natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Domstolen erindrede først og fremmest om, at EF­traktatens tidl. artikel 129, stk. 4, første led, udelukker en harmonisering af de love og bestemmelser, medlemsstaterne har vedtaget til beskyttelse og forbedring af fol­kesundheden, men fandt, at dette »ikke indebærer, at harmoniseringsforanstaltninger vedtaget på grundlag af andre traktatbestemmelser ikke må have indvirkning på beskyttelsen af folkesundheden«, på betingelse af at formålet med at vedtage dem med hjemmel i andre traktatbestemmelser ikke er at omgå den udtrykkelige bestem­melse i tidl. artikel 129, stk. 4, første led.
Firstly, it pointed out that the first indent of former Article 129(4) of the EC Treaty ruled out any harmonisation of laws and regulations of the Member States designed to protect and improve public health but added that such provision did not mean that harmonisation measures adopted on the basis of other provisions of the Treaty could not have any impact on the protection of human health, provided that the purpose of recourse to other articles of the Treaty was not to circumvent the first indent of former Arti­cle 129(4).
Domstolen fastslog derefter, at når man læser EF­traktatens tidl. artikler 100 A, 3 Β og 7 A sammen, fremgår det, at de ved­tagne foranstaltninger »reelt skal have til formål at lette gennemførelsen af det indre marked.
Secondly, the Court found that if former Articles 100a, 3b and 7a of the EC Treaty were read in combination, it was clear that the purpose of any measures adopted must be to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
Hvis man fortolker dem således, at de giver EU­lovgiveren generel beføjelse til at regulere det indre marked, vil det ikke alene være i strid med selve ordlyden i de nævnte bestemmelser, men også uforeneligt med princippet i tidl. arti­kel 3 Β om, at Fællesskabets beføjelser er de beføjelser, det har fået tillagt«.
To interpret former Article 100a as giving the Community legislature general powers to regulate the internal market would be not only contrary to the wording of the abovementioned provisions but also incompatible with the principle enshrined in former Article 3b that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it.
Dom­stolen tog derefter stilling til, om den omhandlede foranstaltning rent faktisk havde til formål at forbedre det indre marked, dvs. tog sigte på at fjerne hindringer for frie varebevægelser og fri udveksling af tjenesteydelser samt eliminere konkurrencefor­drejninger.
Thirdly, the Court considered whether the measure in question was indeed intended to improve the internal market, that is to say, to ascertain whether the purpose of the measure was to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods and services and to eliminate distortions of competition.
Den nåede frem til den konklusion, at overordnet set var det faktiske for­mål med direktivet hovedsageligt ikke at forbedre det indre marked.
It concluded that essentially the directive was not in fact intended to improve the functioning of the market.
(') Sae C­376/98 og C­74/99.
"' Cases C-376/98 and C-74/99 Germany ν Parliament and Council. '2'OJL 213, 30.7.1998.
Fri bevægelighed for personer
Free movement for workers
I en dom af 13. april(') afgjorde Domstolen et præjudicielt spørgsmål angående fortolkningen af de tidl. artikler 6, 48, 85 og 86 i EF-traktaten i forbindelse med et idrætsforbunds vedtægter.
On 13 April, the Court gave a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of former Articles 6,48, 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty as applied to the rules of a sports federation '".
Disse vedtægter fastsatte transfer-frister for ansættelse af professionelle spillere, der kunne spille på holdet under mesterskaberne. Formålet med fristerne var at sikre, at der ikke skabes ulige vilkår i kampene.
The rules in question lay down the periods within which profession­al basketball players must be transferred if they are to be fielded during the cham­pionship season, the aim being to prevent any distortion of competition.
Dom stolen fik i denne dom lejlighed til at uddybe de principper, den opstillede i Bosmansagen (2), hvad angår den sportslige begrundelse for eventuelle hindringer for arbejdskraftens frie bevægelighed og amatørsportens karakter af økonomisk virksomhed, når den udøves på højt niveau.
In its ruling, the Court clarified its judgment in Bosman '2' as regards the sport­related reasons which might justify obstacles to the free movement of persons and as regards the status of top­level amateur sport as an economic activity.
Domstolen fastslog i den konkrete sag, at den pågældende basketballspiller, Jyri Lehtonen, skulle betragtes som en arbejdstager efter EF-traktatens artikel 48, eftersom han var en lønnet professionel basketballspiller, og at hans sportsudøvelse derfor var en økonomisk virksomhed.
The Court held that Mr Lehtonen, the basketball player concerned, should indeed be regard­ed as a worker within the meaning of Article 48 of the EC Treaty since he was a paid professional player and the exercise of his sport therefore constituted an eco­nomic activity.
Under disse omstændigheder skal reglerne om sporten være i overensstemmelse med fælles skabsretten.
This being the case, the rules governing the sport had to be in line with Community law.
I det omfang deltagelse i turneringskampe udgør en professionel spillers hovedbeskæftigelse, vil en regel, som begrænser den pågældendes deltagelse, også begrænse hans ansættelsesmuligheder, og de vil følgelig udgøre en hindring for arbejdskraftens frie bevægelighed.
In as much as participation in matches was the essential purpose of a player's activity, a rule which restricted that participation obviously also restricted the chances of employment of the player concerned and, conse­quently, constituted an obstacle to the free movement of workers.
De transfer-regler, som er udstedt af det internationale basketballforbund, FIBA, og som opstiller forskellige datoer for spillere fra det europæiske område og for ikke-europæiske spillere, udgjorde en hindring for Lehtonens frie bevægelighed.
In this particu­lar case, the transfer rules laid down by FIBA (Fédération internationale de basket ­ball) set different deadlines for players inside and outside the European zone and thus constituted an obstacle to Mr Lehtonen's freedom of movement.
Domstolen fandt, at sådanne regler var ulovlige, med mindre de var begrundet i objektive, rent sportslige hensyn eller i forskelle mellem de forskellige spilleres situation. I den konkrete sag fremhævede Domstolen, at dette ikke var godtgjort.
The Court held that such rules were illegal unless they could be justified on objective grounds concerning only sport as such or relating to differences between the position of players from a federation in the European zone and that of players from a federa­tion outside that zone.
Den mindede dog om, at en fastsættelse af frister med det formål at sikre lige vilkår i sportskampe og lette deres afvikling, der ikke er mere vidt gående, end hvad der er nødvendigt for at nå dette mål, kan være berettiget, når fristerne gælder »på samme måde for alle spillere, uanset deres oprindelse«.
It noted, however, that the fixing of deadlines to ensure the proper conduct of sporting competitions could be justified provided that the measures taken did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve that objective and provi­ded that they applied in the same manner to all players, irrespective of where they came from.
Domstolen fik af Luxembourg på grundlag af EF-traktatens tidl. artikel 173 indbragt et annullationssøgsmål mod Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 98/5/EF(3) om lettelse af adgangen til varig udøvelse af advokaterhvervet i en anden medlemsstat end den, hvor EF-beskikkelsen er opnået.
On 7 November, the Court ruled on an application '3' brought by Luxembourg, on the basis of former Article 173 of the EC Treaty, for the annul­ment of Directive 98/5/EC to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained'4'.
Luxembourg gjorde gældende, at der forelå en overtrædelse af EF-traktatens tidl. artikel 52, i det omfang hvor det anfægtede direktiv indførte en forskelsbehandling mellem indenlandske og udenlandske advokater til skade for den almene interesse, forbrugerbeskyttelsen og god retspraksis.
Luxembourg claimed that there had been a breach of former Article 52 of the EC Treaty in that this particular directive introduced a differ­ence in treatment between national and non­national lawyers, thus going against the general interest, the protection of consumers and the proper
IX-2 medlemsstat under hjemlandets advokattitel og herunder yde juridisk rådgivning om værtslandets ret.
Firstly, it pointed out that under the directive any lawyer had the right to practise permanently in another Member State on the strength of his original professional qualification and that this included the right to give legal advice on the law of the host Member State.
Udøvelsen af denne ret er ikke betinget af dokumentation for praktisk erfaring eller en egnethedsprøve.
The exercise of this right was not subject to any probationary period or test.
Domstolen afviste påstanden om, at direktivet var uforeneligt med den tidl. artikel 52. Den erindrede om, at det grund læggende princip om ikke-forskelsbehandling indebærer, at sammenlignelige situationer ikke må behandles forskelligt.
The Court rejected the argument that the directive was incompatible with former Article 52, pointing out that the fundamental principle of non­discrimination required that compa­rable situations should not be treated in different ways.
Den fandt, at dette princip ikke var blevet overtrådt ved dette direktiv, eftersom en udenlandsk advokat, der udøver advokat virksomhed under sin hjemlandstitel, objektivt set befinder sig i en anden situation end en indenlandsk advokat.
In the Court's view, this principle had not been breached by the directive since the non­national lawyer practising on the strength of his original qualification was, objectively speaking, in a different position from a national lawyer.
EU-lovgiveren har ikke tilsidesat det overordnede ligebehandlingsprincip ved at behandle ikke-sammenlignelige situationer forskel ligt.
The Community legislature had not breached the general principle of equality by treating differently situations which were not comparable.
Domstolen afviste også påstanden om tilsidesættelse af hensyn til den almene interesse, forbrugerbeskyttelse og god retspraksis.
The Court also rejected the arguments that the directive ran counter to the general interest, the protection of the consumer and the proper administration of justice.
For den advokattitel, den uden landske advokat bærer, oplyser forbrugeren om hans oprindelige uddannelse.
The professional qualifications of the non­national lawyer provided the consumer with information on his original training.
Direktivet fastsætter i øvrigt, at en advokat, der udøver virksomhed i en anden medlemsstat, er underlagt visse begrænsninger og desuden skal overholde de samme faglige og etiske regler som advokater, der udøver advokatvirksomhed under værtslandets advokattitel.
The directive provided that the activities of non­national lawyers were to be subject to certain restrictions and that such lawyers were to comply with the same professional and ethical rules as those which applied to lawyers prac­tising on the strength of a professional qualification obtained in the host Member State.
Domstolen fandt, at det anfægtede direktiv indfører en ordning for gensidig anerkendelse af advokattitler, der supplerer EU-systemet, som tager sigte på at åbne mulighed for uhindret udøvelse af advokaterhvervet under værtslandets advokattitel og derfor kunne vedtages med kvalificeret flertal.
The Court took the view that the contested directive introduced arrangements for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications which supplemented the Community system, the aim of which was to enable lawyers to practise freely on the strength of professional qualifications obtained in the host Member State and that, consequently, the directive could be adopted by a qualified­majority vote.
Denne dom markerer en milepæl i retspraksis angående EF-traktatens artikel 43 (tidl. artikel 52).
The Court's judgment forms a significant stage in the case­law relating to Article 43 (for­mer Article 52) of the EC Treaty.
Etableringsretten kan ikke afhænge af kriterierne for udøvelse af et erhverv i hver medlemsstat.
The right of establishment must not depend on criteria governing the practice of a profession in a given Member State.
En advokat må kunne etablere sig i en anden medlemsstat uden at skulle opfylde en betingelse gående ud på, at han skal være fuldgyldigt medlem af dette erhverv i dette land, medmindre denne betingelse er nødvendig ud fra almene hensyn.
A lawyer must be able to establish himself in another Member State without having to be a full member of the profession in the latter State, unless compliance with such a con­dition is necessitated by imperative reasons of general interest.
I en dom af 16. maj(') afsagt i en traktatbrudssag anlagt af Belgien mod Spanien tydeliggjorde Domstolen de principper, den havde opstillet i sin dom af 9. juni 1992(2) om vilkårene for frie varebevægelser i relation til betingelserne for tildeling af en oprindelsesbetegnelse.
On 16 May, giving judgment in Treaty­infringement proceedings brought by Belgium against Spain I1', the Court clarified its ruling of 9 June 1992 on the rules governing the free movement of goods and the conditions for gran­ting a registered designation of origin '2'.
(') Sag C-388/95. Belgien mod Spanien (Bull.
"i Case C­388/95 Belgium ν Spain; Bull.
I en dom af 14. marts (3) i en præjudiciel sag indbragt af det franske Conseil d'État skulle Domstolen fortolke EF-traktatens tidl. artikel 73, stk. 1, litra b). Dom stolen fastslog, at bestemmelser om forudgående tilladelse til direkte investering i udlandet ikke kan begrundes med hensynet til den offentlige orden og den offentlige sikkerhed uden anden præcisering (som i det foreliggende tilfælde).
On 14 March, the Court, having been asked by the French Conseil d'État for an interpretation of former Article 73d(l)(b) of the EC Treaty, held that a prior authorisation system for direct foreign investments could not be jus­tified by a general reference (as in this particular case) to a threat to public order and public security'3'.
Bestemmelsens vage karakter giver ikke investorerne mulighed for at vide, under hvilke nærmere omstændigheder det er nødvendigt at indhente forudgående tilladelse, og for at kende omfanget af deres rettigheder og pligter.
Such lack of precision prevented the persons concerned from ascertaining the specific circumstances in which authorisation was re­quired and, consequently, the extent of their rights and obligations under the
(') Sag C-225/98. Kommissionen moti Frankrig. (:) Op. cit.
'" Case C­225/98 Commission ν France. 'J' Ibidem.
I en dom af 10. februar(') tog Domstolen for første gang stilling til, om nationale love udstedt i henhold til Verdenspostkonventionen er forenelige med EF-traktaten, når det bestemmes i disse love, at posttjenester med en dominerende stilling inden for postomdeling i en medlemsstat kan kræve indenlandsk porto for omdeling af brevforsendelser, der remailes via en anden medlemsstat, eller nægte omdeling ved manglende betaling heraf.
On 10 February, the Court ruled for the first time on the compatibility with the EC Treaty of national law based on the Universal Postal Convention, whereby postal services enjoying a dominant position on the market for the dis tribution of mail in the Member State concerned may charge internal postage on the distribution of letters 'remailed' via another Member State and may refuse to distribute these letters unless such postage is paid'1'.
Domstolen fastslog, at ved at give en post tjeneste, som indtager en dominerende stilling, og som har pligt til at omdele remailpost, ret til at opkræve fuld indenlandsk porto uden at tage hensyn til de terminalafgifter, som betales af postvæsenet i afsendelseslandet, medfører den nationale lov, at dette postvæsen kommer til at misbruge en dominerende stilling som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 82.
The Court held that, by enabling the dominant postal operator, which had an obligation to distribute 'remailed' items, to charge the full amount of internal postage without taking account of the terminal dues received from the postal service of origin, the national law was inducing the operator to abuse its dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
I en dom af 19. september(2) skulle Domstolen tage stilling til en tysk skattelov, der åbner mulighed for visse skattelettelser ved køb af kapitalandele i virksomheder med sæde og ledelse i de nye tyske delstater eller i Vestberlin.
On 19 September, the Court ruled on a German tax law which provided for certain tax concessions where shares were acquired in undertakings having their registered office and central administration in the new Länder or West Berlin '2*.
Efter at have fået anmeldt denne nye skatteordning havde Kommissionen besluttet, at der var tale om statsstøtte i strid med fællesmarkedet efter EF-traktatens tidl. artikel 92, stk. 1, og at ordningen var i strid med EF-traktatens tidl. artikel 52 om fri etableringsret.
The Commission, having been notified of these new tax arrangements, decided that the concessions in question constituted aid incompatible with the common market under former Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty and con trary to former Article 52 on the freedom of establishment.
Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland indbragte derefter denne beslutning for Domstolen. Domstolen stadfæstede Kommissionens beslutning, idet den lagde større vægt på de støttemodtagende virksomheders særlige regionale karakter end deres størrelse.
Germany appealed against this decision, but the Court ruled in the Commission's favour, drawing attention to the specific regional nature of the undertakings assisted rather than their size.
Med hensyn til påvirkning af samhandelen og fordrejning af konkurrencen bekræftede Domstolen den normale antagelse om, at støtte som den her omhandlede »principielt« virker konkurrencefordrejende og påvirker samhandelen, eftersom den skattemæssige foranstaltning giver de indirekte begunstigede virksomheder en fordel, de ikke ville have fået under normale markedsvilkår. Domstolen konkluderede, at støtten påvirkede de private investorers adfærd, og at det ikke var nødvendigt at analysere dens faktiske virkninger.
As regards the effects on trade and the distortion of competition, the Court again took the view that aid of this particular type did in principle distort the conditions of competition and had an effect on trade since the undertakings which were the indirect beneficiaries of the tax concessions were thereby given an economic advantage which they would not have enjoyed under normal mar ket conditions.
Med hensyn til ordningens uforenelighed med fællesmarkedet udtalte Domstolen, at EF-traktatens tidl. artikel 92, stk. 2, ikke fandt anvendelse.
As regards the question of incompatibility, the Court ruled that former Article 92(2) of the EC Treaty was not applicable.
Denne undtagelsesbestemmelse har et meget begrænset anvendelsesområde (3).
The scope of the exception was necessarily restricted'3'.
Den finder kun anvendelse på de direkte følger af Tysklands deling, og den vedtagne foranstaltning må i streng forstand tage sigte på at afhjælpe de økonomiske ulemper, denne deling forårsagede. I den konkrete sag fandt Domstolen, at »de økonomiske ulemper, de nye tyske delstater som helhed lider under, var ikke direkte forårsaget af Tysklands geografiske deling«, men »bl.a. af forskellige politiske og økonomiske systemer«.
The derogation in question applied only to the direct consequences of the division of Germany and any aid granted had to be intended solely as compensation for the economic disadvantages caused by that
(:) Sag C-156/98, Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland mod Kommissionen (Buli.
> Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission; Bull. 10-2000, point 1.8.58. 131
10-2000."punkt 1.8.58). (') Førsteinstansrettens dom af 15. december 1999. Freistaat Sachsen mfl. mod Kommissionen.
CH judgment of 15 December 1999 in Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission.
385 driftsstøtte, som det kun er tilladt at yde under ekstraordinære omstændigheder, dvs. når den kan fremme en varig udvikling af den økonomiske aktivitet.
As regards the derogations provided for in former Article 92(3)(a) and (c)of the EC Treaty, the Court reiterated its earlier rulings that such aid schemes were not investment aid but operating aid, which could be granted only in exceptional circumstances, that is to say, where they were likely to promote a durable devel­opment of economic activity.
Det var ikke tilfældet i den konkrete sag.
This was not the case in this instance.
Med hensyn til tilsidesættelsen af traktatens tidl. artikel 52 bekræftede Domstolen, at »det følger af selve traktatens grundidé, at proceduren i artikel 88 (tidl. artikel 93) aldrig må føre til et resultat, .som ville stride mod de specifikke traktatbestemmelser«.
As regards non­compliance with former Article 52 of the Treaty, the Court held that it was clear from the general scheme of the Treaty that the procedure under Article 88 (former Article 93) should never produce a result which was contrary to the spe­cific provisions of the Treaty.
Heraf følger, at kravets om, at støttemodtagerne skal have sæde og ledelse i de nye delstater, udgør en uberettiget forskelsbehandling grundet i nationalitet, fordi det udelukker, at en virksomhed fra en anden medlemsstat, der udøver virksomhed i de nye delstater, kan nyde godt af ordningen.
Consequently, the requirement that the beneficia­ries must have their registered office and central administration in the new Län­der constituted wrongful discrimination on grounds of nationality, since it prevented an undertaking from another Member State from benefiting from the aid scheme in question if it engaged in economic activities in the new Länder.
I to domme af hhv. 24. februar og 9. marts(') i forskellige sager (traktatbrudssag og præjudicielt spørgsmål) udtalte Domstolen sig om et fælles mål, nemlig medlemsstaternes muligheder for at belægge varer, der allerede er pålagt harmoniseret punktafgift, en ikke-harmoniseret punktafgift.
On 24 February and 9 March, the Court handed down judgment in two very different cases (Treaty­infringement proceedings, on the one hand, and a reference for a preliminary ruling, on the other) which did, however, have a common purpose, namely to determine the margin for manoeuvre available to Member States for the taxation, in the form of non­harmonised excise duties, of products already subject to harmonised excise duty'1'.
Domstolen anerkendte, at med lemsstaterne fortsat har et vist spillerum på dette område, forudsat at to betingelser er opfyldt (formålet må ikke være budgetmæssigt, og afgiften skal være forenelig med EU's almindelige punktafgiftsordning).
The Court acknowledged that Member States retained some discretionary powers in this area provided that two criteria were satisfied (the duty must be levied for a non­budgetary purpose and must be compatible with the overall Community system of excise duties).
Desuden begrænsede Domstolen for første gang de tidsmæssige virkninger af en dom på skatte- og afgiftsområdet, idet den fastslog, at tvingende retssikkerhedshensyn er til hinder for »anfægtelse af retsforhold, der har udtømt deres virkninger i fortiden«.
For the first time, moreover, the Court limited the temporal effects of a decision on tax matters by ruling that legal relations which had exhausted their effects in the past should not be called into question.
Domstolen fraveg i dette tilfælde princippet om, at en given fortolkning af en bestemmelse altid gælder, efter at have vurderet de følger, det ville få i praksis (retssikkerhed og finansielle virkninger).
It thus departed, in this in­stance, from the principle that the law as interpreted on a given date has unlim­ited retrospective force, having assessed the consequences which application of that principle would have in practice (in terms of legal certainty and financial impact).