natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Restructuring aid must therefore be linked to a viable restructuring plan to which the Member State concerned commits itself.
Ümberkorraldamisabi peab seetõttu olema seotud elujõulise ümberkorraldamiskavaga, mida asjaomane liikmesriik kohustub rakendama.
The plan must be submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission and include, in particular, a market survey.
Komisjonile tuleb esitada üksikasjalik kava, mis eelkõige peab sisaldama turuülevaadet.
The improvement in viability must derive mainly from internal measures contained in the restructuring plan and may be based on external factors such as variations in prices and demand over which the company has no great influence if the market assumptions made are generally acknowledged.
Elujõulisuse paranemine peab tulenema peamiselt ümberkorraldamiskavas sisalduvatest sisemistest meetmetest ja võib välistel teguritel, nagu hindade ja nõudluse erinevused, mida äriühing ise eriti mõjutada ei saa, põhineda ainult sel juhul, kui turu arengu kohta tehtud oletused on üldtunnustatud.
Restructuring must involve the abandonment of activities which would remain structurally loss making even after restructuring.
Ümberkorraldamine peab sisaldama sellise tegevuse lõpetamist, mis isegi pärast ümberkorraldamist oleks kahjumlik.
The restructuring plan should describe the circumstances that led to the company’s difficulties, thereby providing a basis for assessing whether the proposed measures are appropriate.
Ümberkorraldamiskavas tuleks kirjeldada raskusteni viinud asjaolusid, andes sellega aluse soovitatud meetmete asjakohasuse hindamiseks.
It should take account, inter alia, of the present State of and future prospects for supply and demand on the relevant product market, with scenarios reflecting best-case, worst-case and intermediate assumptions and the firm’s specific strengths and weaknesses.
Ümberkorraldamiskavas tuleks muu hulgas arvesse võtta nõudmise ja pakkumise praegust olukorda ning tulevikuväljavaateid asjaomasel tooteturul vastavalt stsenaariumidele, mis põhinevad optimistlikel, pessimistlikel ja vahepealsetel oletustel ning äriühingu erilistel tugevatel ja nõrkadel külgedel.
It should enable the firm to progress towards a new structure that offers it prospects for long-term viability and enables it to stand on its own feet.
See kava peaks võimaldama äriühingul areneda uue struktuuri suunas, mis pakub pikaajalise elujõulisuse väljavaateid ning aitab äriühingul jalule tõusta.
The plan should provide for a turnaround that will enable the company, after completing its restructuring, to cover all its costs including depreciation and financial charges.
Kava peaks pakkuma sellist pööret, mis võimaldaks äriühingul pärast ümberkorraldamise lõppemist kõik kulud ise kanda, kaasa arvatud amortisatsiooni- ja finantseerimiskulud.
The expected return on capital should be enough to enable the restructured firm to compete in the marketplace on its own merits’.
Ümberkorraldatud äriühingu eeldatav kapitalitasuvus peaks olema küllaldane võimaldamaks tal turul omal jõul konkureerida.”
The Commission concluded in its decision initiating the procedure (points 242 to 247) that Belgium had provided a restructuring plan which fulfilled the criteria set out in the guidelines, and therefore did not express any doubts as to this criterion.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses (punktid 242–247) leidis komisjon, et Belgia esitatud ümberkorralduskava vastas suunistes loetletud kriteeriumidele, ega avaldanud nende kriteeriumidega seoses mingeid kahtlusi.
Following the initiation of the procedure, the Commission did not receive any comments from interested parties contesting this conclusion.
Pärast menetluse algatamist ei ole komisjon saanud huvitatud isikutelt järeldust vaidlustavaid märkusi.
The Commission observes that the firm IFB had been able to demonstrate its economic viability both in its restructuring plan, presented in 2003, and in its results achieved since then.
Komisjon märgib, et IFB puhul on majanduslik elujõulisus tõendatud nii 2003. aastal esitatud ümberkorralduskavaga kui ka sestpeale saavutatud majandustulemustega.
Consequently, the Commission concludes, as in its decision initiating the procedure (point 271), that the criterion ‘restructuring plan restoring the economic viability of the firm’ is fulfilled.
Seetõttu leiab komisjon, nagu ka menetluse algatamise otsuses (punkt 271), et ettevõtja majandusliku elujõulisuse taastava ümberkorralduskava kriteerium on täidetud.
Nevertheless, as indicated in point 290 of this decision, the restructuring plan establishing the economic viability of the firm is not a sufficient condition; it is also necessary to establish that aid does not lead to undue distortions of competition.
Siiski, nagu nähtub käesoleva otsuse punktist 290, ei ole asjaolu, et ümberkorralduskava taastab ettevõtja majandusliku elujõulisuse, piisav tingimus. Samuti on vaja tuvastada, et abiga ei kaasne konkurentsi lubamatu kahjustamine.
Prevention of undue distortions in competition
Konkurentsi lubamatu kahjustamise vältimine
As regards the prevention of undue distortions of competition, the 1999 guidelines state (points 35 to 39):
Konkurentsi lubamatu kahjustamise vältimise kohta on 1999. aasta suunistes märgitud järgmiselt (punktid 35–39):
Measures must be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on competitors.
Tuleb võtta meetmeid, et võimalikult palju leevendada abi kahjulikku mõju konkurentidele.
Otherwise, the aid should be regarded as “contrary to the common interest” and therefore incompatible with the common market.
Vastasel juhul tuleb abi lugeda „ühiste huvidega vastuolus olevaks” ja seetõttu ühisturule sobimatuks.
This condition usually takes the form of a limitation on the presence which the company can enjoy on its market or markets after the end of the restructuring period.
See tingimus tähendab tavaliselt seda, et pärast ümberkorraldamist piiratakse äriühingu osatähtsust turul või turgudel.
Where the size of the relevant market(s) is negligible at Community and at EEA level or the firm’s share of the relevant market(s) is negligible it should be considered that there is no undue distortion of competition.
Kui asjassepuutuva turu (turgude) suurus ühenduse ja EMP tasandil on tühine või kui äriühingu osa asjassepuutuvast turust (turgudest) on väike, loetakse põhjendamatu konkurentsimoonutus olematuks.
This condition should accordingly be regarded as not normally applying to small or medium-sized enterprises, except where otherwise provided by rules on State aid in a particular sector.
Tuleks silmas pidada, et seda tingimust ei kohaldata tavaliselt VKEde suhtes, kui teatavas sektoris antavat riigiabi käsitlevad eeskirjad ei näe ette teisiti.
The compulsory limitation or reduction of the company’s presence on the relevant market(s) represents a compensatory factor in favour of its competitors.
Äriühingu turuosa kohustuslikud piiramised või vähendamised on tema konkurentide kasuks rakendatavad kompenseerivad meetmed.
It should be in proportion to the distortive effects of the aid and, in particular, to the relative importance of the firm on its market or markets.
Need peaksid olema võrdelised abi moonutava mõjuga ja eriti äriühingu suhtelise tähtsusega turul või turgudel.
The Commission will determine the extent of the limitation or reduction on the basis of the market survey attached to the structuring plan and, where the procedure has been initiated, on the basis of information supplied by interested parties.
Komisjon määrab ümberkorraldamiskavale lisatud turuülevaate alusel, ja kui vastav menetlus on juba algatatud, siis huvitatud poolte esitatud teabe alusel, kindlaks piiramiste või vähendamiste määra.
The reduction in the firm’s presence is to be put into effect through the restructuring plan and any conditions attached thereto.
Äriühingu turuosa vähendamine toimub ümberkorraldamiskava ja sellele lisatud tingimuste kaudu.
A relaxation of the need for compensatory measures may be contemplated if such a reduction or limitation is likely to cause a manifest deterioration in the structure of the market, for example by having the indirect effect of creating a monopoly or a tight oligopolistic situation.
Võib ette näha kompenseerivate meetmete vajaduse leevendamist, kui turuosa vähendamine või piiramine põhjustab tõenäoliselt turustruktuuri tõsist halvenemist, mõjutades näiteks kaudselt monopoolse või oligopoolse olukorra tekkimist.
Prior to the decision initiating the procedure, the Belgian authorities had explained that, in order to mitigate, as far as possible, any adverse effects of the aid on competitors, IFB had taken two measures:
Enne menetluse algatamise otsust selgitasid Belgia ametiasutused, et konkurentidele abist tingitud ebasoodsate tagajärgede leevendamiseks võttis IFB kaks meedet:
Withdrawal from its transhipment activities in France,
Prantsusmaal lastikäitlustegevuse vähendamine;
The closure of the terminal in Bressoux in Belgium and the sale of shareholdings in the terminals in Brussels and Zeebrugge in Belgium.
Belgias asuva Bressoux’ terminali sulgemine ning Belgias asuvate Brüsseli ja Zeebrugge terminalide osakute müük.
In its decision initiating the procedure (points 252 to 265), the Commission expressed doubts as to whether these measures were sufficient to mitigate, as far as possible, any unfavourable consequences of the aid on competitors.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses (punktid 252–256) kahtles komisjon, kas need meetmed on küllaldased konkurentidele abist tingitud ebasoodsate tagajärgede leevendamiseks.
These doubts concern the two sectors in which IFB is continuing its activities, that is to say the Belgian freight transhipment market and the Belgian logistics market.
See kahtlus oli kahe sektori suhtes, milles IFB oma tegevust jätkas, s.o Belgia lastikäitlus- ning logistikaturgu.
The Belgian freight transhipment market
Belgia lastikäitlussektor
The two measures referred to in the letter initiating the procedure (point 260) concern the Belgian freight transhipment market.
Menetluse algatamise kirjas (punkt 260) nimetatud kaks meedet on seotud Belgia lastikäitlussektoriga.
In the letter initiating the procedure (points 262 to 264), the Commission expressed doubts as to whether these measures were sufficient, notably in view of the fact that it was envisaged that SNCB’s shareholding in the company TRW, which retains significant shareholdings in the Brussels and Zeebrugge terminals, would be transferred to IFB, and that IFB owns minority shareholdings in a number of important Belgian terminals.
Menetluse algatamise kirjas (punktid 262–264) väljendas komisjon kahtlust, kas need meetmed on küllaldased, arvestades eelkõige asjaoluga, et äriühing TRW mille puhul oli SNCB kavandanud osaluse üleandmist IFB-le, omab olulist osalust Brüsseli ja Zeebrugge terminalides ning et IFB-l on väikesed osalused paljudes Belgia terminalides.
The Belgian Government, in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, presents several arguments to refute the Commission’s doubts.
Vastuses menetluse algatamise kirjale esitas Belgia valitsus mitu väidet komisjoni kahtluste hajutamiseks.
Finally, Belgium informed the Commission that the handover of TRW to IFB will not take place.
Viimaks teatas Belgia komisjonile, et TRW osaluse üleandmist IFB-le ei toimu.
The Commission considers that this last change is important since it means that the closure of Bressoux and the sale of shareholdings to Brussels and Zeebrugge result in a genuine reduction in IFB’s presence in the Belgian freight transhipment market.
Komisjon leiab, et viimane muudatus on oluline, kuna sellest tulenevalt väheneb Bressout’ terminali sulgemise ning Brüsseli ja Zeebrugge terminalide osakute müügi tagajärjel ka tegelikult IFB kohalolek Belgia lastikäitlussektoris.
In view of these arguments, and the fact that IFB’s market share is reduced, the Commission considers that Belgium has produced proof that sufficient measures to mitigate any unfavourable consequences of the aid for competitors have been taken in the freight transhipment sector.
Neid argumente arvestades ning arvestades asjaolu, et IFB turuosa on vähenenud, leiab komisjon, et Belgia on tõendanud, et lastikäitlussektoris on võetud küllaldased meetmed, et võimalikult palju leevendada abi kahjulikku mõju konkurentidele.
The Belgian logistics market
Belgia logistikaturg
In its letter initiating the procedure (points 257 to 259), the Commission noted that the proposed measures did not concern the logistics market.
Menetluse algatamise kirjas (punktid 257–259) märkis komisjon, et kavandatud meetmed ei olnud seotud logistikaturuga.
The Commission therefore considered that the absence of measures proposed for the logistics market, together with the fact that the market is in a state of flux and that IFB had been able to increase its volume significantly, created some doubts as to whether Belgium had limited, as far as possible, the unfavourable consequences of IFB’s logistics activities on competition.
Komisjon leidis, et logistikaturuga seotud meetmete puudumine ning asjaolu, et tegemist on muutuva turuga, samuti asjaolu, et IFB võiks oma tegevust oluliselt laiendada, tekitas kahtlusi küsimuses, kas Belgia on IFB logistikategevust puudutavas osas abi konkurentsi kahjustavat mõju võimalikult palju vähendanud.
The Belgian Government, in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, presented five arguments aimed to demonstrate that, contrary to what was being claimed by the Commission in its decision initiating the procedure, IFB had taken sufficient measures to limit distortions of competition (for the details, see the description in section 3 of this decision, points 177 to 187).
Vastuses menetluse algatamise kirjale tõi Belgia valitsus välja viis argumenti, millega sooviti näidata, et vastupidiselt menetluse algatamise otsuses esitatud komisjoni väidetele, on IFB võtnud konkurentsi kahjustamise vähendamiseks küllaldased meetmed (üksikasjalikult vt kirjeldus käesoleva otsuse 3. osas, punktides 177 ja 178).
These arguments can be summarised as follows:
Argumendid võib kokku võtta järgmiselt:
Reduction of 49 % in the wagon capacity utilised by IFB,
IFB kasutatavate vagunite mahutavuse vähendamine 49 % võrra;
IFB’s market share less than 5 %,
IFB turuosa alla 5 %;
Slower growth than market (9,9 % for IFB, against an average of 12 % for the market),
turu üldise kasvuga võrreldes väiksem kasv (IFB kasv 9,9 %, turu keskmine 12 %);
Growth mainly due to freight transport, a sub-sector of the market in which IFB had only a very small presence before 2002,
kasv on saavutatud peamiselt puistevedudelt ehk selliselt turusegmendilt, kus IFB enne 2002. aastat vaid väga vähesel määral tegutses;
The liberalisation of the rail freight market from 2007 will once again increase competitive pressure.
raudteekaubaveo turu avamine alates 2007. aastast suurendab konkurentsisurvet veelgi.
The Commission notes that the five arguments presented by the Belgian Government are convincing.
Komisjon leiab, et need viis Belgia valitsuse argumenti on veenvad.
Regarding the first argument, it considers that the Belgian Government has demonstrated that IFB has reduced its logistical capacity by reducing the number of wagons utilised by 49 %, which makes it possible to limit the distortions of competition brought about by the measures in question.
Esimese argumendi kohtas leiab komisjon, et Belgia valitsus on tõendanud, et IFB on oma logistikategevuse mahtu vähendanud, vähendades kasutatavate vagunite hulka 49 % võrra, mis võimaldab vähendada kõnealusest abist tingitud konkurentsi kahjustamist.
Regarding the second argument, the Commission agrees that the Belgian Government that IFB’s market shares of the logistics market have been reduced within the meaning of point 36 of the 1999 guidelines.
Teise argumendi suhtes nõustub komisjon Belgia valitsusega selles, et IFB turuosa logistikaturul on 1999. aasta suuniste punkti 36 tähenduses vähenenud.
Regarding the third argument, the Commission considers that the explanations given by Belgium to describe in more detail IFB’s increase in turnover demonstrate that IFB Logistics has grown less quickly than its competitors, and that the most significant growth concerns a sub-sector where IFB is only marginally present.
Kolmanda argumendi kohta leiab komisjon, et Belgia valitsuse esitatud täpsustustest IFB käibe suurenemise kohta nähtub, et IFB Logistics’i tegevus kasvas aeglasemalt kui konkurentide oma ning et kõige suurem kasv seondus sellise allsektoriga, kus IFB varem oli väga vähe esindatud.
Regarding the fourth argument, the Commission considers that, even if the decision to open its terminals to competitors was probably also due to economic considerations, it nevertheless has the consequence of consolidating the opening-up of the markets in which IFB is active, and can thus limit the negative effects of aid.
Neljanda argumendi kohta leiab komisjon, et isegi kui otsus konkurentidele oma terminalid avada pidi tõenäoliselt samuti olema seotud majanduslike kaalutlustega, suurendab see siiski turgude, millel IFB tegutseb, avatust ning võib samuti vähendada abi negatiivset mõju.
Regarding the fifth argument, the Commission recognises that IFB’s situation is in some ways similar to the situation of SNCF freight, insofar as IFB, like SNCF freight, is active in the sub-sectors ‘rail freight transport’ and ‘combined transport’, which have been completely liberalised since 1 January 2007 [50].
Viienda argumendi suhtes möönab komisjon, et IFB olukorda võib võrrelda SNCF Fret’ olukorraga, kuna nii IFB kui SNCF Fret tegutsevad raudteevedude ja kombineeritud vedude allsektorites, mis on alates 1. jaanuarist 2007 täielikult avatud [50].
The Commission concludes that Belgium has shown proof that sufficient measures have been taken to mitigate, as far as possible, the unfavourable consequences of aid on competitors in the logistics sectors.
Komisjon leiab, et Belgia on tõendantud, et logistikasektoris on võetud piisavad meetmed, et võimalikult palju leevendada abi kahjulikku mõju konkurentidele.
The Commission concludes that the Belgian authorities have shown proof that they have taken sufficient measures to mitigate, as far as possible, the unfavourable consequences of aid for competitors in the two markets in question.
Komisjon leiab, et Belgia ametiasutused on tõendanud, et nad on võtnud küllaldased meetmed, et võimalikult palju leevendada abi kahjulikku mõju konkurentidele mõlemal asjaomasel turul.
Aid limited to a minimum
Miinimumiga piirduv abi
As regards the limitation of aid to a minimum, the 1999 Guidelines state (points 40 and 41):
Abi piirdumise kohta miinimumiga märgitakse 1999. aasta suunistes järgmist (punktid 40 ja 41):
The amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the company, its shareholders or the business group to which it belongs.
Toetuse suurus ja intensiivsus peavad rangelt piirduma ettevõetavaks ümberkorraldamiseks vajamineva miinimumiga, pidades silmas äriühingu, selle osanike või seda hõlmava kontserni olemasolevaid rahalisi vahendeid.
Aid beneficiaries will be expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources, including through the sale of assets that are not essential to the firm’s survival, or from external financing at market conditions.
Abisaajatelt oodatakse omavahenditest tehtavat olulist makset ümberkorraldamiskava heaks, sealhulgas äriühingu säilimiseks ebaoluliste varade müügi või turutingimustes toimuva välisfinantseerimise kaudu.
To limit the distortive effect, the amount of the aid or the form in which the aid is granted must be such as to avoid providing the company with surplus cash which could be used for aggressive, market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process.
Et piirata moonutavat toimet, ei tohi abi anda sel määral või sellises vormis, mis võimaldaks äriühingul ülemääraseid rahalisi ressursse kasutada agressiivseks turgu moonutavaks tegevuseks, mis ei ole seotud ümberkorraldamisprotsessiga.
The Commission will accordingly examine the level of the firm’s liabilities after restructuring, including the situation after any postponement or reduction of its debts, particularly in the context of its continuation in business following collective insolvency proceedings brought against it under national law.
Seetõttu uurib komisjon pärast ümberkorraldamist äriühingu kohustuste taset, kaasa arvatud olukorda pärast maksunõuete edasilükkamist või vähendamist; eeskätt peetakse silmas äriühingu tegevuse jätkamise võimalust pärast kõiki võlakohustusi hõlmava maksejõuetusmenetluse algatamist siseriikliku õiguse kohaselt.
Neither should any of the aid go to finance new investment that is not essential for restoring the firm’s viability.
Abi ei tohiks kasutada ka selliste uute investeeringute rahastamiseks, mis ei ole äriühingu elujõulisuse taastamiseks olulised.
In any event, it must be demonstrated to the Commission that the aid will be used only for the purpose of restoring the firm’s viability and that it will not enable the recipient during the implementation of the restructuring plan to expand production capacity, except in so far as this is essential for restoring viability without unduly distorting competition’.
Komisjonile tuleb igal juhul näidata, et abi kasutatakse üksnes äriühingu elujõulisuse taastamiseks ning et see ei võimalda abisaajal ümberkorraldamiskava rakendamise ajal oma tootmisvõimsust laiendada, välja arvatud selles osas, mis on oluline elujõulisuse taastamiseks ega moonuta lubamatult konkurentsi.”
It is therefore necessary to verify firstly whether the aid is limited to the minimum, and then whether IFB has made an adequate contribution itself.
Seega tuleb esmalt kontrollida, kas abi piirdub miinimumiga ning seejärel seda, kas IFB on andnud küllaldase panuse.
Limitation of aid to a minimum
Miinimumiga piirduv abi
In order to demonstrate that the aid is limited to the strict minimum, the Belgian Government explains that the increase in capital is limited to restoring IFB’s capital stock, which has become negative further to losses recorded in 2001 and 2002, to a level which allows it to recover its economic viability.
Näitamaks, et abi piirdus rangelt miinimumiga, selgitab Belgia valitsus, et kapitali suurendamine piirdus 2001. ja 2002. aastal kantud kahjumi tõttu negatiivseks muutunud IFB aktsiakapitali taastamisega piirini, mis võimaldas taastada majandusliku elujõulisuse.
As explained in section 2 of this decision, IFB’s solvency rate, that is to say the debt-to-equity ratio, will be 35,6 % after the increase in capital.
Nagu on selgitatud käesoleva otsuse punktis 2, on IFB maksejõulisuse määr, see tähendab omakapitali ja kohustuste suhe pärast omakapitali suurendamist 35,6 %.
In its decision initiating the procedure (point 268), the Commission noted that the increase in capital was EUR 20 million less than had been recommended by the consultants McKinsey in the restructuring plan; furthermore, the Commission noted (point 268) that the solvency rate envisaged by IFB was less than that of the terminal companies and also, though to a lesser extent, than that of companies with mixed activities.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses (punkt 268) leidis komisjon, et kapitali suurendati 20 miljoni euro võrra vähem kui nõustaja McKinsey oli ümberkorralduskavas soovitanud, lisaks märkis komisjon (punkt 268), et IFB jaoks soovituslik maksejõulisuse määr oli väiksem kui terminale käitavatel äriühingutel ning samuti ligi pooles ulatuses sellest, mis on mitmel turul tegutsevatel ettevõtetel.
However, it noted that the rate was greater than the average of the rates recorded in the transport companies.
Siiski leidis komisjon, et see määr oli suurem kui veoettevõtjate keskmine.
In view of that, it concluded that it did not have at its disposal sufficient factors to consider definitively that the aid was limited to the strict minimum.
Selles osas leidis komisjon, et tal ei ole piisavalt andmeid, et saaks kindlalt asuda seisukohale, et abi piirdus miinimumiga.