natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Såfremt den anden godkendelsesbeslutning imidlertid bliver endelig, efter at den mundtlige forhandling er afsluttet, men inden Domstolens afgørelse af den verserende sag, bør dette efter de for mig foreliggende oplysninger bevirke, at appellanternes retlige interesse bortfalder. I så fald ville jeg imidlertid anse det for nødvendigt på ny at
By contrast, if the second clearance decision becomes final after the close of the oral proceedings but before the decision of the Court of Justice in the present case, on the information available to me at the moment this would result in the appellants ceasing to have an interest.
54 — Jf. nærværende forslags punkt 12.
54 — See above, point 12.
»tidligere« fusionsforordning, men en besvarelse af dem er imidlertid også relevant for den nye affattelse af EF-fusionsforordningen (forordning nr. 139/2004), idet de to forordninger ikke adskiller sig væsentligt på de punkter, der er omtvistede her.
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P relation to the ‘old’ Merger Regulation, but the answers to them are still decisive for the recast EC Merger Regulation (Regulation No 139/2004), because there is no significant difference between the two regulations as regards the points in dispute in the present case.
Det er i det væsentlige appellanternes opfattelse, at Retten er gået for vidt med hensyn til de retlige krav, der stilles til en godkendelsesbeslutning fra Kommissionen og den retlige kontrol med denne.
In essence, the appellants are of the view that the Court of First Instance applied excessive legal requirements relating to a clearance decision by the Commission and to judicial review thereof.
Heri støttes de tildels af Kommissionen 57.
In that regard they are supported in part by the Commission.
Impala støtter derimod i det hele den appellerede dom.
57Impala, on the other hand, defends the judgment under appeal in its entirety.
Begrundelse af godkendelsesbeslutninger vedrørende fusionskontrol (sjette anbringendes første og tredje led)
Standard of reasoning for merger clearance decisions (first and third part of the sixth ground of appeal)
Da de enkelte anbringender til dels overlapper hinanden, er det hensigtsmæssigt at gruppere dem under hensyn til deres indholdsmæssige fællestræk og derefter undersøge dem i den ændrede rækkefølge.
Given that the individual grounds of appeal overlap in part, it is appropriate to group them according to the substantive points to which they relate, and accordingly to consider them in a different order.
Det er herefter alene ufornødent at behandle det femte anbringende, idet det som anført dels skal afvises, dels er uden betydning 56.
Only the fifth ground of appeal needs no further consideration, because, as already mentioned, it is in part inadmissible and in part ineffective (‘inopérant’). 56
Indledningsvis vil jeg gennemgå sjette anbringendes første og tredje led 58.
I start my consideration with the first and third parts of the sixth ground of appeal. 58
Appel- lanterne gør hermed gældende, at Retten har stillet forkerte og overdrevent strenge krav til begrundelsen for Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutninger under fusionskontrollen.
There the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance applied erroneous and excessive standards of reasoning for Commission merger clearance decisions.
A — Oplysnings- og begrundelseskrav vedrørende Kommissionens beslutninger om godkendelser (første, andet, tredje og sjette anbringende)
A — Extent of investigation and justification required of the Commission in relation to clearance decisions (first, second, third and sixth grounds of appeal)
Det skal for det første afklares, om Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutninger
It must first be clarified whether Commission clearance decisions can at all
Første, andet, tredje og sjette anbringende vedrører konkret de bestræbelser, som Kommissionen skal lægge for dagen med hensyn til sagens oplysning og begrundelse, når den godkender en virksomhedssammenslutning.
The first, second, third and sixth grounds of appeal concern in particular the pains the Commission must take by way of investigation and giving reasons where it grants clearance for a concentration of undertakings.
58 — I det omfang sjette anbringende anfægter Rettens henvisninger til meddelelsen af klagepunkter som værende behæftet med retlige fejl (sjette anbringendes andet led), vil dette blive gennemgået senere i forbindelse med første anbringende (forslagets punkt 145-183).
58 — So far as the sixth ground of appeal complains about the Court of First Instance’s references to the statement of objections as errors in law (the second part of the sixth ground of appeal), I consider it below in conjunction with the first ground of appeal (see points 145 to 183).
I det omfang sjette anbringende angår de indholdsmæssige krav til en godkendelsesbeslutning (sjette anbringendes fjerde led), overlapper dette tredje anbringendes andet led og fjerde anbringende og vil blive gennemgået i forbindelse hermed (henholdsvis i forslagets punkt 201-232 og punkt 233-268).
So far as the sixth ground of appeal concerns the substantive requirements of a clearance decision (fourth part of the sixth ground of appeal) it overlaps with the second part of the third ground of appeal and with the fourth ground of appeal and shall be considered in conjunction with them (points 201 to 232, and points 233 to 268).
56 — Jf. punkt 5055 og punkt 66-71 i nærværende forslag.
56 — See above, points 50 to 55 and 66 to 71.
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA mulighed for at udøve ekstern kontrol med institutionernes handlinger, men skal også tilskynde institutionerne til at udøve selvcensur og undgå uovervejede eller slet gennemtænkte foranstaltninger.
not only to enable acts of the institutions to be subject to independent review by the Community Courts, but also to encourage the institutions to exercise self-control and to guard against ill-considered or ill-thought through measures.
Begrun- delse af beslutninger bidrager endvidere til åbenhed i forvaltningen 60.
The statement of reasons for decisions also contributes to ensuring transparency of administrative action. 60
a) Spørgsmålet, om godkendelsesbeslutninger kan anfægtes som følge af begrundelsesmangler
(a) Whether clearance decisions may be challenged on the ground of failure to state reasons
Appellanterne finder, at Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutning af en fusionskontrol overhovedet ikke kan kendes ugyldig på grund af en begrundelsesmangel.
The appellants are of the view that a merger clearance decision by the Commission cannot in any event be annulled for insufficient reasoning.
Denne opfattelse overbeviser mig ikke.
I am not convinced by this view.
Begrundelsespligten er på ingen måde begrænset til at omfatte beslutninger, der bebyrder adressaterne.
The obligation to state reasons is by no means restricted to decisions which negatively affect their addressees.
Retsstatsprincippet og princippet om god forvaltning kræver derimod ligeledes, at beslutninger, der begunstiger adressaterne, begrundes.
The principles of the rule of law and of proper administration instead require reasons to be given also for decisions which benefit their addressees.
Dette gælder så meget desto mere, som sådanne beslutninger kan være til skade for tredjemands rettigheder og interesser, ikke mindst på det konkurrenceretlige område.
This applies a fortiori where such decisions may negatively affect the rights and interests of third parties, not least in the field of competition law.
Hverken artikel 253 EF eller artikel 41, stk. 2, tredje led, i grundrettighedschartret sondrer således mellem beslutninger, der begunstiger deres adressater, og beslutninger, der bebyrder dem.
Accordingly, neither Article 253 EC nor the third indent of Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights distinguishes between decisions which benefit their respective addressees and those which are disadvantageous for them.
Med hensyn til fusionskontrol betyder dette særligt, at Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutninger såvel som dens forbudsbeslutninger skal begrundes.
In relation to merger control in particular, this means that reasons must be given for Commission clearance decisions just as much as for prohibition decisions.
Denne begrundelsespligt følger af retsstatsprincippet og er tillige kommet til udtryk i artikel 41, stk. 2, i Den Europæiske Unions charter om grundlæggende rettigheder 59i forbindelse med retten til god forvaltning.
This duty to state reasons is a consequence of the rule of law and, in conjunction with the right to proper administration, finds expression also in Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union.
En tilsidesættelse af begrundelsespligten kan som et væsentligt formkrav bl.a. indbringes til prøvelse for Fællesskabets retsinstanser ved et annullationssøgsmål i henhold til artikel 230 EF.
As it infringes an essential procedural requirement, a breach of the duty to state reasons may be complained of inter alia by means of an annulment action before the Community Courts subject to the conditions in Article 230 EC.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P sionen fra den lovbestemte forpligtelse til 63ved en begrundet beslutning udtrykkeligt at tage stilling 64til samtlige anmeldelser om sammenslutninger, der indgives til den.
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P of its statutory duty 63 to make an express finding by way of a reasoned decision in relation to every concentration notified to it. 64
Bestemmelsen løser derimod de situationer, hvor Kommissionen undtagelsesvis ikke måtte efterkomme denne forpligtelse rettidigt.
On the contrary, the provision contains a remedy should the Commission in a given case not comply with this obligation within the applicable time-limit.
Fusionsforordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, som appellanterne henviser til i den foreliggende sag, indeholder ingen undtagelser fra retten til at anfægte beslutninger i tilfælde af tilsidesættelse af begrundelsespligten.
Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation, on which the appellants rely in the present case, does not provide for any exception to the liability of decisions to challenge on the ground of breach of the duty to state reasons.
Det følger allerede af normhierarkiet, at bestemmelser i afledt ret ikke kan begrænse rækkevidden af primærretten, som artikel 230 EF og artikel 253 EF ligeledes er en del af.
It follows simply from the hierarchy of norms that provisions of secondary law cannot restrict the scope of primary law, including Article 230 EC and Article 253 EC.
Fusionsforordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, skal derimod fortolkes og anvendes i lyset af trinhøjere ret, navnlig artikel 230 EF og artikel 253 EF 61.
Instead, Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation is to be interpreted and applied in light of higherranking provisions, in particular Article 230 EC and Article 253 EC. 61
Fusionsforordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, er endvidere tillige udtryk for det krav om hurtighed, der præger hele fusionskontrolproceduren.
In addition, Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation is certainly an expression of the requirement for speed which characterises the whole of the merger control pro -cedure.
Sammen med de strenge sagsbehandlingsfrister, der fremgår af samme artikel, bidrager bestemmelsen til, at der snarest muligt skabes retssikkerhed, hvilket ikke alene kommer fusionsdeltagerne til gode, men også markederne generelt.
Together with the strict procedural timelimits laid down by that same article, this provision contributes to creating legal certainty as quickly as possible, and this is to the benefit not only of the undertakings participating in the concentration but also of the markets in general.
Hverken ordlyden af eller formålet med fusionsforordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, eller bestemmelsens normative sammenhæng taler på nogen måde for at gøre undtagelse fra begrundelsespligten eller endog for at »friholde« Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutninger fra indsigelser om manglende begrundelse.
In any event, to introduce an exception to the duty to state reasons, or even to confer on Commission clearance decisions an ‘immunity’ from challenge on the ground of failure to state reasons, would not cor -respond to the wording or to the purpose and legislative context of Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation.
Fusionsforordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, bevirker alene en godkendelsesfiktion for det tilfælde, at Kommissionen ikke rettidigt har truffet afgørelse om, hvorvidt en anmeldt fusion er forenelig med fællesmarkedet 62.
Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation provides for deemed clearance only where the Commission does not give a decision in good time as to the compatibility with the common market of a concentration which has been notified to it.
Bestemmelsen fritager således ikke Kommis-
62By contrast, the provision does not relieve the Commission
Desuagtet kan det legitime behov for retssikkerhed ikke føre så vidt, at fusionsbeslutningen helt eller delvist unddrages domstolskontrol.
Nevertheless, the legitimate need for legal certainty cannot go so far as to exclude the decision on a concentration in whole or in part from review by the courts.
Først efter udløb af klagefristen i henhold til artikel 230, stk. 5, EF eller manglende medhold i et annullationssøgsmål bliver fusionsgodkendelsen endelig og bringer definitiv retssikkerhed for alle parter.
It is only once the timelimit under Article 230(5) EC for bringing a challenge has expired, or for example an annulment action which has been raised is dismissed, that the clearance of the concentration becomes final and creates definitive legal certainty for all the participants.
63 — Denne forpligtelse følger af fusionsforordningens artikel 6, stk. 1, for så vidt angår forundersøgelsesfasen og af fusionsforordningens artikel 8, stk. 1 for så vidt angår den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
63 — This obligation arises from Article 6(1) of the Merger Regulation as regards the preliminary phase and from Article 8(1) of the Merger Regulation as regards the formal investigation procedure.
64 — Kommissionen er alene fritaget for denne forpligtelse, såfremt den i henhold til fusionsforordningens artikel 9 henviser sammenslutningen til en national konkurrencemyndighed, samt såfremt anmeldelsen tilbagekaldes som følge af, at sammenslutningen opgives.
64 — The Commission is relieved of this obligation only in so far as the concentration is referred to a national competition authority under Article 9 of the Merger Regulation, except for cases in which the notification is withdrawn because the intention to form a concentration is abandoned.
62 — Der gælder herefter en formodning om, at sammenslutningen er forenelig med fællesmarkedet (jf. om begrebet formodning endvidere fusionsforordningens artikel 7, stk. 1 og 5).
62 — In that event, there is a presumption that the concentration is compatible with the common market (as regards the concept of the presumption, see also Article 7(1) and (5) of the Merger Regulation).
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA b) Begrundelsespligtens omfang
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA
Appellanterne finder endvidere, at Retten med urette har antaget, at den første godkendelsesbeslutning mangler begrundelse.
The appellants are in addition of the view that in the present case the Court of First Instance erred in finding that insufficient reasons were given for the first clearance decision.
Retten går hermed imod Fællesskabets retsinstansers faste praksis.
In their opinion, the Court of First Instance thereby set itself against the established caselaw of the Community Courts.
I modsætning til appellanternes opfattelse fortaber fusionsforordningens artikel 10, stk. 6, heller ikke på nogen måde sin effektive virkning (»effet utile«), blot fordi den — udtrykkelige eller implicitte — fusionsgodkendelse fortsat er undergivet retslig kontrol.
Contrary to the submission of the appellants, Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation is by no means deprived of its practical effectiveness (‘effet utile’) solely by the fact that the — explicit or deemed — clearance remains subject to review by the courts.
Truslen om, at der indtræder en godkendelsesfiktion, såfremt fristerne overskrides (»guillotine-virkning«), har snarere en disciplinerende virkning i forhold til Kommissionen som fusionskontrolmyndighed under fusionskontrolproceduren, hvilken ikke må undervurderes 65.
Instead, the impending grant of a deemed clearance in case of the expiry of the timelimit (the ‘guillotine effect’) promotes selfdiscipline in every merger control procedure dealt with by the Commission as the merger control authority, and this to an extent which is not to be underestimated.
Det står endvidere fusionsdeltagerne frit for at gennemføre sammenslutningen, så snart den er godkendt af Kommissionen, eller der er indtrådt en godkendelsesfiktion 66; appellanterne har ifølge deres egne oplysninger ligeledes benyttet denne mulighed.
65In addition, the participating undertakings are free to implement their concentration as soon as it is cleared by the Commission or deemed to have been cleared; 66 according to the information they themselves provided, the appellants indeed made use of this possibility in the present case.
Tvisten angår navnlig spørgsmålet om, hvor detaljeret Kommissionen skal begrunde sin konstatering i den første godkendelsesbeslutning af, at markedet ikke er tilstrækkeligt gennemsigtigt til at muliggøre en koordinering af priserne 67.
In essence the dispute revolves around the question of the level of detail in which the Commission was required to justify its finding in the first clearance decision that the market was not so transparent as to enable prices to be co-ordinated. 67
Henset hertil finder jeg derfor, at godkendelse af en sammenslutning — uanset om godkendelsen er udtrykkelig eller stiltiende — kan kendes ugyldig som følge af tilsidesættelse af begrundelsespligten.
In all, I conclude that clearance of a concentration — whether explicit or deemed — can be annulled on the ground of breach of the duty to state reasons.
Denne konstatering har betydning for Kommissionens vurdering af, at der ikke var tilstrækkeligt grundlag for at antage, at de fem største koncerner havde en kollektiv dominerende stilling på forskellige nationale markeder for indspillet musik, og at sammenslutningen formentlig heller ikke ville føre til, at der skabtes en sådan kollektiv dominerende stilling 68.
This finding was of relevance to the Commission’s assessment that there was no sufficient basis for finding a collective dom -inant position of the five majors on various national markets for recorded music and that the concentration was not likely to create such a collective dominant position.
Godkendelsen af sammenslutningen støttes ikke mindst på denne vurdering.
68The clearance of the concentration was based not least on this assessment.
65 — Så vidt ses er det kun forekommet én gang i løbet af den fællesskabsretlige fusionskontrols mangeårige historie, at Kommissionen — som følge af en regnefejl — overskred en sagsbehandlingsfrist (sag IV/M.330 — McCormick/PCP/ Rabobank/Ostmann); jf. Von Koppenfels, U., i Drauz/Jones (udg.) EU competition Law, bind II — Mergers and Acquisitions, Leuven 2006, punkt 6.27.
65 — So far as appears, in the long history of European merger control the Commission has only once failed to comply with a procedural time-limit, and then on account of a mistake in calculation (Case IV/M.330 — McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/ Ostmann); in relation to this see Von Koppenfels, U., in Drauz / Jones (eds), EU Competition Law, Volume II — Mergers and Acquisitions (Leuven 2006), paragraph 6.27.
67 — Jf. her præmis 278-325, navnlig præmis 287 og 325 i den appellerede dom.
67 — On this point, see paragraphs 278 to 325, and in particular paragraphs 287 and 325, of the judgment under appeal.
68 — Betragtning 153, 158 godkendelsesbeslutning.
68 — Recitals 153, 158 and 183 of the first clearance decision.
I den appellerede dom undersøgte Retten forskellige afsnit i den første godkendelsesbeslutning for så vidt angik spørgsmålet, om den indeholdt en tilstrækkelig begrundelse for konstateringen af, at der ikke var gennemsigtighed på markedet, hvilket den i hvert tilfælde benægtede.
In the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance reviewed various sections of the first clearance decision as to whether they provided sufficient justification for the finding that the market was not transparent, and in each case decided the issue in the negative.
I denne forbindelse undersøgte den såvel Kommissionens angivelser vedrørende katalogpriser som vedrørende rabatter (almindelige rabatter og salgsfremmende rabatter).
73 In this connection it considered both the information provided by the Commission as regards list prices and that as regards price discounts (file discounts and campaign discounts).
I denne forbindelse fastslog Retten dels, at »ifølge selve ordlyden af beslutningen udgør katalogpriserne […] en faktor, der bidrager til gennemsigtighed på markedet« 74.
In this regard the Court of First Instance held first, that ‘according to the very terms of the Decision, list prices … constitute a factor of market transparency’.
For det andet beviser »de få bemærkninger om de salgsfremmende rabatter […] ikke […], at markedet er uigennemsigtigt, endsige at de salgsfremmende rabatter er uigennemsigtige, da bemærkningerne er upræcise, uunderbyggede eller endog i strid med andre iagttagelser i beslutningen« 75.
74Second, ‘the few assertions relating to campaign discounts … in so far as they are imprecise, unsupported, and indeed contradicted by other observations in the Decision, cannot demonstrate the opacity of the market or even of campaign discounts …’.
Endelig bemærkes, at »afsnittet om de små lande heller ikke indeholder en begrundelse for fastslåelsen af, at markedet ikke er gennemsigtigt på grund af de salgsfremmende rabatter« 76.
75Finally, ‘the section dealing with the smaller countries, too, contains no reasoning for the finding that the market is not transparent on account of the campaign discounts’. 76
Retten gennemgik først det specifikke afsnit i den første godkendelsesbeslutning, hvori den behandlede spørgsmålet om gennemsigtighed 69, og konstaterede, at Kommissionen »ikke fastslog, at markedet var uigennemsigtigt eller ikke tilstrækkeligt gennemsigtigt til at muliggøre en kollektiv dominerende stilling«.
The Court of First Instance considered, first, the section of the first clearance decision which concerned the issue of market transparency, 69 and found that the Commission ‘did not conclude that the market was opaque or not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position’.
Forholdet var yderligere det, at den også — »kun med undtagelse af den temmelig begrænsede og uunderbyggede bemærkning om, at de salgsfremmende rabatter kunne mindske gennemsigtigheden og gøre et stiltiende kartel vanskeligere — kun henviste til faktorer, der kan tilvejebringe stor gennemsigtighed på markedet og lette kontrollen med en samordning«.
In addition, in that section the Commission mentioned ‘only factors capable of giving rise to great transparency in the market and of facilitating the monitoring of compliance with collusion, with the sole exception of the rather limited and unsubstantiated assertion that campaign discounts could reduce transparency and make tacit collusion more difficult’.
Det står derfor klart, at dette specifikke afsnit i den første godkendelsesbeslutning »ikke i sig selv kan anses for i fornødent omfang at give en begrundelse for fastslåelsen af, at markedet ikke er tilstrækkeligt gennemsigtigt« 70.
Thus, this specific section of the first clearance decision could ‘clearly not, in itself, be considered to support to the requisite legal standard the assertion that the market was not sufficiently transparent’. 70
71 — Den tyske oversættelse af betragtning 69 til den første godkendelsesbeslutning er for så vidt upræcis, idet den anvender ordet »Preisabsprachen« for »common price policy«.
71 — The German translation of recital 69 of the first clearance decision is inaccurate in that regard, given that it uses the term ‘Preisabsprachen’ for the term ‘common price policy’.