natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Meddelelser med opfordring til atfremsætte bemærkninger til alliancen blev offentliggjort samme dag, og identiske spørgeskemaer blevudsendt til konkurrenter, rejseagenter og erhvervskunder.
Notices inviting comments on the alliance were published on the same day and identicalquestionnaires were sent out to competitors, travel agents and corporate customers.
Der blev også afholdt fællesmøder med deanmeldende parter såvel som med tredjeparter.
Joint meetings werealso held with the notifying parties as well as with third parties.
Som et resultat af dette samarbejde nåede de to konkurrencemyndigheder frem til en fælles holdning til, hvilke fordele denne alliance kunne give, hvilkekonkurrenceproblemer den kunne rejse, og hvordan disse eventuelt kunne løses.
As a result of this close cooperation, bothcompetition authorities were able to reach a common understanding of the benefits arising from thealliance, the possible competition concerns and the remedies that might have been needed to addressthese.
Den 25. januar 2002 gav det amerikanske transportministerium sin foreløbige godkendelse af alliancenpå betingelse af, at parterne afgav 224 ugentlige slots i Londons Heathrow-lufthavn.
On 25 January 2002, the US DoT tentatively granted BA/AA’s application for antitrust immunity subjectto the divestiture of 224 weekly slots at London’s Heathrow airport.
Parterne fandt, at detvar for høj en pris at betale, og besluttede at opgive deres allianceplan.
The parties considered this too higha price and decided to abandon their planned alliance.
Den 21. februar bekræftedeparterne officielt, at de havde opsagt deres allianceaftaler, og at de derfor ønskede at tilbagetrække denanmeldelse, de havde indgivet efter de britiske regler.
On 21 February, the parties officially confirmedthat their alliance agreements were terminated and that they consequently wished to withdraw theirnotification under the UK enforcement regulations.
Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence besluttedesom følge heraf at indstille den procedure, det havde indledt i denne sag.
As a consequence, the Competition DG decided toclose the procedure it had opened in this case.
Alliancerne mellem KLM og NorthWest (sag COMP/D-2/36.111) og mellem Lufthansa, SAS og United Airlines (sag COMP/D-2/36.201)
The alliances between KLM/NorthWest (Case COMP/D2/36.111) and between Lufthansa/SAS/Unites Airlines (Case COMP/D2/36.201)
Den 28. oktober besluttede Kommissionen at indstille de undersøgelser, den efter traktatens artikel 85(tidl. 89) havde indledt af to luftfartsalliancer i Atlanttrafikken, nemlig alliancen mellem KLM og
On 28 October, the Commission decided to close its investigations under Article 85 (ex 89) of the Treatyinto two transatlantic aviation alliances, that is, the alliance between KLM and NorthWest (Wings) on theone hand, and the alliance between Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines (STAR Alliance) on the
Kommissionen tog også hensyn til en erklæring fra den tyskeregering om ophævelse af lovgivningsbetingede adgangsbarrierer på de pågældende ruter.
The Commission also took account of adeclaration by the German Government, meant to lift possible regulatory entry barriers on the routesconcerned.
Med hensyn tilalliancen mellem KLM og NorthWest var der ikke behov for sådanne tilsagn.
In the case of KLM/NorthWest no remedies were held necessary.
Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3975/87 (EFT L 374 af 31.12.87, s.1), der fastlægger fremgangsmåden for anvendelse afkonkurrencereglerne på virksomheder i luftfartssektoren, omfatter kun flytransport mellem EØS-lufthavne. I henhold til EC Competition Law (§§ 84 og 85) Enforcement Regulations 2001, som ændret ved EC Competition Law(§§ 84 og 85) Enforcement (Amendment) Regulations 2002.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 (OJ L 374, 31.12.1987), which lays down the procedure for the application of therules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, only covers air transport between EEA airports.Pursuant to the EC Competition Law (Articles 84 and 85) Enforcement Regulations 2001, as amended by the ECCompetition Law (Articles 84 and 85) Enforcement (Amendment) Regulations 2002.
Meddelelserne herom er offentliggjort i EFT C 264 af 30.10.2002, s. 5. Pressemeddelelse IP/02/1569.
Notices published in OJ C 264, 30.10.2002; press release IP/02/1569, 29.10.2002.
BERETNING OM ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION store markedsandele, også selv om der antages at bestå en vis subsitution mellem direkte og indirekteflyvninger på de pågældende Atlantruter.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Selv om Kommissionen accepterede, at alliancerne var forbundet med fordele i relation til flere afgangeog lavere priser til gavn for forbrugerne, og at disse fordele nok ikke ville kunne opnås med mindrekonkurrencebegrænsende midler, fandt den for LH/SAS/UA-alliancens vedkommende, at der var risikofor, at alliancen ville eliminere konkurrencen på visse ruter fra Frankfurt til USA på grund af de barriererfor adgangen til markedet, der fandtes.
In its investigation, the Commission came to the conclusion that both transatlantic aviation alliancesrestricted competition within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty on certain city pairs where theparties were prior to the alliance either actual or potential competitors and where they held substantialcombined market shares, even when accepting a certain substitutability between direct and indirectflights on the transatlantic routes concerned.
Disse barrierer var både af lovgivningsmæssig art (statsligpriskontrol på indirekte flyvninger) og af kommerciel art (mangel på slots i Frankfurt lufthavn).
Although the Commission accepted that the alliances brought benefits in terms of increased frequenciesand reduced fares to the advantage of consumers and that these benefits were unlikely to be achieved byless restrictive alternatives, it identified in the case of LH/SAS/UA a risk that the alliance would eliminatecompetition on certain routes from Frankfurt to the US because of the existence of market entry barriers.These barriers were both of a regulatory nature (government price control on indirect services) and of acommercial nature (slot constraints at Frankfurt airport).
For at imødekomme disse indsigelser, afgav parterne en række tilsagn.
In order to meet the identified competition concerns, the parties proposed certain commitments.
De tilbød i alt væsentligt at afgiveslots i Frankfurt lufthavn, således at nye selskaber kunne flyve (enten direkte eller indirekte) på disseruter.
Inessence, they offered to surrender slots at Frankfurt airport to allow new air services (either direct orindirect) on the routes concerned.
Parterne tilbød at afgive tilstrækkeligt mange slots til, at der blev mulighed for yderligere tokonkurrerende afgange om dagen på hver af de andre tre ruter.
They offered to surrender sufficient slots to allow two additional dailycompeting air services on the Frankfurt–Washington route and one additional daily competing air serviceon each of the other three routes.
Desuden ville nytilkomne flyselskaber, derovertog disse slots, hvis de fløj non-stop, få adgang til parternes bonusprogrammer og få tilbudt interlining. Endvidere ville parterne ikke deltage i den del af IATA-takstkonferencen, der drejer sig omflyvning på de pågældende ruter.
In addition, new entrants using the slots, if they operated a non-stopservice, would be admitted to the parties’ frequent flyer programme and be offered interlining facilities.Moreover, the parties would not participate in that part of the IATA tariff conference which concernedservices on the routes in question.
Kommissionen fandt, at alliancen efter disse tilsagn og under hensyn til den tyske regerings erklæringkunne anses at opfylde de kumulative betingelser i traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3.
The Commission considered that, on the basis of these proposed commitments and the declaration by the German Government, the alliance could be said to fulfil the cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty and could be accepted.
Parternes tilsagn og erklæringen fra den tyske regering løste problemerne omkring adgangsbarrierer for konkurrenterne og forhindrede dermed, at konkurrencen blev elimineret.
The proposed commitments and the declaration by the German Governmentaddress possible entry barriers for competitors and thereby avoid the risk of elimination of competition.
Hvad angår KLM/NW-alliancen blev der ikke påvist nogen større adgangsbarrierer, og det blev derforikke fundet nødvendigt at afkræve parterne tilsagn.
As regards the KLM/NW alliance, no substantial market entry barriers were identified and therefore nospecific remedies were held necessary.
I november 2002 traf det britiske Office of Fair Trading formel afgørelse om individuel fritagelse eftertraktatens artikel 81, stk. 3, til alliancen mellem Bmi British Midland og dennes amerikanske partner,
In November, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) adopted a formal decision granting an individualexemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty to the alliance between bmi British Midland and its US
Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence besluttede derfor at indstille sine undersøgelser efter EU-reglerne af denne alliance.
As a result, the Competition DG decided to close its investigation under the EU competition rules in relation to this alliance.
Kommissionenindledte ingen formel procedure i sagen, men samarbejdede aktivt med OFT.
In this case,the Commission did not launch formal proceedings but cooperated actively with the OFT.
Den 13. december 2001anmeldte parterne formelt aftalen til OFT i henhold til de britiske gennemførelsesbestemmelser til EU’skonkurrenceregler.
On 13 December 2001, the parties formally notified the agreement to the OFT underthe enforcement regulations.
Parterne indgav ikke nogen formel parallel anmeldelse til Kommissionen, menfremsendte en kopi af aftalen til Kommissionen sammen med alle de oplysninger, de senere indsendte til OFT.
The parties did not formally make a parallel notification of the agreement tothe European Commission, although the parties supplied the Commission with a copy of the agreementand with all subsequent information supplied to the OFT.
Kommissionen foretog en parallel uformel undersøgelse (45).
The Commission conducted a parallel informalinvestigation (45).
I sin afgørelse af 1. november 2002konkluderede OFT, at allianceaftalen, hvis den blev gennemført, ville være i strid med EF-traktatensartikel 81, stk. 1, den ville hindre, begrænse eller fordreje konkurrencen inden for passagerruteflyvning
In its decision of 1 November 2002, the OFT concluded that the alliance agreement, ifimplemented, would infringe Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty as it would have the effect of appreciably
OFT’s afgørelse blev truffet i henhold til EC Competition Law (§§ 84 og 85) Enforcement Regulations 2001, som ændretved EC Competition Law (§§ 84 og 85) Enforcement (Amendment) Regulations 2002 (»de britiske gennemførelsesbestemmelser til EU’s konkurrenceregler«).Se meddelelsen i EFT C 367 af 21.12.2001, s. 30.
The OFT’s decision was made under the EC Competition Law (Articles 84 and 85) Enforcement Regulations 2001, asamended by the EC Competition Law (Articles 84 and 85) Enforcement (Amendment) Regulations 2002 (theenforcement regulations).See notice published in the Official Journal (OJ C 367, 21.12.2001).
211 mærkbart, men at betingelserne for individuel fritagelse efter artikel 81, stk. 3, også var opfyldt.
211 preventing, restricting or distorting competition in relation to the scheduled air transport of passengers, butthat the requirements for individual exemption under Article 81(3) were also met.
OFTbesluttede derfor at indrømme individuel fritagelse til aftalen.
The OFT thereforedecided to grant the agreement an exemption from the prohibition in Article 81 of the EC Treaty.
Af proceduremæssige grunde blev det besluttet, at det var OFT, der skulle stå for denne sag med hjemmeli sine beføjelser efter de britiske gennemførelsesbestemmelser til EU’s konkurrenceregler (46), selv omden formelle fritagelsesbeslutning, der blev truffet den 1. november 2002, blev udarbejdet sammen med Kommissionen.
For procedural reasons, it was decided that the OFT should take the lead in this case, using its powers under
Kommissionen er enig i den vurdering af konkurrenceforholdene, der foretages iafgørelsen, for den stemmer overens med den holdning, Kommissionen har anlagt i andre sager omluftfartsalliancer.
The Commission agrees with the competition assessment set outin the decision, which is consistent with the approach taken by the Commission in other airline alliancecases.
Dette er endnu et godt eksempel på et effektivt og udbytterigt samarbejde mellem Kommissionen og en national konkurrencemyndighed forud for moderniseringen af EU’s konkurrenceregler.
It is another good example of effective and fruitful cooperation between the Commission and anational competition authority, in advance of modernisation of the EC competition rules.
Sagen om alliancen mellem Bmi og United var første gang, Kommissionen og OFT gik sammen om atbehandle en konkurrencesag i alle faserne.
The bmi/United alliance case is the first time that the Commission and the OFT have completed acompetition investigation together, through all stages of the enforcement procedure.
Som følge af dette tætte samarbejde var konkurencemyndighederne i stand til at formulere en fælles vurdering af konkurrenceforholdene og nå frem til fælleskonklusioner.
As a result of thisclose cooperation, the competition authorities were able to formulate a joint competition assessment andreach fully shared conclusions.
Kommissionen er derfor helt enig i den analyse og de konklusioner, der er indeholdt i OFT’s formelle afgørelse.
Therefore the Commission fully concurs in the analysis and conclusionsset out in the OFT’s formal exemption decision.
Det tidlige og koordinerede samarbejde mellem de to konkurrencemyndigheder gjorde, at man undgik alle håndhævelsesproblemer og politiske problemer.
The early and coordinated cooperation between the twocompetent competition authorities enabled any enforcement or policy problems to be avoided.
Det var derfor ikkenødvendigt for Kommissionen at indlede formelle undersøgelser i denne sag.
It wastherefore not necessary for the Commission to open a formal investigation in this matter.
Den 4. november indstillede Kommissionen sine undersøgelser af en påstået markedsdelingsaftale
On 4 November, the Commission closed its investigation into an alleged market-sharing agreement
47 mellem det danske bryggeri Carlsberg og det nederlandske bryggeri Heineken (
47 between Danish brewer Carlsberg and Dutch brewer Heineken (
5.Foreløbige afgørelser i igangværende sager
5.Intermediate procedural steps
Den 1. juli fremsendte Kommissionen en skrivelse til Air France og Alitalia, hvori den gav udtryk foralvorlige betænkeligheder ved deres samarbejde på visse ruter mellem Frankrig og Italien.
On 1 July, the Commission sent a letter of serious doubts to Air France and to Alitalia in connection withtheir cooperation on certain routes between France and Italy.
I november 2001 havde Air France og Alitalia anmeldt en række samarbejdsaftaler til Kommissionen,som de anmodede om fritagelse for i henhold til forordning 3975/87.
In November 2001, Air France and Alitalia had notified to the Commission a number of cooperationagreements and requested an exemption under Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87.
Aftalerne har til formål at få Alitaliaintegreret i den verdensomspændende SkyTeam-alliance og samtidig opbygge en vidfavnende, langsigtetstrategisk bilateral alliance mellem parterne baseret på et tæt samarbejde.
The agreements pursue thedouble aim of integrating Alitalia into the worldwide SkyTeam alliance and of building a far-reaching,long-term strategic bilateral alliance based on close cooperation between the parties.
Aftalerne tager sigte på atsammenkoble de to flyselskabers respektive hovedlufthavne Paris-Charles de Gaulle, Rom Fiumicino og Milano Malpensa.
The agreements aimat interconnecting the two airlines’ respective hubs at Paris-Charles de Gaulle, Rome Fiumicino and Milan Malpensa.
BERETNING OM ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION publication of the summary triggers a 90-day period within which the Commission must decide whetherto raise serious doubts or not.
Er det ikke tilfældet,fritages aftalen automatisk i seks år regnet fra offentliggørelsen af resuméet.
If it does not raise serious doubts, the agreement is automatically exemptedfor a period of six years from the date of publication.
Som samarbejdsaftalen er udformet i dag, risikerer den at medføre en kraftig indskrænkning af konkurrencen mellem Air France og Alitalia, da de to selskaber vil aftale alt fra sædekapacitet til antallet afafgange og billetpriser på flyvninger mellem Frankrig og Italien.
The cooperation agreements as they currently stand would significantly restrict competition between Air France and Alitalia, because the parties would agree on passenger capacity, flight frequencies and pricesto be charged on flights between France and Italy.
Som det har været tilfældet medtidligere bilaterale samarbejdsaftaler mellem luftfartsselskaber, indeholder også disse aftaler bestemmelser om codesharing, overskudsdeling og sammenlægning af bonusprogrammer.
The agreements also include code sharing, sharing ofearnings and the pooling of frequent-flyer programmes.
Air France og Alitaliavil i fællesskab komme til at sidde på næsten hele trafikken på en række ruter mellem de to lande,herunder på ruterne mellem Paris og Rom, mellem Paris og Milano og mellem Paris og Venedig, hvor deto selskaber har meget store markedsandele.
Air France and Alitalia together would controlalmost all traffic on a number of routes between the two countries, including Paris–Rome, Paris–Milanand Paris–Venice, where the two airlines have very high market shares.
Sammenlægningen af de to nationale luftfartsselskabersressourcer vil også i fremtiden gøre det vanskeligt for andre selskaber at trænge ind på de pågældenderuter eller overleve på dem.
The pooling of forces betweenthe two flag carriers will also make it difficult for third parties to enter the routes concerned in the futureor, where third airlines operate, to maintain their operations.
Selv om Kommissionens tjenestegrene ikke er i tvivl om, at alliancen kan bidrage til at fremme dentekniske og økonomiske udvikling takket være de forbedrede tilslutningsmuligheder samt de besparelserog synergieffekter, som parterne vil opnå, vil aftalen indskrænke konkurrencen betydeligt på noglevigtige ruter mellem Frankrig og Italien, hvilket vil være i strid med passagerernes interesser på disseruter.
While the Commission’s departments are satisfied that the alliance could contribute to technical andeconomic progress, given the improvements in connectivity and the cost savings and synergies achievedby the parties, the agreements would significantly reduce competition on key routes between France and Italy, which would be against the interests of passengers on these routes.
Kommissionen besluttede derfor at skrive til parterne før udløbet af 90-dages fristen for at tilkendegive sine alvorlige betænkeligheder og pege på, at der ikke kan indrømmes fritagelse på dette stadium iproceduren.
The Commission thereforedecided to send the parties a letter of serious doubts before the expiry of the 90-day deadline, informingthem that there are indeed competition concerns and that an antitrust exemption cannot be granted at thisstage of the procedure.
Dette foregriber ikke sagens endelige udfald.
This does not prejudge the outcome of the procedure.
6.Sammendrag af domme afsagt af EU-Domstolen
6.Summary of judgments made by the Community courts
Fjernvarmerørkartellet
Pre-insulated pipes cartel
Den 20. marts afsagde Førsteinstansretten en serie domme (48) i appelsager mod Kommissionensbeslutning i sagen om fjernvarmerørkartellet (49).
On 20 March, the Court of First Instance delivered a series of judgments (48) on appeal against the Commission’s decision in the pre-insulated (or district heating) pipes cartel case (49).
Retten stadfæstede i vid udstrækning Kommissionens beslutning, men nedsatte nogle af virksomhedernes bøder af forskellige årsager og fandt i særdeleshed, atto af virksomhederne ikke kunne holdes ansvarlige for den af Kommissionen påviste overtrædelse,specielt fordi de først blev oprettet efter overtrædelsens ophør.
While the Court largely upheld the Commission’s decision, it reduced the fines imposed on certain undertakings ondifferent accounts and found, in particular, that two entities of the group targeted could not be held liablefor the infringement established by the Commission given, in particular, that they were created after theinfringement was terminated.
Retten stadfæstede imidlertid lovlighedenaf Kommissionens bødepolitik i almindelighed og i særdeleshed af Kommissionens retningslinjer for
However, the Court confirmed the legality of the Commission’s fining
50 bødepålæg (
50 policy in general, and more specifically of the Commission guidelines on fines (
Den statuerede især, at Kommissionen har ret til at hæve det generelle bødeniveau inden for de i forordning nr. 17 fastsatte grænser, hvis det er nødvendigt for at håndhæve EU’s konkurrencepolitik.
It held in particular that the Commission is entitled to raise the general level of fines, within the limits laid down in Regulation 17, if that is necessary to ensure the implementation of Community competition policy.
Den 8. oktober (51) annullerede Førsteinstansretten Kommissionens fritagelsesbeslutning af 10. maj 2000i Eurovision-sagen (52).
(b) the sharing of jointly acquired sport television rights;
I sin beslutning havde Kommissionen indrømmet fritagelse efter EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3, for Eurovision-systemet, dvs. de regler, Den Europæiske Radiounion (EBU) har vedtaget om a) fælles erhvervelse af sports-tv-rettigheder b) deling af kollektivt erhvervede sports-tv-rettigheder c) udveksling af signalet til sportsprogrammerne d) tredjemands kontraktbaserede adgang til Eurovision-sportsrettigheder (underlicensordningen).
(d) the contractual access to Eurovision sports rights for third parties (the sublicensing scheme).
Fritagelsesbeslutningen grundede på, at Eurovision-systemet åbnede mulighed for en maksimal dækningaf sportsbegivenheder ved at give flere tv-selskaber mulighed for at sende programmerne.
The exemption was based on the fact that the Eurovision system permitted better broadcasting of sports eventsby a large number of broadcasters by ensuring maximum coverage of these events.
Desuden blevdet fremhævet, at EBU rent faktisk kun besad en ret begrænset rettighedsportefølje, som var blevetindskrænket betydeligt på grund af konkurrencen fra stærke private selskaber.
Moreover, the decisionemphasised that the EBU actually held a rather limited portfolio of rights that had decreased significantlyunder the competitive pressure of powerful private operators.
Kommissionen anerkendte,at der kunne opstå risiko for en eliminering af konkurrencen på markedet for erhvervelse af rettigheder tilvigtige internationale sportsbegivenheder, hvilket kunne anses at udgøre et særskilt marked, men afviste isin beslutning denne risiko i lyset af underlicensordningen, der blev antaget at give tredjemand adgang tilde kollektivt erhvervede Eurovision-rettigheder.
However, while acknowledging a risk ofelimination of competition on the market for the acquisition of rights to major international sports events,which could constitute a separate market on its own, the decision discounted this risk in the light of the sublicensing scheme, which was supposed to give third parties access to jointly acquired Eurovision rights.
Førsteinstansretten så først på strukturerne på det relevante marked og de konkurrencebegrænsninger,som Eurovision-reglerne affødte.
The CFI first considered the structure of the markets in question and the restrictions on competitionresulting from the Eurovision rules.