natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission notes that all the conditions laid down for the granting of guarantees have been met in the present case.
Komisjon märgib, et kõik selles programmis ette nähtud eeldused käenduse andmiseks on antud juhul täidetud.
It has to be emphasised that the scheme was adopted before the entry into force of the Community guidelines and that these guidelines did not require the Member States to bring their existing schemes into line with the new rules (see point 2.5 of the Community guidelines).
Tuleb rõhutada, et see reglement viidi sisse enne Ühenduse suuniseid (1994) ning et Ühenduse suunised (1994) ei nõudnud liikmesriikidelt olemasoleva abikava kooskõlastamist uute eeskirjadega (vaata Ühenduse suunised (1994), lõige 2.5.).
In addition, the Commission did not review the scheme at issue after the adoption of the Community guidelines.
Pealegi ei kontrollinud komisjon vaieldavat reglementi üle pärast Ühenduse suuniste (1994) väljaandmist.
This explains why Measures 9 and 10 comply with the rescue and restructuring scheme but are not in accordance with the Community guidelines.
See selgitab, miks meetmed 9 ja 10 vastavad küll päästmis- ja ümberstruktureerimisprogrammile, aga ei ole kooskõlas Ühenduse suunistega (1994).
The measures in question can thus be regarded as existing aid which need not be reassessed.
Järelikult võib neid meetmeid käsitada olemasoleva abina, mida ei tule uuesti hinnata.
Measure 11: Investment grants amounting to EUR 1,94 million (DEM 3,8 million) were granted on the basis of an aid scheme approved by the Commission as regional investment aid [20].
Meede 11: investeeringutoetusi summas 1,94 mln eurot (3,8 mln Saksa marka) anti abiprogrammi alusel, mis on saanud komisjonilt kinnituse regionaalse investeeringutoetusena.
In its response to the information injunction, Germany stated that it would ensure that the rules on cumulation were complied with in respect of regional aid granted to CWP and that the maximum regional aid ceiling for SMEs was respected.
Vastuses informeerimiskorraldusele teatas Saksamaa, et CWP-le regionaalabi andmisel on tagatud summeerimiseeskirjadest kinnipidamine ning arvestamine regionaalse toetuse ülempiiriga VKE jaoks.
The Commission thus regards the measure as existing aid.
Komisjon peab meedet olemasolevaks abiks.
In addition, the aid measure was not taken into consideration when the formal investigation procedure was initiated.
Peale selle ei võetud abimeedet arvele formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamisel.
Measure 12: Investment allowances amounting to EUR 0,36 million (DEM 0,7 million) were granted on the basis of aid schemes approved by the Commission as regional investment aid.
Meede 12: investeeringusoodustused summas 0,36 mln eurot (0,7 mln Saksa marka), mida anti komisjoni poolt kinnitatud abiprogrammi alusel regionaalse investeerimistoetusena.
Accordingly, the Commission considers that on the basis of the information provided, Measures 1 (including 1a), 2 and 3 as well as Measures 9, 10, 11 and 12 constitute existing aid which need not be reassessed by the Commission.
Järelikult lähtub komisjon sellest, et olemasoleva informatsiooni alusel kujutavad nii meetmed 1 (kaasa arvatud 1a), 2 ja 3 kui ka meetmed 9, 10, 11 ja 12 endast olemasolevat abi, mis ei kuulu komisjoni poolt uuesti hindamisele.
Their amount will nevertheless be taken into account in assessing the proportionality of the overall aid.
Siiski võetakse need summad arvesse koguabi proportsionaalsuse hindamisel.
Other State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
Muu riigiabi Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 mõttes
According to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, any aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings is incompatible with the common market in so far as it affects trade between Member States.
Vastavalt Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõikele 1 ei ole abi, mis teatavate ettevõtete soodustamise tõttu konkurentsi kahjustab või seda kahjustada ähvardab, ühisturuga kokkusobiv, niivõrd kui see tekitab kahju liikmesriikide vahelisele kaubandusele.
The financial measures in favour of CWP have conferred advantages on CWP that a company in difficulty would not have obtained on the market.
CWP kasuks rakendatud finantsmeetmed lõid ettevõttele eeliseid, mida üks raskustesse sattunud ettevõte turul ei oleks saanud.
It should be recalled here that CWP was on the verge of insolvency in 1997 and that no private investor was willing at that time to provide CWP with the financial means it needed.
Olgu meenutatud seda, et CWP seisis 1997. aastal juba peaaegu maksejõuetuse ees ning et tookord ei olnud mitte ükski erainvestor valmis andma CWP käsutusse vajalikke finantsvahendeid.
As CWP’s products are also traded and as its competitors are present in other Member States, the measures threaten to distort competition and affect trade between Member States.
Kuna ka CWP valmistatud toodetega kaubeldakse ja CWP konkurendid on tegevad teistes liikmesriikides, ähvardavad meetmed konkurentsi kahjustada ning piiravad liikmesriikidevahelist kaubandust.
The measures are financed through State resources and granted by the THA/BvS and the Land of Saxony-Anhalt.
Meetmeid finantseeriti riiklikest vahenditest, mida jagati THA/BvSi või Sachsen-Anhalt'i liidumaa poolt.
The THA was set up as a public-law entity with the task of privatising State-owned firms in the former German Democratic Republic and was under the direct supervision of the German Ministry of Finance.
THA loodi avalik-õigusliku ametkonnana endise Saksa Demokraatliku Vabariigi riiklike ettevõtete erastamiseks ning allus otseselt saksa finantsministeeriumile.
They constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty and have to be assessed accordingly.
Seega on tegemist riiklike meetmetega, mis kujutavad endast riigiabi Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 1 järgi ning on sellele vastavalt hinnatavad.
Measures 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8: These Measures, i.e. the waiver of the purchase price and the accumulated interest, the investment grant as well as the two 20 % BvS guarantees, were granted outside the scope of any aid scheme and thus constitute ad hoc aid and have to be assessed accordingly.
Meetmed 4, 5, 6, 7 ja 8: neid meetmeid, s.t ostuhinna ja kogunenud intresside tühistamist, investeeringutoetust nagu ka BvS-i mõlemat 20 %-list käendust, võimaldati väljaspool abikava; seetõttu kujutavad nad endast ad-hoc-abi ning on vastavalt hinnatavad.
This is not contested by Germany.
Seda Saksamaa ei vaidlustata.
Measures 7a/8a: In Germany’s view, the prolongation of the guarantees and their subsequent conversion into loans and grants do not rank as new aid.
Meetmed 7a/8a: Saksamaa arvamusel ei ole käenduse pikendamine ja sellele järgnev käendussumma laenuks ja toetusteks ümbermuutmine hinnatav uue abina.
However, this would be relevant only if Measures 7 and 8 constituted existing aid, which is not the case.
See küsimus oleks ainult sel juhul relevantne, kui meetmete 7 ja 8 korral oleks tegemist olemasoleva abiga, mis aga nii ei ole.
Since Measures 7 and 8 are to be regarded as ad hoc measures, Measures 7a and 8a are, as part of Measures 7 and 8, included in the assessment of compatibility.
Kuna meetmed 7 ja 8 on hinnatavad ad-hoc-abina, siis kaasatakse meetmed 7a ja 8a kokkusobivuse hinnangusse osana meetmetest 7 ja 8.
The guarantees under Measure 7 (including Measure 7a) and under Measure 8 (including Measure 8a) enabled CWP to obtain loans on better financial terms than those normally available on the financial markets.
Meetmete 7 (kaasa arvatud 7a) ja 8 (kaasa arvatud 8a) raames antud käendused võimaldasid CWP-l saada laenu soodsamatel tingimustel, kui seda finantsturgudel tavaliselt pakuti.
The Commission considers that the aid element of the guarantees under Measures 7 and 8 is the difference between the interest rate that CWP would have had to pay for a loan on market terms, i.e. without a guarantee, and the interest rate at which the guaranteed loan was actually provided.
Komisjon peab meetmete 7 ja 8 raames antud käenduse abielemendiks intressimäära, mida CWP oleks pidanud tasuma turutingimustel saadud laenu korral (s.t ilma käenduseta), erinevust sellest intressimäärast, millega käendatud laenu tegelikult võimaldati.
As CWP was in severe financial difficulties at the time the guarantees were granted and the loans made available, the aid element could be as high as 100 % of the guarantees as nobody would have granted the loans without any guarantee.
Kuna CWP oli käenduste ja laenu andmise ajal sügavates finantsraskustes, võib abielement ulatuda 100 %ni käendussummast, sest mitte keegi poleks võimaldanud laenu ilma tagatiseta.
According to the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates [21], the Commission establishes reference rates which are supposed to reflect the average level of interest rates charged on medium- and long-term loans backed by normal security.
Vastavalt komisjoni teatisele viit- ja diskonteerimisintressimäära kindlaksmääramise meetodi [21] kohta, peavad viitintressimäärad peegeldama tavapäraste garantiidega keskpika ja pikaajalise laenu turul kehtiva intressimäära keskmist väärtust.
The notice also points out that this reference rate is a floor rate which may be increased in situations involving a particular risk, e.g. an undertaking in difficulty.
Edasi öeldakse teatises, et sel viisil kindlaks määratud intressimäär on alammäär, mida võib suurendada erilistel riskijuhtudel (nt raskustes olevad ettevõtted).
In such cases, the premium may amount to 400 basis points or more.
Niisugusel juhul võib juurdehindlus ulatuda 400 baaspunktini või isegi üle selle.
And so, in the present case, the Commission considers that, without the guarantees, CWP would have had to pay an interest rate at least equal to the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points.
Seetõttu on komisjon antud juhul arvamusel, et CWP oleks ilma käendusteta pidanud maksma vähemalt intressi, mille suuruseks on viitintressimäär pluss 400 baaspunkti.
The aid element of each guarantee thus consists in the difference between the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points and the interest rate at which the guaranteed loan was provided.
Iga käenduse abielement seisneb seega viitintressimäära, millele on liidetud 400 baaspunkti, ja käendusega tagatud laenu intressimäära vahelises erinevuses.
A similar reasoning applies to the conversion of the guarantees into loans by the BvS.
Sarnased kaalutlused kehtivad käendussummade BvSi laenuks ümbermuutmise jaoks.
The Commission considers that the loans were granted at an interest rate below the interest rate that CWP would have been able to obtain on the market.
Komisjoni arvamusel anti laenu intressimääraga, mis on madalam intressimäärast, mida CWP turul oleks saanud.
The aid element of the BvS loans under Measures 7 (including Measure 7a) and Measure 8 (including Measure 8a) thus consists in the difference between the interest rate that CWP would have been able to obtain for such a loan on the market and the interest rate at which the loans were provided by the BvS.
Seega seisneb meetme 7 (kaasa arvatud 7a) ja meetme 8 (kaasa arvatud 8a) raames antud BvS-laenu abielement intressimäära, mida CWP oleks turul niisuguse laenu korral saanud, ja BvSi poolt antud laenu intressimäära vahelises erinevuses.
The Commission takes the view that CWP would have had to pay an interest rate at least equal to the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points.
Komisjoni käsituse kohaselt oleks CWP pidanud maksma vähemalt intressi, mille suuruseks on viitintressimäär pluss 400 baaspunkti.
The aid element of each loan is thus the difference between the reference rate plus 400 basis points and the interest rate at which the loan was actually granted.
Iga laenu abielement seisneb seega viitintressimäära, millele on liidetud 400 baaspunkti, ja intressimäära, millega laenu tegelikult anti, vahelises erinevuses.
Measures 4, 5, 6, 7 (including 7a) and 8 (including 8a) are to be assessed by the Commission as ad hoc aid.
Meetmed 4, 5, 6, 7 (kaasa arvatud 7a) ja 8 (kaasa arvatud 8a) on komisjoni poolt hinnatavad ad-hoc-abina.
Article 87(2) and (3) of the EC Treaty provides for derogations from the general prohibition on aid in Article 87(1).
Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõiked 2 ja 3 näevad ette erandeid artikli 87 lõike 1 üldisele abikeelule.
The derogations in Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty do not apply in the present case because the aid measures neither have a social character and are granted to individual consumers, nor do they make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, nor is the aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany.
Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 2 erisätted ei rakendu käesoleval juhul, kuna tegemist pole ei sotsiaalse abiga üksikutele tarbijatele ega abiga looduskatastroofide või muude erakorraliste sündmuste läbi tekkinud kahjude kõrvaldamiseks või majandusabiga teatud kindlatele, Saksamaa jagunemisest tingitud piirkondadele.
Germany has not invoked any of these derogations.
Saksamaa ei ole neid erisätteid kehtima pannud.
Restructuring aid is covered above all by the derogation in Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty.
Ümberstruktureerimisabi jaoks rakendatakse eelkõige Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 punkti c) erisätteid.
For its assessment of rescue and restructuring aid, the Commission issued the Community guidelines [22], which are applicable in this case [23].
Päästmis- ja ümberstruktureerimisabi hindamiseks on komisjon välja andnud ühenduse suunised (1994), [22] mida käesoleval juhul rakendati.
The conditions for the application of the Community guidelines are examined below.
Eeldusi ühenduse suuniste (1994) kohaldamiseks kontrollitakse alljärgnevalt.
The Commission considers that no other grounds for compatibility, and in particular none of the other Community guidelines or frameworks such as those for research and development, environmental protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, employment, training or risk capital, could apply.
Komisjoni arvamuse kohaselt ei saa antud juhul kohaldada teisi kokkusobivuse aluseid ning iseäranis mingeid muid ühenduse reglemente, nt teadusuuringute ja arendamise, keskkonnakaitse, väikese ja keskmise suurusega ettevõtete, tööhõive ja hariduse või riskikapitali jaoks.
Eligibility of the company
Ettevõtte abikõlbulikkus
According to point 2.1 of the Community guidelines, the financial weakness of firms that receive help for restructuring is due to poor past performance and dim future prospects.
Vastavalt ühenduse suuniste (1994) lõigule 2.1. on ümberstruktureerimiseks abi saavate ettevõtete finantsnõrkus põhjustatud mineviku ebapiisavast tootlikkusest ja tuleviku ebasoodsatest väljavaadetest.
The typical symptoms are deteriorating profitability or increasing size of losses, diminishing turnover, growing inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, increasing debt, rising interest charges and low net asset value.
Tüüpiliste sümptomite hulka kuuluvad nii vähenev rentaablus või kasvavad kahjumid, käibe langus, laovarude suurenemine, liigvõimsus, alanev sularahakäive, kasvav võlgnevus ja intressikoormus kui ka madal arvestuslik jääkmaksumus.
At the time the aid was granted, CWP registered increasing losses and was faced with severe liquidity problems as described in detail above.
Abi andmise ajaks registreeris CWP üha suurenevat kahjumit ja oli vastakuti tõsiste likviidsusprobleemidega, nagu ülalpool üksikasjalikult selgitatud.
The Commission thus considers that CWP ranked as a company in difficulty at the time.
Seetõttu on komisjon seisukohal, et abi andmise ajaks oli CWP näol tegemist raskustesse sattunud ettevõttega.
The sine qua non of all restructuring plans is that they must restore the long-term viability of the company within a reasonable time scale and on the basis of realistic assumptions as to its future operating conditions.
Iga ümberstruktureerimisplaani vältimatuks eelduseks peab olema see, et ta taastab ettevõtte pikaajalise rentaabluse sobiva ajavahemiku jooksul, mis on paika pandud realistlike oletuste baasil, pidades silmas tulevasi ekspluatatsioonitingimusi.
Consequently, restructuring aid must be linked to a viable restructuring plan.
Järelikult peab ümbersturktureerimisabi olema seotud kandevõimelise ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooniga.
The restructuring plan usually involves the reorganisation and rationalisation of the business activities on a more efficient basis.
Ümberstruktureerimisplaan näeb reeglina ette allüksuste reorganiseerimist ja ratsionaliseerimist efektiivsemal alusel.
Among other things, it takes into account the circumstances giving rise to the difficulties.
Muuhulgas tuleb arvestada raskusteni viinud asjaolusid.
It is to be noted that, in the case of CWP, a first restructuring had been undertaken following privatisation but it failed.
CWP puhul tuleb märkida, et esimene ümberstruktureerimine pärast erastamist nurjus.
A second restructuring based on the two documents referred to in recitals 40 and 41 was undertaken in 1997.
Teine ümberstruktureerimine mõlema dokumendi alusel, millele viidatakse põhjendustes 40 ja 41, viidi läbi 1997. aastal.
Although there are differences between them, clearly the strategy was to introduce the wet process and for this the extraction installation was essential so that MGA could be used as the raw material and the dependence on high-cost elemental phosphorus reduced.
Isegi kui mõlema dokumendi vahel on erinevusi, oli strateegia ilmselgelt suunatud märgmenetluse sisseviimisele. Selle jaoks oli vajalik ekstraheerimisrajatis, et toormaterjalina saaks kasutada MGAd ning vähendada seega sõltuvust elementaarse fosfori kõrgetest hindadest.
In addition, the quality of the main end product, i.e. phosphates, was to be enhanced.
Peale selle pidi parandatama olulisima lõpptoote, s.t fosfaatide, kvaliteeti.
The two aims are linked: CWP could produce phosphates economically with a more readily available and cheaper raw material only by using the wet process.
Mõlemad eesmärgid olid teineteisega seotud: fosfaadi ökonoomne tootmine hõlpsamini kättesaadavast ja hinnasoodsamast toormaterjalist oli CWP jaoks võimalik üksnes märgmenetluse abil.
In order to determine whether the 1996 strategy was viable, the measures for introducing the wet process need to be assessed.
Selleks et teha kindlaks, kas 1996. aasta strateegia oli kandejõuline, peab hindama märgmenetluse sisseviimiseks ettenähtud meetmeid.
As the expert report submitted by Prayon-Rupel demonstrates, the new production process cannot be introduced by way of minor adjustments to the existing installations. The wet process requires installations altogether different from those used for the thermal process and necessitates, among other things, pre- and post-treatment of the product including defluorination, concentration and decolourisation.
Nagu Prayon-Rupeli eksperthinnangust lähtub, ei saa uut tootmismeetodit sisse viia olemasolevate rajatiste väikeste muutustega.
However, the 1996 strategy did not provide for any of these steps.
Märgmenetlus vajab täiesti teistsuguseid rajatisi kui termiline meetod ning nõuab muu hulgas toote eel- ja järeltöötlemist, kaasa arvatud defloreerimine, kontsentreerimine, värvitustamine jne. Igatahes ei näinud 1996. aasta strateegia ette mitte ühtegi nendest protsessi etappidest.
Pre-treatment was introduced in December 1997, when the project was already operational, after tests in the laboratory had shown it to be necessary.
Eeltöötlusjärk viidi sisse detsembris 1997, kui projekt oli juba käivitunud, pärast laborikatsete tõestust selle tootmisetapi vajalikkusest.
Such tests should have been conducted before the project started and should have served as a basis for calculating the overall costs.
Niisuguseid katseid oleks pidanud läbi viima juba enne projekti algust ning kasutama neid alusena kogukulude arvutamisel.
The DLM study on the feasibility of the installation dated November 1997 also mentions the necessary pre-treatment of wet phosphoric acid during the wet process.
DLM-uuringus rajatise teostatavusest novembrist 1997 mainitakse samuti fosforhappe hädavajalikku eeltöötlemist märgmenetluse korral.
It should, however, have been drawn up before the restructuring plan was established and should have been used as a basis for determining the costs and financing of the restructuring.
Selle uuringu oleks pidanud tegema enne ümberstruktureerimisplaani koostamist ja kasutama baasina ümberstruktureerimise kulude ja finantseerimise kindlakstegemisel.
Post-treatment was introduced only in early 1999, although CWP claims that it turned out to be necessary only because its supplier could no longer provide the appropriate quality of acid.
Mis puudutab järeltöötlemist, siis viidi see sisse alles 1999. aasta alguses, kuigi CWP väidab, et see olevat ainult seetõttu vajalikuks osutunud, et tema hankija ei olnud enam võimeline tarnima sobiva kvaliteediga hapet.
However, the Commission cannot share this view: the contract between CWP and its supplier was dated July 1998, whereas the project was conceived in 1996.
Komisjon ei saa seda seisukohta siiski jagada: CWP ja tema hankija vaheline leping on kuupäevastatud juulis 1998 samal ajal kui projekt kavandati 1996. aastal.
Hence, already in 1996 it should have been clear that a post-treatment phase was necessary, particularly in order to obtain high-purity products for the food industry, as CWP intended.
Seetõttu oleks juba 1996. aastal pidanud olema selge järeltöötlemisfaasi vajalikkus, iseäranis selleks, et saada kõrge puhtusastmega tooteid toiduainetetööstuse jaoks, nagu CWP poolt kavandatud.
Pre- and post-treatment of the products also require larger installations, as CWP realised in 1999.
Samuti eeldab toodete eel- ja järeltöötlemine suuremaid rajatisi, nagu CWP 1999. aastal konstanteeris.
This again should have been anticipated from the outset.
Seda oleks samuti pidanud juba algusest saadik ette nägema.
Moreover, the 1996 documents constituting the restructuring plan did not contain an adequate solution for the highly toxic raffinate. They do not mention it at all.
Lisaks sellele ei näinud ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooni moodustavad 1996. aasta dokumendid ette adekvaatset lahendust ülimalt toksilisele rafinaadile.
Nor does the 1997 notification.
Rafinaati ei mainita üleüldse, ka mitte 1997. aasta teatises.
The 1997 DLM study states that phosphates derived from raffinate (which contains phosphoric acid) have too high a metallic content and that it should be established what an acceptable proportion would be.
DLM-uuringus rajatise teostatavusest novembrist 1997 öeldakse, et (fosforhappesisaldavusega) rafinaadist saadud fosfaadi metallisisaldus on liiga kõrge ning et tuleks kindlaks teha, missugune oleks aktsepteeritav metalli osakaal.
In other words, it identifies a problem and a possible approach to resolving it but does not provide a solution.
Teiste sõnadega, uuring näitab probleemi ja selle üht võimalikku lahendusteed, täielikku lahendust aga ei anna.
Subsequently, CWP probably hoped to be able to sell the raffinate but discovered that there was no demand for it, and this contributed to the acute financial crisis in 2000.
Hiljem lootis CWP küll rafinaadi müügile, pidi aga nentima, et nõudlus rafinaadi järele puudus, mis aitas kaasa akuutsele finantskriisile 2000. aastal.
It should have been clear already at the conception phase of the plan in 1996 that a solution had to be found for the toxic raffinate.
Juba 1996. aasta kontseptsioonifaasis oleks pidanud selge olema, et toksilise rafinaadi jaoks tuleb lahendus leida.
If the solution were to sell it, then an appropriate market study should have been conducted in order to establish whether this was feasible.
Kui see lahendus seisnes müügis, oleks vastava turu-uuringu abil pidanud kindlaks tegema, kas see lahendus on teostatav.
However, the 1996 and 1997 documents did not even mention the problem.
Dokumentides aastatest 1996 ja 1997 ei mainita probleemi siiski kordagi.