Domstolen fastslog, at Schengenprotokollen var blevet anvendt korrekt, og at dens artikel 5, stk. 1, skal fortolkes således, at en medlemsstats deltagelse i vedtagelsen af en foranstaltning i henhold til denne bestemmelse kun kan ske, for så vidt som medlemsstaten har fået bemyndigelse af Rådet til at tiltræde det område af Schengenreglerne, som foranstaltningen henhører under, eller som den udgør en videreudvikling af, hvilket i den foreliggende sag ikke var tilfældet. Ifølge Domstolen ville den af Det Forenede Kongerige anlagte fortolkning medføre, at Schengenprotokollens artikel 4 helt berøves sin eektive virkning, for så vidt som Irland og Det Forenede Kongerige derved ville kunne deltage i alle forslag og initiativer til udbygning af Schengenreglerne i henhold til artikel 5, stk. 1, selv om disse medlemsstater ikke har tiltrådt de relevante bestemmelser i Schengenreglerne eller ikke har fået tilladelse til at deltage heri.
Lastly, in Case C-202/06 P Cementbouw Handel & Industrie v Commission (judgment of 18 December 2007), the Court examined the eect of commitments proposed by the parties on the Commission’s competence in relation to concentrations. The Court noted that Regulation No 4064/89 (21) on the control of concentrations is based on the principle of a clear division of powers between the national and Community supervisory authorities. That division reects, in particular, a concern for legal certainty, which means that it must be possible to identify in a foreseeable manner the authority competent to examine a given concentration. For that reason, the Community legislature has laid down criteria that are both precise and objective allowing the determination of whether a concentration has the economic size necessary for it to have a‘Community dimension’and, accordingly, to fall within the exclusive competence of the Commission. In addition, the need for speed, which characterises the general scheme of Regulation No 4064/89 and which requires the Commission to comply with strict time limits for the adoption of the final decision, means that the Commission’s competence cannot be challenged at any time or be in a state of constant ux. The Court held, therefore, that while the Commission loses its competence to examine a concentration where the undertakings concerned completely abandon the proposed concentration, the position is otherwise where the parties do no more than propose partial amendments. Proposals of that kind could not have the eect of requiring the Commission to re-examine its competence without allowing the undertakings concerned signicantly to disturb the course of the proceedings and the eectiveness of the control which the legislature sought to put in place. The commitments proposed or adopted by undertakings are therefore so many matters which the Commission must take into account in its examination of the substantive question, that is to say, that of the compatibility or incompatibility of the concentration with the common market, but they cannot strip the Commission of its competence, since that is a matter which will have been determined in the first phase of the proceedings. It follows that the competence of the Commission to make findings in relation to a concentration must be established, as regards the whole of the proceedings, at a xed time, which must necessarily be closely related to the notication of the concentration. Taxation