natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retten tilføjede i denne forbindelse, at lovgivers indførelse af en justeringskoefficient på mindre end 100% også for »mindre dyre« medlemsstater under alle omstændigheder ikke kan anses for at være åbenlyst vilkårlig og uhensigtsmæssig 7.
In any event, the Court of First Instance also observed that the legislature’s introduction of a minimum correction coefficient of 100% also for ‘less expensive’ Member States cannot be considered a manifestly arbitrary or inappropriate act. 7
V — Retsforhandlingerne for Domstolen og parternes påstande forskelsbehandling i forhold til pensionister bosat i Belgien, på hvis pension der trods overgangen til »landemetoden« fortsat anvendes en justeringskoefficient, der er beregnet på basis af leveomkostningerne i Bruxelles, i hele Belgien.
V — Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought by the parties his claim of a difference in treatment in relation to pensioners living in Belgium, to whom a correction coefficient calculated on the basis of the cost of living in Brussels, instead of the entire territory of Belgium, continued to be applied, despite the switch to the ‘country method’.
Retten bemærkede hertil, at den nye vedtægts bestemmelser om justeringskoefficienterne for pensionister ikke på nogen måde henviser til Bruxelles, men blot til Belgien.
The Court of First Instance observed that the rules of the new Staff Regulations on correction coefficients for pensioners make absolutely no reference to Brussels but simply to Belgium.
Det eventuelle ulovlige forhold, sagsøgeren har påtalt, vedrører ikke vedtægten, men blot omstændighederne vedrørende den praktiske gennemførelse af denne.
The possible unlawfulness of which the appellant complains concerns not the Staff Regulations but only the practical procedures for implementing those rules.
Retten anførte desuden, at det netop er størrelsen af den pension, der udbetales til tidligere tjenestemænd med bopæl i Belgien, der udgør referencepunktet for anvendelsen af eventuelle justeringskoefficienter for pensionister bosat i andre medlemsstater.
The Court of First Instance also noted that it is in fact the amount of pension paid to former officials resident in Belgium that constitutes the benchmark for applying any correction coefficients for pensioners living in other Member States.
Endelig henviste Retten til princippet om, at ingen til egen fordel kan påberåbe sig en ulovlighed, der er begået til fordel for andre 6.
Finally, it stated that, in any event, the principle that no person may rely, in support of his claim, on unlawful acts committed in favour of third parties was to be heeded. 6
Ved appelskrift indleveret til Domstolens Justitskontor den 8. februar 2007 har appellanten iværksat appel af Rettens dom.
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 8 February 2007, the appellant appealed against the abovementioned judgment.
Endelig forkastede Retten sagsøgerens argument om, at der var tale om forskelsbehandling i forhold til pensionister bosat i »mindre dyre« medlemsstater. Før reformen trådte i kraft, blev pensionen til pensionister bosat i disse stater tillagt en justeringskoefficient, der var mindre end 100% (pensionen blev med andre ord nedsat i forhold til referencebeløbet).
Lastly, the Court of First Instance rejected the appellant’s argument that he suffered discrimination by comparison with pensioners living in ‘less expensive’ Member States.
Efter reformen har alle pensionister derimod krav på en justeringskoefficient på mindst 100%, hvilket indebærer, at ingen pensionister længere, uanset bopæl, oppebærer en pension, der er mindre end den, der udbetales til pensionister bosat i Belgien.
As a result of the reform, however, a minimum correction coefficient of 100% was applied to all pensioners, which means that no pensioner, irrespective of his place of residence, will henceforth be paid a lower pension than that paid to pensioners living in Belgium.
Retten afviste dette argument fra realitetsbehandling ud fra den betragtning, at
The Court of First Instance held the appellant’s argument to be inadmissible,
— Appellanten gives medhold i sin administrative klage og følgelig annul-
— grant the forms of order sought by the appellant in his complaint, thereby
CAMPOLI MOD KOMMISSIONEN samt hans leres afslaget herpå pensionsopgørelser.
CAMPOLI v COMMISSION
I denne appelsag har appellanten blandt de mange anbringender, han havde fremsat for Retten, kun fastholdt anbringendet vedrørende tilsidesættelse af ligebehandlingsprincippet.
In these appeal proceedings, the appellant pursues, among the many pleas in law relied on before the Court of First Instance, only the plea alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment.
— Appellanten tilpligtes at betale sagens omkostninger i medfør af artikel 122 i Domstolens procesreglement.
— order the appellant to pay the costs in accordance with Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.
Appellantens kritik er særligt rettet mod Rettens svar på tre af de fire argumenter, han havde fremført til støtte for dette anbringende. Appellanten har nemlig udtrykkeligt erklæret, at han ikke har til hensigt at anfægte Rettens vurdering af det andet af de nævnte argumenter, nemlig argumentet om en angivelig forskelsbehandling mellem pensionister og tjenestemænd i aktiv tjeneste 8.
More specifically, the appellant focuses his criticism on the response of the Court of First Instance to three of the four arguments adduced in support of that plea: the appellant expressly states that he does not intend to call into question the findings of the Court of First Instance on the second of those arguments, relating to alleged discrimination between pensioners and serving officials. 8
Før der foretages en gennemgang af appellantens klagepunkter vedrørende den forkastes som værende
Before examining the appellant’s criticism of the judgment under appeal, however,
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-71/07 P er som nævnt desuden dem, appellanten har fastholdt under appelsagen.
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-71/07 P the outset are, as we have seen, the only ones repeated by the appellant in the appeal.
appellerede dom, er det imidlertid nødvendigt at tage stilling til Kommissionens »kontraappel«.
it is necessary to assess the ‘cross-appeal’ brought by the Commission.
Appellanten har i sin replik nedlagt påstand om, at »kontraappellen« afvises, idet Kommissionen ikke helt eller delvist ikke har fået medhold i sine egne påstande for Retten, således som det kræves efter artikel 56 i statutten for Domstolen.
The appellant, in his reply, maintains that the ‘cross-appeal’ is inadmissible, since the Commission was not unsuccessful in any of its submissions before the Court of First Instance, as required by Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
Kommissionen fremsatte nemlig ikke denne afvisningspåstand for Retten, og der er følgelig ikke tale om, at den ikke har fået medhold heri.
Indeed, according to the appellant, the Commission did not raise the present objection of inadmissibility before the Court of First Instance and was therefore not unsuccessful on that point.
Desuden har Kommissionen efter appellantens opfattelse ikke nedlagt påstand om ophævelse eller revision af Rettens dom, men om afvisning af appellen.
Furthermore, the appellant asserts that the Commission is not seeking the annulment or amendment of the judgment of the Court of First Instance but simply a ruling that the appeal is inadmissible.
I den sidste del af appelsvarskriftet har Kommissionen iværksat en »kontraappel«, hvori den gør gældende, at Retten burde have afvist sagen, navnlig burde den have afvist det fjerde argument vedrørende tilsidesættelse af ligebehandlingsprincippet, eftersom det først var blevet fremført i replikken.
In the final part of its defence, the Commission lodges a ‘cross-appeal’, in which it claims that the Court of First Instance should have ruled, first and foremost, that the fourth argument alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment was inadmissible because it had been raised for the first time only in the reply.
Jeg vil senere beskæftige mig med dette særlige spørgsmål som indledning til gennemgangen af argumentets substans.
I shall deal with this specific question below, as a preface to discussion of the substance of the argument itself.
Appellanten er i øvrigt af den opfattelse, at Kommissionens kontraappel ligeledes er ugrundet i realiteten, idet der allerede i den klage, appellanten indbragte efter vedtægtens artikel 90, blev fremsat et klagepunkt vedrørende tilsidesættelse af ligebehandlingsprincippet.
The appellant maintains, moreover, that the Commission’s cross-appeal is unfounded as to the substance, since infringement of the principle of equal treatment had previously been alleged in the complaint lodged under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations.
Alle de argumenter, der for Retten blev fremført til støtte for, at der foreligger en sådan forskelsbehandling, er under alle omstændigheder snævert forbundet med det, der tidligere har været anført, også selv om de ikke udtrykkeligt blev anført i klagen.
All of the arguments put forward in the proceedings before the Court in support of the claim alleging unequal treatment, although not specifically previously presented in the complaint, were nevertheless closely connected with the assertions previously made.
Kommissionen har endvidere gjort gældende, at Retten ligeledes burde have afvist første, tredje og (atter) fjerde argument, idet appellanten ikke fremførte disse i sin administrative klage, før han indbragte sagen for Retten.
The Commission then maintains that the Court of First Instance should also have ruled that the first, third and (again) fourth arguments were inadmissible, since they had not been presented in the administrative complaint lodged by the appellant before bringing proceedings before the Court of First Instance.
De tre argumenter, som Kommissionen mener, at Retten fra starten skulle have afvist,
Moreover, the three arguments which the Commission maintains the Court of First Instance should have ruled inadmissible from
Kommissionen har i sin duplik bekræftet, at formålet med kontraappellen ikke er at få Rettens dom ophævet eller
In its reply, the Commission confirms that the aim of its cross-appeal is not to obtain the annulment or amendment of the
Kommissionens »kontraappel« kunne således synes uantagelig til realitetsbehandling, da forudsætningen i artikel 56, stk. 2, i statutten for Domstolen om, at »en appel [kan] iværksættes af enhver part, som helt eller delvist ikke har fået medhold«, ikke er opfyldt.
The Commission’s ‘cross-appeal’ could therefore appear to be inadmissible, since it fails to satisfy the requirement of having been unsuccessful within the meaning of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the second paragraph of which provides that an appeal may be brought ‘by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions’.
ændret 9. Den har ikke desto mindre gjort gældende, at den omstændighed, at en del af de argumenter, appellanten havde fremført for Retten, oprindeligt ikke kunne antages til realitetsbehandling, forvandles til en sag om afvisning — med hensyn til de samme argumenter — af den appel, appellanten selv har iværksat ved Domstolen.
inadmissibility of part of the arguments put forward by the appellant before the Court of First Instance translates into a ground of inadmissibility, in relation to the same arguments, of the appeal lodged by the appellant before the Court of Justice.
Da det er de omhandlede argumenter, der er fremført i appelsagen, bør selve appellen afvises i sin helhed.
Since the arguments in question constitute the totality of those repeated in the appeal, in the view of the Commission the appeal itself should be declared inadmissible in its entirety.
Det er ikke desto mindre min opfattelse, at den just nævnte løsning ikke er korrekt, og at det er hensigtsmæssigt at benytte en anden indfaldsvinkel til det pågældende problem.
I consider, however, that the solution I have just outlined is not correct and that a different approach to resolving the problem in question is to be preferred.
Kommissionens »kontraappel« hviler på princippet om overensstemmelse mellem på den ene side indholdet af den administrative klage i henhold til tjenestemandsvedtægtens artikel 90 og på den anden side indholdet af den stævning, appellanten indgav til Retten i Første Instans.
The Commission’s ‘cross-appeal’ is based on the principle that there should be consistency between, on the one hand, the content of the administrative complaint lodged by the appellant under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations and, on the other, the content of the action brought before the Court of First Instance.
Kommissionens »kontraappel« er unægtelig atypisk, hvilket den selv har medgivet i sin duplik 10.
The ‘cross-appeal’ lodged by the Commission is undoubtedly unconventional, as that institution itself recognises in its reply.
Det er navnlig bemærkelsesværdigt, at Kommissionen efter en sådan »kontraappel« ikke har nedlagt påstand om ophævelse af den appellerede dom.
10 In particular, it is significant that the Commission has not sought, as a consequence of such a ‘cross-appeal’, the annulment of the judgment under appeal.
Dette viser uomtvisteligt, at der på ingen måde er tale om, at Kommissionen ikke har fået medhold i sine påstande for Retten.
This shows incontrovertibly that, before the Court of First Instance, the Commission was not unsuccessful in any of its own submissions.
Rækkevidden af dette princip er blevet analyseret og gennemgået inden for rammerne af en omfattende retspraksis fra Fællesskabernes retsinstanser.
The scope of that principle has been examined and clarified in a long series of rulings by the Community Courts.
Domstolen har særligt fastslået, at den administrative procedure, der er fastsat i vedtægten, og navnlig kravet om indgivelse af en klage, har karakter af et »væsentligt formkrav« 11.
In particular, the Court of Justice has stated that the pre-litigation procedure laid down in the Staff Regulations and, in particular, the lodging of a complaint are an ‘essential procedural requirement’.
Domstolen har ligeledes fastslået, at klagefristerne er ufravigelige, og at Domstolen af egen drift kan efterprøve, om de er blevet
11The Court has also stated that compliance with the timelimits for the pre-litigation procedure in question is a matter of public policy, which
9 — Jf. påstandene i Kommissionens duplik samt dennes punkt 31.
9 — That is the sense of the conclusions of the Commission’s reply and point 31 thereof.
Jeg skal dog bemærke, at Kommissionen i duplikkens punkt 40 har anført, at »[…] følgelig bør Domstolen annullere Rettens dom, for så vidt som den ikke har afvist første og tredje del af anbringendet som følge af, at de ikke var fremsat i den administrative klage, og den fjerde del desuden fordi den først blev fremsat i replikken«.
I note, however, that at point 40 of that document the Commission states that ‘… the Court of Justice should therefore annul the part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance in which it did not rule that the first and third parts of the plea were inadmissible in that they were not raised in the pre-litigation complaint, and also the fourth part since it was raised only in the reply’.
På den anden side er det — set i lyset af det standpunkt, jeg agter at indtage med hensyn til »kontraappellen«, ikke nødvendigt at tage stilling til, om Kommissionen — subsidiært — har nedlagt påstand om ophævelse af den appellerede dom.
However, in the light of the position that I intend to adopt with regard to the ‘cross-appeal’, it is not necessary to determine whether the Commission does or does not, as a preliminary matter, seek the annulment of the judgment under appeal.
11 — Dom af 3.2.1977, sag 91/76, de Lacroix mod Domstolen, Sml. s. 225, præmis 11.
11 — Case 91/76 de Lacroix v Court of Justice [1977] ECR 225, paragraph 11.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-71/07 P overholdt i den relevante administrative procedure 12.
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-71/07 P the Court can verify of its own motion.
Retten i Første Instans har på grundlag af denne retspraksis fastslået, at spørgsmålet om overensstemmelse mellem den administrative klage og den indgivne stævning ligeledes har karakter af en ufravigelig procesforudsætning, og at det således kan efterprøves af Fællesskabets retsinstanser af egen drift 13. Jeg er helt enig i Rettens praksis, der ligger tæt op ad Domstolens på dette punkt.
12 The Court of First Instance, for its part, on the basis of that caselaw of the Court of Justice, has stated that the question of consistency between the prior complaint through official channels and the application to the Court is also a public policy issue and may therefore be examined by the Court of its own motion.
Hvad angår den præcise definition af begrebet og definitionen af grænserne for overensstemmelsesprincippet fremgår det af fast retspraksis, at den administrative klage principielt ikke strengt og endeligt fastlægger indholdet af en eventuel senere retssag, men at den samtidig hverken kan ændre årsagen til eller genstanden for den administrative klage 14.
With regard to the precise definition of the concept and limits of the principle of consistency, according to the settled caselaw of the Court of Justice, in general, a complaint through administrative channels does not bind any judicial proceedings strictly and absolutely, but, at the same time, claims submitted at this latter stage may change neither the cause nor the object of the complaint.
Domstolen har ligeledes præciseret, at der under en retssag kan fremføres anbringender og argumenter, som ikke nødvendigvis figurerer i den administrative klage, men som står i nøje forbindelse hermed 15.
14The Court of Justice has also stated that, in an action before the Courts, submissions and arguments which do not appear in the administrative complaint but are closely linked to it are admissible. 15
Hvad angår genstanden for den administrative klage og genstanden for stævningen i denne sag er der ingen tvivl om, at disse fuldt ud er sammenfaldende. På dette punkt er det altså uproblematisk at antage sagen til realitetsbehandling.
As regards the subjectmatter of the administrative complaint and that of the application in the case under examination, there can be no doubt that they are exactly the same: hence, from that point of view, no problem of admissibility arises.
Hvis efterprøvelsen af overensstemmelsen mellem indholdet af den administrative klage og stævningen følgelig er en ufravigelig procesforudsætning, der kan efterprøves af Fællesskabets retsinstanser af egen drift, er det efter min mening muligt simpelthen at kvalificere Kommissionens »kontraappel« — uanset den juridiske betegnelse — som et faktum vedrørende et spørgsmål, der kan efterprøves ex officio.
Hence, if verification of the consistency between the content of the administrative complaint and the application to the Court is a matter of public policy that can be raised of the Court’s own motion, it is, in my opinion, possible to classify the ‘cross-appeal’ brought by the Commission, leaving aside the nomen iuris, simply as a matter that can be examined by the Court of its own motion.
Det er mere problematisk at definere »den sag«, der ligger til grund for det ønske om annullation, der er fremsat i den administrative klage.
Identification of the ‘cause’ underlying the request for annulment contained in the administrative complaint is more problematic.
Ifølge dette ræsonnement kan spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt der i det foreliggende tilfælde er overensstemmelse mellem den af appellanten indgivne klage i henhold til vedtægtens artikel 90 og den stævning, han efterfølgende indgav til Retten, efterprøves af Domstolen.
Following that line of reasoning, the question of the consistency, in the present case, between the administrative complaint lodged by the appellant under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations and the action subsequently brought before the Court of First Instance can be examined by the Court of Justice.
Med hensyn til anbringendet om forskelsbehandling, som er det eneste appellanten har fastholdt i appelsagen, er den klage, han indgav i medfør af vedtægtens
With regard to the plea alleging a difference in treatment — the only plea repeated by the appellant in the present appeal proceedings — the complaint lodged under
12 — Jf. f.eks. Domstolens dom af 19.2.1981, forenede sager 122/79 og 123/79, Schiavo mod Rådet, Sml. s. 473, præmis 22, af 20.3.1984, forenede sager 75/82 og 117/82, Razzouk og Beydoun mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 1509, præmis 13, og af 4.2.1987, sag 302/85, Pressler-Hoeft mod Revisionsretten, Sml. s. 513, præmis 5.
12 — See, for example, Joined Cases 122/79 and 123/79 Schiavo v Council [1981] ECR 473, paragraph 22; Joined Cases 75/82 and 117/82 Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission [1984] ECR 1509, paragraph 13; and Case 302/85 Pressler-Hoeft v Court of Auditors [1987] ECR 513, paragraph 5.
14 — Jf. f.eks. dommen i sagen Razzouk og Beydoun mod Kommissionen, præmis 9, og dom af 19.11.1998, sag C-316/97 P, Parlamentet mod Gaspari, Sml. I, s. 7597, præmis 17.
14 — See, for example Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission, paragraph 9, and Case C-316/97 P Parliament v Gaspari [1998] ECR I-7597, paragraph 17.
13 — Rettens dom af 29.3.1990, sag T-57/89, Alexandrakis mod Kommissionen, Sml. II, s. 143, præmis 8.
13 — Case T-57/89 Alexandrakis v Commission [1990] ECR II-143, paragraph 8.
CAMPOLI MOD KOMMISSIONEN artikel 90, nemlig temmelig kortfattet, idet den er begrænset til følgende punkter:
Article 90 of the Staff Regulations was, in fact, extremely brief, being confined to the following points:
Kommissionen har følgelig med rette anført, at af den række argumenter, appellanten har fremført til støtte for, at der foreligger forskelsbehandling, er det kun dem, der tager udgangspunkt i en angivelig forskelsbehandling mellem tjenestemænd i aktiv tjeneste og tidligere tjenestemænd, der er nævnt i den administrative klage.
The Commission has therefore correctly stated that, of the various arguments put forward by the appellant to support the claim of a difference in treatment, only that based on alleged discrimination between serving officials and former officials appeared in the administrative complaint.
»b) Tilsidesættelse af ligebehandlingsprincippet
‘(b) Infringement of the principle of equal treatment
Den nye pensionsordning, Europa-Kommissionen iværksatte den 1. maj 2004, er heller ikke berettiget henset til ligebehandlingsprincippet.
The new pension scheme established by the European Commission on 1 May 2004 is not even justified in the light of the principle of equal treatment.
Det skal således afgøres, om de øvrige argumenter, appellanten i den foreliggende sag har fremført til støtte for, at der foreligger forskelsbehandling, kan anses for at være »nært forbundet« med den, som han har anført i den administrative klage.
It must therefore be ascertained whether, in the case in point, the other arguments presented by the appellant in the judicial proceedings to support the claim of a difference in treatment can be regarded as being ‘closely linked’ to that set out in the administrative complaint.
Justeringskoefficientens funktion er nemlig at sikre, at tjenestemænd og tidligere tjenestemænd, der befinder sig i samme situation, har samme købekraft.
The purpose of the correction coefficient is to guarantee the same purchasing power to officials and former officials in the same situation.
Situationen i det konkrete tilfælde må siges at være vanskelig, og den befinder sig på den hårfine grænse mellem antagelse til og afvisning fra realitetsbehandling.
The situation in the case in point is rather delicate, being situated on the fine line between admissibility and inadmissibility.