natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(b) Et andet karakteristisk træk for resultaterne var de noget vidtsvævende forventninger, folk havde m.h.t. arbejdstagerrepræsentanter - forbedret kommunikation, løsning af klagepunkter, for'bedrede arbejdsvilkår, bedre arbejdsmarkedsforhold, større interesse og engagement i arbejdet for arbejdstagernes vedkommende -for blot at nævne nogle få eksempler.
(b) A second feature of the results was the rather diffuse expectations that people had of worker directors - improving communication, solving grievances, improving working conditions, improving industrial relations, giving workers more interest and involvement in work, to give just a few examples.
Alle disse forventninger er naturligvis i sig -selv betydelige opgaver og næppe anliggender, arbejdstagerrepræsentanter kan gennemføre på egne vegne uden samarbejde med andre systemer, så som ledelse, fagforbund eller endog bestyrelsen.
All of these are of course sizeable assignments in themselves and hardly matters which worker directors can do on their own without working in tandem with other systems such as the management system or the union system or even the Board system.
(c) Burde arbejdstagerrepræsentanten være fuldstændig frit stillet, burde han repræsentere sine vælgere eller indtage en position midt imellem?
(c) Should the worker director be a completely free agent or should he be a delegate of his constituents or should he occupy a position in between?
Dette var spørgsmål, som trådte ganske klart frem ud fra undersøgelsens data.
This was an issue which obviously emerged in the data from the survey.
Loven om medindflydelse på arbejdspladsen henviser ikke til nogen specifik adfærd eller angrebsmåde, arbejdstagerrepræsentanten bør følge, men nævner blot i almindelighed, at denne har samme pligter og ansvar som de øvrige bestyrelsesmedlemmer.
The Worker Participation Act does not mention any specific behaviour or approach that the worker director ought to adopt but states broadly that he has the same duties and responsibilities as other directors.
Andre bestyrelsesmedlemmer - d.v.s. ikke-arbejdstagerrepræsentanter -er blevet udnævnt af vedkommende minister og udfører i det store hele deres pligter uden henvisning til den centrale administration eller den
Other directors, that is non-worker directors, owe their positions to the appropriate government minister and by and large carry out their duties without reference to central administration or the minister concerned.
16 pågældende minister. Dersom arbejdstagerrepræsentanten optrådte på samme måde som de eksisterende bestyrelsesmedlemmer, ville han have ubetydelig eller ingen kontakt med folkene, der valgte ham.
Were the worker director to adopt as his model existing directors then he would have little or no contact with those who elected him.
Rolleopfattelsen i dette tilfælde ville indebære, at arbejdstagerrepræ­ sentanten helt og holdent deltog i bestyrelsesmøderne og gav sit bidrag til alle beslutninger, der måtte tages.
The conception of role in this case would be for tine worker director to participate to the full at Board meetings and make his contributions to whatever decisions were being made.
Hans bidrag ville formodentligt være baseret på hans erfaringer som arbejder og hans forståelse af beho­ vene, indstillingerne og meningerne på værkstedsgulvet. Ifølge, denne rol­ leopfattelse ville og kunne arbejdstagerrepræsentanten handle forholds­ vis selvstændigt.
His contributions presumably would be informed by his experience as a worker and his understanding of shop floor needs, attitudes and thinking.
Undersøgelsens resultater viste klart, at det store flertal af de ansat­ te mente, der var et behov for mere kontakt med arbejdstagerrepræsentan­ terne, end man havde forudset i dennes rolle som sådan.
From the survey results it was obvious that the vast majority of employees saw a need for more contact with worker directors than would be envisaged in this role.
På en måde så ar­ bejderne på arbejdstagerrepræsentanten som "deres mand".
In a sense workers saw the worker director as "their man".
På daværende tids­ punkt mente forfatterne, at arbejderne ikke ønskede at have fuldstændig kontrol over arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne, men der var ikke ret megen tvivl om, at de syntes, han skyldte dem en særlig loyalitet.
The authors concluded at the time that in their opinion workers would not wish to completely control the worker director but of the fact that they felt he owed them a special allegiance there was little doubt: employees felt they should have contact with the worker director, be able to talk to and influence him and know something about what was happening at Board level.
Arbejdsta­ gerne mente, de burde have kontakt med arbejdstagerrepræsentanten, at de burde kunne tale med og influere ham og blive orienteret om, hvad der ske­ te på bestyrelsesplan.
Employees by and large felt more strongly than did existing directors and management that worker directors needed to report back to employees.
(d) Andre aspekter af undersøgelsens resultater ledte forfatterne til at sætte spørgsmålstegn ved arbejdstagernes forståelse af besty­ relsens funktion, og de nåede til den konklusion, at arbejdstager­ ne ofte selv ikke kunne skelne mellem bestyrelse og ledelse, spe­ cielt øverste ledelse.
(d) Other aspects of the results of the survey led the authors to question the understanding by employees of the function of the
Hidtil er arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne således blevet interviewet mindst to gange i løbet af undersøgelsen. Første gang huskede de endnu klart de første bestyrelsesmøder, valgene og hvorledes de tilpassede sig i almindelighed.
Board and they concluded that frequently employees did not distinguish in their own minds between the Board and management, particularly senior management.
I de tidlige stadier var det ikke usædvanligt for arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne at have en fornemmelse af, at andre bestyrelsesmedlemmer og/eller øverste ledelse i det mindste var noget fortrydelige over deres til stedeværelse.
The authors spoke with worker directors for the first time some six months after their election and six to twelve months after that again. Thus worker directors were interviewed at least twice in the course of the study to date.
Det er sikkert rigtigt, at dér var en sådan fortrydelse i hvert fald i nogle tilfælde, men samtidigt var arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne sikkert også noget overfølsomme i denne henseende.
On the first occasion memories of early Board meetings, of elections, and of settling down generally were fresh in their minds.
De kom fra en baggrund med et fagforbundsengagement (hvor de kendte spillets regler, og hvor deres beføjelser så at sige lå) til en ny situation uden fortilfælde m.h.t., hvad man skulle gøre for at være effektiv.
That they were thus resented may have been true at least in some cases, but equally there was probably a sensitivity on their part in this regard: worker directors were coming from a background of trade union involvement, where they knew the rules of the game and where their power lay so to speak, to a nev; situation where there were no precedents as to what one should do to be effective.
Da de opdagede, at de kunne have indflydelse på andre bestyrelsesmedlemmer, og at de fik tildelt faciliteter, så som kontorlokaler og tid fri, blev de mindre sensible, hvad deres positioner angik.
Fairly quickly, however, when they saw they could influence other Board members and that they were granted facilities such as office accommodation and time off they became less sensitive about their positions.
I resten af denne sammenfatning har forfatterne forsøgt kort at skitsere de hidtidige erfaringer med dette arbejderinitiativ, idet de har baseret dette på indberetninger fra arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne selv, bestyrelsesmedlemmer udefra og topledelser, andre virksomhedsledere og tilsynsførende, tillidsmænd og heltidsbeskæftigede fagforbundsrepræsentanter.
What the authors have tried to do for much of the remainder of this summary is to briefly outline the experience of the worker initiative to date based on reports of the worker directors themselves, outside directors and senior management, other managers and supervisors, shop stewards and full time trade union officials.
Arbejdstagerrepræsentanter mener, at de har og faktisk udøver indflydelse på bestyrelsesplan, om end det må indrømmes, at nogle arbejdstagerrepræsentanter er mere tilfredse med deres lod i denne henseende end andre.
Worker directors feel they can and do exert influence at Board level though it is true to say that some worker directors are happier with their lot in this regard than are others.
I nogle tilfælde var arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne kritiske over for ledelsen med den begrundelse, at topledelsen ikke havde megen føling med medindflydelse og modsatte sig denne.
In some cases worker directors were critical of management on the grounds that senior management had no great feel for participation and resisted it.
En arbejdstagerrepræsentant sammenfattede situationen ved at erklære, at ledelsen mente, at medindflydelse kun var fordelagtigt for arbejderne, og at den ikke lod til at være klar over, at dette også var fordelagtigt for virksomheden.
One worker director summed up the situation by saying that management thought participation was good only for workers and didn't seem to realise that it was good for the company as well.
3- Arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne var fuldstændig klar over behovet for at holde kontakten vedlige med fagforeninger og arbejdere, men kontaktstrukturerne i denne henseende befinder sig endnu på fosterstadiet, og det har vist sig at være vanskeligt at etablere disse under bestyrelsesplanet.
Worker directors are very conscious of the need to keep in contact both with unions and employees but contact procedures in this regard are still at an embryo stage and it is not proving easy to establish below Board structures.
I tre af selskaberne opretholdes kontakten gennem arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne egne indsatser, idet de besøger arbejdspladser og
In the case of the other two companies below Board structures in the form of a Works Council pre-dated worker directors. In these tine worker
hovedsageligt mødes med tillidsmænd. I de to andre selskaber sker denne kontakt under bestyrelsesplanet i form af et bedriftsråd, der eksisterede før arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne.
16 directors keep in touch with employee representatives through these bodies though not exclusively so.
Det kan siges, at det har taget sin tid at etablere og udvikle struk turer under bestyrelsesplanet.
It is true to say that there has been delay in setting up and developing below Board structures.
Dette gælder især for strukturer, som for det første omfatter alle fagforbund og som for det andet har andre formål end kontakter med arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne.
This is particularly true of structures which firstly embrace all unions and secondly have other purposes besides liason with worker directors.
Fagforbundenes indstilling til denne sag er, at forsinkelserne i det store hele skyl des pres, som er opstået ud fra behovet for at klare andre anliggender på arbejdsmarkedet, og dette spiller uden tvivl ind.
The position of the unions on the matter is that, by and large, delays have been due to pressures stemming from the need to deal with other industrial relations matters and undoubtedly this plays a part.
Det er imidlertid også blev antydet, at barriererne mellem fagforbundene også spiller en rolle, specielt hvor de mindre fagforbund mener, at de mister deres indflydelse, hvis de bliver en del af et større organ, og hvor der har været uoverensstemmelser mellem fagforbundene før i tiden.
There have, however, been suggestions that barriers between unions are also playing a part, particularly where smaller unions feel they could lose influence if they become part of a larger body, and where there has been friction between unions in the past.
Hvor man overvejer strukturer under bestyrelsesplan, har man også en for nemmelse af, at sådanne strukturers rækkevidde og funktioner vil vise sig at indebære problemer.
Winer e below Board structures are being contemplated one senses too that the scope and function of such structures is proving troublesome.
En arbejdstagerrepræsentant udtrykte sin bekymring for, at en sådan struktur ville medføre en lignende svæk kelse i beføjelserne som i mange, af fortidens samarbejdsudvalg.
One worker director expressed the fear that such a structure would suffer a similar evisceration of powers as did many of the Joint Consultation Committees of the past.
En anden udtalte, at han var imod etableringen af en medindflydelses- struktur, der var adskilt fra tillidsmanden og overenskomstforhand lingssystemet .
Another said that he was opposed to setting up a participation structure which was separate from the shop steward and collective bargaining system.
Strukturer under bestyrelsesplanet, som er uafhængige af arbejds tagerrepræsentanterne, d.v.s. med andre målsætninger end blot at mødes med arbejdstagerrepræsentanter, kan eventuelt være vigtige af to grunde..
Below Board structures with an existence independent of worker directors, that is, with purposes other than merely having worker directors meet with them, may be important for two reasons.
Initiativet til at holde møderne gående og udvikle dem kommer for det første fra en anden kilde end arbejdstagerrepræ sentanterne.
Firstly, energy to sustain meetings and develop them is coming from a source other than worker directors.
Hvis der findes et sådant organ under bestyrelsen, kan det for det andet være, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne inddrages i et bredere medindflydelsesaspekt., end når der ikke fandtes sådanne organer.
Secondly, if there is some such form of below Board structure, it may be that worker directors are placed in a wider context of participation more readily than when such structures are absent.
19 spontant og eftertrykkeligt klart under interviewerne.
Tnis emerged during interviews spontaneously and with emphasis.
I fire af selskaberne arbejdede arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne som et hold: de mødtes før bestyrelsesmøderne og drøftede dagsordenen i almindelighed for indbyrdes at klarlægge og tolke informationerne.
In the case of four of the companies worker directors worked as a team: they meet before Board meetings and discuss the agenda generally to get clarification and interpretation of information from each other.
I tre af disse fire selskaber fandtes der en formel ordning for disse møder, d.v.s. møderne blev afholdt på et bestemt tidspunkt og på et bestemt sted.
In the case of three of these four formal provision was made for these meetings, that is, meetings were held at a particular time and place.
I det fjerde tilfælde var møderne afhængige af tiden, der stod til rådighed i frokostpausen, og disse møder var som regel mere forhastede.
In the fourth case meetings depended on time available over lunch and were generally more rushed.
Tiden, arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne tilbragte med udførelsen af de res rolle, varierede betydeligt mellem selskaberne fra omkring 20 procent eller under til 75 procent og over.
Time spent by worker directors in carrying out their worker director roles varied considerably across companies from roughly 20 per cent or less to 75 per cent or more.
Dette er sikkert langt mere, end mange folk forudså fra starten, men heraf kan man naturligvis ikke uden videre slutte, at tiden, arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne anvender til udførelsen af deres pligter, er urimelig.
This is almost certainly more than might have been anticipated by many people at the outset but of course this is not to argue per se that the amount of time spent on worker director duties is excessive.
Der var meningsforskelle blandt arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne m.h.t. den til rådighed stillede tid og kontorfaciliteterne.
There were differences in outlook as regards.time off and indeed as regards such things, as office facilities between directors.
Nogle - måske flertallet - syntes, de burde have den frie tid og de faciliteter, der krævedes til udførelsen af deres arbejde på den mest effektive og tilfredsstillende måde; andre med de samme målsætninger var derimod mere følsomme over for de potentielle barrierer, der kunne rejse sig mellem arbejdstagere og dem selv, hvis det viste sig, at de til bragte en stor del af tiden borte fra deres arbejdsplads eller fik tildelt statussymboler, så som kontorer.
Some and probably a majority felt that they should take whatever time and facilities were necessary to carry out their work in the most efficient and satisfactory manner possible: others while having the same goals, were more sensitive about the potential barriers arising between employees and themselves should they be seen to spend a great deal of time away from their work or acquire prestige symbols such as offices.
5· Hvad arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne - ud over de eksterne bestyrelsesmedlemmers bidrag - selv mente, de kunne bidrage til bestyrelsesmøderne, var ikke blot et kendskab til arbejdstagernes holdninger og følelser, men til den daglige drift i selve selskabet.
What worker directors saw themselves bringing to Board meetings over and above what outside directors could bring was a knowledge not just of employee attitudes and feelings but of day to day operations within the company.
Dette synspunkt var til en vis grad det samme blandt de eksterne bestyrelsesmedlemmer.
This view to an extent was reciprocated by outside directors.
Forfatterne fandt det noget vanskeligt at definere de specifike bidrag og problemer, arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne valgte at blive engageret i under deres første tolv til atten måneder i bestyrelsen, fordi det er ret besværligt at rekonstruere et menneskes engagement i et problem, man ikke selv observerer.
The authors found some difficulty in deciphering the specific contributions and issues which worker directors chose to become involved in during their first twelve to eighteen months in office, since it is quite difficult to reconstruct a person's involvement in an issue which one is not observing for oneself; for instance, if an issue is under consideration at the time a respondent is being interviewed he may be highly involved and go into considerable detail, whereas if one were to enquire at a later stage, when the issue has been resolved, the matter could well be disposed of in a sentence or two.
Hvis et problem f.eks. er under overvejelse
In addition it is not always easy to see whether or not a person is having influence when decisions are taken by consensus as was the case in almost all the Board meetings in which worker directors were involved.
20 på tidspunktet for et interview med vedkommende person, kan denne være stærkt impliceret og gå i udførlige enkeltheder. Hvis samtalen derimod finder sted på et senere tidspunkt, når problemet er løst, kan samme sag meget vel klares med een eller to sætninger.
Generally worker directors were scrupulous in not cutting across trade union lines, though with considerable difficulty,since one of the problems emerging for them was the expectation at shop floor level that they would help out with industrial relations issues.
Desuden er det ikke altid nemt at se, om en person har indflydelse eller ej, når der træf fes eenstemmige beslutninger, som tilfældet var på næsten alle besty relsesmøder, i hvilke arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne var impliceret.
The expectationsthat worker directors would help to resolve specific industrial relations problems at Board level seemed to the authors to vary across companies, in that,in some companies worker directors were keenly aware of the expectations of staff in this direction and of hov; concrete these expectations were, whereas in other companies worker directors, while being in no way unaware of staff expectations, felt less pressure.
Med tanke på dette motiveredes arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne bl.a. af spørgsmål, så som lukningen af faciliteter i selve selskabet med en heraf følgende forstyrrelse omend ikke nødvendigvis strukturopsigelser for personalet; interviewer med ansøgere om ledende stillinger som medlemmer af et underudvalg af bestyrelsen; bestyrelsesprocedurer, så som mødeindkaldelser eller forudgående cirkulation af dokumenter til bestyrelsesmøder; mægling i forbindelse med arbejdsmarkedsproblemer.
It was the authors impressions too that Boards themselves differed in their sensitivity to the introduction by worker directors of industrial relations issues. In one case, at a meeting before the first Board meeting which worker directors were to attend, a senior manager seemingly put.forward a proposition, as the worker directors understood it, that because of the conflict of interest provisions in the Worker Participation Act/worker directors would have to withdraw from meetings when industrial relations matters were being discussed.
I almindelighed var arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne meget omhyggelige med at undgå at gå på tværs af fagforeningsgrænserne.
Some worker directors saw their role at Board level as a general one.
Dette var ret vanskeligt, idet et af problemerne, de kom ud for, var forventninger ne på værkstedsplan om, at de ville yde hjælp med arbejdsmarkedspro blemer.
As one put it the hard core of industrial relations belonged below Board level; the unions could brief worker directors on issues if they wanted to but worker directors would not get into detail at.
De andre bestyrelsesmedlemmer ventede på den anden side, at de ville bidrage noget i denne retning.
Board level particularly in day to day matters.
Det var også forfatternes indtryk, at selve bestyrelserne varierede m.h.t. deres følsomhed over for arbejdstagerrepræsentanternes frem læggelse af arbejdsmarkedsproblemer.
Many of the worker directors saw dangers in contributing only on industrial relations matters in that it could be construed by other directors as following a party line and they endeavoured to contribute on other areas as well.
I et tilfælde under et møde før det første bestyrelsesmøde, arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne skulle over være, fremsatte et overordnet medlem af bestyrelsen tilsyneladende et forslag, der efter arbejdstagerrepræsentanternes mening gik ud på, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne burde trække sig tilbage fra møderne
Many were surprised that voting did not take place at Board meetings and they were also concerned to see that they did not push issues to a vote since if, as one of them put it, worker directors pushed matters to a conclusion in this regard they could be cast in the role of permanent opposition but without real influence.
Et særligt emne, der ofte kom for dagen under interviewerne med arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne, havde relation til delingen af ansvarene mellem bestyrelsen og virksomhedsledelsen. Mange mente, at talrige beslutninger med indflydelse på arbejderne som det ville være i disses interesse at være medbestemmende i, ikke blev truffet på bestyrelsesplan, men derimod af virksomhedsledelsen.
One particular theme that frequently surfaced in interviews with worker directors related to the division of responsibilities between the Board and executive management; many felt that a lot of decisions which affected workers and which it would be in workers' interest to have a say in were taken not at Board level but at an executive management level.
Dette kom som en over raskelse for arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne. og afspejlede måske den almindelige forvirring m.h.t. bestyrelsens rolle, der kom frem under den oprindelige undersøgelse af forventningerne.
This came as a surprise to the worker directors and perhaps reflected the confusion generally about the role of the Board which emerged in the initial survey of expectations.
Efter at sagen var blevet drøftet, blev en repræsentant for persona let fra bedriftsrådet i eet af selskaberne inkluderet i visse af dets driftsledelsesmøder. Det drejede sig om to møder, som behandlede hhv.
In one of the companies, after the matter had been discussed, a representative of the workers from the Works Council was included in certain operational management meetings in the company.
planlægning og en gennemgang af virksomhedens drift, samt en nærmere granskning af virksomhedens omkostninger.
There were two meetings involved and these dealt respectively with the planning and review of certain of the company's operations and v/ith the review of costs within the company.