natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Begge hovedstæder har nydt godt af en betydelig stigning i beskæftigelsen Indenfor servicesektoren.
The large state-run enterprises that characterised the period before transition were heavily subsidised in a number of ways, which had the effect of encouraging high levels of employment and labour hoarding.
I Rumænien har faldet i be­skæftigelsen været forholdsvis ensartet fordelt regio­nerne imellem.
This masked the relatively unproductive nature of much em ployment which, under market conditions, would have tended to result in unemployment.
De har alle oplevet et fald, men det har været særlig markant i Bukarest, mest på grund af, at landbruget i de øvrige regioner har afbødet faldet.
Some sources suggest that 'true' unemployment' may have been as high as 20 to 30% in the CEE countries in the 1980s.
Da overgangsperioden startede blev ledigheden en realitet.
With the start of transition, unemployment became a reality.
Generelt set steg ledigheden brat i de tidlige overgangsår, og ¡følge officielle beregninger var 7,5 mill, central­ og østeuropæere ledige i starten af 1994.10
In general, unemployment rose sharply during the early years of transition and by early 1994, 7.5 mil lion Central and Eastern Europeans were unem ployed according to official estimates.10
Følgelig udviser beskæftigelsesgraden også markante regionale forskelle.
In Poland, the fall in employment has been larger in voivodshipsw'úh high shares of employment in industry.
I Ungarn er den betydelig højere i Budapest end i landets nordlige del.
Conversely, many voivodships w\\h high employ ment in agriculture have fared better.
Det samme gæl­der for Polen.
However, this is nota uniform pattern.
I Slovakiet er beskæftigelsesgraden kun­stig: høj i Bratislava på grund af omfattende pendling, men selv når der korrigeres herfor, ligger den væsent­ligt over beskæftigelsesgraden I landets østlige del, mens forskellene mellem regionerne er mindre I Tjekki­et.
In general, Western parts of the country have been more affected by declining em ployment than Eastern regions, while, in Slovakia, employment has fallen by more in Eastern parts.
I Rumænien er der også kun forholdsvis små for­skelle i beskæftigelsesgrad mellem regionerne, trods det uforholdsmæssigt store fald I beskæftigelsen i og omkring Bukarest.
The only region which is an exception to this in Poland is Warsaw where employment rose between 1990 and 1995.
Generelt toppede ledigheden i CØE­landene I om­kring 1993, men stabiliserede sig derefter, og har især siden 1995 vist en faldende tendens.
Similarly, employment increased in Bratislava overthe same period, while in all other Slovak regions it fell.
Det er til­fældet i Letland, Ungarn, Polen, Litauen, Slovakiet og I nogen grad Bulgarien.
Both capitals have benefited from a significant rise in service sector employment.
Tjekkiet var den vigtigste undtagelse fra den generelle stigning i ledigheden, og antallet af arbejdsløse er stadig lavere her end an­dre steder.
In Romania, the re duction of employment has been relatively evenly balanced between regions.
Det skyldtes et gunstigere udgangspunkt, den hurtige fremvækst af private fir­maer, en aktiv arbejdsmarkedspolitik, men også, at nogle holdt op med at være erhvervsaktive.
All have experienced a fall but it has been particularly marked in Bucharest, largely due to the fact that in other regions agriculture has cushioned the decline.
I de seneste år har den tjekkiske arbejdsløshed dog haft en stigende tendens, og var i 1997 på over 5% (Graf 42).
CEE unemployment generally peaked in 1993 or so but subsequently stabilised and, especially from
Beskæftigelse fordelt på sektorer i Central­ og Østeuropa, 1994­97
41 Employment by sector in Central and Eastern Europe, 1994 and 1997
/o af sameide beskæftigede
% of total employment
Venstre søjle 1995, højre søjle 1997
Left bar 1995, right bar 1997
EUR15: 1995 og 1997
EUR15: 1995 and 1997
11995 var 38% af de bulgarske arbejdsstyrke under 25 ledige, det højeste antal i re gionen. I Polen, Letland og Litauen var procenten no get lavere, 31-32%.
In the Baltic States, extensive labour hoarding largely restrained the rise of unemployment in the early years of transition.
Kun Tjekkiet havde et encifret ungdomsarbejdsløshedstal på omkring 8%.
Similarly, unemployment in Romania was contained in the early years of transition as economic restructuring was postponed and here it has been kept well below 10% throughout the transition.
Derimod havde Tjekkiet, Rumænien (7%) og Slovenien (7%) ledighedsprocenter et stykke under EU-gennemsnittet, mens ledigheden i Ungarn (10%) og Estland (10%) var nogenlunde på linje med EU-gennemsnittet.
By contrast, the Czech Republic, Romania (7%) and Slovenia (7%) had unemployment rates well below the EU average while they were broadly in line with the EU average in Hungary (10%) and Estonia (10%).
Fra 1995 til 1997 faldt ledigheden i alle landene, und tagen Bulgarien, Tjekkiet og Estland, hvor den steg.
Unemployment among young people increased faster during the initial years of transition than among the rest of the work force, reflecting the relatively low rate of new job creation.
Men selv hvor den er faldet er procenten stadig for holdsvis høj og svarer til tallene for EU .
By 1995, 38% of the Bulgarian labour force under 25 was unemployed, the high est rate in the region.
I 1997 var le digheden på 14% i Letland, Litauen og Bulgarien, 12% i Slovakiet, 10% i Polen og Estland, 9% i Ungarn, 7% i Slovenien og godt 5% i Rumænien og Tjekkiet.
In Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, rates were somewhat lower at 31-32%. Only the Czech Republic had a single-digit youth unemploy ment rate at some 8%.
Fra 1995 til 1997 faldt ungdomsarbejdsløsheden i alle CØE-landene, med undtagelse af Tjekkiet og Estland.
From 1995 to 1997, unemployment fell in all the countries except Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Estonia where it increased.
Men alligevel er ungdomsarbejdsløsheden stadig klart højere, i almindelighed dobbelt så høj som den gennemsnitlige ledighed i alle CØE-lande, med undtagelse af de baltiske lande.
However, even where it has fallen, the rate in most cases remains relatively high and comparable to levels in the EU.
I 1997 var den stadig højere end noget andet sted i Bulgarien (36%), fulgt af Litauen (26%), Letland (25%), Polen (23%) og Slovakiet (22%). Nogle under søgelser tyder dog på, at det økonomiske opsving har gavnet de unge mere end de ældre medlemmer af arbejdsstyrken.
In 1997, unem ployment stood at 14% in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, 12% ¡n Slovakia, 10% in Poland and Estonia, 9% in Hungary, 7% in Slovenia and just over 5% in Ro mania and the Czech Republic.
Ledighedens opståen og stigning har utvivlsomt været årsag til øget fattigdom og betydelige sociale problemer.
The emergence and rise in unemployment has un doubtedly given rise to increased poverty and signifi
Ligesom i EU-landene er kvindernes ledighed højere end mændenes i de fleste CØE-lande, selv om for skellene ofte er mindre end i Unionen.
In a number of countries, however, youth unemploy ment has come down in recent years as employment opportunities in the private sector have expanded.
I to lande, Ungarn og Estland, er kvindernes ledighed lavere end
From 1995 to 1997, youth unemployment declined in all CEE countries with the exception of the Czech Re public and Estonia.
Nedlæggelse af arbejdspladser, især i industrien, har specielt ramt mennesker med kvalifikationer, der stort set ikke er brug for mere, og som har ringe omstillingsevne.
Nevertheless, youth unemploy ment has remained clearly higher, in general twice as high, than the overall rate in all CEE countries except the Baltic States.
I 1995 havde over halvde-
In 1997, it was still higher than else-
% af arbejdsstryken
¿of labour force
Fra venstre mod hojre: 1993 til 1997
From left to right: 1993 to 1997
I Bulgarien, Rumænien, Slovenien og Letland (der foreligger ikke tal for Litauen) er kvindernes gennemsnitlige ledighed kun en smule højere end mændenes.
15 cant social problems. Moreover, with the passage of time, there has been an increase in the duration of unemploy ment, as noted below, and a growing threat to social cohesion with more of the unemployed exhausting their entitlement to benefit.
I Po len var kvindernes ledighedsprocent til gengæld over 3 procentpoint højere end mændenes (svarende til forskellen i Unionen), i Tjekkiet over 2,5 procent point og i Slovakiet over 1,5 procent point højere.
According to a study, only 28% of unemployed in Bulgaria in 1994 were entitled to benefits and only 22% of those ceasing to draw benefits in Hungary did so because they had found a job.
Ungdomsarbejdsløshed
Female unemployment
Ungarn og den nordlige del af pusztaen.
On the whole, capital city regions, large urban centres and Western regions tend to have lower unem ployment than the rest of the country.
Til sammen ligning har alle tjekkiske regioner forholdsvis lave ledighedsprocenter, men med visse regionale for skelle — meget lave tal i Prag og Sydbøhmen, men højere tal i Nordbøhmen og Mähren, hovedsagelig på grund af nedgangen i kulminedrift og sværindustri.
In comparison, Czech regions all have relatively low un employment rates, but with some regional variation — very low rates in Prague and Southern Bohemia but higher rates in Northern Bohemia and Moravia, largely due to the decline of coal mining and heavy in dustry.
I almindelighed synes Ungarns østlige regioner være hårdere ramt af øget ledighed end landets vestlige egne, dog med undtagelse af Syd-Transdanubia (Kort 48).
In general, the Eastern regions in Hungary seem to have been more affected by rising unem ployment than Western parts with the exception of Southern Transdanubia (Map 48).
len af alle arbejdsløse været uden job i et år eller mere I de fleste CØECEO-llande.
By 1995, slightly more than half of the total unemployed had been out of work for a year or more in most CEE countries.
Kun Tjekkiet, (34%), Est land (37% og Polen (44%) havde væsentlig lavere tal for langtidsledigheden.
Only the Czech Republic (34%), Estonia (37%) and Poland (44%) had significantly lower shares of longterm un employment.
Den største langtidsledighed sås i Bulgarien (65%), Letland (65%) og Slovakiet (61%).
The highest levels were in Bulgaria (65%), Latvia (63%) and Slovakia (61%).
I næsten alle CØE-landene var langtidsledigheden ligefremt proportional med uddannelsesniveauet, selv om Rumænien og — i mindre grad — Po len er undtagelser, idet den høje beskæftigelse i jordbruget har skaffet job til folk med lave faglige kvalifikationer.
In nearly all CEE countries, longterm unemployment was directly proportional to the level of education, though Romania and, to a lesser extent, Poland are exceptions as high levels of rural employment have provided the lowskilled with jobs.
I Rumænien var de hårdest ramte folk med kortere erhvervsuddannelser real- eller studentereksamen.11 tereksamen.11
In Romania, those most affected were people with vocational and secondary education rather than those with lower levels.11
I Polen er de regionale uligheder større, med de største ledighedsprocenter i landets nordlige og vestlige del (hvor der er sket en omfattende nedgang i industrien), og de laveste tal i landets sydlige og østlige dele, hvor en stor del af arbejdsstyrken stadig er be skæftiget ved landbrug.
In Poland, regional disparities are wider, with the highest rates in the North and West, where there has been largescale industrial decline, and the lowest rates in the South and parts of the East, where a high proportion of the work force is still employed in agriculture.
Generelt set fremviser byområder som f.eks. Warszawa, Poznan og Katowice de laveste ledighedstal.
In general, urban centres such as Warsaw, Poznan, and Katowice present the lowest unemploy ment levels.
Nogle af byerne står dog stadig foran en omfattende omstillingsproces.
However, in some of them, significant re structuring still lies ahead.
Den stigning i beskæftigelsen, som der er sket i de fleste CØE-lande siden 1993 eller 1994, har haft en vis virkning på langtidsledigheden.
The rise in employment which most CEE countries have experienced since 1993 or 1994 has had some effect on the incidence of longterm unemployment.
Mellem 1995 og 1997 faldt andelen af ledige, der var uden arbejde i et år eller længere, i alle landene undtagen Rumænien (hvor den var uændret) og i Estland (hvor den steg betydeligt).
Between 1995 and 1997, the proportion of the unem ployed out of work for a year or more fell in all the countries except Romania, where it was unchanged, and Estonia where it increased significantly.
Faldet i langtidsledigheden var mest markant i Bulgarien og Polen.
The fall in longterm unemployment was most marked in Bulgaria and Poland.
Ikke desto mindre er andelen i de fleste af landene stadig højere end i EU, mellem 50% og 60%.
Nonetheless, in most countries it remains higher than the EU rate, at between 50% and 60%.
Kun i Tjekkiet (29%) og Polen (38%) var andelen væsentligt lavere end i EU.
Only in the Czech Republic (29%) and Poland (38%) was the proportion significantly less than in the EU.
Dette tyder på, at problemet med langtidsledighed ikke kan løses med økonomisk vækst alene.
This suggests that the problem of longterm un employment may not be resolved simply by economic growth.
I Rumænien er ledigheden størst i den nordvestlige del og lavest i den vestlige.
There are significant regional disparities in unem ployment.
I Slovakiet findes den laveste ledig hedsprocent ligeledes i hovedstaden, men i Bratislava afspejler den lave ledighed primært et stigende antal arbejdspladser, frem for tilbagetrækning fra ar bejdsmarkedet.
These result from inherited regional imbalances as well as from new regional differences
Der er betydelige regionale uligheder i beskæftigelsen.
In Romania, unemployment is highest in the North-East and lowest in the West.
Samlet set er der en tendens til at hovedstadsregioner, store byområder og vestlige regioner har lavere ledighed end resten af landet.
Bucharest has experi enced the largest fall in employment, indicating that it is primarily the reduction in participation and the exodus to rural areas which has kept the rate low.
Som allerede nævnt nyder de generelt godt af en gunstig beliggenhed, bedre forsyning med infrastruktur og højere vækst i erhvervslivet, især indenfor serviceerhvervene.
In Slovakia, the lowest rate of unemployment is also in the capital, though here the low rate in Bratislava primarily reflects job growth rather than declining participation.
I landdistrikterne er tendenserne mere blandede. De steder, hvor man har omlagt landbrugene, er ledigheden ste get.
Unemployment is substantially higher in the Eastern region, which has been hit especially hard by the collapse in trade with the former Soviet Union.
Kort 48 Arbejdsløshedprocent i Central- og Østeuropa, 1995
Map 48 Unemployment rates in Central and Eastern Europe, 1995
BG: nationale tal HU, PL, RO: registreret arbejdsløshed
BG: national level HU, PL, R0: registered unemployment Others: LFS Regional figures are approximate
af ganske få år. Modsætningsvis er deres indbyrdes samhandel faldet til forholdsvis lave niveauer (12,5% af importen, 20% af eksporten).
Trade creased by 429% (over 5 times), while imports from them rose by 263%. so giving rise to a substantial trade surplus for EU Member States (Graph 43).
I 1996 udgjorde EUs eksport til CØE-lande ca. 10% af Unionens samlede eksport til tredjelande, eller kun ca. 1% af Unionens BNP.
By 1996, some 59% of CEE exports went to the Union and around 58% of their imports came from the Un ion.
Det lyder måske ikke af meget, men det er mere end Unionen eksporterer til Japan, og næsten lige så meget som eksporten til Fjernøsten. Ydermere var væksten i eksporten til regionen mellem 1990 og 1996 kun en smule mindre end væksten i eksporten til det hastigt voksende fjernøstlige marked.
Both figures were over 60% in the case of Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, though only around 35% in the case of Slovakia (for which trade with the Czech Republic is important) and Lithuania (for which trade with former Soviet Union countries remains substantial). stantial).
EUs eksport til regionen går dog fortrinsvis til tre lan de.
For most countries in the region, therefore, the scaie of trade with the Union in relative terms has. in a very short space of time, reached a similar level to that of trade between EU Member States.
I 1996 gik omkring 30% til Polen, 25% til Tjekkiet og 15% til Ungarn.
By contrast, trade between themselves has fallen to relatively low levels (121/2% of imports, 20% of exports).
Ligeledes stod disse tre lande for en tilsvarende andel af EU-importen fra CØE-landene (Graf 45 og 46).
In 1996, EU ex ports to CEE countries amounted to around 10% of to tal Union exports to third countries, or only around 1 % of Union GDP, which may seem small but it is larger than Union exports to Japan and almost as much as those to East Asia.
Under Den Kolde Krig havde EU generelt et lille handelsunderskud i forhold til CØE-landene, anslået til 0,9 mia. ECU i 1990.
Moreover, between 1990 and
I 1993 var billedet totalt vendt, med et handelsoverskud i EUs favør på 5,5 mia. ECU.
Under the former (CMEA) trading system, the CEE countries developed highly specialised and mutually complementary structures of production.
Trods handelsaftalernes asymmetriske karakter er EU fortsat med at akkumulere et betydeligt handelsoverskud overfor CØE-landene, der i 1996 var nået op på 16,5 mia. ECU, noget mere end 25% af værdien af eksporten til regionen.
Trade with the rest of the world was extremely limited, though over the 1970s and 1980s, it was expanded as a de liberate part of policy and largely to service growing foreign debt.
I 1997 var EUs handelsover skud steget yderligere til over 20 mia. ECU (Graf 43).
Nevertheless, in 1985, under 20% of CEE exports went to present EU Member States.
Siden starten af overgangsperioden har EU indgået en ny generation af aftaler med ansøgerlandene fra CØE, Europaaftalerne.
The low figure was partly because of the difficulty of reaching an agreement between the EU and the CEE countries to reduce restrictions on trade.
Disse aftaler fjerner EU-tolden på industriprodukter og nedsætter de kvantitative be grænsninger progressivt (aftalerne er asymmetriske, idet de først fjerner handelsrestriktionerne på EU-siden), selv om der stadig er handelsrestriktioner for landbrugsprodukter (Graf 43).
The prefer ence in the EU was for an approach based on bilateral trade agreements with each of the countries concerned rather than with the CMEA as a group for fear of Soviet domination.
Som resultat af det te og åbningen af CØE-markedet er der sket en drastisk stigning i handelen mellem CØE-landene og EU.
In 1988, however, an EU-CMEA joint declaration led to a first generation of bilateral agreements between the two sides, giving 'most-favoured nation' status to all countries in the re gion, except Romania which already had a more farreaching trade agreement, and, as a result, there was some increase in trade.
Mellem 1990 og 1996 steg EUs eksport til CØE-landene med 429% (dvs. femdobledes), mens importen fra disse lande steg med 263% og dermed medførte et betydeligt handelsoverskud i EU-landenes favør.
1996, the growth of exports to the region was only slightly smaller than the growth of those to the rapidly expanding East Asian market.
I 1996 gik omkring 59% af CØE-landenes eksport til Unionen, og ca. 58% af de res import kom fra Unionen.
EU exports to the region, however, go predominantly to three countries. In 1996, some 30% went to Poland, 25% to the Czech Republic and 15% to Hungary.
Begge tal var over 60% for Polen, Estland, Slovenien og Ungarn, men kun ca. 35% for Slovakiet (der har en betydelig samhandel med Tjekkiet) og Litauen (der stadig har en betydelig saimandel med landene I det tidligere Sovjetunionen). nen).
Equally, these three countries accounted for a similar proportion of EU imports from CEE countries (Graphs 45 and 46).
For de fleste lande i regionen er samhandelen med Unionen således, relativt set, kommet op på et niveau svarende til samhandelen mellem EU-landene, i løbet
As a result of this and the opening up of the CEE market, trade between the CEE countries and the EU has increased dramatically, Between 1990 and 1996, EU exports to CEE countries in-
11996 var Letland og Bulgarien de eneste CØE-lande med handelsoverskud i forhold til EU.
During the Cold War, the EU generally ran a small trade deficit with the CEE countries estimated at 0.9 billion ECU in 1990.
For Bulgariens vedkommende skyldtes det hovedsagelig en kraftig devaluering (Tabel 38).
By 1993, the position had been firmly reversed with a trade surplus in favour of the EU of 5.5 billion ECU.
CØE-landenes handelsunderskud beløb sig samlet til 7% af deres samlede BNP, men var væsentlig højere i nogle lande: I Est land var det på 23% af BNP, i Letland 15%, i Litauen 11 %, i Slovakiet 12% og i Tjekkiet 10%.
Despite the asymmetrical nature of the trade agreements, the EU has continued to accumulate a substantial trade surplus with CEE countries, which in 1996 had risen to 16.5 billion ECU, well over 25% of the value of exports to the region. By
I 1996 havde alle EU-lande handelsoverskud, undtagen Grækenland og Portugal, der havde meget små underskud.
In 1996, Latvia and Bulgaria were the only CEE countries with a trade surplus with the EU.
Tysk land er langt den største eksportør og Importør og står for ca. 45% af al EU-eksport til regionen og næsten 50% af Unionens import herfra (selv om de nordiske
In the case of Bulgaria, this was mainly caused by a substantial devaluation (Table 38). The trade deficit of CEE countries amounted in aggregate to 7% of their total GDP but was substantially higher in some standing at 23% of
4 Udvidelse lande er vigtigere handelspartnere for de baltiske lan­de).
4 Enlargement ward investment, especially from EU Member States.
Det skyldes dels landets geografiske nærhed, dels historiske og kulturelle bånd.
In 1996, well over 70% of exports of goods from CEE countries consisted of manufactures and almost 80% of those to the EU.
De næststørste ekspor­tører/importører er Italien (der står for ca. 12% af beg­ge dele) og Østrig (knap 10% — hvilket vil sige, at i forhold til BNP er deres handel med CØE­landene endnu større end Tysklands).
Moreover, whereas in 1990, machin­ery, transport equipment and electrical and electronic goods accounted for only 15% of CEE exports to the EU, by 1996, the figure had increased to 30%.
Samhandelens sammensætning tionsmidler, og halvfabrikata.
GDP in Estonia, 15% in Latvia, 11% in Lithuania 12% in Slovakia and 10% in the Czech Republic.
Med overgangen er der sket et massivt skift i importen hen imod forbrugsgo­der. Endvidere — og måske mod forventning — er de fleste CØE­lande nettoimportører af fødevarer og landbrugsprodukter.
While in many CEE countries, these deficits are financed by net capital inflows, all countries in the region had growing debts with the rest of the world, reflecting their relative lack of competitiveness as well as their expanding mar­kets and, for a number of countries, special programmes of repayment with the IMF.
En stigende andel af CØE­landenes eksport og Import består i færdig­varer, og det gælder i særdeleshed deres samhandel med EU.
Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the composition of exports between countries in the re­gion.
Det er i øvrigt et typisk træk ved samhande­len mellem industrialiserede lande, at de ofte ekspor­terer og importerer samme type produkt, og det af­spejler dels forbrugernes krav om valgmuligheder, dels en væksten i handelen mellem underafdelinger af samme firma, eller mellem firmaer og deres under­leverandører.
In Bulgaria and Romania, exports still consist to a major extent of intermediate products and chemi­cals and in Lithuania and Latvia, of raw materials and fuels, which is also true in Estonia, though here manu­factures represent a growing share of total exports.