natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Applying the CAPM, the parties first determined a minimum remuneration for a hypothetical share-capital investment in NordLB.
CAPMi kohaldamisel määrasid osapooled esmalt minimaalse tasu oletusliku aktsiakapitali investeeringu eest NordLB-sse.
They arrived at an appropriate minimum remuneration of 10,03 % for the LTS promotion-related assets.
Jõuti kokkuleppele, et minimaalne nõuetekohane tasu moodustab 10,03 % LTS-dega seotud varadest.
They took as their basis the risk-free interest rates of the REX1O Performance Index of Deutsche Börse AG and, for the beta factors, a KPMG report of 26 May 2004 drawn up on behalf of the Landesbanks (and now in the Commission's possession).
Riskivabade intressimäärade aluseks võeti Deutsche Börse AG tulemuslikkuse näitaja REX10 ning beetanäitajateks andmed, mis olid toodud liidumaa pankade poolt tellitud KPMG 26. mail 2004. aastal koostatud aruandes (mis nüüd on komisjoni valduses).
In practical terms, a risk-free basic interest rate of 7,15 % was calculated for NordLB as at 31 December 1991 and a beta value of 0,72 was applied on the basis of the KPMG study.
See tähendab, et riskivaba baasintressimäär 7,15 % arvutati NordLN-le seisuga 31. detsember 1991 ja beetaväärtust 0,72 rakendati KPMG uuringu alusel.
The market-risk premium was set at 4 % (for all Landesbanks).
Tururiski preemiaks määrati 4 % (kõikidele liidumaa pankadele).
A deduction was then determined for the capital's lack of liquidity on the basis of the risk-free interest rate of 7,15 % as gross refinancing costs.
Seejärel määrati hinnaaland kapitali likviidsuse puudumise eest, võttes aluseks riskivaba intressimäära 7,15 % refinantseerimise kogukuludena.
To determine the net refinancing costs, the standard tax burden of NordLB at the transfer date was fixed at a flat rate of 50 %, giving a liquidity discount of 3,75 %.
Refinantseerimise netokulu määramiseks fikseeriti üldine maksukoormus üleandmise kuupäeval NordLB jaoks 50 %, andes 3,75 % hinnaalandi likviidsuse puudumise eest.
Lastly, a premium of 0,3 % was added to allow for the failure to issue voting rights.
Lõpuks lisati 0,3 % preemia, kuna hääleõigusi ei õnnestunud saada.
This resulted overall in an appropriate remuneration of 6,76 % per annum after tax for that portion of the LTS proportion-related assets that could be used for the competitive activities of NordLB.
Selle tulemusel saadi asjakohane 6,76 %-line aastatasu pärast maksude mahaarvamist LTS-dega seotud varade eest, mida võib kasutada NordLB konkurentsivõimeliseks tegevuseks.
This remuneration was payable as of the end of the month when the assets were recognised as core capital (30 November 1993).
See tasu tuli maksta alates selle kuu lõpust, mil varad tunnustati põhikapitaliks (30. november 1993).
The understanding makes no mention of any remuneration for that portion of the LTS promotion-related assets that could not be used for the competitive activities of NordLB (bank guarantee — Avalprovision).
Kokkuleppes ei mainitud tasu LTS-dega seotud nende varade eest, mida ei tohi kasutada NordLB konkurentsivõimeliseks tegevuseks (pangagarantii – Avalprovision).
The first step in appraising the measure under the state aid rules of the EC Treaty is to assess whether it constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Esimene samm meetme määramiseks vastavalt EÜ asutamislepingu riigiabi eeskirjadele on hinnata, kas see kujutab endast riigiabi EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses.
STATE RESOURCES AND FAVOURING OF A PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING
RIIKLIKUD RESSURSID JA TEATUD ETTEVÕTETE EELISTAMINE
As described above, the Land of Lower Saxony’s shares in the promotion-related assets of the three LTS were transferred to NordLB as equity capital.
Nagu eelpool kirjeldatud, anti Alam-Saksile kuulunud kolme LTS edendamisega seotud varad üle NordLB-le omakapitalina.
If state assets of this kind, which have a commercial value, are transferred to an undertaking, then state resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty are involved.
Kui kaubanduslikku väärtust omavad riigivarad antakse üle ettevõttele, siis on EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 mõistes tegemist riiklike ressurssidega.
In order to verify whether the transfer of state resources to a publicly owned undertaking favours the latter and is therefore liable to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission applies the ‘market-economy investor principle’.
Et teha kindlaks, kas riigivara üleandmine riigi omandis olevale ettevõttele soosib viimast ning viitab sellele, et tegemist on riigiabiga EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses, kohaldab komisjon “turumajandusliku investori põhimõtet”.
This principle has been accepted (and developed) by the Court in a number of cases.
Euroopa Kohtu aktsepteeris ja laiendas seda põhimõtet arvukatel juhtudel.
The assessment under that principle will be made in paragraph 93 et seq. below.
Hindamine vastavalt sellele põhimõttele on toodud põhjenduses 93.
DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
KONKURENTSI MOONUTAMINE JA MÕJU LIIKMESRIIKIDEVAHELISELE KAUBANDUSELE
As a result of the liberalisation of financial services and the integration of financial markets, banking within the Community has become increasingly sensitive to distortions of competition, especially since remaining obstacles to competition in the financial services markets are being gradually dismantled.
Finantsteenuste liberaliseerimise ja finantsturgude integratsiooni tagajärjel on pangandus ühenduse piires muutunud konkurentsimoonutuste suhtes üha tundlikumaks, eriti pärast konkurentsi ees seisvate tõkete lammutamist finantsteenuste turul.
NordLB is an all-purpose bank and an important player on the international capital markets.
NordLB on universaalne pank ja oluline tegija rahvusvahelistel kapitaliturgudel.
It offers banking services in competition with other European banks inside and outside Germany.
Ta pakub konkurentsivõimelisi pangateenuseid koos teiste Euroopa pankadega Saksamaal ja väljaspool seda.
Aid given to NordLB therefore distorts competition and affects trade between the Member States.
Seetõttu moonutab NordLB-le antav abi konkurentsi ja mõjutab liikmesriikidevahelist kaubavahetust.
It should also be recalled that there is a close link between the equity of a credit institution and its banking activities.
Tuleks ka silmas pidada, et krediidiasutuse omakapitali ja tema pangategevuse vahel valitseb tihe seos.
Only on the basis of sufficient accepted equity capital can a bank operate and expand its commercial operations.
Pank saab tegutseda ja oma kaubanduslikke operatsioone laiendada ainult siis, kui tal on piisavalt aktsepteeritud omakapitali.
As the state measure provided NordLB with such equity capital for solvency purposes, it directly influenced the bank's business possibilities.
Kuna riigiabi tagas NordLB-le maksevõime mõistes sellise omakapitali, mõjutas see otseselt panga äritegevusvõimalusi.
MARKET-ECONOMY INVESTOR PRINCIPLE
TURUMAJANDUSLIKU INVESTORI PÕHIMÕTE
In deciding whether a financial measure taken by a public owner of an enterprise constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission applies the market-economy investor principle.
Et otsustada, kas avaliku sektori ettevõtte poolt võetud finantsmeede kujutab endast riigiabi EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 tähenduses, rakendab komisjon turumajandusliku investori põhimõtet.
This principle has been applied by the Commission in many cases and has been accepted and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in several decisions.
Nimetatud põhimõtet on Komisjon rakendanud mitme juhtumi puhul ja see on Euroopa Kohtu mitmete otsuste puhul heaks kiidetud ja laiendatud.
It allows the Commission to bear in mind the specific circumstances of each case, e.g. to take into account certain strategies of a holding company or group of companies or to distinguish between the short- and long-term interests of an investor.
See võimaldab komisjonil arvestada iga juhtumi puhul eri asjaoludega, näiteks arvestada valdusettevõtte või ettevõtte gruppide strateegiat või teha vahet investori lühi- ja pikaajaliste huvide vahel.
The market-economy investor principle will also be applied to the case at hand.
Turumajandusliku investori põhimõtet rakendatakse ka käesolevas juhtumis.
According to the principle, no state aid is involved if funds are made available on ‘terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market-economy conditions’.
Selle põhimõtte kohaselt ei ole tegemist riigiabiga, kui vahendid tehakse kättesaadavaks “tingimustel, mis oleksid vastuvõetavad erainvestorile vahendite andmisel võrreldavale eraettevõttele, kui erainvestor tegutseb normaalsetes turumajanduslikes tingimustes”.
In particular, a financial measure must be considered unacceptable to a market-economy investor if the proposed remuneration arrangements are less attractive than the market-rate remuneration paid for comparable investments.
Nimelt tuleb lugeda finantsmeede turumajandusliku investori põhimõttele vastuvõtmatuks, kui pakutud tasu ei ole nii ligitõmbav kui turul makstav tasu võrreldavate investeeringute eest.
In the light of the market-economy investor principle, the key question is therefore whether such an investor would have supplied NordLB with capital that had the specific characteristics of the LTS assets and under the same conditions, especially in view of the probable return on the investment.
Turumajandusliku investori põhimõtte valguses on antud juhtumi puhul võtmeküsimuseks, kas turumajanduslik investor oleks samadel tingimustel NordLB-le üle kandnud kapitali, millel olid samasugused omadused kui LTS-de varadel, iseäranis investeeringu oodatavat tulu arvestades.
This question will be examined below.
Seda küsimust vaadeldakse allpool.
Article 295 of the EC Treaty lays down that the system of property ownership in the various Member States must not be affected.
EÜ asutamislepingu artiklis 295 sätestatakse, et omandi õiguslikku režiimi liikmesriikides ei tohi mõjutada.
This does not, however, justify any infringement of the competition rules of the Treaty.
See ei õigusta siiski asutamislepingu konkurentsieeskirjade rikkumist.
Germany claims that, because of the constraints imposed by the special purpose assigned to the LTS assets, the only possible profitable use of these resources was to transfer them to a similar public-law institution.
Saksamaa väidab, et LTS-de varade eriotstarbelisusest johtuvate piirangute tõttu sai neid varasid kasumlikult kasutada ainult siis, kui need kanda üle sarnasele avalik-õiguslikule asutusele.
Consequently, the transfer represented the commercially most sensible use of those assets.
Sellest tulenevalt oli üleandmise puhul tegemist kaubanduslikult kõige arukama varade kasutusega.
So any remuneration for the transfer, i.e. any additional return on the LTS capital, would be sufficient to justify the transfer in the light of the market-economy investor principle.
Seetõttu on igasugune tasu üleandmise eest, st igasugune lisatulu LTS-de varade eest, sobiv üleandmise õigustamiseks turumajandusliku investori põhimõtte seisukohalt.
This line of argument cannot be accepted.
See väide ei ole vastuvõetav.
It may be that the transfer of the three LTS to NordLB, which subsequently allowed NordLB to use part of the LTS capital to underpin its competitive business, was the commercially most sensible use.
Võibolla oli kolme LTS varade üleandmine NordLB- le, mis võimaldas viimasel kasutada osa sellest kapitalist oma konkurentsivõimelise äritegevuse toetamiseks, majanduslikult kõige õigem teguviis.
However, simply taking the view of a public investor would leave out of account the fundamental question of whether the recipient benefited from preferential treatment.
Kuid avalik-õigusliku investori puhul ei teki põhimõttelist küsimust, kas varade saaja sai sooduskohtlemisest kasu.
NO CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
MUUTUSTE PUUDUMINE OMANDISTRUKTUURIS
One way of ensuring an adequate return on the capital provided would have been to increase the Land's participation in NordLB accordingly, provided that the bank's overall profitability corresponds to the normal rate of return that a market-economy investor would expect from his investment.
Üks viis asjakohase tulu määramiseks ülekantud kapitalilt võiks olla liidumaa osaluse vastav suurendamine NordLB-s eeldusel, et panga üldine tasuvus vastaks tavalisele tulumäärale, mida turumajanduslik investor loodab investeeringult saada.
However, this course was not taken by the Land of Lower Saxony.
Samas ei kohaldanud Alam-Saksi seda teguviisi.
Germany also attributes the failure to increase the Land’s shares in NordLB to the fact that, at the time of the asset transfer, NSGV undertook to inject capital in proportion to its share in NordLB, which it then did by creating the LBS special-purpose reserve of DEM 450 million and making the silent partnership contribution of DEM 550 million.
Saksamaal ei õnnestunud suurendada liidumaa omandiosa NordLB-s seetõttu, et varade üleandmise ajal kohustus NSGV tegema NordLB-le kapitalisüsti proportsionaalselt oma omandiosale; sellega seoses loodi LBS-is 450 miljoni Saksa marga suurune eriotstarbeline reserv ja tehti 550 miljoni Saksa marga suurune vaikiva seltsingu panus.
Moreover, Germany argues that, in Alitalia, the Court held that a capital injection from public funds would always satisfy the private investor principle if another shareholder made an investment and that in such a case no state aid was involved.
Pealegi väidab Saksamaa, et Alitalia puhul otsustas kohus, et riiklikest vahenditest tehtav kapitalisüst on alati kooskõlas erainvestori põhimõttega, kui investeeringu tegi teine osanik ja et sellisel juhul ei ole tegemist riigiabiga.
It should be pointed out that the Court of Justice's ruling in Alitalia referred to investments by private parties.
Tuleb märkida, et Alitalia kohtuotsuse puhul oli tegemist eraisikute investeeringutega.
But, in the case of NSGV, we are dealing not with a private party but with a public-law entity.
Kuid NSGV puhul ei ole tegemist eraisiku, vaid avalik-õiguslik üksusega.
The contributions by NSEV were, moreover, not comparable to the transfer of the LTS assets either in timing or in content.
Pealegi ei olnud NSEV panused võrreldavad LTSde varade üleandmisega ei ajastuselt ega sisult.
Whereas the LTS assets were transferred to NordLB with effect from 31 December 1991, it was only with effect from 1 July 1994 that LBS was hived off from NordLB and the LBS special-purpose reserve of DEM 450 million was formed.
LTS-de varade üleandmine NordLB-le toimus 31. detsembril 1991. aastal, kuid LBS eraldus NordLB-st alles 1. juulil 1994. aastal, mil moodustati ka 450 miljoni Saksa marga suurune eriotstarbeline reserv.
The silent partnership contribution of DEM 550 million took effect only from 10 October 1994.
550 miljoni Saksa marga suurune vaikiva seltsingu panus tehti 10. oktoobril 1994. aastal.
In the Commission’s view, this difference in timing between the transactions already shows that they did not take place under similar conditions.
Komisjoni arvates näitab erinevus ülekannete ajastamises, et need ei toimunud samadel tingimustel.
Moreover, the investments in question took a different form, at least in the case of the silent partnership.
Pealegi olid kõnealuste investeeringute vorm erinev, vähemalt vaikiva seltsingu panuse puhul.
At that time, all silent partnership contributions constituted ‘lower tier I capital’, i.e. additional capital which could not be drawn on to the same extent as share capital in order to comply with solvency regulations.
Sel ajal koosnesid vaikiva seltsingu panused “esimese taseme madalamast kapitalist”, s.o. lisakapitalist, mida ei saanud kasutada maksevõimelisuse reguleerimiseks samas ulatuses kui aktsiakapitali.
Also, in contrast to share-capital investors, silent partners do not share in a company’s increases in value, but are remunerated entirely by means of direct payments, which are normally lower than those for share-capital investments.
Vastupidiselt aktsiakapitali omavatele investoritele ei jaga vaikivad seltsinglased ettevõtte väärtuse kasvu, vaid neid tasustatakse ainult otsetoetustega, mis on tavaliselt aktsiakapitali investeeringutest madalamad.
Even if one assumes that a higher remuneration should have been paid for the (liquid) silent partnership contribution of DEM 550 million than for the (non-liquid) promotion-related assets of the LTS, the transfers of assets by the Land and by NSGV are not comparable given the differences in remuneration.
Isegi kui keegi arvab, et 550 miljoni Saksa marga suuruse (likviidse) vaikiva seltsingu panuse eest tuleks maksta kõrgemat tasu kui (mittelikviidsete) LTS-dega seotud varade eest, ei saa liidumaa ja NSGV poolt ülekantavaid varasid võrrelda lähtuvalt tasu erinevusest.
Each year a payment of 7,5 % (before tax) is made for the LBS special-purpose reserve, while, according to the Federal Government, the silent partnership contribution yields interest of around 9,11 % (before tax).
Igal aastal makstakse 7,5 % (enne maksu mahaarvamist) LBS eriotstarbelise reservi jaoks, samal ajal kui vaikiva seltsingu panuselt saadakse intressi umbes 9,11 % (enne maksu mahaarvamist).
By contrast, the LTS assets yield interest of 0,5 % after tax (around 1,2 % before tax).
Seevastu LTS-de varadelt saadakse pärast maksude mahaarvamist intressi 0,5 % (umbes 1,2 % enne maksude mahaarvamist).
So the remuneration for the LTS assets is much lower than that for the measures taken by the NSGV.
Seega on tasu LTS-de varade eest tunduvalt madalam kui NSGV võetud meetmete puhul.
Given such marked differences between the transactions carried out by the Land and by NSGV, the question can ultimately be left open as to whether, at the time when the LTS assets were transferred to NordLB, NSGV was in fact bound by an obligation to inject into NordLB an amount of capital corresponding to its shareholding or whether this obligation was laid down only later.
Arvestades suuri erinevusi liidumaa ja NSGV poolt tehtud tehingute vahel tekib küsimus, kas LTS-de varade NordLB-sse üleandmise ajal oli NSGV ka tegelikult seotud kohustusega paigutada NordLB-sse kapitali mahus, mis vastab tema aktsiapakile, või kehtestati see hiljem.
It can therefore be concluded that there was no proportional, comparable capital injection by a private investor, so that the conditions underlying the Alitalia case are not met here.
Seega võib järeldada, et erainvestori poolt ei tehtud proportsionaalset, võrreldavat kapitalisüsti ja seega ei saa siin kasutada Alitalia juhtumi põhitingimusi.
The investment was made by another public shareholder, NSGV, and the conditions of the capital injection are not comparable since the two contributions took place at different times and the terms also differed.
Investeeringu tegi teine riiklik osanik, NSGV, ja kapitalisüsti tingimused pole võrreldavad, sest need kaks panust toimusid eri aegadel ja eri tingimustel.
OWNER EFFECT
OMANIKU MÕJU
Germany believes that, in calculating the remuneration, a market-economy investor would have taken into account the increase in value in its own holding in NordLB.
Saksamaa arvab, et turumajanduslik investor oleks pidanud tasu arvutamisel võtma arvesse oma osakapitali väärtuse suurenemist NordLB-s.
At the time when the LTS assets were transferred, the Land of Lower Saxony had a 60 % share in NordLB, the value of which increased as a result of the transfer.
LTS-de varade üleandmise ajal oli Alam-Saksi liidumaal 60 %-line osalus NordLB-s, mille väärtus seoses varade üleandmisega suurenes.
Moreover, according to Germany, the Land ensured that NSGV also injected capital commensurate with its own holding in order to prevent NSGV from sharing in an increase in value brought about solely by the Land.
Saksamaa väidete kohaselt hoolitses liidumaa selle eest, et ka NSGV paigutas NordLB-sse oma kapitaliosa ulatuses kapitali, et mitte jagada liidumaa poolt tekitatud väärtuse kasvu NSGV-ga.
For the reasons set out in paragraph 102 et seq., no importance can be attached to the fact that the Land had shares in NordLB and NSGV’s capital injection cannot be regarded as a comparable investment.
Vastavalt põhjenduses 102 toodud põhjustele pole tähtis, et liidumaal oli osalus NordLB-s ja NSGV kapitalisüsti ei saa võtta samaväärse investeeringuna.
By means of that injection NSGV shared in the increase in value without having made a corresponding contribution.
Selle kapitalisüsti tõttu sai NSGV väärtuse suurenemisest oma osa ilma et ta oleks teinud vastavat panust.
No market-economy investor would agree, as a joint owner, to bear the entire cost of an investment if it were then to realise only part of the gains from it.
Ükski turumajanduslik investor ei nõustuks ühisomanikuna kandma kõiki investeeringuga seotud kulusid, kui sellest saadud kasumist saaks realiseerida vaid osa.
The Court of First Instance has specifically confirmed this view in its judgment in WestLB.
Esimese astme kohus on seda arvamust kinnitanud oma otsusega WestLB kohta.
CAPITAL BASIS FOR CALCULATING THE REMUNERATION
KAPITALIBAAS TASU ARVUTAMISEKS
Germany submits that only the part of the accepted original own funds which can be used by NordLB to underpin its commercial business has an economic value for the bank, so that a remuneration can be demanded by the Land in respect of this part only.
Saksamaa nõustub, et panga jaoks kujutab majanduslikku väärtust vaid see osa aktsepteeritud algsetest omavahenditest, mida NordLB saab kasutada oma äritegevuse toetamiseks ja liidumaalt saab tasu nõuda üksnes selle osa eest.
BdB claims that the whole amount of DEM 1 754.4 million is at risk and therefore a remuneration must be paid on that amount.
BdB väidab, et kogu summa (1754,4 miljonit Saksa marka) on riskiga seotud ja seetõttu tuleb tasu maksta sellelt summalt.
However, the remuneration may differ for the different parts of the transferred assets.
Siiski võib ülekantud varade eri osade puhul olla tasu erinev.
For the purpose of determining an appropriate remuneration, a distinction should be made between the different parts of the LTS assets according to their use to NordLB.
Asjakohase tasu määramiseks tuleb eraldi välja tuua LTS-de varade eri osad vastavalt nende kasutusele NordLB-s.
The value of the assets is determined every year.
Varade väärtus määratakse igal aastal.
At the end of 1991 it stood at DEM 1 754.4 million.
aasta lõpul oli see 1754,4 miljonit Saksa marka.
However, only DEM 1500 million was entered as equity on NordLB's balance sheet.
Kuid ainult 1500 miljonit Saksa marka märgiti NordLB bilansis omakapitalina.
The difference between this amount and the value of the LTS assets was booked as a provision for commitments arising from the transfer agreement.
Erinevus nimetatud summa ja LTS-de varade väärtuses märgiti üleandmislepingust tulenevate kohustuste reservina.
Such provisions are built up against imminent liabilities and do not constitute equity capital.
Selline reserv moodustub möödapääsmatutest kohustustest ja ei kujuta endast omakapitali.
As a consequence, they generally do not improve a firm’s credit standing.
Seetõttu ei paranda see üldiselt ettevõtte rahalist seisu.
The Land of Lower Saxony is also entitled to withdraw interest payments and amortisations which flow back to the promotion-related assets, in so far as the market value of the assets exceeds DEM 1500 million.
Alam-Saksi liidumaal on õigus muuta edendamisega seotud varadelt saadavat intressi ja kulumit, kui varade turuväärtus on üle 1500 miljoni Saksa marga.
Since NordLB is therefore unable to use the capital that exceeds the value of DEM 1500 million either to expand its business or to cover liabilities, the Commission assumes that an investor could not demand a remuneration for this portion of the promotion-related assets.
Kuna NordLB ei suuda kasutada kapitali, mille väärtus on üle 1500 miljoni Saksa marga oma äritegevuse laiendamiseks ega võlgnevuste kustutamiseks, leiab komisjon, et investor ei saa nõuda tasu edendamisega seotud varade selle osa eest.