natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne domstol besluttede før realitetsbehandlingen af sagen at stille Domstolen følgende spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af domskonventionen:
Before ruling on the substance of the matter that court decided to submit the following questions to the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention.
Omfatter begrebet 'erstatning uden for kontrakt' i artikel 5, nr. 3, en sådan for­dring?
Does the term 'matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict' in Article 5 (3) in clude such a claim? If so:
Hvad bestemmer artikel 5, nr. 3, om det tilfælde, hvor skadetilføjelsen er fore­gået i et område, som efter Ems­Dollart­traktaten af kongeriget Nederlandene henregnes til Nederlandenes højhedsområde og af Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland til Forbundsrepublikkens højhedsområde? Bestemmer artikel 5, nr. 3, at de neder­landske retter skal gå ud fra, at dette sted (også) ligger i Nederlandene?
What is the effect of Article 5 (3) in a situation where the harmful event occured in the territory which, in view of the Ems-Dollard Treaty, is regarded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands as belonging to the territory of the Netherlands and by the Federal Republic of Germany as belonging to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany?
Har det her­ved, når henses til den pågældende fordrings art, nogen betydning, at dette sted lig­ger i et område, i hvilket kongeriget Nederlandene i medfør af Ems­Dollart­trakta­ten varetager vandvejsadministrationen og derfor er forpligtet til at fjerne et vrag, der ligger i dette område?
Having regard to the nature of the present claim is it in this respect relevant that the place lies in the territory in which, pursuant to the Ems-Dollard Treaty, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is responsible for riverpolice functions and is therefore obliged to remove a wreck lying in the said territory?
Kan 'det sted, hvor skadetilføjelsen er foregået', antages at være det sted, hvor staten hævder, skaden er indtrådt, nemlig enten i Haag, hvor statens hjemsted er, eller i Delfzijl (i Arrondissement Groningen), hvor resterne af vraget blev solgt af staten, hvorved det kunne konstateres, i hvilket omfang de af staten for vragets bjærgning afholdte udgifter ikke blev dækket?
(d) Can the 'place where the harmful event occurred' be the place where the dam age as alleged by the State occurred, namely either The Hague, where the State has its seat of government, or Delfzijl (in the Arrondissement [legal district] of Groningen) where the goods salvaged from the wreck were sold by the State revealing to what extent the costs incurred by the State in removing the wreck were not covered? ered?
Såfremt Ems­Dollart­traktaten skal fortolkes således, at den gør de neder­landske retter kompetente til at pådømme et krav som her omhandlet (et spørgsmål, der ikke forelægges Domstolen til besvarelse), vil disse retter da også i medfør af Bruxelles­konventionens artikel 57 kunne anvende denne konventions artikel 5, nr.3?«
If the Ems-Dollard Treaty is to be understood as giving the Netherlands courts jurisdiction over a claim such as the present one (which question is not referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling) does Article 57 of the Brussels Con vention leave scope for the application of the opening words and paragraph (3) of Article 5 regarding jurisdiction?"
Domstolen udtalte herom (i præmisserne 6—17):
In reply to those questions the Court of Justice ruled as follows (paragraphs 6 to 17 of the Decision):
»Første spørgsmål
"The first question
6 I det første spørgsmål anmoder Hoge Raad indledningsvis Domstolen om at afgø­re, om begrebet 'borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager', jfr. konventionens arti­kel 1, kan anses for at omfatte et regressøgsmål af den art, som den nederlandske stat har rejst i det foreliggende tilfælde.
6 In its first question the Hoge Raads asks the Court to state first of all whether the concept 'civil and commerical matters' in Article 1 of the Convention must be construed as including a claim for redress such as that brought in the instant case by the Netherlands State.
1968 - ARTIKEL 1, STK. 1
1968 - ARTICLE 1(1)
(fortsat 2) dom af 22.2.
(continued 2)
1979, Gourdain, sag 133/78, Sml., s. 733'), at begrebet 'borgerlige sa ger, herunder handelssager' i domskonventionens artikel 1, skal anses for at være et selvstændigt begreb, som skal fortolkes under hensyn dels til konventionens mål og opbygning samt dels til de almindelige principper, der kan udledes af de nationale retssystemer under ét.
7 It is apparent from the case-law of the Court (judgment of 14 October 1976 in Case 29/76 LTU[W6] ECR 1541 ;' judgment of 14 July 1977 in Cases 9 and 10/77 Bavaria-Germanair[\911] ECR 1517;2 judgment of 22 February 1979 in Case 133/78 Gourdain [1978] ECR 7333) that the concept 'civil and commerical matters' used in
8 I lyset af disse fortolkningsprincipper har Domstolen i de nævnte domme antaget, at selv om visse afgørelser i tvister mellem en offentlig myndighed og en privat kan falde ind under konventionens anvendelsesområde, forholder det sig anderledes, når offentlige myndighed udøver offentligretlige beføjelser.
8 In the light of those considerations the Court has specifically held in that same case-law that whilst certain judgments given in an action between a public authority and a person governed by private law may come within the area of application of the Convention that is not the case if the public authority is acting in the exercise of its public authority powers.
9 Dette er bl.a. tilfældet, når der er tale om en sag til inddrivelse af omkostninger hidrørende fra fjernelse af et vrag i en offentlig vandvej, som foretages af en tilsynsførende stat i henhold til en international forpligtelse og på grundlag af regler i in tern ret, som tillægger staten stilling som offentlig myndighed over for private ved ad ministrationen af denne vandvej.
9 Such a case is an action for the recovery of the costs involved in the removal of a wreck in a public waterway, administered by the State responsible in performance of an international obligation and on the basis of provisions of national law which, in the administration of that waterway, confer on it the status of public authority in regard to private persons.
io Det står fast, at den hollandske stat i det foreliggende tilfælde lod vraget af 'Otrate' fjerne på grundlag af en forpligtelse i henhold til Ems-Dollart-traktatens artikler 19, stk. 1, litra a), og 20, stk. 2, litra d), inden for rammerne af de flodpolitimæssige opgaver, som er tillagt staten i denne vandvej ved den nævnte traktat, og at staten således i det foreliggende tilfælde har handlet som offentlig myndighed.
io It is common ground that in this case the Netherlands State had the wreck of the Otrate removed in performance of an obligation which was assumed under Article 9(1) (a) and 20 (2) (d) of the Ems-Dollard Treaty within the framework of the riverpolice functions conferred on it in that waterway by the said Treaty and that consequently it acted in this case as the body invested with public authority.
n Anerkendelsen af, at den, der bærer ansvaret for de flodpolitimæssige opgaver i offentlige vandveje, indtager en sådan stilling, for så vidt angår fjernelsen af vrag i disse vandveje, svarer i øvrigt til de almindelige principper, som kan udledes af medlemsstaternes nationale retssystemer under ét, hvis bestemmelser om administration af offentlige vandveje netop viser, at den, som administrerer disse vandveje, med hensyn til fjernelsen af vrag handler som offentlig myndighed.
n The granting of such status to the agent responsible for policing public waterways, for the purpose of removing wrecks located in those waterways, is furthermore in keeping with the general principles which stem from the corpus of the national le gal systems of the Member States whose provisions on the administration of public waterways precisely show that the agent administering those waterways does so, when removing wrecks, in the exercise of public authority.
12 Når henses hertil kan det søgsmål, som den nederlandske stat har rejst for den nationale domstol, ikke anses for omfattet af domskonventionens anvendelsesområde, således som dette er defineret ved begrebet »borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager«, jfr. konventionens artikel 1, idet det er konstateret, at den nederlandske stat i det foreliggende tilfælde har handlet som offentlig myndighed.
12 In view of those factors the action brought by the Netherlands State before the national court must be regarded as being outside the ambit of the Brussels Convention, as defined by the concept of 'civil and commercial matters' within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1 of that Convention, since it is established that the Netherlands State acted in the instant case in the exercise of public authority.
13 Det forhold, at den for den nationale domstol verserende sag i det foreliggende tilfælde ikke drejer sig om selve fjernelsen af vraget, men om inddrivelsen af om kostningerne i forbindelse med fjernelsen, og at den nederlandske stat søger at ind drive disse omkostninger ved et regressøgsmål, og ikke, således som intern ret i andre medlemsstater bestemmer, ad administrativ vej, er ikke tilstrækkeligt til at bringe det omtvistede sagsforhold ind under domskonventionens anvendelsesområde. de.
13 The fact that in this case the action pending before the national court does not concern the actual removal of the wreck but the costs involved in that removal and that the Netherlands State is seeking to recover those costs by means of a claim for
Jfr. nedenfor under 1-1.2 — Al.
3 - See 1-1.2 -Al, infra.
1968 ­ ARTIKEL 1, STK. 1
1968 - ARTICLE 1 (1)
Ifølge dommene udelukker et sådant krav, at kon­ventionen kan fortolkes alene ud fra den kompetencefordeling mellem de forskel­lige retsinstanser, som findes i bestemte stater.
14 As the Court has stated in the authorities cited above the Brussels Convention must be applied in such a way as to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obli­gations which derive from it for the Contracting States and the persons to whom it applies are equal and uniform.
Dommene indebærer derimod, at kon­ventionens anvendelsesområde principielt skal fastlægges på grundlag af de fakto­rer, som karakteriserer retsforholdet mellem parterne i tvisten, eller på grundlag af tvistens genstand.
By that same case-law such a requirement rules out the possibility of the Convention's being interpreted solely in the light of the division of jurisdiction between the various types of courts existing in certain States: on the contrary it implies that the area of application of the Convention is essentially deter­mined either by reason of the legal relationships between the parties to the action or of the subject-matter of the action.
15 Det forhold, at inddrivelsen af de nævnte omkostninger sker på grundlag af en fordring, som har sit udspring i en handling foretaget under udøvelsen af offentlig myndighed, er tilstrækkeligt til, at søgsmålet ikke kan anses for omfattet af doms­konventionens anvendelsesområde, uanset arten af den inddrivelsesform, som na­tional ret giver mulighed for i så henseende.
15 The fact that in recovering those costs the administering agent acts pursuant to a debt which arises from an act of public authority is sufficient for its action, whatever the nature of the proceedings afforded by national law for that purpose, to be treated as being outside the ambit of the Brussels Convention.
16 Det første spørgsmål bør herefter besvares således, at begrebet »borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager« i artikel 1, stk. 1, i konventionen af 27. september 1968 om retternes kompetence og om fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser i borgerlige sager, herun­der handelssager, ikke omfatter sådanne retssager som den af den nationale domstol omtalte, der er anlagt af forvaltningen af de offentlige vandveje mod den efter lovgiv­ningen ansvarlige med henblik på at få erstattet omkostningerne i forbindelse med fjernelsen af vrag, som forvaltningen har foretaget eller ladet foretage som et led i sin udøvelse af offentlig myndighed.
16 For those reasons the answer to the first question must be that the concept of 'civ­il and commerical matters' within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg­ments in Civil and Commerical Matters does not include actions such as that re­ferred to by the national court brought by the agent responsible for administering public waterways against a person having liability in law in order to recover the costs incurred in the removal of a wreck carried out by or at the instigation of the adminis­tering agent in the exercise of its public authority.
De øvrige spørgsmål π Den nationale domstol har stillet de øvrige spørgsmål for det tilfælde, at det første spørgsmål besvaredes bekræftende.
The other questions π The other questions were submitted by the national court in case the answer to the first question were in the affirmative.
Da dette spørgsmål er blevet besvaret be­nægtende, er det ufornødent at tage stilling til de øvrige spørgsmål«.
As the answer to that question is in the neg­ative there is no further point in considering them."
I tilslutning til denne dom forkastede Hoge Raad den nederlandske stats kassationsanke (dom af 16.6. 1981, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982, nr. 98).
Following this judgment the Hoge Raad dismissed the appeal in cassation brought by the Netherlands State (Judgment of 26 June 1981, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982, No 98).
Hoge Raad udtalte, at der med anken alene var blevet rejst den indsigelse, at Gerechtshof med urette havde und­ladt at lægge konventionens artikel 5, nr. 3 — som den nederlandske stat havde påbe­råbt sig — til grund ; af denne artikel skulle følge, at de nederlandske domstole var kom­petente.
It stated that it had merely been argued in the appeal that the Gerechtshof had wrongly rejected the State's reliance on Article 5 (3) of the Brussels Convention, on which the jurisdiction of the Netherlands courts was said to be based.
Da det fulgte af Domstolens dom, at konventionen ikke fandt anvendelse på den af den nederlandske stat anlagte retssag, kunne indsigelsen ikke føre til kassation.
Since the Court of Justice had ruled that the Convention did not apply to the action brought by the State, that ground of appeal could not lead to the quashing of the decision.
(fortsat 1) ved hjælp af andre dokumenter, og idet et dateret, bekræftet modtagelsesbevis ifølge Haag­konventionens artikel 5 er tilstrækkeligt.
For proof of such service, as required by Article 47 (1) of the Brussels Convention, production of a certificate of service was not necessary, because under the domestic pro­cedural law of Germany proof could be furnished by means of other documents and un­der Article 5 of the Hague Convention a dated authenticated acknowledgment of re­ceipt was sufficient for that purpose.
Sagen hjemvistes til Oberlandesgericht, idet Bundesgerichtshof ikke selv kunne træffe bestemmelse om den udsættelse af afgørelsen ifølge konventionens artikel 38, som re­kvisitus havde begæret.
The matter was referred back to the Oberlandesgericht because the Bundesgerichtshof could not itself decide to stay the proceedings in accordance with the respondent's ap­plication under Article 38 of the Convention.
I henhold til § 20, stk. 2, i den tyske gennemførelseslov kunne Bundesgerichtshof ikke foretage den hertil nødvendige efterprøvelse af de faktiske om­stændigheder.
Paragraph 20 (2) of the German Ausfüh­rungsgesetz [implementing law] did not allow it to make the requisite findings of fact.
Det var hermed givet, at også arbejdsretlige sager var omfattet af be­grebet, og at sådanne sager, da de ikke var undtaget ved en særlig bestemmelse, var om­fattet af konventionen.
It stood to reason that employment law was also covered by that term, and, as it was not specifically excluded, it therefore fell within the scope of the Convention.
Også i en dom, afsagt af Tribunal d'instance d'Angers (dom af 4.11.1975, Sion mod Soc. Nino, Recueil Dalloz­Sirey 1976, Jur., s. 202) blev det lagt til grund, at konventionen fandt anvendelse på sager om arbejdsforhold.
The Convention was likewise held to be applicable to employment disputes in a judg­ment of the Tribunal d'Instance, Angers, of 4 November 1975, Sion ν Société Nino, Re­cueil Dalloz­Sirey 1976, Jur., p. 202.
I­l.l — Β 5 Tribunal du travail de Liège, dom af 25. maj 1979, D. mod det tyske selskab E.,
I­l.l — Β 5 Tribunal du Travail, Liège, Judgment of 25 May 1979, D. ν Société de droit allemand E. Journal des Tribunaux 1980, p. 174
Retten anså sig for inkompetent til at påkende en sag mellem et tysk selskab og en ar­bejdstager, som arbejdede for selskabet i Belgien.
The court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an action between a worker and a German company by which he was employed in Belgium.
Da parterne i arbejdsaftalen havde vedtaget Düsseldorf (Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland) som værneting, var retterne dér enekompetente i henhold til artikel 17 i konventionen af 1968.
Since in the contract of em­ployment the parties had conferred jurisdiction on the courts in Düsseldorf (Federal Re­public of Germany), those courts had exclusive jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Brus­sels Convention.
Bestemmelserne i konven­tionen, som i Belgien var blevet tiltrådt ved lov af 13. januar 1971, gik forud for kompe­tencereglerne i den belgiske retsplejelov (Code judiciaire), der allerede var trådt i kraft i 1970.
The provisions ofthat Convention, which had been ratified in Belgium by a Law of 13 January 1971, took precedence over the jurisdiction rules of the Code Ju­diciaire, which had come into force in 1970.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt konventionen i medfør af artikel 1 fandt anvendelse på ar­bejdsaftaler, blev besvaret bekræftende.
The question whether the Convention was applicable to contracts of employment, in ac­cordance with Article 1 thereof, required an affirmative answer.
Inden for arbejds­ og socialretten måtte der sondres mellem social sikring, som er beslægtet med forvaltningsretten, og den aftale­mæssige regulering af individuelle interesser, som trods nøje fastlagte præceptive regler må henføres til privatretten.
In the field of employ­ment law and social law a distinction must be drawn between social security, which was akin to administrative law, and the contractual regulation of individual interests, which, notwithstanding certain mandatory provisions, belonged to the province of private law.
Hvis de kontraherende stater ville have undtaget arbejdsaf­taler fra konventionens anvendelsesområde, ville de have givet udtryk herfor — som de har gjort med hensyn til social sikring, som i hvert fald ikke hører til de borgerlige sager, herunder handelssagerne, og som udtrykkeligt er undtaget i medfør af artikel 1.
If the Contracting States had wished to exclude contracts of employment from the scope of the Convention, they would have expressed such an intention, as indeed they did in the case of social security, which clearly did not come within the ambit of civil and com­mercial matters and was expressly excluded by Article 1.
Jfr. også 1­17.1.1 ­ B 7.
Note: See also 1­17.1.1 ­ Β 7.
Anvendelsesområde — sag vedrørende en arbejdsaftale, der føres i sammenhæng med en sag vedrørende socialforsikringsretlige krav — konventionen fandt kun anven­delse på den arbejdsretlige sag
Scope — Claim arising out of a contract of employment joined to a claim connected with social security — Question of the applicability of the Convention — Affirmative answer with the exclusion of the claim connected with social security
Fortolkning af konventionen — protokol af 3. juni 1971 — forelæggelse for EF­Dom­stolen til præjudiciel afgørelse — spørgsmålet om den domstol, for hvilken sagen er ind­bragt, har pligt hertil (artikel 3, stk. 1) — betingelser — spørgsmålet om der foreligger et egentligt »spørgsmål«
Interpretation of the Convention — Protocol of 3 June 1971 — Reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling — Obligation to make a reference (Article 3 (1)) — Conditions — Existence of a real question
Indbyrdes sammenhængende krav — flere krav, der gøres gældende ved samme domstol —fortolkning af konventionens artikel 22, stk. 3
Related actions — Plurality of actions brought before the same court — Interpreta­tionfor the purposes of the third paragraph of Article 22 of the Convention
Indbyrdes sammenhængende krav — definition (artikel 22, stk. 3) — socialforsik­ringsretlige krav, der gøres gældende for en domstol, som behandler arbejdsretlige krav, for hvilke der er aftalt værneting ved en domstol i en anden medlemsstat — ingen risiko for uforenelige afgørelser
Related actions — Definition (third paragraph of Article 22) — Action connected with social security brought before a court in which an action is being brought in con­nection with a contract of employment conferring jurisdiction on a court in another Con­tracting State — Risk of irreconcilable judgments — None
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — værnetings klausul i en arbejdsaftale — konventionen fandt anvendelse, selv om den nationale domstol havde kompetence til at påkende arbejdsretlige sager ifølge en senere udstedt national bestemmelse, der ikke kunne fraviges ved aftale
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Jurisdiction clause in a contract of em­ployment — Question of the applicability of the Convention in relation to a later rule of internal law which confers on the national courts jurisdiction in employment disputes which cannot be excluded by agreement — Affirmative answer
En italiensk ingeniør, Ernesto Bianco, der var leder af det tyske firma Andreas Kuffe­rath's salgskontor for Italien, anlagde — i forbindelse med tjenesteforholdets ophør som følge af firmaets annulation af arbejdsaftalen — sag ved Tribunale di Milano med påstand om, at det tyske firma tilpligtedes at betale
An Italian engineer by the name of Ernesto Bianco, who was director of the sales office for Italy of the German undertaking Andreas Kufferath, brought an action in the Tribu­nale di Milano as a result of the unilateral termination of his contract of employment by the employer. He sought an order requiring the German undertaking to:
Under henvisning til en klausul i arbejdsaftalen, hvorefter »retten på firma Kufferath's hjemsted« skulle være værneting i sager i anledning af kontraktsforholdet, gjorde fir­maet gældende, at den italienske domstol savnede kompetence.
The company objected to the jurisdiction of the Italian court on the basis of a contractual clause conferring jurisdiction "on the court for the place where Kufferath has its regis­tered office".
Tribunale di Milano ud­talte, at den ikke havde kompetence til at påkende de krav, der fulgte af arbejdsforhol­det, men at den havde kompetence til at træffe afgørelse om de socialforsikringsretlige krav.
The Tribunale di Milano held, on the one hand, that it had no jurisdiction in respect of the claims based on the employment relationship, but that it did have jurisdiction in re­spect of the claims connected with social security.
Derefter indbragte sagsøgeren sagen for Corte di cassazione for at opnå en præju­diciel afgørelse om den internationale kompetence. Sagsøgeren gjorde gældende, at den anlagte arbejdsretlige sag ikke faldt ind under domskonventionen, som i henhold til arti­kel 1 kun gælder »borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager« ; det var derfor kun muligt at udelukke kompetencen for de italienske domstole inden for de grænser, der fulgte af artikel 2 i den italienske civilproceslov.
The plaintiff therefore appealed to the Corte di Cassazione for a preliminary decision on the question of jurisdiction, arguing that employment disputes did not fall within the scope of the Brussels Convention, which Article 1 confined to "civil and commercial matters"; therefore, it was argued, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Italian courts was permitted only within the limits established by Article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.