natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Concerning the issue of new bonds, Austria argued that the decision of the management board to issue new bonds to the amount of EUR 380 million, complementing the prior decision — based on the planning in BB’s business plan — to issue bonds worth EUR 320 million in September 2005, had been independent of the forthcoming privatisation and from the future owner of BB.
Uute võlakirjade emiteerimise kohta märkis Austria, et järelevalvenõukogu otsusel emiteerida võlakirju 380 miljoni euro väärtuses lisaks varasemale BB äriplaani kohaselt 2005. aasta septembris tehtud otsusele emiteerida võlakirju 320 miljoni euro väärtuses ei olnud seost eelseisva erastamisprotsessi ning BB tulevaste omanikega.
The Province of Burgenland did not think that the issue of those additional bonds had been worth mentioning in the process letter, as this would not have been decisive for the sale.
Burgenlandi liidumaa asus seisukohale, et täiendavate võlakirjade emiteerimine ei oma BB müügi seisukohast tähtsust ning seetõttu seda pakkumiskutses ei mainitud.
However, both bidders had been informed during the due diligence and the issue would have taken place regardless of the identity of the buyer.
Samas teavitati mõlemat pakkujat kõnealuste võlakirjade emiteerimisest due diligence analüüsi tegemise käigus ning emiteerimine oleks toimunud ostjast olenemata.
GRAWE alone had incorporated this in its draft contract.
Kõnealust asjaolu pidas lepingu kavandis silmas siiski ainult GRAWE.
Austria stressed that the issue of an additional EUR 380 million of bonds was done in order to benefit as much as possible from the favourable refinancing conditions under Ausfallhaftung.
Austria rõhutas, et võlakirju emiteeriti täiendavalt 380 miljoni euro väärtuses, et võimalikult ära kasutada liidumaa vastutuse tõttu pakutavaid soodsaid refinantseerimise võimalusi.
This had been mentioned repeatedly in the course of the negotiations with the Consortium.
Sellele asjaolule viidati konsortsiumiga peetud läbirääkimistel mitmel korral.
Indeed, had BB been sold to the Consortium, it would have profited from the better refinancing conditions to a considerably higher extent than GRAWE as buyer.
Kui BB oleks müüdud konsortsiumile, oleks konsortsium saanud parematest refinantseerimise võimalustest märksa enam kasu kui GRAWE.
Austria argued that the refinancing conditions of BB in the event of a sale to the Consortium would have been more costly, given that GRAWE was rated and the Consortium was not only not rated, but had its seat in Ukraine and BB could therefore expect at most refinancing conditions for a — hypothetical — rating of ‘BB’ or ‘B’, if at all.
Austria selgitas, et BB refinantseerimise kulud oleksid konsortsiumile müügi korral olnud suuremad, kuna konsortsiumil puudus erinevalt GRAWE-st reiting ning kuna selle põhitegevuskoht asub Ukrainas, mistõttu BB refinantseerimise tingimused oleksid kujunenud hüpoteetilise reitingu „BB” või „B” alusel, kui sedagi.
In regard to the special arrangement with GRAWE to transfer four of BB’s real estate subsidiaries back to the Province of Burgenland prior to closing at their book value of EUR 25 million, Austria pointed out that, given that BB’s auditor confirmed on 31 December 2005 that the market value of the property would be equal to its book value, this transfer would have only a liquidity effect.
Seoses GRAWE-ga sõlmitud erikokkuleppega anda Burgenlandi liidumaale enne müügitehingu lõpetamise päeva üle neli BB kinnisvarafirmat bilansilise väärtusega 25 miljonit eurot viitab Austria asjaolule, et BB-d kontrollinud majandusaudiitorite ühing on 31. detsembri 2005. aasta seisuga kinnitanud, et vara turuväärtus vastab selle bilansilisele väärtusele, mistõttu vara üleandmine mõjutab vaid likviidsust.
This liquidity effect therefore did not need to be taken into account in the comparison of the two offers.
Seetõttu ei olnud likviidsusele avalduvat mõju vaja arvesse võtta kõnealuse kahe pakkumise võrdlemisel.
An advance payment of EUR 15 million into a trust account with Ukraine-based Active Bank on the day of signing of the contract was offered by the Consortium.
Lepingu sõlmimise päeval usaldusisiku kontole Activa Bank’is, mille registreeritud asukoht on Ukrainas, 15 miljoni euro suuruse osamakse tasumise ettepaneku tegi konsortsium.
GRAWE had to transfer the sales price in full on the day of closing.
GRAWE pidi ostuhinna kogusumma üle kandma müügitehingu lõpetamise päeval.
The warranty clause concerning State aid in the contract with GRAWE
GRAWE-ga sõlmitud lepingu riigiabi käsitlev garantiisäte
Austria took the view that the clause, which was also part of the draft contract with the Consortium [22], was standard in any sales contract in such transactions as part of the sales conditions and price and was in line with the State aid rules.
Austria leiab, et kõnealune säte, mis sisaldus ka konsortsiumiga sõlmida kavandatud müügilepingu kavandis, [22] on sarnaste tehingute korral sõlmitavates müügilepingutes lepingutingimuste ja hinna osana tavaline ning kooskõlas riigiabi eeskirjadega.
It was in the legitimate interest of BB’s buyer, who had not been willing to bid a higher price and might be asked to pay more through a recovery order as a consequence of a State aid decision.
See on BB ostja õigustatud huvi, kuna ostja, kes ei ole nõus pakkuma suuremat hinda, võib leida ennast olukorras, kus ta on riigiabi otsuse alusel tagasimaksmisele kuuluva summa tõttu sunnitud maksma kõrgemat hinda.
Besides, the Commission should also take into account the fact that the clause included a right of the buyer to withdraw from the contract if the clause was invalid under the State aid rules.
Peale selle peaks komisjon arvestama, et kõnealune säte annab ostjale õiguse lepingust taganeda, kui peaks selguma, et säte on vastuolu tõttu riigiabialaste õigusaktidega tühine.
According to GRAWE, the Commission’s doubts were irrelevant as long as there was no recovery order.
GRAWE on arvamusel, et komisjoni kahtlused ei oma asjas seni tähtsust, kuni ei ole tehtud tagasimaksmise otsust.
GRAWE stressed that the buyer in a tender procedure had very limited means to prevent behaviour by a public seller that was potentially relevant to a State aid assessment.
GRAWE rõhutas, et pakkumismenetluses on üsnagi piiratud pakkuja võimalused takistada avalik-õigusliku võõrandaja tegevust, mis võib olla vastuolus riigiabialaste õigusaktidega.
GRAWE considered that such a clause gave the State even more reason to comply with the State aid rules and was therefore in turn in the Commission’s interest.
Kõnealune säte sunnib GRAWE sõnul riiki veelgi enam tähelepanu pöörama riigiabi eeskirjade järgimisele, mis on omakorda komisjoni huvides.
The market conformity of the sales price paid by GRAWE
GRAWE tasutud ostuhinna vastavus turutingimustele
According to Austria, the existence of an open and transparent tender procedure which produced the market price was demonstrated by the fact that three bidders came forward with an indicative offer, of which GRAWE’s offer was second.
Austria sõnul tõendab pakkumismenetluse avatust ja läbipaistvust, mis võimaldas müüa panga turuhinnaga, asjaolu, et esialgse pakkumise esitasid kolm pakkujat, kusjuures GRAWE tegi paremuselt teise pakkumise.
This indicated that GRAWE’s offer had not been below BB’s market value.
Sellest võib järeldada, et GRAWE pakutud hind ei olnud madalam BB turuväärtusest.
Austria referred to the outcome of the second attempt to privatise BB.
Siinkohal viitab Austria teisele BB erastamise katsele.
All four offers at the time had been within a range of EUR 85 million to EUR 93 million. The EUR 100,3 million paid by GRAWE could therefore also be considered to be in line with market conditions.
Kõik neli pakkumist jäid toona vahemikku 85 miljonit eurot kuni 93 miljonit eurot, mistõttu GRAWE tasutud 100,3 miljoni euro suurust ostuhinda võib käsitada turuhinnana.
According to the State aid rules, Austria was not obliged to sell the bank in an open tender procedure at all but was free to choose either an open tender procedure or an expert evaluation.
Riigiabi eeskirjad ei kohustanud Austriat korraldama panga võõrandamiseks avatud pakkumismenetlust; Austria oleks selle asemel võinud piirduda eksperdiarvamuse tellimisega.
As long as the sales price was in keeping with these prior evaluations, State aid was not involved.
Kui ostuhind vastab enne müüki tellitud eksperdiarvamusele, ei ole tegemist riigiabiga.
In this context, the Commission had disregarded the fact that Austria had already presented a number of studies in the early phase of the investigation confirming its view that the price paid by GRAWE had been in line with market conditions.
Kõnealusega seoses on komisjon jätnud tähelepanuta, et Austria on uurimise varajases staadiumis tellinud mitu eksperdiarvamust, mis kinnitasid Austria seisukohta, et GRAWE tasutud ostuhind oli turuhind.
Austria and GRAWE backed up their arguments by referring to the following studies and documents:
Austria ja GRAWE on oma seisukoha toetuseks esitanud järgmised eksperdiarvamused ja dokumendid:
the Consortium’s own assessment, which assumed a stand-alone equity value of BB in the range of EUR 50-75 million.
konsortsiumi koostatud hinnang, mille kohaselt BB varade stand-alone-väärtus oli 50 miljonit eurot kuni 75 miljonit eurot.
In addition, Austria argued that the bidders had priced in the conditions of the tender procedure and therefore both offers had been higher than the actual market value.
Austria märkis veel, et pakkujad olid pakkumismenetluse tingimusi arvesse võtnud pakutud hinna puhul, mistõttu mõlemad hinnapakkumised ületasid tegelikku turuväärtust.
Austria offered to commission a further study by an independent expert in order to establish that a price in line with market conditions had been paid.
Austria tegi ettepaneku tellida veel ühe sõltumatu eksperdi arvamus, et tõendada ostuhinna vastavust turuhinnale.
The role of Ausfallhaftung in the sale of BB
Liidumaa vastutuse olulisus BB müügi korral
Throughout the investigation Austria repeatedly stressed the importance of Ausfallhaftung and the ensuing financial interest of the Province of Burgenland in the sale of BB, and in this was supported by GRAWE.
Austria on uurimismenetluses mitmel korral rõhutanud liidumaa vastutuse olulisust ja sellega kaasnevat Burgenlandi liidumaa finantshuvi BB müügi vastu ning GRAWE on tema märkusi toetanud.
The criterion of ‘continued operation of Bank Burgenland and, at the same time, avoidance of the use of Ausfallhaftung’ was one of the conditions Austria had made public in the tender procedure and hence was known to all concerned.
Kriteerium „BB tegevuse jätkamine selliselt, et liidumaa vastutus ei rakenduks” on üks Austria poolt pakkumismenetluses avalikult teatavaks tehtud tingimus, mistõttu see oli kõigile huvitatud isikutele teada.
In this connection, Austria and GRAWE presented the following arguments in particular.
Siinkohal esitavad Austria ja GRAWE eeskätt järgmised argumendid.
The basis for Ausfallhaftung could be found in statute.
Liidumaa vastutuse võib sätestada seadus.
However, as a company limited by shares (‘AG’), BB had a private-law legal form and the guarantee itself was a private-law institution (Section 1356 of the General Civil Code); the conditions and extent of the liability of the Province of Burgenland were therefore governed by private-law provisions. The State had acted as owner of Bank Burgenland and not in its public-law capacity.
Kuna BB on eraõiguslik aktsiaselts ning vastutus panga täitmata kohustuste eest on eraõiguse instituut (ABGB § 1356), reguleerib Burgenlandi liidumaa vastutuse tekkimise tingimusi ja vastutuse ulatust eraõigus; riik ei ole siinkohal Bank Burgenlandi omanikuna tegutsenud kui avaliku võimu teostaja.
In not accepting this argument, the Commission was ignoring the separation of powers in Austria between the legislature (the source of Ausfallhaftung), on the one hand, and the executive (the Province of Burgenland, which had taken the decision to sell BB), on the other.
Kui komisjon ei nõustu selle argumendiga, jätab ta tähelepanuta Austrias toimiva võimude lahususe: kõnealuse vastutuse on sätestanud seadusandja, samal ajal kui BB otsustas müüa täidesaatev võim, st Burgenlandi liidumaa.
The relationship between the Province of Burgenland and BB could be likened to the situation of a parent company giving a guarantee for its subsidiary in the form of a comfort letter (Patronatserklärung).
Burgenlandi liidumaad võib suhetes BB-ga võrrelda emaühinguga, kes käendab tütarühingu tegevust.
Such a guarantee would be taken into account when selling a subsidiary, as would any other off-balance sheet risk.
Tütarühingu müügi korral võetaks sellist vastutust arvesse nagu igasugust muud bilansivälist riski.
Austria further supported this view by referring to a judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court of 4 April 2006 [25].
Argumendi toetuseks viitab Austria kõrgeima kohtu (Oberster Gerichtshof) 4. aprilli 2006. aasta kohtuotsusele. [25]
Furthermore, the Commission and Austria had agreed on the abolition of the guarantee as existing aid after a transitional period.
Peale selle on komisjon ja Austria jõudnud kokkuleppele riigi vastutuse kui olemasoleva abi lõpetamises pärast üleminekutähtaega.
Until its abolition, Ausfallhaftung would be ‘legalised’, which should also allow the Province of Burgenland to take it into consideration when selling BB.
Kuni selle kehtetuks tunnistamiseni on kõnealune vastutus „seadustatud”, mistõttu Burgenlandi liidumaa võis seda arvesse võtta ka BB müügi puhul.
The guarantee had not been granted by the Province of Burgenland with a view to the privatisation process and Austria had had no legal means of discharging itself from its guarantee prior to the sale of BB.
Burgenlandi liidumaa ei võtnud asjaomast vastutust erastamisprotsessile mõeldes ja Austrial ei olnud õiguslikult võimalik enne BB müüki kõnealusest vastutusest vabaneda.
If the risk associated with Ausfallhaftung could not be taken into account under these circumstances, the Commission would effectively be preventing the Province of Burgenland from privatising BB.
Kui kirjeldatud asjaoludel ei tohi vastutusega kaasnevat riski arvesse võtta, takistaks komisjon sisuliselt Austriat BB-d erastamast.
This would contradict the privatisation requirement in the Commission’s earlier decision on BB and would unlawfully restrict Member States' freedom to privatise their assets.
See oleks vastuolus komisjoni varasema otsusega Austriale pandud kohustusega BB erastada ning piiraks lubamatult liikmesriikide õigust nende omandis olevat vara erastada.
Austria’s view was confirmed by the Commission’s own practice and by the European Courts.
Komisjoni varasemad otsused ja ühenduse kohtute praktika toetavad Austria seisukohta.
In particular, the Commission had recognised that liabilities and off-balance sheet risks could be taken into account in a privatisation procedure [26].
Nii on eeskätt komisjon möönnud, et erastamisel võib arvesse võtta kohustusi ja bilansis kajastamata riske.
In Gröditzer Stahlwerke, the Court of Justice of the European Communities also implicitly recognised that a guarantee given by the State, which was relevant to the liquidation of the undertaking, should be taken into account [27].
Gröditzer Stahlwerke kohtuotsuses tunnistas ka Euroopa Ühenduste Kohus kaudselt, et arvesse võib võtta riigi garantiid, mis omab tähtsust ettevõtte likvideerimisel.
The recognition of Ausfallhaftung as existing aid was therefore relevant.
Liidumaa vastutuse kui olemasoleva abi tunnustamine on seega oluline.
The risk that Ausfallhaftung might be called upon depended on the future risk profile of the bank and, therefore, on the risk profile of its new owner.
Liidumaa vastutuse rakendumise risk sõltub panga tuleviku riskiprofiilist ning seega uue omaniku riskiprofiilist.
The Province of Burgenland had considered the risk associated with the Consortium as owner to be unacceptable.
Riskid, mis kaasnenuks BB omandamisega konsortsiumi poolt, ei oleks Burgenlandi liidumaa jaoks olnud vastuvõetavad.
The fact that BB remained under the supervision of the FMA did not change this prognosis, as the FMA intervened only ex post.
Seda hinnangut ei mõjuta kuidagi asjaolu, et BB jääb ka edaspidi FMA järelevalve alla, kuna FMA tegutseb ex post.
The liquidation scenario presented by Austria
Austria esitatud likvideerimisstsenaarium
Austria provided a calculation for the amount guaranteed by Ausfallhaftung and a liquidation scenario. It pointed out that the approach used in the calculation was identical to the one presented to the Commission in the procedure leading to the restructuring decision.
Austria edastas komisjonile arvutused vastutusega tagatud summade kohta ning likvideerimisstsenaariumi viitega, et arvutusteks kasutati meetodit, mida tutvustati komisjonile ümberkorraldamiskava otsusega lõppenud menetluses.
GRAWE submitted that it was wrong to use a liquidation scenario in this context as the Province of Burgenland had to decide, not on a liquidation of BB, but on which buyer it should choose.
GRAWE väitis omakorda, et käesoleval juhul ei ole likvideerimisstsenaariumile tuginemine asjakohane, kuna Burgenlandi liidumaa ei otsusta mitte BB likvideerimise üle, vaid pidi välja valima sobiva ostja.
The liquidation scenario had been intended for a different situation (decision on restructuring aid).
Likvideerimisstsenaarium on mõeldud kasutamiseks teistel asjaoludel (ümberkorraldamisel antud riigiabi üle otsustamine).
In addition, in a situation of Ausfallhaftung, the Province of Burgenland would not be able to demand the liquidation of all assets, as all creditors could address the Province directly with their claims.
Pealegi ei saaks Burgenlandi liidumaa vastutuse rakendumisel nõuda kõigi varade müümist, kuna kõik võlausaldajad võivad oma nõuetega pöörduda otse liidumaa poole.
The refinancing of BB after its sale
BB refinantseerimine pärast võõrandamist
Austria linked this element to the criterion of ‘continued operation of BB and, at the same time, avoidance of the use of the guarantee’, maintaining that the announcement of the sale of BB to the Consortium might have led to an increase in BB’s refinancing needs and a significant liquidity outflow, and eventually might have triggered Ausfallhaftung.
Austria arvates on kõnealune aspekt seotud kriteeriumiga „BB tegevuse jätkamine selliselt, et liidumaa vastutus ei rakenduks”. Austria jääb oma seisukoha juurde, et pärast seda, kui oleks teatavaks saanud BB müük konsortsiumile, oleks refinantseerimise vajadus kasvanud ning panga likviidsus märkimisväärselt vähenenud, mistõttu liidumaa vastutus oleks võinud rakenduda.
BB’s liquidity in the wake of the sale had been a crucial factor in the decision-making.
Samas oli BB likviidsus pärast selle müüki olnud otsustuse oluliseks teguriks.
The Consortium had also not excluded the possibility of deposit withdrawal by clients or the cancellation of inter-bank credit lines, albeit to a significantly lesser extent than estimated by Austria.
Ka konsortsium ei välistanud hoiuste väljavõtmist ja pankadevaheliste krediidiliinide lõpetamist, hinnates samas riski suurust märksa väiksemaks kui Austria.
Austria further underlined that it would have been less concerned on this score had the Consortium presented a financially strong business partner, as it had announced during the negotiations.
Veel rõhutab Austria, et tema kahtlused oleksid kõnealuses küsimuses olnud märksa väiksemad, kui konsortsium oleks kaasanud tugeva finantspartneri, nagu väideti läbirääkimistel.
Issues regarding the authorisation of the sale by the FMA
Müügitehingu heakskiitmine FMA poolt
Austria explained that, according to Section 20 of the Banking Act, the FMA could only carry out the so-called ‘fit & proper test’ of the buyer of a bank when the parties had already entered into a binding agreement.
Austria väitel saab FMA BWG § 20 järgi teha ostja sobivustesti alles pärast seda, kui läbirääkimiste pooled on sõlminud siduva müügilepingu.
A hypothetical evaluation of more than one potential buyer would exceed the FMA’s powers.
Kui FMA peaks hüpoteetiliselt hindama rohkem kui ühte potentsiaalset ostjat, ületaks ta oma pädevust.
For the same reason, it was not possible to provide the Commission ex post with such an evaluation, as requested in the opening decision.
Samal põhjusel ei saa FMA anda tagantjärele hinnangut, nagu seda nõudis komisjon menetluse algatamise otsuses.
Consequently, the FMA had refused to examine the documents both of the Consortium and of GRAWE, as both potential buyers had provided the FMA with documents in order to obtain permission prior to the sale [28].
Nii konsortsium kui GRAWE esitasid enne müügitehingu toimumist FMA-le kirjaliku taotluse tehingu lubamiseks, misjärel FMA keeldus esitatud dokumente kontrollimast.
The FMA was required to evaluate any deal in an unbiased manner.
FMA olevat kohustatud kontrollima iga müügitehingut erapooletult.
Austria stated that it had nevertheless tried to obtain a statement concerning the two remaining bidders.
Austria selgitas, et ta püüdis sellegipoolest saada arvamust mõlema ülejäänud pakkuja kohta.
Informally, the FMA had indicated that an evaluation of GRAWE, which was well known to the authority, would probably only take a few weeks.
FMA olevat andnud mõista, et temale niigi hästi teada GRAWE hindamiseks kulub vaid mõni nädal.
In contrast, the evaluation of the Consortium also involved other authorities outside the European Union and would therefore presumably take more than three months.
Seevastu konsortsiumi hindamisel pidanuks osalema ka Euroopa Liidu välised ametiasutused, mistõttu hindamine võtaks tõenäoliselt kauem aega kui kolm kuud.
However, the FMA was bound by law to react within three months; otherwise the sale would be deemed authorised.
Samas kohustab seadus FMAd tegema tehingut keelava otsuse kolme kuu jooksul, vastasel korral peetakse seda tehingu heakskiitmiseks.
Therefore, a sale to the Consortium would inevitably lead to the FMA provisionally prohibiting the sale as a first step.
Seetõttu oleks FMA pidanud ajutiselt keelama panga võimaliku müügi konsortsiumile.
The FMA could, however, continue with the examination and, if necessary, revoke its earlier refusal.
Seejärel oleks FMA saanud konsortsiumi esitatud BB omandamise kava edasi uurida ning hiljem vajadusel esialgse keelava otsuse tühistada.
The whole process could take up to a year.
Võib oletada, et kogu menetlus kestnuks kuni aasta.
According to the FMA, the outcome would have been ‘entirely open’.
FMA sõnul oleks menetluse tulemus olnud „täielikult lahtine”.
Against this background, Austria stressed that the Province of Burgenland had needed to sell BB on the basis of its own prognosis of the FMA’s final decision.
Austria rõhutas, et kirjeldatud asjaoludel oleks Burgenlandi liidumaa pidanud ise hindama, kas FMA-lt võib oodata BB müügi lubamist.
However, Austria had considered that the FMA would never have allowed a sale to the Consortium.
Sealjuures olevat Austria lähtunud sellest, et FMA ei oleks müügitehingut konsortsiumiga kindlasti heaks kiitnud.
The main considerations underlying the prognosis by the Province of Burgenland had been as follows:
Olulisemaid kaalutlusi, millele Burgenlandi liidumaa sellise prognoosi tegemisel tugines, selgitatakse allpool.
Back in 1994 SLAV International Bank AG had applied for a banking licence in Austria. The application was rejected on 17 November 1997.
Juba 1994. aastal taotles SLAV International Bank AG Austrias krediidiasutuse tegevusluba; taotlust ei rahuldatud 17. novembri 1997. aasta otsusega.
One of the grounds for rejection had been that the Ukrainian fund which was the owner at the time did not apply International Accounting Standards (IAS).
Taotluse rahuldamata jätmist põhjendati muu hulgas sellega, et toonane omanik, Ukraina fond, ei rakendanud rahvusvahelist raamatupidamisstandardit (IAS).
In contrast, in GRAWE Bank Burgenland would be gaining an experienced partner in the banking and capital market sector that had an ‘A’ rating and was well known to the FMA.
Seevastu GRAWE näol saaks Bank Burgenland panganduses ja kapitaliturgudel kogenud partneri, kelle reiting on „A” ning keda FMA hästi tunneb.