natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ôçò ëßñáò Éôáëßáò , óôçí áñ ÷ Þ ôçò ðåñéüäïõ áíáöïñÜò , ðñéí áðü ôçí åðáíÝíôáîç óôï ÌÓÉ , áñ ÷ éêÜ áíáêüðçêå åëáöñþò êáé ðñüóêáéñá ç ðñïçãïýìåíç áíïäéêÞ ôçò ðïñåßá , åíþ ç ìÝãéóôç áðüêëéóÞ ôçò Ýíáíôé åíüò íïìßóìáôïò ôïõ ÌÓÉ Þôáí 7,6% êÜôù áðü ôç ìåôÝðåéôá êåíôñéêÞ ôçò éóïôéìßá ôï ÌÜñôéï 1996 .
In the case of the Italian lira , at the beginning of the reference period , before rejoining the ERM , it initially experienced a small and temporary setback in its previous strengthening trend , reaching a maximum downward deviation of 7.6% below its future central rate against one ERM currency in March 1996 .
Óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ôïõ ìÜñêïõ Öéëáíäßáò , åðßóçò óôçí áñ ÷ Þ ôçò ðåñéüäïõ áíáöïñÜò , ðñéí áðü ôçí Ýíôáîç óôï ÌÓÉ , ôï íüìéóìá áñ ÷ éêÜ óõíÝ ÷ éóå ôçí ðôùôéêÞ ôïõ ðïñåßá ôùí áìÝóùò ðñïçãïýìåíùí ìçíþí - ç ïðïßá åß ÷ å äéáêüøåé ôçí ðéï ìáêñïðñüèåóìç áíïäéêÞ ôçò êßíçóç áðü ôï 1993 - öèÜíïíôáò óå ìÝãéóôç áðüêëéóç 6,5% êÜôù áðü ôç ìåôÝðåéôá êåíôñéêÞ ôïõ éóïôéìßá Ýíáíôé åíüò íïìßóìáôïò ôïí Áðñßëéï 1996 .
In the case of the Finnish markka , also at the beginning of the reference period , before joining the ERM , it initially continued its weakening movement apparent over the previous few months - which had interrupted the longer-term upward movement since 1993 - reaching a maximum downward deviation of 6.5% below its future central rate against one ERM currency in April 1996 .
Ôüóï ç ëßñá Éôáëßáò áðü ôçí åðáíÝíôáîÞ ôçò óôï ÌÓÉ ôï ÍïÝìâñéï 1996 üóï êáé ôï öéëáíäéêü ìÜñêï áðü ôçí ÝíôáîÞ ôïõ ôïí Ïêôþâñéï 1996 êéíÞèçêáí êáôÜ êáíüíá êïíôÜ óôéò áìåôÜâëçôåò êåíôñéêÝò ôïõò éóïôéìßåò Ýíáíôé Üëëùí íïìéóìÜôùí ôïõ ÌÓÉ . ¼ ðùò óõíÝâç êáé ìå Üëëá íïìßóìáôá ôïõ ÌÓÉ , ðåñéóôáóéáêÜ
Since joining and rejoining the ERM in October and November 1996 respectively , both the Finnish markka and the Italian lira have normally traded close to their unchanged central rates against other ERM currencies .
¼ ðùò óçìåéþèçêå ðáñáðÜíù , ç äñá ÷ ìÞ åíôÜ ÷ èçêå óôï ìç ÷ áíéóìü óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí éóïôéìéþí ôïõ ÅÍÓ áðü 16 Ìáñôßïõ 1998 . ¼ ðùò óçìåéþèçêå ðáñáðÜíù , ïé ðñïçãïýìåíåò äéìåñåßò êåíôñéêÝò éóïôéìßåò ôçò ëßñáò Éñëáíäßáò Ýíáíôé ôùí Üëëùí íïìéóìÜôùí ôïõ ìç ÷ áíéóìïý óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí éóïôéìéþí áíáôéìÞèçêáí êáôÜ 3 % áðü 16 Ìáñôßïõ 1998 .
As was the case for other ERM currencies , on occasion the Italian lira and the Finnish markka traded outside a range close to their central rates , but such deviations were limited and temporary .
Ïé äéáöïñÝò ôùí âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí Ýíáíôé ôùí ÷ ùñþí ôçò ÅÅ ìå ôá ÷ áìçëüôåñá åðéôüêéá ðáñÝìåéíáí ìåãÜëåò óôçí ÅëëÜäá êáé , åíþ ìÝ ÷ ñé ôá ìÝóá ôïõ 1997 ìåéþíïíôáí , Üñ ÷ éóáí íá äéåõñýíïíôáé áðü ôï ÍïÝìâñéï 1997 , óôç Óïõçäßá üìùò ðåñéïñßóôçêáí óçìáíôéêÜ . Óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ôçò ëßñáò Áããëßáò , ïé äéáöïñÝò ôùí âñá ÷ õðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí ðáñïõóßáóáí ôÜóç äéåýñõíóçò .
In the case of the pound sterling the short-term interest rate differential tended to widen . The long-term interest rate criterion Over the twelve-month reference period ending January 1998 , fourteen Member States ( Belgium , Denmark , Germany , Spain , France , Ireland , Italy , Luxembourg , the Netherlands , Austria , Portugal , Finland , Sweden and the United Kingdom ) had average long-term interest rates of below the reference value .
áñéèìçôéêü ìÝóï ôùí ìáêñïðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí ôùí ôñéþí ÷ ùñþí ìå ôï ÷ áìçëüôåñï ðëçèùñéóìü ( ÅíÄÔÊ ) , óõí 2 åêáôïóôéáßåò ìïíÜäåò .
This reference value was calculated by using the unweighted arithmetic average of the long-term interest rates in the three countries with the lowest rates of HICP inflation , plus 2 percentage points .
Ôá åðéôüêéá ôùí ÷ ùñþí áõôþí Þôáí 5,6% ãéá ôçí Áõóôñßá , 5,5% ãéá ôç Ãáëëßá êáé 6,2% ãéá ôçí Éñëáíäßá , ôùí ïðïßùí ï ìÝóïò üñïò åßíáé 5,8% , ïðüôå , ðñïóèÝôïíôáò ó  áõôüí 2 åêáôïóôéáßåò ìïíÜäåò , êáôáëÞãïõìå óå ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò 7,8% .
These three countries long-term interest rates were 5.6% for Austria , 5.5% for France and 6.2% for Ireland , and , adding 2 percentage points to the average of 5.8% , the reference value is 7.8% .
Ôá áíôéðñïóùðåõôéêÜ ìáêñïðñüèåóìá åðéôüêéá óôçí ÅëëÜäá , ðïõ áðü ôïí Éïýíéï 1997 åßíáé ðëÝïí óõãêñßóéìá ìå ôéò áðïäüóåéò óôéò Üëëåò ÷ þñåò , Þôáí 9,8% , äçë . áñêåôÜ õøçëüôåñá áðü ôçí ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò ( âë .
Representative long-term interest rates in Greece , which have been comparable with yields in other countries since June 1997 , were 9.8% and thus stood well above the reference value ( see Table A and Chart C ) .
Áðü ôçí åðéóêüðçóç ôùí åôþí 19901997 ðñïêýðôåé üôé óå ïñéóìÝíåò ÷ þñåò ôá ìáêñïðñüèåóìá åðéôüêéá Þôáí ðáñáðëÞóéá , åÜí ç ðáñáðÜíù ðåñßïäïò åîåôáóôåß óôï óýíïëü ôçò .
Looking back over the period from 1990 to 1997 , long-term interest rates were broadly similar in a number of countries when considered over the period as a whole .
Óôç Öéëáíäßá êáé ôç Óïõçäßá ç äéáäéêáóßá óýãêëéóçò ôùí áðïäüóåùí åðéôá ÷ ýíèçêå áðü ôï 1994-95 êáé åîÞò , åíþ êáé óôéò äýï ÷ þñåò ïé äéáöïñÝò åðéôïêßùí åßíáé ðåñéïñéóìÝíåò áðü ôï 1996 ðåñßðïõ .
In Finland and Sweden the process of yield convergence accelerated from 1994-95 onwards and both countries have recorded limited differentials since around 1996 .
Óôçí Éóðáíßá , ôçí Éôáëßá êáé ôçí Ðïñôïãáëßá , üðïõ ïé áðïäüóåéò Þôáí óçìáíôéêÜ õøçëüôåñåò êáôÜ ôï ìåãáëýôåñï ìÝñïò ôçò äåêáåôßáò ôïõ 1990 , ôá ìáêñïðñüèåóìá åðéôüêéá áðïêëéìáêþèçêáí áðüôïìá áðü ôï 1995 êáé åîÞò êáé êéíÞèçêáí ðñïò åðßðåäá ÷ áìçëüôåñá áðü ôçí ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò óôá ôÝëç ôïõ 1996 Þ óôéò áñ ÷ Ýò ôïõ 1997 .
In Spain , Italy and Portugal , where yields were significantly higher for most of the 1990s , long-term interest rates declined steeply from 1995 onwards and moved below the 9 reference value in either late 1996 or early 1997 .
Ôï êñéôÞñéï ôùí ìáêñïðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí Óôç äéÜñêåéá ôçò äùäåêÜìçíçò ðåñéüäïõ áíáöïñÜò ìÝ ÷ ñé êáé ôïí ÉáíïõÜñéï 1998 , óå äåêáôÝóóåñá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç ( ÂÝëãéï , Äáíßá , Ãåñìáíßá , Éóðáíßá , Ãáëëßá , Éñëáíäßá , Éôáëßá , Ëïõîåìâïýñãï , Ïëëáíäßá , Áõóôñßá , Ðïñôïãáëßá , Öéëáíäßá , Óïõçäßá êáé ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï ) ôá ìÝóá ìáêñïðñüèåóìá åðéôüêéá äéáìïñöþèçêáí óå åðßðåäá ÷ áìçëüôåñá áðü ôçí ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò .
In the case of the United Kingdom , reflecting a different position in the cycle vis-vis continental European countries , a broad trend has been observed since the early 1990s of , first , convergence with , and later divergence from the long-term interest rates prevailing in the countries with the lowest bond yields , although long-term interest rate differentials have narrowed more recently .
Ïé áãïñÝò Ýêñéíáí üôé ïé ðáñáðÜíù åîåëßîåéò ðñïïéùíßæïíôáé êáëýôåñåò ðñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ôç óõììåôï ÷ Þ óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ôçò ÏÍÅ óôïé ÷ åßï ðïõ ìðïñåß êé áõôü ìå ôç óåéñÜ ôïõ íá óõíÝâáëå áíåîÜñôçôá óôïí ôá ÷ ýôåñï ðåñéïñéóìü ôùí äéáöïñþí ìåôáîý ôùí áðïäüóåùí , ôüóï áðåõèåßáò üóï êáé ìÝóù ôçò ðåñáéôÝñù âåëôßùóçò ôùí ðñïïðôéêþí ãéá ôç óôáèåñüôçôá ôùí ôéìþí êáé ôùí óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí éóïôéìéþí . Ç áýîçóç ôïõ ïíïìáóôéêïý êüóôïõò åñãáóßáò áíÜ ìïíÜäá ðñïúüíôïò ãåíéêÜ åðéâñáäýíèçêå óôç äéÜñêåéá ôçò äåêáåôßáò ôïõ 1990 óå åðßðåäá ðïõ åßíáé óõíåðÞ ìå ôï ÷ áìçëü ðëçèùñéóìü .
These underlying developments were seen by the markets as improving the prospects for participation in Stage Three of EMU - an element which may in turn have played an independent role in accelerating the narrowing of yield differentials , both directly and by further improving the prospects for price and exchange rate stability .
Óå ïñéóìÝíåò ÷ þñåò ( ÂÝëãéï , Ãåñìáíßá , Ãáëëßá , Éñëáíäßá , Ïëëáíäßá , Áõóôñßá êáé Öéëáíäßá ) ôï ïíïìáóôéêü êüóôïò åñãáóßáò áíÜ ìïíÜäá ðñïúüíôïò óôçí ðåñßïäï 1996-1997 ðáñÝìåéíå ó ÷ åäüí áìåôÜâëçôï Þ ìåéþèçêå , åíþ óå ìåñéêÝò Üëëåò ðåñéðôþóåéò ( Äáíßá , Éóðáíßá , Ãáëëßá , Ëïõîåìâïýñãï , Ðïñôïãáëßá êáé ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï ) ïé áõîÞóåéò Þôáí óáöþò èåôéêÝò áëëÜ ùò åðß ôï ðëåßóôïí ìÝôñéåò .
Austria and Finland nominal unit labour costs over the period 1996-97 either were broadly stable or declined , while in several other cases ( Denmark , Spain , France , Luxembourg , Portugal and the United Kingdom ) increases were clearly positive but for the most part moderate .
Åîáßñåóç áðïôÝëåóå êõñßùò ç ÅëëÜäá , üðïõ ï ñõèìüò áíüäïõ ôïõ ïíïìáóôéêïý êüóôïõò åñãáóßáò áíÜ ìïíÜäá ðñïúüíôïò , ðáñÜ ôç óçìáíôéêÞ ôïõ åðéâñÜäõíóç óôç äåêáåôßá ôïõ 1990 , Þôáí 7,5% ôï 1997 .
The main exception was Greece , where , despite a significant deceleration during the 1990s , the increase in nominal unit labour costs was 7.5% in 1997 .
Óôçí Éôáëßá êáé ôç Óïõçäßá ç Üíïäïò ôïõ êüóôïõò åñãáóßáò áíÜ ìïíÜäá ðñïúüíôïò åðéôá ÷ ýíèçêå ôï 1996 êáé ðëçóßáóå ôï 5 %, åíþ ôï 1997 åðéâñáäýíèçêå óå 3,1% óôçí Éôáëßá êáé óå 1,2% óôç Óïõçäßá .
In Italy and Sweden the increase in unit labour costs picked up in 1996 to close to 5 %, before slowing in 1997 to 3.1% in Italy and 1.2% in Sweden .
Áðü ðñüóöáôá óôïé ÷ åßá ãéá ôï éóïæýãéï ôñå ÷ ïõóþí óõíáëëáãþí ôùí ÷ ùñþí ôçò ÅÅ ðñïêýðôåé üôé óå 11 ÷ þñåò õðÜñ ÷ åé ðëåüíáóìá .
Recent figures for EU countries current account positions point to surpluses in eleven countries in 1997 .
Áðü áõôÝò , óôçí Éóðáíßá , ôç Ãáëëßá , ôçí Éôáëßá , ôç Öéëáíäßá êáé ôç Óïõçäßá óôéò áñ ÷ Ýò ôçò äåêáåôßáò ôïõ 1990 óçìåéþèçêå Ýëëåéììá ôï ïðïßï óôç óõíÝ ÷ åéá åêìçäåíßóôçêå .
Among these , in Spain , France , Italy , Finland and Sweden deficits were recorded in the early 1990s but have subsequently been eliminated ;
Óôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï óçìåéþèçêå ìéêñü ðëåüíáóìá ôï 1997 .
in the United Kingdom a small surplus emerged in 1997 .
Óôá õðüëïéðá ÊñÜôçÌÝëç ( Ãåñìáíßá , ÅëëÜäá , Áõóôñßá êáé ¢ ëëïé ðáñÜãïíôåò ÐÝñá áðü ôá êñéôÞñéá óýãêëéóçò ðïõ ðñïáíáöÝñèçêáí , ç ¸ êèåóç ëáìâÜíåé åðßóçò õðüøç ìéá óåéñÜ áðü  Üëëïõò ðáñÜãïíôåò  ðïõ áíáãñÜöïíôáé ñçôþò óôï ¢ ñèñï 109 É ( 1 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé åßíáé : ç åîÝëéîç ôïõ ECU , ôá áðïôåëÝóìáôá ôçò ïëïêëÞñùóçò ôùí áãïñþí , ç êáôÜóôáóç êáé ç åîÝëéîç ôïõ éóïæõãßïõ ôñå ÷ ïõóþí óõíáëëáãþí êáé ìéá åîÝôáóç ôïõ êüóôïõò åñãáóßáò áíÜ ìïíÜäá ðñïúüíôïò êáé Üëëùí äåéêôþí ôéìþí ( âë .
In the remaining four Member States ( Germany , Greece , Austria and Portugal ) current account deficits have been more persistent , although in the case of Germany the deficit in 1997 was small . With regard to the integration of markets , European Commission figures on the state of implementation of internal market directives ( as of February 1998 ) show that the average transposition rate in the Union is approximately 94 %.
Ðßíáêá Â ) . 12
In a breakdown by sector , the Commission identifies public procurement as the sector in which the most technical barriers remain .
Ðïñôïãáëßá ) ôï Ýëëåéììá ôïõ éóïæõãßïõ ôñå ÷ ïõóþí óõíáëëáãþí åßíáé ðéï åðßìïíï , ìïëïíüôé óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò ôï Ýëëåéììá Þôáí ìéêñü ôï 1997 .
Considering trade flows in goods and services , the share of intra-EU trade as a percentage of total trade is significant for all EU countries .
¼ óïí áöïñÜ ôçí ïëïêëÞñùóç ôùí áãïñþí , óýìöùíá ìå óôïé ÷ åßá ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ÅðéôñïðÞò ðïõ áðåéêïíßæïõí ðþò ðñï ÷ ùñåß ç åöáñìïãÞ ôùí ïäçãéþí ãéá ôç äçìéïõñãßá åóùôåñéêþí áãïñþí ( áðü ôï ÖåâñïõÜñéï 1998 ) , ôï ìÝóï ðïóïóôü åíóùìÜôùóçò ôùí êïéíïôéêþí ïäçãéþí óôéò ÷ þñåò ôçò ÅÅ åßíáé ðåñßðïõ 94 %.
In 1996 intraEU exports as a proportion of total exports Other factors In addition to the convergence criteria mentioned above , the Report also takes account of a number of other factors which are referred to explicitly in Article 109j ( 1 ) of the Treaty : the development of the ECU ;
Ôï 1996 ïé åîáãùãÝò ðñïò Üëëåò ÷ þñåò ôçò ÅÅ ùò ðïóïóôü ôùí óõíïëéêþí åîáãùãþí êõìÜíèçêáí áðü 52 % óôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï Ýùò 80 % êáé ðëÝïí óôçí Ðïñôïãáëßá .
ranged from 52 % in the United Kingdom to over 80 % in Portugal .
Ï ìÝóïò üñïò ãéá ôï óýíïëï ôçò ÅÅ åßíáé 61 %.
The average for all EU Member States is 61 %.
Ãéá ôéò åéóáãùãÝò áðü êïéíïôéêÝò ÷ þñåò , ôï áíôßóôïé ÷ ï ðïóïóôü êõìáßíåôáé áðï 54 % óôç Äáíßá Ýùò 76 % óôçí Ðïñôïãáëßá , åíþ ï ìÝóïò üñïò ãéá ôï óýíïëï ôùí ÷ ùñþí ôçò ÅÅ åßíáé ðåñßðïõ 61 %.
For intra-EU imports the corresponding figures range from 54 % in Ireland to 76 % in Portugal , while the average for all EU countries is approximately 61 %.
Ç óõíïëéêÞ áãïñÜ ôïõ éäéùôéêïý ECU õðÝóôç êáé íÝá óõññßêíùóç ôï 1997 , áíôáíáêëþíôáò ôç ìåßùóç ôùí åêöñáóìÝíùí óå ECU óôïé ÷ åßùí åíåñãçôéêïý êáé ôïõ ðáèçôéêïý ôùí ôñáðåæþí êáé êõêëïöïñïýíôùí äéåèíþí ïìïëüãùí .
The overall private ECU market contracted further in 1997 , reflecting declines in bank assets and liabilities and international bonds outstanding .
Ç óõññßêíùóç áõôÞ óçìåéþèçêå ðáñÜ ôï ãåãïíüò üôé ôï 1997 õðÞñîáí êÜðïéåò åõíïúêÝò åîåëßîåéò .
This contraction took place despite some favourable developments in 1997 .
ÓõãêåêñéìÝíá , åîáëåßöèçêáí ïñéóìÝíåò íïìéêÝò áâåâáéüôçôåò êáé , åí ìÝñåé åîáéôßáò áõôïý , ç äéáöïñÜ ôçò áãïñáßáò éóïôéìßáò Ýíáíôé ôçò éóïôéìßáò ôïõ êáëáèéïý ôïõ ÅCU óõíÝ ÷ éóå íá ðåñéïñßæåôáé . Åéäéêüôåñá , áðü 0,90 åêáôïóôéáßåò ìïíÜäåò óôï ôÝëïò Äåêåìâñßïõ 1996 ìçäåíßóôçêå óôï ôÝëïò Äåêåìâñßïõ 1997 , êáé ìÜëéóôá ìåôáôñÜðçêå óå áñíçôéêÞ ãéá Ýíá óýíôïìï äéÜóôçìá ðñïò ôï ôÝëïò ôïõ 1997 .
In particular , some legal uncertainties were resolved and , partly in response to this , the spread between market and basket ECU exchange rates narrowed further between end-December 1996 and end-December 1997 from around 90 basis points to par ; it was even at a premium for a short period towards the end of 1997 .
2.1 ÅéóáãùãÞ Ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ïñßæåé üôé ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç äéáóöáëßæïõí , ôï áñãüôåñï êáôÜ ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , üôé ç åèíéêÞ ôïõò íïìïèåóßá , óõìðåñéëáìâáíïìÝíïõ ôïõ êáôáóôáôéêïý ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ôïõò , åßíáé óõìâáôÞ ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü ( íïìéêÞ óýãêëéóç ) . Äåí áðáéôåßôáé åíáñìüíéóç ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ , áëëÜ áðëþò ç åèíéêÞ íïìïèåóßá êáé ôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ðñÝðåé íá ðñïóáñìïóôïýí þóôå íá ãßíïõí óõìâáôÜ ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü .
Therefore , adaptations which relate to the independence of an NCB need to become effective at the latest at the date of the ESCB s establishment . Other statutory requirements relating to the legal integration of NCBs in the ESCB need only enter into force at the moment that the integration of an NCB in the ESCB becomes effective , i.e. the starting date of Stage Three or , in the case of a Member State with a derogation or a special status , the date on which it adopts 11
Áõôü éó ÷ ýåé ãéá êÜèå åßäïõò íïìïèåóßá ðïõ åìðßðôåé óôï ¢ ñèñï 108 . Ùóôüóï , ç ðáñáðÜíù äéÜêñéóç áíÜìåóá óå äéÜöïñïõò ôïìåßò ôçò íïìïèåóßáò åßíáé óçìáíôéêÞ üôáí ðñüêåéôáé ãéá ôïí êáèïñéóìü ôçò çìåñïìçíßáò êáôÜ ôçí ïðïßá ç íïìïèåóßá ðñÝðåé íá ôåèåß óå éó ÷ ý .
This does not require the harmonisation of NCBs statutes , but it implies that national legislation and statutes of NCBs need to be adjusted in order to make them compatible with the Treaty and the Statute .
ÐïëëÝò áðïöÜóåéò ôéò ïðïßåò èá ëÜâïõí ôï Äéïéêçôéêü Óõìâïýëéï ôçò ÅÊÔ êáé ïé ÅèíÊÔ áðü ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ ìÝ ÷ ñé ôï ôÝëïò ôïõ 1998 èá ðñïêáèïñßóïõí ôçí åíéáßá íïìéóìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ êáé ôçí åöáñìïãÞ ôçò óôçí ðåñéï ÷ Þ ôïõ åõñþ .
For the purpose of identifying those areas where the adaptation of national legislation is necessary , a distinction may be made between the independence of NCBs , the legal integration of NCBs in the ESCB and legislation other than statutes of NCBs .
Ïé ëïéðÝò êáôáóôáôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ðïõ áöïñïýí ôç íïìéêÞ Ýíôáîç ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ äåí 14 2.2 Áíåîáñôçóßá ôùí ÅèíÊÔ Ç áíåîáñôçóßá ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí åßíáé áðáñáßôçôç ãéá ôçí áîéïðéóôßá ôçò ìåôÜâáóçò óôç ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ¸ íùóç êáé óõíåðþò áðïôåëåß ðñïûðüèåóç ãéá ôç ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ¸ íùóç .
The entry into force of adaptations of legislation other than statutes of NCBs which are required to ensure compatibility with the Treaty and the Statute is dependent on the content of such legislation and therefore needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis .
ÅèíÊÔ ùò ðñïò ôçí åêôÝëåóç ôùí åñãáóéþí ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ ( âë . ¢ ñèñï 12.1 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , ôåëåõôáßá ðáñÜãñáöïò ) .
or be consulted ( ex ante ) on an NCB s decisions are incompatible with the Treaty and / or the Statute and , thus , require adaptation .
Ç áñ ÷ Þ ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí ÅèíÊÔ äéáôõðþíåôáé ñçôþò óôï ¢ ñèñï 107 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý .
a governor of an NCB may not be dismissed for reasons other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute ( i.e. if he / she no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his / her duties or if he / she has been guilty of serious misconduct ) ;
Ôï ¢ ñèñï 107 áðáãïñåýåé êÜèå áðüðåéñá íá áóêçèåß åðéññïÞ óôçí ÅÊÔ , ôéò ÅèíÊÔ Þ ôá ìÝëç ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí áõôþí , åíþ ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 äéáóöáëßæåé ôç èçôåßá ôùí åí ëüãù ìåëþí .
other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks have the same security of tenure as governors ; 2.2 Independence of NCBs Central bank independence is essential for the credibility of the move to Monetary Union and , thus , a prerequisite of Monetary Union .
Ôï ÅÍÉ êáèéÝñùóå Ýíá êáôÜëïãï ìå ôá ÷ áñáêôçñéóôéêÜ ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí , ôá ïðïßá äéáêñßíåé óå ÷ áñáêôçñéóôéêÜ èåóìéêÞò , ðñïóùðéêÞò êáé ïéêïíïìéêÞò öýóåùò . 4 ¼ óïí áöïñÜ ôç èåóìéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá , ôá äéêáéþìáôá ôñßôùí ( ð .
The institutional aspects of Monetary Union require monetary powers , currently held by Member States , to be exercised in a new system , the ESCB . This would not be acceptable if Member States could influence the decisions taken by the governing bodies of the ESCB .
ôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ðñÝðåé íá åîáóöáëßæïõí üôé : ïé äéïéêçôÝò ôùí ÅèíÊÔ Ý ÷ ïõí èçôåßá ôïõëÜ ÷ éóôïí ðÝíôå åôþí , ï äéïéêçôÞò ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ äåí ìðïñåß íá áðïëõèåß ãéá Üëëïõò ëüãïõò åêôüò áðü üóïõò áíáöÝñïíôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ( äçë .
The principle of the independence of NCBs is expressly referred to in Article 107 of the Treaty and Article 14.2 of the Statute .
ðáñÜãñáöï 2.3 êáôùôÝñù ) .
Financial independence requires that NCBs can avail themselves of the appropriate means to fulfil their mandate .
2.3 Ç íïìéêÞ Ýíôáîç ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ Ç ðëÞñçò óõììåôï ÷ Þ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ åðéâÜëëåé íá ëçöèïýí êáé Üëëá ìÝôñá , ðÝñáí åêåßíùí ðïõ óêïðüò ôïõò åßíáé íá äéáóöáëßóïõí ôçí áíåîáñôçóßá .
Statutory constraints in this field must be accompanied by a safeguard clause to ensure that ESCB-related tasks can be properly fulfilled .
2.5 Óõìâáôüôçôá ôçò åèíéêÞò íïìïèåóßáò ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü ¼ ëá ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç , åêôüò áðü ôç Äáíßá , ôçò ïðïßáò ç íïìïèåóßá äåí ÷ ñåéÜæåôáé ðñïóáñìïãÞ , Ý ÷ ïõí Þäç åðéöÝñåé áëëáãÝò , Þ âñßóêïíôáé óå ðñï ÷ ùñçìÝíï óôÜäéï ôñïðïðïßçóçò , óôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ôïõò óýìöùíá ìå ôá êñéôÞñéá ðïõ áíáöÝñïíôáé óôéò ÅêèÝóåéò ôïõ ÅÍÉ êáé óôéò ãíùìïäïôÞóåéò ôïõ ÅÍÉ .
Thus the EMI s assessment of the compatibility of the statutes of NCBs with the Treaty and the Statute focuses on the following areas : statutory objectives , tasks , instruments , organisation , financial provisions and miscellaneous issues .
Ôï ÇíùìÝíï Âáóßëåéï , ôï ïðïßï áðáëëÜóóåôáé áðü ôéò õðï ÷ ñåþóåéò ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , âñßóêåôáé Þäç óôç äéáäéêáóßá åéóáãùãÞò íÝïõ êáôáóôáôéêïý ôçò ÅèíÊÔ ôïõ , ôï ïðïßï , åíþ áíáãíùñßæåé óôçí êåíôñéêÞ ôñÜðåæá õøçëüôåñï âáèìü ëåéôïõñãéêÞò áíåîáñôçóßáò , äåí åðéäéþêåé ñçôþò ôç íïìéêÞ óýãêëéóç üðùò ôçí áðáéôåß ôï ÅÍÉ þóôå íá õðÜñîåé ðëÞñçò óõììüñöùóç ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü .
2.5 Compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty and the Statute All Member States except Denmark , whose legislation does not require adaptation , have introduced , or are in an advanced process of introducing , changes in the statutes of their NCBs , following the criteria laid down in the EMI s Reports and in the EMI s opinions .
Óå üëç ôçí ÅõñùðáúêÞ ¸ íùóç , ôá íïìïèåôéêÜ üñãáíá , ìå åîáßñåóç ôéò ðáñáðÜíù ðåñéðôþóåéò , áíÝëáâáí ìéá íïìïèåôéêÞ äéáäéêáóßá ìå óêïðü ôçí ðñïåôïéìáóßá ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ôçò ÏÍÅ . 2.4 ËïéðÞ íïìïèåóßá åêôüò áðü ôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ Ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç íïìéêÞò óýãêëéóçò óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , ôï ïðïßï åíôÜóóåôáé óôï êåöÜëáéï ìå ôßôëï  ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ , éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôïõò ôïìåßò åêåßíïõò ôçò íïìïèåóßáò ðïõ åðçñåÜæïíôáé áðü ôç ìåôÜâáóç áðü ôï Äåýôåñï ÓôÜäéï óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï .
The United Kingdom , which is exempt from the obligations under Article 108 of the Treaty , is in the process of introducing a new statute of its NCB which , while providing a greater level of operational central bank independence , is not expressly intended to achieve the legal convergence as required by the EMI for full compliance with the Treaty and the Statute . Throughout the European Union legislators , with the above exceptions , have undertaken a legislative process intended to prepare NCBs for Stage Three of EMU .
Áðáéôåßôáé íá äéáôçñçèåß ðñùôïãåíÝò ðëÝïíáóìá ôïõëÜ ÷ éóôïí 6 % ôïõ ÁÅÐ åôçóßùò êáé íá åðéôõã ÷ Üíïíôáé áõîáíüìåíá êáé éêáíïý ìåãÝèïõò óõíïëéêÜ äçìïóéïíïìéêÜ ðëåïíÜóìáôá , ðñïêåéìÝíïõ íá êáôáóôåß äõíáôÞ ç äñáóôéêÞ ìåßùóç ôïõ ëüãïõ ôïõ ÷ ñÝïõò óå åðßðåäï 60 % ìÝóá óå åýëïãï ÷ ñïíéêü äéÜóôçìá . Áõôü óõãêñßíåôáé ìå ôçí ðñáãìáôïðïßçóç äçìïóéïíïìéêïý åëëåßììáôïò 2,1% ôïõ ÁÅÐ ôï 1997 êáé ìå ðñüâëåøç 1,7% ôï 1998 .
Summaries country by country in 1997 , as well as the forecast deficit of 1.7% in 1998 . The Stability and Growth Pact also requires , as a medium-term objective , a budgetary position that is close to balance or in surplus .
Ùò ðñïò ôïõò Üëëïõò ðáñÜãïíôåò , ôï 1996 êáé ôï 1997 ï ëüãïò ôïõ åëëåßììáôïò õðåñÝâç ôï ëüãï äçìüóéùí åðåíäýóåùí / ÁÅÐ , åíþ ôï ÂÝëãéï äéáôçñåß ìåãÜëá ðëåïíÜóìáôá óôï éóïæýãéï ôñå ÷ ïõóþí óõíáëëáãþí êáé ç êáèáñÞ åîùôåñéêÞ ôïõ èÝóç åßíáé óçìáíôéêÜ èåôéêÞ .
With regard to other factors , in 1996 and 1997 the deficit ratio exceeded the ratio of public investment to GDP , while Belgium has maintained large current account surpluses and a strong net external asset position .
Ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÅèíéêÞò ÔñÜðåæáò ôïõ Âåëãßïõ ôñïðïðïéÞèçêå ìå ôï Íüìï 1061/12 - 96/97 .
The statute of the National Bank of Belgium was amended with Law No. 1061/12 - 96/97 .
3.1 ÂÝëãéï Óôç äéÜñêåéá ôçò ðåñéüäïõ áíáöïñÜò ôï ÂÝëãéï ðÝôõ ÷ å ñõèìü ðëçèùñéóìïý ( ÅíÄÔÊ ) 1,4% , äçë . áñêåôÜ ÷ áìçëüôåñï áðü ôçí ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò ðïõ ïñßæåé ç ÓõíèÞêç .
3.1 Belgium Over the reference period Belgium has achieved a rate of HICP inflation of 1.4% , which is well below the reference value stipulated by the Treaty .
Óýìöùíá ìå ôéò ðñïâëÝøåéò , ï ðëçèùñéóìüò èá åßíáé ãýñù óôï 1,5% ôï 1998 êáé ôï 1999 .
forecasts project inflation to be around 1‰ % in 1998 and 1999 .
Óôç äéÜñêåéá ôçò ðåñéüäïõ áíáöïñÜò ðáñÝìåéíå ðåñßðïõ óôáèåñü , ãåíéêþò êïíôÜ óôéò êåíôñéêÝò ôïõ éóïôéìßåò , oé ïðïßåò ðáñÝìåéíáí áìåôÜâëçôåò , ÷ ùñßò íá ÷ ñåéáóôåß íá ëçöèïýí ìÝôñá ãéá ôç óôÞñéîç ôçò óõíáëëáãìáôéêÞò éóïôéìßáò .
Over the reference period it remained broadly stable , generally close to its unchanged central parities without the need for measures to support the exchange rate .
Ôï åðßðåäï ôùí ìáêñïðñüèåóìùí åðéôïêßùí Þôáí 5,7% , äçë .
The level of long-term interest rates was 5.7% , i.e. well below the respective reference value .
Ôï 1997 ôï ÂÝëãéï ðÝôõ ÷ å ëüãï äçìïóéïíïìéêïý åëëåßììáôïò 2,1% ôïõ ÁÅÐ , äçë . êÜôù áðü ôçí ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò , êáé õðÜñ ÷ ïõí ðñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ðåñáéôÝñù ìåßùóç óå 1,7% ôï 1998 .
In 1997 Belgium achieved a fiscal deficit ratio of 2.1% of GDP , i.e. below the reference value , and the outlook is for a further decline to 1.7% in 1998 .
Ï ëüãïò ÷ ñÝïõò / ÁÅÐ õðåñâáßíåé êáôÜ ðïëý ôçí ôéìÞ áíáöïñÜò 60 %.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is far above the 60 % reference value .
Áöïý Ýöèáóå ôï õøçëüôåñï óçìåßï ôï 1993 , ìåéþèçêå êáôÜ 13,0 åêáôïóôéáßåò ìïíÜäåò êáé äéáìïñöþèçêå óå 122,2% ôï 1997 .
After having reached a peak in 1993 , it declined by 13.0 percentage points to stand at 122.2% in 1997 ;
ÕðÜñ ÷ ïõí ðñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ðåñáéôÝñù ìåßùóç óå 118,1% ôïõ ÁÅÐ ôï 1998 .
the outlook is for a further decline to 118.1% of GDP in 1998 .
3.2 Äáíßá Ç Äáíßá , óýìöùíá ìå ôïõò üñïõò ôïõ Ðñùôïêüëëïõ áñéè .
addressing this issue will have to remain a key priority for the Belgian authorities .
12 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , Ý ÷ åé ãíùóôïðïéÞóåé óôï Óõìâïýëéï ôçò ÅÅ üôé 17 äåí ðñïôßèåôáé íá óõììåôÜó ÷ åé óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ôçò ÏÍÅ .
The maintenance of a primary surplus of at least 6 % of GDP per year and the achievement of growing and sizable overall fiscal surpluses are needed in order to be able to forcefully reduce the debt ratio to 60 % within an appropriate period of time .