natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det er i denne henseende vigtigt at sondre mellem udøvelsen af et skøn og fortolkningen af de relevante retlige kriterier, som netop fastlægger grænserne for dette
In this connection, it is important to distinguish between exercising a margin of discretion and interpreting the relevant legal criteria determining the precise
55 — Jf. bl.a. generaladvokat P. Légers forslag til afgørelse i Upjohn-sagen, punkt 50 og 51.
55 — See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Léger in Upjohn, cited above, points 50 and 51.
På dette grundlag foreslår jeg Domstolen at svare den forelæggende ret således, at den nationale tilsynsmyndighed ved efterprøvelsen af, om priserne er omkostningsrelaterede, råder over en skønsmargin, som bl.a. vedrører metoden til omkostningsberegning og spørgsmålene om fastsættelse af de kalkulatoriske renter og rimelige afskrivningsperioder.
I therefore propose that the Court reply to the referring court to the effect that, when assessing whether charges have been set on the basis of costorientation, the national regulatory authority has a margin of discretion with regard, in particular, to the method used to calculate the costs and also to issues relating to the determination of imputed interest and reasonable depreciation periods.
En effektiv domstolskontrol af en afgørelse om takstgodkendelse skal gøre det muligt at efterprøve, om den pågældende afgørelse om takstgodkendelse er i strid med forordningens formål og kriterierne om ikkediskrimination og ligebehandling.
Effective judicial review of a rates approval decision must make it possible to ascertain whether or not the rates approval decision in question is in breach of the aims of the regulation and the criteria of nondiscrimination and equal treatment.
Det skal desuden være muligt at efterprøve, om de grænser, der følger af fortolkningen af fællesskabsbegrebet omkostningsrelaterede priser, er blevet overholdt, og navnlig om afgørelsen viser, at der er foretaget en rimelig afvejning mellem hovedformålet om at fremme konkurrencen i accessnettet og formålet om at sikre den nødvendige investering i infrastruktur.
It must also make it possible to ascertain whether the limits arising from the interpretation of the Community concept of costorientation have been respected and, in particular, whether the decision shows that an appropriate balance has been struck between the essential aim of fostering competition within the local network and the aim of ensuring the necessary level of investment in infrastructure.
G — Sjette spørgsmål afgørelsen til en uafhængig myndighed på nationalt plan« 59. I Connect Austria-
G — The sixth question
Med dette spørgsmål ønsker den forelæggende ret i det væsentlige oplyst, om konkurrenter, der er adgangsberettiget til den notificerede operatørs abonnentledninger, selv om de ikke er adressater for en afgørelse om takstgodkendelse truffet af en national tilsynsmyndighed, bør have ret til at indbringe en sådan afgørelse for domstolene, når de mener, at adgangstaksterne ikke er omkostningsrelaterede.
By this question, the referring court is, basically, asking whether, although a rates approval decision adopted by a national regulatory authority is not addressed to them, competitors as beneficiaries of access to the notified operator’s local network, must have a right of appeal against such a decision where they consider that the rates approved have not been set on the basis of costorientation.
I mit forslag til afgørelse af 15. februar 2007, fremsat i Tele2 UTA Telecommunica-tion-sagen 57, har jeg beskæftiget mig med et problem i forbindelse med en markedsanalyseprocedure i den nye rammelovgivning, som for en betydelig del svarer til det problem, der er genstand for det foreliggende spørgsmål.
The Court then concluded that ‘in order to ensure that national law is interpreted in compliance with Directive 90/387 and that the rights of individuals are effectively protected, national courts must determine whether the relevant provisions of their national law provide individuals with a right of appeal against decisions of the national regulatory authority which satisfies the criteria laid down in Article 5a(3) of Directive 90/387.’ 61 had occasion to consider an issue in connection with the procedure for market analysis within the new regulatory framework, which is broadly equivalent to the problem forming the subjectmatter of this question. For further discussion of this, I would, therefore, refer to my Opinion in the Tele2 UTA Telecommunication case, cited above. 58
Artikel 5a, som i øvrigt også artikel 4, stk. 1, i rammedirektivet, udspringer af det generelle fællesskabsretlige princip om, at medlemsstaterne skal sikre en effektiv
Article 5a, like Article 4(1) of the framework directive, is an expression of the general principle of Community law whereby Member States have the responsibility of
Jeg har tidligere i dette forslag til afgørelse bemærket, at ifølge artikel 5a i direktiv 90/387, der hører til den gamle lovgivning vedrørende telekommunikation, som forordningen har til formål at supplere, skal medlemsstaterne sørge for »at parter, som en afgørelse fra det nationale myndighedsorgan får virkning for, har mulighed for at indklage
I already pointed out in that Opinion that, according to Article 5a of Direct- ive 90/387, which constituted part of the
59 — Samme garanti er fastsat i artikel 4, stk. 1, i rammedirektivet, som grosso modo i den nye rammelovgivning for telekommunikation efterfølger artikel 5a, stk. 1, i direktiv 97/387.
59 — An identical guarantee is provided by Article 4(1) of the framework directive which, within the new regulatory framework for telecommunications, more or less replaces Article 5a(1) of Directive 90/387.
57 — Sag C-426/05, der i øjeblikket verserer for Domstolen.58 — Nærmere bestemt i punkt 14-40.
57 — Case C-426/05, currently pending before the Court.58 — More specifically, points 14 to 40.
ARCOR som Arcor skal betale til Deutsche Telekom, er ikke et resultat af forhandlingen mellem Deutsche Telekom og Arcor, men af den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds afgørelse, som formodes for at opfylde kravet om omkostningsrelaterede priser som fastsat i forordningens artikel 3, stk. 3.
ARCOR tions between Deutsche Telekom and Arcor, but of the decision by the national regulatory authority, which is deemed to have complied with the costorientation requirement laid down by Article 3(3) of the regulation.
domstolsbeskyttelse af de rettigheder, som tilkommer borgerne i medfør af fællesskabsretten 62.
ensuring effective legal protection of the rights which individuals are accorded under Community law.
En afgørelse fra en national tilsynsmyndighed som den i hovedsagen, der fastsætter de priser, som den notificerede operatør kan opkræve af adgangsberettigede konkurrerende operatører, er en afgørelse, som ifølge fællesskabsretten skal kunne anfægtes for en uafhængig retsinstans.
62 A decision by a national regulatory authority, such as the decision at issue in the main proceedings, setting the rates which the notified operator is entitled to charge competing operators as beneficiaries, is a decision against which, according to Community law, there must be a right of appeal before an independent judicial body.
Det spørgsmål, der rejses i den foreliggende sag, er det mere specifikke om, hvorvidt konkurrerende adgangsberettigede såsom Arcor, selv om de ikke er adressater for afgørelsen om takstgodkendelse, skal have ret til for domstolene at anfægte adgangstakster med den begrundelse, at de i strid med forordningens artikel 3, stk. 3, er fastsat på et sådant grundlag, at de ikke er omkostningsrelaterede.
The question which has been posed in this case is, however, more specific and asks whether, although the rates approval decision is not addressed to them, competitors as beneficiaries of access, such as Arcor, must have the right to bring an action to contest the rates for access on the grounds that they have not been set on the basis of costorientation, in breach of Article 3(3) of the regulation.
I modsætning til hvad der hævdes af Deutsche Telekom, den tyske regering og Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland som part i tvisten ved den forelæggende ret, er jeg af den opfattelse, at fællesskabsretten giver konkurrenter, der er adgangsberettigede til abonnentnettet, som Arcor i den foreliggende sag, ret til for domstolene at anfægte priser, der ikke er omkostningsbaserede.
Contrary to what Deutsche Telekom, the German Government and the Federal Republic of Germany, as a party to the dispute before the referring court, maintain, it is my view that Community law confers upon competitors as beneficiaries of access to the local loop, such as Arcor in this case, the right to bring proceedings to contest rates which have not been set on the basis of costorientation.
Forordningens artikel 3, stk. 3, beskytter, når den kræver, at adgangspriserne skal være omkostningsrelaterede, ikke alene den notificerede operatørs interesser ved at sikre, at hans omkostninger bliver dækket, men også de konkurrenter, der er adgangsberettiget til den notificerede operatørs abonnentnet 63.
Where it requires that charges for access must be set on the basis of costorientation, Article 3(3) of the regulation protects not only the interests of the notified ope -rator, by ensuring that it is able to cover its costs, but also the interests of competitors as beneficiaries of access to the notified operator’s local loop. 63
Det skal for det første bemærkes, at Deutsche Telekom og Arcor var kontraherende parter på tidspunktet for takstgodkendelsen af 30. marts 2001.
It is, first of all, important to recall that, at the time of the rates approval decision of 30 March 2001, Deutsche Telekom and Arcor were parties to a contract.
Ifølge den forelæggende ret skulle de af den nationale tilsynsmyndighed godkendte takster i den foreliggende sag anses for aftalt ved kontrakten mellem Deutsche Telekom og Arcor.
According to the referring court, the rates approved by the national regulatory authority in the present case were set by agreement between Deutsche Telekom and Arcor in their contract.
Når den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds afgørelse fastsætter taksterne i overensstemmelse med forordningen, fastsætter den faktisk den pris, som Arcor skal betale for adgangen til Deutsche Telekoms abonnentledninger.
Consequently, where the national regulatory authority sets the rates in accordance with the regulation, it in effect establishes the price which Arcor is required to pay for access to Deutsche Telekom’s local loop.
Den højere eller lavere pris, afgørelse i
Whatever price Arcor has to pay to Deutsche Telekom is the result, not of negotia-
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT POIARES MADURO — SAG C-55/06 afgørelse, som fastsætter taksterne 64.
OPINION OF MR MADURO — CASE C-55/06 tionship is affected by the decision by the regulatory authority setting the rates.
De skal begge have ret til at anlægge sag til prøvelse af denne afgørelse på det grundlag, at den godkender priser, som ikke opfylder kravet om omkostningsægthed i forordningens artikel 3, stk. 3.
64 They operator benefiting from that access must have the right of appeal against such a decision in order to contest the rates set, on the ground that they fail to satisfy the costorientation requirement laid down by the regulation.
nationale tilsynsmyndigheds afgørelse om takstgodkendelse, skal den adgangsberettigede operatør gives adgang til at indbringe en sådan afgørelse for retten med henblik på at klage over de fastsatte taksters manglende overensstemmelse med kravet om omkostningsrelaterede priser i henhold til forordningen.
must both have the right to bring proceedings to contest that decision on the ground that it approved rates incompatible with the costorientation requirement laid down in Article 3(3) of the regulation.
Forordningen forfølger den målsætning at fremme konkurrencen på accessnetmarkedet.
The aim of the regulation is to foster competition on the local access market.
Kravet om omkostningsrelaterede priser er et middel til at virkeliggøre dette formål, og, som det udtrykkeligt hedder i forordningens artikel 4, stk. 1, skal de nationale tilsynsmyndigheder sørge for, at prissætningen for ubundtet adgang til abonnentledninger skaber en fair og bæredygtig konkurrence.
The requirement that charges must be set on the basis of costorientation is instrumental in achieving that aim and, as Article 4(1) of the regulation expressly recalls, the national regulatory authorities are required to ensure that charging for unbundled access to the local loop fosters fair and sustainable competition.
I lyset af disse målsætninger er det ikke holdbart, at den notificerede operatør tillægges ret til ad rettens vej at anfægte priserne som uforenelige med omkostningsægtheden, og at de nytilkomne konkurrerende operatører, som skal betale de af tilsynsmyndigheden fastsatte takster, ikke har samme rettighed 65.
In the light of those aims, it would not be tenable for the notified operator to be granted the right to bring proceedings to contest rates on the ground that they are incompatible with the costorientation requirement, whereas competing operators, as new entrants to that market who are required to pay the charges set by the regulatory authority, do not have that same right.
Det følger heraf, at når en konkurrerende operatør opretholder et kontraktforhold med en notificeret operatør om adgang til dennes abonnentledninger med takster fastsat ved den
65It therefore follows that, where a competing operator has a contractual relationship with a notified operator for access to the latter’s local loop, with rates set by an approval decision of the national regulatory authority, the
Jeg mener desuden, at under hensyn til forordningens formål om at fremme konkurrencen og den rolle som middel hertil, der i denne henseende spilles af kravet om omkostningsrelaterede priser, skal også operatører, der er konkurrenter til den notificerede operatør, men som ikke har et kontraktforhold med denne, have en effektiv mulighed for at gå til domstolene vedrørende adgangstakster, der ikke er omkostningsrelaterede.
I further consider that, in view of the aims of fostering competition set by the regulation and of the instrumental role which the requirement that charges for access must be set on the basis of costorientation plays in connection with this, even operators which are competitors of the notified operator but do not have a contractual relationship with the latter must also effectively have a real possibility of bringing an action to contest access charges which have not been set on the basis of costorientation.
Sådanne konkurrerende operatører, som endnu ikke har kontraktforhold med den notificerede operatør, er også direkte omfattet af de af forordningens bestemmelser, der skal fremme konkurrencen i dette markedssegment inden for telekommunikation, som udgøres af abonnentledninger 66.
Such competing operators, who do not yet have a contractual relationship with the notified operator, are also the direct beneficiaries of the provisions of the regulation, which are designed to foster competition in the segment of the telecommunications market comprising the local access network.
Med andre ord er det, for at blive anset for »adgangsberettiget« til ubundtet adgang til abonnentledninger som fastsat i forordningens bestemmelser, ikke nødvendigt at have et kontraktforhold med den notificerede operatør 67.
66In other words, it is not necessary to have any kind of contractual relationship with the notified operator in order to be classed as a ‘beneficiary’ of the unbundled local loop access introduced by the regulation. 67
64 — Jf. analogt dom af 17.1.1985, sag 11/82, Piraiki-Patraiki m.fl., Sml. s. 207, præmis 19 og 31.
64 — See, by analogy, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others [1985] ECR 207, paragraphs 19 and 31.
66 — Jf. ligeledes mit forslag til afgørelse i Tele2 UTA Telecommunication-sagen, punkt 37-40.
66 — See also my Opinion in Tele2 UTA Telecommunication, cited above, points 37 to 40.
67 — Det er i denne forbindelse tilstrækkeligt at se på begrebet »adgangsberettiget« i forordningens artikel 2, litra b), der karakteriserer det som »en tredjepart, der har behørig tilladelse […] eller har ret til at levere kommunikationstjenesteydelser […], og som er berettiget til ubundtet adgang til abonnentledninger«.
67 — On this point, it is sufficient to look at the concept of ‘beneficiary’ contained in Article 2(b) of the Regulation, which defines it as ‘a third party duly authorised … or entitled to provide communications services … and which is eligible for unbundled access to a local loop.’
65 — Jf. i denne retning generaladvokat A. Geelhoeds forslag til afgørelse i Connect Austria-sagen (punkt 48), hvor han anførte, at »[d]et kan ikke være rigtigt, at tredjemænd, som berøres direkte af afgørelserne, ikke har mulighed for at indklage disse.
65 — See, to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in the Connect Austria case (cited at point 48 above) in which he stated that ‘[i]t certainly cannot be the case that interested third parties who are directly affected by the decision do not have a right of appeal.
Det gælder så meget desto mere, som artikel 5a, stk. 3, [i direktiv 90/387] netop har til formål at beskytte nytilkomne operatørers interesser, som f.eks. det sagsøgende selskab«.
Indeed, Article 5a(3) [of Directive 90/387] is, precisely, intended partly to protect the interests of newcomers to the market such as Connect Austria’.
ARCOR omkostningsrelaterede, dels under den administrative procedure, der går forud for afgørelsen om takstgodkendelse, dels under et af en berørt konkurrent anlagt søgsmål til prøvelse af den nationale tilsynsmyndigheds afgørelse.
ARCOR costorientation lies, both during the course of the administrative procedure preceding the rates approval decision and during an appeal lodged against the regulatory authority’s decision by a competitor affected by it.
Når en afgørelse om takstgodkendelse pålægger priser, som ikke er omkostningsrelaterede, vil denne afgørelse imidlertid også have en negativ virkning for de konkurrerende operatører, som måtte ønske at få adgang til den notificerede operatørs abonnentledninger.
Where a rates approval decision imposes rates which have not been set on the basis of costorientation, that decision will also have a negative impact on those competing operators who might wish to obtain access to the notified operator’s local loop.
Såfremt en konkurrent står over for en afgørelse om takstgodkendelse, som gør det vanskeligere for ham at indgå et påtænkt kontraktforhold med den notificerede operatør, skal han ligeledes have mulighed for at fremføre et klagepunkt for domstolene om en eventuel mangel på omkostningsrelaterede priser.
In fact, where a competitor is faced with a rates approval decision which makes it more difficult for it to establish a proposed contractual relationship with the notified operator, it must also have the possibility of bringing proceedings to contest the fact that those rates have not been set on the basis of costorientation, where appropriate.
Disse konkurrerende operatører skal således også have en søgsmålsret, fuldstændig som dem, der i forvejen havde kontraktforhold med den notificerede operatør.
Consequently, those competing operators must also have the right of appeal, in the same way as operators which already have a contractual relationship with the notified operator.
Forordningen indeholder ingen bestemmelse, der angiver, hvem der har bevisbyrden for, at priserne er omkostningsrelaterede.
The regulation contains no provision stipulating where the burden of providing proof of the costs on which the charges must be based lies.
I artikel 7, stk. 2, i direktiv 97/33, som er en del af lovgivningen om telekommunikation, som forordningen har til formål at supplere, er det udtrykkeligt anført, at »[b]evisbyrden for, at taksterne er omkostningsægte og ikke giver mere end en rimelig forrentning af investeringerne, påhviler den organisation, der udbyder samtrafik via sine faciliteter« 68.
It is Article 7(2) of Dir -ective 97/33, which forms part of the regulatory framework for telecommunications that the regulation is designed to complement, which expressly states that ‘[t]he burden of proof that charges are derived from actual costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall lie with the organisation providing interconnection to its facilities.’ 68
På denne baggrund foreslår jeg Domstolen at svare den forelæggende ret, at det er et krav efter fællesskabsretten, at konkurrenter, der er berettiget til adgang til den notificerede operatørs abonnentledninger, har ret til for domstolene at anfægte adgangstakster, der er godkendt ved en national tilsynsmyndigheds afgørelse, med den begrundelse, at de ikke er baseret på omkostningerne.
I therefore propose that the Court reply to the referring court to the effect that Community law requires that competitors as beneficiaries of the right of access to the notified operator’s local loop have the right to bring proceedings to contest rates for access approved by a national regulatory authority, on the ground that they were not set on the basis of costorientation.
H — Syvende spørgsmål
H — The seventh question
I betragtning af at begrebet omkostningsrelaterede priser vedrører den notificerede operatørs omkostninger, dvs. de omkostninger, der er »relevante« for tilrådighedsstillelsen af adgang til hans eksisterende abonnentledninger, er det klart den notificerede operatør, der er bedst i stand til at levere oplysninger vedrørende sine omkostninger.
In view of the fact that the concept of costorientation relates to the notified operator’s costs, that is to say the costs ‘connected with’ the provision of access to an existing local loop owned by that operator, it is obviously the notified operator that is best placed to provide information concerning its costs.
Det påhviler således den notificerede
In the context of the supervision of chargesetting, which, in accordance with Article 4 of the regulation, is to be carried out by the
68 — I det nye retsgrundlag bestemmer artikel 13, stk. 3, i direktiv 2002/19, at »[h]ar en udbyder pligt til at sikre, at priserne er omkostningsbaserede, er det udbyderen selv, der skal bevise, at taksterne er baseret på omkostningerne inklusiv en rimelig forrentning af investeringerne«.
68 — In the new regulatory framework, Article 13(3) of Directive 2002/19 states that ‘[w]here an operator has an obligation regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the burden of proof that charges are derived from costs including a reasonable rate of return on investment shall lie with the operator concerned.’
Den forelæggende ret ønsker i det væsentlige oplyst, hvem der bærer bevisbyrden for, at priserne er
The referring court is, basically, seeking to ascertain where the burden of proof that rates have been set on the basis of
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT POIARES MADURO — SAG C-55/06 operatør i forbindelse med tilsynsproceduren vedrørende prissætningen, der i henhold til forordningens artikel 4 gennemføres ved den nationale tilsynsmyndighed, at føre bevis for de relevante omkostninger for tilrådighedsstillelsen af adgang til hans abonnentledninger, på grundlag af hvilke de takster, han kræver af konkurrenterne, skal fastsættes.
OPINION OF MR MADURO — CASE C-55/06 national regulatory authority, it is, therefore, for the notified operator to provide evidence of the costs connected with the provision of access to its local loop on the basis of which the prices which it charges competitors must be orientated.
Den nationale ret skal ved afgørelsen af fordelingen af bevisbyrden under alle omstændigheder overholde fællesskabsprincipperne om effektivitet og ækvivalens.
As a result, Community law does not require that the rule which places upon the notified operator the burden of providing evidence of the costs in line with which the prices it charges for access must be orientated, during the administrative stage preceding the national regulatory authority’s decision on those rates, must also apply during any subsequent legal proceedings.