natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Germany concluded that the economic impact on the market of a capital injection of about EUR 1,8 billion should be valued at about EUR 18 billion.
Saksamaa järeldas sellest, et ligikaudu 1,8 mld euro suuruse kapitalieraldise majanduslik mõju turule võiks olla ligikaudu 18 mld eurot.
The Commission accepts these arguments.
Komisjon nõustub nende kaalutlustega.
The effect of the risk shield is thus comparable to that of a capital injection of some EUR 6 billion.
Sedavõrd tuleb riskikaitse mõju pidada võrdseks hüpoteetilise kapitalieraldisega ligikaudu 6 mld eurot.
The same applies to the capital contribution provided for in the repayment agreement, which, in the event of a recovery decision by the Commission, can be estimated at a maximum value of EUR 1,8 billion.
Sama kehtib tagasimakselepingu deposiidi kohta, mille maksimaalne väärtus komisjoni tagasinõudeotsuse korral on 1,8 mld eurot.
Article 45 of the detailed agreement sets the maximum liability that may be incurred by the Land of Berlin as a result of these obligations at EUR 21,6 billion.
Detaillepingu artiklis 45 on maksimaalne summa, mis nimetatud kohustustest Berliini liidumaale tekkida võib, määratletud summaga 21,6 mld eurot.
It states that this is the theoretical nominal value of the risks covered, adjusted for duplication.
Vastavalt artiklile 45 on siinkohal tegemist garanteeritud riskide mitmekordsest kirjendamisest puhastatud teoreetilise nimiväärtusega.
The nominal theoretical maximum specified in Article 45 of the detailed agreement is EUR 35,34 billion; when multiple coverage is taken out, the maximum is EUR 21,6 billion.
Teoreetiline maksimaalne nominaalsumma, mis on nimetatud detaillepingu punktis 45, on 35,34 mld eurot. Kui mitmekordne riskikate välja jätta, on maksimumsumma 21,6 mld eurot.
This, however, is still a nominal value, i.e. it assumes full materialisation of all risks, something which is unlikely (see above).
See on aga ikka veel nimiväärtus, s.t lähtutakse kõigi riskide täielikust materialiseerumisest, mis ei ole tõenäoline (vaata eeltoodut).
Consequently, for reasons of prudence, the Commission had to work with the only limit available, i.e. EUR 35,34 billion.
Seetõttu pidi komisjon, et olla hoolikas, töötama ainsa tema käsutuses oleva maksimumpiiriga, s.t 35,34 mld euroga.
Since this amount would though probably not be called in, it would be out of proportion to take it as a basis for establishing the necessary compensatory measures.
Kuna selline summa aga tõenäoliselt ei realiseeru, oleks selle kasutamine nõutavate kompensatsioonimeetmete kindlaksmääramise alusena ebaproportsionaalne.
The difference in costs between winding up and continuing the activities of IBAG was described in greater detail.
IBAG-i likvideerimise ja jätkamise kulude vahe määratleti täpsemalt.
The total costs of winding up comprised the operational liquidation costs (EUR [...]**) plus a balance‐sheet shortfall.
Likvideerimiskulud kokku koosnevad likvideerimistegevuse kuludest [...] eurot ja bilansilisest puudujäägist.
To keep the firm going, on the other hand, the costs for the period from 2001 to 2005 would, depending on the scenario, amount to between EUR [...]** and EUR [...]** (for the real‐case scenario, EUR [...]*)*.
Jätkamise korral kujuneksid perioodil 2001 — 2005 kulud vastavalt stsenaariumile alates [...]* kuni [...]* eurot (base-case [...]* eurot).
Winding up IBAG, as opposed to continuing its activities, would therefore, depending on the scenario, involve additional costs of between EUR [...]** and EUR [...]**.
Seega tekiksid IBAG-i likvideerimise korral jätkamisega võrreldes olenevalt stsenaariumist suuremad kulud alates [...]* kuni [...]* eurot.
Targeted portfolio management and the related exclusion of risk‐bearing loans, the introduction of risk‐geared pricing, and the focusing of business on the core segments of commercial customers and regional corporate banking would lead to a slight drop in the volume of loans from EUR [...]** to EUR [...]** despite average market growth in Berlin in the period 2001 to 2006 of 1 %.
Sihipärase portfellijuhtimise ja sellega seotud riskantsete laenude eemaldamise, riskipõhise hinnakujunduse sisseviimise ning äritegevuse keskendamisega põhisegmentidele nagu tööstuskliendid ja piirkondlikud ärikliendid, saavutataks Berliinis ajavahemikus 2001 — 2006 vaatamata turu keskmisele 1-protsendilisele kasvule laenumahu kerge vähenemine [...]* eurolt [...]* eurole.
The reduction in risk assets was in order to avoid high cluster risks, especially in the large corporate customer segment (turnover of more than EUR 50 million).
Riskiinvesteeringuid vähendatakse suurte koondriskide vältimiseks eriti suuremate äriklientide segmendis, kelle käive on üle 50 mln eurot.
Bavaria anticipated a total project volume of EUR [...]* in 2002.
Bavaria puhul eeldatakse aastal 2002 projektimahtu kokku [...]* eurot.
IBAG’s new business amounted to around EUR [...]*.
IBAG-i uued tehingud oleksid seega ligikaudu [...]* eurot.
The guarantees agreed amount to a nominal theoretical maximum of EUR 21,6 billion.
Lepingulised garantiid hõlmavad teoreetilist maksimaalset nominaalsummat 21,6 mld eurot.
This amount covers all theoretically conceivable risks and comprises, for example, the total loss of all rents in the case of the rental guarantees (EUR [...]*), the application of full production costs for all buildings and outside facilities in the case of the renewal guarantees (EUR [...]*) or the complete loss of the guaranteed book values of IBG/IBAG and its subsidiaries (EUR [...]*).
See summa katab kõik teoreetilised mõeldavad riskid ja see sisaldab näiteks garantiid kõigi üüride täielikku saamatajäämise puhuks ([...] eurot), kõigi hoonete ja välirajatiste täielikke taastamiskulusid niinimetatud revitaliseerimisgarantiide näol ([...] eurot) või IBG/IBAG ja nende tütarettevõtete garanteeritud bilansilise väärtuse täieliku kao garantiid ([...]* eurot).
This exceeded by a significant margin the planned target for 2003 of a little over EUR 160 billion.
See ületas oluliselt 2003. aasta plaanilist eesmärki 160 mln eurot.
By 2006 the figure should have fallen to just under EUR [...]*.
aastaks peaksid need jälle langema napile [...]*eurole.
The book value of the holding in BerlinHyp is EUR [...]*.
Osaluse bilansiline väärtus on [...]* eurot.
If BerlinHyp were to miss its targets, e.g. owing to a further worsening of the situation in the real estate market, the business plan would have to be revised.
Kui BerlinHyp näiteks olukorra edasise halvenemise tõttu kinnisvaraturul püstitatud eesmärke ei saavuta, tuleks äriplaan ümber töötada.
The difference between the holding’s book value of EUR [...]* and the net own capital of approximately EUR [...]* represents the devaluation risk in a base-case scenario.
Erinevus osaluse bilansile väärtuse [...]* eurot ja netoomakapitali vahel suuruses ligikaudu [...]* eurot kujutab endast baasstsenaariumis väärtuse vähenemise riski.
This therefore amounts to EUR [...]*.
See on seega ligikaudu [...]* eurot.
However, in spite of a core capital of EUR [...]*, BGB expects that a sale would bring in only EUR [...]*‐EUR [...]*.
Vaatamata tuumkapitalile [...]* eurot ootab pank müügitulu ainult [...]* kuni [...]* eurot.
In the Commission's view, this calculation is very conservative.
Komisjon peab sellist arvestust väga konservatiivseks.
On this point Berliner Volksbank argues that the Land’s risk shield actually constitutes an unlimited additional funding commitment since the Land of Berlin’s associated liability cannot be estimated at present and is therefore a ‘blank cheque’ for future losses.
Berliner Volksbank on siinkohal arvamusel, et liidumaa riskikaitse vastab pigem piiramatu lisamakse kohustusele, kuna Berliini liidumaa vastavat kohustuste ülevõtmise kohustust praegu ei saa hinnata ja seega on see edasiste kahjumite jaoks välja antud “blankotšekk”.
The Commission cannot accept this estimate. Without the risk shield or, alternatively, a capital injection of about EUR 6 billion, BGB would not have been able to continue in business as a result of the interlocking risks within the group.
Komisjon ei saa sellise hinnanguga nõustuda, kuna ilma riskikaitseta või — alternatiivselt — kapitalieraldiseta suuruses ligikaudu 6 mld eurot ei oleks BGB sisemise riskide põimumise tõttu saanud oma majandustegevust jätkata.
The risk shield comprises the following guarantees, which are given by the Land of Berlin for 30 years in order to cover the risks arising out of the real estate services business carried on by the subsidiaries IBAG, IBG and LPFV: Loan guarantees: BGB, LBB and BerlinHyp are guaranteed the contractual interest and capital repayments on loans granted by them to IBAG, IBG and their subsidiaries and certain other companies up to 31 December 2001. The companies and loans concerned are listed exhaustively in the annexes to the detailed agreement, which also lays down restrictions in respect of certain loans and a number of express exclusion clauses (negative list). Book value guarantees: IBAG, IBG and certain other companies in the group, primarily direct and indirect subsidiaries of IBAG and IBG, are guaranteed the value of the individual assets entered in the relevant audited balance sheet, with the exception of certain designated items such as intangible assets, cash, balances at the Bundesbank and credit institutions, and prepayments and deferred income (Rechnungsabgrenzungsposten). These book value guarantees are likewise subject to restrictions and exclusions (negative list). Performance obligations taken over from LPFV: LPFV is indemnified in respect of obligations arising out of the earlier real estate business of IBG and its previous subsidiaries Bavaria, Arwobau and Immobilien‐Beteiligungsvertriebsgesellschaft der Bankgesellschaft Berlin GmbH (‘IBV’): LPFV is liable for the first EUR 100 million, and thereafter such obligations are taken over by the Land.
See hõlmab järgmisi garantiisid, vabastusi, täitmiskohustuste ülevõtmisi ja tagatisi, mida Berliini liidumaa annab 30 aastaks, et katta tütarettevõtete IBAG, IBG ja LPFV kinnisvarateenuste valdkonna riske:
Berliner Volksbank argued that there could be no question of authorising the notified restructuring aid under Article 87(3) of the EC Treaty. The aid was also not covered by the statutory arrangements of institutional liability (Anstaltslast) and guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) and hence was not existing aid.
Berliner Volksbank on seisukohal, et deklareeritud ümberstruktureerimisabi ei kuulu ei avalik-õigusliku rahastamiskohustuse ega ka tagatiseandja vastutuse õiguse instituudi alla, selle kinnitamine asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 kohaselt ei ole võimalik ja seega ei ole tegemist olemasoleva abiga.
The own‐funds ratio targeted by BGB was not too high. Lenders’ and investors’ confidence in BGB was shaken.
BGB eesmärgiks seatud omakapitali määr ei ole liiga kõrge, kuna kapitali andjate ja investorite usaldus BGB suhtes on pikaks ajaks rikutud.
However, the Commission considers the qualitative and quantitative objectives and the strategy in the real estate financing field to be overoptimistic. [...]*.
Kvaliteedi ja kvantiteedi alaseid eesmärke ja strateegiat kinnisvara finantseerimise valdkonnas peab komisjon siiski nagu eespool juba käsitletud, liiga optimistlikuks [...]*.
Real estate services are the area which was the main cause of the crisis and of the restructuring measures under consideration here, and they have benefited most from the risk shield, the measure that represents the largest volume of aid. From the outset, therefore, there were doubts about the continuation of this line of business.
Kinnisvarateenuste tegevusvaldkond on peamine kriisi ja siinkohal hinnatava ümberstruktureerimisabi põhjustaja ja on saanud kõige enam kasu riskikaitsest kui kõige suuremate abisummadega meetmest.
This general intention was spelt out in detail in the undertaking submitted by Germany in January 2004. Germany here undertakes to ensure that by 31 December 2005 the BGB group sells or liquidates all holdings in real estate service companies covered by the risk shield.
Saksamaa täpsustas seda üldist kavatsust jaanuaris 2004 esitatud nõusolekus.
The Commission examined these arguments, together with the related data provided, and came to the conclusion that divestment of the real estate financing business in the short term would jeopardise the bank’s viability (see paragraph 230). Moreover, an analysis of the competitive situation on the German market for real estate financing showed that BGB is not among the leading suppliers.
Komisjon on kõnealuseid argumente ja esitatud asjakohast informatsiooni kontrollinud ja jõudnud järelduseni, et kiire võõrandamine kinnisvara finantseerimise valdkonnas tõepoolest ohustaks panga elujõulisust (vaata servanumbrit 230).
According to the original notification, BGB, with a share of some 5 % in 2000, occupied third place. However, according to more up‐to‐date data submitted by Germany, which are adjusted for public‐sector lending, actual market share in 2000 was only some 3 %, and this is likely to fall to 2 % by 2006.
Lisaks on Saksa turul kinnisvara finantseerimise valdkonnas valitseva konkurentsiolukorra analüüs näidanud, et BGB ei kuulu siin juhtivate pakkujate hulka.
In response to the Commission’s doubts, Germany argued that the volume‐based market shares originally submitted for BGB in the individual segments of the Berlin market were overstated. This was because of BGB’s reports to the Land central bank, which were for the whole group and did not distinguish between product markets or regions.
Saksamaa veenis komisjoni tema kahtluste osas, et algselt esitatud ja mahust lähtuvad BGB turuosa arvestused üksikutes Berliini turu segmentides on liialdatult suured.
By its own efforts, in particular by reducing its risk exposure, the bank subsequently managed to increase its core‐capital ratio to above 5 %. At the end of 2003 the ratio stood at around 6 %.
Pangal õnnestus edaspidi oma jõupingutustega, eriti riskipositsioonide vähendamise teel tõsta esmaste omavahendite määra üle 5 %.
Without that agreement the bank would, at the request of its auditors, have had to include in its 2002 annual accounts reserves against impending liabilities amounting to hundreds of millions of euros. This would have had a negative impact on the bank’s annual results for 2002 and on its own funds. However, at the time when its annual accounts for 2002 were drawn up, and also thereafter, the bank reported a core‐capital ratio that was no more than 6 % and was partly below that figure. The bank would not have coped with any further pressure on the core‐capital ratio at this stage of restructuring.
Ilma lepinguta oleks pank pidanud audiitorite nõudmisel 2002. aasta aastaaruandes esitama sadadesse miljonitesse ulatuvad reservid ähvardavate kohustuste katteks.
OJ C 288, 9.
EÜT C 288, 9.
on the State aid implemented by Germany for MobilCom AG
Saksamaa riigiabi kohta MobilCom AG-le
(notified under document number C(2004) 2641)
(teatavaks tehtud numbri C(2004) 2641 all)
Having regard to the Agreement establishing the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,
võttes arvesse Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingut, eriti selle artikli 62 lõike 1 punkti a,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 7(3) and (4) thereof,
võttes arvesse nõukogu 1999. aasta 22. märtsi määrust (EÜ) nr 659/1999, millega kehtestatakse üksikasjalikud eeskirjad Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 93 kohaldamiseks, eriti selle artikli 7 lõikeid 3 ja 4,
Having called on the Member State and other interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provisions cited above, and having regard to their comments,
olles palunud liikmesriigil ja muudel huvitatud isikutel esitada oma märkused eespool viidatud sätete kohaselt ja võttes arvesse nende märkusi
By letter dated 18 October 2002, Germany informed the Commission of ‘rescue aid’ in the form of a State guarantee for a loan of EUR 50 million granted to MobilCom AG (hereinafter referred to as MobilCom) by the State‐owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).
aasta 18. oktoobri kirjas teatas Saksamaa komisjonile “päästmisabist”, mis kujutas endast riiklikku tagatist 50 miljoni euro suurusele laenule, mille oli MobilCom AG-le, edaspidi “MobilCom”, andnud riigile kuuluv Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, edaspidi “KfW”.
The loan had been paid out on 19 September 2002.
Laenusumma maksti välja 19. septembril 2002.
By letters dated 21 and 30 October 2002, the Commission asked for additional information, which Germany duly supplied by letters dated 23 October, registered as received on 23 and 24 October, and by letter dated 5 November, registered as received on the same day.
Nii 2002. aasta 21. kui ka 30. oktoobri kirjas palus komisjon lisateavet, mille Saksamaa esitas nõuetekohaselt 23. oktoobri kirjades, mis märgiti kättesaaduks vastavalt 23. ja 24. oktoobril, ja 5. novembri kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks viimati nimetatud kuupäeval.
By letter dated 21 January 2003, the Commission informed Germany of its decision to approve the guarantee for the loan of EUR 50 million as rescue aid pursuant to Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty and to the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
aasta 21. jaanuari kirjas teatas komisjon Saksamaale oma otsusest kiita heaks 50 miljoni euro suurusele laenule antud tagatis kui EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 87 lõike 3 punkti c ning raskustes olevate ettevõtete päästmiseks ja ümberkorraldamiseks antavat riigiabi käsitlevate ühenduse suuniste kohane päästmisabi.
By the same letter, the Commission informed Germany of its decision to initiate formal proceedings under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the 80 % deficiency guarantee for the EUR 112 million loan.
Samas kirjas teatas komisjon Saksamaale oma otsusest alustada EÜ asutamislepingu artikli 88 lõikes 2 nimetatud 112 miljoni euro suuruse laenu 80 % suurust puudujäägitagatist puudutavat ametlikku menetlust.
The Commission's decision to initiate proceedings was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Komisjoni otsus menetluse alustamise kohta avaldati Euroopa Liidu Teatajas.
The Commission called on interested parties to submit comments.
Komisjon kutsus huvitatud isikuid üles avaldama oma arvamust.
By letters dated 24 February 2003, registered as received on 25 and 26 February, Germany submitted comments on the Commission's decision to initiate proceedings.
aasta 24. veebruari kirjades, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 25. ja 26. veebruaril, esitas Saksamaa oma arvamuse komisjoni otsuse kohta alustada menetlust.
By letter dated 14 March 2003, registered as received on the same day, Germany supplied the Commission with further information, while at the same time announcing its intention of extending up to the end of 2007 the State guarantees for the EUR 50 million and EUR 112 million loans granted to MobilCom.
aasta 14. märtsi kirjas, mis märgiti samal päeval kättesaaduks, andis Saksamaa komisjonile lisateavet, tehes samas teatavaks oma kavatsuse pikendada MobilComile antud 50 miljoni ning 112 miljoni euro suuruse laenu riiklikke tagatisi 2007. aasta lõpuni.
Germany also pointed out that only EUR 88,3 million of the second loan had been paid out to the company.
Saksamaa märkis ka seda, et teisest laenust on ettevõttele välja makstud ainult 88,3 miljonit eurot.
By letter dated 10 April 2003, the Commission asked for additional information on the planned extension of the State guarantees, which Germany supplied by letter dated 9 May, registered as received on 12 May.
aasta 10. aprilli kirjas palus komisjon riiklike tagatiste planeeritava pikendamise kohta lisateavet, mille Saksamaa esitas 9. mai kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 12. mail.
Germany then submitted further information by letter dated 21 May, registered as received on 21 May.
mai kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 21. mail, esitas Saksamaa lisateavet.
By letter dated 3 June 2003, registered as received on 4 June, MobilCom submitted its comments on the Commission's decision to initiate proceedings.
aasta 3. juuni kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 4. juunil, esitas MobilCom oma arvamuse komisjoni otsuse kohta alustada menetlust.
By letter dated 9 July 2003, the Commission informed Germany that it was extending the Article 88(2) proceedings already under way to take in the planned extension of the loan guarantees up to the end of 2007.
aasta 9. juuli kirjas teavitas komisjon Saksamaad sellest, et artikli 88 lõikes 2 nimetatud, juba käimasolevat menetlust pikendatakse eesmärgiga hõlmata laenutagatiste kavandatud pikendamist 2007. aasta lõpuni.
The Commission's decision to extend proceedings was published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Komisjoni otsus menetluse pikendamise kohta avaldati Euroopa Liidu Teatajas.
By letter dated 1 September 2003, registered as received on 2 September, Germany submitted its comments on the extension of proceedings.
aasta 1. septembri kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 2. septembril, esitas Saksamaa oma arvamuse menetluse pikendamise kohta.
By letter dated 9 September 2003 the Commission asked for additional information.
aasta 9. septembri kirjas palus komisjon lisateavet.
Germany replied by letter dated 23 September, registered as received on 25 September, in which it also informed the Commission that MobilCom had, on 22 September 2003, fully repaid the outstanding loans for which State guarantees had been granted and that the guarantee bonds were being returned to the Federal Government and the Land of Schleswig-Holstein by KfW (the consortium leader).
Saksamaa esitas 23. septembril kirjaliku vastuse, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 25. septembril ja milles ta teavitas komisjoni muu hulgas ka sellest, et 22. septembriks 2003 oli MobilCom täies ulatuses tagastanud talle väljastatud laenud, millele olid antud riiklikud tagatised, ning et KfW (konsortsiumi juht) oli võlakirjad tagastanud keskvalitsusele ning Schleswig-Holsteini liidumaale.
By letter dated 5 November 2003, registered as received on 6 November, Germany stated that the question of the application to the Commission for an extension of the loan guarantees up to 2007 had been dealt with since the loans had been paid back.
aasta 5. novembri kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 6. novembril, märkis Saksamaa, et komisjonile laenutagatiste pikendamiseks kuni 2007. aasta lõpuni esitatava taotluse küsimusega on tegeldud pärast laenude tagastamist.
By letter dated 25 September 2003, registered as received on 25 September, and by letter dated 2 October, registered as received on 6 October, two of MobilCom's competitors sent the Commission comments on the extension of proceedings, which were forwarded to Germany for its opinion.
Nii 2003. aasta 25. septembri kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 25. septembril, kui 2. oktoobri kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 6. oktoobril, saatis kaks MobilComi konkurenti komisjonile menetluse pikendamise kohta oma arvamuse, mis edastati Saksamaale, saamaks viimase arvamust.
Germany's reply was received by letter dated 5 November, registered as received on 6 November.
Saksamaa vastas 5. novembri kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 6. novembril.
Talks were held on 9 and 21 January 2004 between representatives of the Commission, the Federal Government, the Land of Schleswig‐Holstein and the company on the matter of whether additional measures were required to prevent undue distortions of competition.
aasta 9. ja 21. jaanuaril peeti komisjoni, keskvalitsuse, Schleswig-Holsteini liidumaa ning ettevõtte esindajate vahel läbirääkimisi küsimuses, kas konkurentsi ülemäärase moonutamise ennetamiseks on vaja kasutusele võtta lisameetmeid.
By letter of 13 February 2004, registered as received on 13 February, Germany informed the Commission that MobilCom AG was, in principle, prepared to discontinue direct online distribution of MobilCom mobile telephony contracts for a period of seven months.
aasta 13. veebruari kirjas, mis märgiti kättesaaduks 13. veebruaril, teatas Saksamaa komisjonile, et MobilCom on üldiselt valmis seitsmeks kuuks peatama MobilComi mobiiltelefonilepingute otsese on-line-sõlmimise.