natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I de forenede sager FI/2003/0024 og FI/2003/0027 (168) om de o entligt tilgængelige internationale telefontjenester leveret på et fast sted til private kunder og erhvervskunder i Finland fandt Kommissionen, at den nske nationale lovgivningsmyndighed, Ficora, ikke fremlagde tilstrækkeligt bevis og ikke tog hensyn til den eksisterende lovgivning på markedet, da den nåede til den konklusion, at der ikke var nogen operatører med stærk markedsposition på disse markeder.
In the joint cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027 (168), concerning the publicly available international telephone services provided at a xed location for residential and non-residential customers in Finland, the Commission found that the Finnish NRA, Ficora, did not provide sufficient evidence and did not take into account existing regulation in the market when reaching the conclusion that there were no operators with SMP on these markets. e Commission contested Ficora’s nding, according to which, despite the high market shares (above 50 %) of TeliaSonera, the latter did not have SMP as a result of low barriers to entry, the large number of undertakings providing international telephone services and the fact that subscribers could easily acquire international telephone services from operators other than the one providing the subscriber connection.
Kommissionen satte spørgsmålstegn ved Ficoras konklusion, ifølge hvilken TeliaSonera til trods for høje markedsandele (over 50 %) ikke havde stærk markedsposition som følge af lave adgangsbarrierer, det store antal virksomheder, der leverer internationale telefontjenester, og det forhold, at abonnenterne let kunne købe internationale telefontjenester hos andre operatører end den operatør, der
Furthermore, Ficora’s assessment of the degree of market power of the undertakings in the markets did not take appropriately into account the existence of regulatory remedies and their impact on the perceived level of competition in the market, thereby considerably undermining its conclusions. In particular, Ficora’s claims that barriers to entry into these markets were low and that there were several undertakings providing international telephone services, and the resulting conclusion of a lack of SMP relied on existing regulation, such as carrier selection, carrier-pre-selection and the
Beslutning af 20.2.2004, K(2004)527 endelig, tilgængelig på: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
Decision of 20.2.2004, C(2004) 527 nal, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
Kommissionen påpegede, at et centralt princip i markedsanalyse var at vurdere, hvorvidt den e ektive konkurrence udelukkende eller hovedsageligt var et resultat af den eksisterende regulering, og om konkurrencesituationen på det de nerede marked kunne tænkes at være anderledes uden en sådan regulering.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 obligation to interconnect. e Commission pointed out that a key principle of market analysis was to assess whether e ective competition was or was not entirely or primarily a result of regulation in place, and whether the status of competition in the de ned market was likely to be di erent in the absence of such regulation.
I sag FI/2004/0082 (169) vedrørende markedet for adgang og opkaldsoprindelse i o entlige mobilnet i Finland konkluderede Kommissionen, at den påtænkte foranstaltning, som Ficora havde anmeldt, ikke kunne understøtte den konklusion, at TeliaSonera havde en stærk markedsposition på det nske marked for adgang og opkaldsoprindelse i o entlige mobilnet.
In case FI/2004/0082 (169), concerning the market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks in Finland, the Commission concluded that the dra measure notified by Ficora lacked the evidence to support the conclusion that TeliaSonera had significant market power in the Finnish market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks.
Selv om TeliaSonera havde en markedsandel på over 60 %, var der to andre mobilnetoperatører på udbudssiden og foruden netoperatørerne over ti tjenesteudbydere på markedets e erspørgselsside.
Although TeliaSonera had a market share in excess of 60 %, there were two other mobile network operators on the supply side, and in addition to the network operators more than 10 service providers on the demand side of the market.
Tjenesteudbyderne har været i stand til at indgå engrosa aler, herunder virtuelle mobilnetoperatøra aler, på et kommercielt grundlag — uden nogen lovfæstet pligt for mobilnetoperatører til at give adgang — med alle mobilnetoperatører på det relevante marked. Kommissionen fandt, at foruden den tydelige dynamik, der stammer fra detailmarkedet, konkurrerede mobilnetoperatørerne om og var i stand til at indgå a aler med forskellige tjenesteleverandører på grund af deres evne til at tilvejebringe eksible tilbud eller typer af tjenester, som ikke blev tilvejebragt af andre mobilnetoperatører.
Service providers have been able to conclude wholesale agreements, including mobile virtual network operator agreements, on a commercial basis — without any regulatory obligation for mobile network operators to provide access — with all mobile network operators in the relevant market. e Commission found that in addition to the apparent dynamics resulting from the (downstream) retail market, mobile network operators were competing for and were able to conclude agreements with di erent service providers due to their ability to provide exible o ers or types of services that were not provided by other mobile network operators.
Endvidere fremlagde Ficora ikke overbevisende dokumentation for, at koblingsomkostningerne i betydelig grad ville hæmme en tjenesteleverandørs mulighed for at udski e sin engrosleverandør.
Furthermore, Ficora did not provide convincing evidence that the switching costs would significantly hinder the ability of a service provider to change its wholesale provider.
I sag AT/2004/0090 (170) vedrørende det østrigske marked for transittjenester i det o entlige faste net var Kommissionen ikke enig med den østrigske nationale lovgivningsmyndigheds konklusion om, at operatører, der leverer transittjenester til sig selv, udgjorde en del af transitmarkedet, og at Telekom Austrias markedsandel derfor lå under 50 %, og at det derfor ikke havde nogen stærk markedsposition.
Finally, in case AT/2004/0090 (170), concerning the Austrian market for transit services in the xed public network, the Commission did not agree with the Austrian NRA’s conclusion that operators providing transit services for themselves were part of the transit market, and that therefore the market share of Telekom Austria was below 50 % and consequently it did not have SMP.
Navnlig underbyggede den østrigske nationale lovgivningsmyndighed ikke i tilstrækkelig grad
In particular, the Austrian NRA did not substantiate to a sufficient extent its nding that network operators purchasing transit services could promptly shi to selfprovision in response to price change, in the light of the high investments and the substantial planning and time associated with network roll-out.
Beslutning af 5.10.2004, K(2004)3682 endelig, kan ndes på http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home Beslutning af 20.10.2004, K(2004)4070 endelig, kan ndes på: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
Decision of 5.10.2004, C(2004) 3682 nal, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ ecctf/home Decision of 20.10.2004, C(2004) 4070 nal, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
Forhandlinger mellem EU og USA om åbent luftrum
EU/US open aviation area negotiations
E er Open Skies-retssagerne indledte EU og USA forhandlinger med henblik på at etablere et åbent lu rum mellem disse to store handelspartnere. I juni k EU’s transportministre forelagt et omfattende udkast til a ale, som kunne have løst en lang række juridiske spørgsmål og banet vej for en fuldstændig liberalisering af lu fartstjenesterne mellem EU og USA.
Following the ‘open skies’ court cases, the EU and the USA entered into negotiations with a view to establishing an open aviation area between these two major trading partners.
Den 3. marts fremsatte Kommissionen forslag om en tredje jernbanepakke, indeholdende foranstaltninger med henblik på at åbne markedet for grænseoverskridende passagertjenester med virkning fra 2010. Det drejer sig bl.a. om en togoperatørs ret til at medtage og afsætte passagerer på en hvilken som helst station på ruten, herunder mellem stationer beliggende i samme medlemsstat (cabotage).
On 3 March, the Commission tabled proposals for a third railway package, including measures to open up the market for cross-border passenger services with e ect from 2010. is would include the right for a train operator to pick up and set down passengers at any station along the line of route, including between stations located in the same Member State (cabotage).
Selv om en medlemsstat skulle få tilladelse til at begrænse denne adgangsret til afgangssteder og destinationer, der allerede er omfattet af en o entlig tjenestekontrakt, skal denne begrænsning afpasses strengt e er behovet for at bevare den økonomiske ligevægt i den tjeneste, der er indgået kontrakt om. Begrebet »international grouping« skal ligeledes ophæves med
While a Member State would be permitted to limit this right of access for origins and destinations already covered by a public service contract, this limitation would have to be strictly proportionate to the need to maintain the economic equilibrium of the contracted service.
Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken 2004 — Bind 1 virkning fra 2010. Pakken blev behandlet af Parlamentet den 23. november.
Also with e ect from 2010, the concept of ‘international grouping’ would be abolished. e package was considered by Parliament on 23 November.
Ved årets udgang ventede den på førstebehandling i plenarforsamlingen.
At the end of the year, it was awaiting its rst reading in plenary.
Den 29. april blev den anden jernbanepakke endelig vedtaget e er et forlig. Den største hindring var åbningen af markedet for jernbanefragttransporttjenester.
On 29 April, the second railway package was nally adopted following conciliation. e main stumbling block was market opening for rail freight transport services.
Det blev a alt, at alle jernbanefragtmarkeder i EU, herunder cabotage, skulle åbnes fuldstændigt senest den 1. januar 2007.
It was agreed that all EU rail freight markets, including cabotage, would be fully open by no later than 1 January 2007.
Oprettelsen af et integreret og e ektivt europæisk marked for nansielle tjenesteydelser er et vigtigt og ambitiøst mål, der forfølges i Lissabon-processen og gennem handlingsplanen for nansielle tjenesteydelser.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 through the ‘financial services action plan’.
GD for Konkurrence har bl.a. arbejdet aktivt med at fremme liberaliseringen af værdipapirmarkederne og få disse til at fungere hensigtsmæssigt, herunder handel, clearing og afregning.
In particular, the Competition DG has been active in promoting the liberalisation and proper functioning of securities markets, including trading, clearing and settlement.
Uden forbedringer vil margenen mellem investorernes aast og udstedernes nansieringsomkostninger være højere end nødvendigt.
Without improvements, the margin between investors’ returns and the cost of nance for issuers will be higher than it need be.
Håndhævelse og styrkelse af konkurrencen har derfor positive virkninger, såsom bedre fordeling af nansielle ressourcer til fordel for såvel investorerne som o entligheden, idet aastet på investeringer f.eks. påvirker pensionernes størrelse.
Competition enforcement and advocacy therefore have beneficial e ects such as better allocation of nancial resources to the benefit both of investors and of the public at large, as the return on investments in uences, for example, the amount of pensions.
I USA er omkostningerne ved afvikling af en aktietransaktion beregnet til 0,10 EUR, mens omkostningerne ved afregning af en almindelig grænseoverskridende handel i Europa kan løbe op i 35 EUR eller mere. Siden 2001 har en række grupper på højt plan og ekspertgrupper, som f.eks.
In the USA, the cost of settling an equity transaction has been calculated at EUR 0.10, while the cost of settling a standard cross-border trade in Europe can be EUR 35 or more.
Lamfalussy-vismandsudvalget og Giovanninigruppen, udpeget grænseoverskridende clearing og afvikling, herunder især spørgsmål i relation til adgang og prisfastsættelse, som den vigtigste årsag til, at de europæiske værdipapirmarkeder ikke fungerer e ektivt. Den første beslutning på dette område blev vedtaget den 2. juni i Clearstream-sagen (se henvisning i afsnit I.B.1).
Since 2001 high-level groups and expert groups, such as the Lamfalussy group of wise men and the Giovannini group, have identified cross-border clearing and settlement, and in particular issues related to access and pricing, as the main source of inefficiencies for the proper functioning of European securities markets. e rst decision in this area was adopted on 2 June in the Clearstream case (referred to above in section I.B.1).
Generaldirektoratet for Det Indre Marked fortsætter arbejdet med betalingssystemer og værdipapirmarkeder.
Work is proceeding with the Internal Market DG on payment systems as well as on securities markets.
B ANDRE SEKTORER
B OTHER SECTORS
Liberale tjenester, som i denne sammenhæng betyder tjenester ydet af liberale erhverv, spiller en vigtig rolle med hensyn til at styrke den europæiske økonomis konkurrenceevne.
Professional services, meaning in this context services provided by liberal professions, have an important role to play in improving the competitiveness of the
Den italienske konkurrencemyndighed har anslået, at i Italien kan gennemsnitlig 6 % af eksportvirksomhedernes omkostninger henføres til liberale tjenester. Større forskel i priser og kvalitet samt større innovation i de liberale tjenester kunne således yde et vigtigt bidrag til at forbedre de europæiske virksomheders konkurrenceevne og styrke væksten i BNP i EU.
European economy. ey are inputs for the economy and business, and their quality and competitiveness have substantial spillover e ects. e Italian Antitrust Authority has estimated that in Italy 6 % of exporting rms’ costs on average are due to professional services. us, greater variety in prices and quality, as well as greater innovation in professional services could go a long way to improve the competitiveness of European enterprises and foster GDP growth in the EU.
Som følge heraf bør moderniseringen af de liberale erhverv ses som et led i Lissabon-dagsordenen.
For these reasons the modernisation of professional services should be seen as part of the Lisbon agenda.
I den nærmeste fremtid vil konkurrencen om liberale tjenester fortsat hovedsageligt foregå på lokalt plan.
For the foreseeable future, competition for professional services will continue to take place mainly at local level.
Den 9. februar vedtog Kommissionen en rapport om konkurrencen inden for de liberale erhverv (171). Hovedformålet med denne rapport er at redegøre for
On 9 February, the Commission adopted a report on competition in professional services (171). e main purpose of this report is to set out the Commission’s thinking on the scope for reforming or modernising specific professional rules.
I denne rapport udpeges de fem vigtigste former for potentielt restriktiv regulering inden for de liberale erhverv i EU: a) prisfastsættelse, b) vejledende priser, c) reklamerestriktioner, d) adgangskrav og eksklusive rettigheder samt e) regler for virksomhedsstrukturen og multidisciplinære aktiviteter.
In this report the ve main categories of potentially restrictive regulation in the EU professions are identified: (i) price xing, (ii) recommended prices, (iii) advertising regulations, (iv) entry requirements and reserved rights, and (v) regulations governing business structure and multidisciplinary practices.
På den ene side konkluderes det i rapporten, at et omfattende empirisk forskningsmateriale påviser de negative virkninger, som overdrevne eller forældede restriktive reguleringer kan have for forbrugerne.
On the one hand, the report concludes that a significant body of empirical research shows the negative e ects that excessive or outdated restrictive regulations may have for consumers.
Sådanne reguleringer kan nemlig erne eller begrænse konkurrencen mellem tjenesteudbydere og således reducere incitamentet for de liberale erhverv til at arbejde omkostningseffektivt, sænke priserne, øge kvaliteten og tilbyde innovative tjenester.
Indeed, such regulations may eliminate or limit competition between service providers and thus reduce the incentives for professionals to work cost-e ciently, at lower prices, to increase quality or to o er innovative services.
På den anden side erkendes det i rapporten, at der hovedsageligt er tre grunde til, at det kan være nødvendigt med en vis regulering af de tjenesteydelser, de liberale erhverv udbyder. For det første er der en asymmetrisk information mellem kunder og tjenesteudbydere: et karakteristisk træk ved de liberale erhverv er, at tjenesteudbyderne skal have en stor teknisk viden, som forbrugerne ikke nødvendigvis besidder; for det andet er der de eksterne følger, idet disse tjenesteydelser kan få følger for tredjemand; og for det tredje anses visse liberale erhverv for at producere »offentlige goder«, der har værdi for samfundet som helhed.
On the other hand, the report acknowledges that there are essentially three reasons why some regulation of professional services may be necessary: rst, asymmetry of information between customers and service providers: a de ning feature of professional services is that they require practitioners to display a high level of technical knowledge which consumers may not have; second, externalities, as these services might have an impact on third parties; and third, certain professional services are deemed to produce ‘public goods’ that are of value for society in general.
For så vidt angår anvendelsen af EU’s konkurrenceregler, skelnes der i rapporten mellem de faglige organisationers og medlemsstaternes potentielle ansvar.
As far as the application of EU competition rules is concerned, the report distinguishes between the potential liability of professional bodies and that of the Member States.
Når en faglig organisation regulerer sine medlemmers økonomiske adfærd, er de regler, den vedtager, vedtagelser inden for sammenslutninger af virksomheder e er EF-traktatens artikel 81.
When a professional body regulates the economic behaviour of its members, the regulations it adopts are decisions of associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 EC.
Regler, som objektivt set er nødvendige for at sikre korrekt udøvelse af erhvervet i henhold til den ordning, erhvervet er underlagt i den pågældende medlemsstat, er imidlertid ikke omfattet af det forbud, der er indeholdt i denne artikel (172).
However, regulations which are objectively necessary to guarantee the proper practice of the profession, as organised in the Member State concerned, fall outside the scope of the prohibition contained in that article (172).
Statslige bestemmelser, som indfører eller fremmer en konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd eller styrker virkningerne heraf, er i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra g), artikel 10, stk. 2, og artikel 81.
State regulation which imposes or favours anticompetitive conduct or reinforces its e ects, infringes Articles 3(1)(g), 10(2) and 81 EC.
Når en medlemsstat uddelegerer sin beslutningsret til en faglig sammenslutning uden tilstrækkelige beskyttelsesforanstaltninger — dvs. uden klart at angive de mål af almen interesse, der skal respekteres, uden at beholde den endelige beslutningsbeføjelse og uden at overvåge gennemførelsen — kan medlemsstaten også drages til ansvar for eventuelle overtrædelser som følge heraf.
Where a State delegates its policymaking power to a professional association without sufficient safeguards — that is, without clearly indicating the public interest objectives to be respected, without retaining the power to take the decisions of last resort and without monitoring implementation — the Member State can also be held liable for any resulting infringement.
Endelig bør der e er Kommissionens opfattelse ved enhver nærmere undersøgelse af faglige regler anvendes en proportionalitetstest.
Ultimately, in the Commission’s view, in all scrutiny of professional regulation a proportionality test should be applied.
Reglerne skal være objektivt nødvendige for at nå et klart formuleret og legitimt mål af o entlig interesse, og de skal udgøre den mindst konkurrencebegrænsende mekanisme til at nå dette mål.
Rules must be objectively necessary to attain a clearly articulated and legitimate public interest objective and they must be the mechanism least restrictive of competition to achieve that objective.
De regulerende myndigheder i medlemsstaterne og de faglige organisationer opfordres til at gennemgå de eksisterende regler under hensyntagen til, om de er nødvendige af hensyn til den almene interesse, om de er proportionelle, og om de er berettigede. Rapporten sætter desuden fokus på behovet for at indføre mekanismer, som er konkurrencefremmende og fører til større gennemsigtighed med henblik på at styrke forbrugernes rettigheder.
Regulatory authorities in the Member States and professional bodies are invited to review existing rules taking into consideration whether those rules are necessary for the public interest, whether they are proportionate and whether they are justified. e report also highlights the need to put in place mechanisms which are procompetitive and lead to greater transparency in order to strengthen consumer empowerment.
Hvis de konkurrencebegrænsende regler er koncentreret om en enkelt medlemsstat, bliver den administrative gennemførelse af EU’s konkurrenceregler i de liberale erhverv først og fremmest et anliggende for de relevante regionale konkurrencemyndigheder. Kommissionen vil imidlertid fortsat om nødvendigt se på individuelle sager.
To the extent that competition restrictions have their centre of gravity in one Member State, administrative enforcement of the EU competition rules in the liberal professions will then mainly be the task of the relevant national competition authority. e Commission will, however, also continue to carry out casework where appropriate.
En sammenhængende anvendelse af artikel 81 og 82 vil blive sikret gennem samordning inden for Det Europæiske Konkurrencenetværk (netværk mellem konkurrencemyndigheder).
Coherent application of Articles 81 and 82 EC will be ensured through coordination in the European competition network of competition authorities.
Disse møder giver Kommissionen mulighed for at nde ud af, hvilke restriktioner der ser ud til at være over ødige og eventuelt skal ernes eller begrundes.
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577.
De giver de europæiske faglige organisationer mulighed for at redegøre for deres opfattelse af de mål af almen interesse, der ndes på deres område, og indgå en a ale med Kommissionen om mere konkurrencefremmende mekanismer til at nå disse mål. De europæiske faglige organisationer skal dere er videregive Kommissionens tanker til de relevante nationale faglige organisationer.
III — Sector developments pharmacists to bilateral meetings to discuss the justification for the existing professional rules. ese meetings enable the Commission to clarify which restrictions appear to be excessive and might need to be eliminated or justified. ey provide an opportunity for the European professional bodies to explain their understanding of the public interest objectives in their domain and to come to an agreement with the Commission on more procompetitive mechanisms to achieve those objectives. e European professional bodies should then relay the Commission’s concerns to the relevant national professional organisations.