natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
- Denne aftales artikel VII siger, at gældende lov forbliver uændret, og at aftalen skal fortolkes i overensstemmelse med denne gældende lov. Denne aftale kan derfor ikke give nogen parts konkurrencemyndigheder bemyndigelse til nogen handling, de ikke allerede er bemyndiget til.
The presumption of deferral will only occur if the party in the territory of which the restrictive activities are occurring has jurisdiction over these activities and is prepared to deal actively and expeditiously with the matter.
En følge heraf er, at Kommissionen kun kan afgive oplysninger til de amerikanske myndigheder, når dette er i overensstemmelse med fællesskabslovgivningen.
When dealing with the case that party will keep its counterpart closely informed of any developments in the procedure, within the limits of its internal rules protecting confidentiality.
EF-retten sikrer en høj grad af beskyttelse af fortrolige oplvsninger afgivet til Kommissionen, og det er påkrævet, at ethvert samtykke skal være tilstrækkeligt til at fritage Kommissionen fra dens fortrolighedsforpligtelse i henhold til EF-rettens generelle principper. Domstolens retspraksis og artikel 20. stk. 2. i Rådets forordning nr. 17.«
The new Agreement constitutes an important development, since it represents a commitment on the part of the European Union and the United States to cooperate with respect to antitrust enforcement in certain situations, rather than to seek to apply their antitrust laws extraterritorially.
Gennemsigtighed for de berorte medlemsstater
Protection of confidential information
De berørte medlemsstater holdes underrettet om samarbejdsaktiviteter i henhold til aftalen mellem EF og USA fra 1991 i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens første udtalelse til Rådet243i 1995.
Following its 1st Statement242 in 1995, the Commission indicated in a new `Statement on Confidentiality of Information' made during the adoption on 29.05.1998 of the Joint Council and Commission Decision concluding the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement that:
Kommissionen påpegede følgende i en ny udtalelse om gennemsigtighed i forbindelse med vedtagelsen den 29. maj 1998 af Rådets og Kommissionens fælles afgørelse om indgåelse af aftalen fra 1998 om »positive comity«:
Ð `The Statement made by the Commission in April 1995 on the confidentiality of information and the exchange of interpretative letters dated May 31 and July 31, 1995 in relation to the 1991 Agreement apply in their entirety to this Agreement.
- De medlemsstater, hvis interesser berøres, underrettes snarest muligt om enhver anmodning fra de amerikanske myndigheder om at undersøge eller afhjælpe konkurrencebegrænsende aktiviteter tig om enhver procedure. Kommissionen indleder som følge af en anmodning fra de amerikanske myndigheder i henhold til denne aftales artikel III.
Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, OJ L 173, 18/06/1998, pp. 26 Ð 31.
Forelagl Ràdei af Kommissionen i forbindelse med vedtagelsen af Rådets og Kommissionens fælles afgørelse al 10.4.1995 om ikrafttrædelsen af aftalen mellem EF og USA fra 1991 og offentliggjort i den tredje rapport om samarbejdet mellem FF og USA. punkt 3. KOM(98) 510 endelig udg.. se også 27. beretning om konkurrencepolitikken, s. 317-327.
Submitted by the Commission to the Council during the adoption on 10.04.1995 of the Joint Council and Commission Decision regarding the entry into force of the 1991 EC/US Agreement and published in the 3rd EC/US cooperation report at point 3, Com(98) 510 final; see also XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 317327.
'- Forelagl Rådet af Kommissionen i forbindelse med vedtagelsen af Rådels og Kommissionens f/elles afgørelse af 10.4.1995 om ikrafttrædelsen af aftalen mellem EF og USA fra 1991 og offentliggjort i den tredje rapport om samarbejdet mellem EF og USA. punkt 4. KOM(98) 510 endelig udg., se også 27. beretning om konkurrencepolitikken, s. 317-327.
Ð Article VII of this Agreement states that existing laws remain unchanged and that the Agreement must be interpreted consistently with those existing laws. This Agreement therefore cannot permit either of the Parties' competition authorities to do any act they do not already have the power to do.
- De medlemsstater, hvis interesser berøres, underrettes snarest muligt om eventuelle anmodninger sendt til de amerikanske myndigheder i henhold til denne aftales artikel III om at undersøge konkurrencebegrænsende aktiviteter.
Ð The Member States whose interests are affected shall be informed as soon as is reasonably possible of Commission and US deferrals or suspensions of enforcement activities pursuant to Article IV(2) of the Agreement, or of Commission and US initiations or re-institutions of such activities pursuant to Article IV(4) of the Agreement.
- De medlemsstater, hvis interesser berøres, underrettes snarest muligt om Kommissionens eller de amerikanske myndigheders udsættelse eller suspension af håndhævelsesaktiviteter i henhold til aftalens artikel IV. stk. 2. eller om Kommissionens eller de amerikanske myndigheders indledning eller genoptagelse af sådanne aktiviteter i henhold til aftalens artikel IV. stk. 4.
Ð When the Commission opens proceedings following a request by the US authorities under Article III of this Agreement, the undertakings concerned shall be informed of the existence of the request,
- Når Kommissionen indleder procedure efter en anmodning fra de amerikanske myndigheder i henhold til denne aftales artikel III. skal de berørte virksomheder underrettes om anmodningen, senest når klagepunktsmeddelelsen udsendes, eller når der offentliggøres en meddelelse i henhold til artikel 19. stk. 3. i Rådets forordning nr. 17.
Submitted by the Commission to the Council during the adoption on 10.04.1995 of the Joint Council and Commission Decision regarding the entry into force of the 1991 EC/US Agreement and published in the 3rd EC/US cooperation report at point 4, Com(98) 510 final; see also XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 317327.
— Den årsrapport.
COMPETITIONREPORT1998
Kommissionen forelægger Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om gennemførelsen af aftalen fra 1991. skal også omfatte anvendelsen af denne aftale, herunder sager, hvor der er udvekslet oplysninger i henhold til aftalerne«.
Ð The annual report presented by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 1991 Agreement shall also cover the application of this Agreement, including any cases where information has been exchanged under the Agreements'.
Anvendelse af aftalen fra 1998
Application of the 1998 Agreement
I perioden mellem aftalens ikrafttrædelse (4. juni 1998) og den 31. december 1998 indgav hverken EF eller USA anmodninger i henhold til aftalen fra 1998 om »positive comity«.
In the period from its entry into force (4.6.1998) to 31.12.1998 no requests have been submitted by the EC or the US under the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement.
Sagsrelateret samarbejde i 1998
Case specific cooperation within 1998
De sager, der anføres nedenfor, falder alle direkte ind under aftalen mellem EF og LJSA og behandles i USA af enten justitsministeriet eller FTC Nogle konkurrencesager behandles i USA af en anden myndighed, f.eks. det amerikanske trafikministerium (Department ol' Transportation). Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) eller handelsministeriet (Department of Commerce).
The cases listed below are those which fall directly under the EC/US Agreement and are dealt in the US by either the US DoJ or the FTC.
Disse organer samarbejder formelt ikke direkte med Kommissionen, men indirekte oftest via det amerikanske justitsministerium.
These agencies do not formally cooperate with the Commission directly, but do so indirectly, mostly through the DoJ.
Der er derfor uformelle kontakter mellem Kommissionen og disse organer.
There are therefore informal contacts between the Commission and these agencies.
Disse sager drøftes ikke i denne rapport.
These cases are not discussed in this report.
Statistiske oplysninger a)
Statistical information a)
Antal sager, hvor Kommissionen og tie amerikanske myndigheder har givet meddelelse
Number of cases notified by the Commission and by the US
Kommissionen gav meddelelse i 52 sager i perioden 1. januar 1998-31. december 1998.
There were the total of fifty-two notifications made by the Commission during the period between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 1998.
Sagerne er opdelt i fusionssager og ikke-fusionssager og anført i bilag I.
The cases are divided into merger and non-merger cases and are listed in the Annex 1.
Kommissionen modtog 46 meddelelser fra de amerikanske myndigheder i samme periode, heraf 24 fra justitsministeriet (DoJ) og 12 fra FTC (Federal Trade Commission).
The Commission received the total of forty-six notifications from the US authorities during the same period. Twenty-four were received from the DoJ and twenty-two from the FTC.
Bilag 2 indeholder en liste over disse sager, igen opdelt i fusionssager og ikke-fusionssager.
A list of these cases is found in the Annex 2, again broken down in merger and non-merger cases.
Kommissionen gav 4.3 fusionsmeddelelser og de amerikanske myndigheder 39.
There were forty-three merger notifications by the Commission and thirty-nine by the US authorities.
Kommissionens meddelelser lil medlemsstaterne
Notifications by the Commission to Member States
Når Kommissionen modtager meddelelser fra de amerikanske myndigheder, videresendes de således omgående' til de relevante kontorer i GD IV og samtidig i kopi til den eller de eventuelle medlemsstater, hvis interesser berøres.
Thus, when notifications are received from the US Authorities, they are forwarded immediately to the relevant units of DGIV and at the same time copies are sent to the Member States, if any, whose interests are affected.
Når GD IV giver meddelelser til de amerikanske myndigheder, sender de på tilsvarende' vis samtidig kopier heraf til den eller de medlemsstater, hvis interesser berøres.
Equally, at the same time that DGIV makes notifications to the US authorities, copies are sent to the Member State(s) whose interests are affected.
I de fleste tilfælde informerer de amerikanske myndigheder også medlemsstaterne direkte, jf. OECD's rekommandation244.
In most instances, the US authorities also notify the Member States directly, under the OECD Recommendation244.
I beretningsperioden blev der givet meddelelse om 35 sager til Det Forenede
During the period under review 35 cases were notified to the United Kingdom,
2 til Italien og 1 til Danmark. Finland og Irland.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Materielle aspekter af sagsrelateret samarbejde247
Substantive aspects of case-specific cooperation245
1998 var bemærkelsesværdigt ikke blot på grund af den fortsat høje fusions- og overtagelsesaktivitet. men også fordi de anmeldte aftaler blev større og større.
1998 was notable not only for the continuation of a substantial level of merger and acquisition activity but also for the increasing size of the deals being announced.
Gennem hele året indløb der meddelelser om stadigt større globale fusioner.
Throughout the year there were a string of announcements of ever larger global-scale mergers.
Først på året var den største fusion aftalen mellem WorldCom og MCI. der har en samlet omsætning på 37 mia. USD.
At the start of the year the merger with largest claimed value was the WorldCom/MCI deal, with a figure in the order of US$37 billion.
Af andre vigtige sager, der blev givet meddelelse om i 1998. kan nævnes Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand og KPMG/Ernst & Young samt en række mindre fusioner med virkninger ud over deres hjemlande. Ikke alle store fusioner skal anmeldes i Europa — SBC/Ameritech er et eksempel på en sag. som ikke hørte ind under EF's kompetence.
Other headline cases announced in 1998 included Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand and KPMG/Ernst & Young, as well as numbers of smaller concentrations which had implications beyond their home territory. Not all large mergers require filing in Europe Ð SBC/Ameritech is one example which did not fall under EC jurisdiction.
Da de fleste af ovennævnte fusioner imidlertid var internationale om ikke globale, krævede størstedelen flere konkurrenceretlige anmeldelser til forskellige instanser, herunder normalt antitrustmyndighederne i EF og USA.
But as most of those mentioned above were international, if not global in scale, the majority required multiple competition filings with different agencies, including normally the EC and the US antitrust enforcement agencies.
Man kunne tro. at store fusioner normalt krævede mere omfattende samarbejde alene på grund af deres størrelse, men det er ikke nødvendigvis tilfældet.
It might be thought that large mergers would normally require more extensive cooperation simply because of their scale, but this is not necessarily true.
Mens nogle forholdsvis store sager teknisk faldt ind under EF's kompetence, havde de ringe eller ingen konkurrencemæssig betydning i Europa.
While some relatively large cases fell technically within the EC jurisdiction, they had little or no competitive impact in Europe.
Det kan skyldes, at deres hovedaktiviteter foregår uden for Europa, som i Travelers Citicorps tilfælde, eller at de fusionerende parter havde en vis position i deres respektive hjemlande, mens den konkurrencemæssige betydning af overlapningen var minimal.
This might be because the main focus of activity is outside Europe, such as in the Travelers Citicorp case, or because the merging parties were coming together from home positions in the irrespective territories and the competitive impact of the overlap was minimal.
I Daimler Benz/Chrysler- og BP/ Amoco- sagerne var de enkelte parter især aktive på deres respektive kontinenter, men ikke
In the Daimler Benz/Chrysler and BP/Amoco cases each party was active principally in its respective home continent, but absent or not substantially present in the territory of the other, hence overlaps were marginal or non-existent.
Ændrel rekommandation Ira Rådet for Organisationen for Økonomisk Samarbejde og Udvikling om samarbejde mellem medlemslandene vedrørende konkurrencebegrænsninger i den internationale handel, vedtaget den 27.28. juli 1995.
In another category of case, the EC and US agencies may adopt differing views on product and geographic markets, but find cooperation helpful in establishing why those differences exist, and to satisfy themselves that they are comfortable with their own reasoning.
Denne rapport fokuserer på aspekter af sagsbehandlingen i samarbejdet mellem EF og USA.
This report concentrates on aspects of case handling related to the EC/US cooperation.
For nærmere oplvsninger om en konkret sag henvises til 27. beretning om konkurrencepolitikken.
For more information on a particular case see the XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy.
I sagerne Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, WorldCom/MCI. Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier, Exxon/Shell og Marsh & McLennan/Sedgwick, drøftede man definitionen af produkt markedet og den geografiske udbredelse for at bekræfte begge myndigheders analytiske fremgangsmåde. måde. Det bliver mere almindeligt, at sagsbehandlere rutinemæssigt anmoder om fritagelse fra fortrolighedskravet for at udveksle fortrolige oplysninger.
Marsh & McLennan/Sedgwick, discussions took place about product market definition and geographic extent, with a view toconfirming each agency's analytical approach. It is becoming more common for casehandlers to ask for waivers on a routine basis in order to enable the agencies to exchange confidential information between one another.
Ofte er hovedformålet hermed ikke at få de oplysninger, der kan udveksles, men at fjerne de begrænsninger, der forhindrede myndighederne i at fore en fri og uhindret dialog.
Frequently the main benefit of this is not so much the information which might be exchanged, but the removal of constraints which prevented the agencies from having a free and unfettered dialogue.
Sådanne udvekslinger kan f.eks. forhindre misforståelser, der ellers kunne opstå på grund af ufuldstændig forståelse af sagsbehandlernes stilling og intentioner i den anden jurisdiktion.
For example, such exchanges prevent misunderstandings which might otherwise arise owing to an imperfect understanding of the position or intentions of casehandlers in the other jurisdiction.
Når der er tale om samarbejde i undersøgelsesfasen, kan en koordineret fremgangsmåde endvidere lette byrden for de anmeldende parter og tredjemand.
And where cooperation is carried into the investigation stage, a coordinated approach can reduce the burden on the notifying parties and third parties.
Endelig kan samarbejde om tilrettelæggelse af afhjælpende foranstaltninger hjælpe de anmeldende parter med at undgå dobbelt strafforfølgning, hvilket kræver, at de forhandler om afhjælpende foranstaltninger en for en og dermed må give den anden myndighed yderligere indrømmelser for at sikre godkendelse af en aftale, som allerede er blevet godkendt af den første myndighed.
Finally, cooperation in the devising of remedies can help the notifying parties avoid `double-jeopardy' whereby they are required to negotiate remedies sequentially, and thus have to make further concessions to the second agency to secure the clearance of a deal which has already received the blessing of the first.
Hvis en sadan dialog skal have nogen værdi, er det vigtigt at muliggøre den tidligst muligt i vurderingsprocessen.
If such dialogue is to be of value, it is important to facilitate it as early as possible in the assessment process.
Tidligere forsøg på at sikre fritagelser fra fortrolighedskravet var ofte præget af langvarige forhandlinger med parterne om vilkårene herfor, hvorefter værdien af et eventuelt efterfølgende' samarbejde kunne gå tabt.
A common feature of earlier attempts to secure waivers was lengthy negotiations with the parties about the terms of their waiver, to the point where the value of any subsequent cooperation might be lost.
Kommissionen er begyndt at tage initiativet og foreslå de anmeldende parter at undertegne en standardformular for fritagelse fra fortrolighedskravet. hvorved man bruger mindre tid på at forhandle om vilkårene.
The Commission has begun to take the initiative in suggesting to notifying parties a `standard form' waiver, which they are invited to sign, and hence to minimise the time spent on negotiating the terms.
I nogle få sager er samarbejdet gået videre og har omfattet koordinering af undersøgelsesaktiviteterne.
In a few cases, cooperation has been taken a stage further, to include coordination of investigative activity.
Selv om begge myndigheder fortsat vil lave deres egen efterforskning hos tredjemand, kan de drøfte, hvem der skal kontaktes, og koordinere deres spørgsmål.
Although both agencies would continue to make their own enquiries of third parties, they might discuss who should be contacted, and coordinate the questions to be asked.
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION amerikanske myndigheder, var villige til at tillade, at der blev udvekslet oplysninger, mens andre afgav de samme oplysninger til begge myndigheder.
In WorldCom/MCI, assessments were greatly facilitated by the readiness of many firms who responded to parallel enquiries from the EC and US agencies and allow information to be shared between them, or who supplied the same submission to both.
Samarbejdet kan gå endnu videre.
Cooperation can go further still.
I WorldCom/MCI- og Exxon/Shell-sagerne blev det samarbejde', der var påbegyndt i vurderingsfasen, fortsat, da man begyndte at drøfte afhjælpende foranstaltninger.
In WorldCom/MCI and Exxon/Shell case the cooperation which had begun during the assessment stage was continued when discussions of remedies began.
I WorldCom/MCI-sagen blev der ført trepartsforhandlinger mellem de anmeldende parter og de to myndigheder.
In WorldCom/MCI trilateral remedy negotiations were conducted between the notifying parties and the two agencies.
Endvidere foretog det amerikanske justitsministerium (som er den ansvarlige amerikanske myndighed) og Kommissionen i fællesskab markedsafprøvningen af de forste afhjælpende foranstaltninger.
In addition, the US Department of Justice (ªDoJº Ð the US agency responsible for handling the case) and the Commission jointly conducted the market testing of a first set of remedies.
Det betød, at en sagsbehandler fra G D IV deltog i det amerikanske justitsministeriums markedsafprøvning.
This included the presence of one person from DGIV case team in the DoJ premises to take part to the DoJ market testing.
I Exxon/Shell-sagen drøftede de amerikanske og europæiske myndigheder de afhjælpende foranstaltninger indgående, inden nogen af dem tral en endelig beslutning.
In Exxon/Shell, the remedy was extensively discussed between the US and EC agencies before either agency came to a final view.
Der er endnu kun få eksempler på sager, hvor der er samarbejdet om gennemførelsen af tilsagn, men det kan vise sig at være et vækstområde fremover.
There areas yet few cases on record where cooperation has taken place regarding the implementation of undertakings offered, but this may be an area of growth in the future.
I sagen om WorldCom/MCI blev der udvekslet breve mellem EF og det amerikanske justitsministerium, hvori Kommissionen anmodede amerikanerne om at samarbejde om de tilsagn, som parterne tilbød både Kommissionen og det amerikanske justitsministerium.
In WorldCom/MCI there was an exchange of letters between the EC and the US DoJ where the Commission requested the DoJ's cooperation regarding the undertakings which were mutually offered by the parties to both the Commission and the DoJ.
Amerikanerne bekræftede, at de ville træffe de nødvendige og passendeforholdsregler for at foretage en evaluering, og hvis man fandt tilsagnene tilstrækkelige, ville man sørge for en effektiv gennemførelse.
The DoJ confirmed that it would take whatever steps are necessary and appropriate to evaluate, and if it found them to be sufficient, to seek the effective implementation of these undertakings.
Et godt eksempel på denne form for samarbejde er Halliburton/ Dresser-sagen. som blev godkendt i første fase i EF. mens det i USA tog noget længere, idet man fandt flere alvorlige problemer.
In a good example of such cooperation, the Halliburton/Dresser case was cleared within the first Phase in the EC, but in the US it took somehow longer because of several serious problems identified there.
Et af problemerne' vedrørte markedet for borevæsker.
One of the problem areas found related to the market for drilling fluids.
Selv tim dette gav anledning til betænkeligheder for både Kommissionen og det amerikanske justitsministerium, fandt man. at den amerikanske Antitrust Division bedre kunne behandle sagen, da den omhandlede frasalg af aktiver i LJSA.
Although this was of concern to the European Commission as well as to the DoJ, the US Antitrust Division was considered to be better placed to deal with it, as it involved divestitures of assets located
Kommissionen holdt sig derfor i tæt kontakt med sine amerikanske kolleger og overlod det til dem at sørge for det påkrævede frasalg, der indgik i beslutningen om at godkende sagen i første fase.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION in the US. Therefore, the Commission kept in close contact with its US counterparts, and relied on their pursuing the required divestiture as an element in deciding to clear the case at Phase 1.
Derefter holdt den amerikanske Antitrust Division Kommissionen fuldt underrettet gennem hele frasalgsprocessen.
Subsequently, the US Antitrust Division kept the Commission fully informed throughout the divestiture process.
Gennemførelsen af aftalen fra 1991 mellem EF og LJSA har hidtil været en stor succes.
The implementation of the bilateral EC/US 1991 Agreement has been very successful so far.
De respektive antitrustmyndigheders fremgangsmåder har stort set været sammenfaldende.
Approaches by the respective antitrust authorities have been largely converging rather than diverging.