natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At den påståede kapacitetsmangel kun var et påskud, beviser et andet telex af 16. juli 1985 til en britisk kunde (CALOND G), hvori Thibodraad på kundens købstilbud fremsætter et konkret salgstilbud.
That lack of capacity was only a pretext is shown by another telex dated 16 July 1985 to a British customer (CALOND G) to whom Thibodraad made a concrete offer in reply to the customer's enquiry.
Dette telex bekræfter, at der i juli/august 1985 var tilstrækkelig produktionskapacitet, og den egentlige grund til at der ikke fandt leverancer sted til Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland må derfor være en aftale om eksportbegrænsning.
This telex proves that Thibodraad was not short of capacity in July-August 1985, so that the real reason for its refusal to supply Germany was the existence of an export limitation arrangement.
Disse aftaler må derfor anses som et kvote- og priskartel, som væsentligt begrænsede og fordrejede konkurrencen mellem deltagerne og mærkbart påvirkede handelen mellem medlemsstater, idet det direkte vedrørte en regulering af de grænseoverskridende varebevægelser.
These agreements have therefore to be viewed as establishing a quota and price cartel which substantially restricted and distorted competition between the parties and appreciably affected trade between Member States as it directly regulated cross-border trade in goods.
land, Belgien og Nederlandene fremgår også af det (i betragtning 92 og 150) nævnte telex fra hr. M. Müller (BStG) til Thibodraad.
(156) The existence of a comprehensive arrangement covering trade interpénétration between Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands is also apparent from the telex from Mr M. Müller (BStG) to Thibodraad referred to above (92 and 150).
En kopi af dette telex blev af Thibodraad videresendt til Tréfilarbed i Gentbrugge med anmodning om en stillingtagen, for at der kunne gives et fælles svar (kilde: brev fra Thibodraad til Tréfilarbed, Gentbrugge, dateret 16. december 1983).
Thibodraad sent a copy of this telex to TA in Gentbrugge for comment, so that they could give a joint answer (source: letter dated 16 December 1983 from Thibodraad to TA Gentbrugge).
Selv om telexet er rettet til Thibodraad, klages der kun over en belgisk producents (TFE/FBC) øgede eksport, hvoraf det kan sluttes, at de andre deltagere i »Breda-runden« overholdt aftalen.
The parties to the 1981/1982 agreements were the French companies TU, SMN, CCG, STPS and Sotralentz and at least Ferriere Nord, Martinelli and ILRO (Italy), TFE/FBC and Boël/Trébos (Belgium) and TA (Germany/Benelux).
(160) Det andet aftalekomplex fra 1983/1984 mellem franske producenter og producenter i Italien, Tysk land og Belgien (jf. betragtning 51 og 76) begrænsede og fordrejede ligeledes konkurrencen mellem deltager ne og påvirkede handelen mellem medlemsstaterne mærkbart.
( 160) The second set of agreements in 1983/1984 between French producers and producers from Italy, Germany and Belgium (see 51 to 76) likewise restricted and distorted competition between the participants and appreciably affected trade between Member States.
Nr. L 260/35 rende aftalerne fra 1983/84; eksistensen af en sådan overenskomst kunne heller ikke udledes af den nævnte »protocole d'accord« fra oktober 1983.
TFE/FBC and Boël/Trébos; nor could the existence of such an agreement be deduced from the 'protocole d'accord' of October 1983.
Af særlig betydning er den nævnte »Protocole d'accord« fra oktober 1983 (jf. betragtning 60 ff.), som er karakteriseret ved sin fuldstændighed og den detaljerede regulering af alle tænkelige aspekter.
In particular, the 'protocole d'accord' of October 1983 (see 60 et seq.), with its comprehensive and detailed provisions covering every possible aspect was of special importance.
Den omfattede kvote- og prisreguleringer, anvendelsesbestemmelser, særtilfælde og sanktioner og sigtede således mod en total afskaffelse af konkurrencen mellem parterne, hvilket i vid udstrækning også lykkedes (jf. betragtning 64 ff.).
It covers quotas, prices, manner of operation, special cases and enforcement including contractual penalties. It had the object of totally eliminating competition between the participants and to a large extent succeeded in that object (see 64 et seq.).
I øvrigt svarer de mængder, som de pågældende virksomheder rent faktisk leverede i de første ni måneder, som var omfattet af protokollen, tilnærmelsesvis til de tal, som er indeholdt i nævnte »protocole d'accord«.
Furthermore, the quantities actually delivered by the undertakings concerned during the first seven months of the period covered by the 'protocole d'accord' correspond roughly to the figures contained in the 'protocole', at least for the first year of the agreement.
I dette aftalekompleks deltog i hvert fald de franske virksomheder TU, SMN, CCG, STPS og Sotralentz samt følgende udenlandske virksomheder: TFE/FBC og Boël/Trébos (Belgien) og Tréfilarbed (Tyskland/ Benelux).
The parties to this set of agreements were at least the French companies TU, SMN, CCG, STPS and Sotralentz and the French associations STA and Adets and the following foreign companies: Ferriere Nord, Martinelli and ILRO (Italy), TFE/FBC and Boël/ Trébos (Belgium) and TA (Germany/Benelux).
Også en række ikke-franske virksomheders henvisning til deres ringe markedsandel på det franske marked med det formål at bestride, at deres adfærd havde haft mærkbare følger for handelen mellem medlemsstaterne, er ikke holdbar.
The argument put forward by several non-French companies challenging the finding that interstate trade had been appreciable affected by their conduct, i.e. that they had only a small share of the French market, is rejected (see 77 et seq.).
Følgerne af deltagelsen i aftalerne skal ikke vurderes isoleret for hver af de deltagende virksomheder, men under ét for alle deltagere i de generelle aftaler, og endvidere skal aftalerne for de øvrige delmarkeder (Benelux og Tyskland) også tages i betragtning.
The effects of participation in the agreements are to be assessed, not individually for each of the participating companies, but in the wider context of the overall agreements concluded by all participants, including the arrangements made with respect to the other national and regional markets (Benelux and Germany).
På baggrund af de gensidige forpligtelser med producenter på disse markeder øges betydningen af selv en relativt lille markedsdeltagers adfærd.
As a result of the reciprocal obligations entered into with producers from those markets, the conduct of even a relatively small operator gains in significance.
Heraf følger, at EØF-Traktatens artikel 85 finder anvendelse på alle de deltagende virksomheder, når en generel aftale påvirker handelen mellem medlemssta- af ADETS (herunder importøren TA), der som led i denne aftale foregik vedrørende individuelle leverancer til det franske marked, og som blev koordineret af ADETS (jf. betragtning 64).
(161) An important role was played in the operation of the agreements by the indirect exchange of information between the members of Adets, including the importer TA, on their individual deliveries to the French market, which was coordinated by Adets (see 64).
Denne udarbejdelse og distribution af individuelle data for leverancerne udgør en samordnet praksis i henhold til principperne i Domstolens dom mod virksomheder inden for den europæiske sukkerindustri (').
The collection and circulation of individual sales figures among competitors constitute a concerted practice, according to the principles established by the Court of Justice in its Judgment in the European sugar cartel case(').
Disse principper har Kommissionen udtrykkelig tilsluttet sig i den 7. konkurrenceberetning (1977) nr. 5—8.
These principles were formally adopted by the Commission in a statement in paragraphs 5 to 8 of its Seventh (1977) Report on Competition Policy.
Herefter udgør individuel oplysning til konkurrenter om enkeltvirksomheders afsætning en begrænsning og fordrejning af konkurrencen, som på grund af TA's deltagelse kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater.
Accordingly, the communication of data about individual firms to their competitors in the present case constituted a restriction and distortion of competition, which in view of the involvement of TA was likely to affect trade between Member States.
(162) I deres svar på meddelelsen af klagepunkterne gjorde især repræsentanterne for de franske virksomheder gældende, at de ovennævnte aftaler fra 1981/82 og 1983/84 kom i stand som led i en påstået omstrukturering af den franske armeringsnetindustri, som uden videre kunne sammenlignes med den omstrukturering, som tilsigtedes i Tyskland ved hjælp af strukturkrisekartellet.
(162) In their reply to the Statement of Objections, the representatives of the French producers claimed above all that the abovementioned agreements of 1981/1982 and 1983/1984 should be viewed against the background of an alleged restructuring of the French welded steel mesh industry, which was altogether comparable to the restructuring aimed at in Germany through the structural crisis cartel.
(163) De aftaler om fælles prisfastsættelse for de forskellige typer af armeringsnet, som blev truffet på møderne i Breda og Bunnik (jf. betragtning 84—112), havde til formål og i vid udstrækning til følge, at konkurrencen mellem de deltagende producenter på Benelux-markedet blev forhindret eller i det mindste væsentligt begrænset.
(163) The agreements on the general fixing of prices for the various types of welded steel mesh that were made at the meetings in Breda or Bunnik (see 85 to 112) had the object of preventing, or at least considerably restricting, competition between the producers concerned on the Benelux market, and largely succeeded in that object.
Kommissionen kan derfor ikke godtage dette argument.
The Commission therefore rejects this argument.
En sådan adfærd udgør på baggrund af ovenstående (betragtning 161) også en overtrædelse af EØF-Traktatens artikel 85.
In the light of what is said above (161), such conduct also constituted an infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
Endvidere påstår de belgiske virksomheder, der deltog i aftalerne, at der ikke eksisterede nogen skriftlig og af TFE/FBC og Boël/Trébos underskrevet overens komst mellem dem og de franske producenter vedrø-
The Belgian undertakings parties to the agreements maintain, moreover, with regard to the agreements of 1983/1984 that there was no written agreement between them and the French producers signed by
(') EF-Domstolens dom af 16. december 1975, forenede sager 40—48, 50, 54—56, 111, 113 og 114/73, Samling 1975, s. 1663, præmis nr. 173 og 174.
') Judgment of 16 December 1975 in Joined Cases 40—48, 50, 54—56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission [1975] ECR 1663 at 1942, grounds 173 and 174.
(165) Den omstændighed, at de prisaftaler, som blev truffet på disse møder, ifølge deres natur ikke var bindende, ændrer intet ved det forhold, at de var traktatstridige.
(165) The fact that the price agreements made at these meetings were not in a binding form does not make them any the less contrary to the Treaty.
Mødernes regelmæssighed og den omstændighed, at
The regularity of the meetings and the fact that at each
89 møde ikke forpligter de fraværende.
89 the meeting into effect.
I almindelighed blev de fraværende underrettet om, hvad der var vedtaget på mødet (jf. f.eks. betragtning 100).
Absentees were generally informed of what had been agreed at a meeting (see, for example, 100).
der på hvert møde blev truffet nye prisaftaler alt efter markedsudviklingen, viser, at deltagerne var principielt enige om løbende at kontrollere markedet.
meeting new prices were agreed according to the prevailing state of the market shows that there was a basic consensus between the participants to control the market on an ongoing basis.
I dette øjemed etablerede de et permanent, på det nærmeste institutionaliseret samarbejde, som trådte i stedet for den normale konkurrence.
For this purpose, they replaced normal competition by continuous, virtually institutionalized cooperation.
(170) De prisaftaler, der blev truffet på møderne i Breda og
(170) The price agreements made at Breda and Bunnik were likely to affect trade between Member States, because companies or groups of companies from five Member States that operated on the Benelux market were parties to them.
(166) De aftalte priser blev også i væsentlig udstrækning overholdt.
(166) The agreed prices were largely observed.
blev bebrejdet enkelte deltagere, at de ikke havde overholdt de på det foregående møde aftalte priser.
This is shown by the fact that at the meetings there were only rarely complaints that the prices agreed at a previous meeting had been ignored, and then only by particular producers.
Heller ikke den omstændighed, at de aftalte priser af konjunkturmæssige årsager ikke altid blev opnået, forringer aftalernes betydning.
Nor does the fact that the agreed prices could not always be achieved because of weakness of the market diminish the significance of the agreements.
Alle deltagerne benyttede de aftalte priser som målpriser.
The agreed prices were targets at which the participants collectively aimed.
De faktisk opnåede priser lå ganske vist ofte under de tilstræbte målpriser, men givetvis over de priser, som havde kunnet opnås på markedet under normale konkurrencevilkår (dvs. uden aftaler).
The prices actually achieved were often below the aimed-for target prices, but certainly in excess of those that could have been achieved on the market under normal competitive conditions, i.e. without the agreements.
(171) I denne sammenhæng må der tillægges de kontakter og aftaler særlig betydning, som blev truffet mellem Benelux-producenterne og TU (»Breda-runden«) på den ene side og den tyske »gruppe« på den anden side (jf. betragtning 91—96), og især den beredvillighed, som kom til udtryk i telexet af 15. december 1983 fra hr. M. Müller til Thibodraad (jf. betragtning 92 ff.), til at overholde aftalerne vedrørende leverancer til Nederlandene/Belgien og til at »tage fat på« eller »bremse« de øvrige medlemmer af den tyske »gruppe« (»de små udbrydere«) samt til at forelægge eksport tallene for de pågældende tyske producenter på det næste møde i Breda.
(171) Of particular importance in this connection were the contacts and arrangements between Benelux producers and TU (the 'Breda group') and the German 'group' (see 91 to 96), and in particular the promise made by Mr M. Müller in his telex of 15 December 1983 to Thibodraad (see 92 et seq.) to abide by the arrangements on deliveries to Holland/Belgium and to 'curb' or at least 'contain' the activities of the other members of the German 'group' ('the small maverick producers'). He also promised to supply the export figures of the German producers concerned for the next meeting in Breda.
Eksistensen af en aftale om kvantitative begrænsninger for den tyske eksport til Belgien/Nederlandene (kvoteaftale), som fremgår af telexet, samt meddelelsen af eksporttal for individuel le tyske producenter til den belgisk/nederlandske »gruppe« (»Breda-runden«) udgør en klar begrænsning og fordrejning af konkurrencen mellem deltager ne, som mærkbart kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater.
The existence of an arrangement to restrict German exports to Belgium/Netherlands (quota arrangement) which is implied by the telex and the supply of export figures for individual German producers to the Belgian/Dutch 'Breda group' represented a clear restriction and distortion of competition between the participants which was likely to affect trade between Member States to an appreciable extent.
ning 112), skal det bemærkes, at disse møder allerede begyndte den 26. august 1982 (jf. betragtning 84), dvs. lang tid før oprettelsen af strukturkrisekartellet i Tyskland (begyndelsen af juni 1983, jf. betragtning 126).
(167) As regards the reference by several participants to the formation of the structural crisis cartel in Germany (see 112), it should be pointed out that the meetings began on 26 August 1982 (see 84), that is to say long before the cartel was set up (beginning of June 1983, see 126).
At den planlagte oprettelse af strukturkrisekartellet i Tyskland også blev omtalt på det første møde kan under ingen omstændigheder retfærdiggøre, at der blev truffet prisaftaler til imødegåelse af en eventuel fremtidig fare.
The fact that the planned formation of the cartel was discussed at the first meeting in no way justifies the making of price agreements with an eye to some future danger.
Kommissionen går ud fra, at i hvert fald BStG fra tysk side og samtlige Benelux-virksomheder, der var med i »Breda-runden«, fra Benelux-side deltog i disse aftaler. ler.
The Commission proceeds on the basis that on the German side at least BStG and on the Benelux side, all the Benelux companies in the 'Breda group' were parties to this arrangement.
(168) Heller ikke nogle ikke-Benelux-producenters (TU, BStG) henvisning til deres ringe markedsandel på Benelux-markedet med det formål at bestride, at deres adfærd havde haft mærkbare følger for handelen mellem medlemsstater (jf. betragtning 112), kan godtages af Kommissionen, i analogi med hvad der allerede er gjort rede for i betragtning 162 for det franske markeds vedkommende.
(168) Nor does the Commission accept the argument put forward by several non-Benelux producers (TU, BStG) with a view to challenging the finding that interstate trade had been appreciably affected by their conduct i.e. that they had only a small share of the Benelux market (see 112), any more that it accepts the argument relating to the French market (see 162).
I aftalerne i Breda og Bunnik deltog i hvert fald følgende virksomheder: Thibodraad, Tréfilarbed, Boël/Trébos, Frère-Bourgeois Commercial (FBC), Van Merksteijn, ZND, Tréfilunion (TU) og af de tyske producenter i hvert fald BStG (vedrørende BStG, jf. betragtning 93 og 94).
The following companies at least were parties to the Breda and Bunnik agreements: Thibodraad, TA, Boël/Trébos, (FBC), Van Merksteijn, ZND, TU and, of the German producers, at least BStG (as far as BStG is concerned, see 93 and 94).
(172) Den »gentlemen's agreement« mellem Tréfilarbed og Thibodraad på den ene side og Van Merksteijn på anden side, hvorefter Van Merksteijn ikke skulle fremstille katalognet og Tréfilarbed (Gent og Roer mond) og Thibodraad ikke skulle fremstille lagernet (jf. betragtning 116) må anses som en begrænsning af konkurrencen mellem deltagerne, som kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater. Hver af parterne i denne gentlemen's agreement gav nemlig herved afkald på at fremstille og sælge det produkt, som var blevet tildelt den anden part, via sit eget salgsnet, som dækkede flere medlemsstater og ikke var identisk med den anden parts salgsnet.
(172) The 'gentlemen's agreement' between TA and Thibodraad on the one hand and Van Merksteijn on the other, under which Van Merksteijn did not manufacture any catalogue mesh and TA (in Ghent and Roermond) and Thibodraad did not manufacture any standard mesh (see 116), must be regarded as a restriction of competition between the parties which was likely to affect trade between Member States, since each party thereby relinquished the right to manufacture and sell the product yielded to the other party through its own sales network, which in each case covered several Member States and was not identical with the sales network of the other.
(169) Nogle af parterne deltog ikke regelmæssigt eller ikke fra starten i møderne.
(169) Some of the participants did not attend the meetings regularly or from the very beginning.
Selv om dette må betragtes som en formildende omstændighed for de pågældende, må det gøres klart, at et rent fysisk fravær fra et bestemt møde ikke ubetinget medfører, at resultaterne af dette
While this is a mitigating factor in their favour, it should be made clear that the physical absence of a particular producer from a particular meeting does not necessarily mean that the absentee did not help to put the results of
(173) De aftaler, som blev truffet ved de bilaterale kontakter mellem Tréfilarbed og Thibodraad (jf. betragtning 117—124) udgør en konkret anvendelse af den grund-
(173) The arrangements made following bilateral contacts between TA and Thibodraad (see 117 to 124) were practical applications of a basic agreement between
(176) De ved samtalen den 7. juni 1985 mellem hr. M. Müller (BStG-Fachverband Betonstahlmatten — Strukturkrisekartellet) og hr. Marie (Tréfilunion — ADETS) indgåede og overholdte aftaler (jf. betragtning 135—143) vedrørende den gensidige markeds indtrængning mellem Tyskland og Frankrig udgør en begrænsning af konkurrencen mellem tyske og franske producenter, som kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater.
(176) The arrangements which were made at the meeting of 7 June 1985 between Mr M. Müller (BStG, Fachverband Betonstahlmatten, structural crisis cartel) and Mr Marie (TU, Adets) (see 135 to 143) concerning trade between France and Germany, and which were adhered to, constituted a restriction of competition between French and German producers which was likely to affect trade between Member States.
Aftalerne havde til formål og følge, at konkurrencen mellem deltagerne blev elimineret eller væsentligt begrænset.
The arrangement had the object and effect of eliminating or at least substantially reducing competition between the parties.
Aftalerne kunne endvidere påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, da begge virksomheder eksporterede betydelige mængder, og Tréfilarbed desuden er etableret i flere medlemsstater.
They were also likely to affect trade between Member States as both companies are substantial exporters and TA has establishments in several Member States.
(177) Eksistensen af en kvoteaftale for Sotralentz' eksport til Tyskland, som fremgår af telexudvekslingen mellem BStG og Sotralentz (jf. betragtning 144—146), ud gjorde ligeledes en begrænsning af konkurrencen mellem Sotralentz og i hvert fald BStG, som kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater.
(177) The quota arrangement governing Sotralentz's exports to Germany, the existence of which is indicated by the exchange of telexes between BStG and Sotralentz referred to at 144 to 146, was also a restriction of competition between Sotralentz and at least BStG which was likely to affect trade between Member States.
I hvert fald udgjorde denne informationsudveksling mellem Sotralentz og BStG en samordnet praksis i henhold til principperne i Domstolens dom i den tidligere nævnte (betragtning 161) sukkersag, som kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater.
The exchange of information between Sotralentz and BStG was itself a concerted practice within the meaning of the Court's judgment in the sugar cartel case (see 159) which was likely to affect trade between Member States.
(178) Eneforhandlingsaftalerne mellem BStG og Bouwstaai Roermond (senere Tréfilarbed Roermond) henhold
(174) The cartel arrangement, and in particular subsections 5 (2) and 7(1) thereof, not only restricted
svis Arbed SA, afdeling Nederland, Roermond (jf. betragtning 148), der gav BStG eneforhandling af Roermond-fabrikkens armeringsnet i Tyskland, med førte en begrænsning af konkurrencen mellem to konkurrerende virksomheder i to medlemsstater, som kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater.
M 7RÌ The exclusive distribution agreements between \ί/0 > BStG and Bouwstaai Roermond (later Tréfilarbed competition between the cartel members in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also distorted competition in respect of intraCommunity trade because it led to artificial changes in the conditions for deliveries of German producers to other European markets and for deliveries of foreign producers to the German market ( 127 to 130). This being so, the cartel arrangement was liable to affect trade between Member States. Roermond) and between BStG and Arbed SA Afdeling Nederland, Roermond (see 148) whereby BStG distributed the Roermond plant's welded mesh in Germany on an exlusive basis also represented a restriction of competition between two competitors from different Member States which was likely to affect trade between Member States.
BStG's og TA's påstand om, at der var tale om en rent koncern-intern procedure (jf. betragtning 149), kan ikke accepteres af Kommissionen.
The Commission rejects the argument advanced by BStG and TA that this was a purely intragroup matter (see 149).