natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
So the risk shield could be regarded as constituting a market distortion only in relation to IBAG’s new business up to the end of 2005, i.e. a total of EUR [...]* from 2002 to 2005.
Seetõttu võiks riskikaitset arvestada turumoonutusena kõige enam IBAG-i uute tehingute osas kuni 2005. aasta lõpuni, mis perioodil 2002 — 2005 oleks kokku [...]* eurot.
This total volume of market distortion lay between the best‐ and worst‐case scenarios for the actual cover provided by the Land of Berlin under the risk shield (EUR 2,7 billion and EUR 6,1 billion respectively).
See turumoonutuse kogusumma jääb Berliini liidumaa riskikaitse tegeliku kasutamise Best-Case-stsenaariumi (2,7 mld eurot) ja Worst-case-stsenaariumi (6,1 mld eurot) vahele.
This amount corresponds to the realistic worst‐case scenario supported by Germany with assumptions and is thus necessary for the assessment if only for prudential reasons.
See summa vastab Saksamaa poolt eeldustega põhjendatud realistliku Worst-Case või pessimistlikule stsenaariumile ja on seetõttu juba ettevaatuse põhjustel hinnangu andmiseks asjakohane.
In addition, a value of roughly this amount would also result if, in the alternative, the liability from risks is discharged by capital injection.
Samuti jõutaks ligikaudu sama summani ka riskide alternatiivsel katmisel kapitalieraldistega.
Point 4 of the guidelines assumes that a firm is in difficulty ‘where it is unable, whether through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it to go out of business in the short or medium term’.
Suuniste punktis 4 lähtutakse sellest, et ettevõte on raskustes, “kui ta ei ole suuteline oma finantsvahenditega või võõrvahenditega, mille annavad käsutusse tema omanikud/osanikud või võlausaldajad, teha lõppu kahjumile, mis põhjustaks lühemas või keskpikas perspektiivis sama hästi kui kindlalt majandusliku huku, kui riik ei sekku”.
The Land’s tax receipts in 2006 would fall by EUR 70 million in the event of a restructuring and by EUR 150 million if no restructuring took place.
Liidumaa aastased maksutulud aastal 2006 langeksid ümberstruktureerimisega 70 mln euro võrra, ilma ümberstruktureerimiseta 150 mln euro võrra.
In the decision initiating the procedure, the Commission noted that it could not verify these estimates as no further explanations had been provided.
Menetluse algatamise otsuses märkis komisjon, et ta ei saa neid hinnangulisi väärtusi täiendavate selgituste puudumise tõttu kontrollida.
In the past, market participants had been able to achieve growth only through very aggressive pricing, which, however, in many cases later led to significant value adjustments, as the example of BerlinHyp or BGB showed.
Varasematel aegadel said turul osalejad tagada kasvu ainult agressiivse hinnakujundusega, mis paljudel juhtudel tõi aga hiljem kaasa märkimisväärse väärtuse korrigeerimise, nagu on näha ka BerlinHyp ja BGB näite varal.
The strong fragmentation of the market had resulted in intensive competition and considerable pressure on margins.
Turu tugev fragmenteerumine tõi kaasa intensiivse konkurentsi ja tugeva surve marginaalile.
Following an analytical examination of a suitable sample of the bank’s loan portfolio, the Commission’s advisers Mazars recommended that the level of risk provisioning be gradually increased up to the end of the restructuring period in the base-case scenario by EUR [...]* and in the worst-case scenario by EUR [...]*.
Panga laenuportfelli sobivate pisteliste proovide analüütilise kontrollimise alusel soovitasid nõustajad komisjonile suurendada riskieraldisi järkjärgult kuni ümberstruktureerimisperioodi lõpuni baasstsenaariumi puhul [...]* euro võrra ja Worst-case-stsenaariumi korral [...]* euro võrra. Lisaks määratlesid nad saamatajäävad summad Worst-case-stsenaariumi puhuks, mille tasakaalustamiseks on vaja täiendavaid riskieraldisi [...]* eurot.
They also identified an omission in the worst-case scenario which needs to be offset by an additional risk provision of EUR [...]*, broken down into EUR [...]* for 2003, EUR [...]* for 2004, EUR [...]* for 2005 and EUR [...]* million for 2006.
Viimased jagunevad aastate lõikes [...]* eurot aastaks 2003, [...]* eurot aastaks 2004, [...]* eurot aastaks 2005 ja [...]* eurot aastaks 2006.
If specific, previously absent signs of such a failure were to appear, the bank would have to increase its level of risk provisioning accordingly.
Kui vastavad konkreetsed, seni veel mitte esinevad märgid peaksid ilmnema, peaks pank oma riskieraldisi vastavalt suurendama.
As recommended by the Commission’s advisers, the maximum devaluation risk in the worst-case scenario was also increased by EUR [...]*.
Seejuures suurendati ka vastavalt komisjoni nõustajate soovitustele maksimaalset väärtuse vähenemise riski pessimistlikus stsenaariumis [...]* euro võrra.
However, this has not had any decisive impact on the Commission’s overall assessment.
Viimane ei avalda aga otsustavat mõju komisjoni üldhinnangule.
In order to continue in business, an undercapitalised bank must either reduce its risk assets, and hence its volume of business, in proportion to the shortfall in capital (e.g. applying the legal minimum core‐capital ratio of 4 %, the risk assets must be reduced by a factor of up to 25); or seek a capital injection equal to the shortfall.
Seejuures on oluline järgmine kaalutlus: et suuta oma äritegevust alal hoida, peab alakapitaliseeritud pank kas vastavalt vähendama riskiinvesteeringuid, see tähendab äritegevust, (näiteks vähendama maksimaalselt 25 korda, võttes aluseks seadusega kehtestatud minimaalse esmaste omavahendite suhte riskidega kaalutud aktivatesse 4 %) või taotlema vastavat kapitalieraldist.
Such a capital injection will enable it to avoid the reduction that would otherwise be necessary.
Viimasel juhul väldib ta muidu nõutavat vähendamist.
At an early stage in the procedure, Germany also announced its intention of divesting LBB of the development business of IBB and at least part of the IBB special reserve, which is currently available to LBB as core capital.
Saksamaa on ka menetluse ühes varasemas staadiumis teatanud oma kavatsusest IBB abitegevus nagu ka vähemalt osa praegu esmase omakapitalina LBB käsutuses olevatest IBB erireservidest uuesti LBB-st eraldada.
This intention was likewise spelt out in an undertaking submitted by Germany in January 2004.
Ka see kavatsus on Saksamaa jaanuaris 2004 esitatud nõusolekus täpselt ja üksikasjalikult lahti seletatud.
However, the Commission commented back in its decision initiating the procedure that ‘BGB is extremely strong locally and regionally in the markets of retail and corporate banking, with shares ranging from 30 to 57 % in the individual segments at local level and from 23 to 46 % at regional level, and with huge gaps between itself and its nearest competitors, which achieve only half, a third or a fourth of BGB’s shares.’
Siiski märkis komisjon juba menetluse algatamise otsuses, “et BGB on era- ja äriklientide valdkonnas piirkondlikel ja kohalikel turgudel äärmiselt tugev, esitatud andmete kohaselt on turuosa üksikutes segmentides kohalikul tasandil 30 % ja 57 % vahel ning 23 % ja 46 % vahel piirkondlikul tasandil, kusjuures järgmised konkurendid on väga kaugel maas, ja — kuivõrd see andmetest nähtub — neile kuulub ainult pool, kolmandik või veerand BGB turuosadest.”
The Commission already had doubts in this connection about whether the target reduction in the retail and corporate sectors by way of the planned divestments would suffice to mitigate the distortive effects of the aid in the greater Berlin region.
Komisjon on kõnealuses seoses juba avaldanud kahtlust, kas eesmärgiks võetud vähendamine era- ja äriklientide valdkonnas kavandatud meetmete abil on piisav, et leevendada abi konkurentsi moonutavat mõju Berliini piirkonnas.
As explained in paragraph 138, the risk shield, which has a nominal value of EUR 21,6 billion, is worth EUR 6,1 billion in economic terms for the purpose of assessing the state aid.
Riskikaitse nimiväärtusega 21,6 mld eurot on, nagu servanumber 138 all selgitatud, riigiabina hindamiseks majandusliku väärtusega 6,1 mld eurot.
The Land of Berlin issued in May 2001 a declaration of intent guaranteeing that the necessary capital would be injected.
Berliini liidumaa lubas mais 2001 kavatsuste protokollis kindlalt liidumaa poolt antava kapitalieraldisena selleks vajaliku summa.
The theoretical ceiling is therefore adjusted for such duplication, and this reduces it to EUR 21,6 billion.
Nii osutus võimalikuks teoreetilise maksimumsumma puhastamine sellisest mitmekordsest kirjendamisest ja määrata kindlaks summa 21,6 mld eurot.
According to the provisional calculations submitted by Germany, the largest item in the EUR 21,6 billion figure is the performance obligation taken over from LPFV: it amounts to EUR [...]**, comprising EUR [...]** to indemnify LPFV in respect of liabilities arising out of rent and dividend guarantees and EUR [...]** to indemnify it in respect of risks arising out of the renewal guarantees for buildings.
Summast 21,6 mld eurot moodustab LPFV vabastamine Saksamaa esitatud ajutiste arvestuste kohaselt suurima summa (ligikaudu [...]* eurot, millest [...]* eurot langeb LPFV vabastamisele üüri- ja dividendigarantiidest ja [...]* eurot vabastamisele hoonete niinimetatud revitaliseerimisgarantiidest).
According to this approach, the EUR 1,755 billion capital injection from the Land of Berlin in the summer of 2001 would alone correspond to a theoretical asset reduction of up to EUR 44 billion.
Ainuüksi Berliini liidumaa kapitalieraldis suuruses 1,755 mld eurot 2001. aasta suvel vastaks nende kaalutluste kohaselt varaliste väärtuste teoreetilisele vähendamisele kuni 44 mld euro võrra.
However, the Commission pointed out that this guide should not be applied ‘mechanically’ but should be subject to discretion in order to take account of specific circumstances and factors important for the survival and viability of the bank.
Siiski juhtis komisjon tähelepanu sellele, et seda pidepunkti ei tohi kohaldada “mehaaniliselt”, vaid siin peab jääma mänguruumi eriliste asjaoludega arvestamiseks nagu näiteks tegurid, mis on olulised panga püsimajäämise ja rentaabluse seisukohast.
Outside Berlin, there would be a further reduction of EUR [...]**.
Väljaspool Berliini vähendataks mahtu täiendava [...]* euro võrra.
The volume of deposits by corporate customers was expected, despite a targeted reduction in large‐volume credit business through cross‐selling, to remain more or less constant.
Äriklientide hoiuste maht peaks vaatamata sihipärasele suure mahuga laenutegevuse vähendamisele ristmüügi tõttu jääma ligikaudu samaks.
The total amount of aid used as a point of reference for assessing its appropriateness included the EUR 1,755 billion capital injection by the Land and the aid value of the risk shield, which in a worst‐case scenario was equivalent in financial terms to EUR 6,07 billion.
Abi kogusumma kui pidepunkt asjakohasuse kontrollimisel hõlmab liidumaa kapitalieraldisi suuruses 1,755 mld eurot ja riskikaitse abi väärtust, mis majanduslikult vastavad maksimaalselt Worst Case-stsenaariumile 6,07 mld eurot.
As remuneration for the risk shield, BGB would pay a guarantee commission of EUR 15 million each year.
Hüvitisena riskikaitse eest tasub BGB aastas garantiitasu suuruses 15 mln eurot.
In 2002 IBV was expected to sell fund investments totalling EUR [...]*.
IBV-s oodatakse aastal 2002 fonditurustuse mahuks kokku [...]* eurot.
The divestment of Berliner Bank will reduce the assets in retail banking by EUR [...]* (EUR [...]* in the private customer sector and EUR [...]* in the commercial customer sector).
“Berliner Banki” võõrandamine vähendab segmendivara kogu jaepanganduse valdkonnas [...]* euro võrra ([...]* eurot eraklientide valdkonnas ja [...]* eurot äriklientide valdkonnas).
Together with the measures already planned, the reduction in the assets will amount to EUR [...]*.
Koos juba kavandatud meetmetega vähendatakse segmendivara kokku [...]* euro võrra.
In the least favourable scenario, the Land was assuming EUR 6,1 billion.
Kõige ebasoodsamal juhul lähtuks liidumaa summast 6,1 mld eurot.
Since it was realistic to expect that the guarantee would be invoked (though, plainly, a precise figure could not be given), its aid intensity would correspond to the nominal amount.
Kuivõrd reaalselt tuleb arvestada garantiijuhtumi tekkimisega (mida ilmselt ei saa arvuliselt esitada), vastab garantii abisumma garantii nimiväärtusele.
Germany also explained that, from a commercial standpoint, the total take‐up expected corresponded to the worst‐case scenario, with an estimated value of EUR 6,1 billion (EUR [...]* in rent guarantees, EUR [...]* in maximum price guarantees, EUR [...]* in renewal guarantees, EUR [...]* in book value guarantees and EUR [...]* in residual amounts), and hence to the economic value of the aid.
Saksamaa on ka selgitanud, et mikroökonoomiliselt võiks eeldada garantiide kasutamist Worst-Case-stsenaariumi puhul hinnanguliselt 6,1 mld euro ulatuses ([...]* eurot üürigarantiide puhul, [...]* eurot maksimumhinna garantiide puhul, [...]* eurot revitaliseerimisgarantiide, [...]* eurot bilansilise väärtuse garantiide ja [...]* eurot ülejäänud garantiide puhul) vastab seega abi tegelikule majanduslikule väärtusele.
This economic value was underpinned by an alternative calculation submitted by Germany: without the guarantees in the risk shield, liability for all the risks would have had to be ‘discharged’ with a capital injection of some EUR [...]*‐ [...]*.
Seda majanduslikku väärtust põhjendas Saksamaa alternatiivse kaalutlusega: ilma riskikaitse garantiideta oleks tulnud kõik riskid “maandada” kapitalieraldisega suuruses ligikaudu [...]* eurot kuni [...]* eurot.
Germany also explained in this connection that it was nevertheless not possible for supervisory reasons to limit the maximum liability under the risk shield to the economic value of just over EUR 6 billion.
Kõnealuses seoses on Saksamaa samuti selgitanud, riskikaitse vastutuse maksimumsumma piiramine majandusliku väärtusega 6 mld eurot ei ole järelvalveõiguslikel põhjustel siiski võimalik.
Only if the amount were EUR 21,6 billion would all conceivable risks mentioned above be covered, so that the group banks’ loans to property service companies, which on account of the risks were being committed and drawn down from rent, renewal and the other above‐mentioned guarantees, play no role in the calculation of the subsidiary banks’ and the group’s own‐funds ratios because they have a 0 % weighting in the calculation and are therefore not included and also not set off against the large‐scale lending limits.
Ainult summaga 21,6 mld eurot on kõik teoreetiliselt mõeldavad, eelnimetatud riskid kaetud, nii et kontsernipankade laenud kinnisvarateenuste ettevõtetele, millega on samuti nõustustud ja mida on kasutatud riskide tõttu üüri-, revitaliseerimis- ja muudest eelnimetatud garantiidest, ei mängi osapankade ja kontserni omavahendite määra arvutamisel mingit rolli, kuna neid on arvutamisel kaalutud 0 protsendiga ja sellele vastavalt ei ole nendega arvestatud ja samuti ei ole neid juurde arvatud suurte laenude limiitidele.
The Commission recognises the need, from a supervisory standpoint, to start with all the theoretically occurring risks and an amount of EUR 21,6 billion.
Komisjon tunnustab seda järelevalveõiguslikku vajadust eeldada kõigi teoreetiliste riskide esinemist summas 21,6 mld eurot.
Further, for the state aid assessment of the measure, it assumes, on the basis of the justification presented by Germany, that the aid contained in the risk shield has an economic value of EUR 6,1 billion.
Lisaks lähtub ta meetme abiandmise õiguslikuks hindamiseks Saksamaa esitatud põhjenduse alusel riskikaitses sisalduva abi majanduslikust väärtusest suuruses 6,1 mld eurot.
In the Commission's view, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that BGB is to be regarded as a firm in difficulty within the meaning of Section 2.1. (point 30, read in conjunction with points 4 to 8) of the guidelines.
Komisjon peab piisavalt tõendatuks, et BGB-d tuleb vaadelda raskustes oleva ettevõttena suuniste lõike 2.1 tähenduses (punkt 30 koos punktidega 4 — 8).
According to Germany, this scenario would impose charges of some EUR 31 billion to EUR 40 billion on the Land.
Saksamaa andmete kohaselt koormaks selline stsenaarium liidumaad 31 mld eurot kuni 40 mld euro ulatuses.
It was assumed here that the Land decides to terminate LBB’s business and would, therefore, exercise not the institutional liability but the guarantor liability of the Land, i.e. liability for the total amount of LBB’s liabilities not covered by assets.
Seejuures süüdistati, et liidumaa otsustab LBB tegevuse seisata ja seega ei käivitu mitte avalik-õiguslikust rahastamiskohustusest tulenev vastutus, vaid liidumaa kui tagatiseandja vastutus — ehk vastutus LBB varaga katmata kohustuste eest.
According to its own estimates, which are based on the figures supplied by Germany, the Commission assumes that, if LBB were to continue in business, the charges on the Land would be of the order of some EUR 13 billion to EUR 20 billion or more.
Komisjon lähtub oma hinnangutes tuginedes Saksamaa andmetele sellest, et liidumaa kohustused LBB jätkamise korral oleksid suurusjärgus ligikaudu 13 mld eurot kuni üle 20 mld euro.
This would comprise first the loss of the Land’s share in BGB's capital (just under EUR 2 billion).
Seejuures oleks liidumaa puhul esmalt otseselt tuntav Berliini liidumaa osaluse kaotamine BGB põhikapitalis (napilt 2 mld eurot).
The charges for the Land can, therefore, be estimated only roughly and range from some EUR 13 billion to over EUR 30 billion.
Liidumaa kohustusi saab seetõttu ainult üldjoontes — vahemikus ligikaudu 13 kuni üle 30 mld eurot — prognoosida.
However, taking a probable value between these extremes, it can be concluded that, with the help of the aid measures in question, a restructuring will impose less onerous charges on the Land of Berlin.
Nende pooluste vahelise tõenäolise väärtusega saab siiski kindlalt lähtuda sellest, et ümberstruktureerimine siinkohal kõne all oleva abi arvelt toob enesega Berliini liidumaa jaoks kaasa suured kohustused.
Risk positions, which are decisive when it comes to calculating the core‐capital ratio, should be reduced between 2001 and 2006 by about [...]* % from just under EUR [...]* to a little over EUR [...]*.
Esmaste omavahendite määra arvutamiseks olulisi riskipositsioone tuleb aastatel 2001 — 2006 vähendada napilt [...]* eurolt ligikaudu [...]* % võrra vähemalt [...]* eurole.
The bank aims to raise the core‐capital ratio in the medium term to at least 7 %.
Panga eesmärgiks on keskpika tähtajaga tõsta esmaste omavahendite määr vähemalt 7 protsendile.
Total earnings are set to [...]* in the reorganisation sphere from 2001 to 2006, while total administrative expenditure during the same period should fall by more than [...]* % and profit before tax should rise from below minus EUR [...]* to about EUR [...]*.
Tulude summa peaks 2001 — 2006 aasta saneerimisringis olema [...]*, sellal kui sama perioodi halduskulude summa peaks rohkem kui [...]* % vähenema ja kasum enne maksusid peaks kasvama miinus [...]* eurolt [...]* eurole.
Risk positions are to be significantly reduced.
Riskipositsioone tuleb oluliselt vähendada.
In view of the fairly sizeable stock of large loans, the Commission, in line with Mazars’ findings, is aware that exceeding the risks provided for is theoretically possible in the event of the failure of a large loan amounting to at least EUR [...]*.
Arvestades suurte krediitide suhteliselt suurt hulka on komisjon — nagu Mazars kinnitab — teadlik sellest, et riskireservide ületamine on vähemalt [...]* euro suuruse suurlaenu laekumata jäämisel põhimõtteliselt võimalik.
The bank’s risk positions are being reduced in this connection by [...]* between 2002 and 2006, while average earnings of EUR [...]* are being aimed at.
Panga riskipositsioone vähendatakse kõnealuses seoses aastatel 2002 — 2006 [...]* võrra, samas püütakse saavutada keskmist tulu [...]* eurot.
The second way in which it is being done is by a risk management system that the Commission’s advisers, on the basis of their investigations, regard as being entirely adequate.
Teisest küljest kontrollitakse riske riskijuhtimissüsteemi abil, mida komisjoni nõustajad oma uuringute põhjal sobivaks peavad.
In the opinion of the Commission’s advisers Mazars, these could have a negative impact on the consolidated own capital to the tune of some EUR [...]*.
See võiks komisjoni nõustaja Mazarsi hinnangul avaldada konsolideeritud omakapitalile negatiivset mõju ligikaudu [...]* euro ulatuses.
It will have to be borne in mind, however, that as a result of the introduction of IFRS opposite effects may also result from the adjustment of other balance‐sheet items.
Tuleb siiski arvestada, et ka rahvusvaheliste raamatupidamisstandardite sisseviimine võib avaldada vastupidist mõju seoses muude bilansipositsioonide kohandamisega.
In the medium and long term, the planned pre‐tax result in 2006 of EUR [...]* (according to the reworked medium‐term plan incorporating the three measures mentioned above) would fall by EUR [...]* to EUR [...]*, of which around half being accounted for by the discontinuation of Berliner Bank's earnings contribution to the group and the rest by the delayed staff cutbacks, the abandonment of the planned increase in commission earnings and remaining (fixed) costs (primarily on account of back‐office diseconomies of scale).
Keskpikas ja pikas perspektiivis väheneks plaanitud tulem enne maksusid aastal 2006 summalt [...]* eurot (kolme eelnimetatud meetme alusel ümbertöötatud keskpika plaani kohaselt) [...]* euro võrra summale [...]* eurot, sellest pool Berliner Banki panuse ärajäämise tõttu kontserni tuludesse, ülejäänu töötajate koondamise viibimise tõttu, vahendustulude kavandatud kasvu ärajäämise ja jääk(püsi)kulude tõttu (eelkõige tehingubüroo väikestest mahtudest tingitud halvemuste tõttu).
However, this calculation assumed that, in order to maximise the number of bidders, Berliner Bank would be sold as an independent bank, with further charges being incurred.
See arvestus põhineb siiski eeldusel, et võõrandataks pakkujateringi maksimeerimiseks iseseisva pangana, mis toob enesega kaasa suuremaid kulusid.
According to the bank, this was, in any case, more than offset by the necessary core capital for Berliner Bank equivalent to [...]* % of risk items amounting to EUR [...]*, giving a negative effect of EUR [...]* to EUR [...]*.
Panga andmete kohaselt neelaks selle ja veel enam siiski Berliner Banki [...]* % riskipositsioonide erakorraline varustamine tuumkapitaliga summas [...]* eurot, nii et tulemuseks oleks negatiivne mõju [...]* kuni [...]* eurot.
In addition, the divestment of Berliner Bank would reduce the profit share of retail business in BGB’s total business from just over [...]* % to around [...]* % and the share accounted for by capital market business would accordingly rise from just over [...]* % to some [...]* %.
Lisaks väheneks Berliner Banki eraldamise kaudu jaepanganduse tulude osa BGB kogutegevuses vähemalt [...]* protsendilt ligikaudu [...]* protsendile ja kapitalituru valdkonna osakaal tõuseks vastavalt [...]* protsendilt ligikaudu [...]* protsendile.
If Berliner Bank’s core capital is to be some EUR [...]*, it is, in the Commission’s view, rather unlikely for the sale proceeds to be only EUR [...]* to EUR [...]*.
Kui Berliner Banki tuumkapital peaks olema ligikaudu [...]* eurot, on see komisjoni arvates pigem ebatõenäoline, et müügitulu võib saada ainult [...]* kuni [...]* eurot.
Given the well‐established brand name and client basis of Berliner Bank, the sales proceeds should tend to reach or even exceed the value of the core capital, which the bank regards as an expense, and should therefore reduce BGB's charges to a much greater extent.
Arvestades tõsiasja, et Berliner Bankil on tugev kaubamärk ja kliendibaas, peaks müügitulu pigem olema võrdne esmase omakapitali väärtusega, mida pank käsitleb kuluna, või seda koguni ületama, ja seega BGB kohustust oluliselt suuremal määral vähendama.