natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvad de ikke-horisontale virkninger (engrosmarkedet for elektricitet) angår, ville den anmeldte fusion have givet den fusionerede enhed et fortrin i form af privilegeret adgang til fortrolige oplysninger om konkurrenternes omkostninger, hvilket ville give den en betydelig fordel. Desuden ville den få adgang til alle gasressourcer og infrastrukturer i Portugal samt mulighed for og incitament til at kontrollere gaspriserne og drive konkurrenternes omkostninger i vejret.
As for the non-horizontal e ects (wholesale electricity market), the proposed concentration would have given the merged entity privileged and preferential access to proprietary information about its competitors’ costs, conferring on it a significant advantage; access to Portuguese gas resources and infrastructure; and the ability and the incentive to control gas prices and raise its rivals’ costs.
GDP’s dominerende stilling på disse markeder ville være blevet styrket af den anmeldte transaktion, som ville sætte den fusionerede enhed i stand til lægge yderligere hindringer i vejen for den konkurrence, som liberaliseringsprocessen skulle åbne mulighed for. Dette beror hovedsageligt på følgende:
GDP’s dominant position in these markets would have been strengthened by the proposed operation, allowing the merged entity to impede further the competition being introduced as a result of the liberalisation process. is is essentially for the reasons outlined below.
Inden for gasforsyninger til CCGT-værker og lokale distributionsselskaber ville den anmeldte fusion have trængt alle de gasleverancer, som hidtil ikke havde været kontrolleret af GDP, ud af markedet — nemlig leverancerne til dækning af det kortsigtede behov i de CCGT-værker, hvori EDP er ejer eller medejer, og gase erspørgslen fra distributionsselskabet Portgás.
As regards the supply of gas to CCGTs and LDCs, the notified operation would have foreclosed all the gas demand which was not controlled by GDP so far, namely the short-term requirements of the CCGTs owned or participated in by EDP and the gas demand of the LDC Portgás.
Inden for gasforsyning af store industrikunder og små kunder ville EDP have været den mest sandsynlige nye udbyder på markederne, når de var blevet liberaliseret, navnlig i betragtning af, at EDP driver et elproducerende CCGT-kra værk, hvilket giver EDP et stærkt incitament til at gå ind på gasforsyningsmarkederne, at EDP ville kunne tilbyde sine elkunder (EDP sidder på tæt ved 100 % af eldistributionen i Portugal) samlede leverancer af både el og gas, og at EDP også kunne udnytte Portgás’ erfaringer, navn og kundegrundlag.
As regards the supply of gas to large industrial customers and small customers, EDP would have been the most likely entrant in these markets, once they are liberalised, considering in particular that EDP operates a CCGT for the production of electricity, which confers a strong incentive to enter the gas supply markets, that it could rely on its electricity customers (EDP controls close to 100 % of electricity distribution in Portugal), to whom it could o er a joint supply of gas and electricity (dual fuel), and that it could also rely on the experience, the reputation and the customer base of the gas
Hvor vigtigt det er at komme ind på gasmarkedet, fremgår også af EDP’s nylige overtagelse af den næststørste gasleverandør i Spanien (Naturcorp). Dette betydelige konkurrencepotentiale ville gå tabt med fusionen.
LDC Portgás. e importance of entering the gas markets is also evidenced by EDP’s recent acquisition of the second-largest gas player in Spain (Naturcorp). is significant potential competition would be lost a er the merger.
F.eks. hæ ede Kommissionen sig ved, at Setgás kun tegner sig for 8 % af detailmarkedet for gas, mens det EDP-kontrollerede distributionsselskab, Portgás, tegner sig for hele 30 %, og at der ikke var garanti for, at der ville være tilstrækkelig kapacitet til, at andre kunne importere, selv om overførslen af gasinfrastrukturer til REN (der ville bryde ejerskabsforbindelserne) ville være et positivt skridt. Desuden
For instance, the Commission noted that Setgás accounts for only 8 % of the gas retail market while the LDC controlled by EDP, Portgás, accounts for as much as about 30 %; although the transfer of the gas infrastructure to REN (ownership unbundling) would have been a positive move, no sufficient available capacity for third parties’ imports was guaranteed; the proposed lease of power production in EDP’s gas-fired power plant represented only 4 % of generation capacity in Portugal and would have created a high degree of dependence on the part of the lessee upon EDP.
Vedkommende ville hverken have ha mulighed for eller incitament til at lægge noget større konkurrencepres på EDP.
Such lessee would not have had either the ability or the incentive to exert a strong competitive constraint on EDP.
Nogen tid e er udløbet af fristen for afgivelse af tilsagn tilbød parterne reviderede tilsagn, der dog ikke kunne give nogen klar løsning på de konkurrenceproblemer, denne fusion ville rejse.
Some time a er the deadline for submitting remedies, the parties proposed revised commitments which, however, failed to address the competition concerns resulting from the operation in a straightforward manner.
Kommissionen havde den 9. august 1999 godkendt Aventis-fusionen mellem Hoechst AG og Rhône-Poulenc SA, e er at parterne havde afgivet en række tilsagn for at løse adskillige konkurrenceproblemer.
On 9 August 1999, the Commission cleared the Hoechst AG and Rhône-Poulenc SA concentration resulting in the creation of Aventis, subject to commitments
Amersham producerer produkter til diagnostikudstyr som f.eks. scannere til billedanalyser af menneskers sundhedstilstand samt biomedicinske produkter.
Amersham makes diagnostic pharmaceuticals that are used to enable diagnostic equipment, such as scanners, to image the body’s health status and also produces biopharmaceuticals.
Men e ersom GE’s og Amershams produkter til brug i sundhedssektoren er komplementære, og hospitalerne til ere billedanalyseformål er nødt til at købe både udstyr og produkter, så Kommissionen nærmere på, om fusionen kunne resultere i konglomeratvirkninger. Den var bl.a. betænkelig ved, at GE kunne have et incitament til at tilbyde særlige produktpakker til priser, der lå under prisen for summen af hvert produkt købt hver for sig, eller udforme produkterne på en sådan måde, at Amershams produkter ville virke bedre med GE’s udstyr end med konkurrenternes.
But as the products of GE and Amersham in the medical sector are complementary and hospitals need to purchase both the hardware and the pharmaceuticals for some imaging applications, the Commission focused its analysis on any possible conglomerate e ects arising from the merger. e Commission was concerned, in particular, that GE could have incentives to o er bundles of products, at better prices than the sum of the individual products or by designing its products in such a way that Amersham’s products would work better with GE than with rival equipment (technical tying).
Markedsundersøgelsen viste imidlertid, at det var usandsynligt, at noget sådant ville ske. Det beroede på, at hverken GE eller Amersham havde nogen dominerende stilling inden for deres respektive produkter i Europa.
However, the market investigation showed that such a scenario was unlikely. is was because neither GE nor Amersham held dominant positions in their respective products in Europe.
Desuden var både kunderne og ere konkurrenter enige i, at de relevante markeder var præget af hård konkurrence og tilstedeværelsen af stærke udstyrsfabrikanter som Philips, Siemens og Toshiba samt stærke medicinalproducenter som Schering, Bristol Myers Squibb, Tyco/Mallinckrodt og Bracco. Kommissionen drog derfor den konklusion, at der ikke var nogen sandsynlighed for, at disse aktører ville blive trængt ud af markedet eller marginaliseret.
Furthermore, both customers and a number of competitors agreed that the markets concerned enjoyed strong competition with viable equipment manufacturers such as Philips, Siemens and Toshiba, and strong pharmaceuticals makers such as Schering, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Tyco/Mallinckrodt and Bracco. e Commission therefore concluded that these players were unlikely to be foreclosed from the market or to become marginalised. e technical tying concerns were also dismissed as the Commission ascertained that there was perfect interoperability between the di erent
Også betænkelighederne angående den tekniske bundtning bortfaldt, da Kommissionen fastslog, at alle de forskellige udstyrs- og medicinalprodukter, der fandtes, var fuldt kompatible indbyrdes, og at denne kompatibilitet ikke kunne antages at ville blive mindsket med markedsføringen af nye produkter.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 existing equipment and pharmaceutical products and that such interoperability was unlikely to be reduced when new products came to market.
Messer-koncernen opererede i Tyskland, Det Forenede Kongerige og USA. Kommissionen var betænkelig ved, at overtagelsen kunne føre til højere priser for gaskunderne, især i Tyskland.
Messer Group had activities in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. e Commission was concerned that the acquisition would result in higher prices for gas customers — particularly in Germany.
Men e er de tilsagn, parterne afgav, kunne fusionen godkendes, uden at det var nødvendigt at iværksætte en tilbundsgående undersøgelse.
However significant divestments were o ered which rendered regulatory clearance possible without the need for an in-depth investigation.
På nationalt plan rejste den desuden duopolproblemer i Tyskland (risiko for et duopol sammen med Linde AG) for bulk- og askegas til brug i industrien og i hospitalsektoren.
On a national level, it furthermore raised duopoly concerns in Germany (together with Linde AG) for gases supplied in bulk and cylinders for industrial and medical use.
For at imødekomme Kommissionens betænkeligheder afgav Air Liquide tilsagn om at aænde betydelige dele af sine egne eller Messers aktiviteter i Tyskland. Der var bl.a. tale om dele af Messers rørledningsnet og ere tonnagefabrikker, fabrikker til ydendegørelse af lu gasser og askepåfyldningsanlæg samt kundegrundlaget hertil.
To address the Commission’s concerns, Air Liquide committed itself to divesting significant parts of its or Messer’s activities in Germany. ese divestments included parts of Messer’s pipeline networks and several tonnage plants, liquefiers for air gases and lling centres for cylinders as well as the related customer bases.
Air Liquide forpligtede sig desuden til at aænde Messers interesser i sit joint venture med Nippon Sanso, der producerer ESG-gasser.
Air Liquide also committed itself to divesting Messer’s participation in its joint venture with Nippon Sanso, a company which produces ESGs.
I januar afgav medicinalvirksomheden Sanofi-Synthélabo SA et overtagelsestilbud på Aventis SA, som Kommissionen godkendte på en række betingelser.
In January, pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Synthelabo SA announced a takeover bid for Aventis SA which the Commission approved subject to conditions.
Aventis var selv et resultat af en fusion mellem Hoechst og Rhône-Poulenc, der blev godkendt i august 1999 på nærmere betingelser.
Aventis was itself the result of a merger between Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc which was cleared in August 1999, subject to conditions. is combination would have created one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world and raised some competitive concerns in the markets where their activities overlapped.
Den nye fusion ville have skabt en af verdens største medicinalvirksomheder og rejste visse konkurrenceproblemer på de markeder, hvor der var overlapning mellem de to virksomheders aktiviteter.
It appeared that competition might be reduced to the detriment of patients suffering from thrombosis, colorectal cancer and insomnia.
Der var bl.a. tale om medicin til behandling af hjerteproblemer, dårligt blodomløb, øre-, næse- og halsinfektioner og søvnløshed, og størsteparten af overlapningerne opstod på markederne for hepariner og heparoider (i alle 11 EU-lande) og midler til behandling af tyktarmscancer (i 7 EU-lande).
Such products were used for the treatment of heart failure, poor arterial circulation, ear, nose and throat infections, insomnia, with the most overlaps occurring in markets
Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken 2004 — Bind 1 afsvækkelse af konkurrencen på visse markeder for sikkerhedstjenester i Luxembourg, Nederlandene og Det Forenede Kongerige.
II — Merger control for heparins and heparoids (in 11 EU countries) and colorectal cancer treatment (in seven EU countries). A ected areas also included sales of vitamins, muscle relaxants and antibiotics.
Den engelsk-danske fusion ville skabe verdens næststørste aktør i sikringsbranchen, hvor svenske Securitas fortsat vil være den største.
239. e Commission also granted regulatory clearance to the proposed merger between Securicor and Group 4 Falck a er the companies resolved concerns about reduced competition in some security service markets in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. e Anglo-Danish merger would create the second largest security company in the world a er Securitas of Sweden.
Den danske virksomhed Group 4 Falck og den britiske Securicor er aktive inden for private sikkerhedstjenester. De tilbyder begge en bred vi e af tjenester, bl.a. pengetransporter, vagtværn, alarmsystemer og tjenester til det o entlige (f.eks. fængselsdriog fangetransporter).
Group 4 Falck, a Danish company, and Securicor, a company based in the United Kingdom, are active providing private security services. ey both o er a wide range of activities such as cash transportation, guarding services, alarm systems and justice services (e.g. management and transport of prisoners).
Parterne ville overføre alle deres aktiver til en ny virksomhed, Group 4 Securicor, med undtagelse af Group 4 Falcks tjenester til det o entlige (som skulle aændes til en tredje virksomhed før fusionens gennemførelse).
All assets of the parties were to be merged into a new company named Group 4 Securicor, with the exception of Group 4 Falck’s justice activities (which were to be sold to a third company before the completion of the merger).
Som følge af forskellene i lovgivningen i de forskellige lande leveres sikkerhedstjenester på et nationalt eller et regionalt plan. Fusionen blev derfor behandlet på basis af hvert land.
Because of the di erent regulatory framework in each country, the provision of security services is on a national or regional level.
Den oprindeligt anmeldte fusionsplan ville have givet parterne store markedsandele i de berørte regioner og elimineret en betydelig konkurrent på de i forvejen stærkt koncentrerede markeder.
Owens-Illinois is an international manufacturer of glass containers, machinery for manufacturing glass containers, and plastic containers and associated equipment. In the European Union it has glass manufacturing operations in Finland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Ud over fusionsparterne var der kun én anden større aktør i disse regioner, nemlig franske St. Gobain, idet de øvrige konkurrenter på de berørte områder var ret små.
245. e transaction, as originally notified, would have led to high market shares in the regions concerned and would have removed an important competitor in what are already highly concentrated markets.
På disse områder ville fusionen derfor have resulteret i, at antallet af store leverandører blev reduceret fra tre til to.
Besides the merging partners, the only other major player in these regions is French company St. Gobain, the other competitors in the a ected regions being rather small. erefore, in these areas, the e ect would have been to reduce the number of significant suppliers from three to two.
For at imødekomme Kommissionens betænkeligheder tilbød Owens-Illinois at aænde et produktionsanlæg til en rentabel, uaængig konkurrent i hvert af de to berørte områder, nemlig i Milano i Italien og Barcelona i Spanien.
In order to alleviate the Commission’s concerns, Owens-Illinois o ered to divest a production plant to an independent, viable competitor in each of the two a ected regions, in Milan in Italy and in Barcelona in Spain.
GIMD er en fransk koncern med interesser inden for især lu fartsindustri, it, vinavl og magasiner. GIMD udgiver bl.a. magasinerne Valeurs Actuelles, Le Journal des Finances, Finances Magazine and Le Spectacle du Monde.
GIMD is a French group with interests mainly in aeronautics, computing, wine growing and magazines.
Socpresse er også en fransk udgiver af landsdækkende og regionale dagblade, magasiner og fagtidsskri er.
Socpresse is also a French company producing national and regional daily newspapers, magazines and specialist publications.
Socpresse er moderselskabet i Figaro Holding, der udsender dagbladene Le Figaro og Figaro Magazine, og i L’Express-L’Expansion-koncernen, der udgiver en lang række blade, bl.a. L’Express, L’Expansion, La Vie Financière og Mieux Vivre Votre Argent.
It is the parent company of Figaro Holding, which produces the daily Le Figaro and Figaro Magazine, and the Groupe L’Express–L’Expansion, which publishes a large number of magazines, including L’Express, L’Expansion, La Vie Financière and Mieux Vivre Votre Argent.
Den ville have været i stand til at dominere markedet via det magtfulde Socpresse-agentur, der sælger annonceplads i over 80 magasiner og dagblade.
250. e Commission’s inquiries indicated that the GIMD/Socpresse group would control a significantly larger number of economic and nancial magazines than its
For at løse konkurrenceproblemerne og dermed undgå en tilbundsgående undersøgelse tilbød GIMD at aænde økonomi- og nansmagasinet La Vie Financière, der udgives af Express-Expansion-koncernen, hvilket Kommissionen som følge af denne publikations kvalitet og anseelse fandt, var tilstrækkeligt.
To resolve the competition concerns and hence avoid an in-depth investigation, GIMD o ered to dispose of the economic and nancial magazine La Vie Financière, published by the Express-Expansion Group, which, given the quality and reputation of the publication, the Commission felt was enough to dispel its doubts.
Men for at sikre, at størsteparten af de journalister, der arbejder på La Vie Financière, bliver der e er salget og ikke gør brug af den opsigelsesklausul, som indehavere af et pressekort i henhold til fransk lovgivning har i tilfælde af, at deres blad aændes, vil Kommissionen insistere på, at køberen af dette blad er en tilstrækkeligt troværdig aktør i bladsektoren, for derved at sikre dets fortsatte beståen som en e ektiv konkurrent på markedet på længere sigt.
However, in order to ensure that most of the journalists working on La Vie Financière stay with the magazine a er it is sold and do not exercise their right to leave under the clause de cession provided for by French industrial legislation for holders of a press card, the Commission will try to ensure that the purchaser of the publication has sufficient credibility in the publishing sector to ensure the continuity of the title and e ective longterm competition in the market.
Den 17. august godkendte Kommissionen på en række nærmere betingelser den schweiziske virksomhed Syngenta Crop Protection AG’s overtagelse af den nederlandske frøproducent Advanta BV.
On 17 August, the Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the proposed acquisition of Dutch-based seed producer Advanta BV by Swiss-based Syngenta Crop Protection AG.
Under sin gennemgang af Fox Paines overtagelse af Advanta konstaterede Kommissionen, at Fox Paine har interesser inden for adskillige sektorer og bl.a. også er majoritetsaktionær i den amerikanske frøproducent Seminis, der udvikler, avler og sælger frugt- og grønsagsfrø også i Europa.
A few days later, on 20 August, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition by Fox Paine, a US manager of investment funds, of Advanta’s worldwide activities in seeds for sugar beet, oilseed rape, sorghum, sun ower, grasses as well as the maize and cereals businesses outside North America.
Der var overlapning mellem Seminis og Advanta på markederne for ærte- og løgfrø, men markedsundersøgelsen tydede ikke på nogen særlige konkurrenceproblemer, da parterne fortsat ville skulle konkurrere med andre store producenter.
258. e Commission’s review of the Fox Paine/Advanta transaction showed that Fox Paine has interests in several sectors, including a majority holding in US seed producer Seminis, which develops, grows and sells fruit and vegetable seeds including in Europe. e activities of Seminis and Advanta overlapped in the markets for vining pea seeds and onion seeds, but the market investigation did not reveal any particular competition concern as the parties would continue to face competition from other important players.
Den 17. december godkendte Kommissionen den amerikanske virksomhed Cytec Industries Inc.’s (Cytec) overtagelse af UCB’s Surface Specialties-division (Surface Specialties) e er en række tilsagn fra parterne.
On 17 December, the Commission cleared, subject to commitments, the proposed acquisition of UCB’s Surface Specialties (Surface Specialties) business by Cytec Industries Inc. (Cytec) of the USA.
Cytec producerer specialkemikalier og -materialer, bl.a. kemikalier til minedriog vandbehandling, over adebehandling, bindemidler og kompositmaterialer samt kemikalier til mursten.
Cytec produces specialty chemicals and materials, including mining and water treatment chemicals, coating chemicals, adhesives and composite materials and building block chemicals.
Surface Specialties, som tilhørte den belgiske kemikalie- og medicinalkoncern UCB, producerer over adebehandlingskemikalier, bindemidler og kemikalier til grafik. k.
Surface Specialties, part of the Belgian chemicals and pharmaceutical company UCB, produces coating chemicals, adhesives and chemicals used for graphic arts applications.
Disse problemer blev løst, da Cytec afgav tilsagn om at aænde Surface Specialties’ fabrik i Fechenheim (Tyskland), der tegner sig for næsten hele Surface Specialties’ produktion i Europa.
Cytec was able to remove these concerns by o ering to divest Surface Specialties’ Fechenheim plant (Germany), which accounts for almost all of Surface Specialties’ European production.
BOKS 7: DET FØRSTE SKRIDT PÅ VEJEN MOD EN KONSOLIDERING AF LUFTFARTSSEKTOREN I EUROPA FUSIONEN MELLEM AIR FRANCE OG KLM OG ALLIANCEN MELLEM AIR FRANCE OG ALITALIA
BOX 7: A FIRST STEP IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF EUROPEAN AVIATION THE AIR FRANCE/KLM MERGER AND THE AIR FRANCE/ALITALIA ALLIANCE
Med hensyn til udviklingen i EU-reglerne i lu fartssektoren har de sidste 3 år været meget begivenhedsrige. Open Skies-dommene (1) fra 2002 og det lovgivningsarbejde, Kommissionen k gennemført i de foregående år (2), havde tilvejebragt det juridiske grundlag for at få skabt et ægte indre marked inden for civil lu fart.
Introduction e last three years have been particularly productive for Community law in the eld of aviation. e ‘open skies’ judgments (1) in 2002 and the legislative e ort launched by the Commission in previous years (2) created the legal basis for the development of a truly internal market for the civil aviation industry.
Det var dere er op til de europæiske yselskaber at udnytte de nye regler og sørge for at få skabt paneuropæiske aktører, så vi får gjort en ende på den hidtidige fragmentering af den europæiske lu fartssektor (3).
It was then the turn of European airline companies to respond to this new legal environment and create EU-wide players, putting an end to the fragmentation of the European aviation industry (3).
Siden 2002 har Air France og KLM som de første europæiske yselskaber grebet denne mulighed.
Since 2002, Air France and KLM have been the rst European carriers to seize this opportunity.
Air France (AF) og KLM anmeldte deres fusion i andet halvår af 2003, og den blev godkendt af Kommissionen den 11. februar (4).
Air France (AF) and KLM announced their merger in the second half of 2003 and it was cleared by the Commission on 11 February (4).
Kort e er denne beslutning, nemlig den 7. pril, k AF indrømmet fritagelse e er EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3, for sin
Soon a er the AF/KLM decision, on 7 April, AF was granted an exemption under Article 81(3) EC for its more traditional alliance with Alitalia (AZ) (5