natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Before the establishment of SACE BT and granting the initial capital thereto, already at the end of 2003, SACE sought external expertise to confirm and further elaborate the business opportunities identified by SACE so as to enter into the segment of marketable risks.
2007. aastal ettevõtjaga SA Ducroire tehtud investeeringu puhul ettevõtjasse KUP oli aga hind nõustaja (Rothchild) hinnangust 5 % kõrgem.
The main opportunities were identified in the market segments, where the major credit insurance market players were not yet present at the time, i.e. provision of credit insurance in Italy for domestic credits and export-credit insurance for the Italian exporting companies, mainly SMEs, towards the marketable risk countries.
Siiski müüs SACE BT selle investeeringu suhteliselt kiiresti pärast mõistmist, et ettevõtja KUP kasumlikkust ei õnnestu taastada [100].
Also, the business plan of SACE BT was based on market benchmarking and creating the structure of the company anew, rather than the continuation of any past business.
SACE BT müüs oma osaluse ettevõtjas KUP kahjumiga ettevõtjale SA Ducroire 25. veebruaril 2009, et minimeerida edasisi kahjusid [101].
In other words, it was not based on the existing track record of the business (or restructuring of the past business), but it was set up anew.
Komisjon märgib lisaks, et SACE kui pikaajalise ekspordikrediidikindlustuse valdkonnas tegutsev ettevõtja tunneb teataval määral krediidikindlustuse riski turgu.
Therefore, SACE BT is not the continuation of an activity which existed within SACE, but the result of a decision to set up a start-up and develop an economic activity which was not carried out within SACE.
Seega ei investeerinud ta valdkonnast midagi teadmata.
As a result, it can be concluded that the factual elements provided by Italy and SACE in the framework of the formal investigation procedure allow the Commission to conclude that SACE BT was created as a start-up and was not the mere continuation of activities carried out already within SACE.
Kokkuvõttes märgib komisjon, et äriplaan koostati eelnevalt ja maineka välisnõustaja abiga ning selles uuriti uusi turuvõimalusi ning see esitati ettevõtjale SACE enne SACE BT loomist.
The Commission considers that the business plan prepared for a start-up should consist of a careful analysis of business opportunities into the market in which the start-up intends to operate in and the likely return to be generated, demonstrating thereby that the expected profitability is sufficient for the initial investment to be worthwhile.
Lisaks oli investeering selgelt suunatud idufirmale ja see tugines kavale, mis põhines turutavade üksikasjalikul võrdlusel, eelkõige kulude ja hinnakujunduse osas, ning milles tehti piisavalt täpselt kindlaks kasvu ja arengu ärivõimalused.
However, there may be a degree of uncertainty and thus some scope for adjustment and refinement of the scope of operations and of the financial forecasts.
Väidet toetab lisaks see, et emaettevõtja on tähelepanelikult jälginud idufirma toimimist ja esimestel aastatel on tehtud õigeaegseid kohandusi.
This may particularly be the case in the initial years of the company's operation.
Arvestades eespool loetletud tingimusi ja eelkõige kasumlikkuse taset, mida võib eeldada SACE BT äritegevuse teisest ja kolmandast sambast, mida uuriti omal ajal üksikasjalikult, võib järeldada, et ootus teenida algse kapitaliinvesteeringu, st esimese meetme pealt piisavat tulu, oli realistlik ja kooskõlas turutavadega.
By definition, start-ups do not have a history of financial performance on which to base a valuation.
Seetõttu saab järeldada, et SACE nõudis ettevõtjasse SACE BT raha süstimisel oma investeeringu pealt piisavat tulu (nagu on märgitud juhatuse koosoleku protokollis ja märkustes) ja tal oli mõistlik alus seda eeldada.
Therefore, the investor has to develop a process for valuing the company based on comparable businesses (benchmarking) and financial projections.
Kokkuvõttes leitakse, et esimene meede ei andnud ettevõtjale SACE BT eelist.
Since young businesses may take time to become profitable, the key of valuing start-ups is to focus on the activities allowing generation of adequate profits in the future.
Seega ei ole see riigiabi ja muid riigiabina kvalifitseerumise kriteeriume ei ole vaja hinnata.
There are sufficient factual elements confirming that, before deciding to create SACE BT and to allocate its initial capital, SACE has undertaken analysis of the market in which SACE BT would operate.
Eelise olemasolu teise meetme puhul
Initial discussions and preliminary elements of the business plan for the development of SACE's activities for the years 2004-2006 have been presented in the meetings of SACE's [93] Board of Directors of 21 November and 3 December 2003 [94].
Algatamisotsuse põhjenduses 100 seadis komisjon kahtluse alla selle, kas turuosaliste ja emaettevõtja SACE edasikindlustustegevus toimus võrreldavatel tingimustel.
During the meeting of 21 November 2003, SACE's Board of Directors discussed the new directions for development and the possibility to operate in the short-term credit insurance in the OECD countries on the basis of a study prepared by an external consultant and SACE.
Kaudselt riigi pakutav edasikindlustus (st riikliku ekspordikrediidikindlustuse andja SACE kaudu) tundub tekitavat kunstlikku mahu loomist, mis ei oleks kättesaadav eraõiguslikul turul.
The Board of Directors concluded that for the marketable risks, the resources, investments and objectives would be defined on the basis of a feasibility study (studio di fattibilità) [95].
Lisaks ei välistanud komisjon algatamisotsuse põhjenduses 103 seda, et teine meede andis ettevõtjale SACE BT eelise.
Consequently, a business plan was sought from a reputable external consultant.
Itaalia ja SACE ei esitanud uusi faktilisi asjaolusid, mis oleksid muutnud algatamisotsuses esitatud esialgset hinnangut.
The tasks of the consultant were, amongst others, to identify the opportunities related especially to the short-term risks in OECD countries (where SACE evaluated the size of the market to EUR 2,5-5 billion [96]) and set out the operational terms for a new undertaking.
Ekspordikrediiti käsitleva teatise punkti 4.2 kohaselt pidid liikmesriigid lõpetama teatavat liiki riigiabi ühe aasta jooksul alates nimetatud teatise avaldamisest, sealhulgas riigipoolse edasikindlustamise kas otse või avalik-õigusliku või riigi toetust saava ekspordikrediidikindlustuse andja kaudu soodsamatel tingimustel kui on kättesaadavad eraõiguslikul edasikindlustuse turul, mis tingib edasikindlustuskaitse hindade allalöömise või sellise mahu kunstliku tekitamise, mis eraõiguslikul turul ei ole võimalik (punkti 4.2 alapunkt f).
In the tender letter of 17 December 2003, it was clearly stated that the start-up will not be able to rely on any State support, either directly (financial support) or indirectly (using the resources allocated to the non-marketable risks) [97].
Punktis 4.2 sätestatakse lisaks, et vaheperioodi jooksul on lubatud kohaldada olemasolevat täiendavat edasikindlustuskorda, eeldusel et riigipoolne edasikindlustamine moodustab väikese osa kindlustusandja edasikindlustuse üldpaketist ning et riigipoolset turukõlblike riskide edasikindlustust võivad saada kõik krediidikindlustusandjad, kes suudavad järgida üldisi abikõlblikkuse kriteeriume.
The initial business plan drawn on 18 May 2004 contained benchmarking [98] to the market practices (mainly major market players) in terms of expected pricing, claims expenses and other costs ratios and other details on how to set up and operate the business in line with market practices.
On väga selge, et käesoleval juhul ei ole viimased sätted täidetud, kuna riigile kuulus suurem osa edasikindlustamisest.
This could serve as a solid basis for a start-up company to make its operations conform to market practices.
Lisaks ei olnud kava avatud kõikidele krediidikindlustusandjatele.
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the process and steps followed by SACE before taking the decision to invest the initial capital into SACE BT were comparable to market practices in similar circumstances.
Eelise olemasolu hindamisel tõestab komisjon esiteks, et meede poleks olnud kättesaadav ülejäänud turult.
Notably, before deciding on the investment, SACE sought a feasibility study from an external advisor and before proceeding with the investment it carefully assessed and identified significant market opportunities for growth in the credit insurance market in Italy as well as to further expansion into the CEE markets or into other services related to the credit insurance.
Teiseks tõestatakse, et SACE ei tegutsenud eraõigusliku edasikindlustusandjana.
As regards the limited time period of the financial projections contained in the initial business plan (i.e. only the four years 2005-2008) and limited profitability to be achieved at the end of that period, the Commission observes that it was due to the fact that some of key elements still had to be refined and the plan therefore only contained financial projections only for part of the envisaged activities (first pillar, see recital 48).
Kolmandaks tõestatakse, et isegi kui võtta arvesse asjaolu, et SACE oli SACE BT emaettevõtja, ei võimalda see järeldada, et SACE toimis nii, nagu oleks sellises olukorras toiminud eraõiguslik ettevõtja.
In that context, the Commission notes that the adjusted business plan — formally adopted by SACE's Board of Directors only one month after the start of operations of SACE BT, changed some of the initial assumptions, extended the financial projections with one year, up to 2009, and presented estimations of the required capital and its return separately for the endogenously developed credit insurance business (first pillar) for which the required capital in relation to the projected premiums was estimated at EUR 40,3 million.
Neljandaks tõestab komisjon, et SACE antud edasikindlustus annab ettevõtjale SACE BT eelise.
The projected return upon this capital for 2009 was EUR 4,8 million and the expected ROAE was 12,1 %).
Sellest tulenevalt otsustas SACE BT „pärast mitmeid katseid jõuda turuosalistega kokkuleppele” [103] taotleda ülejäänud osa kahju ülemmäära edasikindlustusest ettevõtjalt SACE.
The accompanying note to the Board clearly specified the extension of the business into surety market and the delineation of the evolutionary scenario regarding other opportunities of the external growth into the sectors presenting opportunities for synergies with the credit insurance activity of SACE BT, so as to align the return on the entire capital investment into SACE BT with the market benchmarks.
SACE andis 74,15 % kahju ülemmäära edasikindlustusest 5. juunil 2009. aastal samadel prioriteetsuse, mahu ja kindlustusmakse tingimustel kui eraõiguslikud edasikindlustusandjad.
The document stated that the analysis had to be further elaborated upon preparation of the restated business plan for the regulatory purposes (expected in February/March 2005).
Seega on selge, et SACE antud kahju ülemmäära edasikindlustus 74,15 % ulatuses ei oleks olnud saadav ülejäänud turult [104].
Italy and SACE also provided documents showing that the plan was constantly kept under review.
Selgitamaks välja, kas selline meede annab eelise, tuleb teha kindlaks ka see, et kõnealuse meetme võtmisel ei tegutsenud SACE nii, nagu oleks sarnases olukorras toiminud eraõiguslik kindlustusandja.
This demonstrates that the plan was really followed and used by the management and updated regularly on the basis of new information.
Teine põhjus, miks ettevõtjal SACE BT ei õnnestunud leida edasikindlustust turult, oli raske finantsolukord ja asjaolu, et mitmed eraõiguslikud edasikindlustusandjad, kes SACE BT edasikindlustamise pikendamist käsitlevates aruteludes osalesid, olid mures ettevõtja olukorra pärast.
This practice appears to be comparable to that expected to be done in the case of a start-up, where evaluation of future profitability is uncertain and needs to be adjusted after the start of operations of the start-up.
SACE BT oli 2008. aastal deklareerinud märkimisväärse kahjumi (ligikaudu 29,5 miljonit eurot).
As regards other pillars of business, i.e. expansion of SACE BT operations through acquisitions (‘external growth strategy’), the Commission observes that the company identified at an early stage, with the help of a reputable external advisor (see recital 113), market opportunities in other market segments, which present significant synergies to its core credit insurance activity (including the potential targets for acquisitions).
Selline nõrk seis tähendab, et edasikindlustuse risk oli suurem [105].
Given the concentrated structure of the market in Western Europe, SACE explored opportunities to expand in the CEE markets, where, at the time, the three big credit insurance players were significantly less present than in Western Europe.
Edasikindlustamises osalenud edasikindlustusandjate käitumine tõestab, et eraõiguslikud edasikindlustusandjad oleksid oluliselt suurema tasu puudumise korral osalenud sellises riskantses edasikindlustamises vaid piiratud määral.
The Commission observes that, while SACE BT received a capital larger than the one needed for the organic growth of its credit insurance business (first pillar), Italy and SACE have provided documents showing that SACE had already considered and analysed the national and international expansion of SACE BT (respectively second and third pillar) before establishing SACE BT on 27 May 2004.
Nad poleks kunagi olnud nõus katma nii suurt osa, nagu on 74 %, samadel tingimustel, mida edasikindlustusandjad nõudsid palju väiksema edasikindlustuse osa eest.
Notably, the second and the third pillars were considered in the letter dated 17 December 2003 (see recitals 52 and 53) where the external consultant, apart from being requested to look at the endogenous growth of SACE, it had been requested to analyse a collaboration with other entities, either Italian or foreign (such as a collaboration with one of the biggest market players, a collaboration with a secondary player (e.g. CESCE — Spain, OND — Belgium) and a collaboration with an Italian player operating in another market segment or in another financial sector).
Ratsionaalne investor oleks küsinud tasu, milles oleks arvestatud võetavat suuremat riski [106].
Moreover, in March 2004, the external consultant had already provided supplementary analyses regarding the Italian market of the commercial information, the Italian market of the recovery of credits and its principal actors on the credit insurance in the Central and Eastern Europe (the supplements to the business plan).
Seega oleks pidanud SACE nõutud tasu olema õigupoolest suurem kui tasu, mida nõudsid viis eraõiguslikku edasikindlustusandjat palju väiksema edasikindlustuse osa eest [107].
Consequently, even though at the time when the first measure was granted no exact financial projections were made regarding the expected profitability from expansion into other services in Italy and other geographical markets by means of acquisitions, SACE had already had the analysis prepared by a reputable external consultant to support such prospective identification of potential targets.
Seetõttu arvutab komisjon teise meetme puhul abisumma edasikindlustustasu, mida oleks nõudnud eraõiguslik edasikindlustusandja sellise suure edasikindlustuse osa eest, ja ettevõtjalt SACE BT nõutud tasu vahena.
The Commission acknowledges that further consolidation of the smaller players in the market could reasonably be expected as well as potential privatisation of the credit insurers in the CEE.
Komisjoni tava kohaselt [108] leiab komisjon, et nii suure edasikindlustuse osa ja riski eest oleks pidanud tasu olema vähemalt 10 % suurem kui tasu, mida eraõiguslikud edasikindlustusandjad nõudsid väiksema edasikindlustuse osa ja riski eest.
It also understands the difficulties of SACE in spite of iterative process to precisely evaluate in money terms the amount of capital to be spent for these future acquisitions and the returns to be generated by such companies, before the owner of the potential target agrees to sell and the expected returns are evaluated for such potential acquisition targets.
Eespool kirjeldatud põhjustel järeldab komisjon, et SACE ei tegutsenud eraõigusliku edasikindlustusandjana.
In light of the considerations of SACE done before the investment as well as the detailed analysis sought from the reputable external advisor, which preliminary identified the potential targets, the Commission can agree with the claim of Italy and SACE that the acquisition plans were considered by SACE, when investing the capital into SACE BT, without being able to estimate their profitability or expected synergies without having access to internal data of such potential targets and without knowing the sale price.
Seoses küsimusega, kas emaettevõtja oleks katnud nii suure osa edasikindlustusest olukorras, kus tütarettevõtjal poleks õnnestunud leida turult väljapakutud hinnaga piisavalt edasikindlustusandjaid, tuleb märkida, et selline edasikindlustusleping suurendab emaettevõtja avatust tütarettevõtja tegevusele.
In view of the extensive acquisition strategy, common to the sector and expected by SACE, the Commission can also agree with the argument of Italy and SACE that the capital to be used in the future acquisitions can be approximated to an investment into an equity fund.
Käesoleval juhul oli SACE 2009. aastal olukorras, kus ta vajas suurt rekapitaliseerimist ja edasikindlustust.
Indeed, in an equity fund only expected rate of return may be defined in line with market benchmarks (in this case approximating the required rate of return by the three biggest credit insurance players having expanded significantly through acquisitions), whilst more specific evaluation is done before each investment, once such opportunity arises.
Sellise meetme võtmise otsust tuleks seega analüüsida paralleelselt kolmanda ja neljanda meetme võtmisega.
There may also be some delay before all the capital is invested.
Tõepoolest, teist, kolmandat ja neljandat meedet tütarettevõtja SACE BT [110] toetuseks kaalus SACE juhatus juba 26. mail 2009 [111].
In terms of profitability from acquisitions, the Commission observes that an external consultant's advice was consistently sought before making acquisitions.
Nagu järeldatakse nende meetmete hinnangus, ei oleks eraõiguslik investor rekapitaliseerimist teoks teinud, vaid oleks lasknud ettevõtjal pankrotti minna.
As regards Assedile, the price offered was below (for the first acquisition of 70 % of the stake in Assedile) or within the valuation range (when considering combined acquisition of 100 % of Assedile) proposed by the external consultant [99].
Seetõttu tuleb järeldada, et eraõiguslik emaettevõtja poleks võtnud teist meedet, mis suurendab veelgi emaettevõtja avatust tütarettevõtja riskidele.
However, as regards investment in KUP in 2007 jointly with SA Ducroire, the price paid was above the valuation made by the consultant (Rothschild) by 5 %.
Seoses küsimusega, kas edasikindlustus andis ettevõtjale SACE BT eelise, on SACE tunnistanud (vt põhjendus 70), et meede võimaldas ettevõtjal SACE BT suurendada pakutavate krediidikindlustuste mahtu ja seega võimaldas see sõlmida rohkem lepinguid, kui tal oleks olnud muidu võimalik.
On the other hand, quite quickly after realising that KUP's profitability could not be restored, SACE BT sold this investment [100].
Teise võimalusena oleks SACE BT pidanud ilma selle meetmeta toetama neid riske oma bilansil/asetama oma kapitali suuremasse riski või suurendama edasikindlustuse saamiseks tasu vähemalt 10 % (vt põhjendus 128).
The Commission also notes that SACE, being a firm working on long-term export credit insurance, has some knowledge of the market for credit insurance risk.
Komisjon järeldab, et teine meede andis ettevõtjale SACE BT eelise, mis võrdus erinevusega SACE BT makstud tegeliku tasu ja vähemalt 10 % suurema tasu vahel, mida oleks nõudnud eraõiguslik edasikindlustusandja, võttes arvesse võetavat suuremat riski.
It was therefore not investing without any own knowledge of the sector.
Eelise olemasolu kolmanda ja neljanda meetme puhul
In summary, the Commission notes that the business plan was prepared ex ante and with the help of a reputable external consultant which looked into new market opportunities that were presented to SACE before the creation of SACE BT.
Algatamisotsuse põhjenduses 107 seadis komisjon kahtluse alla võimaluse, et eraõiguslik ettevõtja oleks investeerinud sama summa, mida praegu ettevõtjaga SACE BT seoses hinnatakse.
Moreover, the investment was clearly targeted to a start-up company and was underpinned by a plan based on a detailed benchmarking to market practices, notably in terms of costs and pricing, and adequately identifying business opportunities for its growth and development.
Nagu tunnistasid Itaalia ametiasutused, katavad kolmas ja neljas meede kapitalivajadused, mida SACE BT vajas toimetulekuks finantskriisi mõjudega [112].
Given all the circumstances listed above and notably the level of profitability that could be expected from the second and the third pillars of business of SACE BT, which was explored in detail at the time, it can be concluded that an expectation to reach an adequate return from the initial capital investment, i.e. from the first measure, was realistic and in line with market practices.
Samas dokumendis on kirjas, et juba 2009. aasta esimese poolaasta lõpus ei piisanud varadest reservide katmiseks, st 2009. aasta juuni lõpus oli vaja 23 miljonit eurot ja 2009. aasta lõpus 68 miljonit eurot.
Therefore, it can be concluded that when SACE injected money in SACE BT, it required (as stipulates in the minutes and notes to the Board) and could have reasonably expected a sufficient return on its investment.
Algatamisotsuses märgitakse, et tundub, nagu poleks SACE BT suutnud katta 2008. aasta lõpus deklareeritud kahjumit ja et tema varadest ei piisanud tol ajal reservide katmiseks.
In conclusion, the first measure is deemed as not having conferred an advantage to SACE BT.
Tundub, et SACE BT poleks suutnud hankida talle eraldatud kapitali turult, kuna tema eeldatud kasumlikkus polnud piisav.
Hence, it did not constitute aid and the other criteria required to qualify as state aid do not have to be assessed.
Puuduvad tõendid selle kohta, et ettevõtja SACE BT väärtus tol ajal oleks olnud positiivne.
Presence of an advantage in the second measure
Algatamisotsuse põhjenduses 108 kutsus komisjon Itaaliat üles esitama märkusi selle kohta, kas kolmas meede oli vajalik selleks, et SACE BT saaks tegevust jätkata, ning kui see nii oli, siis millised oleksid olnud SACE hinnangulised kulud, kui ta oleks SACE BT müünud või likvideerinud.
In recital 100 of the opening decision, the Commission expressed its doubts that the reinsurance by the market operators and parent company SACE was provided under comparable terms.
Algatamisotsuse põhjendustes 111 ja 117 seadis komisjon kahtluse alla kolmanda ja neljanda meetme vastavuse turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva investori põhimõttele.
The reinsurance provided by the State indirectly (i.e. via a public export-credit insurer SACE) seems to lead to the artificial creation of capacity that would not be available from the private market.
Komisjon märkis lisaks, et need kaks meedet tundusid andvat ettevõtjale SACE BT eelise.
Furthermore, in recital 103 of the opening decision the Commission did not exclude that the second measure conferred an advantage to SACE BT.
Algatamisotsuses (põhjendus 109) märgitakse, et kõige olulisem on investeeringu ajal kättesaadav plaan.
Italy and SACE did not provide new factual elements that would change the preliminary assessment set out in the opening decision.
Plaan on kõige olulisem, kuna eraõiguslik investor annab ettevõtjale, kellel on kasumipuudujääk, uut kapitali üksnes siis, kui ta eeldab, et ettevõtja taastab piisava kasumlikkuse.