natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Consequently, this absence of reporting entails that the burden of proof falls on Greece: it is for Greece to prove that the Commission would have endorsed the successive prolongations of the period to implement the investment programme.
Järelikult toob aruannete mitteesitamine endaga kaasa selle, et Kreekal tuleb tõendada seda, et komisjon oleks kiitnud heaks investeerimiskava rakendamisperioodi järgmise pikendamise.
As indicated in the description of the business plan in Decision N 401/97, the investment plan was in fact not simply linked to the restructuring; it was itself one of the two pillars of the restructuring because the yard had made no investments in the previous years and needed to replace ‘old and obsolete equipment with new technology’ to restore its competitiveness.
Nagu osutati äriplaani kirjelduses otsuses N 401/97, ei olnud investeerimiskava tegelikult ümberkorraldamisega mitte lihtsalt seotud, vaid oli ümberkorraldamise üks kahest sambast, kuna laevatehas ei teinud eelmistel aastatel mingeid investeeringuid ja pidi „vanad ja iganenud seadmed asendama uute seadmetega”, et taastada oma konkurentsivõime.
In section 2.1 of their letter of 20 October 2004, the Greek authorities confirm that the investment programme aimed at restoring the competitiveness of HSY, by means of better productivity and modernisation, in order to become a competitive firm at the national and international level.
Kreeka ametiasutused kinnitavad 20. oktoobri 2004. aasta kirja punktis 2.1, et investeerimiskava eesmärk oli taastada HSY konkurentsivõime parema tootlikkuse ja ajakohastamise abil, et muuta ettevõte konkurentsivõimeliseks riiklikul ja rahvusvahelisel tasandil.
Greece also confirms that the purpose was to replace outdated and unused equipments by new equipment with modern technology.
Kreeka kinnitab samuti, et eesmärk oli vahetada iganenud ja kasutamata seadmed välja kaasaegse tehnoloogiaga uue varustuse vastu.
In conclusion, from decision N 401/97 itself as well as from Greece’s letters, it appears that the investment programme had a crucial role in the restructuring plan and in the restoration of viability.
Seega, tulenevalt otsusest N 401/97 ja samuti Kreeka kirjadest, selgub, et investeerimiskava mängis otsustavat rolli ümberkorralduskavas ja elujõulisuse taastamisel.
Since it was ‘linked to a restructuring plan’ and crucial for the return to viability, it is obvious that the implementation of the investment programme could not be delayed significantly.
Kuna see oli „seotud ümberkorralduskavaga” ja oluline elujõulisuse taastamisel, on selge, et investeerimiskava rakendamist ei saanud oluliselt edasi lükata.
In fact, its implementation was urgent in order to allow restoration of viability.
Tegelikult oli rakendamine hädavajalik, et võimaldada elujõulisuse taastamist.
In conclusion, the Commission authorised an aid to support an investment programme that had to be implemented in a precise period; it did not authorise an aid to support any investment project carried out in the future.
Järelikult kiitis komisjon heaks abi investeerimiskava toetamiseks, mis oleks tulnud rakendada kindlaksmääratud aja jooksul ning ei kiitnud heaks abi mis tahes investeerimisprojekti toetamiseks, mis viiakse ellu tulevikus.
As regards the precise timing of the implementation of this investment programme, decision N 401/97 did not include the planned calendar.
Kõnealuse investeerimiskava rakendamise täpne ajakava ei olnud otsuse N 401/97 ajakavas ette nähtud.
The Commission concludes that on the basis of decision N 401/97, the investment programme had to be completed at the latest at the end of 2000.
Komisjon järeldab, et otsuse N 401/97 kohaselt oleks investeerimiskava tulnud viia ellu hiljemalt 2000. aasta lõpuks.
From the foregoing, the Commission concludes that respecting the date of 31 December 2000 was important to ensure the success of the restructuring plan.
Eeltoodust lähtuvalt järeldab komisjon, et 31. detsembriks 2000 seatud tähtajast kinnipidamine oli oluline ümberkorralduskava edu tagamiseks.
In addition, any investment implemented significantly after 2000 could not be considered as linked to the restructuring plan which is described in decision N 401/97, as requested by Directive 90/684/EEC.
Lisaks ei saanud pidada mitte ühtki investeeringut, mida rakendati oluliselt hiljem pärast 2000. aastat, ümberkorralduskavaga seotuks, mida on kirjeldatud otsuses N 401/97, nagu see on ette nähtud direktiivis 90/684/EMÜ.
After this analysis of the decision N 401/97, the Commission has to determine whether it would have granted a prolongation of the period to carry out the investments if Greece had requested it and correctly informed the Commission about the delays.
Pärast otsuse N 401/97 analüüsimist peab komisjon otsustama, kas ta oleks andnud pikendust investeeringute rakendamisperioodile, kui Kreeka oleks seda palunud ning teavitanud komisjoni viivitustest nõuetekohaselt.
In September 1999, an earthquake partially damaged the following of the yard’s facilities: walls, roofs, windows, structure of three buildings, tubes, electrical networks, piers, and cranes’ rails.
aasta septembris kahjustas maavärin osaliselt laevatehase järgmisi rajatisi: seinu, katuseid, aknaid, kolme ehitise tarindeid, torusid, elektrivõrke, kaisid ja kraanarööpaid.
Greece claims that the earthquake forced the yard to stop the investment plan and to focus on the repair of these damages.
Kreeka väidab, et maavärin sundis laevatehast investeerimiskava peatama ja keskenduma eelnimetatud kahjustuste likvideerimisele.
The Commission observes that, if it had applied paragraph 52 of the 1999 R & R guidelines, it would not have approved the first prolongation since the restructuring plan approved in 1997 had become clearly insufficient to restore viability in view of the situation prevailing in November 2000 and no other restructuring plan allowing a return to viability was available at that time.
Komisjon märgib, et kui ta oleks kohaldanud 1999. aasta ühenduse suuniste punkti 52, ei oleks ta esimest pikendamist heaks kiitnud, kuna 1997. aastal heaks kiidetud ümberkorralduskava ei olnud enam selgelt piisav elujõulisuse taastamise seisukohast, arvestades 2000. aasta novembris valitsenud olukorda, ning tol hetkel ei eksisteerinud ühtki teist ümberkorralduskava, mis oleks võimaldanud elujõulisuse taastamist.
However, the Commission doubts that it would have applied paragraph 52 of the 1999 R & R guidelines since the aid had not been approved on the basis of these guidelines, since there was no ‘amendment’ of the content of the plan but only a delay of the date to complete the investments, and since there were not clear provisions regarding the modification of the date for completing the investments in decision N 401/97 and in Directive 90/684/EEC.
Siiski kahtleb komisjon selles, kas ta oleks kohaldanud 1999. aasta ühenduse suuniste punkti 52, kuna abi ei olnud nende suuniste alusel heaks kiidetud, kuivõrd kava olemust ei „muudetud”. Edasi lükkus vaid investeeringute rakendamise kuupäev ning lisaks puudusid otsuses N 401/97 ja direktiivis 90/684/EMÜ selged sätted investeeringute rakendamise kuupäeva muutmise kohta.
In addition, since a severe earthquake is an event beyond responsibility of the yard and of the Greek authorities, which is exceptional and not related to the economy and the business, the Commission would have probably considered that it can justify some months of delay.
Tugev maavärin on sündmus, mis ei kuulu laevatehase ja Kreeka ametiasutuste vastutusalasse, see on erandlik ega ole seotud majanduse ja ettevõtlusega, oleks komisjon tõenäoliselt olnud seisukohal, et maavärin võib õigustada mõne kuu pikkust viivitust.
In addition, the implementation of an investment plan is something difficult, which may necessitate some additional months.
Lisaks on investeerimiskava rakendamine keeruline, mille puhul võivad osutuda vajalikuks täiendavad kuud.
Consequently, even if one year is a long delay, it is reasonable to consider that the Commission might have accepted the prolongation.
Vaatamata sellele, et üks aasta on juba pikk viivitus, on mõistlik asuda seisukohale, et komisjon oleks võinud pikendamise heaks kiita.
Regarding the second prolongation granted by the Greek authorities, Greece and HSY justified it by the privatisation of the yard during which the investment plan was frozen.
Kreeka ametiasutuste antud teist pikendamist põhjendasid Kreeka ja HSY laevatehase erastamisega, mille ajal investeerimiskava külmutati.
In other words, the delay in the implementation of the investment programme resulted from a conscious decision to suspend the implementation.
Teisisõnu tulenes viivitus investeerimiskava rakendamisel teadlikust otsusest lükata rakendamine edasi.
The Commission can certainly not authorise a prolongation of the period to implement the investment programme when it was consciously decided to stop the implementation during several quarters of a year.
Komisjon ei saa investeerimiskava rakendamisperioodi pikendamist kindlasti heaks kiita, kui otsus peatada rakendamine mitmeks kvartaliks võeti vastu teadlikult.
As concluded previously, the respect of the calendar set for the implementation of the restructuring plan was crucial.
Nagu järeldati eespool, oli ümberkorralduskava rakendamiseks sätestatud ajakava järgimine väga oluline.
The Commission has authorised aid to support a precise restructuring plan implemented at a precise moment.
Komisjon kiitis heaks abi konkreetse ümberkorralduskava rakendamise toetamiseks konkreetsel hetkel.
Moreover, significant restructuring measures were implemented in 2001–2002, which were new and not included in the restructuring plan described in decision N 401/97 (for instance, an additional reduction of the workforce).
Lisaks rakendati perioodil 2001–2002 olulisi ümberkorraldusmeetmeid, mis olid uued ja mida ei olnud hõlmatud otsuses N 401/97 kirjeldatud ümberkorralduskavas (näiteks tööjõu täiendav vähendamine).
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Commission considers that it would not have endorsed a prolongation of the investment period after 31 December 2001.
Ülalmainitud kaalutlusi arvesse võttes on komisjon seisukohal, et ta ei oleks investeerimisperioodi pikendamist pärast 31. detsembrit 2001 heaks kiitnud.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that any aid supporting investment expenses incurred after 31 December 2001 fall outside the scope of decision N 401/97.
Seega on komisjon seisukohal, et mis tahes abi investeerimiskulude toetamiseks, mis tekkisid pärast 31. detsembrit 2001, jääb välja otsuse N 401/97 reguleerimisalast.
Therefore, any aid granted to the firm, and especially aid supporting the modernisation of obsolete equipment, should have been considered as restructuring aid.
Seega oleks saanud ümberkorraldusabiks pidada firmale antud mis tahes abi, eriti iganenud seadmete ajakohastamiseks antud abi.
Paragraph 48 of the 1999 R & R guidelines allows an exemption from the ‘one time, last time’ condition in ‘exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances’.
aasta ühenduse suuniste punkti 48 kohaselt tohib ühekordse abi põhimõttest teha erandit „erandlikel ja ettenägematutel tingimustel”.
Greece claims that the ‘one time, last time’ condition would not be breached since the aid would take place in the adaptation of an existing restructuring plan.
Kreeka väidab, et ühekordse abi põhimõtet ei rikuta, kuna abi antakse osana olemasoleva ümberkorralduskava kohandamisest.
As has been extensively explained, the Commission considers that the investment implemented after 31 December 2001 are not part of the investment programme described in decision N 401/97.
Nagu laialdaselt selgitatud, on komisjon seisukohal, et pärast 31. detsembrit 2001 rakendatud investeeringud ei ole otsuses N 401/97 kirjeldatud investeerimiskava osa.
In addition, paragraph 52 of the 1999 R & R guidelines indicates that ‘the revised plan must still show a return to viability within a reasonable timescale’.
Lisaks osutatakse 1999. aasta ühenduse suuniste punktis 52 sellele, et „läbivaadatud kava peab sisaldama elujõulise saavutamist mõistliku aja jooksul”.
Finally, the Commission observes that accepting such a long prolongation of the restructuring period would be similar to a circumvention of the ‘one time, last time’ condition.
Lõpuks märgib komisjon, et ümberkorraldusperioodi sellise pikendamise heakskiitmist võiks võrrelda ühekordse abi põhimõttest kõrvalehiilimisega.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that aid in favour of the investment expenses incurred until 31 December 2001 and related to the investment programme described in decision N 401/97 can be considered to be covered by decision N 401/97.
Seega on komisjon seisukohal, et pärast 31. detsembrit 2001 tekkinud investeerimiskulude toetuseks antud ja otsuses N 401/97 kirjeldatud investeerimiskavaga seotud abi saab pidada hõlmatuks otsusega N 401/97.
Any other aid does not fall within the scope of decision N 401/97.
Mis tahes muu abi ei kuulu otsuse N 401/97 reguleerimisalasse.
In addition, any other aid in favour of the other investment expenses that have been incurred by HSY is incompatible with the common market.
Lisaks on ühisturuga kokkusobimatu mis tahes muu abi, mis on antud HSY-le sellele tekkinud investeerimiskulude toetuseks.
Since Greece has indicated that the investment aid has not been paid out to HSY yet, no aid has to be recovered from HSY.
Kuna Kreeka osutas sellele, et investeerimisabi ei ole HSY-le siiani välja makstud, ei pea HSY abi tagasi maksma.
GRD 4,67 billion (EUR 13,72 million) loan granted in 1999 and covered by a State guarantee (measure P2)
aastal antud 4,67 miljardi Kreeka drahmi (13,72 miljoni euro) suurune laen, mis oli kaetud riigi garantiiga (meede P2)
Greece indicates that this 8-year loan amounting to GRD 4,67 billion (EUR 13,72 million) was granted by ETVA to finance the investment programme.
Kreeka osutab sellele, et kõnealuse kaheksa aasta pikkuse laenu summas 4,67 miljardit Kreeka drahmi (13,72 miljonit eurot) andis ETVA investeerimiskava rahastamiseks.
By decision of 8 December 1999, the government granted a guarantee and charged an annual guarantee fee of 100 basis points.
detsembri 1999. aasta otsusega andis valitsus garantii ning nõudis aastast garantiilõivu (100 baaspunkti).
On 31 May 2002, the State guarantee and the loan were prolonged until 30 June 2009 and the interest rate increased by 100 basis points.
mail 2002 pikendati riigi garantiid ja laenu kuni 30. juunini 2009 ning intressimäär tõusis 100 baaspunkti võrra.
The reimbursement of the capital started with a first payment in December 2003.
Kapitali tagasimaksmine algas esimese maksega 2003. aasta detsembris.
The opening decision indicates that the State guarantee could constitute State aid, the compatibility of which is doubtful.
Algatamisotsuses osutatakse sellele, et riigi garantii puhul võib tegemist olla riigiabiga, mille kokkusobivus on kaheldav.
In addition, leaving aside the qualification of aid or not, decision N 401/97 indicated that, in order to finance the investment programme, bank loans would be raised at normal market conditions without State guarantees.
Jättes kõrvale selle, kas meede kvalifitseerub abina või mitte, osutatakse otsuses N 401/97 sellele, et investeerimiskava rahastamiseks oleks pangalaenu antud tavapärastel turutingimustel ilma riigi garantiita.
It seems therefore that State guarantees were per se prohibited by decision N 401/97.
Seetõttu näib, et riigi garantiid olid otsusega N 401/97 juba iseenesest keelatud.
Elefsis made the following comments concerning measures P2, P3 and P4.
Elefsis esitas meetmete P2, P3 ja P4 kohta järgmised märkused.
It recalls that decision N 401/97 required that the bank loans financing HSY will be obtained on normal market terms without State guarantees.
Ta tuletab meelde, et otsuses N 401/97 on ette nähtud, et pangalaenu ettevõtja HSY rahastamiseks tuleb anda tavapärastel turutingimustel ilma riigi garantiideta.
It can be shown that all three loans were given upon a non-arm’s length basis.
On võimalik tõestada, et kõik kolm laenu anti mitteärilistel tingimustel.
First, these loans were granted from the end of 1999 onwards, when HSY’s financial situation was catastrophic and raised the risk of the revocation of the company’s operating licence.
Esiteks anti laenu pärast 1999. aasta lõppu, kui HSY finantsolukord oli katastroofiline ja esines ettevõtja tegevusloa tühistamise risk.
Second, the loans were granted at a time when it was clear that HSY had failed to implement its restructuring/investment plan and had failed to respect the terms of decision N 401/97.
Teiseks anti laenu ajal, kui oli selge, et ettevõtja HSY ei ole suutnud ümberkorraldus-/investeerimiskava ellu viia ega ole täitnud otsuse N 401/97 tingimusi.
Third, given its catastrophic financial situation and the lack of arm’s length security, HSY would not have been able to raise these loans from the private sector.
Kolmandaks, võttes arvesse ettevõtja katastroofilist finantsolukorda ja kindlustunde puudumist, ei oleks HSY saanud laenu erasektorist.
The Greek authorities (as well as HSY) claim that the State guarantee does not constitute State aid and was offered at normal market conditions.
Kreeka ametiasutused (samuti HSY) väidavad, et riigi garantiide puhul ei ole tegemist riigiabiga ning seda pakuti tavapärastel turutingimustel.
They base their analysis on the following elements:
Nende analüüs põhineb järgmistel elementidel:
the yard could have concluded a similar loan with any other bank by offering other types of securities than a State guarantee.
laevatehas oleks võinud sõlmida sarnase laenulepingu mis tahes muu pangaga, pakkudes teist tüüpi tagatisi kui riigi garantiid.
In particular, the company could have offered as securities some claims related to large contracts or some mortgages on its assets,
Ettevõtja oleks saanud pakkuda tagatisi, mis on seotud suurte lepingute või mõnede varade hüpoteegiga;
the annual guarantee fee of 1 % is the market rate.
aastane garantiilõiv on 1 % turuhinnast.
In addition, it is not selective since the Greek State granted several guarantees during that period and in some cases the fee charged by the State was much smaller,
Lisaks ei ole see valikuline, kuna Kreeka riik andis mitmeid garantiisid kõnealusel perioodil ning mõnedel juhtudel oli riigi nõutud lõiv palju väiksem;
even if the Commission should consider that the guarantee fee was below the market rate, the State nevertheless acted as a market economy investor since it was shareholder of HSY (through ETVA) and would benefit from the return to profitability following from the implementation of the investment plan,
isegi kui komisjon peaks asuma seisukohale, et garantiilõiv oli turuhinnast väiksem, käitus riik siiski turumajandusliku investorina, kuna oli HSY aktsionär (ETVA kaudu) ning oleks saanud kasu kasumlikkuse taastumisest investeerimiskava rakendamise järel;
the fact that the loan aimed at financing an investment plan which had been approved by the Commission should have constituted a sufficiently solid ground for the lending bank and the guarantor to expect that HSY would be able to reimburse the loan,
asjaolu, et laenu eesmärk oli rahastada investeerimiskava, mille komisjon oli heaks kiitnud, oleks olnud piisavalt kindel põhjus laenu andvale pangale ja garandile eeldamaks, et HSY suudab laenu tagasi maksta;
the loan is regularly reimbursed and the guarantee fee paid.
laenu on tagasi makstud korrapäraselt ja garantiilõiv makstud.
Before undertaking an assessment of the compatibility under Article 87 of the Treaty, the applicability of Article 296 of the Treaty needs to be considered.
Enne kokkusobivuse hindamist asutamislepingu artikli 87 kohaselt tuleb kaaluda asutamislepingu artikli 296 kohaldatavust.
The Commission notes that on the basis of the granting decision, HSY was obliged to use the guaranteed loan as well as the two others loans covered by the opening decision (i.e. measures P3 and P4) for the financing of the investment programme.
Komisjon märgib, et abi andmise otsuse kohaselt oli HSY kohustatud kasutama investeerimiskava rahastamiseks garanteeritud laenu, samuti kahte teist laenu, mis olid hõlmatud algatamisotsusega (st meetmeid P3 ja P4).
As concluded in the assessment of measure P1, the investment programme does not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Nagu järeldati meetme P1 hindamisel, ei kuulu investeerimiskava asutamislepingu artikli 296 reguleerimisalasse.
The Commission therefore considers that these three loans earmarked for the financing of the investment programme are subject to State aid rules and are not covered by Article 296 of the Treaty.
Komisjon on seetõttu seisukohal, et nimetatud kolme laenu suhtes, mis eraldati investeerimiskava rahastamiseks, saab kohaldada riigiabi eeskirju ning need ei ole hõlmatud asutamislepingu artikliga 296.
It first needs to be verified whether the State guarantee fulfils the conditions to be State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Kõigepealt tuleb kontrollida, kas riigi garantii vastab riigiabi tingimustele asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses.
Greece did not contest that application.
Kreeka ei vaidlustanud kõnealust kohaldamist.
Conversely, Greece also applied it to assess measure P2.
Vastupidi, Kreeka kohaldas seda samuti meetme P2 hindamisel.
First, in order to fall under Article 87(1), a measure must involve State resources.
Esiteks peab meede sisaldama riigi ressursse, et seda saaks käsitleda artikli 87 lõike 1 kohaselt.
This is the case for measure P2 since, by granting this guarantee, the State put State resources at risk.
See peab paika meetme P2 puhul, kuna kõnealuse garantii andmisega seadis riik oma ressursid ohtu.
Second, it needs to be established whether the measure is selective.
Teiseks tuleb kindlaks teha, kas meede oli valikuline või mitte.
Greece claims that the State has granted several guarantees to other firms and charged also a premium of 1 %.
Kreeka väidab, et riik andis teistele firmadele mitmeid garantiisid ning nõudis samuti 1 % suurust tasu.
Greece provided a list of these firms.
Kreeka esitas nende firmade nimekirja.
The Commission considers that this fact does not show that the measure was a general measure.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et kõnealune asjaolu ei tõesta, et meede oli üldist laadi.
The present measure can therefore not be considered to be a general one.
Seega ei saa käesolevat meedet pidada üldiseks.
In particular, it is not because certain firms have received a State guarantee that all the firms could receive one.
See, et teatavad firmad said riigilt garantii, ei tähenda, et kõik firmad võiksid seda saada.
Greece has not shown that the granting of a State guarantee is open to all economic agents on an equal access basis.
Kreeka ei ole tõestanud, et riigi garantii andmine on võrdselt kättesaadav kõigile majandustegevuses osalejatele.
In addition, all the firms that appear in the list provided by Greece are State-owned firms or firms carrying out some military activities.
Lisaks on kõik firmad Kreeka esitatud nimekirjas riigile kuuluvad firmad või firmad, mis teostavad mõnda sõjalist tegevust.
It seems therefore that private firms could not have received such a guarantee for the financing of their normal activities.
Seega näib, et erafirmad ei oleks sellist garantiid oma tavapärase tegevuse rahastamiseks saanud.
In fact, Greece does not indicate the legal basis on the basis of which the Minister of Finance decided on 8 December 1999 to grant the guarantee.
Tegelikult ei osuta Kreeka õiguslikule alusele, mille alusel rahandusminister otsustas 8. detsembril 1999. aastal garantii anda.
It is likely that it is Law 2322/1995, which is a selective measure as it will be explained in the assessment of measure E12b.
Tõenäoliselt on selleks seadus nr 2322/1995, mis on valikuline meede, nagu selgitatakse meetme E12b hindamisel.
Third, the existence of an advantage must be demonstrated.
Kolmandaks tuleb tõestada eelise olemasolu.
In accordance with point 2.2.2 of the Notice on guarantees, since the guarantee was granted before the granting of the loan and not ‘ex post’, there is no presumption of aid to the lender.
Vastavalt garantiide teatise punktile 2.2.2 ei eeldanud laenuandja abi olemasolu, sest garantii anti enne laenu andmist ja mitte pärast seda.