natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Af disse grundekonkluderede Kommissionen, at fusionen ikke ville føre til skabelse eller styrkelse af nogendominerende stilling, hverken i form af enedominans eller i form af kollektiv dominans, på markedernefor elkabler med lav- og mellemspænding samt elkabler med høj og ekstra høj spænding tilenergiforsyningsselskaberne.
For these reasons, the Commissionconcluded that the concentration would not lead to the creation or strengthening of any dominantposition, either single or collective, in respect of the markets for the provision of power cables oflow/medium and high/extra-high voltage to the energy utilities.
Boeing Companys overtagelse af Hughes Electronics Corporations aktiviteter på satellitområdet blevgodkendt efter en tilbundsgående undersøgelse.
The acquisition by the Boeing Company of the satellite business of Hughes Electronics Corporation wascleared following an indepth investigation.
Kommissionen fastslog, at HSC fortsat ville være udsatfor konkurrence fra andre store primærleverandører af satellitter som f.eks. Lockheed Martin, S/S Loral,Alcatel Space Industries og Astrium.
The Commission’s investigation found that HSC will remainsubject to competition from other large satellite prime contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, S/S Loral,Alcatel Space Industries and Astrium.
Med denne transaktion vil parternes aktiviteter inden for satellitkonstruktion blivelagt sammen, og den vil resultere i en vertikal integration mellem Hughes’ satellitaktiviteter og Boeingssatellitopsendelsesaktiviteter.
The transaction will combine the parties’ satellite manufacturing activities and result in verticalintegration between Hughes’ satellite operations and Boeing’s launch activities.
Kommissionens undersøgelser viste, at HSC’s position ikke ville blive nævneværdigt styrket eftertransaktionen, for eftersom HSC blev udskillet fra Hughes-koncernen, ville HSC ikke i større omfang fånye muligheder, men ville måske i stedet miste Hughes’ satellitoperatørkunder (PanAmSat, DirecTV og Hughes Network Systems), der tegnede sig for tæt ved 45 % af HSC’s satellitordrer i årene mellem 1997og 1999.
The Commission’s investigation showed that HSC’s position would not be significantly strengthened asa result of the transaction since HSC’s severance from the Hughes group would not create new majoropportunities for HSC, and might instead cause HSC to lose the custom of Hughes’ satellite operatingcompanies (PanAmSat, DirecTV and Hughes Network Systems), which represented approximately 45 %of HSC’s satellite orders between 1997 and 1999.
Kommissionen så også på, om parterne kunne få Hughes’ kunder til at vælge Boeing somopsendelsesoperatør ved at gøre det dyrere at bruge andres raketter til at opsende HSC’s satellitter end Boeings raketter.
The Commission also investigated whether the parties could induce Hughes customers to choose Boeingas a launch service operator by making the integration of its satellites with third-party launch vehiclesmore expensive than in the case of Boeing vehicles.
Der var også frygt for, at Hughes kunne påvirke valget af opsendelsesraket til Boeingsfordel i forbindelse med Delivery In Orbit-kontrakter.
There were also fears that Hughes could influencethe launch vehicle selection to the advantage of Boeing in the case of ‘delivery in orbit’ contracts.
Kommissionens omfattende rundspørge blandtkunderne viste, at HSC tværtimod sandsynligvis ville miste kontrakter, hvis selskabet forsøgte at gøre detdyrere at bruge dets satellitter sammen med andre opsendelsesraketter end Boeings.
Theextensive customer enquiry indicated that HSC would be more likely to lose contracts if it attempted toincrease the costs of integration of its satellites to non-Boeing launchers.
2.Fusioner godkendt på visse betingelser efter fusionsforordningens artikel 8, stk. 2
2.Merger proposals conditionally cleared pursuant to Article 8(2) of the ECMR
Med TotalFinas overtagelse af Elf Acquitaine opstod verdens fjerdestørste oliekoncern, og der vardesuden tale om en fusion mellem de to førende aktører på et nationalt marked.
The takeover of Elf Acquitaine by TotalFina created the world’s fourth-largest oil group and was also acase of regrouping of major national players.
Kommissionens opgavebestod i at påvise og eliminere såvel aktivitetsoverlapninger som flaskehalse, der kunne sætte den nyeenhed i stand til at dominere markedet i kraft af kontrol med importlogistik, transport og distribution afraffinerede olieprodukter.
The Commission’s task was to identify and eliminate (i)activity overlaps and (ii) bottlenecks that could enable the new entity to corner the market by controllingimport logistics and the transport and distribution of refined petroleum products.
En anden grund til at analysere denne transaktion meget nøje var, at den måtteventes at få betydelige virkninger på vigtige forbrugermarkeder.
The operation called forcareful assessment also owing to its expected significant impact on vital markets for consumers.
Med hensyn til engrossalg af motorbrændstof og fyringsolie samt kontrol med »logistikkæden« fremgikdet af Kommissionens analyse, at den planlagte fusion ville have ført til, at et enkelt integreretolieselskab ville komme til at sidde på 55 % af raffineringskapaciteten og en tilsvarende andel afmarkederne for motorbrændstof og fyringsolie og samtidig ville kontrollere de fleste franskeimportdepoter og de tre største rørledninger, der forsyner alle egne af Frankrig, og desuden ville have enbetydelig andel af de lokale olielagre.
On the wholesale business in fuel and domestic heating oil and control of the ‘logistical chain’, itemerged from the Commission’s analysis that the proposed concentration would have led to a singleintegrated refiner holding 55 % of refining capacity and an equivalent share in the wholesale car fuel anddomestic heating oil markets and controlling most French import depots, the three main pipelinessupplying every corner of France and a substantial share of the local depots.
Denne kombination ville have givet TotalFina/Elf en megetbetydelig markedsstyrke, som hverken aftagerne (supermarkeder og store endelige forbrugere) ellerkonkurrenterne i olieindustrien ville have kunnet anfægte.
This combination wouldhave given TotalFina/Elf substantial market power which neither the demand side (supermarkets ormajor end customers) nor competitors in the refining industry could have challenged.
Det ville have sat TotalFina/Elf i stand til athæve priserne, i første omgang på engrosmarkederne, og efter således at have svækket supermarkedernei konkurrencen, derefter på markederne for detailsalg af motorbrændstof og fyringsolie.
This would haveallowed TotalFina/Elf to increase prices, initially on the wholesale markets and then, having thusweakened competition from the supermarkets, on the retail market for sales of car fuel and domesticheating oil.
TotalFina måttederfor afhænde en stor del af sine investeringer i transport- og lagerinfrastrukturer for at opnå Kommissionens godkendelse af denne fusion.
TotalFina therefore undertook to sell off a large proportion of its investments in transport andstorage logistics in order to gain the Commission’s approval for the planned merger.
Inden for salg af brændstof på motorveje fremgik det af Kommissionens undersøgelser, at konkurrencen,som allerede var svækket efter fusionen mellem TotalFina og Elf, praktisk taget ville blive elimineret,hvis de to selskaber kom til at sidde på tæt ved to tredjedele af markedet.
On motorway fuel sales, the inquiry carried out by the Commission showed that competition, alreadyreduced by the merger between TotalFina and Elf, would be virtually eliminated if these two operatorsmanaged to concentrate nearly two thirds of the market in their hands.
I lyset af Kommissionenskraftige indsigelser tilbød TotalFina at opgive 70 tankstationer.
In view of the Commission’sextreme concern about this risk, TotalFina proposed to give up 70 service stations.
Kommissionen fandt også, at LPG-markedet allerede var stærkt koncentreret, og at den nye enhed efterfusionen ville få en dominerende stilling på markedet — navnlig ville dens kontrol medlogistikinfrastrukturerne til import, oplagring og aftapning (af flaskegas) overalt i Frankrig gøre den heltuafhængig og uden behov for at udveksle infrastrukturadgang med konkurrenterne, hvilket ellers ernormalt i denne branche.
The Commission also found that the LPG market is already highly concentrated and that, following themerger, the new entity would acquire a dominant position on the market; in particular, its control of thelogistical infrastructure for imports, storage and bottling (for conditioned LPG) would make itcompletely independent across the whole of France, freeing it from the need to have recourse, as isnormal practice in this sector, to infrastructure access swaps with its competitors.
De franske LPG-infrastrukturer er præget af kapacitetsproblemer, navnlig omvinteren, hvor efterspørgslen er størst, hvilket gør det vanskeligt for en konkurrent at øge sine leverancer,hvis den dominerende koncern hæver sine priser.
French LPG logisticsare stretched, especially in winter when demand is heaviest, making it difficult for a competitor toincrease its supplies should the dominant group raise its prices.
I tilfælde af kraftige prisforhøjelser fra dendominerende udbyders side vil det formentlig være i de andre udbyderes interesse at følge trop i stedetfor at risikere en konfrontation.
In such a price-hike scenario, it wouldprobably be in the interests of players to follow the market leader rather than risk a confrontation.
TotalFina tilbød endelig at afhænde hele Elf Antargaz, hvorved enhveroverlapning mellem Totals og Elfs LPG-aktiviteter elimineres.
TotalFina finally offered to sell off the whole of Elf Antargaz, which will have the effect of eliminatingany overlapping between Total’s and Elf’s LPG businesses.
For at forhindre den fusionerede enhed i at få fuldstændig kontrol med salg af jetbrændstof i Lyon og Toulouse lufthavne har TotalFina afgivet tilsagn om at sælge sin 50 %-andel i de infrastrukturpools,selskabet overtager sammen med Elf.
In order to prevent the new merged entity from gaining a complete stranglehold over the sale of jet fuelsat Lyon and Toulouse airports, TotalFina has undertaken to sell the 50 % share in the infrastructure poolsacquired following its takeover of Elf.
I kraft af sine strukturforbindelserog visse bestående kontraktarrangementer med Bertelsmann ville AOL/TW også få fortrinsadgang til Bertelsmann-indhold og specielt til Bertelsmanns store musikbeholdning.
Because of the structurallinks and some existing contractual arrangements with Bertelsmann, AOL/TW would also have hadpreferred access to Bertelsmann’s content and, in particular, to its large music library.
AOL/TW ville dermed havefået kontrollen med den førende kilde til musikrettigheder i Europa, hvor TW og Bertelsmann tilsammensidder på omkring en tredjedel af markedet.
As a result,AOL/TW would have controlled the leading source of music publishing rights in Europe, where TW and Bertelsmann together hold approximately one third of the market.
For at imødegå de konkurrenceproblemer, transaktionen rejste, tilbød parterne en række tilsagn, der isidste instans tager sigte på at bryde forbindelserne mellem Bertelsmann og AOL.
In order to ease the competition concerns raised by the transaction, the parties offered a package ofcommitments whose ultimate goal is to break the links between Bertelsmann and AOL.
I særdeleshed har AOL og Bertelsmann indført en ordning, hvor Bertelsmann gradvis skal trække sig ud af AOL Europe ogdet franske joint venture AOL Compuserve.
In particular,AOL and Bertelsmann have put in place a mechanism by which Bertelsmann will progressively exit from AOL Europe and the French joint venture AOL Compuserve.
Desuden vil parterne i mellemtiden tage skridt til at sikre, at AOL og Bertelsmann handler uafhængigt af hinanden indtil Bertelsmanns endelige udtræden.
In addition, the parties will take interimmeasures to ensure that the relationships between AOL and Bertelsmann will be kept at arm’s lengthuntil Bertelsmann’s exit has been completed.
Specieltvil AOL/Time Warner ikke handle på en sådan måde, at der kun bliver online-adgang til Bertelsmannsmusik via AOL, eller at musikindholdet formateres i et format, der kun kan afspilles på en AOL-afspiller.
In particular, AOL Time Warner will not take any actionthat would result in Bertelsmann music being available online exclusively through AOL or beingformatted in a proprietary format that is playable exclusively on an AOL music player.
Kommissionen konkluderede, at når Europas største medieselskab — og navnlig dets førendemusikenhed, BMG — således bliver frit stillet og kan konkurrere uafhængigt, vil AOL/TW inden formusikrettigheder ikke have den kritiske størrelse, der skal til for at kunne dominere markedet.
With Europe’s largest media company, particularly its leading music unit BMG, freed to compete alone,the Commission concluded that AOL/TW would not have the critical mass in terms of music publishingrights to dominate the market.
I Air Liquide/BOC identificerede Kommissionen særskilte produktmarkeder i industrigassektoren påbasis af gastype og distributionsmåde og afgrænsede de relevante markeder til tonnagemarkedet,bulkmarkedet og flaskemarkedet.
In Air Liquide/BOC, the Commission identified distinct product markets in the industrial gases sector,defined by type of gas and by method of distribution, namely (i) the tonnage market, (ii) the bulk marketand (iii) the cylinders market.
Kommissionen tog hensyn til samspillet mellem disse markeder, derf.eks. indebærer, at en stærk stilling på tonnagemarkedet ofte vil give konkurrencefordele påbulkmarkedet og omvendt.
The Commission took account of the interrelation between these markets,implying for instance that a strong position on the tonnage market will often confer competitiveadvantages on the bulk market and vice versa.
Tonnagemarkedet blev fundet at omfatte hele EØS.
The tonnage market was considered to be EEA-wide.
På dette marked ville parterne have fået endominerende stilling. Parterne afgav imidlertid tilsagn, som løste de af Kommissionen påvistekonkurrenceproblemer.
On this market, the parties would have obtained adominant position.
Det geografiske marked for gas solgt i bulk og på flaske (med undtagelse af visse gasser med stor renhedog af høj værdi) blev anset for at være et nationalt marked, hovedsageligt på grund af forskelle i priser,markedsstrukturer og distributionsmåder i medlemsstaterne.
The geographic market for bulk and cylinder gases (with the exception of certain high-purity and highvalue gases) was found to be national in scope owing mainly to different prices, market structures anddistribution systems in Member States.
Det årlige salg fra de anlæg, derafhændes, lå i en størrelsesorden svarende til omkring halvdelen af den markedsandel, Air Liquide ellersville have fået.
The annual sales of the divestedplants were in the range of about half of the market share that Air Liquide would otherwise haveacquired.
På markederne for heliumgas og specialgasser til elektronikindustrien, der blev fundet mere omfattendeend nationale markeder, truede fusionen med at skabe en kollektivt dominerende stilling mellem Air Products (der ligesom Air Liquide havde budt på BOC, således at BOC’s aktiver skulle deles mellem deto selskaber efter transaktionens gennemførelse).
In helium and electronic speciality gases, which were found to be wider than national in scope, theoperation would threaten to create a joint dominant position between the new entity and Air Products (ajoint bidder with Air Liquide for the acquisition of BOC, subject to the division between them of BOC’sassets after completion of the deal).
Disse problemer blev løst gennem afhændelser afkontrakter på leverancer af flydende helium fra Rusland og Polen, adgang til Air Liquide/ BOC’sindkøbsaftaler i USA samt en fastfrysning af Air Liquides kontrol (sammen med Air Products og i sidsteinstans sammen med den algeriske regering) med de vigtige forsyninger fra Algeriet.
Remedies consisted of the divestiture of contracts for liquid heliumsupply from Russia and Poland, access to Air Liquide/BOC’s purchasing agreements in the United States, plus a freezing of Air Liquide’s joint control (together with Air Products and ultimately with the Algerian Government) of the important Algerian supply channel.
Hvad angår denkollektivt dominerende stilling, fusionen ville have ført til på markedet for specialgasser tilelektronikindustrien, blev der afgivet tilsagn om afhændelse af Air Liquides påfyldningsanlæg i Frankrigsamt om at give tredjemand adgang til licenser på BOC’s patentbeskyttede teknologi via en uafhængigpatentadvokat. I sidste instans kom denne fusion imidlertid ikke i stand.
Remedies vis-à-vis the joint dominantposition that the operation would create in electronic specialty gases consisted of the divestment of thetransfill facility owned by Air Liquide in France, and of a commitment to grant third-party access tolicences to BOC’s patented technology, a process to be managed by an independent patent attorney.
De konklusioner, Kommissionen havde draget i Air Liqide-sagen med hensyn til definitionen afproduktmarkeder og geografiske markeder for tonnage-, bulk- og flaskegasser, blev bekræftet i denparallelle sag Linde/AGA. Tilsagnene gik her ud på afhændelser på markederne for bulk- og flaskegasseri Nederlandene og Østrig.
The Commission’s findings in the Air Liquide case as regards the product and geographic marketdefinition of tonnage, bulk and cylinder gases were confirmed in the parallel case of Linde/AGA.Commitments in that case covered divestments in the bulk and cylinder gas markets in the Netherlandsand Austria.
Fusionen mellem de tyske koncerner VEBA og VIAG vil sammen med fusionen mellem RWE og VEW,som samtidig blev behandlet af Bundeskartellamt, ændre situationen i den tyske elindustri, navnlig i desammenkoblede net.
The merger between the German groups VEBA and VIAG, together with the merger between RWE and VEW, which was investigated at the same time by the Bundeskartellamt, will change the face of the German power industry, especially at the level of the interconnected grid.
I sin oprindelige form ville fusionen mellem VEBA og VIAG have ført til etdominerende duopol mellem VEBA/VIAG på den ene side og RWE/VEW på den anden på markedet forelforsyning via de sammenkoblede net.
In its original form, the mergerof VEBA and VIAG would have resulted in a dominant duopoly between VEBA/VIAG on the one handand RWE/VEW on the other on the market in the supply of electricity from the interconnected grid.
Efter fusionen ville PreussenElektra AG (VEBA) og Bayernwerk AG (VIAG) sammen med RWE/VEW have kontrolleret et godt stykke over 80 % af dette marked.
Afterthe merger, PreussenElektra AG (VEBA) and Bayernwerk AG (VIAG) together with RWE/VEW wouldhave controlled well over 80 % of this market.
Der var en lang række strukturbetonede faktorer, der betød, at VEBA/VIAG og RWE efter fusionen idens oprindeligt anmeldte form ikke ville have konkurreret nævneværdigt med hinanden.
Numerous structural factors meant that, after the merger was originally notified, a significant degree ofcompetition between VEBA/VIAG and RWE could no longer be expected.
Der var meget,der tydede på, at der ville blive tale om en parallel adfærd.
There were a number offactors that indicated that parallel behaviour could result.
Blandt disse faktorer kan nævnes, atelektricitet er et ensartet produkt, der sælges på et gennemsigtigt marked, at selskabernesomkostningsstruktur var nogenlunde ens på grund af nogenlunde samme sammensætning af kraftværker,at de desuden drev flere store kraftværker i fællesskab, at der var talrige indbyrdes relationer mellem VEBA/VIAG og RWE, at der kun kunne forventes en ringe vækst i efterspørgslen, og at produktetudmærker sig ved en lav priselasticitet.
These included the fact that electricity is atotally homogeneous product, which is sold on a transparent market; that the companies had similar coststructures owing to a similarly composed stock of power stations and also held a number of jointlyoperated large power stations; that there were numerous interrelationships between VEBA/VIAG and RWE; and that expected growth in demand is low, and the product has a low price elasticity.
Desuden ville duopolet mellem VEBA/VIAG og RWE eller RWE/VEW ikke være udsat for nogennævneværdig konkurrence.
Moreover, the duopoly VEBA/VIAG and RWE or RWE/VEW would not have faced any significantcompetition from outside.
Ud over duopolets ekstremt høje markedsandel hæftede Kommissionen sigved, at bortset fra EnBW vil intet andet elselskab med sammenkoblede net have været uafhængigt afduopolselskaberne. Duopolet ville have kontrolleret langt størsteparten af den installeredeelproduktionskapacitet, næsten hele den frie produktionskapacitet og langt størsteparten aftransmissionsnettet i Tyskland.
In addition to the extremely high market share of the duopoly, apart from EnBW no other interconnected power company would have been independent of the duopolists.
Desuden var markedet præget af betydelige adgangsbarrierer, navnlighvad angår etablering af ny kapacitet og import.
There are alsosignificant barriers to entry to the market, in particular relating to the creation of new capacity andimports.
For at imødekomme Kommissionens indsigelser tilbød VEBA/VIAG at afhænde en lang rækkeinteresser i andre virksomheder og ændre nogle af de rammevilkår, der gælder på elektricitetsmarkedet.Tilsvarende tilsagn blev af RWE/VEW afgivet over for Bundeskartellamt.
In response to the Commission’s objections, VEBA/VIAG proposed that it should dispose of numerousholdings in other companies and make improvements to the ground rules governing the market inelectricity. Similar undertakings have been given to the Bundeskartellamt by RWE/VEW.
VEBA/VIAG’s og RWE/VEW’s tilsagn sikrer, at de vigtigste forbindelser mellem de to store koncerner bliver brudt,navnlig som følge af salget af deres interesser i det østtyske sammenkoblede selskab Vereinigte Energiewerke AG (VEAG) og brunkulsproducenten LAUBAG.
Thecommitments given by VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW ensure that the main links between the two biggroups will be severed, especially as a result of the sale of their holdings in the east Germaninterconnected company Vereinigte Energiewerke AG (VEAG) and the lignite producer Laubag.
VEAG bliver derigennem uafhængig afde store sammenkoblede vesttyske selskaber, som vil være nødt til at tage VEAG alvorligt somkonkurrent.
VEAGwill thus become independent of the west German interconnected companies, and will have to be takenseriously as a competitor.
VEAG får en position på markedet svarende til VIAG’s før fusionen og bliver dentredjestørste på det tyske marked, efterfulgt af det sydtyske selskab Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW).
VEAG will have a market position comparable to that of VIAG before themerger, and will become the third force on the German market, the fourth one being the southerncompany Energie Baden-Württemberg (EnBW).
Salget af disse interesser vil samtidig svække VEBA/VIAG’s og VEAG’s hidtidigemoderselskab RWE/VEW’s position på markedet.
The sale of these holdings will at the same time reducethe market positions of VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW, to whom VEAG belonged until now.
Andre forbindelser med RWE/VEW vil blive brudt gennem afhændelse af VIAG’s direkte og indirekteinteresser i VEW samt VEBA’s aktier i Rhenag Rheinische Energie AG.
Other links with RWE/VEW will be cut by selling off shares in VEW held directly and indirectly by VIAG, and shares in Rhenag Rheinische Energie AG held by VEBA.
De resterende sammenkobledeselskaber vil komme til at stå stærkere — tidligere havde enten VEBA eller VIAG interesser i dem, medundtagelse af EnBW.
The position of the remaininginterconnected companies will be strengthened; either VEBA or VIAG previously had a stake in each ofthese with the exception of EnBW.
Det gælder Hamburg-selskabet Hamburgische Electricitätswerke AG (HEW) og Berlin-selskabet Kraft und Licht AG (BEWAG).
This applies to the Hamburg electricity supplier Hamburgische Electricitätswerke AG (HEW) and the Berlin company Kraft und Licht AG (BEWAG).