natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som Retten selv anfører, er denne regel navnlig begrundet i den bestående forskel »mellem den kontrol, som kan udøves på den ene side af den administrative myndighed og domstol, og på den anden side af anklagemyndigheden og den ret, der træffer afgørelse i straffesagen, da de sidstnævnte myndigheder normalt råder over mere vidtgående kontrolbeføjelser end de førstnævnte«9.
As the Court of First Instance itself observes, that rule is justi fied, in particular, by the difference in the scope of the controls 'exercised by the administrative authorities and courts, on the one hand, and the criminal authorities and courts, on the other, since the latter normally have greater powers of control than the former'. 9
For at undgå fejl i forbindelse med en disciplinærsag er det i vedtægten fastsat, at de kompetente myndigheder ikke vurderer de forhold, som tjenestemanden beskyldes for, før straffedomstolen har afsagt sin endelige dom, således at de — alt efter sagens udfald — kan foretage en mere nøjagtig og rigtigere bedømmelse af de forhold, der lægges tjenestemanden til last.
The appellant argues that in order to prevent any error in disciplinary proceed ings, the Staff Regulations provide that the competent authorities are to wait until the criminal court has delivered a final verdict on the substance of the case, so that those authorities will, where necessary, be able to make a more precise and more appropriate assessment of the facts alleged against the official.
Ifølge appellanten gælder dette så meget mere, som en disciplinær sanktion ikke kan have til følge at forringe tjenestemandens stilling over for straffedomstolen.
That is all the more true, according to the appellant, because the imposition of a disciplinary measure would not have the effect of aggravating an official's situation before the criminal courts.
Faktisk kan disciplinære sanktioner vedrøre for hold, som ikke har nogen strafferetlig betydning, og som således ikke kan gøres til genstand for en straffesag.
Disciplinary measures can be imposed in respect of facts which are irrelevant for the purposes of criminal law and cannot therefore form the subject of criminal proceedings.
Ifølge appellanten giver ordlyden af artikel 88, stk. 5, ikke mulighed for en sådan restriktiv fortolkning. Formålet med
The appellant maintains that the wording of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 does not allow of such a restrictive interpreta
Appellanten har afgivet et yderligere detaljeret indlæg om dette punkt, som jeg dog ikke skal behandle nærmere, da det
The appellant submits more detailed observations in that regard, but there is no need to consider them, since it is clear from
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT ALBER — SAG C-191/98 P fremgår af ordlyden af artikel 88, stk. 5, at disciplinær- og straffesagen skal vedrøre samme forhold.
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-191/98 P the wording of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 that the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings must relate to the same facts.
Dette er også Kommissionens opfattelse.
That is also the Commission's argument.
At følge appellantens ræsonnement vil være ensbetydende med, at disciplinærmyndigheden kun kunne basere sig på fuld stændige og nøjagtige omstændigheder, såfremt en sideløbende straffesag er afsluttet.
If the appellant's submission were fol lowed that would mean that the disciplinary authority could rely on complete and accurate facts only when any pending criminal proceedings had been concluded.
Deraf kunne man slutte, at der i rene disciplinærsager ikke kan føres tilstrækkeligt bevis for omstændighederne.
The inference is that in purely disciplinary proceedings the facts can never be sufficiently established.
Denne konklusion kan ikke godtages.
That conclusion cannot be accepted.
Selv om en straffedomstols beføjelser kan overstige beføjelserne for Disciplinærrådet, viser de undersøgelsesmuligheder, som er nævnt i vedtægtens bilag IX, at disse beføjelser er tilstrækkelige omfattende til, at omstændighederne i forbindelse med en disciplinærsag kan bevises med en sådan grad af klarhed, at der kan pålægges en disciplinær sanktion.
Although a criminal court enjoys more extensive powers of investigation than the Disciplinary Board, the possibility of carrying out inquiries referred to in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations shows that the power of investigation is sufficiently wide to enable the facts to be established in disciplinary proceedings with sufficient precision for a decision imposing a disciplinary measure to be taken.
Kommissionen finder endvidere, at selv om vedtægtens artikel 88, stk. 5, blev for tolket på den af appellanten anførte måde, ville dette argument ikke være relevant i den foreliggende sag.
The Commission further contends that even if the fifth paragraph of Article 88 were to be interpreted in the manner advocated by the appellant that argument would be irrelevant in the present case.
Som Retten har fastslået, fremgår det af sagsakterne, at der ikke var rejst nogen straffesag i henhold til artikel 88, stk. 5, mod tjenestemanden på tidspunktet for den omtvistede disciplinære afgørelse.
As the Court of First Instance observed, the evidence before it showed that on the date on which the contested disciplinary decision was adopted no criminal proceedings for the purpose of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 had been initiated against the applicant.
Derfor kan disse bestem melser slet ikke finde anvendelse.
Accordingly, those provisions are not applicable at all here.
I det tilfælde, hvor straffesagen får et andet udfald, indebærer artikel 11 i bilag IX til vedtægten en mulighed for at genoptage disciplinærsagen, således at tjenestemandens rettigheder ikke krænkes i denne henseende.
If the criminal proceedings should none the less reach a different conclusion, Article 11 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations provides that the disciplinary proceedings may be reopened, so that the official's rights are not affected in that regard either.
Man bør følge Rettens opfattelse, hvor efter det egentlige formål med artikel 88, stk. 5, er at undgå at stille tjenestemanden ringere i en straffesag.
I must agree with the Court of First Instance that the true ratio of the protection conferred by the fifth paragraph of Article 88 is to ensure that the official is not placed at a disadvantage in the criminal proceedings.
Formålet med arti kel 88, stk. 5, er ikke primært, at straffedomstolen skal kunne fastslå visse omstændigheder, der danner grundlag for en disciplinærsag.
The aim of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 is not primarily to enable certain facts to be established by a criminal court as the basis for disciplinary proceed ings.
Den pågældende tjene stemands interesse heri er i øvrigt lige så stor som ansættelsesmyndighedens.
Furthermore, the official concerned would have an interest in such findings equal to that of the appointing authority.
— Tredje punkt i første anbringende: konstatering af de samme forhold inden for den i artikel 88, stk. 3 og 4, indeholdte frist på fire måneder.
— Point 3 of the first ground of appeal: establishment of the same facts in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 88.
Appellanten gør gældende, at Retten — med urette — finder, at det påhviler ham at beskrive de forhold, de to sager er baseret på.
The appellant claims that the Court of First Instance incorrectly considers that he must identify the matters forming the basis of both sets of proceedings.
Under disse omstændigheder kan det anføres, at det egentlige formål med arti kel 88, stk. 5, er at undgå, at tjeneste manden stilles ringere under en straffesag.
In the light of all those circumstances, it is clear that the real meaning and purpose of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 is that an official must not be placed at a disadvantage in criminal proceedings.
Derfor kan det også forventes af den person, der kræver afgørelsen udsat, frem fører beviser og begrundelser herfor.
It is also reasonable, therefore, that the person seek ing a stay of the disciplinary proceedings should be expected to provide appropriate facts and reasons.
I denne henseende er Rettens konklusion i dommens præmis 38 ligeledes korrekt.
In that regard, the conclusion which the Court of First Instance reaches in paragraph 38 of the judgment is also well founded.
Heraf fremgår følgende:
That para graph reads:
Han mener ikke, at han var forpligtet til at »angive sine grunde til, at en afgørelse fra ansættelsesmyndigheden vedrørende hvert af disse forhold kunne forringe hans retsstilling under en efterfølgende straffe sag«11. (Appellanten henviser her til præmis 38 og 41 i den anfægtede dom).
He contends that he is not required to 'state the reasons for which a decision taken by the appointing authority in respect of each of those matters was such as to affect his position in any subsequent criminal proceedings'11(here the appellant is referring to paragraphs 38 and 41 of the contested judgment).
Han anser det for tilstrækkeligt, at det påvises, at det er de samme forhold, der er genstand for straffe- og disciplinærsagerne, uden at det er nødvendigt at fremlægge yderligere oplysninger.
He contends that it is sufficient that the matters forming the subjectmatter of the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are shown to be the same and that there is no need to provide further details.
»Da der imidlertid på dette tidspunkt var iværksat en undersøgelse vedrørende sags øgeren, som kunne føre til, at der blev rejst straffesag mod ham, fandt Retten, at sags øgeren i overensstemmelse med formålet med vedtægtens artikel 88, stk. 5, måtte have mulighed for at godtgøre, at en afgørelse, hvorved hans retsstilling blev endeligt fastlagt, kunne forringe hans rets stilling under en efterfølgende straffesag, hvis den undersøgelse, der blev foretaget på tidspunktet for den disciplinære forfølgning, og som vedrørte de samme forhold, førte til, at der blev rejst straffesag.
'In so far as the applicant was at that time the subject of inquiries liable to lead to criminal proceedings, however, he should be allowed, in accordance with the ratio legis of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 of the Staff Regulations, to show specifically that a final decision on his case was capable of affecting his position in any subsequent criminal proceedings to which the inquiry being carried out at the same time as the disciplinary proceedings might lead and which related to the same matters.
Sags øgeren var i den forbindelse forpligtet til at give en præcis beskrivelse af disse forhold og angive sine grunde til, at en afgørelse fra ansættelsesmyndigheden vedrørende hvert af disse forhold kunne forringe hans rets stilling under en efterfølgende straffe sag«10.
It is therefore incumbent on the applicant to identify those matters precisely and to state the reasons for which a decision taken by the appointing authority in respect of each of those matters was such as to affect his position in any subsequent criminal pro ceedings'. 10
Eftersom han på dette stadium af straffesagen ikke havde haft nogen aktindsigt, gør han gældende, at såfremt man skulle følge Rettens ræsonnement, ville artikel 88, stk. 5, stort set, hvis ikke generelt, være uden betydning.
The appellant claims that since he had no access to the file at that stage of the criminal proceedings, if it were necessary to follow the reasoning of the Court of First Instance, the fifth paragraph of Article 88 would in the majority of cases, if not systematically, be inoperative.
Hvad endelig angår tjenestemandens anbringende om, at artikel 88, stk. 5, ikke kan baseres på hypoteser, finder Kommissionen, at dette argument skyldes en mis forståelse af den pågældende præmis i den anfægtede dom.
Finally, the Commission contends that the official's assertion that the fifth para graph of Article 88 cannot be supported by mere hypotheses is based on a misreading of the relevant passage in the judgment.
Kommissionen har under streget, at Retten i præmis 41 anførte, at det påhvilede tjenestemanden at angive, hvorfor en afgørelse fra ansættelsesmyndigheden efter hans mening kunne påvirke hans retsstilling.
At paragraph 41 the Court of First Instance observed that it was for the official to set out the reasons for which he considered that a decision taken by the appointing authority could in his view affect his position.
Det hypotetiske aspekt vedrører således ikke de faktiske omstændigheder, men de følger en afgørelse fra ansættelsesmyndigheden kan have for tjenestemanden under en straffesag.
The hypothetical aspect therefore relates not to the facts but to the consequences which a decision by the appointing authority might have on the official in the context of the criminal proceedings.
Under henvisning til præmis 41 i dom men gør appellanten endelig gældende, at der ligeledes er tale om en tilsidesættelse af artikel 88, stk. 5, når Retten pålægger den pågældende tjenestemand at bevise, at han havde grundlag for at antage, at en afgørelse truffet af ansættelsesmyndigheden kunne påvirke hans retsstilling i strafferet lig henseende. En disciplinærsag kan ikke baseres på hypoteser.
Finally, the appellant alleges, with reference to paragraph 41 of the judgment, that the Court of First Instance also infringed the fifth paragraph of Article 88 by requiring that the official concerned provide evidence that he was entitled to believe that a decision taken by the appointing authority would be likely to affect his situation for the purpose of the criminal proceedings.
Derfor må sagen udsættes, indtil der foreligger en domstols afgørelse.
The proceedings should therefore have been suspended until a 'verdict' had been delivered.
Han tilføjer, at ansættelsesmyndigheden på grund af ophævelsen af hans immunitet i øvrigt selv havde nøje kendskab til omstændighederne.
Moreover, the appointing authority itself was sufficiently aware of the facts, as a result of having lifted the appellant's immunity.
Hvad angår appellantens aktindsigt i forbindelse med straffesagen gør Kommissionen gældende, at de dokumenter, der var bilagt appellantens svar på Rettens spørgsmål, viser, at appellanten var fuldt ud informeret om de forhold, han blev tiltalt for.
As regards the appellant's access to the criminal file, the Commission claims that it is clear from the documents annexed to his answers to the questions put by the Court of First Instance that he was fully informed of the facts alleged against him.
Som det fremgår af dommens præmis 35, er det først, når der er rejst sag, at Retten forventer at få mere præcise oplysninger om begrebet »samme forhold«.
It follows from paragraph 35 of the judgment that it is only where criminal proceedings have actually been initiated that the Court of First Instance expects more specific information on the concept of the 'same acts'.
Det siges udtrykkeligt i præmis 35 i den anfægtede dom:
Paragraph 35 expressly states :
Det er først, når der er rejst en sådan straffesag, at de forhold, som sagen vedrører, kan identificeres og sammenholdes med de forhold, for hvilke der er rejst disciplinærsag, således at det kan afgøres, om der er indbyrdes overensstemmelse mellem dem«12.
It is only where such criminal proceed ings have been initiated that the matters to which they relate can be identified and compared with the matters in respect of which the disciplinary proceedings have been instituted so that it can be determined whether they are the same'.12
Kommissionen har endvidere gjort gældende, at da formålet med artikel 88, stk. 5, er ikke at påvirke tjenestemandens retsstilling i forbindelse med en straffesag, er det logisk, at administrationen ikke kan nøjes med tjenestemandens blotte påstande, men derimod kræver, at denne præciserer de omstændigheder, der ligger til grund for de to sager, og forklarer, hvorfor en afgørelse fra ansættelsesmyndigheden om disse forhold kan påvirke hans retsstilling i straffesagen.
The Commission further observes that since the purpose of the fifth paragraph of Article 88 is not to affect the official's position in criminal proceedings, it is logical that the administration cannot be satisfied with mere assertions on the part of the official but that it should expect him to specify what the facts giving rise to both sets of proceedings consist of and to explain why a decision by the appointing authority in respect of those facts could affect his position in the criminal proceedings.
Heraf udleder Retten i præmis 37, at ansættelsesmyndigheden ikke har tilsidesat artikel 88, stk. 5.
The Court of First Instance concluded at paragraph 37 that the appointing authority had not infringed the fifth paragraph of Article 88.
Man kan i øvrigt ikke kritisere Retten for at have krævet af en person, hvis retsstilling den ikke ville påvirke i forbindelse med en straffesag — hvorfor den overvejede at udsætte sagen eller i givet fald afsige dommen på et senere tidspunkt — at denne person anfører de for hold, som de to sager er baseret på.
Nor can the Court of First Instance be criticised for having required a person whose situation it did not wish to affect in criminal proceedings, so that it was prepared to adjourn the proceedings or, where appropriate, deliver judgment at a later date, to indicate the facts on which both proceedings were based.
I denne henseende er det ligeledes uden relevans at foregive, at ansættelsesmyndigheden har haft kendskab til forholdene efter ophævelsen af appellantens immunitet, eftersom det udelukkende er Rettens kendskab, der har betydning i denne situation.
In that regard, it is also pointless to claim that the appointing authority was aware of the facts after it lifted the applicant's immunity, since only the Court's knowledge matters in the latter case.
Det er heller ikke vedrørende disciplinærsagen, at Retten forventer mere præcise oplysninger fra appellanten, men udelukkende under og vedrørende den verserende sag, således som det klart fremgår af præmis 40 i den anfægtede dom, for det er tydeligt, at Retten var indstillet på, i appellantens interesse, at udsætte sin afgørelse i denne sag.
It is not for the purposes of the disciplinary proceedings that the Court of First Instance expects more specific information on the applicant's part, but solely for the purposes of and in the context of the concurrent criminal proceedings: this clearly follows from paragraph 40 of the judgment, since it is evident that the Court of First Instance was prepared, in the applicant's interest, to postpone its judgment in this case.
Der var således ikke tale om at udsætte disciplinærsagen, men eventuelt at udsætte dommen vedrørende lov ligheden af den af ansættelsesmyndigheden fastsatte sanktion til et senere tidspunkt.
It was therefore not a question of staying the disciplinary pro ceedings but of reserving a decision on the legality of the measure imposed by the appointing authority until a subsequent date.
Appellanten har imidlertid ikke fremlagt tilstrækkeligt materiale som svar på de af Retten stillede spørgsmål.
However, Mr Tzoanos did not pro vide the specific information requested by the Court of First Instance.
Appellanten har således ikke påvist, at der verserede en straffesag angående de samme forhold som disciplinærsagen.
The appellant therefore did not submit that criminal proceedings had been initiated in respect of the same matters as the disciplinary proceedings.
Han har heller ikke godtgjort, at en forudgående (retlig) konstatering vedrørende spørgsmålet om lovligheden af den disciplinære sanktion kunne påvirke hans retsstilling i denne straffesag.
Nor did he submit that a prior (judicial) finding as to the legality of the disciplinary measure could have affected his position in those criminal proceedings.
I betragtning af, at straffesagen i Belgien har verseret — som Retten anfører — siden den 4. januar 199613, men at appel lanten først skriftligt besvarede de af Retten stillede spørgsmål i september 1997 — der blev først holdt retsmøde i november 1997 — er det vanskeligt at se, hvorfor appellanten endnu ikke, selv i slutningen af 1997, havde oplysninger om den straffesag, der var indledt mod ham.
Considering that the criminal proceed ings in Belgium had been pending, as the Court of First Instance states, since 4 January 1996,13but that Mr Tzoanos only provided written answers to the questions put by the Court in September 1997 (the hearing did not take place until November 1997), it is difficult to see why even at the end of 1997 Mr Tzoanos still had no information about the criminal proceedings initiated against him.
Det fremgår af ovenstående, at arti kel 88, stk. 5, ikke er blevet forkert anvendt af ansættelsesmyndigheden eller
It follows from all the foregoing that the fifth paragraph of Article 88 was neither misapplied by the appointing authority nor incorrectly interpreted in law by the
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT ALBER — SAG C-191/98 P fejlfortolket af Retten. Første anbringende bør derfor forkastes i sin helhed.
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-191/98 P
af Rettens ræsonnement vedrørende første anbringende, at Retten ikke har begået nogen retlig fejl.
lowed, however, it follows from the examination of the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in relation to the first plea in law that it did not err in law.
Andet anbringende (Rettens konklusioner vedrørende appellantens arbejdsopgaver og ansvarsområde)
Second ground of appeal (the findings of the Court of First Instance concerning Mr Tzoanos's duties and responsibilities)
Det skal endnu en gang understreges, at med henblik på at vurdere lovligheden af disciplinærafgørelsen er det eneste afgørende element omstændighederne på tidspunktet for vedtagelsen af denne afgørelse.
It should be pointed out once again that for the purpose of assessing the legality of the disciplinary decision the only relevant circumstances are those obtaining on the date on which the decision was adopted.
Eftersom der ikke var indledt nogen formel straffesag den 22. juni 1995, var det ikke nødvendigt for ansættelsesmyndigheden at udsætte den endelige afgørelse af appellantens retsstilling til et senere tidspunkt.
Since no formal criminal proceedings had been initiated on 22 June 1995, there was no need for the appointing authority to postpone a definitive decision on Mr Tzoanos's situation to a later date.
Det fremgår af sagsakterne — navnlig af dom mens præmis 36 og 41 — at appellanten den 4. januar 1996 var blevet informeret om indledningen af straffesagen.
It is apparent from the papers before the Court — and in particular from paragraphs 36 and 41 of the judgment — that Mr Tzoanos was informed on 4 January 1996 that criminal proceedings had been initiated.
Ganske vist blev der først truffet afgørelse om hans klage den 19. februar 1996 — dvs. efter den nævnte dato; på grundlag af sagsakterne kan det imidlertid udledes, at ansættelsesmyndigheden på dette tidspunkt ikke var yderligere informeret om de nødvendige detaljer i denne sag.
Admittedly, a decision on his complaint was taken on 19 February 1996, that is to say, subsequently; it is clear from the case-file, however, that the appointing authority had by then still not been informed of the essential details of those proceedings.
Faktisk havde man heller ikke kendskab til disse detaljer under retsmødet for Retten den 13. november 1997.
Those details were not even known on the day of the hearing before the Court of First Instance, on 13 November 1997.
Normalt indgives den strafferetlige anmeldelse af ansættelsesmyndigheden, der således har kendskab til de samme forhold.
As a general rule the complaint is filed by the appointing authority, which is then naturally aware of the same facts.
I den foreliggende sag var det kun appel lanten, der havde kendskab til disse elementer, og det påhvilede denne at videre give detaljerne — eftersom han gjorde krav på den i artikel 88, stk. 5, hjemlede udsættelse.
In the present case, only Mr Tzoanos was aware of those matters and it was also incumbent on him to provide the details, since he wished to have the disciplinary proceedings stayed pursuant to the fifth paragraph of Article 88.