natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen fremførte, at bestemmelserne i artikel 21, stk. 3, ville miste enhver virkning, hvis Kommissionen i mangel af en sådan underretning ikke var i stand til at tage stilling til, om en foranstaltning truffet af en medlemsstat var begrundet i en af de interesser, der i artikel 21, stk. 3, udtrykkeligt betragtes som værende legitime. Det ville betyde, at medlemsstaterne kunne undgå Kommissionens stillingtagen ved blot at undlade at underrette den om sådanne foranstaltninger.
In the decision and in its defence before the Court, the Commission argued that the structure of Article 21 is built on the balance between, on the one hand, the Member State being under an obligation to communicate to the Commission in advance ‘any
Sag C-42/01, Den Portugisiske Republik mod Kommissionen, endnu ikke o fentliggjort. Artikel 21, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89, nu artikel 21, stk. 4, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004.COMP/M.2054.Decreto-lei nr. 380/93.
Case C-42/01 Portuguese Republic v Commission, not yet reported.Article 21(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, now Article 21(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.COMP/M.2054.
Under alle omstændigheder havde den portugisiske regering ikke gjort noget sådant hensyn gældende.
Member States could easily avoid the scrutiny of the Commission by not communicating such measures.
De hensyn, der lå til grund for de to afgørelser truffet af den portugisiske nansminister, som Kommissionen i strid med fusionsforordningens artikel 21, stk. 3, ikke var blevet underrettet om, var derfor ikke forenelige med fællesskabsretten (158).
280. e Commission therefore considered that Article 21 should be interpreted as meaning that, irrespective of whether a measure is communicated, the Commission is entitled to adopt a decision assessing whether a measure not covered by one of the three grounds mentioned in Article 21 should be recognised as compatible with the Treaty.
Hvis Kommissionen i mangel af enhver underretning fra den pågældende medlemsstat kun havde mulighed for at anlægge en traktatbrudssag e er traktatens artikel 226, ville det være umuligt at vedtage en EU-beslutning inden for de korte tidsfrister, der er fastsat i fusionsforordningen.
By adopting the decisions declining to authorise the acquisition of more than 10 % of the shares in Cimpor, the Portuguese Republic, in the Commission’s view, in e ect prohibited the acquisition and thereby raised barriers to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital enshrined in the Treaty, which could not be considered warranted under any essential grounds of public interest recognised in the caselaw of the Court.
Og det ville øge risikoen for, at de allerede trufne nationale foranstaltninger uigenkaldeligt ville præjudicere en fusion med fællesskabsdimension og gøre Kommissionens stillingtagen e er artikel 21, stk. 3, virkningsløs, fordi det ville sætte medlemsstaten i stand til at unddrage sig den kontrol, som denne bestemmelse fastsætter.
In any event, the Portuguese Government had not advanced any such grounds. e interest underlying the two decisions of the Portuguese Minister of Finance, which were not notified to the Commission, contrary to Article 21(3) of the merger regulation, was thus found incompatible with Community law (158).
Det bemærkes, at EF-Domstolen den 4. juni 2002 — altså mens denne sag verserede — afsagde dom i sag C-367/98.
Objective of Decree Law No 380/93.It should be noted that, during the proceedings, on 4 June 2002, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Case C-367/98.
Der var tale om en sag, som Kommissionen på grundlag af reglerne for det indre marked havde anlagt mod bl.a. den portugisiske lov nr. 11/90 (rammelov om privatisering) samt lovdekret nr. 380/93 (forhåndsgodkendelse).
In that action, the Commission challenged on the basis of internal market rules, inter alia, Portuguese Law No 11/90 (framework law on privatisation) as well as Decree Law No 380/93 (prior authorisation).
Domstolen fandt, at de portugisiske regler indebar en åbenlys forskelsbehandling af investorer fra andre medlemsstater, hvilket lagde hindringer i vejen for de frie kapitalbevægelser.
The Court found that the Portuguese rules provided for a manifestly discriminatory treatment of investors from other Member States with the e ect of restricting free movement of capital.
Hvad angår Portugals påstand angående nødvendigheden af at sikre sine økonomiske interesser, understregede Domstolen, at sådanne økonomiske hensyn, der fremføres som begrundelse for indførelse af krav om forhåndstilladelse, ifølge fast retspraksis ikke kan retfærdiggøre indskrænkninger i den frie bevægelighed.
As to the argument based on the need to safeguard the nancial interests of the Portuguese Republic, the Court emphasised that it was settled caselaw that such economic grounds, put forward in support of a prior authorisation procedure, cannot serve as justification for restrictions on freedom of movement.
Ved at have vedtaget og bibeholdt især lov nr. 11/90 og lovdekret nr. 380/93 havde Portugal tilsidesat sine forpligtelser i henhold til traktatens artikel 73B (nu artikel 56).
By adopting and maintaining in force, in particular, Law No 11/90 and Decree Law No 380/93, the Portuguese Republic had failed to full its obligations under Article 73b (now Article 56) of the Treaty.
Manglende underretning om de interesser, der søges beskyttet ved den nationale foranstaltning, kan skabe komplikationer og usikkerhed, når Kommissionen skal identificere disse interesser, men den har altid mulighed for at anmode den pågældende medlemsstat om oplysninger herom.
Consequently, one of the essential questions for the Commission in these proceedings was whether the Commission had the competence to adopt an Article 21(3) decision under these circumstances or whether it should have reverted to an infringement procedure under Article 226 of the Treaty. e Commission maintained that Article 21(3) should be interpreted as covering a situation where the Member State has not communicated to the Commission the public interest, other than public security, plurality of the media or prudential rules, it intends to protect prior to taking the measures.
Retten anerkendte, at det havde Kommissionen også gjort.
284. e Court agreed with the Commission that the Commission has the competence to rule by decision as to the compatibility of those interests with the general principles and other provisions of Community law, irrespective of whether or not those interests have been communicated to it.
I sådanne tilfælde må Kommissionen altid først se på, om de pågældende foranstaltninger er begrundet i et af de hensyn, der er nævnt i andet afsnit i fusionsforordningens artikel 21, stk. 3 (offentlig sikkerhed, mediepluralitet, tilsynsregler).
If, in the absence of any communication by the Member State concerned, the sole option open to the Commission were to bring an action for failure to full obligations under Article 226 of the Treaty, it would be impossible to obtain a Community decision within the short time limits laid down by the merger regulation. is would in turn increase the risk of national measures already taken irretrievably prejudicing a merger with a Community dimension and rendering the Commission’s review under Article 21(3) ineffective by giving the Member States the possibility of circumventing the controls laid down by that provision.
Retten konkluderede, at Kommissionen med vedtagelsen af den anfægtede beslutning ikke havde gjort indgreb i EF-Domstolens eller de nationale domstoles kompetence, ikke havde tilsidesat fusionsforordningens artikel 21, stk. 1, og heller ikke havde begået nogen procedurefejl.
In such cases, the Commission inevitably rst needs to examine whether those measures are justified by one of the interests specified in the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of the merger regulation (public security/plurality of media/prudential rules). e Court thus concluded that, in adopting the contested decision, the Commission did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the Court or national courts and did not infringe Article 21(1) of the merger regulation, Article 220 of the Treaty and Article 226 of the Treaty, nor did it commit any misuse of procedure.
I sin dom udtalte Retten sig klart om den nærmere kompetencefordeling mellem nationale myndigheder og EU-myndigheder og om de foranstaltninger, nationale myndigheder og EU-myndigheder kan træffe for at sikre en e ektiv fusionskontrol, der tilgodeser behovet for sund forvaltning, retssikkerheden og de implicerede virksomheders legitime interesser.
In this judgment, the Court clearly emphasised the precise allocation of competencies between the national and Community authorities and interventions that can be made by the national and by the Community authorities with a view to e cient merger control respecting sound administration, legal certainty and the legitimate interests of the undertakings concerned.
Det understreges desuden, at Retten anerkendte artikel 21, stk. 3, som lex specialis, der har forrang for traktatbrudssager anlagt e er traktatens artikel 226.
Most importantly, the Court recognises Article 21(3) as being a lex specialis taking priority over an action for failure to full obligations under Article 226 of the Treaty.
(beslutningen) i MCI/Sprint-sagen (160), som var blevet indbragt for Retten af MCI. I sin beslutning havde Kommissionen nedlagt forbud mod fusionen mellem MCI, tidligere MCI WorldCom, og Sprint, som begge er amerikanske it-selskaber med verdensomspændende aktiviteter, fordi den ville have resulteret i skabelse eller styrkelse af dominerende stillinger på det globale marked for maksimal eller universel internetkonnektivitet.
In the decision, the Commission had prohibited the merger between MCI, formerly MCI WorldCom, and Sprint, both US-based global communications companies, on the ground that it would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the global market for the provision of top-level or universal Internet connectivity.
MCI’s interesse kunne drages i tvivl, navnlig fordi MCI hævdede at have opgivet fusionsplanen allerede før beslutningens vedtagelse.
Doubts could be raised as to MCI’s interest mainly on the ground that it claimed to have abandoned the merger even before adoption of the decision.
Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken 2004 — Bind 1 at Kommissionen havde vedtaget en beslutning rettet til MCI, som var den eneste eksisterende juridiske hindring for at gennemføre transaktionen, hvis parterne skulle ønske at fusionere under samme omstændigheder.
Whereas in previous cases the Court had required that the abandonment of the transaction be directly attributable to the contested decision, in the present case it considers it sufficient that the Commission adopted a decision addressed to MCI which is the only existing legal obstacle to carrying out the transaction should the parties wish to merge under the same conditions.
MCI gjorde i alt væsentligt gældende, at Kommissionen ikke var kompetent til at vedtage beslutningen af 28. juni 2000, da de anmeldende parter formelt havde trukket deres anmeldelse tilbage den 27. juni i et brev, hvori de skrev, at »parterne ikke længere havde til hensigt at gennemføre den anmeldte fusion i den form, hvorunder den blev anmeldt.
In substance, MCI claimed that the Commission lacked the competence to adopt the decision on 28 June 2000, when the notifying parties had formally withdrawn their notification on 27 June by a letter saying: ‘e parties no longer propose to implement the proposed merger in the form presented in the notification.
Såfremt parterne beslutter at fusionere under en anden form i fremtiden, vil de foretage de ændringer, der måtte være nødvendige e er de gældende fusionsregler«. Kommissionen begrundede sin kompetence ved i beslutningen at anføre, at brevet af 27. juni 2000 ikke kunne betragtes som en formel opgivelse af den fusionsa ale af 4. oktober 1999, der var blevet anmeldt, og ved at henvise til parternes pressemeddelelse af 27. juni 2000, hvori de udtalte, at de stadigvæk håbede på, at der kunne ndes en fornu ig løsning i sagen.
In so far as the parties decide to merge their activities in a modified form in the future, the parties will make such modifications as appropriate under the applicable merger laws.’ e Commission substantiated its competence by explaining in the decision that the letter of 27 June 2000 did not amount to a formal abandoning of the merger agreement of 4 October 1999 that was the object of the notification and by referring to the parties’ press releases of 27 June 2000, stating that they still hoped that a sensible conclusion to the merger could be reached.
Antal endelige beslutninger siden 1998 og antal anmeldelser
Number of nal decisions adopted each year since 1998 and number of notications
Sagernes fordeling på fusionstype (1995-2004)
Breakdownby typeofoperation(1995–2004)
Overtagelse af
Acquisition of majority45 %
III UDVIKLINGEN I DE ENKELTE SEKTORER
III SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS
Kommissionen nedsatte bl.a. en ECN-undergruppe for energi og holdt regelmæssigt kontakt med lovgivere på energiområdet (161).
In particular, the Commission established an ECN energy subgroup and liaised regularly with energy regulators (161).
Hvad angår lovgivningsprocessen, var 2004 det år, hvor de direktiver, Kommissionen vedtog i 2003 med henblik på at fremskynde gennemførelsen af det indre marked for gas og elektricitet, skulle gennemføres af medlemsstaterne. De este medlemsstater overholdt desværre ikke denne frist.
As far as the legislative process is concerned, 2004 was the year in which the directives adopted by the Commission in 2003 in order to accelerate the completion of the internal gas and electricity markets were to be transposed by the Member States.
Lovgivningsprocessen skred endvidere frem på fællesskabsplan, og der blev gjort et stort fremskridt med vedtagelsen af Rådets fælles holdning til en forordning om betingelserne for adgang til gastransmissionsnettene. Forordningen vil tackle nogle af de resterende hindringer for gennemførelsen af det indre marked, navnlig med hensyn til samhandel med gas.
Regrettably, most Member States did not respect this deadline. e legislative process advanced also at Community level and significant progress was made with the adoption of the Council common position for a regulation on conditions for access to the gas transmission networks. e regulation will tackle some remaining barriers to the completion of the internal market, in particular regarding trade in gas.
I sagen Gaz de France (162) bekræ ede Kommissionen ved en formel beslutning, at territoriale begrænsningsklausuler er i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 81.
In the Gaz de France case (162) the Commission confirmed by formal decision that territorial restriction clauses infringe Article 81 EC.
Gaz de France og det tyske selskab Ruhrgas (164), e er at den i 2001 og 2003 havde indgået forlig med de tyske selskaber BEB (165) og yssengas (166) og det nederlandske
163) as regards the remaining two suppliers, the French company Gaz de France and the German company Ruhrgas (164), a er settling the case in 2001 and 2003 with the German companies BEB (165) and yssengas (166), and the Dutch company Gasunie (167).
Se ovenfor afsnit I.C.3.Se punkt 81.COMP/36.246.IP/04/573.IP/03/1129.IP/01/1641.IP/03/547.
See above section I.C.3.See above point 81.COMP/36.246.IP/04/573.IP/03/1129.IP/01/1641.IP/03/547.
Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken 2004 — Bind 1 at give det norske datterselskab af det amerikanske energiselskab Marathon adgang til deres respektive gasnet. De tilsagn, som Gaz de France og Ruhrgas tilbød, forbedrede tredjeparters adgang til deres net og gav kunderne mulighed for at få fuld fordel af åbningen af gasmarkederne i Frankrig og Tyskland.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 party access to their networks and allowed customers to fully benefit from the opening of the gas markets in France and Germany.
Ruhrgas forpligtede sig bl.a. til at indføre en ny indgangs-/udgangsordning, som gør det muligt at reservere gastransportkapacitet særskilt ved indgangs- og udgangssteder (frem for at skulle reservere kapacitet via en ktiv kontraktmæssig rute mellem det punkt, hvor gassen føres ind i transportsystemet, og det punkt, hvor den tages ud).
In particular, Ruhrgas undertook to introduce a new entry/exit regime, which makes it possible to book gas transport capacities separately at entry and exit points (rather than having to book capacity over a ctitious contractual path between the point where the gas is injected into the transport system and the point where it is withdrawn).
Gaz de France, som allerede havde indført et indgangs-/udgangssystem, og Ruhrgas forpligtede sig endvidere til gradvist at reducere antallet af balancerings- og takstzoner i deres respektive net, hvilket vil reducere transportomkostningerne på tværs af ere zoner.
Gaz de France, which had already implemented an entry/exit system, and Ruhrgas further undertook to gradually reduce the number of balancing and tariff zones in their respective networks, which will reduce the cost of transport related to the crossing of several zones.
Gaz de France forpligtede sig også til at gennemføre et program for frigivelse af gas over 3 år i det sydlige Frankrig for at muliggøre konkurrence uden at afvente færdiggørelsen i midten af 2007 af den planlagte nye infrastruktur, som skal gøre det lettere for konkurrerende gas at få adgang til dette område.
Gaz de France also undertook to implement a gas release programme over three years in the south of France, in order to allow the development of competition without waiting for the completion in mid-2007 of planned new infrastructure facilitating the access of competing gas to this area.
På fusionsområdet besluttede Kommissionen at blokere for de planer, som det etablerede elselskab i Portugal, Energias de Portugal (EDP), og det italienske energiselskab ENI havde om at overtage den fælles kontrol med det etablerede gasselskab i Portugal, Gás de Portugal (GDP). Denne transaktion ville have styrket EDP’s dominerende stilling på deres respektive markeder (engros- og detailmarkederne for elektricitet og gasmarkederne i Portugal) som følge af både horisontale og vertikale virkninger.
In the merger eld, the Commission decided to block the envisaged acquisition of joint control over Gás de Portugal (GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), the incumbent electricity company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company. is operation would have strengthened EDP’s dominant position in their respective markets (electricity wholesale and retail markets and gas markets in Portugal) as a result of both horizontal and vertical e ects.
Den ville bl.a. have ernet GDP’s potentielle konkurrence på elmarkederne og medført, at EDP højst sandsynligt ville være kommet ind på gasmarkederne.
In particular, it would have removed GDP’s potential competition in the electricity markets as well as EDP’s most likely entry in the gas markets.
Endvidere ville fusionen have gjort elproducenter, der anvender gas som brændstof, stærkt aængige af deres vigtigste konkurrent, dvs. EDP, med hensyn til deres gasforsyninger. Endelig ville transaktionen have udelukket en væsentlig del af gase erspørgslen, som i øjeblikket kontrolleres af EDP.
Moreover, the concentration would have made electricity producers using gas as a fuel highly dependent on their main competitor, i.e. EDP, for their gas supplies.
Sidst, men ikke mindst, sendte Kommissionen en åbningsskrivelse til Grækenland i en sag angående de græske markeder for brunkulsminedriog elfremstilling og -forsyning.
Last but not least, the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to Greece in a case concerning the Greek lignite mining and electricity generation and supply markets.
Grækenland giver den etablerede elproducent eneret til udvinding af brunkul uden kompensation.
Greece grants to the incumbent electricity producer exclusive mining rights to extract lignite without compensation. is privileged access to lignite, the cheapest energy source for electricity generation in Greece, enables the electricity incumbent to maintain its dominant position on the electricity generation and supply markets by preventing market entry of potential competitors.
Denne privilegerede adgang til brunkul, som er den billigste energikilde til elproduktion i Grækenland, sætter den etablerede elproducent i stand til at fastholde sin dominerende stilling på markederne for
In the Commission’s view, Greece infringes Articles 86(1) and 82 EC by maintaining these rights.
III — Udviklingen i de enkelte sektorer elfremstilling og -forsyning ved at forhindre, at potentielle konkurrenter får adgang til markedet.
III — Sector developments
En af de grundlæggende ændringer, der er indført med det nye regelsæt for elektronisk kommunikation, indebærer, at de nationale lovgivende myndigheder skal de nere de relevante markeder for elektronisk kommunikation i overensstemmelse med principperne i konkurrenceretten. De skal foretage en analyse af de relevante markeder og afgøre, om disse markeder rent faktisk er konkurrenceprægede, hvilket vil sige, at der ikke er nogen virksomhed med stærk markedsposition (svarende til det konkurrencemæssige begreb dominans) på det pågældende marked.
One of the fundamental changes introduced by the new regulatory framework for electronic communication services is that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are obliged to de ne relevant electronic communication markets in accordance with the principles of competition law. ey must carry out an analysis of the relevant markets and determine whether those markets are e ectively competitive, meaning that there is no undertaking with significant market power (SMP, equivalent to the competition concept of dominance) on that market.
Hvis et marked i realiteten ikke er konkurrencepræget, skal de nationale lovgivningsmyndigheder indføre mindst én specifik lovgivningsforpligtelse blandt dem, der er anført i adgangs- eller forsyningspligtdirektivet.
If a market is not e ectively competitive, NRAs must impose at least one specific regulatory obligation among those set out in the access directive or the universal service directive.
Hvis et marked rent faktisk er konkurrencepræget, må de nationale lovgivningsmyndigheder omvendt ikke fastholde eller indføre nogen specifikke lovgivningsmæssige forpligtelser.
Conversely, if a market is e ectively competitive, NRAs may not maintain or introduce any specific regulatory obligations.
Kommissionen kan enten fremsætte bemærkninger, som de nationale lovgivningsmyndigheder skal tage størst muligt hensyn til, eller anmode de nationale lovgivningsmyndigheder om at trække den påtænkte foranstaltning tilbage, hvis markedsdefinitionen og/eller konstateringen af stærk markedsposition er uforenelig med fællesskabsretten.
Following the market analysis procedure, NRAs must notify to the Commission dra regulatory measures concerning the de nition of the relevant markets, the nding or non- nding of SMP and the regulatory remedies proposed, if any. e Commission may either issue comments, which NRAs must take utmost account of, or request the NRA to withdraw the dra measure if the market de nition and/or the determination of SMP is incompatible with Community law.
I 2004 modtog Kommissionens tjenestegrene 89 sådanne anmeldelser og afsluttede 90 sager.
In 2004, the Commission’s departments received 89 such notifications and closed 90 cases.
I tre sager anmodede Kommissionen den nationale lovgivningsmyndighed om at trække den pågældende påtænkte foranstaltning tilbage.
In three cases, the Commission requested the NRA to withdraw the dra measure concerned.