natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ó » Æıôü ôï ðº ÆßóØï , ç ¯ ˚Ô ıðåíŁıìßæåØ ôØò óıóôÜóåØò ôçò ÝŒŁåóçò , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôçí ïðïßÆ óå ŒÆôÆóôÜóåØò Œæßóçò , ŒÜŁå Ææ ÷ Þ ðïı åßíÆØ ðØŁÆíü üôØ ŁÆ åðçæåÆóôåß Æðü ÆıôÝò ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ åíçìåæþíåôÆØ åª ŒÆßæøò .
dinator , since this follows in particular the recommendations of the Economic and Financial Committee Report on financial crisis management . In this context , the ECB also recalls that the report recommends that  in a crisis situation , all authorities likely to be involved should be informed in a timely manner .
¯ äþ ŁÆ ıðÜª ïíôÆí , âÜóåØ ôçò ÝŒŁåóçò ôçò ˇØŒïíïìØŒÞò ŒÆØ ˜çìïóØïíïìØŒÞò ¯ ðØôæïðÞò , ïØ ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò ŒÆØ ïØ öïæåßò åðßâº åłçò ôøí óıóôçìÜôøí ðº çæøìþí .
This would include , in the terms of the EFC report , central banks and overseers of payment systems .
Ùò åŒ ôïýôïı , ç ¯ ˚Ô åðÆíÆº ÆìâÜíåØ üôØ ŒÆØ óôï ðº ÆßóØï Œæßóåøí óå åðßðåäï × ˇ ¯ ˜ , ï æüº ïò ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí óôçí åðßôåıîç ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒÞò óôÆŁåæüôçôÆò ŁÆ äØŒÆØïºïª ïýóå ôçí åíçìÝæøóÞ ôïıò Æðü ôØò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ŒÆØ ôï óıíôïíØóôÞ .
The ECB would therefore reiterate that the role of central banks in the pursuance of financial stability would warrant the communication by the competent authorities and the coordinator to central banks , also in a crisis at the financial conglomerate level .
ÔÝôÆæôïí , øò ðæïò ôç óıíåæª ÆóßÆ ŒÆØ ôçí ÆíôÆººÆª Þ ðº çæïöïæØþí ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí .
Fourthly , the cooperation and exchange of information between competent authorities .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŒæïôåß ôï ÜæŁæï 9 ôçò ðæüôÆóçò .
The ECB welcomes Article 9 of the proposal .
¯ æìçíåýïíôÆò ôçí ðÆæÜª æÆöï 1 ôïı ÜæŁæïı 9 , ç ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ÆıôÞ ŁåóðßæåØ ıðï ÷ æÝøóç óıíåæª ÆóßÆò ŒÆØ ÆíôÆººÆª Þò ðº çæïöïæØþí ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí óå ªåíØŒüôåæï ðº ÆßóØï , Æºº Ü ŒÆØ óå åØäØŒüôåæåò ðåæØðôþóåØò .
The ECB interprets Article 9 ( 1 ) as setting out mandatory obligations of the competent authorities to cooperate and share information , both generally and in specific instances .
¯ ðßóçò , ç ¯ ˚Ô åðØŒæïôåß ôçí ÆíôÆººÆª Þ ðº çæïöïæØþí , ôüóï ŒÆôüðØí ÆØôÞìÆôïò üóï ŒÆØ ìå ßäØÆ ðæøôïâïıº ßÆ ôçò åŒÜóôïôå ÆæìüäØÆò Ææ ÷ Þò .
The ECB also welcomes sharing of information both on request and at the initiative of a competent authority itself .
¯ ðïìÝíøò , ç ¯ ˚Ô åßíÆØ ôçò Üðïłçò üôØ äåí ðæÝðåØ íÆ ıðÜæ ÷ ïıí ðåæØïæØóìïß óôç óıíåæª ÆóßÆ ŒÆØ ôçí ÆíôÆººÆª Þ ðº çæïöïæØþí ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí ôøí æıŁìØæüìåíøí åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåøí åíüò × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
The ECB is therefore of the view that there should not be any constraints on cooperation and information sharing among the competent authorities of the regulated entities of a given financial conglomerate .
ðøò ÆíÆöÝæŁçŒå ðæïçª ïıìÝíøò ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôç äØÆ ÷ åßæØóç Œæßóåøí , ç ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ôï æıŁìØóôØŒü ðåäßï ôïı ôåº åıôÆßïı åäÆößïı ôïı ÜæŁæïı 9 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 åßíÆØ ıðåæâïº ØŒÜ åıæý óå ó ÷ Ýóç ìå ôï ðº ÆßóØï ôøí äåóìåıôØŒþí äØÆôÜîåøí ôïı Øäßïı ÜæŁæïı 9 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 .
As already mentioned above with regard to crisis management , the ECB considers that the scope of the last paragraph of Article 9 ( 1 ) is too broad in the context of the mandatory provisions of the same Article 9 ( 1 ) .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô , Æí ŒÆØ ÆíÆª íøæßæåØ ôçí ÆíÜª Œç ýðÆæîçò åıåº ØîßÆò óôØò ó ÷ ÝóåØò ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí ìåôÆîý ôïıò , ØäØÆßôåæÆ óå ü , ôØ ÆöïæÜ ôç äØåŒðåæÆßøóç ôøí ŁåóìØŒþí ôïıò ŒÆŁçŒüíôøí , ðØóôåýåØ üôØ óôçí ðæÜîç ç åıåº ØîßÆ ÆıôÞ åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ åðØôåı ÷ Łåß óôï ðº ÆßóØï óıìöøíØþí ðïı ŁÆ ŒÆôÆæôØóôïýí ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí .
While the ECB recognises the need for flexibility in the relations between competent authorities , particularly with regard to the pursuance of their respective institutional mandates , it also believes that such flexibility may be achieved in practice in the context of the arrangements that will be established between the competent authorities .
Ôæßôïí , øò ðæïò ôç äØÆ ÷ åßæØóç Œæßóåøí .
Thirdly , crisis management .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô ÆíôØº ÆìâÜíåôÆØ üôØ ôï åðïðôØŒü ðº ÆßóØï ðïı ðÆæïıóØÜæåôÆØ óôçí ðæüôÆóç ðåæØº ÆìâÜíåØ ŒÆôÆóôÜóåØò ðïı Æöïæïýí ôç äØÆ ÷ åßæØóç Œæßóåøí óå åðßðåäï × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
The ECB understands that the prudential supervisory framework set out in the proposal encompasses crisis management situations at the financial conglomerate level .
¯ ØäØŒüôåæÆ , ôÆ ŒÆŁÞŒïíôÆ ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ , üðøò ŒÆŁïæßæïíôÆØ óôï ÜæŁæï 8 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 , ðåæØº ÆìâÜíïıí « ôï óıíôïíØóìü ôçò óıª ŒÝíôæøóçò ŒÆØ äØÜäïóçò ôøí ÆðÆæÆßôçôøí Þ ïıóØøäþí ðº çæïöïæØþí [.
In particular , the tasks of the coordinator , as defined under Article 8 ( 1 ) , include  the coordination of gathering and dissemination of relevant or essential information in [.
] óå åðåßª ïıóåò ŒÆôÆóôÜóåØò » ŒÆØ ôïí « ðæïª æÆììÆôØóìü ŒÆØ óıíôïíØóìü ôøí åðïðôØŒþí äæÆóôçæØïôÞôøí [.
] emergency situations  and  the planning and coordination of supervisory activities [.
] óå åðåßª ïıóåò ŒÆôÆóôÜóåØò » .
] in emergency situations .
« ıôü Øó ÷ ýåØ ıðü ôçí åðØöýº Æîç ôçò ÜóŒçóçò åŁíØŒþí ÆæìïäØïôÞôøí ŒÆØ , ÆíôØóôïß ÷ øò , ôïı æüº ïı Üºº øí ó ÷ åôØŒþí Ææ ÷ þí øò äØÆ ÷ åØæØóôþí Œæßóåøí .
This is without prejudice to the exercise of national competences and , accordingly , the role of other relevant authorities as crisis managers .
Ùóôüóï , ç ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ç ðïº ý ªåíØŒÞ äØÜôÆîç ôïı ôåº åıôÆßïı åäÆößïı ôïı ÜæŁæïı 9 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 ßóøò äåí óıìâÜºº åØ óôçí ðæïþŁçóç ôïı æüº ïı ôïı óıíôïíØóôÞ óôï ðº ÆßóØï ðÆæüìïØøí ŒÆôÆóôÜóåøí , Øäßøò ŒÆŁþò öÆßíåôÆØ ÆóýìâÆôïò ìå ŒÆŁÞŒïíôÆ ðïı ó ÷ åôßæïíôÆØ ìå « åðåß -
However , the ECB considers that the very general clause of the last paragraph of Article 9 ( 1 ) may not be helpful in supporting the role of the coordinator in such situations as it may seem to be incompatible , in particular , with the tasks relating to  emergency situations . Nevertheless the ECB welcomes the assignment of such role to the coor -
--- Ýìðôïí , øò ðæïò ôçí ÆíÆöïæÜ ôçò ðæüôÆóçò óå ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò ŒÆØ óôï ¯ ıæøóýóôçìÆ .
Fifthly , the reference in the proposal to central banks and the Eurosystem .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŒæïôåß ôç äØÆôýðøóç ôïı ÜæŁæïı 9 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôï ïðïßï « ïØ ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ìðïæïýí åðßóçò íÆ ÆíôÆºº Üóóïıí ðº çæïöïæßåò ìå ôØò ÆŒüº ïıŁåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ªØÆ ôçí åŒôÝº åóç ôïı ÆíôßóôïØ ÷ ïı Ýæª ïı ôïıò , óå ü , ôØ ÆöïæÜ ôØò æıŁìØæüìåíåò åðØ ÷ åØæÞóåØò ðïı ÆðÆæôßæïıí ŒÜðïØï × ˇ ¯ ˜ , óýìöøíÆ ìå ôØò äØÆôÜîåØò ðïı ŒÆŁïæßæïıí ïØ ôïìåÆŒïß ŒÆíüíåò : ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò , ºïØðïß ïæª ÆíØóìïß ìå ðÆæüìïØÆ ŒÆŁÞŒïíôÆ ìå ôçí ØäØüôçôÆ íïìØóìÆôØŒþí Ææ ÷ þí ŒÆØ , üðïı ÷ æåØÜæåôÆØ , Üºº åò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ªØÆ ôçí åðßâº åłç óıóôçìÜôøí ðº çæøìþí » .
The ECB welcomes the reference , under Article 9 ( 1 ) , that  the competent authorities may also exchange information with the following authorities as may needed for the performance of their respective tasks , regarding regulated entities in a financial conglomerate , in line with the provisions laid down in the sectoral rules : central banks , other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as monetary authorities , and where appropriate other authorities responsible for overseeing payments systems .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô ÆíôØº ÆìâÜíåôÆØ üôØ ç äØÜôÆîç ÆıôÞ ÆßæåØ ŒÜŁå åíäå ÷ üìåíï íïìØŒü Œþº ıìÆ óå ŒïØíïôØŒü åðßðåäï óå ü , ôØ ÆöïæÜ ôçí ÆíôÆººÆª Þ åðïðôØŒþí ðº çæïöïæØþí ó ÷ åôØŒÜ ìå ôïıò × ˇ ¯ ˜ ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí , ÆíåîÆæôÞôøò ôøí ôïìåÆŒþí ôïıò ÆæìïäØïôÞôøí , ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí ŒÆØ ôøí öïæÝøí åðßâº åłçò ôøí óıóôçìÜôøí ðº çæøìþí .
The ECB understands that this provision removes any possible legal impediments at Community level to supervisory information-sharing regarding financial conglomerates between the competent authorities , independently of their sectoral responsibilities , and central banks and payment systems overseers .
¯ í ðæïŒåØìÝíø , ç ¯ ˚Ô åðØŁıìåß ŒÆôÆæ ÷ Þí íÆ ŁÝóåØ ÝíÆ æÞôçìÆ ïæïºïª ØŒÞò öýóåøò .
In this connection , the ECB would first like to address a question of terminology .
« öåíüò , üº åò ïØ íïìØóìÆôØŒÝò Ææ ÷ Ýò ðïı åäæåýïıí óôçí ¯ ıæøðÆœŒÞ ‚íøóç åßíÆØ ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò , Æıôü äå åðÆº çŁåýåôÆØ ôüóï óôçí ðæÜîç üóï ŒÆØ äıíÜìåØ ôçò óıíŁÞŒçò óôï ðº ÆßóØï ôçò ˇ˝ ¯.
On the one hand , all the monetary authorities based in the European Union are central banks , as it is the case both in practice and under the Treaty in the context of EMU .
˙ íïìØóìÆôØŒÞ Ææ ÷ Þ ªØÆ ôÆ äþäåŒÆ ŒæÜôç ìÝº ç åßíÆØ ôï ¯ ıæøóýóôçìÆ .
The monetary authority for 12 Member States is the Eurosystem .
« öåôÝæïı , ïØ ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò ôøí ŒæÆôþí ìåº þí ŒÆØ ôï ¯ ıæøóýóôçìÆ åßíÆØ åðßóçò ïØ ìüíåò ÆæìüäØåò Ææ ÷ Ýò ªØÆ ôçí åðßâº åłç ôøí óıóôçìÜôøí ðº çæøìþí åíôüò ôçò ˚ïØ -
On the other hand , the central
íüôçôÆò . Ôï ìíçìüíØï óıìöøíßÆò ðåæß óıíåæª ÆóßÆò ìåôÆîý ôøí öïæÝøí åðßâº åłçò ôøí óıóôçìÜôøí ðº çæøìþí ŒÆØ ôøí öïæÝøí ÜóŒçóçò ôæÆðåæØŒÞò åðïðôåßÆò óôï ôæßôï óôÜäØï ôçò ˇØŒïíïìØŒÞò ŒÆØ ˝ïìØóìÆôØŒÞò ‚íøóçò ( 1 ) ÆíôØŒÆôïðôæßæåØ ðº Þæøò Æıôü ôï ðº ÆßóØï .
banks of the Member States and the Eurosystem are also the only authorities in the Community responsible for overseeing payment systems . The Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in stage three of economic and monetary union ( 1 ) fully reflects this framework .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŁıìåß , óıíåðþò , ìÝóø ôçò ÆŒüº ïıŁçò ÆíÆäØÆôýðøóçò , íÆ äØÆóÆöçíØóôåß ôï ðæïÆíÆöåæŁÝí åäÜöØï ôïı ÜæŁæïı 9 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 : « [.
The ECB would like therefore to clarify the abovementioned paragraph of Article 9 ( 1 ) by rewording it as follows :  [.
] ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò , ¯ ıæøðÆœŒü ÓýóôçìÆ ôøí ˚åíôæØŒþí ÔæÆðåæþí ŒÆØ ¯ ıæøðÆœŒÞ ˚åíôæØŒÞ ÔæÜðåæÆ » .
] central banks , the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank . The reasons to include the ESCB and the ECB are twofold .
˜ýï ºüª ïØ ıðÆª ïæåýïıí ôç óıìðåæßº çłç ôïı ¯ ˚ÓÔ ŒÆØ ôçò ¯ ˚Ô . --- æþôïí , ìåôÜ ôç äçìØïıæª ßÆ ôïı ¯ ıæøóıóôÞìÆôïò , ç ÆíôÆººÆª Þ ðº çæïöïæØþí ìåôÆîý ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí ôïı ¯ ıæøóıóôÞìÆôïò óıíåðÜª åôÆØ ìØÆ äØÆóıíïæØÆŒÞ äØÜóôÆóç , ç ïðïßÆ äåí ºÆìâÜíåôÆØ ÆŒüìç ıðüłç óôØò ôïìåÆŒÝò ïäçª ßåò .
First , since the establishment of the Eurosystem , the exchange of information with the central banks of the Eurosystem involves a cross-border dimension that is not yet acknowledged in the sectoral directives . Secondly , information conveyed to a central bank of the Eurosystem may be shared among the central banks of the Eurosystem .
˜åýôåæïí , ïØ ðº çæïöïæßåò ðïı äØÆâØâÜæïíôÆØ óå ìØÆ ŒåíôæØŒÞ ôæÜðåæÆ ôïı ¯ ıæøóıóôÞìÆôïò åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ ÆíôÆºº ÜóóïíôÆØ ìåôÆîý ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí ôïı ¯ ıæøóıóôÞìÆôïò .
The ECB considers that the wording in the proposal would only further consolidate outdated concepts . In this regard , a recital in the proposal acknowledging the establishment of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank would be welcome .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ç äØÆôýðøóç ôçò ðæüôÆóçò Æðº þò ŁÆ ðÆª ßøíå ðåæÆØôÝæø ŒÜðïØåò ÆíåðßŒÆØæåò ÝííïØåò .
domestic borders .
« ðü ôçí Üðïłç ÆıôÞ , ŁÆ ÞôÆí åıðæüóäåŒôç ç óıìðåæßº çłç , óôçí ðæüôÆóç , ìØÆò ÆØôØïºïª ØŒÞò óŒÝłçò ç ïðïßÆ ŁÆ ºÆìâÜíåØ ıðüłç ôç äçìØïıæª ßÆ ôïı ¯ ıæøðÆœŒïý ÓıóôÞìÆôïò ˚åíôæØŒþí ÔæÆðåæþí ŒÆØ ôçò ¯ ıæøðÆœŒÞò ˚åíôæØŒÞò ÔæÜðåæÆò .
In this context , the network of central banks of the Eurosystem may provide improved monitoring of risks to financial stability in the single currency area .
¯ ðØðº Ýïí , ç ¯ ˚Ô óçìåØþíåØ üôØ ç ÆíÆöïæÜ ôïı ÜæŁæïı 9 ðÆæÜª æÆöïò 1 óôçí ÆíôÆººÆª Þ åðïðôØŒþí ðº çæïöïæØþí ìå ôØò ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò äýíÆôÆØ íÆ óıìâÜº åØ óôçí ÆíÆª íþæØóç ôçò óıíåØóöïæÜò ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí óôï åðïðôØŒü ðº ÆßóØï ôøí × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
Furthermore , the ECB notes that the reference in Article 9 ( 1 ) to the exchange of supervisory information with central banks may serve as an acknowledgement of the contribution by central banks to the prudential supervisory framework for financial conglomerates .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŁıìåß íÆ ôïíßóåØ ôï ªåª ïíüò üôØ ç ðÆæÆŒïº ïýŁçóç ôøí åªª åíþí ŒØíäýíøí ôøí ðæÜîåøí ìåªÜº øí ŒÆØ óýíŁåôøí ðïº ıåŁíØŒþí ØäæıìÜôøí åíäØÆöÝæåØ ÜìåóÆ ôØò ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò .
The ECB would like to emphasise that the monitoring of risks inherent in the operations of large and complex multinational institutions is of direct concern to central banks .
˙ ŒÆôÜ ðÆæÜäïóç åóôßÆóç ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí óôï óıóôåìØŒü Œßíäıíï , óå óıíäıÆóìü ìå ôç ªíþóç Æðü ÆıôÝò ôøí ÷ æçìÆôÆª ïæþí , ôøí Æª ïæþí ÷ æåïª æÜöøí ŒÆØ ôçò ıðïäïìÞò ôçò Æª ïæÜò , ŒÆŁþò ŒÆØ ï æüº ïò ôïıò óôçí åðßâº åłç ôøí óıóôçìÜôøí ðº çæøìþí ŒÆØ äØÆŒÆíïíØóìïý , ôØò ôïðïŁåôåß óå ìØÆ ìïíÆäØŒÞ ŁÝóç óå ü , ôØ ÆöïæÜ ôïí åíôïðØóìü ÆðåØº þí ŒÆôÜ ôçò óôÆŁåæüôçôÆò ôïı ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒïý óıóôÞìÆôïò .
The central banks » traditional focus on systemic risk , together with their knowledge of money and securities markets and market infrastructures and their function in the oversight of payment and settlement systems , places them in a unique position to identify threats to the stability of the financial system .
Ó » Æıôü ôï ðº ÆßóØï , ç ÆíôÆººÆª Þ åðïðôØŒþí ðº çæïöïæØþí ìå ôØò ŒåíôæØŒÝò ôæÜðåæåò ŁÆ óıìâÜº åØ óôçí ðÆæÆŒïº ïýŁçóç ŒÆØ ôçí åðßôåıîç ôçò óıóôçìØŒÞò óôÆŁåæüôçôÆò óôçí ˚ïØíüôçôÆ .
In this context , supervisory information sharing with central banks will contribute to the monitoring and pursuit of systemic stability in the Community .
¯ ðØðº Ýïí , ºÆìâÜíïíôÆò ıðüłç üôØ óŒïðüò ôçò ðæüôÆóçò åßíÆØ ç åîÝôÆóç ôïı óıóôåìØŒïý ŒØíäýíïı ôøí × ˇ ¯ ˜ óå ŒïØíïôØŒü åðßðåäï , ç ¯ ˚Ô Łåøæåß üôØ ç ðæïïðôØŒÞ ôçò æþíçò ôïı åıæþ ÆðïŒôÜ åðßóçò ØäØÆßôåæç óçìÆóßÆ óôï åí ºüª ø ðº ÆßóØï .
Moreover , taking into consideration that the aim of the proposal is to consider the systemic risk of financial conglomerates at Community level , the ECB considers that also the euro-area perspective becomes particularly relevant .
óýíŁåôøí ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒþí ïìßº øí ŁÆ åðçæåÜóåØ ôüóï ôØò ÷ æçìÆôÆª ïæÝò ŒÆØ ôØò ŒåöÆºÆØÆª ïæÝò üóï ŒÆØ ôÆ óıóôÞìÆôÆ ðº çæøìþí ŒÆØ äØÆŒÆíïíØóìïý ðïº ý ðÝæÆí ôøí åóøôåæØŒþí óıíüæøí .
The behaviour of large and complex financial groups is likely to affect money and capital markets , as well as payment and settlement systems , well beyond
« ðü ÆıôÞ ôçí Üðïłç , ôï äßŒôıï ôøí ŒåíôæØŒþí ôæÆðåæþí ôïı ¯ ıæøóıóôÞìÆôïò åßíÆØ äıíÆôü íÆ ðÆæÜó ÷ åØ ìßÆ ŒÆº ýôåæç ðÆæÆŒïº ïýŁçóç ôøí ŒØíäýíøí ªØÆ ôçí ÷ æçìÆôïðØóôøôØŒÞ óôÆŁåæüôçôÆ óôç æþíç ôïı åíØÆßïı íïìßóìÆôïò . 16 .
16 . Sixthly , the comitology procedure .
‚Œôïí , øò ðæïò ôç äØÆäØŒÆóßÆ åðØôæïðïºïª ßÆò . ˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŒæïôåß ôçí ðæïôåØíüìåíç äØÆäØŒÆóßÆ åðØôæïðïºïª ßÆò ôøí ÜæŁæøí 16 ŒÆØ 17 , ç ïðïßÆ ŒÆôÆæ ÷ Þí Ý ÷ åØ øò óôü ÷ ï íÆ åíóøìÆôþóåØ ôØò åîåº ßîåØò ôçò Æª ïæÜò ŒÆØ ôØò íïìïŁåôØŒÝò åîåº ßîåØò óôØò ŒýæØåò ÝííïØåò óôØò ïðïßåò âÆóßæåôÆØ ç ðæüôÆóç , ŒÆŁþò ŒÆØ íÆ äØÆóöÆº ßóåØ ôçí ïìïØüìïæöç åöÆæìïª Þ ôïıò .
The ECB welcomes the proposed comitology procedure , under Articles 16 and 17 , which aims basically to incorporate market and legislative developments in the main concepts on which the proposal is based , as well as to ensure their uniform application . The establishment of a Financial Conglomerates Committee is therefore a key element of the proposal .
˙ óıª Œæüôçóç ìØÆò åðØôæïðÞò × ˇ ¯ ˜ åßíÆØ óıíåðþò óôïØ ÷ åßï-ŒºåØäß ôçò ðæüôÆóçò .
The ECB welcomes the proposed approach , which recently was given a new impetus by the report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European securities markets .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô åðØŒæïôåß ôçí ðæïôåØíüìåíç ðæïóÝªª Øóç , óôçí ïðïßÆ ç ÝŒŁåóç ôçò ¯ ðØôæïðÞò Óïöþí ªØÆ ôç æýŁìØóç ôøí åıæøðÆœŒþí Æª ïæþí ŒØíçôþí ÆîØþí Ýäøóå ðæüóöÆôÆ íÝÆ þŁçóç .
It should be borne in mind however that the legitimacy of comitology procedures should rely not only on their technical feasibility but also on appropriate safeguards for transparency and the prerogatives of the relevant Community institutions and bodies .
--- æÝðåØ , ðÜíôøò , íÆ ºçöŁåß ıðüłç üôØ ç íïìØìüôçôÆ ôøí äØÆäØŒÆóØþí åðØôæïðïºïª ßÆò äåí ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ âÆóßæåôÆØ ìüíï óôçí ôå ÷ íØŒÞ ôïıò ºåØôïıæª ØŒüôçôÆ , Æºº Ü ŒÆØ óå ŒÆôÜººçº Æ å ÷ Ýªª ıÆ äØÆöÜíåØÆò , ŒÆŁþò ŒÆØ óôÆ ðæïíüìØÆ ôøí ïØŒåßøí ŒïØíïôØŒþí ïæª Üíøí ŒÆØ ïæª ÆíØóìþí . ˙ ¯ ˚Ô ıðåíŁıìßæåØ åðßóçò ôÆ óıìðåæÜóìÆôÆ ôçò ¯ ðØôæïðÞò Óïöþí ÆíÆöïæØŒÜ ìå ôçí ÆíÜª Œç ŒÆôÜæôØóçò åíüò ŒïØíïôØŒïý ŒÆíïíØóôØŒïý ðº ÆØóßïı åıÝº ØŒôïı ŒÆØ åýŒïº Æ ðæïóÆæìïæüìåíïı óôØò ìåôÆâÆºº üìåíåò ÆíÜª Œåò .
The ECB would also recall the conclusions of the Committee of Wise Men on the need to devise a Community regulatory framework that is flexible and swiftly adaptable to changing needs . In this context , the ECB underlines that supervisory cooperation on the convergence of supervisory practices and the implementation of the proposed Directive , particularly as regards the main features of cooperative arrangements among the competent authorities , should be a main element in the Community 's regulatory process for financial conglomerates .
˙ ¯ ˚Ô ıðïª æÆììßæåØ ó ÷ åôØŒÜ üôØ ç åðïðôØŒÞ óıíåæª ÆóßÆ óôçí ðæïóðÜŁåØÆ åðßôåıîçò óýªŒº Øóçò ôøí åðïðôØŒþí ðæÆŒôØŒþí ŒÆØ ıº ïðïßçóçò ôçò ðæïôåØíüìåíçò ïäçª ßÆò , ØäØÆßôåæÆ üóïí ÆöïæÜ ôÆ ŒýæØÆ ÷ ÆæÆŒôçæØóôØŒÜ ôøí óıìöøíØþí óıíåæª ÆóßÆò ìåôÆîý ôøí ÆæìüäØøí Ææ ÷ þí , ŁÆ ðæÝðåØ íÆ Æðïôåº ÝóåØ ôï ŒýæØï óôïØ ÷ åßï ôçò ŒïØíïôØŒÞò ŒÆíïíØóôØŒÞò äØÆäØŒÆóßÆò ªØÆ ôïıò × ˇ ¯ ˜ .
A periodical mapping exercise of financial conglomerates would also be helpful .
ÖæÆíŒöïýæôç , 13 Óåðôåìâæßïı 2001 .
Done at Frankfurt am Main on 13 September 2001 .
( 1 ) ˜åº ôßï Ôýðïı ôçò ¯ ˚Ô ôçò 2Æò « ðæØº ßïı 2001 , Memorandum of understanding on co-operation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in stage three of economic and monetary union .
( 1 ) ECB press release of 2 April 2001 , memorandum of understanding on cooperation between payment systems overseers and banking supervisors in stage three of economic and monetary union .
Navigation Path : Home &gt; The European Central Bank &gt; Νομικό πλαίσιο &gt; Σύνολο κειμένων κατά χρονολογική σειρά &gt; 2009 &gt; CON / 2009/37
Navigation Path : Home &gt; The European Central Bank &gt; Legal framework &gt; All by date &gt; 2009 &gt; CON / 2009/37
Πρόταση κανονισμού του Συμßουλίου για την τροποποίηση του κανονισμού ( EΚ ) αριθ . 332/2002 για τη θέσπιση ενός μηχανισμού μεσοπρόθεσμης οικονομικής στήριξης του ισοζυγίου πληρωμών των κρατών μελών , pdf 145 kB , el
Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation ( EC ) No 332/2002 , establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States » balances of payments , pdf 18 kB , en
Απόφαση ΕΚΤ / 1999/6
Decision ECB / 1999/6
Πελάτης σε τράπεζα της Γερμανίας λαμßάνει μια « συσκευασία εξοικείωσης » , πριν τεθεί το νέο νόμισμα σε κυκλοφορία .
Receiving a starter kit at a bank counter in Ravensburg , Germany . A selection of coins was made available to the general public in the euro area in mid-December 2001 to familiarise them with the new cash to be introduced on 1 January 2002
ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΙΑ της 16ης Μαρτίου 2006 µεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας και των εθνικών κεντρικών τραπεζών των κρατών µελών εκτός ζώνης ευρώ για τη θέσπιση των λειτουργικών διαδικασιών του µηχανισµού συναλλαγµατικών ισοτιµιών κατά το τρίτο στάδιο της οικονοµικής και νοµισµατικής ένωσης ( 2006 / C 73/08 ) Η ΕΥΡΩΠΑΪΚΗ ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΑ ( ΕΚΤ ) ΚΑΙ ΟΙ ΕΘΝΙΚΕΣ ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΕΣ ΤΡΑΠΕΖΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΚΡΑΤΩΝ ΜΕΛΩΝ ΠΟΥ ∆ΕΝ ΑΝΗΚΟΥΝ ΣΤΗ ΖΩΝΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΥΡΩ ΤΗΝ 16Η ΜΑΡΤΙΟΥ 2006 ( ΕΦΕΞΗΣ « ΕθνΚΤ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΖΩΝΗΣ ΕΥΡΩ » ) ,
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AGREEMENT of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union ( 2006 / C 73/08 ) THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK ( ECB ) AND THE NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS OF THE MEMBER STATES THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE EURO AREA ON 16 MARCH 2006 ( HEREINAFTER THE « NONEURO AREA NCBs ') ,
ευρώ και των λοιπών νοµισµάτων της ΕΕ , οι οποίες θα διατάρασσαν τις εµπορικές ροές µεταξύ των κρατών µελών .
currencies , which would disrupt trade flows between Member States .
Επιπλέον , δυνάµει του άρθρου 124 της συνθήκης για την ίδρυση της Ευρωπαϊκής Κοινότητας , κάθε κράτος µέλος έχει την υποχρέωση να αντιµετωπίζει τη συναλλαγµατική του πολιτική ως πρόßληµα κοινού ενδιαφέροντος · --- ο ΜΣΙ ΙΙ ßοηθά ώστε τα κράτη µέλη εκτός ζώνης ευρώ που συµµετέχουν στον ΜΣΙ ΙΙ ( εφεξής « συµµετέχοντα κράτη µέλη εκτός ζώνης ευρώ » ) να ακολουθούν πολιτική σταθερότητας και να ενισχύουν τη σύγκλιση , επικουρώντας τα έτσι στις προσπάθειές τους να υιοθετήσουν το ευρώ · --- η συµµετοχή στον ΜΣΙ ΙΙ είναι προαιρετική για τα κράτη µέλη εκτός ζώνης ευρώ .
Moreover , under Article 124 of the Treaty establishing the European Community , each Member State has an obligation to treat its exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest ; Whereas : --- ERM II helps to ensure that non-euro area Member States participating in ERM II ( hereinafter « participating non-euro area Member States ') orient their policies to stability , foster convergence and thereby help them in their efforts to adopt the euro ;
Αν ένα κράτος µέλος δεν συµµετέχει στον ΜΣΙ ΙΙ εξαρχής , µπορεί να συµµετάσχει αργότερα · --- ο ΜΣΙ ΙΙ λειτουργεί χωρίς να θίγει τον πρωταρχικό στόχο της ΕΚΤ και των ΕθνΚΤ εκτός ζώνης ευρώ , δηλαδή τη διατήρηση της σταθερότητας των τιµών · --- για το νόµισµα κάθε κράτους µέλους εκτός ζώνης ευρώ που συµµετέχει στον ΜΣΙ ΙΙ ( εφεξής « συµµετέχον νόµισµα εκτός ζώνης ευρώ » ) καθορίζεται µία κεντρική ισοτιµία έναντι του ευρώ · --- προßλέπεται κανονικό περιθώριο διακύµανσης ± 15 % γύρω από την κεντρική ισοτιµία · --- θα πρέπει να εξασφαλιστεί ότι κάθε προσαρµογή των κεντρικών ισοτιµιών γίνεται έγκαιρα , ώστε να αποφεύγονται οι µεγάλες αποκλίσεις .
( 1 )
Η συµφωνία της 1ης Σεπτεµßρίου 1998 µεταξύ της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας και των εθνικών κεντρικών τραπεζών των κρατών µελών εκτός ζώνης ευρώ για τη θέσπιση των λειτουργικών διαδικασιών του µηχανισµού συναλλαγµατικών ισοτιµιών κατά το τρίτο στάδιο της οικονοµικής και νοµισµατικής ένωσης ( 1 ) ( εφεξής « συµφωνία της 1ης Σεπτεµßρίου 1998 » ) τροποποιήθηκε τρεις φορές .
The Agreement of 1 September 1998 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union ( 1 ) ( hereinafter the « Agreement of 1 September 1998 ') has been amended three times . The introduction of a new criterion for counterparties eligible to conduct interventions at the margins directly with the ECB would require a further amendment of Annex I to the Agreement of 1 September 1998 .
Η εισαγωγή ενός νέου κριτηρίου όσον αφορά τη δυνατότητα των αποδεκτών αντισυµßαλλοµένων να πραγµατοποιούν παρεµßάσεις στα όρια του περιθωρίου διακύµανσης απευθείας µε την ΕΚΤ καθιστά αναγκαία την περαιτέρω τροποποίηση του παραρτήµατος Ι της συµφωνίας της 1ης Σεπτεµßρίου 1998 .
In the interests of clarity and transparency therefore , the Agreement of 1 September 1998 should be replaced by a new Agreement . --- participation in ERM II is voluntary for the non-euro area Member States .
Ως εκ τούτου , ενδείκνυται , χάριν σαφήνειας και διαφάνειας , η αντικατάσταση της συµφωνίας της 1ης Σεπτεµßρίου 1998 από νέα συµφωνία .
Nevertheless , Member States with a derogation can be expected to join the mechanism . A Member State which does not participate from the outset in ERM II may participate at a later date ;
Με το ψήφισµα της 16ης Ιουνίου 1997 ( εφεξής « ψήφισµα » ) , το Ευρωπαϊκό Συµßούλιο συµφώνησε να θεσπίσει µηχανισµό συναλλαγµατικών ισοτιµιών ( εφεξής « ΜΣΙ ΙΙ » ) κατά την έναρξη του τρίτου σταδίου της οικονοµικής και νοµισµατικής ένωσης , την 1η Ιανουαρίου 1999 .
The European Council agreed in its Resolution of 16 June 1997 ( hereinafter the « Resolution ') to set up an exchange rate mechanism ( hereinafter « ERM II ') when the third stage of economic and monetary union began on 1 January 1999 . --- ERM II functions without prejudice to the primary objective of the ECB and the non-euro area NCBs to maintain price stability ;
Σύµφωνα µε τα οριζόµενα στο ψήφισµα : --- ο ΜΣΙ ΙΙ αντικαθιστά το Ευρωπαϊκό Νοµισµατικό Σύστηµα · --- το σταθερό οικονοµικό περιßάλλον είναι απαραίτητο για την καλή λειτουργία της ενιαίας αγοράς και για περισσότερες επενδύσεις , οικονοµική ανάπτυξη και απασχόληση , και εποµένως εξυπηρετεί το συµφέρον όλων των κρατών µελών .
Under the terms of the Resolution , --- for the currency of each participating non-euro area Member State ( hereinafter « participating non-euro area currency ') a central rate against the euro is defined ;