natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
unødvendigt træge: selv om Kommissionens kontrolbestemmelser oprindelig blev indført for at gøre det muligt for Rådet oftere at overdrage regeludstedende funktioner på tredje niveau til Kommissionen og således fungere som en forenklende faktor, hævdes det ofte, at de med tiden er blevet en komplicerende faktor.
Commission were originally introduced to enable the Council to confer third-level legislative functions on the Commission more frequently, and, therefore, as a simplifying factor, it is often asserted that they have with time become a complicating factor.
Selv om det bør bemærkes, at overvejelser om at ændre komitologien rejser andre spørgsmål, er det klart, at de nuværende ordninger viser sig at være meget tunge, selv for medlemsstater- nes regeringer1
While it should be noted that consideration of comitology changes raises wider issues, it is clear that the current arrangements are proving burdensome, even for the governments of the
Nogle argumenterer således for, at det nu bør overvejes at forenkle komito- logiprocedurerne yderligere.
Some accordingly argue that further simplification of the committee procedures should now be envisaged.
For nylig har disse overvejelser fået tilskyndelse fra Det Europæiske Råd, der i forbindelse med Lissabonprocessen har anmodet både EU-institutionerne og medlemsstaterne om at "udarbejde en strategi for forenkling af de lovgivningsmæssige rammer både nationalt og på fællesskabsplan, herunder en effektivisering af den offentlige forvaltning".
More recently, these discussions have received the encouragement of the European Council which, in the framework of the Lisbon process, called on the European institutions, and the Member States, to "set out a strategy to simplify the regulatory environment, including the performance of public administration, at both national and Community level."
Det er også i den sammenhæng, man skal se den brede debat om nye styreformer3, som Kommissionen iværksatte sidste år.
This context also encompasses the broad debate on governance 3 launched by the Commission last year.
Relevante punkter i den forbindelse er blandt andet: i)
Relevant points include the following:
I forbindelse med de lovgivningsmæssige procedurer bliver det ofte påpeget, at forberedelsesfasen ikke er fyldestgørende for så vidt angår konsekvenserne for de økonomiske aktører, der ville foretrække grundigere forudgående høring af de berørte miljøer, herunder vedrørende valget af den mest egnede form for indsats.
(i) in legislative procedures, it is often argued that the preparatory phase is not sufficient from the point of view of the impact on economic operators, who would prefer greater in-depth consultation in advance, including on the choice of the most appropriate form of action.
Fællesskabets retsakter menes ofte at være for detaljerede, tit som følge af vanskelige kompromis'er i de enkelte institutioner og mellem institutionerne.
(iii) Community legislative acts are often thought too detailed, frequently as a result of difficult compromises within and between the institutions.
Evaluering og revision af eksisterende retsakter anses for et andet område, hvor Kommissionen, de nationale forvaltninger samt de økonomiske og sociale aktører kan gennemføre en samordnet indsats.
(iv) Evaluation and review of existing acts is seen as another field for coordinated action on the part of the Commission, national administrations and economic and social operators.
Det overvejes at indføre en revisionsmekanisme i retsreglerne (sunset clause) i form af en frist for revision af retsakten.
Consideration is being given to the insertion of a revision mechanism (sunset clause) in legislative acts, in the form of a deadline for revision of the act.
Idéer til overvejelse efter konventets debat
Areas for further consideration following the debate within the Convention
Konventet har drøftet de spørgsmål, der behandles i denne note, især på plenarmødet den 23.24. maj 2002.
The Convention addressed the issues covered by this note during its plenary meeting on 23 and 24 May 2002.
Konventsmedlemmernes overvejelser, ønsker og kritik mundede ud i nogle idéer til overvejelse:
The following areas for further consideration emerged from the ideas, wishes and criticisms expressed by members of the Convention.
Et stort flertal af konventsmedlemmerne kritiserede de mange forskellige typer instrumenter, som EU råder over til at udøve sine kompetencer.
A large majority of members of the Convention criticised the excessive proliferation of instruments available to the Union to exercise its competences.
De lagde vægt på, at der er behov for at rationalisere disse instrumenter ved at omdefinere og forenkle dem samt reducere deres antal, men også ved at tage deres nuværende betegnelser op til revision.
They stressed the need to rationalise those instruments, by redefining and simplifying them and reducing their number, but also by re-examining what they are currently called.
Med deres kritik af traktaternes nuværende søjlestruktur var der mange konventsmedlemmer, som gik ind for en mere ensartet udformning af instrumenterne i de tre søjler eller i det mindste i den første (fællesskabsdelen) og den tredje (strafferetligt samarbejde), hvor instrumenternes utilstrækkelighed blev fremhævet af mange konventsmedlemmer.
Criticising the pillar structure of the current Treaties, many members of the Convention were in favour of making instruments within the three pillars uniform, or at least of doing so in the first (Community) and third (cooperation in criminal matters) where the disparity between instruments has been highlighted by many members of the Convention.
Derfor blev der også lagt vægt på nødvendigheden af at bevare fællesskabsrettens og dens instrumenters unikke karakter, især deres forrang og direkte retsvirkning.
The need to preserve the unique characteristics of Community law and its instruments, particularly precedence and direct application, was mentioned in this context.
Skal instrumenterne katalogiseres efter, hvor kraftigt EU's indgreb er?
Should the instruments be catalogued according to the intensity of the Union's action?
Mange kritiserede den overdrevne detaljeringsgrad, der ofte præger fællesskabslovgivningen.Der blev argumenteret for hyppigere brug af rammelovgivning.
The excessive detail which is said often to characterise Community legislation was the subject of much criticism. More frequent use of framework legislation was advocated.
Nogle konventsmedlemmer mente, at der bør opstilles en klassificering over de forskellige typer EU-indsats, efter hvor omfattende deres virkning er (regulering med ensartet anvendelse, fuldstændig harmonisering eller minimumsharmonisering, gensidig anerkendelse, bindende eller "åben" koordinering).
Some members of the Convention believed that types of Union involvement should be classified according to their intensity (rules of uniform application, complete or minimal harmonisation, mutual recognition, binding or "open" coordination).
Mange konventsmedlemmer mener derimod, at det vil være umuligt at etablere en sammenhæng mellem de forskellige typer retlige instrumenter (forordning, direktiv, beslutning ...) og de forskellige kompetencekategorier (enekompetence, delt eller komplementær kompetence) eller virkningen af EU's indsats. Det vil f.eks. kunne vise sig nødvendigt at bruge forordninger til gensidig anerkendelse eller til et beskedent økonomisk program.
On the other hand, many members of the Convention believed that it would not be possible to establish a correlation between the types of legal instrument (regulation, directive, decision, etc.) and the categories of competence (exclusive, shared, complementary) or the intensity of the Union's action.
Nogle medlemmer foreslog, at man ændrer instrumenternes betegnelse, således at deres karakter bedre kommer til udtryk (betegnelserne "lov" og "rammelov" blev nævnt som eksempel).
Some have proposed changing the names of the instruments, so as better to express their character (the names "law" and "framework law" have been mentioned as examples).
Institutionernes modus operandi
The institutions' modus operandi
Giver de nuværende procedurer sikkerhed for legitimitet, effektivitet og åbenhed i beslutningstagningen?
Do current procedures ensure the legitimacy, efficiency and transparency of decision-making?
Bør de forenkles?
Should they be simplified?
Mange konventsmedlemmer ønskede, at effektiviteten og legitimiteten i EU's beslutningstagning forbedres væsentligt.
Many members of the Convention want substantial improvements to the efficiency and legitimacy of decisionmaking procedures within the Union.
I den sammenhæng understregede flere nødvendigheden af at forenkle disse procedurer (bl.a. begrænse varigheden), og reducere deres antal.
Several have stressed the need to simplify procedures (particularly to limit the time they take) and reduce their number.
Andre bemærkede imidlertid, at målet om forenkling nødvendigvis vil møde begrænsninger i et EU præget af mangfoldighed, og at man bør bevare beslutningsprocessens særlige karakteristika, idet det vigtigste mål snarere skal være at gøre procedurerne mere gennemsigtige og forståelige for borgerne.
However, others have noted that the aim of simplification would inevitably meet constraints within a Union characterised by diversity, and that it would be better to retain the individuality of its decisionmaking process, with the main aim being rather to make those procedures more transparent and comprehensible for citizens.
Hvilke elementer i procedurerne skal ændres?
Which elements of the procedures should be modified?
Flere konventsmedlemmer gik ind for udvidet brug af afstemninger med kvalificeret flertal Nogle mente, at enstemmighed kan afløses af superkvalificeret flertal.
Several members of the Convention advocated an extension of qualified majority voting. Some felt that unanimity could be replaced by a superqualified majority.
Et stort flertal af konventsmedlemmerne gik ind for en styrkelse af det parlamentariske element i EU's beslutningsprocedurer.
A large majority of members of the Convention spoke in favour of strengthening the parliamentary element in the Union's decisionmaking procedures.
I den sammenhæng nævnte nogle dels behovet for, at de nationale parlamenter får en øget rolle i proceduren, dels nødvendigheden af at styrke Europa-Parlamentets beføjelser, bl.a. gennem en udvidelse eller en generalisering af dets rolle som medlovgiver.
Some highlighted the need for an increased role for national parliaments in this procedure, others the need to strengthen the powers of the European Parliament, especially by extending its role as co-legislator, or even making it the general rule.
Konventsmedlemmerne drøftede endvidere, om Kommissionen skal bevare sine beføjelser til at tage lovgivningsmæssige initiativer.
The question of maintaining the Commission's prerogatives to initiate legislation was also addressed by the members of the Convention.
Nogle medlemmer gik ind for at give Europa-Parla-mentet initiativret, andre ønskede endog at give de nationale parlamenter og/eller Rådet en sådan ret.
Some favoured granting a power of initiative to the European Parliament, with others even wanting this to be extended to national parliaments and/or the Council.
Andre afviste disse forslag og forsvarede Kommissionens eneinitiativret.
However, other members of the Convention rejected these proposals, defending the retention of the exclusive right of initiative of the Commission.
Skal der indføres et klarere regelhierarki?
Should a clearer hierarchy of acts be established?
Er det nødvendigt at skelne mere præcist mellem den lovgivende og den udøvende magt?
Should legislative and executive roles be distinguished more precisely?
Mange konventsmedlemmer gik ind for at indføre et klarere regelhierarki.
A number of members of the Convention spoke in favour of establishing a clearer hierarchy of acts.
Nogle talte for at indføre "organiske love" som et nyt instrument, der skal være forbeholdt bestemmelser af kvasiforfatningsmæssig karakter.
Some advocated the creation of "organic laws" as a new instrument reserved for provisions of a quasi-constitutional nature.
Nogle fandt det også nødvendigt at foretage en egentlig magtadskillelse.
Some also felt a need to establish a real separation of powers.
Det blev bekræftet, at der i højere grad bør skelnes mellem lovgivning og gennemførelsesbestemmelser.
The need to make a clearer distinction between legislative acts and implementing rules was affirmed.
Der bør rettes op på den nuværende komitologiordning, der er for kompliceret og ugennemsigtig.
The complexity and opacity of the current "comitology" system should be corrected.
Nogle gik ind for en kraftig beskæring af antallet af udvalg og mere åbenhed i deres arbejde.
Some favoured a considerable reduction in the number of committees, and greater transparency in their proceedings.
Andre mente, at lovgiveren skal have større mulighed for at kontrollere Kommissionens gennemførelsesaktivitet, eller at der skal indføres nye kontrolmekanismer.
Others advocated strengthening or creating new mechanisms for control by the legislator over the executive activity of the Commission.
En række konventsmedlemmer tog betydningen af lovgivningskvaliteten op.
A number of members of the Convention raised the importance of the quality of legislation.
Der blev rejst flere spørgsmål i denne forbindelse, navnlig behovet for i større omfang at høre de berørte kredse i løbet af lovgivningsprocessen samt betydningen af den rolle, som sammenslutninger og organisationer spiller som repræsentanter for de berørte kredse som "grænseflade" mellem borgerne og de politiske aktører.
Several issues were raised in this area, particularly the need to intensify consultations with those concerned throughout the legislative process, as well as the importance of the role of associations and organisations representing those concerned as an interface between citizens and political players.
Ifølge nogle konventsmedlemmer bør man oftere lade de berørte sektorer "regulere sig selv" eller benytte "samregulering" i form af samarbejde mellem disse sektorer og de offentlige myndigheder for at gøre beslutningsprocessen mindre tung på visse områder.
Some members of the Convention felt that more use should be made of methods of "self-regulation" by the sectors concerned, or of "co-regulation" by means of cooperation between those sectors and the authorities, so as to slim down the decisionmaking procedure in some areas.
Andre mener, at nye indsatsmetoder som åben koordinering bør nedfældes i traktaterne.
Others felt that new methods such as open coordination should be enshrined in the Treaties.
Konventsmedlemmerne mente endelig at have bemærket en vis mangel på sammenhæng i de instrumenter, EU og EF råder over til at udføre deres opgaver, hvilket rejser en række spørgsmål:
Overall, members of the Convention clearly perceived that the instruments available to the Union and the Community to carry out their tasks were in disarray, which raises several questions:
Er der brug for så mange instrumenter?
Is such a number of instruments necessary?
Skal man opstille en udtømmende liste over de instrumenter, EU benytter sig af, i én bestemmelse med en præcis definition af deres juridiske rækkevidde?
Should the instruments available to the Union be listed exhaustively in one single provision, with a precise definition of their legal scope?
Skal man af hensyn til klarheden nedfælde i traktaterne, hvilke virkninger visse af instrumenterne har fået gennem institutionernes praksis?
Should certain instruments which have gained acceptance through use by institutions be incorporated into the Treaties, thus clarifying their effects?
Skal en sådan liste ensrette instrumenterne i de tre søjler og deres retsvirkning?
Should such a catalogue make the instruments of the three pillars and their legal effects uniform?
Kunne man i det mindste overveje at harmonisere RIA-instrumenterne med EF-instrumenterne?
Would it at least be possible to harmonise JHA instruments with those of the Community pillar?
Skal der være en sammenhæng mellem de retlige instrumenter og virkningen af EU's/EF's indsats?
Should a correlation be established between legal instruments and the intensity of the Union's/Community's action?
Eller skal de klassificeres afhængigt af de forskellige typer beføjelser?
Or should they be classified according to the various types of competence involved?
Skal man snarere tilstræbe en sammenhæng mellem bestemte former for indgreb og virkningen af indsatsen?
Should a link rather be sought between certain types of intervention and the intensity of the action?
Skal man ændre benævnelsen på instrumenterne for at signalere deres virkninger og rækkevidde bedre?
Should the names of the instruments be modified so that their effects and scope are better understood?
Bør gennemførelsesbestemmelserne eventuelt have en særlig benævnelse?
Would it be useful to have a particular denomination for implementing rules?
Kunne man forestille sig, at det nedfældes i traktaterne, at retsakterne kun skal indeholde generelle principper og grundlæggende regler, mens detaljerne og de mere tekniske spørgsmål henvises til gennemførelsesbestemmelserne?
Would it be possible in the Treaties to limit legislative acts only to general principles and fundamental rules, so as to leave details and more technical questions to the implementing rules?
Eller skal man hellere opfordre lovgiveren til i højere grad at overlade normgivningen til Kommissionen ved at indføre en tilbagekaldelsesret, så lovgiveren effektivt kan kontrollere gennemførelsesbestemmelserne?
Should the legislator rather be encouraged to make more frequent use of the delegation of rule-making functions to the Commission, providing for a power of retrieval which would make it possible to control the implementing rules effectively?
Bør man overveje at forenkle komitologiprocedurerne endnu mere?
Should comitology procedures be simplified further?
Så meget, at de begrænses til en rent konsultativ funktion?
Should this go as far as restricting them to a consultative function?
Forbedring af procedurerne for vedtagelse af retlige instrumenter
Improving procedures for the adoption of legal instruments
Kunne man overveje at nedsætte antallet af procedurer og eventuelt forenkle dem?
Should the number of procedures be reduced or should they be simplified?
Bør der indføres generelle regler?
Should general rules be laid down?
Bør kvalificeret flertal være den normale afstemningsmetode?
Should voting by a qualified majority be put into general use?
Fælles beslutningstagning?
And codecision?
Hvilke områder bør fortsat kræve enstemmighed, og ud fra hvilke kriterier?
What subjects would retain unanimity, and on what criteria would this depend?
Bør man i stedet for enstemmighed indføre et superkvalificeret flertal for visse følsomme områder?
Should a superqualified majority be stipulated instead of unanimity for certain sensitive issues?
Vil det være nyttigt at fastlægge de lovgivningsmæssige og udøvende funktioner i traktaterne og præcisere, hvilke institutioner der har kompetence og i hvilket omfang?
Would it be useful to define legislative and executive functions in the Treaties, specifying which institution was responsible for them and to what extent?
Er det nødvendigt at sondre mere klart mellem retsakter og gennemførelsesbestemmelserog tydeliggøre dette i retsakternes benævnelse?
Is it necessary to make a clearer distinction between legislative acts and implementing rules and to make this explicit in the names of the acts?
Kunne man tænke sig, at der i traktaterne fastsættes et klart og eksplicit regelhierarki?
Is it possible to enshrine a clear and explicit hierarchy of acts in the Treaties?
Skal der som led i et sådant hierarki etableres en sammenhæng mellem beslutningsprocedurerne og de forskellige regelniveauer?
In the context of such a hierarchy, should a correlation be established between decisionmaking procedures and the various levels of act?
Bør de juridiske instrumenter ikke alene klassificeres efter deres form og virkning, men også efter hvilken procedure de vedtages efter?
Should legal instruments be classified not only according to their form and effects but also the procedure by which they are adopted?
Lovgivningskvaliteten
Quality of legislation
Hvordan kan de lovgivningsmæssige rammer forbedres?
How could the regulatory environment be improved?
Skal man i højere grad benytte uformelle mekanismer, der allerede anvendes i praksis?
Should recourse to the informal mechanisms already used in practice be promoted?
Eller skal man overveje mere tilbundsgående reformer af traktaterne?
Or should there be a more profound reform of the Treaties?
Skal bestemte uformelle mekanismer nedfældes i traktaterne?
Should some of these informal mechanisms be incorporated into the Treaties?
NOTEfra: til: Vedr.: præsidiet konventet Lovgivningsprocedurerne (herunder budgetproceduren): – status
Praesidium Convention
Hermed følger til medlemmerne af konventet et arbejdsdokument om lovgivningsprocedurerne, herunder budgetproceduren.
Members of the Convention will find attached a discussion paper on legislative procedures, including the budgetary procedure.
Det er meningen, at dette dokument og de idéer til overvejelse, der er anført i afsnit IV, skal danne udgangspunkt for debatten på konventets plenarmøde den 12.-13. september 2002.
This document and the avenues to be explored identified in Chapter IV of the document are intended to serve as a basis for the debate to take place at the plenary session of the Convention on 12 and 13 September 2002.
Lovgivningsproceduren har gennemgået en betydelig udvikling siden Rom-traktaten af 25. marts 1957.
Legislative procedure has evolved considerably since the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957.
Det, der særlig kendetegnede den, var Kommissionens initiativmonopol og Rådets beslutningsmyndighed, medens Parlamentet kun havde ret til at blive hørt (almindelig høring, én behandling).
It was basically characterised by the Commission having sole right of initiative and the Council having the power of decision, with the Parliament only being allowed the right to be consulted (ordinary consultation, with one reading).
Ved den europæiske fælles akt (som trådte i kraft den 1. juli 1987) indførte man samarbejdsproceduren (to høringer) i forbindelse med indførelsen af det indre marked, men denne procedure bruges praktisk taget ikke mere i dag, undtagen i forbindelse med Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union.
The Single European Act (which entered into force on 1 July 1987) introduced the cooperation procedure (two readings) in the sphere of the establishment of the internal market, but this procedure has now fallen almost completely into disuse, except in the context of Economic and Monetary Union.
Ved Maastricht-traktaten (der trådte i kraft den 1. november 1993) indførte man proceduren med fælles beslutningstagning.
The Treaty of Maastricht (which entered into force on 1 November 1993) introduced the codecision procedure.
Denne procedure blev først anvendt inden for 15 områder, og ved Amsterdamtraktaten (der trådte i kraft den 1. maj 1999) blev den derefter udvidet til at gælde for 24 områder.
This procedure applied initially in 15 areas, subsequently extended to 24 areas by the Treaty of Amsterdam (which entered into force on 1 May 1999).
Ved Nicetraktaten blev dens anvendelsesområde yderligere udvidet, og den må siges at være den mest anvendte lovgivningsprocedure i dag.
The Treaty of Nice extended its scope yet further, and it could nowadays be described as the dominant legislative procedure.
Den adskiller sig fra samarbejdsproceduren på to vigtige punkter: forligsfasen og det faktum, at Rådet ikke kan gennemtrumfe noget over for Parlamentet, selv ved enstemmighed.
It is distinct from the cooperation procedure in two essential ways: the conciliation phase, and the fact that it is impossible for the Council to impose its will on the Parliament, even by unanimity.
Budgetproceduren har ligeledes gennemgået en betydelig udvikling.
The budgetary procedure has also evolved considerably.