natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Domme af 5.11.2002 i sagerne C-475/98, C-471/98, C-467/98, C-469/98, C-476/98, C-472/98, C-468/98 og C-466/98 mod henholdsvis Østrig, Belgien, Danmark, Finland, Tyskland, Luxembourg, Sverige og Det Forenede Kongerige. Se bl.a. konklusionerne fra transportministrenes møde i Rådet den 5.6.2003 og Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 847/2004 (EUT L 195 af 2.6.2004).
Judgments of 5.11.2002 in Cases C-475, 471, 467, 469, 476, 472, 468 and 466/98 against Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom, respectively.See notably the conclusions of the Transport Council of 5.6.2003 and Regulation (EC) No 847/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 195, 2.6.2004).
Denne beslutning er blevet indbragt for Førsteinstansretten af en tredjepart (sag T-177/04).COMP/38.248 — Air France/Alitalia.
This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-177/04).COMP/38.248 — Air France/Alitalia.
Denne beslutning er blevet indbragt for Førsteinstansretten af en tredjepart (sag T-300/04).
This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-300/04).
Sammenlignet med en alliance åbner en fusion mulighed for en bedre rationalisering og integrering af de fusionerende yselskabers rutenet.
Compared with alliances, mergers allow a better rationalisation and integration of the network structure of the merging carriers.
Men tidligere var det meget vanskeligt for yselskaber af forskellig nationalitet i EU at fusionere på grund af det system med bilaterale internationale a aler, der fandtes, og som regulerede trafikrettighederne mellem staterne.
However, mergers in the EU between carriers of di erent nationalities used to be di cult owing to the system of bilateral international agreements regulating traffic rights between States.
I henhold til den internationale lu fartskonvention af 7. december 1947 (Chicagokonventionen) kan enhver suveræn stat bestemme over trafikrettighederne til sit lu rum.
Pursuant to the International Convention on Aviation of 7 December 1947 (Chicago Convention), each sovereign State has the competence to grant traffic rights over its airspace.
På grundlag heraf k yselskaber fra tredjelande tildelt trafikrettigheder gennem bilaterale a aler, hvor de to kontraherende stater o e kun giver trafikrettigheder til yselskaber med de pågældende staters nationalitet (nationalitetsklausulen).
On this basis, traffic rights were granted to carriers from third countries through bilateral agreements, whereby the two signing States o en grant traffic rights only to carriers having the nationality of those States (‘nationality clause’).
I dette juridiske landskab foretrak de europæiske yselskaber i stedet at indgå strategiske alliancer.
In that legal context, European carriers preferred to use strategic alliances.
EF-Domstolen statuerede, at de medlemsstater, der havde indgået forpligtelser over for USA, ikke havde ret til at gøre det og havde handlet i strid med Fællesskabets enekompetence på en række områder.
Moreover, the Court ruled that the negotiation of bilateral agreements by Member States on behalf of their national carriers while excluding other Community carriers constitutes an infringement of the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 43 EC.
Den udtalte desuden, at medlemsstaterne
As a result, the nationality clauses contained in bilateral agreements with third countries
Forordningerne (EF) nr. 2407/92, (EF) nr. 2408/92 og (EF) nr. 2409/92.Blandt tidligere beslutninger om fusioner mellem EU- yselskaber kan nævnes beslutning af 5.10.1992 i sag IV/M.616 — Air France/Sabena, og beslutning af 11.8.1999 i sag COMP/JV.19 — KLM/Alitalia.
Regulations (EC) Nos 2407, 2408 and 2409/92.Some previous decisions on mergers between Community carriers are: decision of 5.10.1992 in Case IV/M.616 — Air France/Sabena, and decision of 11.8.1999 in Case COMP/JV.19 — KLM/Alitalia.
Fusionsbegrebet omfatter »kun foranstaltninger, som kan bevirke en varig ændring af de berørte virksomheders struktur« (9). Rammea alen mellem AF og KLM af 16. oktober 2003 (10) indeholder bestemmelse om, at de to hidtil uaængige yselskaber skulle fusionere og i sidste instans blive til én enkelt operatør på markedet (under navnet Air France-KLM).
Description of the two transactions e concept of concentration covers ‘only operations bringing about a lasting change in the structure of the undertakings concerned’ (9). e framework agreement of 16 October 2003 (10) signed between AF and KLM provides that two previously independent carriers will merge to become ultimately a single operator in the market (under the name Air France–KLM).
AF’s tidligere aktionærer ville få 81 % af aktierne i Air France-KLM, og KLM’s minoritetsaktionærer ville få de resterende 19 %.
Former shareholders of AF will hold 81 % of Air France–KLM shares and the minority shareholders of KLM the remaining 19 %.
Selv om den bedste måde at opnå alle synergivirkningerne på ville være en fuldstændig fusion, var det af hensyn til en gradvis accept af »EU-flyselskabsbegrebet« hos tredjelande nødvendigt at gå forsigtigt og gradvis til værks.
Although the best way to benefit fully from synergy e ects would be a full merger, the gradual acceptance of the principle of the ‘Community carrier’ concept by third States requires a cautious and progressive approach.
I anden omgang skulle AF og KLM integreres mere, og det fusionerede selskab ville til sidst kunne komme til at operere som ét samlet yselskab. At AF lige fra starten k centrale vetorettigheder over KLM, indebar, at den anmeldte transaktion udgjorde en fusion e er fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b).
In a second phase, the integration between AF and KLM will be enhanced and the merged entity might ultimately operate as a single carrier. e acquisition of key veto rights by AF over KLM from the outset implies that the notified transaction constituted a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the ECMR.
Inden for rammerne af deres omfattende alliance a alte AF og AZ at koordinere deres dri s- og forretningspolitik på en række ruter (i første omgang rutebundtet Frankrig-Italien) gennem omfattende brug af codesharing, koordinering af net og rutesamarbejde, fælles priser og fælles salgspolitik.
Under their extensive alliance, AF and AZ agree to coordinate their operational and commercial policies on a number of routes (i.e. initially the France–Italy bundle of routes), through extensive use of code-sharing, network coordination and route cooperation, share prices and a common sales policy.
Men i modsætning til AF/KLM-sagen blev AF og AZ ved med at operere som to selvstændige og særskilte
However, unlike the AF/KLM case, AF and AZ remain two distinct and independent entities in the market. e alliance does not create a new entity either de jure or de facto, nor has it altered the structure of the undertakings concerned, particularly as regards control.
Den 5.6.2003 k Kommissionen af Rådet mandat til sammen med medlemsstaterne at forhandle en omfattende luftfartsaftale med USA og et horisontalt mandat til forhandlinger med tredjelande på alle områder, der falder ind under Fællesskabet enekompetence.
On 5.6.2003, the Commission proposed and obtained from the Council a mandate to negotiate, together with the Member States, a comprehensive air services agreement with the US and a horizontal mandate for negotiations with third countries in all areas which fall under exclusive Community competence.
I sin ovennævnte meddelelse af 5.11.2002 om følgerne for den europæiske luftfartspolitik af Domstolens domme anfører Kommissionen, at indføjelsen af en fællesskabsklausul i disse aftaler vil sætte EU- yselskaberne i stand til at øge deres internationale yvninger fra lufthavne i andre medlemsstater og samtidig bane vej for større kommerciel integration mellem yselskaber i forskellige medlemsstater.
The Commission states in the above-mentioned communication of 5.11.2002 on the consequences of the Court judgments for European air transport policy that ‘the negotiation of Community clauses will permit Community airlines to expand their international operations from airports in other Member States, as well as pave the way for greater commercial integration between airlines in di erent Member States’.
23. betragtning til forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89.Aftalen blev anmeldt den 18.12.2003 i henhold til forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89.
Recital 23 to Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89.This Agreement was notified under Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on 18.12.2003.
Alliancen er derfor helt klart ikke en fusion, men derimod en samordningsa ale omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 81 (11).
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 within the scope of Article 81 EC (11
Markedsdefinition og vurdering af de to transaktioner
Market de nition and assessment of the two transactions e substantive assessments of the two cases are similar.
Den måtte blandt andet også tage stilling til internationale ruter (14) og vurdere virkningen af AF’s og KLM’s partnerskaber med andre
14 the assessment of international routes (
En samarbejdsalliance betyder ikke nogen permanent ændring på markedet, og beslutningen om fritagelse e er artikel 81, stk. 3, gjaldt i første omgang i 6 år, med mulighed for fornyet overvejelse e er udløbet af dette tidsrum.
Commission to conclude that, post-merger, AZ will no longer have an incentive to compete with KLM in the Italian/Dutch bundle of routes and these routes were therefore included in the competitive assessment of the merger.
En fusion har derimod varig indvirkning på virksomhedernes og markedets struktur.
Finally, the AF/KLM decision also assessed other related markets such as cargo transport and maintenance.
Netop derfor spiller strukturelle tilsagn en stor rolle i fusionssager, fordi de ifølge selve deres natur kan sikre en sådan permanent virkning (17).
e Commission found competition concerns on seven routes in the AF/AZ case, and nine intra-Community routes and ve inter-continental routes in the AF/KLM case. ese are routes on which the parties have a high combined market share and barriers to entry are high, basically owing to airport congestion in at least one of the two points of O & D. Similarities and dierences between the remedies applied
I den forstand udgør beslutningen i AF/KLM-sagen en nyskabelse i retning af en mere permanent eller »strukturel« tilgang til de traditionelle tilsagn angående slots.
Competition problems deriving from alliances and concentrations in the aviation sector, and therefore the remedies applied, are similar.
For det første gælder forpligtelsen til at afgive slots på ubestemt tid.
By de nition, competition concerns in this sector do not usually arise from restrictions on physical capacity requiring the divestiture of a given business (e.g. aeroplanes or subsidiaries), but rather from barriers to entry, namely access to airport slots (16).
For det andet skal slots, som parterne har frigivet, men som ikke længere udnyttes af en ny operatør på et bestemt bypar, gå tilbage til slotpuljen i lu havnen, hvis der ikke længere er nogen forpligtelse til at afgive slots.
In this regard the parties agreed to put slots at the disposal of competitors in both cases so that the latter might be able to operate ights on the routes where the Commission found competition concerns. ese remedies were accompanied by other measures (frequency freeze and the obligation to enter into agreements concerning the frequent-flyer programme, interlining and intermodal transport services, etc.).
For det tredje gik man på ruten Amsterdam-Paris, som konkurrenterne fandt det særligt vanskeligt at trænge ind på, fordi den går mellem AF’s og KLM’s respektive hovedlu havne, frem e er »kronjuvel«-princippet.
However, remedies should also reflect the particularities derived from the di erent nature of an alliance and a concentration.
På visse betingelser kan et konkurrerende yselskab, når det først har øjet på denne rute i mindst 3 år, endog vinde hævd på de slots, fusionsparterne har afgivet.
A cooperative alliance does not represent a permanent change in the market and an Article 81(3) decision is granted for an initial period of six years, subject to review a er that period.
Med hensyn til problemerne angående langdistanceruterne, som kun gjorde sig gældende i AF/KLM-sagen, fandt Kommissionen det nødvendigt at skabe sikkerhed for, at antagelsen om, at indirekte yvninger kunne lægge et konkurrencepres på direkte yvninger, ville holde stik. Med henblik herpå afgav de franske og de nederlandske myndigheder erklæringer om, at de ville afstå fra ethvert indgreb i prissætningen af indirekte yvninger på et stort antal ruter (den såkaldte »sjette frihed«) og sikre tredjelandsselskaber ret til at mellemlande i Amsterdam eller Paris for at kunne tilbyde destinationer uden for EU (den femte frihed).
Where the use of divestiture is di cult or impossible, ‘the change in the market structure resulting from a proposed concentration can lead to major barriers or impediments to entry into the relevant market.
Disse erklæringer indgår i AF/KLM-beslutningen.
In such circumstances, remedies may aim at facilitating market entry by ensuring that competitors will have access to the necessary infrastructure . . .’
Den 20. april modtog Kommissionen en anmeldelse af en fusion gående ud på, at den tyske virksomhed Kabel Deutschland GmbH (KDG) overtog de to virksomheder
On 20 April, the Commission received a notification of the proposed acquisition of the undertakings ish GmbH & Co KG, Germany, and ish KS NRW GmbH & Co KG, Germany (the latter two ‘ish’) by the German undertaking Kabel Deutschland GmbH, Germany (KDG). 264.
På markedet for transmission af radio- og tv-signaler via bredbåndskabler, hvor e erspørgselssiden består af radio- og tvselskaber, kunne denne dominerende stilling ifølge Bundeskartellamt blive yderligere styrket på grund af den øgede rækkevidde, sammenlægningen af de to net kunne resultere i.
In the market for the feeding-in of broadcast signals, where broadcasters demand the transmission of their signals via the broadband cable, such a strengthening could — according to the FCO — result from the increase of reach that follows the combination of the two networks.
På markedet for tjenester til digitalt betalings-tv, markedet for levering af signaler fra det regionale bredbåndskabel til kabelnettene i husene og på markedet for levering af signaler til endelige brugere fandt Bundeskartellamt, at konkurrencen kunne blive yderligere afsvækket, hvis ish blev elimineret som konkurrent til KDG, der i forvejen blev anset for at være dominerende på ere regionale markeder.
Moreover, in the market for services for digital pay-TV, the market for delivery of signals from the regional broadband cable to the in-house cable systems and the market for the supply of signals to end customers, competition could in the view of the FCO be further impeded if ish were eliminated as competitor to KDG, which was considered already dominant in some regional markets.
Den fandt, at Bundeskartellamt havde de bedste forudsætninger for at analysere de umiddelbare konkurrenceproblemer, e ersom det krævede undersøgelser af lokale markeder og særlige nationale forhold.
It believed that the FCO was best placed to analyse the preliminary competition concerns, as this required the examination of local markets and specific national circumstances.
Desuden rejste alle KDG’s tre planlagte overtagelser — dvs. overtagelsen af ish, af iesy Hessen og af Kabel Baden-Württemberg — stort set identiske problemer og burde derfor behandles under ét af en og samme konkurrencemyndighed. Kommissionen besluttede derfor den 7. juni at henvise sagen til Bundeskartellamt.
Moreover, all three proposed acquisitions by KDG — i.e. the acquisitions of ish, iesy Hessen and Kabel Baden-Württemberg — raised similar questions and should therefore be examined uniformly by a single competition authority. e Commission therefore decided on 7 June to refer the case to the FCO.
Den 4. juni besluttede Kommissionen at henvise en del af en sag angående et joint venture i kasinobranchen mellem Accor, familiekoncernen Barrière-Desseigne og Colony til de franske konkurrencemyndigheder.
On 4 June, the Commission decided to refer to the French competition authorities part of the proposed joint venture in the casinos sector between Accor, the Barrière-Desseigne family group and Colony. is partial referral concerned the assessment of the competitive impact of the transaction on the casino management markets in two French regions, Côte d’Azur and Basque and Landes Coasts.
Tilsagnene gik ud på, at parterne ville aænde to kasinoer, det ene i Côte d’Azur og det andet i den sydfranske atlanterhavsregion.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 the parties of two casinos, one on the Côte d’Azur and a second one in the Basque and Landes Coasts.
Den 22. september anmeldte den tyske kuglelejeproducent INA Holding Schaeffler KG (INA) og den amerikanske forsikringskoncern AIG en transaktion til Kommissionen, der gik ud på de to virksomheders fælles overtagelse af den franske producent af præcisionskuglelejer, SNFA.
On 22 September, the German bearings manufacturer INA Holding Schaeffler KG (INA) and the US insurance group AIG notified to the Commission the joint acquisition of the French producer of precision bearings SNFA.
Præcisionskuglelejer bruges især til formål, der kræver en høj grad af præcision, særlig i værktøjsmaskinindustrien og i lu - og rumfartsindustrien.
Precision bearings are mainly used in applications that require a very high degree of accuracy, in particular in the machine tool industry and in the aerospace sector.
NSK eller de mindre udbydere — ville have været i stand til at lægge et tilstrækkeligt e ektivt konkurrencepres på INA. Kommissionen fandt også, at kunderne ikke kunne antages at kunne lægge nogen tilstrækkelig dæmper på INA’s prisstrategi, e ersom størstedelen af værktøjsmaskinindustrien består af små virksomheder med begrænsede forhandlingsmuligheder.
None of the remaining competitors, whether the Swedish supplier SKF or the Japanese company NSK, or other smaller players, would have been able to exert a sufficient and e ective competitive pressure on INA. e Commission also found that customers would be unlikely to exert a sufficient check on INA’s pricing strategy since most machine tool and spindle manufacturers are small businesses with limited bargaining power.
Der blev dog ikke vedtaget nogen endelig beslutning, da parterne i januar 2004 opgav deres plan.
A nal decision, however, was not issued, since the parties abandoned the transaction in January 2004.
Den 11. oktober opgav de østrigske virksomheder RWA Rai eisen-Ware Austria AG (RWA) og AMI Agro Linz Melamine International GmbH (AMI) deres planer om at etablere et joint venture, Inter-Fert Düngemittel GmbH (Inter-Fert), og trak deres anmeldelse til Kommissionen tilbage.
On 11 October, the Austrian companies RWA Rai eisen-Ware Austria AG (RWA) and AMI Agro Linz Melamine International GmbH (AMI) gave up the planned creation of the joint venture Inter-Fert Düngemittel GmbH (Inter-Fert) and withdrew the corresponding notification with the Commission. e establishment of the joint venture would have united the leading Austrian producer of fertilisers, AMI, with the most important agricultural wholesale organisation in Austria, RWA.
Ved beslutning af 29. september havde Kommissionen indledt andenfasebehandling af sagen, da den indledende gennemgang af den planlagte fusion viste, at etableringen af dette joint venture ville styrke RWA’s dominerende stilling på markedet for engrossalg af gødning i Østrig.
In a decision of 29 September the Commission had initiated the second phase of the proceedings, since the preliminary examination of the intended merger found that the creation of the joint venture would strengthen the dominant position of RWA in the wholesale market for fertilisers in Austria.
I naboregionen Bayern havde Kommissionen også påvist konkurrenceproblemer inden for handelen med gødning.
In neighbouring Bavaria, the Commission also identified competition concerns regarding the trade in fertilisers.
Desuden ville RWA’s dominerende stilling være blevet yderligere forstærket ved fusionen med AMI i kraaf den deraf følgende vertikale integration. Der var risiko for, at transaktionen ville have ført til en afskærmning af markedet, så andre ikke kunne få adgang til det.
276. e Commission’s preliminary conclusion was that RWA alone had market shares in a range of 55 % to 65 % in the markets for certain types of fertiliser individually or all fertilisers together and that the operation would have removed AMI as an important competitor in the Austrian wholesale market.
Den kunne også have styrket den dominerende stilling, som BayWa, der er moderselskab til RWA, havde på markedet for detailsalg af gødning i Bayern, hvor BayWa havde en markedsandel på ca. 70 %, og have trængt sine konkurrenter ud af markedet. Det ville have ført til en styrkelse af BayWas dominerende stilling på detailmarkedet for gødning i Bayern og hæmmet konkurrencen på en væsentlig del af fællesmarkedet.
Furthermore, the dominant position of RWA would have been strengthened following the merger with AMI by the resulting vertical integration. ere was a risk that the transaction would have led to foreclosure. e transaction might also have strengthened the dominant position of BayWa, a parent company of RWA, in the Bavarian retail markets for fertilisers where it has a market share of about 70 % and could have resulted in the foreclosure of BayWa’s competitors. is would have led to a strengthening of BayWa’s dominant position in the Bavarian retail markets for fertilisers and a significant impediment of competition in a substantial part of the common market.
For at få løst konkurrenceproblemerne i relation til Østrig og Bayern tilbød parterne en række tilsagn, der dog ikke blev fundet tilstrækkelige til at ajælpe konkurrenceproblemerne på de berørte markeder i Østrig og Bayern. Det blev bekræ et, da tilsagnene blev testet på markedet.
In order to eliminate the competition concerns with regard to Austria and Bavaria, the parties proposed commitments which, however, were not considered sufficient to eliminate the competition concerns for the a ected markets in Austria and Bavaria. is was confirmed when the commitments were market tested.
E er at parterne havde fået meddelelse om, at Kommissionen havde indledt andenfasebehandling i sagen, trak de deres anmeldelse tilbage.
A er the parties were notified of the Commission’s institution of second phase proceedings they withdrew their notification. cation.
I en dom af 22. juni (154) gav Førsteinstansretten Kommissionen medhold i en sag, der drejede sig om en beslutning, Kommissionen den 22. november 2000 havde vedtaget e er fusionsforordningens (155) artikel 21, stk. 3, i Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor-sagen (156).
On 22 June, the Court of Justice (ECJ) gave judgment (154) for the Commission in a case related to the Commission Decision of 22 November 2000 adopted under
I denne artikel 21, stk. 3-beslutning (beslutningen) opfordrede Kommissionen den portugisiske regering til at træffe de fornødne foranstaltninger for at overholde fællesskabsretten og trække to afgørelser tilbage (despachos af 5. juli 2000 og 11. august 2000), hvorved regeringen på grundlag af den portugisiske privatiseringslovgivning havde modsat sig en fusion, der var blevet anmeldt til Kommissionen og havde fællesskabsdimension.
(‘the decision’), the Commission called on the Portuguese Government to take the necessary measures to comply with Community law and to withdraw two decisions (despachos of 5 July 2000 and 11 August 2000) which that government had taken to oppose, on the basis of national privatisation legislation, the proposed concentration, which had been notified to the Commission and had a Community dimension.