natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Secondly, in the course of 2001, the local authorities agreed to convert debts that VAOP owed them for the supply of waste paper into a loan of NLG 3 million (EUR 1,3 million, ‘the second measure’).
Teiseks nõustusid kohalikud omavalitsused 2001. aastal muutma neile paberijäätmete eest maksmata summad 3 miljoni Hollandi kuldna (1,3 miljonit eurot) suuruseks laenuks (edaspidi “teine meede”).
VAOP had undergone heavy losses at the end of 2000, following the insolvency of one of its subsidiaries.
VAOP oli saanud 2000. aasta lõpul ühe oma tütarettevõtja maksejõuetuse tõttu suurt kahju.
On 31 December 2000, the consolidated accounts of VAOP showed negative equity of NLG 3,4 million (EUR 1,5 million).
detsembril 2000 näitas VAOP konsolideeritud aastaaruanne 3,4 miljoni Hollandi kuldna (1,5 miljonit eurot) suurust negatiivset omakapitali.
At the same date, the balance sheet total was NLG 32,1 million (EUR 14,5 million).
Bilansimaht oli samal ajal 32,1 miljonit Hollandi kuldnat (14,5 miljonit eurot).
VAOP’s main creditor, BNG, had obtained liens (pandrechten) on nearly all the assets, so that this unsecured loan could be considered subordinate to BNG’s claims.
BNG, VAOPi peamine võlausaldaja, oli saanud peaaegu kõigi varade suhtes pandiõiguse, mistõttu võis sellist tagamata laenu pidada BNG nõuetele allutatuks.
It was therefore referred to as ‘the subordinated loan’ (achtergestelde lening).
Seega viidati sellele kui allutatud laenule.
As regards the first measure, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure because it doubted whether a normal market economy investor would have acted in the same way.
Esimese meetme suhtes algatas komisjon ametliku uurimismenetluse, sest kahtles, kas iga teine turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev investor oleks käitunud samamoodi.
At the material time VAOP had nearly no equity.
Komisjon märkis, et sel ajal ei olnud VAOPil peaaegu üldse omakapitali.
In addition, the size of the new loan seemed very high in comparison with the borrower’s balance sheet total.
Peale selle näis uus laen väga suur võrreldes laenusaaja bilansimahuga.
In short, the risk involved seemed too big for a normal market economy investor.
Lühidalt öelduna tundus laenuga seotud risk tavalise investori jaoks liiga suur.
Regarding the second measure, the Commission doubted whether a normal market economy creditor would have agreed to convert its claim into a subordinated loan of this kind.
Teise meetme puhul kahtles komisjon, kas iga teine turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev võlausaldaja oleks nõustunud muutma oma nõude selliseks allutatud laenuks.
The loan seemed to present a high degree of risk, as the borrower’s financial situation was bad and all its assets appeared to be subject to a lien in favour of BNG.
Laen näis kujutavat endast liiga suurt riski, sest laenusaaja finantsseisund oli halb ja kõik tema varad olid antud BNG-le tagatiseks.
Finally, the Commission wondered whether a market economy creditor would not have requested a higher interest rate.
Samuti arvas komisjon, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev võlausaldaja oleks küsinud kõrgemat intressi.
In conclusion, the Commission suspected that the two measures might constitute state aid to VAOP falling under the prohibition laid down in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Kokkuvõttes kahtlustas komisjon, et need kaks meedet võivad olla EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõikes 1 keelatud riigiabi VAOPile.
The Commission has received the following comments from the complainant.
Komisjon on saanud kaebuse esitajalt järgmised märkused.
Regarding the first measure, the complainant asserts that the general policy and practice of BNG is to offer financial products to public bodies and associated institutions on terms that are not in line with the market.
Seoses esimese meetmega rõhutab kaebuse esitaja, et BNG üldine tava on pakkuda avaliku sektori asutustele ja nendega seotud institutsioonidele finantstooteid turutingimustest erinevatel tingimustel.
The complainant analyses the size of VAOP’s equity, and concludes that at the time its balance sheet structure was far from healthy.
Kaebuse esitaja analüüsib VAOPi omakapitali suurust ja järeldab, et sel ajal ei olnud VAOPi bilansi struktuur kaugeltki hea.
There was a significant lack of equity.
Omakapitali osas oli oluline puudujääk.
The complainant also points to the scale of debt.
Kaebuse esitaja osutab ka võla suurusele.
In these circumstances, the BNG financing allowed VAOP to expand its business despite its lack of equity and at low cost.
Neis oludes võimaldas BNG rahastamine VAOPil omakapitali puudusele vaatamata oma tegevust väheste kuludega laiendada.
The complainant reckons that a high-risk loan of that kind would not have been provided by a private bank, and constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Kaebuse esitaja leiab, et erapank ei oleks sellist riskantset laenu andnud ja et see laen kujutab endast riigiabi EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1tähenduses.
The complainant also argues that given that VAOP’s financial situation did not improve over the years, BNG should have not continued to finance it.
Kaebuse esitaja väidab ka, et kuna VAOPi finantsseisund aja jooksul ei paranenud, ei oleks BNG pidanud ettevõtja rahastamist jätkama.
Turning to the second measure, the complainant argues that this subordinated loan carried a very high degree of risk, given the scale of the debts owed by VAOP that would have to be reimbursed first in the event of insolvency.
Seoses teise meetmega väidab kaebuse esitaja, et selline allutatud laen oli väga riskantne, kui võtta arvesse VAOPi võlgasid, mis oleks tulnud pankroti korral kõigepealt tagasi maksta.
The margin on the loan was not sufficient to compensate for that risk.
Laenuintress ei olnud selle riski hüvitamiseks küllalt suur.
This loan therefore constitutes state aid too.
Seega kujutab ka see laen endast riigiabi.
The Commission has received the following comments from the alleged recipient, VAOP.
Komisjon on saanud väidetavalt abisaajalt VAOPilt järgmised märkused.
VAOP claims that the first measure was a purely commercial transaction, in accordance with the market investor principle.
VAOP väidab, et esimene meede oli puhtakujuline äritehing, mis on kooskõlas turumajandusliku investori põhimõttega.
VAOP says that at the time it was also in contact with several private banks, which were proposing to provide financing on terms close to those offered by BNG.
VAOP väidab samuti, et võttis samal ajal ühendust ka mitme erapangaga, kes pakkusid rahastamist BNG pakutud tingimustele sarnastel tingimustel.
VAOP has provided a copy of a signed offer of financing made by [a private bank] on 7 January 1998.
VAOP esitas koopia [erapanga nimi]7. jaanuaril 1998 allkirjastatud finantspakkumisest.
Regarding the second measure, VAOP asserts that it was not obliged to enter into the loan arrangement with the municipalities.
Teise meetme kohta rõhutab VAOP, et ta ei olnud kohustatud omavalitsustega laenulepingut sõlmima.
On the basis of its constitution (statuten) and its supply contracts with the municipalities, VAOP cannot be required to pay its paper suppliers more than its liquidity position allows.
VAOPi põhikirja ja tarnelepingute kohaselt ei ole ta kohustatud maksma paberijäätmete tarnijatele rohkem kui likviidsus võimaldab.
In addition, VAOP is entitled to impose obligations on its members in the form of a ‘yearly contribution’, which may be used to cover operating charges or may be regarded as risk-bearing capital.
Peale selle on VAOPil õigus määrata oma liikmetele kohustusi iga-aastaste osamaksetena, mida võib kasutada tegevuskulude katteks või käsitleda riskikapitalina.
VAOP’s contract with the municipalities also allowed VAOP to give the municipalities a claim against it, and that was what the management of VAOP had decided to do.
VAOPi leping omavalitsustega võimaldas VAOPil anda omavalitsustele nõudeõigus enda vastu, mida ühingu juhid ka teha otsustasid.
Regarding the first measure, the Netherlands argues that the granting of the credit facility by BNG was not a matter for the State.
Seoses esimese meetmega väidavad Madalmaad, et BNG antud laen ei seondu riigiga.
BNG is a public limited company.
BNG on aktsiaselts.
There is no provision in the constitution of the bank requiring the management to comply with the directions of the supervisory board when offering financial products.
Panga põhikirjas ei ole ühtegi sätet, mis kohustaks juhatust finantstoodete pakkumisel nõukogu juhiseid täitma.
There was no provision requiring that the supervisory board be consulted or that it give its authorisation for the loan concerned, which was the responsibility exclusively of the management.
Ei olnud ühtegi sätet, mis nõuaks, et nõukoguga asjaomase laenu suhtes konsulteeritaks või et nõukogu peaks laenule heakskiidu andma – sellised otsused olid ainult juhatuse pädevuses.
Finally, the Dutch authorities assert that there is nothing else to suggest that this transaction was attributable to the State.
Viimaks rõhutavad Madalmaade ametiasutused, et ei ole ka midagi muud, mis viitaks, et käesoleva tehingu puhul esineks seos riigiga.
Even if the loan was imputable to the State, the Netherlands submits that its terms would be acceptable to a market economy investor.
Isegi kui laenu andjaks saaks pidada riiki, teatavad Madalmaad, et selle tingimused oleksid vastuvõetavad ka turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsevale investorile.
A higher level of equity would indeed have been desirable, but the risk of loss to BNG was limited, thanks to several forms of security, notably a first-rank lien on VAOP’s receivables, which had to amount to 100 % of the loan.
Suurem omakapital oleks küll soovitatav, kuid BNG kahju saamise risk oli piiratud tänu mitmesugustele tagatistele, eelkõige tänu esimese järjekoha pandiõigusele VAOPi saadaolevate maksete suhtes; tagatis kattis 100 % laenust.
The loan was granted at a time when the firm was not in difficulty and its prospects were good.
Laen anti ajal, kui äriühing ei olnud raskustes ja kui selle väljavaated olid head.
The very serious deterioration in its financial situation could not have been foreseen.
Äriühingu finantsseisundi väga tõsist halvenemist ei saanud sel ajal ette näha.
With regard to the second measure, the Netherlands recalls that VAOP is a not for profit body that transfers to its members the net revenues generated from the sale of the recyclable waste collected on their territory.
Seoses teise meetmega tuletavad Madalmaad meelde, et VAOP on mittetulundusühing, mis kannab oma liikmetele üle nende maa-alalt kogutud ringlusse võetavate jäätmete müügist saadud netotulu. 2001. aasta alguses oli VAOP klaasi ringlussevõtuga tegeleva tütarettevõtja pankroti tõttu finantsraskustes.
In the beginning of 2001, VAOP was in a difficult financial situation as a result of the insolvency of a subsidiary engaged in the recycling of glass; it decided not to pay to the participating municipalities a small part of the revenues generated by the sale of the waste in 2000 , and to convert it instead into a five-year subordinated loan.
Kontsern otsustas liikmetele maksmata jätta väikese osa tulust, mis oli saadud jäätmete müügist 2000. aastal, ja muuta selle viieaastase tagasimakseperioodiga allutatud laenuks.
BNG was threatening that without additional resources such as this subordinated loan it would not continue to finance VAOP, which would then have been insolvent itself.
BNG hoiatas, et ilma selliste lisavahenditeta nagu see laen ei jätkaks ta VAOPi rahastamist, mis oleks seejärel ise maksejõuetuks muutunud.
The Netherlands asserts, first, that on the basis of its constitution and its contracts with the participating municipalities VAOP was not obliged to pay this NLG 3 million (EUR 1,3 million) to the municipalities, because the amount exceeded the resources it had available.
Madalmaad rõhutavad, et VAOP ei olnud oma põhikirja ega osalevate omavalitsustega sõlmitud lepingute järgi kohustatud nimetatud 3 miljonit Hollandi kuldnat (1,3 miljonit eurot) omavalitsustele maksma, sest see summa ületas VAOPi kasutada olevaid vahendeid.
VAOP nevertheless decided to give the municipalities a corresponding claim against it in the form of an interest-bearing loan.
Sellele vaatamata otsustas VAOP pakkuda omavalitsustele sellele summale vastava nõude intressi kandva laenu näol.
Second, from the point of view of the local authorities this conversion of part of their claims into a loan represented a more favourable option than insolvency.
Teiseks oli kohalike omavalitsuste jaoks niisugune nõuete osaline muutmine laenuks soodsam lahendus kui pankrot.
At that time they had claims against VAOP amounting to NLG 5,7 million (EUR 2,59 million) which were not secured.
Omavalitsuste tagatiseta nõuded VAOPi vastu ulatusid toona 5,7 miljoni Hollandi kuldnani (2,59 miljoni euroni).
The Dutch authorities have calculated that, in the event of insolvency, the municipalities would have recovered around NLG 1,2 million (EUR 0,5 million), resulting in a net loss of NLG 4,5 million (EUR 2,05 million).
Madalmaade ametiasutused on välja arvutanud, et pankroti korral oleksid omavalitsused saanud tagasi umbes 1,2 miljonit Hollandi kuldnat (0,5 miljonit eurot), mis oleks tähendanud 4,5 miljoni Hollandi kuldna (2,05 miljoni euro) suurust kahjumit.
The municipalities acted as market economy creditors would have done by accepting the conversion of NLG 3 million (EUR 1,3 million) of their claims against VAOP into a loan, which enabled VAOP to continue in business in the knowledge that BNG would continue to finance it.
Omavalitsused käitusid samamoodi nagu oleksid käitunud turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsevad võlausaldajad, kui nõustusid oma 3 miljoni Hollandi kuldna (1,3 miljoni euro) suuruse nõude laenuks muutmisega. See võimaldas VAOPil jätkata oma tegevust teadmisega, et BNG rahastab teda edasi.
The first measure
Esimene meede
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty indicates that ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.’
Asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 kohaselt on “igasugune liikmesriigi poolt või riigi ressurssidest ükskõik missugusel kujul antav abi, mis kahjustab või ähvardab kahjustada konkurentsi, soodustades teatud ettevõtjaid või teatud kaupade tootmist, ühisturuga kokkusobimatu niivõrd, kuivõrd see kahjustab liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust”.
The Court of Justice has held that ‘It should also be noted that, pursuant to the principle that the public and private sectors are to be treated equally, capital placed directly or indirectly at the disposal of an undertaking by the State in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions cannot be regarded as State aid … Therefore, in accordance with equally settled case-law, it is necessary to determine whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor of a dimension comparable to that of the bodies managing the public sector could have been prevailed upon to make capital contributions of the same size … having regard in particular to the information available and foreseeable developments at the date of those contributions’.
Euroopa Kohus on sedastanud, et “kuna põhimõtteliselt tuleb avalikku ja erasektorit kohelda võrdselt, ei saa riigi poolt tavapärastel turutingimustel otseselt või kaudselt ettevõtja käsutusse antud kapitali pidada riigiabiks. Seetõttu tuleb vastavalt väljakujunenud kohtupraktikale kindlaks määrata, kas avaliku sektori juhtivate asutustega võrreldavate mõõtmetega erainvestorit oleks suudetud veenda sama palju investeerima, võttes eelkõige arvesse investeerimise ajal kättesaadavat teavet ja eeldatavat arengut”.
In order to determine whether the grant of the credit facility by BNG constituted aid, the Commission has therefore to verify whether the transaction respects the market economy investor principle as expounded by the Court in the judgment referred to.
Selle kindlakstegemiseks, kas BNG laen oli abi, peab komisjon seega kontrollima, kas tehing arvestas turumajandusliku investori põhimõtet nagu Euroopa Kohus viidatud otsuses selgitas.
At the request of the Commission, in addition to a copy of the loan agreement of March 1998 itself, the Dutch authorities have provided a copy of the internal documents of BNG relating to each step of the decision-making process that led to the provision of this financing to VAOP: the proposal by the account managers, dated 21 January 1998, the opinion of the credit analyst, dated 22 January 1998, and the positive decision by the credit committee, dated 26 January 1998.
Komisjoni taotlusel on Madalmaade ametiasutused esitanud lisaks 1998. aasta märtsi laenulepingu koopiale ka koopiad järgmistest BNG sisedokumentidest iga etapi kohta otsustusprotsessis, mis viis VAOPile laenu andmiseni: kontohaldurite ettepanek 21. jaanuarist 1998, laenuanalüütiku arvamus 22. jaanuarist 1998 ning laenukomitee positiivne otsus 26. jaanuarist 1998.
These papers show that BNG identified and analysed the risks associated with the loan, including the very limited equity.
Need dokumendid näitavad, et BNG tuvastas ja analüüsis laenuga seotud riske, sealhulgas väga piiratud omakapitali.
On the basis of this analysis, BNG gave VAOP a low rating (‘C-’).
Selle analüüsi alusel andis BNG VAOPile madala reitingu (“C”).
To offset the risks identified, BNG decided to impose strict conditions and to require substantial security.
Tuvastatud riskide tasakaalustamiseks otsustas BNG seada ranged tingimused ja nõuda märkimisväärseid tagatisi.
Among other things, BNG insisted that all the parties (VAOP and its subsidiaries) should be jointly and severally liable for all the liabilities of the other members of the group.
Muuhulgas nõudis BNG, et kõik asjaosalised (VAOP ja tema tütarettevõtjad) vastutaksid teiste kontserniliikmete kohustuste eest solidaarselt.
It also demanded a first rank lien on various commercial claims held by VAOP.
Samuti nõudis BNG esimese järjekoha pandiõigust VAOPi mitmesuguste kommertsnõuete suhtes.
VAOP was to provide BNG with a monthly list of liens on commercial claims, the value of which had to amount to at least 100 % of the sum lent by the bank.
VAOP pidi iga kuu esitama BNG-le loetelu panditud kommertsnõuete kohta, mille väärtus pidi olema vähemalt 100 % panga antud laenust.
The credit committee decided that the loan could be granted provided that the loan agreement comprised these various conditions and forms of security for BNG.
Laenukomitee otsustas, et krediiti saab anda ainult juhul, kui laenuleping sisaldab neid tingimusi laenu BNG-le tagamise kohta.
The new loan agreement also included an existing NLG 5 million (EUR 2,2 million) financing.
Uus laenuleping hõlmas ka olemasolevat 5 miljoni Hollandi kuldna (2,2 miljoni euro) suurust rahastamist.
It increased BNG’s potential claim on VAOP from the existing maximum of NLG 5 million (EUR 2,2 million) to NLG 16,3 (EUR 7,4 million).
See suurendas BNG võimalikku nõuet VAOPi suhtes olemasolevalt maksimaalselt 5 miljonilt Hollandi kuldnalt (2,2 miljonilt eurolt) 16,3 miljonile Hollandi kuldnale (7,4 miljonile eurole).
The net increase was therefore NLG 11,3 million (EUR 5,1 million).
Netosuurenemine oli seega 11,3 miljonit Hollandi kuldnat (5,1 miljonit eurot).
These documents show that BNG conducted the lending operation in accordance with its normal procedures, and asked for substantial security for the loan.
Need dokumendid näitavad, et BNG tegi laenutehingu oma tavapärase korra kohaselt ja seadis tingimuseks olulised tagatised.
The Commission also notes that in January 1998 […] proposed to grant VAOP a loan.
Komisjon märgib ka, et jaanuaris 1998 pakkus $$$ VAOPile laenu. See oleks lisandunud olemasolevale BNG antavale 5 miljoni Hollandi kuldna suurusele krediidile.
The interest rate margins which […] planned to charge in this firm proposal, at 125bps and 150bps, are below those that applied for lending to a company in difficulty or for equity provision.
Nimetatud $$$ ettepanekus pakutud intressimäärad 125 ja 150 baaspunkti on madalamad kui need, mida kasutati raskustes ettevõtjatele laenamisel või omakapitali investeeringute puhul.
This shows that contrary to the doubts expressed by the Commission when it decided to launch the formal investigation procedure a private bank might have agreed to grant a large loan to VAOP despite its very limited equity.
See näitab, et vastupidi komisjoni kahtlusele ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise ajal võis erapank nõustuda VAOPile suurt laenu andma, hoolimata viimase väga piiratud omakapitalist.
The Commission has compared the interest rate on BNG’s loan with the rate proposed by […].
Komisjon on võrrelnud BNG antud laenu intressimäära $$$ pakutud määraga.
BNG’s interest rate is slightly smaller.
BNG intressimäär on pisut väiksem.
However, the Commission notes, first of all, that BNG had (and still has) very low operating costs, much lower than […]’s.
Komisjon märgib siiski, et esiteks olid BNG tegevuskulud (ja on siiani) väga väiksed, $$$-st tunduvalt väiksemad.
Second, the loan agreement between BNG and VAOP included various commissions to be charged in the event that VAOP actually called upon certain loan facilities.
Teiseks sisaldas BNG ja VAOPi vahel sõlmitud laenuleping mitmesuguseid teenustasusid, mida VAOP ühe või teise laenu tegelikul kasutuselevõtmisel tasuma pidi.
The offer made by […] explicitly excluded the payment of such charges.
$$$ tehtud pakkumises oli selliste tasude maksmine sõnaselgelt välistatud.
Finally, it is likely that the existence of […]’s offer encouraged BNG to make the very best offer it could (within the limits of its lending guidelines and subject to substantial security), in order not to lose the business of an existing client with what appeared at the time to be real prospects of expansion.
Lisaks eelnevale on tõenäoline, et $$$ pakkumise olemasolu ärgitas BNGd tegema parima pakkumise, mida ta suutis (oma laenuandmissuuniste piires ja nõudes märkimisväärseid tagatisi), et mitte kaotada ärisuhet olemasoleva kliendiga, kellel näisid sel ajal olevat reaalsed laienemise väljavaated.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that even though BNG provided financing at an interest rate lower than the one proposed by a private bank, BNG, when it granted the loan in 1998, was acting as a market economy investor.
Eelkirjeldatu alusel järeldab komisjon, et kuigi BNG andis laenu erapangaga võrreldes madalama intressimääraga, käitus ta 1998. aastal laenu andes turumajandusliku investorina.
The loan consequently does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Seega ei kujuta see laen endast riigiabi EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses.
The complainant also asserts that a market economy creditor would not have continued to finance VAOP given the poor financial situation of the enterprise in the succeeding years.
Kaebuse esitaja rõhutab ka, et turumajanduse tingimustes tegutsev võlausaldaja ei oleks VAOPi rahastamist viimase halba finantsseisundit arvestades järgnevatel aastatel jätkanud.
The Commission has therefore analysed how BNG has dealt with the deterioration of VAOP’s financial situation.
Seetõttu on komisjon analüüsinud, kuidas BNG VAOPi finantsseisundi halvenemisele reageeris.
In 1999, when the financial situation of VAOP Glas BV and REVA deteriorated, BNG negotiated a new agreement, which was signed on 9 July 1999.
aastal, kui VAOP Glas B.V. ja REVA finantsseisund halvenes, pidas BNG läbirääkimisi uue lepingu üle, mis allkirjastati 9. juulil 1999.
First, the security was expanded to include liens on inventories, plant and other assets.
Esiteks laiendati tagatisi nii, et laenuandjale panditi ka seadmed, tehased ja muud varad.
Second, it was agreed that there would be a strict screening of the monthly list of claims subject to a lien.
Teiseks lepiti kokku, et hakatakse rangelt kontrollima igakuist võlausaldajale panditud nõuete loetelu.
Third, no long-term loans would any longer be granted for investments in fixed assets.
Kolmandaks ei olnud enam võimalik saada pikaajalisi laene põhivarainvesteeringuteks.