natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To ENI , ka toi lambánei yp ch thn anágkh na doqe perioristik w xarakt raw sthn paroýsa pr tash , qa enqárryne th syn xish toy rgoy gia thn epejergas a symplhrvmatik n odhgi n poy qa kalýptoyn toyw organismoýw poy den emp ptoyn sto ped o efarmog w thw sýmbashw kai qa plaisi noyn thn paroýsa pr tash ( idia tera ta pistvtiká idrýmata ) , vw q ma proterai thtaw .
The EMI , while noting the necessity of restricting the current proposal , would therefore encourage continued work to frame additional directives covering those entities outside the scope of both the Convention and the present proposal ( particularly financial institutions ) as a matter of priority . Therefore , the proposal is particularly welcome at this time .
Epom nvw , e nai idia tera epvfel w h diatýpvsh thw pr tashw ayt w katá ton par nta xr no. üOpvw shmei netai sthn parágrafo 3 anvt rv , h pr sqeth bebai thta poy anam netai na prokýcei ap thn paroýsa pr tash qa bohq sei ep shw to ESKT sthn antimet pish toy kindýnoy poy synd etai me th sýnach tvn symbatik n symfvni n me ta pistvtiká idrýmata , sto pla sio thw q shw se efarmog thw nomismatik w politik w. T low , to ENI ekfrázei thn ikanopo hs toy gia to gegon w ti h pr tash , katarx n , qa enarmon sei tiw diadikas ew ejyg anshw kai ekkaqárishw , me thn arx toy el gxoy ap th x ra katagvg w poy qesp sqhke gia thn ep blech tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn .
As noted in Paragraph 3 , the additional certainty expected to result from this proposal will also be of benefit to the ESCB in managing its risk when effecting monetary policy through entering into contractual arrangements with credit institutions . Finally , the EMI welcomes that the proposal will , in principle , bring in line the winding-up and reorganisation procedures with the principle of home-country control adopted for the supervision of credit institutions .
Ejetázontaw to q ma ap th skopiá kentrik w trápezaw , to ENI qa apod xontan katá ton pl on qetik tr po káqe n a pr tash poy qa en sxye thn bebai thta sxetiká me thn ejyg ansh kai thn ekkaqárish opoioyd pote organismoý o opo ow qa mporoýse na e nai ant stoixow thw Eyrvpa k w Kentrik w Trápezaw / kai opoiasd pote eqnik w kentrik w trápezaw sto pla sio thw áskhshw thw nomismatik w politik w. Toýto qa mporoýse , katá to tr to stádio thw ONE , na epektaqe gia na kalýcei tiw etair ew ependýsevn poy den apoteloýn pistvtiká idrýmata , oi opo ew emp ptoyn sto ped o efarmog w thw odhg aw sxetiká me tiw ependytik w yphres ew ( 93/22 / EOK ) --- árqro 18 parágrafow 1 deýterh per ptvsh toy katastatikoý toy ESKT kai thw EKT poy anaf retai sth «. .
From a central banking perspective , the EMI would particularly welcome any further proposal providing additional certainty in relation to the reorganisation and winding up of any entity which may be a counterparty to the European Central Bank and / or any national central bank in relation to the pursuance of monetary policy . This may , in stage three of EMU , extend to cover non-credit institution investment firms within the scope of the Investment Services Directive ( 93/22 / EEC ) , Article 18 ( 1 ) , second indent of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB referring to the « .
dien rgeia pistodotik n kai pistolhptik n prájevn me pistvtiká idrýmata kai álloyw fore w thw agoráw . .
. conduct of credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants .
To ENI den kr nei sk pimo na probálei sx lia sxetiká me th diatýpvsh thw pr tashw .
The EMI does not consider that it would be appropriate for it to make comments on the drafting of the proposal .
Vst so , diatyp nei sth gn mh toy seirá parathr sevn oi opo ew , eán lhfqoýn yp ch , qa mporoýsan na katast soyn anagka a thn tropopo hsh thw paroýsaw diatýpvshw prokeim noy na sygkekrimenopoihqe to antike meno orism nvn diatájevn thw pr tashw .
However , several points are made in the opinion which , if taken , might necessitate some amendment to the current drafting in order to make the intent of particular provisions within the proposal clearer .
Shmei netai idia tera to ped o efarmog w thw pr tashw poy aforá eidiká ta pistvtiká idrýmata .
The scope of the proposal , specifically relating as it does to credit institutions , is noted .
Diapist netai ep shw to gegon w ti xei ep lqei sxetik symfvn a sxetiká me th sýmbash thw EE per pt xeyshw , h opo a kalýptei ta periss tera nomiká pr svpa , allá apokle ei rht w ap to ped o efarmog w thw xi m no pistvtiká idrýmata allá kai asfalistik w epixeir seiw , etair ew ependýsevn poy par xoyn yphres ew poy perilambánoyn thn katox kefala vn t tlvn gia logariasm tr tvn kai organismoýw syllogik n ependýsevn .
It is also noted that agrement has now been reached on the EU Bankruptcy Convention , which covers most EU incorporated legal persons but specifically excludes from its scope not only credit institutions but also insurance undertakings , investment undertakings which provide services involving the holding of funds or securities for third parties and collective investment undertakings .
To ENI shmei nei ti lew oi kathgor ew organism n poy apokle ontai ap to ped o efarmog w thw sýmbashw mporoýn na ephreásoyn th staqer thta tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn kai tvn xrhmatooikonomik n agor n kai ti , katá syn peia , e nai shmantik na epinohqoýn katállhlew protáseiw poy qa kalýptoyn lew ayt w tiw kathgor ew xrhmatopistvtik n organism n. Sxetiká me to q ma ayt , to ENI gnvr zei thn ýparjh en w parállhloy sxed oy sxetiká
The EMI notes that all of the types of entity which are excluded from the scope of the Convention have a significant potential impact on the stability of financial institutions and markets and that therefore it is important to devise suitable proposals covering all such types of entity .
To ENI shmei nei ep shw ti oi promhqeyt w xrhmatooikonomik n yphresi n sthn Eyr ph xoyn lo kai periss tero thn tásh na epekte nontai se orism new synafe w xrhmatooikonomik w drathri thtew .
The EMI further notes that there is an increasing trend for suppliers of financial services in Europe to diversify into a number of finance-related activities .
Gia ryqmistikoýw kai epixeirhsiakoýw l goyw , h ep ktash ayt pragmatopoie tai syxná m sv thw dhmioyrg aw xvrist n qygatrik n , oi opo ew dýnantai den dýnantai na emp ptoyn sthn dia dikaiodos a poy ypágetai kai h mhtrik etair a , mvw orism new m no ap ayt w e nai pistvtiká idrýmata .
For regulatory and business reasons , this diversification is often effected through establishing separate subsidiaries which may , or may not , be incorporated in the same jurisdiction as the parent , only some of these entities being credit institutions .
Dedom nvn tvn shmantik n kindýnvn poy , geniká , enypárxoyn se om loyw ayt w thw morf w , syxná h anágkh ejyg anshw ekkaqárishw kápoioy ap toyw organismoýw toy om loy apaite ep shw th l ch paremfer n m trvn gia la ta yp loipa m lh toy om loy .
In view of the significant intra-group exposure which generally exists within such groups , it is usually the case that the need to reorganise or wind up one of the entities in such a group will require similar measures to be taken in respect of all other members of the group .
H xrevkop a orism nvn organism n ent w en w t toioy xrhmatooikonomikoý om loy eterogen n ekmetalleýsevn , end xetai na xei sobar terew syn peiew sth staqer thta tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn kai tvn xrhmatooikonomik n agor n sto sýnol toyw ap thn apotyx a en w memonvm noy organismoý toy opo oy oi drasthri thtew mporoýn na prosdioristoýn leptomer stera kai na e nai pio periorism new .
Failure of a number of entities in such a multidisciplinary financial group has the potential to have an even greater impact on the stability of financial institutions and the financial markets as a whole than the failure of a single entity whose activities may be more narrowly defined and constrained .
Lambánontaw yp ch ayt to fain meno , kaq w kai tiw prospáqeiew poy xoyn pragmatopoihqe prow to skop thw en sxyshw toy kanonistikoý plais oy sxetiká me toyw xrhmatooikonomikoýw om loyw , to ENI eýxetai pvw oi n ew protáseiw odhgi n sxetiká me thn ejyg ansh kai thn ekkaqárish tvn xrhmatooikono -
In view of this phenomenon , and being aware of the efforts to enhace the regulatory framework concerning financial conglomerates , the EMI encourages all
mik n organism n poy den e nai pistvtiká idrýmata , qa láboyn yp ch , me idia terh prosox , to gegon w ayt kai idia tera ta eidiká probl mata poy mporoýn na dhmioyrg soyn sth staqer thta tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn kai tvn xrhmatooikonomik n agor n , oi xrhmatooikonomiko ayto miloi .
further proposals for directives relating to the reorganisation and winding-up of non-credit institution financial entities to take this point into account with due regard to the specific problems that financial conglomerates may raise for the stability of financial insitutions and markets . a number of subsidiaries .
qygatrik w. Katá syn peia , to ENI yposthr zei ti oi n ew protáseiw odhgi n ston tom a thw ejyg anshw kai thw ekkaqárishw qa pr pei na lambánoyn yp ch thn ep ptvsh thw ejyg anshw thw ekkaqárishw en w ypokatast matow miaw epixe rhshw stiw állew ont thtew toy id oy om loy .
In view of this fact , the EMI encourages further proposals for Directives touching on reorganisation and winding up to take into account the impact of reorganisation or winding up of a branch of one undertaking on other entities within the same corporate group .
Se diáfora árqra thw pr tashw probl petai ti oi arm diew arx w poy anaf rontai , ant stoixa , sto parárthma I II , par xoyn plhrofor ew sxetiká me tiw diadikas ew stiw arx w poy e nai arm diew gia q mata epopte aw tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn .
Various Articles of the proposal provide for the competent authorities referred to , respectively , in Annex I or II to provide information on proceedings to the authorities competent to supervise credit institutions .
Sxetiká me to q ma ayt mporoýn na anaferqoýn ta árqra 5 , 6 , 9 kai 12 .
Examples include Articles 5,6,9 and 12 .
O apoxr n l gow tvn diatájevn ayt n e nai na epitrape stoyw organismoýw , epopte aw tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn na lambánoyn gkaira ta katállhla m tra sxetiká me ta idrýmata poy ayto epopteýoyn .
The rationale of such provisions is to allow relevant supervisors of credit institutions to take appropriate steps in relation to supervisees at an early stage .
Molon ti h odhg a 95/26 / EK toy Symboyl oy epitr pei thn antallag plhrofori n metajý epoptik n arx n , kentrik n trapez n kai arx n poy e nai epifortism new me thn epopte a tvn systhmátvn plhrvm w , lambánontaw yp ch ton idia tera shmantik r lo poy diadramat zoyn oi kentrik w trápezew kai oi arx w poy e nai epifortism new me thn epopte a tvn systhmátvn plhrvm w , tan ayt h eyqýnh aske tai m sv en w jexvristoý endiámesoy organismoý , sth diat rhsh thw staqer thtaw tvn xrhmatooikonomik n agor n , to ENI kr nei ti oi plhrofor ew sxetiká me thn ejyg ansh kai thn ekkaqárish qa pr pei na diabibázontai ámesa se aytoýw toyw organismoýw , stiw x rew poy to sxetik pistvtik dryma e nai egkatesthm no. Vst so , h ypoxr vsh diab bashw tvn plhrofori n stiw kentrik w trapezik w arx w den qa pr pei na kaqystere thn ap fash l chw m trvn thw kdoshw odhgi n sxetiká me thn ejyg ansh thn ekkaqárish pistvtik n idrymátvn .
Although Council Directive 95/26 / EC will give the possibility of a flow of information between supervisory authorities and central banks and payment overseers , the EMI believes that , in view of the pivotal role of central banks and , where this function is effected through a separate organisation , overseers of payment systems in ensuring the continued stability of the financial markets , it would also be appropriate that information on reorganisation and winding-up procedures should be directly communicated to these entities within those jurisdictions where the relevant credit institution has a presence . However , any requirement imposed to pass on information to central banking authorities must not delay action being taken or orders being granted in relation to the reorganisation or winding-up of credit institutions .
Katá syn peia , to ENI syst nei thn aýjhsh tvn antallag n plhrofori n poy pro rxontai ap tiw arm diew arx w poy anaf rontai ant stoixa sta parart mata I kai II , me th q spish diatájevn poy qa ejasfal zoyn ti oi kentrik w trápezew , poy e nai epifortism new me thn epopte a tvn systhmátvn plhrvm n kai thw parox w reyst thtaw , qa enhmer nontai tan ta m tra aytá aforoýn na ypokatásthma thw x raw toyw , xvr w na ejartoýn th q sh se efarmog tvn m trvn ap th diab bash tvn plhrofor vn ayt n ap thn emplek menh kentrik trápeza .
The EMI therefore recommends extending the information flows from the competent authorities referred to respectively in Annexes I and II by provisions which ensure that central banks , in their function as overseers of payment systems and liquidity providers , are informed when a branch in their jurisdiction is affected by the measures , but that the measures are not made conditional on the central bank being informed .
To árqro 23 parágrafow 1 thw pr tashw anaf rei orism new peript seiw stiw opo ew tropopoioýntai merik w ta apotel smata en w m troy ejyg anshw diadikas aw ekkaqárishw .
Article 23 ( 1 ) of the proposal refers to a number of situations where the effects of the reorganisation or winding up are to be modified in some way .
To ENI antilambánetai ti ayt h diátajh xei vw st xo na ejasfal sei thn efarmog tvn kan nvn poy isxýoyn sth sxetik rýqmish , sto pla sio thw nomoqes aw kai toy dika oy poy anaf rontai sto árqro 23 parágrafow 1 kai ti , prow to skop ayt , oi kan new ayto katisxýoyn tvn diatájevn per diadikasi n ejyg anshw ekkaqárishw toy krátoyw m loyw katagvg w. To ENI ekfrázei thn ikanopo hs toy gi » ayt n thn pros ggish toy q matow , id vw se , ti aforá tiw proanaferqe sew eidik w ryqm seiw ( p.x. symbáseiw symchfismoý , dikai mata ek kinht n aji n kai ryqm seiw systhmátvn plhrvm w ) , poy dýnantai endexom nvw na xoyn ámesh ep ptvsh sta pistvtiká idrýmata kai tiw xrhmatooikonomik w agor w kai poy katá syn peia aforoýn ámesa ton tom a armodi thtaw toy ENI .
The EMI understands that the intention of this provision is to ensure the enforcement of the rules applicable to the relevant arrangement under the specific system of law mentioned in Article 23 ( 1 ) and that , for these purposes , the provisions of the home Member State reorganisation or winding-up procedure are overridden . The EMI welcomes this approach , particularly in relation to those of the arrangements specified which have an immediate potential impact on financial institutions and markets ( e.g. contractual netting , rights in securities and payment-system arrangements ) and which will therefore have particular impact in relation to the EMI 's field of competence .
Omo vw , to ENI antilambánetai ti to árqro 23 parágrafow 2 aposkope na ejasfal sei ti kápoiow mpore na epikalesqe enant on tr tvn ton ek toy n moy aporr onta symchfism , dynámei thw nomoqes aw toy krátoyw m loyw poy di pei thn apa thsh toy pistvtikoý idrýmatow poy aqete tiw ypoxre seiw toy , pará to m tro ejyg anshw th diadikas a ekkaqárishw .
Similarly , the EMI understands that the intent of Article 23 ( 2 ) is to ensure that statutory set-off is enforceable in accordance with the law of the Member State applicable to the failed credit institution 's claim notwithstanding the reorganisation measure or winding-up procedure .
To ENI yposthr zei ep shw ayt to st xo .
This intent is also supported by the EMI .
Vst so , dedom nhw thw spoydai thtaw tvn nomik n problhmátvn poy antimetvp zontai básei toy árqroy 23 , qa pr pei na lhfqe idia terh m rimna katá th diatýpvs toy , ste oi epidivk menoi st xoi na parágoyn pl rvw ta epiqymhtá apotel smata .
However , the importance of the legal issues dealt with in Article 23 calls for great care in the drafting with a view to ensuring that the full intended effect is given to these welcome objectives .
Shmei netai ti h pr tash den aforá ta pistvtiká idrýmata poy xoyn thn dra toyw ekt w thw Koin thtaw , pará m no tan , sýmfvna me to árqro 1 parágrafow 2 toy sxed oy , to pistvtik dryma diaq tei ypokatast mata se dýo , toyláxiston , kráth m lh thw Koin thtaw .
It is noted that the proposal will only relate to those credit institutions the head office of which is outside the Community where , according to Article 1 ( 2 ) of the draft , such an entity has branches in at least two Member States of the Community .
Oi l goi poy synhgoroýn yp r aytoý toy periorismoý e nai safe w. Vst so , diapist netai ti ypárxoyn orism noi pollo megáloi miloi trapez n ap tr tew x rew , me shmantik paroys a sthn Koin thta , poy askoýn tiw drasthri tht w toyw sthn Koin thta m sv ypokatasthmátvn kai qygatrik n --- dynámenew na xoyn na m no ypokatásthma , allá poll w
The reasoning behind such a limitation is clear . However , it is noted that there are a number of very large non-EU banking groups which have a significant presence in the Community and which conduct their business in the Community through a mixture of branches and subsidiaries , conceivably having only one branch but
Prokeim noy na ypárxei megalýterh saf neia , to ENI eishge tai ep shw thn antikatástash sto árqro 23 parágrafow 1 tr th per ptvsh toy roy « pistvt w » ap ton ro « antisymball menoi » .
For the sake of clarity , the EMI also suggests the replacement of the word « creditors » by the word « counterparts » in Article 23 ( 1 ) , third indent .
Anagnvr zetai ti h ýparjh symbásevn symchfismoý metajý tvn symball menvn mer n ejyponoe ti káqe m row se mia t toia rýqmish qa e nai o pistvt w se sx sh me m a periss terew symbáseiw , o opo ow , se per ptvsh poy den ypárxei mia t toia sýmbash , qa ep bale sto állo m row na diakanon sei tiw ypoxre seiw toy se akaqáristh básh .
It is acknowledged that the existence of a contractual netting arrangement between parties implies that any party to such an arrangement will be the creditor in relation to one or more contracts which , in the absence of the netting agreement , would require the other party to settle obligations on a gross basis .
Vst so , stiw periss terew symbáseiw symchfismoý káqe m row dýnatai na e nai o kaqar w pistvt w o kaqar w xre sthw , dedom noy ti h sxetik q sh mpore na allájei sth diárkeia toy xr noy .
However , it is the nature of most netting contracts that either party may be the net creditor or the net debtor and this position may change over time .
H xrhsimopo hsh toy roy « pistvt w » se ayt to pla sio , ypárxei k ndynow na ermhneyqe katá tr po ste h diátajh ayt na mhn efarm zetai pará m no tan to pistvtik dryma e nai o kaqar w xre sthw sto pla sio sýmbashw symchfismoý --- eán katá thn narjh isxýow tvn m trvn ejyg anshw thw narjhw thw
By using the word creditor in this context there is a danger that this provision will be construed as only applying when the credit institution is the net debtor in respect of a contractual netting arrangement , where , on the commencement of reorganisation or
diadikas aw ekkaqárishw to pistvtik dryma e nai o kaqar w pistvt w sto pla sio sýmbashw symchfismoý , yf statai to endex meno se ayt n thn per ptvsh na mhn isxýei h diátajh ayt .
winding-up measures the credit institution is the net creditor in respect of a contractual netting arrangement the implication may arise that this provision does not apply .
To árqro 26 stoxeýei ston apokleism thw efarmog w toy kan na « xronik shme o mhd n » kai tvn diatájevn sxetiká me thn anadromik thta , sto m tro poy dýnantai na xoyn ep ptvsh sthn isxý tvn synallag n poy ekteloýntai m sv syst matow plhrvm n diatrapezik n systhmátvn symchfismoý .
Article 26 aims to exclude the application of the zero-hour rule and retroactivity provisions in so far as they may impact on the validity of transactions effected through payment system and interbank netting systems .
Ayt h diátajh stoxeýei na ayj sei th bebai thta sxetiká me ton teles diko xarakt ra thw rýqmishw sto pla sio tvn systhmátvn plhrvm w , gegon w poy qa e xe eyergetiká apotel smata sth staqer thta tvn pistvtik n idrymátvn kai tvn xrhmatooikonomik n agor n kai , katá syn peia , qa me vne toyw systhmatikoýw kindýnoyw .
This provision aims to add further certainty in relation to finality within payment systems , thereby having potential benefits for the stability of financial institutions and financial markets and , as a result , having the potential to reduce systematic risks .
Synep w , to ENI ekfrázei thn ikanopo hs toy gia th diátajh ayt .
Therefore , the EMI welcomes this provision .
Vst so , gia na e nai pl rvw apotelesmatik , e nai idia tera shmantik h diatýpvs thw na epitr pei na kaqor zetai saf w to xronik shme o sto opo o oi ryqm seiw oi plhrvm w emp ptoyn se ayt th diátajh .
However , to be effective , it is vital that the point in time at which arrangements or payments benefit from the provision , is clearly determinable from the drafting .
Katá syn peia , h odhg a qa mporoýse na odhg sei sthn epejergas a kan nvn poy qa di poyn ta eqniká syst mata plhrvm n kai diakanonismoý , anaf rontaw saf w se poio stádio thw diadikas aw xeirismoý thw synallag w , h prosfer menh prostas a ap th diátajh arx zei na isxýei , gia parádeigma qa mporoýse na isxýei ap th stigm katá thn opo a h plhrvm kaq statai ametáklhth oristik sýmfvna me toyw kan new toy sxetikoý syst matow / kai dynámei thw isxýoysaw nomoqes aw .
Therefore , the Directive might induce rules governing national payment and settlement systems to make clear at what point in the processing arrangements the protections provided by the provision come into effect , this might for example be the moment when , under the rules of the relevant system and / or under the relevant law , the payment becomes irrevocable or final .
To ENI shmei nei ti to árqro 30 , pvw diatyp netai sto ggrafo SN 4582/96 thw pr tashw , kaqor zei proqesm a ent w thw opo aw ta kráth m lh qa pr pei na q soyn se isxý tiw anagka ew nomoqetik w , kanonistik w kai dioikhtik w diatájeiw prokeim noy na symmorfvqoýn me thn odhg a. To ENI antilambánetai ti h diátajh ayt xei tropopoihqe se metagen sterh kdosh thw pr tashw , ste h odhg a na t qetai se isxý tr a th metá ap th dhmos eys thw sthn Ep shmh Efhmer da tvn Eyrvpa k n Koinot tvn kai den aforá pará m no ta m tra ejyg anshw tiw diadikas ew ekkaqárishw dromologoýntai metá ap ayt n thn hmeromhn a. To ENI ekfrázei thn ikanopo hs toy sxetiká me ayt n ton tr po rýqmishw kaq w kai me opoiad pote állh prvtoboyl a poy qa stoxeýei sthn ejasfálish kalýteroy syntonismoý sxetiká me thn hmeromhn a narjhw isxýow thw paroýsaw pr tashw .
The EMI notes that Article 30 as drafted in document SN 4582/96 of the proposal sets a latest date by which Member States are to bring into force the laws , regulations and administrative provisions to comply with the Directive . The EMI understands that this provision has been changed in a subsequent draft of the proposal so that the Directive will be implemented three years after publication of the text in the Official Journal of the European Communities and will only apply to reorganisation measures or winding-up procedures which are opened or commenced after this date .
H pr -
The EMI welcomes this and any other moves to coordinate further the date of implementation of this proposal .
tash qa mporoýse endexom nvw na aposafhn sei kai na tropopoi sei thn ep ptvsh orism nvn qemátvn idivtikoý dieqnoýw dika oy --- idia tera dynámei toy árqroy 23 .
The proposal will potentially have the effect of clarifying and altering the result of certain questions of private international law , particularly by virtue of Article 23 .
Vst so , eán ayt w oi diatájeiw arx soyn na isxýoyn se diaforetik w hmeromhn ew sta diáfora kráth m lh , toýto qa e xe vw syn peia th dhmioyrg a abebai thtaw kai sýgxyshw katá th diárkeia thw metabatik w peri doy .
If these provisions were to come into effect at different times in different Member States , however , uncertainty and confusion will arise during the transitional period .