natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvad angår betingelsen om den ulovlige karakter af de handlinger, Kommissionen har begået, fremgår det af præmis 83 i mellemdommen — der ikke er blevet appelleret og følgelig skal anses for endelig — at den ulovlige handling i dette tilfælde bestod i, at Kommissionen ved de omtvistede afgørelser ikke havde godtgjort, at den inden dens afslag havde foretaget en behørig sammenligning af Marie-Claude Girardots fortjenester med hensyn til hver af de stillinger, hun havde ansøgt om.
As regards the condition relating to the allegedly unlawful act, it is clear from paragraph 83 of the interim judgment, against which no appeal has been brought and which must therefore be considered to be final, that the unlawful conduct in the present case resides in the fact that, by the two contested decisions, the Commission did not demonstrate that it had properly examined the merits of Mrs Girardot’s application in relation of each of the posts she had applied for, before rejecting it.
Med hensyn til betingelsen om, at der skal være lidt et tab, bemærkes, at det tab, som påstås erstattet, skal være faktisk og reelt (jf. i denne retning dom af 27.1.1982, forenede sager 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80 og 5/81, Birra Wührer m.fl. mod Rådet og Kommissionen, Sml. s. 85, præmis 9, og af 9.11.2006, sag C-243/05 P, Agraz m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 10833, præmis 27).
As regards the condition relating to damage, the damage for which compensation is sought must be actual and certain (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 256/80, 257/80, 265/80, 267/80 and 5/81 Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 85, paragraph 9, and Case C-243/05 P Agraz and Others v Commission [2006] ECR I-10833, paragraph 27).
I dette tilfælde er det ubestridt, at Marie-Claude Girardot som følge af Kommissionens ulovlige handling utvivlsomt og uopretteligt har fortabt muligheden for at opnå en stilling ved Kommissionens tjenestegrene efter udløbet af den omhandlede procedure i denne sag, og at denne fortabte mulighed følgelig udgør en reel og faktisk skade for hende.
In the present case, it is not a matter of dispute that, because of the unlawful act committed by the Commission, Mrs Girardot lost, definitively and irremediably, the chance of being recruited to a post within the departments of that institution on the conclusion of the procedure in question in this case and that, consequently, that loss of an opportunity represents damage which is for her actual and certain.
Det fremgår desuden af Rettens konstateringer, navnlig i mellemdommens præmis 84-91, der af de årsager, der er anført ovenfor i denne doms præmis 53, heller ikke kan anfægtes under denne appel, at det faktiske og reelle tab, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt, ligeledes omfatter den omstændighed, at det er umuligt for hende at deltage i en ny forskriftsmæssig ansættelsesprocedure, idet hun ikke længere er i stand til og ikke engang har ret til at tilkendegive sin interesse for et opslag om »en særlig forskerstilling« som den, hun i sin tid ansøgte om.
Further, it is clear from the findings made by the Court of First Instance, in particular in paragraphs 84 to 91 of the interim judgment, which, for the reasons given in paragraph 53 of this judgment, can no longer be challenged in this appeal, that the actual and certain damage suffered by Mrs Girardot extends to the fact that it was impossible for her to take part in a fresh and properly conducted recruitment procedure, since Mrs Girardot was no longer either in a position or even entitled to express her interest in posts to be filled by replying to a ‘specific research’ vacancy notice in respect of posts for which she had submitted applications.
Kommissionen har anført, at Retten ved anvendelse af denne metode ikke har opgjort det faktiske og reelle tab, der opstod ved, at Marie-Claude Girardot fortabte den omhandlede mulighed, men beregnede et andet tab af rent hypotetisk karakter som følge af det vederlag, hun kunne have mistet, såfremt hun havde haft ret til at blive ansat, hvorved Retten således ændrede den fortabte ansættelsesmulighed til en fortabt sikkerhed for at opnå en stilling.
The Commission claims that, by that method, the Court of First Instance did not quantify the actual and certain damage resulting from the loss of opportunity suffered by Mrs Girardot but, in fact, evaluated a different form of damage, purely hypothetical, resulting from the loss of earnings which she might have suffered if she had been entitled to be recruited, thereby transforming the loss of opportunity to be recruited to a post into the loss of the certainty of obtaining a post.
I denne forbindelse skal det fremhæves, at Retten i henhold til vedtægtens artikel 91, stk. 1, andet punktum, råder over fuld prøvelsesret i tvister, hvor der indgår pengebeløb, inden for rammerne af hvilken den har beføjelse til i givet fald ex officio at dømme sagsøgte til betaling af en erstatning for det tab, der er forvoldt ved dens fejl og i påkommende tilfælde at ansætte tabet efter ret og billighed på baggrund af samtlige foreliggende omstændigheder (jf. bl.a. dom af 5.6.1980, sag 24/79, Oberthür mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 1743, præmis 14, af 27.10.1987, forenede sager 176/86 og 177/86, Houyoux og Guery mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 4333, præmis 16, af 17.4.1997, sag C-90/95 P, de Compte mod Parlamentet, Sml. I, s. 1999, præmis 45, og dommen i sagen EIB mod Hautem, præmis 95).
On that point, it must be emphasised that, under the second sentence of Article 91(1) of the Staff Regulations, the Court of First Instance has, in disputes of a financial character, unlimited jurisdiction, pursuant to which it has the power, if need be, of its own motion to order the defendant to pay compensation for the damage caused by the defendant’s wrongful act and, in such a case, taking account of all of the circumstances of the case, to assess the damage suffered ex aequo et bono (see, inter alia, Case 24/79 Oberthür v Commission [1980] ECR 1743, paragraph 14; Joined Cases 176/86 and 177/86 Houyoux and Guery v Commission [1987] ECR 4333, paragraph 16; Case C-90/95 P de Compte v Parliament [1997] ECR I-1999, paragraph 45; and EIB v Hautem, cited above, paragraph 95).
Det bemærkes desuden, at det af den ovenfor i præmis 45 nævnte retspraksis fremgår, at Retten, når den har fastslået, at der er indtrådt et tab, har enekompetence til inden
In addition, in accordance with the caselaw referred to in paragraph 45 of this judgment, when the Court of First Instance has determined that there is damage, it alone
I besvarelse af et spørgsmål fra Domstolen har Kommissionen imidlertid selv under retsmødet erkendt, at det er særdeles vanskeligt — for ikke at sige umuligt — at definere en metode, der gør det muligt med sikkerhed at opgøre muligheden for at opnå en stilling ved den omhandlede institution og følgelig at vurdere det tab, der følger af, at en sådan mulighed fortabes.
However, as the Commission itself acknowledged at the hearing in response to a question from the Court on that matter, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to specify a method whereby it is possible accurately to quantify the chance of being recruited to a post within that institution and, consequently, to assess the damage resulting from the loss of that chance.
For at efterprøve, om den appellerede dom er behæftet med en retlig fejl med hensyn til fastsættelsen af, i hvilket omfang den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt som følge af den fortabte mulighed, skal erstattes, skal der følgelig tages hensyn til den skønsmargen, som Retten rådede over under udøvelsen af sin fulde prøvelsesret ved valg af den metode, der skal anvendes til at foretage en sådan fastsættelse.
Consequently, for the purpose of examining whether the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law as regards the determination of the extent of the compensation for the damage resulting from the loss of opportunity suffered by Mrs Girardot, account must be taken of the margin of appreciation which the Court of First Instance has, when exercising its unlimited jurisdiction, in relation to the method to be chosen to carry out such a determination.
Det fremgår af den appellerede dom, at Retten — for at fastsætte, i hvilket omfang den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt i denne sag, skal erstattes — fandt, at den for det første måtte definere det løntab, hun havde lidt, ved at opgøre forskellen mellem det vederlag, hun ville have oppebåret, såfremt hun var blevet ansat, og det vederlag, hun rent faktisk oppebar, efter ulovligheden var blevet begået, og for det andet i form af en procentsats vurdere den mulighed, hun havde for at blive ansat med henblik på at vægte det løntab, der var beregnet på denne måde.
It is clear from the judgment under appeal that, to determine the extent of the reparation for the damage caused in this case to Mrs Girardot, the Court of First Instance considered that it should, first, specify the loss of earnings suffered by her, by establishing the difference between the earnings which she would have received if she had been recruited and the earnings which she actually received following the unlawful act, and then, secondly, assess, as a percentage, the chance she had of being recruited in order to weight the loss of earnings thus calculated.
Kommissionen har ganske vist ret i, at denne metode, da den hviler på kriteriet om det løntab, den pågældende har lidt, indebærer, at der ikke skal betales erstatning,
It is admittedly true that, to the extent that the method employs the criterion of the loss of earnings suffered by the person concerned, it is a corollary of that method, as the Commission has rightly observed, that when the earnings actually received after
KOMMISSIONEN MOD GIRARDOT når det vederlag, der rent faktisk oppebæres efter den ulovlige adfærd, er større end det, der er fortabt som følge af denne ulovlighed, selv om der foreligger en fortabt mulighed.
COMMISSION v GIRARDOT the unlawful conduct are higher than the earnings which were lost because of it no compensation would be awarded, although an opportunity would still have been lost.
Som Kommissionen ligeledes har anført, fører en sådan metode desuden nødvendigvis til, at Fællesskabets retsinstanser — i lighed med Rettens fremgangsmåde i præmis 59-95 i den appellerede dom — må foretage en fremadvendt undersøgelse med henblik på at gøre et forsøg på at rekonstruere den fiktive karriere, som den pågældende kunne have fået ved denne institution, ved at støtte sig til en række hypoteser, der, uanset at de henhører under Rettens uafhængige vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder, i sagens natur er usikre, med hensyn til længden af hendes ansættelse og størrelsen af hendes vederlag.
In addition, such a method, as the Commission has also stated, necessarily imposes on the Community courts the task of carrying out, as the Court of First Instance did in paragraphs 59 to 95 of the judgment under appeal, a prospective examination in an attempt to construct the fictitious career which she might have achieved within that institution, relying on a series of suppositions which, while they fall within that appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance against which no appeal lies, remain, by their nature, at best uncertain, both as to the length of her employment and the progression in the amount of her earnings.
Det er endvidere korrekt, at løntabskriteriet ikke i sig selv kan anvendes til afgørelsen af, i hvilket omfang den skade, der er lidt som følge af en fortabt mulighed for ansættelse, skal erstattes.
Moreover, it is true that the criterion of loss of earnings cannot by itself determine the extent of the reparation for the damage caused following the loss of an opportunity to be recruited.
I et sådant tilfælde kan den skade, der er lidt, nemlig ikke sidestilles med størrelsen af det vederlag, der ville være blevet oppebåret, hvis muligheden var blevet realiseret, eftersom den pågældende, som Retten har anført i den appellerede doms præmis 116 — henset til den skønsbeføjelse, Kommissionen har på området — ikke har noget retskrav på at blive ansat.
In such a situation, the damage suffered cannot be identified with the earnings which would have been received if the chance had materialised, since, as the Court of First Instance stated in this case in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, when account is taken of the discretion which the Commission has in this area, the party cannot claim any right to be recruited.
Den skade, som en sådan person har ret til at få erstattet, kan følgelig ikke svare til den tabte arbejdsfortjeneste, der følger af tabet af en rettighed (jf. analogt dom af 27.1.2000, forenede sager C-104/89 og C-37/90, Mulder m.fl. mod Rådet og Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 203, præmis 59 og 60).
Consequently the damage for which such a person is entitled to obtain compensation cannot correspond to the loss of earnings resulting from the loss of a right (see, by analogy, Joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I-203, paragraphs 59 and 60).
Det kan imidlertid ikke udledes heraf, at det løntabskriterium, Retten lagde til grund i den appellerede dom, henset til den skønsmargen, Retten råder over med hensyn til den metode, der skal anvendes i denne henseende, er uegnet til at fastsætte, i hvilket omfang den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt som følge af den fortabte mulighed i denne sag, skal erstattes.
However, it cannot therefore be concluded that the criterion of the loss of earnings to which the Court of First Instance had recourse in the judgment under appeal, taking account of the discretion which that Court has in the method to be adopted for that purpose, is unsuited to determining the extent of the reparation for the damage resulting from the loss of opportunity suffered by Mrs Girardot in the present case.
Da værdien af den fortabte mulighed, således som generaladvokaten i det væsentlige har anført i punkt 77 i forslaget til afgørelse, afhænger af størrelsen af den fortjeneste, hun ville have opnået, såfremt denne mulighed var blevet konkretiseret, udgør det løntab, der er lidt som følge af den påklagede ulovlige adfærd, selv om det ikke alene kan være afgørende for, i hvilket omfang den mistede mulighed skal erstattes, ikke desto mindre et relevant kriterium i dette øjemed.
Indeed, since the value of the chance lost by her is, as the Advocate General in essence stated in point 77 of his Opinion, a function of the income attributable to that chance materialising, the loss of earnings suffered because of the alleged unlawful conduct, while that cannot by itself determine the extent of the reparation for the loss of opportunity, constitutes nevertheless a relevant criterion.
Selv om Marie-Claude Girardot ikke havde noget retskrav på ansættelse, afhænger den værdi, der kan tillægges denne mulighed, altså, i hvert fald delvist, af størrelsen af det vederlag, hun kunne forvente at oppebære.
Even though Mrs Girardot had no right to be recruited, the value to be attributed to that chance depends therefore, at least in part, on the amount of the earnings which she could have expected.
I denne forbindelse bemærkes, at den alternative metode, Kommissionen har foreslået inden for rammerne af denne appel med henblik på at erstatte den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt, der består i at tilkende hende en erstatning, udmålt som et fast beløb, hvis størrelse bør fastsættes til tre måneders nettoløn, svarende til det minimale opsigelsesvarsel i ansættelsesvilkårenes artikel 47, stk. 2, litra a), ligeledes er støttet på størrelsen af det vederlag, der er tabt som følge af den påklagede ulovlighed.
On that point, it must also be observed that the alternative method proposed by the Commission in this appeal for the purposes of making good the damage suffered by Mrs Girardot, which consists in awarding her lump sum compensation the amount of which is set at the three months’ net remuneration to be paid for the minimum notice period laid down in Article 47(2)(a) of the Conditions of Employment, is also based on the amount of earnings lost because of the alleged unlawful conduct.
Under disse omstændigheder kan Kommissionen vanskeligt bestride relevansen af dette kriterium.
In those circumstances, the Commission can hardly criticise the relevance of that criterion.
Det må endvidere erkendes, at det vederlag, der rent faktisk er oppebåret efter den begåede ulovlighed, ligeledes delvist er afgørende for, i hvilket omfang den lidte skade skal erstattes, da enhver skadelidt person er forpligtet til at begrænse denne skade.
In addition, it must be accepted that the remuneration actually received subsequent to the unlawful acts also partly determines the extent of the reparation for the damage, since any injured party has the obligation to minimise his loss.
I denne forbindelse kan Kommissionens argumentation om, at der skulle bestå en risiko for forskelsbehandling, ikke tiltrædes.
In that regard, the claim by the Commission that there is a risk of discrimination cannot be upheld.
To ansøgere, der ulovligt er blevet udelukket, og som har lidt et tab af forskellig størrelse, kan nemlig ikke — selv ikke hvis deres mulighed for at opnå ansættelse er lige stor — anses for at befinde sig i en identisk eller lignende situation med hensyn til, i hvilket omfang skaden skal erstattes.
If two unlawfully excluded candidates do not suffer the same loss of earnings, they cannot, even when they have the same chance of being recruited, be considered to be in an identical or similar situation as to the extent of the damage suffered.
Selv om Retten for at fastslå, i hvilket omfang den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt som følge af den fortabte mulighed, skal erstattes, rent faktisk først har søgt at opgøre størrelsen af det vederlag, hun har tabt, har den desuden ikke kun anvendt dette kriterium for at fastslå, i hvilket omfang denne skade skal erstattes.
Furthermore, even if the Court of First Instance, in order to determine the extent of the reparation for the loss of opportunity suffered by Mrs Girardot, did indeed seek to determine the amount of the earnings lost by her, that court did not rely on that criterion alone to determine the extent of that reparation.
Ved i den appellerede doms præmis 58 at bemærke, at der for at fastslå, i hvilket omfang den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt som følge af den fortabte mulighed, skal erstattes, »eventuelt« skal foretages en vurdering af hendes mulighed for ansættelse, og derved lade forstå, at denne vurdering er fakultativ, har Retten begået en retlig fejl, idet undladelse af at foretage en sådan vurdering, der indgår i selve begrebet fortabt mulighed, ville være ensbetydende med blot at foretage en beregning af det løntab, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt, selv om hun ikke havde noget retskrav på ansættelse.
It is true that, by ruling in paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal that, in order to determine the extent of the reparation for the loss of opportunity suffered by Mrs Girardot, it was necessary ‘if appropriate’ to make an assessment of the chance she had of being recruited, suggesting thereby that that assessment was merely optional, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law, since the omission of that assessment, which is part of the very definition of loss of opportunity, would amount to evaluating only the loss of earnings suffered by Mrs Girardot, although she had no right to be recruited.
Denne fejl har imidlertid ingen betydning, da Retten — efter i den appellerede doms præmis 59-95 at have beregnet det løntab, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt — i den appellerede doms præmis 96-122 knyttede en procentsats til dette tab for på grundlag af en række konkrete omstændigheder i det foreliggende tilfælde — der henhører under Rettens selvstændige vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder — i tal at opgøre den mulighed, Marie-Claude Girardot havde for at blive ansat.
However, that error is inoperative since, having, calculated the loss of earnings suffered by Mrs Girardot, in paragraphs 59 to 95 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance, in paragraphs 96 to 122 of that judgment, in fact applied to that loss a percentage which was intended, on the basis of all the particular facts of the case — the appraisal of those facts by that court not being open to appeal — to quantify the chance which Mrs Girardot had of being recruited.
Et sådant kriterium, der er anvendt — efter en metode, der ligeledes anvendes i flere nationale lovgivninger — for, som generaladvokaten har anført i punkt 55 i forslaget til afgørelse, at vægte løntabskriteriet, er imidlertid egnet til at fremskaffe en relevant angivelse med henblik på at fastslå, i hvilket omfang den skade, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt som følge af den fortabte mulighed, skal erstattes, da den gør det muligt ved denne fastsættelse at tage hensyn til sandsynligheden for, at hun ville oppebære det vederlag, hun uopretteligt havde mistet.
However, that criterion, applied in that way, in order to weight the criterion relating to loss of earnings, following a method also adopted, as the Advocate General stated in point 55 of his Opinion, in the domestic law of several Member States, is capable of providing relevant guidance to determine the extent of the reparation for the loss of opportunity suffered by Mrs Girardot, since it is thereby possible for the purposes of that determination, to take account of the probability of her receiving the earnings which she in fact irremediably lost.
Som Kommissionen har anført under retsmødet, er det korrekt, at den grad af sandsynlighed, Retten på denne måde beregnede, er af hypotetisk karakter og ikke i sig selv kan anses for faktisk og reel.
It is true that, as the Commission submitted at the hearing, the degree of chance thus calculated by the Court of First Instance is hypothetical and that it cannot itself be considered actual or certain.
Denne omstændighed er imidlertid uden betydning, da det er uomtvistet, at det tab, Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt som følge af en fortabt mulighed for ansættelse, er faktisk og reel, og Retten råder over en skønsmargen ved bestemmelsen af, hvilken metode der skal anvendes for at fastsætte størrelsen heraf.
However, that factor is irrelevant, since it is common ground that the damage suffered by Mrs Girardot because of the loss of opportunity to be recruited is actual and certain and that the Court of First Instance has a margin of appreciation as to the method to be adopted to quantify it.
Endelig må det under alle omstændigheder konstateres, at den metode, Kommissionen har foreslået, og som er gengivet ovenfor i denne doms præmis 68, klart er mindre egnet til at fastslå, i hvilket omfang den skade, der følger af en fortabt mulighed, skal erstattes, end den, som er anvendt i den appellerede dom.
Lastly, it must in any event be held that the method proposed by the Commission, described in paragraph 68 of this judgment, is manifestly less suitable for determining the extent of the reparation for the damage resulting from the loss of an opportunity than that adopted in the judgment under appeal.