natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det første anbringende: tilsidesættelse af forordning nr. 17 og forordning (EØF) nr. 3975/87
In that regard, it must be stated that the Court of First Instance could properly find that Regulation No 3975/87 only applies to activities directly relating to the supply of air transport services, which is not the case as regards the activities carried out by ADP.
Det bemærkes hertil, at Retten rigtigt fastslog, at forordning nr. 3975/87 kun finder anvendelse på virksomhed, som direkte vedrører levering af lufttransportydelser, hvortil ADP's virksomhed ikke hører.
In that context, the Court of First Instance correctly referred, at paragraph 41 of the contested judgment, to the title of Regulation Nó 3975/87, which states that it determines the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to 'entreprises de transports aériens'.
ADP har til støtte for dette anbringende for det første henvist til dom af 11. marts 1997 (sag C264/95 P, Kommissionen mod UIC), hvor Domstolen udtalte, at det var »hele transportsektoren«, der var blevet undtaget fra anvendelsen af forordning nr. 17 ved Rådets forordning nr. 141 af 26. november 1962 om ikke-anvendelse af Rådets forordning nr. 17 på transportsektoren. Forordning nr. 3975/87, der erstattede forordning nr. 141, må derfor gælde for hele transportsektoren, som ADP's virksomhed ubestrideligt hører ind under.
ADP bases that plea, first, on the judgment in Case C­264/95 Ρ Commission ν UIC [1997], in which the Court of Justice held, at paragraph 44, that 'the whole of the transport sector' had been removed from the scope of Regulation No 17 by Regulation No 141 of the Council of 26 November 1962 exempting transport from the application of Regulation No 17.
Andet anbringende: Rettens begrundehespligten
It should be noted, first, that contrary to ADP's contention, the Court of First Instance did address that argument at paragraph 218 of the contested judgment in the following terms:
Med hensyn til realiteten bemærkes det, at Retten i præmis 65-67 i den appellerede dom fastslog, at der hverken i den anfægtede beslutning eller i meddelelsen af klagepunkter blev stillet krav om samme afgifter for egenhandling og handling for andre, og at Kommissionen kun krævede, at de pågældende afgifter ikke måtte indebære en forskelsbehandling.
The Court of First Instance explained at paragraphs 120 to 124 of the contested judgment the reasons which led it to find, at paragraph 125 of the same judgment, that ADP's activities do not form part of the performance of a task conferred by public law and that they are economic activities for the purposes of Article 86 of the Treaty, even though carried out on publicly-owned property.
Det bemærkes, at Domstolen i ovennævnte dom i sagen Kommissionen mod UIC undersøgte, om en klausul om, at rejsebureauerne i deres reklamer, tilbud og kunderådgivning ikke måtte bidrage til at fremme brugen af transportformer, der konkurrerede med jernbanetransport, henhørte under anvendelsesområdet for forordning nr. 17 eller for Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 1017/68 af 19. juli 1968 om anvendelse af konkurrenceregler for transport med jernbane, ad landeveje og sejlbare vandveje, der i artikel 1 bl.a. nævner aftaler, »som har til formål eller følge at fastsætte befordringspriser og -vilkår, begrænsning af eller kontrol med udbudet af transportydelser, opdeling af transportmarkederne«.
The Court of First Instance added at paragraph 126 of the contested judgment that the fact, pointed out by ADP with a view to proving the exclusively public-law nature of the fees in question, that HRS operates from outside the airport perimeter without paying a fee to ADP, cannot alter the finding at paragraph 125 of that judgment, inasmuch as HRS must in any case use the airport facilities since, by definition, groundhandling services are provided within the airport. The Court of First Instance was entitled to find that that fact could not alter the nature of the fees in question or of the services for which they constituted remuneration.
Det var i forbindelse med, at den fastslog, at en sådan klausul
The fourth plea in law, alleging failure to address a plea in law raised by ADP
Dette er ikke i modstrid med, at det i præmis 206-210 i den appellerede dom blev fastslået, at virksomheder, der udførte ground handling for andre, og selskaber med egenhandling i den foreliggende sag modtog de samme forvaltningsydelser fra ADP, og at den
The Court of First Instance did not distort the clear sense of the evidence before it in distinguishing, in its analysis of the relevant fees, between the State fee as consideration for a siteoccupancy licence of publicly-owned property, on the one hand, and the commercial fee as consideration for the management services provided by ADP and the operating licence, on the other.
prismæssige forskelsbehandling mellem disse to kategorier af tjenesteydere ikke var berettiget.
completeness, as the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out.
Det skal indledningsvis bemærkes, at Retten i modsætning til, hvad ADP har gjort gældende, i præmis 218 i den appellerede dom behandlede argumentet i følgende udtalelse:
The seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty by the Court of First Instance in characterising ADP as an undertaking
Det bemærkes, at Retten i præmis 120-124 i den appellerede dom redegjorde for grundene til, at den i dommens præmis 125 konkluderede, at ADP's aktiviteter ikke udgjorde udøvelse af en offentlig myndighedsopgave, og at der var tale om en aktivitet udøvet af en virksomhed i traktatens artikel 86's forstand, selv om aktiviteterne blev drevet på offentlig ejendom.
As the Advocate General has demonstrated at paragraphs 107 to 113 of his Opinion, which relate to the agreement between ADP and AFS, that distinction may, inter alia, be based, in addition to the wording of the title of that agreement, on Article 17 thereof defining its purpose, and on Article 23 of that agreement, which provides that a 'commercial' fee calculated as a proportion of turnover is payable to ADP, whilst no 'State' fee is payable.
»Endvidere kan sagsøgerens argument om, at der ikke foreligger nogen diskrimination på selve lufttransportmarkedet, fordi der ikke i de parisiske lufthavne er nogen begrænsning med hensyn til egen-handling, heller ikke tiltrædes.
By its seventh plea in law, ADP submits that the Court of First Instance infringed Article 86 of the Treaty in characterising, at paragraphs 120 to 126 of the contested judgment, ADP as an undertaking within the meaning of that provision.
For det første angår dette argument — hvis udsagnet er rigtigt — ikke diskrimination mellem virksomheder, der udøver ground handling for andre, og egen-handlingvirksomheder.
The administration of publicly­owned property, the only activity in issue in the present case, involves the exercise of official powers and therefore cannot constitute a business activity for the purposes of Article 86 of the Treaty.
For det andet er argumentet forkert, for så vidt som kun de store luftfartsselskaber, der står for en betydelig trafik i lufthavnene i Paris — som anført i betragtning 123 til den anfægtede beslutning — i praksis har mulighed for at udvikle en egenhandlingstjeneste og gøre den rentabel, mens de øvrige er nødsaget til at henvende sig til virksomheder, der udfører ground handling for andre.« og urigtig
Accordingly, in rejecting ADP's contention that the fees paid to it by AFS and OAT were financial consideration solely for the private use of publicly­owned property, the Court of First Instance did not in any way distort the clear sense of the evidence before it, and the fifth plea must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
Femte anbringende: forvanskning gengivelse af beviserne
The sixth plea in law, alleging perverse interpretation of national law
I præmis 126 i den appellerede dom tilføjede Retten, at det forhold, at HRS drev sin virksomhed fra et sted uden for lufthavnenes arealer uden at betale afgift til ADP — hvilket ADP havde anført som bevis for, at de pågældende afgifter kun var en statsafgift — var uden betydning for bedømmelsen i dommens præmis 125, for så vidt som HRS under alle omstændigheder skulle bruge lufthavnsanlæggene, eftersom ground handling i sagens natur foregår i lufthavnen.
In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in the field of competition law, the concept of an undertaking covers any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C­159/91 and C­160/91 Poucet and Pistre [1993], paragraph 17).
Retten fandt derfor med rette, at dette forhold ikke kunne medføre en ændret bedømmelse af de pågældende afgifter eller af de aktiviteter, afgifterne udgjorde betaling for.
In order to determine whether the activities in question are those of an undertaking within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, it is necessary to establish the nature of those activities (see, inter alia, Case C­364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft [1994], paragraph 19).
Det fjerde anbringende: manglende behandling af et af ADP's anbringender
ADP submits that the Court of First Instance clearly interpreted national law perversely in holding, at paragraph 125 of the contested judgment, that 'the activities in question carried out by ADP are economic activities, and although those activities are carried out on publicly­owned property, they do not for that reason form part of the performance of a task conferred by public law.'
Ifølge ADP foretog Retten i præmis 117 i den appellerede dom en grov forvanskning af beviserne, da den sondrede mellem brug af arealer, bygninger og udstyr inden for lufthavnsområdet, hvor tjenesteyderen som vederlag skal betale en statsafgift, og ydelser vedrørende forvaltning af lufthavnen og bevilling til at levere ground handling-ydelser, som tjenesteyderen skal betale en omsætningsbaseret afgift af.
The Court of First Instance was entitled to find, at paragraph 121 of the contested judgment, that the provision of airport facilities to airlines and the various service providers, in return for a fee at a rate freely fixed by ADP, constitutes an economic activity.
Det må konstateres, at Retten ikke har gengivet oplysningerne i sagen forkert, da den i sin gennemgang af de pågældende afgifter sondrede mellem statsafgiften som et vederlag for tilladelsen til brug af offentlig ejendom og den omsætningsbaserede afgift som vederlag for ADP's forvaltningsydelser og driftstilladelsen.
It is settled case­law that any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity (see, inter alia, Case C­35/% Commission ν Italy [1998], paragraph 36 and Case C­475/99 Glöckner [2001], paragraph 19).
Ifølge ADP blev det i den anfægtede beslutning hævdet, at ADP's forskellige behandling af ground handling for andre og egenhandling havde virkninger, der indebar en forskelsbehandling på lufttransportmarkedet.
The conclusion arrived at by the Court of First Instance at paragraph 125 of the contested judgment is not based on an analysis of French law, which was analysed merely for the sake of completeness, at paragraph 129 of the same judgment, but results from a characterisation, in paragraphs 119 to 124 of the contested judgment, of the activities of ADP in question in the light of Community law.
ADP har i den forbindelse henvist til, at de luftfartsselskaber, der ikke har egen-handling, ifølge punkt 123, sidste punktum, i den anfægtede beslutnings begrundelse var »nødt til at anvende leverandører af ground handling-tjenester til tredjemand, der er dyrere, og de påvirkes derfor af de diskriminerende følger af ADP's omsætningsbaserede afgiftssystem«.
The eighth plea in law, alleging infringement, in relation to the definition of the market, of Article 86 of the Treaty
Som generaladvokaten med hensyn til aftalen mellem ADP og AFS har påvist i punkt 107-113 i sit forslag til afgørelse, kan denne sondring særligt finde støtte både i aftalens titel og i dens artikel 17, hvori dens formål fastlægges, samt i aftalens artikel 23, i henhold til hvilken der skal betales en »omsætningsbaseret« afgift til ADP som vederlag for tilladelse til brug og »drift«,
Whether the airport infrastructure management activities carried out by ADP constitute a business activity for the purposes of Article 86 of the Treaty is a question to be determined in the light of Community law. Thus, contrary to ADP's contention, the reasoning at paragraph 129 of the contested judgment was included for the sake of
Retten behandlede imidlertid ikke ADP's argument om, at dette ikke var rigtigt, idet der var forskelle på situationen for de luftfartsselskaber, der har egen-handling, og dem, som anvender tjenesteydelser fra andre.
ADP claims that in so far as the commercial fees in question are not consideration for the private occupation of publicly­owned property, which is not a prerequisite for the provision of
som offentlig myndighed og kan derfor ikke udgøre en aktivitet udført af en virksomhed i traktatens artikel 86's forstand.
It follows that, in relation to definition of the market, there has been an infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty.
mens der ikke skal betales nogen »statsafgift«.
The first part of the eighth plea concerning the definition of the product market is admissible.
Det samme gør sig gældende for den aftale, der blev indgået mellem ADP og OAT, hvori der klart sondres mellem en »statsafgift« og en »omsætningsbaseret afgift«.
In that regard, ADP indicates precisely the contested elements of the judgment which it is sought to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of that application.
Da Retten ikke godtog ADP's faktiske anbringende om, at de afgifter, AFS og OAT betalte til ADP, kun var et vederlag for eneret til brug af offentlig ejendom, foretog den derfor på ingen måde en urigtig gengivelse af oplysningerne i sagen, hvorfor det femte anbringende må forkastes.
As regards the substance of that part of the plea, it is clear from the examination of the fifth plea that the Court of First Instance properly found that the commercial fees in issue constituted consideration for ADP's services as manager of the airport facilities.
Det sjette anbringende: urigtig gengivehe af national ret
The publicly-owned property in question does not constitute a market for the purposes of competition law.
Det bemærkes i den forbindelse, at inden for konkurrencerettens område omfatter begrebet virksomhed enhver enhed, som udøver økonomisk virksomhed, uanset denne enheds retlige status og dens finansieringsmåde (jf· bl.a. dom af 17.2.1993, forenede sager C-159/91 og C160/91, Poucet og Pistre, præmis 17).
It must be observed at once that it is clear from the examination of the eighth plea in law that the Court of First Instance rightly held that the market for management services in respect of the facilities of the Paris airports constitutes the relevant market in the present case.
For at afgøre, om de pågældende aktiviteter er aktiviteter, der er udført af en virksomhed i traktatens artikel 86's forstand, er det nødvendigt at se nærmere på arten af disse aktiviteter (jf. bl.a. dom af 19.1.1994, sag C-364/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft, præmis 19).
The Court of First Instance could properly conclude, at paragraph 137 of the contested judgment, that the market to be taken into consideration is that for management services in the Paris airports, on which ADP, as manager of those airports, is the supplier, while the groundhandlers, who need the licence issued by ADP and the airport facilities in order to carry out their activity, constitute the demand side of that market.
ADP har gjort gældende, at Retten foretog en åbenbart urigtig gengivelse af national ret, da den i præmis 125 i den appellerede dom fastslog, at »ADP's aktiviteter er erhvervsmæssig virksomhed, der ganske vist drives på offentlig ejendom, men ikke af den grund udgør udøvelse af en offentlig myndighedsopgave«.
ADP's assertion that the powers it enjoys over its publicly-owned property are the same as those of any other owner over his property cannot alter the finding that ADP occupies a dominant position in the relevant market.
Retten kunne med rette fastslå i præmis 121 i den appellerede dom, at tilrådighedsstillelsen af lufthavnsanlæg for luftfartsselskaber og forskellige tjenesteydere mod betaling af en afgift, som ADP frit fastsætter, skulle betragtes som erhvervsmæssig virksomhed.
As regards the second part of the eighth plea, concerning the determination of the geographical market, even if it were admissible to the extent that it does not merely repeat the argument put forward by ADP before the Court of First Instance and considered at paragraph 141 of the contested judgment, it is in any event unfounded.
Det fremgår af fast retspraksis, at al virksomhed, der består i at udbyde varer og tjenesteydelser på et marked, er erhvervsmæssig virksomhed (jf. bl.a. dom af 18.6.1998, sag C-35/96, Kommissionen mod Italien, præmis 36, og af 25.10.2001, sag C-475/99, Ambulanz Glöckner, præmis 19).
As paragraphs 91 to 93 of the present judgment make clear, the relevant market is that for airport facilities in which, by definition, groundhandling services must be supplied. Thus the Court of First Instance properly found, at
Det bemærkes, at Rettens konklusion i præmis 125 i den appellerede dom ikke bygger på en gennemgang af fransk ret — en sådan gennemgang blev kun foretaget som et yderligere moment i præmis 129 — men var en følge af den retlige vurdering af ADP's aktiviteter i forhold til fællesskabsretten, der blev anlagt i præmis 119124 i den appellerede dom.
As the Court of First Instance rightly found at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, ADP indisputably enjoys a legal monopoly, under Article L. 251-2 of the French Civil Aviation Code, to manage the airports concerned and is alone able to grant authorisation to carry out groundhandling activities there and to determine the terms on which those activities are carried out.
Ottende anbringende: tilsidesættelse af traktatens artikel 86 med hensyn til afgrænsningen af markedet
The tenth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty as regards the comparison between the fees paid by AFS and OAT common market or a substantial part thereof may not 'apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage'.
I modsætning til, hvad ADP har gjort gældende, udgør begrundelsen i præmis 129 i den appellerede dom, som Retten rigtigt tilkendegav, kun et yderligere moment.
ADP claims, first, that by holding that the fees it charged AFS and OAT were discriminatory, the Court of First Instance seriously misrepresented the function of those fees.
Det syvende anbringende: Retten tilsidesatte artikel 86 ved at anse ADP for at være en virksomhed
As noted in recital 84 of the grounds of the contested decision, under subparagraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 86 of the Treaty, an undertaking holding a dominant position on the
ADP har gjort gældende, at Retten, for så vidt som de pågældende omsætningsbaserede afgifter kun var et vederlag for eneretten til brug af offentlig ejendom, der ikke er nødvendig for at udføre ground handling-ydelser, fejlagtigt lagde til grund, at det relevante marked var markedet for »tjenester i forbindelse med forvaltning af de parisiske lufthavne«.
The Court of First Instance found that the providers of third-party and self-handling services receive the same management services from ADP.
ADP indrømmede ikke kun de virksomheder, der med eneret brugte den offentlige ejendom, adgangstilladelse til det afspærrede område inden for lufthavnene, og selve indrømmelsen af tilladelse til adgang medførte ikke, at der skulle betales afgifter.
From that it correctly inferred, at paragraphs 214 to 216 of the same judgment, that it is necessary to take account of both types of groundhandling services for the purpose of ascertaining whether the fees are discriminatory.
Traktatens artikel 86 blev herved tilsidesat med hensyn til afgrænsningen af markedet.
Orders Aéroports de Paris to pay the costs.'
Administration af offentlig ejendom, der er den eneste aktivitet, den foreliggende sag angår, indebærer efter appellantens opfattelse udøvelse af beføjelser
— order the appellant to pay the costs, including those of AFS.'
Det første led af det ottende anbringende, der vedrører afgrænsningen af produktmarkedet, kan antages til realitetsbehandling.
Case C-99/01 Gottfried Linhart and Hans Biffi Approximation of laws
ADP har præcist angivet, hvilke elementer der anfægtes i den dom, der påstås ophævet, samt de retlige argumenter, der særligt støtter påstanden.
Preliminary ruling (Approximation of laws — Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 EC and 30 EC) - Directive 76/768/EEC relating to cosmetic products — Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising — National legislation laying down restrictions on advertising) (Sixth Chamber)
Retten udtalte i præmis 149 og 151 i den appellerede dom, ikke i højere grad havde et »monopol« på det pågældende område, end enhver anden ejer har på sin ejendom.
(Palmolive liquid antibacterial soap) with the statement that it was 'dermatologically tested' appearing on its packaging.
Det skal indledningsvis bemærkes, at det fremgår af gennemgangen af det ottende anbringende, at Retten korrekt fastslog, at markedet for tjenester i forbindelse med forvaltning af de parisiske lufthavnsanlæg var det relevante marked i den konkrete sag.
By order of 29 January 2001, received at the Court on 28 February 2001, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Higher Administrative Court) referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC two questions on the interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 28 EC and 30 EC) and Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products, and Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising.
For så vidt angår dette led af anbringendet bemærkes det, at det fremgår af gennemgangen af det femte anbringende, at Retten rigtigt fastslog, at de pågældende omsætningsbaserede afgifter udgjorde et vederlag for forvaltningstjenester på lufthavnsanlæggene.
By decision of 9 May 2000, the Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat im Land Niederösterreich (Independent Administrative Chamber for Lower Austria) (Austria) held Dr Biffi, as the managing director of Haarkos Parfumeriewaren und Kosmetika GmbH, to be in breach of Paragraphs 74(1), 9(l)(b) and 8(f) of the LMG, on the basis that the company had distributed the product 'Keralogie Creme-Peeling Anti Schuppen regulierendes Haarbad' (dandruff-controlling conditioner), whose packaging stated that it was 'dermatologically tested'.
ADP's argument om, at de beføjelser, selskabet har på sin offentlige ejendom, er de samme, som en hvilken som helst ejer har over sin ejendom, er uden betydning for vurderingen af, at ADP havde en dominerende stilling på det relevante marked.
Those questions were raised in proceedings related to actions brought against Mr Linhart and Dr Biffi, who are alleged to have placed incorrectly described cosmetic products on the market.
Retten kunne i præmis 137 i den appellerede dom med rette heraf udlede, at det relevante marked var markedet for tjenester i forbindelse med forvaltning af de parisiske lufthavne, hvor ADP i sin egenskab af forvaltningsorgan var udbyderen, mens de ground handlingvirksomheder, der havde brug for en bevilling fra ADP og for lufthavnsanlæg til at udøve deres virksomhed, var efterspørgerne på markedet.
In their appeals against those decisions before the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, Mr Linhart and Dr Biffi claimed that the Austrian law in force, on which those decisions were based, was in breach of Community law, in particular the provisions of Directive 76/768, and of the case-law of the Court, in particular as it follows from the judgment in Unilever (Case C-77/97 [1999]).