natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Menneskerettighedsdomstolen har i øvrigt fastslået, at det ikke kan opstilles som et almindeligt princip, der følger af forpligtelsen til at være upartisk, at en domstol, der ophæver en administrativ eller retlig afgørelse, har pligt til at henvise sagen til en anden juridisk myndighed eller til et andet organ under den samme myndighed (jf. bl.a.
Moreover, the Court of Human Rights considered that it cannot be stated as a general rule resulting from the obligation to be impartial that a court quashing an administrative or judicial decision is bound to send the case back to a different judicial authority or to a differently composed branch of that authority (see, in particular, Eur.
Det skal desuden bemærkes, at når en sag bliver indbragt for Menneskerettighedsdomstolens Storkammer, som appel til prøvelse af en dom fra et kammer, må ingen dommer fra det kammer, der afsagde dommen, i medfør af EMRK artikel 27, stk. 3, have sæde i Storkammeret med undtagelse af formanden for det kammer, der afsagde dommen, og den dommer, der har haft sæde for den stat, som er part i sagen.
It must also be observed that, under Article 27(3) of the ECHR, when a case is referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Human Rights, on a referral following a Chamber’s judgment, no Judge from the Chamber which rendered the judgment is to sit in the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President of the Chamber and the Judge who sat in respect of the State Party concerned.
EMRK giver således adgang til, at dommere, der har taget stilling til en sag en gang, kan deltage i et andet dommerkollegium og på ny påkende den samme sag, og at dette forhold ikke i sig selv forekommer at være uforeneligt med kravet om en retfærdig rettergang.
The ECHR thus accepts that Judges who heard and determined the case initially may sit in another formation hearing and determining the same case again, and that that is not in itself incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial.
Under disse omstændigheder er det ikke godtgjort, at det dommerkollegium, der afsagde den appellerede dom, var retsstridigt sammensat alene på grund af deltagelsen af et medlem af Retten, der allerede havde siddet i det dommerkollegium, der tidligere havde påkendt sagen.
In those circumstances, it has not been established in the present case that the composition of the Chamber which delivered the judgment under appeal was unlawful merely as a result of the presence in that Chamber of a member of the Court of First Instance who had already sat in the Chamber which previously heard and determined the case.
Det første anbringende må således forkastes.
The first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
B — Det andet anbringende om, at der foreligger en procedurefejl med hensyn til Rettens materielle afgørelse vedrørende et anbringende, der burde have været afvist
Second ground of appeal: procedural defect in connection with the Court’s substantive ruling on an inadmissible plea
La Poste har med det første led gjort gældende, at Retten har undladt at tage stilling til den formalitetsindsigelse, som virksomheden havde fremsat mod et af UFEX m.fl. påberåbt anbringende om, at overførslen af Postadex udgjorde statsstøtte, idet der var tale om et anbringende, der ikke havde været gjort gældende under proceduren, der gav anledning til dommen i sagen UFEX m.fl. mod Kommissionen, og at det derfor var et nyt anbringende fremsat under den sag, der førte til den appellerede dom.
La Poste submits, in the first part of this ground of appeal, that the Court of First Instance failed to rule on the plea of inadmissibility which it had put forward in opposition to a plea advanced by UFEX and Others alleging that the Postadex transfer constituted State aid, a plea which had not been advanced in the proceedings giving rise to the judgment in Ufex and Others v Commission, and which was therefore new in the proceedings giving rise to the judgment under appeal.
La Poste har med det andet led anført, at Retten ved at tage stilling til dette nye anbringende tilsidesatte bestemmelserne i artikel 48, stk. 2, i sit procesreglement.
In the second part, it submits that, in ruling on that plea, which was new, the Court of First Instance infringed Article 48(2) of its Rules of Procedure.
UFEX m.fl. har bestridt, at dette anbringendes første led kan antages til realitetsbehandling, for så vidt som det hviler på uklare og selvmodsigende argumenter, ligesom det ikke er angivet, hvilken bestemmelse i Rettens procesreglement der er tilsidesat.
UFEX and Others argue that the first part of that ground of appeal is inadmissible in that it relies on confused and contradictory arguments and does not state which provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance has been infringed.
I øvrigt er dette led ugrundet, eftersom Retten ikke skulle tage stilling til en indsigelse, der ikke selv kunne antages til realitetsbehandling, eftersom den alene var fremsat af en intervenient.
Furthermore, the first part is unfounded, as the Court of First Instance was not obliged to address a plea which in itself was inadmissible because it had been raised only by an intervener.
Endvidere har La Poste ved at præcisere, at Retten har ændret indholdet af dette anbringende i forbindelse med prøvelsen af anbringendet i stævningen vedrørende et åbenbart fejlskøn, medgivet, at anbringendet havde været påberåbt og dermed ikke var nyt.
In addition, in stating that the Court of First Instance expressed that ground of appeal in different terms when considering it under the plea put forward in the application alleging a manifest error of assessment, La Poste admits that the plea was appropriately raised and therefore not new.
Det andet led er følgelig ugrundet, eftersom Retten formelt kunne omformulere argumentationen i stævningen.
Thus, since the Court of First Instance was entitled to express the arguments submitted in the application in different terms, the second part is equally unfounded.
La Poste har i sin replik bestridt afvisningen af sit andet anbringendes første led.
La Poste, in its reply, denies that the first part of its second ground of appeal is inadmissible, as contended.
La Poste har gjort gældende, at anbringendet er tilstrækkeligt klart.
It maintains that it is clear.
Selv om formalitetsindsigelsen rejst for Retten ikke kunne realitetsbehandles, skulle Retten udtrykkeligt have fastslået dette.
Furthermore, even if the plea of inadmissibility which it advanced before the Court of First Instance had itself been inadmissible, the Court should have made an express finding to that effect.
I nærværende sag kan indsigelsen antages til realitetsbehandling, for det første fordi La Postes anbringender ifølge La Poste har samme formål som Kommissionens, endvidere blev UFEX m.fl.’s nye anbringende rejst efter interveneringen, og endelig havde La Poste, som var beskyldt for at have tilsidesat reglerne om statsstøtte, en interesse i at gøre indsigelser gældende, som Kommissionen havde undladt at gøre gældende.
The plea in the present case is admissible because, according to La Poste, its pleas are directed towards the same objective as those of the Commission, the new plea by UFEX and Others was raised well after the intervention and, having been accused of infringing the rules on State aid, La Poste had an interest in raising pleas omitted by the Commission.
UFEX m.fl. har i deres duplik bekræftet, at en indsigelse fremsat af en intervenient ikke kan antages til realitetsbehandling., og at spørgsmålet, om et anbringende skal anses for nyt, ikke udgør en ufravigelig procesforudsætning,
In their rejoinder, UFEX and Others reiterate that a plea put forward by an intervener is not admissible, and that the novel nature of a plea is not a matter of public policy.
Det er ubestridt, at La Poste i sin egenskab af intervenient kunne støtte Kommissionens påstande i sagen, der gav anledning til den appellerede dom, og at Kommissionen ikke har gjort den formalitetsindsigelse gældende, som La Poste har påberåbt sig for Retten, om at det af UFEX m.fl. påberåbte anbringende vedrørende overførslen af Postadex var nyt, da det ikke var fremført under proceduren, der førte til dommen i sagen UFEX m.fl. mod Kommissionen.
It is common ground that, in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment under appeal, La Poste intervened in support of the form of order sought by the Commission, and that the Commission did not raise the plea of inadmissibility relied upon by La Poste before the Court of First Instance alleging that the plea advanced by UFEX and Others concerning the Postadex transfer was new, in that it had not been submitted in the procedure which gave rise to the judgment in Ufex and Others v Commission.
Den af La Poste påberåbte formalitetsindsigelse, der — som generaladvokaten har anført i punkt 65 i sit forslag til afgørelse — ikke udgjorde en ufravigelig procesforudsætning, og den kunne derfor ikke selv antages til realitetsbehandling.
The plea of inadmissibility thus raised by La Poste, and which, as the Advocate General noted at point 65 of her Opinion, did not concern an issue of public policy, was therefore itself inadmissible.
Under disse omstændigheder skulle Retten, selv hvis den havde taget stilling til denne indsigelse, også nødvendigvis have afvist indsigelsen.
Accordingly, even if the Court of First Instance had been required to address that plea, it would equally but necessarily have had to conclude that it was inadmissible.
Dermed var Rettens manglende stillingtagen uden betydning for La Postes rettigheder, som derfor ikke kan støtte sig på denne manglende stillingtagen ved anfægtelsen af den appellerede doms gyldighed.
Therefore, its failure to give a ruling was of no consequence as regards the rights of La Poste, which is therefore not justified in relying on that omission in order to challenge the lawfulness of the judgment under appeal.
Uanset om det andet anbringendes første led skulle have været antaget til realitetsbehandling, er det på baggrund af det ovenstående under alle omstændigheder ugrundet. Dette led må derfor forkastes.
In those circumstances, even if the first part of the second ground of appeal were admissible, it is in any event unfounded.
b) Det andet anbringendes andet led
— Second part of the second ground of appeal
Det bemærkes, at i henhold til artikel 48, stk. 2, i Rettens procesreglement, der i medfør af procesreglementets artikel 120 finder anvendelse, når Retten som i den foreliggende sag skal træffe afgørelse efter Domstolens hjemvisning, må nye anbringender ikke fremsættes under sagens behandling, medmindre de støttes på retlige eller faktiske omstændigheder, som er kommet frem under retsforhandlingerne.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Article 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, applicable by virtue of Article 120 of those Rules where, as in the present case, the Court of First Instance is seised of a case by a judgment of the Court of Justice referring it back, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or of fact which come to light in the course of the procedure.
Det følger heraf, at parterne efter Domstolens hjemvisning af sagen, principielt ikke kan påberåbe sig anbringender, som ikke har været gjort gældende under sagen, som førte til Rettens dom, der blev ophævet af Domstolen.
It follows that, following the referral judgment of the Court of Justice, the parties are not entitled, in principle, to rely on pleas which were not raised in the procedure which gave rise to the judgment of the Court of First Instance set aside by the Court of Justice.
Det fremgår af en gennemgang af den stævning, som UFEX m.fl. indgav til Retten i den procedure, der førte til dommen i sagen UFEX m.fl. mod Kommissionen, at påstanden om annullation var støttet på fire anbringender, som Retten udlagde som en tilsidesættelse af kontradiktionsprincippet, en mangelfuld begrundelse, et anbringende om faktiske fejl og åbenbart urigtige skøn, og endelig en tilsidesættelse af begrebet statsstøtte (dommen i sagen UFEX m.fl. mod Kommissionen, præmis 37).
It is apparent from examination of the application brought before the Court of First Instance by UFEX and Others in Ufex and Others v Commission that the application for annulment was based on four pleas in law which the Court analysed as alleging an infringement of the rights of the defence, an inadequate statement of reasons, errors of fact and manifest errors of assessment, and an error in applying the concept of State aid (Ufex and Others v Commission, paragraph 37).
UFEX m.fl. fastholdt i deres indlæg indleveret i forlængelse af dommen i sagen Chronopost m.fl. mod UFEX m.fl. de tre sidstnævnte anbringender, som Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 49 udlagde som en tilsidesættelse af begrundelsespligten, et anbringende vedrørende faktiske fejl og åbenbart urigtige skøn samt en fejlagtig anvendelse af begrebet statsstøtte.
In their observations lodged following the judgment in Chronopost and Others v Ufex and Others, UFEX and Others maintained the last three of their pleas which the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 49 of the judgment under appeal, analysed as alleging a breach of the obligation to state reasons, errors of fact and manifest errors of assessment, and an error in applying the concept of State aid.
Det fremgår ikke af disse indlæg, at UFEX m.fl. ønskede at fremsætte et nyt anbringende.
It is not apparent from examination of these observations that UFEX and Others intended to raise a new plea.
Det er endvidere ubestridt, at den af UFEX m.fl. udviklede argumentation hvad angår overførslen af Postadex til støtte for anbringendet om faktiske fejl og åbenbart urigtige skøn allerede var blevet fremført i deres stævning i sagen, der førte til dommen i sagen UFEX m.fl. mod Kommissionen.
It is common ground, moreover, that the arguments which they then expounded in relation to the Postadex transfer in support of the plea alleging errors of fact and manifest errors of assessment had already been submitted in the application which they lodged in the proceedings giving rise to the judgment in Ufex and Others v Commission.
En sådan argumentation kan ikke kvalificeres som et nyt anbringende.
Such expounding of arguments cannot be described as a new plea.
Som Retten i øvrigt med rette har præciseret i den appellerede doms præmis 51, er anbringendet om materielle fejl og åbenbart urigtige skøn i denne sag sammenfaldende med anbringendet om fejlagtig anvendelse af begrebet statsstøtte.
Furthermore, as the Court of First Instance correctly stated in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, the pleas alleging errors of fact and manifest errors of assessment are indissociable, in the present case, from the plea alleging an error in applying the concept of State aid.
Under disse omstændigheder kunne Retten med rette ændre UFEX m.fl.’s argumentation vedrørende overførslen af Postadex til en støtte for anbringendet om fejlagtig anvendelse af begrebet statsstøtte (jf. om muligheden for at foretage en sådan ændring, dom af 19.11.1998, sag C-316/97 P, Parlamentet mod Gaspari, Sml. I, s. 7597, præmis 21).
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance was entitled to express the arguments of UFEX and Others concerning the Postadex transfer in different terms as supporting the plea alleging an error in applying the concept of State aid (see, on the possibility of expressing a plea in different terms, Case C-316/97 P Parliament v Gaspari [1998] ECR I-7597, paragraph 21).
Følgelig har Retten ved at forholde sig til denne argumentation i analysen af anbringendet om en fejlagtig anvendelse af begrebet statsstøtte på ingen måde taget stilling til et nyt anbringende, og dermed har Retten heller ikke tilsidesat artikel 48, stk. 2, i sit procesreglement.
Therefore, by addressing those arguments in the analysis of the plea alleging an error in applying the concept of State aid, the Court of First Instance did not rule on a new plea and did not, therefore, infringe Article 48(2) of its Rules of Procedure.
Da det andet anbringendes andet led er ugrundet, må det ligeledes forkastes.
The second part of the second ground of appeal is unfounded and must therefore also be rejected.
Det andet anbringende skal følgelig forkastes i sin helhed.
Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.
C — Det tredje anbringende om, at Retten har begået en retlig fejl ved vurderingen af pligten til at begrunde den omtvistede beslutning hvad angår den logistiske og forretningsmæssige bistand, som La Poste har ydet SFMI-Chronopost
Third ground of appeal: error of law by the Court of First Instance in the assessment of the duty to state reasons in the contested decision with regard to the logistical and commercial assistance provided by La Poste to SFMI-Chronopost
Undersøgelsen af dette anbringende kræver, at de grunde, Retten har givet for at annullere den omtvistede beslutning på grund af utilstrækkelig begrundelse, opregnes, inden der redegøres for parternes argumentation.
In order to examine this ground of appeal, it is necessary to recall the Court’s reasons for concluding that the statement of reasons for the contested decision was inadequate, before setting out the arguments of the parties.
I den appellerede doms præmis 63-71 redegjorde Retten for de krav, EF-traktaten stiller med hensyn til begrundelsen af fællesskabsinstitutionernes retsakter, således som de er defineret i retspraksis, og prøvede derefter den omtvistede beslutnings begrundelse, idet den i det væsentlige lagde to — ifølge Retten afgørende — kategorier af faktorer til grund.
After recalling in paragraphs 63 to 71 of the judgment under appeal the requirements of the EC Treaty, as established in the caselaw, with regard to the statement of reasons for acts of the Community institutions, the Court went on to consider the statement of reasons for the contested decision on the basis, in essence, of two sets of considerations which, according to the Court, were decisive.
Retten fandt for det første, at der skulle foretages en prøvelse af, om Kommissionen havde overholdt sin begrundelsespligt, på baggrund af de principper, der blev fastslået i præmis 40 i dommen i sagen Chronopost m.fl. mod UFEX m.fl., og som er gengivet i nærværende doms i præmis 15.
First, the Court took the view that it had to consider whether the Commission had complied with its obligation to state reasons, in the light of the principles outlined in paragraph 40 of the judgment in Chronopost and Others v Ufex and Others, as recalled in paragraph 15 of the present judgment.
Retten konkluderede i den appellerede doms præmis 72, at »[…] Dette indebærer på baggrund af de principper, som Domstolen fastslog i sin dom, som er gengivet ovenfor i præmis 50, bl.a. en undersøgelse af, om den omtvistede beslutning er tilstrækkeligt begrundet, dels med hensyn til spørgsmålet, om den modydelse, der
The Court of First Instance concluded in paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal that ‘… that implies in particular an examination of the adequacy of the statement of reasons in the contested decision as regards (i) the issue whether the price charged to SFMI-Chronopost covers, first, all the additional, variable costs incurred in providing
Retten fandt på alle disse punkter, at den omtvistede beslutning ikke indeholdt tilstrækkelige oplysninger.
The Court of First Instance took the view in respect of each of those points that the contested decision did not provide sufficient details.
Retten bemærkede for det andet, at rækkevidden af begrundelsespligten skal bedømmes i forhold til den konkrete sags omstændigheder, som i givet fald kan gøre en mere detaljeret begrundelse nødvendig, og fastslog, at det var tilfældet i det pågældende tilfælde.
Second, observing that the scope of the obligation to provide a statement of reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of each case, which could, in an appropriate case, justify a more detailed statement of reasons, the Court held that this was so in the instant case.
I den forbindelse fandt Retten i den appellerede doms præmis 97, at »[i] det foreliggende tilfælde er en mere indgående begrundelse nødvendig, fordi det for det første drejede sig om en af de første beslutninger, der vedrørte det komplekse spørgsmål inden for rammerne af statsstøttereglerne om beregning af omkostningerne for et moderselskab, der opererer på et monopoliseret marked og yder logistisk og handelsmæssig bistand til sit datterselskab, der ikke opererer på et forbeholdt marked.
In that regard, the Court held, in paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘… the circumstances justifying a more detailed statement of reasons lie in the fact that, first, this was one of the first decisions dealing with the complex question, in the context of the application of the provisions on State aid, of the calculation of the costs of a parent company operating in a reserved market and providing logistical and commercial assistance to a subsidiary which does not operate in a reserved market.
For det andet skulle tilbagetrækningen af Kommissionens første beslutning om afslag af 10. marts 1992, efter at der var anlagt et annullationssøgsmål og efter Domstolens SFEI-dom, have fået Kommissionen til at begrunde sin fremgangsmåde med så meget desto større omhu og præcision med hensyn til de bestridte punkter.
Second, the withdrawal of the Commission’s first rejection decision of 10 March 1992 following the lodging of an action for annulment and the SFEI judgment … should have led the Commission to reason its approach even more diligently and precisely in relation to the disputed points.
Endelig burde den omstændighed, at sagsøgerne har fremlagt flere økonomiske analyser under den administrative procedure, ligeledes have fået Kommissionen til at forberede en omhyggelig begrundelse og svare på sagsøgernes væsentlige argumenter, som blev støttet af disse økonomiske analyser«.
Lastly, the fact that the applicants submitted several economic studies during the administrative procedure should also have led the Commission to prepare a thorough statement of reasons while addressing the essential arguments of the applicants, as substantiated by those economic studies.’
Chronopost og La Poste har gjort gældende, at de krav om en detaljeret begrundelse af den omtvistede beslutning, som Retten har henvist til som begrundelse for at annullere beslutningen, går videre end, hvad der følger af den begrænsede kontrol med en beslutning vedtaget inden for et område, hvor Kommissionen råder over et vidt skøn.
Chronopost and La Poste submit that the requirements to be satisfied by detailed reasoning in the contested decision — the basis on which the Court of First Instance found that decision to be deficient — go beyond what is necessary for the restricted review of a decision taken in an area in which the Commission has a broad discretion.
Chronopost har tilføjet, at Retten under dække af en prøvelse af begrundelsen under udøvelse af magtfordrejning undersøgte, om der forelå åbenbart urigtige skøn, eller endda hensigtsmæssigheden af den omtvistede beslutning, ved at erstatte Kommissionens vurdering med sin egen.
Chronopost further submits that, in what was a real misuse of powers, the Court of First Instance purported to review the statement of reasons but carried out a review of the manifest error of assessment, or even of the expediency of the contested decision, by substituting its own assessment for that of the Commission.
UFEX m.fl. har nedlagt påstand om afvisning at dette anbringende, da den omtvistede beslutning ikke var tilstrækkeligt begrundet og begrænsede sig til almindelige betragtninger, der ikke forholdt sig til den detaljerede argumentation i klagen.
UFEX and Others contend that this ground of appeal should be rejected, claiming that the contested decision was not sufficiently reasoned and was confined to general considerations which did not address the detailed arguments of the complaint.
UFEX m.fl. har gjort gældende, at argumentet om magtfordrejning ikke finder anvendelse på en afgørelse fra Retten.
They submit that the argument relating to misuse of powers is irrelevant to a decision of the Court of First Instance.