natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The amount of the discount for lack of liquidity would be calculated, using the WestLB method, on the basis of net refinancing costs (gross refinancing costs minus the applicable corporation tax).
Likviidsuse puudumise eest tehtava hinnaalandi summa arvutataks WestLB meetodiga refinantseerimise netokulude alusel (refinantseerimise brutokulud miinus kohaldatav ettevõttemaks).
The liquidity deduction would be calculated for Helaba on the basis of a gross refinancing rate of 6,57 % a year (corresponding to the long-term risk-free base rate at the time of the transfer in 1998), to which the overall tax rate should be applied to obtain the net refinancing rate.
Mahaarvatis likviidsuse arvelt arvutatakse Helaba puhul vastavalt refinantseerimise brutoväärtusele 6,57 % aastas (mis vastab pikaajalise riskivaba investeeringu baasintressile ülekandmise ajal 1998. aastal), mille suhtes tuleb kohaldada üldist maksumäära, et saada refinantseerimismäära netoväärtus.
In the BdB's view, three aspects of the transfer increase its risk compared with a ‘normal share capital investment’: the in part exceptionally high volume of assets transferred, the failure to issue new shares in the company and the related forgoing of additional voting rights, and the lack of fungibility of the investment, i.e. the impossibility of withdrawing the invested capital from the company again at any time.
BdB arvamuse kohaselt suurendavad kolm aspekti loovutamise riski võrreldes “normaalse aktsiakapitali investeeringuga”: loovutatavate aktsiate osaliselt erakordselt suur maht, uute aktsiate mitteemiteerimine äriühingus ja sellega seotud täiendavast hääleõigusest loobumine ning investeeringu vahetatavuse puudumine, st investeeritud kapitali ei ole võimalik suvalisel ajal äriühingust välja võtta.
The BdB considers a premium of at least 1,5 % a year justified here in line with the WestLB methodology.
BdB leiab, et siin on WestLB metoodika kohaselt põhjendatud hinnalisand vähemalt 1,5 % aastas.
CAPITAL BASE AND ELEMENTS OF REMUNERATION
KAPITALIBAAS JA TASU ELEMENDID
The BdB stresses firstly that, in calculating the appropriate remuneration in the case of Helaba, the total amount which was recognised as core capital for underpinning competitive business should be taken as the basis and not solely the actually used or usable part.
BdB rõhutab esmalt seda, et asjakohase tasu arvutamisel Helaba juhtumi puhul tuleks aluseks võtta kogusumma, mida tunnustati konkurentsivõimelise äritegevuse toetamiseks mõeldud tuumkapitalina, mitte ainult tegelikult kasutatud või kasutatav osa.
It backs up this argument by stating that a market-economy investor would never agree to limit his remuneration to the portion of funds actually used.
Ta toetab seda argumenti väitega, et turumajanduslik investor ei nõustuks iialgi sellega, et tema tasu piirdub vahendite tegelikult kasutatud osaga.
For a private investor bearing the risk of losing his investment, it is irrelevant whether the credit institution actually uses the injected capital to expand its business.
Erainvestori jaoks, keda saadab risk oma investeeringust ilma jääda, on tähtsusetu, kas krediidiasutus kasutab kaasatud kapitali ka tegelikult oma äritegevuse laiendamiseks.
What matters to the investor is that he himself can no longer invest that amount and obtain a corresponding return.
Investorile läheb korda see, et tema ise ei saa seda summat enam investeerida ega saada vastavat tulu.
The calculation of the remuneration in the period 1998 to 2002 on the basis of tranches rising in annual steps had been justified not as a discount because of the fact that the transferred capital had not been ‘split up’ or by the fact that transfer ‘en bloc’ to Helaba would have had the effect of imposing a burden on it.
Tasu arvutamine perioodil 1998 kuni 2002 igal aastal astmeliselt kasvavate osamaksetena oli hinnaalandina õigustatud mitte selle asjaolu tõttu, et ülekantud kapitali ei olnud “tükeldatud” või et Helabale “tervikuna” loovutamise tagajärjeks oleks olnud talle koorma peale panemine.
Even if the capital transfer was perhaps not necessary to meet solvability criteria, it had nevertheless considerably increased Helaba's equity capital base and had allowed a strong expansion in its competitive activity.
Isegi kui kapitaliloovutus ei olnud maksevõime kriteeriumide täitmiseks ehk vajalik, oli see sellegipoolest suurendanud Helaba omakapitalibaasi ning teinud võimalikuks panga konkurentsivõimelise äritegevuse jõulise laiendamise.
A market-economy investor would therefore require a full remuneration on the entire amount on the basis of its recognition as liable equity capital.
Turumajanduslik investor nõuaks seega täielikku tasu kogusumma pealt, lähtudes selle tunnustamisest riskikapitalina.
The 0,3 % a year guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) applied by the Commission in its WestLB decision, which it calculated by comparing the amount of capital with a guarantee, had to be charged for the part of the transferred core capital that could not be used to underpin competitive business.
Komisjoni poolt WestLB otsuses kohaldatud garantiipreemiat (Haftungsprovision)0,3 % aastas, mida arvutatakse kapitalisumma tagatisega võrdlemise teel, tuli nõuda ülekantud tuumkapitali selle osa eest, mida ei saanud kasutada konkurentsivõimelise äritegevuse toetamiseks.
Only the guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) and the perpetuity premium (Permanenzzuschlag) could be taken into account as components of the remuneration.
Tasu komponentidena sai arvesse võtta vaid garantiipreemiat (Haftungsprovision) ja lisatasu püsivuse eest (Permanenzzuschlag).
Trade tax, most of which went not to the Land at all, but to the municipality, was not a part of the remuneration.
Kaubandusmaks, millest enamik ei läinud üldse liidumaale, vaid haldusüksusele, ei olnud osa tasust.
It was a charge imposed by law, stemming from tax-related circumstances that were independent of the intentions of the parties.
Tegemist oli seadusega kehtestatud lõivuga, mis tulenes osapoolte kavatsustest sõltumatutest maksualastest asjaoludest.
Lastly, the return was paid not to the Land of Hessen, but — after deduction of capital yield tax — ‘allocated as a net amount to the special fund’.
Tulu ei makstud Hesseni liidumaale, vaid – pärast kapitalitootlusmaksu mahaarvamist – “paigutati netosummas erifondi”.
Since Helaba was the (sole) owner of the special fund, it was in reality paying itself.
Kuna Helaba oli erifondi (ainu)omanik, maksis ta tegelikult iseendale.
A private investor would not have accepted this as a return for his investment.
Erainvestor ei oleks seda oma investeeringu katteks aktsepteerinud.
COMMENTS FROM THE LAND OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA AND WESTLB
NORDRHEIN-WESTFALENI LIIDUMAA JA WESTLB MÄRKUSED
On 30 October 2003, Germany forwarded a response from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and WestLB to the Commission's decision of 13 November 2002 to initiate proceedings in which they disputed the statement that the assets transferred to the Landesbanks could be compared to share capital.
oktoobril 2003 edastas Saksamaa Nordrhein-Westfaleni liidumaa ja WestLB vastuse komisjoni 13. novembri 2002. aasta otsusele menetluse algatamise kohta, milles nad vaidlustasid väite, nagu saaks liidumaade pankadele ülekantud varasid võrrelda aktsiakapitaliga.
They argued that silent partnership contributions and ‘perpetuals’ had in fact been recognised as core capital in Germany since 1991.
Nad väitsid, et vaikivate seltsingute panuseid ja tähtajatuid instrumente oli Saksamaal tegelikult tuumkapitalina tunnustatud juba aastast 1991.
They added that remuneration for an investment depended not on how it was classified by the banking supervisory authorities, but on its risk profile.
Nad lisasid, et tasu investeeringu eest ei sõltu mitte sellest, kuidas pangandusjärelevalvega tegelevad asutused seda liigitavad, vaid selle riskiprofiilist.
Since the assets were junior-ranking, the risk pattern had more in common with silent partnership contributions or ‘perpetuals’ than with share-capital investments.
Kuna varad olid subordineeritud, sarnanes riskimudel pigem vaikiva seltsingu panusele või tähtajatutele instrumentidele kui investeeringutele aktsiakapitali.
WestLB had no objections to the CAPM method for calculating the minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment, but it felt that the beta values determined by the BdB — at well over one — were inappropriate.
WestLB ei omanud vastuväiteid CAPM meetodi kasutamisele aktsiakapitali investeeringu miinimumtasu arvutamiseks, kuid ta leidis, et BdB määratud beetaväärtused – tublisti üle ühe – ei ole asjakohased.
A beta factor of more than one meant that a company's shares represented a higher risk than the market as a whole.
Ühest suurem beetafaktor tähendas seda, et äriühingu aktsiad kujutasid endast kõrgemat riski kui turg tervikuna.
Yet the risk of investing in a Landesbank was well below the overall market risk because of the institutional liability (Anstaltslast) and guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) which it enjoyed and which were not challenged at the time.
Samas oli liidumaa panka investeerimisega seotud risk üldisest tururiskist tublisti väiksem tänu tema institutsionaalsele vastutusele (Anstaltslast) ja garandi vastutusele (Gewährträgerhaftung), mida sel ajal ei vaidlustatud.
Moreover, in the specific case of the Landesbanks, it was a mistake to use as a benchmark the return expected at the time that the assets were transferred to the banks.
Konkreetsel liidumaade pankade juhtumil oli viga kasutada etalonina varade pankadele loovutamise ajal eeldatud tulu.
Although this was generally a sensible approach to adopt in relation to the private-investor test, it here meant using as a basis the returns expected in 1991.
Kuigi see oli üldiselt erainvestori testiga seoses mõistlik lähenemine, tähendas see antud juhul 1991. aastal oodatud tulu aluseks võtmist.
But for an investor to receive in 2003 the return expected in 1991, which was much higher than the returns actually achieved, flew in the face of all economic realities.
Kuid et investor saab 2003. aastal 1991 aastal oodatud tulu, mis oli tegelikult saavutatud tulust märksa kõrgem, oli vastuolus kõigi majanduslike realiteetidega.
Permanently and systematically applying a rate of return of around 12 % placed the Landesbanks at an unjustifiable disadvantage compared with private competitors.
Umbes 12 % tulumäära püsiv ja süstemaatiline rakendamine asetas liidumaade pangad erakonkurentidega võrreldes põhjendamatult ebasoodsale positsioonile.
As regards the discount for the lack of liquidity of the transferred assets, WestLB and the Land of North Rhine -Westphalia considered that the rate for risk-free government bonds should be deducted in full from the basic return.
Mis puudutab hinnaalandit ülekantud varade likviidsuse puudumise eest, siis WestLB ja Nordrhein-Westfaleni liidumaa leidsid, et riskivabade valitsuse võlakirjade määr tuleks põhituludest täies ulatuses maha arvata.
They argued that the Landesbanks had received no liquidity as a result of the asset transfers.
Nad väitsid, et liidumaade pangad ei olnud omandanud varade ülekandmise tulemusena likviidsust.
It was not defensible in economic terms to reduce this rate by the tax savings since the pricing of capital market instruments was independent of the tax situation.
Majanduslikus mõttes ei ole selle määra vähendamine maksusäästude võrra õigustatav, kuna kapitalituru instrumentide hind sõltub maksusituatsioonist.
Lastly, the fact that the assets' lack of liquidity did not pose a risk to the liquidity position should be seen as reducing the risk — and hence the remuneration.
Lõpetuseks tuleks fakti, et varade likviidsuse puudumine ei kujutanud riski likviidsuspositsioonile, käsitada riski – ja seega tasu – vähendavana.
This should be taken into account by applying a corresponding deduction.
Sellega tuleb vastava mahaarvamise kohaldamisel arvestada.
V. GERMANY'S RESPONSE TO THE BDB'S COMMENTS
V. SAKSAMAA VASTUS BDB MÄRKUSTELE
In Germany's view, the BdB was not successful in its attempt to reinterpret the silent partnership contribution as a share capital investment, nor was it able to raise doubts as to the appropriateness of the remuneration which was agreed and paid to the Land of Hessen.
Saksamaa arvates ei saatnud edu BdB püüet tõlgendada vaikiva seltsingu panust investeeringuna, ka ei suutnud ta äratada kahtlusi kokkulepitud ja Hesseni liidumaale makstud tasu asjakohasuses.
In Germany's view, therefore, there was no aid.
Saksamaa arvates seega abi ei osutatud.
In Germany's view, there was no justification, in calculating the remuneration, for taking the roundabout approach of calculating the remuneration on a fictitious share capital investment.
Saksamaa arvates puudus õigustus kasutada tasu arvutamisel kaudset lähenemisviisi, mille kohaselt tasu arvutamise aluseks võeti fiktiivne investeering aktsiakapitali.
The Land of Hessen had from the outset transferred its housing-promotion assets as a silent partnership contribution to the bank.
Hesseni liidumaa oli juba alguses oma elamuehituse edendamiseks antud varad vaikiva seltsingu panusena pangale loovutanud.
What was involved was therefore a financing instrument which was defined in company, tax and banking supervision law and which differed fundamentally from a share capital investment, in which the Land was not interested and which the owners of the bank did not want.
Seega oli tegemist äriühingu-, maksu- ja pangandusjärelevalveõiguses määratletud finantseerimisvahendiga, mis erines fundamentaalselt investeeringust aktsiakapitali, millest liidumaa ei olnud huvitatud ja mida panga omanikud ei soovinud.
The BdB ignored important differences between share capital and silent partnership contributions and tried to identify non-existent differences between ‘normal’ silent partnership contributions and the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen.
BdB eiras olulisi erinevusi aktsiakapitali ja vaikivate seltsingute panuste vahel ning püüdis tuvastada olematuid erinevusi “normaalsete” vaikivate seltsingute panuste ja Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panuse vahel.
The BdB essentially argued that silent partnerships were of only limited duration or could be withdrawn and consequently, in accordance with the principles of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, were recognised as core capital only up to 15 % of the entire core capital of a credit institution.
BdB väitis põhiosas seda, et vaikivad seltsingud on vaid piiratud tähtajaga või need võidakse tagasi võtta ning sellest tulenevalt tunnustati neid vastavalt Baseli Pangajärelevalve Komitee põhimõtetele tuumkapitalina üksnes kuni 15 % ulatuses krediidiasutuse kogu tuumkapitalist.
Since the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen had been made available to Helaba without any time limit and was not covered by the 15 % limit and therefore did not represent a ‘normal’ silent partnership contribution, but functionally represented share capital, the criterion in assessing the remuneration should not be other silent partnership contributions or other innovative capital instruments, but share capital investments.
Kuna Hesseni liidumaa vaikiva seltsingu panus oli Helabale kättesaadavaks tehtud ilma mingite ajalimiitideta ning seda ei hõlmanud 15 % limiit ja seepärast ei kujutanud see endast “normaalset” vaikiva seltsingu panust, vaid esindas funktsionaalselt aktsiakapitali, ei peaks tasu hindamiskriteeriumiks olema teised vaikivate seltsingute panused või teised innovatiivsed kapitaliinstrumendid, vaid investeeringud aktsiakapitali.
This core argument on which the BdB was relying was, for a number of reasons, erroneous.
See põhiline argument, millele BdB tugines, oli mitmel põhjusel ekslik.
For example, limited duration or withdrawability were not a necessary and indispensable feature of silent partnerships either under company law or under banking supervision law.
Näiteks ei olnud piiratud tähtaeg ja tagasivõetavus ei äriühinguõiguse ega pangandusjärelevalveõiguse alusel vaikivate seltsingute vajalikud ega vältimatud tunnused.
Conversely, share capital was not necessarily of unlimited duration and unwithdrawable.
Aktsiakapital seevastu ei olnud tingimata tähtajatu ja väljavõtmise võimaluseta.
Under German company law, rather, all companies irrespective of their legal form could be set up for a limited period or it could be agreed that a contribution could be withdrawn subject to notice, which did not stand in the way of its recognition as core capital under German banking supervision law.
Saksamaa äriühinguõiguse alusel sai pigem kõiki äriühinguid hoolimata nende juriidilisest vormist asutada piiratud ajaks või leppida kokku, et panuse saab teatamisel välja võtta, mis ei takistanud selle tunnustamist tuumkapitalina Saksamaa pangandusjärelevalveõiguse alusel.
The BdB was also wrong in arguing that the 15 % limit for recognition as core capital under international banking supervision law did not, under the ‘Sydney declaration’ of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the practice of the Germany supervisory authority based on it, apply to permanent capital instruments, which could be withdrawn only on the initiative of the issuer (but not of the investor).
BdB eksis ka väites, et 15 % limiit tuumkapitalina tunnustamiseks rahvusvahelise pangandusjärelevalveõiguse alusel ei olnud Baseli Pangajärelevalve Komitee Sydney deklaratsiooni ja Saksamaa järelevalveasutuse sellel põhinevate tavade kohaselt kohaldatav püsivate kapitaliinstrumentide suhtes, mida sai tagasi võtta üksnes emitendi (kuid mitte investori) algatusel.
Furthermore, the practice of the German supervisory authority was now based on the assumption that a contribution with a term of at least 30 years and the explicit exclusion of withdrawal was made available to the investor on a ‘permanent’ basis and consequently did not come under the 15 % limit.
Pealegi tuginesid Saksamaa järelevalveasutuse tavad nüüd eeldusel, et panus tähtajaga vähemalt 30 aastat ja selgesõnaliselt välistatud tagasivõtmisega tehti investorile kättesaadavaks “alaliselt” ning seega ei kuulunud see 15 % limiidi alla.
This too showed that the difference between contributions of limited and unlimited duration was by no means as great as the BdB was arguing.
Ka see näitas, et tähtajaliste ja tähtajatute panuste erinevus ei olnud mingil juhul nii suur, nagu BdB väitis.
As far as the appropriate remuneration was concerned, there was no cause or justification on this account for reinterpreting silent partnership contributions as share capital.
Kuivõrd jutt on asjakohasest tasust, puudus sellekohane põhjus või õigustus vaikivate seltsingute panuste ümbertõlgendamiseks aktsiakapitalina.
Only a few months after Helaba, the Deutsche Bank had taken up a ‘permanent’ contribution in the form of ‘perpetuals’, and had done so on the capital market.
Vaid paar kuud pärast Helabat oli Deutsche Bank omandanud “alalise” panuse “tähtajatute instrumentide” kujul ning teinud seda kapitaliturul.
Contrary to what the BdB asserted, the 15 % limit did not, according to a newspaper report submitted on the subject, apply to this contribution, since no increase in the interest rate had been agreed if the bank did not exercise a right of withdrawal that had been accorded to it (no ‘step-up’ clause).
Vastupidiselt BdB kinnitusele ei kehtinud vastavalt antud teemal esitatud ajaleheartiklile selle panuse suhtes 15 % limiit, kuna polnud kokku lepitud intressimäära tõstmises, kui pank ei kasuta talle antud tagasivõtmisõigust (kasvuklausel (“step-up” clause) puudub).
The Deutsche Bank perpetuals were by no means exceptional in character, since in the subsequent period numerous other credit institutions had taken up ‘permanent’ contributions on the market, examples of which Germany provided.
Deutsche Bank'i tähtajatud instrumendid ei olnud olemuselt mingil moel erandlikud, kuna järgneval perioodil olid arvukad teisedki krediidiasutused omandanud turul “alalisi” panuseid, mille kohta Saksamaa tõi ka näiteid.
No single issue, whose volumes ranged from EUR 150 million to over EUR 2 billion, provided anything like the return of share capital; the remuneration lay in the range between 110 and 290 basis points above mid-swaps.
Ükski emissioon mahuga 150 miljonit eurot kuni üle 2 miljardi euro ei andnud tulemuseks midagi aktsiakapitali tootlikkusega võrreldavat; tasu jääb 110–290 baaspunkti vahemikus turu keskmistest vahetuskurssidest kõrgemale.
Already in 1999, the market had, as regards remuneration, not attached any major importance either to the distinction between capital instruments of limited and unlimited duration or to the question of whether the issue proceeds fell under the 15 % limit or not.
Juba 1999. aastal ei olnud turg tasuga seoses omistanud mingit suuremat tähtsust ei vahetegemisele piiratud ja piiramatu tähtajaga kapitaliinstrumentide vahel ega küsimusele, kas emissioonitulud langesid alla 15 % piiri või mitte.
Nor did Germany accept the criteria selectively applied by the BdB, which were supposed on the one hand to demonstrate common features between share capital and the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen and, on the other, differences between this silent partnership contribution and a ‘normal’ silent partnership contribution.
Ka ei aktsepteerinud Saksamaa BdB poolt valikuliselt kohaldatud kriteeriume, mis pidanuks näitama ühelt poolt Hesseni liidumaa aktsiakapitali ja vaikiva seltsingu panuse ühisjooni ning teiselt poolt erinevusi tema vaikiva seltsingu panuse ja “normaalse” vaikiva seltsingu panuse vahel.
The BdB was overlooking on the one hand the extent to which the shaping of silent partnership contributions could be shaped by agreement between the parties and, on the other, features that were essential and indispensable to the distinction between share capital and a silent partnership.
BdB jättis kahe silma vahele ühelt poolt ulatuse, mil määral vaikivate seltsingute panuste vormi saab pooltevahelise kokkuleppega vormida, ja teiselt poolt aktsiakapitali ja vaikiva seltsingu eristamise seisukohalt põhilise tähtsusega ja vältimatud tunnusjooned.
Share capital did not yield interest, but conferred a claim to payment of a dividend, which was not only dependent on profits, but above all in proportion to profits.
Aktsiakapital ei tootnud intressi, kuid andis nõude dividendi maksmiseks, mis mitte ainult ei sõltunud kasumist, vaid oli eelkõige kasumi suhtes proportsionaalne.
The remuneration on a silent partnership contribution, by contrast, was only profit-dependent.
Tasu vaikiva seltsingu panuse eest seevastu oli üksnes kasumist sõltuv.
Whether or not provision was made for retrospective payments in the case of a silent partnership contribution was a matter for agreement between the parties and was not in any case one of the constitutive features of a ‘normal’ silent partnership.
See, kas vaikiva seltsingu panuse puhul nähti ette tagasiulatuvad maksed, oli pooltevahelise kokkuleppe küsimus, ning see ei ole mingil juhul “normaalse” vaikiva seltsingu panuse üheks olemuslikuks tunnusjooneks.
However, under [...] pursuant to Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act, specific provision had been made, in the event of losses, for the junior-ranking retrospective payment requirement typical of silent partnership contributions.
[...] kohaselt vastavalt Saksamaa pangandusseaduse paragrahvi 10 lõikele 4 oli tehtud erisäte kahjumi korral subordineeritud tagasiulatuva maksenõude kohta, mis on vaikivate seltsingute panuste puhul tüüpiline.
The prior-ranking requirement was to replenish the contribution again to the original amount from future profits.
Eelisjärjestuse nõue pidi viima panuse tulevase kasumi arvelt uuesti esialgse summani.
The assertion that for very large volumes only share capital and not ‘normal’ silent partnerships could be used was contradicted by the size of the silent partnership contributions which private credit institutions had taken up on the capital market in 1998/99 and were also currently taking up.
Väite vastu, nagu saaks väga suurte summade puhul kasutada üksnes aktsiakapitali, mitte aga “normaalseid” vaikivaid seltsinguid, rääkis nende vaikivate seltsingute panuste suurus, mida eraõiguslikud krediidiasutused olid kapitaliturul omandanud 1998/99 ja jätkuvalt omandasid.