natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Mange arbejdsmiljøforbedringer kunne i virkeligheden vise sig at være fordelagtige i sig selv, når faktorer såsom fravær på grund af sygdom og arbejdstagermotivering tages med i betragtning. Fordelene ved forbedringerne er imidlertid ikke det eneste kriterium for en virksomhed.
Furthermore the individual employees could be motivated through direct or indirect involvement in the preventive activities.
I tabel 1 nedenfor gives der en oversigt over disse hensyn, hvad angår om en virksomhed er villig til at arbejde aktivt eller ej.
In addition, the proposed system is in the nature of a social security scheme.
Det er ikke tilstrækkeligt at motivere arbejdsgiveren, selv om de økonomiske motiveringsmidler formelt er rettet mod denne.
Another central determining feature of the corporate culture is the size of enterprise.
Tværtimod må incitamenterne rettes mod hele virksomhedskulturen for at sikre optimal motivering.
It has been shown in several investigations that small enterprises present a specific problem in terms of accident rates (higher than average), the lack of health and safety organisation and the infrequent contact with external authorities.
Samarbejdsudvalg såvel som sikkerhedsrepræsentanter og/eller andre kollektive repræsentanter for de ansatte kunne betragtes som de næstvigtigste parter, som man måtte henvende sig til i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af forebyggende foranstaltninger.
These enterprises often work without formalized internal planning and with one person as a central figure in all decision making.
Desuden kunne de enkelte ansatte motiveres ved hjælp af direkte eller indirekte engagement i de forebyggende aktiviteter.
When referring to small enterprises it is important to emphasize that this is here taken to mean less than around 50 employees.
På den anden side ville det ikke være muligt at tilbyde direkte, økonomisk motivering af de ansatte, fordi arbejdsgiveren bærer hovedansvaret for arbejdets tilrettelæggelse og dets udførelse.
In some countries and sectors the limits for establishing a safety organisation are even lower.
Derfor er det arbejdsgiveren, som har bedst mulighed for at udforske mulige metoder til at give de ansatte incitamenter.
Experience shows that these enterprises have to be approached in a specific way.
I tillæg hertil er den foreslåede ordning i sig selv en slags social sikkerhedsordning.
One example is that some small enterprises are proud of their non-bureaucratic form of organisation.
En anden afgørende egenskab ved virksomhedskulturen er virksomhedens størrelse.
This report is based on the following understanding of target groups:
Det har i flere undersøgelser vist sig, at små virksomheder udgør et særligt problem hvad angår frekvensen af ulykker (større end gennemsnittet), manglen på sikkerhedsorganisation samt den ikke særlig regelmæssige kontakt med eksterne myndigheder.
Some enterprises are typical of their sector as regards production processes, technology and materials used, manpower and the resulting working environment problems.
Disse virksomheder arbejder ofte uden nogen form for formel intern planlægning og med blot een person som den centrale beslutningstager.
Others are far from this average because they use other technologies, or because their working environment is exceptionally good or poor.
Når små virksomheder tages under overvejelse, er det vigtigt at understrege, at disse i denne sammenhæng betyder virksomheder med under omkring 50 ansatte.
Some enterprises have an active corporate culture that promotes health and safety, others have a passive one and others again have an antagonistic corporate culture as far as external motivation and the prevention of occupational injuries are concerned.
I visse lande og sektorer ligger grænsen for oprettelsen af en sikkerhedsorganisation endnu lavere. Erfaringerne viser, at man må tilnærme sig disse virksomheder på en bestemt måde.
Finally, some small enterprises might not be able to respond, or be interested in responding, to external motivation unless it is shaped specifically for their form of work and corporate culture.
For eksempel er nogle små virksomheder stolte af deres ikkebureaukratiske organisationsform.
Table 1 summarises the main situations which economic incentive methods must target.
Hvis man henvender sig til disse virksomheder med truslen om indførelsen af en mængde papirarbejde (eller andet), vil det uden tvivl kun skabe modstand.
Type of enterprise Enterprises with standard problems
Nærværende rapport er baseret på den nedenstående oversigt over målgrupperne:
Enterprises with standard problems looking for solutions
Nogle virksomheder er typiske for deres sektor hvad angår produktionsprocesser, teknologi og de anvendte materialer, arbejdsstyrken og de resulterende arbejdsmiljøproblemer.
Enterprises with individual problems knowing the solution
Endelig er det muligt, at nogle små virksomheder ikke vil være i stand til eller interesserede i at reagere på ekstern motivering,
Similarly, the responsible body will in its evaluation and control activities distinguish between enterprises with a high, medium and low risk level compared with the sector.
medmindre den er specielt indrettet og tager sigte på deres specielle arbejdsform og virksomhedskultur.
including the frequency of visits, special evaluations and special incentives.
Tabel 1 giver en oversigt over de vigtigste situationer, som de økonomiske incitamentsmetoder bør rettes mod.
The health and safety problems in the target enterprises which are to be tackled by the incentives include the whole spectrum of health and safety issues, such as:
Målgruppe
O O O O O O
Villige til at arbejde aktivt eller er passive
Technical Organisational Educational.
Virksomheder med gængse problemer, leder efter løsninger
This broad understanding of problems and solutions is necessary if the incentive is to help the target enterprises achieve real improvements in prevention across sectors of industry and commerce with veiy different working environments.
Virksomheder med individuelle problemer, kender løsningen
Furthermore it is necessary to understand the working environment as a continually changing issue.
Virksomheder med individuelle problemer, kender ikke løsningen
New machines, tools, products, raw materials, chemicals, recruits etc. all contribute to change in the workplace.
Tabel 1: Målgrupper for incitamenterne
The introduction of these is not only a result of market forces.
Den vil organisere sine aktiviteter i henhold hertil inkl. hyppigheden af besøg, særlige bedømmelser og særlige incitamenter.
Other dynamics are also active such as public debate, governmental regulation, fashion-phenomena and others.
De arbejdsmiljøproblemer, der eksisterer i målgruppevirksomhederne, og som skal tackles vha. incitamenterne, omfatter hele spektret af sundsheds- og sikkerhedsmæssige anliggender såsom:
Some of these changes go on month by month, others intermittently, but this dynamism underlines the necessity to re-evaluate the schemes continually in order to meet the reality of the target enterprises.
O O O tekniske organisatoriske uddannelsesmæssige.
Principles of Economic Incentives
Denne brede forståelse af problemerne og løsningerne er nødvendig, hvis et incitament skal kunne hjælpe målgruppevirksomhederne til at opnå reelle forbedringer i forebyggelsen af arbejdsskader på tværs af brancher med meget forskellige arbejdsmiljøer.
Some basic reflections are necessary on the effects and side effects of possible incentives, before a special incentive method can be designed and recommended.
Desuden er det nødvendigt, at arbejdsmiljøet betragtes som et problemområde, der konstant ændrer karakter.
Risk reduction in the enterprise can be realised by a health and safety programme which includes
Indførelsen af disse er ikke alene et resultat af markedskræfterne.
These types of instruments can be used in various combinations to promote safety and health.
Andre dynamiske faktorer spiller også en aktiv rolle som f.eks. offentlig debat, statslige regler, modefænomener og lignende.
Technical measures normally can be applied to investment decisions of the enterprise that are taken for predominantly economic reasons.
Principperne bag de økonomiske incitamenter
treat it here. We are interested in an incentive model not for the development of innovations but to modify routine investment decisions.
Før en bestemt incitamentsmetode kan udformes og anbefales, er det nødvendigt at overveje virkningerne og bivirkningerne.
These conditions make them less fit for our purpose: if a tax reduction is offered to employers who invest in equipment that is less hazardous than legally required, this does not affect the competition among the users of the equipment, because every company can have the same tax privilege.
En reduktion i risici på virksomheden kan realiseres ved hjælp af et arbejdsmiljøprogram, der omfatter
Effect of Taxation on Competition If a noisy and a less noisy machine can be produced at equal cost (and, while competition is effective, be sold at the same price), there is no need for intervention by the state.
O O O tekniske foranstaltninger organisatoriske foranstaltninger undervisning og uddannelse.
The market itself would bring about the desired effect because if one can buy a machine or a machine plus extra positive effects at the same price, no rationally acting individual would buy the machine without the "extras".
Denne type midler kan anvendes i forskellige kombinationer til at fremme sikkerheden og sundheden.
If the noisy machine (which, nota bene, meets the legal requirements) is produced (and sold) more cheaply than the less noisy one, a tax reduction would have to compensate for the price difference (andpossible differences in running costs) to encourage the rationally acting employer to purchase the less noisy machine.
Tekniske foranstaltninger kan normalt rettes mod virksomhedens investeringsbeslutninger, som primært tages af økonomiske årsager.
But then the market is heavily affected: the producer of the "noisy" machine would at least lose a substantial part of his share of the market.
Vi vil derfor begynde med de tekniske aspekter og behandle organisation og uddannelse separat.
If the competitor with the less noisy machines is big enough or can grow fast enough, the noisy machines might even be totally excluded from the market though they are stricdy within the legal requirements.
Spørgsmålet om uddannelse og undervisning er i mange europæiske lande reguleret i detaljer i form af lovkrav.
Such an intervention by the state is obviously not compatible with the economic system of the EU member states.
("rammedirektivet") træder i kraft, vil det sikre ensartede minimumsnormer.
Moreover, in the EU there are still many different systems of taxation.
En vigtig yderligere foranstaltning på dette område kunne så være indførelsen af "sikkerheds- og sundhedsfora".
Even if harmonisation is proceeding, it might be difficult to modify these different tax systems so that they all have an equal effect on the markets.
Fordele (eller omkostningsnedskæringer) for en virksomhed kan opnås via forskellige metoder, f.eks.
This applies to direct tax variations as well as to any other method of influencing the tax load (such as special rates of depreciation, permission to accumulate tax-reduced operational reserves, etc.).
1. skattelempelser 2. tilskud af forskellig art 3. indflydelse på den til rådighed stående kapital 4. nedsættelse af forsikringspræmier 5. marketingsassistance.
This applies further to any type of subsidy that influences the price ratio between "good" and "bad" equipment (from payments in cash to subsidies on interest rates).
Naturligvis kan hvert enkelt af disse midler også bruges i negativ retning, f.eks. i form af højere skatter og præmier, ekstrabelastning på "dårlige" produkter osv., men vi mener ikke, at staten ligefrem bør "straffe" manglen på aktiviteter ud over de lovbefalede.
We also do not have to discuss the specific problems, in connection with the technique of tax imposition, that necessarily would be connected with most methods of subsidising "good" equipment.
Desuden kunne en sådan fremgangsmåde også forårsage forfatningsmæssige problemer, i det mindste i nogle af medlemsstaterne.
It is sufficient to point out that the fiscal authorities normally cannot easily react to technical differences, which they cannot judge by their own expertise.
2.2.1 Skatter og tilskud
2.2.2 Availability of capital
Tekniske foranstaltninger til forbedring af arbejdsmiljøet indebærer som regel investeringsbeslutninger for virksomheden.
Especially for small and medium sized enterprises the availability of capital can be a problem.
Økonomisk teori har i mindste detalje undersøgt forskellige midler til stimulering af investering, fra tilskud til rentesatser til direkte udbetalinger.
Unlike large companies, smaller ones often suffer from lack of assets to cover additional credit.
Vores synspunkt er ikke at stimulere til investering, men at øve indflydelse på investeringsmetoden.
Therefore a system could be developed that makes credit available with little or no security ("risk capital") to companies who seek to meet certain safety and health standards.
Hvis en virksomhed har besluttet at købe en maskine, bør den opmuntres til at købe en mindre farlig eller mindre sundhedsskadelig maskine.
This can, but does not have to, be combined with direct subsidies on the interest rates.
Til dette formål har nogle lande udviklet programmer som f.eks. det tyske "Humanisierung der Arbeit" (humanisering af arbejdet), hvor innovative modeller for bedre arbejdsvilkår sponsoreres af den tyske regering.
Of course placing a credit at someone's disposal with little security can be a method of subsidising the interest rate, too, though an indirect one.
Denne type incitament er veletableret og praktiseres udbredt, hvorfor vi ikke behøver behandle dette emne her.
Sometimes, however, a company cannot get credit for investment at any reasonable rate.
Vi er ikke interesserede i en incitamentsmodel til udvikling af nytænkninger, men en model der vil modificere rutinemæssige investeringsbeslutninger.
Then the mere availability of "risk capital" at market rates can be incentive enough.
Skatter, som i det store og hele har til hensigt at give staten en indtægt, kan også modificeres, således at de påvirker privatøkonomisk adfærd.
Such a system would not directly affect the competition among the users of equipment, because again every company has the same chance to get under-secured credit.
Hvis skatter anvendes til dette formål bør de ikke anfængte friheden til at træffe privatøkonomiske beslutninger, og de bør ikke medføre konkurrencemæssig forvridning. Disse betingelser gør dem mindre velegnede til vort formål.
But there are, of course, indirect effects: on the one hand it might slightly support small and medium sized enterprise, because the larger companies as a rule have easier access to the capital market.
Hvis der tilbydes en skattelettelse til arbejdsgivere, som investerer i udstyr, der er mindre farligt, end hvad der kræves efter loven, vil det ikke have nogen indflydelse på konkurrencen blandt brugerne af udstyret, idet hver eneste virksomhed kan have samme skattemæssige privilegium.
On the other hand it could be a (slight) handicap for those who participate, because they have to purchase the "good" equipment, that very often has higher running costs, e.g. additional filters, more expensive lubricants.
Imidlertid ville det have en mærkbar indvirkning på konkurrencen mellem producenterne af udstyret.
Therefore their costs would be somewhat higher than that of a competitive company with enough security that buys the cheaper-to-operate "bad" equipment.
Dette kan illustreres ved at overveje markedet for maskiner med de samme egenskaber, men med forskellige støjniveauer (se rubrikken).
This difference in cost could be compensated by slightly reducing the interest rate.
Skattemæssig påvirkning af konkurrenceforholdene Hvis en støjende og en mindre støjende maskine kan fremstilles med de samme omkostninger (og, mens konkurrencen er effektiv, sælges til samme pris), er der ingen grund til, at staten skal foretage nogle indgreb.
If the credit is given at market rates (or just below, to compensate for the higher operating costs), the influence on the market of the equipment can also be kept small: the price difference between the "good" and "bad" products is not compensated. Only additional demand, that could not be realised without the intervention, would meet the "good" products.
Selve markedet ville sørge for, at den ønskede virkning blev opnået, idet ingen fornuftige mennesker ville overveje at købe en maskine uden "ekstra fordele", hvis valget stod mellem en maskine uden og en maskine med nogle ekstra "fordele" til samme pris.
Actual or desired safety and health standards could be certified by the industrial inspection services, which already exist in most member states or have to be installed according to Framework Directive 89/39I/EEC; therefore no new bureaucracy has to be set up.
Hvis den støjende maskine (som vel at mærke imødekommer de lovbefalede krav) produceres og sælges billigere end den mindre støjende maskine, ville der være brug for en skattelempelse, som kunne kompensere for prisforskellen (og evt. forskelle i de løbende udgifter) for at opmuntre den fornuftigt tænkende arbejdsgiver til at købe den mindre støjende maskine.
If this instrument is to be combined with a subsidy, the possible spectrum reaches from subsidies on interest rates, as mentioned above, to the conversion of the loan into a grant, if the improvement of working conditions reaches a certain predetermined level. This means that the "tuning" of the instrument could be very fine.
I så fald ville markedet blive påvirket.
There are some more advantages to this method:
Producenten af den "støjende" maskine ville miste en væsentlig del af sin markedsandel. Hvis konkurrenten med de mindre støjende maskiner er stor nok eller kan vokse hurtigt nok, kunne de støjende maskiner endog blive skubbet helt ud af markedet, også selv om de strengt taget ligger inden for de lovbefalede krav.
It could be installed in every member state individually but could be handled on the EU level, too.
Det ville næppe være foreneligt med EU-medlemsstaternes økonomiske system.
It could be combined with subsidies of various kinds and thus could offer an additional instrument for economic policy.
Dette gælder for direkte beskatningsformer såvel som enhver anden metode til at influere skattebyrden (såsom særlige afskrivningsregler, tilladelse til at akkumulere skattelempede driftsreserver osv).
It could not only be "tuned" very precisely in small steps, but could also be combined with "ceilings" for number of employees, capital or other structural characteristics.
Det samme gælder yderligere for tilskud, der har indvirkning på prisforholdet mellem "godt" og "dårligt" udstyr og maskineri (fra kontantbetaling til subsidierede rentesatser).
It fits perfectly into the EU's set of instruments, so that the knowhow and the administration are easily available.
Der er derfor ikke behov for at overveje disse metoder yderligere.
It therefore might be put through easily.
Vi har heller ikke behov for at overveje de specifikke problemer i forbindelse med selve beskatningsmetoden, som nødvendigvis ville være tilknyttet de fleste metoder til at give tilskud til "godt" udstyr.
Premium variations are widely applied at present, but do not seem to have much incentive effect so long as they are coupled with the outcomes of safety and health activities (as discussed in detail in the booklet "Economic Incentives to Improve the Working Environment" Ref2 ).
Skattemyndighederne ville ikke med lethed være i stand til at reagere på tekniske forskelle, som de ikke kan bedømme på grundlag af egne erfaringer og ekspertise.
Traditionally, premiums are set to recover costs already incurred in the compensation of past events ("the pay-as-you-go" system).
Variationer i skattebyrden til fordel for en forbedring af arbejdsmiljøet ville derfor enten kræve ekstra administration eller et samarbejde mellem skattemyndighederne og f.eks. arbejdstilsynet.
For the discussion of the effects of premium variation we have to distinguish between compulsory and voluntary insurance and, in the case of compulsory insurance, between monopolistic or non-monopolistic market structures.
2.2.2 Låneordninger
a) voluntary insurance
Adgang til kapital kan være et problem især for små og mellemstore virksomheder.
If the accident insurance is voluntary, the insurance companies may vary their premiums at will.
Til forskel fra store foretagender lider små virksomheder ofte af mangel på aktiver til dækning af yderligere kreditfaciliteter.
Moreover, in the Single European market one member state might not be able to force insurers from other member states to participate in such a co-ordination.
Derfor kunne der udvikles et system, som stiller kreditfaciliteter - med kun begrænset eller ingen sikkerhedsstillelse ("risikokapital") - til rådighed for virksomheder, der søger at opfylde bestemte arbejdsmiljøstandarder.
If the insurance market is competitive, premium (= price) variations are the most important means of competition. No insurer would take the risk of losing significant parts of his share in the market by e.g. raising prices for political reasons.
Dette kan kombineres - men behøver ikke nødvendigvis blive det - med direkte tilskud til renterne.
Some insured companies, especially the big ones, could be even driven out of the insurance system, covering the
Et sådant system ville ikke have nogen direkte indvirkning på konkurrenceforholdet blandt brugerne af udstyret, fordi hver eneste virksomhed ville have samme muligheder for at opnå kredit med begrænset sikkerhedsstillelse.
damages without help, as do the public institutions in some countries (e.g. in Germany): it has to be kept in mind that insurance does not, as a rule, change the expected value of damages but only its distribution over time.
På den ene side ville systemet eventuelt give lidt mere støtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder, idet de større selskaber som regel har lettere adgang til kapitalmarkedet.
As long as there is no fairly unifonn compulsory accident insurance system in all member states of the EU, premium variations for promoting the improvement of working conditions cannot be recommended.
Denne omkostningsforskel kunne man kompensere for ved at reducere rentesatsen.
They would not only be difficult to enforce, but could disturb competition among companies in countries with compulsory and voluntary insurance.
Der kompenseres ikke for prisforskellen mellem de "gode" og "dårlige" produkter. Kun yderligere efterspørgsel, som ikke ville have været mulig uden indgrebet, ville være rettet mod de "gode" produkter.
If a uniform system of compulsory accident insurance can be installed in the EU, then it depends on the details of the system as to whether and how premium variations would work.
Egentlige eller ønskværdige arbejdsmiljøstandarder kunne certificeres af arbejdstilsynene.
If there were a multitude of insurance bodies, as e.g. in Germany, then it would depend on the legal situation whether uniform premium variations could be enforced.
Hvis denne metode skal kombineres med tilskud, rækker spektret af muligheder fra subsidierede rentesatser som nævnt ovenfor til omdannelsen af lånet til en offentlig bevilling, hvis forbedringen af arbejdsforholdene imødekommer visse forudbestemte krav. Dette betyder, at metoden kunne finjusteres ganske præcist.
At present in Germany there are 35 insurance bodies in the safety and health field, which are obliged by law to vary dieir premium according to the number or severity of accidents, but the methods applied differ significantly (see the system descriptions in the "Catalogue of Incentive Systems for the Improvement of the Working Environment", published by the European Foundation 1994Reri).
Der findes yderligere fordele ved denne metode:
Variations are coupled to improvements of the working conditions.
I tilfælde af en EU-løsning kunne metoden hjælpe med til at harmonisere arbejdsmiljøstandarderne, idet betingelserne for ydelsen af kredit kunne bestemmes af EU.
We have already pointed out that, due to statistical limitations, this can lead to considerable disadvantages for small and medium sized enterprise.