natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is, however, to be noted that these restructuring costs [13] include costs for the period 1995 to 2001, i.e. including the failed restructuring after privatisation.
Siiski peab konstateerima, et need kulud [13] sisaldavad kulutusi ajavahemikul 1995–2001, s.t ka nurjunud ümberstruktureerimisperioodil pärast erastamist.
In its letter of 26 August 2004 Germany finally stated that the overall costs from 1997 until then totalled some EUR 31,20 million (DEM 61 million).
Oma kirjas 26. augustist 2004 märkis Saksamaa lõpuks kogukulude suuruseks alates 1997. aastast kuni kirja koostamise kuupäevani umbes 31,20 mln eurot (61 mln Saksa marka).
It does not provide any explanation of the difference with the figures previously reported in its response to the information injunction.
Erinevust andmetest, mis toodi välja vastuses informeerimiskorraldusele, lähemalt ei selgitatud.
Private contribution
Omapanus
According to the 1997 notification, the private contribution from CWP to the restructuring consisted in the financing of certain investments and a contribution from the shareholders.
Vastavalt 1997. aasta teatisele seisnes CWP omapoolne panus ümberstruktureerimisse teatud investeeringute finantseerimises ja osanike panuses.
CWP was to carry out investments totalling EUR 5,11 million (DEM 10 million) by 31 December 2002.
CWP pidi kuni 31. detsembrini 2002 investeerima kogusummas 5,11 mln eurot (10 mln Saksa marka).
However, it is to be noted that this investment obligation had already been agreed at the time of the privatisation on 29 June 1994 and did not require these investments to be financed by private means.
Siiski peab märkima, et see investeerimiskohustus lepiti kokku juba erastamisel 29. juunil 1994 ning see ei näinud ette investeeringute finantseerimist eravahenditest.
In its response to the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, Germany stated that investments amounting to EUR 15,70 million (DEM 30,70 million) had been made during the period 1994 to 2000 and that, of those investments, EUR 7,21 million (DEM 14,11 million) had been privately financed.
Vastuses formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamisele teatas Saksamaa, et ajavahemikul 1994–2000 tehti investeeringuid summas 15,7 mln eurot (30,70 mln Saksa marka). Sellest 7,21 mln eurot (14,11 mln Saksa marka) olevat finantseeritud eravahenditest.
However, this amount includes publicly financed measures totalling EUR 3,73 million (DEM 7,30 million).
Siiski tuleb mainida, et see summa sisaldab riiklikult finantseeritud meetmeid 3,73 mln euro (7,3 mln Saksa marga) ulatuses.
The contribution by shareholders to these investments thus amounts to EUR 3,48 million (DEM 6,81 million).
Järelikult on osanike panus nendesse investeeringutesse 3,48 mln eurot (6,81 mln Saksa marka).
As regards the second component of the private contribution, i.e. contributions from the shareholders, Vopelius Chemie GmbH was, according to the 1997 notification, to contribute a loan of EUR 0,15 million (DEM 0,3 million).
Mis puutub omapanuse teise komponenti, s.t osanike panusesse, siis olevat Vopelius Chemie GmbH vastavalt 1997. aasta teatisele andnud 0,15 mln euro (0,3 mln Saksa marga) suurust krediiti.
In its response to the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, Germany explained that this amount related to the hire purchase (Mietkauf) of investment goods for which Vopelius provided a guarantee.
Vastuses formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamisele selgitas Saksamaa, et tegemist olevat tootmisvahendite liisinguga, mille jaoks Vopelius võttis üle ekspromissoorse käenduse.
In its response to the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, Germany also considered that the company’s subscribed capital of EUR 288879 (DEM 0,565 million) must be regarded as a contribution from the shareholders to the financing of the investments.
Vastuses formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamisele oli Saksamaa lisaks sellele arvamusel, et sissemakstud omakapital 288879 eurot (0,565 mln Saksa marka) on samuti käsitletav osanike panusena investeeringute finantseerimiseks.
In its response to the information injunction, Germany listed the measures which, in its view, constituted private financing (Table 6).
Vastuses informeerimiskorraldusele loetles Saksamaa üles meetmed (tabel 6), mida tema arvates saab vaadelda erafinantseeringutena.
Private financing
Erafinantseerimine
Limited partner’s capital contribution (BVT)
Kommandiitsissemakse (BVT)
Shareholder loan (BVT)
Osanike krediit (BVT)
Shareholder grant (BVT)
Osanike rahaline toetus (BVT)
Share capital
Põhikapital
Sales price — salt
Tulu fosfaaditootmise müügist
Sales price — saltworks (not yet paid)
Tulu fosfaaditootmise rajatiste müügist (veel maksmata)
Supplier credit (Vopelius)
Hankijakrediit (Vopelius)
The increase in private financing, as notified by Germany, is due mainly to the capital contribution from BVT, which became a non-typical silent partner in CWP (atypische stille Beteiligung) in December 1998.
Nagu Saksamaa esile tõi, on erafinantseerimise suurendamine seletatav peamiselt kapitali sissemaksuga BVT poolt, kellest sai detsembris 1998. a CWP atüüpiline usaldusosanik (“atypische stille Beteiligung”).
BVT also provided a loan in March 2001 and a grant in September 2001.
BVT andis CWP-le märtsis 2001 laenu ning septembris 2001 rahalist toetust.
In addition, Germany included as investor contributions a supplier credit by Vopelius (which was made available between January 1997 and January 1998 and consisted in deferral of the payment for raw materials supplied by Vopelius) and the revenues that CWP would obtain from the sale of its phosphate division to TI.
Sellele lisaks mainis Saksamaa investorite panusena Vopeliuse hankijakrediiti, mida võimaldati jaanuarist 1997 jaanuarini 1998 ja mis seisnes Vopeliuse poolt tarnitud toormaterjali maksetähtaja pikendamises, ning tulu, mida CWP saaks fosfaadiäri müügist TI-le.
It is unclear how the measures in Table 6 relate to the restructuring costs described in recitals 46 to 49.
Siiski on ebaselge, missuguses vahekorras seisavad tabelis 6 välja toodud meetmed põhjenduste 46–49 all kirjeldatud ümberstruktureerimiskuludega.
Market analysis
Turuanalüüs
CWP was traditionally a manufacturer of industrial phosphates and produced phosphoric acid for its own consumption.
Traditsiooniliselt oli CWP tööstuslike fosfaatide valmistaja ning tootis fosforhappet enda tarbeks.
Under the restructuring plan, it was to increase the quality of its phosphates in order to produce for the food industry, with the wet process being introduced for the production of phosphoric acid.
Ümberstruktureerimisplaani kohaselt pidi fosfaatide tootmiseks toiduainetetööstuse jaoks parandama nende kvaliteeti ja viima sisse märgmenetluse fosforhappe valmistamiseks.
It should be noted that the phosphoric acid produced with the wet process is equivalent in quality and properties to that produced with the thermal process.
Tuleb märkida, et märgmenetlusel toodetud fosforhappel on sama kvaliteet ja omadused nagu termilisel fosforhappel.
However, the two processes actually use a different raw material: elemental phosphorus for the thermal process and MGA for the wet process.
Siiski kasutatakse mõlema tootmismeetodi juures erinevat toormaterjali – elementaarset fosforit termilise meetodi ja MAGd märgmenetluse korral.
Moreover, the wet process has different stages and generates by-products (notably raffinate) which need further processing.
Lisaks sellele hõlmab märgmenetlus erinevaid protsessijärke ning selle käigus tekivad kõrvalproduktid (nt rafinaat), mida peab edasi töötlema.
Phosphoric acid is the basis for the production of phosphate products requiring higher-purity raw materials.
Fosforhape moodustab põhialuse nende fosfaattoodete valmistamiseks, mis vajavad kõrgema puhtusastmega toormaterjali.
It is used in the production of phosphate fertilisers for agriculture and of phosphates for the food industry.
Fosforhapet kasutatakse põllumajanduslike fosfaatväetiste ja toiduainetetööstuses vajaminevate fosfaatide valmistamiseks.
Polyphosphates, and in particular sodium tripolyphosphate, are used in detergent formulations for laundry, dishwasher and other cleaning products.
Polüfosfaate, eelkõige soodiumtripolüfosfaate, kasutatakse nii pesemis- ja nõudepesuvahendites kui ka teistes puhastustoodetes.
They are also used in various industrial and technical applications.
Samuti leiavad nad kasutamist erinevates tööstuslikes ja tehnilistes rakendustes.
The 2002 Chemical Economics Handbook reports that the demand for thermal phosphoric acid has been drastically losing ground as wet phosphoric acid becomes preferred for downstream chemicals, that there has also been stiff competition because of imports from China and that many phosphates and direct applications which formerly required thermal phosphoric acid now use purified wet phosphoric acid, with important cost advantages.
aasta väljaandes “Chemical Economics Handbook” väidetakse, et nõudlus termilise fosforhappe järele väheneb drastiliselt, kuna järelseisvate keemiatoodete jaoks eelistatakse märgmenetlusel valmistatud fosforhapet. Peale selle võtvat maad terav konkurents sissevedude tõttu Hiinast.
It also states that raw phosphoric acid is widely available and relatively inexpensive.
Arvukate fosfaattoodete ja otseste kasutuste kõrval, mille jaoks varem olevat vajalik olnud termiline fosforhape, minnakse tagasi ekstraheeritud fosforhappe juurde, mis toovat endaga kaasa märkimisväärse kulude kokkuhoiu.
According to the handbook, there were still four producers of thermal phosphoric acid in Western Europe in 2002: TI (the largest), CWP, FEBEX SA and Krems Chemie.
Toorfosforhape olevat piisavalt kättesaadav ja suhteliselt soodsa hinnaga. Edasi öeldakse, et 2002. aastal olevat Lääne-Euroopas veel neli fosforhappe tootjat: TI (suurim tootja), CWP, FEBEX S.A. ja Krems Chemie.
Germany states that the European market for phosphoric acid and phosphates is one of oligopoly on which there is no overcapacity.
Vastavalt Saksamaa andmetele iseloomustab Euroopa fosforhappe ja fosfaatide turgu oligopol ning liigvõimsusi ei ole.
CWP, however, takes the view that there is no oligopoly on the relevant European market.
CWP arvamuse kohaselt ei ole relevantsel Euroopa turul siiski oligopoli.
Some of CWP’s competitors agree but maintain that there is clear overcapacity.
Mõningad CWP konkurendid jagavad seda seisukohta, on aga siiski arvamusel, et tegemist on ilmselge võimsuse ülejäägiga.
Both Germany and CWP consider that CWP’s market share on the Western European phosphate market as a whole (industrial and food) is insignificant.
Nii Saksamaa kui ka CWP peavad CWP turuosa kogu Lääne-Euroopa fosfaaditurul (tööstuslikud fosfaadid ja toiduainetefosfaadid) ebaoluliseks.
It was estimated to be 5,1 % in 2000.
aasta turuosa suuruseks antakse 5,1 % koguturust.
Since 2001 CWP has been producing only for TI and is thus not present on the market any more.
Alates 2001. aastast toodab CWP eranditult TI jaoks ning ei ole seega enam turul esindatud.
Its market share was taken over by TI.
Tema turuosa võeti üle TI poolt.
Germany also states that TI has not been active on the specific phosphate market like CWP but on the market for phosphorus, phosphoric acids and other derivatives.
Nagu Saksamaa järgnevalt selgitab, ei ole TI tegev spetsiaalfosfaatide segmendis nagu CWP, vaid fosfori, fosforhappe ja teiste järeltoodete turul.
As regards the production of phosphoric acid, CWP states that its production of 40000 tonnes of thermal phosphoric acid is to be reduced to 20000 tonnes using the extraction process.
Fosforhappe tootmise kohta nendib CWP, et tootmist tuleb vähendada 40000 tonnilt termiliselt fosforhappelt 20000 tonnile ekstraheeritud happele.
Its originally foreseen share of the phosphoric acid market (6 %) is to be reduced to 3 % in Western Europe.
Algselt ettenähtud 6 % turuosa fosforhappe turul Lääne-Euroopas peab vähendama 3 %ni.
As the thermal installations have been shut down and the extraction installation is not yet operational, CWP currently does not produce any phosphoric acid and its market share is zero.
Kuna termilised rajatised seisati ja ekstraheerimisrajatis ei olevat veel tootmisvõimeline, siis ei valmistavat CWP hetkel fosforhapet ning tema turuosa olevat võrdne nulliga.
REASONS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
FORMAALSE KONTROLLMENETLUSE ALGATAMISE PÕHJUSED
Following an action for annulment brought by Prayon-Rupel, the CFI in its judgment of 15 March 2001 annulled the Commission decision of 16 December 1997 [14] on the grounds of infringement of an essential procedural requirement.
Prayon-Rupeli tühisushagi põhjusel tühistas Euroopa Ühenduste Esimese Astme Kohus oma kohtuotsusega 15. märtsist 2001 olulise vorminõude rikkumise tõttu komisjoni 16. detsembri 1997. aasta [14] otsuse.
It ruled that the Commission had been obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure because of serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the aid with the common market.
Esimese astme kohus märkis, et komisjon oli kohustatud algatama formaalset kontrollmenetlust tõsiste raskuste tõttu abi ühisturuga kokkusobivuse hindamisel.
The CFI put the serious difficulties down to the fact that the Commission had taken the decision without sufficient knowledge of the technical restructuring measures.
Kohus selgitas neid tõsiseid raskusi sellega, et komisjon langetas otsuse ilma piisava teadmiseta tehnilistest ümberstruktureerimismeetmetest.
Firstly, the CFI ruled that the Commission had erroneously described the restructuring measures implemented by CWP.
Esiteks kinnitas esimese astme kohus, et komisjon olevat ebaõigelt kirjeldanud CWP läbiviidud ümberstruktureerimismeetmeid.
The Commission had based the description of the technical restructuring measures on the information provided by Germany in 1997, namely that the wet process was to replace the thermal process in the production of phosphoric acid.
Komisjon olevat tehniliste ümberstruktureerimismeetmete kirjeldamisel toetunud Saksamaa poolt 1997. aastal esitatud informatsioonile, et fosforhappe tootmise termiline meetod pidavat asendatama märgmenetlusega.
However, the CFI emphasised that the two draft restructuring plans of May and October 1996, submitted by Germany to the Commission, did not mention any abandonment of the thermal process.
Nagu esimese astme kohus siiski toonitas, ei räägita kummaski mais ja oktoobris 1996. a koostatud ümberstruktureerimisplaani kavandis, mida Saksamaa komisjonile esitas, termilise meetodi ülesandest.
Secondly, is stated that the Commission had obviously misjudged the technical feasibility and profitability of the restructuring measures.
Teiseks tegi esimese astme kohus selgeks, et komisjon hindas silmnähtavalt valesti ümberstruktureerimismeetmete tehnilist teostatavust ja rentaablust.
According to the CFI, an expert opinion presented by the plaintiff provides clear evidence of this.
Esimese astme kohtu kohaselt kinnitatakse seda üheselt hageja esitatud eksperthinnangus.
According to the first paragraph of Article 233 of the Treaty, the Commission was required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the CFI.
Vastavalt Euroopa Ühenduse asutamislepingu artikli 233 lõikele 1 oli komisjon kohustatud rakendama vajalikke meetmeid esimese astme kohtu otsuse täitmiseks.
Firstly, the Commission could not determine the exact amount of aid involved overall.
Esiteks ei saanud komisjon kindlaks teha abi täpset kogusummat.
Secondly, a preliminary assessment under the 1994 Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (Community guidelines) [15] raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the common market.
Teiseks tekitas esialgne kontroll, mis viidi läbi vastavalt Ühenduse 1994. aasta suunistele, raskustesse sattunud ettevõtete päästmiseks ja ümberstruktureerimiseks antud riigiabi kohta (edaspidi “Ühenduse suunised (1994)”), [15] tõsist kahtlust abi ühisturuga kokkusobivuse suhtes.
Consequently, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure.
Seetõttu algatas komisjon formaalse kontrollmenetluse.
REASONS FOR ISSUING THE INFORMATION INJUNCTION
INFORMEERIMISKORRALDUSE PÕHJUSED
The Commission initiated the investigation procedure mainly on the basis of the information submitted in 1997.
Komisjon algatas menetluse peamiselt 1997. aastal esitatud informatsiooni põhjal.
However, Germany’s response to the initiation of the information injunction contained details of previous measures that were presented as constituting existing aid (Measures 1 to 3), amendments to some measures (Measures 1a and 7a/8a).
Saksamaa vastus informeerimiskorraldusele sisaldab siiski ka üksikasju varasemate meetmete kohta, mida esitleti olemasoleva abina (meetmed 1–3) ning teatud kindlate meetmete muudatusi (meede 1a ja meetmed 7a/8a).
In addition, measures which had been regarded until then as ad hoc measures were regarded by Germany as existing aid following the initiation of the procedure (Measures 9 and 10).
Peale selle liigitas Saksamaa varem ad-hoc-meetmetena käsitletud meetmed pärast menetluse algatamist olemasolevaks abiks (meetmed 9 und 10).
On the basis of the information available, the Commission could not verify whether the measures described as existing aid actually complied with the schemes under which they had allegedly been granted.
Kasutada oleva informatsiooni põhjal ei saanud komisjon kindlaks teha, kas olemasoleva abina tähistatud meetmed on tõepoolest kooskõlas nende reglementidega, mille põhjal neid öeldatavasti rakendati.
The Commission issued an information injunction on 6 March 2003 in order to clarify the situation.
Selle selgitamiseks tegi komisjon 6. märtsil 2003 korralduse informatsiooni andmiseks.
V. COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
V. OSAPOOLTE ARVAMUSED
Following the initiation of the formal investigation procedure the Commission received comments from three direct competitors of CWP and from CWP itself. These comments are summarised below:
Pärast formaalse kontrollmenetluse algatamist saabusid arvamused CWP kolmelt otseselt konkurendilt ning CWP-lt endalt, mis allpool järgnevalt kokku võetakse.
Comments from Prayon-Rupel
Prayon-Rupeli arvamus
Prayon-Rupel submitted an exhaustive description of the two production processes (thermal and wet) as well as of the relevant products and markets.
Prayon-Rupel edastas nii mõlema tootmisprotsessi (termiline meetod ja märgmenetlus kui ka vastavate toodete ja turgude põhjaliku kirjelduse.
It doubted firstly that the project accounts could be regarded as a restructuring plan.
Esiteks kahtleb Prayon-Rupel selles, et ettevõtmist saab vaadelda ümberstruktureerimisplaanina.
According to it, a change in the production method did not amount to a viable restructuring within the meaning of the Community guidelines.
Tootmismeetodi muudatus ei olevat kandejõuline ümberstruktureerimine Ühenduse suuniste (1994) mõttes.
Furthermore, if the difficulties of the company were due to a supply problem, the change of production process would not resolve the matter.
Kui ettevõtte raskuste põhjuseks olevat varustamisprobleem, siis ei saavat seda kõrvaldada tootmismeetodi ümberkorraldamisega.
Prayon-Rupel also considered that there was no supply problem, as the company could obtain phosphorus from China, the world’s largest producer, instead of from Kazakhstan.
Peale selle ei olevat varustamisprobleeme olemas, kuna ettevõte saaks fosforit hankida Kasahstani asemel maailma suurimalt tootjalt Hiinalt.
Secondly, Prayon-Rupel doubted the viability of the restructuring plan.
Teiseks seab Prayon-Rupel kahtluse alla ümberstruktureerimisplaani kandevõimelisuse.
In its view, the switch from the thermal to the wet process envisaged in the first document was not feasible.
Esimeses dokumendis ette nähtud ümberkorraldus termiliselt meetodilt märgmenetlusele ei olevat teostatav.
Such a change would require substantial investments including an entirely new installation and not simply the few investments listed by Germany.
Niisugune ümberkorraldus nõuaks ulatuslikke investeeringuid, kaasa arvatud täiesti uut rajatist, mitte ainult Saksamaa poolt ülesloetletud väheseid investeeringuid.
In addition, it would not lead to an improved product, a view also shared by Germany.
Lisaks sellele ei viiks tootmismeetodi muutmine kõrgväärtusliku tooteni; seda seisukohta jagab ka Saksamaa.
Prayon-Rupel doubted that CWP could restore its viability as the turnover forecasts were based on extremely optimistic assumptions and the operating results continued to be negative.
Lõpuks on Prayon-Rupelil kahtlus CWP rentaabluse taastamise suhtes, kuna käibeprognoosid tuginevad ülimalt optimistlikele oletustele ning ettevõtte tulem on jätkuvalt negatiivne.
According to Prayon-Rupel, a change in the production method not backed by sufficient investment would only lead to lower-quality products and hence to a further fall in profits.
Ebapiisavate investeeringutega teostatud tootmismeetodi muudatus viiks ainult madalama kvaliteediga toodeteni ja seega tulu jätkuva vähenemiseni.
Thirdly, Prayon-Rupel considered that CWP was expanding capacity.
Kolmandaks on Prayon-Rupel arvamusel, et CWP suurendab oma võimsust.
On the basis of the first restructuring document, CWP was to introduce the wet process without abandoning the thermal process.
Esimese ümberstruktureerimisdokumendi kohaselt peab märgmeenetlus sisse viidama ilma termilisest meetodist loobumata.
According to Prayon-Rupel, this amounted to a doubling of capacity.
See põhjustab Prayon-Rupeli arvates võimsuse kahekordistumist.
Fourthly, Prayon-Rupel considered that the aid was not limited to the minimum and that the commitment of the shareholders to invest EUR 5,11 million (DEM 10 million) following privatisation was not linked to the restructuring but was hypothetical and insufficient.
Neljandaks esindab Prayon-Rupel seisukohta, et toetus ei piirdu hädavajaliku miinimumiga ning et osanike kohustus investeerida erastamise käigus 5,11 mln eurot (10 mln Saksa marka) olevat mitte ümberstruktureerimisega seotud, vaid hüpoteetiline ja ebapiisav.
Lastly, Prayon-Rupel doubted that the plan would be implemented in full.
Lõpuks kahtleb Prayon-Rupel, et ümberstruktureerimisplaan täielikult ellu viiakse.
In its view, the acquisition by TI of CWP’s phosphate production already confirmed that the plan had not been implemented as planned.
CWP fosforitootmise ülevõtmine TI poolt tõestavat juba, et plaani ei realiseerita nii, nagu seda on ette nähtud.
Comments from Chemische Fabrik Budenheim A. Oetker
Chemischen Fabrik Budenheim A. Oetkeri arvamus
In its letter of 20 August 2001, Chemische Fabrik Budenheim A. Oetker (CFB) expressed doubts as to the viability of the restructuring plan.
Oma 20. augusti 2001. aasta kirjas kahtles Chemische Fabrik Budenheim A. Oetker (edaspidi CFB) ümberstruktureerimiskontseptsiooni kandejõulisuses.
It claimed that the construction of the new extraction installation was impracticable at such low cost and over the short period envisaged by CWP.
Uue ekstraheerimisrajatise ehitamine nii väheste kuludega ja sedavõrd lühikese aja jooksul, nagu CWP poolt kavandatud, ei olevat realiseeritav.
It stated that this had been confirmed subsequently since, according to market information, CWP’s thermal installation had been shut down and the construction of the new extraction installation interrupted.
See olevat tagantjärele kinnitust leidnud, kuna turuinformatsiooni kohaselt olevat CWP termiline rajatis suletud ja uue ekstraheerimisrajatise ehitustööd seisma pandud.
In its view, the calculation of the construction costs of the new installation was too low and CWP did not have the required know-how for a new process to produce phosphoric acid.
CFB on seisukohal, et uue rajatise ehituskulud kalkuleeriti liiga madalad ning et CWP-l ei ole vajalikku oskusteavet fosforhappe tootmiseks uuel meetodil.
Besides, CWP did not indicate how the noxious by-products of this new process were to be treated.
CWP ei selgitavat muuseas, mil viisil uue tootmismeetodi juures tekkivaid toksilisi kõrvalprodukte edasi töötlema peaks.