natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The difference between this amount and the EUR 194400000 stated in the second extension of the procedure, EUR 2100000, will be assumed not to be State aid since it has not been established when and how this amount of money was provided.
Oletatakse, et 2100000 eurone vahe selle summa ja menetluse teisel laiendamisel teatatud 194400000 euro vahel ei ole riigiabi, sest ei ole määratletud, millal ja kuidas see raha anti.
The issue to be assessed is, as the Court has established in Case 40/85 (Boch) whether in similar circumstances a private shareholder, having regard to the foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, regional policy and sectoral considerations would have provided such loans.
Hindamisele kuuluv element on, nagu kohus kehtestas kohtuasjas 40/85 (Boch), kas sarnastel asjaoludel oleks erainvestor andnud selliseid laene, pidades silmas kasumi saamise võimalikkust ja jättes kõrvale kõik sotsiaal- ja regionaalpoliitika ja sektoriaalsed kaalutlused. Seega on küsimus, kas erainvestor, kaasa arvatud juhul, kui ta võtaks otsuse ühe grupi terviku tasemel, ootaks normaalses turumajanduses vastuvõetavat tasuvust investeeritud kapitali eest.
Therefore, the question is if a private investor, even if taking a decision at the level of the whole group would under normal market economy conditions expect an acceptable rate of profitability on the capital invested.
Kohus kinnitas, et sobiv meetod hindamaks, kas laen moodustab riigiabi, on rakendada kriteeriumit määratlemaks, mil määral võiks ettevõte saada vajalikke summasid erakapitaliturgudel, mida nimetatakse erainvestori katseks.
From the annual reports for Juliana, Cadiz and Manises it is clear that these three companies receiving the loans were in difficulties.
Juliana, Cádiz’i ja Manises’i aastaaruanded näitavad selgesti, et need kolm ettevõtet olid kriisiolukorras.
Each of the three companies had negative book values at the end of 1998, and recorded losses for 1999.
Nende kõigi arvestuslikud väärtused olid 1998. aasta lõpul negatiivsed ja neil registreeriti kahjumid 1999. aastal.
The auditor also stated in the annual accounts both for year 1998 and 1999 that the companies needed support from their shareholders in order to be able to continue operation.
Ka audiitor teatas nii 1998. kui ka 1999. aasta aruannetes, et ettevõtted vajasid tegevuse jätkamiseks oma aktsionäride toetust.
There were furthermore no signs that the difficult financial situation for the shipyards would improve.
Lisaks ei olnud ka märke sellest, et laevatehaste raske rahaline olukord võiks paraneda.
For these reasons, it can be established that the three companies would not have been able to obtain the loans on the private capital markets.
Nendel põhjustel võib määratleda, et kolmel ettevõttel ei oleks olnud võimalik saada laene erakapitaliturgudelt.
Therefore, these loans did not comply with the private creditor test.
See tähendab, need laenud ei oleks läbinud erainvestori katset.
For the same reasons SEPI could not have expected a repayment of the loans and the interest.
Nendel samadel põhjustel ei saanud SEPI oodata laenude tagastamist intressidega.
Therefore the provision of such resources from SEPI to the shipyard companies did not comply with the market creditor principle. Therefore the loans constitute State aid to the three companies.
Järelikult ei järginud selliste ressursside võimaldamine SEPI poolt laevatehastele erainvestori põhimõtet ning laenud moodustavad riigiabi kolmele ettevõttele.
This State aid was illegal, given that it was not notified to the Commission and it is not compatible with the Common market since it cannot be authorised as restructuring aid or any other type of aid.
See riigiabi oli ebaseaduslik niivõrd, kuivõrd sellest ei teatatud komisjonile ja see ei ole kokkusobiv ühisturuga niivõrd, kuivõrd seda ei saa lubada ümberkorralduse või mistahes muud tüüpi abina.
According to Spain, the loans, amounting to EUR 192100000, have on 12 September 2000 been repaid to SEPI, with interest, by IZAR which at that time had taken over and dissolved the companies Juliana, Cadiz and Manises.
Hispaania sõnul tagastas 12. septembril 2000. aastal 192100000 eurosed laenud koos intressidega SEPI-le IZAR, kes oli sel ajal võtnud oma hoolde Juliana, Cádiz'i ja Manises'i ning oli need ettevõtted likvideerinud.
This illegal aid has therefore been recovered.
Seega saadi see ebaseaduslik riigiabi tagasi.
However, the Commission intends to use this information in another State aid investigation, C 38/03, which concerns the extent to which SEPI’s capital injections to IZAR benefited civil shipbuilding.
Siiski teeb komisjon ettepaneku kasutada seda teavet teises riigiabi puudutavas uurimises C 38/03, milles vaadeldakse, mil määral tulid SEPI kapitalitoetused IZAR-ile kasuks tsiviillaevaehitusele.
Aid contained in transactions linked to transfer 2, between AESA and IZAR
Abi AESA ja SEPI vahelise ülekandmisega 2 seonduvates tehingutes
AESA on 20 July 2000 sold to Bazán its remaining three shipyard companies, Puerto Real, Sestao and Sevilla [28].
juulil 2000. aastal müüs AESA Bazán’ile kolm järelejäänud laevatehast: Puerto Real, Sestao ja Sevilla. [28]
There are two aspects that need to be assessed, and which were raised in the decisions to extend the procedure, in order to determine the existence of State aid.
Riigiabi olemasolu määratlemiseks tuleb hinnata kahte küsimust, mis tõstatati menetluse laiendamise otsustes.
One is whether the purchase price paid by IZAR to AESA was market price, and the other is whether SEPI’s capital injection of EUR 252425000 to AESA complied with the market investor principle.
Üks element on, kas ostuhind, mille IZAR maksis AESA-le oli turuhind, ning teine, kas SEPI 252425000 eurone toetus AESA-le järgis turuinvestori põhimõtet.
The capital injection
Kapitalitoetus
SEPI decided on 18 July 2000 to provide AESA with EUR 252425000 capital injection, two days before AESA sold its shipyards companies (Sestao, Sevilla, Puerto Real) to Bazán.
juulil 2000. aastal, kaks päeva enne seda, kui AESA müüs oma laevatehased (Sestao, Sevilla ja Puerto Real) Bazán’ile, otsustas SEPI anda AESA-le 252425000 eurot kapitalina.
This capital was provided in September 2000.
See kapital maksti välja 2000. aasta septembris.
Spain claims that since this capital was only provided in September 2000, when AESA already had sold its shipyards, it could not distort competition for shipbuilding.
Hispaania kinnitab, et kuna kapital anti alles 2000. aasta septembris, kui AESA oli juba müünud oma laevatehased, ei saanud see laevaehituse konkurentsi moonutada.
According to the annual report of AESA for the year 2000, AESA provided EUR 309 million to its three shipyard companies before they were sold to Bazán/IZAR.
AESA 2000. aasta aruande järgi andis see oma kolmele laevatehasele 309 miljonit eurot toetust enne nende Bazán/IZAR-ile müümist.
The annual reports of these shipyards reveal that this capital was provided to the shipyards through debt cancellations.
Nende laevatehaste aastaaruanded näitavad, et toetus anti võla tühistamise teel.
Spain has confirmed that AESA ‘adjusted’ its debts to its shipyard companies in connection with their sale to Bazán to ‘better reflect the value of the yards’, but did not provide any figures.
Hispaania kinnitas, et AESA “kohaldas” laevatehaste võlad nende müümiseks Bazán’ile “et paremini peegeldada laevatehaste väärtust”, kuid ei andnud ühtegi arvu.
Following the debt cancellation AESA sold the companies for ESP 1 each to Bazán.
Pärast võla tühistamist müüs AESA ettevõtted Bazán’ile hinnaga 1 peseeta igaüks.
The issue to be assessed is, as noted above, whether in similar circumstances a private shareholder, would have injected the capital and could expect an acceptable rate of profitability on the capital invested.
Asjaolu, mida tuleb eelvaadeldu põhjal hinnata, on kas eraaktsionär oleks sarnastel asjaoludel andnud kapitalitoetust ja kas ta võiks oodata vastuvõetavat tasuvuse määra investeeritud kapitalilt.
It is firstly evident that AESA could not generate any acceptable return on the capital, since it used the funds to cover costs linked to the cancellation of debts to its shipyards and the subsequent loss when selling these shipyards to Bazán.
Esiteks on ilmne, et AESA ei saanud tekitada kapitaliga vastuvõetavat kasumit, sest ta kasutas vahendeid oma laevatehaste võlgade tühistamisega seonduvate kulude ja järgneva kahjumi katteks, mis tulenes nende laevatehaste müügist Bazán’ile.
In addition, AESA is a pure holding company, which is not involved in any other economic activity. Thus, it is not able to generate own profits.
Pealegi on AESA ettevõtete grupp, mis ei arenda muud tüüpi tegevust, mistõttu ei ole ta võimeline tekitama oma kasumit.
It can therefore be concluded that the capital injection by SEPI to AESA did not comply with the market investor principle and therefore constitute State aid.
Seega võib järeldada, et SEPI kapitalitoetus AESA-le ei järginud turuinvestori põhimõtet ja moodustab riigiabi.
It has to be stressed in this regard that AESA, by cancelling debts of its shipyards for EUR 309 million improved their financial situation by the same amount.
Siinkohal tuleb rõhutada, et AESA, tühistades oma laevatehaste võlad summas 309 miljonit eurot, parandas nende rahalist olukorda sama summa võrra.
It can also be established that since AESA’s debt cancellation did not involve any cash payment, SEPI’s decision on 18 July 2000 to inject EUR 252425000 to AESA, although the money was only provided in September 2000, enabled AESA to immediately cancel the debts without having to declare immediate bankruptcy.
Võib ka väita, et kuna AESA võla tühistamine ei eeldanud mistahes sularahamakset, võimaldas SEPI 18. juuli 2000. aasta otsus anda 252425000 eurot AESA-le, kuigi summat ei makstud välja enne 2000. aasta septembrit, AESA-l tühistada viivitamatult võlad vajaduseta oma maksejõuetust välja kuulutada.
From a State aid perspective the aid was granted by SEPI’s decision on 18 July 2000 to provide the capital injection, since this decision was the precondition to enable AESA to relieve the shipyards of its debts.
Riigiabi seisukohast anti abi SEPI 18. juuli 2000. aasta otsusega kapitalitoetuse andmiseks, sest see otsus oli eeltingimuseks, et AESA saaks leevendada laevatehaste võlgu.
The ultimate beneficiary of this aid was the shipyards, since the effect of the operation was that the shipyards were relieved of their debts to AESA.
Selle abi lõplikud abisaajad olid laevatehased, sest operatsiooni tagajärjeks oli, et laevatehased tühistasid oma võlad AESA-le.
Even if it can be concluded that the market economy investor principle has not been complied with, Spain also refers to the right to make a capital injection in order to ensure an orderly closing, as expressed in the Lanerossi judgment [29].
Kuigi võib järeldada, et ei järgitud turumajanduse investori põhimõtet, viitab Hispaania ka õigusele anda kapitalitoetust, tagamaks korralik ettevõtte tegevuse lõpetamine vastavalt Lanerossi [29] kohtuotsuses väljendatule.
The Commission considers that Spain’s argument cannot be accepted for the following reasons:
Komisjon arvestab, et Hispaania väitega ei saa nõustuda järgmistel põhjustel:
Firstly, the Lanerossi judgment is not relevant in this case, since the three shipyards benefiting from the capital injection via the debt reduction are still in operation, and were never intended to be closed when the aid was provided.
Esiteks ei ole Lanerossi kohtuotsus antud juhul asjasse puutuv, sest kolm laevatehast, kes said kapitalitoetust tänu võla tühistamisele, jätkavad endiselt tegevust ja nende lõpetamine ei olnud abi andmise hetkel absoluutselt ette nähtud.
Furthermore, even if the Spanish argument is assessed from the point of view of a closure of AESA, instead of a closure of its last three shipyards, it can be noted that procedures to start a closure of AESA only started in the middle of 2002.
Lisaks, isegi juhul, kui arvestada Hispaania väidet AESA likvideerimise vaatepunktist selle viimase kolme laevatehase likvideerimise asemel, võib täheldada, et AESA sulgemise protsess käivitati alles 2002. aasta keskpaigas.
Furthermore, the Court stated in the Lanerossi judgment that when the injection of capital disregard any prospects of profitability even in the long term, such a provision must be regarded as aid.
Pealegi kinnitas kohus Lanerossi kohtuotsuses, et kui kapitalipaigutusel ei võeta arvesse tasuvuse väljavaadet, kaasa arvatud pikaajaliselt, tuleb seda üleandmist pidada abiks.
This is the situation in this case, since SEPI can not be expected to ever receive any remuneration for the capital it has provided to civil shipbuilding companies via AESA.
Selline on olukord antud juhul, sest ei saa oodata, et SEPI saab kunagi tasu kapitali eest, mis ta andis tsiviillaevaehitusettevõtetele AESA vahendusel.
Finally, it can be noted that the closing costs of AESA, according to Spain, consists of social costs linked to the 1994 to 1998 restructuring of the civil shipyards.
Lõpuks tuleb märkida, et AESA sulgemise kulud, nagu kinnitab Hispaania, seisnevad sotsiaalkuludes seoses tsiviillaevatehaste ümberkorraldamisega, mis toimus 1994. ja 1998. aasta vahel.
Any further aid to cover these costs would imply a violation of the 1997 Commission decision authorising the restructuring aid.
Mistahes muu abi nende kulude katteks eeldaks komisjoni 1997. aasta otsuse rikkumist, millega anti luba ümberkorraldusabi andmiseks.
The question of whether the purchase price constituted State aid to IZAR was raised in the first extension of the procedure, dated 28 November 2001.
Küsimus, kas ostuhind moodustas riigiabi IZAR-ile, tõstatati menetluse esimesel laiendamisel 28. novembril 2001.
The reason why State aid could be provided in this manner is that once AESA had sold its shipyards to Bazán, it was an empty shell with virtually no activities.
Põhjuseks, miks riigiabi võis anda sel viisil, on see, et kui AESA oli müünud oma laevatehased Bazán’ile, oli see tühi asutus, mis ei arendanud praktiliselt mingit tegevust.
It could thus be tempting for the Spanish authorities to ensure that as many assets as possible were transferred from AESA to its shipyard companies and thus to the company that would take over the civil shipyards, Bazán.
Seetõttu võis olla Hispaania ametivõimudele ahvatlev veenduda, et kantakse üle suurim võimalik kogus aktivaid AESA-lt tema laevatehastele ja seega ettevõttele, mis võtab oma hoolde tsiviillaevatehased, Bazán’ile.
It also appears evident that the probability that the market value of each of these three companies would be exactly the same, ESP 1, is very small.
Ka näib ilmne, et on väga väike tõenäosus, et kõigi nende kolme ettevõtte turuväärtus on täpselt sama, üks peseeta.
As already noted above, ESP 1 per yard clearly was not market prices and in theory implied a net gain for Bazán/IZAR of EUR […] if the Spanish estimation of market value is correct.
Nagu eelnevalt selgitatud, ei olnud 1 peseeta laevatehase eest selgelt turuhind ja tähendas teoorias […] eurost puhaskasumit Bazán/IZAR-i jaoks, kui Hispaania turuväärtuse hinnang on õige.
However, since it has not been established that this gain for Bazán/IZAR directly involved resources from SEPI or the State, the Commission does not consider that the price of ESP 1 per yard can be used to establish further State aid to the buyer, Bazán/Izar.
Kuna ei ole siiski välja selgitatud, et see kasum Bazán/IZAR-ile hõlmas otseselt SEPI või riigi ressursse, ei hinda komisjon, et ühe peseeta hinda laevatehase eest võiks kasutada ostjale, Bazán/IZAR-ile antud riigiabi olemasolu määratlemiseks.
Aid contained in transactions linked to transfer 3, between SEPI and Bazán
Abi AESA ja SEPI vahelise ülekandmisega 3 seonduvates tehingutes
The four companies Astano, Cadiz, Juliana and Manises were sold from SEPI to Bazán, on 20 July 2000, for ESP 1 each.
SEPI müüs neli ettevõtet (Astano, Cádiz, Juliana ja Manises) Bazán’ile 20. juulil 2000. aastal hinnaga üks peseeta igaüks.
In the first extension of the procedure the Commission expressed doubts that this was market price and that therefore State aid could have been provided to Bazán/IZAR.
Menetluse esimesel laiendamisel väljendas komisjon kahtlusi, kas see oli turuhind ja kas seega võis olla antud riigiabi Bazán/IZAR-ile.
Concerning the price, Spain has provided credible information which indicates that market value for each of the four companies was negative.
Mis puutub hinda, siis andis Hispaania usutavat teavet, mis näitab, et kõigi nelja ettevõtte turuväärtus oli negatiivne.
It can therefore be concluded that the price was not too low, and therefore did not imply State aid to Bazán/IZAR.
Seega võib järeldada, et hind ei olnud liiga madal ja ei tähendanud seega riigiabi Bazán/IZAR-ile.
Recovery of restructuring aid already granted and approved in 1997
aastal antud ja lubatud ümberkorraldusabi tagasisaamine
Since the doubts of further illegal State aid to the public shipyards have been confirmed, the Commission must assess, as noted in the second extension of the procedure, whether some of the restructuring aid granted in 1997 will be considered to be incompatible and be recovered.
Kuna kinnitust leidsid kahtlused uue ebaseadusliku riigiabi kohta avalik-õiguslikele laevatehastele, peab komisjon menetluse teisel laiendamisel täheldatu põhjal hindama, kas osa 1997. aastal antud ümberkorraldusabist peetakse kokkusobimatuks ja kas see tuleb tagasi saada.
On this issue, the Commission considers that, taking into consideration the comments made by Spain and IZAR in the context of this procedure, there are no grounds to consider part of the restructuring aid authorised in 1997 to be incompatible.
Selles osas hindab komisjon, et arvestades Hispaania ja IZAR-i märkusi käesoleva menetluse kontekstis, ei leidu väiteid pidamaks osa 1997. aastal lubatud ümberkorraldussabist kokkusobimatuks.
The reason is that, according to the decision [31] authorising the aid, the Commission’s right to request recovery of the aid authorised in 1997 expired with the last monitoring report [32], dated 13 October 1999.
Põhjuseks on, et vastavalt otsusele [31], millega abi lubati, aegus komisjoni õigus nõuda 1997. aastal lubatud abi tagastamist 13. oktoobri 1999. aasta viimase kontrollaruandega [32].
Therefore, the aid approved in 1997 became existing aid once the monitoring period expired.
Seega muutus 1997. aastal heakskiidetud abi olemasolevaks abiks kontrollperioodi lõppemisel.
Aid recovery following change of ownership
Abi tagasisaamine pärast omanikuvahetust
The shipyard companies benefiting from the illegal aid established above are now owned by IZAR, and this illegal aid should therefore be recovered from IZAR.
Laevatehased, kes said eelnevalt määratletud ebaseaduslikku abi, on praegu IZAR-i omanduses ja seega peaks IZAR selle ebaseadusliku abi hüvitama.
The change of ownership of the yards, from AESA or SEPI to IZAR does not mean that the recovery of the aid could fall on the previous owner of the concerned companies.
Laevatehaste omanikuvahetus AESA-lt või SEPI-lt IZAR-ile ei tähenda, et abi tagasisaamine võiks olla asjasse puutuvate ettevõtete eelmise omaniku kohuseks.
The reason is that the companies were transferred to IZAR, not on market terms in open and transparent tendering procedures, but in the form of a reorganisation of companies within the same SEPI group, with the use of a symbolic price.
Põhjuseks on, et ettevõtted anti üle IZAR-ile mitte turutingimustes ja avatud ja läbipaistvate enampakkumiste kutsete teel, vaid ettevõtete ümberkorraldamise vormis sama grupi, SEPI sees sümboolse hinnaga.
The European Court of Justice ruled in two recent judgments [33] that in so far as companies are bought under non-discriminatory competitive conditions and at the market price, that is to say at the highest price which a private investor acting under normal competitive conditions was ready to pay for those companies in the situation they were in, in particular after having enjoyed State aid, the aid element was assessed at the market price and included in the purchase price.
Kohus määras kahes hiljutises lahendis, [33] et niivõrd, kuivõrd ettevõtted ostetakse mittediskrimineerivates konkurentsitingimustes ja turuhinnaga (see tähendab suurima hinnaga, mida erainvestor oleks valmis ettevõtete eest maksma normaalsetes turutingimustes olukorras, milles nad hetkel on), eriti pärast seda, kui nad on saanud riigiabi, hinnati abielementi turuhinnaga ja arvestati ostuhinna sisse.
Only in such circumstances, the undertakings to which the tenders were granted cannot be regarded as having benefited from an advantage in relation to other market operators.
Ainult sellistel asjaoludel ei saa pidada ettevõtteid, mille suhtes korraldati enampakkumised, eelise saajateks teiste turul osalejate suhtes.
They could not therefore be asked to repay the aid element in question.
Seega ei saa neilt paluda, et nad maksaksid tagasi kõnesoleva abielemendi.
It is obvious from the description of the facts in the present case that these conditions are not met.
Käesoleval juhul on asjaolude kirjeldusest ilmne, et need tingimused ei ole täidetud.
In addition, in joined Cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v. Commission [34], paragraph 38, the Court stressed that ‘the sale of shares in a company which is the beneficiary of unlawful aid by a shareholder to a third party does not affect the requirement for recovery’.
Pealegi rõhutas kohus liidetud kohtuasjades C-328/99 ja C-399/00 Itaalia ja SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v komisjon, [34] lõige 38, et “osaluste müük ühes ebaseaduslikku abi saanud ettevõttes aktsionärilt kolmandale ei puuduta eeskirja, mis nõuab abi hüvitamist.”
In the present case, Bazán/IZAR, owned by State holding company SEPI, acquired the shares of companies, also part of the SEPI group, and eliminated them as legal entities after the acquisition of the shares.
Antud juhul ostis Bazán/IZAR, mis kuulub riiklikule grupile SEPI, osalused ettevõtetes, mis moodustasid samuti osa SEPI grupist, ja tühistas need juriidiliste isikutena.
As successor of the previously legally independent yards (in the form of share companies), IZAR is now the beneficiary and has to recover the aid granted to those yards.
Varem iseseisvate laevatehaste õigusjärglasena (nende aktsiaseltsi seisuses) on IZAR nüüd juriidilisest seisukohast abisaaja ning peab nendele laevatehastele antud abi tagasi saama.
Article 296
Artikkel 296
In so far as the capital injection into the yards is considered as aid to Bazán Spain claims that this aid would fall under Article 296 and thus outside the scope of the State aid rules, since Bazán was a military company at the time of the acquisition of the yards.
Juhul, kui kapitalitoetust laevatehastele peetakse abiks Bazán’ile, väidab Hispaania, et see abi on kooskõlas artikliga 296 ja jääb seega välja riigiabi alaste normide reguleerimisalast, kuna Bazán oli laevatehaste omandamise hetkel sõjaline ettevõte.
The Commission does not share the viewpoint … to the effect that, by virtue of the military aspects, the whole measure is caught by Article 296, even if there is a clear effect on competition in non-military sectors.
Komisjon ei jaga Hollandi ja Hispaania ametivõimude seisukohta selles tähenduses, et sõjaliste aspektide alusel katab meedet täielikult artikkel 296, kuigi see avaldab selget mõju konkurentsile mittesõjalistes sektorites.
That interpretation clearly conflicts with the wording of the Article.’
See tõlgendus on täielikult vastuolus artiklis väljendatuga.”
This decision further states that if it is ‘clear that the measures have indeed affected the conditions of competition as regards commercial products.
Selles otsuses kinnitatakse lisaks, et “on seega selge, et meetmed mõjutasid tõepoolest kaubanduslike toodete turustamise tingimusi.
Therefore, in accordance with its standard practice, the Commission must assess the measures in the light of the State aid rules in so far as they distort, or threaten to distort, competition in markets for products that are not caught by Article 296.’
Seega kooskõlas oma normaalsete tavadega peab komisjon hindama meetmeid, võttes arvesse riigiabi suhtes kehtivaid eeskirju selles osas, kas need moonutavad või ähvardavad moonutada konkurentsi artiklis 296 nimetamata toodete turgudel.”