natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved fastsættelsen af det korrekte begyndelsestidspunkt for femårsfristen for at gøre erstatningskravet gældende er det derfor efter min opfattelse vigtigt at foretage en forholdsvis grundig gennemgang af afgørelsen fra den nationale førsteinstansret (Tribunale civile di Roma).
In order to decide what is the correct point from which the fiveyear timelimit for bringing this action started to run, it is therefore in my view essential to analyse with some care the decision of the national court at first instance (the Tribunale civile di Roma).
Jeg har allerede (ovenfor i punkt 29) citeret de centrale passager i denne rets dom.
I have set out above (at point 29) the central passage from its judgment.
41 — Jf. præmis 141 i Rettens dom.
41 — See paragraph 141 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
Den nationale ret bemærkede indledningsvis, at »forordning nr. 2499/82 betinger retten til at modtage støtte af, at de fastsatte strenge frister og betingelser overholdes, idet manglende overholdelse af disse frister og betingelser medfører en hel eller delvis tilbagesøgning af den forudbetalte støtte.
The national court first observed that ‘Regulation No 2499/82 confers entitlement to aid on condition that the strictly-imposed time limits and conditions are observed; failure to observe those timelimits and conditions entails recovery in whole or in part of the aid paid in advance.
Destillerierne er […] de umiddelbare støttemodtagere, mens producenterne af vin og vindruer er de endelige modtagere af støtten«.
The distillers are … the intended recipients of the aid whilst the wine and grape producers are the intended ultimate recipients’.
Herefter fastslog den nationale ret affærdigende, at »[d]et følger af det ovenfor anførte, at fortolkningen af [forordning nr. 2499/82] er klar, og at det ikke er nødvendigt at forelægge Domstolen et præjudicielt spørgsmål«.
The national court then said, dismis -sively, that ‘[i]t is clear from this that [Regulation No 2499/82] is easy to interpret and that it is not necessary to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruing’.
Dette er da også rigtigt, hvis man — som den nationale ret tydeligvis gjorde — udelukkende tænker på de forskellige tidsfrister, inden for hvilke destilleriet skulle foretage en række handlinger for at undgå, at den sikkerhed, det havde stillet til gengæld for forudbetaling af fællesskabsstøtten, ville blive inddraget.
That is quite true, provided that one concentrates exclusively — as the national court clearly did — on the various timelimits within which the distiller was required to take various steps in order to avoid forfeiting the security that it had lodged in return for advance payment of Community aid.
Med denne udtalelse foretager den nationale ret to korrekte konstateringer og begår én vigtig fejl.
In so saying, the national court made two correct statements and one significant error.
For alle Fællesskabets markedsstøtteordninger inden for landbrugssektoren gælder det ganske rigtigt, at der skal være sikkerhed for, at dem, der gør krav på støtten, opfylder betingelserne i fællesskabsforordningerne 42.
The Community arrangements for market support in the agricultural sector do indeed all depend, correctly, upon making sure that those claiming support comply with the necessary conditions laid down by the Community regulations.
Producenterne af vin og vindruer var også de »endelige modtagere af støtten«.
42 The wine and grape producers were indeed the ‘intended ultimate recipients of the aid’.
Derimod mener jeg ikke, at forordning nr. 2499/82 på nogen måde kan fortolkes således, at destillerierne (DAI) var de »umiddelbare støttemodtagere« hvad angår mindsteopkøbsprisen.
However, it seems to me that, on a proper construction of Regulation No 2499/82, the distillers (DAI) were not, in any true sense, the ‘intended recipients of the aid’ in so far as concerns the minimum buyingin price.
De udgjorde snarere den kanal, hvorigennem denne støtte — såfremt vinen blev leveret til destilleriet og destilleret efter forskrifterne — skulle tildeles vinproducenterne 43.
Rather, they were the conduit through which that aid was intended — provided that the wine duly entered the distillery and was distilled — to be transmitted to the wine producers. 43
42 — Dette fremgår af talrige domme, hvori Domstolen har givet Kommissionen medhold, at den kan tilbageholde støtte fra EUGFL med den begrundelse, at den berørte medlemsstat ikke har sikret overholdelsen af disse betingelser.
42 — As may be seen in the numerous judgments in which the Court has upheld the Commission’s withholding of aid provided for by the EAGGF on the ground that the Member State concerned has not ensured compliance with those conditions.
Det ville følgelig være forkert at konkludere, at den nationale ret ikke tog hensyn til fællesskabsretten i sin afgørelse.
Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that the national court ignored Community law in reaching its decision.
Den nationale ret undersøgte faktisk forordning nr. 2499/82, men kun for så vidt angår de i forordningens artikel 9 fastsatte tidsfrister, inden for hvilke DAI skulle handle og fremlægge dokumentation for sine handlinger.
It did look at Regulation No 2499/82, but only to the extent of examining the timelimits in Article 9 of that regulation for DAI to act and to supply relevant proofs of its actions.
Den nationale ret fokuserede alene på forholdet mellem DAI og AIMA (i form af Assediles sikkerhedsstillelse).
It concentrated exclusively upon the relationship between DAI and AIMA (as reflected by the lodging of the security provided by Assedile).
Herefter beskrev den (korrekt), hvorledes DAI i tre forskellige henseender ikke havde opfyldt sine forpligtelser i henhold til forordningen: i) Det havde, bortset fra betalinger på i alt 110 795 870 ITL (57 221 EUR) 44, ikke betalt mindsteprisen til producenterne, ii) det havde ikke udbetalt støtten til producenterne inden for fristen på 90 dage, og iii) det havde ikke senest den 1. juni 1984 fremsendt bevis for, at det havde gennemført betalingerne.
It proceeded (quite correctly) to identify three separate ways in which DAI had failed to meet its obligations under the regulation: (i) it had failed, apart from payments totalling ITL 110 795 870 (EUR 57 221), 44 to pay the producers the minimum price; (ii) it had failed to pay them within the 90-day timelimit and (iii) it had failed to provide proof before 1 June 1984 that it had made the payments.
(Alle tre forhold udgør naturligvis blot forskellige aspekter af den samme grundlæggende tilsidesættelse, som bestod i, at DAI ikke fuldt ud havde betalt producenterne mindsteopkøbsprisen for den vin, de havde leveret til destillation.)
(All three are, of course, different strands of the same basic breach by DAI of its obligations: namely, that it had not paid the wine producers the full amount of the minimum buyingin price due to them for their wine delivered for distillation.)
43 — Hvis der skulle være nogen tvivl om dette, skal jeg bemærke, at Kommissionen ikke har anfægtet Rettens dom hvad angår realiteten.
43 — Even if there were any doubt about this, it is important to note that the Commission has not challenged the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance.
Kommissionen bør derfor ikke rejse tvivl om den fortolkning, som Retten har lagt til grund, og et spørgsmål herom vil slet ikke være omfattet af Domstolens prøvelsesret under en appelsag.
It would accordingly be neither appropriate nor indeed in accordance with this Court’s power of review on appeal for it to question the interpretation of the legislation by the Court of First Instance.
44 — Jf. punkt 26 ovenfor.
44 — See point 26 above.
Herved undgik den nationale ret helt at komme ind på det underliggende (og grundlæggende) spørgsmål om, hvem der i sidste instans skulle modtage den omhandlede fællesskabsstøtte.
In so doing, the national court failed to focus at all upon the underlying (and fundamental) issue, who should end up receiving the Community aid in question?
Retten anså tydeligvis de intervenerende vinproducenter (modtagerne af mindsteopkøbsprisen og de eneste aktører, som efter fællesskabsordningen skulle have økonomisk fordel af denne opkøbspris) for at være ligestillet med alle andre, som DAI skyldte penge på tidspunktet for dets konkurs.
It is evident that it regarded the intervening wine producers (the intended recipients of the minimum buyingin price; and the only players intended, under the Community regime, to benefit financially from that buyingin price) as being on a par with everyone else who was owed money by DAI as it went under.
De beløb, producenterne havde til gode i form af denne del af fællesskabsstøtten, blev ligestillet med andre fordringer på DAI under konkursbehandlingen.
The sums owing to them as that element of Community aid were equated to DAI’s other debts in the insolvency.
Dette fremgår med al ønskelig klarhed af den eneste præmis i dommen, som specifikt vedrører producenternes interesser: med forordning nr. 2499/82. Havde den gjort dette, ville den sandsynligvis være nået frem til det samme resultat som Retten, nemlig at der var en lakune i forordning nr. 2499/82, som medførte en forskellig behandling af vinproducenter, alt efter om medlemsstaten havde valgt proceduren i henhold til artikel 9 eller artikel 10, at forskelsbehandlingen ikke var begrundet, og at ansvaret for overtrædelsen måtte placeres hos den fællesskabsinstitution, som havde udformet forordning nr. 2499/82, nemlig Kommissionen 45.
This is abundantly clear from the only paragraph of the judgment that specifically addresses their interests: likely that it would have reached the same conclusion as has the Court of First Instance, namely that there was a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82 leading to different treatment of wine producers depending upon whether their Member State had chosen the Article 9 or the Article 10 procedure; that the difference in treatment was not justified; and that responsibility for that violation lay with the Community institution that had drafted Regulation No 2499/82, i.e. the Commission.
Svarene til den nationale ret ville ganske vist (uundgåeligt) have medført, at de indstævnte ikke ville have fået mulighed for at opnå betaling af den skyldige fællesskabsstøtte gennem deres intervention i sagen for den nationale ret, men de ville i så fald objektivt blive bekendt med, at de skulle rette deres krav mod Kommissionen. Det ville derfor være klart, at fristen for at indbringe et erstatningssøgsmål ville være begyndt at løbe fra dette tidspunkt.
45 Although the answers given to the national court would (inevitably) have led to the applicants failing to recover the Community aid due to them through their intervention in the national proceedings, they would then objectively have known that the claim lay against the Commission.
»Vinkooperativerne vil — ligesom kautionisten [Assedile], hvis han vælger at indtræde i rettighederne — kunne opnå dækning af deres krav i forbindelse med konkursbehandlingen sammen med de øvrige kreditorer og under overholdelse af princippet om ligebehandling af kreditorerne.«
‘The cooperative wine-cellars may — as may the guarantor [Assedile] if it decides to take the applicant’s place — obtain satisfaction of their rights to receive payment in the course of the insolvency proceedings, together with all the other creditors and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment of creditors.’
Det kan tænkes, at den nationale ret ikke ofrede vinproducenternes interesser den store opmærksomhed, fordi de var intervenienter i en sag anlagt af DAI og ikke selv sagsøgere.
It is possible that the national court paid less than full attention to the wine producers’ interests because they were interveners in DAI’s action, rather than applicants in their own name.
Under de foreliggende omstændigheder ville det efter min opfattelse være lovligt strengt at lægge producenterne til last, at de ikke selv anlagde sag — mod DAI (eftersom det i realiteten var destilleriet, der skyldte dem den resterende del af fællesskabsstøtten) — sammen med AIMA og eventuelt Assedile som adciterede sagsøgte.
It seems to me that it would be rather harsh to fault the producers, in the circumstances, for not bringing separ- ate proceedings, presumably against DAI (since it was the distiller who actually owed them the balance of the Community aid payable) with AIMA and perhaps Assedile as additional defendants.
Faktum er, at en relevant sag (mellem DAI og AIMA) allerede var »verserende« ved de
As it was, there was already a relevant action (between DAI and AIMA) that was ‘live’ before the national
45 — Jf. den omhyggelige gennemgang af sagens realitet i præmis 151-178, særligt præmis 164-172.
45 — See the careful discussion of the merits at paragraphs 151 to 178, in particular paragraphs 164 to 172.
Jeg bemærker, at Kommissionen ikke anfægter Rettes dom hvad angår realiteten, men alene støtter sin appel på anbringendet vedrørende forældelsesfristen.
It is to be noted that the Commission does not seek to appeal the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance. It relies solely upon the limitation point.
Herved afslører den national ret, at den ikke har forstået hele baggrunden for og formålet med fællesskabsstøtteordningen.
In so saying, the national court failed to understand the whole thrust and purpose of the Community aid regime.
Helt afgørende er det, at den nationale ret også afviste at forelægge et præjudicielt spørgsmål.
Crucially, it had also declined to make a reference.
Dette var den naturligvis ikke forpligtet til at gøre, eftersom den ikke træffer afgørelse i sidste instans og skal overholde den strengere bestemmelse i sidste stykke i artikel 234 EF (Tribunale civile di Roma rettede tilsyneladende også sit fokus i den forkerte retning, da den bestred, at en forelæggelse var »nødvendig«).
There was, of course, no obligation on it to do so, not being a final court bound by the stricter requirements of the final paragraph of Article 234 EC (and it also seems likely that the Tribunal civile di Roma was directing its mind to the wrong part of the issue in asking itself whether a reference was ‘necessary’).
Domstolen fik derfor ikke på dette tidspunkt lejlighed til at undersøge opbygningen af og formålet
As a result, this Court was not given the opportunity, at that stage, of examining the structure and purpose of Regulation No 2499/82. Had it done so, it seems to me
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT SHARPSTON — SAG C-51/05 P sikkerhed blev inddraget af AIMA og efterfølgende regnskabsført til fordel for EUGFL, når en medlemsstat (som Italien) havde valgt proceduren i henhold til artikel 9 i forordning nr. 2499/82.
OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-51/05 P its subsequent reimbursement by AIMA to EAGGF when a Member State (such as Italy) had chosen the procedure laid down in Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82.
Jeg mener følgelig ikke, at denne dom bragte producenterne i en situation, hvor de — objektivt set — burde have indset, at deres eneste mulighed var at opgive de nationale retssager og blot anlægge sag mod Kommissionen, som var ophavsmand til den mangelfulde lovgivning.
In consequence, I do not read that judgment as placing them in a position in which, objectively, they ought to have realised that their only recourse was to abandon the national proceedings and, without further ado, to bring proceedings against the Commission as the author of the defective legislation.
Det må — af praktiske og procesøkonomiske hensyn — have forekommet ganske naturligt at intervenere i denne sag og herigennem indbringe spørgsmålet om vinproducenternes krav på betaling af fællesskabsstøtten for den nationale ret.
It would have seemed rather natural, in the interests of procedural efficiency and economy, to intervene in that action and to place the wine producers’ entitlement to payment of their Community aid before the national court in that way.
Hvis DAI havde fået medhold, eller tabt sagen efter en forelæggelse, ville de (henholdsvis) have haft bedre chancer for at få støtten udbetalt af DAI eller i det mindste have vidst, hvordan de stod.
Had DAI succeeded, or lost following a reference, they would (respectively) have either had a better chance of being paid the aid by DAI or at least known where they stood.
Hvis producenterne begik en fejl ved at intervenere i sagen i stedet for at anlægge en separat sag, var det efter min opfattelse en objektiv undskyldelig fejl.
If it was an error to intervene in those proceedings rather than to commence separate proceedings, it seems to me that that error was objectively excusable.
Den nationale ret gjorde kort proces med de intervenerende vinproducenter (og deres klare interesser).
As interveners, the wine producers (and their clear interests) were given short shrift by the national court.
Var det ikke for bagklogskabens skarpe blik, ville jeg have svært ved at tolke Tribunale civile di Romas dom således, at den skulle indeholde noget klart (eller for den sags skyld udtrykkeligt) signal til dem om, at de havde en god sag, men forfulgte den det forkerte sted.
Save with the (undoubted) benefit of hindsight, I find it difficult to read into the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma any clear (let alone express) indication to them that they had a good claim but were in the wrong place to pursue it.
De fik tværtimod at vide, at de hverken var bedre eller ringere stillet end alle andre kreditorer.
On the contrary, they were told that they were in no better and no worse position than any other person to whom DAI owed money.
Den strakte sig over en periode, der indledtes den 27. januar 1986 (med Tribunale civile di Romas dom), omfattede Corte d’appellos dom af 19. november 1991 og sluttede med Corte di cassaziones endelige forkastelse af anken den 28. november 1994.
They stretched from 27 January 1986 (the date of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma) via the judgment of the Corte d’appello on 19 November 1991 through to the final dismissal of the appellants’ appeal by the Corte di Cassazione on 28 November 1994.
Det kan ikke på grundlag af sagens akter fastslås, om de indstævnte under dette appelforløb henledte opmærksomheden på indholdet af deres fællesskabsretlige krav, eller om de igen rejste spørgsmålet om en forelæggelse for Domstolen med henblik på at få afklaret, hvorledes forordning nr. 2499/82 fungerer, og dermed få bragt orden i det kaos, som DAI’s konkurs efterlod.
It is impossible to ascertain from the file before this Court whether the applicants drew attention to the substance of their claim under EC law within that procedural appeal, or raised again the question of whether this Court should be asked for guidance in understanding the workings of Regulation No 2499/82, with a view to unravelling the mess left behind by DAI’s insolvency.
Det kan have været umuligt for dem at gøre dette i videre omfang eller overhovedet.
It may not have been possible for them to do so to any significant extent, or at all.
Selv er jeg meget utilbøjelig til at mene, at de aldrig burde have appelleret, og at fristen bør anses for at være begyndt at løbe tidligere end den 28. november 1994.
For my part, I am most reluctant to presume against them that they should never have appealed and that time should be said to have started to run from a point earlier than 28 November 1994.
Jeg mener navnlig ikke, at Tribunale civile di Romas dom indeholder nogen klar og utvetydig tilkendegivelse af, at vinproducenterne ikke ville komme videre med sagen ved de nationale retter (inden for rammerne af den af DAI anlagte sag og såmænd heller ikke i en separat sag), fordi der ikke fandtes nogen mekanisme til beskyttelse af deres interesser ved at forhindre, at DAI’s
In particular, I do not deduce from the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma any straightforward judicial guidance that the wine producers would get nowhere in the national courts (either within the context of DAI’s action or, indeed, in separate proceedings) because there was no mechanism for protecting their interests by preventing the forfeiture of DAI’s security to AIMA and
Derudover forekommer det mig sandsynligt, at Kommissionen, hvis producenterne havde anlagt sag mod den ved Retten uden først at gøre det ved en national ret, blot ville have henvist til, at de burde have gjort deres krav gældende for de nationale domstole, som ville have kunnet sikre dem en effektiv prøvelse.
It seems to me, moreover, likely that, had the applicants sought to bring proceedings against the Commission before the Court of First Instance without first going to the national court, the Commission would have argued that they ought to be pursuing their claim before the national courts, which were perfectly capable of granting them an effective remedy.
Kommissionen ville efter al sandsynlighed have fremført argumenter svarende til dem, der fremgår af dens indlæg i sagen her 47.
It would, in all likelihood, have deployed arguments similar to those that it presented in the context of these proceedings. 47
På denne baggrund vil jeg nu undersøge Rettens undersøgelse af fristen i henhold til statuttens artikel 46.
Against that background, I turn to consider the analysis of the Court of First Instance of the timelimit provided for by Article 46 of the Statute.
I det foreliggende tilfælde fastslog Retten, at forældelsesfristen begyndte at løbe på det tidspunkt, hvor der forelå vished for, at sagsøgerne havde lidt et tab som følge af, at fællesskabsstøtten ikke eller delvist ikke blev udbetalt 49.
In the present case the Court of First Instance ruled that the period of limitation began to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid was suffered for certain by the applicants.
Retten fandt, at en forudseende og påpasselig producent under de helt særlige omstændigheder i sagen i) med rimelighed kunne forvente at få udbetalt den omhandlede støtte, og ii) at det (navnlig i betragtning af det komplekse system, som var indført med forordning nr. 2499/82 50, og den specielle situation med hensyn til lakunen i denne forordning) var umådeligt vanskeligt for en sådan producent på forhånd at indse, at han ikke ville opnå betaling af denne støtte ved de nationale domstole.
49That court considered that in the exceptional circumstances (i) a prudent and wellinformed trader could reasonably expect to obtain payment of the aid and (ii) (given in particular the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 50 and the exceptional nature of the situation relating to the lacuna in that regulation) it was extremely difficult for such a trader to be aware that he could not obtain such payment before a national court.
Ved vurderingen af, om der var vished for tabet, skulle de nationale sager, som netop vedrørte spørgsmålet om, hvad der skulle ske med sikkerheden, tages i betragtning.
Consequently, in order to assess whether damage was certain, it was necessary to take into consideration the national proceedings, concerning specifically the fate of the security.
Disse to led kunne efter min mening lige så vel (og måske mere rammende) have været formuleret som et spørgsmål om, hvorledes en fornuftig, udenforstående beskuer
It seems to me that those two limbs could equally well have been phrased (and might perhaps have been more felicitously phrased) in terms of what a reasonable bystander,
Ifølge Domstolens praksis kan forældelsesfristen for søgsmål vedrørende ansvar uden for kontraktforhold, som har sin oprindelse i en generel retsakt, først begynde at løbe, når retsaktens skadevoldende følger har vist sig, og følgelig ikke førend det tidspunkt,
According to the caselaw of the Court of Justice, time starts to run in cases of noncontractual liability originating in a legislative measure when the injurious effects of that measure have been produced, and consequently when the persons concerned
47 — Jf. præmis 89 i Rettens dom.
47 — See paragraph 89 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.