natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Samordning af de økonomiske politikkerb) Debat om det sociale Europa (CONV 300/02 + COR 2 og CONV 374/02)
Coordination of economic policies(b) debate on a Social Europe (CONV 300/02 + COR 2 and CONV 374/02)
Anne VAN LANCKER – Europa-Parlamentet Proinsias DE ROSSA – Irland (parlamentet) Vytenis ANDRIUKAITIS – Litauen (parlamentet) Ben FAYOT – Luxembourg (parlamentet) Jürgen MEYER – Tyskland (parlamentet) Eduarda AZEVEDO – Portugal (parlamentet) Paraskevas AVGERINOS – Grækenland (parlamentet) Carlos CARNERO – Europa-Parlamentet Danny PIETERS – Belgien (parlamentet) Antonio TAJANI – Europa-Parlamentet Jan KOHOUT – Den Tjekkiske Republik (regeringen) Frans TIMMERMANS – Nederlandene (parlamentet) Per DALGAARD – Danmark (Folketinget)
1.Ms Anne VAN LANCKER – European Parliament 2.Mr Proinsias DE ROSSA – Ireland (Parliament) 3.Mr Vytenis ANDRIUKAITIS – Lithuania (Parliament) 4.Mr Ben FAYOT – Luxembourg (Parliament) 5.Mr Jürgen MEYER – Germany (Parliament) 6.Ms Eduarda AZEVEDO – Portugal (Parliament) 7.Mr Paraskevas AVGERINOS – Greece (Parliament) 8.Mr Carlos CARNERO – European Parliament 9.Mr Danny PIETERS – Belgium (Parliament) 10.Mr Antonio TAJANI – European Parliament 11.Mr Jan KOHOUT – Czech Republic (Government) 12.Mr Frans TIMMERMANS – Netherlands (Parliament) 13.Mr Per DALGAARD – Denmark (Parliament)
Orientering ved John Bruton om status over drøftelserne i Arbejdsgruppe X vedrørende Frihed, Sikkerhed og Retfærdighed
Progress report by Mr Bruton on the proceedings of Working Group X on Security and Justice
TALERLISTE (revideret)efter indlæggenes rækkefølge
LIST OF SPEAKERS (revised)following order of intervention
Fortsættelse af den indledende debat om det foreløbige udkast til en forfatningstraktat
Resumption of the preliminary debate on the preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty
Sammenfattende rapport vedrørende plenarmødet den 5.–6. december 2002Bruxelles
Summary report on the plenary session – Brussels, 5 and 6 December 2002 1
Forelæggelse af Kommissionens meddelelse ved formanden for Kommissionen, Romano Prodi
Presentation of the Commission communication by President Prodi
Formand Valéry Giscard d'Estaing åbnede plenarmødet i konventet og bød formanden for Kommissionen, Romano Prodi, velkommen.
Chairman Giscard D'Estaing opened the plenary session of the Covnention and welcomed the Commission President, Mr Romano Prodi.
Romano Prodi forelagde Kommissionens meddelelse af 4. december 2002 om institutionsopbygningen (KOM(2002) 728 endelig).
Mr Prodi then presented the Commission communication of 4 December 2002 on institutional architecture (COM(2002) 728 final).
Forenklingen af instrumenter og procedurer – Debat om rapporten fra Gruppe IX, der har Giuliano Amato som formand (dok. CONV 424/02) i)
Simplification of instruments and procedures – debate on the report by Group IX, chaired by Mr Amato (CONV424/02) i.
Forelæggelse af rapporten ved Giuliano Amato
Presentation of the report by Mr Amato
Guiliano Amato understregede straks, at opgaven med forenkling af procedurer og instrumenter ikke udelukkende er af teknisk karakter, men også rummer politiske udfordringer.
Mr Amato began by emphasising that simplifying procedures and instruments was not a purely technical exercise; there were political issues at stake as well.
Beslutningsprocedurerne varierer således afhængigt af, om de indebærer væsentlige politiske valg.
Hence, decisionmaking procedures varied according to whether or not they comprised fundamental policy choices.
For så vidt angår instrumenterne oplyste Giuliano Amato, at det i rapporten foreslås at reducere deres antal fra 15 til 6, idet der foretages en sondring ud fra deres virkning.
Mr Amato stated that the report suggested scaling down the number of instruments from 15 to 6, and distinguishing between them according to their effects.
Det drejer sig om
These would be:
– bindende instrumenter af lovgivningsmæssig karakter: love og rammelove, der skal afløse de nuværende forordninger og direktiver.
– – binding legislative instruments - laws and framework laws, intended to replace Regulations and Directives respectively.
Nogle af de nuværende "afgørelser", der vedtages inden for rammerne af den såkaldt komplementære kompetence, vil ligeledes blive udformet som "love". bindende instrumenter, der ikke har lovgivningsmæssig karakter: beslutninger og forordnin-ger.ikke-bindende instrumenter: henstillinger og udtalelser.
Some "decisions" currently adopted by way of "complementary competence" (assisting measures) would also take the form of "laws"; binding non-legislative instruments - Decisions and Regulations; non-binding instruments - Recommendations and Opinions.
Disse instrumenter vil ligeledes blive anvendt i forbindelse med de nuværende afsnit V og VI i TEU.
These instruments would also be used for the requirements of the current Titles V and VI TEU.
I afsnit V bliver hovedinstrumentet således "FUSP-beslutninger" (og "FUSP-gennemførelses-beslutninger"), mens love og rammelove vil blive anvendt på området retlige og indre anliggender.
Hence, in Title V, the main instruments would be the "CFSP Decision" (and the "CFSP implementing decision"), while laws and framework laws would be used in the justice and home affairs areas.
De såkaldt "atypiske" retsakter (konklusioner, resolutioner, meddelelser, mv.) bevares for at opfylde behovet for fleksibilitet, men de bør kun anvendes i de tilfælde, hvor det ikke er hensigten at anvende en formel retsakt.
"Non-standard" acts (conclusions, Resolutions, communications, etc.) would be retained, in the interests of flexibility, but they would be used only where there was no provision for recourse to a formal act.
For så vidt angår den åbne koordinationsmetode erindrede Giuliano Amato om, at gruppen anbefaler, at dens eksistens anerkendes i forfatningstraktaten, idet det præciseres, at denne form for fælles indsats fra medlemsstaternes side ikke kan træde i stedet for Unionens aktion på de områder, hvor dens kompetence er anerkendt.
The Group had recommended that the existence of the open method of coordination should be recognised in the Constitutional Treaty, whilst specifying that this mode of concerted action by Member States could not supplant Union action in areas where competence lay with the Union.
Som Giuliano Amato nævnte, har gruppen interesseret sig for at definere begrebet lovgivningsmæssig retsakt som en retsakt, der indeholder væsentlige elementer fra et område eller nye politiske valg.
As Mr Amato explained, the Working Group had focussed on defining the concept of a legislative act as containing essential elements in a given field or new policy choices.
Lovgiveren bevarer sin skønsbeføjelse med hensyn til fortolkningen af dette begreb.
The legislature would still have some degree of discretion in interpreting this concept.
For at tilskynde til, at lovgiveren ikke påtager sig at fastsætte regler for de tekniske sider og detailaspekterne af en retsakt, blev der fremført en idé om en ny type retsakt, "en delegeret retsakt", hvori visse elementer af en lovgivningsmæssig retsakt udbygges i detaljer eller tilpasses inden for rammerne af en bemyndigelse, der defineres af lovgiveren.
In order to discourage the legislature from going into the technical and detailed aspects of an act, the idea of a new type of act had been mooted; this was the "delegated act", which would flesh out the detail or amend certain elements of a legislative act under powers defined by the legislature.
Det vil i princippet være Kommissionen, der vedtager delegerede retsakter.
As a rule, delegated acts would be adopted by the Commission.
Giuliano Amato gjorde dog opmærksom på, at i visse tilfælde, navnlig i forbindelse med spørgsmål, der vil kunne tænkes at høre under de rådssammensætninger, der eventuelt får gennemførelsesbeføjelser (økonomi og finans, eksterne forbindelser, politisamarbejde), vil Rådet også kunne vedtage sådanne delegerede retsakter.
However, in some cases, particularly those likely to come under possible executive formations of the Council (ECOFIN, Foreign Affairs or Police Cooperation), delegated acts could also be adopted by the Council.
Det er lovgiveren selv, der afgør, om der skal anvendes delegerede retsakter.
The decision to have recourse to delegated acts would be taken by the legislature itself.
Delegerede retsakter skal omfattes af kontrolmekanismer, der fastsættes af lovgiveren i den lovgivningsmæssige retsakt.
The delegation of powers would be subject to control mechanisms to be laid down by the legislature in the legislative act.
For så vidt angår gennemførelsesretsakter erindrede Giuliano Amato om, at når udøvelsen af "loven" kræver, at disse vedtages på EU-plan (og ikke på medlemsstatsplan, som ellers er den generelle regel), bliver de i princippet vedtaget af Kommissionen eller i visse tilfælde Rådet (artikel 202 i TEF).
Mr Amato pointed out that when implementing acts for implementing a "law" were required to be adopted at Union level (instead of by the Member States, as was the rule), they would usually be adopted by the Commission or, in some cases, by the Council (Article 202 of the TEC).
Det bør fastsættes, at de ligeledes kan vedtages af regeludstedende myndigheder (agenturer).
Provision would also need to be made for them to be adopted by regulatory authorities (agencies).
Endelig vil visse retsakter, der vedtages direkte på grundlag af traktaterne, heller ikke længere have lovgivningsmæssig karakter (institutionernes og EU-organernes interne organisation, udnævnelser, Kommissionens eller Den Europæiske Centralbanks tekniske aktiviteter, gennemførelse af de væsentlige politiske valg, der er indeholdt i traktaten).
Lastly, some acts adopted directly on the basis of the Treaty were not legislative in character either (internal organisation of Union Institutions and bodies, appointments, technical activities by the Commission or the European Central Bank, implementation of fundamental policy choices contained in the Treaty).
For så vidt angår procedurerne anførte Giuliano Amato, at der kun tilsyneladende er tale om et højt antal, og at der navnlig findes adskillige varianter i forbindelse med høring af visse institutioner eller organer.
Mr Amato pointed out that although there did seem to be a large number of procedures, this was merely an impression resulting from the many variants for consultation of certain institutions or bodies.
Det anbefales i rapporten at udvide anvendelsen af den fælles beslutningsprocedure til samtlige lovgivningsmæssige retsakter, idet der anvendes kvalificeret flertal i Rådet, dog med forbehold af undtagelser.
The report recommended that the codecision procedure be extended to all legislative acts and accompanied by qualified majority voting in Council, subject to some exceptions.
Samarbejdsproceduren (der i øjeblikket dækker fire retsgrundlag) bortfalder og erstattes af den fælles beslutningsprocedure eller den almindelige høringsprocedure alt efter omstændighederne.
The cooperation procedure (which currently covered four legal bases) would be abolished and replaced by the codecision procedure or by ordinary consultation, as necessary.
Proceduren med samstemmende udtalelse anvendes kun i forbindelse med indgåelse af visse internationale aftaler.
The consent procedure would be kept for the conclusion of certain international agreements.
For så vidt angår de retsgrundlag, hvor det i øjeblikket er fastsat, at Europa-Parlamentet skal afgive almindelig udtalelse, bør de tages op til fornyet drøftelse på baggrund af de principper, der er opstillet i rapporten.
As for legal bases currently requiring ordinary consultation of the European Parliament, these should be reviewed in the light of the principles laid down in the report.
Giuliano Amato bemærkede ligeledes, at vurderingen i gruppens rapport er, at den fælles beslutningsprocedure som helhed er velfungerende.
It was stated in the Group's report that the codecision procedure was felt to be working well overall.
Sammensætningen af Forligsudvalget kan gøres mere fleksibel, dog med bevarelse af pariteten mellem Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet.
However, the composition of the conciliation committee could be made more flexible while retaining parity between the Parliament and the Council.
Der bør ikke sættes spørgsmålstegn ved Kommissionens eksklusive initiativret, men der er behov for at styrke de mekanismer, der allerede er fastsat i artikel 192 og 108 i TEF, og som åbner mulighed for, at Europa-Parlamentet eller Rådet anmoder Kommissionen om at få forelagt et lovgivningsforslag.
The Commission's sole right of initiative should not be called into question, but there should be an enhanced role for the mechanisms already provided for in Articles 192 and 108 of the TEC, whereby the Parliament or the Council could ask the Commission to submit a legislative proposal.
Endelig kan der foretages en sproglig revision af visse formuleringer.
Lastly, some terminology questions could be reviewed.
For så vidt angår budgetproceduren kunne der i forfatningstraktaten indskrives en række budgetprincipper (om balance mellem indtægter og udgifter, budgettets enhed, etårige budgetter, budgetdisciplin osv.).
On budgetary procedure, the Constitution could enshrine a number of budget-related principles (balance, unity, annual budget, budgetary discipline, etc.).
Det foreslås endvidere i rapporten at forenkle den årlige procedure i den udstrækning udgiftsdisciplinen bliver sikret, navnlig ved i traktaten at formalisere de finansielle overslag gennem en fastsættelse af udgiftslofter, såvel samlet som fordelt på udgiftsområder.
The report also proposed simplifying the annual procedure, provided that spending discipline was guaranteed, in particular by formalising in the Treaty the financial perspective setting overall expenditure ceilings by heading.
Giuliano Amato afsluttede sin fremlæggelse med at henvise til den del af rapporten, der behandler åbenhed, og hvori det navnlig anbefales, at institutionerne arbejder i fuld offentlighed inden for rammerne af deres lovgivende funktion, samt afsnittet om lovgivningens kvalitet.
Mr Amato concluded his presentation by alluding to the sections of the report on transparency, recommending inter alia that the institutions should sit in public when acting in a legislative capacity, and on the quality of legislation.
Plenarmødets debat
debate in plenary
Med hensyn til forenklingen af EU's retsakter tilsluttede et stort flertal af talerne sig gruppens rapport.
The great majority of speakers agreed with the Group's report as far as the simplification of Union acts was concerned.
Samtlige talere gik således ind for en radikal reduktion af antallet af EU's juridiske instrumenter (fra 15 til 6).
All speakers were in favour of a radical cut in the number of the Union's legal instruments (from fifteen down to six).
Medlemmerne af konventet gik ligeledes ind for at ændre betegnelserne for de to vigtigste lovgivningsinstrumenter, "forordninger" og "direktiver", til henholdsvis "love" og "rammelove", som er mere forståelige betegnelser for borgerne, og som bedre afspejler deres lovgivende karakter.
The Convention members were also in favour of changing the names of the main two legislative instruments, the "Regulation" and the "Directive", to "law and "framework law" respectively, as these terms would easier for the public to grasp and gave a better indication of their legislative character.
Betegnelsen "forordning" vil være forbeholdt vedtagelsen af gennemførelsesretsakter eller "delegerede retsakter" (såfremt dette begreb godkendes af konventet).
The term "Regulation" would be kept for the adoption of implementing acts or "delegated acts" (if this last concept were approved by the Convention).
Samtlige talere var således enige om at begrænse EU's lovgivningsinstrumenter til: "EU-love", "EU-rammelove", "beslutninger" (med større rækkevidde end for de nugældende), "forordninger", "henstillinger" og "udtalelser".
All the speakers were accordingly agreed that the Union's legal instruments should be confined to: "EU law", "EU framework law", "Decision" (broader in scope than at present), "Regulation", "Recommendation" and "Opinion".
De var også enige om, at disse instrumenter ligeledes bør anvendes på de områder, der i øjeblikket er omfattet af afsnit V og VI i TEU.
They further agreed that these instruments should also be used in areas currently covered by Titles V and VI of the TEU.
Nogle konventsmedlemmer gjorde opmærksom på behovet for, at "rammelovene" er mindre detaljerede, så medlemsstaterne har større spillerum til at gennemføre dem.
Some Convention members drew attention to the need for the "framework laws" to be less detailed in order to leave Member States more latitude when implementing them.
Visse konventsmedlemmer ønskede, at der indføres en ny type retsakter, nemlig "organiske love", som er underlagt forfatningen, men står over lovene.
Some members of the Convention wanted to create a new type of act, the "organic law", which would have less force than the Constitution but more than a law.
Endelig blev der givet udtryk for betænkeligheder med hensyn til at medtage den åbne koordinationsmetode i forfatningstraktaten.
Lastly, there were some misgivings on the inclusion of the open method of coordination in the Constitutional Treaty.
Dette vil gøre det muligt for lovgiveren at koncentrere sig om det egentlig afgørende inden for et område og, hvis det ønskes, at undgå at vedtage bestemmelser af mere teknisk karakter.
This would enable the legislative arm to concentrate on the truly important matters in a field and to relieve it of the task of adopting the more technical rules, if it so wished.
Den fælles beslutningstagning bør efter et stort flertal af talernes opfattelse være hovedreglen for vedtagelse af sådanne retsakter, selv om der bør fastsættes undtagelser.
A large majority of speakers felt that these acts should normally be adopted by codecision, although exceptions should be allowed.
Der var delte synspunkter om, hvorvidt der i traktaten bør indføjes et andet niveau med "delegerede" retsakter, der i detaljer udbygger eller tilpasser visse ikkeafgørende elementer i de lovgivningsmæssige retsakter.
Opinion was divided on introducing into the Treaty a second tier of "delegated" acts which would flesh out the detail or amend certain non-essential elements of legislative acts.
En række talere støttede gruppens forslag, mens andre ønskede at få begrebet yderligere præciseret og ligeledes ønskede en præcision af afgrænsningen mellem sådanne retsakter og gennemførelsesretsakter, inden de tog stilling til forslaget.
Some speakers supported the Working Group's proposal, whilst others wanted further clarification of the concept and of how these acts would differ from implementing acts, before they formed a view.
Visse konventsmedlemmer understregede vigtigheden af, at der i forfatningstraktaten fastsættes en "tilbagekaldelsesmekanisme" til fordel for lovgiveren, når denne anvender den delegerede lovgivningsmekanisme.
Some Convention members stressed how important it was for the Constitutional Treaty to include a "call-back" mechanism for the legislature when it had recourse to delegated legislation.
Opmærksomheden blev ligeledes henledt på behovet for at give medlemsstaterne større råderum til at gennemføre EU-retsakter på nationalt plan.
Attention was also drawn to the need to give Member States greater latitude in the implementation of Union acts at national level.
Nogle konventsmedlemmer erindrede om, at det er nødvendigt at ændre artikel 202 i TEF for at fastsætte, at det er Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet, der tildeler gennemførelsesbeføjelserne i forbindelse med retsakter vedtaget ved fælles beslutningstagning.
Some Convention members pointed to the need to amend Article 202 of the TEC to provide that, when acts were adopted by codecision, implementing powers were to be conferred by the Parliament and by the Council.
Nogle henviste til behovet for at foretage en forenkling af de eksisterende udvalg, hvis mekanismen med delegerede retsakter indføres i forfatningstraktaten.
Some pointed out that the existing committee structure would need to be simplified if the delegated act mechanism were introduced in the Constitutional Treaty.
For så vidt angår procedurerne var der bred enighed om ligeledes at lade vedtagelsen af lovgivningsmæssige retsakter være omfattet af den fælles beslutningsprocedure.
In the matter of procedures, a broad consensus emerged in favour of extending the codecision procedure to the adoption of legislative acts.
En række medlemmer af konventet understregede dog, at det er nødvendigt at fastsætte undtagelser på enkelte områder, der er særligt følsomme for visse medlemsstater.
However, a number of Convention members emphasised the need to allow exceptions in some areas of special sensitivity for particular Member States.
Social- og arbejdsmarkedsområdet, det fiskale område og landbrugsområdet blev nævnt.
Social affairs, taxation and agriculture were mentioned.
Andre medlemmer af konventet anførte, at hvis der skal være undtagelser, bør de være få og klart defineret.
Other Convention members stated that, if there were to be any exceptions, they should be few in number and clearly defined.
Visse konventsmedlemmer ønskede at udvide anvendelsen af den fælles beslutningsprocedure til de fire retsgrundlag, der i øjeblikket er omfattet af samarbejdsproceduren, mens andre foretrak den almindelige høringsprocedure.
Some Convention members wanted the codecision procedure to be extended to the four legal bases which currently came under the cooperation procedure, while others advocated the ordinary consultation procedure.
Nogle anmodede om, at der stilles krav om samstemmende udtalelse fra Europa-Parlamentet i forbindelse med indgåelse af samtlige internationale aftaler med henblik på at styrke den demokratiske kontrol med EU's optræden udadtil (navnlig inden for handelspolitik).
Some wanted Parliament's consent to be required for conclusion of all international agreements in order to strengthen democratic control of the Union's international activities (in particular as regards trade policy).
Med hensyn til forløbet af den fælles beslutningsprocedure rejste flere talere spørgsmålet om Rådets repræsentation i Forligsudvalget, idet de fandt, at denne afgørende fase kræver tilstedeværelse af ministre.
As regards conduct of the codecision procedure, a number of speakers raised the question of Council representation in the Conciliation Committee, and felt that given the importance of this stage in the proceedings, ministers would need to be present.
Flere talere henviste ligeledes til spørgsmålet om enstemmighed.
A number of speakers also raised the question of unanimity.
Nogle anbefalede helt at afskaffe denne model for beslutningstagning, også inden for den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik.
Some recommended doing away with this mode of decisionmaking altogether, even for the common foreign and security policy.
Flere fandt, at der fortsat bør anvendes enstemmighed, men kun i helt særlige undtagelsestilfælde.
A number of speakers felt that unanimity should be kept, but only for quite exceptional cases.
Det blev også foreslået, at enstemmighed i visse tilfælde kan erstattes af styrket kvalificeret (eller "superkvalificeret") flertal.
It was also suggested that, in some cases, unanimity might be replaced by enhanced qualified majority (or "super-qualified") voting.
Efter nogle konventsmedlemmers opfattelse bør der dog nødvendigvis fortsat anvendes enstemmighed i visse tilfælde, selv om den fælles beslutningsprocedure finder anvendelse.
Some Convention members felt it was imperative to retain unanimity in some cases, even where the codecision procedure applied.
For så vidt angår budgetproceduren var der bred enighed om behovet for, at hovedprincipperne for EU's budget anføres i en særskilt artikel i forfatningstraktaten.
As regards budgetary procedure, a broad consensus emerged on the need to list the major principles governing the Union budget in a specific article of the Constitutional Treaty.