natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen afviste de tilsagn, som Tetra havdetilbudt, og som hovedsageligt bestod af løfter om ikke at misbruge sin stilling, holde Sidel som ensærskilt virksomhed og tilbyde en uafhængig tredjepart licens på Sidels SBM-udstyr.
The Commission rejected remedies offered by Tetra consisting mainly of promises not to engage in abusivepractices, to hold Sidel as a separate company and to offer a licence for Sidel’s SBM machinery to anindependent third party.
Kommissionenfandt, at disse tilsagn var uigennemførlige, vanskelige at kontrollere og utilstrækkelige til at løse dealvorlige konkurrenceproblemer, fusionen ville give anledning til.
The Commission found that the remedies were not viable, impossible to monitorand insufficient to address the serious anticompetitive effects of the merger.
249.Kommissionens beslutning blev indbragt for Retten med påstand om proceduremæssige ogmaterielle fejl.
249.The Court of First Instance was asked to annul the Commission’s decision on the basis ofprocedural and substantive arguments.
På det proceduremæssige plan hævdede Tetra, at den ulovligt var blevet nægtet aktindsigti en ekspertrapport og i svarene på en markedstest af Tetras tilsagn.
Regarding procedure, the applicant claimed that it had beenunlawfully denied access to the file in respect of an expert report and the responses to a market survey onits offer of commitments.
På det materielle plan hævdede Tetra,at Kommissionen ikke havde godtgjort, at fusionen ville føre til skabelse eller styrkelse af endominerende stilling, og gjorde gældende, at Tetra ikke ville være i stand til at udnytte nogenstyrkeposition eller afskærme markedet, og at en eliminering af potentiel konkurrence ikke ville ændrenoget ved Tetras incitamenter til at innovere og sænke priserne på kartonmarkedet.
On the substance, Tetra claimed that the Commission had not shown that themerger would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as leveraging was not possible,foreclosure could not take place and elimination of potential competition would not change Tetra’sincentives to innovate and lower prices in the carton market.
Den fandt, at sagsøger havde hafttilstrækkelig adgang til ekspertrapporten og været i stand til at sætte sig ind i og fremsætte bemærkningertil rapporten.
It found that the applicant had hadsufficient access to the expert report and had been able to understand and to comment on this report.
Hvad angår markedstesten af tilsagnene, fandt Retten, at Kommissionen havde ret til at giveindsigt i den i form af resuméer, når det drejede sig om at beskytte nogle af de adspurgte, der frygtede forrepressalier, hvis deres identitet blev kendt.
Asregards the market test of the commitments, the Court found that the Commission was entitled to provideaccess in the form of summaries in order to protect the identity of certain respondents, who fearedretaliation.
Retten afviste også Tetras påstande om, at spørgeskemaernevar upræcise eller vildledende, og konkluderede, at intet tydede på, at de adspurgte var blevet vildledteller forvirret.
The Court also dismissed claims made by Tetra that the questionnaires were inaccurate ormisleading and concluded that it was not apparent that respondents were misled or confused.
Tetras rettigheder var derfor ikke blevet tilsidesat ved brugen af disse resuméer.
The rightsof defence were therefore not infringed by the use of summaries.
251.På det materielle plan bekræftede Retten Kommissionens ret til at tage stilling til fusionenseventuelle konkurrencebegrænsende konglomerale virkninger, selv om det er Rettens opfattelse, atfusioner mellem virksomheder, der er aktive på forskellige markeder, normalt ikke giver anledning tilkonkurrenceproblemer (præmis 150).
251.As regards the substantive issues, the Court confirmed that the Commission was entitled to assessthe possible anticompetitive conglomerate effects of the merger, even though, in the Court’s view,mergers between undertakings active on distinct markets do not usually give rise to competition concerns(paragraph 150).
Den bemærkede dog, at de ressourcer og den kapacitet, der læggessammen ved en konglomeral fusion, umiddelbart kan sætte den fusionerede enhed i stand til relativt hurtigtat skaffe sig en dominerende stilling på et nabomarked (præmis 151).
The Court observed that, in certain circumstances, the means and capacities broughttogether by a conglomerate merger may immediately create conditions allowing the merged entity toacquire, in the relatively near future, a dominant position on a neighbouring market by leverage(paragraph 151).
Retten anerkendte således, at Kommissionen i denne sag med velunderbyggede og objektive midler havde ført bevis for, at de tomarkeder var nært forbundne, og at den fusionerede enhed ville være i stand til at udnytte sin styrke(præmis 199).
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that, in this case, the Commission had shown, on thebasis of well-established and objective evidence, that the two markets in question were closely relatedand that the merged entity would have the ability to engage in leveraging practices (paragraph 199).
Udnyttelse af økonomisk styrke
253.The Court based its reasoning on three elements.
253.Retten begrundede dette med følgende tre faktorer: For det første burde Kommissionen haveovervejet, i hvilket omfang den fusionerede enheds incitament til at udnytte sin styrke ville blivebegrænset eller måske endog elimineret, fordi det ville være ulovligt og sandsynligvis blive opdaget meddet resultat, at myndighederne både på EU-plan og nationalt plan ville skride ind med store bøder(præmis 159).
First, the Commission should have considered theextent to which the incentives of the merged entity to leverage would be reduced, or even eliminated, by theillegality of the conduct in question, the likelihood of its detection, action taken by the competent authorities,both at EU and national level, and the financial penalties which could ensue (paragraph 159).
Desuden skulle Kommissionen have taget hensyn til de tilsagn, sagsøger havde afgivetmed hensyn til sin fremtidige adfærd, da den vurderede sandsynligheden for, at den fusionerede enhedville misbruge sin styrke (præmis 161).
Furthermore,the Commission should have taken into account the behavioural commitments offered by the applicant inassessing the likelihood of the merged entity engaging in unlawful leveraging activity (paragraph 161).
I mangel af en sådan vurdering baserede Retten udelukkende sinanalyse af spørgsmålet om udnyttelse af økonomisk styrke på en adfærd, »der i hvert fald sandsynligvisikke ville være ulovlig« (præmis 162).
In theabsence of such an assessment, the Court based its analysis of leveraging exclusively on conduct ‘whichwould, at least probably, not be illegal’ (paragraph 162).
For det andet var Retten ikke enig med Kommissionen i dennesopfattelse af vækstudsigterne for PET til emballering af mælk og frugtjuice, som den ikke fandtoverbevisende dokumenteret (præmis 203-214), og for det tredje fandt Retten, at kommissionsbeslutningen ikke indeholdt tilstrækkelig dokumentation for den definition, der blev foretaget afdelmarkeder inden for SBM-maskiner afhængigt af deres endelige anvendelsesformål (præmis 269), ogat der ikke fandtes et særskilt marked for SBM-maskiner til følsomme produkter.
Second, the Court disagreed with the Commission’sassessment of the growth prospects of PET in respect of milk and fruit juice, considering that it was not basedon convincing evidence (paragraphs 203 to 214). Third, the Court of First Instance held that the decision didnot provide sufficient evidence to justify the definition of sub-markets among SBM machines with referenceto their end-use (paragraph 269) and that there was no distinct market for SBM machines for sensitiveproducts.
Endelig fandt Retten, at Kommissionen havde undervurderet den fusionerede enheds konkurrenter på karton- og PET-markedetog samspillet mellem PET/karton og andre emballagematerialer, som f.eks. glas, dåser og HDPE, somden fusionerede enhed ikke beskæftigede sig med, eller hvor den kun ville stå svagt.
Finally, the Court of First Instance found that the Commission underestimated the importance ofthe merged entity’s competitors on the carton and the PET side and the interaction of PET and carton withother packaging materials such as glass, cans and HDPE where the merged entity would not be present orwould have a modest position.
På grundlag herafstatuerede Retten derfor, at Kommissionen havde gjort sig skyldig i en åbenlys vurderingsfejl, da denfastslog, at der ville blive skabt en dominerende stilling på markederne for PET-udstyr, navnlig inden for SBM-maskiner med lav og høj kapacitet (præmis 308).
On this basis, the Court thus found that the Commission committed a manifesterror of assessment in concluding that a dominant position would be created on PET equipment markets, andparticularly on those for low- and high-capacity SBMs (paragraph 308).
254.Også på det punkt anerkendte Retten det berettigede i, at Kommissionen så på de potentiellekonkurrencebegrænsende konglomerale effekter, nærmere betegnet hvilken betydning en begrænsning afden potentielle konkurrence fra nabomarkederne for PET-udstyr ville få på kartonmarkederne (præmis323).
254.Again, the Court acknowledged that the Commission was entitled to examine potentialanticompetitive conglomerate effects, namely the significance for the carton markets of a reduction ofpotential competition from the neighbouring PET equipment markets (paragraph 323).
Retten mente dog ikke, at Tetras adfærd med hensyn til priser og innovation på kartonmarkedetville ændre sig efter fusionen, da der var en tilstrækkelig konkurrence, som ville sikre, at Tetra fortsatville være nødt til at søge at innovere.
However, the Court held that Tetra’s behaviour as regards pricing and innovation in the carton market would notchange after the merger as there was a sufficient level of competition to ensure that Tetra would have tocontinue to fight and innovate.
Retten konkluderede derfor, at det ikke var godtgjort, at denfusionerede enhed ville få styrket sin position i forhold til konkurrenterne på kartonmarkederne.
Therefore, the Court concluded that it had not been demonstrated that themerged entity’s position would be strengthened vis-à-vis its competitors on the carton markets.
256.I 2002 blev ti fusioner godkendt efter en længere (seks uger) førstefasebehandling, og efter atfusionsparterne havde afgivet tilsagn, der klart ville løse de påviste konkurrenceproblemer (således at derkunne vedtages en beslutning efter fusionsforordningens artikel 6, stk. 2).
256.Ten cases in 2002 were cleared after an extended (six-week) phase I investigation and afterundertakings had been submitted by the merging parties that provided a clear-cut solution to identifiedcompetition problems (resulting in a decision pursuant to Article 6(2) of the merger regulation).
I mange af de sager, dergennemgås nedenfor, havde der været omfattende drøftelser mellem Kommissionen og fusionsparterne,før fusionen blev anmeldt, hvorunder man havde indkredset mulige konkurrenceproblemer.
Many ofthe cases outlined below were preceded by extensive discussions between the Commission and themerging parties prior to notification, during which potential competition problems were identified.
Det kan forvirksomhederne være en effektiv måde at sikre godkendelse af deres fusion på, navnlig når de er klar
Thiscan be an effective way for companies to obtain clearance of a notified merger, in particular where theyare aware of the likely competitive issues and have already considered potential divestitures.
XXXII BERETNING OM KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN 2002 — SEK(2003) 467 ENDELIG over, hvilke konkurrenceproblemer fusionen kan ventes at rejse, og allerede har overvejet muligeafhændelser.
It involved SEB, a French manufacturer of smallelectrical household appliances (e.g. deep-fryers, toasters, coffee machines, kettles, food processors, irons)under brands such as Tefal, Rowenta Calor and SEB.
257.SEB/Moulinex var den første af disse sager i 2002.
COMPETITION REPORT 2002
SEB’s overtagelse af Moulinex måtte ventes at få betydelige indvirkninger på konkurrencen i Frankrig, hvor SEB er førendepå markedet inden for nogle produkter og Moulinex inden for andre.
XXXIIND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2002 — SEC(2003) 467 FINAL acquisition of Moulinex was expected to have significant effects on competition in France, where SEB is themarket leader for some products and Moulinex for others.
Disse aspekter blev henvist til defranske myndigheder, jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 9, stk. 2, litra a), efter at de havde anmodet heromden 7. december 2001.
These aspects were referred under Article 9(2)(a)to the French authorities, following their request received on 7 December 2001.
Overtagelsen ville også have rejst konkurrenceproblemer i Portugal, Grækenland,Belgien og Nederlandene, hvor den ene eller den anden af parterne havde store markedsandele førtransaktionen.
The acquisition would alsohave raised competition concerns in Portugal, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands, where one or otherof the two companies had large market shares before this transaction.
I Tyskland, Østrig, Danmark, Sverige og Norge ville transaktionen have ændretkonkurrenceforholdene betydeligt på adskillige produktmarkeder, navnlig inden for fritureapparater.
In Germany, Austria, Denmark,Sweden and Norway the transaction would have appreciably altered the terms of competition on severalproduct markets, especially for deep-fryers.
Deikke-franske aspekter af transaktionen blev godkendt, efter at SEB havde tilbudt at meddele eksklusivlicenser på brug af Moulinexmærket i fem år til salg af små husholdningsapparater i ni lande (Portugal,Grækenland, Belgien, Nederlandene, Tyskland, Østrig, Danmark, Sverige og Norge).
The non-French aspects of the transaction were authorisedafter SEB proposed granting exclusive licences to use the Moulinex brand for a period of five years forthe sale of small electric household appliances in nine countries (Portugal, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway).
For at givelicenstageren tid til gradvis at få indført sit eget mærke har SEB lovet ikke at genindføre Moulinexmærket i disse lande i yderligere tre år efter eksklusivlicensens udløb.
SEB will not reintroduce the Moulinexbrand in those countries for a further period of three years from the expiry of the exclusive licence, so asto allow the licensee time for the gradual introduction of a brand name of its own.
258.Masterfoods, som er et fransk datterselskab af det amerikanske selskab Mars Inc., anmeldte ijanuar 2002 en planlagt overtagelse af den franske dyrefoderproducent Royal Canin SA. Mars fremstillersnacks, is, hunde- og kattemad, bl.a. under mærkerne Pedigree, Advance, Cesar, Whiskas og Sheba, dersælges i hele verden, samt nationale/regionale mærker som Canigou og Brekkies.
258.Masterfoods, a French subsidiary of the American company Mars Inc., notified its proposedacquisition of the French pet food company Royal Canin SA in January.
Royal Canin er enførende udbyder af tørfoder til selskabsdyr og har især slået sine mærker fast gennem salg i specialbutikker overalt i EU. Af førstefaseundersøgelserne af denne fusion fremgik det, at den rejste konkurrenceproblemer på flere markeder for tørfoder til selskabsdyr i Frankrig og Tyskland.
Royal Canin is a leading supplierof dry prepared pet food products and has developed its branded business primarily through sales inspecialist outlets throughout the European Union.
For at få løst disseproblemer afgav Mars tilsagn om at afhænde alle sine aktiviteter i Europa inden for fem af denfusionerede enheds dyrefodermærker, nemlig Advance, Premium, Royal Chien, Playdog og Brekkies,sammen med to store produktionsanlæg og andre aktiver knyttet til de aktiviteter, der skulle afhændes.Fusionen må ikke gennemføres, før disse betingelser er opfyldt.
To address theseconcerns, Mars undertook to divest for the whole of Europe its businesses connected to five of themerged group’s pet food brands, i.e. Advance, Premium, Royal Chien, Playdog and Brekkies, togetherwith two major manufacturing plants and all other assets relating to the divested business. The mergercannot be implemented before the conditions have been fulfilled.
Kommissionen undersøgte udelukkendeovertagelsens virkninger i EU, eftersom foder til selskabsdyr ikke falder ind under EØS-aftalen.
The Commission examined the impactof the acquisition only for the European Union, as pet food products are excluded from the application ofthe EEA Agreement between the EU, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
259.I februar anmeldte den belgiske kemikalie- og medicinalkoncern Solvay en planlagt overtagelseaf den italienske kemikalieproducent Ausimont, der er aktiv i Italien, Tyskland, Japan og USA.Overtagelsen rejser alvorlige problemer på to markeder, nemlig inden for persalt, som er et råmaterialemed blegeegenskaber, der bruges til fremstilling af vaskepulver, og inden for polyvinylidendifluorid(PVDF), som er en højresistent fluoropolymer.
259.In February, Solvay, a Belgian chemicals and pharmaceuticals group, notified to the Commissionits planned purchase of Ausimont, an Italian chemicals company with operations in Italy, Germany, Japanand the United States. The operation led to serious concerns in two markets: persalts, a raw material witha bleaching agent used in the production of detergents; and non-coatings polyvinylidene difluoride(PVDF), a high-performance fluoropolymer.
På persaltmarkederne ville transaktionen have skabt endirekte forbindelse mellem Solvay — som er den førende producent i Europa — og Solvays største
In the persalts markets, the deal would have created a directlink between Solvay — the leading producer in Europe — and Degussa, its largest competitor, through MedAvox, a joint venture set up by Degussa and Ausimont.
Sag COMP/M.2621 af 8.1.2002.Sag COMP/M.2544 af 15.2.2002.Sag COMP/M.2690 af 9.4.2002.
COMP/M.2544 Masterfoods/Royal Canin, 15.2.2002.COMP/M.2690 Solvay/Montedison — Ausimont, 9.4.2002.
VF2 er det vigtigsteråmateriale til PVDF. Kommissionen samarbejdede i denne sag om Solvays overtagelse af Ausimont medden amerikanske Federal Trade Commission.
VF2 is the key raw material for PVDF.The Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission cooperated in their analysis of Solvay’sacquisition of Ausimont.
260.Denne sag drejede sig om en fusion mellem to af verdens største tobaksfabrikanter.
260.This case involved two of the world’s biggest cigarette manufacturers.
Imperial Tobacco fremstiller og sælger en lang række tobaksprodukter, bl.a. cigaretmærkerne Superkings,Lambert and Butler, Embassy, John Player Special, Regal og Richmond, tobaksmærket Drum tilselvrullede cigaretter og cigaretpapiret Rizla.
Imperial Tobaccomanufactures and sells a range of tobacco products, including Superkings, Lambert and Butler, Embassy,John Player Special, Regal and Richmond cigarette brands, Drum ‘roll-your-own’ tobacco and Rizlacigarette papers.
Målvirksomheden Reemtsma er verdens femtestørstecigaretfabrikant med mærkerne West og Davidoff.
Reemtsma, the target, is the world’s fifth largest cigarette manufacturer, supplying the West and Davidoff cigarette brands.
Parternes aktiviteter er i alt væsentligt komplementære,og af undersøgelserne fremgik det, at overtagelsen kun ville rejse større konkurrenceproblemer på detbritiske cigaretmarked.
The activities of the parties are mostly complementary and theinvestigation revealed substantial competition concerns only in the UK cigarette market.
Imperial Tobacco og Gallaher er de førende udbydere på det britiske marked.Gallahers styrke ligger inden for de dyrere mærker, mens Imperial Tobacco især står stærkt inden for detlavere prislag.
Imperial Tobacco and Gallaher are the clear leaders in this market.
Reemtsma har ganske vist kun en ret lille markedsandel, men har en enestående positioninden for cigaretter solgt under handelsmærker, hvor Reemtsma er den eneste større udbyder.
Gallaher’s strength is in the premium brandsegment whereas Imperial Tobacco’s is more in the low-priced sector.
Som nogethelt usædvanligt ejer Reemtsma mange af de handelsmærker, hvorunder der sælges cigaretter, bl.a.
While Reemtsma’s market share isrelatively small, it has a unique position in the supply of ownlabel cigarettes, for which it has been theonly significant supplier.
Red Band i Det Forenede Kongerige, selv om distributørerne har eneret til at benytte dem.
Unusually, Reemtsma owns many of the ownlabel cigarette trademarks such as Red Band in the United Kingdom, even though exclusivity is granted to distributors.
Overtagelsen af Reemtsma ville derfor ikke alene give Imperial Tobacco en stærk position inden for cigaretter i denlavere prisklasse, men også gøre Imperial Tobacco til den eneste leverandør af handelsmærkecigaretter.Eftersom handelsmærkecigaretter er en vigtig konkurrencefaktor på det britiske marked, navnlig på detnedre prissegment, gav denne situation anledning til alvorlige konkurrenceproblemer.
The acquisition of Reemtsma would therefore give Imperial Tobacco not only a strong position in the low-priced cigarettesector but would also establish it as the only supplier of ownlabel cigarettes. As ownlabel cigarettes are asignificant source of competition in the UK market, particularly in the low-priced sector, this situation gaverise to serious competition concerns.
Imperial Tobacco afgav også tilsagn om, at hvis handelsmærkedistributørerne i fremtiden fandt andreleverandører, ville de få lov til at beholde disse handelsmærker.
261.To alleviate these concerns, Imperial Tobacco undertook not to develop the trademarks for itsown account and to maintain the exclusivity distributors currently enjoy.
Disse tilsagn skulle eliminere distributørernes afhængighed af Imperial Tobacco og derved sikre, at handelsmærkecigaretter fortsat kan være envigtig konkurrencefaktor på det britiske marked.
It also undertook that, if ownlabel distributors were to find other suppliers in the future, they would retain the trademarks at stake.These undertakings should remove any dependency of distributors on Imperial Tobacco, thereby ensuringthat ownlabel cigarettes continue to be an effective source of competition in the UK market.
262.I denne sag var der tale om et overtagelsestilbud, hvor Barilla og den italienske bank Banca Popolare di Lodi Scarl (BPL) ønskede at overtage alle de børsnoterede aktier i Kamps og derigennem fåfælles kontrol med Kamps.
262.Barilla and the Italian bank Banca Popolare di Lodi Scarl (BPL) launched a public bid for all of Kamps’s listed shares which would have given Barilla and BPL joint control over Kamps.
Barilla fremstiller og sælger pasta og pastasaucer, bageriprodukter (brød,brøderstatninger og kager) og is.
Barillaproduces and sells pasta and pasta sauce products, bakery products (bread, bread substitutes and cakes)and ice cream.
De fleste af Barillas bageriaktiviteter er koncentreret om Italien, menselskabets Wasa-datterselskab er en førende knækbrødsproducent i flere europæiske lande, herunder
While most of the company’s bakery operations are centred in Italy, Barilla’s Wasasubsidiary is a leading crispbread manufacturer in several European countries, notably Germany.
Sag COMP/M.2779 af 8.5.2002.Sag COMP/M.2817 af 25.6.2002.
COMP/M.2779 Imperial Tobacco/Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken, 8.5.2002.COMP/M.2817 Barilla/BPL/Kamps, 25.6.2002.COMP/M.2761 BP/Veba Oel, 1.7.2002.COMP/M.2533 BP/E.ON, 20.12.2001.
Overtagelsen ville have styrket Barillas førende position i Tysklandinden for knækbrød.
The acquisition by BP of full control of Veba Oel did not give rise to new competitionproblems.
Oprettelsen af Veba Öl-joint venturet var blevet godkendt på en række betingelser, der blev stilletfor at løse problemerne med sammenlægningen af BP’s og Veba Öls petroleumaktiviteter.
However, in view of the fact that some of the conditions imposed in the BP/E.ON joint ventureby both the Commission and the Federal Cartel Office had not yet been met, the original concerns hadnot been fully eliminated.