natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ôï ðåäßï åöÆæìïª Þò óıíÆæôÜôÆØ ðæïò ôïí ïæØóìü ôøí × ˇ ¯ ˜ , ï ïðïßïò ðåæØº ÆìâÜíåØ ôÆ ÆŒüº ïıŁÆ óôïØ ÷ åßÆ : ôçí åíôüò ôïı ïìßº ïı ýðÆæîç ìØÆò ÆóöÆº ØóôØŒÞò Þ ÆíôÆóöÆº ØóôØŒÞò åðØ ÷ åßæçóçò ŒÆØ , ìßÆò ôïıº Ü ÷ Øóôïí , Üºº çò åðØ ÷ åßæçóçò äØÆöïæåôØŒïý ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒïý ôïìÝÆ , ôçí åíôüò ôïı ïìßº ïı ýðÆæîç , ìßÆò ôïıº Ü ÷ Øóôïí , æıŁìØæüìåíçò åðØ ÷ åßæçóçò ( ðØóôøôØŒïý ØäæýìÆôïò Þ åðØ ÷ åßæçóçò åðåíäýóåøí Þ ÆóöÆº ØóôØŒÞò åðØ ÷ åßæçóçò ) , ôØò ïıóØþäåØò äØÆôïìåÆŒÝò äæÆóôçæØüôçôåò ŒÆØ ôçí ðÆæï ÷ Þ Œıæßøò ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí ıðçæåóØþí .
The inclusion of off-balance sheet items is made conditional upon the common agreement of competent authorities under Article 3 ( 3 )( c ) of the proposal . However , reporting based solely on on-balance sheet items may be deemed insufficient in cases where off-balance sheet items form a significant share of the complete range of activities .
« íÆöïæØŒÜ ìå ôï ôåº åıôÆßï ŒæØôÞæØï , ç ¯ ˚Ô åðØŁıìåß íÆ ôïíßóåØ ôæåØò ðôı ÷ Ýò .
6 . The scope of application hinges upon a definition of financial conglomerate , which comprises the following elements : the presence in the group of both one insurance or reinsurance undertaking and at least one other entity of a different financial sector ;
--- æþôïí , ç ðÆæï ÷ Þ Œıæßøò ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí ıðçæåóØþí åîÆæôÜôÆØ Æðü ôïí ïæØóìü ôïı «÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒïý ôïìÝÆ » .
and the provision of mainly financial services . With regard to this last criterion , the ECB would like to highlight three aspects .
ˇ åí ºüª ø ïæØóìüò , üðøò ðÆæÆôßŁåôÆØ óôï ÜæŁæï 2 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 7 , ðåæØº ÆìâÜíåØ ôïıò ôïìåßò ôøí ôæÆðåæØŒþí , ÆóöÆº ØóôØŒþí ŒÆØ åðåíäıôØŒþí ıðçæåóØþí .
First , the provision of mainly financial services , is dependent on a definition of  financial sector . The latter definition , set out in Article 2 ( 7 ) , comprises the banking , insurance and investment services sectors .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô ðÆæÆôçæåß üôØ ï ïæØóìüò Æıôüò åîÆØæåß Æðü ôçí ÝííïØÆ ôïı ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒïý ôïìÝÆ ÝíÆ óçìÆíôØŒü ôìÞìÆ ôøí äæÆóôçæØïôÞôøí óıººïª ØŒÞò äØÆ ÷ åßæØóçò ôøí óôïØ ÷ åßøí åíåæª çôØŒïý .
The ECB notes that this definition does exclude from the financial sector a major part of the collective asset management business .
˙ åí ºüª ø ðæïóÝªª Øóç ŒæßíåôÆØ Æðæüóöïæç , ºüª ø ôçò öýóåøò ŒÆØ ôçò óçìÆóßÆò ôïı ôìÞìÆôïò Æıôïý óôïí ôïìÝÆ ôøí ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí ıðçæåóØþí .
This does not seem adequate , given the nature and importance of that business segment in the financial services industry .
Óôï ( 1 ) EE L 126 ôçò 26.5.2000 , ó .
In this context , the ECB recalls that , following the definitive adoption of the proposal for a directive amending the ( 1 ) OJ L 126 , 26.5.2000 , p. 1 .
¯ íôïýôïØò , ìØÆ ÆíÆªªåº ßÆ ðïı âÆóßæåôÆØ ìüíï óå óôïØ ÷ åßÆ ôïı Øóïºïª Øóìïý åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ ŒæØŁåß ÆíåðÆæŒÞò óå ðåæØðôþóåØò üðïı ôÆ åŒôüò Øóïºïª Øóìïý óôïØ ÷ åßÆ óıíØóôïýí óçìÆíôØŒü ôìÞìÆ ôïı óıíïº ØŒïý ðåäßïı äæÆóôçæØïôÞôøí . Ôæßôïí , ðÜíôÆ óå ó ÷ Ýóç ìå ôï ÜæŁæï 3 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 , ç ¯ ˚Ô óçìåØþíåØ üôØ ç ðæüôÆóç äåí åîåôÜæåØ ôçí ðåæßðôøóç åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåøí ðïı ÆíÞŒïıí åí ìÝæåØ óå ôæßôïıò , üðïı ï ıðïºïª Øóìüò ôøí ïæßøí ìå ÷ æÞóç ôøí óıíïº ØŒþí óôïØ ÷ åßøí ôïı Øóïºïª Øóìïý åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ Æðïâåß óå ïæØóìÝíï âÆŁìü ðÆæÆðº ÆíçôØŒüò .
Thirdly , also regarding Article 3 ( 1 ) , the ECB notes that the proposal does not address the possibility of partially-owned entities , where the calculation of thresholds using total balance sheet figures may be somewhat misleading .
˚ÆôÜ óıíÝðåØÆ , ôï ÜæŁæï 3 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 ŁÆ ìðïæïýóå íÆ ðæïâº ÝðåØ åðßóçò ôïí ıðïºïª Øóìü ôøí ïæßøí ìå ÷ æÞóç ôøí óôïØ ÷ åßøí óå ÆíÆºïª ØŒÞ âÜóç .
Therefore , Article 3 ( 1 ) could also allow for threshold calculations using figures on a pro-rata basis .
( 2 ) « íÆŒïßíøóç ôçò ¯ ðØôæïðÞò ðæïò ôï ¯ ıæøðÆœŒü ˚ïØíïâïýº Øï , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôï ÜæŁæï 251 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 2 äåýôåæï åäÜöØï ôçò óıíŁÞŒçò ¯ ˚ , ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôçí ŒïØíÞ ŁÝóç ðïı ŒÆŁüæØóå ôï Óıìâïýº Øï ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôçí ÝŒäïóç ïäçª ßÆò ôïı ¯ ıæøðÆœŒïý ˚ïØíïâïıº ßïı ŒÆØ ôïı Óıìâïıº ßïı ªØÆ ôçí ôæïðïðïßçóç ôçò ïäçª ßÆò 85/611 /¯ ˇ˚ ªØÆ ôï óıíôïíØóìü ôøí íïìïŁåôØŒþí , ŒÆíïíØóôØŒþí ŒÆØ äØïØŒçôØŒþí äØÆôÜîåøí ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ïæØóìÝíïıò ïæª ÆíØóìïýò óıººïª ØŒþí åðåíäýóåøí óå ŒØíçôÝò Æîßåò ( ˇÓ ¯ ˚ `) ìå óŒïðü ôç æýŁìØóç ôøí åôÆØæåØþí äØÆ ÷ åßæØóçò ŒÆØ ôøí Æðº ïðïØçìÝíøí åíçìåæøôØŒþí äåº ôßøí [ COD ( 1998 ) 0242 ] .
( 2 ) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 251 ( 2 ) of the EC Treaty concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending the Directive 85/611 / EEC on the coordination of laws , regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities ( UCITS ) with a view to regulating management companies and simplified prospectuses ( COD ( 1998 ) 0242 ) .
( 3 ) EE L 193 ôçò 18.7.1983 , ó .
( 3 ) OJ L 193 , 18.7.1983 , p. 1 .
1 . C 271/12
C 271/12 EN
--- æïŒåØìÝíïı íÆ ŒÆôÆóôÞóåØ äıíÆôÞ ôçí ÆíÆª íþæØóç ôçò ôÆıôüôçôÆò ôøí åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåøí åíüò × ˇ ¯ ˜ , ôï ÜæŁæï 2 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 11 ôçò ðæüôÆóçò ïæßæåØ ôïí « üìØº ï » ìå ÆíÆöïæÜ óôçí ýðÆæîç « óôåíþí äåóìþí » ìåôÆîý öıóØŒþí Þ íïìØŒþí ðæïóþðøí .
In order to enable identification of entities within a financial conglomerate , Article 2 ( 11 ) of the proposal defines  group  with a reference to the existence , between natural or legal persons , of  close links .
ˇ ôåº åıôÆßïò üæïò âÆóßæåôÆØ óôçí ÝííïØÆ ôøí óôåíþí äåóìþí , ôçí ïðïßÆ åØóÞªÆª å óôØò ôïìåÆŒÝò ïäçª ßåò ç ºåª üìåíç « ïäçª ßÆ post BCCI » ( ïäçª ßÆ 95/26 /¯ ˚ ( 1 )) , ç ïðïßÆ ÆíÆöÝæåôÆØ Œıæßøò óå åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåØò ðïı , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôçí ïäçª ßÆ 83/349 /¯ ˇ˚ , ıðï ÷ æåïýíôÆØ íÆ ŒÆôÆæôßæïıí åíïðïØçìÝíïıò ºïª ÆæØÆóìïýò .
The latter notion draws on the concept of close links as introduced in the sectoral directives by the so-called post BCCI Directive ( Directive 95/26 / EC ) ( 1 ) , which mainly refers to undertakings that , according to Directive 83/349 / EEC , have to prepare consolidated accounts .
¯ ðØðº Ýïí , ï ïæØóìüò ðïı äØÆôıðþíåôÆØ óôï ÜæŁæï 2 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 12 ôçò ðæüôÆóçò ŒÆº ýðôåØ Üºº åò ŒÆôÆóôÜóåØò , üðøò , ªØÆ ðÆæÜäåØª ìÆ , « üôÆí , ŒÆôÜ ôçí Üðïłç ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí , ôï ÝíÆ Æðü ôÆ äýï ÆıôÜ ðæüóøðÆ ÆóŒåß ðæÆª ìÆôØŒÜ ïıóØþäç åðØææïÞ óôïí ÝíÆ Þ ôïí Üºº ï » , ÆíåîÆæôÞôøò ôçò ÜóŒçóçò ôçò åí ºüª ø ïıóØþäïıò åðØææïÞò äıíÜìåØ óıìâÜóåøò Þ üæïı ôïı ŒÆôÆóôÆôØŒïý ôçò åðØ ÷ åßæçóçò ( üðøò , ÆíôØŁÝôøò , ÆðÆØôåß ªØÆ ôçí åíïðïßçóç ôøí ºïª ÆæØÆóìþí ç óıíÆöÞò ïäçª ßÆ ) .
In addition , the definition used by Article 2 ( 12 ) of the proposal covers other situations , such as , for instance ,  a situation in which in the opinion of the competent authorities one or more persons effectively exercise a dominant influence over another person , regardless of the fact that such dominant influence is exercised pursuant to a contract or to a provision in the undertaking 's articles of association ( as it is instead required for the consolidation of accounts by the relevant directive ) .
¯ íþ åßíÆØ åıíüçôï üôØ ç ÆæìüäØÆ Ææ ÷ Þ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ äØÆŁÝôåØ ôçí ÆðÆØôïýìåíç åıåº ØîßÆ åí üłåØ ôïı ŒÆŁïæØóìïý ôøí åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåøí ðïı ŁÆ óıìðåæØº ÆìâÜíïíôÆØ óôïıò × ˇ ¯ ˜ ŒÆØ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ ıðüŒåØíôÆØ óå óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞ åðïðôåßÆ , ıðïóôçæßæåôÆØ üôØ äåí ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ Łßª åôÆØ ç ÆíÆª ŒÆßÆ ïìïØïìïæößÆ óå ü , ôØ ÆöïæÜ ôç ìåºº ïíôØŒÞ åöÆæìïª Þ ôçò ïäçª ßÆò óôÆ ŒæÜôç ìÝº ç .
While it is well understood that the competent authority should have enough flexibility in defining which entities are to be included in financial conglomerates and should be subject to supplementary supervision , it is submitted that the necessary uniformity in the future application of the proposal throughout the Member States should not be impaired .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŁıìåß íÆ åðØóçìÜíåØ ó ÷ åôØŒÜ üôØ ïØ ðåæØóóüôåæåò äØÆôÜîåØò ôçò ðæüôÆóçò âÆóßæïíôÆØ óå óıìöøíßåò óıíåæª ÆóßÆò ŒÆØ óıíôïíØóìïý ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí .
like to note that most provisions of the proposal rely on cooperation and coordination arrangements between competent authorities .
« ıôü Øó ÷ ýåØ , ªØÆ ðÆæÜäåØª ìÆ , óôçí ðåæßðôøóç ôïı ÜæŁæïı 3 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 3 , ôïı ÜæŁæïı 4 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 4 , ôïı ÜæŁæïı 5 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 5 , ôïı ÜæŁæïı 6 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 6 , ôïı ÜæŁæïı 13 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 2 ŒÆØ ôøí ðÆæÆæôçìÜôøí É ŒÆØ II .
For instance , this is the case of Article 3 ( 3 ) , Article 4 ( 4 ) , Article 5 ( 5 ) , Article 6 ( 6 ) , Article 13 ( 2 ) , and Annexes I and II .
˙ ºåØôïıæª ØŒüôçôÆ Æıôþí ôøí äØÆôÜîåøí åîÆæôÜôÆØ , åðïìÝíøò , Æðü ôçí ŒÆôÜæôØóç óÆöþí , Ýªª æÆöøí óıìöøíØþí ŒÆØ æıŁìßóåøí ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí ôøí æıŁìØæüìåíøí åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåøí ðïı ÆðÆæôßæïıí ôïí üìØº ï .
The workability of all these provisions depends , therefore , on the establishment of concrete and written arrangements and agreements among the competent authorities of the regulated entities comprising the conglomerate .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ïØ ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ Ý ÷ ïıí ôç äıíÆôüôçôÆ äçìïóØïðïßçóçò ôÝôïØøí óıìöøíØþí , ŒÆôÜ ðæïôßìçóç ìÝóø äçìïóßåıóçò óôçí ¯ ðßóçìç ¯ öçìåæßäÆ ôøí ¯ ıæøðÆœŒþí ˚ïØíïôÞôøí .
The ECB considers that competent authorities should have the possibility to make such agreements public , preferably by publishing them in the Official Journal of the European Communities .
¯ ðØðº Ýïí , üóïí ÆöïæÜ ôçí ıº ïðïßçóç ôøí óıìöøíØþí Æıôþí , ç ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ åðØôıª ÷ ÜíåôÆØ ïæØóìÝíïò âÆŁìüò óýªŒº Øóçò øò ðæïò ôÆ ŒýæØÆ óôïØ ÷ åßÆ ôïıò , åíþ ôÆıôü ÷ æïíÆ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ äØÆöıº ÜóóåôÆØ ç ÆðÆæÆßôçôç åıåº ØîßÆ ôøí åðïðôØŒþí æıŁìßóåøí , ðæïŒåØìÝíïı íÆ åðØôıª ÷ ÜíåôÆØ ç ðæïóÞŒïıóÆ äØÆöÜíåØÆ ŒÆØ óÆöÞíåØÆ ôïı åðïðôØŒïý ðº ÆØóßïı , ŒÆŁþò åðßóçò ŒÆØ ç ØóüôØìç ŒÆØ Æðïôåº åóìÆôØŒÞ ìåôÆ ÷ åßæØóç , Æðü Üðïłç åðïðôåßÆò , ìåôÆîý ôøí × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
In addition , with regard to the implementation of these arrangements , the ECB considers that some degree of convergence should be achieved regarding their main elements , while safeguarding the necessary flexibility of supervisory arrangements , in order to achieve adequate transparency and clarity of the supervisory framework , as well as equal and effective supervisory treatment across financial conglomerates .
˜åýôåæïí , øò ðæïò ôçí ÜóŒçóç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò ŒÆØ ôï æüº ï ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ .
Secondly , the exercise of supplementary supervision and the role of the coordinator .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô ðÆæÆôçæåß üôØ äåí ıðÜæ ÷ åØ åðßóçìïò ïæØóìüò ôïı óı ÷ íÜ åðÆíÆº ÆìâÆíüìåíïı üæïı « ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ªØÆ ôçí ÜóŒçóç ôçò óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò » , üðøò åíäåØŒôØŒÜ ÆíÆöÝæåôÆØ óôï ÜæŁæï 5 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 , óôï ÜæŁæï 6 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 ŒÆØ óôï ÜæŁæï 7 .
The ECB notes that there is no formal definition of the recurrent term of  competent authorities responsible for exercising supplementary supervision , for instance as referred to in Article 5 ( 1 ) , Article 6 ( 1 ) and Article 7 .
« ðü ôïí ôßôº ï ôïı ÜæŁæïı 7 ŒÆØ ôç äØÆôýðøóç ôïı ÜæŁæïı 7 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 óıíÜª åôÆØ üôØ ÆæìüäØÆ Ææ ÷ Þ ªØÆ ôç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞ åðïðôåßÆ åßíÆØ , óôçí ðæÆª ìÆôØŒüôçôÆ , ï óıíôïíØóôÞò .
The heading of Article 7 and the wording of Article 7 ( 1 ) imply that the competent authority responsible for supplementary supervisions is in fact the coordinator .
« ıôü ôï óçìåßï ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ äØÆóÆöçíØóôåß .
This point should be clarified .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ßóøò äåí Æðïôåº åß ºåØôïıæª ØŒÞ ºýóç ç ýðÆæîç óıíôïíØóôÞ Æðïôåº ïýìåíïı Æðü ðåæØóóüôåæåò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôï ÜæŁæï 7 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 .
The ECB considers that it may not be a workable solution for the coordinator , under Article 7 ( 1 ) , to be composed of more that one competent authority .
« ıôü óçìÆßíåØ üôØ , ŁåøæçôØŒÜ , ï óıíôïíØóôÞò åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ Æðïôåº åßôÆØ Æðü ðåæØóóüôåæåò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò .
This means that the coordinator may comprise several competent authorities .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô ÆíôØº ÆìâÜíåôÆØ üôØ ï æüº ïò ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ óıìâÜºº åØ óôç ìåßøóç ŒÆØ ü ÷ Ø óôçí åðßôÆóç ôçò ðïºıðº ïŒüôçôÆò .
The ECB understands that the role of a coordinator should contribute towards reducing complexity rather that increasing it .
^ ØÆ ôï ºüª ï Æıôü , ç ¯ ˚Ô ŁÆ ðæïôØìïýóå ôçí ÆíÜŁåóç ôïı æüº ïı óıíôïíØóôÞ óå ìßÆ ìüíï ÆæìüäØÆ Ææ ÷ Þ .
Therefore , the ECB would prefer that the role of coordinator be assigned to one competent authority only .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô óçìåØþíåØ åðßóçò üôØ , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôï ÜæŁæï 7 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 3 ôçò ðæüôÆóçò , ï ÆæìüäØïò óıíôïíØóôÞò ªØÆ ôç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞ åðïðôåßÆ ÝíÆíôØ ôïı × ˇ ¯ ˜ åíçìåæþíåØ ôØò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ôøí Üºº øí åìðº åŒüìåíøí ŒæÆôþí ìåº þí , ŒÆŁþò ŒÆØ ôçí ¯ ðØôæïðÞ , ªØÆ ôï æüº ï ôïı .
The ECB also notes that , under Article 7 ( 3 ) of the proposal , the coordinator for the supplementary supervision with regard to the financial conglomerate shall inform the competent authorities of the other Member States involved and the Commission of its identification .
˚ÆôÜ ôçí ¯ ˚Ô , ïØ åðØôÆª Ýò ôçò äØÆöÜíåØÆò ôïı ŒïØíïôØŒïý ŁåóìØŒïý ðº ÆØóßïı óôï ŁÝìÆ ôçò ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò ðæïßðïŁÝôïıí üôØ ï æüº ïò ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ , äıíÜìåØ ôïı íüìïı , íÆ ªíøóôïðïØåßôÆØ åðßóçò óôØò æıŁìØæüìåíåò ŒÆØ ìç æıŁìØæüìåíåò åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåØò ðïı ÆðÆæôßæïıí ôïí × ˇ ¯ ˜ , ªØÆ ðÆæÜäåØª ìÆ ìÝóø ôçò ìçôæØŒÞò åôÆØæåßÆò ôïı ïìßº ïı Þ ôïı æıŁìØæüìåíïı ØäæýìÆôïò ðïı äıíÜìåØ ôïı ôüðïı åª ŒÆôÜóôÆóÞò ôïı ıðÜª åôÆØ óôç äØŒÆØïäïóßÆ ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ , ŒÆŁþò åðßóçò ŒÆØ óôï ŒïØíü .
The ECB considers that the requirements for transparency of the Community 's institutional framework for financial supervision imply that the identification of the coordinator should also , by force of law , be communicated to the regulated and unregulated entities comprising the financial conglomerate , for instance through the parent company of the conglomerate or the regulated institution located in the jurisdiction of the coordinator , and also to the general public .
Ó » Æıôü ôï ðíåýìÆ , ªØÆ ðÆæÜäåØª ìÆ , ï ŒþäØŒÆò ïæŁþí ðæÆŒôØŒþí ôïı ˜ØåŁíïýò ˝ïìØóìÆôØŒïý ÔÆìåßïı ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôç äØÆöÜíåØÆ ôçò íïìØóìÆôØŒÞò ŒÆØ ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒÞò ðïº ØôØŒÞò ( Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies ) ôïíßæåØ , óôï ôìÞìÆ 5.1.2 Æıôïý , üôØ ïØ ÆæìïäØüôçôåò ôøí ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí öïæÝøí ŒÆØ ç åîïıóßÆ ÜóŒçóçò ÷ æç ( 1 ) EE L 168 ôçò 18.7.1995 , ó . 7 .
For instance , in this sense , the International Monetary Fund 's  Code of good practices on transparency in monetary and financial policies , in Section 5.1.2 , points out that  the responsibilities of the financial agencies and the authority to conduct financial policies should be publicly disclosed . In this connection , the ECB should ( 1 ) OJ L 168 , 18.7.1995 , p. 7 .
Ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôØò äØÆôÜîåØò ðïı Æöïæïýí ôï äØïæØóìü ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ ŒÆôÜ ôï ÜæŁæï 7 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 2 , ç ¯ ˚Ô ðæïŒæßíåØ ôÆ ÆíôØŒåØìåíØŒÜ ŒæØôÞæØÆ ðïı ðÆæÆôßŁåíôÆØ óôçí åí ºüª ø äØÜôÆîç ÝíÆíôØ ôçò äØÆŒæØôØŒÞò åı ÷ ÝæåØÆò ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí íÆ ŒÆôÆºÞª ïıí óå åØäØŒÞ óıìöøíßÆ øò ðæïò ôï ðæüóøðï ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ  ç ôåº åıôÆßÆ ŁÆ ìðïæïýóå íÆ ðÆæÆìåßíåØ øò åíÆºº ÆŒôØŒÞ ºýóç . « ıôü äØŒÆØïºïª åßôÆØ Æðü ôï ªåª ïíüò üôØ ôÆ ÆíôØŒåØìåíØŒÜ ŒæØôÞæØÆ ªØÆ ôï äØïæØóìü ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ åîıðçæåôïýí ŒÆº ýôåæÆ ôØò åðØôÆª Ýò ôçò äØÆöÜíåØÆò , ôçò óÆöÞíåØÆò ŒÆØ ôçò ÆóöÜº åØÆò äØŒÆßïı üóïí ÆöïæÜ ôç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞ åðïðôåßÆ ôøí × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
With regard to the provisions concerning the appointment of the coordinator , under Article 7 ( 2 ) , the ECB would prefer that the objective criteria listed in this provision prevail over the discretion of competent authorities to reach an ad-hoc agreement on the coordinator , while the latter may remain as an alternative solution .
¯ ðØðº Ýïí , ç ¯ ˚Ô ðÆæÆôçæåß üôØ ïæØóìÝíåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ðïı ÆŒïº ïıŁïýíôÆØ ŒÆôÜ ôçí åðØºïª Þ ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ ŒÆØ , óıª ŒåŒæØìÝíÆ , åŒåßíåò ôïı ÜæŁæïı 7 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 2 óôïØ ÷ åßï â ) óçìåßÆ ii ) , iii ) ŒÆØ iv ) , åîÆæôþíôÆØ Æðü ðÆæÜª ïíôåò üðøò  ôï ıłçº üôåæï óýíïº ï Øóïºïª Øóìïý » , ïØ ïðïßïØ ıðüŒåØíôÆØ óå ìåôÆâïº Ýò ìå ôçí ðÜæïäï ôïı ÷ æüíïı .
This is justified on the basis that objective criteria for the appointment of the coordinator better serve the requirements of transparency , clarity and legal certainty regarding the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates . The ECB notes , in addition , that certain principles for identifying a coordinator , namely under Article 7 ( 2 )( b ) ( ii ) , ( iii ) and ( iv ) , depend on factors that may be changing over time , such as the  largest balance-sheet total .
Ó » Æıôü ôï ðº ÆßóØï , ç ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ç ðæüôÆóç ŁÆ ìðïæïýóå , óå ŒÜŁå ðåæßðôøóç , íÆ ŒÆŁïæßóåØ ïæØóìÝíç åº Ü ÷ Øóôç äØÜæŒåØÆ ôçò ŁçôåßÆò ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ , ÆíåîÜæôçôç Æðü ôØò äØÆŒıìÜíóåØò ðÆæüìïØøí ìåôÆâº çôþí ðÆæÆª üíôøí , ìå åîÆßæåóç ôØò ðåæØðôþóåØò åðÝº åıóçò ìåØæüíøí ìåôÆâïº þí óôç óýíŁåóç ôïı × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
In this context , the ECB considers that the appointment of the coordinator should , in all cases , be fixed for a specified minimum period of time , which could be defined in the proposal , independently of variations on such dynamic factors , unless major changes in the composition of the conglomerate occur .
˙ åí ºüª ø æýŁìØóç ðæüŒåØôÆØ ü ÷ Ø ìüíï íÆ äØÆóöÆº ßóåØ ïæØóìÝíï âÆŁìü óıíÝ ÷ åØÆò óôç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞ åðïðôåßÆ , Æºº Ü ŒÆØ íÆ ÆíôÆðïŒæØŁåß óôØò åðØôÆª Ýò ôçò äØÆöÜíåØÆò , ôçò óÆöÞíåØÆò ŒÆØ ôçò ÆóöÜº åØÆò äØŒÆßïı .
This would not only ensure a certain degree of continuity in supplementary supervision but would also be justified by the requirements for transparency , clarity and legal certainty .
óïí ÆöïæÜ ôÆ ŒÆŁÞŒïíôÆ ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ äıíÜìåØ ôïı ÜæŁæïı 8 , ç ¯ ˚Ô åðØŒæïôåß ôïí ðæïôåØíüìåíï ŒÆôÜºïª ï ŒÆŁçŒüíôøí .
With regard to the tasks of the coordinator under Article 8 , the ECB welcomes the proposed list of mandatory assignments .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ï óıíôïíØóôÞò ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ ÆíÆº ÆìâÜíåØ åíåæª ü æüº ï óôçí ðÆæÆŒïº ïýŁçóç ôïı × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
The ECB considers that the coordinator should be entrusted with an active role regarding the monitoring of the financial conglomerate .
--- æïò üöåº ïò ôçò äØÆöÜíåØÆò ŒÆØ óÆöÞíåØÆò ÝíÆíôØ ôøí óıììåôå ÷ üíôøí óôçí Æª ïæÜ Æºº Ü ŒÆØ ôïı ŒïØíïý ªåíØŒüôåæÆ , ç ¯ ˚Ô ðæïôåßíåØ , ðÝæÆ Æðü ôçí ðæïâº åðüìåíç óôï ÜæŁæï 8 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 äÝóìç ŒÆŁçŒüíôøí , ôçí ÆíÜŁåóç óôï óıíôïíØóôÞ ôïı ŒÆŁÞŒïíôïò óıíôïíØóìïý ôçò ªíøóôïðïßçóçò óôï ŒïØíü ôøí ÆðïöÜóåøí ðïı åßíÆØ ŒæßóØìåò ªØÆ ôïí × ˇ ¯ ˜ óôï óýíïº ü ôïı , âÜóåØ óıìöøíßÆò ìå ôØò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ŒÆØ ìå ôÞæçóç ôøí ôïìåÆŒþí ŒÆíüíøí .
The ECB would propose , for the sake of transparency and clarity vis-à-vis market participants and the public in general , that in addition to the set of tasks under Article 8 ( 1 ) , the coordinator be assigned the task of coordinating , in agreement with the competent authorities and in observance of sectoral rules , the communication to the general public of decisions which are relevant for the financial conglomerate as a whole .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô óçìåØþíåØ üôØ ŒÆØ ç ÜóŒçóç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò øò ðæïò ôçí ŒåöÆº ÆØÆŒÞ åðÜæŒåØÆ , ôØò óıíÆººÆª Ýò óôï åóøôåæØŒü ôïı ïìßº ïı ŒÆØ ôç óıª ŒÝíôæøóç ŒØíäýíøí åîÆæôÜôÆØ Æðü ôçí Æðïôåº åóìÆôØŒüôçôÆ ôøí óıìöøíØþí óıíåæª ÆóßÆò ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí .
The ECB notes that also the exercise of supplementary supervision with regard to capital adequacy , intra-goup transactions and risk concentration is dependent on effective cooperation arrangements between the competent authorities .
˚ÜôØ ôÝôïØï åíäÝ ÷ åôÆØ Ýøò ÝíÆ âÆŁìü íÆ ðæïŒÆº ÝóåØ ÆíÆóöÜº åØÆ øò ðæïò ôç äØÜæŁæøóç ôïı åðïðôØŒïý ðº ÆØóßïı , ôï ïðïßï , ŒÆôÆæ ÷ Þí , ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ åßíÆØ ŒÆŁïæØóìÝíï óôï óýíïº ü ôïı ìå óÆöÞíåØÆ ŒÆØ íÆ ìçí ÆðïäıíÆìþíåôÆØ ºüª ø ÆïæØóôßÆò óå ó ÷ Ýóç ìå ôçí Æðïôåº åóìÆôØŒüôçôÜ ôïı .
This may lead to some uncertainty about the structure of the prudential framework , which , as a matter of principle , should be well defined throughout and not weakened by ambiguities about its effectiveness .
Ôï æÞôçìÆ ôøí ØóüôØìøí üæøí ÆíôÆª øíØóìïý ìåôÆîý ôøí ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí ØäæıìÜôøí åíäÝ ÷ åôÆØ íÆ ŒÆôÆóôåß ØäØÆßôåæÆ óçìÆíôØŒü åíôüò ôïı ðæïôåØíüìåíïı ðº ÆØóßïı , ï äå Œßíäıíïò åðïðôØŒïý ÆæìðØôæÜæ ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ Æðïöåýª åôÆØ üóï ôï äıíÆôüí ðåæØóóüôåæï .
The issue of level playing field among financial institutions may become increasingly relevant within the proposed framework and the risk of regulatory arbitrage should be avoided as much as possible .
^ ØÆ ðÆæÜäåØª ìÆ , ŒÆØ ðæïò Æðïöıª Þ åíäå ÷ üìåíøí ÆìöØóçìØþí , ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ ïæØóôåß ôï äØÆôïìåÆŒü ŒåöÜº ÆØï óå åðßðåäï × ˇ ¯ ˜ , äåäïìÝíïı üôØ ïØ ôïìåÆŒÝò ïäçª ßåò äåí åßíÆØ åíÆæìïíØóìÝíåò óå ü , ôØ ÆöïæÜ ôÆ óôïØ ÷ åßÆ ðåæß Øäßøí ŒåöÆº Æßøí .
For instance , cross-sector capital at the level of the financial conglomerate should be defined to avoid possible ambiguities , since the sectoral directives are not harmonised as regards own funds elements .
¯ ðØðº Ýïí , ç ðæüôÆóç äåí äØåıŒæØíßæåØ ðïØÆ åŁíØŒÞ íïìïŁåóßÆ ŁÆ åöÆæìïóôåß óôç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞ åðïðôåßÆ ôïı ïìßº ïı .
Furthermore , the proposal does not clarify which national legislation will apply to the supplementary supervision of the conglomerate .
´ ÜóåØ ôïı ÜæŁæïı 8 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 óôïØ ÷ åßï â ) , öÆßíåôÆØ üôØ ŁÆ åôýª ÷ Æíå åöÆæìïª Þò ç íïìïŁåóßÆ ôïı ŒæÜôïıò ìÝº ïıò ôçò ÝäæÆò ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ .
According to Article 8 ( 1 )( b ) , the law of the Member State where the coordinator is based would seem to apply .
˙ ÆíÜª íøóç , øóôüóï , ôøí ðÆæÆæôçìÜôøí I ŒÆØ ÉÉ , ôÆ ïðïßÆ ªåíØŒÜ ðæïâº Ýðïıí üôØ ïØ ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ ŒÆôÆºÞª ïıí óå óıìöøíßÆ ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôçí åöÆæìïª Þ ôøí åðïðôØŒþí ŒÆíüíøí , åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ ŁÝóåØ ôçí åí ºüª ø åæìçíåßÆ ıðü ÆìöØóâÞôçóç .
However , this interpretation may be questioned by the reading of Annexes I and II , which generally provide that competent authorities should reach an agreement on the application of prudential rules .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ôç ºýóç óôï æÞôçìÆ ôçò åðßôåıîçò ìåªÆº ýôåæçò óÆöÞíåØÆò ŁÆ ìðïæïýóå íÆ ðÆæÜó ÷ åØ ŒÜðïØÆ äØÜôÆîç ïæßæïıóÆ øò åöÆæìïóôÝï äßŒÆØï ªØÆ ôØò äæÆóôçæØüôçôåò ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ óôï ðº ÆßóØï ôçò óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò ôïı × ˇ ¯ ˜ ôç íïìïŁåóßÆ ôïı ŒæÜôïıò ìÝº ïıò ôçò ÝäæÆò ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ .
The ECB considers that a solution for achieving greater clarity would be to stipulate that the relevant national legislation of the Member State where the coordinator is based is the law applicable to the activities carried out by the coordinator in the supplementary supervision of the financial conglomerate .
--- Üíôøò , ç ðæüôÆóç ŁÆ ÆðÆØôåßôï íÆ äØåıŒæØíßæåØ ôï åöÆæìïóôÝï äßŒÆØï óôØò ðåæØðôþóåØò üðïı ï óıíôïíØóôÞò ÆðÆæôßæåôÆØ Æðü ðåæØóóüôåæåò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò .
However , the proposal would have to clarify the applicable legislation in those cases where the coordinator is composed of more than one competent authority .
« öåôÝæïı , ïæØóìÝíåò äØÆôÜîåØò ôçò ðæüôÆóçò ðæïâº Ýðïıí ôç óıììåôï ÷ Þ ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí óôçí ÜóŒçóç óıìðº çæøìÆôØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò .
On the other hand , certain provisions of the proposal provide scope for the competent authorities to participate in the exercise of supplementary supervision .
^ ØÆ ðÆæÜäåØª ìÆ , ç åŒôÝº åóç ìÝôæøí ðïı ÆðïóŒïðïýí óôçí ðÆýóç ôøí ðÆæÆâÜóåøí ðïı äØÆðØóôþíïíôÆØ ŒÆôÜ ôï ÜæŁæï 13 åìðßðôåØ óôçí åîïıóßÆ ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí . ˚Æô » ÆıôÞ ôçí ÝííïØÆ , ç åöÆæìïª Þ ìÝôæøí Æðü ìØÆ åðïðôØŒÞ Ææ ÷ Þ óå åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåØò åíüò × ˇ ¯ ˜ ìå ÝäæÆ óå Üºº ï ŒæÜôïò ìÝº ïò åíäÝ ÷ åôÆØ íÆ åª åßæåØ æçôÞìÆôÆ óýª Œæïıóçò íïìïŁåóØþí ŒÆØ ðæïóäØïæØóìïý ôïı ÆæìüäØïı ªØÆ ôçí ÜóŒçóç åºÝª ÷ ïı äØŒÆóôçæßïı .
For instance , the enforcement of measures aimed at ending observed breaches , under Article 13 , is in the power of the competent authorities .
Óıíåðþò , ç ¯ ˚Ô óıíØóôÜ íÆ ŒÆôÆóôåß óÆöÝóôåæç óôçí ðæüôÆóç ç äØÆöïæïðïßçóç ìåôÆîý ôçò åŒôÝº åóçò ôøí ÆíÆôØŁÝìåíøí óôØò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò åðïðôØŒþí ŒÆŁçŒüíôøí ŒÆØ ôïı æüº ïı ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ .
In this sense , the application of measures by a supervisory authority to entities of a financial conglomerate located in another Member State may give rise to problems of conflict of laws and of identification of the competent court for review .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô , ðÜíôøò , åðØŒæïôåß ôçí ÆíÜŁåóç ôïı æüº ïı Æıôïý óôï óıíôïíØóôÞ , äåäïìÝíïı üôØ ŒÜôØ ôÝôïØï ÆðïææÝåØ Øäßøò Æðü ôØò óıóôÜóåØò ôçò ÝŒŁåóçò ôçò ˇØŒïíïìØŒÞò ŒÆØ ˜çìïóØïíïìØŒÞò ¯ ðØôæïðÞò ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôç äØÆ ÷ åßæØóç ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí Œæßóåøí .
Therefore , the ECB suggests that the proposal differentiates more precisely between the execution of supervisory tasks , to be undertaken by competent authorities , and the role of the coordinator .