natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den hurtige behandling af disse sager blev muliggjort af en ny hurtigprocedure, der blev indført i 2000, og som har gjort domstolsprøvelsen af Kommissionens fusionskontrollangt mere effektiv. Ved udgangen af 2002 verserede der ved Retten og Domstolen 16 sager, der varindbragt mod en kommissionsbeslutning.
The speed with which two of these judgments were issued was madepossible by the application of a new expedited (‘fast-track’) procedure introduced in 2000, which hasgreatly enhanced the effectiveness of the judicial review of the Commission’s merger control procedure.There were 16 appeals against Commission decisions pending before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice at the end of 2002.
224.Den 6. juni annullerede Retten i Første Instans den beslutning, hvorved Kommissionen havdenedlagt forbud mod fusionen mellem to britiske rejsearrangører, Airtours og First Choice.
224.On 6 June, the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission’s decision to prohibit a mergerbetween Airtours and First Choice, two UK-based holiday tour operators.
Kommissionenhavde modtaget anmeldelsen af Airtours’ overtagelsestilbud rettet mod First Choice den 29. april 1999.Efter andenfasebehandlingen besluttede Kommissionen den 22. september 1999 at nedlægge forbud modfusionen, fordi den vurderede, at fusionen ville have skabt en kollektiv dominans på det britiske markedfor pakkerejser til de nære rejsemål (134).
The Commission had receivedthe notification of Airtours bid to take over First Choice on 29 April 1999. After an indepth phase IIinvestigation, the Commission decided on 22 September 1999 to prohibit the merger because the mergerwould have created a situation of collective dominance in the market for short-haul foreign packageholidays in the United Kingdom (134).
225.Efter fusionen ville der kun have været tre store rejsearrangører tilbage på markedet, nemlig denfusionerede enhed (med en markedsandel på 19,4 + 15,0 = 34,4 %), Thomas Cook (20,4 %) og Thomson(30,7 %). Alle de andre ville have under 3 %.
225.After the merger there would have been three major tour operators left in the market: the mergedentity (with 19.4 + 15.0 = 34.4 % market share), Thomas Cook (20.4 %) and Thomson (30.7 %).
Kommissionen fandt, at de tre tilbageværende store rejsearrangører ville være i stand til at koordinere deres adfærd og begrænse deres udbud og derigennem hævepriserne for de britiske forbrugere.
The Commission’s view was that the three remaining largeoperators would be able to coordinate behaviour by restricting the capacity put on sale, thereby raisingprices for British consumers.
Kommissionen havde i sin beslutning anført, at det ikke var nogen forudsætning forkollektiv dominans, at oligopolvirksomhederne stiltiende optrådte, som om de var i et kartel.
The Commission had stated in the decision that it is not a necessary condition forthe finding of collective dominance that the oligopolists will behave tacitly as if they were a cartel.Collective dominance in the context of the merger regulation could also occur in a situation where a‘merger makes it rational for the oligopolists, in adapting themselves to market conditions, to act —individually — in ways which will substantially reduce competition between them, and as a result ofwhich they may act, to an appreciable extent, independently of competitors, customers andconsumers’ (135).
I relation tilfusionsforordningen kunne kollektiv dominans også opstå i en situation, hvor »det i kraft af fusionenbliver rationelt for oligopolmedlemmerne, at de for at tilpasse sig til markedsforholdene handler — hverfor sig — på måder, der vil begrænse konkurrencen mellem dem mærkbart, og som vil sætte dem i stand
This statement was not of immediate relevance for this particular merger since the Commission had indeed found that the conditions for tacit coordination were present and the Court of First Instance thus abstained from giving its opinion as to whether the concept of collective dominance
Sag COMP/M.2822 af 17.12.2002.Førsteinstansrettens dom af 6.6.2002, sag T-342/99, Airtours plc mod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.Sag nr. IV/M.1524, Airtours/First Choice.
Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities.Case No IV/M.1524 Airtours/First Choice.Decision, paragraph 54.
XXXII BERETNING OM KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN 2002 — SEK(2003) 467 ENDELIG67 til i betydeligt omfang at handle uden hensyn til konkurrenter, kunder og forbrugere« (135).
XXXIIND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2002 — SEC(2003) 467 FINAL69 could include other situations than tacit coordination.
Retten konkluderede, at »da beslutningen udgør en retsakt til gennemførelse afartikel 2 i forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89 vedrørende en bestemt fusion, skal Retten ved efterprøvelsen af
The Court of First Instance concluded that ‘sincethe decision is a measure applying Article 2 of Regulation No 4064/89 to a specific concentration, the Court must, in its review of the legality of the decision, confine itself to the position adopted by the
227.Det var på grundlag af en række træk ved dette marked, at Kommissionen havde draget denkonklusion, at de store udbydere havde et incitament til stiltiende samordning.
227.A number of features in the market had led the Commission to conclude that there was anincentive for the big operators to coordinate tacitly.
Kommissionensundersøgelser havde vist, at rejsearrangørerne var indbyrdes afhængige af hinanden, at de finansiellemarkeder ikke var venligt stemt over for aggressive strategier baseret på organisk vækst, og at institutionelle investorer havde betydelige aktieposter i flere af rejsearrangørerne.
The investigation had shown that operators wereinterdependent, that the financial markets were hostile to aggressive strategies based on organic growthand that institutional investors owned significant shares in several of the operators.
228.Retten i Første Instans fandt imidlertid, at Kommissionen ikke havde fremlagt tilstrækkeligebeviser for denne påstand. I 1997 udsendte den britiske Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) endetaljeret rapport om rejsebranchen.
228.The Court of First Instance found, however, that the Commission had not mustered enoughevidence for its claim.
I denne rapport blev det konkluderet, at markedet i 1997 stort set varet konkurrencepræget marked.
This report concluded that in 1997 the market wasbroadly competitive.
Retten hæftede sig meget ved nogle af konklusionerne i denne rapport ogvar i sidste instans ikke overbevist om, at situationen på fusionstidspunktet adskilte sig tilstrækkeligt frasituationen på tidspunktet for MMC-rapporten til at retfærdiggøre Kommissionens betænkeligheder.
The Court of First Instance placed great emphasis on some of the findings in thisreport and was in the end not convinced that the situation at the time of the merger differed sufficientlyfrom that analysed in the MMC report to justify the Commission’s concerns.
Den fandt, at Kommissionen ikke havde ført tilstrækkeligt bevis for sinpåstand om, at der allerede var en tendens til kollektiv dominans i branchen, og at den ikke havde taget tilstrækkeligt hensyn til markedsandelenes svingende karakter (137).
It found that the Commission had not provided adequate evidence insupport of its claim that there was already a tendency in the industry towards collective dominance and that it had not appropriately taken the volatility of market shares into account (137).
Retten fandt desuden, at Kommissionen havde fejlfortolket de oplysninger, der forelå om væksten i efterspørgslen (138).
It also found that the Commission had misinterpreted the data available to it concerning demand growth (138).
230.Med hensyn til den generelle analyse af stiltiende samordning opstillede Retten tre betingelser,der skal være opfyldt, for at der kan foreligge en kollektivt dominerende stilling som defineret i dennesag: Der skal være gennemsigtighed, der skal være tilstrækkeligt med faktorer, der kan afskrække fra atfravige en samordning, og en reaktion fra konkurrenter og kunder skal være usandsynlig (139).
230.With respect to the general analysis of tacit coordination, the Court of First Instance specifiedthree necessary conditions for a collective dominant position as defined in this case to exist: transparency,deterrent mechanisms and the unlikelihood of a response from competitors and consumers (139).
231.En forudsætning for stiltiende samordning er, at hvert medlem af oligopolet har mulighed for atse, hvordan de andre medlemmer opfører sig, således at de kan kontrollere, om de overholder den fællessamordning eller ej.
231.For tacit coordination to be credible, each member of the oligopoly must have the ability to knowhow the other members are behaving in order to monitor whether or not they are adopting the commoncollusive policy.
Kommissionen havde i sin vurdering konkluderet, at der var tilstrækkeliggennemsigtighed på markedet, dels på grund af de hyppige kontakter mellem oligopolvirksomhederne,dels på grund af de brochurer, de udsender, og som giver hver af dem nøje indsigt i de andres kapacitet.Retten i Første Instans var ikke enig i denne vurdering (140).
The Commission had concluded in its assessment that the market was sufficientlytransparent, partly due to the frequent interaction of the oligopolists, partly due to the publication ofbrochures that allowed each operator to closely monitor the capacity of the others. The Court of First Instance disagreed with this assessment (140).
Beslutningen, nr. 54.Dommen, præmis 53.Dommen, præmis 120.Dommen, præmis 133.Dommen, præmis 62.Dommen, præmis 180.
Judgment, paragraph 53.Judgment, paragraph 120.Judgment, paragraph 133.Judgment, paragraph 62.Judgment, paragraph 180.
Retten afviste disse afskrækningsmidler,fordi den fandt, at de enten ikke var realistiske eller for kostbare at føre ud i livet (141).
141 either not credible, or costly to implement (
233.En stiltiende samordning er kun holdbar, hvis de nuværende og fremtidige konkurrenter ogforbrugerne ikke er i stand til at modvirke resultaterne af denne samordning.
233.Tacit coordination is only stable if current and future competitors as well as consumers are notable to jeopardise the results expected from the common policy.
Kommissionen mente ikke,at nicheaktørerne kunne danne modvægt mod oligopolselskaberne, fordi den vertikale integration, der erkarakteristisk for de store rejsearrangører, havde gjort nicheaktørerne afhængige af oligopolselskaberne.Retten konkluderede, at Kommissionens vurdering var forkert, og at den undervurderede deres evne til atreagere og modvirke skabelsen af en kollektivt dominerende stilling (142).
The Commission did not believe that thefringe could constrain the oligopolists because the vertical integration of the big operators had broughtthe fringe into a situation of dependence vis-à-vis the members of the oligopoly. The Court of First Instance concluded that the Commission’s assessment was incorrect and that it underestimated theirability to react as a countervailing force capable of counteracting the creation of a collective dominantposition (142).
234.Selv om Kommissionen ikke fik medhold, må denne dom hilses velkommen, fordi den yder etbetydeligt bidrag til at skabe større klarhed over, hvilke krav der stilles til bevisførelsen i sager angåendekollektiv dominans.
234.Despite its negative finding, the judgment should be welcomed as a significant step forward inthat it brings clarity as to what are the necessary standards of proof in cases of creation of collectivedominance.
235.Den 22. oktober afsagde Retten i Første Instans efter for første gang at have brugt denfremskyndede procedure i en fusionssag en dom, hvorved den annullerede den beslutning,Kommissionen havde vedtaget den 10. oktober 2001, hvor den havde erklæret fusionen mellem defranske eludstyrsfabrikanter Schneider og Legrand uforenelig med fællesmarkedet (143).
235.On 22 October, the Court of First Instance, adjudicating for the first time under an expeditedprocedure in a merger case, annulled the Commission decision of 10 October 2001 declaring the mergerbetween the French electrical equipment manufacturers Schneider and Legrand incompatible with thecommon market (143).
236.Kommissionens beslutning blev kendt ugyldig dels på grund af en række analyse- ogvurderingsfejl, dels på grund af en tilsidesættelse af parternes ret til at blive hørt.
236.The annulment of the Commission decision was based on two sets of considerations: first, errorsof analysis and assessment and, second, infringement of the rights of the defence.
237.Med hensyn til Kommissionens økonomiske analyse af fusionens virkninger fandt Retten, at Kommissionen havde gjort sig skyldig i fejlanalyser og fejlvurderinger, hvilket fratog den dens værdisom bevismiddel i sagen.
237.With regard to the Commission’s economic analysis of the impact of the merger operation, the Court of First Instance considered that it was vitiated by errors of analysis and assessment whichdeprived it of probative value.
238.For det første bemærkede Retten, at Kommissionen havde lagt en række indikatorer forøkonomisk styrke, såsom det produktsortiment og den varemærkeportefølje, den fusionerede enhed villehave fået i hele EØS, til grund for sin vurdering af dens økonomiske styrke på hvert af de nationalemarkeder, der ville blive berørt af fusionen.
238.First, the Court of First Instance noted that the Commission had relied on evidence such as therange of products and the combination of brands which it would have been able to offer throughout the EEA in assessing the economic power which the new entity resulting from the merger would enjoy ineach of the different national markets affected by the operation.
Uden på forhånd at udelukke muligheden for derudover ogsåat tage hensyn til tværnationale faktorer i analysen af en fusions virkninger på markeder af nationalttilsnit fandt Retten, at Kommissionen i den konkrete sag ikke havde ført bevis for sådanne virkninger påhvert af de berørte nationale markeder.
Without ruling out in principle thepossibility of taking into account, on a supplementary basis, transnational factors in the analysis of theeffects of a merger on national markets, the Court of First Instance held that, in the present case, the Commission had not shown that such effects existed in each of the national markets affected.
239.For det andet fandt Retten, at Kommissionen med urette ikke havde taget hensyn til det internesalg hos nogle af de vertikalt integrerede konkurrenter, hvilket bevirkede, at den havde overvurderet den
239.Secondly, the Court of First Instance held that the Commission had been wrong not to takeaccount of the internal sales of certain vertically integrated competitors, leading it to overestimate thestrength of the entity resulting from the merger.
Dommen, præmis 207.Dommen, præmis 277.Sag T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA mod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.
Judgment, paragraph 207.Judgment, paragraph 277.Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission of the European Communities.
XXXII BERETNING OM KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN 2002 — SEK(2003) 467 ENDELIG69 fusionerede enheds markedsstyrke.
XXXIIND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2002 — SEC(2003) 467 FINAL71
240.Retten opstillede et vigtigt princip, nemlig at uanset hvor store lakuner en kommissionsbeslutning, hvorved en fusion erklæres uforenelig med fællesmarkedet, er behæftet med, kan de ikke føretil, at beslutningen annulleres, hvis det af de andre elementer i beslutningen fremgår, at fusionensgennemførelse vil resultere i skabelse eller styrkelse af en dominerende stilling, der vil hæmme deneffektive konkurrence betydeligt.
240.The Court of First Instance then laid down the important principle that, whatever the scale of thedefects affecting a Commission decision declaring a merger incompatible with the common market,those defects cannot lead to its annulment if it follows from the other elements of the decision thatimplementation of the operation will create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of whicheffective competition will be significantly impeded.
Retten fastslog også, at dette ville blive resultatet af fusionen mellem Schneider og Legrand på de franske markeder.
The Court found that the merger between Schneiderand Legrand did have such an effect on the French markets.
241.På disse markeder fandt Retten imidlertid, at Kommissionen havde tilsidesat Schneiders ret til atblive hørt, fordi den i sin beslutning havde medtaget et klagepunkt, som ikke var indeholdt i densklagepunktsmeddelelse.
241.However, with regard to those markets, the Court of First Instance held that the Commission hadinfringed Schneider’s rights of defence as it had included in its decision an objection that did not featurein the statement of objections.
Det pågældende klagepunkt drejede sig om den stærke stilling, den fusioneredeenhed ville have fået over for grossisterne.
The objection in question concerned the position of strength of the entityresulting from the merger enjoyed vis-à-vis wholesalers.
Retten fandt, at denne tilsidesættelse af Schneiders ret til atblive hørt havde påvirket sagens udfald i to henseender.
The Court of First Instance took the view thatthis infringement of Schneider’s rights of defence had affected the outcome of the proceedings in tworespects.
For det første fik Schneider ikke lejlighed til atfremsætte sine bemærkninger til dette klagepunkt, hverken i sit svar på klagepunktsmeddelelsen ellerunder høringen.
First, Schneider had not been given a proper opportunity to comment on the objection, eitherin its reply to the statement of objections or at the hearing.
For det andet fik Schneider ikke lejlighed til i tide at fremsætte forslag om afhændelser,der var tilstrækkelige til at løse de konkurrenceproblemer, Kommissionen havde påvist på de franskemarkeder.
Secondly, Schneider had not been given anopportunity to submit in good time proposals for divestiture capable of resolving the competitionproblems identified by the Commission on the French markets.
242.I øvrigt udtalte Retten, at i betragtning af det krav om en hurtig sagsbehandling, der generelt erindbygget i forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89, var den frist på 12 dage — svarende til fem arbejdsdage —som Kommissionen havde givet parterne til at besvare en begæring om oplysninger efter forordningensartikel 11, stk. 5, en rimelig frist til trods for de mange spørgsmål, der blev stillet (322).
242.The Court of First Instance considered that, in view of the requirement for speed whichcharacterises the overall scheme of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, the period of 12 days, correspondingto five working days, set by the Commission to allow the parties to respond to a request for informationunder Article 11(5) of the regulation was reasonable despite the large number of questions put (322).
Retten den beslutning, Kommissionen havde truffet den 30. januar 2002, hvorved den påbød Schneider atudskille Legrand.
) delivered the same day, the Court of First Instance, again acting under the expedited procedure, annulled the Commission decision of 30 January 2002 ordering Schneider todemerge from Legrand.
Retten fandt, at da beslutningen om fusionens uforenelighed var blevet annulleret,havde beslutningen om fusionens opløsning ikke længere noget retsgrundlag.
The Court held that, since the decision finding that the merger operation wasincompatible with the common market had been annulled, the demerger decision had no basis in law.
244.I disse to sager afsagde Retten dom, ca. 10 måneder efter at sagen var blevet anlagt og ca.12 måneder efter vedtagelsen af Kommissionens beslutning.
244.In both these cases, the Court of First Instance delivered its judgment approximately 10 monthsafter the application was lodged and approximately 12 months after the incompatibility decision wasadopted.
Desuden statuerede Retten før udløbet afden frist, Schneider havde fået til at opløse fusionen med Legrand.
It did so, moreover, before the deadline imposed on Schneider and Legrand to demerge hadexpired.
245.Efter grundige overvejelser besluttede Kommissionen ikke at indbringe denne dom for EF-Domstolen.
After careful consideration, the Commission decided not to appeal against the judgment in this
246.Den 25. oktober annullerede Retten den beslutning, Kommissionen havde vedtaget den30. oktober 2001, hvor den erklærede fusionen mellem Tetra Laval, som er et schweizisk selskab, derprimært er aktivt inden for kartonemballage, og Sidel, som er et fransk emballageselskab, der primærtbeskæftiger sig med PET-plastemballeringsudstyr, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
246.On 25 October, the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission’s decision of 30 October 2001declaring the merger between Tetra Laval, a Swiss packaging company active mainly in cartonpackaging, and Sidel, a French packaging company active mainly in plastic PET packaging equipment,incompatible with the common market.
Det er første gang, at Retten udtrykkeligt har taget stillingtil en fusion, hvor der var konglomerale aspekter involveret, og udviklet en ny, potentielt kontroversiel
It is the first case in which the Court of First Instance hasexpressly considered a merger involving conglomerate issues and creates new, potentially controversialcase-law in this field by directly addressing issues such as the assessment of conglomerate mergers underthe ECMR, the relationship between Article 82 and the ECMR, and the role of behavioural remedies. Thecase was dealt with under the Court of First Instance’s expedited procedure.
Sag T-77/02.Førsteinstansrettens dom af 25.10.2002, sag T-05/02,Tetra Laval mod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.
Case T-77/02.Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-05/02 Tetra Laval v Commission of the European Communities.
XXXII BERETNING OM KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN 2002 — SEK(2003) 467 ENDELIG retspraksis på området ved direkte at tage stilling til spørgsmål som vurdering af konglomerale fusionerefter EU’s fusionsforordning, forholdet mellem traktatens artikel 82 og fusionsforordningen og tilsagnangående parternes adfærd. Sagen blev behandlet efter den fremskyndede procedure.
XXXIIND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2002 — SEC(2003) 467 FINAL
248.Kommissionens beslutning var især rettet mod de konkurrencebegrænsende konglomeralevirkninger, som den fandt fusionen kunne få.
248.The Commission’s decision focused mainly on the likely anticompetitive conglomerate effects ofthe merger.
Kommissionen drog den konklusion, at de to virksomhedervar aktive på forskellige produktmarkeder, nemlig henholdsvis kartonemballage og PET-emballe-ringsudstyr, der dog var nært beslægtede, eftersom PET er en teknisk erstatning til emballering af desåkaldt følsomme produkter, der traditionelt har været emballeret i karton (flydende mejeriprodukter,juice, læskedrikke med frugtsmag og te/kaffe), og der ventes en kraftig vækst i brugen af PET på dissesegmenter i en overskuelig fremtid på bekostning af karton.
The Commission concluded that the two companies were active in distinct product markets,carton packaging and PET packaging equipment respectively, which were, however, closelyneighbouring markets. PET is a technical substitute for the so-called sensitive products that traditionallyhave been packaged in carton (liquid dairy products, juices, fruit-flavoured still drinks, and tea/coffeedrinks) and PET is expected to grow significantly in those segments in the near future in competition withcarton.
Fusionen ville skabe en markedsstruktur,hvor den fusionerede enhed ville kunne udnytte sin dominerende stilling inden for karton til at blivedominerende inden for PET-emballeringsudstyr.
The merger would create a market structure allowing the merged entity to leverage its dominantposition in carton to turn its leading position in PET packaging equipment into a dominant one.
Fusionen ville også styrke Tetras allerede dominerendestilling inden for karton ved at eliminere den faktiske og potentielle konkurrence fra Sidel som denførende virksomhed på et konkurrerende nabomarked.
Themerger would also strengthen Tetra’s existing dominance in carton by eliminating the actual and potentialcompetition represented by Sidel as the leading company in a neighbouring, rival market.