natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA foreligger et åbenbart urigtigt skøn, gælder det ikke desto mindre, at den retslige prøvelse skal kunne omfatte de faktiske omstændigheders rigtighed, fuldstændighed og troværdighed (jf. i denne retning dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, præmis 39, og dom af 22.11.2007, sag C-525/04 P, Spanien mod Lenzing, Sml. I, s. 9947, præmis 56 og 57).
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA absence of a manifest error of assessment, it none the less remains the case that the correctness, completeness and reliability of the facts on which a decision is based may be the subject of judicial review (see, to that effect, Commission v Tetra Laval, paragraph 39, and Case C-525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] ECR I-9947, paragraphs 56 and 57).
Det er navnlig således, at Fællesskabets retsinstanser kan undersøge, hvorvidt de faktiske og retlige forhold, som udøvelsen af skønsbeføjelsen afhænger af, er korrekte (jf. i denne retning dom af 21.11.1991, sag C-269/90, Technische Universität München, Sml. I, s. 5469, præmis 14).
Indeed, that is one of the ways in which the Community judicature can verify whether the factual and legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of assessment depends were present (see, to that effect, Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I-5469, paragraph 14).
Der følger heraf, at skønt klagepunktsmeddelelsen er midlertidig og på trods af den omstændighed, at Kommissionen ikke er forpligtet til at redegøre for eventuelle forskelle i forhold til klagepunktsmeddelelsen, er Retten ikke nødvendigvis forhindret i at anvende klagepunktsmeddelelsen ved fortolkningen af en kommissionsbeslutning, særligt for så vidt angår undersøgelsen af de faktiske omstændigheder, der ligger til grund herfor.
It follows that notwithstanding the preparatory and provisional nature of the statement of objections and despite the fact that the Commission is not obliged to explain any differences by comparison with the statement of objections, the Court of First Instance is not necessarily precluded from using the statement of objections in order to interpret a decision of the Commission, particularly as regards the examination of its factual basis.
Rettens henvisninger til klagepunktsmeddelelsen i den appellerede doms præmis 300, 302 og 308 inden for rammerne af Rettens vurdering af den anfægtede beslutnings begrundelse er — således som generaladvokaten ligeledes har anført særligt i punkt 165 og 166 i forslaget til afgørelse — alene illustrerende eller endog overflødige.
Thus, for example, the references to the statement of objections made by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 300, 302 and 308 of the judgment under appeal when reaching its findings in relation to the reasoning of the contested decision were, as the Advocate General pointed out in substance in points 165 and 166 of her Opinion, made for purely illustrative purposes, or simply for the sake of completeness.
Det samme gør sig gældende for visse af appellanterne citerede præmisser i dommen vedrørende Rettens vurdering af argumenterne om det åbenbart urigtige skøn, nemlig den appellerede doms præmis 338, 339, 341, 362, 402, 456, 467, 532 og 538, som alene tjener som illustration for og supplement til det, som Retten under alle omstændigheder allerede havde udledt direkte af den anfægtede beslutning.
The same applies to certain of the paragraphs of the judgment cited by the appellants which concern the evaluation by the Court of First Instance of the arguments alleging manifest errors of assessment, namely paragraphs 338, 339, 341, 362, 402, 456, 467, 532 and 538 of the judgment under appeal, which serve merely to illustrate and to supplement what the Court of First Instance had, in any event, already directly deduced from the contested decision.
Det skal imidlertid fastslås, at visse af de henvisninger til klagepunktsmeddelelsen, som findes i den appellerede dom, viser, at Retten på trods af sine egne bemærkninger, for så vidt angår meddelelsens midlertidige karakter, har tillagt den en mere troværdig og afgørende karakter, for så vidt som den i den appellerede doms præmis 410 har kvalificeret »de tidligere foretagne faktuelle konstateringer« i den pågældende meddelelse frem for konstateringerne i selve den anfægtede beslutning.
However, some of the references in the judgment under appeal to the statement of objections show that, notwithstanding the position it itself adopted as to the provisional nature of that statement, the Court of First Instance treated what, in paragraph 410 of the judgment, it termed ‘findings of fact made previously’ in that statement as being more reliable and more conclusive than the findings set out in the contested decision itself.
Retten har i denne forbindelse i det væsentlige lagt en sondring til grund mellem sådanne »tidligere foretagne faktuelle konstateringer« og »vurderinger«, hvor
The Court of First Instance, in effect, relied in that regard on a distinction between those ‘findings of fact made previously’, on the one hand, and ‘assessments’, on the
Retten har særligt i den appellerede doms præmis 379 kvalificeret det synspunkt, som findes i klagepunktsmeddelelsen, hvorefter »der er tilstrækkelige beviser for, at de store selskaber kender de andre store selskabers forretningsbetingelser«, ikke som værende »Kommissionens vurdering, som kan ændres, men snarere en faktuel konstatering, der følger af dens undersøgelse«.
In particular, in paragraph 379 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance classified the statement in the statement of objections that ‘there is sufficient evidence that the majors are aware of each other’s commercial terms’ as not being ‘an assessment by the Commission that might be modified, but rather a finding of fact resulting from its investigation’.
Rettens synspunkt skal ses i lyset af andre synspunkter, som Retten er fremkommet med tidligere i den appellerede dom.
That statement by the Court of First Instance should be understood in the light of other statements made previously in the judgment under appeal.
Retten har således bl.a. anført i den appellerede doms præmis 335, at »[den anfægtede beslutnings] vurderinger [bør] være forenelige med de faktuelle konstateringer i klagepunktsmeddelelsen, for så vidt det ikke er blevet påvist, at disse var ukorrekte«.
Thus, in paragraph 335 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance stated, among other things, that ‘the findings set out in the [contested decision] must be compatible with the findings of fact made in the statement of objections, in so far as it is not established that the latter findings were incorrect’.
Retten har endvidere bemærket i den appellerede doms præmis 378, at »de konklusioner, der drages af bevismaterialet i [den anfægtede beslutning], [afviger] ligeledes meget klart fra konstateringerne i klagepunktsmeddelelsen«.
In addition, in paragraph 378 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance stated that ‘the conclusions drawn from [the evidence as mentioned in the contested decision] are also markedly different from the findings made in the statement of objections’.
Retten har således ikke begrænset sig til at anvende klagepunktsmeddelelsen som et instrument til undersøgelse af rigtigheden, fuldstændigheden og troværdigheden af de faktiske omstændigheder, som ligger til grund for den anfægtede beslutning. Retten har tillagt visse konklusioner i meddelelsen bevisværdi, skønt disse alene skal betragtes som midlertidige.
Thus, the Court of First Instance did not merely use the statement of objections as a basis for verifying the correctness, completeness and reliability of the factual material which underpinned the contested decision.
Denne forståelse af klagepunktsmeddelelsen fremgår endvidere ligeledes af andre præmisser i den appellerede dom.
That conception of the statement of objections can also be seen in other paragraphs of the judgment under appeal.
Retten har således i den appellerede doms præmis 409 og 410 kritiseret Kommissionen for ikke at have afkræftet »de tidligere foretagne faktuelle konstateringer« i klagepunktsmeddelelsen.
Thus, in paragraphs 409 and 410 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance criticised the fact that the Commission did not refute the ‘findings of fact made previously’ in the statement of objections.
Appellanterne og Kommissionen foreholdes endvidere i dommens præmis 424, at de hverken har hævdet, »endsige påvist«, at en »konklusion« i meddelelsen var forkert.
In addition, in paragraph 424 of the judgment, the appellants and the Commission were criticised for not having asserted, ‘still less demonstrated’, that a ‘finding’ in the statement of objections was incorrect.
I den appellerede doms præmis 446 anføres tilsvarende, at »bemærkningen om, at der ikke var noget bevis for, at rabatterne havde påvirket priserne mærkbart, er snarere en faktuel konstatering end en vurdering«.
In paragraph 446 of the judgment under appeal, it was similarly indicated that ‘the observation that there was no evidence that discounts significantly affected prices constitutes a finding of fact rather than an assessment’.
Kommissionen kritiseres i øvrigt i dommens præmis 398, 419, 447 og 451 i det væsentlige for i høj grad at have lagt »de salgsfremmende rabatter« til grund i den anfægtede beslutning, mens Kommissionen som anført af Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 447, »ikke engang [fandt det] nødvendigt at nævne [disse] rabatter« i klagepunktsmeddelelsen.
Moreover, in paragraphs 398, 419, 447 and 451 of the judgment, the Commission was, in essence, criticised for having relied to a considerable extent, for the purposes of the contested decision, on the impact of ‘campaign discounts’, whereas, as the Court of First Instance indicated in paragraph 447 of the judgment, the Commission ‘did not even consider it necessary to mention [those] discounts in the statement of objections’.
Som Kommissionen har anført, er det imidlertid muligt, at de anmeldende parter i deres besvarelse af klagepunktsmeddelelsen i lyset af denne meddelelse supplerer eller afklarer deres »holdning« til det eller de pågældende markeders funktion, således at der tilføjes nye bevisforhold, eller således at de faktiske omstændigheder, som Kommissionen allerede har undersøgt, bliver erstattet i et helt nyt perspektiv.
As the Commission points out, it can happen that, in their reply to the statement of objections, the notifying parties will supplement or clarify their ‘case’ regarding the functioning of the market or markets in question in the light of that statement, so that new elements may be added or facts previously examined by the Commission may be put in an entirely different light.
Under sådanne omstændigheder kan Kommissionens vurdering af visse midlertidige individuelle konstateringer, som den har anført i klagepunktsmeddelelsen, i en ændret sammenhæng være fuldstændig anderledes, selvom disse konstateringers manglende grundlag ikke er blevet påvist.
In those circumstances, even if the lack of justification for certain of the individual findings of fact provisionally made by the Commission in the statement of objections is not established, the Commission’s evaluation of those findings in that new context may be radically different.
Ved i den appellerede dom at fokusere på forskellene mellem den anfægtede beslutning, som er genstand for den anlagte sag, og »de tidligere foretagne faktuelle konstateringer« i klagepunktsmeddelelsen, synes Retten at tilsidesætte denne mulighed.
In the judgment under appeal, it appears that the Court of First Instance, by focusing on the discrepancies between the contested decision, which was the subject of the action brought before it, and the ‘findings of fact previously made’ in the statement of objections, excluded that possibility.
Som Kommissionen har anført, forekommer Rettens synspunkt, som kan udledes af visse præmisser i den appellerede dom, at bygge på en antagelse om, at Kommissionens midlertidige konklusioner i den pågældende meddelelse er fast forankret i utvetydige bevisforhold.
As the Commission argues, the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance in some paragraphs of the judgment under appeal appears to assume that the Commission’s provisional conclusions in the statement of objections are invariably based on unequivocal evidence.
Det kan imidlertid — eventuelt bortset fra ukontroverse forhold, der f.eks. på grund af deres empiriske og verificerbare karakter, er åbenlyse i en sådan grad, at de ikke kan anfægtes — ikke hævdes, at synspunkter i en klagepunktsmeddelelse ikke kan ændres som følge af svarene på en sådan meddelelse.
Apart, possibly, from noncontroversial elements which, for example, by reason of their empirical and verifiable nature are obvious to such a degree that they cannot be contested, it should not be assumed that assessments made in a statement of objections cannot be modified in the light of the replies to such a statement.
Selv hvis det antages, at Retten med rette kunne sondre mellem faktuelle konstateringer og vurderinger i klagepunktsmeddelelsen, skal det i øvrigt bemærkes, at Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 379 og 446 har kvalificeret visse vurderinger som faktuelle konstateringer, skønt der er tale om komplekse vurderinger, som under alle omstændigheder ikke kan betragtes som faktuelle konstateringer, der ikke kan ændres.
Furthermore, even if it were accepted that the Court of First Instance was entitled to make a distinction between the findings of fact and the assessments made in the statement of objections, it must be held that in paragraphs 379 and 446 of the judgment under appeal, it categorised as findings of fact certain complex assessments which could not in any event be considered as findings of fact that could not be modified.
Herefter skal det fastslås, at Retten har begået en retlig fejl, for så vidt som den i sin undersøgelse af argumenterne vedrørende åbenbart urigtige skøn har tillagt visse forhold i klagepunktsmeddelelsen bevisværdi uden at godtgøre grundene til, at disse forhold skulle betragtes som uanfægtelige, på trods af Kommissionens endelige standpunkt i den anfægtede beslutning.
In those circumstances, it must be held that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in so far as, in its examination of the line of argument alleging the existence of manifest errors of assessment, it treated certain elements in the statement of objections as being established, without demonstrating the reasons for which, notwithstanding the final position adopted by the Commission in the contested decision, those elements should be considered as being established beyond dispute.
Denne fejl kan imidlertid ikke i sig selv rejse tvivl ved Rettens vurdering i den appellerede doms præmis 377, hvorefter »bevismaterialet, således som der henvises til det i [den anfægtede beslutning], følgelig ikke [kan] underbygge de konklusioner, der drages af det«.
None the less, that error is not of itself capable of undermining the finding of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 377 of the judgment under appeal that ‘the evidence, as mentioned in the [contested decision], does not support the conclusions drawn from it’.
Følgelig kan fejlen ikke i sig selv føre til ophævelse af den appellerede dom.
Consequently, it is not of itself capable of leading to the setting aside of the judgment under appeal.
Der skal således tages stilling til de øvrige anbringender.
Further grounds of appeal thus fall to be examined.
Om det andet anbringende samt tredje anbringendes første led vedrørende retlige fejl, for så vidt som Retten har krævet af Kommissionen, at den skal foretage nye vurderinger som følge af besvarelsen af klagepunktsmeddelelsen, og har anvendt strenge bevisbestemmelser på besvarelse af klagepunktsmeddelelsen
The second ground of appeal, together with the first part of the third ground, alleging errors of law in that the Court of First Instance required the Commission to undertake new market investigations following the response to the statement of objections and applied an unduly high standard of proof to the evidence submitted in response to the statement of objections
Inden for rammerne af undersøgelsen af anbringendet om åbenbart urigtige skøn, for så vidt angår markedets gennemsigtighed, har Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 414 bl.a. bemærket, at »fusionsdeltagerne [ikke] kan vente til sidste øjeblik med at forelægge Kommissionen bevismateriale med henblik på at tilbagevise klagepunkter, som denne har fremsat rettidigt, eftersom den på dette tidspunkt ikke længere har mulighed for at foretage den nødvendige efterprøvelse.
In its examination of the plea alleging manifest errors of assessment in relation to the issue of market transparency, the Court of First Instance stated in paragraph 414 of the judgment under appeal, in particular, that ‘the parties to the concentration cannot wait until the last minute before submitting evidence to the Commission with a view to refuting objections raised at the proper time by the Commission, since the Commission would then no longer be in a position to carry out the necessary investigations.
I denne situation må det pågældende bevismateriale for med føje at kunne føre til tilbagevisning af Kommissionens klagepunkter i det mindste være i særlig grad troværdigt, objektivt, relevant og overbevisende«.
In such a hypothetical situation, that evidence must at the very least be particularly reliable, objective, relevant and cogent if it is to be capable of validly refuting the objections raised by the Commission’.
Retten har endvidere bemærket i den appellerede doms præmis 415, at Kommissionen ikke kan »gå så vidt som til ukontrolleret at overlade det til fusionsdeltagerne at varetage bestemte aspekter af undersøgelsen, navnlig ikke når, som i det foreliggende tilfælde, de pågældende aspekter udgør det afgørende punkt, hvorpå [den anfægtede beslutning] er baseret, og de af fusionsdeltagerne fremlagte vurderinger og oplysninger står i diametral modsætning til de oplysninger, Kommissionen har indsamlet under sin undersøgelse, og til de konklusioner, den har draget af dem«.
The Court of First Instance also held, in paragraph 415 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission cannot ‘go so far as to delegate, without supervision, responsibility for conducting certain parts of the investigation to the parties to the concentration, in particular where, as in the present case, those aspects constitute the crucial element on which the [contested decision] is based and where the data and assessments submitted by the parties to the concentration are diametrically opposite to the information gathered by the Commission during its investigation and also to the conclusions which it drew from that information’.
Flere steder i den appellerede dom bl.a. i præmis 398, 428 og 451 har Retten endvidere bemærket, at Kommissionen efter fusionsdeltagernes svar på klagepunktsmeddelelsen undlod at foretage nye markedsundersøgelser for at efterprøve, om der var grundlag for dens ændrede vurdering af den påtænkte fusion.
In addition, in a number of places in the judgment under appeal, among others in paragraphs 398, 428 and 451, the Court of First Instance stated that the Commission did not, following the response of the parties to the concentration to the statement of objections, carry out any new market investigations in order to test the validity of its altered assessment of the proposed concentration.
Med det andet anbringende har appellanterne gjort gældende, at Retten har begået en retlig fejl ved i det væsentlige at fastslå, at Kommissionen er forpligtet til at gennemføre nye markedsundersøgelser som følge af besvarelsen af klagepunktsmeddelelsen.
By the second ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in holding, in essence, that the Commission is required to undertake new market investigations following the response to the statement of objections.
Rettens konklusion, hvorefter Kommissionen har begået skønsfejl og begrundelsesfejl, fordi den ikke har foretaget nye undersøgelser, er imidlertid uden grundlag.
Its finding that the Commission committed errors of assessment and of reasoning because it did not undertake any new investigations is accordingly without foundation.
Med tredje anbringendes første led, som skal behandles sammen med andet anbringende, har appellanterne gjort gældende, at Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 414 reelt har antydet, at de beviser, som de anmeldende parter har fremlagt til besvarelse af klagepunktsmeddelelsen, er underlagt højere krav end dem, der finder anvendelse på de bevisforhold, som Kommissionen har anført i klagepunktsmeddelelsen til støtte for sine klagepunkter.
By the first part of the third ground, which should be considered together with the second ground, the appellants maintain that the Court of First Instance in effect suggested in paragraph 414 of the judgment under appeal that the exculpatory evidence submitted by the notifying parties in response to the statement of objections is subject to a higher standard of proof than that applied to the evidence cited by the Commission in the statement of objections.
Kommissionen har til støtte for appellanternes anbringender for det første gjort gældende, at henset til de korte frister, den er underlagt i henhold til forordningen, skal den have mulighed for at støtte sig på beviselementer, som appellanterne har fremlagt som svar på klagepunktsmeddelelsen, idet denne besvarelse er en del af den formelle procedure.
In support of the appellants, the Commission argues, first, that in view of the tight deadlines that it faces under the Regulation it must be able to rely on the evidence submitted by the appellants in the reply to the statement of objections, since that reply forms part of the formal proceedings.
I lighed med appellanterne har Kommissionen anført, at forordningen foreskriver pålæggelse af bøder eller tvangsbøder, hvis der gives urigtige eller mangelfulde oplysninger, og giver Kommissionen mulighed for at ophæve en beslutning, som bygger på urigtige oplysninger, som en af virksomhederne er ansvarlig for, eller som er opnået svigagtigt.
Like the appellants, it observes that the Regulation provides for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments where incorrect or misleading information is submitted and gives the Commission the power to revoke a decision based on incorrect information for which one of the undertakings is responsible or which has been obtained by deceit.
Kommissionen er for det andet af den opfattelse, at den appellerede doms præmis 414, hvori der redegøres for Rettens synspunkt angivet i dommens præmis 415-457, og som bygger på en mængde beviselementer, viser en række retlige fejl vedrørende bl.a. bevisværdien af de forhold, som er angivet som svar på klagepunktsmeddelelsen.
Secondly, the Commission considers that paragraph 414 of the judgment under appeal, which sets out the approach followed by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 415 to 457 of the judgment to a large body of evidence, reveals a number of related errors of law concerning, among other things, the probative value of the evidence submitted in response to the statement of objections.
Impala har anført, at Retten har taget hensyn til de strenge frister, som er fastsat i forordningen.
Impala submits that the Court of First Instance took into account the strict timetables laid down by the Regulation.
Den fastslog blot den omstændighed, at Kommissionen har undladt at foretage nogen yderligere markedsundersøgelse, uden at præcisere hvorvidt sådanne markedsundersøgelser skulle have været foretaget efter høringen.
It merely found as a fact that the Commission had failed to carry out any market investigations whatsoever, without stating whether, after the hearing, market investigations should have been carried out.
Impala er af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen burde have undersøgt problematikken vedrørende gennemsigtigheden og rabatterne, før den udsendte klagepunktsmeddelelsen.
According to Impala, the Commission should have investigated the problem of transparency and discounts before issuing the statement of objections.