natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen fastslog, at ESB stadigvæk havde en dominerende stilling på det irske marked forproduktion og salg af elektricitet til engroskunder (hvor ESB havde en markedsandel på 97 %) og forsalg af elektricitet til »privilegerede kunder« (en markedsandel på 60 %).
The Commission established that ESB still holds a dominant position on the Irish markets for ‘electricityproduction and sales to wholesalers’ (ESB’s market share 97 %) and for ‘electricity sales to eligiblecustomers’ (ESB’s market share is 60 %).
Selv om markedsstrukturernesandsynligvis ville blive forbedret i de kommende år, især når det nordirske elselskab Viridian får gang isit nye 340 MW-kraftværk i Huntstown (Irland), fandt Kommissionen, at Viridian nok ikke ville blive ESB’s stærkeste konkurrent.
Whilst the market structure is likely to improve in the years tocome, in particular when Viridian, the Northern Irish electricity company, commissions its new 340 MWpower plant at Huntstown (Ireland), the Commission took the view that Viridian might not develop into ESB’s fiercest competitor.
Dette skyldtes, at både ESB og Viridian er aktive i Nordirland og i Den Irske Republik, hvilket skaber en vis balance i det potentielle konkurrencepres.
This is due to the fact that ESB and Viridian are both active in Northern Irelandand the Republic of Ireland, creating a certain equilibrium of potential competitive threats.
Parterne tilbød en række tilsagn for at imødekomme Kommissionens indsigelser.
The companies proposed to address the Commission’s competition concerns in a settlement.
Forhandlingerne omdisse tilsagn blev ført af Irish Commission for Electricity Regulation (CER) efter drøftelser med Kommissionen.
Thesettlement negotiations were carried out by the CER following discussions with the Commission.
Hovedelementerne i de tilsagn, som ESB og Synergen afgav, er: (1) ESB og Synergenstiller 600 MW elektricitet til rådighed hvert år, indtil der er nye elektricitetskilder svarende til 400 MWtil rådighed, hvoraf 300 MW skal produceres af et enkelt nyt kraftværk. (2) Den mængde, som ESBsørger for (400 MW), sælges som led i et auktionssystem (en såkaldt VIPP-ordning).
Themain elements of the commitments submitted by ESB and Synergen are: (1) ESB and Synergen willmake available 600 MW of electricity per year until additional sources of electricity of 400 MW becomeavailable, of which 300 MW must be produced by a single new plant; (2) the volumes provided by ESB (400 MW) will be sold under an auction system (socalled VIPP scheme).
Kommissionen finder, at disse aftaler vil lette adgangen til de irske elmarkeder.
The Commission takes the view that the commitments will facilitate market entry into the Irish electricitymarkets.
Når Viridians kraftværk i Huntstown står klart, vil leverandørerne kunne købe elektricitet fra mindst tre forskellige kilder:Huntstown, ESB’s auktion og Synergen.
Once Viridian’s power plant at Huntstown is commissioned, suppliers will be able to buyelectricity from at least three different sources: Huntstown, ESB auction and Synergen.
Nye producenter får mulighed for at opbygge en kundebase forfremtidige kraftværker.
New producerswill have the opportunity to build up a customer base for their future power plant.
193 planlægning, og at 600 MW tegner sig for ca. 50 % af elefterspørgslen fra alle de kunder, der i dag fritkan vælge leverandør.
193 also noted favourably that the duration of the supply contracts for Synergen output (up to three years)will provide operators with more certainty for medium-term planning and that 600 MW accounts forapproximately 50 % of the electricity demand of all customers currently free to choose a supplier.
Kommissionen godkendte ligeledes den kontrakt om gasleverancer, ifølge hvilken Statoil skal levere gastil Synergen (30 % deltagelse fra Statoil) i 15 år med eneret.
The Commission also cleared the gas supply contract under which Statoil delivers gas to Synergen (30 %Statoil participation) for 15 years on an exclusive basis.
Kommissionen vurderede, at det irskegasmarked stadig er domineret af den etablerede gasleverandør, BGE.
The Commission considered that the Irish gasmarket is still dominated by the incumbent gas supplier BGE.
Derudover bemærkede Kommissionen, at Synergen-kontrakten er den første større aftale om gasleverancer, som Statoil har indgået i Irland, hvilket bringer Statoils markedsandel en anelse over den såkaldte bagatelgrænse.
The Commission also noted that the Synergen contract is the first large-scale gas supply contract for Statoil in Ireland, which raises Statoil’smarket share slightly above the so-called de minimis threshold.
Kontraktenskulle også kunne sikre Statoils deltagelse på det irske marked på sigt.
The contract should also ensure Statoil’slong-term presence in the Irish gas market.
Desuden tog Kommissionenhensyn til, at Statoil tilbød en særlig prisformel for gas, som virksomheden ikke ville have tilbudt, hvisden ikke havde haft sikkerhed for en længerevarende eneret.
Furthermore, the Commission took into account that Statoiloffered a special price formula for its gas, which it would not have offered had it not been assured longterm exclusivity.
2.2.Vertikale aftaler
2.2.Vertical agreements
I januar 2000 anmeldte B & W Loudspeakers et selektivt distributionssystem.
In January 2000, B & W Loudspeakers notified a selective distribution system.
I december 2000 udsendte Kommissionen en klagepunktsmeddelelse, fordi dette distributionssystem indeholdt adskillige »hard-core«-konkurrencebegrænsninger, nemlig mindstepriser og -avancer i detailleddet (forklædt som et forbud mod »lokkepriser« (13)), et forbud mod krydsleverancer mellem grossister og et forbud modfjernsalg, herunder også salg via internet (14).
In December of that year,the Commission issued a statement of objections because this distribution system contained several‘hardcore’ restrictions of competition, namely minimum retailer prices and margins (disguised as a prohibition on ‘bait pricing’(13)), a prohibition on cross supplies to wholesalers and a prohibition ondistant sales, including through the Internet (14). The block exemption provided for in Commission
Gruppefritagelsen i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 2790/1999 om vertikale begrænsninger kunne ikke finde anvendelse, eftersom sådanne begrænsningerer i strid med forordningens artikel 4.
Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 on vertical restraints could not apply as such restrictions are contrary toits Article 4.
Det er heller ikke muligt at opnå individuel fritagelse for sådannebestemmelser efter artikel 81, stk. 3.
An individual exemption for such provisions under Article 81(3) is not possible either.
Efter at Kommissionen havde indledt formel procedure i sagen, besluttede B & W Loudspeakers at ændresine aftaler. Restriktionerne angående krydsleverancer og priser blev fjernet.
Following the opening of formal proceedings, B & W Loudspeakers decided to modify its agreements.The restriction on cross supplies and pricing were deleted.
Med hensyn til fjernsalg, navnlig salg over internet, har allerede autoriserede forhandlere i princippet rettil at sælge produkterne via internet uden særskilt tilladelse.
As regards distant — and in particular Internet — sales, dealers that have already been authorised have inprinciple the right to sell products via the Internet, and do not need specific permission to do so.
En producent kan imidlertid stille særligekvalitative servicebetingelser i forbindelse med bestemte salgsmetoder, f.eks. krav til udformingen afforhandlerens hjemmeside, for at værne om sit mærkeimage og sine produkters omdømme på sammemåde, som han ville kunne gøre det for vinduesudstillinger eller postordrekataloger.
Amanufacturer can, however, impose qualitative service requirements specific to particular sales methods,such as requirements relating to the design of a dealer’s web site, in order to protect its brand image andthe reputation of its products, in the same way as is possible for window displays or mail ordercatalogues.
I den konkrete sag havde B & W Loudspeakers ingen erfaringer med internetsalg og var ikke i stand til påforhånd at fastlægge, hvilke særlige krav virksomhedens forhandlere skulle opfylde, når de benyttededenne salgsmetode.
In this particular case, B & W Loudspeakers did not have any experience of Internet sales and was not ableto define in advance the particular requirements with which its authorised dealers had to comply whenusing this sales method.
B & W Loudspeakers gik imidlertid med til, at hvis virksomheden ville forbydeforhandlerne at sælge via internet, skulle det ske skriftligt og udelukkende, når det var begrundet ibehovet for at opretholde mærkets image og produkternes omdømme.
It agreed, however, to forbid dealers from engaging in Internet sales only inwriting and solely on the basis of criteria related to the need to maintain the brand image and reputationof its products.
B & W Loudspeakers bliver derfornødt til at udvikle en eksplicit politik for internetsalg, som der kan føres kontrol med, hvis det blivernødvendigt.
B & W Loudspeakers will therefore need to develop an explicit policy on Internet salesthat can be monitored if necessary.
Desuden skal de kriterier, der lægges til grund i den forbindelse, være ens over for alleforhandlere, og der må ikke diskrimineres mellem salgsmetoder, for mangel på forhåndsspecificeredekrav til internetsalg må ikke udnyttes til at stille krav, der gør det vanskeligere eller helt umuligt at sælgevia internet end via andre »traditionelle« salgsmetoder.
It was further specified that the criteria must be appliedindiscriminately to all dealers and must not discriminate between sales methods, given that a lack ofadvance specification of service requirements for Internet sales must not be abused in order to impose
Ved »lokkepriser« forstås, at der anvendes en særlig attraktiv pris på et produkt for at lokke kunderne ind i butikken. Se også XXX Konkurrenceberetning 2000, nr. 215.
‘Bait pricing’ is the practice of offering a certain product at a very attractive price with the aim of attracting customers tothe sales outlet.See also 2000 Competition Report, point 215.
BERETNING OM ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION requirements that render such sales more difficult than other, more ‘traditional’, sales methods or evenmake them impossible.
Sagen blev afsluttet med fremsendelse af et comfort letter om, at aftalerne kunne falde ind under gruppefritagelsen i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 2790/1999.
The case was closed by a comfort letter stating that the agreements could benefit from the blockexemption provided by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999.
6C DVD-poolens ændrede patentlicensprogram (sag COMP/C-3/37.506)
DVD 6 C amended patent licensing programme (Case COMP/C-3/37.506)
Den 22. juli godkendte Kommissionen en række aftaler, som medlemmerne af 6C DVD-poolen (
On 22 July, the Commission cleared agreements contained in a supplementary notification lodged on
) havde anmeldt i en supplerende anmeldelse den 28. februar.
28 February by the members of the 6C DVD patent pool (15).
16 maj 1999 og godkendt ved et comfort letter efter artikel 81, stk. 3, den 3. oktober 2000 (
The original agreements had been notifiedin May 1999 and cleared by a comfort letter under Article 81(3) on 3 October 2000 (16).
De oprindeligt anmeldte aftaler blev ændret, efter at flere nye typer DVD-produkter (nemlig DVD-Audio,DVD-RAM, DVD-RW, DVD-R og DVD Video Recording) var kommet med i det fælles licensprogram.
Following the inclusion in the joint licensing programme of several new families of DVD products(namely, DVD-Audio, DVD-RAM, DVD-RW, DVD-R and DVD Video Recording), the originallynotified agreements were modified.
Efter modtagelsen af den supplerende anmeldelse foretog Kommissionen en ny vurdering af, hvilkekonkurrenceskadelige virkninger patentpoolen kunne antages at få, og drog den konklusion, at der ikkevar sandsynlighed for konkurrenceskadelige virkninger på nogen af de tre markeder, der blev berørt,nemlig teknologimarkedet for DVD, det generelle marked for innovation og flere markeder vertikaltforbundet dermed inden for video- og audioprodukter samt markedet for massereproduktion af opticaldiscs.
On the occasion of the supplementary notification, the Commission re-examined the possible anticompetitive effects of the patent pool and came to the conclusion that anticompetitive effects wereunlikely in any of the three types of market affected, namely a technology market for DVD, a generalmarket for innovation and several vertically related markets covering video and audio products as well asthe mass replication of optical discs.
Kommissionen fastslog i særdeleshed, at poolen kun omfattede væsentlige patenter, og at poolmedlemmerne ville meddele individuelle ikkeeksklusive licenser, der ville gælde for produkterne, uanset om destemte overens med standardspecifikationerne for DVD eller ej.
In particular, the Commission ascertained that only essential patents were included in the pool and thatpool members would grant individual non-exclusive licences which extend to products irrespective oftheir conformity to the DVD standard specifications.
Desuden er poolen åben for deltagelsefra andre, der har udtaget (yderligere) væsentlige patenter, og den grantback-forpligtelse, der gælder foralle licenstagere, finder kun anvendelse på væsentlige patenter.
In addition, the pool is open to third parties whichacquire (additional) essential patents and the grant-back provision, applicable to all licensees, is limitedto essential patents.
Desuden indeholdt aftalerne en klausulom »mest begunstigede nation«, der forhindrede diskrimination mellem poolmedlemmerne og tredjeparter såvel som mellem forskellige tredjeparter, poolmedlemmerne (dvs. licensgiverne) har også selvfået licenser fra poolen, og de licensafgifter, der for øjeblikket anvendes, forekommer ikke at udgørenogen større andel af de endelige priser på DVD-produkter.
Furthermore, (a) a ‘most-favoured-nation’ clause impedes discrimination betweenpool members and third parties, as well as amongst third parties, (b) pool members (licensors) have alsotaken licences from the pool themselves and (c) the royalties currently due do not appear to represent avery significant part of the final prices of DVD products.
Endelig har licensgiverne indført en rækkesystemer, der giver garanti for, at konkurrencefølsomme oplysninger holdes fortrolige.
Finally, the licensors have erected firewalls toprotect competitively sensitive information and keep it confidential.
Under drøftelser med Kommissionen gik licensgiverne med til at give licenstagerne mulighed for atunderskrive en tillægskontrakt, der begrænser licensen til kun at gælde for en konkret kategori af
During discussions with the Commission, licensors agreed to offer licensees the opportunity to sign aside letter limiting the scope of the licence to a specific category of products. Licensees will be able to
Desuden er der på dette websted indføjet oplysninger om patenternes udløbsdato og patenthavernesidentitet.
) In addition, expiry dates and the identity of patent owners have been added to the patent list in the same web.
Den 24. juli 2002 vedtog Kommissionen en formel beslutning i Visa International-sagen, der drejede sig
On 24 July, the Commission adopted a formal decision in the Visa International case, concerning
195 som normalt vælter den over på detailhandlerne som en del af det gebyr, de betaler til deres bank for hverenkelt Visakorttransaktion.
195 carried out with a payment card. In the Visa system, it is paid to the cardholder’s bank by the retailer’sbank and constitutes a cost for the latter which is normally passed on to retailers as part of the fee theypay to their bank for each Visa card payment.
Medmindre to banker aftaler noget andet, beregnes det multilaterale interbankgebyr efter de regler, som Visas bestyrelse udstikker, jf. Visa Internationals betalingskortregler, somer blevet anmeldt til Kommissionen.
The default level of the Visa MIF — which applies unlesstwo banks agree otherwise — is set by the Visa Board and laid down in the Visa International paymentcard rules, which had been notified to the Commission.
Med denne beslutning blev der på nærmere fastsatte betingelser indrømmet fritagelse for nogle af Visas MIF-gebyrer, nemlig de gebyrer, der anvendes for grænseoverskridende betalinger med private Visa-kortinden for EØS.
The decision grants a conditional exemption to certain MIFs of Visa, namely those for cross-borderpayment transactions with Visa consumer cards within the European Economic Area.
Beslutningen omfatter altså ikke gebyrerne for indenlandske Visa-betalinger eller forbetalinger foretaget med firmakort (dvs. kort, der anvendes af en virksomheds ansatte til dækning afforretningsudgifter).
The decision thusdoes not apply to MIFs for domestic Visa payments within Member States, nor to MIFs for corporate Visa cards (that is, cards used by employees for business expenditure).
I september 2000 havde Kommissionen udsendt en klagepunktsmeddelelse angående Visas tidligere MIF-system.
In September 2000, the Commission had issued a statement of objections concerning Visa’s previoussystem of MIFs.
Den endte imidlertid med at indrømme fritagelse, efter at Visa havde tilbudt at foretagebetydelige ændringer i sit MIF-system.
However, it was possible to grant an exemption after Visa proposed far-reaching reformsto its MIF system.
De vigtigste ændringer er følgende:
The main reforms are as follows:
For det andet vil der blive lagt loft over det multilaterale interbankgebyr svarende til omkostningerneknyttet til kortudstedernes levering af bestemte tjenester, som efter Kommissionens opfattelse svarertil tjenester leveret af kortholdernes banker, som er til fordel for de handlende, der i sidste endebetaler det multilaterale interbankgebyr.
—Secondly, the MIF will be capped at the level of costs for certain specific services provided by issuingbanks, which in the Commission’s view correspond to services provided by cardholders’ bankswhich benefit those retailers who ultimately pay the crossborder MIF.
Det drejer sig om følgende tre tjenester: behandlingen af
These services are: transaction
Visa vil gennemføre en omkostningsanalyse, som vil blive kontrolleret af et uvildigt revisionsfirma.
The level of costs will be determined by a cost study, to be carried out by Visa and audited by an independent accountant.
Loftet vil væregældende uanset tilbud fra Visa om en eventuel sænkning af MIF-gebyret (det betyder, at hvis denøvre omkostningsgrænse er lavere end 0,7 %, da må det multilaterale interbankgebyr ikke overstige0,7 %).
This ceiling willapply regardless of the reductions in the level of the MIF offered by Visa (that is, if the cost cap isbelow 0.7 %, then the MIF will have to be below 0.7 %).
Desuden vil Visa tillade medlemsbankerne at videregive oplysninger til de handlende om niveauetfor det multilaterale interbankgebyr og de tre omkostningskategoriers relative andel af gebyret (dissetal betragtes i dag som en forretningshemmelighed).
—Furthermore, Visa will allow member banks to reveal information about the MIF levels and therelative percentage of the three cost categories (currently considered business secrets) to retailers attheir request.
De handlende skal selv fremsætte ønske omdisse oplysninger, og de skal underrettes om denne mulighed.
Retailers are to be informed of this possibility.
Fritagelsen gælder indtil den 31. december 2007, hvorefter Kommissionen vil kunne tage Visasreviderede MIF-system op til en helt ny vurdering i lyset af dets virkninger på markedet.
The exemption will be valid until 31 December 2007, after which date the Commission will be free to reexamine the Visa MIF system in the light of the effects of the revised MIF on the market.
I 1997 modtog Kommissionen i øvrigt en formel klage mod Visas MIF-system fra den europæiske detailhandelsorganisation EuroCommerce.
The MIF of Visa, inter alia, was the subject of a formal complaint in 1997 by EuroCommerce, a European organisation of retailers.
Denne klage er nu blevet afvist, eftersom den var rettet mod de MIF-gebyrer, der blev indrømmet fritagelse for ved beslutningen af 24. juli 2002.
The complaint has now been rejected, in so far as it concerns the MIFsexempted by the decision of 24 July 2002.
Udtrykket »betalingsgaranti« dækker over kortudstederens tilsagn om at honorere alle betalinger, også selv om der måtteforeligge svig, eller selv om kortholderen i sidste ende ikke betaler, dog forudsat at den handlende har foretaget defornødne verifikationer på betalingstidspunktet.
The term ‘payment guarantee’ is used to describe the promise of the cardholder’s bank to honour payments made bycardholders, even those which turn out to be fraudulent or for which the cardholder ultimately defaults, on condition thatthe retailer undertakes all the necessary security checks.
Der er reelt tale om en betalingsforsikring for de handlende.Den »gratis finansieringsperiode« er den tid, der går, inden kortholderen enten skal betale kortregningen (i forbindelsemed kreditkort), eller hvor saldoen på kreditkortregningen overføres til den udvidede kreditfacilitet, hvoraf der betalesrenter.
This effectively constitutes a kind of payment insurance forretailers.The ‘free funding period’ corresponds to the time period before the cardholder must either pay the card bill or (for creditcards only) ‘roll over’ the balance of the credit card bill into the extended credit facility, to which a rate of interest isapplied.
Kommissionen er af den opfattelse, at denne »gratis finansieringsperiode« er til fordel for detailhandlerne i engrænseoverskridende kontekst, idet den stimulerer salget.
This ‘free funding period’ is considered by the Commission to benefit retailers in a crossborder context bystimulating additional sales.
2 mia. m3 gas til det tyske engrosselskab Wingas i ti år med mulighed for forlængelse med yderligerefem (21).Gasleverancerne startede i 1998/1999.
The Commission cleared two gas supply agreements by which UK-based EDF Trading is to deliver a total of two billion m3 of natural gas per year to the German gas company WINGAS for a total period of10 years, renewable for a further five years (21).Gas deliveries started in 1998/99.
Aftalerne kunne godkendes, efter at virksomhederne havde accepteret at ændre aftalerne i relation til den såkaldte »reduktionsmekanisme«.
The clearance followed the commitment of the companies to modify the agreements in respect of the so-called reductionmechanism.
Denne mekanismemedførte en nedsættelse af de mængder, som WINGAS købte, hvis EDF Trading skulle sælge gas til WINGAS’ hovedleveranceområde i Tyskland.
This mechanism leads to a reduction of the volumes bought by WINGAS if and when EDFTrading sells gas into WINGAS’s main supply territory in Germany.
Kommissionen fandt, at denne reduktionsmekanisme mindskede EDF Tradings incitament til at sælgegas direkte til kunder i Tyskland og begrænsede konkurrencen mærkbart.
With respect to the reduction mechanism, the Commission considered that it reduces EDF Trading’sincentive to sell gas directly to customers located in Germany and restricts competition in an appreciablemanner.
Kommissionen fastslog også, atdenne mekanisme i den konkrete sag ikke gjaldt, hvis EDF Trading solgte gas til bestemte etableredegrossister i Tyskland, bl.a. Ruhrgas, hvilket gav dem en fordel frem for andre grossister — hvoraf defleste er nytilkomne udbydere — i Tyskland.
The Commission also established that — in the case in point — the reduction mechanism doesnot apply if and when EDF Trading sells gas to certain incumbent wholesalers in Germany such as Ruhrgas, which puts these companies in a favourable position over other wholesalers — mostprominently newcomers — in Germany.
Efter drøftelser mellem parterne og Kommissionen tilbød selskaberne at ændre kontrakterne.
Following discussions between the parties and the Commission, the companies proposed to amend thecontracts.