natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Under Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission may impose on undertakings fines of from EUR 1000 to EUR 50000 where, intentionally or negligently, they supply incorrect or misleading information in a notification pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation.
Koondumismääruse artikli 14 lõike 1 punkti b kohaselt võib komisjon ettevõtjatele määrata trahvi 1000 kuni 50000 eurot, kui need annavad tahtlikult või hooletuse tõttu koondumismääruse artikli 4 alusel esitatud teatises ebaõiget või eksitavat teavet.
Under Article 14(3), in setting the amount of the fine, the Commission is to take account of the nature and gravity of the infringement.
Artikli 14 lõike 3 kohaselt võetakse trahvi määramisel arvesse rikkumise laadi ja raskust.
The Commission thereby takes account of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Seejuures võtab komisjon arvesse kõiki raskendavaid ja kergendavaid asjaolusid.
Nature of the infringement
Rikkumise laad
The infringement committed by KLM took the form of the supply of incorrect and misleading information within the meaning of Article 14(1)b of the Merger Regulation.
KLM pani toime rikkumise, esitades ebaõiget ja eksitavat teavet koondumismääruse artikli 14 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses.
The supply of this incorrect and misleading information was at the very least grossly negligent.
Nende ebaõigete ja eksitavate andmete esitamine oli põhjustatud vähemalt tõsine hooletusest.
Gravity of the infringement
Rikkumise raskusaste
The infringement of the Merger Regulation by KLM should be regarded as a serious infringement for the reasons set out below.
Koondumismääruse nõuete rikkumist KLM poolt peaks käsitlema tõsise rikkumisena järgmistel põhjustel.
relevance of the incorrect or misleading information
Eksitava teabe olulisus
Information concerning any overlap between the parties on individual destinations is clearly of relevance to the competition assessment of the operation.
Andmed mis tahes kattumiste kohta osaliste üksikute lendude sihtkohtade osas on selgelt tähtis koondumise hindamiseks konkurentsi aspektist. Seda vaatamata küsimusele, kas asjaomane turg koosneb üksikutest marsruutidest, kõikidest või teatud sihtkohtadest Vahemeremaades.
This is regardless of the question whether the relevant market consists of individual routes or of all or certain Mediterranean destinations.
Märkimata jäetud Transavia sihtkohad on olulised Hispaania, Portugali ja Kreeka puhkepiirkonnad, kuhu suundub palju reisijaid.
The Transavia destinations which were not mentioned are the important Spanish, Portuguese and Greek holiday destinations which attract a high volume of passengers.
Teave, et Transavia teostab lende kõikidesse asjaomastesse Martinair’i sihtkohtadesse, on samuti tähtis Martinair’i ja Transavia vahelise tegeliku konkurentsi hindamiseks, eriti kui käsitleda seda osaliste korduvate väidete kontekstis, et Martinair’i ja Transavia lennud täiendavad üksteist.
The information that Transavia is operating towards many major holiday destinations scheduled and charter services in parallel is also clearly of importance in order to assess Transavia's market position.
Teave, et Transavia teostab paljudesse peamistesse puhkusekohtadesse paralleelselt nii regulaar- ja tellimuslende, on samuti väga oluline selleks, et hinnata Transavia turuseisundit.
Regardless of whether or not seats sold on scheduled flights form part of the relevant product market, the information that Transavia has substantial scheduled operations to its charter destinations is relevant to an assessment of the market strength of Transavia on those routes.
Olenemata sellest, kas müüdud regulaarlendude istekohad moodustavad osa asjaomasest kaubaturust või mitte, on teave, et Transavia teostab olulisel määral regulaarlende oma tellimuslendude sihtkohtadesse, tähtis hindamaks Transavia turuseisundit nendel marsruutidel.
mitigating factors invoked by KLM
KLM poolt ära märgitud kergendavad asjaolud
KLM emphasises that it had several meetings with the Commission in order to prepare the notification, that it discussed several drafts of the notification in those meetings and that it complied in good faith with the suggestions and remarks made by the Commission.
KLM rõhutab, et tal oli teatise ettevalmistamise ajal komisjoniga mitmeid kohtumisi, et nendel kohtumistel arutati mitmeid teatise kavandeid ning et ta järgis heauskselt komisjoni ettepanekuid ja märkusi.
It also points out that the notification in this matter was very complex because of the lack of readily available data.
Ta märgib ka, et teatise koostamine selles osas oli väga keeruline, kuna puudusid hästi kättesaadavad andmed.
KLM further states that it is not proven that it provided ‘incorrect or misleading’ information, or that at any rate, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, any such provision cannot be taken as grounds for the imposition of a fine.
KLM väidab veel, et “ebaõige ja eksitava” teabe esitamine ei ole tõestatud või, et igal juhul, võttes arvesse juhtumi konkreetseid asjaolusid, ei saa selliste andmete esitamist käsitleda alusena trahvi määramiseks.
The Commission cannot share this view for the reasons set out below.
Komisjon ei saa seda seisukohta jagada järgmistel põhjustel.
Transavia's charter destinations
Transavia tellimuslendude sihtkohad
In its comments on the statement of objections, KLM explains the omission of the Transavia charter destinations as the result of an administrative error [38].
Oma kommentaarides vastuväidetele selgitab KLM Transavia tellimuslendude sihtkohtade osas andmete esitamata jätmist administratiivse veaga.
KLM further argues that the mistake should have been evident to anybody examining the notification.
KLM väidab ka, et viga oleks pidanud olema ilmne igaühele, kes teadet loeb.
KLM argues that the table in question was only included in the text of Form CO at the request of the Commission and that for the ongoing summer season 1998 detailed market share data were not yet available.
KLM väidab, et kõnealune tabel lisati vormile CO alles komisjoni nõudmisel ning et käimasoleva 1998. aasta suvehooaja kohta ei olnud veel üksikasjalikke andmeid turuosa kohta saadaval.
However, the table on page 40 of the notification is not presented as an addendum or an update to the information contained in the SH&E study referred to in paragraph 26 of this Decision.
Kuid tabel teatise leheküljel 40 ei ole esitatud käesoleva otsuse punktis 26 nimetatud SH&E analüüsis sisalduvate andmete täiendamiseks või ajakohastamiseks.
It is an illustration following the KLM's statement that Transavia's and Martinair's activities are ‘to a large extent complementary’.
See illustreerib KLM-i väidet, et Transavia ja Martinair’i tegevus on “suurel määral üksteist täiendav”.
KLM's claim that this table could only have been read in conjunction with the study is unfounded as there is not even a reference to the study.
KLM-i väide, et seda tabelit oleks pidanud lugema ainult koos analüüsiga, on põhjendamatu, kuna see ei sisalda isegi mitte viidet analüüsile.
KLM's claim that the incorrectness of the table was obvious is also unfounded.
KLM-i väide, et tabelis toodud andmete ebaõigsus oli ilmne, on samuti põhjendamatu.
If the omission of the charter destinations in question was not detected by KLM, which has a much better knowledge of its activities than anybody else, it was certainly not such an obvious mistake that it could have been detected by any careful reader.
Kui tellimuslendude sihtkohtade andmete puudumist ei märganud KLM, kellel on palju paremad teadmised oma tegevusest kui kellelgi teisel, ei olnud see loomulikult nii ilmne viga, et seda oleks märganud iga hoolikas lugeja.
KLM emphasises that it was not its intention to withhold that information from the Commission and that the seriousness of its administrative error is exaggerated by the Commission.
KLM rõhutab, et tema eesmärk ei olnud andmete varjamine komisjoni eest ning et komisjon liialdab administratiivse vea raskuse määratlemisel.
However, the explanation of how KLM collected the information on Transavia's charter destinations shows a large degree of carelessness.
Kuid KLM-i selgitus selle kohta, kuidas ta kogus andmeid Transavia tellimuslendude sihtkohtade kohta, viitab tõsisele hoolimatusele.
To base the information on an in-flight magazine and not on a more reliable source shows a grave neglect of the duty to select carefully the necessary information, particularly in view of the fact that Transavia is a fully controlled subsidiary.
Võtta andmete aluseks pardaajakiri ja mitte usaldusväärsem allikas näitab väga hooletut suhtumist oma ülesandesse vajalike andmete valikul, eriti pidades silmas asjaolu, et Transavia on täieliku kontrolli all olev tütarfirma.
Transavia's scheduled operations
Transavia regulaarlennud
KLM argues that it never made a secret in its contacts with the Commission of the fact that the KLM Group, including its subsidiary Transavia, operates scheduled flights in Europe in general and to the Mediterranean in particular.
KLM väidab, et suheldes komisjoniga ei teinud ta kunagi saladust sellest, et KLM Group, kaasa arvatud selle tütarfirma Transavia, teostab regulaarlende Euroopas üldiselt ja eriti Vahemeremaadesse.
It also states that it would have provided more information on Transavia's scheduled flights if the Commission had requested it during the pre-notification talks.
Ta märgib ka, et oleks Transavia regulaarlendude kohta esitanud rohkem teavet, kui komisjon oleks seda teatise esitamisele eelnenud läbirääkimistel küsinud.
KLM refers to the SH&E study which it claims makes it clear that 47 % of all Dutch holiday-makers go on vacation on a scheduled flight.
KLM viitab SH&E analüüsile, mis tema väitel näitab selgelt, et 47 % Hollandi puhkusereisijatest lendab puhkusereisile regulaarlendudel.
KLM states that it would be inconceivable that a large proportion of these passengers would not be attributed to the KLM group.
KLM väidab, et oleks mõeldamatu suurt osa nendest reisijatest mitte KLM grupi arvele kirjutada.
The discussions in the prenotification meetings were principally concerned with clarifying the market definition.
Teatise esitamisele eelnenud läbirääkimistel selgitati peamiselt turu määratlusega seonduvat.
The Commission accepts that since KLM did not explain that Transavia had substantial sales of seats on its scheduled flights to package tour operators, the Commission did not initially contemplate taking those activities into account for market definition purposes.
Komisjon möönab, et kuna KLM ei selgitanud, et Transavia müüb olulisel hulgal istekohti oma regulaarlendudel reisipakette pakkuvatele turismifirmadele, ei kaalunud komisjon algul nende tegevuste arvesse võtmist turu määratlemisel.
This does not, however, remove the obligation of KLM to include full information on those activities, at least in response to Question 6.2 of Form CO [39].
Kuid see ei vabasta KLM-i kohustusest esitada nende tegevuste kohta täielik teave, vähemalt vastuses vormi CO küsimusele 6.2.
Furthermore, the information given in the SH&E study relates to all Dutch holiday-makers and not just to customers who buy a package tour from a tour operator.
Pealegi, SH&E analüüsis toodud andmed puudutavad kõiki Hollandi puhkusereisijaid ja mitte ainult neid kliente, kes reisifirmadelt reisipakette ostavad.
It was therefore not possible to deduce from that information that Transavia sold seats on its scheduled flights to package tour operators.
Seepärast ei olnud nendest andmetest võimalik tuletada, et Transavia müüs istekohti regulaarlendudel reisipakette pakkuvatele reisifirmadele.
The way in which the information on Transavia was presented in all drafts submitted was not likely to prompt such questions on the part of the Commission.
Viis, kuidas teavet Transavia kohta kõikides teatise kavandites esitati, ei saanud sellist küsimust komisjoni poolt tekitada.
Transavia was always presented as a ‘charter operator’.
Transaviat esitleti alati “tellimuslendude teostajana”.
The information that Transavia also operates scheduled flights was only given in the final version of the notification in footnote 11 on page 45, which concerns the participation of Transavia in the KLM frequent flyer scheme.
Teave, et Transavia teostab ka regulaarlende, esitati alles teatise lõplikus versioonis leheküljel 45 allmärkusena 11, mis puudutab Transavia osalemist KLM-i püsikliendiprogrammis.
That information was not contained in earlier drafts.
See teave ei sisaldunud eelnevates teatise kavandites.
The argument that the Commission could, or should, have asked for that information is therefore unfounded.
Väide, et komisjon võinuks või oleks pidanud seda teavet küsima, on seega põhjendamatu.
KLM further claims that the information on scheduled flights did not change KLM's market share and that therefore the omission of that information was irrelevant.
KLM väidab veel, et andmed regulaarlendude kohta ei muutnud KLM-i turuosa ning et sellepärast oli nende andmete esitamata jätmine väheoluline.
However, the actual market share of a company is only one element to measure its market strength.
Ettevõtja tegelik turuosa on aga ainult üks element tema turuseisundi hindamisel.
The operation by Transavia of scheduled services to destinations which it also serves on a charter basis is clearly a factor which can contribute to its strength on those routes and is therefore relevant to the Commission's assessment of competition in connection with the merger.
Transavia regulaarlendude teostamine sihtkohtadesse, kuhu ta teostab ka tellimuslende on selgelt asjaolu, mis võib toetada tema seisundit nendel marsruutidel ja on seega komisjonile oluline konkurentsi aspektide hindamise seisukohalt koondumisega seonduvalt.
Accordingly, the Commission's substantive assessment of the case, and the nature and scope of any remedies that may be required, is likely to be affected by its knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the existence of those operations and of their nature and extent.
Seega võivad komisjoni sisulist hinnangut juhtumile ning vajalike meetmete laadile ja ulatusele mõjutada tema teadmised (või teadmatus) nende lendude olemasolust ning nende iseloomust ja ulatusest.
For example, if it were really the case that Transavia had no scheduled operations to those destinations, it might be argued that it would be relatively easy for other scheduled airlines to commence such operations, selling seats to individuals and to tour operators, and that in consequence the merger should be allowed.
Näiteks, kui Transavial ei oleks tõepoolest olnud regulaarlende nendesse sihtkohtadesse, võiks väita, et teistel regulaarlende teostavatel lennuettevõtjatel oleks suhteliselt lihtne neid lende alustada, müües istekohti isikutele ja reisifirmadele, ning järelikult peaks koondumine olema lubatud.
Similarly, if a possible dominant position were found to exist on some of the routes concerned, a remedy which focused exclusively on Martinair's operations, or Transavia's charter operations, might be insufficient, since it would not affect or take into account the substantial sales to tour operators which Transavia makes on its scheduled flights on those routes.
Sarnaselt, kui mõne asjaomase marsruudi suhtes oleks tuvastatud turguvalitseva seisundi olemasolu, võiksid ainult Martinair’i lendudele või Transavia tellimuslendudele keskenduvad meetmed olla ebapiisavad, sest need ei mõjutaks ega võtaks arvesse märkimisväärset hulka istekohti, mida Transavia müüb reisifirmadele nende marsruutide regulaarlendudele.
Amount of the fine
Trahvi suurus
In proceedings initiated under the Merger Regulation, it is very important that the parties to the merger supply full information in submitting the notification.
Koondumismääruse alusel algatatud menetlustes on väga tähtis, et koondumise osalised esitavad teatises täieliku teabe.
These constraints mean that firms must be particularly careful in submitting details of their merger.
See kohustus tähendab, et firmad peavad olema koondumiste üksikasjade esitamisel eriti hoolsad.
In the present case KLM supplied information which was incorrect and misleading and KLM was at the very least, grossly negligent.
Käesoleval juhul esitas KLM andmed, mis olid ebaõiged ja eksitavad ja KLM-i puhul oli tegemist vähemalt tõsise hooletusega.
Furthermore, the information was clearly relevant for the competitive assessment of the operation.
Peale selle olid andmed otseselt vajalikud koondumise hindamiseks konkurentsi seisukohalt.
KLM provided the correct information not on its own initiative but only as a result of the Commission's investigation.
KLM esitas õiged andmed alles komisjoni uurimise tulemusena, mitte omal algatusel.
Complete information on the additional Transavia charter destinations could only be derived from information provided in a response to a request for information and was finally confirmed orally.
Täielikke andmeid Transavia täiendavate tellimuslendude sihtkohtade kohta võis ainult tuletada teabenõude vastuseks esitatud teabe põhjal ja neid kinnitati lõpuks suuliselt.
The information that Transavia operates scheduled flights to Mediterranean destinations was given as a result of a request for information.
Teave, et Transavia teostab regulaarlende sihtkohtadesse Vahemeremaades, esitati teabenõude vastusena.
The fact that KLM sells seats on its scheduled flights to tour operators under the same economic conditions as for its charter flights, and the importance of that activity, was only fully confirmed in the notification of 21 December 1998 and the Commission's subsequent investigation of the information contained in that notification.
Asjaolu, et KLM müüb oma regulaarlendude istekohti reisifirmadele samadel majanduslikel tingimustel nagu oma tellimuslendude istekohti ning selle tegevuse tähtsust kinnitati täielikult alles 21. detsembri 1998. aasta teatises ja teatises esitatud teabe edasise uurimise käigus komisjoni poolt.
In assessing the conduct of KLM, it must also be borne in mind that KLM is a large European company with significant business in Europe.
KLM-i käitumise hindamisel peab samuti meeles pidama, et KLM on suur Euroopa ettevõtte, kes teostab märkimisväärse ulatusega äritegevust Euroopas.
KLM also had prior experience of a notification under the Merger Regulation.
KLM-il oli ka eelnev kogemus koondumisest teatamise kohta vastavalt koondumismäärusele.
In mitigation, KLM has claimed, in summary and as more fully described in paragraphs 47 to 55, that the alleged infringements were not deliberate, that the Commission should have been able to identify the missing information and request it during the prenotification period (which in this instance was quite extensive) and that the missing information was not decisive for the outcome of the case.
Kergendava asjaoluna on KLM väitnud kokkuvõttes ja nagu kirjeldatud punktides 47 kuni 55, et väidetavad rikkumised ei olnud tahtlikud, et komisjon oleks pidanud olema võimeline puuduvaid andmeid märkama ning paluma neid teatise esitamisele eelnenud ajal (mis antud juhul oli üpris pikk) ja et puuduvad andmed ei olnud juhtumi tulemuste suhtes otsustava tähtsusega.
In the Commission's view, only limited weight can be attached to those claims as regards their impact on the gravity of the infringement and hence on the amount of the fine that should be imposed.
Komisjon on seisukohal, et nendele väidetele saab omistada ainult mõningast kaalu, käsitledes neid rikkumise raskusastme ja seega määratava trahvi suuruse kontekstis.
There is no evidence that the infringements were intentional, and KLM's participation in prenotification contacts with the Commission indicates, at the least, a desire to ensure that its notification was acceptable.
Ei ole tõendatud, et rikkumised oleksid tahtlikud, ning KLM-i kontaktid komisjoniga teatise esitamisele eelnenud ajal viitavad vähemalt soovile tagada teatise vastuvõetavus.
Nevertheless, the responsibility for ensuring that all relevant information was provided was KLM's, and it failed to exercise due care in carrying that task out.
Sellele vaatamata vastutas KLM kogu asjakohase teabe esitamise eest ning ei täitnud seda ülesannet vajaliku hoolikusega.
The degree of negligence associated with the infringements is very substantial, in both instances.
Rikkumisega seotud hooletuse tase on mõlemal juhul oluline.
KLM should not have relied on an in-flight magazine for crucial information such as that concerning Transavia's charter destinations.
KLM ei oleks tohtinud toetuda pardaajakirjale sellise olulise tähtsusega andmete osas nagu andmed Transavia tellimuslendude sihtkohtade kohta.
It could have provided the information about Transavia's scheduled flights, and should have appreciated the importance of doing so, even in the absence of a specific request or reminder from the Commission.
Ta oleks võinud esitada andmed Transavia regulaarlendude kohta ja pidanud mõistma selle tähtsusest isegi siis, kui komisjon ei oleks konkreetset palvet või meeldetuletust esitanud.
Moreover it is certainly possible that if the Commission had failed to identify either element of the missing information, its continued absence would have affected the substantive decision on the merger, and in ways which could have benefited KLM.
Pealegi on täiesti võimalik, et kui komisjon ei oleks märganud kummaski aspektis puuduvaid andmeid, oleks nende edaspidine puudumine mõjutanud sisulist otsust koondumise kohta ning seda KLM-ile soodsal viisil.
On the basis of the above, and taking account of the circumstances in the case, the Commission considers it appropriate to impose a fine of EUR 40000 on KLM, pursuant to Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
Ülaltoodu põhjal ja võttes arvesse juhtumi asjaolusid, on komisjon seisukohal, et vastavalt koondumismääruse artikli 14 lõike 1 punktile b on asjakohane määrata KLM-ile 40000 euro suurune trahv.
A fine of EUR 40000 is hereby imposed on Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (KLM) pursuant to Article 14(1)(b) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 for having supplied incorrect and misleading information in the notification submitted to the Commission under that Regulation on 1 September 1998.
Vastavalt määruse (EMÜ) nr 4064/89 artikli 14 lõike 1 punktile b määratakse Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV-le (KLM) 40000 euro suurune trahv ebaõige ja eksitava teabe esitamise eest teatises, mis esitati komisjonile nimetatud määruse kohaselt 1. septembril 1998.
The fine referred to in Article 1 shall be paid within three months of the date of notification of this Decision into bank account No 310-0933000-43 of the European Commission, Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Agence Européenne, Rond Point Schuman 5, B-1040 Brussels
Artiklis 1 nimetatud trahv makstakse kolme kuu jooksul alates käesoleva otsuse teatavakstegemist Euroopa Komisjoni pangaarvele nr 310-0933000-43, Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Agence Européenne, Rond Point Schuman 5, B-1040 Brussels
After the expiry of that period, interest shall be automatically payable at the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its repo operations on the first working day of the month in which this Decision is adopted, that is 3 %, plus 3,5 percentage points, making 6,5 %.
Pärast selle ajavahemiku möödumist võetakse automaatselt intressi Euroopa Keskpanga poolt repotehingutele käesoleva otsuse vastuvõtmise kuu esimesel tööpäeval kehtestatud määras, mis on 3 % pluss 3,5 %, kokku 6,5 %.
This Decision is addressed to:
Käesolev otsus on adresseeritud:
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1999.
Brüssel, 14. detsember 1999
Case No IV/M.1128 — KLM/Martinair (OJ C 281, 10.9.1998, p. 7).
Juhtum IV/M.1128 – KLM/Martinair (EÜT C 281, 10.9.1998, lk 7).
OJ C 298, 26.9.1998, p. 8.
EÜT C 298, 26.9.1998, lk 8.
Case No IV/M.1328 — KLM/Martinair (OJ C 408, 29.12.1998, p. 8).
Juhtum IV/M.1328 – KLM/Martinair (EÜT C 408, 29.12.1998, lk 8).
OJ C 42, 17.2.1999, p. 9.
EÜT C 42, 17.2.1999, lk 9.
Page 26 of the notification.
Teatise lk 26.
The timetable ‘Charter flights summer 1998’ was provided as Annex III to a response ( 9 September 1998) to a request for information (4 September 1998).
Sõiduplaan “Tellimuslennud, suvi 1998” esitati III lisana 4. septembri 1998. aasta teabenõude vastusele (Transavia 9. september 1998).
The timetable also mentions destinations in Malta and Croatia.
Sõiduplaanis on toodud ka sihtkohad Maltal ja Horvaatias.