natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For instance, in a letter dated 6 December 2001 and addressed to HDW and copied to Ferrostaal, Alpha Finance, which was the adviser of the State and of ETVA, indicates: ‘we have been instructed by the Ministry of Development and ETVAbank to provide you with the attached language, proposed by ETVAbank, for […] the letter of guarantee to be provided by ETVAbank to HDW-Ferrostaal in the case that Clause 1.2.3 of the Agreement is not fulfilled’. In fax messages dated 23 January 2002, 31 January 2002 and 8 March 2002, HDW sent to Alpha Finance comments regarding the exact wording of the guarantee.
Näiteks osutab Alpha Finance, riigi ja ETVA nõustaja, oma 6. detsembri 2001. aasta kirjas, mis on adresseeritud HDW-le ning mille koopia saadeti Ferrostaalile: „Arenguministeerium ja ETVA pank on andnud meile juhised, mis näevad ette lisatud sõnastuse, mille väljapakkujaks on ETVA pank, esitamist teile […] garantiikirja jaoks ETVA pangalt HDW/Ferrostaalile juhuks, kui lepingu punkti 1.2.3 ei täideta.”23. jaanuari 2002. aasta, 31. jaanuari 2002. aasta ja 8. märtsi 2002. aasta faksisõnumitega edastas HDW Alpha Finance’ile märkused garantii täpse sõnastuse osas.
Bank Pireaus submitted several press articles relating to the period October 2001 to May 2002 illustrating that the government was directly involved in the privatisation process of HSY.
Piraeus Bank esitas mitu ajakirjandusartiklit, mis käsitlevad ajavahemikku 2001. aasta oktoobrist 2002. aasta maini ja viitavad valitsuse vahetule osalemisele HSY erastamisprotsessis.
The letter of 23 May 2005 indicates:‘The sale of HSY was conducted with the procedure of denationalisation (Law 2001/1990).
mai 2005. aasta kiri osutab:„HSY müük viidi ellu denatsionaliseerimismenetluse (seadus 2001/1990) kaudu.
Consequently, as it is also underlined in the letter of 17.12.2004, it concerns not only a legal and financially common condition, but also a condition which is included in the negotiations for the privatisation of the Shipyard from the outset and, in particular, in the form of a critical (sine qua non) condition, without which the completion of the sale of HSY’s shares would not have been possible.
Eeltoodust lähtuvalt, nagu rõhutatud ka 17. detsembri 2004. aasta kirjas, ei seondu see üksnes juriidilise ja rahandusliku üldtingimusega, vaid ka tingimusega, mis on kaasatud laevatehase erastamisläbirääkimistesse algusest peale ning kriitilise (sine qua non) tingimusena, milleta ei oleks HSY aktsiate müügi lõpuleviimine võimalik olnud.
It is characteristic that, as it has been mentioned above, this condition, with different stipulations but always with the same objective, i.e. the reasonable facilitation of the transaction in the framework of the market rules, appears from the beginning of the privatisation procedure in the following texts:The Declaration of the AdvisorThe Invitation for the Submission of Binding OffersThe Offer of the Purchasing Joint Venture (particularly without being included in the Declaration of Quitting from its condition)In the texts of the Negotiations and, lastly,In the Share Purchasing Agreement of 11 October 2001.Consequently, the declaration of guarantee that is included to the addition of the guarantee contract of 31.5.2002 was addressed to the candidate bidder from the outset and therefore does not constitute state aid to the final purchaser.
On iseloomulik, et nagu eespool nimetatud, võib seda tingimust erinevate sätetega, kuid alati sama eesmärgiga, st tehingu mõistlikuks lihtsustamiseks turureeglite raames, erastamismenetluse algusest saadik kohata järgnevates tekstides:Nõustaja avaldusKutse siduvate pakkumiste esitamiseksOstva ühisettevõtte pakkumine (eriti oma tingimusest loobumise avaldusse kaasamata)Läbirääkimiste tekstid ning, lõpetuseks,11. oktoobri 2001. aasta aktsiate ostuleping.Eeltoodust lähtuvalt oli garantiiavaldus, mis sisaldub lisas 31. mai 2002. aasta garantiilepingule, algusest peale adresseeritud pakkujakandidaadile ega kujuta seetõttu endast riigiabi lõplikule ostjale.
The same condition would have been valid for every bidder, since, as it has already been mentioned, it has been included in the procedure of denationalisation.
Sama tingimus oleks kehtinud iga pakkuja korral, sest nagu juba märgitud, sisaldub see denatsionaliseerimismenetluses.
It is also self-evident that, since the procedure of denationalisation began in February 2001 (at a time when the main shareholder of the then selling Bank ETVA was the Greek State), the State, as a seller of ETVA to Bank Piraeus, ought to also provide and did actually provide its own guarantee to the purchaser of its shares in ETVA (Bank of Piraeus), regarding the asset that was for sale, i.e. the Shipyards, because the seller had to provide such a guarantee.
Samuti on ilmne, et kuna denatsionaliseerimisprotsess algas 2001. aasta veebruaris (ajal, mil tollase müüjapanga ETVA põhiaktsionäriks oli Kreeka riik), oleks riik kui ETVA müüja Piraeus Bankile pidanud andma ja andiski omapoolse garantii talle kuulunud ETVA aktsiate ostjale (Piraeus Bankile) müügiloleva vara, st laevatehase suhtes, sest müüja pidi niisuguse garantii andma.
These guarantees, which, as it has already been stressed, are included with absolute transparency and clarity in all the contractual texts of the denationalisation and mainly in the promissory contract of 11.10.2001, pertain to the character of the transaction (sale of a definite asset), are valid for all candidate bidders and do not confer any additional benefit to anyone.
Need garantiid, mis, nagu juba rõhutatud, on absoluutse läbipaistvuse ja selgusega kaasatud kõikidesse denatsionaliseerimisega seonduvatesse lepingutekstidesse ning peamiselt 11. oktoobri 2001. aasta kohustuslepingusse, seonduvad tehingu liigiga (kindla vara müük), on kehtivad kõigi pakkujakandidaatide jaoks ega anna kellelegi mingisuguseid täiendavaid eeliseid.
On the basis of the abovementioned, the true nature of this guarantee is proven (as a condition necessary to the transaction and common under market rules), as well as its binding character, on the basis of all the procedures preceding privatisation but also of the Sale-Purchase Agreement of the shares of HSY of 11.10.2001 itself, which was subsequently followed by the Sale-Purchase Agreement of the shares of ETVA of 18.10.2001 and the First Amending Act of 18.3.2002 between ETVA and the Greek State.
Eespool nimetatust tulenevalt on kõnealuse garantii tegelik iseloom (tingimus, mis on tehingu jaoks nõutav ja turureeglite järgi tavaline) ning siduv olemus tõendatud kõigi erastamisele eelnenud menetluste põhjal, kuid ka HSY aktsiate 11. oktoobri 2001. aasta müügilepingu põhjal, millele järgnesid ETVA aktsiate 18. oktoobri 2001. aasta müügileping ja 18. märtsi 2002. aasta esimene muutev õigusakt ETVA ning Kreeka riigi vahel.
The fundamental point, however, is — and this is emphatically stressed — that the condition on the guarantee is included in the entire procedure of denationalisation and is not stipulated for the first time after the conclusion of the contract.
Samas on põhiaspektiks – ja seda rõhutatakse otsustavalt – et garantiitingimus on kaasatud kogu denatsionaliseerimismenetlusse ning seda ei ole esmakordselt kehtestatud lepingu sõlmimise järel.
It does not, therefore, constitute a last-minute “invention”, as the complainant desires to show, whose aim is circumventing the Community Rules on the legality of State aid.
Seega ei ole eeltoodust tulenevalt tegu viimase minuti „leiutisega”, nagu soovib näidata kaebuse esitaja, kelle eesmärgiks on hoida kõrvale ühenduse eeskirjadest riigiabi seaduslikkuse osas.
The Greek State as a seller of the shares of ETVA ought to, not only at the time of the contract of 18.10.2001, but also according to law, to transfer to Bank Piraeus its shares in ETVA free from any obligation.
ETVA aktsiate müüjana peaks Kreeka riik, mitte üksnes 18. oktoobri 2001. aasta lepingu sõlmimise ajal, vaid ka kooskõlas seadustega, võõrandama Piraeus Bankile oma osaluse ETVAs ilma igasuguste kohustusteta.
Given that Bank of Piraeus had no involvement in the procedure of the denationalisation of HSY, it should be, according to law and transaction customs, secured against any obligation emanating from the contract of transferring HSY to which it was not participating.
Võttes arvesse asjaolu, et Piraeus Bank ei olnud mingil viisil kaasatud HSY denatsionaliseerimismenetlusse, peaks Piraeus Bank seaduste ja tehingutavade kohaselt olema kaitstud ükskõik milliste kohustuste eest, mis tulenevad HSY üleandmislepingust, milles ta ei osalenud.
The Greek State gave it since it had a contractual obligation, acting towards Bank Piraeus as a party to a contract, i.e. as a fiscus, and not as an agent of public power.’The Commission recalls that at the time of that letter, Greece, commenting on Elefsis’ allegation that the guarantee constituted aid to HDW/Ferrostaal, wished to show that this guarantee did not constitute an advantage selectively granted to HDW/Ferrostaal but was offered to all the bidders (including Elefsis) that participated in the privatisation process of HSY.
Kreeka riik andis selle oma vastava lepingulise kohustuse tõttu, käitudes Piraeus Banki suhtes lepingu osapoolena, st maksuhalduri ja mitte avaliku võimu esindajana.”Komisjon tuletab meelde, et selle kirja edastamise ajal seoses märkuste esitamisega vastuseks Elefsise väitele, et garantii kujutas endast abi HDW/Ferrostaalile, soovis Kreeka näidata, et kõnealuse garantii korral ei olnud tegu valikuliselt HDW/Ferrostaalile võimaldatud eelisega, vaid et seda pakuti kõikidele pakkujatele, kes HSY erastamisprotsessis osalesid (sealhulgas Elefsisele).
In its following submissions to the Commission, Greece, realising that the Commission could consider this guarantee as aid to HSY, tried to put in doubt the imputability of the measure to the State by claiming that the guarantee has been concluded not earlier than in May 2002, which is a total contradiction of the claims made in the letter of 23 May 2005.
Oma järgnevates esildistes komisjonile üritas Kreeka, olles mõistnud, et komisjon võib käsitleda kõnealust garantiid abina HSY-le, seada kahtluse alla meetme seostatavuse riigiga, väites, et garantii sõlmiti alles 2002. aasta mais, mis on täielikus vastuolus 23. mai 2005. aasta kirjas esitatud väidetega.
As indicated in recital 59 of the present decision, the privatisation was decided by decision No 14/3-1-2001 of the relevant Inter-ministerial Privatisation Committee.
Nagu osutatud käesoleva otsuse põhjenduses 59, kiideti erastamine heaks asjaomase ministeeriumidevahelise erastamiskomitee otsusega nr 14/3–1-2001.
The Commission acknowledges that the wording and the structure of the agreement of 20 March 2002 is confusing.
Komisjon tunnistab, et 20. märtsi 2002. aasta lepingu sõnastus ja ülesehitus tekitavad segadust.
Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 provides that, in respect of the aid included in Article 3 to 6 of Law 2941/2001 (see recital 33 of the present decision for a description of that law), the State would pay to Piraeus Bank 100 % of the amount which would be paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
märtsi 2002. aasta lepingu artikkel 8.2.4 näeb ette, et seaduse 2941/2001 artiklites 3–6 sätestatud abiga seoses (kõnealuse seaduse kirjeldus – vt käesoleva otsuse punkti 33) tasub riik Piraeus Bankile 100 % ETVA poolt HDW/Ferrostaalile makstavast summast.
However, in case of recovery of aid not included in Article 3 to 6 of Law 2941/2001, Article 8.2.4 of the agreement of 20 March 2002 does not apply.
Samas aga ei kehti 20. märtsi 2002. aasta artikkel 8.2.4 seaduse 2941/2001 artiklite 3–6 alla mittekuuluva abi tagasinõudmise korral.
Therefore, Article 8.2.1 would be applicable.
Seega oleks kohaldatav artikkel 8.2.1.
This article provides that the State will pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the amount which would be paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Antud artikkel näeb ette, et riik maksab Piraeus Bankile vaid 57,7 % ETVA poolt HDW/Ferrostaalile makstavast summast.
However, the Commission observes that Article 8.2.2 of the Agreement indicates that, despite the sale of the majority of the shares of ETVA to Piraeus Bank, it is the State — and not Piraeus Bank/ETVA — that is going to manage the on-going sale of HSY.
Samas märgib komisjon, et lepingu artikli 8.2.2 kohaselt on vaatamata ETVA enamusaktsiate müügile Piraeus Bankile just riik – ja mitte Piraeus Bank ega ETVA – määratud juhtima HSY käimasolevat müüki.
This article, and in particular point 8.2.2(d), indicates that the State undertakes that the Purchaser (i.e. Piraeus Bank) will suffer no damage in relation to the privatisation of Hellenic Shipyards.
Kõnealune artikkel, eelkõige selle punkt 8.2.2.d, osutab, et riik kohustub välistama ükskõik milliste kahjude kandmise ostja (st Piraeus Banki) poolt seoses Hellenic Shipyardsi erastamisega.
Since, as shown by Article 8.2.4 (and by Article 7.4 of the Agreement of 18 December 2001), the agreement was based on the assumption that Piraeus Bank and ETVA would soon merge, the commitment made by the State in Article 8.2.2 would not be respected if it would pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the sum paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Kuna leping põhines eeldusel, et Piraeus Bank ja ETVA ühinevad peatselt, nagu selgub artiklist 8.2.4 (ning 18. detsembri 2001 lepingu artiklist 7.4), rikuks riik oma artiklis 8.2.2 sätestatud kohustust juhul, kui ta tasuks Piraeus Bankile ainult 57,7 % ETVA poolt HDW/Ferrostaalile makstud summast.
In order words, in order to implement the commitment made in paragraph 8.2.2 — namely to ensure that Piraeus Bank will not suffer from the sale of HSY — the mechanism laid down in Article 8.2.4 must apply to all cases of recovery of aid, and not only to cases of recovery of aid stemming from Law 2941/2001.
Teisisõnu peab artiklis 8.2.4 sätestatud mehhanism artiklis 8.2.2 võetud kohustuse elluviimiseks – nimelt selle tagamiseks, et Piraeus Bank HSY müügiga seoses kahju ei kanna – kehtima kõigi abi tagastamisjuhtude suhtes, ja mitte üksnes seadusest 2941/2001 tulenevate abi tagastamisjuhtude suhtes.
This means that even if, contrary to the foregoing conclusion, the agreement of 20 March 2002 had obliged the State to pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the amount paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal, this has been modified by the letter of the government of 31 May 2002, which states unambiguously that the mechanism provided in Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 (i.e. 100 % indemnification) applies.
Eeltoodu tähendab seda, et isegi kui 20. märtsi 2002. aasta leping oleks vastupidiselt eelnevale järeldusele kohustanud riiki tasuma Piraeus Bankile vaid 57,7 % ETVA poolt HDW/Ferrostaalile makstud summast, on seda muudetud valitsuse 31. mai 2002. aasta kirjaga, mis kinnitab üheselt 20. märtsi 2002. aasta lepingu artikliga 8.2.4 sätestatud mehhanismi (st 100 % hüvitise) kehtivust.
In answer to a precise question by the Commission sent by letter of 12 February 2008, Greece confirmed in its letter of 3 March 2008 that it would be obliged to pay to Piraeus Bank the full (i.e. 100 % and not 57,7 %) amount paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Vastuseks komisjoni konkreetsele küsimusele 12. veebruari 2008. aasta kirjas kinnitas Kreeka oma 3. märtsi 2008. aasta kirjas, et ta oleks kohustatud maksma Piraeus Bankile kogu (st 100 % ja mitte 57,7 %) ETVA poolt HDW/Ferrostaalile tasutava summa.
As indicated in the assessment of measure E7, the employees were the owner of these shares but had not paid the purchase price they should have paid to ETVA.
Nagu osutatud meetme E7 hinnangus, olid töötajad nende aktsiate omanikeks, kuid polnud tasunud ETVA-le ostuhinda, mida nad oleksid pidanud tasuma.
See recital 33 of the present decision for a description of that law.
Mainitud seaduse kirjeldus – vt põhjendus 33.
Case C-334/99, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission, paragraphs 133 to 141.
Juhtum C-334/99 Saksa Föderatiivne Vabariik vs. komisjon, lõiked 133–141.
In addition, the Commission observes that, to its knowledge, none of the loans and guarantees covered by Article 296 comply with the conditions laid down in section 3.1 of the present decision.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et talle teadaolevalt ei vasta ükski artikli 296 alla kuuluvatest laenudest ja garantiidest käesoleva otsuse jaos 3.1 sätestatud tingimustele.
They would therefore not have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
Seega ei oleks need turumajanduslikule investorile vastuvõetavad olnud.
Taking into account the risk aversion of the economic agents, the sale of HSY would be preferred over the liquidation of HSY only if the statistical expectancy of payments following from the guarantee would be significantly smaller than EUR 6 million.
Võttes arvesse majandussubjektide soovimatust riskida, oleks HSY müüki eelistatud HSY likvideerimisele vaid juhul, kui garantiist tulenevate maksete statistiliselt ootuspärane maht oleks olnud tunduvalt väiksem kui 6 miljonit eurot.
This has already been analysed by the Commission in the extension decision, in particular in the description and the assessment of measure 18(a).
Komisjon on seda laiendamisotsuses juba analüüsinud, muu hulgas meetme 18 punkti a kirjelduses ja hindamises.
The Commission also notes that the second Deloitte report indicates: ‘The clause d) above, regarding the allocation of the consideration between an amount destined for a share capital increase and price offered for the acquisition of existing shares, at a set ratio of 2:1, from our experience in similar transactions, is not a very common term.
Samuti märgib komisjon, et teine Deloitte’i aruanne osutab: „Punkt d eespool, mis käsitleb tasude jaotamist aktsiakapitali suurendamiseks mõeldud summa ja olemasolevate aktsiate omandamise eest pakutud hinna vahel kindlaksmääratud suhet 2:1 järgides, ei ole meie sarnaste tehingutega seoses omandatud kogemustele tuginedes väga levinud tingimus.
However, taking into consideration the significant operational problems and deteriorating financial position of the Company, we believe that the decision taken by the Sellers (and their Advisors) to set such terms was both rational and reasonable’ (page 9–2).
Samas, võttes arvesse ettevõtte olulisi talitlushäireid ning halvenevat rahanduslikku olukorda, usume, et müüjate (ja nende nõustajate) tehtud otsus vastavate tingimuste kehtestamise osas oli nii ratsionaalne kui ka mõistlik.”
The Commission interprets this quotation as confirming that this allocation of the purchase price was a rational and reasonable request of the State if one considers that its objective was to ensure the continuation of the activities of HSY over the long term (goal as public authority), not if one considers that its objective was to maximise the revenues from the sale (goal as market economy investor).
(lk 9–2). Komisjon tõlgendab seda tsitaati kinnitusena selle kohta, et ostuhinna taoline jaotus oli riigi seisukohast ratsionaalne ja mõistlik juhul, kui võtta arvesse, et riigi eesmärgiks oli tagada HSY tegevuse jätkumine pika aja vältel (eesmärk avaliku võimu kandjana), mitte müügist saadava tulu maksimeerimine (eesmärk turumajandusliku investorina).
See footnote 148.
Vt allmärkus 148.
The Commission does not claim that a due diligence would have allowed to identify all the measures which have to be recovered according to the present decision, but some of them.
Komisjon ei väida, et nõuetele vastavuse kontrollimine oleks võimaldanud tuvastada kõiki meetmeid, mis käesoleva otsuse kohaselt tagasinõudmisele kuuluvad – küll aga mõningaid neist.
In its letter of 21 June 2007, TKMS/GNSH has submitted some due diligence reports performed in 2001 by Arthur Andersen on behalf of HDW/Ferrostaal.
Oma 21. juuni 2007. aasta kirjas on TKMS/GNSH esitanud mõned 2001. aastal Arthur Anderseni poolt HDW/Ferrostaali nimel läbiviidud nõuetele vastavuse kontrollimiste aruanded.
Arthur Andersen indicates in these reports that it is not excluded that HSY has received State aid which should be recovered in the future.
Neis aruannetes märgib Arthur Andersen, et ei ole välistatud, et HSY on saanud riigiabi, mis kuulub tulevikus tagastamisele.
In particular, since ETVA and Greece had promised to grant this guarantee in the tender document submitted to the bidders, the fact that this guarantee was not mentioned as a condition in the bid documents submitted by Elefsis would not have prevented it from requesting it later in the negotiation process.
Muu hulgas, kuna ETVA ja Kreeka olid andnud kõnealuse garantii võimaldamise lubaduse pakkujatele esitatud dokumendis, ei oleks fakt, et garantiid ei mainitud tingimusena Elefsise esitatud pakkumiskutse dokumentides, takistanud Elefsist seda nõudmast hiljem, läbirääkimiste protsessi käigus.
This point is underpinned in the second Deloitte report which claims that, if HDW/Ferrostaal had had to support the risk of having to reimburse State aid received by HSY in the previous years, it would not have purchased HSY.
Seda aspekti on rõhutatud teises Deloitte’i aruandes, kus väidetakse, et kui HDW/Ferrostaal oleks olnud sunnitud võtma arvesse HSY-le varasematel aastatel antud riigiabi tagasinõudmise riski, ei oleks HDW/Ferrostaal HSYd ostnud.
This is clear from the text of the Seventh Shipbuilding Directive and from its structure, in which ‘Investment aid’ is a part of ‘Chapter III Restructuring aid’.
See ilmneb seitsmenda laevaehitusdirektiivi tekstist ja struktuurist, kus „Investeeringutoetus” kuulub „Peatükk III Ümberkorraldusabi” alla.
See the very large debt waiver mentioned in decision C 10/94, the payment of the closure costs mentioned in decision N 513/01, and all the financial supports provided by the State and falling under Article 296 which were mentioned in the extension decision.
Vt võlgade tühistamine väga suures ulatuses, mida on mainitud otsuses C 10/94, otsuses N 513/01 nimetatud sulgemiskulud ja kogu riigi osutatud rahaline toetus, mis kuulub artikli 296 alla ning mida mainiti laiendamisotsuses.
For instance, as regards State financial support which was provided to HSY without being earmarked to the financing of a precise activity, the Commission has considered that only 25 % of the State support benefited to the civil activities.
Näiteks leidis komisjon riigi rahalise toetuse puhul, mis anti HSY-le ilma konkreetse tegevuse rahastamise kohustuseta, et ainult 25 % kõnealusest riigi toetusest kulutati tsiviilotstarbeliseks tegevuseks.
However, if only 25 % of the State support is recovered, only 6,25 % (i.e. 25 % of 25 %) of the State support would in fact be recovered from the civil activities.
Kui tagasi nõutakse ainult 25 % riigi toetusest, saadakse tsiviilotstarbelise tegevuse arvelt tagasi vaid 6,25 % (st 25 % 25 %-st) riigi toetusest.
This will not restore the initial situation of the civil activities of HSY, because they received 25 % of the State support and will only reimburse 6,25 %.
See ei taastaks HSY tsiviilotstarbelise tegevuse algset olukorda, sest nad tagastaksid saadud 25 % riigi toetusest vaid 6,25 %.
According to the amended plan, dated November 2002, HSY applied for, and eventually received the approval of the Greek authorities to complete the implementation of the investment plan by 30 June 2004.
aasta novembris muudetud kava kohaselt taotles HSY Kreeka ametiasutuste heakskiitu, mille ta lõpuks ka sai, et viia investeerimiskava lõplikult ellu 30. juuniks 2004.
Moreover, according to the amended plan, the aid approved by the Commission in 1997, has not yet been paid out to HSY.
Muudetud kava kohaselt ei ole komisjoni poolt 1997. aastal heakskiidetud abi ettevõtjale HSY veel välja makstud.
After having requested and received extensions of the deadline to submit comments, HSY made comments on the opening decision by letter of 18 October 2004.
Märkuste esitamise tähtaja pikendamise järel esitas ettevõtja HSY märkused algatamisotsuse kohta 18. oktoobri 2004. aasta kirjaga.
These comments are the same as the ones submitted by Greece on 20 October 2004.
Märkused kattusid 20. oktoobril 2004 esitatud Kreeka märkustega.
Elefsis, a Greek competitor of HSY, submitted comments by letter of 10 September 2004.
Ettevõtja HSY Kreeka konkurent Elefsis esitas märkused 10. septembri 2004. aasta kirjaga.