natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards the article in La Libre Belgique, it emphasises, as in Article 2 of the framework agreement, that the federal authority only had something to say about the Belgian Government’s communication to the Commission, by means of which the framework agreement was notified.
Nii nagu raamlepingu artikli 2 kohta, väidab Belgia valitsus ka La libre Belgique’i artikli kohta, et föderaalvalitsus ei olnud veel oma sõna öelnud teatise kohta, millega Belgia valitsus komisjonile raamlepingust pidi teatama.
The text of the press article and SNCB’s press release is clear.
Artikli ja SNCB pressiteate sõnastus on aga selge.
If SNCB’s press department had wanted to say that the Belgian Government only had to approve a text for communication to the Commission, it would have indicated that the problem to be resolved was purely a problem of form, and not one of substance.
Kui SNCB pressiesindaja soovinuks öelda, et Belgia valitsus peab heaks kiitma üksnes komisjonile edastatava teksti, oleks ta selgitanud, et tegemist on formaalse küsimusega ja mitte sisulisega.
As regards the points made by Karel Vinck, the Belgian authorities consider that these were limited to the management of the public service assignments.
Karel Vincki sõnade kohta leiavad Belgia ametiasutused, et selles käsitleti üksnes avalike ülesannete täitmist.
This does not appear very credible, as he was interviewed on the subject of the ABX and IFB files, which, as the Belgian Government itself recognised, concern SNCB’s commercial activities, and not the public service assignments.
See tundub väheusutav, kuna teda intervjueeriti konkreetselt seoses ABXi ja IFB küsimustega, mis, nagu Belgia valitsus ise tunnistab, käsitlesid SNCB äritegevust ja mitte avalike ülesannete täitmist.
Scope, contents, conditions of the framework agreement
Raamlepingu ulatus, sisu ja tingimused
In a more general manner, the Commission recalls the aforementioned point 56 of the Stardust Marine ruling which states that ‘any other indicator showing, in the particular case, an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains’ must be taken into account to establish the imputability of a measure to the Member State, with the result that the scope, the content, and the conditions of the framework agreement constitute additional indications of imputability.
Üldiselt meenutab komisjon, et eelviidatud Stardust Marine kohtuasjas tehtud otsuse punktist 56, mille kohaselt tuleb abimeetmete riigiga seostatavuse puhul arvesse võtta ka „mis tahes muud näitajad, mis osutavad konkreetsel juhul riigiasutuste asjassesegatusele või asjassesegatuse puudumise ebatõenäosusele meetme kohaldamises, arvestades selle ulatust, selle sisu või selles sisalduvaid tingimusi” tulenevalt on raamlepingu ulatus, sisu ja tingimused täiendavateks märkideks riigi seostatavuse kohta.
Belgium refutes this third suggestion, repeating that SNCB would be completely autonomous in taking all these decisions, with the exception of the management of the public services.
Belgia vaidleb sellele vastu, korrates, et SNCB on oma otsuste langetamisel täielikult sõltumatu, välja arvatud avalike ülesannete puhul.
The Commission considers that the 1993 Act which regulates SNCB’s status as a joint stock company under public law certainly gives SNCB independence for its commercial activities.
Komisjon leiab, et 1993. aasta seadus, mis annab SNCB-le avalik-õigusliku aktsiaseltsi staatuse annab tõepoolest SNCB-le oma äritegevuse küsimustes iseotsustusõiguse.
However, the Commission recalls that the Government Commissioner is present at every meeting of the Executive Committee, and can refer a matter to the Belgian authorities in order to revoke a decision made by the Management Board relating to a matter which is not concerned with the fulfilment of public service assignments if that decision is prejudicial to […] the implementation of public service duties.
Siiski tuletab komisjon meelde, et valitsuse asjur viibib kohal kõigil haldusnõukogu koosolekutel ning võib pöörduda Belgia ametiasutuste poole haldusnõukogu sellise otsuse tühistamiseks, mis ei seondu avalike ülesannete täitmisega, ent mis „kahjustab […] avalike ülesannete täitmist”.
As already explained, the Commission considers that the decision to grant a cash advance of EUR 2,5 million could not be subject to appeal by the Government Commissioner as, due to its amount and its nature, it could not be prejudicial to the implementation of public service duties.
Nagu juba selgitatud, leiab komisjon, et 2,5 miljoni euro suuruse rahalise ettemakse tegemist käsitleva otsuse osas ei saanud valitsuse asjur sekkuda, kuna selle summa ja selle andmise vormi tõttu ei saanud see avalike ülesannete täitmist kahjustada.
The assessment must be different for the decision to invest nearly EUR 100 million in a company on the verge of bankruptcy.
Teistsugune on seisukoht aga pankroti äärel olevasse ettevõttesse ligi 100 miljoni euro investeerimise otsustamise korral.
That decision should lead the Government Commissioner to intervene, or at least to inform the Belgian authorities so that they could intervene formally or informally, as he did for example in 2000 for the investments in the Italian branch of ABX.
Selle otsuse puhul pidi valitsuse asjur sekkuma või vähemalt teavitama Belgia ametiasutusi, et need kas ametlikult või mitteametlikult sekkuksid, nagu tehti näiteks 2000. aastal ABXi Itaalia haru investeeringute puhul.
Consequently, the Commission considers that, taken together with the presence and the powers of the Government Commissioner, the scope, the contents and the conditions of the framework agreement also constitute evidence of imputability.
Seetõttu leiab komisjon, et ka raamlepingu ulatus, sisu ja tingimused, koostoimes valitsuse asjuri kohaloleku ja pädevusega, on märkideks abi seostatavuse kohta Belgia riigiga.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that the measures in question are imputable to the Belgian State as regards the period subsequent to the decision by SNCB’s Management Board of 20 December 2002.
Seepärast leiab komisjon, et kõnealuse abi andmine on seostatav Belgia riigiga selle perioodi kohta, mis järgneb SNCB haldusnõukogu 20. detsembri 2002. aasta otsusele.
It is therefore necessary to analyse whether the measures taken by SNCB concerning IFB from 20 December onwards conferred an advantage upon the beneficiary, or if, on the contrary, SNCB behaved like an informed investor in a market economy.
Seega tuleb analüüsida, kas SNCB poolt IFB-le pärast 20. detsembrit 2002 antud abi andis abisaajale eelisseisundi või kas SNCB käitus nii nagu oleks seda teinud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev arukas erainvestor.
Advantage to the aid recipient applying the principle of an informed investor in a market economy
Abisaaja eelisseisund lähtudes aruka turuinvestori põhimõttest
It is necessary to analyse whether the decision by SNCB’s Management Board of 20 December 2002 to increase IFB’s capital by the conversion of credits due, and to award the rescue measures, which led to SNCB’s signature, on 7 April 2003, of the framework agreement with IFB, created an economic advantage for IFB, or if this decision was the result of an assessment by a private investor in a market economy.
Tuleb hinnata, kas SNCB haldusnõukogu 20. detsembri 2002. aasta otsus suurendada IFB kapitali tekkinud võlgade kapitaliks ümberarvestamise teel ning päästmisabi andmine, mis viis SNCB 7. aprillil 2003. aastal IFBga raamlepingu sõlmimiseni, andis IFB-le majandusliku eelise või kas seda otsust saab hinnata turumajanduse tingimustes tegutseva erainvestori otsusena.
Since SNCB’s decision not to request any further payment of its invoices to IFB from the end of 2000 until December 2002 and SNCB’s decision to award an advance of EUR 2,5 million are not imputable to Belgium, there is no longer any need to analyse these decisions in detail.
Kuna SNCB otsus mitte nõuda IFB-lt 2002. aasta lõpust kuni 2002. aasta detsembrini esitatud arvete tasumist ning SNCB otsus anda ettemaksena 2,5 miljonit eurot ei ole Belgia riigiga seostatavad, ei ole neid otsuseid vaja üksikasjalikult analüüsida.
For information, the rescue measures consist of:
Meenutuseks, et päästmisabi seisnes järgmises:
The granting of a payment extension for debts of EUR 63 million,
63 miljoni euro suuruse võla tasumiseks maksetähtaja andmine;
The granting of a credit facility of EUR 15 million,
15 miljoni euro suuruse krediidi andmine;
The granting of a recoverable advance of EUR 5 million.
5 miljoni euro suuruse tagastatava ettemakse tegemine.
The restructuring measures consisted of the divestiture of the subsidiaries in France and the restructuring and continuation of activities in Belgium.
Ümberkorraldusmeetmed seisnesid Prantsusmaa tütarettevõtetes olnud osalustest loobumises ning Belgias toimuva tegevuse ümberkorraldamises ja selle jätkamises.
The financing of these measures was initially ensured by the rescue measures, the restructuring plan providing that this finance would be secured by the conversion of the subsequent debts into capital stock:
Ümberkorraldusmeetmete rahastamine tagati esmalt päästmisabi kaudu ning ümberkorralduskavas nähti ette, et see finantseering muudetakse järgmiste võlgade kapitaliks ümberarvestamise kaudu tagastamatuks:
The conversion of debts of EUR 63 million for which a payment extension had been granted into capital stock,
63 miljoni euro suuruse edasilükatud võla ümberarvestamine omakapitaliks;
The conversion of the credit facility of EUR 15 million into capital stock,
15 miljoni euro suuruse krediidi ümberarvestamine omakapitaliks;
The conversion of the capitalised interest on the payment extension and on the credit facility into capital stock.
maksetähtaja ja krediidi kapitaliseeritud intresside ümberarvestamine omakapitaliks.
In order to establish whether SNCB behaved as a private investor in a market economy would have done, it is necessary to assess whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor of a size comparable to SNCB, finding itself in a situation comparable to that of SNCB, would have acted in the same way [42].
Tuvastamaks, kas SNCB tegutses nii, nagu oleks seda teinud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev erainvestor, tuleb hinnata seda, kas SNCB-ga võrreldava suurusega ning SNCB-ga võrreldavas olukorras olev erainvestor oleks sarnastel asjaoludel võinud samamoodi toimida [42].
The Court of Justice stated that, while the conduct of a private investor is not necessarily that of an ordinary investor placing capital funds with a view to their profitability in the shorter or longer term, it must, at least, be that of a private holding, or a group of private businesses pursuing a structural, global or sector policy, and guided by the prospects of profitability in the longer term [43].
Euroopa Kohus täpsustas, et kui erainvestori käitumine ei ole tingimata just selline nagu tavalisel investoril, kes paigutab oma kapitali lühema- või pikemaajaliselt kasumi saamise eesmärgil, siis vähemalt peab see olema selline nagu eraõiguslikul valdusettevõtjal või ettevõtjate grupil, kes lähtub struktuuri-, üldisest või grupistrateegiast ning juhindub kasumlikkusest veel pikemas perspektiivis [43].
The Court stated that the Commission is obliged to ‘conduct a complete analysis of all the factors pertinent to the contested action and in its context’ in order to know whether the State acted as an informed investor in a market economy would have done [44].
Kohus täpsustas, et selleks, et saada teada, kas riik toimis nii, nagu oleks teinud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev arukas investor, peab komisjon „analüüsima igakülgselt kõiki vaidlusaluse tehingu ja selle sisu asjassepuutuvaid elemente” [44].
In its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, Belgium considers that SNCB’s decision to request IFB to divest the group’s French subsidiaries, and also SNCB’s decision to request IFB to restructure and continue with its activities in Belgium correspond to decisions which a private investor in a market economy would have taken.
Vastuses menetluse algatamise kirjale leiab Belgia, et SNCB otsus nõuda, et IFB loobuks osalusest Prantsusmaa tütarettevõtetes ning ka SNCB otsus nõuda, et IFB Belgias toimuva tegevuse ümber korraldaks ja seda jätkaks, on sellised otsused, mille oleks turumajanduse olukorras teinud ka erainvestor.
The Commission however considers that the pertinent question is not to know whether IFB, in divesting its subsidiaries in France and restructuring and continuing its activities in Belgium, acted in the same way as an investor in a market economy, but to know whether SNCB’s decision to finance these two measures is a decision that a private investor would have taken.
Komisjon leiab aga, et põhiküsimus ei ole mitte selles, kas IFB käitus Prantsusmaa tütarettevõtete osalustest loobudes ning Belgias toimuvat tegevust ümber korraldades ja jätkates nagu turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev erainvestor, vaid selles, kas SNCB otsus nende meetmete rahastamise kohta on selline otsus, mille oleks teinud ka erainvestor.
In 2002/2003, SNCB therefore had to decide whether it was cheaper overall to finance the restructuring of IFB (which involved the divestiture of the subsidiaries in France and the continuation of activities in Belgium) or to file for IFB’s bankruptcy.
2002/2003. aastal pidi SNCB niisiis otsustama, kas kokkuvõttes oleks olnud odavam IFB ümberkorraldamise (mis tähendas Prantsusmaa tütarettevõtete osalustest loobumist ning Belgias toimuva tegevuse jätkamist) finantseerimine või IFB pankrotistumine.
It is appropriate to establish first of all the cost to SNCB of each one of these two scenarios, i.e. the restructuring and the liquidation of IFB.
Seega tuleb kõigepealt selgitada välja, milline kulu oleks SNCB jaoks kummagi lahenduse, see tähendab ümberkorraldamise ja likvideerimisega kaasnenud.
Cost of restructuring IFB
IFB ümberkorraldamise kulud
In the first scenario, SNCB commits EUR 95,3 million to the financing of the restructuring of IFB by waiving the recovery of receivables which are converted into capital.
Esimese stsenaariumi korral kulutas SNCB IFB ümberkorraldamise finantseerimiseks 95,3 miljonit eurot, loobudes võlgade sissenõudmisest ning arvestades need ümber kapitaliks.
The Commission notes therefore that, if IFB had been sold, SNCB would only have been able to obtain a negative sale price.
Seepärast leiab komisjon, et IFB võimaliku müügi korral oleks SNCB saanud üksnes negatiivse müügihinna.
Hypothetical cost of the liquidation of IFB
IFB võimaliku likvideerimise oletuslik kulu
The Commission does not agree with this analysis.
Selle analüüsiga komisjon ei nõustu.
First of all, it contests that SNCB would have had to meet the total cost of IFB’s liabilities.
Esmalt vaidleb komisjon vastu väitele, et SNCB oleks pidanud täitma võik IFB kohustused.
Furthermore, it contests the amount of the additional cost calculated by Belgium.
Teiseks ei nõustu komisjon Belgia arvutatud töösuhtest tulenevate kulude suurusega.
SNCB’s responsibility for IFB’s liabilities
SNCB vastutus IFB kohustuste eest
Contrary to what Belgium claims, the fact that IFB has negative net assets (value of the recovery of assets, minus the value of the current liabilities) does not mean that, in the event of bankruptcy, SNCB would have had to bear the corresponding excess liabilities.
Vastupidiselt Belgia väidetele, ei tähenda asjaolu, et IFB-l negatiivne netovara (vara tegelik väärtus, millest on lahutatud sissenõutavaks muutunud kohustuste summa) seda, et pankroti korral oleks SNCB pidanud kandma ülejäänud kohustuste osa.
The Commission points out that, in principle, a company like IFB responds to its obligations with its own capital assets.
Komisjon tuletab meelde, et IFB sugune äriühing vastutab oma kohustuste eest omaenda kapitaliga.
The shareholders’ responsibility for the company’s obligations does not normally go beyond the latter’s capital stock and therefore does not affect the individual capital of the various shareholders.
Aktsionäride vastutus ühingu kohustuste eest piirdub tavaliselt ühingu kapitaliga ega hõlma eri aktsionäride isiklikku vara.
In the hypothetical case of IFB’s bankruptcy, SNCB would therefore have lost its capital stock, but it would not have had to repay the other IFB creditors.
IFB pankroti korral oleks SNCB niisiis kaotanud oma kapitaliosa, ent ta ei oleks olnud kohustatud täitma muude IFB võlausaldajate nõudeid.
A priori, the cost of IFB’s bankruptcy to SNCB, acting as a shareholder, would therefore have been zero, and not the EUR 29,5 to EUR 39,4 million as maintained by the Belgian authorities.
IFB pankroti kulu oleks SNCB kui aktsionäri jaoks olnud niisiis null ja mitte 29,5–39,4 miljonit eurot, nagu väidavad Belgia ametiasutused.
In its decision-making process, the Commission recognises, however, that a business placed in SNCB’s situation would have been obliged to support some costs in capacities other than that of shareholder [47].
Varasemas otsustamispraktikas on komisjon siiski tunnustanud seda, et SNCB-sugusel ettevõtjal võis kulude kandmise kohustus tekkida muul alusel kui aktsionäriks olemisest [47].
In this case, costs are notably as follows:
Käesoleval juhul on need kulud eelkõige järgmised:
As a creditor, SNCB will lose its receivables from IFB, at least in proportion to its share in IFB’s liabilities not covered by the assets; the Commission can accept that, taking SNCB’s role in IFB’s liquidation into account, this risk could be assessed as being up to the total amount of receivables held by SCNB in IFB, i.e. EUR 95 million,
võlausaldajana jääks SNCB ilma oma nõuetest IFB vastu vähemalt ulatuses, mis vastab SNCB nõuete osale IFB varalise katteta kohustuste hulgas; komisjon võib nõustuda, et arvestades SNCB rolli IFB likvideerimises, võib see risk ulatuda kuni SNCB-l IFB vastu olevate nõuete kogusummani ehk kuni 95 miljoni euroni;
The Commission would be able to accept that, in order to save its reputation, it would have been advisable for SNCB, as the parent company, to take back some of the unpaid debts to IFB’s suppliers who are also suppliers to SNCB.
komisjon võib nõustuda sellegagi, et emaettevõttena oleks SNCB-l oma maine päästmiseks olnud mõistlik maksta kinni osa tasumata võlgadest neile IFB tarnijatele, kes on ühtlasi SNCB tarnijad.
It is necessary therefore to estimate the maximum amount which SNCB would have been led to bear in this capacity.
Niisiis tuleb hinnata, milline on maksimaalne summa, mis oleks jäänud SNCB kanda.
The Commission considers that in principle a private investor in a market economy, who has to decide between financing of the restructuring of its subsidiary and its bankruptcy, might be minded to take into account the cost of a reduction in its personnel, if that reduction in personnel were a direct and inevitable consequence of the bankruptcy of its subsidiary.
Komisjon leiab, et põhimõtteliselt võib turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev erainvestor, kes peab otsustama oma tütarettevõtte ümberkorraldamise finantseerimise ja tütarettevõtte pankrotistumise vahel, võtta arvesse oma personali vähendamisega seotud kulusid, kui personali vähendamine on tütarettevõtte pankrotistumise vahetu ja vältimatu tagajärg.
Belgium concludes that IFB’s bankruptcy would have left SNCB with an overstaffing situation of 530 employees, 50 of whom were seconded to IFB, and 480 of whom were employees within SNCB in areas dependent upon the IFB’s activities.
Belgia leiab kokkuvõttes, et IFB pankrotistumise tõttu oleks SNCB-l tekkinud 530 üleliigset töötajat, kellest 50 olid IFB juurde lähetatud töötajad ning 480 SNCBs töötavad töötajad, kelle töö jätkumine sõltus IFB tegevusest.
The reduction of SNCB’s personnel by 530 employees would have led to costs of EUR 122,4 million, which is EUR 230000 per employee.
SNCB personali vähendamisega 530 töötaja võrra oleks Belgia kohaselt kaasnenud 122,4 miljoni euro suurune kulu, mis teeb 230000 eurot ühe töötaja kohta.
The details of this calculation are explained in part 3 of this decision.
Nende arvutuste üksikasju on selgitatud käesoleva otsuse 3. osas.
The Commission considers that it is not realistic to consider that SNCB would only have been able to recover 21 % of the traffic previously generated by IFB.
Komisjon leiab, et realistlik ei ole seisukoht, et SNCB oleks saanud taastada ainult 21 % varem IFB kaudu toimunud kaubavahetusest.
First of all, as Belgium recognised in its reply to the decision initiating the procedure, the markets in which IFB is active are booming (11 % growth for freight transhipment, 12 % growth for combined transport).
Esiteks, nagu Belgia ise menetluse algatamise kirjale antud vastuses tunnistab, on turud, kus IFB tegutseb, täies õitsengus (11 % kasv lastikäitamise puhul, 12 % kasv kombineeritud vedude puhul).
Consequently, it would appear probable that IFB’s competitors would have purchased IFB’s assets in order to continue its activities.
Seetõttu näib võimalik, et IFB konkurendid oleksid IFB tegevuse jätkamiseks ostnud ära IFB vara.
Under this assumption, the purchaser of IFB would have needed rail freight transport services.
Sel juhul oleks IFB ostja vajanud raudteekaubaveo teenuseid.
In view of SNCB’s very strong position in the international transport market for goods leaving Belgium, and its monopoly (until 1 January 2007) of the national goods transport market within Belgium, the Commission considers that the buyer of IFB would have chosen SNCB as its rail carrier, at least for a significant part of its requirements.
Arvestades SNCB väga tugevat positsiooni Belgiast lähtuvate rahvusvaheliste kaubavedude turul ning tema monopoli (kuni 1. jaanuarini 2007) Belgia siseste kaubavedude turul, leiab komisjon, et IFB ostja oleks, vähemalt olulise osa kohta oma vajadustest, valinud raudteevedajaks just SNCB.
Consequently, even under the assumption of IFB’s bankruptcy, SNCB would have been able to recover a very large proportion of the rail traffic generated by IFB.
Seega oleks isegi IFB pankrotistumise korral SNCB saanud taastada suure osa IFB tegevusega seotud raudteeliiklusest.
Furthermore, the Commission observes that the rail transport markets are in growth.
Lisaks märgib komisjon, et raudteevedude turg kasvab pidevalt.
Consequently, it would appear reasonable to assume that SNCB would have grown at the same rate as the market, which would have allowed it to reintegrate the 50 employees released from IFB as needs arose.
Seetõttu tundub mõistlik eeldada, et SNCB oleks saanud oma tegevust laiendada turuga samal kiirusel, mis oleks võimaldanud tal järk-järgult 50 IFB juurde lähetatud töötajat taas tööle rakendada.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that Belgium has not convincingly demonstrated that SNCB would have had an overstaffing situation of 480 employees under the assumption of IFB’s bankruptcy, and that it would not have been able to reintegrate the 50 employees seconded to IFB.
Kokkuvõttes leiab komisjon, et Belgia ei ole veenvalt tõendanud, et SNCB-l oleks IFB pankrotistumise korral tekkinud 480 üleliigset töötajat ning et ta ei oleks 50 IFB juurde lähetatud töötajat saanud taas tööle rakendada.
On the basis of information communicated by Belgium, the Commission considers that, in the second scenario, SNCB (as in the first scenario) would also waive the recovery of its debts up to a maximum of EUR 95,3 million and beyond this, bear a maximum cost of EUR 13 million.
Belgia esitatud andmete alusel leiab komisjon, et teise stsenaariumi korral jääb SNCB ilma (nagu ka esimese stsenaariumi puhul) oma nõuete rahuldamise võimalusest maksimaalselt 95,3 miljoni euro ulatuses ning peab lisaks kandma maksimaalselt 13 miljoni euro suuruse kulu.