natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retten har derfor med føje i præmis 157 og 158 i den appellerede dom forkastet Moccia's argument om, at Kommissionen skulle have benyttet kriteriet om, at virksomheden blot skulle være produktionsdygtig.
However, in the present case, Moccia has not adduced before the Court matters of law capable of underpinning its argument that there was a misuse of powers.
Det bemærkes vedrørende dette anbringendes anden del, at det af den appellerede dom klart fremgår, at argumentet vedrørende muligheden for at opnå godkendelse af den planlagte støtte ved en beslutning i medfør af EKSF-traktatens artikel 95 ved Retten kun blev fremført af Sidercamuna.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance was right to reject, at paragraphs 157 and 158 of the contested judgment, the argument raised by Moccia according to which the Commission ought to have applied the criterion of mere suitability for production.
Moccia har med det tredje anbringende gjort gældende, at Retten ikke har begrundet sin afvisning af argumentet om, at Kommissionen med godkendelsen af den omhandlede støtteordning stiltiende godkendte artikel 1, stk. 2, i gennemførelsesbekendtgørelsen, hvilket indebærer en overtrædelse af forbuddet mod forskelsbehandling.
In its third plea Moccia alleges that the Court of First Instance omitted to provide a statement of its reasons for rejecting the argument that the Commission, by authorising the aid scheme at issue, by implication approved Article 1(2) of the implementing rules, which is in breach of the principle of non-discrimination.
Det fremgår af artikel 50 i procesreglementet for Retten i Første Instans, at en kendelse om forening af sager ikke berører de pågældende sagers indbyrdes uafhængighed og selvstændige karakter, og at en bestemmelse om ophævelse af foreningen altid er mulig.
According to Moccia, the Court of First Instance, thus interpreted the second indent of Article 4(2) of the Fifth Code in an unduly restrictive manner. Moccia also maintains in that connection that the contested judgment is vitiated by flawed reasoning and that the Court of First Instance is guilty of a misuse of powers.
Lamifer's og Casilina's anbringender
Pleas raised by Lamifer and Casilina
Med den første del af det første anbringende har disse appellanter gjort gældende, at den omhandlede støtte ikke kan fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og derfor ikke kan være omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for EKSF-traktatens artikel 4, litra c).
By the first limb, these appellants claim that the aid at issue cannot distort competitive conditions, so that it does not come within the scope of Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty.
Lamifer og Casilina har med deres andet anbringende gjort gældende, at Retten fejlagtigt i den appellerede doms præmis 138 har godkendt Kommissionens anvendelse af kriteriet om den maksimalt mulige produktion. Det er deres opfattelse, at anvendelsen af dette kriterium giver anledning til kritik på tre punkter.
That need for a strict interpretation stems from the actual wording of the reasoning of the Fifth Code in which the Commission clearly manifested its intention that the Fifth Code should be interpreted strictly and solely by reference to its express wording.
Det bemærkes herved på den ene side, at Retten i præmis 138 i den appellerede dom har fastslået, at det af Lamifer og Casilina foreslåede kriterium, nemlig virksomhedens faktiske og løbende produktion fra det ene år til det andet, ikke tager højde for virksomhedens produktionskapacitet eller for forholdet mellem produktionskapaciteten og den faktiske produktion.
In this regard, it should be pointed out, first, that the Court of First Instance stated at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment that the criterion proposed by Lamifer and Casilina, namely the production actually achieved by the undertaking and its regularity from one year to the next, fails to take account of the production which the undertaking is capable of achieving and the ratio between production capacity and actual production.
Retten fastslog endvidere i samme præmis, at dette kriterium blot ville have ført til en nedsættelse af produktionskapaciteten og ville medføre, at støtten tilfaldt virksomheder med en marginal produktion, og dermed en produktion, som ville være ubetydelig med henblik på opfyldelsen af de målsætninger, som støtten tilsigter.
In the same paragraph, the Court of First Instance also found that application of that criterion would have ensured simply a reduction in production capacity and would have meant awarding aid to undertakings with a marginal production level, thus insignificant in terms of the achievement of the objectives pursued by such aid.
Det fremgår endvidere af det anførte, at anden del af Larmier's og Casilina's tredje anbringende, hvorefter Kommissionen burde have begrundet sin beslutning på baggrund af deres bemærkninger og den afvisning af substitutionskriterierne, som den italienske regering havde fastlagt, heller ikke kan lægges til grund.
In that connection, as far as the first limb of this plea is concerned and as is clear from paragraph 41 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance found that, in the actions brought by Lamifer and Casilina, no argument was directed specifically at the Fifth Code, the latter being rather the basis for the criticisms levelled at the legality of the authorisation decision and of Decisions 96/678 and 97/258.
I øvrigt bemærkes, at Lamifer og Casilina med deres andet anbringende søger at rejse tvivl om den bedømmelse af sagens faktiske omstændigheder, som Retten har anlagt.
Secondly, Lamifer and Casilina are seeking, by their second plea, to call in question findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance.
Hvad angår tredje del af det tredje anbringende, hvorefter Rettens konstatering i den appellerede doms præmis 141 er forkert, må det konstateres, at Lamifer og Casilina overhovedet ikke har godtgjort, at Retten har forvansket de beviser, der var blevet forelagt den herom.
As regards the second limb of this plea it should be pointed out that it is clear from the contested judgment that the argument based on the possibility that the proposed aid might be eligible for authorisation under Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty was raised only by Sidercamuna at first instance.
Det fremgår imidlertid af artikel 225 EF og artikel 51 i EF-statutten for Domstolen, at appel af begrænset til retsspørgsmål, og at det derfor alene er Retten, der har kompetence til at fastlægge sagens faktiske omstændigheder, når bortses fra tilfælde, hvor den faktiske urigtighed af Rettens konstateringer fremgår af de aktstykker, den har fået forelagt, og til at tage stilling til disse faktiske omstændigheder.
Under Article 225 EC and Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on a point of law only. Therefore, the Court of First Instance has sole jurisdiction to find and appraise the facts, except in a case where the factual inaccuracy of its findings arises from evidence adduced before it.
Det bemærkes herved, at med dette anbringende bestrides den fastlæggelse og bedømmelse af sagens omstændigheder, som Retten anlagde i den appellerede doms præmis 206-217.
It follows that the plea constitutes a plea raised by Lamifer and Casilina for the first time on appeal.
Det fremgår af den appellerede doms præmis 213, at Retten fastslog, at den årsag til indstilling af produktionen, som Lamifer havde påberåbt sig, ikke var behørigt påvist
By their third plea, which is made up of three limbs, Lamifer and Casilina allege that, at paragraphs 140 to 145 and 179 et seq. of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance infringed and misapplied the authorisation decision for no reason.
Konstateringen heraf, som Lamifer absolut ikke har bestridt, kan under ingen omstændigheder gøres til genstand for appel, når der ikke er tale om, at Retten har forvansket de i sagen fremlagte bevismidler.
The Court has also consistently held that, under Articles 113(2) and 116(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, fresh submissions, not contained in the original application, cannot be raised in an appeal.
Efter en ordning, der som femte kodeks fraviger det meget udtrykkelige forbud mod støtte i EKSF-traktatens artikel 4, litra c), kan planlagt støtte kun godkendes, såfremt alle betingelser ifølge denne ordning er opfyldt.
In the context of a scheme, such as the Fifth Code, which derogates from the strict prohibition of aid laid down in Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty, proposed aid can be approved only if it observes each of the conditions laid down in that scheme.
Under behandlingen af planlagte støtteprojekter skal Kommissionen derfor undersøge, om disse betingelser er opfyldt ved tildelingen af en støtte.
During the course of the procedure for examination of the proposed aid, it is therefore for the Commission to investigate whether the grant of aid will comply with those conditions.
Hermed udelukkes ethvert behov for anden begrundelse end konstateringen af, at visse i denne ordning fastsatte kriterier konkret ikke er opfyldt.
Consequently, there is no need for a statement of reasons other than the Commission's finding that certain criteria applied under that scheme are not satisfied in the instant case.
Hvad angår Casilina's fjerde anbringende, fremgår det af den appellerede doms præmis 210-214, at Retten undersøgte, om den årsag, som dette selskab havde påberåbt sig for at forklare den manglende overholdelse af kriteriet om den mulige maksimale produktion, ligesom i virksomhedernes Diano's og OLS' tilfælde var begrundet i kravet om at videreføre en produktion.
By their second plea, Lamifer and Casilina maintain that the Court of First Instance was wrong at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment to uphold the use by the Commission of the criterion of highest possible production. In their submission, the use of that criterion gives rise to three complaints.
Da det ikke er godtgjort, at Retten har tilsidesat princippet om ligebehandling, kan Casilina's fjerde anbringende ikke lægges til grund.
As is apparent from paragraph 213 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance found that the reason adduced by Lamifer for the suspension of its production was not duly established as a matter of fact.
Generaladvokat L.A Geelhoed fremsatte forslag til afgørelse i retsmødet (Sjette Afdeling') den 8. februar 2001.
As to the third limb of the third plea, alleging that the Court of First instance erred in finding at paragraph 141 of the contested judgment, it must be concluded that Lamifer and Casilina have not demonstrated at all that the Court of First Instance distorted the evidence adduced before it in that connection.
»a) Appellerne forkastes.
The Court ruled:
Marie-Laurence Buisson / Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber Tjenestemandsvedtægten
Advocate General LA Geelhoed delivered his Opinion at the sitting of the Sixth Chamber on 8 February 2001.
»Tjenestemænd - almindelig udvælgelsesprøve - adgang nægtet til de skriftlige prøver -formaliteten - akt, der indeholder et klagepunkt - frist - berettiget forventning -kompensation· (Anden Afdeling)
'a) dismiss the appeals in their entirety; b) order the applicants to bear their own costs and, jointly and severally, to pay those incurred by the Commission.'
Sag T-146/00 Stefan Ruf, Martin Stier / Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design) Immaterialrettigheder
Case T-243/99 Marie-Laurence Buisson ν Commission of the European Communities Staff Regulations of Officials
M. S. indgav ved skrivelse af 18. marts 1997 en begæring om restitutio in integrum »med henblik på fastsættelse af en ansøgningsdato«. M. S. gjorde til støtte for denne begæring gældende, at den sene indbetaling af ansøgningsgebyret skyldtes forsømmelse fra en af hans assistenters, fru C, side.
(Officials - Open competition — Refusal to admit to the written tests — Admissibility — Act adversely affecting a candidate — Timelimit — Legitimate expectation — Compensation) (Second Chamber)
Ved skrivelse af 4. september 1997 anmodede M. S. om status over de begæringer om restitutio in integrum, der var indleveret i sagen »DAKOTA« og i syv andre registreringsansøgninger.
(Community trade mark — Payment of the application fee after expiry of the timelimit of one month from filing of the application for registration — Lapse of the right to be accorded as a filing date the date when the application was lodged — Conditions for restitutio in integrum) (Second Chamber)
Harmoniseringskontoret bekræftede ved telefax af 21. maj 1996 modtagelsen af registeringsansøgningen.
By fax of 21 May 1996 the Office acknowledged receipt of the application for registration.
Harmoniseringskontoret meddelte ved skrivelse af 24. oktober 1997 sagsøgerne, at deres registreringsansøgning havde fået ansøgningsdatoen 12. februar 1997, hvilket var datoen for betaling af ansøgningsgebyr.
Through their representative, Mr S, the applicants filed an application with the Office on 15 April 1996 for registration of the figurative Community trade mark 'DAKOTA' (No 227 306).
M. S. sendte ved skrivelse af 17. juni 1996 Harmoniseringskontoret en kopi af bevis for registrering af varemærket »DAKOTA« ved det tyske patentkontor (Deutsches Patentamt) samt fuldmagt fra sagsøgerne.
By letter of 17 June 1996 Mr S sent to the Office a copy of the certificate of registration of the trade mark 'DAKOTA' at the German Patent Office (Deutsches Patentamt), together with the applicants' authorisation.
Sagsøgerne indgav den 27. november 1998 i henhold til artikel 59 i forordning nr. 40/94 en klage til Harmoniseringskontoret med henblik på, at denne afgørelse blev annulleret.
In the space on the application form relating to fees, the applicants stated that the application fee would be paid later.
Afgørelsen annulleres.
— call Mr S, his predecessor, and Ms C as witnesses;
sagsøgernes registreringsansøgning ansøgningsdatoen 12. februar 1997.
By letter of 19 December 1996 Mr S sent the Office a further authorisation at the latter's request.
Harmoniseringskontoret tilpligtes at give EF-varemærkeansøgning nr. 227 306 ansøgningsdatoen 15. april 19%.
During the hearing, the applicants withdrew the second head of the forms of order they were seeking and the Court takes formal notice thereof.
M. S., hans forgænger og fru C føres som vidner.
The application for annulment
Således fastsætter gennemførelsesforordningens regel 9 ikke de nærmere vilkår for anvendelse af artikel 78 i forordning nr. 40/94, der er af betydning i denne sag.
On 12 February 1997 the Office's account was credited with the amount of the application fee, that is to say ECU 975, plus ECU 200 representing the fee for restitutio in integrum.
Sagsøgerne har under den mundtlige forhandling frafaldet den anden hovedpåstand, hvilket Retten har taget til efterretning.
By letter of 18 March 1997 Mr S applied for restitutio in integrum 'as regards the award of a filing date.'
Da det fjerde anbringende således ikke kan støtte sagsøgernes annullationspåstand, skal Renen ikke undersøge dets retmæssighed.
In support of that application, Mr S submitted that the application fee had been paid out of time owing to an oversight by a member of his staff, Ms C.
Det første anbringende om, at artikel 27 i forordning nr. 40194 er uforenelig med visse internationale konventioner om beskyttelse af industriel ejendomsret
By letter of 4 September 1997 Mr S enquired as to what progress had been made in examining his applications for restitutio in integrum in the 'DAKOTA' matter and on seven other applications for registration.
Pariserkonventionen om beskyttelse af industriel ejendomsret indeholder ikke materielle bestemmelser, der regulerer vilkårene for fastsættelse af ansøgningsdatoer. Det fremgår af konventionens artikel 4, punkt A, stk. 2, at et andragendes forskriftsmæssighed skal afgøres i henhold til den nationale lovgivning i et unionsland eller til bilaterale eller multilaterale aftaler mellem unionslandene.
The pleas in law relied on in support of the action are that Article 27 of Regulation No 40/94 is incompatible with certain international conventions on the protection of industrial property; that the defendant failed to inform the applicants on its own initiative that there was a one-month timelimit for payment of the application fee under Article 27 of Regulation No 40/84; infringement of Article 78 of Regulation No 40/94; and, lastly, infringement of Rule 9(1) of the implementing regulation, under which the Office was under a duty to inform the applicants that their application for registration could not be accorded a filing date because the application fee had not been paid within the prescribed period.
De anbringender, der er anført til støtte for sagen, er henholdsvis, at artikel 27 i forordning nr. 40/94 er uforenelig med visse internationale konventioner om beskyttelse af industriel ejendomsret, at sagsøgte har undladt af egen drift at oplyse sagsøgerne om den i artikel 27 i forordning nr. 40/94 indrømmede frist for betaling af ansøgningsgebyret, at artikel 78 i forordning nr. 40/94 er tilsidesat, at gennemførelsesforordningens regel 9, stk. 1, er tilsidesat, idet Harmoniseringskontoret i henhold til denne regel skulle have meddelt sagsøgerne, at deres registreringsansøgning ikke kunne gives en ansøgningsdato, da ansøgningsgebyret ikke var betalt inden for den indrømmede frist.
By letter of 24 October 1997 the Office informed the applicants that their application for registration had been accorded a filing date of 12 February 1997, the date on which the application fee was paid.
Det fremgår endvidere af artikel 78, stk. 2, og artikel 90, stk. 3, i Munchen-konventionen om meddelelse af europæiske patenter, at ansøgningsgebyr skal betales senest en måned efter ansøgningens indlevering; i modsat fald anses patentansøgningen for at være trukket tilbage.
It must be observed at the outset that this action is solely for annulment of the Decision, inasmuch as it refused the applicants' request for restitutio in integrum, essentially by according as a filing date for their application for registration the date on which it was lodged at the Office, that is to say 15 April 1996.
Det skal indledningsvis præciseres, at den foreliggende sag alene omhandler annullation af afgørelsen, for så vidt som sagsøgernes begæring om restitutio in integrum blev afvist, idet begæringen i det væsentlige havde til formål, at deres registreringsansøgning fik den dato, hvor ansøgningen blev indgivet til Harmoniseringskontoret, nemlig den 15. april 19%, som ansøgningsdato.
By decision of 8 October 1998 the examiner dismissed the application for restitutio in integrum.
Det vil efter Retten opfattelse under hensyn til denne præcisering være hensigtsmæssigt først at behandle det fjerde anbringende.
On 27 November 1998 the applicants appealed to the Office under Article 59 of Regulation No 40/94 seeking annulment of that decision.
Washington-konventionen om det internationale samarbejde på patentområdet indeholder, som sagsøgerne også selv har anført i stævningens punkt 52, en udtrykkelig henvisning til Pariserkonventionen om beskyttelse af industriel ejendomsret.
In the light of that, the Court of First Instance considers it appropriate to deal with the fourth plea first.
Det fjerde anbringende om tilsidesættelse af gennemførelsesforordningens regel 9
Fourth plea in law: infringement of Rule 9 of the implementing regulation
Der findes således ikke i de påberåbte internationale konventioner, såfremt de er relevante, noget princip, som artikel 27 i forordning nr. 40^4 kan anses for at være uforenelig med.
That appeal was dismissed by a decision of the First Board of Appeal of 28 March 2000 (hereinafter 'the Decision').
Det fjerde anbringende anfægter reelt ikke lovligheden af afgørelsen, der, som Harmoniseringskontoret med rette har anført, ikke er omtvistet i den foreliggende sag, men Harmoniseringskontorets afgørelse, der fandtes i skrivelse af 24. oktober 1997, om at give
The fourth plea in fact amounts to a challenge to the legality not of the Decision, which, as the Office has correctly pointed out, is not being called into question in these proceedings, but of the Office's decision in its letter of 24 October 1997 to accord a filing date of 12 February 1997 to the applicants' application for registration.
er udvist den efter omstændighederne fornødne omhu i den forstand, dette udtryk er anvendt i artikel 78 i forordning nr. 40/94.
there was a one-month timelimit for payment of the application fee procedure for remedying applications for registration that enables applicants to obtain as their filing date the date on which they remedy any defects in their application.
Det andet anbringende om, at sagsøgte har undladt af egen drift at oplyse sagsøgerne om fristen for betaling af ansøgningsgebyret
Since the fourth plea does not support the applicants' request for annulment, there is no need for the Court to consider whether it is well founded.
Den undtagelsesvise arbejdsbyrde og organisationskravene, som sagsøgerne påstår at være underlagt med ikrafttrædelsen af forordning nr. 40/94, er i denne forbindelse uden enhver betydning.
It appears from the description of Mr S's system for monitoring time-limits described in the context of the second plea in law considered below that Mr S issued his staff with general instructions to ensure that the one-month timelimit for payment of the application fee laid down by Article 27 of Regulation No 40/94 was observed.
Det fremgår af M. S.' beskrivelse af hans ordning til kontrol af frister, som forklaret under det tredje anbringende, der er behandlet nedenfor, at M. S. har givet sine medarbejdere en general instruks om at sørge for, at fristerne for betaling af ansøgningsgebyr i artikel 27 i forordning nr. 40/94 overholdes.
Accordingly, given that the applicants' representative was aware of the obligation to pay the application fee within that time-limit, the alleged defect, if it were proven, is in any event irrelevant as, therefore, is the plea of infringement of the principle of equal treatment.
Anmodningen om vidneførsel
Third plea in law: infringement of Article 78 of Regulation No 40/94
Det fremgår af ovenstående, at Retten har kunnet afgøre sagen på grundlag af påstandene, anbringenderne og de argumenter, der er fremkommet under den skriftlige og mundtlige sagsbehandling samt på grundlag af de fremkomne bilag.
It follows from Article 4 A(2) of that Convention that the validity of filing is determined by the law of each of the countries in the Union or by bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between them.
Det tredje anbringende om tusidesættelse af artikel 78 i forordning nr. 40/94
Furthermore, it follows from the provisions of Articles 78(2) and 90(3) of the Munich Convention on the Grant of European Patents that the application fee must be paid within one month of filing the application at the latest, failing which the European patent application is deemed to be withdrawn.
Anmodningen om vidneførsel, som sagsøgerne er fremkommet med i deres tredje påstand, skal under disse omstændigheder afslås.
The exceptional workload and organisational strains to which the applicants claim they were subject as a result of the entry into force of Regulation No 40/94 are irrelevant in that connection.
Det kan ikke antages, at det er godtgjort, at der
The application for witnesses to be called
»1) Kontoret for Harmonisering i det Indre Marked (Varemærker og Design) frifindes.
The international conventions referred to, even if they were relevant, therefore do not establish any principle with which Article 27 of Regulation No 40/94 must be considered to be incompatible.
Sag T-188/99 Euroalliages / Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber Handelspolitik
That being so, the application for witnesses to be called by the applicants under the third head of their forms of order sought must be dismissed
*1) Sagens afvises.
20 June 2001 annulment)
2) Sagsøgeren betaler sagens omkostninger.·
(Dumping — Decision terminating an expiry review — Action for (Second Chamber, Extended Composition)
Sag C-330/00 Ρ Alsace International Car Services SARL (AICS) Regler for virksomhederne
Following a complaint lodged by the applicant in December 1990, the Commission adopted on 30 June 1992 Regulation (EEC) No 1808/92 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferrosilicon originating in Poland and Egypt.