natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Court has examined the verification of this principle for the 1989 to 1993 and 1994 to 1999 periods, for all the Structural Funds Objectives (1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b and 6), in order to obtain an overall view of its implementation. 
The Court has examined the verification of this principle for the 1989 to 1993 and 1994 to 1999 periods, for all the Structural Funds Objectives (1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b and 6), in order to obtain an overall view of its implementation.
Checks were carried out at the Commission and on the spot in Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Checks were carried out at the Commission and on the spot in Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Questionnaires were sent to the 15 Member States (see paragraphs 1 and 2). 
Questionnaires were sent to the 15 Member States (see paragraphs 1 and 2).
Summary of the main findings The main findings concerning the procedures for verifying additionality and their implementation at the Commission and in the Member States are as follows: (a) theprincipleofadditionality,asdefinedintheregulations,allowsdifferinginterpretationsbytheMember States (see paragraph 4). 
Summary of the main findings The main findings concerning the procedures for verifying additionality and their implementation at the Commission and in the Member States are as follows: (a) theprincipleofadditionality,asdefinedintheregulations,allowsdifferinginterpretationsbytheMember States (see paragraph 4).
The obligations in the regulations have not been backed up by sanctions or other consequences (see paragraph 6); (b) the procedures for verifying the principle are inadequate, difficult to use and not always observed (see paragraphs 7 to 11); (c) the division of responsibilities at the Commission for monitoring and checking has not been laid down (see paragraphs 12 to 13) and there is no coordination between the Directorates-General (DGs) involved (see paragraphs 14 to 17); these failings have hampered the work on the verification of additionality. 
The obligations in the regulations have not been backed up by sanctions or other consequences (see paragraph 6); (b) the procedures for verifying the principle are inadequate, difficult to use and not always observed (see paragraphs 7 to 11); (c) the division of responsibilities at the Commission for monitoring and checking has not been laid down (see paragraphs 12 to 13) and there is no coordination between the Directorates-General (DGs) involved (see paragraphs 14 to 17); these failings have hampered the work on the verification of additionality.
Clauses suspending payments, because of the absence of information enabling the ex ante verification of the observance of the principle, have been used in an unsatisfactory and, on occasion, irregular way (see paragraphs 18 to 21); (d) work on the verification of additionality for the 1989 to 1993 period is still unfinished for certain Member States (see paragraphs 24 to 28). 
Clauses suspending payments, because of the absence of information enabling the ex ante verification of the observance of the principle, have been used in an unsatisfactory and, on occasion, irregular way (see paragraphs 18 to 21); (d) work on the verification of additionality for the 1989 to 1993 period is still unfinished for certain Member States (see paragraphs 24 to 28).
For the 1994 to 1999 period, it is difficult to establish whether the principle has been observed by some Member States, because of the methodological weaknesses affecting the data submitted (see paragraphs 29 to 38). 
For the 1994 to 1999 period, it is difficult to establish whether the principle has been observed by some Member States, because of the methodological weaknesses affecting the data submitted (see paragraphs 29 to 38).
The main causes of the methodological difficulties in the verification of the principle of additionality are as follows: (a) the difficulties in determining the public structural expenditure, or comparable expenditure, to be taken into account, the incompleteness of the existing statistical and budgetary data and problems in identifying which expenditure headings to analyse and in compiling the data (see paragraphs 40 to 50); (b) the overlapping of the periods makes it difficult to compare expenditure during the programming period with a reference period. 
The main causes of the methodological difficulties in the verification of the principle of additionality are as follows: (a) the difficulties in determining the public structural expenditure, or comparable expenditure, to be taken into account, the incompleteness of the existing statistical and budgetary data and problems in identifying which expenditure headings to analyse and in compiling the data (see paragraphs 40 to 50); (b) the overlapping of the periods makes it difficult to compare expenditure during the programming period with a reference period.
In fact, the actual programming period does not necessarily coincide with the calendar years under consideration, because of possible extensions to the period in order to fulfil commitments and the minimum extension of two years for making the payments, which always results in the simultaneous implementation of at least two periods. 
In fact, the actual programming period does not necessarily coincide with the calendar years under consideration, because of possible extensions to the period in order to fulfil commitments and the minimum extension of two years for making the payments, which always results in the simultaneous implementation of at least two periods.
This overlapping of the periods therefore results in verifications being carried out on disparate elements and the impossibility of comparing the ex ante and on-going verifications (see paragraphs 51 to 57); (c) problemsconnectedwithcomparingdatafromoneperiodwiththepreviousoneandtheinfluenceofthe starting point chosen for the reference period. 
This overlapping of the periods therefore results in verifications being carried out on disparate elements and the impossibility of comparing the ex ante and on-going verifications (see paragraphs 51 to 57); (c) problemsconnectedwithcomparingdatafromoneperiodwiththepreviousoneandtheinfluenceofthe starting point chosen for the reference period.
Thus, the potentially eligible expenditure or the eligible areas may not be the same for the two periods, and certain special circumstances, such as privatisations, must be taken into account (see paragraphs 58 to 63); 9.3.2000 
Thus, the potentially eligible expenditure or the eligible areas may not be the same for the two periods, and certain special circumstances, such as privatisations, must be taken into account (see paragraphs 58 to 63); 9.3.2000
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities (d) expenditure is broken down geographically in proportion to the population or the surface area of the relevant zones, and this simplification leads to questionable results (see paragraphs 64 to 68). 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities (d) expenditure is broken down geographically in proportion to the population or the surface area of the relevant zones, and this simplification leads to questionable results (see paragraphs 64 to 68).
Conclusions The reportŐs main conclusions are as follows: (a) the difficulties encountered are caused by the limited development of the principle in terms of concepts and methodology and the joint failure to find appropriate and effective procedures for verifying it (see paragraph 69); (b) the absence of any sanctions in cases where the Member States are in breach of their obligations has not encouraged them to observe the relevant provisions (see paragraph 70); (c) theidentificationofthestructuralassistanceinterventionsintheeligibleregionsisunreliable,andthisleads to the inclusion of a large number of estimates and hypotheses which are difficult to verify (see paragraphs 71 to 72); (d) verification of the principle of additionality is an exercise which is isolated from the on-going processes of monitoring and evaluation of the structural measures, which means that the work done by the Commission and the Member States is of little practical use (see paragraph 73); (e) deficienciesintheorganisationandcoordinationoftheCommissiondepartmentsinthisareahavereduced the effectiveness of individual efforts (see paragraph 73); (f) for the new programming period, and in accordance with the relevant regulations, procedures for verifying additionality should be drawn up that are more workable, that are integrated into the programming, monitoring and evaluation frameworks and that are suitable for use with the budgetary and statistical information that is available. 
Conclusions The reportŐs main conclusions are as follows: (a) the difficulties encountered are caused by the limited development of the principle in terms of concepts and methodology and the joint failure to find appropriate and effective procedures for verifying it (see paragraph 69); (b) the absence of any sanctions in cases where the Member States are in breach of their obligations has not encouraged them to observe the relevant provisions (see paragraph 70); (c) theidentificationofthestructuralassistanceinterventionsintheeligibleregionsisunreliable,andthisleads to the inclusion of a large number of estimates and hypotheses which are difficult to verify (see paragraphs 71 to 72); (d) verification of the principle of additionality is an exercise which is isolated from the on-going processes of monitoring and evaluation of the structural measures, which means that the work done by the Commission and the Member States is of little practical use (see paragraph 73); (e) deficienciesintheorganisationandcoordinationoftheCommissiondepartmentsinthisareahavereduced the effectiveness of individual efforts (see paragraph 73); (f) for the new programming period, and in accordance with the relevant regulations, procedures for verifying additionality should be drawn up that are more workable, that are integrated into the programming, monitoring and evaluation frameworks and that are suitable for use with the budgetary and statistical information that is available.
These data should be improved (see paragraphs 74 to 75). 
These data should be improved (see paragraphs 74 to 75).
C 68/3 
C 68/3
C 68/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 INTRODUCTION 1. 
C 68/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 INTRODUCTION 1.
This report concerns the verification of the principle of additionality in the Structural Funds (SFs). 
This report concerns the verification of the principle of additionality in the Structural Funds (SFs).
The CourtŐs checks concerned all the Objectives (1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b and 6) and were carried out by means of an inspection of the CommissionŐs files, questionnaires sent to the 15 Member States and meetings with the responsible bodies in Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
The CourtŐs checks concerned all the Objectives (1, 2, 3, 4, 5a, 5b and 6) and were carried out by means of an inspection of the CommissionŐs files, questionnaires sent to the 15 Member States and meetings with the responsible bodies in Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
The operation of the SFs is based on four overall principles: concentration, partnership, programming and additionality. 
The operation of the SFs is based on four overall principles: concentration, partnership, programming and additionality.
Additionality is designed to ensure that SF appropriations do not take the place of public expenditure by the Member State on structural or comparable projects in the whole of the territory eligible under an Objective (1). 
Additionality is designed to ensure that SF appropriations do not take the place of public expenditure by the Member State on structural or comparable projects in the whole of the territory eligible under an Objective (1).
Since 1975, the concept of additionality has been the subject of numerous analyses. 
Since 1975, the concept of additionality has been the subject of numerous analyses.
In Council Regulation (EEC) No 724/75 of 18 March 1975 (2) the view was already being expressed that Ôthe assistance of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) should not lead Member States to reduce their own regional development efforts but should complement these effortsŐ (11th recital). 
In Council Regulation (EEC) No 724/75 of 18 March 1975 (2) the view was already being expressed that Ôthe assistance of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) should not lead Member States to reduce their own regional development efforts but should complement these effortsŐ (11th recital).
Since then, subsequent ERDF and SF regulations have attempted to give better and more precise definitions of the concept of additionality. 
Since then, subsequent ERDF and SF regulations have attempted to give better and more precise definitions of the concept of additionality.
Thus, Article 36 of Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84 on the ERDF (3) defined two kinds of additionality (spe-cific or overall) and the choice between them was left to the Member States. 
Thus, Article 36 of Regulation (EEC) No 1787/84 on the ERDF (3) defined two kinds of additionality (specific or overall) and the choice between them was left to the Member States.
During the reform of the SFs in 1988, overall additionality, by Objective and by Member State, was chosen. 
During the reform of the SFs in 1988, overall additionality, by Objective and by Member State, was chosen.
In 1993, and in response to the difficulties of implementing this principle, the concept was reformulated. 
In 1993, and in response to the difficulties of implementing this principle, the concept was reformulated.
Finally, in 1998, in its proposals for SF regulations for the period 2000 to 2006, the Commission submitted new guidelines (4). 
Finally, in 1998, in its proposals for SF regulations for the period 2000 to 2006, the Commission submitted new guidelines (4).
In spite of the successive reformulations of the principle of additionality in each of the new SF regulations, it has always been defined in terms that allow differing interpretations by the Member States. 
In spite of the successive reformulations of the principle of additionality in each of the new SF regulations, it has always been defined in terms that allow differing interpretations by the Member States.
Specifically, Article 9(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 makes provision for taking account of Ôthe macroeconomic circumstancesŐ, Ôa number of specific economic circumstancesŐ, Ôan unusual level of public structural expenditure undertaken in the previous programming periodŐ and Ôbusiness cycles in the national economyŐ. 
Specifically, Article 9(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 makes provision for taking account of Ôthe macroeconomic circumstancesŐ, Ôa number of specific economic circumstancesŐ, Ôan unusual level of public structural expenditure undertaken in the previous programming periodŐ and Ôbusiness cycles in the national economyŐ.
The Commission attempted to make the contents of Article 9 more complete and precise by including a ÔstatementŐ in the minutes of the Council meeting held on 20 July 1993, at which the texts of the regulations governing the SFs were adopted. 
The Commission attempted to make the contents of Article 9 more complete and precise by including a ÔstatementŐ in the minutes of the Council meeting held on 20 July 1993, at which the texts of the regulations governing the SFs were adopted.
A statement of this kind is only binding on its author, but has made it possible to clarify certain points. 
A statement of this kind is only binding on its author, but has made it possible to clarify certain points.
The Member StatesŐ obligations are defined in the Regulation as: to observe the principle of additionality, to ensure that structural expenditure is maintained and to provide the relevant information. 
The Member StatesŐ obligations are defined in the Regulation as: to observe the principle of additionality, to ensure that structural expenditure is maintained and to provide the relevant information.
However, there are no specific provisions on the consequences of failure to meet these obligations. 
However, there are no specific provisions on the consequences of failure to meet these obligations.
In fact, the provisions on payments, on financial control and on reduction, suspension and cancellation of assistance concern decisions to grant aid under the heading of individual forms of assistance (operational programmes, global grants or major projects), whereas verification of additionality must be carried out at the general level of the Community support framework (CSF) (5). 
In fact, the provisions on payments, on financial control and on reduction, suspension and cancellation of assistance concern decisions to grant aid under the heading of individual forms of assistance (operational programmes, global grants or major projects), whereas verification of additionality must be carried out at the general level of the Community support framework (CSF) (5).
PROCEDURES FOR VERIFYING ADDITIONALITY 7. 
PROCEDURES FOR VERIFYING ADDITIONALITY 7.
Under the provisions of the regulations, the procedures for verifying additionality are supposed to be agreed between the Commission and the Member State concerned when the CSFs are drawn up. 
Under the provisions of the regulations, the procedures for verifying additionality are supposed to be agreed between the Commission and the Member State concerned when the CSFs are drawn up.
However, these procedures, which either merely refer to the provisions of the regulations or contain extremely brief rules of a standard type, were not always established in the various CSFs or single programming documents (SPDs) of Objectives 2 and 5b. 
However, these procedures, which either merely refer to the provisions of the regulations or contain extremely brief rules of a standard type, were not always established in the various CSFs or single programming documents (SPDs) of Objectives 2 and 5b.
Checks at the Commission and in the Member States showed that the verification procedures are insufficient to enable the principle to be verified. 
Checks at the Commission and in the Member States showed that the verification procedures are insufficient to enable the principle to be verified.
These procedures should have been workable and adapted to the particular institutional, administrative and statistical systems of the Member States. 
These procedures should have been workable and adapted to the particular institutional, administrative and statistical systems of the Member States.
The procedures laid down in the CSFs and the SPDs did not tackle the real methodological and practical difficulties already encountered during the previous period. 
The procedures laid down in the CSFs and the SPDs did not tackle the real methodological and practical difficulties already encountered during the previous period.
Some-times they state that the previous periodŐs method is to be used, when in fact no method had been defined, or when it had proved inadequate. 
Sometimes they state that the previous periodŐs method is to be used, when in fact no method had been defined, or when it had proved inadequate.
For certain Member States, the process of drawing up the CSFs/SPDs resulted in the presentation of incomplete tables or numerical data (see paragraphs 29 and 30). 
For certain Member States, the process of drawing up the CSFs/SPDs resulted in the presentation of incomplete tables or numerical data (see paragraphs 29 and 30).
The verification procedures consist of the obligation to send to the Commission on a regular basis global tables, covering all the regions and areas concerned, which include the final or provisional expenditure for the previous years and estimates and forecasts for future years. 
The verification procedures consist of the obligation to send to the Commission on a regular basis global tables, covering all the regions and areas concerned, which include the final or provisional expenditure for the previous years and estimates and forecasts for future years.
A table of this kind is difficult to verify without, on the one hand, a relevant breakdown of the data by region and by expenditure category and, on the other hand, a distinction between actual and forecast expenditure. 
A table of this kind is difficult to verify without, on the one hand, a relevant breakdown of the data by region and by expenditure category and, on the other hand, a distinction between actual and forecast expenditure.
In a number of these procedures (6), if, in the CommissionŐs opinion, there appears to be a risk that the respect of the principle of additionality is endangered the Commission may request that the Member State communicate, within a specified time, details of the measures it intends to take in respect of eligible 
In a number of these procedures (6), if, in the CommissionŐs opinion, there appears to be a risk that the respect of the principle of additionality is endangered the Commission may request that the Member State communicate, within a specified time, details of the measures it intends to take in respect of eligible
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/5 non-co-financed expenditure. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/5 non-co-financed expenditure.
The Commission will then decide, in accordance with the procedures laid down in the regulations, what measures it will take in respect of expenditure co-financed by the Structural Funds. 
The Commission will then decide, in accordance with the procedures laid down in the regulations, what measures it will take in respect of expenditure co-financed by the Structural Funds.
However, the regulations do not lay down any procedures which allow the Commission to take measures. 
However, the regulations do not lay down any procedures which allow the Commission to take measures.
Moreover, in the absence of a precise legal basis, there is no definition of the nature and content of these possible measures. 
Moreover, in the absence of a precise legal basis, there is no definition of the nature and content of these possible measures.
For these reasons, this provision has never been applied. 
For these reasons, this provision has never been applied.
Information to enable monitoring of the principle of additionality has rarely been sent within the periods specified in the CSFs and the SPDs; for certain Member States and Objectives it has never even been sent (see paragraphs 32 to 35). 
Information to enable monitoring of the principle of additionality has rarely been sent within the periods specified in the CSFs and the SPDs; for certain Member States and Objectives it has never even been sent (see paragraphs 32 to 35).
In the specific cases of Objectives 2 and 5b, certain Member States stated that the verification procedures did not lay down any precise timetable for the sending of information. 
In the specific cases of Objectives 2 and 5b, certain Member States stated that the verification procedures did not lay down any precise timetable for the sending of information.
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE COMMISSION Allocation of responsibility for verification 12. 
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE COMMISSION Allocation of responsibility for verification 12.
Within the Commission, the division of responsibilities for monitoring and checking the observation of the principle of additionality does not appear to have been adequately laid down or formalised. 
Within the Commission, the division of responsibilities for monitoring and checking the observation of the principle of additionality does not appear to have been adequately laid down or formalised.
Four Directorates-General (DG II, DG V, DG VI and DG XVI) have to deal with additionality issues, and within these directorates several departments are involved. 
Four Directorates-General (DG II, DG V, DG VI and DG XVI) have to deal with additionality issues, and within these directorates several departments are involved.