natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
With the transfer of silent partnership assets, the Land of Hessen opted for a form of contribution of resources based on the concept of transferring public aid resources to Helaba in order to strengthen its equity-capital base, but also of achieving additional income for the Land of Hessen.
Vaikiva seltsingu varade loovutamisega valis Hesseni liidumaa ressursside panustamise vormi, mille aluseks on riigiabi ressursside loovutamine Helabale, et tugevdada tema omakapitali baasi, kuid tuua ka Hesseni liidumaale täiendavaid sissetulekuid.
In spite of the fact that the returns from these claims were still available for promotion-related assets and hence served a public-benefit purpose, the assets were recognised by the supervisory authority and could therefore be used to provide cover for the liabilities of Helaba, which was in competition with other credit institutions.
Hoolimata faktist, et nendest nõuetest laekunud sissetulekud olid edendamisega seotud varade jaoks veel saadaval ja seega teenisid üldsuse huve, tunnustas varasid järelevalveasutus ning neid ei saanud seega kasutada teiste krediidiasutustega konkureeriva Helaba kohustuste katteks.
State resources therefore were transferred to Helaba.
Seega kanti Helabale üle riigi vahendeid.
FAVOURING OF A PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING
KONKREETSE ETTEVÕTJA SOOSIMINE
In order to verify whether the transfer of state resources to a publicly-owned undertaking favours the latter and is therefore liable to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission applies the ‘market-economy investor principle’.
Et teha kindlaks, kas riigivarade ülekandmine riigi omandis olevale ettevõttele soosib viimast ning viitab sellele, et tegemist on riigiabiga EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses, kohaldab komisjon “turumajandusliku investori põhimõtet”.
This principle was accepted and developed by the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in a number of cases, in particular by the WestLB judgment, in a context which is relevant to the present case.
Euroopa Kohus ja esimese astme kohus aktsepteerisid ja laiendasid seda põhimõtet arvukatel juhtudel, eriti WestLB kohtuotsusega kontekstis, mis sarnaneb käesolevale juhtumile.
Market-economy investor principle
Turumajandusliku investeerimise põhimõte
According to this principle, no state aid is involved where funds are made available on ‘terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market-economy conditions’.
Selle põhimõtte kohaselt ei ole tegemist riigiabiga, kui vahendid tehakse kättesaadavaks “tingimustel, mis oleksid vastuvõetavad erainvestorile vahendite andmisel võrreldavale eraettevõttele, kui erainvestor tegutseb normaalsetes turumajanduslikes tingimustes”.
In contrast, the undertaking is being favoured within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty if the proposed remuneration arrangement and/or the financial position of the undertaking is such that a normal return on investment cannot be expected within a reasonable period of time.
Vastupidiselt sellele eelistatakse ettevõtet EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses juhul, kui väljapakutud tasustamisskeem ja/või ettevõtte finantspositsioon on niisugused, et investeeringu tavatasu ei ole mõistliku aja jooksul oodata.
The market-economy investor principle is applicable in the same way to all public enterprises, whether profitable or loss-making.
Turumajandusliku investori põhimõtet saab samal viisil kohaldada kõigi avalik-õiguslike ettevõtete suhtes olenemata sellest, kas need toodavad kasumit või kahjumit.
The Commission's view here was upheld by the Court of First Instance in WestLB.
Esimese astme kohus toetas WestLB kohtuasjas komisjoni siinset seisukohta.
It follows that the key question in examining this case is whether a market-economy investor would have transferred to Helaba capital that had the same characteristics as the Land of Hessen's promotion-related assets and under the same conditions, especially in view of the probable return on the investment.
Sellest tulenevalt on käesoleva juhtumi uurimisel võtmeküsimuseks see, kas turumajanduslik investor oleks samadel tingimustel Helabale üle kandnud kapitali, millel olid samasugused omadused kui Hesseni liidumaa edendamisega seotud varadel, iseäranis investeeringu oodatavat tulu arvestades.
Legal and economic classification of the capital contributed
Paigutatud kapitali juriidiline ja majanduslik liigitus
The Land of Hessen contributed to Helaba up to 31 December 1998 as silent partnership reserves promotion-related assets with a nominal loan portfolio for the Land share of DEM 6,026 billion (EUR 3,081 billion) and a cash value assessed on the basis of an expert evaluation of DEM 2,473 billion (EUR 1,264 billion).
Hesseni liidumaa andis Helabale kuni 31. detsembrini 1998 vaikiva seltsingu reservide kujul edendamisega soetud varasid nominaalse laenuportfelliga, milles liidumaa osa oli 6,026 miljardit DEM (3,081 miljardit eurot) ja mille rahaline väärtus eksperthinnangu alusel oli 2,473 miljardit DEM (1,264 miljardit eurot).
BAKred recognised these, as stated above, in full as basic own funds for supervisory purposes.
BAKred tunnustas neid, nagu eespool märgitud, järelevalve teostamisel tervikuna elementaarsete omavahenditena.
They were to only a small extent required, on the basis of an amount which varied from year to year, to underpin promotion operations.
Need olid aastast aastasse varieeruva summa alusel vaid vähesel määral vajalikud edendamistegevuse toetamiseks.
This part of the silent partnership reserves shown in the balance sheet served only a guarantee function for Helaba.
See osa bilansis kajastatud vaikiva seltsingu reservidest täitis Helaba jaoks üksnes garantiifunktsiooni.
Most of the remainder was available to Helaba to underpin and expand its competitive business.
Enamik ülejäänust oli Helabale kättesaadav oma konkurentsivõimelise äritegevuse toetamiseks ja laiendamiseks.
As in the WestLB case the Commission has determined the appropriate remuneration for the transferred promotion-related assets in the light of their commercial usefulness for Helaba.
Nagu WestLB juhtumil, on komisjon määranud asjakohase tasu loovutatud edendamisega seotud varade eest, pidades silmas nende kaubanduslikku otstarbekust Helaba seisukohast.
As explained above, the starting point for determining the normal market remuneration is primarily the remuneration that would be demanded by a market-economy investor providing a bank with equity capital.
Nagu eespool selgitatud, on turul tavalise tasu määramise lähtepunktiks eeskätt tasu, mida nõuaks panka omakapitaliga varustav turumajanduslik investor.
The complainant argues that the capital made available to Helaba is, as in the case of the transfer of the WfA assets to WestLB, an investment similar to share capital.
Kaebuse esitaja väidab, et Helaba käsutusse antud kapital on, nagu ka WfA varade WestLB'le ülekandmise puhul, aktsiakapitalile sarnanev investeering.
Germany disputes its similarity with share capital.
Saksamaa vaidlustab selle sarnasuse aktsiakapitalile.
It argues, rather, that the capital is a silent partnership, which affects the level of the remuneration.
Ta väidab pigem, et kapital on vaikiv seltsing, mis mõjutab tasu määra.
Germany, Helaba and the complainant agree that the promotion-related assets comprised in the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen constitute core capital.
Saksamaa, Helaba ja kaebuse esitaja nõustuvad, et Hesseni liidumaa vaikivasse seltsingusse kuuluvad edendamisega seotud varad moodustavad tuumkapitali.
The special-purpose reserve was recognised by BAKred as core capital (‘tier 1 capital’) and could therefore only be compared with equity instruments that were recognised as core capital in Germany in the year of the transfer and that were available to Helaba at the time of contribution specifically for an investment of this order of magnitude, which made up significantly more than 15 % of the core capital.
BAKred tunnustas eriotstarbelist reservi esmaste omavahenditena (“esimese taseme kapitalina”) ning seda saab seetõttu võrrelda ainult omakapitali instrumentidega, mida tunnustati Saksamaal omakapitalina ülekande toimumise aastal ning mis olid Helabale kättesaadavad panuse tegemise ajal just sellise suurusjärgu investeeringu tarbeks, mis moodustas märgatavalt üle 15 % tuumkapitalist.
The Commission agrees with the parties on this point.
Komisjon nõustub selles punktis osapooltega.
It already made clear in its WestLB decision of 1999 that a comparison between the Wfa assets, which were also recognised as core capital, and equity instruments that were recognised only as additional capital, such as profit participation certificates and non-voting preference shares, cannot serve as a basis for determining the appropriate remuneration for the transferred capital (Decision 2000/392/EC, paragraph 199).
Ta tegi juba oma 1999. aasta WestLB otsuses selgeks, et võrdlus Wfa varade, mida tunnustati ka tuumkapitalina, ja aktsiate vahel, mida tunnustati üksnes lisakapitalina, nagu kasumiosalussertifikaadid ja hääleõiguseta eelisaktsiad, ei saa olla aluseks ülekantud kapitali eest antava asjakohase tasu kindlaksmääramisel (otsus 2000/392/EÜ, lõige 199).
Core capital is of much greater use to an undertaking because it can be used to raise additional own funds (such as profit participation certificates) up to the same amount in order to increase the bank's own funds.
Tuumkapital on ettevõttele märksa otstarbekam, kuna seda saab kasutada täiendavate omavahendite loomiseks (näiteks kasumiosalussertifikaadid) sama summa ulatuses, et suurendada panga omavahendeid.
For the capital provided to be recognised as basic own funds, there must be greater exposure to risk, which as a general rule is also reflected in a higher market remuneration for such instruments.
Antud kapitali puhul, mida tunnustatakse algsete omavahenditena, eksisteerib suurem riskioht, mis reeglina väljendub kõrgema turutasuna niisuguste vahendite eest.
Any point of comparison with ‘additional funds’ that offer only limited scope for use in business expansion can therefore be ruled out from the outset.
Igasuguse võrdlusaluse “täiendavate vahenditega”, mis pakuvad tegevuse laiendamisel kasutamiseks vaid piiratud võimalusi, saab seega kohe välistada.
In the view of the BdB, however, the only legal form properly available to Helaba for this specific investment was that of share capital.
BdB arvates on ainuke Helabale selle konkreetse investeeringu tegemiseks nõuetekohaselt kättesaadav juriidiline vorm aktsiakapital.
In the view of Germany, another legal form available was that of a silent partnership contribution of unlimited duration (perpetual), which met the requirements of Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act (KWG) and at the same time the criteria of the ‘Sydney Declaration’ of the Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, which in turn guided the decisions taken by the German banking supervisory authority BAKred.
Saksamaa arvates oli teine võimalik juriidiline vorm piiramatu tähtajaga vaikiva seltsingu panus (tähtajatu), mis vastas Saksamaa pangandusseaduse (KWG) paragrahvi 10 lõikele 4 ja samal ajal Baseli Rahvusvaheliste Arvelduste Panga Pangajärelevalve Komitee “Sydney deklaratsiooni” kriteeriumidele, mis omakorda suunasid Saksamaa pangandusjärelevalveasutuse BAKred otsuseid.
The subject of the agreement between the Land of Hessen and Helaba was, therefore, the legal form of a silent partnership contribution of unlimited duration, which was recognised as such both by the competent banking supervisory authority BAKred and also by the competent tax authority.
Hesseni liidumaa ja Helaba vahelise lepingu objektiks oli seega tähtajatu vaikiva seltsingu panuse juriidiline vorm, mida tunnustasid sellisena nii pädev pangandusjärelevalveasutus BAKred kui ka pädev maksuasutus.
In the Commission's view, Germany has demonstrated sufficiently that the BdB's argument will not stand up.
Komisjoni arvates on Saksamaa piisavalt tõendanud, et BdB argument ei pea paika.
The BdB argues that the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen represented a formal abuse of a ‘normal’ silent partnership.
BdB väidab, et Hesseni liidumaa vaikiv seltsing kujutab endast “normaalse” vaikiva seltsingu formaalset kuritarvitamist.
In economic terms, the silent partnership contribution had so many points in common with share capital that an investor would have insisted on the payment of interest corresponding to the remuneration of share capital.
Majanduslikus mõttes oli vaikiva seltsingu panusel aktsiakapitaliga nii palju ühisjooni, et investor oleks nõudnud aktsiakapitali tasule vastava intressi maksmist.
The Commission notes firstly that the silent partnership contribution was expressly agreed as such between the Land of Hessen and Helaba and accepted as such by the competent German authorities.
Komisjon märgib esiteks, et Hesseni liidumaa ja Helaba leppisid selgesõnaliselt kokku vaikiva seltsingu panuse kui sellise asjus ning Saksamaa pädevad asutused aktsepteerisid seda niisugusel kujul.
In order to be able to assume that there was an abuse of form, it would have to be beyond question that the competent German authority wrongly recognised the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen as such.
Et saaks eeldada vormi kuritarvitamist, ei peaks olema kahtlust selles, et Saksamaa pädev asutus tunnustas Hesseni liidumaa vaikivat seltsingut niisugusena valedel alustel.
However, there is no evidence of this.
Selle kohta puuduvad siiski tõendid.
The Commission agrees here with Germany's view that the limited duration or withdrawability of a silent partnership contribution is, neither from the company law nor banking supervision points of view, a necessary characteristic feature for the recognition of a silent partnership as core capital pursuant to Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act.
Komisjon nõustub siin Saksamaa seisukohaga, et vaikiva seltsingu panuse piiratud tähtaeg või tagasivõtmise võimalus pole ei äriühinguõiguse ega pangandusjärelevalve vaatenurgast vajalik omadus vaikiva seltsingu panuse tunnustamiseks tuumkapitalina vastavalt Saksamaa pangandusseaduse paragrahvi 10 lõikele 4.
Furthermore, the Commission interprets the ‘Sydney Declaration’ of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of October 1998 as imposing a 15 % limit only for the recognition of certain innovative capital instruments, particularly those limited in time, as core capital.
Pealegi kehtestab Baseli Pangajärelevalve Komitee 1998. aasta oktoobri “Sydney deklaratsioon” komisjoni tõlgenduse kohaselt 15 % limiidi üksnes teatavate innovatiivsete, eriti ajaliselt piiratud kapitaliinstrumentide tunnustamiseks tuumkapitalina.
However, the converse conclusion may not be drawn that permanent innovative capital instruments may not at all be recognised as core capital or are also covered by this limit.
Samas ei saa teha vastupidist järeldust, et püsivaid innovatiivseid kapitaliinstrumente ei või üleüldse tunnustada tuumkapitalina või et need on samuti selle limiidiga hõlmatud.
Moreover, the usefulness of permanent innovative capital instruments as core capital above the 15 % limit is testified to by the practice of private banks as well in recent years, as was amply demonstrated by Germany.
Pealegi kinnitab ka erapankade viimaste aastate praktika püsivate innovatiivsete kapitaliinstrumentide otstarbekust tuumkapitalina ülalpool 15 % limiiti, mille kohta Saksamaa tõi ohtralt näiteid.
Nor does the Commission regard the selective criteria adduced by the BdB as sufficiently convincing.
Samuti ei pea komisjon BdB poolt lähendatud valikulisi kriteeriumeid piisavalt veenvateks.
From the risk analysis point of view, the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen is more similar in type to a ‘normal’ silent partnership than to share capital.
Riskianalüüsi vaatenurgast sarnaneb Hesseni liidumaa vaikiv seltsing tüübilt pigem “normaalse” vaikiva seltsinguga kui aktsiakapitaliga.
The Commission agrees with Germany's comments here too.
Komisjon nõustub ka siinkohal Saksamaa märkustega.
For the Commission, it is crucial in this context that both the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen and other ‘normal’, i.e. time-limited silent partnerships taken up on the capital market must in insolvency proceedings be paid back before share capital and that the investor thus gets the recovery percentage, whereas in the case of a share capital investment he gets nothing.
Komisjoni jaoks on selles kontekstis otsustava tähtsusega, et nii Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panus kui ka teised kapitaliturul omandatud “normaalsed”, st ajaliselt piiratud seltsingud tuleb maksejõuetuse menetlustes tagasi maksta enne aktsiakapitali ja et investor saab seega tagasi teatava protsendi, samas kui aktsiakapitali investeeringu puhul ei saa ta midagi.
Germany submitted a legal opinion demonstrating that, under the contractual provisions, the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen will, in the event of solvency or liquidation, in so far as it has not been reduced or used up by losses, be met on a prior-ranking basis before share capital from any remaining assets.
Saksamaa esitas juriidilise seisukoha, millest nähtus, et lepingusätete alusel rahuldatakse Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panusega seotud nõue maksejõuetuse või likvideerimise korral, kuivõrd see ei ole kahjumiga seoses vähenenud või ammendunud, eelisjärjekorras võimalike ülejäänud varade arvel enne aktsiakapitali.
Furthermore, so long as the undertaking is not making a loss, both the Land of Hessen and the investor of a time-limited silent partnership get the entire agreed remuneration, whereas the investor in share capital can claim only payment of a dividend that is in proportion to profits.
Seni kui ettevõte ei tooda kahjumit, saavad nii Hesseni liidumaa kui ka ajaliselt piiratud vaikiva seltsingu panuse teinud investor kätte kogu kokkulepitud tasu, samas kui aktsiakapitali investeerinud investor saab nõuda üksnes kasumiga proportsionaalse dividendi maksmist.
In this respect too, the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen is a typical silent partnership contribution within the meaning of Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act.
Ka selles suhtes on Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panus tüüpiline vaikiva seltsingu panus Saksamaa pangandusseaduse paragrahvi 10 lõike 4 tähenduses.
Nor is the BdB's objection convincing that the silent partnership was equivalent to share capital because in the long term it had resulted in an increase of almost 50 % in Helaba's core capital.
Samuti ei ole veenev BdB vastuväide, et vaikiv seltsing on samaväärne aktsiakapitaliga, kuna pikemas perspektiivis oli selle tagajärjeks Helaba tuumkapitali ligi 50 % kasv.
Account should be taken here firstly of the phased arrangement which the Land of Hessen and Helaba had agreed and under which, in the period from 1999 to 2002, in line with its actual capital requirement, Helaba could use only an annual increasing partial amount of the usable core capital to actually cover core business.
Siin tuleb esiteks arvesse võtta Hesseni liidumaa ja Helaba vahel kokku lepitud etapiviisilist skeemi, mille alusel sai Helaba ajavahemikul 1999–2002 kasutatavast tuumkapitalist vastavalt oma tegelikule kapitalivajadusele kasutada põhilise äritegevuse katteks üksnes igal aastal kasvavat osalist summat.
Furthermore, the Commission would in this context draw explicit attention to the fact that, in the WestLB case too, the large volume of the capital injection is merely an indicator, but not on its own decisive in assuming similarity to share capital.
Peale selle juhiks komisjon antud kontekstis selgesõnaliselt tähelepanu tõsiasjale, et WestLB juhtumi puhul on samuti kapitalipaigutuse suur maht pelgalt indikaator, eraldi võetuna aga ei oma see aktsiakapitaliga sarnasuse eeldamisel otsustavat tähtsust.
In the WestLB decision, the Commission concluded, on the basis of an overall assessment, that the similarity of the transaction being examined to a share capital investment was predominant.
WestLB otsuses järeldas komisjon üldisele hinnangule tuginedes, et uuritava tehingu sarnasus investeeringuga aktsiakapitali on valdav.
An essential consideration in this respect was, for example, the fact that the WfA assets had, like share capital, been exposed to the full risk of loss in the event of solvency or liquidation.
Seoses sellega vajas tingimata arvesse võtmist näiteks asjaolu, et WfA varasid, nagu aktsiakapitaligi, ohustas täielik kahjumirisk maksejõuetuse või likvideerimise korral.
Furthermore, in the WestLB case, the Commission also took account of the fact that, at the time of the transfer of the WfA assets in 1991 — in contrast to the time of the transfer of the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen to Helaba in 1998 — there was not yet a developed market for hybrid core capital instruments in Germany and a credit institution such as WestLB could have taken up a comparable core capital volume on the market only in the form of share capital.
Lisaks võttis komisjon WestLB juhtumi puhul arvesse asjaolu, et WfA varade ülemineku ajal 1991. aastal – vastupidiselt Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panuse Helabale ülekandmisele 1998. aastal – polnud hübriidsete tuumkapitali instrumentide turg Saksamaal veel välja kujunenud ja WestLB-sugune krediidiasutus oleks võinud omandada võrreldava mahuga tuumkapitali turul üksnes aktsiakapitali kujul.
In the current case, Helaba could also easily have covered its estimated capital requirement in the period from 1998 to 2002 on the market by taking up, at intervals, several smaller silent partnership contributions from a number of different institutional investors.
Käesoleval juhul saanuks Helaba samuti hõlpsalt katta turul oma kapitalivajaduse ajavahemikul 1998-2002, omandades teatavate ajavahemike järel erinevatelt institutsioonilistelt investoritelt mitu väiksemat vaikiva seltsingu panust.
The BdB also points out that, with the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen, Helaba's share capital buffer was only 50 %, whereas, in the case of private credit institutions, the share of hybrid instruments in core capital is below 20 % and hence the share capital buffer amounts to more than 80 %.
BdB juhib tähelepanu ka sellele, et Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panusega oli Helaba aktsiakapitali puhver vaid 50 %, samas kui eraõiguslike krediidiasutuste puhul on hübriidsete instrumentide osakaal tuumkapitalis alla 20 % ja seega ulatub aktsiakapitali puhver enam kui 80 %ni.
An institutional investor would, according to the BdB, against the background of this high share in Helaba's overall core capital, not have agreed to a comparable contribution.
Institutsiooniline investor ei oleks BdB sõnul kõnealuse kõrge osakaalu taustal Helaba üldises tuumkapitalis nõustunud võrreldava panusega.
Germany confirmed that the proportion of core capital accounted for by the silent partnership contribution in 2003, i.e. after the last stage of the phased arrangement had been reached, was [...] % and that the proportion accounted for by all the silent partnership contributions (i.e. not only the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen) in 2003 amounted to [...] %.
Saksamaa kinnitas, et tuumkapitali vaikiva seltsingu panusest pärinev osa 2003. aastal, st pärast etapiviisilise skeemi viimasesse staadiumi jõudmist, oli [...] % ja et kõigi vaikivate seltsingute panuste osakaal (st mitte ainult Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panus) aastal 2003 moodustas [...] %.
Nevertheless, in the Commission's view, it cannot necessarily be deduced from this that an institutional investor would not have made a comparable silent partnership contribution because of the high proportion of total equity capital it represented.
Sellegipoolest ei saa komisjoni arvates sellest tingimata järeldada, et institutsiooniline investor ei oleks oma summaarse omakapitali suure osakaalu tõttu teinud võrreldavat vaikiva seltsingu panust.