natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
DEM 187,5 million of that amount corresponded to an increase in LBB's nominal capital by the nominal capital of the former WBK and some DEM 1,715 billion to WBK's revenue reserves (without the net profit for 1992 of just under DEM 200 million), which from that point on were shown as a special-purpose reserve belonging to IBB and continued to grow each year.
Sellest 187,5 mln Saksa marka langes LBB põhikapitali suurendamisele toonase WBK põhikapitali arvel ja 1,715 mld Saksa marka WBK kasumireservile (ilma 1992. aasta puhaskasumita ligikaudu 200 mln Saksa marka), mis seejärel kajastati kui IBB sihtotstarbeline reserv, mis pidevalt kasvas.
The transfer of some DEM 1,9 billion and its recognition as core capital for supervisory purposes significantly increased LBB's lending capacity and thus its scope for expanding its competitive business.
Tänu 1,9 mld Saksa marga üleandmisele ja järelevalveõiguse kohase tunnustuse saamisele esimese taseme omavahenditele kasvas oluliselt LBB laenuandmis- ja äritegevuse laiendamise võime.
With a risk weighting of 100 % for all claims (e.g. from loans to non-banks) and without any further raising of additional capital, the business expansion potential theoretically lies at 12,5 times the additional liable equity capital (in this case just under DEM 24 billion).
Kui kõiki nõudeid kaaluda sajaprotsendilise riskiga (nt laenud mitte-pankadele) ja täiendavaid vahendeid ei kaasataks, siis võiks teoreetiliselt tegevust laiendada umbes 12,5 korda täiendava vastutava omakapitali summast (siin seega ca 24 miljardit Saksa marka).
It is not possible to give a precise figure for this potential in individual cases, as it depends on customer structure, strategic planning and unforeseeable external influences.
Kui suur on tegelik potentsiaal üksikjuhul, pole täpselt määratav, sest see oleneb klientide struktuurist, strateegilisest planeerimisest ja ettenägematutest välistest mõjudest.
However, the question of whether and how a credit institution employs new own funds is not a matter for this investigation.
Samas ei ole tegevuse kontrollimisel oluline, kas ja kuidas krediidiasutus omavahendeid kaasab.
Irrespective of the fact that IBB still needed part of the funds to underpin its promotion activities, the transferred assets were recognised by the supervisory authority and could thus be used by LBB, which was competing with other credit institutions, to cover its liabilities.
Kuigi IBB vajas üht osa vahenditest jätkuvalt arendus- ja edendustegevuse tagamiseks, tunnustati vahendeid järelevalveõiguse kohaselt ja teiste krediidiasutustega konkureeriv LBB võis neid vastutuse eesmärgil rakendada.
There is therefore no doubt that this case involves the transfer to LBB of state resources which were such as to give it an economic advantage over its competitors to the extent that the resources concerned were not obtained on market terms.
On väljaspool kahtlust, et LBB-le anti üle riiklikke ressursse, mis võimaldasid LBB-le anda eelise konkurentide ees, niivõrd, kuivõrd ta ei saanud neid vahendeid turumajanduslikel tingimustel.
FAVOURING OF A PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING
TEATUD ETTEVÕTJA SOODUSTAMINE
In order to verify whether the transfer of state resources to a publicly-owned undertaking favours the latter and is therefore liable to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission applies the ‘market-economy investor principle’.
Selleks, et kontrollida, kas riigi osalusega äriühingule riigi ressursside üleandmine kujutab endast ettevõtja soodustamist ja riigiabi asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses, kasutab komisjon “turumajanduslikult tegutseva investori” põhimõtet.
The Court of First Instance has accepted and developed this principle in a number of cases, most recently in its judgment of 6 March 2003 regarding a similar transfer to WestLB.
Esimese astme kohus aktsepteeris ja arendas nimetatud põhimõtet edasi reas kohtuasjades, viimati 6. märtsi 2003. aasta otsuses, mis käsitles sarnast üleandmist WestLB-le.
Market-economy investor principle
Turumajanduslikult tegutseva investori põhimõte
According to the market-economy investor principle, no state aid is involved where funds are made available on ‘terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market-economy conditions’.
Turumajanduslikult tegutseva investori põhimõttest lähtuvalt ei peeta ettevõtja soodustamiseks seda, kui kapital eraldatakse tingimustel, millistel “normaalsetes turumajanduslikes tingimustes tegutsev erainvestor nõustuks vahendeid andma eraõiguslikule ettevõtjale”.
In contrast, the undertaking is being favoured within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty if the proposed remuneration arrangement and/or the financial position of the undertaking is such that a normal return on investment cannot be expected within a reasonable period of time.
Samas on asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses tegemist soodustamisega, kui ettenähtud hüvitamise tingimused ja/või ettevõtja finantsseis ei võimalda tavalist tulusust mõistliku aja jooksul.
Article 295 of the EC Treaty
Asutamislepingu artikkel 295
Article 295 of the EC Treaty lays down that the system of property ownership in the various Member States must not be affected.
Vastavalt asutamislepingu artiklile 295 ei mõjuta asutamisleping omandi õiguslikku režiimi liikmesriikides.
However, this cannot justify any infringement of the Treaty's competition rules.
See ei õigusta siiski asutamislepingu konkurentsisätete rikkumist.
Germany claims that, because of the constraints imposed by the special purpose assigned to the WBK assets, the only possible profitable use of these resources was to transfer them to a similar public-law institution.
Saksamaa selgitab, et WBK vara sihtotstarbe tõttu ei olnud võimalik vahendeid kasutada tulutoovalt teisiti kui sarnasesse avalik-õiguslikku asutusse investeerimisega.
Consequently, the transfer represented the commercially most sensible use of those assets.
Seega olevat üleandmine vara kõige mõistlikum äriline kasutus.
Germany therefore argues that any remuneration for the transfer, i.e. any additional return on WBK's capital, is sufficient to justify the transfer in the light of the market-economy investor principle.
Igasugune tasu üle antud vara eest, sealhulgas igasugune WBK kapitali täiendav tootlus õigustavat üleandmist piisavalt “turumajanduslikult tegutseva investori põhimõttest” lähtuvalt.
This line of argument cannot be accepted.
Selliste argumentidega ei saa nõustuda.
It may be true that WBK's transfer to LBB, which subsequently allowed LBB to use part of WBK's capital for underpinning its competitive business, was the commercially most sensible use.
Võimalik, et WBK ühendamine LBB-ga ja LBB sellest tulenev võimalus kasutada osa WBK kapitali äritegevuse tagamiseks oli majanduslikult kõige mõistlikum vara kasutamise viis.
However, as soon as public funds and other assets are used for commercial, competitive activities, the normal market rules must be applied.
Siiski, niipea kui riigi raha ja muud vara kasutatakse konkurentsile orienteeritud äritegevuses, tuleb kohaldada turureegleid.
This means that the State, once it decides to assign public-purpose assets to a commercial use, must demand a remuneration in line with normal market conditions.
See tähendab, et riik, niipea kui ta otsustab kasutada avalik-õiguslike ülesannete täitmiseks ette nähtud vara (ka) äriliselt, peab nõudma turu tavapärasele hüvitisele vastavat tasu.
Ownership structure
Omanike struktuur
The key question, as formulated by the Court of First Instance in its judgment in WestLB with reference to the previous case law, is whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor operating in normal conditions of a market economy and of a comparable size to that of the bodies operating in the public sector could have been prompted to make the capital contribution in question.
Senisele kohtupraktikale viidates märkis esimese astme kohus WestLB otsuses, et uurimise keskne küsimus on järgmine: kas avaliku sektori haldusasutustega samas suurusjärgus olevat ja tavapärastes turumajanduslikes tingimustes tegutsevat erainvestorit olnuks võimalik mõjutada antud asjaoludel tegema vaadeldavat kapitalisüsti.
Lastly, as the Court also points out with reference to other case law, ‘the comparison between the conduct of public and private investors must be made by reference to the attitude which a private investor would have had at the time of the transaction in question, having regard to the available information and foreseeable developments at that time’.
Kohus selgitas teistele otsustele viidates, et “avalik-õigusliku investori käitumist tuleb võrrelda erainvestori omaga lähtudes sellest, kuidas oleks erainvestor küsitaval juhul vastaval ajal tema käsutuses oleva informatsiooni põhjal ja prognoositava arengu korral käitunud”.
This makes it clear that the assessment must focus on the time of the investment and on the expectations which an investor might reasonably, i.e. on the basis of the available information, have had at that time.
Seega on selge, et kontroll peab keskenduma investeerimise ajale ja sel ajal olemasoleva informatsiooni põhjal tekkinud investori mõistlikele ootustele.
These expectations essentially relate to the likely return.
Viimased puudutavad peamiselt prognoositavat tulusust.
The Land of Berlin was the sole shareholder of LBB (and of WBK).
Berliini liidumaa oli LBB (ja WBK) ainuomanik.
Even if this circumstance should make it possible to depart from an approach which takes account only of the fixed, agreed rate of remuneration (on average 0,25 % on the part of the special-purpose reserve used by LBB as of December 1995), in the present case ownership by the Land of Berlin cannot be used to justify the low direct remuneration.
Isegi kui see asjaolu võimaldaks loobuda silmas pidamast üksnes selgelt kokkulepitud hüvitist – keskmiselt 0,25 % LBB sihtotstarbelise reservi kasutuselevõetud osast alates 1995. aasta detsembrist – ei õigusta antud juhul Berliini liidumaa ainuomanikuks olemine väikest otsest hüvitist.
To cite the Land’s ownership as justification, there would have to be an adequate business plan, expert valuation or assessment of the likely return from the investment at issue.
Liidumaa omanikustaatusele tuginemine eeldaks, et investeeringu kohta oli olemas piisav äriplaan, eksperdi hindamisakt või tulususe prognoos.
None was produced at the time.
Käesoleval juhul neid ei olnud.
The Commission therefore has no means of verifying the Land's statements.
Komisjonil puuduvad seepärast viited liidumaa selgituste kontrollimiseks.
The Commission accordingly takes the view that, in this case, the appropriate return must be established on the basis of the direct market return.
Komisjon leiab seepärast, et käesoleval juhul tuleb mõistlik hüvitis määrata otsese, turutingimustele vastava hüvitise alusel.
Remuneration and elements of remuneration
Hüvitis ja hüvitise koostisosad
Capital basis for calculating the remuneration
Hüvitise arvutamise kapitalibaas
In principle, remuneration is payable on the entire value of the transferred assets. This approach was applied in Decision 2000/392/EC and upheld by the Court of First Instance.
Nagu otsuses 2000/392/EÜ rakendatud ja esimese astme kohtus kinnitust leidnud, tuleb hüvitada üle antud vara kogu väärtus.
As BAKred directly recognised the full amount as core capital, the funds were available to LBB to cover liabilities from 1 January 1993 onwards, except for the amount required each year for the promotion-related business itself.
Kuna BAKred aktsepteeris vahendeid täies mahus kohe esimese taseme omavahenditena, siis olid need alates 1993. aasta 1. jaanuarist LBB käsutuses vastutuse tagamiseks, v.a igal aastal arendus- ja edendustegevuseks vajalikud summad.
The capital needed to underpin the promotion-related business and which LBB could not use has to be deducted from the amounts which grew each year from then on.
Pärast seda aastast aastasse kasvanud summadest tuleb siiski maha arvata edendustegevusest tuleneva vastutuse tagamiseks vajalik kapital, mida LBB ei saanud kasutada.
The values for the WBK/IBB special-purpose reserve and for the capital needed for IBB's promotion-related business varied, or continually increased, as of early 1993.
WBK/IBB sihtotstarbeline vara ja IBB edendustegevuseks vajaliku kapitali suurus kõikus või kasvas pidevalt alates 1993. aasta algusest.
They are shown in the table at paragraph 142.
Vara ja kapitali väärtus on toodud tabelis punkti 142 all.
The nominal capital of WBK/IBB worth DEM 187,5 million and transferred to LBB's nominal capital was liquid capital.
LBB põhikapitali lisandunud WKB/IBB põhikapital summas 187,5 mln Saksa marka oli likviidne kapital.
75,01 % of LBB's shares were sold to BGB in 1994, and the remaining 24,99 % in 1998 at a price of DEM 1,5 billion.
Aastal 1994 võõrandati 75,01 % LBB-st BGB-le, aastal 1998 müüdi ülejäänud 24,99 %-line osalus BGB-le 1,5 mld Saksa marga eest.
The nominal capital was therefore attributed to BGB as of 1998.
Seega tuli põhikapital alates 1998. aastast kajastada BGB bilansis.
There are therefore three bases for calculating an appropriate remuneration: first, the liquid capital of DEM 187,5 million for 1993, with a value of DEM 46,9 million (corresponding to 24,99 % of shares) for the years 1994 to 1997; second, the special-purpose reserve and third, the funds needed for the promotion-related business.
Eelnevat arvestades saab mõistliku hüvitise arvutada tuginedes kolmele alusele: esiteks, likviidse kapitali alusel summas 187,5 mln Saksa marka 1993. aastal ja summas 46,9 mln Saksa marka (vastavalt 24,99 %-line osalus) aastatel 1994–1997; teiseks, sihtotstarbelise reservi ning kolmandaks, edendustegevuseks vajalike vahendite alusel.
As the same minimum return applies to the first two elements, they can initially be considered together in what follows.
Et kahe esimesena nimetatud instrumendi puhul tuleb rakendada sama miinimumtulusust, võib neid järgnevas esialgu vaadelda koos.
Appropriate remuneration for the nominal capital and the special-purpose reserve
Mõistlik hüvitis põhikapitali ja sihtotstarbelise reservi eest
Investments of differing economic quality require differing returns.
Erineva majandusliku kvaliteediga finantsinvesteeringud nõuavad erinevat tulusust.
In analysing an investment's acceptability to an investor acting under normal market conditions, it is important therefore to bear in mind the special economic nature of the financial measure in question and the value of the capital provided for LBB.
Seepärast peab küsimuse analüüsimisel, kas tavapärastes turutingimustes tegutsev investor nõustuks investeerima, lähtuma kõnealuse kapitalimeetme majanduslikust eripärast ja käsutusse antud kapitali väärtusest LBB-le.
Comparison with other equity instruments
Võrdlus teiste omakapitali instrumentidega
In establishing an appropriate remuneration, it is important to determine to which other equity instruments the transfer of WBK's assets may be compared since market remuneration differs from one instrument to another.
Mõistliku hüvitise leidmisel on oluline, milliste teiste omakapitali instrumentidega on WBK vahendite üleandmine võrreldav, sest erinevate instrumentide eest turutingimustel makstav hüvitis on erinev.
For the purposes of their understanding, the BdB, the Land and LBB assume that it can be compared to a share capital investment.
Kokkuleppe eesmärgil lähtuvad BdB, liidumaa ja LBB võrreldavusest põhikapitali investeeringuga.
The Commission likewise takes the view that the transfer most closely resembles a share capital investment.
Komisjon on samuti seisukohal, et WBK üleandmine on eelkõige sarnane põhikapitali investeeringuga.
For the nominal capital, this can undisputedly be assumed to be the case and does not require any further discussion here.
Esiteks saab seda kahtlemata eeldada põhikapitali puhul ega vaja siinkohal lähemat käsitlemist.
However, it also applies to the special-purpose reserve, which was equally recognised by BAKred as core capital.
Teiseks kehtib öeldu aga ka sihtotstarbelise reservi kohta, mida BAKred samuti aktsepteeris esimese taseme omavahenditena.
In this connection, it should be noted that the relatively broad range of innovative equity instruments now available to credit institutions in several countries did not exist in Germany back in 1993 when it was decided to transfer WBK to LBB.
Kõnealuses seoses tuleb kõigepealt rõhutada, et erinevates liidumaades praegu krediidiasutuste käsutuses olevad erinevad uuenduslikud omakapitali instrumendid ei olnud Saksamaal kasutatavad 1993. aastal, mil otsustati WBK üleandmine LBB-le.
Some of these instruments have been developed in the meantime, while others already existed but were not accepted in Germany.
Mõned nendest instrumentidest arendati välja hiljem, teised olid küll olemas, aga Saksamaa neid ei tunnustanud.
It would therefore be inappropriate to compare the special-purpose reserve to such innovative instruments, most of which have developed in the meantime and some of which are available only in other countries.
Seega ei oleks veenev sihtotstarbelise reservi võrdlemine niisuguste uuenduslike instrumentidega, mis loodi valdavalt hiljem ja olid osaliselt üksnes teistes riikides rakendatavad.
The Commission also takes the view that it is not appropriate to compare the special-purpose reserve recognised as core capital to a silent partnership contribution when determining the appropriate remuneration, precisely because the transfer did not take the form of a silent partnership contribution but of a special-purpose reserve.
Komisjon on samuti seisukohal, et esimese taseme omavahenditena tunnustatud sihtotstarbelise reservi eest mõistliku hüvitise määramiseks ei ole võrdlus hääleõiguseta osalusega (sks k stille Einlage) sobiv. Komisjonile on sealjuures oluline lähtuda sellest, et üle anti sihtotstarbeline reserv, mitte aga hääleõiguseta osalus.
BAKred too recognised the transfer as a reserve and not as a silent partnership contribution pursuant to Section 10 of the German Banking Act.
BAKred tunnustas üle antud vara samuti reservina ja mitte hääleõiguseta osalusena KWG § 10 kohaselt.
The fact that the German supervisory authority treated the capital made available as a reserve suggests that it resembles share capital rather than a silent partnership.
See, et Saksa järelevalveasutus käsitles vara reservina, kõneleb selle poolt, et eraldatud kapital on pigem võrreldav põhikapitali kui hääleõiguseta osalusega.
Moreover, the risk that the transferred capital might at least partially be lost in the event of insolvency or liquidation is no less than the risk associated with a share capital investment since WBK's assets make up a considerable part of LBB's equity capital and LBB used it extensively for many years to cover risk-bearing assets.
Lisaks ei erine üle antud kapitali vähemalt osalise kaotamise risk pankroti või likvideerimise korral põhikapitali investeeringu riskist, sest WBK vara moodustab olulise osa LBB omakapitalist ja LBB kattis riskiga kaalutud varasid olulises mahus tema käsutusse antud varaga paljude aastate jooksul.
Liquidity costs of the special-purpose reserve
Sihtotstarbelise reservi puuduv likviidsus
A ‘normal’ capital injection into a bank supplies it both with liquidity and with an own funds base which it requires for supervisory reasons to expand its activities.
“Tavaline” kapitalisüst suurendab nii panga likviidsust kui omavahendite baasi, mis on järelevalveõiguse kohaselt vajalik äritegevuse laiendamiseks.
In order to use the capital in full, i.e. to expand its 100 % risk-adjusted assets by a factor of 12,5 (i.e. 100 divided by a solvency ratio of 8), the bank must refinance itself on the financial markets 11,5 times over.
Et kapitali tervenisti kasutada, st laiendamaks 100 %-lise riskiga kaalutud varasid 12,5 korda (100 jagatud likviidsusmääraga/kapitali adekvaatsuse määraga 8 %), peab pank ennast 11,5 korda rahaturgudel refinantseerima.
Put simply, the difference between 12,5 times the interest received and 11,5 times the interest paid minus other costs of the bank (e.g. administration) gives the profit on the equity.
Lihtsamalt öeldes on kasumi ja omakapitali suhe väljendatav kapitalilt 12,5 korda saadud ja 11,5 korda makstud intresside vahena, millest on lahutatud panga muud kulud (nt halduskulud).
Apart from the nominal capital of DEM 187,5 million, the transfer of WBK's assets did not provide LBB with initial liquidity.
Arvestamata 187,5 mln Saksa marga suurust põhikapitali ei suurendanud WBK vara üleandmine esialgu LBB likviidsust.
LBB therefore faced additional funding costs equal to the amount of the capital if it was to raise the necessary funds on the financial markets to take full advantage of the business opened up by the additional capital, i.e. to expand risk-adjusted assets by 12,5 times the capital amount (or to maintain existing assets at that level).
LBB peab seepärast kandma täiendavat finantseerimiskulu kapitali ulatuses – eeldusel, et LBB kaasab finantsturgudelt vajalikke vahendeid –, mis on vajalik, et täiendava omakapitali kaudu täielikult ära kasutada avanevaid ärilisi võimalusi, s.t suurendada riskiga kaalutud varasid kaasatud kapitali 12,5-kordseks (või et säilitada olemasolevad varad nimetatud tasemel).
Because of these extra costs, which do not arise in the case of other forms of injected equity capital, the appropriate remuneration must be reduced accordingly.
Nimetatud lisakulude tõttu, mida teistsuguse omakapitali eraldamisel ei tekiks, tuleb mõistlikku tasu vastavalt vähendada.
A market-economy investor could not expect to be remunerated in the same way as for a cash injection.
Turumajanduslikult tegutsev investor ei või sellistel tingimustel oodata samasugust tasu nagu likviidse rahasüsti tegemisel.
The Commission does not believe that the entire refinancing interest rate has to be taken into account.
Komisjon on siinjuures seisukohal, et arvesse ei saa võtta kogu refinantseerimise intressimäära.
Refinancing costs constitute operating expenses and therefore reduce taxable income.
Refinantseerimise kulud on ettevõtlusega seotud kulud ja vähendavad seeläbi maksustatavat tulu.
This means that the bank's net result is not reduced by the amount of additional interest expenses incurred.
Panga puhaskasum ei kahane täiendavalt makstud intresside summa võrra.
These expenses are offset in part by reduced corporation tax.
Osaliselt tasakaalustab kulusid väiksem ettevõtte tulumaks (Körperschaftssteuer).
Only the net costs should be taken into account as an additional burden on LBB because of the special nature of the capital transferred.
LBB täiendava kulutusena seoses üle antud kapitali eripäraga tuleb arvestada üksnes netokulutusi.
Overall, the Commission accepts that LBB incurs additional ‘liquidity costs’ to the extent of ‘refinancing costs minus corporation tax’.
Kokkuvõtvalt tunnistab komisjon, et LBB-l tekivad täiendavad “likviidsuskulud” summas “refinantseerimiskulud miinus ettevõtte tulumaks”.
In the negotiations on their understanding, the parties, as in the Hamburgische Landesbank case, in which the transfer took place at the same point in time, took as a basis the long-term risk-free rate of 7,23 %.
Kokkuleppe sõlmimise läbirääkimistel lähtusid pooled, nagu ka samal ajal üle antud Hamburgische Landesbank’i kohta sõlmitud kokkuleppes, pikaajalisest riskivabast määrast 7,23 %.
They also agreed to assume a flat 50 % tax rate.
Lisaks olid pooled üksmeelel kogusummana arvestatud 50 %-lises maksumääras.
This produces a net refinancing rate of 3,62 % and thus a corresponding liquidity discount.
Järelikult saadakse neto-refinantseerimise määraks 3,62 %, mille võrra vähendatakse tasu ebapiisava likviidsuse tõttu.
This discount applies only to the special-purpose reserve.
Viimane kehtib üksnes sihtotstarbelise reservi kohta.
Determination of a likely minimum remuneration for the special-purpose reserve and the nominal capital
Sihtotstarbelise reservi ja põhikapitali eest oodatava minimaalse hüvitise väljaselgitamine