natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This measure, which aimed at ensuring that the employees would not hinder the sale of HSY, would have been unacceptable to a market economy investor, among others since there was no contractual obligation to do it and since in addition the employees still owed EUR 24 million to ETVA as purchase price for the shares.
See meede, mille eesmärgiks oli tagada, et töötajad ei pidurdaks HSY müüki, oleks turumajandusliku investori jaoks olnu vastuvõetamatu muu hulgas sellepärast, et puudus vastav lepinguline kohustus, lisaks võlgnesid töötajad ETVA-le aktsiate eest endiselt 24 miljonit eurot.
Finally, the State asked the bidders to pay a part of the purchase price of HSY in the form of a capital increase.
Lõpetuseks palus riik pakkujatel tasuda osa HSY ostuhinnast kapitali suurendamise kaudu.
All these elements illustrate that during the sale of HSY, the State did not behave with the objective of maximising its revenues and minimising its costs, but with the goal of facilitating the sale of HSY and the continuation of the yard’s operations.
Kõik need asjaolud annavad tunnistust sellest, et HSY müügi ajal oli riigi eesmärgiks mitte oma tulude maksimeerimine ja kulude minimeerimine, vaid HSY müügile kaasaaitamine ning laevatehase töö jätkumine.
Therefore, during the sale of HSY, the Greek State did not act as a market economy investor.
Seetõttu ei käitunud Kreeka riik HSY müügiga seoses turumajandusliku investorina.
On the basis of each of the three foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that a market economy investor would not have granted the guarantee.
Kõigi kolme eespool toodud kaalutluse põhjal järeldab komisjon, et turumajanduslik investor ei oleks kõnealust garantiid andnud.
As regards the existence of an advantage and the identification of the beneficiary, the Commission considers that no investor would have purchased the entire HSY (i.e. including the civil activities) without the guarantee.
Seoses eelisseisundi olemasolu ja kasusaaja tuvastamisega järeldab komisjon, et ükski investor ei oleks ostnud kogu HSYd (st koos tsiviilotstarbelise tegevusega) ilma garantiita.
The second Deloitte report confirms this conclusion: ‘Based on our experience and the above analysis, we tend to believe that no rational investor would have been prepared to acquire HS and in parallel assume any additional risk related to State aid (which at that time was neither certain nor quantified by the EC), for the company that a) was under the ownership and management of a State-owned company (ETVA Bank) for a number of years, and at the same time b) had a significant negative shareholders’ equity position, amongst other operational problems (i.e. low productivity, high operational costs, excess staff, etc.)’.
Teine Deloitte’i aruanne kinnitab seda järeldust: „Oma kogemustele ja eespool toodud analüüsile tuginedes usume, et ükski ratsionaalne investor ei oleks nõustunud omandama HSi ja võtma paralleelselt enda kanda võimalikke riigiabiga seonduvaid täiendavaid riske (mis tol ajal ei olnud kindlad ega EK poolt kvantifitseeritud) ettevõtte eest, mis a) oli palju aastaid olnud riigile kuuluva ettevõtte (ETVA pank) omanduses ja halduse all, ning millel b) oli oluliselt negatiivne omakapital, lisaks muudele talitlusprobleemidele (st madal tootlikkus, suured tegevuskulud, liiga palju töötajaid jne).”
This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that Greece, anticipating that such a guarantee would be necessary to attract private investors, promised in the tender documents that the highest bidder would receive such a guarantee.
Seda järeldust kinnitab ka asjaolu, et Kreeka, eeldades, et vastav garantii on vajalik erainvestorite ligimeelitamiseks, lubas selle pakkumiskutse dokumentides parimale pakkujale.
This conclusion that such a guarantee was necessary to find a purchaser for HSY is logic since an investor performing a due diligence of HSY would have found that HSY had benefited of several measures which could constitute aid of which the recovery could be asked by the Commission.
Järeldus, et kõnealune garantii on HSY-le ostja leidmiseks vajalik, on loogiline, sest HSY nõuetele vastavuse kontrollimisel oleks iga investor avastanud, et HSY on saanud kasu mitme meetme arvelt, mis võivad endast kujutada abi, mille tagastamist võib komisjon edaspidi taotleda.
Contrary to this conclusion, Elefsis claims that this guarantee was not necessary and claims in particular that it would have been ready to purchase HSY without such a guarantee, what is illustrated by the fact that, in its bid for the purchase of HSY, it did not put this guarantee as a condition for purchasing HSY.
Vastupidiselt tehtud järeldusele väidab Elefsis, et kõnealune garantii ei olnud vajalik, väites muu hulgas, et ta oleks olnud valmis ostma HSY ilma niisuguse garantiita, mille tõenduseks on asjaolu, et oma pakkumises HSY ostmiseks ei määratlenud Elefsis garantiid HSY omandamise eeltingimusena.
The Commission considers that Elefsis’ claim lacks credibility.
Komisjon leiab, et Elefsise väide on väheusutav.
The Commission first recalls that, even if this it was true that Elefsis did not request such a guarantee in its bid, it does not prove that, if Elefsis had been selected as the preferred bidder, it would not have requested this guarantee at a later stage of the negotiation with the seller.
Esiteks tuletab komisjon meelde, et isegi juhul, kui Elefsis niisugust garantiid oma pakkumises tõepoolest ei taotlenud, ei tõenda see seda, et kui Elefsis oleks eelistatava pakkujana välja valitud, ei oleks ta taotlenud vastavat garantiid müüjaga peetavate läbirääkimiste hilisemas etapis.
This is very likely that Elefsis would have done so.
On väga tõenäoline, et Elefsis oleks nõnda toiminud.
Indeed, as soon as HSY was sold to HDW/Ferrrostaal, Elefsis started to file complaints with the Commission, claiming that HSY had benefited from several and large aid measures that the Commission should recover.
Niipea, kui HSY oli HDW/Ferrostaalile müüdud, alustas Elefsis kaebuste esitamist komisjonile, väites, et HSY oli kasu saanud mitmest suurest abimeetmest, mida komisjon peaks tagasi nõudma.
An investor convinced that a firm has received tens of millions of Euro of incompatible aid will not himself take the risk of purchasing this firm, except if he receives a guarantee.
Investor, kes on veendunud selles, et ettevõte on saanud mitmekümne miljoni euro ulatuses kokkusobimatut abi, ei riskiks seda ettevõtet osta, välja arvatud garantii olemasolu korral.
The Commission therefore dismisses Elefsis’ claim and considers that without this guarantee no market economy investor would have purchased the entire HSY, i.e. HSY including the civil activities.
Seetõttu jätab komisjon Elefsise väite kõrvale ja leiab, et ilma kõnealuse garantiita ei oleks ükski turumajanduslik investor ostnud HSYd tervikuna, st HSY-d koos tsiviilotstarbelise tegevusega.
As indicated earlier, if HSY had not been sold, Greece could have continued to support the military activities on the basis of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Nagu eespool osutatud, kui HSYd ei oleks müüdud, oleks Kreeka võinud jätkata sõjaotstarbelise tegevuse toetamist asutamislepingu artikli 296 kohaselt.
Conversely, because of Article 87 of the Treaty, Greece would not have been allowed to provide financial support to the civil activities.
Vastupidiselt, asutamislepingu artikli 87 tõttu ei oleks Kreekal olnud õigust rahalise toe osutamiseks tsiviilotstarbelisele tegevusele.
Besides the ship repair activity, the three main civil contracts performed during these years were the contracts with ISAP, OSE and Strintzis.
Lisaks laevaremonditegevusele olid kolmeks peamiseks nende aastate vältel teostatud mittesõjaliseks lepinguks lepingud ISAPi, OSE ja Strintzisega.
As has been explained in the present decision (see description and assessment of measure E12c), the contracts with ISAP and OSE were executed with significant delays, forcing HSY to pay high penalties and to provide rolling stock for free, what also represented a high cost for HSY.
Nagu käesolevas otsuses selgitatud (vt meetme E12c kirjeldus ja hindamine), viidi lepingud ISAPi ning OSEga ellu oluliste viivitustega, mistõttu HSY oli sunnitud tasuma suuri trahve ja tarnima veeremit tasuta, millega samuti kaasnesid suured kulud HSY jaoks.
It is therefore clear that these contracts were highly loss-making.
Seetõttu on ilmne, et kõnealused lepingud olid väga kahjumlikud.
As has also been explained in the present decision, the contract concluded with Strintzis at the beginning of 1999 was a big failure for HSY.
Nagu samuti käesolevas otsuses juba selgitatud, kujutas Strintzisega 1999. aasta alguses sõlmitud leping endast HSY jaoks suurt läbikukkumist.
The contract was cancelled in 2002, HSY had to pay the contractual indemnities to Strintzis and sold the hulls in 2004 at a price which was only a small fraction of the tens of millions of Euro of costs which HSY had incurred to build these hulls.
Leping tühistati 2002. aastal, HSY oli sunnitud tasuma Strintzisele lepingujärgseid hüvitisi ja müüma laevakered 2004. aastal hinnaga, mis moodustas vaid murdosa HSY poolt laevakerede ehitamisega seoses kantud mitmekümne miljoni euro suurustest kuludest.
This contract was therefore also highly loss-making.
Ka see leping oli eeltoodust tulenevalt väga kahjumlik.
Finally, the last civil activity was the ship repair.
Viimaseks tsiviilotstarbeliseks tegevuseks on laevade remontimine.
It is a low margin business since there is fierce competition between yards.
Tegu on madala kasumimarginaaliga äritegevusega, sest laevatehaste vahel valitseb tihe konkurents.
The Commission therefore doubts that this activity has been profitable, and, in any event, it was certainly unable to compensate the big losses stemming from the ISAP, OSE and Strintzis contracts.
Seetõttu kahtleb komisjon selle tegevuse kasumlikkuses, ning igal juhul ei saanud sellest kindlasti piisata ISAPi, OSE ja Strintzise lepingutest tulenevate suurte kahjumite hüvitamiseks.
Above all, the failure to carry out correctly the ISAP, OSE and Strintzis contracts proves that, without being purchased by a large firm and without benefiting from the technical and project management skills of the latter, the civil activities would have remained loss-making.
Eelkõige on suutmatus ISAPi, OSE ja Strintzise lepinguid nõuetekohaselt ellu viia tõenduseks sellest, et kui ei oleks toimunud müüki suurele ettevõttele ja sellest tulenevat kasusaamise võimalust viimase oskustest tehnika ning projektijuhtimise alal, olek tsiviilotstarbeline tegevus kahjumlikuks jäänudki.
In summary, the Commission has shown in this paragraph that without the guarantee, no investor would have purchased the civil activities of HSY and, if these activities had not been purchased, they would have stopped rapidly.
Kokkuvõttes on komisjon selles jaos tõendanud, et garantii puudumisel ei oleks ükski investor HSY tsiviilotstarbelist tegevust ostnud, ja kui mainitud tegevus oleks ostmata jäänud, oleks see peatselt hääbunud.
The Commission concludes that the beneficiary of the guarantee is HSY and that the advantage is to allow the continuation of the civil activities.
Komisjon järeldab, et garantii kasusaajaks on HSY, ning et eelisseisundiks on tsiviilotstarbelise tegevuse jätkumise võimaldamine.
Elefsis disagree with the prior conclusion regarding the identification of the beneficiary.
Elefsis ei nõustu eelneva järeldusega kasusaaja tuvastamise osas.
Elefsis claims that, in addition to HSY, HDW/Ferrostaal was also a beneficiary of the guarantee granted by ETVA.
Elefsis väidab, et lisaks HSY-le oli ETVA antud garantii kasusaajaks ka HDW/Ferrostaal.
The Commission disagrees with this assessment.
Komisjon ei nõustu sellise hinnanguga.
As has been shown, in the tender document submitted to the bidders, it was already indicated that they would be indemnified in case of recovery of State aid from HSY.
Nagu eespool tõendatud, oli juba pakkujatele esitatud pakkumiskutse dokumendis osutatud, et neil on riigiabi tagasinõudmise korral HSY-lt õigus hüvitisele.
This means that when HDW/Ferrostaal made its bid for the purchase of HSY, it made the assumptions that, if any aid would be recovered from HSY, it would receive a corresponding indemnification from ETVA.
Eeltoodust tuleneb, et kui HDW/Ferrostaal esitas oma pakkumise HSY omandamiseks, eeldas HDW/Ferrostaal, et ükskõik millise abi tagasinõudmise korral HSY-lt saab ta ETVA-lt vastava hüvitise.
In order words, the purchase price proposed by HDW/Ferrostaal was already taking into account the indemnification guarantee.
Teisisõnu oli hüvitisgarantiisid HDW/Ferrostaali poolt pakutud ostuhinnas juba arvesse võetud.
The guarantee has therefore not favoured HDW/Ferrostaal.
Seetõttu ei andnud garantii HDW/Ferrostaalile eelisseisundit.
The Commission concludes that the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty and the beneficiary of this aid is HSY.
Komisjon järeldab, et ETVA garantii HDW/Ferrostaalile kujutab endast riigiabi asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses, ja et selle abi kasusaajaks on HSY.
As regards the guarantee granted by the Greek State to Piraeus Bank, it also constitutes aid.
Mis puutub Kreeka riigi garantiisse Piraeus Bankile, kujutab seegi endast abi.
It is a selective measure financed by State resources.
Tegemist on riigi vahenditest rahastatava valikulise meetmega.
A market economy investor selling ETVA would not have granted such a guarantee.
Turumajanduslik investor ei oleks ETVAt müües niisugust garantiid võimaldanud.
Indeed, the only justification for granting this guarantee was the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Tegelikkuses oli kõnealuse garantii andmise ainsaks õigustuseks ETVA garantii HDW/Ferrostaalile.
If the latter guarantee had not been granted, it would not have been necessary to provide the guarantee to Piraeus Bank.
Kui viimatinimetatud garantiid ei oleks antud, ei oleks tarvis olnud garantiid Piraeus Bankile.
Since, as has been explained, no market economy investor would have granted the guarantee granted by ETVA, which constitutes State aid, no market economy investor would have granted the guarantee to Piraeus Bank (since the latter guarantee would not have been necessary, i.e. it would have been irrelevant).
Nagu eespool selgitatud, kuna ükski turumajanduslik investor ei oleks nõustunud andma ETVA antud garantiid, mille näol on tegu riigiabiga, ei oleks ükski turumajanduslik investor andnud garantiid Piraeus Bankile (sest viimatinimetatud garantii ei oleks olnud vajalik, st oleks olnud ebaoluline).
As regards the identification of the beneficiary of the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank, the Commission recalls that the present procedure concerns potential State aid to HSY.
Seoses riigi poolt Piraeus Bankile antud garantii kasusaaja tuvastamisega tuletab komisjon meelde, et käesolev menetlus käsitleb võimalikku riigiabi HSY-le.
No other potential beneficiary is mentioned in the extension decision.
Ühtki muud potentsiaalset kasusaajat ei ole laiendamisotsuses mainitud.
Therefore, only aid to HSY can be investigated in the framework of the present procedure.
Seega saab käesoleva menetluse raames uurida vaid abi HSY-le.
If the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank were to constitute aid to HSY, it would not constitute additional State aid on top of the State aid included in the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Kui riigi garantii Piraeus Bankile kujutaks endast abi HSY-le, ei oleks tegu täiendava riigiabiga lisaks riigiabile, mis kuulub ETVA poolt HDW/Ferrostaalile antud garantii alla.
Indeed, it is thanks to the latter guarantee that a private investor accepted to purchase HSY and that the civil activities of HSY were thereby saved.
Just tänu viimatinimetatud garantiile nõustus erainvestor HSYd ostma, mille tulemusena päästeti HSY tsiviilotstarbelised tegevused.
In other words, the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank does not provide an additional advantage to HSY and can therefore not constitute additional aid to HSY: all the advantage to HSY is granted by the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Teisisõnu ei anna riigi garantii Piraeus Bankile HSY-le lisaeelist ega saa seetõttu endast kujutada täiendavat abi HSY-le: kogu eelis HSY jaoks lähtub ETVA garantiist HDW/Ferrostaalile.
In the present procedure which concerns potential State aid to HSY, the Commission therefore does not have to take a final view on the identity of the beneficiary of the guarantee granted by the Greek State to Piraeus Bank and the Commission does not have to further investigate the latter guarantee.
Käesoleva menetluse raames, mis seondub potentsiaalse riigiabiga HSY-le, ei ole komisjon seega kohustatud võtma lõplikku seisukohta Kreeka riigi poolt Piraeus Bankile antud garantii kasusaaja suhtes, samuti ei ole komisjon kohustatud viimatinimetatud garantiid põhjalikumalt uurima.
It is sufficient to investigate the former guarantee — the guarantee of ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal — and to cancel it if it constitutes incompatible aid to HSY.
Piisab esimesena mainitud garantii – ETVA garantii HDW/Ferrostaalile – uurimisest ja selle tühistamisest juhul, kui tegu on kokkusobimatu abiga HSY-le.
As regards the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal, the Commission fails to see how this aid could be found compatible on the basis of Article 87(2) and (3) of the Treaty.
Seoses ETVA garantiiga HDW/Ferrostaalile jääb komisjonile arusaamatuks, kuidas kõnealust abi saab pidada kokkusobivaks asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõigete 2 ja 3 kohaselt.
As regards Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, the Commission observes that HSY was in difficulty.
Seoses asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 punktiga c märgib komisjon, et HSY oli raskustes.
The Commission has already indicated that aid to shipbuilding was regulated from 1 January 1999 by Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Komisjon on juba osutanud, et laevaehitusele antavat abi reguleerib 1. jaanuarist 1999. aastast nõukogu määrus (EÜ) nr 1540/98.
Article 5 indicates that restructuring aid ‘may exceptionally be considered compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties’.
Artiklis 5 sätestatakse, et ümberkorraldusabi võib „erandkorras pidada ühisturuga kokkusobivaks tingimusel, et abi on kooskõlas raskustes olevate ettevõtete päästmiseks ja ümberkorraldamiseks antavat riigiabi käsitlevate ühenduse suunistega”.
For instance, under condition (b) ‘Restoration of viability’, the granting of the aid must be ‘conditional on implementation of the restructuring plan which must be endorsed by the Commission in the case of all individual aid measure’.
Näiteks tingimuse b „Elujõulisuse taastamine” kohaselt on „abi andmise tingimuseks ümberkorralduskava rakendamine, mille komisjon kinnitab iga abimeetme kohta eraldi”.
The Commission observes that the grant of the guarantee was not conditional on implementation of a restructuring plan.
Komisjon märgib, et garantii andmine ei sõltunud ümberkorralduskava läbiviimisest.
In addition, this plan, since it was not submitted to the Commission, has not been endorsed by it.
Lisaks ei ole komisjon vastavat kava heaks kiitnud, sest seda ei ole talle esitatud.
The guidelines also indicate ‘the plan must be submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission’.
Samuti näevad suunised ette, et „komisjonile tuleb esitada üksikasjalik kava”.
This pre-consultation of the Commission was especially necessary in the present case since the Commission had already approved a restructuring plan in 1997, which had failed to restore the viability of HSY.
Niisugune komisjoni eelkonsultatsioon oli kõnealusel juhul eriti vajalik, sest komisjon oli 1997. aastal juba kiitnud heaks ümberkorralduskava, mille abil ei õnnestunud taastada HSY elujõulisust.
As noted in the analysis of measure P1, the State granted this aid in December 1997 (but did not pay it out).
Nagu märgitud meetme P1 analüüsis, võimaldas riik kõnealuse abi 1997. aasta detsembris (kuid ei maksnud seda välja).
As has been shown in this decision, the firm also received several non-notified and incompatible aids in the years before the 2001–2002 privatisation.
Nagu osutatud käesolevas otsuses, sai ettevõte erastamisele eelnenud aastatel 2001–2002 lisaks mitu korda abi, millest ei teatatud ja mis oli kokkusobimatu.
The restructuring aid authorised by decision C 10/94 was granted to the yard but the conditions attached to its approval were not respected.
Otsusega C 10/94 kiideti heaks laevatehasele antav ümberkorraldusabi, kuid selle tingimustest ei peetud kinni.
Since the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal constitutes incompatible aid in favour of HSY, the Commission considers that it has to be stopped immediately.
Et ETVA garantii HDW/Ferrostaalile kujutab endast kokkusobimatut abi HSY kasuks, on komisjon seisukohal, et abi andmine tuleb viivitamatult peatada.
Per se prohibition of the guarantee
Garantii andmise keeld iseenesest
As indicated in the extension decision, the guarantee granted to HDW/Ferrostaal is incompatible with the common market for a second reason.
Nagu osutatud laiendamisotsuses, on HDW/Ferrostaalile antud garantii ühisturuga kokkusobimatu teisel põhjusel.
The Commission considers that it is per se incompatible since, by preventing any recovery of aid from HSY to have an ‘effect utile’, it prevents the application of the State aid rules.
Komisjon leiab, et see on iseenesest kokkusobimatu, sest ei võimalda nn effet utile HSY-lt mis tahes abi tagasinõudmisel, takistades riigiabi eeskirjade rakendamist.
TKMS/GNSH and HSY contest this position.
TKMS/GNSH ja HSY selle seisukohaga ei nõustu.
In particular, they recall that HSY is not the recipient of any indemnity payment.
Eelkõige tuletavad nad meelde, et HSY ei ole ühegi hüvitismakse saajaks.
Indeed, the guarantee issued by ETVA insures HDW/Ferrostaal and not HSY.
ETVA antud garantii kindlustab HDW/Ferrostaali ja mitte HSY-d.
Therefore, if the Commission would order the reimbursement of aid, HSY would have to make the reimbursement and this would restore the initial situation.
Seetõttu peaks HSY juhul, kui komisjon nõuab abi tagastamist, abi tagasi maksma, taastades nõnda algse olukorra.
TKMS/GNSH fails to understand why the indemnification of TKMS/GNSH (as successor of HDW/Ferrostaal) would invalidate this conclusion.
TKMS/GNSH-le jääb arusaamatuks, miks TKMS/GNSH-le (kui HDW/Ferrostaali õigusjärglasele) hüvitise maksmine selle järelduse kehtetuks muudaks.
Indeed, there is no obligation for TKMS/GNSH to re-invest in HSY the indemnification received.
TKMS/GNSH ei ole ju kohustatud saadud hüvitist HSY-sse reinvesteerima.
The Commission observes that 100 % of the shares of HSY were purchased by HDW/Ferrostaal and are now held by TKMS/GNSH.
Komisjon märgib, et 100 % HSY aktsiatest osteti HDW/Ferrostaali poolt ja need kuuluvad nüüd TKMS/GNSH-le.
This means that, even if HSY and its shareholder are two different legal entities, they form one single economic unit.
Eeltoodu tähendab seda, et isegi kui HSY ja tema aktsionär on kaks erinevat juriidilist isikut, moodustavad nad ühe tervikliku majandusüksuse.
Thanks to the guarantee, this economic unit would be 100 % indemnified for any aid it would have to reimburse to the State.
Tänu garantiile hüvitataks kõnealusele majandusüksusele 100 % mis tahes abist, mida see võib olla sunnitud riigile tagasi maksma.
The Commission therefore considers that this constitutes an elimination of the ‘effet utile’ of any recovery decision.
Seetõttu on komisjon arvamusel, et tegu on mis tahes tagasinõudmisotsuse effet utile kõrvaldamisega.
As regards the absence of a legal provision forcing TKMS/GNSH to re-inject into HSY any indemnification received, the Commission fails to understand how it would invalidate the prior conclusion.
Seoses õigusnormi puudumisega, mis sunniks TKMS/GNSHd mis tahes saadud hüvitist HSYsse reinvesteerima, jääb komisjonile arusaamatuks, kuidas peaks see eelneva järelduse kehtetuks muutma.
In addition, the Commission observes that, if there is no obligation, there is also no prohibition to do it.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et see ei ole küll kohustuslik, kuid ei ole ka keelatud.
Therefore, TKMS/GNSH could inject in HSY the indemnification received.
Seega võiks TKMS/GNSH saadud hüvitise HSYsse investeerida.