natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Et underliggende princip for hele forordningen er princippet om samarbejde og om gensidig tillid mellem medlemsstaternes retsinstanser og myndigheder, hvilket indebærer en principiel automatisk anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse af afgørelser fra retsinstanserne i den medlemsstat, hvor barnet havde sit sædvanlige opholdssted 8(jf. især forordningens betragtning 18, 21, 23 og 25 og artikel 21, 24, 26 og 42).
A principle which underpins the Regulation as a whole is that of cooperation and mutual confidence between the courts and authorities of the Member States, which implies that decisions of the courts of the Member State of the child’s habitual residence 8should in principle be recognised and enforced automatically (see in particular recitals 18, 21, 23 and 25, and Articles 21, 24, 26 and 42).
Dette princip blev ligeledes med eftertryk påberåbt under retsmødet, og jeg kan kun tilslutte mig, at barnets tarv faktisk skal veje tungest under alle omstændigheder.
That principle too was invoked, emphatically, at the hearing, and I can only agree that the superior interests of the child must indeed be paramount in all circumstances.
Det er åbenlyst, at hvis en anerkendelse afslås på grundlag af sådan tvivl (uanset om de litauiske retsinstanser reelt nærer sådan tvivl eller ej), indebærer det, at hele den ordning, som forordningen tilsigter at indføre, benægtes. Dette er helt
It is clear that to allow recognition to be refused on the basis of such doubts (whether they are or are not in fact felt by the Lithuanian courts) would negate the whole system which the Regulation seeks to establish.
Jeg ønsker dog at nuancere denne angivelse for så vidt angår barnets tilbagegivelse til medlemsstaten med det sædvanlige opholdssted.
However, I should like to qualify that statement in the context of the child’s return to the Member State of habitual residence.
Det er åbenlyst, at konventionen og forordningen bygger på det princip, hvorefter barnets tarv i tilfælde af en ulovlig bortførelse eller fjernelse altid kræver, at barnet tilbagegives, med det ene forbehold
It is clear that the Convention and the Regulation are based on the principle that, in the event of a child’s wrongful removal or retention, his or her superior interests do indeed always require that return, except only in
8 — Jeg vil herefter anvende den kortere formulering »medlemsstaten med det sædvanlige opholdssted« til at betegne den medlemsstat, hvorfra barnet blev fjernet, og hvor det havde sit sædvanlige opholdssted før fjernelsen.
8 — I shall use henceforth the short form ‘Member State of habitual residence’ to refer to the State from which the child has been removed and where he or she was habitually resident before the removal.
GENERALADVOKAT SHARPSTONS STILLINGTAGEN — SAG C-195/08 PPU har bidraget til denne situation, synes det under alle omstændigheder, at det samarbejde mellem retsinstanserne og centralmyndighederne, som konventionen og forordningen skal sikre, ikke har fungeret optimalt.
VIEW OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-195/08 PPU which have contributed to that situation, it would seem in any event that the cooperation between courts and authorities which the Convention and the Regulation seek to ensure did not function in an ideal manner.
Det synes i øvrigt klart, når tingene er lidt på afstand, at det med konventionen og forordningen ønskede resultat ikke ville være blevet modarbejdet på samme måde, hvis faderen havde henvendt sig direkte til Amtsgericht Oranienburg umiddelbart efter, at Klaipėdos apygardos teismas havde truffet sin afgørelse om, at barnet ikke skulle tilbagegives 11.
With hindsight, moreover, it seems clear that the result sought by the Convention and the Regulation would not have been obstructed in the same way if the father had applied directly to the Oranienburg court as soon as the Klaipėda court had issued its nonreturn order.
for visse præcise omstændigheder, der er redegjort for i konventionens artikel 13 og 20 [sammenholdt hvad angår artikel 13, litra b), med forordningens artikel 11, stk. 4].
11 certain clearly-defined situations set out in Articles 13 and 20 of the Convention (read, in so far as Article 13(b) is concerned, in conjunction with Article 11(4) of the Regulation).
Dette forekommer mig helt sammenhængende og endog nødvendigt.
That, it seems to me, is perfectly coherent, and even necessary.
Det kan ikke være i barnets tarv at blive slæbt fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat af en forælder på jagt efter den ret, som vedkommende antager vil være bedst egnet til at give ham eller hende medhold.
A child can have no interest in being dragged from one Member State to another by a parent in quest of the court which he or she supposes will be the most sympathetic to his or her cause.
Jeg vil tilføje, at barnets tilbagegivelse til medlemsstaten med det sædvanlige opholdssted ikke nødvendigvis indebærer, at barnet tilbagegives til den forladte forælder og adskilles fra den bortførende forælder.
I would add that a return to the Member State of habitual residence does not necessarily imply the child’s return to the home of the parent left behind, or separation from the abducting parent.
Dette er særskilte spørgsmål, som skal behandles af den kompetente ret under hensyntagen til alle situationens følelsesmæssige, psykologiske og materielle forhold og med forrang til barnets tarv i afgørelsen.
Those are separate questions, to be decided by the competent court, which must take account of all the emotional, psychological and material aspects of the situation and which must, in deciding, accord paramount importance to the child’s superior interests.
Det forekommer mig dog nyttigt at undersøge retsforhandlingernes forløb i lyset af de relevante bestemmelser i konventionen og forordningen, inden jeg vil forsøge at besvare de af Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis teismas stillede spørgsmål.
However the situation came about, I think it will be helpful, before endeavouring to answer the questions raised by the Supreme Court of Lithuania, to examine the course taken by the procedure in the light of the relevant provisions of the Convention and the Regulation.
Det er dermed især i lyset af disse formål og principper, at forordningens bestemmelser efter min opfattelse skal fortolkes.
It is above all in the light of those aims and principles that the provisions of the Regulation must, in my view, be interpreted.
De fulgte retsforhandlingers forløb, som undersøges i lyset af de relevante bestemmelser
The course taken by the procedure, examined in the light of the relevant provisions
Det skal imidlertid fastslås, at det grundlæggende mål i denne sag, som er at fratage den bortførende forælders handling enhver praktisk og retlig følge ved at sikre barnets omgående og faktiske tilbagegivelse, langt fra er opnået.
However, one cannot but observe that, in the present case, the fundamental aim of depriving the actions of the abducting parent of any practical or juridical consequences by ensuring the child’s prompt return is far from having been achieved.
Det er for det første ubestridt og ubestrideligt, at de tyske retsinstanser havde kompetence til at påkende skilsmissesagen i medfør af forordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra a), idet alle de heri opregnede krav om opholdssted var opfyldt på tidspunktet for sagens anlæggelse.
First of all, it is neither denied nor deniable that the German courts had jurisdiction to hear the divorce proceedings under Article 3(1)(a) of the Regulation, as all the residence requirements listed there were fulfilled at the time when the proceedings were initiated.
Uden at det er muligt ud fra de oplysninger, som Domstolen råder over, præcist og sikkert at identificere alle de faktorer, der
Although, from the information available to the Court, it is not possible to identify precisely and with certainty all the factors
11 — Jf. punkt 34 ff. nedenfor.
11 — See point 34 et seq. below.
Det forekommer dernæst at være anerkendt, at der faktisk var tale om ulovlig tilbageholdelse af barnet i konventionens (artikel 3) og forordningens (artikel 2, nr. 11) forstand.
Next, it appears to be common ground that the child was indeed wrongfully retained for the purposes of the Convention (Article 3) and the Regulation (Article 2(11)).
På det tidspunkt, hvor moderen bekendtgjorde sin hensigt om ikke at vende tilbage til Tyskland med barnet, havde de to forældre fælles forældremyndighed i henhold til tysk ret, og faderen havde kun samtykket i en to ugers ferie i Litauen.
At the time when the mother announced her intention not to return to Germany with the child, custody rights were actually exercised by both parents jointly, by virtue of German law, and the father had consented only to a two-week trip to Lithuania.
Det kan på dette tidspunkt bemærkes, at i medfør af forordningens artikel 21, stk. 1, skal denne midlertidige tilkendelse af forældremyndigheden anerkendes i Litauen, »uden at der stilles krav om anvendelse af en særlig procedure«, men at faderen i medfør af samme artikels stk. 3 kunne anmode om anerkendelse, eller moderen kunne anmode om ikkeanerkendelse, »efter proceduren i afdeling 2«.
It may be noted here that, by virtue of Article 21(1) of the Regulation, that provisional award of custody was to be recognised in Lithuania ‘without any special procedure being required’ — but that, under Article 21(3), it would have been open to the father to apply for a decision that it should be recognised, or to the mother to apply for a decision that it should not be recognised, both ‘in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section 2’.
Ingen af disse fremgangsmåder blev imidlertid iværksat.
Neither, however, took that course.
Dernæst anmodede faderen den 30. oktober 2006 i det væsentlige med hjemmel i konventionens artikel 12 den kompetente litauiske ret (i denne sag, Klaipėdos apygardos teismas) om at fastslå, at barnet skulle tilbagegives.
Then, on 30 October 2006, on the basis, essentially, of Article 12 of the Convention, the father requested the competent Lithuanian court (namely the Klaipėda court) to order the child’s return.
Jeg vil her bemærke, at selv om han først iværksatte denne fremgangsmåde, efter at han var blevet tilkendt eneforældremyndigheden, og dette var blevet stadfæstet, hindrede intet ham i at indgive denne anmodning, da det var blevet konkretiseret, at barnet var blevet tilbageholdt.
I would point out here that, even though he did not do so until sole custody had been awarded to him and confirmed on appeal, there was nothing to prevent him from making that application as soon as the child had failed to be returned.
Da betingelserne i forordningens artikel 10 om overførelse af kompetence dermed ikke var opfyldt, bevarede retsinstanserne i medlemsstaten med barnets sædvanlige opholdssted inden den ulovlige tilbageholdelse, nemlig Tyskland, kompetencen i henhold til artikel 8 til at træffe afgørelse om ethvert spørgsmål om forældreansvar.
Thus, as the conditions for a displacement of jurisdiction set out in Article 10 of the Regulation were not satisfied, the jurisdiction conferred by Article 8 in all matters of parental responsibility remained with the courts of the Member State of the child’s habitual residence immediately before the wrongful retention, namely Germany.
Der var med en ubestridelig logik — som, hvis der var behov herfor, bekræftes i forordningens artikel 12, stk. 1 — nærmere bestemt tale om den ret, for hvilken skilsmissesagen verserede, nemlig Amtsgericht Oranienburg.
With inescapable logic — confirmed, if need be, by Article 12(1) of the Regulation — the specific court concerned was that before which the divorce proceedings were pending, namely the Oranienburg court.
Barnet skulle vende tilbage til Tyskland den 6. august 2006.
The child should have been brought back to Germany on 6 August 2006.
Da moderen havde bekendtgjort sin hensigt om at blive i Litauen med barnet, rettede faderen først henvendelse til den ret, der havde kompetence vedrørende forældreansvaret (Amtsgericht Oranienburg), som den 14. august 2006 tilkendte ham den midlertidige eneforældremyndighed. Efter appel iværksat af moderen stadfæstede Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgericht denne tilkendelse den 11. oktober 2006.
When the mother announced her intention of remaining in Lithuania with the child, the father first applied to the court which had jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility (the Oranienburg court) which, on 14 August 2006, provisionally granted him sole custody.
I denne sag traf den litauiske ret sin afgørelse — som afslog barnets tilbagegivelse — den 22. december 2006, lidt over syv uger efter anmodningens indgivelse 12.
In the event, the Lithuanian court gave its decision — refusing the child’s return — on 22 December 2006, slightly over seven weeks after the application was lodged. 12
I stedet for at benytte sig af denne mulighed anvendte faderen imidlertid afgørelsen om, at barnet ikke skulle tilbagegives, fra Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas, som den 15. marts 2007 annullerede afgørelsen og fastslog, at barnet skulle tilbagegives inden for en frist på en måned 13.
However, instead of using that possibility, the father appealed against the nonreturn order to the Lithuanian Court of Appeal, which, on 15 March 2007, quashed the decision and ordered the child’s return within one month. 13
Det forekommer, at denne sidstnævnte kendelse burde have været fuldbyrdet inden for den fastsatte frist, fordi det fremgår af Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis teismas’ dom af 7. januar 2008, at artikel 2, stk. 6, i den litauiske lov om iværksættelse af forordningen udtrykkeligt forbyder en kassationsanke.
That order, it would seem, should have been enforced within the period laid down, as it appears from the Supreme Court’s judgment of 7 January 2008 that Article 2(6) of the Lithuanian law implementing the Regulation expressly precludes any further appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision.
Dommens omgående fuldbyrdelse ville i øvrigt have været i overensstemmelse med konventionens og forordningens grundlæggende formål.
Immediate enforcement would, moreover, have been consistent with the fundamental aims of the Convention and the Regulation.
Efter en anmodning om sagens genåbning fra moderen og statsadvokaturen, som fulgte efter, er intet imidlertid sket, hvilket fortsat er tilfældet på nuværende tidspunkt.
However, as a result of the mother’s application for the proceedings to be reopened and the procedural vagaries that have followed upon it, the decision was not enforced, nor has it been enforced to this day.
Fuldbyrdelsen af Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas’ afgørelse er derimod blevet udsat flere gange, herunder af Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis teismas — og dette på trods af, at samme retsinstans 14i den dom, som tillod genåbningen, udtalte, at en sådan udsættelse var udelukket.
On the contrary, enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s decision has been suspended on several occasions, even by the Supreme Court itself — despite that fact that the same Supreme Court 14 held, in its judgment allowing the reopening, that such suspension was not possible.
Dernæst kunne Amtsgericht Oranienburg på faderens anmodning i medfør af forordningens artikel 11, stk. 8, have anordnet barnets tilbagegivelse.
The Oranienburg court could then, on application by the father, have ordered the child’s return by virtue of Article 11(8) of the Regulation.
Denne ret ville således have haft det sidste ord.
That would have been the last word.
Hvis den efter at have undersøgt spørgsmålet om forældremyndighed i overensstemmelse med artikel 11, stk. 7, havde fastslået barnets tilbagegivelse og havde attesteret sin afgørelse i overensstemmelse med forordningens artikel 42, ville denne afgørelse have skullet fuldbyrdes i Litauen under i de i artikel 42-45 opregnede betingelser.
If, after examining the question of custody in accordance with Article 11(7), it had then certified its judgment in accordance with Article 42 of the Regulation, that decision would have been enforceable in Lithuania as provided for in Articles 42 to 45.
13 — Det kan bemærkes, at ifølge oplysningerne fra den tyske regerings befuldmægtigede under retsmødet meddelte den litauiske centralmyndighed den tyske centralmyndighed denne afgørelse, og den tyske myndighed gav faderens advokat meddelelse herom, men ved en fejl ikke Amtsgericht Oranienburg.
13 — At the hearing, the agent for the German Government informed the Court that this decision was transmitted by the Lithuanian central authority to the German central authority, which notified it to the father’s lawyer but not, through an oversight, to the Oranienburg court.
Det fremgår imidlertid af den nævnte rets dom af 20.6.2007 og af Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgerichts stadfæstende dom af 20.2.2008, at disse retsinstanser havde fået kendskab til afgørelsen.
However, it is clear from that court’s judgment of 20 June 2007, and from the Brandenburg appeal court’s confirming judgment of 20 February 2008, that both those courts had cognisance of the decision.
12 — Domstolen har ikke en kopi af denne afgørelse, men det synes ubestridt, at afslaget byggede på konventionens artikel 13, litra b), som fastsætter denne mulighed, hvis »der er alvorlig risiko for, at tilbagegivelsen vil udsætte barnet for fysisk eller psykisk skade eller på anden måde sætte barnet i en situation, som det ikke bør tåle«.
12 — We do not have a copy of this decision, but it appears to be common ground that the refusal was based on Article 13(b) of the Convention, which provides for such a possibility if ‘there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation’.
14 — Dog et andet dommerkollegium ifølge oplysninger fra faderens repræsentant under retsmødet.
14 — Albeit, according to information given by counsel for the father at the hearing, a different Chamber.
RINAU mulighed for at blive hørt (moderen var ikke til stede, men var repræsenteret 15), og c) at
RINAU were given an opportunity to be heard (the mother being represented but not present 15),
Selv hvis fuldbyrdelsen af en afgørelse fra en ret i en medlemsstat på dens eget område er omfattet af national ret, kan det kun på dette tidspunkt konkluderes, at den situation, som følger af disse løbende udsættelser — det forhold, at barnet endnu ikke er vendt tilbage til Tyskland næsten to år efter tilbageholdelsen og mere end 15 måneder efter afsigelsen af den afgørelse, som fastslog tilbagegivelsen — er helt uforenelig med konventionens og forordningens grundlæggende formål.
Even if enforcement of a judgment of a court of a Member State within its own territory is a matter for domestic law, it can only be concluded, at this point, that the outcome of these successive suspensions — the fact that, nearly two years after she was first supposed to return and more than 15 months after the decision ordering her return was issued, the child has still not been brought back to Germany — is totally incompatible with the fundamental aims of the Convention and the Regulation.
de af Klaipėdos apygardos teismas angivne grunde for kendelsen om, at barnet ikke skulle tilbagegives (kendelse af 22.12.2006, som i dag er ophævet, med forbehold for sagens genåbning), er blevet undersøgt og forkastet.
and (c) the reasons for not ordering return given by the Klaipėda court in its decision (of 22 December 2006, now quashed, subject to the proceedings being reopened) were examined but not accepted.
Selv om alle detaljerne i fremsendelsesproceduren i forordningens artikel 11, stk. 6, således ikke formelt er blevet overholdt, er målsætningen med denne procedure blevet opfyldt, og det fremgår klart af Amtsgericht Oranienburgs dom af 20. juni 2007 og af Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgerichts dom af 20. februar 2008, som forkastede moderens appel, at disse to retsinstanser havde fuldt kendskab til sagen, da de traf afgørelse.
Thus, even if the transmission procedure provided for in Article 11(6) of the Regulation was not formally observed in every particular, the aim sought was well and truly achieved, and it is quite clear, from both the judgment of the Oranienburg court of 20 June 2007 and that of the Brandenburg appeal court of 20 February 2008 dismissing the mother’s appeal, that both courts ruled in full knowledge of the background.
Jeg når nu til Amtsgericht Oranienburgs dom af 20. juni 2007, som fastslog skilsmissen, tilkendte faderen den endelige eneforældremyndighed og (atter) fastslog, at barnet skulle tilbagegives (dom stadfæstet den 17.2.2008 af Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgericht).
I come now to the Oranienburg court’s judgment granting divorce, awarding sole custody definitively to the father and ordering (yet again) the child’s return (delivered on 20 June 2007 and confirmed on 17 February 2008 by the Brandenburg appeal court).
Denne dom blev attesteret i overensstemmelse med forordningens artikel 42, hvilket sædvanligvis indebærer, at tilbagegivelsen »anerkendes og er eksigibel« i Litauen, »uden at der kræves en afgørelse om eksigibilitet, og uden at der kan gøres indsigelse mod anerkendelsen«.
That judgment was certified in accordance with Article 42 of the Regulation, which normally means that it must be ‘recognised and enforceable’ in Lithuania ‘without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition’.
Status for denne afgørelse og den attest, som ledsagede den, rejser, henset til forordningens bestemmelser, spørgsmål hos den forelæggende ret, som er kommet til udtryk i det femte spørgsmål.
The status of that decision and of its accompanying certificate, in the light of the provisions of the Regulation, raises doubts for the referring court, expressed in its fifth question.
Det forekommer mig nyttigt først at behandle dette spørgsmål, fordi det forekommer mig at være det mest centrale, og besvarelsen heraf kan angive, hvorledes flere andre spørgsmål skal besvares.
That question, I consider, is best addressed first, as it appears to lie at the core of the matter, and the answer to it may guide the approach to several other questions.
15 — Det fremgår af de tyske domme i sagsakterne, at moderen var repræsenteret og havde kunnet fremsætte bemærkninger, selv om hun ikke havde været til stede under de retsforhandlinger, som gav anledning til Amtsgericht Oranienburgs domme af 14.8.2006 og af 20.6.2007, og at hun havde været personligt til stede og var blevet hørt i forbindelse med de retsforhandlinger, som gav anledning til Brandenburgisches Oberlandesgerichts stadfæstende dom af 20.2.2008.
15 — It appears from the German judgments in the case-file that the mother was represented and able to submit observations, though not physically present, in the proceedings giving rise to the Oranienburg court’s judgments of 14 August 2006 and 20 June 2007, and that she was present and heard in the proceedings giving rise to the Brandenburg appeal court’s confirmatory judgment of 20 February 2008.
Disse forhold blev bekræftet under retsmødet for Domstolen, hvor moderen ligeledes var til stede.
That information was confirmed at the hearing before the Court of Justice, when the mother was again present.
Jeg fastslår, at den attest, som ledsagede afgørelsen, anvender den fastsatte formulering og indeholder alle de krævede oplysninger og erklæringer, og at selve afgørelsen i overensstemmelse med forordningens artikel 42, stk. 2, angiver: a) at det er fundet uhensigtsmæssigt at høre barnet under hensyntagen til dets alder, b) at parterne har haft
I note that the certificate accompany- ing that decision uses the standard form provided for and contains all the required information and statements, and that the judgment itself indicates, in line with Article 42(2) of the Regulation, that (a) it was not considered appropriate to hear the child, having regard to her age, (b) the parties
Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis teismas ønsker med dette spørgsmål i det væsentlige oplyst, om den tyske ret under de processuelle omstændigheder i denne sag i henhold til forordningens bestemmelser kunne fastslå, at barnet skulle tilbagegives, og udstede den i artikel 42 omhandlede attest.
The Supreme Court wishes to know essentially whether, in the procedural circumstances of the case, the Regulation allowed the German court to order the child’s return and issue the certificate under Article 42.