natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retten gør i præmis 118 på overbevisende måde rede for, hvorfor sagsøgerne faktisk ikke var ydet en effektiv domstolsbeskyttelse ved de nationale domstole. Det er svært at være uenig i denne konklusion (i lyset af, at de har ført sag ved de nationale domstole i mere end ti år).
The Court of First Instance explains cogently at paragraph 118 that the applicants did not, in fact, enjoy any effective judicial protection before the national courts; a conclusion with which (in the light of just over 10 years of litigation before the national courts) it is hard to disagree.
Det er imidlertid mindre sikkert, at dette ville have været lige så åbenbart, hvis de havde startet med at føre sag ved Retten i stedet for ved de nationale domstole.
However, it is not so clear that that would necessarily have been equally apparent had the litigation started in the Court of First Instance rather than in the national courts.
50 — Jf. generaladvokat Darmons bemærkninger i den beslægtede sammenhæng vedrørende forholdsmæssigheden af sanktionen i henhold til artikel 9, stk. 2, tredje afsnit, i forordning nr. 2499/82: »Man kan her ikke undgå at blive forvirret over forordningens mærkværdige blanding af udtrykkeligt fastsatte og forudsatte sanktioner, samt over denne sammenstilling af hovedforpligtelser og sekundære forpligtelser, hvis tilsidesættelse imødegåes med lige strenge sanktioner, bestående i en fortabelse af hele støttebeløbet […]« (punkt 27 i forslaget til afgørelse i Lingenfelser-sagen, nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 9).
50 — See the comments of Advocate General Darmon in the related context of the proportionality of the penalty imposed by the third subparagraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 2499/82: ‘It is hard not to feel confused when confronted with this peculiar mixture of penalties expressly prescribed and penalties which have to be implied, and with the juxtaposition of principal and ancillary obligations, both of which are penalised with equal severity through total forfeiture of aid …’ (point 27 of the Opinion in Lingenfelser, cited in note 9).
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT SHARPSTON — SAG C-51/05 P var tidspunktet, hvor de »skadevoldende følger [af lakunen i fællesskabsretsakten havde] vist sig«.
OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-51/05 P the point at which ‘all the injurious effects of the [lacuna in the Community] measure [were] produced’.
På denne baggrund kan jeg fuldt ud tilslutte mig Rettens løsning, i hvert fald hvad angår de fire indstævnte, som appellerede Tribunale civile di Romas dom 51.
With that gloss, I fully endorse the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance, at least with regard to the four applicants who appealed against the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma. 51
Såfremt Domstolen — som en alternativ løsning — er villig til at overveje muligheden for i særlige tilfælde at tage hensyn til subjektive elementer, frembyder denne sag for mig at se stærke paralleller til sagen Adams mod Kommissionen 52 og giver lige så gode grunde til at inddrage subjektive elementer, som sidstnævnte sag gjorde.
If, in the alternative, the Court is prepared to contemplate the possibility, in an exceptional case, of taking account of a subjective element, it seems to me that there are strong parallels with Adams; 52and that the reasons for accommodating a subjective element are as strong here as they were there.
ville have vurderet den objektive situation.
observing the situation, would have supposed the objective situation to be.
Objektivt set ville en sådan udenforstående beskuer, i lyset af fællesskabslovgivningen, det aftalelignende forhold mellem AIMA og vinproducenterne, det forhold, at vinproducenterne havde opfyldt deres forpligtelser, og det åbenbare formål med fællesskabslovgivningen, således som dette kommer til udtryk i betragtningerne til forordning nr. 2499/82, nok have antaget, at den rette fremgangsmåde med henblik på erstatning ville være at anlægge sag ved den nationale ret for at opnå betaling af fællesskabsstøtten, efter al sandsynlighed med en forelæggelse for Domstolen i medfør af artikel 234 EF.
Objectively, looking at the Community legislation, the quasi-contractual relations between AIMA and the wine producers, the fact that the wine producers had complied with their obligations and the apparent purpose of the Community legislation as expressed in the recitals to Regulation No 2499/82, it seems to me that such a bystander would have supposed that the proper course of redress was by way of proceedings before the national court to obtain payment of the Community aid with, in all probability, a reference under Article 234 EC.
Sådanne betalinger foretages almindeligvis på nationalt plan, og kravet om betaling gøres (om nødvendigt) gældende for de nationale domstole, idet medlemsstaten efterfølgende aflægger regnskab over for Fællesskabet via proceduren for afslutning af EUGFL’s regnskaber.
Such payments are generically made at national level, and are claimed (if necessary) via national proceedings, with the Member State then accounting to the Community through the procedure for the clearance of EAGGF accounts.
Jeg har svært ved at indse, at en fornuftig, udenforstående beskuer med et objektivt blik på situationen i 1983 ville have konkluderet, at vinproducenterne burde anlægge erstatningssøgsmål mod Kommissionen.
I find it difficult to accept the idea that a reasonable bystander, viewing the situation objectively, would have jumped to the conclusion in 1983 that the wine producers should launch a damages claim against the Commission.
Lige som sagen Adams mod Kommissionen er den foreliggende sag — af de grunde, som Retten har anført — helt særlig.
The present case, like Adams, is, for the reasons given by the Court of First Instance, an exceptional case.
I sagen Adams mod Kommissionen havde sagsøgeren, Stanley George Adams, underrettet Kommissionen om en række konkurrencestridige forhold fra sin arbejdsgivers side, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG (herefter »Roche«). Han anlagde efterfølgende sag mod Kommissionen med påstand om, at denne skulle erstatte ham det tab, som han mente at have lidt ved retsstridige 51 — Jf. punkt 30 og 32 ovenfor og punkt 107 nedenfor.52 — Nævnt ovenfor i fodnote 34.
In Adams, the applicant had notified the Commission of anti-competitive practices engaged in by his employer Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG (‘Roche’). He subsequently brought an action against the Commission for compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of wrongful acts or omissions on its part which led to his arrest, detention and conviction in Switzerland for 51 — See points 30 and 32 above and 107 below.52 — Cited in footnote 34.
Hvis vi i stedet anvender kriteriet (således som fastsat af Kommissionen) om, at »forældelsesfristen først kan begynde at løbe, når retsaktens skadevoldende følger har vist sig, og følgelig ikke førend det tidspunkt, hvor der var vished for, at sagsøgerne havde lidt et tab«, mener jeg, at en sådan udenforstående ville have sagt, at der i juni 1983 måske nok kan have været klarhed om den generelle karakter af det tab, som sagsøgerne sandsynligvis ville lide, hvis de ikke fik udbetalt fællesskabsstøtten, men ikke om tabets uundgåelige karakter.
Rather, applying the test (as set out by the Commission) that ‘the limitation period cannot begin to run before all the injurious effects of the measure have been produced and consequently before the time when the applicants were bound to incur damage which was certain in character’, I consider that such a bystander would have said that, although the general nature of the damage that the applicants were likely to suffer if they were not paid the Community aid might be obvious in June 1983, its unavoidable nature was not.
Der var først »vished for, at de indstævnte havde lidt et tab«, da det stod objektivt klart, at de nationale sager ikke ville føre til, at de fik udbetalt støtten. Dette
The applicants were ‘bound to incur damage which was certain in nature’ only when it became objectively clear that proceedings before the national court would not result in their receiving the aid.
Domstolen lagde til grund, at Kommissionen — efter at den havde haft besøg af Roches advokat den 8. november 1974 — i så tilstrækkelig grad var bevidst om omfanget af den risiko, som den havde udsat Stanley George Adams for ved sin tidligere adfærd 53, at det var ansvarspådragende.
The Court found that, following a visit by Roche’s lawyer to the Commission on 8 November 1974, the Commission’s knowledge of the gravity of the risk to which it had exposed Mr Adams by its earlier conduct 53was sufficient to give rise to liability.
Kommissionen havde, ved ikke at have foretaget det fornødne for at meddele Stanley George Adams de oplysninger, som den sad inde med efter dette besøg, pådraget sig ansvar over for ham for den skade, som han havde lidt ved at blive identificeret.
By failing to make all reasonable efforts to pass on to Mr Adams the information available to it following that visit, the Commission incurred liability towards him in respect of the damage which was likely to result from the discovery of his identity.
gøres gældende over for skadelidte, der først på et senere tidspunkt har fået kendskab til det forhold, der er årsag til skaden, og derfor ikke inden forældelsesfristens udløb har haft rimelig tid til at indgive sin stævning til Domstolen eller gøre sit krav gældende over for vedkommende institution.
of the limitation cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to it and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to submit his application to the Court or to the relevant institution before the expiry of the limitation period.
I dette tilfælde bør der henvises til det af Domstolen antagne vedrørende erstatningsansvaret, hvorefter Fællesskabet har pådraget sig ansvar som følge af, at Kommissionen ikke søgte at informere og konsultere sagsøgeren efter [besøget af Roches advokat] den 8. november 1974.
In this case it must be borne in mind that the Court has based its conclusion in regard to the Community’s liability on the fact that the Commission had not attempted to inform and to consult the applicant following [Roche’s lawyer’s] visit of 8 November 1974.
Det fremgår af sagen, at sagsøgeren først har kunnet få kendskab til dette forhold i forbindelse med sagens behandling, idet [advokatens] besøg første gang nævnes i Kommissionens svarskrift.
It is clear from the information before the Court that the applicant could not have become aware of that fact until the preparatory inquiry in these proceedings, since [Roche’s lawyer’s] visit was mentioned for the first time in the Commission’s defence.
Sagsøgeren har derfor ikke haft mulighed for på dette grundlag at gøre ansvar gældende mod Fællesskabet inden det tidspunkt, på hvilket forældelsesfristen normalt ville udløbe« 54.
Therefore, he could not have sought to establish the Community’s liability on that basis before the normal date of expiry of the limitation period’. 54
Kommissionen gjorde gældende, at søgsmålet var forældet i henhold til artikel 43 i statutten for Domstolen, der var forgængeren til den nuværende artikel 46.
The Commission argued that it was timebarred by virtue of Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the predecessor to the present Article 46.
Stanley George Adams gjorde gældende, at han først havde fået kendskab til de omhandlede omstændigheder i 1980, efter at hans nye advokat havde haft lejlighed til at sætte sig ind i straffesagens akter.
Mr Adams argued that the events had not become known to him until 1980, when his new lawyer had had the opportunity to study the documents relating to the criminal proceedings.
Han havde ikke troet på oplysningerne fra det schweiziske politi og havde ikke kunnet læse de schweiziske domme, der var affattet på tysk.
He had not believed the information supplied by the Swiss police and had been unable to read the Swiss judgments which were in German.
Han havde under alle omstændigheder ikke haft mulighed for at få kendskab til Roches advokats besøg i Kommissionen den 8. november 1974.
Nor could he possibly have known of the events relating to the visit by Roche’s lawyer to the Commission on 8 November 1974.
Domstolen fastslog, at artikel 43 »skal fortolkes således, at forældelsen ikke kan
The Court stated that Article 43 ‘must be interpreted as meaning that the expiry
Sagen Adams mod Kommissionen adskiller sig naturligvis i flere henseender fra den foreliggende sag, således som Kommissionen også indirekte antyder (jeg må dog indrømme, at jeg ikke helt forstår Kommissionens argument om, at dommen i sagen ikke vedrører forældelsesfristens begyndelsestidspunkt, men dens udløb, idet dette er jo to sider af samme sag).
Adams is, of course, and as Commission implicitly argues, distinguishable in various respects from the present case (although I confess to some puzzlement over the Commission’s argument that it concerns not the determination of when time starts to run but rather when the limitation period expires, since the one surely depends on the other).
Dommen viser imidlertid, at Domstolen er villig til at fravige den normale anvendelse af forældelsesreglerne i særlige tilfælde.
It does, however, demonstrate that the Court is prepared to depart from the normal application of the rules of prescription in an exceptional case.
I sådanne sjældne, helt særlige tilfælde mener jeg, at det kan være nødvendigt at være mere åben over for at anvende disse regler på en måde, som kan forhindre, at forældelsesindsigelsen kan gøres gældende i situationer, hvor dette vil være åbenbart urimeligt.
In such rare, exceptional cases I consider that it may be necessary to approach those rules more sympathetically in order to prevent prescription from being relied on as a defence in circumstances where that would be manifestly unjust.
53 — Kommissionen havde givet personalet i Roche retoucherede fotokopier af direktionsskrivelser, som Stanley George Adams havde overladt den. Herved havde Roche fået mulighed for at identificere ham som hovedmistænkt i den anmeldelse, selskabet havde indgivet til den schweiziske anklagemyndighed, og det var derfor denne dokumentovergivelse, der var årsag til hans anholdelse, ligesom den også gav politiet og de schweiziske myndigheder vigtige beviser mod ham.
53 — Namely, handing over to Roche staff edited photocopies of memoranda supplied to it by Mr Adams which had enabled Roche to identify him as the main suspect in the complaint that it had lodged with the Swiss Public Prosecutor’s Office, and which had therefore led to his arrest and supplied the police and the Swiss courts with substantial evidence against him.
For den femte indstævntes vedkommende må fristen i overensstemmelse med ovenstående gennemgang være begyndt at løbe på datoen for Tribunale civile di Romas dom, dvs. den 27. januar 1989.
With regard to the fifth applicant, the analysis I have proposed above leads to the conclusion that time began to run on the date of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma, that is to say on 27 January 1989.
Vedkommendes erstatningskrav mod Kommissionen er følgelig forældet.
The fifth applicant’s action against the Commission is accordingly timebarred.
Resultatet kan kun blive et andet, hvis Domstolen skulle finde, at det — som i sagen Adams mod Kommissionen — under hensyn til sagens særlige omstændigheder bør bestemmes, at forældelsesfristen i statuttens artikel 46 ikke skal finde anvendelse på nogen af de indstævnte.
That would be otherwise only if the Court were to take the view that, as in Adams, it would in the exceptional circumstances of the present case be appropriate for it essentially to rule that the timelimit laid down in Article 46 of the Statute is inapplicable to any of the applicants.
I den foreliggende sag traf de indstævnte en beslutning, som på det givne tidspunkt og i den givne sammenhæng var fornuftig, nemlig at indtræde i den sag, som DAI havde anlagt mod Assedile og AIMA ved Tribunale civile di Roma i september 1984.
In the present case, the applicants took the decision, entirely reasonably at the time and in the context, to intervene in the proceedings brought by DAI against Assedile and AIMA in September 1984 before the Tribunale civile di Roma.
De indstævnte havde ingen mulighed for at påvirke varigheden af denne sag.
The duration of those proceedings was not, and could not have been, within the applicants’ control.
Tribunale civile di Roma afviste at forelægge Domstolen et præjudicielt spørgsmål. Havde den gjort dette, ville spørgsmålet være blevet afgjort på dette tidspunkt.
That court refused to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.
I forbindelse med en sådan præjudiciel sag ville Domstolen have undersøgt systematikken i forordning nr. 2499/82, og herved ville den have afsløret lakunen i denne (således som Retten efterfølgende gjorde), nemlig det forhold, at hvis en medlemsstat valgte én af de to muligheder for udbetaling af støtten, ville midler, der var øremærket til producenterne som de endelige støttemodtager, under omstændigheder som i den foreliggende sag blive tilbageført til Fællesskabet og ikke udbetalt til producenterne.
In the context of such a reference, the Court would necessarily have reviewed the structure of Regulation No 2499/82. In so doing, it would have identified the lacuna in that regulation (as the Court of First Instance subsequently did), namely that if a Member State took one of the two available options for channelling aid, funds earmarked for the producers as ultimate recipients would in circumstances such as those of the present case be refunded to the Community rather than paid to the producers.
For fuldstændighedens skyld skal jeg tilføje, at de indstævnte efterfølgende anlagde sag mod AIMA ved en national ret med påstand om, at organet havde opnået en ugrundet berigelse 56.
For the sake of completeness, I should add that the applicants subsequently brought an action against AIMA before the national courts for unjust enrichment.
Som de indstævnte selv indså, efter at de havde henvendt sig til Kommissionen og blevet bekendt med, at den sikkerhed, som Assedile havde stillet, var blevet overført af AIMA til Kommissionen og regnskabsført til fordel for EUGFL 57, ville de heller ikke få medhold i denne påstand: AIMA havde ikke opnået en ugrundet berigelse.
56 As the applicants themselves realised, once they had approached the Commission and ascertained that the funds derived from the Assedile security had been transferred by AIMA to the Commission and credited to the EAGGF account, 57 that claim was also bound to fail: there had been no unjust enrichment of AIMA.
Det kan herved hævdes, at det først var på dette tidspunkt, at det sidste spinkle håb om medhold ved de nationale instanser brast.
An argument could be made out for saying that it was only at that point that the last, flickering hope of success via the national courts was extinguished.
Det er efter min mening dog hverken nødvendigt eller rimeligt at gå så vidt.
I do not think it necessary or appropriate to go that far.
Eftersom en sådan forelæggelse og efterprøvelse ikke blev foretaget, var det imidlertid først, da der blev truffet endelig afgørelse i den nationale sag (med Corte di cassaziones dom af 28.11.1994), at de fire af de fem indstævnte, som havde appelleret Tribunale civile di Romas dom 55, blev klar over, at det ikke ville lykkes dem at opnå betaling af den fællesskabsstøtte, som de havde ret til, via de nationale domstole.
In the absence of a reference leading to such a review, however, it was only at the final conclusion of the national proceedings (the judgment of the Corte di Cassazione of 28 November 1994) that those four out of the five applicants who had appealed against the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma 55knew that their attempt to obtain payment of the Community aid that was rightfully theirs through the national courts could not succeed.
Efter min opfattelse må forældelsesfristen i henhold til statuttens artikel 46 antages at være begyndt at løbe på dette tidspunkt.
That seems to me to be the appropriate point to hold that time had begun to run for the purposes of Article 46 of the Statute.
56 — Den 16.2.1996, jf. præmis 38 i Rettens dom, nævnt ovenfor i punkt 34.
56 — On 16 February 1996: see paragraph 38 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, mentioned above at point 34.
55 — Jf. punkt 30 og 32 ovenfor.
55 — See points 30 and 32 above.
Jeg mener derfor, at det objektivt set var nederlaget ved Corte di cassazione, som satte punktum for enhver realistisk chance for de indstævnte om at få medhold ved de nationale domstole 58.
It therefore seems to me that, objectively, the failure of the appeal to the Corte di Cassazione spelled the end of any realistic chance that the applicants could succeed before the national courts.
Det følger heraf, at det var på dette tidspunkt, at der måtte antages at være »vished« for tabet.
58It follows that that was when the damage suffered could be regarded as ‘certain’.
Tabet var da både umiddelbart forestående og påregneligt, selv om det endnu ikke kunne opgøres nøjagtigt 59.
At that point, the damage was indeed both imminent and foreseeable, even if it could not yet be accurately determined. 59
Hvis vinproducenterne i det foreliggende tilfælde fra begyndelsen havde anlagt sag mod Kommissionen, ville denne højst sandsynligt have indvendt, at det rette forum var de nationale domstole, både fordi fællesskabsstøtte inden for landbrugssektoren normalt udbetales gennem det nationale interventionsorgan, og fordi der var indledt konkursbehandling på nationalt plan.
Here, if the applicants had brought a claim against the Commission at the outset it is highly likely that the Commission would have taken the view that the correct forum was the national court, both because Community aid in the agricultural sector is normally paid via the national intervention board and because national insolvency proceedings were under way.
Jeg finder det i denne forbindelse betegnende, at Kommissionen selv under sagen for Retten fortsat hævdede, at der forelå effektive retsmidler for de indstævnte ved de nationale domstole.
In that context, I find it significant that, even in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, the Commission continued to argue that national procedures did provide the applicants with an effective remedy.
Denne praksis er imidlertid ikke udviklet på grundlag af omstændigheder som i foreliggende sag, der ligger i et kritisk område mellem den nationale retsorden og fællesskabsretsordenen.
That caselaw was not, however, developed in the context of circumstances such as those giving rise to the present case, where the situation falls uncomfortably between the national and Community legal systems.
I den hidtidige retspraksis har det grundlæggende spørgsmål om valget mellem de nationale eller Fællesskabets retsinstanser som rette forum nemlig ikke været behandlet.
In the caselaw to date, in contrast, the basic problem of determining which of those systems was the appropriate forum for proceedings was not at issue.
Hvis forældelsesindsigelsen tages til følge i den foreliggende sag, vil konsekvensen være, at de indstævnte bliver frataget muligheden for at anlægge sag og dermed adgangen til domstolsprøvelse. Dette ville være i strid med det grundlæggende princip om, at fællesskabsretten skal sikre de personer, som den tillægger rettigheder, en effektiv retsbeskyttelse.
If the prescription defence were to succeed in the present case, the result would be to deny the applicants access to the courts and hence to justice.
Vinproducenterne er personer, som har ret til at modtage fællesskabsstøtte for den vin, de leverede til DAI til destillation, og som har mistet de pågældende beløb på grund af en lakune i forordning nr. 2499/82, som Kommissionen ifølge Rettens dom er ansvarlig for.
The applicants are persons who are entitled to receive payment of Community aid in respect of the wine that they sent to DAI for distillation and who have been deprived of their money through a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82 for which the Court of First Instance has held the Commission responsible.
Kommissionen har ikke anfægtet Rettens dom hvad angår realiteten.
There is no challenge before the Court on the merits.