natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In particular, the Commission considers that, in line with point 26 of the Restructuring Communication, in a restructuring context the discretionary offset of losses by beneficiary banks (for example by releasing reserves or reducing equity) in order to guarantee the payment of dividends and coupons on outstanding subordinated debt, is in principle not compatible with the objective of limiting the aid amount to the minimum.
Kooskõlas ümberkorraldamist käsitleva teatise punktiga 26 on komisjon eelkõige seisukohal, et kahjumi katmine abisaavate pankade äranägemisel (näiteks reservide kasutuselevõtmise või omakapitali vähendamise kaudu), eesmärgiga tagada dividendide maksmine ja tagastamata allutatud laenude eest tasutavate kupongimaksete tegemine, ei sobi ümberkorraldamise kontekstis põhimõtteliselt kokku eesmärgiga piirata abi minimaalselt vajalikuga.
In particular financial instruments with equity components should participate in losses incurred.
Tekkivate kahjumite katmises peaksid eelkõige osalema omakapitalielementidega finantsinstrumendid.
As Germany refuses to propose additional own contribution measures, the aid measure cannot be approved as compatible under Article 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Kuna Saksamaa ei paku omapanusega seoses välja täiendavaid meetmeid, ei saa abi pidada ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punkti b alusel siseturuga kokkusobivaks.
Such measures can, however, be imposed by attaching conditions to the Decision.
Sellised meetmed võib siiski kehtestada.
Thus, during the restructuring phase, the Commission should impose the condition that HSH must not make any payments in respect of profit-related equity instruments (such as hybrid financial instruments and profit participation certificates), in so far as those payments are not owed on the basis of a contract or the law.
Komisjon näeb seega ette, et HSH ei tohi ümberkorraldusperioodil teha väljamakseid kasumist sõltuvatelt omakapitaliinstrumentidelt (nt hübriidinstrumendid ja kasumiosalussertifikaadid), kui maksete tegemise kohustus ei tulene lepingust või seadusest.
As part of such a dividend ban the Commission also considers that if HSH’s balance sheet, without the adjustment of reserves and retained earnings, shows a loss, those instruments must participate in the loss.
Komisjoni arvates tähendab dividendide maksmise keeld ka seda, et kõnealused instrumendid osalevad kahjumi katmises, juhul kui HSH bilanss on eraldisi ja reserve kasutusele võtmata kahjumis.
There should be no participation in losses brought forward from previous years.
Eelmiste perioodide ülekantud kahjumis ei tuleks osaleda.
In order to ensure that the owners of HSH participate to the maximum extent in the reconstitution of an adequate capital basis over the restructuring period (see recitals 229 to 231 above), the Commission would also consider any dividend payment over the restructuring period to be against the principles of keeping state aid to the minimum necessary.
Et tagada ümberkorraldusperioodil pangaomanike võimalikult suur osalemine nõuetekohase kapitalibaasi taastamises (vt punktid 229–231), on komisjoni arvates ka kõik ümberkorraldusperioodil tehtavad dividendimaksed vastuolus põhimõttega piirata abi minimaalselt vajalikuga.
Therefore the Commission takes the view that HSH should not pay dividends in the period up to and including the 2014 financial year.
Seepärast leiab komisjon, et HSH ei tohiks 2014. majandusaasta lõpuni dividende välja maksta.
Burden sharing by minority shareholders
Vähemusaktsionäride osalemine kulude jagamises
In the Decision initiating the procedure (recitals 66 to 72), the Commission took the preliminary view that the minority shareholders who had not participated in the recapitalisation of HSH in May 2009 had not seen their stakes sufficiently diluted.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses (põhjendused 66–72) leidis komisjon esmalt, et 2009. aasta mais HSH rekapitaliseerimisest eemale jäänud vähemusaktsionäride osalus ei ole piisavalt vähenenud.
The original restructuring plan did not include burden sharing sufficient to allow the aid to HSH to be considered compatible.
Esialgne ümberkorralduskava ei näinud ette kulude nõuetekohast jagamist, mille alusel oleks saanud HSH-le antud abi pidada siseturuga kokkusobivaks.
Further, the Commission questioned whether the minority shareholders themselves might have benefited from the state aid by maintaining excessively high shareholdings in HSH.
Lisaks tõstatas komisjon küsimuse, kas vähemusaktsionärid võisid HSHs ülemäära suurt osalust säilitades ise riigiabist kasu saada.
The Commission concluded that the measure might include potential indirect aid to the minority shareholders, which might be unlawful if mechanisms to achieve adequate burden sharing were not put in place (recital 73).
Komisjon järeldas, et meede hõlmas võimalikku vähemusaktsionäridele antud kaudset abi, mis võib olla siseturuga kokkusobimatu, juhul kui ei seata sisse kulude nõuetekohase jagamise mehhanismi (menetluse algatamise otsuse punkt 73).
The Commission responses to comments by Germany and third parties
Komisjoni vastus Saksamaa ja kolmandate isikute märkustele
The savings banks associations have asserted that the Commission has not investigated secondary indirect aid effects in any previous recapitalisation case (see recital 129); the Commission points out that it has in fact investigated indirect aid in a great variety of aid measures in a number of decisions [78].
Komisjon märgib esmalt, et erinevalt hoiupankade liitude märkusest, mille kohaselt ei ole komisjon senini ühegi rekapitaliseerimist käsitleva riigiabi juhtumi puhul hinnanud kaudse abi teisejärgulist mõju (vt punkt 130), on kaudset abi tegelikult uuritud paljudes otsustes seoses mitmesuguste abimeetmetega [78].
The Commission recalls that according to settled case-law, Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of state intervention by reference to their causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects [79].
Komisjon meenutab, et vastavalt väljakujunenud kohtupraktikale teeb ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõige 1 riigi sekkumistel vahet mitte nende põhjustest või eesmärkidest, vaid mõjust lähtudes [79].
The origin of the advantage indirectly conferred on the minority shareholders was the renunciation by the public-sector owners of that additional shareholding in HSH which they would have received if the price of the new shares had been determined correctly.
Vähemusaktsionäridele kaudselt antud eelis tulenes sellest, et avalik-õiguslikud omanikud loobusid täiendavast osalusest HSHs, mille nad oleksid omandanud, kui uute aktsiate hind oleks määratud õigesti.
There is a causal link between the aid granted through state resources to HSH and the advantage to the minority shareholders.
HSH-le riigi vahenditest antud abi ja vähemusaktsionäridele antud eelise vahel esineb põhjuslik seos.
The Commission also disagrees with the statement that the advantage to the minority shareholders is not imputable to the State because the decision about the recapitalisation, including the number of shares and the share price, was taken by the shareholders’ meeting (see recital 128).
Peale selle ei jaga komisjon esitatud seisukohta, et vähemusaktsionäridele antud eelist ei tule omistada riigile, kuna otsus rekapitaliseerimise ja aktsiate arvu ning hinna kohta tehti aktsionäride üldkoosolekul (vt punkt 129).
At that meeting the public-sector owners were present as shareholders, and acted in their function as public bodies [80].
Nimetatud koosolekul olid avalik-õiguslikud omanikud aktsionäridena siiski esindatud ja tegutsesid avalik-õiguslike asutustena [80].
There was a political discussion on the future of HSH at that time.
Sellest tulenevalt toimus tookord poliitiline vaidlus HSH tuleviku üle.
The main comments from Germany and the minority shareholders revolve around the arguments that a lesser dilution is not aid and that in any case dilution is simply the result of the parameters chosen for the capital increase, namely the number of shares and the price of those shares.
Saksamaa ja vähemusaktsionäride tähtsaimad märkused on seotud väitega, et osaluste vähenemine väiksemal määral ei kujuta endast riigiabi ja et vähenemine on igal juhul vaid kapitali suurendamiseks valitud tegurite, st aktsiate arvu ja hinna tagajärg.
Further, regarding such parameters, Germany and the minority shareholders have pointed to the fact that the valuation was conducted by PwC, a respected company, in line with recognised valuation standards.
Nimetatud tegureid arvesse võttes märgivad Saksamaa ja vähemusaktsionärid, et PwC – mainekas ettevõtja – järgis hindamisel tunnustatud hindamisstandardeid.
The valuation was based on the assumption that HSH would return to A rating in 2013, which it was claimed was a reasonable premise.
Hindamine põhines eeldusel, et HSH reiting on 2013. aastaks taas tasemel A ja seda toetavad kaalukad põhjused.
The savings bank associations and Flowers agree with Germany as to that assessment.
Hoiupankade liidud ja Flowers nõustusid Saksamaa seisukohaga.
They claim that the issue price of the new shares was in fact too low.
Nad märgivad, et uute aktsiate väljalaskehind oli tegelikult liiga madal.
The Commission does not question that PwC is a respected company and that it conducted the valuation of HSH in line with recognised valuation standards.
Komisjon ei kahtle, et PwC on mainekas ettevõtja, kes tugines HSH hindamisel tunnustatud hindamisstandarditele.
However, it maintains that the valuation of HSH did not take into account several aspects which, had they been considered, would have led to a lower value of HSH.
Komisjon leiab siiski, et HSH hindamisel ei võetud arvesse mitut aspekti, mille arvestamisel oleks HSH väärtus osutunud väiksemaks.
The PwC valuation report (‘the Valuation Report’) was delivered on 15 May 2009 [81].
PwC hindamisaruanne [81] (edaspidi „hindamisaruanne”) avaldati 15. mail 2009.
On 30 April 2009 Germany notified the State aid measures for HSH to the Commission because HSH was at risk of not being able to meet regulatory capital requirements.
Saksamaa teatas 30. aprillil 2009 komisjonile HSH kasuks rakendatavatest abimeetmetest, kuna HSH ei suuda ilmselt täita regulatiivseid kapitalinõudeid.
At that point in time it was apparent that HSH would have to undergo substantial restructuring and that it would have to offer compensatory measures for competition distortions that the aid measures might cause.
Nimetatud kuupäevaks oli selge, et HSH peab ennast olulisel määral ümber korraldama ja esitama konkurentsimoonutusi tasakaalustavad meetmed, mis võivad põhjustada abimeetmete rakendamist.
The PwC valuation was conducted on the basis of a business plan that did not take all those aspects into account.
PwC võttis hindamisel aluseks äriplaani, milles ei olnud kõiki nimetatud aspekte arvesse võetud.
Furthermore, the valuation was conducted under the assumption that HSH would return to an A rating in 2013. PwC explicitly mentioned in the Valuation Report that on 6 May 2009 S&P downgraded HSH from A to BBB + with negative outlook [83], and that the downgrade was not reflected in the funding planning on which the valuation was based and consequently was not taken into account in the calculation of the indicative value of HSH.
Lisaks lähtuti hindamisel eeldusest, et HSH reiting tõstetakse 2013. aastal taas tasemele A. PwC märkis hindamisaruandes sõnaselgelt [83], et S&P langetas 6. mail 2009 HSH reitingu tasemelt A tasemele BBB+ (negatiivse väljavaatega) ja et kõnealune langetamine ei kajastunud hindamise aluseks olnud rahastamiskavas ning seepärast ei võetud seda HSH väärtuse arvutamisel arvesse.
In addition, PwC observed that, in view of the upcoming state aid investigation, it could be expected that in order to ensure the compatibility of the aid measures, requirements would be imposed which would have a considerable impact on HSH’s business plan.
Lisaks märkis PwC, et tulevast riigiabieeskirjadel põhinevat hindamist silmas pidades on oodata kohustuste kehtestamist, millega tagatakse abimeetme kokkusobivus siseturuga ja mis avaldavad suurt mõju HSH äriplaanile.
PwC also noted that the general economic conditions in the sectors relevant for HSH (shipping, aviation) and restrictions on the capital market (funding) made it difficult to predict future developments.
Peale selle märkis PwC, et üldised majanduslikud raamtingimused HSH jaoks olulistes valdkondades (laevandus, lennundus) ja piirangud kapitaliturul (rahastamine) raskendavad tulevaste suundumuste prognoosimist.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the valuation was conducted under the assumption that the risk shield would be implemented.
Kokkuvõttes võib järeldada, et hindamisel lähtuti riskikaitse rakendamise eeldusest.
Without the risk shield the RWA relief would not have taken place, and the scale of the necessary recapitalisation would have had to have been increased and the rating assumptions reviewed.
Ilma riskikaitseta ei oleks toimunud riskiga kaalutud varade toetamist, vajaliku rekapitaliseerimise maht oleks suurenenud ja reitinguprognoosid oleks tulnud üle vaadata.
PwC also calculated the value of HSH for the scenario in which the risk shield was not implemented [84], and arrived at an indicative value for HSH of EUR [0,8-1,2] billion to EUR [1,5-2] billion, which corresponds to a share price between [> 9] and [< 22] EUR. In view of those facts the Commission continues to consider that the price of the newly issued shares was considerably too high.
PwC [84] arvutas HSH väärtuse välja ka juhuks, kui riskikaitset ei rakendata, ja sai HSH ligikaudseks väärtuseks [0,8–1,2] miljardit kuni [1,5–2] miljardit eurot, mis vastab aktsiahinnale vahemikus [> 9] ja [< 22] eurot. Neid asjaolusid arvesse võttes peab komisjon uute emiteeritud aktsiate hinda endiselt selgelt liiga kõrgeks.
The minority shareholders also argued that in its Decision on HRE the Commission accepted a price for new shares that was above the stock exchange price without questioning its adequacy for burden sharing purposes.
Vähemusaktsionärid märkisid lisaks, et komisjon nõustus ettevõtjale Hypo Real Estate antud riigiabi käsitlenud otsuses uute aktsiate hinnaga, mis oli börsihinnast kõrgem, seadmata kahtluse alla hinna asjakohasust kulude jagamise seisukohast.
They claim that the issue of the share price in HSH should therefore not be investigated either.
Vähemusaktsionäride arvates ei tule seepärast uurida ka HSH aktsiate hinda.
The Commission is of the opinion that those two cases are not comparable.
Komisjoni arvates ei ole kõnealused kaks riigiabi juhtumit siiski võrreldavad.
In HRE a series of measures was taken leading to a full nationalisation of HSH.
Ettevõtjale Hypo Real Estate antud riigiabi puhul võeti hulk meetmeid, mille tulemusel pank täielikult riigistati.
The main difference between the two cases is that HRE was taken into public ownership and that the State acquired the shares at a price based on the value of the company without state support [85].
Peamine erinevus kahe juhtumi vahel seisneb selles, et Hypo Real Estate riigistati ja riik omandas osalused hinnaga, mis põhines kontserni väärtusel ilma riigiabita [85].
That is not the case for HSH.
HSH puhul ei olnud asi nii.
The valuation of HSH for determining the price of the newly issued shares was conducted under the assumption that the risk shield of EUR 10 billion would be implemented.
Emiteeritud aktsiate hinna määramise eesmärgil toimunud HSH hindamine põhines eeldusel, et võetakse kasutusele 10 miljardi euro suurune riskikaitse.
That assumption must have significantly influenced the result of the valuation.
See eeldus avaldas hindamistulemusele suurt mõju.
The Commission understands that the savings bank associations had an option on the new stock and were not obliged to exercise that right.
Komisjoni arvates oli hoiupankade liitudel uute aktsiate omandamise õigus, kuid nad ei olnud kohustatud seda õigust kasutama.
The Commission does not see a connection between the capital measures in 2008 and the aid measures in 2009.
Komisjon ei näe seost 2008. aastal võetud kapitalimeetmete ja 2009. aasta abimeetmete vahel.
The Commission does not agree with the savings bank associations’ comments stating that they do not conduct any economic activities and therefore cannot be regarded as undertakings for the purposes of the state aid rules (see recital 128).
Komisjon ei nõustu hoiupankade liitude märkusega, mille kohaselt ei tegelenud nad majandustegevusega ja neid ei saa seega pidada riigiabieeskirjade seisukohast ettevõtjateks (vt punkt 129).
The savings banks in Schleswig-Holstein carry on an economic activity [86].
Schleswig-Holsteini hoiupangad tegelevad majandustegevusega [86].
They have grouped their economic interests in the savings bank associations.
Nad on koondanud oma majanduslikud huvid hoiupankade liitudes.
The savings bank associations provide services to the savings banks in Schleswig-Holstein and hold participations/shareholdings for the savings banks, as is the case with the savings bank’s shares in HSH Nordbank.
Hoiupankade liidud osutavad Schleswig-Holsteini hoiupankadele teenuseid ja omavad hoiupankades osalusi sarnaselt HSH-le kuuluvatele hoiupankade osalustele.
If the participations of the savings banks in the associations increase in value, the value of the savings banks also increases.
Kui liitudesse kuuluvate hoiupankade osaluste väärtus tõuseb, siis tõuseb ka hoiupankade väärtus.
The savings bank associations and their member savings banks form an economic unit.
Hoiupankade liidud ja nende liikmeteks olevad hoiupangad moodustavad ühe majandusüksuse.
Any advantage to the associations is by the same token an advantage to the savings banks in Schleswig-Holstein.
Liitudele antav eelis on ühtlasi Schleswig-Holsteini hoiupankadele antav eelis.
Therefore the savings bank associations, which economically speaking can be wholly identified with the Schleswig-Holstein savings banks, can be considered recipients of state aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Seepärast võib hoiupankade liite, kes on majanduslikult täielikult võrreldavad Schleswig-Holsteini hoiupankadega, käsitada riigiabi saajatena ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 1 tähenduses.
The comments received from Germany and third parties have not allayed the Commission’s doubts on the insufficiency of the burden sharing by minority shareholders.
Saksamaa ja kolmandate isikute märkused ei kõrvaldanud komisjoni kahtlusi, et vähemusaktsionäride osalemine kulude jagamises on ebapiisav.
The Commission still believes that the minority shareholders who did not participate in the recapitalisation of HSH in 2009, did not see their stakes sufficiently diluted because the number of shares allocated to the public owners in the recapitalisation was not based on a correct valuation of HSH at the relevant time.
Komisjon on endiselt seisukohal, et 2009. aastal HSH rekapitaliseerimisest eemale jäänud vähemusaktsionäride osalused ei ole piisavalt vähenenud, kuna avalik-õiguslikele omanikele rekapitaliseerimise raames antud osaluste arv ei põhinenud tollal HSH nõuetekohasel hindamisel.
However the Commission observes that the modified restructuring plan contains additional measures which considerably improve burden sharing by the minority shareholders.
Komisjon märgib siiski, et muudetud ümberkorralduskava sisaldab lisameetmeid, mis vähemusaktsionäride osalemist kulude jagamises tunduvalt suurendavad.
In particular, the additional measures on remuneration of the risk shield imposed by the Commission (recitals 202 to 208) will increase the degree of burden sharing.
Panus kulude jagamisse suureneb eriti riskikaitse hüvitisega seotud lisameetmete rakendamisel, mille nägi ette komisjon (punktid 202–208).
Second, the EUR 500 million lump sum payment in shares will dilute the stakes held by the minority shareholders, whose shareholding will decrease from 16,8 % currently to about 14-15 % (depending on the share price valuation).
Teiseks vähendab 500 miljoni euro suurune ühekordne makse vähemusaktsionäride osalust praegusest 16,8 %-st ligikaudu 14–15 %-ni (olenevalt aktsiahinnale antavast hinnangust).
In addition to the effect resulting from the conditions imposed in respect of the remuneration of the risk shield, burden sharing by minority shareholders will be further improved by the restriction on remuneration of capital instruments set out in recitals 241 to 244.
Peale riskikaitse hüvitisega seotud kohustuste mõju suurendab vähemusaktsionäride osalemist kulude jagamises kapitaliinstrumentide tulu piiramine (vt põhjendused 241– 244).
The Commission considers that even though burden sharing by the minority shareholders has been significantly improved in the modified restructuring plan and through the conditions imposed by the Commission, the measures do not ensure that the burdens are shared to the maximum extent by the minority shareholders.
Komisjon leiab, et meetmed vähemusaktsionäride kaasamiseks kulude jagamisse on muudetud ümberkorralduskavas pärast komisjoni ettekirjutuste arvessevõtmist küll tunduvalt paranenud, kuid need ei taga siiski vähemusaktsionäride võimalikult suurt panust kulude jagamisse.
As Germany refuses to propose additional burden sharing measures, the aid measure cannot be approved as compatible under Article 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Kuna Saksamaa keeldub esitamast lisameetmeid kulude jagamiseks, ei saa abimeedet pidada menetlusmääruse artikli 7 lõike 3 alusel siseturuga kokkusobivaks.
On that basis, the indirect aid to the minority shareholders would have to be deemed incompatible, unless some other conditional measures can be found which improve burden sharing by the minority shareholders.
Juhul kui vähemusaktsionäride osalemist kulude jagamises parandavad muid tingimusi ei saa kehtestada, tuleks seega vähemusaktsionäridele antud kaudset abi pidada siseturuga kokkusobimatuks.
To that end, the Commission should impose the condition that in the period from 1 January 2015 until 31 December 2016, dividend payments may not exceed 50 % of the annual surplus for the previous financial year.
Sellega seoses teeb komisjon ettekirjutuse, et ajavahemikul 1. jaanuarist 2015 kuni 31. detsembrini 2016 tohib dividende maksta üksnes 50 % ulatuses eelmise majandusaasta kasumist.
Furthermore, dividend payments should be permissible during that period only in so far as they would not jeopardise compliance with the Basel III provisions on the capital of credit institutions in the medium-term.
Peale selle on dividendide maksmine kõnealusel ajavahemikul lubatud vaid siis, kui see ei ohusta keskpikas plaanis Basel III kohaste, krediidiasutuste omakapitaliga varustatuse nõuete järgimist.
Conclusion on own contribution and burden sharing by minority shareholders
Järeldus vähemusaktsionäride omapanuse ja kulude jagamises osalemise kohta
The Commission concludes that adequate own contribution and burden sharing of the minority shareholders can be achieved, and consequently that the aid can be viewed as compatible subject to the conditions described in recitals 262, 202 to 208 and 241 to 244.
Komisjon leiab, et vähemusaktsionäride nõuetekohane omapanus ja osalemine kulude jagamises on saavutatav ning punktides 262, 202–208 ja 241–244 loetletud tingimuste täitmise korral võib riigiabi seega pidada siseturuga kokkusobivaks.
Measures limiting distortion of competition
Konkurentsimoonutuste piiramise meetmed
The Restructuring Communication requires that the restructuring plan contains measures limiting distortions of competition and ensuring a competitive banking sector.
Ümberkorraldamist käsitleva teatise kohaselt tuleb ümberkorralduskavas ette näha meetmed riigiabist põhjustatud konkurentsimoonutuste piiramiseks ja konkurentsipõhise pangandussektori tagamiseks.
The Restructuring Communication indicates, in point 30, that the measures to limit the distortion of competition created by the aid should be tailor-made to address the distortions identified on the markets where the beneficiary bank operates following its return to viability after restructuring.
Vastavalt ümberkorraldamist käsitleva teatise punktile 30 tuleks konkurentsimoonutusi piiravaid meetmeid kohandada vastavalt konkreetsetele moonutustele sellistel turgudel, kus abi saanud pangad tegutsevad pärast seda, kui nende elujõulisus on ümberkorraldamise tulemusena taastunud.