natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
er efter min opfattelse afgørende, hvorvidt selskabet er stillet ringere i en grænseoverskridende situation.
17Here it seems to me that what is decisive is whether a company is disadvantaged in a crossborder situation.
Muligheden for, at et selskab kan blive stillet ringere, fordi et tab, som skyldes ugunstige valutabevægelser, ikke tages i betragtning ved opgørelsen af skattetilsvar, opstår alene, såfremt selskabet har grænseoverskridende aktiviteter.
The possibility that a company can be disadvantaged because a loss arising from an adverse currency fluctuation affecting transactions between it and a crossborder establishment is not taken into account when computing tax liability arises only where that company engages in crossborder establishment.
Både Tyskland og Nederlandene henviste i vidt omfang til generaladvokat Geelhoeds forslag til afgørelse i sag C-374/04, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation 16.
Both Germany and the Netherlands draw heavily on the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation.
I forslagets punkt 37-39 (som ikke blev udtrykkeligt fulgt af Domstolen, om end den nåede til samme resultat) betegnede generaladvokat Geelhoed visse omstændigheder med begrænsende virkning som »kvasirestriktioner«.
16At points 37 to 39 of that Opinion (which were not specifically followed by the Court, although the Court reached the same conclusion), Advocate General Geelhoed classified a certain number of circumstances having a restrictive effect as ‘quasi-restrictions’. He
Det er endvidere tvivlsomt, om de foreliggende omstændigheder alene er forårsaget af behovet for samarbejde mellem de tyske og italienske skattemyndigheder.
It is also doubtful whether the present circumstances arise solely because of the need for cooperation between the German and Italian fiscal regimes.
Ulempen er en konsekvens af, at valutatabet alene er synligt i Tyskland.
The disadvantage arises as a result of a currency loss that can be seen only in Germany.
Det kan derfor alene tages i betragtning af de tyske skattemyndigheder.
It can therefore
15 — Jf. i denne forbindelse dommen i sag C-336/96, Gilly, Sml. I, s. 2793, hvori Domstolen fandt, at sidstnævnte mulighed ikke udgør en begrænsning, der kræver begrundelse.
15 — In this respect see Case C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793 in which the Court held that the latter does not amount to a restriction requiring justification.
17 — Jf. punkt 45 ff., navnlig punkt 49 og 50.
17 — See points 45 et seq. below, in particular points 49 and 50.
Derfor er den ulempe, som Deutsche Shell har lidt, forårsaget af de tyske myndigheders beslutning.
Therefore the disadvantage suffered by Deutsche Shell is attributable to the decisions of the German authorities.
Denne beslutning er ganske vist truffet inden for rammerne af 1925-over-enskomsten, men det følger ikke heraf, at forskellene alene er affødt af sameksistensen af to forskellige skattesystemer.
These decisions are, it is true, carried out within the framework of the 1925 Convention, but it does not follow from that that the differences merely flow from the co-exist-ence of two tax systems.
Ifølge fast retspraksis kan en begrænsning af udøvelsen af den frie etableringsret under visse omstændigheder være begrundet.
It is settled caselaw that a restriction on the right to exercise one’s freedom of establishment may be justifiable in certain circumstances.
En sådan situation øger de risici, som et selskab, der ønsker at etablere en filial i en medlemsstat med en anden valuta, står over for.
Such a situation increases the risks faced by a company which wishes to create a branch in a Member State which uses a different currency.
Moderselskabet er ikke alene udsat for de faremomenter, som er forbundet med filialens succes; det vil under alle sådanne omstændigheder skulle imødese en større risiko, når det stiller indskudskapital til rådighed for filialen 18.
Not only does the parent company face the normal risks associated with the success of the branch; it will in such circumstances also have to face an increased level of risk in providing startup capital to the branch. 18
Desuden skal det godtgøres, at begrænsningen er egnet til at sikre gennemførelsen af dette lovlige mål og ikke går ud over, hvad der er nødvendigt for at nå det 19.
Furthermore, it must be shown that the application of the restrictive measure is appropriate in order to ensure the attainment of this legitimate objective and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective. 19
Sagens parter har i deres indlæg under sagen foreslået en række mulige begrundelser for den omtvistede skattemæssige behandling. Disse vil alle blive behandlet i tur og orden.
In their observations, the parties to the present proceedings have suggested a number of possible justifications for the tax treatment here at issue.
Som et resultat af sin udøvelse af retten til fri etablering har Deutsche Shell lidt et tab, som ikke kan tages i betragtning ved opgørelsen af dets globale skattepligtige indkomst.
As a consequence of exercising its right to freedom of establishment, Deutsche Shell has suffered a loss which cannot be taken into account in the valuation of its global profits for the purposes of tax assessment.
Dette gør utvivlsomt retten til fri etablering mindre tiltrækkende.
This result indisputably makes the exercise of the right of establishment less attractive.
Jeg finder, at omstændighederne i denne sag forårsager en begrænsning af retten til fri etablering som omhandlet i artikel 43 EF og artikel 48 EF.
I conclude that the circumstances of this case give rise to a restriction on freedom of establishment within the meaning of Articles 43 and 48 EC.
18 — Jf. analogt generaladvokat Lenz’ forslag til afgørelse i sag C-1/93, Halliburton Services, Sml. 1994, I, s. 1137, punkt 18 (selv om der her var tale om et klart tilfælde af forskelsbehandling, er betragtningen generel).
18 — See, by analogy, the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case C-1/93 Halliburton [1994] ECR I-1137, point 18 (although that was a clear discrimination case, the proposition is general).
19 — Dom af 13.12.2005, sag C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, Sml. I, s. 10837, præmis 35, hvori der henvises til dom af 15.5.1997, sag C-250/95, Futura Participations og Singer, Sml. I, s. 2471, præmis 26, og af 11.3.2004, sag C-9/02, de Lasteyrie du Saillant, Sml. I, s. 2409, præmis 49. Jf. ligeledes dom af 12.9.2006, sag C-196/04, Cadbury Schwepps og Cadbury Schwepps Overseas, Sml. I, s. 7995, præmis 47. I - 1140
19 — Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, paragraph 35, referring to Case C-250/95 Futura Participations and Singer [1997] ECR I-2471, paragraph 26, and Case C-9/02 de Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409, paragraph 49. See also Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995, paragraph 47. I - 1140
Afbalanceret fordeling af skattekompetence to berørte medlemsstater, og som ikke kan betragtes som indkomst for filialen i dette udtryks sædvanlige betydning, ikke udtryk for en rimelig anvendelse af medlemsstaternes beføjelse til at fordele beskatningskompetencen imellem sig.
Balanced allocation of taxing powers proportionate application of Member States’ power to allocate fiscal competences between themselves.
Skattemæssig sammenhæng
Fiscal coherence
Både Tyskland og Nederlandene henledte Domstolens opmærksomhed på opdelingen af kompetence mellem de tyske og de italienske skattemyndigheder.
Both Germany and the Netherlands draw the Court’s attention to the division of competences between the German and Italian tax authorities.
Tyskland har desuden henvist til national suverænitet som begrundelse.
Germany also invokes national sovereignty as a justification.
Tyskland har gjort gældende, at de ordninger, der er fastsat i 1925-overenskomsten, er en logisk fordeling af den skattemæssige kompetence mellem Tyskland og Italien i grænseoverskridende sammenhænge.
It states that the arrangements put in place by the 1925 Convention are a logical way to partition German and Italian fiscal competences in crossborder situations.
Valutatabet falder under italiensk kompetence, idet det hidrører fra Italien og skulle have været taget i betragtning i denne medlemsstat.
The currency loss, since it derived from Italy, fell under Italian competence and should have been taken into account in that State.
Tyskland og Nederlandene gør gældende, at sammenhængen i det tyske skattesystem kan gå tabt, såfremt Deutsche Shell kan inddrage valutatab ved beregningen af sin globale indkomst for så vidt angår tysk skat.
Germany and the Netherlands submit that the coherence of the German fiscal system might be compromised if Deutsche Shell were permitted to take a currency loss into account when calculating its global profits for taxation in Germany.
Imidlertid har såvel Deutsche Shell som Kommissionen i deres indlæg understreget, at Italien i 1992 anvendte ITL, hvorfor alle skattemæssige beregninger derfor alene skete i ITL.
However, as both Deutsche Shell and the Commission have highlighted in their observations, Italy operated in ITL in 1992 and all computations for tax purposes would, accordingly, have been carried out solely in ITL.
Valutatabet viste sig først, da ITL-belø-bene blev omvekslet til DEM.
The currency loss only appeared when the sums in ITL were converted to DEM.
Argumentet er derfor ikke holdbart og må afvises som begrundelse.
It follows that this argument is inherently flawed and must be rejected as a justification.
Restriktive foranstaltninger kan være begrundede som en nødvendig beskyttelse af sammenhængen i et nationalt skattesystem.
Restrictive measures may be justified by the need to preserve the coherence of a national tax system.
Imidlertid skal der for at begrunde en sådan foranstaltning bestå en direkte sammenhæng mellem den økonomiske ulempe, som moderselskabet har lidt, og en tilsvarende skattemæssig fordel, som opvejer den ulempe, som selskabet har lidt 20.
However, in order to justify such a measure, there must be a direct link between the financial disadvantage suffered by a parent company, and a corres- ponding tax advantage, which offsets the disadvantage suffered by that company. 20
Desuden er en fuldstændig udelukkelse af et tab, som ikke er synligt i den ene af de
Furthermore, totally excluding a loss which is invisible in one of the two Member States concerned and which cannot be considered to be income of the branch in the normal sense of that term is not a
begunstige dem, som bærer byrden som følge af de begrænsende foranstaltninger. Skatte»fordele« af denne type er ikke ægte skattefordele, men derimod en dobbelt ulighed.
Tax ‘advantages’ of the kind that are generated here are not true fiscal advantages, but are instead a double inequality.
Findes der en fordel, der opvejer den ulempe, som Deutsche Shell har lidt i denne sag?
Is there an advantage which offsets the disadvantage suffered by Deutsche Shell in this case?
Tyskland gør gældende, at fordelen ved det eksisterende system er, at valutagevinster som følge af gunstige kursændringer heller ikke ville blive medregnet.
Germany argues that the advantage of the existing system is that a profit arising from a favourable shift in exchange rates would also not be taken into consideration.
I AMID-sagen argumenterede Belgien i lighed hermed for, at de forskelle, der opstod som følge af det belgiske skattesystem, var begrundede, idet de ville komme et selskab, der var i den modsatte situation end AMID, til gode.
In AMID, Belgium likewise argued that the inequalities created by the Belgian tax legislation were justified as they would benefit a company which was in the inverse position to AMID.
Et sådant tænkt selskab ville være gunstigere stillet end et indenlandsk selskab uden en filial i Luxemburg. Domstolen forkastede dette anbringende 23.
Such a hypothetical company would be in a better position than a domestic company with no establishments in Luxembourg.
Selskabet kan ikke ændre dette til en valutagevinst.
It cannot transform that into an exchange rate profit.
Der findes dermed ikke nogen kompenserende fordel for sagsøgeren.
There is thus no compensatory advantage being offered to the claimant.
I den henseende er den foreliggende sag sammenlignelig med sag C-385/00, de Groot 22.
In that respect, the present case is analogous to Case C-385/00 de Groot.
I ingen af disse sager kan sagsøgeren opnå en skattemæssig fordel, men bærer byrden ved ikke at kunne fradrage et tab.
22In both cases the claimant cannot claim any fiscal advantage, and is burdened instead with the impossibility of deducting a loss.
Tysklands anbringende om, at de, der drager fordel af en valutakursændring, har fordel af det nuværende system, undlader at tage hensyn til, at disse »fordele« skal
Germany’s argument that those on the right side of a shift in exchange rates benefit
Kommissionen gør gældende, at en skattemæssig kohærens faktisk beskyttes bedre, såfremt der tages hensyn til valutakursændringer.
The Commission argues that fiscal coherence would, indeed, be better preserved by taking the effect of an exchange rate fluctuation into account.
Både Kommissionen og Deutsche Shell understreger, at såfremt valutatabet i stedet havde været en valutagevinst, ville den omstændighed, at dette ikke blev taget i betragtning ved skatteberegningen, medføre, at den økonomiske gevinst ville være »argent blanc«.
Both the Commission and Deutsche Shell emphasise that, were the exchange rate losses instead an exchange rate profit, failing to include that element in the tax computation would make the resulting financial gain ‘argent blanc’.
De peger ligeledes på, at det nuværende system favoriserer et selskab, som tjener på en valutakursændring, uforholdsmæssigt, mens det ikke kompenserer et selskab, der lider tab som følge af en
They also point out that the existing system disproportionately benefits a company which gains from exchange rate fluctuation, whilst offering no compensatory advantage to a company which suffers financially from
23 — Jf. punkt 24-28.
23 — See paragraphs 24 to 28.
lukning af en filial i en anden medlemsstat.
the possibility of deducting a currency loss arising on the closure of an establishment in another Member State.
Ville en kvalificeret fradragsret, hvorefter et valutatab kan indgå i beregningsgrundlaget i oprindelsesstaten, men alene er fradragsberettiget som driftsomkostning, i det omfang der ikke foreligger skattefri indkomst fra filialen i den anden medlemsstat 24, være tilstrækkeligt til at sikre overholdelsen af artikel 43 EF?
Would a qualified right of deduction, which included a currency loss in the basis for assessment in the State of origin, but allowed it to be deducted as operating expenditure only in so far as no taxfree profits were obtained from the branch in the other Member State, 24 be sufficient to ensure compliance with Article 43 EC?
Jeg er enig i begge disse betragtninger.
I agree with both these observations.
Jeg finder ikke, at de resultater, der følger af det nuværende tyske skattesystem, kan begrundes, hverken med henvisning til en ligelig fordeling af skattekompetencen imellem medlemsstaterne eller med nødvendigheden af at opretholde kohærens i skattemæssig henseende.
I do not consider that the results generated in a situation such as the present by the German tax system can be justified by reference either to the balanced allocation of taxing powers between Member States or by the need to preserve fiscal coherence.
Selv såfremt (quad non) en af disse begrundelser kunne komme i betragtning, ville jeg under alle omstændigheder anse den fuldstændige udelukkelse af valutatab for uforholdsmæssig.
If (quod non) either justification were in principle made out, I would in any event regard the total exclusion of losses caused by exchange rate fluctuations as disproportionate.
Ifølge Finanzgerichts forelæggelseskendelse kan driftsomkostninger, som er direkte økonomisk forbundet med erhvervelsen af skattefri indkomst, ikke fradrages i moderselskabets indkomst.
The reference from the Finanzgericht states that operating expenditure is precluded from being deducted from the profits of the parent company if it has a direct economic link to taxfree income.
Finanzgericht finder, at indkomsten fra salget af Deutsche Shells andele er skattefri i Tyskland, idet den allerede er blevet beskattet i Italien.
In the opinion of the Finanzgericht, the income from the sale of Deutsche Shell’s shares to Edison is taxfree in Germany, as it has already been taxed in Italy.
Jeg foreslår derfor Domstolen at besvare Finanzgerichts første spørgsmål bekræftende.
I therefore suggest that the Court answer the first question posed by the Finanzgericht in the affirmative.
Imidlertid nævner Finanzgericht ikke, at der ikke blev taget hensyn til valutatabet ved opgørelsen af denne skat.
However, the Finanzgericht does not mention that the currency loss was not taken into account in assessing this taxation.
Den forelæggende ret fandt ligeledes, at der var en klar og direkte forbindelse mellem valutatabet og Deutsche Shells skattefrie indkomst fra filialen i Italien.
The referring court also took the view that there was a clearly defined direct connection between the currency loss and Deutsche Shell’s taxfree profit derived from its branch in Italy.
Såfremt det første spørgsmål (som jeg foreslår) besvares bekræftende, er det nødvendigt at behandle den forelæggende rets andet spørgsmål om, i hvilket omfang oprindelsesstaten kan udelukke muligheden for at fratrække et valutatab, der hidrører fra
If (as I propose) the first question is answered in the affirmative, it becomes necessary to consider the referring court’s second question, which concerns the extent to which the State of origin may exclude
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT SHARPSTON — SAG C-293/06 direkte økonomisk forbundet med skattefri indkomst.
OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-293/06 link with non-taxable revenues.
Nederlandene har ikke behandlet det andet spørgsmål særskilt.
The Netherlands has not dealt specifically with the second question.
relevante lovgivning 25, at valutatabet alene er fradragsberettiget i det omfang, det overstiger filialens skattefrie indkomst.
were possible to include the currency loss in the basis for the assessment of German tax, the effect of the relevant legislation 25is that the currency loss would be deductible only in so far as it exceeded the branch’s taxfree profits.
Da valutatabet var mindre end den samlede skattefrie indkomst, som fremkom fra overførslen af filialens aktiver til Sierra og salget af andele i dette selskab, konkluderer den forelæggende ret, at tysk ret ville afskære Finanzamt fra at tage hensyn til valutatabet.
As the currency loss was less than the total taxfree profits obtained from the transfer of the assets of the branch to Sierra and the sale of the shares in that company, the referring court reasons that German law would operate to exclude the Finanzamt from taking into account this currency loss.
I så tilfælde ønsker den forelæggende ret oplyst, om artikel 43 EF i forbindelse med 48 EF er til hinder for et sådant resultat.
If this is the case, the referring court is interested in whether Article 43 EC, read with Article 48 EC, precludes such a result.
En sådan slutning er udelukket som følge af overenskomstens ordlyd, der alene vedrører indkomst.
Such a conclusion is precluded by the wording of the Convention, which focuses on income.
Valutatabet udgør alene en del af den italienske filials resultatopgørelse.
The currency losses formed only a portion of the Italian branch’s profit and loss account.
Da Deutsche Shell i 1992 opnåede et samlet overskud fra dets italienske filial, selv såfremt valutatabet blev medregnet, ville der ikke under nogen omstændigheder fremkomme et fradragsberettiget tab som omhandlet i § 2a, stk. 3, i EStG.
As Deutsche Shell had achieved an overall profit for 1992 through its Italian branch, even when the currency loss is taken into account, no deductible loss under Paragraph 2a(3) of the EStG ever arose.
Indlæggene er sparsomme med hensyn til dette spørgsmål.
The observations addressing this question are scant.
Deutsche Shell og Kommissionen koncentrerer sig om det første spørgsmål og tilføjer blot, at såfremt det første spørgsmål besvares bekræftende, bør også det andet spørgsmål besvares bekræftende.
Deutsche Shell and the Commission confine themselves to the first question, adding only that if the answer to the first question is yes, then an affirmative answer should also be given to the second question.
Som jeg allerede har anført, var valutatabet ikke synligt i ITL og blev derfor ikke taget i betragtning ved den skattemæssige opgørelse af filialens indkomst i Italien.
As I have already indicated, however, the currency losses were not apparent in ITL, and were therefore not taken into account in the Italian tax assessment of the branch’s profits.
Tyskland gør gældende, at dette ikke udgør en begrænsning af den frie etableringsret, og at en sådan begrænsning alene vedrører den situation, hvor et tab er
Germany states that this is not a restriction on freedom of establishment, and that such a restriction as is imposed is limited to the case where a loss has a direct economic
Det forekommer derfor inadækvat at fortolke EStG således, at valutatabet som sådan bliver en del af (eller direkte forbundet med) filialens indkomst, som er skattefri i Tyskland.
It therefore seems perverse to construe the EStG in a way that classifies the currency loss itself as part of (or directly linked to) the profits of the establishment which were taxfree in Germany.
DEUTSCHE SHELL skal det følgelig tages i betragtning ved den tyske skatteberegning af Deutsche Shells globale indkomst.
DEUTSCHE SHELL invisible during the Italian tax computation in ITL, it follows that it must be so taken into account during the German tax calculation of Deutsche Shell’s global profits.
Det perspektiv, som den forelæggende ret har anlagt i sit andet spørgsmål, forfejler sagens afgørende omstændighed, nemlig at det tyske og italienske system har skabt en ordning, hvorefter et valutatab ikke kan medregnes af nogen af skattemyndighederne.
To address this issue from the perspective offered by the referring court in its second question misses the crucial point of the case, which is that the German and Italian systems have created a regime in which a currency loss cannot be taken into account by either tax authority.
Jeg finder, at en korrekt fortolkning af artikel 43 EF, sammenholdt med artikel 48 EF, fører til, at et sådant tab (som et ethvert andet tab) kan medregnes i sin helhed.
In my view, a proper interpretation of Article 43 EC read with Article 48 EC requires such a loss to be taken into account in its entirety (like any other operating loss).
Da det ikke var synligt i den italienske skatteberegning i ITL,
Given that it was
Jeg foreslår derfor, at det andet spørgsmål ligeledes besvares bekræftende.
I therefore propose that the second question also be answered in the affirmative.
Henset til de anførte betragtninger foreslår jeg, at de af Finanzgericht Hamburg forelagte spørgsmål besvares således:
In the light of the above, I consider that the questions referred by the Finanzgericht Hamburg should be answered as follows:
»1) Det er i strid med artikel 43 EF, sammenholdt med artikel 48 EF, såfremt Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland som oprindelsesstat behandler et valutatab, som et tysk moderselskab har lidt som følge af tilbageførsel af såkaldt indskudskapital fra et italiensk driftssted, som en del af driftsstedets overskud, og det i
(1) It is contrary to Article 43 EC, in conjunction with Article 48 EC, for the Federal Republic of Germany, as the State of origin, to treat a currency loss of a German parent company resulting from the repatriation of so-called startup capital granted to an Italian establishment as being part of that establishment’s profits and to exclude that loss, on the basis of the exemption under