natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ledelse og tilsynsførende berettede i det store hele, at introduktio nen af arbejdstagerrepræsentanter havde haft ubetydelig indflydelse på dem i deres job, men de gik stadigvæk ind for tanken med at have ar bejdstagerrepræsentanter.
Management and supervision generally reported the advent of worker directors as having had little impact on them in their jobs but were still generally in favour of the idea of having worker directors.
Blandt fordelene, ledelse og tilsynsførende så i at have arbejdstagerrepræsentanter, kan nævnes, at ledelsen nu havde større tillid til, at dens udtalelser kunne kontrolleres gennem en uafhængig kilde. Andre anså det også for at være en fordel, at man nu havde arbejdstagerrepræsentanter, der havde interesse i selskabet i modsætning til blot at have bestyrelsesmedlemmer udefra, og de mente også, at det'ville komme bestyrelsen til gode at have folk i denne, som var helt igennem fortrolige med enkelthederne vedr. virksomhedens drift.
Among the advantages management and supervisors saw in having worker directors were increased credibility for management in that what management was saying could be checked out with an independent source; some saw it too as an advantage to now have directors who had a stake in the company as opposed to just having outside directors and they also considered that Boards would benefit from having people on it who were well versed in the details of company operation.
Mens ledere og tilsynsførende i de fleste tilfælde stadig gik ind for tanken med arbejdstagerrepræsentanter, var de alligevel bekymrede over forholdet mellem arbejdstagerrepræsentanter og fagforbund, idet de men te, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne eventuelt ville kunne forfølge sær interesser. Desuden tvivlede man noget på, om de ville blive anset for at tjene sådanne interesser, dersom de fortsatte med at beholde deres fagforbundsposter.
Some managers and supervisors, while in most cases still remaining in favour of the notion of worker directors, expressed concern about the relationship between worker directors and trade unions considering that perhaps worker directors could pursue sectional interests and also wondering, if, by continuing to hold union positions, they would be seen as serving such interests,
Efter at eksperimentet havde varet i tolv til atten måneder, var syns punkterne blandt bestyrelsesmedlemmer og øverste ledelse stadig stort set positive undtagen i een virksomhed, hvor flertallets meninger var negative.
The views of Board members and senior management towards having worker directors were after twelve to eighteen months of the experiment still in the main positive, except for one company, where the views of a majority were negative.
Hvad de positive responser angår, udtrykte flere på den ene ene eller anden måde en overraskelse og lettelse over, at det var gået bedre end ventet.
Regarding the positive responses several people in one way or another expressed surprise or relief that it had worked out better than expected.
På debetsiden hævdedes det, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanternes syn på virksomheden er snæversynet, og at de kun interesserer sig for virk somheden, for så vidt som denne har indflydelse på arbejdernes umiddelbare interesser.
Among the reasons for positive views were a perception that worker directors had made a contribution to improved industrial relations, had helped through their detailed knowledge of company operations to make Board meetings more penetrating and informative and had thus increased the influence of the Board vis-a-vis executive management, had brought about a greater realisation of organisational and financial realities and had provided the Board with feedback on company climate.
I denne forbindelse blev det antydet, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne havde tendens til at være urealistiske, idet man kunne vente, at de reagerede positivt på forslag om virksomhedens udvidelse, men at de ville og faktisk har modsat sig forslag om nedskæringer, indskrænkninger eller rationalisering, hvis dette indebar strukturopsigelser.
On the debit side it was argued that worker directors take a sectional view of the company and are only interested in the company in so far as it affects the immediate interests of workers; it was suggested in this connection that worker directors could show a lack of realism in that they could be expected to respond favourably to proposals for expansion of activities but that proposals for cutbacks, retrenchments, or rationalisations particularly if they involved redundancy, would be and had been resisted.
Nogle af de adspurgte kom også ind på, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne ikke kunne skelne mellem bestyrelsens og ledelsens pligter, og at arbejdstagerrepræsentanter var tilbøjelige til at prøve at lede virksomheden fra bestyrelsesværelset.
A number of respondents also raised queries about worker directors not being fully cognisant of the distinction between directorial and managerial duties and of a tendency worker directors had to try to manage the company from the Board.
Før arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne blev valgt til bestyrelsen, forudså de eksisterende bestyrelsesmedlemmer og øverste ledelse, at fortrolighed muligvis ville frembyde den største vanskelighed.
Before directors were elected to the Board the issue of confidentiality was seen as possibly the' greatest difficulty envisaged by existing Board members and senior management.
Det var forfatternes ind tryk, at selskabets almindelige praksis m.h.t. omfanget af enkeltheder, der ekspederes på bestyrelsesplan, varierede betydeligt, og som følge heraf varierede problemet også.
As it turned out respondents in general said that in the main it did not arise as an issue up to now though some felt the advent of worker directors had inhibited discussion of industrial relations matters at Board level.
I nogle selskaber anvender den øverste ledelse allerede vidtrækkende diskretion, idet anliggender vedr. arbejdsmarkedstaktik og forhandlingspositioner ikke drøftes ret meget på bestyrelsesplan.
It was the authors' impression that company practice in regard to the level of detail which is dealt with at Board level varied considerably as did this problem as a consequence; in some companies seniormanagement already operate with very wide discretion and so matters having to do with industrial relations tactics and negotiating positions would not be discussed very much at Board level.
I andre selskaber var bestyrelsens rolle derimod bredere, og øverste ledelse indberettede ofte til bestyrelsen før og under forhandlinger.
On the other hand in other companies the role of the Board would be wider and senior management frequently reported to the Board before and during negotiations.
Under sådanne omstændigheder er det måske forståeligt, at tilstedeværelsen af arbejdstagerrepræsentanter eventuelt kan virke hæmmende på forhandlingerne.
In such circumstances, of course, the presence of worker directors might, conceivably inhibit proceedings.
Efter de adspurgtes meninger var de vigtigste fordele ved at have arbejdstagerrepræsentanter i bestyrelsen for det første, at de syntes, de nu sad inde med flere informationer om virksomheden end før, og at arbejderne for det andet nu havde en talsmand på højeste plan, som kun ne oplyse bestyrelsen om deres synspunkter.
The main benefits deriving from having worker directors in the views of respondents were firstly that they felt they now had more information about tine company than heretofore and secondly that employees had a voice at the highest level and could now make their views known at Board level.
I betragtning af ovennævnte var manglen på feedback fra arbejdstager repræsentanterne paradoksalt nok genstand for den stærkeste kritik fra tillidsmændenes side.
Paradoxically in view of the foregoing one of the main criticisms voiced by shop stewards was the lack of sufficient feedback from worker directors.
Disse lod således til at mene, at der var tale om nogen feedback, men den var ikke tilstrækkelig.
As far as shop stewards were concerned therefore it seemed to be a question of some feedback but not enough.
Tillidsmændenes anden væsentlige kritik af initiativet hidrørte fra de adspurgtes antagelse, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne blev stemt ned, at de ikke blev hørt eller på anden måde var ude af stand til at udøve deres -indflydelse eller at indflydelsen, de eventuelt ville kunne have på bestyrelsen, var begrænset.
The other main criticism levelled at the initiative by shop stewards sprang from a perception on the part of those interviewed that worker directors were outvoted, not listened to, or were otherwise unable to influence or were limited in the influence they could bring to bear on Board decisions.
Heltidsansatte fagforeningsrepræsentanter blev også interviewet som en del af projektets andet stadium.
Full time trade union officials were also interviewed as part of the second stage of the project.
I det store hele anså fagforenings repræsentanterne arbejdstagerrepræsentantens rolle for at være vanske lig og henviste til den konfliktbetonede position, de var blevet place ret i.
Generally trade union officials saw the role of worker director as a difficult one and mentioned the conflictful position in which he had been placed.
For størstedelen så de dog ret positivt på initiativet, men understregede som oftest, at det var livsvigtige spørgsmål, så som lønninger og arbejdsvilkår, snarere end virksomhedspolitik, arbejds tagerne var interesseret i.
For the most part they saw the initiative fairly positively but frequently pointed out that it was the bread and butter issues of wages and working conditions rather than company policy which employees were interested in.
Dette skabte efter deres mening en række problemer for arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne i bestyrelsen.
This posed a number of problems, as they saw it, for worker directors.
Der kunne for det første opstå pres fra værkstedsgulvet, som sigtede på arbejds tagerrepræsentanternes engagement i disse problemer, og det ville for det andet vise sig at være vanskeligt for arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne at få arbejderne interesseret i virksomhedens politik.
Firstly pressures would arise from the shop floor for worker directors to get involved in these issues and secondly it would prove difficult enough for worker directors to interest employees in company policy.
Hvad arbejdstagerrepræsentanternes indflydelse på deres egne stillin ger angår, mente fagforeningsrepræsentanterne med nogle få undtagelser, at denne indflydelse var meget ringe eller minimalt fordelagtig.
As regards the impact of worker directors on their own positions, with a couple of exceptions, trade union officials found it of very little impact or mildly useful.
Een enkelt var imod tanken og nogle få var mere begejstrede end gennem snittet.
One individual was against the idea and acouplewere more enthusiastic than the general run.
25 arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne holdt kontakten vedlige med arbejderne.
Almost all recognised a need for worker directors to keep in contact with employees.
De holdt imidlertid stejlt på, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne burde holde sig fra at blive indblandet i spørgsmål i forbindelse med over enskomstforhandlinger, og det var forfatternes indtryk, at de tog sig i agt for ikke at blive alt for impliceret.
They were adamant, however, that worker directors should steer clear of involvement in collective bargaining issues and the impression the authors got was that they were watchful to see they did not get so involved.
Et spørgsmål, der blev gransket nærmere med fagforbundsrepræsentanterne, vedrørte' forholdet, der burde eksistere mellem arbejdstagerrepræsentanter og fagforbund.
One question which was explored with trade union officials concerned the relationship which ought to exist between worker directors and trade unions.
I almindelighed tilstod fagforeningsrepræsentanterne arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne ret stor selvstændighed i stedet for at prøve på at kontrollere dem fuldstændigt.
Generally trade union officials would allow worker directors a fair degree of independence rather than seek to control them completely. One trade union
Een fagforeningsrepræsentant udtalte, at han ville bede arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne om informationer under visse omstændigheder eller anmode om at orientere dem, men han vil le overlade det til dem selv at vurdere, hvor meget de ville tage hensyn til hans synspunkter. Han ventede dog af dem, at de var specielt loyale over for folkene, der havde valgt dem, så som landmænd, der beskytter deres egne interesser.
22 official said he would ask the worker directors for information in certain circumstances or seek leave to brief them but he would leave it to their own judgment as to how much account they took of his views; he would expect them, however, to have a special loyalty towards those who elected them like the farmers, for instance, who protect their cwn interests.
Det er vigtigt at huske, at der ikke var gået to år, siden arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne overværede deres første bestyrelsesmøde'i nogen af virksomhederne, på hvilke Loven om medindflydelse på arbejdspladsen (statsejede foretagender) af 1977 finder anvendelse.
It is important to remember that in the case of none of the companies which come under the Worker Participation (State Enterprises) Act 1977, have two years elapsed since worker directors attended their first Board meeting.
Det var noget, et ret stort antal af de adspurgte henviste til i løbet af undersøgelsen: som svar på spørgsmålene understregede mange af de adspurgte, at det var for tidligt at drage konklusioner.
This was something which quite a few respondents remarked on during the research: many pointed out in response to questions that it was too early to draw conclusions.
Forfatterne kom ud for en række iøjnefaldende træk i forbindelse med eksperimentet under deres gennemgang af de hidtidige erfaringer.
A number of salient features in relation to the experiment struck the authors in reviewing the experience to date.
(a) På et tidligt tidspunkt blev det klart, at arbejdstagerrepræsentantens rolle er meget konfliktpræget.
(a) It became apparent to the authors at an early stage that the role of worker director is a very conflictful one.
Andre bestyrelsesmedlemmers forventninger er f.eks. i det store hele, at bestyrelsen tager sig af politik, mens forventningerne på organisationens lavere niveauer er, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne kan klare alt det, der er af betydning for de ansatte på et givet tidspunkt.
For instance, expectations of other directors by and large are that the Board deals with policy, whereas expectations at lower levels of the organisation are that worker directors can deal with whatever it is that is salient for employees at a particular point in time.
Der er flere etablerbare grupper, initiativet med arbejdstagerrepræsen tanter påvirker - arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne selv, bestyrelsesmedlem mer udefra, ledelse, fagforbund og de ansatte i almindelighed.
There are a number of identifiable groups on whom the worker director initiative impacts - the worker directors themselves, outside directors, management, trade unions and rank and file employees.
Alle disse grupper er normalt velvilligt indstillede over for ordningen med arbejdstagerrepræsentanter, om end grundene hertil varierer noget og under hensyntagen til nogle undtagelser i selve grupperne.
Generally all those groups are in favour of the idea of worker directors, if for somewhat different reasons and allowing for some exceptions within the groups.
Med de konfliktbetonede forventninger i øjeblikket er der en tendens til at mene, at andre forventninger end ens egne trænger til modificering.
At present where expectations are in conflict there is a tendency to see that set of expectations other than one's own as being the ones in need of modification.
Det er imidlertid et vigtigt punkt, at der ikke findes noget forum, hvor alle implicerede parter kan mødes og diskutere problemet og mest ningsforskellene om arbejdstagerrepræsentantens rolle.
Importantly, however, there is no forum where all the parties involved can meet to air the problem and the differing views on the role of worker director.
Og det er usand synligt, at der kan gøres ret meget til at reducere denne konfliktpræ gede rolle, der ikke direkte involverer de forskellige relevante par ter som sådanne.
And it is unlikely that much progress can be made to reduce this role conflict which does not directly involve the different parties themselves.
Det lader dog til, at der kunne gøres en hel del for at afhjælpe den ne situation.
It would appear that quite a good deal could be done to help the situation.
Fagforbundene .er f.eks. i det store hele tilbøjelige til at mene, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne bør holde sig fra problemer med tilknytning til overenskomstforhandlinger.
By and large, for instance, trade unions tend to the view that worker directors should steer clear of collective bargaining issues.
Hvis fagforbundene kun ne få deres medlemmer til at forstå dette, ville det bidrage til at definere arbejdstagerrepræsentanternes rolle over for de ansatte og til at give arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne deres godkendelse, når de hen viser krav om visse former for hjælp til fagforbundene som den rette kanal til behandlingen af sådanne krav.
If trade unions got this across to members it would help to define the role of worker directors for employees and give sanction to worker directors when they refer requests for particular kinds of help to trade unions as being the proper channel to handle them.
Bestyrelserne kunne også se nærmere på deres egne skikke og sædvaner og undersøge, om de eventuelt kunne gøre noget til imødekommelse af nogle af de ansattes forventninger om, hvorledes bestyrelsessystemet burde fungere nu, da arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne er impliceret.
Boards too could examine the customs and practices applying to themselves and see whether they could move to meet some of the expectations employees have of how the Board system should operate now that worker directors are involved.
Det ville også være en fordel, hvis der var en bedre forståelse i hele selskabet af bestyrelsens rolle og af ledelsens rolle og, af, hvor den ene begynder, og den anden ender.
It would also help if there was a greater degree of understanding throughout companies of the role of the Board and the role of management and of where one begins and the other ends.
27 forskellige grupper, så som ledelse og arbejdstagere eller ledelse og fagforbund, kan have ret stor indflydelse på arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne og på, hvad de ansatte venter af dem.
(b) The conditions in a company and the quality relationships between different groups such as management and employees or management and trade unions can have quite an impact on v/orker directors and what employees expect of them.
Fordi arbejdstagerrepræsentanternes rolle er så dårligt defineret, kan der meget vel være en tendens til at aflaste alle mulige problemer på arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne.
Because the role of worker director is so ill-defined there may well be a tendency to off-load on to worker directors all manner of problems.
Fordi denne rolle er så utilstrækkeligt defineret, for søger andre og ikke arbejdstagerrepræsentanten (omend undertiden måske med hjælp fra arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne) med andre ord at definere denne rolle på en pragmatisk måde.
In other words because the role is ill-defined people other than the worker director (and sometimes perhaps with help from the worker directors) attempt in pragmatic fashion to define the role.
I eet selskab var der f.eks. ret stor utilfredshed med, hvad man måske kan beskrive som frynsegoder ud over det almindelige beskæftigelsesforhold, og arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne udsattes for en del pres med sigte på en forbedring heraf.
In one company, for instance, there was quite a deal of dissatisfaction about what might be described as fringe employment conditions and the worker directors came under a deal of pressure to improve these.
Kommunikationsproblemer lader til at være typiske for tidsalderen, vi lever i, og arbejdstagerrepræsentanten menes naturligvis at have en rolle at spille i kommunikationsprocessen.
Problems of communication seem to typify the age we live in and of course the worker director is seen as having a part to play in the communication process.
Hvor vidt han bør indtage en central position eller blot gøre den til sin vigtigste målsætning er en anden sag.
Whether he should have a central role or whether he should make it a main aim is another matter; if there is a communication problem a solution is more likely to emerge if all concerned tackle it, than it is if dumped on somebody who happens to be a convenient receptacle for it.
(c) I nogle selskaber i modsætning til andre var indstillingen til med indflydelse bedre før arbejdstagerrepræsentantinitiativet, for så vidt som nogle af selskaberne havde forsøgt at engagere arbejdere og fagforbund i beslutningsprocessen.
(c) In some companies more than other there was a better climate of participation pre-dating the worker director initiative in the sense that some of the companies more than others had attempted to involve workers and trade unions in decision making.
Hvor dette var tilfældet, var det forfatternes indtryk, at arbejdstagerrepræsentanterne faldt hurtigere til end i selskaber med minimal forudgående medindflydelse.
Where this v/as the case it seemed to the authors that worker directors settled in more quickly than in companies where there was little participation.
Når der hersker uro, kan dette meget nemt få arbejdstagerrepræsentanten til at mene, at han bør gøre noget, selv om dette måske ikke helt er i overensstemmelse med rollen, han indtager.
Where there is turbulence the onus being felt by the worker director may well be to do something even if this something is not altogether appropriate to his role.
28 gør det umulige, og at han herefter får skylden, når han uvægerligt svigter.
In this situation too he can be expected to do the impossible and then blamed when inevitably he fails.
I form af et sammendrag har vi beskrevet arbejdstagerrepræsentantinitia- tivet, som det har udviklet sig hidtil.
We have outlined in summary form a description of the worker director initiative as it has developed to date.
I alle rapporter eller forsknings projekter er det præsenterede billede underkastet forskernes udvalg og fortolkning af begivenhederne med den ufuldstændighed og endog forudind- tagethed, dette medfører.
In any report or research project the picture presented is subject to selection and interpretation of events by the researchers with the incompleteness and even bias to which this gives rise.
En sammenfattende rapport er endnu mere udsat for sådanne farer.
A summary report is even more open to these dangers.
Vi håber imidlertid, at rapporten vil hjælpe læseren med at nå frem til en forståelse af noget, der i mange henseender er et spændende initiativ.
However, we hope that the report will help the reader to gain some understanding of what is in many respects an exciting initiative.
det europæiske institi til forbedring af leve-og arbejdsvilkårene
PARTICIPATION IN DANISH COMPANIES
SAMARBEJDE OG INDFLYDELSE
INSTITUTIONALIZED FORMS OF
I DANSKE VIRKSOMHEDER
PARTICIPATION IN DANISH COMPANIES
Denne rapport er en forkortet og ajourført version af en 1979-rapport med den samme titel, der allerede er udgivet uforkortet på dansk og engelsk.
This report is an abridged and updated version of a 1979 report of the same title, which has already been published in full in Danish and English.
Den udgør det danske bidrag til Det europæiske Instituts arbejde med ind virkningen af forskellige systemer af arbejdermedvirken og -ledelse på forbedringen af arbejdsorganisation og arbejdsmiljø.
It forms the Danish contribution to the European Foundation's work on the impact of different systems of workers' participation and control on the improvement of work organisation and work environment.