natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
207 — Kommissionens skriftlige indlæg af 21.9.2005 som svar på skriftlige spørgsmål fra Retten.
207 — Commission document of 21 September 2005 responding to written questions from the Court of First Instance.
206 — Dom af 6.4.2006, sag C-551/03 P, General Motors mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 3173, præmis 54, dommen i sagen JBC Service mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 127, præmis 108, og dommen i sagen Wunenburger mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 44, præmis 67.
206 — Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173, paragraph 54, JCB Service (cited above, footnote 127), paragraph 108, and Wunenburger (cited above, footnote 44), paragraph 67.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P lerne i bilag E.4.2« 209.
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P namely ‘the tables in Annex E.4.2’.
Der findes således også i sagens akter på forsiden til bilag E.4.2 en titel, der klart har lighed med de indledende ord i den appellerede doms præmis 425 210, og tabellen i bilag E.4.2 opregner den forskel, som er nævnt i præmis 425 mellem de mindste og de største rabatter pr. kunde.
209And indeed in the case file the cover sheet to Annex E.4.2 includes a heading which is clearly similar to the introductory words of paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal, 210and the tables in Annex E.4.2 identify the differential referred to in paragraph 425 between minimum and maximum discounts by customer.
Det følger heller ikke af Kommissionens bemærkninger i punkt 19-22 i dets skriftlige indlæg af 21. september 2005, at Retten skulle have fortolket tabellerne i bilag E.4.2 åbenbart urigtigt.
Nor does it follow from the Commission’s statements in paragraphs 19 to 22 of its document of 21 September 2005 that the Court of First Instance manifestly misinterpreted the tables in Annex E.4.2.
Kommissionens bemærkninger henviser nemlig allerede efter sin ordlyd alene til bilag B.6, B.8 og E.2.
According to their wording, the information provided by the Commission there refers only to Annexes B.6, B.8 and E.2.
I modsætning hertil indeholder den passage, som appellanterne har citeret fra Kommissionens skriftlige indlæg, ingen oplysninger vedrørende de her omtvistede tabeller i bilag E.4.2.
By contrast, the passages in the Commission’s document to which the appellants refer do not contain any explanation of the tables in Annex E.4.2 in question at this point.
Henset hertil finder jeg, at anbringendet om, at der er tale om en urigtig gengivelse af beviser i relation til præmis 425 i den appellerede dom, er ubegrundet.
Against this background I find that the complaint of distortion of evidence is unfounded as regards paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal.
I den appellerede doms præmis 427 bemærker Retten følgende:
In paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance states:
Jeg lægger derfor til grund, at den appellerede doms præmis 425 henviser til tabellerne i bilag E.4.2.
Accordingly, I proceed on the footing that paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal refers to the tables in Annex E.4.2.
Det er imidlertid ikke muligt af dette bilag at udlede, hvilken åbenbar urigtig gengivelse Retten taler om i præmis 425.
However, this Annex does not disclose anything suggesting that the Court of First Instance’s discussion in paragraph 425 is clearly incorrect.
De tabeller, der er gengivet i dette bilag, indeholder — med undtagelse af titlen på bilagets forside — ingen oplysninger.
Admittedly, the tables printed in this Annex, with the exception of the heading in the Annex’s cover sheet, do not contain any explanatory additions.
»Selv hvis de forskellige tabeller, fusionsdeltagerne har udarbejdet, og som Kommissionen har fremlagt, rent faktisk beviser de angivelige større eller mindre variationer, er det ikke desto mindre tvivlsomt, om variationerne er relevante […], dels fordi de kun viser spænd og ikke vejede gennemsnit og variationer i forhold til gennemsnittene […]«
‘In any event, even on the assumption that the various tables drawn up by the parties to the concentration and produced by the Commission are in fact capable of establishing the more or less important variations alleged, the fact remains that … those variations are of doubtful relevance in so far as … they show only brackets without analysing the weighted averages and variations by reference to the averages …’
Appellanterne har intet bemærket med hensyn hertil.
However, the appellants do not make any submissions in relation to these.
Ifølge appellanterne har mange af oplysningerne i de tabeller og diagrammer, som Kommissionen under sagens behandling for førsteinstansen fremlagde for Retten i sit svarskrift af 11. februar 2005, derimod støtte i vejede gennemsnit.
The appellants’ opinion is that, to the contrary, many of the items in the tables and charts produced by the Commission to the Court of First Instance in its reply of 11 February 2005 at first instance are indeed based on weighted average values.
De henviser i denne forbindelse til bilag B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 og B.13 samt til Kommissionens yderligere bemærkninger i dens skriftlige indlæg til førsteinstansen af 14. marts 2007.
In this connection, they refer to Annexes B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 and B.13, as well as to the additional explanations given by the Commission at first instance in its document of 14 March 2007.
Henset hertil finder jeg, at påstanden om urigtig gengivelse af beviser for så vidt angår den appellerede doms præmis 427 er ubegrundet.
Against this background I find that the complaint of distortion of evidence is unfounded as regards paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal.
Det bemærkes, at Retten i sin dom klart anlægger en sproglig sondring mellem tabeller og diagrammer 212.
On this point it is to be noted that in its judgment the Court of First Instance makes a clear linguistic distinction between tables and charts.
I den appellerede doms præmis 427 henviser Retten udtrykkeligt til forskellige tabeller, som Kommissionen har fremlagt.
212In paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance expressly refers to the various tables produced by the Commission.
Jeg ville derfor have forventet, at appellanterne til støtte for deres påstand om urigtig gengivelse af beviser ligeledes havde henvist til de sagsakter, der indeholder tabeller.
I would therefore have expected that to prove their allegation of distortion of evidence the appellants would likewise refer to parts of the case files which contained tables.
Efter at have gennemgået bilag B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 og B.13 må jeg imidlertid konstatere, at disse ganske vist indeholder en del diagrammer, men i ingen af bilagene findes der tabeller.
However, after having looked at Annexes B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 and B.13, I have to find that although they contain a number of charts, none of these Annexes contain any tables.
De nævnte bilag er således lige så lidt i stand til at godtgøre den påståede urigtige gengivelse af beviser som Kommissionens eventuelle forklaringer vedrørende netop disse bilag.
In these circumstances the Annexes referred to are just as little capable of establishing the alleged distortion of evidence as are any explanations the Commission has given of these Annexes.
I den appellerede doms præmis 431-434 behandler Retten spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt det er muligt ved en »omvendt beregning« (»reverse engineering«) at fastslå nettosalgspriserne over for detailhandlerne ud fra detailsalgspriserne.
In paragraphs 431 to 434 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance considers the question whether it is possible to determine net selling prices to retailers on the basis of retail prices using ‘reverse engineering’.
Baggrunden for dette er Impalas argument under sagens behandling i førsteinstansen om, at »detailhandlernes avancer generelt er gennemsigtige og kendes med en høj grad af præcision« 213.
The background to this is Impala’s submission at first instance that retailers’ mark-ups were generally transparent and were known with a high degree of accuracy. 213
Det forekommer langt mere sandsynligt, at Retten i den appellerede doms præmis
It is much more probable that in paragraph 427 the Court of First Instance was
213 — Denne sammenhæng fremgår af den appellerede doms præmis 431 og 433.
213 — This context appears from paragraphs 431 and 433 of the judgment under appeal.
For så vidt angår undersøgelsens indhold er det ganske vist korrekt, at der i dens andet kapitel foretages en gennemgang af de detailhandlendes avancepolitik, navnlig af spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt de detailhandlende anvender standardavancer (»standard mark-ups«).
As regards the substance of the study, it is correct that its section 2 concerns retailers’ mark-up policy and in particular whether retailers apply standard mark-ups.
Retten fandt imidlertid, at der i undersøgelsen savnedes oplysninger om, hvorvidt »en detailhandler følger en forskellig salgspolitik for den samme type album« 215.
However, the Court of First Instance found the study to lack information as to whether ‘a retailer will apply a different sales policy for the same type of album’.
Efter en gennemgang af undersøgelsen i bilag B.17 kommer jeg i denne henseende til samme resultat som Retten.
215 After reading the study in Annex B.17, I have reached the same conclusion as the Court of First Instance.
»[…] oplysningerne i den af fusionsdeltagernes økonomer udarbejdede undersøgelse ikke er pålidelige, relevante og sammenlignelige […] Skønt det ganske vist er sandsynligt, at de forskellige former for detailhandlere (supermarkeder, uafhængige butikker, specialiserede butikskæder osv.) har en forskellig avancepolitik, og at der er forskelle inden for den enkelte kategori af erhvervsdrivende og endog forskelle på den enkelte erhvervsdrivendes plan, som afhænger af, hvilken type albummer der er tale om, eller hvor stor succes albummerne nyder, er det derimod meget usandsynligt — og undersøgelsen indeholder ikke nogen oplysninger derom — at en detailhandler følger en forskellig salgspolitik for den samme type album […]«
‘… the study drawn up by the economic advisers to the parties to the concentration does not present data that are sufficiently reliable, relevant and comparable … While it is indeed probable that the different types of retailer (supermarkets, independents, specialist chains, etc.) apply different mark-up policies, and that there are differences within each category of operators, and even differences for each individual operator, according to the types of album or their degree of success, it is very unlikely, on the other hand, and the study contains no data in that regard, that a retailer will apply a different sales policy for the same type of album.’
Henset hertil finder jeg, at anbringendet om, at der er tale om en urigtig gengivelse af beviser i den appellerede doms præmis 434, er ubegrundet.
Against this background I find that the complaint of distortion of evidence is unfounded as regards paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal.
Appellanterne kritiserer, at Retten ser bort fra den undersøgelse, som dens økonomer har udarbejdet, og som Kommissionen har fremlagt som bilag B.17 214, navnlig bilagets andet kapitel.
The appellants claim that the Court of First Instance disregarded the study drawn up by their economic experts and produced by the Commission as Annex B.17, 214 and in particular section 2 thereof.
Det indeholder omfattende økonomiske oplysninger, som viser, at Rettens antagelse om, at detailhandlende fører samme avancepolitik, er forkert.
This allegedly contains comprehensive economic information which indicates that the Court of First Instance was wrong to find that retailers followed a uniform mark-up policy.
Jeg finder ikke dette argument overbevisende.
This submission does not convince me.
Det fremgår allerede af en gennemlæsning af den omtvistede præmis 434 i Rettens dom, at Retten på ingen måde har undladt at tage hensyn til den nævnte undersøgelse, men at den derimod har foretaget en vurdering af den.
It is clear from merely reading the disputed paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance, far from disregarding this study, considered it.
215 — Den appellerede doms præmis 434 (min fremhævelse).
215 — Paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal (emphasis added).
C — Anvendelse af fortrolige oplysninger i den appellerede dom (syvende appelanbringende)
C — The use of undisclosed evidence in the judgment under appeal (seventh ground of appeal)
Da appellanterne bl.a. har kritiseret, at de ikke har kunnet tage stilling til sidstnævnte dokumenter for Retten, skal det for det første drøftes, om der eventuelt foreligger en krænkelse af princippet om kontradiktorisk procedure for Retten.
Since the appellants complain inter alia that they were not able to comment on the latter documents before the Court of First Instance, it must first be considered whether there has been any breach of the adversarial principle before the Court of First Instance.
Med syvende appelanbringende har appellanterne kritiseret Retten for med urette at have støttet dommen på beviser, som ikke er blevet meddelt dem, som de aldrig har haft lejlighed til at tage stilling til, og som Kommissionen heller ikke fremlagde, da den traf den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
By their seventh ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance erred in law by basing its judgment on evidence that was not disclosed to the applicants, on which they had no opportunity of commenting, and which was not before the Commission at the time it adopted the first clearance decision.
Da sådanne beviser ikke kan indgå i Kommissionens beslutningsgrundlag, kan annullationen af den første godkendelsesbeslutning heller ikke støttes herpå.
Given that such evidence could not have provided a basis for the Commission’s decision, the setting aside of the first clearance decision could likewise not be based on it.
Det er hævet over al tvivl, at en retsafgørelse ikke kan baseres på faktiske omstændigheder og dokumenter, som parterne eller en af disse ikke har kunnet skaffe sig kendskab til, og som de således ikke har kunnet tage stilling til 219.
There is no doubt that a judicial decision cannot be based on facts and documents of which the parties themselves — or one of them — have no knowledge and on which they therefore have not been able to comment either.
I den foreliggende sag var appellanterne imidlertid slet ikke parter under sagen for førsteinstansen, men var alene indtrådt i sagen som intervenienter til støtte for Kommissionens påstande.
219 However, in the present case, in the proceedings at first instance the appellants were not in the position of a party to the action, but participated merely as interveners in support of the Commission.
De havde således en svagere stilling under sagen end sagsøgeren og sagsøgte.
As such they have a weaker position in the proceedings than an applicant or a defendant.
Artikel 116, stk. 2, andet punktum, i procesreglementet for Retten i Første Instans bestemmer udtrykkeligt, at retsformanden efter anmodning fra en part kan undlade at tilstille intervenienten hemmelige eller fortrolige dokumenter, hvilket ikke sjældent forekommer netop i konkurrencesager 220.
In particular, the second sentence of Article 116(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance expressly provides that the President may, on application by one of the parties, omit secret or confidential information from being disclosed to an intervener, and this is not infrequent in competition law proceedings in particular.
I sager om de fællesskabsretlige konkurrenceregler er bevisførelsen nemlig navnlig
220Particularly in Community competition
Retten Kommissionens konstatering af, at Sony og Bertelsmann har indført et system med ugentlige rapporter med oplysninger om konkurrenterne 217. Retten henviser imidlertid i sin dom endvidere ligeledes til visse dokumenter, som Impala har fremlagt, og som er angivet som værende fortrolige 218.
216 In this connection the Court of First Instance first emphasises one of the Commission’s findings, namely that Sony and Bertelsmann had a system of weekly reports which contained information about their competitors too.
219 — Dom af 22.3.1961, forenede sager 42/59 og 49/59, Snupat mod Den Høje Myndighed, Sml. 19541964, s. 247, org.ref.: Rec. s. 99, på s. 159, af 10.1.2002, saga C-480/99 P, Plant m.fl. mod Kommissionen og South Wales Small Mines, Sml.
219 — Joined Cases 42/59 and 49/59 Snupat v High Authority [1961] ECR 53, at p.
I, s. 265, præmis 24, og af 2.10.2003, sag C-199/99 P, Corus UK mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 11177, præmis 19.
See also the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Feldbrugge v The Netherlands (1986) Series A, No. 99, p.
Jf. ligeledes Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstols dom af 29.5.1986, Feldbrugge mod Nederlandene, serie A, nr. 99, s. 16, præmis 44, og af 31.10.2006, Aksoy (Eroğlu) mod Tyrkiet, nr. 59741/00, præmis 21 og den deri nævnte retspraksis.
16, paragraph 44, and Aksoy (Eroğlu) v Turkey, 31 October 2006, Application No. 59741/00, paragraph 21, and the caselaw referred to there.
220 — Jf. bl.a. kendelse af 15.6.2006, sag T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom mod Kommissionen, Sml. II, s. 1747.
220 — See for example the order in Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2006] ECR II-1747.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P forventes af Kommissionen, at den ville påberåbe sig disse under den administrative procedure som begrundelse for en eventuel forbudsbeslutning eller for at afkræfte visse af fusionsdeltagernes argumenter.
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P reasonably be expected to rely on them in the administrative procedure to justify a possible prohibition decision, or even simply to rebut particular arguments of the parties to the concentration.
karakteriseret ved den omstændighed, at de undersøgte dokumenter ofte indeholder forretningshemmeligheder eller andre oplysninger, som ikke kan udleveres, eller som kun kan udleveres i meget begrænset omfang 221.
cases the taking of evidence is characterised by the fact that the documents considered often contain trade secrets or other information which may be published either not at all or only subject to significant restrictions.
Det følger således allerede af opbygningen af procesreglementet, at Retten i givet fald kan støtte sin dom på bevismidler, som intervenienterne ikke har haft adgang til (jf. ligeledes artikel 67, stk. 3, første punktum, i procesreglementet for Retten i Første Instans og artikel 287 EF).
221Thus, it is already inherent in the scheme of the Rules of Procedure that the Court of First Instance can base its judgment, if necessary, on evidence which was not available to interveners (see also Article 67(3)(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, and moreover Article 287 EC).
Henset hertil foreligger der en retlig fejl, idet Retten begrundede sin annullation af den første godkendelsesbeslutning på fortrolige dokumenter, som Impala havde fremlagt.
Against this background the Court of First Instance erred in law when it supported its decision to annul the first clearance decision by relying on the confidential documents lodged by Impala.
Fortrolig behandling af dokumenter, som Impala har fremlagt, er således ligeledes mindre — end det måtte synes ved en første betragtning — et problem om en kontradiktorisk procedure for Retten, end det er et spørgsmål om respekt for fusionsdeltagernes ret til kontradiktion under den administrative procedure.
Indeed, contrary to what might appear at first sight, the confidential treatment of documents submitted by Impala is less a problem in the adversarial proceedings before the Court of First Instance than a question of observing the rights of defence of the parties to the concentration in the administrative procedure.
Der findes nemlig andre begrundelser for Rettens bemærkninger, som ikke vedrører de fortrolige dokumenter, som Impala havde fremlagt.
Thus, reliance on those documents was merely one of a number of factors from which the Court of First Instance concluded ‘that the already strong transparency … is increased even further’.
Henvisningerne til disse dokumenter udgør således i sidste instans blot en af flere faktorer, hvoraf det ifølge Retten fulgte, af »at de øger den allerede høje grad af gennemsigtighed« 223.
223Accordingly, even if, having regard to the appellants’ rights of defence, the Court of First Instance had declined to take the confidential documents submitted by Impala into account, this would not have undermined the conclusions it drew in the judgment under appeal in any way. 224
Appellanterne har med rette gjort gældende, at Retten ikke kunne begrunde annullationen af den første godkendelsesbeslutning med henvisning til de omtvistede dokumenter, som Impala havde fremlagt, idet Kommissionen som følge af dokumenternes fortrolige karakter ikke kunne benytte dem.
The appellants correctly submit that the Court of First Instance was not entitled to rely on the disputed documents lodged by Impala to support the annulment of the first clearance decision, because the Commission itself ought not to have used these documents, owing to their confidential nature.
Såfremt Retten nemlig finder, at visse dokumenter er så fortrolige, at den i det hele forholder deres indhold for fusionsdeltagerne 222, kan det heller ikke med rimelighed
If the Court of First Instance considers certain documents to be confidential to such an extent that it withholds their entire content from the undertakings participating in the concentration, 222the Commission cannot
Følgelig er syvende appelanbringende ligeledes ubegrundet.
It follows that the seventh ground of appeal is also unfounded.
221 — Dom af 25.1.2007, sag C-411/04 P, Salzgitter Mannesmann mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 959, præmis 43.
221 — Case C-411/04 P Salzgitter Mannesmann v Commission [2007] ECR I-959, paragraph 43.
224 — I samme retning dommen i sagen Aalborg Portland m.fl. mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 121, præmis 72, dommen i sagen Musique Duffusion française m.fl. mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 117, præmis 30, og dom af 29.6.1995, sag T-30/91, Solvay mod Kommissionen, Sml. II, s. 1775, præmis 58.
224 — To the same effect, see Aalborg Portland (cited above, footnote 121), paragraph 72, Musique Diffusion française (cited above, footnote 117), paragraph 30, and Case T-30/91 Solvay v Commission [1995] ECR II-1775, paragraph 58.
222 — Uanset at jeg efter at have gennemset førsteinstanssagens akter nærer tvivl om, hvorvidt et sådant skridt var berettiget i den foreliggende sag, tilkommer det ikke Domstolen under en verserende appelsag at rejse spørgsmål om Rettens vurdering af de pågældende dokumenters fortrolighed.
222 — Even if I have considerable doubt after looking at the case file from the proceedings at first instance as to whether such an approach was justified in the present case, it is not the task of the Court in the present appeal proceedings to call in question the Court of First Instance’s assessment as to the confidentiality of these documents.
Appellen skal således i det hele forkastes.
Accordingly, the appeal is to be dismissed in its entirety.
Impala har forstået Kommissionens bemærkninger som en kontraappel og har under henvisning til procesreglementets artikel 117, stk. 2, fremsat sine bemærkninger hertil i et særskilt processkrift.
Impala considered these observations by the Commission to be a cross appeal, and under reference to Article 117(2) of the Rules of Procedure replied to them by a separate document.
Med tilladelse fra præsidenten for Domstolen er der blevet indgivet yderligere indlæg vedrørende dette spørgsmål.
With permission of the President of the Court further documents were submitted on this matter.
VI — Ad den påståede kontraappel
VI — The supposed cross appeal
Kommissionens svarskrift indeholder i slutningen et særligt afsnit med »yderligere bemærkninger« 225 til, hvad Retten betegnede som den »væsentlige del af begrundelsen« for den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
At the end of the Commission’s response to the appeal there appears a separ- ate section with ‘additional observations’ 225 on what the Court of First Instance described as the ‘essential grounds’ of the first clearance decision.