natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved udgangenaf 2002 verserede der ved Retten og Domstolen16 sager, der var indbragt mod en kommissionsbeslutning.
There were16 appeals against Commission decisions pending before the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice at the end of 2002.
Nogle beslutninger gav anledning tilflere sager.
Some decisions have generated more than one appeal.
221.Carnival og P & O Princess tegnede sig i2000 tilsammen for ca. en tredjedel af krydstogtpassagererne i EØS, med det største overlap i Det Forenede Kongerige og Tyskland.
221.Carnival and P & O Princess accounted in2000 for around a third of cruise passengers in the EEA, with the main overlap being in the United Kingdom and Germany.
De havde ogsåstore markedsandele i Italien og Spanien, men idisse lande ville Carnivals overtagelse af P & Oikke betyde nogen større markedsandelsforøgelse.
Market shares were alsohigh in Italy and Spain, but in these countries theaddition of P & O’s cruise operations was minimal.
Kommissionen indledte tilbundsgåendeundersøgelser på grund af betænkeligheder vedparternes stærke stilling på det britiske og det tyske krydstogtmarked.
An indepth investigation was opened owingto initial concerns about the parties’ strong position in the cruise market in the United Kingdomand in Germany.
Efter en grundig analyseblev det imidlertid konkluderet, at den stærkevækst på markedet, mangelen på nævneværdigeadgangsbarrierer på markedet og konkurrenternes muligheder for at flytte kapacitet f.eks. fra USA til Det Forenede Kongerige ville lægge ettilstrækkeligt stort konkurrencepres på Carnival.Transaktionen blev derfor godkendt.
But after an indepth analysis itwas concluded that the strong growth enjoyed inthe market, the absence of substantial barriers toentry and the ability for rivals in the market toshift capacity, for example from the United Statesto the United Kingdom, would exert a sufficientcompetitive pressure on Carnival. The deal wassubsequently cleared.
Under sagsbehandlingen havde Kommissionen kontakt medden britiske Competition Commission, der behandlede og godkendte et konkurrerende bud på P & O Princess fra Royal Caribbean, og med USA’s Federal Trade Commission, der havdebegge transaktioner til behandling og også godkendte dem.
In the course of its investigation, the Commission had contact with the United Kingdom’s Competition Commission,which assessed and cleared a rival bid for P & OPrincess by Royal Caribbean, and with the Federal Trade Commission of the United States,which examined and cleared both deals.
222.I december godkendte Kommissionen på enrække nærmere betingelser, at det tyske elektricitetsselskab Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW, som kontrolleres af Électricité de France)og det italienske gas- og olieselskab ENI SpA ifællesskab overtog den tyske regionale gasgrossist Gas Versorgung Süddeutschland (GVS) (2).Denne transaktion ville som oprindeligt anmeldt
The Commission had received the notification of Airtours bidto take over First Choice on 29 April 1999. Afteran indepth phase II investigation, the Commission decided on 22 September 1999 to prohibitthe merger because the merger would have created a situation of collective dominance in themarket for short-haul foreign package holidays inthe United Kingdom (4).
224.Den 6. juni annullerede Retten i Første Instans den beslutning, hvorved Kommissionenhavde nedlagt forbud mod fusionen mellem tobritiske rejsearrangører, Airtours og First Choice.Kommissionen havde modtaget anmeldelsen af Airtours’ overtagelsestilbud rettet mod First Choice den 29. april 1999.
222.In December, the Commission authorised,subject to conditions, the joint acquisition of German regional gas wholesaler Gas Versorgung Süddeutschland (GVS) by German electricityfirm Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW, controlled by Electricité de France) and Italiangas and petroleum firm ENI SpA (2).
Efter andenfasebehandlingen besluttede Kommissionen den 22. september 1999 at nedlægge forbud mod fusionen, fordiden vurderede, at fusionen ville have skabt en
The operation, as initially notified to the Commission,would have strengthened GVS’s dominant position on the wholesale gas market in Baden-Würt-temberg, in south-west Germany, by securing GVS’s hold on EnBW’s local distributors. In
Sag COMP/M.2706 af 24.7.2002.Sag COMP/M.2822 af 17.12.2002.
Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities.Case No IV/M.1524 Airtours/First Choice.
Førsteinstansrettens dom af 6.6.2002, sag T-342/99, Airtours plcmod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.
COMP/M.2706 Carnival Corporation/P & O Cruises, 24.7.2002.COMP/M.2822 ENBW/ENI/GVS, 17.12.2002.
I 1997 udsendteden britiske Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) en detaljeret rapport om rejsebranchen.
lies and Mergers Commission (MMC) publisheda detailed study of the foreign package holidaybusiness.
I denne rapport blev det konkluderet, atmarkedet i 1997 stort set var et konkurrencepræget marked.
This report concluded that in 1997 themarket was broadly competitive.
Retten hæftede sig meget ved nogleaf konklusionerne i denne rapport og var i sidsteinstans ikke overbevist om, at situationen på fusionstidspunktet adskilte sig tilstrækkeligt fra situationen på tidspunktet for MMC-rapporten til atretfærdiggøre Kommissionens betænkeligheder.
The Court of First Instance placed great emphasis on some ofthe findings in this report and was in the end notconvinced that the situation at the time of themerger differed sufficiently from that analysed inthe MMC report to justify the Commission’sconcerns.
229.Retten fandt, at Kommissionen have gjortsig skyldig i en fejlvurdering, da den konkluderede, at hvis transaktionen kom i stand, ville detre store rejsearrangører have et incitament til atophøre med at konkurrere med hinanden.
229.The Court of First Instance found that the Commission made an error of assessment when itconcluded that, if the transaction were to proceed,the three main operators would have an incentiveto cease competing with one another.
Denfandt, at Kommissionen ikke havde ført tilstrækkeligt bevis for sin påstand om, at der allerede varen tendens til kollektiv dominans i branchen, ogat den ikke havde taget tilstrækkeligt hensyn tilmarkedsandelenes svingende karakter (4).
It found thatthe Commission had not provided adequate evidence in support of its claim that there was alreadya tendency in the industry towards collective dominance and that it had not appropriately taken thevolatility of market shares into account (3).
Rettenfandt desuden, at Kommissionen havde fejlfortolket de oplysninger, der forelå om væksten i efterspørgslen (5).
It also found that the Commission had misinterpreted thedata available to it concerning demand growth (4).
230.Med hensyn til den generelle analyse af stiltiende samordning opstillede Retten tre betingelser, der skal være opfyldt, for at der kan foreliggeen kollektivt dominerende stilling som defineret idenne sag: Der skal være gennemsigtighed, derskal være tilstrækkeligt med faktorer, der kan afskrække fra at fravige en samordning, og en reaktion fra konkurrenter og kunder skal være usandsynlig (6).
230.With respect to the general analysis oftacit coordination, the Court of First Instancespecified three necessary conditions for a collective dominant position as defined in this caseto exist: transparency, deterrent mechanismsand the unlikelihood of a response from competitors and consumers (5).
226.Sagsøger gjorde gældende, at Kommissionen havde benyttet en ny og urigtig definition påkollektiv dominans.
226.The applicant had argued that the Commission had used a new and incorrect definition ofcollective dominance.
Kommissionen havde i sinbeslutning anført, at det ikke var nogen forudsætning for kollektiv dominans, at oligopolvirksomhederne stiltiende optrådte, som om de var i etkartel.
The Commission hadstated in the decision that it is not a necessarycondition for the finding of collective dominancethat the oligopolists will behave tacitly as if theywere a cartel.
I relation til fusionsforordningen kunnekollektiv dominans også opstå i en situation, hvor»det i kraft af fusionen bliver rationelt for oligopolmedlemmerne, at de for at tilpasse sig til markedsforholdene handler — hver for sig — på måder, der vil begrænse konkurrencen mellem demmærkbart, og som vil sætte dem i stand til i betydeligt omfang at handle uden hensyn til konkurrenter, kunder og forbrugere« (2).
Collective dominance in the context of the merger regulation could also occur in asituation where a ‘merger makes it rational for theoligopolists, in adapting themselves to marketconditions, to act — individually — in wayswhich will substantially reduce competitionbetween them, and as a result of which they mayact, to an appreciable extent, independently ofcompetitors, customers and consumers’ (1).
Denne vurdering var uden direkte relevans for denne konkretefusion, fordi Kommissionen jo havde fastslået, atbetingelserne for stiltiende samordning var tilstede, og Retten i Første Instans afstod således fraat udtale sig om, hvorvidt begrebet kollektiv dominans kunne omfatte andre situationer end situationer med stiltiende samordning.
Thisstatement was not of immediate relevance for thisparticular merger since the Commission hadindeed found that the conditions for tacit coordination were present and the Court of First Instance thus abstained from giving its opinion asto whether the concept of collective dominancecould include other situations than tacit coordination.
Retten konkluderede, at »da beslutningen udgør en retsakttil gennemførelse af artikel 2 i forordning (EØF)nr. 4064/89 vedrørende en bestemt fusion, skal Retten ved efterprøvelsen af en sådan beslutningslovlighed holde sig til Kommissionens stillingtagen til den anmeldte fusion« (3).
The Court of First Instance concluded that‘since the decision is a measure applying Article 2of Regulation No 4064/89 to a specific concentration, the Court must, in its review of the legality of the decision, confine itself to the positionadopted by the Commission in relation to thetransaction as notified’ (2).
227.Det var på grundlag af en række træk veddette marked, at Kommissionen havde draget denkonklusion, at de store udbydere havde et incitament til stiltiende samordning.
231.For tacit coordination to be credible, eachmember of the oligopoly must have the ability toknow how the other members are behaving inorder to monitor whether or not they are adoptingthe common collusive policy.
Kommissionensundersøgelser havde vist, at rejsearrangørernevar indbyrdes afhængige af hinanden, at de finansielle markeder ikke var venligt stemt over for aggressive strategier baseret på organisk vækst, og
227.A number of features in the market had ledthe Commission to conclude that there was anincentive for the big operators to coordinate tacitly.The investigation had shown that operators wereinterdependent, that the financial markets werehostile to aggressive strategies based on organicgrowth and that institutional investors owned significant shares in several of the operators.
231.En forudsætning for stiltiende samordninger, at hvert medlem af oligopolet har mulighed forat se, hvordan de andre medlemmer opfører sig,således at de kan kontrollere, om de overholderden fælles samordning eller ej.
232.For tacit coordination to be sustainablethere must exist punishment or retaliation mech-
Kommissionenhavde i sin vurdering konkluderet, at der var tilstrækkelig gennemsigtighed på markedet, dels pågrund af de hyppige kontakter mellem oligopolvirksomhederne, dels på grund af de brochurer,
228.The Court of First Instance found, however,that the Commission had not mustered enoughevidence for its claim. In 1997, the UK Monopo-
II — FUSIONSKONTROL franske eludstyrsfabrikanter Schneider og Legrand uforenelig med fællesmarkedet (4).
II — MERGER CONTROL vitiated by errors of analysis and assessmentwhich deprived it of probative value.
de udsender, og som giver hver af dem nøje indsigt i de andres kapacitet. Retten i Første Instansvar ikke enig i denne vurdering (1).
anisms that deter the oligopolists from departingfrom the common policy.
Retten afviste disse afskrækningsmidler,fordi den fandt, at de enten ikke var realistiske eller for kostbare at føre ud i livet (2).
The Court of First Instance rejectedthese deterrent mechanisms since they wereeither not credible, or costly to implement (1).
238.For det første bemærkede Retten, at Kommissionen havde lagt en række indikatorer forøkonomisk styrke, såsom det produktsortimentog den varemærkeportefølje, den fusionerede enhed ville have fået i hele EØS, til grund for sinvurdering af dens økonomiske styrke på hvert afde nationale markeder, der ville blive berørt af fusionen.
238.First, the Court of First Instance noted thatthe Commission had relied on evidence such asthe range of products and the combination ofbrands which it would have been able to offerthroughout the EEA in assessing the economicpower which the new entity resulting from themerger would enjoy in each of the differentnational markets affected by the operation.
Uden på forhånd at udelukke mulighedenfor derudover også at tage hensyn til tværnationale faktorer i analysen af en fusions virkningerpå markeder af nationalt tilsnit fandt Retten, at Kommissionen i den konkrete sag ikke havde førtbevis for sådanne virkninger på hvert af de berørte nationale markeder.
Without ruling out in principle the possibility of takinginto account, on a supplementary basis, transnational factors in the analysis of the effects of amerger on national markets, the Court of First Instance held that, in the present case, the Commission had not shown that such effects existed ineach of the national markets affected.
233.En stiltiende samordning er kun holdbar, hvisde nuværende og fremtidige konkurrenter og forbrugerne ikke er i stand til at modvirke resultaterneaf denne samordning.
233.Tacit coordination is only stable if currentand future competitors as well as consumers arenot able to jeopardise the results expected fromthe common policy.
Kommissionen mente ikke,at nicheaktørerne kunne danne modvægt mod oligopolselskaberne, fordi den vertikale integration,der er karakteristisk for de store rejsearrangører,havde gjort nicheaktørerne afhængige af oligopolselskaberne.
The Commission did notbelieve that the fringe could constrain the oligopolists because the vertical integration of thebig operators had brought the fringe into a situation of dependence vis-à-vis the members of theoligopoly.
Retten konkluderede, at Kommissionens vurdering var forkert, og at den undervurderede deres evne til at reagere og modvirkeskabelsen af en kollektivt dominerende stilling (3).
The Court of First Instance concludedthat the Commission’s assessment was incorrectand that it underestimated their ability to react asa countervailing force capable of counteractingthe creation of a collective dominant position (2).
239.For det andet fandt Retten, at Kommissionen med urette ikke havde taget hensyn til det interne salg hos nogle af de vertikalt integreredekonkurrenter, hvilket bevirkede, at den havdeovervurderet den fusionerede enheds markedsstyrke.
239.Secondly, the Court of First Instance heldthat the Commission had been wrong not to takeaccount of the internal sales of certain verticallyintegrated competitors, leading it to overestimatethe strength of the entity resulting from themerger.
Retten fandt nemlig, at ikke-integreredefabrikanter som Schneider og Legrand var udsatfor direkte priskonkurrence fra integrerede fabrikanter, når de bød på store anlægsprojekter.
The Court considered that the prices ofnon-integrated manufacturers such as Schneiderand Legrand were subject to direct competitivepressure from integrated manufacturers when itcame to carrying out large construction projectsfollowing an invitation to tender.
234.Selv om Kommissionen ikke fik medhold,må denne dom hilses velkommen, fordi den yderet betydeligt bidrag til at skabe større klarhedover, hvilke krav der stilles til bevisførelsen i sager angående kollektiv dominans.
234.Despite its negative finding, the judgmentshould be welcomed as a significant step forwardin that it brings clarity as to what are the necessary standards of proof in cases of creation of collective dominance.
235.Den 22. oktober afsagde Retten i Første Instans efter for første gang at have brugt den fremskyndede procedure i en fusionssag en dom,hvorved den annullerede den beslutning, Kommissionen havde vedtaget den 10. oktober 2001,hvor den havde erklæret fusionen mellem de
235.On 22 October, the Court of First Instance,adjudicating for the first time under an expeditedprocedure in a merger case, annulled the Commission decision of 10 October 2001 declaringthe merger between the French electrical equipment manufacturers Schneider and Legrandincompatible with the common market (3).
240.Retten opstillede et vigtigt princip, nemligat uanset hvor store lakuner en kommissionsbeslutning, hvorved en fusion erklæres uforeneligmed fællesmarkedet, er behæftet med, kan deikke føre til, at beslutningen annulleres, hvis detaf de andre elementer i beslutningen fremgår, atfusionens gennemførelse vil resultere i skabelseeller styrkelse af en dominerende stilling, der vilhæmme den effektive konkurrence betydeligt.Retten fastslog også, at dette ville blive resultatetaf fusionen mellem Schneider og Legrand på defranske markeder.
240.The Court of First Instance then laid downthe important principle that, whatever the scale ofthe defects affecting a Commission decisiondeclaring a merger incompatible with the common market, those defects cannot lead to itsannulment if it follows from the other elements ofthe decision that implementation of the operationwill create or strengthen a dominant position as aresult of which effective competition will be significantly impeded. The Court found that themerger between Schneider and Legrand did havesuch an effect on the French markets.
Sag T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA mod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.
241.However, with regard to those markets, the Court of First Instance held that the Commissionhad infringed Schneider’s rights of defence as ithad included in its decision an objection that didnot feature in the statement of objections.
For det andet fik Schneider ikke lejlighed til i tide at fremsætte forslag om afhændelser,der var tilstrækkelige til at løse de konkurrenceproblemer, Kommissionen havde påvist på defranske markeder.
Secondly, Schneider had not been givenan opportunity to submit in good time proposalsfor divestiture capable of resolving the competition problems identified by the Commission onthe French markets.
247.Der er tale om en meget væsentlig sag.
247.The case is of wide significance.
Deter første gang, at Retten udtrykkeligt har tagetstilling til en fusion, hvor der var konglomeraleaspekter involveret, og udviklet en ny, potentieltkontroversiel retspraksis på området ved direkteat tage stilling til spørgsmål som vurdering afkonglomerale fusioner efter EU’s fusionsforordning, forholdet mellem traktatens artikel 82 ogfusionsforordningen og tilsagn angående parternes adfærd.
It is thefirst case in which the Court of First Instance hasexpressly considered a merger involving conglomerate issues and creates new, potentiallycontroversial caselaw in this field by directlyaddressing issues such as the assessment of conglomerate mergers under the ECMR, the relationship between Article 82 and the ECMR, and therole of behavioural remedies.
Sagen blev behandlet efter den fremskyndede procedure.
The case was dealtwith under the Court of First Instance’s expeditedprocedure.
242.I øvrigt udtalte Retten, at i betragtning afdet krav om en hurtig sagsbehandling, der generelt er indbygget i forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89,var den frist på 12 dage — svarende til fem arbejdsdage — som Kommissionen havde givetparterne til at besvare en begæring om oplysninger efter forordningens artikel 11, stk. 5, en rimelig frist til trods for de mange spørgsmål, der blevstillet (322).
242.The Court of First Instance considered that,in view of the requirement for speed whichcharacterises the overall scheme of Regulation(EEC) No 4064/89, the period of 12 days, corresponding to five working days, set by the Commission to allow the parties to respond to arequest for information under Article 11(5) of theregulation was reasonable despite the largenumber of questions put (322).
243.I en særskilt dom (1) afsagt samme dag ogogså efter den fremskyndede procedure annullerede Retten den beslutning, Kommissionen havdetruffet den 30. januar 2002, hvorved den påbød Schneider at udskille Legrand.
243.In a separate judgment (1) delivered thesame day, the Court of First Instance, again actingunder the expedited procedure, annulled the Commission decision of 30 January 2002 ordering Schneider to demerge from Legrand.
Retten fandt, at dabeslutningen om fusionens uforenelighed var blevet annulleret, havde beslutningen om fusionensopløsning ikke længere noget retsgrundlag.
The Court held that, since the decision finding that themerger operation was incompatible with thecommon market had been annulled, the demergerdecision had no basis in law.
244.I disse to sager afsagde Retten dom, ca.10 måneder efter at sagen var blevet anlagt og ca.12 måneder efter vedtagelsen af Kommissionensbeslutning.
244.In both these cases, the Court of First Instance delivered its judgment approximately10 months after the application was lodged andapproximately 12 months after the incompatibility decision was adopted.
Desuden statuerede Retten før udløbet af den frist, Schneider havde fået til at opløsefusionen med Legrand.
It did so, moreover,before the deadline imposed on Schneider and Legrand to demerge had expired.
245.Efter grundige overvejelser besluttede Kommissionen ikke at indbringe denne dom for EF-Domstolen.
245.After careful consideration, the Commission decided not to appeal against the judgment inthis case.
246.Den 25. oktober annullerede Retten denbeslutning, Kommissionen havde vedtaget den
246.On 25 October, the Court of First Instanceannulled the Commission’s decision of 30 October 2001 declaring the merger between Tetra Laval, a Swiss packaging company active mainlyin carton packaging, and Sidel, a French packaging company active mainly in plastic PET packaging equipment, incompatible with the commonmarket.
Sag T-77/02.Førsteinstansrettens dom af 25.10.2002, sag T-05/02, Tetra Lavalmod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.
Case T-77/02.Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-05/02 Tetra Laval v Commission of the European Communities.
Kommissionen afviste de tilsagn,som Tetra havde tilbudt, og som hovedsageligtbestod af løfter om ikke at misbruge sin stilling,holde Sidel som en særskilt virksomhed og tilbyde en uafhængig tredjepart licens på Sidels SBM-udstyr.
249.The Court of First Instance was asked toannul the Commission’s decision on the basis ofprocedural and substantive arguments.
Kommissionen fandt, at disse tilsagn var uigennemførlige, vanskelige at kontrollere og utilstrækkelige til at løse de alvorligekonkurrenceproblemer, fusionen ville give anledning til.
Regardingprocedure, the applicant claimed that it had beenunlawfully denied access to the file in respect ofan expert report and the responses to a marketsurvey on its offer of commitments. On the substance, Tetra claimed that the Commission had
På det materielleplan hævdede Tetra, at Kommissionen ikke havdegodtgjort, at fusionen ville føre til skabelse ellerstyrkelse af en dominerende stilling, og gjordegældende, at Tetra ikke ville være i stand til at udnytte nogen styrkeposition eller afskærme markedet, og at en eliminering af potentiel konkurrenceikke ville ændre noget ved Tetras incitamenter tilat innovere og sænke priserne på kartonmarkedet.
II — MERGER CONTROL not shown that the merger would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position asleveraging was not possible, foreclosure couldnot take place and elimination of potential competition would not change Tetra’s incentives toinnovate and lower prices in the carton market.
250.Retten afviste sagsøgers argumenter på procedureplanet.
250.The Court dismissed the applicant’s procedural arguments.