natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For at effektivisere sin likviditetsförvaltning yderligere udarbejdede den endelig et globalt program for virksomhedscertifikater i euroer.
Furthermore, to boost the efficiency of its liquidity management, it instituted a global commercial paper programme in euro.
Desuden var Banken meget aktiv på kapitalmarkederne i de central- og østeuropæiske lande, hvorved den stimulerede deres vækst og internationalisering for at frem skynde deres integration i EU. Banken optrådte på de fleste kapitalmarkeder, som den yder stor indflydehe på takket være sin position som verdens største internationale emittent.
The Bank was simiUrly highly active on the capital markets of Central and Eastern Europe, fostering the growth and internationalisation of these markets in order to quicken the pace of their integration with the EU.
Tilvejebragte midler 1994-
Breakdown of resources raised from 1994 to 1998
Den samlede middeltilvejebringelse på markederne beløb sig til 31 463 mio mod 23 071 mio i 1997, hvilket er en stigning på 36%. 68% var i EU-valutaer, heraf 41% i eurozo- nevalutaer.
Aggregate borrowings launched on the market totalled 31 463 million, 36% higher than the 23 071 million in 1997; 68% was raised in EU currencies, including 41% in the cur rencies of countries participating in the euro (Euro-11).
Herunder blev der indgået aftale om 30 144 mio til afholdelse af udbeta linger og negative pengestrømme, hvortil kommer 1 318 mio i eurorettede emissioner inden for rammerne af et første tilbud om gældsombytning i forbindelse med omlæg ningen af Bankens gæld til euroer.
Of the total raised, 30 144 mil lion were signed to cover disbursement needs and cash flow shortfalls whilst 1 318 mil lion related to euro-tributary issues as part of an initial debt exchange offer with a view to restructuring the Bank's debt into euro.
EIB gennemførte 117 låntagningsforretninger (156 i 1997) i 22 forskellige valutaer (21 i 1997), nemlig 108 offentlige emissioner (144 i 1997) og 9 private lån (12 i 1997), heraf en del (48 forretninger) via programmer for mellemfristede notes eller emissionsram-
Resources were mobilised through 117 operations (156 in 1997) encompassing 22 dif ferent currencies (21 in 1997), broken down into 108 public issues (144 in 1997) and
Mellem- og langfristede forretninger Offentlige län Private lån
Medium and longterm operations Public issues
Banken sig af såvel valuta- som renteswaps.
For the purpose of commanding funds tai
dels dækningen af de negative penge­
< am Private borrowings
Bortset fra emissionerne i forbindelse med strømme.
23 346 million in 1997) and, on the other, to coverage of cash flow shortfalls.
gældsomlægningen til euroer fandt middel tilvejebringelsen sted i 17 valutaer, fordelt på
lored to its needs, the Bank made use of currency and/or interest-rate swaps. Barring issues launched as part of the euro debt ex
111 forretninger.
Pre-ln currencies.
Denne betydelige i de øvrige EU-valutaer. Den mest lånte valuta stigning skyldes dels de øgede udbetalinger var GBP efterfulgt af DEM, ITL og EUR.
This steep rise can be attributed, on the currency with the highest volume, followed one hand, to the faster pace of loan disburse by the DEM, ITL and euro.
Tendenserne på kapitalmarkederne i 1998
Capital markets trends in 1998
Året 1998 var kendetegnet af en faldende kort og lang rente, hvilket i høj grad skyldtes de deflatoriske virkninger af den asiatiske krise og den pengepolitik, som en række større cen­tralbanker anlagde.
The year 1998 was characterised by downward trends in shortterm and longterm interest rates, driven by the deflationary impact of the Asian crisis and monetary accommodation by several major central banks.
Den økonomiske afmatning i Asien udløste et fald i råvarepriserne og dæm­pede de udviklede landes eksport.
Asia's economic slowdown reduced commodity prices and depressed the exports of developed countries.
Den russiske gældskrise udløste en anden finansiel chok­bølge, og den deraf følgende tendens til fordel for kvalitet forstærkede faldet i afkastene af de statslige obligationer i De Forenede Stater.
The Russian debt crisis generated a second wave of global financial contagion, and the ensuing flight to quality further reduced US government bond yields.
For at begrænse den mangel på likviditet, der kort efter ramte de amerikanske kapitalmarkeder, valgte den amerikanske centralbank i tredje kvartal at sænke renten. Den heraf følgende likviditetsforbedring gjorde det muligt at over­vinde den indenlandske finansielle krise og støttede ligeledes i høj grad statspapirerne.
In an effort to contain the liquidity crunch that soon thereafter hit US capital markets, the Federal Reserve chose to cut interest rates during the third quarter.
Afka­stene af de amerikanske statslige obligationer faldt med ca. et procentpoint i 1998, således at de mod årets slutning udgjorde under 5%.
Yields on US Treasury bonds fell by around a percentage point in 1998, dropping below 5% towards the end of the year.
Også i Europa bidrog deflationstendensen og den aftagende vækst i verden som helhed til at reducere afkastene af de statslige obligationer.
In Europe too, deflationary pressures and slower world growth contributed to lower yields on government bonds.
Den tyske stats tiårige obligationer faldt således fra 4,8% først i 1998 til 3,8% i december.
Yields on German 10-year government bonds fell from 4.8% at the beginning of 1998 to 3.8% in December.
Også gennemsnittet af de europæiske korte renter viste nedadgående tendens som følge af de konvergensforanstaltninger, der blev gennemført i forventning om overgangen til ØMU.
Average European shortterm rates were also on a down ward trend due to EMU-driven convergence.
Denne udvikling bremsedes af det generelt ustabile fi­nansielle klima i tredje kvartal, men de kommende eurovalutaers modstandsdygtighed afspej­lede klart ØMU's betydelige troværdighed.
This process was slowed down by global financial distress during the third quarter, but the resilience of participating currencies in the end proved EMU's high level of credibility.
Den almindelige finanskrise havde imidlertid dæm­pet væksten i eksporten, og for at fastholde opsvingets dynamik sænkede de kommende ØMU-landes centralbanker forebyggende deres diskontoer til 3% i december.
The global crisis had undermined export growth, however, and in a pre-emptive move to keep the recovery on track, EMU-participating central banks lowered their key rates to 3% in December.
Japan nedsatte sin diskonto i et forsøg på at genoplive sin svækkede økonomi, til trods for at landet ikke havde meget spillerum.
Japan cut its key rate in response to its weaker economy, despite limited room for easing.
Afkastene af de japanske statslige emissioner viste ganske vist aftagende tendens året igennem, men det skyldtes snarere den tiltagende afmatning og deflation i Japan end en tendens til fordel for kvalitet.
Yields on Japanese government bonds did decline over the year, but this was more the result of Japan's deepening recession and deflation than flight to quality.
Mod årets slutning var afkastene på ny steget til ca. 2% som følge af en række nye budgetforanstaltninger, der nok gjorde det muligt at inddæmme den økonomiske afmatning, men samtidig skabte bekymring over den japanske gældsbyrde.
Yields recovered to around 2% by the end of the year in response to a new fiscal package, which both contained the economic decline and raised concerns over Japan's debt burden.
Sammenlignet med de statslige obligationer var forholdene for virksomhedsobligationer bety­delig mindre gunstige.
Corporate bonds experienced a much less favourable environment than that of government bonds.
I kølvandet af den asiatiske monetære krise i 1997 steg risikopræmierne for alle aktiver fra de opdukkende markeder, men de bistandsprogrammer, der blev gennemført under IMF's ledelse, skabte forventning om en forbedring af denne situation.
Following the Asian currency crisis in 1997, risk premia on all emerging market assets had widened, but the IMF-led rescue packages did manage to raise expectations of a turnaround.
Mange investorer indgik betydelige engagementer i håb om en reduktion af risikopræmierne i 1998. Den for­bedring, som bistandsprogrammerne medførte, blev imidlertid kortvarig, da omfanget af den spirende afmatning i Asien viste sig at være undervurderet.
Many investors adopted leveraged positions on the assumption that risk premia would narrow over the course of 1998.
Den nye forøgelse af risikopræ­mierne havde imidlertid tilskyndet kreditorerne til at revidere deres vurdering af andre sårbare opdukkende markeder.
Higher risk premia had in the meanwhile contributed to creditor reassessment of other vulnerable emerging market economies.
Da markedsvilkårene strammedes yderligere, blev ydelserne på den rus­siske gæld umulige at betale, hvilket bragte landet ud i en de facto betalingsstandsning i august.
As market conditions tightened further, Russia's debt service became unsustainable, leading to its de facto debt default in August.
De globale virkninger af den russiske krise forstærkedes af en række faktorer.
Several factors elevated the global impact of the Russian crisis.
Således havde talrige investorer i forventning om høje afkast engageret sig stærkt i Rusland og på andre op­dukkende obligationsmarkeder.
Many investors had become heavily exposed to Russia and other emerging bond markets in the search for higher returns.
Det årelange fald i inflationen i De Forenede Stater og Europa ophørte, og investorerne så sig nødsaget til at acceptere højere kreditrisici for fortsat at opnå de afkast, som de gradvis var blevet vant til.
Years of US and European disinflation were coming to an end, and investors had to accept greater credit risk to maintain the returns they had grown accustomed to.
Takket være deres avancerede risikostyringsværk­tøjer var investeringscheferne overbeviste om, at de kunne opnå betydelig højere afkast uden større negativ virkning på risikoprofilen ved at investere i de mest risikobetonede papirer.
Using advanced risk management tools, fund managers were confident that investment in more risky instruments could improve performance substantially, without having a large negative impact on the risk profile.
Den øjensynlige forbedring af likviditetssituationen på disse markeder bidrog til at styrke den op­fattelse, at man hurtigt kunne skille sig af med de risikobetonede aktiver om nødvendigt.
The perception that liquidity had improved in these markets also fostered the belief that one could move quickly out of risky assets if need be.
Den pludselige og uventede stigning i kredit- og likviditetsrisikopræmierne som følge af den russiske krise bredte sig hurtigt til samtlige kapitalmarkeder på grund af de omtalte engage­menters omfang.
The sudden and unexpected widening of credit and liquidity risk premia following the Russian crisis spread rapidly through capital markets as a result of these exposures.
Et godt eksempel på den hermed forbundne mekanik er den store amerikan­ske arbitragefond Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), der blev bragt på fallittens rand på grund af sine arbitragepositioner på meget betydelige beløb. I store træk bestod LTCM's ar­bitragestrategi i at investere i mindre likvide aktiver, generelt med beskeden kreditrisiko, og styre markedsrisikoen via korte positioner i de mest likvide statspapirer.
A telling illustration of the mechanism at work was provided by the near-collapse of a major US hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), which had highly leveraged positions.
Desuden havde LTCM knyttet nære forbindelser med talrige andre finansieringsinstitutioner.
Moreover, this hedge fund had established linkages to many other financial institutions.
Medens LTCM normalt kunne have forventet en betydelig fortjeneste i forbindelse med en normalisering af de finan­sielle forhold, udløste den fornyede og uventede tendens til fordel for kvalitet og likviditet sam­men med LTCM's høje gearing en barsk nedtur.
While LTCM stood to make substantial gains from a normalisation of financial con ditions, the unexpected resurgence of flight to quality and liquidity combined with its highly leveraged positions became a key component in its demise.
Mange andre investorer med tilsvarende po­sitioner på store beløb befandt sig i en tilsvarende position.
Many other highly leveraged in vestors were in similar situations.
De stigende kredit- og likviditetspræmier udløste derfor et selvforstærkende kursfald på disse aktiver, da investorerne var nødsaget til at likvidere deres positioner for at indfri kreditorernes krav om supplerende de­positumindbetalinger.
The widening of credit and liquidity premia triggered successively falling prices on these assets as investors were forced to close their positions to meet creditors' margin calls.
Disse salgsbølger styrkede imidlertid kursfaldene yderligere og bidrog derved til at udløse en alvorlig likviditetskrise på det amerikanske kapitalmarked.
But these fire sales added fuel to the price declines and soon contributed to a serious liquidity crunch in the US capital market.
Talrige virk­somheders muligheder for at optage obligationslån blev derved kraftigt beskåret, og i septem­ber tiltog risikoen for, at mangelen på likviditet og kreditmuligheder kunne udløse en økono­misk afmatning.
Many corporate issuers found it difficult to place bond issues, and by September there was a growing risk that the liquidity squeeze and credit famine would cause a recession.
Den krise, der i starten så ud til kun at skulle ramme Rusland, var dermed blevet en trussel for det finansielle system, hvilket fik centralban­kerne på begge sider af Atlanterhavet til at sænke renten.
What started as a seemingly limited Russian crisis had thus become a threat to the financial system, leading to interest rate reductions by central banks on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
TILVEJEBRAGTE
page45 I RESOURCES
MIDLER
RAISED
'■¿UQfu agtige vilkår, Banken kunne tilbyde sine lån­ aftaler om fremtidig rentefastsættelse.
The decline in the proportion of Community the Bank and resold in line with loan dis­ currencies was largely due to the appreciable bursement needs and, lastly, deferred rate­ share raised in USD (21%) as a result of the setting contracts.
Som i de foregående år benyttede Banken sig europæiske markeder for nyemissioner, f.eks.
As in previous years, the Bank had recourse then pass on to its own borrowers.
ITL, ESP og PTE, i forventning om overgangen vejebragte midler til behovene, det være sig til ØMU.
Moreover, to swap markets to adapt its resources to suit certain European markets for new issues, demand, in terms of currencies and interest­ such as those in ITL, ESP and PTE, became less rate formulae, for loan disbursements or to active in the run­up to the third stage of convert structured issues into "plain vanilla"
1997), svarende til 53% mod 54% i 1997. De va­ tede produkter.
fixed or floating­rate products.
Den indgik i alt 122 swaps på riabelt forrentede midler var fortsat genstand
The nominal value of swaps totalled 20.6 billion compared with
USD, GBP, ITL og de østeuropæiske landes va­ lutaer (CZK og HUF).
Fixed­rate borrowings, amounting to 15 957 million (12 358 million in 1997), made up the bulk of resources raised, with 53% as opposed to 54% the previous year; borrowers continued to evince interest in floating­rate resources, es­pecially USD, GBP, ITL, and Central and Eastern European currencies (CZK, HUF).
Lånenes gennemsnitlige løbetid steg yderli­
The finishing touches to preparing for the euro
1997), især på grund af skabelsen af nye se­ relsen af euroen, en øget tapning af visse rier af 20­30­årige eurorettede lån.
The average maturity of borrowings once again lengthened (10.2 years as against 8 in 1997), above all following creation of new lines of 20 to 30­year euro­tributary issues.
mellem 2 og 30 år.
Ranging between 2 and 30 years, maturities on individual borrowings covered the entire length of the interest­rate curve.
De korte løbetider, der især var domineret af strukturerede forret­
Short­dated borrowings frequently involved structures; for instance, operations linked to stock ex­change or currency indices.
De sidste forberedelser ti I euroens indførelse ninger, var knyttet til et børsindeks eller en
Longer­dated issues included zero coupon or reverse fixed­rate option structures.
Som de øvrige førende emittenter, det være pengemarkedsrente, medens de lange blandt sig de EU­lande, der deltager i Den Mone­ andet omfattede nulkuponer eller optioner tære Union, eller andre fremtrædende aktø­ om omlægning til fast rente.
Like all major borrowers, whether the various Member States of the European Union par­ticipating in EMU or other leading players on the capital markets, the Bank pressed ahead with its strategy of positioning itself on the future large­scale euro market.
rer på kapitalmarkederne, fortsatte Banken
This approach basically revolved around four main policy
Banken foretog førtidige indfrielser på 693 sin strategi for at etablere sig på det kom­ mio, der hovedsagelig afholdtes af likvidite­ mende, store euromarked. Denne indsats be­ ten.
The Bank redeemed borrowings early worth 693 million, basically by drawing on liquid holdings.
Hertil kommer genkøb af egne obligatio­ stod hovedsagelig af fire tiltag, der er omtalt ner på 216 mio i form af strukturerede emis­ nedenfor.
It also bought back 216 million of its own paper comprising structured issues, one of which was refinanced by a new bor­rowing operation.
sioner, hvoraf én blev refinansieret med et nyt lån.
■ Speeding up issuance of euro­tributary bonds denominated in either
Optrapning af de eurorettede emissioner både i EU­landenes valutaer og i euroer.
Union currencies or directly in euro.
I 1998 blev der indgået aftaler om 27 forret­ variabel forrentning, for det andet afdæk­ ninger på 13,9 mia. Der var tale om nye lån ningsporteføljen af fast forrentede obligatio­
In 1998, 27 operations were signed for a to­
udløber den 15. januar 2003, i DEM, ITL og præsentationer af euroen i alle store byer i
tranche of new issues such as those due to
EUR på 5 mia med en løbetid på 10 år og i
An issue for 1.3 billion concluded in 1997 was mature on 15 February 2003 in DEM, FRF and augmented by 200 million in a placement
En emission på 1,3 mia, der blev indgået af­
ESP, for a total of 1 644 million, 10­year aimed more specifically at Japanese subscrib­ bonds in DEM, ITL and euro for 5 billion and ers.
2028) ­ eller tilføjelser af nye trancher til ek­ tale om i 1997, blev forhøjet med 200 mio, sisterende lån.
A 10­year operation for 300 million was longer­dated issues (2018 and 2028) in ITL also launched via the multiple­currency and PTE, or the addition of fresh tranches to medium­term note programme.
der var specielt rettet mod de japanske inve­
existing fungible issues.
De fire, direkte eurodenominerede emissio­ storer. Via programmet for mellemfristede ner beløb sig til 3,5 mia. Primo 1998 udbød notes i flere valutaer udbød Banken desuden
Two further benchmark issues were launched during the year, both for 1 billion each, with maturities of 7 and 10 years respectively.
amerikanske, asiatiske og europæiske marke­
The aggregate amount of euro­tributary
Dette lån gjorde det muligt for de ame­ årets løb, hver på 1 mia med en løbetid på rikanske investorer at gøre sig bekendt med henholdsvis 7 og 10 år.
At the start of 1998, a global 2 billion issue was offered simultaneously on American, Asian and European markets.
Sidstnævnte, hvorom den fælles valuta, idet der blev organiseret der først blev indgået aftale i 1999, udmær­ kede sig ved at være den første emission i euroer, hvor alle betalinger er udtrykt i denne valuta, herunder indbetalingen af det tegnede beløb.
This bond enabled American investors to familiarise themselves with the single European currency and sev­eral presentations were arranged for these investors in major US cities.
Eurorettede emissioner inden swaps pr. 31.12.1998
1.3 billion in exchange operations detailed below, totalled
31.12.1998 til i alt 21,1 mia, fordelt på 33 lån i 10 forskellige valutaer, hvoraf 26 på i alt
21.1 billion as at 31 December 1998, compris­ ing 33 fungible issues launched in 10 differ­ ent currencies, of which 26 to be redenomi­ nated into euro and consolidated in 1999 for
15,4 mia vil blive redenomineret til euroer og
(Situation as at 31 December 1998, amount in millions) tween 2003 and 2028 for individual issues of
Eurozone­valutaer lem 500 mio og 5 mia, sikrer Bankens tilste­ deværelse på euromarkedet fra begyndelsen af 1999.
ECU between 500 million and 5 billion, thereby positioning the Bank strongly on the euro market right from the start of 1999.
4 984 87 finanssektoren såvel som for ejerne af EIB's papirer, der gør det muligt for den at om­
A debt exchange programme enabling the Bank to restructure its borrowings into euro was announced to the financial community and presented to holders of EIB securities in mid­1998 on the occasion of the first euro
Programmet for gældsombytning til euroer lait lægge sin gæld til euroer.
Euro Debt Exchange Offer Programme
(') Denne emission omfatter fungibilitetsbestemmel­serne fra de eurorettede emissioner, men dens kupon og løbetid svarer til vilkårene for statspapirer.
(1) Although these issues include euro­tributary fungi­bility clauses, the coupons and maturities are in line with Gilts.
TILVEJEBRAGTE
RAISED page 47
■ Endelig giver et globalt program for virk­somhedscertifikater på i alt 5 mia Banken mulighed for at tilbyde markedet et komplet udvalg af løbetider og en bred vifte af pro­dukter i euroer.
■ Lastly, a global commercial paper pro­ issues denominated in DEM, FRF and ITL, for gramme of 5 billion is enabling the Bank to a total of roughly 10 billion, to be exchanged offer the market the full range of maturities for euro­tributary issues denominated in the and a vast array of products denominated in same currency as the bonds presented for ex­ euro.
Marke­det tog overordentlig vel imod Bankens ini­tiativ, og der blev ombyttet et samlet påly­dende på 1 318 mio, hvilket gjorde det mu­ligt at øge udeståendet på hver af de euro­rettede emissioner, der indgår i programmet.
This initiative by the Bank was very well received on the market, and an overall nominal amount of 1 318 million was
Styrkelse af tilstedeværelsen på visse store finansielle markeder af hensyn til likviditeten
The euro's arrival on the scene will mean a outstanding of each euro­tributary issue of­ reduction in the number of currencies in fered as part of the exchange.
■ Redenominering af den eksisterende gæld til euroer
which the Bank has hitherto raised its re­ sources, which, as a corollary, implies for the
Indførelsen af euroen begrænser det antal valutaer, der hidtil er indgået i Bankens mid­deltilvejebringelse.
Although not a direct means of raising funds euro area, such as the GBP or USD markets.
Derfor skal EIB ikke blot etablere sig på euromarkedet, men også styrke sin tilstedeværelse på visse vigtige mar­keder uden for Den Monetære Union, såsom GBP og USD.
in euro, redenominating existing borrowing lines is vital to establish a critical mass of out­ standing debt in euro. This process will also
Låntagningsstrategi og ­aktivitet i andre valutaer
Borrowing strategy and operations in other make it easier for the Bank to implement its currencies asset/liability management policy and stream­
■ 10 045 mio USD (9 005 mio ECU) inden swaps
USD 10 045 million (ECU 9 005 million) line back­office operations.
Skønt uden direkte forbindelse med middel­tilvejebringelsen i euroer, er en redenomine­ring nødvendig for at skabe en kritisk masse af eksisterende gæld i euroer.
(ECU 6 451 million) the various countries participating in EMU to after swaps ensure that the process of redenomination is carried through as smoothly as possible.
Der skal redenomineres lån på i alt ca. 56 mia. Det sker ifølge den metode, som hvert af de lande, der deltager i Den Monetære Union, har valgt under hensyntagen til især de sær­lige problemer i forbindelse med ihændeha­verpapirer.
Total borrowings to be redenominated come the Bank with 30% of the total before swaps, to approximately 56 billion. The issues will be still occupying second place, 21% of the total, redenominated in accordance with the meth­ after swaps.