natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Two of the four guarantees apply until the end of 2013 (that is, for 5 years), one expired in 2010 (after 2 years) and one expired in 2009 (after 1 year).
Neljast tagatisest kehtib kaks 2013. aasta lõpuni (st viis aastat), kolmas lõppes 2010. aastal (st kehtis kaks aastat) ja neljas 2009. aastal (st kehtis ühe aasta).
The guarantees which last until 2013 relate to annual batches of deliveries.
aastani kehtivad tagatised hõlmavad aastaseid tarnemahtusid.
The total value of supplies concerned is close to USD 19 million.
Potentsiaalsete tarnete kogumaht on ligikaudu 19 miljonit dollarit.
Since some suppliers chose to cover only a part of their deliveries, the guarantees relate to some USD 12 million.
Et osa tarnijaid on otsustanud katta üksnes osa tarnetest, hõlmavad tagatised ligikaudu 12 miljonit dollarit.
Three of the four suppliers obtained cover for supplies of less than USD 2,8 million each.
Neljast tarnijast kolm said tagatise tarnetele, mille kogumaht on igaühe puhul alla 2,8 miljoni dollari.
Axon Cable retains a 25 % ‘share’ of the gain if the dollar is strong, while the other suppliers retain 50 % of the gain.
Axon Cable säilitab tugeva dollari korral 25 %, ülejäänud tarnijad aga 50 % „kasumist”.
The table below was made available by France at the meeting held in December 2009.
aasta detsembris toimunud kohtumisel edastas Prantsusmaa järgmise tabeli.
It summarises the suppliers involved, the guarantees granted each year and the annual guaranteed exchange rate.
Selles on antud ülevaade meetmega hõlmatud tarnijatest ning igal aastal antud tagatistest ja iga aasta tagatud vahetuskursist.
AD Industrie and Axon Cable did not accept the total amount offered by Coface.
AD Industrie ja Axon Cable ei nõustunud Coface’i pakutud kogusummaga.
USD 0,264 million/[…] [5]
0,264 mln USD/[…] [5]
USD 0,256 million/[…]
0,256 mln USD/[…]
USD 2 million/[…]
2 mln USD/[…]
USD 0,384 million/[…]
0,384 mln USD/[…]
USD 2,712 million/[…]
2,712 mln USD/[…]
USD 0,205 million/[…]
0,205 mln USD/[…]
USD 0,511 million/[…]
0,511 mln USD/[…]
USD 8 million
8 mln USD
USD 0,264 million
0,264 mln USD
USD 1,866 million
1,866 mln USD
USD 2,712 million
2,712 mln USD
Maximum amount offered by Coface
Coface’i pakutud maksimum-summa
USD 12,7 million
12,7 mln USD
USD 3,74 million
3,74 mln USD
Premiums
Preemiad
Interest
Osalus
Summary of concerns which led to the opening of the formal investigation procedure
Ülevaade kahtlustest, mille tõttu algatati ametlik uurimismenetlus
The reasons for the decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU was that there was uncertainty as to whether State aid was absent and as to whether or not the aid examined was compatible with the rules on State aid.
Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikes 2 sätestatud menetluse algatamise otsust põhjendati teatavate kahtlustega väite suhtes, et tegemist ei ole riigiabiga, ning selle suhtes, kas vaadeldud abimeede on kooskõlas riigiabi eeskirjadega.
First, the Commission had concerns as to whether the premiums paid by the beneficiary undertakings are consistent with market prices.
Esiteks oli komisjonil kahtlusi abi saanud ettevõtjate makstavate kindlustuspreemiate turuhindadega vastavuse suhtes.
Specifically, the Commission took the view that the French authorities had not shown that the premiums paid covered the following factors: the administrative costs of Coface for administering the guarantee, the risk of default by suppliers, the credit risk in respect of staggered payment of premiums and a profit margin.
Täpsemalt leidis komisjon, et Prantsuse asutused ei ole tõendanud, et tasutud kindlustuspreemiad hõlmavad järgmisi elemente: Coface’i tagatise haldamisega seotud kulud, tarnija makseraskustesse sattumise oht, preemiate maksegraafiku alusel tasumise korral tekkiv krediidirisk ja kasumimarginaal.
The possibility therefore remained that there was a selective economic advantage for suppliers which took out the guarantee.
Seetõttu ei saanud välistada, et tegemist on tagatise saanud tarnijatele antud valikulise majandusliku eelisega.
Given that the French State could be considered to be responsible for the Aero 2008 guarantee, it was possible that the measure may constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Võttes arvesse, et meedet „Aero 2008” võib käsitada Prantsuse riigi abimeetmena, ei saanud välistada, et selle puhul võib tegemist olla riigiabiga Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
Secondly, the Commission was uncertain as to whether there was market failure in respect of hedging instruments against short-term and longer-term EUR/USD exchange rate fluctuations as regards SMES and large enterprises.
Teiseks kahtles komisjon selles, kas euro ja dollari vahetuskursi lühemas ja pikemas perspektiivis esinevate kõikumiste vastu suunatud finantsinstrumentide turul tekib VKEde ja suurettevõtete kindlustamisega seoses tõepoolest raskusi.
Thirdly, the Commission was uncertain as to whether the measure had an incentive effect, since the suppliers were able to obtain the exchange rate guarantee even if their application was made after the date when the contract was signed.
Kolmandaks kahtles komisjon, kas tegemist on stimuleeriva mõjuga, kuna tarnijad võivad tagatise saada isegi juhul, kui taotlus esitatakse pärast lepingu sõlmimist.
Fourthly, the Commission was uncertain as regards the proportionality of the measure, which is not limited to undertakings that are known to have difficulties in obtaining exchange rate guarantees from their banks.
Neljandaks väljendas komisjon kahtlusi meetme proportsionaalsuse suhtes, kuna selle kaudu ei abistata mitte üksnes selliseid ettevõtjaid, kellel on raskusi pangalt vahetuskursitagatiste saamisega.
Fifthly, the Commission had concerns as to whether the potential positive impact of that aid could outweigh its negative impact, so as not to distort trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Viiendaks kahtles komisjon selles, kas abi võimalik positiivne mõju kompenseerib selle negatiivse mõju, nõnda et meede ei mõjutaks kaubandustingimusi ebasoovitavalt määral, mis oleks vastuolus ühiste huvidega.
COMMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
PRANTSUSE VABARIIGI MÄRKUSED
France considers that the premiums invoiced under Aero 2008 reflect the market value of the exchange rate insurance granted and that the measure in question does not therefore constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Prantsusmaa on seisukohal, et „Aero 2008” raames makstavad kindlustuspreemiad on kooskõlas vahetuskursiriski kindlustuse turuväärtusega ning et järelikult ei ole kõnealune meede riigiabi Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
The French authorities sent the Commission a detailed description of the methodology used to determine the amounts of the premiums invoiced under Aero 2008.
Prantsuse asutused edastasid komisjonile üksikasjaliku kirjelduse metoodika kohta, mille alusel määratakse kindlaks meetme „Aero 2008” raames tasutavad kindlustuspreemiad.
France submitted information proving the exact market value of the financial products required to set up the guarantee.
Prantsusmaa esitas teabe, mille alusel saab välja selgitada tagatise andmiseks vajalike finantstoodete täpse turuväärtuse.
The guarantee is subdivided into financial instruments which in combination show its payment profile: forward purchases in EUR/USD, purchases and sales of options in EUR/USD.
Tagatis jaotub finantsinstrumentideks, mille kombinatsioon moodustab selle makseprofiili: EUR/USD tähtpäevaostud, EUR/USD optsioonide ost ja müük.
The market value of those financial instruments is calculated on the basis of data from Bloomberg software, one of the market leaders in financial information.
Kõnealuste finantsinstrumentide turuväärtus arvestatakse välja finantsteabe maailmaturu ühe liidri Bloombergi tarkvaraprogrammi andmete põhjal.
France provided extracts from the Bloomberg software for all of the financial instruments making up the guarantees granted to the four suppliers which took out the Aero 2008 guarantee.
Prantsusmaa esitas väljavõtteid Bloombergi andmetest kõigi finantsinstrumentide kohta, mis moodustavad „Aero 2008” raames abi saanud neljale ettevõtjale antud tagatised.
The market values thus established include a profit margin for the financial institutions from which Coface buys those instruments.
Sellisel viisil kindlaks määratud turuväärtus hõlmab Coface’ile kõnealuseid instrumente müüvate finantsinstitutsioonide kasumimarginaali.
According to information provided by France, the exchange rate risk products offered by the banks do not in general include the payment of a premium since the banking sector earns money on the guaranteed rates and the option prices.
Prantsusmaa esitatud teabe kohaselt ei hõlma pankade pakutavad vahetuskursiriskiga seotud tooted enamasti preemia maksmist, kuna pangad teenivad tulu tagatud kursside ja optsioonihindade pealt.
The margins in question are in incorporated by design in the prices of the financial products making up the guarantee offered to the suppliers and are therefore covered by the premiums invoiced by Coface.
Kõnealused marginaalid sisalduvad tarnijatele pakutava tagatise moodustavates finantstoodetes ning seetõttu ühtlasi Coface’ile makstavates kindlustuspreemiates.
Moreover, the guaranteed forward rate chosen is always higher than the forward rate for the year in which the rate is fixed by Coface.
Lisaks määratakse Coface’i vahetukursi määratlemisel tagatud tähtajaline vahetuskurss alati kõrgem kui aastane turu vahetuskursside maksimum.
In order to cover the additional administrative costs related to the handling of the measure by Coface, a margin of 40 base points is included in the amount of the premium.
Coface’i meetme haldamisega seotud täiendavate kulude katmiseks hõlmab preemiasumma ka 40 baaspunkti suurust marginaali.
That margin represents between 17 % and 32 % [6] of the total value of the premiums invoiced to the four undertakings which took out the Aero 2008 guarantee.
Kõnealune marginaal moodustab 17–32 % [6] meetme „Aero 2008” kaudu tagatise saanud nelja ettevõtja tasutavatest preemiatest.
The risk of default by the supplier is determined by Coface on the basis of the Score@rating rating system of French undertakings launched by Coface in 2002 which is based on its 20 years of experience in rating businesses.
Tarnija makseraskustesse sattumise riski määrab Coface kindlaks Prantsuse ettevõtete hindamissüsteemi Score@rating alusel, mille Coface algatas 2002. aastal ja mis tugineb Coface’i 20 aasta pikkusele kogemusele ettevõtete hindamise valdkonnas.
With its Score@rating, Coface obtained the status of External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) from the Commission bancaire for its rating activities in France.
Panganduskomisjon on Coface’ile kui hindamissüsteemi Score@rating haldajale andnud External Credit Assesment Institution’i (ECAI) staatuse.
That approval was granted in accordance with the Basel II rules.
Kõnealune staatus anti kooskõlas Baseli II raamistikuga.
The following table gives the equivalences between different recognised rating systems [7].
Järgnevas tabelis on esitatud erinevate tunnustatud hindamissüsteemide võrdlus [7].
Risk Weight
Riskikaal
Basel mapping
Baseli krediidi-kvaliteedi astmed
AAA to AA-
AAA kuni AA-
Aaa to Aa3
Aaa kuni Aa3
A+ to A-
A+ kuni A-
A1 to A3
A1 kuni A3
BBB+ to BBB-
BBB+ kuni BBB-
Baa1 to Baa3
Baa1 kuni Baa3
Evaluation of long-term risk
Pikaajalise riski hinnang
BB+ to BB-
BB+ kuni BB-
to Ba3
kuni Ba3
B+ to B-
B+ kuni B-
B1 to B3
B1 kuni B3
CCC+ and below
vähemalt CCC+
Caa1 and below
vähemalt Caa1
Score@rating is a risk rating which divides probability of default into phases.
Score@rating on riskihinne, mis kujuneb eri taseme raskustesse sattumise tõenäosuse alusel.
The risk analysed is default by the undertaking under the terms of the law, or a failure to pay of equivalent seriousness.
Analüüsitav risk on ettevõtja maksejõuetus või samaväärsel tasemel makseraskustesse sattumine.
Each rating, measured on a scale of 1 to 10, corresponds to an average annual default rate.
Kümne palli süsteemis vastab igale hindele aastane keskmine makseraskuste riskimäär.
The table below shows the annual default rate corresponding to different Score@rating ratings [8]:
Järgnevas tabelis on näidatud aastased makseraskuste riskimäärad vastavalt süsteemi Score@rating hinnetele [8]:
Very high risk
Suur risk
Average risk
Keskmine risk
Annual default rate
Aastane tüüpmäär
In order to deal with the risk of default by the insured undertaking in the event of a strong dollar, Coface must be covered for the probability of default by financial instruments [9].
Maandamaks riski, et kindlustatu võib dollari kursi tõusu korral sattuda makseraskustesse, peab Coface end makseraskustesse sattumise tõenäosuse tasemel kindlustama finantsinstrumentidega [9].
The Bloomberg software can calculate the price of the instruments required to cover the credit risk on the day a guarantee is quoted.
Tarkvaraprogrammi Bloomberg kaudu saab välja arvestada tagatise hinnapakkumise tegemise kuupäeva seisuga vajalike instrumentide hinna.
The premium is therefore adjusted according to the default risk determined on the basis of the Score@rating system and the cost of the instruments required to cover that risk.
Preemia maksumust kohandatakse seega vastavalt süsteemi Score@rating alusel kindlaks määratud makseraskustesse sattumise riskile ja selle riski vastu kindlustamiseks vajalike instrumentide hinnale.
The factors described in recitals 40 to 49 form the basis for calculating the current premiums under the Aero 2008 guarantee.
Tagatise „Aero 2008” raames rakendatavate preemiasummade kindlaksmääramisel lähtutakse põhjendustes 40–49 kirjeldatud elementidest.
The French authorities have provided a detailed breakdown of the premiums invoiced to the four suppliers taking out the guarantee.
Prantsuse asutused esitasid üksikasjalikud andmed kõigi nelja tagatise saanud ettevõtja kindlustuspreemiate komponentide kohta.
This is illustrated in the table below:
Seda illustreeritakse järgnevas tabelis.
Quotation date
Hinnapakkumise kuupäev
Coface note on quotation
Coface’i hinne hinnapakkumise tegemise hetkel
Year commencing
Algusaasta
Year ending
Lõpuaasta
Sharing percentage
Tulemustasu
15-cent ceiling?
Tulemustasu piiratud 15 sendiga?
2 months
2 kuud
Total amount USD
Kogusumma (USD)
Market price of the guarantee
Tagatise turuhind
Credit risk
Krediidirisk
Margin for administrative costs
Halduskulude marginaal
Coface premium
Coface’i preemia
Difference related to execution risk [10]
Täitmisriskiga seotud vahe [10]
According to the French authorities, the structure of the premium as set out makes the guarantee less attractive than the products offered by the banking sector.
Prantsuse asutuste väitel on tagatis sellisel viisil määratletud struktuuri tõttu vähem atraktiivne kui pankade pakutavad tooted.
The conditions offered under the Aero 2008 guarantee are therefore not more favourable than market conditions and the premiums clearly incorporate the market value of the financial products required to set up the guarantee, including a profit margin, Coface’s administrative costs, and the value of the default risk of the supplier.
Tagatise „Aero 2008” raames pakutavad tingimused ei ole seega turutingimustest soodsamad ning preemiad sisaldavad ka tagatise andmiseks vajalike finantstoodete turuväärtust, sealhulgas kasumimarginaali, Coface’i halduskulu ja tarnijate makseraskustesse sattumise riski väärtust.
France therefore argued that the measure does not involve selective economic advantage and so does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Prantsusmaa jääb niisiis selle juurde, et meetmega ei anta valikulist majanduslikku eelist ning et järelikult ei ole tegemist riigiabiga Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
France also stated that seven of the eleven undertakings which received an offer from Coface decided to reject the offer.
Prantsusmaa osutas ka sellele, et üheteistkümnest ettevõtjast, kellele Coface pakkumise esitas, otsustas seitse selle tagasi lükata.
According to information provided by the French authorities, two of the undertakings in question stated that the banks’ terms were more favourable (in particular, no premium) and two others stated that the terms offered by Coface were not advantageous (in particular, unattractive guaranteed rates).
Prantsuse asutuste esitatud teabe kohaselt väitsid kõnealustest ettevõtjatest kaks, et pankade pakutavad tingimused on soodsamad (näiteks see, et preemiat pole vaja maksta), ning kaks teist nentisid, et Coface’i pakutavad tingimused ei ole soodsad (näiteks ei ole tagatavad kursid kuigi atraktiivsed).
One undertaking stated that its terms of payment were incompatible with the guarantee offered, another stated that it had finally managed to enter into an agreement in EUR and a third undertaking stated that the negotiations with the purchaser had broken down at the end of the validity of the guarantee commitment.
Üks ettevõtja osutas, et maksetingimused ei ole kooskõlas pakutava tagatisega, üks teatas, et sai soovitava lepingu sõlmida eurodes, ning kolmas osutas, et tagatislubaduse kehtivusaja lõpuks ei olnud läbirääkimised ostjaga veel lõpule jõudnud.
A measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if it fulfils four conditions: it must be granted by the State or through State resources, confer a selective advantage to some undertakings or economic activities, distort or threaten to distort competition, and be liable to affect trade between Member States.
Meede on riigiabi Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses, kui selle puhul on täidetud neli tingimust: abi antakse liikmesriigi poolt või riigi ressurssidest, sellega antakse teatavatele ettevõtjatele või majandusharudele valikuline eelis, see kahjustab või ähvardab kahjustada konkurentsi ning see võib kahjustada liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
As stated in recital 34, the decision to initiate a formal investigation procedure was based, first, on the existence of concerns about whether the premiums paid by the beneficiary undertakings were consistent with market prices.
Nagu on täpsustatud põhjenduses 34, põhines ametliku uurimise algatamise otsus ennekõike kahtlustel, mis tekkisid seoses abi saavate ettevõtjate tasutavate preemiate vastavusega turuhinnale.
Specifically, the Commission took the view that the French authorities did not show that the premiums paid covered the following factors: the administrative costs of Coface for administering the guarantee, the risk of default by suppliers, the credit risk in respect of staggered payment of premiums, and a profit margin.
Täpsemalt leidis komisjon, et Prantsuse asutused ei ole tõendanud, et tasutud preemiad hõlmavad järgmisi elemente: Coface’i tagatise haldamise kulud, tarnija makseraskustesse sattumise risk, krediidirisk preemiate maksegraafiku alusel tasumise korral ja kasumimarginaal.
The possibility therefore remained that there was a selective economic advantage for suppliers who took out the guarantee.
Seega ei saanud välistada tagatise saanud ettevõtjatele valikulise majandusliku eelise andmist.
The Commission’s services analysed the information provided by the French authorities following the opening of the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU with a view to determining whether the measure is consistent with the market economy private investor principle, that is to say, whether or not the conditions offered by Coface are consistent with the market conditions offered by private operators.
Komisjoni talitused analüüsisid teavet, mida Prantsuse asutused esitasid pärast Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 108 lõikes 2 sätestatud menetluse algatamist, et selgitada välja, kas meede on kooskõlas turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva erainvestori põhimõttega, see tähendab kas Coface’i pakutavad tingimused vastavad erasektori pakutavatele turutingimustele.
The Commission notes, first, that the French authorities undertook to ensure that when Coface determines the applicable rate of the premium, it uses the same methodology for all undertakings applying for the guarantee, namely the methodology set out in Section IV [11].
Komisjon märgib esmalt, et Prantsuse asutused kohustusid tagama, et Coface määrab tasutava preemia suuruse kõigi tagatist taotlevate ettevõtjate puhul kindlaks ühesuguse metoodika alusel, mida on kirjeldatud IV jaos [11].
The Commission finds that products comparable to those offered by Coface are also available on the markets.
Komisjon nentis, et Coface’i pakutava tagatisega võrreldavad tooted on ka turul kättesaadavad.
The Commission then verified that the market price of the guarantee invoiced by Coface is consistent with the market price applied by private operators.
Seejärel veendus komisjon, et Coface’i pakutava tagatise turuhind on kooskõlas turuhindadega, mida rakendavad erasektori ettevõtjad.
The Commission takes the view that the price of the financial instruments required to set up the guarantee are in fact market prices, as shown by the extracts from the Bloomberg software provided by France, and that they are accurately reflected in the premiums invoiced by Coface.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et tagatise rakendamiseks vajalike finantsinstrumentide hind on kooskõlas turuhindadega, nagu näitavad Prantsusmaa esitatud tarkvaraprogrammi Bloomberg väljavõtted, ning et need kajastuvad adekvaatselt Coface’ile makstavates preemiates.
In addition, the market prices of those financial products include a profit margin for the financial institutions from which Coface bought the instruments in question.
Lisaks hõlmavad kõnealuste finantstoodete turuhinnad selliste finantsinstitutsioonide kasumimarginaali, kellelt Coface on kõnealused instrumendid ostnud.
The French authorities also showed that an additional margin of 40 base points is invoiced in order to cover Coface’s administrative costs.
Samuti tõendasid Prantsuse asutused, et Coface’i halduskulude katmiseks rakendatakse 40 baaspunkti ulatuses täiendavat marginaali.
As set out in recital 45, that margin represents a substantial proportion of the value of the premiums invoiced.
Nagu on kirjeldatud punktis 45, moodustab kõnealune marginaal olulise osa makstavate preemiate väärtusest.
The Commission therefore considers that the premiums invoiced incorporate a profit margin and a margin to cover Coface’s administrative costs, which removes the uncertainty expressed when the formal investigation procedure was initiated.
Komisjon leiab seega, et makstavad preemiad hõlmavad tõepoolest kasumimarginaali ja marginaali, mis aitab katta Coface’i halduskulud, ning see võimaldab hajutada kahtlused, mida väljendati ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamisel.
The Commission observes that such an additional margin is not included by private banks, which merely receive the margin included in the Bloomberg database price.
Komisjon märgib, et erasektori pangad sellist marginaali ei rakenda, vaid piirduvad üksnes Bloombergi andmebaasi hinna puhul näidatud marginaaliga.
Accordingly, that margin may be considered to be consistent with the market price.
Seega võib kõnealust marginaali pidada turuhinnale vastavaks.
The Commission takes the view that France has also succeeded in demonstrating that the default risk by the supplier [12] was reflected correctly in the calculation of the amount of the premiums invoiced.
Komisjoni hinnangul tõendas Prantsusmaa ka seda, et makstavate preemiate kindlaksmääramisel võetakse nõuetekohaselt arvesse tarnija makseraskustesse sattumise riski [12].
In order to deal with the risk of default by the insured undertaking, Coface must obtain cover for the probability of default by:
Kindlustatu makseraskustesse sattumise korral kohustuste ülevõtmiseks peab Coface end kindlustama kooskõlas makseraskustesse sattumise riskimääraga järgmiselt:
buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the guaranteed forward rate for (1 – sharing %) × the guaranteed dollar amount, or
ostetud EUR/USD müügioptsiooniga, mille täitmishind on võrdne tagatise tähtaja kursiga (1-% tulemustasu) x dollari kohta;