natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, several banking activities, e.g. guarantees, do not need any liquidity at all.
Lisaks sellele ei vaja mitmed pangandustegevused, nt garantiid, üldse likviidsust.
Therefore, if any costs at all are taken into account, then it should only be a small margin of 2,7 percentage points in order to offset the fact that the Wfa assets are locked up in unprofitable business.
Juhul kui üldse kulusid arvesse võtta, peaks selleks olema vaid 2,7 protsendipunkti, et tasakaalustada asjaolu, et Wfa varad on seotud kasumit mitteteenivates ärides.
BdB submitted an outside expert's opinion on this point.
Selle punkti kohta esitas BdB väliseksperdi arvamuse.
The BdB further mentioned that the 7,5 % for refinancing costs claimed by WestLB was questioned as being too high in any case.
Lisaks mainis BdB, et WestLB väidetavate refinantseerimiskulude määr 7,5 % on igal juhul liiga kõrge.
On the basis of an analysis of the average market rates in the different years for the various refinancing instruments and in accordance with WestLB's balance-sheet structure, the actual rate for WestLB's refinancing on the markets was said to be an average of between 6,07 % and 6,54 % for the years 1992-96.
Erinevate refinantseerimisinstrumentide mitme aasta keskmise turumäära analüüsi ja WestLB bilansistruktuuri põhjal jäi WestLB refinantseerimise tegelik määr turgudel ajavahemikus 1992–1996 väidetavalt keskmiselt 6,07 % ja 6,54 % vahele.
BdB also provided the Commission with figures for the refinancing costs of some large German private banks at the time of the transfer, which were considerably lower than the 7,5 % claimed by WestLB as appropriate refinancing costs at an earlier stage of the procedure.
BdB esitas komisjonile ka suuremate Saksamaa erapankade refinantseerimiskulude arvnäitajad üleandmise ajal, mis olid märkimisväärselt madalamad kui WestLB poolt menetluse varasemas etapis kohaste refinantseerimiskuludena esitatu.
Moreover, according to BdB, a distinction had to be drawn between figures before tax and figures after tax.
Lisaks sellele tuli BdB sõnul eristada näitajaid enne makse ja pärast makse.
Refinancing costs reduced the taxable profit.
Refinantseerimiskulud vähendasid maksustatavat kasumit.
So, if any refinancing costs are taken into account, only rates applied after tax should be considered.
Seega tuleks juhul, kui refinantseerimiskulusid üldse arvesse võtta, kasutada määrasid pärast makse.
Capital basis for the calculation of the remuneration
Kapitalibaas tasu arvutamiseks
As already mentioned, BdB suggested that the appropriate remuneration should be paid on the total accepted amount of DEM 4000 million (EUR 2050 million).
Nagu eelnevalt mainitud, tegi BdB ettepaneku, et kohast tasu tuleks maksta 4000 miljoni Saksa marga (2050 miljoni euro) suuruselt heaks kiidetud kogusummalt.
However, it claimed in its observations that not only this amount, recognised by BAKred as original own funds, but also the excess amount of DEM 1900 million (EUR 970 million), which cannot be used to underpin business but is nevertheless shown as equity in the balance sheet, benefited WestLB.
Oma tähelepanekutes väitis ta samuti, et lisaks kõnealusele summale, mille BAKred kiitis heaks esmaste omavahenditena, on ka ülejäänud 1900 miljoni Saksa marga (970 miljonit eurot) suurune summa, mida ei saanud kasutada äritegevuse toetamiseks, kuid mis bilansis on näidatud omakapitalina, toonud WestLB-le kasu.
Rating agencies and investors did not look at the accepted original own funds but at the total equity shown in the balance sheet, as the latter formed the basis for commercial estimates of what was available to cover losses.
Reitinguagentuur ja investorid ei tundnud huvi heaks kiidetud esmaste omavahendite vastu, vaid vaatasid kogu bilansis kajastatud omakapitali, kuna see võimaldas äriliselt prognoosida, kui suures ulatuses ollakse võimeline kahjumit katma.
This amount therefore increased WestLB's credit standing, and a remuneration comparable to a guarantee premium should be paid for it.
Kõnealune summa parandas seega WestLB krediidireitingut ja selle eest tuleks maksta tasu, mis on võrreldav tagatise andmise tasuga.
Synergy effects
Sünergia mõjud
According to BdB, the claimed synergy effects did not constitute the real reason for the transfer.
BdB sõnul ei olnud üleandmise tegelikuks põhjuseks väidetav sünergeetiline mõju.
This was said to be apparent from the fact that the law on the transfer justified the measure on the grounds of the need to strengthen WestLB's competitive position and from the agreement that a remuneration should be paid for the act in money's worth.
Väidetavalt ilmes see asjaolust, et üleandmist käsitlev seadus põhjendab meedet WestLB konkurentsivõime tõstmise vajadusega ja et leping sätestas tasu maksmise rahalise tehingu eest(geldwerte Leistung).
Furthermore, BdB questioned how synergy effects could be achieved while Wfa's and WestLB's commercial businesses are separated from each other in economic, organisational and personnel terms, as provided for in the relevant legal provisions.
Lisaks sellele pidas BdB küsitavaks, kuidas võis sünergeetiline mõju avalduda, kui Wfa ja WestLB äritegevused tuli – vastavalt seadusele – hoida nii majanduslikult, organisatsiooniliselt kui ka personali osas lahus.
If synergies did emerge in Wfa's activities, they would reduce the costs of housing promotion but could not be regarded as remuneration for the Land from WestLB.
Kui sünergeetiline mõju ka Wfa tegevuses ilmnes, oleks see vähendanud elamuehituse edendamise kulusid, kuid seda poleks saanud pidada WestLB tasuks liidumaale.
TAX ASPECTS
MAKSUASPEKTID
BdB pointed out that Wfa remained exempt from property tax, tax on business capital and corporation tax even after the transfer.
BdB osutas asjaolule, et Wfa jäi isegi pärast üleandmist vabastatuks omandimaksust, kapitalimaksust ja ettevõtte tulumaksust.
Tax exemptions for public-law credit institutions were justified only as long as these institutions were engaged exclusively in promotional activities and thus did not operate in competition with private taxable institutions.
Avalik-õiguslike krediidiasutuste maksuvabastus oli õigustatud vaid siis, kui need asutused tegelesid eranditult edendustegevusega ja seega ei konkureerinud maksustatavate eraõiguslike asutustega.
According to BdB, a normal bank increasing its capital would each year have to pay on this additional capital 0,6 % property tax and 0,8 % tax on business capital.
BdB sõnul maksab tavaline pank, mis oma kapitali suurendab, igal aastal kõnealuselt lisakapitalilt 0,6 % omandimaksu ja 0,8 % kapitalimaksu.
WestLB was therefore in a favourable position compared with other banks.
Võrreldes teiste pankadega, oli WestLB seega soodsamas olukorras.
The exemption from corporation tax was said to benefit WestLB indirectly.
Ettevõtte tulumaksust vabastamine tõi WestLB-le väidetavalt kaudset kasu.
The waiver of tax income constituted state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Maksutulust loobumine kujutas endast riigiabi EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses.
WAIVER OF LIABILITY
KOHUSTUSTEST LOOBUMINE
Prior to the transfer, Wfa was released from liabilities of DEM 7300 million (EUR 3730 million) vis-à-vis the Land, which waived them without asking for any consideration for this either from Wfa or from WestLB.
Enne üleandmist vabastati Wfa 7300 miljoni Saksa marga (3730 miljoni eurot) suurustest kohustustest liidumaa ees, kes loobus neist Wfa-lt või WestLB-lt tasu küsimata.
A market-economy investor would have asked for a consideration for such a waiver.
Turumajanduslikest tingimustest lähtuv investor oleks sellise loobumise eest küsinud tasu.
The waiver was also a decisive prerequisite for the acceptance by BAKred of DEM 4000 million (EUR 2050 million) of capital.
Loobumine oli samuti otsustavaks eelduseks 4000 miljoni Saksa marga (2050 miljonit euro) suuruse kapitali heaks kiitmisel BAKredi poolt.
WestLB therefore profited directly from the waiver.
Seega sai WestLB loobumisest otseselt kasu.
OBSERVATIONS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
TEISTE HUVITATUD ISIKUTE TÄHELEPANEKUD
Besides WestLB and BdB, two other interested parties commented on the Commission decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
Lisaks WestLB-le ja BdB-le esitasid oma arvamuse komisjoni otsuse kohta (alustada EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 2 sätestatud menetlus) kaks huvitatud isikut.
The Association Française des Banques states that the transfer of own funds to WestLB, for which only an insignificant remuneration was sought, and the continuing guarantee for the bank from the Land lead to distortions of competition detrimental to French credit institutions.
Association Française des Banques väidab, et omavahendite üleandmine WestLB-le, mille eest küsiti tähtsusetut tasu, ja liidumaa jätkuv garantii kahjustab konkurentsi, olles kahjulik Prantsusmaa krediidiasutustele.
Since WestLB's owners demanded a return on their capital that was clearly below the normal level, WestLB could offer its services at below cost (‘dumping’).
Kuna WestLB omanikud rahuldusid kapitali tasuvusega, mis jäi selgelt alla tavalist taset, sai WestLB pakkuda oma teenuseid alla omahinna (“dumping”).
As it benefits from guarantor liability, WestLB has a triple-A rating which allows it to refinance on the markets on very favourable terms.
Tänu garandi vastutusele on WestLB-l kolmekordne A reiting, mis lubab tal turgudel teha refinantseerimistehinguid väga soodsatel tingimustel.
These advantages place French banks operating in Germany at a disadvantage.
Need eelised seavad Saksamaal tegutsevad Prantsusmaa pangad ebasoodsasse olukorda.
At the same time, WestLB can, under these special conditions, develop its business in France, especially in the sector of municipal finance.
Samas saab WestLB nendes eritingimustes arendada oma äritegevust Prantsusmaal, eriti omavalitsuste rahastamise valdkonnas.
Competition within the banking sector is distorted in Germany, France and other Member States.
Konkurentsi on kahjustatud Saksamaa, Prantsusmaa ja teiste liikmesriikide pangandussektorites.
The British Bankers' Association argues that WestLB is an active competitor against non-German banks within Germany and across the European market.
British Bankers' Association väidab, et WestLB on aktiivne konkurent mitte-Saksa pankadele Saksamaal ja Euroopa turul.
Therefore, any aid granted to WestLB has a distorting effect on trade within the Community.
Seega kahjustab igasugune abi, mida WestLB saab, ühendusesisest kaubandust.
The Commission is called upon to uphold the principles of the single market and not to exempt publicly owned banks from the competition rules of the Treaty.
Komisjoni kutsutakse üles toetama ühtse turu põhimõtteid ja mitte vabastama avalik-õiguslikke panku asutamislepingus sätestatud konkurentsieeskirjade täitmisest.
OBSERVATIONS FROM WESTLB
WESTLB TÄHELEPANEKUD
Following publication of the Commission decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, WestLB submitted as its position a copy of Germany's observations on the same question and declared itself fully in agreement with that statement.
Pärast komisjoni otsuse (alustada EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 2 sätestatud menetlus) avaldamist, esitas WestLB sama küsimuse kohta koopia Saksamaa tähelepanekutest, mis kajastasid ka tema seisukohti ning teatas, et nõustub väidetega täielikult.
Thus, the arguments of Germany generally reflect the position of WestLB, which is therefore presented only briefly.
Seega peegeldavad Saksamaa väited üldiselt WestLB seisukohti, mis seepärast on esitatud vaid lühidalt.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRANSFER
ÜLDISED TÄHELEPANEKUD ÜLEANDMISE KOHTA
According to WestLB, the market-economy investor principle is not applicable to investments in economically sound and profitable enterprises.
WestLB sõnul ei ole turumajanduse tingimustest lähtuva investori põhimõte rakendatav investeeringute puhul majanduslikult tugevatesse ja kasumlikesse ettevõtetesse.
This is said to be confirmed by the Court, which had in the past applied this principle only in cases where, at the time of the investment decision, the enterprise in question had already been operating at a significant loss for a considerable time and was active in a sector characterised by structural overcapacity.
Väidetavalt olevat seda kinnitanud ka kohus, kes on nimetatud põhimõtet kohaldanud vaid juhtudel, mil kõnealune ettevõte tegutses investeerimisotsuse tegemise ajal juba pikemat aega märkimisväärse kahjumiga, seda valdkonnas, mida iseloomustas struktuuriline ülevõimsus.
It is claimed that there is no basis in case law for applying the principle to sound and profitable enterprises.
Väideti, et kohtupraktika ei anna alust nimetatud põhimõtte kohaldamiseks tugevate ja kasumlike ettevõtete suhtes.
WestLB submits that, given Wfa's special purpose, its assets are not comparable to normal funds.
Arvestades Wfa erieesmärki väidab WestLB, et selle varad ei ole tavaliste vahenditega võrreldavad.
The transfer to WestLB of Wfa's otherwise unusable assets represents the most commercially sensible use of these assets.
Wfa muidu kasutamiskõlbmatute varade üleandmine kujutab endast nende varade kõige mõistlikumat kasutust.
By means of the transfer the Land has optimised the use of funds earmarked for housing promotion.
Üleandmise teel on liidumaa optimeerinud elamuehituse edendamiseks ettenähtud vahendite kasutust.
A private owner would have acted in the same way.
Eraõiguslikud omanikud oleks toiminud samamoodi.
According to WestLB, an increase in the Land's participation following the transfer would be not only unnecessary but also incompatible with the particular risk profile of Wfa's capital.
WestLB sõnul oleks liidumaa osaluse suurendamine üleandmise järel olnud mittevajalik ja Wfa kapitali eriomaste riskidega kokkusobimatu.
Given the lack of liquidity, the transfer cannot be compared to other capital injections.
Arvestades likviidsuse puudumist, ei ole üleandmine võrreldav muude kapitalisüstidega.
Other equity instruments on the market do not carry voting rights either.
Muud turul pakutavad omakapitali instrumendid ei anna samuti hääleõigust.
It is claimed that, since the remuneration received by the Land was a reasonable price, there was no need to ask for any increase in WestLB's profitability.
Kuna liidumaa saadud tasu oli mõistlik hind, väidetakse, et WestLB kasumlikkuse suurendamist polnud põhjust nõuda.
Furthermore, it was not apparent why a market-economy investor would require a certain target profit if he invested in a profitable company.
Lisaks sellele polnud selge, miks peaks turumajanduslikest tingimustest lähtuv investor nõudma teatava kasumi saavutamist, kui ta investeeris kasumlikku äriühingusse.
Since WestLB had made a profit in the past, there was also no need to establish any restructuring plan.
Kuna WestLB oli minevikus tootnud kasumit, ei olnud vajadust ka ümberkorralduste kava järele.
Such a plan was required by the Court only in cases of restructuring aid for loss-making enterprises.
Sellist kava on kohus nõudnud vaid juhtudel, mis käsitlevad restruktureerimisabi kahjumis ettevõtete jaoks.
According to WestLB, the remuneration paid for the capital in question is appropriate.
WestLB sõnul on kõnealuse kapitali eest makstud tasukohane.
In support of this opinion, WestLB submitted a report from an investment bank which had been commissioned by WestLB to assess the remuneration.
Selle arvamuse toetuseks esitas WestLB investeerimispanga aruande, mille WestLB tellis tasu hindamiseks.
The expert report compares the risk profile of Wfa's capital with that of other equity instruments on the capital markets and, on the basis of this comparison, identifies a rate within the range of 0,9 % to 1,4 % as appropriate remuneration for Wfa's capital.
Eksperdiarvamuses võrreldakse Wfa kapitali riskiprofiili teiste kapitaliinstrumentide omadega ja määratakse võrdluse põhjal Wfa kapitali kohase tasu määraks 0,9 % kuni 1,4 %.
This compared with costs of about 1,1 % (before tax) for WestLB for the use of Wfa's capital.
Seda umbes 1,1 % suuruste WestLB kulude juures (enne makse) Wfa kapitali kasutamise eest.
WestLB stresses that, in order to be used in full, the capital requires additional refinancing costs, which are given in different documents in the range of 7,5 % to 9,3 %.
WestLB rõhutab, et kapitali täielikuks ärakasutamiseks tuleb teha täiendavaid refinantseerimiskulutusi, mis erinevates dokumentides jäävad vahemikku 7,5 % kuni 9,3 %.
WestLB also submits that the figures presented by BdB on the return on equity of German banks are not correct for several reasons.
WestLB väidab samuti, et BdB poolt esitatud näitajad Saksamaa pankade omakapitali tasuvuse kohta ei ole mitmel põhjusel õiged.
On account of specific stock exchange developments, the investment period used by BdB for the calculation led to particularly high returns.
Eriliste arengute tõttu väärtpaberibörsil näitab investeerimisperiood, mida BdB arvutuste aluseks kasutas, eriti kõrget tasuvust.
The arithmetic average used by BdB did not provide correct results as the compound annual growth rate method should be used for such calculations.
Aritmeetiline keskmine, mida BdB kasutas, ei andnud õigeid tulemusi, sest selliste arvutuste puhul tuleb kasutada aastast liitkasvumäära meetodit.
BdB included in its calculations investment periods which were not relevant for an investment decision in 1992 and, because it took into account all possible holding periods, it counted individual years several times over.
BdB arvutuste aluseks olid investeerimisperioode, mis ei olnud 1992. aasta investeerimisotsuse jaoks asjakohased ja kuna ta võttis arvesse kõikvõimalikke investeeringute pikkusi, arvestas ta üksikuid aastaid mitmeid kordi.
The banks used by BdB for computing an average rate of return on equity for large German banks could not be compared to WestLB because of differing core businesses.
Pangad, mida BdB suuremate Saksa pankade omakapitali tasuvuse keskmise määra arvutamiseks kasutas, ei ole võrreldavad WestLB-ga nende erineva põhitegevuse tõttu.
According to WestLB, the average return on equity of 16,6 % presented by BdB falls to 5,8 % after adjustment for all these factors.
Pärast kohandusi kõigi nimetatud teguritega langeb BdB poolt esitatud 16,6 %-ne omakapitali tasuvus 5,8 %-le.
SYNERGY EFFECTS
SÜNERGEETILISED MÕJUD
According to WestLB, the integration of Wfa into WestLB led to considerable cost savings for Wfa.
WestLB sõnul aitas Wfa liitmine WestLB-ga Wfa-l märkimisväärselt kulusid säästa.
In the first two years Wfa's staff of 588 (personnel within the ‘old’ Wfa as well as in the housing promotion division of WestLB, the costs of which had to be borne by Wfa before the transfer) was reduced by 53.
Esimese kahe aasta jooksul vähenes Wfa töötajate arv (nii “vana” Wfa personal kui ka WestLB elamuehituse edendamise divisjon, mille kulud pidi enne üleandmist kandma Wfa, kokku 588 inimest) 53 inimese võrra.
In the early years the transfer led to annual savings of DEM 13 million (EUR 7 million) for Wfa as a result of synergies.
Esimestel aastatel pärast üleandmist säästeti Wfa jaoks sünergia tulemusel 13 miljonit Saksa marka (7 miljonit eurot) aastas.
The reduction in staff numbers should continue and annual savings were expected to increase to around DEM 25 million (EUR 13 million) from 1997 onwards.
Töötajate arvu vähendamine peaks jätkuma ja aastaseks kokkuhoiuks loodetakse alates 1997. aastast umbes 25 miljonit Saksa marka (13 miljonit eurot).
These amounts were said to benefit exclusively the housing promotion business of the Land.
Need summad pidid eranditult minema liidumaa elamuehituse edendamisele.
Another document refers to a synergy effect of at least DEM 35 million (EUR 18 million) annually.
Teine dokument viitab sünergeetilisele mõjule, mille tulemusena hoitakse kokku vähemalt 35 miljonit Saksa marka (18 miljonit eurot) aastas.
Furthermore, in the course of the merger, changing the pension scheme for Wfa employees cost WestLB DEM 33 million (EUR 17 million) in payments to the pension institution of the Federation and the Länder.
Peale selle läheb Wfa töötajate pensioniskeemi muutmine liitumise käigus WestLB jaoks maksma 33 miljonit Saksa marka (17 miljonit eurot), mis tasutakse liitvabariigi ja liidumaade pensionasutustele.
The payments would reduce Wfa's subsequent expenses.
Maksed vähendaksid Wfa edaspidiseid kulusid.
TAX EXEMPTIONS
MAKSUVABASTUSED
According to WestLB, the exemption of Wfa from certain taxes is in line with the system of German tax law, under which the taxes in question do not apply to institutions that serve public purposes and do not compete with other, tax-paying institutions.
Vastavalt WestLB-le on Wfa vabastamine teatud maksudest kooskõlas Saksamaa maksuseadusega, mille alusel kõnealuseid makse ei kohaldata asutustele, millel on avalik otstarve ja mis ei konkureeri teiste, makse maksvate asutustega.
WestLB itself is liable in full to all these taxes and does not derive any benefit from the exemption of Wfa.
WestLB on ise maksukohustuslane ega saa Wfa maksuvabastusest mingit kasu.
It is also pointed out that property tax has not been levied since 1 January 1997 and tax on business capital not since 1 January 1998.
Samuti tuleb märkida, et omandimaksu ei ole võetud alates 1. jaanuarist 1997. aastal ja kapitalimaksu alates 1. jaanuarist 1998. aastal.
As WestLB points out, the waiver of the liabilities in question was made before the transfer and subsequent valuation of Wfa's assets.
Nagu WestLB märkis, tehti kõnealustest kohustustest loobumise otsus enne üleandmist ja sellele järgnenud Wfa varade hindamist.
Germany submitted that the transaction does not include any elements of state aid for WestLB within the meaning of the EC Treaty.
Saksamaa väitis, et tehing ei kujuta WestLB jaoks mingilgi moel riigiabi EÜ asutamislepingu tähenduses.
The Land of North Rhine-Westphalia received an appropriate remuneration which corresponded to the terms of the market.
Nordrhein-Westfaleni liidumaa sai kohase tasu, mis vastas turu tingimustele.
Nor did the transaction constitute state aid for the other shareholders of WestLB as the preservation of the shareholder structure after Wfa's transfer was justified by the appropriate remuneration paid by WestLB.
Samuti ei kujutanud tehing teiste WestLB aktsionäride jaoks riigiabi, kuna WestLB poolt makstud kohane tasu õigustas omanike struktuuri säilitamist pärast Wfa üleandmist.
Furthermore, the tax exemptions for Wfa do not include elements of state aid for WestLB because they did not affect the commercial business of the bank.
Lisaks sellele ei sisaldanud Wfa maksuvabastus WestLB jaoks riigiabi elemente, sest see ei mõjutanud panga äritegevust.
In Germany's opinion, the Commission may examine the case only on the basis of the circumstances obtaining at the time of the investment, i.e. at the end of 1991.
Saksamaa arvates võib komisjon juhtumit uurida vaid investeerimise ajal valitsenud asjaoludel, s.t 1991. aasta lõpus valitsenud asjaoludel.
Only these circumstances could have been the basis for the Land's investment decision.
Vaid need asjaolud võisid olla liidumaa investeerimisotsuse aluseks.
Subsequent questions and developments such as the acceptance of own funds by BAKred or the annual valuation and integration of Wfa's assets and liabilities into WestLB's accounts fell outside the scope of the Commission's investigation.
Edasised küsimused ja areng, nagu näiteks omavahendite heaks kiitmine BAKredi poolt või iga-aastane hindamine ja Wfa varade ja kohustuste liitmine WestLB bilansiga, jäid väljapoole komisjoni uurimise ulatust.
According to Germany, the ideas on integrating Wfa into WestLB dated back to the 1970s and the 1980s and were prompted by the view that housing promotion could be made more efficient.
Saksamaa sõnul ulatusid Wfa WestLB-ga liitmise mõtted 1970sse ja 1980sse ja olid ajendatud seisukohast, et elamuehituse edendamist saaks tõhustada.
Before the transfer, the procedure for receiving a housing loan was very complicated as both Wfa and WestLB were involved alongside the relevant public authorities.
Enne üleandmist oli eluasemelaenu saamise protseduur väga keeruline, kuna sellega tegelesid nii Wfa kui ka WestLB koos asjaomaste avalik-õiguslike ametiasutustega.