natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This conclusion is backed up by the observation that SNCB is subject to the Law of 21 March 1991 under which it is granted specific protection against the risk of bankruptcy, comparable to a guarantee from the State.
Seda järeldust süvendab tõdemus, et SNCBle laienevad 21. märtsi 1991. aasta seaduse sätted, mis annavad talle erilise kaitse pankrotiohu vastu, mis on samane riigipoolse garantiiga.
In addition, also in Stardust Marine, at paragraph 52, the Court states that: ‘…the mere fact that a public undertaking is under State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertaking, such as the financial support measures in question here, to be imputed to the State.
Lisaks märgib Euroopa Kohus sama Stardust Marine'i otsuse punktis 52, et: “... ainuüksi asjaolust, et riigi osalusega äriühing on riigi kontrolli all ei piisa selleks, et seostada riigiga selliseid tema poolt võetavaid meetmeid, nagu kõnealused finantsabimeetmed.
It is also necessary to examine whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures’.
Lisaks on vaja hinnata, kas riigiasutusi saab käsitleda ühel või teisel viisil nende meetmete vastuvõtmisega seotuna”.
Another condition needed for measures taken by a public undertaking to constitute State aid is that the measures are not the same as those which would be taken by a private investor in a similar situation.
Teine vajalik tingimus selleks, et riigi osalusega äriühingu poolt võetud meetmeid saaks käsitleda riigiabina, on see, et need meetmed ei vasta sellele, kuidas oleks käitunud võrreldavas olukorras olev eraõiguslik investor.
As a result, the Commission will assess each of the measures taken by the SNCB in favour of the ABX group to check whether each one is both imputable to the State and not the likely behaviour of a private investor in this situation.
Seetõttu hindab komisjon alljärgnevalt iga SNCB poolt ABX kontserni kasuks võetud meetme puhul, kas need on ühtaegu seostatavad riigiga ja hälbivad vastava eraõigusliku investori tõenäolisest käitumisest.
If both these conditions are fulfilled, the measures are deemed to constitute State aid and the Commission will analyse the subject and amount of this.
Kui need kaks tingimust on üheaegselt täidetud, on nende meetmete näol tegemist riigiabiga, mille eset ja summat komisjon hindab.
Investments made in 2001 and parallel contributions
aasta investeeringud ja paralleelsed toetused
The Belgian authorities pointed out that the reinvestments made in 2001 by SNCB in the ABX group's German, Dutch and French operations were based on positive financial forecasts and the advice of business development experts.
Belgia ametiasutused märgivad, et 2001. aastal SNCB tehtud investeeringud ABX kontserni Saksamaa, Madalmaade ja Prantsusmaa ettevõtetesse põhinesid positiivsetel majandusprognoosidel ja ettevõtte arendamise valdkonna ekspertide soovitustel.
The profitability calculations set out above appear to be based on acceptable business development forecasts, as far as SNCB was able to predict in 2001.
Eespool välja toodud kasumlikkuse arvutused näivad põhinevat aktsepteeritavatel tegevuse arendamise hüpoteesidel, mida SNCB 2001. aastal välja töötada sai.
The investments in Germany are based on an expert opinion which calculated that by successfully turning around ABX-D the ABX strategy could be continued, potentially creating EUR 300 million compared with the injection of EUR 50 million, and based on an adequate intrinsic return.
Saksamaale tehtud investeeringud põhinesid ekspertarvamusel, mille hinnangu kohaselt võimaldaks ABX-D tervendamise edukus ABXi strateegiat jätkata 50 miljoni paigutatud euroga võrreldes potentsiaalse 300 miljoni euro suuruse loodava väärtuse ja piisava sisemise tasuvuslävega.
Regarding the investment of EUR 30 million in France, the profitability calculations indicate that the SNCB could achieve an internal rate of return of between 8 and 14 %.
Prantsusmaale tehtud 30 miljoni euro suuruse investeeringu osas näitas kasumlikkuse arvestus, et SNCB võiks oodata 8 % ja 14 % vahele jäävat sisemist tasuvusläve.
Moreover, this investment has made it possible to start a programme to securitise receivables so the company can get a bank credit line of EUR 70 million.
Lisaks võimaldas see investeering käivitada 70 miljoni suuruse panga krediidiliini saamist võimaldava võlanõuete väärtpaberistamise programmi.
The Commission considers that there is insufficient justification, in the case of the investment made in 2001 in ABX-NL, for basing the calculation of the IRR on the capital gain after deducting the costs of acquiring Wegtransport, as is proposed by the Belgian authorities.
Mis puutub 2001. aastal ABX-NLi tehtud investeeringusse, leiab komisjon, et IRR arvutuste rajamine kapitali suurendamise summale pärast Wegtransporti kulude mahaarvamist, nagu pakuvad välja Belgia ametiasutused, ei ole piisavalt põhjendatud.
However, considering that the SNCB's total investment includes this acquisition cost and as a result is EUR 19,2 million rather than EUR 12,2 million, the IRR of the investment is between 8,9 % and 10,2 %, and therefore remains acceptable, in particular in the light of the fact that when the investment was made, the entire ABX-NL was expected to become profitable again within the very short period of two years.
Siiski arvestades, et SNCB koguinvesteering sisaldab seda omandamiskulu ja tõuseb algse 12,2 miljoni euro asemel 19,2 miljoni euroni, on investeeringu IRR 8,9 % ja 10,2 % vahel ja seega vastuvõetav, eriti kõrvutades asjaoluga, et investeeringu tegemise ajal oodati kogu ABX-NL kasumlikkuse taastamist kahe aasta pikkuse lühikese ajaga.
Likewise, the estimation of rates of profitability of the ‘parallel contributions’ to the capital of the companies in the ABX group in Ireland, Belgium, Portugal and Singapore (which were not in financial difficulty) gave an expected IRR of between 9,6 % and 12,7 %, and appears acceptable.
Samuti näitab Iirimaal, Belgias, Portugalis ja Singapuris asuvate ABX kontserni äriühingute (mis ei olnud finantsraskustes) kapitalile antud paralleelsete toetuste kasumlikkuse hinnang 9,6 % ja 12,7 % vahele jäävat diskonteeritud IRRi ja näib vastuvõetav.
The Commission also points out that until the end of 2001 SNCB's financial structure allowed it to finance its commercial development without placing an excessive burden on its financial structure (debt/equity ratio rising from 0,6 to 0,9 between 1997 and 2001), which was not the case from 2002.
Teisalt meenutab komisjon, et kuni 2001. aasta lõpuni oli SNCBl selline finantsstruktuur, mis võimaldas tal oma äritegevuse arendamist rahastada ilma oma finantsstruktuuri ülemäära koormamata (võlgade ja omakapitali suhe tõusis aastatel 1997–2001 0,6-lt 0,9-le), kuid alates 2002. aastast ei olnud see enam nii.
Lastly, it should be noted that all these investment decisions are part of a group strategy.
Viimaks tuleb märkida, et kõik need investeerimisotsused olid kooskõlas kontserni strateegiaga.
In these circumstances SNCB was justified in taking account not only of the expected intrinsic return on each of these operations, but also the positive effects expected at group level.
Neis tingimustes arvestas SNCB põhjendatult lisaks iga tehingu oodatavale sisemisele tasuvuslävele ka positiivse mõjuga kontserni tasandil.
The Commission therefore concludes that, in the light of the prospects at the time, SNCB acted as a private investor would have done by making reinvestments in 2001 and making ‘parallel contributions’, and that these measures do not constitute state aid.
Komisjon järeldab, et tegutsedes lähtuvalt 2001. aastal tehtud reinvesteeringute ja paralleelsete toetuste selle aja perspektiividest, on SNCB käitunud nii, nagu oleks võinud seda teha eraõiguslik investor ja et nende meetmete näol ei ole tegemist riigiabiga.
However, the Commission notes that SNCB gave a guarantee to ABX Singapore without requiring payment, which is not what a private investor would have done.
Seevastu tõdeb komisjon, et vastupidiselt sellele, kuidas oleks teinud eraõiguslik investor, andis SNCB ABX Singapourile oma garantii ilma tasu nõudmata.
Given that this guarantee was granted in June 2000 when ABX started arousing public interest and the public authorities intervened with regard to SNCB, and taking account in its analysis of all potential forms of aid, the Commission feels that granting this guarantee without payment may involve state aid.
Teades, et see garantii anti 2000. aasta juunis ajal, mil ABX hakkas tekitama avalikku huvi ja arvestades ka teatavaid SNCB teemalisi riigiasutuste sõnavõtte ning selleks, et võtta oma analüüsis arvesse võimaliku abi kõiki elemente, leiab komisjon, et see tasuta garantii andmine võib sisaldada riigiabi.
As this guarantee was awarded to a company in the ABX group at a time when the decision to reorganise and restructure the network had already been taken and this was underway, the Commission will investigate this aid together with the other restructuring measures taken by the ABX group, which has incorporated ABX Singapore.
Kuna see abi anti ABX kontserni kuuluvale äriühingule ajal, mil võrgustiku reorganiseerimine ja ümberkorraldamine olid juba otsustatud ja elluviimisel, hindab komisjon seda abi koos teiste, ka ABX Singapouri hõlmava ABX kontserni ümberkorraldusmeetmetega.
Recapitalisation measures
Rekapitaliseerimismeetmed
The meeting of the Belgian Council of Ministers in February 2002 constitutes irrefutable proof of the Belgian Government's involvement, from that day on, in SNCB's management of the ABX case.
aasta veebruaris toimunud Belgia ministrite nõukogu istung on ümberlükkamatu tõend selle kohta, et sellest päevast alates oli Belgia valitsus seotud ABXi küsimuste juhtimisega SNCB poolt.
The measures taken to recapitalise ABX Germany (for a sum of EUR 157,4 million) and ABX Netherlands (for a sum of EUR 10,6 million) were notified by Belgium after this date, and have not yet been implemented.
Saksamaa ABXi (summas 157,4 miljonit eurot) ja Madalmaade ABXi (summas 10,6 miljonit eurot) rekapitaliseerimise meetmetest teatas Belgia pärast seda kuupäeva ja neid ei ole veel ellu viidud.
Belgium has presented these measures not as wise investments, but as restructuring aid.
Belgia ei esitanud neid meetmeid kui investeeringuid, vaid kui ümberkorraldusabi.
There is therefore no doubt that these measures must be classed as state aid and investigated as restructuring aid.
Seega ei ole kahtlust, et neid meetmeid peab käsitlema riigiabina ja hindama kui ümberkorraldusabi.
The letter of intent which SNCB had to issue for its German subsidiary because the latter's equity was negative from the month in which it was bought, was re-issued annually until 2005 by SNCB, including during a period when there is no doubt that SNCB's decisions regarding ABX can be imputed to the State.
Tagatiskirja, mille SNCB pidi andma oma Saksamaa tütarettevõttele, kuna sellel jäi tema omandamisele järgnenud kuude jooksul omakapital negatiivseks, andis SNCB kuni 2005. aastani uuesti välja igal aastal, sealhulgas ajal, mil riigi seotuses SBCB ABXi hõlmavate otsuste tegemisega ei ole kahtlust.
As this letter contains commitments comparable to a guarantee and SNCB received no payment for this, the Commission considers that there are elements of state aid.
Kuna selle kirjaga võetakse garantiiga võrreldavaid kohustusi ja kuna SNCB selle eest tasu ei saanud, leiab komisjon, et selles on riigiabi elemendid.
However, since the recapitalisation of ABX Germany by SNCB, which is the subject of this Decision, effectively and definitively gives the company's creditors the security which they sought through the letter of intent, which then becomes inapplicable, there will be no need to conduct a separate, redundant investigation relating to the recapitalisation measures themselves.
Kuivõrd aga käesoleva otsuse esemeks olev SNCB poolne Saksamaa ABXi rekapitaliseerimine annab selle äriühingu võlausaldajatele tõhusa ja kindla turvalisuse, mida nad otsisid sellest tagatiskirjast, mis seega esemetuks muutub, ei maksa seda rekapitaliseerimismeetmete endiga võrreldes eraldi ja pikalt uurida.
Loans in 2002
aasta laenud
SNCB granted loans to ABX Logistics NV and to ABX-D, -NL and -F from April and May 2002, i.e. during a period in which there is no doubt that SNCB's decisions regarding ABX can be imputed to the State.
SNCB andis äriühingutele ABX Logistics NV ning ABX-D, -NL ja -F laene alates 2002. aasta aprillist ja seega ajavahemikul, mil riigi seotuses SNCB ABXi käsitlevate otsuste tegemisega ei ole kahtlust.
As indicated in the descriptive section, these loans resulted in remuneration of between [...] and [...] %.
Nagu kirjeldavas osas märgitud, anti need laenud vahemikku [...] % ja [...] % jääva tasu eest.
The Commission considers that this level of remuneration is inadequate in view of the situation of the companies concerned.
Komisjoni hinnangul ei ole selline intressimäär asjaomaste ettevõtjate olukorda silmas pidades adekvaatne.
It uses the Commission's reference rate, set at 5,06 %, as an indicator of an appropriate level, which was also used for setting the rate of the rescue aid granted in January 2003 to ABX Germany.
Sobiva intressimäära näitena toob ta komisjoni viitemäära 5,06 %, mida kasutati muuseas 2003. aasta jaanuaris Saksamaa ABXile antud päästmisabi puhul.
The Commission concludes that these loans contain an element of state aid.
Sellest järeldab komisjon, et need laenud sisaldavad riigiabi elementi.
On the basis of the above reference rate increased by 400 basis points for a firm in difficulty, but also undergoing restructuring, the Commission estimates the sum of the aid element corresponding to this loan at around EUR 8 million.
Raskustes, aga ka ümberkorraldamisel oleva ettevõtte puhul 400 baaspunkti võrra suurendatava eeltoodud viitemäära põhjal hindab komisjon selle laenu puhul riigiabi elemendi suuruseks umbes 8 miljonit eurot.
As the loans were given to several companies in the ABX group at a time when the decision to reorganise and restructure the network had already been taken and was being implemented, the Commission will investigate this aid together with the other measures to restructure the ABX group, which has incorporated the retained activities of the companies which benefited from these loans.
Kuna need laenud anti erinevatele ABX kontserni kuuluvatele äriühingutele ajal, mil võrgustiku reorganiseerimine ja ümberkorraldamine olid juba otsustatud ja elluviimisel, hindab komisjon seda abi koos teiste, ka neid laene saanud äriühingute säilitatud ettevõtteid hõlmava ABX kontserni ümberkorraldusmeetmetega.
Guarantee granted for setting up a cash pool
Kontsernkonto (vahendite koondamine) loomiseks garantii andmine
As stated in the description of the restructuring measures, the Belgian authorities pointed out that the overdraft facility of EUR [...] million opened by the ABX group with a financial establishment results in commercial remuneration, and that the guarantee set up in January 2001 by SNCB for this credit line is subject to a remuneration of [...] basis points.
Nagu ümberkorraldusmeetmete sissejuhatuses märgitud, tõid Belgia ametiasutused välja, et ABX kontserni poolt ühe finantsasutuse juures [...] euro suuruse krediidiliini avamise eest tuli maksta tasu ja et 2001. aasta jaanuaris SNCB poolt selle krediidiliini jaoks antud garantii eest maksti tasu [...] baaspunkti väärtuses.
This rate is permitted in view of the usual bank rates given in similar situations.
Arvestades võrreldavates olukordades tavaliselt kohaldatavaid pankade määrasid, näib see määr vastuvõetav.
The Commission concludes that this guarantee has not given the ABX group an advantage constituting state aid.
Sellest järeldab komisjon, et nimetatud garantii ei andnud ABX grupile riigiabina käsitletavat eelist.
Besides, even if it were considered that the rate demanded by a private investor would have been a few basis points higher or even double, it would have resulted in a negligible advantage in view of the other aid measures (EUR 0,07 million per year) and would not have changed the following assessment of the compatibility of all the restructuring aid measures.
Isegi kui asuda seisukohale, et eraõigusliku investori nõutav määr oleks olnud mõne baaspunkti võrra suurem või isegi kahekordne, oleks see võrreldes teiste abimeetmetega andnud tähtsusetu eelise (0,07 miljonit eurot aastas), mis ei oleks muutnud järgnevat seisukohta ümberkorraldusmeetmete kui terviku kokkusobivuse kohta.
Other SNCB off-balance sheet commitments
Muud SNCB bilansivälised kohustused
The Belgian authorities maintained that in addition to the guarantees taken out at the time of the original acquisition of some companies in the network, the only new guarantees issued by SNCB in favour of the ABX group are the two above guarantees in favour of ABX Singapore, taken out at the end of 2005, and the approval of the overdraft facility for the cash pool.
Belgia ametiasutused kinnitasid, et lisaks esialgse mõnede võrgustikku kuuluvate äriühingute omandamise käigus antud garantiidele on ainsateks SNCB poolt ABX kontserni kasuks antud garantiideks eelnimetatud garantii ABX Singapuri kasuks, mis lõppes 2005. aasta lõpus ja kontsernkonto krediidiliini jaoks antud garantii.
However, SNCB did issue a number of letters of intent.
Siiski on SNCB andnud teatava hulga tagatiskirju.
The Belgian authorities are of the view that these letters of intent, which do not involve any remuneration, are standard practice in a market economy in dealings between a parent company and its subsidiaries.
Belgia ametiasutused leiavad, et sellised tagatiskirjad, mille eest tasu ei maksta, on ema- ja tütarettevõtete vahelises suhtlemises turul tavaline praktika.
In the case in point, with the exception of the letter for ABX Germany which has already been assessed and a letter of intent in favour of ABX Spain for EUR 12,3 million, the Commission noted that none of the new letters of intent of which it is aware and which have been issued since 2000 (when ABX started arousing public interest) contains terms which are legally binding on SNCB.
Kui välja arvata juba vaadeldud ABX Saksamaa kasuks antud kiri ja üks 12,3 miljoni euro ulatuses ABX Hispaania kasuks antud tagatiskiri, möönab komisjon, et ükski teine tagatiskiri, millest ta teadlik oleks ja mis oleks antud alates 2000. aastast (ajast, mil ABX hakkas tekitama avalikku huvi), ei sisalda SNCB jaoks õiguslikult siduvaid tingimusi.
The Commission deems that the letter of intent in favour of ABX Spain is equivalent to a bank guarantee, given that SNCB undertakes to grant ABX Spain the funds needed to repay its debts to the bank.
Komisjon leiab, et ABX Hispaania kasuks antud tagatiskiri on võrdne panga garantiiga, kuna SNCB võtab kohustuse anda ABX Hispaaniale vajalikud vahendid, et viimane saaks pangale oma võlad tasuda.
The Commission recalls that the aid element in question is made up of the cost of the guarantee which the company would have had to pay to obtain the loan and which is in addition to the cost of the loan itself; in any case this amount remains limited and corresponds to a few basis points.
Komisjon meenutab, et nimetatud abielement koosneb garantii kulust, mille ettevõte oleks pidanud selle laenu saamiseks maksma ja mis lisandub krediidi enda kulule; see element on igal juhul väike ja võrdub mõne baaspunktiga. Samuti, kui pidada adekvaatseks [...] baaspunkti suurust määra, mida muuhulgas maksis ABX kontsern SNCBle, siis jääks abielemendi suurus marginaalseks (0,02 miljonit eurot aastas).
Disposal of the Road domestic France business
Prantsusmaa road domestic ettevõtte müümine
As the choice and the conditions of ABX France disposing of its Road domestic France business were clearly imputable to the Belgian State, the Commission must check the arguments put forward by the Belgian authorities to justify the choice of an MBO as being in line with what a private investor would have done under the same circumstances.
Otsus ABX France'i Prantsusmaa road domestic ettevõtted müüa ja selle müügi tingimused on selgelt seotud Belgia riigiga; komisjon peab kontrollima Belgia ametiasutuste esitatud argumente, millega põhjendatakse, et ettevõtte tagasiostmise töötajate poolt oleks valinud ka samas olukorras olev erainvestor.
Cost of the scenario chosen by SNCB. the total cost of the divestiture scenario chosen by SNCB is EUR 137,5 million, or EUR [...] million corresponding to the business' negative net assets at the time of disinvestment, and a negative selling price of EUR [...] million.
SNCB valitud lahenduse kulud. SNCB valitud tegevuse lõpetamise viisi kulud on kokku 137,5 miljonit eurot, ehk [...] miljonit eurot, mis vastab negatiivsele netoaktivale tegevuse lõpetamise ajal ja [...] miljoni euro suurusele negatiivsele müügihinnale.
The Commission notes that two independent experts have confirmed that this sum of EUR [...] million corresponds to the negative value of the Road domestic France business sold to the employees.
Komisjon märgib, et kaks eksperti on kinnitanud, et see [...] miljoni euro suurune summa vastab töötajatele müüdud road domestic ettevõtte negatiivsele väärtusele.
Deloitte Corporate Finance reviewed the business plan of the company in question and evaluated it using the discounted cash flows method.
Samuti on Deloitte Corporate Finance asjaomase ettevõtte äriplaani kontrollinud ja hinnanud seda diskonteeritud rahavoogude (discounted cash flows) meetodil.
The business plan covers the years 2005 to 2008.
See äriplaan hõlmab aastaid 2005–2008.
The assessment concludes that the value of ABX-F domestics corresponds to the above negative price.
Hinnangu kohaselt vastas ABX-F domestics'i väärtus eespool nimetatud negatiivsele hinnale.
This was confirmed by Ernst & Young Transaction Advisory Services who reviewed the estimates made by Deloitte.
Seda tulemust kinnitas ka Ernst & Young Transaction Advisory Services, kes kontrollis Deloitte'i hinnanguid.
Given that these two independent experts used the standard and appropriate assessment methods, the Commission accepts that this price corresponds to the market price and that the buyer of the Road domestic France activity did not receive state aid when making this purchase.
Arvestades, et kaks sõltumatut eksperti kasutasid tavalisi ja sobivaid analüüsimeetodeid, nõustub komisjon, et see hind vastas turuhinnale ning et Prantsusmaa Road domestic ettevõtte ülevõtja ei ole selle väljaostmise näol riigiabi saanud.
Cost of voluntary liquidation: according to the Belgian authorities, the cost of voluntary liquidation would be EUR 183 million, or EUR [...] million for the negative net assets when the disposal decision was taken, and EUR [...] million in other additional costs.
kulud kokkuleppelise likvideerimise korral. Belgia ametiasutuste sõnul oleks kokkuleppelise likvideerimise korral kulu olnud 183 miljonit eurot ehk [...] miljonit eurot seoses negatiivse netoaktivaga loovutamist käsitleva otsuse tegemise ajal ja [...] miljonit eurot seoses muude täiendavate kulutustega.
In the case of a voluntary liquidation plan, SNCB would have to pay off all the creditors of the liquidated company which were not covered by the liquidated assets.
Kokkuleppelise likvideerimise korral oleks SNCB pidanud hüvitama kõik likvideeritava äriühingu võlad, mida ei oleks saanud katta likvideerimisel tekkiva vara arvelt.
It is therefore legitimate to include the amount of EUR [...] million.
Seega oleks ilmselt õige arvestada [...] miljoni euro suuruse kuluga.
The other additional costs taken into account by the Belgian authorities comprise in particular EUR [...] million for the redundancy programme which should have been carried out by SNCB during the liquidation, and EUR [...] million incurred through losses which would have been made by the ABX group throughout the negotiations for this programme.
Muud täiendavad kulud, mida Belgia ametiasutused arvestavad, koosnevad iseäranis [...] miljonist eurost seoses sotsiaalkavaga, mille SNCB oleks pidanud likvideerimise korral ellu viima ja [...] miljonist eurost seoses kahjumiga, mis oleks ABX kontsernil tekkinud selle kava läbirääkimiste aja jooksul.
Both these estimates seem reasonable.
Need kaks hinnangut näivad mõistlikud.