natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En sådan metode, der svarer til helt at udelukke de konkrete omstændigheder i Marie-Claude Girardots situation med henblik på at opstille en regel til brug for på ensartet vis at yde erstatning for det tab, som forvoldes alle, der fortaber en mulighed for at blive ansat, gør det nemlig — i strid med de krav, der er opstillet i Domstolens praksis (jf. bl.a. dom af 8.10.1986, forenede sager 169/83 og 136/84, Leussink m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 2801, præmis 13, og dommen i sagen Lucaccioni mod Kommissionen, præmis 22 og 28) — ikke muligt at sikre, at der ydes fuld erstatning for det individuelle tab, som den berørte rent faktisk har lidt som følge af den særlige karakter af den ulovlighed, der er begået i vedkommendes tilfælde, og berøver desuden Fællesskabernes retsinstanser den skønsmargen, de råder over for at fastslå, i hvilket omfang skaden skal erstattes.
Such a method, which has the effect of entirely ignoring the particular circumstances of Mrs Girardot’s situation in order to propose a rule designed to provide reparation in a consistent manner for the loss by any party of the opportunity of being recruited, fails, contrary to the requirements set out in the caselaw (see, in particular, Joined Cases 169/83 and 136/84 Leussink and Others v Commission [1986] ECR 2801, paragraph 13, and Lucaccioni v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 22 and 28), to ensure that the individual damage actually suffered by the party concerned because of the particular unlawful acts of which she was the victim is fully compensated, and, in addition, deprives the Community courts of the margin of appreciation which they have to determine the extent of the reparation for the damage.
Denne alternative metode ville — da den er ensbetydende med, at det forudsættes, således som Retten har gjort i den appellerede doms præmis 74, at varigheden af den periode, hvorunder Marie-Claude Girardot var i Kommissionens tjeneste, hvis den havde ansat hende, var så hypotetisk, at der helt måtte ses bort herfra, hvorfor det måtte lægges til grund, at Kommissionen ville have afsluttet hendes ansættelse straks efter, at den var begyndt — i øvrigt føre til at yde erstatning for en fiktiv skade, der hverken er faktisk eller reel.
Furthermore, that alternative method, since it amounts to claiming, as the Court of First Instance observed in paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal, that the length of time Mrs Girardot would have remained in the service of the Commission if it had recruited her is so hypothetical that it should be completely disregarded and, consequently, that it should be considered that her employment was terminated as soon as it had begun, would result in the provision of compensation for fictitious damage which was neither actual nor certain.
Det følger heraf, at Kommissionen, der i øvrigt ikke har bestridt, at den appellerede dom er tilstrækkeligt begrundet i denne henseende, ikke har godtgjort, at Retten som følge af den metode, den har anvendt i dommen, under udøvelse af den skønsmargen, den råder over på dette punkt, har fordrejet det tab, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt i det foreliggende tilfælde ved ikke at have fastslået det faktiske og reelle tab, hun led ved den fortabte mulighed for ansættelse.
It follows that the Commission, which does not, moreover, dispute that the statement of the reasons of the judgment under appeal is sufficient in law, has not demonstrated that the Court of First Instance, in exercising the discretion available to it in this matter, has, by the method adopted, misinterpreted the damage suffered in this case by Mrs Girardot, by not determining the actual and certain damage resulting for her from the loss of an opportunity of being recruited.
Det står imidlertid fast, at der er en direkte årsagsforbindelse mellem sidstnævnte tab og den ulovlighed, der påklages i denne sag.
It is not disputed that there is a direct causal link between that damage and the alleged unlawful conduct in the present case.
Under disse omstændigheder må det konkluderes, at appellen er ugrundet og derfor må forkastes.
In those circumstances, it must be concluded that the main appeal is unfounded and, consequently, that it must be dismissed.
Marie-Claude Girardot har ved sin kontraappel gjort gældende, at Retten har tilsidesat fællesskabsretten derved, at den har anlagt flere åbenlyse fejlskøn.
By the cross-appeal, Mrs Girardot claims that the Court of First Instance infringed Community law by making several manifest errors of assessment.
Marie-Claude Girardot har for det første anført, at Retten ved kun at tage en periode på fem år i betragtning ved beregningen af lønforskellen har anlagt et åbenbart fejlskøn, idet den i den appellerede doms præmis 80 har bortset fra den fortabte mulighed for at gøre karriere, skønt udsigten til en tjenestemandsansættelse ikke var usikker, da Kommissionen på daværende tidspunkt efter en klart fastlagt politik
First, Mrs Girardot submits that, by adopting only a period of five years as the reference period for calculating the difference in remuneration, the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment, in that, in paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal, it excluded from the factors under consideration the loss of opportunity of a career, when the prospect of appointment as an established official was not a matter
For det andet har Marie-Claude Girardot gjort gældende, at Retten ved at anvende det månedlige nettovederlag, der i gennemsnit svarer til den sidste løn, hun fik udbetalt af Kommissionen som indplaceret i en stilling i lønklasse A5, anlagde et åbenbart fejlskøn med hensyn til fastsættelsen af lønforskellen, idet den i den appellerede doms præmis 85 overså det faktum, at hun havde større chance for at blive ansat i en stilling i lønklasse A4 end i en stilling i lønklasse A5, eftersom fem af de otte stillinger, hun havde ansøgt om, var opslået i lønklasse A4.
Secondly, Mrs Girardot claims that, by referring to the net monthly earnings corresponding, on average, to the last remuneration paid to her by the Commission in a post in grade A 5, the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment in determining the difference in remuneration, in that, in paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, that court disregarded the fact that she had a greater chance of being recruited to a post in grade A 4 than to a post in grade A 5 since five of the eight posts for which she had applied were in grade A 4.
Retten burde i øvrigt have genoprettet hendes karriere på grundlag af den gennemsnitlige længde af den periode, der hengår mellem forfremmelser fra en lønklasse til en anden, og under hensyntagen til de pensionsrettigheder, hun ville have optjent i tilfælde af en ansættelse.
In addition, the Court of First Instance should have constructed the progression of her career on the basis of the average time taken for promotion from one grade to another and taken account of pension rights she would have acquired in the event of recruitment.
Marie-Claude Girardot er for det tredje af den opfattelse, at Retten ved at fastsætte muligheden for, at hun blev ansat, til 50%, anlagde et åbenbart fejlskøn med hensyn til sandsynligheden for, at muligheden blev konkretiseret, idet Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 116 bortså fra, at hendes mulighed for ansættelse var større, fordi der til hver af de omhandlede stillinger kun var én anden ansøger, fordi hver af disse ansøgere blev ansat, og fordi én ansøger til otte stillinger har større mulighed for at blive ansat end en ansøger, der kun ansøger om én stilling.
Thirdly, Mrs Girardot considers that, by setting the chance she had of being recruited at 50%, the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment as to the probability of that chance materialising, in that, in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, the Court failed to take into account that her chances of being recruited were increased by the fact that for each of the posts in question there was only one other competing candidate, that each of those others was recruited and that a candidate applying for eight posts has more opportunity to be recruited than a candidate who presents himself for only one post.
Desuden svarer en realistisk mulighed ikke til én mulighed ud af to.
In addition, a one in two chance does not amount to a strong chance.
For det fjerde er Marie-Claude Girardot af den opfattelse, at Retten har anlagt et åbenbart fejlskøn ved ikke i den appellerede doms præmis 133-138 at have taget hensyn til alle omstændigheder vedrørende den psykiske og fysiske skade, hun har lidt, uanset at de lægeerklæringer, hun har fremlagt under sagen, dokumenterer, at hun har lidt af en depressiv tilstand, siden hendes ansøgninger ulovligt ikke blev efterkommet.
Fourthly and lastly, Mrs Girardot considers that the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment by not taking into account, in paragraphs 133 to 138 of the judgment under appeal, all the evidence of nonmaterial and physical harm, whereas the medical certificates produced by her within these proceedings record the existence of a depressive syndrome from which she has suffered since the date of the unlawful rejection of her applications.
Kommissionen har under retsmødet nedlagt påstand om, at kontraappellen i det hele må afvises, da den indebærer en anfægtelse af Rettens vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder.
At the hearing, the Commission submitted that the cross-appeal was entirely inadmissible since its objective was to challenge the appraisal of facts carried out by the Court of First Instance.
Som det fremgår af artikel 225 EF og artikel 58 i Domstolens statut, er appel begrænset til retsspørgsmål, og det er derfor alene Retten, der har kompetence til at fastlægge sagens faktiske omstændigheder, når bortses fra tilfælde, hvor den faktiske urigtighed af Rettens konstateringer fremgår af de aktstykker, den har fået forelagt, og til at tage stilling til disse faktiske omstændigheder.
As is clear from Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on points of law only and therefore the Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction to find and to appraise the facts, save where the factual inaccuracy of its findings results from the documents in the case before it.
Bedømmelsen af de faktiske omstændigheder udgør således ikke et retsspørgsmål, der er undergivet Domstolens prøvelsesret, medmindre der er tale om en urigtig gengivelse af de for Retten fremlagte beviser (jf. bl.a. dommen i sagen EIB mod Hautem, præmis 44, dom af 5.6.2003, sag C-121/01 P, O’Hannrachain mod Parlamentet, Sml. I, s. 5539, præmis 35, og kendelse af 27.4.2006, sag C-230/05 P, L mod Kommissionen, ikke trykt i Samling af Afgørelser, præmis 45).
The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, EIB v Hautem, cited above, paragraph 44; Case C-121/01 P O’Hannrachain v Parliament [2003] ECR I-5539, paragraph 35; and order of 27 April 2006 in Case C-230/05 P L v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 45.
Dette sidstnævnte krav er ifølge retspraksis ikke opfyldt, når appelskriftet — endog uden at indeholde en argumentation, der har til formål præcist at angive den retlige fejl, den appellerede dom angiveligt er behæftet med — blot gentager de anbringender og argumenter, der allerede er blevet fremført for Retten, herunder de anbringender og argumenter, der var støttet på faktiske omstændigheder, som Retten udtrykkeligt har afvist at lægge til grund.
According to the case-law, that requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, confines itself to repeating or reproducing the pleas in law and arguments submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those founded on facts explicitly rejected by that Court.
En sådan appel har i realiteten kun til formål at opnå, at de i stævningen for Retten fremsatte påstande pådømmes endnu en gang, hvilket ligger uden for Domstolens kompetence (jf. bl.a. dommen i sagen Bergaderm og Goupil mod Kommissionen, præmis 35, og i sagen Eurocoton m.fl. mod Rådet, præmis 47, samt kendelsen i sagen Lucaccioni mod Kommissionen, præmis 41).
Such an appeal amounts in reality to a request for no more than a re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (see, inter alia, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, paragraph 35, and Eurocoton and Others v Council, paragraph 47, both cited above; and the order in Lucaccioni v Commission, cited above, paragraph 41).
Ifølge den retspraksis, der er nævnt i denne doms præmis 45, er det desuden alene Retten, når den har fastslået, at der er indtrådt et tab, der har kompetence til inden for rammerne af den nedlagte påstand at fastslå, hvorledes og i hvilket omfang skaden skal erstattes.
Furthermore, according to the caselaw set out in paragraph 45 of this judgment, when Court of First Instance has determined that there is damage, it alone has jurisdiction, within the confines of the claim, to assess the form and extent of reparation for the damage.
I denne sag må det imidlertid konstateres, at Marie-Claude Girardot ved denne appel ikke — hvilket hun selv har oplyst under retsmødet som besvarelse af et spørgsmål fra Domstolen på dette punkt — tilsigter at påvise, at der foreligger retlige fejl, som Rettens begrundelse i den appellerede dom er behæftet med, men derimod dels ved at gentage de argumenter, hun fremsatte i første instans, dels ved at påberåbe sig angiveligt nye beviser, at anfægte den vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder,
In the present case, it must be held that, by this cross-appeal, Mrs Girardot, as she herself stated at the hearing in response to a question from the Court on that point, seeks not to identify errors of law allegedly vitiating the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in the judgment under appeal but rather, by (i) repeating her arguments relied on at first instance and (ii) putting forward supposed new evidence, she
Retten har foretaget i dommen med henblik på at fastslå, i hvilket omfang skaden skal erstattes, uden imidlertid hverken at hævde, at der er tale om nogen urigtig gengivelse af de faktiske omstændigheder, eller fremsætte et eneste retligt argument med henblik på at godtgøre, hvorfor Rettens vurdering af disse argumenter udgør en retlig fejl.
COMMISSION v GIRARDOT seeks to challenge the assessment of facts which that Court undertook in that judgment for the purposes of determining the extent of reparation for the damage, but she does not either allege any distortion of those facts or advance the slightest legal argument capable of demonstrating why the assessment by Court of First Instance of her arguments was erroneous in law.
Marie-Claude Girardot har derved blot anmodet om en fornyet pådømmelse af den appellerede dom.
That being the case, Mrs Girardot therefore does no more than request a re-examination of the judgment under appeal.
Kontraappellen skal følgelig afvises.
Consequently, the cross-appeal must be dismissed as inadmissible.
Det følger af samtlige ovenstående bemærkninger, at appellen og kontraappellen må forkastes.
It follows from all of the foregoing that the main appeal and the cross-appeal must be dismissed.
I henhold til procesreglementets artikel 69, stk. 2, der i medfør af artikel 118 finder anvendelse i appelsager, pålægges det den tabende part at betale sagens omkostninger, hvis der er nedlagt påstand herom.
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 118 of those Rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they are applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
Da Marie-Claude Girardot har nedlagt påstand om, at Kommissionen tilpligtes at betale sagens omkostninger, og da Kommissionen har tabt sagen, pålægges det denne at betale omkostningerne i hovedappellen.
Since Mrs Girardot applied for costs against the Commission and the latter has been unsuccessful in its grounds of appeal, the Commission must be ordered to pay the costs of the main appeal.
Da Kommissionen har nedlagt påstand om, at Marie-Claude Girardot tilpligtes at betale omkostningerne i kontraappellen, og da hun har tabt sagen, pålægges det hende at betale omkostningerne i kontraappellen.
Since the Commission applied for the costs of the cross-appeal against Mrs Girardot and she has been unsuccessful in her grounds of appeal, she must be ordered to pay the costs of that appeal.
Sag C-425/06
Case C-425/06
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, tidligere Ministero delle Finanze mod Part Service Srl, selskab under konkurs, tidligere Italservice Srl
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, formerly Ministero delle Finanze v Part Service Srl, company in liquidation, formerly Italservice Srl
»Sjette momsdirektiv — artikel 11, punkt A, stk. 1, litra a), og artikel 13, punkt B, litra a) og d) — leasing — kunstig opdeling af ydelsen — retsvirkning — nedsættelse af beskatningsgrundlaget — fritagelser — misbrug — betingelser«
(Sixth VAT Directive — Articles 11A(1)(a) and 13B(a) and (d) — Leasing — Artificial division of the supply into a number of parts — Effect — Reduction of the taxable amount — Exemptions — Abusive practice — Conditions)
Domstolens dom (Anden Afdeling) af 21. februar 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 21 February 2008 . . . . . .
Fiskale bestemmelser — harmonisering af lovgivningerne — omsætningsafgifter — det fælles merværdiafgiftssystem — sjette direktiv — transaktioner, der udgør misbrug
Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax — Sixth Directive — Transactions constituting an abusive practice
[Rådets direktiv 77/388, art. 11, punkt A, stk. 1, og artikel 13, punkt B, litra a) og d)]
(Council Directive 77/388, Arts 11A(1) and 13B(a) and (d))
— Den ydelse, som leasingselskabet leverer, er opdelt, således at det finansielle element er overladt et andet selskab og er opdelt i kreditydelser, forsikring og mægling.
— the service supplied by the leasing company is subject to a division, the financing element is entrusted to another company to be split into a credit service, an insurance service and a brokerage service;
Sjette direktiv 77/388 om harmonisering af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om omsætningsafgifter skal fortolkes således, at der foreligger misbrug, når opnåelse af en afgiftsfordel er hovedformålet med den eller de omhandlede transaktioner.
The Sixth Directive 77/338 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes must be interpreted as meaning that there can be a finding of an abusive practice when the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim of the transaction or transactions at issue.
(jf. præmis 45 og domskonkl. 1)
(see para. 45, operative part 1)
— Den ydelse, som leasingselskabet yder, består derfor alene i biludlejning.
— the service of the leasing company is therefore reduced to a service for renting a vehicle;
— De leasingafgifter, som brugeren samlet betaler, overstiger knap godets værdi.
— the lease payments made by the customer are of an amount which is only slightly higher than the purchase cost of the vehicle;
Ved anvendelsen af merværdiafgiften tilkommer det den nationale ret at afgøre, om leasing, som kendetegnes af følgende karakteristika, kan anses for at udføre misbrug som omhandlet i direktiv 77/388 om harmonisering af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om omsætningsafgifter:
It is for the national court to determine whether, for the purposes of the application of value added tax, leasing transactions having the following characteristics can be considered to be an abusive practice under the Sixth Directive 77/338 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes:
— De to selskaber, der deltager i leasingen, tilhører samme gruppe.
— that service, considered in isolation, therefore seems to be economically unprofitable, so that the viability of the business cannot be ensured solely by means of contracts concluded with the customers;
— Isoleret set giver denne ydelse således ikke noget økonomisk afkast, hvilket indebærer, at selskabets levedygtighed ikke kan sikres ene og alene ved de kontrakter, der er indgået med brugerne.
— the two companies taking part in the leasing transaction are part of the same group;
— Leasingselskabet modtager udelukkende betaling for leasingtransaktionerne via de kumulative leasingafgifter, som brugeren betaler, og de beløb, som erlægges af det andet selskab i gruppen.
— the leasing company receives the consideration of the leasing transaction only through the cumulative lease payments made by the customer and the amounts transferred from the other company of the same group.
det medkontraherende selskab. Dette resultat forekommer at være i strid med formålet med sjette direktivs artikel 11, punkt A, stk. 1, nemlig beskatning af den samlede modværdi, som modtages af aftageren.
leasing company.
Eftersom udlejning af køretøjer ved leasing er en tjenesteydelse i henhold til sjette direktivs artikel 6 og 9, er en sådan transaktion, hvis beskatningsgrundlag skal fastlægges i henhold til sjette direktivs artikel 11, punkt A, stk. 1, normalt merværdiafgiftspligtig.
Since the leasing of vehicles under leasing contracts constitutes a supply of services within the meaning of Articles 6 and 9 of the Sixth Directive, such a transaction is normally subject to value added tax, for which the taxable amount is determined in accordance with Article 11A(1) of the Sixth Directive.
Det tilkommer ligeledes den nationale ret at efterprøve, om der på baggrund af de oplysninger, den har fået forelagt, og bortset fra, hvad der fremgår af selve kontraktens indhold, er tale om én enkelt transaktion.
It is also for the national court to assess if, the contractual structure of the transaction notwithstanding, the evidence put before the court discloses the characteristics of a single transaction.
I denne henseende kan retten foranlediges til at udstrække sin vurdering og forsøge at finde tegn på misbrug.
In that context, it may find it necessary to extend its analysis by seeking evidence of indications of the existence of an abusive practice.
Med henblik på at undersøge, om der foreligger misbrug, skal den nationale ret først og fremmest undersøge, om det tilsigtede formål er opnåelse af en afgiftsfordel, som det ville stride mod et eller flere af formålene med sjette direktiv at tildele, og den skal dernæst undersøge, om en afgiftsfordel er hovedformålet med denne kontrakttype.
For that purpose, the national court must verify, first, whether the result sought is a tax advantage, the granting of which would be contrary to one or more of the objectives of the Sixth Directive and, then, whether that constituted the principal aim of the contractual approach adopted.
Hvad angår det andet kriterium kan den nationale ret ved den vurdering, som den skal foretage, tage transaktionernes rent kunstige karakter tillige med juridiske, økonomiske og/eller personlige forbindelser mellem de omhandlede aktører i betragtning med henblik på at bevise, at opnåelse af en afgiftsfordel udgør selve hovedformålet, skønt der foreligger erhvervsmæssige hensyn baseret på f.eks. marketing, tilrettelæggelse og sikkerhedsstillelse.
As regards the second criterion, the national court, in the assessment which it must carry out, may take account of the purely artificial nature of the transactions and the links of a legal, economic and/or personal nature between the operators involved, those aspects being such as to demonstrate that the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim pursued, notwithstanding the possible existence, in addition, of economic objectives arising from, for example, marketing, organisation or guarantee considerations.