natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Instead, the capital market and rating agencies tended to use appropriate benchmarks which entailed considerably higher own‐funds ratios and hence reduced the apparently large own resources cushion from just under [...]* % to around [...]* %.
Palju olulisemaks peavad kapitaliturg ja reitinguagentuurid tüüpiliselt asjakohaseid bench-mark’e (e võrdlusbaase), mis näitavad oluliselt suuremat kapitali adekvaatsust ja vastavalt sellele vähendavad näiliselt kõrgemat omavahendipuhvrit napilt [...]* protsendilt ligikaudu [...]* protsendile.
An above‐average own‐funds ratio in 2006 was vital [...]*.
Keskmisest kõrgem kapitali adekvaatsus aastal 2006 on [...]* vältimatult vajalik.
Rating agencies attached considerable importance to capital structure and in the past have called for improvements in BGB’s core‐capital ratio.
Reitinguagentuurid omistavad oma reitingute andmisel kapitalistruktuurile väga suurt tähtsust ja on juba varem nõudnud, et BGB parandaks esmaste omavahendite määra.
Given the close correlation between the financial strength rating and the long‐term rating, on the one hand, and the forthcoming end of guarantor liability, on the other, a significant improvement in the financial strength rating was required to avoid negative consequences for the scale and cost of refinancing.
Tiheda vastastikuse sõltuvuse tõttu finantstugevuse ja pikaajalise reitingu vahel on riigipoolse vastutuse äralangemise korral tingimata vajalik finantstugevuse reitingu märkimisväärne parandamine, et vältida negatiivset mõju refinantseerimise mahule ja kuludele.
Moreover, the reappraisal of risk‐bearing assets under Basel II would probably result in a higher own resources requirement from 2006 onwards because of the increasing volatility of risk‐bearing assets.
Lisaks tuleneb riskiinvesteeringute ümberhindamisest vastavalt Basel II nõuetele eeldatavasti alates aastast 2006 riskiaktivate kasvavast volatiilsusest vajadus suuremate omavahendite järgi.
COMMENTS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
TEISTE ASJASSEPUUTUVATE ISIKUTE SEISUKOHAD
In response to the publication of the decision to initiate proceedings in the Official Journal of the European Communities, the Commission received comments from two other interested parties, namely Berliner Volksbank and a third party which asked for its identity to be kept secret.
Komisjon sai pärast menetluse avamise otsuse avaldamist Euroopa Ühenduste Teatajas kahe asjassepuutuva isiku seisukohad, nimelt Berliner Volksbank ja isik, kes taotles isikusamasuse mitteavaldamist.
Comments from Berliner Volksbank
Berliner Volksbanki seisukoht
The aid measures for BGB were on a completely new scale.
BGB kantud abi ületas seni tavapäraseid mahtusid.
The bank’s financial difficulties were due in the first place to its extremely exposed business in closed‐end real estate funds.
BGB finantsraskused tulenevad ennekõike ettevõtte äärmiselt kahjumlikest tehingutest kinniste kinnisvarafondidega.
The reason for BGB’s losses was that virtually no checks had been made when the property had been acquired.
BGB kahjumite põhjus seisneb selles, et objektide omandamisel kontroll praktiliselt puudus.
Yet investors had been guaranteed an income.
Ometi garanteeriti fondiinvestoritele tulu.
The undertaking had been regarded throughout the Federal Republic as the market leader — primarily, in all probability, on account of the favourable conditions for investors.
Ettevõtet peeti — küllap eelkõige investoritele soodsate tingimuste tõttu — turuliidriks kogu riigi ulatuses.
Restructuring aid could be justified in individual cases given the serious negative consequences of a bank failure for the banking system and public confidence.
Ümberstruktureerimisabi võiks küll üksikutel juhtudel, arvestades panga maksejõuetuse tõsiseid negatiivseid tagajärgi pangandussüsteemile ja usaldusele üldsuse silmis olla õigustatud.
Unlike in previous cases decided by the Commission, however, the aid recipient here operated on a limited regional scale so that the effect of the aid was concentrated on only a few competitors.
Erinevalt seni komisjoni poolt otsustatud juhtudest on siin siiski tegemist piiratud piirkondliku tegevusraadiusega abisaajaga, nii et abi mõju kontsentreerub vähestele konkurentidele.
These would be hit all the harder by the distortive effects, especially Berliner Volksbank, which competed with the BGB right across its business.
Neid tabaksid konkurentsi moonutavad mõjud seda tugevamalt, eriti Berliner Volksbanki, kes konkureerib BGBga kõikides tegevusvaldkondades.
The level and intensity of the aid should be limited to the minimum necessary for the restructuring.
Abi suurus ja intensiivsus peaks piirduma ümberstruktureerimiseks vajaliku miinimumiga.
But this was not apparent.
Seda ei ole aga märgata.
The Land guarantee for risks in the property sector was an unlimited additional funding commitment since the Land of Berlin’s associated liability could not currently be estimated and was therefore a ‘blank cheque’ for future losses.
Liidumaa garantii kinnisvara valdkonna riskidele tähendab lisamakse kohustust, kuna sellega seotud piiramata nõuete rahuldamise kohustust Berliini liidumaa poolt ei saa praegu hinnata ja see vastab seega “blankotšekile” tulevaste kahjumite jaoks.
No excess liquidity could be allocated to the undertaking, however.
Ettevõttele ei tohi aga liigset likviidsust anda.
Given its amount (EUR 21,6 billion) and its duration (30 years), the guarantee was already disproportionate: it gave the bank virtually unlimited creditworthiness and distorted competition quite considerably.
Juba oma suuruse (21,6 mld eurot) ja kestuse (30 aastat) poolest on kõnealune garantii ebaproportsionaalne, andes pangale praktiliselt piiramatu tagatise ja moonutades seega olulisel määral konkurentsi.
By being completely indemnified against the risks of property servicing in operational banking, BGB was receiving an ‘unconditional licence’ to submit offers on whatever terms it wanted, e.g. when selling or leasing property.
Panga täielik vabastamine kinnisvarateenuste äri riskidest operatiivpanganduses annab BGBle “loa” pakkumiste tegemiseks näiteks kinnisvara võõrandamisel või väljaüürimisel mistahes tingimustel.
Even if the bank were to make losses in the process, these would be fully compensated by the Land of Berlin.
Isegi kui pank teeniks sellega kahjumit, hüvitaks Berliini liidumaa selle jälle täies ulatuses.
Consequently, the guarantee was an additional funding commitment of unlimited amount which, by its very nature, could not be authorised and which was also not defined in the underlying legislation.
Selle tulemusena vastab garantii seega summaliselt piiramatule lisamakse kohustusele, mis juba oma olemuse poolest ei ole lubatav ja mis aluseks olevas seaduses ei ole konkretiseeritud, kuigi see on vajalik.
In addition, the capital injection combined with the risk‐hedging guarantee provided double cover.
Lisaks toob kumuleeruv kapitalieraldiste tegemine ja riskikaitse garantii kaasa riskide topeltkatte.
When determining the grant equivalent of the guarantee, the fact that much of it would definitely be used should be taken into account.
Garantiile vastava abi määramisel tuleks arvestada, et seda kasutatakse kindlasti olulises ulatuses.
The market for financial services was characterised by strong competition on terms, with considerable pressure on margins.
Finantsteenuste turgu iseloomustab tugev konkurents tingimuste osas märkimisväärse survega marginaalile.
It was therefore to be expected that BGB would pass on the full advantage conferred by the aid to the market and thus considerably distort competition to the detriment of its competitors.
Seetõttu võib oodata, et BGB annab abi näol saadud eelised edasi täies mahus turule ja moonutab siin oluliselt konkurentsi oma konkurentide kahjuks.
This was a particular cause for concern because the aid was being granted to the market leader in the Berlin/Brandenburg region, whose market share in that region relative to the lending business as a whole was, on BGB’s own estimation, just under 50 % and which owned just over 50 % of all branches of credit institutions in Berlin.
See on eriti murettekitav, kuna abi antakse Berliini/Brandenburgi piirkonna turuliidrile, kelle turuosa piirkonnas kogu aktivaäris tema enda hinnangu kohaselt on napilt 50 % ja kellele kuulub tublisti üle 50 % kõigist Berliini krediidiasutuste filiaalidest.
BGB was a direct competitor of Berliner Volksbank in the latter’s main fields of business, i.e. personal banking and banking for medium‐sized corporate clients, and already had a market share many times larger than Berliner Volksbank’s.
BGB on Berliner Volksbanki otsene konkurent nende peamistes tegevusvaldkondades, eraklientide valdkonnas ja keskmise suurusega äriklientide valdkonnas, ja tema turuosa ületab mitmekordselt Berliner Volksbanki turuosa.
The aid thus contributed to a further economic ‘consolidation of power’ in the Berlin banking market.
Abi suurendaks seega veelgi Berliini pangandusturul majandusliku “võimu kindlustamist”.
The bank’s comparatively strong market presence was also a consequence of the multibrand strategy of BGB, which was operating with several institutions under different brands or business names.
BGB suhteliselt suur turuosa on ka BGB mitme kaubamärgi strateegia tulemus, kuna BGB osaleb turul mitme erineva kaubamärgi ja ärinimega asutuse kaudu.
BGB was pursuing a business strategy which had detached itself from profitability strategies and, through its subsidised conditions, had become predatory.
BGB järgib äristrateegiat, mis on eraldunud rentaablusstrateegiatest ja tänu subventsioneeritud tingimustele on toonud kaasa konkurentide kõrvaletõrjumise.
Because it lacked a cogent plan for a sustained recovery, the proposed restructuring programme would not restore the long‐term profitability of the undertaking.
Esitatud ümberstruktureerimiskava ei sobi loogilise kontseptsiooni puudumise tõttu jätkusuutlikuks tervendamiseks, et võimaldada ettevõtte rentaabluse taastamist pikaajalises perspektiivis.
It was based on overly optimistic assumptions, was not sufficiently specific and overemphasised positive aspects.
See põhineb liiga optimistlikel eeldustel, ei ole piisavalt konkreetne ja rõhutab liigselt positiivseid aspekte.
Moreover, it was not suited to ensuring the long‐term profitability and hence the viability of the undertaking since it set out to achieve a target profitability of only some 6 to 7 %, which was only half as much as the usual average for the sector.
Lisaks ei ole see sobiv, et tagada ettevõtte rentaablus pikaajalises perspektiivis ja seega selle elujõulisus, kuna lähtutakse ainult ligikaudu 6 — 7 protsendilise rentaabluse eesmärgist, mis on ainult pool panganduses tavalisest keskmisest.
Lastly, the restructuring programme did not mention future aid reimbursement obligations associated with the pending investigation of the transfer of WBK to the Land bank in 1993.
Lõpuks ei ole ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsioonis mainitud tulevasi riigiabiõigusel põhinevaid tagasimaksekohustusi seoses poolelioleva kontrolli menetlusega WBK ülekandmise asjas Landesbankile aastal 1993.
Insufficient attention was paid to the need, identified in the Commission’s guidelines, to reduce the adverse effects on competitors by limiting the presence of the aid recipient on the relevant markets after restructuring since business activities in the relevant markets would actually expand.
Komisjoni suuniste kohaselt esineva vajadusega leevendada kahjulikke mõjusid konkurentidele abisaaja kohalolu piiramisega asjaomastel turgudel pärast ümberstruktureerimise lõpuleviimist ei ole piisavalt arvestatud, kuna äritegevust asjaomastel turgudel isegi laiendatakse.
The restructuring programme would make it possible to increase profits in the private and corporate customer segments and to compensate for the closure of various sites outside Berlin, in particular by focusing and expanding those activities in Berlin.
Ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooni kohaselt peaks tulu suurenemine era- ja äriklientide valdkonnas ja kompensatsioon erinevate asukohtade sulgemise eest väljaspool Berliini saama eelkõige võimalikuks nimetatud äritegevusele keskendumise ja selle laiendamise kaudu Berliinis.
BGB was planning to retreat only from those geographic markets in which it had not so far acquired considerable importance.
BGB kavandab ainult tagasitõmbumist geograafilistelt turgudelt, millel ta seni pole märkimisväärset tähtsust saavutanud.
The announced closure of branches might not lead to a reduction of BGB’s market presence but it corresponded more to a general trend in the markets for financial services in Germany, which was regarded as ‘over‐banked’.
Väljakuulutatud filiaalide sulgemine ei saa viia BGB turul esindatuse vähenemiseni, vaid vastab pigem üldisele arengusuunale Saksamaa finantsteenuste turgudel, mida loetakse “ülepangastunuks”.
The extent of the remedies to be provided by BGB would have to be calculated using its current dominant position in the Berlin banking market, since this was where the distortive effects were strongest.
BGB poolt osutatava kohustuse ulatust tuleks mõõta BGB praegu turgu valitseva positsiooni alusel Berliini pangandusturul, kuna siin ilmnevad konkurentsi moonutavad tagajärjed kõige tugevamalt.
As a condition for offsetting the distortions caused by the aid, the Commission should consider the sale of part of the BGB group.
Komisjoni poolt ettenähtud kohustusena tasakaalustada abi põhjustatud konkurentsimoonutusi võiks kõne alla tulla BGB kontserni mingi valdkonna võõrandamine.
One possibility would be to sell Berliner Bank, which in the relevant market segments had market shares similar to those of Berliner Volksbank.
Selleks sobiks hästi näiteks Berliner Banki võõrandamine, millele kuuluvad asjaomastes turusegmentides turuosad, mis vastavad Berliner Volksbanki omadele.
The advantage of selling Berliner Bank was that, organisationally, the institution was largely independent and had its own entrance to the market; it could therefore be taken over by a competitor with relative ease.
Berliner Banki võõrandamisel on see eelis, et siinkohal on tegemist organisatsiooniliselt ulatuslikult iseseisva asutusega, kes tegutseb turul iseseisvalt ja kelle konkurendi poolt ülevõtmise tehniline külg ei põhjusta suuremaid probleeme.
Given the amount of aid, the size of the business sold off would be appropriate compensation for the aid’s considerable distortive effects.
Sellega loovutatud äritegevuse suurusjärk oleks abi suurust arvestades kohane kompensatsioon selle olulisel määral konkurentsi moonutavate mõjude eest.
Along with the public liability guarantees (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung) and the transfer of Wohnbau‐Kreditanstalt to the Berlin Land bank, the present aid measure was only one of the many financial public support measures for BGB.
Käesolev abi on riiklike vastutusgarantiide (avalik-õiguslik rahastamiskohustus ja tagatiseandja vastutus) ja ülekandmise kõrval Landesbank Berlinile ainult üks riikliku sektori arvukatest finantsabimeetmetest BGB kasuks.
This resulted in a combination of aid which would also have to be taken into account in determining the remedies for the granting of the restructuring aid.
See viib kumuleerumiseni, mida tuleb arvestada ka ümberstruktureerimisabi eest vastuteenuste määramisel.
Raising the own‐funds ratio to 9,7 % was not essential.
Kapitali adekvaatsuse tõstmine 9,7 protsendile ei ole vajalik.
Only the 8 % minimum laid down in the German Banking Law (Kreditwesengesetz) was legally binding and, in the words of the guidelines, the ‘strict minimum needed’.
Ainult krediidiasutuste seaduses ette nähtud 8 % miinimum on õiguslikult siduv ja kuulub täitmisele ning on komisjoni suuniste kohaselt “vältimatult vajalik miinimum”.
The combination of risk hedging and capital injection was not essential since the former by itself would cover the risk of losses in the property sector.
Riskikaitse ja kapitalieraldise kumuleerumine ei ole nõutav, kuna esimene juba peab katma kinnisvaraärist tulenevate kahjumite riski.
The capital injection led to the Land of Berlin compensating for losses twice over.
Kapitalieraldis tooks kaasa “kahjumi kahekordse hüvitamise” Berliini liidumaa poolt.
BGB might use the additional funds obtained for other business segments.
BGB võiks täiendavalt saadud vahendeid kasutada teistel tegevusaladel.
Furthermore, there were indications of other aid.
Lisaks sellele on viiteid edasistele abidele.
The Land government was negotiating with selected investors over the takeover of the bank.
Senat peab valitud investoritega läbirääkimisi panga ülevõtmise üle.
The sale was not at the market price since the tendering procedure was not open to all, was not transparent and was not being conducted without discrimination.
Ülevõtmine ei toimuks turuhinnaga, kuna pakkumine ei ole kõigile avatud, ei ole läbipaistev ega kulge mittediskrimineerivalt.
Comments from a third party that asked for its identity to be kept secret
Isiku selgitused, kes taotles oma isikusamasuse mitteavaldamist
The bank’s future strategy seemed in particular to be to reduce its activities, capacities and infrastructure and to concentrate on regional personal and corporate banking.
Panga tulevane strateegia näib seisnevat eelkõige selles, et vähendada panga tegevusi, võimsusi ja infrastruktuuri ning keskenduda panga tegevuses piirkondlikule era- ja äriklientide valdkonnale.
This plan could be based only on the assumption that these regional markets and the bank’s share of them would grow.
Selline kontseptsioon peab põhinema eeldusel, et need piirkondlikud turud kasvavad ja samuti panga osa neis.
There were some doubts and contradictions, however, about the bank’s shares of these markets.
Panga osa kohta nimetatud turgudel esineb aga mõningaid kahtlusi ja vastuolusid.
It was also unclear whether the bank could build on a sound customer basis at all.
Teiseks ei ole selge, kas pank üldse saab toetuda soliidsele kliendibaasile.
The Berliner Bank brand had weaknesses in this respect.
Kaubamärk “Berliner Bank” viitab seejuures nõrkusele.
Because of the problems of the property financing business in the past, there were doubts about its future success.
Varasemate probleemide tõttu kinnisvara finantseerimise valdkonnas on panga tulevase edu suhtes kahtlusi.
Maintaining a large share of the capital market business was not typical of a regional bank.
Kapitaliturgudel kauplemises olulise osa hoidmine ei ole piirkondliku panga jaoks tüüpiline.
The successful implementation of the restructuring programme depended substantially on whether it managed to achieve the ambitious plans for reducing staff, introducing a new risk control system and improving information systems.
Ümberstruktureerimiskava elluviimise edu sõltub olulisel määral sellest, kas õnnestub töötajate arvu vähendamise ja uue riskikontrollisüsteemi sisseviimise ning infosüsteemide parendamise auahned plaanid realiseerida.
There was a question mark against this, however, since staff reduction measures to date had not achieved their targets and since resistance from employees and unions was to be anticipated.
Selles võib kahelda, kuna seni võetud meetmed töötajate arvu vähendamiseks on olnud seatud eesmärkidest väiksemad ja arvestada tuleb töötajate ja ametiühingute vastupanuga.
Moreover, many of the reductions to date were attributable to outsourcing measures, but no long‐term reduction in costs could be expected from these.
Lisaks on suur osa seni läbi viidud vähendamistest sisuliselt teenuste sisseostmise meetmed. Selle baasil ei saa aga oodata kulude vähenemist pikaajalises perspektiivis.
Rather, it should be reckoned that the costs of the transferred workers would have to be borne by the bank in the form of higher service charges.
Palju enam võib oodata, et pangal tekivad tööjõukulude asemel suuremad kulud teenustasude näol.
In the future, the bank had to be able to compete in the marketplace on its own merits, in accordance with point 34 of the guidelines.
Pank peaks vastavalt suuniste punktile 34 edaspidi olema suuteline oma jõududega turul püsima.
There were doubts whether the target return on own resources of 7 % for 2006 was sufficient for this.
On kahtlusi, kas eesmärgiks seatud omakapitali tootlus 7 % aastaks 2006 on selleks piisav.
It could not be assumed, therefore, that long‐term viability would be restored.
Seetõttu ei saa lähtuda elujõulisuse taastamisest pikemas perspektiivis.
Nor could that low return be justified by the performance of public functions by the savings bank since these were irrelevant to an assessment of the return.
Sellist madalat tootlust ei saa õigustada ka hoiukassa avalike ülesannete täitmisega, kuna tootluse hindamisel ei oma see tähtsust.
With continuing public ownership, there were considerable doubts as to whether the bank’s viability could be restored and guaranteed.
Avalik-õigusliku omandi jätkumisel esineksid märkimisväärsed kahtlused, kas panga elujõulisust on võimalik taastada ja tagada.
The Land of Berlin would be exposed to considerable political pressure when terminating employment relationships.
Berliini liidumaad tabaks töösuhete lõpetamisel tõsine poliitiline surve.
In general, it would not be able to implement the restructuring plan.
Üldiselt ei oleks Berliini liidumaa suuteline ümberstruktureerimiskava ellu viima.
The bank’s bodies would still have political appointees on them, which would give rise to conflicts of interest.
Panga organid moodustataks poliitiliste kaalutluste alusel, see aga tooks kaasa huvide konflikte.
Even if it were taken over by another German regional bank, these problems would continue.
Kõnealused probleemid püsiksid ka ülevõtmise korral mõne muu Saksa Landesbank-tüüpi panga poolt.
V. GERMANY’S REACTION TO THE COMMENTS OF OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
V. SAKSAMAA VASTUS TEISTELE ASJASSEPUUTUVATELE ISIKUTELE
Germany commented on the observations of Berliner Volksbank and the anonymous third party.
Saksamaa esitas oma seisukoha Berliner Volksbanki ja anonüümse kolmanda isiku arvamuse kohta.
Berliner Volksbank’s submission about alleged existing aid was unfounded.
Berliner Volksbanki etteheide väidetava varasema abi suhtes on väär.
There were no substantial financial resources that had been built up through alleged aid.
Mingeid väidetava abi toel loodud suuri finantsressursse ei ole.
Otherwise the group would not be in difficulties.
Vastasel korral ei oleks kontsern tõsistes raskustes.
Further, the Commission had assessed the liability systems of institutional liability and guarantor liability as existing aid and these should not therefore be regarded as encumbering BGB.
Muus osas hindas komisjon õiguse instituuti kui olemasolevat abi avalik-õigusliku rahastamiskohustusena ja tagatiseandja vastutusena ning seda ei tohiks seetõttu vaadelda BGB kahjuks.
The capital injection provided through the rescue aid would indeed be made available to the bank permanently, but this was in accordance with the guidelines and the Commission’s practice as regards restructuring aid.
Päästeabi näol saadud kapitalieraldis tuleks tõepoolest anda tähtajatult panga käsutusse, see aga vastab suunistele ja komisjoni praktikale ümberstruktureerimisabi raames.
The transfer of WBK to LBB was being investigated by the Commission in a separate proceeding but was not described by Germany as aid.
WBK toomist LBBsse uurib komisjon eraldi kontrollmenetlusega, ent Saksamaa seda abina ei kvalifitseeri.
While BGB had a relatively strong position on the Berlin banking market in both personal and corporate banking, its market shares were not as high as Berliner Volksbank claimed.
BGB turupositsioon Berliini pangandusturul on küll era- ja äriklientide valdkonnas suhteliselt tugev. Panga turuosad ei ole aga nii suured kui seda väidab Berliner Volksbank.
The market shares based on volumes were clearly smaller than those based on customers since Berliner Sparkasse had many accounts with small credit and deposit volumes, which was proving to be more of an additional cost factor.
Mahu järgi hinnatud turuosad on oluliselt väiksemad kui klientide arvu järgi hinnatud turuosad, kuna hoiukassal Berliner Sparkasse on palju väikeste laenu- ja hoiusemahtudega kontosid, mis pigemini kujutab endast täiendavat kulufaktorit.
The restructuring programme was fully documented in sufficient detail.
Ümberstruktureerimiskava sisaldab kõiki vajalikke ja piisavalt üksikasjalikke dokumente.