natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The amended contracts were lawful and in accordance with the original ones.
Muudetud lepingud olid seaduslikud ja kooskõlas algsete lepingutega.
The above information shows in the opinion of Greece that the consortia, and thus HSY, were never given a treatment more favourable than that afforded to other suppliers of OSE, and that the penalty and interest amounts were claimed and collected in every case.
Kreeka arvates tõendab ülaltoodud teave seda, et konsortsiumile, ja seega HSY-le, ei võimaldatud kunagi soodsamat kohtlemist võrdluses OSE muude tarnijatega, ning et trahvi- ja viivisesummad nõuti iga kord sisse.
The contract made no provision for default interest on penalty amounts, but OSE claimed the interest and invoiced the consortia accordingly.
Leping ei näinud ette viivise maksmist trahvisummadelt, kuid OSE esitas konsortsiumile viivisenõude ja vastava arve.
The same things apply with regard to the ISAP amounts, which are actual payments made by HSY, not provisions.
Sama kehtib ISAPi summade suhtes, mis kujutavad endast tegelikke HSE poolt tehtud makseid, mitte ettekirjutusi.
It is emphasised, further, that there was no renegotiation or amendment in the case of programme agreement 1/97.
Lisaks rõhutatakse, et programmilepingu 1/97 ümbervaatamist või muutmist ei toimunud.
That agreement provided for the design, construction, delivery and placing in operation of 40 multiple units, each consisting of three vehicles.
Leping nägi ette neljakümne mootorrongi, millest igaühe koosseisu kuulub kolm sõidukit, projekteerimise, ehitamise, kohaletoimetamise ja kasutuselevõtmise.
The delivery of the units was late, and therefore the penalties and interest envisaged in the programme agreement were imposed and withheld.
Mootorrongide üleandmine hilines, mistõttu kohaldati ja peeti kinni programmilepingus ettenähtud trahvid ning viivised.
The present measure does not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty since it concerns exclusively civil activities.
Meede ei kuulu asutamislepingu artikli 296 kohaldamisalasse, sest see seondub üksnes tsiviiltegevusega.
The Commission observes that the Greek authorities have provided detailed information on the contracts concerned, as requested in the extension decision.
Komisjon märgib, et Kreeka ametiasutused on esitanud üksikasjaliku teabe asjaomaste lepingute kohta, nagu laiendamisotsuses taotletud.
On the basis of this information, the doubts raised by the Commission have been allayed.
Komisjoni tõstatatud kahtlused on selle teabe abil hajutatud.
Indeed, HSY paid the penalty and relevant interest amounts in accordance with its contractual obligations, and, when renegotiations of contracts took place, the Commission did not find evidence that the renegotiations were not affected in accordance with accepted commercial practice.
Leidis kinnitust, et HSY tasus trahvid ja asjakohased intressisummad kooskõlas oma lepinguliste kohustustega ning komisjon ei avastanud lepingute ümbervaatamisi käsitledes tõendusmaterjali selle kohta, et võimalikke ümbervaatamisi ei oleks läbi viidud kooskõlas tunnustatud äritavadega.
As acknowledged by Elefsis itself, the delays in the execution of the contracts have cost tens of millions of euro to HSY precisely because OSE and ISAP requested the payment of the penalties and default interest, or, alternatively, the supply of equivalent rolling stock.
Nagu tunnistas Elefsis ise, on viivitused lepingute täideviimisel läinud HSY-le maksma kümneid miljoneid eurosid, ning seda just sellepärast, et OSE ja ISAP nõudsid trahvide ning viivise maksmist või (alternatiivselt) samaväärse veeremi tarnimist.
As regards Elefsis’ claim that OSE and ISAP, if they had been private firms, would have turned down all the amendments proposed by the consortia, would have therefore requested the entire payment of the penalties and default interest and would have requested a rapid payment in cash rather than spreading the payments over a longer period, it can be said that this seems highly unlikely.
Seoses Elefsise väitega, et kui OSE ja ISAP oleksid olnud eraettevõtted, oleksid nad tagasi lükanud kõik konsortsiumi poolt väljapakutud muudatused, nõudnud kõigi trahvide ning viiviste tasumist täies ulatuses ja eelistanud kiiret tasumist sularahas maksete ajatamisele pikema perioodi vältel, võib öelda, et see näib äärmiselt ebatõenäolisena.
Indeed, if OSE and ISAP had adopted such an inflexible approach before the closure of the sale of HSY, this would have probably deterred the new owner to purchase the yard.
Kui OSE ja ISAP oleksid võtnud omaks niisuguse paindumatu lähenemise enne HSY müügitehingu sooritamist, oleks see tõenäoliselt toonud kaasa uue omaniku loobumise laevatehase ostust.
Without such a purchase, the yard, as will be explained in the analysis of measure E18c, would most probably have gone bankrupt.
Kui ost oleks sooritamata jäänud, oleks laevatehas ülima tõenäosusega pankrotistunud, nagu selgitatakse meetme E18c analüüsis.
Even after the purchase by HDW/Ferrostaal, the financial situation of the yard did not improve.
Laevatehase rahaline olukord ei paranenud ka selle omandamise järel HDW/Ferrostaali poolt.
Consequently, if OSE and ISAP would have adopted a totally inflexible approach, there was a real risk that HSY would go bankrupt.
Sellest tuleneb, et kui OSE ja ISAP oleksid rakendanud täiesti paindumatut lähenemist, oleks HSYd ähvardanud tõsine pankrotioht.
This means that the execution of the existing contracts would have been stopped.
See oleks tähendanud olemasolevate lepingute täideviimise katkestamist.
This means that OSE and ISAP would have had to organise a new call for tender, the contract would have been awarded to a new supplier, and the delivery would have been delayed by several years.
Niisugusel juhul oleksid OSE ja ISAP pidanud korraldama uue pakkumiskonkursi, leping oleks sõlmitud uue tarnijaga ning tarne oleks hilinenud mitme aasta võrra.
In such circumstances, the Commission considers that a market economy purchaser may accept a partial renegotiation which allows the completion of the existing contract within a reasonable timeframe, such that the purchaser finally receives the ordered railstock material with a limited delay.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et kirjeldatud asjaolude juures võib turumajanduslik ostja nõustuda osalise ümbervaatamisega, võimaldamaks olemasoleva lepingu mõistlikes ajalistes piirides täide viia, nii et ostja saaks tellitud veeremimaterjali piiratud hilinemisega lõpuks siiski kätte.
In this respect, the Commission observes that the probability that the contracts would be completed in a reasonable timeframe increased when HSY was privatised since the new private owner had experience with the management of complex projects and was a private firm motivated by profit and therefore willing to limit the delay to limit the negative financial consequences.
Sellega seoses märgib komisjon, et lepingute mõistliku ajavahemiku vältel täideviimise tõenäosus suurenes pärast HSY erastamist, sest uuel eraomanikul oli keerukate projektide haldamise kogemus ja tegu oli kasusaamise võimalusest motiveeritud eraettevõttega, mis omas seetõttu valmisolekut hilinemise piiramiseks negatiivsete finantstagajärgede piiramise nimel.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that there is not convincing evidence that the behaviour of OSE and ISAP would not have been acceptable to a private company in similar circumstances.
Kokkuvõttes leiab komisjon, et puudub veenev tõendusmaterjal selle kohta, et OSE ja ISAPi käitumine oleks eraettevõtte jaoks olnud sarnaste asjaolude juures vastuvõetamatu.
The Commission therefore concludes that the way in which the contracts with OSE and ISAP were implemented and the limited amendments of the contracts accepted by OSE in 2002–2003 do not involve aid elements.
Seetõttu järeldab komisjon, et OSE ja ISAPiga sõlmitud lepingute elluviimise viis ja lepingute OSE poolt 2002. aasta märtsis heakskiidetud piiratud muudatused ei hõlma riigiabi elemente.
Loan of ETVA to finance the Strintzis contract (measure E13a)
ETVA laen Strintzise lepingu rahastamiseks (meede E13a)
On 29 October 1999, ETVA granted a GRD 16,9 billion (EUR 49,7 million) loan to HSY to finance the construction of the two ferries ordered by the company Strintzis.
oktoobril 1999 andis ETVA HSY-le 16,9 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (49,7 miljoni euro) suuruse laenu ettevõtte Strintzis poolt tellitud kahe parvlaeva ehitamiseks.
The interest rate was LIBOR plus 100 basis points.
Intressimääraks oli LIBOR pluss 100 baaspunkti.
In June 2001, a preferential mortgage on the two ships under construction was created.
aasta juunis seati kahele ehitatavale laevale eelishüpoteek.
The loan was repaid in full to the lending bank on 8 October 2004.
Laen tagastati täies mahus selle andnud pangale 8. oktoobril 2004.
The extension decision raised doubts whether the conveyance of a mortgage on the ships and of insurance premiums constituted a sufficient security.
Laiendamisotsuses tõstatati kahtlusi selle kohta, kas hüpoteegi seadmine laevadele ja kindlustuspreemiad kujutavad endast piisavat tagatist.
In addition, it seemed that the loan was immediately paid out to HSY, whereas it should have been paid in parallel with the construction costs.
Lisaks tundus, et laen maksti HSY-le välja kohe, samas kui selle väljamaksmine oleks pidanud aset leidma paralleelselt ehituskuludega.
Moreover, the interest rate seemed insufficient in view of the difficulties of the yard.
Lisaks näis intressimäär laevatehase raskusi arvesse võttes ebapiisavana.
Finally, the combination of this loan and the next measure (measure E13b) indicates that a substantial part of the financing of the two ships ordered by Strintzis was supported by ETVA.
Lõpetuseks näitab selle laenu ja järgneva meetme (meede E 13b) kombinatsioon, et ETVA võimaldas olulise osa kahe Strintzise poolt tellitud laeva rahastamisest.
Elefsis claims that no private banks would have granted this loan.
Elefsis väidab, et ükski kommertspank ei oleks kõnealust laenu andnud.
First ETVA had no security when the loan was concluded since the mortgage on the ships was created much later.
Esiteks puudus ETVA-l laenulepingu sõlmimise ajal tagatis, sest hüpoteek seati laevadele märksa hiljem.
In addition, Elefsis agrees that the market value of hulls in construction is low.
Lisaks nõustub Elefsis sellega, et ehitatavate laevakerede turuväärtus on madal.
Greece and HSY stress that the conditions of the loan were usual for that time.
Kreeka ja HSY rõhutavad, et laenu tingimused olid tolle aja jaoks tavalised.
The Deloitte report confirms that both the specific bank (ETVA) and in general the Greek banks were granting loans to firms at a similar interest rate.
Deloitte’i aruanne kinnitab, et nii konkreetne pank (ETVA) kui ka Kreeka pangad üldiselt andsid ettevõtetele laenu sarnase intressimääraga.
HSY gives details on the securities which were granted to ETVA at the time of loan contract (assignment of the price of the two vessels, of the insurance indemnities, and of all claims against third party arising from the charter or generally the exploitation of the ships) and at a later date (the mortgage on the ships), and conclude that they were adequate.
HSY esitab üksikasjalikud andmed tagatiste kohta, mis anti ETVA-le laenulepingu sõlmimisel (kahe aluse hinna, kindlustushüvitiste ja kõigi kolmandate isikute vastu suunatud nõuete loovutamine, mis tulenevad prahtimisest või laevade kasutamisest üldiselt) ning hilisemal kuupäeval (laevade hüpoteek) ja järeldab, et need olid piisavad.
Greece also gives the calendar according to which the loan was paid out by ETVA to HSY and which shows that it was paid in parallel with the evolution of the construction costs.
Kreeka esitab lisaks kalendri, mille kohaselt ETVA maksis laenu HSY-le välja, ja mis näitab, et laen maksti välja paralleelselt ehituskulude lisandumisega.
This loan was concluded after June 1999, at a time when no bank would have lent to HSY anymore.
Laenuleping sõlmiti pärast 1999. aasta juunit ehk ajal, mil ükski pank ei oleks jätkanud laenude andmist HSY-le.
Greece claims that the security attached to the loan were reducing the risk so much that the granting of the loan would have been acceptable to a private investor.
Kreeka väidab, et laenuga kaasnev tagatis vähendas riski niivõrd suurel määral, et laenu andmine oleks olnud erainvestorile vastuvõetav.
This claim can not be accepted.
Selle väitega ei saa nõustuda.
The assignment of the price of the ships represents a solid security only if the yard brings the construction of the ship to a good end, what is uncertain.
Laevade hinna loovutamine kujutab endast kindlat tagatist vaid juhul, kui laevatehas laevade ehitamise edukalt lõpule viib, mis ei ole kindel.
If the yard goes bankrupt during the construction of the ship, this security has no value since the purchase price can not be claimed from Strintzis because the latter has not received the ordered vessels.
Kui laevatehas peaks laeva ehitamise vältel pankrotistuma, kaotab niisugune tagatis väärtuse, sest Strintziselt ei saa välja nõuda ostuhinda, kuna viimane ei ole tellitud laevu saanud.
This means that the security would be worthless exactly in the scenario where it would be needed.
See tähendab, et garantii oleks väärtusetu just selles stsenaariumis, kui seda vaja läheb.
As regards the constitution of a mortgage upon each one of the ships under construction, it was granted to ETVA only in June 2001, well after the loan had been paid out to HSY.
Hüpoteegi seadmine mõlemale ehitatavale laevale võimaldati ETVA-le üksnes 2001. aasta juunis, tükk aega pärast laenu väljamaksmist HSY-le.
In addition, the Commission observes that the value of ships under construction is relatively low and they are difficult to sell.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et ehitusjärgus laevade väärtus on suhteliselt madal ja neid on raske müüa.
This is illustrated by the present case.
Käesolev juhtum on selle tõenduseks.
As regards the assertion of Greece, HSY and Deloitte that the interest rate of the loan granted to HSY was similar to the interest rate of many other loans granted during the same period by ETVA and by Greek banks, it does not show that the loan granted to HSY is not an aid.
Ehkki Kreeka, HSY ja Deloitte kinnitavad, et HSY-le antud laenu intressimäär sarnanes paljude muude samal ajavahemikul ETVA ning Kreeka pankade poolt väljastatud laenude intressimääraga, ei anna see põhjust veendumuseks, et HSY-le väljastatud laen ei ole abi.
Indeed, Greece, HSY and Deloitte have neither analysed nor shown that the financial situation of the other borrowers used as comparison point was similar to the one of HSY, i.e. that their financial situation was as bad as the situation of HSY.
Kreeka, HSY ja Deloitte ei ole analüüsinud ega tõendanud, et võrdluseks kasutatavate teiste laenusaajate rahaline olukord oli sarnane HSY omale, st et nende rahaline olukord oli sama halb kui HSY-l.
They have therefore not shown that private banks were ready to lend to firms in difficulty at an interest rate similar to the one of the present loan.
Seega ei ole nad tõendanud, et kommertspangad olid nõus andma laenu raskustes ettevõtetele käesoleva laenu intressimäärale sarnase intressimääraga.
Comparing the interest rate of loans granted to different firms without verifying that the risk supported by the lending banks is similar is a pointless exercise.
Erinevatele ettevõtetele antud laenude intressimäärade võrdlemine tõenduseta, et laenu andvate pankade poolt võetav risk on sarnane, on mõttetu tegevus.
The Commission therefore concludes that no market economy investor in similar circumstances would have granted this loan to HSY, which therefore constitutes aid.
Seetõttu järeldab komisjon, et ükski turumajanduslik investor ei oleks sarnaste asjaolude juures HSY-le vastavat laenu andnud, mistõttu laen kujutab endast abi.
As concluded here above, the loan in fact allowed HSY to undertake this commercial contract, which HSY could not have financed by raising funds from the market.
Nagu eespool järeldatud, võimaldas laen HSY-l sõlmida kõnealuse ärilepingu, mille rahastamine turult saadud vahenditega olnuks võimatu.
In addition, the hulls were sold to a new purchaser only in 2004, i.e. several years after 31 December 2000.
Lisaks müüdi kered uuele ostjale alles 2004. aastal, st mitu aastat pärast 31. detsembrit 2000.
Since the aid is unlawful and incompatible, it has to be recovered.
Et käsitletav abi on ebaseaduslik ja kokkusobimatu, tuleb see tagasi nõuda.
Since the loan has been reimbursed, part of the advantage received by HSY has already been withdrawn.
Kuivõrd laen on tagastatud, on osa HSY-le osaks saanud eelisest juba tagasi võetud.
However, thanks to this loan of ETVA, HSY had at its disposal the amount of the loan during several years, an amount which HSY could otherwise not have had at its disposal during that period.
Samas oli tänu ETVA-lt saadud laenule HSY käsutuses mitme aasta vältel laenusumma, mis vastasel juhul ei oleks vastaval ajavahemikul HSY käsutuses olnud.
This advantage needs also to be recovered.
Ka see eelis kuulub tagasi nõuda.
The Commission thus considers that aid has to be recovered which amounts to the difference between the interest rate paid to ETVA and reference rate for Greece plus 600 bps for the period from the payment of the loan to HSY until the date when the loan was secured by a mortgage on the hulls.
Seega leiab komisjon, et tagastada tuleb abi, mis võrdub ETVA-le makstava intressimäära ja Kreeka viitemäära vahega pluss 600 baaspunkti alates laenu väljamaksmisest HSY-le kuni kuupäevani, mil laen tagati hüpoteegi seadmise teel laevakeredele.
For the period thereafter until the reimbursement of the loan, the aid to recover is the difference between the interest rate paid to ETVA and the reference rate for Greece plus 400 bps.
Sellele järgneva ja laenu tagasimaksmisega lõppeva ajavahemiku eest tagasinõudmisele kuuluv abi võrdub ETVA-le makstud intressimäära ning Kreeka viitemäära vahega pluss 400 baaspunkti.
The reduction by one third of this risk premium reflects the fact that the mortgage on the hulls would have partially reduced the loss of the lender in case of default of HSY, and therefore reduced the risk of the loan for ETVA.
Käesoleva riskipreemia vähendamine ühe kolmandiku võrra väljendab asjaolu, et laevakeredele seatud hüpoteek oleks osaliselt vähendanud laenuandja kahjusid lepinguliste kohustuste täitmajätmise korral HSY poolt ning piiranud seetõttu laenuriski ETVA jaoks.
In particular, as just indicated, HSY succeeded to sell the hulls at a price roughly equivalent to one third of the money lent by ETVA.
Lisaks, nagu just osutatud, õnnestus HSY-l müüa laevakered hinnaga, mis võrdub ligikaudselt ühe kolmandikuga ETVA-lt laenuks saadud rahast.
Guarantee of ETVA in relation to the Strintzis contract (measure E13b)
ETVA garantii seoses Strintzise lepinguga (meede E13b)
The extension decision considers that the two guarantees, the terms of which were not known at the time of the decision, could constitute aid.
Laiendamisotsuses väljendatakse seisukohta, et kõnealused kaks garantiid, mille tingimused ei olnud otsuse vastuvõtmise ajal teada, võivad endast kujutada abi.
Elefsis emphasizes the fact that the State/ETVA has at the same time assumed the role of guarantor, creditor, shareholder and largest customer of HSY.
Elefsis rõhutab asjaolu, et riik/ETVA on samaaegselt omandanud HSY garandi, võlausaldaja, aktsionäri ja suurima kliendi rollid.
By doing so, the State was putting itself in a situation of serious financial risk.
Riik on sedakaudu end seadnud olukorda, millega kaasneb tõsine rahaline risk.
In assuming this multiple role, the State was in effect providing finance with no security since in the event of the company’s default and/or insolvency, the State would have no recourse and would sustain a definite loss since the value of the yard’s assets would be considered to be insufficient to cover all the liabilities.
Niisuguse mitmetahulise rolli omandamise kaudu võimaldas riik sisuliselt rahastamist ilma tagatiseta, sest ettevõtte poolt lepinguliste kohustuste täitmatajätmise ja/või maksejõuetuse korral ei saaks riik midagi ette võtta ning kannaks pöördumatut kahju, sest laevatehase vara väärtusest ei piisaks kõigi kohustuste katmiseks.
Greece and HSY claim that the assignment of proceeds resulting from Agreement 39 with OSE was an adequate security which would render the grant of the guarantee acceptable for a private investor.
Kreeka ja HSY väidavad, et HSEga sõlmitud lepingust 39 tulenev tulude loovutamine oli piisavaks tagatiseks, mis oleks muutnud garantii andmise erainvestorile vastuvõetavaks.
The Commission observes that, in case of bankruptcy of HSY, this security would not have allowed a bank to recover money.
Komisjon märgib, et HSY pankrotistumise korral ei oleks vastav tagatis võimaldanud pangal raha tagasi saada.
Indeed, if HSY had gone bankrupt, the construction of the rolling stock would have stopped, no delivery would have been made to OSE and no payment could be requested from OSE under that Agreement.
Kui HSY oleks pankrotistunud, oleks veeremi ehitamine seiskunud, tarned OSE-le ära jäänud ja OSE-lt ei oleks kõnealuse lepingu alusel saanud nõuda mingite maksete tasumist.
The Commission therefore fails to understand how this security would have significantly decreased the risk of a loan to HSY.
Seetõttu jääb komisjonile arusaamatuks, kuidas oleks vastav tagatis võinud oluliselt vähendada HSY-le laenamise riski.
HSY has been able to indicate neither to the Commission nor to its own consultant (see first Deloitte report, page 4–9) whether HSY was contractually obliged to pay a guarantee premium to ETVA and what was the level of this premium.
HSY ei ole suutnud komisjonile ega oma konsultandile (vt esimene Deloitte’i aruanne, lk-d 4–9) selgeks teha, kas HSY oli lepinguliselt kohustatud maksma garantiitasu ETVA-le või mitte ja milline oli vastava tasu määr.
As explained in the assessment of measure E12b, HSY should normally have paid an annual premium of at least 480 basis points for such a guarantee.
Nagu selgitatud meetme E12b hinnangus, oleks HSY pidanud maksma niisuguse garantii eest vähemalt 480 baaspunkti suurust aastatasu.
Knowing the level of the other guarantee premiums paid by HSY to ETVA, it is highly unlikely that the guarantee premium actually paid by HSY was as high as 480 basis points.
Teades muude HSY poolt ETVA-le makstavate garantiitasude määra, on ülimalt ebatõenäoline, et HSY poolt tegelikult makstud garantiitasu oli koguni 480 baaspunkti.
The Commission therefore concludes that the guarantee granted by ETVA constitutes State aid, which amounts to the difference between the annual guarantee premium actually paid to ETVA and a guarantee premium of 480 basis points.
Seetõttu järeldab komisjon, et ETVA anud garantii kujutab endast riigiabi, mis võrdub ETVA-le tegelikult makstud aastase garantiitasu ja 480 baaspunkti suuruse garantiitasu vahega.
As indicated in the assessment of measure E13a, the Commission considers that aid like the present one constitutes operating aid, which can not be found compatible on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Nagu osutatud meetme E13a hindamises, on komisjon arvamusel, et niisugust liiki abi kujutab endast tegevusabi, mida ei saa käsitleda kokkusobivana määruse (EÜ) nr 1540/98 alusel.
It is therefore unlawful and incompatible and must be recovered.
Seetõttu on vastav abi ebaseaduslik ja kokkusobimatu ning see tuleb tagasi nõuda.
State guarantee securing a GRD 10 billion (EUR 29,3 million) loan (measure E14)
Riigigarantii 10 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (29,3 miljoni euro) suuruse laenu tagamiseks (meede E14)
Given the financial situation of HSY at the time, it is doubtful that the terms of the guarantee would have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
Võttes arvesse HSY tollast rahalist olukorda, on küsitav, kas garantiitingimused oleksid olnud turumajandusliku investori jaoks vastuvõetavad.
As regards the compatibility on the basis of Article 87(2)(b), Greece has not shown that the size of the measure was commensurate to the damage suffered by HSY.
Kokkusobivuse kohta artikli 87 lõike 2 punkti b kohaselt ei ole Kreeka tõendanud, et meetme suurus oleks samaulatuslik HSY kantud kahjuga.