natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ç ìåèïäïëïãßá õðïëïãéóìïý ôùí áðïäüóåùí ôùí ïìïëüãùí åßíáé ðáñüìïéá ìåôáîý ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí , ôá óôáôéóôéêÜ óôïé ÷ åßá ãéá ôá áíôéðñïóùðåõôéêÜ 310 ìá ðåñéëáìâÜíåé ðåñéóóüôåñá áðü Ýíá ïìüëïãá , ëüãù ôçò ñåõóôüôçôáò ôùí åðéëåãÝíôùí ïìïëüãùí åðéâÜëëåôáé íá ÷ ñçóéìïðïéçèåß ï áðëüò ìÝóïò üñïò ôùí áðïäüóåùí ãéá íá åîá ÷ èåß ôï áíôéðñïóùðåõôéêü åðéôüêéï .
Finally , a uniform formula was chosen from existing international standards , namely formula 6.3 from the formulae for yield and other calculations of the International Securities Market Association .
Åíþ ãéá ôá ôÝóóåñá êõñéüôåñá êñéôÞñéá ôï Ðñùôüêïëëï áñéè . 6 ðåñéãñÜöåé áíáëõôéêüôåñá ðïéá óôïé ÷ åßá èá ÷ ñçóéìïðïéçèïýí êáé ïñßæåé üôé ç ÅðéôñïðÞ èá ðáñÜó ÷ åé ôá óôïé ÷ åßá ðïõ èá ÷ ñçóéìïðïéçèïýí ãéá ôçí áîéïëüãçóç ôçò óõììüñöùóçò ôùí Êñáôþí-ÌÝëþí ìå ôá êñéôÞñéá áõôÜ , óôï Ðñùôüêïëëï äåí ãßíåôáé ëüãïò ãé  áõôïýò ôïõò  Üëëïõò ðáñÜãïíôåò .
As mentioned above , the production of the harmonised representative long-term interest rates has been implemented by the central banks , and fully harmonised data are used in this Report .
Ç áíÜðôõîç ôïõ ECU êáé ç ïëïêëÞñùóç ôùí áãïñþí ó ÷ åôßæïíôáé ãåíéêüôåñá ìå ôçí ðñüïäï ðñïò ôçí ÏéêïíïìéêÞ êáé ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ¸ íùóç , åíþ ïé Üëëïé ðáñÜãïíôåò áíáëýïíôáé ìå âÜóç ïñéóìïýò ðïõ óÞìåñá ðáñÝ ÷ ïõí ôá ðéï óõãêñßóéìá áðïôåëÝóìáôá ìåôáîý ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí . ¢ ëëïé ðáñÜãïíôåò Ç ôåëåõôáßá ðáñÜãñáöïò ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 109 É ( 1 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ïñßæåé üôé ïé åêèÝóåéò ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ÅðéôñïðÞò êáé ôïõ ÅÍÉ , èá ðñÝðåé , åêôüò áðü ôá ôÝóóåñá êõñéüôåñá êñéôÞñéá , íá ëáìâÜíïõí õðüøç êáé ôçí áíÜðôõîç ôïõ ECU , ôá áðï -
Other factors The last paragraph of Article 109j ( 1 ) of the Treaty states that the reports of the European Commission and the EMI shall , besides the four main criteria , also take account of the development of the ECU , the results of the integration of markets , the situation and development of the balances of payments on current account and an examination of the development of unit labour costs and other price indices .
ÃåíéêÝò ðáñáôçñÞóåéò ÅéóáãùãÞ ðïõ êáèïñßæïíôáé óôéò ÅêèÝóåéò êáé óôéò ãíùìïäïôÞóåéò ôïõ ÅÍÉ . Ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï , ôï ïðïßï áðáëëÜóóåôáé áðü ôéò õðï ÷ ñåþóåéò ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , âñßóêåôáé óôï óôÜäéï åéóáãùãÞò íÝïõ êáôáóôáôéêïý ôçò ÅèíÊÔ ôïõ , ôï ïðïßï , åíþ áíáãíùñßæåé ìåãáëýôåñç ëåéôïõñãéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá óôçí êåíôñéêÞ ôñÜðåæá , äåí åðéäéþêåé ñçôþò íá åðéôý ÷ åé ôç íïìéêÞ óýãêëéóç üðùò ôçí áðáéôåß ôï ÅÍÉ þóôå íá õðÜñ ÷ åé ðëÞñçò óõììüñöùóç ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ .
Whereas for the four main criteria Protocol No. 6 describes the data to be used in more detail and stipulates that the European Commission will provide the data to be used for the assessment of compliance with these criteria , there is no reference to these other factors in the Protocol . While the development of the ECU and the integration of markets relate to progress towards Economic and Monetary Union in more general terms , the analysis of the other factors is based on definitions which currently provide the most comparable results between Member States .
Óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 109 É ( 1 ) êáé ( 4 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , 1 ôï ÅÍÉ ( êáèþò êáé ç ÅðéôñïðÞ ) õðïâÜëëïõí Ýêèåóç , ìåôáîý Üëëùí , ãéá ôï  åÜí ç åèíéêÞ íïìïèåóßá êÜèå ÊñÜôïõòÌÝëïõò , óõìðåñéëáìâáíïìÝíïõ ôïõ êáôáóôáôéêïý ôçò åèíéêÞò êåíôñéêÞò ôñÜðåæÜò ôïõ , óõìâéâÜæåôáé ìå ôá ¢ ñèñá 107 êáé 108 ôçò ðáñïýóáò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ìå ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ  ( óôçí ðáñïýóá ¸ êèåóç èá áíáöÝñåôáé ùò  íïìéêÞ óýãêëéóç ) .
1.1 Introduction Article 109j ( 1 ) and ( 4 ) of the Treaty 16 requires the EMI ( as well as the Commission ) to report , inter alia , on the compatibility between each Member State s national legislation , including the statutes of its national central bank , and Articles 107 and 108 of this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB ( in this Report also referred to as legal convergence ) .
Ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , üðùò åðáíáëáìâÜíåôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 14.1 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , 16 ðñïâëÝðåé ó ÷ åôéêÜ üôé ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç åîáóöáëßæïõí , ôï áñãüôåñï ìÝ ÷ ñé ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , üôé ç åèíéêÞ íïìïèåóßá ôïõò , óõìðåñéëáìâáíïìÝíïõ ôïõ êáôáóôáôéêïý ôùí åèíéêþí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí ôïõò ( ÅèíÊÔ ) , åßíáé óõìâáôÞ ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü .
Article 108 of the Treaty , as reproduced in Article 14.1 of the Statute , 16 states in this connection that Member States shall ensure , at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB , that their national legislation , including the statutes of their national central banks ( NCBs ) , is compatible with the Treaty and the Statute .
Ç ðáñïýóá ¸ êèåóç áíôëåß óôïé ÷ åßá áðü ðñïçãïýìåíåò åêèÝóåéò ôïõ ÅÍÉ ìå èÝìá ôç íïìéêÞ óýãêëéóç : ôéò ÅêèÝóåéò ôïõ 1995 êáé 1996 ãéá ôçí Ðñüïäï ðñïò ôç Óýãêëéóç êáé ôá íåüôåñá óôïé ÷ åßá ðïõ ðñïóôÝèçêáí ó  áõôÝò ôïí Ïêôþâñéï 1997 ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôá íïìéêÜ æçôÞìáôá .
The present Report draws on the EMI s previous reports on legal convergence : the 1995 and 1996 Reports on Progress towards Convergence and the legal update thereof dated October 1997 .
¼ ëá ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç , åêôüò áðü ôç Äáíßá , ôçò ïðïßáò ç íïìïèåóßá äåí ÷ ñåéÜæåôáé ðñïóáñìïãÞ , åßôå Ý ÷ ïõí åðéöÝñåé ìåôáâïëÝò óôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ôïõò ôï 1997 Þ ôï 1998 , åßôå âñßóêïíôáé óå ðñï ÷ ùñçìÝíï óôÜäéï ôñïðïðïßçóçò ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí óýìöùíá ìå ôá êñéôÞñéá
All Member States except Denmark , whose legislation does not require adaptation , either have introduced in 1997 or in 1998 , or are in an advanced process of introducing , changes in the statutes of their NCBs , following the criteria laid down in the EMI s Reports and in the EMI s opinions .
1.2 Áíôéêåßìåíï ôçò ðñïóáñìïãÞò
The United Kingdom , which is exempt from the obligations under Article 108 of the Treaty , is in the process of introducing a new statute of its NCB which , while providing a greater level of operational central bank independence , is not expressly 288
1.2.1 Ôïìåßò ðñïóáñìïãÞò ÐñïêåéìÝíïõ íá ðñïóäéïñéóôïýí ïé ôïìåßò óôïõò ïðïßïõò ÷ ñåéÜæåôáé ðñïóáñìïãÞ ôçò åèíéêÞò íïìïèåóßáò , ãßíåôáé äéÜêñéóç áíÜìåóá : óôçí áíåîáñôçóßá ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ( âë . éäßùò ¢ ñèñï 107 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ¢ ñèñá 7 êáé 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ) óôç íïìéêÞ Ýíôáîç ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ ( âë .
1.2 Scope of adaptation 1.2.1 Areas of adaptation For the purpose of identifying those areas where adaptation of national legislation is necessary , a distinction is drawn between : - the independence of NCBs ( see in particular Articles 107 of the Treaty and Articles 7 and 14.2 of the Statute ) ;
éäßùò ¢ ñèñá 12.1 êáé 14.3 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ) , êáé óôç ëïéðÞ íïìïèåóßá åêôüò ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ .
- the legal integration of NCBs in the ESCB ( see in particular Articles 12.1 and 14.3 of the Statute ) ;
¢ ñèñï 12.1 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , ôåëåõôáßá ðáñÜãñáöïò ) .
Thus , it will be essential for the NCBs to be independent in the performance of their ESCB-related tasks vis - - vis external bodies .
1.2.2  Óõìâáôüôçôá  Ýíáíôé  Åíáñìüíéóçò  Ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ïñßæåé üôé ç åèíéêÞ íïìïèåóßá ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé  óõìâáôÞ  ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ìå ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü .
Provisions in national legislation ( particularly in NCB statutes ) which would prevent the execution of ESCB-related tasks or compliance with decisions of the ECB would be incompatible with the effective operation of the System .
Ïé åèíéêÝò éäéáéôåñüôçôåò ìðïñïýí íá óõíå ÷ ßóïõí íá õößóôáíôáé . ÐñÜãìáôé , ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.4 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý åðéôñÝðåé óôéò ÅèíÊÔ íá åêôåëïýí êáé Üëëåò ëåéôïõñãßåò åêôüò áðü åêåßíåò ðïõ êáèïñßæïíôáé óôï Êáôáóôáôéêü , åöüóïí áõôÝò äåí ðáñáêùëýïõí ôïõò óôü ÷ ïõò êáé ôá êáèÞêïíôá ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ .
Legislation other than statutes of NCBs The obligation of legal convergence under Article 108 of the Treaty , which is incorporated in a chapter entitled Monetary Policy , applies to those areas of legislation which are affected by the transition from Stage Two to Stage Three and which would be incompatible with the Treaty and Statute if they were to remain unchanged .
Óýìöùíá ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü , ðñÝðåé íá áñèïýí ïé NïìéêÞ Ýíôáîç ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ Ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.3 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ïñßæåé üôé ïé ÅèíÊÔ áðïôåëïýí áíáðüóðáóôï ìÝñïò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , üôé åíåñãïýí óýìöùíá ìå ôéò êáôåõèõíôÞñéåò ãñáììÝò êáé ïäçãßåò ôçò ÅÊÔ êáé üôé ôï Äéïéêçôéêü Óõìâïýëéï ëáìâÜíåé üëá ôá áíáãêáßá ìÝôñá þóôå íá äéáóöáëßæåé ôç óõììüñöùóç ðñïò ôéò åí ëüãù êáôåõèõíôÞñéåò ãñáììÝò êáé ïäçãßåò .
In particular , while national traditions may continue to exist , all provisions which infringe on an NCB s independence as defined in the Treaty and its role as an integral part of the ESCB have to be adjusted . The Treaty and the Statute require the removal of incompatibilities with the Treaty and the Statute in national legislation .
Ùò åê ôïýôïõ , áðáéôïýíôáé ðñïóáñìïãÝò ôùí åèíéêþí íïìïèåóéþí êáé ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ãéá íá äéáóöáëéóôåß ç óõììüñöùóç ðñïò ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü . ËïéðÞ íïìïèåóßá åêôüò ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ Ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç íïìéêÞò óýãêëéóçò âÜóåé ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , ôï ïðïßï åíôÜóóåôáé óôï êåöÜëáéï ìå ôßôëï  ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ , éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôïõò ôïìåßò åêåßíïõò ôçò íïìïèåóßáò ðïõ åðçñåÜæïíôáé áðü ôç ìåôÜâáóç áðü ôï Äåýôåñï óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï êáé ïé ïðïßïé èá
The obligation in Article 108 of the Treaty only extends to incompatibilities with Treaty and Statute provisions and not to incompatibilities with secondary Community legislation to be adopted after the selection of participating Member States and to enter into force at the beginning of Stage Three . After the start of Stage Three national legislation which is incompatible with secondary EC or ECB legislation will , of course , also have to be brought into line with such secondary legislation .
Ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç ðïõ áðïññÝåé áðü ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò áöïñÜ ìüíï ôá óçìåßá ðïõ äåí åßíáé óõìâáôÜ ìå ôéò äéáôÜîåéò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý êáé ü ÷ é åêåßíá ðïõ äåí åßíáé óõìâáôÜ ìå ôï ðáñÜãùãï êïéíïôéêü äßêáéï ôï ïðïßï èá õéïèåôçèåß áöïý åðéëåãïýí ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç ðïõ èá óõììåôÝ ÷ ïõí óôçí ÏÍÅ êáé èá ôåèåß óå éó ÷ ý áðü ôçí Ýíáñîç ôïõ Ôñßôïõ Óôáäßïõ .
This may be achieved by references to the Treaty and the Statute , by the incorporation of provisions thereof , by the simple deletion of incompatibilities or by a mixture of these methods . 1.2.2 « Compatibility » versus « harmonisation » Article 108 of the Treaty requires national legislation to be compatible with the Treaty and the Statute .
Áõôü éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôçí ðÜóçò öýóåùò íïìïèåóßá ðïõ åìðßðôåé óôï ¢ ñèñï 108 .
This applies to all legislation under Article 108 .
ÐïëëÝò áðü ôéò áðïöÜóåéò ôéò ïðïßåò èá ëÜâïõí ôï Äéïéêçôéêü Óõìâïýëéï ôçò ÅÊÔ êáé ïé ÅèíÊÔ áðü ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ êáé ìÝ ÷ ñé ôï ôÝëïò ôïõ 1998 èá ðñïêáèïñßóïõí ôçí åíéáßá íïìéóìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ êáé ôçí åöáñìïãÞ ôçò åíôüò ôçò ðåñéï ÷ Þò ôïõ åõñþ .
Many decisions which the Governing Council of the ECB and the NCBs will take between the date of the ESCB s establishment and the end of 1998 will predetermine the single monetary policy and its implementation within the euro area .
ÔÝëïò , ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 óôï ÷ åýåé óå ìéá óõãêåêñéìÝíç ÷ ñïíéêÞ óôéãìÞ , äçë . ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ .
Finally , Article 108 targets one specific point in time , i.e. the date of the establishment of the ESCB .
1.2.3 × ñïíïäéÜãñáììá ðñïóáñìïãÞò Ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ïñßæåé üôé ç åèíéêÞ íïìïèåóßá ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé  óõìâáôÞ  ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ìå ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü  ôï áñãüôåñï ìÝ ÷ ñé êáé ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ  ( ç ïðïßá , âÜóåé ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 109 Ë ( 1 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , èá ðñïçãçèåß ôçò Ýíáñîçò ôïõ Ôñßôïõ Óôáäßïõ ) . ÐñïêåéìÝíïõ íá õðÜñîåé óõììüñöùóç ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 , ïé åèíéêÝò íïìïèåôéêÝò äéáäéêáóßåò èá ðñÝðåé íá Ý ÷ ïõí ïëïêëçñùèåß êáôÜ ôñüðï þóôå íá
Therefore , the present Report does not , for instance , address future adaptations of national legislation relating to the introduction of the euro flowing from the EU Council Regulations on this topic , such as the replacement of national banknotes and coins by euro banknotes and coins and the legal aspects thereof .
Ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç ìå ðáñÝêêëéóç , ç Äáíßá êáé ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï 1.3.1 Ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç ìå ðáñÝêêëéóç Ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôçí åöáñìïãÞ ôùí ¢ ñèñùí 107 êáé 108 , ç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü äåí äéáêñßíïõí ìåôáîý ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí ìå ðáñÝêêëéóç êáé ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí ÷ ùñßò ðáñÝêêëéóç .
1.3 Member States with a derogation , Denmark and the United Kingdom 1.3.1 Member States with a derogation In relation to the application of Articles 107 and 108 , the Treaty and the Statute do not make a distinction between Member States with and Member States without a derogation .
Åðßóçò , ôï ¢ ñèñï 109 Ê ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôï ¢ ñèñï 43 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý äåí ðñïâëÝðïõí åîáßñåóç ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí ìå ðáñÝêêëéóç áðü ôçí õðï ÷ ñÝùóç íá åîáóöáëßóïõí ôçí áíåîáñôçóßá ôçò êåíôñéêÞò ôñÜðåæáò .
Also , Article 109k of the Treaty and Article 43 of the Statute do not provide for an exemption to the obligation to ensure central bank independence for Member States with a derogation .
12 , áõôü óçìáßíåé üôé ç Äáíßá èá áíôéìåôùðßæåôáé ùò ÊñÜôïò-ÌÝëïò ìå ðáñÝêêëéóç .
In accordance with Article 2 of Protocol No. 12 , this means that Denmark will be treated as a Member State with a derogation .
Ïé åðéðôþóåéò ôçò êáôÜóôáóçò áõôÞò ãéá ôç Äáíßá áíáðôý ÷ èçêáí óôçí Áðüöáóç ðïõ Ýëáâáí ïé Áñ ÷ çãïß Êñáôþí Þ ÊõâåñíÞóåùí óôç Óýíïäï ôïõ Åäéìâïýñãïõ óôéò 11 êáé 12 Äåêåìâñßïõ 1992 .
Implications thereof for Denmark were elaborated in a Decision taken by the Heads of State or Government at their Edinburgh Summit meeting on 11 and 12 December 1992 .
Åöüóïí ôï ¢ ñèñï 107 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 109 Ê ( 3 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôç Äáíßá , ç ÅèíéêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Äáíßáò ðñÝðåé íá ðëçñïß ôïõò üñïõò ðåñß áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí .
As Article 107 of the Treaty , in accordance with Article 109k ( 3 ) of the Treaty , applies to Denmark , Danmarks Nationalbank has to fulfil the requirements of central bank independence .
1.3.3 ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï Óýìöùíá ìå ôï Ðñùôüêïëëï áñéè . 11 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ãéá ïñéóìÝíåò äéáôÜîåéò ðïõ áöïñïýí ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï ôçò ÌåãÜëçò Âñåôáíßáò êáé Âïñåßïõ Éñëáíäßáò , ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï äåí õðï ÷ ñåïýôáé íá ìåôáâåß óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï , åêôüò åÜí ãíùóôïðïéÞóåé óôï Óõìâïýëéï ó ÷ åôéêÞ ðñüèåóÞ ôïõ .
1.3.3 United Kingdom According to Protocol No. 11 of the Treaty on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , the United Kingdom shall be under no obligation to move to Stage Three unless it notifies the Council that it intends to do so .
¾ óôåñá áðü ôç ãíùóôïðïßçóç ôïõ ÇíùìÝíïõ Âáóéëåßïõ ðñïò ôï Óõìâïýëéï óôéò 30 Ïêôùâñßïõ 1997 üôé äåí ðñïôßèåôáé íá õéïèåôÞóåé ôï åíéáßï íüìéóìá ôçí 1ç Éáíïõáñßïõ 1999 , ïñéóìÝíåò áðü ôéò äéáôÜîåéò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ( ìåôáîý áõôþí , ôá ¢ ñèñá 107 êáé 108 ) êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý äåí éó ÷ ýïõí ãéá ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï .
Pursuant to the notification given by the United Kingdom to the Council on 30 October 1997 that it does not intend to adopt the single currency on 1 January 1999 , certain provisions of the Treaty ( including Articles 107 and 108 ) and of the Statute do not apply to the United Kingdom .
12 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ïñéóìÝíåò äéáôÜîåéò ðïõ áöïñïýí ôç Äáíßá ðñïâëÝðåé üôé ç äáíéêÞ êõâÝñíçóç èá ãíùóôïðïéÞóåé óôï Óõìâïýëéï ôç èÝóç ôçò ãéá ôç óõììåôï ÷ Þ ôçò óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ðñïôïý ôï Óõìâïýëéï ðñïâåß óôçí áîéïëüãçóÞ ôïõ óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 109 É ( 2 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò .
2 Independence of NCBs Central bank independence finds its limits in statutes defining the objective of a central bank and the scope of its powers , as well as in the review by the judiciary of its acts .
Ôï ÅÍÉ óõíÝôáîå êáôÜëïãï ôùí ÷ áñáêôçñéóôéêþí ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí , äéáêñßíïíôáò ìåôáîý ÷ áñáêôçñéóôéêþí èåóìéêÞò , ðñïóùðéêÞò êáé ÷ ñçìáôïïéêïíïìéêÞò öýóåùò . 18 ÊáôÜ ôç äéáäéêáóßá áõôÞ , ôï ÅÍÉ âáóßóôçêå óå ôñåéò êõñßùò ðáñáäï ÷ Ýò : Ç áíåîáñôçóßá ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí áðáéôåßôáé êáôÜ ôçí Üóêçóç
bank independence should therefore be considered from that perspective . - Such features should not be seen as a kind of secondary Community legislation , going beyond the scope of the Treaty and the Statute , but as tools to facilitate an assessment of the independence of the NCBs .
ÈåóìéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá Ç èåóìéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá áðïôåëåß ÷ áñáêôçñéóôéêü ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí , ôï ïðïßï áíáöÝñåôáé ñçôþò óôï ¢ ñèñï 107 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , üðùò åðáíáëáìâÜíåôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 7 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý .
- Central bank independence is not a matter which can be expressed in arithmetical formulae or applied in a mechanical manner and the way in which it is achieved for individual NCBs is therefore assessed on a case-by-case basis .
ÕðÜñ ÷ åé åðßóçò ôï êñéôÞñéï ôçò ëåéôïõñãéêÞò áíåîáñôçóßáò , äåäïìÝíïõ üìùò üôé óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ïé ÅèíÊÔ èá åíôá ÷ èïýí óôï ÅÓÊÔ , ôï èÝìá áõôü áíáëýåôáé óôï ðëáßóéï ôçò íïìéêÞò Ýíôáîçò ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ ( âë . ðáñÜãñáöï 3 ðáñáêÜôù ) .
The reference in Article 107 to the tasks and duties of the ESCB implies that the independence requirement refers to all ESCB-related tasks . In other fields of activity , instructions are not forbidden .
Áðáãïñåýåôáé åðßóçò óôá êïéíïôéêÜ üñãáíá êáé ïñãáíéóìïýò , êáèþò êáé óôéò êõâåñíÞóåéò ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí , íá åðéäéþêïõí íá åðçñåÜóïõí ôá ìÝëç ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ôçò ÅÊÔ Þ ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ôùí ïðïßùí ïé áðïöÜóåéò åíäÝ ÷ åôáé íá åðçñåÜóïõí ôçí åêðëÞñùóç áðü ôéò ÅèíÊÔ ôùí áñìïäéïôÞôùí ôïõò ðïõ ó ÷ åôßæïíôáé ìå ôï ÅÓÊÔ . Ôá êýñéá êáèÞêïíôá ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , üðùò ïñßæïíôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 3 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , åßíáé : íá ÷ áñÜæåé êáé íá åöáñìüæåé ôç íïìéóìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ ôçò Êïéíüôçôáò , íá äéåíåñãåß ðñÜîåéò óõíáëëÜãìáôïò óýìöùíá ìå ôéò äéáôÜîåéò ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 109 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , íá êáôÝ ÷ åé êáé íá äéá ÷ åéñßæåôáé ôá åðßóçìá óõíáëëáãìáôéêÜ äéáèÝóéìá ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí , íá ðñïùèåß ôçí ïìáëÞ ëåéôïõñãßá ôùí óõóôçìÜôùí ðëçñùìþí .
This applies , for example , to NCBs in fulfilling other tasks permitted within the limitations of Article 14.4 of the Statute , which states that NCBs may perform functions other than those in the Statute , unless the Governing Council finds , by a two-thirds majority , that these interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB . The prohibition on instructions and attempts to influence covers all sources of external influence on the NCBs in relation to ESCB matters which prevent them from complying with the Treaty and the Statute .
Ç áíáöïñÜ ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 107 óôá êáèÞêïíôá êáé ôéò õðï ÷ ñåþóåéò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ óõíåðÜãåôáé üôé ç ðñïûðüèåóç ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò áöïñÜ üëá ôá êáèÞêïíôá ðïõ ó ÷ åôßæïíôáé ìå ôï ÅÓÊÔ . Óå Üëëïõò ôïìåßò äñáóôçñéüôçôáò äåí áðáãïñåýåôáé ç ðáñï ÷ Þ êáé ëÞøç õðïäåßîåùí .
The following rights of third parties ( e.g. government or parliament ) are incompatible with the Treaty and / or the Statute and therefore require adaptation . 2.2 Institutional independence Institutional independence is a feature of central bank independence which is expressly referred to in Article 107 of the Treaty as reproduced in Article 7 of the Statute .
ãéá üóåò ÅèíÊÔ åêôåëïýí Üëëá êáèÞêïíôá ðïõ åðéôñÝðïíôáé õðü ôïõò ðåñéïñéóìïýò ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 14.4 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , ôï ïðïßï ïñßæåé üôé ïé ÅèíÊÔ ìðïñïýí íá åêôåëïýí êáé ëåéôïõñãßåò Üëëåò áðü åêåßíåò ðïõ êáèïñßæïíôáé óôï Êáôáóôáôéêü , åêôüò åÜí ôï Äéïéêçôéêü Óõìâïýëéï áðïöáíèåß , ìå ðëåéïøçößá äýï ôñßôùí , üôé ïé ëåéôïõñãßåò áõôÝò ðáñáêùëýïõí ôïõò óôü ÷ ïõò êáé ôá êáèÞêïíôá ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ . Ç ðáñï ÷ Þ êáé ëÞøç õðïäåßîåùí êáé ç åðéäßùîç Üóêçóçò åðéññïÞò áðáãïñåýåôáé óå ó ÷ Ýóç ìå üëåò ôéò ðçãÝò åîùôåñéêÞò
These Articles prohibit the ECB , the NCBs and members of their decisionmaking bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies , from any government of a Member State or from any other body . They also prohibit Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States from seeking to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of those decision-making bodies of the NCBs whose decisions may have an impact on the fulfilment by the NCBs of their ESCB-related tasks .
2.2.1 Äéêáßùìá ðáñï ÷ Þò õðïäåßîåùí Ôá äéêáéþìáôá ôñßôùí íá ðáñÝ ÷ ïõí õðïäåßîåéò óôéò ÅèíÊÔ Þ óôá üñãáíá ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåþí ôïõò åßíáé áóõìâßâáóôá ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü üóïí áöïñÜ ôá êáèÞêïíôá ðïõ Üðôïíôáé ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ .
2.2.1 A right to give instructions Rights of third parties to give instructions to NCBs or their decision-making bodies are incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute as far as ESCB-related tasks are concerned .
2.2.2 Äéêáßùìá Ýãêñéóçò , áíáóôïëÞò , áêýñùóçò Þ áíáâïëÞò áðïöÜóåùí Ôá äéêáéþìáôá ôñßôùí íá åãêñßíïõí , íá áíáóôÝëëïõí , íá áêõñþíïõí Þ íá áíáâÜëëïõí áðïöÜóåéò ôùí ÅèíÊÔ åßíáé áóõìâßâáóôá ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü üóïí áöïñÜ ôá êáèÞêïíôá ðïõ Üðôïíôáé ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ .
2.2.2 A right to approve , suspend , annul or defer decisions Rights of third parties to approve , suspend , annul or defer decisions of NCBs are incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute as far as ESCB-related tasks are concerned . 292
2.2.3 Äéêáßùìá ëïãïêñéóßáò áðïöÜóåùí ãéá íïìéêïýò ëüãïõò Ôï äéêáßùìá ëïãïêñéóßáò , ãéá íïìéêïýò ëüãïõò , áðïöÜóåùí ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôçí åêôÝëåóç ôùí êáèçêüíôùí ðïõ Üðôïíôáé ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ åßíáé áóõìâßâáóôï ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü , äåäïìÝíïõ üôé ç åêôÝëåóç ôùí êáèçêüíôùí áõôþí äåí ìðïñåß íá ðáñáêùëýåôáé óå åèíéêü åðßðåäï .
2.2.3 A right to censor decisions on legal grounds A right to censor , on legal grounds , decisions relating to the performance of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute as the performance of these tasks may not be obstructed at a national level .
Áõôü äåí áðïôåëåß ìüíï Ýêöñáóç ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí áëëÜ êáé ôçò ãåíéêüôåñá áðáéôïýìåíçò Ýíôáîçò ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ ( âë . ÔìÞìá 3 êáôùôÝñù ) .
This is not only an expression of central bank independence but also of the more general requirement of the integration of NCBs in the ESCB ( see Section 3 below ) .
óõíÝ ÷ åéá íá ôéò ðáñáðÝìðåé óôéò ðïëéôéêÝò áñ ÷ Ýò ãéá íá ëÜâïõí ôåëéêÞ áðüöáóç èá éóïäõíáìïýóå , áí êáé ï äéïéêçôÞò äåí óõãêáôáëÝãåôáé óôïõò  ôñßôïõò , ìå ôï íá æçôÜ õðïäåßîåéò áðü ðïëéôéêÜ üñãáíá , ðñÜãìá ôï ïðïßï åßíáé áóõìâßâáóôï ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 107 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò . äåí Ý ÷ åé ùò áðïôÝëåóìá ôçí ðáñáêþëõóç ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí ìåëþí ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ .
A right of the governor to censor decisions on legal grounds and subsequently submit them to the political authorities for final decision would , although a governor is not a third party , be equivalent to seeking instructions from political bodies , which is incompatible with Article 107 of the Treaty .
äåí ðáñáâéÜæïíôáé ïé áñìïäéüôçôåò êáé ç ëïãïäïóßá ôçò ÅÊÔ óå êïéíïôéêü åðßðåäï , êáèþò êáé ç éäéáßôåñç èÝóç ôïõ äéïéêçôÞ ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ ùò ìÝëïõò ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí , êáé ðëçñïýíôáé ïé ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ðåñß áðïññÞôïõ ðïõ áðïññÝïõí áðü ôéò äéáôÜîåéò ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý . 2.2.4 Äéêáßùìá óõììåôï ÷ Þò óôá üñãáíá ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ ìå äéêáßùìá øÞöïõ Ç óõììåôï ÷ Þ åêðñïóþðùí Üëëùí ïñãÜíùí ( ð .
level ( see , in particular , Article 109b of the Treaty and Article 15.3 of the Statute ) . However , dialogue between NCBs and their respective political authorities , even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views , is not incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute , provided that : - this does not result in interference with the independence of the members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs ;
ÐñïóùðéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá 2.2.5 Äéêáßùìá ãíùìïäüôçóçò ( åê ôùí ðñïôÝñùí ) ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôéò áðïöÜóåéò ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ Ç ñçôÞ êáôáóôáôéêÞ õðï ÷ ñÝùóç ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ íá óõìâïõëåýåôáé ôéò ðïëéôéêÝò áñ ÷ Ýò áðïôåëåß åðßóçìï ìç ÷ áíéóìü ðïõ åðéôñÝðåé óôéò áðüøåéò ôùí ðïëéôéêþí áñ ÷ þí íá åðçñåÜóïõí ôçí ôåëéêÞ áðüöáóç êáé åßíáé óõíåðþò áóõìâßâáóôç ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü .
2.2.4 A right to participate in the decisionmaking bodies of an NCB with a right to vote The participation of representatives of other bodies ( e.g. government or parliament ) in the decision-making bodies of an NCB with a right to vote on matters concerning the performance by the NCB of ESCBrelated tasks , even if this vote is not decisive , is incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute .