natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kan det på den baggrund konkluderes, som Domstolen gjorde i dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Belgien, at prisforskellen mellem øl og vin i Sverige er så væsentlig, at forskellen på 20% 39 mellem de punktafgifter, der pålægges de to drikkevarer, ikke vil kunne påvirke forbrugerens adfærd?
In the light of those figures, is it possible to conclude — as the Court did in Case 356/85, referred to above — that the difference in the prices of beer and wine in Sweden is so great that the 20 % disparity 39 between the rates of duty applied to the two beverages is not capable of influencing consumer behaviour?
Jeg vil nu sammenligne oplysningerne i den foreliggende sag med de ovenfor anførte for at se, om det er muligt at drage de samme konklusioner her, som Domstolen gjorde i sagen Kommissionen mod Belgien.
At this point, it is necessary to compare the information we have in the present case with the figures set out above, in order to assess whether, in the present case, it is possible to reach the same conclusions as the Court arrived at in Case 356/85 Commission v Belgium.
Hvis man tager udgangspunkt i de oplysninger, som Kongeriget Sverige har fremlagt, henholdsvis ikke har bestridt 36, og for en liter vin med et alkoholindhold på 12,5% vol. anvender samme punktafgift som for øl, dvs. 1,47 SEK pr. volumenprocent alkohol, medfører det, at prisen i absolutte tal falder med 4,63 SEK/l (0,50 EUR) 37og i procent
On the basis of the data provided by or unchallenged by the Kingdom of Sweden, 36 and applying to a litre of wine with an alcoholic strength of 12.5 % vol. the excise duty applicable to beer (SEK 1.47 by volume of alcohol), the outcome is a price reduction in absolute terms of SEK 4.63 per litre (EUR 0.50), 37and, in percentage terms, a
Det mener jeg ikke, det kan.
In my view, that question must elicit a negative response.
Sammenligningen af oplysningerne i den foreliggende sag med dem, der forelå i sagen Kommissionen mod Belgien, peger således ikke i retning af, at de to situationer er sammenlignelige.
A comparison of the data relating to the present case and the facts which gave rise to the judgment in Case 356/85 reveals that the two cases cannot, in fact, be regarded as comparable.
I den nævnte dom bemærkede Domstolen, at vin var fire gange dyrere end øl, og at det ikke ville påvirke forbrugernes valg, hvis prisen på vin blev sænket med ca. 5%, men det samme kan ikke uden hensyntagen til andre faktorer siges med sikkerhed, når vin er dobbelt så dyr som øl, og prisen på vin muligvis sænkes med 6,5% 40. Det vil
While the Court was able to hold in Case 356/85 that, given a ratio of 1 : 4 between the price of beer and the price of wine, any reduction in the price of wine in the region of 5 % did not appear capable of influencing consumer choice, the same cannot be claimed with certainty and without taking other factors into consideration if that ratio is 1 : 2, and any reduction in the price of wine is in the region of 6.5 %.
38 — 2,1 gange dyrere mod før 2,3.
38 — It would decrease from 2.3 to 2.1.
39 — Idet man sammenligner punktafgiften pr. volumenprocent alkohol og går ud fra en vin med et alkoholindhold på 12,5%.
39 — Comparing the duty levied by volume of alcohol and using as a basis a wine with an alcoholic strength of 12.5 % vol.
36 — Sammenligningen er baseret på gennemsnitsprisen for en liter vin med et alkoholindhold på 12,5%.
36 — The comparison is based on the average price of a litre of wine with an alcoholic strength of 12.5 % vol.
Det er klart, at hvis man vælger at se på de letteste og billigste vine i den relevante afgiftskategori, vil prisforskellen i forhold til øl være mindre markant, hvorimod afgiftsforskellen som tidligere nævnt vil være højere på bekostning af vin.
It is scarcely necessary to point out that if lighter and less expensive wines — falling within the tax bracket relevant in this case — were taken into consideration, the price difference compared with beer would be less marked, whereas, as we saw above, the difference in taxation to the detriment of wine would be greater.
40 — Prisfaldet vil dog være større for billigere vine med lavt alkoholindhold.
40 — But this increases if less expensive wines of lower alcoholic strength are taken into consideration.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-167/05 i princippet være sådan, at jo mindre prisforskellen mellem to konkurrerende varer er, desto mere substituerbare vil de være, og desto mindre skal priserne variere, for at forbrugerne fravælger den ene vare til fordel for den anden.
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-167/05 ratio between the prices of two competing products, the more interchangeable they become, and, consequently, the degree of price variation that could make them potential alternates shrinks.
lagets butikker 41 og under sådanne omstændigheder, at det uden tvivl vil være mest nærliggende at sammenligne drikkevarernes literpris. Hertil kommer, at den svenske gennemsnitsforbruger, som den sagsøgte regering har nævnt i sit indlæg, foretrækker at købe vine, der er emballeret i en såkaldt »Bag in Box« 42.
circumstances in which it is definitely more straightforward to compare the prices of the beverages per litre, bearing in mind also that, as the Swedish Government pointed out in its observations, the average Swedish consumer tends to buy wine packaged in what is known as the ‘Bag in Box’ format.
Kommissionen har i hvert fald ikke fremlagt oplysninger, der tyder på, at dens sammenligningsmetode, når henses til de svenske forbrugeres vaner og markedets karakteristika, er mere relevant end den, den sagsøgte regering har foreslået.
42In any event, the Commission has failed to provide any information to demonstrate that its method of comparison is more relevant — bearing in mind the habits of Swedish consumers and the characteristics of the market — than the method suggested by the Swedish Government.
Jeg mener i betragtning af det ovenfor anførte, at man må afvise Kongeriget Sveriges anbringende om, at det alene ud fra den eksisterende prisforskel mellem vin og øl kan udelukkes, at forskellen mellem de punktafgiftssatser, der gælder for de to varer, vil kunne påvirke forbrugernes valg.
On the basis of the foregoing, I consider it necessary to reject the argument of the Kingdom of Sweden to the effect that it is possible, merely by taking into account the difference in price between wine and beer, to rule out the possibility that the disparity between the excise duty rates applied to the two products is likely to have any influence on consumer choice.
Jeg vil nu undersøge, om Kommissionens oplysninger i tilstrækkeligt omfang godtgør, at den pågældende afgiftsordning vil kunne beskytte øl på bekostning af vin.
At this point, it is necessary to assess whether the evidence provided by the Commission is sufficient to demonstrate that the tax arrangements at issue are likely to produce a protectionist effect in relation to beer and to the detriment of wine.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse fremgår det klart af Systembolagets statistikker, at forbrugernes adfærd påvirkes af prisudsving, der skyldes ændringer i punktafgiften på de omhandlede varer. Den har anført, at det fremgår af statistikkerne for 1997, hvor den
According to the Commission, it is clear from the Systembolaget’s statistics that consumer behaviour is influenced by the price variations caused by the differences in the rates of duty applied to the products at issue.
Da jeg har draget denne konklusion ud fra de oplysninger, den sagsøgte regering har fremlagt, vil jeg undlade at komme nærmere ind på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt den sammenligningsmetode, den svenske regering har anvendt, og som går ud på at sammenligne prisen på en liter vin med prisen på en liter øl, er korrekt.
Since I have reached that conclusion in the light of the information provided by the Swedish Government, I shall not dwell on the question — the subject of lengthy discussion between the parties in the course of the written procedure — of the appropriateness of the method of comparison which the Swedish Government adopted, and which consisted in comparing the price of a litre of wine with the price of a litre of beer.
Dette spørgsmål har parterne allerede drøftet indgående under den skriftlige forhandling.
41 — Sales in licensed catering establishments do not seem to account for more than 10 % of total sales.
Jeg vil blot bemærke, at den metode, Kommissionen har foreslået, og som går ud på at sammenligne priserne på et glas vin og et krus øl, der ikke indeholder samme mængde, ikke synes at være mest hensigtsmæssig, især i betragtning af den måde, de pågældende varer afsættes på.
42 — The ‘Bag in Box’ (wine box) system is a method of packaging liquids in which the liquid is first sealed in a bag which may be made of plastic or aluminium. The bag is then placed inside a cardboard box which is designed to make it easier to transport and store the product.
Varerne sælges almindeligvis i Systembo-
Normally, in the case of wine, the box will have a capacity of 3.5 litres, 10 litres or 20 litres.
KOMMISSIONEN MOD SVERIGE afgiftsreform, der sænkede punktafgiften på øl med 40%, trådte i kraft, dels at salget af denne drikkevare steg med 8,9%, hvilket var et skift i forhold til tendensen i de foregående år, hvor der skete et betydeligt fald i salget, dels at salget af vin faldt med 3,7%.
COMMISSION v SWEDEN reduced, the increase in sales amounted to just 2.8 %, which is the minimum figure for the period 1997-2003, whereas in 1999 sales rose by 15.4 %, far higher than the increase in 1997, in response to the cut in tax.
I 2002, hvor punktafgiften på vin blev sænket med 18,8%, steg salget af denne vare til gengæld med 11%.
The years after 1999, with the exception of 2003, reveal a more or less constant increase in sales, in the region of 10 %.
Kommissionen har desuden understreget, at vinsalget generelt var stigende i perioden fra 1997 til 2001, men at ølsalget procentmæssigt steg langt mere.
In my view, that suggests that factors other than the tax rate influenced the rise in beer sales in the reference period and, consequently, the difference in the volume of wine and beer sales during that period.
Kommissionen har endelig anført, at hvor der stort set blev solgt den samme mængde vin som øl i 1995 (ca. 103 mio. liter), blev der i 2004 solgt ca. 20% mere øl (ca. 173 mio. liter) end vin (ca. 139 mio. liter).
So far as wine is concerned, while the Systembolaget’s statistics record a fall in sales in 1997, the year in which the reduced rate of tax was applied to beer, sales of wine in fact rose again in the following year, increasing by 2.7 %, almost the same as the rate of increase in beer sales recorded that year (2.8 %).
I årene efter 1999 har der, hvis man ser bort fra 2003, været en næsten konstant stigning på ca. 10% i salget.
In 2002, the year in which the rate of duty on wine was cut by 18.8 %, sales of wine rose by 11 %.
Dette tyder efter min opfattelse på, at andre faktorer end afgiftsfaktoren var medvirkende til, at ølsalget steg i referenceperioden, og dermed også til, at der var forskel mellem de solgte mængder vin og øl i denne periode.
The Commission further points out that, while in the period between 1997 and 2001 sales of wine rose overall, sales of beer clearly increased more significantly in percentage terms.
Med hensyn til vin viser Systembolagets salgsstatistikker en afmatning i 1997, hvor punktafgiften på øl blev sænket, men allerede året efter steg salget på ny med 2,7%, hvilket næsten svarede til stigningen i ølsalget dette år (2,8%).
Finally, the Commission notes that, while, in 1995, sales of wine by volume were substantially equivalent to sales of beer (approximately 103 million litres of each beverage), the volume of beer sold in 2004 (approximately 173 million litres) outstripped by some 20 % sales of wine (approximately 139 million litres).
De oplysninger, sagsøgeren har fremlagt, er efter min opfattelse ikke særlig relevante. Det skyldes først og fremmest og især, at de omhandler vin- og ølsalget i almindelighed og derfor ikke gør det muligt at fokusere specifikt på udviklingen i salget i de konkurrerende kategorier.
The figures which the Commission has provided do not appear to me to be particularly meaningful, first, and above all, because they relate to sales of wine and beer generally, and do not therefore permit a separate analysis of sales trends in the competing categories.
Det fremgår desuden af de statistikker, Kommissionen har påberåbt sig, at ølsalget steg fra 1997 til 2003, men
Secondly, while it is true that the statistics which the Commission has attached to its submission show that, from 1997 and until 2003, sales of beer continued to rise, that increase was not constant. In 1998, the year after the rate of duty was
Jeg mener i lyset heraf, at Kommissionens oplysninger højst viser, at de svenske forbrugere er følsomme over for prisudsving, der skyldes ændringer i afgiftsordningen for de omhandlede drikkevarer, og at følsomheden i overensstemmelse med de lokale forbrugsvaner, der traditionelt har
In the light of the above considerations, I am of the view that the figures submitted by the Commission prove at most that Swedish consumers are sensitive to the variations that result from changes to the tax arrangements applicable to the beverages at issue; and, reflecting local patterns of consumption, where there is traditionally a predilection for beer, that sensitivity is more marked in the
Der må i denne forbindelse tages stilling til spørgsmålet om, hvilken bevisbyrde Kommissionen rent konkret har i forbindelse med en traktatbrudsprocedure efter artikel 90, stk. 2, EF.
At this point, it is necessary to consider what constitutes the actual burden of proof which the Commission must discharge in infringement proceedings pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 90 EC.
været centreret om øl, er størst for vin 43. Det fremgår desuden, at den positive virkning, som en nedsættelse af punktafgiften har for salget, kun varer i en vis tid, og at virkningen formentlig fortaber sig i løbet af det første år efter, at afgiftsændringen er trådt i kraft.
case of wine. 43 Moreover, it is clear that the effect, whereby sales expand as a result of a cut in tax, is of limited duration and probably lasts for just one year following the entry into force of the change in the tax rules.
De statistikker, Kommissionen har fremlagt, viser ganske vist, at der er en vis elasticitet i efterspørgslen efter de pågældende varer set i forhold til prisen, hvilket Kongeriget Sverige i øvrigt ikke er uenig i 44, men jeg mener ikke, at de indeholder tilstrækkeligt relevante oplysninger om, hvilken indvirkning prisudsving har på konkurrenceforholdet mellem disse varer, således at det er muligt at fastslå, at stigningen i salget af henholdsvis øl og vin i 1997 og 2002 i hvert fald til dels skyldes, at forbrugerne erstattede den ene vare med den anden.
While it is possible to infer from the statistics produced by the Commission that demand for the products at issue is to some degree elastic depending on price — and the Kingdom of Sweden does not dispute that fact — 44it is not, in my view, possible to extract from those statistics information concerning the impact of the price variations on the competitive relationship between the products that is sufficiently significant to enable us to establish that the increases in the sales of beer and wine respectively in 1997 and 2002 are attributable, at least in part, to a substitution effect.
43 — De statistikker, Kommissionen har fremlagt, viser, at vinsalget i 2002 steg mere end salget af øl i 1997, selv om nedsættelsen af punktafgiften på vin kun var halvt så stor som den tidligere nedsættelse af afgiften på øl.
43 — The statistics which the Commission has provided record a greater increase in wine sales in 2002 than in beer sales in 1997, none the less the reduction in the rate of tax on wine was approximately half of the reduction previously applied to beer.
Domstolen forlanger som tidligere nævnt ikke, at det bevises ved hjælp af statistiske oplysninger eller økonometriske analyser, at den omtvistede afgiftsordning faktisk har beskyttende virkning, hvilket heller ikke med rimelighed kan kræves af Kommissionen 45, men den forlanger, at det bevises, at denne ordning vil kunne have en sådan virkning.
I have already stated that the Court does not require the submission of statistical data or econometric studies which demonstrate that the tax arrangements at issue actually have a protectionist effect; nor could the Commission reasonably be required to furnish such evidence. 45However, it must demonstrate that the tax system is likely to produce such an effect.
Kommissionen har med andre ord pligt til at undersøge alle objektive kendetegn ved den omhandlede afgiftsordning for at se, om der set i forhold til den afgiftsmæssige situation, der forelå, inden ordningen blev indført, og markedets karakteristika foreligger tilstrækkelige oplysninger til, at det må formodes, at denne ordning har påvirket det potentielle forbrug af varer fra andre medlemsstater og konkurrenceforholdet mellem de pågældende varer 46.
In other words, it is incumbent on the Commission to assess all the objective features of the tax provision at issue in order to determine whether, in the light of the fiscal position that existed prior to its introduction and the characteristics of the market, there is evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that it is having an impact on the potential consumption of the products originating in other Member States and on the competitive relationship between the products in question.
Når der findes tilstrækkelige indicier, som bekræfter Kommissionens antagelse, tilkommer det den berørte regering at
46If there are indicators which substantiate the Commission’s argument, then it is for the govern-
45 — Det kan være meget vanskeligt at føre bevis herfor, når der er tale om varer, som kun er delvis substituerbare.
45 — That proof may be particularly hard to provide if the products are only partly interchangeable.
46 — Det er klart at Kommissionens bevisbyrde vil være lettere, jo mere direkte konkurrenceforholdet er mellem de omhandlede varer, og at den kan nøjes med at fastslå, at beskatningen er forskellig, hvis varerne praktisk talt er ens.
46 — Clearly, the more direct the competitive relationship between the products at issue, the less demanding the burden of proof that falls on the Commission, until the point is basically reached where the issue is a difference in the taxation of products which are practically the same.
44 — Stigningen i vinsalget i 2002, efter at afgiften var sat ned, fremgår også af de statistikker, Kongeriget Sverige har fremlagt.
44 — The increase in wine sales in 2002, following the cut in excise duty, is also apparent from the statistics provided by the Kingdom of Sweden.
Det fremgår desuden af den sagsøgte regerings indlæg, at Sverige netop på grund af den mere eller mindre udtalte, men dog mærkbare elasticitet i den generelle efterspørgsel efter alkoholholdige drikkevarer traditionelt har kunnet benytte afgiftsinstrumentet til at påvirke priserne og dermed også forbrugsvanerne.
It is also clear from the Swedish Government’s written submissions that it is the more or less high but, in any event, appreciable elasticity in demand for alcoholic beverages in general that has enabled Sweden traditionally to use taxation to intervene in relation to prices and thereby to influence consumer habits.
Regeringen har eksempelvis tidligere fået forbrugerne til at drikke mindre spiritus og vælge drikkevarer med et lavere alkoholindhold (navnlig vin) ved at forhøje afgiftssatsen for spiritus og træffe andre ikke-afgifts-mæssige foranstaltninger.
In the past, for example, raising the rate of tax on beverages with a high alcohol content, combined with other non-fiscal measures, enabled the Government to steer consumers of such beverages towards products with a lower alcohol content, mainly wine.
KOMMISSIONEN MOD SVERIGE begrunde den omhandlede forskel i beskatningen 47 og/eller fremlægge oplysninger, der tidligere havde været på stærkøl og vin med et alkoholindhold på ca. 11% vol. 49.
COMMISSION v SWEDEN ment concerned to justify the difference in tax treatment at issue 47and/or to provide evidence to show that there is no breach of the second paragraph of Article 90 EC. 48
Denne fordeling af bevisbyrden synes heller ikke at være uforenelig med dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Belgien, hvor de oplysninger, som den belgiske regering fremkom med, og som Kommissionen uden held forsøgte at bestride, bekræftede, at de forskellige momssatser, der anvendtes for vin og øl, i det store og hele virkede neutralt i relation til konkurrenceforholdet mellem disse varer, og afkræftede Kommissionens antagelse om, at afgiftsordningen for disse varer kunne have beskyttende virkning.
Moreover, allocating the burden of proof in that way does not appear to run counter to the abovementioned judgment in Commission v Belgium, in which the data produced by the Belgium Government — and unsuccessfully challenged by the Commission — bore out the fact that the different VAT rates applied to wine and beer were largely neutral in terms of the competitive relationship between the products, invalidating the Commission’s argument concerning a possible protectionist effect of the tax system applicable to them.
Findes der tilstrækkelige indicier i den foreliggende sag til, at det kan formodes, at den omtvistede afgiftsordning har beskyttende virkning?
In the present case, are there sufficient indicators to raise a presumption that the tax arrangements at issue are protectionist in nature?
Lad os først se på denne ordnings kendetegn.
Let us start by reviewing the features of those arrangements.
Som den svenske regering selv har erkendt, førte afgiftsreformen i 1997, hvor punktafgiften på øl blev nedsat med 40%, til en ændring af den ensartede afgift, der
As the Swedish Government has itself acknowledged, the 1997 tax
Jeg vil nu se på den forskel i beskatningen af de omhandlede varer, som anvendelsen af den ovenfor beskrevne ordning resulterer
It is then necessary to evaluate the difference in the taxation of the products at issue as a result of applying the system described
47 — Jf. bl.a. dom af 14.1.1981, sag 46/80, Vinal, Sml. s. 77, der drejer sig om beskatningen af denatureret alkohol i Italien.
47 — See, for example, the case concerning the taxation of denatured alcohol in Italy: Case 46/80 Vinal [1981] ECR 77.
49 — Ifølge den sagsøgte regerings egne oplysninger.
49 — According to the Swedish Government.
50 — Det fremgår ikke af sagen, om punktafgiften, før ordningen blev ændret i 1997, blev beregnet efter samme metode både for vin og øl.
48 — I must make it clear that this does not imply a reversal of the burden of proof, since it is in any event incumbent on the Commission to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate prima facie the existence of a protectionist effect.
48 — Jeg vil gerne præcisere, at det ikke vender bevisbyrden, da det stadig er Kommissionen, der skal føre tilstrækkeligt bevis for, at der umiddelbart forekommer en beskyttende virkning.
50 — The case-file does not indicate whether the method of calculation was the same for both wine and beer before the change came into force in 1997.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-167/05 i.
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-167/05 above.
Som jeg allerede har gjort opmærksom på 51, viser en sammenligning af den afgifts- byrde, der påhviler vin og øl, uanset hvilket parameter der lægges til grund for denne sammenligning (varernes volumen, alkoholprocent eller pris), imidlertid, at de kategorier af vin, der konkurrerer med øl, pålægges en væsentligt højere punktafgift end øl.
As I had occasion to point out earlier, 51a comparison of the fiscal burden to which wine and beer are respectively subject shows that, whatever the criterion for comparison that is used (volume, alcoholic strength or product price), those categories of wine which are in competition with beer are subject to a significantly higher rate of excise duty than applies to beer.