natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I det omfang der er tale om en kunstig nedbringelse af efterspørgslen på penge, medfører inflationen således en økonomisk forvridning, den har sine omkostninger.
To the extent that the demand for money is artificially depressed, inflation thus introduces a distortion into the economy which has a cost.
Lad os nævne et lille eksempel: hvis man har en mindre kontantbeholdning, end man ideelt set ønsker, må man sikkert hyppigere hen i banken eller til pengeautomaten for at få beholdningen fyldt op.
One small example: if you keep less cash than you would ideally like, you will probably have to go to the bank or the cash machine more often to top up.
Den traditionelle mikroøkonomi hævder, at forvridningens omfang afhænger af den pengemængde, der er i omløb, men det er en rimelig antagelse, at en inflation på 10% medfører et velfærdstab på 0,1 - 0,3% af bnp.
Standard micro economics suggests that the scale of the distortion will depend on the amount of money in circulation but a reason able estimate is that a 10 per cent inflation rate would lead to a loss of welfare of between 0.1 and 0.3 per cent of GDP.
Denne virkning alene svarer nogenlunde til de transaktionsomkostninger, der kan spares ved en fælles valuta.
This effect alone is similar to the transactions costs which could be saved by a common currency.
Prisstabilitet er vigtigt.
Stable prices are important.
Inflation kan medføre, at folk har en mindre kontantbeholdning, end det ville være naturligt i forhold til deres indtægter og udgifter, men værdien selv af den kontantbeholdning, de har, er faldende.
Inflation may cause people to hold less cash than they would otherwise do compared with their income or spend ing, but the cash which they do hold is nevertheless shrink ing in value.
For blot at fastholde det minimalt rimelige kontantniveau er folk tvunget til konstant at skaffe flere kontanter.
In order to maintain even a minimum reasonable level of cash, people are forced constantly to seek more cash.
Det eneste, staten behøver at foretage sig, er at trykke flere penge, som den kan bruge til at købe de varer og tjenesteydelser, den skal bruge.
All the government has to do is to print the money, which it can then use to buy the goods and services it wants.
Fordi det praktisk taget ikke påfører de monetære myndigheder nogen udgift at udstede disse ekstrakontanter, giver inflationen staten mulighed for at forøge sit provenu på linje med en hver anden skat.
Because there is effectively no cost to the monetary authorities in issuing the extra cash, inflation provides governments with a way of raising revenue like any other tax.
Denne inflationsvirkning er faktisk blevet kaldt „inflationsskatten".
Indeed, this effect of inflation has been called the "inflation tax".
En stor del af den økonomiske litteratur hævder, at inflationsskatten hverken er værre eller bedre end andre skattetyper, idet alle skatter forvrider folks beslutninger i forhold til beslutninger i et frit marked. (Undtagelsen er skatter i faste beløb, der
Much of the economic literature in fact argues that the inflation tax is no better or worse than any other type of tax, since all taxes
ikke er sat i forhold til folks betalingsevne, men de er normalt politisk upopulære, selvom økonomiske teoretikere er glade for dem).
(The exception is lump sum taxes unrelated to any ability to pay, but these tend to be politically unpopular even if they are regarded as a good thing by theoretically minded economists.)
Hvorom alting er, er det vanskeligt at påstå, at der er stærke gavnlige virkninger ved inflationens provenuforøgende egenskaber, selvom der nok kan være betydningsfulde virkninger for de offentlige finanser - det vender vi tilbage til i næste kapitel.
However, it is hard to argue that there are strong positive benefits from the revenue-raising properties of inflation, though there can be important implications for the public finances to which we return in the next chapter.
Endnu en virkning af forudsete inflationer er, at den tvinger producenterne til konstant at revidere deres prislister.
Another effect of anticipated inflation is that it forces producers to change their price lists on a regular basis.
(Disse omkostninger kaldes „menuomkostninger", fordi de svarer til restauranternes ændringer af menuen).
(These costs are known as "menu costs", being analagous to restaurants having to change their menus.)
Generelt er disse omkostninger ubetydelige.
In general, these costs are trivial.
Men der er dog en vigtig undtagelse på skatteområdet.
But there is an important exception in the area of taxation.
I de fleste lande er der progression i satserne for indkomstbeskatning, d.v.s. de stiger med indtægten.
In most countries, income tax rates are progressive: they go up as income goes up.
Hertil kommer, at der ikke sker nogen automatisk hævning af tærsklen til den beskatningssats, som folk betaler skat efter, når priserne stiger.
In addition, there is no automatic increase in the threshold at which people begin to pay higher rates of income tax when prices rise.
Resultatet er „fiscai drag" - det fænomen, der indebærer, at en højere inflation forøger skattebyrden, fordi den skubber folk op i nogle skatteklasser, der ligger højere end, dem de ellers ville blive beskattet i. Denne effekt kan være et gode eller et onde afhængigt af, om man ser det fra statens eller fra skatteyderens synspunkt.
The result is "fiscal drag" - the phenomenon whereby higher inflation increases the tax burden because it pushes people into higher tax bands than they would otherwise be in.
Hidtil har vi behandlet inflationens mikroøkonomiske virkninger, men de makroøkonomiske er også betydningsfulde.
The macroeconomics are also crucial.
I 60erne var der gene rel makroøkonomisk enighed om, at der eksisterede et stabilt forhold mellem inflation og arbejdsløshed; det gik under betegnelsen Phillipskurven.
During the sixties, the consensus macroeconomic view was that there was a stable relationship between inflation and unemployment known as the Phillips curve.
Jo højere inflation, jo lavere arbejdsløshed og omvendt.
The higher was inflation, the lower unemployment and vice versa.
I princippet kunne myndighederne fastholde det ønskede beskæftigelsesniveau ved at lægge sig på en passende inflationsrate.
In principle, the authorities could maintain a desired level of unemployment by choosing an appropriate inflation rate.
Af såvel teoretiske som empiriske grunde kan dette synspunkt ikke længere accepteres.
This view of the world is no longer accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds.
Den teoretiske hovedindvending går simpelthen ud på, at man går ud fra den antagelse, at folk aldrig kommer til at gennemskue inflationen.
The main theoretical objection is simply that it assumes that people never learn about inflation.
Hvis folk begynder at regne med, at myndighederne vil tillade en inflationsrate på så og så meget, tilpasser de deres løn- og prisforventninger i overensstemmelse hermed.
If they come to expect that the government will allow an inflation rate of so much, they may adjust their wage and price expectations accordingly.
Ved at forlange højere løn og priser ved et givet arbejdsløshedsniveau, får de Phillipskurven til at
By asking for higher wage rises at a given level of unemployment, they will cause the Phillips relationship to
bryde sammen.
58 The Ecu Report break down.
Det er det, der stort set synes at være sket efter 1968, da den tilsyneladende stabile Phillipsrelation i de fleste industriøkono­mier brød sammen.
This is broadly what appears to have happened after 1968, when the apparently stable Phillips relationships in most industrial economies broke down.
I 70erne led de fleste økonomier under en ubeha­gelig blanding af højere inflation og højere arbejdsløshed, hvilket viste, at der ikke eksisterede noget stabilt forhold mellem arbejdsløshed og inflation.
During the seventies, most economies suffered an unpleasant mixture of higher inflation and higher unemployment which showed that there was no stable trade-off between unemployment and inflation.
Figur 2: Arbejdsløshed og inflation i OECD-landene (1970-85)
Figure 2 Unemployment and inflation in the OECD countries (1970-85)
Kilde: OECD. data findes fra 1970 Regressionsresullat: Arbejdslosheden = 1,6 + 0,33 inflation (3,82) Τ­statistik i parantes R2 = 0,41 ; 23 D.o.F.
Source: OECD, data available from 1970
Figur 2 er et punktdiagram over de gennemsnitlige inflations­ og arbejdsløshedsrater for de højtudviklede lande (medlemmerne af Or­ganisationen for Økonomisk Udvikling og Samarbejde eller OECD) i perioden 1970 til 1985.
Figure 2 is a scatter diagram of average inflation and unemployment rates for developed countries (members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD) over the period from 1970 to 1985.
Lande med høje inflationsrater synes nærmest at have haft høje arbejdsløshedsrater.
If anything, countries with higher inflation tended to have higher unemployment.
Det beviser ikke i sig selv, at den omvendte Phillipskurve er den rigtige.
This does not mean that the the reverse of the Phillips curve holds true.
Endnu en indikation på, at inflation ikke har gunstige virkninger, ses i figur 3, som viser forholdet mellem inflationen og væksten i nationalindkomsten (bnp) per individ.
A further indication that inflation does not have positive effects is Figure 3, which shows the relationship between inflation and the growth of national income (GDP) per head.
Det fremgår, at lande med høj inflation tendentielt har lav vækst i indkomster, hvilket er, hvad man vil vente, hvis det er rigtigt, at en høj inflation reducerer økonomiens effektivitet.
It is apparent that high inflation countries tend to have lower growth of income, which is what one would expect if higher inflation reduced the efficiency of the economy.
Vi kan naturligvis ikke hævde, at dette beviser, at høj inflation forårsager lav indkomsttilvækst.
We cannot argue, of course, that this proves that higher inflation causes lower growth of income.
Der kan eksistere en tredje faktor, der har indflydelse på såvel inflation som arbejdsløshed.
Again, there may be a third factor influencing both inflation and growth.
Men bevismaterialet modbeviser i det mindste ikke en teori om, at inflation reducerer den økonomiske effektivitet.
But the evidence is at least consistent with the theory that inflation reduces economic efficiency.
Hertil kommer, at bevismaterialet udelukker det synspunkt, der gjorde sig gældende i 60erne, om at en høj inflation gavner indkomstudviklingen.
Equally, the evidence rejects the sixties view that higher inflation benefits the growth of income.
Statistiske undersøgelser, som kommissionen har foretaget, viser, at der ikke eksisterer noget signifikant forhold mellem vækst og inflation.
Statistical tests carried out by the Commission show that there is no significant relationship between growth and inflation.
Figur 3: Inflation og vækst i real-bnp pr. indbygger 1955-85
Figure 3 Inflation and the growth of real GDP per head (1955-85)
Faktisk synes bevismaterialet at pege i retning af, at høj inflation reducerer væksten og forøger arbejdsløsheden.
Source: IFS Note: except for the Netherlands, Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia, the period of observation is 1955-85
Hidtil har vi i dette kapitel set på de sandsynlige virkninger af en stabil inflationsrate, som er helt forudsigelig.
Up to this point in the chapter, we have looked at the likely effects of a steady rate of inflation that is quite predictable.
Men i virkeligheden er inflation aldrig helt forudsigelig.
But in reality inflation is never stable, and never entirely predictable.
Indicierne tyder på, at en høj inflation normalt er forbundet med meget svingende og derfor meget uforudsigelig inflation. Dette er veldokumenteret i den økonomiske litteratur (se
The evidence suggests that high inflation is usually linked to highly variable and hence to highly unpredictable inflation.
f.eks. Cukierman 1981).
This has been well demonstrated in the economic literature (see for example Cukierman 1981).
Det ses også overordentligt tydeligt af figur 4.
It also leaps out of Figure 4.
Langs den vandrette akse aftegnes den gennemsnitlige inflationsra­te i relation til de gennemsnitlige udsving i inflationsraten (inflatio­nens standardafvigelse) aftegnet langs den lodrette akse.
The figure plots the average infla­tion rate along the horizontal axis against the average change in the inflation rate (the standard deviation of inflation) along the vertical axis.
Forbindelsen mellem en høj og en variabel inflation bekræftes tilli­ge af de statistiske undersøgelser, kommissionen har gennemført, og som er gengivet i deres helhed i rapporten.
The link between high and variable inflation is also con­firmed by statistical tests reported fully in the Commission's study.
Undersøgelserne viser, at en stigning i inflationsraten på 1 procent­point fører til en gennemsnitlig stigning i inflationsfluktuationen på 1,3 procent­point.
The tests suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the average inflation rate is associated with a 1.3 percentage point rise in the average change in inflation.
Når inflationen er høj, er den også mere variabel og derfor mere uforudsigelig.
If inflation is high, it is also more variable, and hence more unpredictable.
Uforudset inflation har langt større virkning på statsfinanserne end en stabil, forudsigelig inflationsrate (og inflationsskat). Grunden til, at en stabil inflationsrate øger statens provenu, er, at folk har brug for flere kontanter og må levere varer og tjenesteydelser for at skaffe dem.
Unpredicted inflation has much bigger effects on the Government's finances than a steady, predictable inflation rate (and inflation tax).
Grunden til, at en overraskende inflation medfører et endnu større provenu, er, at den formindsker statens reelle gæld, der normalt er temmelig meget større end kontantmængden i økonomien.
The reason a surprise inflation raises even more revenue is because it reduces the real value of the Government's debt, which tends to be a good deal larger than the amount of cash in the economy.
I næsten alle tilfælde er statens gæld fast forrentet og medfører en forpligtelse til at tilbagebetale et fast beløb, når obligationen forfalder til betaling.
In almost all cases in the Community, government debt carries a fixed interest rate and involves a commitment to repay a fixed sum when the bond matures.
En overraskende inflation reducerer brat gældens realværdi og den realrente, der skal ydes på den.
A surprise inflation suddenly reduces the real value of the debt, and the real value of the interest stream payable on it.
Er det så en god nyhed for staten?
Is this good news for governments?
Det må det helt klart være på kort sigt.
In the short run, it clearly must be.
Men staten vil kun på længere sigt få en fordel hvis de der ejer obligationerne regner med, at staten aldrig nogensinde igen vil tillade en overraskende inflation.
However, governments will only benefit in the longer term if their bondholders expect them never to allow a surprise inflation again.
Hvis finansmarkederne får mistanke om, at finansministeriet vil tillade yderligere overraskende inflation, vil markedet simpelthen nægte at låne staten flere penge, medmindre den som bod for sin initiativløshed er villig til at betale en overrente ud over det, den ellers måtte betale.
If the financial markets suspect that the finance ministry is going to condone another surprise inflation, they will merely refuse to lend the Government more money unless it pays a premium over and above what it would otherwise have to pay in order to compensate for its expected fecklessness.
En forøget forrentning af statens gæld, kan medføre en svækkelse i de offentlige finanser.
By raising the interest rates payable on government debt, the public finances could become weaker.
Denne om kostning vil normalt være størst for de lande, der har en høj statslig gældsætning, og som har klaret inflationsbekæmpelsen dårligt.
This cost will tend to be largest for those countries which have a high public debt and a poor inflation record.
Hvad så med de makroøkonomiske følger af „overraskende" inflation?
What of the macroeconomic effects of a "surprise" inflation?
I den moderne makroøkonomiske teori skønnes det, at det tager en vis tid for folk at foretage en justering i deres forventninger om højere inflation.
Modern macroeconomic theory holds that it takes time for people to adjust their expectations to a higher inflation.
Derfor kan en „overraskende" inflation narre dem til at tro, at økonomien vokser hurtigere, end de troede, og den vil midlertidigt forøge produktionen og beskæftigelsen ud over det niveau, der er basis for (ligevægtsniveauet).
Thus a "surprise" inflation will tend to trick them into believing that the economy is growing more rapidly than they thought, and it will tend temporarily to increase output and employment above the warranted (or equilibrium) level.
Der er med andre ord på kort sigt et Phillips-forhold mellem inflation og arbejdsløshed.
In other words, there is a Phillips relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short run.
På kort sigt fører højere inflation til lavere arbejdsløshed.
Higher inflation does lead to lower unemployment in the short term.
Men det modsatte er også rigtigt - en „overraskende" lavere inflationsrate vil reducere aktiviteten og øge arbejdsløsheden.
However, the reverse also holds true: a "surprise" lower rate of inflation tends to reduce activity and increase unemployment.
Det følger heraf, at en høj og svingende inflationsrate konstant vil holde produktionen borte fra dydens snævre sti.
Thus it must follow that a high and variable inflation rate must keep
folk stole på, hvad deres regering siger?
Can people believe what their governments say?
Vi har set, at staten/regeringen har en interesse i overraskende inflation, fordi den reducerer statens gæld.
We have seen that governments have an interest in a surprise inflation in order to reduce the level of government debt.
Vi har også set, at folk ikke er dumme - de forudser derfor inflationen og kræver en risikobetinget overrente.
We have also seen that people are not fools: they therefore anticipate the inflation and require a risk premium.
Men selvom regeringen indser, at offentligheden forventer inflationen, kan den ironisk nok alligevel have en vis interesse i at sørge for, at inflationen faktisk skabes.
However, even if the government realises that the public anticipates the inflation, it may still, ironically, have an interest in ensuring that the inflation happens.
Hvis inflationen er mindre, end forudset af offentligheden, kan væksten mindskes og arbejdsløsheden vokse.
If inflation is lower than expected by the public, growth may be lower and unemployment may result.
For at opnå en situation med prisstabilitet og forventning om fortsat prisstabilitet kræves det, at offentligheden tror på det, regeringen siger.
To reach a situation where prices are stable and are expected to remain stable requires the public to believe what the government says.
Offentligheden skal stole på, at regeringen ikke vil falde for fristelsen til at lade en overraskende inflation opstå.
The public has to believe that the government will not succumb to the temptation to run a surprise inflation. Credibility is crucial.
(Vi kommer tilbage til dette spørgsmål senere i kapitlet, når vi behandler spørgsmålet om, hvordan centralbankens institutionelle beskaffenhed påvirker troværdigheden).
(We return to this issue later in the chapter, in discussing how the institutional design of the central bank affects credibility.)
Endnu en grund til at antage, at inflation medfører makroøkonomi ske omkostninger, er ganske enkelt, at folk ikke kan lide den.
A further reason to believe that inflation entails macroeconomic costs is simply the fact that people do not like it.
I de fleste lande med høj inflation og demokratisk styre, der er lydhøre over for den offentlige mening, forsøger myndighederne fra tid til anden at nedbringe inflationen ved hjælp af en stram penge- og fi nanspolitik.
In most countries with high inflation and democratic regimes which are responsive to public opinion, the authorities periodically try to suppress inflation with tight monetary and fiscal policies.
Hagen ved dette er, at det ofte er vanskeligt at fastholde en sådan politik p.g.a. voksende arbejdsløshed, og resultatet bliver en stop-go-cyklus, der også kan føre til makroøkonomiske omkostninger, fordi efterspørgsel og produktion destabiliseres.
The snag is that these policies are frequently hard to maintain in the face of rising unemployment, and the result is a stop-go cycle which can also involve macroeconomic costs because demand and output are destabilised.
Figur 5 viser, at en høj gennemsnitlig inflationsrate normalt ledsages af en fluktuerende vækstrate.
Figure 5 shows that a high average inflation rate tends to be associated with a more variable growth rate.
Gennemsniüig forbrugerprisindeksinflation (% pr. år)
Output will slow down and unemployment may rise.
Kilde: ¡FS Note: For Holland er observationsperioden 1956­85 og for Østrig og Jugoslavien 1960­85 (data for tidligere år ej tilgængelige) Regressionsresultat:
The more "sticky" or "rigid" they are, the harder will be the process of adjustment and the bigger the fall in profits, output and employment.
Fordi overraskende inflation overrasker forskellige mennesker i forsk­elligt omfang, medfører den også forstyrrelse i prisrelationerne inden for økonomien (Cukierman 1983).
They may involve backward-looking wage index ation provisions, or strong trade unions, or relatively uncompetitive markets for goods in which companies see little reason to respond rapidly to demand.
Disse skiftende prisrelationer, der ikke har deres rod i forandringer i udbud og efterspørgsel, medfører velfærdstab, fordi folk narres til at forvride deres forbrugs­ og pro­duktionsmønstre.
Whatever the precise reasons for wage and price rigidity, there is little doubt that it exists in abundance everywhere.
Skøn for Tyskland tyder på, at en stigning på 1 procent­point i prisfluktuationen nedsætter den potentielle produktion med 0,3% (Neumann og von Hagen 1989).
However, the size of the so-called 'sacrifice ratio' - the output loss for each percentage point reduction in inflation - is not constant.
På baggrund af alle de ting vi har anført, er der ikke mange økono­mer, der påstår, at inflation er omkostningsfri.
An additional difficulty in estimating the 'sacrifice ratio' is that it depends on that intangible quality of credibility.
Men det er en anden sag at hævde, at den bør reduceres.
It may depend decisively on the policy regime, especially the exchange rate regime.
ningerne ved at affinde sig med en relativ høj inflationsrate er lavere end omkostningerne ved at forsøge på at nedbringe den.
Certainly, companies in the tradeable part of the economy are likely to respond more rapidly if they know that the exchange rate cannot be devalued without the explicit consent of other countries.
Omkostninger ved reduktion af inflationen
However, the evidence on the beneficial effect of EMS on expectations and hence on the costs of disinflation is not conclusive.
Problemet opstår i princippet som følge af de midler, regeringen må bringe i anvendelse for at få sænket priserne - den må begrænse efterspørgslen ved at hæve renten eller skatterne eller ved at sænke de offentlige udgifter.
Some have argued, though, that disinflation by means of a credible commitment to stabilise the value of the currency (within a system like EMS) could lead to a boost in demand and activity (see Giavazzi and Spaventa 1990).
Når man gør det, skærer man i væksten i den samlede købekraft i økonomien og udøver et nedadgående pres på prisstigningerne.
Imagine a high inflation and hence high interest rate country which joins the EMS in order to pursue a disinflationary policy.
Princippet er det samme for ethvert marked - et fald i efterspørgslen på en vare fører til et fald i varens pris.
If capital is free to flow across frontiers, the government's commitment to exchange rate stability will encourage an inflow of capital aiming to take advantage of its high nominal interest rates.