natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is therefore the aid to the borrower that needs to be investigated, as defined in point 2.1.1 of the Notice on guarantees.
Seetõttu tuleb uurida abi laenusaajale, nagu on määratletud garantiide teatise punktis 2.1.1.
Greece claims that there is no advantage since HSY could have obtained a similar loan by offering a bank other securities instead of a State guarantee.
Kreeka väidab, et eelist ei ole, kuna HSY oleks saanud sarnase laenu, kui oleks pangale pakkunud teistsuguseid tagatisi riigi garantii asemel.
The Commission considers that it does not have to investigate whether, by offering other securities, HSY could have obtained this loan.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et ta ei pea uurima, kas teiste tagatiste pakkumisel oleks HSY kõnealuse laenu saanud või mitte.
Indeed, the Commission must assess whether the actual transaction implemented by the State, namely granting a guarantee on a loan without benefiting of any security, would have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
Tõepoolest peab komisjon hindama, kas tegelik tehing, mille riik ellu viis ehk andis laenule garantii mis tahes tagatistest kasu saamata, oleks turumajanduslikule investorile olnud vastuvõetav.
A guarantee on a loan secured by a lien on some assets or by the conveyance of claims constitutes a different transaction.
Garantii andmise puhul laenule, mis on tagatud mõnede varade hüpoteegiga või nõuete loovutamisega, on tegemist teistsuguse tehinguga.
As indicated in section 2.1.1 of the Notice on guarantee, one of the potential advantages of the State guarantee is the possibility for the borrower ‘to offer less security’.
Nagu on osutatud teatise garantiidena antava riigiabi suhtes lõikes 2.1.1, on riigigarantii üheks potentsiaalseks eeliseks laenusaaja võimalus „pakkuda vähem tagatisi”.
In addition, even if the possibility to obtain a financing by offering more securities had to be assessed, the Commission has already concluded in section 3.1 of the present decision that after 30 June 1999 HSY would not have received loans or guarantees from private banks, even by offering a security to the bank.
Isegi kui tuleks hinnata rahaliste vahendite saamise võimalust enamate tagatiste pakkumise abil, jõudis komisjon käesoleva otsuse punktis 3.1 seisukohale, et pärast 30. juunit 1999 ei oleks HSY saanud erapankadelt laenu ega garantiisid, isegi juhul, kui oleks pakkunud pangale tagatist.
The Commission concludes that, since the State guarantee was granted in December 1999, it gave an advantage to HSY by providing financing which HSY could not have received from the market.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et kuna riigi garantii anti 1999. aasta detsembris, andis see HSY-le eelise, pakkudes talle rahalisi vahendeid, mida HSY ei oleks turult saanud.
Greece also claims that the guarantee fee of 1 % was the market price and there is therefore no advantage.
Kreeka väidab samuti, et garantiilõiv on 1 % turuhinnast ning ei kujuta seetõttu eelist.
The Commission notes that Greece did not provide any market data showing that banks were ready to grant a guarantee at that price.
Komisjon märgib, et Kreeka ei esitanud turuandmeid, mis tõestaksid, et pangad olid valmis sellise hinnaga garantiid andma.
Greece only provided a list of guarantees provided by the State during the same period for the same price.
Kreeka esitas üksnes nimekirja garantiide kohta, mida riik oli samal perioodil sama hinna eest andnud.
The Commission fails to understand how this list of State guarantees could prove that the guarantee fee asked from HSY is market conform and does not constitute aid.
Samuti ei mõista komisjon, kuidas kõnealune riigi garantiide nimekiri võiks tõestada, et HSY-lt küsitud garantiilõiv on turuga kooskõlas ega kujuta endast abi.
In particular, this list can not be considered as ‘a State guarantee scheme [which] does not constitute State aid under Article 87(1)’ since, as the guarantee in favour of HSY illustrates, it does not fulfil many of the conditions laid down in section 4.3 of the Notice on guarantees.
Eriti ei saa kõnealust nimekirja pidada „riigi garantiikavaks, mis ei kujuta endast riigiabi artikli 87 lõike 1 kohaselt”, kuna HSY kasuks antud garantii näitab, et see ei vasta paljudele tingimustele, mis on sätestatud garantiide teatise punktis 4.3.
Furthermore, even if a guarantee fee of 1 % might have been market conform for other (healthy) companies, this would not automatically make it market conform for a company in difficulties like HSY.
Isegi kui 1 % suurune garantiilõiv võis olla kooskõlas teistele (heas majanduslikus olukorras) ettevõtetele pakutava lõivu turutingimustega, ei tähenda see automaatselt seda, et see peab paika raskustes ettevõtte, näiteks HSY puhul.
As regards the claim that a guarantee fee below the market price could be acceptable for a private investor in similar circumstances because Greece was shareholders of HSY, the Commission has already dismissed this claim in section 3.1 of the present decision.
Mis puutub väitesse, et turuhinnast väiksem garantiilõiv oleks erainvestorile sarnastes tingimustes olnud vastuvõetav, kuna Kreeka oli HSY aktsionär, lükkas komisjon kõnealuse väite käesoleva otsuse punktis 3.1 tagasi.
The corresponding point made by Greece must therefore be dismissed.
Seega lükatakse Kreeka esitatud asjaomane punkt tagasi.
Finally, as regards the fact raised by Greece that the loan is reimbursed in accordance with the terms of the contract, the Commission fails to see how it could prove that a private bank would have granted the loan in question.
Lõpuks, mis puutub Kreeka väitesse, et laenu maksti tagasi lepingu tingimustele vastavalt, ei saa komisjon seda lugeda tõestuseks selle kohta, et erapank oleks kõnealust laenu andnud.
Indeed, what matters is the situation of the firm and the information available when the guarantee was granted.
Tõepoolest loeb firma olukord ja olemasolev teave garantii andmise ajal.
As a subsidiary element, the Commission observes that, in accordance with the information available at the time of the granting of the guarantee and on the basis of which it could be expected that the yard would book severe losses in the following years, the yard has really recorded heavy losses in the following years and its net equity really became very negative.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et vastavalt garantii andmise ajal kättesaadavale teabele, mille alusel võis eeldada, et laevatehas võib järgnevatel aastatel kanda suuri kahjusid, kandiski laevatehas järgnevatel aastatel tõepoolest suuri kahjusid ning selle omakapital muutus tõesti väga negatiivseks.
In addition, HSY only survived (and thus is able to reimburse the loan) because of the continued support by State aid.
Lisaks jäi HSY ellu (ja seega suutis laenu tagasi maksta) ainult seetõttu, et sai jätkuvalt toetust riigiabi näol.
From the foregoing, the Commission considers that the measure gives an advantage to HSY.
Eeltoodust lähtuvalt on komisjon seisukohal, et meede annab eelise HSY-le.
This selective advantage distorts competition because it provides financing at a time when HSY would not have received financing from the market and was in difficulty.
See valikuline eelis moonutab konkurentsi, kuna pakub rahalisi vahendeid ajal, kui HSY ei oleks turult rahalisi vahendeid saanud ning oli raskustes.
The measure therefore contributed to keep HSY alive and to finance its activities.
Meede aitas seega kaasa ettevõtja HSY elus hoidmisele ja selle tegevuse rahastamisele.
Since some competitors of HSY are located in other Member States, this distortion of competition affects trade between Member States .
Kuna HSY mõned konkurendid asuvad teistes liikmesriikides, mõjutab kõnealune konkurentsi moonutamine liikmesriikide vahelist kaubandust .
Since it fulfils all the conditions laid down in Article 87(1) of the Treaty, the guarantee constitutes State aid.
Kuna kõik asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõikes 1 sätestatud tingimused on täidetud, kujutab garantii endast riigiabi.
Since, contrary to the requirement laid down in Article 88(3) of the Treaty, it was granted without prior notification, it constitutes unlawful aid.
Kuivõrd selle andmisest ei teatatud, mis on vastuolus asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 3 sätestatud nõudega, on tegemist ebaseadusliku abiga.
Since the Commission has just demonstrated that a selective advantage granted to HSY distorts competition and trade, the Commission will not repeat the analysis of the existence of a distortion of competition and trade anymore when it will assess the remaining measures.
Kuna komisjon just näitas, et valikuline eelis ettevõtja HSY kasuks moonutab konkurentsi ja kaubandust, ei korda komisjon ülejäänud meetmete hindamisel analüüsi konkurentsi- ja kaubanduse moonutuste olemasolu kohta.
As regards the compatibility under Article 87(2) and (3) of the Treaty, the Commission notes than none of the provisions laid down in Article 87(2) and Article 87(3)(b) and (d) apply.
Kokkusobivuse puhul asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõigete 2 ja 3 kohaselt märgib komisjon, et asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 2 ja artikli 87 lõike 3 punktide b ja d sätted ei ole kohaldatavad.
As regards the compatibility under Article 87(3)(a), (c) and (e), aid to shipbuilding was regulated from 1 January 1999 by Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding (hereinafter ‘Regulation (EC) No 1540/98’).
Kokkusobivuse puhul asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 punktide a, c ja e kohaselt reguleeritakse alates 1. jaanuarist 1999 l laevaehitusele antavat abi nõukogu 29. juuni 1998. aasta määrusega (EÜ) nr 1540/98, millega kehtestatakse laevaehitusele antavale abile uued eeskirjad (edaspidi „määrus (EÜ) nr 1540/98”).
Since the guaranteed loan aimed at financing an investment plan which was a part of a restructuring plan and since in addition HSY was in difficulty, the State guarantee should be assessed on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Kuna garanteeritud laenu eesmärk oli rahastada investeerimiskava, mis moodustas osa ümberkorralduskavast ning kuna HSY oli raskustes, tuleks riigi garantiid hinnata määruse (EÜ) nr 1540/98 artikli 5 kohaselt.
It is clear that the measure does not fulfil the conditions laid down in this article.
On selge, et meede ei vasta osutatud artiklis kehtestatud tingimustele.
In particular, Article 5 indicates that restructuring aid ‘may exceptionally be considered compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties’.
Muu hulgas sätestatakse artiklis 5, et ümberkorraldusabi võib „erandkorras pidada ühisturuga kokkusobivaks tingimusel, et abi on kooskõlas raskustes olevate ettevõtete päästmiseks ja ümberkorraldamiseks antavat riigiabi käsitlevate ühenduse suunistega”.
The guidelines applicable at the time of the grant were the 1999 R & R guidelines, which had been published in the Official Journal on 9 October 1999 and which entered into force on the same day.
Garantii andmise ajal kohaldusid 1999. aasta ühenduse suunised, mis avaldati Euroopa Liidu Teatajas9. oktoobril 1999 ning jõustusid samal päeval.
Several of the conditions for authorisation of the aid laid down in section 3.2.2 of these guidelines are not fulfilled.
Mitmed kõnealuste suuniste lõikes 3.2.2 sätestatud abi võimaldamise tingimused ei ole täidetud.
For instance, regarding condition (b) ‘Restoration of viability’, the Commission notes that the State guarantee financed an investment plan which was part of a restructuring plan which, in December 1999, has become totally insufficient to restore the long term viability of HSY.
Näiteks tingimuse b „Elujõulisuse taastamine” kontekstis märgib komisjon, et riigi garantiiga rahastati investeerimiskava, mis moodustas osa ümberkorralduskavast, mis 1999. aasta detsembris oli täiesti ebapiisav, et taastada pikas perspektiivis HSY elujõulisus.
Regarding the condition (d) ‘Aid limited to the minimum’, the Commission had already decided in decision N 401/97 that State aid could at the maximum amount to 50 % of the investment costs and the remaining 50 % would be financed by funds raised from the shareholders and by bank loans raised at market conditions.
Tingimuse d „Abi piirdumine minimaalse vajalikuga” puhul oli komisjon otsuses N 401/97 jube ette näinud, et riigiabi võib moodustada kuni 50 % investeerimiskuludest ja ülejäänud 50 % rahastatakse vahenditest, mis on saadud aktsionäridelt ja turutingimustel saadud pangalaenudest.
Consequently, no additional aid in favour of the investment plan could be granted otherwise the maximum aid intensity of 50 % would be breached.
Järelikult ei saa investeerimiskava toetuseks anda täiendavat abi, ilma et rikutaks abi 50 % osatähtsust.
The State guarantee also breached the ‘one time, last time’ condition laid down in section 3.2.3 of the 1999 R & R guidelines since by decision N 401/97, the Commission had authorised investment aid, which, under Directive 90/684/EEC, was a kind of restructuring aid.
Riigi garantiiga rikuti samuti ühekordse abi põhimõtet, mis on ette nähtud 1999. aasta ühenduse suuniste punktis 3.2.3, kuna otsusega N 401/97 kiitis komisjon heaks investeerimisabi, mis direktiivi 90/648/EMÜ kohaselt oli teatavat liiki ümberkorraldusabi.
This aid has been granted to HSY by Ministerial Decision of December 1997 (but, as described in recital 84 of the present decision, Greece indicates that it has not been paid out to HSY yet).
Kõnealune abi anti HSY-le ministri 1997. aasta otsuse alusel (käesoleva otsuse põhjenduses 84 osutab Kreeka aga sellele, et abi ei ole HSY-le veel välja makstud).
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission considers that the State guarantee constitutes unlawful and incompatible aid, which must be recovered.
Eeltoodust lähtuvalt on komisjon seisukohal, et riigi garantii kujutab ebaseaduslikku ja kokkusobimatut abi, mis tuleb tagasi maksta.
If it is still outstanding at the time of this decision, the State guarantee has to be stopped immediately.
Kui seda ei ole käesoleva otsuse hetkel veel välja makstud, tuleb riigi garantii viivitamata peatada.
This is however insufficient to restore the situation that would have prevailed without aid since HSY has during several years benefited from a loan which it would not have received without State intervention.
See ei ole siiski piisav enne abi andmist valitsenud olukorra taastamiseks, sest HSY sai mitmete aastate jooksul kasu laenust, mida ta ei oleks saanud ilma riigi sekkumiseta.
In order to recover this advantage, the Commission considers, in accordance with the conclusion reached in section 3.1 of the present decision, that the difference between the total cost of the guaranteed loan (interest rate and guarantee premium) and the reference rate for Greece increased by 600 basis points needs to be recovered for the years during which the guarantee was running.
Kõnealuse eelise tagasimaksmise kontekstis on komisjon seisukohal, et vastavalt käesoleva otsuse punktis 3.1 tehtud järeldusele tuleb garantii kehtivusaja eest tagasi maksta vahe garanteeritud laenu kogukulude (intressimäär pluss garantiipreemia) ja Kreeka viitemäära vahel, mida on suurendatud 600 baaspunkti võrra.
The Commission considers that this will restore the situation that would have existed without a State guarantee.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et seeläbi taastatakse olukord, mis oleks ilma riigi garantiita valitsenud.
Thereby, the breach of the prohibition of State guarantees and financing below market rate laid down in decision N 401/97 is eliminated.
Seega on välistatud riigi garantiide ja turuhinnast väiksema hinnaga rahaliste vahendite andmise keelu rikkumine, mis on ette nähtud otsuses N 401/97.
GRD 1,56 billion (EUR 4,58 million) loan granted in 1999 (measure P3)
aastal antud 1,56 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (4,58 miljoni euro) suurune laen (meede P3)
In 1999, HSY received a loan amounting to GRD 1,56 billion (EUR 4,58 million) from ETVA, which received as securities a right on the payment of the first tranche of the investment aid authorised by decision N 401/97.
aastal sai HSY 1,56 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (4,58 miljonit eurot) suuruse laenu ETVA-lt, kes sai tagatiseks otsusega N 401/97 määratud investeeringutoetuse esimese osa maksmise õiguse.
The loan was concluded on 28 July 1999 and fully paid out to HSY the next day.
Laenuleping sõlmiti 28. juulil 1999 ja laen maksti HSY-le täielikult välja järgmisel päeval.
In the opening decision, the Commission indicates that the loan could constitute aid, the compatibility of which is doubtful.
Algatamisotsuses osutas komisjon, et laenu puhul võib olla tegemist abiga, mille kokkusobivus on kaheldav.
In addition, if it turned out that this loan benefited from a State guarantee, it seems to infringe decision N 401/97, which indicated that, in order to finance the investment programme, bank loans would be raised at normal market conditions without State guarantees.
Lisaks, kui selgub, et kõnealuse laenu jaoks anti riigigarantii, on tegemist otsuse N 401/97 rikkumisega, mille kohaselt peavad investeerimisprogrammi rahastamiseks kasutatavad pangalaenud olema võetud tavapärastel turutingimustel ilma riigigarantiita.
Elefsis claims, in addition to the comments indicated previously with respect to measure P2, that since the measures P3 and P4 have been granted at a time when it was clear that HSY had failed to implement its restructuring/investment plan and had failed to respect the terms of decision N 401/97, there was a material risk that the security given for these loans, i.e. the payment of the approved investment aid, was unlawful and thus void and unenforceable.
Elefsis väidab lisaks meetme P2 kohta tehtud märkustele, et meetmeid P3 ja P4 võimaldati ajal, mil oli selgunud, et HSY ei suuda oma ümberkorralduskava/investeerimiskava ellu viia ning otsuse N 401/97 tingimusi täita, eksisteeris seepärast oluline risk, et nendele laenudele antud tagatis, st heakskiidetud investeeringutoetuse maksmine, oli ebaseaduslik ja seetõttu kehtetu ning jõustamatu.
The Greek authorities (and HSY) claim that this loan was granted on market terms.
Kreeka ametiasutused (ja HSY) väidavad, et kõnealune laen anti turutingimustel.
In particular, the interest rate is similar to the one of some loans granted by ETVA to other firms during this period.
Muu hulgas sarnaneb intressimäär vastava ajavahemiku vältel ETVA-lt muudele ettevõtetele antud mõnede laenude intressimäärale.
HSY could have borrowed from any other bank but logically preferred ETVA which was its shareholder.
HSY oleks võinud võtta laenu ükskõik millisest pangast, kuid eelistas loogiliselt ETVA-t, oma aktsionäri.
In addition, the security in the form of the conveyance of the claims on the first tranche of the investment aid constituted a collateral acceptable to any bank.
Lisaks oli investeeringutoetuse esimese osaga seonduvate nõuete üleandmise vormis antav tagatis vastuvõetav ükskõik millisele pangale.
Finally, Greece notes that the loan was fully reimbursed to the bank.
Lõpetuseks märkis Kreeka, et laen tagastati pangale täies mahus.
The Commission has already concluded in the assessment of measure P2 that measure P3 does not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Komisjon on meetme P2 hindamisega seoses juba järeldanud, et meede P3 ei kuulu asutamislepingu artikli 296 reguleerimisalasse.
It must therefore be assessed under State aid rule.
Seetõttu tuleb meedet hinnata riigiabi eeskirjade alusel.
First, the Commission notes that the loan has been granted by ETVA and was not covered by a State guarantee.
Esiteks märgib komisjon, et laenu andjaks oli ETVA ja see ei olnud hõlmatud riigigarantiiga.
As regards the selectivity of the measure, Greece observes that other firms received loans from ETVA at similar interest rates.
Meetme selektiivsuse osas väitis Kreeka, et teised ettevõtted said ETVA-lt laene sarnaste intressimääradega.
However, as already explained in the assessment of measure P2, a measure is a general measure only if it fulfils strict conditions, which are clearly not fulfilled in the present case.
Samas, nagu on juba selgitatud meetme P2 hindamisega seoses, kujutab meede endast üldmeedet vaid juhul, kui see vastab rangetele tingimustele, mis ei ole antud juhul selgelt täidetud.
For instance the measure is not open to all firms on an equal access basis, since interest rates vary from one borrower to the other and depend on the decision of ETVA to grant the loan or not, and on which conditions.
Näiteks ei ole meede avatud kõikidele ettevõtetele võrdväärse juurdepääsu põhimõtte alusel, sest intressimäärad varieeruvad laenusaajati ning sõltuvad ETVA otsusest laenu andmise või mitteandmise ja laenutingimuste kohta.
The measure is therefore selective.
Seetõttu on meede selektiivne.
As regards the existence of an advantage, the Commission notes that this loan was granted after 30 June 1999, at a time when the firm had no access to the loan market anymore, as explained in section 3.1 of the present decision.
Eelisseisundi olemasolu osas märgib komisjon, et laen anti pärast 30. juunit 1999 ehk ajal, mil ettevõttel puudus juurdepääs laenuturule, nagu on selgitatud käesoleva otsuse lõikes 3.1.
The fact that ETVA charged a similar interest rate for some loans to other firms during that period does not prove that this interest rate would have been acceptable for a private bank in similar circumstances.
Asjaolu, et ETVA rakendas sarnast intressimäära mõningate vastaval ajavahemikul muudele ettevõtetele antud laenude puhul, ei tõenda seda, et kõnealune intressimäär oleks olnud kommertspangale sarnastel asjaoludel vastuvõetav.
First, the interest rate demanded by a private bank on a particular loan depends on the creditworthiness of the borrower.
Esiteks sõltub kommertspanga poolt konkreetse laenu suhtes kohaldav intressimäär laenusaaja krediidivõimest.
Greece has not shown that the other borrowers in the list had a risk of default similar to the risk of default of HSY.
Kreeka ei ole tõendanud, et muude loetelus toodud laenusaajate makserisk oleks sarnanenud HSY makseriskile.
The Commission recalls that the situation of HSY was very bad at the time.
Komisjon tuletab meelde, et HSY olukord oli tollal väga halb.
It is therefore likely that a market economy investor would have requested a higher interest rate for loans to HSY than for loans to healthy firms.
Seetõttu on tõenäoline, et turumajanduslik investor oleks HSY laenude puhul kasutanud kõrgemat intressimäära kui heas seisundis ettevõtetele antavate laenude puhul.
Second, even if the other borrowers had a risk of default as high as HSY, the list provided by Greece would still be insufficient to conclude that this interest rate was the market price.
Teiseks, isegi juhul, kui muude laenusaajate makserisk oleks olnud sama kõrge kui HSY-l, ei piisaks Kreeka esitatud loendist siiski selleks, et teha järeldusi kõnealuse intressimäära turuhinnale vastavuse kohta.
Indeed, the list provided by Greece contains only loans granted by ETVA, which was a State-owned bank (and in addition a development bank), and it is therefore possible that the other loans also contain an aid element.
Kreeka esitatud loend hõlmab vaid laene, mille andjaks oli ETVA, mis aga oli riigile kuuluv pank (ja pealegi arengupank), ning seetõttu on võimalik, et muudki laenud sisaldasid riigiabi elemente.
It therefore does not prove that they would have been acceptable to a private bank.
Seega ei tõenda eeltoodu, et laenud oleksid olnud kommertspanga jaoks vastuvõetavad.
The Greek authorities also assert that the security in the form of the conveyance of the claims on the first tranche of the investment aid constituted a collateral, which would have rendered the loan acceptable to any private bank.
Samuti kinnitavad Kreeka ametiasutused, et investeeringutoetuse esimese osa suhtes esitatud nõuete üleandmise vormis antud tagatis oleks muutnud laenu vastuvõetavaks ükskõik millise kommertspanga jaoks.