natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to facilitate the rapid payment of amounts due, information regarding the removal of Ôsuspensive clausesŐ was frequently communicated to the Member State in an informal manner. 
In order to facilitate the rapid payment of amounts due, information regarding the removal of Ôsuspensive clausesŐ was frequently communicated to the Member State in an informal manner.
The Commission agrees that, once a Ôsuspensive clauseŐ is included in a programming document, it covers all the Funds concerned. 
The Commission agrees that, once a Ôsuspensive clauseŐ is included in a programming document, it covers all the Funds concerned.
Therefore, it is acknowledged that no further payments should be made in such cases prior to the removal of the clauses. 
Therefore, it is acknowledged that no further payments should be made in such cases prior to the removal of the clauses.
As is pointed out by the Court, a number of payments were undertaken while Ôsuspensive clausesŐ were still in force, although in some cases only shortly before their formal removal. 
As is pointed out by the Court, a number of payments were undertaken while Ôsuspensive clausesŐ were still in force, although in some cases only shortly before their formal removal.
Procedures will be put in place to avoid any repetition of such a situation for the next programming period. 
Procedures will be put in place to avoid any repetition of such a situation for the next programming period.
Information relating to the verification of additionality is often presented to the Member States in the meetings of the Monitoring Committees and thereafter summarised in the min-utes. 
Information relating to the verification of additionality is often presented to the Member States in the meetings of the Monitoring Committees and thereafter summarised in the minutes.
Methodological issues are often discussed in informal technical meetings of the persons in charge before or after the Monitoring Committee meetings. 
Methodological issues are often discussed in informal technical meetings of the persons in charge before or after the Monitoring Committee meetings.
There is no particular requirement for the Commission to publish regular information on additionality. 
There is no particular requirement for the Commission to publish regular information on additionality.
In addition, part of the information submitted by the Member States is of a confiden-tial nature and inappropriate for publication. 
In addition, part of the information submitted by the Member States is of a confidential nature and inappropriate for publication.
As explained above, most of the communication on additionality is done in the context of the Monitoring Committee meetings. 
As explained above, most of the communication on additionality is done in the context of the Monitoring Committee meetings.
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/21 The 1989 to 1993 period 24. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/21 The 1989 to 1993 period 24.
Regarding the 1989 to 1993 period, the majority of Member States has submitted the required tables. 
Regarding the 1989 to 1993 period, the majority of Member States has submitted the required tables.
When the data have been accepted by the Commission, this has in general been communicated informally to the Member States in the context of meetings of the Monitoring Committees. 
When the data have been accepted by the Commission, this has in general been communicated informally to the Member States in the context of meetings of the Monitoring Committees.
The audit referred to by the Court was indeed concluded but, due to lack of information from the Member States, no follow-up was carried out (see response to paragraph 16). 
The audit referred to by the Court was indeed concluded but, due to lack of information from the Member States, no follow-up was carried out (see response to paragraph 16).
The Commission wishes to underline that there was in fact an intensive process of information, discussion and negotiation between Commission and Member States regarding the ex ante evaluation of additionality for the programming period 1994 to 1999. 
The Commission wishes to underline that there was in fact an intensive process of information, discussion and negotiation between Commission and Member States regarding the ex ante evaluation of additionality for the programming period 1994 to 1999.
The Commission has successfully obliged Member States to increase the transparency of additionality verification procedures, and has made considerable progress in improving the quality of information on data sources and methodological issues in 1994 to 1999 in comparison with the 1989 to 1993 period. 
The Commission has successfully obliged Member States to increase the transparency of additionality verification procedures, and has made considerable progress in improving the quality of information on data sources and methodological issues in 1994 to 1999 in comparison with the 1989 to 1993 period.
The Commission agrees that comparisons of additionality tables between Member States are difficult, mainly for two rea-sons. 
The Commission agrees that comparisons of additionality tables between Member States are difficult, mainly for two reasons.
Firstly, they ignore the significant differences between Member StatesŐ expenditure in Objective 1 regions regarding political priorities, organisation and the relative importance of the Structural Funds. 
Firstly, they ignore the significant differences between Member StatesŐ expenditure in Objective 1 regions regarding political priorities, organisation and the relative importance of the Structural Funds.
Secondly, they do not take into account the fact that the Commission has never encouraged Member States to include 100 % of their development-related expenditure in the additionality table, which would have meant an excessive administrative burden. 
Secondly, they do not take into account the fact that the Commission has never encouraged Member States to include 100 % of their development-related expenditure in the additionality table, which would have meant an excessive administrative burden.
The CommissionŐs priority has been to have as many identical expenditure categories as possible in the current and reference additionality tables, which may require the exclusion of some expenditure. 
The CommissionŐs priority has been to have as many identical expenditure categories as possible in the current and reference additionality tables, which may require the exclusion of some expenditure.
32 to 35. 
32 to 35.
The Commission acknowledges that the quality of information submitted by Member States on the intermediate verification of additionality varies considerably across the Objectives. 
The Commission acknowledges that the quality of information submitted by Member States on the intermediate verification of additionality varies considerably across the Objectives.
This situation is clearly linked to the relatively heavy administrative burden of the present system of verification and will undoubtedly be improved by the considerable simplification of the system introduced for the next programming period. 
This situation is clearly linked to the relatively heavy administrative burden of the present system of verification and will undoubtedly be improved by the considerable simplification of the system introduced for the next programming period.
The indicator of gross-fixed capital formation (GFCF) of the general government as calculated by the system of economic accounts differs from the indicator of eligible expenditure as used for additionality which limits the value of comparisons between the two indicators. 
The indicator of gross-fixed capital formation (GFCF) of the general government as calculated by the system of economic accounts differs from the indicator of eligible expenditure as used for additionality which limits the value of comparisons between the two indicators.
In particular, GFCF does not take into account most of the expenditure on human resources. 
In particular, GFCF does not take into account most of the expenditure on human resources.
In the next programming period the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 3 taken together will be based on expenditure on active labour market policy and, where justified, other actions in accordance with the new Regulation on the Structural Funds (Article 11). 
In the next programming period the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 3 taken together will be based on expenditure on active labour market policy and, where justified, other actions in accordance with the new Regulation on the Structural Funds (Article 11).
However, the verification will continue to be based on information submitted by Member States. 
However, the verification will continue to be based on information submitted by Member States.
A harmonised statistical database on labour market policy, which is at present being established by the Commission, will complement the information submitted by Member States DIFFICULTIES DETECTED AND THEIR CAUSES Expenditure to be taken into account and compiling the data 39 to 50. 
A harmonised statistical database on labour market policy, which is at present being established by the Commission, will complement the information submitted by Member States DIFFICULTIES DETECTED AND THEIR CAUSES Expenditure to be taken into account and compiling the data 39 to 50.
The Commission agrees that the verification of additionality should be as clear, operational and simple as possible. 
The Commission agrees that the verification of additionality should be as clear, operational and simple as possible.
In its relations with the Member States the Commission has therefore sought to be pragmatic to arrive at acceptable yet workable solutions adapted to their specific situations, within a well-defined framework of minimum methodological requirements. 
In its relations with the Member States the Commission has therefore sought to be pragmatic to arrive at acceptable yet workable solutions adapted to their specific situations, within a well-defined framework of minimum methodological requirements.
For the future, the verification of additionality will be facilitated by the considerable simplification of the system introduced in the new Regulations. 
For the future, the verification of additionality will be facilitated by the considerable simplification of the system introduced in the new Regulations.
Overlapping of periods 51 to 57. 
Overlapping of periods 51 to 57.
The Commission would like to recall that additionality relates only to the spending of the Member State, and entirely excludes the contribution of the Structural Funds. 
The Commission would like to recall that additionality relates only to the spending of the Member State, and entirely excludes the contribution of the Structural Funds.
Therefore, issues such as overlapping spending periods, delays in closing programmes, etc. are not very relevant in verifying additionality. 
Therefore, issues such as overlapping spending periods, delays in closing programmes, etc. are not very relevant in verifying additionality.
In practice the overlap of spending between programming periods does not significantly affect the assessment of additionality and only does so to the extent that the time profile of Structural FundsŐ spending has an impact on the time profile of a Member StateŐs own expenditure. 
In practice the overlap of spending between programming periods does not significantly affect the assessment of additionality and only does so to the extent that the time profile of Structural FundsŐ spending has an impact on the time profile of a Member StateŐs own expenditure.
For most Member States, the time profile of Structural Funds spending can be expected to only have a marginal effect. 
For most Member States, the time profile of Structural Funds spending can be expected to only have a marginal effect.
Finally, the pragmatic approach chosen by the Commission has the major advantage that it allows the verification of additionality in real time rather than several years after the event. 
Finally, the pragmatic approach chosen by the Commission has the major advantage that it allows the verification of additionality in real time rather than several years after the event.
C 68/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 Starting point and comparability of data ticular, between Objective 1, which accounts for 70 % of Structural FundsŐ spending, and the remaining Objectives. 
C 68/22 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 Starting point and comparability of data ticular, between Objective 1, which accounts for 70 % of Structural FundsŐ spending, and the remaining Objectives.
In application of the principle of proportionality, the Commission has been much more rigid in assessing additionality for Objective 1 and somewhat more flexible for the other Objectives, in order to avoid imposing a disproportionate administrative burden on national and regional authorities which have to overcome major problems of data availability. 
In application of the principle of proportionality, the Commission has been much more rigid in assessing additionality for Objective 1 and somewhat more flexible for the other Objectives, in order to avoid imposing a disproportionate administrative burden on national and regional authorities which have to overcome major problems of data availability.
In this regard, the Commission notes that the greater number of difficulties identified in the present report concerns non-Objective 1 regions. 
In this regard, the Commission notes that the greater number of difficulties identified in the present report concerns non-Objective 1 regions.
The Commission agrees that the instruments available to sanction non-compliance with the principle of additionality, i.e. information to the public and the suspension of payments, are insufficient. 
The Commission agrees that the instruments available to sanction non-compliance with the principle of additionality, i.e. information to the public and the suspension of payments, are insufficient.
The Commission regrets that its initial proposal in the new general Structural Funds Regulation to introduce a workable sanctioning mechanism by linking the verification of additionality to the allocation of the performance reserve has been rejected by Member States, which are at the same time both legislator and party to the verification of additionality. 
The Commission regrets that its initial proposal in the new general Structural Funds Regulation to introduce a workable sanctioning mechanism by linking the verification of additionality to the allocation of the performance reserve has been rejected by Member States, which are at the same time both legislator and party to the verification of additionality.
In view of the impossibility of taking into account all public eligible expenditure, the Commission and Member States have to be pragmatic in order to arrive at acceptable yet workable solutions adapted to specific situations within a well-defined framework of minimum methodological requirements. 
In view of the impossibility of taking into account all public eligible expenditure, the Commission and Member States have to be pragmatic in order to arrive at acceptable yet workable solutions adapted to specific situations within a well-defined framework of minimum methodological requirements.
The Commission has never urged Member States to include 100 % of their development-related expenditure in the additionality table, which would have meant an excessive administrative burden, but to have as many identical expenditure categories as possible in the current additionality table and the reference table. 
The Commission has never urged Member States to include 100 % of their development-related expenditure in the additionality table, which would have meant an excessive administrative burden, but to have as many identical expenditure categories as possible in the current additionality table and the reference table.
The Commission agrees that the verification of additionality is much easier in Member States totally eligible for Objective 1 assistance, which receive the major part of Structural Funds. 
The Commission agrees that the verification of additionality is much easier in Member States totally eligible for Objective 1 assistance, which receive the major part of Structural Funds.
However, the unavoidable recourse to estimates for smaller regions and areas does not necessarily imply that the results are not reliable. 
However, the unavoidable recourse to estimates for smaller regions and areas does not necessarily imply that the results are not reliable.
In the forthcoming programming period, these problems will be reduced considerably by the new concept for the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 3 together. 
In the forthcoming programming period, these problems will be reduced considerably by the new concept for the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 3 together.
Regarding the integration of additionality with the monitoring and evaluation systems, the Commission would underline the frequent contacts between the officials of the different Commission services and between officials of the Commission services and the national authorities in the context of Monitoring Committee meetings. 
Regarding the integration of additionality with the monitoring and evaluation systems, the Commission would underline the frequent contacts between the officials of the different Commission services and between officials of the Commission services and the national authorities in the context of Monitoring Committee meetings.
The Commission agrees that there is room for improvement in the coordination of the actions of the different services of the Commission dealing with additionality and steps have already been taken to that end. 
The Commission agrees that there is room for improvement in the coordination of the actions of the different services of the Commission dealing with additionality and steps have already been taken to that end.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there will always be some difficulties in circumstances where the organisational structure of the Commission obliges several services to deal with different aspects of the same matter, a situation that is certainly not unique to additionality. 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there will always be some difficulties in circumstances where the organisational structure of the Commission obliges several services to deal with different aspects of the same matter, a situation that is certainly not unique to additionality.
58 to 59. uring additionality resulted from discussions between the Commission and the national authorities and were not chosen arbi-trarily by the Member States alone. 
58 to 59. uring additionality resulted from discussions between the Commission and the national authorities and were not chosen arbitrarily by the Member States alone.
The aim was to find the most recent and reliable reference period taking into account the specific situation of each country. 
The aim was to find the most recent and reliable reference period taking into account the specific situation of each country.
In the case of Sweden, for example, which at the time had a financial year that did not coincide with the calendar year, the most recent reliable data were for the financial year 1991/1992, including data at the municipal level. 
In the case of Sweden, for example, which at the time had a financial year that did not coincide with the calendar year, the most recent reliable data were for the financial year 1991/1992, including data at the municipal level.
Although the private sector is sometimes undertaking investment in areas traditionally considered to be within the remit of the public sector, it would be extremely difficult to extend the verification of additionality to include private investment. 
Although the private sector is sometimes undertaking investment in areas traditionally considered to be within the remit of the public sector, it would be extremely difficult to extend the verification of additionality to include private investment.
Such an exercise would involve the collection and scrutiny of the accounts of a range of private companies Ń which would be under no obligation to provide either the national authorities or the Commission with relevant information. 
Such an exercise would involve the collection and scrutiny of the accounts of a range of private companies Ń which would be under no obligation to provide either the national authorities or the Commission with relevant information.
Geographical breakdown of expenditure The reference periods adopted as the baseline for meas-64 to 68. 
Geographical breakdown of expenditure The reference periods adopted as the baseline for meas-64 to 68.
Objectives 2 and 5b, for which there are hardly any budgetary data available, the Commission had no alternative but to accept the pragmatic approach of estimating the expenditure in these areas. 
Objectives 2 and 5b, for which there are hardly any budgetary data available, the Commission had no alternative but to accept the pragmatic approach of estimating the expenditure in these areas.
This unsatisfactory situation was one of the main reasons for the Commission to suggest a shift to expenditure on active labour market policies at the national level for the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 3 for the programming period 2000 to 2006. 
This unsatisfactory situation was one of the main reasons for the Commission to suggest a shift to expenditure on active labour market policies at the national level for the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 3 for the programming period 2000 to 2006.
The Community Initiatives have not been included in the ex ante verification of additionality due to their relatively small budgetary impact and because they had not been allocated at the time of the ex ante verification. 
The Community Initiatives have not been included in the ex ante verification of additionality due to their relatively small budgetary impact and because they had not been allocated at the time of the ex ante verification.
The Commission agrees with the overall conclusion of the Court that the basic concept of additionality is relatively clear, whereas its actual implementation involves some methodological complexities. 
The Commission agrees with the overall conclusion of the Court that the basic concept of additionality is relatively clear, whereas its actual implementation involves some methodological complexities.
In most cases, however, these difficulties have been overcome in partnership between the Commission and the Member States through the identification of pragmatic solutions within a broad methodological framework. 
In most cases, however, these difficulties have been overcome in partnership between the Commission and the Member States through the identification of pragmatic solutions within a broad methodological framework.
Furthermore, it is important, when examining the verification of additionality, to distinguish between the different Objectives of the Structural Funds: in par-In view of the small size of many areas eligible under 
Furthermore, it is important, when examining the verification of additionality, to distinguish between the different Objectives of the Structural Funds: in par-In view of the small size of many areas eligible under
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/23 74. 
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/23 74.
There is certainly a general need for better regional information and statistics. 
There is certainly a general need for better regional information and statistics.
The situation will improve in the coming years through the new European system of integrated accounts (ESA 95) which obliges Member States to provide improved and extended regional economic statistics. 
The situation will improve in the coming years through the new European system of integrated accounts (ESA 95) which obliges Member States to provide improved and extended regional economic statistics.