natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Jeg kan heller ikke følge ØSU, når udvalget gør gældende, at den tone og de formuleringer, som fru E. anvendte i den kritiserede skrivelse, ikke skulle kunne kvalificeres som mangel på sømmelighed, og at heller ikke baggrunden for den dybt­gående forværring af forholdet mellem fru E. og hendes overordnede kan henføres til dette begreb.
Nor can I share the view expressed by the Economic and Social Committee that the tone and expressions which E employed in the memorandum for which she is criticised and the context of the radical deterioration in relations between E and her superiors are irreconcilable with a classification as unseemly conduct.
Hvordan kan man i øvrigt seriøst hævde, at det er en fejlagtig retlig kvali­fikation at betegne fru E.'s adfærd som værende i strid med kravene til almindelig sømmelighed og ikke som udtryk for respektløshed, når det fremgår af ordbogen Le Petit Robert, at der findes et fælles synonym for sømmelighed og respekt, nemlig høflighed ?
Can one, moreover, seriously maintain that classifying E's conduct as unseemly rather than lacking in deference was an erroneous assessment of the legal nature of the facts, when consultation of the Le Petit Robert dictionary reveals that 'bienséance' ('seemly conduct') and 'respect' ('defer­ence') have a common synonym, 'politesse' ('courtesy')?
Denne baggrund er nemlig bestemt ikke uden betydning for sagen og bør også tages i betragtning på tidspunktet for valget af sanktion, hvorimod den ikke har relevans for kvalifikationen af handlingen.
That context, admittedly, is not a matter of indifference, and must even be taken into account when it comes to choosing the disciplinary measure, but it is not relevant in terms of classifying the infringement.
De udtryk, som indstævnte anvendte, var i sig selv uacceptable, uanset om hendes adfærd over for sine overordnede allerede var kritisabel inden fremsendelsen af den pågældende skrivelse.
The words and expressions used were unacceptable in themselves, regardless of whether E's behaviour in relation to her superiors was already sus­ceptible to criticism before she sent the memorandum in question.
Det er imidlertid ikke tilfældet, da vedtægten, som det vil fremgå af det
That is not, however, so, since, as will be seen below and as, moreover, the Economic and Social Committee acknowl­edges, the Staff Regulations do not associ­
Følgelig er jeg af den opfattelse, at ØSU's første anbringende må forkastes.
I am therefore of the view that the ESC's first plea cannot be upheld.
Anvendelsen af proportionalitetsprincippet ved gennemførelsen af en disciplinær sanktion kræver, at den trufne foranstaltning er absolut nødvendig således at forstå, at der skal være et rimeligt forhold mellem sanktionen og tjenesteforseelsens grovhed.
It argues that applying the principle of proportion ality in the exercise of disciplinary action requires the penalty chosen to be strictly necessary, in the sense that there must be a close correlation between the penalty and the gravity of the infringement.
Institutionen, som er ansvarlig for pålæggelsen af en disciplinær sanktion, skal derfor vælge den, som er mindst indgribende, og som er bedst afpasset efter den begåede forseelse.
The admin istration responsible for imposing a disciplinary measure must, therefore, choose that measure which is least restrictive and which corresponds most closely to the infringement committed.
Jeg tror det må være rigtigst at behandle de to andre anbringender under ét, som ØSU har gjort gældende, og som efter min opfattelse hører sammen.
It seems to me appropriate to address the two other pleas in law on which the Economic and Social Committee relies together, since they are, in my view, linked in all respects.
ØSU's andet anbringende er, at dommen lider af en begrundelsesmangel, og at vedtægtens artikel 86 og 87 er fejlagtigt fortolket.
The ESC's second complaint alleges that the judgment gives an inadequate statement of reasons and misinterprets Article 86 and Article 87 of the Staff Regulations.
ØSU kritiserer Retten for kun at have taget hensyn til de konkrete omstændigheder, som blev foreholdt fru E., uden at begrunde, hvorfor den ikke tog hensyn til den samlede baggrund for sagen, herunder de skærpende omstændigheder, som er nævnt i ansættelsesmyndighedens afgørelse, hvorved den forsømte at tage hensyn til, at sanktionen ifølge vedtægtens artikel 8689 skal være fastsat på grundlag af en helhedsbedømmelse af alle de konkrete og særlige omstændigheder i sagen.
The Economic and Social Committee complains that the Court of First Instance erred in taking into consideration only the specific conduct found against E, without stating its reasons for not taking account of all the circumstances of the case, including the aggravating circumstances set out in the appointing authority's decision, thus overlooking the fact that Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations require the disciplinary measure to be determined by a comprehensive appraisal of all the particular facts and circumstances peculiar to the case.
Ved bestemmelsen af den egnede sanktion kan Retten i øvrigt ikke ifølge ØSU sætte sin egen vurdering i stedet for ansættelsesmyndighedens. dighedens.
Nor, in so determining the appropriate penalty, was the Court of First Instance entitled, in the submission of the ESC, to substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority. ity.
Endvidere anfører ØSU, at den anfægtede afgørelse indeholder alle de oplysninger, der er nødvendige som begrundelse for den pålagte sanktion.
Furthermore, according to the ESC, its contested decision contained all the particulars necessary to justify the disciplinary measure chosen.
På grund af de skærpende omstændigheder som helhed måtte fru E. indplaceres tre løntrin lavere, så meget mere som der ikke fandtes nogen formildende omstændigheder.
The aggravating circumstances taken as a whole dictated the imposition of relegation by three steps, and all the more so because no mitigating circumstances could be established in E's favour.
Ifølge ØSU er det i den foreliggende sag så meget alvorligere, at Retten ikke har begrundet, hvorfor den ikke tog hensyn til baggrunden for de skærpende omstændigheder, som den af ØSU i sagen anfægtede afgørelse udtrykkeligt var støttet på disse skærpende omstændigheder, ligesom disse omstændigheder havde særlig stor betydning.
The Economic and Social Committee points out that, in the present case, the lack of reasons given as to why the Court of First Instance did not take the background of aggravating circumstances into account is all the more serious in that the contested decision of the Economic and Social Committee was based explicitly on those aggravating circumstances, and because they have particular significance.
Følgelig foreligger der en begrundelsesmangel og er anlagt en fejlagtig fortolk ning af vedtægtens artikel 86 og 87.
This gives rise, in its submission, to defects of reasoning and misinterpretation of Article 86 and Article 87 of the Staff Regulations.
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MISCHO — SAG C­150/98 Ρ navnlig som denne praksis er kommet til udtryk i sagen F. mod Kommissionen 2. I denne dom fastslog Domstolen: direkte økonomiske virkninger for hende.
OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C­150/98 Ρ review which it considers it should exercise over disciplinary measures, as expressed, in particular, in the judgment in Case 403/85 F ν Commission.2In that judgment the Court of Justice held: with an immediate economic impact on the party concerned.
ØSU handlede imidlertid i overensstem­melse med proportionalitetsprincippet, da det valgte den mildeste af de sanktioner, som har direkte økonomiske virkninger.
None the less, in so far as it chose the least severe of the penalties with direct economic effect, the Economic and Social Committee did act in accor­dance with the principle of proportionality.
»181 den førnævnte dom af 29. januar 1985 har Domstolen allerede henvist til sin faste praksis, hvorefter det, når de handlinger, en tjenestemand lastes for, er bevist, tilkommer ansættelses­myndigheden at vælge den hertil sva­rende sanktion.
'18 In its judgment of 29 January 1985, the Court has already referred to its con­sistent decisions to the effect that, once the truth of the allegations against the official has been established, it is for the appointing authority to choose the appropriate penalty.
Domstolen kan ikke sætte sin vurdering i stedet for denne myndigheds undtagen i tilfælde af åbenbar vildfarelse eller magtfordrej­ning.
The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the appointing authority except in the case of a manifest error or misuse of powers.
Jeg skal vedrørende det anførte bemærke, at den anfægtede dom ikke er helt uden begrundelse.
It should be noted, first of all, that this is not an instance where no reasons at all were given.
Det fremgår nemlig ved en gennemgang af præmis 58 til 61, at Retten efter at have erindret om, at den skal begrænse sig til at efterprøve, om sankti­onen står i åbenbart misforhold til den foreholdte handlemåde, gengiver omstæn­dighederne i deres rette sammenhæng, nemlig på baggrund af bedømmelsesproce­duren, og udtaler, at den pågældendes handlemåde rent faktisk var i strid med vedtægtens artikel 12 og 21, men dog ikke udgør en grov tilsidesættelse af de forplig­telser, som påhviler tjenestemanden efter disse bestemmelser.
Examination of paragraphs 58 to 61 of the judgment reveals that the Court of First Instance, having pointed out that it must confine its review to analysing whether the disciplinary measure was manifestly disproportionate to the facts, placed those facts once again in context, that is, the framework of the staff report procedure, and found them on analysis to constitute an infringement of Article 12 and Article 21 of the Staff Regulations but not serious infringement of the obliga­tions which those provisions impose on officials.
Heraf sluttede Retten, at da der ikke forelå grove tilsidesættelser, var ØSU's ansættelsesmyndighed ikke berettiget til at pålægge fru E. en discipli­nær sanktion bestående i en indplacering flere løntrin lavere, hvilket er »en alvorlig sanktion, som sjældent pålægges tjeneste­mænd, og som, hvis sanktionen skal stå i passende forhold til de begåede handlinger, forudsætter, at den pågældende har begået betydeligt grovere handlinger end dem, der er omhandlet i den foreliggende sag«.
It concluded from this that, since those facts were not serious, the Economic and Social Committee appointing authority did not have authority to impose on E the penalty of relegation by several steps, 'a serious measure which is rarely imposed on officials and which, in order to be propor­tionate, must correspond to facts much more serious than those of the present case'.
Retten begrundede altså annullationen af sanktionen — som den fremhævede var alvorlig — med, at den klart stod i misfor­hold til tjenesteforseelsens karakter.
The Court of First Instance therefore founded the annulment of the disciplinary measure, which it stressed was a serious measure, on the fact that it was highly disproportionate in relation to its finding as to the severity of the infringement.
26 Det bemærkes i den henseende, at tjenestemandsvedtægtens bestemmelser om disciplinære sanktioner (nemlig artiklerne 86­89) ikke fastsætter faste forhold mellem de heri opregnede sanktioner og de forskellige former for overtrædelse af tjenestepligterne, der begås af tjenestemændene, samt heller ikke præciserer i hvilket omfang eksistensen af skærpende eller formil­dende omstændigheder indgår i valget af sanktion.
26 In that regard, it must be stressed that the provisions of the Staff Regulations on disciplinary measures (Articles 86 to 89) do not specify any fixed relation­ship between the measures provided for and the various sorts of failure by officials to comply with their obliga­tions; nor do they state the extent to which the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances should affect the choice of penalty.
Valget af den sanktion, der skal pålægges i det enkelte individuelle tilfælde, er således baseret på en gene­rel vurdering af sagens samtlige kon­
The determina­tion of the penalty to be imposed in each individual case is therefore based on a comprehensive appraisal of all the
Jeg skal derpå erindre om Domstolens praksis vedrørende omfanget af den prø­velse, som den mener at burde udøve i sager om pålæggelse af disciplinære sanktioner,
One should note, next, the case­law of the Court of Justice on the scope of the
2 — Dom af 5.2.1987, sag 403/85, Sml. s. 645.
2 — Case 403/85 F ν Commission [1987] ECR 645.
krete omstændigheder og særegenheder. « idet den ikke mente at kunne konstatere nogen formildende omstændigheder — og endelig redegjort for, at den pålagte sanktion, som den fandt var alvorlig, var i fuld overensstemmelse med de alvorlige bebrejdelser, som kunne rettes mod fru E.
ESC V E particular facts and circumstances peculiar to the case.' detailed examination of all the factors which it held to be aggravating circumstances, having been unable to find any mitigating circumstances, and finally to show in what respect the measure imposed, which it did not at all deny was a serious measure, corresponded absolutely to the serious nature of the charges which could be levelled against E.
Retten har altid tilstræbt at følge denne praksis, som den i øvrigt henviser til i dommens præmis 58. Skulle den ikke have anvendt denne praksis korrekt i den fore liggende sag?
The Court of First Instance has always sought to follow that caselaw, to which it refers, moreover, at paragraph 58 of its judgment.
De detaljerede forklaringer er gengivet fuldt ud i appelskriftet.
These detailed explanations are rehearsed in full in the notice of appeal.
Et er, om de udgør en sandfærdig beskrivelse af virkeligheden — hvilket det tilkom Retten at efter prøve — et andet er at se bort fra disse forklaringer. Dette synes Retten imidlertid at have gjort, da den alene begrunder annullationen af afgørelsen med, at den pålagde en alvorlig sanktion for en forseelse, som i sig selv er mindre alvorlig, i det mindste efter Rettens opfattelse.
Whether or not they accurately reflect the true situation is one thing, and was a matter for the Court of First Instance to verify; to disregard them is another.
For at kunne konstatere, om dette er tilfældet, er det nødvendigt, at dommen begrunder, hvorfor Retten — som ikke uden forklaring kan sætte sit skøn i stedet for ansættelsesmyndighedens — afviste at anerkende den begrundelse, der blev givet i den anfægtede disciplinære afgørelse for, at sanktionen stod i rimeligt forhold til for seelsen, og hvorfor Retten skønnede, at denne begrundelse var uberettiget.
In order to be able to determine whether it did indeed do so, the reasoning of the judgment must contain the grounds on which the Court of First Instance, which could not, without explanation, substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority, rejected as unfounded the reasoning of the contested disciplinary decision as regards whether the penalty was appropriate to the infringement.
Dom men må også indeholde en forklaring på, hvorfor misforholdet mellem sanktionen og forseelsen var så åbenbart, at den anfægtede afgørelse burde ophæves uanset den skønsbeføjelse, der tilkommer ansættelsesmyndigheden. myndigheden.
The judgment must also set out in what respect the inappropriate nature of the penalty to the infringement was so manifest that, despite the discretion allowed to the appointing authority, the Court was bound to set aside the contested decision.
Det fremgår intetsteds af dommen, at der er foretaget en efterprøvelse af, om de vurderinger, som ØSU's ansættelsesmyndighed foretog vedrørende valget af sanktion, var velbegrundede, men Retten har nøjedes med at anføre, at forseelsen var mindre alvorlig.
The judgment reveals no trace of any examination of the validity of the evaluations by the Economic and Social Commit tee appointing authority as regards the choice of penalty, the Court of First Instance confining itself to the observation that the infringement was not serious.
Retten kan derfor kritiseres for at have fulgt en fejlagtig fremgangsmåde.
The Court of First Instance may therefore be criticised for adopting a mistaken approach.
I afgørelsen har ØSU's ansættelsesmyndighed nemlig givet en detaljeret forklaring på, hvorfor fru E.'s skrivelse udgjorde en grov tjenstlig forseelse, foretaget en lige så detaljeret gennemgang af alle de omstændigheder, som den anså for skærpende —
The Economic and Social Committee appointing authority, in fact, took pains in its decision to explain in abundant detail in what respect the infringement arising from E's memorandum was in its view a serious infringement, to carry out an equally
Retten kunne nemlig ikke alene ud fra den opfattelse, at forseelsen var mindre alvorlig, konkludere, at en alvorlig sanktion var uberettiget, uden i overensstemmelse med den ovenfor nævnte retspraksis at tilbagevise de argumenter, som ØSU
It was not entitled, on the basis merely of the view that the infringement was not serious, to reach the conclusion that there could be no justification for a serious
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT MISCHO — SAG C­150/98 Ρ fremførte med støtte i den af fru E. fulgte adfærd som begrundelse for at pålægge hende en alvorligere sanktion.
OPINION OF MR MISCHO — CASE C­150/98 Ρ however, that no trace of any such exam­ination can be found in its judgment.
Da Retten således ikke har givet en klar og velargumenteret begrundelse for, hvor­ledes sanktionen i betragtning af alle de forhold, som kunne have betydning for valget heraf, var uforholdsmæssig i forhold til forseelsen, har Retten naturligvis heller ikke kunnet påpege, hvorfor dette misfor­hold var åbenbart, hvilket imidlertid er en betingelse for at annullere en afgørelse som led i dens prøvelsesret.
That judgment does, admittedly, give reasons, yet those reasons cannot but seem inadequate in the light of the principles expounded by the case­law on the exercise of disciplinary power and its review by the courts.
Jeg skal i denne forbindelse hverken tage stilling til forholdet mellem forseelsen og sanktionen i den foreliggende sag eller fuldt ud tilslutte mig ØSU's anbringender til godtgørelse af, at den pålagte sanktion, som bestod i en indplacering tre løntrin lavere, helt og holdent var i overensstem­melse med proportionalitetsprincippet.
It is not my intention here in any way to take a position on the question whether the penalty fitted the infringement in the present case, or to signify my full agree­ment with the ESC's argument intended to prove to this Court that the measure chosen, that is, relegation by three steps, was precisely the penalty which compliance with that principle dictated.
Til godtgørelse heraf baserer ØSU sig nemlig på en opfattelse af proportionalitetsprin­cippet, som er diskutabel, da den tilsyne­ladende beror på en sammenblanding af kravet om fuld overensstemmelse, der ikke levner noget plads for en skønsmæssig bedømmelse, og kravet om, at der blot skal være et passende forhold.
In order to adduce that proof, it relies in fact on an interpretation of the principle of propor­tionality which is open to question, being based apparently on a confusion between a requirement that the penalty be absolutely fitting, leaving no room whatsoever for any discretion, and a requirement merely that it correspond sufficiently to the infringement.
Jeg er derfor af den opfattelse, at Domstolen ikke har andre muligheder end at tage anbringendet til følge og ophæve Rettens dom.
I consider that, in those circumstances, the Court of Justice cannot but uphold this plea and set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
Jeg skal nøjes med at fastslå, at Retten ikke i den foreliggende sag har angivet, hvorfor den omstændighed, at forseelsen som sådan ikke var alvorlig, indebar, at ØSU måtte antages at have tilsidesat pro­portionalitetsprincippet.
All I would observe here is that the Court of First Instance did not, in the present case, set out in what respect the fact that the infringement was not serious, in itself, notwithstanding the case­law refer­red to above and the grounds accompany­ing the disciplinary decision, necessarily implied that the Economic and Social Committee had breached the principle of proportionality.
Bør Domstolen selv træffe afgørelse vedrø­rende realiteten?
Should the Court of Justice rule on the merits of the case ?
Måske har Retten alligevel foretaget en grundig undersøgelse af forholdet mellem forseelsen og sanktionen, men dommen indeholder ikke noget spor heraf.
Perhaps the Court of First Instance did, none the less, examine in depth whether the penalty fitted the infringement. The fact is,
afgørelse vedrørende tvisten, såfremt Ret tens dom ophæves.
Committee that, in the event of the judg­ment of the Court of First Instance being set aside, the Court of Justice should rule on the merits of the case.
opregne alle de negative sider ved fru E.'s adfærd og tegner et portræt af hende, som vil afholde enhver overordnet fra at ansætte hende som medarbejder i sin tjeneste.
appeal, is unstinting in setting out all the negative factors which it was able to point up in E's conduct, and paints a picture of her such as to dissuade any superior from having the applicant amongst the staff of his department.
Jeg mener af flere grunde, at denne påstand ikke bør tages til følge.
For my part, I am not in favour of the request being granted, for various reasons.
Den første grund er, at det er nødvendigt for at forkaste fru E.'s søgsmål, at der er skabt sikkerhed for, at den sanktion, hun blev pålagt, ikke var åbenbart uforholdsmæssig. holdsmæssig.
The first is that, in order to dismiss E's action, one would have to be certain that the disciplinary measure imposed on her was not manifestly disproportionate.
Såfremt Retten foretog en fornyet prøvelse af sagen under overholdelse af princippet om »audi alteram partern«, ville det sikkert klargøre nogle punkter og måske give anledning til visse berigtigelser.
Re­examination of the case by the Court of First Instance observing the audi alteram partem principle would indeed shed some light and provide the opportu­nity, perhaps, for certain rectifications.
F.eks. blev det anset for en skærpende omstændighed i den disciplinære afgørelse, som fru E. anfægter, at hun tidligere har modtaget to irettesættelser.
For example, the disciplinary decision chal­lenged by E notes, amongst the aggravating circumstances, two previous reprimands.
En af disse blev dog annulleret ved Rettens dom i sag T-293/943.
However, one of these was annulled by the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T­293/94. 3
Efter min opfattelse er det imidlertid kun muligt at opnå en sådan sikkerhed, såfremt der foretages en meget omhyggelig undersøgelse af baggrunden for den begåede tjenesteforseelse.
However, one could only achieve this certainty, in my view, after a meticulous examination of the context in which the infringement was committed.
Som anført summarisk af Retten selv i dommens præmis 2, »opstod der flere og flere problemer mellem sagsøgeren og hen des overordnede ved den sagsøgte institution, såvel i de indbyrdes forbindelser som over for administrationen«.
As, moreover, the Court of First Instance stated, in succinct terms, in para­graph 2 of its judgment, 'administrative and personal relationship problems built up between the applicant and the defendant institution'.
For øvrigt fremgår det, uden at dette giver noget grundlag for at undskylde fru E.'s adfærd, at hun og ØSU også har været modparter ved Retten i andre sager end den foreliggende.
Further, without there being any ques­tion here of excusing E's conduct, one can point out that, besides this case, E and the Economic and Social Committee have been adversaries in various other proceedings before the Court of First Instance.
Selv om fru E. normalt ikke har fået medhold, bør det dog fremhæves,
Although E has not, in general, obtained satisfaction, it should be noted, none the
3 — Dom af 18.6.1996, sag T-293/94, Vela Palacios mod ØSU, Sml. Pers.
3 — Case T­293/94 Vela Palacios ν ESC [1996] ECR I­A­305 and II­893.
ØSU undser sig hverken i den disciplinære afgørelse eller i appelskriftet fra at
The ESC, both in its decision imposing the disciplinary measure and in its notice of