natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Prior to the application for the Government support, the Group explored other possible sources of external risk capital, but without success.
Enne riigiabi taotluse esitamist uuris kontsern edutult muid võimalusi saada toetust välistest riskikapitali allikatest.
Despite the fact that AB Volvo is in a strong position to access external funding, there is very limited external funding available for this type of long-term aerospace R & D project, partly due to perceived high project risks.
Hoolimata sellest, et kontsernil on välisrahastamise osas head väljavaated, on pikaajaliste lennundus- ja kosmosevaldkonna teadus- ja arendusprojektide puhul keeruline leida väliseid rahastamisallikaid, osaliselt ka sellepärast, et kõnealuseid projekte peetakse väga riskantseks.
The Swedish authorities also provided arguments explaining why borrowing would not be suitable to fund capital-intensive aerospace R & D projects with high technological and commercial risks and very long pay-back periods.
Rootsi ametiasutused esitasid ka argumendid selle kohta, miks laenu võtmine ei ole asjakohane kapitalimahukate, suurte tehniliste ja kaubanduslike riskidega ja väga pikkade tagasimaksetähtaegadega teadus- ja arendusprojektide rahastamiseks lennundus- ja kosmosevaldkonnas.
The Swedish authorities explained that the Volvo Group sought external risk-sharing financing for the GEnx project without success.
Rootsi ametiasutused selgitasid, et kontsern püüdis projekti GEnx jaoks edutult leida riskijagamist hõlmavat rahastamist väljastpoolt.
The Volvo Group approached Nordea Bank, but the bank would not provide risk-sharing financing.
Kontsern pöördus kõnealuses küsimuses Nordea panga poole, aga sai eitava vastuse.
The Volvo Group also contacted private equity players on an informal basis, but without success.
Kontsern võttis mitteametlikult ühendust ka erasektori riskikapitali pakkujatega, aga tema taotlusi ei saatnud edu.
Finally, Volvo Aero was able to secure only a small contribution from one sub-contractor (Carlton ForgeWorks) to cover the entry fee to GE.
Volvo Aero suutis lõpuks saada ainult väikese panuse ühelt alltöövõtjalt (Carlton Forge Works) ja maksis sellest GE-le projektiga ühinemise tasu.
The Commission therefore is able to conclude that no external funding was available for the GEnx project.
Komisjon on eespool esitatud andmete alusel jõudnud seega järeldusele, et projektile GEnx ei olnud võimalik leida väliseid rahastamisallikaid.
The Commission also noted in the opening decision that the financial policies of Volvo Group seem to imply that State funding was the pre-condition for financing its subsidiaries.
Uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses märkis komisjon, et kontserni Volvo rahastamispoliitika näib tütarettevõtjate rahastamisel lähtuvat riigiabist kui eeltingimusest.
In their observations, the Swedish authorities explained that public funding was not a precondition for the Group to finance its subsidiaries.
Rootsi ametiasutused selgitasid oma märkustes, et riigilt toetuse saamine ei olnud kontsernile eeltingimus oma tütarettevõtjate rahastamiseks.
The Group’s financial policies define the procedures for seeking alternative sources of funding, either through loans from outside the Volvo Group or commercial credit and other forms of structured products, including public funding.
Kontserni rahastamispoliitika raames on kehtestatud menetlused alternatiivsete rahastamisallikate (näiteks väljastpoolt kontserni saadavad laenud või kommertslaenud ning muud struktureeritud tooted, sealhulgas rahastamine riiklikest vahenditest) leidmiseks.
On the basis of the comments provided, the Commission finds that while the non-availability of the aid has forced Volvo Aero to rely heavily on the intra-group financing, the Group does not appear to be in a position to sustain such funding in the long run without imposing risks on other Group’s operations.
Saadud märkuste põhjal leiab komisjon, et kuigi Volvo Aero oli riigiabi kättesaamatuse tõttu sunnitud suurel määral toetuma kontsernisisesele rahastamisele, ei suuda kontsern projekti rahastamist pikema ajavahemiku jooksul jätkata, kuna see seaks ohtu tema teiste tegevusvaldkondade rahastamise.
In light of the new elements and the reduction in the aid from the Swedish authorities to take account of the Group’s own de facto contribution to the project at the date of the formal granting of the aid, the Commission is able to conclude that the aid is intended to address a market failure.
Komisjon võtab arvesse uusi andmeid ja asjaolu, et Rootsi ametiasutused vähendavad abisummat, arvestades rahalist panust, mille kontsern oli abi ametliku heakskiitmise kuupäevaks juba teinud, ning järeldab, et abi eesmärk on kõrvaldada turutõrge.
In its opening decision the Commission expressed doubts about the incentive effect of the aid, as the formal agreement of the Swedish Government of the aid to be granted was given when the project had been largely implemented, at least for the Boeing B787.
Uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses väljendas komisjon kahtlust abi ergutava mõju suhtes, kuna Rootsi valitsus kiitis abi andmise ametlikult heaks alles siis, kui projekt oli suures osas juba rakendatud (vähemalt lennukitüübi Boeing B787 puhul).
As the decision was taken when the project was almost complete, it seemed to cover risks not related to the R & D content of the project.
Kuna abiandmisotsus võeti vastu alles projekti lõppjärgus, tundus, et abiga kaetakse riske, mis ei ole seotud projekti teadus- ja arendustegevuse aspektiga.
According to chapter 6 of the R & D&I Framework the Commission has first to look whether the request for the aid was submitted by the beneficiary before the start of the R & D project.
Vastavalt TAI raamistiku 6. peatükile peab komisjon kõigepealt kontrollima, kas abisaaja esitas abitaotluse enne teadus- ja arendusprojekti algust.
As already indicated in the opening decision, the aid was requested by Volvo Aero before the start of the project, thus respecting the provision contained in the second paragraph of chapter 6 of the R & D&I Framework.
Nagu uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses juba märgitud, taotles Volvo Aero abi enne projekti algust ning pidas seega kinni TAI raamistiku 6. peatüki teises lõigus sisalduvast sättest.
The Commission notes that it normally questions the incentive effect of a measure whenever a formal decision to grant the aid is taken by the State at a point where the project is well advanced and de facto financed by the beneficiary.
Komisjon osutab sellele, et peab harilikult meetme ergutavat mõju küsitavaks, kui riik võtab abiandmisotsuse vastu projekti hilises etapis ning kui abisaaja on projekti tegelikult juba oma vahenditest rahastanud.
In the case of R & D, it is essential that the aid should have an impact on the behaviour of the Company, in inducing a larger or a speedier investment in a project.
Teadus- ja arendusprojektide puhul on äärmiselt oluline, et abi mõjutaks ettevõtja käitumist ning ajendaks teda tegema projekti suuremaid või kiiremaid investeeringuid.
Without such an impact, the aid would have no incentive effect and would therefore not be necessary.
Sellise mõju puudumine tähendab ühtlasi abi ergutava mõju puudumist ja abi ei ole seega vajalik.
In order to have such an impact, the aid has to be decided upon by the State, either formally, but with a suspensive clause in view of the necessary approval by the Commission of the compatibility of the aid on the basis of the Article 88(3) of the Treaty, or through a letter of intent, which would not give rise to any legitimate expectations but would be sufficiently strong to indicate a willingness by the State to support a project [17].
Kirjeldatud mõju saavutamiseks peab riik võtma vastu ametliku abiandmisotsuse, tingimusel et komisjon kiidab abi kokkusobivuse ühisturuga asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõike 3 alusel heaks, või andma kirjaliku kinnituse, mis ei annaks alust õiguspäraste ootuste tekkeks, ent milles väljendataks piisavalt selgelt riigi tahet projekti toetada [17].
The Commission also notes that a necessary condition for the compatibility of aid to a R & D project is an early notification of the aid under Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
Komisjon märgib lisaks, et teadus- ja arendusprojektidele antava abi kokkusobivuse hindamisel on oluline tingimus ka abist varajane teatamine asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõike 3 alusel.
A notification of aid to a project which is close to its end would mean that the State is not convinced about the aid it intends to grant or not able to give an assurance about such aid.
Kui komisjonile teatatakse abist, mida kavatsetakse anda lõppjärgus olevale projektile, tähendab see, et riik ei ole veendunud kavandatava abi vajalikkuses või ei saa sellise abi andmist kinnitada.
If on the face of this uncertainty, the Company is able to carry out the project, and even to conclude it, it is likely then that the aid is largely not necessary for the Company itself.
Kui ettevõtja suudab sellise ebakindluse taustal projekti alustada ning selle koguni lõpule viia, ei ole abi talle tõenäoliselt vajalik.
According to Chapter 6 of the R & D&I Framework, the Commission has to assess, for all individual measures, a number of criteria indicating the incentive effect of the aid, related to the increase in size, scope or speed of the project or the increase in total amount spent by the beneficiary on R & D. The Commission, in performing the detailed assessment of the incentive effect, has based itself on point 7.3.3 of the R & D&I Framework.
Komisjon peab vastavalt TAI raamistiku 6. peatükile hindama iga üksikmeetme puhul mitmesuguseid tegureid, mis viitavad abi ergutavale mõjule, sealhulgas projekti suurenemine, selle ulatuse laienemine või kiiruse suurenemine või abisaaja poolt teadus- ja arendustegevuseks kulutatava kogusumma suurenemine. Komisjon tugines abi ergutava mõju üksikasjalikul hindamisel TAI raamistiku punktile 7.3.3.
In determining the incentive effect of the aid in changing the behaviour of the Company, the Commission questioned the value of the oral assurances by the Government given to Volvo Aero in December 2004.
Ettevõtja käitumist muutva ergutava mõju kindlakstegemisel seadis komisjon kahtluse alla valitsuse poolt 2004. aasta detsembris Volvo Aerole antud suulise kinnituse väärtuse.
The Swedish authorities and third parties reiterated in their observations that the assurances by the Government to provide the aid were a decisive factor in the decision by Volvo Aero to engage in the project.
Rootsi ametiasutused ja kolmandad isikud rõhutasid esitatud märkustes, et valitsuselt saadud kinnitus abi andmise kohta oli Volvo Aerole projektiga ühinemisel otsustava tähtsusega.
Volvo Aero’s contacts with the Ministry of Industry during the autumn of 2004 further strengthened Volvo Aero in its confidence that the resources set aside by the Parliament would be used to support the GEnx R & D project [18].
Volvo Aero kontaktid majandusministeeriumiga 2004. aasta sügisel tugevdasid Volvo Aero veendumust, et parlamendis kättesaadavaks tehtud vahenditega kavatsetakse toetada projekti GEnx raames toimuvat teadus- ja arendustööd [18].
The Swedish authorities also provided internal documents demonstrating that the Company counted on the assurances concerning the aid before engaging in the project [19].
Rootsi ametiasutused esitasid ka sisedokumente, millest nähtub, et Volvo Aero toetus enne projektiga ühinemist valitsuselt saadud kinnitusele abi andmise kohta [19].
As indicated by the former CEO of the Company, had Volvo Aero not received such assurances from the Government, the GE agreement would not have been concluded, as the project would represent an unacceptable level of risk and scale of investment for the Company and the Group.
Volvo Aero endine peadirektor osutas asjaolule, et kui ettevõtja ei oleks valitsuselt sellist kinnitust saanud, ei oleks GEga kokkulepet sõlmitud, kuna projektiga oleks ettevõtjale ja kontsernile kaasnenud vastuvõetamatult suur risk ja investeeringute maht.
According to Sweden, the fact that there is no counterfactual project (i.e. a project that the Company would carry out in the absence of aid) could also show that Volvo Aero had expectations of receiving the aid, as with the TRENT 900 project [20].
Rootsi sõnul võib alternatiivse projekti (projekt, mida ettevõtja suudaks rakendada ilma riigi toetuseta) puudumine viidata asjaolule, et Volvo Aero arvestas riigiabi saamisega samamoodi nagu varasema projekti TRENT 900 [20] puhul.
GE has also confirmed in its observations that the prospect of receiving aid was important to Volvo Aero’s decision to become a risk-sharing partner.
Ka GE kinnitas oma märkustes, et väljavaade saada riigiabi oli Volvo Aerole oluline tema otsuses projektiga ühineda ja teiste partneritega riske jagada.
The GE agreement with Volvo Aero dated 15 December 2004 also contains a reference to the support from the Swedish State.
GE ja Volvo Aero vahel 15. detsembril 2004 sõlmitud kokkuleppes sisaldub samuti viide Rootsi riigilt saadavale abile.
The Commission took into account the economic arguments provided by the Swedish authorities justifying why the GEnx project would not have taken place without Government support.
Komisjon võttis arvesse Rootsi ametiasutuste majanduslikke argumente, millega selgitatakse, miks projekti GEnx ei oleks olnud võimalik rakendada valitsuse toetuseta.
First, high upfront costs would put an unacceptable strain on the Company’s financial position.
Esiteks oleksid projekti alustamise suured kulud pannud ettevõtja väga raskesse rahalisse olukorda.
As evidenced by financial documents, Volvo Aero was able to finance only up to 60 % of the project costs from its operating cash flow while the remaining 40 % of the project costs were temporarily covered from the intra-group cash pool in anticipation of the expected public funding.
Finantsdokumentidest nähtub, et Volvo Aero oli suuteline oma põhitegevuskäibest rahastama ainult kuni 60 % projekti kuludest ning ülejäänud 40 % kaeti ajutiselt kontserni vahenditest, eeldusel et saadakse riigiabi.
The Commission notes that while the aid seems to have had a limited effect on liquidity (the project has after all been financed by Volvo Aero from its internal cash flow and intra-group funding) and a limited effect on profitability in terms of its impact on the internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV), the aid reduced the financial exposure of Volvo Aero, thus reducing the project risks in the event of its technological or commercial failure.
Komisjon märgib, et abi mõju likviidsusele näib olevat piiratud (kokkuvõttes rahastas projekti siiski Volvo Aero oma käibest ja kontserni vahenditest), samuti näib olevat piiratud abi mõju tulususele nii ettevõttesisese tulususe kui ka kasumimäära tähenduses, ent abiga vähendatakse Volvo Aero finantskoormust ning seega ka riske, mis on seotud projekti tehnilise või kaubandusliku luhtumisega.
The R & D work related to GEnx presented additional risks which were not present in the CF6-80 programme, which was pure production work without any R & D component.
Projekti GEnx raames toimuva teadus- ja arendustööga kaasnesid täiendavad riskid, mis programmi CF6-80 puhul puudusid, kuna viimane kujutas endast puhast tootmist ega sisaldanud teadus- ja arendustegevust.
The Commission questioned in its opening decision the incentive effect of the aid that would come when the project was very nearly complete and the nature of technical and commercial risks changed.
Uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses kahtles komisjon abi ergutavas mõjus, kuna projekt oli juba lõppjärgus ning sellega seotud tehnilised ja kaubanduslikud riskid olid muutunud.
In their observations, the Swedish authorities demonstrated adequately that technical and commercial risks were still very significant even when the R & D project was at a fairly advanced stage due to the novelty of the technology and Volvo Aero’s limited experience of this type of project.
Rootsi ametiasutused suutsid oma märkustes aga veenvalt tõestada, et tehnilised ja kaubanduslikud riskid olid ka projekti lõppjärgus seoses uuendusliku tehnoloogia ja Volvo Aero väheste kogemustega endiselt suured.
In light of the above, the Commission is able to conclude that internal decision-making documents and GE observations indicate the critical importance of the aid for Volvo Aero in taking the decision to engage in the project because it reduces risk levels to a level that is acceptable for the Company to undertake the project.
Komisjon võib eespool esitatud andmete põhjal järeldada, et ettevõtja sisedokumentidest ja GE märkustest nähtub abi suur tähtsus Volvo Aerole projektiga ühinemise otsuse tegemisel, kuna abi aitab vähendada ettevõtja jaoks riske projekti rakendamiseks vastuvõetava tasemeni.
On the basis of these elements, the Commission is able to accept that the aid had an incentive effect as it was considered necessary in order for Volvo Aero to engage in the GEnx project.
Komisjon võib kõnealustele andmetele toetudes nõustuda abi ergutava mõju olemasoluga, sest abi oli Volvo Aerole projektiga GEnx ühinemiseks vajalik.
In its opening decision, the Commission stated it was not entirely convinced about the proportionality of the aid as concerns the repayment terms of the repayable advance.
Uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses ei olnud komisjon tagastatava ettemakse tagasimaksmistingimuste tõttu abi proportsionaalsuses täielikult veendunud.
Given that the reimbursement of the advance is structured on the basis of SEK sales figures, while revenues from sales to GE are USD-based, the Commission suspected that the foreign exchange risks might be borne by the Government and not by the Company.
Kuna ettemakse tagasimaksmine põhineb Rootsi kroonides arvestataval müügitulul, aga GE-le komponentide müümisest saadavat tulu arvestatakse USA dollarites, kahtlustas komisjon, et valuutavahetuskursist tulenevat riski kannab valitsus ja mitte Volvo Aero.
The Commission notes the arguments presented by the Swedish authorities that it is Volvo Aero and not the Government that bears the foreign exchange risk, given that Volvo Aero receives payments from GE in USD, while the aid has to be repaid in SEK.
Komisjon võtab teadmiseks Rootsi ametiasutuste väited selle kohta, et olukorras, kus Volvo Aero saab GE-lt makseid USA dollarites, aga abi tuleb tagasi maksta Rootsi kroonides, kannab valuutavahetuskursist tulenevat riski Volvo Aero ja mitte valitsus.
Besides, since the repayment of the advance is based on revenues from sales (regardless of currency) and not units sold, the instrument is more proportionate, as it also includes the sale of spare parts.
Ametiasutused väitsid ka, et kuna ettemakse tagasimaksmine põhineb müügitulul (vääringust sõltumata) ja mitte müüdud ühikute arvul, on abi proportsionaalsem, sest hõlmab ka varuosade müüki.
The repayment terms of the repayable advance would seem to confirm the proportionality of the aid: returns are set at 7,32 %, surplus repayments are not capped in time and the repayment is on a quarterly basis based on revenues from GE.
Tagastatava ettemakse tagasimaksmistingimused näivad abi proportsionaalsust kinnitavat: intressimääraks on kehtestatud 7,32 %, jääksumma tagasimaksmine on tähtajatu ning abi tagasimaksmine toimub GE-lt saadud tulu alusel kord kvartalis.
While the Commission notes that the foreign exchange risk should be borne by the Company, the fact that the reimbursement is made on all revenues and not just on sales of engines balances the potential advantage to the Company from foreign exchange gains.
Komisjon võtab teadmiseks, et valuutavahetuskursist tulenevat riski peab kandma Volvo Aero, märgib aga, et kui tagasimaksmine toimub kõikidest tuludest ja mitte ainult mootorite müügist saadavast tulust, kaalub see üles ettevõtjale valuutavahetuskursist tuleneva võimaliku tulu.
Furthermore, the repayment advance is in line with the R & D&I Framework and it is a less distorting aid instrument.
Lisaks sellele on tagasimaksmistingimused kooskõlas TAI raamistikuga ja tegemist on konkurentsi vähem moonutava abimeetmega.
Taking into account also the relatively high return demanded by Sweden, the aid can be considered to be proportionate, as concerns the foreign exchange risk.
Võttes arvesse ka Rootsi kehtestatud võrdlemisi kõrget intressimäära, võib abi käsitleda proportsionaalsena valuutavahetuskursist tuleneva riskiga.
The Commission further points out that a repayable advance is a risk-sharing instrument that, where the project is successful, allows for a more than proportionate reimbursement from the beneficiary: If sales forecasts are reached, the aid is fully reimbursed, including interest.
Komisjon toob esile asjaolu, et tagastatav ettemakse on riskijagamist hõlmav instrument, mis võimaldab abisaajal projekti edu korral maksta tagasi proportsionaalsest osast rohkem. Müügiprognooside täidemineku korral makstakse abi koos intressidega täielikult tagasi.
If sales fall below the forecast, the reimbursement is reduced proportionally [21].
Juhul kui prognoositud tulemusi ei saavutata, vähendatakse tagasimakseid proportsionaalselt [21].
If sales are above the forecast, the reimbursement exceeds the amount of the advance received.
Juhul kui tulemused osutuvad aga prognoositust paremaks, makstakse tagasi saadud ettemaksest suurem summa.
In assessing whether the aid is proportionate to the nature and magnitude of the market failure, the Commission must ensure that the aid is limited to the necessary minimum.
Selleks et hinnata, kas abi on proportsionaalne turutõrke ulatuse ja iseloomuga, peab komisjon tagama abisumma piiratuse vajaliku miinimumiga.
In its letter of 12 November 2008 the Commission therefore questioned whether the whole amount of the aid was actually necessary, considering that the aid was formally agreed when the project was fairly advanced and Volvo Aero had been able to finance the costs through the cash-pool described above.
Seetõttu kahtles komisjon oma 12. novembri 2008. aasta kirjas, kas terve abisumma väljamaksmine on vajalik, kuna abi andmine kiideti ametlikult heaks alles projekti lõppjärgus ja Volvo Aero oli suuteline rahastama projekti kulud kontserni vahenditest, nagu on kirjeldatud eespool.
In response to the Commission’s concerns that the aid may not have been kept to the minimum, the Swedish authorities acknowledged that the aid granting process and the financial situation of the Group were an indication that the amount of aid could be reduced compared to their initial intention.
Vastuseks komisjon kahtlusele selle kohta, et abisumma ei vasta miinimumile, tunnistasid Rootsi ametiasutused, et abiandmisprotsess ja kontserni finantsolukord annaksid põhjust esialgset abisummat vähendada.
They proposed to reduce the amount of the aid based on the de facto situation of Volvo Aero at the moment of the agreement to grant the aid on 14 June 2007.
Nad tegid ettepaneku vähendada abisummat vastavalt Volvo Aero tegelikule olukorrale abi andmise heakskiitmise kuupäeval 14. juunil 2007.
As of that date, Volvo Aero covered approx. 66,5 % of the eligible costs, of which 60 % had been covered from Volvo Aero internal cash.
Kõnealuseks kuupäevaks oli Volvo Aero katnud ligikaudu 66,5 % abikõlblikest kuludest ning neist 60 % oli ta katnud oma rahakäibest.
The remaining 6,5 %, equivalent to approx. SEK 58 million (approx. EUR 6 million), was financed from the intra-group cash pool.
Ülejäänud 6,5 % kuludest, mis vastavad ligikaudu 58 miljonile Rootsi kroonile (ligikaudu 6 miljonit eurot), kaeti kontserni vahenditest.
In summary, Sweden proposes to reduce the total aid amount from the initially requested SEK 362 million (approx. EUR 39 million) to approx. SEK 304 million (approx. EUR 33 million).
Kokkuvõttes teeb Rootsi ettepaneku vähendada abi kogusummat esialgu taotletud 362 miljonist Rootsi kroonist (ligikaudu 39 miljonit eurot) umbes 304 miljoni Rootsi kroonini (ligikaudu 33 miljonit eurot).