natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These ranged up into the area of around EUR 1 billion.
Need küündisid umbes 1 miljardi euro kanti.
In relative terms, any silent partnership contribution even over the 15 % limit was recognised as core capital if it met the requirements of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and was in line with the practice of the German supervisory authorities which was based on them.
Suhtelises mõttes tunnustati mis tahes vaikiva seltsingu panust, ka 15 % piiri ületavat, tuumkapitalina, kui see vastas Baseli Pangajärelevalve Komitee nõuetele ja oli kooskõlas Saksamaa järelevalveasutuste tegevusega, mis tugines kõnealustele nõuetele.
Current evidence of the possibility of the 15 % limit being exceeded was provided by a capital measure taken on 2 December 2003 by a BdB member institution, the Deutsche Bank.
Esitati kehtivad tõendid 15 % limiidi ületamise kohta seoses 2. detsembril 2003 BdB liikmesasutuse Deutsche Bank'i võetud kapitalimeetmega.
This was the taking up of silent partnership contributions from private investors totalling EUR 300 million for an unlimited term (a so-called ‘perpetual’) .
Selleks oli erainvestoritelt vaikivate seltsingute panuste ülevõtmine piiramatuks tähtajaks kogusummas 300 eurot (niinimetatud “tähtajatu instrument”).
This illustrated once again how liquid and transparent the market for silent partnership contributions in respect of German banks was, even where large volumes were involved.
See näitas taas, kui likviidne ja läbipaistev oli vaikivate seltsingute panuste turg seoses Saksamaa pankadega, isegi kui asi puudutas suuri mahte.
With an agreed liability premium of 0,99 %, moreover, the measure provided further evidence that the liability remuneration that had been agreed for the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen to Helaba had been calculated in a way that was market-related and market-adequate.
Kokkulepitud riskipreemiaga 0,99 % tõendas see meede veel täiendavalt, et Hesseni liidumaa Helabale antud vaikiva seltsingu panuse eest kokku lepitud riskipreemia oli arvutatud viisil, mis oli turuga seotud ja turu suhtes adekvaatne.
In response to a request from the Commission, Germany submitted a table showing the trend of silent partnership contributions and other hybrid core capital instruments for selected large banks in the private sector from 1998 to 2003.
Vastusena komisoni taotlusele esitas Saksamaa tabeli, mis näitas vaikivate seltsingute panuste ja muude hübriidsete tuumkapitali instrumentide trendi erasektoris valitud suurpankade puhul aastatel 1998 kuni 2003.
Germany argued that this made it clear that the institutions listed had also taken up hybrid core capital beyond the 15 % limit set for banking supervisory purposes, and the extent to which they had done so, since the proportion of total core capital accounted by such instruments exceeded 15 %.
Saksamaa väitel näitas see selgelt, et loetletud asutused olid omandanud ka hübriidset tuumkapitali üle pangandusjärelevalvega seoses kehtestatud 15 % limiidi, samuti nimetatud tegevuse ulatust, kuna kõnealuste instrumentidega seotud osakaal kogu tuumkapitaliga võrreldes ületas 15 %:
[Bank A]
[Pank A]
[Bank B]
[Pank B]
[Bank C]
[Pank C]
Hybrid core capital instruments(of which silent partnership contributions)
Hübriidsed tuumkapitaliinstrumendid (neist vaikivate seltsingute panuseid) (mln €)
Core capital (€ millions)
Tuum-kapital (mln €)
Share of hybrid core capital ( %)
Hübriid-se tuum-kapitali osakaal ( %)
Hybrid core capital instruments (€ millions)
Hübriidsed tuumkapitali-instrumendid (mln €)
Share of hybrid core capital ( %) [18]
Hübriid-se tuum-kapitali osakaal ( %) [18]
Contrary to what the BdB argued, both the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen and silent partnership contributions taken up on the capital market would be paid back in the event of insolvency before the share capital, i.e. on a prior-ranking basis compared to the share capital.
Vastupidiselt BdB väitele kuuluksid nii Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panus ja kapitaliturul ülevõetud vaikivate seltsingute panused maksejõuetuse korral tagasimaksmisele enne aktsiakapitali, st aktsiakapitaliga võrreldes eelisjärjekorras.
Contrary to what the BdB stated, the Land of Hessen like the investor of any other silent partnership contribution would in the event of insolvency receive the recovery percentage, whereas the owner would receive nothing, resulting in a reduced risk compared with share capital.
Vastupidiselt BdB väitele saaks Hesseni liidumaa, nagu mis tahes muu vaikiva seltsingu panuse teinud investor, maksejõuetuse korral tagasinõudeprotsendi, samas kui omanik ei saaks mitte midagi, mistõttu risk on aktsiakapitaliga võrreldes väiksem.
A silent partnership differed significantly from share capital because the silent partner did not have a stake in the assets of the undertaking and also did not have any voting rights.
Vaikiv seltsing erines oluliselt aktsiakapitalist, kuna vaikival seltsinglasel puudus osalus ettevõtte varades ja igasugused hääleõigused.
The BdB had mistaken this in its analysis and thought that a premium should be paid for it.
BdB oli seda oma analüüsis ekslikult arvestanud ja arvas, et selle eest tuleks maksta lisatasu.
The market did not follow this line of thinking.
Turg seda mõttekäiku ei järginud.
The BdB's doubts as to the tax deductibility of the remuneration were unfounded.
BdB kahtlused selles osas, kas tasu kuulub maksustatavast summast mahaarvamisele, olid alusetud.
The Land of Hessen had taken on neither the entrepreneurial risk nor the entrepreneurial initiative necessary for the assumption of a partnership.
Hesseni liidumaa ei olnud enda kanda võtnud ei ettevõtlusriski ega ettevõtlusalgatust, mis on vajalik seltsingu loomiseks.
The Land of Hessen, like any typical silent partner, participated, under the contract on the setting up of the silent partnership, only in Helaba's current profit and loss, but not in its undisclosed reserves, nor in the business value and increases in value in the operating assets.
Hesseni liidumaa, nagu tüüpiline vaikiv seltsinglane kunagi, osales vaikiva seltsingu loomist käsitleva lepingu alusel Helaba jooksvas kasumis ja kahjumis, kuid mitte tema avalikustamata reservides, samuti mitte panga ettevõtlusväärtuses ega tegevusvarade väärtuse kasvus.
Upon termination of the silent partnership, it merely got back its contribution.
Vaikiva seltsingu lõppedes sai ta oma panuse lihtsalt tagasi.
The Land of Hessen had not been given any possibility of exercising company rights that corresponded to the voting, monitoring and contradictory rights of a limited partner or the monitoring rights of a shareholder in accordance with Article 716(1) of the Civil Code.
Hesseni liidumaa ei olnud saanud mingit võimalust rakendada ettevõtteõigusi, mis vastavad usaldusosaniku hääle-, järelevalve- ja vastuvaidlemisõigusele või aktsionäri järelevalveõigusele vastavalt tsiviilkoodeksi artikli 716 lõikele 1.
Furthermore, the state contract between the Länder of Hessen and Thuringia on the formation of a joint savings bank organisation had authorised the bank to take up an atypical silent partner.
Pealegi oli ühise hoiupangaorganisatsiooni moodustamist käsitleva Hesseni ja Tüüringi liidumaa vahelise riikliku lepinguga antud pangale luba ebatüüpilise vaikiva seltsinglase omandamiseks.
In the absence of partnership, the financial authorities had accordingly also recognised the tax deductibility of the remuneration paid to the Land of Hessen.
Seltsingu puudumisel olid finantsasutused vastavalt sellele juba tunnustanud Hesseni liidumaale makstud tasu kuulumist maksustatavast summast mahaarvamisele.
Balance sheet treatment was also different.
Ka bilansikäsitlus oli teistsugune.
Share capital was serviced from the balance sheet profit (surplus of asset items over liability items) by decision of the general meeting of shareholders.
Aktsiakapitali dividende maksti aktsionäride üldkoosoleku otsusega bilansijärgsest kasumist (varaartiklite ülejääk kohustustega võrreldes).
In the case of the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen, by contrast, the remuneration reduced the bank's operating result by reducing net interest received (the remuneration was a component part of expenditure on interest) and did not constitute profit utilisation, and did not therefore require any decision by shareholders.
Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panuse puhul seevastu vähendas tasu panga tegevustulemit, vähendades saadud netointressi (tasu oli intressikulude koostisosa), ega kujutanud endast kasumi kasutamist ning seega polnud vaja aktsionäride otsust.
This mandatory balance sheet treatment of the silent partnership contribution reduced the cost-income-ratio and the balance-sheet equity return.
Vaikiva seltsingu panuse kõnealune kohustuslik bilansikäsitlus vähendas tulude ja kulude suhet ning bilansis kajastatud aktsiatulu.
Contrary to what the BdB argued, a market-economy investor would have agreed to the assessment basis for calculating his remuneration being limited to the part actually used for business expansion and would, for the excess part, not have required a remuneration of 0,3 % in line with the Commission's WestLB decision.
Vastupidiselt BdB väitele oleks turumajanduslik investor nõustunud sellega, et tema tasu arvutamise hindamisalus piirdub üksnes tegevuse laiendamiseks kasutatud osaga ega oleks nõudnud ülejäänud osa eest 0,3 % tasu vastavalt komisjoni poolt WestLB küsimuses tehtud otsusele.
Because of Helaba's limited requirement, made known from the outset, any other investor would not have been able to achieve any better negotiating result than the Land of Hessen.
Helaba limiteeritud nõude tõttu, mis tehti algusest peale teatavaks, ei oleks ükski teine investor suutnud saavutada läbirääkimistel paremat tulemust kui Hesseni liidumaa.
As far as the level of the appropriate remuneration was concerned, the BdB's argument was mistaken in its very approach.
Kuivõrd asi puudutab asjakohast tasu, siis oli BdB argument juba lähenemisviisilt ekslik.
The criterion could only be remunerations that had been agreed during the relevant period on the market for comparable silent partnership contributions to credit institutions.
Kriteeriumiks said olla üksnes tasud, mille asjus oli kokku lepitud võrreldavate krediidiasutustele antud vaikivate seltsingute panuste vastava turuloleku perioodi jooksul.
Differences in the shaping of the various silent partnership contributions, but also in the quality of the credit institutions taking them up, should be taken into account in the comparison of the remunerations through deductions from or premiums on such remunerations and not on the remuneration for a hypothetical share capital investment.
Tasude võrdlemisel tuleks arvesse võtta erinevusi vaikivate seltsingute panuste vormis, aga ka neid omandavate krediidiasutuste kvaliteedis, arvestades mahaarvamisi või kõnealuste tasude, mitte aga hüpoteetilise aktsiakapitali investeeringu eest makstava tasu alusel arvestatavaid lisatasusid.
Quite apart from that, the determination of the yield on share capital investments by the BdB was erroneous.
Lisaks sellele oli aktsiakapitali investeeringute tootlus BdB poolt valesti määratud.
In determining the beta value, the Landesbanks should not be equated with credit banks with an above-average systematic risk.
Beetaväärtuse määramisel ei tohiks liidumaade pankasid võrdsustada keskmisest kõrgema süstemaatilise riskiga krediidipankadega.
Rather, the proper criterion should be the clearly defined group of banks listed on the stock exchange, the so-called CDAX banks.
Pigem peaks õige kriteerium olema börsil noteeritud selgepiiriline pankade rühm, nõndanimetatud CDAX pangad.
A large proportion of Helaba's balance sheet total related to low-risk local authority, interbank and mortgage claims.
Suur osa Helaba bilansi kogusummast oli seotud madala riskiga kohalike asutuste, pankadevaheliste ja hüpoteeginõuetega.
As part of an objective business appraisal, an independent expert had, on 1 January 1999, determined for seven credit institutions with a comparable risk structure in terms of business risk, business activity, customer structure and size, an average beta factor of [...], i.e. well below 1.
Äritegevuse objektiivse hindamise osana oli sõltumatu ekspert 1. jaanuaril 1999 määranud seitsme võrreldava riskistruktuuriga (äririsk, äritegevus, kliendistruktuur ja suurus) krediidiasutuse keskmiseks beetafaktoriks [...], st tublisti alla 1.
The expert had started from the assumption of a long-term market yield of 5,0 % and a long-term risk-free interest rate of 6,0 %.
Ekspert oli lähtunud eeldusest, et pikaajaline turuintress on 5,0 % ja pikaajaline riskivaba intressimäär on 6,0 %.
This gave, on 1 January 1999, an equity capital cost of [...] %.
See andis 1. jaanuaril 1999 omakapitali maksumuseks [...] %.
The BdB's assertion regarding the equity yield of 11,66 % on 31 December 1998 for Helaba was based on an excessive beta factor and, moreover, on historical data that were no longer current.
BdB väide Helaba 11,66 % aktsiatulu kohta 31. detsembril 1998 tugines ülemäära kõrgele beetafaktorile ja peale selle varasematele andmetele, mis ei olnud enam aktuaalsed.
The level of interest rates had changed significantly in recent decades, and the BdB's comments on inflation and inflation expectations were not comprehensible in this context.
Intressimäärade tase oli viimastel aastakümnetel oluliselt muutunud ning BdB märkused inflatsiooni ja eeldatava inflatsiooni kohta ei olnud selles kontekstis mõistetavad.
Furthermore, the agreed remuneration for the duration of the silent partnership contribution could be compared only with the changing level of the relevant share capital yield and not, for example, with the share capital yield of the undertaking at the time of the investment.
Peale selle saab kokkulepitud tasu vaikiva seltsingu panuse kehtivusajal võrrelda üksnes asjaomase aktsiakapitali tootluse muutuva tasemega, mitte aga näiteks ettevõtte aktsiakapitali tootlusega investeeringu tegemise ajal.
No-one would have guaranteed an owner of the bank an equity yield at the level of the end of 1998 and thus afforded protection from the risk of yield fluctuations.
Mitte keegi ei oleks taganud panga omanikule omakapitali tootlust 1998. aasta lõpu tasemel ja seega pakkunud kaitset tootluse kõikumiste riski eest.
The BdB's comments on the level of the deduction of refinancing costs did not stand up.
BdB märkused refinantseerimiskulude mahaarvamistaseme kohta ei pidanud paika.
Reference could be made to the net refinancing costs only if, from the comparative remunerations which private credit institutions pay for comparable silent partnership contributions taken up by them on the capital market, the theoretical or actual overall tax ratio of such institutions was deducted.
Refinantseerimise netokuludele saab viidata üksnes juhul, kui eraõiguslike krediidiasutuste poolt kapitaliturul omandatud võrreldavate vaikivate seltsingute panuste eest makstavatest võrreldavatest tasudest arvatakse maha kõnealuste asutuste teoreetiline või üldine maksumäär.
For the contributions taken up on the capital market, however, it was usually not the overall remuneration, but only the remuneration premium that was given, which in the case of variable interest rate instruments and in the case of illiquid contributions, was identical with the liability remuneration.
Kapitaliturul ülevõetud panuste puhul ei antud tavaliselt mitte üldist tasu, vaid üksnes lisatasu, mis muutuva intressimääraga instrumentide ja mittelikviidsete panuste puhul oli riskipreemiaga identne.
The comparison between the remuneration on the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen and the remunerations paid on the market could, therefore, be made directly.
Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panust ja turul makstud tasusid saab seega otseselt võrrelda.
The roundabout approach of taking a fictitious overall remuneration on a fictitious cash contribution from which the refinancing costs then had to be deducted was unnecessary and, moreover, increased the uncertainty of the quantitative assessment many times over, since estimates then had to be introduced at a number of stages.
Kaudne lähenemine, mille kohaselt võetakse fiktiivne üldtasu fiktiivse rahalise panuse pealt, millest tuli siis refinantseerimiskulud maha arvata, oli tarbetu ja pealegi kasvatas kvantitatiivse hindamise ebakindlust mitmekordselt, kuna sel juhul tuli mitmes punktis sisse tuua hinnangulised väärtused.
Contrary to what the BdB argued, there was no justification for any remuneration premiums.
Vastupidiselt BdB väitele puudus lisatasudel õigustus.
There was no empirical evidence that a premium was paid on the market for a particularly large contribution.
Puudusid empiirilised tõendid selle kohta, nagu oleks turul eriti suure panuse eest makstud preemiat.
Comparable capital-raising operations by private credit institutions did not reveal any connection between the amount and the remuneration.
Võrreldavad eraõiguslike krediidiasutuste kapitalitootmistehingud ei toonud ilmsiks mingeid seoseid summa ja tasu vahel.
Rather, the Land had had to accept the agreed phased arrangements because Helaba had initially no use for the special fund en bloc.
Pigem oli liidumaa pidanud kokkulepitud etapiviisilise skeemiga nõustuma, kuna Helabal puudus algselt erifondi jaoks tervikuna kasutusotstarve.
On the market, no investor would have been able to receive not only a remuneration immediately for the entire amount, but in addition a premium as well.
Turul ei oleks mitte ühelgi investoril õnnestunud saada mitte üksnes tasu kohe kogu summa eest, vaid ka lisatasu.
Furthermore, the argument that, in the case of share capital investments, the waiving of a voting right must be compensated for by an additional remuneration could not be applied to a silent partnership.
Pealegi ei saanud vaikiva seltsingu suhtes kohaldada argumenti, et aktsiakapitali investeeringute puhul tuleb hääleõigusest loobumist kompenseerida täiendava tasuga.
The silent partner had by law no voting right, and the market did not grant any remuneration for the silent partner's ‘waiving’ of the possibility of exercising influence.
Vaikival seltsinglasel ei olnud seaduse kohaselt hääleõigust ning turg ei andnud mingit tasu selle eest, et vaikiv seltsinglane “loobub” mõjuvõimu rakendamise võimalusest.
It was in principle true that, on the market, an investor accepted the lack of fungibility of his investment in return for a higher yield.
Põhimõtteliselt oli tõsi, et turul aktsepteeris investor vahetatavuse puudumist vastutasuks kõrgema intressimäära eest.
Indeed, the lack of fungibility of the silent partnership contribution of the Land as compared with profit-sharing capital had been taken into account in the discussions leading up to the transaction.
Õigupoolest oli liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panuse vahetatavuse puudumist võrreldes tulujagamiskapitaliga tehinguni viinud aruteludes arvesse võetud.
The parties had taken account of the perpetuity of the contribution in the form of the remuneration premium of 0,20 % a year.
Osapooled olid arvesse võtnud panuse püsivust lisatasuna 0,20 % aastas.
However, a private investor would have taken account of the fact that in this instance an investment was sought not for cash, but for a large, non-divisible special fund earmarked for a specific purpose that could be transferred only as an illiquid capital contribution.
Erainvestor oleks arvesse võtnud tõsiasja, et antud juhul ei olnud investeeringu ajendiks sularaha, vaid suur jagamatu sihtotstarbeline erifond, mida saab üle anda üksnes mittelikviidse kapitalipanusena.
When the BdB argued that there was virtually no market for such an investment, this applied not only to reinvestment (fungibility), but also to the initial investment.
Kui BdB väitis, et niisuguse investeeringu jaoks praktiliselt puudus turg, ei kehtinud see mitte üksnes ümberinvesteerimise (vahetatavus), vaid ka esialgse investeeringu kohta.
It was not plausible that a private investor would in view of this have demanded or received an even higher premium than the 0,20 % a year agreed for the perpetuity aspect.
Polnud usutav, et erainvestor oleks seda silmas pidades nõudnud või saanud veelgi kõrgemat preemiat kui kokkulepitud 0,20 % aastas katkematuse aspekti eest.
Nor had the BdB provided any further explanation or justification on this point.
Samuti polnud BdB esitanud selle punkti kohta mingeid täiendavaid selgitusi ega põhjendusi.
In the market comparison, lastly, contrary to the view put forward by the BdB, the trade tax effect had to be taken into account.
Turuvõrdluses omakorda tuli vastupidiselt BdB esitatud seisukohale arvesse võtta kaubandusmaksu mõju.
Silent partnership contributions to credit institutions were usually provided by institutional investors which had themselves to pay the trade tax on the remuneration received.
Vaikivate seltsingute panuseid krediidiasutustesse tegid tavaliselt institutsionaalsed investorid, kes pidid ise saadud tasu pealt kaubandusmaksu tasuma.
The Land, by contrast, was not liable to trade tax and would therefore be satisfied with a correspondingly lower remuneration.
Seevastu liidumaa ei olnud kaubandusmaksu kohustuslane ning rahuldunuks seega vastavalt madalama tasuga.
The counter effect of the non-liability of the Land was the liability of the bank, which accordingly had to pay the trade tax.
Liidumaa vastutuse puudumise vastasmõju seisnes panga vastutuses, kes pidi vastavalt kaubandusmaksu maksma.
Whether it was paid to the Land or the municipality was irrelevant, as was the fact that the trade tax was assessed on the taxable income (usually the taxable income of the recipient of the remuneration, but here the taxable income of the bank), so long as the bank did in fact achieve income.
Kas see maksti liidumaale või haldusüksusele, oli tähtsusetu, nagu ka tõsiasi, et kaubandusmaksu hinnati maksustatavate sissetulekute alusel (tavaliselt tasu saaja maksustatav tulu, kuid siin panga maksustatav tulu), kuivõrd pank tegelikult tulu ei saanud.
If, by contrast, it suffered losses, not only was there no payment of trade tax, but also no payment of the remuneration on the contribution.
Kui ta seevastu kahju kannaks, ei pääse ta mitte üksnes kaubandusmaksu, vaid ka panuse pealt tasu maksmisest.
Contrary to what the BdB argued, Helaba did not pay the remuneration to itself either.
Vastupidiselt BdB väitele ei maksnud Helaba tasu ka iseendale.
In accordance with the decision of the Land of Hessen, the yield remaining after tax from the investment of the special fund did not accrue to the general budget, but was similarly tied to the earmarked purposes of the fund and was to be used to strengthen the promotion-related business.
Vastavalt Hesseni liidumaa otsusele ei kogunenud erifondi investeerimisest laekunud maksustamisjärgsed intressid üldeelarvesse, vaid olid sarnaselt seotud fondi sihtotstarbelisusega ning mõeldud kasutamiseks edendamisega seotud äritegevuse tugevdamiseks.
This was a question of the use of the resources paid by Helaba to the Land.
Siin oli küsimus Helaba poolt liidumaale makstud vahendite kasutamises.
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty states that, save as otherwise provided in that Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is incompatible with the common market, insofar as it affects trade between Member States.
EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 kohaselt, “kui käesolevas lepingus ei ole sätestatud teisiti, on igasugune liikmesriigi poolt või riigi ressurssidest ükskõik missugusel kujul antav abi, mis kahjustab või ähvardab kahjustada konkurentsi, soodustades teatud ettevõtjaid või teatud kaupade tootmist, ühisturuga kokkusobimatu niivõrd, kuivõrd see kahjustab liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust”.
STATE RESOURCES
RIIKLIKUD VAHENDID