natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen lagde til grund, al overtrædelserne var alvorlige og af middellang varighed.
The fines were calculated on the basis of the Commission's published guidelines for the calculation of fines.6 The Commission took account of the fact that the infringements were serious and of medium duration.
De fire parters deltagelse i overtrædelserne blev vurderet til at være meget forskellig:
Considerable differentiations with regard to the individual contributions of the four parties to the infringement were made:
British Sugar var på grund af selskabets store andel af de relevante markeder for industrisukker og detailsukker og sin stilling som prisførende selskab på disse markeder en væsentlig deltager i kartellet.
Ð the participationof British Sugar, on account of its high share of the relevant markets for industrial and retail sugar and its position as price leader on those markets, was an essential element in the operation of the cartel;
— Tate & Lvle var pã grund af selskabets andel af de relevante markeder det næstvigtigste kartelmedlem. Grossisterne Napier Brown og James Budgett deltog ikke i det afgørende møde den 20. juni 1986. De tilsluttede sig først nogle måneder senere kartellet og deltog derefter udelukkende i overtrædelserne vedrørende industrisukker.
Ð Tate & Lyle, on account of its share on the relevant markets, was the second most important member of the cartel; Ð the merchants Napier Brown and James Budgett did not participate in the key meeting of 20 June 1986; they joined the cartel only several months later and from the n onwards only participated in the infringements concerning industrial sugar.
Da de var afhængige af leveringer fra de to nationale sukkerproducenter British Sugar og Tate ¿¡L Lyle — for en stor del af det sukker, de solgte som grossister, var deres indflydelse og magt på det relevante marked begrænset.
Because they were dependent on supplies from the two domestic sugar producers Ð British Sugar and Tate & Lyle Ð for a significant part of the sugar they sold in their capacity as merchants, their influence on the relevant market and their scope for exercising power on that market were limited. Moreover, with regard to British Sugar, several aggravating factors were found:
- British Sugar var initiativtager til overtrædelserne og var i hele den omhandlede periodedrivkraften.
Ð British Sugar was the instigator of the infringements and, throughout the relevant period, remained the driving force.
Efter at have ført priskrig mod konkurrenterne tog selskabet på mødet den 20. juni 1986 initiativ til at erstatte denne krig med en fælles strategi om højere priser sammen med konkurrenterne.
In fact, after having waged a price war against its competitors, it took the initiative, by arranging the meeting of 20 June 1986, of replacing this price war with a collaborative strategy of higher pricing with its competitors.
- British Sugar handlede derfor i modstrid med bestemmelserne i »compliance«-programmet, som selskabet forelagde Kommissionen i oktober 1986 i forbindelse med en procedure mod Napier Brown, og som Kommissionen tog i betragtning som en formildende omstændighed ved bødefastsættelsen i Napier Brown-beslutningen7.
Ð British Sugar acted in a manner contrary to the clear wording of the comprehensive compliance programme it presented to the Commission in October 1986 in the course of a proceeding brought in response to a complaint by Napier Brown, and which the Commission took into account as a mitigating factor when setting the fine in the Napier Brown decision.7
- Allerede i juli 1988 pålagde Kommissionen i Napier Brown-beslutningen British Sugar en bøde for at have forsøgt at presse en grossist ud af detailmarkedet for stødt melis i Storbritannien.
Ð Back in July 1988, in its Napier Brown decision, the Commission had already fined British Sugar for attempting to squeeze a merchant out of the retail market on the white granulated sugar market in the United Kingdom.
På det samme marked anvendte British Sugar den fælles strategi om højere priser, der er genstand for denne beslutning, i en toårig periode sideløbende med Kommissionens procedure, der førte til Napier Brown-beslutningen.
On the same relevant market, British Sugar pursued the collaborative strategy of higher pricing at issue in the present decision for two years in parallel with the Commission proceeding leading up to the Napier Brown decision.
Flvad angår Tate & Lyle har Kommissionen foretaget en betragtelig nedsættelse af bøden i henhold til meddelelsen om bødefritagelse eller bødenedsættelse i kartelsagerK for at tage højde for det faktum, at Tate & Lyle samarbejdede med Kommissionen, blandt andet ved at fremsende to selvanklagendeskrivelser til Kommissionen. Disse to skrivelser gav nemlig afgørende bevis for, at der eksisterede et kartel, og gjorde det muligt for Kommissionen at gå ind i sagen. EFT C 9 af 14.1.1998. s. 3. EFT 1.
As for Tate & Lyle, the Commission substantially reduced the fine under its notice on the waiving or reduction of fines in cartel cases,8 in order to take account of the fact that Tate & Lyle cooperated with 6
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION the Commission, in particular by submitting two self-incriminating letters to it.
Græske færger
Greek ferries
Kommissionen besluttede den 9. december 1998 at pålægge syv færgeselskaber boder for at haveindgået prisaftaler om roll-on/roll-off færgetransport mellem Grækenland og Italien.
By decision of 9 December the Commission fined seven ferry operators for entering into price-fixing collusion in relation to roll-on/roll-off services on routes between Greece and Italy.
Et af selskaberne, nemlig Adriatica, er etableret i Italien.
One company Ð Adriatica Ð is established in Italy.
Efter at have modtaget en skrivelse fra en borger besluttede Kommissionen i juli 1994 at undersøge sagen uden på forhånd at have underrettet de seks færgeselskaber, hvoraf fem er baseret i Grækenland og et i Italien.
Following receipt of a letter from a member of the public, the Commission carried out investigations without prior warning at the offices of six ferry operators, five in Greece and one in Italy, in July 1994.
Der blev fundet stærke beviser for en overtrædelse af artikel 81.
Strong evidence of an infringement of Article 81 was discovered.
Kommissionen konkluderede, at de omhandlede færgeselskaber i flere år havde deltaget i et priskartel.
The Commission concluded that these ferry companies had participated in a price-fixing cartel for several years.
Det var en løbende aftale, som selskaberne karakteriserede som »normal praksis«.
This was an ongoing agreement described by the companies as ªthe usual practiceº.
Kartellet tog form af regelmæssige møder og udveksling af korrespondance, der tog sigte på at fastsætte passager- og fragttakster.
The cartel operated in the form of regular meetings and an exchange of correspondence involving the collective readjustment of prices for passengers and vehicles.
Ikke desto mindre, er det relevante marked begrænset både i geografisk omfang og størrelse.
The relevant market is limited both geographically and in size.
Der er tale om tre ud af fem ruter i Adriaterhavet.
It concerns three out of five routes on the Adriatic.
Det er et forholdsvis lille sæsonpræget marked i forhold til andre markeder i EU.
This is a relatively small seasonal market compared with other markets in the EU.
Overtrædelsen havde ret begrænsede følger for markedet.
The Commission would normally regard such an infringement as very serious, Nevertheless, the infringement had a fairly limited actual impact on the market.
Parterne anvendte ikke fuldt ud alle de gældende prisaftaler, og taksterne blev holdt på et lavt niveau i forhold til andre ruter på det fælles marked for søtransport fra en medlemsstat til en anden. Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at overtrædelsen ikke kunne betragtes som alvorlig.
The parties did not apply in full all the specific price agreements, and fares were kept at a low level compared with other routes within the common market for maritime transport from one Member State to another.
Kommissionen pålagde bøder på i alt 9.1 mio. ECU.
The Commission imposed fines totalling ECU 9.1 million.
Næsten alle de omhandlede virksomheder samarbejdede med Kommissionen, og der blev derfor indrømmet en bødenedsættelse.
Almost all the firms in question cooperated with the Commission and benefited from reductions in fines.
Kommissionen mener, at der efter denne indgriben igen er indført normale loyale konkurrenceforhold på dette marked.
The Commission believes that, after its intervention, normal conditions of undistorted competition have been re-established on this market.
Prisfastsættelse, markedsopdeling og tilbudsmanipulation i præisolerede ror
Price-fixing, market-sharing and bid-rigging cartel in preinsulated pipes
Den 21. oktober 1998'' vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning, der pålagde bøder på over 92 mio. ECU til ti virksomheder, der havde deltaget i et hemmeligt kartel om markedsopdeling, tilbudsmanipulation og prisfastsættelse for hele det europæiske marked for præisolerede rør til fjernvarmeanlæg.
On 21 October9 the Commission decided to impose fines totalling more than ECU 92 million on ten companies which had been engaged in a clandestine marketsharing, bid-rigging and price-fixing cartel covering the whole European market for preinsulated pipes used in district heating systems.
Kartellets leder, den svensk-svejsiske industrikoncern ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. blev pålagt en bode pa 70 mio. ECU.
The ringleader of the cartel, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd, the Swiss-Swedish engineering group, was fined ECU 70 million.
Kommissionens undersøgelser blev udført i juni 1995 efter en klage fra det svenske selskab Powcrpipc. der er den eneste producent, der ikke deltager i kartellet: selskabet klagede over. at det systematisk havde været udsat for gengældelsesaktioner fra de andre producenters side. fordi selskabet havde afvist at deltage i deres ulovlige forehavende.
The Commission investigations were carried out in June 1995 following a complaint from Powerpipe of Sweden, the only producer not involved in the cartel, that it had been the object of systematic reprisals from the others as a result of its refusing to join their unlawful enterprise. Tangible evidence of the
Kartellet begyndte i Danmark — hvor de fleste producenter er beliggende eller har deres hovedsæde — i slutningen af 1990 og blev gradvist udvidet til andre markeder, bl.a. Tyskland, der er det største individuelle nationale marked for fjernvarme.
The cartel began in Denmark, where most of the producers are located or have their headquarters, in late 1990 and was gradually extended to other markets, particularly Germany, the largest individual national market for district heating.
Fra 1994 og i de efterfølgende år blev hele det vesteuropæiske marked til en værdi på over 400 mio. ECU årligl omfattet af kartellet.
From 1994 onwards, the cartel covered the entire west European market, worth more than ECU 400 million annually.
De fleste administrerende direktører i koncernledelsen havde truffet beslutning om den fælles politik og givet hver deltager markedskvoter, og på hvert nationalt marked sørgede »kontaktgrupper« bestående af salgsdirektører for at gennemføre deres beslutninger og overvågede gennemførelsen af kartellet.
Managing directors or chief executives determined the joint policy and allocated market quotas to each participant. In each national market `contact groups' of sales managers carried out the decisions and monitored the cartel's implementation.
De fleste fjernvarmekontrakter tildeles ved udbud, og for de store udbuds vedkommende finder EU's udbudsregler anvendelse.
Most contracts for district heating are awarded by competitive bidding and public tendering and, for the larger projects, EU rules on public procurement apply.
I Tyskland og Danmark, hvor de mest avancerede arrangementer blev anvendt, tildelte kartellet hemmeligt hvert nyt projekt til en »favorit«, der besluttede, hvilken pris der skulle tilbydes: de øvrige producenter indgav derefter højere tilbud for at sikre, at førstnævnte blev tildelt kontrakten.
In Germany and Denmark, where the most sophisticated arrangements were in place, each new project announced was secretly allocated by the cartel to a `favourite' which decided the price it would bid; the other producers the n put in higher offers to ensure it was awarded the contract.
Da Powerpipe indgik en stor kontrakt i Tyskland mod kartellet, besluttede de andre producenter at tvinge selskabet ud af markedet ved at indføre en boycot og sørge for. at leverancerne blev stoppet.
When Powerpipe won a large contract in Germany against the cartel, the other producers decided to force it out of business by organising a boycott and ensuring that its supplies were cut off.
En særlig skærpende omstændighed ved overtrædelsen var. at de ti involverede producenter bevidst fortsatte kartellet i næsten et år efter undersøgelserne.
The fact that the ten producers involved deliberately continued the cartel for almost a year after the investigations constitutes a particularly aggravating feature of this infringement.
Ved fastsættelsen af bøderne anvendteKommissionen retningslinjerne, der foreskriver et udgangspunkt på 20 mio. ECU for meget alvorlige overtrædelser.
When determining the fines, the Commission applied its guidelines, which provide for a minimum fine of ECU 20 million for very serious cases.
På trods af den fortsatte overtrædelse nedsatte Kommissionen i de fleste tilfælde den bøde. virksomhederne ville være blevet pålagt, for at tage højde for virksomhedernes samarbejde.
Even though the infringement was prolonged, the Commission reduced the fines imposed on most participants to take account of the fact that they had cooperated.
ABB blev pålagt en meget høj bøde. da den øverste ledelse havde deltaget aktivt i kartellet.
In the case of ABB, the fine reflects the fact that senior group management was involved in the cartel.
Kommissionen har pålagt Volkswagen AG - den største europæiske bilkoncern — en bøde på 102 mio. ECU for at have overtrådt EF-traktatens arlikel 81. stk. 1.
The Commission imposed a fine of ECU 102 million on Volkswagen AG Ð Europe's largest motormanufacturing group Ð for an infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.
Kommissionen konstaterede bl.a.. at virksomheden systematisk forpligtede de italienske forhandlere' til at afvise at sælge biler af mærket Volkswagen og Audi til udenlandske kunder, bl.a. tyske og østrigske.
In particular, it found that Volkswagen had systematically forced its authorised dealers in Italy to refuse to sell Volkswagen and Audi cars to foreign buyers, mainly from Germany and Austria.
Siden 1995 har en rækkeforbrugere indgivet klager til Kommissionen over de vanskeligheder, de har med at købe nye biler i Italien.
Since 1995 the Commission had been receiving a large number of complaints from consumers who had had difficulty buying new cars in Italy.
Kommissionen konkluderede i sin beslutning af 28. januar 1998'". at Volkswagen AG, det italienske datterselskab Autogerma S.p.A. samt datterselskabet Audi AG havde indgået aftaler med de italienske forhandlere om en strategi, der tog sigte på at forhindre og/eller i væsentlig grad begrænse salg fra Italien til andre medlemsstater, herunder Østrig og Tyskland.
In its decision of 28 January,10 the Commission found that Volkswagen AG, its Italian subsidiary Autogerma SpA and Audi AG had devised, in concert with their Italian dealers, a strategy aimed at preventing, or at least substantially restricting, sales from Italy to other Member States, especially Germany and Austria.
Volkswagen fik en frist på to maneder til at gennemføre de af Kommissionen pålagte bestemmelser for at afvikle denne praksis.
Volkswagen was given two months to take the steps required by the Commission in order to put an end to the practices involved.
I oktober 1995 foretog Kommissionen kontrolundersøgelser hos Volkswagen AG i Wolfsburg. Audi AG i Ingolstad og Autogerma S.p.A i Verona (100%-ejet datterselskab af Volkswagen og officiel italiensk importør af begge mærker) og hos en række VAG-forhandlere i Norditalien.
In October 1995 the Commission had carried out inspections at Volkswagen's offices in Wolfsburg, at Audi's offices in Ingolstadt, at Autogerma's offices in Verona (Autogerma is a wholly owned subsidiary of Volkswagen, and the official importer for both makes in Italy) and at the offices of a number of VAG dealers in the north of Italy.
De dokumenter, der blev opdaget under disse kontrolundersøgelser, gav klare beviser for. at Volkswagen, Audi og Autogerma førte en politik, der tog sigte på at opdele markedet.
Papers found in the course of those inspections provided clear evidence of a market-partitioning policy pursued by Volkswagen, Audi and Autogerma.
EET L 124 af 23.4.9S. s. 60.
COMPETITIONREPORT1998
146 ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE l DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Kommissionen fastslår i beslutningen, at Volkswagens adfærd udgjorde en trussel for det indre marked og en meget grov overtrædelse af EU's konkurrenceregler.
In its decision, the Commission found that the conduct of Volkswagen/Audi was a threat to the proper functioning of the single market and a very serious infringement of Community competition law.
Ved de trufne foranstaltninger havde Volkswagen forsøgt og opnået at indføre et eksportforbud/en eksportbegrænsning.
On the basis of the measures it took, Volkswagen successfully sought to impose an export prohibition/ restriction.
Foranstaltningerne var både samlet og individuelt stærkt konkurrencebegrænsende.
The measures in question, whether viewed as a whole or individually, were liable significantly to restrict competition.
Samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne blev påvirket, idet Volkswagens eksportforbud/eksportbegrænsning begrænsede den grænse overskridende samhandel.
Trade between Member States was affected in that the export prohibition/restriction imposed by Volkswagen restricted crossborder trading.
Det medførte en mærkbar påvirkning af samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
This resulted in trade between Member States being affected significantly.
Hvad angår fastsættelsen af bødestørrelsen tog Kommissionen højde for overtrædelsens varighed — over ti år — og det forhold, at bl.a. de selskaber, der indgår i Volkswagen-koncernen, har udnyttet deres økonomiske magt over for forhandlernettene i Italien for at indføre en konkurrencebegrænsende praksis.
In setting the fine, the Commission took account of the duration of the infringement Ð more than ten years Ð and of the fact that, among other things, the companies in the Volkswagen group set up the system of restrictive practices by exploiting the economic strength they enjoyed in their relationship with their networks of authorised dealers in Italy.
Endvidere fandt Kommissionen, at det var en skærpende omstændighed, at Volkswagen ikke havde reageret hensigtsmæssigt på Kommissionens påbud om at bringe denne grove overtrædelse til ophør.
It also held that the infringement was aggravated by the fact that Volkswagen did not take the appropriate action when told by the Commission to put an end to what was a serious infringement.
Beslutningen er et vigtigt skridt i Kommissionens beslutningspraksis, idet Kommissionen ved denne beslutning pålagde én enkelt virksomhed den hidtil højeste bøde.
This decision marks an important step in the Commission's practice in this field in that the fine involved is the highest it has ever imposed on a single firm.
Bødestørrelsen viser, at Kommissionen ikke vil tolerere en sådan praksis, og at den er indstillet på at handle på lignende vis over for andre fabrikanter, der måtte opdele det indre marked på lignende vis.
The size of the fine is an indication that the Commission will not tolerate practices of this kind and will act with similar determination against other manufacturers who set out to partition the market.
Sagen skal ligeledes relateres til forordningen om gruppefritagelse for distribution af motorkøretøjer ". Det hedder i denne forordnings artikel 11. at Kommissionen skal vurdere anvendelsen af forordningen, bl.a. hvad angår den virkning, som fritagelse af forhandlingssystemer har på prisforskellen og pa kvaliteten af den service, der ydes de endelige forbrugere.
This case should also be seen in the context of the monitoring of the block exemption Regulation for car distribution.11 Article 11 of this Regulation requires the Commission to evaluate the application of the Regulation, particularly as regards the impact of the exempted system of distribution on price differentials and on the quality of service to final users.
Ifølge forordningen har hele bilindustrien ret til at fastsætte konkurrencebegrænsende klausuler og konkurrencebegrænsende praksis i kontraktforholdet med forhandlerne.
The Regulation allows the industry to establish a number of competition-restricting clauses and practices within the contractual relationships with their dealers.
Til gengæld skal fabrikanterne overholde en række regler, der er fastsat i forordningen, bl.a. om ikke at begrænse de endelige forbrugeres og andre forhandleres ret til al købe biler i en hvilken som helst medlemsstat.
In return, manufacturers are required to comply with a number of rules laid down in the Regulation, for instance not to restrict the freedom of final consumers and other network dealers to acquire cars in the Member State of their choice.
Kommissionen betragter misligholdelse af denne betingelse som en megel alvorlig overtrædelse af konkurrencereglerne, der skal straffes i overensstemmelse hermed.
Noncompliance with this condition is considered by the Commission to be a very serious infringement of the competition rules, and is punished accordingly.
Kommissionen har ikke desto mindre bemærket, at der fortsat er hindringer for parallelhandel i visse medlemsstater, og den vil derfor ikke tøve med at træffe foranstaltninger mod fabrikanter, der ikke overholder de gældenderegler.
The Commission is aware that obstacles to parallel trade still exist in some Member States and it will consequently not hesitate to take measures against manufacturers who break the rules.
Den 11. marts 1998 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning på basis af EF-traktatens artikel 81 og 82, der fordømmer Unilevers »frysereksklusivitet« i Irland for at lette andre leverandørers adgang til markedet for impulsis.
On 11 March the Commission adopted a decision, based on an assessment under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, condemning Unilever's practice of ªfreezer exclusivityº in Ireland with a view to facilitating access by other suppliers to the ªimpulseº ice cream market.
Et af Unilevers datterselskaber. Van den Bergh Foods Limited, er den førende leverandør af is i Irland med en markedsandel pa over 85%.
A Unilever subsidiary, Van den Bergh Foods Limited, is the leading supplier of ice cream in Ireland, with a market share in excess of 85%.
Selskabet har et omfattende net af frysere, der stilles gratis til rådighed for detailhandlerne på den betingelse, at de udelukkende anvendes til al opbevare Unilevers produkter.
The company has an extensive network of freezer cabinets which a replaced at the disposal of retailers free of any direct charge but on condition that they are used exclusively for the storage of Unilever's products.
Kommissionen fandt i betragtning af situationen pa det irske marked, al tilradighedsstillelsen af frysere pa eksklusiv basis betyder, at de omhandlede detailhandlere kun har mulighed for at udbyde Unilevers isprodukter.
The Commission found that, in the circumstances of the Irish market, the provision of cabinets on exclusive terms results in many of the recipient outlets only being in a position to offer for sale the ice cream products of Unilever.
De markedsundersøgelser, som Kommissionen har baseret sig på. viser, at detailhandlerne sjældent udskifter frysere, især frysere installeret af Unilever, eller opstiller nye frysere, især ikke
Market research relied on by the Commission demonstrates that retailers are very unlikely either to replace incumbent cabinets, in particular those installed by Unilever, or to