning järelikult ei oleks ükski turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja lepingut sõlminud.
In any event, NEUWOGES claims to have eventually fulfilled its privatisation obligation at a rate of 165 %, meaning that even without the BAVARIA deal the debt write-off would have been confirmed.
Turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja sõlmiks ainult sellise lepingu, mis on kasumlik või ei too vähemalt kahjumit.
Modernisation
NEUWOGES selgitab, et GVV oleks teeninud kasumit ainult juhul, kui oleks olnud võimalik mõistlikul viisil eeldada, et kõrget täituvusmäära, üüri iga-aastast tõstmist […] % võrra ja stabiilseid kulusid on tegelikult võimalik saavutada.
NEUWOGES further submits that it did not benefit from the modernisation carried out by BAVARIA, as BAVARIA was the owner of the buildings and thus the only beneficiary of the modernisation.
Juba lepingu sõlmimisel võis siiski aru saada, et keskmiselt […] % suurust täituvusmäära ei ole võimalik saavutada, üüri tõstmine vähemalt […] % aastas on võimatu ja et haldus- ja hoolduskulud kasvavad lepinguperioodi jooksul vältimatult.
Bidding Process
Nende väidete tõendamiseks viitab NEUWOGES nii elanike arvu prognoositud vähenemisele kui ka Neubrandenburgi kinnisvaraturule ja kinnitab, et selle teabe alusel tuli arvestada kahjumiga.
NEUWOGES asserts that the limited bidding process carried out in 1997 cannot be invoked as an indication that the price paid by BAVARIA was in actual fact the market price.
Kuna Neubrandenburgi elanike arv oli juba enne kõnealuste lepingute sõlmimist kahanemas, esines vähemalt alates 1995. aastast märkimisväärne korterite ülepakkumine, kusjuures just lepingu esemeks olevad vähe ligitõmbavad paneelelamud seisid tühjalt ja olid madala üüriga.
It submits that the bidding process was not open, transparent, unconditional and non-discriminatory, and is therefore insufficient for establishing the market value.
NEUWOGESi väitel oleks turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja tuginenud oma arvutustes pessimistlikumatele ootustele, näiteks prognoositud üüri tõstmine […] %-lt […] %ni, üüri saamata jäämise risk […] % ja kulude indekseerimine […] %ga.
General Management Contract
NEUWOGESi esitatud hilisem rahavoogude analüüs 2012. aastast tõendab, et nende eelduste alusel tuli GVV puhul arvestada negatiivse rahavooga […] eurot (nominaalsumma) või […] eurot (diskonteeritud summa) [15].
NEUWOGES asserts that no MEO of similar size and in a similar situation would have concluded the general management contract, as it was clear from the outset that the contract would result in substantial losses.
NEUWOGES väidab, et see summa kujutab endast BAVARIA saadud riigiabi.
Specifically, NEUWOGES argues that losses were foreseeable from the start, as the calculations underlying the contract were based on assumptions about the future development of the rental market in Neubrandenburg that were clearly too optimistic.
Lisaks esitatakse kõnealusest rahavoogude analüüsist hulk variante, millest nähtub, et isegi kui optimistlikumad eeldused oleksid olnud põhjendatud (näiteks keskmine tühjalt seismise määr […] %, üüri iga-aastane tõstmine […] % võrra ja kulude […] %line kasv), oleksid prognoositud rahavood kokku samuti negatiivsed olnud.
NEUWOGES also maintains that various allegedly similar contracts provided by BAVARIA for the purpose of comparison cannot prove the market conformity of the general management contract; NEUWOGES accepted this clearly disadvantageous contract only for political reasons, which are irrelevant in applying the MEO test.
GVVga oleks olnud võimalik kasumit teenida ainult väidetavalt täiesti ebarealistlikke eeldusi aluseks võttes ([…] % suurune tühjalt seismise määr, iga-aastane üüri tõstmine […] % võrra, kulude kasv […] % võrra).
The General Management Contract in the light of market expectations
Näidislepingud
NEUWOGES submits that the central provisions of the General Management Contract — a fixed monthly leasing payment that is increased annually by […]%, a non-indexed cost deduction of initially approximately […]% for costs (including […]% risk of loss of rent), and a duration of 30 years — do not correspond to conditions that a MEO would have agreed to.
NEUWOGES eitab, et teatud võrreldavatel tehingutel põhinevate lepingutega ([…] [16]-, […] [17]- ja […] [18]-lepingud) on võimalik tõendada GVV vastavust tavapärastele turutingimustele.
More specifically, NEUWOGES asserts that:
NEUWOGES ei nõustu seisukohaga, et lepingud on võrreldavad, ja selgitab, et need erinevad GVVst järgmistes olulistes punktides.
the low calculated risk of loss of rent of only […]% of the net rent income imposes on NEUWOGES the financial risk of not being able to achieve an occupancy rate of at least […]%;
Kuna ei esitatud tõendeid selle kohta, et valitseb piisav sarnasus nende linnade majandusliku olukorra ja tulevikuväljavaadete vahel, kus asub näidislepingutes hõlmatud kinnisvara, ning Neubrandenburgi olukorra ja väljavaadete vahel, ei ole võimalik lähtuda sellest, et lepingud on kokkuvõttes võrreldavad.
the indexation of the fixed leasing payment by […]% per year means that NEUWOGES bears the financial risk of not being able to impose annual rent increases corresponding to at least this rate;
Rendi indekseerimine võrdluslepingutes erineb suurel määral GVVs ette nähtud indekseerimisest (st 1,0–1,5 %).
since the costs are not independently indexed, NEUWOGES bears the financial risk of any increase in administration and maintenance costs, and only a rent increase of over […]% per year could conceivably offset an increase in costs;
Kõik kasutatud näidislepingud on võrdluseks sobimatud, sest asjaolud on igal juhul erinevad ([…]: vähem kulukad hoolduskohustused, […]: korterite asemel ärikinnisvara, mille tühjalt seismise määr on lepingu sõlmimisel 0 %, […]: kinnisvara majanduskasvuga piirkonnas).
these financial risks are significant in the light of the long, 30-year, duration.
NEUWOGESi arvates ei suuda näidislepingud kinnitada GVV vastavust tavapärastele turutingimustele, vaid tõendavad vastupidiselt pigem just selle mittevastavust tavapärastele turutingimustele, sest sisaldavad vähem koormavaid sätteid, kuigi asjaomaste objektide majandusväljavaated olid paremad.
NEUWOGES argues that it was clear from the outset that these risks would materialise, leading to heavy losses, and that accordingly no MEO would have concluded the contract.
Poliitilised põhjused
According to NEUWOGES, a MEO would conclude only a contract that was profitable or that at least did not result in losses.
NEUWOGES väidab, et GVV sõlmiti selgele majanduslikule halvemusele vaatamata poliitilistel põhjustel.
NEUWOGES asserts that the general management contract could have been expected to result in a profit only if it had been reasonable to expect that the high occupancy rate, annual rent increases of […]% and stable costs could actually be achieved.
NEUWOGES tuletab meelde, et riigiabi andmise põhjused ei ole õigusliku hinnangu andmisel olulised, ja väidab, et just osutatud poliitilised põhjused tõendavad, et majanduslikud kaalutlused ei etendanud otsustavat osa.
According to NEUWOGES it was, however, already clear when the contract was concluded that an average occupancy rate of […]% would not be achievable, that a rent increase of at least […]% per year would be impossible, and that the administration and maintenance costs would inevitably increase over the duration of the contract.
NEUWOGES selgitab, et GVV sõlmiti järgmistel põhjustel.
To support these assertions, NEUWOGES points to both the projected population decline and the real-estate market in Neubrandenburg, maintaining that, in the light of these factors, the contract was bound to result in a loss.
Valitses suur poliitiline surve uutes liidumaades asuvate elamispindade renoveerimiseks ja erastamiseks.
Since Neubrandenburg’s population was in decline even before the contracts at issue were concluded, there was a significant oversupply of apartments from at least 1995 onwards, with the unattractive prefabricated apartment blocks, which are the subject of the contract, being most affected by vacancies and low rents.
Neubrandenburgi linn lootis elanikkonna pidevat kahanemist korterite renoveerimise ja erastamisega tõkestada.
NEUWOGES alleges that a MEO would have based its calculations on more pessimistic expectations, such as projected annual rent increases of between […]% and […]%, a risk of loss of rent of […]% and an indexation of the costs of […]%.
GVV sõlmimise ja GPV kaudu hoiti investeerimistaset Neubrandenburgis kõrgel, samal ajal kui investeeringute vähenemine oleks avaldanud suurt mõju kohapealsele töötuse määrale.
NEUWOGES presents an ex post cash-flow analysis prepared in 2012 demonstrating that, on the basis of these assumptions, the cash flow that would have been expected to result from the general management contract was EUR […] in nominal terms and EUR […] after discounting [15].
Alternatiivid
It is NEUWOGES’ submission that this amount constitutes the state aid received by BAVARIA.
Lõpuks väidab NEUWOGES, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja oleks eelistanud kõnealuste lepingute asemel alternatiive.
A number of variations of this cash-flow analysis are also provided, showing that, even if more optimistic assumptions had been justified (such as an average vacancy rate of […]%, annual rent increases of […]% and an increase in costs of […]%), the overall predicted cash flow would also have been negative.
NEUWOGES selgitab esmalt, et eelistada oleks tulnud otsemüüki, sest see oleks toonud kasumit, ent GVV puhul võis algusest peale lähtuda kahjumist.
The general management contract would have been expected to result in a profit only if allegedly quite unrealistic assumptions had been accepted ([…]% vacancy rate, […]% annual rent increase and […]% increase in costs).
Objektid (hooned ja kinnistud) oleks olnud võimalik võõrandada turuväärtuse kohta koostatud eksperdiarvamustes kindlaks tehtud või sellest kõrgema hinnaga.
Comparison contracts
Isegi kui ostja oleks ostnud vaid kinnistud ja lammutanud hooned maha, oleks selline müük olnud kasumlikum.
NEUWOGES disputes that certain contracts from similar transactions (the[…] [16], […] [17] and […] [18] contracts) can prove the market conformity of the general management contract.
NEUWOGES jääb selle hinnangu juurde ka AHG võlakergenduse arvessevõtmise korral, sest NEUWOGES oleks saanud üritada täita oma kohustusi teiste hoonete erastamise kaudu ja müük oleks olnud ka ilma AHG võlakergenduseta müügi- ja tagasirenditehingust kasumlikum.
Rejecting suggestions that these contracts are comparable, NEUWOGES argues that they differ from the general administration contract in the following material respects:
Kõnealustest alternatiividest loobumise põhjusi tuleb näha NEUWOGESi poliitilistes kohustustes.
Since no evidence was presented that the economic situation and outlook of these cities (in which the properties to which the comparison contracts relate are located) were sufficiently similar to those of Neubrandenburg, it cannot be assumed that the contracts as a whole are comparable.
Lisaks on NEUWOGES seisukohal, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja oleks meelsamini väiksemamahulist renoveerimist ise rahastanud, ilma renoveerimiseta edasi üürinud või hooned lammutanud.
The indexation of the leasing payment in the comparison contracts differs significantly from that in the general management contract (i.e. 1,0-1,5 %).
Nendest alternatiividest loobumist põhjendatakse jällegi NEUWOGESi poliitiliste kohustustega.
None of the individual comparison contracts is suitable for comparison because the circumstances are different in each case ([…]: less onerous maintenance obligations; […]: commercial properties rather than apartments, which had a vacancy rate of 0 % at the conclusion of the contract; […]: the properties were located in a growth region).
Lõpuks kinnitab NEUWOGES, et renoveerimisotsuse korral oleks olnud NEUWOGESi jaoks igal juhul kasumlikum kõnealuseid töid teisiti rahastada.
Rather than proving the market-conformity of the general management contract, NEUWOGES submits that the comparison contracts demonstrate precisely its non-conformity, since they include less onerous provisions despite relating to property with a better economic outlook.
Näiteks oleks võinud võtta laenu, millele Neubrandenburgi linn oleks tagatise andnud, nii et laenutingimused oleksid kujunenud soodsamaks kui BAVARIAga sõlmitud tehingu puhul.
Political motivation
Riigi vahendid ja seostatavus riigiga
NEUWOGES submits that the general management contract, despite clearly being economically disadvantageous, was concluded for political reasons.
NEUWOGES on arvamusel, et väidetav eelis anti riigi vahenditest ja on seostatav riigiga.
After pointing out that the reasons for which a public authority grants state aid are not relevant to the legal assessment, NEUWOGES argues that the political motivation proves precisely that economic considerations were not the deciding factor.
Esiteks väidab NEUWOGES, et Neubrandenburgi linnal oli ainuosanikuna ja valitseva mõju tõttu nõukogule ka NEUWOGESi üle valitsev mõju.
More specifically, NEUWOGES asserts that the general management contract was concluded for the following reasons:
Seda kontrollivat suhet silmas pidades kujutab müügi- ja tagasirenditehingust saadud väidetav kahjum endast riigi saamata jäänud vahendeid.
There was intense political pressure to promote both the modernisation and privatisation of apartments owned by local housing companies in the former East Germany.
Edasi väidab NEUWOGES, et käesoleval juhul on olemas peaaegu kõik riigiga seostatavuse näitajad: Neubrandenburgi linnal on NEUWOGESi üle ulatuslik kontroll; NEUWOGESi jaoks on linna huvide teenimine suurima tähtsusega; kõnealune tehing sõlmiti poliitilistel põhjustel ja on tõendatud, et Neubrandenburgi linnal oli müügi- ja tagasirenditehingu juures viimane sõna.
By modernising and privatising apartments, the city of Neubrandenburg hoped to counteract the ongoing decrease in population numbers.
BAVARIA lükkab NEUWOGESi esitatud argumendid tagasi ja selgitab, et kõnealused lepingud kujutasid endast tavalisi turutehinguid ega andnud talle eelist.
Concluding the general management contract, in combination with the global lump-sum contract, maintained a high level of investment in Neubrandenburg, a fall in which would have had significant consequences for the local unemployment rate.
Järelikult ei olnud need ka riigiabi.
Alternatives
BAVARIA selgitab esmalt, et kõnealuseid lepinguid tuleb vaadelda ühtse majandusüksusena (punkt 4.2.1).
NEUWOGES finally submits that a MEO would have preferred alternatives to the contracts at issue.
Teiseks ei ole lepingud kokkuvõttes sellised, et ükski turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja ei oleks neid allkirjastanud (punkt 4.2.2).
First, NEUWOGES submits that an outright sale would have been preferable, since it would have generated a profit, whereas the general management contract could from the start have been expected to result in losses.
Kolmandaks ei olnud NEUWOGESi loetletud alternatiivid NEUWOGESi jaoks soodsamad (punkt 4.2.3).
It claims that the property (buildings and land) could have been sold at or above the price determined in the valuations.
Viimasena selgitab BAVARIA, et riigiga seostatavaid vahendeid üle ei kantud (punkt 4.2.4).
It is further claimed that even if a buyer had simply bought the land and demolished the buildings, such a sale would have been more profitable.
BAVARIA leiab, et kõnealuseid lepinguid tuleb vaadelda ühe üksusena ja neid ei saa hinnata üksteisest eraldiseisvana.
This assessment would remain the same even if the debt write-off pursuant to the Inherited Debt Support Law were taken into account, since NEUWOGES could have attempted to fulfil its obligations by privatising other buildings and, even without the debt-write off, a sale would have been more profitable than the sale-and-lease-back transaction.
Hoonete müük ja järgnev tagasirentimine on üheainsa tehingu kaks omavahel seotud osa.
NEUWOGES claims that the reasons for not choosing any of these alternatives are to be found in NEUWOGES’ political commitments.
BAVARIA rõhutab, et tehingut pakuti paketina ja NEUWOGES seda sellisena ka käsitles, nagu nähtub ettevõttesisesest protokollist, milles on dokumenteeritud NEUWOGESi otsustusprotsess.
Second, NEUWOGES further argues that a MEO would also have preferred financing a more limited modernisation itself, continuing to rent without any modernisation, or demolishing the buildings.
Turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva ettevõtja kriteeriumi tuleb BAVARIA väitel järelikult kohaldada tehingule tervikuna, mitte kummalegi üksiklepingule.
Again, the reasons for not choosing these alternatives lie in NEUWOGES’ political commitments.
Tehing ei andnud BAVARIA-le eelist
Finally, NEUWOGES maintains that, if a decision to modernise had been taken, it would have been more profitable for NEUWOGES to finance these works by other means.
BAVARIA väitel on eelise võimalik esinemine välistatud juba asjaoluga, et NEUWOGES korraldas turu uurimiseks pakkumismenetluse (ehkki piiratud ulatuses).
For instance, a loan could have been taken up for which a guarantee from the City of Neubrandenburg could have been secured, rendering the loan conditions more favourable than those of the BAVARIA deal.
Ei ole põhjust kahelda selles, et NEUWOGES valis välja majanduslikult soodsaima pakkumuse.
State resources and imputability
Et kindlaks teha, kas turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja oleks tehingu pakkumismenetlusest sõltumata sõlminud, tuleb arvesse võtta NEUWOGESi eriolukorda.
NEUWOGES is of the opinion that the alleged advantage was granted through state resources and is imputable to the State.
NEUWOGES pidi kaasama kapitali ja korterid renoveerima, et need (jätkuvalt soodsate üürihindadega) erastada ja saada AHG kohast võlakergendust.
First, NEUWOGES submits that the City of Neubrandenburg, which was its sole shareholder and dominated its supervisory board, had a dominating influence on NEUWOGES.
BAVARIA väitel oleks turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev ettevõtja seetõttu samasuguses olukorras samuti tehingu sõlminud.
Based on this control, the losses allegedly resulting from the sale-and-lease-back transaction constitute foregone state resources.
Mis puudutab GVV tingimusi ja Neubrandenburgi kinnisvaraturu oodatust aeglasema arenguga (näiteks prognoositust kõrgem tühjalt seismise määr jne) kaasnevaid riske, siis leiab BAVARIA, et soovitud üüri ja täituvusmäära saavutamata jätmise riski ei surutud NEUWOGESile peale, vaid see pigem jäi NEUWOGESile.
Second, NEUWOGES argues that, in this case, virtually all the indicators of imputability are present.
NEUWOGES oleks pidanud kandma turu oodatust aeglasema arengu tagajärgi ka juhul, kui tehingut BAVARIAga ei oleks toimunud.
It points out that the City of Neubrandenburg has far-reaching control over NEUWOGES, that serving the city’s interests is of the utmost importance for NEUWOGES, that the transaction in question was concluded for political reasons, and that the evidence indicates that the City of Neubrandenburg had the final say on the sale-and-lease-back transaction.
GVV üksikute tingimustega seoses väidab BAVARIA, et rendimäära arvutamisel aluseks võetud keskmine üür ruutmeetri kohta jäi veidi alla näitajatele, mida oleks võinud Neubrandenburgi sellekohase üüritasude ülevaate alusel oodata.
BAVARIA rejects NEUWOGES’ submissions, arguing instead that the contracts at issue were normal market transactions not conferring an advantage and accordingly not constituting state aid.
Lisaks rõhutab BAVARIA, et samas üüritasude ülevaates lähtuti üüritasude kasvust 1. jaanuarile 2000 järgneval perioodil, nii et üüri tõstmine […] % võrra aastas ei olnud ebarealistlik.
BAVARIA first asserts that the contracts at issue have to be seen as an economic unit (section 4.2.1); second, that the contracts as a whole were not such that no MEO would have agreed to them (section 4.2.2); third, BAVARIA asserts that the alternatives put forward by NEUWOGES would not have been more advantageous to NEUWOGES (section 4.2.3); finally, BAVARIA submits that no imputable transfer of state resources was involved (section 4.2.4).
EBVga seoses toonitab BAVARIA, et 1997. aasta ja 2007. aasta eksperdiarvamusi turuväärtuse kohta ei ole võimalik otseselt EBVga võrrelda, sest eksperdiarvamused puudutasid otsemüüki, samal ajal kui EBV sisaldas küll hoonete müüki, kuid üksnes läbi hoonestusõiguse seadmise kinnistutele.
BAVARIA argues that the contracts at issue have to be seen as a unit and cannot be assessed in isolation from each other.
Kuna NEUWOGES jäi kinnistute omanikuks, ei olnud võimalik eksperdiarvamustes kindlaks tehtud kinnistute väärtust arvesse võtta.
The sale and subsequent lease-back of the buildings constitute two interdependent parts of one transaction.
Turuväärtuse kohta koostatud eksperdiarvamused ei ole BAVARIA arvates igal juhul olulised, sest nendes selgitati välja ainult objektide teoreetiline väärtus, mitte nende realiseerimisväärtus.