natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission notes that, according to the government decision by which the investment aid was approved, the payment of the first tranche of the aid would take place once the competent control body would have observed that the investment expenses amount to GRD 2,73 billion.
Komisjon märgib, et vastavalt valitsuse otsusele, millega investeeringutoetus heaks kiideti, pidi toetuse esimese osa väljamaksmine toimuma pärast seda, kui pädev kontrolliasutus on kinnitanud investeerimiskulude ulatumist 2,73 miljardi Kreeka drahmini.
In addition, the payment had to take place before 31 December 1999.
Lisaks pidi väljamakse toimuma enne 31. detsember 1999.
However, different problems preventing the payment of the aid could still occur.
Eeltoodule vaatamata oleksid siiski võinud ilmneda mitmesugused toetuse väljamaksmist takistavad probleemid.
First, in case of bankruptcy of HSY, it was not certain that the Greece authorities would have accepted to pay the investment aid to a firm that would have ceased operations.
Esiteks ei oleks HSY võimaliku pankrotistumise korral olnud kindel, kas Kreeka ametiasutused oleksid nõustunud maksma investeeringutoetust ettevõttele, mis on tegevuse lõpetanud.
The bank would then have had to start costly and lengthy legal actions to recover the money.
Niisugusel juhul oleks pank olnud sunnitud rakendama raha tagasisaamiseks kulukaid ja aeganõudvaid õiguslikke meetmeid.
Second, it is not certain that the competent control bodies would have accepted to validate the investment expenses incurred, such that the threshold would not be reached in due time.
Teiseks ei ole kindel, et pädevad ametiasutused oleksid kantud investeerimiskuludega nõustunud, millisel juhul ei oleks künnist õigeaegselt ületatud.
As indicated in chapter 1 ‘Procedure’ of the present decision, when the Commission later learnt about the delay in the implementation of the investment plan, it asked the suspension of the payment of the aid which had not yet been paid to HSY.
Nagu on osutatud käesoleva otsuse peatükis 1 „Menetlus”, taotles komisjon investeerimiskava elluviimise hilinemisest tagantjärele teada saades HSY-le selleks ajaks tasumata toetuse väljamaksmise peatamist.
The Commission concludes that the payment of the first tranche of the investment aid by the State was likely but not certain.
Komisjon järeldab, et investeeringutoetuse esimese osa liikmesriigipoolne väljamaksmine oli tõenäoline, kuid mitte kindel.
In view of the difficult situation of HSY, a private bank would have required securities that could be enforced rapidly and with certainty, and would have not been satisfied with security of which the value could be zero in certain circumstances.
HSY rasket olukorda arvese võttes oleks kommertspank nõudnud tagatisi, mida saaks kiiresti ja kindlalt realiseerida, ning ei oleks rahuldunud tagatisega, mis võib teatavatel asjaoludel osutuda väärtusetuks.
The Commission thus concludes that a private bank would not have accepted to grant this loan.
Seega järeldab komisjon, et kommertspank ei oleks nõustunud niisugust laenu väljastama.
As indicated previously, this is confirmed by HSY’s unsuccessful attempts to raise funds from market economy investors.
Nagu eespool märgitud, kinnitavad seda HSY edutud katsed hankida raha turumajanduslikelt investoritelt.
Greece also claims that, since ETVA was the shareholder of HSY, it served its interests by providing this loan to HSY.
Samuti väidab Kreeka, et HSY aktsionärina kaitses ETVA enda huve, andes laenu HSY-le.
In section 3.1.3 of the present decision, the Commission has already rejected this claim.
Selle väite on komisjon käesoleva otsuse lõikes 3.1.3 juba tagasi lükanud.
Finally, regarding the fact that the loan has been reimbursed, the Commission has already explained in the assessment of measure P2 why such a fact does not show that a private bank would have accepted to provide this financing to HSY at that moment.
Seoses laenu tagastamisega on komisjon meetme P2 hinnangus juba selgitanud, miks antud asjaolu ei tõenda, et mõni kommertspank oleks nõustunud HSY-d vastaval ajahetkel rahastama.
From the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that the loan gives an advantage to HSY since it could not have received this loan from the market.
Eeltoodu põhjal järeldab komisjon, et laen annab HSY-le eelise, sest turult ei oleks ettevõte niisugust laenu saanud.
The Commission concludes that measure P3 constitutes aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Komisjon järeldab, et meede P3 kujutab endast abi asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses.
Since, contrary to the requirement laid down in Article 88(3) of the Treaty, the aid was granted without prior notification, it constitutes unlawful aid.
Kuivõrd abist eelnevalt ei teatatud, mis on vastuolus asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 3 sätestatud nõudega, on tegemist ebaseadusliku abiga.
As measure P2, the compatibility of the present measure must be assessed under Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Nagu meedet P2 tuleb ja käesoleva meetme kokkusobivust hinnata määruse (EÜ) nr 1540/98 kohaselt. Sarnaselt meetmega P2 oli käesolev laen suunatud investeerimiskava rahastamiseks, mis moodustas osa ümberkorralduskavast.
Since, as measure P2, this loan aimed at financing an investment plan which was a part of a restructuring plan and since it was granted to a firm in difficulty, it should also be considered as restructuring aid covered by Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Kuna see oli antud raskustes ettevõttele, tuleks seda samuti käsitleda määruse (EÜ) nr 1540/98 artikli 5 kohase ümberkorraldustoetusena.
The guidelines applicable at the time of the grant were the ones published in the Official Journal on 23 December 1994 and which entered into force on the same day (hereinafter the 1994 R & R guidelines).
Abi andmise ajal kehtivad suunised avaldati Euroopa Liidu Teatajas23. detsembril 1994. aastal ja jõustusid samal päeval (edaspidi: 1994. aasta ühenduse suunised).
For instance, regarding condition (i) ‘Restoration of viability’, the Commission notes that the State guarantee financed an investment plan which was part of a restructuring plan which, in July 1999, had become insufficient to restore the long term viability of HSY.
Näiteks märgib komisjon tingimuse i) „Elujõulisuse taastamine” puhul, et riigigarantiiga rahastati investeerimiskava, mis moodustas osa ümberkorralduskavast, mis 1999. aasta juuliks oli muutunud ebapiisavaks HSY pikaajalise elujõulisuse taastamise seisukohast.
Regarding the condition (iii) ‘Aid in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits’, the Commission had already decided in decision N 401/97 that State aid could at the maximum amount to 50 % of the investment costs and the remaining 50 % would be financed by funds raised from the shareholders and by bank loans raised at market conditions.
Mis puutub tingimusse iii) „Ümberkorraldamise hinna ja eelistega proportsionaalne abi”, oli komisjon oma otsuses N 401/97 juba otsustanud, et riigiabi võis ulatuda maksimaalselt 50 %-ni investeerimiskuludest ning ülejäänud 50 % oleks tulnud rahastada aktsionäridelt saadud vahendite ja turutingimustel võetud laenude arvelt.
Consequently, no additional aid in favour of the investment plan could be granted otherwise the aforementioned percentages of 50 % would be breached and the Commission could not consider that the aid is proportional to ‘the restructuring costs and benefits’.
Eeltoodust tulenevalt ei ole lubatav ükskõik millise lisaabi andmine investeerimiskava jaoks, vastasel juhul ületatakse eelmainitud 50 % piir ning komisjon ei saa järeldada, et abi oli proportsionaalne „ümberkorraldamise hinna ja eelistega”.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission consider that the loan constitutes unlawful and incompatible aid, which must be recovered.
Eeltoodu põhjal järeldab komisjon, et laenu puhul oli tegemist ebaseadusliku ja kokkusobimatu abiga, mis kuulub tagastamisele.
Since after 30 June 1999 HSY could not have received any loan from the market, the entire loan has to be reimbursed.
Kuna HSY ei oleks pärast 30. juunit 1999 turult laenu saanud, kuulub tagastamisele kogu laen.
This is however insufficient to restore the situation that would have prevailed without aid since during several years HSY has benefited from a loan which it would not have received without State intervention.
Sellest aga ei piisa olukorra taastamiseks, mis oleks valitsenud abi puudumisel, sest HSY on mitme aasta vältel saanud kasu laenust, mida ettevõte ei oleks riigi sekkumiseta saanud.
In order to recover this advantage, the Commission considers, in accordance with the conclusion reached in section 3.1 of the present decision, that the difference between the interest rate of the loan and the reference rate of Greece increased by 600 basis points needs to be recovered for each year from the pay-out of the loan to HSY until its reimbursement.
Selle eelise tagasinõudmise osas on komisjon kooskõlas käesoleva otsuse lõikes 3.1 esitatud järeldusega seisukohal, et erinevus laenu intressimäära ja Kreeka viitemäära vahel suurendatuna 600 baaspunkti võrra tuleb tagasi nõuda iga aasta eest alates laenu väljamaksmisest HSY-le kuni selle tagastamiseni.
The Commission notes that in March 2002 the State sold the majority of ETVA’s shares to Piraeus Bank.
Komisjon märgib, et 2002. aasta märtsis müüs riik ETVA enamusaktsiad Piraeus Bankile.
In order to answer this question, the Commission recalls that when the State grants a loan with an interest rate below the market rate, the aid is granted at the time of the conclusion of the loan, even if the advantage only materialises at each interest payment dates, when the borrower pays a lower interest rate.
Sellele küsimusele vastamiseks tuletab komisjon meelde, et kui riik annab laenu intressimääraga, mis jääb alla turumäära, on tegemist laenulepingu sõlmimise ajal antud abiga, seda isegi juhul, kui eelis realiseerub vaid igal intressi maksekuupäeval, kui laenusaaja tasub madalama intressimäära.
In the same manner, the market value of a loan which has an interest rate not reflecting adequately the difficulties of the borrower decreases immediately after the signature of the loan contract (i.e. not at the future dates when the borrowers pays an interest rate below the market interest rate).
Samal viisil langeb laenu turuväärtus, mille intressimäär ei peegelda adekvaatselt laenusaaja raskusi, laenulepingu allkirjastamise järel viivitamatult (st mitte kuupäevadel tulevikus, mil laenusaaja tasub turu intressimäärast väiksemat intressimäära).
In turn, the value of a bank depends on the value of its assets, and notably its portfolio of existing loans.
Panga väärtus sõltub omakorda panga varade väärtusest ning olulisel määral olemasolevate laenude portfellist.
Therefore, the granting of loans at non market conform conditions decreased the value of ETVA and therefore diminished the price that the State later received when it sold ETVA’s shares.
Seega vähendas laenude andmine turuolukorrale mittevastavatel tingimustel ETVA väärtust, mistõttu riik sai ETVA aktsiate müümisel väiksema hinna.
This illustrates that it is the State which supported the cost of these aid measures, including for their duration running after March 2002.
Eeltoodu näitab, et just riik kandis nende abimeetmete kulud, seda isegi pärast 2002. aasta märtsi.
EUR 13,75 million loan granted in 2002 (measure P4)
aastal antud 13,75 miljardi euro suurune laen (meede P4)
The loan would be used as an advance on the second and third tranches of the investment aid.
Laenu oli kavas kasutada ettemaksena investeeringutoetuse teise ja kolmanda osa eest.
The loan was secured by the conveyance of the payment of the second and third tranches of the investment aid.
Laenu tagatiseks oli investeeringutoetuse teise ja kolmanda osa maksmise üleandmine.
Elefsis’s comments on this measure are similar to the comments on measure P3.
Ettevõtja Elefsis märkused antud meetme kohta sarnanevad märkustega meetme P3 kohta.
The Greek authorities claim that this loan was granted on market terms.
Kreeka ametiasutused väidavad, et kõnealune laen anti turutingimustel.
In addition, the security in the form of the conveyance of the claims on the second and third tranches of the investment aid constituted a collateral acceptable to any bank.
Lisaks oli investeeringutoetuse teise ja kolmanda osaga seonduvate nõuete üleandmise vormis antav tagatis vastuvõetav mis tahes panga jaoks.
Finally, the loan was never paid out to HSY and it could therefore not constitute aid to HSY.
Lõpetuseks ei makstud laenu kunagi HSY-le välja, mistõttu seda ei saa käsitleda HSY-le antud abina.
In addition, the fact that ETVA has refused to pay out the loan when it realised that the payment of the investment aid had been ‘freezed’ for procedural reasons and that the payment of the aid was uncertain illustrates that ETVA acted as any other bank would have done.
Asjaolu, et ETVA keeldus laenu väljamaksmisest pärast seda, kui sai teada, et investeeringutoetuse maksmine on menetluslikul põhjustel „külmutatud” ja et toetuse maksmine ei ole kindel, näitas seda, et ETVA toimis viisil, nagu oleks toiminud mis tahes muu pank.
The Commission has previously concluded in the assessment of measure P2 that measure P4 does not fall in the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Komisjon on meetme P2 hindamisega seoses eelnevalt järeldanud, et meede P4 ei kuulu asutamislepingu artikli 296 kohaldamisalasse.
The Commission observes that, since ETVA refused to pay out the loan to HSY, HSY never received any money under the loan contract.
Komisjon tunnistab, et kuna ETVA keeldus laenu väljamaksmisest HSY-le, ei saanud HSY laenulepingu alusel eales mingit raha.
Therefore, there is no advantage to HSY and the Commission can immediately conclude that the measure does not constitute aid.
Seetõttu puudub eelis HSY jaoks ja komisjon saab kohe järeldada, et meede ei kujuta endast abi.
The two following elements concerning measure P4, even if they are irrelevant for the assessment of measure P4, may cast doubts on the validity of the assessment of other measures.
Kaks järgnevat elementi, mis seonduvad meetmega P4, võivad isegi juhul, kui need on meetme hindamise seisukohast ebaolulised, tekitada kahtlusi muude meetmete hindamise kehtivuse osas.
Therefore the Commission will analyse them.
Seetõttu analüüsib komisjon neid.
First, Greece claims that the fact that ETVA, because there was a risk that the investment aid would not be paid, decided not to disburse the loan to HSY illustrates that ETVA acted as a normal private lender and did not offer to HSY a favourable treatment.
Esiteks väidab Kreeka, et ETVA otsus loobuda laenu väljamaksmisest HSY-le seepärast, et valitses oht, et investeeringutoetust välja ei maksta, annab tunnistust sellest, et ETVA käitus tavalise kommertslaenuandjana ega pakkunud HSY-le sooduskohtlemist.
The Commission notes that Greece’s claim fails to take into account the fact that when ETVA refused to pay out the loan it was already under the control of Piraeus Bank and not under State control anymore.
Komisjoni arvamusel ei võta Kreeka arvesse asjaolu, et ajal, mil ETVA laenu väljamaksmisest keeldus, oli ETVA juba Piraeus Banki ja mitte riigi kontrolli all.
Therefore, the refusal to pay out the loan can not be taken as an illustration of the way ETVA behaved when it was under State control.
Seetõttu ei saa laenu väljamaksmisest keeldumist käsitleda näitena ETVA käitumisest ajal, mil ETVA oli riigi kontrolli all.
Conversely, this confirms that a private bank would have avoided to lend to HSY.
Vastupidi, pigem leiab kinnitust see, et kommertspank oleks vältinud raha laenamist HSY-le.
Second, the Commission notes that measure P4 has the same type of collateral as measure P3.
Teiseks märgib komisjon, et meetmel P4 on sama liiki tagatis kui meetmel P3.
Measure P4 was signed when Piraeus Bank had already taken control of ETVA.
Meede P4 allkirjastati pärast seda, kui ETVA oli läinud Piraeus Banki kontrolli alla.
However, this does not show that measure P3 was in fact acceptable to a private bank.
Samas ei tähenda eeltoodu, et meede P3 oleks olnud kommertspanga jaoks vastuvõetav.
Indeed, the two situations are not comparable for several reasons.
Tegelikkuses ei ole kaks kõnealust olukorda mitmel põhjusel omavahel võrreldavad.
The Commission notes for instance that when the loan contract was signed on 31 May 2002, it was already known, and certainly to ETVA who was the shareholder of HSY until that date, that the payment of the investment aid had been ‘freezed’ for administrative reasons.
Näiteks märgib komisjon, et kui laenuleping 31. mail 2002 allkirjastati, oli kindlasti juba ka ETVA-le, kes oli osutatud kuupäevani HSY aktsionär, et investeeringutoetuse maksmine oli administratiivsetel põhjustel „külmutatud”.
Therefore, when ETVA signed the contract on 31 May 2002, it was already in a position to refuse to pay out the loan.
Seetõttu oleks ETVA juba lepingu allkirjastamisel 31. mail 2002 võinud keelduda laenu väljamaksmisest.
It knew that it had the possibility to refuse to pay out the loan.
ETVA teadis, et tema käsutuses on võimalus keelduda laenu väljamaksmisest.
The acquisition increased the chances of survival of the firm.
Omandamine suurendas ettevõtte lootusi püsima jääda.
Such an acquisition could not be foreseen in July 1999.
aasta juulis oleks olnud võimatu niisugust omandamist ette näha.
Misuse of the GRD 54 billion (EUR 160 million) aid authorised in 1997 (measure E7)
aastal heakskiidetud 54 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (160 miljoni euro) suuruse abi (meede E7) väärkasutus
On 15 July 1997, besides decision N 401/97 endorsing the investment aid, the Commission adopted decision C 10/94.
juulil 1997 võttis komisjon lisaks investeeringutoetust kinnitavale otsusele N 401/97 vastu ka otsuse C 10/94.
That decision closed the procedure pursuant to Article 88(2) by approving under Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 a debt write-off amounting to GRD 54 billion (EUR 160 million), which corresponded to the debts related to civil work of the yard.
See otsus lõpetas menetluse vastavalt artikli 88 lõikele 2, kiites määruse (EÜ) nr 1013/97 alusel heaks 54 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (160 miljoni euro) suuruse võla kustutamise, mis vastas laevatehase tsiviiltöödega seonduvale võlasummale.
The write-off of the debts related to military work of the yard, which took place at the same time, has not been assessed under State aid rules.
Laevatehase sõjaliste töödega seonduvate võlgade samaaegset kustutamist ei ole riigiabi eeskirjade põhjal hinnatud.
In the extension decision, the Commission raises doubts that two conditions laid down in decision C 10/94 have been breached.
Laiendamisotsuses väljendab komisjon kahtlust, et otsusega C 10/94 sätestatud kahte tingimust on rikutud.
First, the authorisation of the debt write-off was conditional on the implementation of the restructuring plan, of which the investment plan was one of the two pillars.
Esiteks seoti võla kustutamise heakskiitmine tingimusega, et ümberkorralduskava viiakse ellu ja investeerimiskava oli üheks selle kahest tugisambast.
As the Commission has explained in the opening decision (see description of measure P1), the Commission doubts that this investment plan has been implemented correctly.
Nagu komisjon selgitas algatamisotsuses (vt meetme P1 kirjeldus), on komisjonil kahtlusi kõnealuse investeerimiskava nõuetekohase elluviimise osas.
Second, decision C 10/94 prohibits the granting of additional operating aid for restructuring purposes.
Teiseks on otsusega C 10/94 täiendava tegevusabi andmine ümberkorraldamiseks keelatud.
The Commission observes that the different measures included in the extension decision seem to constitute additional restructuring aid.
Komisjon märgib, et laiendamisotsusesse kaasatud erinevad meetmed kujutavad endast täiendavat ümberkorraldusabi.
It seems therefore that this condition was breached.
Seetõttu jääb mulje, et vastavat tingimust on rikutud.
Elefsis claims that the breach of two conditions brought forward in the opening decision constitute a valid basis to conclude that the aid was misused.
Elefsis väidab, et algatamisotsuses esiletoodud kahe tingimuse rikkumine on tugev alus järelduse tegemiseks toetuse väärkasutuse kohta.
The Commission should consider the absence of any real privatisation, which was a condition for the waiver, as an additional breach of the decision C 10/94.
Komisjon peaks käsitlema otsuse C 10/94 täiendava rikkumisena tõelise erastamise puudumist, sest erastamine oli loobumise eeltingimuseks..
In their comments on the extension decision, Greece and HSY claim that the prohibition of additional restructuring aid only renders any new aid unlawful.
Laiendamisotsust käsitlevates märkustes väidavad Kreeka ja HSY, et täiendava ümberkorraldusabi keelamine muudab mis tahes uue abi ebaseaduslikuks.
This prohibition, if breached, does not have the effect of rendering the aid authorised by decision C 10/94 incompatible.
Selle keelu rikkumine ei muuda otsusega C 10/94 heakskiidetud abi osutamist kokkusobimatuks.
In addition, Greece stresses that the decision prohibits additional ‘operating aid’ (as defined in Article 5 of Directive 90/684/EEC) for restructuring.
Lisaks rõhutab Kreeka, et otsus keelab täiendava „tegevusabi” (nõukogu direktiivi 90/684/EMÜ artiklis 5 sätestatud tähenduses) andmise ümberkorraldamise jaoks.
It therefore contests that after 1997 no restructuring aid may be granted to HSY.
Seepärast ei nõustu Kreeka sellega, et riik ei tohtinud anda HSY-le ümberkorraldusabi pärast 1997. aastat.
As regards the investment plan, Greece and HSY contend that decision C 10/94 did not contain a condition concerning the implementation of an investment plan.
Investeerimiskava puhul väidavad Kreeka ja HSY, et otsus C 10/94 ei sisaldanud investeerimiskava elluviimise tingimust.
Moreover, it could not have contained such a condition since Directive 90/684/EEC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/97, which formed the legal basis for the decision, did not contain such a condition.
Pealegi ei oleks see saanud niisugust tingimust sisaldada, sest direktiiv 90/684/EMÜ ja määrus (EÜ) nr 1013/97, mis moodustasid otsuse juriidilise aluse, ei sisaldanud vastavat tingimust.
The only condition was the partial privatisation of HSY and the submission (i.e. not the implementation) of an investment plan.
Ainsaks tingimuseks oli HSY osaline erastamine ja investeerimiskava esitamine (st mitte elluviimine).
Article 296 does not apply to the present measure since it concerns the write-off of debts exclusively related to the civil activities of the yard.
Artikkel 296 ei kehti käesoleva meetme suhtes, sest see käsitleb üksnes laevatehase tsiviiltegevusega seonduvate võlgade kustutamist.
In addition, decision C 10/94 was based on State aid rules and not on Article 296 of the Treaty
Lisaks põhines otsus C 10/94 riigiabi eeskirjadel ja mitte asutamislepingu artiklil 296.
Implementation of the investment plan
Investeerimiskava elluviimine
As regards the implementation of the investment plan, the Commission considers that it was a condition laid down in decision C 10/94.
Seoses investeerimiskava elluviimisega leiab komisjon, et see oli üheks otsuses C 10/94 määratletud tingimustest.
Indeed, the second before last paragraph indicates ‘The investment plan has not yet started […].
Eelviimases lõigus on kirjas: „Investeerimiskava ei ole veel käivitunud […].
Once it is executed, the ongoing restructuring should be completed and the yard should return to viability’ In the one before last paragraph, the Commission recalls the prohibition of further restructuring aid.
Kui see on ellu viidud, peaks käimasolev ümberkorraldamine olema lõpetatud ja laevatehase elujõulisus taastuma.” Eelviimases lõigus meenutab komisjon edasise ümberkorraldusabi keeldu.
Finally, the last paragraph indicates ‘In the light of the above, the Commission has decided to close the procedure pursuant to Article 93(2) by authorising the aid subject to the conditions described in this letter.
Lõpetuseks sätestatakse viimases lõigus: „Eespool toodut arvesse võttes on komisjon otsustatud lõpetada menetluse kooskõlas artikli 93 lõikega 2, kiites heaks abi, mille suhtes kehtivad selles kirjas kirjeldatud tingimused.