natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Præjudiciel »Fælles landbrugspolitik - artikel 32 EF-38 EF - forordning (EØF) nr. 804/68 - fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter — indikativpris f or mælk —forordning nr. 26 — anvendelse af visse konkurrenceregler inden förproduktion og handel med landbrugsvarer — medlemsstaternes adgang til at anvende de nationale konkurrenceregler over for mælkeproducenter, som har valgt at organisere sig i kooperativer, og som har en dominerende stilling på markedet* (Domstolens plenum)
Preliminary ruling (Common agricultural policy — Articles 32 EC to 38 EC — Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 — Common organisation of the market in milk and milk products — Target pnce for milk -Regulation No 26 ~- Application of certain competition rules to the production of and trade in agricultural products — Wliether Member States may apply national competition rules to milk producers who choose to organise themselves into cooperatives and hold market power) (Full Court)
Ved kendelse af 31. marts 2000 har High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office) forelagt fire præjudicielle spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af artikel 12 EF, artikel 28 EF-30 EF, artikel 32 EF-38 EF, artikel 49 EF og 55 EF, af Rådets forordning nr. 26 af 4. april 1962 og af Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 804/68 af 27. juni 1968. Spørgsmålene er blevet rejst inden for rammerne af en sag anlagt af Milk Marque Ltd (herefter »Milk Marque«) og National Farmers' Union (herefter »NFU«) mod Competition Commission, tidligere Monopolies and Mergers Commission (herefter »Competition Commission«), mod Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (herefter »Secretary of State«) og mod Director General of Fair Trading (herefter »DGFT«), vedrørende en redegørelse udarbejdet af Competition Commission, hvori det anbefales at iværksætte foranstaltninger over for Milk Marque i forbindelse med selskabets angiveligt konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd, samt vedrørende de beslutninger, Secretary of State efterfølgende har truffet på grundlag af denne redegørelse.
Those questions were raised in proceedings between Milk Marque Ltd (hereinafter 'Milk Marque') and the National Farmers' Union (hereinafter 'the NFU') on the one hand, and the Competition Commission, formerly the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (hereinafter 'the Competition Commission'), the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (hereinafter 'the Secretary of State') and the Director-General of Fair Trading (hereinafter 'the DGFT') on the other, relating to a report by the Competition Commission recommending that measures be adopted against Milk Marque because of allegedly anti­competitive conduct engaged in by it and to decisions subsequently taken by the Secretary of State on the basis of that report.
Milk Marque er et kooperativ af landbrugere, der indsamler, fordeler og leverer mælk.
Milk Marque is a farmers' cooperative society engaged in the collection, distribution and supply of milk.
Umiddelbart efter liberaliseringen af mælkemarkedet i Det Forenede Kongerige i 1994 besad medlemmerne af Milk Marque en markedsandel på ca. 60% af mælkeforsyningen i Storbritannien. I perioden 1997/1998, som er omhandlet i Competition Commissions redegørelse, var markedsandelen faldet til 49,6%.
Immediately after the deregulation of the milk market in the United Kingdom in 1994 the members of Milk Marque had some 60% of the supply of milk in Great Britain.
I perioden fra april 1999 til september 1999 faldt tallet yderligere til 40,8%.
During the period from April 1999 to September 1999, it fell still further to 40.8%.
i fællesskabsbestemmelserne, dels at Milk Marques medlemmers priser vedvarende har været blandt de laveste, der har været tilbudt producenterne i England og Wales.
It is apparent from the documents before the Court, first, that the price obtained by the producers in the United Kingdom for their milk has at all times, both before and after deregulation, been below the target price fixed by the Community legislation and, secondly, that the prices charged by Milk Marque members have always been among the lowest prices offered by producers in England and Wales.
Oprindelig rådede Milk Marque ikke selv over anlæg til forarbejdning af mælk.
Milk Marque did not originally have its own facilities for the processing of milk.
Selskabet erhvervede i 1997 en osteproducent og i 1998 yderligere én.
It acquired one cheese maker in 1997 and another in 1998.
Der var planlagt en væsentlig udvidelse af mælkeforarbejdningskapaciteten.
It has planned a substantial expansion of its milk processing capacity.
Bevisførelsen for High Court har klarlagt, at der i andre medlemsstater var adskillige vertikalt integrerede mejerikooperativer med betragtelige markedsandele.
The evidence before the High Court showed that there were several dairy cooperatives in other Member States with substantial market shares which were vertically integrated.
Competition Commission, som er den myndighed, der bl.a. er ansvarlig for at foretage undersøgelser og udarbejde redegørelser vedrørende monopolsituationer som omhandlet i Fair Trading Act 1973 (herefter »FTA«) og Competition Act 1998 (herefter »CA«), har — foranlediget af en henvendelse fra DGFT den 27. januar 1998 — foretaget en undersøgelse af, om der foreligger en monopolsituation for så vidt angår forsyningen af rå komælk i Storbritannien.
On a reference by the DGFT on 27 January 1998, the Competition Commission, which is the authority responsible for investigating and reporting on monopoly situations as defined by the Fair Trading Act 1973 (hereinafter 'the FTA') and the Competition Act 1998 (hereinafter 'the CA'), carried out an investigation of whether a monopoly situation existed in relation to the supply in Great Britain of raw cows' milk.
Competition Commission afsluttede denne undersøgelse den 26. februar 1999 og fremsendte sin redegørelse til Secretary of State.
It completed its investigation on 26 February 1999 and sent its report to the Secretary of State.
I redegørelsen fastslog Competition Commission for det første, at der forelå en monopolsituation i henhold til section 6(l)(a) i FTA idet Milk Marque leverede mindst en fjerdedel af hele den mælkemængde, der leveredes i Storbritannien.
In its report, the Competition Commission stated, first of all, that a scale monopoly situation existed by virtue of section 6(l)(a) of the FTA, in that Milk Marque supplied at least one quarter of all milk which is supplied in Great Britain.
For det andet fastslog Competition Commission, dels at Milk Marque indtog en »dominerende stilling« (powerful position) på mælkemarkedet i Storbritannien, dels at »dette har bidraget til, at mælk, der leveres i Storbritannien, opnår en højere pris end tilfældet ville have været under mere konkurrenceprægede betingelser«.
Secondly, the Competition Commission stated that Milk Marque held a 'powerful position' in the milk market in Great Britain and that 'this has contributed to milk being supplied in Great Britain at a higher price than the level it would have reached under more competitive conditions'.
For det tredje fandt Competition Commission, at Milk Marque benyttede sin »markedsstyrke« (»market power«) til at udnytte eller opretholde monopolsituationen til egen fordel.
Thirdly, the Competition Commission considered that Milk Marque had exercised its 'market power' to exploit or maintain the scale monopoly situation in its favour.
For det fjerde fastslog Competition Commission, dels at Milk Marques former for praksis og adfærd (bortset fra dets adfærd med hensyn til identifikationssystemet), var forhold, der stred imod eller måtte antages at stride imod almenvellets interesser.
Fourthly, the Competition Commission concluded that the practices and conduct of Milk Marque (with the exception of its conduct in respect of traceability) were facts found which operated or might be expected to operate against the public interest.
Hertil kom ifølge Competition Commission, at den forøgede produktionskapacitet, som Milk Marques datterselskab MMD forberedte, var et faktum, som måtte forventes at ville blive anvendt imod almenvellets interesser med den særlige uønskede virkning, at dette vil give Milk Marque mulighed for yderligere at udbygge den dominerende stilling til sin fordel og i sidste ende at forøge de allerede konstaterede uønskede virkninger.
Also, according to the Competition Commission, Milk Marque's increased processing capacity which its subsidiary MMD was planning was a finding of fact which might be expected to operate against the public interest, with the particular adverse effect that this would give Milk Marque the ability to exploit still further the scale monopoly situation in its favour and ultimately intensify the adverse effects already identified.
På baggrund heraf anbefalede Competition Commission foranstaltninger, der havde til formål »at eliminere Milk Marques markedsstyrke, at skabe et mere konkurrencepræget marked for forsyning med mælk samt at give producenter og forarbejdningsvirksomheder en ny mulighed for at udvikle forretningsmæssige forbindelser, der både tjener deres egne og forbrugernes interesser«.
On the basis of those findings, the Competition Commission made recommendations whose purpose was stated to be 'to eliminate the market power of Milk Marque, to create a more competitive market for the supply of milk and to provide fresh opportunities for producers and processors to develop commercial relationships that serve their interests as well as the interests of consumers'.
Den væsentligste anbefaling var en omstrukturering af Milk Marque, idet selskabet skulle opdeles i tre eller fire uafhængige og konkurrerende selskaber med tildelte kvoter, der kunne sælge deres mælk på almindelig forretningsmæssig basis samt — efter ønske — foretage forarbejdning af mælken.
The main recommendation was the restructuring of Milk Marque by dividing it into between three and five independent and competing quota-holding bodies, which would be able to sell their milk on an ordinary commercial basis and, if they wished, to engage in milk processing.
Competition Commission anbefalede endvidere, at der blev truffet »foreløbige foranstaltninger«, indtil dets indstilling om opdeling af Milk Marque blev gennemført.
The Competition Commission also recommended the adoption of a series of 'interim measures', pending implementation of its recommendation that Milk Marque be divided up.
Den 6. juli 1999 offentliggjorde Secretary of State de beslutninger, der var truffet på grundlag af Competition Commissions redegørelse.
On 6 July 1999, the Secretary of State published the decisions taken by him on the basis of the Competition Commission's report.
Som et resultat af ministerens beslutninger offentliggjorde Milk Marque den 17. september 1999 en pressemeddelelse om, at virksomheden ville blive opdelt i tre mindre kooperativer, hvilket ville træde i kraft pr. 1. april 2000.
As a result of the Secretary of State's decisions, Milk Marque announced, in a press release dated 17 September 1999, its proposal to divide itself into three smaller cooperatives, which would operate from 1 April 2000.
Den 5. november 1999 tilbagekaldte Secretary of State sit krav om tilsagn fra Milk Marque med hensyn til iværksættelse af de foreløbige foranstaltninger, som var anbefalet i Competition Commissions redegørelse.
On 5 November 1999, the Secretary of State withdrew his requirement for commitments from Milk Marque in respect of the implementation of the interim measures recommended in the Competition Commission's report.
Han præciserede imidlertid, at de nye kooperativer kun havde tilladelse til at forarbejde deres mælk, såfremt han blev overbevist om, at de virkede uafhængigt af hinanden.
However, he stated that his consent to the new cooperatives processing their milk was dependent upon his being satisfied that they would operate independently from one another.
På trods heraf anlagde Milk Marque sag ved High Court til prøvelse af Competition Commissions redegørelse og de efterfølgende beslutninger truffet af Secretary of State.
Despite those events, Milk Marque brought an action before the High Court to contest the Competition Commission's report and the subsequent decisions adopted by the Secretary of State.
Senere anlagde også NFU, som er en organisation, der repræsenterer 80% af landbrugerne i Storbritannien, sag ved samme domstol til prøvelse af den nævnte redegørelse og de nævnte beslutninger.
Subsequently, the NFU, an organisation representing 80% of farmers in Great Britain, also brought an action to contest that report and those decisions before the same court.
De to sager er blevet forenet af High Court
The two actions were joined by the court.
Det er på denne retlige og faktiske baggrund, at High Court of Justice (England og Wales), Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office), har besluttet af udsætte sagen og at forelægge Domstolen fire præjudicielle spørgsmål.
In that legal and factual context, the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office), decided to stay proceedings and to refer a number of questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
Med det første spørgsmål ønsker den forelæggende ret for det første nærmere bestemt oplyst, om artikel 32 EF-38 EF, forordning nr. 26 og forordning nr. 804/68 skal fortolkes således, at de national myndigheder inden for det område, som er reguleret af den fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter, har kompetence til at anvende deres nationale konkurrenceregler på et kooperativ af mælkeproducenter, som indtager en dominerende stilling på det nationale marked.
By its first question, the national court is essentially asking whether Articles 32 to 38 EC and Regulations Nos 26 and 804/68 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the sector governed by the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products, the national authorities have jurisdiction to apply their national competition law to a milk producers' cooperative occupying a powerful position on the national market.
I bekræftende fald ønsker retten for det andet oplyst, hvilke grænser der gælder for denne eventuelle kompetence, og navnlig om de nationale kompetente konkurrencemyndigheder overskrider disse grænser i tilfælde, hvor de træffer foranstaltninger som de i hovedsagen omhandlede over for et landbrugskooperativ, som indtager en dominerende stilling på markedet, og hvis priser i den omhandlede periode til stadighed har været lavere end den indikativpris, som er fastsat i medfør af artikel 3, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 804/68.
If they are to be so interpreted, it asks what the limits on any such jurisdiction are and, in particular, whether the national competition authorities are acting outside those limits if they adopt measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings in relation to an agricultural cooperative occupying a powerful position on the market and whose prices during the relevant period have always been lower than the target price laid down pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation No 804/68.
Om medlemsstaterne nar kompetence til at gribe ind, i henhold til deres nationale konkurrenceregler, på det område, som reguleres af den fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter
Whether the Member States are competent to take steps under their national competition law in the sector governed by the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products
Det bemærkes indledningsvis, at opretholdelse af en effektiv konkurrence på markederne for landbrugsprodukter er en af målsætningerne med den fælles landbrugspolitik og de fælles ordninger for de omhandlede markeder.
It must first of all be observed that the maintenance of effective competition on the market for agricultural products is one of the objectives of the common agricultural policy and the common organisation of the relevant markets.
Selv om det er korrekt, at artikel 36 EF overlader det til Rådet at beslutte, i hvilket omfang de fællesskabsretlige konkurrenceregler skal finde anvendelse på produktionen af og handelen med landbrugsprodukter, under hensyntagen til den særlige situation for markederne for disse varer, fastslår bestemmelsen ikke desto mindre princippet om, at de fællesskabsretlige konkurrenceregler kan finde anvendelse inden for landbrugssektoren.
Whilst Article 36 EC has conferred on the Council responsibility for determining the extent to which the Community competition rules are applicable to the production of and trade in agricultural products, in order to take account of the particular position of the markets for those products that provision nevertheless establishes the principle that the Community competition rules are applicable in the agricultural sector.
Denne konstatering bekræftes i øvrigt både af den første betragtning til forordning nr. 26 og af Domstolens praksis, hvorefter de fælles markedsordninger hviler på princippet om et åbent marked, som enhver producent frit har adgang til på effektive konkurrencevilkår.
That conclusion is also confirmed both by the first recital in the preamble to Regulation No 26 and by the Court's case-law, according to which the common organisations of the market are based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access under effective conditions of competition.
Hertil kommer, at betydningen af, at der består en konkurrence inden for rammerne af den fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter klart fremgår af artikel 25, stk. 3, litra a), i forordning nr. 804/68, som bestemmer, at i tilfælde, hvor en medlemsstat bemyndiges til at indrømme en national organisation de særlige rettigheder, som er fastsat i samme bestemmelses stk. 1, skal medlemsstaten sikre, at udøvelsen af de nævnte rettigheder »kun i det absolut nødvendige omfang påvirker konkurrencen i landbrugssektoren«.
In addition, the importance of competition in the context of the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products is seen clearly in Article 25 (3) (a) of Regulation No 804/68, which provides that, where a Member State is authorised to grant to a national organisation the special rights provided for in Article 25(1), it must ensure that the exercise of those rights 'does not affect competition in the agricultural sector more than is absolutely necessary'.
Mens artikel 81 EF og 82 EF rammer konkurrencebegrænsninger, fordi de kan hindre samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, vedrører de nationale lovgivninger - hver ud fra egne særlige grunde — alene konkurrencebegrænsninger på rent nationalt plan.
Whereas Articles 81 and 82 EC regard them in the light of the obstacles which may result from trade between Member States, national law proceeds on the basis of the considerations peculiar to it and considers restrictive practices only in that context.
Om grænserne for medlemsstaternes kompetence til at gribe ind i medfør af deres nationale konkurrenceregler på det område, hvor den fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter gælder
The limits of the Member States' jurisdiction to act under national competition law in the sector governed by the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products
Det skal for det første bemærkes, at når der er udstedt en forordning om oprettelse af en fælles markedsordning for en given sektor, er medlemsstaterne forpligtet til ikke at gøre undtagelser fra ordningen eller i øvrigt tilsidesætte den.
It must first of all be observed that where there is a regulation establishing the common organisation of the market in a given sector the Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might undermine or create exceptions to it.
For det andet bemærkes, at det ligeledes fremgår af fast retspraksis, at artikel 36 EF, serv for så vidt angår traktatens konkurrenceregler, anerkender landbrugspolitikkens forrang i forhold til traktatens formål på konkurrenceområdet.
Secondly, it is also clear from settled case-law that, even in regard to the competition rules of the Treaty, Article 36 EC gives precedence to the objectives of the common agricultural policy over those in relation to competition policy.
Hvad angår foranstaltninger som de i hovedsagen omhandlede er det ubestridt, at de ikke fraviger en udtrykkelig bestemmelse blandt dem, som udgør grundlaget for den fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter.
With regard to measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings, it is common ground that they do not undermine an express provision of the rules establishing the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products.
For så vidt særligt angår spørgsmålet, om nationale foranstaltninger som de i hovedsagen omhandlede udgør en tilsidesættelse af de relevante fællesskabsretlige bestemmelser som følge af, at Milk Marques producentmedlemmers mælkepris var lavere end den indikativpris, som var fastlagt ved forordning nr. 1190/97 før de nationale myndigheders indgriben, bemærkes, at denne omstændighed ikke i sig selv er tilstrækkelig til at gøre de nævnte foranstaltninger ulovlige i henhold til fællesskabsretten.
With regard, in particular, to the question whether national measures such as those at issue in the main proceedings infringe the relevant Community legislation because the milk price of Milk Marque producers was lower than the target price laid down by Regulation No 1190/97 before the national authorities took action, it must be observed that that fact alone is not sufficient to render those measures unlawful under Community law.
For det første bemærkes, at denne form for vejledende pris er en politisk målsætning på fællesskabsplan og ikke udgør en garanti for, at samtlige producenter i hver medlemsstat vil opnå en indkomst svarende til indikativprisen.
First of all, this sort of price guideline is a political objective at Community level and is not a guarantee to all producers in every Member State that they will earn an income corresponding to the target price.
For det andet bemærkes, at eftersom opretholdelse af en effektiv konkurrence er en af målsætningerne med den fælles markedsordning for mælk og mejeriprodukter, kan artikel 3, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 804/68 ikke fortolkes således, at mælkeproducenterne har ret til at søge at opnå en indkomst svarende til indikativprisen med ethvert middel, herunder gennem misbrug og konkurrencebegrænsninger.
Secondly, given that the maintenance of effective competition is one of the objectives of the common organisation of the market in milk and milk products, Article 3(1) of Regulation No 804/68 cannot be interpreted as meaning that producers of milk have the right to seek to earn an income corresponding to the target price by any means, including those that may constitute abuses or be anti-competitive.
Fællesskabsinstitutionerne skal ved forfølgelsen af de forskellige mål, der er opregnet i artikel 33 EF, til stadighed foretage den afvejning, der kan være nødvendig ved en eventuel modstrid mellem disse mål anskuet hver for sig.
In pursuing the various aims laid down in Article 33 EC, the Community institutions have a permanent duty to reconcile the individual aims.
Dersom denne afvejning ikke gør det muligt at isolere et af disse mål uden at gøre gennemførelsen af de øvrige umulig, kan fællesskabsinstitutionerne ikke desto mindre midlertidigt give et af dem forrang, såfremt faktiske omstændigheder eller økonomiske forhold kræver det, og på dette grundlag træffe deres beslutninger.
Although that duty to reconcile any contradictions means that no single aim may be pursued in isolation in such a way as to make the achievement of the others impossible, the Community institutions may allow one of them temporary priority in order to satisfy the demands of the economic or other conditions in light of which their decisions are made.