natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Besides these comments on the direct remuneration, Germany also argued that it was not a factor, or not the only factor, in an investment decision and that ‘in accordance with the case law, … an investor who does not hold or seek to hold a significant share in the relevant company but who is interested in a rapid return on his investment must be distinguished from investors geared to the long term, such as holding companies’.
Vaatamata selgitustele otsese hüvitise kohta, jäi Saksamaa siiski põhimõttelisele seisukohale, et investeerimisotsused ei sõltu üldse või mitte üksnes otsesest hüvitisest. “Kohtupraktika kohaselt tuleb vahet teha investoril, kel pole kõnealuses ettevõttes nimetamisväärset osalust ja kes selle poole ka ei püüdle, vaid on huvitatud oma investeeringu kiirest tasuvusest, ja pikemas perspektiivis tegutseval investoril, nt valdusühingud”.
The latter were interested in long-term return expectations and would also take account of strategic considerations.
Viimased juhinduvad pikemas perspektiivis oodatavast tulususest ja peaksid silmas ka strateegilisi kaalutlusi.
As sole owner of LBB, the Land assumed at the time of the investment that it would benefit fully and directly from the increase in LBB's value brought about by WBK's transfer.
LBB ainuomanikuna eeldas liidumaa investeeringu tegemise ajal, et saab WBK üleandmisele järgnevast LBB väärtuse kasvust täielikku ja vahetut kasu.
Germany initially indicated that LBB's return-on-equity ratio was 13,5 % in 1992 and 30,83 % in 1993.
Saksamaa esialgse selgituse kohaselt olevat LBB omakapitali tulusus 1992. aastal olnud 13,5 % ja 1993. aastal 30,83 %.
These figures, submitted back in 1999, related to the ratio ‘earnings before (income) tax/equity capital shown in the balance sheet at the start of the same year’.
Neid juba 1999. aastal esitatud arve tuleks vaadelda suhestatuna “kasumiga enne (tulu)maksu/bilansijärgne omakapital sama aasta alguses”.
However, in supplying these figures, Germany had not included IBB's special-purpose reserve in LBB's equity capital from 1993 onwards.
Samas ei kajastanud Saksamaa esitatud arvandmetes alates 1993. aastast LBB omakapitali real IBB sihtotstarbelist reservi.
At the Commission's request, this was corrected with the sending of data series covering a longer period.
Komisjoni päringu tulemusel seda korrigeeriti pikemat ajavahemikku kajastavate arvandmete edastamisega.
For the period 1985-1992 these figures gave an average return on equity of about 13 %.
Aastatel 1985 kuni 1992 kujunes esitatud arvandmete alusel keskmiseks omakapitali tulususeks 13 %.
Germany stated that these figures would fall within the range of values obtained by private German banks in the same period, but it did not initially provide data produced by a similar method for other banks.
Saksamaa selgitas, et need näitajad sarnanevad Saksa erapankade näitajatega samal ajavahemikul. Esialgu puudusid siiski metoodika poolest võrreldavad teiste pankade andmed.
It subsequently submitted its own calculations based on the published profit and loss statements of 35 German banks.
Hiljem esitas Saksamaa 35 Saksamaa panga avalikult kättesaadavate kasumiaruannete alusel koostatud omapoolsed arvutused.
Taking ‘earnings before tax as a percentage of equity capital shown in the balance sheet at the start of the same year’, this gave an average return-on-equity ratio for these banks of around 11 % in 1992 and just under 13 % for the period from 1988 to 1992.
Esitatu kohaselt kujunes “kasum enne (tulu)maksu/bilansijärgne omakapital sama aasta alguses” põhjal 1992. aastal viidatud pankade keskmiseks omakapitali tulususeks ca 11 % ja aastate 1988–1992 keskmiseks peaaegu 13 %.
Germany also stated that, from a business point of view, earning capacity was a decisive factor in an investment decision and that, in the case of banks, it could best be derived from profit from ordinary business or from operating result as a percentage of equity capital shown in the balance sheet since extraordinary earnings and expenditure would then be excluded.
Saksamaa selgitas täiendavalt, et investeerimisotsuse juures on mikroökonoomika seisukohalt oluline tulu teenimise võime. Viimane avaldub panga puhul kõige ehedamalt tavalise majandustegevuse kasumi või tegevuskasumi suhtes bilansilisse omakapitali, sest sel juhul ei arvestata erakorralisi tulusid ja kulusid. LBB-d mõjutasid aastatel 1990–1992 erakorralised asjaolud, eelkõige “Sparkasse Ost” ühendamise tulemusel.
In the years 1990-92 LBB faced extraordinary circumstances, in particular the integration of the East Berlin Savings Bank and the related setting up of its own pension scheme, at the same time as it had to pay a compensation fee for withdrawing from the Federal and Länder Pension Institution and to make provision for the general banking risks of the former East Berlin Savings Bank.
Muuhulgas seondus viimasega iseseisva vanaduspensioni süsteemi rajamine. Samal ajal tasuti kompensatsioon kindlustusasutusest Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder väljaastumisel, nagu ka kunagise “Sparkasse Ost” üldiste pangandusriskide provisjon.
As regards obtaining methodologically comparable return-on-equity ratios for other banks in the same period, Germany stated that banks were required only as of 1993 to enter extraordinary result and profit from ordinary business separately in the profit and loss account, and that this cannot be compared with the pre-1993 method, when extraordinary income and expenditure were included, together with other items, under ‘other income and expenditure’ and therefore could not be identified precisely.
Saksamaa selgitas teiste pankade sama perioodi metoodiliselt võrreldavate omakapitali tulususe määrade kohta, et alles alates 1993. aastast nõuti kasumiaruandes erakorralise ja tavalise majandustegevuse kasumi eristamist. Seega ei ole metoodikad enne ja pärast 1993. aastat võrreldavad, sest varem olid erakorralised tulud ja kulud koos teiste kirjetega real “muud tulud/kulud” ja ei olnud täpselt määratletavad.
For the period pre-1993, Germany submitted its own calculations.
Saksamaa esitas varasema aja kohta omapoolsed arvutused.
In the course of the proceedings Germany also made corrections and additions to the method for calculating LBB's return on equity, in order to render the figures for LBB comparable with the Bundesbank's official survey of German banks.
Samuti tegi Saksamaa menetluse käigus LBB omakapitali tulususe arvutusmeetodis parandusi ja täiendusi selleks, et LBB arvnäitajad oleksid võrreldavad keskpanga (Bundesbank) ametlike andmetega teiste Saksa pankade kohta.
According to Germany, this did not change the basic assessment that LBB's return on equity was in line with the average for the sector.
Saksamaa sõnul ei muutnud see midagi põhimõttelises hinnangus, et LBB omakapitali tulusus jäi majandusharu keskmise piiridesse.
In Germany's view, all the data showed that, at the time of the capital injection, LBB had a high earning capacity.
Saksamaa arvates tõendavad kõik arvnäitajad, et LBB oli vahendite eraldamise ajal võimeline tulu teenima.
The Land of Berlin was the sole owner and would alone benefit from the bank's commercial success, whether in the form of dividends or an increase in value.
Berliini liidumaa oli ainuomanik ning saanuks üksi osa panga äriedust, olgu siis makstavate dividendide või väärtuse kasvu näol.
In this respect, the Land would not have to share the expected increase in return with other shareholders and the almost ‘intra-group’ investment was sound conduct from the point of view of an investor operating in a market economy.
Seetõttu ei pidanud liidumaa jagama oodatavat tulususe kasvu teiste omanikega ja kvaasi-“kontsernisisene” ümberpaigutamine olevat turumajanduslikult tegutseva investori seisukohalt mõistlik käitumine.
The question of whether and how large a remuneration was paid by LBB for the capital injection was therefore irrelevant to an assessment of the transfer's market-economy status.
Küsimus, kas ja millises ulatuses maksis LBB vahendite eraldamise eest hüvitist, olevat üleandmise turumajandusliku iseloomu küsimuse jaoks väheoluline.
According to Germany, the Commission expressly laid down this assessment criterion in Decision 2000/392/EC: ‘Therefore, one way of ensuring an adequate return on the capital provided would have been to increase the Land’s participation in WestLB accordingly, provided that the bank's overall profitability corresponds to the normal rate of return that a market-economy investor would expect from his investment.
Kõnealusele hindamiskriteeriumile tugines komisjon sõnaselgelt otsuses 2000/392/EÜ: “Selleks, et tagada eraldatud kapitali mõistlik tulusus, oleks liidumaa pidanud suurendama oma osalust WestLB-s, niivõrd kui panga kogutulusus vastanuks normaalsele tulususele, mida investeeringu puhul eeldab turumajanduslikult tegutsev investor.
This would have avoided the discussion of whether the 0,6 % rate of remuneration is appropriate. However, this course was not adopted by the Land.’
Seega oleks olnud üleliigne tegeleda küsimusega, kas tasu 0,6 % on piisav, ent liidumaa ei otsustanud siiski sellise teguviisi kasuks.”
In this connection, Germany also stated that LBB's increase in value as a result of WBK's assets benefited the Land after LBB's incorporation into BGB.
Saksamaa selgitas ühtlasi, et liidumaa sai kasu LBB väärtuse kasvust WBK varade arvel pärast LBB ühendamist BGB-ga.
The transfer, undertaken in three stages in 1994 and 1998, of 100 % of the beneficial ownership in LBB to BGB was carried out on the basis of expert reports by various chartered accountants and one investment bank on the value of the Land’s silent partnership in LBB and on whether the quid pro quo — the BGB shares transferred, including in relation to other shareholders — equated to an acceptable market price.
Majanduslikus mõttes LBB omandi 100 %-line üleandmine BGB-le viidi läbi kolmes etapis aastatel 1994 ja 1998 mitme majandusaudiitori ja investeerimispanga ekspertarvamuse põhjal, mis kajastasid liidumaa sissemaksena hääleõiguseta osaluse väärtust LBB-s ja vastutasu – üle antud BGB aktsiad, seda ka suhetes teiste aktsionäridega, – vastavust turutingimustele.
Germany provided relevant extracts from these reports and the related correspondence with the accountants.
Saksamaa edastas asjaomaste ekspertarvamuste väljavõtted ja asjassepuutuva kirjavahetuse majandusaudiitoritega.
According to these documents, the value of LBB was set at some DEM 3,5 billion in 1993 (excluding IBB itself, but taking account of LBB's higher core capital ratio as a result of the special-purpose reserve) and, by a further expert, at just under DEM 6 billion at 31 December 1997.
LBB väärtust hinnati selles 1993. aastal ligikaudu 3,5 mld Saksa margale (ilma IBB-ta, kuid pidades silmas sihtotstarbelise reservi arvel tõusnud LBB esimese taseme omavahendite määra) ja teise eksperdi hinnangul 31. detsembri 1997. aasta seisuga 6 mld Saksa margale.
Germany also suggested, in the alternative, that the method used by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC was faulty in that it assumed comparability with liquid ordinary capital investment.
Alternatiivselt asus Saksamaa seisukohale, et otsuse 2000/392/EÜ puhul kasutatud metoodika on vigane, sest see lähtub võrreldavusest likviidsete, tavapäraste põhikapitaliinvesteeringutega.
This approach failed to take account of the particularities of the transaction at issue in these proceedings.
Selline lähenemine ei õigustavat end kõnealuse tehingu eripära tõttu.
It was proper to use comparable equity instruments as a basis for calculating even the starting amount.
Asjakohane olevat juba lähteväärtuste puhul tugineda võrreldavatele omakapitali instrumentidele.
While this might be difficult, as the Commission had explained in the WestLB case, the difficulties would not be overcome by using a completely unsuitable equity capital instrument, almost as a ‘way around’ the problem.
See võib küll osutuda keeruliseks, nagu komisjon WestLB juhtumis nentis. Ent keerulisust ei saa vältida täiesti sobimatu omakapitali instrumendi kasutamisega ehk niiöelda “ringi tegemisega”.
It was also mistaken to use average return as a benchmark.
Lisaks olevat ekslik kasutada võrdlusbaasina keskmist tulusust.
Only a return below the range available to investors for assessment purposes was no longer acceptable to a private investor.
Erainvestor ei nõustuks tulususega alles siis, kui see jääb allapoole vahemikku, mille raames investor saab otsuseid teha.
Lastly, it was erroneous to deduct only net refinancing costs instead of total refinancing costs.
Samuti olevat väär ainult neto-refinantseerimiskulude mahaarvamine täies mahus refinantseerimiskulude mahaarvamise asemel.
Any tax savings by the company were immaterial from the investor's point of view.
Ettevõtte potentsiaalselt säästetavad maksud olevat investori seisukohalt tähtsusetud.
A further consideration showed that this approach was unacceptable since with non-liquid provision of capital the earnings function of the capital was still available to the investor and could be re-invested by him to obtain at least the risk-free rate of interest, and he would thus achieve ‘double’ earnings.
Juba teistsugune arutluskäik näitaks mainitud lähenemise ebasobivust, sest mittelikviidse kapitali üleandmise korral jääks investorile endiselt kapitali tulususe funktsioon, mistõttu investor saaks teha uue investeeringu ja teenida vähemalt riskivaba intressi, saades seega topeltkasu.
Germany also argued that the limitation period had expired (pursuant to Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999) and that the Commission therefore had no power to order recovery of any aid.
Saksamaa asus lisaks seisukohale, et komisjonil ei olevat tähtaja möödumise tõttu (määrus (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõige 1) õigust võimalikku abi tagasi nõuda.
The basic resolution on WBK's transfer had been adopted on 16 June 1992, i.e. more than ten years before the decision initiating the investigation procedure was served on 4 July 2002.
WBK üleandmise põhimõtteline otsus olevat tehtud 16. juunil 1992. aastal, seega enam kui kümme aastat enne menetluse algatamise otsuse kättetoimetamist 4. juulil 2002. aastal.
The resolution expressed the basic intention to merge the Land’s bank holdings and WBK into one holding company (later BGB), provided that WBK's promotional activities could continue and that the assumption of sovereign tasks and the tax exemption were guaranteed.
Tegemist oli põhimõttelise kavatsusega ühendada ühe valdusfirma (hilisem BGB) alla liidumaa osalused pankades ja WBK, kuivõrd olnuks võimaldatud WBK arendus- ja edendustegevuse jätkamine, avaliku võimu teostamisega seotud ülesannete täitmine ja maksuvabastus.
The resolution had been in the public domain since then, and the Commission had been informed of its date in 1999.
Otsus oli üldsusele sellest ajast teada ja komisjoni informeeriti 1999. aastal otsuse kuupäevast.
In a number of decisions, the Commission had already taken the declaration of intent by the relevant body, even subject to conditions, as marking the point at which the aid was implemented.
Komisjon olevat mitmes otsuses lugenud pädeva organi kavatsuste protokolli – isegi tingimusliku – abi osutamise ajaks.
This was also the position adopted by the Commission in the decision on rescue aid for BGB, even though the resolution concerned, adopted on 22 May 2002, had still required the approval of Parliament and of the Commission.
Sellise hinnangu olevat komisjon andnud ka nt BGB päästeabi otsuses, kuigi kõnealusel 22. mai 2002. aasta otsusel puudusid veel volikogu (sks k Abgeordnetenhaus) ja komisjoni heakskiit.
Moreover, in Germany's view, the limitation period had not been interrupted pursuant to the second sentence of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which states that only action taken by the Commission can interrupt the period.
Saksamaa sõnul ei ole tegemist tähtaja katkemisega määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõike 2 teise lause alusel. Tähtaega võivad katkestada ainult komisjoni meetmed.
The first such Commission action was the letter regarding the initiation of the procedure dated 4 July 2002, and not the requests for information, which were not measures taken by the Commission or the relevant Commission Member.
See olevat toimunud alles 4. juuli 2002. aasta kirjaga menetluse algatamise kohta, mitte aga pelgalt teabenõuete alusel, mis ei olevat komisjoni ega pädeva voliniku meede.
Account should moreover be taken of the fact that the limitation period existed in the interests of legal certainty, not only in relations between the Commission and the Member States but also for the recipients of state aid.
Peab samuti arvestama, et aegumistähtaeg teenib õiguskindluse huve ning seda mitte ainult komisjoni ja liikmesriikide suhetes, vaid ka abi saaja õiguskindluse tagamiseks.
As Germany was asked for the first time in the decision initiating the procedure to forward a copy of the letter to the aid recipient, which it did on 9 July 2002, the limitation period was interrupted only as of that date.
Kuna alles menetluse algatamisel nõuti Saksamaalt dokumendi koopia edastamist abi saajale, mis toimus 9. juulil 2002. aastal, võivat aegumise katkemine kõne alla tulla alles nimetatud päevast alates.
Since the measure subject to state aid monitoring was the resolution of 16 June 1992, it constituted, if it were aid at all, existing aid pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Kuna antud asjas kontrollitakse abi esinemist meetmes, milleks on 16. juuni 1992. aasta otsus, siis abi esinemise korral on tegemist olemasoleva abiga määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõike 3 tähenduses.
V. COMMENTS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
V. TEISTE ASJASSEPUUTUVATE ISIKUTE SELGITUSED
After the decision initiating the procedure had been published in the Official Journal, the Commission received comments from the Berliner Volksbank (‘BV’) and the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (‘BdB’) in October and November respectively.
Pärast menetluse algatamise teate ilmumist EÜT-s sai komisjon oktoobris– novembris Berliner Volksbank’i (edaspidi: “BV”) ja katusorganisatsiooni Bundesverband deutscher Banken (edaspidi: “BdB”) arvamuse.
The BV took the view that the transfer of WBK was aid because the capital had been made available on terms which a market-economy investor would not have accepted.
BV oli seisukohal, et WBK üleandmine kujutab endast abi, sest kapitalivahendid anti kasutada tingimustel, millega turumajanduslikult tegutsev investor ei oleks nõustunud. Maksed olevat toimunud LBB-lt LBB osakonnana toimivale IBB-le.
Payments were made by LBB to IBB, which was itself managed as a division of LBB; moreover, the agreed interest rate of 0,25 % lay well below the normal market rates, as illustrated by Decisions 2000/392/EC (WestLB), 95/547/EC and 98/490/EC (Crédit Lyonnais), where a likely return on capital of at least 12 % was taken as a basis.
Kokkulepitud intressimäär 0,25 % ei vastanud kaugeltki turutingimustele, mida kinnitavat ka näiteks otsused 2000/392/EÜ (WestLB), 95/547/EÜ ja 98/490/EG (Crédit Lyonnais), milles oodatava omakapitali tulususena tugineti vähemalt 12 %-le.
This aid led to a serious distortion of Community-wide competition, but with particularly serious consequences in Berlin, where BGB, including LBB (and Berliner Bank and Berliner Sparkasse), led the market in personal and corporate retail banking.
Abi kahjustas oluliselt konkurentsi kogu ühenduse piires, avaldades eriti tugevat mõju konkurentsile Berliinis, kus BGB ja selle raames LBB on era- ja äriklientide turu liidrid (sh Berliner Bank ja Berliner Sparkasse).
By comparison, BV was a small competitor with market shares of 5-7 % and was thus particularly affected by the negative impact of the aid.
BV olevat väike konkurent, mille turuosad jäävad 5-7 % vahele ja on seetõttu abi negatiivsetest mõjudest eriti puudutatud.
It closed its statement by calling on the Commission to order recovery of the aid.
Arvamus lõpeb taotlusega komisjonile teha abi tagasinõudmise otsus.
The BdB began by stating that the proceedings at issue formed part of a series of investigations by the Commission involving the transfer of Land housing promotion institutions to the Landesbanks, which carried on competitive business.
BdB selgitas kõigepealt, et kõnealune menetlus moodustab osa kompleksest komisjoni uurimisest elamuehitust edendavate asutuste üleandmise kohta konkurentsitingimustes tegutsevatele liidumaade riiklikele pankadele.
In LBB's case too, contrary to the statements by Germany, the higher own funds requirements under the Solvency Directive were decisive.
Sealjuures olevat ka LBB juhtumil, vastupidiselt Saksamaa väidetele, otsustava tähtsusega maksevõime direktiivi rangemad omakapitali nõuded.
Evidence that this was the case were the timing of the transfer and the comments by the relevant Member of the Land Government at the time, who referred to the European own funds requirements, which were expected to become stricter.
Sellele motiivile viitab nii üleandmise aeg kui ka toonase vastutava senaatori ütlused, kes olevat samuti maininud, et oodata on rangemaid EL-i omakapitali eeskirju.
In this respect, there was no relevant difference in state aid terms between the transfer of WBK to LBB at issue here and the transfer of WfA to WestLB, which meant that the method used by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC could be applied here.
Selles mõttes ei ole riigiabi õiguse seisukohast olulist erinevust siin hinnatava WBK LBB-le üleandmise ja WfA WestLB-le üleandmise vahel, mistõttu on võimalik kasutada komisjoni otsuses 2000/392/EÜ rakendatud metoodikat.
The BdB went on to comment that it was not only the special-purpose reserve which was at issue here but also the transfer of WBK's capital of DEM 187,5 million, which was assigned to LBB's subscribed capital; this constituted a financial advantage as it influenced the rating and the terms for raising external capital.
BdB märkis täiendavalt, et asi ei ole üksnes sihtotstarbelises reservis, vaid ka WBK kapitali üleandmises summas 187,5 mln Saksa marka, mis lisati LBB aktsiakapitalile. See kujutas endast rahaliselt hinnatavat eelist, sest mõjutab reitingut ja võõrkapitali kaasamise tingimusi.
However, of much greater significance was the increase in core capital recognised for supervisory purposes as a result of the transfer.
Üleandmisega seotud ja järelevalveõiguslikult tunnustatud esimese taseme omavahendite suurendamine oli aga märksa kaalukama tähtsusega.
As this had been available in full as liable capital, despite the special-purpose reserve's being used primarily for promotional activities, its purpose was not the issue.
Kapitali seotus sihtotstarbega ei ole määrav, sest vaatamata sihtotstarbelise reservi kasutamisele eelkõige edendamisülesannete täitmiseks, oli see täies mahus panga käsutuses vastutava kapitalina.
The key factor was the economic advantage of the business expansion function, especially since the core capital had powerful leverage (lending capacity increased by 12,5 times for 100 % risk-weighted assets such as lending to companies and by 25 times for 50 % risk-weighted assets such as loans to public authorities).
Määrav olevat äritegevuse laiendamise funktsiooni majanduslik eelis, kuivõrd just esimese taseme omavahendid on jõuliseks hoovaks (12,5-kordne laenuandmise võime 100 %-lise riskiga kaalutud varade korral nagu näiteks laenud ettevõtjatele; 25-kordne 50 %-lise riskiga kaalutud varade korral nagu näiteks laenud avalikule sektorile).
If additional capital were raised, with a core capital of (hypothetically) €1 billion and a risk weighting of 50 %, loans amounting to as much as €50 billion could be given.
Lisakapitali kaasamise teel oleks (hüpoteetiliselt) ühe miljardi euro väärtuses esimese taseme omavahendite ja 50 %-lise riskiga kaalumise korral võimalik anda laene isegi 50 mld euro ulatuses.