natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
2 fortsat 3) reisers frie bevægelighed inden for Fællesskabet ved en forenkling af fremgangsmåden i forbindelse med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning og en begrænsning af antallet af indsigelser, der kan fremsættes mod anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser.
(continued 3) recognition and enforcement which is governed by Title III of the Convention, to fa cilitate the free movement of judgments within the Community by simplifying the procedure for recognition and by reducing the number of grounds which may operate to prevent the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Artikel 27, nr. 2, omhandler en af disse indsigelser, idet bestemmelsen, udelukkende for at beskytte sagsøgtes rettigheder, foreskriver, at anerkendelse og, sammenholdt med artikel 34, fuldbyrdelse kan nægtes, når de garantier, som opstilles i domsstatens lov givning og i konventionen selv, undtagelsesvis ikke er tilstrækkelige til at sikre sag søgte mulighed for at varetage sine interesser for retten i domsstaten.
Amongst these grounds are that contained in Article 27, point 2, which, for the sole purpose of safeguarding the rights of the defendant, provides for refusal of recognition and, read to gether with Article 34, for refusal of enforcement, in exceptional cases where the guarantees contained in the law of the State in which the judgment was given and in the Convention itself are insufficient to ensure that the defendant has an opportunity of arranging for his defence before the court in which judgment was given.
Disse betragtninger bør lægges til grund ved fortolkningen af den bestemmelse, der er påberåbt af kassationsappellanten i hovedsagen.
It is in the light of these considerations that the provision relied upon by the appellant in cas sation in the main proceedings must be interpreted.
Spørgsmål 1 og 2
The first two questions
8 Hoge Raad's første spørgsmål går ud på, om det — i et regelsæt som det, der var i kraft i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland i 1976, hvorefter forkyndelsen for sagsøgte af et betalingspålæg gjorde det muligt for sagsøgeren, hvis sagsøgte ikke rejste indsigelse inden for de foreskrevne frister, at opnå en retsafgørelse, der selv efter begæring om genoptagelse forblev midlertidigt eksigibel, men hvorefter både begæring om genoptagelse og fremsættelse af indsigelser medførte, at sagen overgik til behandling som en almindelig domssag — må antages at være betalingspålægget eller fuld byrdelsesdekretet, der falder ind under begrebet 'det indledende processkrift i sa gen'.
8 By the first question the Hoge Raad asks whether, under a system like that which was in force in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976 in accordance with which service on the defendant of an order for payment enables the plaintiff, where the de fendant does not submit an objection to the order within the prescribed period, to ob tain a decision which remains provisionally enforceable even after the submission of the objection against the enforcement order, but under which both that objection and the objection to the order for payment transform the procedure into adversary proceedings, the words 'the document which instituted the proceedings' refers to the order for payment [Zahlungsbefehl] or the enforcement order [Vollstreckungsbefehl]. fehl].
9 Som anført ovenfor har artikel 27, nr. 2, til formål at sikre, at en retsafgørelse ikke anerkendes eller fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen, hvis sagsøgte ikke har haft mulighed for at varetage sine interesser under sagen for retten i domsstaten.
9 As has been indicated above, Article 27, point 2, is intended to ensure that a judgment is not recognized or enforced under the Convention if the defendant has not had an opportunity of defending himself before the court first seised.
Heraf følger, at et dokument, som betalingspålægget (Zahlungsbefehl) i tysk ret, hvis forkyndelse til sagsøgte giver sagsøgeren mulighed for, dersom indsigelse ikke rejses, at opnå en retsafgørelse, der kan fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen, skal for kyndes forskriftsmæssigt og i så god tid, at sagsøgte kan varetage sine interesser under sagen, og at et sådant dokument må antages at være omfattet af begrebet 'det indledende processkrift i sagen' i artikel 27, nr. 2.
It follows that a measure, such as the order for payment [Zahlungsbefehl] in German law, service of which on the defendant enables the plaintiff, where no objection to the order is made, to obtain a decision which is enforceable under the Convention, must be duly served on the defendant in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence and accordingly that such a measure must be understood as being covered by the words 'the document which instituted the proceedings' in Article 27, point 2.
Derimod omfatter begrebet ikke en retsafgørelse som et efter tysk ret afsagt fuldbyrdelsesdekret (Vollstreckungsbefehl), der afsiges efter forkyndelsen af et betalingspålæg, og som i sig selv kan fuld byrdes på grundlag af konventionen. Dette gælder, selv om begæring af genoptagelse over for en sådan retsafgørelse — på samme måde som en indsigelse, der rejses mod betalingspålægget — ændrer sagen til en almindelig domssag.
On the other hand a decision, such as the enforcement order [Vollstreckungsbefehl] in German law, which is issued following service of an order for payment and which is in itself enforceable under the Convention, is not covered by those words even though the lodging of an objection against the enforcement order, like the objection to the order for payment, transforms the procedure into adversary proceedings.
io Med hensyn til spørgsmål 2 findes de samme betragtninger at måtte føre til, at domstolen i fuldbyrdelsesstaten ved afgørelsen af, om sagsøgte har kunnet varetage sine interesser i artikel 27, nr. 2's forstand, udelukkende skal tage hensyn til den frist — som den, der i tysk ret gælder for at rejse indsigelse (Widerspruch) — som skyld neren har til rådighed for at undgå, at der træffes en udeblivelsesafgørelse, der kan fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen.
io With regard to the second question the same considerations show that for the pur pose of examining whether the defendant has been able to arrange for his defence within the meaning of Article 27, point 2, the court in which enforcement is sought must take account only of the time, such as that allowed under German law for sub- tone 2/Ma_r 1983
(fortsat 4)
(continued 4) mining an objection to the order for payment, available to the defendant for the pur poses of preventing the issue of a judgment in default which is enforceable under the Convention.
11 Spørgsmål 1 og 2 vil derfor være at besvare således, at artikel 27, nr. 2, skal fortolkes som følger:
n The reply to those two questions must accordingly be that Article 27, point 2, must be interpreted as follows:
— begrebet 'det indledende processkrift i sagen' omfatter et dokument som betalingspålægget (Zahlungsbefehl) i tysk ret, hvis forkyndelse efter domsstatens lovgivning giver fordringshaveren mulighed for, såfremt skyldneren intet foretager sig, at opnå en retsafgørelse, der kan anerkendes og fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen;
The words 'the document which instituted the proceedings' cover any document, such as the order for payment [Zahlungsbefehl] in German law, service of which enables the plaintiff, under the law of the State of the court in which the judgment was given, to obtain, in default of appropriate action taken by the defendant, a deci sion capable of being recognized and enforced under the provisions of the Convention; tion;
— en retsafgørelse som et efter tysk ret afsagt fuldbyrdelsesdekret (Vollstrekkungsbefehl) der afsiges efter forkyndelsen af betalingspålægget, og som kan fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen, er ikke omfattet af begrebet 'det indledende processkrift i sagen' ;
A decision such as the enforcement order [Vollstreckungsbefehl] in German law, which is issued after service of the order for payment has been effected and which is enforceable under the Convention, is not covered by the words 'the document which instituted the proceedings';
— ved afgørelsen af, om sagsøgte har kunnet varetage sine interesser artikel 27, nr. 2's forstand, skal domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten udelukkende tage hensyn til den frist — som den, der i tysk ret gælder for at rejse indsigelse (Widerspruch) — som sagsøgte har til rådighed for at undgå, at der træffes en udeblivelsesafgørelse, der kan fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen.
In order to determine whether the defendant has been enabled to arrange for his de fence as required by Article 27, point 2, the court in which enforcement is sought must take account only of the time, such as that allowed under German law for sub mitting an objection [Widerspruch] to the order for payment, available to the defendant for the purposes of preventing the issue of a judgment in default which is en forceable under the Convention.
Spørgsmål 3
Third question
12 Dette spørgsmål angår i det væsentlige kompetencen hhv. for retterne i domsstaten og for den domtol i en anden kontraherende stat, som behandler en sag om anerkendelse eller fuldbyrdelse af en retsafgørelse truffet i førstnævnte stat.
This question refers in substance to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which the judgment was given and the courts of another Contracting State before which proceedings have been brought for the recognition or enforcement of judgment given in the former State.
Herom skal det bemærkes, at artikel 27, nr. 2, ikke henvender sig til retterne i domsstaten, men kun til den domstol i en anden kontraherende stat, der behandler sagen om anerkendelse eller fuldbyrdelse.
In this connection it should be emphasized that Article 27, point 2, is not addressed to the courts of the State in which the judgment was given, but only to the court before which proceedings have been brought for recognition or enforcement of the judgment in another Contracting State.
I det i spørgsmålet nævnte tilfælde har sagsøgte ikke taget stilling til sagens realitet for retten i domsstaten.
In the case with which the question is concerned the defendant did not submit a defence as to the sub stance of the case before the court first seised.
Afvisningen af begæringen om gen optagelse betyder, at den under sagsøgtes udeblivelse trufne afgørelse består fuldt ud.
The dismissal of the objection to the en forcement order as inadmissible means that the decision given in default remains in tact.
Af den grund kræver formålet med artikel 27, nr. 2, at domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten i et tilfælde som nævnt i spørgsmålet foretager den under søgelse, der foreskrives i artiklen.
For that reason the objective of Article 27, point 2, requires that in the case with which this question is concerned the court in the State in which enforcement is sought should carry out the examination prescribed by that provision.
13 Det tredje spørgsmål vil derfor være at besvare således, at artikel 27, nr. 2, også finder anvendelse, når sagsøgte har begæret genoptagelse af den under en udeblivelsessag trufne afgørelse, og en ret i domsstaten har afvist begæringen med den be grundelse, at fristen for denne var overskredet.
The reply to the third question should therefore be that Article 27, point 2, re mains applicable where the defendant has lodged an objection against the decision given in default and a court of the State in which the judgment was given has held the objection to be inadmissible on the ground that the time for lodging an objection has expired.
2 fortsat 5)
(continued 5)
15 Med henblik på besvarelsen af denne første del af spørgsmålet må det først be­mærkes, at artikel 27, nr. 2, opstiller to betingelser.
14 By this question the Hoge Raad asks first whether, where a court of the State in which the judgment was given has already found that service has been duly effected, the court seised in the other Contracting State is still required to consider whether service was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to arrange for his de­fence.
Den ene, der vedrører spørgsmå­let, om forkyndelsen er sket forskriftsmæssigt, indebærer en afgørelse på grundlag af domsstatens lovgivning og de konventioner, som denne stat er bundet af med hen­syn til forkyndelser og meddelelser, mens den anden betingelse, der angår den tid, som er nødvendig for, at sagsøgte kan varetage sine interesser under sagen, indebæ­rer en bedømmelse af faktiske forhold.
15 For the purposes of the reply to the first part of the question it should first of all be pointed out that Article 27, point 2, lays down two conditions, the first of which, that service should be duly effected, entails a decision based on the legislation of the State in which judgment was given and on the conventions binding on that State in regard to service whilst the second, concerning the time necessary to enable the de­fendant to arrange for his defence, implies appraisals of a factual nature.
En afgørelse truffet i domsstaten vedrørende den første betingelse kan derfor ikke fritage domstolen i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyr­delsesstaten fra pligten til at efterprøve, om den anden betingelse er opfyldt, endog selv om den pågældende afgørelse er truffet efter en særskilt kontradiktorisk proce­dure.
A decision concerning the first of those conditions made in the State in which the judgment was given accordingly does not release the court in the State in which enforcement is sought from its duty to examine the second condition, even if that decision was made in the context of separate adversary proceedings.
16 Denne del af spørgsmålet vil derfor være at besvare således, at selv hvis en ret i domsstaten efter en særskilt kontradiktorisk procedure herom har fundet, at forkyn­delsen eller meddelelsen er sket forskriftsmæssigt, kræver artikel 27, nr. 2, at domsto­len i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten foretager en prøvelse af, om forkyndel­sen eller meddelelsen er sket i så god tid, at sagsøgte kunne varetage sine interesser under sagen.
16 The reply to this part of the question must accordingly be that, even if the court in which the judgment was given has held, in separate adversary proceedings, that service was duly effected, Article 27, point 2, still requires the court in which en­forcement is sought to examine whether service was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence.
π For det tilfælde, at første del af spørgsmål 4 besvares bekræftende, har Hoge Raad desuden spurgt, om den pågældende prøvelse skal begrænses til, om proces­skriftet rettidigt er kommet frem til sagsøgtes bopæl, eller om det f.eks. også er på­krævet, at den pågældende forkyndelse frembyder tilstrækkelig garanti for, at pro­cesskriftet rettidigt er kommet til sagsøgtes kundskab.
π In the event of an affirmative reply to first part of the fourth question, the Hoge Raad asks further whether the examination in question must be limited to the finding that the document reached the habitual residence of the defendant in sufficient time or whether it is a further requirement, for example, that the service in question should provide a sufficient guarantee that the document would reach the defendant person­ally in good time.
18 Formålet med den anden betingelse i artikel27, nr.2, er at sikre sagsøgte tilstræk­kelig tid til at forberede sit forsvar eller til at træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at undgå en udeblivelsesafgørelse.
18 The second condition contained in Article 27, point 2, is intended to ensure that the defendant has sufficient time to prepare his defence or to take the steps necessary to prevent judgment's being given in default.
Det stillede spørgsmål angår ikke fristens længde, men snarere det tidspunkt, den må antages at løbe fra.
The question submitted to the Court is not concerned with how long this time is but rather with the point from which it begins to run.
Hoge Raad har i rea­liteten spurgt, om domstolen i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten skal gå ud fra, at sagsøgte kan begynde at forberede varetagelsen af sine interesser fra det øjeblik, hvor det indledende processkrift i sagen er kommet frem til hans bopæl.
The Hoge Raad is in fact asking whether the court in which enforce­ment is sought must proceed on the assumption that a defendant is able to prepare his defence as soon as the document which instituted the proceedings reaches his ha­bitual residence.
19 I så henseende skal det først og fremmest fastslås, at det ifølge artikel 27, nr. 2, ikke kræves godtgjort, at det indledende processkrift i sagen rent faktisk er kommet til sagsøgtes kundskab.
19 In this connection it must be stated first of all that Article 27, point 2, does not require proof that the document which instituted the proceedings was actually brought to the knowledge of the defendant.
Domstolen i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten kan derfor i almindelighed indskrænke sig til at efterprøve, om fristen, beregnet fra det tidspunkt, da forkyndelse eller meddelelse er sket forskriftsmæssigt, har givet sagsøgte tilstrækkelig tid til at varetage sine inte­resser. Retten kan dog konkret tage stilling til, om der foreligger ganske særlige om­stændigheder, som må føre til at antage, at der vel er foretaget forskriftsmæssig for­
Having regard to the exceptional nature of the grounds for refusing enforcement and to the fact that the laws of the Contract­ing States on the service of court documents, like the international conventions on this subject, have as their objective the safeguarding of the interests of defendants, the court in which enforcement is sought is ordinarily justified in considering that,
1-27.2 - A 1 fortsat 6) kyndeise eller meddelelse, men at dette dog ikke har været tilstrækkeligt til at sætte sagsøgte i stand til at påbegynde varetagelsen af sine interesser og derfor heller ikke har været tilstrækkeligt til at få den i artikel 27, nr. 2, foreskrevne frist til at løbe.
Nevertheless the court must consider whether, in a particular case, there are exceptional circumstances which warrant the conclusion that, although service was duly effected, it was, however, inadequate for the purposes of enabling the defendant to take steps to arrange for his defence and, accordingly, could not cause the time stipulated by Article 27, point 2, to begin to run.
20 Domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten kan for at afgøre, om der foreligger en sådan situation, tage hensyn til enhver omstændighed i sagen, herunder den måde, hvorpå forkyndelse eller meddelelse er sket, forholdet mellem sagsøgeren og sagsøgte, eller karakteren af de foranstaltninger, sagsøgte har skullet træffe for at undgå en udeblivelsesafgørelse.
20 In considering whether it is confronted with such a case the court in which en forcement is sought may take account of all the circumstances of the case in point, including the means employed for effecting service, the relations between the plain tiff and the defendant or the nature of the steps which had to be taken in order to pre vent judgment from being given in default.
Hvis sagsgenstanden f.eks. vedrører et forretningsmellemværende, og hvis det indledende processkrift i sagen er blevet forkyndt eller meddelt på en adresse, hvorfra sagsøgte driver forretning, kan sagsøgtes blotte fra vær på tidspunktet for forkyndelsen eller meddelelsen almindeligvis ikke antages at udelukke ham fra at varetage sine interesser, navnlig hvis de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at undgå udeblivelsesafgørelse kan træffes formløst og endog ved fuld mægtig.
If, for example, the dispute concerns commercial relations and if the document which instituted the proceedings was served at an address at which the defendant carries on his business activities the mere fact that the defendant was absent at the time of service should not normally prevent him from arranging his defence, above all if the action necessary to avoid a judgment in default may be taken informally and even by a representative.
2i Denne del af spørgsmål 4 vil derfor være at besvare således, at domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten i almindelighed kan indskrænke sig til at efterprøve, om fristen, regnet fra det tidspunkt, da forkyndelsen eller meddelelsen er sket forskriftsmæssigt, har givet sagsøgte tilstrækkelig tid til at varetage sine interesser under sagen; dog kan retten tage stilling til, om der i den konkrete sag foreligger så danne ganske særlige omstændigheder, at forkyndelsen eller meddelelsen, selv om den er sket forskriftsmæssigt, ikke har været tilstrækkelig til, at fristen kan regnes fra det nævnte tidspunkt.
21 The reply to that part of the fourth question should therefore be that the court in which enforcement is sought may as a general rule confine itself to examining whether the period reckoned from the date on which service was duly effected allowed the defendant sufficient time for his defence. However the court is also required to con sider whether, in a particular case, there are exceptional circumstances such as the fact that, although service was duly effected, it was nevertheless inadequate for the purpose of causing that time to begin to run.
Spørgsmål 5
Fifth question
'Ved afgørelsen af, om en part har en bopæl i den kontraherende stat, for hvis dom stole sagen er indbragt, skal retten anvende denne stats interne lovgivning.
'In order to determine whether a party is domiciled in the Contracting State whose courts are seised of a matter, the court shall apply its internal law.
Har en part ikke bopæl i den stat, ved hvis retter sagen er anlagt, skal retten ved afgørelsen af, om parten har bopæl i en anden kontraherende stat, anvende sidsnævnte stats lovgivning.
If a party is not domiciled in the State whose courts are seised of the matter, then, in order to determine whether the party is domiciled in another Contracting State, the court shall apply the law of that State.'
Det præciseres i denne artikel, hvilken stats lovgivning der skal finde anvendelse i det tilfælde, at det ifølge andre af konventionens regler, herunder navnlig kompe tencereglerne, skal afgøres, hvor en part har bopæl (eller én af sine bopæle).
23 That article states which law is applicable where, according to the other provisions of the Convention, in particular those concerning jurisdiction, it is necessary to determine the habitual residence (or one of the habitual residences) of a party.
I forbindelse med artikel 27, nr. 2, kan sagsøgtes bopæl være en afgørende omstændighed ved afgørelsen af, om forkyndelse eller meddelelse er sket forskriftsmæssigt, men dette spørgsmål skal dog altid afgøres på grundlag af domsstatens interne lovgivning og de relevante konventioner.
In the context of Article 27, point 2, the habitual residence of the defendant may be a decisive factor for the purpose of considering whether service has been duly effected but that question must in any case be resolved by applying the internal law of the
(fortsat 7)
(continued 7)
24 Det femte spørgsmål vil derfor være at besvare således, at konventionens artikel 52 og den omstændighed, at retten i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten når til det resultat, at sagsøgte efter denne stats lovgivning havde bopæl på statens område, da det indledende processkrift i sagen blev forkyndt eller meddelt, ikke har indvirkning på de ovenfor givne svar.«
24 The reply to the fifth question should therefore be that Article 52 of the Convention and the fact that the court of the State in which enforcement is sought concluded that under the law ofthat State the defendant was habitually resident within its territory at the date of service of the document which instituted the proceedings do not af fect the replies given above."
Domstolen kendte herefter for ret:
Accordingly, the Court ruled as follows:
»Artikel 27, nr. 2, i Bruxelles-konventionen af 27. september 1968 om retternes kom petence og om fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser i borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager, skal fortolkes således:
"Article 27, point 2, of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters must be inter preted as follows: