natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Alle almindelige retsvidenskabelige værker, indledninger til retsstudiet eller retsfilosofiske værker anvender dette udtryk.
So far as the meaning of the concept of a 'lacuna' used in relation to law is concerned, books on general law, introduction to the study of the law or jurisprudence refer to this concept.
Men beskrives udtrykket tilstrækkeligt præcist ? Er der sondringer, som skal foretages ?
But has their examination of the concept being sufficiently thorough?
Er dette ikke tilfældet, vil man da ikke ofte, og forgæves, diskutere på grund lag af udtryk, der har forskelligt indhold og omfang?
Consequently, is it not repeatedly and, therefore, fruitlessly discussed on the basis of concepts which have a different scope and meaning?
Særdeles hensigtsmæssigt er følgende sondringer opstillet (e
A useful distinction has been drawn between: β
Jeg finder, at der også må gøres en væsentlig sondring mellem på den ene side retslakuner og på den anden side lakuner i love, retsgrundsætninger eller i sædvaner. Retslakunen svarer til den deontologiske, ideologiske eller ontologiske lakune. En lakune i bl.a. en »lov« svarer til den teleologiske lakune, som er beskrevet af Conte.
It seems to me that a vital distinction must therefore be drawn between, on the one hand, a lacuna in the law and, on the other hand a lacuna in a law or in the principles of law or custom.
Når man hævder, der er en retslakune, anlægger man en værdibedømmelse.
To determine whether there is a lacuna in the law or not is to make a value judgment.
Meningerne herom vil være delte: nogle mener, at en sådan lakune ikke foreligger, medens andre derimod mener, at en sådan foreligger, men måske ikke er indbyrdes enige om, på hvilken måde lakunen skal udfyldes.
The relevant evaluations may differ: some may take the view that there is no lacuna, others, on the other hand that there is, the latter not always suggesting the same way of filling it in.
Hvis det anføres, at en lov ikke indeholder nogen løsning på en situation, men at en ikke skreven grundsætning, en sædvane, eller en regel, der kan udledes af en eller flere love, omhandler den pågældende situation, så har man faktisk, om man vil, konstateret en »lakune« i loven.
To point out that a law does not contemplate such a solution but that an unwritten principle or custom, or again a rule which be be inferred from one or more laws, govern the said situation, is merely a finding, if you like, that there is a 'lacuna' in a law.
At konstatere, at hverken EØF-traktaten eller nogen anden bestemmelse i fællesskabsretten hjemler kontrol med virksomhedssammenslutninger, er en konstatering af en »lakune« i fællesskabsretten, hvis man mener, at denne bør hjemle en sådan kontrol.
To record the finding that neither the EEC Treaty nor any other provision of Community law permits the control of mergers, is to find that there is a lacuna in this law, if the view is held that such a control must be permitted.
At påpege, at fællesskabsretten ikke indeholder nogen regel, hvorefter et kvalificeret flertal kan ændre traktaterne, men at en sådan procedure bør indføres, samt at konstatere, at Europa-Parlamentet ikke har den lovgivende magt, det imidlertid burde have, er også en påvisning af lakuner i fællesskabsretten.
To point out that Community law provides no procedure for the revision of the Treaties which would enable a qualified majority to legislate to this end and that such a procedure should be adopted and, again, that the European Parliament does not possess the legislative power which it should nevertheless be able to exercise, is also to call attention to lacunae in Community law.
Det er normalt ikke domstolene, der skal dække lakuner i retten som sådan: denne opgave tilkommer »lovgiveren« og folket, der umiddelbart skaber sædvanerne og i hvert fald delvis retsgrundsætningerne.
It is not normally the function of a court to fill in gaps in the law; this is the task of the 'legislature' and of the Nation which naturally develops customs and, in part at least,, legal principles of its own accord.
Derimod skal domstolene dække lakuner — hvis man ellers vil kalde det »lakune« — i lovteksterne ved at ty til regler, der kan udledes af en eller flere andre tekster, af disses ånd, eller formål eller af de regler, der indeholdes i retsgrundsætningerne eller i sædvanen.
On the other hand it is for a court to fill in the lacunae (if importance is attached to this word 'lacuna') in the provisions of laws by considering the rules which emerge from one or several other provisions, from their spirit and purpose or rules found in legal principles or custom.
Hvis man går ud fra, at retsreglerne alene er at finde i skreben ret og kun der, vil der naturligvis være lakuner, et utal af lakuner, men det er i hvert fald kun lakuner i »loven«.
If it is borne in mind that rules of law are only found in provisions, and in them alone, there are unquestionably lacunae, and indeed a large number of them, but these are in any case only lacunae in 'a law'.
Man har, ofte med urette, henvist til artikel 4 i Code Civil om »déni de justice« i1). Denne bestemmelses formål er imidlertid ikke at tillægge dommeren en lovgivende funktion, hvilket i øvrigt ville være i strid med de forfatnings retlige regler.
Reference is, often wrongly, made to Article 4 of the Civil Code which deals with a refusal on the part of a judge to give a decision.'
(') »Den dommer, der afviser at træffe afgørelse under påberåbelse af, at loven er tavs, uklar eller ufuldstændig kan straffes for > déni de justice < «. 111-143
'Le juge qui refusera de juger sous prétexte du silence, de l'obscurité ou de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra être poursuivi comme coupable de déni de justice' ('Legal proceedings may be taken against a judge, who refuses to give a decision on the ground that the law is silent, obscure or inadequate, for refusal to give a decision').
Denne ærværdige regel betyder selvfølgelig ikke, at dommeren altid, uanset hvor, skal finde en regel, det være sig ud fra billigheds­ eller retfærdighedsbe­tragtninger, og, ved at anvende den i sin myndighedsudøvelse, give denne regel værdi og gyldighed som en regel i positiv ret.
In any case it refers to the inadequacy of a law and not of the law. It is clear that this provision, which is held in great respect, cannot mean that the judge must always find a rule, and it doesn't much matter where he discovers it, in equity or in law, upon which he would bestow the force and effect of a rule of substantive law by applying it during the performance of his judicial functions.
En afgørelse om, at ingen regel i den positive ret finder anvendelse i sagen, er i overensstemmelse med be­stemmelsen i artikel 4.
The judge who comes to the conclusion that no rule of substantive law applies to the case complies with the requirement of Article 4.
Det er nemlig klart, at den positive ret ikke kan inde­holde bestemmelser om et hvilket som helst menneskeligt forhold: en sådan positiv ret ville være utålelig, som allerede Kant påpegede.
It is in fact clear that substantive law does not have to cover every kind of human relationship: a system of substantive law which did so would produce an intolerable system which Kant has already denounced.
Som det så udmærket er blevet sagt »forpligter artikel 4 i Code Civil ikke dom­meren til at dække lakuner i retten, men til at dømme.
As Mr Foriers has written so well 'the provision in Article 4 of the Code Civile... by no means makes it obligatory to fill in gaps in the law but it imposes upon the Judge the duty to determine the issues before him.
Der er tale om to forskellige ting: lovgiver har bestemt, at den dommer, der er indsat til at dømme, skal dømme, men dommeren skal ikke skabe retsregler, hvor der ingen er« (χ).
These are two very different things: the legislature intended that the judge, appointed to perform judicial functions, should determine the issues before him but certainly does not oblige him to create a rule where none exists'.'
Den schweiziske Code Civil bestemmer også i artikel 1 : »I mangel af en an­vendelig lovbestemmelse træffer retten afgørelse efter sædvaneretten, og i mangel af en sædvane, efter de regler, retten ville opstille, såfremt denne var lovgiver«.
Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code also provides that: 'In the absence of a statutory provision which can be applied, the court must decide the case according to customary law and, if there is no such custom, according to the rules which it would adopt if it had to act in a legislative capacity'.
I så henseende understreges det sædvanligvis (2), at den dommer, der skal dække en lakune, ikke har lovgiverens frihed til at begynde helt forfra og fravige tidligere love: dommeren skal altid respektere samtlige gældende love, samt de normer og de principper, der flyder heraf (3).
In this connexion it is frequently emphasized2that, in filling in a gap, a court does not enjoy the freedom of the legislature to begin afresh by derogating from previous laws; the court must always abide by all the laws in force and the standards of behaviour and principles which flow from them.3
»Loven« — også her anvendes dette udtryk i den almindelige betydning — har efter sit væsen et alment indhold: den kan derfor ikke opregne eller beskrive samtlige faktiske omstændigheder, forhold eller begivenheder i hele deres uendelige mangfoldighed.
It is the nature of the 'law' (here I also, when referring to this concept, have in mind its general meaning) to be of general application.
Lovens opgave er i store træk at fastsætte
Consequently, it cannot enumerate or set out all the facts, circumstances and events which
Men på den ene side udgør Common Law en væsentlig bestanddel af den positive ret og på den anden side er det engelske billighcdssystcm (equity) ikke det samme som billighed i belgisk, fransk eller nederlandsk ret, men tværtimod en samling af præcise og ordnede regler, der er opstået som følge af en velkendt historisk omstændighed.
But, on the one hand, Common Law constitutes a substantial part of substantive law and, on the other hand, equity in England certainly does not have the same meaning as in Belgium, France or the Netherlands but, on the contrary, is a body of precise and wellordered rules which came into being for wellknown historical reasons.
Det er dommeren, der opfyldt af lovenes almindelige ånd, som skal styre anvendelsen heraf ... i1)«.
It is for the judge, imbued with the general spirit of the laws, to supervise their application'.1
Det er altså fejlagtigt at tro, at der er en »lakune« — altså et tomrum, en for glemmelse, en mangel — når den skrevne ret ikke har forudset og reguleret enhver situation, ethvert problem, som kan tænkes forelagt dommeren, der ikke desto mindre løser sådanne tilfælde »prætorisk«, som en egentlig lov giver (2).
It is therefore a mistake to believe that there is a 'lacuna' (in other words an empty space, omission or deficiency) whenever written law has not expressly provided for and covered every situation and question which can arise and that the court, which in spite of this fact gives a decision in such cases, performs the function of the 'Praetor' which, is indeed legislative. -
Hvis man ikke er opmærksom på, hvad en »lov« egentlig er, og hvilken opgave, der tilkommer dommeren ... vil man nødvendigvis støde på utallige »lakuner«, endog flere lakuner end skrevne regler.
In this connexion if account is not taken of what a 'law' and the Court's task consist of, one is bound to find that there are innumerable, more lacunae even than written rules.
Men hvad betyder »hermeneutisk«?
But what is the meaning of 'herméneutics'?
Efter Larousse encyclopédique: »fortolkning af de hellige skrifter, antikke bøger, gamle love ... de regler der skal følges ved fastlæggelsen af skrifternes nøjagtige betydning«.
According to 'le Larousse Encyclopédique' a hermeneut is a person who interprets sacred and ancient texts, ancient laws . . . explains the rules to be followed when searching for the exact meaning of writings'.
Efter samme leksikon var hermeneuterne de af den kristne kirkes præster i de første århundreder, som havde til opgave at forklare og udlægge skriften for folket. Dictionnaire de l'Académie anfører: »hermeneutisk — tillægsord — som skal fortolke tekster. Den hermeneutiske videnskab: som navneord femininum: lovenes hermeneutik.
According to the same dictionary hermcneuts were ministers of the Christian Church in the first centuries (A.D.) who were responsible for translating and explaining the writings to the people.
I snæver forstand betyder hermeneutik fortolkning af de hellige skrifter«.
In its general use, herméneutics mean the interpretation of sacred writings'.
På engelsk har »hermencutical« fået en bredere betydning og vedrører i første række Bibelen (modsat exegetisk, »cxegetical«) men kan også anvendes på andre områder (Oxford Dictionary, hermcneutical: belonging to or concerned with interpretation). I en bemærkelsesværdig artikel anvender prof. Capurso også ordet i en vid betydning: M. Capurso, Criteri ermenautici in ordine all'applicazione di norme comunitarie, convenzionali e derivate, confliggenti con norme primarie di diritto interno. Riv. dir. pub. 1975, 1057—1095.
'Hermeneutical', in English, has acquired a wider meaning and is mainly applied to Scripture (in the opposite sense to 'exegetical'), and can equally well be applied in other fields (Oxford Dictionary, cf. 'hermeneutical': belonging ro or concerned with interpret ation).
virksomheds adfærd eller handlemåde men også dens sammenslutning med andre virksomheder, har Domstolen ikke dækket »lakuner« men har præciseret indhold og omfang af retsreglerne i overensstemmelse med den opgave, som »loven« pålægger dommeren.
When the Court ruled that Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty covers agreements between associatio?ts oí undertakings,1that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty also applies to agreements with undertakings outside the Common Market,2 that purely national concerted practices are or are not caught by the same article3 or again, in particular, that the abuse of a dominant economic power within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty may arise not only from the practices or conduct of an undertaking but also from its merger with other undertakings, the Court did not fill in 'lacunae' but defined the meaning and scope of rules of law in accordance with the task which the 'law' entrusts it.
Ganske vist definerer traktaten ikke udtrykket »tilskud eller anden støtte« i EKSF-traktatens artikel 4, litra c), men dette er ikke nogen begrundelse for at hævde, at Domstolen har dækket »en lakune« ved den 23. februar 1961 (*) at udtale, hvad der skal forstås ved tilskud eller anden støtte ... medmindre man er af den opfattelse, at en »lov« altid udtrykkeligt skal tage stilling til enhver situation eller ethvert problem, præcisere ordenes betydning og definere udtrykkene.
It is true that the Treaty does not define the concept of 'subsidies' or 'aids' within the meaning of Article 4 (c) of the ECSC Treaty but this is no reason for concluding that on 23 February 19614the Court filled in 'a lacuna' by defining what subsidies or aids are, unless the view is taken that 'a law' must always expressly provide for every single situation or question and define the exact meaning of words and concepts.
EØF-traktatens artikel 93 bestemmer ikke, inden for hvilken frist Kommissionen skal udtale sig om nye eller ændrede nationale støtteordninger, men — som understreget af Domstolen i dom af 11. december 1973 (2): selv om den pågældende medlemsstat ikke kan gennemføre de planlagte foranstaltninger, før denne procedure er sluttet med en endelig afgørelse, og selv on denne fase (der medgår til proceduren) ... skal give Kommissionen en passende frist, skal denne sidste dog handle med den påkrævede hurtighed og tage hensyn til medlemsstaternes interesse i hurtigt at få klarhed i tilfælde, hvor den nødvendige indgriben kan vise sig at haste.
Article 93 of the EEC Treaty does not specify the timelimit within which the Commission must make its attitude known on national proposals for fresh aid or the modification of an existing aid but, as the Court stressed in its judgment of 11 December 1973,5although the Member State cannot put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision and while this period [of the procedure] must allow the Commission sufficient time, the latter must, however, act diligently and take account of the interest of Member States in being informed of the position quickly in fields where the need to intervene can be of an urgent nature.
Domstolen statuerede derfor, at Kommissionen skal tage stilling inden for en rimelig frist (3).
The Court accordingly ruled that the Commission must take a decision within a reasonable time. °
Det er måske at fuldstændiggøre den skrevne regel men ved anvendelse af andre regler i fællesskabsretten: retssikkerhedsprincippet eller princippet om beskyttelse af den berettigede forventning eller forbudet mod retsmisbrug.
Judgment of 17 October 1972 in Case 8/72 [1972] ECR 977 — not yet published — [1973] C.M.L.R. 7 Judgment of 23 February 1961 in Case 30/59 Recueil 1961 Case 120/73 [1973] ECR 1480 and 1481 The Court has used this concept of a reasonable timelimit in relation inter alia in relation to a limitation period which was claimed and also, more particularly, in relation to the Staff Regulations of Officials (see the judgments of 4 February 1970 in Case 13/69 and of 12 July 1973 in Joined Cases 10 and 47/72 [1973] ECR 763.
Det er ganske enkelt også en mådeholdende og rimelig anvendelse af den skrevne regel, følgende den mening, som »lovgiver« nødvendigvis har måttet lægge i den.
National courts are also familiar with this concept of a reasonable time-limit. Where the provisions of written law do not include a specific time-limit, the courts sometimes, and more particularly in administrative cases, rule that a reasonable timelimit be complied with: see the opinion of Commissaire du Gouvernment Mr Galmot before the judgment of the
(2) 11. december 1975, sag 120/73 (Sml. 1973, s. 1471).
Can this be filling in a gap?
I forbindelse med omtalen af den »harmoniserende og koordinerende« op gave (kapitel V, 4. afsnit) anførte jeg dom af 12. juli 1957 H om tilbagekaldelse af forvaltningsakter, der skaber individuelle rettigheder for tjenestemænd.
On 15 December 19701the Court, after stating that 'neither Regulation No 19 nor the implementing regulations issued thereunder contain provisions whereby the rate of the levy applicable to a specified category of cereals can be reduced because of damage and loss of value suffered by these cereals before being imported', ruled that: 'In view of the absence of such provisions, this problem must be solved by reference to the system of the regulation, having regard to the principles governing the common organization of agricultural markets and the aims attributed to it by the Treaty'.
Domstolen havde antaget, at »der er tale om et forvaltningsretligt problem, der er velkendt i retspraksis og teori i alle medlemsstaterne, men til hvis løsning traktaten ikke indeholder regler.
No specific solution is to be found in the provisions; there may therefore be a 'lacuna' in these provisions.
Hvis ikke Domstolen skal begå »déni de justice« (se foran), må den derfor ved løsningen af dette spørgsmål lade sig inspirere af de i medlemsstaternes love, teori og retspraksis anerkendte regler«.
But a solution can be found in the regulations taken as a whole and their objectives; in fact, therefore, there is no lacuna.
Der ville nemlig have været »déni de justice«, om Domstolen havde udtalt, at da reglerne ingen løsning gav, kunne den ikke løse den konflikt, der var blevet den forelagt : men en sådan indstilling lå naturligvis den høje europæiske Domstol meget fjernt.
The same obvervations apply to the judgment of 30 January 1974 in Case 159/73, in which the Court stated that: 'the rules of the common organization of the market in sugar form a complete system in the sense that it does not leave the Member States the power to fill a lacuna by resorting to theit national law'.
Hvad angår begrebet lakune, som der således henvises til med ordene »traktaten indeholder ikke regler (til spørgsmålets løsning)«, er det rigtigt, at ingen bestemmelse udtrykkeligt indeholder løsningen, men som jeg har forsøgt at påvise i afsnittet om »harmonisering og koordinering«, kan løsningen udledes af indholdet og rækkevidden af flere retsregler, der, som også i andre til fælde, må sammenholdes.
The Court went on to hold that: 'It is thus proper to seek a solution in the light of the aims and objectives of the common organization of the market, taking account of considerations of a practical and administrative nature'.2
Den 15. december 1970 (2) anførte Domstolen, at »hverken forordning nr. 19/62 eller dennes gennemførelsesregler indeholder nogen bestemmelse om, at den for en given kornsort gældende importafgiftssats kan formindskes som følge af skader eller værditab på dette korn, inden det importeres«, og Dom stolen konkluderede herpå, »at da bestemmelserne er tavse, må spørgsmålet løses på grundlag af den ordning, der indeholdes i disse forordninger, og under hensyn til de principper, der gælder for de fælles landbrugsordninger, og de formål, som traktaten herved forfølger«.
On 30 October 1972,3with reference to the question whether a national regulation concerning the cultivation of hyacinth bulbs was compatible with Article 10 of Regulation No 234/68 of the Council of 27 February 1968 on the establishment of a common organization of the market in live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage, the Court stated: 'in the absence of express provisions as to the compatibility of a national regulation restricting production with the organization of the market set up by Regulation No 234/68, it is necessary to seek the solution to the question referred in the light of the objects and the purposes of the regulation within the framework of the principles laid down by the Treaty itself ... It thus follows from the general tenor of the regulation that...' etc.
(2) Det drejede sig om fortolkning af Rådets fererdning nr. 1009/67 af 18. december 1967 om den fælles sukkermarkedsordning og Kommissionens forordning nr. 142/69 af 27. januar
Case 31/70 [1970] ECR 1062 The case was concerned with the interpretation of Regulation No 1009/67/EEC of the Council of 18 December 1967 on the common organization of the market in sugar and Regulation (EEC) No 142/69 of the Commission of 27 January 1969 laying down certain detailed rules for the application of the quota system for sugar.
(2) Sag 190/73, Sml. 1974, s. 1123.
Case 190/73 [1974] ECR 1123
Med rette understreger Domstolen ofte-som allerede nævnt i kapitel I — at den ikke kan dække lakuner i bestemmelserne og således skabe nye regler, hvilket ville gå ud ovn dens kompetence.
As I have already mentioned in Chapter I, the Court sometimes emphasizes, and rightly, that it cannot fill in gaps in the law by cteating new regulations because by doing so it would exceed its powers.
I dom af 14. juli 1972 (*) anførte Domstolen, at det henhører under fælles skabslovgivers enekompetence at fastsætte en forældelsesfrist på konkurrence området. Som Domstolen imidlertid er beføjet til, henviste den til retssikkerhedsprincippet og bestemte, at sager skal påbegyndes inden for en rimelig frist.
In its judgment of 14 July 1972,2it pointed out that the Community legislature alone is empowered to lay down a limitation period for competi­tion.
) Sag 48/69 — I.C.I. — Ree. 1972, s. 656.
Case 48/69, I.C.I., Recueil 1972, page 656
Nogle kritiske bemærkninger til visse af dom stolens domme
Criticisms directed at certain judgments of the Court of Justice
Som understreget i kapitel II — tredje afsnit in fine — går dommere, der samvittighedsfuldt og dygtigt udøver deres dømmende myndighed, af og til ind for løsninger, som andre dommere med samme evner og samme samvittighedsfuldhed i gerningen ikke kan tilslutte sig.
I emphasized towards the end of Section 3 of Chapter II that, when carrying out their judicial task meticulously and efficiently, judges sometimes adopt solutions which would not have satisfied other judges who have the same standing and conception of their duties.