natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det betyder sammen med det faktum, at Kommissionen også flere måneder og endog år efter, at beslutningen er truffet, skal føre tilsyn med opfyldelsen af komplicerede tilsagn, at Kommissionen er tvunget til at afsætte mere tid og flere ressourcer til disse sager.
This, together with the factthat complicated undertakings need careful monitoring on the Commission’s part months, and evenyears, after the decision has been taken, means that the Commission is forced to devote more time andresources to the cases concerned.
Når konkurrenceproblemerne ydermere er af en sådan karakter, at de kun kan løses ved hjælp af omfattende og detaljerede tilsagn, er Kommissionen nødt til meget nøje at overveje, om de komplekse tilsagn, den accepterer, fører til et reelt tilfredsstillende resultat ud fra et konkurrencemæssigt synspunkt, eller om den i stedet burde have nedlagt forbud mod sådanne fusioner.
Moreover, when the nature of competition problems becomes such thatthey require elaborate undertakings and mechanisms to remove the concerns, the Commission has tocarefully consider whether accepting complex undertakings will lead to a truly satisfactory result fromthe competition point of view or whether such transactions should instead be prohibited.
Antallet af beslutninger, hvor fase 1 -tilsagn blev accepteret, er langt større end de i alt 12 sidste år.
The number of decisions where first phase remedies were acceptedclearly exceeded last year’s total of 12 decisions.
11999 kunne 19 fusioner, som førhen skulle have været under kastet fase 2-undersøgelser, således godkendes efter seks uger på grundlag af tilsagn afgivet af parterne.
In 1999, 19 cases which would previously have beensubject to second phase investigations were able to be cleared after six weeks with undertakings.
De mest omfattende tilsagn i fase 1-sager blev godtaget i Ave/i/ti-fusionen mellem Hoechst og Rhône-Poulenc C12).
The most comprehensiveundertakings in Phase I proceedings were accepted in the merger between Hoechst and Rhône-Poulencinto Aventis(112).
Disse tilsagn gik ud på afhændelse af kemikalievirksomhederne Rhodia og Celanese samt Hoechsts veterinærdivision, HR Vet.
Those undertakings included the divestment of the chemical businesses of Rhodia and Celanese as well as Hoechst’s veterinary division, HR Vet.
Desuden afgav parterne også tilsagn for at imødekomme konkurrenceproblemer på forskellige markeder for lægemidler og landbrugskemikalier, som Kommissionen havde påvist under sine undersøgelser.
In addition, the parties submittedcommitments in response to competition concerns in various pharmaceutical and agrochemical marketsas identified by the Commission during its investigation.
Det forud sætter dog, at Kommissionen har garanti for, at alle potentielle konkurrenceproblemer er tilgodeset.
This can,however, be done only if the Commission is certain that all potential competition problems are resolved.Moreover, it is essential that the Commission be given sufficient time to investigate notified transactions,in particular if it is likely that they could be cleared only subject to undertakings.
Desuden er det meget vigtigt, at Kommissionen får tid nok til at behandle de anmeldte transaktioner, navnlig når der er sandsynlighed for, at de kun vil kunne godkendes med tilsagn.
For instance, despitethe need for substantial undertakings, the Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenccase was able to be cleared in Phase I because there were detailed discussions between the parties and the Commission before the operationwas formally notified.
Til trods for nødvendigheden af omfattende tilsagn kunne Hoechst/Rhône-Poidenc-sagen f.eks. således godkendes i fase 1, fordi der havde været
Therefore, in cases where the parties suspect that the transaction will lead tocompetition concerns, it is important that they contact the Commission at the earliest possible stage, andbefore formal notification takes place.
Boks 8: Fristen for afgivelse af tilsagn i fase 2-sager
Box 8:Legal deadlines forsubmitting undertakings in Phase II cases
Artikel 18, stk. 2, i gennemførelsesforordningen (') fastsætter, at de tilsagn, der afgives over for Kommissionen i fase 2-sager, skal være indsendt senest tre måneder efter den dato, hvor fase 2undersøgelserne blev indledt.
Article 18(2) of the implementing regulation(1) provides that commitments offered to the Commission in Phase II cases must be submitted to the Commission within not more than threemonths from the date on which the Phase II proceedings are initiated.
Kommissionen kan under ekstraordinære omstændigheder forlænge denne tremånedersfrist.
The Commission may, inexceptional circumstances, extend the three-month period.
I 1999 måtte Kommissionen i to tilfælde tage stilling til, om den skulle forlænge fristen for godtagelse af tilsagn i fase 2-sager.
The Commission had to take a stance onthe issue of extending the legal deadline to accept remedies in Phase II proceedings twice in 1999.
I Telia/Telenor besluttede Kommissionen at acceptere tilsagn en uge efter, at den fastsatte frist var udløbet.
In Telia/Telenor, the Commission agreed to accept commitments one week after the expiry of the legaldeadline.
I denne beslutning tog Kommissionen hensyn til, at de anmeldende parter havde haft yderligere og ekstraordinære vanskeligheder med at indsende deres tilbud om tilsagn. Dette skyldtes ikke selskabernes ejerforhold som sådan, men derimod, at det svenske og det norske parlament skulle høres, før der blev af givet tilbud om tilsagn.
In reaching this decision, the Commission took into account the fact that the notifyingcompanies faced additional and exceptional constraints in submitting the proposed commitments.These additional constraints were due, not to the companies’ownership structure as such, but to thefact that the Swedish and Norwegian Parliaments had to be consulted prior to the submission of theproposed remedies.
Kommissionen tog også hensyn til, at parterne allerede havde angivet, hvad de yderligere tilsagn ville gå ud på i deres anmodning om en forlængelse af fristen, og at denne anmodning blev indgivet inden for den gældende frist.
The Commission also took account of the fact that the parties had alreadyindicated what the additional commitments would be in their request for an extension and that thisrequest was submitted within the legal deadline.
Kommissionen hæftede sig desuden ved,at der var tale om klare tilsagn, som satte den i stand til at foretage en tilbundsgående vurdering af den ændrede fusionsplan.
The Commission further took note of the clear-cutcharacter of the proposed undertakings, which enabled it to conduct a full and proper assessment ofthe modified proposal.
I AirtourslFirst Choice afviste Kommissionen derimod at acceptere tilsagn efter udløbet af den gældende frist.
In Airtours/First Choice, however, the Commission rejected the submission of undertakings outsidethe legal deadline.
Kommissionen gennemgik en række tilsagn, som Airtours havde afgivet kort før udløbet af tremånedersfristen, men fandt dem utilstrækkelige. Airtours reviderede derefter sit tilbud, men det nye tilbud blev først fremsendt til Kommissionen, efter at den gældende frist for at acceptere tilsagn var udløbet.
The Commission considered a package of possible remedies offered by Airtoursshortly before the end of the three-month period, but these undertakings were found to be inadequate.Airtours subsequently revised its proposal, but the proposal was submitted to the Commission onlyafter the legal deadline to accept remedies had expired.
Der blev ikke fundet nogen ekstraordinære omstændigheder i denne sag.
Noexceptional circumstances were found toexist in this case.
Der var efter Kommissionens opfattelse intet i det nye tilbud, der ikke kunne have været tilbudt i det oprindelige.
There was nothing, in the Commission’s view, in the new proposal which could nothave been included in the original one.
For at kunne vurdere det reviderede tilbud, ville det desuden have været nødvendigt at høre tredjeparter og konsultere medlemsstater, og dette kunne ikke nås på den korte tid, der var tilbage af den tid, inden for hvilken der i henhold til forordningen skal være truffet en beslutning.
Moreover, in order to assess the revised proposal, it wouldhave been necessary to consult third parties and liaise with Member States, and this could not havebeen completed within the short time remaining under the statutory period for a final decision.
Disse to sager illustrerer, hvilke vanskeligheder der er forbundet med at forlænge fristen for at acceptere tilsagn.
These two cases illustrate the difficulties relating to the extension of the time limit to acceptundertakings.
Formålet med bestemmelserne i forordningens artikel 18, stk. 2, er at tilgodese to lige vigtige be hov — på den ene side må Kommissionen, medlemsstaterne og interesserede parter have rimelig tid til at foretage en ordentlig vurdering af parternes tilsagn, og på den anden side må der i overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet kunne tages hensyn til særlige forhold,der gør det berettiget at afkorte den tid, der skønnes nødvendig for denne vurdering.
Article 18(2) aims to reconcile two equally important needs: first, the need properly toassess the undertakings submitted by the parties for the Commission, Member States and interestedthird parties within a reasonable time and, second, the need to take account, in line with the principleof proportionality, of specific situations justifying a shortening of the time period that is considerednecessary to carry out the assessment.
Kommissionen er også nødt til at arbejde tæt sammen med Det Rådgivende Udvalg, der består af repræsentanter for medlemsstaterne, og det kan også være nødvendigt, at der er tid til at forhandle om ændringer, der eventuelt måtte være nødvendige.
The Commission also has to liaise closely with the advisorycommittee of Member States and time may also be needed to negotiate any changes that may benecessary.
Desuden er Kommissionen nødt til at afslutte den interne sagsbehandling, der fører til vedtagelsen af en endelig be slutning i kommissærkollegiet, inden for den firemånedersfrist, der er fastsat i forordningen.
Moreover, the Commission needs to complete the internal procedures leading to theadoption of a final decision by the College of Commissioners within the statutory four-monthdeadline.
Undtagen under ekstraordinære omstændigheder vil de tre måneder derfor blive betragtet som den absolut sidste frist for indgivelse af tilsagn i fase 2-sager fremover.
In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the three-month deadline will therefore beconsidered the strict final deadline for submitting undertakings in Phase II proceedings in futurecases.
Kommissionen har redegjort forårsagerne til denne frist i sit udkast til meddelelse om tilsagn, der blev sendt til høring i den brede offentlighed før Air tourslFirst Choice-sagen.
The Commission has outlined the reasons for this time limit in its draft notice on commitments,which was released to the general public for comments before the Airtours/First Choicecase.
(') Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 447/98 af 1. marts 1998 om anmeldelser, frister og udtalelser i henhold til Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89 om kontrol med fusioner og virksomhedsovertagelser.
(1)Commission Regulation (EC) No447/98 of 1 March 1998 on the notifications, time limits and hearingsprovided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.
Artikel 2, stk. 4
4.Article 2(4)
I henhold til fusionsforordningens artikel 2, stk. 4, skal et joint venture, der har til formål eller til følge at samordne moderselskabernes konkurrenceadfærd, også vurderes efter kriterierne i EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1 og stk. 3.1 1999 fik Kommissionen 19 sager af den type til behandling, og den vedtog 15 beslutninger.
According to Article 2(4) of themerger regulation, a joint venture having as its object or effect the coordination of the competitivebehaviour of its parent companies also has to be appraised in accordance with the criteria of Article 81(1)and (3) of the EC Treaty. In 1999, 19 such cases were investigated and 15 decisions taken.
14 tilfælde blev de pågældende joint ventures først godkendt, efter at parterne havde afgivet tilsagn.
Fourcooperation cases were cleared only after the parties submitted undertakings.
Kommissionen rejste indsigelser mod, at dette joint venture kunne resultere i en samordning af moderselskabernes konkurrenceadfærd.
The Commission raised concerns that the joint venture could lead to coordination of the parties’competitive behaviour.
For at imødekomme disse indsigelser tilbød AT & T at afhænde ACC UK.
In order to remove these concerns,AT & Toffered to divest ACC UK.
AT & T afgav også tilsagn om en skarpere strukturel adskillelse mellem AT & T og Telewest.
AT & Talso committed itself to more structural separation between AT & Tand Telewest.
Desuden tilbød AT & T at give en anden distributør adgang til at distribuere AUCS-tjenester (dvs. globale teletjenester leveret af AUCS, som er et joint venture mellem AT & T og Unisource) i Det Forenede Kongerige, når AT & T UK opløses.
Furthermore, AT & Tundertook to give another distributor the option to distribute AUCS services (i.e. global telecommunications services offered by the company AUCS, a joint venture betweenAT & T and Unisource) in the UK, as AT & TUK will be wound up.
Kommissionen fastslog, at fusionen ikke ville have større virkninger for konkurrencen i de nordiske lande med undtagelse af Norge, hvor Skandia sidder på en stor del af markedet via Vesta, som er et helejet datterselskab af Skandia P & C Insurance Company Ltd (pubi).
The Commission concluded that theoperation would have only minor effects on competition in the Nordic countries, with the exception of Norway, where Skandia has a significant market presence through Vesta, a wholly owned subsidiary of Skandia P & C Insurance Company Ltd (publ).
For at imødekomme de konkurrenceproblemer, der skyldtes Storebrands og Vestas tilsammen store markedsandele i Norge, gik Skandia med til at afhænde sit norske datterselskab Vesta Forsikring A/S, således at Storebrands position på markedet ikke blev styrket yderligere.
In order to remedy the competition concerns arising fromthe combined market shares of Storebrand and Vesta in Norway, Skandia agreed to divest its Vesta Forsikring A/S subsidiary there, thus avoiding a further strengthening of Storebrand’s market position.
For at imødekomme Kommissionens indsigelser tilbød Alitalia og KLM at træffe en række foranstaltninger, der kunne give konkurrenterne lettere adgang, og som stemte overens med de tidligere beslutninger, der er truffet i luftfartssektoren (se kapitel I.C.4.).
To remedy theseconcerns, Alitalia and KLM proposed a set of measures to facilitate entry in line with previous decisionsin the air transport sector (see Chapter I.C.4. above).
Disse betydelige tilsagn omfattede et tilsagn om at stille slots til rådighed for nye konkurrenter på de pågældende ruter (op til 336 slots om ugen), skære ned på parternes afgange på ruterne Amsterdam-Milano og/eller Amsterdam-Rom, når et nyt selskab begynder at flyve på disse ruter, indgå interliningaftaler med det nye selskab, give en ny konkurrent adgang til at deltage i KLM's og Alitalias Frequent Flyer Programme, afstå fra at binde rejseagenter og erhvervskunder i Italien og Nederlandene til alliancen gennem loyalitetsrabatter og lignende ordninger samt sikre, at når et konkurrerende selskab er begyndt af flyve på den eller de pågældende ruter, vil det første skærmbillede i edb-reservationssystemet ikke blot vise alliancens afgange, og at kunderne informeres om de nærmere codesharing-aftaler.
The extensive undertakings offered included: acommitment to make available slots to new entrants on the routes in question (up to 336 weekly slots);a commitment to reduce the parties’frequencies on the Amsterdam-Milan and/or Amsterdam-Romeroutes when an entrant starts operations; a commitment to enter into interlining agreements with the newentrant and to give any new entrant the opportunity to participate in KLM’s and Alitalia’s Frequent Flyer Programme; a commitment to refrain from tying travel agents and corporate customers in Italy and the Netherlands respectively with loyalty or other similar rebate schemes; and a commitment to ensure that,once a competing airline has entered on the route(s) in question, the first screen of the computerreservation system (CRS) is not filled with the flights of the Alliance and that consumers will beinformed about the precise code-share arrangements.
Der var tale om en sammenlægning mellem Siemens'
This operation combines the European businesses of
XXIX BERETNING OM KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN — SEK(2000) 720 ENDELIG 75 europæiske aktiviteter og Fujitsu inden for udvikling, fremstilling og salg af computerudstyr og produkter i tilknytning hertil, bl.a. desktop-PC'er, laptop-PC'er, arbejdsstationer, servere og lagringssystcmer.
Siemens and Fujitsu for the development, manufacture and sale of computer hardware and relatedproducts, including desktop PCs, laptops, workstations, servers and storage systems.
For at imødekomme Kommissionens indsigelser angående dette marked afgav Siemens tilsagn om at afhænde sit datterselskab på dette marked, Siemens Nixdorf Retail and Banking Systems GmbH.
Toaddress the Commission’s serious competitive concerns in that market, Siemens undertook to divest Siemens Nixdorf Retail and Banking Systems GmbH, a subsidiary active on that market.
Boks 9: Bødepålæg for urigtige eller vildledende oplysninger i anmeldelser
Box 9:Fines forsupplying incorrect ormisleading information in the notification
Et markant træk ved udviklingen i Kommissionens fusionskontrol er, at Kommissionen for første gang har gjort brug af sine beføjelser til at pålægge virksomheder bøder for at have givet urigtige eller vildledende oplysninger i deres anmeldelse eller under de efterfølgende undersøgelser.
An important development in merger control was that, for the first time, the Commission used its powersto fine companies for supplying incorrect or misleading information in their notifications or during thesubsequent investigations.
I henhold til fusionsforordningen kan Kommissionen pålægge bøder på mellem 1 000 og 50 000 EUR, hvis en virksomhed forsætligt eller uagtsomt har givet urigtige eller forvanskede oplysninger i en anmeldelse eller i et svar på en begæring om oplysninger.
The merger regulation stipulates that the Commission can impose fines of between EUR 1 000 and EUR 50 000 where a company provides intentionally or negligently incorrect ormisleading information in a notification or in response to a request for information.
I februar 1999 anmeldte Deutsche Post AG en planlagt overtagelse af enekontrollen med det tyske ekpresbefordringssclskab Trans-o-flex GmbH.
In February 1999,Deutsche Post AG notified its planned acquisition of sole control over the German high-speeddelivery service, trans-o-flex GmbH.
Ifølge Deutsche Post havde selskabet overtaget en minoritetspost i Trans-o-flex i 1997, men anmeldelsen indeholdt oplysninger, der pegede i retning af, at der dengang var tale om overtagelse af enekontrollen.
According to Deutsche Post, it had acquired a minorityshareholding in trans-o-flex in 1997 but the notification contained facts that pointed to an acquisitionof sole control during that time.
I så fald ville Kommissionen ikke have haft nogen kompetence til at behandle den transaktion, der blev anmeldt i 1999, hvorimod aktiekøbet i 1997 skulle have været be handlet af flere nationale myndigheder.
If that had been the case, the Commission would have had nojurisdiction to assess the transaction as notified in 1999 but, instead, the evaluation of the acquisitionof the shares in 1997 would have had to be carried out by a number of national authorities.
På baggrund heraf afkrævede Kommissionen Deutsche Post og andre virksomheder yderligere oplysninger angående 1997-transaktionen.
On thebasis of these indications, the Commission requested additional information from Deutsche Post andothers concerning the 1997 transaction.
Kommissionens undersøgelser tydede på, at Deutsche Post havde haft kontrol med Trans-o-flex siden 1997 via virksomhedens hovedaktionær, et selskab ved navn Industrial Information. Deutsche Post havde således gjort sig skyld i en alvorlig overtrædelse af to bestemmelser i fusionsforotdningen. Kommissionen pålagde derfor to separate bøder, hver især på 50 000 EUR, som er det maksimumbeløb,der kan pålægges i henhold til fusionsforordningen.
The Commission’s investigation suggested that Deutsche Post had exercised controlover trans-o-flex since 1997 through its largest shareholder, a company called Industrial Information.Deutsche Post thus committed a serious infringement of two provisions of the merger regulation.
Kommissionen pålagde desuden KLM en bøde for at have givet urigtige og vildledende oplysninger. KLM anmeldte i september 1998 en planlagt overtagelse af Martinair til Kommissionen.
The Commission also imposed a fine on KLM for supplying incorrect and misleading information.KLM notified the Commission of its planned acquisition of Martinair in September 1998.
Denne anmeldelse blev derefter trukket tilbage.
Thenotification was subsequently withdrawn.
Overtagelsen blev anmeldt på ny i december 1998, men opgivet i maj 1999. efter at Kommissionen havde rejst indsigelser mod den.
The operation was re-notified to the Commission in December 1998 but abandoned in May 1999 after the Commission raised objections against theoperation.
Kommissionen indledte procedure i sagen, fordi KLM havde givet urigtige oplysninger i sin første anmeldelse fra september 1998.
The Commission started proceedings in that case because KLM supplied incorrectinformation in its first notification, the one issued on September 1998.
Heri gav KLM urigtige oplysninger om datterselskabet Transavias charterdestinationer og tilbageholdt oplysninger om Transavias ruteflyvninger.
In that notification, KLMsubmitted incorrect information on the charter destinations of its subsidiary Transavia and withheldrelevant information on scheduled flights of Transavia.
KLM gav specielt en urigtig beskrivelse af Transavias destinationer og undlod at angive 10 af Transavias vigtigste destinationer. KLM fremstillede Transavias og Martinairs aktiviteter som værende »stort set komplementære«, medens begge flyselskaber i realiteten flyver til alle destinationer i Middelhavsområdet.
In particular, KLM gave an incorrectdescription of the destinations of Transavia and failed to list 10 important Transavia destinations.KLM presented the operations of Transavia and of Martinair as ‘largely complementary’while, inreality, both airlines operated to all Mediterranean destinations.
Desuden undlod KLM at oplyse, at Transavia havde omfattende ruteflyvninger til Middelhavsdestinationerne og solgte et stort antal sæder på disse fly til nederlandske rejsearrangører, og KLM gav således en vildledende beskrivelse af Transavias aktiviteter.
Furthermore, KLM failed to informthe Commission about the fact that Transavia had substantial scheduled operations to Mediterraneandestinations and sold a significant number of seats on these flights to Dutch tour operators, therebygiving a misleading description of the activities of Transavia.
Kommissionen fandt, at KLM havde handlet groft uagtsomt og pålagde en bøde på 40 000 EUR.
The Commission considered thebehaviour of KLM to be grossly negligent, at the very least, and imposed a fine of EUR 40 000.
Kommissionen besluttede at pålægge Sanofi og Synthelabo (') maksimumbøden på 50 000 EUR for at have givet urigtige oplysninger.
The Commission decided to impose the maximum fine of EUR 50 000 on Sanofi and Synthélabo(1)for providing incorrect information.
I denne sag måtte Kommissionen tilbagekalde sin oprindelige godkendelse efter at have opdaget, at parterne ikke havde givet oplysninger om alle deres overlappende aktiviteter.
In this case the Commission had to revoke its original clearance decision following the discovery that the parties had not provided information on all their overlappingactivities.