natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the process letter, the potential bidders were asked for an indicative, non-binding offer to buy the bank before 6 December 2005.
Nimetatud pakkumiskutses paluti potentsiaalsetel pakkujatel teha 6. detsembriks 2005 panga omandamiseks ligikaudne, mittesiduv pakkumine.
Only three of the 14 potential bidders came forward with indicative offers on time, which were pitched at EUR 65 million, EUR 100 million and EUR 140 million respectively [17], and entered the second phase aimed at leading to a binding offer for which the deadline was set at 6 February 2006.
14 potentsiaalsest pakkujast tegid vaid kolm isikut tähtaegse ligikaudse pakkumise summas 65 miljonit eurot, 100 miljonit eurot ja 140 miljonit eurot [17] ja osalesid pakkumise teises etapis, kus pidi 6. veebruariks 2006 esitama siduva pakkumise.
This second phase included, in particular, a due diligence phase to be carried out in an Internet data room from 7 January to 30 January 2006, supplemented by a number of presentations and meetings.
Kõnealuses teises etapis võimaldati teha due diligence analüüs, mille jaoks avati Interneti-põhine andmekogu ajavahemikus 7. jaanuarist kuni 30. jaanuarini 2006 ning korraldati selgitavaid esitlusi ja kohtumisi.
The bidders also had the opportunity to ask questions during and after the due diligence process.
Samuti võisid pakkujad kõnealuse analüüsi tegemise ajal esitada küsimusi.
On 6 February 2006 two bidders submitted a binding offer, GRAWE on the one hand, and the Consortium on the other.
veebruaril 2006 esitasid siduva pakkumise kaks pakkujat, GRAWE ja konsortsium.
With these two bidders the binding offers were individually negotiated further.
Seejärel peeti mõlema pakkujaga individuaalseid läbirääkimisi siduvate pakkumiste üle.
These negotiations ended on 4 March 2006.
Läbirääkimised lõppesid 4. märtsil 2006.
On 5 March 2006 the Province of Burgenland awarded the contract to GRAWE despite the purchase price offered by GRAWE (EUR 100,3 million) being significantly lower than the price offered by the Consortium (EUR 155 million).
märtsil 2006 tunnistas Burgenlandi liidumaa edukaks GRAWE pakkumise, kuigi GRAWE pakutud ostuhind (100,3 miljonit eurot) oli märksa väiksem kui konsortsiumi pakutud hind (155 miljonit eurot).
The decision was based on a written recommendation by HSBC (hereinafter called ‘the recommendation’) dated 4 March 2006, supplemented by oral explanations to the members of the Government of the Province of Burgenland on the day of the decision.
Otsuses tugineti HSBC 4. märtsi 2006. aasta kirjalikule soovitusele (edaspidi „soovitus”), mida otsuse tegemise päeval täiendati Burgenlandi liidumaa valitsuskabineti liikmetele jagatud suuliste selgitustega.
The Government of the Province of Burgenland formally agreed to the sale on 7 March 2006.
Burgenlandi liidumaa valitsus kiitis müügitehingu ametlikult heaks 7. märtsil 2006.
The closing of the deal took place on 12 May 2006.
Müügitehing lõpetati 12. mail 2006.
Capital Bank, a subsidiary of GRAWE, subscribed to EUR 350 million of the total EUR 700 million bonds.
Nimetatud võlakirjadest koguväärtusega 700 miljonit eurot märkis GRAWE tütarühing Capital Bank võlakirju väärtuses 350 miljonit eurot.
The selection criteria in the process letter
Pakkumiskutses avaldatud valikukriteeriumid
The following criteria for evaluating the offers were based on a decision of the Government of the Province of Burgenland of 6 September 2005 and were enumerated in the process letter:
Burgenlandi liidumaa valitsus määras 6. septembri 2005. aasta otsusega kindlaks järgmised valikukriteeriumid, mis loetleti ka pakkumiskutses:
the purchase price and reliability of the purchase price payment;
ostuhind ja ostuhinna tasumise tagamine;
maintenance of the autonomy of BB;
BB iseseisvuse säilitamine;
continued operation of BB and, at the same time, avoidance of use of Ausfallhaftung;
BB tegevuse jätkamine selliselt, et liidumaa vastutus ei rakenduks;
willingness to conduct any necessary capital increases;
vajaduse korral kapitali suurendamine;
transaction security;
tehingu toimumise kindluse tagamine;
considerations of time in carrying out the transaction.
tehingu toimumise ajakava.
The process letter further stated that the shareholder of BB would, on the basis of the recommendation, make a discretionary choice as to which bidders could enter the second phase of the sales process.
Pakkumiskutses viidati muu hulgas sellele, et BB aktsionärid otsustavad antud soovitusele tuginedes oma äranägemise järgi, millistele pakkujatele anda võimalus osaleda müügiprotsessi teises etapis.
The warranty clause in the contract with GRAWE
Garantiiklausel GRAWE-ga sõlmitud lepingus
The contract with GRAWE contains a warranty by the Province of Burgenland that the State aid rules are infringed neither in the context of the guarantee agreements which are the subject matter of the restructuring decision, nor in the context of the sales contract itself.
GRAWE-ga sõlmitud lepingus on säte, mille kohaselt Burgenlandi liidumaa kinnitab, et ümberkorraldamiskava otsuses käsitletud garantiikokkulepete ega ostumüügilepingu puhul ei ole rikutud riigiabiõiguse sätteid.
This warranty is supplemented by a clause which entitles the buyer GRAWE to be compensated by the Province of Burgenland in respect of any recovery ordered by the Commission in a negative decision.
Kõnealusele kinnitusele lisandub lepingusäte, mille kohaselt on ostjal (GRAWE) õigus nõuda Burgenlandi liidumaalt nende summade hüvitamist, mille tagastamist võib komisjon nõuda negatiivse otsuse tegemisel.
If the State aid rules were to prohibit such an adjustment of the sales price, the buyer could, according to this clause, rescind the contract.
Kui riigiabi eeskirjade kohaselt ei ole ostuhinda võimalik sel viisil muuta, võib ostja kõnealusele sättele tuginedes lepingust taganeda.
The recommendation by HSBC
HSBC soovitus
The recommendation compares the two offers by GRAWE and the Consortium on the basis of the selection criteria mentioned above. It points out that the purchase price would lead to a decision in favour of the Consortium.
Soovituses võrreldi GRAWE pakkumist konsortsiumi omaga lähtuvalt eespool loetletud valikukriteeriumidest ning jõuti järeldusele, et ostuhinna põhjal tuleks otsustada konsortsiumi kasuks.
However, in view of the other criteria — reliability of the purchase price payment, continued operation of the bank and avoidance of use of Ausfallhaftung, capital increases and transaction security — HSBC recommends a sale to GRAWE (see paragraphs 27 to 29 of the opening decision for further details).
Ent võttes aluseks muid kriteeriume (ostuhinna tasumise tagamine, BB tegevuse jätkamine selliselt, et liidumaa vastutus ei rakenduks, kapitali suurendamine ja tehingu toimumise kindluse tagamine) soovitas HSBC müüa BB GRAWE-le (vt selle kohta menetluse algatamise otsuse põhjendused 27–29).
DECISION TO INITIATE THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 88(2) OF THE EC TREATY
EÜ ASUTAMISLEPINGU ARTIKLI 88 LÕIKE 2 KOHASE AMETLIKU UURIMISMENETLUSE ALGATAMISE OTSUS
The Commission decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty for the following main reasons.
Komisjoni otsus algatada ametlik uurimismenetlus EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõike 2 kohaselt põhines eeskätt järgmisel.
Applying the principles set out in the XXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy [18], the Commission could not establish that the sale had taken place free of aid, especially as it was obvious that the Consortium, while submitting a substantially higher offer, was not chosen as the buyer of BB by the Province of Burgenland.
Tuginedes XXIII konkurentsipoliitika aruandes [18] kinnistatud põhimõtetele, ei olnud komisjonil võimalik kindlaks teha, et müügi puhul ei olnud tegemist riigiabiga, seda eelkõige seetõttu, et Burgenlandi liidumaa ei tunnistanud edukaks BB ostupakkumiseks konsortsiumi pakkumist, mis oli märksa suurem.
In addition, there were a number of discrepancies in the way the bidding procedure was described by the complainant on the one hand and Austria on the other.
Peale selle esines kaebuse esitaja ja Austria esitatud pakkumismenetluse kirjelduses teatavaid erinevusi.
Doubts related to the tender procedure
Pakkumismenetlusega seotud kahtlused
As to the tender procedure, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether it could be regarded as transparent, unconditional and non-discriminatory.
Komisjon kahtles selles, kas pakkumismenetlust võib tõepoolest pidada läbipaistvaks, tingimustega mitteseotuks ja mittediskrimineerivaks.
The Commission especially doubted whether the bidders had been treated in the same way during the tender procedure and also whether a private vendor would have imposed some of the conditions attached to the sale as set out in HSBC’s process letter.
Eeskätt kahtles komisjon selles, kas pakkumismenetluses oli tagatud pakkujate võrdne kohtlemine ning kas turutingimustes tegutsev müüja oleks samamoodi kui HSBC kehtestanud pakkumiskutses loetletud müügitingimused.
The Commission expressed further doubts on the transparency of the final selection, given that there was no indication as to how the criteria would be weighted; moreover, the further criterion of ‘refinancing of BB after the sale’, which was stressed during the negotiations, was not included in the list (see paragraphs 65 to 69 of the opening decision for further details).
Peale selle oli komisjonil kahtlusi lõpliku valiku läbipaistvuses, sest miski ei viidanud sellele, et üksikuid kriteeriume oleks kaalutud. Peale selle ei olnud kriteeriumide loetelus kriteeriumi „BB refinantseerimine pärast selle müüki Burgenlandi liidumaa poolt”, millele pöörati läbirääkimiste käigus erakordselt suurt tähelepanu (vt selle kohta menetluse algatamise otsuse põhjendused 65–69).
Furthermore, the Commission could not rule out the possibility that an economic advantage had been conferred on GRAWE, for the following reasons.
Samuti ei saanud komisjon järgmistel põhjustel välistada, et GRAWE-le oli antud majanduslik eelis:
the price difference, indicating that the market price had not been paid in selling BB to GRAWE;
Pakutud hindade erinevus viitas asjaolule, et BB-d ei müüdud GRAWE-le turuhinnaga.
the issue of further bonds worth EUR 380 million covered by Ausfallhaftung, which was not an element of the business plan of BB which had been given to the potential buyers and which apparently had not been offered to the Consortium;
Liidumaa vastutusega tagatud võlakirjade täiendavat emiteerimist 380 miljoni euro väärtuses ei olnud potentsiaalsetele ostjatele esitatud äriplaanis ette nähtud ning tõenäoliselt ei pakutud seda võimalust konsortsiumile.
the uncertainty whether higher bids might have been offered or whether other competitors might have participated in the sale, had the conditions referred to above not been imposed.
Ei olnud kindel, kas oleks tehtud suuremaid pakkumisi või kas ka mõni teine konkurent oleks müügiprotsessis osalenud, kui ei oleks seatud eespool kirjeldatud tingimusi.
The Commission also mentioned the potential effect of the tax loss carry-over on the economic value of the respective offers.
Komisjon viitas ka asjaolule, et pakkumiste majanduslikku väärtust võis mõjutada ka varasemate aastate kahjum.
The warranty clause contained in the contract with GRAWE was a further matter for concern.
Kaheldavaks pidas komisjon ka GRAWE-ga sõlmitud lepingus sätestatud kinnitusi.
On the stipulation in the contract concerning compensation for early discharge (Vorfälligkeitsentschädigung) of the guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000, the Commission wondered whether the restructuring decision had been fully complied with by Austria.
Seoses 20. juuni 2000. aasta garantiilepingus sätestatud ennetähtaegse makse hüvitisega, kahtles komisjon, kas Austria on täitnud ümberkorraldamiskava otsusest tulenevaid kohustusi täies ulatuses.
The Commission received comments from the beneficiary GRAWE and from a Hungarian third party [19].
Komisjon sai märkusi väidetavalt abisaajalt GRAWElt ja ühelt Ungari isikult.
The comments from GRAWE support and supplement Austria’s arguments and these are dealt with together below.
GRAWE märkused kinnitavad ja täiendavad Austria argumente ning neid käsitletakse koos.
The Hungarian interested party submitted a number of documents which refer to an alleged earlier fraud concerning primarily the business of BB in Hungary, where its subsidiary Sopron Bank RT is situated. It maintained that the fraud could be kept secret only by selling BB to an Austrian bidder.
Ungari huvitatud isik saatis arvukalt dokumente väidetava varasema pettusejuhtumi kohta, mis on seotud peamiselt BB tegevusega Ungaris, kus tegutseb BB tütarühing Sopran Bank RT. Ungari isiku sõnul saab pettuse salajas hoida vaid siis, kui BB müüakse Austria pakkujale.
Numerous documents were provided, relating especially to a number of Hungary-based subsidiaries linked with BB, such as extracts from trade registers, the founding charters of the undertakings concerned, minutes of annual meetings or other company data, covering periods clearly prior to the sale of BB.
Esitati ka hulgaliselt dokumente eeskätt mitme Ungaris asuva BB-ga seotud tütarühingu kohta (nt äriregistri väljavõte, asjaomaste äriühingute põhikirjad, iga-aastaste üldkoosolekute protokollid ja muud andmed äriühingute tegevuse kohta, kusjuures dokumendid pärinesid märksa varasemast ajast kui BB müük).
The Commission was unable to establish any relevant link between these documents and the privatisation procedure it had to assess under the State aid rules. These comments could therefore not be taken into account.
Kuna komisjon leidis, et kõnealuste dokumentide ja komisjoni poolt riigiabi eeskirjade alusel kontrollitava erastamismenetluse vahel puudub otsene seos, jäeti nimetatud dokumendid tähelepanuta.
V. COMMENTS FROM AUSTRIA AND GRAWE
V. AUSTRIA JA GRAWE MÄRKUSED
Austria stressed and supplemented the arguments which had already been presented before the Commission decided to open the formal investigation procedure.
Austria täiendas juba enne menetluse algatamise otsust esitatud argumente uue teabega.
In this, Austria was largely supported by GRAWE.
GRAWE toetab üldjoontes Austria argumente.
Admissibility
Lubatavus
On procedural grounds, Austria maintained that the Commission should not go into the details of this complaint as the Consortium, which had not yet entered the European banking market and was therefore not even a competitor, could not be regarded as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 [now Article 88] of the EC Treaty [20].
Menetlusõiguslikult jääb Austria oma seisukoha juurde, et komisjon ei tohiks esitatud kaebust kontrollida, kuna konsortsium, mis praeguseni ei tegutse Euroopa siseturul, mistõttu ei ole tegemist ka konkurendiga, ei ole huvitatud pool nõukogu 22. märtsi 1999. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 (millega kehtestatakse üksikasjalikud eeskirjad EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 93 [praegu artikkel 88] kohaldamiseks) [20] artikli 1 punkti h tähenduses.
Any alleged discrimination would, rather, be linked with the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital; entry into the European banking market could not be obtained via a State aid procedure.
Igasugune väidetav diskrimineerimine on asutamisvabaduse ja kapitali liikumise vabadusega seonduv küsimus; Euroopa pangandusturule sisenemist ei saa taotleda riigiabi menetluse kaudu.
The Commission should also take into consideration the fact that the Consortium was not active subsequent to the Commission’s opening decision and had made it publicly known that it no longer had any interest in acquiring the bank.
Peale selle peaks komisjon arvesse võtma asjaolu, et konsortsium jäi pärast komisjoni menetluse algatamise otsust passiivseks ning on avalikult teatanud, et ei ole panga omandamisest enam huvitatud.
The Commission would be exceeding its discretionary powers by examining this case.
Komisjon ületaks käesoleva juhtumi uurimisega diskretsiooniõiguse piire.
Austria stressed that the Austrian courts had dealt extensively with the case under State aid law, had intensively heard witnesses, had fully evaluated the facts and had concluded that an open, fair and transparent tender procedure had been carried out.
Austria rõhutas, et Austria kohtud on juhtumi riigiabialaste õigusaktide seisukohast hoolikalt läbi töötanud, tunnistajad on üle kuulatud ning faktilisi asjaolusid on igakülgselt kontrollitud, misjärel kohus on jõudnud järeldusele, et pakkumismenetlus oli avatud, õiglane ja läbipaistev.
The Commission should have endorsed this view instead of opening a formal investigation procedure.
Komisjon oleks pidanud ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise asemel ühinema selle seisukohaga.
General issues related to the tender procedure and its outcome
Pakkumismenetluse üldised aspektid ja menetluse tulemus
The circumstances of the tender
Pakkumismenetluse raamtingimused
Austria stressed that there had been an open, fair and transparent tender procedure, confirmed by the courts in Austria dealing with the matter.
Austria rõhutab, et menetlus oli avatud, õiglane ja läbipaistev. Sama kinnitasid juhtumiga tegelenud Austria kohtud.
The final decision was not taken before 4 March 2006.
Lõplikku otsust ei tehtud enne 4. märtsi 2006.
All parties had been given the same opportunities to obtain the information they needed for their due diligence, even if the parties did not use it in the same way.
Kõigil pakkujatel olid ühesugused võimalused due diligence analüüsi jaoks vajaliku teabe hankimiseks, kuigi pakkujad kasutasid seda võimalust erinevalt.
Even though there had been strong reservations against the Consortium from the start, it was legitimate to keep the Consortium in the tender procedure as long as possible, instead of excluding it on the basis of the indicative offers.
Kuigi konsortsiumi suhtes oldi algusest peale kahtleval seisukohal, lubati konsortsiumil õigustatult osaleda võimalikult pikalt pakkumismenetluses, selle asemel, et ta esialgse pakkumise alusel menetlusest välistada.
Such behaviour was in keeping with that of a private vendor, who would thus increase competition between the bidders in order to drive the price as high as possible.
Turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev müüja oleks toiminud samamoodi, tugevdades sel viisil pakkujatevahelist konkurentsi, et saada võimalikult kõrget ostuhinda.
In addition, Austria had kept expecting the Consortium to put itself forward as a financially strong business partner, as it had announced during the negotiations.
Austria tugines ka läbirääkimistel konsortsiumi väljendatud kavatsusele kaasata tugev finantspartner.
Such a partner could have changed the situation substantially.
Selline partner oleks võinud olukorda oluliselt muuta.
GRAWE submitted that it could not perceive that it had been treated in a preferential manner during the tender procedure, either by the Province of Burgenland or by the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA).
GRAWE on selgitanud, et Burgenlandi liidumaa ega Austria finantsinspektsioon (Finanzmarktaufsicht, edaspidi „FMA”) ei ole teda kunagi eelistanud.
The recommendation
Soovitus
Austria pointed out that HSBC’s recommendation was no more than a summary of the privatisation process and could not in itself be regarded as the only basis for the decision taken.
Austria väitel võttis HSBC soovitus erastamisprotsessi kokku ning asjaomane otsus ei põhinenud ainuüksi soovitusel.
The recommendation was only intended to give a short overview of the procedure and the offers.
Soovituses anti vaid lühiülevaade menetlusest ning esitatud pakkumistest.
Its findings had been complemented by oral explanations given to the decision makers.
Tulemusi selgitati otsusetegijatele lähemalt suuliselt.
Austria supplemented this information by providing a note which had been drafted by HSBC for the Province of Burgenland to help it prepare its reply to the Commission’s first request for information of 12 April 2006, and in which the findings were further commented on.
Kõnealust teavet on Austria täiendanud HSBC aruandega Burgenlandi liidumaale, mis aitas ette valmistada komisjoni 12. aprilli 2006. aasta esimesele teabenõudele saadetud vastust ning milles selgitati tulemusi lähemalt.
According to Austria, the recommendation should not be regarded as an expert opinion on the value of the bank, which was not required by European law.
Soovitust ei saa Austria sõnul käsitada panga väärtuse kohta koostatud eksperdiarvamusena, mida Euroopa õiguses ka ei nõuta.
The decision made on 5 March 2006 was instead based on experience acquired in the course of the privatisation process, the recommendation, oral valuations and confidential explanations by HSBC representatives.
märtsi 2006. aasta otsus põhines eelkõige varasemate erastamiskatsete käigus saadud kogemustel ning HSBC soovitusel ja HSBC esindajate suulistel hinnangutel ja konfidentsiaalsetel selgitustel.
The comparability of the offers by GRAWE and the Consortium
GRAWE ja konsortsiumi hinnapakkumiste võrreldavus
A number of elements in both the submissions by Austria and the comments by GRAWE address the comparability of the offers made by the two bidders.
Nii Austria kui GRAWE märkustes käsitletakse mitmel korral kahe kõnealuse pakkuja pakkumiste võrreldavuse küsimust.
As far as the compensation for early discharge (Vorfälligkeitsentschädigung) of the 4guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000 is concerned, Austria argued that the Commission had misinterpreted the relevant arrangements provided for in the offers of both final bidders.
juuni 2000. aasta garantiilepingus sätestatud ennetähtaegse makse hüvitisega seoses on Austria viidanud asjaolule, et komisjon on kahe viimase pakkuja pakkumises ette nähtud kokkuleppeid tõlgendanud vääralt.
The compensation related to the fact that the Province of Burgenland would be making its payments under the guarantee agreement several years earlier than planned [21].
Kõnealune hüvitis on tingitud asjaolust, et Burgenlandi liidumaa teeb garantiilepingu raames maksed mitu aastat kokkulepitust varem.
This was not an element of the purchase price, as apparently assumed by the Commission.
Sellegipoolest ei ole tegemist ostuhinna komponendiga, nagu komisjon on ilmselt oletanud.
Furthermore, the scheme did not call the earlier decision on the restructuring of BB into question, but helped reduce the aid which had at the time been authorised by the Commission.
Samuti ei muuda kirjeldatud leping küsitavaks varasemat BB ümberkorraldamiskava otsust, vaid on aidanud vähendada komisjoni varem heaks kiidetud riigiabi osakaalu.
In regard to the warranty clauses and the warranty periods provided for in the sales contracts with GRAWE and the Consortium, Austria argued that they were the result of the individually conducted negotiations with each party.
GRAWE ja konsortsiumiga läbiräägitud müügilepingutes ette nähtud kinnituste ja garantii kehtivuse tähtaegadega seoses märgib Austria, et tegemist on iga pakkujaga individuaalselt peetud läbirääkimiste tulemusega.
The different arrangements in regard to the limits of liability, the amounts of exemption and the warranty periods (two years for the Consortium and three years for GRAWE) did not discriminate between bidders.
Erinevad kokkulepped vastutuse piiride, omavastutuse ja garantii kehtivuse tähtaegade küsimuses (konsortsiumi puhul kaks aastat ja GRAWE puhul kolm aastat) ei tähenda pakkujate erinevat kohtlemist.
Only the draft contract with the Consortium stipulated an annual fee of EUR 100000 for Ausfallhaftung, to be paid until 2017 to the Province of Burgenland.
Ainult konsortsiumiga kavandatud lepingu kavandis olevat liidumaa vastutuse hüvitamiseks ette nähtud iga-aastane 100000 euro suurune tasu, mida 2017. aastani oleks tulnud maksta Burgenlandi liidumaale.
In explanation, Austria pointed out that the contract with GRAWE did not stipulate an annual fee as this was already included in the sales price offered by GRAWE.
GRAWE-ga sõlmitud lepingus sellist tasu ei sätestatud, kuna Austria sõnul sisaldus see juba GRAWE hinnapakkumises.