natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards points (b) and (c), KWW argues that the decisions of the Commission contain no clauses that would justify reassessment of the approved aid.
Punktides b ja c väidab KWW, et komisjoni otsustes ei sisaldu klausleid, mis õigustaksid abi hilisemat ümberhindamist.
The aid was approved in its totality.
Abi kiideti täies mahus heaks.
Especially as there are no conditions or indications in the decisions on the fact that only the loss compensation corresponding to the real losses would be covered by the decisions approving the aid.
Otsustes ei ole tingimusi ega viiteid sellele, et nendega kiidetaks heaks ainult tegelikule kahjumile vastav kahjumikate.
There was no restriction in the decisions that would justify later control.
Otsustes ei ole ka piirangut, mis õigustaks hilisemat kontrolli.
The only sentence in the decisions to this effect is the one stating that Commission gave its commitment to the Council to use its monitoring and investigating powers to ensure that the yards only receive the aid necessary for their restructuring.
Ainuke lause, mis sellele viitab, on lause, kus on kirjas, et komisjon võtab nõukogu ees kohustuse kasutada oma järelvalve- ja uurimisvolitusi tagamaks, et tehased saavad ainult restruktureerimiseks vajalikku abi.
According to KWW, this sentence is only an introduction, which stresses that the investigating and controlling powers were used in the context of the approval of the aid in order to check the necessity of the aid before releasing the tranches.
KWW arvates on see lause vaid sissejuhatus, mis rõhutab, et uurimis- ja kontrollivolitusi kasutati abile heakskiidu andmisel, kontrollimaks abi vajadust enne abi osade väljamaksmist.
This sentence was meant only to justify why the Commission approved the restructuring aid in several tranches.
Selle lause mõte oli vaid põhjendada abi heakskiitmist mitmes osas.
Consequently, according to KWW the Commission’s decisions approving the aid could only be understood in that the aid was released in accordance with the provisions of the privatisation agreement, without later repayment obligations in case the real losses would turn out the be lower than estimated.
KWW arvates järeldub sellest, et komisjoni otsuseid, millega abi heaks kiideti on võimalik tõlgendada vaid selliselt, et abi lubati maksta välja vastavalt erastamislepingule, sisaldamata hilisemat tagasimakse kohustust, kui tegelik kahjum osutuks oodatust väiksemaks.
In accordance with the concept of the Acquisition Agreement between Kvaerner and THA aid was meant to cover part of the costs of the restructuring.
Kvaerneri ja THA vahel sõlmitud erastamislepingu tähenduses oli abi mõeldud restruktureerimiskulude osaliseks katmiseks.
The aid was used for the restructuring of the yard and therefore in accordance to its objectives.
Abi kasutati tehase restruktureerimiseks ja seega sihtotstarbeliselt.
A further argument of KWW is that the Commission has known since 1996 that the real losses were significantly lower than the estimated ones.
KWW väidab ka, et komisjon on alates 1996. aastast teadnud, et tegelik kahjum olid oodatust märksa väiksem.
According to Kvaerner, the facts were presented in a way, which corresponded to the time of drafting the report.
Kvaerneri väitel peegeldasid esitatud andmed olukorda aruannete koostamise kuupäeval.
Kvaerner and Germany were under no obligation, after submitting the last spillover report covering the period until the end of 1995, to submit any further documentation to the Commission on the further development of the losses.
Ei Kvaerneril ega Saksamaal olnud pärast viimase spill-over-aruande esitamist (mis katab ajavahemiku kuni 1995. aasta lõpuni) mingit kohustust esitada täiendavaid dokumente kahjumi edasise muutumise kohta.
In any case, the Commission should have already noticed, on the basis of the 1995 spillover report, that the losses were lower than estimated.
Igal juhul oleks komisjon pidanud juba viimasest 1995. aasta abi kasutamise aruandest märkama, et kahjum oli prognoositust väiksem.
The difference between the amount of losses in the 1995 spillover report (31 December 1995 — EUR 224,861 million (DEM 439,791 million)) and the auditor’s report of 25 April 1997 (31 December 1996 — EUR 201,048 million (DEM 393,216 million)) results from the fact that in individual cases risk estimates were not fully realised.
Erinevus 1995. aasta abi kasutamise aruande [31. detsember 1995 – 224,861 miljonit eurot (439,791 miljonit Saksa marka)] ja 25. aprilli 1997. aasta audiitori aruande [31. detsember 1996 – 201,048 miljonit eurot (393,216 miljonit Saksa marka)] kahjumisummade vahel tuleneb sellest, et teatavatel juhtudel jäid prognoositud riskid realiseerumata.
KWW requests that the EUR 31,955 million (DEM 62,5 million) of Wettbewerbshilfe should not be calculated within the loss compensation.
KWW taotleb, et 31,955 miljoni euro (62,5 miljonit Saksa marga) suurust konkurentsitoetust ei arvestataks kahjumikatte sisse.
This would lead to a smaller difference between estimated and real losses.
Selle tulemuseks oleks erinevus prognoositud ja tegeliku kahjumi vahel väiksem.
Germany explains that EUR 60,988 million (DEM 119,284 million) subject to the present procedure is existing aid forming part of the operating aid approved by the Commission decisions of 3 March 1993 and 17 January 1994.
Saksamaa selgitab, et 60,988 miljonit eurot (119,284 miljonit Saksa marka), mis on kõnealuse menetluse subjekt, on olemasolev abi, mis moodustab osa komisjoni 3. märtsi 1993. aasta ja 17. jaanuari 1994. aasta otsustega heakskiidetud tegevusabist.
Therefore it is not understandable that the Commission initiated the procedure concerning non-notified aid, meaning new aid.
Saksamaa ei mõista, miks komisjon algatas menetluse teatamata abi ehk uue abi suhtes.
Without an explicit provision in its decision, the Commission cannot assess anew the compatibility of aid that it had, years before, already declared as being compatible with the common market.
Komisjon ei saa ilma vastava selgesõnalise sätteta komisjoni otsuses, hinnata uuesti aastaid tagasi ühisturuga kokkusobivaks kuulutatud abi nõuetele vastavust.
This is against the principles of legal security and legitimate expectations.
See on vastuolus õiguskindluse ja õiguspärase ootuse põhimõtetega.
Further, Germany says that not all the amounts that the Commission dealt with in its decisions approving the aid in fact were aid.
Edasi väidab Saksamaa, et mitte kõik summad, mis komisjoni oma abi käsitlevates otsustes heaks kiitis ei olnud tegelikult abi.
The Commission approved the full coverage of the restructuring costs.
Komisjon kiitis heaks kogu restruktureerimisega seotud kulude katmise.
In this context it did not examine, to what extent the restructuring was carried out by using the own resources of the yard.
Seejuures ei uurinud komisjon, millises ulatuses viidi restruktureerimist läbi tehase omavahenditest.
The prognosis for losses resulting from contracts signed after 1 July 1990 was EUR 230,08 million (DEM 450 million).
Pärast 1. juulit 1990 sõlmitud lepingutelt teenitav prognoositud kahjum oli 230,08 miljonit eurot (450 miljonit Saksa marka).
To cover this amount, there was not only the amount of EUR 29,812 million (DEM 58,309 million) operating aid paid in cash, as indicated in the paying schedule (Zahlungsplan) submitted to the Commission, but also own resources of the yard which appeared as positions in the balance sheet.
Selle katmiseks kasutati mitte ainult tegevusabina välja makstud 29,812 miljonit eurot (58,309 miljonit Saksa marka), nagu esitatud maksegraafikus (“Zahlungsplan”), vaid ka tehase omavahendeid, mis kajastusid bilansikirjetel.
These own resources cannot be considered as aid, since they were assets of the yard, which were sold as a result of an open and unconditional bidding procedure.
Kõnealuseid omavahendeid ei saa käsitleda abina, kuna tegemist oli avaliku ja tingimusteta pakkumismenetluse teel müüdud tehase varadega.
Germany stresses that the yard could not have been restructured without the aid laid down in the privatisation contract and approved by the Commission, since Kvaerner, as the best bidder, was only willing to carry out the restructuring at its own risk if it received this aid.
Saksamaa rõhutab, et tehast ei oleks ilma erastamislepingus kehtestatud ja komisjoni heakskiidetud abita restruktureeritud, kuna Kvaerner kui parim pakkuja oli nõus restruktureerimisega, võttes riskid enda peale, ainult koos abi saamisega.
In case the Commission doubted the plausibility of the loss prognosis in the business plan at the time, it should not have approved the aid as a lump sum but should have inserted a provision in its approval stating that the approval only covered aid that corresponded to the actual losses.
Juhul, kui komisjon kahtles sel ajal äriplaani kahjumiprognoosi usutavuses, ei oleks ta pidanud kiitma abi heaks kindlasummalisena, vaid oleks pidanud heakskiitmisele lisama sätte, mille kohaselt heakskiit katnuks vaid tegelikule kahjumile vastava abi.
However, the wording of the decisions does not contain such provisions and this was not even the intention of the Commission at the time.
Otsustes aga niisuguseid sätteid ei ole ja see ei olnud sel ajal ka komisjoni eesmärk.
Under these circumstances the lump sum agreed upon was indeed meant to be final.
Selles olukorras mõeldi kokkulepitud kindlat summat kui lõplikku.
The risks and benefits linked with possible exceeding or undercutting of this amount were left for KWW as an incentive to restructure the yard as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Selle summa võimaliku ületamise või sellele alla jäämisega seotud vastav kahjum või kasum jäeti KWW kanda, mis pidi olema tehase võimalikult kiire ja tõhusa restruktureerimise stiimul.
Germany refers to its letter of 28 May 1993 to the Commission, which reminds the Commission, that the compensation of the actual losses against a proof of the losses submitted by the company is not provided for in the privatisation contract.
Saksamaa viitab oma 1993. aasta 28. mai kirjale, kus tuletatakse komisjonile meelde, et erastamislepingus ei nähtud ette tegeliku kahjumi katmist vastavalt kahjumi tõendamisele.
The buyer of the yard bears the risk for any additional costs.
Tehase ostja kannab oodatust suurema kahjumi riski.
As a counterpart the buyer can benefit from the, according to the experience, minor chances for achieving any savings.
Tasuks saab ostja kasu säästmisest, mille võimalused on kogemustele toetudes väikesed.
Thereby the operating aid as established in a lump sum and agreed upon with the buyers is necessary for the privatisation of the Eastern German yards.
Seetõttu on kindlasummalisena kehtestatud ja ostjatega kokkulepitud tegevusabi Ida-Saksamaa tehaste erastamiseks vajalik.
Germany also refers to its letter of 16 October 1993, in which is written that the continuous monitoring of the future loss provisions is note envisaged.
Saksamaa viitab ka oma 1993. aasta 16. oktoobri kirjale, kus kirjutatakse, et tulevase kahjumi järelevalvet ei ole ette nähtud.
This would also correspond to the contractual agreement with the buyer, according to which KWW bears the full risk of the losses being higher than those provided for when the contract was signed.
See oleks kooskõlas ka ostjaga sõlmitud lepinguga, mille järgi KWW kannab täielikult riski, et kahjum võib olla suurem kui lepingu sõlmimise ajal prognoositud.
Consequently, the Commission approved in 1993 all the operating aid without any restrictive conditions, being fully aware of the circumstances.
Sellest tulenevalt kiitis komisjon 1993. aastal heaks kogu tegevusabi ilma piiravate tingimusteta, olles asjaoludest täiel määral teadlik.
The aid was then immediately paid to the yard as planned, long before it could be established how high the actual losses would finally be.
Seejärel maksti abi plaanikohaselt tehasele välja, ammu enne seda, kui oli võimalik kindlaks teha, kui suureks tegelik kahjum lõpuks kujuneb.
A further point raised by Germany is that the Commission did not reserve itself the right to later examine the necessity of the aid.
Saksamaa toob veel välja, et komisjon ei jätnud endale mingit õigust abi vajalikkuse hilisemaks kontrollimiseks.
Neither did the decision of March 1993 nor the one of January 1994 indicate that the aid was approved only to cover the actual losses and that the final assessment would only be carried out later once the final amount of the actual losses was known.
Samuti ei viidanud ei 1993. aasta märtsi ega 1994. aasta jaanuari otsused, et abi kiideti heaks ainult tegeliku kahjumi katmiseks, ja et lõplik hindamine viidaks läbi alles siis, kui tegelik kahjumisumma on teada.
Neither do the Commission decisions indicate that the amount of the actual losses should be demonstrated or that the aid that would subsequently be proven as being ‘not necessary’, should be paid back.
Komisjoni otsused ei sätestanud ka seda, et tegeliku kahjumisummat tuleks tõendada või et abi, mis hiljem osutub “mittevajalikuks”, tuleks tagasi maksta.
The Commission should have inserted an express provision in its decisions in order to be able to legally enforce such right.
Komisjon oleks pidanud lisama selgesõnaliselt vastavad sätted, mis hiljem niisugust õigust juriidiliselt toetaksid.
Germany refers to the approving Commission decisions, in which it is stated that ‘The Commission can, in the light of the undertaking given to the Council described above, only approve the granting of aid for as far as the necessity is clearly shown …’.
Saksamaa viitab komisjoni heakskiitvatele otsustele, kus öeldakse, et “komisjon saab ülalkirjeldatud nõukogu ees võetud kohustuse valguses heaks kiita vaid abi, mille vajalikkus on selgelt näidatud…”.
Since the Commission then approved the aid without attaching any conditions to it, this can only be interpreted as meaning that the Commission was convinced about the necessity of aid before approving it.
Kuna komisjon kiitis abi sel ajal heaks sidumata seda mingite tingimustega, saab seda tõlgendada ainult nii, et komisjon oli enne heakskiitmist abi vajalikkuses veendunud.
According to Germany, the decisions cannot be interpreted in a way that the Commission would use its monitoring and investigating authority for a later assessment of the necessary amount of aid.
Saksamaa arvamuse kohaselt ei saa otsuseid tõlgendada nii, et komisjon võib kasutada oma järelevalve- ja uurimisvolitusi vajaliku abisumma hilisemaks hindamiseks.
Neither did the Commission reserve itself the right of such control.
Õigust niisuguseks kontrolliks ei jätnud endale ka komisjon ise.
In the Commission decisions approving the aid it is only stated that the Commission gave its commitment to the Council to use its monitoring and investigating powers in order to ensure that the yards only receive the aid necessary for their restructuring.
Komisjoni abi heakskiitvates otsustes öeldakse ainult, et komisjon võttis nõukogu ees kohustuse kasutada oma järelevalve- ja uurimisvolitusi tagamaks, et tehased saavad ainult restruktureerimiseks vajalikku abi.
This statement was put in the decisions in order to explain why the Commission did not approve all the aid with one decision but released it in several tranches.
See lisati otsustesse selgitamaks, miks komisjon ei kiitnud kogu abi heaks ühe otsusega, vaid lubas seda välja maksta mitmes osas.
In addition, this phrase indicated that the Commission took the final decision, each time, on the necessity of the aid before releasing a tranche.
Lisaks sellele tähendas see fraas, et komisjon otsustas abi vajalikkuse üle lõplikult enne iga osa lubamist.
Germany also explains that to the contrary of what the Commission claims in the opening of procedure, its letter of 28 May 1993 does in no way indicate that Germany should ensure that the Commission verify the use of the aid after it had been granted and released.
Saksamaa selgitab ka, et vastupidiselt komisjoni väitele menetluse algatamise otsuses ei öeldud komisjoni 1993. aasta 28. mai kirjas mingilgi moel, et Saksamaa peaks tagama komisjonile võimaluse kontrollida abi kasutamist pärast selle lubamist.
In fact, Germany had in its letter referred to the fact that the Commission can verify how the aid should be used before releasing the tranches.
Tegelikult oli Saksamaa oma kirjas viidanud asjaolule, et komisjon saab enne abi osade heakskiitmist kehtestada, kuidas tuleb abi kasutada.
Therefore in the letter of 28 May 1993 a reference was made to the document on the proof of the use of the aid (Verwendungsnachweis) prepared by the yards at the time.
Seetõttu viidati 28. mai 1993. aasta kirjas dokumendile abi kasutamise tõendamise kohta (“Verwendungsnachweis”), mille tehased sel ajal ette valmistasid.
The information given by KWW on 26 May 1993 on the use of aid was attached to the letter.
Kirjale oli lisatud 26. mail 1993 KWW poolt antud teave abi kasutamise kohta.
The invitation to verify the use of the aid concerned only this information.
Taotlus abi kasutamise kontrollimiseks oli seotud vaid selle teabega.
Germany refers to the Commission decision releasing the second tranche of aid, which stipulates that the authorised amount is the highest operating aid that can be paid to the yard.
Saksamaa viitab komisjoni abi teist osa heakskiitvale otsusele, kus märgitakse, et heakskiidetud summa on maksimaalne tegevusabi summa, mida tehasele maksta võib.
This would only mean that the yard should not receive any other operating aid than that provided for in the privatisation contract, in particular no additional aid under the approved schemes.
See saab tähendada ainult seda, et tehas ei tohiks saada mingit muud tegevusabi peale erastamislepingus kokkulepitu ehk, tehas ei tohiks saada täiendatavat abi kõnealuste heakskiidetud kavade raames.
Germany explains that the fact of submitting the Commission information after the approval of the aid, in particular the spillover reports, does not result in a competence for the Commission to verify the necessity of the aid.
Saksamaa selgitab, et komisjonile peale abi heakskiitmist teabe, konkreetsel juhul niinimetatud spill-over-aruannete esitamine ei anna komisjonile pädevust abi vajalikkust kontrollida.
The spillover reports were submitted in order to demonstrate that no spillover of aid took place from the yard to other undertakings.
Spill-over-aruandeid esitati näitamaks, et ei toimunud abi ülekandmist tehaselt teistele ettevõtetele.
Contrary to what the Commission claims, the meaning and purpose of the reports was not to show the actual amount of losses.
Vastupidiselt komisjoni väidetele ei olnud aruannete mõte ja eesmärk näidata kahjumi tegelikku summat.
The information on the use of aid contained in these reports was only meant to help in presenting in a transparent way, considering the purpose of the spillover controls, that no aid was transferred to the investor or to the other yards.
Nendes aruannetes sisalduv teave abi kasutamise kohta oli mõeldud vaid selleks, et läbipaistval viisil, arvestades spill-over-kontrolli eesmärki näidata, et abi ei kantud üle investorile ega teistele tehastele.
Germany states that it had fulfilled all its reporting obligations in time.
Saksamaa kinnitab, et oli täitnud kõik oma aruandekohustused õigeaegselt.
The last spillover report concerning the period until 31 December 1995 was submitted to the Commission by letter of 6 July 1996.
Viimane spill-over-aruanne (mis käsitles perioodi kuni 31. detsembrini 1995) esitati komisjonile 6. juuli 1996. aasta kirjaga.
On the basis of the information contained in this last report the Commission was, at the latest from July 1996, aware that the actual losses were significantly less than EUR 262,037 million (DEM 512,5 million).
Selles viimases aruandes sisaldunud teabe põhjal oli komisjon hiljemalt 1996. aasta juulis teadlik, et tegelik kahjum oli 262,037 miljonist eurost (512,5 miljonist Saksa margast) märksa väiksem.
Germany explained the difference between the actual losses in the 1995 report and the report submitted later by Arthur Andersen to Germany by letter of 25 July 1997 concerning the situation at 31 December 1996.
Saksamaa selgitas tegeliku kahjumi erinevust 1995. aasta aruandes ja hiljem Arthur Anderseni poolt 25. juuli 1997. aasta kirjaga Saksamaale esitatud 1996. aasta 31. detsembri seisu kohta käivas aruandes.
They are due to the fact that the risk estimations were not fully realised and that the situation proved to be different in 1996 due to the time factor.
Need tulenevad asjaolust, et prognoosid ei realiseerunud täielikult ja et 1996. aastal muutus olukord ajateguri tõttu.
Some risks that were envisaged did not materialise.
Mõned arvesse võetud riskid ei materialiseerunud.
Therefore, the actual losses turned out to be less than those estimated at 31 December 1995.
Seetõttu osutus tegelik kahjum väiksemaks kui 31. detsembril 1995 prognoositi.
However, Germany explains that contrary to what the Commission claims in the opening procedure, it was not to be expected in summer 1996 that the actual losses would turn out to be higher than those indicated in the last spillover report.
Saksamaa selgitab aga, et vastupidiselt komisjoni väidetele menetluse algatamise otsuses, ei olnud 1996. aastal põhjust arvata, et tegelik kahjum osutuks suuremaks kui viimases spill-over-aruandes märgitud.
The yard’s balance sheet was carefully drafted taking into consideration the rules on maintaining sufficient capital.
Tehase bilanss koostati hoolikalt, arvestades piisava kapitali säilitamise reegleid.
Therefore the losses were estimated in such a way that greater losses were not to be expected.
Seega prognoositi kahjumit selliselt, et sellest suuremat kahjumit ei oleks oodata.
For this reason the Commission was already fully aware of the difference between the original loss estimation and the actual losses since July 1996.
Sel põhjusel oli komisjon juba 1996. aasta juulis täiel määral teadlik algse prognoositava kahjumi ja tegeliku kahjumi erinevusest.
However, it only started asking for information on the actual losses in summer 1999 and only opened the procedure in February 2000.
Tegeliku kahjumi kohta hakkas komisjon aga teavet küsima alles 1999. aasta suvel ja algatas menetluse alles 2000. aasta veebruaris.
Germany further argues that in case the Commission should come to the conclusion that the difference between the estimated and actual losses has State aid relevance, the difference would be smaller than claimed by the Commission.
Saksamaa väidab veel, et juhul, kui komisjon jõuaks järeldusele, et erinevus prognoositava ja tegeliku kahjumi vahel on riigiabi seisukohast asjakohane, on erinevus väiksem kui komisjon väidab.
The Commission claims that the amount of aid received for loss compensation was EUR 262,037 million (DEM 512,5 million).
Komisjon väidab, et kahjumikatteks saadud abi summa oli 262,037 miljonit eurot [512,5 miljonit Saksa marka).
This amount consists of the estimated loss compensation (EUR 230,081 million (DEM 450 million)) and the Wettbewerbshilfe (EUR 31,955 million (DEM 62,5 million)).
See summa koosneb prognoositud kahjumi kattest (230,081 miljonit eurot (450 miljonit Saksa marka)] ja konkurentsitoetusest [31,955 miljonit eurot (62,5 miljonit Saksa marka)].
However, Wettbewerbshilfe was not meant for loss compensation but, as usual, for compensating for the disadvantages suffered by all the German yards due to their location in Germany and in Europe.
Konkurentsitoetus ei olnud aga mõeldud kahjumikatteks, vaid, nagu tavaliselt, katmaks Saksamaa tehaste ebasoodsamat olukorda, mis tuleneb nende asukohast Saksamaal ja Euroopas.
This was a scheme approved by the Commission.
See oli komisjoni poolt heakskiidetud kava.
Therefore the amount of the actual losses can only be compared with the original loss estimation of EUR 230,081 million (DEM 450 million).
Seetõttu saab tegeliku kahjumi summat võrrelda ainult algse kahjumi prognoosiga 230,081 miljonit eurot (450 miljonit Saksa marka).
The difference is thereby only EUR 29,033 million (DEM 56,784 million).
Erinevus on seega ainult 29,033 miljonit eurot (56,784 miljonit Saksa marka).