natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
EU's konkurrencelovgivning indeholder specifikke regler vedrørende forhandling af motor køretøjer, nemlig i form af Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1475/95, der trådte i kraft den 1. oktober 1995.
EU competition law contains specific provisions on motor vehicle distribution. The legislation (Regulation (EC) No 1475/95) came into force on 1 October 1995.
Der er tale om en gruppefritagelsesforordning, som har til formål at styrke forbrugernes ret til at købe et nyt køretøj, enten direkte eller via en bemyndiget mellemhandler, hvor som helst i EU.
One aim of the block exemption was to reinforce the right of consumers to purchase a new car, either directly or through an authorised intermediary, wherever they wish in the European Community.
Bilfabrikanter eller forhandlere, der gør sig skyldige i en hvilken som helst af disse »sortlistede« foranstaltninger, risikerer en automatisk udelukkelse fra gruppefritagelsen.
Accordingly, the regulation prohibits any director indirect hindrance of parallel trade, i.e.: refusals by dealers to supply a consumer simply because he/she is a resident of another Member State; charging foreign consumers higher prices or imposing longer delivery periods than for consumers based in the Member State; refusing to perform guarantee services or other free services for cars imported from another Member State; hindering the activities of intermediaries authorised by consumers by applying excessive criteria as regards their mandate; restricting supplies by manufacturers to dealers who sell cars to consumers resident in another Member State; threats by manufacturers to terminate contracts with dealers who sell cars to consumers resident in another Member State;
Forordningen bestemmer, at bilfabrikanterne er forpligtet til at forsyne deres forhandlere med biler med de specifikationer, som ønskes af forbrugere fra andre medlemsstater, f.eks. højrestyring, hvis forhandlerne ønsker at sælge dem.
The regulation requires manufacturers to supply their dealers with cars produced to the specifications of consumers from other Member States Ð for example, right-hand-drive (RHD) Ð if the dealers wish to sell them.
EU-lovgivningen pålægger imidlertid ikke de individuelle bilforhandlere en retlig forpligtelse til at sælge biler.
However, EU competition law does not impose a legal obligation on individual car dealers to sell cars.
Med sin beslutning om at pålægge Volkswagen/Audi en bøde, fordi denne bilfabrikant havde tvunget sine forhandlere i Italien til ikke at sælge biler af disse to mærker til udenlandske købere, viste Kommissionen med al tydelighed, at den ikke vil tolerere praksis, der strider mod forbrugernes interesser.
By its decision to fine Volkswagen/Audi for forcing its authorised dealers in Italy to refuse to sell Volkswagen and Audi cars to foreign buyers, the Commission demonstrated that it will not tolerate practices which are contrary to consumers' interests.
Kommissionen er i færd med at undersøge tilsvarende sager vedrørende andre bilfabrikanter.
The Commission is currently examining similar cases involving other manufacturers.
Hvis det viser sig, at der er sandsynlighed for, at EU's konkurrenceregler er blevet overtrådt som følge af en koordineret salgsnægtelse, vil Kommissionen, ligesom i Volkswagen-sagen, vedtage de nødvendige beslutninger.
Insofar as infringements of Community competition rules seem likely to be proven, the Commission will investigate cases of coordinated refusals to sell and, as in the recent Volkswagen case, take the necessary decisions.
Kommissionen gentager, at den ikke vil tøve med at indlede sager mod fabrikanter, der overtræder EU's lovgivning.
The Commission reiterates that it will not hesitate to act against manufacturers who fail to comply with Community law.
Foruden disse direkte interventioner fortsætter Kommissionen med at øge prisgennemsigtigheden ved at offentliggøre sine halvårlige rapporter om bilpriserne i EU.
In addition to such direct action, the Commission continues to increase price transparency by publishing twice-yearly reports on car prices in the Union.
Forbrugernes stigende efterspørgsel efter denne rapport — der udsendes ca. 8 000 kopier om året — viser, at de bliver mere og mere opmærksomme på de fordele, som det indre marked giver dem.
Growing consumer demand for this report Ð about 8 000 copies are distributed annually Ð illustrates that consumers are increasingly aware of the benefits that the single market can provide.
Denne udvikling forventes at blive forstærket med euroens indførelse, der vil øge prisgennemsigtigheden og gøre det nemmere at sammenligne priser.
The introduction of the euro, which will increase price transparency and facilitate comparisons, is expected to reinforce this behaviour within the European Community.
Forbrugernes stigende opmærksomhed om deres rettigheder har ført til en tilsvarende stigning i enkeltpersoners anmodninger om bistand ved køb af en bil i udlandet.
This heightened awareness has led to greater demand from individuals for assistance in purchasing cars abroad.
Problemerne samler sig især om britiske statsborgeres forsøg på at købe højrestyrede biler uden for Det Forenede Kongerige.
This applies in particular to difficulties encountered by British citizens when trying to purchase RHD cars outside the United Kingdom.
Kommissionen har haft held med at hjælpe en stor del af de pågældende personer.
The Commission has succeeded in helping a large number of these individuals.
Tallene fra bilfabrikanterne viser faktisk, at antallet af højrestyrede biler, der sælges med henblik på indførsel i Det Forenede Kongerige, er stigende.
In fact, the figures supplied by some manufacturers indicate an increase in sales of RHD cars for import into the United Kingdom.
For at finde en passende løsning på dette specifikke problem har mange bilfabrikanter, nemlig BMW, Fiat, Ford, Mercedes-Benz, Opel/Vauxhall, PSA (Peugeot/ Citroën), Volvo, VW/Audi, Honda, Nissan og Renault, fulgt Kommissionens forslag om at oprette informationscentre for europæiske forbrugere, der ønsker at købe en bil i udlandet.
In order to provide an appropriate solution to this specific problem, most manufacturers, i.e. BMW, Fiat, Ford, Mercedes- Benz, Opal/Vauxhall, PAS (Peugeot/CitroeÈn), Volvo, VW/Audi, Honda, Nissan and Renault have, at the Commission's suggestion, established information centres for European consumers wishing to buy a car abroad.
Traktatens artikel 82 forbyder virksomheder, der indtager en dominerende stilling på et givet marked, at misbruge denne situation til skade for andre.
Article 82 prohibits undertakings in a dominant position on a given market from abusing this situation to the prejudice of third parties.
Misbrug af en dominerende stilling kan bl.a. bestå i en begrænsning af produktionen, opkrævning af urimeligt høje priser, anvendelse af en diskriminerende eller aggressiv prispolitik, koblingssalg eller andre urimelige forretningsbetingelser, der ikke tjener hensynet til økonomisk effektivitet.
Such abuse consists, inter alia, in limiting production, charging excessive prices, discriminatory or predatory pricing, tied sales or other commercial practices not based on the principle of economic efficiency.
Disse former for praksis begrænser konkurrencen og bliver især forkastelige, når de udøves af virksomheder, der står så stærkt på markedet, at de kan se bort fra konkurrencen og, uden nævneværdig skade for sig selv, drive konkurrenterne ud af markedet og i væsentligt omfang hindre nye virksomheder i at trænge ind på markedet.
The Commission takes the view that such practices, which undermine competition, are particularly dangerous when they are carried out by undertakings with the power to shield themselves from competitive pressure and eliminate their competitors without significant damage to themselves or to block market access by new entrants to a significant degree.
Som led i befæstelsen af det indre marked er disse former for praksis så meget desto mere skadelige, da de fører til en afskærmning af de nationale markeder og forsinker integreringen af økonomierne i EU.
In the context of further development of the single market, these practices are particularly damaging because they lead to market partitioning and delay the integration of the Member States' economies.
dominerende stillinger har for denne udvikling.
This is why the Commission is particularly alert to the effects of dominant positions on these processes.
Antallet af formelle beslutninger baseret på artikel 82 er steget støt de sidste to år.
The number of formal decisions pursuant to Article 82 has increased steadily over the last two years.
I 1998 afsluttede Kommissionens tjenestegrene seks sager22vedrørende anvendelse af artikel 82.
In 1998 the Commission concluded six cases22 under that article.
To af sagerne vedrørte lufthavnene i Frankfurt og Paris, hvor de selskaber, der driver lufthavnene, indtager en dominerende stilling.
Two cases concerned the airports at Frankfurt and Paris, which are operated by companies in a dominant position.
Den praksis, som Kommissionen anfægtede, vedrørte ground handling og egenhandling, hvorom der blev vedtaget et liberaliseringsdirektiv i 1996.
The abuses identified by the Commission concerned groundhandling and selfhandling services, which were liberalised under a directive adopted in 1996.
Foruden de direkte konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger for udbyderne af ground handling-ydelser kunne Kommissionen påvise, at de pågældende former for praksis også havde konsekvenser for udenlandske luftfartsselskaber og dermed bidrog til markedsafskærmningen.
In addition to the direct anticompetitive effects on the suppliers involved, the Commission showed that there were repercussions on non-domestic airlines, with market partitioning occurring as a result.
Desuden bidrager sådanne former for praksis til at forsinke liberaliseringen af ground handling-markedet.
The abuses also slowed down the liberalisation of groundhandling services.
Sagen om Frankfurt lufthavn handlede om de ground handling-ydelser, der finder sted på forpladsen.
The Frankfurt Airport case concerns groundhandling.
Efter at have modtaget klager fra en række luftfartsselskaber kunne Kommissionen konstatere, at den tyske lufthavnsoperatør (Flughafen Frankfurt AG/FAG) havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling ved at forbyde såvel egenhandling (udført af luftfartsselskaberne selv) og ground handling udført af tredjeparter, hvorved FAG skabte sig et monopol på dette beslægtede, men særskilte marked. Kommissionen påbød derfor FAG at bringe en ende på monopolsituationen23.
Following complaints from several airlines, the Commission found that the operator of the German airport (Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG (FAG)) had abused its dominant position as operator by prohibiting airlines from providing selfhandling services and by denying access to any independent providers of groundhandling services, thus creating on the related but separate groundhandling market a monopoly situation of which it was the beneficiary.
Kommissionen gjorde også opmærksom på, at de lange aftaler (af en varighed på mellem tre og ti år), som lufthavnsoperatøren i Frankfurt havde indgået med sine bedste kunder, var i strid med EU's lovgivning, idet de lukkede ground handling-markedet af for nye virksomheder eller gjorde samme marked mindre attraktivt. Disse aftaler styrkede derfor FAG's dominerende stilling.
The Commission therefore ordered FAG to bring its monopoly to an end.23 It also found that the longterm contracts (three to ten years) that FAG had awarded to its best customers were contrary to Community law in that they effectively closed the groundhandling-services market to new entrants or made it less attractive to them, thus reinforcing its dominant position.
FAG accepterede at ændre aftalerne og gav aftaleparterne mulighed for at opsige dem én gang om året.
FAG agreed to amend the contracts in question by granting contracting parties an annual right of withdrawal.
I sagen vedrørende Alpha Flight Services (AFS) og Aéroports de Paris (ADP) fastslog Kommissionen, at sidstnævnte, der varetager driften af to parisiske lufthavne, havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling ved at opkræve udbyderne af ground handling-ydelser eller luftfartsselskaberne selv (ved egen handling) diskriminerende afgifter i tilknytning til catering, rengøring og håndtering af fragt.
In the Alpha Flight Services/AeÂroports de Paris (ADP) case, the Commission found that the operator of the two Paris airports had abused its dominant position as operator by imposing discriminatory commercial fees on suppliers or airlines providing groundhandling or selfhandling services such as catering, cleaning and freight handling.
ADP anvendte nemlig forskellige afgiftstakster for de to ground handling-udbydere, dvs. AFS (den klagende part) og OAT, der er et datterselskab af Air France.
ADP charged different levels of fees to the two third-party suppliers, AFS, the plaintiff, and OAT, a subsidiary of Air France.
Det forholdt sig desuden således, at den afgift, som ADP opkrævede hos de luftfartsselskaber, der gennem egne selskaber selv tog sig af catering, enten var lig nul eller i hvert fald mindre end den afgift, som blev opkrævet hos de cateringselskaber, der arbejdede for tredjeparter.
In addition, the fee charged by ADP to airlines providing catering services for passengers via specialist subsidiaries was either zero or less than that charged to companies providing similar catering services for third parties.
Denne differentiering uden objektiv begrundelse fordrejede konkurrencen mellem tjenesteydere, idet nogle af dem. helt uberettiget, kunne regne med lavere driftsomkostninger.
There was no objective justification for the differences, which distorted competition between suppliers since some benefited from lower operating costs.
Kommissionen pålagde derfor ADP at afskaffe det pågældende afgiftssystem.
The Commission therefore ordered AeÂroports de Paris to bring its fee arrangements to an end.
Kommissionen gjorde ligeledes brug af bestemmelserne i artikel 82 i en sag vedrørende transportsektoren.
The Commission also invoked Article 82 in another case involving the transport sector.
Det drejede sig om sagen angående TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement), som mundede ud i en bøde på 273 mio. ECU til medlemmerne af konferencen24.
This was the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) case, in which the Commission fined the members of the liner conference ECU 273 million.24
I sagerne IRE/Nordion og Van den Bergh Foods, der vedrørte to meget forskellige markeder, lagde Kommissionen særlig stor vægt på virkningerne af dominerende virksomheders kontrakter indeholdende bestemmelser om eksklusivitet, idet sådanne bestemmelser kan sætte medkontrahenten i et så snævert afhængighedsforhold til den dominerende virksomhed, at de tilbageværende
In the IRE/Nordion and Van den Bergh Foods cases, both involving very different markets, the Commission devoted a great deal of attention to the effects of contracts concluded by companies in a dominant position and containing exclusivity clauses: such clauses may make the other parties involved so dependent on the dominant company that the residual competitors' ability to counter its dominant position is severely restricted.
Inkl. føromtalte AMMS-sag. Beslutning 98/190/EFaf 14.1.1998. EFT L 72 af 11.3.1998. s. 30.
Including the AMMS case discussed under point 2.
Nordion er en canadisk virksomhed, der beskæftiger sig med fremstilling og salg af molybden 99, der er et radioaktivt lægemiddel, der anvendes inden for nuklearmedicin. Virksomheden indgik eksklusive og langvarige leveringsaftaler med sine kunder, hvilket forhindrede hovedkonkurrenten, den belgiske virksomhed IRE. der var den klagende part i sagen, i at udvikle sine aktiviteter eller endda forblive på markedet.
Nordion, a Canadian company operating on the world market for the production and sale of molybdenum 99, a base product for radiopharmaceuticals used in nuclear medicine, concluded exclusive, longterm supply agreements with its customers, with the result that the main competitor, the Belgian company IRE, which was the complainant in this case, was prevented from developing and ultimately even from maintaining its presence on the market.
Nordions praksis hindrede desuden enhver potentiel konkurrent i at trænge ind på markedet.
This situation also made the entry of potential new competitors impossible.
Efter at have modtaget en klagepunktsmeddelelse for misbrug af en dominerende stilling gav Nordion tilsagn om at fjerne kontraktbestemmelserne om eksklusivitet.
After receiving a statement of objections charging it with abusing its dominant position, Nordion undertook to renounce the exclusivity clauses in its contracts.
Kommissionen besluttede derefter at afslutte sagen25.
The Commission the n decided to terminate the proceedings.25
Van den Bergh Foods, der er et datterselskab af Unilever, behersker over 85% af markedet for flødeis i Irland.
Van den Bergh Foods, a Unilever subsidiary, holds more than 85% of the Irish ice cream market.
Virksomheden ejer et meget tæt net af frysere, der stilles gratis til rådighed for de detailhandlende. forudsat at de kun benyttes til Unilever-produkter.
The company has an extensive network of freezer cabinets which are provided to retailers free of charge on condition that they are used exclusively for the storage of Unilever's products.
Kommissionens undersøgelse afslørede, at netop på det irske marked udgjorde denne betingelse en veritabel adgangshindring for Unilevers konkurrenter.
The Commission found that, in the circumstances of the Irish market, the provision of cabinets on exclusive terms constituted a real barrier to market entry for Unilever's competitors.
Da de irske detailhandlende ydermere var tilbageholdende med enten at lade deres Unilever-frysere udskifte med andre frysere eller at installere ekstra frysere fra andre virksomheder, endte det med. at 40% af alle detailforretninger i Irland kun forhandlede Unilevers produkter.
Given the reluctance of Irish retailers to replace Unilever cabinets, or to install additional ones, 40% of retail outlets in Ireland offered Unilever products only.
Takket være sin dominerende stilling på markedet kunne Unilever tilskynde de detailhandlende til at samarbejde med virksomheden på basis af eksklusive aftaler.
By virtue of its dominant position on this market, Unilever had be enable to encourage retailers to enter into exclusive arrangements with it.
Kommissionen fandt, at denne praksis udgjorde et misbrug af en dominerende stilling, og den vedtog en beslutning, hvori den fordømte Unilever26.
The Commission took the view that this practice constituted an abuse of a dominant position and issued a decision condemning Unilever.26
Året 1998, der endte med et samlet bødebeløb på 560 mio. ECU, vil formentlig forblive det skrappeste år i 1990'erne efterfulgt af 1994 (535 mio. ECU med navnlig Poutrelles-sagen og kartonog cementsagerne).
1998 seems likely to go down as the strictest year of the decade, with fines totalling ECU 560 million, followed by 1994 (ECU 535 million, with inter alia the Beams, Cartonboard and Cement cases).
Aret var også bemærkelsesværdigt på grund af mangfoldigheden af de konkurrencebegrænsende former for praksis, der blev nedlagt forbud mod: fire karteller og tre tilfælde af misbrug af dominerende stilling.
It was also noteworthy for the variety of anticompetitive practices which were identified: four cartels but also three abuses of a dominant position.
Sanktionernes strenghed og mangfoldigheden af praksis og berørte økonomiske sektorer vidner om Kommissionens vilje til at befæste det indre marked med henblik på gennemførelsen af Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union.
The severity of the penalties and the diversity of the practices and economic sectors involved reflect the Commission's determination to consolidate the single market with a view to completing economic and monetary union.
I slutningen af 1997 vedtog Kommissionen nogle retningslinjer for beregningen af bøder.
At the end of 1997 the Commission adopted guidelines on setting fines.
Analysen af de forskellige sager, der blev afsluttet i 1998, viser, at det er lykkedes at praktisere disse retningslinjer, der skal bidrage til at gøre Kommissionens bødepolitik mere ensartet og forstærke bødernes afskrækkende virkning.
The various cases concluded in 1998 reflect the implementation of these guidelines, which were designed to `help to make the Commission's policy on fines more coherent and to strengthen the deterrence of the financial penalties.'
Grundbeløbet kan forhøjes eller nedsættes for at tage hensyn til skærpende eller formildende omstændigheder.
Aggravating circumstances include repeated infringements, refusal to cooperate or the role of leader in the infringement.
IRE/Nordion-sagen gav også anledning til en procedure i Japan, hvorfor der blev indledt et samarbejde mellem Kommissionen og de japanske myndigheder (JFTC).
Proceedings were also instituted against IRE/Nordion in Japan, with the result that the Commission cooperated with the Japanese authorities (JFTC).
Læs nærmere herom i kapitel IV — Internationalt samarbejde.
See Chapter IV-International cooperation.
' Kommissionen fandt desuden, al eksklusivitetsklausulen udgjorde en konkurrencebegrænsning i strid med artikel 81.
The Commission also took the view that the exclusivity condition constituted a restriction of competition which infringed Article 81.
Som eksempler på skærpende omstændigheder kan nævnes gentagelser, samarbejdsvægring eller indtagelse af en lederrolle i forbindelse med overtrædelsen.
41 aggravating circumstance found against British Sugar was that the company was the instigator of the infringement and, throughout the relevant period, remained the driving force.
Bødebeløbet kan også nedsættes, hvis en virksomhed har været samarbejdsvillig under hele sagens forløb.
A reduction in the amount of a fine may be justified on the basis that the company concerned cooperated in the proceedings.
Begge virksomheder fik nedsat deres bøder i forhold til de øvrige karteldeltagere.
These companies were fined a smaller amount than their partners.
Endelig blev det i sagen om færgefarten mellem Grækenland og Italien betragtet som en formildende omstændighed, at den anfægtede praksis havde haft forholdsvis beskedne konsekvenser for markedet.
An attenuating circumstance which was taken into account in the case of ferry services between Greece and Italy was the fact that the infringement had had a fairly limited impact on the market.
Der erindres om Kommissionens meddelelse af 10. juli 1996 om bødenedsættelse og bødefritagelse, som siger, at Kommissionen — ved beregningen af bøder — skal tage hensyn til. om en virksomhed har samarbejdet med Kommissionen og selv afsløret det kartel, virksomheden har deltaget i.
Also of relevance is the notice of 10 July 1996 on the waiving or reduction of fines in cartel cases, which states that the Commission should take into account, when calculating the amount of the fine, cooperation on the part of companies which inform it of cartels in which they were involved.