natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Da første led af femte appelanbringende således ikke henviser til den egentlige begrundelse for dommen, men alene til supplerende betragtninger fra Retten, kan det ikke føre til, at den appellerede dom ophæves.
Thus, because the introductory part of the fifth ground of appeal does not refer to the ratio decidendi of the judgment but merely to additional considerations mentioned by the Court of First Instance, it cannot result in the judgment under appeal being set aside.
Det følger af fast praksis, at dette led i appellen skal forkastes som værende uden betydning 43.
In accordance with the consistent caselaw of the Court this part of the appeal is to be dismissed as ineffective (inopérant). 43
Som appellanterne imidlertid med rette selv bemærkede 42, er den omtvistede
However, as the appellants themselves correctly pointed out, 42 the disputed passage,
Foreløbig konklusion passage, ligesom de retlige betragtninger, Retten har lagt til grund, obiter dicta.
Interim conclusion and also the legal reasoning of the Court of First Instance connected to it, are obiter dicta.
I hele det afsnit af den appellerede dom, der omfatter præmis 245-253, efterprøver Retten således ikke en ugyldighedsgrund, som Impala gjorde gældende for førsteinstansen, men angiver obiter dictum sin opfattelse af, hvorledes kriterierne for at fastslå, at der foreligger en kollektiv dominerende stilling, skal anvendes.
In the whole of the section of the judgment under appeal, from paragraph 245 to 253, the Court of First Instance is not considering one of the grounds of invalidity raised by Impala at first instance, but is merely stating obiter dicta on the application of the criteria for establishing whether a collective dominant position exists.
Samtlige andre anbringender er derimod egnede til at opfylde det mål, som appellanterne har for øje.
By contrast, all the other grounds of appeal are capable of achieving the result sought by the appellants.
C — Spørgsmålet, om der fortsat består en retlig interesse
C — Continuing existence of interest in pursuing the appeal
For så vidt angår de anbringender, som kan admitteres, og som ikke er uden betydning, skal det endelig vurderes, om ikke appellanternes interesse i at fortsætte appelsagen i mellemtiden er bortfaldet.
As regards the grounds of appeal which are admissible and not ineffective it remains to be considered whether the appellants have in the meantime ceased to have an interest in pursuing the appeal.
Dette fremgår særlig klart, såfremt man sammenholder den omtvistede passage i dommen og præmis 254, hvor Retten udtrykkeligt begrænser sin efterprøvelse af den første godkendelsesbeslutning til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Airtours-kriterierne er opfyldt: »[…] Retten [vil] ved behandlingen af de fremsatte anbringender begrænse sig til at efterprøve, om de betingelser, der fremgår af retspraksis i Airtours-dommen, er blevet anvendt korrekt i beslutningen.« Retten kommer derimod udtrykkeligt ikke ind på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt det ligeledes kan antages, at der er tale om en dominerende stilling, »idet det er ufornødent positivt at bevise, at der hersker gennemsigtighed på markedet«.
This becomes particularly clear if one reads the disputed passage of the judgment with paragraph 254 of the judgment under appeal, in which the Court of First Instance expressly restricts its consideration of the first clearance decision to the question whether the Airtours criteria are fulfilled: ‘[T]he Court will confine itself, in its examination of the pleas in law put forward, to ascertaining that the Decision properly applied the conditions defined in Airtours v Commission. …’. By contrast, in its judgment the Court of First Instance expressly rules out considering the question whether the existence of a dominant position can be found to be established, ‘without its being necessary positively to establish market transparency’.
Dette spørgsmål er »ikke blevet drøftet« under forhandlingerne for førsteinstansen.
In the proceedings at first instance this question had, ‘not been discussed’.
Med kravet om retlig interesse sikres det formelt, at retsinstanserne ikke forelægges rent hypotetiske retsspørgsmål til udtalelse.
The requirement for such an interest ensures at a procedural level that the courts are not asked to give expert opinions on purely hypothetical questions of law.
Retlig interesse er derfor en tvingende procesforudsætning, som skal undersøges ex officio, og som kan være relevant på forskellige processuelle stadier.
Accordingly, the existence of an interest is a mandatory requirement of admissibility, which must be considered ex proprio motu and which can be relevant at various stages of the proceedings.
Den skal således utvivlsomt foreligge allerede på tidspunktet for sagens anlæg.
Thus, there is no doubt that an interest must exist at the time an action is brought or an appeal lodged; however, it must also continue to exist beyond that time and up to the Court’s decision in the case. 44
Der består en retlig interesse, såfremt appelsagens udfald kan tilføre den appellerende part en fordel 45.
An interest exists so long as the appeal is likely, if successful, to procure an advantage to the party bringing it. 45
Efter at den anden godkendelsesbeslutning blev vedtaget, råder de virksomheder, der deltager i fusionen, imidlertid på ny over en godkendelse i henhold til fusionsforordningen.
However, since the second clearance decision was issued, the participating undertakings once more have clearance for their concentration under the Merger Regulation.
For så vidt angår den dispositive del er den anden godkendelse ikke mindre omfattende end den første, idet de begge, uden betingelser eller påbud, blev erklæret for forenelige med fællesmarkedet og EØS-aftalen.
The operative part of this second clearance does not fall short of the first in any way, both having declared the concentration to be compatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement, and neither being subject to any conditions or obligations.
Den uafklarede situation, der var tale om, siden den første godkendelsesbeslutning blev annulleret, hvor de deltagende virksomheder og markeder ikke havde sikkerhed for, at sammenslutningen var blevet lovligt gennemført, er ligeledes blevet bragt til ophør med den nye godkendelse.
In addition, the state of uncertainty which has existed since the first clearance decision was annulled, and in which the participating undertakings and the markets could not be certain whether the concentration had been lawfully carried out, was removed by the renewed clearance of the concentration.
Ifølge idéen 46 med fusionsforordningens artikel 7, stk. 5, har den anden godkendelsesbeslutning nemlig tilbagevirkende gyldighed fra det tidspunkt, hvor de retshandler, der blev indgået med henblik på fuldbyrdelse af sammenslutningen, blev foretaget (»ex-tunc virkning«).
Specifically, the legal approach taken in Article 7(5) of the Merger Regulation 46has the effect that the second clearance decision has retrospective effect to the time at which the transactions by which the concentration was brought about were carried out (‘ex tunc effect’).
Det er ubestridt, at appellanterne havde retlig interesse på det tidspunkt, hvor appellen blev iværksat.
It is not disputed that at the time they lodged their appeal the appellants had an interest in it.
Efter Rettens annullation af den første godkendelsesbeslutning savnede Bertelsmann og Sony med tilbagevirkende kraft den nødvendige godkendelse af sammenslutningen i henhold til fusionsforordningen.
This is because, from the time the first clearance decision was annulled by the Court of First Instance, Bertelsmann and Sony did not have the necessary approval retrospectively for their concentration under the Merger Regulation.
Med en ophævelse af den appellerede dom i overensstemmelse med påstanden i appellen ville godkendelsen på ny kunne få virkning.
If the judgment under appeal were set aside, as the appeal seeks, this approval could have been revived.
Appellanterne ville således kunne opnå denne fordel gennem appellen.
The appeal could thus have procured them this advantage.
Dette indebærer imidlertid ikke nødvendigvis, at den foreliggende appel er uden genstand.
All this does not necessarily mean that the present appeal is devoid of purpose.
Appellen er nemlig ikke direkte rettet mod Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutning, men mod Rettens dom, der fortsat har gyldighed.
This is because the appeal is not aimed directly at the Commission’s first clearance decision, but against the judgment of the Court of First Instance under appeal, which continues to have effect.
Muligheden for at fastslå, at sagen er blevet uden genstand (procesreglementets artikel 92, stk. 2), kan derfor ikke
Accordingly, the possibility of declaring that there is no need to adjudicate on the action (Article 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure) is not applicable in appeal
46 — Da den omtvistede fusion blev gennemført på et tidspunkt, hvor den første godkendelsesbeslutning fortsat var gyldig, er fusionsforordningens artikel 7, stk. 5, ikke materielt anvendelig i den foreliggende sag.
46 — Given that the disputed concentration was implemented at a time when the first clearance decision was still in force, Article 7(5) of the Merger Regulation is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Bestemmelsens grundlæggende idé om, at spørgsmålet om ugyldighed er uafklaret, og at uvisheden kan afhjælpes med tilbagevirkende gyldighed ved en godkendelsesbeslutning, kan imidlertid også med fordel finde anvendelse i den foreliggende sag.
The legal concept underlying this provision, namely temporary invalidity and retrospective cure of temporary invalidity by a clearance decision can, however, be usefully applied in the present case.
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA finde anvendelse i appelsager (procesreglementets artikel 118) 47.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA proceedings (see Article 118 of the Rules of Procedure).
gender forkastes 48.
47 other grounds succeeds.
Interessen i at ophæve førsteinstansens afgørelse om sagsomkostninger kan ifølge idé og formål med artikel 58, stk. 2, i statutten for Domstolen isoleret betragtet lige så lidt begrunde, at appelsagen fortsættes.
48Having regard to the wording and purpose of Article 58(2) of the Statute, nor can an interest in setting aside the decision at first instance on costs justify continuing an appeal.
En fortsættelse af appelsagen kræver således, at appellanten har en yderligere retlig interesse end førsteinstansens afgørelse om sagens omkostninger.
Accordingly, in order to pursue appeal proceedings, it is necessary for the appellant to have an interest beyond that relating to the costs at first instance.
Desuagtet rejser den anden godkendelsesbeslutning spørgsmål om, hvorvidt appellen kan tilføre appellanterne en fordel, dvs. om de fortsat har interesse i at videreføre appelsagen.
Nevertheless, the existence of the second clearance decision raises the question as to whether the appeal can procure any advantage for the appellants, that is whether they continue to have an interest in maintaining the appeal.
I den foreliggende sag har appellanterne imidlertid en åbenbar interesse i snarest muligt at opnå, ikke alene en godkendelse, men en endelig godkendelse, af fusionen.
In the present case, however, the appellants have an obvious interest in obtaining as quickly as possible not only clearance but also a definitive clearance of their concentration.
Først herved opnår såvel fusionsdeltagerne som markederne generelt endelig retssikkerhed med hensyn til, om fusionen blev lovligt gennemført.
Only then will the participating undertakings, and indeed the market generally, have legal certainty as to whether the concentration was lawfully effected.
Den omstændighed, at appellanterne ved den appellerede dom blev pålagt at bære deres egne omkostninger i førsteinstanssagen, kan imidlertid ikke i sig selv begrunde, at de har retlig interesse.
The sole fact that in the judgment under appeal the appellants were ordered to bear their own costs from the proceedings at first instance does not in any event establish that they have an interest.
I henhold til artikel 58, stk. 2, i statutten for Domstolen kan der ikke lovligt iværksættes appel alene til forandring af afgørelser om sagsomkostninger.
This is because Article 58(2) of the Statute of the Court provides that an appeal directed solely against a decision on costs is inadmissible.
Domstolen afviser med samme begrundelse en appel vedrørende førsteinstansens afgørelse om sagsomkostninger, såfremt dette anbringende er det eneste resterende, og det allerede er fastslået, at de øvrige anbrin-
For the same reason, the Court dismisses an appeal against a decision at first instance on costs if this is the only one remaining of a number of grounds of appeal and it has already been established that none of the
Den anden godkendelsesbeslutning kan aktuelt ikke bevirke en sådan retssikkerhed, idet den ikke kan forventes at blive endelig inden for overskuelig tid.
The second clearance decision cannot provide this certainty at this time, because it may not become definitive for the foreseeable future.
Beslutningen skal nemlig — foruden at den skal meddeles adressaterne (artikel 254, stk. 3,
This is because it must, in addition to being notified to its addressees (Article 254(3) EC), be published in the
47 — Desuagtet fastslår Domstolen undertiden, at en appelsag er blevet uden genstand, når det er godtgjort, at appellanten allerede har opnået det ønskede mål (kendelser af 23.10.2001, sag C-281/00 P, Una Film »City Revue« mod Parlamentet og Rådet, præmis 4 og 5, og sag C-313/00 P, Davidoff mod Parlamentet, præmis 4 og 5), eller såfremt det er godtgjort, at formålet ikke længere kan tilgodeses, dom af 15.2.2005, sag C-13/03 P, Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, Sml. I, s. 1113, præmis 21-23; kendelse af 27.2.2002, sag C-477/01 P(R), Reisebank mod Kommissionen, Sml.
47 — Notwithstanding this, the Court has from time to time declared that there is no need to adjudicate on an appeal, where it is found that the appellant has already achieved its aim (orders of 23 October 2001 in Case C-281/00 P Una Film ‘City Revue’ v Parliament and Council, paragraphs 4 and 5, and Case C-313/00 P Davidoff v Parliament and Council, paragraphs 4 and 5), or where it is clear that it can no longer achieve its aim (Case C-13/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-1113, paragraphs 21 to 23; orders in Case C-477/01 P(R) Reisebank v Commission [2002] ECR I-2117, paragraphs 24 to 28, and Case C-480/01 P(R) Commerzbank v Commission [2002] ECR I-2129, paragraphs 23 to 27).
I, s. 2117, præmis 24-28, og sag C-480/01 P(R), Commerzbank mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 2129, præmis 23-27.
As I will show in the following, however, neither of these is the case here.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P for bringing a challenge 52 and thus the time at which the decision can become final. 53
EF) — offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende (fusionsforordningens artikel 20, stk. 1).
Official Journal of the European Union (Article 20(1) of the Merger Regulation).
Først når denne offentliggørelse 49 for søgsmålsfristens begyndelsestidspunkt 52, og følgelig for, fra hvilket tidspunkt beslutningen i givet fald bliver endelig 53.
51 By contrast, the mere fact that the wording of the decision may have been brought to the knowledge of individual third parties, specifically Impala, in advance in the form of a non-confidential version, does not affect the beginning of the period
Såfremt Retten ligeledes efter begæring af en tredjemand måtte fastslå, at den anden godkendelsesbeslutning er ugyldig, ville der på ny foreligge en uafklaret situation, hvor de deltagende virksomheder ville være uden godkendelse af sammenslutningen i henhold til fusionsforordningen. En sådan uvished, der kan vare flere måneder eller endog i årevis, ville kunne have en negativ betydning for de deltagende virksomheder samt for markederne generelt.
Should the Court of First Instance annul the second clearance decision too, following the application of a third party, a state of uncertainty would again arise, in which the participating undertakings would not have any clearance for their concentration under the Merger Regulation.
For så vidt muligt at undgå en ny uafklaret situation og de deraf følgende negative virkninger er det af særlig betydning for appellanterne at videreføre den verserende appelsag og snarest muligt at opnå en endelig afgørelse fra Fællesskabets retsinstanser vedrørende lovligheden af den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
In order, so far as possible, to avoid another such state of uncertainty and its negative effects, it is of particular importance to the appellants to continue with the present appeal and to obtain a final decision from the Community Courts on the legality of the first clearance decision as quickly as possible.
Selv om Domstolen, såfremt appellanterne får medhold, ikke selv skulle kunne træffe endelig afgørelse i den
Even if, should the Court allow the appeal, the state of the proceedings does not
49 — Nærmere bestemt regnes den i artikel 230, stk. 5, EF omhandlede søgsmålsfrist i henhold til artikel 102, stk. 1, i procesreglementet for Retten i Første Instans fra udløbet af fjortendedagen efter datoen for offentliggørelsen af retsakten i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
49 — To be precise, Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance provides that the period for challenges laid down by Article 230(5) EC begins with the expiry of the 14th day after publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Dette forudsætter ganske vist, at en ikke fortrolig affattelse af beslutningens betragtninger er blevet offentliggjort in extenso i EU-Tidende eller i hvert fald samtidig hermed er blevet gjort tilgængelig for offentligheden på internettet.
Admittedly, this presupposes that the non-confidential version of the grounds for the decision is published in full in the Official Journal, or at least is made available to the public at the same time via the internet.
Såfremt dette ikke er tilfældet, regnes klagefristen først fra det tidspunkt, hvor den potentielle sagsøger har fået meddelt den fuldstændige ordlyd — såfremt dette ikke allerede er sket, jf. i denne retning dom af 6.7.1988, sag 236/86, Dillinger Hüttenwerke mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 3761, præmis 14.
If this is not the case, the period for bringing a challenge begins to run only when the potential claimant receives a complete version, so far as he has not received it already (to this effect see Case 236/86 Dillinger Hüttenwerke v Commission [1988] ECR 3761, paragraph 14.
52 — Dommen i sagen Olsen mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 51, præmis 81.
52 — Case T-17/02 Olsen (cited above, footnote 51), paragraph 81.
53 — For fuldstændighedens skyld bemærkes endelig, at en formel offentliggørelse (meddelelse) af beslutningen til tredjemand, fra hvilket tidspunkt den for denne gældende søgsmålsfrist begynder at løbe, ikke kommer i betragtning.
53 — For the sake of completeness only, it may be mentioned that a formal notification (notice) of the decision to a third party by virtue of which the time period for it to bring a challenge might start to run is not relevant.
I henhold til artikel 254, stk. 3, EF meddeles beslutninger nemlig alene »dem, de er rettet til«.
Article 254(3) EC provides that decisions shall be notified only ‘to those to whom they are addressed’.
Dette betyder for så vidt angår fusionskontrol de deltagende virksomheder og medlemsstaternes kompetente myndigheder, i samme retning — for fremtidige sager — nu artikel 8, stk. 8, i forordning nr. 139/2004.
In merger control, those are the undertakings concerned and the competent authorities of the Member States; see, for future cases, Article 8(8) of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA høre sagens parters vedrørende spørgsmålet om retlig interesse.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA consider it necessary to hear the parties again on the question of interest.
foreliggende sag, idet den ikke er moden til påkendelse, men i stedet hjemviser den til Retten (artikel 61, stk. 1, i statutten for Domstolen), er det absolut sandsynligt, at den endelige retsafgørelse vedrørende lovligheden af den første godkendelsesbeslutning træffes inden afgørelsen vedrørende lovligheden af den anden.
permit it to give a final decision itself on the present dispute, and it must instead refer the case back to the Court of First Instance (Article 61(1) of the Statute of the Court), it would be highly probable that the final judicial decision on the lawfulness of the first clearance decision would be given before that on the lawfulness of the second.
Under disse omstændigheder taler det krav om hurtighed, der præger fusionskontrollen på fællesskabsplan 54, ligeledes for, at den verserende appelsag fortsættes.
In these circumstances the requirement for speed which characterises merger control at the Community level 54equally favours continuing the present appeal.
Dette kan endvidere forhindre, at annullationssøgsmål, som anlægges af tredjemand, kan forsinke opnåelsen af retssikkerhed for de virksomheder, der deltager i fusionen, længere end nødvendigt.
By this means it is also possible to prevent annulment actions raised by third parties from delaying certainty for the undertakings participating in the concentration for any longer than is necessary.
Jeg finder derimod ikke, at den idé, der kort blev skitseret i retsmødet, om, at den verserende sag alene skal fortsættes, fordi Kommissionen støtter visse af de appelanbringender, som Bertelsmann og Sony har gjort gældende, er overbevisende.
In any event, I do not find convincing the idea cursorily mentioned at the oral hearing that the present proceedings could be pursued solely on the ground that the Commission supports some of the individual grounds of appeal relied upon by Bertelsmann and Sony.
Fællesskabets institutioner nyder ganske vist et privilegium for så vidt angår appelsager, som iværksættes af institutionerne selv (artikel 56, stk. 2 og 3, i statutten for Domstolen), idet de ikke skal godtgøre en retlig interesse heri 55.
Community organs have a privileged status as regards appeals they have raised themselves (Article 56(2) and (3) of the Statute of the Court), and in particular need not prove an interest in such appeals.
Såfremt en institution derimod ikke selv er appellant, men kun anden part i sagen, kan dens interesse i sagens udfald og i, at visse retsspørgsmål afklares af Domstolen, ikke i sig selv opveje appellantens eventuelt manglende retlige interesse.
55However, where such an organ is not itself the appellant but only one of the other parties to the proceedings, its mere interest in the outcome of the appeal and in the clarification of certain questions of law by the Court cannot compensate for the appellants’ lack of interest.
Det er således min opfattelse, at Domstolens afgørelse fortsat vil kunne tilføre appellanterne en fordel, og at de følgelig har en tilstrækkelig retlig interesse i at fortsætte den verserende appelsag.
In all, I am therefore of the opinion that at the moment the decision of the Court can certainly procure the appellants an advantage and it follows that they have a sufficient interest in maintaining the present appeal.
Appellanten har gjort i alt syv anbringender gældende over for den appellerede dom.
The appellants challenge the judgment under appeal with a total of seven grounds of appeal.
Med disse rejses der retsspørgsmål af fundamental betydning for fusionskontrolordningen på fællesskabsplan.
They raise legal questions of fundamental importance for the system of merger control at Community level.
Spørgsmålene er ganske vist blevet rejst på baggrund af den
Admittedly, these questions of law arise in