natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Fuldbyrdelse — eksigibel afgørelse — arrestdekret — retsafgørelse i konventionens for­stand (artikel 25) — hindringer for anerkendelse, som udelukker fuldbyrdelsespåtegning (artikel 34, stk. 2) — bevis for forskriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse eller meddelelse (arti­kel 27, nr. 2) — ikke påkrævet ved fuldbyrdelsespåtegning på et arrestdekret
Enforcement — Enforceable judgment — "Arrestbefehl" [Order for attachment in security of a claim] — Judgment within the meaning of the Convention (Article 25) — Reasons for refusing recognition which prevent the issue of an order for enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — Proof of due service in sufficient time (Article 27 (2)) — Not necessary in the case of an order for the enforcement of an "Arrestbefehl".
Til sikring af en påstået fordring mod en belgisk virksomhed opnåede et tysk selskab en afgørelse fra en belgisk ret, hvorved selskabet blev bemyndiget til at lade en fordring, som den belgiske virksomhed skulle have mod et firma i Hamburg, belægge med arrest.
So as to obtain security for an alleged claim against a Belgian undertaking, a German company obtained an order from the appropriate Belgian court which permitted it to attach a debt said to be owed to the Belgian undertaking by a Hamburg firm.
For at kunne gennemføre dette indgav selskabet anmodning til Landgericht Hamburg om meddelelse af fuldbyrdelsespåtegning på det belgiske dekret.
In order to be able to carry out the attachment the German company applied to the Landgericht Hamburg for an order for the enforcement of the Belgian decision.
Anmodningen blev efterkommet.
The application was granted.
Landgericht efterprøvede og svarede bekræftende på spørgsmålet, om også arrest — der var en »retsafgørelse« i konventionens artikel 25's forstand — faldt ind under konven­tionens anvendelsesområde.
The Landgericht considered first the question whether an "Arrestbefehl" [order for the attachment of property in security of a claim pendente lite], which was said to be a judg­ment within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention, fell within the scope of the Convention and held that it did. That was a result of Article 1 of the Convention, and also, indirectly, of Articles 34 and 35 of the German Ausführungsgesetz zu dem Überein­kommen [law implementing the Convention] of 29 July 1972 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1972 I 1328).
Disse bestemmelser indeholdt særlige forskrifter for retsafgørelser fra tyske retter og omfattede blandt andet også arrestdekreter.
Those articles contained particular provisions for judgments of German courts and related inter aliato "Arrestbefehle".
Da afgørelsen fra den belgiske ret var blevet truffet, uden at den belgiske virksomhed var blevet hørt, undersøgte Landgericht endvidere, om fuldbyrdelsespåtegning kunne meddeles uanset hindringen for anerkendelse i konventionens artikel 27, nr. 2, (jfr. arti­kel 34, stk. 2).
As the order of the Belgian court had been issued without the Belgian respondent having been heard, the Landgericht Hamburg considered further whether the ground for re­fusing recognition contained in Article 27 (2) of the Convention prevented the issue of an order for enforcement (see the second paragraph of Article 34).
Retten kom til det resultat, at denne bestemmelse — hvorefter en retsafgø­relse ikke kan anerkendes, såfremt det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke forskrifts­mæssigt er blevet forkyndt eller meddelt den udeblevne sagsøgte i så god tid, at han har kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen — ikke kunne anvendes i det foreliggende tilfælde »på grund af arrestprocedurens natur«.
It came to the con­clusion that that provision — whereby a judgment given in default of appearance shall not be recognized if the defendant was not duly served with the document which institu­ted the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence — could not be applied in the present case "because of the nature of the procedure for obtaining an 'Arrestbefehl' ".
(fortsat 1) blev dommen forsynet med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning af Corte d'appello di Torino.
1­27.2 — Β 3 Corte d'Appello, Turin, Judgment of 11 March 1977, Ditta Pollo Giusy SNC ν Soc. Rousseau et Vergnaud
Debi­tor, den italienske virksomhed, appellerede afgørelsen i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 36 og anførte herved, at den franske udeblivelsesdom ikke kunne anerkendes og fuldbyrdes, fordi det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke forskriftsmæssigt var blevet forkyndt for eller meddelt den i så god tid, at den havde kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen (konventionens artikel 27, nr. 2).
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second para­graph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Examination by the court in which recognition and enforce­ment is sought of the sufficiency of the time — Criteria of assessment — Facts and circum­stances of each case — Procedural law of the State in which the judgment was delivered irrelevant.
Den italienske virksomhed havde først og fremmest gjort gældende, at perioden fra den italienske stævningsmands forkyndelse af stævningen og indkaldelsen (17.5.
The Corte d'Appello dismissed the appeal. It held, first, that the statement of claim and summons had been duly served by the Italian court officer at the place where the Italian undertaking had its offices at the request of the Procureur de la République attached to the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Poitiers, after the defendant had already received a copy of the statement of claim and the summons.
1975) til tidspunktet for retsmødet ved Tribunal de commerce de Poitiers (23.6.
Service had been carried out in accor­dance with French procedural law and was also effective under Italian law.
1975) ikke havde været tilstrækkelig til forberedelsen af sagen, hvorfor forkyndelsen ikke var sket »i... god tid« i artikel 27, nr. 2's forstand.
The Italian undertaking's principal contention was that the period of time between the service of the statement of claim and summons by the Italian court officer (17 May 1975) and the date of the hearing before the Tribunal de Commerce, Poitiers, (23 June 1975) had not been sufficient for it to arrange for its defence and that service had accord­ingly not been effected "in sufficient time" within the meaning of Article 27 (2).
Dette ville kun have været tilfælde, hvis den franske ret havde overholdt de i fransk retspleje og i den fransk­italienske konvention af 3. juni 1930 om fuldbyrdelse af domme i civile og kommercielle sager foreskrevne indkaldelses­frister.
It sub­mitted that service would only have been effected in sufficient time if the French court had observed the periods of notice laid down in French procedural law and the Conven­tion between France and Italy on the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters of 3 June 1930.
Ifølge disse bestemmelser skulle indkaldelsen være sket med 98 dages varsel, hvorimod den faktisk indrømmede frist var væsentligt kortere.
Under those provisions, the period of notice given by the sum­mons should have been 98 days, whereas the period actually allowed had been substan­tially shorter.
Hertil anførte Corte d'appello, at afgørende for spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt forkyndelsen var rettidig, i dette tilfælde alene kunne være domskonventionens artikel 27, nr. 2, som for så vidt havde afløst konventionen af 1930 (konventionens artikel 55).
The Corte d'Appello, however, held that the only criterion for testing whether the period of notice had been sufficient was Article 27 (2) of the Brussels Convention which re­placed the 1930 Convention (Article 55 of the Brussels Convention).
Ganske vist gjaldt den gamle konvention i henhold til artikel 56 stadig på de retsområder, hvor domskonventionen ikke fandt anvendelse, men alle spørgsmål vedrørende fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser og således også spørgsmålet om forkyndelsens rettidighed var udtøm­mende reguleret i domskonventionen.
Although under Ar­ticle 56 the former convention continued to have effect in relation to matters to which the Brussels Convention did not apply, all questions relating to the enforcement of judg­ments and thus to the issue of the sufficiency of the period of notice were exclusively gov­
(fortsat 2) det foreliggende foreskrev en frist på 90 dage, der dog kunne afkortes indtil det halve (ar­tikel 163 a i Codice di procedura civile).
It was not prevented from reaching that conclusion by the fact that in cases such as the present Ita­lian procedural law prescribed a period of notice of 90 days, which, however, could be reduced by half (Article 163 bis of the Codice di Procedura Civile).
Den heri indeholdte ordning var — ligesom de franske retsplejeforskrifter — generel og skulle omfatte en mængde ganske forskellige tilfælde; de ændrede faktiske forhold inden for Det europæiske økonomiske Fælles­skab havde ikke kunnet forudses ved reglens udfærdigelse.
The rules laid down in that article — and also those laid down in the French procedural rales — were ab­stract and intended to cover a number of wholly different cases. They could not take ac­count of altered factual circumstances within the European Economic Community.
Domskonventionens arti­kel 27, nr. 2, krævede imidlertid, at begrebet rettidighed skulle fortolkes ud fra en vurde­ring af omstændighederne i det konkrete tilfælde; i det foreliggende tilfælde måtte der også tages hensyn til, at sagsøgte ved det forud tilsendte anbefalede brev allerede 15 dage før forkyndelsen ved stævningsmand havde fået kendskab til stævningen og ind­kaldelsen.
Arti­cle 27 (2) of the Brussels Convention on the other hand required that the concept of serv­ice in sufficient time should be supplemented by an assessment of the circumstances of each case. In the present instance account had also to be taken of the fact that 15 days be­fore service by the court officer the defendant had been given notice by registered letter of the statement of claim and the summons.
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — forskriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse eller meddelelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 27, nr. 2) — kriterium for prøvelsen af forskriftsmæssigheden — kon­ventioner eller aftaler mellem kontraherende stater (protokollens artikelIV)
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of the document which in­stituted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Criterion for due service — Conventions or agreements between Contracting States (Article IV of the Protocol to the Convention)
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — manglende forskriftsmæssig forkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (arti­kel 27, nr.2) — ingen afhjælpning derved, at der ikke tages retsmidler i anvendelse imod den forkyndte udeblivelsesdom
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — No due service of the document which instituted the pro­ceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Not cured by failure to appeal against the judgment given in default when it was served.
(fortsat 1) ventionen knyttede protokol af 27. september 1968, der bestemmer, at inden­ og uden­retslige dokumenter, der udfærdiges inden for en kontraherende stats område, og som skal meddeles eller forkyndes for personer, der befinder sig inden for en anden kontra­herende stats område, skal fremsendes i overensstemmelse med de fremgangsmåder, der er fastsat ved konventioner eller aftaler indgået mellem de kontraherende stater.
The applicant, an Italian firm, had obtained judgment by default in the civil and crimi­nal court at Monza (Italy) against the respondent, who was resident in the Federal Re­public of Germany.
Den i den foreliggende sag valgte form for forkyndelse opfyldte imidlertid hverken kra­vene i den gamle tysk­italienske konvention af 9. marts 1936 om anerkendelse og fuld­byrdelse af retsafgørelser i civile og kommercielle sager, som i mellemtiden var blevet af­løst af domskonventionen, eller i Haag­civilproceskonventionen af 1. marts 1954.
The statement of claim and summons had been served on the defen­dant several months in advance of the hearing, first by posting on the notice board of the court in Monza, secondly by registered post and thirdly by delivery to the Procura de la Repubblica at the court in Monza. At the request of the German court officer a transla­tion of the claim had also been posted to the respondent seven weeks before the date fixed for the hearing.
Selv om Haag­konventionen i artikel 6 indeholdt hjemmel til direkte fremsendelse med po­sten, havde Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland imidlertid ikke indgået nogen sådan over­enskomst og havde i øvrigt rejst indsigelse mod direkte postforkyndelse.
The respondent had taken no steps in response to this nor had he appealed against the judgment given in default, of which he had had notice.
Selv om der også i artikel 2, litra c), nr. 2, i den tysk­nederlandske anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelseskonvention af 30. august 1962 fandtes regler for et sådant tilfælde, kunne disse regler ikke anses som udtryk for en almindelig retsgrundsætning, men kun som en undtagelse.
By vir­tue of the second paragraph of Article 34 and Article 27 (2) of the Convention a judg­ment in default of appearance could not be enforced if the defendant was not duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence.
Tilsvarende bestemmelser fandtes i øvrigt heller ikke i nogen af de konventioner om anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse af udenlandske domme, som Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland havde afsluttet.
Due service was governed by Article IV of the Protocol to the Convention of 27 September 1968 which provided that judicial and extrajudicial docu­ments drawn up in one Contracting State which had to be served on persons in another Contracting State should be transmitted in accordance with the procedures laid down in the conventions and agreements concluded between the Contracting States.
Heller ikke domskonventionen indeholdt sådanne bestemmelser.
The method of service chosen in the present case satisfied neither the Convention of 9 March 1936 be­tween Germany and Italy on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil or commercial matters, which had since been replaced by the Brussels Convention, nor the Hague Convention on civil procedure of 1 March 1954.
Tværtimod fandtes der i arti­kel 20, stk. 2, og artikel 27, nr. 2, jfr. protokollens artikel IV, beskyttelsesregler af særlig vægt til fordel for den i udlandet bosatte sagsøgte, for hvem forkyndelse skulle ske.
Although Article 6 of the Hague Convention allowed for the possibility of direct service by post, the Federal Republic of Germany had not entered into any agreement in that respect and had not allowed direct postal service.
Sagsøgeren gjorde gældende, at sagsøgte uden videre havde kunnet indtræde i den franske retssag og gøre sine rettigheder gældende med de til rå­dighed stående retsmidler, anke, genoptagelse eller anmodning om forlængelse af fri­sterne for at anvende retsmidlerne. Dette havde sagsøgte dog ikke gjort.
On the contrary, it laid down special safeguards for a foreign defendant in re­gard to service of the summons in the second paragraph of Articles 20 and Article 27 (2) taken in conjunction with Article IV of the Protocol.
Oberlandesgericht hældede til den opfattelse, at anerkendelse af en afgørelse, der var truffet i strid med konventionens artikel 20, stk. 2, måtte afslås i henhold til konven­tionens artikel 27, nr. 2, uanset det af sagsøgeren anførte.
The Oberlandesgericht was inclined to the view that recognition of a judgment given contrary to the second paragraph of Article 20 of the Convention should be refused under Article 27 (2) notwithstanding the circumstances stressed by the plaintiff.
Oberlandesgericht fore­lagde derfor ved kendelse af 18.oktober 1978 (6 W 82/78) EF­Domstolen følgende spørgsmål til præjudiciel afgørelse:
By order of 18 October 1978 (6 W 82/78) it submitted the following question to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling:
»Er rekvisitus i en sag om anerkendelse efter konventionens artikel 27 afskåret fra at gøre den indsigelse gældende, at det indledende processkrift ikke rettidigt er ble­vet forkyndt for ham eller meddelt ham, når han, uanset at han ved en senere forkyn­delse er blevet sat i kendskab til den verserende sag, ikke har truffet processuelle for­anstaltninger til varetagelse af sit forsvar?«
"In the recognition procedure under Article 27 of the Convention ... is a defendant debarred from objecting that he was not served in sufficient time with the document which initiated the proceedings, if notice of the pending action was served on him later and he failed to take any procedural steps in his defence?"
På grund af en senere meddelelse fra Oberlandesgericht om, at parterne havde ind­gået udenretligt forlig, besluttede Domstolen at slette sagen af registret [sag 254/78].
On being subsequently informed by the Oberlandesgericht of an extra­judicial settle­ment between the parties, the Court of Justice decided to delete the case from the register [Case 254/78].
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) —for­skriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse eller meddelelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 27, nr. 2) — kriteriumfor prøvelsen af forskriftsmæssigheden —forkyndelsesslatens lov — vid fortolkning af begrebet »forkyndelse«
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second para­graph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the
(fortsat 1) forstand, måtte det antages, at den sagsøgte indehaver af handelsselskabet måtte have modtaget de dokumenter, der var fremsendt til aktieselskabets filial.
The sole trader business, on the other hand, had its main office in Prato with branches in Florence and Milan, albeit in a different street in Milan from that in which the branch office of the limited company was situated.
De var dermed bragt til hans kundskab, dvs. »meddelt«.
Under Article 27 of the Brussels Convention it was sufficient if the statement of claim was "in­formally served" ("communicato") on the defendant.
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — retti­digforkyndelse eller meddelelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 27, nr. 2) — efterprøvelse ved den fuldbyrdende ret — kriterium for efterprøvelsen — det enkelte tilfæl­des faktiske omstændigheder — såvel doms­ som fuldbyrdelsesstatens procesret uden be­tydning
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second para­graph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Examination by the court in which enforcement is sought — Criteria — Factual circumstances of the individual case — Procedural law of both the State where judgment was given and the State where enforcement is sought irrelevant
Under en retssag ved Landgericht Braunschweig (Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland) var den italienske sagsøgte ved udeblivelsesdom af 5. marts 1975 blevet dømt til betaling af et bestemt beløb.
By a judgment given in default on 5 March 1975 in an action before the Landgericht Braunschweig (Federal Republic of Germany) the Italian defendant was ordered to pay a certain sum of money.
Stævningen var blevet forkyndt for sagsøgte ved stævningsmand den 5. november 1974 i Italien.
The writ had been served on it on 5 November 1974 by a court officer in Italy.
Landgericht havde berammet retsmødet med en måneds var­sel til den 5. marts 1975.
The Landgericht had allowed the defendant a period of one month within which to enter an appearance and had appointed 5 March 1975 as the date for
Sagsøgte hverken svarede eller gav møde.
Issue 1/February 1981
Den fuldbyrdende rets prøvelse af, om forkyndelse var sket rettidigt, skulle ske uafhængigt af retsplejereglerne i domsstaten og i fuldbyrdelsesstaten.
It subsequently appealed against the issue in Italy of an order for the enforcement of the judgment in default on the ground that service of the writ had not been made in sufficient time within the meaning of Article 27 (2) of the Brussels Convention.
Det var herved uden betydning, om det varsel, som Landgericht Braunschweig havde givet, op­fyldte kravene i italiensk eller tysk procesret.
It was not relevant whether the pe­riod for entering an appearance allowed by the Landgericht Braunschweig accorded with Italian or German rules of procedure.
Retten lagde herefter vægten på tilfældets konkrete omstændigheder og anførte, at i betragtning af afstanden og trafikforbindel­serne mellem Milano og Braunschweig var en frist på en måned til at indlede forsvaret i sagen ved at antage en advokat og til at udfærdige en skriftling fremstilling af indsigel­serne tilstrækkelig.
The court then turned to consider the facts and circumstances of the case and held that, having regard to the distance and means of communication between Milan and Braunschweig, a period of one month to defend the action by instructing a lawyer and lodging a defence was sufficient.
Bortset derfra havde sagsøgte også haft mulighed for at varetage sine interesser under retsmødet, der først afholdtes fire måneder efter stævningens forkyndel­
That apart, the de­fendant had still had the opportunity of effectively defending itself at the hearing, which did not take place until four months after the service of the writ.
I en afgørelse af 28. september 1976 i sagen Soc. Ingg.
In a judgment of 28 September 1976, Soc.
S. & Agostino Beloni Sri mod Ditta Veeder Root GmbH kom Corte d'appello di Milano til det resultat, at en frist på 25 dage måtte være tilstrækkelig til, at en i Milano hjemmehørende sagsøgt part kunne forberede sit forsvar i en sag, der var anlagt ved Landgericht Stuttgart (Forbundsrepu­blikken Tyskland), såfremt sagen gik sin normale gang. Dette var dog ikke tilfældet, når Udsendelse 1/februar 1981
S. & Agostino Beloni S. r. I. ν Veeder Root GmbH, the Corte d'Appello, Milan, came to the conclusion that a period of 25 days could be regarded as sufficient for a defendant resident in Milan to prepare its defence to an action brought in the Landgericht Stuttgart (Federal Republic of Germany), provided that the machinery of justice was in normal operation. That was not so, howe­ver, where — as in the instant case — both service of the writ and the date for the hearing occurred in August when, owing to the court vacation, considerable time and difficulty were involved in instructing a lawyer. The fact that the defendant's business was shut for holidays during August had also to be taken into account. In those circumstances serv­ice of the writ had not been effected within sufficient time as required by Article 27 (2). (Ñp
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — begrebet »retsafgørelse« i konventionens forstand (artikel 25) — kendelse om fastsættelse af sagsomkostninger, som gik en advokats mandant imod — »retsafgørelse« i art. 25's forstand
The applicants, who were lawyers in Mönchengladbach (Federal Republic of Germany), had represented the respondent, who was resident in the Netherlands, in proceedings before the Arbeitsgericht [labour court] Mönchengladbach.
I denne sag var forholdet det, at rekvirenterne i fuldbyrdelsessagen, der var advokater i Mönchengladbach (Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland), havde repræsenteret rekvisitus, der havde bopæl i Nederlandene, i en sag for Arbeitsgericht Mönchengladbach.
Subsequently the applicants had the fees payable to them by the respondent in connexion with that representation determined by a decision of the administrative officer attached to the Arbeitsgericht.
Hono­rarkravene mod rekvisitus ifølge dette mandatsforhold lod advokaterne senere fastsætte ved kendelse afsagt af fuldmægtigembedet (»der Rechtspfleger«) ved Arbeitsgericht, og de indgav derpå begæring til Arrondissementsrechtbank Almelo om meddelelse af fuld­byrdelsespåtegning på kendelsen i Nederlandene.
They then applied to the Arrondissementsrechtbank, Almelo, for an order for the enfor­cement ofthat decision in the Netherlands.