natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Alt i alt konkluderede Kommissionen, at bundneforpagtningsaftaler, som et pubselskab, der ikke er bundet til noget bryggeri, har med sineudskænkningssteder, i højere grad ville fremme konkurrencestrukturen på markedet end bidrage (eller ivæsentlig grad bidrage) til nogen afskærmning.
All in all, the Commission found that the tied leases of a pub companywhich were not tied ‘upstream’ to any brewer were more likely to enhance the competitive structure ofthe market than to contribute (let alone significantly contribute) to any foreclosure.
Med hensyn til reklameklausulen erkendte Kommissionen, at den havde en negativ indvirkning på salgetaf andre ølmærker end dem, der blev leveret af GPC (især gæsteøl).
As to the advertising clause, the Commission recognised that this had a negative impact on the sale ofbeers other than those supplied by GPC (in particular the guest beer).
Den ville umuliggøre reklame forsådanne ølmærker, da den kræver, at denne reklamevirksomhed skal stå i forhold til mærkets andel afpubbens omsætning, hvilket pr. definition er lig nul i begyndelsen, hvor mærkerne er nye.Kommissionen mente dog, at ølbindingsbetingelserne i forvejen satte GPC i stand til at udelukke andreølmærker (ved at de blev sat på GPC’s prisliste som specificeret øl).
In fact, the letter of this clausewould make advertising for such beers impossible, as the clause requires the advertising to beproportional to their share of the pub’s turnover, which by definition is initially zero, as the beers arenew. However, the Commission found that the terms of the beer tie already enabled GPC to excludethird-party beers (by adding them to GPC’s price list as a specified beer).
Da ølbindingen ikke faldt ind underanvendelsesområdet for artikel 81, stk. 1, betød det, at reklameklausulen, der umuliggjorde reklame forandre ølmærker, heller ikke faldt ind under artikel 81, stk. 1.
Since the beer tie had beenfound to fall outside the scope of Article 81(1), it followed that the advertising clause which made theadvertising of such third-party beers impossible did not fall within Article 81(1) either.
Den spanske luftfartsmyndighed, AENA, der er et offentligt foretagende, har fået eneret til atadministrere lufthavnsinfrastrukturen i alle de 41 civile lufthavne i Spanien.
The Spanish airport authority, AENA, which is a public enterprise, has been granted the exclusive rightto administer the airport infrastructure of all 41 commercial airports in Spanish territory.
Flyselskaberne skal betale etgebyr for de tjenester, der leveres i forbindelse med flyenes start og landing.
In return for theservices provided in connection with the landing and take-off of planes, a fee has to be paid by theairlines.
Landingsgebyrerne ogændringerne deraf fastsættes ved dekret og ved lov.
The levels of landing fees as well as the differentiation of tariffs are laid down by royal decreesand by law.
I spansk lovgivning skelnes der mellemindenrigsflyvninger, flyvninger i EU og flyvninger til lande, der ikke er medlemmer af EU.
Spanish law distinguishes between domestic, intra-Community and extra-Community
Selv om AENA’s rabatter gælder for alle flyselskaber, er de i praksis en større fordel for de indenlandskeend for de udenlandske.
Although the discounts offered by AENA apply to all airlines, domestic airlines in fact benefitconsiderably more than foreign ones.
Det er kun spanske flyselskaber som Iberia, Binter Canarias, Spanair, Air Europa eller Air Nostrum, der kan drage fordel af den største rabatkategori.
Only Spanish airlines, namely Iberia, Binter Canarias, Spanair, Air Europa and Air Nostrum, benefit from the largest category of discounts available.
I 1999 modtog Iberia aleneomkring 62 % af alle rabatter, som AENA ydede i forbindelse med landingsgebyrer.
In 1999, Iberia alonereceived about 62 % of all discounts on landing fees granted by AENA.
Der foreligger ingen objektiv begrundelse for denne forskelsbehandling.
There is no objective justification for this difference in treatment.
AENA’s tjenester, såsomindflyvningskontrol og brug af standpladser, kræver samme arbejdsindsats, uanset hvilket flyselskab derer tale om.
The services provided by AENA, suchas approach control and use of apron areas, require the same work irrespective of the individual airline.In the case of landing and take-off services, economies of scale do not exist.
Der findes ingen stordriftsfordele i forbindelse med start- og landingstjenester.Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at AENA ved ovennævnte rabatter behandler flyselskaberneforskelligt uden nogen objektiv begrundelse.
The Commission thereforeconcluded that, by applying the discounts as described above, AENA treats airlines differently withoutobjective justification.
Den stiller derved nogle af selskaberne dårligere ikonkurrencen, hvilket betragtes som misbrug af dominans.
It thereby imposed on some of them a competitive disadvantage, whichconstitutes an abuse of a dominant position.
Det samme gælder de forskelle i taksterne,der afhænger af, om der er tale om en indenrigsflyvning eller en flyvning inden for EU.
A similar reasoning applies to the differentiation of tariffsdepending on whether the flight is domestic or intra-Community.
Også i dettetilfælde behandles flyselskaberne forskelligt i forbindelse med levering af de samme start- oglandingstjenester.
Also in this case the effect is to treatairlines differently for the provision of equivalent landing and take-off services.
Dette betyder, at flyselskaber, der opererer i EØS, stilles dårligere i konkurrencen endselskaber, der foretager indenrigsflyvninger.
This places airlinesoperating European Economic Area (EEA) services at a competitive disadvantage in comparison withairlines providing domestic services.
Den 26. juli 2000 vedtog Kommissionen derfor en beslutning om forbud mod landingsgebyrsystemet ispanske lufthavne, som den mente medfører forskelsbehandling til fordel for de spanske flyselskaber.
On 26 July, the Commission therefore adopted a decision finding against the system of landing feesapplied at Spanish airports on the grounds that they discriminate in favour of national airlines.
3.Afvisning af klager
3.Rejections of complaints
Klagen vedrørte forsikringsvilkårene for importerede biler.
The complaint concerned insurance terms for cars imported into Sweden.
Ejerne af nogle importerede bilmodeller skalinstallere ekstra sikkerhedsudstyr, hvis det ikke allerede er monteret, for at kunne tegne bestemtebilforsikringer ud over den lovpligtige ansvarsforsikring.
The owners of some models ofimported cars must equip their cars with additional safety devices, if not already fitted, to qualify forcertain car insurance policies on top of the compulsory third-party insurance.
Skandia og andre selskaber skal have samarbejdet om et fælles projekt for reduktion af biltyverierne oghave undersøgt officielle statistikker fra Rikspolisstyrelsen og det centrala bilregistret for at påvise,hvilke modeller der er i risikogruppen.
According to information requested, Skandia and other companies had collaborated in a joint projectseeking measures to reduce car thefts and had examined official statistics from the Swedish National Police Board and Central Car Register to identify risk-prone car models.
Projektet har understreget problemerne i forbindelse med nogleimporterede biler.
The project highlighted theproblems related to some imported cars.
Disse ekstra krav er derfor blevet nødvendige ifølge forsikringsselskaberne.
The additional requirements had therefore become necessary,according to the insurers.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene havde ingen grund til at tro, at dette ikke var tilfældet.
The Commission departments had no reason to believe that this was not the case.
Det fremgik, atdisse krav var indført for at hindre biltyverier. De officielle statistikker viste, at der var større risiko fortyveri af disse direkte importerede biler end af andre biler.
It appeared that therequirements in question had been introduced as countermeasures against car thefts.
BERETNING OM ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION for pc-operativsystemer ved at indføre urimelige betingelser i sine licensaftaler medoriginaludstyrsfabrikanter (OEM), herunder Elonex.
Elonex alleged that Microsoft was abusing its dominant position in themarket for PC operating systems by imposing unfair conditions in the licence agreements that it signswith its original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), including Elonex.
Det fremfører desuden, at disse aftaler tilsammenudgør en form for patentfællesskab, der fordrejer konkurrencen på markedet for pc-produkter.
It furthermore alleged that theseagreements collectively formed a type of patent pool which distorted competition in the market for PCproducts.
De fleste forbrugere køber pc’er med præinstallerede operativsystemer.
The great majority of PCs are bought by consumers with pre-installed operating system software.
Det betyder, at det er vigtigt forpc-producenterne at indgå licensaftaler med leverandører af pc-operativsystemer.
Thismeans that it is essential for PC manufacturers to enter into licensing agreements with providers of PCoperating system software.
På dette markedindtager Microsoft en yderst stærk stilling med en markedsandel på skønsmæssigt mellem 80 % og 95 %.
In this latter market, Microsoft has an extremely strong position estimated atbetween 80 % and 95 % market share.
Elonex hævdede, at Microsoft havde overtrådt både artikel 81 og 82, og at Microsoft pålagde det en OEM-licensaftale, der i praksis tvinger Elonex til at give sine intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder til Microsoft, dets datterselskaber og alle dets øvrige licenstagere uden at modtage licensafgifter derfor (densåkaldte vederlagsfrie grant-back-klausul).
Elonex claimed that Microsoft violated both Articles 81 and 82: according to Elonex, Microsoft imposedan OEM licence agreement on it which effectively forced Elonex to grant its intellectual property rightsto Microsoft, its subsidiaries and all its other licensees without receiving any royalties in return (a socalled grant-back clause without consideration).
Det hævder, at denne aftale giver Microsofts andrelicenstagere (som for manges vedkommende er Elonex’ direkte konkurrenter) mulighed for gratis aterhverve Elonex’ patenterede teknologi (energisparesystemer til pc-skærme).
It claimed that this agreement allowed other Microsoftlicensees (many of which are direct competitors of Elonex) to appropriate Elonex’s patented technology(power saving systems for PC monitors) for free.
Det hævder endvidere, at etsådant patentfællesskab, der gennemføres med Microsofts markedsstyrke, styrker Microsoftsmarkedsstilling ved at etablere præferencemæssige forbindelser mellem Microsoft og dets net aflicenstagere på bekostning af andre markedsdeltagere.
It furthermore claimed that such a patent pool enforcedby Microsoft’s market power acted to reinforce Microsoft’s market position by creating preferential linksbetween Microsoft and its network of licensees, to the exclusion of other market players.
Efter at Kommissionen havde modtaget denne klage, sendte den Microsoft et brev (efter artikel 11) medanmodning om yderligere oplysninger om OEM-licensaftalerne.
Following receipt of the complaint, an Article 11 letter was sent to Microsoft requesting furtherinformation on the OEM licence agreements.
Microsoft svarede, at licensaftalerneikke har den virkning, som Elonex har fremført, og at de kun omfatter intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder,som kan anvendes i den software, der meddeles licens på (dvs. Windows), og ikke produkter, derproduceres af andre af Microsofts licenstagere.
Microsoft responded by stating that the licence agreementsdid not have the effect alleged by Elonex and that they covered only intellectual property rights thatmight be used in the licensed software (i.e. Windows) and not products that might be produced by otherlicensees of Microsoft.
Da Elonex ikke har modbevist Microsofts fortolkning, ersagen nu blevet indstillet.
Since Elonex has not provided any evidence to contradict Microsoft’sinterpretation, the case has now been closed.
DSF/Den Europæiske Radiounion (EBU) (sag COMP/C-2/35.629)
DSF/European Broadcasting Union (EBU) (Case COMP/C2/35.629)
Telecinco/Den Europæiske Radiounion (EBU) (sag COMP/C-2/36.174)
Telecinco/European Broadcasting Union (EBU) (Case COMP/C2/36.174)
Det tyske tv-selskab DeutschesSportFernsehen (DSF), der driver en sportskanal, indgav en klage over EBU den 28. juni 1995.
The German television broadcaster DeutschesSportFernsehen (DSF), which operates a special-interestsports channel, lodged a complaint against the EBU on 28 June 1995.
Den vedrørte fælles indkøb af transmissionsrettighederne til sportsbegivenhederinden for Eurovisionssystemet.
The complaint was directed againstthe joint acquisition of broadcasting rights to sports events within the framework of the Eurovisionsystem.
Desuden fremførte klageren, at de tyske EBU-medlemmer havdemisbrugt en dominerende stilling i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 82 ved meddelelse af underlicenser påtransmissionsrettigheder, der var erhvervet inden for Eurovisionssystemet, fordi de krævede alt for højepriser for disse rettigheder.
Furthermore, the complainant argued that the German EBU members had abused a dominantposition in breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty when sublicensing broadcasting rights acquired in the Eurovision system by demanding excessive prices for these rights.
De to klagere fremførte, at Eurovisionssystemet var i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1, og ikkekunne fritages efter artikel 81, stk. 3.
Both complainants argued that the Eurovision system infringed Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty and couldnot be exempted pursuant to Article 81(3).
Da Kommissionen konkluderede, at Eurovisionssystemet opfyldte betingelserne i artikel 81, stk. 3,vedtog den en ny fritagelsesbeslutning den 10. maj 2000.
As the Commission came to the conclusion that the Eurovision system fulfilled the conditions of Article81(3), it adopted a new exemption decision on 10 May 2000.
Den tilbageviste derfor DSF’s og Telecincosklager ved formelle beslutninger den 7. juli 2000.
Consequently, the Commission rejected thecomplaints of DSF and of Telecinco by formal decisions of 7 July 2000.
Den afviste også DSF’s klage med hensyn til overtrædelsen af artikel 82, især fordi reglerne omunderlicenser, der er en betingelse for fritagelse af Eurovisionssystemet, omfatter en voldgiftsprocedure itilfælde af uenighed om priserne på transmissionsrettighederne, og fordi DSF ikke forsøgte at få udstedten voldgiftskendelse.
It rejected DSF’s complaint also in so far as an infringement of Article 82 was alleged, in particularbecause the sublicensing rules, which are a condition for the exemption of the Eurovision system,provide for an arbitration procedure in the event of a disagreement concerning the prices of thebroadcasting rights and DSF had not sought such an arbitration decision.
UEFA’s anmeldelse af billetsalgsordningerne for EM i fodbold i 2000(sag COMP/37.424)
Notification by UEFA of ticket sales arrangements for the 2000 European Football Championships (Case COMP/37.424)
Den 7. juni 2000 godkendte Kommissionen ved en administrativ skrivelse UEFA’s anmeldtearrangementer for billetsalget til EM i fodbold i 2000 i Belgien og Nederlandene (Euro 2000).
On 7 June, the Commission approved by way of a comfort letter UEFA’s notified arrangements relatingto the sale of entry tickets for the 2000 European Football Championships in Belgium and the Netherlands (‘Euro 2000’).
På baggrund af sin seneste beslutning vedrørende den lokale arrangør af VM i fodbold i Frankrig i
In assessing UEFA’s notified arrangements, and bearing in mind its recent decision finding against the
UEFA’s planer gav forbrugerne overalt i Europa mulighed for at få billetter på et rimeligt grundlag.
), the Commission was particularly concerned to ensure that UEFA’s proposals offered consumers throughout Europe theopportunity to obtain entry tickets on a fair and equitable basis.
Idenne forbindelse tog Kommissionen til efterretning, at UEFA’s planer omfattede salg af billetter tileuropæiske forbrugere helt uden forskelsbehandling, og godkendte derfor ordningerne.
In this respect, the Commission notedthat UEFA’s proposals provided for the sale of entry tickets to European consumers under genuinelynon-discriminatory conditions and approved the arrangements accordingly.
Kommissionen modtog under sin vurdering af anmeldelsen en klage over, at UEFA misbrugte sindominerende stilling i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 82 ved at nægte at lade den lokaleorganisationskomite levere pr-pakker for erhvervslivet til udenforstående agenturer med henblik på
While it was assessing the notification, the Commission received a complaint alleging abuse by UEFA ofits dominant position in breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty on the ground that it had refused to allowthe event’s local organising committee to supply corporate hospitality packages to third-party ticket
22 videresalg.
22 agencies for resale.
På grundlag af Domstolens retspraksis(
Applying the case-law of the Court of Justice(
) konkluderede Kommissionen, at det under ingen omstændigheder var sikkert, at UEFA indtog en dominerende stilling på markedet for salg af pr-pakker,men at UEFA’s afslag i så fald kun kunne betragtes som misbrug af dens dominerende stilling, hvisleveringen af pr-pakker til dette arrangement var nødvendig, for at disse agenturer kunne fortsætte deresdrift.
), the Commission concluded that even if UEFA held a dominant position in the market for corporate hospitality sales, which was not inany event certain, UEFA’s refusal to deal with third-party agencies could constitute an abuse of itsdominant position only if the supply of corporate hospitality packages for the event was indispensable tothe continuation of those agencies’ business activities.
Da denne forudsætning ikke var opfyldt, blev klagen afvist.
As that essential condition was not fulfilled, thecomplaint was rejected.
I denne advarselsskrivelse underrettede Kommissionen selskaberne om, at den oprindeligeforsyningsaftale kunne indebære en overtrædelse af traktatens artikel 82, da den styrkede dendominerende stilling, som Gas Natural i forvejen havde på det spanske gasmarked.
In that warning letter, the Commission informed the companies that the original supply agreement couldconstitute an infringement of Article 82 of the Treaty as it had the effect of reinforcing the alreadyexisting dominant position of Gas Natural in the Spanish gas market.
Kommissionennærede især betænkeligheder på følgende områder:
The Commission’s concerns inrelation to the contract were basically the following:
Hindringer for adgangen til det liberaliserede spanske gasmarked.
The creation of barriers to entry into the liberalised Spanish gas market.
Gennem denne aftale dækkede ENDESA hele sit gasbehov i en overskuelig fremtid.
Endesa, through thiscontract, was basically covering all its gas requirements for the foreseeable future.
Samtidig mistede potentielle nye virksomhederpå markedet en mængdemæssigt attraktiv kunde, da elselskaber hører til de største gaskunder.
At the same time,potential entrants were losing an attractive client in terms of volumes, as electricity generators areamong the larger gas consumers.
Detville derved blive vanskeligere for nye konkurrenter at komme ind på markedet.
Entry of new competitors was thereby going to be rendered moredifficult.
Den deraf følgendeafskærmning af det spanske marked kunne mærkbart have forhindret den fortsatte liberalisering afdet europæiske gasmarked.
The subsequent foreclosure effect in the Spanish market could have substantially hinderedthe ongoing liberalisation of the European gas market.
Aftalens begrænsning af videresalget af gas førte til en segmentering af det spanske gasmarked.
The restriction on the resale of the gas covered by the contract led to segmentation of the Spanishgas market.
Denoprindelige aftale begrænsede også ENDESAS konkurrencemæssige stilling på gasmarkedet, hvordet for øjeblikket er en mindre aktør, fordi det ikke måtte videresælge den gas, det købte hos Gas Natural til elfremstilling. Gas Natural forpligtede sig til i en særskilt aftale at levere gas til videresalgtil en anden pris. Prisdifferentiering afhængigt af gassens endelige anvendelsesformål og forbudmod videresalg er et typisk led i eksisterende virksomheders adfærd, når markedsliberaliseringenbegynder.
The original agreement also had the effect of limiting the competitive position of Endesain the gas market, where it is at present a small player, since it was not allowed to resell thecompetitive gas purchased from Gas Natural for electricity generation, while Gas Natural committeditself in a separate agreement to supplying gas for resale at a different price.
En prisnedsættelse over for kunder, der vil kunne tiltrække nye virksomheder tilmarkedet, samtidig med at der opretholdes et højt prisniveau på andre dele af markedet(markedssegmentering), bidrager til at styrke de eksisterende virksomheders stilling på markedet(som Gas Natural) og styrker kunstigt deres stilling.
Lowering prices to customers that are likely to attract newentry while maintaining a higher price level in other segments of the market (market segmentation)certainly helps to artificially reinforce the market position of incumbent firms (such as Gas Natural).
Forskelsbehandling af andre spanske gaskunder.
Discrimination against other Spanish gas purchasers.
Nogle af den oprindelige aftales bestemmelser kanfortolkes i den retning, at ENDESA vil blive behandlet bedre end Gas Natural andre fremtidigekunder.
Some of the clauses of the original agreementcould be interpreted as having the effect of affording Endesa better treatment than other futureclients of Gas Natural.
Efter at Kommissionen havde udtrykt betænkeligheder, foreslog Gas Natural og ENDESAsamarbejdsvilligt en række ændringer i gasforsyningsaftalen for at fjerne Kommissionensbetænkeligheder og undgå en formel overtrædelsesprocedure.
After the Commission had made known its concerns, Gas Natural and Endesa, in a cooperative spirit,proposed some amendments to the gas supply contract in order to eliminate the Commission’s concernsand avoid formal infringement proceedings.
Deres forslag gik ud på følgende:
Their proposals were basically the following:
Væsentlig nedskæring (ca. 25 %) i de gasmængder, som aftalen omfattede, for at frigøre en del af ENDESAS indkøbskapacitet og dermed sikre, at den fortsat var aftager på gasmarkedet. Det vilderfor være nødvendigt for ENDESA at købe mere gas i fremtiden, hvorved selskabet vil tiltrækkenye leverandører og skærpe konkurrencen på det spanske marked.
A substantial reduction (of around 25 %) in the gas volumes covered by the contract in order to freepart of Endesa’s purchasing capacity and thus ensure that it remained a customer in the gas market.Accordingly, Endesa will need to purchase more gas in the future, thus attracting new suppliers andbringing more competition to the Spanish market.
I denne sag mente Kommissionen, at de mængder, der ville blive frigjort, var store nok til at tiltrække nyevirksomheder til markedet.
In this case, the Commission considered that thevolumes that will become free are large enough to attract new entry.
Importen er en væsentlig konkurrencefremmende faktor inden for den liberaliserede energisektor og kankun finde sted gennem samkøringslinjer mellem tilstødende højspændingselnet. Adgang tilgrænseoverskridende samkøringslinjer er derfor en forudsætning for, at det indre marked for elektricitet
Imports are a crucial source of competition in the liberalised energy sector, and they can only be achievedthrough interconnectors which link the networks of neighbouring high-voltage electricity grids.Accordingly, access to crossborder interconnectors is a prerequisite for the emergence of a functioning
Åbning af elmarkederne for konkurrenter fra andre medlemsstater bidrager i stadig højere grad til et nyt mønster i elhandelen på tværs af de nationale grænser.
The opening-up of electricity markets to competitors from other
Nogle af samkøringslinjernemellem medlemsstaterne er derfor blevet overbelastet.
Someof the interconnectors between Member States have become congested as a result.