natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At the beginning of the 1994 to 1999 period, the initial results of the ex ante verifications were set out in the majority of the CSFs/SPDs, in varying degrees of detail. 
At the beginning of the 1994 to 1999 period, the initial results of the ex ante verifications were set out in the majority of the CSFs/SPDs, in varying degrees of detail.
In many cases the data needed were sent by the Member States only a few days before the approval of the CSFs/SPDs, or afterwards. 
In many cases the data needed were sent by the Member States only a few days before the approval of the CSFs/SPDs, or afterwards.
For example, the ex ante verification of Objective 2 for 1994 to 1996 for Luxembourg was only carried out during the summer of 1998. 
For example, the ex ante verification of Objective 2 for 1994 to 1996 for Luxembourg was only carried out during the summer of 1998.
The Commission carried out the ex ante analyses on the basis of the tables sent in by the Member States. 
The Commission carried out the ex ante analyses on the basis of the tables sent in by the Member States.
Usually these tables had been created by putting together many items of data relating to regions, sectors and other units. 
Usually these tables had been created by putting together many items of data relating to regions, sectors and other units.
Their reliability can only be properly evaluated if their sources and the methods used to draw them up are known, which is not often the case. 
Their reliability can only be properly evaluated if their sources and the methods used to draw them up are known, which is not often the case.
The lack of the methodology and tools needed to examine the validity of the results obtained by the Member States leaves the Commission no alternative but to accept the conclusions reached by the national authorities. 
The lack of the methodology and tools needed to examine the validity of the results obtained by the Member States leaves the Commission no alternative but to accept the conclusions reached by the national authorities.
Tables 1 and 2 show the annual average expenditure on development in the Objective 1 regions as given in the CSFs/SPDs. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the annual average expenditure on development in the Objective 1 regions as given in the CSFs/SPDs.
The extreme variations that can be seen in these tables could, in some cases, be the result of the quality and the quantity of the information transmitted by the Member States. 
The extreme variations that can be seen in these tables could, in some cases, be the result of the quality and the quantity of the information transmitted by the Member States.
Thus, for example, according to the data submitted by the Member States for the 1994 to 1999 period, the SFs financed 39,7 % of the ECU 919,9 million of government expenditure connected with the development of the French Objective 1 regions, whereas for the German regions, this percentage was apparently 4,5 % of the ECU 50 646 million. 
Thus, for example, according to the data submitted by the Member States for the 1994 to 1999 period, the SFs financed 39,7 % of the ECU 919,9 million of government expenditure connected with the development of the French Objective 1 regions, whereas for the German regions, this percentage was apparently 4,5 % of the ECU 50 646 million.
It turned out that the methodology used by these Member States resulted in underestimating the expenditure connected with regional development in France, and overestimating it in Germany. 
It turned out that the methodology used by these Member States resulted in underestimating the expenditure connected with regional development in France, and overestimating it in Germany.
However, given the lack of homogeneity in the data submitted by the Member States and the fact that the Member States have varying socio-economic circumstances and priorities, it is difficult to draw conclusions from such comparisons. 
However, given the lack of homogeneity in the data submitted by the Member States and the fact that the Member States have varying socio-economic circumstances and priorities, it is difficult to draw conclusions from such comparisons.
The on-going verifications were not carried out in the same way for all the Objectives. 
The on-going verifications were not carried out in the same way for all the Objectives.
For Objectives 1 and 6, all the Member States except France converted their tables of expenditure to current values, although the updatings were carried out after long delays. 
For Objectives 1 and 6, all the Member States except France converted their tables of expenditure to current values, although the updatings were carried out after long delays.
For Objective 2, 1994 to 1996, the on-going verifications were not carried out until the ex ante verifications for the 1997 to 1999 period. 
For Objective 2, 1994 to 1996, the on-going verifications were not carried out until the ex ante verifications for the 1997 to 1999 period.
Serious problems were posed by transfers of assistance between the two periods, their overlapping and their relatively short duration, and these have not yet been resolved. 
Serious problems were posed by transfers of assistance between the two periods, their overlapping and their relatively short duration, and these have not yet been resolved.
It is doubtful whether two separate ex post verifications, for 1994 to 1996 and 1997 to 1999, are feasible, and some Member States intend to carry out just one verification. 
It is doubtful whether two separate ex post verifications, for 1994 to 1996 and 1997 to 1999, are feasible, and some Member States intend to carry out just one verification.
The only advantage of this would be to gain some time pending the necessary methodological reflections on the root of the problem. 
The only advantage of this would be to gain some time pending the necessary methodological reflections on the root of the problem.
With regard to Objectives 3 and 4, checks made with the managers at DG V revealed failures to observe the timetables set in the SPDs for sending in data. 
With regard to Objectives 3 and 4, checks made with the managers at DG V revealed failures to observe the timetables set in the SPDs for sending in data.
Several Member States had not sent in any data at all. 
Several Member States had not sent in any data at all.
Following these checks, the Commission reminded some Member States of their obligation to carry out the on-going verifications for which provision had been made. 
Following these checks, the Commission reminded some Member States of their obligation to carry out the on-going verifications for which provision had been made.
Four Member States (B, DK, F and L) had not carried out the on-going verifications for Objective 5b. 
Four Member States (B, DK, F and L) had not carried out the on-going verifications for Objective 5b.
The Italian authorities only did so at the end of 1998. 
The Italian authorities only did so at the end of 1998.
Verification of additionality for Objective 5a poses particular problems, since its implementation procedures are different from those of the others. 
Verification of additionality for Objective 5a poses particular problems, since its implementation procedures are different from those of the others.
Specifically, Community financing of the measures provided for in Regulations (EEC) No 2328/91 (15) and (EC) No 950/97 (16) is carried out through the refunding of expenditure effected, and not through the use of an SPD. 
Specifically, Community financing of the measures provided for in Regulations (EEC) No 2328/91 (15) and (EC) No 950/97 (16) is carried out through the refunding of expenditure effected, and not through the use of an SPD.
It was not until 1995 that the Commission began discussing with the Member States the procedures for verifying additionality for this Objective. 
It was not until 1995 that the Commission began discussing with the Member States the procedures for verifying additionality for this Objective.
These discussions have not yet resulted in agreement on a suitable methodology. 
These discussions have not yet resulted in agreement on a suitable methodology.
It is difficult to establish whether the principle of additionality has been observed by some Member States for the 1994 to 1999 period. 
It is difficult to establish whether the principle of additionality has been observed by some Member States for the 1994 to 1999 period.
When the relevant CSFs were adopted, two Member States (D and E) indicated that they could not guarantee they would maintain their structural expenditure at the same level as during the previous programming period, because of circumstances which permit observance of the principle of additionality to be waived, as laid down in Article 9(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 (see paragraph 4). 
When the relevant CSFs were adopted, two Member States (D and E) indicated that they could not guarantee they would maintain their structural expenditure at the same level as during the previous programming period, because of circumstances which permit observance of the principle of additionality to be waived, as laid down in Article 9(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 (see paragraph 4).
If one or more Member States cannot ultimately maintain the same level of expenditure, they will be inclined to make use of the derogations allowed for in the Regulation. 
If one or more Member States cannot ultimately maintain the same level of expenditure, they will be inclined to make use of the derogations allowed for in the Regulation.
(2) For Austria the data in the first section concern the period 1993 to 1994 and those in the second section concern the period 1995 to 1999. 
(2) For Austria the data in the first section concern the period 1993 to 1994 and those in the second section concern the period 1995 to 1999.
(3) Observance of the principle of additionality is measured by comparing these two columns. 
(3) Observance of the principle of additionality is measured by comparing these two columns.
Table 1 Development expenditure in the Objective 1 regions according to the ex ante verifications carried out within the context of the CSFs or SPDs (in million ECU, 1994 prices) 
Table 1 Development expenditure in the Objective 1 regions according to the ex ante verifications carried out within the context of the CSFs or SPDs (in million ECU, 1994 prices)
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/9 1. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/9 1.
Human resources 3. Productive environment 4. Other 3 200,0 1 706,0 1 589,0 611,0 404,0 532,0 102,0 507,0 226,0 319,0 82,0 1 118,0 630,0 851,0 184,0 2 589,0 1 302,0 1 057,0 133,0 3 500,0 2 120,0 1 764,0 1 068,0 574,0 647,0 41,0 658,0 191,0 308,0 26,0 1 726,0 765,0 955,0 67,0 2 432,0 1 546,0 1 117,0 219,0 1. 
Human resources 3. Productive environment 4. Other 3 200,0 1 706,0 1 589,0 611,0 404,0 532,0 102,0 507,0 226,0 319,0 82,0 1 118,0 630,0 851,0 184,0 2 589,0 1 302,0 1 057,0 133,0 3 500,0 2 120,0 1 764,0 1 068,0 574,0 647,0 41,0 658,0 191,0 308,0 26,0 1 726,0 765,0 955,0 67,0 2 432,0 1 546,0 1 117,0 219,0 1.
Human resources 3. Productive environment 4. Other 8 604,0 3 427,0 2 514,0 1 092,0 465,0 466,0 0,0 1 084,0 274,0 621,0 0,0 2 176,0 739,0 1 087,0 0,0 7 512,0 2 962,0 2 048,0 11 123,0 4 036,0 3 733,0 1 772,0 1267,0 1 315,0 1 124,0 438,0 552,0 10,0 2 896,0 1 705,0 1867,0 41,0 9 351,0 2 769,0 2 418,0 BELGIUM Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF-SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution GERMANY Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1. 
Human resources 3. Productive environment 4. Other 8 604,0 3 427,0 2 514,0 1 092,0 465,0 466,0 0,0 1 084,0 274,0 621,0 0,0 2 176,0 739,0 1 087,0 0,0 7 512,0 2 962,0 2 048,0 11 123,0 4 036,0 3 733,0 1 772,0 1267,0 1 315,0 1 124,0 438,0 552,0 10,0 2 896,0 1 705,0 1867,0 41,0 9 351,0 2 769,0 2 418,0 BELGIUM Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF-SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution GERMANY Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1.
C 68/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 1. 
C 68/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 1.
Human resources 3. Productive environment 4. Other 762,2 731,7 565,0 18,5 205,5 361,8 339,0 133,5 245,8 202,1 339,0 607,6 541,1 556,7 369,9 226,0 1 121,2 833,4 499,0 54,0 184,8 411,6 305,2 35,0 130,0 138,0 105,5 314,8 549,6 410,7 50,8 936,4 421,8 193,8 FRANCE Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution IRELAND Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution ITALY Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1. 
Human resources 3. Productive environment 4. Other 762,2 731,7 565,0 18,5 205,5 361,8 339,0 133,5 245,8 202,1 339,0 607,6 541,1 556,7 369,9 226,0 1 121,2 833,4 499,0 54,0 184,8 411,6 305,2 35,0 130,0 138,0 105,5 314,8 549,6 410,7 50,8 936,4 421,8 193,8 FRANCE Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution IRELAND Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution ITALY Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1.
Human resources humaines 3. Productive environment 4. Other 11 563,7 1 460,0 2 409,0 1 196,3 650,6 419,6 630,2 5,8 792,9 234,5 783,1 1 443,5 654,1 1 413,3 10,0 10 913,1 1 040,4 1 778,8 1 190,5 11 261,6 2 060,9 6 029,0 736,7 978,0 1 714,7 811,4 2 860,0 20,9 10 524,9 1 530,2 4 834,4 THE NETHERLANDS Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1. 
Productive environment 4. Other 11 563,7 1 460,0 2 409,0 1 196,3 650,6 419,6 630,2 5,8 792,9 234,5 783,1 1 443,5 654,1 1 413,3 10,0 10 913,1 1 040,4 1 778,8 1 190,5 11 261,6 2 060,9 6 029,0 736,7 978,0 1 714,7 811,4 2 860,0 20,9 10 524,9 1 530,2 4 834,4 THE NETHERLANDS Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1.
Human resources 3. 
Human resources 3.
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/11 1. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/11 1.
Infrastructure 2. 
Infrastructure 2.
Productive environment 4. 
Productive environment 4.
Other 3 258,0 1 114,0 1 005,0 187,0 518,0 582,0 649,0 458,0 274,0 311,0 976,0 856,0 960,0 2 740,0 532,0 356,0 154,0 4 320,0 1 173,0 1 277,0 691,0 685,0 832,0 122,0 421,0 220,0 320,0 905,0 1 152,0 173,0 488,0 445,0 96,0 AUSTRIA Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF-SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1. 
Other 3 258,0 1 114,0 1 005,0 187,0 518,0 582,0 649,0 458,0 274,0 311,0 976,0 856,0 960,0 2 740,0 532,0 356,0 154,0 4 320,0 1 173,0 1 277,0 691,0 685,0 832,0 122,0 421,0 220,0 320,0 905,0 1 152,0 173,0 488,0 445,0 96,0 AUSTRIA Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF-SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National CSF - SPD counterpart contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1.
Other 107,1 23,1 39,7 21,6 107,1 23,1 39,7 97,7 36,6 74,6 6,6 11,5 10,1 25,5 18,0 18,7 42,6 91,1 28,0 57,4 0,8 PORTUGAL Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution UNITED KINGDOM Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1. 
Other 107,1 23,1 39,7 21,6 107,1 23,1 39,7 97,7 36,6 74,6 6,6 11,5 10,1 25,5 18,0 18,7 42,6 91,1 28,0 57,4 0,8 PORTUGAL Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution UNITED KINGDOM Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF-SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution Public (national + EC) Structural Funds (CSF - SPD) National counterpart CSF - SPD contribution Public total, net of the Structural Funds contribution 1.
2 3 4=2+3 5=1-2 1 2 5=1-2 1112,0 3 629,0 33,0 11,0 44,0 218,0 51,0 Annual average 1993 to 1994 Annual average 1995 to 1999 Annual average 1989 to 1993 Annual average 1994 to 1999 Annual average 1989 to 1993 Annual average 1994 to 1999 0,0 1,6 8,6 17,1 0,8 0,8 1,7 12,5 18,2 13,8 18,2 4,4 EC) (in million ECU, 1994 prices) 
2 3 4=2+3 5=1-2 1 2 5=1-2 1112,0 3 629,0 33,0 11,0 44,0 218,0 51,0 Annual average 1993 to 1994 Annual average 1995 to 1999 Annual average 1989 to 1993 Annual average 1994 to 1999 Annual average 1989 to 1993 Annual average 1994 to 1999 0,0 1,6 8,6 17,1 0,8 0,8 1,7 12,5 18,2 13,8 18,2 4,4 EC) (in million ECU, 1994 prices)
C 68/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 37. 
C 68/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 37.
The 1994 to 1999 period was affected by the general environment of reductions in budget deficits. 
The 1994 to 1999 period was affected by the general environment of reductions in budget deficits.
Table 3 shows the trend in the gross-fixed capital formation of governments, which is a good indicator of the trend of government investment expenditure. 
Table 3 shows the trend in the gross-fixed capital formation of governments, which is a good indicator of the trend of government investment expenditure.
This dropped considerably in most Member States and, as a whole, fell from 3 % of GDP in 1991 and 1992 to 2,7 % in 1994 and to 2,1 % in 1998. 
This dropped considerably in most Member States and, as a whole, fell from 3 % of GDP in 1991 and 1992 to 2,7 % in 1994 and to 2,1 % in 1998.
This is due, in part, to privatisations in the fields of transport, energy and telecommunications. 
This is due, in part, to privatisations in the fields of transport, energy and telecommunications.
It should be noted that expenditure is measured in absolute terms for the cal-culations made to verify additionality and that economic growth is thus not taken into account. 
It should be noted that expenditure is measured in absolute terms for the calculations made to verify additionality and that economic growth is thus not taken into account.
The trend of expenditure on active measures to promote employment could be used as an indicator, in particular in the context of verifying additionality for Objectives 3 and 4. 
The trend of expenditure on active measures to promote employment could be used as an indicator, in particular in the context of verifying additionality for Objectives 3 and 4.
For the period 2000 to 2006, this expenditure will be the basis for verification work on the newly defined Objectives 2 and 3. 
For the period 2000 to 2006, this expenditure will be the basis for verification work on the newly defined Objectives 2 and 3.
However, as it has few statistical data at its disposal, the Commission makes use of data published by the OECD. 
However, as it has few statistical data at its disposal, the Commission makes use of data published by the OECD.
The Commission plans to create a database, expected to become operational during the year 2000, to improve the quality, reliability and comparability of data on employment policies. 
The Commission plans to create a database, expected to become operational during the year 2000, to improve the quality, reliability and comparability of data on employment policies.
In addition, the trend in expenditure in connection with active measures depends to a great extent on unemployment rates. 
In addition, the trend in expenditure in connection with active measures depends to a great extent on unemployment rates.
On the one hand, a considerable reduction in unemployment may cause a substantial drop in expenditure on active employment policies, as has been seen in Finland in the context of Objectives 3 and 4. 
On the one hand, a considerable reduction in unemployment may cause a substantial drop in expenditure on active employment policies, as has been seen in Finland in the context of Objectives 3 and 4.
On the other hand, an increase in the unemployment rate may also lead to a reduction in expenditure connected with active measures, because of their replacement by passive measures, as has been seen in the new German Lnder. 
On the other hand, an increase in the unemployment rate may also lead to a reduction in expenditure connected with active measures, because of their replacement by passive measures, as has been seen in the new German Lnder.
Government investment expenditure (gross-fixed capital formation of governments, as % of GDP) Table 3 DIFFICULTIES DETECTED AND THEIR CAUSES Introduction 39. 
Government investment expenditure (gross-fixed capital formation of governments, as % of GDP) Table 3 DIFFICULTIES DETECTED AND THEIR CAUSES Introduction 39.
Analyses of the CommissionŐs files, on-the-spot visits and answers to questionnaires reveal numerous methodological dif-ficulties. 
Analyses of the CommissionŐs files, on-the-spot visits and answers to questionnaires reveal numerous methodological difficulties.