natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Durand (Cristalleries d'Arques) aftager årligt [. . .] tons.
Durand (Cristalleries d'Arques) has an annual offtake of [. . .] tonnes.
Indtil 1987 modtog Durand en rabat på 5% for mængder over [. . .] tons.
Up to 1987, Durand received a rebate of 5% for tonnage over [. . .] tonnes.
For 1988 omfattede ord ningen ikke blot et prisnedslag på 5 %, men også en yderligere rabat på 100 ffr. pr. ton ved køb af over [. . .] tons.
For 1988, the arrangement included not only the 5 % rebate but also a supplementary rebate of FF 100 per tonne on purchases over [. . .] tonnes.
For 1989 havde Solvay fastslået, at Durands samlede behov for soda ville ligge på [. . .]
For 1989 having ascertained that Durand's total requirements of soda-ash would be [. . .] tonnes, Solvay increased the
91 tons, og forhøjede sin rabat på mængder mellem [. . .] og [. . .] tons til 140 ffr. pr. ton og 175 ffr. for resten, dvs. mængder over [. . .] tons.
91 rebate on tonnages from [. . .] to FF 140 per tonne with FF 175 on the last tranche, i.e. anything over [· · ■]■
sarion ved at tilbyde en rabat pi [. ..] ffr. ([. . .] χ 231,25 ffr.).
(22) have to compensate the customer for moving its business by offering an inducement of FF [. ..] ([. . .] χ FF 231,25).
Hvis vi antager, at den anden leverandørs listepris ab fabrik er den samme som Solvays (1 125 ffr.), ville alle [. . .] mio. ffr. skulle fordeles pi leverancer til en listepris pi kun [. . .] ffr., dvs. at der skulle ydes en rabat pi over 20 %.
On the assumption that its ex-works list price is the same as Solvay's (FF 1 125), it would have to absorb the whole FF [. . .] million on business worth only FF (. . .] at list price, i.e. give an effective discount of over 20 %.
Perrier bruger ca. [. . .] tons soda om året og aftager hele denne mængde fra Solvay.
Perrier consumes around [. . .] tonnes of soda-ash per year, all purchased from Solvay.
I henhold til virksom­hedens »evergreen«­Ieveringsaftale fra 1981 er den forpligtet til at aftage [. . .] tons ± 10% fra Solvay.
Under its 'evergreen' supply contract dating from 1981, it is required to take [. . .] tonnes ± 10% from Solvay.
Fra 1987 modtog Perrier en rabat pi 4% pi basis­mængden, men hvis dens indkøb oversteg [. . .] tons, blev rabatten forhøjet til 4,75 % for hele den indkøbte mængde.
From 1987 onwards, Perrier received a basic 4 % tonnage rebate but if its offtake exceeded [. . .] tonnes, the rebate was increased to 4,75% on the whole of the tonnage purchased.
Hvis Perrier siledes henvender sig til en anden leverandør, nir det drejer sig om ekstramæng­den, dvs. mænder over [. . .] tons, skal den anden leverandør yde Perrier kompensation for den yderli­gere rabat pi 0,75 %, som Perrier mister på alle de [. . .] tons, den allerede har købt hos Solvay.
Thus if Perrier goes to another supplier for marginal tonnage i.e. anything over [. . .] tonnes, the second supplier would have to compensate it for the loss of the additional 0,75% rebate on the whole of the [. . .] tonnes already purchased from Solvay.
St. Gobain­koncernen, der driver omkring 30 glas­værker i Europa — i Frankrig, Tyskland, Italien, Spanien, Belgien og Portugal — er Solvays største kunde og aftog i 1988 over [. . .] tons soda.
The St Gobain group, which operates almost 30 glassworks across Europe — in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal — is Solvay's largest customer with purchases of over [. . .] tonnes of soda-ash in 1988.
St. Gobain fremstiller både planglas og emballageglas.
St Gobain produces both flat and container glass.
Af dens samlede sodaforbrug pi [. . .] tons i Vesteu­ropa (1988) leverede Solvay [. . .] % (1987: [­ ­ ­] %)­
Out of its total consumption of soda-ash in western Europe of [. . .] tonnes (1988) Solvay supplied [. . .] % (1987: [. . .] %).
Den faktiske pris pr. ton for de sidste [. . .] tons leveret fra Solvay ser siledes ud:
The effective price per tonne of the last [. . .] tonne tranche from Solvay is as follows:
Solvay er St. Gobains eneleverandør pi alle store nationale markeder uden for Frankrig, medens den er St. Gobains næststørste leverandør med 75 % i Fran­krig, hvor leverandøren traditionelt har været Rho­ne­Poulenc.
Solvay supplies 100% of St Gobain's requirements in all important national markets outside France where it is in the position of second supplier, 75% of St Gobain's requirement in that Member State having traditionally been supplied by Rhone-Poulenc.
Priser og andre vilkir forhandles pi nationalt plan mellem det lokale St. Gobain­dattersel­skab og Solvay DN i det pågældende land.
Prices and other conditions are negotiated at a national level between the local St Gobain subsidiary and the Solvay 'DN' in that country.
I de fleste tilfælde er leveringsaftalerne af ubestemt varighed (de såkaldte > cvergreen«­aftaler) og kan opsiges med en frist pi to ir. (I Italien findes der dog ingen formel aftale, og i Frankrig opsagde St. Gobain aftalen den 10. marts 1987 med 24 måneders varsel. Man var i gang med at forhandle nye betingelser pi det rids­punkt, hvor Kommissionen foretog kontrolundersø­gelser). — listepris ab fab­rik pr. ton:
(In Italy however there is no formal contract and for France, St Gobain terminated the agreement by giving 24 months' notice on 10 March 1987: new conditions were being negotiated at the date of the Commission's investigations.)
— prisen pr. ton leveret:
— Delivered price per tonne
Der er betydelige prisforskelle mellem de forskellige medlemsstater, men St. Gobain udnytter sin tilstede­værelse i flere lande til at mindske forskellene i Solvays priser (tilsyneladende til Solvays utilfredshed).
There are substantial price variations between the different Member States but St Gobain (to Solvay's apparent dissatisfaction) uses its presence in several countries to exercise downward pressure on Solvay's differential pricing.
— yderligere rabat:
— Additional rebate
I november 1982 blev der udarbejdet en hemmelig protokol (med virkning fra 1. januar 1983) om det særlige forhold mellem Solvay og St. Gobain­koncer­nen, der skulle give hinanden status som »mest begunstiget partner«.
A secret Protocol was concluded in November 1982 (effective 1 January 1983) to give expression to the special relationship between Solvay and the St Gobain group based on a reciprocated 'most-favoured partner' status.
I protokollens punkt 2 er der fastsat følgende:
By Clause 2 of the Protocol:
Solvays gennemsnitlige leveringspris pr. ton er meget højere, hvis den leverer alle [. . .] tons, nemlig 1 136 ffr.
Solvay's average delivered price per tonne if it supplies the whole [. . .] tonnes is much higher: FF 1 136.
En konkurrent, der ønsker at levere de sidste [.. .] tons, skal dog tilbyde en leveringspris pa 991,75 ffr. eller mindre.
A competitor wishing to supply the marginal [. . .] tonnes would however have to offer a delivered price of FF 991,75 or better.
En leverandør, som forsøger at fi kunden til at flytte sin handel, mi yde kompen­
The second supplier would
»Pi de europæiske markeder, undtagen Frankrig, skal St. Gobain fortsat give Solvay en fortinsstilling ril sodaleverancer pi mindst [. . .] tons om iret, beregnet pi grundlag af St. Gobains glasproduk­tion i 1981; i Frankrig skal St. Gobain gradvis
'On European markets other than France St Gobain will continue to give priority to Solvay for supplies of soda-ash, for quantities of at least [. . .] tonnes per annum, based on St Gobain's glass production in 1981; in France St Gobain will progressively increase purchases from Solvay to
De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende forøge sine indkøb hos Solvay, således at de når op på mellem [. . .] og [. . .] tons om året.«
No L152/27 bring them to the level of [. .] to [. . .] tonnes per annum.'
For soda til de samme anvendelsesformål i glasproduktionen skal St. Gobain ifølge en række bestemmelser betale de laveste priser, som Solvay tilbyder i hvert enkelt land, og desuden indeholder punkt 4 en bestemmelse om en særlig koncernrabat på St. Gobains samlede indkøb hos Solvay: ciel, aftale (den såkaldte »gentlemen's agreement«) med St. Gobains tyske datterselskab Vegla, om at denne kunde dækker hele sit behov for soda ved indkøb hos Solvay.
In addition to provisions under which St Gobain is to receive the lowest prices offered by Solvay in each country for comparable glassmaking usages, Clause 4 provides for a special group rebate on St Gobain's total purchases from Solvay: unofficial, arrangement (referred to as a 'gentleman's agreement') with Vegla, the German St Gobain subsidiary, by which it is understood that this customer takes all its requirements of soda-ash from Solvay.
Vegla-aftalen blev dog formelt benævnt »mængde«-aftale, formodentlig fordi man har skelet til EF's konkurrenceregler.
With an eye presumably on the letter of EEC competition rules, the Vegla agreement had however been formally expressed' as a 'tonnage' contract.
Ligesom de fleste af Solvays andre store kunder i Tyskland har Vegla en »evergreen«-aftale fra 1981, dvs. en aftale af 'ubestemt varighed, der kan opsiges med 24 måneders varsel.
Vegla, in common with most of Solvay's large customers in Germany, has an 'evergreen' contract dating from 1981, i.e. one of undetermined duration subject to termination on 24 months' notice.
De nøjagtige mængder fastsættes ved årlige forhandlinger.
The exact quantities are the subject of annual negotiation.
»Som led i denne protokol yder Solvay desuden St. Gobain en supplerende rabat på 1,5 % på St. Gobains samlede indkøb af soda hos Solvay i Europa.«
'Under this Protocol Solvay. further grants St Gobain an additional rebate of 1,5 % calculated on St Gobain's total soda-ash purchases from Solvay in Europe.'
Da en repræsentant for Vegla mindede DSW om, at Kommissionen i 1981 havde krævet, at Solvay ændre de sine eksklusive leveringsaftaler, reagerede DSW således:
When a Vegla representative reminded DSW that the Commission had in 1981 required Solvay to amend its exclusive supply agreements, DSW's reaction was:
»Vi — Vegla og DSW — var dog hele tiden enige om, at aftalen vedrørte virksomhedens samlede behov (uden Bergisch-Gladbach).«
'But we —r Vegla and DSW — have always worked on the understanding that the agreement related to the total requirements of the factories (except Bergisch-Gladbach).' '
• Hvis St. Gobain modtager konkurrerende tilbud, der er lavere end Solvays priser, og som gælder varige leverancer, skal de undersøges af parterne i fællesskab i begges interesse.
'Competing offers received by St Gobain at prices below Solvay's for longterm deliveries will be examined by the parties together in their mutual interest.
Hvis ikke der findes en løsning, som er acceptabel for begge parter, betragtes denne protokol som ugyldig.
If a solution acceptable to both parties cannot be agreed, this Protocol will cease to be valid.
Tilbud på spot- eller dumpingleverancer tages ikke i betragt ning.«
No account shall be taken of "spot" offers or offers at "dumping" prices.'
Den »superrabat«, der ydes St. Gobain, andrager ca. [. . .]—[. . .] mio. bfr. årligt.
The 'super group rebate' granted to St Gobain amounts to some BFrs [. . .] million annually.
Solvays interne dokumenter efterlader ringe tvivl om formålet med denne særaftale med St. Gobain:
The internal documentation of Solvay leaves little doubt about the purpose of this special arrangement with St Gobain:
Der er også meget, der tyder på, at DSW på et tidspunkt havde meddelt Vegla, at alle leverancer ville blive standset, medmindre virksomheden dækkede sit samlede behov ved køb hos Solvay. Et Solvay-notat fra et møde i Paris med ledere fra St. Gobain lyder således:
There are also strong indications that DSW had told Vegla at one time that unless it purchased its total consumption from Solvay, all supplies would be cut off: a Solvay note of a meeting in Paris with senior officials of St Gobain reads:
•— Det skal bemærkes, at »superrabatten« på 1,5 % til St. Gobain, som bidrager til at sikre denne koncerns loyalitet, ikke kan være et »absolut« våben (det er vanskeligt af hæve satsen på grund af EF-reglerne).
'— It should be noted that the SG "super group rebate" of 1,5 %, which helps to "tie in" the SG group, is not an "absolute" weapon (it being difficult to increase the amount owing to EEC rules).
Den forpligter især St. Gobain til at afsløre eventuelle større indkøb hos konkurrenter.«
In particular it requires SG to "come clean" if it buys significant quantities from competitors.'
». . . meddeler, at DSW ifølge SG/D (St. Gobain, Tyskland) skulle have fastsat en uacceptabel betingelse, nemlig at DSW skulle levere 100% til SG/D eller intet!«.
'He [. . .] points out that, according to SG/D [St Gobain/Germany] DSW has imposed an unacceptable condition: SG/D to buy 100% of requirements from DSW or DSW will not supply SG/D at all!'
DSW meddelte ved to lejligheder en repræsentant for St. Gobains tyske datterselskab Vegla, at den protokol, der var indgået mellem St. Gobain og Solvay i Bruxelles i praksis var en eksklusivaftale, selv om parterne af indlysende årsager ikke kunne fastslå dette skriftligt.
DSW frankly informed a representative of St Gobain's German subsidiary Vegla on two occasions that the protocol concluded between St Gobain and Solvay in Brussels was to all intents and purposes an exclusivity agreement even if for obvious reasons the parties could not actually say so in writing.
Formålet med aftalen skulle være at opretholde status quo, hvilket klart var en hentydning til Solvays stilling som eneleverandør. Den eneste meningsforskel mellem DSW og Solvays hovedkontor med hensyn til fortolkningen af aftalen var, at Solvay i Bruxelles tilsyneladende ikke mente, at St. Gobain i princippet var udelukket fra at handle på spotmarkedet. det.
The object of the agreement was said to be to maintain the status quo, clearly a reference to Solvay's position as exclusive supplier.
Eksklusivaftaler i Tyskland
Exclusivity arrangements in Germany
Bortset fra den hemmelige protokol med St. Goba-in-koncernen har DSW også en varig, om end uoffi-
Quite apart from the secret 'Protocol' with the St Gobain group, DSW also has a long-standing, if
Ud over loyalitetsbonus til en række store kunder i Frankrig blev Solvays stilling som eneleverandør
In addition to the fidelity rebates given to several major customers in France, the tie of exclusivity with
1981 insisterede Kommissionen på, at også disse aftaler blev ændret.
The Commission insisted in the course of the discussions with Solvay between 1980 and 1981 that these contracts would also have to be modified.
Ifølge nye aftaler, der blev indgået med de tre glasproducenter med virkning fra 1. januar 1983, skulle kunden aftage en bestemt mængde ± 15%.
New agreements were concluded with the' three glassmakers, effective from 1 January 1983, providing for the customer to take a specified tonnage ± 15%.
Der blev fastsat følgende mængder:
The tonnages stipulated were:
(Siden Verlipack kom i vanskeligheder og blev rekonstrueret i 1985, er virksomhedens forbrug blevet halveret, og den foretager nu sine indkøb i henhold til en årlig aftale).
(Since the failure of Verlipack and its restructuring in 1985 its annual consumption has halved and it now purchases under an annual contract.)
»Evergreen«-lcveringsaftalen med BSN af 18. juni 1981 forpligter BSN til årligt at aftage [. . .] tons ± 15% til sine glasfabrikker i Frankrig.
The 'evergreen' supply contract with BSN which dates from 18 June 1981 requires BSN to purchase from Solvay annually a quantity of [. . .] tonnes ± 15% for its glass factories in France.
BSN's samlede sodabehov fra 1982 til 1984 var i realiteten på ca. [. . .] tons og faldt fra 1985 til ca. [. . .] tons årligt.
BSN's total soda-ash requirement from 1982 to 1984 was in reality some [. . .] tonnes falling from 1985 onwards to around [.. .] tonnes annually.
Den mindstemængde, som BSN er forpligtet til at aftage fra Solvay i henhold til 1981-aftalen, er på[. . .] tons, dvs. næsten det samme som virksomhedens samlede behov.
The minimum tonnage which BSN is obliged to purchase from Solvay under the termsof the 1981 agreement is [. . .] tonnes, a tonnage which is not far short of its total requirements.
Aftalen er af ubestemt varighed og gælder fortsat i en periode på to år efter opsigelse fra en af parterne.
The contract is of indeterminate duration and continues for a period of two years after notice of termination either side.
Solvay har i praksis været eneleverandør af soda til BSN siden, 1982 og har årligt leveret ca. 98 % af BSN's behov.
Solvay has been the virtually exclusive supplier of soda-ash to BS since 1982, supplying each year some 98 % of its requirements.
Kunderne skal inden 1. november hvert år underrette Solvay om, hvor store mængder de påtænker at aftage det følgende år, og der findes særlige bestemmelser for det tilfælde, hvor kunden aftager mere eller mindre end den aftalte mængde.
Before 1 November of each year, the customer has to inform Solvay of the tonnages which it intends to take during the following year: there are also special provisions dealing with the eventuality of the customer taking more or less than the contractual tonnage.
Perrier: aftalt mængde [. .] tons ±10%: årligt behov siden 1982 ± [. . .] tons — hele mængden leveret af Solvay.
The supply contracts with a number of other major glassmaking customers in France — for example Perrier, Verrerie d'Albi — also require the customer to take a tonnage close to its actual requirements:
Verrerie D'Albi: aftalt mængde: [. . .] tons ± 5 000 tons; årligt behov siden 1982: [. . .] tons — hele mængden leveret af Solvay.
Perrier: contractual tonnage [. . .] tonnes ± 10%; annual requirements since 1982, ± [. . .] tonnes, all supplied by Solvay.
Også disse to aftaler har en opsigelsesfrist på to år.
Verrerie d'Albi: contractual tonnage [. . .] tonnes ± 5 000 tonnes; annual requirement since 1982, [. . .] tonnes, all supplied by Solvay.
I praksis lå de aftalte basismængder rimelig tæt på kundernes samlede årsforbrug på det pågældende tidspunkt.
In practice, the basic contractual tonnages were a reasonably close approximation of the total annual consumption of the customers at the time.
Siden 1983 har de tre kunder aftaget praktisk talt alt, hvad de skulle bruge hos Solvay ('). En undtagelse var dog de [. . .] tons, som St. Roch importerede i begyndelsen af 1988 i henhold til ordningen for aktiv forædling.
Since 1983 the three customers have in fact taken virtually all of their requirements from Solvay (')· An exception was the [. . .] tonnes imported by St Roch in early 1988 under inward-processing arrangements.
Der blev forhandlet indgående mellem Solvay og St. Gobain om disse mængder, der igen for 1989 blev leveret af Solvay.
This business was the subject of intensive negotiations between Solvay and St Gobain and has now been regained by Solvay for 1989.
Aftalerne med de belgiske glasproducenter
The Belgian glassmaker contracts
Uanset hvilke formelle instrukser Solvay gav DN i sin skrivelse af 19. februar 1981, er det klart, at der, i hvert fald hvad angår St. Roch, blev ført indgående drøftelser med kunden om dennes nøjagtige samlede behov, og hvorefter der fulgte et vellykket forsøg på at sikre kundens udtrykkelige tilsagn om a) at begrænse sine indkøb hos konkurrenten til 8 000 tons i 1988 og b) at bruge Solvay som eneleverandør i 1989.
It is clear that — whatever the formal instructions given by Solvay in its letter of 19 February 1981 to the 'DN' — there was, in the case of St Roch at least, detailed discussion with the customer regarding the exact tonnage of its total requirements, followed by a successful atempt to secure the customer's express agreement (a) to limit to 8 000 tonnes the volume which would be acquired in 1988 from the competing supplier and (b) to revert to Solvay completely for 1989.
Et andet eksempel på »mængdeaftaler« svarende til kundens forventede samlede behov er »Contrats Ver riers Belges« mellem Solvay og de tre største belgiske glasproducenter, St. Roch (St. Gobain-koncernen), Glaverbel og Verlipack.
Another example of 'tonnage' contracts for what is close to the customer's estimated total requirement is provided by the contracts concluded between Solvay and the three major Belgian glass producers St Roch (St Gobain 'group), Glaverbel and Verlipack.
Som Solvay anfører i et internt notat af 11. februar 1986, fastsættes den belgiske pris i praksis på grundlag af den pris, disse tre kunder betaler.
As Solvay states in an internal note of 11 February 1986 the Belgian price is effectively determined by the price to these three customers.
Indtil 1978 havde disse kunder allerede dækket næsten hele deres behov ved køb hos Solvay.
Up to 1978 these customers had always purchased almost all of their requirements from Solvay.
I januar samme år greb den belgiske regering ind og forhindrede de tre glasproducenter i at indgå en aftale med FMC om at købe betydelige mængder soda fra USA.
In January of that year the Belgian Government intervened to prevent the three glass producers from entering into a contract with FMC to purchase substantial quantities of soda-ash from the United States.
En række aftaler med mindre kunder indeholder ligeledes bestemmelser med det formål at binde kun derne til Solvay.
A number of contracts with smaller customers also contain clauses designed to secure the customer's tie to Solvay.
Den 7. februar 1978 blev der indgået aftale mellem de belgiske producenter og Solvay om, at de i en femårs periode skulle dække deres samlede behov ved køb hos Solvay. Under drøftelser med Solvay i 1980 og
(') Glaverbel (to Solvay's knowledge) has to purchase some [. . .] tonnes per annum from East Germany to offset its exports of glass to that country.
(') Glaverbel er n»dt til at kebc ca. [. . .] tons årligt fra Østtyskland til gengæld for sin glaseksport til dette land (Solvay har kendskab dertil). Bortset fra denne mængde får virksomheden udelukkende sine leverancer hos Solvay.
On 7 February 1978 agreements were signed between the Belgian glassmakers and Solvay under which they were required to purchase the totality of their requirements from Solvay for a period of five years.
Durobur i Soignies har siden 1983 aftaget ca. [. . .] tons årligt fra Solvay i henhold til årlige eller halvårlige leveringsaftaler.
Durobur of Soignies has since 1983 had a series of annual or biennial delivery contracts with Solvay with an annual offtake of some [. . .] tonnes.
hos Solvay, og at de nøjagtige mængder skal fastsættes ved årets begyndelse. Kunden er dermed aftalemæssigt forpligtet over for Solvay til at aftage en bestemt mindstemængde i en lang periode, og denne mængde kan i realiteten svare til kundens samlede behov (jf. f.eks. Vegla og Oberlandglas).
In Germany the supply agreements (most of which require 24 months' notice of termination) stipulate that the customer take a minimum tonnage from Solvay, the exact quantities having to be specified at the beginning of each year.
De aftaler, der blev indgået, indeholdt hver gang en klausul, som effektivt sikrede, at Durobur ikke skiftede leverandør ved aftaleperiodens udløb.
The contracts made on each occasion contained a clause which effectively ensured that Durobur does not change to another supplier at the end of the contractual period.
Ifølge aftalerne skal Solvay og Durobur holde møde ved periodens udløb for at forhandle om betingelserne i den næste aftale, ligesom aftalerne indeholder følgen de bestemmelse:
The agreements provide that Solvay and Durobur will meet at the end of the period to negotiate the conditions of the next contraa, and then stipulate:
»Før disse forhandlinger har fundet sted, giver Durobur ikke noget tilsagn med hensyn til sine sodaleverancer for (det følgende år).«
'Before these negotiations take place Durobur will not make any purchase commitment for soda-ash supplies for (the following year).'
Der findes tilsvarende bestemmelser i Solvays aftale med Pittsburg Corning (ca. [. . .] tons årligt).
Similar provisions appear in the Solvay contract with Pittsburg Corning (approximately [. . .] tonnes per year).
I så fald kan DSW ophæve aftalen omgående.«
From mid-1986 the agreements with Owens Corning ([. . .] tonnes per year) have provided expressly for an 'exceptional' rebate based on a total requirements contract: