natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen fandt, at denne prisklausul falder ind under EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1, og derfor bør undersøges på grundlag af samme traktats artikel 81, stk. 3.
The Commission took the view that the fixed selling price clause was caught by Article81(1) of the ECTreaty and had to be examined in the light of Article81(3).
Kommissionen har set på to forhold: den undersøgte først, om det var muligt at organisere distributionen til kiosker på en anden måde, og dernæst undersøgte den, om den prisklausul, udgiverne pålægger, er nødvendig i et system, hvor usolgte eksemplarer skal tages tilbage.
It carried out a two-stage analysis, first examining whether distribution at news-stands could beorganised differently and then considering whether the clause imposing the price set by the publisherwas indispensable in a sale-or-return system.
Kommissionen konstaterede, at denne måde at organisere distributionen af aviser og blade til kiosker på, går igen overalt i verden. Det faktum, at det samme system anvendes overalt, er allerede i sig selv udtryk for, at der ikke findes alternative løsninger.
The Commission noted that this method of organising distribution at news-stands was applied throughout theworld; the widespread use of the system was in itself already an initial sign of a lack of alternative solutions.
Kommissionen så derefter nærmere på avis- og ugebladsproduktets særlige karakter; der er tale om et produkt med en ekstremt kort levetid, en enkelt dag for aviser og nogle få dage for ugeblade.
It then looked into the specific nature of newspapers and periodicals. The products have an extremelyshort lifespan: one day in the case of daily publications, a few days in the case of weeklies.
Det er dette særlige træk ved aviser og ugeblade, der er forklaringen på det almindelige system med tilbagetagelse af usolgte eksemplarer.
Thisparticular characteristic explains why the sale-or-return system is generalised.
Dernæst overvejede Kommissionen, hvorvidt en udgiver kunne acceptere et system med tilbagetagelse af usolgte eksemplarer uden selv at kunne fastsætte salgsprisen i detailleddet. Det ville ikke indebære nogen form for økonomisk risiko for detailsælgeren i relation til usolgte eksemplarer.
The Commission went on to consider whether a publisher could accept a sale-or-return system withoutcontrolling the price to the consumer.
Hvis detailsælgeren fejlbedømmer markedet, hvad der godt kan tænkes, hvis han ikke har noget overblik over en given avis' eller et givet ugeblads markedsposition, ville der være flere usolgte eksemplarer, og udgiveren ville komme til at bære den økonomiske byrde ved denne fejlbedømmelse af prisniveauet.
If the retailer made a commercial misjudgment, something which could well happenin the absence of an overview of the newspaper’s position in the market, there would be more unsoldcopies and the publisher would bear the financial burden of the retailer’s pricing error.
Det er derfor økonomisk acceptabelt inden for det pågældende distributionssystem, at den aktør, der løber den største økonomiske risiko, også kan kontrollere salgsprisen.
It is thereforeeconomically acceptable in the distribution system concerned that the operator who incurs the maineconomic risk should control the selling price.
Under disse omstændigheder kunne der indrømmes fritagelse for denne klausul, og den 3. juni 1999 fremsendte Kommissionen en administrativ skrivelse med oplysning om fritagelse i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3.
There were consequently grounds for exempting this clause under Article81(3) of the ECTreaty and on3June the Commission sent AMPa comfort letter to that effect.
Den 27. februar 1998 anmeldte Microsoft, der fremstiller computersoftware, officielt flere licens- og distributionsaftaler til Kommissionen; det drejede sig om aftaler indgået med europæiske Internet udbydere for produkter, der anvender Microsofts Internet Explorer.
On 27February1998 Microsoft, the computer software manufacturer, formally notified to the Commission a set of agreements concluded with some European Internet Service Providers (ISPs) forthe licensing and distribution of its Internet Explorer products.
En Internetudbyder er et firma, der administrerer en permanent opkobling til Internettet og giver sine abonnenter mulighed for at koble sig på via en telefonlinje til udbyderen.
An ISPis a company that maintains apermanent connection to the Internet and enables its subscribers to connect to it via a telephone link withthe ISP.
Internetudbyderne kan også tilbyde deres abonnenter World Wide Web-sider.
ISPs may also provide their subscribers with World Wide Web (WWW) pages.
Denne officielle anmeldelse fandt sted, efter at Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence havde indledt en undersøgelse.
Microsoft’s formal notification of its agreements followed an inquiry launched by the Commission’s Competition Directorate-General.
I forbindelse med denne undersøgelse havde Kommissionen henstillet til Microsoft at gennemgå selskabets aftaler på grundlag af EU's konkurrenceregler for at sikre sig, at de ikke indeholdt begrænsninger, der kunne bevirke, at Microsofts konkurrenter ulovligt blev lukket ude fra markedet for Internet-navigatører, og at brugen af Microsofts teknologi promoveres ulovligt på Internettet.
During that inquiry, the Commission advised Microsoft to re-examineits agreements in the light of the Community competition rules to ensure that they did not containrestrictions that might have the effect of illegally foreclosing the market for Internet browser softwareto Microsoft’s competitors and of illegally promoting the use of Microsoft’s proprietary technology onthe Internet.
Microsoft ændrede derefter sine aftaler og anmeldte en revideret version til Kommissionen. De to vigtigste ændringer, Microsoft foretog, var følgende: Det forhold, at Internetudbyderne ikke når op på bestemte distributionsmæssige minimumsmængder eller procentsatser for teknologien i tilknytning til Internet Explorer, indebærer ikke automatisk, at aftalerne ophæves, og Internetudbyderne har nu tilladelse til at promovere konkurrerende navigatører og reklamere for dem.
Microsoft subsequently amended its agreements and notified the revised agreements to the Commission.The two main changes are the following: failure by the ISPs to attain minimum distribution volumes orpercentages for Internet Explorer browser technology will no longer result in termination of theiragreements; and ISPs are now allowed to promote and advertise competing browser software.
166 ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
The Commission examined two major land transport infrastructure operations in the light of itscommunication on the application of the competition rules to new transport infrastructure projects.(60)
Aftalerne om adgang til Channel Tunnel Rail Links (CTRL) jernbanespor, som i 2007 skal sikre højhastighedstogforbindelsen mellem tunnelen under Kanalen og London, er blevet anmeldt til Kommissionen.
The track access agreements for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL), a high-speed link between the Channel Tunnel and London due to be completed in 2007, were notified to the Commission.
Disse aftaler er indgået mellem jernbanevirksomheden Eurostar (UK) Ltd, som er den britiske partner i den internationale Eurostar-tjeneste, og infrastrukturforvalteren Railtrack plc.
Theagreements were concluded interaliabetween the railway company Eurostar (UK) Ltd, the UK partnerin the Eurostar international service, and the infrastructure manager Railtrack plc.
Kommissionen har i en meddelelse C50) oplyst, at den havde til hensigt ikke at gøre indsigelse mod disse aftaler.
The Commissionindicated in a notice(61) that it intended to take a favourable view of the agreements.
Den har ikke drøftet parternes holdning til, om der skal være kapacitet til rådighed for nye aktører på markedet, når først jernbanen er taget i brug. Den har blot konstateret, at der ikke fandtes nogen reel konkurrent til jernbanevirksomheden Eurostar (UK) omkring adgangen til forbindelsen, og at spørgsmålet om en potentiel konkurrent på dette stadium fortsat er rent hypotetisk.
It did not discussthe parties’opinion that there would be spare capacity for new entrants once the track was brought intoservice; it merely pointed out there was no actual competitor to Eurostar (UK) for access to the CTRLand that any potential competitor was still, at that stage, hypothetical.
I en administrativ skrivelse af 12. marts 1999 bekræftede Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence således over for parterne, at man ikke fandt anledning til at anvende EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1, på de pågældende aftaler.
In a comfort letter dated 12Marchthe Competition Directorate-General therefore confirmed to the parties that there were in its view nogrounds for applying Article81(1) of the ECTreaty to the agreements in question.
1994 om fritagelse i 30 år til fordel for brugsaftalen mellem Eurotunnel, British Rail og Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) (62).
On22October1996 the Court of First Instance annulled(62) the Commission’s decision of13December1994(63) exempting for 30years the usage contract between Eurotunnel, British Rail and Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF).
Ud over det forhold, som Retten tog ad notam i sin dom, nemlig at bestemmelserne i brugsaftalen giver Eurotunnel mulighed for at afgive en del af sin egenkapacitet til nye aktører på markedet, tog Kommissionen brugsaftalen op til fornyet vurdering på grundlag af den mellemliggende udvikling i lovgivningen på området og i den økonomiske kontekst i relation til trafikken på tværs af Kanalen, siden tunnelen blev åbnet i 1994.
In addition to bearing in mind the fact, noted bythe CFI in its judgment, that certain clauses in the contract allowed Eurotunnel to cede some of its owncapacity to new entrants, the Commission conducted a fresh analysis of the usage contract in the lightof the regulatory developments that had taken place in the meantime and the evolution of the crossChannel transport market since the tunnel opened in 1994.
Párteme har i øvrigt givet afkald på at anvende en bestemmelse i brugsaftalen, som lå til grund for Kommissionens beslutning i 1994.
The parties had furthermore waived one ofthe clauses in the usage contract that had prompted the Commission’s 1994 decision.
Kommissionen konstaterede for det første, at tunnelen ikke er udnyttet i fuldt omfang.
The Commission noted first of all that the tunnel was not saturated.
I det omfang, der findes disponibel kapacitet, og aftalen mellem Eurotunnel og jernbaneselskaberne ikke er en eksklusivaftale, er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at brugsaftalen hverken havde til formål eller til virkning at begrænse konkurrencen på markedet for levering af timekapacitet.
In so far as there were availablehourly paths and the agreement between Eurotunnel and the railway companies was not exclusive, the Commission took the view that the usage contract had neither the purpose nor the effect of restrictingcompetition in the market for the provision of hourly paths.
Brugsaftalen er således heller ikke udtryk for en deling af markedet og har ikke til formål at begrænse konkurrencen, eftersom jernbaneselskaberne og Eurotunnel opererer på forskellige markeder for transportydelser.
Neither was the usage contract a market-sharing agreement, and neither was it intended to restrictcompetition in so far as the railway companies and Eurotunnel were operating on different transportservices markets.
Kommissionen fandt heller ikke, at brugsaftalen havde konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger på de forskellige markeder i tilknytning til transportydelser, som jernbaneselskaberne og Eurotunnel opererer på.
Nor did the Commission find that the usage contract had restrictive effects on therelevant transport services markets in which the railway companies and Eurotunnel were active.
I en administrativ skrivelse af 21. maj 1999 bekræftede Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence således over for parterne, at man ikke længere fandt anledning til at anvende traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1, på brugsaftalen.
In a comfort letter dated 21May the Competition Directorate-General therefore confirmed to the partiesthat there were in its view no longer any grounds for applying Article81(1) of the ECTreaty to the usagecontract.
Sådanne forpagtningsaftaler er omfattet af artikel 81, stk. 1, hvis de opfylder to betingelser, som er fastsat i Delimitis-dommen ('"'): (a) hvis det nationale marked for øludskænkning er et lukket marked, og (b) hvis det pågældende bryggeris aftaler bidrager i væsentlig grad til denne lukning.
The Commission exempted the standard leases of the three largest brewers in the UK. This followed anexhaustive examination by the Commission departments of the way in which the national brewers Bass,Scottish and Newcastle (“S & N”) and Whitbread had operated contractual agreements with their lessees.
Kommissionen fandt, at det britiske marked for øludskænkning var et lukket marked i betragtning dels af, at al øludskænkning varetages af forpagtede pubber, bestyrede pubber og lånbundne udskænkningssteder, som alle de bryggerier, der opererer i Det Forenede Kongerige, står for, plus de pubkæder, som ikke har nogen tilknytning til bryggerier og er nødsaget til at købe øl fra lokale bryggerier, dels af en række andre faktorer, der influerer på mulighederne for adgangen til markedet, og som er bestemmende for konkurrencekræfterne.
The national brewers’standard leases are typical UK property tie agreements. In such arrangements, acompany (in this case a national brewer) owns a retail outlet which it does not operate itself, but insteadrents out to an independent entrepreneur in exchange for a contractual rent and the obligation to buy allhis beer (of certain specified types) from the landlord-brewer.
Kommissionen fandt desuden, at de forpagtningsnet, som Bass, S & N og Whitbread (
The leases fall within the scope of Article81(1) if they meet two conditions set down in Delimitis:(65)(i)if the national on-trade beer market is foreclosed and (ii)if the agreements of the brewer in question contribute significantly to that foreclosure.
) har etableret, bidrager kraftigt til at gøre markedet lukket.
The Commission also considered that the tied networks of Bass, S & N and Whitbread(66) contributedsignificantly to that foreclosure.
Kommissionen kunne konstatere, at Bass', S & N's og Whitbreads forpagtere gennemsnitligt måtte betale mere for deres ølindkøb end uafhængige pubbestyrere, som køber det samme øl fra det samme bryggeri (de såkaldte »free traders«).
The Commission found that, on average, the lessees which are tied to Bass, S & N and Whitbread had topay more for their beer purchases than individual operators who bought the same beer from the samebrewer (so-called free traders).
Kommissionen mente dog, at det var berettiget at indrømme en fritagelse, fordi Bass', S & N's og Whitbreads forpagtere generelt ikke er ringere stillet end deres konkurrenter.
However, the Commission considered that an exemption was warrantedbecause Bass, S & N and Whitbread tied lessees were, on average, on a level playing field with their othercompetitors.
Kommissionen besluttede derfor at indrømme en tidsbegrænset individuel fritagelse til fordel for disse bryggeners standardforpagtningsaftaler.
The Commission therefore decided to grant a temporary individual exemption to these brewers’standardleases.
Eftersom Whitbread stadig stod som ejer af et stort antal pubber og fort sat indgår 20-årige aftaler med forpagtere, mente man, at der var behov for en lang fritagelsesperiode, og Kommissionen konkluderede, at fritagelsen skulle forlænges indtil den 31. december 2008.
As Whitbread still owned a large leased estate and was still entering into 20-year leases withtenants, it was considered that a long exemption period was required and the Commission consequentlyconcluded that the exemption should extend until 31December2008.
For Bass' og S & N's vedkommende, hvor de forpagtede pubber enten var blevet solgt fra eller var vedat blive omdannet til bestyrede pubber, indrømmede Kommissionen en kortere fritagelse, nemlig med udløb den 31. december 2002, hvilket skulle være tilstrækkeligt til at give Bass og S & N mulighed for at basere deres forretningsmæssige forhandlinger med de resterende forpagtede pubber på et rimeligt sikkert retligt grundlag.
For Bass and S & N, where theleased estate had either been sold off or was in the process of being converted to managed houses, the Commission decided on a shorter exemption end-date, namely 31December2002, which was consideredto enable both Bass and S & N to base their commercial decisions with the remaining tenanted houses ona reasonable level of legal certainty.
), modtog en række klagere en kopi af beslutningen, hvilket svarede til en officiel afvisning af deres klager.
)Cases 35079, 35999 and 36081 (notifications) and 36302, 36349, 36356, 36717, 36719, 36745, 36746, 36953,
) Domstolens dom i sag nr. C-234/89, Stergios Delimiiis mod Henninger Bräu, Sml. 1991 I, s. 935.
36954, 36956, 36971, 36987, 36991, 37007, 37011, 37019 and 37054 (complaints).(65)Court of Justice, Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitisv Henninger Bräu[1991] ECRI-935.
168 ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
Following the adoption by the Commission of these three Article81(3) decisions concerning Whitbread,
I Nederlandene deles de samlede omkostninger ved at transmittere el gennem ledningsnettet mellem forbrugerne med 75% og producenterne med 25%.
In the Netherlands the total cost of transmitting electricity through the grid is shared on a 75:25 basis betweenconsumers and producers.
Den største nederlandske operatør i sektoren for eltransmission havde til hensigt at kræve betaling af leverandører både for import i Nederlandene og for transittransmission af el gennem Nederlandene efter samme takst, som anvendtes for indenlandske leverandører, dvs. 25%. Den Nederlandske Elektricitetsstyrelse, som skal godkende sådanne afgifter, spurgte Kommissionen til råds om, hvorvidt elselskabets planlagte prispolitik var forenelig med EU's konkurrenceregler.
The dominant Dutch transmission system operator (TSO) intended to charge suppliers for imports into the Netherlands and for transit transmissions of electricity through the Netherlands thesame fee as domestic suppliers, i.e. 25%.The Dutch electricity regulator, who has to approve such fees, consulted the Commission on the compatibility of the TSO’s planned pricing policy with the Community competition rules.
Elektricitetsstyrelsen gjorde dette i fuld overensstemmelse med EU-reglerne, hvorefter nationale myndigheder ikke må godkende nogen praksis eller aftale, som strider mod EU's konkurrenceregler (69).
The regulator was acting in accordance with Community case-law, under which national authorities must not approve any practice or agreement contrary to Community competition law.(70)
I sit svar til Den Nederlandske Elektricitetsstyrelse meddelte Kommissionens tjenestegrene, at man fandt afgifterne for import og transit forenelige med EF-traktatens artikel 82, såfremt to betingelser var opfyldt.
In their reply to the Dutch electricity regulator, the Commission departments regarded the import andtransit charges as compatible with Article82 of the EC Treaty, provided that two conditions were met.
En operatør med en dominerende stilling inden for eltransmission må kun opkræve afgifter baseret på de faktiske omkostninger for at undgå misbrug i den i EF-traktatens artikel 82 fastsatte betydning.
Adominant TSO’s charges for electricity transmissions must always be linked to the actual cost in orderto avoid abuse within the meaning of Article82.
Ifølge de oplysninger, Kommissionen ligger inde med, opstår sådanne omkostninger normalt kun, hvis der er tale om en fysisk strøm af elektroner over grænsen.
According to the information currently available to the Commission, such costs normally arise only if there is a physical flow of electrons across borders.
Den nederlandske operatør kan derfor under Elektricitetsstyrelsens tilsyn kun kræve betaling for import og transittransmission i det omfang, det medfører ekstra omkostninger på de linjer, der forbinder det nederlandske elforsyningsnet med andre net i nabomedlemsstater.
The Dutch TSO may therefore, under the supervision of the regulator, charge for import and transittransmissions only to the extent that these give rise to extra costs on the lines interconnecting the Dutchgrid with other grids in neighbouring Member States.
I forbindelse med det nye indre marked for energi kan det sagtens lade sig gøre at handle el flere gange på tværs af landegrænser.
Within the new framework of the internal market for energy it is quite possible for electricity to be tradedseveral times across national boundaries.
Det gælder især i medlemsstater med en elektricitetsbørs som den, der findes i Nederlandene.
This is particularly the case in Member States with a powerexchange such as exists in the Netherlands.
For at undgå, at den dominerende operatør kræver betaling to gange, skal man sikre sig, at udenlandske selskaber kun kommer til at betale importafgifter for den elektricitet, som rent faktisk importeres fra en anden medlemsstat.
In order to avoid double payments to the dominant TSO,care must be taken that foreign traders only pay import charges for electricity which is actually importedfrom another Member State.
Det er dog importørerne, der skal kunne dokumentere elektricitetens oprindelse.
It is, however, for importers to prove the origin of the electricity.
Spørgsmålet opstod, fordi en række foretagender og joint ventures har planer om at bygge nye kraftværker beregnet for det irske marked og baseret på gas; kapaciteten på gasledningen mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland anses imidlertid for at være utilstrækkelig til at dække det voksende behov for kraftproduktion fra 2001 til 2004.
The question arose as a numberof undertakings or JVs were planning to build new gas-fired plants generating electricity for the Irishmarket; however, the capacity in the UK-Ireland gas interconnector was considered insufficient to meetthe increased demand for power generation between 2001 and 2004.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene indtog i sin analyse det synspunkt, at princippet om ligebehandling ville blive tilsidesat, hvis kraftværker blev favoriseret frem for andre gasbrugere ved fordelingen, når den øgede elefterspørgsel ikke kunne dækkes på anden måde.
In their analysis, the Commission departments took the view that the principle of non-discriminationwould not be violated if power plants were favoured over other gas users in the allocation process,provided that the increased electricity demand could not be met through other means.
ESB, der har
They also pointed
Man fandt således, at tildeling af gaskapacitet til ESB ville styrke selskabets dominerende stilling på det irske elmarked.
Thus, it appeared that the allocation of gas capacity tothe ESB would reinforce its dominant position on the Irish electricity market.
De irske myndigheder spurgte Kommissionen til råds om den mest hensigtsmæssige fordelingsmetode: auktion, lodtrækning, »den, der kommer først til mølle ....« osv. Der blev ikke taget endelig stilling til dette spørgsmål, men Kommissionens tjenestegrene gjorde det klart, at det i princippet er myndighederne, der skal vælge den mest hensigtsmæssige metode under overholdelse af visse principper såsom åbenhed og ligebehandling.
The Irish Department of Public Enterprise also consulted the Commission on the appropriate allocationmethod: auction, lottery, first come first served, etc. Although no final position was taken on this issue, the Commission departments made it clear that it was normally for the Department to choose the appropriatemethod provided certain conditions such as transparency and the principle of non-discrimination were fulfilled.
I dette tilfælde forekom en fordeling baseret på auktion acceptabel.
In the case in question allocation by means of an auction appeared to be acceptable.
Lille/UEFA (»Mouscron«-sagen) (Sag COMP/E3/36.851)
Lille/UEFA (the “Mouscron case”) (Case COMP/E3/36.851)