natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Impala har anført, at Retten under alle omstændigheder har fastslået i den appellerede doms præmis 528, at Kommissionen ikke har foretaget nogen analyse af den forventede situation, for så vidt angår spørgsmålet, om den omhandlede fusion skabte en kollektiv dominerende stilling, og har fastslået, at Impalas andet anbringende alene af denne grund skulle tages til følge, hvilket i sig selv var tilstrækkeligt til at annullere den anfægtede beslutning.
Impala submits that, in any event, the Court of First Instance held in paragraph 528 of the judgment under appeal that the Commission did not carry out a prospective analysis of whether the concentration would create a collective dominant position, and held that for this reason alone that Impala’s second plea in law at first instance was well founded.
Impala er følgelig af den opfattelse, at selv om appellanterne får medhold i et eller flere af deres anbringender, skal appellen under
That, in itself, is sufficient to annul the contested decision. Accordingly, even if the appellants succeed on one or more of their grounds of appeal, the
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA alle omstændigheder forkastes, idet de ikke anfægter den omstændighed, at der ikke er foretaget nogen analyse af den forventede situation.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA appeal must in any event be dismissed, since the appellants do not contest the finding that no prospective analysis was carried out.
Det skal i denne forbindelse blot bemærkes, at der i appelskriftet i opregningen af de dele af dommen, der særligt kritiseres, henvises til præmis 528 samt til præmis 533, 539 og 541, der ligeledes vedrører spørgsmålet om skabelse af en kollektiv dominerende stilling på markedet.
In that regard, it is sufficient to hold that the appeal expressly refers, in a list of the passages in the judgment under appeal that are specifically subject to criticism, to paragraph 528 of that judgment, as well as to paragraphs 533, 539 and 541, which also address the question of the creation of a collective dominant position.
Henset hertil kan det ikke med følge gøres gældende, at appellen alene angår Rettens bemærkninger vedrørende spørgsmålet om styrkelse af en bestående dominerende stilling på markedet, og anbringendet skal derfor i det hele afvises.
That being the case, it cannot validly be argued that the appeal is limited to the reasoning of the Court of First Instance regarding the question of the strengthening of a pre-existing collective dominant position with the result that it should be rejected as inadmissible in its entirety.
De syv anbringender, som appellanterne har anført, dækker forskellige aspekter.
The seven grounds of appeal relied on by the appellants overlap in a number of respects.
Det første til fjerde anbringende samt det syvende anbringende vedrører i det væsentlige Rettens kontrolforanstaltninger navnlig med hensyn til bevisspørgsmålene.
Essentially, the first to fourth grounds, together with the seventh ground, concern the manner in which the Court of First Instance carried out its review, particularly with respect to questions of proof.
Femte anbringende vedrører begrebet kollektiv dominerende stilling.
The fifth ground concerns the concept of a collective dominant position.
Sjette anbringende vedrører Rettens vurdering af den anfægtede beslutnings utilstrækkelige begrundelse.
The sixth ground relates to the findings of the Court of First Instance with respect to the failure of the contested decision to state adequate reasons.
Det er hensigtsmæssigt at indlede realitetsbehandlingen af appellen med de anbringender, der vedrører Rettens behandling af beviselementerne og først tredje anbringendes andet led.
It is appropriate to begin the examination of the substance of this appeal by considering the grounds of appeal concerning the manner in which the Court of First Instance approached issues of evidence and proof, and, in the first place, by considering the second part of the third ground.
Om tredje anbringendes andet led vedrørende en retlig fejl, for så vidt som Retten har anvendt strenge bevisbestemmelser på beslutninger om godkendelse af fusioner
The second part of the third ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in that the Court of First Instance applied an excessive burden and standard of proof as regards decisions approving a concentration
Det fremgår bl.a. af den appellerede doms præmis 289, 366 og 459, at Retten har undersøgt, hvorvidt de forhold, der lå til grund for den anfægtede beslutning, kunne begrunde Kommissionens vurdering i beslutningen, hvorefter de omhandlede markeder ikke var tilstrækkeligt gennemsigtige til at muliggøre en kollektiv dominerende stilling.
It is apparent from, among others, paragraphs 289, 366 and 459 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance considered whether the considerations on which the contested decision was based were capable of justifying the Commission’s finding in that decision that the markets in question were not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position.
Med det tredje anbringende har appellanterne gjort gældende, at Retten har begået en retlig fejl ved at anvende fejlagtige og strenge bevisbestemmelser på beslutninger om godkendelse af fusioner.
By their third ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law by applying an incorrect and excessive standard of proof as regards merger clearance decisions.
Inden for rammerne af dette anbringendes andet led har appellanterne anført, at Retten har fejlfortolket de bevisbestemmelser, der skal finde anvendelse på sådanne beslutninger.
In the second part of that ground, the appellants submit that the Court of First Instance misconstrued the burden and standard of proof which applies to those decisions.
Appellanterne er af den opfattelse, at for så vidt som det tilkommer Kommissionen at underbygge en beslutning, som forbyder en fusion, skal den godkende en påtænkt fusion, hvis den ikke har kunnet indsamle beviser, som svarer til den høje norm fastlagt af Fællesskabets retsinstanser til godtgørelse af et sådant forbud, særligt når Kommissionen støtter sig på synspunktet om en kollektiv dominerende stilling.
According to the appellants, since it is for the Commission to substantiate a decision prohibiting a concentration, where it has not been able to collect evidence which meets the high standard set by the Community judicature to justify such a prohibition, particularly where the Commission is pursuing a theory of collective dom -inance, it must approve the proposed concentration.
Det fremgår således navnlig af forordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, at hvis Kommissionen ikke er i stand til at godtgøre en konkurrencemæssig skadevirkning på grundlag af overbevisende beviser, pålægger forordningens ordning den at godkende fusionen.
It is clear, in particular, from Article 10(6) of the Regulation that if the Commission is unable to substantiate its theory of competitive harm on the basis of convincing evidence, the scheme of the Regulation dictates that it must approve the concentration.
Appellanterne har endvidere anført i denne forbindelse, at Retten har begået en retlig fejl ved ikke at fastslå, at Kommissionen er underlagt højere beviskrav i tilfælde af forbud mod en fusion end ved godkendelse af en fusion, idet forbuddet udgør en alvorlig indskrænkning i de anmeldende parters erhvervsmæssige frihed, og idet fusioner skal antages at være i overensstemmelse med fællesmarkedet.
The appellants also maintain in that regard that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in failing to recognise that the Commission is obliged to satisfy a higher standard of proof when a concentration is prohibited than when such a concentration is approved, since a prohibition represents a serious limitation of the commercial freedom of the notifying parties and since concentrations should benefit from a presumption that they are compatible with the common market.
Det fremgår af retspraksis, at Kommissionen skal godtgøre, at en beslutning om at forbyde en fusion er grundet ud fra et strengere kriterium end blot en afvejning af sandsynlighederne, og at Kommissionen ikke er underlagt samme forpligtelse for så vidt angår beviset for en beslutning om godkendelse af en fusion, som ved en beslutning om at forbyde en sådan fusion.
It is clear from the caselaw that the Commission must prove that a decision prohibiting a concentration is well founded in accordance with a standard which is stricter than one based on the mere balancing of probabilities and, consequently, that the Commission is not subject to the same burden and standard of proof in the case of an approval decision as it is in the case of a prohibition decision.
I henhold til et strengere kriterium end blot en afvejning af sandsynlighederne er Kommissionen således reelt forpligtet til alene at bevise grundlaget for en beslutning om forbud mod en fusion.
Under a stricter standard than the mere balancing of probabilities, the Commission is, in reality, required only to prove that a decision prohibiting a concentration is well founded.
Appellanterne er af den opfattelse, at undladelsen af at fastslå en sådan »asymmetrisk« bevisnorm kendetegner den vurdering, som Retten har foretaget af den anfægtede beslutning og de beviser, som Kommissionen har lagt til grund.
According to the appellants, the failure to accept such an ‘asymmetric’ standard of proof permeates the assessment by the Court of First Instance of the contested decision and of the evidence on which the Commission relied.
Appellanterne har endvidere anført, at Retten følgelig har begået en retlig fejl ved at anmode Kommissionen om at bevise den manglende gennemsigtighed på markedet for indspillet musik, idet Retten burde have undersøgt, hvorvidt der på tidspunktet for den anfægtede beslutning var tilstrækkelige beviser til at fastslå, at en sådan gennemsigtighed forelå. Den appellerede dom er behæftet med denne fejl i sin helhed og særligt visse forhold, som er detaljeret beskrevet i appelskriftets punkt 381-387, 389, 420, 428, 429 og 433.
The appellants go on to submit that, as a result, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in requiring the Commission to prove the absence of transparency in the recorded music market, when it should have examined whether, at the date of the contested decision, there was sufficient evidence to prove to the requisite legal standard that that transparency existed.
At følge appellanternes argumentation til støtte for tredje anbringendes andet led og anerkende en antagelse om en fusions godkendelse ville ifølge Impala have alvorlige indvirkninger på ordningen med fusionskontrol, såsom risikoen for misbrug af systemet.
According to Impala, to follow the appellants’ line of argument in support of the second part of the third ground of appeal and to accept that there is a presumption in favour of the approval of concentrations could have grave repercussions for the merger control regime, such as the risk of abuse of the system.
Argumentationen tilsidesætter den hårfine balance, som er skabt ved Fællesskabets bestemmelse om fusionskontrol, mellem private og offentlige interesser og Kommissionens »dobbelte symmetriske forpligtelse« til at forbyde fusioner, der er uforenelige med fællesmarkedet og godkende dem, som er forenelige hermed.
That line of argument ignores the delicate balance created by the Community legislation on merger control between private and public interests and the symmetrical double obligation imposed on the Commission to prohibit mergers which are incompatible with the common market and to approve those that are compatible with it.
De krævede bevisbestemmelser svarer i denne forbindelse til en afvejning af sandsynlighederne, og det tilkommer Kommissionen at godtgøre, hvad der er mest sandsynligt.
The standard of proof required in that regard is that of the balance of probabilities and it is for the Commission to demonstrate where the balance falls.
Impala har i øvrigt anført, at Retten for det første har fastslået, at Kommissionen
Impala also submits that the
DOM AF 10.7.2008 — SAG C-413/06 P har samlet en række overbevisende bevisforhold for, at der var gennemsigtighed på de pågældende markeder, men at Kommissionen imidlertid til slut fandt, at denne gennemsigtighed var utilstrækkelig på grundlag af de »mindre gennemsigtige« salgsfremmende rabatter.
Court of First Instance concluded that the Commission had found a large body of convincing evidence showing that there was transparency on the markets concerned, but that it had ultimately decided that there was not sufficient transparency on the basis of ‘less transparent’ campaign discounts.
Retten har for det andet fastslået, at de beviselementer, som skulle godtgøre denne utilstrækkelige gennemsigtighed, ikke bekræftede den.
The Court of First Instance also found that the evidence that was supposed to establish that insufficiency of transparency did not support it.
Impala har i øvrigt anført, at appellanterne med den argumentation, der er nævnt i denne doms præmis 41, tilsyneladende anmoder Domstolen om at tage stilling til de vurderinger af de faktiske omstændigheder, som Retten har foretaget.
Impala also considers that in putting forward the arguments referred to in paragraph 41 of this judgment the appellants appear to be inviting the Court to reopen the findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance.
For så vidt som Impala inden for rammerne af sin generelle formalitetsindsigelse udtrykkeligt påberåber sig, at tredje anbringende skal forkastes i sin helhed, kan denne argumentation således ikke godtages.
Thus, in so far as Impala, under its general plea of inadmissibility, specifically argues that the third ground of appeal is inadmissible in its entirety, that argument cannot be accepted.
Som Impala har anført, er tredje anbringendes andet led centreret omkring det synspunkt, at beviskravene er forskellige, efter om det drejer sig om en beslutning om godkendelse af en fusion eller en beslutning om forbud mod en sådan fusion.
As regards the substance, as Impala points out, at the heart of the second part of the third ground of appeal is the premiss that the standard of proof will differ according to whether a decision approving a concentration or a decision prohibiting a concentration is involved.
Det er i denne forbindelse ikke bestridt af parterne, at Retten i den appellerede dom har anvendt samme beviskrav på den anfægtede beslutning, som udgør en beslutning om godkendelse af en fusion, som den ville have anvendt på en beslutning om forbud mod en sådan fusion.
In this connection, it is common ground between the parties that in the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance applied the same standard of proof to the contested decision — an approval decision — as that which it would have applied to a prohibition decision.
Det skal i denne forbindelse indledningsvis bemærkes, at det ikke fremgår af ordlyden af forordningens artikel 2, stk. 2 og 3, at forordningen stiller forskellige beviskrav til beslutninger om godkendelse af en fusion på den ene side og beslutninger om forbud mod en sådan fusion på den anden side.
In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that there is nothing in Article 2(2) or (3) of the Regulation which states that it imposes different standards of proof in relation to decisions approving a concentration, on the one hand, and decisions prohibiting a concentration, on the other.
Som Domstolen allerede har fastslået, forudsætter den nødvendige fremtidsanalyse på området for fusionskontrol, som består i at vurdere, på hvilken måde en fusion kan ændre de faktorer, der bestemmer konkurrenceforholdene på et givent marked, med henblik på at afgøre, om fusionen vil medføre en væsentlig hindring for en effektiv konkurrence, at der opstilles forskellige alternative årsags- og virkningskæder, med henblik på at de kæder, der er mest sandsynlige, lægges til grund (jf. i denne retning dom af 15.2.2005, sag C-12/03 P, Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, Sml. I, s. 987, præmis 43).
Thus, as the Court has, in substance, already held, the prospective analysis called for in relation to the control of concentrations, which consists of an examination of how a concentration might alter the factors determining the state of competition on a given market in order to establish whether it would give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition, makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with a view to ascertaining which of them is the most likely (see, to that effect, Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, paragraph 43).
I modsætning til hvad appellanterne har anført, kan der således ikke af forordningen udledes en generel formodning for en anmeldt fusions forenelighed eller uforenelighed med fællesmarkedet.
Contrary to what the appellants submit, it cannot therefore be inferred from the Regulation that there is a general presumption that a notified concentration is compatible with, or incompatible with, the common market.
Denne fortolkning af forordningen svækkes ikke ved forordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, hvorefter en anmeldt fusion anses for at være forenelig med fællesmarkedet, hvis Kommissionen ikke inden for den gældende frist har truffet afgørelse om fusionens forenelighed.
That interpretation of the Regulation is not invalidated by Article 10(6), which provides that a notified concentration is to be deemed compatible with the common market where the Commission has not taken a decision on the compatibility of that concentration within the prescribed period.
Bestemmelsen er således et specifikt udtryk for det bydende krav om hurtighed, som karakteriserer opbygningen af forordningen, og som indebærer, at Kommissionen har pligt til at overholde strenge tidsfrister for udstedelsen af den endelige beslutning (jf. i denne forbindelse dom af 18.12.2007, sag C-202/06 P, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 12129, præmis 39). Bestemmelsen udgør imidlertid en undtagelse fra forordningens generelle opbygning, som bl.a. fremgår af artikel 6, stk. 1, og artikel 8, stk. 1, hvorefter Kommissionen tager udtrykkeligt stilling til de fusioner, der bliver anmeldt til den. 50
That provision is a specific expression of the need for speed, which characterises the general scheme of the Regulation and which requires the Commission to comply with strict timelimits for the adoption of the final decision (see, in that regard, Case C-202/06 P Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission [2007] ECR I-12129, paragraph 39). It is, however, an exception to the general scheme of the Regulation, which is laid down in particular in Articles 6(1) and 8(1), according to which the Commission is to rule expressly on the concentrations which are notified to it. 50
Det er i øvrigt korrekt, at det fremgår af Domstolens praksis, at Kommissionens beslutninger vedrørende fusioners forenelighed med fællesmarkedet skal være underbygget af tilstrækkeligt afgørende og samstemmende oplysninger (jf. i denne
Furthermore, it is true that, as is apparent from the Court’s caselaw, the decisions of the Commission as to the compatibility of concentrations with the common market
DOM AF 10.7.2008 — SAG C-413/06 P retning dom af 31.3.1998, forenede sager C-68/94 og C-30/95, Frankrig m.fl. mod Kommissionen, den såkaldte »Kali & Salz-dom«, Sml. I, s. 1375, præmis 228), og at inden for rammerne af en analyse af en fusion af »konglomerat«-typen er kvaliteten af de beviser, som Kommissionen fremlægger for at fastslå behovet for en beslutning, hvorved fusionen erklæres uforenelig med fællesmarkedet, af særlig betydning (jf. dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, præmis 44). 51
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P must be supported by a sufficiently cogent and consistent body of evidence (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, ‘Kali & Salz’, paragraph 228) and that in the context of the an -alysis of a ‘conglomeratetype’ concentration the quality of the evidence produced by the Commission in order to establish that it is necessary to adopt a decision declaring the concentration incompatible with the common market is particularly important (see Commission v Tetra Laval, paragraph 44). 51
Denne retspraksis afspejler således blot bevisets væsentligste funktion, som er at understøtte en hypotese, eller således som det er tilfældet ved fusionskontrol, at styrke de vurderinger, der ligger til grund for Kommissionens beslutninger (jf. i denne retning dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, præmis 41 og 44). Hvorvidt det drejer sig om en hypotese om en kollektiv dominerende stilling eller ej har endvidere ikke i sig selv betydning for hvilke beviskrav, der skal stilles.
That caselaw merely reflects the essential function of evidence, which is to establish convincingly the merits of an argument or, as in the case of the control of concentrations, to support the conclusions underpinning the Commission’s decisions (see, to that effect, Commission v Tetra Laval, paragraphs 41 and 44).
Herved udgør den kompleksitet, som er forbundet med en opfattelse om, at konkurrencen begrænses, som er gjort gældende i forbindelse med en anmeldt fusion, et element, der skal tages hensyn til ved vurderingen af rimeligheden af fusionens forskellige konsekvenser, med henblik på at identificere, hvilke konsekvenser der er mest sandsynlige, men en sådan kompleksitet har ikke som sådan betydning for det krævede bevisniveau.
In that regard, the inherent complexity of a theory of competitive harm put forward in relation to a notified concentration is a factor which must be taken into account when assessing the plausibility of the various consequences such a concentration may have, in order to identify those which are most likely to arise, but such complexity does not, of itself, have an impact on the standard of proof which is required.
Det følger af ovenstående bemærkninger, at når Kommissionen skal tage stilling til en fusion i overensstemmelse med forordningen, er den i princippet forpligtet til at tage stilling enten i retning af godkendelse af fusionen eller i retning af forbud mod fusionen alt efter dens vurdering af, hvilke økonomiske konsekvenser det er mest sandsynligt, at den omhandlede fusion vil få.
It follows that, where it has been notified of a proposed concentration pursuant to the Regulation, the Commission is, in principle, required to adopt a position, either in the sense of approving or of prohibiting the concentration, in accordance with its assessment of the economic outcome attributable to the concentration which is most likely to ensue.
Herefter bemærkes, at det er med urette, at appellanterne har anført, at idet det drejer sig om en beslutning om godkendelse af en fusion, burde Retten alene have taget stilling til, hvorvidt Kommissionen — under anvendelse af særligt strenge beviskrav — burde have forbudt den omhandlede fusion.
The appellants are accordingly incorrect in maintaining that, since it was a decision approving a concentration that was at issue, the Court of First Instance should have considered only whether the Commission could, by applying a particularly high standard of proof, have prohibited that concentration.
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA vedrørende de præmisser i den appellerede dom, som er nævnt i denne doms præmis 41 — at idet det underliggende synspunkt i disse klagepunkter er ugrundet, kan de under alle omstændigheder ikke tages til følge.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA it being necessary to adopt a position on the admissibility of the specific criticisms relating to the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal listed in paragraph 41 of this judgment, it must be held that since the premiss underlying those criticisms is groundless, they cannot, in any event, be accepted.
Henset til de ovenstående bemærkninger skal tredje anbringendes andet led således forkastes.
In the light of the above, the second part of the third ground of appeal must be rejected.