natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, the Nationalisation Law also set out the provision that any credit or liquidity assistance measures undertaken by CGD ‘in favour of BPN within the context of the nationalisation or in substitution of the State … shall benefit from a state guarantee’ [12].
Lisaks sisaldas riigistamisseadus sätet, mille kohaselt peab kõigil krediidi- või likviidsusabi meetmetel, mida CGD võtab BPNi toetuseks seoses riigistamisega või riigi asemel, olema riigi tagatis [12].
The financial support measures prior to nationalisation
Rahalised toetusmeetmed enne riigistamist
Prior to its nationalisation in November 2008, BPN had already benefited from a number of financial support measures described by the Portuguese authorities as ‘special liquidity support measures’ [13].
Enne riigistamist 2008. aasta novembris oli BPNi suhtes juba võetud mitmeid rahalisi toetusmeetmeid, mida Portugali ametiasutused kirjeldasid „erakorraliste likviidsust toetavate meetmetena” [13].
On 17 February 2010, the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that in the period up to 30 October 2008, BPN had obtained special liquidity assistance measures from both CGD and the BdP for a total amount of EUR 501,6 million, consisting of four loans granted to BPN by CGD for a total amount of EUR 315 million [14] and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) provided in October 2008 by the BdP for an amount of EUR 186,6 million [15].
17. veebruaril 2010 teatasid Portugali ametiasutused komisjonile, et ajavahemikul 30. oktoobrini 2008 sai BPN CGD-lt ja BdP-lt erakorralist likviidsusabi kokku summas 501,6 miljonit eurot, mis hõlmas CGD poolt BPNile antud nelja laenu kogusummas 315 miljonit eurot [14] ja BdP erakorralist likviidsusabi summas 186,6 miljonit eurot [15], mis anti 2008. aasta oktoobris.
Whilst the BdP was reimbursed after the nationalisation, the four loans granted by CGD were reimbursed only on 9 March 2009, with the issuance of the first commercial paper by BPN.
Kui BdP-le maksti raha tagasi pärast riigistamist, siis CGD antud neli laenu maksti tagasi alles 9. märtsil 2009, kui BPN viis läbi esimese kommertsväärtpaberite emissiooni.
The financial support measures after the nationalisation
Rahalised toetusmeetmed pärast riigistamist
By letter of 17 February 2010, the Portuguese authorities also mentioned that CGD had been authorised on 27 October 2009 to subscribe a further EUR 1 billion of commercial papers with a state guarantee.
17. veebruari 2010. aasta kirjas mainisid Portugali ametiasutused ka seda, et CGD-le anti 27. oktoobril 2009 luba märkida riigi tagatisega kommertsväärtpabereid veel 1 miljardi euro väärtuses.
Subsequently, by electronic mail of 14 June 2010, the Commission was further informed that the total of the state guarantees on commercial papers issued by BPN and subscribed by CGD had risen to EUR 4 billion, as in April 2010 a third issue of BPN commercial paper had been organised and was subscribed by CGD for an amount of EUR 1 billion.
14. juuni 2010. aasta e-kirjaga teatati komisjonile, et BPNi emiteeritud ja CGD märgitud kommertsväärtpaberitele antud riigi tagatiste kogusumma on kasvanud 4 miljardile eurole, sest 2010. aasta aprillis korraldati kolmas BPNi kommertsväärtpaberite emissioon summas 1 miljard eurot, mille märkis CGD.
In this context, it should be noted that since its nationalisation in November 2008 and until June 2011, BPN had constantly made use of money market credit facilities given to it by CGD.
Sellega seoses tuleks märkida, et alates riigistamisest 2008. aasta novembris kuni 2011. aasta juunini kasutas BPN pidevalt rahaturu laenuvõimalust, mida talle võimaldas CGD.
According to the figures supplied by the Portuguese authorities on 3 February 2012, the outstanding amount owed by BPN to CGD (apart from the commercial paper issues) was EUR 433,7 million on 31 December 2011 and EUR 232 million on 31 January 2012.
Portugali ametiasutuste poolt 3. veebruaril 2012 esitatud andmete kohaselt moodustas BPNi võlg CGD-le (peale kommertsväärtpaberite emissioonide) 31. detsembril 2011. aastal 433,7 miljonit eurot ja 31. jaanuaril 2012. aastal 232 miljonit eurot.
Overview of liquidity obtained by BPN from CGD, as at 31 December 2011
Ülevaade CGD poolt BPNile võimaldatud likviidsusest 31. detsembri 2011. aasta seisuga
Source: Portuguese authorities
Allikas: Portugali ametiasutused
With explicit state guarantee
Riigi sõnaselge tagatisega
CGD Loans
CGD laenud
(without explicit state guarantee)
(riigi sõnaselge tagatiseta)
Special Purpose Vehicles [18]
Eriotstarbelised äriühingud [18]
It should be noted that under Article 2(9) of the Nationalisation Law all credit or liquidity lines offered by CGD to BPN in the context of the nationalisation are to be guaranteed by the Portuguese State.
Tuleb märkida, et riigistamisseaduse artikli 2 lõike 9 kohaselt tuleb kõigile krediidi- või likviidsusliinidele, mida CGD seoses riigistamisega BPNile võimaldab, anda Portugali riigi tagatis.
It is therefore clear that all of the amounts described in Table 1 above benefited from a state guarantee pursuant to Article 2(9) of the Nationalisation Law and the various orders issued by the Secretary of State for the Treasury and Finance.
Seega on selge, et riigistamisseaduse artikli 2 lõike 9 ja arvukate rahandusministri korralduste alusel laienes riigi tagatis kõikidele ülal olevas tabelis 1 märgitud summadele.
The remuneration for the state guarantees was set at 0,2 % per year.
Riigi tagatiste eest makstavaks tasuks kehtestati 0,2 % aastas.
The Restructuring of BPN
BPNi ümberkorraldamine
The 2010 restructuring plan
aasta ümberkorraldamiskava
An initial restructuring plan of 13 September 2010 (hereinafter ‘the 2010 Restructuring Plan’) was sent to the Commission by the Portuguese authorities on 16 September 2010.
septembril 2010 saatsid Portugali ametiasutused komisjonile esialgse ümberkorraldamiskava 13. septembrist 2010 (edaspidi „2010. aasta ümberkorraldamiskava”).
In that plan, the Portuguese authorities explained their intention to split BPN into a good bank and a bad bank and to then try to sell the good bank.
Kavas selgitasid Portugali ametiasutused oma kavatsust jagada BPN „heaks pangaks” ja „halvaks pangaks” ning seejärel proovida müüa head panka.
The extent of the bank to be reprivatised: creation of the SPVs
Erastatava panga suurus: eriotstarbeliste äriühingute loomine
The State wanted to proceed through an open tender process with the sale of the ‘good bank’, BPN S.A., which was to be exclusively a retail bank.
Riik soovis hea panga ehk BPN S.A. müüa avatud pakkumismenetluse kaudu; nimetatud pank pidi olema üksnes jaepank.
That process was to be conducted on the basis of a call for expressions of interest, for which the specification (‘Caderno de Encargos’) was approved on 16 August 2010 by the Portuguese authorities [19].
See protsess pidi toimuma pakkumiskutse alusel ja Portugali ametiasutused kinnitasid pakkumisdokumendid (Caderno de Encargos) 16. augustil 2010 [19].
Under the 2010 Restructuring Plan, a number of BPN’s assets and liabilities were to remain outside the scope of the reprivatisation and transferred to three new Special Purpose Vehicles (‘SPVs’), Parvalorem, Parups and Parparticipadas.
aasta ümberkorraldamiskava kohaselt pidid paljud BPNi varad ja kohustused jääma taaserastamisest välja ning need pidi üle antama kolmele uuele eriotstarbelisele äriühingule Parvalorem, Parups ja Parparticipadas.
These SPVs would initially remain within BPN and after the sale would be transferred to the State.
Eriotstarbelised äriühingud pidid algselt jääma BPNi koosseisu ja pärast müügitehingut riigile üle antama.
Loans and credits would be transferred to Parvalorem, real estate and investment funds to Parups, and subsidiaries to Parparticipadas.
Laenud ja krediidid pidi üle antama Parvaloremile, kinnisvara ja investeerimisfondid Parupsile ning tütarettevõtjad Parparticipadasele.
The Portuguese authorities valued the total amount of assets to be transferred to the SPVs at EUR 3885 million, with EUR 2507 million transferred to Parvalorem, EUR 1228 million to Parups and EUR 150 million to Parparticipadas.
Portugali ametiasutused hindasid eriotstarbelistele äriühingutele üleantavate varade koguväärtuseks 3,885 miljardit eurot: Parvaloremile 2,507 miljardit eurot, Parupsile 1,228 miljardit eurot ja Parparticipadasele 150 miljonit eurot.
Loans were transferred at nominal value; fund units, securities and real estate were to be transferred at purchase price, and companies owned by BPN at their book value.
Laenud pidi üle antama nimiväärtuse alusel, fondiosakud, väärtpaberid ja kinnisvara ostuhinna alusel ning BPNi omanduses olevad äriühingud nende bilansilise väärtuse alusel.
According to the Portuguese authorities, the transfer of assets to the SPVs was done on the basis of objective criteria, taking into account the volume of impairments as well as the fact that certain activities were not core for BPN after the nationalisation (consumer credit, investment bank, asset management, investment fund management, insurance and international business).
Portugali ametiasutuste väitel anti varad eriotstarbelistele äriühingutele üle objektiivsete kriteeriumide alusel, võttes arvesse allahindluste mahtu ja asjaolu, et teatavad tegevusvaldkonnad ei kuulunud pärast riigistamist enam BPNi põhitegevusvaldkondade hulka (tarbijakrediit, investeerimispangandus, varahaldus, investeerimisfondide haldus, kindlustus ja rahvusvaheline äritegevus).
BPN was to reposition itself as a pure retail bank with reduced exposure to the uncertainty of wholesale funding.
BPN pidi end repositsioneerima puhtalt jaepangana ja vähendama avatust pankadevahelise rahastamisega kaasnevatele riskidele.
Following the transfer of assets, BPN’s balance sheet was reduced by around 30 %.
Pärast varade üleandmist vähenes BPNi bilansimaht umbes 30 %.
According to information received from the Portuguese authorities, in order to allow BPN to comply with legal and regulatory requirements (namely in order to reach the 9 % core tier 1 capital required for 2011 [21]), and given that the own capital of BPN would still be negative after the transfer of assets to the SPVs, the State would have had to recapitalise BPN by about EUR 417 million [22].
Portugali ametiasutustelt saadud teabe kohaselt oleks riik pidanud rekapitaliseerima BPNi umbes 417 miljoni euro ulatuses, võimaldamaks BPNil täita õigusaktide nõudeid (s.t saavutada 2011. aastal esimese taseme omavahendite suhtarvuks 9 % [21]) ja arvestades, et ka pärast varade üleandmist eriotstarbelistele äriühingutele olnuks BPNi omakapital endiselt negatiivne [22].
The first two calls for reprivatisation
Esimesed kaks erastamiskutset
The base price set for BPN (which excluded the assets to be transferred to the SPVs) in the tender published by Portugal was fixed at EUR 171,1 million based on the valuations of third party consultants Deloitte (EUR […] [23] million) and Deutsche Bank (EUR […] million).
Portugali avaldatud pakkumuses määrati BPNi alghinnaks (mis ei sisaldanud eriotstarbelistele äriühingutele üleantavaid varasid) 171,1 miljonit eurot, tuginedes kolmandast isikust konsultantide hinnangutele: Deloitte ([…] [23] miljonit eurot) ja Deutsche Bank ([…] miljonit eurot).
BPN’s new CGD management had in the meantime started a restructuring process for the bank.
BPNi uus CGD juhtkond oli vahepeal alustanud panga ümberkorraldamist.
Operational costs were reduced by [1-10] % from December 2008 to December 2010; BPN’s activity was reduced in order to achieve a bank exclusively focused on retail commercial banking.
Tegevuskulusid vähendati ajavahemikul 2008. aasta detsembrist 2010. aasta detsembrini [1–10] %; BPNi tegevuse ulatust vähendati, et saavutada pank, mis keskendub üksnes jaeklientidele suunatud kommertspangandusele.
That reduction in activity resulted partly from the drop in deposits following the nationalisation, but also from the transfer of assets to the three SPVs.
Tegevuse vähenemine oli osaliselt tingitud hoiuste vähenemisest pärast riigistamist, ent ka varade üleandmisest eriotstarbelistele äriühingutele.
Measures to improve the risk management and internal control systems of the bank were also implemented by the new management.
Lisaks rakendas uus juhtkond meetmeid panga riskijuhtimise ja sisekontrollisüsteemide parandamiseks.
No interested parties came forward in response to the first two calls for privatisation by 30 September and 30 November 2010.
Kahele esimesele erastamiskutsele ei reageerinud 2010. aasta 30. septembriks ja 30. novembriks ühtki huvitatud isikut.
Following the failure of the tender process, in January 2011 Portugal indicated its intention to restructure BPN, making it more independent of CGD by appointing a new board, independent of the latter.
Pärast pakkumismenetluse ebaõnnestumist teatas Portugal 2011. aasta jaanuaris oma kavatsusest BPN ümber korraldada, muutes selle CGDst vähem sõltuvaks ja nimetades selleks ametisse uue juhatuse, mis on CGDst sõltumatu.
It also sought to accelerate the operational recovery of BPN, by redefining the bank’s brand and corporate identity and by reinforcing the recovery plan through cost cuts and enhancing commercial dynamics.
Samuti püüti kiirendada BPNi tegevusalast taastumist, muutes panga kaubamärki, sümboolikat ja identiteeti ning tugevdades taastamiskava kulude vähendamise ja äritegevuse elavdamise kaudu.
However, despite several requests, no updated restructuring plan was provided to the Commission.
Vaatamata korduvatele taotlustele ei esitatud aga komisjonile uuendatud ümberkorraldamiskava.
In the MoU of 17 May 2011, the Government gave an undertaking to launch a new privatisation process.
mail 2011 sõlmitud vastastikuse mõistmise memorandumis võttis valitsus kohustuse algatada uus erastamisprotsess.
In the MoU, the Portuguese authorities committed to ‘launching a process to sell Banco Português de Negócios (BPN) on an accelerated schedule and without a minimum price. To this end, a new plan is submitted to the EC for approval under competition rules. The target is to find a buyer by end-July 2011 at the latest. To facilitate the sale, the three existing special purpose vehicles holding its non-performing and non-core assets have been separated from BPN, and more assets could be transferred into these vehicles as part of the negotiations with prospective buyers. BPN is also launching another program of more ambitious cost cutting measures with a view to increase its attractiveness to investors. Once a solution has been found, CGD’s state guaranteed claims on BPN and all related special purpose vehicles will be taken over by the state according to a timetable to be defined at that time’ [24].
Portugali ametiasutused kohustusid vastastikuse mõistmise memorandumis „käivitama Banco Português de Negóciose (BPN) müügiprotsessi kiirendatud ajakava alusel ja ilma miinimumhinnata. Selleks esitatakse komisjonile konkurentsieeskirjade alusel heakskiitmiseks uus kava. Eesmärk on leida ostja hiljemalt 2011. aasta juuli lõpuks. Müügi hõlbustamiseks on BPNist eraldatud kolm olemasolevat eriotstarbelist äriühingut, millele kuuluvad BPNi probleemsed ja põhitegevusega mitteseotud varad, ning võimalike ostjatega peetavate läbirääkimiste tulemusena võib nendesse äriühingutesse kanda veelgi vara.
Sale to BIC
Müük BICile
A third privatisation attempt was launched at the beginning of May 2011 without a minimum price in order to find a buyer for BPN by 31 July 2011, as agreed in the MoU.
Kolmas erastamise katse algatati 2011. aasta mai alguses ilma miinimumhinnata, et vastavalt vastastikuse mõistmise memorandumis kokkulepitule leida BPNile ostja 31. juuliks 2011.
A tender procedure was held during which contacts with potential interested buyers took place.
Toimus pakkumismenetlus, mille vältel suheldi võimalike huvitatud ostjatega.
An Investment Opportunity Overview (‘IOO’) was also produced.
Koostati ka investeerimisvõimaluste ülevaade.
According to the IOO, interested parties had to bid for up to 100 % of the shares of BPN, but could ask for additional assets and liabilities to be removed from BPN’s balance sheet.
Ülevaate kohaselt pidid huvitatud isikud tegema pakkumuse kuni 100 %-le BPNi aktsiatest, kuid nad võisid taotleda täiendavate varade ja kohustuste eemaldamist BPNi bilansist.
They could also ask for higher recapitalisation scenarios.
Samuti võisid nad taotleda suuremat rekapitaliseerimist.
A memorandum governing the rules of the process was signed between BPN and the potential bidders allowing them to enter a data room, set up on 15 June 2011 for five weeks.
BPNi ja võimalike pakkujate vahel sõlmiti protsessi reegleid sisaldav memorandum, mis võimaldas pakkujatel siseneda 15. juunil 2011 viieks nädalaks loodud andmeruumi.
Four binding offers were submitted by 20 July 2011.
20. juuliks 2011 esitati neli siduvat pakkumust.
These offers were analysed by the boards of CGD and BPN who submitted their opinion to the shareholder – the State – by 25 July 2011.
Neid analüüsisid CGD ja BPNi juhatus, kes esitasid oma arvamuse aktsionärile – riigile – 25. juuliks 2011.
Three of the four bidders submitting binding offers were eliminated.
Kolm neljast pakkujast, kes olid esitanud siduva pakkumuse, kõrvaldati menetlusest.
According to the Portuguese authorities, two bidders (Montepio and Aníbal Ribeiro) did not fulfil the requirements of the memorandum signed with BPN [25].
Portugali ametiasutuste sõnul ei vastanud kaks pakkujat (Montepio ja Aníbal Ribeiro) BPNiga sõlmitud memorandumi nõuetele [25].
Montepio did not bid for the acquisition of the shares of BPN, but only for selected assets and liabilities, while Aníbal Ribeiro had not provided sufficient proof of managerial and financial capacities to run a bank.
Montepio ei teinud pakkumust BPNi aktsiate omandamiseks, vaid üksnes valitud varade ja kohustuste omandamiseks, ning Aníbal Ribeiro ei esitanud piisavalt tõendeid panga käigushoidmiseks vajaliku juhtimis- ja finantsvõimekuse kohta.
The third bid, from NEI [26], complied with the memorandum’s requirements, but there was insufficient proof of its capabilities to run the bank and of its financial capacity to assume future capital needs of BPN.
Kolmas pakkumus, mille esitas NEI [26], vastas memorandumi nõuetele, kuid puudusid piisavad tõendid panga käigushoidmise võimekuse ja BPNi tulevaste kapitalivajaduste täitmiseks vajaliku finantsvõimekuse kohta.
Based on the only valid offer submitted under the tender procedure, which was made by BIC on 20 July 2011 (the ‘BIC offer of 20 July 2011’), the Government decided on 31 July 2011 to continue exclusive negotiations with BIC.
Ainsa kehtiva pakkumuse põhjal, mille pakkumismenetluses 20. juulil 2011 esitas BIC (edaspidi „BICi 20. juuli 2011. aasta pakkumus”), tegi valitsus 31. juulil 2011 otsuse jätkata läbirääkimisi ainult BICiga.
BIC was authorised by the BdP to exercise commercial banking activities on 9 October 2007 and actually started its activity in Portugal in May 2008, being active mainly in corporate banking and in private banking.
BIC oli BdP-lt saanud loa kommertspangana tegelemiseks 9. oktoobril 2007 ja alustas tegelikult oma tegevust Portugalis 2008. aasta mais, olles peamiselt tegev äri- ja privaatpanganduse valdkonnas.
BIC’s main shareholders are a group of investors from Angola, and include Portuguese shareholders such as Amorim Projectos SGPS, SA (which has a 25 % shareholding).
BICi põhiaktsionärideks on investorite rühm Angolast, ent aktsionäride ringi kuulub ka Portugali aktsionäre, näiteks Amorim Projectos SGPS, SA (millele kuulub 25 % osalus).
As at December 2010, it had a turnover of EUR 389 million, with total assets of EUR 1 billion, and at 31 March 2011 it had capital of EUR 32 million and 7 branches.
aasta detsembri seisuga oli BICi käive 389 miljonit eurot ja varade koguväärtus 1 miljard eurot ning 31. märtsi 2011. aasta seisuga moodustas BICi kapital 32 miljonit eurot ja pangal oli seitse filiaali.
According to the information provided by Portugal the market share of BIC in the market segments where it is active is less than 1 % [27].
Portugali esitatud teabe kohaselt oli BICi turuosa turusegmentides, kus ta tegutses, alla 1 % [27].
The sale conditions
Müügitingimused
According to the information provided by the Portuguese authorities, following the BIC offer of 20 July 2011 [28], the negotiations with BIC culminated with the signing on 9 December 2011 of a Framework Agreement for the sale of BPN to BIC [29].
Portugali ametiasutused teatasid, et pärast seda, kui BIC oli esitanud oma 20. juuli 2011. aasta pakkumuse, peeti BICiga läbirääkimisi, mis lõppesid 9. detsembril 2011 raamlepingu [28] sõlmimisega BPNi müügiks BICile [29].
The BIC offer of 20 July 2011 set out only general terms, and provided for:
BICi 20. juuli 2011. aasta pakkumuses esitati vaid üldtingimused ja nähti ette, et
i. a recapitalisation by the State in order for BPN to reach a core tier 1 ratio of [between 9 and 18] % plus EUR [100-300] million;
i. riik rekapitaliseerib BPNi, et BPN saavutaks esimese taseme omavahendite suhtarvuks [9–18] %, millele lisandub veel [100–300] miljonit eurot;
the removal of part of the credit loans to be selected by BIC in order to achieve a loan-to-deposit ratio of [110-150] %;
BICi valitavad laenud eemaldatakse bilansist, et saavutada laenude ja hoiuste suhe [110–150] %;
the transfer out of BPN of all non-performing loans above the threshold of approximately EUR […] million (estimated level of provisioning of loans at BPN);
kõik ligikaudu […] miljoni euro künnist (BPNi laenueraldiste hinnanguline summa) ületavad probleemsed laenud viiakse BPNist välja;
the right of BIC to remove from the balance sheet of BPN additional assets and liabilities (e.g. loans to credit institutions, financial assets, real estate assets, some provisions, other assets and other liabilities) that have been provided outside the scope of its normal activity;
BICil on õigus eemaldada BPNi bilansist täiendavalt varasid ja kohustusi (näiteks laenud krediidiasutustele, finantsvarad, kinnisvara, mõned eraldised, muu vara ja muud kohustused), mis ei ole seotud BPNi tavapärase tegevusega;
v. the transfer out of BPN of deposits selected by BIC that are not offering market conditions;
v. BPNist viiakse välja BICi valitud hoiused, mida ei pakuta turutingimustel;
the granting of a money line to BIC from CGD for up to [150-650] million for a period of […] years, with a lending rate at […] months Euribor.
CGD võimaldab BICile […] aastaks rahastamisliini summas kuni [150–650] miljonit eurot laenuintressiga […] kuu Euribor.
That amount would be increased if deposits were to fall below EUR […] billion;
Seda summat suurendatakse, kui hoiused langevad alla […] miljardi euro;
the maintenance of 500 to 600 employees of BPN (out of approximately 1600 employees) and of 160-170 branches which are in facilities belonging to the bank or with leasing contracts with a maturity up to 12 months.
BPNi jääb tööle 500–600 töötajat (ligikaudu 1600 töötajast) ja BPN säilitab 160–170 filiaali, mis tegutsevad pangale kuuluvates või kuni 12-kuulise tähtajaga rendilepingu alusel kasutatavates ruumides;
the transfer to the State of the costs linked to litigation; and
riik kannab kohtuvaidlustega seotud kulud; ja
an acquisition price of EUR 30 million to be paid by BIC.
BIC maksab ostuhinnana 30 miljonit eurot.
Following the negotiations, that lasted approximately five months, the Framework Agreement provides for:
Pärast läbirääkimisi, mis kestsid umbes viis kuud, nähti raamlepingus ette, et
i. a recapitalisation by the State to reach the minimum capital level and the additional level required by BIC — BIC required a final capital level of EUR [200-400] million after the balance sheet adjustments it had proposed [30];
i. riik rekapitaliseerib BPNi, et saavutada miinimumkapital ja BICi taotletud täiendav kapital – BIC nõudis, et pärast tema soovitud bilansimuudatusi oleks lõplik kapital [200–400] miljonit eurot [30];
the removal of part of the loans in BPN, over and above those loans which had already been transferred to the SPVs as of 30 December 2010 [31].
BPNist viiakse välja osa laene lisaks neile, mis olid 30. detsembri 2010. aasta seisuga juba üle antud eriotstarbelistele äriühingutele [31].