natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Therefore, in this case, the cross-subsidisation cannot be deemed to confer an economic advantage on Schönefeld if it is part of a strategic plan with long-term gains or if it is overall beneficial for the FBS group.
Nendes märkustes eeldati, et Schönefeldis pakutud tingimuste puhul ei oleks olnud tegemist riigiabiga üksnes juhul, kui need oleksid olnud võrdsed tingimustega, mida pakuti Tegelis.
For all the reasons mentioned in section 7.2.2, it was clear at least since 1992, and therefore well before the ‘Aéroports de Paris’ judgment [54], that it was rational to maintain Schönefeld in operation instead of closing it down even if it generated losses for many years.
Nii see aga ei ole.
Indeed, Schönefeld’s closure would have caused serious economic harm to BER airport (which as the future single Berlin airport was expected to generate profits at least in the long term, and even put the viability of this major strategic project into question.
Esiteks on Tegelil ja Schönefeldil lennujaamatasude kõrval ka palju muid erinevusi, eriti seoses lennujaama taristu laadiga ja lennujaama kaugusega kesklinnast.
Indeed, the decision to build a sole airport in Berlin was not only driven by land planning or environmental considerations, but also with the view to absorbing potential increase in traffic and increasing revenues.
Seepärast ei asenda nad teineteist kõige paremini.
As recognised by the 2009 Commission decision approving the aid to the financing of the BER airport, the success of the project relied on the expected traffic growth in Berlin [55] in a single airport [56].
Seda tõestab enne odavlendude strateegia rakendamist tehtud ebaõnnestunud katse veenda lennuettevõtjaid viima oma tegevus üle Tegelist Schönefeldi.
In order to maintain Schönefeld in operation, possibly with a view to transforming Schönefeld into a profitable airport (first by inviting airlines to relocate at Schönefeld and later by implementing the LCC strategy), it was necessary to ensure its economic viability by using part of the profits generated by Tegel and Tempelhof to finance it.
Pealegi ei sunni keegi lennuettevõtjaid tegema oma lende Tegelist või Schönefeldist.
Therefore, the cross-subsidisation occurring in this case is part of ‘a strategic plan with good hopes of long-term gain’, and in any event, it is beneficial to the FBS group as a whole in the long run compared to a counterfactual situation where Schönefeld would be closed down.
Nende valikute kõrval on lennuettevõtjatel veel kaks võimalust: jätta Tegelist ja Schönefeldist lennud tegemata või teha nendest lennujaamadest lende vähem (ning kasutada oma lennukit ja meeskonda liinidel, mis saavad alguse mujalt kui Berliinist, kuivõrd odavlennuettevõtjad on tõestanud oma võimet kohandada muutuvates turutingimustes kiiresti oma suutlikkust).
These long-term benefits – the successful opening and profitable operation of a new single airport for the Berlin agglomeration (plus the expected profits from the operations of Schönefeld after some years of implementing the LCC strategy) – could be expected by FBS to exceed the losses accumulated by Schönefeld before the opening of BER.
Seepärast võib FBSi mis tahes katse kehtestada Schönefeldist lendude tegemist kaaluvale lennuettevõtjale samad tingimused, mis kehtivad Tegelis, lõppeda lihtsalt sellega, et see lennuettevõtja loobub oma plaanidest ning otsustab jätta lendamata nii Schönefeldist kui ka Tegelist või vähendada oma Berliinist tehtavate lendude arvu.
Therefore, by concluding and maintaining in place the control and profit transfer agreement and maintaining Schönefeld in operation, the FBS group has not conferred any economic advantage on Schönefeld [57].
Seepärast ei olnud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseval arukal investoril mingit põhjust võtta Schönefeldi lennujaamatasude taseme kindlaksmääramisel arvesse Tegelis valitsevaid tingimusi.
The conclusion and implementation of the control and profit transfer agreement since 12 December 2000 thus does not involve State aid.
Jätkates sama mõttekäiku ning võttes arvesse Tempelhofi piiratud majanduslikku tähtsust ja selle lennujaama tegevuse kokkutõmbamist või lakkamist, ei olnud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseval arukal investoril mingit põhjust võtta Schönefeldi lennujaamatasude taseme kindlaksmääramisel arvesse Tempelhofis valitsevaid tingimusi.
Agreements between FBS and various airlines: preliminary remarks
Turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva investori põhimõtte kohaldamine lennujaama ja lennuettevõtjate vaheliste lepingute suhtes
Before the agreements between FBS and various airlines are assessed, it is useful to make various preliminary remarks, notably in light of the judgment of the General Court in the Charleroi case (the ‘Charleroi judgment’) [58], which was issued after the formal investigation procedure was opened in the present case.
Komisjon märgib, et vaatlusaluseid lepinguid tuleb käsitleda käesoleval juhul osana odavlendude strateegia rakendamisest, mis pidi tooma Schönefeldile keskmises ja pikas perspektiivis häid tulemusi.
Application of the market economy operator principle to the agreements between FBS and various airlines
Et hinnata, kas mõnega neist lepingutest on antud majanduslik eelis, on vaja analüüsida, kas turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev arukas investor oleks eeldanud lepingu sõlmimise päeval, et leping toob suurema kasumi, kui oleks muidu saavutatud.
Certain third parties argued in substance that the agreements at issue confer an economic advantage on the airlines concerned because the conditions offered through these agreements would deviate from the general rules applicable to airport charges at Schönefeld or because the same conditions are not offered equally to all airlines.
Seda suuremat kasumit mõõdetakse kui erinevust lepinguga kaasneva eeldatava lisatulu (st lepingu sõlmimise korral teenitava tulu ja lepingu sõlmimata jätmise korral teenitava tulu vahe) ja lepinguga seoses tekkivate eeldatavate lisakulude (st lepingu sõlmimise korral tekkivate kulude ja lepingu sõlmimata jätmise korral tekkivate kulude vahe) vahel, kohaldades tekkivate rahavoogude suhtes asjakohast diskontomäära.
The crucial question raised by these arguments is the following.
Lisaks tuleb selles analüüsis arvesse võtta kõiki tehinguga seonduvaid lisatulusid ja -kulusid.
If there is a system of published charges at a given airport run by a public company and if the airport manager offers discounts to these charges or financial incentives having the same effect as such discounts [59], do such discounts and incentives [60] confer by themselves and in all circumstances an economic advantage on the airlines concerned?
Eri elemente (lennujaamatasude puhul tehtavad allahindlused, turustamistoetused, muud rahalised stiimulid) ei tohiks hinnata eraldi.
The answer to this question is no.
Charleroi kohtuotsuses on öeldud järgmist: „… erainvestori kriteeriumi kohaldamisel on oluline käsitleda äritehingut tervikuna, et teha kindlaks, kas riiklik üksus ja tema poolt kontrollitav üksus käitusid koosvõetuna kui turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsevad mõistlikud ettevõtjad.
Indeed, in the Charleroi judgment which concerned in particular a discount offered by the Walloon region to an airline at an airport for which the region was responsible for setting airport charges, the General Court stated: ‘The mere fact that, in the present case, the Walloon Region has regulatory powers in relation to fixing airport charges does not mean that a scheme reducing those charges ought not to be examined by reference to the private investor principle, since such a scheme could have been put in place by a private operator.’ [61] It follows from this statement that discounts to airport charges (or financial incentives which reduce the net financial flows from the airlines to the airport manager) do not automatically confer an economic advantage.
Vaidlusaluste meetmete hindamisel peab komisjon arvestama kõiki olulisi asjaolusid ja nende konteksti…” [69].
In order to determine whether they do so, it is necessary to assess whether a prudent market economy operator guided by profitability prospects would have accepted to grant similar discounts and incentives to the particular carrier concerned [62].
Eeldatav lisatulu peab hõlmama eelkõige lennujaamatasudest saadavat tulu, võttes arvesse allahindlusi, lepinguga eeldatavasti tekkivat lisaliiklust ning lisaliiklusega eeldatavasti kaasnevat lennundusvälist tulu.
For a prudent market economy operator running an airport, there can be many reasons for not offering the same conditions to all airlines.
Eeldatavad lisakulud peavad kätkema eelkõige kõiki lisanduvaid tegevus- ja investeerimiskulusid, mis ei oleks ilma lepinguta tekkinud, nagu ka turustamistoetuste ja muude rahaliste stiimulitega seotud kulusid.
In particular, it can be rational to offer specific financial incentives (including in the form of marketing grants) and specific discounts to the published airport charges to airlines that bring a high number of passengers to the airport.
EasyJeti 2003. aasta lepingu (2. meede) hindamine
These favourable conditions can be objectively justified by the expected additional traffic, in view of the non-aeronautical revenues brought about by that additional traffic [63] and also because, even if the margin per passenger generated by the airport charges paid by the airline is reduced by the discounts and financial incentives, this margin may be significant in absolute terms in light of the numbers of passengers at stake.
EasyJeti 2003. aasta leping sõlmiti enne 2004. aasta tasumäärade jõustumist esialgu kümneks aastaks võimalusega pikendada lepingut veel kümneks aastaks.
Numerous factors can be taken into account by a prudent market economy operator running an airport to determine the conditions offered to airlines, not only the expected additional traffic but also the moment in which the agreement with the airline is negotiated (and the situation of the airport in that period, in particular in terms of capacity utilisation), the routes on which the airline considers operating [64], the airline’s operational requirements at the airport, the types of services required from the airport and their characteristics, the pressure exerted by airlines during negotiations [65] etc.
Saksamaa on esitanud tõendid projekti finantsväljavaadete kohta, mis põhinesid eelkõige prognoosil, mille FBS oli teinud 17. detsembril 2003, st enne FBSi ja easyJeti vahelise lepingu sõlmimist 19. detsembril 2003 (vt põhjendus 37).
For a prudent market economy operator running an airport, it can thus be justified to offer different conditions to different airlines in terms of airport charges and financial incentives, whether through bilateral agreements or through discount and financial incentive schemes embedded in the acts setting the charges [66].
FBS eeldas, et lepinguga suureneb tegevuskasum ajavahemikul 2004–2012 igal aastal ja et 2010. aastal jõutakse tegevusega kasumisse.
For the purposes of assessing whether such discounts and financial incentives confer an economic advantage, it must be determined whether, when the airport manager took the decision to offer them, it could reasonably expect this decision to be profitable, or in other words, to lead to a higher profit (or lower losses) than would be achieved in the counterfactual situation.
Tabel 9
Furthermore, contrary to what certain third parties have suggested, when it comes to conditions offered by airport managers to airlines through bilateral agreements (for instance specific grants for the opening of new routes) and not resulting from general discount or financial incentive schemes embedded in a published schedule of charges, a prudent market economy operator has no reason to ensure that such conditions are based on a set of general and transparent criteria applicable to all carriers.
FBSi prognoos easyJeti 2003. aasta lepinguga kaasneva lisakasumi kohta (miljonites eurodes)
When negotiating a bilateral arrangement with an airline, a prudent market economy operator is expected to take into account all the relevant features of the airline’s proposed services rather than a set of pre-determined transparent criteria which may constrain its margin of negotiation.
Tegevuskasum easyJeti lepingu sõlmimata jätmise korral
Therefore, the comments made by certain third parties as regards the alleged lack of transparency of the discount and financial incentives offered by FBS in this case are irrelevant in the context of the application of the market economy operator principle.
Lisanduv tegevuskasum easyJeti lepingu sõlmimise korral
Lawfulness of the 2004 Schedule and of the bilateral agreements between FBS and various airlines under national law
Konsolideeritud tegevuskasum
The question of whether the 2004 Schedule lawfully entered into force under national law, while important under German law, is irrelevant in the context of the application of the market economy operator principle.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et see prognoos ja selle koostamisel kasutatud eeldused olid kindel alus, mille põhjal allkirjastada easyJeti 2003. aasta leping.
Indeed, the fact that a discount to generally applicable airport charges, or a financial incentive with an equivalent effect, is granted via a bilateral agreement rather than through a general scheme embedded in a published schedule of charges is irrelevant.
EasyJeti 2003. aasta lepinguga kaasneva lennuliikluse prognoosimisel võeti aluseks nende lennukite arv, mille easyJet paneb lepingu kohaselt aja jooksul sooritama lende Schönefeldist, ja […] %line täituvus, mis tundub olevat odavlennuettevõtjate tavapärast täituvust silmas pidades usutav.
As a matter of fact, a prudent market economy operator could decide to grant discounts or incentives through either type of mechanism and the profitability of such decisions would not depend on the chosen mechanism.
Äriplaanis võeti arvesse kõiki asjakohaseid prognoositud lisakulusid ja -tulusid, sealhulgas lennundusega seotud ja lennundusväliseid kululiike, ning easyJetile pakutud rahaliste stiimulitega seotud kulusid.
Therefore, the question of whether the conditions offered by FBS to certain airlines resulted from the mere implementation of a valid applicable schedule of charges or from bilateral arrangements is irrelevant.
Prognoosimisel arvestati eelkõige lepinguga eeldatavasti lisanduvat liiklust ja lepingu tingimusi.
Besides, the question of whether FBS had the right, under national law, to enter into bilateral agreements that would set conditions deviating from the applicable schedule of charges [67] is equally irrelevant.
Teine ekspert tugines oma easyJeti 2003. aasta lepingu analüüsis põhjenduses 158 juba nimetatud FBSi prognoosidele.
Effects of conditions offered to airlines operating at Tegel
Näiteks kohandas teine ekspert äriplaani, et lisada sellesse […] miljoni euro suurune investeerimiskulu seoses easyJeti jaoks B-terminalis lisaväravate rajamisega.
In their comments, certain interested parties have argued that airlines operating at Schönefeld would be subsidised by airlines operating at Tegel through low airport charges and other favourable conditions.
Lisaks tegi ta kohandusi, kajastamaks asjaolu, et FBSi prognoosid põhinesid easyJeti lepingu kavandil, mis oli allkirjastatud lepingust pisut erinev.
This alleged cross-subsidisation would come from the fact that FBS would compensate the effect of low charges at Schönefeld through high charges at Tegel.
Seega kohandas teine ekspert äriplaani, et viia see täielikult vastavusse allkirjastatud lepingu tingimustega.
These comments suggest that for the conditions offered at Schönefeld to be free of State aid, they should equate to those offered at Tegel.
NPV on tavaline vahend, mida ettevõtjad kasutavad projekti kasumlikkuse hindamisel.
First, Tegel and Schönefeld differ in many respects other than airport charges, in particular concerning the nature of the airport infrastructures and the distance to the city centre.
Selleks leidis ta klassikalise finantsvarade hindamise mudeli alusel rahavoogude diskonteerimiseks kohaldatava diskontomäära, [70] nii et see määr kajastas tõepäraselt FBSi 2003. aasta kapitalikulusid.
Therefore, they are not perfect substitutes for one another.
Saadud NPVd on esitatud tabelis 10.
This is evidenced by the failure to persuade airlines to move from Tegel to Schönefeld before the implementation of the LCC Strategy.
Tabel 10
Moreover, airlines are not ‘forced’ to operate from Tegel or from Schönefeld.
EasyJeti 2003. aasta lepinguga seoses prognoositud rahavoogude NPV
In addition to these options, airlines have two other options: operate neither from Tegel nor from Schönefeld or just operate with lower capacity at those airports (and use their aircraft and crew on routes other than from Berlin as LCCs have proven to be able to quickly adjust their capacity to changing market circumstances).
teise eksperdi uuring.
Therefore, any attempt by FBS at imposing on an airline considering operating from Schönefeld the same conditions as at Tegel may simply lead that airline to abandon its plans and to decide to operate neither from Schönefeld nor from Tegel or downsize operations from Berlin.
NPV kogusumma aasta lõpus (30. detsembri 2003. aasta väärtusega)
Therefore, there would be no reason for a prudent market economy operator to take into consideration the conditions prevailing at Tegel when determining the level of charges at Schönefeld.
Need NPVd on kõik positiivsed ja kinnitavad, et easyJeti 2003. aasta lepingu sõlmimine oli mõistlik.
Following the same line of reasoning and taking into account the limited economic scope, the downsizing and the eventual cessation of operations of Tempelhof, there would be no reason for a prudent market economy operator to take into consideration the conditions prevailing at Tempelhof when determining the level of charges at Schönefeld.
Teine ekspert märkis oma aruandes, et FBS ei olnud võtnud 2003. aastal lepingu sõlmimise hindamisel arvesse seda, millist mõju avaldab leping BERi lennujaamale sellisel kujul, nagu see algul sõlmiti (st kehtivusega kümme aastat võimalusega pikendada seda veel kümneks aastaks).
The Commission notes that in the present case, the agreements at issue have to be seen as part of the implementation of the LCC Strategy, which was expected to lead to positive results for Schönefeld in the medium/long term.
Pealegi olid selles lepingus sätestatud tingimused, mis olid ilmselgelt soodsamad BERi jaoks kavandatud üldiste tasude raames ette nähtud tingimustest, mida oleks kohaldatud BERi avamisel.
In order to assess whether any of the agreements at issue confers an economic advantage, it is necessary to analyse whether, at the date when the agreement was concluded, a prudent market economy operator would have expected this agreement to lead to a higher profit than would have been achieved otherwise.
Teise eksperdi sõnul valitses seetõttu oht, et easyJeti 2003. aasta lepingu olemasolu tulemusel võisid teised lennuettevõtjad avaldada FBSile suurt survet, et vähendada erinevust BERis kehtivate üldiste tasude ja easyJetiga kokku lepitud tasude vahel.
This higher profit is to be measured by the difference between the incremental revenues expected to be generated by the contract (that is, the difference between the revenues that would be achieved if the contract were concluded and the revenues that would be achieved absent the contract) and the incremental costs expected to be incurred as a result of the contract (that is, the difference between the costs that would be incurred if the contract were concluded and the costs that would be incurred absent the contract), the resulting cash flows being discounted with an appropriate discount rate.
2003. aastal oli see siiski väga kauge oht, mida ei olnud võimalik odavlendude turu kiiret arengut silmas pidades mingi kindlusega ette näha, ammugi siis mõõta.
Furthermore, in this analysis, all the relevant incremental revenues and costs associated with the transaction must be taken into account.
See oht ei saanudki tegelikkuseks.
The various elements (discounts to airport charges, marketing grants, other financial incentives) must not be assessed separately.
EasyJeti 2003. aasta leping asendati easyJeti 2007. aasta muutmislepinguga, mis pidi BERi avamisel lõppema.
Indeed, as stated in the Charleroi judgment: ‘It is (…) necessary, when applying the private investor test, to envisage the commercial transaction as a whole in order to determine whether the public entity and the entity which is controlled by it, taken together, have acted as rational operators in a market economy.
Seepärast kinnitatakse teise eksperdi uuringus, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev arukas investor oleks easyJeti 2003. aasta lepingu sõlminud.
The Commission must, when assessing the measures at issue, examine all the relevant features of the measures and their context […].’ [69]
Kokkuvõttes ei kaasne easyJeti 2003. aasta lepinguga riigiabi.
The expected incremental revenues must include in particular the revenues from airport charges, taking into account the discounts as well as the traffic expected to be generated by the agreement and the non-aeronautical revenues expected to be generated by the additional traffic.
Teiste lennuettevõtjatega sõlmitud lepingute (3. meede) hindamine
The expected incremental costs must include in particular all the incremental operating and investment costs that would not be incurred absent the agreement as well as the costs of the marketing grants and other financial incentives.
FBSi otsused sõlmida lepingud lennuettevõtjatega Ryanair, Germanwings, Volare, Icelandair, Norwegian Air Shuttle ja Aer Lingus põhinesid samuti lisaliikluse ning lisakulude ja -tulude prognoosidel, millest nähtus, et nende lepingute sõlmimine on kasulik.
Assessment of the 2003 easyJet agreement (measure 2)
Iga lepingu puhul lähtuti liikluse prognoosimisel lennuettevõtja kavandatud lendude arvust ja põhjendatud eeldustest nende täituvuse kohta.
The 2003 easyJet agreement was concluded before the entry into force of the 2004 Schedule and initially foreseen for a period of 10 years with an option to extend it by a further 10 years.
Neis prognoosides võeti arvesse kõiki asjakohaseid ennustatavaid lisakulusid ja -tulusid, sealhulgas lennundusega seotud ja lennundusväliseid kululiike, ning FBSi poolt lennuettevõtjatele pakutud rahaliste stiimulitega seotud kulusid.
Germany has submitted evidence exhibiting the ex ante financial prospects of the project, based in particular on the FBS forecasts of 17 December 2003, i.e. before the date of the agreement signed between FBS and easyJet on 19 December 2003, see recital 42).
Nagu easyJeti 2003. aasta lepingu puhul, tehti ka FBSi prognoosidele stressitest, mille teostas teine ekspert.
FBS foresaw that the agreement would bring about a positive incremental operational profit for each year of the period 2004-2012 and that the operational break-even would be reached in 2010:
Stressitestide tulemusena leiti, et kõnealuste lennuettevõtjatega lepingute sõlmimine toob iga lepingu puhul igal lepingu kehtivuse aastal ikkagi kaasa lepingu lisakulusid ületava lisatulu (hoolimata teistest, konservatiivsematest järeldustest).
Table 9
Selle järelduseni jõudmiseks analüüsis teine ekspert kõnealuseid kohandatud prognoose aluseks võttes igat lepingut viisil, mis oli täielikult kooskõlas punktides 7.4.4 ja 7.5 kirjeldatud metoodikaga.
FBS forecasts as regards the incremental profits generated by the 2003 easyJet agreement (million euros)
Teine ekspert tugines läbivaatamisel ja kohanduste tegemisel üksnes nendele andmetele ja prognoosidele, mis olid FBSile kättesaadavad lepingu sõlmimise võimaluse hindamise ajal.
Operating profit without easyJet
Tabelis 11 on esitatud lepingute kohaldamisperioodi NPVd, mille teine ekspert arvutas lepingu sõlmimise ajal välja neist üheksast lepingust kaheksa kohta.
Additional operating profit with easyJet
Tabel 11
Consolidated operating profit
FBSi ja eri lennuettevõtjate vahel sõlmitud lepingute NPVd
The Commission considers that these forecasts and their underpinning assumptions were a sound basis to sign the 2003 easyJet agreement.
Lepingu kohaldamise aeg