natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As a consequence of the inadequate planning of the necessary steps to achieve the objective, the costs of the entire investment programme and, in particular, of the extraction installation were clearly understated.
Eesmärkide saavutamiseks vajalike sammude ebapiisava planeerimise tõttu hinnati investeerimisprogrammi kogukulusid ja iseäranis ekstraheerimisrajatise maksumust ilmselgelt liiga madalaks.
Germany, however, does not share this view and presented a study by DLM on the costs of the extraction installation.
Siiski ei jaga Saksamaa seda arvamust ning ta esitas uuringu, mille DLM viis läbi ekstraheerimisrajatise kulude hindamiseks.
The four-page study, which is based on theoretical calculations that need be checked by conducting practical tests, is simply a list of the costs of producing phosphoric acid by means of the wet process.
Neljal lehel on tegemist üksnes fosforhappe märgmenetlusel tootmise kulude ülesloetlemisega, tuginedes seejuures ainult teoreetilistele arvutustele, mida tuleb praktiliste katsetustega üle kontrollida.
No estimate is given of the costs of building the installation itself.
Rajatise ehitamise kulusid ei kalkuleerita.
This study does not then alter the view that the costs of the investment programme and, in particular, of the extraction installation were not carefully planned when the restructuring strategy was decided on.
Seetõttu ei muutu midagi hinnangus, et investeerimisprogrammi ja iseäranis ekstraheerimisrajatise kulud ei olnud ümberstruktureerimisstrateegia paikapanemisel hoolikalt planeeritud.
This view has been confirmed subsequently as the costs were seriously understated.
See leiab tagantjärele kinnitust, kuna kulusid alahinnati tugevasti.
The extraction installation was supposed to cost EUR 3,07 million (DEM 6 million) in 1996 but the cost had risen to EUR 7,72 million (DEM 15,1 million) by 2000/2001, when the work was interrupted owing to a lack of liquidity.
aastal ekstraheerimisrajatise jaoks planeeritud 3,07 mln eurot (6 mln Saksa marka) olid aastavahetuseks 2000/2001, mil tööd sularaha puudumise tõttu katkestati, kasvanud 7,72 mln euroni (15,1 mln Saksa margani).
The overall investment, which had been put at for EUR 7,67 million in 1996, had risen to EUR 17,93 million by 2000/2001.
aastal koguinvesteeringute suuruseks kavandatud summa 7,67 mln eurot oli aastavahetuseks 2000/2001 tõusnud 17,93 mln euroni.
The inevitable consequence of the lack of any real planning for the restructuring measures and the investment costs was that the extraction installation was not completed by 1998 and CWP had not restored its long-term viability by 2000 as initially envisaged.
Ümberstruktureerimismeetmete ja investeerimiskulude puuduliku planeerimise paratamatuks tagajärjeks oli see, et ekstraheerimisrajatist ei ehitatud 1998. aastaks valmis ning CWP ei taastanud aastaks 2000 oma pikaajalist rentaablust, nagu algselt ette oli nähtud.
By 2000 CWP had not managed to repay any of the loans granted to it, was far from having completed the extraction installation, continued to be dependent on elemental phosphorus and was on the verge of insolvency.
aastal ei maksnud CWP tagasi mitte ühtegi talle antud laenu, ekstraheerimisrajatis ei saanud veel kaua valmis, ettevõte oli jätkuvalt sõltuv elementaarsest fosforist ning seisis teda ähvardava maksejõuetuse ees.
It can thus be assumed that the 1996 restructuring strategy failed in 2000.
Seepärast võib lähtuda sellest, et 1996. aasta ümberstruktureerimisstrateegia oli aastaks 2000 nurjunud.
Germany, however, takes a different view, namely that, when CWP avoided insolvency by selling its phosphate division to TI, it successfully accomplished the restructuring of that division.
Saksamaa on siiski teisel seisukohal. Saksamaa arvates on CWP pärast maksejõuetuse ärahoidmist fosfaadiäri TI-le müümise teel, selle ärivaldkonna ümberstruktureerimise edukalt lõpetanud.
In addition, it considers that the restructuring of the phosphoric acid division will have been successful once TI pays the outstanding amount of the price because then CWP will complete the innovative extraction installation and become viable once again.
Fosforhappe valdkonna ümberstruktureerimine lõpeb Saksamaa arvamusel samuti edukalt niipea, kui TI maksab ära järelejäänud ostuhinna, sest siis ehitab CWP valmis innovatiivse ekstraheerimisrajatise ning saab hakata oma rentaablust tagasi võitma.
In support of this assertion, Germany has submitted a report from Dr Scheibitz dated 25 July 2000.
Selle väite toetuseks esitas Saksamaa eksperthinnangu dr Scheibitzilt 25. juulist 2000.
Its conclusion is that the initial strategy was successful and, even if the Commission does not share this view, the changes to the initial strategy have ensured that CWP will be viable.
Saksamaa tuleb lõppjäreldusele, et esialgne strateegia oli edukas ning et isegi sel juhul, kui komisjon seda seisukohta ei jaga, olevat muudatused esialgses kontseptsioonis kindlustanud CWP elujõulisuse.
The Commission does not agree.
Komisjon ei saa seda seisukohta jagada.
First, the restructuring of CWP cannot be divided into two divisions (phosphates and phosphoric acid). CWP was a firm which was in difficulty and for which a restructuring strategy was drawn up.
Esiteks ei saa CWP ümberstruktureerimist jaotada kahte ettevõttevaldkonda (fosfaadid ja fosforhape): tegemist oli raskustesse sattunud ettevõttega, kelle jaoks kavandati ümberstruktureerimisstrateegia.
Moreover, the restructuring of the two divisions is linked: CWP could produce phosphates efficiently only if it could count on producing phosphoric acid economically.
Peale selle on mõlema valdkonna restruktureerimine teineteisega seotud: efektiivne fosfaaditootmine oli ainult siis võimalik, kui CWP sai toetuda fosforhappe ökonoomsele valmistamisele.
Although CWP increased its product range and potentially even the quality of its phosphates, it never produced them efficiently because it remained dependent on elemental phosphorus.
Olgugi et CWP laiendas tootepaletti ja parandas potentsiaalselt ka oma fosfaatide kvaliteeti, ei olnud efektiivne tootmine mingil ajal võimalik, kuna sõltuvus elementaarsest fosforist jätkus.
The fact that CWP withdrew from its traditional market by selling its phosphates division in a bid to avoid insolvency cannot be regarded as a successful restructuring but is proof of the failure of the original plan.
Tõsiasja, et CWP ähvarava maksejõuetuse vältimiseks fosfaadiäri müügi teel oma traditsiooniliselt turult tagasi tõmbus, ei saa vaadelda eduka ümberstruktureerimisena, vaid see on tõendus esialgse kontseptsiooni nurjumisest.
It should also be noted that the restructuring has not yet ended.
Järgnevalt tuleb märkida, et ümberstruktureerimist ei ole veel lõpule viidud.
The extraction installation, which should have been completed by 1998, i.e. before the ‘sale’ of the phosphates division to TI, is still not operational and the installations for the production of thermal phosphoric acid have been closed down.
Ekstraheerimisrajatis, mis pidi valmima 1998. aastaks, s.t enne fosfaadiäri “müüki” TI-le, pole ikka veel tootmisvõimeline ning rajatised fosforhappe tootmiseks termilisel meetodil on seisatud.
The Commission cannot regard these as changes to the initial restructuring strategy: what is clear is that the initial strategy failed completely in 2000 and that CWP is now in a quite different position.
Komisjon ei saa seda vaadelda esialgse ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooni muudatusena: on selge, et esialgne strateegia on aastal 2000 täielikult nurjunud ning et sellest ajast alates on CWP täiesti teistsuguses situatsioonis.
The Commission cannot agree with Germany either that the modified strategy would increase CWP’s chances of survival.
Samuti ei saa komisjon jagada Saksamaa seisukohta, et modifitseeritud strateegia parandaks CWP väljavaateid ellujäämiseks.
It notes that the report from Dr Scheibitz, which Germany presented in order to demonstrate the technical feasibility of the extraction installation, points to two main problems.
Komisjon märgib, et dr Scheibitzi hinnang, mille Saksamaa esitas tõestusena ekstraheerimisrajatise tehnilise teostatavuse kohta, viitab kahele peamisele probleemile.
First, if the problem with the raffinate is not solved, the installation cannot become operational.
Esiteks ei saa rajatist käitada, kui pole lahendatud probleemi rafinaadiga.
Second, CWP obviously did not incorporate in its planning a pilot phase that could show clearly whether there were any problems with the installation.
Teiseks ei ole CWP ilmselt planeerinud pilootfaasi, mis võiks selgelt näidata, kas rajatisega tekib probleeme.
As could have been envisaged, shortly after this report CWP was once again on the verge of insolvency.
Nagu oligi ette näha, seisis CWP veidi pärast eksperthinnangut jälle maksejõuetuse piiril.
On the basis of the information available, the problem with the raffinate has not been solved.
Olemasoleva informatsiooni põhjal ei ole probleemi rafinaadiga lahendatud.
Even if CWP were to complete the installation, further problems could arise in the absence of a pilot phase.
Isegi kui CWP peaks rajatise valmis ehitama, võivad ilma pilootfaasita ilmneda edasised probleemid.
Finally, the Commission notes that CWP is not a major player on what is a difficult and highly concentrated market dominated by large firms such as Rhodia, Astaris, Prayon and TI.
Lõpetuseks märgib komisjon, et CWP on väike osatäitja suurel, tugevasti kontsentreeritud turul, mida valitsevad suured ettevõtted nagu Rhodia, Astaris, Prayon ja TI.
CWP clearly does not have easy access to financing and suffers from a chronic lack of equity.
CWP-l ei ole ilmselgelt hõlpsat juurdepääsu finantseerimisele ning ta kannatab kroonilise sularahapuuduse all.
Even completion of the extraction installation would not by itself ensure the company’s survival.
Isegi ekstraheerimisrajatise valmisehitamine ei kindlusta per se ettevõtte ellujäämist.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the 1996 strategy was not carefully planned and presented shortcomings and that costs were understated.
Lõpetuseks on komisjon seisukohal, et 1996. aasta strateegia ei olnud hoolikalt planeeritud, puudusid vajalikud sammud ning kulusid alahinnati.
Such a strategy could not lead to the restoration of long-term viability.
Niisugune strateegia ei saanud viia pikaajalise elujõulisuse taastamiseni.
The numerous changes to the plan support this view.
Seda tõendavad kontseptsiooni arvukad muudatused.
It is not surprising, therefore, that CWP found itself on the verge of insolvency at the time when the restructuring should have been successfully completed.
Seetõttu ei ole üllatav, et selleks ajaks, kui ümberstruktureerimine oleks pidanud edukalt lõpetatud olema, seisis CWP maksejõuetuse piiril.
In addition, the Commission considers that the 1996 strategy, for which the aid was granted, failed completely in 2000 and that there is no guarantee of CWP’s continued survival.
Lisaks sellele on komisjon arvamusel, et 1996. aasta strateegia, mille jaoks abi anti, oli 2000. aastal täielikult nurjunud ning et CWP edasiseks ellujäämiseks pole mingit garantiid.
Consequently, the conditions laid down in point 3.2.2(i) of the Community guidelines are clearly not met.
Järelikult on Ühenduse suuniste (1994) eeldused vastavalt lõike 3.2.2. punktile i) ilmselgelt täitmata.
Aid in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits
Ümberstruktureerimise kulude ja tulude vahekord
The amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be undertaken and must be related to the benefits anticipated from the Community’s point of view.
Abi ulatus ja intensiivsus peavad piirduma ümberstruktureerimise jaoks vajaliku minimaalmääraga ning olema proportsioonis ühenduse vaatepunktist lähtuva oodatava tuluga.
Therefore, aid beneficiaries will normally be expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources or from external commercial financing.
Seetõttu nõutakse abisaajatelt ümberstruktureerimisplaani jaoks tavaliselt küllaltki suurt summat kas omavahenditest või võõrfinantseerimisest.
Moreover, the form in which the aid is granted must be such as to avoid providing the company with surplus cash which would be used for aggressive, market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process.
Lisaks sellele peab Abi antama niisugusel kujul, et ettevõttel ei tekiks üleliigset likviidsust, mida ta võiks kasutada agresiivseks, turgu kahjustavaks käitumiseks ümberstruktureerimisprotsessi mitte puutuvates ärivaldkondades.
According to the figures submitted by Germany in 1997, the costs of the restructuring should amount to EUR 12,88 million (see Table 4).
Vastavalt Saksamaa andmetele 1997. aastast pidanuks ümberstruktureerimiskulud kokku olema 12,88 mln eurot, nagu tabelis 4 näidatud.
In its response to the initiation of the investigation procedure, Germany indicated that the overall costs of the restructuring totalled EUR 18,87 million (see Table 5).
Vastuses formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamisele teatas Saksamaa, et ümberstruktureerimise kogukulude suuruseks on 18,87 mln eurot, nagu tabelist 5 nähtub.
As regards the contribution of the beneficiary to the restructuring, the 1997 notification identified two items: financing of investments of EUR 5,11 million (DEM 10 million) and contribution from the shareholders of originally EUR 0,15 million (DEM 0,3 million).
Abisaaja panusena ümberstruktureerimisse seisab 1997. aasta teatises kaks kirjet: investeeringute finantseerimine summas 5,11 mln eurot (10 mln Saksa marka) ja osanike panus esialgses summas 0,15 mln eurot (0,3 mln Saksa marka).
As noted in the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, the investment obligation was a requirement of the privatisation in 1994, which had been agreed two years before the restructuring started, and not a contribution to the 1996 restructuring.
Nagu on märgitud formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamises, oli investeerimiskohustus erastamise eelduseks 1994. aastal, kaks aastat enne ümberstruktureerimise algust, mitte panus 1996. aasta ümberstruktureerimisse.
The State-guaranteed loans cannot be considered as a private investor contribution as claimed by CWP.
Riikliku käendusega tagatud laenu ei saa käsitleda erainvesteeringuna nagu CWP seda väidab.
In its response to the information injunction, Germany lists a supplier credit from Vopelius as a private investor contribution.
Vastuses informeerimiskorraldusele toob Saksamaa investorpanusena välja Vopeliuse hankijakrediidi.
It should be noted that this item does not constitute a credit as such but consists in deferral for several weeks of the payment by CWP for raw material supplies from Vopelius.
Tuleb märkida, et seejuures ei ole tegemist laenuga tavalises mõttes, vaid Vopeliuse toormaterjalitarnete maksetähtaja mitmenädalase pikendamisega.
The amount of EUR 2,75 million indicated by Germany as a private investor contribution is an outstanding claim of Vopelius dated January 1998.
Saksamaa poolt investorpanusena näidatud summa 2,75 mln euro puhul on tegemist Vopeliuse avatud nõudega jaanuaris 1998.
The outstanding claim fluctuates constantly.
Nõude suurus kõigub pidevalt.
It amounted to EUR 0,73 million in January 1997 and then fell to EUR 0,4 million in April 1997 before increasing again until January 1998.
Jaanuaris 1997 oli see 0,73 mln eurot, langes seejärel aprillis 1997 0,4 mln eurole, enne kui ta jaanuaris 1998 uuesti tõusis.
This short-term deferral of the payment of liabilities, which is not related to the financing of the restructuring costs, cannot be considered as a private contribution to the restructuring.
Seda nõuete maksetähtaja lühiajalist pikendamist, mis pole seotud ümberstruktureerimiskulude finantseerimisega, ei saa vaadelda omapanusena ümberstruktureerimisse.
The other measures listed by Germany as private investor contribution in its response to the information injunction date from the period after 1998 and so are not related to the granting of the aid in late 1996/early 1997 or to the original restructuring plan.
Ülejäänud meetmed, mida nimetati Saksamaa vastuses informeerimiskorraldusele, on kuupäevastatud pärast 1998. aasta lõppu ja ei ole seega seotud abi andmisega 1996. aasta lõpus/1997. aasta alguses või esialgse ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooniga.
Therefore, even if the Commission were to take into account the planned restructuring costs as originally notified by Germany (EUR 12,88 million) and to regard as private contributions the company’s subscribed capital of EUR 0,29 million and the shareholders’ contribution of EUR 0,15 million mentioned in the 1997 notification, the ratio of private contributions to the restructuring costs would amount to 3,4 %, which is manifestly insufficient, even when taking into account the previous practice regarding aid to companies in the Länder of eastern Germany.
Isegi kui komisjon võtaks arvesse Saksamaa poolt algselt teada antud planeeritud ümberstruktureerimiskulusid (12,88 mln eurot) ja tunnustaks omapanusena nii ettevõtte märgitud kapitali summas 0,29 mln eurot, kui ka 1997. aasta teatises mainitud osanike poolt tehtid sissemakset 0,15 mln eurot, moodustaks omapanus ümberstruktureerimiskuludest 3,4 %, mis on ilmselgelt ebapiisav isegi Ida-Saksa liidumaades paiknevatele ettevõtetele antud abi senist praktikat arvestades.
Consequently, the condition of the aid being proportionate to the restructuring costs and benefits is not fulfilled.
Järelikult pole täidetud eeldus, et abi peab olema proportsionaalne ümberstruktureerimise kulude ja tuludega.
The criteria laid down in point 3.2.2(iii) of the Community guidelines are clearly not met.
Ühenduse suuniste (1994) lõike 3.2.2. punkti iii) kriteeriumid on ilmselgelt rahuldamata.
Full implementation of the restructuring plan
Ümberstruktureerimisplaani täielik elluviimine
As already mentioned, the 1996 restructuring plan has not been implemented.
Nagu juba mainitud, ei viidud 1996. aasta “Ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooni” ellu.
Consequently, the conditions laid down in point 3.2.2(iv) of the Community guidelines are not met.
Järelikult pole täidetud ka ühenduse suuniste (1994) lõike 3.2.2. punktis iv) nimetatud eeldused.
Conclusion
Lõppjäreldus
An ex ante assessment indicates that the aid, as initially planned and granted, does not fulfil the criteria of the Community guidelines and so cannot be regarded as being compatible with the common market.
Hinnang ex ante näitab, et abi ei täida niisugusena, nagu seda esialgu kavandati ja anti, ühenduse suuniste (1994) eeldusi ning seetõttu ei saa seda pidada ühisturuga kokkusobivaks.
Moreover, it is to be noted that subsequent events both during the period when further measures were granted and after the granting of the last measures confirm this conclusion: it is clear that the initial strategy for which the aid was granted failed and that the future of the company is highly uncertain.
Lisaks sellele tuleb märkida, et hilisemad sündmused nii edasiste meetmete tagamise ajal kui ka pärast viimaste meetmete rakendamist kinnitavad seda lõppjäreldust: on selge, et esialgne strateegia, mille jaoks abi anti, on nurjunud ja ettevõtte tulevik ülimalt ebakindel.
For this reason, the Commission considers that the aid granted to CWP is incompatible with the common market.
Seetõttu peab komisjon CWP-le antud abi ühisturuga kokkusobimatuks.
In accordance with Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 [24], where negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission has to decide that the Member State concerned must take all necessary measures unless this would be contrary to a general principle of Community law.
Vastavalt nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 659/1999 artiklile 14 [24] otsustab komisjon negatiivotsustes õigusvastase abi suhtes, et asjaga seotud liikmesriik rakendab kõiki vajalikke meetmeid, välja arvatud kui see rikuks mingit ühenduse õiguse üldist printsiipi.
In the present case, all the aid measures, including those that were notified initially, have been granted and not authorised by a valid Commission decision.
Käesoleval juhul on kõik abimeetmed, kaasa arvatud esialgu registreeritud meetmed, tarvitusele võetud ilma kehtiva komisjoniotsuse kinnituseta.
They must, therefore, be considered as unlawful aid.
Seetõttu on need meetmed käsitatavad õigusvastase abina.
Given that the previous decision was challenged within the prescribed time-limits and annulled by the Court of First Instance, the general principles of Community law, and in particular the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, do not preclude recovery.
Arvestades tõsiasja, et eelmine otsus vaidlustati tähtajale vastavalt hagi teel ja tunnistati esimese astme kohtu poolt kehtetuks, ei välista ühenduse õiguse üldised põhimõtted, iseäranis õiguskindluse ja õigustatud usalduse printsiip, tagastamisnõuet.
This is consistent with the relevant case law of the Community Courts [25].
See on kooskõlas ühenduse kohtute relevantse kohtupraktikaga.
To conclude otherwise would render ineffective the review conducted by the Community legislator in accordance with Article 220, the first paragraph of Article 230 and Article 233 of the EC Treaty, of the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions [26].
Vastasel korral jõustub ühenduse kohtuniku poolt vastavalt Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artiklile 220, artikli 230 lõikele 1 ja artiklile 233 läbi viidav ühenduse organite välja antud õigusaktide seaduslikkuse kontroll.
To this extent, no distinction can be drawn between the aid measures notified initially and those unlawfully granted since the outset.
Selles mõttes ei saa vahet teha algselt registreeritud abimeetmete ja algusest saadik õigusvastaselt rakendatud abimeetmete vahel.
Accordingly, the Commission takes the view that Germany should order the beneficiary to repay the aid, including interest, within a period of two months as of the date of this decision.
Komisjon on seetõttu arvamusel, et Saksamaa peab kahe kuu jooksul arvates käesoleva otsuse langetamisest nõudma abisaajalt saadud abi, kaasa arvatud intressid, tagasimaksmist.
It also deems it necessary that, within a period of two months as of the date of this decision, Germany submit the documents which prove that recovery proceedings have been initiated against the beneficiary of the unlawful aid (such as circulars and recovery orders),
Lisaks sellele peab komisjon nõutavaks, et Saksamaa kahe kuu jooksul arvates käesolevast otsusest annab üle dokumendid (nagu haldusringkirjad ja tagastamisnõude teatised), mis tõestavad, et õigusvastase abi saaja suhtes on algatatud tagastamisnõude menetlus,
The State aid which Germany has implemented for Chemische Werke Piesteritz is incompatible with the common market.
Riigiabi, mida Saksamaa CWP-le andis, on ühisturuga kokkusobimatu.
The aid consists of the following measures:
Abi hõlmab järgmisi meetmeid.
Measure 4: The waiver of a purchase price totalling EUR 3181769.
Meede 4: ostuhinna tühistamine summas 3181769 eurot.
Measure 5: The waiver of interest accumulated on the purchase price up to the end of 1996 and amounting to EUR 237239.
Meede 5: 1996. aasta lõpuni ostuhinnale lisandunud intresside tühistamine summas 237239 eurot.
Measure 6: An investment grant of EUR 1799747.
Meede 6: investeeringutoetus 1799747 eurot.
Measure 7 (including Measure 7a): A guarantee/loan from the BvS of EUR 644228.
Meede 7 (kaasa arvatud 7a): BvSi käendus/laen 644228 eurot.
The aid element of the guarantee is calculated as the difference between the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points and the interest rate at which the guaranteed loan was provided.
Käenduse abielemendina arvestatakse viitintressimäära, millele on liidetud 400 baaspunkti, ja intressimäära, millega käendatud laenu anti, vahelist erinevust.
The aid element of the loan is the difference between the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points and the interest rate at which the loan was provided by the BvS.
Laenu abielemendile vastab erinevus viitintressimäära, millele lisandub 400 baaspunkti, ja BvSi poolt antud laenu intressimäära vahel.