natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, on 20 October 2004 the Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure in respect of one of the notified measures: the indemnity undertaking for unknown claims.
Kuid 20. oktoobril 2004 algatas komisjon ametliku uurimismenetluse ühe teatatud meetme asjus: ettenägematute nõuete hüvitamise kohustus.
In that decision, the Commission stated that this indemnity undertaking is applicable after accession.
Selles otsuses sedastas komisjon, et hüvitamise kohustust kohaldatakse pärast ühinemist.
The Commission took the view that the measure could constitute State aid and had serious doubts about its compatibility with the common market.
Komisjon asus seisukohale, et meede võib olla riigiabi ning tal oli tõsiseid kahtlusi selle kokkusobivuse kohta ühisturuga.
COMMENTS RECEIVED AFTER THE INITIATION OF THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
PÄRAST AMETLIKU UURIMISMENETLUSE ALGATAMIST LAEKUNUD MÄRKUSED
Comments by Hungary
Ungari märkused
The Hungarian authorities take the view that the indemnity undertaking for unknown claims constitutes a measure (rather than aid) that is not applicable after accession.
Ungari ametiasutused on seisukohal, et ettenägematute nõuete hüvitamine on meede (mitte abi), mida ei kohaldata pärast ühinemist.
They claim that the measure meets the three conditions to be regarded as no longer applicable after accession within the meaning of paragraph 52 of the Commission decision initiating the procedure.
Nad väidavad, et meede vastab kolmele tingimusele, mis on nõutavad selleks, et lugeda meede pärast ühinemist mittekohaldatavaks komisjoni menetluse algatamise otsuse punkti 52 tähenduses.
They consider that the measure cannot constitute State aid, since it is what its name says: an indemnity undertaking, i.e. a conventional commercial term in a sale and purchase agreement concluded under an open and competitive procedure.
Nad leiavad, et meede ei saa olla riigiabi, kuivõrd see seisneb hüvitamise kohustuses, mis on tavaline äritingimus avatud ja konkurentsi alusel toimuva menetluse raames sõlmitud ostu-müügilepingus.
The market price paid for Postabank precludes aid.
Kuna Postabanki eest tasuti turuhinda, ei ole tegemist abiga.
They also argue that the Commission did not take into account the fact that Postabank was sold following an open, non-discriminatory and unconditional tender procedure.
Samuti väidavad nad, et komisjon ei võtnud arvesse asjaolu, et Postabank müüdi pärast avatud, mittediskrimineerivat ja tingimusteta pakkumismenetlust.
They further state that the restructuring of Postabank and its privatisation are two entirely separate events and not one indivisible ‘package’ as stated in the Commission’s analysis, which assesses the pre-privatisation measures after the event.
Nad osutavad, et Postabanki ümberkorraldamine ja erastamine on kaks täiesti erinevat sündmust ja mitte üks jagamatu pakett, nagu mainitud komisjoni järelanalüüsis, milles hinnatakse erastamiseelseid meetmeid.
The privatisation of Postabank was not part of the restructuring process, as the Bank had returned to viability by that time.
Postabanki erastamine ei olnud ümberkorraldamisprotsessi osa, kuivõrd pank oli selleks ajaks jälle elujõuline.
Therefore, the measure is not part of a chain of interventions and the need for it arose only in the course of the privatisation process.
Seepärast ei ole meede sekkumiste ahela osa ning selle järele tekkis vajadus alles erastamise käigus.
The assessment of the restructuring and the privatisation as a single package is also beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, since, as the Commission itself acknowledges in the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, most of the elements of this ‘package’ are not applicable after accession, which means that they are not examinable by the Commission.
Ümberkorraldamise ja erastamise lugemine üheks paketiks on samuti väljaspool komisjoni jurisdiktsiooni, sest nagu komisjon ise ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuses tunnistab, ei ole enamik selle paketi elemente pärast ühinemist kohaldatavad, mis tähendab, et komisjon ei saa neid läbi vaadata.
The Hungarian authorities further state that the measure does not in itself distort competition as the market price was paid in the course of the privatisation, which included the value to Erste Bank of the indemnity undertaking.
Lisaks mainivad Ungari ametiasutused, et meede ise ei moonuta konkurentsi, sest erastamise käigus tasuti turuhind, mis hõlmas hüvitise väärtust Erste Bankile.
It was the measure that enabled the privatisation of Postabank to go ahead.
Tänu sellele meetmele sai Postabanki erastamine jätkuda.
The Hungarian authorities explained that the need for the measure became clear during the privatisation process, as no bidder was willing to buy Postabank without the possibility of indemnification.
Ungari ametiasutused selgitasid, et vajadus meetme järele selgus erastamisprotsessi käigus, kuivõrd ilma hüvitamisvõimaluseta ei tahtnud ükski pakkuja Postabanki osta.
Therefore it became an indispensable condition for the privatisation to take place.
Seepärast sai sellest erastamise toimumise vältimatu tingimus.
The Hungarian authorities argue that potential buyers, in valuing the business, were not in a position to fully assess the risk of litigation resulting from Postabank’s troubled past, this being a typical asymmetric information problem.
Ungari ametiasutused väidavad, et potentsiaalsed ostjad ei saanud ettevõtte väärtuse hindamisel täielikult hinnata Postabanki problemaatilisest minevikust põhjustatud kohtulike nõuete esitamise riski, mille näol oli tegu tüüpilise teabemoonutuse probleemiga.
The State as seller conducted an extensive litigation risk assessment before the privatisation.
Riik müüjana korraldas enne erastamist põhjaliku kohtuasjade algatamise riski hindamise.
No new claims were identified and it was strongly felt that any such claim would have come to light prior to the privatisation process as the Bank had been subject to various audits and inspections since 1998.
Uusi nõudeid ei tuvastatud ning jõuti kindlale seisukohale, et sellised nõuded oleksid selgunud enne erastamise algust, sest pangas oli alates 1998. aastast läbi viidud mitmeid auditeid ja kontrolle.
With regard to all litigation claims, at the time of the sale purchase agreement there was a certain risk-sharing between the Hungarian State as seller and Erste Bank as buyer, whereby the buyer took over all potential liabilities in respect of pending litigation, while threatened and unknown litigation claims were partially undertaken to a limited extent (for unknown claims 10 % of the first HUF 10 billion and for threatened claims 50 % of the first HUF 4 billion of the relevant bank liabilities in total).
Ostu-müügilepingu sõlmimise ajal olid kohtulike nõuetega seotud riskid teatud määral jagatud Ungari riigi kui müüja ja Erste Banki kui ostja vahel, mille alusel ostja võttis üle kõik potentsiaalsed kohustused seoses käimasolevate kohtuasjadega, samal ajal kui ähvardavad ja ettenägematud kohtulikud nõuded võeti osaliselt üle piiratud mahus (ettenägematud nõuded 10 % ulatuses esimesest 10 miljardist Ungari forintist ja võimalikud nõuded 50 % ulatuses esimesest 4 miljardist Ungari forintist panga asjaomastest kogukohustustest).
By offering the risk-sharing mechanism the State intended to send an encouraging signal to bidders that the seller was confident that the State would not suffer financial loss as a result of that arrangement and thereby to strengthen bidders’ willingness to attribute a premium value to the Bank.
Riskide jagamise mehhanismi väljakuulutamisega tahtis riik saata pakkujatele julgustava signaali selle kohta, et müüja on kindel, et riik ei kanna asjade sellise korraldamise tulemusena rahalist kahju, ning suurendada pakkujate valmisolekut näha panga ostu väärtusliku tehinguna.
The privatisation advisor of the State estimated the potential liability arising from the unknown claims to amount to zero in the best-case scenario and HUF 5 billion in the worst-case scenario.
Riigi erastamisnõustaja hinnangul oli ettenägematutest nõuetest tulenevate kohustuste summa parimal juhul null ja halvimal juhul ulatus see 5 miljardi Ungari forintini.
The total estimated theoretical exposure to all litigation (threatened and unknown) in the worst-case scenario was significantly lower than the difference between the sales price of HUF 101 billion and the proceeds originally envisaged by the State before the privatisation.
Teoreetiline kohtulike (võimalike ja ettenägematute) nõuete kogusumma oli halvimal juhul oluliselt väiksem kui müügihinna 101 miljardit Ungari forintit ja riigi poolt algselt enne erastamist prognoositud tulude vahe.
This amount was also significantly lower than the difference between the sales price and the highest indicative bid received [6].
See summa oli samuti tunduvalt väiksem kui müügihinna ning kõrgeima soovitusliku hinnapakkumise vahe.
Therefore, the Hungarian authorities believe that by giving the indemnity undertaking the State was able to generate an additional premium on the sale and that the State acted wholly in line with the market economy investor principle.
Seepärast on Ungari ametiasutused veendunud, et hüvitamise kohustust kehtestades annab riik müügitehingule lisaväärtust ning et riik tegutseb täielikus vastavuses turumajanduse investorpõhimõttega.
The Hungarian authorities furthermore state that a rescue and restructuring analysis is unnecessary since the measure does not constitute State aid.
Ungari ametiasutused lisavad, et päästmis- ja ümberkorraldusanalüüsi ei tule teha, sest meede ei ole riigiabi.
In the decision initiating the procedure the Commission considered that the Strategic Cooperation Agreement between Postabank and Magyar Posta (Hungarian Post) signed in December 2002 reinforces the competitive position of Postabank on the Hungarian market and confers an advantage on it by granting it exclusivity for the postal sale of jointly developed new products.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses leidis komisjon, et Postabank ja Magyar Posta (Ungari Posti) vahel detsembris 2002 allkirjastatud strateegiline koostööleping tugevdab Postabanki konkurentsivõimet Ungari turul ning annab sellele tänu ühiselt väljatöötatud uute toodete müügi ainuõigusele eelise.
The Hungarian authorities claim that the Commission misinterprets the relationship between Magyar Posta and Postabank.
Ungari ametiasutused väidavad, et komisjon tõlgendab Magyar Posta ja Postabanki suhet valesti.
They state that the Strategic Cooperation Agreement is a wholly commercial agreement and does not grant either party any form of general exclusivity.
Nad väidavad, et strateegiline koostööleping on läbinisti äriline leping ega anna kummalegi poolele mingeid üldisi ainuõigusi.
If the measure were to qualify as State aid, Hungary does not agree with the doubts expressed by the Commission (see paragraphs 135-138 of the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure) in respect of the application of Article 45(2) of the Europe Agreement in the present case to justify the measures granted for Postabank.
Kui meede oleks käsitletav riigiabina, ei nõustu Ungari komisjoni väljendatud kahtlustega (vt ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise otsuse punkte 135–138) Euroopa lepingu artikli 45 lõike 2 kohaldamise suhtes praeguse juhtumi puhul Postabankile antud meetmete õigustamiseks.
They argue that the Commission should take into account the fact that Hungary was not yet a member of the EU when the measures under assessment took place.
Nad väidavad, et komisjon peaks arvesse võtma asjaolu, et Ungari ei olnud hindamise all olevate meetmete kohaldamise ajal veel ELi liige.
They claim that the Hungarian Government could not have allowed Postabank to fail in 1998 at a time when it was experiencing its greatest difficulties and the Hungarian market was not stable.
Nad kinnitavad, et Ungari valitsus ei oleks lasknud Postabankil 1998. aastal, kui ta koges suurimaid raskusi ja Ungari turg ei olnud stabiilne, pankrotti minna.
The failure of Postabank, given its size, could have led to a major financial crisis.
Postabanki pankrot oleks tema suurust arvestades toonud kaasa suure finantskriisi.
Comments by Erste Bank
Erste Banki kommentaarid
Erste Bank submitted arguments similar to those put forward by the Hungarian authorities.
Erste Bank esitas Ungari ametiasutuste omadega sarnased argumendid.
Erste Bank disagrees with the conclusions of the Commission that the measure constitutes aid incompatible with the common market.
Erste Bank ei nõustu komisjoni järeldustega, et meetme näol on tegu ühisturuga kokkusobimatu abiga.
Erste Bank also contests the contention that the measure is applicable after accession.
Samuti vaidlustab Erste Bank väite, et meede on kohaldatav pärast ühinemist.
It claims that the measure is limited in scope, amount and duration.
Ta kinnitab, et meetme ulatus, maht ja kestus on piiratud.
All the potential claims were clearly defined before accession; therefore, no new aid could arise as a result of it after accession.
Kõik potentsiaalsed nõuded määrati enne ühinemist selgesti kindlaks, mistõttu pärast ühinemist ei ole tegemist uue abiga.
It further argues that the measure does not confer a commercial advantage or distort competition, because it is simply a standard market term in a share purchase agreement for dealing with particular risks and it was agreed on under a competitive procedure, which ensures that the market price was paid for the indemnity undertaking and that, therefore, there was no element of aid.
Ta leiab, et meetmega ei anta ärieelist ega moonutata konkurentsi, sest tegu turul tavalise tingimusega konkreetsete riskide maandamiseks aktsiate ostulepingus ning selles lepiti kokku konkursi käigus, mis tagab turuhinna tasumise hüvitamiskohustuse eest ning seetõttu ei kaasnenud abielementi.
On the basis of case-law in relation to privatisations conducted under open, non-discriminatory, competitive and transparent procedures, Erste Bank argued that it had legitimate expectations that the sale of Postabank did not involve any State aid being conferred on it.
Avatud, mittediskrimineerivate, konkurentsi tingimustes ja läbipaistvate menetluste alusel toimunud erastamisi käsitleva pretsedendiõiguse alusel kinnitas Erste Bank, et tal oli põhjust eeldada, et Postabanki müügiga ei kaasne riigiabi andmist.
In addition, in contrast to a guarantee, which can be a legal obligation in its own right, the measure is, by its nature, an indemnity undertaking, which cannot be viewed as a stand-alone measure, since it is always inextricably linked to a specific sale agreement.
Lisaks sellele on kõnealune meede – erinevalt garantiist, mis võib olla iseseisev juriidiline kohustus – olemuselt hüvitamiskohustus, mida ei saa käsitleda iseseisva meetmena, kuivõrd see on alati lahutamatult seotud konkreetse müügilepinguga.
The indemnity undertaking serves to protect the value of the assets transferred at the time of the sale against risks arising in respect of the period prior to the sale.
Hüvitamiskohustuse eesmärk on kaitsta müügi ajal üle antavate varade väärtust müügile eelnenud perioodist tulenevate riskide eest.
Erste Bank also argues that the measure should be assessed in isolation from past measures and that the private investor test analysis carried out by the Commission should not lump together the pre-accession restructuring measures for Postabank and its privatisation.
Erste Bank väidab, et meedet tuleks hinnata varasematest meetmetest eraldi ning et komisjoni läbi viidud erainvestori analüüsis ei tohiks Postabanki ühinemiseelset ümberkorraldamist ja erastamist käsitleda ühe paketina.
The measure is not a restructuring measure, but an indemnity undertaking inextricably linked to the share purchase agreement, which is separate from the restructuring process.
Meede ei ole ümberkorraldamismeede, vaid aktsiate ostu-müügilepinguga lahutamatult seotud hüvitamiskohustus, mis on eraldatud ümberkorraldamisprotsessist.
Postabank was viable at the time of its privatisation.
Postabank oli erastamise ajal elujõuline.
Second, the Commission has no jurisdiction to examine previous restructuring measures that are not applicable after accession.
Teiseks ei ole komisjon pädev uurima eelnevaid ümberkorraldamismeetmeid, mida pärast ühinemist ei kohaldata.
The Commission’s approach of lumping together measures not applicable after accession and the indemnity undertaking for unknown claims treats the 1998-2002 measures as aid, although it has no jurisdiction to examine them.
Komisjoni lähenemises, mille puhul pannakse kokku pärast ühinemist mittekohaldatavad meetmed ja ettenägematute nõuete hüvitamise kohustus, käsitletakse 1998.–2002. aasta meetmeid abina, ehkki komisjon ei ole pädev neid uurima.
Erste Bank also states, as a subsidiary argument, that the Commission’s private investor test analysis is, in any event, incomplete as it does not examine the costs of liquidation or the relevant Hungarian banking rules preventing liquidations from taking place.
Lisaks kinnitab Erste Bank, et komisjoni erainvestori analüüs on igal juhul ebatäielik, sest selles ei käsitleta likvideerimiskulusid ega Ungari panganduseeskirju, millega välditakse likvideerimisi.
Erste Bank considers that, since the measure does not constitute aid and is not applicable after accession, there is no need for a compatibility assessment.
Erste Bank leiab, et kuivõrd meede ei ole abi ning seda ei kohaldata pärast ühinemist, ei ole vaja kokkusobivust hinnata.
It also claims that the compatibility assessment is based on the mistaken assumption that the measure is a restructuring measure rather than an element in the privatisation.
Samuti väidab ta, et kokkusobivuse hindamine põhineb ekslikul eeldusel, et meede on ümberkorraldamismeede, mitte aga erastamise element.
Erste Bank further argues that the measure does not distort competition or confer a commercial advantage, since it came about in the context of a competitive procedure under which Postabank was sold at a market price.
Lisaks sellele põhjendab Erste Bank, et meede ei moonuta konkurentsi ega anna ärieelist, sest meede, mille käigus müüdi Postabank turuhinnaga, võeti konkurentsi tingimustes.
In any event, according to the case-law, the benefit of any advantage would remain with the seller and would not be passed on to the buyer.
Igal juhul kuuluks pretsedendiõiguse kohaselt kõik eelised müüjale ning ostjale neid edasi ei antaks.
Therefore, there was no selective commercial advantage in favour of Erste Bank (in respect of the indemnity undertaking for unknown claims or otherwise) as the State would have been prepared to sell Postabank to whichever company had offered the highest price.
Seepärast ei olnud tegu valikulise ärieelisega Erste Banki kasuks (seoses ettenägematute nõuete hüvitamise kohustuse või muuga), sest riik oleks olnud valmis müüma Postabanki ükskõik millisele ettevõttele, kes oleks pakkunud kõrgeimat hinda.
Erste Bank states that the Commission does not identify the legal grounds for its applicability test and that in order to show that the Commission has the jurisdiction to examine the measure under Article 88(2), it would have to be shown that the undertaking constituted new aid within the meaning of Annex IV(3) of the Act of Accession.
Erste Bank väidab, et komisjon ei määratle oma kohaldamistesti õiguslikku alust ning tõendamaks, et komisjon on pädev uurima meedet vastavalt artikli 88 lõikele 2, tuleks näidata, et kohustuse näol oli tegu uue abiga ühinemisakti IV lisa 3. osa alusel.
It also states that Hungary was not a member of the EU at the time the measures were created and therefore not directly subject to Article 87(1) EC.
Samuti kinnitab ta, et Ungari ei olnud meetmete võtmise ajal ELi liige ning seetõttu ei saa EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõiget 1 talle otseselt kohaldada.
The Commission cannot apply State aid rules to situations definitively fixed before accession, such as the Postabank share purchase agreement, which is a legally binding act, as this would contravene the principle of non-retroactivity.
Komisjon ei tohi kohaldada riigiabi eeskirju olukordadele, mis olid enne ühinemist lõplikult paigas, näiteks Postabanki aktsiate ostu-müügilepingule, mis on õiguslikult siduv dokument, kuivõrd see oleks vastuolus tagasiulatuva jõu puudumise põhimõttega.
At the time of privatisation neither Hungary nor Erste Bank was aware of the requirement that risks have to be precisely defined in order for indemnity undertakings not to be considered applicable after accession.
Erastamise ajal ei olnud ei Ungari ega Erste Bank teadlik nõudest, et selleks, et hüvitamiskohustust ei loetaks kohaldatavaks pärast ühinemist, peavad riskid olema täpselt määratletud.
Applicability after accession
Kohaldatavus pärast ühinemist
As explained above as well as in the decision initiating the procedure, the Commission’s assessment first examines whether the measure on which the formal investigation procedure was initiated, i.e. the indemnity undertaking for unknown claims, is applicable after accession according to the criteria set out in paragraph 14.
Nagu selgitatud eespool, samuti menetluse algatamise otsuses, hindas komisjon kõigepealt, kas meede, mille suhtes ametlik uurimismenetlus algatati, st ettenägematute nõuete hüvitamise kohustus, on vastavalt punktis 14 sätestatud kriteeriumidele kohaldatav pärast ühinemist.
The question of aid being ‘applicable after accession’ is a distinct question from the question of whether a measure qualifies as aid (at any given relevant time) and is subject to distinct criteria.
Küsimus, kas abi „kohaldamist jätkatakse pärast ühinemist” seisab eraldi küsimusest, kas meedet võib abina käsitleda (mis tahes ajahetkel) ja kas selle kohta kehtivad kindlad kriteeriumid.
The irrevocable unilateral declaration signed on 29 April 2004 by Postabank’s buyer, Erste Bank, provides for an overall cap of HUF 200 billion and a narrower definition of risk in respect of Hungary’s liability towards the buyer, as laid down in the share purchase agreement.
aprillil 2004. aastal Postabanki ostja Erste Banki allkirjastatud tagasivõtmatus ühepoolses avalduses nähakse ette üldine ülemmäär 200 miljardit Ungari forintit ja määratletakse vastavalt aktsiate ostu-müügilepingule kitsamalt Ungari vastutusega seotud risk ostja ees.
However, despite this setting of an overall cap and narrowing of the scope of the measure, the Commission notes that the indemnity undertaken by the Hungarian Government in order to facilitate the sale of Postabank was not precisely defined and did not involve an exhaustive and binding list finalised by the date of accession.
Kuid üldise ülemmäära kehtestamisest ja meetme kitsendamisest hoolimata märgib komisjon, et Ungari valitsuse poolt Postabanki müügi hõlbustamiseks võetud hüvitamiskohustus ei olnud täpselt määratletud ega hõlmanud ühinemise kuupäevaks lõplikult vormistatud ammendavat ja siduvat loetelu.
On the contrary, the measure covers indemnities with a wide scope, is not precisely defined and is capped at a high level, which moreover was introduced at a later date.
Vastupidi, meede hõlmab suurema ulatusega hüvitisi, ei ole täpselt määratletud ning selle ülemmäär on kõrge, mis pealegi kehtestati hilisemal kuupäeval.
Therefore, the undertaking provides the potential for an undetermined number of further claims beyond what had been clearly defined by the time of accession, which is contrary to what the Hungarian authorities and Erste Bank maintain.
Seepärast võimaldab kohustus määramata arvul edasisi nõudeid lisaks ühinemise ajaks selgesti määratletutele, mis on vastuolus sellega, mida väidavad Ungari ametiasutused ja Erste Bank.
The Commission considers that a mere cap without listing (itemising) the specific events which might trigger the undertaking does not tie the payment of the indemnity after accession to specific events definitively and unconditionally identified prior to accession.
Komisjon leiab, et lihtsalt ülemmäär ilma konkreetsete sündmuste loeteluta (spetsifikatsioonita), mis võiksid kohustuse kaasa tuua, ei seo hüvitise maksmist pärast ühinemist konkreetsete sündmustega, mis määratleti lõplikult ja tingimusteta enne ühinemist.