natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Directive 90/684/EEC in the version as amended by Directive 92/68/EEC provides for a derogation from the abolition of operating aid applicable to shipbuilding in favour of the shipyards in the former GDR.
Direktiivis 92/68/EMÜ, millega muudetakse direktiivi 90/684/EMÜ, on sätestatud endise Saksa Demokraatliku Vabariigi (SDV) laevatehastele erand laevatehaste suhtes kohaldatavast tegevusabi keelust.
This operating aid should enable these yards to undergo urgent and comprehensive restructuring and to become competitive.
See erand pidi võimaldama neil tehastel viia läbi kiire ja igakülgse ümberstruktureerimise ning muutuda konkurentsivõimeliseks.
According to Article 10a(2) of Directive 90/684/EEC, operating aid for the shipbuilding and ship conversion activities of the yards situated in the former GDR may be considered, under certain conditions, compatible with the common market until 31 December 1993.
Vastavalt direktiivi 90/684/EMÜ artikli 10a lõikele 2 võib kuni 31. detsembrini 1993 laevaehituseks ja laevade rekonstrueerimiseks antavat tegevusabi lugeda ühisturuga kokkusobivaks teatavatel tingimustel.
These conditions include an annual reporting obligation for Germany.
Nende tingimuste hulgas on Saksamaa iga-aastane aruandekohustus.
In addition, the Commission shall ensure that the aid referred to in this Article does not affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Lisaks sellele pidi komisjon tagama, et selles artiklis nimetatud abi ei mõjutaks kaubandustingimusi sellisel määral, mis ei sobiks ühisturuga kokku.
Based on Directive 90/684/EEC as amended by Directive 92/68/EEC, the Commission adopted, in two decisions in 1993, certain measures in favour of shipyards in the former GDR.
Direktiivi 90/684/EMÜ alusel sellisena, nagu muudetud direktiiviga 92/68/EMÜ, kiitis komisjon 1993. aastal kahe otsusega heaks teatavad meetmed SDV tehastele.
Among these measures were also grants of operating aid, which were considered compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 87(3)(e) of the EC Treaty.
Nende meetmete hulgas oli ka tegevusabi andmine, mida peeti EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 punkti e kohaselt ühisturuga kokkusobivaks.
These Commission decisions approving the aid refer to the obligation of the Commission to ensure that the yards in the new Länder only receive aid, which is necessary for their restructuring.
Komisjoni abi heakskiitvad otsused viitavad ka komisjoni kohustusele tagada, et uute liidumaade tehased saaksid ainult restruktureerimiseks vajalikku abi.
The aim of Directive 92/68/EEC providing a derogation from the general prohibition of operating aid applicable to shipbuilding, was to allow ‘the continued operation of the yards’ during their restructuring.
Üldisest laevaehitusele tegevusabi andmise keelust erandi kehtestanud direktiivi 92/68/EMÜ eesmärk oli võimaldada “tehaste jätkuv töötamine restruktureerimise ajal”.
Aid granted on the basis of this exceptional derogation had to be strictly limited to this purpose, namely the restructuring of the yards.
Selle erandliku keelust kõrvalekaldumise alusel antud abi pidi olema rangelt piiratud selle eesmärgiga, nimelt tehaste restruktureerimisega.
Therefore, the Commission only approved aid on the condition that it was necessary for the above, namely the continued operation during restructuring.
Seetõttu kiitis komisjon abi heaks ainult tingimusel, et see on ülaltoodu, eelkõige restruktureerimise ajal jätkuva töötamise jaoks vajalik.
This is clearly stated in the fourth paragraph of the decision communicated to Germany by letter of 3 March 1993 (SG (93) D/4052) and in the fourth paragraph of the decision communicated to Germany with the letter of 17 January 1994 (SG (94) D/567) [6].
See on selgesõnaliselt esitatud 3. märtsi 1993. aasta kirjas (SG (93) D/4052) Saksamaale edastatud otsuse kolmandas punktis ja 17. jaanuari 1994. aasta kirjas (SG (94) D/567) Saksamaale edastatud otsuse neljandas punktis. [6]
In addition, the decision on the releasing of the second tranche of aid communicated to Germany by letter of 17 January 1994 underlines that this operating aid constitutes the maximum operating aid to be paid to the yard related to contracts signed until 31 December 1993.
Lisaks rõhutatakse 1994. aasta 17. jaanuari kirjas Saksamaale edastatud abi teist osa lubavas otsuses, et see tegevusabi tähendab maksimaalset tegevusabi, mida võib tehasele maksta seoses kuni 31. detsembrini 1993 sõlmitud lepingutega.
That makes it evident that the concept of the decision was made clear to Germany and the beneficiary: the aid approved is a maximum amount, which is to be granted only insofar as it is strictly necessary for the success of the restructuring process.
See tõestab, et otsuse mõte oli Saksamaale ja abisaajale selgeks tehtud: heakskiidetud abi on maksimaalne summa, mida võib anda, tingimusel et see on rangelt restruktureerimisprotsessi eduks vajalik.
Loss prognosis and the concept of ‘lump sum’
Kahjumiprognoos ja “kindla summa” tähendus
Germany and KWW claim that the Commission decided in a final manner on the necessity of the aid before releasing the tranches.
Saksamaa ja KWW väidavad, et komisjon otsustas abi vajalikkuse üle enne abi osade heakskiitmist.
In its decisions it did not lay down any conditions, which would justify a later reassessment of the aid.
Komisjon ei sätestanud oma otsustes mingeid tingimusi, mis oleksid õigustanud abi hilisemat ümberhindamist.
In addition, being fully aware that the privatisation contract did not provide for any possible repayment obligations, the Commission approved the lump sum of aid.
Lisaks sellele kiitis komisjon kindla abisumma heaks, olles täielikult teadlik sellest, et erastamislepingus ei olnud ette nähtud mingeid tagasimaksekohustusi.
If the Commission doubted the plausibility of the loss prognosis submitted to it at the time, it should have inserted a provision in its decisions stating that the approval only covered aid that corresponded to the actual losses.
Kui komisjon kahtles sel ajal talle esitatud kahjumiprognoosi usutavuses, oleks tulnud abi heakskiitvates otsustes selgelt sätestada, et heakskiit katab ainult tegelikule kahjumile vastavat abi.
As explained in the decision to open the procedure [7], the Commission notes that in cases where aid is granted for restructuring, which is to be carried out after the decision on the compatibility of aid is taken, the approval has to be based on estimations.
Nagu selgitatakse komisjoni menetluse algatamise otsuses, [7] märgib komisjon, et juhtudel, mil abi kiidetakse heaks nõuetele vastavuse hindamise otsusest hiljem läbi viidava restruktureerimise jaoks, peab heakskiit põhinema prognoosidel.
Estimations on the elements of the operating aid were especially needed in this case since Article 10a(2)(a) of Directive 90/684/EEC required that this aid was to be paid by 31 December 1993.
Sel konkreetsel juhul oli tegevusabi elementide prognoose vaja, kuna direktiivi 90/684/EMÜ artikli 10a lõike 2 punktis a on sätestatud, et abi pidi välja makstama 31. detsembriks 1993.
The above decisions take into consideration this urgency, when they stress that ‘[it] is clear to the Commission that a decision is urgently needed in order not to inhibit the possibilities of the yard to restructure’.
Ülalnimetatud otsused võtavad seda kiireloomulisust arvesse, rõhutades: “komisjonile on selge, et otsust on kiiresti vaja, et mitte pärssida tehase võimalusi restruktureerimiseks”.
The Commission had to adopt its decisions concerning operating aid on the basis of the information submitted in advance by the German government.
Komisjon pidi võtma otsused vastu Saksamaa valitsuse poolt eelnevalt esitatud teabe põhjal.
That is why appropriate conditions concerning the necessity had to be and were in fact inserted expressly into the decisions.
Tegelikult lisatigi sellepärast otsustesse selgesõnaliselt abi vajalikkust puudutavad tingimused.
When the decisions were taken, the Commission did not doubt the plausibility of the loss prognosis, but it had to ensure, that should the losses not be as high as estimated, granted loss compensation would become incompatible aid and consequently has to be recovered.
Komisjon ei kahelnud kahjumiprognoosi usutavuses ajal, mil otsused vastu võeti, kuid oli vaja tagada, et juhul, kui kahjum osutub oodatust väiksemaks, ei vasta kõnealune kahjumikate enam nõuetele ja tuleb seega tagasi nõuda.
That is also why all Commission decisions releasing the tranches of aid recall that on adoption of this derogation from the rules on operating aid applicable to other Community yards, the Commission gave an undertaking to the Council that the Commission would use its monitoring and investigative powers to ensure that the yards in the new Länder only receive the aid ‘needed in order not to inhibit the possibilities of the yard to restructure’.
See on ka põhjus, miks komisjon tuletab kõigis oma abi osi heakskiitvates otsustes meelde, et kõnealuse teistele ühenduse tehastele kohaldatavatest reeglitest erandi vastuvõtmisel võttis komisjon nõukogu ees kohustuse kasutada oma järelevalve- ja uurimisvolitusi tagamaks, et uute liidumaade tehased saavad vaid “abi, mida on vaja, et mitte pärssida tehase restruktureerimise võimalusi”.
It cannot be put into question that the concept of aid, to be granted as a lump sum presented by Germany after the restructuring was finalised, does not correspond to the provisions either of the Council directives or the Commission decisions.
On väljaspool kahtlust, et Saksamaa poolt pakutud pärast restruktureerimise lõpuleviimist välja kindlasummalise abi põhimõte ei ole kooskõlas ei nõukogu direktiivide sätete ega komisjoni otsustega.
Misinterpretation of State aid rules
Riigiabi eeskirjade väärtõlgendamine
Before the decisions for aid were taken, Germany provided the Commission with a copy of the Acquisition Agreement between the THA and Kvaerner Warnow Werft.
Enne otsuste vastuvõtmist esitas Saksamaa komisjonile THA ja Kvaerner Warnow Werfti vahelise ülevõtmise kokkuleppe koopia.
According to Germany, this document fully informed the Commission about the provisions on aid, which was granted as a lump sum.
Saksamaa arvates oli selles dokumendis edastatud komisjonile kogu teave kindlasummalisena antud abi tingimuste kohta.
Germany does not explain in which way such an agreement concluded between the THA and Kvaerner Warnow Werft could bind a third party, namely the Commission.
Saksamaa ei selgita, kuidas niisugune THA ja Kvaerner Warnow Werfti vaheline kokkulepe saab olla kolmandale poolele ehk komisjonile siduv.
Further to this, Germany refers to its letter to the Commission, by which it submitted on 28 May 1993 additional information concerning the privatisation of East German shipyards to the Commission.
Edasi viitab Saksamaa oma 28. mai 1993. aasta kirjale, millega riik esitas komisjonile täiendavat teavet Ida-Saksamaa laevatehaste erastamise kohta.
The main issue of this communication was to explain the need for operating aid in order to cover losses from contracts and underemployment.
Selle teavitamise peamine eesmärk oli selgitada tegevusabi vajalikkust lepingutest ja alltöövõtust tuleneva kahjumi katmiseks.
Germany also recalled that according to the Acquisition Agreements a refund of incurred losses against proof of payment was not envisaged in order to avoid uneconomic management of the enterprise.
Saksamaa tõi ka välja, et vastavalt ülevõtmise kokkuleppele ei nähtud ette tekkiva kahjumi katmist tõendite alusel, et vältida ettevõtte ebamajanduslikku juhtimist.
It would have been the THA’s objective to assign the financial risk of additional losses to the purchaser.
THA eesmärk oli jätta suurema kahjumi risk ostja kanda.
Therefore, the expected losses for the shipyards, including Warnow Werft, had to be determined, in advance, as exactly as possible.
Seetõttu oli oluline eelnevalt määratleda laevatehaste – sh Warnow Werft’i – prognoositav kahjum võimalikult täpselt.
Germany further explained that in a countermove it was agreed that the purchaser would benefit from the unlikely development of making savings.
Saksamaa selgitas ka, et juhul kui kahju osutub väiksemaks, mis ei ole küll tõenäoline, pidi teenitud vahe jääma ostjale.
This mechanism should encourage purchasers to carry out the transition of shipyards into the conditions of a market economy as quick as possible.
See mehhanism peaks stimuleerima ostjaid viima laevatehased turumajanduse tingimustele vastavale tasemele nii kiiresti kui võimalik.
This is precisely the reason why the Commission had to repeat, in its decision of 17 January 1994, the undertakings given by Germany, which were actually already set out unequivocally in the first decision communicated to Germany by letter of 3 March 1993.
Just see on põhjus, miks komisjon pidi oma 17. jaanuari 1994. aasta otsuses kordama Saksamaa poolt võetud kohustusi, mis kehtestati tegelikult selgesõnaliselt juba esimeses, 3. märtsil 1993. aastal Saksamaale edastatud otsuses.
In addition, the Commission decided to reply in a decision, i.e. in an attackable legal act, capable of becoming definitive.
Lisaks sellele otsustas komisjon vastata otsusega, mida on võimalik edasi kaevata ja, mille võib muuta lõplikuks.
Taking into account Germany’s knowledge of State aid rules and background information of the case, the Commission cannot understand the misinterpretation of the Commission’s authorising decisions in 1993 and 1994 by Germany.
Arvestades Saksamaa teadlikkust riigiabi eeskirjadest ja antud juhtumi taustateabe valdamist, ei saa komisjon aru 1993. ja 1994. aasta abi heakskiitvate otsuste väärtõlgendamisest.
These decisions clearly underlined that the Commission would use its investigating and monitoring powers to ensure that the yards only receive the aid necessary for their restructuring.
Nendes otsustes rõhutati, et komisjon kasutab oma uurimis- ja järelevalvevolitusi tagamaks, et tehased saavad ainult restruktureerimiseks vajalikku abi.
Aid amounts received by KWW
KWW saadud abisummad
In its comments both Germany and KWW argue that the contested amount of EUR 60,988 million (DEM 119,284 million) is part of the total operating aid approved by the Commission decisions communicated to Germany in March 1993 and January 1994 and therefore existing aid, of which the compatibility cannot be subsequently reassessed.
Nii Saksamaa kui KWW väidavad oma märkustes, et vaidlusalune 60,988 miljonit eurot (119,284 miljonit Saksa marka) on osa 1993. aasta märtsis ja 1994. aasta jaanuaris Saksamaale edastatud komisjoni otsustega heakskiidetud tegevusabist ja seega olemasolev abi, mille nõuetele vastavust ei saa hiljem uuesti hinnata.
They further comment that not all the amounts the Commission approved as aid were in fact aid.
Edasi kommenteerivad nad, et mitte kõik abina heakskiidetud summad ei olnud tegelikult abi.
A part of the restructuring costs was covered by the yard’s own resources, which appeared as items in the balance sheet.
Osa restruktureerimiskuludest kaeti tehase oma ressurssidest, mida kajastasid vastavad bilansikirjed.
The Commission notes that the total aid includes cash and non-cash aid.
Komisjon märgib, et kogu abi koosneb rahalisest ja mitterahalisest abist.
This non-cash aid consists in the transfer of assets to the new company, a transfer of certain fixed and current assets, joined with a less than proportional transfer of financial liabilities.
See mitterahaline abi koosneb uuele ettevõttele teatavate põhi- ja käibevarade ülekandmisest ja suhteliselt väiksematest finantskohustuste üleandmisest.
However, the form of payment of the aid is not decisive as regards the nature of a payment as aid.
Seega ei ole makse käsitlemisel abina määrav maksetüüp.
The Commission approved, in its two decisions, a total of EUR 380,9 million (DEM 745 million) of operating aid and a part of this aid was paid in cash, another part non-cash.
Komisjon kiitis oma kahe otsusega heaks kokku 380,9 miljonit eurot (745 miljonit Saksa marka) tegevusabi, millest osa pidi makstama välja ja osa mitte.
Neither Decision has been challenged by Germany or by the beneficiary.
Ei Saksamaa ega abisaaja ei ole kumbagi otsust vaidlustanud.
Consequently, they are binding for Germany, for the beneficiary and for the Commission itself.
Järelikult on need Saksamaale, abisaajale ja komisjonile endale siduvad.
At this stage, it has also to be stated that according to the decisions the total amount of aid granted in cash is clearly higher than the contested amount of EUR 60,988 million (DEM 119,284 million).
Siin tuleb ka märkida, et kogu rahas makstavana heakskiidetud abisumma on selgelt suurem kui vaidlusalune 60,988 miljonit eurot (119,284 miljonit Saksa marka).
The beneficiary should have contested these decisions within two months if it found that the assessment was wrong, as provided for in Article 230(5) of the EC Treaty.
Kui abisaaja leidnuks, et hindamine oli vale, oleks ta pidanud need otsused kahe kuu jooksul vaidlustama vastavalt EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 230 lõikele 5.
Therefore, the projected balance sheet included positions, which were not direct elements of the transferred assets but which KWW received to cover losses from shipbuilding contracts; such positions constitute State aid.
Seega sisaldas esialgne eelarve kirjeid, mis ei olnud otseselt seotud ülekantud varadega, vaid summadega, mida KWW sai laevaehituslepingutest tuleneva kahjumi katmiseks. Need kirjed moodustavad riigiabi.
The fact that part of the aid was paid non-cash is made clear in the Commission decision communicated to Germany on 17 January 1994, which releases the second tranche of operating aid and which reads as follows: ‘… 617,1 m DEM operating aid of which 113.5 m DEM would be paid in cash being 66.9 m DEM Wettbewerbshilfe and 46.6 m DEM to cover a part of the losses on contracts signed after 1.7.1990 ….’
Asjaolu, et osa abist maksti mitterahalisena, oli selgelt kirjas 17. jaanuari 1994. aasta kirjas Saksamaale edastatud komisjoni otsuses, millega kiideti heaks abi teise osa maksmine.
This indicates that most part of the operating aid approved by this decision, namely the amount of EUR 257,4 million (DEM 503,6 million), was approved as non-cash aid.
Selles otsuses on kirjas: “… 617,1 miljonit Saksa marka tegevusabi, millest 113,5 miljonit Saksa marka makstakse välja, sh 66,9 miljonit Saksa marka konkurentsitoetust ja 46,6 miljonit Saksa marka pärast 1. juulit 1990 sõlmitud lepingutelt saadud kahjumi osaliseks katmiseks…” See näitab, et suurem osa otsusega heakskiidetud tegevusabist, nimelt 257,4 miljonit eurot (503,6 miljonit Saksa marka), kiideti heaks mitterahalisena.
KWW cannot pretend that it never attacked the decisions in the parts concerning non-cash aid because the Commission provided a positive decision.
KWW ei saa väita, et ei ole kunagi vaidlustanud otsuseid mitterahalist abi puudutavas osas, kuna komisjoni otsus oli positiivne.
Qualifying the transfer of assets as State aid weighted on KWW in a way that an application against the decision was admissible if KWW had not agreed to this.
Varade ülekandmise kvalifitseerimine riigiabina oli KWW jaoks siduv selliselt, et KWWl oli otsusega mittenõustumise korral võimalik see edasi kaevata.
The Commission classified the measures as aid and examined the compatibility with the common market.
Komisjon klassifitseeris ülekande riigiabina ja kontrollis selle kokkusobivust ühisturuga.
It meant that the Commission was able to impose conditions respectively to accept Germany’s undertakings directly affecting the beneficiary’s operations.
See tähendas, et komisjon võis seada otseselt abisaaja tegevust mõjutavatele Saksamaa meetmetele vastavad tingimused. Sellises olukorras loetakse otsuse tühistamist taotlev kaebus vastuvõetavaks.
The Commission carried out an in-depth analysis of the aid amounts, which KWW received after the approval of the aid based on all information available.
Komisjon viis kogu saadaoleva teabe põhjal läbi põhjaliku abisummade analüüsi, mille KWW sai kätte pärast abi heakskiitmist.
Following the screening of the pre-privatisation balance sheet, the takeover balance sheet, spillover reports from the auditor Arthur Anderson, the privatisation procedure and the privatisation contract, it appears that the shipyard did not receive operating aid equivalent to the waiver of old current liabilities of EUR 42,1 million (DEM 82,400 million) as authorised in the Commission decision of 3 March 1993.
Erastamiseelse kalkulatsiooni, ülevõtmise kalkulatsiooni, Arthur Andersoni spill-over-aruannete, erastamisprotseduuri ja erastamislepingu uurimise järel tundub, et laevatehas ei saanud 42,1 miljoni euro (82,4 miljonit Saksa marga) suurust vanadest täitmata kohustustest vabanemisega ekvivalentset tegevusabi, nagu komisjoni 3. märtsi 1993. aasta otsusega heaks kiideti.
Indeed, such a waiver would only constitute payment of State aid if the beneficiary accordingly kept at his disposal assets freed of financial liabilities (or received these assets if a new company were created as in the current case).
Selline nõudest loobumine on riigiabi ainult siis, kui abisaaja saab vastavalt sellele rahalistest kohustustest vabastatud varad endale jätta (või saab need varad endale, juhul kui luuakse uus ettevõte, nagu antud juhul).
However, KWW’s takeover balance sheet does not include such assets transferred free of financial liabilities corresponding to this waiver, which would represent this operating aid.
KWW ülevõtmise kalkulatsioonis aga ei kajastu selliste finantskohustusteta varade ülekandmist, mis võiks kujutada kõnealust tegevusabi.
Since the loan waived just before privatisation was a liability of WW (a public owned company), the State, as the previous shareholder, was the only beneficiary and did not transfer the advantage to the new company.
Kuna vahetult enne erastamist kustutatud laen oli WW (riigile kuuluva ettevõtte) kohustus, oli ainuke kasusaaja sellest riik kui eelmine aktsiate omanik ja riik ei kandnud seda eelist uuele ettevõttele üle.
It appears that the shipyard did not benefit from this operating aid that the Commission formerly approved.
Tundub, et laevatehas ei saanud sellest komisjoni varem heaks kiidetud tegevusabist kasu.
Finally, according to the spillover report, shipbuilding contracts for special ships called ‘cash carriers’ were not transferred to KWW.
Lõpuks ei kantud spill-over-aruande järgi KWWle üle nn konteinerilaevade (Kassettenshiffe) ehituslepinguid.
Although a loss compensation for those contracts was included in the operating aid of EUR 315,5 million (DEM 617,1 million) as approved by the Commission on 17 January 1994, KWW was not in charge to carry out the contracts.
Kuigi komisjoni 17. jaanuari 1994. aasta 315,5 miljoni euro (617,1 miljoni Saksa marga) suurust tegevusabi heakskiitvasse otsusesse oli kahjum nendelt lepingutelt sisse arvestatud, ei vastutanud KWW nende lepingute täitmise eest.
Accordingly KWW could not receive a compensation for envisaged losses resulting from those contracts.
Vastavalt sellele ei tulnud KWW nendest lepingutest tulenevat prognoositavat kahjumit katta.
There is therefore no reason to compensate KWW for not having received this aid of EUR 17,7 million (DEM 34,6 million).
Seega ei ole põhjust KWWle selle abi [17,7 miljoni euro (34,6 miljonit Saksa marga)] saamatajätmist hüvitada.
As mentioned in recitals 12 to 20, this last amount was not included in the loss cover of EUR 230,08 million (DEM 450 million) indicated in the spillover report.
Nagu punktides 12-20 mainitud, ei sisaldunud see summa viimases spill-over-aruandes nimetatud 230,08 miljoni euro (450,0 miljonit Saksa marga) suuruses kahjumikattes.
KWW received EUR 8 million (DEM 15,6 million) less investment aid from the Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
KWW on saanud Mecklenburg-Vorpommerni liidumaalt 8 miljonit eurot (15,6 miljonit Saksa marka) vähem investeerimisabi.
‘Wettbewerbshilfe’
Konkurentsitoetus
KWW and Germany further comment that if the Commission came to the conclusion that the difference between the actual and estimated losses was of State aid relevance, then in any case the difference would be smaller than claimed by the Commission.
KWW ja Saksamaa kommenteerivad veel, et kui komisjon peaks jõudma järeldusele, et erinevus oodatud ja tegeliku kahjumi vahel on riigiabi seisukohast asjakohane, siis on see erinevus igal juhul väiksem, kui komisjon väidab.