natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Write-off, Deferral into 5 quarterly instalments; First instalment payable 30 June 2005
Kustutamine, edasilükkamine 5 kvartaalse osamaksena; esimene osamakse tähtaeg 30. juunil 2005
Write-off, Deferral into 6 quarterly instalments; First instalment payable 1 January 2006
Kustutamine, edasilükkamine 6 kvartaalse osamaksena; esimene osamakse tähtaeg 1. jaanuaril 2006
Deferral into 12 monthly instalments
Edasilükkamine 12 igakuise osamaksena;
First instalment payable 2 January 2006
esimene osamakse tähtaeg 2. jaanuaril 2006
Warsaw City Authority Białołęka District
Varssavi linnavalitsuse Białołęka linnaosa
Fee for perpetual usufruct of land
maa alalise kasutusvalduse tasu
Deferral of fee until 31 December 2005
Tasu edasilükkamine kuni 31. detsembrini 2005
Warsaw City Authority
Varssavi linnavalitsus
District Starost Office in Ełk
Ełki piirkonna vanema kantselei
Ełk City Authority
Ełki linnavalitsus
Real estate tax
kinnisvaramaks
Deferral into 12 monthly instalments of liabilities for April and May 2004
aasta aprilli ja mai kohustuste edasilükkamine 12 igakuise osamaksena;
First instalment payable 31 December 2004
esimene osamakse tähtaeg 31. detsembril 2004
First instalment payable 30 June 2005
esimene osamakse tähtaeg 30. juunil 2005
Kożuchów City Authority
Kożuchów linnavalitsus
First instalment payable 1 January 2005
esimene osamakse tähtaeg 1. jaanuaril 2005
Mazowiecki Provincial Governor
Mazowiecki provintsi kuberner
Write-off of fee for 2004
aasta tasu kustutamine
District Starost Office in Opole
Opole piirkonna vanema kantselei
Deferral of fee until 31 December 2004
Tasu edasilükkamine kuni 31. detsembrini 2004
District Starost Office in Nysa
Nysa piirkonna vanema kantselei
Nysa City Authority
Nysa linnavalitsus
Write-off, Deferral into instalments payable in 16 quarterly instalments
Kustutamine, edasilükkamine 16 kvartaalse osamaksena.
Mazowiecki Tax office, Warsaw
Mazowiecki 2. maksuamet, Varssavi
Tax on civil law transactions
tsiviilõiguslike tehingute maks
II Customs Office in Warsaw
Varssavi II tolliamet
Customs duties
tollimaksud
Deferral of payments for May and June 2004 until December 2004
aasta mai ja juuni maksete edasilükkamine 2004. aasta detsembrini
Deferral of payments for July and August 2004 until January 2005
aasta juuli ja augusti maksete edasilükkamine 2005. aasta jaanuarini
National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management/Provincial Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management
Riiklik Looduskaitse- ja Veemajandusfond/Provintsi Keskkonnakaitse- ja Veemajandusfond
Subsidy or preferential loan to finance costs for the implementation and functioning by the end of 2008 of a system to recycle vehicles and the costs of adapting to legal requirements concerning environmental protection
Subsiidium või sooduslaen sõidukite ringlussevõtusüsteemi 2008. aastaks rakendamise ja käitamise kulude ning keskkonnakaitse juriidiliste nõuetega vastavusse viimise kulude rahastamiseks
TOTAL in PLN (rows 2-24)
KOKKU Poola zlottides (read 2–24)
The notified aid measures amount to USD 83 million (EUR 66 million) and PLN 62 million (EUR 16 million).
Teatatud abimeetmete summa on 83 miljonit USA dollarit (66 miljonit eurot) ja 62 miljonit Poola zlotti (16 miljonit eurot).
At the exchange rate of 20 October 2006, the total aid measures therefore amount to EUR 82 million or PLN 318 million.
oktoobri 2006. aasta vahetuskursiga on abimeetmete kogusumma seega 82 miljonit eurot ehk 318 miljonit Poola zlotti.
A large proportion of the aid measures are in the form of a write-off or deferral of the State’s existing claims on FSO.
Suur osa abimeetmetest rakendatakse riigi nõuete kustutamise või edasilükkamise teel.
Since, to the Commission’s knowledge, FSO has not paid these claims, the company has already benefited from the suspension of payment of its liabilities.
Kuna komisjonile teadaolevalt ei ole FSO neid nõudeid tasunud, on äriühing kohustuste tasumise peatamisest juba kasu saanud.
As a result, these measures can be deemed to have already been partially implemented.
Seetõttu võib kõnealuseid meetmeid pidada juba osaliselt rakendatuks.
For measures notified before this date, the previous 1999 rescue and restructuring guidelines [15] (‘the guidelines’) apply.
Enne seda kuupäeva teatatud meetmete suhtes kohaldatakse varasemaid, 1999. aasta päästmise ja ümberkorraldamise suuniseid [15] („suunised”).
As the measures were notified on 29 April 2004, the 1999 guidelines apply.
Kuna meetmetest teatati 29. aprillil 2004, kohaldatakse 1999. aasta suuniseid.
The Commission therefore made an initial assessment of the notified (new) aid on the basis of the criteria laid down in those guidelines.
Seetõttu andis komisjon esialgse hinnangu teatatud (uuele) abile nendes suunistes sätestatud kriteeriumide alusel.
The Commission concluded firstly that given the losses and the decline in sales which FSO had suffered in the previous years, it qualified as a firm in difficulty under section 2.1 of the guidelines.
Esiteks tegi komisjon järelduse, et FSO eelmiste aastate kahjumit ja müügi vähenemist arvestades võib FSOd pidada suuniste punkti 2.1 alusel raskustes olevaks äriühinguks.
Regarding restoration of viability, the Commission expressed doubts about certain aspects of the plan.
Elujõulisuse taastamise osas väljendas komisjon kahtlust kava teatavates aspektides.
One element of these doubts concerned the lack of clarity about the planned level of production.
Osaliselt olid kahtlused seotud kavandatava tootmistaseme ebaselgusega.
The Commission also remarked that it did not have at its disposal the updated restructuring plan, which, according to the Polish authorities, had been negotiated with the investor.
Samuti märkis komisjon, et tal puudub ajakohastatud ümberkorraldamiskava, mille üle Poola ametiasutuste väitel oli investoriga läbirääkimisi peetud.
Importantly, the Commission also stated that it had not received a market survey from the Polish authorities.
Olulise punktina märkis komisjon ka seda, et ta ei olnud saanud Poola ametiasutustelt turuülevaadet.
It indicated that the survey would have to include an assessment of total production capacity and demand at Community level, and a conclusion as to whether there was excess capacity on the market.
Komisjon osutas, et ülevaade peaks sisaldama tootmise koguvõimsuse ja nõudluse hinnangut ühenduse tasandi kohta ning järeldust ülemäärase võimsuse olemasolu kohta turul.
Regarding the avoidance of undue distortion of competition, the Commission indicated that it could not take a final position because, firstly, the Polish authorities had not provided information on whether there was overcapacity on the market on which FSO operated.
Konkurentsi põhjendamatu moonutamise osas märkis komisjon, et ta ei saa lõplikku seisukohta võtta, sest esiteks ei esitanud Poola ametiasutused teavet selle kohta, kas turul, kus FSO tegutseb, esineb ülevõimsust.
Secondly, Poland had not indicated whether FSO and/or the investor were planning any measures that could be considered compensatory measures, beyond the capacity reduction already included in the restructuring plan as a measure necessary to achieve viability.
Teiseks ei teatanud Poola, kas FSO ja/või investor kavandasid mingeid meetmeid, mida võiks käsitleda kompenseerivate meetmetena lisaks võimsuse vähendamisele, mida ümberkorraldamiskava elujõulisuse saavutamise meetmena juba sisaldab.
Regarding the limitation of aid to the strict minimum necessary, the Commission requested more details on the measures considered to be own contributions and details about restructuring costs.
Abi vajaliku miinimumiga piirdumise osas nõudis komisjon täiendavaid üksikasju omafinantseeringuna käsitletavate meetmete ja ümberkorraldamise kulude kohta.
The Commission also expressed doubts about whether the aid was limited to the minimum necessary because the conditionality of some of the aid measures seemed to indicate that they were not absolutely necessary.
Komisjon väljendas ka kahtlust abi piirdumise kohta vajaliku miinimumiga, sest mõne abimeetme tingimuslikkus näis viitavat sellele, et kõnealused meetmed ei olnud hädavajalikud.
Finally, the Commission noted that the agreement on debt restructuring concluded with public creditors on 22 September 2003 might contain aid granted before accession.
Viimaks märkis komisjon, et 22. septembril 2003 avaliku sektori võlausaldajatega sõlmitud võlgade ümberkorraldamise kokkulepe võib sisaldada enne ühinemist antud abi.
Even if the compatibility of this potential aid cannot be assessed and it cannot be recovered, it must nevertheless be taken into account in the assessment of the new aid.
Isegi kui selle võimaliku abi kokkusobivust ei saa hinnata ja seda abi ei saa tagastada, tuleb seda uue abi hindamisel ikkagi arvesse võtta.
POLAND’S COMMENTS
POOLA MÄRKUSED
Regarding the contradictory figures on planned production levels in the years 2005 and 2006, the Polish authorities explained in their letter of 13 June 2005 that, owing to delays in the entry of the investor, the figures had had to be revised downwards in successive versions of the restructuring plan.
ja 2006. aasta kavandatavate tootmistasemete vastuoluliste näitajate osas selgitasid Poola ametiasutused 13. juuni 2005. aasta kirjas, et investori kaasamisel tekkinud viivituste tõttu tuli neid näitajaid ümberkorraldamiskava järgmistes versioonides alandada.
They indicated that the break-even point, estimated to be [100000-150000] units, should be reached in […].
Andmete kohaselt tuleks kasumilävi, mis eelhinnangu kohaselt on [100000–150000] ühikut, saavutada […].
In their letter of 22 May 2006 the Polish authorities provided sales forecasts for the years 2008 to 2010.
mai 2006. aasta kirjas esitasid Poola ametiasutused 2008.–2010. aasta müügiprognoosi.
In the documents submitted during the meeting of 31 August 2006, the Polish authorities provided a forecast for the years 2006 to 2008, which confirmed the figures set out above.
augusti 2006. aasta koosolekul esitatud dokumentides avaldasid Poola ametiasutused prognoosi aastateks 2006–2008, mis kinnitas eespool esitatud näitajaid.
Production forecast
Tootmisprognoos
(1000 cars)
(tuhandetes autodes)
Letter of 22 May 2006 [16]
mai 2006. aasta kiri [16]
Document of 31 August 2006 (Production forecast including assembly kits)
augusti 2006. aasta dokument (koostekomplekte hõlmav tootmisprognoos)
In their letter of 3 October 2006, the Polish authorities submitted a substantially higher forecast for 2008 to 2010.
oktoobri 2006. aasta kirjas esitasid Poola ametiasutused 2008.–2010. aastaks oluliselt kõrgema prognoosi.
According to this forecast, annual production should evolve to a level of [over 250000] units during that period.
Selle prognoosi kohaselt peaks aastatoodang sel perioodil saavutama [rohkem kui 250000] ühikust kõrgema taseme.
As requested in the decision to initiate the procedure, Poland submitted the updated version of the restructuring plan on 31 May 2005.
Nagu menetluse algatamise otsuses nõutud, esitas Poola ümberkorraldamiskava ajakohastatud versiooni 31. mail 2005.
Poland has submitted further updated versions since then.
Hiljem on Poola esitanud täiendavalt ajakohastatud versioone.
The restructuring plan includes descriptions of the markets on which FSO operates.
Ümberkorraldamiskava sisaldab nende turgude kirjeldusi, kus FSO tegutseb.
It shows that there are considerable overcapacities in the EU, as already indicated.
Kava kohaselt on ELis märkimisväärne ülevõimsus, nagu juba osutatud.
In terms of proposals for compensatory measures, Poland has stated that, firstly, FSO plans targeted restriction of production and sales to the level of [140000-170000] cars until 2008, despite the fact that it could produce [200000-230000] cars and has the real possibility of selling over [140000-170000] cars.
Kompenseerivate meetmete ettepanekute osas on Poola teatanud, et esiteks kavatseb FSO tootmist ja müüki 2008. aastaks piirata sihttasemeni [140000–170000] autot, vaatamata asjaolule, et ta suudaks toota [200000–230000] autot ning reaalselt müüa rohkem kui [140000–170000] autot.
Secondly, FSO has limited its sales network by reducing the number of car sales outlets from […] in 2003 to […] in 2006.
Teiseks on FSO piiranud oma müügivõrgustikku, vähendades automüügiesinduste arvu […]-lt 2003. aastal […]-le 2006. aastal.
It has also liquidated two of its own sales outlets.
FSO on kaks müügiesindust likvideerinud.
Thirdly, the company is limiting the number of countries to which it exports its products.
Kolmandaks piirab äriühing nende riikide arvu, kuhu ta oma toodangut ekspordib.
Regarding the limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, the Polish authorities have provided several documents on the amounts described as own contributions.
Abi vajaliku miinimumiga piirdumise osas on Poola ametiasutused esitanud mitmeid dokumente omafinantseeringuna kirjeldatud summade kohta.
Finally, Poland has provided a copy of the agreement of 22 September 2003 on debt restructuring.
Viimaks on Poola esitanud 22. septembri 2003. aasta võlgade ümberkorraldamise kokkuleppe koopia.
The Polish authorities do not contest that the measures listed in Table 4 constitute State aid, as concluded in the opening decision.
Poola ametiasutused ei vaidlusta, et tabelis 4 loetletud meetmed on riigiabi, nagu algatamisotsuses järeldatud.
Besides the measures listed in Table 4, in the decision to open the procedure the Commission expressed doubts that the agreement with public creditors of 22 September 2003 on debt restructuring could contain aid granted before accession.
Lisaks tabelis 4 loetletud meetmetele väljendas komisjon menetluse algatamise otsuses kahtlust, et 22. septembril 2003 avaliku sektori võlausaldajatega sõlmitud võlgade ümberkorraldamise kokkulepe võib sisaldada enne ühinemist antud abi.
Indeed, the Commission noted that the financial institutions accepted a partial write-off of their claims against FSO only on the condition that the depreciation resulting from this waiver was accepted by the Polish tax authority as a cost reducing taxable income.
Komisjon märkis tõepoolest, et finantsasutused nõustusid oma nõudeid FSO vastu osaliselt kustutama üksnes tingimusel, et Poola maksuhaldur aktsepteerib kõnealusest loobumisest tulenevat amortisatsiooni maksustatavat tulu vähendava kuluna.
The Commission therefore indicated that the State may have granted a more substantial concession than the private parties to the agreement.
Seetõttu osutas komisjon, et riik võis teha olulisema järeleandmise kui erasektori kokkuleppeosalised.
The Polish authorities provided a copy of the agreement of 22 September 2003.
Poola ametiasutused esitasid 22. septembri 2003. aasta kokkuleppe koopia.
The Commission observed that the conversion of debt into FSO shares accepted by the State Treasury was carried out in parallel with and on the same terms as the conversion of debt by DMC, which is a private sector company.
Komisjon märkis, et võla konverteerimine FSO aktsiateks, mida riigikassa aktsepteeris, toimus paralleelselt ja samadel tingimustel võla konverteerimisega erasektori äriühingu DMC poolt.
In addition, the amount so converted by DMC is much larger than the amount converted by the State Treasury.
Lisaks sellele on DMC konverteeritud summa palju suurem kui riigikassa konverteeritud summa.
In these circumstances, the Commission concluded that this operation respected the market economy creditor principle and did not constitute State aid.
Nendel asjaoludel järeldas komisjon, et kõnealune toiming järgis turumajanduse tingimustel tegutseva võlausaldaja põhimõtet ning selle puhul ei olnud tegemist riigiabiga.
Even though doubts on this subject were not expressed in the decision to launch the procedure, because the transaction took place afterwards, the Commission checked whether the sale of the State’s stake in FSO to AvtoZAZ for the […] price of PLN 100 on 30 June 2005 contained aid to the purchaser, and, indirectly, to FSO.
Ehkki menetluse algatamise otsuses ei väljendatud sel teemal kahtlust, sest tehing toimus hiljem, kontrollis komisjon, kas FSO riigiosaluse müük AvtoZAZile 30. juunil 2005 […] hinnaga 100 Poola zlotti sisaldas ostjale ja kaudselt FSO-le antavat abi.
The Commission has analysed the valuation report drawn up by KPMG.
Komisjon on analüüsinud KPMG koostatud hindamisakti.
The consulting firm observes that the company has been registering heavy losses and that demand for its products has been low.
Konsultatsioonifirma märgib, et äriühing on kandnud suurt kahjumit ning nõudlus tema toodete järele on olnud vähene.
Therefore, the discounted cash flows method cannot be applied properly.
Seetõttu ei saa diskonteeritud rahavoogude meetodit nõuetekohaselt kohaldada.
Only the cost method and liquidation method can be applied.
Kohaldada saab ainult maksumuse meetodit ja likvideerimismeetodit.
Both methods conclude that FSO’s value is […].
Mõlema meetodi kohaldamise tulemusena on FSO väärtus […].
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (‘PWC’) agrees to a large extent with the conclusions of KPMG.
PriceWaterhouseCoopers („PWC”) nõustub suurel määral KPMG järeldustega.
The Commission has not found any manifest errors in these reports and has concluded that the events that took place between the date of valuation by KPMG and the date of the transaction did not result in the price of the shares becoming […].
Komisjon neis aktides vigu ei leidnud ja järeldas, et KPMG poolse hindamise ja tehingu kuupäeva vahelisel perioodil toimunud sündmused ei viinud aktsiate hinna […].
The Commission therefore considers that this transaction does not include an element of aid.
Seega on komisjon arvamusel, et kõnealuse tehinguga ei osutatud abi.
In conclusion, only the measures listed in Table 4 constitute aid covered by the current decision.
Kokkuvõtteks kätkevad käesoleva otsusega hõlmatud abi üksnes tabelis 4 loetletud meetmed.
Quantification of the aid
Abi suuruse määramine
In the decision to launch the procedure, the Commission concluded that the measures listed in Table 4 had not been granted before the accession of Poland to the EU on 1 May 2004.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses järeldas komisjon, et tabelis 4 loetletud meetmeid ei rakendatud enne Poola ühinemist ELiga 1. mail 2004.
However, the Commission observed that in the contract for the sale of FSO shares concluded on 30 June 2005 between the government and AvtoZAZ, the State aid chapter (Article 9) provides that ‘The relevant organs of the public administration intend, provided they receive a decision from the European Commission recognising the planned State aid as consistent with the common market, to grant the Company […] State aid for restructuring.
Komisjon märkis aga, et 30. juunil 2005 valitsuse ja AvtoZAZi vahel sõlmitud FSO aktsiate müügilepingu riigiabi käsitlev peatükk (artikkel 9) sätestab: „Asjaomased riiklikud haldusorganid kavatsevad anda äriühingule ümberkorraldamiseks […] riigiabi tingimusel, et Euroopa Komisjon teeb otsuse, milles ta tunnustab kavandatava riigiabi kokkusobivust ühisturuga.
This assistance shall be granted on the terms set out in FSO’s restructuring plan, which is currently under review at the European Commission under case number C 3/2005.
Abi antakse tingimustel, mis on sätestatud FSO ümberkorraldamiskavas, mida komisjon praegu numbri C 3/2005 all läbi vaatab.
[…] The Buyer declares that the award of State aid to the Company referred to in clause 1 above was one of the conditions of its decision to invest by purchasing Company Shares.
[…] Ostja avaldab, et 1. punktis osutatud riigiabi andmine äriühingule oli üks eeldusi, mille põhjal ostja otsustas äriühingu aktsiate ostmisesse investeerida.
[…] The declarations of the relevant organs of the public administration on the intent to grant State aid to the Company, referred to in clause 1 above, are included in Attachment No 6 to this contract’.
[…] Asjaomaste riiklike haldusorganite avaldused, mis käsitlevad kavatsust anda äriühingule 1. punktis osutatud riigiabi, on lisatud käesoleva lepingu 6. lisas”.
The Commission concludes from the foregoing that on 30 June 2005 there was a legally binding commitment from the State to grant the notified aid subject to approval by the Commission.
Eespool osutatu põhjal järeldab komisjon, et riik võttis 30. juunil 2005 õiguslikult siduva kohustuse anda teatatud abi, kui komisjon selle heaks kiidab.
The Commission has noted that on 30 June 2005 and on earlier dates, it was far from certain that FSO could regain viability.
Komisjon on märkinud, et 30. juunil 2005 ja enne seda ei olnud kaugeltki kindel, et FSO suudab taas elujõuliseks muutuda.
This is confirmed by the aforementioned KPMG and PWC valuation reports.
Seda kinnitavad KPMG ja PWC eespool nimetatud hindamisaktid.
In particular, the Commission notes that the company had no licensor for the production of a new model.
Eelkõige märgib komisjon, et äriühingul puudus uue mudeli tootmiseks litsentsiandja.
The company did not know what it would produce in the future.
Äriühing ei teadnud, mida ta tulevikus tootma hakkab.
The contract for the […] was only signed in 2006.
[…] leping sõlmiti alles 2006. aastal.
The then existing licence agreement with GM DAT for the production of the Lanos expires […].
Sel ajal kehtinud litsentsileping GM DATiga Lanose tootmiseks lõpeb […].
The level of production of the Lanos was low and insufficient to cover costs.
Lanose tootmismaht oli väike ja sellest ei piisanud kulude katmiseks.
In conclusion, the aid was unconditionally promised at a time when the risk of bankruptcy was high.
Kokkuvõtteks anti tingimusteta lubadus abi anda ajal, mil valitses suur pankrotioht.
As regards the precise amount of aid included in the State guarantee covering the investment loan to […], the Polish authorities have not submitted a calculation of a risk factor by which the guarantee could be weighted.
[…] antud investeerimislaenu riigigarantiis sisalduva abi täpse summa osas ei ole Poola ametiasutused esitanud riskiteguri arvutust, millega garantiid kaaluda.
Up to October 2006, the Polish authorities always emphasised that this guarantee was necessary as the company was unable to obtain financing from the market due to the bad experience and the losses suffered by the banks in connection with earlier loans to FSO.
Kuni 2006. aasta oktoobrini rõhutasid Poola ametiasutused alati, et kõnealune garantii oli vajalik, sest äriühingul ei olnud võimalik leida turult rahastamist pankade halbade kogemuste ja kantud kahjude tõttu seoses FSO-le varem antud laenudega.
In addition, the Commission has noted that, as indicated above, the commitment to grant the guarantee was entered into at a time when the risk of bankruptcy was high.
Lisaks sellele on komisjon märkinud, et nagu eespool osutatud, võeti garantii andmise kohustus ajal, mil valitses suur pankrotioht.
In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the aid included in the State guarantee may be up to 100 % of the amount of the guarantee.
Neil asjaoludel arvab komisjon, et riigigarantiis sisalduv abi võib moodustada kuni 100 % garantii summast.
However, on the basis of the later assessment of the compatibility of the aid, the Commission does not need to quantify the precise amount of aid included in this guarantee.
Abi kokkusobivuse hilisema hindamise põhjal ei ole komisjonil aga vaja kõnealuses garantiis sisalduva abi täpset suurust kindlaks määrata.
The Commission notes that the Polish authorities, in their letter of 17 October 2006, suggested that the company would be able to obtain loans from the market at that time.
Komisjon märgib, et Poola ametiasutused viitasid 17. oktoobri 2006. aasta kirjas, et äriühingul oleks võimalik nimetatud ajal turult laene saada.
As a result, Poland asked for the aid included in the guarantee to be quantified on the basis of the reduction in the interest rate obtained thanks to the guarantee.
Seetõttu palus Poola määrata garantiis sisalduva abi suuruse kindlaks, lähtudes garantii tõttu saadud intressimäära alandamisest.
The Commission cannot accede to this request.
Komisjon ei saa sellele palvele vastu tulla.