natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
2. »Hvis et selskab, som har til formål at udnytte komponisters ophavsrettigheder, må betragtes som en virskomhed, der misbruger en dominerende stilling på fælles­markedet eller en væsentlig del heraf, er den omstændighed, at udnyttelse af ophavs­rettighederne i visse tilfælde kun vedrører opfyldelsen i tredjelande af kontrakter, som er indgået på en medlemsstats område af derunder hørende parter, ikke til hin­der for, at traktatens artikel 86 finder anvendelse.«
"Where an association exploiting composers' copyrights is to be regarded as an undertaking abusing a dominant position within the common market or in a substan­tial part of it, the fact that such abuse, in certain cases, relates only to the perform­ance in nonmember countries of contracts entered into in the territory of a Member State by parties within the jurisdiction ofthat State does not preclude the application of Article 86 of the Treaty."
»Fortolkningen og anvendelsen af den i traktatens artikler 85 og 86 indeholdte be­tingelse vedrørende påvirkning af samhandelen mellem medlemsstater må tage sit ud­gangspunkt i formålet med denne betingelse, som er at afgrænse fællesskabsrettens gyldighedsområde i forhold til den nationale rets for konkurrencerettens vedkom­mende.
"The interpretation and application of the condition relating to effects on trade between Member States contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty must be based on the purpose ofthat condition which is to define, in the context of the law governing competition, the boundary between the areas respectively covered by Community law and the law of the Member States.
Fællesskabsretten omfatter således alle aftaler og alle former for samordnet praksis, der er egnet til at bringe den frie handel mellem medlemsstaterne i fare på en måde, der kan skade gennemførelsen af målene for et mellemstatsligt enhedsmarked, især gennem en afskærmning af de nationale markeder eller gennem en ændring af konkurrencestrukturen i fællesmarkedet.
Thus Community law covers any agreement or any practice which is capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market between the Member States, in particular by partitioning the national markets or by affecting the structure of competition within the common market.
En adfærd, hvis virkninger udelukkende udfolder sig inden for en enkelt medlemsstats område, henhører derimod under na­tional ret.«
On the other hand conduct the effects of which are confined to the territory of a single Member State is governed by the national legal order."
Dom af 31. maj 1979: sag 22/78, Hugin/Kommissionen, Sml. 1979, s. 1869, 1899 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 1902).
Judgment of 31 May 1979, Case 22/78, Hugin ν Commhsion, [1979] ECR 1869, 1899 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1902).
Mens artiklerne 85 og 86 rammer konkurrencebegrænsninger, fordi de kan hindre samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, vedrører de nationale lovgivninger — hver ud fra egne særlige grunde — alene konkurrencebegrænsninger på rent nationalt plan.
Whereas Articles 85 and 86 regard them in the light of the obstacles which may result for trade between Member States, national law proceeds on the basis of the considerations peculiar to it and considers restrictive practices only in that context.
Heraf følger, at de nationale myndigheder også kan skride ind mod forhold, der kan være genstand for en beslutning fra Kommissionen.
It follows that the national authorities may also take action with regard to situations which are capable of form­ing the subject­matter of a dedsion by the Commission.
Dom af 10. juli 1980 : foren, sager 253/78 og 1­3/79, Procureur de la République/'Giry og Guerlain, Sml. 1980, s. 2327, 2374 f.
Judgment of 10 July 1980, Joined Cases 253/78 and 1 to 3/79, Procureur de la République ν Giry and Guerlain, [1980] ECR 2327, cf. p.
3. »At Kommissionen har fundet, at en given praksis ikke rammes af forbudet i arti­kel 85, stk. 1 og 2, som alene omhandler aftaler, der kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, hindrer på ingen måde de nationale myndigheder i at bedømme den nævnte praksis eller de begrænsende virkninger, den kan have på nationalt plan.
"The fact that a practice has been held by the Commission not to fall within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Article 85(1) and (2), the scope of which is limited to agreements capable of affecting trade between Member States, in no way prevents that practice from being considered by the national authorities from the point of view of the restrictive effects which it may produce nationally.
[Heraf følger], at fællesskabsretten ikke er til hinder for anvendelse af nationale be­stemmelser, der forbyder leveringsnægtelse, selv om de kontrakter, der er påberåbt til støtte for leveringsnægtelsen, har været genstand for en henlæggelse fra Kommis­sionen['s side].«
Accordingly,... Community law does not prevent that application of national provi­sions prohibiting a refusal to sell even where the agreements relied upon for the pur­
Dom af 10. juli 1980: foren, sager 253/78 og 1­3/79, Procureur de la République/Giry og Guerlain, Sml.
Judgment of 10 July 1980, Joined Cases 253/78 and 1 to 3/79, Procureur de la République ν Giry and Guerlain, [1980] ECR 2327,2375 (Opinion : Reischl, p. 2377).
Aftalernes ugyldighed 3. Dispensation fra forbudet
Nullity of agreements and decisions 3.
Aftaler mellem virksomheder, vedtagelser inden for sammenslutninger af virksomheder og samordnet praksis
Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of under­takings and concerted practices
Påvirkning afhandelen mellem medlemsstater 4.
Effect on trade between Member States 4.
Aftaler, der er uforenelige med det fælles marked: eksempler 5. Selektive distributionssystemer
Agreements incompatible with the common market: examples 5.
Aftaler mellem virksomheder, vedtagelser inden for sammenslutninger af virksomheder og samordnet praksis
Agreements between undertakings, decisions by asso­ciations of undertakings and concerted practices
Mundtlige aftaler, der gensidigt forpligter to virksomheder, udgør aftaler som nævnt i artikel 85, stk. 1.
Oral agreements mutually binding two undertakings are agreements within the meaning of Article 85 (1).
Dom af 20. juni 1978: sag 28/77, Tepea/Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, s. 1391, jfr. s. 1414 (Forslag: Capotorti, s. 1420).
Judgment of 20 June 1978, Case 28/77, Tepea ν Commhsion, [1978] ECR 1391, cf. p. 1415 (Opinion: Capotorti, p. 1421).
En henstilling fra en sammenslutning af virksomheder, som er et klart udtryk for medlemmernes vilje til at indrette deres markedsadfærd i overensstemmelse med henstillingen, opfylder de nødvendige betingelser for at anvende EØF­traktatens ar­tikel 85, stk. 1.
A recommendation made by an assodation of undertakings and constituting a faithful expression of the members' intention to conduct themselves compulsorily on the market in conformity with the terms of the recommendation fulfils the necessary conditions for the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty.
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commhsion, [1980] ECR 3125, Summary, para. 9, cf. p.
EØF­traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, finder også anvendelse på sammenslutninger, som ikke arbejder med gevinst for øje, i det omfang deres egne aktiviteter eller den aktivitet, der udøves af de virksomheder, der er tilsluttet dem, tilsigter at fremkalde de virkninger, som denne bestemmelse er rettet mod.
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty also applies to non-profit-making assodations in so far as their own activities or those of the undertakings belonging to them are cal­culated to produce the results which it aims to suppress.
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml. 1980, s. 3125, Smdrg.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commhsion, [1980] ECR 3125, Summary, para. 10, cf. p.
10, jfr. s. 3250 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 3286).
3250 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 3286).
Begrænsning af konkurrencen
Restriction on competition
1. »...en klausul om eksportforbud [er] i sig selv ... en konkurrencebegrænsning, uanset om den er optaget på leverandørens eller kundens initiativ, idet det mål, som kontrahenterne er blevet enige om, er et forsøg på at isolere en del af markedet.
1. "...by its very nature, a clause prohibiting exports constitutes a restriction on competition, whether it is adopted at the instigation of the supplier or of the customer since the agreed purpose of the contracting parties is the endeavour to isolate a part of the market
Den omstændighed, at leverandøren ikke strengt håndhæver sådanne forbud, er så­ledes ikke et bevis på, at de ikke har fået virkning, idet de i sig selv kan skabe et 'op­tisk og psykologisk' klima, som tilfredsstiller kundekredsen og bidrager til en mere eller mindre effektiv opdeling af markederne.
Thus the fact that the supplier is not strict in enforcing such prohibitions cannot es­tablish that they had no effect since their very existence may create a 'visual and psy­chological' background which satisfies customers and contributes to a more or less rigorous division of the markets.
En producents markedsstrategi vil ofte rette sig efter kundekredsens ønsker af mere eller mindre generel art.
The market strategy adopted by a producer is frequently adapted to the more or less general preferences of his customers.
Selv om det derfor måtte antages, at det som af Miller anført er korrekt, at optagelsen af de anfægtede forbud snarere var en følge af medkontrahenternes ønsker end af en ensidig og planlagt strategi fra Miller, medfører dette ikke, at Millers adfærd falder uden for forbudene i traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1.«
Consequently Miller's statement that the disputed prohibitions originated in the wishes of its co-contractors rather than its own unilateral and premeditated strategy, even if it is correct, cannot allow its behaviour to escape the prohibitions contained in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty."
Dom af 1. februar 1978: sag 19/77, Miller/Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, s. 131, 147f. (Forslag: Warner, s. 153).
Judgment of 1 February 1978, Case 19/77, Miller ν Commhsion, [1978] ECR 131, 148 (Opinion: Warner, p. 154).
Dom af 20. juni 1978: sag 28/77, Tepea/Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, s. 1391, 1416 (Forslag: Capotorti, s. 1420).
Judgment of 20 June 1978, Case 28/77, Tepea ν Commhsion, [1978] ECR 1391, cf. p. 1417 (Opinion: Capotorti, p. 1421).
3. »For ... at vurdere, om en aftale må antages at være forbudt som følge af de æn­dringer i den frie konkurrence, der er genstand for aftalen eller en virkning af den, må der foretages en undersøgelse af konkurrenceforholdene inden for den faktiske ramme, hvor den ville udfolde sig uden den omtvistede aftale.
3. "... in order to dedde whether an agreement is to be considered as prohibited by reason of the distortion of competition which is its object or its effect, it is necessary to examine the competition within the actual context in which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute.
I så henseende må man bl.a. se på karakteren og den eventuelt begrænsede mængde af de produkter, der er genstand for aftalen, den stilling og betydning, parterne har på markedet for de på­gældende produkter og spørgsmålet, om der kun foreligger én tvivlsom aftale eller den derimod indgår i en helhed af aftaler.
To that end, it is appropriate to take into account in particular the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, the position and the importance of the parties on the market for the products concerned, and the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alterna­tively, its position in a series of agreements.
[Herom har Domstolen præciseret]..., at eksistensen af lignende aftaler uden at være altafgørende er en omstændighed, der i forbindelse med andre kan danne en helhed, som er den økonomiske og retlige [kon­tekst], som aftalen skal vurderes i.«
In that regard ... although not necessari­ly dedsive, the existence of similar contracts is a circumstance which, together with others, is capable of being a factor in the economic and legal context within which the contract must bejudged." judged."
Dom af 10. juli 1980: sag 99/79, Lancôme/Etos, Sml. 1980, s. 2511, 2536 f.
Judgment of 10 July 1980, Case 99/79, Lancôme ν Etos, [1980] ECR 2511, 2536 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 2539).
Jfr. tilsvarende: Dom af 11. december 1980: sag 31/80, L'Oréal/De Nieuwe AMCK, Sml. 1980, s. 3775, 3792 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 3796).
See also: Judgment of 11 December 1980, Case 31/80, L'Oréal ν De Nieuwe AMCK, [1980] ECR 3775, 3792 (Opinion: Reischl, p.3796).
»... de belgiske forbrugsafgifts­ og priskontrolbestemmelser samt gennemførelsen af dem inden for rammerne af statens afgiftspolitik [fratager] næsten fuldstændigt... producenterne og importørerne muligheden for at konkurrere på en måde, der slår igennem på detailprisen.
4. "... in the manufactured tobacco sector the Belgian rules on consumer taxes and price controls and their application pursuant to the revenue policy pursued by the State have the effect of making it practically impossible for manufacturers and im­porters to compete in such a way that there would be an effect upon the amount of the retail selling price.
Det er derimod på ingen måde blevet påvist, at bestemmelserne eller deres gennem­førelse forhindrer producenten eller importøren i individuelt af den del af en bestemt detailpris, der tilkommer dem selv, at indrømme visse grossister en større avance.
On the other hand it is necessary to point out that it has by no means been shown that the said rules or their application prevent the manufacturer or importer from allowing particular wholesalers on an individual basis a larger profit margin out of the manu­facturers' or importers' share of the retail price.
Ved at samordne de maksimale avancer, de indrømmer grossisterne, pålægger sagsø­gerne sig imidlertid kollektivt ikke at konkurrere på denne måde og formindsker samtidig de nævnte forhandlers incitament til at føre en salgspolitik, hvorved de fa­voriserer varerne fra den producent eller importør, af hvem de får eller håber at få en større avance.
In taking concerted action regarding the maximum level of profit margins which they allow wholesalers the applicants jointly prevent themselves from so competing and at the same time discourage those intermediaries from pursuing a sales policy which would benefit the products of the manufacturer or importer from whom they obtain or hope to obtain a more advan­tageous profit margin.
Det skal i denne henseende bemærkes, at traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, forbyder enhver begrænsning af konkurrencen i ethvert omsætningsled mellem producenten og for­brugeren.
In that respect it is necessary to point out that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty prohibits any restriction on competition at any trading level between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer.
I artikel 85, stk. 1, tales der således i litra a), i generelle vendinger om 'for­retningsbetingelser', i litra b), om 'produktion' og 'afsætning', og i litra c), uden at der opstilles en sondring mellem de forskellige omsætningsled, om 'markeder' eller 'forsyningskilder'.
Thus Article 85(1) (a) speaks in general terms of 'trading condi­tions', Article 85 (l)(b) of 'production' and 'markets' and Article 85 (l)(c) without any distinction between the respective stages of trade of'markets' or 'sources of sup­ply*.
Desuden er den del af detailprisen, der udgøres af afgifter, i dette tilfælde ganske vist betydelig, men der er dog levnet producenten eller importøren fornødent spillerum til en effektiv konkurrence, da der er tale om almindelige, masseproducerede for­brugsvarer, for hvilke en begrænset prisnedsættelse i produktions­ eller importleddet kan påvirke forbruget mærkbart.
Further, in the present case even if the share of the retail price due to the revenue is large there remains for the manufacturer or importer a sufficient margin to allow ef­fective competition even with regard to mass­produced products of current consump­tion in respect of which a very small reduction in the price at the manufacturing or im­port stage may have a significant effect at the consumer stage.
Den samordning af avancerne,... som er resultatet af en aftale mellem de fleste pro­ducenter og importører af en almindelig forbrugsvare inden for en væsentlig del af fællesmarkedet, nemlig Belgien, må således betragtes som en konkurrencebegræns­ning, som falder ind under forbudet i traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1,...«
The concerted action in relation to profit margins... resulting from an agreement be­tween the majority of manufacturers and importers of widely consumed products in a substantial part of the common market, namely Belgium, must therefore be re­garded as constituting a restriction on competition prohibited by Article 85 (1) of the Treaty..."
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen. Sml.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commhsion, [1980] ECR 3125, cf. p.3270 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 3286).
... desuden ... kan den omstændighed, at videreforhandlere, som er kunder hos sag­søger, foretrækker at begrænse deres forretningsvirksomhed til snævrere regionale eller nationale markeder, ikke begrunde en formelig optagelse af klausuler om eks­portforbud i individuelle kontrakter eller i salgsbetingelser, lige så lidt producentens ønske om en opdeling af det fælles marked.«
Furthermore..., the fact that resellers, as customers of the applicant, prefer to limit their commercial operations to more restricted markets, whether regional or national, cannot justify the formal adoption of clauses prohibiting exports, either in particular contracts or in conditions of sale, any more than the desire of the producer to wall off sections of the common market"
Dom af 1. februar 1978: sag 19/77, Miller/Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, s. 131, 150f. (Forslag: Warner, s. 153).
Judgment of 1 February 1978, Case 19/77, Miller ν Commhsion, [1978] ECR 131,151 (Opinion: Warner, p. 154).
En aftale falder uden for forbudet i artikel 85, såfremt den ikke øver en mærkbar virkning på samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet.
An agreement does not fall within the prohibition contained in Article 85 if it does not affect trade between Member States to an appredable extent.
En aftale om eneforhandling i en medlemsstat af en mærkevare fremstillet i en anden medlemsstat, hvoraf salget i den første medlemsstat udgør 15% af markedet for varer af den pågældende type, er egnet til mærkbart at begrænse samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet.
An agreement on the exclusive distribution in a Member State of branded products manufactured in another Member State whose sales in the former State account for 15% of the market in the appliances in question is capable of restricting intra-Com­munity trade to an appredable degree.
Dom af 20. juni 1978: sag 28/77, Tepea/Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, s. 1391, jfr. s. 1415 f. (Forslag: Capotorti, s. 1420).
Judgment of 20 June 1978, Case 28/77, Tepea ν Commhsion, [1978] ECR 1391, cf. p. 1416 (Opinion: Capotorti, p. 1421).
4. »Selv om en aftale ... kan falde uden for forbudet i artikel 85, stk. 1, når den kun påvirker markedet på ubetydelig måde på grund af den svage stilling, som parterne indtager på markedet for de pågældende produkter, gælder de samme betragtninger ikke, når det drejer sig om et produkt, som en stor virksomhed er alene om at produ­cere.«
"Although an agreement may escape the prohibition in Article 85(1) when it af­fects the market only to an insignificant extent, having regard to the weak position which those concerned have in the market in the products in question, the same con­siderations do not apply in the case of a product of a large undertaking responsible for the entire production."
[Domstolen har tidligere udtalt]... at en vedtagelse, en aftale eller en samord­ning kun kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, såfremt den på grundlag af samtlige objektive, retlige eller faktiske forhold gør det muligt med tilstrækkelig sandsynlighed at forudsige, at den, direkte eller indirekte, aktuelt eller potentielt, kan øve en sådan indvirkning på handelen mellem medlemsstater, at det kan befrygtes, at den kan hindre virkeliggørelsen af et enhedsmarked mellem medlemsstaterne.
"[As the Court has already held,] in order that an agreement, dedsion or con­certed practice may affect trade between Member States it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that the agreement, dedsion or concerted practice in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States. The influence thus foreseeable must give rise to a fear that the realiza­tion of a single market between Member States might be impeded.
Det skal i denne henseende bemærkes, at det er ubestridt, at en væsentlig del af de tobaksvarer, der sælges i Belgien ... importeres af producenter, som er medlemmer af Fedetab, og som bringer dem i handelen gennem samme distributionsnet, som an­vendes for de varer, de selv producerer. ...
In that respect it is right to observe that it is common ground, that... a substantial part of the manufactured tobacco products sold in Belgium are imported through manufacturing members of FEDETAB [Fédération Belgo­Luxembourgeoise des In­dustries du Tabac Asbl] who market them using the same distribution networks as for the products which they manufacture themselves...
Selv om parallelimport af tobaksvarer til Belgien i vidt omfang er udelukket på grund af de skattemæssige og tekniske vanskeligheder, som Domstolen [tidligere] har omtalt ... skal det bemærkes, at påvirkningen af handelen i de foreliggende sager ... frem for alt udgår fra den store import, der foretages af de producenter, der er medlemmer af Fedetab.
Moreover, although because of difficulties of a fiscal and technical nature which the Court pointed out in [a previous judgment] parallel imports into Belgium of manufac­tured tobacco are largely excluded, it is necessary to observe that the influence on the trade in question in the present cases is ... above all from the large imports made by manufacturing members of FEDETAB.
Det må i denne henseende konstateres, at de ovenfor omtalte konkurren­cebegrænsninger, for så vidt angår avancerne, årsrabatten og betalingsfristerne kan dreje handelsstrømmene på tobaksvareområdet bort fra den retning, de ellers ville have taget.
In that respect it must be observed that the restrictions on competition pointed out above in relation to trade margins, end­of­year rebate and terms of payment are likely to distort trade patterns in manufactured tobacco from the course which they would have otherwise followed.
Dette gælder så meget mere de foranstaltninger, som anvendtes forud for henstillingen, og som gik ud på i hvert omsætningsled at sikre en nøje overholdelse af de af producenterne og importørerne fastsatte priser.
A fortiori the same is true as regards those of the measures prior to the recommendation which aimed at ensuring stria observance at each stage of distribution of the prices laid down by the manufacturers and importers.
Ved at samordne disse funda­mentale led i salgsvilkårene over for forhandlerne formindskede sagsøgerne mærk­bart deres tilskyndelse til som modydelse for individuelle økonomiske fordele at fremme salget af visse indførte varer fremfor andre indførte varer.
In taking concerted action on these funda­mental aspects of the sale terms to be allowed to intermediaries, the applicants appre­ciably reduced still further any inducement the intermediaries may have had of en­couraging the sale as regards imported products of certain products in relation to oth­ers, in exchange for individual finandal advantage.
... de af sagsøgerne indførte konkurrencebegrænsninger kan påvirke handelen mel­lem medlemsstater.«
... the restrictions on competition by the applicants are likely to affect trade between Member States."