natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selv om en sådan fritagelse kun finder anvendelse, når en aftale for det første tilgodeser alle de i artikel 33 EF nævnte formål og for det andet er nødvendige for at nå dem, var
Whereas such an exemption is applicable only where an agreement favours all the objectives of Article 33 EC and is also necessary for the attainment of those objectives, that was not the position in this case: although the agreement might well be considered to be necessary for the objective of ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, it could, on the other hand, be prejudicial to ensuring that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices and did not concern the stabilisation of the markets.
I, s. 1979, præmis 21, og af 12.9.2000, forenede sager C-180/98 – C-184/98, Pavlov m.fl., Sml. I, s. 6451, præmis 74.
Regulation No 26 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules of competition to production of and trade in agricultural products (OJ, English Special Edition 1959–62, p. 129).
Kommissionens beslutning 2003/600/EF af 2.4.2003 om en procedure i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel [81 EF] (sag COMP/C.38.279/F3 – Fransk oksekød) (EUT L 209, s. 12).
In practice, medicines intended to be reimbursed in other Member States of the Community were to be sold at a higher price than those intended to be reimbursed in Spain, where the administration sets maximum prices.
Forordning nr. 26 af 4.4.1962 om anvendelse af visse konkurrenceregler inden for produktion og handel med landbrugsvarer (EFT 1959-1962, s. 120).
In those circumstances, according to the Court of First Instance, it cannot be inferred merely from a reading of the terms of the agreement, even in its context, that the agreement is restrictive of competition, and it is therefore necessary to consider the eects of the agreement.
Arbejdet dette ikke tilfældet i denne sag: Selv om aftalen nok kunne anses for nødvendig i forhold til formålet at sikre landbrugsbefolkningen en rimelig levestandard, var der derimod risiko for, at den ville være til skade for fastsættelsen af rimelige priser på landbrugsvarer for forbrugerne, og den vedrørte ikke stabilisering af markederne.
Proceedings or distorted to an appreciable extent. The competition in question must be understood within the actual context in which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute; the interference with competition may in particular be doubted if the agreement seems really necessary for the penetration of a new area by an undertaking.
Anvendelse af artikel 81, stk. 1, EF
In this case, the Court of First Instance considered that the contested decision was aected by a number of errors of analysis.
Artikel 81, stk. 1, EF bestemmer, at alle aftaler mellem virksomheder, alle vedtagelser inden for sammenslutninger af virksomheder og alle former for samordnet praksis, der kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, og som har til formål eller til følge at hindre, begrænse eller fordreje konkurrencen inden for fællesmarkedet, er uforenelige med fællesmarkedet og er forbudt.
Second, the decision did not demonstrate, in concrete terms, in the context of the relevant emerging market, that the provisions of the agreement on roaming had restrictive eects on competition, but was conned, in this respect, to a petitio principii and to broad and general statements.
Kartellers konkurrencebegrænsende formål eller virkning
Application of Article 81(3) EC
I praksis skulle lægemidler, der var beregnet til at blive dækket i andre af Fællesskabets medlemsstater, sælges til højere priser end dem, der var beregnet på at blive dækket i Spanien, hvor myndighederne fastsætter maksimale priser. GlaxoSmithKline havde anmeldt disse almindelige salgsbetingelser til Kommissionen, og denne konstaterede efter indgivelse af flere klager, at de omhandlede salgsbetingelser havde konkurrencebegrænsende formål eller virkning.
Article 81(3) EC provides that the provisions of Article 81(1) EC may be declared inapplicable to, in particular, any agreement between undertakings which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benet, and which does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives or aord to such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
I dommen lagde Retten imidlertid til grund, at en aftale, der tilsigter at begrænse parallelhandel, ikke ifølge sin natur, dvs. uafhængigt af en konkurrencemæssig analyse, kan antages at have et konkurrencebegrænsende formål.
In GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission, to which reference has already been made, the applicant put forward, in particular, evidence intended to establish that parallel trade would lead to a loss in eciency by reducing the applicant’s capacity to innovate.
Når parallelhandel nyder en vis beskyttelse, er dette ikke af hensyn til parallelhandelen som sådan, men fordi den er til fordel for dels udviklingen af samhandelen, og dels styrkelsen af konkurrencen, dvs. i denne anden henseende, idet den bibringer de endelige forbrugere fordelene ved en effektiv konkurrence for så vidt angår udbud eller pris.
It thus contended that the agreement in issue, by aecting parallel trade and improving the applicant’s margins, would enable the applicant to increase its capacity for innovation.The Commission’s examination of certain relevant evidence put forward by the applicant could not be accepted as sucient to support the conclusions which the Commission had
Retten i Første Instans økonomiske agenter, der opererer på et mellemliggende stadium i værdikæden, og kan beholde den fordel, som parallelhandelen kan indebære for så vidt angår pris, i hvilket tilfælde denne fordel ikke gives videre til den endelige forbruger.
Court of First Instance reached. The Commission could not neglect to consider whether the agreement in issue could enable the applicant’s capacity for innovation to be reinstated and could thus give rise to a gain in eciency for interbrand competition insofar as in the medicines sector the eect of parallel trade on competition is ambiguous.
Eftersom priserne på de omhandlede lægemidler for det andet er beskyttet mod frit udbud og fri efterspørgsel på grund af de gældende regler og fastsættes eller kontrolleres af offentlige myndigheder, kan det ikke som udgangspunkt tages for givet, at parallelhandel typisk medfører nedsættelse af priserne og således øger fordelen for de endelige forbrugere.
In eect, the gain in eciency to which the agreement is likely to give rise for interbrand competition, the role of which is limited by the applicable pharmaceutical regulatory framework, must be compared with the loss in eciency to which the agreement is likely to give rise for interbrand competition.
Det er derfor nødvendigt, at Kommissionen fremlægger præcise og samstemmende beviser for, at overtrædelsen er blevet begået. Imidlertid skal hver enkelt af de af Kommissionen fremlagte beviser ikke nødvendigvis opfylde disse kriterier i forhold til hver enkelt led i overtrædelsen.
In 2006 the Court of First Instance adjudicated on the conditions of Article 82 EC in only two judgments, both relating to the rejection of a complaint.
Det er tilstrækkeligt, at den række indicier, som institutionen har påberåbt sig, bedømt i deres helhed opfylder dette krav.
Second, in Haladjian Frères v Commission, the company Haladjian Frères had lodged a complaint with the Commission, claiming in particular that there had been a number of infringements of Article 82 EC which were alleged to result from the introduction of a system for the marketing of replacement parts by the United States company Caterpillar.
I denne sag gjorde de fem banker, der havde anlagt søgsmålet, gældende, at der ikke på et møde, der fandt sted den 15. oktober 1997, blev indgået nogen aftale om niveauet og regler for gebyrberegning ved veksling af kontanter, der udgør underenheder af euroen, i overgangsperioden mellem indførelsen af euroen som fællesmønt og indførelsen af euromønter og -sedler.
The Court of First Instance held that the applicant’s arguments did not call in question the appraisals of the elements of fact and of law carried out by the Commission and that the Commission had been correct to reject the applicant’s complaint.
Retten undersøgte både beviserne vedrørende baggrunden for mødet den 15. oktober og de beviser, der direkte vedrørte dette, og fastslog, at de dog ikke var tilstrækkelige som grundlag for at antage – uden at dette punkt gav anledning til rimelig tvivl – at de tilstedeværende banker indgik den sanktionerede aftale.
The complaints alleging the imposition of unfair prices, the limiting of markets or the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions were rejected, regard being had in particular to the fact that the system in issue did not prohibit in fact or in law competition in the form of parts imported at prices lower than the European prices.
Kommissionens forpligtelser ved undersøgelse af en aftale
Procedure for penalising anticompetitive practices
Arbejdet situation som i denne sag, hvor det er anerkendt, at aftalen ikke har et konkurrencebegrænsende formål, skal aftalens virkninger undersøges, og for at aftalen skal kunne omfattes af forbuddet, kræves det, at der foreligger omstændigheder, der beviser, at konkurrencen faktisk er blevet enten hindret, indskrænket eller mærkbart fordrejet.
Proceedings the Commission that there has been an infringement of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC. As the ultimate purpose of the rules which seek to ensure that competition is not distorted within the internal market is to increase the welfare of the consumer, the recognition that such customers have a legitimate interest in obtaining a finding by the Commission that there has been an infringement of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC contributes to the attainment of the objectives of competition law.
Den konkurrence, som det vedrører, skal forstås inden for de reelle rammer, hvor den ville udfolde sig, såfremt den omstridte aftale ikke fandtes. Det kan navnlig forekomme tvivlsomt, om der foreligger en forstyrrelse af konkurrencen, hvis aftalen netop viser sig at være nødvendig for, at en virksomhed kan trænge ind på et område, hvor den ikke har virket.
In Raieisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others v Commission, the Court of First Instance further stated, first, that a concerned party may be admitted as complainant and receive the statement of objections at any stage of the administrative procedure and, second, that the right to receive the statement of objections cannot be restricted on the basis of mere suspicion that that document may be misused.
En sådan fremgangsmåde indebærer ikke at der anvendes en »rule of reason« i forhold til artikel 81, stk. 1, EF, bestående i, at der foretages en afvejning af aftalens konkurrencestyrkende og -begrænsende virkninger, men en overvejelse af aftalens virkning på den aktuelle og potentielle konkurrence samt konkurrencesituationen, såfremt aftalen ikke fandtes, idet disse to aspekter er væsentligt forbundet.
The judgment in Archer Daniels Midland v Commission (citric acid) provided the Court of First Instance with the opportunity to dene the conditions in which the Commission may use against an undertaking admissions obtained by an authority in a non-Member country without breaching the right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination as recognised by Community law 26.
Retten tilføjede, at en sådan undersøgelse er særlig nødvendig for så vidt angår de markeder, som er ved at blive liberaliseret, eller de markeder, der opstår – som det her omhandlede marked for tredjegenerations-mobiltelekommunikation – hvor konkurrencens effektive virkning kan være besværliggjort, f.eks. som følge af tilstedeværelsen af en dominerende operatør, af markedsstrukturens intensivitet eller af tilstedeværelsen af betydelige adgangshindringer.
Bayer, one of the members of the cartel on which sanctions were imposed, had communicated to the Commission a report of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) concerning the hearing of a representative of the applicant before the United States authorities, which was subsequently used in support of the statement of objections and then of the decision penalising the undertaking.
Retten lagde i denne sag til grund, at den anfægtede beslutning var behæftet med flere undersøgelsesmangler.
In its action against that decision, the applicant contended that it had not had the opportunity to rely on its right not to incriminate itself, as recognised by Community law.
Dels indeholder den ikke en objektiv drøftelse af konkurrencesituationen, såfremt den nævnte aftale ikke fandtes – hvilket fordrejer bedømmelsen af aftalens faktiske og potentielle virkning på konkurrencen.
In its judgment, however, the Court of First Instance held that there is no provision prohibiting the Commission from relying, as evidence, on a document drawn up in a procedure other than that conducted by the Commission itself.
Med henblik på gyldigt at kunne vurdere, i hvilket omfang aftalen var nødvendig for O2 (Germany) for at få adgang til markedet for tredjegenerationsmobiltelekommunikation, burde Kommissionen have uddybet, om O2 ville have været til stede på tredjegenerationsmarkedet, hvis aftalen ikke fandtes.
Nonetheless, it held that where the Commission relies on a statement made in a dierent context from that of the procedure before it, and where that statement potentially contains information which the undertaking concerned would have been entitled to refuse to supply, the Commission is required to ensure that the undertakings concerned enjoys procedural rights equivalent to those conferred by Community law.
Dels beviser den ikke konkret, i sammenhæng med det pågældende opståede marked, at aftalens bestemmelser vedrørende roaming har konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger, men indskrænker sig i den henseende til en cirkelslutning og generelle påstande.
In the absence of such doubts, the procedural rights of the parties concerned must be considered to have been suciently guaranteed if, in the statement of objections, the Commission indicated clearly, annexing the documents concerned to the statement of objections where necessary, that it intended to rely on the statements in issue.
Sagsøgeren gjorde ligeledes gældende, at den omtvistede aftale gennem påvirkning parallelhandelen og forbedring af sagsøgerens indtjeningsmargen ville styrke selskabets
On the right not to incriminate oneself, see the judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 October 1989 in Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283.
Bidrag vedrørende artikel 82 EF
Public nature of measures and denition of professional secrecy
I år har Retten kun truffet afgørelse om betingelserne i artikel 82 i to domme, der begge vedrørte afvisning af en klage.
In Bank Austria Creditanstalt v Commission, the applicant claimed, in substance, that it was unlawful to publish a decision imposing fines, as the publication of that decision was not in this case obligatory.
Dels konstaterede Retten i den allerede nævnte dom i sagen SELEX Sistemi Integrati mod Kommissionen vedrørende virksomhedsbegrebet, at da sagsøgeren i sin klage ikke havde henvist til en adfærd hos Eurocontrol som led i dens aktivitet med rådgivning til nationale myndigheder, der levede op til kriterierne for anvendelse af artikel 82 EF, forelå der tilsyneladende ikke noget konkurrenceforhold mellem Eurocontrol og sagsøgeren eller nogen anden virksomhed, der virkede inden for den omhandlede sektor.
In its judgment, however, the Court of First Instance rejected that plea, holding that the power of the institutions to make acts which they adopt public is the rule. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to that principle, insofar as Community law, notably by means of the provisions that guarantee compliance with professional secrecy, opposes the publication of those acts or of certain information which they contain.
Dels indgav selskabet Haladjian Frères i sagen Haladjian Frères mod Kommissionen en klage til Kommissionen, hvorved selskabet gjorde gældende, at der var forekommet flere overtrædelser af artikel 82, der hævdedes at være en følge af det amerikanske selskab Caterpillars etablering af et system til salg af reservedele.
The Court of First Instance then dened the concept of professional secrecy, holding that, in order that information be of the kind to be covered by that protection, it is necessary, first of all, that it be known only to a limited number of persons. It must then be information whose disclosure is liable to cause serious harm to the person who has provided it or to third parties.
Retten fastslog, at de argumenter, sagsøgeren havde gjort gældende, ikke kunne ændre den bedømmelse, som Kommissionen havde foretaget af de faktiske og retlige omstændigheder, og at Kommissionen derfor havde grundlag for at afvise sagsøgerens klage.
In fact, the Community legislature has balanced the public interest in the transparency of Community action against interests liable to militate against such transparency in various acts of secondary legislation, inter alia in Regulations (EC) No 45/2001 and (EC) No 1049/2001 27.
Klagepunkterne vedrørende den hævdede fastsættelse af urimelige priser, begrænsningen af salgskanaler eller endog anvendelse af ulige vilkår for ydelser af samme art blev forkastet, navnlig på grund af den omstændighed, at det omhandlede system ikke isolerede fællesmarkedet, eftersom det hverken faktisk eller retligt forbød konkurrencen vedrørende reservedele, der importeredes til priser, der var lavere end de europæiske.
Insofar as such provisions of secondary legislation prohibit the disclosure of information to the public or exclude public access to documents containing it, that information must be considered to be covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. Conversely, to the extent that the public has a right of access to documents containing certain information, that information cannot be considered to be of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.
Procedurer vedrørende forfølgning af konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd a)
In 2006, the Court of First Instance again delivered a large number of judgments dealing with the lawfulness of the appropriateness of fines imposed for infringement of Article 81 EC.
Retten, at en slutkunde af varer eller tjenesteydelser, såsom et politisk parti, der modtager østrigske banktjenesteydelser, har en berettiget interesse, der gør denne berettiget til indsigt i meddelelsen af klagepunkter.
In Jungbunzlauer v Commission and Degussa v Commission, the Court of First Instance rejected an objection of illegality in respect of Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 28, whereby it was alleged that that provision was incompatible with the principle that penalties must be provided for by law.
En slutkunde, som godtgør, at hans økonomiske interesser har lidt skade, eller at de kan lide skade på grund af en konkurrencebegrænsning, har nemlig en berettiget interesse i at fremsætte en begæring eller en klage med henblik på, at Kommissionen fastslår, at artikel 81 EF og 82 EF er overtrådt.
According to the applicants, which had been parties to the cartels covering the markets for citric acid and methionine, that provision unlawfully confers on the Commission the discretion to decide on the appropriateness and the amount of the fine.
Da de regler, som skal sikre, at konkurrencen ikke fordrejes på det indre marked, har som endeligt formål at styrke forbrugerens velbefindende, bidrager anerkendelsen af, at sådanne kunder har en berettiget interesse i, at Kommissionen fastslår, at artikel 81 EF og 82 EF er overtrådt, til gennemførelsen af konkurrencerettens formål.
The Court of First Instance nonetheless considered that the principle that penalties must be provided for by law, as interpreted by the caselaw of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the assumption that Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is applicable to fines imposed in respect of infringements of the competition rules, requires only that the terms of the provisions whereby penalties are imposed be suciently precise for the consequences that may arise from an infringement of those provisions to be foreseeable with absolute certainty.
I dommen i sagen Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich m.fl. mod Kommissionen præciserede Retten endvidere for det første, at anerkendelse af en interesseret part i egenskab af klager og meddelelse af klagepunkterne til denne kan finde sted på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt i den administrative procedures forløb, og, for det andet, at retten til at modtage meddelelsen af klagepunkter ikke kan begrænses på grundlag af, at der blot foreligger en mistanke om, at dette dokument eventuelt misbruges.
Furthermore, although the Commission’s discretion in applying penalties is wide, it is not absolute, since it is limited by the ceiling of 10 % of turnover, by the appraisal of the gravity and the duration of infringements, by the principles of equal treatment and proportionality, by its previous administrative practice seen in the light of the principle of equal treatment and, last, by the self-restraint which the Commission has imposed on itself by adopting the Leniency Notice and the Guidelines on the method of setting fines. The Court of First Instance therefore rejected the objection of illegality raised.
Sagen Archer Daniels Midland mod Kommissionen (citronsyre) gav Retten anledning til at præcisere betingelserne, hvorunder Kommissionen kan benytte en tilståelse, der er afgivet over for en myndighed i et tredjeland, mod en virksomhed, uden dermed at tilsidesætte retten til ikke at inkriminere sig selv, således som den er anerkendt i fællesskabsretten 26.
Although the Commission adopted new Guidelines on the method of setting fines on 1 September 2006, the judgments delivered, and, moreover, the newly lodged cases, in 2006 concerned only the Guidelines adopted in 1998 29.
Ved sit søgsmål vedrørende denne beslutning gjorde sagsøgeren gældende, at selskabet ikke havde haft lejlighed til at påberåbe sig retten til ikke at inkriminere sig selv, således som den er anerkendt i fællesskabsretten.
From a general point of view, it is now accepted that the Guidelines bind the Commission.
Retten konstaterede imidlertid i dommen, at der ikke findes bestemmelser, der forhindrer Kommissionen i ved bevisførelsen at støtte sig på et dokument, der er blevet til inden for rammerne af en anden procedure end den, Kommissionen selv har gennemført.
However, in Raieisen Zentralbank Österreich and Others v Commission, the Court of First Instance held that the fact that the Commission had thus bound itself was not incompatible with its retention of a substantial discretion.
Kommissionen er således forpligtet til af egen drift at undersøge, hvorvidt der umiddelbart synes at foreligge egentlig tvivl om, hvorvidt de berørte parters processuelle rettigheder er blevet iagttaget inden for rammerne af den procedure, hvorunder de har fremsat sådanne erklæringer.
The adoption of the Guidelines thus did not render irrelevant the previous caselaw according to which the Commission has a discretion which allows it to take into consideration, or not to do so, certain elements when it fixes the amount of the fines which it proposes to impose, depending in particular on the circumstances of the case. Where the Commission has departed from the method set out
Foreligger der ikke en sådan tvivl, bør de berørte parters processuelle rettigheder betragtes som sikrede i tilstrækkelig høj grad, hvis Kommissionen i meddelelsen af klagepunkter tydeligt angiver, alt efter omstændighederne
Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles [81 EC] and [82 EC] (OJ, English Special Edition 1959–62, p. 87).