natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
La Cour supreme de cassation gik klart ind for fællesskabsrettens direkte virkninger og forrang i flere domme i året 1972: nr. 1171 og 1173 af 8. juni 1972 og nr. 2896 af 6. oktober 1972; i sidstnævnte dom henvises der udtrykkeligt til fællesskabsdomstolens retspraksis og til dommen »S.A. Fromagerie Franco-Suisse« fra den belgiske Cour de cassation.
The supreme Corte di Cassazione gave clear rulings in favour of the direct application and precedence of Community law in 1972 in judgments Nos 1171 and 1173 of 8 June 1972 and No 2896 of 6 October 1972. The last-mentioned judgment referred expressly to the caselaw of the European Court and to the judgment of the Belgian Cour de Cassation in the SA Fromagerie Franco-Suisse case.
Denne retspraksis knæsattes, for så vidt angår fællesskabsrettens direkte virkning, i dom nr. 183 af 18/27. december 1973 fra Cour constitutionelle, som indeholder en bemærkelsesværdig og en i og for sig klassisk gennemgang af fællesskabsrettens vigtigste karakteristika og af dens virkninger på medlemsstaternes territorium.
This caselaw was consolidated — at least as regards the question of the direct applicability of Community law — in the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 18/27 December 1973, No 183, which contains a remarkable and in a way classic analysis of the basic characteristics of Community law and its effect within the territory of the Member States.
En nyere dom, nr. 232 af 22/30. oktober 1975 viser dog, at dette ikke var det sidste ord fra Cour constitutionelle: det skal jeg vende tilbage til om et øjeblik.
However, a more recent judgment, No 232 of 22/30 October 1975, shows that that case was not the last word from the Constitutional Court, as I shall explain more fully below.
Status over udviklingen i retspraksis vedrørende fællesskabs rettens anvendelse; skønhedspletterne
Assessment of the developments which have taken place in caselaw regarding the application of Community law; the dark side of the picture
Lad os efter denne korte gennemgang — der kun i ringe omfang dækker de foreliggende mangfoldige forudsætninger af forfatningsmæssig, lovmæssig, judiciel og teoretisk karakter — forsøge at gøre status over udviklingen.
After this short analysis, which is somewhat inadequate in the light of the enormous number of constitutional and legislative factors, caselaw and legal
Det første jeg konstaterer er, at denne udvikling, trods usikkerhed og visse »tilbageslag« har samme generelle tendens: den præges af en enten øjeblikkelig eller gradvis erkendelse af fællesskabsrettens krav og en stadig bestræbelse på at sikre denne rets optimale gyldighed inden for rammerne af de politiske og juridiske forudsætninger, der er forskellige i hver medlemsstat.
The first observation to be made is that despite some wavering and the occasional setback the general tendency of these developments has been in the same direction: this tendency is marked by either an immediate or a gradual awareness of the requirements of Community law and by a constant effort to ensure the maximum effectiveness of that law within the particular political and legal framework of each State.
Den anden konstatering er, at fællesskabsrettens hovedkrav i det væsentlige er opfyldt.
The second observation is that in the main the basic requirements of Community law are fulfilled.
Denne ret anvendes virkelig i alle medlemsstaterne med samme gyldighedsgrad.
This law is in fact applied in all the Member States with the same degree of effectiveness.
Man kan ikke benægte, at der undervejs er opstået konflikter mellem fælles skabsret og national ret, men det er alligevel en kendsgerning, at disse kollisioner ikke har været andet end, hvad man med et banalt udtryk plejer at kalde »småuheld«.
It cannot be denied that conflicts have arisen between Community law and national law on the way but these collisions have only amounted to what we generally call 'minor mishaps'.
Den alvorlige konfrontering har aldrig fundet sted, fordi ingen har ønsket det, fordi alle, lovgivere og dommere, har været klar over, at for at fællesskabsretten kan udøve sin mission til det fælles bedste, må den anvendes efter de samme koordinater i hele Fællesskabet.
No major confrontation has ever arisen because nobody has wanted one and because both legislatures and courts are aware that, in order to act in the common interest, Community law must be implemented on the same terms throughout the Community.
Efter at have foretaget denne konstatering, som efter alt er betryggende, skal jeg afslutningsvis sætte nogle spørgsmålstegn.
Having made this observation, which is on the whole reassuring, I must conclude by raising a few queries.
a) Et første spørgsmål angår beskyttelsen af de grundlæggende rettigheder i fællesskabssystemet.
(a) The first concerns the protection of fundamental rights in the Com munity system.
Dette spørgsmål er kun blevet rejst i de medlemsstater, hvori der findes en forfatningsret, altså i Tyskland og i Italien.
This issue has been raised only in those of the Member States which have a Constitutional Court, that is, in Germany and Italy.
Herom for holder det sig således.
Let us consider the facts.
I slutningen af den bemærkelsesværdige kendelse af 18. oktober 1967, hvori fællesskabsrettens selvstændighed understreges, har den tyske forfatningsdomstol forbeholdt sig ret til at genoptage sin prøvelsesret, såfremt den forelægges en sag, hvor der er konflikt mellem fællesskabsretten og de grundrettigheder, som er sikret i den nationale forfatning.
At the end of the noteworthy order of 18 October 1967, which strongly emphasizes the autonomy of Community law, the German Constitutional Court made the reservation that it might re-assert its rights of review if any question of a conflict between Community law and the fundamental rights guaranteed by the national Constitution again came before it.
Også den italienske forfatningsdomstol tager i sin dom nr. 183 af 18/27. december 1973 et lignende forbehold, ganske vist særdeles teoretisk.
The Italian Constitutional Court made a similar reservation in its jugdment No 183 of 18/27 December 1973, although in a rather hypothetical way.
Endelig realiserer anden afdeling af den tyske forfatningsdomstol i sin kendelse af 29. maj 1974 det i 1967 tagne forbehold: efter at have fået forelagt en indvending mod en fællesskabsforordning — hvis gyldighed fællesskabsdomstolen havde undersøgt og anerkendt bl.a. under hensyn til respekten for menneskerettighederne (dom Internationale Handelsgesellschaft af 17. december 1970) — tillægger den sig kompetence til at bedømme den samme forordning under hensyn til de krav om beskyttelse af grundrettighederne, der er fastsat i den nationale forfatning.
Finally, in its order of 29 May 1974, the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court acted on the reservation made in 1967. In an appeal brought before it against a Community regulation, the validity of which had been considered and accepted by the European Court of Justice as regards, utter alia, the protection of human rights (judgment of 17 December 1970 in the Inter nationale Handelsgesellschaft case), the Constitutional Court asserted its own jurisdiction to assess the regulation in question in the light of the measures necessary to protect the fundamental rights laid down by the national Constitution.
For så vidt angår realiteten giver den tyske forfatningsdomstol fællesskabsdomstolen ret i dens vurdering; det er imidlertid ikke dér, problemet ligger, men i det for hold, at en national ret har tillagt sig selv magt til ensidigt at undersøge spørgsmålet om en fællesskabsforordnings gyldighed.
In substance the German Constitutional Court upheld the findings of the European Court of Justice. However, the problem does not lie there but in the fact that a national court has asserted its own power to make a unilateral examination of the validity of a Community regulation.
Denne retssag har gjort det klart, at skaberne af De europæiske Fællesskaber har tænkt alt for lidt på det lovmæssige grundlag for deres konstruktion og i al for høj grad har for sømt at beskytte de forrettigheder, der er vigtige for individet inden for den nye europæiske helhed.
This case has drawn attention to the fact that the builders of the European Communities thought too little about the legal foundations of their edifice and paid too little attention to the protection of the basic rights of the individual within the new European structure.
Der består altså her et punkt, som stadig kan forårsage strid ; dog skal man ikke overdrive betydningen af henholdsvis den tyske og italienske forfatningsrets udtalelser og handlinger: spørgsmålet har kun betydning i en situation, der kun sjældent opstår i praksis, nemlig i en kon flikt mellem fællesskabsretten og individets vigtige grundrettigheder.
Here, therefore, is a question which remains open. One must not, however, exaggerate the scope of what has been said and done by the German and Italian Constitutional Courts: the question is limited to the possibility — which in practice occurs very infrequently — of a conflict between Community law and basic human rights.
I øvrigt drejer det sig ikke om fællesskabsrettens forrang, og de to forfatningsretter har da også givet udtryk for dette.
In other matters, the precedence of Community law is not in question and the two Constitutional Courts have made this quite clear.
b) En anden skønhedsplet vedrører anvendelsen af fællesskabsretten i tilfælde, hvor fællesskabsretten — reelt eller teoretisk — strider mod en national lov.
(b) A further dark area is that of the application of Community law where there is a real or imagined conflict with the national law.
Dette har man f.eks. konstateret i visse ældre domme fra den franske Conseil d'Etat, som har undladt at forelægge Domstolen de relevante spørgsmål, selv om sagen drejede sig om, hvorvidt nationale lovbestemmelser stred mod visse fællesskabsretlige regler.
This was seen, for example, in certain old decisions of the French Conseil d'État which omitted to refer relevant questions to the Court of Justice when the compatibility of internal legislative provisions with certain rules of Com munity law was contested before it.
dommen af 1. marts 1968 i sag Syndicat général des fabricants de semoule, hvor fællesskabsrettens anvendelse tilsidesattes for en national lovbestemmelse.
Two judgments are involved, both of which have been widely commented upon in legal circles in the Community; the judgment of 19 June 1964 in the Shell Berre case, which the doctrine known as the 'acte clair' was called in aid and the judgment of 1 March 1968 in the case of the Syndicat Général des Fabricants de Semoule, in which the application of Community law was set aside in favour of a provision of national law.
Hvis man skal tro regeringens repræsentant i denne sag, synes der at ligge en række reflekshandlinger til grund for disse domme: bevidstheden om de grænser, der er sat for dommerens beføjelser i den forfatningsmæssige magtfordeling; den ubetingede respekt for loven; måske også manglende tillid til, at fællesskabsdommeren ville være i stand til at bedømme visse nationale retsforholds ømfindtlige karakter.
According to the submissions of the Commissaire du Gouvernement in this latter case these decisions were inspired by a number of different considerations: a consciousness of the limits imposed on the powers of the court by the division of the prerogatives provided for under the Constitution, the unconditional observance required by the law and perhaps also a lack of confidence in the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Communities to appreciate the finer points involved in certain national issues.
Det er givet forkert at fortolke disse domme, der er blevet til under ret specielle omstændigheder, som udtryk for en principiel holdning.
As these judgments were given in very special circumstances, it would certainly be wrong to interpret them as the expression of a view on a matter of principle.
For nylig er der for så vidt angår følgerne af modstrid mellem fællesskabsret ten og de nationale lovbestemmelser, i en udførligt begrundet dom fra den italienske Cour constitutionelle, nr. 232 af 22/30. oktober 1975, lagt en snæver opfattelse for dagen; dommen afsagdes efter en henvisning fra Cour de cassation vedrørende et spørgsmål om forfatningens lovlighed.
As regards the consequences of the conflict between Community law and the provisions of a national law, a restrictive view recently appeared in a judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court, No 232 of 22/30 October 1975, the reasons for which were stated at length and which was given following a reference from the Corte di Cassazione on a question of legality under the Constitution.
Problemet drejede sig om, hvorvidt enhver dommer i tilfælde af en konflikt mellem en national lov og fællesskabsrettens bestemmelser kan afgøre spørgsmålet om den nationale lovregels anvendelighed, eller om denne afgørelse bør forbeholdes forfatningsdomstolen, der har til opgave at tage stilling til loves gyldighed.
The problem was whether, where a conflict exists between a national law and the provisions of Community law, any court may hold that the internal rule is inapplicable or whether this finding may only be made by the Constitutional Court as the Court which decides on the validity of laws. Without in any way calling into question the direct applicability and
Den høje ret erklærede — uden på nogen måde at bestride fælles skabsrettens direkte anvendelse og forrang — at det alene tilkom den at afgøre, om en national lov, der strider mod fællesskabsrettens krav, kan an vendes.
precedence of Community law the Constitutional Court stated that it alone has jurisdiction to rule on the inapplicability of a national law where it conflicts with the requirements of Community law.
Virkningen af denne afgørelse må, når alt kommer til alt, blive, at spørgsmål om konflikt mellem fællesskabsretten og den interne lovgivning, alene behandles af forfatningsdomstolen.
It appears that in the end the effect of this decision must be that all disputes arising out of at conflict between Community law and national law must be settled by the Constitutional Court alone.
Man må stille sig selv det spørgsmål, om denne dom ikke strengt begrænser den retsundergivnes muligheder for at få konstateret overtrædelser af fællesskabsretten fra lovgivers side, især hvis man betænker, at de domme, hvori forfatningsdomstolen erklærer en lov for ugyldig, kun har virkning for fremtiden.
It is open to question whether that decision does not severely limit the possibilities open to an individual of obtaining a ruling that the legislature is in breach of Community law, particularly in the light of the fact that the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which rule that a legislative measure is invalid, only take effect in futuro.
Således er der i Italien rejst en alvorlig processuel hindring for den praktiske anerkendelse af kravet om fællesskabsrettens forrang og for dens umiddelbare tidsmæssige virkning.
Thus, a serious procedural obstacle has been set up in Italy to the practical acceptance of the principle of the precedence of Community law and to its immediate effect.
En bemærkning, der er fælles for de nationale domme, som jeg netop har omtalt: alle domme er afsagt ensidigt, uden at de pågældende retter har be nyttet sig af den mulighed for at spørge Domstolen, som artikel 177 giver dem.
One observation must be made which concerns all the decisions of the national courts to which I have just referred: every one has been taken unilaterally, without the courts in question availing themselves of the opportunity provided by Article 177 of getting into touch with the Court of Justice.
Dette på trods af, at hver enkelt af de ovenfor nævnte sager har drejet sig om fællesskabsretlige regler og krav. I lige så mange tilfælde har man for sømt at iværksætte et retsligt samarbejde, som på gensidig tilfredsstillende måde havde kunnet løse problemer, der har stor betydning for fællesskabsret tens gyldighed.
In fact, as each case under consideration raised a question concerning the rules and requirements of Community law several opportunities of implementing legal cooperation have been missed which would have enabled problems of prime importance for the effectiveness of Community law to be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties.
Jeg skal som afslutning på denne korte gennemgang drage nogle konklusioner, nemlig følgende tre: den første er, at fællesskabsretten stiller vore stater og dens domstole over for visse ufravigelige krav; den anden, at traktaterne indeholder de nødvendige midler til i rimelig grad at leve op til disse nye krav; den tredje er, at de nationale myndigheders og især domstole nes reaktion over for disse krav alt i alt har været positiv og endog konstruktiv.
At the end of this short analysis it is appropriate to draw certain conclusions. They derive from three successive propositions: first, that Com munity law subjects our States and their courts to certain mandatory requirements; secondly, that the Treaties contain all the necessary means for us to make an appropriate response to new requirements; thirdly, the reaction of the national authorities and, in particular, of the courts to these require ments has on the whole been positive and, what is more, constructive.
Fællesskabsrettens krav i forhold til det nationale retssystem
Requirements of Community law in relation to the national legal system
Først et ord om de krav, som kan udledes af disse overvejelser om fællesskabs rettens anvendelse i medlemsstaterne.
Let me say a word first of all about the requirements which emerge from this consideration of the manner in which Community law is applied in the Member States.
Den kompetence, som forfatnings mæssigt er uadskilleligt forbundet med fællesskabsretten, må i og med denne anvendelse gennemføres.
Its application must enable the overriding power which is, in constitutional terms, inherent in the existence of Community law to be implemented.
Først må forholdet mellem fællesskabsret og national ret fastlægges ud fra den erkendelse, at det her drejer sig om et fælles retssystem, skabt til fælles gavn for vore stater og vore folk.
First of all, a definition of the relationship between Community law and national law must take into account the fact that we are here dealing with a common legal order established in the collective interest of all our States and our peoples.
Fællesskabsretten er ikke en fremmedret, heller ikke en ret uden for statens grænser.
Community law is not foreign law nor is it external law.
Denne ret er hver enkelt af vore staters i samme grad som den nationale ret; men den besidder den særlige egenskab samtidig at have fælles gyldighed for os alle.
It belongs to each of our States just as much as the national law. However, it is peculiar in that at the same time it provides a common standard for us all.
Vi er altså alle temmelig direkte berørt af denne ret.
So we are all directly affected by it.
Men samtidig kan den ikke indeholde ensidige løsninger på problemer, der rejses ved dens anvendelse.
At the same time, there can be no unilateral solutions to the problems raised by its application.
Man kan kun nå frem til hensigtsmæssige løsninger, hvis der er vilje til samarbejde og gensidig tillid.
The right solutions can only be found in a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust.
Desuden, og det er en anden tankegang, som man må gå ind i, kan fælles skabsretten kun virkeligt eksistere som retssystem, for så vidt som den effektivt kan gennemføres inden for medlemsstaterne.
¡Furthermore, and this is the second idea which must be fully accepted, Community law can only exist in real terms as a legal order in so far asr it is actually capable of being applied within the Member States.
Den retspraksis, som jeg har gennemgået, har vist, at dette gyldighedsprincip medfører yderligere to krav: først fællesskabsrettens »direkte virkning«, hvilket vil sige, at denne ret skal anvendes i medlemsstaterne med samme gyldighed som national ret uden noget mellemled i form af en national gennemførelsesbestemmelse. Det
The caselaw to which I have referred shows that this principle of effectiveness has two complementary requirements: first, the 'direct effect' of Community law, which means that this law must be applied as positively within the Member States as national law itself, without the need for any national order to be
vil desuden betyde, at fællesskabsretten i kritiske situationer i tilfælde af konflikt skal gælde forud for enhver modstridende national bestemmelse.
made for its implementation. This also means that in critical cases of conflict Community law must be able to take precedence over any contrary provision of national law.
For hvis fællesskabsretten ikke i konflikt med den nationale lov kunne hævde sin forrang, ville Fællesskabet øjeblikkeligt befinde sig i en situation, der kunne true dets eksistens. Domstolen har uophørligt understreget dette.
If, in a conflict with national law, Community law did not succeed in asserting its supremacy, the very existence of the Community would be instantly threatened.
Midlerne til tilvejebringelse af fælles løsninger
Means of finding common solutions
En anden konklusion, som man kan drage af de foregående undersøgelser og overvejelser, er, et de traktater, der udgør Fællesskabets grundlag, har forsynet os med alle de nødvendige midler til at fortsætte den fælles stræben efter denne enhed og denne nødvendige fællesskabsretlige gyldighed.
A second conclusion which may be drawn from the foregoing investigation and reflexions is that the treaties which form the basis of the Community have put at our disposal all the necessary means of pursuing the common search for that unity and necessary effectiveness of Community law.
Fællesskaberne besidder nemlig en samling institutioner, som hver på sin måde bidrager til fællesskabsrettens udvikling: dels de tre institutioner, som — ganske vist stadig ret uligt — deles om den lovgivende magt, nemlig Europa-Parlamentet, Rådet og Kommissionen; dels Domstolen, et judicielt organ som samtidig med at den fungerer som voldgift for de stridigheder, der opstår som følge af fællesskabsudviklingen, beskæftiger sig med den voksende rets praksis om denne fælles ret.
The Communities are made up of a number of institutions, each of which contributes in its own way to the development of Community law: first, there are the three institutions which share — although admittedly still very unequally — legislative power, that is, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Secondly, there is the Court of Justice, the legal institution, which, in addition to settling disputes arising out of the functioning of the Community, is involved in the increasing caselaw relating to this common law.
Alle disse institutioner er sammensat således, at de repræsenterer hele Fællesskabet og, for vores vedkommende, retssystemer, som den forener i sit skød.
All these institutions are constituted in such a way as to represent the Community as a whole and, what is of importance to us, the legal systems which it combines within it.
Den retsforhandling, der foregår for Domstolen, er især betydeligt mere omfattende og mere repræsentativ end den, der foregår for de nationale retter, eftersom, foruden de private sagsparter, medlems staternes regeringer og de fælles institutioner deltager heri.
The legal argument before the Court of Justice is wider in scope and more representative than argument before national courts because, in addition to the parties to the case, the governments of the Member States and the Community institutions take part in it.
Selv om deltagerne veksler fra sag til sag, medfører retsforhandlingen i sin helhed, at der frem kommer et i høj grad repræsentativt udsnit af de juridiske interesser og anskuelser.
On the whole, although these combinations vary from case to case, the legal discussions bring in a highly representative range of legal interests and opinions.