natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The second paragraph of Article 9 of the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Statute of the BNB provides as follows: ‘The State shall guarantee the Bank against any loss and shall guarantee repayment of any loan granted by the Bank as a result of the execution of the agreements referred to in the previous paragraph [‘international monetary cooperation agreements binding on Belgium’] or as a result of its participation in international monetary cooperation agreements or operations to which the Bank, subject to the agreement of the Council of Ministers, is party. The State shall also guarantee the Bank repayment of any loan granted as part of its contribution to the stability of the financial system, and shall guarantee the Bank against any loss incurred as a result of any transaction necessary in that regard’ [115].
Belgia keskpanga põhikirja sätestava 22. veebruari 1998. aasta seaduse artikli 9 lõikes 2 on sätestatud järgmist: „Riik annab keskpangale tagatise igasuguse kahjumi vastu ning panga antud kõikide laenude tagasimaksmise eelmises lõikes nimetatud lepingute [st Belgiale siduvate rahvusvahelise rahanduskoostöö lepingute] tulemusel või panga osalemise tulemusel (mis on kinnitatud ministrite nõukogu poolt) rahvusvahelise rahanduskoostöö alastes lepingutes või toimingutes. Muu hulgas tagab riik keskpangale kõigi laenude tagasimaksmise, mis on antud keskpanga osalemise raames finantsstabiilsuse tagamises ning lisaks annab tagatise mis tahes kahjumile, mis on tekkinud selleks vajaliku toimingu tulemusel” [115].
In the Commission’s view, it follows that, for the activities referred to in that paragraph, the BNB is guaranteed by the State ‘against any loss’.
Komisjoni arvates on tulemus seoses nimetatud klausliga see, et Belgia keskpank on saanud riigi tagatise „igasuguse kahjumi vastu”.
Furthermore, the Belgian authorities have continually cited the need to avoid destabilising the financial system as justification for the ELAs for Dexia.
Muu hulgas on Belgia ametiasutused õigustanud erakorralise likviidsusabi andmist Dexiale järjepidevalt vajadusega hoida ära finantssüsteemi ebastabiilsus.
The fact that, in their notification of 21 October 2011 concerning the new ELA measure, the Belgian authorities felt the need to mention the presence of a State counter-guarantee for the BNB almost immediately after mentioning that the ELA was necessary to preserve Belgium’s financial stability confirms that this counter-guarantee does indeed cover the ELA:
Asjaolu, et Belgia ametiasutused pidasid oma 21. oktoobri 2011. aasta teatises vajalikuks märkida ära riikliku edasitagatise olemasolu Belgia keskpanga suhtes vahetult pärast seda, kui nad olid selgitanud, et erakorraline likviidsusabi oli vajalik Belgia finantsstabiilsuse säilitamiseks, annab tunnistust sellest, et edasitagatis katab ka erakorralist likviidsusabi:
In these circumstances, the BNB and the Belgian Government, each within the ambit of their relevant roles and their respective competences, had started considering available options to preserve DBB’s viability and the financial stability in Belgium.
In these circumstances, NBB and the Belgian Government, each within the ambit of their relevant roles and their respective competences, had started considering available options to preserve DBB’s viability and the financial stability in Belgium.
Pursuant to the organic law of the BNB of 22 February 1998 the Belgian State automatically guarantees the repayment of any credit granted in the context of the BNB’s contribution to the stability of the financial system as well as any loss incurred as a result of any transaction necessary in this regard.
Pursuant to the organic law of NBB of 22 February 1998 the Belgian State automatically guarantees the repayment of any credit granted in the context of NBB’s contribution to the stability of the financial system as well as any loss incurred as a result of any transaction necessary in this regard.
The BNB has recognised that these operations have been undertaken in view of the systemic importance of Dexia Group …’ [116].
NBB has recognised that these operations have been undertaken in view of the systemic importance of Dexia Group […]” [116].
The conditions laid down in the Banking Communication in order for funding not to constitute aid are therefore not all satisfied as regards the BNB’s ELA for DBB/Belfius.
Pangandusteatises määratletud tingimused abi olemasolu välistamiseks ei ole seega Belgia keskpanga poolse DBB/Belfiusele antud erakorralise likviidsusabi puhul täielikult täidetud.
The same applies for the half of the ELA which the BdF granted to DCL, for the reasons set out in recitals 414-429.
Sama kehtib erakorralise likviidsusabi selle poole suhtes, mille Prantsuse keskpank andis DCLile (põhjendustes 414–429 osutatud põhjustel).
Since the agreement of 2 February 2012 [117] between the Belgian and French central banks became binding, the BNB has been required to provide compensation of 50 % for any losses which the BdF might sustain as a result of a possible default by DCL.
Alates hetkest, mil Belgia ja Prantsuse keskpankade vaheline 2. veebruari 2012. aasta konventsioon [117] siduvaks muutus, oli Belgia keskpank kohustatud hüvitama kuni 50 % ulatuses DCLi võimaliku pankroti korral Prantsuse keskpangale tekkida võiva kahjumi.
This BNB guarantee for the BdF is itself covered by the Belgian State guarantee provided for in the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Statute of the BNB.
Belgia keskpanga tagatis Prantsuse keskpangale tugineb ise aga Belgia riigi tagatisele, mis on ette nähtud Belgia keskpanga põhikirja sätestava 22. veebruari 1998. aasta seadusega.
In the absence of adequate evidence that the provisional agreement between the two central banks which preceded the agreement of 2 February 2012 [118] was legally binding, the Commission regards 2 February 2012 as the date from which the BdF’s ELA for DCL may have begun to constitute aid.
Piisavate andmete puudumisel 2. veebruari 2012. aasta eelselt kahe keskpanga vahel sõlmitud ajutise lepingu õigusliku sidususe kohta käsitleb komisjon Prantsuse keskpanga poolset DCLile antud erakorralise likviidsusabi kui riigiabi alguskuupäevana 2. veebruari 2012 [118].
In conclusion, the condition which requires that, for ELA not to constitute aid under the Banking Communication, that ELA must not be backed by a counter guarantee of the State [119] is also not satisfied as regards the BdF’s ELA for DCL.
Kokkuvõttes ei ole ka Prantsuse keskpanga poolse DCLile antud erakorralise likviidsusabi puhul täidetud tingimus, et erakorralist likviidsusabi ei peeta pangandusteatise tähenduses riigiabiks, kui sel ei ole riiklikku edasitagatist [119].
The conditions laid down in the Banking Communication if funding is not to constitute aid are therefore not all satisfied either as regards the BNB’s ELA for DBB/Belfius or as regards the BdF’s ELA for DCL.
Pangandusteatises määratletud tingimused abi olemasolu välistamiseks ei ole seega Belgia keskpanga DBB/Belfiusele ega ka Prantsuse keskpanga DCLile antud erakorralise likviidsusabi puhul täielikult täidetud.
Consequently, it must be ascertained whether the conditions constituting State aid are indeed met.
Niisiis tuleb kontrollida, kas täidetud on riigiabi kriteeriumid.
The BNB is a public institution and the measures it takes involve State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Belgia keskpank on avaliku sektori asutus ning tema sekkumised hõlmavad riigi vahendeid aluslepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
According to the BNB itself, ‘When the National Bank was established, the fact that the general interest takes priority in its management was given shape in a legal system that differs from the normal statutory provisions regarding public limited liability companies’ [120].
Belgia keskpanga enda väite kohaselt kajastab üldsuse huvi ülimuslikkus riigi keskpanga haldamise suhtes panga loomisest alates panga suhtes äriühinguõigusest erinevat kehtivat süsteemi [120].
It performs State functions such as maintaining price stability for society as a whole.
Ta täidab võimu teostamisega seotud ülesandeid, nagu hinnastabiilsuse hoidmine kogu rahva huvides.
It is governed by an organic law and its Statute is approved by royal decree.
Keskpanka reguleeritakse konstitutsioonilise seaduse ja põhikirja alusel, mis kiidetakse heaks rakendusmäärusega.
The Governor and Directors are appointed by the King.
Keskpanga peadirektor ja direktorid nimetab ametisse kuningas.
The ELA thus constitutes a measure of the State granted through State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Seega kujutab erakorraline likviidsusabi riigi meedet, mis võeti riigi vahenditega ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
The BdF is an institution whose capital belongs to the State.
Prantsuse keskpank on riigile kuuluva kapitaliga institutsioon.
Subject to the main objective of price stability, the BdF supports the government’s general economic policy and provides services requested by the State or carried out for third parties with the State’s agreement.
Ilma et see piiraks põhieesmärki, milleks on hinnastabiilsus, toetab Prantsuse keskpank valitsuse üldist majanduspoliitikat ning osutab riigi tellitud või kolmandatele isikutele suunatud teenuseid riigi nõusolekul.
The ELA paid to DCL and that paid to DBB/Belfius until Dexia sold it to the Belgian State is a measure selectively granted to Dexia, which gives it an advantage in that it provides funding which Dexia is no longer able to obtain on the market because of the serious problems it faces, particularly as regards liquidity.
DCL-ile ja DBB/Belfiusele (kuni Dexia müüs viimatinimetatu riigile) antud erakorraline likviidsusabi on Dexia kasuks võetud valikuline meede, mis annab ettevõtjale eelise finantseeringu näol, mida see oma tõsiste eeskätt likviidsusega seotud raskuste tõttu turult enam saada ei suuda.
Similarly, the ELA paid to DBB/Belfius after Dexia sold it to the Belgian State is a measure selectively granted to DBB/Belfius, which has given it an advantage by providing it with funding no longer available to it on the market.
Samamoodi on DBB/Belfiusele pärast selle müüki Belgia riigile eraldatud erakorraline likviidsusabi eelis finantseeringu näol, mida viimane turult enam ei saanud.
Moreover, in the context of the Dexia Group’s serious liquidity problems, DBB/Belfius continued, after it was sold, to subscribe to the bonds issued by DCL.
Lisaks jätkas DBB/Belfius müügijärgsel perioodil Dexia kontserni tõsiste likviidsusprobleemide olukorras DCLi võlakirjaemissioonide märkimist.
The ELA enabled it to make this investment, whereas that facility was not available to its competitors.
Erakorraline likviidsusabi lihtsustas nimetatud investeeringut, samas kui konkurentidel sellist võimalust ei olnud.
As Dexia is active in a number of Member States and in competition, for most of its activities, with other financial institutions operating across the European Union, the ELA granted to it distorted competition and affected trade between Member States.
Arvestades, et Dexia tegutses mitmes liikmesriigis ning konkureeris enamikul oma tegevusaladest teiste ELis tegutsevate finantseerimisasutustega, moonutas erakorraline likviidsusabi konkurentsi ja kahjustas liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
Similarly, the ELA gave DBB/Belfius, after it was sold, a source of funding without which it could not have continued its activities (particularly subscribing to financial instruments issued by DCL), and which thus gave it an advantage that distorted competition.
Samamoodi oli DBB/Belfiusel müügijärgsel ajal erakorralise likviidsusabi näol olemas rahalised vahendid, ilma milleta ei oleks ta suutnud oma tegevust jätkata (eriti märkida DCLi emiteeritud rahastamisvahendeid) ning mis andsid talle seetõttu konkurentsi moonutava eelise.
It is a major bank in Belgium and is in competition with other financial institutions operating across the European Union.
Tegemist oli Belgia ühe suurema pangaga, kes konkureeris kogu ELis tegutsevate muude finantsettevõtjatega.
This advantage has thus affected trade between Member States.
Seega kahjustas nimetatud eelis liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
Consequently, and notwithstanding the debt portfolios provided as security by DBB/Belfius and DCL, the Commission considers that the ELAs contain State aid.
Selle tulemusel ja hoolimata DBB/Belfiuse ja DCLi panditud väärtpaberitest leiab komisjon, et erakorraline likviidsusabi sisaldab riigiabi.
Aid from the sale of DBB/Belfius to the Belgian State
Abi, mis tuleneb DBB/Belfiuse müügist Belgia riigile
In its opening decision on the sale of DBB/Belfius, the Commission expressed its doubts that the sale of DBB/Belfius to the Belgian State did not involve aid.
DBB/Belfiuse müügi suhtes ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses väljendas komisjon kahtlust abi puudumise suhtes DBB/Belfiuse müümise tehingus riigile.
Any positive deviation between the price paid by the Belgian authorities and the market value of DBB/Belfius at the time of the transaction would be regarded as the equivalent amount of State aid to the vendor (Dexia SA).
Tehingu mis tahes hinnavahe Dexia SA kasuks Belgia riigi makstud hinna ja DBB/Belfiuse müügiväärtuse vahel loetakse müüjale (Dexia SA) antud riigiabiks samas summas.
Furthermore, the transaction may also prove to involve aid for the entity sold (DBB/Belfius).
Lisaks võib tehing sisaldada riigiabi müüdud üksusele (DBB/Belfius).
This aid is on top of the aid — in question here — which was the subject of the conditional authorisation decision and from which DBB/Belfius has already benefited as an entity of the Dexia Group (see Section 6.1.1, recitals 387-405), and the ELA received by DBB/Belfius (see point (b) in the current section).
Nimetatud abi lisandub tingimuslikus otsuses käsitletud ja kahtluse alla seatud abile, mida DBB/Belfius sai Dexia kontserni liikmena (vt 6.1.1 jao põhjendused (387)–(405)), ning erakorralisele likviidsusabile (vt käesoleva jao punkt b).
Aid for the vendor
Müüja saadud abi
The transaction by which the Belgian State acquired shares in DBB/Belfius was financed by State resources (from the SFPI).
DBB/Belfiuse aktsiate riigile müümise tehingut rahastati riigi vahenditest (mis pärinesid SFPI-st).
The Belgian State intervened to help Dexia and/or its subsidiaries under terms and conditions which would not be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market conditions.
Belgia riik võttis Dexia ja/või selle tütarettevõtja kasuks meetmeid tingimustel, mis ei oleks tavalistes turutingimustes tegutseva erainvestori jaoks olnud vastuvõetavad.
The vendor, Dexia, received State resources as a result of the excessively high price paid by Belgium to acquire DBB/Belfius.
Müüja Dexia sai riigi vahenditest kasu, kuna Belgia maksis DBB/Belfiuse eest liiga kõrget hinda.
The Commission notes that the price valuation supplied by the Belgian authorities shows a value of between EUR 2,8 billion and EUR 7,2 billion.
Komisjon märgib, et Belgia ametiasutuse saadetud hinnaanalüüs kajastab väärtust, mis võib olla 2,8 miljardit eurot kuni 7,2 miljardit eurot.
After taking account of unrealised losses resulting from market conditions in summer 2011 (deterioration of some EUR [0-2] billion in unrealised losses), and of the profit outlooks announced (EUR 408 million and EUR […] million for 2012 and 2013 respectively), and on the basis of the various ways of valuing European banking groups similar to Belfius (P/E ratio [121] of [5-10] for 2012 and 2013 and P/TBV [122] of [0,6-0,8] at the end of 2011), it appears that the value of the part of DBB/Belfius that was sold may be estimated at between EUR [0-5] billion and EUR [0-5] billion.
Olles võtnud arvesse 2011. aasta suve turutingimustest (realiseerimata kahjumi suurenemine [0–2] miljardi euro võrra) põhjustatud realiseerimata kahjumit, samuti väljakuulutatud tuluprognoose (408 miljonit eurot ja […] miljonit eurot vastavalt 2012. ja 2013. aastaks) ning tuginedes mitmetele Belfiusega sarnaste ELi pangakontsernide väärtuse määramise meetoditele (P/E kordaja [121] [5–10] 2012. ja 2013. aastal ja P/TBV kordaja [122] [0,6–0,8] 2011. aasta lõpus), võib DBB/Belfiuse müüdud osa väärtus jääda vahemikku [0–5] miljardit eurot kuni [0–5] miljardit eurot.
The Commission further observes that the conditions for the DBB/Belfius transaction involved contractual obligations for DBB/Belfius and/or the Belgian State which were advantageous for Dexia/DCL and which, under normal market conditions, would have reduced the transaction price.
Lisaks täheldab komisjon, et DBB/Belfiuse müügi tehingu tingimused sisaldavad DBB/Belfiuse ja/või Belgia riigi jaoks selliseid lepingutingimusi, millest saab kasu Dexia/DCL ja mis oleks tavalistes turutingimustes tehingu väärtust kahandanud.
These obligations are the price supplement mechanism, the finance agreement between DBB/Belfius and DCL/Dexia, and the Belgian State’s immunisation of the Dexia Group against any risk of loss associated with outstanding loans to Arco, Ethias and Holding Communal.
Nimetatud kohustused kujutavad hinnatäiendusmehhanismi – DBB/Belfiuse ja DCL/Dexia vaheline rahastamisleping ning Belgia riigi poolne Dexia kontsernile antud kaitse Arco, Ethiase ja Holding Communali laenujääkidega seotud mis tahes riskide suhtes.
First of all, as regards the price supplement mechanism, the Commission recognises that it is usual in bank sales for there to be price adjustment mechanisms depending on the future performance of the activity sold.
Mis puutub hinnatäiendusmehhanismi, siis tunnistab komisjon, et pankade müügi valdkonnas on hinna kohandamine vastavalt müüdava tegevusala tuluprognoosile tavapärane praktika.
The Commission points out, however, that in this particular case the mechanism is disproportionate.
Siiski märgib komisjon, et käesoleval juhul on see mehhanism ebaproportsionaalne.
In particular, the fact that the Belgian State undertook to repay 100 % of the capital gains means that it agreed to take a very large risk (acquisition for EUR 4 billion) while waiving any remuneration for that risk (and without reimbursement of its financing costs).
Asjaolu, et Belgia riik võtab kohustuse hüvitada 100 % kapitalikasumist, tähendab eeskätt seda, et riik on nõus võtma väga suure riski (4 miljardi euro väärtuses ost), loobudes igasugusest hüvitisest sellise riski eest (ning saamata tagasi oma rahastamiskulusid).
A private investor would never have agreed to repay the capital gains without a significant reduction in the sale price.
Erasektori investor ei oleks olnud nõus sellise kapitalikasumi hüvitamisega müügihinda oluliselt kohandamata.
According to the information provided by Belgium and its consultant bank, and on the basis of market figures, the price supplement mechanism can be valued at between EUR 40 million and EUR 150 million.
Belgia ja selle nõustava panga esitatud teabe ning turuandmete alusel võib hinnata hinnatäiendusmehhanismi väärtuse 40–150 miljonile eurole.
Second, the bid formulated by the Belgian State to the Dexia Group includes a gradual reduction in the funding provided by DBB/Belfius for the rest of the Group, particularly Dexia SA and DCL.
Teiseks sisaldab Belgia riigi hinnapakkumine Dexia kontsernile DBB/Belfiuse poolt kontserni teiste liikmete, eriti Dexia SA ja DCLi rahastamise järkjärgulist vähendamist.
However, no clear and binding timetable is given for this reduction.
Vähendamisel puudub aga ajakava ja siduv iseloom.
The Commission considers that no private investor would have agreed to buy under these conditions a bank that retained such a substantial exposure to Dexia and its subsidiaries, a group in major difficulties, without a reduction in the sale price.
Komisjoni arvamusel ei oleks ükski erainvestor nõustunud ostma sellistel tingimustel ja müügihinda kohandamata panka, millel on sedavõrd oluline riskipositsioon Dexia ja selle tütarettevõtjate suhtes, väga suurtes raskustes olevat kontserni suhtes.
Third, the Belgian State’s immunisation of the Dexia Group against any risk of loss associated with outstanding loans to Arco, Ethias and Holding Communal, as shown in the Belgian State’s bid to Dexia published on 10 October 2011, would not have been acceptable to an informed investor.
Kolmandaks ei oleks aruka investori jaoks olnud vastuvõetav Belgia riigi poolne Dexia kontsernile antud immuunsus Arco, Ethiase ja Holding Communali laenujääkidega seotud mis tahes riskide suhtes, 10. oktoobril 2011. aastal Belgia riigi Dexiale tehtud pakkumise kujul.
As stated in the opening decision on the sale of DBB/Belfius [123] and confirmed by the temporary approval decision [124] and the decision to extend the procedure [125], the sale of DBB/Belfius to the Belgian State under conditions that were advantageous to Dexia is an aid measure which forms part of the introduction by the Member States concerned of a serious of additional structural measures to help Dexia (about which the Commission did not yet have enough accurate information when it adopted the opening decision on the sale of DBB/Belfius, but which subsequently turned out to be the refinancing guarantee, the ELA and the measures provided for in the revised orderly resolution plan for Dexia), which would not have been acceptable to an informed investor.
Nagu on märgitud DBB/Belfiuse müügi suhtes ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses [123] ja kinnitatud ajutise heakskiitmise otsuses [124] ning menetluse pikendamise otsuses [125], on DBB/Belfiuse müük Belgia riigile Dexiale soodsatel tingimustel abimeede, mis kuulub asjaomaste liikmesriikide poolt Dexia suhtes võetud täiendavate struktuurimeetmete raamistikku (mille kohta ei olnud komisjonil DBB/Belfiuse suhtes ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse tegemise ajal piisavalt täpset teavet, mis aga osutus hiljem refinantseerimistagatiseks, erakorraliseks likviidsusabiks ja Dexia läbivaadatud saneerimiskavas ette nähtud meetmeteks), mis ei oleks olnud aruka investori jaoks vastuvõetav.
It follows that the purchase of DBB/Belfius cannot be seen in isolation from the other support measures provided for Dexia [126].
Sellest nähtub, et DBB/Belfiuse ostu ei saa käsitleda muudest Dexia suhtes võetud abimeetmetest eraldi [126].
The price of DBB should therefore have been adjusted downwards to take account of the obligations described in recitals 441-445 which benefited Dexia/DCL.
Seega oleks tulnud DBB hinda kohandada allapoole, võtmaks arvesse põhjendustes 441–445 osutatud kohustusi, millest sai kasu Dexia/DCL.
The Commission thus considers that the sale price of DBB/Belfius was overvalued and higher than a private investor would have accepted.
Seega leiab komisjon, et DBB/Belfiuse müügihind oli ülehinnatud ja kõrgem hinnast, mis oleks olnud vastuvõetav erainvestorile.
The aid for DCL/Dexia can thus be estimated at somewhere between EUR 1 billion and EUR 2 billion.
Seega on hinnanguline abi DCL/Dexiale 1–2 miljardit eurot.
Dexia is in competition with foreign groups, so that trade between Member States has been affected and the sale at too high a price has distorted competition.
Dexia konkureeris väliskontsernidega, seega kahjustati liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust ning liiga kõrge hinnaga müük moonutas konkurentsi.
Aid for DBB/Belfius
DBB/Belfiusele antud abi
The Commission considers that it has been established that the Belgian State did not behave like an informed market economy investor when it acquired DBB/Belfius since the sale price was higher than the market value and the Belgian State acquired DBB/Belfius to prevent the financial situation of the Group and therefore of the Belgian financial system from deteriorating.
Komisjon leiab, et on leidnud tõestust, et Belgia riik ei ole käitunud DBB/Belfiuse ostmisel aruka turumajandusliku investorina, sest müügihind oli turuhinnast kõrgem ning Belgia riik ostis DBB/Belfiuse kontserni selle finantsolukorra halvenemise ning seega ka Belgia finantssüsteemi halvenemise ärahoidmiseks.