natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The same phenomenon occurs frequently in other Objectives for certain expenditure categories. 
The same phenomenon occurs frequently in other Objectives for certain expenditure categories.
Privatisations are one of the specific economic circumstances which must be taken into account within the context of additionality. 
Privatisations are one of the specific economic circumstances which must be taken into account within the context of additionality.
Several verification procedures provide that the national authorities are to notify the Commission of any partial or total privatisation so that, working in partnership, they may establish, on a case-by-case basis, the procedures for taking account of them. 
Several verification procedures provide that the national authorities are to notify the Commission of any partial or total privatisation so that, working in partnership, they may establish, on a case-by-case basis, the procedures for taking account of them.
Little use has been made of these provisions. 
Little use has been made of these provisions.
As a general rule, and in spite of the size of the privatisation phenomenon, few concrete steps have been taken to ensure that the bases for comparison are homogeneous. 
As a general rule, and in spite of the size of the privatisation phenomenon, few concrete steps have been taken to ensure that the bases for comparison are homogeneous.
In most cases, verifications have continued to be carried out as if nothing had changed, in the absence of a precise methodological framework. 
In most cases, verifications have continued to be carried out as if nothing had changed, in the absence of a precise methodological framework.
In other cases, the Commission left it up to the Member States to choose between excluding or including the relevant expenditure in the tables for the two periods. 
In other cases, the Commission left it up to the Member States to choose between excluding or including the relevant expenditure in the tables for the two periods.
In cases where this expenditure has decreased, it is entirely in the interest of the Member State, which is already aware of the results, to exclude it. 
In cases where this expenditure has decreased, it is entirely in the interest of the Member State, which is already aware of the results, to exclude it.
Given the significance of the areas involved (telecommunications, energy, etc.), this step alone may bring 
Given the significance of the areas involved (telecommunications, energy, etc.), this step alone may bring
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/15 about a substantial change in the final result. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/15 about a substantial change in the final result.
It should also be noted that the private sector is, to an increasing extent, taking over investments which were traditionally the responsibility of the public sector (24). 
It should also be noted that the private sector is, to an increasing extent, taking over investments which were traditionally the responsibility of the public sector (24).
This phenomenon has not been taken into account for the comparisons either. 
This phenomenon has not been taken into account for the comparisons either.
The significant efforts made by several Member States to improve their methodology in recent years have not always been accompanied by adjustments in respect of previous years, in particular the reference period, because of the complexity and cost of doing so. 
The significant efforts made by several Member States to improve their methodology in recent years have not always been accompanied by adjustments in respect of previous years, in particular the reference period, because of the complexity and cost of doing so.
For this reason, it is difficult to make correct com-parisons, and extrapolations and estimates have had to be made. 
For this reason, it is difficult to make correct comparisons, and extrapolations and estimates have had to be made.
Geographical breakdown of expenditure 64. 
Geographical breakdown of expenditure 64.
For the geographical breakdown of expenditure, taking into account the difficulty of identifying it by eligible area under Objectives 2 and 5b, the Commission has agreed to a pragmatic approach, which involves allocating regional or even national expenditure to the relevant areas mainly in proportion to their population or their surface area. 
For the geographical breakdown of expenditure, taking into account the difficulty of identifying it by eligible area under Objectives 2 and 5b, the Commission has agreed to a pragmatic approach, which involves allocating regional or even national expenditure to the relevant areas mainly in proportion to their population or their surface area.
This method compromises the reliability of the verification of the principle of additionality within the context of Objectives 2 and 5b. 
This method compromises the reliability of the verification of the principle of additionality within the context of Objectives 2 and 5b.
The starting hypothesis is that structural expenditure is divided equally between the eligible and non-eligible areas. 
The starting hypothesis is that structural expenditure is divided equally between the eligible and non-eligible areas.
This is a simplification which, of necessity, gives rise to overestimates or underestimates and thus makes it impossible to determine whether, in the eligible areas, the SFs have replaced any national expenditure or not. 
This is a simplification which, of necessity, gives rise to overestimates or underestimates and thus makes it impossible to determine whether, in the eligible areas, the SFs have replaced any national expenditure or not.
The estimates made in allocating expenditure to the eligible areas give results which are on occasion highly debatable: in France, the method used results in the expenditure of one eligible area being higher than that of the whole region for some cat-egories; in the United Kingdom, the breakdown of rural expenditure over a mainly urban population results in the allocation to certain areas of expenditure lower than that of the SPD on its own; in Italy, the expenditure is broken down globally, on the basis of the eligible population for the 1994 to 1999 period, and not region by region; moreover, for Objective 5b, it is compared to the expenditure for the 1989 to 1993 period, calculated on the basis of the eligible population for that period, which was, in the main, smaller. 
The estimates made in allocating expenditure to the eligible areas give results which are on occasion highly debatable: in France, the method used results in the expenditure of one eligible area being higher than that of the whole region for some categories; in the United Kingdom, the breakdown of rural expenditure over a mainly urban population results in the allocation to certain areas of expenditure lower than that of the SPD on its own; in Italy, the expenditure is broken down globally, on the basis of the eligible population for the 1994 to 1999 period, and not region by region; moreover, for Objective 5b, it is compared to the expenditure for the 1989 to 1993 period, calculated on the basis of the eligible population for that period, which was, in the main, smaller.
Some confusion concerning the eligible regions and areas has also been detected. 
Some confusion concerning the eligible regions and areas has also been detected.
In Italy, expenditure for two areas which were not eligible under Objective 2 (Trento and Bolzano) was included. 
In Italy, expenditure for two areas which were not eligible under Objective 2 (Trento and Bolzano) was included.
For Objective 5b for the 1994 to 1999 period, the regions examined initially were those which had been eligible in the previous period. 
For Objective 5b for the 1994 to 1999 period, the regions examined initially were those which had been eligible in the previous period.
The treatment of Community initiatives and other Community measures also poses many problems. 
The treatment of Community initiatives and other Community measures also poses many problems.
The ex ante verifications have not dealt with this important issue. 
The ex ante verifications have not dealt with this important issue.
Few Member States, with the exception of those which are eligible in their entirety under Objective 1, took Community initiatives into account. 
Few Member States, with the exception of those which are eligible in their entirety under Objective 1, took Community initiatives into account.
While it is true that identifying these initiatives and breaking them down on a geographical basis cannot easily be done, the majority of the Member States simply ignored the issue. 
While it is true that identifying these initiatives and breaking them down on a geographical basis cannot easily be done, the majority of the Member States simply ignored the issue.
As a result, assistance which comes under this type of programme is classified as being wholly nationally financed, so that the Member StateŐs structural assistance is artificially inflated. 
As a result, assistance which comes under this type of programme is classified as being wholly nationally financed, so that the Member StateŐs structural assistance is artificially inflated.
In addition, in two Member States (F and UK), Community initiatives were duly taken into account for the reference period (1989 to 1993), but not for the period subject to verification (1994 to 1999), further distorting the results. 
In addition, in two Member States (F and UK), Community initiatives were duly taken into account for the reference period (1989 to 1993), but not for the period subject to verification (1994 to 1999), further distorting the results.
CONCLUSION 69. 
CONCLUSION 69.
Although the principle of additionality (non-replacement of national expenditure by Structural Funds appropriations) is relatively clear, considerable difficulties have been encountered in its application in practice because of the limited development of concepts and methodology relating to its content. 
Although the principle of additionality (non-replacement of national expenditure by Structural Funds appropriations) is relatively clear, considerable difficulties have been encountered in its application in practice because of the limited development of concepts and methodology relating to its content.
The partnership between the Commission and the Member States has not succeeded in finding effective procedures for verifying the principle of additionality. 
The partnership between the Commission and the Member States has not succeeded in finding effective procedures for verifying the principle of additionality.
In short, it is necessary for the content of the principle of additionality to be properly established by seeking appropriate, fixed methodology which would make verification of the principle feasible. 
In short, it is necessary for the content of the principle of additionality to be properly established by seeking appropriate, fixed methodology which would make verification of the principle feasible.
Furthermore, the Commission ought to provide itself with the tools needed to analyse the consistency and plausibility of the data sent in by the Member States. 
Furthermore, the Commission ought to provide itself with the tools needed to analyse the consistency and plausibility of the data sent in by the Member States.
The obligations imposed by the regulations on the Member States to maintain structural expenditure and to provide the Commission with the appropriate financial data have not been backed up by sanctions or other legal consequences. 
The obligations imposed by the regulations on the Member States to maintain structural expenditure and to provide the Commission with the appropriate financial data have not been backed up by sanctions or other legal consequences.
None of the Member States identify and register all the structural assistance interventions in the eligible regions by national, regional and local government, bodies carrying out a public service function and, under certain conditions, public and private undertakings. 
None of the Member States identify and register all the structural assistance interventions in the eligible regions by national, regional and local government, bodies carrying out a public service function and, under certain conditions, public and private undertakings.
This is done solely for the purpose of calculating the additionality. 
This is done solely for the purpose of calculating the additionality.
Considerable individual efforts are made in various Member States to attempt to record all cases of assistance, but because of the size of the task the results can never be considered reliable. 
Considerable individual efforts are made in various Member States to attempt to record all cases of assistance, but because of the size of the task the results can never be considered reliable.
In addition, it is difficult to verify the whole process because of the large number of estimates and hypotheses included therein. 
In addition, it is difficult to verify the whole process because of the large number of estimates and hypotheses included therein.
The quality of the verification is also dependent on the number of eligible regions/areas and the number of participants. 
The quality of the verification is also dependent on the number of eligible regions/areas and the number of participants.
For example, the task is easier in the countries which are eligible in their entirety under Objective 1. 
For example, the task is easier in the countries which are eligible in their entirety under Objective 1.
When the eligible regions/areas do not correspond to any statistical or administrative divisions, the estimates made lead to artificial results. 
When the eligible regions/areas do not correspond to any statistical or administrative divisions, the estimates made lead to artificial results.
C 68/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 73. 
C 68/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 73.
Verification of the principle of additionality is an isolated task which is not integrated within the framework of either monitoring or evaluation. 
Verification of the principle of additionality is an isolated task which is not integrated within the framework of either monitoring or evaluation.
The efforts made by the Member States and the Commission to verify the principle, which are often costly in terms of human and physical resources, are of little use if no practical conclusions can be drawn from them. 
The efforts made by the Member States and the Commission to verify the principle, which are often costly in terms of human and physical resources, are of little use if no practical conclusions can be drawn from them.
In addition, deficiencies concerning the organisation and coordination of the Commission departments reduce the effectiveness of these individual efforts. 
In addition, deficiencies concerning the organisation and coordination of the Commission departments reduce the effectiveness of these individual efforts.
The operation of the Structural Funds is based on the principle of programming, as seen in the various plans (regional development plans, regional and social conversion plans, etc.) drawn up for each Objective. 
The operation of the Structural Funds is based on the principle of programming, as seen in the various plans (regional development plans, regional and social conversion plans, etc.) drawn up for each Objective.
The difficulties detected reveal the need to search harder for appropriate tools and to improve the budgetary and statistical data, particularly at the regional level, so that programming of a high quality and a sound analysis of the trends in structural assistance can be produced. 
The difficulties detected reveal the need to search harder for appropriate tools and to improve the budgetary and statistical data, particularly at the regional level, so that programming of a high quality and a sound analysis of the trends in structural assistance can be produced.
In view of the difficulties detected, on the eve of the new 2000 to 2006 programming period and in the light of the new regulatory provisions governing the Structural Funds, which were adopted on 21 June 1999 (25), the Commission, in partnership with the Member States, ought to define procedures for verifying additionality that are simpler, more concrete and more workable. 
In view of the difficulties detected, on the eve of the new 2000 to 2006 programming period and in the light of the new regulatory provisions governing the Structural Funds, which were adopted on 21 June 1999 (25), the Commission, in partnership with the Member States, ought to define procedures for verifying additionality that are simpler, more concrete and more workable.
They should be clearly set out in the implementation provisions of the CSFs and SPDs when these are being drawn up, thus enabling the principle of additionality to be better integrated into the programming framework. 
They should be clearly set out in the implementation provisions of the CSFs and SPDs when these are being drawn up, thus enabling the principle of additionality to be better integrated into the programming framework.
Verification of the principle of additionality should also be closely coordinated with the processes of monitoring and evaluation. 
Verification of the principle of additionality should also be closely coordinated with the processes of monitoring and evaluation.
Verification procedures must be more suitable for use with the budgetary and statistical information that is available. 
Verification procedures must be more suitable for use with the budgetary and statistical information that is available.
If these steps are not taken, it will not be possible to carry out the ex ante evaluations of additionality for the new generation under the right circumstances, and the efforts made by the Commission and the Member States will once again be in vain. 
If these steps are not taken, it will not be possible to carry out the ex ante evaluations of additionality for the new generation under the right circumstances, and the efforts made by the Commission and the Member States will once again be in vain.
Moreover, if financial sanctions or other penalties are to be applied, they should be based on precise criteria, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations. 
Moreover, if financial sanctions or other penalties are to be applied, they should be based on precise criteria, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 9 December 1999. 
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 9 December 1999.
(1) The principle of additionality is defined in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 of 20 July 1993 (OJ L 193, 31.7.1993, p. 
(1) The principle of additionality is defined in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 of 20 July 1993 (OJ L 193, 31.7.1993, p.
20): Ô1. 
20): Ô1.
In order to achieve a genuine economic impact, the Structural Funds and the FIFG appropriations allocated in each Member State to each of the Objectives under Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 may not replace public expenditure on structural or comparable expenditure undertaken by the Member State in the whole of the territory eligible under an Objective. 
In order to achieve a genuine economic impact, the Structural Funds and the FIFG appropriations allocated in each Member State to each of the Objectives under Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 may not replace public expenditure on structural or comparable expenditure undertaken by the Member State in the whole of the territory eligible under an Objective.
For this purpose, in establishing and implementing the Community support frameworks, the Commission and the Member State concerned shall ensure that the Member State maintains, in the whole of the territory concerned, its public structural or comparable expenditure at least at the same level as in the previous programming period, taking into account, however, the macroeconomic circumstances in which the funding takes place, as well as a number of specific economic circumstances, namely privatisations, an unusual level of public structural expenditure undertaken in the previous programming period and business cycles in the national economy. 
For this purpose, in establishing and implementing the Community support frameworks, the Commission and the Member State concerned shall ensure that the Member State maintains, in the whole of the territory concerned, its public structural or comparable expenditure at least at the same level as in the previous programming period, taking into account, however, the macroeconomic circumstances in which the funding takes place, as well as a number of specific economic circumstances, namely privatisations, an unusual level of public structural expenditure undertaken in the previous programming period and business cycles in the national economy.
The Commission and the Member States shall also agree, in establishing the Community support frameworks, the arrangements for verifying additionality. 
The Commission and the Member States shall also agree, in establishing the Community support frameworks, the arrangements for verifying additionality.
To permit verification of the principle of additionality, the Member State shall provide the relevant financial information to the Commission at the time of the submission of the plans and regularly during the implementation of the Community support frameworks.Ő (2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 724/75 of 18 March 1975 establishing a 3 European Regional Development Fund (OJ L 73, 21.3.1975, p. 
To permit verification of the principle of additionality, the Member State shall provide the relevant financial information to the Commission at the time of the submission of the plans and regularly during the implementation of the Community support frameworks.Ő (2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 724/75 of 18 March 1975 establishing a 3 European Regional Development Fund (OJ L 73, 21.3.1975, p.
1). () Council Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84 of 19 June 1984 on the Euro4 pean Regional Development Fund (OJ L 169, 28.6.1984, p. 
1). () Council Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84 of 19 June 1984 on the Euro4 pean Regional Development Fund (OJ L 169, 28.6.1984, p.
(5) COM(98) 131 final of 18 March 1998. () See the Commission Legal ServiceŐs note of 20 January 1994 on this 6 subject. () For example, the procedures established in the Objective 1 CSFs and 7 SPDs for the 1994 to 1999 period. () Annual Report concerning the financial year 1996 (OJ C 348, 8 18.11.1997, paragraphs 7.30 to 7.34). () For example, at the beginning of 1999, the Spanish authorities had not been informed of the CommissionŐs reaction to the ex post verifications for the 1989 to 1993 period for Objectives 1, 2 and 5b, the results of which had been given to the Commission at the end of 9 1995. () Communication to the Committee on the current situation in the field of verifying additionality. 
(5) COM(98) 131 final of 18 March 1998. () See the Commission Legal ServiceŐs note of 20 January 1994 on this 6 subject. () For example, the procedures established in the Objective 1 CSFs and 7 SPDs for the 1994 to 1999 period. () Annual Report concerning the financial year 1996 (OJ C 348, 8 18.11.1997, paragraphs 7.30 to 7.34). () For example, at the beginning of 1999, the Spanish authorities had not been informed of the CommissionŐs reaction to the ex post verifications for the 1989 to 1993 period for Objectives 1, 2 and 5b, the results of which had been given to the Commission at the end of 9 1995. () Communication to the Committee on the current situation in the field of verifying additionality.
Item 5 of the agenda for the 25th 10 meeting, 18 October 1995. () Annual Report. 
Item 5 of the agenda for the 25th 10 meeting, 18 October 1995. () Annual Report.
Additionality Objectives 3 and 4, 1990 to 1993. 
Additionality Objectives 3 and 4, 1990 to 1993.