natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som begrundelse for denne rets kompetence påberåbte sagsøgeren sig blandt andet domskonventionens artikel 5, nr. 5, og hævdede, at sag­søgte drev en filial i Heidelberg.
In support of its contention that the Landgericht had jurisdiction the plaintiff relied inter alia on Article 5 (5) of the Brussels Convention and stated that the defen­dant maintained a branch in Heidelberg.
Heroverfor gjorde det italienske selskab gældende, at der i Heidelberg alene fandtes et »kontor« for dets datterselskab, et tysk GmbH (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung), som havde hjemsted i Hamburg.
In reply the Italian company argued that in Heidelberg there was merely an "office" of its subsidiary company, a company incor­porated under German law and based in Hamburg.
For den italienske virksomhed tjente kontoret alene som en »postadresse«. Landgericht af­viste sagen, og efter sagsøgerens appel stadfæstede Oberlandesgericht afgørelsen.
So far as the Italian undertaking was concerned the office merely had the function of a "post-box".
Oberlandesgericht lagde tysk ret til grund for fortolkningen af begrebet filial i konven­tionens artikel 5, nr. 5.
The Oberlandesgericht based its interpretation of the term "branch" in Article 5 (5) of the Convention on German law.
Da sagsøgte var et italiensk aktieselskab, fulgte det af tysk ret, at en indenlandsk filial skulle føre benævnelsen »aktieselskab« (AG).
Under German law, as the defendant was a company limited by shares under Italian law, a branch within Germany should bear the descrip­tion "company limited by shares".
Da »kontoret« i Hei­delberg imidlertid førte samme navn som sagsøgtes datterselskab i Hamburg, skulle det anses for en filial af dette selskab, men ikke for en filial af det italienske moderselskab.
But since the office in Heidelberg bore the descrip­tion of the defendant's subsidiary company in Hamburg, it must be regarded as a branch ofthat company and not of the Italian parent company.
Dette fulgte specielt af den omstændighed, at en filial ikke kunne udgøre en selvstændig juridisk person.
That followed in particu­lar from the fact that a branch could not have its own legal personality.
Da kontoret var en filial af det tyske datterselskab, var det heller ikke automatisk en filial af moderselskabet, da begge selskaber var selvstændige juridiske personer.
As a branch of the German subsidiary the office was not automatically a branch of the parent com­pany, as both companies were independent legal persons.
Retten undersøgte desuden, om kontoret i Heidelberg — uafhængigt af de formelle aspekter — kunne anses for en filial af sagsøgte på grundlag af dets faktiske funktion.
The Court further considered whether, irrespective of the formal aspects, the Heidelberg office might actually be regarded as a branch of the defendant because of the tasks which it in fact carried out.
Retten antog i denne forbindelse — igen på grundlag af tysk ret — at en filial ikke er en underordnet og uselvstændig afdeling af modervirksomheden, men derimod »et
In this connexion the Court held, again on the basis of German
(fortsat I) andet centrum for den pågældende virksomhed«.
(continued 1) law, that a branch is not a subordinate and dependant department of the principal establishment but "another centre of the undertaking in question".
Filialen måtte være indrettet således, at den ved modervirksomhedens eventuelle bortfald fortsat kunne bestå som en selv stændig handelsvirksomhed.
The branch must be established in such a way that if the principal establishment were to be removed the branch could continue as an independent trading establishment.
Dette krævede, at den havde en udadtil selvstændig ledelse med generelle beføjelser, at den havde en særskilt kapital, og at den skulle kunne frem vise et selvstændigt regnskab.
That meant that it must have a management ostensibly independent and endowed with general authority, that it must possess its own business assets and keep its own accounts.
Dette var ikke tilfældet for det pågældende kontor.
But that was not the case with the office in question.
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — flere sagsøgte — kompetence for retten pá det sted, hvor en af de sagsøgte har bopæl (artikel 6, nr. 1)
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Plurality of defendants — Jurisdiction of the court for the place where one of the defendants is domiciled (Article 6 (1)).
Sagsøgte 1 og 2, som havde bopæl i Frankrig, var personligt hæftende interessenter i sagsøgte 3, et interessentskab med hjemsted i Forbundsrepublikken, som var blevet stiftet med henblik på udnyttelse af sagsøgte l's industrielle ejendomsrettigheder.
The first and second defendants, who were domiciled in France, were personally liable partners of the third defendant, a partnership based in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was formed for the purpose of exploiting the first defendant's industrial property rights.
Sagsøgeren var leder af et patentbureau, som under sagen krævede gebyrer og godtgørelse af om kostninger, som var opstået i forbindelse med sagsøgte l's enerettigheder.
The plaintiff, a patent agent, claimed payment of his fees and reim­bursement of expenses incurred in connexion with the said rights of the first defendant.
Landgericht fastslog, at den havde international og stedlig kompetence.
The Landgericht decided that it had jurisdiction under both international and domestic rules.
Sagsøgte 1 og 2 kunne i henhold til konventionens artikel 6, nr. 1, sammen med sagsøgte 3 sagsøges under én sag på sagsøgte 3's hjemsted, uden at der forelå et nødvendigt procesfællesskab mellem parterne.
The first and second defendants could be sued under Article 6 (1) of the Conven­tion jointly with the third defendant at its seat even though the relationship between them did not make it mandatory to sue all of them jointly.
Indsigelsen om, at denne bestemmelse kun kunne finde anvendelse på fysiske personer, fandt ifølge retten ingen støtte i bestemmelsens ordlyd.
The objection that that provi­sion could be applied only to natural persons was not supported by the wording thereof.
Kravene var heller ikke vilkårligt kumuleret; der forelå derimod en sammenhæng, som berettigede til, at de tre sagsøgte sagsøgtes under én sag.
The actions had not been joined arbitrarily; on the contrary, they were so related as to justify suing the three defendants jointly.
Sagsøgte 1 og 2 var ikke alene personligt hæftende interessenter i sagsøgte 3, men interessentskabet udnyttede også sagsøgte l's enerettigheder, og gebyrerne og omkostningerne vedrørte rettighedernes opståen og opretholdelse.
The first and second defendants were not only personally liable partners of the third defendant, but in addition the latter exploited the industrial property rights of the first defendant and it was in connexion with the esta­blishment and upholding of those rights that the fees and expenses were incurred.
Yderligere havde sagsøgte 1 ikke alene haft kontakt med sagsøgeren, men også betalt denne gennem interessentskabet.
Moreover, the first defendant had not only been in contact with the plaintiff through the partnership, but had also made payment to him.
I denne sag, som førtes i henhold til artikel 41 i Codice di procedura civile, statuerede Corte di cassazione, at italienske domstole havde international kompetence i forhold til den nederlandske appellant.
Giving judgment in proceedings under Article 41 of the Codice di Procedura Civile, the Corte di Cassazione held that the Italian courts had international jurisdiction over the Netherlands applicant.
For retten i første instans havde arvingerne efter Colombo på grund af dennes død ved en hotelbrand i Nederlandene påstået både det italienske selskab Philips, der var afdødes arbejdsgiver, og det nederlandske selskab Selene, som havde drevet hotellet, dømt til in solidum at betale skadeserstatning.
In the court of first instance the heirs of a Mr Colombo had brought an action for damages in respect of the death of their relative in an hotel fire in the Netherlands, joining as co­defendants an Italian company, Philips, the deceased's employer, and a company incorporated in the Netherlands, Selene, which had managed the hotel.
Corte di cassazione udtalte, at der i det foreliggende tilfælde var tale om flere sagsøgte, jfr. konventionens artikel 6, nr. 1.
The Corte di Cassazione found that in this case there were a number of defendants within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the Convention.
Henvisningen i denne bestemmelse til flere sagsøgte omfattede ikke kun det tilfælde, hvor et enkelt krav rettes mod flere personer på grundlag af et enkelt retsforhold — nødvendigt procesfællesskab — men også tilfælde af kumulation, hvor forskellige sammenhængende krav rettes mod flere sagsøgte.
The reference to a number of de­fendants in that provision covered not only the situation in which the same claim was pursued against several persons on the basis of a single legal relationship (when those parties must be sued jointly), but also the situation in which different but related claims were pursued against several defendants (where joinder was optional).
Heller ikke den omstændighed, at der under sagens senere forløb ikke længere var flere sagsoiitc - tvisten mellem arvingerne efter Colombo og firmaet Philips forligtes ved rettens mellemkomst — havde betydning for de italienske retters internationale kompetence, jfr. princippet om »perpetuatio jurisdictionis« i artikel 5 i Codice di procedura civile.
The fact that at a subsequent stage of the procedure there was only one defendant, the dispute between Mr Colombo's heirs and Philips having been settled in court, did not affect the interna­tional jurisdiction of the Italian courts in view of the principle of "perpetuatio jurisdic­tionis" laid down in Article 5 of the Codice di Procedura Civile.
Corte di cassazione bemærkede i øvrigt, at reglerne i konventionens artikel 6, nr. 2, måtte bringes i anvendelse i det foreliggende tilfælde, såfremt man alene ville sætte det tilfælde, at der er fiere sagsøgte, i forbindelse med oprindelig kumulation og det tilfælde, at der gives procesunderretning, i forbindelse med efterfølgende kumulation.
The Corte di Cassazione observed obiterihät the present case would have to be dealt with under Article 6 (2) of the Convention if it were considered that only an initial joinder could create proceedings involving a number of defendants and that a subsequent join­der produced third party proceedings.
16 — B 3 Cour d'appel de Paris, dom af 19.1. 1978, Sté Leybold-Heraeus et Sté Leybold-Heraeus Sogev SI mod Seima Tysk oversættelse i: RIW/AWD-Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 1978, s. 271
1­6 — Β 3 Cour d'Appel, Paris, Judgment of 19 January 1978, Société Leybold­Heraeus and Société Leybold­Heraeus Sogev SI ν Seima German translation in RIW/AWD — Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 1978, p. 271
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — flere sagsøgte — kompetence for ret ten i den retskreds, hvor en af de sagsøgte har bopæl (artikel 6, nr. 1) — betingelser ved kontraktmæssigt krav for en fransk ret mod tysk selskab og dettes franske datterselskab
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Plurality of defendants — Jurisdiction of the courts for the place where one of the defendants is domiciled (Article 6 (1)) — Conditions with regard to an action in contract in a French court against a German company and its French subsidiary
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — opfyldelsesvæmeting (artikel 5, nr. 1) — bestemmes i henhold til den tilgrundliggende aftale — opfyldelsesstedet for hoved forpligtelserne afgørende
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of the courts for the place of per­formance (Article 5 (1)) — Determined according to the contract on which the action is based — The place of performance of the essential contractual obligations is decisive
Den franske sagsøger havde anlagt sag ved handelsretten i Sens mod et selskab med hjemsted i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland samt mod dettes franske datterselskab med påstand om annullation af et køb af et industrianlæg.
A French plaintiff brought an action in the Tribunal de Commerce, Sens, against a com­pany based in the Federal Republic of Germany and its French subsidiary company. In the action the plaintiff sought rescission of a contract of sale relating to industrial parts.
Den franske sagsøgte anførte til sit forsvar, at dette selskab kun havde handlet på den tyske sagsøgtes vegne, men ikke havde været part i købeaftalen, således at selskabet var blevet sagsøgt med urette.
The French defendant maintained in its defence that it had acted purely on behalf of the German defendant and had not itself been a party to the contract of sale, with the result that proceedings directed against it were misconceived.
Den tyske sagsøgte rejste indsigelse mod rettens kompetence under påberåbelse af en værnetingsaftale til fordel for tyske retter.
The German defendant, relying on a jurisdiction clause in favour of the German courts, objected to the jurisdiction of the court.
Handelsretten statuerede, at der bestod kontraktlige
The appeal lodged against the judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce succeeded.
Udsendelse 1/februar 1981
Further, the delivery had actually taken place at that factory and payments ex­ lssue 1/February 1981
(fortsat I) relationer til den franske sagsøgte, og erklærede sig kompetent vedrørende kravet mod den tyske sagsøgte, da værnetingsaftalen var ugyldig i henhold til fransk procesret.
(continued 1) pressed in German currency had been made in Germany.
Da det franske selskab således var indstævnet med urette, kunne kriteriet, »hvor en af de sagsøgte har bopæl«, ikke finde anvendelse.
Therefore the essential obliga­tions under the contract of sale had been performed in that country.
Retten fastslog derpå, at der ikke bestod en gyldig værnetingsaftale, da der i partemes almindelige forretningsbetingelser fandtes indbyrdes modstridende væmetingsklausu­ler. Der var heller ikke værneting i Frankrig i henhold til artikel 5, nr. 1.
Tests carried out in the plaintiffs factory for the purpose of putting the machinery into operation were inci­dental to the contract and should not be taken into consideration for the application of the jurisdiction rules contained in the Convention.
1­6 — Β 4 Cour d'appel de Paris, dom af 28.6. 1978, Banque nationale de Paris mod Soc. Carl Felk og Soc. Serifit Revue critique de droit international privé 1979, s. 444
1­6 — Β 4 Cour d'Appel, Paris, Judgment of 28 June 1978, Banque Nationale de Paris ν Soc.
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — opfyldelsesvæmeting (artikel 5, nr. 1) — betingelser — kontraktsforholdet mellem parterne
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of the courts for the place of per­formance (Articles (1)) — Conditions — Contractual relations between the parties
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — flere sagsøgte — kompetence for ret­ten i den retskreds, hvor en af de sagsøgte har bopæl (artikel 6, nr. 1) — betingelser — egentlig sammenhæng mellem kravene
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Plurality of defendants — Jurisdiction of the courts for the place where one of the defendants is domiciled (Article 6 (1)) — Conditions — Existence of a genuine connexion between the claims
Med henblik på afviklingen af en købeaftale mellem en fransk og en tysk virksomhed åbnede den tyske køber en tidsbegrænset rembours i en tysk bank, som på sin side gav en fransk bank i opdrag at foretage udbetalingen af købesummen mod udlevering af nærmere bestemte dokumenter.
In connexion with a contract of sale between a French undertaking and a German un­dertaking the German buyer opened a letter of credit, subject to a time­limit, with a Ger­man bank, which in turn instructed a French bank to pay a sum representing the pur­chase price on presentation of certain documents.
Efter at den franske bank havde foretaget udbetalingen på denne måde og havde debiteret den tyske banks konto i overensstemmelse hermed,
Proceedings were taken against the French undertaking only in case the German undertaking should be held to have been justified in rejecting the documents.
Cour d'appel udtalte, at retten i første instans havde været berettiget til på embeds vegne i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 20, stk. 1 — efter en prøvelse af konventionens væmetingsregler, og for så vidt angk sagen mod den i Forbundsrepublikken hjemmehørende sagsøgte — at erklære ikke at være kompetent, da denne sagsøgte på trods af at være blevet forskriftsmæssig indstævnt ikke havde givet møde under sagen.
(continued 1) blic, since in spite of being properly served with the document instituting the proceed­ings that defendant had not entered an appearance.
Retten i første instans havde ikke været kompetent i henhold til konventionen.
The court of first instance did not ac­quire jurisdiction under the Convention.
Sagsøgeren, den franske bank, kunne ikke påberåbe sig konventionens artikels, nr. 1, da den alene havde handlet på den tyske banks vegne ved afviklingen af remboursen, og da der ikke havde bestået noget kontraktsforhold mellem sagsøgeren og den tyske sagsøgte; arti kel 5, nr. 1, var imidlertid kun gældende for retstvister, opstået på grundlag af en aftale mellem sagens parter.
The plaintiff could not rely on Article 5 (1) of the Convention, since in paying the letter of credit it had merely acted as agent for the German bank, and had not entered into any legal relationship with the German defen­dant; Article 5(1) applied only to disputes arising from a contract between the parties to the action.
Der bestod heller ikke noget værneting i henhold til konventionens artikel 6, nr. 1.
Further, there was no basis for jurisdiction under Article6 (1) of the Conven­tion.
Det i denne bestemmelse fastlagte kumulationsværneting gjaldt kun, når der bestod en egentlig sammenhæng mellem de krav, der rettedes mod de en kelte sagsøgte.
The jurisdiction provided for under that provision for cases where there were a number of defendants arose only in so far as there existed a genuine connexion between the actions brought against the individual defendants.
Som det fremgik af det af sagsøgeren anførte, rettedes der kun krav mod den franske virksomhed for det tilfælde, at den tyske virksomhed måtte blive frifundet.
But, as was apparent from the plaintiffs submissions, the French undertaking had only been sued in case the action against the German undertaking was unfounded.
Før der rejstes sag i Frankrig mod den franske virksomhed på grund af ugrundet berigelse, havde sagsøgeren lige så vel kunnet afvente udfaldet af en sag i Tyskland mod den tyske virksomhed.
Before bringing an action based on un­just enrichment against the French undertaking in France the plaintiff could just as ea­sily have awaited the outcome of an action against the German undertaking in Germa­ny.
Mellem de to krav, som i øvrigt angik forskellige sagsgenstande, be stod der således kun en kunstig, og ikke en egentlig sammenhæng.
Thus there existed only an artificial, not a genuine, connexion between the two ac­tions, which, moreover, did not have the same subject-matter.
For så vidt sagsøgeren subsidiært havde påstået de to sagsøgte dømt in solidum, var dette i endnu højere grad kunstigt, da der ikke var fremført noget som helst grundlag for en solidarisk hæftelse, som var i modstrid med det af sagsøgeren i øvrigt anførte.
As regards the case plead­ed by the plaintiffs, as a further alternative, that both defendant undertakings were jointly and severally liable, that was even more artificial, as the plaintiff had not ad­vanced any grounds for joint and several liability, which in any case ran contrary to the rest of its submissions.
Afdeling 3 ­ KOMPETENCE I FORSIKRINGSSAGER (artikel 7 — artikel 12)
Section 3 ­ JURISDICTION IN MATTERS RELATING TO INSURANCE (Articles 7 to 12)
[kompetence i sager mod forsikringsgiveren]
(Jurisdiction in actions against the insurer)
Kompetence — almindelige bestemmelser — selskabers og juridiske personers hjem­ting (artikel 2. og 53) — bestemmelse af hjemstedet — anvendelse afforumstatens in­ternationale privatret
Jurisdiction — General provisions — Jurisdiction based on the seat of companies and other legal persons (Articles 2 and 53) — Determination of the seat — Application of the rules of private international law of the lex fori
Kompetence — kompetence i forsikringssager — forsikringsgiver, der ikke har hjem­sted på en af de kontraherende staters højhedsområde — denne forsikringsgivers filial eller agentur i en kontraherende stat — værneting i sager vedrørende »driften« af filia­len eller agenturet (artikel 8, stk. 3) — begreb
Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance — Insurer not domiciled in a Contracting State — Branch or agency of that insurer in a Contracting State — Jurisdiction in disputes "arising out of the operations" ofthat branch or agency (third paragraph of Article 8) — Concept
Sammenhængende sager — udsættelse af afgørelsen — betingelser — henvisning af en sag til domstolene i en anden kontraherende stat — ikke tilladt efter nederlandsk ret
Related action — Staying proceedings — Conditions — Transfer of case to courts of another Contracting State — Not possible under the law of the Netherlands.
Baggrunden for denne retssag var et færdselsuheld i Belgien, hvor føreren af en knallert blev kvæstet ved et sammenstød med en bil.
This dispute arose out of a road accident in Belgium in which a moped rider was injured as a result of a collision with a car.
Den tilskadekomne knallertførers neder­landske socialforsikringsgiver, den sagsøgende Bedrijfsvereniging, udbetalte derpå ydelser på grund af uarbejdsdygtighed og indledte i samme anledning et regressøgsmål mod bilistens ansvarsforsikringsselskab, et forsikringsselskab med hjemsted i Perth (Skotland), ved Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam.
The plaintiff Bedrijfsvereniging, a Netherlands social security organization with which the injured person was insured, paid him benefit in view of his incapacity for work.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam var kompetent, anførte sagsøge­ren, at sagsøgte havde kontor i Amsterdam og således var etableret dér. Følgelig var Ar­rondissementsrechtbank kompetent i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 2.
The plaintiff thereafter brought an action in the Arron­dissementsrechtbank, Amsterdam in which it claimed reimbursement of those payments from the motorist's insurer, an insurance company having its seat in Perth (Scotland).
I øvrigt havde sagsøgtes Amsterdam­kontor, efter at parterne siden 1970 havde ført forhandlin­ger om opgørelsen af erstatningskravet, i 1973 overtaget sagen og ført omfattende for­handlinger med sagsøgeren.
Moreover, following negotiations which had taken place between the parties since 1970 with a view to settling the claim, the defendant's Amsterdam office had taken over the matter in 1973 and conducted extensive negotiations with the plaintiff.
Sagsøgte gjorde gældende, at Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam ikke var kompetent, og anførte bla.a., at sagen ikke vedrørte driften af kon­toret i Amsterdam, eftersom forsikringsaftalen med den i ulykken implicerede bilist var sluttet af sagsøgtes kontor i Antwerpen. Subsidiært påstod sagsøgte bl.a. sagen henvist
The defen­dant objected to the jurisdiction of the Amsterdam court, arguing inter alia that the dis­pute had not arisen out of the operation of its Amsterdam branch since the insurance contract with the driver involved in the accident had been concluded by its branch in
Den tog først stilling til det spørgsmål, om den kunne være kompetent i medfør af hovedreglen i konventionens artikel 2, hvilket den dog besvarede benægtende.
First of all, it inquired whether it had general ju­risdiction under Article 2 of the Convention and decided that it did not.
Spørgsmålet om, hvor sagsøgtes hjemsted var beliggende, måtte i henhold til nederlandsk international privatret — der efter konventionens arti kel 53 skulle finde anvendelse — løses efter nederlandsk ret.
In accordance with the rules of Netherlands private international law, which were applicable under Ar­ticle 53 of the Convention, the question where the defendant had its seat was to be an­swered under Netherlands law.