natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
1979. έπρεπε νά φροντίσει ώστε νά συμπεριληφθοϋν στή Συμ¬ φωνία Συνεργασίας κατάλληλες διατάξεις πού νά τής έπι-· τρέπουν νά τηρεί τίς διαδικασίες σχετικά μέ τά δικαιολο¬ γητικά έγγραφα, δπως απαιτεί ό δημοσιονομικός κανονι¬ σμός. 
1979. ensure the inclusion of adequate provisions in the Cooperation Agreement which would allow the Commission to respect the procedures for support¬ ing documents required by the Financial Regula¬ tion.
Ή Συμφωνία Συνεργασίας δέν παρέχει καμία ένδειξη γιά τό πώς καί μέ ποια βάση ορίστηκε τό 75 ο/ο τοϋ ετησίου επιτοκίου, τό όποιο θά είχε βαρύνει τό δάνειο έάν αυτό δέν ελάμβανε επιδότηση, γιά νά εφαρμο¬ στεί σάν σύνθετος τόκος στον υπολογισμό τής τρέχουσας τιμής τής επιδοτήσεως. 
The Cooperation Agreement gives no indica¬ tion as to how and on what basis 75 % of the annual rate of interest, which the loan would have borne if it did not benefit from a subsidy, was chosen as the compound interest to be applied to calculate the present value of the subsidy.
Αυτή ή κατάσταση υπάρχει παρά τό γεγονός δτι πρόκειται γιά σημαντικές πιστώσεις τοΰ προϋπολογισμοΰ (200 εκατομμυρίων ΕΛΜ ετησίως). 
This situation exists in spite of the considerable budgetary appropriations (200 million EUA per year) involved.
Αυτό τό ποσοστό έχει άμεση επίδραση στό υψος τών. πιστώσεων τοΰ προϋπολογισμού πού καταβαλλει ή 'Επι¬ τροπή στην ETE σάν επιδοτήσεις επιτοκίων τοΰ ΕΝΣ. . 
This percen¬ tage has a direct influence on the level of budgetary appropriations paid out by the Commission as EMS interest subsidies to the EIB.
Τό Συνέδριο, έχοντας επισημάνει τίς διαφορές στην αντιμετώπιση άπό πλευράς ETE ανάλογα μέ τό άν οί επιδοτήσεις επιτοκίου καταβάλλονται γιά δάνεια ΕΤΕ/ΝΚΜ είτε στην 'Ιταλία είτε στην 'Ιρλανδία, κρίνει δτι ή 'Επιτροπή, πού είναι τελικά υπεύθυνη γιά αυτές τίς πιστώσεις προϋπολογισμοΰ, θά έπρεπε νά είχε φροντίσει ώστε ή Συμφωνία Συνεργασίας νά καθορίζει: α) β) . σαφείς ενδείξεις τοΰ τρόπου μέ τόν οποίο ή ETE θά πρέπει νά διαθέτει τά κεφάλαια επιδοτήσεων επιτο¬ κίου πού τής μεταφέρει ή 'Επιτροπή' δτι ή ETE θά πρέπει νά υποβάλλει ετήσια δημοσιονομική έκθεση στην 'Επιτροπή σχετικά μέ τή χρησιμο¬ ποίηση τών επιδοτήσεων επιτοκίου. . 
The Court, having noted the differences in treatment by the EIB dependent on whether the interest subsidies are paid on EIB/NCI .loans to either Italy or Ireland, considers that the Commis¬ sion, being ultimately responsible for these budget¬ ary appropriations, should have ensured that the Cooperation Agreement stipulated: (a), precise indications as to how the EIB should dispose of the interest subsidy funds transferred to it by the Commission ; (b) that the EIB should render an annual financial report to the Commission on the utilization of the interest subsidies.
'Επιδοτήσεις επιτοκίων γιά δάνεια «σεισμών» 5.36. 
Interest rate subsidies on 'earthquake'loans 5.36.
Γιά τήν πρακτική εφαρμογή αυτών τών επιδοτή¬ σεων επιτοκίου δέν μποροΰν νά γίνουν παρατηρήσεις, λόγω τοΰ γεγονότος δτι ή 'Επιτροπή δέν πραγματοποίησε πληρωμές μέ τό μέτρο αυτό τό 1981. 
No observations may be made on the prac¬ tical workings of these interest rate subsidies due to the fact that the Commission made no payments under this measure in 1981.
'Εντούτοις, ή πλη¬ ρωμή αυτών τών επιδοτήσεων επιτοκίου σέ ετήσια βάση φαίνεται προτιμότερη άπό τό σύστημα πληρωμής τών επιδοτήσεων επιτοκίου τοΰ ΕΝΣ μέ βάση τήν τρέχουσα άξια. 
However, the payment of these interest rate subsidies on an annual basis would appear more preferable to the payment sys¬ tem for the EMS interest subsidies on the present value basis.
Μέ τήν πληρωμή σέ ετήσια βάση αποφεύγονται Ιδίως οί δυσκολίες πού ενυπάρχουν στον υπολογισμό καί στή συμφωνία γιά τήν τρέχουσα αξία τών επιδοτήσεων επιτοκίου, δπως αναφέρθηκε στίς παραγράφους 5.18 καί 5.34. 
The payment on an annual basis nota¬ bly avoids the difficulties inherent in calculating and agreeing the present value of the interest rate subsidies, as stated in paras 5.18 and 5.34.
. 2. 
BP mechanism 6.2.
. 
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) which was established by the Council in 1973, was entrusted with; making the necessary arrangements for the administration of the loans and borrowings contracted under the BP mechan¬ ism.
. 
Because the EMCF is a Community organ¬ ization it is subject to the audit provisions of the EEC Treaty.
. 
It delegated by its Directive of 9 March 1976 the responsibility for this administration to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, an organization outside the Community.
. 
Since both these interest rate subsidies - are financed directly by the Community budget, then they are subject to the audit provisions contained in Articles 206 (a) of the EEC Treaty and the Financial Regulation.
. 
Therefore, the Council Regulations establishing these subsidies do not refer to the audit of the subsidies.
. 
Observations Β Ρ mechanism 6.6.
. 
The Court considers, in view of the BIS's res¬ ponsibility as agent of the EMCF for the adminis¬ tration of the BP mechanism, that the latter's direc¬ tive to the BIS should include an appropriate clause protecting the Community's right of audit of the administration of the BP loans and borrowings.
. 
NCI mechanism and EMS interest rate subsidies 6.7. '
. Μηχανισμός ΝΚΜ ' Ή ευθύνη έλεγχου y\à τό μηχανισμό ΝΚΜ καθορί-«Ό δημοσιονομικός έλεγχος αυτών τών πράξεων, πού περιλαμβάνονται στό ειδικό τμήμα τής Τραπέ¬ ζης, διεξάγεται σύμφωνα μέ τίς διαδικασίες έλεγχου πού προβλέπονται άπό τό καταστατικό τής ETE γιά δλες τίς δραστηριότητες της». , 'Η ρήτρα αυτή έχει περιληφθεί παρά τό γεγονός δτι ή ETE χορηγεί τά δάνεια ΝΚΜ, πρώτον έξ ονόματος, γιά λογαριασμό καί μέ^ κίδυνο τής Κοινότητας, καί δεύτερον, μέ τό προϊόν τών δανείων πού συνάπτει ή 'Επιτροπή. 3. 
In spite of the audit provisions contained in the Council decisions on the NCI mechanism and the audit provisions for the EMS interest rate subsi¬ dies as outlined in 6.5 above, the bilateral Coopera¬ tion Agreements which were concluded between the Commission and the EIB incorporated additional Audit responsibility for the NCI mechanism is 'The financial control of these, operations, included in the Bank's Special Section, shall be carried out in accordance with the audit proce¬ dures foreseen in the EIB statutes for all its activities*.
. 12. 
No C 319/30 Official Journal of the European Communities 6. 12.
. 
82 For the EMS interest rate subsidies, Article 16 of the Cooperation Agreement states: 'With regard to the EIB, the financial control of the operations carried out within the context of this Agreement, shall be according to the verifi¬ cation and discharge procedures foreseen in its statutes.'
. 
This clause is included notwithstanding the Com¬ mission's direct responsibility for the implementa¬ tion of the Community budget as contained in Article 205 of the EEC Treaty. It is in contradiction with Article 206 of the EEC Treaty and therefore should be deleted.
. 
6.8.
. 
The ' Court recommends that as a general policy, a contract granting a mandate to an organ¬ ization to act as the Community's agent, should automatically incorporate a clause whereby the agent explicitly accepts, and agrees to respect, the application of the Treaty's audit provisions to the activities for which it is being granted a mandate.
. 
The inclusion of such an audit clause would have 'as a double objective firstly, to clarify the audit proce¬ dures to be followed and secondly, to avoid the inclusion of provisions which are in contradiction with the Treaty's audit provisions.
. 6.8. 
The Court has noted with satisfaction the Commis¬ sion's reply to point 6.7 but observes that no reply has been made to the Court's observations in point 6.8. .
. 1 . 
On the basis of the detailed observations contained in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the following observations of a general nature may be formulated concerning the loans and borrowings.
. 
Euratom The introduction of these mechanisms in the 7.1. period 1975 to 1981 may not be construed as the result of an explicit decision or policy decided by the Council with regard to the manner in which Community policies are to be financed and, in parti¬ cular, the choice between financing those policies either through the revenue of the Community budget or by way of Commission borrowings on behalf of the Community.
. 
The attribution of responsibilities for the NCI Neither may the establishment of these mechanisms be construed as the result of a consistent Com¬ munity policy on loans and borrowings.
. 
The attribu¬ tion of responsibilities for the granting and adminis¬ tration of the loans differs from one mechanism to another, without the basis for that differentiation being clear.
. 2. 
New Community Instrument 7.2.
. Ή αρμοδιότητα αυτή δόθηκε στην ETE παρά τό γεγονός δτι πρώτον, αυτά τά δάνεια ΝΚΜ χρηματοδοτούνται μέ δανεισμό τής 'Επιτροπής καί δεύτε¬ ρον, ή ETE ήδη έχει δικό της καθιερωμένο μηχανισμό δανειοδοτήσεως πού χρηματοδοτείται άπό δικούς της πόρους. "Αν τό ΝΚΜ είχε προβλεφθεί σάν ανανεωτική δύναμη, τότε θά ήταν καλύτερα νά είχε δομηθεί έξω άπό τό φάσμα τών ήδη υφισταμένων Κοινοτικών μηχανισμών δανειοδοτήσεως, δπως είναι τής ETE. 
The New Community Instrument was estab¬ lished in 1978 as a new measure to promote invest¬ ment within the Community and it was the EIB which was allocated the responsibility for granting 7.3. mechanism differs from that decided for the Eura¬ tom mechanism in 1977, For the Euratom mechan¬ ism, as with the NCI, it is the Commission which is responsible for contracting the borrowings. How¬ ever, in contrast with the NCI, it is the Commission which also decides on the granting of the Euratom loans. This system was chosen for the Euratom mechanism notwithstanding the fact that the EIB also grants its own loans to frequently the same energy projects.
. 4. 
CHAPTER 7 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS EMS interest rate subsidies 7.4.
. 12. "Ελλειψη συνέπειας στην κατανομή αρμοδιοτήτων παρουσιάζεται επίσης στην κατάσταση πού υπάρχει στίς ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟ 7 ΓΕΝΙΚΕΣ ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΗΣΕΙΣ 
A lack of consistency in the attribution of res¬ ponsibilities is reflected also in the situation for the EMS interest rate subsidies. Due to the fact that
. 
82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 319/31 these interest rate subsidies are financed by the Community budget, then all decisions relating to the utilization of budgetary appropriations should be within the Commission's power.
. 
On examina¬ tion, however, it may be discerned that the final decisions to commit and pay budgetary appropria¬ tions on the EMS interest rate subsidies, as well as the timing and the level of utilization of those appropriations, are dependent on the ElB's deci¬ sions rather than the Commission's.
. 
This is because even when the Commission decides a project is eli¬ gible for an interest rate subsidy, the implementa¬ tion of that decision by the actual granting of a sub¬ sidy (and the level of the subsidy) is determined by the EIB's decision on whether to grant a loan to that project.
. 
External audit budget.
. 
The overall volume of their operations is determined therefore not by annual appropriations included in the budget but rather by a ceiling on total borrowings which the Council fixes for each mechanism.
. 
In 1978, the Court of Auditors gave a favourable opinion on the Commission's proposal to Council to amend the Financial Regulation applicable to the Community budget by including appropriate provisions for the loans and borrowings.
. 
Notwithstanding . the present non-inclusion of the loans and borrowings of the BP, Euratom and NCI mechanisms in the Community budget, the Court of Auditors considers that it would be preferable if the Commission would introduce appropriate internal procedures for the decision making and financial management of the loans and borrowings analogous to those procedures contained in the Financial Regulation, which are applicable to the revenue and expenditure of the general budget.
. 
The Court has noted that the Commission in its replies (point 5.25, first paragraph, points 5.28 to 5.31, point 7.6) makes frequent reference to the internal control unit recently established within DG XVIII and responsible to its Director-General.
. 
However, when the Court refers to the application of internal procedures analogous to the Financial Regulations, it is referring to the introduction of the Commission's financial controller and accounting officer in DG XVIH's financial operations.
. 
The above comments were adopted by the Court of Auditors at its meeting of 19 July 1982.
. 
For the Court of Auditors Pierre LELÓNG President As with the lack of consistency on the attribu¬ 7.5. -J tion of responsibilities for the various phases of the loans and borrowings and associated interest rate subsidies, the definition of the audit of the mechan¬ isms has also varied. The Court considers that it is the EEC Treaty's audit provisions which apply to the audit of the mechanisms and therefore bilateral Cooperation Agreements between the Commission and its agents must respect these audit provisions.
. Καταχώριση στον προϋπολογισμό 7.6. Τά δάνεια πού χορηγοΰνται καί συνάπτονται στό πλαίσιο κάθε μηχανισμοΟ δέν περιλαμβάνονται στον κοι 7.5. 
The Court considers it necessary that the duties and responsibilities of both the Commission and the Court of Auditors with regard to the audit of the agent's disposal of the Commission's funds, budge¬ tary and non-budgetary, be clearly understood and carried out. - Budgetization 7.6. ,The loans and borrowings contracted under each mechanism are not included in the Community Luxembourg, 6 August 1982.
. 
No C 319/32 Official Journal of the European Communities 6.
. 1 . 
82 1.
. 
4.
. 
BP loans outstanding at 31 December 1981 as stated in the Commission's Revenue and Expenditure Account 1981, Vol. II, page 320, COM(82) 233 final.
. 2. 
Β Ρ borrowings: In the period 1976-1977, US $ 1 600 million and DM 500 million was borrowed by the Com¬ mission and on-lent to Member States as BP loans. ' 2.
. 
EURATOM LOANS Table 2.1 Euratom loans granted in the period 1977-1981 () \ (i) Source: I Commission's Revenue and Expenditure Account 1981, Vol. II, page 322. COM(82) 233 final.
. 
Loan amounts stated are those amounts outstan¬ ding at 31 December 1981.
. 
No capital repayments had been made on the loans up to 31 December 1981.
. 1 . 
Commission's Revenue and Expenditure Account 1981, Vol. II, page 322. COM(82) 233 final. · Loan amounts stated are those amounts outstanding at 31 December 1981.
. 
No capital repay¬ ments had been made on the loans up to 31 December 1981.
. 
Note: The number of loans granted to Member States outlined above should not be equated with the number of nuclear energy projects financed.
. 
In effect, as a project may consist of several phases extended over many years, then it may receive more than one Euratom loan over its lifetime.
. 2. 4. 
EMS INTEREST RATE SUBSIDIES Table 4.1 EMS interest rate subsidies paid on NCI and EIB loans Interest rate subsidies (million ECU) on Number of projects benefiting Totals 70-2 519-9 21· Ul , Table4.2 EMS interest rate subsidies accorded to Italian and Irish projects in the period 1979-1981 (million ECU) Year Interest subsidies on Italian projects receiving Interest subsidies on Irish projects receiving Totals 340-0 50-4 179-9 19-9
. 
Whenever any major questions arise, they are mentioned in the summary record of the meeting.
. 
The Commission's procedure for taking decisions on applications for Euratom financing is based on an assessment of the investment projects with respect to their conformity. with the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and secondary legislation, the Council's decisions and guidelines, the Cooperation Agreement with the EIB and the latter's recommendation on each of the projects in question.
. 
The Inter-Service Group which prepares the Commission's decisions records its conclusions on each project unanimous approval without discussion or list of problems and divergences of view prompting reservations or adverse opinions. Explicit reference in the Cooperation Agreement to the criteria used by the EIB in evaluating projects In granting loans as the executive agent for Euratom, the EIB applies the provisions embodied in Council decisions and in the texts annexed to the Council minutes as well as those laid down in its Statute.
. 
The Commission keeps the Bank informed of the various ways in which it applies the guidelines set by the Council, as required by Article 5 of the Cooperation Agreement.
. 12. 
No C 319/36 Official Journal of the European Communities 6.12.82 . · . ' With regard to the eligibility guideline which requires investments to conform to the relevant Com¬ munity rules, the Commission makes those rules known to the Bank and explains their content: this applies particularly to the rules on competition and the opening-up of markets, protection of the environment, restrictive or priority conditions relating to 'sectors such as energy or agriculture, the demarcation of zones and regions regarded as sensitive, opinions on investments notified to the Commission in accordance with the provisions of the Community Treaties, for which an application for financing has been made, etc.
. 
In the two specific fields of energy and infrastructures, the Commission has preferred not to sub¬ ject the application of a financial instrument to formal criteria, the definition of which would inevitably be in some degree arbitrary and imperfect.
. 
If, on the other hand, in later applications of the NCI more specific policies were to be developed or more restricted projects implemented than is the case in the two fields now covered, the Commission would take utmost care to ensure that the criteria for aid were defined with all the precision necessary.
. 
Point 4.39: NCI loans: Minutes of the Inter-Service Group meetings There are already sufficiently detailed summary records to enable the decision-making process to be traced back in cases where problems have arisen.
. Ή διυπηρεσιακή ομάδα πού ετοιμάζει τίς αποφάσεις τής 'Επιτροπής καταχωρεί τ' αποτελέσματα τών συζη¬ τήσεων έπί κάθε σχεδίου, δηλαδή είτε τίς θέσεις πού είναι ομόφωνα ευνοϊκές χωρίς συζήτηση, εϊτε τά προ¬ βλήματα καί τίς διαφορετικές απόψεις πού είναι ή αιτία επιφυλάξεων ή μή ευνοϊκών θέσεων. 
However, as with Euratom loans, the Com¬ mission will arrange for the minutes of meetings to record more fully the main points discussed. The Commission's decisions relating to applications for NCI financing are based on an assess¬ ment of the investment projects with respect to conformity with the provisions of the EEC Treaty and secondary legislation, the Council's decisions and guidelines and the cooperation agreement with the EIB. : The Inter-Service Group which prepares the Commission's decisions records the results of its dis¬ cussions on each project unanimous approval without discussion or list of problems and di¬ vergences of view prompting reservations or adverse opinions.
. 4. 'Η 'Επιτροπή υποστηρίζει τό γεγονός δτι ή ανάπτυξη τών χορηγουμένων δανείων ΝΚΜ είχε ένα πρόσθετο απο¬ τέλεσμα έν σχέσει μέ τίς επεμβάσεις τής ETE. 
The same arrangements (see 4.37 above) will be made for the EIB Inter-Service Group's discussions about NCI loans. Point 4.40: Difference between NCI loans and EIB loans In view of the experimental nature of the NCI operations under the first tranches of borrowings,' the close link between the two instruments was desirable and beneficial. The Commission would stress that the development of NCI loans has had the effect of supplementing the EIB's activities.
. Τό πρώτο βήμα σ' αυτή τή κατεύθυνση έγινε ήδη μι τή δυνατότητα τοϋ ΝΚΜ νά χρηματοδοτεί, σέ ορισμένες περιπτώσεις, στεγάσεις. 
Subsequent developments, however, will show the NCI evolving along its own lines: the first step in this direction was taken in allowing NCI I to finance housing in certain cases.
. 
In the future, the Commission envisages a more specific application of the instrument in areas less well cov¬ ered by EIB aid.
. 
This is evidenced by the areas of application defined in the recent Council deci¬ sion.
. 
The NCI will have a role distinct from that of the EIB in the financing of certain classes of investments relating to the rational use of energy or.investments by small and medium-size busi¬ nesses, notably non-industrial and outside classified regions (NCI II decisions of 15 March 1982 and 26 April 1982).
. 
Point 4.41 : NCI loans: Divergence between the decision-making procedures for the NCI instrument (1978) and for the Euratom instrument (1977) The difference between the Euratom and NCI procedures is that Euratom projects are far fewer but involve much larger sums than those of the NCI, and they relate to a special category of
. 
'Because of these special features of Euratom operations the Commission is able to handle appli-' cations for financing and the grant of loans without additional personnel, whereas full-scale management of NCI applications and loans by the Commission would require a large number of new staff with the appropriate administrative framework, which would thus duplicate the Bank's ν facilities.
. 
If, then, the Commission asked for the Euratom procedure to be applied to the NCI, as the Court of Auditors suggests, it would have to take on a large number of additional staff.
. 
(This also applies to points 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28 to 5.31.) . , This is why Article 172 (4) of the Euratom Treaty provides that loans will be granted without any specific body being set up, whereas thé EEC Treaty, which lays the legal foundation for NCI operations (Article 235), makes provision for the establishment of the EIB (Article 129) with the task of contributing to the balanced development of the common market by granting loans for the financing of projects in all sectors of the economy (Article 130).
. 
The Commission feels that the Court of Auditors should bear in mind these very clear-cut differ¬ ences between NCI and Euratom projects and realize that they call for different procedures. ' .
. 
Responsibility for decisions to grant NCI loans The Council decided that the Bank should be made responsible, under a cooperation agreement, for granting loans in pursuance of its Decision 78/870/EEC.
. 
This allocation of powers does not leave the Commission with rio responsibility in the decision-making procedures relating to the grant of NCI loans.
. 
This responsibility is as follows: the Commission decides on the eligibility of each project; any project found ineligible by the Commission will not receive an NCI loan; '.'../ . under Article 9 of the Agreement it can seek consultation with the Bank before a final decision òn the application is taken; the director nominated by the Commission on the board of directors of the EIB has a say ih decisions on the grant of NCI loans; the Commission, acting on behalf of the Community, signs NCI loan contracts jointly with the EIB; without this signature, which confirms the eligibility decision, no contract can enter into force.
. 
It is clear that even apart from the decision on eligibility, the Commission remains in full control of its position until the contract is signed.
. 
The Commission would also add that the Commission and the EIB frequently hold-working meetings on questions relating to the applica¬ tion of the NCI or to Euratom loans at various levels including that of the President and Management Committee of the EIB and the Member of the Commission responsible (at present the Vice-President of the Commission responsible for economic and financial affairs).
. 12. 
No C 319/38 Official Journal of the European Communities 6.12.82 > agriculture, environment, etc.).
. 
The EIB is familiar with all these rules and applies them when selecting applications.
. 
¡ Like the Commission's opinions and decisions on the grant of loans, decisions on eligibility for an interest subsidy are taken with reference to all the criteria set by the Community's policies, with which the EIB is well acquainted.