natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ï äéÜëïãïò ìå ðïëéôéêïýò öïñåßò èá äéåîÜãåôáé ôüôå êõñßùò óå êïéíïôéêü åðßðåäï ( âë . éäßùò ¢ ñèñï 109 Â ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ¢ ñèñï 15.3 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ) .
Article 14.2 of the Statute states that the statutes of NCBs shall , in particular , provide for a minimum term of office for a governor of five years .
Ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ïñßæåé üôé ôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ðñïâëÝðïõí åéäéêüôåñá üôé ç èçôåßá ôïõ äéïéêçôÞ äåí åßíáé ìéêñüôåñç áðü ðÝíôå Ýôç .
Against this background , the statutes of NCBs have to respect the following features of personal independence :
2.3.1 ÅëÜ ÷ éóôç äéÜñêåéá èçôåßáò ôùí äéïéêçôþí Tá ÊáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ðñÝðåé , óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , íá ðñïâëÝðïõí üôé ç èçôåßá 320
293 2.3.1 Minimum term of office for governors The statutes of NCBs must , in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute , contain a minimum term of office for a governor of five years .
Áõôü , öõóéêÜ , äåí áðïêëåßåé èçôåßá ìåãáëýôåñçò äéÜñêåéáò , åíþ áí ðñïâëÝðåôáé èçôåßá áðåñéüñéóôçò äéÜñêåéáò äåí áðáéôåßôáé ðñïóáñìïãÞ ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí åöüóïí ïé ëüãïé ðáýóçò ôïõ äéïéêçôÞ åßíáé óýìöùíïé ìå åêåßíïõò ðïõ äéáôõðþíïíôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ( âë . 2.3.2 êáôùôÝñù ) .
This , of course , does not preclude longer terms of office , while an indefinite term of office does not require the adaptation of statutes if the grounds for the dismissal of a governor are in line with those of Article 14.2 of the Statute ( see point 2.3.2 below ) .
2.3.2 Ëüãïé ðáýóçò ôùí äéïéêçôþí Tá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ èá ðñÝðåé íá åîáóöáëßæïõí üôé ï äéïéêçôÞò äåí ìðïñåß íá ðáõèåß ãéá Üëëïõò ëüãïõò åêôüò áðü åêåßíïõò ðïõ áíáöÝñïíôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ( äçë . åÜí äåí ðëçñïß ðëÝïí ôéò áðáñáßôçôåò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ãéá ôçí åêôÝëåóç ôùí êáèçêüíôùí ôïõ Þ åÜí äéáðñÜîåé âáñý ðáñÜðôùìá ) .
2.3.2 Grounds for the dismissal of governors The statutes of NCBs must ensure that a governor may not be dismissed for reasons other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute ( i.e. no longer fulfilling the conditions required for the performance of his / her duties or being guilty of serious misconduct ) .
Áðü ôçí çìåñïìçíßá ßäñõóçò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , ôá ÊáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ èá ðñÝðåé íá áíáãñÜöïõí ôïõò ëüãïõò âÜóåé ôùí ïðïßùí ìðïñåß íá ðáõèåß ï äéïéêçôÞò êáé ïé ïðïßïé ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé óýìöùíïé ìå åêåßíïõò ðïõ ðñïâëÝðïíôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý Þ äåí èá ðñÝðåé íá áíáöÝñïõí êáíÝíá ëüãï áðïìÜêñõíóçò , åöüóïí ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 åßíáé áðåõèåßáò åöáñìïóôÝï .
As from the date of the establishment of the ESCB , the statutes of NCBs should contain grounds for dismissal which are compatible with those laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute or should not mention any grounds for dismissal since Article 14.2 is directly applicable .
Ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç íá ðáñÝ ÷ åôáé ðáñüìïéá äéáóöÜëéóç ôçò èçôåßáò áðïññÝåé áðü äéÜöïñá Üñèñá ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý . Ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý äåí ðåñéïñßæåé ôçí äéáóöÜëéóç ôçò èçôåßáò óôïõò äéïéêçôÝò , åíþ ôï ¢ ñèñï 107 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôï ¢ ñèñï 7 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý áíáöÝñïíôáé óå  ìÝëç ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ  êáé ü ÷ é óôïõò  äéïéêçôÝò .
Article 14.2 of the Statute does not restrict the security of tenure of office to governors , while Article 107 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute refer to any members of decision-making bodies of NCBs rather than to governors .
Áõôü éó ÷ ýåé éäßùò üôáí ï äéïéêçôÞò åßíáé  ðñþôïò ìåôáîý ßóùí  áíÜìåóá óå óõíáäÝëöïõò ôïõ ìå éóüôéìç øÞöï Þ üôáí , óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 10.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , áõôÜ ôá Üëëá ìÝëç èá ðñÝðåé åíäå ÷ ïìÝíùò íá áíáðëçñþóïõí ôï äéïéêçôÞ óôï Äéïéêçôéêü Óõìâïýëéï .
This applies in particular where a governor is primus inter pares between colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where , in the case referred to in Article 10.2 of the Statute , such other members may have to deputise for the governor within the Governing Council .
Ðáñüôé ôá óõóôÞìáôá áõôÜ äåí åîáóöáëßæïõí ðÜíôïôå üôé ç èçôåßá êÜèå ìåìïíùìÝíïõ ìÝëïõò ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí åßíáé ôïõëÜ ÷ éóôïí ðÝíôå Ýôç üðùò áíáöÝñåé ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , ï ãåíéêüò óôü ÷ ïò ôùí óõóôçìÜôùí áõôþí äåí åßíáé 2.3.3 ÄéáóöÜëéóç èçôåßáò ôùí ìåëþí ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ôçò ÅÊÔ ðïõ åìðëÝêïíôáé óôçí åêôÝëåóç ôùí ó ÷ åôéêþí ìå ôï ÅÓÊÔ êáèçêüíôùí , åêôüò ôùí äéïéêçôþí Ç ðñïóùðéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá èá ìðïñïýóå íá áðåéëçèåß åÜí äåí åöáñìüæïíôáí ïé ßäéïé êáíüíåò ðïõ äéáóöáëßæïõí ôç èçôåßá ôùí äéïéêçôþí êáé óôá Üëëá ìÝëç ôùí ïñãÜíùí
While these systems may not always ensure that each individual member of the decision-making bodies serves the minimum five years to which Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB refers , the general aim pursued by such systems is not incompatible with the Treaty if the normal term of office is generally established at five years or more .
áóõìâßâáóôïò ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç åöüóïí ç êáíïíéêÞ èçôåßá ïñßæåôáé óõíÞèùò óôá ðÝíôå Þ ðåñéóóüôåñá Ýôç . 19 ÐñïêåéìÝíïõ üìùò íá áðïöåõ ÷ èåß êÜèå áìöéâïëßá ùò ðñïò ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , ôï ÅÍÉ óõíéóôÜ üðùò ôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ üëùí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ äéáóöáëßæïõí üôé ç èçôåßá êÜèå ìåìïíùìÝíïõ ìÝëïõò ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ðïõ åìðëÝêåôáé óôçí åêôÝëåóç ôùí ó ÷ åôéêþí ìå ôï ÅÓÊÔ êáèçêüíôùí åßíáé ôïõëÜ ÷ éóôïí ðåíôáåôÞò .
19 However , for the avoidance of doubt with respect to Article 19 2.3.3 Security of tenure of members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCBrelated tasks other than governors Personal independence could be jeopardised if the same rules for the security of tenure of office of governors were not also applied to the other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks .
2.3.4 ÄéáóöÜëéóç Ýíáíôé óõãêñïýóåùí óõìöåñüíôùí Ç ðñïóùðéêÞ áíåîáñôçóßá óõíåðÜãåôáé åðßóçò ôçí åîáóöÜëéóç üôé äåí áíáêýðôïõí óõãêñïýóåéò óõìöåñüíôùí ìåôáîý ôùí êáèçêüíôùí ôùí ìåëþí ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ Ýíáíôé ôçò áíôßóôïé ÷ çò ÅèíÊÔ ( êáé åðßóçò ôùí äéïéêçôþí Ýíáíôé ôçò ÅÊÔ ) êáé Üëëùí ëåéôïõñãéþí ôéò ïðïßåò ôõ ÷ üí Ý ÷ ïõí ôá ìÝëç áõôÜ ôùí ïñãÜíùí ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ðïõ åìðëÝêïíôáé óôçí åêôÝëåóç ôùí ó ÷ åôéêþí ìå ôï ÅÓÊÔ êáèçêüíôùí êáé ïé ïðïßåò óõãêñïýóåéò èá ìðïñïýóáí èá èÝóïõí óå êßíäõíï ôçí ðñïóùðéêÞ ôïõò áíåîáñôçóßá .
Such a recommendation is not warranted for transitional arrangements whereby new decision-making bodies are put in place and different expiry dates for appointees terms of office are foreseen . These are once and for all schemes , aimed at ensuring different dates for the expiry of terms of office of members of decisionmaking bodies and , thus , achieving continuity in the management of the NCB .
ÔÝôïéá óõóôÞìáôá ðñïâëÝðïíôáé óôç ÓõíèÞêç ãéá Üëëá áíåîÜñôçôá êïéíïôéêÜ üñãáíá : ôçí ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅðéôñïðÞ (¢ ñèñï 159 ) , ôï Åõñùðáúêü ÄéêáóôÞñéï (¢ ñèñï 167 ) êáé ôï Åõñùðáúêü Åëåãêôéêü ÓõíÝäñéï (¢ ñèñï 188 Â ( 6 )) . Ôï ¢ ñèñï 50 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ ðñïâëÝðåé ôÝôïéï óýóôçìá ìå êõëéüìåíåò èçôåßåò ãéá ôá ìÝëç ðïõ èá áðïôåëÝóïõí ôçí ðñþôç óýíèåóç ôçò ÅêôåëåóôéêÞò ÅðéôñïðÞò ôçò ÅÊÔ , åêôüò áðü ôïí Ðñüåäñï .
2.3.4 Safeguards against conflicts of interest Personal independence also entails ensuring that no conflicts of interest arise between the duties of members of decision-making bodies of NCBs vis - - vis their respective NCB ( and of governors , additionally , vis - vis the ECB ) and any other functions which such members of decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCBrelated tasks may have and which may jeopardise their personal independence .
ÍïìéêÞ Ýíôáîç ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ íá åðéôåõ ÷ èåß óõììüñöùóç ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , ïé äéáôÜîåéò ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôá êáèÞêïíôá ðïõ ðåñéÝ ÷ ïíôáé óôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ èá ðñÝðåé íá óõãêñéèïýí ìå ôéò ó ÷ åôéêÝò äéáôÜîåéò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý 22 êáé íá áðáëåéöèïýí ïé áóõìâáôüôçôåò .
Article 50 of the Statute of the ESCB provides for such a system of staggered initial appointments of the members of the Executive Board of the ECB , exclusive of the President . 295
21 Åéäéêüôåñá , åíäÝ ÷ åôáé íá ÷ ñåéáóôïýí ìÝôñá ðïõ íá åðéôñÝðïõí óôéò ÅèíÊÔ íá åêôåëïýí êáèÞêïíôá ùò ìÝëç ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ êáé óýìöùíá ìå ôéò áðïöÜóåéò ôçò ÅÊÔ .
21 In particular , measures may be necessary to enable NCBs to execute tasks as members of the ESCB and in accordance with decisions by the ECB .
Ç Ýíôáîç ôùí ÅèíÊÔ óôï ÅÓÊÔ ðñïûðïèÝôåé üôé ïé ( ðñùôáñ ÷ éêïß êáé äåõôåñåýïíôåò ) êáôáóôáôéêïß ôïõò óêïðïß åßíáé óõìâáôïß ìå ôïõò óôü ÷ ïõò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ , üðùò áõôïß ðñïâëÝðïíôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 2 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý . Áõôü óçìáßíåé , ìåôáîý Üëëùí , üôé ðñÝðåé íá õðïóôïýí ðñïóáñìïãÞ ïé êáôáóôáôéêïß óêïðïß ðïõ Ý ÷ ïõí  åèíéêÞ ÷ ñïéÜ , ð .
3.3 Instruments The statutes of many , if not all , NCBs contain provisions on monetary policy instruments . Again , national provisions on such instruments are to be compared with those contained in the Treaty and Statute and incompatibilities need to be removed in order to comply with Article 108 of the Treaty .
Ôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ðïëëþí ÅèíÊÔ , áí ü ÷ é üëùí , ðåñéÝ ÷ ïõí äéáôÜîåéò ãéá ôá ìÝóá Üóêçóçò ôçò íïìéóìáôéêÞò ðïëéôéêÞò . Êáé óôçí ðåñßðôùóç áõôÞ , èá ðñÝðåé íá ãßíåé óýãêñéóç ìåôáîý ôùí åèíéêþí äéáôÜîåùí ãéá ôá åí ëüãù ìÝóá êáé åêåßíùí ðïõ ðåñéÝ ÷ ïíôáé óôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü êáé íá áðáëåéöèïýí ïé áóõìâáôüôçôåò , ðñïêåéìÝíïõ íá åðéôåõ ÷ èåß óõììüñöùóç ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò .
This means , inter alia , that statutory objectives with a national flavour , for example referring to an obligation to conduct monetary policy within the framework of the general economic policy of the Member State concerned , need to be adapted .
ÏñãÜíùóç Åêôüò áðü ôçí áðáãüñåõóç íá ðáñÝ ÷ ïíôáé , íá ëáìâÜíïíôáé Þ íá æçôïýíôáé õðïäåßîåéò , äåí ðñÝðåé íá õðÜñ ÷ åé êáíÝíáò ìç ÷ áíéóìüò óôá êáôáóôáôéêÜ ôùí ÅèíÊÔ ðïõ èá ìðïñïýóå 21
In addition to the prohibition on giving , accepting or soliciting instructions , there must be no mechanisms in the statutes of NCBs which could either bind a governor in his / her voting behaviour in the Governing Council of the ECB in which he / she acts in the separate capacity as a member of that Council or prevent an NCB s decisionmaking bodies from complying with rules adopted at the level of the ECB .
Ôï ¢ ñèñï 14.3 , óå óõíäõáóìü ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 43.1 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , õðïíïåß üôé ïé ðëÞñùò óõììåôÝ ÷ ïõóåò ÅèíÊÔ èá áðïôåëÝóïõí áíáðüóðáóôï ìÝñïò ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ êáé èá ðñÝðåé íá ôçñïýí ôéò êáôåõèõíôÞñéåò ãñáììÝò êáé ïäçãßåò ôçò ÅÊÔ .
In order to comply with Article 108 of the Treaty , provisions on tasks in the statutes of NCBs therefore need to be compared with the relevant Treaty and Statute provisions 22 and incompatibilities need to be removed .
Éäßùò ìå ôá ¢ ñèñá 105 êáé 105á ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôá ¢ ñèñá 3 Ýùò 6 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý .
296 Financial provisions in the Statute , which may be of particular relevance as far as the identification of incompatibilities in the
323 íá äåóìåýåé ôç óõìðåñéöïñÜ ôïõ äéïéêçôÞ ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ êáôÜ ôçí øçöïöïñßá óôï Äéïéêçôéêü Óõìâïýëéï ôçò ÅÊÔ , óôï ïðïßï ìåôÝ ÷ åé êáé ùò ìÝëïò , Þ íá åìðïäßæåé ôá üñãáíá ëÞøåùò áðïöÜóåùí ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ íá óõììïñöþíïíôáé ìå ôïõò êáíüíåò ðïõ Ý ÷ ïõí õéïèåôçèåß óôï åðßðåäï ôçò ÅÊÔ .
Article 14.3 in conjunction with Article 43.1 of the Statute implies that fully participating NCBs will become an integral part of the ESCB and that they will have to comply with guidelines and instructions from the ECB .
Ïé êáíüíåò áõôïß óõíåðÜãïíôáé üôé ïé ÅèíÊÔ ðñÝðåé íá åßíáé óå èÝóç íá óõììïñöþíïíôáé ìå ôéò õðï ÷ ñåþóåéò ôïõò ðïõ áðïññÝïõí áðü ôá óõíáöÞ Üñèñá ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý . 3.6
In particular Articles 105 and 105a of the Treaty and Articles 3 to 6 of the Statute .
Ïé ÷ ñçìáôïïéêïíïìéêÝò äéáôÜîåéò ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , ïé ïðïßåò åíäÝ ÷ åôáé íá åßíáé éäéáßôåñá óçìáíôéêÝò ðñïêåéìÝíïõ íá åíôïðéóôïýí ïé áóõìâáôüôçôåò ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ , äéáéñïýíôáé óå êáíüíåò ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôç ëïãéóôéêÞ23 , ôï ëïãéóôéêü Ýëåã ÷ ï 24 , ôçí åããñáöÞ óôï êåöÜëáéï25 , ôç ìåôáâßâáóç óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí äéáèåóßìùí26 êáé ôï íïìéóìáôéêü åéóüäçìá27 .
statutes of NCBs is concerned , may be divided into rules on accounting23 , auditing24 , capital subscriptions 25 , transfer of foreign reserve assets26 and monetary income27 . These rules imply that NCBs need to be able to comply with their obligations under the relevant Treaty and Statute articles .
ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç ôïõ ðñïóùðéêïý ôçò ÅÊÔ êáé ôùí ÅèíÊÔ íá ôçñåß ôï åðáããåëìáôéêü áðüññçôï , üðùò ðñïâëÝðåôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 38 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý , åíäÝ ÷ åôáé íá åðçñåÜóåé ðáñüìïéåò äéáôÜîåéò ôùí êáôáóôáôéêþí ôùí ÅèíÊÔ .
For example , the obligation of professional secrecy for staff of the ECB and NCBs as laid down in Article 38 of the Statute may have an impact on similar provisions in the statutes of NCBs as well .
Ïé íüìïé áõôïß ðñÝðåé íá áíáãíùñßæïõí ôï áðïêëåéóôéêü äéêáßùìá ôïõ Äéïéêçôéêïý Óõìâïõëßïõ ôçò ÅÊÔ íá åðéôñÝðåé ôçí Ýêäïóç ôñáðåæïãñáììáôßùí , üðùò ðñïâëÝðåôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 105 Á ( 1 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé åðáíáëáìâÜíåôáé óôï ¢ ñèñï 16 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý . Åðßóçò , ïé äéáôÜîåéò ðïõ åðéôñÝðïõí óôéò êõâåñíÞóåéò íá áóêïýí åðéññïÞ ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå èÝìáôá üðùò ç ïíïìáóôéêÞ áîßá , ç ðáñáãùãÞ , ï üãêïò êáé ç áðüóõñóç ôùí ôñáðåæïãñáììáôßùí ðñÝðåé íá áíáãíùñßæïõí ôéò áñìïäéüôçôåò ôçò ÅÊÔ ùò ðñïò ôá ôñáðåæïãñáììÜôéá óå åõñþ , üðùò ðñïâëÝðïíôáé óôá ðñïáíáöåñüìåíá Üñèñá ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý .
Usually , governments or , more specifically , Ministers of Finance have the exclusive right to mint coins , while NCBs are often involved in the distribution thereof . In some cases , the right to print banknotes and mint coins is combined within an NCB .
Ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç íïìéêÞò óýãêëéóçò óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , ôï ïðïßï åíôÜóóåôáé óôï êåöÜëáéï ìå ôßôëï  ÍïìéóìáôéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ , éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôïõò ôïìåßò åêåßíïõò ôçò íïìïèåóßáò ðïõ åðçñåÜæïíôáé áðü ôç ìåôÜâáóç áðü ôï Äåýôåñï óôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï êáé ïé ïðïßïé èá Þôáí áóõìâßâáóôïé ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç êáé ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü åÜí ðáñÝìåíáí áìåôÜâëçôïé . Ç áîéïëüãçóç ôïõ ÅÍÉ åí ðñïêåéìÝíù åóôéÜæåôáé óå íüìïõò ðïõ åðçñåÜæïõí ôçí åêôÝëåóç , áðü ðëåõñÜò ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ , ôùí êáèçêüíôùí ðïõ ó ÷ åôßæïíôáé ìå ôï ÅÓÊÔ êáé óå íüìïõò ôïõ íïìéóìáôéêïý ôïìÝá .
Irrespective of the division of responsibilities in this field between governments and NCBs , the relevant provisions have to recognise the ECB s power of approval of the volume of issuance of coins . The obligation of legal convergence under Article 108 of the Treaty , which is incorporated in a chapter entitled Monetary Policy , applies to those areas of legislation which are affected by the transition from Stage Two to Stage Three and which would be incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute if they were to remain unchanged .
Ïé äéáôÜîåéò ðñÝðåé íá áíôáíáêëïýí ôï ãåãïíüò üôé ç áñìïäéüôçôá ãéá ôç óõíáëëáãìáôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ åíôüò ôçò ðåñéï ÷ Þò ôïõ åõñþ èá åê ÷ ùñçèåß óôï êïéíïôéêü åðßðåäï óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 109 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò , ôï ïðïßï áíáèÝôåé ôçí áñìïäéüôçôá ãéá ôçí åí ëüãù ðïëéôéêÞ óôï Óõìâïýëéï ôçò ÅÅ óå óôåíÞ óõíåñãáóßá ìå ôçí ÅÊÔ . 4.3
4.3 Foreign reserve management One of the main tasks of the ESCB is to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States ( Article 105 ( 2 ) of the Treaty ) . Member States which do not transfer their official foreign reserves to their NCB do not comply with this
Äéá ÷ åßñéóç óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí äéáèåóßìùí 4.5
23 24 25 26 27 Article Article Article Article Article
¸ íá áðü ôá êýñéá êáèÞêïíôá ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ åßíáé íá êáôÝ ÷ åé êáé íá äéá ÷ åéñßæåôáé ôá åðßóçìá óõíáëëáãìáôéêÜ äéáèÝóéìá ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí (¢ ñèñï 105 ( 2 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ) .
the the the the the Statute .
Ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç ðïõ äåí ìåôáâéâÜæïõí ôá åðßóçìá óõíáëëáãìáôéêÜ ôïõò äéáèÝóéìá óôçí ÅèíÊÔ äåí ðëçñïýí ôç óõãêåêñéìÝíç ðñïûðüèåóç ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ( ìå åîáßñåóç ôá ôñÝ ÷ ïíôá ôáìåéáêÜ õðüëïéðá óå óõíÜëëáãìá , ôá ïðïßá êáôÝ ÷ ïõí ïé êõâåñíÞóåéò ôùí Êñáôþí-Ìåëþí óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 105 ( 3 ) ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò ) .
297 requirement of the Treaty ( with the exception of foreign exchange working balances , which the governments of the Member States may keep under Article 105 ( 3 ) of the Treaty ) .
ôçò êõâÝñíçóçò Þ ôïõ êïéíïâïõëßïõ , íá åðçñåÜæoõí ôéò áðïöÜóåéò ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ ãéá ôç äéá ÷ åßñéóç ôùí åðßóçìùí óõíáëëáãìáôéêþí äéáèåóßìùí ( óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 105 ( 2 ) ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ) äåí èá Þôáí óýìöùíï ìå ôç ÓõíèÞêç .
In addition , a right of a third party , for example government or parliament , to influence decisions of an NCB with regard to the management of the official foreign reserves would ( under Article 105 ( 2 ) of the Treaty ) not be in conformity with the Treaty .
ôá ÊñÜôç-ÌÝëç åßíáé åëåýèåñá íá ïñãáíþóïõí ôçí áíôßóôïé ÷ ç ÅèíÊÔ ôïõò óýìöùíá ìå ôï äçìüóéï Þ éäéùôéêü äßêáéï , áëëÜ ïé äéáôÜîåéò ðïõ äéÝðïõí ôï íïìéêü êáèåóôþò ìéáò ÅèíÊÔ - óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ôïõ éäéùôéêïý äéêáßïõ , åíäå ÷ ïìÝíùò ôï äßêáéï ôùí åôáéñéþí - äåí ìðïñïýí íá áíôéâáßíïõí óôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï . ÅðéðëÝïí , ç õðï ÷ ñÝùóç ôÞñçóçò ôïõ áðïññÞôïõ ôïõ ÅÓÊÔ äéÝðåôáé áðü ôï ¢ ñèñï 38 ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý .
4.5 Miscellaneous There are many other areas where legislation may have an impact on an NCB s performance of ESCB-related tasks . For example , Member States are free to organise their respective NCBs under public or private law , but provisions governing the legal status of an NCB - in the latter case , for instance , company law - may not infringe Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three .
ÁîéïëïãÞóåéò êáôÜ ÷ þñá Üëëåò êáôáóôáôéêÝò äéáôÜîåéò ðïõ èá ÷ ñåéÜæïíôáí ðñïóáñìïãÞ âÜóåé ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò .
The supremacy of Community law and rules adopted thereunder implies that national laws on access of third parties to public documents may not lead to infringements of the ESCB s confidentiality regime .
Ç áîéïëüãçóç áõôÞ ôçò êáôÜóôáóçò , üðùò åß ÷ å óôéò 24 Ìáñôßïõ 1998 , ðáñáôßèåôáé óå ÐáñÜñôçìá ôçò ðáñïýóáò ¸ êèåóçò êáé óõíïøßæåôáé óôç óõíÝ ÷ åéá .
Full responsibility for a Member State s exchange rate policy is only assigned to an NCB in a few cases . Provisions have to reflect the fact that
Ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÅèíéêÞò ÔñÜðåæáò ôïõ Âåëãßïõ ôñïðïðïéÞèçêå þóôå íá ðëçñïß ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ìå ôï Íüìï 1061/12 . 96/97 ( ï  íÝïò íüìïò ) , ï ïðïßïò ðñüêåéôáé íá ôåèåß óôáäéáêÜ óå éó ÷ ý áðü ôï ÖåâñïõÜñéï 1998 .
Country assessments 5.1 Belgium The statute of the National Bank of Belgium was amended to meet Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three with Law No. 1061/12 - 96/97 ( the new law ) , which will progressively enter into force as from February 1998 .
Ó ÷ Ýäéï ôïõ íÝïõ íüìïõ õðåâëÞèç óôï ÅÍÉ ãéá ãíùìïäüôçóç êáé åðáêïëïýèçóå ôñïðïðïßçóÞ ôïõ , ìåôáîý Üëëùí êáé ìå âÜóç ôç ãíþìç ôïõ ÅÍÉ . Ìå ôçí øÞöéóç ôïõ íÝïõ íüìïõ êáé ôç èÝóç ôïõ óå éó ÷ ý , êáé ìå ôçí ðñïûðüèåóç üôé èá ôåèïýí åãêáßñùò óå éó ÷ ý ïé óõãêåêñéìÝíåò äéáôÜîåéò ôïõ ( ðïõ ðñïâëÝðåôáé íá ðñïóáñìïóôïýí óôáäéáêÜ , ìÝóù Âáóéëéêþí ÄéáôáãìÜôùí , óýìöùíá ìå ôï ¢ ñèñï 38 ôïõ íïìïó ÷ åäßïõ ) , ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÅèíéêÞò ÔñÜðåæáò ôïõ Âåëãßïõ èá åßíáé óõìâáôü ìå ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï .
The EMI has been consulted on a draft version of the new law , which has been amended , inter alia , in the light of the EMI s opinion . The above specification of areas of particular importance to the adaptation of statutes of NCBs and other legislation with a view to Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three may serve as a basis for a countryby-country assessment of the state of affairs in this respect .
¼ óïí áöïñÜ ôç ëïéðÞ íïìïèåóßá , ôï ÅÍÉ óçìåéþíåé üôé ðñïâëÝðïíôáé ðñïóáñìïãÝò ôïõ Íüìïõ ôçò 12.6.1930 ãéá ôçí ßäñõóç Íïìéóìáôéêïý Ôáìåßïõ , ôïõ Íüìïõ ôçò 28.12.1973 , ôïõ Íüìïõ ôçò 23.12.1988 êáé ôïõ Íïìïèåôéêïý ÄéáôÜãìáôïò 5 / 1.5.1944 .
Such an assessment of the situation as at 24 March 1998 has been elaborated in an Annex to this Report and is summarised below . 298
Ôï Êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÅèíéêÞò ÔñÜðåæáò ôçò Äáíßáò äåí ðåñéÝ ÷ åé áóõìâáôüôçôåò óôïí ôïìÝá ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí ðïõ íá ÷ ñåéÜæïíôáé ðñïóáñìïãÞ âÜóåé ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò . Ç íïìéêÞ Ýíôáîç ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò óôï ÅÓÊÔ äåí ÷ ñåéÜæåôáé íá ðñïâëåöèåß ïýôå åßíáé áíÜãêç íá ãßíåé ðñïóáñìïãÞ óôç ëïéðÞ íïìïèåóßá , ãéá üóï äéÜóôçìá ç Äáíßá äåí õéïèåôåß ôï åíéáßï íüìéóìá .
With the adoption and entry into force of the new law , and assuming that specific provisions thereof ( for which progressive adaptation through Royal Decrees is envisaged in Article 38 ) will enter into force on time , the statute of the National Bank of Belgium will be compatible with Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three .
Ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÏìïóðïíäéáêÞò ÔñÜðåæáò ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò ôñïðïðïéÞèçêå þóôå íá ðëçñïß ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï ìå ôïí ¸ êôï Íüìï ôçò 22çò Äåêåìâñßïõ 1997 ( ï  íÝïò íüìïò ) , ðåñß ôñïðïðïéÞóåùò ôïõ Íüìïõ ãéá ôçí ÏìïóðïíäéáêÞ ÔñÜðåæá ôçò Ãåñìáíßáò , ï ïðïßïò äçìïóéåýèçêå óôçí Åöçìåñßäá Ïìïóðïíäéáêïý Äéêáßïõ .
As far as other legislation is concerned , the EMI takes note that adaptations are envisaged of the Law of 12 June 1930 creating a Monetary Fund , the Law of 28 December 1973 , the Law of 23 December 1988 and Decree-Law No. 5 of 1 May 1944 .
326 ðïõ èá ÷ ñåéÜæïíôáí ðñïóáñìïãÞ âÜóåé ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò .
The EMI is not aware of any other statutory provisions which would require adaptation under Article 108 of the Treaty .
¼ óïí áöïñÜ ôç ëïéðÞ íïìïèåóßá , ôï ÅÍÉ äåí Ý ÷ åé õðüøç ôïõ Üëëåò êáôáóôáôéêÝò äéáôÜîåéò ðïõ èá ÷ ñåéÜæïíôáí ðñïóáñìïãÞ âÜóåé ôïõ ¢ ñèñïõ 108 ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò . Ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò ôçò ÅëëÜäïò ôñïðïðïéÞèçêå , þóôå íá ðëçñïß ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï , ìå ôï Íüìï 548 / 12.12.1997 , ï ïðïßïò äçìïóéåýèçêå óôçí Åöçìåñßäá ôçò ÊõâåñíÞóåùò óôéò 19 Äåêåìâñßïõ 1997 ( ï  íÝïò íüìïò ) .
5.4 Greece The statute of the Bank of Greece was amended to meet Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three with Law 2548 dated 12 December 1997 , which was published in the Government Gazette on 19 December 1997 ( the new law ) . The EMI has been consulted on a draft of the new law , which has been amended , inter alia , in the light of the EMI s opinion .
ÏñéóìÝíåò äéáôÜîåéò ôïõ íÝïõ íüìïõ èá ðåñéðÝóïõí óå á ÷ ñçóßá áðü ôçò õéïèåôÞóåùò ôïõ åíéáßïõ íïìßóìáôïò óôçí ÅëëÜäá . Áõôü éó ÷ ýåé ãéá ôéò áêüëïõèåò äéáôÜîåéò : Ôï ¢ ñèñï 7.4 ( ôïõ íÝïõ íüìïõ ) , ó ÷ åôéêÜ ìå ôçí åðéâïëÞ õðï ÷ ñåùôéêþí êáôáèÝóåùí êáé ðïéíþí óôçí ðåñßðôùóç ìç óõììüñöùóçò , äåí áíáãíùñßæåé ôéò áñìïäéüôçôåò ôçò ÅÊÔ óôïí åí ëüãù ôïìÝá .
This applies to the following provisions : - Article 7.4 ( new ) on the imposition of minimum reserves and penalties in the case on non-compliance does not recognise the ECB s powers in this field . - Article 2.4 ( new ) on the Bank s participation in international monetary and economic organisations does not refer to the ECB s power of approval .
Ôï ¢ ñèñï 2.4 ( ôïõ íÝïõ íüìïõ ) ãéá ôç óõììåôï ÷ Þ ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò óå äéåèíåßò íïìéóìáôéêïýò êáé ïéêïíïìéêïýò ïñãáíéóìïýò äåí áíáöÝñåé ôï äéêáßùìá ôçò ÅÊÔ íá åãêñßíåé ôç óõììåôï ÷ Þ áõôÞ .
5.2 Denmark The statute of Danmarks Nationalbank does not contain incompatibilities in the area of central bank independence .
Ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò ôçò Éóðáíßáò ôñïðïðïéÞèçêå þóôå íá ðëçñïß ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï óôïí ôïìÝá ôçò áíåîáñôçóßáò ôùí êåíôñéêþí ôñáðåæþí , ìå ôï Íüìï 66/30 - 12-1997 ( ï  íÝïò íüìïò ) . Ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò âñßóêåôáé óå äéáäéêáóßá ôñïðïðïßçóçò þóôå íá ðëçñïß ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý óôïí ôïìÝá ôçò Ýíôáîçò ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò óôï ÅÓÊÔ ìå íïìïó ÷ Ýäéï ( ôï  íïìïó ÷ Ýäéï ) ðïõ åêêñåìåß ãéá øÞöéóç óôï Êïéíïâïýëéï .
The legal integration of the Bank in the ESCB does not need to be provided for and other legislation does not need to be adapted as long as Denmark does not adopt the single currency . 5.3 Germany The statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank was amended to meet Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three with the Sixth Act amending the Deutsche Bundesbank Act dated 22 December 1997 , which was published in the Federal Law Gazette on 30 December 1997 ( the new law ) .
Ìå ôçí ðñïûðüèåóç üôé ôï íïìïó ÷ Ýäéï èá õéïèåôçèåß ùò åß ÷ å óôéò 24 Ìáñôßïõ 1998 êáé èá ôåèåß åãêáßñùò óå éó ÷ ý , ôï êáôáóôáôéêü ôçò ÔñÜðåæáò ôçò Éóðáíßáò èá åßíáé óõìâáôü ìå ôïõò üñïõò ôçò ÓõíèÞêçò êáé ôïõ Êáôáóôáôéêïý ãéá ôï Ôñßôï ÓôÜäéï .
With the adoption and entry into force of the new law , the statute of the Deutsche 299