natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En aftale af Helsinkiaftalens art har klart indvirkning på handelen mellem medlemsstaterne, fordi den vedrører checks, som statsborgere i en medlemsstat udsteder i en anden medlemsstat.
An agreement like the Helsinki Agreement clearly has an effect on intraCommunity trade as it concerns cheques drawn in a Member State by nationals of another Member State.
Handelen påvirkes særlig mærkbart i det foreliggende tilfælde, fordi Frankrig er det land, hvor der indløses flest eurocheques, nemlig ca. 6,5 millioner, hvoraf 15 % indløses inden for nonbanking sektoren.
The effect is particularly appreciable in the present case as France is the principal accepting country with nearly 6,5 million Eurocheques, of which 15 % in trade as a whole.
Med ovennævnte gennemsnit på 134'ECU pr. eurocheque andrager samtlige eurocheques udstedt i Frankrig 871 mio. ECU årligt, og de eurocheques, der udstedes i den franske nonbanking sektor, beløber sig alene til 134 mio. ECU.
Taking as a basis the. abovementioned average of ECU 134 per Eurocheque, the annual amounts involved are, for all Eurocheques drawn in France, ECU 871 million, and, for Euro cheques drawn in the trading sector in France, ECU 134 million.
Det er naturligvis ikke muligt at anvende artikel 85, stk. 3, på Helsinkiaftalen fra den 1. december 1983 til den 16. juli 1990, da aftalen ikke var anmeldt i hele denne periode.
The examination as to the applicability of Article 85 (3) does not, by definition, concern the application of the Helsinki agreement between 1 December 1983 and 16 July 1990 as, throughout that period, the agreement had not been notified.
Spørgsmålet om anvendelse af artikel 85, stk. 3, kan kun komme på tale for perioden fra den 16. juli 1990, hvor aftalen blev anmeldt, indtil den 27. maj 1991, hvor den blev ophævet.
The question of the applicability of Article 85 (3) therefore arises only in respect of the period from 16 July 1990, the date of notification of the agree ment, to 27 May 1991, the date of its abolition.
I øvrigt har Eurocheque International og Groupe ment des cartes bancaires »CB« gjort gældende, at Package Dealaftalen på ingen måde — eller i hvert fald ikke længere — bygger på det grundprincip, at modtageren af en eurocheque altid skal have udbetalt det fulde beløb, og at Helsinkiaftalen derfor på ingen måde skulle være i strid med det Euro cheque-system, der bygger på Package. Deal-aftalen.
Eurocheque International and the Groupement have argued that the package deal Agreement rested in no way — or, at all evencs, no longer — on the basic principle according to which the payee of a Eurocheque must always receive the full amount thereof, and that therefore the Helsinki Agreement was in no way at variance with the Eurocheque system governed by the package deal Agreement.
Det kan dog ikke bestrides, at Helsinkiaftalen på det tidspunkt, hvor den blev indgået, var i strid med Package Dealaftalen, der bl.a. byggede på det princip, at eurocheques var gratis for modtageren, idet udgifterne påhvilede udstederen.
In spite of this, there can be no denying that, at the time of its conclusion, the Helsinki Agreement was at variance with the package deal Agreement, which was based, inter alia, on the principle that the Eurocheque is free of charge to ics payee, the costs being borne by the drawer.
Dette erkendes desuden af Eurocheque International (2) og var i øvrigt en af begrundelserne for beslutning
Eurocheque Inter national acknowledges this fact (2). It was, moreover, one of the grounds for Decision 85/77/EEC (3).
Groupement har både i sin anmeldelse og i de senere fremførte argumenter først og fremmest begrundet en fritagelse med, at Helsinkiaftalen havde til formål og til følge at fremme brugen af eurocheques i Frankrig.
In its notification, and in its subsequent submissions, the Groupement based the justification of the applicability of an exemption on the central argument that the Helsinki Agreement had as its object and as its effect the furthering of the development of Eurocheques in France.
Den første af de fire betingelser i artikel 85, stk. 3, nemlig en bedre fordeling af tjenesteydelserne og fremme af den tekniske og økonomiske udvikling, skulle således ifølge groupe ment være opfyldt, fordi »Frankrig takket være denne aftale har ændret sin yderst beskedne stilling til en førerstilling«.
Thus, in the Gourpement's view, the first of the four conditions set out in Article 85 (3), namely the improvement of distri bution and the promotion of technical and economic progress, was fulfilled because 'thanks to this agreement, France has risen form a particularly modest position to a position of leader'.
(') Jf. side 9, første afsnit : »De franske banker har aldrig tilsluttet sig udvidelsen af Package Dealaftalen til ogsi at omfatte nonbanking sektoren.· (2) Referat af høringen den 28. november 1990, s. 82, og skrivelse til Kommissionen af 31. juli 1991.
(') See the firsc paragraph on page 9 : 'French banks have never approved of Che extension of Che package deal to Che non-banking seccor'. P) Record of che hearing of 28 November 1992, page 82, and let ter co Che Commission of 31 July 1991.
Aftalen kan betragtes som anden etape i de franske bankers forsøg på at forhindre den potentielle konkurrence fra eurocheques. Første etape var den bestemmelse i protokollen af 31. juli 1984 om oprettelse af groupement, der forbød medlemmerne heraf at udstede eurocheques til nationalt brug.
In its reply to the supplementary Statement of Objections the Groupement did not offer any explanation for this surprising presentation of the facts at the hearing, pointing out instead that its argument was conformed by the facts as far as the 1990 figures were concerned.
Denne påstand er dog ikke holdbar, for tallene viser, at 1985 betegnede et gennembrud med hensyn til antallet af Eurocheque-kort udstedt af de franske banker, samt at dette gennembrud ikke blev fulgt op året efter på grund af den pågældende bestemmelses ikrafttræden.
This argument is not convincing ; the figures show that Eurocheque cards issued by French banks enjoyed a period of success in 1985 and that that success was nipped in the bud by the entry into force of the provision in question the following year.
Det er ikke overraskende, at der i 1990 ikke skete nogen ny stigning i antallet af Eurocheque-kort udstedt i Frankrig, i betragtning af at antallet af bankkort i mellemtiden var vokset med 50 % ; den tilsigtede begrænsning i brugen af eurocheques var dermed opnået, og der synes ikke længere at kunne rettes op på denne situation.
It is not surprising that 1990 did not see the number of Eurocheque cards issued in France take off again, given the 50 % increase in the meantime in the number of bank cards issued : the objective of preventing the development of Eurocheques has been attained, and this situation now seems to be irreversible.
Under høringen den 28. november 1990 fremførte groupement, dels at det antal eurocheques, der udstedes af franske banker, i sig selv er begrænset, og at dette ikke skyldes samordnet praksis, dels at antallet af eurocheques udstedt af de franske banker faldt i 1989 (jf. betragtning 12) til trods for, at man i 1988 havde ophævet den bestemmelse i protokollen af 1984 om oprettelse af groupement, hvor efter de franske banker kun kunne udstede eurocheques til brug i udlandet (jf. betragtning 29).
At the hearing of 28 November 1990 the Groupe ment argued, firstly, that the limited number of Eurocheques issued by French banks was an issue of fact and not the result of concerted practices, and, secondly, that, despite the abolition in 1988 of the restrictive provision in the 1984 protocol setting up the Groupement whereby French banks could issue Eurocheques only for use abroad (see recital 29 above), the number of Eurocheques issued by French banks fell in 1989 (see recital 12 above).
De tal, som groupement fremlagde under høringen, viser, at denne bestemmelse i protokollen har haft fuld virkning, i modsætning til hvad groupement selv fremførte under høringen ; den hævdede nemlig, at denne restriktive bestemmelse blev ophævet i 1988, og at antallet af franske indehavere af Eurocheque-kort alligevel faldt i 1989.
Like this clause in the 1984 protocol, abolished by the Groupement as from 31 December 1989 as a result of the intervention of the French Conseil de la concurrence, the Helsinki Agreement may be considered as having not only as its object but also as its effect the hampering of the development of Eurocheques in France by making French traders pays for a means of payment, the Eurocheque, which was in principle free of charge to them pursuant to the 1980 package deal Agreement.
Bestemmelsen blev imidlertid først ophævet den 31. december 1989, efter at det franske konkurrenceråd havde påbudt det ved sin beslutning nr. 88-D-37 af 11. oktober 1988, hvis artikel 3 lyder således : »Det pålægges groupement inden den 31. december 1989 at ophæve den bestemmelse i protokollen af 31. juli 1984, hvorefter den uniforme eurocheque ikke længere kan udstedes med betalingsgaranti i Frankrig og for fremtiden kun kan udstedes til brug i udlandet·.
The anticompetitive object of the two provisions combined has been attained, judging by the annual rate of increase in the number of bank cards in France throughout the period during which the Helsinki Agreement was coupled with the provision in the Groupement's by-laws censured by the Conseil de la concurrence. The upshot is that at present nearly every French household has a bank card, 19,5 million CB cards having been issued in 1990, with the result that the risk to the Groupe ment of potential competition from Eurocheque in France has been virtually eliminated.
I lighed med den bestemmelse i protokollen af 1984, der blev ophævet af groupement fra den 31. december 1989 efter påbud fra det franske konkur renceråd, kan Helsinkiaftalen anses for ikke blot at have til formål, men også at have til følge, at hindre brugen af eurocheques i Frankrig ved at pålægge de franske handlende et gebyr for at modtage et betalingsmiddel som eurocheques, som det normalt var gratis for dem at indløse i henhold til Package Dealaftalen af 1980.
The figures which the Groupement furnished at the hearing show that this clause of the protocol had a lasting impact, contrary to what the Groupe ment stated at the hearing, where it claimed that it had been abolished in 1988 and that, despite that abolition, the number of French holders of Euro cheque cards had fallen in 1989.
At dømme efter væksten i antallet af bankkort i Frankrig i den periode, hvor Helsinkiaftalen blev anvendt sammen med den vedtægtsbestemmelse, som konkurrencerådet havde erklæret ulovlig, blev den dermed tilsigtede konkurrencebegrænsning opnået. Resultatet heraf er, at praktisk talt alle franske husholdninger nu er i besiddelse af et bankkort, eftersom der blev udstedt 19,5 millioner CB-kort i 1990, og groupe ment har dermed praktisk taget fjernet risikoen for potentiel konkurrence fra Eurocheques i Frankrig.
In fact, it was not until 31 December 1989 that the clause was deleted in response to an order by the French Conseil de la concurrence in its Decision No 88-D-37 of 11 October 1988, in which it is stated (Article 3 of the operative part) that : The Groupement is called upon to abolish before 31 December 1989 the stipulation in the protocol of 31 July 1984 to the effect that uniform Eurocheques will no longer be issued with a guarantee of payment in France and can continue to be issued only for use abroad'.
Det er derfor ukorrekt, når groupement under høringen har hævdet, at den pågældende bestemmelse blev ophævet i 1988, og antallet af franske udstedere af eurocheques alligevel var faldet i 1989.
The claim made by the Groupement at the hearing that the provision in question had been abolished in 1988 and that that abolition had not prevented the number of French drawers of Eurocheques from decreasing in France in 1989 was therefore false.
Der er tværtimod tale om parallelitet mellem bestemmelsens ikrafttræden den 1. juli 1986 og faldet i antallet af franske eurocheque-udstedere, der tidligere var steget betydeligt i løbet af 1985.
In the contrary, there is a direct link between the entry into force of the clause on 1 July 1986 and the fall in the number of French drawers of Eurocheques, which had increased appreciably in 1985.
Nr. L 95/63 groupement ; for hvis dette ikke var muligt tidligere, blev det muligt med Package Dealaftalen af 1980, men ikke med Helsinkiaftalen af 1983, der kun vedrørte nonbanking sektoren.
No L 95/63 the package deal Agreement. It is just as wrong to claim that the Helsinki Agreement afforded drawers the opportunity of withdrawing cash from 250 000 branches of the member banks of the Groupement : such an opportunity, if it did not previously exist, resulted from the 1980 package deal and not from the 1983 Helsinki Agreement, which concerned only the trading sector.
(69) eurocheques — endog en lidt mindre procentdel, for de franske handlende, der indløser udenlandske eurocheques, er ikke alle tilsluttet groupements kortsystem — aftalen kan derfor pi ingen mide være årsagen til, at Frankrig er det land, hvor der indløses flest eurocheques.
The Helsinki agreement, being concerned with only 15 % of the Eurocheques drawn — or even a slightly lower percentage as not all the French traders to whom foreign Eurocheques are made out are members of the Groupe ment's system of payment by card — cannot there fore in any way be the reason why France is the leading acceptor of Eurocheques.
Forklaringen skal snarere søges i Frankrigs mange turister fra de største eurochequeudstedende lande, der er opført i rækkefølge i den anden tabel i betragtning 14 ; af denne tabel fremgir det ogsi, at Frankrig ganske vist ligger pi førstepladsen med 15%, nir det drejer sig om indløsning af eurocheques, men kun ligger pi niendepladsen blandt de eurochequeudstedende lande, og kun tegner sig for 1 % af de eurocheques, der udstedes i udlandet Dette viser, at Frankrig generelt set ikke er noget udpræget euro-cheque-land, som det er tilfældet med Tyskland og Benelux.
The reason is, rather, to be found in the number of tourists in France coming from the largest Eurochequedrawing countries, whose ranking is given in the second table of recital 14, from which it can also be seen that France, which ranks first among accepting countries with 15 % of Eurocheques being drawn in France, ranks only ninth among Eurocheque-drawing countries, accounting for only 1 % of Eurocheques drawn abroad, which shows clearly that France is not, on the whole, a country which favours the Eurocheque system as do Germany and the Benelux countries.
Hvad de handlende angir, er det indlysende, at Helsinkiaftalen helt igennem har været en ulempe for dem, fordi den indebærer, at de skal betale et gebyr for hver udenlandsk eurocheque, de modtager som betaling, medens dette er gratis for de handlende i de øvrige medlemsstater ifølge Package Deal-aftalen.
With regard to traders, it is clear that the Helsinki Agreement works entirely to their disadvantage as it means they have to pay a commission on each foreign Eurocheque they receive in payment, whereas, for traders in the other Member States, the Eurocheque is free of charge by virtue of the 1980 package deal.
De franske handlende er siledes de eneste handlende i Fællesskabet, der skal betale et særligt gebyr for udenlandske eurocheques.
French traders are therefore the only traders in the Community who have to pay a specific commission on foreign Eurocheques.
Hvis ikke Helsinkiaftalen havde eksisteret, skulle de franske handlende ifølge Package Dealaftalen, som de franske banker havde under tegnet, ikke have betalt noget gebyr og kunne i si fald have haft tendens til at lægge pres pi de franske banker for at bremse udviklingen i betalinger med kort — der netop medfører et gebyr for den handlende — til fordel for eurocheques.
If it had not been for the Helsinki Agreement, French traders would, under the package deal Agreement, to which French banks were party, have had no commission to pay and might thus have tended to apply pressure on the French banking community to curb the development of payment by card — which, for its part, generates a commission payable by the trader — to the advantage of Eurocheques.
Den eneste kategori af brugere — hvis de kan betegnes således, idet der i det foreliggende tilfælde snarere er tale om mellemmænd — der har haft gavn af Helsinki-aftalen, er de franske banker, der således får betaling to gange for den samme ydelse, og som er de eneste banker i Fællesskabet, for hvem dette er tilfældet ; for det første modtager de betaling fra de franske handlende i kraft af Helsinkiaftalen og for det andet af de udenlandske banker (de eurocheque-udstedendes banker) i kraft af Package Deal-aftalen.
The only category of users — if they could be described as such, but they are, rather, intermediaries in the case in point — to benefit from the Helsinki Agreement is made up of French banks, who are thus paid twice for the same service and are the only banks in the Community to be so remunerated : firstly by French traders, as a result of the Helsinki Agreement, and secondly by foreign banks (the banks of the drawers of Eurocheques), as a result of the package deal Agreement.
De egentlige forbrugere opnår ingen fordele af Helsinki-aftalen, som tværtimod er til skade for dem : handlende skal betale et gebyr, selv om eurocheques burde være gratis for dem, og eurocheque-udstedere støder på vanskeligheder ved brug af deres eurocheques i Frankrig, enten fordi de handlende nægter at modtage dem, netop på grund af gebyret, eller fordi de vælter de gebyrer, de skal betale til banken, over på eurocheque-udstederne.
The true users do not, for their part, derive any benefit from the Helsinki Agreement, which, on the contrary, works to their detriment, whether they be traders, who have to pay a commission when the Eurocheque should be free of charge to them, or whether they be drawers, who have difficulty in using their Eurocheques in France, either because traders refuse them precisely because of the commission they have to pay, or because they pass on the drawer the costs which they, as traders, have to pay to their bank.
Den anden betingelse for anvendelse af artikel 85, stk. 3, der gir ud pi, at forbrugerne skal sikres en rimelig andel af fordelen, er ifølge groupement opfyldt for begge forbrugerkategorier, dvs. sivel eurocheque-indehaveme som de handlende. Aftalen har nemlig betydet, at »udenlandske inde havere af eurocheques har fiet nedsat omkostnin gerne ved brug af deres checks«, samt at »disse udenlandske brugere straks har fiet betydelige muligheder for at anvende deres eurocheques, fordi de kan hæve kontanter i over 250 000 filialer af de banker, der er medlemmer af groupement, samt foretage betalinger hos over 450 000 handlende, der er tilknyttet CB«.
In the opinion of the Groupement, the second condition for the application of Article 85 (3), namely that of allowing users a fair share of the resulting benefit, is fulfilled as far as the two cate gories of user, i.e. holders and traders, are concerned, because the agreement 'has enabled foreign holders of Eurocheques to benefit from a reduction in the costs incurred through using their cheques' and that 'such foreign holders have been afforded considerable opportunities for using their Eurocheques as they have acquired instantaneously the possibility of withdrawing cash from more than 250 000 branches of the member banks of the Groupement and of effecting payments on the premises of more than 450 000 CB-affiliated traders'.
Hvad de handlende angår, har de »i stor udstrækning draget fordel af, at eurocheques kan indløses i betalingskortsystemet«, samt »af den reklame, som groupement har gennemført hos de udenlandske checkudstedere«.
As to traders, they have 'amply benefited from the acceptance of Eurocheques by the system of payment by card', and 'from the advertising targeted at foreign holders' by the Groupement.
Når man påstår, at aftalen har betydet nedsatte udgifter for eurocheque-udstedere, glemmer man, at det i Package Dealaftalen af 1980, der blev undertegnet af de franske banker, er fastsat, at inde havere af eurocheques ikke skal betale for brugen af eurocheques i udlandet : når de franske banker, før eller efter Helsinki-aftalen, har opkrævet gebyrer hos eurocheque-indehavere, er det i strid med Package Deal-aftalen.
As far as the drawers of Eurocheques are concerned, to claim that the Agreement has enabled them to benefit from a reduction in the costs they incur is to forget that, under the terms of the 1980 package deal signed by the French banking community, holders were not to be billed for Eurocheques used abroad : if French banks charged holders a commission, either before or after the Helsinki Agreement, it was in violation of
Den tredje betingelse i artikel 85, stk. 3, nemlig at begrænsningerne er nødvendige, skulle ifølge groupement være opfyldt, fordi »systemet giver euro cheque-indehaveme mulighed for at bruge eurocheques i Frankrig pi de samme vilkir som i de øvrige lande, der er medlemmer af Eurocheque, og giver bankerne mulighed for at indløse euro-
According to the Groupement, the third condition of Article 85 (3), viz. the indispensable nature of the restrictions, is fulfilled because 'the system enables holders of Eurocheques to use them in France under the same conditions as in other member
cheques pi de samme vilkir, som gælder ved betaling med bankkort«, og desuden fordi Frankrigs geografiske beliggenhed gør det nødvendigt at forbedre mulighederne for, at turister fra landene nord for Frankrig kan bruge deres normale betalingsmiddel i Frankrig.
(75) countries of Eurocheque, and their banks to accept Eurocheques under the same conditions as bank cards', and also because the geographical situation of France requires that the use in France by tourists from northern Europe of their usual means of payment be facilitated.
Først mi det endnu en gang understreges, at det ikke er Helsinki-aftalen, der har gjort det muligt at anvende eurocheques i den franske nonbanking sektor, men Package Dealaftalen, der udtrykkeligt, i sin titel, vedrørte »åbning af nonbanking sektoren« ; det var slet ikke nævnt i den anmeldte aftale, at denne åbning ikke gjaldt for Frankrig.
First of all, it should be pointed out once more that it is not the Helsinki Agreement that has enabled Eurocheques to be used in the trading sector in France, but the package deal Agreement, which expressly concerns, as its very title indicates, 'the opening-up of the nonbanking sector' : there was no mention in the agreement notified to the Commission of France being excluded from this opening-up of the nonbanking sector.
Imidlertid er det ikke Helsinki-aftalen, der har givet eurocheque-indehaverne mulighed for at bruge deres checks i Frankrig pi de samme vilkir som i de øvrige medlemsstater ; dette var nemlig formilet med Package Deal-aftalen.
But it is not the Helsinki agreement that has enabled holders to use Eurocheques in France under the same conditions as in the other Member States : such was the purpose of the package deal Agreement.
Groupement fremfører, at begrænsningerne er nødvendige, fordi Helsinkiaftalen var den nødvendige betingelse for anvendelse af Package Dealaftalen inden for den franske nonbanking sektor ; men dette ræsonnement er uacceptabelt, eftersom Package Dealaftalen blev fritaget i 1984 på det grundlag, at eurocheques var gratis for modtageren.
(76) trading sector in France, this reasoning is unacceptable as the package deal agreement was exempted in 1984 on the ground that Eurocheques were free of charge to their payees.
Det er derfor fuldstændig forkert at betragte Helsinki-aftalen, der er en væsentlig undtagelse fra Package Dealaftalen, som en begrænsning der er nødvendig for at nå Package Deal-aftalens tilsigtede mål.
It is therefore quite contradictory to describe the Helsinki Agreement, which constitutes a major derogation from the package deal Agreement, as a restriction which is indispensable to the attainment of the objectives of the package deal Agreement.
Om konkurrencen udelukkes, kan vurderes ud fra forskellige aspekter.
As to the non-elimination of all competition, it can be assessed at several levels.