natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the document of 9 June 2009, the Portuguese authorities also stated that they were studying with the supervisory authorities a solution to minimise losses for BPP’s clients holding Absolute Return instruments whose investments were jeopardised.
Portugali ametiasutused märkisid 9. juuni 2009. aasta dokumendis ka seda, et nad püüavad koos järelevalveasutustega leida lahendust sellele, kuidas vähendada selliste absoluutse tootlusega instrumente omavate BPP klientide kahjusid, kelle investeeringud on ohus.
The solution envisaged by the Government would include, among other things, the following features: (1) the creation of a new financial instrument, representative of the current indirect Absolute Return portfolio, to replace the investors’ current positions; (2) the financial instrument would be issued and managed by an entity independent of BPP and owned and managed by national banking institutions.
Valitsuse kavandatud lahendus hõlmaks muu hulgas järgmist: 1) praegust kaudset absoluutse tootlusega portfelli esindava uue finantsinstrumendi loomine, et asendada investorite praegused positsioonid; 2) finantsinstrumendi emiteeriks ja seda haldaks BPPst sõltumatu üksus ning seda omaksid ja haldaksid riiklikud pangandusasutused.
The formal investigation procedure and the second extension of the emergency aid measure
Ametlik uurimismenetlus ja erakorralise abimeetme teistkordne pikendamine
On 15 July 2009 the Commission invited the Portuguese authorities to urgently submit the restructuring plan for BPP, even in a provisional form, recalling that the rescue aid had become unlawful since 6 June 2009.
15. juulil 2009 kutsus komisjon Portugali ametiasutusi esitama kiiremas korras BPP ümberkorralduskava, kasvõi selle esialgsel kujul, tuletades meelde, et päästmisabi oli muutunud alates 6. juunist 2009 ebaseaduslikuks.
Since the requested plan was not submitted, by letter dated 6 October 2009 the Commission sent an official reminder pursuant to Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Kuna nõutud kava ei esitatud, saatis komisjon 6. oktoobri 2009. aasta kirjaga meeldetuletuse vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 5 lõikele 2.
In the same decision the Commission issued an information injunction requiring Portugal to submit the restructuring plan by 22 December 2009.
Sama otsusega andis komisjon teabe esitamise korralduse, nõudes Portugalilt ümberkorralduskava esitamist 22. detsembriks 2009.
The Commission decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union [7].
Komisjoni otsus menetluse algatamise kohta avaldati Euroopa Liidu Teatajas [7].
The Commission invited interested parties to submit comments on the aid measure.
Komisjon kutsus huvitatud isikuid üles esitama abimeetme kohta märkusi.
On 3 December 2009 the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that the State guarantee would be extended for a further 6 months.
3. detsembril 2009 teatasid Portugali ametiasutused komisjonile, et riigigarantiid pikendatakse veel kuue kuu võrra.
According to the Portuguese authorities the State was forced to renew the guarantee as an immediate disruption of BPP would clearly have compromised the solution currently under consideration.
Portugali ametiasutuste sõnul oli riik sunnitud garantiid pikendama, kuna BPP tegevuse kohene lõpetamine oleks selgelt kahjustanud kaalumisel olnud lahendust.
Since BPP was obviously in no condition to repay the loan, the banks that had granted the loan to BPP agreed to extend its maturity by another 6 months, without changing the current terms and without additional financing, on the condition that the corresponding State guarantee was also extended.
Kuna BPP ei olnud ilmselgelt suuteline laenu tagasi maksma, nõustusid BPP-le laenu andnud pangad selle tagastamise tähtpäeva seniseid tingimusi muutmata ja täiendava rahastamiseta veel kuue kuu võrra edasi lükkama tingimusel, et pikendatakse ka vastavat riigigarantiid.
On 5 December 2009 the State guarantee was consequently extended for a further 6 months.
5. detsembril 2009 pikendati seega riigigarantiid veel kuue kuu võrra.
The extension was not notified to the Commission: the Portuguese authorities merely informed the Commission that the guarantee on the loan would be renewed.
Pikendamisest komisjonile ei teatatud: Portugali ametiasutused teavitasid lihtsalt komisjoni, et laenu garantii kehtivust pikendatakse.
On 25 February 2010 the Portuguese authorities sent a letter explaining the elements that the Government considered should provide a basis for a solution to the problems created by BPP for a significant proportion of its clients, namely investors in the Absolute Return investment product.
25. veebruaril 2010 saatsid Portugali ametiasutused kirja, milles selgitasid elemente, mis valitsuse arvates peaksid olema aluseks BPP tekitatud probleemide lahendamisel olulise osa tema klientide, nimelt absoluutse tootlusega investeerimistootesse investeerinud investorite jaoks.
In the same letter the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that on 11 December 2009 the Government had decided to:
Samas kirjas teatasid Portugali ametiasutused komisjonile, et valitsus oli 11. detsembril 2009 otsustanud:
establish a closed and non-harmonised Special Investment Fund (Fundo Especial de Investimento – FEI), made up of the resources (gross assets and liabilities) held in the Absolute Return investment product, characterised by the following: (a) passive management of the Special Investment Fund; (b) in-kind share subscription; (c) 4-year term with possibility of extension up to a maximum of 10 years by decision of the assembly of shareholders (1 share = 1 vote); (d) voluntary membership of clients;
luua kinnine ja ühtlustamata eriinvesteerimisfond (Fundo Especial de Investimento), mis koosneb absoluutse tootlusega investeerimistootes hoitavatest vahenditest (koguvarad ja -kohustused) ja millel on järgmised tunnusjooned: a) eriinvesteerimisfondi passiivne juhtimine; b) mitterahalise sissemaksega tasutud aktsiate märkimine; c) nelja-aastane tähtaeg, mida on võimalik pikendada aktsionäride üldkoosoleku otsusega (1 aktsia = 1 hääl) kuni kümneks aastaks; d) klientide liikmesus on vabatahtlik;
renew the State loan guarantee of EUR 450 million until the Special Investment Fund was established;
pikendada 450 miljoni euro suurust riiklikku laenugarantiid kuni eriinvesteerimisfondi loomiseni;
activate the Deposit Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia de Depósitos – FGD), which guarantees repayment in full of the value of the cash credit balances of each depositor, where that value does not exceed EUR 100000, and the Investor Compensation System (Sistema de Indemnização aos Investidores – SII), which guarantees compensation of up to a maximum of EUR 25000 per investor, under the terms laid down by law, and does not involve any State resources;
aktiveerida hoiuste tagatisfond (Fundo de Garantia de Depósitos), mis tagab iga hoiustaja hoiusekonto jäägi summa täieliku tagasimaksmise, kui selle väärtus on kuni 100000 eurot, ja investorikaitse süsteem (Sistema de Indemnização aos Investidores), mis tagab investeeringute hüvitamise kuni 25000 euro suuruses summas investori kohta seaduses sätestatud tingimustel ja mis ei hõlma riigi vahendite kasutamist;
grant insurance cover of up to EUR 250000 to clients who joined the FEI, provided they were covered by the FGD and SII criteria; thus, the negative difference, if any, between the client’s revenue – in the form of reimbursements from the FGD and the SII and payments from the FEI – and the nominal value of the investment, up to a ceiling of EUR 250000, at 24 November 2008, is insured by the State.
anda kuni 250000 euro suurune kindlustuskaitse eriinvesteerimisfondiga ühinenud klientidele tingimusel, et nende suhtes kohaldatakse hoiuste tagatisfondi ja investorikaitse süsteemi kriteeriume; seega kindlustab riik 24. novembri 2008. aasta seisuga kuni 250000 euro ulatuses kliendi tulude – hoiuste tagatisfondist ja investorikaitse süsteemist saadud hüvitised ning eriinvesteerimisfondist saadud maksed – ja investeeringu nimiväärtuse negatiivse vahe (kui see on olemas).
The commitment taken on by the Portuguese State in relation to FEI’s investors, as resulting from its legal system, will be applicable only on the date of the Fund’s extinction, which is 4 years from the date of its establishment – 30 March 2014 [8].
Kohustus, mille Portugali riik võttis oma õigussüsteemist tulenevalt eriinvesteerimisfondi investoritega seoses, kehtib üksnes fondi likvideerimise kuupäevani, s.o neli aastat pärast fondi loomist, st 30. märtsini 2014 [8].
On 1 February 2010 the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) granted authorisation for the establishment of the FEI as described above, with Privado Fundos – Sociedade Gestora de Fundos de Investimento, S.A. responsible for managing the Fund and Banif – Banco de Investimento, S.A serving as depository for the Fund.
1. veebruaril 2010 andis Portugali väärtpaberituru järelevalve amet (CMVM) loa luua eriinvesteerimisfond, nagu eespool kirjeldatud, kusjuures fondi juhtimise eest pidi hakkama vastutama Privado Fundos – Sociedade Gestora de Fundos de Investimento, S.A. ja fondi depositooriumina tegutsema Banif – Banco de Investimento, S.A.
The FEI was established on 30 March 2010.
Eriinvesteerimisfond loodi 30. märtsil 2010.
On 16 April 2010 the Bank of Portugal issued a communication stating that BPP’s banking licence had been revoked by decision of 15 April, given the impossibility of restructuring or recapitalising the bank.
aprillil 2010 avaldas Portugali pank teate, milles märgiti, et BPP krediidiasutuse tegevusluba oli 15. aprilli 2010. aasta otsusega tühistatud, kuna panga ümberkorraldamine või rekapitaliseerimine ei olnud võimalik.
On 22 April the Bank of Portugal then requested the liquidation of BPP at the competent court (Tribunal de Comércio de Lisboa), presenting at the same time a proposal for the appointment of a liquidation committee.
Seejärel taotles Portugali pank 22. aprillil 2010 pädevas kohtus (Tribunal de Comércio de Lisboa) BPP likvideerimist, esitades samal ajal likvideerimiskomisjoni moodustamise ettepaneku.
The liquidation of BPP follows the Portuguese liquidation rules specifically applicable to banking institutions.
BPP likvideerimisel järgitakse Portugali likvideerimiseeskirju, mida kohaldatakse konkreetselt krediidiasutustele.
The Portuguese authorities estimate that the various legal steps set out under the relevant legislation mean that the liquidation may take approximately 1 year.
Portugali ametiasutuste hinnangu kohaselt tähendavad asjaomase õigusakti kohaselt kavandatud õiguslikud meetmed seda, et likvideerimine võib kesta ligikaudu aasta.
On 13 May 2010 the Portuguese authorities communicated to the Commission that, on the basis of the loan agreement [9], the guarantee had been called in by the bank syndicate and had been executed on 7 May, when Portugal had reimbursed EUR 450 million to the six banks.
mail 2010 teatasid Portugali ametiasutused komisjonile, et pangasündikaat oli garantii laenulepingu [9] alusel sisse nõudnud ja see nõue täideti 7. mail 2010, kui Portugal hüvitas kuuele pangale 450 miljonit eurot.
The Portuguese State stated that it had already taken the necessary steps to enforce its privileged and priority rights as creditor over the collateral relating to the guarantee, having presented its claims to the relevant court [10].
Portugali riik märkis, et ta oli juba võtnud vajalikke meetmeid enda kui võlausaldaja eesõiguste teostamiseks garantiiga seotud tagatise suhtes, olles esitanud oma nõuded asjaomasele kohtule [10].
In its decision of 10 November 2009 initiating the formal investigation procedure, the Commission set out its preliminary assessment and doubts as to the compatibility of the measures at hand with the internal market.
Komisjon esitas oma 10. novembri 2009. aasta ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses esialgse hinnangu vaatlusaluste meetmete kokkusobivuse kohta siseturuga ja sellega seoses tekkinud kahtlused.
The measures in question were:
Kõnealused meetmed olid järgmised:
The pricing of the guarantee, which was below the level normally required pursuant to the Banking Communication [11].
garantii hind, mis oli pangandusteatise [11] kohaselt tavapäraselt nõutavast hinnast väiksem.
The Commission doubted that the remuneration was appropriate taking into account the risk.
Komisjon kahtles, kas tasu oli riski arvesse võttes piisav.
The Commission only authorised such pricing based on Portugal’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan which would, in the longer term, adequately address this advantage.The fact that Portugal had not submitted the restructuring plan despite being formally reminded to do so by the letter dated 6 October 2009.
Komisjon kiitis sellise hinna heaks üksnes seetõttu, et Portugal võttis kohustuse esitada ümberkorralduskava, milles käsitletaks seda eelist pikemas plaanis piisavalt;asjaolu, et Portugal ei olnud esitanud ümberkorralduskava, kuigi talle oli seda 6. oktoobri 2009. aasta kirjaga ametlikult meelde tuletatud;
The extension of the guarantee (on 5 June 2009) beyond the 6 months initially approved by the Commission.
garantii komisjoni poolt esialgu heaks kiidetud kuuekuulise kehtivusaja pikendamine (5. juunil 2009).
OBSERVATIONS FROM PORTUGAL
PORTUGALI MÄRKUSED
In their comments on the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, the Portuguese authorities argued that they were not unaware of the commitment they undertook vis-à-vis the Commission to deliver a plan for the restructuring of BPP.
Portugali ametiasutused väitsid oma märkustes ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise kohta, et nad olid teadlikud komisjoni vastu võetud kohustusest esitada BPP ümberkorralduskava.
However, according to their submission of 13 April 2010, the ultimate responsibility for presenting the restructuring plan rested with BPP (with approval by the Bank of Portugal) and the responsibility of the Portuguese State was only to transmit the plan to the Commission.
Nende 13. aprilli 2010. aasta väidete kohaselt lasus lõplik vastutus ümberkorralduskava esitamise eest siiski BPP-l (Portugali pank pidi kava heaks kiitma) ja Portugali riik vastutas üksnes kava edastamise eest komisjonile.
The Portuguese authorities did not present the restructuring plan to the Commission simply because the plan presented by BPP was not approved by the Bank of Portugal.
Portugali ametiasutused ei esitanud komisjonile ümberkorralduskava lihtsalt seepärast, et Portugali pank ei kiitnud BPP esitatud kava heaks.
The injunction laid down in the Commission Decision of 10 November 2009 could not therefore be fulfilled, notwithstanding the political efforts by the Portuguese State to ensure that BPP actually met its obligations vis-à-vis the Bank of Portugal, the State and, ultimately, the Commission.
Komisjoni 10. novembri 2009. aasta otsuses antud korraldust ei saanud seega täita, hoolimata Portugali riigi poliitilistest jõupingutustest tagada, et BPP täidaks tegelikult oma kohustused Portugali panga, riigi ja lõpuks komisjoni vastu.
As regards the State aid to BPP, Portugal argues that it was, and is, compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) TFEU insofar as it was granted to guarantee the stability of the national financial system, by analogy with what was happening in the European context.
BPP-le antud riigiabi kohta väidab Portugal, et see oli ja on ELi toimimise lepingu artikli 107 lõike 3 punkti b kohaselt siseturuga kokkusobiv, sest see anti riikliku rahandussüsteemi stabiilsuse tagamiseks analoogiliselt sellega, mis toimus Euroopas.
As regards the extensions of the State guarantee on the EUR 450 million loan, Portugal argues that they did not constitute new State aid as there was no change to the situation underlying the Commission’s approval of the State aid measure.
450 miljoni euro suuruse laenu tagatiseks antud riigigarantii pikendamiste kohta väidab Portugal, et pikendamised ei kujutanud endast uut riigiabi, sest olukord ei muutunud võrreldes sellega, mille alusel komisjon riigiabimeetme heaks kiitis.
The State guarantee, extended twice, remained unaltered in its conditions: (i) there was no increase in the value of the loan; (ii) there was no modification to the obligations met by the loan [12]; (iii) under the guarantee contract, the guarantee would only expire thirty days after the date of the last payment of capital and interest and the Commission was aware that the loan agreement was for 2 years [13].
Kahel korral pikendatud riigigarantii tingimused jäid samaks: i) laenu väärtus ei suurenenud; ii) laenuga kaetud kohustusi ei muudetud; [12] iii) garantiilepingu kohaselt lõpeb garantii 30 päeva pärast kapitali ja intressi viimase makse kuupäeva ning komisjon oli teadlik, et laenuleping oli sõlmitud kaheks aastaks [13].
As for the non-notification of the extensions of the State guarantee, the Portuguese authorities argue that the renewal of the loan agreement was not dependent on the Portuguese State but on the bank syndicate and BPP, and that failure to extend the guarantee would have led to the same negative repercussions for the Portuguese financial system that had fully justified the Commission’s approval of the State aid measure.
Riigigarantii pikendamistest teatamata jätmise kohta väidavad Portugali ametiasutused, et laenulepingu pikendamine ei sõltunud Portugali riigist, vaid pangasündikaadist ja BPPst, ning garantii pikendamata jätmine oleks avaldanud Portugali rahandussüsteemile samasugust negatiivset mõju, mille alusel oli komisjon täiesti põhjendatult riigiabimeetme heaks kiitnud.
Furthermore, Portugal considers that the extensions of the guarantee were automatic under the contract regulating the loan agreement, although they were formalised nonetheless for reasons of legal certainty vis-à-vis the bank syndicate.
Lisaks leiab Portugal, et garantii pikendamised toimusid laenulepingu alusel automaatselt, kuigi need vormistati siiski õiguskindluse tagamise huvides pangasündikaadi suhtes.
Further, according to the Portuguese authorities, the extensions (even if they are considered to constitute new aid) did not give rise to an economic advantage, because BPP was not, in practice, operating, at least from 1 December 2008 onward.
Lisaks väidavad Portugali ametiasutused, et pikendamised (isegi kui leitakse, et tegemist oli uue abiga) ei andnud majanduslikku eelist, sest BPP ei tegutsenud tegelikult vähemalt alates 1. detsembrist 2008.
Thus the measure, with or without the extensions, did not ‘grant an economic advantage to BPP or strengthen its position in relation to its competitors for the simple reason that BPP was not operating on the market and, consequently, was not in competition with other banks’ [14].
Seega ei andnud meede, pikendamistega või ilma, „BPP-le majanduslikku eelist või tugevdanud tema positsiooni võrreldes tema konkurentidega sel lihtsal põhjusel, et BPP ei tegutsenud turul ega konkureerinud seega muude pankadega” [14].
Portugal therefore considers that the measure affected neither competition nor trade among Member States.
Portugal leiab seepärast, et meede ei kahjustanud konkurentsi ega liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
In its observations on the comments of the interested parties (see below), the Portuguese authorities stated that the EUR 450 million loan was used in a transparent way in order to avoid systemic contagion and to meet BPP’s liabilities as registered in the balance sheet on 24 November 2008.
Portugali ametiasutused väitsid oma tähelepanekutes huvitatud isikute märkuste kohta (vt allpool), et 450 miljoni euro suurust laenu kasutati läbipaistval viisil, et vältida süsteemset kahju ja täita BPP bilansilised kohustused 24. novembri 2008. aasta seisuga.
The Portuguese authorities also observe that Portugal will assert its rights over the collateral attached to the guarantee as part of BPP’s liquidation proceedings.
Portugali ametiasutused märgivad ka, et Portugal teostab BPP likvideerimismenetluse osana oma õigused garantiiga seotud tagatise suhtes.
In view of its status as a privileged creditor of BPP, Portugal is confident that it will be able to recoup the full amount of EUR 450 million it disbursed to the creditor banks.
Enda kui BPP privilegeeritud võlausaldaja staatust silmas pidades on Portugal kindel, et ta saab tagasi kogu 450 miljoni euro suuruse summa, mille ta andis laenu andnud pankadele.
In this respect, the Portuguese authorities note that the value of the collateral was, as of 7 May 2010, more than 20 % higher than the total amount of the guaranteed loan.
Seoses sellega märgivad Portugali ametiasutused, et tagatise väärtus oli 7. mai 2010. aasta seisuga üle 20 % suurem tagatud laenu kogusummast.
As regards the State’s commitment to compensate losses up to EUR 250000 of Absolute Return clients who joined the FEI, Portugal argues that this commitment does not constitute State aid since: (i) it does not entail the transfer of any State resources to the FEI’s management company or to any other body active on the market; (ii) it is a regular and accepted mechanism that is a logical extension of the system for compensating investors; (iii) it does not entail any economic advantage for investors, to whom it is directed generically and in exclusive terms, in accordance with national and European legal requirements, or any distortion of competition on the market or in relations between Member States.
Seoses riigi võetud kohustusega hüvitada kuni 250000 euro ulatuses selliste absoluutse tootlusega instrumente omavate klientide kahjud, kes olid ühinenud eriinvesteerimisfondiga, väidab Portugal, et see kohustus ei kujuta endast riigiabi, sest i) sellega ei kaasne riigi vahendite üleandmist eriinvesteerimisfondi haldusettevõtjale või mõnele muule turul tegutsevale organile, ii) see on korrapärane ja heakskiidetud mehhanism, mis on investorikaitse süsteemi loogiline järg, iii) vastavalt riigi ja Euroopa õigusnormidele ei kaasne sellega majanduslikku eelist investoritele, kellele see on üldiselt ja eranditult suunatud, ega konkurentsi kahjustamist turul või liikmesriikidevahelistes suhetes.
Furthermore, Portugal argues that actual payments to FEI clients following this commitment will be minimal, if indeed any are made at all.
Lisaks sellele väidab Portugal, et sellest kohustusest tulenevad tegelikud maksed eriinvesteerimisfondi klientidele on minimaalsed, kui neid loomulikult üldse tehakse.
The Portuguese authorities consider the EUR 250000 insurance cover to be a measure to instil confidence in FEI clients, which however will not lead to actual disbursement in most scenarios.
Portugali ametiasutused leiavad, et 250000 euro suurune kindlustuskaitse on eriinvesteerimisfondi klientides usaldust äratav meede, mis ei too siiski enamiku stsenaariumide järgi kaasa tegelikke väljamakseid.
OBSERVATIONS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
MUUDE HUVITATUD ISIKUTE MÄRKUSED
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Commission Decision of 10 November 2009 to open the formal investigation procedure, the Commission received comments, on 6 April 2010, from duly identified third parties who wished to remain anonymous.
Komisjoni 10. novembri 2009. aasta ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse artikli 6 kohaselt sai komisjon 6. aprillil 2010 märkused nõuetekohaselt tuvastatud kolmandatelt isikutelt, kes soovisid jääda anonüümseks.
In their comments on the initiation of the formal investigation procedure the interested parties pointed out that none of the conditions under which the State guarantee on the loan was granted (maximum duration of 6 months and the submission of a restructuring plan) had been respected.
Huvitatud isikud juhtisid oma märkustes ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise kohta tähelepanu sellele, et ühtegi tingimust, mille alusel anti laenule riigigarantii (maksimaalne kestus kuus kuud ja ümberkorralduskava esitamine) ei olnud täidetud.
Therefore, according to the observations submitted, the aid was illegal and the Commission should order Portugal to discontinue the guarantee.
Esitatud märkuste kohaselt oli abi seega ebaseaduslik ja komisjon peaks nõudma Portugalilt garantii lõpetamist.