natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Audit 11 and Inspection Sector - DG V. B.1, 1995. () Seventh Annual Report on the SFs (1995), p. 
Audit 11 and Inspection Sector - DG V. B.1, 1995. () Seventh Annual Report on the SFs (1995), p.
22 - ISBN 92-827-12 8942-X, November 1996. () On 15 May 1995, the Commission sent a letter to all the Member States reminding them of their obligations concerning ex post verifica-13 tion, but this letter was only in respect of Objectives 1 and 2. () Annual Report. 
22 - ISBN 92-827-12 8942-X, November 1996. () On 15 May 1995, the Commission sent a letter to all the Member States reminding them of their obligations concerning ex post verifica-13 tion, but this letter was only in respect of Objectives 1 and 2. () Annual Report.
Audit and Inspection Sector - DG V. B.1, 1995. 
Audit and Inspection Sector - DG V. B.1, 1995.
NOTES For the Court of Auditors Jan O. KARLSSON President 
NOTES For the Court of Auditors Jan O. KARLSSON President
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/17 (14) For France, information on the execution of ESF financing for 1987 to 1989 or on 1993 expenditure was missing. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/17 (14) For France, information on the execution of ESF financing for 1987 to 1989 or on 1993 expenditure was missing.
For Italy, only data on the two regions were analysed. 
For Italy, only data on the two regions were analysed.
For two other countries (DK and NL) the same report spoke of various circumstances limiting the validity 15 of the conclusions. 
For two other countries (DK and NL) the same report spoke of various circumstances limiting the validity 15 of the conclusions.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2328/91 of 15 July 1991 on improving 16 the efficiency of agricultural structures (OJ L 218, 6.8.1991, p. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2328/91 of 15 July 1991 on improving 16 the efficiency of agricultural structures (OJ L 218, 6.8.1991, p.
Council Regulation (EC) No 950/97 of 20 May 1997 on improving the efficiency of agricultural structures (OJ L 142, 2.6.1997, p. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 950/97 of 20 May 1997 on improving the efficiency of agricultural structures (OJ L 142, 2.6.1997, p.
1 to 17 21). 
1 to 17 21).
Statement on Article 9, recorded in the minutes of the Council meet-18 ing of 20 July 1993. the reasons given by the French authorities for not using the meth-21 odology suggested by the Commission. () For example, the Spanish authorities considered that there were more than 2 000 million items of data that ought to be taken into account 22 (reply to the questionnaire sent by the Court). () Annual Report. 
Statement on Article 9, recorded in the minutes of the Council meet-18 ing of 20 July 1993. the reasons given by the French authorities for not using the meth-21 odology suggested by the Commission. () For example, the Spanish authorities considered that there were more than 2 000 million items of data that ought to be taken into account 22 (reply to the questionnaire sent by the Court). () Annual Report.
Audit 23 and Inspection Sector - DG V. B.1, 1995. () In Spain, the tables for Objectives 3 and 4 show a considerable increase in national government expenditure from one period to the next. 
Audit 23 and Inspection Sector - DG V. B.1, 1995. () In Spain, the tables for Objectives 3 and 4 show a considerable increase in national government expenditure from one period to the next.
This is mainly due to the fact that approximately 37,5 % of the total expenditure for the new period is compared with the result posted for the expenditure for the previous generation, namely zero. 
This is mainly due to the fact that approximately 37,5 % of the total expenditure for the new period is compared with the result posted for the expenditure for the previous generation, namely zero.
(24) See the Communication from the Commission: ÔGovernment investment in the framework of economic strategyŐ. 
(24) See the Communication from the Commission: ÔGovernment investment in the framework of economic strategyŐ.
(COM(98) 682 final of 2 December 1998). 
(COM(98) 682 final of 2 December 1998).
(25) Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions for the Structural Funds (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 
(25) Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions for the Structural Funds (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p.
1). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( 19 20 A distinction should always be drawn between three different con-cepts: expenditure potentially eligible under the provisions of the regulations, expenditure eligible for co-financing under the forms of assistance adopted and expenditure actually co-financed. ) 
1). ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( 19 20 A distinction should always be drawn between three different concepts: expenditure potentially eligible under the provisions of the regulations, expenditure eligible for co-financing under the forms of assistance adopted and expenditure actually co-financed. )
Declaration on Article 9 in the minutes of the Council meeting of 20 July 1993. ) 
Declaration on Article 9 in the minutes of the Council meeting of 20 July 1993. )
The fact that there is no consolidated account of this kind is one of 
The fact that there is no consolidated account of this kind is one of
C 68/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities THE COMMISSIONŐS REPLIES SUMMARY Introduction The Commission welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors has undertaken a major examination of additionality, which is one of the four key principles on which the Structural Funds are based, along with concentration, partnership and programming. 
C 68/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities THE COMMISSIONŐS REPLIES SUMMARY Introduction The Commission welcomes the fact that the Court of Auditors has undertaken a major examination of additionality, which is one of the four key principles on which the Structural Funds are based, along with concentration, partnership and programming.
Summary of the main findings With respect to the modalities of verification, the basic concept of additionality is rather simple while its implementation is more difficult. 
Summary of the main findings With respect to the modalities of verification, the basic concept of additionality is rather simple while its implementation is more difficult.
The Commission agrees that the lack of sanctions in cases of non-compliance with the principle of additionality is a major weakness and regrets that Member States have rejected a Commission proposal for such sanctions in the new Regulation. 
The Commission agrees that the lack of sanctions in cases of non-compliance with the principle of additionality is a major weakness and regrets that Member States have rejected a Commission proposal for such sanctions in the new Regulation.
In order to avoid disproportionately high administrative costs, the modalities of verification agreed between the Commission and the Member States have to be pragmatic Ń within a well-defined framework of minimum methodological requirements Ń to arrive at acceptable yet workable solutions adapted to the specific situations of individual Member States. 
In order to avoid disproportionately high administrative costs, the modalities of verification agreed between the Commission and the Member States have to be pragmatic Ń within a well-defined framework of minimum methodological requirements Ń to arrive at acceptable yet workable solutions adapted to the specific situations of individual Member States.
As regards methodological difficulties, which the Court of Auditors has rightly highlighted in its report, many of these will be resolved to a great extent by the new provisions on additionality for the next programming period. 
As regards methodological difficulties, which the Court of Auditors has rightly highlighted in its report, many of these will be resolved to a great extent by the new provisions on additionality for the next programming period.
These provisions, including a reduction of the number of verifications and the simplification of the system in Objective 2 and 3 regions, are intended to facilitate the application and verification of the additionality principle while preserving the basic idea of the non-replacement of national spending by Community funding. 
These provisions, including a reduction of the number of verifications and the simplification of the system in Objective 2 and 3 regions, are intended to facilitate the application and verification of the additionality principle while preserving the basic idea of the non-replacement of national spending by Community funding.
Conclusions Regarding the CourtŐs main conclusions the CommissionŐs comments are as follows. (a) While the basic concept of additionality is relatively straightforward, its actual implementation clearly involves some methodological complexities. 
Conclusions Regarding the CourtŐs main conclusions the CommissionŐs comments are as follows. (a) While the basic concept of additionality is relatively straightforward, its actual implementation clearly involves some methodological complexities.
However, most of these have been overcome in partnership between the Commission and the Member States through pragmatic solutions within a clear methodological framework. (b) The Commission agrees that the absence of a sanctioning mechanism in the case of non-compliance with the principle of additionality is a major weakness and regrets that its initial proposal in the new general Regulation on the Structural Funds to link the verification of additionality to the allocation of the performance reserve has been rejected by the Member States. (c) The simplifying methodologies applied to avoid disproportionate administrative costs do not necessarily reduce the overall reliability of the verification of additionality. 9.3.2000 
However, most of these have been overcome in partnership between the Commission and the Member States through pragmatic solutions within a clear methodological framework. (b) The Commission agrees that the absence of a sanctioning mechanism in the case of non-compliance with the principle of additionality is a major weakness and regrets that its initial proposal in the new general Regulation on the Structural Funds to link the verification of additionality to the allocation of the performance reserve has been rejected by the Member States. (c) The simplifying methodologies applied to avoid disproportionate administrative costs do not necessarily reduce the overall reliability of the verification of additionality. 9.3.2000
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/19 (d) and (e) Many regions consider the verification of additionality to be an extremely important source of information and a political tool to avoid reductions of national expenditure in the regions. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/19 (d) and (e) Many regions consider the verification of additionality to be an extremely important source of information and a political tool to avoid reductions of national expenditure in the regions.
The organisational structure of the Commission obliges several services to deal with different aspects of the same matter, a situation that is certainly not unique to additionality. 
The organisational structure of the Commission obliges several services to deal with different aspects of the same matter, a situation that is certainly not unique to additionality.
In regard to organisation and coordination, the Commission wishes to underline the frequent contacts between the officials of the different Commission services and between officials of the Commission services and the national authorities in the context of meetings of the Monitoring Committees. (f) The modalities for the verification of additionality in the forthcoming programming period as introduced in the new Regulation will be more simple, concrete and operational. 
In regard to organisation and coordination, the Commission wishes to underline the frequent contacts between the officials of the different Commission services and between officials of the Commission services and the national authorities in the context of meetings of the Monitoring Committees. (f) The modalities for the verification of additionality in the forthcoming programming period as introduced in the new Regulation will be more simple, concrete and operational.
As in the past, the CommissionŐs services and the national authorities will find in partnership pragmatic solutions adapted to the specific situation of the Objectives and the Member States. 
As in the past, the CommissionŐs services and the national authorities will find in partnership pragmatic solutions adapted to the specific situation of the Objectives and the Member States.
The 1993 general Regulation on the Structural Funds introduced a clear definition of additionality and the general rules to be respected by the Member States. 
The 1993 general Regulation on the Structural Funds introduced a clear definition of additionality and the general rules to be respected by the Member States.
Regarding derogations, these were included at the insistence of the Member States. 
Regarding derogations, these were included at the insistence of the Member States.
It should be emphasised however that, in practice, such derogations are rarely used. 
It should be emphasised however that, in practice, such derogations are rarely used.
The Commission underlines the usefulness of its declaration on the modalities of verification of additionality which is contained in the minutes of the CouncilŐs meeting of 20 July 1993 concerning the adoption of the Regulations. 
The Commission underlines the usefulness of its declaration on the modalities of verification of additionality which is contained in the minutes of the CouncilŐs meeting of 20 July 1993 concerning the adoption of the Regulations.
Notwithstanding its Ônon-bindingŐ nature, the document provides a basic framework for the practical verification of additionality and, as such, has not been contested by the Member States. 
Notwithstanding its Ônon-bindingŐ nature, the document provides a basic framework for the practical verification of additionality and, as such, has not been contested by the Member States.
The key provision of the declaration is that additionality takes place globally at the level of each Member State, and not at the level of each regional programme. 
The key provision of the declaration is that additionality takes place globally at the level of each Member State, and not at the level of each regional programme.
The Commission shares the CourtŐs concern at the absence of effective sanctions for non-compliance with the principle of additionality. 
The Commission shares the CourtŐs concern at the absence of effective sanctions for non-compliance with the principle of additionality.
In this regard, it regrets that its initial proposal in the new general Structural Funds Regulation to link the verification of additionality to the allocation of the performance reserve has been rejected by Member States. 
In this regard, it regrets that its initial proposal in the new general Structural Funds Regulation to link the verification of additionality to the allocation of the performance reserve has been rejected by Member States.
The Commission wishes to underline that there has been a considerable process of information, discussion and negotiation with the Member States regarding methodological issues relating to additionality. 
The Commission wishes to underline that there has been a considerable process of information, discussion and negotiation with the Member States regarding methodological issues relating to additionality.
The aim has been to avoid disproportionate administrative burdens by striking a balance between the need for equal treatment and the need for flexibility to take account of the specific circumstances of the different Objectives, Member States and regions. 
The aim has been to avoid disproportionate administrative burdens by striking a balance between the need for equal treatment and the need for flexibility to take account of the specific circumstances of the different Objectives, Member States and regions.
The standard text in the CSFs and SPDs only reflects the legal undertaking to comply with the Regulation and not the details particular to each case. 
The standard text in the CSFs and SPDs only reflects the legal undertaking to comply with the Regulation and not the details particular to each case.
General information explaining the common procedures and methodology for the verification of additionality for all Objectives was submitted to the Member States by letter of 6 August 1990 from the Secretariat-General and for Objective 1 by letter of 30 March 1993 from DG XVI. 
General information explaining the common procedures and methodology for the verification of additionality for all Objectives was submitted to the Member States by letter of 6 August 1990 from the Secretariat-General and for Objective 1 by letter of 30 March 1993 from DG XVI.
Information on the verification of additionality for Objective 1 in the period 2000 to 2006 was sent to Member States in August 1999. 
Information on the verification of additionality for Objective 1 in the period 2000 to 2006 was sent to Member States in August 1999.
The preparation of financial information necessary for the verification of additionality and its submission to the Commission is the responsibility of the Member States. 
The preparation of financial information necessary for the verification of additionality and its submission to the Commission is the responsibility of the Member States.
The Commission recognises that certain Member States have difficulties in applying the system and has sought to take account of such difficulties, notably on the basis of experience during the previous programming period. 
The Commission recognises that certain Member States have difficulties in applying the system and has sought to take account of such difficulties, notably on the basis of experience during the previous programming period.
Considerable improvements have been achieved in 1994 to 1999 in comparison with 1989 to 1993. 
Considerable improvements have been achieved in 1994 to 1999 in comparison with 1989 to 1993.
With regard to Objective 1 in particular, and with just one exception which was subject to special requirements, the financial tables provided were complete and contained sufficient detail and justi-fication to allow the identification of the eligible expenditure to be taken into account for the verification of additionality. 
With regard to Objective 1 in particular, and with just one exception which was subject to special requirements, the financial tables provided were complete and contained sufficient detail and justification to allow the identification of the eligible expenditure to be taken into account for the verification of additionality.
In the case of Objectives 2 and 5b, where the available information was considered inadequate to establish an ex ante verification, Ôsuspensive clausesŐ were introduced in the programming documents. 
In the case of Objectives 2 and 5b, where the available information was considered inadequate to establish an ex ante verification, Ôsuspensive clausesŐ were introduced in the programming documents.
C 68/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 9. 
C 68/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 9.
With regard to ongoing monitoring of the verification of additionality, this takes place on the basis of financial information prepared by the Member States and submitted to the Commission following the same presentation as used for the ex ante evaluation. 
With regard to ongoing monitoring of the verification of additionality, this takes place on the basis of financial information prepared by the Member States and submitted to the Commission following the same presentation as used for the ex ante evaluation.
With regard to the procedure to be adopted when compliance with additionality is in doubt, it is necessary to recognise that the statutory provisions provide the Commission with very few powers to deal with the matter. 
With regard to the procedure to be adopted when compliance with additionality is in doubt, it is necessary to recognise that the statutory provisions provide the Commission with very few powers to deal with the matter.
Similar to most issues related to Structural Funds, the final responsibility for the verification of additionality rests with the DGs which are chef de file for each Objective, while DG II provides technical and methodological assistance in view of its economic and financial expertise. 
Similar to most issues related to Structural Funds, the final responsibility for the verification of additionality rests with the DGs which are chef de file for each Objective, while DG II provides technical and methodological assistance in view of its economic and financial expertise.
Similar to DG XVI, DG VI asked DG II for its assistance in the analysis of information submitted by Member States. 
Similar to DG XVI, DG VI asked DG II for its assistance in the analysis of information submitted by Member States.
This does not imply that DG VI considered DG II to have full responsibility for the verification of additionality. 
This does not imply that DG VI considered DG II to have full responsibility for the verification of additionality.
While it is true that responsibility for additionality in DG XVI is divided between a horizontal unit and the geographical units, with the involvement also of DG II, the system in general operates satisfactorily. 
While it is true that responsibility for additionality in DG XVI is divided between a horizontal unit and the geographical units, with the involvement also of DG II, the system in general operates satisfactorily.
In this regard, it is necessary in particular to take account of frequent day-to-day contacts between the officials concerned. 
In this regard, it is necessary in particular to take account of frequent day-to-day contacts between the officials concerned.
The audit performed by DG V was useful and resulted in improvements in the reporting of additionality data from the Member States. 
The audit performed by DG V was useful and resulted in improvements in the reporting of additionality data from the Member States.
In those Member States where no firm conclusions could be drawn due to lack of information, an effort was made by the operational units concerned to collect the necessary data and to complete the exercise as far as possible. 
In those Member States where no firm conclusions could be drawn due to lack of information, an effort was made by the operational units concerned to collect the necessary data and to complete the exercise as far as possible.
The Commission agrees that the information received from the Member States on additionality should be examined in depth. 
The Commission agrees that the information received from the Member States on additionality should be examined in depth.
Suspensive clauses 18 to 19. 
Suspensive clauses 18 to 19.
In order not to delay the adoption of programmes for Objectives 2 and 5b due to the absence of technical information on additionality which is often difficult to prepare, the services had recourse to the use of Ôsuspensive clausesŐ. 
In order not to delay the adoption of programmes for Objectives 2 and 5b due to the absence of technical information on additionality which is often difficult to prepare, the services had recourse to the use of Ôsuspensive clausesŐ.
The intention was to provide the Member States with some extra flexibility in regard to the provision of information rather than proceed with a formal suspension of payments under the relevant provision of the Regulation. 
The intention was to provide the Member States with some extra flexibility in regard to the provision of information rather than proceed with a formal suspension of payments under the relevant provision of the Regulation.