natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
37 — Dom af 11.6.2002, sag T-365/00, AICS mod Parlamentet, Sml. II, s. 2719, præmis 79, og af 17.3.2005, sag T-160/03, AFCon Management Consultants m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. II, s. 981, præmis 112-114.
37 — Case T-365/00 AICS v Parliament [2002] ECR II-2719, paragraph 79, and Case T-160/03 AFCon Management Consultants and Others v Commission [2005] ECR II-981, paragraphs 112 to 114.
Når en ansøger til en stilling eller en budgiver udelukkes fra retten til at deltage som følge af en fejl begået af Kommissionen, afslår Domstolen generelt at yde erstatning for den fortabte mulighed, som dette medfører for den pågældende. Grunden hertil er, at den pågældende ikke har ret til eller en berettiget forventning om at få tildelt stillingen eller kontrakten.
Accordingly, in his view, where an applicant for a post or a tenderer for a contract is excluded from entitlement to compete because of an error on the part of the Community, a court refuses to compensate for the loss of opportunity which results from this for the person concerned because the person concerned cannot count on any right or legitimate expectation that he will obtain the post or contract in question.
I dette tilfælde er det materielle tab, der skyldes de manglende indtægter, som tildeling af stillingen eller af kontrakten ville have medført, for usikkert til, at der kan udbetales erstatning.
The material damage resulting from loss of the profits which would have resulted from obtaining the post or contract appears too uncertain to be deemed to be damage for which reparation may be granted.
Skønt Domstolen ophævede Rettens dom i denne sag, var den imidlertid ikke foranlediget til at afgøre problematikken vedrørende en fortabt mulighed.
Although the Court set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance in that case, it nonetheless did not have to rule on the issue of the loss of an opportunity.
38 — Præmis 44 og 46.
38 — Case T-230/94 Farrugia v Commission [1996] ECR II-195, paragraphs 44 and 46.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-348/06 P for at være af økonomisk art, synes at være blevet bekræftet i Domstolens appelafgørelse i sagen Rådet mod de Nil og Impens.
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-348/06 P confirmed, on appeal, by the Court in its judgment in Council v De Nil and Impens.
Retten har i disse sager undertiden uklart fastslået, at der her forelå ikkeøkonomisk skade 40 og/eller økonomisk skade 41, og for så vidt angår beregnings- grundlaget for erstatningen anvendt enten en metode beroende på lønforskellen 42 eller tildelt en godtgørelse efter ret og billighed 43.
41 nonmaterial and/or material in nature, by using, in respect of the method for calculating the damage, either a method based on the earnings differential, 42or a method of reparation ex aequo et bono. 43
At en skade forvoldt på grund af en fortabt mulighed for karrierefremgang anses
The material nature of damage suffered because of the loss of an opportunity for career development seems to have been
Retten i Første Instans har i præmis 47 i dom af 26. juni 1996, de Nil og Impens mod Rådet 44, fastslået, at sagsøgerne havde godtgjort, at de var berettiget til erstatning for det tab, der beroede på, at de ikke var blevet omplaceret til kategori B samtidig med de øvrige beståede ansøgere i en intern udvælgelsesprøve afholdt af Rådet for Den Europæiske Union, for så vidt som de, skønt de ikke var berettiget til forfremmelse efter deres omplacering, under alle omstændigheder havde fortabt muligheden for den samme karrierefremgang som de beståede ansøgere i nævnte udvælgelsesprøve.
At first instance, the Court of First Instance took the view, in paragraph 47 of De Nil and Impens v Council, 44that the applicants had established the existence of a right to compensation for the damage resulting from the fact that they had not been reclassified in Category B at the same time as the other successful candidates in an internal competition organised by the Council of the European Union, insofar as, even though they were not entitled to promotion after their reclassification, they had, in any event, lost an opportunity of seeing their careers develop in the future in a manner comparable to the careers of the candidates who were successful in that competition.
Foruden dette økonomiske tab gav Retten sagsøgerne medhold i deres påstand om erstatning for ikkeøkonomisk skade, som var forvoldt på grund af den langvarige usikkerhed, de havde befundet sig i, for så vidt angår deres fremtidige karriere.
In addition to that material damage, the Court of First Instance upheld the applicants’ claim for compensation of the nonmaterial damage suffered by the applicants linked to the state of prolonged uncertainty in which they found themselves as regards the development of their careers.
Retten fastsatte derfor efter ret og billighed deres samlede erstatning for den økonomiske og ikke-økonomiske skade til 500 000 belgiske francs (BEF).
It therefore evaluated, ex aequo et bono, the combined material and nonmaterial damage at BEF 500 000.
40 — Dommen i sagen Moat mod Kommissionen, præmis 44-48, og dommen af 31.1.2007, C mod Kommissionen, præmis 70.
40 — Moat v Commission, paragraphs 44 to 48, and Case T-166/04 C v Commission, paragraph 70.
Dommen af 27.10.1994, C mod Kommissionen, som tilsyneladende henhører under denne kategori, eftersom Retten gav sagsøgeren medhold i sin påstand om erstatning for ikkeøkonomisk skade, frembyder dog en vis uklarhed for så vidt som Retten dels ikke udtrykkeligt har angivet karakteren af den skade, den erstattede, dels tildelte et beløb for ikkeøkonomisk skade, der var højere end påstået af sagsøgeren, men samtidig forkastede erstatningspåstanden om økonomisk skade for fortabt mulighed for ansættelse, hvilket beløb var baseret på forskellen i den formente løn og den reelt oppebårne løn, således at det kan udledes, at Retten har foretaget en samlet vurdering af disse to skader.
Case T-47/93 C v Commission, which seems to fall within this category since the Court of First Instance upheld the claim for compensation of the nonmaterial damage suffered by the applicant, nevertheless is somewhat ambiguous insofar as, on the one hand, the Court of First Instance did not expressly indicate the nature of the damage for which it was awarding compensation and, on the other hand, it awarded an amount in respect of nonmaterial damage higher than that claimed by the applicant, while dismissing the claim for compensation in respect of the material damage of loss of opportunity to be recruited based on the difference between the anticipated earnings and those actually received, with the result that it is possible to infer from this that the Court of First Instance carried out an overall assessment of the two forms of damage.
Jf. ligeledes dommen i sagen Allo mod Kommissionen, præmis 73, som den appellerede dom, præmis 56, henfører til de sager, hvori Retten har erkendt, at der forelå en økonomisk skade for et tab forvoldt på grund af en fortabt mulighed, idet den i denne sag modsat i de øvrige nævnte domme fastslog, at den påståede skade ikke var blevet godtgjort.
See, also, Case T-386/94 Allo v Commission [1996] ECR-SC I-A-393 and II-1161, paragraph 73, which the judgment under appeal classes among the cases which have acknowledged that the damage suffered on account of the loss of an opportunity is material in nature, the Court of First Instance having, in that case and in contrast to the other judgments cited above, found that the alleged damage had not been established.
Rådet appellerede denne sag til Domstolen, som ophævede Rettens dom for så vidt som Retten havde tilkendt sagsøgerne
On an appeal brought by the Council, the Court set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance inasmuch as it held that the
42 — Jf. dommen i sagen Eagle m.fl. mod Kommissionen, præmis 163, og i sagen Sanders m.fl. mod Kommissionen, præmis 166.
42 — See, Eagle and Others v Commission, paragraph 163, and Sanders and Others v Commission, paragraph 166.
43 — Jf. dommen i sagen Moat mod Kommissionen, præmis 49, dommen af 27.10.1994, C. mod Kommissionen, præmis 55, dommen i sagen Bories m.fl. mod Kommissionen, præmis 194-204, og dommen af 31.1.2007, C mod Kommissionen, præmis 79.
43 — See Moat v Commission, paragraph 49; Case T-47/93 C v Commission, paragraph 55; Bories and Others v Commission, paragraphs 194 to 204; and Case T-166/04 C v Commission, paragraph 79.
I-A, s. 327, og II, s. 959.
ECR-SC I-A-327 and II-959.
KOMMISSIONEN MOD GIRARDOT bemærkninger over for Rettens praksis, at den skade, som følger af et sådant tab, er af økonomisk karakter, således som det er fastslået i den appellerede doms præmis 56.
‘accepts the idea’, in spite of some critical remarks regarding the caselaw of the Court of First Instance, that the damage resulting from such a loss is of a material nature, as stated in paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal.
Domstolen fastslog, at tvisten på dette punkt var moden til påkendelse og forkastede sagsøgernes påstand om godtgørelse for ikkeøkonomisk skade.
Finding that, on that issue, the state of the proceedings so permitted, the Court dismissed the applicants’ claim concerning compensation for the non-mater - ial damage.
Domstolen forkastede derimod den af Rådet fremsatte kritik vedrørende Rettens anerkendelse af, at der forelå økonomisk skade.
However, the Court rejected the Council’s criticisms of the Court of First Instance’s acknowledgment of the existence of material damage.
Domstolen fastslog i præmis 28 i dommen i sagen Rådet mod de Nil og Impens og under udtrykkelig henvisning til nævnte præmis 47 i Rettens dom, at »det ikke på forhånd kan udelukkes, at de tjenestemænd, der ikke bestod [den pågældende] udvælgelsesprøve […], og som i lighed med sagsøgerne bestod den anden udvælgelsesprøve […], har lidt et økonomisk tab, som består i, at de ikke har haft udsigt til et fremtidigt karriereforløb svarende til karrieren for de ansøgere, der havde bestået den [pågældende] udvælgelsesprøve, hvilket var en følge af, at deres indplacering ikke kunne ændres med virkning fra den 1. januar 1991«.
Accordingly, it ruled, in paragraph 28 of the judgment and with express reference to the abovementioned paragraph 47 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, that ‘it cannot in principle be excluded that the officials who failed in the … Competition [in question] and, like the applicants, were successful in the second Competition … suffered material damage consisting in the fact that they lost the opportunity of seeing their careers develop in the future in a manner comparable to the careers of the candidates who were successful in [the] Competition [in question], owing to the impossibility of reclassifying them from 1 January 1991’.
Kommissionen har anført, at en kvantificering af fortabt mulighed ved anvendelse af forskellen mellem den løn, som den pågældende ville have oppebåret, hvis han var blevet ansat, og den, som han oppebærer, indebærer en denaturering af begrebet fortabt mulighed.
It points out that, by quantifying the loss of opportunity as the difference between the earnings which the person concerned would have received if she had been recruited and those that she actually obtained, the Court of First Instance distorted the notion of loss of opportunity.
Den metode, som Retten har anvendt, og som er baseret på forskel i løn, indebærer nemlig ifølge Kommissionen, at der fastsættes en teoretisk skade og ydes godtgørelse for tab af en sikker ansættelse og ikke fortabt mulighed for at opnå en stilling.
The method used by the Court of First Instance, which is based on the earnings differential, amounts, in effect, in the Commission’s view, to assessing hypothetical damage and to making good the loss of a guarantee and not an opportunity of obtaining a post.
Kommissionen har under retsmødet ligeledes anført, at den nødvendige årsagssammenhæng mellem ulovligheden og den lidte skade ikke opfylder et af kravene i retspraksis, nemlig kravet om, at der skal foreligge en direkte årsagssammenhæng mellem den begåede ulovlighed og skaden.
At the hearing, the Commission also stated that the required causal link between the unlawful act and the damage suffered failed to satisfy one of the conditions laid down in the case-law, namely that there should be a direct causal link between the unlawful act committed and the damage.
Jeg har ingen indvendinger mod at anvende samme vurdering for så vidt angår tab af mulighed for ansættelse i denne sag 45.
I cannot think of any objection to carrying out a similar assessment concerning the loss of an opportunity to be recruited, such as that at issue in this case.
Jeg skal desuden anføre, at Kommissionen i sin appel ikke bestrider, at en fortabt mulighed for ansættelse kan godtgøres og »accepterer den idé«, trods flere kritiske
45 Moreover, it should be pointed out that, in the main appeal, the Commission does not dispute that the loss of an opportunity of being recruited may be compensated for and
45 — Jeg skal herved anføre, at Domstolen i dom af 5.4.1973, sag 11/72, Giordano mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 417, præmis 8 og 9, forkastede sagsøgerens erstatningspåstand for lidt økonomisk skade på grund af fortabelse af en betydelig mulighed for ansættelse, ikke fordi et sådant tab var irrelevant i en tvist om ansvar uden for kontraktforhold, men alene fordi sagsøgeren ikke havde frembragt noget bevis for hans reelle mulighed for ansættelse.
45 — I would point out, in that regard, that in Case 11/72 Giordiano v Commission [1973] ECR 417, paragraphs 8 and 9, the Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation for the alleged material damage suffered as a result of the loss of a real chance of being appointed not because such damage is not relevant in disputes concerning noncontractual liability, but simply because the applicant had failed to adduce proof as to the reality of his chance of recruitment.
Inden jeg skal bedømme, om dette argument er begrundet, består der, som klargjort af Marie-Claude Girardot (jf. punkt 41 i nærværende forslag til afgørelse), tvivl om,
Before assessing the merits of that view, the line of argument put forward by the Commission raises, as was made apparent by Ms Girardot (see point 41 above), the
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-348/06 P hvorvidt den af Kommissionen fremførte argumentation kan fremmes til realitetsbehandling, hvorfor jeg først skal behandle dette spørgsmål.
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-348/06 P preliminary issue of its admissibility, a question which it is now appropriate to consider.
Kommissionen har herom anført, at den ønsker at Domstolen træffer afgørelse vedrørende den beregningsmetode, der er anvendt i den appellerede dom med henblik på fastsættelsen af det forvoldte tab ved den fortabte mulighed.
Indeed, on the one hand, the Commission explains therein that it requests the Court to rule on the method of calculation used in the judgment under appeal to make good the damage caused by the loss of an opportunity.
Men ud fra den anførte retspraksis må disse klagepunkter enten afvises eller, som Domstolen allerede har fastslået 48, omformuleres, således at de omhandler en manglende eller endog tilstrækkelig begrundelse af den appellerede dom med hensyn til de kriterier, der er lagt til grund ved fastsættelsen af erstatningen, således at disse klagepunkter kan have den effektive virkning.
However, in the light of the caselaw cited, those pleas in the main appeal should either be declared inadmissible or, as the Court has already had occasion to do, 48be reclassified as alleging the absence or inadequacy of the statement of reasons in the judgment under appeal as regards the criteria taken into account in determining the compensation for the damage, in order to render those grounds of appeal meaningful.
Kommissionen har imidlertid ikke alene bestridt omfanget af godtgørelsen, men efter min mening også under sit appelanbringende fremhævet en ren praktisk fejl, som den appellerede dom angiveligt også er behæftet med.
Nonetheless, and on the other hand, the Commission does not confine itself to challenging the extent of the compensation for the damage, but identifies, in my view, in its single plea in support of its claims, a genuine error of law which allegedly renders the judgment under appeal unlawful.
Indledningsvis skal jeg bemærke, at det fremgår af retspraksis, at Retten, når den har fastslået, at der foreligger en skade, alene har kompetence til, inden for rammerne af den nedlagte påstand, at fastslå, hvorledes og i hvilket omfang nævnte skade skal erstattes 46.
As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, once the Court of First Instance has found the existence of damage, it alone has jurisdiction to assess, within the confines of the claim, the method and extent of compensation for that damage.
Domstolen har dog fastslået, at for at den kan udøve sin juridiske prøvelse af Rettens domme, skal disse være tilstrækkeligt begrundet og navnlig indeholde en angivelse af de kriterier, der er lagt til grund ved fastsættelsen af erstatningsbeløbet 47.
46The Court has nonetheless stated that in order for it to be able to review the judgments of the Court of First Instance, those judgments must state sufficient reasons and, in particular, set out the criteria taken into account for the purposes of determining the amount selected. 47
I denne sag er den kritik, der er rettet mod den appellerede dom, ikke ganske klar.
In the present case, the main appeal certainly contains some ambiguities as to the criticisms it contains of the judgment under appeal.
Kommissionen har nemlig, uden at den anfægter — eller kan anfægte — den pågældende konstatering, der er foretaget i mellemdommen, om forekomsten af et tab forvoldt af den begåede ulovlighed, hovedsageligt anført, at den godtgørelse, som Retten har fastsat i den appellerede dom, ikke er en godtgørelse for den skade, der er fastslået heri, men derimod en anden skade, nemlig tab for visheden om at kunne besætte
Indeed, although it does not — and cannot — call into question the finding, made in the interim judgment, as to the existence of damage caused by the unlawful act committed, the Commission argues, in essence, that the compensation awarded by the Court of First Instance in the judgment under appeal is not concerned with the damage found to exist in the interim judgment, but, on the contrary, other damage, that is to say the loss of a guarantee of obtaining a post and the loss of earnings relating thereto. In that regard,
47 — Jf. bl.a. dommen i sagen Rådet mod de Nil og Impens, præmis 32 og 33, og kendelsen i sagen Meister mod KHIM, præmis 82.
47 — See, in particular, Council v De Nil and Impens, paragraphs 32 and 33, and the order in Meister v OHIM, paragraph 82.
Jeg foreslår derfor, at appellen fremmes til realitetsbehandling med det forbehold, at de heri fremførte klagepunkter, hvori Kommissionen kritiserer omfanget af godtgørelsen, fortolkes således, at de vedrører en manglende eller utilstrækkelig begrundelse af den appellerede dom.
I therefore propose that the main appeal should be declared admissible, provided that the claims in that appeal criticising the extent of the compensation for the damage are interpreted so as to relate to the absence or inadequancy of the statement of reasons in the judgment under appeal.
Med andre ord har Retten fastslået, at der foreligger et tab, men har dog ikke ydet erstatning for dette tab, men for et andet tab, som ikke opfylder betingelserne i retspraksis for at kunne godtgøres.
In other words, although the Court of First Instance has indeed found the existence of damage, it has nevertheless made good not that damage, but other damage, of a type which does not satisfy the conditions laid down by the caselaw in order to be reparable.
Et sådant spørgsmål, der naturligvis er af juridisk karakter, kan ikke efter min opfattelse falde uden for Domstolens efterprøvelse i denne appelsag.
Such an issue, clearly legal in nature, must, in my view, be subject to review by the Court in the context of the appeal.
Kommissionen har hovedsagelig under henvisning til den appellerede doms præmis 58 kritiseret den omstændighed, at det materielle tab er beregnet på grundlag af kriteriet om lønforskel og ikke på grundlag af en fortabt mulighed, men på grundlag af en fortabt sikkerhed om at opnå en stilling.
In essence, the Commission argues, with reference to paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal, that the material damage was calculated on the basis of the criterion of the difference in earnings, thus wrongly interpreting the loss of an opportunity as being the loss of a guarantee of obtaining a post.
Kommissionen har anført, at den af Retten begåede retlige fejl støttes af andre forhold, således som det er angivet i punkt 37 i nærværende forslag til afgørelse.
In its view, the existence of an error of law on the part of the Court of First Instance is confirmed by other evidence, as stated in point 37 above.
Kommissionens kritik beror efter min mening på en delvis fejllæsning af den appellerede dom.
Those criticisms are the result, in my view, of a partial misreading of the judgment under appeal.
Modsat det af Marie-Claude Girardot i hendes formalitetsindsigelse anførte kan det heller ikke hævdes, at Kommissionens argumentation, for så vidt Kommissionen herved anfægter, at der foreligger et reelt og sikkert tab, må afvises, fordi anbringendet ikke er fremført i førsteinstansen.
Nor is it possible to claim, contrary to Ms Girardot’s submission in her objection of inadmissibility, that, insofar as the Commission’s line of argument disputes the actual and certain nature of the damage, it is inadmissible since it was not submitted at first instance.
Det er nemlig klart, at de konstateringer, som Kommissionen har kritiseret, for første gang forekommer i den appellerede dom, hvilket må indebære, at Marie-Claude Girardots påstand om, at der foreligger et nyt anbringende, må forkastes 49.
It is indeed clear that the findings criticised by the Commission appear for the first time in the judgment under appeal, which must lead to the dismissal of the claim put forward by Ms Girardot that the plea is a new one. 49
49 — Jf. i denne retning dom af 18.1.2007, sag C-229/05 P, PKK og KNK mod Rådet, Sml. I, s. 439, præmis 33.
49 — See, in that regard, Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v Council [2007] ECR I-439, paragraph 33.
Jeg må ganske vist erkende, at den vurdering, som indeholdes i den appellerede doms præmis 58, er behæftet med en retlig fejl.
Indeed, it should be acknowledged that the assessment in paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MENGOZZI — SAG C-348/06 P
OPINION OF MR MENGOZZI — CASE C-348/06 P one.
Muligheden skal være reel. I den forstand er der tale om en anvendelse af princippet om erstatning for et sikkert tab, idet det, der er sikkert, ikke er hændelsen eller den forventede fremtidige udvikling, men reelt tab af mulighed for, at disse konkretiseres.
In that respect, this is an application of the principle of compensation for certain damage, since what is certain is not the anticipated future event or development, but rather the loss of the chance that they may materialise.
Vurderingen af den mulighed, som Marie-Claude Girardot havde for at få hendes ansøgning efterkommet, er derfor ikke fakultativ, idet den indgår i selve definitionen af begrebet fortabt mulighed.
Accordingly, the assessment of the chance that Ms Girardot had of having her application accepted cannot be optional, since it forms part of the very definition of the notion of loss of opportunity.
Jeg skal herved bemærke, at Retten i denne præmis i den appellerede dom har angivet, hvorledes den vil fastsætte omfanget af det tab, som Marie-Claude Girardot har lidt.
It should be pointed out that, in that paragraph of the grounds of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance presented the approach it was going to adopt for the purposes of assessing the extent of the damage suffered by Ms Girardot.