natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At least 4 percentage points of this amount must consist of what is termed core capital, or ‘tier I’ capital, meaning items of capital which are at the credit institution's disposal without restriction and immediately to cover risks or losses as soon as they arise.
Vähemalt 4 protsenti sellest peavad moodustama niinimetatud esimese taseme omavahendid ehk kapital, mis on piiramatult ja vahetult krediidiasutuse käsutuses, katmaks riske ja kahjumeid kohe nende tekkimisel.
In determining the total own funds available to a bank for supervisory purposes, the core capital is of decisive importance because additional capital, or ‘tier II’ capital, is accepted as underpinning for risk-bearing transactions only up to the amount of the available core capital.
Esimese taseme omavahendid on panga jaoks pangandusjärelevalve seisukohast määrava tähtsusega, sest täiendavat kapitali (teise taseme omavahendeid) aktsepteeritakse panga riskiga seotud tehingute tagatisena ainult esimese taseme omavahendite ulatuses.
German banks had to adapt their own funds to the new requirements of the Solvency Directive and the Own Funds Directive by 30 June 1993.
juuniks 1993 pidid Saksa pangad oma kapitali adekvaatsuse määra viima vastavusse maksevõime suhtarvu ja omavahendite direktiivide uute nõuetega.
Even before the Solvency Directive was transposed into German law, many Landesbanks had relatively weak own-funds positions.
Juba enne maksevõime suhtarvu direktiivi ülevõtmist Saksamaa õigusesse oli paljude liidumaade riiklike pankade kapitali adekvaatsus suhteliselt madal.
They now had to strengthen their own-funds base as a matter of urgency in order to avoid restrictions on their business expansion and indeed to maintain their current level of activities.
Asjaomased krediidiasutused vajasid seetõttu tungivalt tugevamat omakapitali baasi, et hoida ära piirangud ettevõtte tegevuse laiendamisele või vähemalt säilitada olemasoleva äritegevuse maht.
However, because the budgetary situation was tight, public shareholders were unable to provide any fresh capital, but neither were they prepared to privatise and to raise additional capital on the capital markets.
Pingelise eelarve tõttu ei saanud avalik-õiguslikud omanikud täiendavat kapitali eraldada, teisalt ei tahetud ka panku erastada ja lisakapitali kapitaliturgudelt hankida.
The public banks thus decided to undertake asset and capital transfers: in the case of WestLB, the assets of the WfA and, in the case of HLB, the aforementioned WK shares, which were transferred to HLB's capital reserves and silent partnership reserve.
Nii otsustasid riiklikud pangad üle anda vara või kapitali, WestLB juhtumi puhul Nordrhein-Westfaleni liidumaa elamuehituse edendamise asutuse Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt (edaspidi: “WfA”) vara, HLB juhtumi puhul nimetatud WK-osalused, mis paigutati HLB kapitalireservidesse või hääleõiguseta osalusse (passiivsesse reservi).
EFFECTS OF THE TRANSFER ON LBB'S CAPITAL BASE
VARA ÜLEANDMISE MÕJU HLB KAPITALI ADEKVAATSUSELE
The reason for the transfers was indicated as being capital requirements and/or a need to improve capital resources for the purpose of expanding HLB's business.
Vara üleandmist põhjendati kapitalivajadusega ja kapitali adekvaatsuse näitajate suurendamisega HLB äritegevuse laiendamise eesmärgil.
The transfer of WK shares presented the advantage of allowing this to happen without the need for an additional capital contribution from FHH's budget.
WK-osaluste üleandmise eeliseks oli, et nimetatud eesmärgid saavutati ilma täiendava kapitalieraldiseta FHH eelarvest.
Back in the 1980s, business expansion had given rise to a steadily growing need for capital.
Juba 80ndatel aastatel kasvas äritegevuse laiendamise tulemusel kapitalivajadus pidevalt.
According to the available information, the bank therefore regularly transferred part of its balance-sheet profit to its interest-bearing share capital.
Olemasolevate andmete kohaselt oli pank seetõttu ühelt poolt regulaarselt eraldanud osa bilansilisest kasumist intressi kandvasse põhikapitali.
However, since this was clearly insufficient, FHH decided as early as 1986 to contribute 24 % of its WK shares (DEM 212,16 million) to HLB.
Kuna sellest aga ilmselgelt ei piisanud, otsustas FHH juba 1986. aastal anda 24 % oma osalusest WK-s (212160 miljonit Saksa marka) üle HLB-le.
At the beginning of the 1990s, a further increase in HLB's equity capital was urgently required in view of the fourth amendment to the German Banking Act (‘KWG’) since HLB would have otherwise failed to comply with the new capital requirements laid down.
aastate algul osutus neljanda krediidiasutuste seaduse (“WG”) muutmise seaduse tõttu vajalikuks HLB omakapitali täiendav suurendamine, kuna vastasel korral ei oleks HLB täitnud uusi kapitali adekvaatsuse nõudeid.
Since FHH also did not have adequate liquid budgetary funds available at the time, it opted for a contribution of non-monetary capital and, on 1 January 1993, transferred the 57,68 % of WK shares (DEM 959,362 million) directly and via HGV to HLB.
Kuna sel ajal ei olnud ka FHH käsutuses piisavalt likviidseid eelarvevahendeid, otsustas ta mitterahalise sissemakse kasuks ja andis 1. jaanuaril 199357,68 % oma osalusest WK-s (959362 miljonit Saksa marka) vahetult ja HGV kaudu üle HLB-le.
The total stated value of the transfers was DEM 1171,552 million.
Üleantud vara koguväärtuseks näidati 1171522 miljonit Saksa marka.
Of this amount, DEM 212,16 million corresponded to the contribution to the open reserves in 1986 (24 % of the WK shares), DEM 659,362 million to the contribution to the open reserves in 1993 (38 % of the WK shares) and DEM 300 million to HGV's silent partnership reserve of the same year.
Sellest kanti 212160 miljonit Saksa marka 1986. aastal avatud reservidesse (24 % WK- osalusest), 659362 miljonit Saksa marka 1993. aastal avatud reservidesse (38 % WK-osalusest) ja 300 miljonit Saksa marka samal aastal HGV hääleõiguseta osalusse (reservi) (19,86 % WK-osalusest).
This calculation was based on WK valuation reports by two auditing firms in 1986 and 1993.
Arvutused põhinesid kahe audiitorfirma eksperthinnangul WK väärtuse leidmiseks 1986. ja 1993. aastal.
The total amount of DEM 1171,522 million was incorporated into the balance sheet for 1993 and subsequent financial years.
Kogusumma 1171522 miljonit Saksa marka võeti 1993. ja järgnevate majandusaastate bilanssi.
The Federal Banking Supervisory Authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen or ‘BAKred’) recognised the capital amount of DEM 212,16million for 1986.
Saksamaa krediidiasutuste järelevalve föderaalamet (Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, edaspidi: “BAKred”) aktsepteeris arvestusliku kapitalina 212160 miljonit Saksa marka aastal 1986.
With regard to the overall capital valuation after the further transfers in 1993, BAKred did not initially approve the relevant application from HLB because it took the view that, for WK to be recognised as a valuable holding, HLB would have to be entitled to sell it off. After a amendment to the WK Act in 1997 under which a decision on dissolution could be taken by shareholders at the request of a single shareholder (including HLB), the problem was settled and the full value was recognised as HLB's liable capital.
Pärast edasiste varade üleandmist 1993. aastal HLB esitatud kogu kapitali kinnitamise avaldust BAKred esialgu ei rahuldanud, sest ta oli WK kui rahalist väärtust omava osaluse aktsepteerimist kaaludes arvamusel, et HLB-l oleks pidanud olema WK likvideerimise õigus. WK seaduse muutmisega 1997. aastal, mis nägi ette omanike likvideerimisotsuse ühe omaniku (ka HLB) nõudmisel, kõrvaldati kõnealune probleem ja vara kogu väärtust aktsepteeriti HLB vastutava omakapitalina.
According to Germany, HLB expanded its business significantly following the two transfers; in the period 1986-99 its balance-sheet total rose from DEM 36,5 billion to over DEM 145 billion.
Saksamaa selgituste kohaselt laiendas HLB pärast mõlemat varade üleandmist olulisel määral äritegevust: ajavahemikus 1986–1999 kasvas bilansimaht 36,5 miljardilt Saksa margalt 1986. aastal 145 miljardile Saksa margale 1999. aastal.
REMUNERATION FOR THE OWN FUNDS TRANSFERRED
ÜLEANTUD OMAVAHENDITE HÜVITAMINE
According to the available information, FHH received no remuneration for the shares transferred on 1 January 1986 (24 % or DEM 212,16 million).
Esitatud andmete kohaselt ei saanud FHH 1. jaanuaril 1986. aastal üle antud osaluste (24 %, vastavalt 212160 miljonit Saksa marka) eest mingit hüvitist.
Likewise, no remuneration was agreed for the shares transferred directly to HLB on 1 January 1993 (38 % or DEM 659,362 million); however, HGV received DEM [...] million each year from HLB for the contribution.
jaanuaril 1993 vahetult HLB-le üle antud osaluste (38 %, vastavalt 659362 miljonit Saksa marka) eest ei olnud samuti mingit hüvitist kokku lepitud, siiski sai HGV investeeringu eest HLB-lt [...] miljonit Saksa marka.
It was agreed that, in return for its contribution, HGV would receive [...] of profits, subject to a ceiling of 10 % each year.
Lepiti kokku, et HGV saab oma investeeringu eest kasumiosalusena [...], maksimaalselt siiski 10 % aastas.
According to the information supplied, a sum of DEM [...] million had been paid by HLB since this understanding of 23 December 1992 (effective as of 1 January 1993).
Esitatud andmete kohaselt maksis HLB pärast lepingu sõlmimist 23. detsembril 1992. aastal 1. jaanuari 1993 seisuga [...] miljonit Saksa marka.
No further remuneration was agreed.
Täiendavas hüvitises kokku ei lepitud.
Germany has nevertheless stated that, up to 1997, FHH, as HLB's sole shareholder, received the maximum annual dividend of 6 % laid down in the latter's statutes.
Siiski on Saksamaa selgitanud, et FHH kui HLB ainuomanik aastani 1997 on saanud põhikirjas ette nähtud iga-aastaseid maksimumdividende suuruses 6 %.
In addition, HLB has regularly converted reserves which it had generated itself into interest-bearing share capital (according to Germany, comparable to the issue of free shares), and this, according to the data submitted, resulted in an effective after-tax return of more than [...] % (and a corresponding inflow) on the capital actually paid in by the shareholder; HLB is thus the Landesbank with the highest effective yield.
Lisaks sellele on HLB regulaarselt ise kandnud teenitud reservid üle intresse kandvasse põhikapitali (Saksamaa andmete kohaselt võrreldav tasuta aktsiate väljaandmisega), mis esitatud andmete kohaselt andis omaniku algselt investeeritud kapitali tegelikuks intressitulu määraks [...] % pärast makse (ja vastava lisa), mis teeb HLB liidumaade riiklike pankade seas kõrgeima tegeliku intressitulu määraga pangaks.
In its decision of 13 November 2002 to initiate the procedure, the Commission explained that the provision of resources by FHH to HLB had to be investigated in the light of the market-economy investor principle.
novembri 2002. aasta menetluse algatamise otsuses selgitas komisjon, et FHH vahendite eraldamist HLB kasuks tuleb kontrollida turumajanduslikult tegutseva investori põhimõtte alusel.
According to this principle, no aid elements are present even in the case of resources provided by a state investor where such funds are provided on terms on which a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions would be willing to provide funds to a private company.
Nimetatud põhimõtte kohaselt ei ole ka avalik-õigusliku investori vahendite eraldamisel tegemist riigiabiga, kui sellised vahendid antakse saaja käsutusse tingimustel, millistel ka tavapärastes turumajanduslikes tingimustes tegutsev erainvestor oleks nõus eraettevõttele vahendeid andma (“turutingimused”).
For a credit institution, the economic benefit of a broader capital base created by the transfers of WK shares in question resides in the resulting greater capacity to lend and the opportunity to expand business.
Krediidiasutuse jaoks seisneb majanduslik kasu ulatuslikumas omavahendite baasis, mille lõi kõnealune WK-osaluste üleandmine, sellega kaasnevas suuremas võimes anda laenusid ja võimaluses äritegevust laiendada.
If this broader capital base is provided by the public investor on terms that are more advantageous than normal market conditions, the company concerned is favoured by state resources.
Kui avalik-õiguslik investor annab laiema kapitalibaasi saaja käsutusse turutingimustest soodsamatel tingimustel, on tegemist riigi ressurssidest antud soodustusega.
As a result, the Commission conducted a preliminary assessment as to whether FHH had provided the funds in question on normal market conditions.
Seetõttu uuris komisjon esialgu küsimust, kas FHH andis kõnealused vahendid üle turutingimustel.
Under normal market conditions, a remuneration corresponding to its value, its function and the risk incurred is expected for the contribution of capital.
Tavapärastes turutingimustes eeldatakse kapitaliinvesteeringu eest selle väärtusele, funktsioonile ja võetud riskile vastavat hüvitist.
On the basis of the information available to it at the time, the Commission doubted whether the remuneration received by FHH and its holding company HGV, which amounted to DEM [...] million [...], or some [less than 3 %] of the total funds transferred, had been paid under normal market conditions.
Kõnealusel ajal komisjoni käsutuses olnud andmete põhjal kahtles komisjon, kas FHH ja tema valdusühingu HGV saadud hüvitis vastab turutingimustele. Makstud hüvitis suuruses [...] miljonit Saksa marka [...] vastas, kui suhestada see kogu üleantud varaga, ligikaudu [vähem kui 3 %-le].
Since, at the time of the two transfers, even the return on outstanding ten-year Federal securities, i.e. risk-free assets, ranged from over 6 % to 7 %, the provision of capital can hardly be regarded as having taken place under normal market conditions.
Kuna mõlema varade üleandmise ajal oli isegi 10-aastase tähtajaga riigivõlakirjade, s.t riskivaba investeeringu, keskmine tootlikkus 6 %–7 %, saab kõnealuste kapitalieraldiste puhul vaevalt rääkida tavapärastest turutingimustest.
Even if the special features of the transaction, such as the transferred resources' lack of liquidity, were taken into consideration, the remuneration received by FHH and HGV can hardly be regarded as a normal market remuneration.
Isegi kui arvestada tehingu eripära nagu üleantud vahendite likviidsuse puudumine, võib FHH ja HGV saadud hüvitist vaevalt pidada turutingimustele vastavaks intressiks.
Germany, it is true, had stated that, at the time of the transfer, HLB was an economically sound company whose value as a going concern had increased year on year.
Saksamaa on selgitanud, et HLB oli varade üleandmise ajal majanduslikult heas seisus ettevõte, mille väärtus on aastast aastasse kasvanud.
Proceeds were either distributed to FHH in the form of dividends or channelled into HLB's capital stock as revenue reserves, which, it is claimed, increased their value and benefited FHH as the only shareholder at the time.
Nii on tulu FHH-le välja makstud osalt dividendidena, osalt on see kantud kasumireservidesse kapitali adekvaatsuse suurendamiseks, mis on suurendanud panga väärtust ja olnud kasulik tolleaegsele ainuomanikule FHH-le.
On the basis of a report drawn up at the time of the sale of shares (49 %) to LSH, an earning capacity value of DEM [...] million had been calculated for HLB as at [...]. According to internal calculations, this had still amounted to DEM [...] million as at 31 December 1985 and at DEM [...] million as at31 December 1992, representing an annual average rise in value of [...] % between 1986 and 1992 and of [...] % between 1993 and 1996 which FHH, the only shareholder until 1997, had been able to use entirely for its own benefit and which had been able to be realised on a pro rata basis on the occasion of the sale to LSH.
Ekspertarvamuses, mis koostati seoses osaluste (49 %) müügiga LSH-le, leiti HLB puhastuluks (sks k Ertragswert) [...] miljonit Saksa marka seisuga [...], mis ettevõttesiseste arvutuste kohaselt oli 31. detsembril 1985 veel [...] miljonit Saksa marka ja 31. detsembril 1992 [...] miljonit Saksa marka, nii et aasta keskmine väärtuse kasv ajavahemikus 1986–1992 oli [...] % ja ajavahemikus 1993–1996 [...] %, mida FHH, kes oli kuni 1997. aastani ainuomanik, võib täielikult pidada saadud kasuks, mille ta olevat ka proportsionaalselt realiseerinud müügitehingus LSH-le.
Since, however, no other information or calculations, e.g. relating to the increases in dividends and value attributable to the contribution of WK shares, were available, the Commission was unable to carry out an assessment.
Kuna täiendavad andmed ja arvutused, näiteks WK-osaluste üleandmisest tingitud dividendide ja väärtuse kasvu kohta, siiski puudusid, ei olnud komisjonil võimalik vastavat hinnangut anda.
On the basis of the available information, the Commission thus had serious misgivings as to whether the conditions on which FHH had transferred the funds that were apparently available to HLB in full as liable capital were normal market conditions.
Komisjoni käsutuses olevate andmete põhjal oli komisjonil tõsiseid kahtlusi FHH vahendite, mis ilmselt olid täielikult HLB käsutuses vastutava kapitalina, üleandmise tingimuste vastavuses turutingimustele.
It therefore concluded that HLB was probably favoured by state resources.
Seetõttu jõudis komisjon järeldusele, et HLB sai tõenäoliselt soodustusi riigi ressurssidest.
As regards the calculation of remuneration, the Commission stated that, as things stood and given the special circumstances of the present case, it intended to apply the method used in the WestLB Decision of 8 July 1999.
Seoses hüvitise suuruse arvutamisega selgitas komisjon, et kavatseb käesoleval etapil ja käesoleva juhtumi erilisi asjaolusid arvestades kasutada WestLB 8. juuli 1999. aasta otsuses aluseks võetud metoodikat.
As part of its provisional assessment and in accordance with Article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, the Commission also assumed that, if there were aid, the measure constituted new aid and not existing aid and referred here to Article 15(2) of that Regulation.
Komisjon lähtus esialgse hinnangu raames ja kooskõlas nõukogu 22. märtsi 1999. aasta määruse (EÜ) 659/1999 (millega kehtestatakse üksikasjalikud eeskirjad EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 93 kohaldamiseks) artikli 1 punktiga b samuti sellest, et meetme puhul on tegemist uue ja mitte olemasoleva abiga, viidates seejuures nimetatud määruse artikli 15 lõikele 2.
In its view, the decision to initiate the procedure was a further Commission measure that interrupted the limitation period within the meaning of Article 15(2) and, as such, confirmed previous measures, including the Commission's requests for information dated 12 January, 10 November and 13 December 1993 and 1 September 1999 as well as the decisions to initiate the procedure in the WestLB case and in the case of Landesbank Berlin.
Komisjon pidas menetluse algatamist komisjoni järjekordseks meetmeks, mis artikli 15 lõike 2 kohaselt peatab aegumistähtaja ja kinnitab sellisena varasemaid meetmeid, kaasa arvatud komisjoni teabenõuded 12. jaanuarist 1993, 10. novembrist 1993, 13. detsembrist 1993 ja 1. septembrist 1999 nagu ka WestLB asjas menetluse algatamise otsus ja HLB-le kätte toimetatud Landesbank Berlin asjas menetluse algatamise otsus.
In its comments, Germany repeated first of all the view that the transfer on 1 January 1986 of 24 % of WK's capital (value transferred to the reserves: DEM 212,16 million) to HLB could not be recovered as unlawful aid in accordance with Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 since the ten-year period applicable to the transfer had expired on 1 January 1996.
Saksamaa kordas oma arvamuses esmalt seisukohta, et 1. jaanuaril 1986. aastal jõustunud 24 % WK kapitali (reservidesse paigutatud summa: 212160 miljonit Saksa marka) üleandmist HLB-le ei saa määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõike 2 alusel käsitleda kui õigusvastast abi, mida saaks tagasi nõuda, sest kümneaastane aegumistähtaeg kõnealuse vara üleandmise menetlemiseks möödus 1. jaanuaril 1996.
This transfer (‘1986 transfer’) was to be seen as a legally and economically independent process separate from the 1993 transfers.
Nimetatud vara üleandmine (“1986. aasta vara üleandmine”) tuleb kui õiguslikult ja majanduslikult iseseisev toiming eraldada 1993. aasta vara üleandmise toimingutest.
In so far as Germany had previously spoken of a ‘single intention to invest’, as the Commission had noted in its decision to initiate the procedure, this applied solely to the 1993 transfers.
Kui Saksamaa oligi varem rääkinud “ühtsest investeerimistahtest”, nagu komisjon menetluse algatamisel märkis, oli sellega mõeldud ainult 1993. aasta toiminguid.
The ‘side letter’ of 22 December 1992, which was referred to in Germany's letter of December 1999, also referred to — and was only concerned with — the 1986 transfer solely to the extent that the reassignment right to reassign the shares given to FHH in 1986 and 1993 was concerned.
Ka Saksamaa 1999. aasta detsembri kirjas mainitud 22. detsembri 1992. aasta “Sideletter” iseenesest, ja ainult see on oluline, on ainult sel määral seotud 1986. aasta toiminguga, kuivõrd seal on viidatud 1986. ja 1993. aastal üleantud FHH osaluste tagasinõudeõigusele.
In addition, Germany's statement that the direct remuneration of DEM [...] million each year corresponded to around [less than 3 %] of the total amount of all the transfers, was intended merely as an illustration.
Lisaks oli Saksamaa selgitus, et vahetult makstud hüvitis suuruses [...] miljonit Saksa marka aastas vastab ligikaudu [vähem kui 3 %-le], kui kõnealune summa suhestada kogu üleantud varaga tervikuna, üksnes illustratiivne.
However, in its view, this in no way altered the fact that de facto and de jure the 1986 transfer was a quite separate process.
See ei muuda asjaolu, et 1986. aastal toimunud vara üleandmine on õiguslikult ja majanduslikult täiesti eraldiseisev toiming.
If, however, the 1986 transfer was to be viewed separately from the 1993 transfers, action by the Commission within the meaning of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 could interrupt the limitation period only if it were taken before 1 January 1996.
Kui 1986. aastal toimunud vara üleandmine hoida lahus 1993. aastal toimunud vara üleandmisest, võiks ainult enne 1. jaanuari 1996 võetud komisjoni meede määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõike 2 tähenduses aegumistähtaja peatada.
However, the Commission's requests for information that preceded the one dated 1 September 1999 were of a general nature, had not even mentioned HLB and so did not meet the conditions for them to be regarded materially as action interrupting the limitation period within the meaning of Article 15(2).
Komisjoni 1. septembrile 1999 eelnenud teabenõuded olid üldise iseloomuga, HLB-d nendes isegi ei mainitud ja need ei vasta seega nõuetele, mis kehtivad aegumistähtaega peatavate meetmete konkreetsuse nõudele määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõike 2 tähenduses.
Germany also mentioned in this respect the judgment by the Court of First Instance of 10 April 2003 in Case T-369/00 Département du Loiret v Commission (hereinafter ‘Scott’).
Saksamaa nimetas kõnealuses seoses ka esimese astme kohtu 10. aprilli 2003. aasta otsust kohtuasjas T-369/00, Département du Loiret/Kommission (edaspidi: “Scott”).
The Court ruled that a Commission letter requesting information regarding a possible aid element was a measure interrupting the limitation period within the meaning of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Kohus sedastas nimetatud otsuses, et komisjoni kiri, milles komisjon palub teavet võimaliku riigiabi juhtumi asjaolude kohta, võib olla aegumistähtaega peatav meede määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artikli 15 lõike 2 tähenduses.
According to Germany, the Court had thus laid down the minimum requirements that a request for information must meet in order to be regarded as action interrupting the limitation period.
Saksamaa arvamuse kohaselt kehtestas kohus sellega miinimumnõuded, millele teabenõue peab vastama, et seda võiks käsitleda aegumistähtaega peatava meetmena.