natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Conversion of short-term credit facilities to long-term loans
Lühiajalise laenu ümberarvestamine pikaajaliseks laenuks
In March 2009 the Ministry of Finance concluded loan conversion agreements with Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. and Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
aasta märtsis sõlmis rahandusministeerium laenude ümberarvestamise lepingu ettevõtjatega Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. ja Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
The loan agreements were all concluded on similar terms.
Laenulepingute tingimused olid kõigil sarnased.
They were repayable over the next seven years with indexation and an interest rate of 2 % per annum.
Tingimuste kohaselt tuli laen tagasi maksta seitsme aasta jooksul ning nende suhtes kohaldati indekseerimist ja intressimäära 2 % aastas.
The repayment terms of the loan to Askar Capital were similar, except that the annual interest rate was 3 %.
Ettevõtjale Askar Capital esitati samasugused tagasimaksetingimused, kuid tema puhul oli aastane intressimäär 3 %.
The total nominal amount of debt, attributable to the three investment banks, at the time of issue of the long-term bonds, was ISK 52,4 billion [6].
Nende kolme investeerimispanga võla nominaalväärtus pikaajaliste võlakirjade väljastamise ajal ulatus kokku 52,4 miljardi Islandi kroonini [6].
The aforementioned measures were based on the proposals of a Working Group which on 20 January 2009 submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Finance for the restructuring of debt owed by financial undertakings due to collateral loan facilities with the CBI.
Eespool nimetatud meetmed põhinesid ettepanekutel, mille töörühm esitas oma 20. jaanuari 2009. aasta märgukirjas rahandusministrile ja mis käsitlesid finantsettevõtjatele antud tagatisega keskpanga laenude restruktureerimist.
The memorandum was based on information regarding the financial undertakings and their ability to repay the debt.
Märgukirjas tugineti teabele finantsettevõtjate ja nende laenu tagasimaksmise suutlikkuse kohta.
According to the memorandum, the financial undertakings concerned were, due to the implications of the financial collapse in Iceland, unable to pay their debts to the CBI in full.
Nimetatud märgukirja kohaselt ei olnud nimetatud finantsettevõtjad Islandi finantskrahhi tõttu võimelised keskpangale tagasi maksma kogu oma võlga.
The memorandum of the Minister’s Working Group also states that at the time, the entire apparatus of the Icelandic authorities had been preoccupied with trying to keep the country’s financial system operating and protecting the interest of deposit holders.
Ministri moodustatud töörühma märgukirjas tõdeti, et tol ajal oli kõigi Islandi ametiasutuste peaülesanne tagada riigi finantssüsteemi toimimine ja hoiustajate huvide kaitse.
Bearing that in mind, along with other considerations, it was considered necessary to make certain arrangements in order to ensure that the undertakings would be able to pay off their debts.
Seda ja ka muid kaalutlusi silmas pidades peeti vajalikuks võtta teatavaid meetmeid, et võimaldada ettevõtjatel oma võlad tasuda.
According to the Icelandic authorities, the decision on the terms and conditions of the interest had not centred on what a fair and normal return on equity should be, since it had been clear in advance that the undertakings in question were unlikely to repay in full the liabilities in question.
Islandi ametiasutuste väitel ei lähtunud intressi tingimusi ja suurust käsitlev otsus õiglasest ja tavalisest omakapitali tulu kaalutlustest, kuna ei olnud eriti tõenäoline, et kõnealused ettevõtjad suudavad oma kohustusi täielikult täita.
Instead, the Working Group had focused on finding an interest percentage sufficiently high to matter to the undertaking in question but not so high as to preclude the possibility for repayment, thus removing the incentive for these undertakings to restructure their finances.
Selle asemel seadis töörühm eesmärgiks leida selline intressimäär, mis on kõnealuste ettevõtjate jaoks küllalt kõrge, kuid mitte nii kõrge, et see muudaks võla tagasimaksmise võimatuks ning seega võtaks neilt stiimuli oma finantsid restruktureerida.
The Icelandic authorities did however set certain conditions for the debt conversion.
Islandi ametiasutused nägid laenu ümberarvestamisel ette ka teatavad tingimused.
According to the conditions the debtor was inter alia obliged not to pay dividends, unless there was a corresponding down payment on the loans, the debtor could not enter into any major risk commitments that exceeded 20 % of equity (CAD), any bonuses to the debtors employees should be moderate, the debtors were obliged to provide the lender with detailed quarterly reports on their operations and the debtors’ CAD-ratios should not fall below 10 %.
Tingimuste kohaselt ei tohtinud võlgnik muu hulgas maksta dividende, välja arvatud omapoolse sissemakse ulatuses, võlgnik ei tohtinud võtta kohustusi, mis oleksid suuremad kui 20 % tema omakapitalist (kapitali adekvaatsuse määr), võlgu olevate ettevõtete töötajatele tohtis maksta ainult mõõdukat preemiat ning sellised ettevõtted olid kohustatud laenuandjale oma tegevuse kohta esitama üksikasjalikud kvartaliaruanded ning nende kapitali adekvaatsuse määr ei tohtinud langeda alla 10 %.
In case the liquidity position of the debtors turned out to be unacceptable in the view of the CBI or their CAD-ratios fell below 10 %, the lender could require that the outstanding amount of the loans together with interest and other relevant costs be converted to equity.
Juhul kui keskpank pidanuks võlgniku likviidsuspositsiooni vastuvõetamatuks või kui tema kapitali adekvaatsuse määr langenuks alla 10 %, võinuks laenuandja nõuda, et tagasimaksmata laenude ja intresside summa koos muude kuludega muudetaks omakapitaliks.
The purpose of those conditions was to increase the likelihood of full recovery of the loans and thereby to safeguard the Treasury’s interest.
Nende tingimuste eesmärk oli kaitsta riigi huve, suurendades tõenäosust, et kogu laenusumma makstakse kord tagasi.
For a more detailed description of the measures, reference is made to the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL [7].
Kõigi meetmete täpset kirjeldust vaata järelevalveameti otsusest nr 363/11/COL [7].
The objective of the measure and the national legal basis
Meetme eesmärk ja õiguslik alus
The Icelandic authorities considered that the objective of the measures was twofold; firstly, to try to secure the immense interests of the State by maximising the Treasury’s recovery of the claims, and, secondly, to give the financial undertakings a breathing space and a chance to work out their matters and get through the difficulties.
Islandi ametiasutuste kava kohaselt oli meetmetel kaks eesmärki: esiteks püüda tagada riigi huvide kaitse, maksimeerides nõuete sissenõudmise riigikassa poolt, ning teiseks anda finantsettevõtjatele mõningast tegutsemisvabadust ning võimalus oma probleemid lahendada ja raskustest üle saada.
The measures were based on an authorisation from the Icelandic parliament in paragraph 7.20 of the State supplementary budget for the year 2008, where the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the Treasury, was authorised to purchase from the Central Bank of Iceland commercial papers which had been pledged to the bank as collateral for loans as well as to settle these claims in the most viable manner possible.
Meetmete aluseks oli 2008. aasta lisaeelarve, mille paragrahviga 7.20 volitas Islandi parlament rahandusministrit riigikassa nimel ostma Islandi Keskpangalt talle laenude tagatiseks antud kommertspabereid ning täitma need nõuded võimalikult jätkusuutlikul viisil.
As previously noted the three beneficiaries to the aforementioned measures were Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. and Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
Nagu juba mainitud, oli eespool nimetatud meetmetega hõlmatud kolm ettevõtjat: Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. ja Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
For a more detailed description of the three beneficiaries and subsequent developments regarding their operations, reference is made to Sections 2.5 and 2.6 of the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL.
Abisaajate ja nende edasise tegevuse üksikasjalikumat kirjeldust vaata järelevalveameti otsuse nr 363/11/COL punktidest 2.5 ja 2.6.
In Decision No 363/11/COL, the Authority assessed preliminarily whether the Treasury’s measures to convert short-term claims to long-term loans on favourable terms were compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.
Oma otsuses nr 363/11/COL analüüsis järelevalveamet seda, kas riigikassa lühiajaliste nõuete soodsatel tingimustel pikaajaliseks laenuks muutmise meetmed on kooskõlas EMP lepingu riigiabi käsitlevate sätetega.
However since the State’s involvement as a major creditor to the undertakings concerned derived from earlier measures, namely the CBI collateral loans and securities lending, it was necessary to consider whether those measures possibly constituted State aid.
Kuna riik oli juba varasemate meetmete kaudu andnud asjaomastele ettevõtjatele laenu (keskpanga tagatisega laenud ja väärtpaberite laenuks andmine), tuli kindlaks teha, kas kõnealused meetmed kujutasid endast riigiabi.
The Authority therefore began its assessment by analysing the CBI short-term collateral loans to financial undertakings.
Seepärast analüüsis järelevalveamet kõigepealt keskpanga poolt finantsettevõtjatele antud lühiajalisi tagatisega laene.
The Icelandic authorities had underlined that the short-term credit facilities concerned belonged to regular monetary policy and financial market measures of the CBI and to the Treasury’s regular government debt management.
Islandi ametiasutused on rõhutanud, et kõnealused lühiajalised laenud anti tavapärase rahapoliitika ja keskpanga finantsturumeetmete raames ning tavapärase riigikassapoolse valitsemissektori võla haldamise käigus.
The Authority did not dispute that these measures belonged to monetary and government debt management policy and that they had been based on relevant rules thereon [8].
Järelevalveamet ei vaidlusta seisukohta, et need meetmed mahuvad raha- ja valitsemissektori võla haldamise poliitika raamesse ning et need põhinevad asjakohastel eeskirjadel [8].
The measures had been taken at the initiative of the financial undertakings concerned and the CBI had not, at the time, been backed by any counter-guarantee of the State.
Nimetatud meetmeid võeti asjaomaste finantsettevõtjate algatusel ja sel ajal ei andnud riik keskpangale mingeid omapoolseid tagatisi.
Therefore the Authority concluded that the CBI short-term collateral loans to financial undertakings and the Treasury’s short-term lending facilities did not involve State aid.
Seetõttu asus järelevalveamet seisukohale, et keskpanga lühiajalised tagatisega laenud finantsettevõtjatele ning riigikassa lühiajaline laen ei kujuta endast riigiabi.
However, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the Treasury’s loan conversion agreements amounted to State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Seevastu riigikassa laenude ümberarvestamise lepingute suhtes järeldas järelevalveamet esialgu, et need kujutasid endast riigiabi EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses.
The following aspects were indentified in the decision to initiate a formal investigation procedure:
Ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses osutati järgmistele asjaoludele:
The Authority concluded that the measures were clearly granted through State resources since the loans had been granted by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of authorisation provided for in the State budget.
järelevalveamet jõudis järeldusele, et kuna laenud andis rahandusministeerium riigieelarvega antud volituse alusel, põhinesid meetmed riigi ressurssidel;
The Authority found that the measures conferred on the three investment banks a commercial advantages since they were relieved of charges, in the form of interest payments and other costs associated with the short-term credit facilities with the CBI, that would normally have been borne by their budgets.
järelevalveamet leidis, et meetmetega anti kolmele investeerimispangale kaubanduslikke eeliseid, kuna nende raames pakuti vabastust intressidest ja muudest kuludest, mis on seotud keskpanga lühiajaliste laenudega ja mille pangad oleksid tavapäraselt pidanud katma oma eelarvest.
The Authority also expressed doubt as to whether the measures were consistent with the conduct of a private creditor in a comparable legal and factual situation, given the favourable repayment terms of the loans and the fact that they did not foresee a step-up of interest rates in case the financial condition of the debtors improved.
Samuti väljendas järelevalveamet kahtlust, kas meetmed olid kooskõlas võrreldavas õiguslikus ja faktilises olukorras oleva erainvestori käitumisega, võttes arvesse, et laenu tagasimaksmise tingimused olid soodsad ega näinud ette intressimäära tõstmist, kui võlgniku majanduslik olukord paraneb;
With regard to selectivity, the Authority concluded that the measures could not be considered to be general in nature, since they favoured three undertakings in one particular economic sector and other undertakings and sectors did not benefit from them.
seoses meetmete valikulisusega järeldas järelevalveamet, et kuna meetmetega eelistati ühe konkreetse majandussektori kolme ettevõtjat ja need ei kehtinud teiste ettevõtjate ja muude valdkondade suhtes, ei saa neid meetmeid pidada oma laadilt üldmeetmeteks.
The measures would therefore have to be considered as selective [9].
Seetõttu tuleb meetmeid pidada valikulisteks [9].
Furthermore the Icelandic authorities had not presented clear evidence that the favourable loan conversion agreements had been effectively made available to all undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation as Saga Capital, VBS and Askar Capital.
Lisaks sellele ei esitanud Islandi ametiasutused selgeid tõendeid selle kohta, et laenu soodustingimustel ümberarvestamist oleks võimaldatud kõikidele ettevõtjatele, kes olid ettevõtjatega Saga Capital, VBS ja Askar Capital võrreldavas õiguslikus ja faktilises olukorras;
Finally, the Authority concluded that the measures were liable to distort competition.
lisaks jõudis järelevalveamet järeldusele, et meetmed tõenäoliselt moonutasid konkurentsi.
Even though the investment banks concerned operated mostly on the Icelandic market and were of modest size, they were nevertheless engaged in provision of financial services which were fully open to competition and trade within the European Economic Area.
Kuigi kõnealused investeerimispangad ei olnud eriti suured ja tegutsesid peamiselt ainult Islandi turul, tegelesid nad siiski finantsteenuste osutamisega, mis on Euroopa Majanduspiirkonnas konkurentsile ja kaubandusele täielikult avatud valdkond.
Moreover, the Authority doubted that the State aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.
Järelevalveamet kahtles ka selles, kas riigiabi võib pidada kokkusobivaks EMP lepinguga.
The Icelandic authorities had referred to Article 61(3) EEA and the Authority’s rescue and restructuring aid guidelines in support of their argument that the measure was compatible with the Agreement.
Selleks et kinnitada oma väidet, et meede on lepinguga kooskõlas, osutasid Islandi ametiasutused EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõikele 3 ning järelevalveameti päästmis- ja ümberkorraldusabi suunistele.
The Icelandic authorities did however not submit any evidence in favour of assessing the compatibility of the measure under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement or the Authority’s temporary State aid guidelines regarding the financial crisis.
Kuid selle kohta, et meede sobib kokku artikli 61 lõike 3 punktiga b või järelevalveameti ajutiste finantskriisi ajal riigiabi andmise suunistega, ei ole Islandi ametiasutused tõendeid esitanud.
The Authority stressed that the temporary rules on aid to financial undertakings provide for the limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, the restoration of the long-term viability of the bank and safeguards against undue distortion of competition.
Järelevalveamet rõhutas, et finantsettevõtjatele abi andmise ajutiste eeskirjade kohaselt peab abi piirduma minimaalselt vajalikuga, tooma kaasa panga pikaajalise elujõulisuse taastamise ja hõlmama kaitsemeetmeid põhjendamatute konkurentsimoonutuste ärahoidmiseks.
In particular, the guidelines set out rules to secure appropriate and adequate remuneration for State recapitalisation [10].
Eelkõige on suunistes sätestatud riigipoolse rekapitaliseerimise eest asjakohase ja piisava tasu maksmine [10].
The repayment terms of the loans provided by the State appeared not to take account of those principles.
Tundub aga, et riigi antud laenu tagasimaksmise tingimuste puhul ei ole neid põhimõtteid arvesse võetud.
The loans had been granted with a repayment period of seven years, with indexation, and at fixed interest rates of 2 % per annum, which was far below market rates and no step-up of interest rates was foreseen to encourage redemption of State capital.
Laenude tagasimaksetähtaeg on seitse aastat, kusjuures ette on nähtud indekseerimine ja fikseeritud intressimäär 2 % aastas, mis on palju madalam kui intressi turumäär; lisaks ei ole ette nähtud intressimäära tõstmist, et stimuleerida kapitali tagastamist riigile.
In light of this, the Authority concluded that lending terms of this kind were not compatible with the Authority’s State aid guidelines.
Seda silmas pidades järeldas järelevalveamet, et laenutingimused ei ole tema riigiabi suunistega kooskõlas.
The comments of the Icelandic authorities are focused on their view that the measures were compatible with the EEA Agreement.
Islandi ametiasutuste märkustega kinnitati seisukohta, et meetmed on kooskõlas EMP lepinguga.
In their view the measures had not been selective since the circumstances of the three investment banks had been unique and other banks, such as Straumur, SPB and SPRON, had not been in a similar situation as the three investment banks.
Nende arvates ei ole meetmed valikulised, sest kolme investeerimispanga olukord oli ainulaadne ja muud pangad, nagu Straumur, SPB ja SPRON, olid nendest kolmest investeerimispangast erinevas olukorras.
Some of the other banking institutions had already defaulted on their obligations against their creditors by the time the loan conversion agreements were made and their reorganisation efforts were so substantial that conversion of debts with the CBI would not have been a significant factor in their financial restructuring.
Laenude ümberarvestamise lepingu sõlmimise ajaks olid mõned teised pangad juba minetanud võime täita oma kohustusi võlausaldajate ees, kusjuures kolme kõnealuse panga reorganiseerimiseks tuli teha nii suuri jõupingutusi, et nende pankade poolt keskpangalt võetud laenu ümberstruktureerimine oli selle kõrval pisiasi.
The Icelandic authorities also maintained that their decisions to convert the loans had been in line with the private creditor principle since any creditor, in the same position as the Icelandic State was in at that time, would have acted in the same manner.
Islandi ametiasutused väitsid ka seda, et laenude ümberarvestamise otsus tehti kooskõlas eraõigusliku võlausaldaja põhimõttega, kuna iga võlausaldaja, kes on samasuguses olukorras kui tol ajal oli Islandi riik, toimiks samamoodi.
Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities provided information on the current status of the three investment banks and the developments that had occurred since the Authority issued Decision No 363/11/COL [11].
Lisaks esitasid Islandi ametiasutused ülevaate kolme investeerimispanga praegusest olukorrast ja sündmustest, mis on toimunud pärast järelevalveameti otsuse nr 363/11/COL vastuvõtmist [11].
In light of the fact that the three beneficiaries had ceased all economic activity since Decision No 363/11/COL was issued, and with reference to established practice by the European Commission and the Authority on the issue of pursuing the classification of measures in corresponding circumstances and assessing their compatibility [12], the Icelandic authorities maintained that there was no reason for the Authority to pursue the matter any further.
Võttes arvesse, et pärast otsuse nr 363/11/COL vastuvõtmist on kõik kolm abisaajat kogu majandustegevuse lõpetanud ning viidates Euroopa Komisjoni ja järelevalveameti väljakujunenud tavale seoses sarnases olukorras võetud meetmete riigiabiks liigitamise ja nende eeskirjadega kokkusobivuse hindamisega, [12] väitsid Islandi ametiasutused, et järelevalveametil ei ole põhjust menetlust jätkata.
This implies that for measures to be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, they must involve a grant by the State or through State resources, confer an advantage on the recipient undertaking, be selective, distort competition and be liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.
Sellest järeldub, et meetme liigitamiseks riigiabiks EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses peab see sisaldama riigi antud või riigi ressurssidest antavat toetust, andma abisaavale ettevõtjale eelise, olema selektiivne, kahjustama konkurentsi ja tõenäoliselt mõjutama lepinguosalistevahelist kaubandust.
As previously noted the Authority, in Decision No 363/11/COL, preliminarily concluded that the measures under assessment, i.e. the conversion of short-term credit facilities to long-term loans, fulfilled the criteria set out in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore constituted State aid.
Nagu juba varem mainitud, esitas järelevalveamet otsuses nr 363/11/COL esialgse järelduse, et meetmed, st lühiajalise laenu ümberarvestamine pikaajaliseks laenuks, vastavad EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõikes 1 sätestatud kriteeriumidele ja seetõttu kujutavad endast riigiabi.
Furthermore, there was nothing to suggest that the measures were compatible with either the general State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement or the Authority’s temporary State aid guidelines regarding the financial crisis.
Lisaks ei kinnita miski väidet, et meetmed on kooskõlas EMP lepingu üldiste riigiabi sätetega ja järelevalveameti esitatud ajutiste finantskriisi ajal riigiabi andmise suunistega.
The Authority has in the course of the investigation received no information which would alter this preliminary view.
Järelevalveamet ei saanud uurimise käigus teavet, mis oleks seda esialgset seisukohta muutnud.
Moreover, the Icelandic authorities had not notified the aid measures covered by the opening decision to the Authority prior to their implementation.
Lisaks ei olnud Islandi ametiasutused teatanud järelevalveametipoolse uurimismenetluse algatamise otsusega hõlmatud abimeetmete võtmisest enne nende meetmete rakendamist.
By not doing so they disrespected their notification obligation pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.
Seega ei täitnud nad protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõike 3 kohast teatamiskohustust.
The implementation of those aid measures was therefore unlawful.
Kõnealuseid abimeetmeid rakendati seega ebaseaduslikult.
Despite of this the Authority must nevertheless assess whether there is a reason for it to pursue the matter further.
Sellest hoolimata peab järelevalveamet hindama, kas on alust jätkata selle küsimuse menetlemist.
As was noted in Decision No 363/11/COL, Askar Capital Investment Bank hf. had already in 2007 sustained significant losses from its investments in structured credit (sub-prime) products with US mortgages as underlying assets.
Nagu on märgitud otsuses nr 363/11/COL, kandis Askar Capital Investment Bank hf. juba 2007. aastal märkimisväärset kahju investeeringutelt, mida ta oli teinud struktureeritud kõrge riskitasemega laenutoodetesse, mille alusvaraks olid Ameerika Ühendriikide hüpoteeklaenud.
The bank faced even greater difficulties in June 2010 when the Supreme Court of Iceland ruled that foreign currency denominated loans were illegal.
Panga raskused süvenesid veelgi 2010. aasta juunis, kui Islandi ülemkohus otsustas, et laenude välisvaluutas nomineerimine on ebaseaduslik.
The bank eventually filed for bankruptcy on 14 July 2010 and was taken over by the Financial Supervisory Authority (‘the FME’) on the same day.
14. juulil 2010 esitas pank pankrotiavalduse ning samal päeval võttis finantsjärelevalveasutus (edaspidi „finantsinspektsioon”) selle haldamise üle.