natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In January 2002 ASS, originally a small subsidiary active in painting works, concluded a framework agreement with SSPH for the construction of hulls and leased production assets from SSPH for this purpose.
aasta jaanuaris sõlmis ASS, mis algselt oli väike värvimistöödega tegelev tütarettevõtja, SSPHga raamlepingu kerede ehitamiseks ja rentis selle jaoks SSPH-lt tootmisvarasid.
Some weeks before SSPH filed for bankruptcy, it sold ASS to ARP for PLN 1.
Mõni nädal enne seda, kui SSPH esitas pankrotiavalduse, müüs ta ASSi ARPile 1 Poola zloti eest.
ASS was then renamed Stocznia Szczecińska Nowa (SSN — the beneficiary of the aid).
Seejärel nimetati ASS ümber Stocznia Szczecinska Nowaks (SSN – abisaaja).
SSN did not take over the debts of SSPH or SS, and so those debts stayed with those two companies and were dealt with under the bankruptcy procedure.
SSN ei võtnud üle SSPH või SSi võlgasid ning seega jäid need võlad asjaomase kahe äriühingu kanda ning neid käsitleti pankrotimenetluse alusel.
SSN took over some ongoing works by concluding new contracts with the shipowners.
SSN võttis üle mõningad pooleliolevad tööd, sõlmides laevaomanikega uued lepingud.
The volume of production increased from 158000 CGT in 2003 to 213000 CGT in 2005 but in 2006 it dropped to 167000 CGT.
Tootmismaht suurenes 158000 CGT-lt (kompenseeritud kogumahutavus) 2003. aastal 213000 CGT-le 2005. aastal, kuid langes 2006. aastal 167000 CGT-le.
Its main customers are located in Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and Italy.
Laevatehase peamised kliendid asuvad Saksamaal, Madalmaades, Venemaal ja Itaalias.
Its main competitors in Europe are Spanish, German and Croatian shipyards.
Selle peamised konkurendid Euroopas on Hispaania, Saksamaa ja Horvaatia laevatehased.
Currently 80 % of SSN is owned by Korporacja Polskie Stocznie SA (Polish Shipyards Corporation SA, hereinafter KPS) and 18 % is owned by ARP.
Praegu kuulub 80 % SSNist Poola Laevatehaste Liidule (Korporacja Polskie Stocznie S.A; edaspidi „KPS”) ning 18 % ARPile.
2 % of the shares are owned by the State Treasury.
2 % aktsiatest kuulub riigikassale.
ARP is a limited company established by law and wholly owned by the State Treasury.
ARP on seaduse alusel asutatud kapitaliühing, mis kuulub täielikult riigikassale.
ARP conducts activities entrusted to it by law, including participating in ownership-restructuring processes in State-owned enterprises, managing State Treasury assets and shares on behalf of State institutions and providing loans and guarantees for the restructuring of public enterprises.
ARP teostab talle seadusega ettenähtud tegevust, mille hulka kuulub osalemine riigi omanduses olevate äriühingute kuuluvuse ümberkorraldamises, riigikassa varade ja aktsiate haldamine riigiasutuste nimel ning laenude ja garantiide andmine riigi osalusega äriühingute ümberkorraldamiseks.
KPS is 100 % owned by ARP and was created to provide financing for shipbuilding companies in Poland.
KPS kuulub 100 % ARPile ja see loodi Poola laevaehitusettevõtete finantseerimiseks.
SSN is active in the production of ships, including container ships, chemical tankers, ro-ro ships and multipurpose vessels.
SSNi tegevusala on laevade, sealhulgas konteinerlaevade, kemikaalitankerite, ro-ro laevade ja mitmeotstarbeliste laevade tootmine.
1 % of the company’s business is in producing metal structures and various shipbuilding-related services.
1 % äriühingu äritegevusest moodustab metallkonstruktsioonide tootmine ja laevaehitusega seotud teenuste osutamine.
SSN’s main production facilities are three slipways: Wulkan Nowy, Odra Nowa and Wulkan 1.
SSNi peamised tootmisrajatised on kolm ellingut: Wulkan Nowy, Odra Nowa ja Wulkan 1.
Immediately after its creation in 2002, SSN started to carry out restructuring activities.
Kohe pärast äriühingu asutamist 2002. aastal alustas SSN ümberkorraldustegevust.
Because of these problems the financial markets became reluctant to finance the shipbuilding, and this led to delays in deliveries and hence an accumulation of penalties and debts.
Nende probleemide tõttu ei soovinud finantsturud laevaehitust rahastada ja see põhjustas tarnete hilinemist ning seega trahvide ja võlgade kuhjumist.
The aim of the restructuring strategy was to achieve enduring profitability by focusing on the container ship market and becoming an important producer of chemical tankers, ro-ro and con-ro vessels and special-purpose vessels.
Ümberkorraldusstrateegia eesmärk oli saavutada kestev kasumlikkus, keskendudes konteinerlaevade turule ja saades oluliseks kemikaalitankerite, ro-ro ja kon-ro laevade ning eriotstarbeliste laevade tootjaks.
The restructuring plan also included the possibility of finding a strategic investor.
Ümberkorralduskava sisaldas ka strateegilise investori leidmise võimalust.
It was necessary to alter the original restructuring plan in 2003 because of the financial difficulties of the cooperating companies, employees and activities closely associated with SSN.
Tingituna koostööd tegevate ettevõtete rahalistest raskustest, tööjõust ja SSNiga tihedalt seotud tegevusest oli 2003. aastal vaja algset ümberkorralduskava muuta.
The financial situation of SSN gradually deteriorated significantly.
SSNi rahaline olukord muutus järk-järgult märgatavalt halvemaks.
SSN’s production
SSNi toodang
Source: 2006 Information Memorandum, submitted by the Polish authorities on 12 October 2007, and ‘Business plan for SSN for 2008-2012 taking into account the information obtained in the course of the due diligence process carried out in the shipyard’, submitted by letter of 29 February 2008.
Allikas: 2006. aasta teabekiri, mille Poola ametiasutused esitasid 12. oktoobril 2007, ning 29. veebruari 2008. aasta kirjaga esitatud „SSNi äriplaan aastateks 2008–2012, võttes arvesse laevatehases korraldatud nõuetele vastavuse kontrolli käigus saadud teavet”.
(PLN million)
(miljonites Poola zlottides)
Operating result
Tegevuskahjum
Equity
Aktsiakapital
The external factors contributing to the difficult financial situation included the depreciation of the dollar (the currency of the yard’s revenues) and the appreciation of the zloty (the currency of the costs), rising steel prices and difficulty in obtaining ship financing following the bankruptcy of SSPH.
Rasket rahalist olukorda süvendasid järgmised välistegurid: dollari odavnemine (laevatehase tulude vääring) ning zloti kallinemine (kulude vääring), terasehinna tõus ja probleemid laevade jaoks rahaliste vahendite saamisel pärast SSPH pankrotti.
As regards internal reasons for the yard’s difficulties, it has been recognised that the facilities were in poor condition and required significant upgrading.
Laevatehasest endast sõltuvate põhjuste kohta on välja selgitatud, et rajatised olid halvas seisukorras ja vajasid olulist uuendamist.
From 2006 the yard faced serious workforce problems: a high rate of absenteeism, rotation of employees and the outflow of qualified workers to other shipyards, in particular in Germany and Norway, where the wages offered were significantly higher.
Alates 2006. aastast oli laevatehasel tõsiseid probleeme tööjõuga: kõrge töölt puudumise määr, personalivoolavus ja kvalifitseeritud töötajate lahkumine teistesse laevatehastesse, eeskätt Saksamaale ja Norrasse, kus pakuti oluliselt kõrgemat palka.
DECISION TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 88(2) OF THE EC TREATY
OTSUS ALGATADA EÜ ASUTAMISLEPINGU ARTIKLI 88 LÕIKE 2 KOHANE MENETLUS
In its decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the Commission initially found that some of the measures notified to it constituted new aid under point 3 of Annex IV to the Accession Treaty because they were not granted at the time of accession.
Ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses leidis komisjon esialgu, et teatavaid komisjonile teatatud meetmeid võis vastavalt ühinemislepingu IV lisa punktile 3 lugeda uueks abiks, kuna neid ei rakendatud ühinemise ajal.
The Commission listed these measures in part B of the Annex to that decision.
Komisjon loetles asjaomased meetmed otsuse lisa B-osas.
The Commission also decided that a number of measures, listed in part A of the Annex to the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, were granted to SSN prior to 1 May 2004 and were not applicable after accession within the meaning of point 3 of Annex IV to the Accession Treaty, and would not therefore be examined under the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
Samuti otsustas komisjon, et mitut ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse lisa A-osas loetletud meedet rakendati SSNi toetuseks enne 1. maid 2004 ning et need ei ole pärast ühinemist ühinemislepingu IV lisa punkti 3 tähenduses kohaldatavad ning seetõttu neid EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 2 sätestatud menetluse alusel ei uurita.
Those measures are not therefore covered by the present Decision.
Neid meetmeid seega kõnealune otsus ei käsitle.
None the less, they have to be taken into account when assessing the compatibility with the common market of the measures granted after accession.
Sellegipoolest tuleb neid võtta arvesse, kui hinnatakse pärast ühinemist rakendatud meetmete kokkusobivust ühisturuga.
In essence, with regard to the measures listed in part B of the Annex to the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the Commission argued that a legally binding decision on these measures had not been taken prior to accession, although it recognised that some preliminary steps towards such a decision had been taken.
Seoses ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse lisa B-osas loetletud meetmetega väitis komisjon peaasjalikult seda, et nende meetmete kohta ei olnud enne ühinemist tehtud õiguslikult siduvat otsust, tunnistades siiski, et teatavaid esialgseid samme oli sellise otsuse suunas astutud.
The first of these measures is a capital injection by ARP.
Esimene sellistest meetmetest on ARPi kapitalisüst.
The 2003 restructuring plan provided for a capital injection of PLN 241752900 but only a part of this capital injection (PLN 180 million) was implemented before accession.
aasta ümberkorralduskavaga nähti ette 241752900 Poola zloti suurune kapitalisüst, kuid enne ühinemist rakendati sellest vaid osa (180 miljonit Poola zlotti).
ARP was, however, unable to implement the entire capital increase of PLN 241752900 for budgetary reasons.
ARP ei suutnud kapitali kogu 241752900 Poola zloti ulatuses suurendada aga eelarvelistel põhjustel.
According to Poland, the decision to implement the remaining capital increase (PLN 61752652) was taken on 21 December 2004.
Poola andmetel tehti otsus kapitali ülejäänud suurendamise (61752652 Poola zlotti) rakendamise kohta 21. detsembril 2004.
The second and third aid measures are performance guarantees provided by ARP (each corresponding to aid of PLN 1935000).
Teine ja kolmas abimeede on ARPi antud täitmisgarantiid (kumbki väärtuses 1935000 Poola zlotti).
Thus the guarantees for ships 7 and 8 were supposed to be granted when ships 4 and 5 were delivered (in 2005).
Seega oli kavas anda garantii laevadele nr 7 ja 8 siis, kui laevad nr 4 ja 5 üle antakse (2005. aastal).
The last set of measures which, according to the information available, were not granted before accession, are measures granted to SSN by the City of Szczecin in the form of write-offs and deferrals of payment of real estate tax.
Viimane kogum meetmeid, mida vastavalt kättesaadavale teabele ei rakendatud enne ühinemist, on Szczecini linna meetmed SSNi toetuseks – kinnisvaramaksu kustutamine ja maksmise edasilükkamine.
In total these measures represent PLN 12,5 million.
Kokku on nende meetmete väärtus 12,5 miljonit Poola zlotti.
These measures, according to the information provided by the Polish authorities [5], have not been granted to the yard to this day.
Neid meetmeid ei ole Poola ametiasutuste esitatud teabe kohaselt [5] laevatehase suhtes tänaseni rakendatud.
The Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation because of the following doubts as to the compatibility of the restructuring aid with the common market.
Komisjon otsustas algatada ametliku uurimise lähtuvalt järgmistest kahtlustest seoses ümberkorraldusabi kokkusobivusega ühisturuga.
Firstly, the Commission had doubts concerning the eligibility of SSN to receive restructuring aid.
Esiteks oli komisjonil kahtlusi seoses sellega, kas SSNil oli õigust saada ümberkorraldusabi.
It appeared that the company had been created to take over the activities of its bankrupt predecessor, without, however, taking over the debts of the latter.
Tundus, et äriühing loodi pankrotistunud eelkäija tegevuse ülevõtmiseks, kuid tolle võlgasid seejuures üle ei võetud.
The Commission therefore considered that SSN was a new company within the meaning of the applicable Community guidelines.
Seetõttu pidas komisjon SSNi kohaldatavate ühenduse suuniste tähenduses uueks äriühinguks.
Secondly, the Commission had doubts as to whether the restructuring activities (already carried out and ongoing) would lead to the long-term viability of SSN.
Teiseks kahtles komisjon selles, kas ümberkorraldusmeetmed (juba võetud ja võetavad) tagavad SSNi pikaajalise elujõulisuse.
The restructuring undertaken by the yard mainly concerned reducing debt and improving liquidity in order to permit production to continue.
Laevatehase ümberkorraldamine seisnes peamiselt võla vähendamises ja likviidsuse parandamises, et võimaldada jätkata tootmist.
The alleged costs of genuine restructuring activities included the costs of purchasing the means of production from the receiver in bankruptcy of SSPH and SS.
Algupärase ümberkorraldustegevuse väidetavad kulud sisaldasid SSPH ja SSi pankrotihalduritelt tootmisvahendite ostmise kulusid.
The Commission noted that even at the end of the restructuring period the planned level of productivity would remain relatively low compared with that of competing European shipyards.
Komisjon märkis, et isegi ümberkorraldusperioodi lõpus jäi kavandatud tootlikkuse tase konkureerivate Euroopa laevatehaste omaga võrreldes üsna madalaks.
Thirdly, based on the information available, the Commission had doubts as to whether appropriate compensatory measures had been adopted, as in fact no genuine reduction of production capacity had been implemented at the yard.
Kolmandaks kahtles komisjon kättesaadava teabe põhjal selles, kas vastu võetud kompensatsioonimeetmed olid asjakohased, kuna tootmisvõimsuse tegelikku vähendamist ei oldud laevatehases õigupoolest ellu viidud.
Fourthly, the Commission had doubts as to whether some of the alleged restructuring costs, such as the costs of purchasing production assets, should be considered eligible as genuinely related to the restructuring.
Neljandaks kahtles komisjon selles, kas teatavaid väidetavaid ümberkorralduskulusid, näiteks tootmisvarade ostmise kulusid, tuleks pidada ümberkorraldamisega reaalselt seotud abikõlblikeks kuludeks.
Finally, the Commission had doubts as to whether the beneficiary’s own contribution to the restructuring plan, either from its own resources or from external financing on market terms, was significant.
Viimasena kahtles komisjon selles, kas abisaaja omaosalus ümberkorralduskavas – kas siis omavahenditest või turutingimustel toimuva välisrahastamise kaudu – oli oluline panus.
In particular, the Commission doubted whether the use of cumulated profit constituted an own contribution.
Eelkõige kahtles komisjon selles, kas kumuleerunud kasumi kasutamist saab pidada äriühingu omaosaluseks.
In addition, the Commission noted that 78 % of the alleged own contribution was made up of advance payments from shipowners, guaranteed by KUKE, the Polish export credit agency.
Peale selle märkis komisjon, et 78 % väidetavast omaosalusest koosnes laevaomanike ettemaksetest, millele esitas garantii Poola ekspordikrediidiagentuur KUKE.
Considering that SSN was a company in financial difficulties, the Commission had doubts as to whether the guarantee premiums charged appropriately reflected the risk involved, whether the collateral required by KUKE was sufficient, and, therefore, whether the proposed own contribution was free of State aid.
Pidades silmas, et SSN oli rahalistes raskustes äriühing, kahtles komisjon selles, kas nõutud garantiitasud kajastavad asjakohaselt seotud riski, kas KUKE nõutud tagatis on piisav ning kas väidetav omaosalus ei sisalda mitte riigiabi.
Following the Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the Polish authorities submitted their comments on the decision.
Pärast komisjoni otsust algatada ametlik uurimismenetlus esitasid Poola ametiasutused otsuse kohta oma märkused.
The beneficiary did not present any separate arguments but endorsed the submission of the Polish Government.
Abisaaja ei esitanud eraldi argumente, kuid väljendas toetust Poola valitsuse esitatud märkustele.
The Polish authorities raised several issues.
Poola ametiasutused tõstatasid mitu küsimust.
The main contested issue was whether certain aid measures were put into effect before the accession of Poland to the European Union, i.e. before 1 May 2004, and were not applicable after accession.
Peamine vaidlustatud teema oli küsimus, kas teatavad abimeetmed jõustati enne Poola ühinemist Euroopa Liiduga, st enne 1. maid 2004, ning kas need on kohaldatavad pärast ühinemist.
Such measures cannot be examined by the Commission; only measures that were not granted before accession are assessed by the Commission as notified aid or as unlawful aid pursuant to the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
Selliseid meetmeid ei saa komisjon uurida; komisjon peab teatatud abiks või ebaseaduslikuks abiks vastavalt EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 2 sätestatud menetlusele üksnes neid meetmeid, mida ei rakendatud enne ühinemist.
The Polish authorities contested the Commission’s finding that the measures presented in part B of the Annex to the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure constituted new aid.
Poola ametiasutused ei olnud nõus komisjoni järeldusega, et ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse lisa B-osas loetletud meetmete puhul on tegemist uue abiga.
The Polish authorities argued that all the measures included in that table were granted before Poland’s accession and therefore no new aid was planned or granted to SSN.
Poola ametiasutused väitsid, et kõiki tabelis sisalduvaid meetmeid rakendati enne Poola ühinemist ning seega ei ole SSNile ette nähtud ega antud mingit liiki uut abi.
Capital injection (part B of the Annex to the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, measure 61)
Kapitalisüst (ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse lisa B-osa, meede nr 61)
Firstly, the Polish authorities argued that SSN had had legitimate expectations that the aid envisaged in the 2003 restructuring plan was compatible with State aid law.
Esiteks väitsid Poola ametiasutused, et SSNil oli õiguspärane ootus, et 2003. aasta ümberkorralduskavaga ette nähtud abi on kooskõlas riigiabiõigusega.
The Polish authorities referred in particular to two documents: ‘Situation of the Polish shipbuilding industry, recommended actions and support for this sector’ (adopted by the Council of Ministers on 16 July 2002) and ‘Mid-term strategy of guarantees from the State Treasury up to 2010’ (adopted by the Council of Ministers on 10 June 2003).
Poola ametiasutused osutasid eeskätt kahele dokumendile: „Poola laevaehitustööstuse olukord, soovitatavad meetmed ja sektori toetamine” (vastu võetud valitsuse poolt 16. juulil 2002) ja „Riigikassa garantiide keskpikaks perioodiks kehtestatud strateegia 2010. aastani” (vastu võetud valitsuse poolt 10. juunil 2003).
The Polish authorities argued that these and similar actions by the central, regional and municipal authorities had been part of a widespread programme to save the shipbuilding industry.
Poola ametiasutused väitsid, et need ja muud sarnased keskvalitsuse ning piirkondlike ja kohalike omavalitsuste meetmed olid osa ulatuslikust programmist laevaehitustööstuse päästmiseks.
Secondly, the Polish authorities claimed that the Commission, by requiring the adoption of a ‘legally binding act’, was applying the criteria of EC law to events and national law prior to accession.
Teiseks väitsid Poola ametiasutused, et komisjon, nõudes õiguslikult siduva dokumendi vastuvõtmist, kohaldab EÜ õiguse kriteeriume ühinemiseelsete sündmuste ja riiklike seaduste suhtes.
Poland asserted that Polish State aid legislation had applied prior to accession and that this legislation ‘did not provide for a formal decision granting the aid addressed to the beneficiary at any point of the procedure.’
Poola kinnitas, et enne ühinemist kohaldati Poola riigiabiõigust ning selles „ei nähtud mitte ühegi menetlusetapi puhul ette ametliku otsuse vastuvõtmist abisaajale suunatud abi andmise kohta”.
All the Polish legislation required was approval of the restructuring plan and the aid measures contained therein by the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Protection, which had indeed been given.
Poola õigusaktide kohaselt oli ainus nõue see, et konkurentsi- ja tarbijakaitseameti president kiidaks ümberkorralduskava ja selles sisalduvad abimeetmed heaks, ning seda oli ta ka tõepoolest teinud.
The Polish authorities argued that ‘it is uncontested that each measure contained in the finally approved restructuring plan was agreed between SSN and the relevant aid-granting authority’.
Poola ametiasutused väitsid, et „on selge, et kõikides lõplikult heakskiidetud ümberkorralduskavas sisalduvates meetmetes olid SSN ja asjakohane abi andev asutus kokku leppinud”.
Furthermore, Poland submitted that the provisions of EC law were not applicable to events which took place before Poland’s accession and that the Fleuren case [6], to which the Commission referred in its decision to initiate the formal investigation, differed fundamentally from the present case.
Peale selle märkis Poola, et EÜ õiguse sätted ei ole kohaldatavad enne Poola ühinemist aset leidnud sündmuste suhtes ning et Fleureni kohtuasi, [6] millele komisjon ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses osutas, on käesolevast juhtumist täiesti erinev.
Thirdly, it was argued that the approval of the restructuring plan by the Supervisory Board of SSN should be considered an aid-granting event.
Kolmandaks väideti, et SSNi nõukogu heakskiitu ümberkorralduskavale tuleks pidada abi andmise toimumiseks.
In response to the Commission’s doubts as to whether the Supervisory Board was the entity entitled to adopt decisions with financial repercussions binding on shareholders, Poland submitted that the Supervisory Board represented the interests of the shareholders because it was appointed by them.
Vastuseks komisjoni kahtlustele, kas nõukogu saab võtta vastu otsuseid, millel on aktsionäridele siduvaid rahalisi tagajärgi, teatas Poola, et nõukogu esindab aktsionäride huve, kuna nõukogu nimetavad aktsionärid.
The members of the Supervisory Board acted on instructions from the shareholders (ARP and the State Treasury) and their acts constituted a commitment of the ARP and the State Treasury to grant the aid.
Nõukogu liikmed toimisid aktsionäride (ARPi ja riigikassa) juhtnööride kohaselt ning oma tegevusega kohustusid ARP ja riigikassa abi andma.
Fourthly, Poland argued that the approval of the 2003 restructuring plan by the ARP team for the shipbuilding industry had reinforced the legitimate expectations of the yard because the members of this team were all representatives of ARP on the Supervisory Board.
Neljandaks väitis Poola, et ARPi laevaehitustööstuse töörühma heakskiit 2003. aasta ümberkorralduskavale oli tugevdanud laevatehase õiguspärast ootust, kuna selle töörühma liikmed olid kõik nõukokku kuuluvad ARPi esindajad.
Poland also confirmed that the real decisions were taken by the Supervisory Board and the ARP shareholders’ meeting.
Samuti kinnitas Poola, et tegelikud otsused tehti nõukogu ja ARPi aktsionäride koosolekul.
Finally, the Polish authorities claimed that the aid had been granted before accession because the exposure of the State had been specified in the 2003 restructuring plan and was therefore known before accession.
Viimaks väitsid Poola ametiasutused, et abi oli antud enne ühinemist, kuna riigi majanduslik seotus oli kindlaks määratud 2003. aasta ümberkorralduskavas ja seega oli see teada enne ühinemist.