natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
New measures are to be taken, particularly in connection with the orderly resolution of Dexia and the sale of DMA resulting in the creation of a development bank to finance local authorities in France and French public health establishments.
Võeti uusi meetmeid ning eeskätt Dexia saneerimise ja DMA loovutamise raames, mille tulemusel asutati uus arengupank, mis rahastab Prantsusmaa kohalikke omavalitsusi ja riiklikke tervishoiuasutusi.
Measures covered by the conditional authorisation decision
Tingimuslikus otsuses käsitletud meetmed
Implementation of the commitments and conditions to which approval of the aid covered by the conditional authorisation decision was subject
tingimuslikus otsuses heaks kiidetud abi suhtes kehtestatud kohustuste ja tingimuste täitmine
As described in recital 7, the Commission authorised the following measures in its conditional authorisation decision, subject to compliance with all the commitments and conditions laid down in that decision:
Nagu on sätestatud põhjenduses 7, kiitis komisjon heaks järgmised tehingud tingimusel, et täidetakse kõiki otsuses ette nähtud kohustusi ja tingimusi:
a recapitalisation of EUR 6 billion, EUR 5,2 billion of which was State aid;
kapitali suurendamine kokku summas 6 miljardit eurot, millest 5,2 miljardit eurot moodustab riigiabi;
a guarantee from the Belgian and French States in respect of an impaired asset portfolio, including EUR 3,2 billion in State aid;
Belgia ja Prantsusmaa riigi antud tagatis langenud väärtusega varadele, millest abi moodustab 3,2 miljardit eurot;
ELA from the BNB guaranteed by the Belgian State, largely drawn down between October and November 2008; and
Belgia riigi tagatud ja Belgia keskpanga antud erakorraline likviidsusabi, mida kasutati põhiliselt 2008. aasta oktoobris ja novembris, ning
a guarantee by the Belgian, French and Luxembourg States in respect of the refinancing of the Group of a maximum amount of EUR 135 billion (this amount also includes a guarantee by the Belgian State in respect of ELA operations granted to Dexia by the BNB).
Belgia, Prantsusmaa ja Luksemburgi riigi antud tagatis kontserni refinantseerimiseks maksimaalselt 135 miljardi euro eest (summa sisaldab ka Belgia riigi tagatist Belgia keskpanga Dexiale antud erakorralisele likviidsusabile).
Throughout the period following the adoption of the conditional authorisation decision, many of the commitments on which the authorisation of the aid was contingent were not complied with, in particular the prohibition on lending to PWB customers at a RAROC level of less than 10 %, observance of a minimum stable funding ratio, the prohibition on exercising a discretionary early repayment option on Tier 2 instruments, the requirement to notify the Commission in advance of any payment of coupons on Tier 1 or Upper Tier 2 hybrid instruments, and the rate of the Group’s deleveraging [87].
Tingimuslikule otsusele järgnenud ajal ei ole peetud kinni paljudest kohustustest, mis olid abi lubamise eelduseks, sealhulgas keelust anda oma PWB klientidele laene, mille riskiga korrigeeritud tulusus on madalam kui 10 %, stabiilse rahastamise miinimumist, keelust kasutada kiirendatud tagasimakse võimalust Tier 2 instrumentidelt ning kohustusest teatada komisjonile Tier 1 või Upper Tier 2 hübriidinstrumentidelt kupongimaksete tegemise kavatsusest, samuti kontserni kogubilansimahu vähendamise tempost [87].
According to the Commission, the fact that the bond portfolio was deleveraged by more than the minimum planned, that new loan production was less than the maximum set, and that most of the entities were sold before the deadline authorised by the commitments in the conditional authorisation decision is nothing more than the normal execution of that decision and cannot make up for or excuse, as the Member States concerned and Dexia suggest in their comments, the significant failings identified.
Komisjoni arvates kujutavad võlakirjaportfelliga seotud finantsvõimenduse vähendamine miinimumist suuremas ulatuses, uute laenude andmine maksimaalsest lubatust väiksemas ulatuses ning enamiku üksuste müük enne tingimuslikus otsuses sisalduvate tingimustega lubatud viimast päeva asjaomase otsuse normaalset täitmise kulgu ning olenemata asjaomaste liikmesriikide ja Dexia oma märkustes väljendatud ootustest ei hüvita ega vabanda need välja olulisi tuvastatud puudusi.
After all, although some entities were sold in good time, two of the largest entities to be sold, Crediop and Sabadell, remain subsidiaries of Dexia even though the time-limit set for their sale has expired, and they do not appear likely to be sold in the immediate future.
Muu hulgas tuleb ära märkida, et kui osa üksusi müüdi tähtaegselt, siis neist kaks kõige olulisemat, Crediop ja Sabadell, on müügitähtaja möödumisest hoolimata praeguseni Dexia tütarettevõtjad ning nende müüki ei paista lähiajal toimuvat.
The deleveraging target for 2010 was ‘met’ on 31 March 2011 rather than by 31 December 2010, as the Member States concerned had committed to.
2010. aastaks seatud bilansimahu vähendamise eesmärk täideti 31. märtsiks 2011 ja mitte 31. detsembriks 2010, nagu asjaomased liikmesriigid olid lubanud.
Point 18d of the commitments requires the Member States concerned, where annual targets are not met, to submit to the Commission measures to enable the targets to be met by 30 June of the following year.
Kohustuste loetelu punkti 18 alapunktis d on sätestatud asjaomastele liikmesriikidele kohustus esitada juhul, kui aastaeesmärke ei saavutata, komisjonile meetmed, mis võimaldavad saavutada asjaomased eesmärgid järgneva aasta 30. juuniks.
If Dexia met its annual deleveraging target at the end of 2011, it was because the balance sheet no longer included the assets and liabilities of DBB/Belfius, which was sold in October 2011, whereas the target was set on the assumption that this major subsidiary of the Group would still belong to Dexia.
Seega saavutas Dexia 2011. aasta lõpuks iga-aastase bilansimahu vähendamise eesmärgi tänu sellele, et bilanss ei kajastanud enam 2011. aasta oktoobris müüdud DBB/Belfiuse vara ega kohustusi, kuigi eesmärk oli püstitatud eeldusega, et see kontserni olulisimaid tütarettevõtjaid kuulub endiselt Dexiale.
While noting that the target for 2011 was officially met, the Commission considers that the deleveraging achieved at the end of 2011 by a Dexia Group without DBB/Belfius was well below the rate required by the conditional authorisation decision for a Dexia Group with DBB/Belfius.
Ehkki 2011. aasta eesmärk ametlikult saavutati, jääb komisjoni arvates ilma DBB/Belfiuseta Dexia kontserni 2011. aasta lõpuks vähendatud bilansimaht kõvasti alla tempo, mis oli tingimuslikus otsuses nähtud ette DBB/Belfiust sisaldava Dexia kontserni jaoks.
Lastly, in reply to the comments of the Member States concerned, the Commission notes that although the sovereign debt crisis may indeed be seen as having hampered the implementation of the conditional authorisation decision, the sovereign debt crisis may not, however, be relied on as a reason for failing to comply with certain commitments such as the minimum RAROC.
Vastuseks asjaomaste liikmesriikide märkustele märgib komisjon, et ehkki riigivõlakriis võis tõepoolest takistada tingimusliku otsuse elluviimist, ei saa sellega õigustada teatavate kohustuste täitmata jätmist, nagu näiteks minimaalset riskiga korrigeeritud tulusust.
For the reasons set out above, the doubts expressed by the Commission in its temporary approval decision [88] and in its decision to extend the procedure [89] have not been allayed by the comments from the Member States concerned claiming that the commitments and conditions set out in the conditional authorisation decision have been complied with [90].
Eespool nimetatud põhjustel ei olnud tingimuslikus otsuses [88] ja menetluse pikendamise otsuses [89] komisjoni väljendatud kahtluste suhtes asjaomaste liikmesriikide esitatud märkused tingimusliku otsuse kohustuste ja tingimuste kohta komisjoni jaoks veenvad [90].
The Commission therefore concludes that the conditions and commitments in the conditional authorisation decision have not been complied with, and that the Member States concerned have misused, within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU, the aid which was the subject of the conditional authorisation decision.
Seega leiab komisjon, et tingimuslikus otsuses si salduvad tingimused ja kohustused ei ole täidetud ning et asjaomased liikmesriigid on kuritarvitanud tingimuslikus otsuses käsitletud abimeetmeid ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõike 2 tähenduses.
Presence of additional aid to Dexia in the form of Arcofin’s participation in Dexia’s recapitalisation
Dexia kapitali Arcofini poolne suurendamine kui täiendav abi Dexiale
When the Commission examined Dexia’s recapitalisation in the context of its conditional authorisation decision, it concluded that the measure fulfilled all the conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU, except as regards the participation of Arcofin, Ethias and CNP Assurances in the capital increase.
Pärast Dexia kapitali suurendamise uurimist tingimusliku otsuse raames järeldas komisjon, et meede vastas kõigile ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tingimustele, välja arvatud Arcofini, Ethiase ja CNP Assurances’i osalemine kapitali suurendamises.
It concluded in recital 130 of that decision that the participation of these companies in Dexia’s recapitalisation did not satisfy the condition that it should be financed through State resources.
Nimetatud otsuse põhjenduses 130 järeldas komisjon, et loetletud ettevõtjate osalemine Dexia kapitali suurendamises ei vasta riigi rahaliste vahendite kaasamise tingimusele.
As described in recital 31 of the decision to extend the procedure, on 3 April 2012 the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure in case SA.33927 [91] ‘guarantee scheme protecting the shares of individual members of financial cooperatives’, considering, on a preliminary view, that the guarantee scheme might constitute aid incompatible with the internal market for financial cooperatives whose individual members were covered by the scheme, and therefore in particular for Arcofin.
Nagu kirjeldatud menetluse pikendamise otsuse põhjenduses 31, algatas komisjon 3. aprillil 2012 ametliku uurimismenetluse riigiabi SA.33927 suhtes [91] (tagatisskeem rahandusühistu üksikliikmete osakute kaitseks), kahtlustades, et tagatisskeem võib kujutada siseturuga kokkusobimatut riigiabi rahandusühistutele, kelle füüsilistest isikutest partnerid on tagatisskeemiga kaetud, seega muu hulgas Arcofinile.
Among other things, according to the decision of 3 April 2012, the guarantee scheme might have helped cooperatives to obtain more capital or, at least, to preserve their existing capital by persuading their existing individual members not to leave their cooperative.
3. aprilli 2012. aasta otsuse kohaselt võis tagatisskeem võimaldada rahandusühistutel saada rohkem kapitali või vähemalt säilitada olemasolevat kapitali, kuna see veenis füüsilistest isikutest partnereid rahandusühistust mitte lahkuma.
This was particularly relevant during the period from autumn 2008 to the date when the royal decree was adopted (10 October 2011), when the fragile state of the markets in general and financial institutions in particular would otherwise have encouraged investors to leave cooperatives [92].
Eriti kehtis see ajavahemikus 2008. aasta sügis kuni rakendusmääruse vastuvõtmiseni (10. oktoobril 2011), kui turu ja eriti finantsinstitutsioonide üldine ebastabiilsus oleks investorid vastasel korral rahandusühistutest lahkuma pannud [92].
As stated in the decision of 3 April 2012 and in the decision to extend the procedure, the Commission pointed out that:
Nagu on märgitud 3. aprilli 2012. aasta otsuses ja menetluse pikendamise otsuses, väitis komisjon järgmist;
on 10 October 2008, the Belgian Government issued a press release announcing its decision to extend the protection provided by the deposits and financial instrument protection fund, which covers the assets of customers of the banking institutions [93].
10. oktoobril 2008 teatas Belgia valitsus pressiteates oma otsusest pikendada Belgia riigi poolset pangaasutuste klientidele antud tagatist hoiuste ja finantsinstrumentide kaitsmise fondi näol [93].
This guarantee was to be extended to other financial sector institutions, ‘in particular insurance companies [‘branch 21’ life insurance] or recognised cooperatives … upon request’ [94].
Asjaomast tagatist kavatseti laiendada ka muudele finantssektori institutsioonidele, eeskätt kindlustusettevõtjatele [nn 21. kategooria elukindlustustootele] või loaga rahandusühistutele, […] kes vastava taotluse esitavad [94].
The press release stated that ‘some organisations have already submitted requests’;
Pressiteates oli öeldud, et teatavad ühistud on vastava taotluse juba esitanud;
on 15 October 2008, the Belgian Federal Parliament adopted a law to promote financial stability, under which the State may introduce by decree ‘a system for granting a State guarantee for commitments given by the institutions under supervision’, i.e. insurance companies, credit institutions, investment firms and stockbrokers;
15. oktoobril 2008 võttis Belgia föderaalne parlament vastu finantsstabiilsuse edendamist käsitleva seaduse, mille kohaselt võib riik võtta määruse alusel kasutusele riigitagatismehhanismi institutsioonidele, kelle suhtes teostatakse eelarvekontrolli: kindlustusettevõtjad, krediidiasutused, investeerimis- ja börsiettevõtted;
on 14 November 2008, a royal decree implemented the Law of 15 October 2008 by extending the State guarantee to holders of ‘branch 21’ life insurance products.
14. novembril 2008 pöörati 15. oktoobri 2008. aasta seadus täitmisele rakendusmäärusega, millega laiendati riigitagatist 21. kategooria elukindlustustooteid omavatele klientidele.
A new ‘special’ fund to protect deposits and life insurance was set up in the Belgian Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations.
Belgia riikliku rahandusasutuse Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations juurde loodi uus erifond hoiuste ja elukindlustustoodete kaitsmiseks.
on 21 January 2009, the Belgian Government issued a press release confirming its commitment to offer a guarantee scheme ‘to [individual] members of existing recognised cooperatives at least half of whose assets are invested in one or more companies active in the financial sector or which are authorised to operate as credit institutions’.
jaanuaril 2009 kinnitas Belgia valitsus pressiteates, et oli võtnud kohustuse laiendada tagatismehhanismi olemasolevate loaga rahandusühistute [füüsilisest isikust] partneritele, kes on vähemalt poole oma varast investeerinud vähemalt ühte finantssektoris tegutsevasse või krediidiasutusena tegutseda võivasse ettevõttesse.
On the same date the Arco Group informed its members of this confirmation by the Government [96];
Samal päeval teavitas Arco kontsern oma partnereid valitsuse kinnitusest [96];
on 14 April 2009 [97], a royal decree instructed the Minister of Finance to draft a law introducing a system for granting a State guarantee for the repayment to individual members of their share of the capital of recognised cooperatives;on 9 September 2011, the Belgian Federal Government confirmed that a draft regulation on the State guarantee for individual members of recognised cooperatives had been finalised [98];
aprillil 2009 [97] avaldati rakendusmäärus, millega anti rahandusministrile ülesanne esitada seaduseelnõu, millega võetakse kasutusele riigitagatismehhanism loaga rahandusühituste füüsilisest isikust partnerite osakapitali hüvitamiseks; 9. septembril 2011 kinnitas Belgia föderaalvalitsus, et valminud on määruse eelnõu loaga rahandusühistute füüsilisest isikust partneritele riigitagatise andmise kohta [98];
the royal decree of 10 October 2011 extended the guarantee introduced by the royal decree of 14 November 2008 to cover recognised cooperatives, so that the special fund also protected their capital.
10. oktoobri 2011. aasta rakendusmäärusega laiendati 14. novembri 2008. aasta rakendusmäärusega kasutusele võetud tagatist ka loaga rahandusühistutele: erifond hakkas katma ka rahandusühistute kapitali.
It stated that the protection offered by the special fund protecting deposits, life insurance and the capital of recognised cooperatives was effective from receipt of payment of the annual contribution and the entrance fee by the insurance company or cooperative applying to participate in the fund;
Komisjon täpsustab, et hoiuste ja elukindlustustoodete kaitsmise erifondiga tagatud kaitse loaga rahandusühistute elujõulisusele ja kapitalile on jõus alates hetkest, mil on laekunud aastamakse ja jõustunud fondis osalemise taotluse esitanud kindlustusettevõtte või rahandusühistu sisenemisõigus;
by a royal decree of 7 November 2011, Belgium announced that, pursuant to the royal decree of 14 November 2008, the application for capital protection from the recognised cooperatives ARCOPAR SCRL, ARCOFIN SCRL and ARCOPLUS SCRL had been approved.
7. novembri 2011. aasta määrusega teatas Belgia, et 14. novembri 2008. aasta rakendusmääruse alusel kiidetakse heaks loaga rahandusühistute ARCOPAR SCRL, ARCOFIN SCRL ja ARCOPLUS SCRL kapitali kaitsmise taotlus.
That approval had been granted ‘Having regard to the fact that … there is justification … for granting [to shares in recognised cooperatives] a guarantee scheme equivalent to the one that exists for substitute savings products, in other words bank deposits and ‘branch 21’ insurance for extending deposit protection to the capital of recognised cooperatives, in the near future, in accordance with the earlier announcement on the subject’.
Heakskiidu kohta öeldi, et loaga rahandusühistute osakud tuleks tagada sama tagatisskeemiga, mis kehtib asendushoiuste, st 21. kategooria panga- ja kindlustushoiuste suhtes ning et on võimalik kiiremas korras laiendada hoiustele antud kaitset loaga rahandusühistute kapitalile, nii nagu varasemalt oli välja kuulutatud.
As far as the Commission is aware, the Arco Group — or more accurately its three subsidiaries Arcofin, Arcopar and Arcoplus — was the first recognised financial cooperative to have applied for the scheme for its individual members and remains, to date, the only financial cooperative covered by the guarantee scheme.
Komisjoni teadmisel on Arco kontsern (või täpsemalt kolm tütarettevõtjat Arcofin, Arcopar ja Arcoplus) esimene loaga rahandusühistu, kes esitas taotluse kohaldada skeemi oma füüsilisest isikust partnerite suhtes ning on seni ainus rahandusühistu, kelle suhtes tagatisskeem kehtib.
According to the report by the Special Commission of the Belgian House of Representatives tasked with examining the circumstances which led to the break-up of Dexia SA, there was no particular financial interest for Arcofin in participating in the recapitalisation of Dexia, and the operation was carried out under pressure from the authorities:
Belgia esindajatekoja moodustatud Dexia SA pankroti põhjuseid uuriva erikomisjoni aruande kohaselt ei olnud Arcofinil endal majanduslikku huvi Dexia kapitali suurendamises osalemiseks, vaid see tehing sooritati ametiasutuste survel. Selles on öeldud järgmist:
‘The events occurred in a context where the private shareholders in question were already in a weak position.
„Sündmused leidsid aset kontrollivate eraaktsionäride juba nõrgenenud positsiooni olukorras.
Holding Communal and the Arco Group relied on income from the portfolio which they held in Dexia, and their own resources were extremely limited.
[…] Holding communal ja Arco kontsern olid sõltuvad oma Dexias oleva portfelli sissetulekutest ning neil oli ülimalt vähe omavahendeid.
On 30 September 2008, Arcofin (Arco Group) and Holding Communal subscribed to a capital increase of EUR 350 million and EUR 500 million respectively in order to rescue Dexia SA.
septembril 2008 suurendasid Arcofin (Arco kontsern) ja Holding Communal Dexia SA päästmiseks oma kapitali vastavalt 350 miljonit eurot ja 500 miljonit eurot.
Although these shareholders did not themselves have the resources necessary to participate in this capital increase, first of all, they obviously wanted to avoid an excessive dilution of their shareholding, and second, it appears that they also came under pressure from the authorities to go ahead with the subscription.
Olgugi et kontrollivatel aktsionäridel ei olnud oma kapitali suurendamiseks vajalikke vahendeid, soovisid nad mõistagi esiteks vältida oma aktsiakapitali liigset lahjenemist ning teiseks tundub, et neile avaldasid vastavat survet ka ametiasutused.
In order to understand the situation facing Arco and Holding Communal, we need to look at the 2008 recapitalisation operation, which was where their shared problem really started.
Et mõista Arco ja Holdin Communali tollast olukorda, tuleb vaadelda 2008. aasta kapitali suurendamist, mis on nende ühise probleemi tegelik sõlmpunkt.
At that time Arco was actively diversifying its portfolio, following a diagnosis that its main position was too heavily concentrated in Dexia.
Sel ajal tegeles Arco portfelli mitmekesistamisega ning seda seoses järeldusega, et ettevõtte peamine riskipositsioon on liigselt koondunud (Dexiasse).
There was no economic interest in further concentrating its portfolio, beyond considerations relating purely to funding, which was also causing problems — see the section analysing this.
Majanduslikult oleks olnud ebamõistlik veelgi koondada oma portfelli pelgalt rahastamise eesmärgil, mis juba iseenesest oli problemaatiline (vt asjaomast analüüsi käsitlev peatükk).
However, when the emergency recapitalisation was to be decided in October 2008, these two shareholders decided to do whatever was needed to avoid diluting their holding too much.
Ometi otsustasid nimetatud kaks aktsionäri pärast 2008. aasta oktoobris tehtud sundotsust kiireloomulise kapitali suurendamiseks teha vajaliku liigse lahjendamise vältimiseks.
The result of this decision … was that their portfolio of holdings was much more concentrated, with a major focus on the Dexia Group, which de facto became their biggest problem.
Selle valiku tulemusel […] on selgelt veelgi olulisem aktsiaportfelli koondumine ning oluline keskendumine Dexiale, millest sai faktiliselt nende suurim probleem.
This capital increase, which was financially beneficial for the Group [Dexia], thus placed these two shareholders in particular in a much weaker position, since they were not financially strong enough to absorb the operation in the systematic risk of their portfolio; for them, the Dexia risk became a specific, non-diversified risk’ [99].
Kapitali suurendamine, mis oli muide kontsernile [Dexiale] kasutoov, nõrgestas seega olulisel määral just nimetatud kahte kontrollivat aktsionäri, kellel puudus piisavalt tugev vundament tehingu hajutamiseks oma portfelli süsteemsesse riski – nende jaoks muutus Dexiaga seotud risk eriliseks ja mittehajutatud riskiks” [99].
According to the Belgian press, the Minister of Finance in the previous government had stated on 25 January 2012, at a hearing before the Special Commission of the Belgian House of Representatives tasked with examining the circumstances which led to the break-up of Dexia SA, that the State guarantee for the shares of Arcofin’s members was the result of a political compromise dating back to 2008 and the first Dexia rescue plan:
Belgia ajakirjanduse kohaselt teatas eelmise valitsuse finantsminister 25. jaanuaril 2012 Belgia esindajatekoja moodustatud Dexia SA pankroti põhjuseid uuriva erikomisjoni ees, et Arcofini partnerite osakutele antud riigitagatis oli 2008. aastal Dexia esimese päästmiskava raames saavutatud poliitilise kompromissi tulemus.
‘He [the Belgian Finance Minister] also confided [on Wednesday, 25 January 2012, during his hearing before the Parliamentary Commission on the break-up of Dexia] that he had not been entirely sure about the Arco guarantees, particularly because he rather feared that Europe would not agree to them.
„Samuti teatas ta [Belgia finantsminister] [kolmapäeval, 25. jaanuaril 2012 Belgia esindajatekoja moodustatud Dexia SA pankroti põhjuseid uuriva erikomisjoni ees], et tal oli esialgu Arcole tagatise andmise suhtes kahtlusi, eeskätt kartuses, et Euroopa jaoks ei ole see vastuvõetav.