natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Appellanterne har for det første gjort gældende, at begrundelseskravene til en godkendelsesbeslutning er mindre end til en beslutning, der indeholder et forbud, idet tredjemand som følge af deres svagere stilling under sagen ikke kan forvente samme grad af præcision med hensyn til begrundelsen som parterne i en sammenslutning, der forbydes.
First, the appellants claim that less stringent requirements are to be imposed in relation to the reasoning of a clearance decision than in relation to a prohibition decision, because the weaker position of third parties in the procedure means that they cannot expect the same degree of precision in the reasoning as the parties to the concentration can in case of a refusal.
Retten har således korrekt generelt bemærket, at Kommissionen for så vidt angår afgørende omstændigheder i forbindelse med beslutningen ikke blot kan støtte sig på sådanne »upræcise bemærkninger« 102, der er »uunderbyggede«, »temmelig begrænsede« 103 og endog selvmodsigende 104.
In all, the Court of First Instance therefore rightly held that the Commission ought not to have restricted itself to ‘vague assertions’ 102as regards the factors which were decisive for its decision, which were ‘unsubstantiated’, ‘rather limited’ 103 and in addition internally contradictory. 104
Dette argument er ikke holdbart.
This argument is not convincing.
Hverken artikel 253 EF eller grundrettighedschartrets artikel 41, stk. 2, tredje led, sondrer mellem begrundelseskravene til beslutninger, der er begunstigende for deres adressater, og beslutninger, der er bebyrdende.
Neither Article 253 EC nor the third indent of Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights distinguishes between decisions which benefit their respective addressees and those which are disadvantageous for them as regards the requirement to state reasons.
Henset hertil er det min opfattelse, at Retten ikke har begået retlige fejl, da den lagde til grund, at den første godkendelsesbeslutning ikke var tilstrækkeligt begrundet for så vidt angår Kommissionens konstateringer om (manglende) gennemsigtighed på markedet 105.
Against this background I am of the view that the Court of First Instance did not make any error of law in finding that the first clearance decision gave insufficient reasons as regards the Commission’s finding in relation to (insufficient) market transparency. 105
c) Øvrige betragtninger
(c) Miscellaneous matters
Når tredjemand således inddrages i fusionskontrolproceduren og formelt høres af Kommissionen — som det var tilfældet for Impala — skal begrundelseskravet tillige beskytte dennes rettigheder og interesser.
In any event, where a third party has been included in a merger control procedure and has been formally heard by the Commission — as was the case with Impala here — the duty to state reasons is intended also to protect its rights and interests.
Tredjemand har i så fald grund til at forvente en logisk, klar og konsekvent begrundelse for så vidt angår de væsentligste faktiske og retlige betragtninger, som Kommissionen støtter en godkendelsesbeslutning på.
The third party may expect at least persuasive, comprehensible and internally consistent reasons as regards the essential factual and legal considerations on which the Commission bases its clearance decision.
Nærværende sag angår netop disse mindstekrav 106.
It is precisely these minimum requirements which are the subject of the present case. 106
101 — Jf. hertil betragtning 80 til den første godkendelsesbeslutning, gengivet i den appellerede doms præmis 315 og 316.
102 — The last sentence of paragraph 289 of the judgment under appeal.
106 — Jf. ovenfor i punkt 119.
106 — See above, point 119 et seq.
Om en begrundelse i sidste instans opfylder de retlige krav i artikel 253 EF, afhænger nemlig af objektive kriterier, hvorefter det navnlig kræves, at de væsentligste faktiske og retlige betragtninger skal være logiske, klare og konsekvente 109.
Specifically, whether a statement of reasons satisfies the legal requirements of Article 253 EC depends ultimately on object- ive criteria, including in particular whether the essential factual and legal considerations are logical, comprehensible and free from contradiction.
Såfremt en begrundelse på et væsentligt punkt savner logik, klarhed og konsekvens, skal den pågældende beslutning annulleres, selv om den retlige beskyttelse af sagsøgeren ikke har lidt skade for så vidt angår dennes øvrige klagepunkter.
109If, as in the present case, a statement of reasons is not logical, comprehensible and free from contradiction on an essential matter, the decision in question is to be annulled even if the applicant’s rights of defence have not suffered any damage as regards his other pleas.
I modsat fald ville det under et annullationssøgsmål foruden andre ugyldighedsgrunde være praktisk umuligt at gøre en begrundelsesmangel gældende.
Otherwise, it would be in practice impossible for an applicant in an annulment action to succeed on the ground that the reasoning was insufficient while also raising other grounds of invalidity.
For det andet gør appellanterne gældende, at hverken Impala eller Retten havde haft problemer med at forstå begrundelsen for den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
Second, the appellants claim that in the present case both Impala and the Court of First Instance had easily understood the reasons for the first clearance decision.
De slutter heraf, at den pågældende beslutning var tilstrækkeligt begrundet.
From this they conclude that the decision included sufficient reasons.
Til forskel fra appellanternes opfattelse er det i øvrigt på ingen måde selvmodsigende, at Retten i den foreliggende sag har konstateret såvel en begrundelsesmangel som en åbenbar skønsfejl hos Kommissionen.
Contrary to the appellants’ view, it is incidentally by no means contradictory for the Court of First Instance in the present case to have found at one and the same time that the reasons given were insufficient and that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment.
En kommissionsbeslutning kan lide af såvel formelle som materielle mangler.
A decision by the Commission may be vitiated by both procedural and substantive flaws.
Den omstændighed, at begrundelsen for en beslutning — f.eks. som følge af manglende logik — er utilstrækkelig, udelukker ikke, at samme beslutning tillige er indholdsmæssigt urigtig.
The fact that the reasons given for a decision — for example on account of not being logical — are deficient does not preclude the possibility that the same decision is also substantively flawed.
Det er ganske vist muligt, at det umiddelbart er tegn på, at begrundelsen er tilstrækkelig, såfremt sagsøgeren i fornødent omfang har kunnet gøre sine øvrige klagepunkter gældende for Retten 108. Imidlertid kan dette alene anses for en gendrivelig formodning.
The fact that the applicant has been able to make his other pleas sufficiently clear before the Court of First Instance may constitute an initial factor pointing to the conclusion that adequate reasons were given.
For det tredje gør appellanterne gældende, at der ved afgrænsningen af begrundelseskravene til en fusionskontrolbeslutning skal tages hensyn til, at følsomme forretningsoplysninger er fortrolige.
Third, the appellants claim that, in laying down requirements as to the reasons to be given in a merger control decision, account must be taken of the confidentiality of sensitive commercial information.
Retten har derfor begået en retlig fejl, idet den i den appellerede doms præmis 411 krævede, at
Thus, in their view, the Court of First Instance made an error in law in that in paragraph 411
107 — Dommen i sagen Kaysersberg mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 8, præmis 105.
107 — Kaysersberg (cited above, footnote 8), paragraph 105.
108 — I samme retning bl.a. dom af 10.3.2005, sag C-342/03, Spanien mod Rådet, Sml. I, s. 1975, præmis 59, og dommen i sagen Kaysersberg mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 8, præmis 160.
108 — To this effect see Case C-342/03 Spain v Council [2005] ECR I-1975, paragraph 59, and Kaysersberg (cited above, footnote 8), paragraph 160.
109 — Jf. ovenfor i punkt 119.
109 — See above, point 119.
BERTELSMANN OG SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA MOD IMPALA d) Foreløbig konklusion
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA
Kommissionen skulle offentliggøre detaljer vedrørende de andre store selskabers pris- og rabatpolitik.
(d) Interim conclusion of the judgment under appeal it required the Commission to publish details of the pricing and discounting policies of the other majors.
Retten har således ikke begået retlige fejl, da den i den appellerede doms præmis 325 og 542 konkluderede, at den første godkendelsesbeslutning var utilstrækkeligt begrundet og følgelig skulle annulleres. Sjette appelanbringendes første og tredje led er således ubegrundet.
In all, it follows that the Court of First Instance did not make any errors in law in reaching the conclusion in paragraphs 325 and 542 of the judgment under appeal that insufficient reasons were given for the first clearance decision, which had, for that reason, to be set aside.
Det skyldes tilsyneladende en urigtig fortolkning af den appellerede doms præmis 411.
It is clearly based on a misunderstanding of paragraph 411 of the judgment under appeal.
Retten krævede nemlig ikke, at Kommissionen skulle afsløre forretningshemmeligheder vedrørende enkelte erhvervsdrivende.
In that paragraph the Court of First Instance by no means required the Commission to disclose business secrets of individual market participants.
Den tilbageviste blot — og med rette — Kommissionens argument om, at visse talmæssige oplysninger som følge af deres fortrolige karakter slet ikke skulle have været nævnt i den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
It merely — and correctly — rejected the Commission’s argument that because of their confidential character certain figures could not have been included at all in the first clearance decision.
Kravet om fortrolighed af forretningshemmeligheder (artikel 287 EF) kan nemlig ikke fortolkes så vidt, at det udhuler begrundelsespligten med hensyn til beslutninger 110.
This is because the obligation of professional secrecy (Article 287 EC) cannot be interpreted so broadly as to undermine the requirement to state reasons for a decision. 110
Med første appelanbringende og sjette appelanbringendes andet led har appellanterne gjort gældende, at Retten med urette lagde meddelelsen af klagepunkter til grund for den retlige prøvelse af den første godkendelsesbeslutning og med urette krævede, at Kommissionen skulle begrunde eventuelle afvigelser mellem klagepunkterne og dens beslutning.
In their first ground of appeal and in the second part of their sixth ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance wrongly used the statement of objections as a benchmark for its substantive assessment of the first clearance decision and wrongly required of the Commission that it justify any deviations from the objections in its decision.
I det omfang talmateriale indeholder forretningshemmeligheder, er det i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens faste praksis inden for konkurrenceretten i beslutninger at erstatte disse tal med marginer eller på anden måde at sammenfatte eller omskrive dem.
So far as figures include business secrets, the Commission’s present practice in competition law is to replace such figures in its decision with ranges of figures, or otherwise to summarise them or describe them.
Retten henviste med rette til 111, at Kommissionen andetsteds i den første godkendelsesbeslutning klart havde anført taloplysninger vedrørende prispolitikken for enkelte erhvervsdrivende 112.
The Court of First Instance rightly points out 111that at other places in its first clearance decision the Commission indeed provided information, including figures, on the pricing policy of individual market participants. 112
110 — Dom af 13.3.1985, forenede sager 296/82 og 318/82, Nederlandene m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 809, præmis 27.
110 — Joined Cases 296/82 and 318/82 Netherlands and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 809, paragraph 27.
111 — Jf. den appellerede doms præmis 413.
111 — Paragraph 413 of the judgment under appeal.
112 — Jf. i denne forbindelse bl.a. betragtning 74, 81, 88, 95 og 102 til den første godkendelsesbeslutning.
112 — On this point see for example recitals 74, 81, 88, 95 and 102 of the first clearance decision.
Det er ubestridt, at den appellerede dom indeholder talrige henvisninger til meddelelsen af klagepunkter.
It is not disputed that the judgment under appeal contains numerous references to the statement of objections.
I det følgende vil jeg for det første gennemgå Rettens forståelse af forholdet mellem godkendelsesbeslutningen og meddelelsen af klagepunkter generelt, inden jeg for det andet gennemgår de konkrete henvisninger, som Retten har
In the following I shall consider, as a first step, the Court of First Instance’s approach in general to the relationship between the clearance decision and the statement of objections, and then, as a second step, I shall consider in
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P anført, til enkelte passager i meddelelsen af klagepunkter.
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P more detail the specific references the Court of First Instance made to individual passages in the statement of objections.
a) Rettens generelle forståelse af forholdet mellem godkendelsesbeslutningen og meddelelsen af klagepunkter
(a) The Court of First Instance’s approach in general to the relationship between the clearance decision and the statement of objections
Retten betegner den endelige godkendelse af fusionen som »denne fundamentale ændring af Kommissionens standpunkt«, der »kan virke overraskende, især i betragtning af dens sene indtræden« 114; endvidere henvises til de bindende tidsfrister inden for fusionskontrolprocedurer, som efter Rettens opfattelse »ikke gør det muligt for denne at forlænge sin undersøgelse, hvilket gør en grundlæggende ændring af Kommissionens standpunkt stadig mindre sandsynlig, efterhånden som den administrative procedure skrider frem« 115.
The ultimate clearance of the concentration was described by the Court of First Instance as a ‘fundamental U-turn in the Commission’s position’ which was ‘surprising, particularly in view of the late stage at which it was made’; 114in addition, reference was made to the requirement to comply with mandatory timelimits in merger control procedures, which, according to the Court of First Instance, ‘does not allow [the Commission] to extend its investigation, thus reducing the likelihood that the Commission will fundamentally alter its position as the administrative procedure advances’. 115
Helt generelt anfægter appellanterne med støtte af Kommissionen Rettens bemærkninger til forholdet mellem godkendelsesbeslutningen og meddelelsen af klagepunkter.
The appellants, supported by the Commission, object generally to the Court of First Instance’s discussion of the relationship between the clearance decision and the statement of objections.
Efter deres opfattelse undlod Retten at tage hensyn til karakteren af og formålet med en meddelelse af klagepunkter, hvilket »smittede af« på resten af dommen.
In their opinion the Court of First Instance misunderstood the nature and function of a statement of objections, and this ‘coloured’ the rest of the judgment.
I lighed med kartelsager skal der også indrømmes ret til forsvar under fusionskontrolprocedurer, inden der træffes en beslutning, der kan være bebyrdende for de pågældende virksomheder 116.
As in antitrust proceedings, in merger control proceedings it is essential to observe the rights of the defence before making a decision which may adversely affect the undertakings concerned. 116
Retten til forsvar omfatter navnlig kontradiktionsprincippet, der er et grund-
The rights of the defence include in particular the principle of the right to a hearing, which is a fundamental principle of
I forbindelse med sin efterprøvelse af indsigelsen om begrundelsesmangler erindrede Retten indledningsvis om, at Kommissionen i meddelelsen af klagepunkter »meget klart fastslog, at fusionen var uforenelig med fællesmarkedet, navnlig fordi der forud for den påtænkte fusion bestod en kollektiv dominerende stilling, og fordi markedet for indspillet musik var meget gennemsigtigt og i særlig grad fremmende for koordinering« 113.
In considering the complaint of a failure to state reasons, the Court of First Instance, by way of preliminary observation, recalled ‘that the Commission had concluded emphatically in the statement of objections that the concentration was incompatible with the common market on the ground, in particular, that a collective dominant position existed before the proposed concentration and that the market for recorded music was transparent and particularly conducive to coordination’. 113
læggende fællesskabsretligt princip 117, som nu også er kommet til udtryk i artikel 41, stk. 2, i chartret om grundlæggende rettigheder.
Community law 117and which is now also recognised in Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights.
For så vidt angår fusionskontrolproceduren fremgår dette princip endvidere af fusionsforordningens artikel 18, stk. 3, andet punktum, der har rang som almindelig lov.
In addition, in relation to merger control proceedings this principle is laid down by statute in the second sentence of Article 18(3) of the Merger Regulation.
Det er et udslag af retten til kontradiktion, at de pågældende virksomheder i kartelsager og fusionskontrolprocedurer skriftligt får en såkaldt meddelelse om klagepunkter 118.
The fact that in antitrust proceedings and in merger control proceedings the undertakings concerned are issued with a written statement of objections 118is the result of their right to a hearing.
Klagepunktsmeddelelsen giver virksomhederne mulighed for at skaffe sig kendskab til de beviser, Kommissionens er i besiddelse af, og for at sikre kontradiktionsrettens fulde virkning 119.
The statement of objections allows them to acquaint themselves with the evidence which the Commission has at its disposal and to render the rights of the defence fully effective.
De får mulighed for at tage stilling til klagepunkterne skriftligt, og efter begrundet anmodning mundtligt 120.
119They are given the opportunity to make submissions on the objections in writing and, on justified application, orally.
Det fremgår endvidere klart af fusionsforordningens artikel 18, stk. 3, første punktum, at Kommissionen alene bygger sine beslutninger på punkter, med hensyn til hvilke de berørte parter har haft lejlighed til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger.
120In addition, the first sentence of Article 18(3) of the Merger Regulation makes it clear that the Commission may base its decisions only on objections on which those concerned have had the opportunity of making known their views.
Den omstændighed, at Kommissionen under fusionskontrolsager, til forskel fra sager, der falder inden for anvendelsesområdet af artikel 81 EF og artikel 82 EF, er underlagt strenge sagsbehandlingsfrister, ændrer heller ikke, at meddelelsen af klagepunkter er af foreløbig karakter.
The fact that, in contrast to where Art -icles 81 EC and 82 EC apply, in merger control proceedings the Commission is subject to strict procedural timelimits does not change this provisional nature of the statement of objections in any way.
Kravet om hurtighed i fusionskontrolprocedurer indebærer naturligvis også, at de berørte virksomheder har særligt korte frister til at udøve deres ret til forsvar.
The requirement for speed in merger control proceedings naturally means that the affected undertakings too are subject to particularly short timelimits within which they can exercise their rights in defence.
Den omfattende ret til kontradiktion kræver imidlertid, at der tages samme grad af hensyn til parternes argumentation i fusionskontrolsager som i kartelsager.
However, the comprehensive safeguarding of the rights of defence requires that submissions in defence by the persons affected in merger control proceedings may not be taken any the less into account than in antitrust proceedings.
I overensstemmelse hermed kan et sådant argument under en fusionskontrol i samme omfang som i kartelsager føre til, at Kommissionen ændrer standpunkt, selv kort tid inden fristen for, at der træffes en godken-delses- eller en forbudsbeslutning, udløber.
Accordingly, such a submission in the context of merger control can lead to a change in the Commission’s view just as much as it can in antitrust proceedings, even shortly before the expiry of the timelimit allowed for a clearance or a prohibition decision.
Den funktion, som meddelelsen af klagepunkter tjener under administrative procedurer, viser, at en sådan meddelelse er et forberedende dokument, hvis faktiske og retlige bedømmelser alene er af foreløbig karakter. Dette er begrundelsen for, at
It follows from its function in administrative proceedings that a statement of objections is a preparatory document containing assessments of fact and of law which are purely provisional in nature.
Henset hertil var det åbenbart uheldigt, at Retten i den appellerede dom fandt, at »denne fundamentale ændring af Kommissionens standpunkt« virkede »overraskende«
Against this background it was certainly unfortunate that in the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance regarded the ‘fundamental U-turn in the Commission’s position’ which occurred just prior
117 — Fast retspraksis siden dom af 13.2.1979, sag 85/76, Hoff-mann-La Roche mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 461, præmis 9 og 11, og af 7.6.1983, forenede sager 100/80-103/80, Musique Diffusion française m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 1825, præmis 10.
117 — This is the consistent caselaw of the Court since Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paragraphs 9 and 11, and Joined Cases 100/80 to 103/80 Musique Diffusion française and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 1825, paragraph 10.
118 — I henhold til artikel 13, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 447/98 fremsender Kommissionen under fusionskontrolprocedurer skriftligt sine indsigelser til de anmeldende og andre berørte parter og fastsætter en frist, inden for hvilken de kan fremsætte deres bemærkninger skriftligt til den.
118 — Article 13(2) of Regulation No 447/98 provides that in merger control proceedings the Commission shall address its objections in writing to the notifying parties and to other involved parties, and shall set a timelimit within which they may inform the Commission of their views in writing.
119 — Dommen i sagen SGL Carbon mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 27, præmis 55.
119 — SGL Carbon v Commission (cited above, footnote 27), paragraph 55.
121 — Jf. dom af 7.1.2004, forenede sager C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P og C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 123, præmis 67, jf. i samme retning dommen i sagen Musique Diffusion française m.fl. mod Kommissionen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 117, præmis 14, og dom af 17.11.1987, forenede sager 142/84 og 156/84, BAT og Reynolds mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 4487, præmis 70.
121 — Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, paragraph 67; to the same effect see also the earlier cases of Musique Diffusion française (cited above, footnote 117), paragraph 14, and Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v Commission [1987] ECR 4487, paragraph 70.
120 — Jf. artikel 13, stk. 2, og artikel 14 i forordning nr. 447/98.
120 — See Article 13(2) and Article 14 of Regulation No 447/98.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT KOKOTT — SAG C-413/06 P
OPINION OF MRS KOKOTT — CASE C-413/06 P to the first clearance decision as ‘surprising’ in view of ‘the late stage at which it was made’, 122and generally described the likeli- hood that the Commission would fundamentally alter its position as ‘reducing … as the administrative procedure advances’. 123