natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
147 hvis der forefindes Unilever­frysere.
143 install additional ones, particularly alongside Unilever cabinets.
Unilevers konkurrenter nægtes derfor adgang til disse salgssteder med det resultat, at ca. 40% af detailhandlerne i Irland ikke udbyder deres produkter til salg.
Unilever's competitors are consequently denied access to these outlets, with the result that their products are not offered for sale from some 40% of retail outlets in Ireland.
De saledes udelukkede salgssteder repræsenterer omtrent samme andel af det samlede salg på det relevante marked.
The outlets foreclosed in this way account for roughly the same proportion of total sales in the relevant market.
Kommissionen fandt derfor, at eksklusivbetingelsen, således som den anvendes i forbindelse med salgssteder, hvis eneste isfrvsere er stillet til rådighed af Unilever, er en krænkelse af EF­traktatens artikel 81.
The Commission therefore found that the exclusivity condition, as applied in relation to outlets whose only ice cream cabinets have been provided by Unilever, infringed Article 81 of the EC Treaty.
Det blev endvidere fastslået, at Unilever misbruger sin dominerende stilling i Irland, hvilket er i modstrid med EF­traktatens artikel 82. ¡det selskabet tvinger detailhandlerne til at indgå sådanne eksklusive aftaler.
It held, moreover, that Unilever was abusing its position of market dominance in Ireland, in breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, by inducing retailers to enter into exclusive arrangements of this sort.
Konkurrenceproblemer pa markedet for distribution af isprodukter blev først bragt til Kommissionens kendskab i 1991 i forbindelse med en klage fra Mars.
Competition concerns arising from the distribution of ice cream products were first brought to the Commission's attention in 1991 with a complaint by Mars.
I 1992 besluttede Kommissionen at forbyde, at de to førende markedsdeltagere på det tvske marked for is anvendte den såkaldte »forretnings­eksklusivitet« før man vendte sig mod det mere udbredte problem med »frysereksklusivitet«.
In 1992 the Commission took a decision outlawing the use of so-called ªoutlet exclusivityº by the two market leaders on the German ice cream market, before turning to the more widespread problem of ªfreezer exclusivityº.
I lyset af de klagepunkter, som Kommissionen fremsatte i 1993. foretog Unilever en række ændringer af distributionsaftalerne i Irland.
In the light of objections first made by the Commission in 1993, Unilever made a number of modifications to its distribution arrangements in Ireland.
Bl.a. blev der i 1995 indført en ordning, der gav detailhandlerne mulighed for at købe Unilever­fryserne på afbetaling, som et frivilligt alternativ til den traditionelle tilrådighedsstillelse af frysere.
In particular, a scheme allowing retailers to buy freezer cabinets from Unilever on a hire-purchase basis was introduced in 1995 as an optional alternative to the traditional method of cabinet provision.
Man forventede, at disse ændringer ville gøre Unilevers distributions­aftaler forenelige med konkurrencereglerne, idet det ville give detailhandlerne bedre mulighed for at erhverve fryserne.
It was expected that these changes would render Unilever's distribution arrangements compatible with the competition rules by facilitating a trend towards wider freezer cabinet ownership by retailers.
Det ville give detailhandlerne mulighed for at sælge andre leverandørers produkter, hvilkel ville bidrage til en egentlig åbning af det irske marked for impulsis.
This would have enabled retail outlets to offer for sale the products of any supplier, thereby contributing to a real openingup of the Irish impulse ice cream market.
Ændringerne førte imidlertid ikke til en sådan udvikling, hvilket fremgik af en omfattende markedsundersøgelse, som Kommissionen lod udføre i sommeren 1996. og der blev derfor i 1997 fremsat en række nye klagepunkter over for Unilever.
The changes did not, however, succeed in bringing about such a trend, a failure confirmed by a comprehensive market survey carried out on behalf of the Commission in the summer of 1996, and a new set of objections was accordingly put to Unilever in 1997.
Unilever har appelleret Kommissionens beslutning til Førsteinstansretten.
Unilever has appealed against the Commission decision before the Court of First Instance.
Mens sagen behandles, besluttede retsformanden pã Unilevers anmodning at suspendere Kommissionens beslutning.
Pending the Court's ruling on this appeal, the President of the Court decided, upon application by Unilever, to suspend the effects of the Commission decision.
Retsformandens væsentligste grund til at efterkomme anmodningen var. at der sideløbende er anlagt sag ved den irske højesteret vedrørende LJnilevers anvendelse af frysereksklusivitet.
The principal reason cited by the President for granting the application was the existence of parallel proceedings before the Irish Supreme Court concerning Unilever's use of freezer exclusivity.
Formålet med suspensionen er al undgå retsusikkerhed som følge af eventuelt forskellige afgørelser fra de to domstole.
The suspension seeks to avoid any legal uncertainty arising from the possibility of conflicting rulings by the two courts.
Den 17. juni 1998 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning12, hvori det konstateres, at Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli dello Stato (AAMS) havde overtrådt EF­traktatens artikel 82. idet AAMS havde en dominerende stilling på det italienske marked for engrosdistribution af cigaretter og den havde indført en ulovlig praksis for at beskytte sine egne cigaretter til skade for udenlandske producenter.
On 17 June the Commission adopted a decision12 finding that the Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli dello Stato (AAMS), which had a dominant position on the Italian market for the wholesale distribution of cigarettes, had infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty by engaging in abusive practices aimed at protecting its cigarettes to the detriment of those manufactured in other Member States.
Kommissionen pålagde ligeledes AAMS en bøde på 6 mio. ECU.
The Commission fined the AAMS ECU 6 million.
AAMS er en afdeling direkte under det italienske finansministerium, der både har en virk­somhedsfunktion (fremstilling, indførsel, udførsel, og engrosdistribution af forarbejdede tobaksvarer) og en offentlig forvaltningsfunktion (overholdelse af den italienske lovgivning for sektoren for forarbejdede tobaksvarer).
The AAMS is a body answering directly to the Italian Ministry of Finance which performs the functions of a firm (production, import/export and wholesale distribution of tobacco products) and of a public authority (exercise of powers to ensure compliance with the Italian rules governing the tobacco products sector).
AAMS har eneret til fremstilling af forarbejdede tobaksvarer i Italien og
The AAMS has the exclusive right to produce tobacco products in Italy and has a
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION har et de facto-monopoi pa det italienske marked for engrosdistribution af forarbejdede tobaksvarer, idet AAMS er den eneste virksomhed, der udøver denne aktivitet i Italien.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION de facto monopoly on the Italian tobacco products wholesale market, being at present the only company to carry on this activity in Italy.
Det konstateres i beslutningen, at AAMS har en dominerende' stilling på det italienske marked for engrosdistribution af cigaretter, og at AAMS har misbrugt denne dominerende stilling ved i en rækkeår at tvinge udenlandske producenter (der fremstiller cigaretter i andre medlemsstater) til at indgå engrosdistributionsaftaler. der indeholder en række restriktioner, der i høj grad begrænser udenlandske producenters adgang til det italienske marked.
The decision stated that the AAMS had abused its dominant position by imposing, for many years, on foreign producers (which manufactured their cigarettes in other Member States) wholesale distribution contracts containing numerous restrictive clauses which seriously limited the access of foreign cigarettes to the Italian market.
For det første begrænser aftalerne producenternes mulighed for at indføre nye udenlandske cigaretmærker på det italienske marked.
Firstly, those contracts limited the opportunities for launching new foreign cigarettes in the Italian market.
Dernæst begrænses deres muligheder for at ekspandere på det omhandlede' marked.
Secondly, they restricted the scope for expanding sales of foreign cigarettes already present in the market.
Endelig stilles der særlige krav til præsentation af og kontrol med udenlandske cigaretter, der ikke er begrundede.
And finally, they imposed on foreign cigarettes a number of unjustified control and presentation requirements.
AMMS har endvidere misbrugt sin dominerende stilling ved at optræde ensidigt for at fremme AAMS' cigaretter på bekostning af de udenlandske cigaretter.
The AAMS also abused its dominant position by taking unilateral measures to promote its cigarettes at the expense of foreign ones.
Denne ensidige adfærd har berørt både de udenlandske producenter og de italienske detailhandlere.
These measures affected both foreign producers and Italian retailers.
Ifølge beslutningen skal AAMS straks bringe de nuværende overtrædelser til ophør og afstå fra at fortsætte med eller gentage den ulovlige adfærd.
The decision ordered the AAMS to put an immediate end to infringements still ongoing and to refrain from continuing or from repeating the abusive conduct.
Bødestørrelsen skyldes, at AAMS' ulovlige adfærd er en alvorlig overtrædelse, der har stået på i en lang periode.
The size of the fine reflected the fact that the conduct constituted a serious, long-standing infringement.
Denne sag vedrører en klage indgivet af cateringselskabet AFS. Alpha Flight Services, over de afgifter, der gælder i Aéroports de Paris (Orly og Roissy Charles-de-Gaulle).
This case concerned a complaint by AFS (Alpha Flight Services), an in-flight caterer, about commercial fees at Paris airports (Orly and Roissy Charles-de-Gaulle).
AFS og OAT der er et datterselskab af Air France-koncernen, er konkurrerende selskaber med hensyn til levering af cateringtjenester i Orly.
AFS and OAT, a subsidiary of the Air France group, compete for the supply of catering services at Orly.
ADP opkræver forskellige afgifter eller omsætning og for anvendelse af infrastruktur. Hvis AFS skulle betale de samme afgifter som OAT ville det kunne nedbringe selskabets samlede afgifter med ca., 3,5 mio. FRF.
ADP (AeÂroports de Paris) charged different levels of commercial and occupancy fees respectively.
Den afgift, der anvendes for luftfartsselskaber, der anvender egenhandling, er enten nul eller under satsen for tjenester til tredjemand.
The fee for airlines providing their own groundhandling services was either zero or less than that charged to third-party suppliers.
Sådanne forskelle kan ikke begrundes objektivt og nedbringer på diskriminerende' vis kostprisen for visse leverandørers tjenester.
There was no objective justification for the differences, which discriminatorily reduced the net cost of providing the services for certain suppliers.
Konkurrenceforholdene for både leverandører af groundhandlingtjenester og luftfartsselskaber fordrejes, idet visse selskaber har omkostningsfordele enten på grund af konkurrencefordrejning for tjenester til tredjemand eller en ulovlig favorisering af egenhandling.
Competition was distorted not only between groundhandling service suppliers but between air carriers, as some enjoyed cost advantages either through distortions between third-party suppliers or through the unfairly favourable treatment of selfhandling.
Bestemmelserne i artikel 82 foreskriver, at en virksomhed med en dominerende stilling på en væsentlig del af fællesmarkedet ikke må anvende ulige vilkår på ydelser af samme værdi over for handelspartnere, som derved stilles ringere i konkurrencen.
Article 82 provides that a firm in a dominant position in a substantial part of the common market may not apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
Det konstateres i Kommissionens beslutning af 11. juni 1998. at Aéroports de Paris har overtrådt EF-traktatens artikel 82 ved at bruge sin dominerende stilling som administrationsselskab for de parisiske lufthavne til at pålæggeleverandører og brugere af groundhandlingtjenester eller egenhandlingtjenester vedrørende catering (herunder ombordbringning og fjernelse af mad- og drikkevarer i fly), rengøring af fly og fragthåndtering, diskriminerende afgifter i de parisiske lufthavne Orly og Roissy-Charles de Gaulle.
The Commission decision of 11 June found that ADP had infringed that article by using its dominant position as the Paris airports operator to impose discriminatory commercial fees at the Paris airports of Orly and Roissy-Charles de Gaulle on service providers or airlines providing groundhandling or selfhandling services such as catering, cleaning and freight handling.
Den omhandlede afgiftsordning er mest fordelagtig for de flyselskaber, der er bedst etableret i lufthavnen.
This fees system mainly benefited the carriers with the best sites within the airport.
Flyselskaber, der ikke er helt så godt etableret, og som væsentligst stammer fra de øvrige medlemsstater, udsættes af administrationsselskabet, der har en dominerende stilling, for en ulovlig diskriminering.
Less well-located carriers, mainly those from other Member States, were therefore abusively discriminated against by the airport operator, which was in a dominant position.
Formålet med beslutningen er at bringe afgiftsordningen lil ophør, ¡del den er en hindring for gennemførelsen af det indre marked for lufttransport.
The decision sought to put an end to the system, which impaired the smooth functioning of the single air transport market.
FAG brugte sin position som lufthavnsoperatør til at forbyde alle uafhængige handlingselskaber adgang til forpladsen og forbyde egenhandling for alle de flyselskaber, der bruger lufthavnen.
FAG made use of its position as airport operator to deny runway access to any independent providers of groundhandling services and to prohibit airlines using the airport from providing their own groundhandling services.
Efter at have forkastet de tekniske begrundelser, som FAG fremførte (herunder pladsargumentet), vurderede Kommissionen, at FAG's beslutning om monopol på de omhandlede tjenester var misbrug af en dominerende stilling, og Kommissionen opfordrede virksomheden til at fremlægge en detaljeret plan for åbning af markedet.
After having rejected the technical arguments put forward by FAG (in particular those relating to space constraints), the Commission found that FAG's decision to grant itself a monopoly of the activities in question constituted an abuse of a dominant position and asked the firm to submit a detailed plan for openingup the market.
Denne kommissionsbeslutning risikerede imidlertid at forblive uden virkning på grund af FAG's beslutning om at tilbyde de bedste kunder langfristede kontrakter, der ville binde dem for en 3­10­årig periode.
There was a risk, however, that this Commission decision might be circumvented by FAG's offering longterm contracts to its best customers for periods of three to ten years.
En sådan aftalepolitik kunne medføre en »afskærmning« af groundhandlingmarkedet og i praksis betyde, at FAG kunne beholde det meste af sit monopol.
This would have had the effect of cornering the groundhandling-services market and preserving the substance of FAG's monopoly.
Sideløbende med den formelle procedure mod FAG meddelte Kommissionen derfor FAG. at den fandt de omhandlede kontrakter i strid med ELT­retten.
Thus, alongside the formal proceedings against FAG, the Commission also informed the firm that the contracts in question were contrary to Community law.
FAG accepterede til sidst at efterleve Kommissionens henstillinger.
FAG finally agreed to comply with the Commission's wishes.
Virksomheden har ikke appelleret Kommissionens beslutning, den har fremlagt en plan for en faktisk åbning af markedet pr. I. januar 1999 og meddelt, at den vil ændre sin politik vedrørende langfristede kontrakter væsentligt. Den 28. juli 1998 meddelte Kommissionen FAG. at overtrædelsen med disse foranstaltninger var bragt til ophør.
It refrained from appealing against the decision, submitted a plan to open up the market as from 1 January 1999 and announced that it would be making substantial changes to its policy on longterm contracts.
Den 5. juli 1994 indgav parterne i Trans­Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA)en ansøgning til Kommissionen om en fritagelse efter EF­traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3.
On 5 July 1994 the parties to the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (TACA) submitted an application to the Commission for exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
TACA er en ændret udgave af Trans­Atlantic Agreement (TAA), der oprindelig blev anmeldt til Kommissionen den 28. august 1992.
The TACA is a revised version of the Trans-Atlantic Agreement (TAA), of which the Commission was originally notified on 28 August 1992.
Den 19. oktober 1994 traf Kommissionen en beslutning i sagen, hvor den nedlagde forbud mod TAA.
The Commission adopted a decision prohibiting the TAA on 19 October 1994.
Den 16. september 1998 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning, der fastslog, at TACA omfattede følgende elementer, der havde til formal eller følge at forhindre, begrænse eller fordreje konkurrencen efter EF­traktatens artikel 81. stk. 1. og EØS­aftalens artikel 53. stk. 1:
On 16 September 1998 the Commission adopted a decision finding that the TACA comprised the following elements, which had the object or effect or preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement:
(a) prisaftalen mellem TACA­parterne om søtransport
(a) the price agreements between the parties to the TACA relating to maritime transport;
(b) aftalen mellem TACA­parterne om fastsættelse af priserne over for afskibere på landtrans­porttjenester udført inden for EU i kombination med andre tjenester som del af en multimodal containertransport (»carrier haulage«) mellem Nordeuropa og USA
(b) the price agreement between the parties to the TACA relating to inland transport services supplied within the territory of the Community to shippers in combination with other services as part of a multimodal transport operation for the carriage of containerised cargo (`carrier haulage services') between northern Europe and the United States of America;
150 ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
(c) aftalen mellem TACA-parterne om. på hvilke betingelser de kan indgå serviceaftaler med afskibere, og
(c) the agreement between the parties to the TACA as to the terms and conditions under which they could enter into service contracts with shippers; and
(d) aftalen mellem TACA-parterne om fastsættelse af ovre grænser for speditørvederlag.
(d) the agreement between the parties to the TACA relating to the fixing of maximum levels of freight forwarder compensation.
Kun den første af disse aftaler falder ind under anvendelsesområdet for gruppefritagelsen for linjerederier i artikel 3 i forordning 4056/86. og i beslutningen afviser Kommissionen en individuel fritagelse for de øvrige tre aftaler.
Only the first of those agreements falls within the scope of the block exemption for liner shipping conferences contained in Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86, and in the decision the Commission refused to grant individual exemption for the remaining three agreements.
I beslutningen finder Kommissionen også. at TACA-parterne har haft en fælles dominerende stilling, og at de har misbrugt denne dominerende stilling på to måder.
The Commission also found that the TACA parties were in a joint dominant position and that they had abused that position in two ways.
For det første ved at pålægge to slags begrænsninger for adgangen til servicekontrakter.
First, by imposing two kinds of restriction on the availability of service contracts.
TACA-parterne forbød klart individuelle service kontrakter i 1995. og efter 1995 var det endda kun muligt at indgå servicekontrakter på meget restriktive betingelser.
Individual service contracts were openly banned by the TACA parties in 1995 and highly restrictive conditions applied to other service contracts after that date.
For det andet misbrugte TACA-parterne den fælles dominerende stilling ved at opfordre potentielle konkurrenter til at slutte sig til TACA og på den måde ændre markedets konkurrencestruktur. TACA-parterne gjorde dette på forskellig vis. bl.a. ved at gå med til. at rederier, der ikke traditionelt var konferencemedlemmer, kunne kræve lavere priser i servicekontrakter end de traditionelle konferencemedlemmer.
Second, the TACA parties abused their joint dominant position by inducing potential competitors to join the conference, thereby altering the competitive structure of the market.
Formålet og følgerne af TACA's aftale' om at indføre prisdifferentierede servicekontrakter var at begrænse konkurrencen fra uafhængige rederier ved at knytte dem til konferencen.
The purpose and effect of the TACA's agreement to enter into dual-rate service contracts was to limit competition from independent shipowners by bringing them within the fold of the conference.
Endvidere konkurrerede de traditionelle konferencemedlemmer på den måde' ikke om vissekontrakter og overlod derved den del af markedet til rederier, der ikke var traditionelle konferencemedlemmer.
In addition, the traditional conference members abstained from competing for certain contracts, thereby leaving that part of the market to shipping lines which were not traditional conference members.
TACA blev pålagt bøder på i alt 273 mio. ECU for de to overtrædelser af artikel 82.
Fines totalling ECU 273 million were imposed on the TACA parties for the two breaches of Article 82.
Alvoren af den anden overtrædelse skyldes til dels den betydelige potentielle konkurrence på markedet for linjerederier.
The seriousness of the second infringement was partly related to the significance of the potential competition in liner shipping markets.
Bøderne er fastsat pa grundlag af Kommissionens offentliggjorte retningslinjer for beregning af bøder.
The fines were calculated using the Commission's published guidelines on the imposition of fines.
Kommissionen besluttede den 26. november 1996 at have den bødeimmunitet for fastsættelse af priser for landtransport, som TACA-parterne kan have nydt godt af som følge af den formelle anmeldelse af aftalen, og Kommissionen kan senere beslutte at pålægge bøder for denne overtrædelse.
The Commission decided on 26 November 1996 to lift immunity from fines in respect of inland ratefixing which the TACA parties may have enjoyed by virtue of the agreement having been formally notified, and may decide to impose fines at a later date in respect of this infringement.
Europa-Kommissionen besluttede ikke at gøre indsigelse mod joint ventureselskabet mellem det finske flyselskab Finnair og det dansk baserede flyselskab Maersk Air. som parterne havde oprettet med henblik pa lufttransport mellem Stockholm og København.
The Commission has decided not to raise any serious doubts about the joint venture set up between the Finnish carrier Finnair and the Danish-based carrier Maersk Air with a view to offering air-transport services between Stockholm and Copenhagen.
I praksis betyder denne beslutning, at Kommissionen gav Finnair og Maersk Air tilladelse til at fortsætte deres fælles drill af rulen mellem
In practice, this decision means that the Commission has authorised Finnair and Maersk Air to continue their joint operations on this route for a period of
Joint ventureselskabet blev tilladt, fordi det fremmer konkurrence på denne rute, der tidligere var domineret af ét flyselskab.
The joint venture was authorised because it enhances competition on this route, which was previously dominated by one carrier.
Finnair og Maersk Air startede med at udbyde ruteflyvning mellem København og Stockholm i april 1997.
Finnair and Maersk Air started to offer regular scheduled flights between Copenhagen and Stockholm in April 1997.