natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Eni havde også for sit eget gas solgt i udlandet tildelt prioriteret langtidsadgang til det nationale net ejet af Enis datterselskab, Snam Rete Gas, og således begunstiget gasforsyninger til de af dets konkurrenter, som også var kunder, til skade for andre uafhængigeforsyningsvirksomheder.
The authority found that outside Italy Eni hadsold volumes of gas to Italian operators originating under its own take-or-pay contracts that weresufficient to cover, until 2007, the entire residual quota reserved for third-party operators by the decree; ithad also granted, in respect of its own gas sold abroad, priority longterm access to the national gridowned by its subsidiary Snam Rete Gas, thereby giving preferential treatment to gas deliveries by thoseof its competitors who were its customers, to the detriment of the other independent operators.
Som følge heraf blev en ekstrem høj andel af den gas, der transporteres gennemde nationale rørledninger og sælges i Italien, forsynet, direkte eller indirekte, af Eni.
As aresult, an extremely high proportion of the gas carried on the national grid and sold in Italy was supplied,directly or indirectly, by Eni.
Eni viste sig underproceduren villig til at forøge kapaciteten af internationale gasrørledninger.
In the course of the proceedings, Eni demonstrated that it was willing toupgrade the capacity of international gas pipelines.
På baggrund af dennevelvilje og det forhold, at Eni havde udvist den pågældende adfærd i fravær af specifikke regler forkontrakter om gastransport på det nationale ledningsnet, men kun en række overgangsregler, besluttedekonkurrencemyndigheden sig til kun at idømme selskabet en symbolsk bøde på 1 000 EUR.
In view of that willingness and the fact that Eni hadadopted the behaviour at issue in the absence of any specific rules governing contracts for gas
327 bestemmelserne i kontrakterne for salg af el til berettigede kunder i 2002, nemlig bestemmelser om vilkårog gebyrer for de berettigede kunders forsyninger af indenlandsk fremstillet eller importeret el.Kontrakten kræver, at de berettigede kunder forpligter sig til udelukkende at forsyne sig hos Enel Trademed importeret el gennem den internationale tilslutningskapacitet, de har fået tildelt.
Lastly, in March the authority started proceedings against Enel Spa and its subsidiary Enel Trade Spa,which operates on the market in the sale of electricity to so-called eligible customers, to establishwhether it had engaged in behaviour contrary to Article 82 of the EC Treaty. The investigation is focusingon certain clauses in the contract for the sale of electricity to eligible customers in 2002, governing theconditions and charges applicable to eligible customers for their supplies of domestically produced orimported electricity.
Når el købes fraandre (indenlandske eller udenlandske) konkurrerende forsyningsvirksomheder, er det i kontraktenfastlagt, at der skal anvendes bestemte prisstigninger på den el, der forsynes af Enel Trade til de enkelteberettigede kunder i forhold til restandelen af deres samlede behov.
Where electricity is purchased from other (domestic or foreign) competing operators, the contractprovides for specific price increases to be applied to electricity supplied by Enel Trade to individualeligible customers in respect of the residual share of their overall requirements.
Endelig indeholder kontrakten enprioritetsret til fordel for Enel Trade for så vidt angår forsyninger fra udenlandske elværker til berettigedekunder, der allerede forsynes af Enel Trade i Italien.
Lastly, the contractincludes a preemption clause in favour of Enel Trade in relation to supplies by foreign generation plantsto eligible customers already supplied by Enel Trade in Italy.
På grund af Enels stilling på elfremstillingsmarkedetkunne de pågældende kontraktbestemmelser udgøre en betydelig hindring for markedsadgangen ogindenlandske og udenlandske producenters og grossisters/forhandleres ekspansionsmuligheder, hvilketvil være i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 82.
Given Enel’s position on the electricitygeneration market, the contractual clauses in question could constitute a considerable barrier to the entryand growth of domestic and foreign producers and of wholesalers/intermediaries, in breach of Article 82of the EC Treaty.
I løbet af 2002 modtog konkurrencemyndigheden, Commission des Pratiques Commerciales Restrictives(CPCR), en klage vedrørende oplagring af olieprodukter.
During the period under review, the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (CPCR) received acomplaint concerning the storage of petroleum products.
En anden sag vedrørte et påstået misbrug af endominerende stilling fra en luxembourgsk virksomheds side inden for prisfastsættelse for bankkort, ogdenne behandles for øjeblikket af CPCR.
Another case, involving alleged abuse of adominant position by a Luxembourg company with regard to the prices charged for bank cards, is beinginvestigated by the CPCR.
Finlands øverste administrative domstol (Suomen korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO) afsagde den 4. juli 2002en vigtig kendelse på området virksomhedsovertagelse vedrørende appelret og henviser i kendelse til EF-Domstolens retspraksis.
On 4 July, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Suomen korkein hallinto-oikeus, KHO)delivered a judgment in the field of acquisitions with major implications for the right of appeal, in whichit referred to the case-law evolved by the European Court of Justice.
Kendelsen vedrørte en transaktion mellem telekommunikationsvirksomhederne Sonera Oyj og Loimaan Seudun Puhelin Oy.
The judgment relates to theacquisition transaction concluded between the telecommunications companies Sonera Oyj and Loimaan Seudun Puhelin Oy.
KHO ophævede konkurrencerådets forbud og iværksatte enbetinget tilladelse til overtagelsen udstedt af konkurrencedirektoratet (Kilpailuvirasto).
The KHO set aside the Competition Council’s prohibition decision and brought intoforce a conditional authorisation decision adopted by the Competition Directorate (Kilpailuvirasto).
KHO annulleredekonkurrencerådets afgørelse, da sidstnævnte havde undersøgt en appel indbragt af Suomen 2G Oy og DNA Finland Oy, konkurrenter til transaktionsparterne, over for konkurrencedirektoratets beslutning, ogda konkurrencerådet som følge af denne appel havde udstedt et forbud mod overtagelsen.
The KHO annulled the Competition Council’s decision in so far as it examined the appeal by Suomen 2G Oyand DNA Finland Oy, competitors of the parties to the acquisition, against the Competition Directorate’sdecision and in so far as, following that appeal, the Competition Council prohibited the deal.
KHOerklærede, at den finske konkurrencelov ikke indeholdt bestemmelser, der tillader konkurrenter til parter ien virksomhedsovertagelse at foreslå konkurrencerådet — dvs. den nuværende konkurrence- og forbrugerklageret (markkinaoikeus) — at udstede forbud mod overtagelsen.
The KHOruled that the Finnish Restrictive Practices Act did not contain any provisions allowing competitors ofparties to an acquisition to request the Competition Council — now the Competition and Consumer Affairs Court (Markkinaoikeus) — to ban the acquisition.
Kun konkurrencedirektoratet harbeføjelse til at foreslå et sådant forbud. Konkurrenterne kan således ikke ved appel anmode konkurrencedirektoratet om at godkende et forbud om virksomhedsovertagelse.
Only the Competition Directorate isempowered to propose such a ban, and competitors may not, by lodging an appeal, request the Competition Directorate to adopt a decision banning an acquisition.
Klagerne kunne heller ikke appellerekonkurrencedirektoratets beslutning, da beslutningen ikke indeholdt bestemmelser, der negativt berørerderes rettigheder, forpligtelser eller interesser, og da beslutningen ej heller for klagerne ville få envirkning, der ville kunne give dem ret til at gøre indsigelse.
Neither were the applicantcompanies entitled to appeal against the Competition Directorate’s decision since the decision did notcontain any provisions adversely affecting their rights, obligations or interests or have any effect on theapplicants entitling them to challenge it.
I henhold til KHO kan en konkurrencebegrænsende virksomheds konkurrenter, som kun indirekte berøres af en beslutning truffet af konkurrencedirektoratet, ikke appellere myndighedens beslutninger.
According to the KHO, competitors of a company responsiblefor a restriction of competition which are affected only indirectly by a decision taken by the Competition Directorate have no right to appeal against the latter’s decisions.
KHO konstaterede, at der i Finland ikke er nogen retspraksis om berørte parters situation og appelret iforbindelse med kontrol af virksomhedsovertagelser.
The KHO found that there was no case-law in Finland concerning the status of interested parties and theright of appeal with regard to the monitoring of acquisitions.
BERETNING OM ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION established by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which recognise the right ofcompetitors to appeal against decisions taken by the European Commission in the merger control field.
OFT har for øjeblikket ikke beføjelse til at anvende artikel 81 og 82, bortset fra spørgsmål, der er omfattet
Currently, the OFT does not have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82, except under the Enforcement
OFT undersøgte i 2002 to luftfartsalliancer i henhold til sine beføjelser under de britiske gennemførelsesbestemmelser.
During 2002 the OFT investigated two airline alliances pursuant to its powers under the regulations.
Den første af sagerne var den påtænkte alliance mellem British Airways og American Airlines, som blev anmeldt til OFT i 2001. Parterne opgav imidlertid deres allianceplaner i januar 2002.
Thefirst of these was the proposed alliance between British Airways and American Airlines, which was notifiedto the OFT during 2001.
OFT undersøgte også en allianceaftale mellem British Midland og United Airlines.
The OFT also investigated the alliance agreement between British Midland and United Airlines.
OFT meddelte den1. november 2002, at den agtede at tildele aftalen en fritagelse i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 81,stk. 3. Fritagelsen får virkning fra tidspunktet for ophævelsen af British Midlands nuværende hindringermed hensyn til at flyve til USA fra London Heathrow, og fritagelsen skal gælde i et tidsrum på syv år frasamme dato, eller indtil den 31. december 2010, alt efter hvad der først indtræder. Beslutningen er offentliggjort på OFT’s websted under rubrikken Public Register of Enforcement Regulations cases (på http://www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Legal+Powers/United+Airlines+and+British+Midland+Alliance+Expansion+Agreement.htm).
On1 November 2002, it announced its decision to grant the agreement an exemption under Article 81(3) EC.The exemption will take effect from the date that the current restrictions upon British Midland preventingit from flying to the United States from London Heathrow are lifted, and it is granted for a period ofseven years from that date, or until 31 December 2010, whichever is earlier.
OFT undersøgte begge disse sager i nært samarbejde med Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence.
Both these cases were investigated by the OFT in close cooperation with the Competition DG.
C — De nationale domstoles anvendelse af EU’s konkurrenceregler (117
C — Application of the Community competition rules by courts in the EU
Konkurrencemyndighederne i Danmark, Spanien, Irland, Italien, Luxembourg, Østrig, Portugal, Finlandog Sverige har ikke indberettet afgørelser truffet af deres domstole under anvendelse af EU’s konkurrenceregler eller indbringelse af præjudicielle spørgsmål for EF-Domstolen.
The competition authorities of Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal, Finlandand Sweden have not reported any decisions by their courts applying the Community competition rulesor referring a question to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
Sådanne afgørelser er indberettet af konkurrencemyndighederne i følgende medlemsstater:
Decisions of that naturewere reported by the competition authorities of the following Member States:
I henhold til disse britiske gennemførelsesbestemmelser til EU’s konkurrenceregler skal OFT anvende EF-traktatens artikel 81 og 82 på sager, der omhandler lufttransporttjenesteydelser mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og lande, der ikke er medlemmer af EF, og på sager, der omhandler trampshipping.
These regulations provide for the OFT to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty to cases involving air transport services between the UK and non-EC member Statesand to cases involving tramp shipping.
For sådanne sager har Europa-Kommissionen ikke udarbejdet gennemførelsesbestemmelser, hvorfor Det Forenede Kongerige efter EF-traktatens artikel 84 er forpligtet til at afgøre, hvorvidt en konkret sag er forenelig med artikel81 og 82.I dette afsnit omtales ikke de domme, der er afsagt af domstole, der har skullet tage stilling til lovligheden af deafgørelser, der er truffet af en national konkurrencemyndighed.
For such cases, implementing regulations for the European Commission have notbeen made and the UK therefore has a duty under Article 84 of the EC Treaty to rule on whether or not a particular case iscompatible with Articles 81 and 82.This section does not contain judgments delivered by courts with jurisdiction over decisions by national competitionauthorities.
Disse domme er nævnt i det foregående afsnit (denationale myndigheders anvendelse af EU’s konkurrenceregler).
These judgments were mentioned in the previous section on the application of the Community competitionrules by national authorities.
329 offentlige virksomheder for at tilpasse forskrifterne til forpligtelserne i forbindelse med den frie konkurrence og harmoniseringen af markedet for telekommunikationsydelser som følge af EU’s afgørelser)pålægger Belgacom kun at anvende præferencetakster for bureauet Belga.
Belgacom explained its refusal on the grounds that it wasrequired to grant preferential rates exclusively to Belga by the act of 19 December 1997 amendingthe act of 21 March 1991 reforming certain public enterprises in order to bring the regulatoryframework into line with the obligations relating to unrestricted competition and harmonisation onthe telecommunications market deriving from decisions of the European Union.
Konkurrencerådet fandt i sin afgørelse af 22. april 1999 (sag 99 — RPR-0606, Moniteur belge, den18.8.1999), at i tråd med EF-Domstolens analyse af EF-traktatens artikel 81 og 82 tager artikel 2(karteller) og artikel 3 (misbrug af dominerende stilling) i den belgiske konkurrencelov kun sigte påkonkurrencebegrænsende adfærd, som udvises af virksomhederne på eget initiativ.
In its decision of 22 April 1999 (Case 99 — RPR-0606, Official Gazette of 18.8.1999), the Competition Council had taken the view, following the interpretation given by the European Court of Justice to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, that Articles 2 (restrictive agreements) and 3 (abuse of a dominantposition) of the act on protection of economic competition related only to anticompetitive behaviouradopted by firms on their own initiative.
Hvis lovgivningensom sådan påbyder en konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd (i nærværende sag ovennævnte lov af19. september 1997), eller hvis således indførte retlige omstændigheder fjerner enhver mulighed forkonkurrenceadfærd for virksomhederne, finder artikel 2 og 3 ikke anvendelse.
If the law in general (in this case, the act of 19 December 1997)imposed an anticompetitive practice, or if the legal constraints thus created ruled out any possibility ofcompetitive behaviour by the firms concerned, then Articles 2 and 3 did not apply.
I samme sag havde formanden for Bruxelles’ handelsret i sin kendelse af 7. november 1997 (ikke offentliggjort) vurderet, at Belgacom havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling som omhandlet især i EF-traktatens artikel 82 ved at nægte at tilbyde SA Way Up samme præferencetakst som Belga for sammetype aktivitet og dermed havde overtrådt såvel Belgiens som EU’s konkurrenceregler.
The President of the Brussels Commercial Court had for his part, in his judgment of 7 November 1997(not published), taken the view that Belgacom had abused its dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 of the EC Treaty by refusing to grant Way Up the preferential rates it allowed Belga for thesame type of service and had thereby infringed the Belgian and EU competition rules.
Efter appel af såvel denne kendelse som konkurrencerådets beslutning bekræftede Bruxelles’ appelret idom afsagt den 20. september 2002 (ikke offentliggjort) konkurrencerådets beslutning og omgjordekendelsen afsagt af formanden for Bruxelles’ handelsret.
Appeals having been brought against both that judgment and the decision of the Competition Council, the Brussels Appeal Court, in its judgment of 20 September 2002 (not published), upheld the Competition Council’s decision and quashed the judgment of the President of the Brussels Commercial Court.
I dommen præciserer Bruxelles’ appelret dels, at »hvis lovgiver faktisk havde villet underlægge allenyhedsbureauer samme ordning, ville dette fremgå klart i loven i stedet for en specifik henvisning til Belga (præmis 2.3 i dommen)«, dels at »Belgacom kun kunne genindføre lighed (mellem nyhedsbureauerne) ved at tilbyde Way Up særligt gunstige forretningsvilkår svarende til den af lovgiverforeskrevne nedsættelse til bureauet Belga. Belgacom har imidlertid ingen kommerciel interesse i attilbyde Way Up præferencetakster.
In its judgment, the Brussels Appeal Court stated that ‘if the legislature had wished to place all pressagencies on the same footing, it would have been sure to make that clear in the act instead of expresslymentioning only Belga’ (paragraph 2.3) and that ‘it (Belgacom) could restore equality (between pressagencies) only by granting Way Up particularly advantageous commercial terms corresponding to thereduction established by the legislature for the benefit of Belga.
Belgacom er nu en virksomhed, der fungerer på markedsvilkår, ogskal være rentabel ligesom de øvrige offentlige virksomheder, bortset fra de undtagelser, hvor lovenpåbyder en særlig adfærd.
Belgacom is now an economic undertaking which has to beprofitable like all other economic undertakings, with the exception of special cases where the lawrequires it to adopt a particular behaviour.
I fraværet af kommercielle forhold, der kunne berettige en takstnedsættelse,ville en sådan fordel for Way Up ikke synes berettiget for Belgacoms øvrige brugere og ville skabeubalance mellem brugerne.
Furthermore, in the absence of economic circumstancesjustifying rate reductions, granting such an advantage to Way Up would not be justified with regard to theother users of Belgacom’s services and would disturb the balance between users to their detriment.
Selv om en virksomhed i dominerende stilling ikke må diskriminere, kan denikke klandres for at efterleve loven (præmis 3.2 i dommen)«.
Whilean undertaking holding a dominant position is prohibited from creating discriminations, it cannot becriticised for complying with the wishes of the legislature’ (paragraph 3.2).
I så tilfælde kræver indehaveren kun den absolutte territoriale beskyttelsemod import i EØS fra tredjelande, som varemærket giver ham. En sådan adfærd har ikke i sig selv tilvirkning at beskytte de godkendte forhandlere på deres nationale markeder.«
In this judgment, the Brussels Appeal Court held that ‘under the Community competition rules, theproprietor may not rely on the rights conferred on him by the registered trade mark in order to justifyprohibiting his authorised distributors established in one Member State from reselling the contract goods toanother authorised distributor established in another Member State, since such a practice frustrates the
BERETNING OM ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION objective of establishing a single market’ but, on the other hand, ‘the fulfilment of that objective is in no wayjeopardised by the mere fact of a proprietor using his exclusive right in order to prevent the goods bearingthe trade mark being imported from third countries into a Member State or being marketed within the EEA.In so doing, the proprietor is merely claiming the absolute territorial protection conferred on him by thetrade mark against imports into the EEA from third countries.
De tyske civildomstole traf i 2002 følgende afgørelser, hvor de anvendte EU-reglerne:
A summary follows of decisions by German civil courts in which Community law was applied and aboutwhich the Federal Cartel Office was informed in 2002.
Mannesmann Arcor AG & Co., Eschborn, mod Deutsche Telekom AG, Bonn Sagsøgtes prispolitik i forbindelse med de priser på CN- og CUG-tjenester, der blev anvendt i 1996-1999og godkendt af staten indtil 1998, udgør ikke misbrug af dominerende stilling, da sagsøgte ikke selv fritkunne fastsætte sine priser. (EF-traktatens art. 82, § 4, stk. 1, PTRegG, § 13, stk. 3, i TKV 1995 og § 29,stk. 1 i TKG).
Mannesmann Arcor AG & Co., Eschborn v Deutsche Telekom AG, Bonn No abusive pricing by the defendant as regards the fees charged in the years 1996–99 and approved,pre-1998, by the State, for CN and CUG services, since the defendant was not free to set the fee amountsat its own discretion (Article 82 EC; first sentence of Section 4(1) of the Post and Telecommunications Regulation Act; Section 13(3) of the Telecommunications Customer Protection Regulation 1995;Section 29(1) of the Telecommunications Act)
Sagsøgtes prispolitik i forbindelse med de priser på CN- og CUG-tjenester, der blev anvendt i 1996-1999og godkendt af staten indtil 1998, udgør ikke misbrug af dominerende stilling, da sagsøgte ikke selv fritkunne fastsætte sine priser. (EF-traktatens art. 82, § 4, stk. 1, PTRegG, § 13, stk. 3, i TKV 1995; § 29,stk. 1 i TKG).
No abusive pricing by the defendant as regards the fees charged in the years 1996–99 and approved,pre-1998, by the State, for CN and CUG services, since the defendant was not free to set the fee amountsat its own discretion (Article 82 EC; first sentence of Section 4(1) of the Post and Telecommunications Regulation Act; Section 13(3) of the Telecommunications Customer Protection Regulation 1995;Section 29(1) of the Telecommunications Act).
Nedsættelse af provisionssatserne for rejseagenters salg af flyrejser fra 9 % til 5 % med trussel omopsigelse af kontrakten, hvis ændringen ikke blev accepteret, er lovlig, da sagsøgte ikke har nogendominerende stilling på markedet for formidling af flyrejser til private og erhvervskunder, og ændringenikke er urimelig (§ 26, stk. 2, i GWB (tidligere version), § 20, stk. 1 og 2 i GWB (nye version),EF-traktatens art. 81).
Reduction from 9 to 5 % in the commission rate for agency sales of flights by way of a change of contract isvalid, since the defendant is not in a dominant position on the market for agency sales of air transportservices to final consumers and business customers and the change of contract is not unfair (Section 26(2)of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition, before amendment; Section 20(1) and (2) of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition, as amended; Article 81 EC).
Stadfæstelse af dom, hvor en områdeafgrænsningsaftale (gasforsyningsdistrikter) blev kendt ugyldig;delafgørelse i appel indbragt mod, at en klausul om dækning af det totale gasbehov blev fundet ugyldig:selv om denne klausul er i strid med konkurrencereglerne, er den ikke endeligt ugyldig, da den vil kunneomgås, f.eks. ved brug af en beskyttelsesklausul.
Applicant is not entitled to be supplied since the termination of the agency agreement with one year’snotice by the opposing party as part of a legitimate and non-arbitrary restructuring of the distributionsystem is valid (Article 5(1)(1) and (3) and Article 6(1)(5) of Regulation 1475/95).