natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission considers that, to establish that the aid was limited to a minimum, it is necessary to check firstly whether the solvency rate of IFB, which will retain its activities in Belgium, does not exceed the average of its competitors, and then if IFB divested its shareholdings in France at the lowest possible cost.
Komisjon leiab, et veendumaks abi piirdumises miinimumiga, tuleb esmalt kontrollida, ega Belgias tegevust jätkava IFB maksejõulisuse määr ei ületa tema konkurentide keskmist ning seejärel seda, kas IFB loobus oma osalustest Prantsusmaal minimaalse võimaliku kuluga.
Solvency rate not exceeding the average of competitors
Maksejõulisuse määr ei ületa konkurentide keskmist
Belgium provided additional information in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure.
Vastuses menetluse algatamise kirjale esitas Belgia täiendavat teavet.
Firstly, it calculated the solvency rate of the six terminal companies which are most comparable to IFB and the solvency rate of the six logistics companies which are most comparable to IFB.
Esmalt arvutas ta välja kuue IFBga võrreldava terminale käitava ettevõtte ning kuue kõige paremini võrreldava logistikaettevõtte maksejõulisuse määrad.
Then, it calculated an average, weighting the average rates of the terminal companies and the logistics companies in relation to the relative strength of these two activities within IFB.
Seejärel arvutas ta välja keskmise, lähtudes terminale käitavate ettevõtete ja logistikaettevõtete keskmistest vastavalt nende tegevusliikide osakaalule IFB tegevuses.
This produced an average solvency rate of 35,6 %, which corresponds to IFB’s solvency rate after the foreseen increase in capital.
Sellest tulenes keskmine maksejõulisuse määr 35,6 %, mis vastab IFB maksejõulisuse määrale pärast kavandatud kapitali suurendamist.
Furthermore, Belgium demonstrated that the two most direct competitors to IFB, namely the companies Gosselin and Hupac, have very similar solvency rates (38,9 % and 34,9 % respectively).
Lisaks näitas Belgia, et kahe IFB kõige otsesema konkurendi, kelleks on Gosselin ja Hupac, maksejõulisuse määrad on sellele väga lähedased (vastavalt 38,9 % ja 34,9 %).
In view of the additional information provided by Belgium, and the fact that the increase in capital has been reduced, in relation to the initial recommendation of EUR 120 million contained in the McKinsey plan of December 2003, to EUR 95,3 million, the Commission considers that the increase in capital is limited to what is strictly necessary.
Arvestades Belgia esitatud täiendavat teavet ning asjaolu, et kapitali suurendati algselt McKinsey 2003. aasta detsembri ümberkorraldusavas soovitatud 120 miljoni euro asemel 95,3 miljoni euro võrra, leiab komisjon, et kapitali suurendamisel piirduti rangelt miinimumiga.
Divestiture of shareholdings in France at lowest cost
Prantsusmaa osaluste loovutamine vähima kuluga
As regards the divestiture of IFB’s French subsidiaries, the Commission has further verified that, during its withdrawal, IFB always chose the lowest cost option, in order to limit withdrawal costs, and therefore aid, to a minimum.
IFBi Prantsusmaa tütarettevõtete osalustest loobumise puhul kontrollis komisjon ka seda, kas IFB valis osalustest loobumiseks kõige vähem kuluka viisi ning kas abi piirdus seega miinimumiga.
The legal divestiture of Acimar by judicial settlement cost of EUR 3,9 million (see section 2 of this decision).
Acimari osalusest loobumine tervendamisemenetluse teel maksis 3,9 miljonit eurot (vt käesoleva otsuse 2. osa).
The Commission notes that Belgium demonstrated that the alternative, that is to say the continuation of its activities, would have necessitated the financing of the annual cash-drain by IFB until the end of 2005, which would have represented a loss of EUR 10,8 million in total, without any certainty of being able recover the debts of EUR 3,9 million which would have had to be abandoned in the judicial settlement.
Komisjon leiab, et Belgia on tõendanud, et tegevuse jätkamine alternatiivina oleks eeldanud IFB poolt kuni 2005. aasta lõpuni raha äravoolu rahastamist, mis oleks tähendanud kokku 10,8 miljoni euro suurust kahjumit, ilma, et see oleks kindlalt taganud võimalust rahuldada 3,9 miljoni euro ulatuses nõudeid, millest tervendamismenetluse käigus loobuti.
The Commission consequently concludes that IFB chose the lowest cost option for Acimar.
Komisjon leiab seetõttu, et Acimar'i puhul valis IFB kõige vähem kuluka lahenduse.
As regards NFTI-ou, which was a company controlled jointly by IFB and Port Autonome de Dunkerque, operating the terminals in the port of Dunkerque, IFB explored two possibilities: the pursuit of activities, or divestiture by selling its shareholding.
Mis puutub NFTI-ou-sse, mille näol oli tegemist äriühinguga, mida kontrollisid ühiselt IFB ja Port Autonome de Dunkerque, kes tegelesid Dunkerque’i sadamas asuvate terminalide käitamisega, siis uuris IFB kahte võimalust: tegevuse jätkamist või oma osakute müügi teel osalusest loobumist.
Divestiture would have led to costs of EUR 18,5 million (see detailed description in section 2 of this decision).
Osalusest loobumise kulud olid 18,5 miljonit eurot (vt üksikasjalikumalt käesoleva otsuse 2. osa.)
As regards the alternative, that is to say the continuation of activities, Belgium demonstrated in its reply that this would have generated losses of EUR 36,2 million (see detailed description in section 3 of this decision).
Alternatiivi ehk tegevuse jätkamise suhtes tõendas Belgia oma vastuses, et sellega oleks kaasnenud 36,2 miljoni euro suurune kahjum (vt üksikasjalikumalt käesoleva otsuse 3. osa).
In view of the cost of these two options, the Commission considers that IFB chose the least expensive option.
Arvestades kahe stsenaariumi maksumust, leiab komisjon, et IFB valis vähem kuluka lahenduse.
The handover of IFB France, which subsequently became AGEP, to NFTI-ou cost EUR 0,9 million (see detailed description in section 2 of this decision).
IFB France’i loovutamine (millest seejärel sai AGEP) NFTI-ou-le maksis 0,9 miljonit eurot (vt üksikasjalikumalt käesoleva otsuse 2. osa).
The question arises as to whether allowing IFB France to file for bankruptcy would not have been less costly for IFB.
Nüüd tekib küsimus, kas IFB France pankrotistumine ei oleks IFB jaoks olnud odavam.
The Commission considers that Belgium has not presented evidence of this risk of coverage of liabilities.
Komisjon leiab, et nende kohustuste tekkimise ohtu ei ole Belgia tõendanud.
Therefore, the Commission must reject this argument.
Seetõttu peab komisjon argumendi tagasi lükkama [51].
The Commission concludes that the handover of IFB France cost at least the same as its continuation would have done.
Komisjon leiab niisiis, et IFB France’i loovutamine maksis vähemalt sama palju kui oleks maksnud selle tegevuse jätkamine.
The Commission therefore concludes that IFB selected one of the two least expensive options.
Komisjon leiab niisiis, et IFB valis ühe kahest odavaimast lahendusest.
For the Dry Port of Dunkerque, it had been decided to liquidate this company, by the preliminary sale of a part of the assets, namely the shareholding of 8,6 % in NFTI-ou.
Dry Port Dunkerque’i puhul otsustati äriühing likvideerida, müües eelnevalt osa selle varadest, sealhulgas 8,6 % osalus NFTI-ou-s.
That cost EUR 7,9 million (see detailed description in section 2 of this decision).
See maksis 7,9 miljonit eurot (vt üksikasjalikumalt käesoleva otsuse 2. osa).
In the alternative scenario, i.e. the continuation of activities, IFB would have had to finance the annual cash drain generated by the company’s losses, which would have presented an additional charge of EUR 2,6 million.
Alternatiivse stsenaariumi, see tähendab tegevuse jätkamise korral oleks IFB pidanud finantseerima äriühingu iga-aastast raha äravoolu, mis oleks tekitanud 2,6 miljoni euro suuruse lisakoormuse.
Consequently, liquidation was the least costly option.
Seetõttu oli likvideerimine kõige vähem kulukas lahendus.
In view of the strategic decision to leave the French market, the decision to sell SSTD for EUR 0,2 million (see detailed description below in section 2) was the most attractive option for IFB.
Arvestades strateegilist otsust Prantsusmaa turult väljuda, oli otsus müüa SSTD 0,2 miljoni euro eest (vt üksikasjalikult käesoleva otsuse 2. osa) IFB jaoks kõige soodsam lahendus.
The Commission concludes that IFB divested its shareholdings in France at the lowest possible cost, and that as a consequence the finance allocated by SNCB to finance this divestiture, which was necessary for the viability of the remainder of IFB, was limited to the minimum possible.
Komisjon leiab, et IFB loovutas oma osalused Prantsusmaal vähima võimaliku kuluga ja seetõttu piirdus IFB ülejäänud tegevuse elujõulisuse seisukohast vajaliku osaluste loovutamise rahastamine SNCB poolt miinimumiga.
Beneficiaries’ own contribution
Eigenbeitrag der Beihilfeempfängerin
Point 40 of the 1999 guidelines states that:
aasta suuniste punktis 40 märgitakse:
‘Aid beneficiaries will be expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources, including through the sale of assets that are not essential to the firm’s survival, or from external financing at market conditions.’
„Abisaajatelt oodatakse omavahenditest tehtavat olulist makset ümberkorraldamiskava heaks, sealhulgas äriühingu säilimiseks ebaoluliste varade müügi või turutingimustes toimuva välisfinantseerimise kaudu.”
In the letter initiating the procedure (point 270), the Commission noted that, according to the restructuring plan, IFB did not appear to make a significant contribution of its own to its restructuring, and therefore the Commission had doubts as to whether IFB contributed sufficiently to its restructuring.
Menetluse algatamise kirjas (punkt 270) märkis komisjon, et ümberkorralduskava kohaselt ei näi IFB oma ümberkorraldamist ise olulises osas finantseerivat ning seetõttu kahtleb komisjon selles, kas IFB poolne ümberkorraldamise omafinantseering on küllaldane.
Belgium, in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, explained in detail what it considered IFB’s own contributions to be (see description in section 3 of this decision, points 194 to 201).
Vastuses menetluse algatamise kirjale selgitas Belgia üksikasjalikult, mida tema peab IFB poolseks ümberkorraldamise omafinantseeringuks (vt käesoleva otsuse 3. osa punktid 194–201).
The Commission assesses Belgium’s explanations as follows:
Komisjon annab Belgia selgitustele järgmise hinnangu:
Costs of restructuring
Ümberkorraldamise kulud
The Commission starts by determining the total cost of restructuring, net of productivity gains and reduction in working capital requirement.
Komisjon alustab sellest, et teeb kindlaks ümberkorraldamise kogukulud, tootlikkuse optimeerimise kulud ja käibekapitali vajaduse vähenemise.
Net costs of restructuring
Ümberkorraldamise kulud
Net operating loss
Tegevuse puhaskahjum
Increase in working capital requirement
Käibekapitali vajaduse suurenemine
Investments and replacement of non-financial assets
Kompenseerivad investeeringud mitterahalisse põhivarasse
Investments in financial assets
Investeeringud finantspõhivarasse
Interest payments to businesses other than SNCB
Intresside maksmine teistele ettevõtjatele peale SNCB
Repayment of financial debt
Rahalise võla tagasimaksed
Partial repayment of debt and interest to SNCB
SNCB-le võla ja intresside osaline tagasimakse
Tax debts
Maksuvõlad
In this respect, the Commission considers that it is justified, in accordance with its decision-making process [52], in retaining the costs in the table above, rather than the costs presented by Belgium (see the table in point 184), in particular for the following reasons:
Komisjon leiab, et tema varasema otsustamispraktika kohaselt [52] tuleb põhjendatult lähtuda ülaltoodud tabelis kajastatud kuludest ja mitte Belgia esitatud kuludest (vt punktis 184 toodud tabel) ning seda eelkõige järgmistel põhjustel:
The operating loss (the ‘cash drain’).
tegevuskahjum (raha äravool).
Belgium had included EUR 27,916 million as ‘gross operating loss’ in the restructuring costs.
Belgia lisas ümberkorralduskulude hulka 27,916 miljonit eurot kui „tegevuse bruto kahjumi”.
The Commission considers that, in line with its decision-making practice [53], only the net operating loss should be included in the restructuring costs.
Komisjon leiab oma praktikale [53] tuginedes, et ümberkorralduskulude hulka saab lugeda üksnes tegevuse neto kahjumi.
These costs may be obtained by deducting the productivity gains during the restructuring period (EUR 25,167 million) from the gross operating loss during the restructuring period (EUR 27,916 million).
Need kulud saadakse, kui lahutada ümberkorraldusperioodil tekkinud tegevuse brutokahjumist (27,916 miljonit eurot) ümberkorraldusperioodil saavutatud tootlikkuse kasv (25,167 miljonit eurot).
Consequently, the net operating loss is EUR 2,749 million,Variations in working capital requirement.
Seetõttu on tegevuse netokahjum 2,749 miljonit eurot; käibevahendite vajaduse muutmine.
In the sections ‘costs’ and ‘own contribution’, Belgium mentions variations in the working capital requirement [54].
Kulude ja omafinantseeringu osas märgib Belgia ära käibevahendite vajaduse muutumise [54].
In accordance with the Commission’s decision-making practice [55], only the net increase in working capital requirement should be taken into account for the restructuring costs, which is EUR 12,998 million [56],Inter-group transfers.
Komisjoni varasema praktika [55] kohaselt tohib ümberkorralduskuludena arvesse võtta üksnes käibevahendite vajaduse netokasvu, mis on 12,998 miljonit eurot [56]; kontsernisisesed ülekanded.
In the costs of restructuring, Belgium includes, under the heading ‘investments in financial assets’, inter-group transfers linked to the centralisation of the Belgian shareholdings in the group.
Belgia lisas ümberkorralduskulude hulka rubriigis „investeeringud finantspõhivarasse” kontsernisisesed ülekanded, mis olid seotud kontserni Belgia osaluste koondamisega.
These transfers were as follows: shares in RKE (a Belgian firm, described in detail in section 2, point 47, of the letter initiating the procedure), held by Haeger & Schmidt International (a 100 % subsidiary of IFB in Germany, described in detail in section 2, point 47, of the letter initiating the procedure) were transferred to IFB, which now holds them directly, and no longer indirectly via Haeger & Schmidt International.
Need ülekanded olid järgmised: Haeger & Schmidt International’ile (IFB 100 % osalusega Saksamaa tütarettevõte, mida on üksikasjalikult kirjeldatud menetluse algatamise kirja 2. osa punktis 47) kuulunud RKE (Belgia äriühing, mida on üksikasjalikult kirjeldatud menetluse algatamise kirja 2. osa punktis 47) aktsiad anti üle IFB-le, kellele need kuuluvad nüüd otse, mitte enam kaudselt Haeger & Schmidt International’i kaudu.
The price of this transaction was EUR 1,6 million and was settled by a cash payment of EUR 0,6 million and by a reduction in IFB’s receivables (current account) from Haeger & Schmidt International of EUR 1 million.
Selle tehingu hind oli 1,6 miljonit eurot ning selle eest maksti 0,6 miljoni eurot rahas ja 1 miljoni euro ulatuses vähendas IFB oma (jooksevkonto) võlanõudeid Haeger & Schmidt International’i vastu.
The Commission considers that this transaction, which constitutes a transfer within the IFB group, may not be taken into consideration as a restructuring cost, as it is financially neutral at group level.
Komisjon leiab, et seda tehingut, mis kujutab endast IFB kontsernisisest vara ülekandmist, ei saa ümberkorralduskuluna arvestada, kuna kontserni tasandil ei ole sellel mingisugust finantsmõju.
At a cost of EUR 0,6 million to IFB, this corresponds to an increase in profits of EUR 0,6 million for Haeger & Schmidt International, which appears in the consolidated accounts for the group as a profit increase.
Tegelikult vastab IFB 0,6 miljoni euro suurusele kulule Haeger & Schmidt International’i 0,6 miljoni euro võrra paranenud tulem, mis nähtub konsolideeritud raamatupidamisaruandest kui kontserni kasumi suurenemine.
Financing by SNCB and own shareholding in IFB
SNCB finantseering ja IFB omafinantseering
It will involve a conversion into capital of the credit facility and receivables for which a payment extension was awarded, together with the interest pertaining to it.
Finantseerimine toimus krediidi ning edasilükatud võlanõuete ning nendega seotud intresside kapitaliks konverteerimise teel.
Contrary to point 43 of the 2004 guidelines, the 1999 guidelines do not prevent the firm’s own contribution consisting of future profits.
Erinevalt 2004. aasta suuniste punktist 43 ei välistata 1999. aasta suunistes seda, et ettevõtja omafinantseering seisneb tulevases oodatavas kasumis.
The Commission considers that, within the context of the 1999 guidelines, future profits can constitute an own contribution, if the future profits were foreseeable at the time when the restructuring plan was prepared.
Komisjon leiab, et 1999. aasta suuniste raames võib tulevast oodatavat kasumit käsitleda omafinantseeringuna, kui see tulevane kasum on prognoositav ümberkorralduskava ettevalmistamise ajal.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that these future profits were foreseeable at the time when the restructuring plan was prepared.
Seetõttu leiab komisjon kokkuvõttes, et kõnealune tulevane kasum oli ümberkorralduskava ettevalmistamise ajal prognoositav.
The co-ownership rights (50 %) to these assets utilised by OCHZ were ceded for a price of EUR 4,5 million.
OCHZi vara kaasomandiosa (50 %) loovutati 4,5 miljoni euro eest.
Autocare Europe and IFB France in 2003,
Autocare Europe ja IFB France aastal 2003;
GIE OCHZ, Brussels Port Invest SA and Brussels Terminal Intermodal SA in 2004, and
GIE OCHZ, Brussels Port Invest SA ning Brussels Terminal Intermodal SA aastal 2004 ning
CNC Ferry Boats Intermodal in 2005.
CNC Ferry Boats Intermodal aastal 2005.
As described in point 187, these future receipts were foreseeable at the time when the restructuring plan was prepared.
Nagu märgitud punktis 187, olid need tulevased tulud prognoositavad ümberkorralduskava ettevalmistamise ajal.
The Commission considers that Belgium has demonstrated that, by means of the sales to private firms described above, IFB has reduced its activities to its core business.
Komisjon leiab, et Belgia on tõendanud, et IFB vähendas eelkirjeldatud eraõiguslike ettevõtjate müügiga oma tegevust põhitegevusalal.
They have been obtained under market conditions, and without the offer of security on the part of SNCB or the Belgian State to the banking establishments.
Need saadi turutingimustel ja ilma SNCB tagatise või Belgia riigi poolt krediidiasutusele antud tagatiseta.
Finally, IFB is contributing EUR 1,105 million, arising from exceptional receipts.
Viimaks hõlmab IFB omafinantseering ka erakorralistest tuludest saadud 1,105 miljonit eurot.
These exceptional receipts correspond to capital increases achieved on the sale of non-financial assets (mainly of EAOS wagons and rolling stock at the terminals).
Need erakorralised tulud vastavad mitterahalise põhivara müügist saadud lisandväärtusele (peamiselt EAOS-vagunid ning terminalide liikuvvahendid).
The Commission concludes that IFB’s own involvement in the restructuring costs amounts to EUR 24,927 million. The following table summarise all IFB’s contributions:
Komisjon leiab, et IFB finantseeris ise enda ümberkorraldamist kokku 24,927 miljoni euroga.
Profits 2004 to 2006
Kasum aastatel 2004–2006
Sale of non-financial assets
Mitterahalise põhivara müük
Sale of financial assets
Finantspõhivara müük
Credit entered into with private banks
Krediidiasutustelt saadud laenud
Conclusion on own contribution
Kokkuvõte omafinantseeringu kohta
To summarise, out of the total costs for the restructuring of IFB, which amount to EUR 125,56 million, EUR 95,3 million, or 76 %, were paid by SNCB.
Kokkuvõttes finantseeris IFB ümberkorraldamise kulusid (mis ulatusid kokku 125,56 miljoni euroni) 95,3 miljoni euro ehk 76 % ulatuses SNCB.
This financing is imputable to the Belgian State.
See finantseering on seostatav Belgia riigiga.
EUR 30,26 million, or 24 %, of these costs were borne by IFB itself.
30,26 miljoni euro ehk 24 % ulatuses kandis need kulud IFB ise.
In this case, the Commission recalls that the 1999 guidelines do not impose a minimum level of own contribution, but only a significant contribution.
Käesoleval juhul tuletab komisjon meelde, et 1999. aasta suunistes ei kehtestata omafinantseeringu miinimummäära, vaid nõutakse üksnes olulise omafinantseeringu olemasolu.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the 2004 guidelines, which are not applicable in this case, insist upon an own contribution greater than 50 %, the Commission believes that it is useful to recall the particular difficulties of restructuring (upon which 250 jobs in Belgium directly depend); the scale of the reductions in capacity (reduction of 49 % of the rail wagons; handover of several terminals); and the importance of combined transport, the market in which IFB is principally active, to the European Union’s transport policy.
Kuivõrd aga 2004. aasta suunistes, mis käesoleval juhul küll kohaldatavad ei ole, nõutakse enam kui 50 % omafinantseeringut, siis peab komisjon vajalikuks meenutada kõnealuse ümberkorraldamisega seotud erilisi raskusi (millest sõltus otseselt 250 töökohta Belgias), väärtuse olulisi vähendamisi (raudteevagunite arvu vähendamine 49 % võrra ja mitmete terminalide loovutamine) ning kombineeritud vedude ehk valdkonna, kus IFB peamiselt tegutses, tähtsust Euroopa Liidu veopoliitikas.
The Commission concludes that, under these circumstances, and in view of the size of the IFB business and its disastrous financial situation prior to its restructuring, a shareholding of 24 % constitutes a significant shareholding.
Komisjon leiab, et 24 % omafinantseeringu näol on neil asjaoludel tegemist olulise omafinantseeringuga, arvestades seejuures IFB ettevõtte suurust ning tema finantsseisundit enne ümberkorraldamist.
Annual report and ‘one time, last time’
Iga-aastane aruanne ning „üks ja ainus kord”
The 1999 guidelines state in points 45 and 48:
aasta suuniste punktides 45 ja 48 on märgitud järgmiselt:
The Commission must be put in a position to make certain that the restructuring plan is being implemented properly, through detailed regular reports communicated by the Member State concerned. […]
Komisjon peab asjaomaste liikmesriikide poolt edastatud korrapäraste üksikasjalike aruannete kaudu saama kinnitust ümberkorraldamiskava nõuetekohase rakendamise kohta.
In order to prevent firms from being unfairly assisted, restructuring aid should be granted once only.
Et vältida ebaõiglast abi andmist äriühingutele, tuleks ümberkorraldamisabi anda ainult üks kord.
When planned restructuring aid is notified to the Commission, the Member State must specify whether the firm concerned has in the past already received restructuring aid, including aid granted before entry into force of these Guidelines and any unnotified aid.
Teatades komisjonile kavandatavast ümberkorraldamisabist, peab liikmesriik täpsustama, kas asjaomane äriühing on minevikus juba saanud ümberkorraldamisabi, kaasa arvatud enne käesolevate suuniste jõustumist antud abi ning igasugune muu abi, millest ei ole teatatud.
If so, and where less than 10 years has elapsed since the restructuring period came to an end or implementation of the plan has been halted, the Commission will normally allow further restructuring aid only in exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances for which the company is not responsible.
Kui äriühing on sellist abi juba saanud ja kui ümberkorraldamisperioodi lõppemisest või kava rakendamise peatamisest on möödunud vähem kui 10 aastat, lubab komisjon tavaliselt uut ümberkorraldamisabi ainult erandlike ja ettenägematute asjaolude korral, mille eest äriühing ei vastuta.
An unforeseeable circumstance is one which could in no way be anticipated when the restructuring plan was drawn up.’
Ettenägematuteks asjaoludeks loetakse selliseid asjaolusid, mida ümberkorraldamiskava koostamisel ei olnud kuidagi võimalik ette näha.”