natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
»1) Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber frifindes.
Advocate General P. Léger delivered his Opinion at the sitting of the Sixth Chamber on 16 December 1999.
Sag C-243/97 Den Hellenske Republik / Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber Landbrug
Case C-243/97 Hellenic Republic ν Commission of the European Communities Agriculture
»Afslutning af EUGFL-regnskaber — regnskabsåret 1993« (Sjette Afdeling)
1993 financial year)
for eksport af olivenolie fra Grækenland til tredjelande
2 413 383 890 in respect of exports of olive oil from Greece to non-member countries;
246 543 179 GRD for nedlæggelse af vinarealer)
GRD 246 543 179 in respect of wine (permanent abandonment of areas under vine);
82 224 025 GRD, 54 471 120 GRD og 97 597 184 GRD for offentlig oplagring af korn, og
GRD 82 224 025, GRD 54 471 120 and GRD 97 597 184 in respect of the public storage of cereals; and
Kommissionens beslutning påstås annulleret, i det omfang Kommissionen deri har fastslået, at EUGFL ikke skal finansiere følgende beløb: for manglende
The action seeks the annulment of that decision in so far as the Commission declared that the following amounts were not chargeable to the EAGGF:
1 531 502 946 GRD mængder hård hvede.
GRD 1 531 502 946 in respect of missing quantities of durum wheat.
1 322 433 341 GRD som følge af overskridelse af fristerne for betaling til modtagerne af støtte til produktion af olivenolie
GRD 1 322 433 341 in respect of failure to observe the deadlines for making payments to recipients of olive oil production aid;
Grundene til de korrektioner, der er blevet gennemført, er kort beskrevet i den sammenfattende rapport, dok. VI/5210/96 af 15. april 1997 om resultaterne af kontrollen i forbindelse med regnskabsafslutningen for EUGFL, Garantisektionen, for regnskabsåret 1993 (herefter »den sammenfattende rapport«).
The reasons for the corrections imposed are summarised in Summary Report No VI/5210/96 of 15 April 1997 on the results of inspections concerning the clearance of the EAGGF Guarantee Section accounts for 1993 (hereinafter 'the summary report").
2 031 347 293 GRD og 2 413 383 890 GRD
GRD 2 031 347 293 and GRD
Generaladvokat P. Léger fremsatte forslag til afgørelse i retsmødet (Sjette Afdeling) den 16. december 1999.
Advocate General P. Léger delivered his Opinion at the sitting of the Sixth Chamber on 16 December 1999.
»Appel — beslutning nr. 3855/91/EKSF (den femte kodeks for støtte til jern- og stålindustrien) — anmeldelse af påtænkte støtteforanstaltninger efter udløbet af den fastsatte frist — virkninger« (Sjette Afdeling)
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 5 June 1998, Salzgitter AG (formerly Preussag Stahl AG and hereinafter 'Salzgitter') brought an appeal against the judgment of 31 March 1998 in Preussag Stahl ν Commission (hereinafter 'the contested judgment'), in which the Court of First Instance dismissed its application for annulment of Commission Decision 96/544/ECSC of 29 May 1996 on State aid to Walzwerk Ilsenburg GmbH.
Kommissionen har gjort gældende, at appellen åbenbart må afvises, idet den i det væsentlige er en gentagelse af de anbringender, der blev fremført for Retten.
It is impossible to accept that the time­limit for notification laid down in the Fifth Code constitutes merely a procedural time­limit of an indicative nature.
Ved appelskrift indleveret til Domstolens Justitskontor den 5. juni 1998 har Salzgitter AG, tidligere Preussag Stahl AG (herefter »Salzgitter«) iværksat appel til prøvelse af dom afsagt den 31. marts 1998 af De Europæiske Fællesskabers Ret i Første Instans i sagen Preussag Stahl AG mod Kommissionen (herefter »den appellerede dom«), hvorved Retten frifandt Kommissionen for Preussag Stahl's påstand om annullation af Kommissionens beslutning 96/544/EKSF af 29. maj 1996 om statsstøtte til Walzwerk Ilsenburg GmbH.
In the contested judgment the Court of First Instance, after rejecting the Commission's objection that the action was inadmissible on the ground that it was out of time and constituted an abuse, examined and rejected each of the seven pleas put forward by the appellant in support of its claim that Decision 96/544 should be annulled.
Det bemærkes, at det fremgår af fast retspraksis, at de krav til begrundelsen af appellen, som fremgår af artikel 51 i EKSF- og EF-statutten for Domstolen og af artikel 112, stk. 1, litra c), i Domstolens procesreglement, ikke kan anses for opfyldt, når appelskriftet blot gentager eller nøjagtigt gengiver de anbringender og argumenter, der er blevet fremført for Retten.
Within the framework of each of those codes, the Commission was not entitled to authorise aid unless the plans to grant or alter it had been notified before the time­limit specifically laid down.
Imidlertid kan retsspørgsmål, som Retten har behandlet, diskuteres på ny under en appelsag, såfremt appellanten bestrider Rettens fortolkning eller anvendelse af fællesskabsretten.
Since that is a finding which touches on the competence of the Commission, it must be raised by the Court of its own motion even though none of the parties has asked it to do so.
I den appellerede dom fastslog Retten først, at Kommissionens formalitetsindsigelse om, at sagen var anlagt for sent og udgjorde unødig trætte, ikke kunne tages til følge, hvorefter den undersøgte og forkastede alle de syv anbringender, som sagsøgeren havde fremført til støtte for sin påstand om annullation af beslutning 96/544.
In support of its appeal, Salzgitter raises six grounds of appeal, concerning respectively the scope of the Commission's powers ratione temporis, the time available for examining proposed aid No 777/94, Article 6(4) of the Fifth Code, the principle of non­discrimination, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and, last, the obligation to state reasons.
Det kan ikke tiltrædes, at anmeldelsesfristen i den femte kodeks udgør en frist, som blot er vejledende.
The Court of First Instance therefore erred in the contested judgment in not holding of its own motion that since proposal No 777/94 had not been notified until after the expiry of the period laid down in Article 6 of the Fifth Code the Commission could in no way authorise the corresponding aid.
Kommissionen kunne hverken i henhold til den ene eller den anden kodeks godkende støtte, hvis de påtænkte foranstaltninger til indførelse eller ændring heraf ikke var blevet anmeldt til den inden udløbet af den foreskrevne frist.
The Commission requests the Court to declare the appeal manifestly inadmissible, in that it consists principally of a repetition of the pleas raised before the Court of First Instance.
Til støtte for appellen har Salzgitter fremført seks anbringender vedrørende Kommissionens kompetence i tidsmæssig henseende, fristen for undersøgelse af projekt nr. 777/94, artikel 6, stk. 4, i den femte kodeks, forbuddet mod forskelsbehandling, princippet om beskyttelse af den berettigede forventning samt
The Commission was required to adopt a negative decision in respect of proposal No 777/94, since it had not been notified to it within the prescribed period. The action brought against Decision 96/544 before the Court of First Instance therefore had to be dismissed irrespective of the pleas in law put forward in support of that action.
En konstatering, som vedrører Kommissionens kompetence, skal foretages af Fællesmarkedets begrundelsespligten.
According to settled case­law, where an appeal merely repeats or reproduces verbatim the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, it fails to satisfy the
Generaladvokat F.G. Jacobs fremsatte forslag til afgørelse i retsmødet (Sjette Afdeling) den 30. marts 2000.
He had argued mainly that the Court should rely on the Commission's failure to respect the preclusive notification time-limit in Article 6(1) of the fifth Code.
Dansk tekst foreligger endnu ikke.
He therefore proposed that the Court should
Præjudiciel »Bruxelles-konventionen — personelt anvendelsesområde - sagsøger med bopæl i en ikkekontraherende stat — materielt anvendelsesområde — kompetenceregler i forsikringssager—sag om en genforsikringsaftale« (Sjette Afdeling) i borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager, forelagt to præjudicielle spørgsmål om fortolkningen af bestemmelserne i afsnit II i konventionen (herefter »konventionen«).
Preliminary ruling (Brussels Convention — Personal scope — Plaintiff domiciled in a non-Contracting State -Material scope — Rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance — Dispute concerning a reinsurance contract) (Sixth Chamber)
genforsikringsaftalen på grundlag af oplysninger, som senere havde vist sig at være urigtige.
Group Josi owed CAD 54 679.34 in respect of its share in the reinsurance transaction.
Spørgsmålene er blevet rejst under en sag, som føres mellem på den ene side Universal General Insurance Company (herefter »UGIC«), i likvidation, som er et canadisk forsikringsselskab med hjemsted i Vancouver (Canada), og på den anden side Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA (herefter »Group Josi«), som er et belgisk genforsikringsselskab med hjemsted i Bruxelles (Belgien).
d'Appel (Court of Appeal), Versailles, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters two questions on the interpretation of the provisions of Title II ofthat convention (hereinafter 'the Convention').
Sagen drejer sig om et pengebeløb, som UGIC afkræver Group Josi i det sidstnævnte selskabs egenskab af deltager i en genforsikringsaftale.
In those circumstances, on 6 July 1994, UGIC brought proceedings against Group Josi before the Tribunal de Commerce (Commercial Court), Nanterre, France.
Group Josi bestred rettens kompetence og gjorde gældende, at rette værneting var Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles, i hvis retskreds Group Josi har sit hjemsted.
Those questions were raised in proceedings between Universal General Insurance Company ('UGIC'), in liquidation, an insurance company incorporated under Canadian law, having its registered office in Vancouver, Canada, and Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA ('Group Josi'), a reinsurance company incorporated under Belgian law, having its registered office in Brussels, concerning a sum of money claimed by UGIC from Group Josi in its capacity as party to a reinsurance contract.
Til støtte herfor påberåbte selskabet sig dels konventionen, dels — for det tilfælde, at de almindelige regler fandtes at være anvendelige i sagen — artikel 1247 i code civil (den franske borgerlige lovbog).
Group Josi argued that that court lacked jurisdiction since the Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, within whose territorial jurisdiction it has its registered office, had jurisdiction, and it relied, first, on the Convention and, second, in the event of the general law being found to apply, on Article 1247 of the French Code Civil (Civil Code).
Ved fax af 27. marts 1990 tilbød Euromepa Group Josi at deltage i genforsikringsaftalen, idet Euromepa anførte, at de »største reassurandører er Union Ruck med 24% og Agrippina Ruck med 20%«.
It is apparent from the documents in the case in the main proceedings that UGIC instructed its broker, Euromepa, a company incorporated under French law, having its registered office in France, to procure a reinsurance contract with effect from 1 April 1990 in relation to a portfolio of comprehensive home-occupiers' insurance polices based in Canada.
Ved dom af 27. juli 1995 fastslog Tribunal de commerce de Nanterre, at retten havde kompetence til at pådømme sagen, fordi UGIC var et canadisk selskab, som ikke havde et etableringssted inden for Fællesskabet, og den kompetenceindsigelse, der var fremsat på grundlag af konventionen, derfor ikke kunne gøres gældende over for UGIC.
By judgment of 27 July 1995, the Tribunal de Commerce, Nanterre, held that it had jurisdiction on the ground that UGIC is a company incorporated under Canadian law without a place of business in the Community and that the objection of lack of jurisdiction raised on the basis of the Convention cannot be applied to it.
Efter realitetsbehandling af sagen tilpligtede retten Group Josi at betale UGIC det påstævnte beløb med tillæg af rente efter loven fra den 6. juli 1994.
On the substance, the court ordered Group Josi to pay the sum claimed by UGIC, plus statutory interest as from 6 July 1994.
Ved fax af 6. april 1990 accepterede Group Josi at deltage med en andel på 7,5%.
By fax dated 27 March 1990, Euromepa offered Group Josi a share in that reinsurance contract, stating that 'the main reinsurers are Union Ruck with 24% and Agrippina Ruck with 20%'.
De præjudicielle spørgsmål
By fax of 6 April 1990, Group Josi agreed to acquire a 7.5% share.
Cour d'appel de Versailles har herefter fundet, at sagens afgørelse må bero på en fortolkning af konventionen, og retten har derfor besluttet at udsætte sagen og at forelægge Domstolen to præjudicielle spørgsmål.
Taking the view that, in those circumstances, the resolution of the dispute required an interpretation of the Convention, the Cour d'Appel, Versailles, decided to stay proceedings and to refer two questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
Den 28. marts 1990 havde Union Ruck meddelt Euromepa, at selskabet ikke ønskede at fortsætte sin deltagelse efter den 31. maj 1990, og Agrippina Ruck havde ved skrivelse af 30. marts 1990 meddelt Euromepa, at selskabet med virkning fra den 1. juni 1990 ville reducere sin andel til 10%. Baggrunden for selskabernes udtræden var ændringer i forretningspolitikken, som forsikringsselskabernes moderselskaber krævede gennemført, fordi disse allerede var etableret i amerikanske lande.
On 28 March 1990, Union Ruck had told Euromepa that it did not intend to retain its share after 31 May 1990 and, by letter of 30 March 1990, Agrippina Ruck had informed the same broker that it would reduce its share to 10% with effect from 1 June 1990, the reason for those withdrawals being changes in economic policy imposed by the American-based parent companies of those insurance undertakings.
Den 25. februar 1991 fremsendte Euromepa til Group Josi et kontoudtog, som udviste et skyldigt beløb, og dernæst en endelig afregning, hvoraf det fremgik, at Group Josi for sin andel i genforsikringen skyldte et beløb på 54 679,34 CAD.
On 25 February 1991, Euromepa sent Group Josi first a statement of account showing a debit balance and then a final calculation showing that
Med henblik på besvarelsen af dette spørgsmål skal det indledningsvis fremhæves, at de fælles regler for kompetencetildelingen, som er opstillet i konventionens afsnit II, tager udgangspunkt i den principielle regel i artikel 2, stk. 1, om, at
By its first question, the national court essentially seeks to ascertain whether the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention apply where the defendant has its domicile or seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member country.
kontraherende stat, på hvis område sagsøgte har bopæl eller er etableret, har kompetencen.
In order to answer that question, it is important to state at the outset that the system of common rules on conferment of jurisdiction established in Title II of the Convention is based on the general rule, set out in the first paragraph of Article 2, that persons domiciled in a Contracting State are to be sued in the courts of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the parties.
personer, der har bopæl på en kontraherende stats område, uanset parternes nationalitet, skal sagsøges ved retterne i denne stat.
The Convention enshrines, on the other hand, the fundamental principle that the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled or established are to have jurisdiction.
Heraf følger, at stedfæstelsen af sagsøgerens bopæl som hovedregel ikke har betydning for anvendelsen af de i konventionen opstillede kompetenceregler, idet anvendelsen af reglerne principielt alene beror på sagsøgtes bopæl i en kontraherende stat.
It follows that, as a general rule, the place where the plaintiff is domiciled is not relevant for the purpose of applying the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention, since that application is, in principle, dependent solely on the criterion of the defendant's domicile being in a Contracting State.
Det må konstateres, at konventionens afsnit II kun helt undtagelsesvist tillægger det afgørende betydning med hensyn til kompetencetildelingen, at sagsøgeren har bopæl i en kontraherende stat.
The Court finds that it is only in quite exceptional cases that Title II of the Convention accords decisive importance, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, to the plaintiff s domicile being in a Contracting State.
Dette er således kun tilfældet, hvis sagsøgeren gør brug af sin valgmulighed i henhold til konventionens artikel 5, nr. 2, artikel 8, stk. 1, nr. 2, og artikel 14, stk. 1, samt med hensyn til aftaler om kompetence i henhold til konventionens artikel 17, men da kun for det tilfælde, at sagsøgte ikke har bopæl i en kontraherende stat.
That is the case only if the plaintiff exercises the option open to him under Article 5(2), point 2 of the first paragraph of Article 8 and the first paragraph of Article 14 of the Convention, and also in matters relating to prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Convention, solely where the defendant's domicile is not situated in a Contracting State.
Ingen af disse tilfælde foreligger imidlertid i hovedsagen.
None of those specific cases is applicable in the case in the main proceedings.
Det fremgår af ordlyden af kompetencereglerne i konventionens afsnit II, afdeling 3, i forsikringssager, at de angår bestemte former for forsikringsaftaler, herunder lovpligtig forsikring, ansvarsforsikring, forsikring vedrørende en fast ejendom, søforsikring og luftfartsforsikring.
The rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance, laid down in Section 3 of Title II of the Convention, apply expressly to certain specific types of insurance contracts, such as compulsory insurance, liability insurance, insurance of immovable property and marine and aviation insurance.
Hertil kommer, at coassurance udtrykkeligt nævnes i konventionens artikel 8, stk. 1, nr. 3.
Furthermore, point 3 of the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention expressly refers to co-insurance.
Hertil kommer, at det er fast retspraksis, at kompetenceregler, der fraviger det almindelige princip i konventionens artikel 2, stk. 1, om, at kompetencen tilkommer retterne i den kontraherende stat, på hvis område sagsøgte har bopæl eller er etableret, ikke kan føre til en fortolkning, der rækker ud over de tilfælde, konventionen udtrykkeligt har for øje.
Furthermore, it is settled caselaw that the rules of jurisdiction which derogate from the general principle, set out in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, that the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled or established are to have jurisdiction, cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by the Convention.
At bestemmelserne har den funktion, at de beskytter den kontraktpart, som antages at være økonomisk set svagere og retligt set mindre erfaren end medkontrahenten, må indebære, at anvendelsen af de specielle kompetenceregler, der ved konventionen er indført med henblik herpå, ikke udvides til at omfatte personer, som ikke har behov for beskyttelsen.
The role of protecting the party deemed to be economically weaker and less experienced in legal matters than the other party to the contract which is fulfilled by those provisions implies that the application of the rules of special jurisdiction laid down to that end by the Convention should not be extended to persons for whom that protection is not justified.
Konventionen skal ikke, ud over de udtrykkeligt nævnte tilfælde, fortolkes således, at retterne på sagsøgerens bopæl, anerkendes at være kompetente, idet sagsøgeren i så fald gennem sit valg af bopæl ville kunne udpege den kompetente ret.
The Convention must not be interpreted as meaning that, otherwise than in the cases expressly provided for, it recognises the jurisdiction of the courts of the plaintiffs domicile and therefore enables a plaintiff to determine the court with jurisdiction by his choice of domicile.
Som allerede nævnt ovenfor er det imidlertid fast retspraksis, at kompetenceregler, der fraviger det almindelige princip i konventionens artikel 2, stk. 1, om, at kompetencen tilkommer retterne i den kontraherende stat, på hvis område sagsøgte har bopæl, ikke kan føre til en fortolkning, der rækker ud over de tilfælde, konventionen har for øje.
As has already been noted above, it is settled caselaw that the rules of jurisdiction which derogate from the general principle, laid down in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention, that the courts of the Contracting State in which the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction, cannot give rise to an interpretation going beyond the cases envisaged by the Convention.
Det bestemmes i konventionens artikel 4, at konventionens kompetenceregler ikke finder anvendelse, når sagsøgte ikke har bopæl på en kontraherende stats område, bekræfter artiklen imidlertid det grundlæggende princip, som er opstillet i konventionens artikel 2, stk. 1.
In so far as Article 4 of the Convention provides that the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention are not applicable where the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, it constitutes a confirmation of the fundamental principle set out in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention.
Konventionens forfattere har da også givet udtryk for, at retterne på det sted, hvor sagsøgeren har bopæl, ikke bør have kompetence til at pådømme sagen, ud over de tilfælde, i hvilke dette udtrykkeligt er bestemt i konventionen.
The framers of the Convention demonstrated their hostility towards the attribution of jurisdiction to the courts of the plaintiffs domicile otherwise than in the cases for which it expressly provides.
I konventionen opstilles der derimod grundlæggende princip om, at retterne i den
As is clear from the wording of the second paragraph of Article 2 and the second paragraph
»1) Afsnit II i konventionen af 27. september 1968 om retternes kompetence og om fuldbyrdebe af retsafgøreber i borgerlige sager, herunder handebsager, som ændret ved konventionen af 9. oktober 1978 om Kongeriget Danmarks, Irlands og Det Forenede Kongerige Storbritannien og Nordirlands tiltrædebe, ved konventionen af 25. oktober 1982 om Den Hellenske Republiks tiltrædebe og ved konventionen af 26. maj 1989 om Kongeriget Spaniens og Den Portugbbke Republiks tiltrædebe, finder principielt anvendebe, når sagsøgte har bopæl eller hjemsted på en kontraherende stats område, også selv om sagsøgeren har bopæl i et tredjeland Det forholder sig kun anderledes i de undtagelsestilfælde, hvor det af en udtrykkelig bestemmebe i konventionen fremgår, at anvendelsen af den fastsatte kompetenceregel berorpå, at sagsøgeren har bopæl på en kontraherende stats område.
Tuie II of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, as amended by the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, by the Convention of 25 October 1982 on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic and by the Convention of 26 May 1989 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, is in principle applicable where the defendant has its domicile or seat in a Contracting State, even if the plaintiff is domiciled in a non-member country. It would be otherwise only in exceptional cases where an express provision of that convention provides that the application of the rule of jurisdiction which it sets out is dependent on the plaintiff's domicile being in a Contracting State.