natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
— I den appellerede doms præmis 53­66 fastslår Retten, at kun fejl, som kan tilskrives de kompetente myndigheders aktive adfærd, giver ret til, at efteropkrævning af told undlades, jf. artikel 5, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 1697/79.
— in paragraphs 53 to 66 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance found that only errors attributable to acts of the competent authorities confer entitlement to the waiver of post-clearance recovery of customs duties under Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79.
Betingelsen herom kunne ikke anses for opfyldt, når de kompetente myndigheder er blevet vildledt af eksportørens urigtige angivel­ser, som myndighederne ikke skal kontrollere eller bedømme gyldigheden af.
That is not, however, the position where the competent authorities have been misled by incorrect declarations on the part of the exporter the validity of which they do not have to check or assess.
Det er herefter importøren selv, der må træffe de foranstaltninger, som er nødvendige for at undgå risikoen for en efteropkrævningssag, og appellan­
In those circumstances, it is the responsibility of the importer himself to make the necessary arrangements in order to guard against the risks of an
CPL IMPERIAL 2 OG UNIFRIGO MOD KOMMISSIONEN terne kunne ikke påberåbe sig princippet om beskyttelse af den berettigede forventning.
CPL IMPERIAL 2 AND UNIFRIGO V COMMISSION action for post-clearance recovery, and the appellants could not rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations; and,
— Vedrørende CPL Imperial 2's subsidiære påstand om annullation af den anfægtede beslutning, for så vidt angår det krævede toldbeløbs størrelse, fastslog Retten i præmis 81-84 i den appellerede dom, at Kommissionen kun har kompetence til at afgøre spørgsmålet, om betingelserne for at anvende artikel 5, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 1697/79 er opfyldt, og ikke fastlægger den toldskyld, der skal opkræves, idet den blot henviser til det beløb, som de kompetente myndigheder anfører i deres anmodning.
— as regards CPL Imperial 2's alternative application for annulment of the contested decision in so far as it concerned the amount of the duties demanded, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraphs 81 to 84 of the contested judgment, that the Commission's powers are limited to establishing whether the conditions for applying Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79 are fulfilled and that it does not determine the amount of the debt payment of which is to be demanded, being required merely to refer to the amount indicated by the competent authorities in their demand.
— Sagen antages til realitetsbehandling.
— declare the appeal admissible;
— Den appellerede dom ophæves, og følgelig annulleres den anfægtede beslutning.
— reverse the contested judgment and, in consequence, annul the contested decision; and, in the alternative, that it should:
— Det fastslås, at denne afgørelse ikke har den virkning, at spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt betingelserne for at gennemføre efterfølgende opkrævning af tolden
— declare that the contested decision does not have the effect of establishing whether or not the conditions for waiver of the right to recover post-
— Kommissionen frifindes i det hele.
— primarily, declare the appeal brought by the appellants against the contested judgment inadmissible;
— Appellanterne tilpligtes at betale sagens omkostninger.
— order the appellants to pay the costs in any event.
Det første led af det første anbringende
The first part of the first plea
14 Appellanterne har med det første led af det første anbringende gjort gældende, at Retten har tilsidesat deres ret til forsvar og fællesskabsretten, idet den ikke har anerkendt, at Kommissionen efter artikel 871, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 2454/93 har en pligt til at undersøge, om de sagsakter, Kommissionen modtog fra de italienske myndigheder, indeholdt alle de oplysninger, der krævedes til en undersøgelse af det pågældende tilfælde, for så vidt som appellanterne ikke har deltaget i proceduren.
14 By the first part of their first plea, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance infringed the rights of the defence and Community law by not acknowledging the Commission's obligation under the first paragraph of Article 871 of Regulation No 2454/93 to check whether the file sent to the Commission by the Italian authorities contained all the information needed for an examination of the matter, inasmuch as the appellants did not take part in the procedure.
De er hverken blevet gjort bekendt med, at proceduren fandtes, eller blevet hørt af Kommissionen.
They were neither informed of the existence of the procedure nor heard by the Commission.
Appellanterne har desuden gjort gældende, at Kommissionen burde have taget hensyn til den af Høyesterett afsagte dom, for så vidt angår varernes oprindelse.
The appellants further maintain that the Commission should have taken into consideration the judgment delivered by the Høyesterett as regards the origin of the goods.
16 Det fremgår desuden af de nævnte bestemmelser, at appel kun kan støttes på, at Retten har tilsidesat visse retsregler, idet enhver bedømmelse af faktisk karakter er udelukket.
16 It also follows from the abovementioned provisions that an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts.
Alene Retten har kompetence til på den ene side at fastlægge de faktiske omstændigheder i sagen, når bortses fra tilfælde, hvor den indholdsmæssige urigtighed af dens konstateringer følger af akterne i den sag, den behandler, og på den anden side til at tage stilling til disse faktiske omstændighe der.
The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts.
Når Retten har fastlagt eller vurderet de faktiske omstændigheder, har omvendt Domstolen i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 168 A (nu artikel 225 EF)
Where the Court of First Instance has established or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 168a of the EC Treaty (now Article 225 EC) to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First
KENDELSE AF 9.12.1999 — SAG C­299/98 Ρ kompetence til at gennemføre sin kontrol med Rettens fastlæggelse af disse faktiske omstændigheders beskaffenhed og dens retslige konklusioner heraf (jf. bl.a. dom af 1.6.1994, sag C­136/92 P, Kommissionen mod Brazzelli Lualdi m.fl., Sml.
Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see, in particular, paragraphs 48 and 49 of the judgment in Case C-136/92 Ρ Commission ν Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I-1981 and paragraph 21 of the judgment in Case C-7/95 Ρ Deere ν Commission [1998] ECR I-3111).
17 Det bemærkes, at det fremgår af de faktiske omstændigheder, som Retten har fastlagt, at Kommissionen ikke behøvede at anmode om supplerende oplysninger for at træffe den anfægtede beslutning, idet de sagsakter, den havde modtaget, var fuldstændige.
17 It is sufficient to recall that, as is apparent from the facts found by the Court of First Instance, the Commission did not need to seek additional information in order to make the contested decision, since the file submitted to it was complete.
Appellanterne havde anmodet de italienske myndigheder om at forelægge sagen for Kommissionen og havde udtalt, at de ikke havde yderligere at føje til de sagsakter, som var blevet overgivet til Kommissionen, og Retten har derfor med føje fastslået, at denne ikke havde anledning til at fremsætte anmodninger om supplerende oplysninger.
Inasmuch as the appellants had requested the Italian authorities to refer the matter to the Commission and had confirmed that they had nothing to add to the file sent to the Commission, the Court of First Instance was correct in finding that there was no need for the Commission to request any additional information.
Den eneste oplysning, der ikke fandtes i de sagsakter, der blev tilstillet Kommissionen, var oplysningen om Høyesterett's dom af 2. april 1993. Som nævnt i præmis 42 i den appellerede dom fastslås det imidlertid ikke i denne dom, at de omhandlede varer hidrørte fra Norge, og den kunne således ikke få nogen betydning for den anfægtede beslutning.
The only item which did not appear in the file sent to the Commission was the judgment of the Høyesterett of 2 April 1993.
18 Herefter skal det første led af det første anbringende forkastes.
18 In those circumstances, the first part of the first plea must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
Det andet og det tredje led af det første anbringende
The second and third parts of the first plea
19 Appellanterne har med det andet og det tredje led af det første anbringende gjort gældende, at Retten har fortolket og anvendt artikel 5, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 1697/79 urigtigt.
19 By the second and third parts of the first plea, which may appropriately be examined together, the appellants maintain that the Court of First Instance misinterpreted and misapplied Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79.
De har således gjort gældende dels, at Retten ud over de tre betingelser i artikel 5, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 1697/79 har stillet endnu en
They claim, first, that the Court of First Instance added a further condition to the three conditions prescribed by Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79, by imposing on
CPL IMPERIAL 2 OG UNIFRIGO MOD KOMMISSIONEN betingelse ved at pålægge dem bevisbyrden for, hvor de omhandlede varer stammede fra, dels at det er umuligt for dem at føre det krævede bevis.
CPL IMPERIAL 2 AND UNIFRIGO V COMMISSION them the burden of proving the origin of the goods in issue and, second, that they are not able to provide the necessary proof.
20 Selv om en appel som fremhævet af Kommissionen skal afvises, når appelskriftet blot gentager eller nøjagtigt gengiver de anbringender og argumenter, der allerede er blevet fremført for Retten (jf. navnlig kendelsen i sagen San Marco mod Kommissionen, præmis 38), må det dog fastslås, at det andet og det tredje led af appellanternes første anbringende skal admitteres.
Whilst it is true that, as the Commission has stated, an appeal must be dismissed as inadmissible if it confines itself to repeating or reproducing word for word the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance (see, in particular, the order in San Marco ν Commission, cited above, paragraph 38), the second and third parts of the first plea must be declared admissible.
For appellanterne kritiserer dermed — om end kun yderst kortfattet — den fortolkning, som Retten har givet af artikel 5, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 1697/79.
The appellants are contesting, albeit laconically, the interpretation of Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79 arrived at by the Court of First Instance.
Retten har i det foreliggende tilfælde kun taget stilling til den første af de i artikel 5, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 1697/79 opstillede betingelser. Den fastslog i den
In the present case, the Court of First Instance ruled only on the first condition laid down by Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1697/79.
KENDELSE AF 9.12.1999 — SAG C­299/98 Ρ appellerede doms præmis 62­65, at denne betingelse ikke var opfyldt i den foreliggende sag, og at det derfor var ufornødent at tage stilling til de øvrige betingelser.
65 of the contested judgment, that that condition was not fulfilled in the present case, so that there was no need to consider the other conditions.
Retten fastslog i denne forbindelse i den appellerede doms præmis 39, at eksportøren ikke var i stand til at godtgøre de omhandlede varers oprindelse og drog heraf med føje og i overensstemmelse med Domstolens faste praksis den slutning, at oprindelsen var ukendt (jf. dom af 7.12.1993, sag C­12/92, Huygen m.fl., Sml. I, s. 6381, præmis 17, og dommen i sagen Faroe Seafood m.fl., præmis 16).
In that connection, the Court of First Instance found, in paragraph 39 of the contested judgment, that the exporter was unable to prove the origin of the goods in question, and rightly concluded, in accordance with the settled caselaw of the Court of Justice, that the goods were therefore of unknown origin (see Case C-12/92 Huygen and Others [1993] ECR I-6381, paragraph 17, and Faroe Seafood and Others, cited above, paragraph 16).
Retten fremhævede endvidere, at appellanterne ikke havde bestridt konstateringen af, at eksportøren var ude af stand til at bevise, at de omhandlede varer hidrørte fra Norge.
The Court of First Instance also noted that the appellants had not contested the fact that the exporter was unable to prove the Norwegian origin of the products in question.
Det fremgår på dette punkt af fællesskabsrettens bestemmelser, at det påhviler eksportøren gennem fremlæggelse af relevant dokumentation af enhver art at bevise, hvilken oprindelse varerne har (jf. dommen i sagen Faroe Seafood m.fl., præmis 60­64, samt artikel 10, stk. 4, i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2937/77 af 20.12.1977 om gennemførelse af afgørelse nr. 1/77 truffet af den blandede komité EØF­Norge om tillæg til og ændring af protokol nr. 3 angående definitionen af begrebet »varer med oprindelsesstatus« og angående metoderne for administrativt samarbejde og om erstatning af visse af ovennævnte blandede komités afgørelser (EFT L 344, s. 1)).
On that point, it follows from the Community provisions that it is for the exporter to prove the origin of the goods by producing all appropriate supporting documents (see Faroe Seafood and Others, paragraphs 60 to 64, and Article 10(4) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2937/77 of 20 December 1977 on the application of Decision No 1/77 of the EEC-Norway Joint Committee supplementing and amending Protocol 3 concerning the definition of the concept of Originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation and replacing certain decisions of the said Joint Committee (OJ 1977 L 344, p. 1)).
Retten har således ikke som anført af appellanterne opstillet endnu en betingelse om, at importøren skal føre bevis for varernes oprindelse.
Thus, contrary to the argument advanced by the appellants, the Court of First Instance did not introduce an additional condition by requiring the importer to prove the origin of the goods.
Herefter skal det andet og det tredje led af det første anbringende forkastes.
In those circumstances, the second and third parts of the first plea must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
28 Appellanterne har med deres andet anbringende kritiseret Rettens fortolkning af begrebet »fejl«, som toldvæsenet har begået, for så vidt som den derved fastslår, at der ikke foreligger en fejl, der kan tilregnes toldvæsenet selv, når den behandling, det fejlagtigt har givet varerne, er i overensstemmelse med eksportørens angivelser.
By the second plea, the appellants contest the construction placed by the Court of First Instance on the notion of 'error' on the part of the customs authorities, inasmuch as it held that no error can be attributed to the customs authorities themselves where the incorrect treatment applied by them to the goods is in conformity with the declaration presented by the exporter.
Ifølge appellanterne er toldvæsenet blevet vildledt og betingelsen i artikel 5, stk. 2, er derfor opfyldt.
According to the appellants, those authorities were misled, and the condition laid down in Article 5(2) is therefore fulfilled.
29 Kommissionen har gjort gældende, at dette anbringende klart skal afvises, idet de argumenter, hvormed det underbygges, blot er en ordret gentagelse af den allerede for Retten fremførte argumentation.
In the Commission's view, that complaint is manifestly inadmissible, since the arguments put forward in support of it merely reproduce word for word the arguments previously advanced before the Court of First Instance.
Dette er en retlig omstændighed, og anbringendet skal derfor admitteres.
Since it concerns a point of law, that plea must therefore be declared admissible.
31 Det må imidlertid fastslås, at Retten med føje i den appellerede doms præmis 5861 har fastslået, at de kompetente myndigheder ikke begik en fejl, idet de var blevet vildledt, navnlig vedrørende varernes oprindelse, af afgiftsskyldners urigtige angivelser, som myndighederne ikke skal kontrollere eller bedømme gyldigheden af (jf. Mecanarte-dommen, præmis 24, og dommen i sagen Faroe Seafood m.fl., præmis 92).
Be that as it may, the Court of First Instance rightly held, in paragraphs 58 to 61 of the contested judgment, that the competent authorities did not commit any error, since they had been misled, in particular as to the origin of the goods, by incorrect declarations on the part of the person liable, the validity of which they did not have to check or assess (Mecanarte, paragraph 24, and Faroe Seafood and Others, paragraph 92).
32 Det fremgår af Domstolens faste praksis, at kun fejl, som kan tilskrives de kompetente myndigheders aktive adfærd, giver ret til, at efteropkrævning af told
It is settled caselaw that only errors attributable to acts of the competent authorities confer entitlement to the waiver of post-clearance recovery of
Det andet anbringende skal derfor forkastes.
In those circumstances, the second plea must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
Første led af det tredje anbringende
The first part of the third plea
Appellanterne har med det første led af det tredje anbringende gjort gældende, at Retten har tilsidesat princippet om den berettigede forventning ved at udtale, at der er forbundet en vis kommerciel risiko med det pågældende marked.
By the first part of the third plea, the appellants claim that, by stating that a certain commercial risk is inherent in the market, the Court of First Instance violated the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
Kommissionen har anført, at appellanterne hermed blot ordret gentager de argumenter, de havde fremført for Retten, og at dette led af anbringendet derfor skal afvises.
The Commission maintains that the appellants are merely reproducing word for word the arguments advanced by them before the Court of First Instance, and that that part of the plea is therefore inadmissible.
Det bemærkes herved, at anbringendet kan admitteres, for så vidt som appellanterne — om end meget kortfattet — dermed kritiserer den appellerede dom.
In that regard, the plea must be declared admissible inasmuch as the appellants are challenging, albeit laconically, the contested judgment.
CPL IMPERIAL 2 OG UNIFRIGO MOD KOMMISSIONEN ukorrekt adfærd hos importørernes leverandører, for det andet, at importøren kan anlægge erstatningssag mod den, der har forfalsket certifikatet, og for det tredje, at en påpasselig erhvervsdrivende, der kender de gældende regler, samtidig med, at han vurderer, hvilket udbytte en handel med præferenceberettigede varer kan indbringe, må kunne bedømme, hvilke risici der findes på det pågældende marked, og indkalkulere dem som normale ulemper i forbindelse med handelen (jf. dom af 11.12.1980, sag 827/90, Acampora, Sml. s. 3731, præmis 8, og af 17.7.1997, sag C-97/95, Pascoal & Filhos, Sml. I, s. 4209, præmis 59). 38
CPL IMPERIAL 2 AND UNIFRIGO V COMMISSION bear the adverse consequences of the wrongful acts of suppliers of importers, second, that the importer may seek compensation from the perpetrator of the fraud, and, finally, that, in calculating the benefits from trade in goods likely to obtain tariff preferences, a prudent trader aware of the rules must assess the risks inherent in the market which he is considering and accept them as normal trade risks (Case 827/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze ν Acampora [1980] ECR 3731, paragraph 8, and Case C­97/95 Pascoal ôc Filhos ν Fazenda Pública [1997] ECR 1­4209, paragraph 59).
Det bemærkes, at det påhviler de erhvervsdrivende selv i deres kontraktforhold at træffe de foranstaltninger, der kan afværge risikoen for en efteropkrævning (jf. dommen i sagen Faroe Seafood m.fl., præmis 114, og Pascoal & Filhos-dommen, præmis 60). 39
It is the responsibility of traders to make the necessary arrangements in their contractual relations in order to guard against the risks of an action for post­clearance recovery (Faroe Seafood and Others, paragraph 114, and Pascoal ÔC Filhos, cited above, paragraph 60).
Det første led af det tredje anbringende skal herefter forkastes.
In those circumstances, the first part of the third plea must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.
Det andet led af det tredje anbringende
The second part of the third plea
Med det andet led af det tredje anbringende har appellanterne gjort gældende, at Retten har tilsidesat EF-traktatens artikel 30 og 36 (efter ændring nu artikel 28 EF og artikel 30 EF), idet den har udtalt, at der forekommer en »toldmæssig«
By the second part of the third plea, the appellants maintain that, by holding that there existed a 'customs' risk, and thus confirming the need for a covert restriction on intra­Community trade, the Court of First Instance infringed
41 Det bemærkes, at efter artikel 113, stk. 2, i Domstolens procesreglement kan der ikke under appel foretages nogen ændring af sagsgenstanden, som den har foreligget for Retten (jf. kendelsen i sagen San Marco mod Kommissionen, præmis 47).
41 It must be recalled in that regard that, under Article 113(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the subjectmatter of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance may not be changed in the appeal (San Marco ν Commission, paragraph 47).
En parts adgang til først for Domstolen at fremføre et anbringende, der ikke er blevet fremført for Retten — her om, at traktatens artikel 30 og 36 er blevet tilsidesat — er ensbetydende med en adgang til at forelægge Domstolen — der har en begrænset kompetence i appelsager — en mere omfattende tvist end den, der blev forelagt Retten.
Were a party to be allowed to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law — in the present case, infringement of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty — which it had not raised before the Court of First Instance, that would enable it to bring before the Court, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the Court of First Instance.
Under en appel har Domstolen således kun kompetence til at prøve Rettens bedømmelse af anbringender, der er blevet behandlet af Retten (jf. kendelsen i sagen San Marco mod Kommissionen, præmis 49, og dommen i sagen Kommissionen mod Brazzelli Lualdi m.fl., præmis 59).
In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to review of the assessment made by the Court of First Instance of the pleas argued before it (San Marco ν Commission, paragraph 49, and Commission ν Brazzelli Lualdi, cited above, paragraph 59).
Selv om det lægges til grund, at det fremførte anbringende bygger på en påstået retsvildfarelse, som Retten har givet anledning til, følger det af artikel 51 i EF­statutten for Domstolen, sammenholdt med artikel 112, stk. 1, litra c), i Domstolens procesreglement, at appelskriftet præcist skal angive, hvilke ele­menter der anfægtes i den dom, som påstås ophævet, samt de retlige argumenter, der særligt støtter påstanden herom (jf. kendelsen i sagen San Marco mod Kommissionen, præmis 37).
Even if the plea advanced were founded on an alleged error of law on the part of the Court of First Instance, it follows from the combined effects of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(l)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal {San Marco ν Commission, paragraph 37).
Appellanterne har ikke på nogen måde mere præcist udviklet, hvorledes traktatens artikel 30 og 36 skulle være tilsidesat, men har blot udtalt, at »hele handelen i Fællesskabet vil blive berørt af denne 'risiko' og må derfor være omfattet af en forsikring, der dækker muligheden for eventuelt flere år efter
The appellants have not in any way specified the nature of the alleged infringement of Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty; they merely state that '[t]he entire system of Community trade would be affected by the aforesaid "risk" and would consequently be subject to the contingency of having to pay, several years