natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ïéêïíïìéêïß äåßêôåò êáé êñéôÞñéá óýãêëéóçò óýìöùíá ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç ôïõ ÌÜáóôñé ÷ ô ( åêôüò áðü ôï êñéôÞñéï ôçò óõíáëëáãìáôéêÞò éóïôéìßáò ) Ðëçèùñéóìüò ÅíÄÔÊ ( á ) ÂÝëãéï Äáíßá ( óô ) Ãåñìáíßá ÅëëÜäá Éóðáíßá Ãáëëßá Éñëáíäßá Éôáëßá Ëïõîåìâïýñãï Ïëëáíäßá Áõóôñßá Ðïñôïãáëßá Öéëáíäßá Óïõçäßá Çí . Âáóßëåéï 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( ä ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( ä ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1996 1997 ( å ) 1998 ( óô ) 1,8 1,4 2,1 1,9 1,2 1,4 7,9 5,2 3,6 1,8 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,2 4,0 1,8 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,1 2,9 1,8 1,1 1,3 0,8 1,9 2,5 1,8 Ìáêñïðñüèåóìï åðéôüêéï ( â ) 6,5 5,7 7,2 6,2 6,2 5,6 14,4 9,8 8,7 6,3 6,3 5,5 7,3 6,2 9,4 6,7 6,3 5,6 6,2 5,5 6,3 5,6 8,6 6,2 7,1 5,9 8,0 6,5 7,9 7,0 Ðëåüíáóìá (+) Þ Ýëëåéììá (-) åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá ( ã ) - 3,2 # 2,1 # - 1,7 # - 0,7 # 0,7 # 1,1 - 3,4 # - 2,7 # - 2,5 - 7,5 - 4,0 # - 2,2 - 4,6 # - 2,6 # - 2,2 - 4,1 # - 3,0 # - 2,9 # - 0,4 # 0,9 # 1,1 - 6,7 # - 2,7 # - 2,5 # 2,5 # 1,7 # 1,0 # - 2,3 # - 1,4 # - 1,6 - 4,0 # - 2,5 # - 2,3 - 3,2 # - 2,5 # - 2,2 - 3,3 # - 0,9 # 0,3 - 3,5 # - 0,8 # 0,5 - 4,8 # - 1,9 # - 0,6 ÁêáèÜñéóôï ÷ ñÝïò åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá ( ã ) 126,9 122,2 118,1 70,6 65,1 # 59,5 60,4 61,3 61,2 111,6 108,7 107,7 70,1 68,8 67,4 # 55,7 # 58,0 # 58,1 72,7 66,3 # 59,5 124,0 121,6 118,1 # 6,6 # 6,7 # 7,1 77,2 72,1 70,0 69,5 66,1 64,7 65,0 62,0 # 60,0 # 57,6 # 55,8 # 53,6 76,7 76,6 74,1 # 54,7 # 53,4 # 52,3
Economic indicators and the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria ( excluding the exchange rate criterion ) HICP inflation ( a ) 1.8 1.4 2.1 1.9 1.2 1.4 7.9 5.2 3.6 1.8 2.1 1.2 2.2 1.2 4.0 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.1 2.9 1.8 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.9 2.5 1.8 Long-term General government interest rate ( b ) surplus (+) or deficit (-) ( c ) 6.5 - 3.2 5.7 # - 2.1 # - 1.7 7.2 # - 0.7 6.2 # 0.7 # 1.1 6.2 - 3.4 5.6 # - 2.7 # - 2.5 14.4 - 7.5 9.8 - 4.0 # - 2.2 8.7 - 4.6 6.3 # - 2.6 # - 2.2 6.3 - 4.1 5.5 # - 3.0 # - 2.9 7.3 # - 0.4 6.2 # 0.9 # 1.1 9.4 - 6.7 6.7 # - 2.7 # - 2.5 6.3 # 2.5 5.6 # 1.7 # 1.0 6.2 # - 2.3 5.5 # - 1.4 # - 1.6 6.3 - 4.0 5.6 # - 2.5 # - 2.3 8.6 - 3.2 6.2 # - 2.5 # - 2.2 7.1 - 3.3 5.9 # - 0.9 # 0.3 8.0 - 3.5 6.5 # - 0.8 # 0.5 7.9 - 4.8 7.0 # - 1.9 # - 0.6 General government gross debt ( c ) 126.9 122.2 118.1 70.6 65.1 # 59.5 60.4 61.3 61.2 111.6 108.7 107.7 70.1 68.8 67.4 # 55.7 # 58.0 # 58.1 72.7 66.3 # 59.5 124.0 121.6 118.1 # 6.6 # 6.7 # 7.1 77.2 72.1 70.0 69.5 66.1 64.7 65.0 62.0 # 60.0 # 57.6 # 55.8 # 53.6 76.7 76.6 74.1 # 54.7 # 53.4 # 52.3 Belgium
# = Ýëëåéììá åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá ðïõ äåí õðåñâáßíåé ôï 3 % ôïõ ÁÅÐ êáé áêáèÜñéóôï ÷ ñÝïò åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá ðïõ äåí õðåñâáßíåé ôï 60 % ôïõ ÁÅÐ .
# = general government deficit not exceeding 3 % of GDP ; general government gross debt not exceeding 60 % of GDP .
Ïé åíáñìïíéóìÝíåò óåéñÝò ãéá ôçí ÅëëÜäá áñ ÷ ßæïõí áðü ôá ìÝóá ôïõ 1997 .
The harmonised series for Greece starts in mid-1997 .
Ãéá ôï äéÜóôçìá Ìáñôßïõ-Éïõíßïõ 1997 , ÷ ñçóéìïðïéÞèçêáí óôïé ÷ åßá ãéá ôéò áðïäüóåéò ìáêñïðñüèåóìùí ïìïëüãùí ìå ìéêñüôåñç äéÜñêåéá áðü ü , ôé ïé åíáñìïíéóìÝíåò óåéñÝò .
for the period from March to June 1997 , yield data for long-term bonds with shorter maturities than the harmonised series were used ;
Ãéá ôï äéÜóôçìá ðñéí áðü ôï ÌÜñôéï 1997 , ÷ ñçóéìïðïéÞèçêáí ïé áðïäüóåéò ( êáôÜ ôçí Ýêäïóç ) ìáêñïðñüèåóìùí ïìïëüãùí ìå ìéêñüôåñç äéÜñêåéá áðü ü , ôé ïé åíáñìïíéóìÝíåò óåéñÝò .
before that period , yields at issue for long-term bonds with shorter maturities than the harmonised series were used .
( ä ) Ðëçèùñéóìüò ÅíÄÔÊ êáé ìáêñïðñüèåóìá åðéôüêéá : äùäåêÜìçíï Ýùò ÉáíïõÜñéï 1998 .
( d ) Data for HICP inflation and long-term interest rate refer to the twelve-month period ending January 1998 ;
Ðëåüíáóìá Þ Ýëëåéììá êáé áêáèÜñéóôï ÷ ñÝïò åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá : ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅðéôñïðÞ ( ðñïâëÝøåéò Üíïéîçò 1998 ) .
European Commission ( spring 1998 forecasts ) for general government surplus or deficit and general government gross debt .
( å ) Ðëåüíáóìá Þ Ýëëåéììá êáé áêáèÜñéóôï ÷ ñÝïò åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá : ðñïâïëÝò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ÅðéôñïðÞò ( ðñïâëÝøåéò Üíïéîçò 1998 ) .
( e ) European Commission projections ( spring 1998 forecasts ) for general government surplus or deficit and general government gross debt .
5 êáé 6 ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôïí Êáíïíéóìü Óõìâïõëßïõ ( ÅÊ ) 3605/93 ôçò 22áò Íïåìâñßïõ 1993 , ôï Óõìâïýëéï êáé ç ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅðéôñïðÞ óõìöùíïýí üôé , ðñïêåéìÝíïõ ãéá ôç Äáíßá , ôá åí ëüãù ðïóÜ èá ðñïóäéïñßæïíôáé êáôÜ ôçí ðáñïõóßáóç ôïõ áêáèÜñéóôïõ ÷ ñÝïõò ôïõ åõñýôåñïõ êõâåñíçôéêïý ôïìÝá .
According to statements 5 and 6 relating to Council Regulation ( EC ) No. 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 , the Council and the Commission agree that , for Denmark , these items shall be specified in the presentation of general government gross debt .
Ôá ðïóÜ áõôÜ áíÞëèáí óõíïëéêÜ óå 9,6% ôïõ ÁÅÐ ôï 1996 êáé 8,0% ôïõ ÁÅÐ ôï 1997 .
They totalled 9.6% of GDP in 1996 and 8.0% of GDP in 1997 .
Åðßóçò , ôá óôïé ÷ åßá äåí Ý ÷ ïõí ðñïóáñìïóôåß ùò ðñïò ôï áíåîüöëçôï õðüëïéðï ôïõ äçìüóéïõ ÷ ñÝïõò áðü ôç ÷ ñçìáôïäüôçóç äçìüóéùí åðé ÷ åéñÞóåùí , ôï ïðïßï , óýìöùíá ìå ôç äÞëùóç 3 ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôïí ðñïáíáöåñüìåíï Êáíïíéóìü , èá ðáñïõóéÜæåôáé ÷ ùñéóôÜ ãéá ôá êñÜôç-ìÝëç .
In addition , the data are not adjusted for the amounts outstanding in the government debt from the financing of public undertakings , which , according to statement 3 relating to the aforementioned Regulation , will be subject to a separate presentation for the Member States .
Óôç Äáíßá , ôï ðïóüí áõôü áíôéóôïé ÷ ïýóå óôï 5,2% ôïõ ÁÅÐ ôï 1996 êáé 4,9% ôïõ ÁÅÐ ôï 1997 .
In Denmark this item amounted to 5.2% of GDP in 1996 and 4.9% of GDP in 1997 . 27
2 ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ ôùí êñáôþí-ìåëþí öèéíüðùñï õðÝóôçóáí ìéêñÞ áíáðñïóáñìïãÞ åí üøåé ðëçèùñéóôéêþí êéíäýíùí ( âë .
2 Monetary policies in Member States This section describes the changes in monetary conditions in individual EU countries in 1997 and their monetary policy objectives for 1998 .
ÄéÜãñáììá 3 êáé ÐáñÜñôçìá 1 , üðïõ ðáñáôßèåôáé ÷ ñïíïëüãéï íïìéóìáôéêþí ìÝôñùí ) . Ï óõíôïíéóìÝíïò ÷ áñáêôÞñáò áõôþí ôùí åíåñãåéþí ðïëéôéêÞò åíßó ÷ õóå ôç óõíï ÷ Þ ìåôáîý ôùí ÷ ùñþí ôùí ïðïßùí ôá åðéôüêéá åßíáé óôåíÜ åõèõãñáììéóìÝíá .
It reflects the task of the EMI in Stage Two of EMU , which is to strengthen co-operation between the national central banks and the co-ordination of the monetary policies of Member States with a view to ensuring price stability .
Ç äéåýñõíóç ôùí äéáöïñþí ôùí âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí Óôï ðáñüí õðïêåöÜëáéï ðåñéãñÜöïíôáé ïé ìåôáâïëÝò ôùí íïìéóìáôéêþí óõíèçêþí óôéò åðéìÝñïõò ÷ þñåò ôçò ÅÅ ôï 1997 , êáèþò êáé ïé óôü ÷ ïé ôçò íïìéóìáôéêÞò ðïëéôéêÞò êÜèå ÷ þñáò ãéá ôï 1998 .
Short and long-term interest rates in these countries thus tended to follow a downward trend , progressively converging towards the lower level of the closely aligned countries ( see Chart 4 ) .
ÊáôÜ ôçí åí ëüãù åîÝôáóç , åëÞöèç õðüøç ç Üóêçóç ðïëéôéêÞò åíôüò ôïõ ìç ÷ áíéóìïý óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí éóïôéìéþí ( ÌÓÉ ) , óôïí ïðïßï óõììåôåß ÷ áí ôï 1997 üëåò ïé ÷ þñåò ôçò ÅÅ åêôüò áðü ôçí ÅëëÜäá , 3 ôç Óïõçäßá êáé ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóéëåßï .
Later in the year , however , short-term interest rates in Ireland began to decline relative to Germany and the Irish pound moved closer to its central rates in the ERM grid . 4 The convergence process was supported by the strong political commitment to EMU demonstrated at the regular meetings of the European Council and the corresponding reduction in market 3
2.1 ÐåñáéôÝñù óýãêëéóç ôùí åðéôïêßùí Ôï ïéêïíïìéêü êáé ÷ ñçìáôïðéóôùôéêü ðåñéâÜëëïí êáôÜ ôï Ýôïò 1997 åðÝôñåøå ôç óõíÝ ÷ éóç ôçò óýãêëéóçò ôùí âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìùí êáé ìáêñïðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí êáé ôç äéáôÞñçóç ó ÷ åäüí óôáèåñþí óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí éóïôéìéþí .
2.1 Further convergence of interest rates The economic and financial environment in 1997 allowed for a continuation of the convergence of short and long-term interest rates and broadly stable exchange rates .
Ôá åðßóçìá êáé ôá âáóéêÜ åðéôüêéá ðáñÝìåéíáí óå ÷ áìçëÜ êáé óôåíÜ åõèõãñáììéóìÝíá åðßðåäá , áí êáé ôï 3
Official and key interest rates remained at low and closely aligned levels , although they were raised to a small extent in the autumn in response to inflation risks ( see Chart 3 and the annex relating to the chronology of monetary measures ) .
Áðü ôéò 16 Ìáñôßïõ 1998 , ç äñá ÷ ìÞ åíôÜ ÷ èçêå óôï ìç ÷ áíéóìü óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí éóïôéìéþí ( ÌÓÉ ) ìå êåíôñéêÞ éóïôéìßá 357 äñ ÷. áíÜ ECU , ãåãïíüò ðïõ óõíåðáãüôáí õðïôßìçóç êáôÜ 14 %.
4 Effective from 16 March 1998 , the Greek drachma joined the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS at a central rate of GRD 357 to the ECU , which implied a depreciation of 14 %.
4 Óôç äéáäéêáóßá óýãêëéóçò óõíÝâáëå ç Ýíôïíç ðïëéôéêÞ ðñïóÞëùóç óôçí ÏÍÅ , ðñïóÞëùóç ðïõ Ýãéíå öáíåñÞ óôéò ôáêôéêÝò óõíüäïõò ôïõ Åõñùðáúêïý Óõìâïõëßïõ , êáèþò êáé ç áíôßóôïé ÷ ç ìåßùóç ôçò áâåâáéüôçôáò óôéò áãïñÝò . Éäéáßôåñá óçìáíôéêÞ Þôáí ç óõìöùíßá ðïõ åðéôåý ÷ èçêå óôçí Üôõðç óõíÜíôçóç ôïõ Óõìâïõëßïõ ECOFIN óôï Mondorf-les-Bains ôï ÓåðôÝìâñéï ôïõ 1997 , üôé ïé äéìåñåßò óõíáëëáãìáôéêÝò éóïôéìßåò ðïõ èá ÷ ñçóéìïðïéçèïýí êáôÜ ôçí Ýíáñîç ôïõ Ôñßôïõ Óôáäßïõ ãéá ôïí êáèïñéóìü ôùí áìåôÜêëçôùí óõíôåëåóôþí ìåôáôñïðÞò ãéá ôï åõñþ èá ðñïáíáããåëèïýí áìÝóùò ìüëéò åðéëåãïýí ïé ÷ þñåò ðïõ èá õéïèåôÞóïõí ôï åíéáßï íüìéóìá ( âë .
Of particular importance was the understanding , reached at the informal ECOFIN Council meeting in Mondorf-lesBains in September 1997 , that the bilateral exchange rates which will be used at the start of Stage Three in determining the irrevocable conversion rates for the euro would be pre-announced immediately after the selection of the countries which will adopt the single currency ( see Box 2 ) . Given the calm conditions on foreign exchange markets in Europe , an increasing number of market participants came to expect that the pre-announced bilateral exchange rates would be equal or very close to the bilateral central rates of the ERM .
Ìå óôü ÷ ï íá äéáóöáëéóôåß ç ðåñáéôÝñù åðéâñÜäõíóç ôïõ ñõèìïý íïìéóìáôéêÞò åðÝêôáóçò êáé íá áíôéìåôùðéóôïýí óå áñ ÷ éêü óôÜäéï ïé êßíäõíïé ðïõ áðåéëïýóáí ôç óôáèåñüôçôá ôùí ôéìþí , ç ÏìïóðïíäéáêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò áðïöÜóéóå óôéò 9 Ïêôùâñßïõ 1997 íá õéïèåôÞóåé êÜðùò ðéï ðåñéïñéóôéêÞ íïìéóìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ .
At the same time it acknowledged that in the second half of 1998 its monetary targeting strategy would have to take greater account of aspects covering the whole group of countries selected to participate in the euro area ( see also Section 3 ) .
Ôï åðéôüêéï óõìöùíéþí åðáíáãïñÜò ÷ ñåïãñÜöùí - ôï ïðïßï åß ÷ å ðáñáìåßíåé 3,0% áðü ôïí Áýãïõóôï ôïõ 1996 - áõîÞèçêå óå 3,3% , åíþ ôï åðßóçìï ðñïåîïöëçôéêü åðéôüêéï êáé ôï åðéôüêéï lombard ðáñÝìåéíáí áìåôÜâëçôá , óå åðßðåäï 2,5% êáé 4,5% áíôßóôïé ÷ á ( âë .
Whereas in 1996 the outturn of 8.1% for M3 growth in the last quarter exceeded the 4-7 % target range , the pace of monetary expansion steadily decelerated in the course of 1997 so that , in the fourth quarter , M3 growth was 4.7% , i.e. just below the centre of the 3.5 - 6.5% target corridor ( see Table 6 ( a )) .
ÄéÜãñáììá 3 ) . Óôï ôÝëïò ôïõ 1996 ç ÏìïóðïíäéáêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò äéåýñõíå ôï ÷ ñïíéêü ïñßæïíôá ôïõ íïìéóìáôéêïý ôçò óôü ÷ ïõ ãéá ôï Ì3 áðü Ýíá Ýôïò óå äýï , ðñïêåéìÝíïõ íá ëçöèåß õðüøç ç áâåâáéüôçôá ðïõ åíäÝ ÷ åôáé íá åðéêñáôÞóåé óôéò ÷ ñçìáôïðéóôùôéêÝò áãïñÝò êáôÜ ôçí ðåñßïäï ôçò ìåôÜâáóçò óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï .
The deceleration of money growth was the result of a weakening in lending to both the private and the public sectors and a high net outflow of funds arising from transactions between domestic nonbanks and non-residents . In 1997 domestic non-banks further reduced their cross-border deposits and ran down their portfolios of money market certificates .
Ôüóï ãéá ôï 1997 üóï êáé ãéá ôï 1998 ï óôü ÷ ïò ãéá ôïí åôÞóéï ñõèìü áýîçóçò ôïõ Ì3 Þôáí ðåñßðïõ 5 %. Ùò åðéðëÝïí óçìåßï áíáöïñÜò âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìá , ôá üñéá ôïõ óôü ÷ ïõ ãéá ôï ñõèìü áýîçóçò ôïõ Ì3 óôï ôÝôáñôï ôñßìçíï ôïõ 1997 ïñßóôçêáí óå 3,5 - 6,5% .
Reflecting this , the M3 aggregate extended by cross-border deposits , short-term bank bonds and investments in money market funds grew more slowly than M3 in 1997 ( at a rate of 4.4% in the fourth quarter of 1997 , compared with a rate of 4.7% for M3 ) .
Ôï ÄåêÝìâñéï ôïõ 1997 ç ÏìïóðïíäéáêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò åðéâåâáßùóå ôï äéåôÞ íïìéóìáôéêü ôçò óôü ÷ ï , ãéá åôÞóéá áýîçóç ôïõ Ì3 êáôÜ 5 % ðåñßðïõ , áëëÜ ìåßùóå ôï åýñïò ôïõ
On 9 October 1997 official and / or key interest rates were also raised by 0.2 - 0.3 percentage point in parallel in Belgium / Luxembourg , Denmark , France , the Netherlands and Austria , whereby some central banks allowed for a small differential with equivalent German policy interest rates
2.2 ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ ôùí åðéìÝñïõò êñáôþí-ìåëþí Ç ÏìïóðïíäéáêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò óõíÝ ÷ éóå íá äéáôçñåß Ýíá ðåñéâÜëëïí ÷ áìçëþí åðéôïêßùí ôï 1997 , ðïõ áíôáíáêëïýóå ôç óôáäéáêÞ åðÜíïäï ôïõ ñõèìïý áýîçóçò ôçò ðñïóöïñÜò ÷ ñÞìáôïò ìå åõñåßá Ýííïéá ( Ì3 ) óå ðéï éêáíïðïéçôéêÜ
2.2 Monetary policies in individual Member States The Deutsche Bundesbank continued to maintain a low interest rate environment in 1997 , reflecting the gradual return of broad money ( M3 ) growth to a more satisfactory level and the subdued outlook for inflation in Germany .
Áðü ôéò 16 Ìáñôßïõ 1998 , ïé äéìåñåßò êåíôñéêÝò éóïôéìßåò ôçò ëßñáò Éñëáíäßáò Ýíáíôé ôùí Üëëùí íïìéóìÜôùí ôïõ ÌÓÉ áíáôéìÞèçêáí êáôÜ 3 %, ìå áðïôÝëåóìá íá ðñïóåããßóïõí ôéò áãïñáßåò éóïôéìßåò ôçò .
Over the summer , however , the appreciation of the US dollar and increases in administered prices caused an upturn in import , producer and consumer price inflation .
Åðßóçìá êáé âáóéêÜ åðéôüêéá ( óå ðïóïóôÜ %) ÃÅÑ repos ( á ) ÃÅÑ Lombard ( á ) ÃÅÑ ðñïåîïöëçôéêü ( á ) ÏËË ðÜãéùí ðñïêáôáâïëþí ( â )( ã ) ÏËË åéäéêþí ðñïêáôáâïëþí ( â ) ÁÕÓ repos ( á ) ÁÕÓ ðñïåîïöëçôéêü ( â ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 ÃÁË ðéóôùô .
With the aim of ensuring a further deceleration of the rate of monetary expansion and to counter the risks to price stability at an early stage , the Bundesbank decided on 9 October 1997 to adopt a somewhat less accommodating monetary stance .
äéåõêüëõíóçò 5-10 çìåñþí ( á ) ÃÁË ðáñÝìâáóçò ( á ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1997 ÄÁÍ ðéóôïð .
The securities repurchase rate which had remained at 3.0% since August 1996 - was raised to 3.3% , while both the official discount rate and the lombard rate were kept unchanged at 2.5% and 4.5% , respectively ( see Chart 3 ) .
1996 ÂÅË êåíôñéêü åðéôüêéï ( á ) ÂÅË ðñïåîïöëçôéêü ( á ) 1997 ÖÉÍ äçìïðñáóßáò ( â )
At the end of 1996 the Bundesbank extended the time horizon of its monetary target in
10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 ÐÏÑ ðñïóöïñÜò ñåõóôüôçôáò ( á ) ( ä ) ÐÏÑ áðïññüöçóçò ñåõóôüôçôáò ( á ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1997 ÉÓÐ repos 10 çìåñþí ( â )
Official and key interest rates ( in percentages ) DE Lombard rate ( a ) DE Repo rate ( a ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 FR 5 to 10-day lending facility ( a ) FR Intervention rate ( a ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 PT Supply ( a )( d ) PT Absorption ( a )( d ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 SE Reversed repo rate ( a ) SE Lending rate ( a ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 1997 1997 UK repo rate ( b )( e ) 1997 ES 10-day repo rate ( b ) 12 10 8 6 4 2 1996 GR Lombard rate ( b ) GR Discount rate ( b ) 22 20 18 16 14 12 1996 1997 1997 1997 DK Cert .
10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 ÓÏÕ áíôßóôñïöùí repos ( á ) ÓÏÕ ÷ ïñçãÞóåùí ( á ) 12 10 8 6 4 2 1997 ÇÂ repos ( â ) ( å )
of deposit ( a ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 IT Fixed term advances ( a ) IT Discount rate ( a ) 1997 IT Repo rate ( a ) IE Short-term facility ( b ) BE BE DE Discount rate ( a ) 10 8 6 4 2 0 1996 Central rate ( a ) Discount rate ( a ) 1997 FI Tender rate ( b ) NL Fixed advances ( b )( c ) NL Special advances ( b ) AT Repo rate ( a ) AT Discount rate ( b )
( ã ) Ðñéí áðü ôéò 23 ÌáÀïõ 1997 : åðéôüêéï ðñïêáôáâïëþí .
( c ) Prior to 23 May 1997 : Interest rate on advances .
( å ) Ðñéí áðü ôéò 3 Ìáñôßïõ 1997 : åëÜ ÷ éóôï åðéôüêéï ÷ ïñçãÞóåùí .
( e ) Prior to 3 March 1997 : Minimum lending rate . 30
ÐáñÜëëçëá , áíáãíþñéóå üôé ôï äåýôåñï åîÜìçíï ôïõ 1998 ç óôñáôçãéêÞ êáèïñéóìïý íïìéóìáôéêïý óôü ÷ ïõ èá ðñÝðåé íá ëÜâåé óïâáñüôåñá õðüøç ôá èÝìáôá ðïõ êáëýðôïõí ôï óýíïëï ôùí ÷ ùñþí ïé ïðïßåò Ý ÷ ïõí åðéëåãåß ãéá íá óõììåôÜó ÷ ïõí óôçí ðåñéï ÷ Þ ôïõ åõñþ ( âë . åðßóçò ÕðïêåöÜëáéï 3 ) .
( see Chart 3 ) .
Ç åðéâñÜäõíóç ôïõ ñõèìïý áýîçóçò ôùí íïìéóìáôéêþí ìåãåèþí Þôáí áðïôÝëåóìá ôçò åîáóèÝíçóçò ôùí ÷ ïñçãÞóåùí ôüóï ðñïò ôïí éäéùôéêü üóï êáé ðñïò ôï äçìüóéï ôïìÝá êáé ôçò õøçëÞò êáèáñÞò åêñïÞò êåöáëáßùí , ç ïðïßá ðñïÝêõøå áðü ôéò óõíáëëáãÝò ìåôáîý ôïõ åã ÷ þñéïõ ìç ôñáðåæéêïý ôïìÝá êáé ìç êáôïßêùí ôçò ÷ þñáò . Ôï 1997 ï åã ÷ þñéïò ìç ôñáðåæéêüò ôïìÝáò ìåßùóå ðåñáéôÝñù ôéò äéáóõíïñéáêÝò êáôáèÝóåéò ôïõ êáé ðåñéüñéóå ôá ÷ áñôïöõëÜêéÜ ôïõ ìå ðéóôïðïéçôéêÜ ÷ ñçìáôáãïñÜò .
Suomen Pankki had already raised its tender rate by 0.25 percentage point in mid-September and Sveriges Riksbank increased its repo rate by the same magnitude in mid-December .
Áõôü áðç ÷ åßôáé óôï ãåãïíüò üôé ôï ìÝãåèïò Ì3 , ìáæß ìå ôéò äéáóõíïñéáêÝò êáôáèÝóåéò , ôá âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìá ôñáðåæéêÜ ïìüëïãá êáé ôéò åðåíäýóåéò óå áìïéâáßá êåöÜëáéá äéá ÷ åßñéóçò äéáèåóßìùí , áõîÞèçêå ìå âñáäýôåñï ñõèìü áðü ü , ôé ôï Ì3 ôï 1997 ( êáôÜ 4,4% ôï ôÝôáñôï ôñßìçíï ôïõ 1997 , Ýíáíôé 4,7% ãéá ôï Ì3 ) .
The correspondence in the size , timing and direction of the monetary policy measures in these Member States reflected the close alignment of their short-term interest rates in an environment of stable exchange rates , similar medium-term inflation prospects and low long-term bond yields .
Óôéò 9 Ïêôùâñßïõ 1997 ôá åðßóçìá Þ / êáé ôá âáóéêÜ åðéôüêéá áõîÞèçêáí êáé áõôÜ êáôÜ 0,2 - 0,3 ôçò åêáôïóôéáßáò ìïíÜäáò ðáñÜëëçëá óôï ÂÝëãéï / Ëïõîåìâïýñãï , ôç Äáíßá , ôç Ãáëëßá , ôçí Ïëëáíäßá êáé ôçí Áõóôñßá , êáé ãé  áõôü ôï ëüãï ìåñéêÝò êåíôñéêÝò ôñÜðåæåò Üöçóáí ðåñéèþñéá ãéá ìéá ìéêñÞ äéáöïñÜ ìå ôá áíôßóôïé ÷ á åðéôüêéá ôçò ãåñìáíéêÞò íïìéóìáôéêÞò ðïëéôéêÞò ( âë .
The Banque de France closed the small remaining gap with the German repurchase rate by raising its intervention rate by 0.2 percentage point to 3.3% in October .
Ç ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Ãáëëßáò áýîçóå ôï åðéôüêéï ðáñÝìâáóçò êáôÜ 0,2 ôçò åêáôïóôéáßáò ìïíÜäáò óå 3,3% ôïí Ïêôþâñéï , ìå áðïôÝëåóìá íá åîáëåéöèåß ç Þäç ìéêñÞ äéáöïñÜ Ýíáíôé ôïõ ãåñìáíéêïý åðéôïêßïõ åðáíáãïñÜò .
This measure aimed at preserving a high level of confidence in the French franc , which in the course of the year appreciated to its central rates against most other ERM currencies .
Ðßíáêá 6 ( á )) .
Table 6
Âáóßëåéï M3 M3 ALP M3 ( â ) M2 M0 M4 1996 Óôü ÷ ïò / êáôåýèõíóç 4-7 6-9 ≤8 5 5 0-4 3-9 ( á ) 1997 Óôü ÷ ïò / êáôåýèõíóç 8,1 9,3 6,5 - 3,2 3,1 5,7 9,8 6-9 ≤7 5 <5 0-4 3-9 (á)</p>
1996 Reference Target / variable guideline ( a ) M3 4-7 M3 6-9 ALP ≤8 5 M3 ( b ) M2 5 M0 0-4 M4 3-9 Outturn 8.1 9.3 6.5 - 3.2 3.1 5.7 9.8 Target / guideline ( a ) 3.5 - 6.5 6-9 ≤7 5 <5 0-4 3-9</p>
1998 Óôü ÷ ïò / êáôåýèõíóç ( á ) 4,7 9,5 3,7 2,0 9,7 6,5 11,1 3-6 5 ~ 5 - Ðñáãìáôïðïßçóç
1997 Outturn 4.7 9.5 3.7 2.0 9.7 6.5 11.1 1998 Target / guideline ( a ) 3-6 .
Ðñáãìáôïðïßçóç 3,5 - 6,5
5 ~ 5 - Germany Greece Spain France Italy United Kingdom
Óôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï , ôá üñéá ðñüâëåøçò áíåóôÜëçóáí óôéò 6 ÌáÀïõ 1997 , åíþ êáôüðéí ç ÅðéôñïðÞ ÍïìéóìáôéêÞò ÐïëéôéêÞò ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò ôçò Áããëßáò áðïöÜóéóå ðñïò ôï ðáñüí íá ìçí ôá åðáíáöÝñåé .
Monitoring ranges for the United Kingdom were suspended 6 May 1997 and the Bank of England 's Monetary Policy Committee subsequently decided not to reinstate them for the time being .
( â ) Ãéá ôï 1996 : Ì3 . Ãéá ôá åðüìåíá Ýôç , ç áîéïëüãçóç âáóßæåôáé êáé óôçí åîÝëéîç ôùí óôåíüôåñùí êáé åõñýôåñùí íïìéóìáôéêþí ìåãåèþí ( M1 , M2 , M3 + P1 ) .
( b ) M3 for 1996 , also assessed by developments in the narrow and broader monetary aggregates thereafter ( M1 , M2 , M3 + P1 ) .
Âáóßëåéï CPI CPIY CPI RPIX 3,5 - 4 ( â ) ~ 2 2 ± 1 1-4 3,6 0,2 0,8 2,9 <3 ~2 2±1 <2,5 (ã) 2,0 0,7 0,8 2,8 2 ~2 2±1 2,5 1996 Óôü÷ïò Ðñáãìáôïðïßçóç Óôü÷ïò 1997 Ðñáãìáôïðïßçóç 1998 Óôü÷ïò</p>
1996 Target variable ( a ) CPI CPIY CPI RPIX Target 3.5 - 4 ( b ) ~ 2 2 ± 1 1-4 Outturn 3.6 0.2 0.8 2.9 Target <3 ~2 2±1 ≤2.5 (c)</p>
CPIY = ÄÔÊ ÷ ùñßò Ýììåóïõò öüñïõò , åðéäïôÞóåéò êáé êüóôïò éäéïêáôïßêçóçò ( ôüêïé óôåãáóôéêþí äáíåßùí êáé áðïóâÝóåéò ) .
CPIY = CPI excluding indirect taxes , subsidies and capital costs for owner-occupied housing , ( mortgage interest payments and depreciation ) .
( â ) Éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôï ðñþôï ôñßìçíï ôïõ 1996 .
( b ) Applies to the first quarter of 1996 .
( ã ) ÊÜôù Þìéóõ ôïõ äéáóôÞìáôïò 1-4 % Ýùò ôçí Üíïéîç ôïõ 1997 , 2,5% Þ ëéãüôåñï ìåôÝðåéôá , óôü ÷ ïò 2,5% áðü ôïí Éïýíéï 1997 êáé ìåôÜ .
( c ) Lower half of 1-4 % range by spring 1997 ; 2.5% or less thereafter ;
Ç óõíáëëáãìáôéêÞ éóïôéìßá ôïõ áõóôñéáêïý óåëéíßïõ ðáñÝìåéíå ðïëý êïíôÜ óôçí êåíôñéêÞ ôïõ éóïôéìßá Ýíáíôé ôïõ ãåñìáíéêïý ìÜñêïõ . Ôá åðéôüêéá ôñéþí ìçíþí ôçò Áõóôñßáò Þôáí êïíôÜ ó  åêåßíá ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò , áí êáé ôïí Ïêôþâñéï ç ÅèíéêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Áõóôñßáò üñéóå åðéôüêéï óõìöùíéþí åðáíáãïñÜò 3,2% , äçë .
Whereas the contraction of M3 observed in 1996 continued in the first months of 1997 , M3 began to recover from the spring onwards , underpinned by the pick-up in economic growth and an upturn in the demand for narrow money ( see Table 6 ( a )) .
ëßãï ÷ áìçëüôåñï áðü ôï áíôßóôïé ÷ ï ãåñìáíéêü , áöïý Ýëáâå õðüøç ôï ãåãïíüò üôé êáôÜ ôçí áíôßëçøç ôùí áãïñþí åß ÷ áí ìåéùèåß ïé ðëçèùñéóôéêïß êßíäõíïé óôï åóùôåñéêü ôçò ÷ þñáò . Óôç Öéëáíäßá , ï ìÝóïò ñõèìüò ôïõ âáóéêïý ( underlying ) ðëçèùñéóìïý ìå âÜóç ôï äåßêôç ôéìþí êáôáíáëùôÞ , áí êáé ðáñÝìåéíå áñêåôÜ êÜôù áðü ôï 2 % ôï 1997 , ðáñïõóßáóå óáöÞ áíïäéêÞ ôÜóç óôç äéÜñêåéá ôïõ Ýôïõò , êáèþò áõîÞèçêáí ïé ðëçèùñéóôéêÝò ðéÝóåéò åîáéôßáò ôùí õøçëþí ñõèìþí áíÜðôõîçò ðïõ óõíÝ ÷ éóå íá óçìåéþíåé ç ïéêïíïìßá êáé ôçò åíßó ÷ õóçò ôùí ðëçèùñéóôéêþí ðñïóäïêéþí ôùí êáôáíáëùôþí .
The growth rate of gross total domestic debt , which is monitored as a prominent indicator of financing conditions , was 3.5% in December 1997 , i.e. slightly higher than a year earlier . The Belgian / Luxembourg franc again showed a high degree of stability vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark , while Belgian short-term interest rates were maintained at slightly higher levels than those in Germany ( see Chart 4 ) .
Ðßíáêá 6 ( â )) , ç ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Öéëáíäßáò áýîçóå ôï åðéôüêéï äçìïðñáóßáò áðü 3,0% óå 3,25% óôá ìÝóá Óåðôåìâñßïõ . Óôç äéÜñêåéá ôïõ 1997 ôï öéëáíäéêü ìÜñêï Þôáí Ýíá áðü ôá éó ÷ õñüôåñá íïìßóìáôá óôï ÌÓÉ êáé ôá åðéôüêéá ôñßìçíçò äéÜñêåéáò ìðüñåóáí ãåíéêþò íá äéáôçñçèïýí óå åðßðåäï åëáöñþò ÷ áìçëüôåñï áðü ôá áíôßóôïé ÷ á ãåñìáíéêÜ .
As these were partly countered by fiscal tightening , the Danish krone nonetheless strengthened its position within the ERM and the positive three-month interest rate spread against the Deutsche Mark narrowed somewhat . During the year the Dutch guilder moved down to its central rate against the Deutsche Mark .
Ç Óïõçäßá êáôÜ ôï ìåãáëýôåñï ìÝñïò ôïõ 1997 åß ÷ å åðßóçò íá áíôéìåôùðßóåé Üíïäï ôïõ ðëçèùñéóìïý ôéìþí êáôáíáëùôÞ , ï ïðïßïò üìùò Þäç âñéóêüôáí óå ðïëý ÷ áìçëü åðßðåäï . Ìå äåäïìÝíï ôïí õøçëüôåñï âáèìü ÷ ñçóéìïðïßçóçò ôïõ ðáñáãùãéêïý äõíáìéêïý
De Nederlandsche Bank reacted by allowing short-term interest rates to rise from just below German levels to around par , which was seen as a welcome movement in view of the buoyancy of the Dutch economy .
êáé êÜðïéï ðñïâëçìáôéóìü ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôéò ìéóèïëïãéêÝò ñõèìßóåéò , ç ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Óïõçäßáò áýîçóå ðñïëçðôéêÜ ôï ÄåêÝìâñéï ôï åðéôüêéï åðáíáãïñÜò ÷ ñåïãñÜöùí áðü 4,1% óå 4,35% ðñïêåéìÝíïõ íá äéáôçñçèåß ï óôü ÷ ïò 2 % ãéá ôïí ðëçèùñéóìü (± 1 åêáôïóôéáßá ìïíÜäá ) . ÓõíïëéêÜ , ç äéáöïñÜ ôùí âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí ôçò Óïõçäßáò Ýíáíôé ôùí ãåñìáíéêþí Þôáí óå ãåíéêÝò ãñáììÝò óôáèåñÞ , ãýñù óôéò 1,1 åêáôïóôéáßåò ìïíÜäåò .
The exchange rate of the Austrian schilling remained very close to its central parity against the Deutsche Mark . Three-month interest rates in Austria were close to those in Germany , although in October the Oesterreichische Nationalbank set the repurchase rate at 3.2% , i.e. slightly below its German equivalent , in response to lower perceived domestic inflationary risks .