natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retterne i alle de kontraherende stater er følgelig forpligtet til at respektere dette valg.
That choice must therefore be respected by the courts of all the Con tracting States.
29 Det tredje spørgsmål må derfor besvares med, at konventionens artikel 17 skal fortolkes således, at en kontraherende stats lovgivning ikke kan hindre, at en værnetingsaftale er gyldig, blot fordi det anvendte sprog ikke er det i denne lovgivning fo reskrevne.«
29 Consequently, the answer to Question 3 must be that Article 17 of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the legislation of a Contracting State may not allow the validity of an agreement conferring jurisdiction to be called in question solely on the ground that the language used is not that prescribed by that legislation."
Domstolen kendte derfor for ret:
Accordingly, the Court of Justice ruled as follows:
Artikel 18 i konventionen af 27. september 1968 om retternes kompetence og om fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser i borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager, fin der også anvendelse, når parterne har indgået en aftale om kompetence i medfør af konventionens artikel 17.
Article 18 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the En forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters applies even where the parties have by agreement designated a court which is to have jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 17 of that Convention.
Artikel 18 i konventionen af 27. september 1968 skal fortolkes således, at kompetencereglen i denne bestemmelse ikke finder anvendelse, når sagsøgte ikke blot
Article 18 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 must be interpreted as meaning that the rule on jurisdiction which that provision lays down does not apply where the defendant not only contests the court's jurisdiction but also makes submissions on the substance of the action, provided that, if the challenge to jurisdiction is not preliminary to any defence as to the substance, it does not occur after the making of the submissions which under national procedural law are considered to be the first defence addressed to the court seised.
(fortsat 5) har rejst indsigelse om inkompetence, men desuden har nedlagt påstand om realiteten, såfremt indsigelsen om inkompetence, hvis den ikke fremsættes forud for enhver realitetsindsigelse, dog ikke sker efter tidspunktet for den stillingtagen, der efter national procesret anses for det første forsvar, der fremføres for den ret, som sagen er indbragt for.
(continued 6) of Justice, that the appellant had, as defendant in the proceedings before the Arbeids­rechtbank, Antwerp, made submissions on the substance in its first defence without con­testing the territorial jurisdiction of the court, a plea which had in fact only been raised at a later stage.
I øvrigt gav Hofvan Cassatie kassationsappellanten medhold og hen viste sagen til Arbeidshof, Bruxelles, til videre forhandling og afgørelse (dom af 5.10. 1981, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1982, spalte 529).
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Entry of appearance by the defendant — Want of jurisdiction pleaded and defence on the substance lodged in the alternative — Such entry of appearance does not found jurisdiction
Med hensyn til de belgiske retters kom petence udtalte Hofvan Cassatie under henvisning til konventionens artikel 18 — således som denne var blevet fortolket af Domstolen — at kassationsappellanten som sag søgt i sagen for Arbeidsrechtbank, Antwerpen, havde nedlagt påstand om realiteten i sit første skriftlige indlæg uden at rejse indsigelse mod rettens stedlige kompetence, hvilket først var sket i et senere skriftligt indlæg.
The Cour d'Appel, Versailles, referred to the Court of Justice a question on the interpre­tation of Article 18 of the Convention which had arisen in proceedings on an appeal lodged by Etablissements Rohr SA, a company based in Sarcelles, France, against an en­forcement order made by the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Pontoise, on 5 June 1979.
Deraf fulgte, at kassationsappellanten havde givet møde for Arbeidsrechtbank og først bestridt denne rets kompetence, efter at selskabet havde fremført det første forsvar vedrørende realiteten.
That order, which had been applied for by Ossberger Turbinenfabrik, of Weissenburg (Federal Republic of Germany), provided for the enforcement in France of a provisionally enforceable judgment of the Landgericht Ansbach of 15 December 1978, together with a taxing order of the same court of 5 February 1979.
1-18 — A 2 Dom af 22. oktober 1981 [tredje afdeling]1), sag 27/81, Rohr mod Ossberger (anmodning om præjudiciel afgørelse indgivet af Cour d'appel de Versailles) Sml. 1981, s. 2431 (Forslag til afgørelse fra generaladvokat F. Capotarti, s. 2441)
The judgment in question was given by the Landgericht Ansbach following proceedings instituted by Ossberger against Rohr for payment of various accounts for goods supplied by Ossberger.
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — sagsøgtes møde i sagen— bestridelse af kompe tencen og subsidiær påstand vedrørende realiteten — indebærer ikke kompetence for retten
Since Rohr merely argued before the Landgericht that the court had no jurisdiction ratione loci and did not submit any defence on the substance, and since the Landgericht considered that it had jurisdiction in accordance with Article 17 of the Convention by reason of a clause conferring jurisdiction contained in Ossberger's gen­eral conditions of sale, Rohr was ordered to settle the said accounts and pay the costs.
Cour d'appel de Versailles forelagde Domstolen et præjudicielt spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af konventionens artikel 18, som var blevet rejst under en kæresag, som Rohr SA, Sarcelles, Frankrig (herefter benævnt Rohr), havde indgivet mod en af præ-
Rohr submitted an appeal to the Oberlandesgericht Nürnberg, again relying upon the objection of lack of jurisdiction without submitting any defence on the substance; that appeal was dismissed by a judgment of 13 June 1979 since the Oberlandesgericht Nürnberg considered that the Landgericht had jurisdiction under the provisions of the Convention and that Rohr had still failed to submit a defence on the substance in the course of the appellate procedure.
(fortsat 1) sidenten for Tribunal de grande instance de Pontoise afsagt fuldbyrdelseskendelse af 5. juni 1979. Ved denne kendelse havde nævnte ret efter begæring fra firmaet Ossberger Turbinenfabrik, Weissenburg, Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland (herefter benævnt Ossberger), forsynet en foreløbig eksigibel dom og en kendelse om sagsomkostninger — begge afsagt af Landgericht Ansbach henholdsvis 15. december 1978 og 5. februar 1979 — med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning.
"Must it be held with regard to all the versions of the Convention of 27 September 1968 which are drawn up in the Dutch, French, German and Italian languages in ac­cordance with Article 68 of the Convention either that Article 18 thereof prohibits the simultaneous submission in the alternative of a defence concerning the substance of the case where an objection contesting jurisdiction as allowed by that provision has been raised, in order that a final decision on jurisdiction must be reached before any argument on the substance of the action, or that the said Article 18 permits, al­though it does not say so expressly, the objection contesting jurisdiction for which it makes provision to be submitted at the same time as a defence in the alternative re­garding the substance of the action in order to permit the court before which the ac­tion is brought to give a decision in a single judgment, if that is appropriate, on both the objection and the substance of the action on the pattern of the express provisions of Article 76 of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile [New Code of Civil Proce­dure] together with the detailed procedures for the protection of rights of the de­fence?"
De pågældende afgørelser var afsagt af Landgericht Ansbach i en sag, som Ossberger havde anlagt mod Rohr med påstand om betaling af nogle regninger for leverancer foretaget af Ossberger.
In reply to this question the Court of Justice observed that in its judgment of 24 June 1981 in Case 150/80 (Elefanten Schuh ν Jacqmain, supra 118 — A 1) it had given a pre­liminary ruling on a similar question.
En af Rohr indgivet revisionsanke til Bundesgerichtshof blev afvist ved kendelse af 19. marts 1980 på grund af fristoverskridelse.
Since nothing had arisen in the present proceedings to change the view expressed there, the question submitted was to be answered as follows :
Ossberger har fastholdt, at konventionens artikel 18 ikke — lige så lidt som den tyske Zivilprozessordnung — afskar Rohr fra at fremføre realitetsindsigelser, men at denne be vidst havde afstået herfra.
"Article 18 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 must be interpreted as meaning that it allows the defendant not only to contest the jurisdiction but to submit at the same time in the alternative a defence on the substance of the action without, how­ever, losing his right to raise an objection of lack of jurisdiction."
På grundlag af Domstolens dom stod det fast, at den tyske afgørelse var truffet i overensstemmelse med konventionens artikel 18.
(continued 2) judgment of the Court of Justice it was clear that the German judgment had been given in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention.
Ifølge denne bestemmelse havde den tyske ret ikke været forpligtet til at træffe afgørelse om kompetencespørgsmålet og først derefter tillade, at der blev fremlagt skriftlige indlæg vedrørende realiteten.
Under that provision the German court was not obliged to determine first whether it had jurisdiction and only then to admit writ ten pleadings on the substance of the case.
Det havde altså påhvilet Rohr, som i overensstemmelse med reglerne var repræsenteret for den tyske ret, at varetage sine interesser på enhver måde, som selskabet anså for rigtig.
It was therefore incumbent upon Rohr, which had been properly represented at the hearing before the German court, to defend its in terests in whatever way it found appropriate.
Selskabet kunne ikke nu påberåbe sig sin passivitet og gøre gældende, at den afgørelse, der var afsagt mod selskabet, beroede på en urigtig anvendelse af de internationale bestemmelser, der skulle anvendes i sagen, og krænkede dets ret til at fremsætte indsigelser samt grundlæggende franske retsprincipper.
It was now debarred from pleading its own inaction and arguing that the judgment given against it disregarded the international provisions applicable to the case or infringed its right to a fair hearing or was contrary to French public policy.
Der var der for med føje afsagt kendelse om fuldbyrdelse af den tyske dom.
The order for the enforcement of the German judgment had there fore been rightly granted.
Retten udtalte, at ganske vist kunne den kompetente ret udpe­ges i henhold til denne bestemmelse ved en skriftlig aftale eller ved en mundtlig aftale, der var skriftligt bekræftet; det var imidlertid anerkendt, at de begreber, som anvendtes i reglerne om international kompetence, skulle fastlægges i henhold til reglerne i ita­liensk ret. I italiensk ret forudsatte en »skriftlig aftale eller en mundtlig aftale, der er skriftligt bekræftet« parternes underskrift.
It was true that under that provision jurisdiction could be conferred on a court by an agreement in writing or by an oral agree­ment evidenced in writing; however, it was recognized that the terms used in the provi­sions dealing with international jurisdiction should be construed according to the rules of Italian law.
Sagsøgtes almindelige forretningsbetingelser var optrykt på bagsiden af fakturaerne, og det var ubestridt, at de ikke var underskrevet. De opfyldte derfor ikke disse betingelser og var således uden betydning for kompetence­spørgsmålet.
The general conditions of business printed on the back of the defendant's invoices, which were not signed, did not satisfy that requirement, with the result that they were not relevant to the question of ju­risdiction.
Litispendens — enhver anden ret end den, ved hvilken sagen først er anlagt, skal erklære sig inkompetent — kompetence til at tage stilling til en påstand om, at en arrest erklæres lovlig gjort
Lis alibi pendens — Obligation to decline jurisdiction — Jurisdiction over an application for judicial confirmation of a protective seizure of goods
I denne sag var der fremsat krav om erstatning for undladelse af at tilbagelevere en fri­mærkesamling og for sagsøgtes foretagelse og forfølgning af en ulovlig arrest i For­bundsrepublikken Tyskland; desuden var der nedlagt påstand om stadfæstelse af nogle arrestforretninger, der på sagsøgerens foranledning var foretaget i Nederlandene, dvs. at de erklæredes foretaget med rette for en fordring, der faktisk bestod.
The main claim in these proceedings was for damages for misappropriating a stamp col­lection and for effecting an unlawful attachment in the Federal Republic of Germany; a subordinate claim was made for judicial confirmation of attachments effected by the plaintiff in the Netherlands, that is to say a declaration was sought to the effect that those attachments had been lawfully effected in pursuance of a valid claim.
Sagsøgeren boede ved sagens anlæg i Tyskland, men flyttede under sagens behandling til Nederlan­dene. Sagsøgte havde bopæl i Nederlandene.
The plaintiff was resident in Germany when the proceedings were commenced but had removed to the Netherlands by the time of the hearing; the defendant was resident in the Nether­lands.
1968 ­ ARTIKEL 21 fortsat 1)
1968 - ARTICLE 21
Arrondissementsrechtbank overlod det til den tyske domstol at træffe videre afgørelse om sagens omkostninger, dvs. om omkostningerne i forbindelse med erstatningskravet.
Before the action in the Arrondissementsrechtbank was commenced, proceedings had already taken place between the parties in the German courts, in which the plaintiff claimed from the defendant inter alia the restitution of the stamp collection and the lift­ing of the attachment effected in Germany.
Indbyrdes sammenhængende krav — retssager i forskellige kontraherende stater mellem parter, der ikke er de samme — forskellige sagsgenstande — den ret, hvor sag senest var anlagt, udsatte ikke sin afgørelse — den ret, hvor sag først var anlagt, afviste at udsætte
Related actions — Actions between different parties in different Contracting States — Dif­ferent matters in dispute — Second action not stayed — Refusal by the court first seised to stay proceedings
Sagsøgte gjorde herved gældende, at de luxembourgske og tyske selskaber, der var parter i de to retssager, hver især parvis til­hørte samme koncern. I særdeleshed var forbindelsen mellem de luxembourgske selska­ber så snæver, at den tyske sagsøgte i sagen i Düsseldorf gjorde gældende, at det retsfor­hold, på hvilket kravet støttedes, udelukkende var kommet i stand med selskabet Conti­nentale nucléaire, sagsøgte i den luxembourgske sag.
The grounds of its request were that the Luxembourg and German companies involved in the two actions belonged respectively to the same groups of undertakings; the relations between the Luxembourg companies in particular were so close that the defence of the German undertakings to the action in the Düsseldorf court was to the effect that the le­gal relations on the basis of which the claim had been brought were established solely with La Continentale Nucléaire, the defendant in the Luxembourg proceedings.
Endvidere frem­gik det ikke af akterne i sagen ved Landgericht Düsseldorf, at sagen dér var begæret udsat på grund af indbyrdes sammenhæng i den i artikel 22, stk. 1, i domskonventionen anførte forstand, og der var heller ikke i medfør af artikel 22, stk. 2, fremsat anmodning om, at den tyske ret, hvor sag senest var anlagt, skulle erklære at savne kompetence.
Further, it was apparent from the documents in the case that there had been no application to the Landgericht Düsseldorf for a stay on the grounds that the actions were related within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Brussels Convention, nor had there been a request under the second paragraph of Article 22 that the German court — which had been seised at a later date — should de­cline jurisdiction.
Litispendens og indbyrdes sammenhængende krav — ingen litispendensvirkning eller ind­byrdes sammenhæng mellem et krav, der gøres gældende under en sag om foreløbige rets­midler i Belgien, og en hovedsag i Frankrig
Lis alibi pendens and related actions — Not applicable in the case of an action for interim measures in Belgium and an action on the substance of the case in France
Nogle belgiske og franske virksomheder havde besluttet sig til at samvirke om et vejbyg­ningsprojekt i Libyen.
A number of Belgian and French undertakings agreed to participate in a joint venture to carry out a road-building project in Libya.
Da en af deltagerne, det belgiske aktieselskab BSL, fragik at have påtaget sig forpligtelsen, begærede de øvrige foreløbige forholdsregler taget i anven­delse for at tvinge BSL til at yde sin andel af finansieringen ved at deponere 250 000 000 BFR i en bank i Bruxelles. Rekvirenterne i sagen var de enkelte virksomhe­der samt det franske selskab Ugha Group, som skulle danne den retlige form for samvir­ket.
When one of the participants, the Belgian company "BSL", denied having committed itself, the others applied for an interlocutory injunction requiring BSL to provide its share of the finance by lodging approximately BFR 250 million with a bank in Brussels.
BSL bestred — for såvidt angik selskabets egen deltagelse i samvirket — gyldigheden af de aftaler, der var indgået med henblik på oprettelsen af selskabet.
BSL contested the validity, as regards its own participation, of the agreements entered into for the foundation ofthat company.
Denne indsigelse havde selskabet i øvrigt fremsat allerede inden sagen for den belgiske ret, nemlig under en sag, der var anlagt ved Tribunal de grande instance i Paris.
It had already contested that point, even before the injunction was applied for, in proceedings commenced by it before the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris.
I underinstansen havde retsformanden for Rechtbank van koophandel i Tongeren er­klæret at savne den saglige kompetence, idet en afgørelse, som imødekom kravet om de­ponering, ville indebære en prøvelse af sagens realitet (nemlig om BSL var kontraktsligt forpligtet), som retten ikke kunne foretage under en sag om foreløbige forholdsregler.
At first instance the President of the Rechtbank van Koophandel, Tongeren, declined jurisdiction on the ground that a decision on the claim for payment of the money into the bank would entail a decision on a substantive issue (namely, the extent to which BSL was contractually bound) which the court was not allowed to make in proceedings for an interlocutory injunction.
I appelinstansen blev afgørelsen stadfæstet, dog således at begrundelsen blev ændret fra, at retten savnede kompetence, til, at kravet måtte afvises.
On appeal that decision was upheld, but the ground now given for declining jurisdiction was the inadmissibility of the claim.
Hof van Beroep forkastede BSL's indsigelse — som støttedes på konventionens arti­kel 16, nr. 2 — om, at den franske domstol på Ugha Group's hjemsted var enekompetent, idet den udtalte, at selskabets beståen og gyldigheden af de af selskabets organer trufne beslutninger ganske vist kunne tages i betragtning som faktiske omstændigheder, som den ret, der behandlede begæringen om foreløbige forholdsregler, kunne tage stilling til, men at kravet ikke angik dette forhold.
The court dismissed BSL's argument that under Article 16(2) of the Convention the French courts at the place where Ugha Group had its seat had exclusive jurisdiction: al­though the validity of the constitution of a company or of decisions of its organs might be relevant as questions of fact which the court could take into consideration in proceed­ings on an application for interim relief, such matters did not constitute the essence of the claim.
Hofvan Beroep mente heller ikke, at artikel 21 (om litispendens) kunne finde anvendelse, idet det fremsatte krav og det, sagen i Paris angik, ikke havde samme genstand.
Nor did the court consider Article 21 (lis alibi pendens) applicable, because the proceedings before it and those before the Paris court did not involve the same cause of action.
Hvad angik artikel 22 udtalte retten på den ene side, at BSL ikke krævede, at den erklærede sig inkompetent til fordel for præsidenten for Tri­bunal de grande instance eller for Tribunal de commerce i Paris i medfør af artiklens stk. 2, og på den anden side, at der ikke fandtes anledning til at udsætte sagen i medfør af artikel 22, stk. 1, idet retsformanden kun kunne træffe en foreløbig afgørelse (jfr. den belgiske retsplejelovs artikel 584), og der således ikke var fare for, at der skulle blive af­sagt uforenelige afgørelser, jfr. artiklens stk. 3.
With regard to Article 22, the court observed in the first place that BSL had not requested it to decline jurisdiction in favour of the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance or the President of the Tribunal de Commerce, Paris, pursuant to the second paragraph of that article; it held, secondly, that there was no reason to stay the proceedings pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 21, because the President could only give a provisional judgment (Article 584 of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek [Judicial Code]) and there was therefore no danger of irreconcilable judgments within the mean­ing of the third paragraph.
Den belgiske ret var kompetent i medfør af konventionens artikel 2. For fuldstændighe­dens skyld fastslog Hof van Beroep imidlertid også, at de retsmidler, der krævedes an­vendt, var af foreløbig eller sikrende karakter, således at også artikel 24 kunne finde an­vendelse.
The jurisdiction of the Belgian courts was founded on Article 2 of the Convention; how­ever, the court held ad abundariam that the measures applied for by the plaintiffs were of a provisional or protective nature, so Article 24 could also be considered applicable.
Det var imidlertid en betingelse herfor, at der var tale om med arresten at sikre et krav, for hvilket kreditor kunne opnå et i Nederlandene eksigibelt eksekutionsfunda­ment, at skyldneren ikke blev unddraget det værneting, som var kompetent med hensyn til hovedsagen, samt at stadfæstelsen alene måtte have til formål at videreføre arresten i en fuldbyrdelsessag, efter at afgørelsen i hovedsagen var blevet erklæret for eksigibel.
However, such relief could only be granted subject to satisfaction of the following conditions: first, that the attachment should be intended to provide security for a claim in respect of which the creditor could obtain a judgment enforceable in the Netherlands; secondly, that the debtor should not thereby be removed from the jurisdiction of the court which is competent in the substan­tive action; and thirdly, that the sole purpose of the confirmation should be to enable the attachment to be transferred to the enforcement proceedings after the decision in the substantive action has been declared enforceable.
I det foreliggende tilfælde havde det været muligt for rekvirenten fra den kompetente italienske ret at opnå en retsafgørelse i hovedsagen, som rekvirenten kunne have begæret forsynet med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning i Nederlandene på grundlag af den nederlandsk­italienske fuldbyrdelseskonvention fra 1959 og domskonventionens artikler 31 ff. Afgø­relsen vedrørende stadfæstelsen af arresten kunne have været udsat i det tidsrum, der var nødvendigt herfor.
In the present case it had been open to the applicant to obtain a decision on the principal claim from the appropriate Italian court and apply for an order for its enforcement in the Netherlands under the 1959 Convention between the Netherlands and Italy on the enforcement of judgments and under Article 31 et seq. of the Brussels Convention. A decision on the confirmation of the protective attachment could have been deferred for the period of time required to do that.