natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Germany has provided a report drawn up by a consultant on 21 January 2002 in support of its argument that Kahla II was never in difficulty.
Saksamaa esitas 21. jaanuaril 2002. aastal koostatud konsultandiaruande, mis toetab väidet, et Kahla II ei ole kunagi olnud raskustes äriühing.
Turnover (DEM million)
Käive (miljonites Saksa markades)
Operating result before tax (DEM million)
Kasum äritegevusest enne makse (miljonites Saksa markades)
Cash flow (DEM million)
Rahakäive (miljonites Saksa markades)
Stocks
Laoseis
% capacity utilisation
Võimsuse kasutamise osatähtsus (%)
% own capital
Omakapitali osatähtsus (%)
% outside capital
Väliskapitali osatähtsus (%)
The Commission notes that Table 11 is an ex post evaluation of the company’s history.
Komisjon märgib, et tabelis 11 on ettevõtte tegevust hinnatud tagantjärele.
It is useful in that it confirms that the main forecasts of the reports available in 1994 were correct: losses were to be incurred during at least the first two years.
See on kasulik, sest kinnitab 1994. aastal kasutatud aruannete peamiste prognooside õigsust: esimesel kahel aastal kantakse kahjusid.
However, the Commission must make its assessment from an ex ante point of view, that is, it must establish whether from 1994 Germany fulfilled its obligations under the EC Treaty and notified the aid.
Sellele vaatamata peab komisjon hinnangu andma ex ante olukorda arvestades, s.t tegema kindlaks, kas Saksamaa täitis alates 1994. aastast EÜ asutamislepingu kohustusi ja teatas riigiabist.
Had Germany fulfilled its obligations, the Commission would have based its assessment on the reports available at that time.
Kui Saksamaa oleks oma kohustust täitnud, oleks komisjon hinnanud olukorda sel ajal olemas olnud aruannete põhjal.
As already stated in paragraphs 95, 96 and 113, those reports are based on the premiss that the company had to restore its viability and concluded that state support was absolutely essential to achieve that aim.
Nagu juba punktides 95, 96 ja 113 märgitud, põhinevad nimetatud aruanded eeldusel, et ettevõtte elujõulisus tuleb taastada, ja neis jõuti järeldusele, et nimetatud eesmärgi saavutamiseks oli riigiabi ülioluline.
In the light of those reports, the Commission would have followed its established practice and regarded Kahla II (an Auffanglösung) as a firm in difficulty.
Nimetatud aruandeid arvesse võttes oleks komisjon järginud väljakujunenud tava ja pidanud Kahla II (Auffanglösung) raskustes olevaks äriühinguks.
This conclusion cannot be altered, ex post, by the fact that, thanks to substantial aid awards, these difficulties were surmounted within a short space of time.
Sellist arvamust ei saa tagantjärele muuta, sest olulise riigiabi toel ületati raskused lühikese aja jooksul.
To sum up, on the basis of the reports available at the relevant point in time, the Commission concludes that Kahla II was unable to recover through its own resources or by raising financing on the market.
Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et sel ajal olemas olnud aruannete põhjal järeldas komisjon, et Kahla II ei oleks suutnud jalule tõusta omavahendite abil või erasektorist laenu võttes.
The Commission notes in particular that Germany expressly admitted this back in 1999.
Komisjon rõhutab, et Saksamaa möönis nimetatud asjaolu sõnaselgelt 1999. aastal.
Moreover, without state support the company would probably have been driven out of the market.
Lisaks oleks ettevõte riigi abita turult ilmselt välja tõrjutud.
The fact that not every indicator in the restructuring aid guidelines applies to Kahla II is irrelevant: the guidelines contain a non-exhaustive list of typical symptoms and not an exhaustive, cumulative list of criteria.
Asjaolu, et Kahla II suhtes ei kehti kõik ümberkorraldamiseks antava riigiabi suunistes sätestatud tunnused, on tähtsusetu: suuniste tüüpiliste tunnuste loetelu ei ole lõplik ja kumulatiivne.
Consequently, the Commission adheres to its view that Kahla II was a company in difficulty during the period from 1994 to the end of 1996, when, most likely thanks to the aid injected, a slightly positive result was first achieved and the share of own capital began to increase.
Seepärast jääb komisjon oma seisukoha juurde, et Kahla II oli raskustes äriühing 1994. aastast kuni 1996. aasta lõpuni, millal tulemused veidi paranesid ja omakapitali osa hakkas suurenema, mille kõige tõenäolisem põhjus oli saadud riigiabi.
The Commission considers that the lack of private financing without state support and the available data bear this out.
Komisjoni arvates kinnitavad seda erafinantseeringute puudumine ja olemasolevad andmed.
Aid purportedly covered by approved aid schemes
Abi, mis väidetavalt on antud heakskiidetud abikava raames
Part of the aid to Kahla I and Kahla II was allegedly granted under approved aid schemes.
Väidetavalt anti ettevõtetele Kahla I ja Kahla II abi heakskiidetud abikavade kohaselt. Komisjon nõudis Saksamaalt hindamiseks dokumentide, teabe ja andmete esitamist, sest kahtles tõsiselt, kas nimetatud abimeetmed on kooskõlas abikavade tingimustega, mille kohaselt abimeetmeid väidetavalt rakendati.
Since the Commission had serious doubts about the compliance of these aid measures with the terms of the schemes under which they had allegedly been awarded, it issued an information order under Article 10(3) of Council Regulation No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [38], requiring Germany to supply all documentation, information and data necessary for their assessment.
Seetõttu andis ta välja teabenõude nõukogu 22. märtsi 1999. aasta määruse nr 659/1999 artikli 10 lõike 3 kohaselt, [38] millega kehtestati EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 93 kohaldamise üksikasjalikud eeskirjad.
In so far as the information transmitted by Germany is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that these measures are covered by the relevant schemes, the Commission is accordingly empowered to take a decision on the basis of the information available.
Komisjonil on õigus langetada otsus olemasoleva teabe alusel, kui Saksamaa edastatud teave on ebapiisav, et otsustada, kas nimetatud meetmed anti asjakohaste abikavade raames.
In its decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, the Commission concluded that measures 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 in favour of Kahla I constituted existing aid which did not need to be reassessed.
Ametliku uurimismenetluse laiendamise otsuses jõudis komisjon järeldusele, et Kahla I asjus rakendatud 1., 4., 5., 6., 7. ja 10. meede sisaldasid olemasolevat abi, mida ei pea ümber hindama.
It still considers that measure 8 was not granted under any approved aid scheme and falls to be assessed as ad hoc aid.
Samas jääb komisjon seisukoha juurde, et 8. meede ei olnud heakskiidetud abikava kohane ja seda tuleb lugeda sihtotstarbeliseks abiks.
As regards Kahla II, in its decision to extend the formal investigation procedure the Commission concluded that measures 28 and 29 in favour of Kahla II constituted existing aid which did not need to be reassessed.
Kahla II puhul jõudis komisjon ametliku uurimismenetluse laiendamise otsuses järeldusele, et ettevõtte suhtes rakendatud 28. ja 29. meede olid olemasolev riigiabi, mida ei pea ümber hindama.
It still considers that measures 11, 12 and 20 were not granted under any scheme approved by it.
Samas jääb komisjon seisukoha juurde, et 11., 12. ja 20. meede ei olnud heakskiidetud abikava kohased, mille alusel neid rakendati.
As regards the remaining measures allegedly granted under approved aid schemes, the Commission will partially review the provisional assessments made in the decisions to initiate and extend the formal investigation procedure.
Ülejäänud heakskiidetud abikavade puhul väidetavalt rakendatud meetmete tõttu on komisjon otsustanud osaliselt läbi vaadata ametliku uurimismenetluse algatamise ja laiendamise otsustes esitatud esialgsed hinnangud.
Measures 13, 14, 23 and 30: These 90 % state guarantees were based on a scheme which was never notified to the Commission.
13., 14., 23. ja 30. meede. Nimetatud 90%-lised riigi garantiid põhinesid abikaval, millest komisjonile ei teatatud.
The scheme was registered under number NN 46/97 and was never approved by the Commission.
Komisjon ei ole kunagi heaks kiitnud kava, mis on registreeritud numbriga NN 46/97.
Consequently, as stated in the decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, these guarantees fall to be assessed as ad hoc aid.
Järelikult, nagu on öeldud ka ametliku uurimismenetluse laiendamise otsuses, tuleb nimetatud garantiisid lugeda sihtotstarbeliseks abiks.
Moreover, in its decision on the guarantee guidelines of the Land of Thuringia [39], the Commission noted Thuringia’s commitment no longer to apply this non-notified scheme.
Lisaks märkis komisjon Tüüringi liidumaa garantiieeskirju käsitlevas otsuses [39] Tüüringi liidumaa kohustust loobuda kõnealuse teatamata abikava edasisest kohaldamisest.
In respect of the aid element in these guarantees, Germany claims that, according to an agreement between Germany and the Commission, the aid element in the guarantee should be 0,5 % of the amount covered by the guarantee.
Garantiide riigiabi elementide kohta väidab Saksamaa, et Saksamaa ja komisjoni kokkuleppe kohaselt peaks garantii riigiabi osa olema 0,5% garantiiga hõlmatud summast.
The Commission would point out, however, that this agreement concerned 80 % state guarantees complying with approved aid schemes.
Komisjon soovib siiski juhtida tähelepanu asjaolule, et kokkulepe käsitles 80% suuruseid garantiisid, mis on heakskiidetud abikava kohased.
The guarantees here exceed this limit by 10 % and were based, not on approved aid schemes, but on a non-notified scheme never approved by the Commission.
Kõnealused garantiid ületavad seda piirmäära 10% võrra ja neid ei antud heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt, vaid abikava alusel, millest oli jäetud komisjonile teatamata ja mida komisjon ei olnud kunagi heaks kiitnud.
Moreover, the agreement excluded companies in difficulty from its scope.
Lisaks ei kuulunud raskustes äriühingud kokkuleppe kohaldamisalasse.
Consequently, despite Germany’s claims, the rate of 0,5 % cannot be applied to these guarantees.
Järelikult ei saa vaatamata Saksamaa väidetele kohaldada nimetatud garantiide puhul 0,5% määra.
In respect of the guarantees under measures 13, 14 and 23, according to the Commission notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid in the form of guarantees, the following applies: “Where, at the time the loan is granted, there is a strong probability that the borrower will default, e.g. because he is in financial difficulty, the value of the guarantee may be as high as the amount effectively covered by that guarantee” [40].
Komisjoni teatise kohaselt, mis käsitleb EÜ asutamislepingu artiklite 87 ja 88 kohaldamist garantiidena antava riigiabi korral, kehtib 13. 14. ja 23. meetme raames antud garantiide puhul järgmine tingimus: “Kui laenugarantii andmise ajal on väga tõenäoline, et laenusaaja ei täida lepingukohustusi näiteks seetõttu, et ta on majanduslikes raskustes, võib garantii väärtus olla niisama suur kui kõnealuse garantiiga tegelikult kaetav summa.”
As stated in Section B of the Assessment (paragraphs 106 to 118), Kahla II was a company in difficulty at the time of the granting of these measures.
Hinnangu B-osa kohaselt (punktid 106–118) oli Kahla II nimetatud meetmete rakendamise ajal raskustes äriühing.
This means that for guarantees provided until 1996, the aid element in these guarantees is potentially 90 % of the credits to which they relate.
See tähendab, et kuni 1996. aastani antud garantiide puhul võib riigiabi elementide osatähtsus olla 90% laenusummadest, millele garantiid anti.
As regards measure 30, which was granted when the company was no longer in difficulty, Germany again considers that, on the basis of the agreement with the Commission referred to in paragraph 123, the aid equivalent should be set at 0,5 %.
meetme puhul, mida rakendati, kui ettevõte ei olnud enam raskustes, leiab Saksamaa taas, et punktis 123 nimetatud kokkuleppe alusel komisjoniga peaks abi ekvivalent olema 0,5%.
The Commission would point out once more, however, that the agreement concerned 80 % guarantees provided under approved aid schemes.
Komisjon rõhutab taas, et kokkulepe käsitles 80% suuruseid heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt antud garantiisid.
The guarantee here exceeded the 80 % limit by 10 % and was not provided under an approved aid scheme.
Kõnealused garantiid ületavad seda piirmäära 10% võrra ega olnud heakskiidetud abikava kohased.
Consequently, the 0,5 % aid equivalent cannot be applied here.
Järelikult ei saa nende puhul kohaldada 0,5% abi ekvivalenti.
At the time of the provision of this guarantee, the Land of Thuringia had agreed to make guarantees subject to the Commission decision on the guarantee guidelines of the Land of Thuringia [41], according to which, for 80 % guarantees provided under approved aid schemes, the aid element in these guarantees would be set at between 0,5 % and 2 %.
Tüüringi liidumaa nõustus garantii andmise ajal andma garantii komisjoni otsuse alusel, mis käsitleb Tüüringi liidumaa garantiieeskirju [41], mille kohaselt oli heakskiidetud abikava alusel antud 80% suurustes garantides riigiabi osatähtsus 0,5–2%.
Although that decision again concerns 80 % guarantees provided under approved aid schemes, the Commission considers it appropriate to apply this rule here by analogy.
Kuigi kokkulepe käsitleb heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt antud 80% suuruseid garantiisid, tuleb komisjoni arvates kohaldada nimetatud eeskirja analoogia alusel.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the guarantee covered a large part of the risks inherent in the loan, which is reflected by the low interest rate fixed by the private bank, the Commission will apply the maximum percentage allowed for guarantees in the scheme, i.e., 2 %.
Võttes arvesse, et garantii hõlmas laenamise tõttu suurt osa loomupäraseid riske, mis väljenduvad erapanga kehtestatud madalas intressimääras, kohaldab komisjon siiski suurimat programmi alusel antud garantiide puhul lubatud osatähtsust, s.t 2%.
Similarly, the Commission considers it appropriate to apply a 2 % aid element to the 90 % guarantee under measure 13, and this from 30 March 1998, when the loans under measures 18-21 were converted into a market loan.
Samuti on komisjon seisukohal, et kohaldada tuleb 2% osatähtsusega abi 13. meetme alusel antud 90%-lise garantii puhul. Seda tuleks teha alates 30. märtsist, kui 18.–21. meetme raames antud laenud vormistati ümber turutingimuste kohaseks laenuks.
The interest rate of the market loan came to 5,90 %.
Turutingimuste kohaselt antud laenu intressimäär oli 5,90%.
Before the loans under measures 18-21 were converted, their interest rate came to between 6,5 % and 6,75 %.
Enne 18.–21. meetme raames antud laenude ümbervormistamist olid nende intressimäärad 6,5% ja 6,75%.
The loans, which were obtained from state resources, were thus converted into a private loan at the precise time when it was possible for the company to secure a lower interest rate for a private loan on the market than was payable on loans obtained from state resources.
Riigi vahenditest antud laenud vormistati seega ümber eralaenudeks täpselt sel ajal, millal ettevõttel oli võimalik saada eralaenu madalama intressimääraga, kui oleks tulnud maksta riigi vahenditest saadud laenudelt.
It should be pointed out in this connection that the conversion was possible only because a 90 % state guarantee had been provided in respect of this new loan.
Sellega seoses tuleks rõhutada, et laenude ümbervormistamine oli võimalik ainult seetõttu, et uuel laenul oli 90%-line riigi garantii.
Germany states that these guarantees fall under the de minimis rules.
Saksamaa väitel on nimetatud garantiid vähese tähtsusega abi eeskirjade kohased.
The application of the de minimis rules will be verified in Section D of the Assessment.
Hinnangu jaos D käsitletakse vähese tähtsusega abi eeskirjade kohaldamist.
Measure 15: A grant of DEM 2,5 million was allegedly granted under an approved aid scheme [42].
meede. Väidetavalt anti 2,5 miljoni Saksa marga suurune toetus heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt.
In its decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, the Commission erroneously stated that this scheme was intended only for SMEs.
Ametliku uurimismenetluse laiendamise otsuses väitis komisjon ekslikult, et asjaomane programm hõlmas ainult väikese ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtteid.
Germany correctly pointed out that large companies were also eligible for aid under this scheme under certain circumstances.
Saksamaa juhtis õigustatult tähelepanu asjaolule, et teatud tingimuste korral oli ka suurtel ettevõtetel õigus abikava kohaselt abi saada.
However, the scheme expressly excludes companies in difficulty from its scope.
Sellele vaatamata on kavast sõnaselgelt välja jäetud raskustes äriühingud.
The Commission recently reached a negative decision in respect of this scheme on grounds of misuse, since it had been used for, amongst others, companies in difficulty [43].
Hiljuti võttis komisjon vastu negatiivse otsuse, mis käsitles nimetatud kavaga seotud kuritarvitusi, mida kasutati raskustes olevate äriühingute toetamiseks.
In its decision the Commission specifically noted that Germany had included Kahla II amongst the companies in difficulty which had benefited from this scheme, contrary to the specific provisions approved by the Commission.
Otsuses märkis komisjon eraldi, et Saksamaa lisas Kahla II programmist kasu saanud raskustes äriühingute hulka, minnes vastuollu komisjoni heakskiidetud erisätetega.
In its decision concerning this scheme, the Commission stated that its decision on the scheme was without prejudice to its decision in the present case, in the context of which this individual application was being examined.
Programmi käsitlevas otsuses teatas komisjon, et see ei piira otsust, mis käsitleb käesolevat juhtumit, mille tõttu nimetatud üksikut taotlust uuriti.
In the present decision, the Commission considers that Kahla II was in difficulty at the time of the granting of this aid measure.
Käesolevas otsuses leiab komisjon, et Kahla II oli abimeetme rakendamise ajal raskustes.
Consequently, the view that the aid here must be regarded as new aid is maintained.
Järelikult jääb komisjon seisukoha juurde, et nimetatud toetust tuleb käsitada uue abina.
Measure 16: A loan of DEM 0,2 million was allegedly granted under an approved equity loan scheme [44].
meede. Väidetavalt anti 0,2 miljoni Saksa marga suurune laen heakskiidetud omakapitalilaenu programmi kohaselt.
This scheme was intended only for SMEs.
Nimetatud programm oli suunatud ainult väikese ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtetele.
However, since Kahla II had more than 250 employees and therefore did not qualify as an SME at the time of the granting of this measure, the aid manifestly does not comply with the scheme.
Abi ei ole programmi tingimuste kohane, sest Kahla II-s oli rohkem kui 205 töötajat ja seetõttu ei olnud ettevõte meetme rakendamise ajal väikese või keskmise suurusega.
Germany recently argued that the loan was granted to Mr G. Raithel and not to the company.
Hiljuti väitis Saksamaa, et laen anti hr G. Raithelile, mitte ettevõttele.
However, according to the Commission’s approval of the scheme on the basis of which the loan was awarded, investors may receive such support only on condition that they bring it into the company as capital.
Sellele vaatamata võivad investorid komisjoni heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt, mille alusel laenu anti, saada nimetatud toetust ainult tingimusel, et laen investeeritakse ettevõttesse kapitalina.
This is what Mr Raithel did.
Seda hr Raithel ka tegi.
Consequently, although directly granted to a private person, the purpose of the loan was to support an undertaking.
Järelikult oli laenu eesmärk ettevõtte toetamine, kuigi laenu anti otse eraisikule.
Hence the loan is regarded as new aid to Kahla II.
Seega oli nimetatud laen Kahla II-le antud uus riigiabi.
Measures 17, 18, 19 and 22: In the course of its examination the Commission came to the conclusion that the conditions set out in the scheme under which these loans were granted [45] were fulfilled in the present case.
17., 18., 19. ja 22. meede. Uurimise käigus jõudis komisjon järeldusele, et laenu andmise aluseks olnud programmi tingimused olid nimetatud juhtumi puhul täidetud.
Consequently, these credits constitute existing aid which does not need to be reassessed by the Commission.
Järelikult kujutavad nimetatud meetmete raames antud laenud olemasolevat abi, mida komisjon ei pea ümber hindama.
Measure 21: This loan was allegedly granted under an approved aid scheme [46].
meede. Väidetavalt anti nimetatud laen heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt.
However, the scheme provided for loans of a maximum of DEM 2 million for companies in the new Länder.
Abikava kohaselt oli lubatud anda kuni kahe miljoni Saksa marga suurust laenu uute liidumaade ettevõtetele.
The loan here exceeds this limit.
Meetme raames antud laen oli suurem.
Consequently, the Commission cannot conclude that the conditions of the relevant scheme were complied with.
Järelikult ei saa komisjon nõustuda, et asjakohase programmi tingimused olid täidetud.
Taking into account the subsidised rate of interest, the reduced value of the collateral provided and the presence of a 90 % guarantee covering almost the whole risk of default, the Commission considers that at the time they were granted these loans constituted aid potentially to their full amount.
Võttes arvesse subsideeritud intressimäära, tagatise alanenud väärtust ja 90% garantiid, mis vaikimisi hõlmas peaaegu kogu laenu tagasimaksmata jätmise riski, leiab komisjon, et laenude andmise ajal võisid need olla kogu summa ulatuses riigiabi.
Measures 24 and 25 were granted under approved aid schemes for the purpose of covering the investments detailed in Table 5.
ja 25. meetme raames anti toetusi heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt tabelis 5 nimetatud investeeringute katteks.
In addition, the information provided by Germany indicates that part of the investment aid granted under the special depreciation scheme (measure 33) also contributed to the coverage of these investments.
Lisaks näitab Saksamaa esitatud teave, et osa vastavalt erikulumi programmile (33. meede) antud investeerimistoetustest kasutati samuti nimetatud investeeringute katteks.
Germany has provided evidence that all these measures comply with the terms of the schemes under which they were allegedly granted.
Saksamaa esitas tõendid, et kõik nimetatud meetmed olid nende programmide tingimuste kohased, mille alusel neid väidetavalt rakendati.
Consequently, measures 24, 25 and 33 constitute existing aid, which the Commission does not need to reassess.
Järelikult on 24., 25. ja 33. meede olemasolev abi, mida komisjon ei pea ümber hindama.
Measure 26: Grants for the promotion of employment in connection with environmental investments, allegedly awarded under an approved scheme, do not count as aid [47].
meede. Riigiabi ei ole toetused keskkonnainvesteeringutega seotud tööhõive parandamiseks, mida väidetavalt anti heakskiidetud abikava kohaselt.
However, as stated in the decision to extend the formal investigation procedure, the scheme was intended - as far as its environmental aspects are concerned - for the cleaning-up of environmental hazards in state-owned enterprises.
Nagu on öeldud ametliku uurimismenetluse laiendamise otsuses, oli programm (keskkonnaga seotud asjaolude puhul) siiski määratud keskkonnaohtude kõrvaldamiseks riigiettevõtetes.
The grants are therefore clearly not in keeping with the scheme on the basis of which they were allegedly granted.
Seega on selge, et toetused ei ole kooskõlas programmiga, mille alusel need väidetavalt anti.
By letter dated 29 July 1994 [48], Germany explained to the Commission how this provision was to be interpreted.
juuli 1994. aasta kirjas [48] selgitas Saksamaa komisjonile, kuidas nimetatud sätet tuleb tõlgendada.