natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I øvrigt kunne det italienske selskab ikke længere gøre gældende, at det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke var forskriftsmæssigt forkyndt, da det ikke havde anfægtet den belgiske rets dom.
Moreover, the Italian under­taking was no longer entitled to challenge the legality of the document which instituted the proceedings, since it had not appealed against the judgment of the Belgian court.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om rettidigheden i artikel 27, nr. 2's forstand, anførte Corte d'appello, at den fuldbyrdende ret, der for så vidt er enekompetent, ved sin bedømmelse måtte gå ud fra de faktiske omstændigheder i det enkelte tilfælde, uanset de procesretlige regler både i doms­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten.
As to whether the document instituting the proceedings had been served in sufficient time within the meaning of Article 27 (2), the Corte d'Appello stated that the court in which enforcement was sought, which had sole jurisdiction in this respect, had to base its assessment on the factual circumstances of the individual case, regardless of the procedu­ral law of the State in which the judgment was given and the State in which enforcement was sought.
I betragtning af afstanden mellem Milano og den belgiske by Nivelles og i betragtning af den omstændighed, at sagen ikke frem­bød særlige problemer for sagsøgte, hvad angik fremskaffelsen af forretningspapirer, var et tidsrum på 22 dage fuldt ud tilstrækkeligt til, at sagsøgte kunne varetage sine inte­resser.
In view of the distance between Milan and the Belgian town of Nivelles and in the light of the fact that the application raised no particular difficulties for the defend­ant as regards the collection of business papers, a period of 22 days was quite sufficient for the preparation of the defence.
Kreditor behøvede altså ikke at godtgøre, at de betingelser, der eventuelt fulgte af
Therefore the creditor did not have to establish that any conditions laid down by the law of the State in which enforcement was sought were satisfied.
Der­for var virkningerne af den afgørelse, som tillod fuldbyrdelse i henhold til konventio­nens artikel 31, begrænset i den forstand, at det, så længe fristen for appel eller genopta­gelse ikke var udløbet eller under appelsagen eller sagen om genoptagelse, ikke var til­ladt at søge sig endelig fyldestgjort i skyldnerens formue på grundlag af denne afgørelse.
(continued 2) decision by which enforcement was authorized under Article 31 of the Convention was limited in its effect, in the sense that during the time specified for an appeal or during the appeal procedure no final execution on the debtor's assets by virtue ofthat decision was permitted.
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — civilretlig dom afsagt under en straffesag — manglende meddelelse om, at der gøres et civilretligt krav gældende — ingen hindring for at erklære dommen eksigibel
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Order under civil law made by a criminal court — Notice thai an application under civil law was to he made not given — No bar to enforce­ment
Sidstnævnte domfældelse skete under adhæ­sionsprocessen på begæring af Centrale Suikermaatschappij og Mathijssen som de for­urettede parter.
That order was made pursuant to an application by Centrale Suikermaatschappij and Mr Mathijssen.
Begæringen om fuldbyrdelsespåtegning på den belgiske rets dom blev afslået af præsi­denten for Rechtbank Breda med den begrundelse, at det hverken af den fremlagte stæv­ning, der var rettet til De Deugd, eller af de fremlagte forkyndelsespåtegninger fremgik med tilstrækkelig sikkerhed, at det var blevet meddelt tiltalte, at der ville blive gjort civil­retlige krav gældende mod ham under retsmødet.
The application for the enforcement of the judgment of the Belgian court was refused by the President of the Rechtbank, Breda, on the ground that it was not sufficiently cer­tain either from the summons which had been served on the defendant or from the docu­ment proving service that he had been informed that claims under civil law were to be made against him at the hearing.
Afgørelsen blev indbragt for Gerechtshof, som ophævede den.
On appeal, the Gerechtshof reversed that decision.
Efter Gerechtshofs op­fattelse kræver konventionens artikel 27 ikke, at det nævnes i det indledende proces­skrift i sagen, at de forurettede parter — som havde indbragt Rechtbank's afgørelse for Gerechtshof — under retsmødet for den ret, der har kompetence til at påkende straffesa­gen, vil gøre et civilretligt erstatningskrav af en bestemt størrelse gældende mod den til­talte.
In its view, Article 27 of the Conven­tion did not require it to be mentioned in the document instituting proceedings that the injured parties would be pursuing a claim for damages under civil law against the de­fendant in the proceedings before the criminal law.
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer f or fuldbyrdelsen — rettidig forkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 27, nr.2) — kriterier for prøvelsen: afstanden og ingen advokattvang
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement — Service in suf­ficient time of the documents which instituted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Criteria: distance and absence of any duty to appoint a legal representative
Sagsøgeren, der boede i Belgien, havde ved Vrederechter van het Kanton Neerpelt op­nået en udblivelsesdom over sagsøgte, der boede i Eindhoven (Nederlandene). Neerpelt ligger i den nederlandsksprogede del af Belgien, ikke langt fra den nederlandske græn­se.
The appellant, who resided in Belgium, had obtained a judgment in default against the espondent, who resided in Eindhoven (Netherlands), from the Vrederechter of the nunicipality of Neerpelt in the Dutch­speaking part of Belgium, not far from the border ■vith the Netherlands.
Præsidenten for Rechtbank 's­Hertogenbosch afslog begæringen om fuldbyrdelses­påtegning på udeblivelsesdommen over sagsøgte, der boede i hans retskreds, med den begrundelse, at stævningen af 17. marts 1981, som var blevet forkyndt for sagsøgte den 20. marts 1981 af en nederlandsk stævningsmand, og hvori han var indkaldt til retsmø­det den 9. april 1981, ikke var blevet forkyndt for ham i så god tid, at han havde kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen.
The President of the Rechtbank, 's­Hertogenbosch, refused the ap­3lication for the enforcement of the judgment in default against the respondent, who re­dded within his jurisdiction, on the ground that the writ — which was dated 17 March 1981 and was served on the respondent on 29 March 1981 by a Dutch process­server vith a summons to appear at a hearing on 9 April 1981 — had not been served on him in iufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence.
Denne bedømmelse gjaldt ikke blot, hvis stævnin­gen måtte anses for forkyndt den 20. marts 1981, men også hvis man gik ud fra den 17. marts, den dag den belgiske stævningsmand havde dateret stævningen.
It stated that its decision applied lot only if the writ was to be regarded as served on 20 March 1981 but also if it was re­carded as served on 17 March, which was the date placed on the writ by the Belgian irocess­server.
Appelinstansen, Gerechtshof 's­Hertogenbosch, kunne ikke tilslutte sig den afgørelse, der var truffet af præsidenten for Rechtbank, og erklærede Vrederechter's dom eksigibel.
The Gerechtshof, 's­Hertogenbosch, reversed the decision of the President of the Recht­• > ank and declared the judgment of the Vrederechter enforceable.
Stævningen måtte anses for forkyndt for sagsøgte den 20. marts 1981 ; dermed havde der været 19 dage mellem forkyndelsen og forhandlingen for Vrederechter.
It held that the writ mould be considered to have been served on the respondent on 20 March 1981 ; there vere therefore 19 days between service and the hearing before the Vrederechter.
Dette tidsrum måtte anses for tilstrækkeligt til, at sagsøgte havde god tid til at varetage sine interesser. Dette gjaldt så meget desto mere, som afstanden mellem Eindhoven og Neerpelt kun er ca. 25 km, og sagsøgte, som Gerechtshof udledte af udeblivelsesdommen, kunne have mødt personligt for Vrederechter.
That nust be regarded as sufficient time to enable the respondent to arrange for his defence, :specially if it were borne in mind that Eindhoven and Neerpelt were only about 25 km ipart and, as was clear from the judgment in default, the respondent could have ap­peared before the Vrederechter in person.
Desuden kunne han have anmodet Vrederechter om at udsætte sagen, så han fik lejlighed til at sikre sig retskyndig bistand.
Furthermore, he could have requested the vrederechter to stay the proceedings so as to give him an opportunity of obtaining legal issistance.
Han fremsatte nu begæring om, at den belgiske rets dom erklæredes eksigibel i Forbundsrepublikken.
He then applied for an order for the enforcement of the judgment of the Belgian court in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Det var ganske vist ikke til hinder for anerkendelse af dommen, at der var tale om en afgørelse truffet af en belgisk kriminalret. Konventionen af 1968 omfatter også civilretlige krav, som gøres gældende under en adhæsionsproces ved en kriminalret.
The fact that the judgment had been given by a Belgian criminal court did not prevent its enforcement.
Der savnedes imidlertid bevis for, at rekvisitus i fuldbyrdelsessagen i overensstemmelse med forskrifterne var blevet underrettet om, at der var indledt en ad­hæsionsproces; det var dermed i medfør af konventionens artikel 27, nr. 2, udelukket at anerkende afgørelsen.
There was, how­ever, no proof that the respondents had been duly informed that a civil claim was to be pursued in the course of the criminal proceedings; enforcement of the judgment was therefore prohibited by Article 27 (2) of the Convention.
Det var kun indkaldelsen til domsforhandlingen i straffesagen, der var blevet forkyndt for rekvisitus.
Only the summons to appear in the main criminal proceedings had been served on the respondents.
Derimod fremgik det ikke af de fremlagte doku­menter, at der under adhæsionsprocessen var blevet forkyndt en stævning eller et lig­nende processkrift.
From the docu­ments produced before the court, it did not appear that a statement of claim or any com­parable document in the civil action had been served on the respondents.
Det havde således ikke været muligt for rekvisitus at indrette sig på en civilretlig domfældelse i tilfælde af udeblivelse.
Thus they had had no opportunity of preparing for a judgment to be given under civil law in the event of their failure to enter an appearance.
Det stod i øvrigt rekvirenten frit for at gøre sine krav mod rekvisitus gældende ved anlæggelse af et nyt søgsmål ved en tysk ret.
Moreover, the applicant was at liberty to enforce his claim against the respondents by bringing a new action before a German court.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse — forskriftsmæssig forkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen — begrebet bopæl efter domsstatens ret — faktisk begreb
Recognition and enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing en­forcement — Due service of the document which instituted the proceedings — Concept of "residence" to be interpreted according to the law of the State in which the judgment was given — Question of fact
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — grunde til nægtelse heraf — modstrid med grund­læggende retsprincipper — udeblivelsesdom — fristen for genoptagelse en anden i domsstaten
Recognition and enforcement — Reasons for refusal — Contrary to public policy — Judgment in default — Time-limit for appeal different in the State in which the judg­ment was given
Ved dom af 17. februar 1975 havde Arbeitsgericht Duisburg ved udeblivelsesdom dømt skyldneren Pilny til at betale et pengebeløb til kreditor Vlk samt til at betale sagens om­kostninger.
By a judgment of 17 February 1975 the Arbeitsgericht Duisburg had ordered Mr Pilny (the appellant), who had not entered an appearance, to pay a certain sum of money to Mr Vlk (the respondent) and to bear the costs.
Som det fremgik af afleveringsattesten, blev der den 12. februar 1975 på en
As was clear from a certificate of postal service, written notice was left on 12 February 1975 at an address in Duisburg that a cer­tain court document had been deposited at a post office in Duisburg.
Han fremsatte begæring om genoptagelse og gjorde gældende, for det første at til­ladelsen til fulbyrdelse var i strid med nederlandsk ordre public, og for det andet at det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke forskriftsmæssigt var blevet forkyndt for eller med­delt ham. Med hensyn til det første argument påberåbte han sig, at fristen for genopta­gelse i medfør af § 339 i den tyske Zivilprozessordnung udgør to uger fra forkyndelsen af udeblivelsesdommen, som ikke behøver at ske for den pågældende personligt, mens fristen for genoptagelse af en udeblivelsesdom efter nederlandsk ret først begynder at løbe, når dommen er forkyndt for den domfældte personlig eller kommet til hans kund­skab.
\rticle339 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung) the time­limit 'or appealing was two weeks from service of the judgment in default, which did not have o be served personally on the defendant, whereas under Netherlands law the time­limit 'or appealing against a judgment in default did not begin to run until the judgment had > een served personally on the judgment debtor or brought to his notice. The appellant based his second ground of appeal on the contention that on 12 February 975 he resided in the Netherlands at an address which was known to the respondent it that time and, as the latter knew, he had never actually lived at the Duisburg address nven in the certificate of postal service.
Kreditor påberåbte sit til gengæld en udskrift fra folkeregisteret i Duisburg, hvorefter skyldneren siden 1971 havde boet på den i afleveringsattesten nævnte adresse.
η reply, the respondent referred to an extract from the register of Duisburg residents, iccording to which the appellant had lived at the address referred to in the certificate of )ostal service since 1971.
Han an­førte, at han i februar 1975 ikke havde været bekendt med, at skyldneren havde en anden bopæl ; den af skyldneren nævnte adresse i Nederlandene havde kun tjent som postadresse.
He maintained that in February 1975 he did not know that the ippellant had any other residence; the address mentioned in the Netherlands had served )nly as a postal address.
I en mellemafgørelse af 11. april 1980 anførte Rechtbank med hensyn til påberåbelsen af nederlandsk ordre public, at der i det foreliggende tilfælde var tale om en dom afsagt af en Arbeitsgericht, således at det ikke var § 339 i Zivilprozessordnung, men § 59 i Ar­beitsgerichtsgesetz, der var gældende, og at denne fastsatte en frist for begæring om gen­optagelse på en uge.
η an interlocutory judgment dated I I April 1980 the Rechtbank stated that, so far as he reference to Netherlands public policy was concerned, because the present case con­:erned a judgment of the Arbeitsgericht, the applicable provision was not Article 339 of he German Code of Civil Procedure but Paragraph 59 of the Law on Labour Courts (Ar­leitsgeriehtgesetz), which prescribed a period of one week as the time for appealing.
Artikel 81 i den nederlandske Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvor­dering indeholdt ikke noget retsprincip, der var så grundlæggende, at anvendelsen af den nævnte bestemmelse i tysk arbejdsprocesret var i strid med (international privatret­lig) ordre public.
Arti­:le 81 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure ¡Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechlsvor­iering] did not contain any principle of law so fundamental as to render the application )f the aforesaid provisions of German procedural labour law contrary to the (private in­ernational) rules of public policy.
Rechtbank støttede sin opfattelse på, at fuldbyrdelsen af en udeblivel­sesdom i henhold til konventionens artikel 46, nr. 2, hører til de emner, der er behandlet i konventionen, og at der i denne regel opstilles en særlig betingelse for fuldbyrdelsen af sådanne domme for at sikre varetagelsen af den udeblevne parts rettigheder.
The Rechtbank based its view on the fact that Arti­de 46 (2) of the Convention provided that a judgment in default was to be enforced un­ler certain circumstances specified by the Convention and that provision contained a larticular precondition for the enforcement of such judgments in order to protect the ights of the party in default.
Med hensyn til forkyndelsen af det indledende processkrift i sagen anførte Rechtbank, at dette spørgsmål måtte bedømmes efter domsstatens ret, i det foreliggende tilfælde alt­så efter tysk ret, og — i givet fald — efter de internationale konventioner om forkyn­delse af retslige dokumenter.
\s to the service of the document which instituted the proceedings, the Rechtbank stated hat that question was to be decided according to the law of the State in which the judg­nent was given; that is to say, in the present case, according to German law and — vhere appropriate — on the basis of international agreements on the service of court locuments.
Desuden anså Rechtbank en nærmere forklaring af betyd­ningen af begrebet »bopæl« i §§ 181 og 182 i Zivilprozessordnung for nødvendig.
The Rechtbank also considered that a more detailed explanation of the neaning of the term "residence" {Wohnung] in Articles 181 and 182 of the German /ode of Civil Procedure was needed.
Efter at hver af parterne havde fremlagt en sagkyndig erklæring fra en tysk advokat, af­sagte Rechtbank endelig dom.
\fter the parties had each produced an opinion from a German lawyer, the Rechtbank ;ave its final judgment.
Ifølge de sagkyndige erklæringer var begrebet »bopæl« et faktisk begreb; det kom ikke an på, om en person var tilmeldt under en bestemt
It was a question not of whether he was registered in the municipality under ι particular address but of whether he actually lived in the building in question.
2 fortsat 2) adresse i en kommune, men på, om den pågældende hovedsagelig boede i den pågæl­dende bygning.
(continued 2) cate of postal service.
Set ud fra disse principper boede skyldneren den 12. februar 1975 ikke på den i afleveringsattesten nævnte adresse i Duisburg.
The respondent had not maintained that the appellant had resided at that address in February 1975 or at any time previously with any regularity.
Rechtbank anførte endvidere, at den mulighed, der i henhold til tysk ret er for alligevel at anse forkyndelsen for forskriftsmæssig, når den, for hvem forkyndelsen skal ske, med vilje har givet det udseende af at bo på en bestemt adresse, skønt dette faktisk ikke er tilfældet, ikke kom i betragtning her.
The Rechtbank also held that the possibility which was available under German law of regarding service as regular if the defendant had fraudulently given the impression that he resided at a particular address, even though he did not in fact do so, was not relevant in this case.
Rechtbank tog følgelig den af skyldneren fremsatte begæring til følge og ophævede præsidentes kendelse, hvori denne havde tilladt fuldbyrdelse, med den begrundelse, at det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke var blevet forskriftsmæssigt forkyndt i Tyskland.
Accordingly, the Rechtbank allowed the appeal and reversed the decision of the Presi­dent authorizing the enforcement of the judgment on the ground that the document insti­tuting the proceedings in Germany had not been duly served.
Afgørelsen blev imidlertid stadfæstet af Oberlandes­gericht.
(continued I) sion to the Cour de Cassation was dismissed.
Rekvisitus anfægtede herefter denne afgørelse ved en .»Rechtsbeschwerde«, men fik heller ikke medhold heri.
The defendant objected to the granting of an order for the enforcement of the French judgment in the Federal Republic of Germany, contending in essence that recognition of the French judgment was precluded by Article 27(1) and (3) of the Convention.
Bundesgerichtshof afslog i øvrigt at indhente en præjudiciel afgørelse fra EF­Domstolen vedrørende fortolkningen af artikel 27, nr. 3, og artikel 27, nr. 1.
The Bundesgerichtshof also refused to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the interpretation of Article 27(1) and (3).
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — hindringer for fuldbyrdelsen — den udenlandske afgørelse uforenelig med en afgørelse truffet i fuldbyrdelsesstaten — udenlandsk afgørelse om under­holdsbidrag efter skilsmisse — indenlandsk afgørelse der ikke anerkendte den uden­landske skilsmissedom — afgørelserne var uforenelige
Recognition and enforcement — Reasons for refusing enforcement — Irreconcilability of he foreign judgment with a judgment given in the State in which enforcement is sought — foreign judgment on maintenance after divorce — Domestic judgment refusing to recognize he foreign divorce decree — Irreconcilable
Parternes ægteskab blev opløst ved dom afsagt af Arrondissementsrechtbank Maastricht den 21. oktober 1976. Samtidig blev manden dømt til at betale hustruen et bestemt må­nedligt underholdsbidrag.
~he parties' marriage was dissolved by a judgment of the Arrondissementsrechtbank, Maastricht, of 21 October 1976.
Hustruen begærede herefter afgørelsen om underholdsbidra­get forsynet med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland.
The applicant then sought he enforcement of the maintenance order in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Endvidere anmodede hun i medfør af artikel 7, stk. 1, i den tyske Familienrechtsänderungsgesetz 1961 delstatens justitsministerium, der havde kompetencen, om at fastslå, at betingel­serne for anerkendelse af skilsmissedommen var opfyldt.
She also ought a declaration from the Minister for Justice of North Rhine­Westfalia, pursuant o Article 7 (1 ) of the German Family Law Amendment Law 1961, that the conditions 'or recognition of the divorce decree were fulfilled.
Ved afgørelse af 12. december 1980 afslog delstatens justitsminister denne anmodning.
In a decision of 12 December 1980 he Minister for Justice refused that application.
Oberlandesgericht anførte, at afgørelsen om underholdsbidraget af 21. oktober 1976 var uforenelig med justitsministerens afgørelse af 12. december 1980 og derfor ikke kunne fuldbyrdes i Tyskland, jfr. konventionens artikler 34, stk. 2 og 27, nr. 3.
The order for the enforcement of the naintenance order which had been issued by the Landgericht was set aside on appeal > y the respondent. The Oberlandesgericht held that the maintenance order of 21 October 1976 was irrecon­:ilable with the decision of the Minister for Justice of 12 December 1980 and therefore ould not be enforced in Germany by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 34 and article 27 (3) of the Convention.
Justitsministe­rens afgørelse opfyldte kravene i artikel 27, nr. 3, da den var truffet under en retsplejelig­nende procedure og var bindende for de nationale retter.
The Minister's decision satisfied the requirements of Article 27 (3) because it was given η judicial proceedings and was binding on national courts.
Den nederlandske afgørelse om underholdsbidraget var uforenelig med denne afgørelse.
The Netherlands order for naintenance was irreconcilable with that decision.
De to afgørelser behøvede ikke at vedrøre samme sagsgenstand.
The two decisions did not have to re­ate to the same matter.
Det var tilstrækkeligt, hvis resultaterne udeluk­kede hinanden.
It was sufficient for their results to be mutually exclusive.
Dette var tilfældet her, da manden på den ene side stadig ansås for gift i Tyskland, men på den anden side som fraskilt ægtemand skulle betale underholdsbi­drag, skønt han som gift muligvis ikke var forpligtet hertil.
That vas the case here, since, on the one hand, the respondent was regarded as still married in jermany but, on the other hand, was required to pay maintenance as a divorced hus­ > and, even though he might not be obliged to do so as a married man.
I øvrigt var det ifølge arti­kel 27, nr. 3, uden betydning, om den indenlandske afgørelse var truffet før eller — som her — senere.
ARTICLE 27 (3)
Justitsministerens afgørelse var dog ikke endelig.
The decision of the Minister for Justice was not, however, final.