natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retten tager derimod selv ved sin efterprøvelse af den første godkendelsesbeslutning udgangspunkt i Kommissionens konstatering af, at »markedet ikke er tilstrækkeligt gennemsigtigt til at muliggøre en kollektiv dominerende stilling« 185. Retten efterprøvede således, som appellanterne krævede, om der faktisk manglede tilstrækkelige beviser for gennemsigtighed på markedet.
Instead, in reviewing the first clearance decision the Court of First Instance orientates itself on the Commission’s finding that the market ‘is not sufficiently transparent to permit a collective dominant position.’ 185Thus, as the appellants demanded, the Court of First Instance even went so far as to review whether there was in fact the alleged insufficiency of evidence that the market was transparent.
Appellanterne kritiserer med deres fjerde appelanbringende, at Rettens retlige efterprøvelse af Kommissionens beslutning var for indgående, idet den ikke respekterede Kommissionens skønsmargin og flere gange satte sin egen vurdering af faktiske omstændigheder og beviser i stedet for Kommissionens, hvorved den begik åbenbare fejl og gengav beviserne urigtigt 187.
By their fourth ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance exceeded the scope of judicial review by failing to respect the Commission’s margin of discretion and, on a number of points, by substituting its own assessment of the facts and of the evidence for that of the Commission; in doing so, the Court itself committed manifest errors and fundamentally misconstrued the evidence. 187
Den åbenbare skønsfejl, som Retten konstaterede, bestod ikke i, at der ikke var ført et positivt bevis for manglende gennemsigtighed på markedet, men derimod i, at den første godkendelsesbeslutning ikke tog hensyn til alle relevante oplysninger, og at de omstændigheder, der blev lagt til grund, ikke kunne underbygge de konklusioner, som Kommissionen selv drog af dem 186.
The manifest error of assessment found by the Court of First Instance consisted not in a failure positively to prove a lack of market transparency but instead in a failure to take all the relevant facts into account in the first clearance decision and in the fact that the facts taken into account were not capable of substantiating the conclusion that the Commission drew. 186
185 — Den appellerede doms præmis 289 og 459; jf. endvidere dommens præmis 287, 366 og 371.
185 — Paragraphs 289 and 459 of the judgment under appeal; see also paragraphs 287, 366 and 371 of that judgment.
187 — De følgende betragtninger vedrører ligeledes det led af sjette appelanbringende, der findes i appelskriftets punkt 101 og 102.
187 — The following discussion applies also in relation to the part of the sixth ground of appeal contained in paragraphs 101 and 102 of the appeal.
186 — Jf. navnlig den appellerede doms præmis 377, 390, 459 og 542.
186 — See in particular paragraphs 377, 390, 459 and 542 of the judgment under appeal.
Kommissionens skønsmargin og den retlige kontrol heraf
The Commission’s discretion and judicial review thereof
— Retten fandt, at de salgsfremmende rabatter »kun har begrænset indvirkning på priserne« 190.
— The Court of First Instance regarded campaign discounts as having ‘only a limited impact on prices’. 190
— Retten nævner henholdsvis »en høj grad af prisgennemsigtighed« og »stor gennemsigtighed på markedet« 191, og finder, at salgsrepræsentanternes ugentlige rapporter »udgør yderligere en faktor, der bidrager til gennemsigtighed på markedet« 192; ifølge Retten har salgs- fremmende rabatter »til formål at blive offentliggjort« 193og »er offentlige og gennemsigtige« 194.
— The Court of First Instance referred to a ‘high level of transparency of prices’ and a ‘high degree of transparency on the market’, 191 and regarded the weekly reports by parties to the concentration as ‘an additional factor of the transparency of the market’; 192the Court of First Instance regarded campaign discounts as ‘destined to become public knowledge’ 193and ‘rather public and transparent’. 194
For at underbygge deres kritik af, at Retten ikke respekterede Kommissionens skønsmargin og satte sin egen vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder og beviser i stedet for Kommissionens, har appellanterne henvist til følgende eksempler fra den appellerede dom:
As support for its complaint that the Court of First Instance did not respect the Commission’s margin of discretion and instead substituted its own assessment of the facts and evidence on a number of points, the appellants give the following examples from the judgment under appeal:
— Forskellene mellem rabatspændene kan ifølge Retten »bero på forskelle mellem selskabernes præstationer« og udelukker ikke, »at rabatterne bygger på en række kendte regler« 195.
— According to the Court of First Instance, the differences in the ranges of discounts could be ‘the result of differences in performance’ and did not preclude ‘the discounts being based on a known set of rules’. 195
— Retten anførte, at tilpasningen af katalogpriserne »rent faktisk var meget udtalt«, mens Kommissionen alene bemærkede, at katalogpriserne var »tilpasset til hinanden i ret høj grad« 188.
— The Court of First Instance described the alignment of list prices as ‘very marked’, whereas the Commission referred simply to list prices as being ‘rather aligned’. 188
— Det er med urette, at Retten ikke finder, at de fremlagte økonomiske oplysninger har relevans for spørgsmålet om, hvor-
— The Court of First Instance wrongly regarded the economic data produced as irrelevant to the question whether
— Ifølge Retten havde de rabatter, som fusionsdeltagerne generelt indrømmede, »kun små variationer« 189.
variation in the general levels of invoice discounts applied by the parties to the concentration as being ‘very low’. 189
189 — Den appellerede doms præmis 307; appellanterne henviser endvidere til den appellerede doms præmis 421, 419, 424, 444 og 457, hvor de påpeger tilsvarende bemærkninger fra Retten.
189 — Paragraph 307 of the judgment under appeal; the appellants refer in addition to paragraphs 421, 419, 424, 444 and 457 of the judgment under appeal, in which they identify similar statements by the Court of First Instance.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P vidt salgsfremmende rabatter også spiller en rolle for de mest solgte albummer 196.
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P campaign discounts also played a significant role for the best-selling albums. 196 of merger control, with regard to manifest errors of assessment. 199
Som allerede nævnt andetsteds 197, råder Kommissionen på området for kontrol med fusioner over en ikke ubetydelig skønsmargin ved vurderingen af komplekse økonomiske sammenhænge.
As already mentioned elsewhere, 197in the context of merger control the Commission has a not insignificant margin of discretion in assessing complex economic situations.
Efter fast retspraksis skal den kontrol, som Fællesskabets retsinstanser udøver, begrænse sig til en kontrol af, om procedure- og begrundelsesforskrifterne er overholdt, om de faktiske omstændigheder er materielt rigtige, og om der foreligger et åbenbart fejlskøn eller er begået magtfordrejning 198.
According to consistent caselaw, review by the Community Courts in this regard must be limited to verifying whether the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. 198
På baggrund af dette kriterium ville det være forkert at antage, at Kommissionens
Having regard to this standard of review, it would be an error to assume that
Med kritikken af de passager af den appellerede dom, der er nævnt i punkt 235, rejser appellanterne endelig spørgsmål om, hvilke grænser Kommissionens skønsmargin sætter for retsinstansernes efterprøvelse af
By their criticism of the passages in the judgment under appeal quoted at paragraph 235 above, the appellants ultimately raise the question of the limits which the Commission’s discretion imposes on the judicial review of its decisions, in the context
199 — Jeg skal her indskyde, at visse af de konstateringer, som appellanterne har kritiseret, nemlig den appellerede doms præmis 299, 307 og 317, systematisk hører til under den formelle prøvelse af begrundelsesmangler i den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
199 — In passing it may be mentioned that the context in which the appellants’ criticism of some of the findings appears, namely those in paragraphs 299, 307 and 317 of the judgment under appeal, indicates that they belong to the formal review of the first clearance decision for failure to state reasons.
Betragtningerne vedrørende sjette appelanbringendes tredje led (jf. navnlig ovenfor i punkt 114-131) gælder ligeledes disse.
That criticism is principally addressed by what has been said above as regards the third part of the sixth ground of appeal (see in particular paragraphs 114 to 131).
Da appellanterne imidlertid synes at antage, at den appellerede doms præmis 299, 307 og 317 endvidere indeholder elementer af en materiel prøvelse vedrørende åbenbare skønsfejl i den første godkendelsesbeslutning, gennemgår jeg dem i det følgende tillige ud fra denne betragtning.
However, given that the appellants appear to assume that paragraphs 299, 307 and 317 of the judgment under appeal contain also elements of the review of the substance of the first clearance decision for manifest errors of assessment, in the following I consider them also on this footing.
198 — Jf. dom af 3.4.2003, sag T-342/00, Petrolessence og SG2R mod Kommissionen, Sml.
197 — See in particular the discussion concerning the first and sixth grounds of appeal in paragraphs 126 and 173 above.
II, s. 1161, præmis 101, dommen i sagen EDP mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 176, præmis 151, og af 4.7.2006, sag T-177/04, easyJet mod Kommissionen, Sml. II, s. 1931, præmis 44.
198 — Case T-342/00 Petrolessence and SG2R v Commission [2003] ECR II-1161, paragraph 101, EDP (cited above, footnote 177), paragraph 151, Case T-177/04 easyJet v Commission [2006] ECR II-1931, paragraph 44.
200 — Dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 96, præmis 39; jf. nu også dommen i sagen Spanien mod Lenzing, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 97, præmis 56 og 57, og i sagen General Electric mod Kommissionen, nævnt i fodnote 96, præmis 63.
200 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 39; likewise Spain v Lenzing (cited above, footnote 97), paragraphs 56 and 57, and General Electric (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 63.
For det første kan det ikke ud fra en retlig betragtning kritiseres, at Retten har efterprøvet om, og i givet fald i hvilket omfang, de faktiske omstændigheder, som Kommissionen har fremlagt, påviser eller modbeviser, at der er tale om gennemsigtighed på markedet.
First, one cannot complain of an error of law in so far as the Court of First Instance reviewed the facts established by the Commission as to whether and to what extent it was evidence for or against market transparency.
De konstateringer, som appellanterne har kritiseret i den appellerede doms præmis 299, 307, 317, 347, 354 og 361, var således berettigede, f.eks. bemærkningen om, »at tre faktorer, hvortil der henvises i beslutningen […], kan skabe en høj grad af prisgennemsigtighed« (præmis 347).
Thus, findings such as those in paragraphs 299, 307, 317, 347, 354 and 361 of the judgment under appeal which are criticised by the appellants were lawful, for example the statement ‘that three factors referred to in the Decision … are capable of giving rise to a high level of transparency of prices’ (paragraph 347).
skønsmargin på forhånd afskærer Fællesskabets retsinstanser fra at foretage deres egen vurdering af faktiske omstændigheder og beviser.
the Commission’s margin of discretion precludes the Community Courts in any event from giving their own analysis of the facts and the evidence.
Fællesskabets retsinstansers egen vurdering er derimod uomgængeligt nødvendig, når det skal efterprøves, om de faktiske omstændigheder, der er lagt til grund for en kommissionsbeslutning, er nøjagtige, troværdige, kohærente og fuldstændige, og om disse faktiske omstændigheder taler til støtte for Kommissionens konklusioner.
On the contrary, it is essential for the Community Courts to undertake such an assessment of their own where they are assessing whether the factual material on which the Commission’s decision was based was accurate, reliable, consistent and complete, and whether this factual material was capable of substantiating the conclusions the Commission drew from it.
I modsat fald ville Fællesskabets retsinstanser overhovedet ikke have mulighed at foretage en realistisk vurdering af, om Kommissionen har respekteret grænserne for sin skønsmargin, eller om den har begået en åbenbar skønsfejl 201.
Otherwise, the Community Courts could not sensibly assess whether the Commission had stayed within the limits of the margin of discretion allowed to it or had committed a manifest error of assessment. 201
Retten overskrider først grænserne for den retlige kontrol med en beslutning, som Kommissionen har truffet som led i sin kontrol med fusioner, såfremt de faktiske omstændigheder og beviserne giver mulighed for forskellige vurderinger, og Kommissionen har valgt den ene, mens Retten desuagtet sætter sin egen, forskellige vurdering i stedet for Kommissionens.
The Court of First Instance exceeds the limits of judicial review of a Commission decision in the context of merger control only where the factual and evidential position reasonably allows different assessments, the Commission adopts one of them, and the Court of First Instance none the less substitutes its own different assessment for that of the Commission.
For det andet står det ligeledes Retten frit for selv at danne sig et indtryk af, om og i hvilket omfang de faktiske oplysninger, som Kommissionen havde konstateret vedrørende rabatter, navnlig salgsfremmende rabatter, var tilstrækkelige til at udelukke, at der var tale om en sådan gennemsigtighed på markedet, at en kollektiv dominerende stilling på markedet var udelukket.
Second, the Court of First Instance was entitled also to form its own view as to whether and to what extent the factual material established by the Commission as regards price discounts, and in particular campaign discounts, was sufficient to exclude there being enough transparency in the market to allow a finding of a collective dominant position.
Rettens konstateringer i den appellerede doms præmis 402, 403, 405, 406, 419, 420, 421, 424, 436, 444, 456 og 457, f.eks. at salgsfremmende rabatter kun repræsenterer en meget beskeden del af bruttosalgsprisen for albummer (præmis 457), hvilket kritiseres af appellanterne, var således ligeledes retmæssige.
Thus, the findings of the Court of First Instance such as those in paragraphs 402, 403, 405, 406, 419, 420, 421, 424, 436, 444, 456 and 457 of the judgment under appeal which are criticised by the appellants were likewise lawful, for example the statement that campaign discounts represent only a very small part of the gross selling price of albums (paragraph 457).
Retten har i de omtvistede præmisser af den appellerede dom således navnlig anvendt de kriterier, som Domstolen selv har udviklet 202, og særligt efterprøvet, om de faktiske omstændigheder, der blev lagt til
In essence, in the disputed paragraphs of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance applied the criteria developed by the Court of Justice itself 202and reviewed in particular whether the factual
Såfremt man betragter de eksempler, som appellanterne har henvist til i den appellerede dom, ud fra dette aspekt, fremgår det, at Retten ganske vist i de enkelte tilfælde selv har foretaget en vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder og af bevisstillingen, men at den desuagtet klart har holdt sig inden for de grænser, der findes for retlig kontrol med beslutninger, som Kommissionen har truffet som led i sin kontrol med fusioner.
If one considers the examples from the judgment under appeal relied upon by the appellants from this point of view, it is clear that although the Court of First Instance in each case undertook its own assessment of the factual and evidential position it clearly remained within the proper limits of judicial review of a Commission decision in the context of merger control.
202 — Jf. på ny dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Tetra Laval, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 96, præmis 39, og senest bekræftet i dommen i sagen Spanien mod Lenzing, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 97, præmis 57.
202 — Again, see Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 39, most recently confirmed in Spain v Lenzing (cited above, footnote 97), paragraph 57.
201 — Jf. som allerede nævnt — i anden forbindelse — ovenfor i punkt 179.
201 — See already above, paragraph 179, albeit in a different context.
Påstanden om urigtig gengivelse af beviser grund for den første godkendelsesbeslutning, taler til støtte for Kommissionens konklusioner om, at markedet ikke var så tilstrækkeligt gennemsigtigt, at det gav mulighed for en kollektiv dominerende stilling.
The alleged distortion of evidence basis underlying the first clearance decision was capable of substantiating the Commission’s conclusion that the market was not sufficiently transparent as to allow a collective dominant position.
Appellanterne har endvidere kritiseret, at Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 425, 427 og 434 gengav beviserne urigtigt.
The appellants further complain that in paragraphs 425, 427 and 434 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance distorted the evidence.
I de omtvistede passager af den appellerede dom behandler Retten Kommissionens betragtning om, at de salgsfremmende rabatter var uigennemsigtige.
In the disputed passages of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance considered the Commission’s view that campaign discounts were not transparent.
Retten satte ikke sin egen vurdering af markedets gennemsigtighed i stedet for Kommissionens, der er ligeså rimelig, og den søgte heller ikke selv at træffe afgørelse om, hvorvidt den omtvistede fusion var forenelig eller uforenelig med fællesmarkedet 203.
The Court of First Instance by no means substituted its own assessment of market transparency for an equally reasonable assessment of the Commission and it by no means took upon itself to decide whether the disputed concentration was compatible or incompatible with the common market.
Retten konkluderede blot, at Kommissionens konstateringer i den foreliggende sag ikke underbyggedes af de faktiske omstændigheder i dens første godkendelsesbeslutning 204.
204 This assessment by the Court of First Instance is part of its analysis of the facts and the evidence in first instance proceedings and as such is not susceptible to review in appeal proceedings, subject, however, to the question of distortion of facts and evidence, to which I will turn in a moment.
Inden jeg påbegynder min nærmere behandling af de nævnte præmisser i den appellerede dom, tillader jeg mig at erindre om de strenge kriterier, som Domstolen ifølge fast praksis lægger til grund ved efterprøvelsen af påstande om, at beviser er gengivet urigtigt.
Before I turn to consider those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, I recall the strict criteria which the Court has laid down in its consistent caselaw for the review of an allegation that evidence has been distorted. According to it, evidence may be found to have been distorted where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence appears to be clearly incorrect.
Herefter foreligger der en urigtig gengivelse af beviserne, såfremt det åbenbart fremgår, at gengivelsen af de foreliggende beviser er urigtige, uden at det er nødvendigt at fremlægge nye beviser 205.
205 Thus, the issue is not to review whether the Court of First Instance’s ana -lysis of the evidence is convincing from the point of view of the Court of Justice.
Der er således ikke tale om at efterprøve, om Rettens bevisbedømmelse efter Domstolens opfattelse er overbevisende; i modsat fald ville Domstolen nemlig sætte sin egen bevisvurdering i stedet for Rettens, hvilket ikke er dens opgave under en appelsag.
Otherwise, the Court would simply be substituting its own analysis of the evidence for that of the Court of First Instance, and this is not its task in appeal proceedings.
Så længe Rettens bevisvurdering i det mindste er forsvarlig, er der ikke tale om en urigtig gengivelse af beviser.
So long as the Court of First Instance’s analysis of the evidence is at least justifiable, there is no distortion of the evidence.
203 — Jf. den appellerede doms præmis 479: »Det tilkommer nemlig ikke Domstolen at tage stilling til, om fusionen vil være forenelig med fællesmarkedet, men at efterprøve lovligheden af konstateringerne i beslutningen.«
203 — See paragraph 479 of the judgment under appeal: ‘It is not for the Court to rule on the compatibility of the concentration with the common market, but to review the lawfulness of the findings made in the Decision.’
Domstolen foretager udelukkende sin prøvelse på grundlag af akterne i sagen 206.
The Court of Justice undertakes its review exclusively by reference to the case file.
Dette følger af punkt 19-22 i Kommissionens skriftlige indlæg af 21. september 2005 207og fremgår entydigt af bilag E.2 til indlægget.
This was apparent from paragraphs 19 to 22 of the Commis- sion’s document dated 21 September 2005, 207 and clearly followed from Annex E.2 to that document.
Med henblik på en hensigtsmæssig prøvelse af påstanden om, at gengivelsen er urigtig, skal det først fastslås, hvilke tabeller retten præcist henviser til i den appellerede doms præmis 425.
In order to review the allegation of distortion of evidence sensibly, there must first be ascertained exactly which tables the Court of First Instance was referring to in paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal.
Beklageligvis er den autentiske engelske sprogudgave af dommen særdeles upræcis på dette punkt.
Regrettably the authoritative English language version of the judgment is very imprecise on this point.
Det fremgår imidlertid umiddelbart af præmis 425 i den engelske sprogudgave, at Retten henviser til tabeller, »der skal vise de største salgsfremmende rabatter, Sony og BMG har indrømmet for deres mest solgte albummer« 208, og hvori der foretages en beregning af forskellen mellem de mindste og de største rabatter for de enkelte kunder.
It none the less appears even from this English language version of paragraph 425 that the Court of First Instance was referring to tables ‘which are intended to show the maximum campaign discounts granted by Sony and BMG for their best-selling albums’ 208and in which a differential between minimum and maximum discounts was calculated by customer.
»Således er der, for begge parters vedkommende, foretaget en beregning pr. kunde af forskellen mellem de mindste og de største rabatter […], som i de fleste tilfælde er forkert, idet den er foretaget på grundlag af de rabatter, den anden part har indrømmet, skønt den […] burde have været foretaget på grundlag af forskellen mellem de mindste og de største rabatter, som en og samme fusionsdeltager har indrømmet sine forskellige kunder.«
‘In effect, the calculation of the differential between minimum and maximum discounts by customer … was carried out incorrectly, in most cases, in consideration of the discounts granted by the other party, whereas … that calculation must be made on the basis of the differential between the minimum and maximum discounts granted by one and the same party to its various customers.’
Den franske sprogudgave af den appellerede dom er i denne henseende mere præcis.
In this respect the French language version of the judgment under appeal is more precise.
Uanset at denne sprogudgave ikke er autentisk i den foreliggende sag, kan den, idet den blev anvendt under udarbejdelsen af og forhandlingerne vedrørende dommen, give yderligere indikationer af, hvad Retten i realiteten henviste til i præmis 425, nemlig »tabel-
Even though it is not authoritative in the present case, this language version, in which the judgment was drafted and deliberated, contains additional indications of what the Court of First Instance was in fact intending to refer to in paragraph 425,