natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den 8. november 1989 forelagde CBB desuden Kommissionen en ny udgave af brancheaftalerne mellem SGFSB og CBB for produktionsårene 1986/87 — 1990/91. I den nye version var der bl.a. foretaget en ændring (vedtaget den 14. februar 1989) af de generelle betingelser for køb og levering af roer samt en tilpasning (vedtaget den 29. september 1989) af den nationale konvention om roekvoter.
In addition, on 8 November 1989, the CBB sent the Commission a new version of the inter­trade agreements concluded between the SGFSB and the CBB for the 1986/87 to 1990/91 marketing years containing an amendment (agreed on 14 February 1989) to the general conditions governing purchase and acceptance and an adjustment (agreed on 29 September 1989) to the national agreement on the setting of quotas for beet production.
Brancheaftalerne indeholder herefter ingen præferenceklausul vedrørende roer dyrket i Belgien.
The new version of the inter­trade agreements no longer contains any clauses giving priority to supplies of beet grown in Belgium.
Belgien, og bestemmelsen om, at roeproducenterne i Bavay­Maubeuge ikke skulle medtages ved forde­lingen af RT's maksimalkvote.
The legal assessment regarding compatibility with the provisions of Article 85 will thus relate to the clause granting priority to beet grown in Belgium and the exclusion of the Bavay-Maubeuge growers in allocating R.T.'s maximum quota.
(73) vedrørende roer, der dyrkes
(73) to beet grown in
I artikel 85, stk. 1, er det fastsat, at alle aftaler mellem virksomheder, alle vedtagelser inden for sammenslutninger af virksomheder og alle former for samordnet praksis, der kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, og som har til formål eller til følge at hindre, begrænse eller fordreje konkur­ rencen inden for fællesmarkedet, er uforenelige med fællesmarkedet og er forbudt.
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty prohibits all agree ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.
Konventionen om individuelle kvoter af 23. december 1985 og de generelle købsbetingelser af 17. marts 1987 (sammenfattende benævnt bran­cheaftaler i det følgende) var aftaler indgået af bran­cheforeninger i deres eget navn og for deres medlemmers regning.
The agreement of 23 December 1985 setting individual quotas and the general conditions governing purchase of 17 March 1987, hereinafter referred to as the inter-trade agreements, were agreements concluded by trade associations, in their own name and also on behalf of their members.
De måtte derfor betragtes som aftaler mellem virksomheder efter EØF­Trak­tatens artikel 85.
They were therefore agreements between undertakings within the meaning of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
Brancheaftalernes bestemmelse om, at de mængder roer, der var nødvendige for at sukkerfabrikkerne kunne opfylde deres maksimalkvote, fortrinsvis skulle leveres af belgiske producenter, havde til formål at begrænse leverancerne fra udenlandske roeproducenter.
The requirement under the inter-trade agreements that beet deliveries required for the production of the undertakings' maximum quotas should be reserved on a priority basis for beet growers established in Belgium had as its object the limiting of supplies from growers operating outside Belgium.
Bestemmelsen gik nemlig ud på, at import af roer kun var tilladt, for så vidt som de var nødvendige for at opfylde de belgiske sukkerfabrik­kers maksimalkvote, og såfremt de ikke havde kunnet fås i Belgien.
The purpose of the clause was to accept beet from abroad only to the extent that such quantities not produced in Belgium were necessary to achieve the Belgian sugar quotas.
Denne forpligtelse havde således til formål at formindske sukkerfabrikkernes forsyningsmuligheder og ville derfor også kunne begrænse de udenlandske roeproducenters adgang til det belgiske marked.
The requirement therefore had the object of restricting the sources of supply of sugar manufacturers and accordingly limited access to the Belgian market for growers established outside Belgium.
Disse aftaler indebar følgende forpligtelser for de belgiske sukkerfabrikker :
The agreements entailed the following obligations for the Belgian sugar undertakings :
(79) a) En forpligtelse ti! fortrinsvis at anvende roer, der er dyrket i Belgien, til produktion af sukker inden for maksimalkvoten.
(a) The obligation to give priority to beet grown in Belgium in supplies intended for sugar production within the maximum quotas of each undertaking.
Denne præference­klausul fandtes også i den tidligere brancheaf­tale, der blev undertegnet i 1981.
This priority clause also existed in the previous inter-trade agreement signed in 1981.
Konkurrencebegrænsningen var særligt mærkbar i det foreliggende tilfælde ; for det første omfattede den nemlig en række nederlandske roeproducentet og alle roeproducenterne i Nordfrankrig mellem Maubeuge og Dunkerque, der ligger i nærheden af den belgisk­franske grænse, hvor producenterne således kan levere på optimale vilkår til de belgiske sukkerfabrikker i nærheden af grænsen ; for det andet omfattede den direkte de leverandører, der i forvejen leverede deres høst eller en del deraf til belgiske sukkerfabrikker.
This restriction was particularly significant since, firstly, it affected not only a number of Dutch growers, but all the French growers in the 'Nord' department of France operating between Maubeuge and Dunkirk alongside the Belgo-French border and able to deliver to the Belgian sugar refineries near the frontier under optimum conditions of costeffectiveness and, secondly, it affected more directly those growers which were already traditionally supplying all or part of their harvest to Belgian sugar refineries.
0 b) En forpligtelse til at fordele de roeleverancer, der er nødvendige for produktionen af maksi­malkvoten, som kvoter til leverandørerne. Denne fordeling fandt sted i begyndelsen af 1986.
Such allocation actually took place in the case of each sugar undertaking at the beginning of 1986.
Den blev foretaget på grundlag af de enkelte roeproducenters gennemsnitlige leve­rancer for de sidste seks år, men roeproducen­terne i Bavay­Maubeuge­området blev ikke medtaget i denne fordeling, selv om de regel­mæssigt havde leveret roer til RT i flere år.
It was carried out in proportion to the average of each grower's deliveries over the last six years, but the growers established in the Bavay-Maubeuge region, including those which had regularly supplied R.T. for several years, were excluded from the allocation.
Forpligtelsen for de belgiske sukkerfabrikker til fortrinsvis at overlade de belgiske roeproducenter leverancerne påvirkede direkte handelen mellem medlemsstaterne, fordi den tog sigte på at udelukke roer, der var dyrket i de andre medlemsstater, fra leverancerne til den belgiske sukkerindustri, eller i hvert fald at begrænse eventuelle leverancer fra disse medlemsstater til kun at omfatte mængder, der svarede til et eventuelt underskud i den belgiske roeproduktion i forhold til den nationale maksimalkvote.
The requirement that the Belgian sugar undertakings accept supplies to their sugar refineries on a priority basis from Belgian growers had a direct effect on intraCommunity trade in beet, since its object was to exclude beet grown in the other Member States from supplies to the Belgian sugar industry or, at least, to restrict any supplies from other Member States to quantities amounting at the most to any shortfalls in Belgian beet production in relation to the maximum Belgian quota.
Kommissionen forbeholder sig sin stilling til sidst­nævnte forpligtelse, som vedrører omfordeling af disponible rettigheder, og som gælder for sukkerfa­brikkerne i Hesbaye­området (herunder Quévy og Brugelette), idet den ikke har fastslået, om den er forenelig med Traktatens konkurrenceregler.
(c) The obligation for the manufacturers having sugar refineries in the Hesbaye region (including Quévy and Brugelette) to reallocate only to traditional supplying growers the rights made available by any delivery shortfalls and calculated in accordance with the rules governing the adjustment of rights annexed to the agree ment on the setting of individual quotas.
Da en del af den nederlandske roeproduktion (nemlig produktionen i den sydvestlige del af Nederlandene) og en endnu større del af de roer, der høstes i Nordfrankrig, ville kunne leveres på rentable vilkår til henholdsvis den belgiske sukker­fabrik i nærheden af den nederlandske grænse og de belgiske sukkerfabrikker i nærheden af den franske grænse, ville brancheaftalerne i det forelig­gende tilfælde have kunnet påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstaterne mærkbart.
As regards this latter obligation concerning the reallocation of available rights and applicable to sugar refineries in the Hesbaye region (including Quévy and Brugelette), the Commission reserved its assessment of the compatibility of such a clause with the competition rules laid down in the Treaty.
Vurderingen af, om aftalerne er forenelige med EØF­Traktatens artikel 85, vedrører således præfe­renceklausulen vedrørende roer, der dyrkes i
Since part of Dutch beet production (beet harvested in the south-west of the Netherlands) and a much larger volume of beet harvested in the 'Nord' department of France could respectively be supplied under good conditions of costeffectiveness to the Belgian sugar refinery situated near the Dutch frontier and to the other Belgian sugar refineries situated near the French frontier, the inter-trade agreements in question must be deemed to have been likely to have had an appreciable effect on trade between Membes States.
(82) artikel 2, i Rådets forordning nr. 26 ('), ikke var omfattet af EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1 (jf. afsnit B), eller såfremt de i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 3, kunne fritages fra forbudet i artikel 85, stk. 1, (jf. afsnit C nedenfor).
90 where, pursuant to Article 2 of Council Regulation No 26 ('), Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty does not apply to them (see point Β below), or where, under Article 85 (3), they are exempt from the ban laid down in Article 85 (1) (see point C below).
Der er tale om et produkt, som normalt ikke transporteres over store afstande, og som på grund af art og anvendelsesformål kun i ringe grad er udsat for konkurrence fra producenter, der geografisk set er afsides beliggende, og derfor påvirkes handelen særdeles mærkbart, når der indføres handelsrestriktioner i et af de EF-lande, hvor samhandelen på grund af dyrkningsområdernes beliggenhed under alle omstændigheder ville kunne blive meget omfattende.
Furthermore, since the product involved is not normally transported over long distances and is thus, by its nature and by custom, little exposed to competition from producers established far away, the fact of imposing restrictions on trade in one of the Community countries best placed (because of the location of the growing areas) to allow trade nevertheless to take place and to reach a not incon­siderable level made the resulting effect on trade all the more appreciable.
Bestemmelsen om, at roeproducenterne i Bavay- Maubeuge ikke skulle medtages ved fordelingen af RTs maksimalkvote
The exclusion of the Bavay-Maubeuge in allocating R.T.'s maximum quota
Ifølge en aftale mellem RT og CBB, som byggede på det princip, at de nationale roeproducenter skulle have fortrinsstilling, blev de roeproducenter i Bavay-Maubeuge, der normalt leverede til RT, ikke medtaget ved fordelingen af RT's kvote.
The exclusion, in allocating R.T.'s quota, of the Bavay­Maubeuge growers who used to supply R.T. on a regular basis was the result of an agreement between R.T. and the CBB based on the principle of the priority given to national growers.
Proceduren i det foreliggende tilfælde vedrører samhandelen med de landbrugsvarer, der er anført i bilag II til EØF-Traktaten.
This proceeding relates to trade in agricultural products listed in Annex II of the EEC Treaty.
Disse varer henhører under artikel 1 og 2 i Rådets forordning nr. 26 ; ifølge artikel 1 gælder EØF-Traktatens artikel 85 til 90 på aftaler og vedtagelser om disse varer ; artikel 2 omhandler de tilfælde, hvor artikel 85 ikke finder anvendelse på aftaler og vedtagelser om disse varer.
Such products are covered by Articles 1 and 2 of Regulation No 26 ; Article 1 provides that Articles 85 to 90 of the EEC Treaty apply to agreements and decisions relating to such products, while Article 2 provides for exceptions to the application of Article 85 of the Treaty to agreements and deci­sions relating to such products.
I henhold til artikel 2, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 26 gælder EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, ikke for aftaler, vedtagelser og former for praksis, der udgør en integrerende del af en national markedsordning, eller som er nødvendige for at nå de i Traktatens artikel 39 angivne mål.
Article 2 (1) of Regulation No 26 states that Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty shall not apply to agreements, deci­sions and practices which form an integral part of a national market organization or are necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty.
Den fælles markedsordning for sukker og roer trådte i kraft den 1. juli 1968 og erstattede de nationale markedsordninger, der tidligere havde eksisteret på dette område ; der findes derfor ikke længere nationale markedsordninger i EF, og de pågældende aftaler kan derfor ikke indgå i en sådan.
Since the entry into force, on 1 July 1968, of the common organization of markets in the sugar sector in place of the national market organizations which had previously existed in the sector, there are no longer any such national market organiza­tions within the EEC, and therefore the agreements in question cannot form part of them.
ikke længere ville modtage franske roer i Quévy, fordi de ikke var omfattet af en særskilt kvote, dels at det var CBB's opfattelse, at den belgiske kvote udelukkende skulle opfyldes med leverancer fra nationale roeproducenter.
This joint desire to exclude the Bavay­Maubeuge growers in allocating R.T.'s quota was reflected in particular in the letter of 1 July 1985 (referred to in point 64 above) from the President of the CBB in which it is stated, firstly, that R.T. will no longer in future accept French beet supplied to Quévy since such beet is not covered by its own quota and, secondly, that the CBB's position is that 'the Belgian quota should be used solely for Belgian growers'.
Dette gav sig konkret udslag i, at RT's kvote udelukkende blev fordelt mellem nationale roeproducenter, og at leveringskontrakterne med roeproducenterne i Bavay-Maubeuge blev ophævet.
The exclusion of the Bavay­Maubeuge growers was finally embodied in the exclusive allo­cation of R.T.'s quota to national growers alone and in the termination of the Bavay­Maubeuge growers' supply contracts.
Det forhold, at roeproducenterne i Bavay-Maubeuge, der regelmæssigt leverede til RT, ikke fik del i RT's kvote, måtte betragtes som en konkurrencebegrænsning, der direkte påvirkede handelen mellem medlemsstaterne, fordi den medførte standsning af leverancerne til RT fra Bavay-Maubeuge-området.
The exclusion of the Bavay­Maubeuge growers who used to supply R.T. on a regular basis from the allocation of R.T.'s quota constituted a restriction of competition which, by bringing about the termina­tion of supplies to R.T. from the Bavay­Maubeuge region, directly affected trade between Member States.
Hvad angår den anden undtagelse i artikel 2 i forordning nr. 26 skal det bemærkes — som det også er anført i tredje afsnit i betragtningerne til nævnte forordning — at den kun gælder, såfremt anvendelsen af Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, medfører fare for, at målene for den fælles land brugspolitik ikke kan nås.
As regards the second exception provided for in Article 2 of Regulation No 26, it should be noted, as is stipulated in the third recital of the Regula­tion, that such exception is intended to apply only insofar as the application of Article 85 (1) of the Treaty would jeopardize attainment of the objec­tives of the common agricultural policy in the sector concerned.
Disse forordninger og navnlig forordningerne om den fælles markedsordning på det pågældende område omfatter de foranstaltninger, der er nødvendige for at nå de i EØF-Traktatens artikel 39 fastsatte mål.
However, there is no such risk in this instance, since the necessary means of attai­ning the objectives set out in Article 39 of the EEC Treaty have been provided for in the regulations establishing the common organization of the markets in the sector concerned.
Disse forordninger, og navnlig forordningerne om brancheaftaler, giver ikke sukkerfabrikkerne mulighed for at lade dere.s roeleverancer eller en del deraf være forbeholdt nationale roeproducenter.
Such regulations, and in particular those relating to inter­trade agree­ments, do not make provision for sugar underta­kings to accept all or part of their beet supplies only from national growers.
Bestemmelserne om, at roer dyrket i Belgien skulle have fortrinsstilling, og at leverandører fra Bavay-
In terms of the Community as a whole, the contraction in the rele­vant trade between France and Belgium was equi­valent to 17 % of the total volume of beet traded within the Community in 1985 and to 24% of Community trade in 1987.
Ovennævnte konkurrencebegrænsninger, der kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstaterne mærkbart, var kun lovlige, såfremt de i henhold til
The abovementioned restrictions of competition which were liable to have a significant effect on trade between Member States could be lawful only
Maubeuge var udelukket, var under alle omstændigheder i strid med princippet om, at markedet for landbrugsvarer skal være åbnet, og var tillige i strid med Traktatens artikel 40 om udelukkelse af forskelsbehandling, især når forskelsbehandling bevirker, at en veletableret samhandel afbrydes. Disse begrænsninger kunne derfor ikke anses for nødvendige for at nå de i EØF-Traktatens artikel 39 fastsatte mål.
Article 40 of the Treaty, all the more so since such discrimination has the effect of disrupting well established trade flows.
På grund af transportomkostningerne og det forhold, at roernes sukkerindhold påvirkes af oplagringsperioden før forarbejdning, er det normalt i sukkerfabrikanternes interesse at få roerne leveret fra de nærmeste dyrkningsområder ; det er derfor kun i tilfælde af, at den lokale produktion er utilstrækkelig, at de er nødt til at indgå kontrakter med roeproducenter længere væk, even tuelt i en tilgrænsende medlemsstat.
(92) affected by the length of the period during which it is stored before being processed, it is normally in sugar manufacturers' interests to obtain their supplies in the growing areas closest to them, and it is therefore only if there is a local shortage that they will have an incentive to enter into contracts with more distant growers who might be established in order, adjacent Member States.
Der er således ingen risiko for, at betydelige leverancer fra andre medlemsstater vil skade afsætningen af den lokale produktion, som hævdet af RT.
Conse quently, the risk referred to by R.T., namely of large-scale supplies coming from other Member States at the expense of sales by local growers, does not exist.
Det er derfor ikke nødvendigt at give nationale roeproducenter fortrinsstilling for at stabilisere deres afsætning.
It is not therefore necessary, in ensuring the stabilization of the relevant growers' sales, to grant national growers priority in sales.
Det forhold, at leverancerne er blevet forbeholdt nationale roeproducenter, og især at leverandører fra Bavay-Maubeuge er blevet udelukket, er desuden i strid med EØF-Traktatens artikel 40, stk. 3, andet afsnit, hvori det er fastsat, at den fælles ordning »skal begrænses til at forfølge de i artikel 39 anførte mål og bør udelukke enhver form for forskelsbehandling af Fællesskabets producenter eller forbrugere«.
In addition, the fact of granting national growers priority status in agricultural supplies, and in particular the exclusion of the Bavay-Maubeuge suppliers, is completely contrary to Article 40 of the EEC Treaty, the second subparagraph of paragraph 3 of which stipulates that 'the common organization shall be limited to pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 39 and shall exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers within the Community'.
Disse begrænsninger strider også mod det princip, at markedet for landbrugsvarer skal være åbent.
The above restrictions are also contrary to the principle of an open agricultural market.
Af ovenstående årsager var det helt udelukket, at foranstaltninger, der hindrede frie varebevægelser inden for Fællesskabet og dermed var i strid med et af Traktatens grundlæggende principper, kunne betragtes som nødvendige for at nå de i Traktatens artikeF 39 anførte mål.
For all these reasons, measures which, by obstruct ing the free movement of goods within the Community, were wholly contrary to one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty, cannot in any way be deemed to be necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39 of the EEC Treaty.
De parter, der var omfattet af Kommissionens klagepunkter, har i denne forbindelse forsvaret sig med, at det er i overensstemmelse med fællesskabsreglerne, at de enkelte medlemsstaters maksimalkvote for sukkerproduktion fortrinsvis er forbeholdt roeproducenterne i den pågældende medlemsstat.
In this connection, the parties to whom the Commission's statement of objections was addressed argued in their defence that it is in line with the logic of the system established by Community rules to deem the maximum sugar production quota of each Member State to be reserved on a priority basis to the beet growers of the relevant Member State.
For ifølge RT og CBB er fællesskabsbestemmelsernes egentlige mål at beskytte roeproducenterne, og tildelingen af sukkerkvoter er kun et middel til at gennemføre denne beskyttelse.
R.T. and the CBB argue that the real objective of the Community rules is to protect beet growers, with the allocation of sugar quotas being merely an instrument for achieving such protection.
Dette medfører, stadig ifølge RT og CBB, at når Fællesskabets lovgivningsmyndighed beslutter at tildele en medlemsstat en sukkerkvote, egentlig sigter mod at give landbrugerne i den pågældende medlemsstat mulighed for at levere sukkerfabrikkerne i den pågældende stat de mængder roer, der er nødven dige for at opfylde denne kvote.
It follows, according to R.T. and the CBB, that, where under Community legislation a sugar quota is allocated to a Member State, the true objective pursued is to allow growers in the Member State concerned to sell to the sugar refineries of the Member State concerned the quantities of beet necessary to produce such quota.
Det ville således være i strid med denne målsætning at give sukker fabrikanterne i en medlemstat mulighed for at modtage roeleverancer fra en anden medlemsstat, når det er muligt for dem at få tilstrækkelige leve rancer på det nationale marked.
It would thus be contrary to this objective to allow sugar manufacturers in a Member State to obtain their supplies of beet from growers in another Member State when sufficient supplies were available on their national· market.
RT og CBB konkluderer, at de nationale roeproducenters fortrinsstilling ganske vist ikke er udtrykkeligt fastsat i forordningerne om den fælles markedsordning, men at den er nødvendig for at beskytte roeproducenternes interesser og dermed for at nå de i Traktatens artikel 39 fastsatte mål.
R.T. and the CBB draw the conclusion from this that the priority given to national suppliers, although not expressly provided for in the regulations governing the common organization of the markets, is necessary in order to protect the interests of beet growers and thus in order to attain the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty.