natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Apart from a letter sent by the Secretary-General to the Member States on 6 August 1990, explaining that the tables must be sent to the DGs in charge with a copy to DG II (Economic and financial affairs), there is no Commission document which sets out clearly the division of responsibility between its departments. 
Apart from a letter sent by the Secretary-General to the Member States on 6 August 1990, explaining that the tables must be sent to the DGs in charge with a copy to DG II (Economic and financial affairs), there is no Commission document which sets out clearly the division of responsibility between its departments.
The DGs in charge of each Objective are those responsible for the management, and DG II plays an advisory role, owing to its expertise in the economic sphere. 
The DGs in charge of each Objective are those responsible for the management, and DG II plays an advisory role, owing to its expertise in the economic sphere.
It is supposed to receive the reports sent by the Member States via the DGs in charge, and is responsible for examining these documents and sending its conclusions to the relevant DGs. 
It is supposed to receive the reports sent by the Member States via the DGs in charge, and is responsible for examining these documents and sending its conclusions to the relevant DGs.
This arrangement is not very effective. 
This arrangement is not very effective.
The fact is that DG II carries out analyses, makes proposals and requests modifications to certain decisions or to the supplementary information, which are not always accepted, because, formally, it does not engage in dialogue with the Member States or react directly to them. 
The fact is that DG II carries out analyses, makes proposals and requests modifications to certain decisions or to the supplementary information, which are not always accepted, because, formally, it does not engage in dialogue with the Member States or react directly to them.
DG II was not called on to participate in the additionality verification exercise for Objectives 3 and 4 for the 1994 to 1999 period because of the methodology adopted by DG V. This methodology was based on samples and takes into account the Objective 1 regions, for which the monitoring of additionality is carried out within the framework of the Objective 1 CSFs. 
DG II was not called on to participate in the additionality verification exercise for Objectives 3 and 4 for the 1994 to 1999 period because of the methodology adopted by DG V. This methodology was based on samples and takes into account the Objective 1 regions, for which the monitoring of additionality is carried out within the framework of the Objective 1 CSFs.
Coordination 14. 
Coordination 14.
At DG VI (Agriculture), few arrangements were made for verifying additionality. 
At DG VI (Agriculture), few arrangements were made for verifying additionality.
DG VI is of the opinion that the responsibility for verifying additionality lies with DG II, since it does not possess the necessary technical expertise to carry out this task. 
DG VI is of the opinion that the responsibility for verifying additionality lies with DG II, since it does not possess the necessary technical expertise to carry out this task.
For several Member States, DG VI was not able to provide any documents on the verification of additionality. 
For several Member States, DG VI was not able to provide any documents on the verification of additionality.
At DG XVI (Regional policy and cohesion), a horizontal department is responsible for monitoring the principle of additionality which relies, as far as technical aspects are concerned, on the work carried out by DG II. 
At DG XVI (Regional policy and cohesion), a horizontal department is responsible for monitoring the principle of additionality which relies, as far as technical aspects are concerned, on the work carried out by DG II.
However, this department is not always informed of contacts between the geographical units and the Member States. 
However, this department is not always informed of contacts between the geographical units and the Member States.
These deficiencies in coordination between the horizontal department, the geographical units and DG II result in documents being dispersed around several units and in several different people communicating with the Member States. 
These deficiencies in coordination between the horizontal department, the geographical units and DG II result in documents being dispersed around several units and in several different people communicating with the Member States.
This situation makes partnership with the Member States difficult, and also makes it hard to obtain an overall view of the issue. 
This situation makes partnership with the Member States difficult, and also makes it hard to obtain an overall view of the issue.
At DG V (Employment, industrial relations and social affairs), in spite of the checks concerning Objectives 3 and 4 of the European Social Fund (ESF) carried out in 1996 by the Court (7), the situation remains unsatisfactory. 
At DG V (Employment, industrial relations and social affairs), in spite of the checks concerning Objectives 3 and 4 of the European Social Fund (ESF) carried out in 1996 by the Court (7), the situation remains unsatisfactory.
The results of the audit of the observance of additionality for Objectives 3 and 4 for the 1990 to 1993 period, carried out by the ÔAudit and inspectionŐ sector of the financial unit of DG V, were very disappointing: for seven Member States (B, EL, E, IRL, I, NL and UK) it was not possible to complete the exercise and nothing has been done to rectify this situation (see paragraph 28). 
The results of the audit of the observance of additionality for Objectives 3 and 4 for the 1990 to 1993 period, carried out by the ÔAudit and inspectionŐ sector of the financial unit of DG V, were very disappointing: for seven Member States (B, EL, E, IRL, I, NL and UK) it was not possible to complete the exercise and nothing has been done to rectify this situation (see paragraph 28).
With regard to the 1994 to 1999 period, where the geographical units did receive information, it was not subjected to much examination. 
With regard to the 1994 to 1999 period, where the geographical units did receive information, it was not subjected to much examination.
Under these circumstances, there were serious failures of coordination in all the DGs involved. 
Under these circumstances, there were serious failures of coordination in all the DGs involved.
The files are very incomplete and dispersed, making it very difficult for the Commission administrators to know what the situation is. 
The files are very incomplete and dispersed, making it very difficult for the Commission administrators to know what the situation is.
Interdepartmental discussions and discussions with the Member States were often informal, so that the results were not recorded in the files. 
Interdepartmental discussions and discussions with the Member States were often informal, so that the results were not recorded in the files.
Some Commission departments asked Member States for information which had already been provided to other Commission departments and which had obviously not been circulated. 
Some Commission departments asked Member States for information which had already been provided to other Commission departments and which had obviously not been circulated.
In order to obviate these problems, one Member State decided to send information to all the officials who might possibly be responsible for the file by post and by e-mail. 
In order to obviate these problems, one Member State decided to send information to all the officials who might possibly be responsible for the file by post and by e-mail.
Suspensive clauses 18. 
Suspensive clauses 18.
The use of suspensive clauses gives a clear illustration of the consequences of this lack of coordination. 
The use of suspensive clauses gives a clear illustration of the consequences of this lack of coordination.
This kind of clause provides for the automatic suspension of payments after the first advance if the relevant information needed for ex ante verification of additionality has not been provided by the Member State. 
This kind of clause provides for the automatic suspension of payments after the first advance if the relevant information needed for ex ante verification of additionality has not been provided by the Member State.
The Commission inserted them in decisions granting assistance as a means of exerting pressure. 
The Commission inserted them in decisions granting assistance as a means of exerting pressure.
This is not a case of the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, which is supposed to govern the suspension of payments, but of a procedure 
This is not a case of the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, which is supposed to govern the suspension of payments, but of a procedure
C 68/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 lacking any procedures or fixed criteria stating when these clauses are to be inserted and applied. 
C 68/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 lacking any procedures or fixed criteria stating when these clauses are to be inserted and applied.
Thus, clauses of this kind have been employed for Objectives 2 and 5b, but not for the other Objectives, although there are factors which might also, in some circumstances, have justified their insertion. 
Thus, clauses of this kind have been employed for Objectives 2 and 5b, but not for the other Objectives, although there are factors which might also, in some circumstances, have justified their insertion.
In the case of some Member States, these clauses were inserted in some regional SPDs, although additionality must be measured at the level of the entire group of regions to which an Objective applies. 
In the case of some Member States, these clauses were inserted in some regional SPDs, although additionality must be measured at the level of the entire group of regions to which an Objective applies.
The Commission justified this practice as necessary to avoid penalising regions which had provided the information required, but it resulted in unequal treatment between Member States. 
The Commission justified this practice as necessary to avoid penalising regions which had provided the information required, but it resulted in unequal treatment between Member States.
In many Member States the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 5b was carried out by the same departments, using identical approaches and sources. 
In many Member States the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 5b was carried out by the same departments, using identical approaches and sources.
However, suspensive clauses were only used for one or the other Objective. 
However, suspensive clauses were only used for one or the other Objective.
The only explanation to be found for this lies in purely formal aspects and in the fact that the DGs in charge and their counterparts in the Member States differ. 
The only explanation to be found for this lies in purely formal aspects and in the fact that the DGs in charge and their counterparts in the Member States differ.
The lifting of these clauses has not always been the subject of formal procedures. 
The lifting of these clauses has not always been the subject of formal procedures.
This decision was communicated, on only one occasion, to the relevant Member State by means of a letter from the Commissioner responsible, which was accompanied by the amended verification procedures and the corresponding tables. 
This decision was communicated, on only one occasion, to the relevant Member State by means of a letter from the Commissioner responsible, which was accompanied by the amended verification procedures and the corresponding tables.
On other occasions, the lifting of the clause was communicated by means of a letter from the Director-General. 
On other occasions, the lifting of the clause was communicated by means of a letter from the Director-General.
On some occasions, there was no written communication. 
On some occasions, there was no written communication.
Since in the case of multifund assistance there is a single decision to grant assistance covering all the Funds, the suspensive clauses obviously apply to all of them. 
Since in the case of multifund assistance there is a single decision to grant assistance covering all the Funds, the suspensive clauses obviously apply to all of them.
However, the lack of coordination and the absence of appropriate monitoring and financial control in respect of the files resulted in the payment of approximately ECU 140 million before the lifting of the suspensive clauses. 
However, the lack of coordination and the absence of appropriate monitoring and financial control in respect of the files resulted in the payment of approximately ECU 140 million before the lifting of the suspensive clauses.
The payments in question concern the ERDF (ECU 4,3 million), the EAGGF Guidance (ECU 2,7 million) and the ESF (ECU 133,5 million) for Objective 2 (ECU 42,4 million for the 1994 to 1996 period and ECU 87,8 million for the 1997 to 1999 period) and Objective 5b (ECU 10,3 million). 
The payments in question concern the ERDF (ECU 4,3 million), the EAGGF Guidance (ECU 2,7 million) and the ESF (ECU 133,5 million) for Objective 2 (ECU 42,4 million for the 1994 to 1996 period and ECU 87,8 million for the 1997 to 1999 period) and Objective 5b (ECU 10,3 million).
The majority of the files involved are the responsibility of DG V, which ought to have monitored the suspensive clauses even though it is not in charge of these Objectives. 
The majority of the files involved are the responsibility of DG V, which ought to have monitored the suspensive clauses even though it is not in charge of these Objectives.
Despite the existence of suspensive clauses, all the eligible requests for payments from the ESF submitted by the Member States concerned were granted, revealing the weaknesses of the control procedures used. 
Despite the existence of suspensive clauses, all the eligible requests for payments from the ESF submitted by the Member States concerned were granted, revealing the weaknesses of the control procedures used.
Procedures 22. 
Procedures 22.
As a general rule, the Commission does not send the national authorities involved the results of its analyses of the documents sent by the Member States. 
As a general rule, the Commission does not send the national authorities involved the results of its analyses of the documents sent by the Member States.
There is no procedure laid down to cover this point. 
There is no procedure laid down to cover this point.
If the information is judged to be insufficient, the Commission sometimes asks the Member State for additional information. 
If the information is judged to be insufficient, the Commission sometimes asks the Member State for additional information.
If the information is judged to be satisfactory, the Member State is not always informed of the fact. 
If the information is judged to be satisfactory, the Member State is not always informed of the fact.
The national authorities are very often unaware of the status of a file on which they have had to do a lot of work (8). 
The national authorities are very often unaware of the status of a file on which they have had to do a lot of work (8).
On the other hand, the absence of a reaction from the Commission does not necessarily mean that it considers the information to be correct. 
On the other hand, the absence of a reaction from the Commission does not necessarily mean that it considers the information to be correct.
It may happen that this lack of reaction is simply because of the lack of any analysis by the Commission. 
It may happen that this lack of reaction is simply because of the lack of any analysis by the Commission.
In cases where the SFs are managed by the regional SPDs and not by a CSF, the absence of a Monitoring Committee at national level has made contact between the Commission and the Member States more difficult. 
In cases where the SFs are managed by the regional SPDs and not by a CSF, the absence of a Monitoring Committee at national level has made contact between the Commission and the Member States more difficult.
For Objective 1, this concerns France and the United Kingdom, for Objective 2, all of the Member States except Spain are concerned and for Objective 5b, all of the Member States are concerned. 
For Objective 1, this concerns France and the United Kingdom, for Objective 2, all of the Member States except Spain are concerned and for Objective 5b, all of the Member States are concerned.
THE STATE OF PROGRESS OF WORK ON THE VERIFICATION OF ADDITIONALITY Introduction 23. 
THE STATE OF PROGRESS OF WORK ON THE VERIFICATION OF ADDITIONALITY Introduction 23.
The Commission has issued very little information on the state of progress of the work that has been carried out with the aim of verifying the observance of the principle of additionality. 
The Commission has issued very little information on the state of progress of the work that has been carried out with the aim of verifying the observance of the principle of additionality.
All that is available is a communication to the Consultative Committee on the development and conversion of regions (9), a single annual report on additionality from 1990 to 1993, concerning Objectives 3 and 4 (10) and a few paragraphs in the annual reports on the SFs. 
All that is available is a communication to the Consultative Committee on the development and conversion of regions (9), a single annual report on additionality from 1990 to 1993, concerning Objectives 3 and 4 (10) and a few paragraphs in the annual reports on the SFs.
These paragraphs are very brief and sometimes include incorrect information. 
These paragraphs are very brief and sometimes include incorrect information.
For example, the 1995 annual report (11) states that ÔObjective 5b was the only Objective for which it was possible to confirm in 1995 that additionality had been observed in all Member StatesŐ. 
For example, the 1995 annual report (11) states that ÔObjective 5b was the only Objective for which it was possible to confirm in 1995 that additionality had been observed in all Member StatesŐ.
However, most Member States have not carried out any ex post verification operation concerning this Objective, and, moreover, have not been asked to do so by the Commission (12). 
However, most Member States have not carried out any ex post verification operation concerning this Objective, and, moreover, have not been asked to do so by the Commission (12).
The 1989 to 1993 period 24. 
The 1989 to 1993 period 24.
Work on the ex post verification of the observance of the principle of additionality for the 1989 to 1993 period is still unfinished for certain Member States. 
Work on the ex post verification of the observance of the principle of additionality for the 1989 to 1993 period is still unfinished for certain Member States.
The extremely long periods over which data collection, processing and forwarding, and the CommissionŐs examination, the discussions and exchanges of letters were spread have led to a gradual loss of interest on the part of the Member States and the Commission in this exercise, which is required by the regulations. 
The extremely long periods over which data collection, processing and forwarding, and the CommissionŐs examination, the discussions and exchanges of letters were spread have led to a gradual loss of interest on the part of the Member States and the Commission in this exercise, which is required by the regulations.
In addition, the fact that the results have not been formally stated or published makes knowledge of the state of progress in each Member State and on each Objective impossible. 
In addition, the fact that the results have not been formally stated or published makes knowledge of the state of progress in each Member State and on each Objective impossible.
For Objective 1, two of the Member States (F and UK) out of the seven involved (EL, E, F, IRL, I, P and UK) have not even begun ex post verification. 
For Objective 1, two of the Member States (F and UK) out of the seven involved (EL, E, F, IRL, I, P and UK) have not even begun ex post verification.
In the case of the others, the Commission has accepted, although not without difficulty and occasionally with reservations (EL), the data and results submitted by the Member States (in some cases extremely late Ń Italy in 1997). 
In the case of the others, the Commission has accepted, although not without difficulty and occasionally with reservations (EL), the data and results submitted by the Member States (in some cases extremely late Ń Italy in 1997).
In Germany, no verification was carried out for the 1991 to 1993 period on account of the special circumstances of the new Lnder. 
In Germany, no verification was carried out for the 1991 to 1993 period on account of the special circumstances of the new Lnder.
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/7 26. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/7 26.
For Objective 2 (B, DK, D, E, F, I, L, NL and UK), the situation is less certain. 
For Objective 2 (B, DK, D, E, F, I, L, NL and UK), the situation is less certain.
Three Member States have not sent in the data (F, L and UK), and for three others the data sent were inadequate. 
Three Member States have not sent in the data (F, L and UK), and for three others the data sent were inadequate.
The Italian authorities did not send in information on the year 1988 until May 1999. 
The Italian authorities did not send in information on the year 1988 until May 1999.
The Commission has not taken any concrete steps to carry out an ex post verification of the observance of additionality for Objective 5b. 
The Commission has not taken any concrete steps to carry out an ex post verification of the observance of additionality for Objective 5b.
The only analyses carried out concern the calcula-tions of the baseline for the 1994 to 1999 period. 
The only analyses carried out concern the calculations of the baseline for the 1994 to 1999 period.
Only one Member State (E) has sent, of its own initiative, final data to the Commission, but has received no reply. 
Only one Member State (E) has sent, of its own initiative, final data to the Commission, but has received no reply.
For Objectives 3 and 4, the Commission published a report (13) in 1995 setting out the results of an audit it had carried out on the data provided by the Member States, which was, in the majority of cases, insufficient (14). 
For Objectives 3 and 4, the Commission published a report (13) in 1995 setting out the results of an audit it had carried out on the data provided by the Member States, which was, in the majority of cases, insufficient (14).
The 12 Member States were examined, even though for the three to whom Objective 1 applied additionality was verified within the framework of the CSF for this Objective. 
The 12 Member States were examined, even though for the three to whom Objective 1 applied additionality was verified within the framework of the CSF for this Objective.
The Commission concluded that the principle of additionality was being observed in four countries (D, F, L and P), was less sure in three other countries (DK, I and NL) and stated that the principle had not been observed at all in the five remaining countries (B, EL, E, IRL and the UK). 
The Commission concluded that the principle of additionality was being observed in four countries (D, F, L and P), was less sure in three other countries (DK, I and NL) and stated that the principle had not been observed at all in the five remaining countries (B, EL, E, IRL and the UK).
This situation has still not been monitored and the process of verifying additionality has therefore not been completed. 
This situation has still not been monitored and the process of verifying additionality has therefore not been completed.
The 1994 to 1999 period 29. 
The 1994 to 1999 period 29.