natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hertil anførte sagsøgeren, at retten nødvendigvis måtte være kompetent, idet de italienske retter havde afvist et søgs­mål anlagt af den nuværende sagsøgte med påstand om, at det statueredes, at kontrak­ten mellem parterne ikke var kommet gyldigt i stand, og at det af sagsøgeren fremsatte er­statningskrav var ubegrundet; begrundelsen for afvisningen var, at de italienske retter savnede kompetence.
In eply, the plaintiff argued that the court must have jurisdiction because an action irought by the defendant before the Italian courts claiming that there had been no valid xintract between the parties and that the plaintiffs claim for damages was unfounded lad been dismissed on the ground that the Italian courts did not have jurisdiction.
Den udtalte først, at den italienske afgørelse ikke havde bindende virkning for den foreliggende sag.
It stated first that the Italian judgnent was not binding in the present action.
Ganske vist skal afgørelser truf­fet i andre kontraherende stater uden videre anerkendes i henhold til konventionens arti­kel 26. Med henblik på den italienske afgørelse betød dette imidlertid kun, at den nuvæ­rende sagsøgte, hvis han anlagde det samme negative anerkendelsessøgsmål ved tyske retter, ikke behøvede at frygte, at søgsmålet på ny blev afvist på grund af manglende stedlig kompetence.
It was true that under Article 26 of the Conention judgments given in other Contracting States were automatically recognized, -lowever, so far as the Italian judgment was concerned that meant merely that if the de'endant in this case were to lodge an identical application for a declaration that there vas no valid contract, it would not be refused again on the ground that the court had no urisdiction.
Den italienske dom havde imidlertid ikke bindende virkning ved prøvelsen af den stedlige kompetence i den foreliggende sag.
But in the present case the Italian judgment was not binding as regards the juestion of territorial jurisdiction.
Retten prøvede herefter spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt den foreliggende sag kunne anlægges for den i medfør af konventionens artikel 5, nr. 1, og besvarede dette spørgsmål benæg­tende.
The court examined the question whether it had jurisdiction in the present action under \rticle 5(1) of the Convention and held that it had not.
Den kontraktlige forpligtelse, der var afgørende herfor — efter det af sagsøgeren anførte overdragelsen af en eksportlicens — skulle — selv hvis tysk ret lagdes til grund, hvilket sagsøgeren gik ind for — ikke have været opfyldt inden for denne rets område.
Even assuming that German law vas applicable, as the plaintiff maintained, the place of performance of the relevant ontractual obligation — which according to the plaintiff was the transfer of an export icence — was not within the jurisdiction of the court.
1­27.1 ­ Β 2 fortsat 1) deren ifølge italiensk ret ifølge loven repræsenteredes af agenten i retssager, og rederen i et sådant tilfælde ikke kunne rejse indsigelse mod dommen, var det i strid med grund­læggende tyske retsprincipper, at en tysk debitor med hensyn til dommens virkninger i Tyskland blev underkastet en sådan ordning.
Even if under Italian law a shipowner was represented in legal proceed­ings by his agent and the shipowner in such a case could not challenge the judgment, it was contrary to German public policy to make a German debtor subject to such rules in connexion with the effects of the judgment in Germany.
Det kunne ikke forventes, at en reder, der deltog i udlandsforretninger, havde kendskab til alle de specielle beføjelser, som i hver enkelt stat muligvis blev tillagt rederiagenter, og dermed at en legal repræsentation var i over­ensstemmelse med hans vilje. Den lettelse i de internationale retsforhold, som var tilsig­tet med artikel 288 i Codice della navigazione, fandt sin grænse dér, hvor den muligvis ikke længere var i overensstemmelse med en udenlandsk parts vilje.
A shipowner engaged in foreign trade could not be expected to acquaint himself with all the special powers which various States might possibly confer on shipping agents and to see that an agent appointed by the local legislature to represent him in legal proceed­ings accorded with his wishes.
Fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — undladelse af at svare i sagen — forskriftsmæssig forkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (ar­tikel 27, nr. 2) — krav om oversættelse af det processkrift, der skal forkyndes — betingel­ser ¡forholdet mellem Frankrig og Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland
Enforcement — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — Defendant not entering an appearance — Due service of the document which insti­tuted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Need for translation of the document which has to be served — Requirements as between France and the Federal Republic of Germany
Fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — modstrid med grundlæggende retsprincipper ¡fuldbyrdelsesstaten (artikel27, nr. 1) — dom til betaling af underholdsbidrag til barn født uden for ægteskab — fastslåelse af faderskabet på grundlag af moderens udsagn samt beviser til støtte herfor — ingen modstrid med grundlæggende franske retsprincipper
Enforcement — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article34) — Contrary to public policy in the Stale in which enforcement is sought (Article 27 (I)) — Order to pay maintenance for an illegitimate child — Establishment of paternity on the basis of the mother's statement and supporting evidence — Not contrary lo French public policy
Appel­lanten havde ikke svaret i sagen for den tyske ret, hvor faderskabet var fastslået på grundlag af moderens forklaringer, der var afgivet under ed.
The judgments established his paternity of an illegitimate child.
Appellanten gjorde nu bl.a. gældende, at det indle­dende processkrift i sagen samt andre processkrifter ikke var blevet forskriftsmæssigt forkyndt for ham, idet de ikke var ledsaget af en oversættelse til fransk.
The appellant had not entered an appearance in the proceedings be­fore the German court.
Han gjorde des­uden gældende, at den tyske rets afgørelse, hvorved hans faderskab til det uden for ægte­skab fødte barn var fastslået, var i strid med fransk ordre public.
The establishment of paternity rested on evidence given on oath by the mother of the child.
Appellanten fik imidler­tid ikke medhold.
In addition, tests had been ordered for the purpose of compar-
Da stævningen var fremsendt direkte, jf. tillægsoverenskomstens artikel 1, var en oversættelse ikke nødvendig, som tilfældet ville have været i medfør af Haag­kon­ventionens artikel 3, stk. 2.
Since the statement of claim ("Klageschrift") had been transmitted directly in ac­cordance with Article 11 of the supplementary agreement a translation, which would have been required in the case of formal service under the second paragraph of Article 3 of the Hague Convention, was not necessary.
Desuden fremgik det af forkyndelsesbegæringen, at en over­sættelse var vedlagt processkriftet; appellanten, der erkendte at have modtaget proces­skrifterne, havde ikke kunnet bevise, at han, som han senere hævdede, ikke havde mod­taget en oversættelse.
Moreover, it appeared from the applica­tion for service that a translation had accompanied the document to be served. The ap­pellant, who acknowledged receipt of the document, had not been able to prove his sub­sequent assertion that he did not receive any translation.
Den således foretagne forskriftsmæssige forkyndelse af det indle­dende processkrift i sagen var også sket rettidigt, nemlig næsten seks måneder før rets­mødet; dette tidsrum havde i givet fald også været tilstrækkeligt til oversættelsen af de tyske processkrifter.
Service of the document which instituted the proceedings had accordingly been regular and had been made in sufficient time, in fact, almost six months before the date of the oral procedure. If necessary, that period would have been sufficient for translation of the documents which were written in German.
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — forskriftsmæssig forkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 2 7, nr. 2) — oversættelse af det processkrift, der skal forkyndes — ikke en betingelse for forskrifts­mæssigforkyndelse i art. 27, nr. 2'sforstand
In its judgment, the court examined whether the Ger­man judgment was compatible with French public policy on the basis of Article 2 (5) of the Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Deci­sions relating to Maintenance Obligations in respect of Children, on which the appel­lant had relied.
Ved dom afsagt af en belgisk ret var den i Frankrig bosatte appellant, der ikke havde svaret i sagen, blevet tilpligtet at betale et pengebeløb.
By a judgment of a Belgian court the appellant was ordered to pay a sum of money.
Den stævning og den indkaldelse til at give møde, der var blevet forkyndt for ham, var affattet på nederlandsk.
He was resident in France and had not entered an appearance in the proceedings. The state­ment of claim and summons with which he was served were written in Dutch.
Dommen indeholdt som begrundelse en konstatering af, at der burde afsiges dom efter sagsøgerens påstand. Dommen blev erklæret eksigibel i Frankrig. I den derpå følgende appelsag, som støttedes på, at domskonventionens artikel 27, nr. 1 og 2, ikke var overholdt, fri­fandtes indstævnte ved Cour d'appel de Reims.
The judg­ment contained as its grounds a statement that the order sought was regarded as justi­fied.
Fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse — tilfælde hvor retten i domsstaten ikke er kompetent — efterprøvelse foretaget af retten i fuldbyrdelsesstaten
Enforcement — Reasons for refusing enforcement — Want of jurisdiction of the courts of the Stale in which judgment was given — Review by the courts of the State in which enforcement is sought
Fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — modstrid med grundlæggende retsprincipper i fuldbyrdelsesstaten (artikel 27, nr. 1) — betingelser
Enforcement — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article34) — Contrary to public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought (Article 27 (1 )) — Requirements
Fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse — modstrid med fællesskabsretlige be­stemmelser — efterprøvelse foretaget af retten i fuldbyrdelsesstaten.
— Reasons f or refusing enforcement — Infringement of provisions of law — Review by the courts of the Siale in which enforcement is sought
Rekvirenten i fuldbyrdelsessagen, et belgisk selskab, som tidligere var eneforhandler for rekvisitus, opnåede ved belgiske retter dom over sidstnævnte til betaling af bestemte beløb i anledning af ensidig annullation af eneforhandlingsaftalen (jf. Cour d'appel de Bruxelles' dom af 23.12. 1976, Cahiers de droit européen 1979, s. 397). Rekvisitus i fuld­
The applicant, a company based in Belgium, was formerly the respondent's exclusive distributor.
Den franske ret meddelte imidlertid fuldbyrdelses­påtegning.
The court granted the order for enforcement.
Retten anførte, at det ganske vist fulgte af de almindelige bestemmelser, at de franske retter på det sted, hvor sagsøgte havde bopæl, var enekompeterte, således at uden­landske retter, når sagsøgte havde hjemsted i Frankrig, ikke var kompetente, men dette forudsatte, at sagsøgte udtrykkeligt havde gjort denne manglende kompetence gælden­de.
The court stated first that although it was true that exclusive jurisdiction was conferred by the general provisions on the French courts for the place of the defendant's domicile, with the result that where the defendant was domiciled in France foreign courts had no jurisdiction, none the less it was necessary for the defendant expressly to plead want of jurisdiction.
I øvrigt fremgik det af domskonventionens artikel 5, nr. 1, at en person, som har bopæl i en kontraherende stat, også kan sagsøges ved ret­terne i en anden kontraherende stat, nemlig i sager om kontraktsforhold ved retten på det sted, hvor den forpligtelse, der ligger til grund for sagen, er opfyldt eller skal opfyl­des.
Moreover, under Article 5 (1) of the Brussels Convention a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State could also be sued in the courts of another Contracting State, namely, in matters relating to contract, in the courts for the place of performance.
Dette havde EF­Domstolen udtrykkeligt anerkendt for eneforhandlingsaftalers ved­kommende.
That had been expressly confirmed in the case of exclusive distributorship agreements by the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Med hensyn til rekvisiti indsigelse om modstrid med fransk ordre public anførte retten, at det var korrekt, at fransk ret ikke kendte de belgiske retsbegreber »monopole de droit« og »concession exclusive« i den betydning, der dér var lagt til grund, men at det forhold, at retssystemerne var forskellige, ikke i sig selv førte til, at der forelå modstrid med fransk ordre public.
In regard to the incompatibility with French public policy contended for by the re­spondent, the court stated that French law did not recognize the concepts of "monopole de droit" and "concession exclusive" in the sense in which they were employed in
Udsendelse 3/december 1985
.( December 1985
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — forskriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (arti­kel?, nr. 2) — krav om oversættelse af det processkrift, der skal forkyndes — betingel­ser ¡forholdet Frankrig/Belgien
Enforcement — Judgment given in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (sec­ond paragraph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of document which insti­tuted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Need for translation of the document which has to be served — Requirements as between France and Belgium
Fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (art. 34, stk. 2) — modstrid med grund­læggende retsprincipper i fuldbyrdelsesstaten (artikel 27, nr. 1) — aftale om renter på 14% og en konventionalbod på 20 % affakturabeløbet — ingen modstrid med grundlæg­gende franske retsprincipper
Enforcement — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article34) — Contrary to public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought (Article 27 ( I )) — Contractual agreement f or payment of interest at the rate of 14 % p.a. and a penalty amounting lo 20% of the sum due — Nol contrary to French public policy
fortsat 1) grund ikke fandt sted — skulle erlægge en bod på 20% af fakturabeløbet.
(continued D served in respect that it was only in Dutch and not translated into French and, more­over, had not been served in sufficient time.
At pålægge appellanten at betale renter med 14% p.a. af de ikke­betalte beløb samt at betale konventionalboden kunne ikke anses som en idømmelse af ågerrenter af det skyldige beløb og var ikke i modstrid med fransk ordre public.
The appellant further contended that the judgment was contrary to French public policy since the liquidated damages stipulated in the contract of sale in question together with the contractually agreed interest amount­ed to the extortionate rate of 34° n.
Cour de cassation stadfæstede denne afgørelse ved dom af 4. marts 1980, idet den til­trådte appelrettens opfattelse (jfr· La Semaine juridique, Edition générale 1980, Ta­bleaux de jurisprudence, s. 194).
The Cour d'Appel stated that due service within the meaning of Article 27 of the Brussels Convention was to be determined having regard to the Hague Convention on civil procedure of 1 March 1954, the Franco­Belgian Convention on reciprocal legal assist­ance of I March 1956 and the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965.
Under kassationsanken var det kun blevet gjort gæl­dende, at bestemmelserne om forskriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse var tilsidesat.
In the instant case service of the document which instituted the proceedings had been effected by both of the methods provided for in Article 1 of the Franco­Belgian Convention, namely by transmittal by one "Parquet" to the other and by transmittal by registered post to the addressee.
Cour de cassation anførte navnlig, at appelretten ikke var bundet af de i fransk procesret fastlagte frister ved prøvelsen af, om forkyndelsen var sket rettidig i konventionens arti­kel 27, nr. 2's forstand.
Since the appellant accepted the document sent to it informally and no formal service was requested, a translation was not required and service was accordingly duly effected. Moreover, the appellant received the registered letter containing the statement of claim 27 days before the date for appearance.
Anerkendelse — begreb — bemyndigelse til at foretage indeholdelse i en socialfor­sikringsydelse — betydning
The court stated that the placing of a contractual penalty on a debtor who had acted in bad faith was not contrary to French public policy.
Vrederechter havde i samme dom desuden pålagt GAK i Maastricht at udbetale de 60% direkte til Y. X havde bopæl i Maastricht (Nederlandene), mens Y boede i Belgien. På begæring af Y meddelte præsidenten for Arrondissementsrechtbank Maastricht fuld­byrdelsespåtegning på Vrederechter's dom, dog kun for så vidt angik bemyndigelsen til at få beløbene udbetalt.
An appeal against this decision, based solely on the alleged infringement of the provi­sions on due service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the proceedings, was dismissed by the Cour de Cassation in a judgment of 4 March 1980, confirming the decision of the Cour d'Appel (summarized in La Semaine Juridique, Edition Générale 1980, Tableaux de Jurisprudence, p. 194).
Den fraskilte ægtemand, X, begærede over for Arrondisse­mentsrechtbank Maastricht sagen genoptaget, men begæringen blev ikke taget til følge, idet retten bl.a. udtalte, at konventionen fandt anvendelse, og at den omstændighed, at
In particular the Cour de Cassation held that, in determining whether service was effected in sufficient time within the meaning of Arti­cle 27 (2) of the Convention, the Cour d'Appel was not bound by the time­limits laid down in French procedural law.
Hoge Raad udtal­te, at fuldbyrdelsespåtegningen — for så vidt angik bemyndigelsen til Y — indebar, at den belgiske afgørelse, i det omfang den angik bemyndigelsen, skulle anerkendes i Nederlandene i medfør af konventionens artikel 26, stk. 2.
By judgment of 7 January 1977 the Vrederechter in Maasmechelen (Belgium) authorized the divorced wife (Y) to receive, by way of maintenance for herself and the children of the marriage, 60% of the invalidity benefits payable to her former husband (X) at the Gemeenschappelijk Administratiekantoor (Common Administrative Office, hereinafter referred to as "the GAK") in Maastricht (Netherlands) on the basis of the Netherlands Law on Insurance Against Incapacity for Work.
Dette betød, at GAK ikke med frigørende virkning over for Y kunne betale den procentdel af ydelsen, bemyndigel­sen var gældende for, til X. En anerkendelse af bemyndigelsen var ikke i strid med grundlæggende nederlandske retsprincipper i konventionens artikel 27, nr. 1 's forstand.
In the same judgment the Vrederechter ordered the GAK office in Maastricht to pay the 60% directly to Y. X resided in Maastricht and Y resided in Belgium. Upon application the President of the Rechtbank, Maastricht, granted Y leave to enforce the judgment of the Vrederechter, but only in so far as it authorized her to receive the benefit.
Det var heller ikke i strid med grundlæggende nederlandske retsprincipper, at indehol­delsen af 60% af X's pension, der var hans eneste indkomstkilde, i betydelig grad over­steg hans økonomiske formåen.
The court held inter alia that the Convention was applicable and that the recognition and enforce­ment of the Belgian decision was not contrary to Netherlands public policy on the ground that the attachment of 60% of the aforesaid benefit was excessive in view of X's means.
Det hensyn til »den frie bevægelighed for retsafgørel­ser« inden for EF's medlemsstater, som var sigtet med konventionen, og som anerken­delsen af afgørelsen var et led i, måtte nemlig veje tungere end den konsekvens, at X nu muligvis var henvist til bistandsydelser i henhold til den almindelige bistandslov.
The Hoge Raad held that the granting of leave to enforce the decision authorizing the attachment entailed a finding that the Belgian decision should be recognized in the Netherlands under Article 26(2) of the Convention, in so far as that authorization was concerned.
X havde tillige påberåbt sig en foreløbig bidragsafgørelse, som Arrondissementsrecht­bank Maastricht havde truffet i en skilsmissesag, som Y havde anlagt i 1975. Ved denne afgørelse, som var truffet forud for den belgiske afgørelse, var der ikke tillagt Y og bør­nene underholdsbidrag.
X also relied on a provisional maintenance award made by the Rechtbank, Maastricht, in divorce proceedings commenced by Y in 1975; that decision pre-dated the decision of the Vrederechter and fixed the maintenance for Y and the children at nil.
X anførte, at bidragsafgørelsen var til hinder for anerkendelse af den belgiske dom, jfr. konventionens artikel 27, nr. 3, om indbyrdes uforenelige afgø­relser.
X submitted that that decision prevented recognition of the Belgian decision on the basis of Article 27(3) of the Convention (irreconcilable judgments). The Hoge Raad held that this
Hoge Raad udtalte herom, at dette anbringende krævede en undersøgelse af, om de to afgørelser rent faktisk var uforenelige, og at en sådan undersøgelse ikke kunne fo­retages under kassationssagen for Hoge Raad.
(continued 1) ground of appeal necessitated further findings of fact concerning the question whether the two decisions were indeed irreconcilable; it was not open to the court to make such findings in an appeal on a point of law.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — grunde til nægtelse heraf — modstrid med grundlæggende retsprincipper i den stat, som begæringen rettes til (artikel 27, nr. 1) — indsigelse afvist af appelretten i domsstaten — sagsøgtes udeblivelse fra retten ¡første instans i domsstaten — ikke en tilsidesættelse af retten til kontradiktion
Recognition and enforcement — Grounds for refusal — Judgment contrary to public policy in the Siale addressed (Article 27(1)) — Defence submission held inadmissible by lhe ap­peal court in the original State — Defendant in default before the court of first instance in thai Stale — No breach of the right to a fair hearing
Corte d'appello di Genova havde i denne sag tilpligtet sagsøgte at betale sagsøgeren er­statning for de skader, sagsøgeren havde lidt ved et færdselsuheld i Italien.
Confirming the judgment of the lower court, the Corte d'Appello. Genoa, had ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff damages in respect of a road accident which had oc­curred in Italy.
En indsigelse om egen skyld hos skadelidte, som sagsøgte først havde fremsat under appelsagen, blev afvist, fordi sagsøgte ikke havde givet møde for den italienske ret i første instans.
The court had refused to entertain a defence submission alleging negli­gence on the part of the victim, on the ground that the defendant, not having entered an appearance in the proceedings before the lower court, had raised that submission only on appeal.
Sag­søgte indankede derefter den af Cour d'appel d'Aix­en­Provence afsagte kendelse om stadfæstelse af den kendelse, hvorved Corte d'appello di Genova's dom var blevet erklæ­ret eksigibel, til kassation ; sagsøgte gjorde gældende, at to­instansprincippet og mulighe­den for under appelsagen at gøre alle de indsigelser gældende, som kunne have været
An order authorizing the enforcement of that judgment in France was con­firmed by the Cour d'Appel, Aix­en­Provence, against whose judgment the defendant appealed to the Cour de Cassation, on the ground that the principle of two­tier justice and the possibility of raising any defence to the principal claim in the appeal proceed­ings form part of the defendant's right to a fair hearing and fall within the French con­cept of public policy in the international sphere.