natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Der er en formodning for, at samordningen, hvorved parterne tilsigtede at opdele et marked, har påvirket parternes adfærd på dette marked, medmindre der føres bevis for det modsatte, hvilket påhviler de pågældende parter.
The criteria of coordination and cooperation used to define that term must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition, according to which each economic operator must determine independently the policy which it intends to adopt on the common market.
Begrebet samordnet praksis omhandler en form for koordinering mellem virksomheder, hvorved disse ikke går så langt som til at indgå en egentlig aftale, men dog bevidst erstatter den risiko, der er forbundet med normal konkurrence, med et indbyrdes praktisk samarbejde.
This requirement of independence strictly precludes any direct or indirect contact between traders, the object or effect of which is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question.
Ved afgrænsningen af begrebet skal kriterierne om koordinering og samarbejde forstås ud fra den grundtanke, der ligger bag traktatens konkurrencebestemmelser, om, at enhver erhvervsdrivende uafhængigt skal tage stilling til den politik, han vil føre på fællesmarkedet. Dette krav om uafhængighed udelukker kategorisk enhver direkte eller indirekte kontakt mellem erhvervsdrivende, som har til formål eller til følge, at der opstår konkurrencevilkår, som ikke svarer til markedets normale vilkår.
As is clear from the very terms of Article 85(1) of the Treaty (now Article 81(1) EC), a concerted practice implies, besides undertakings' concerting together, conduct on the market pursuant to those collusive practices, and a relationship of cause and effect between the two.
Det forhold, at en producent i en medlemsstat måtte have vidst, at de opkøb, de andre europæiske producenter foretog hos denne, havde til formål at bringe producentens direkte salg på de europæiske markeder til ophør eller reducere det, kan ikke i sig selv føre til, at producenten må anses for part i en aftale, som er i strid med traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1 (nu artikel 81, stk. 1, EF). En sådan
Undertakings cannot justify infringement of the rules on competition by claiming that they were forced into it by the conduct of other traders. Nor can the fact that the latter have received public aid justify the adoption of private anticompetitive initiatives, even if the aid in question was unlawful.
Selv om virksomhederne ikke alene har ret til at henlede de ansvarlige myndigheders - også Kommissionens — opmærksomhed på eventuelle overtrædelser af nationale eller EF-bestemmelser, men også kan gøre det kollektivt, hvilket nødvendigvis forudsætter, at de må kunne drøfte sagen indbyrdes
Such knowledge can be deemed to reveal unlawful conduct only if it is established that it was accompanied by the adherence of that producer to the object pursued
Da dette mål er i strid med den omhandlede producents interesser, kan den pågældende kun anses for at have tilsluttet sig dette mål, hvis det er bevist, at producenten påtog sig at ophøre med eller reducere sit direkte salg på de europæiske markeder som modydelse for de omhandlede opkøb.
In as much as the object in question was clearly against the interests of the producer concerned, only evidence of a commitment by that producer that, in return for the purchases under consideration, it would halt or reduce its direct sales on the European markets could be deemed to constitute its adherence to that object.
(præmis 3443 og 3444)
(Paragraphs 3443 and 3444)
Det er således med rette, at Kommissionen har betegnet et samarbejde inden for en komité for erhvervsdrivende, der havde til formål at undgå konkurrenters indtrængen på de respektive nationale markeder inden for EF, som samordnet praksis i henhold til traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1.
Thus, the Commission was correct to classify cooperation within a committee of economic operators designed to prevent incursions by competitors in respective national markets in the Community as a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Medlemmerne af denne komité — eller i det mindste nogle af disse — erstattede inden for rammerne af denne komité den risiko, der er forbundet med normal konkurrence, med et indbyrdes praktisk samarbejde, som havde et klart konkurrencebegrænsende formål, og som henset til komitéens formål og dens medlemmers økonomiske betydning kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstaterne mærkbart.
Within that framework, the members of that committee, or at the very least some of them, substituted for the risks of competition practical cooperation between themselves, with a clearly anticompetitive object, and which, having regard to the object of the committee and the economic importance of its members, was capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member States.
Dette er tilfældet, når virksomhedernes samarbejde har til formål at undgå konkurrenters indtrængen på virksomhedernes respektive nationale markeder inden for EF.
That is so in the case of cooperation between undertakings designed to prevent incursions by competitors on the respective national markets of those undertakings in the Community.
(præmis 3868 og 3869)
(Paragraphs 3868 and 3869)
Bi- og multilaterale ordninger kan kun anses for at udgøre en samlet konkurrencebegrænsende aftale, hvis det er bevist, at de er en del af en samlet plan med et fælles mål.
Bi- or multilateral concerted practices can be regarded as constituent elements of a single anticompetitive agreement only if it is established that they form part of an overall plan pursuing a common objective.
Selv om begrebet samordnet praksis i sig selv forudsætter en adfærd på markedet, indebærer begrebet ikke nødvendigvis, at denne adfærd konkret har den virkning at begrænse, forhindre eller fordreje konkurrencen.
However, the fact that objects of such concerted practices and such an anticompetitive agreement coincide is not sufficient to establish that an undertaking that was party to those practices participated in that agreement.
Det forhold, at ordningerne og den konkurrencebegrænsende aftale har samme formål, er imidlertid ikke tilstrækkeligt til at anse en virksomhed, der har medvirket i disse ordninger, for at have deltaget i aftalen.
Although the very concept of concerted practice presupposes some conduct on the market, it does not necessarily mean that that conduct actually has the effect of restricting, preventing or distorting competition.
Kun såfremt denne virksomhed, da den deltog i disse ordninger, vidste eller burde have vidst, at den dermed tog del i en samlet aftale, kan dens deltagelse i de pågældende ordninger være udtryk for, at den tilsluttede sig aftalen.
Only where the undertaking knew, or ought to have known, when it participated in those concerted practices, that it was taking part in the single agreement, can its participation in those practices constitute the expression of its accession to that agreement.
(præmis 4027, 4109 og 4112)
(Paragraphs 4027, 4109, 4112)
Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, forbyder aftaler, som har til formål eller til følge at begrænse konkurrencen, og som kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstaterne, men der kræves ikke bevis for, at sådanne aftaler har påvirket denne handel mærkbart, hvilket i øvrigt i de fleste tilfælde vil være vanskeligt at godtgøre i fornødent omfang.
Moreover, in prohibiting agreements or concerted practices whose object or effect is to restrict competition and which are of such a nature as to affect trade between Member States, Article 85(1) of the Treaty does not require proof that such agreements or practices have in fact significantly affected trade between Member States, which, moreover, is difficult to establish to a sufficient legal standard in most cases. It requires that it be established that the agreement or practice was capable of having that effect.
Artiklen kræver derimod bevis for, at aftalen kan have en sådan virkning. Betingelsen om, at handelen mellem
Having regard to the method of establishing the infringement employed in the contested decision, under which, first, the participation of a party in a measure implementing the agreement constituted proof of its participation in that agreement and, second, the Commission had chosen to rely solely on specific documentary
(præmis 4270, 4281 og 4283)
(Paragraphs 4270, 4281 to 4283) by the Commission are free of error and compatible with the provisions and principles applicable in regard to fines, and in particular with the principle of non-discrimination.
Det er ønskeligt, at virksomhederne - på en måde, som Kommissionen finder hensigtsmæssig — kan få et detaljeret indblik i, hvorledes den bøde, der pålægges dem, er beregnet, således at de kan tage stilling med fuldt kendskab til sagen uden at være nødsaget til at anlægge sag til prøvelse af beslutningen. Dette gælder navnlig, når Kommissionen anvender detaljerede matematiske formler ved beregningen af bøderne.
The statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the Treaty (now Article 253 EC), which is an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of Article 173 thereof (now, after amendment, Article 230 EC), must be appropriate to the act at issue and must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent Community court to exercise its power of review.
I en sådan situation er det ønskeligt, at de berørte virksomheder, og i givet fald Retten, sættes i stand til at kontrollere, at den metode, Kommissionen har anvendt, og de skridt, den har taget under beregningen, ikke er behæftet med fejl og er forenelige med de bestemmelser og principper, der gælder for bøder, og navnlig med lighedsgrundsætningen.
The fact that an undertaking did not benefit from an infringement of the competition rules cannot preclude the imposition of a fine, since otherwise it would cease to have a deterrent effect.
I den forbindelse kan Retten anmode Kommissionen om en konkret redegørelse for de forskellige kriterier, den har anvendt og nævnt i den anfægtede beslutning, hvis Retten anser det for nødvendigt for bedømmelsen af parternes anbringender.
It follows that the Commission is not required, in order to fix fines, to establish that the infringement brought about an unlawful advantage for the undertakings concerned, nor to take into consideration any lack of profit from the infringement.
En sådan redegørelse er imidlertid ikke en supplerende og efterfølgende begrundelse for beslutningen, men det talmæssige udtryk for de i beslutningen angivne kriterier, såfremt disse selv kan kvantificeres.
An assessment of the unlawful gains from the infringement may be relevant if the Commission bases itself precisely on such gains in order to assess the gravity of the infringement and/or to calculate the fines.
Når der er tale om en beslutning om at pålægge flere virksomheder eller sammenslutninger bøder for overtrædelse af de fællesskabsretlige konkurrenceregler, skal begrundelsespligtens omfang navnlig fastlægges under hensyn til, at overtrædelsernes grovhed skal bedømmes på grundlag af en lang række forhold, herunder bl.a. sagens konkrete omstændigheder, den sammenhæng, den indgår i, og bødernes præventive virkning, idet disse forhold ikke udgør en bindende eller udtømmende liste over de kriterier, der er pligt til at inddrage.
The financial benefit which companies infringing the competition rules have derived from their infringements will become an increasingly important consideration. Wherever the Commission can ascertain the level of this illgotten gain, even if it cannot do so precisely, the calculation of the fine may have this as its starting point', does not mean that the Commission has now taken it upon itself to establish in every case, for the purpose of determining the fine, the financial advantage linked to the infringement found.
Ved fastsættelsen af bødens størrelse har Kommissionen endvidere et skøn, og den
It shows only its intention to take that factor more into account and to use it as a basis for calculating fines, where it is able to assess it, even if only approximately.
Det forhold, at en virksomhed ikke har opnået nogen vinding ved en overtrædelse af konkurrencereglerne, kan ikke være til hinder for, at der pålægges en bøde, idet bøderne ellers ville miste deres præventive virkning.
It is desirable that in order to enable undertakings to define their position in full knowledge of the facts they should be able to determine in detail, in accordance with such system as the Commission might consider appropriate, the method of calculating the fine imposed upon them, without their being obliged, in order to do so, to bring court proceedings against the decision.
Det følger heraf, at Kommissionen ikke ved fastsættelsen af bøderne er forpligtet til at føre bevis for, at overtrædelsen har skaffet de pågældende virksomheder en ulovlig fordel, eller i givet fald til at tage i betragtning, at der ikke blev opnået nogen vinding ved overtrædelsen.
That applies a fortiori where the Commission uses detailed arithmetical formulas to calculate the fines.
Det kan være relevant at vurdere den ulovlige fortjeneste ved overtrædelsen, når
In such a case it is desirable that the undertakings concerned and, if need be, the Court should be able to check that the method employed and the steps followed
Henvisningerne til denne omsætning og dette regnskabsår angår imidlertid kun den øvre grænse på 10% for den bøde, der kan pålægges.
Since the fine is imposed on that undertaking in its own name, it alone is liable for that fine.
Den nævnte bestemmelse i forordning nr. 17 indeholder ingen geografisk afgrænsning for den omsætning, Kommissionen kan tage i betragtning ved beregningen af bøden.
The fact that the burden of those fines might be shared out within the group headed by that undertaking is of no relevance from the point of view of the rules on the determination of fines.
Kommissionen kan derfor fastsætte bøden ud fra en omsætning opgjort efter dens nærmere bestemmelse med hensyn til det geografiske grundlag og de berørte produkter og i givet fald tage omsætningen i et tidligere regnskabsår i betragtning, under forudsætning af, at den bøde, der beregnes på grundlag heraf, ikke overstiger den nævnte grænse.
In competition proceedings, the Commission must, when fixing the amount of the fines, have regard to all the factors capable of affecting the assessment of the gravity of the infringements, such as the role played by each of the parties to those infringements and the threat that infringements of that type pose to the objectives of the Community.
(præmis 5009, 5022 og 5023)
(Paragraphs 4949, 4994)
Når Kommissionen kan bedømme størrelsen af denne uretmæssige fortjeneste, også selv om dette ikke kan ske præcist, kan bøden beregnes med dette som udgangspunkt.« Dette viser ikke, at Kommissionen har forpligtet sig til for fremtiden i alle tilfælde med henblik på bødeudmålingen at fastslå den økonomiske fordel ved den pågældende overtrædelse.
As regards the fixing of the amount of the fines in competition cases, the 'turnover in the preceding business year' referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 means the total turnover of each of the undertakings concerned achieved during the last full business year of each of those undertakings at the date of adoption of the contested decision.
Det er kun udtryk for, at Kommissionen har til hensigt i højere grad at tage hensyn til denne faktor og anvende den som udgangspunkt for beregningen af bøderne, for så vidt som den er i stand til at bedømme den, også selv om dette ikke kan ske præcist.
The references to that turnover and to that year are relevant only to the upper limit of the fine, 10%, which may be imposed.
Når en virksomhed, der har begået en overtrædelse af konkurrencereglerne, er det ledende selskab i en koncern, som udgør en økonomisk enhed, er det omsætningen for hele denne koncern, der skal tages i betragtning ved beregningen af virksomhedens bøde. Denne omsætning udgør den bedste indikator for den pågældendes økonomiske betydning på markedet.
If such an approach may mean that a particular undertaking must pay an amount in its national currency which is more or less than the amount it would have had to pay if the exchange rate in force on the date of adoption or notification of the contested decision had been applied, that is merely the logical result of fluctuations in the real value of the various national currencies.
(præmis 4949 og 4994)
(Paragraphs 5009, 5022 and 5023)
En sådan virksomhed kan ikke gøre gældende, at dens datterselskaber, der ikke er omtalt i den anfægtede beslutning, er blevet pålagt en bøde, idet deres omsætning er indgået i deres moderselskabs omsætning ved beregningen af den bøde, der er blevet pålagt dette.
The expenses incurred by an undertaking in providing and maintaining a bank guarantee in order to avoid the enforcement of a Commission decision against it are not expenses incurred for the purpose of the proceedings within the meaning of Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
Når bøden er pålagt denne virksomhed i eget navn, og virksomheden selv er adressat for den anfægtede beslutning, er det alene denne virksomhed, der er forpligtet til at betale den nævnte bøde.
Similarly, an undertaking's claim that the Commission should be ordered to reimburse the expenses incurred by it during the administrative procedure in competition proceedings must be dismissed.
Den omstændighed, at bøderne kan fordeles inden for den koncern, som virksomheden er det ledende selskab i, er ikke relevant i forhold til reglerne om udmåling af bøder.
Such an undertaking cannot claim that subsidiaries not mentioned in the contested decision were fined as a result of the incorporation of their turnover into that of their parent company for the purpose of calculating
(præmis 5133 og 5134)
(Paragraphs 5133 and 5134)
(præmis 5054 og 5056)
The Court held:
»1) SagT-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95-T-39/95, T-42/95-T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50195 - T-65/95, T-68/95 - T-71/95, T-87/95, T88/95, T-103/95 og T-104/95 forenes med henblik på domsafsigelsen.
Joins Cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95 for the purposes of judgment.
— Artikel 1 i Kommissionens beslutning 94/815/EF af 30. november 1994 om en procedure i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 85 (sag IV/33.126 og 33.322 - Cement) annulleres, for så vidt som det i bestemmelsen er fastslået, at sagsøgeren deltog i den heri omhandlede overtrædelse før den 9. juni 1986 og efter den 7. november 1988.
In Case T-25/95 Cimenteries CBR ν Commission: annuls Article 1 of Commission Decision 94/815/EC of 30 November 1994 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Cases IV/33.126 and 33.322 — Cement) in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before 9 June 1986 and after 7 November 1988; annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before 9 June 1986 and after 31 May 1987; annuls Article 4(2) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after 7 November 1988; annuls Article 4(3) (a) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement before 9 September 1986; annuls Article 4(4) (g) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; fixes the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by Article 9 of Decision 94/815 at EUR 1 711 000; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay one third of the costs incurred by the Commission; orders the Commission to bear two thirds of its own costs.
— Artikel 4, stk 1, i beslutning 94/815 annulleres, for så vidt som det i bestemmelsen er fastslået, at sagsøgeren deltog i den heri omhandlede overtrædelse før den 9. juni 1986 og efter den 31. maj 1987.
In Case T-26/95 Cembureau — Association Européenne du Ciment ν Commission: annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after 31 December 1988; annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of
— Artikel 2, stk 1, i beslutning 94/815 annulleres, for så vidt som det i bestemmelsen er fastslået, at der under møderne i eksekutivkomitéen i Cembureau — Association européenne du ciment forelå aftaler om udveksling af oplysninger om priser, og for så vidt som det i bestemmelsen er fastslået, at sagsøgeren deltog i den heri omhandlede overtrædelse efter den 19. marts 1984.
Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after 19 March 1984; annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between the applicant and its members related, so far as concerns Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, ofthat country's producer, annuls Article 4(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after 31 May 1987; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
— Artikel Ζ stk Ζ i beslutning 94/815 annulleres i forhold til sagsøgeren, for så vidt som det i bestemmelsen er fastslået, at den regelmæssige udveksling af oplysninger mellem sagsøgeren og sammenslutningens medlemmer for så vidt angår de belgiske og nederlandske priser vedrørte de to landes producenters minimumspriser for levering af cement i lastbiler og for så vidt angår Luxembourg vedrørte dette lands producents priser, inklusive rabat
In Case T-30/95 Fédération de l'Industrie Cimentière Belge ν Commission: annuls Article 1 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after 31 December 1988; annuls Article 2(1) of Decision 94/815 in so far as it finds that there were agreements on the exchange of price information at the meetings of the Executive Committee of Cembureau — The European Cement Association, and in so far as it finds that the applicant participated in the infringement after 19 March 1984; annuls Article 2(2) of Decision 94/815 as regards the applicant in so far as it finds that the periodic circulation of information between Cembureau — The European Cement Association and its members related, so far as concerns the Belgian and Netherlands prices, to those two countries' producers' minimum prices for supplies of cement by lorry and, so far as concerns Luxembourg, the prices, inclusive of rebates, of that country's producer, annuls Article 5 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; annuls Article 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as it concerns the applicant; dismisses the remainder of the application; orders each party to bear its own costs.
— I øvrigt frifindes Kommissionen.
In Case T-31/95 Eerste Nederlandse Cementindustrie (ENCI) ν Commission- annuls Articles 1, 5 and 9 of Decision 94/815 in so far as they concern the applicant;
— I øvrigt frifindes Kommissionen.
orders the Commission to pay the costs.