natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det er desuden bemærkelsesværdigt, at ICI i juli 1986 fandt det nødvendigt at forklare Solvay, hvilke principper der lå til grund for dens udskillelse af Soda Ash Products som en særskilt virksomhed inden for ICI.
It is also significant that ICI considered it necessary to explain to Solvay in July 1986 the underlying principles of its formation of Soda Ash Products as a separate business within the ICI structure.
De fortsatte forbindelser mellem Solvay og ICI
The continuing Solvay-ICI relationship
Det er ICI's erklærede politik inden for sodasektoren at fastholde sin stilling som den dominerende og kontrollerende sodaleverandør i Det Forenede Kongerige. rige.
ICI's declared business strategy for soda-ash is to maintain its position as the dominant and controlling supplier of soda-ash in the United Kingdom.
Solvay og ICI har fortsat opretholdt nære forretningsforbindelser inden for sodasektoren.
Solvay and ICI have continued to maintain a close commercial relationship in the soda-ash sector.
Som de »traditionelt førende virksomheder inden for denne industri« i Europa er de begge interesserede i at bevare et stabilt marked.
As the 'traditional industry leaders' in Europe they share an interest in maintaining the stability of the market.
De to producenter har hyppigt haft kontakter og holdt møder for at drøfte spørgsmål af fælles interesse vedrørende sodamarkedet.
The two producers have maintained frequent contacts and meet each other to discuss matters of mutual concern in the soda-ash market.
Indtil midten af 1970'erne udvekslede de detaljerede oplysninger om deres produktionsomkostninger.
Up to the mid-1970s they exchanged detailed information on their production costs.
Det vides ikke, hvor regelmæssigt og hvor hyppigt møderne har
The precise regularity and frequency of the
De »mangeårige« forbindelser til Solvay er klart af væsentlig betydning i denne forbindelse.
The 'long-standing' relationship with Solvay is clearly of vital importance in this connection.
Det fremgår klart af ICl's dokumenter, at grundlaget for de fortsatte forbindelser med Solvay er en aftale om, at virksomhederne ikke vil konkurrere med hinanden.
It is made clear in ICI documents that the basis of the continuing relationship is a mutual abstention from competition. ICI was particularly anxious that this relationship
91 forpligtelser på sine traditionelle og langfristede markeder.
91 substantial tonnage of soda-ash from Solvay in order to meet medium- and longterm commitments in its traditional markets.
Det var ICI magtpåliggende, at disse forbindelser ikke blev bragt i fare. Et dokument vedrørende en eventuel ændring i ICI's sodapolitik (et forslag, der kunne have ændret status quo, og som ikke blev vedtaget) inde holder følgende spørgsmål: »Hvorledes vil Solvay se på dette?
should not be put at risk.
Vil Solvay fortsat mene, at der ikke er tale om konkurrence fra Det Forenede Kongeriges side?« Solvays forretningspolitik for Det Forenede Kongerige beskrives som »godartet«.
Will they continue to see no United Kingdom competition?' The policy of Solvay itself in relation to the United Kindom is described as 'benign'.
I andre dokumenter fra 1988 betragter ICI sine nuværende forbindelser med Solvay ud fra historiske værdier, som går helt tilbage til Brunner-Mond:
In other documents dating from 1988 ICI perceives its present relationship with Solvay in terms of historical values dating from the 'Brunner, Mond' days:
Disse aftaler om køb med henblik på videresalg (purchase for resale eller »PFR«) blev indgået, efter at ICI havde lukket sit anlæg i Wallerscote i 1984.
These arrangements — referred to as 'purchase for resale' or 'PFR' — followed ICI's closure of its Wallerscote works in 1984.
Kapacitetsnedskæringen betød, at ICI i flere år var ude af stand til at dække hele den indenlandske efterspørgsel i Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland og til fortsat at levere til sit største eksportmarked i Sydafrika.
The reduction in capacity meant that for several years ICI was unable to meet the whole domestic demand in the United Kingdom and Ireland, let alone continue to supply its major export market in South Africa.
Da det var et af grundprincipperne i ICI's forretningspolitik at fastholde kontrollen med markedet i Det Forenede Kongerige, var virksomheden ikke indstillet på at lade nogen anden producent levere de resterende mængder på dens hjemmemarked eller tillade, at kunderne begyndte at importere direkte.
One of the basic tenets of ICI's commercial policy being the maintenance of its control over the United Kingdom market, it was prepared neither to see any other producer take up the shortfall on its home market nor to allow customers to begin importing directly themselves.
»Vore forbindelser med Solvay er af væsentlig betydning for mængder, priser og begrænsning af andre producenters adgang til vort marked.
'Our relationship with Solvay is crucial as to volume, price and "limiting the intrusion of others into our market".
For bindelserne styres i vidt omfang af historiske værdier, som går tilbage til Brunncr-Mond-
Relationship/behaviour is largely determined by historical values associated with the Brunner, Mond era.'
1 flere år har ICI købt betydelige mængder hos Solvay med henblik på videresalg til britiske kunder (som tilsyneladende ikke vidste, hvor produkterne stammede fra).
For several years ICI purchased substantial tonnages from Solvay for resale to United Kingdom customers (who were not apparently aware of the origin of the material):
Af et andet notat, Kommissionen fandt hos ICI, fremgår det, at Solvay »betragter SAP (') som arvtagere til Brunner-Monds stilling«.
Another note found at ICI states that Solvay 'view SAPO as the inheritors of the Brunner, Mond position'.
Solvay er også ICI's hovedleverandør af soda til Sydafrika, idet ICI ikke selv fremstiller de produkter, den sælger på dette marked.
Solvay is also the principal source of soda-ash sold in South Africa by ICI, which does not itself procedure any of the material it sells in that market.
1989 (6 mdr.)
1989 (six months)
I forbindelse med de mangeårige forbindelser med Solvay omtaltes også behovet for at aflægge Solvay en »høflighcdsvisit«, før man traf de pågældende foran staltninger.
There war also a reference to the need in the context of the 'long-standing relationship' with Solvay to pay a 'courtesy call' on Solvay before taking the step under discussion.
Under den mundtlige høring indrømmede en ledende medarbejder (the Business Manager) hos ICI Soda Ash Products, at han vidste, at Page 1 000 eksisterede, selv om han dog aldrig havde set den.
During the oral hearing, the Business Manager of ICI Soda Ash Products, while asserting that he had never seen 'Page 1000', admitted that he knew of its existence.
Han fremførte ligeledes, at »de tidligere traditioner i forbindelse med Brunner-Mond« var noget, ICI måtte overveje, og at Solvay som den største europæiske producent ville blive »bekymret«, hvis ICI omstrukturerede sin soda virksomhed, hvorfor det var nødven digt at underrette Solvay på forhånd.
He also stated that the 'traditions which existed in the past with Brunner, Mond' were something which ICI had to consider and that Solvay as the major European producer would have 'concerns' if the structure of ICI's soda-ash business were to be changed, hence the need to inform Solvay in advance.
Det fremgår klart af et notat af 17. september 1982 fra ICI, at PFR-ordningerne har haft væsentlig betydning for den skarpe opdeling mellem Solvays og ICI's respektive »indflydelsessfærer«.
The vital significance of the PFR arrangements in terms of maintaining the rigid division between Solvay's and ICI's respective 'spheres of influence' is apparent from an ICI memorandum of 17 September 1982.
Man mente, at en så kraftig kapacitetsnedskæring, at ICI ikke længere kunne dække efterspørgslen i hele Det Forenede Kongerige, uvægerligt ville medforc en ændring i både kundernes og andre producenters holdning.
Capacity reduction to a point where ICI could not cover United Kingdom demand was seen as bound to lead to a change in the perceptions both of customers and other producers.
ICI var stærkt interesseret i at opretholde sin kontrol med det britiske marked og rydde den opfattelse af vejen, at dets »suverænitet« var blevet svækket ved den plan lagte kapacitetsnedskæring. Underoverskriften »markedskontrol« står der videre i notatet:
ICI's concern was to maintain its control over the United Kingdom market and prevent any perception that its 'sovereignty' had been weakened by the planned capacity reduction.
Det indgik som et vigtigt led i det tætte samarbejde mellem ICI og Solvay, at ICI indkøbte betydelige mængder soda fra Solvay for at indfri sine mellem-
An important aspea of the close ICI-Solvay relationship was ICI's practice of purchasing
»Mulighederne kunne udnyttes, således at kapacitetsnedskæringen »forvaltes« på en sådan måde, at markcdskontrollcn opretholdes.
'Opportunities could be developed to "manage" capacity reduction in such a way as to maintain market control.
F.cks. kunne der indgås en PFR-aftale (om køb med henblik på videresalg) med en andenproducent for at dække underskuddet, eller der kunne indgås aftale om leverancer til eksportmarkederne, såsom Sydafrika, til gengæld for en ordentlig opførsel på det britiske marked.«
For example, a purchase for resale (PFR) deal might be struck with a co-producer to meet the deficit or export markets such as South Africa might be traded off against the expectation of orderly behaviour in the United Kingdom.'
På baggrund af ovennævnte dokument er det indlysende, hvilken betydning PFR-ordningerne med Solvay har haft.
Judged in the light of the above document, the importance of the PFR arrangements with Solvay becomes clear.
Man har opretholdt »status quo« (navnlig at ICI indtager en dominerende stilling på sit britiske »hjemmemarked« og at Solvay har afholdt sig fra dette marked), medens Solvay til gengæld har haft en kommerciel fordel ved de betydelige PFR-leveran-cer til ICI på længere sigt.
The 'status quo' (in particular ICI's dominance of, and Solvay's abstention from, its United Kingdom 'home market') is maintained while in return Solvay under the 'trade off has the commercial benefit of substantial PFR sales to ICI on a longterm basis.
Årsagerne til den fonsatte markedsdeling mellem Solvay og ICI inden for soda siges at være rent kommercielle.
The reasons for the continuing separation oí markets as between Solvay and ICI in soda-ash are said to be purely commercial considerations.
Det er vigtigt (siges det), at producen terne hver især koncentrerer deres afsætning om deres naturlige »hjemmemarked«, hvor de har en indlysende konkurrencemæssig fordel.
It makes sense (it is said) for each producer to concentrate its sales on its natural 'home market' within which it has a natural competitive advantage.
Transportomkostningerne for soda er forholdsvis store i forhold til den endelige salgspris, og denne faktor, kombineret med kundernes præferencer for en lokal leverandør og dermed langfristet forsyningssikkerhed, har ført til en naturlig opdeling af markederne efter geografiske skel.
Transport costs for soda-ash are relatively high in relation to the final selling price, and this factor, combined with customer preference for a local source with longterm security of supply, has led to a natural separation of markets along geographical lines.
Hvad Det Forenede Kongerige angår bidrager det til at isolere markedet, at import og eksport skal foregå med skib.
In the case of the United Kingdom in particular the requirement for a sea-crossing accounts for the insulation of the market in both directions.
Efter Kommissionens beslutning 85/74/EØF (') mod Solvay vedrørende peroxygen har Solvay tilsyneladende været »særdeles følsom med hensyn til markedets opfattelse af samarbejde mellem kemiske producen ter, herunder PFR-ordningerne« (ICI's notat af 15. februar 1985).
For its part Solvay appears, following Commission Decision 85/74/EEC(') 'Peroxides', to have been 'acutely sensitive to the perceptions of the marketplace to any business relationship between chemical producers', including PFR arrangements (ICI note of 15 February 1985).
Ifølge dette notat var Solvay generelt tilbageholdende med at levere ICI direkte på mar keder, hvor begge producenter var til stede, eller hvor den pågældende kunde indgik i en koncern af europæisk dimension.
According to this note, Solvay was in general reluctant to supply on a direct basis to ICI either to markets where both producers were present or where the customer in question was a division of a pan-European group.
Solvay var dog indstillet på en række »kompromisser« eller »undtagelser«, navnlig hvad angår markeder som Sydafrika og Irland, hvor Solvay ikke selv havde nogen salgsorganisation. nisation.
Solvay was however prepared to make a number of 'compromises' or 'exceptions' particularly as regards markets such as South Africa and Ireland where it had no sales structure itself.
Siden 1980 har prisen på soda i Det Forenede Kongerige været højere end i de øvrige vesteuropæiske lande.
Since 1980 the price of soda-ash in the United Kingdom has been higher than in continental western Europe.
Det ville være absurd (siger ICI), hvis virksom heden skulle udbyde sit produkt på de andre vesteuropæiske markeder, hvor markedsprisen er lavere, og hvor den desuden skulle forlange en lavere pris end en eksisterende leverandør.
It would be absurd (says ICI) for it to offer the product to customers in continental western Europe markets where not only is the market price lower but it would have to undercut the existing supplier.
Omkostningerne ved trans port fra Det Forenede Kongerige ville være urimelig høje, og som støtte for denne påstand har ICI fremlagt fragttabeller, hvor transportomkostningerne (ad landevej) til Nordfrankrig anslås til omkring 40 £/ton, næsten 40% af nettosalgsprisen.
The transport costs from the United Kingdom would be prohibitive: in support of this proposition ICI has provided freight tables in which the cost of road transport to northern France is estimated at some £40/tonne, almost 40% of the net selling price.
(Under den mundtlige høring erkendte ICI, at disse omkostninger ville blive halveret, hvis der blev etableret et lager i Frankrig, som fik forsyninger med coaster.)
(During the oral hearing however ICI admitted that this cost would be halved if a depot were established in France and supplied by coaster.)
Selv om ICI nok oprindeligt indgik disse ordninger med Solvay for at løse en række kortfristede produktionsproblemer, må det hurtigt være gået op for Solvay, at ordningerne havde til formål at befæste ICI's stilling i bestemte lande på længere sigt og derved bevare de to koncerners markedsopdeling.
Although ICI seems originally to have presented these arrangements to SoWay as intended simply to overcome short-term production problems, it must soon have been apparent to Solvay that their purpose was to support ICI's longterm position in particular countries and thereby preserve the existing separation of markets between the two groups.
Desuden påpeger ICI og Solvay risikoen for »gengæld«, når en virksomhed begynder at konkurrere på en andens marked.
Neither Solvay nor ICI dispute (a) that in the Community there is little or no competition between them, (b) that in each case this phenomenon is the result of a considered and conscious decision by management.
Hverken Solvay eller ICI benægter, a) at konkurren cen mellem dem i EF er beskeden, hvis der overhovedet er nogen, b) at dette i hvert enkelt tilfælde skyldes en velovervejet og bevidst beslutning fra ledelsens side.
In addition ICI and Solvay point to the risk of 'retaliation' in the event of a competitive incursion by one into the market of the other.
hinandens hjemmemarkeder s.0es derfor at være bevidstheden om, at noget sådant ville medføre en priskrig, som ingen af dem ville have gavn af.
The reason the two producers do not aggressively market in each other's home markets is thus said to be an awareness that such an exercise would generate a price war from which neither would gain.
De hævder dog begge, at deres respektive beslutninger om ikke at konkurrere med hinanden blev truffet uafhængigt ud fra rent kommercielle betragtninger og uden nogen form for aftale eller samråd.
They both assert however that their respective decisions not to compete were reached independently by each undertaking on purely commercial considerations and without any element of collusion or concertation.
Ifølge ICI og Solvay er deres egne udsagn uafhængige af hinanden.
According to ICI and Solvay, theirs is purely an 'arm's-length' relationship.
Medens ICI understreger, at deres møder kun vedrørte lovlige forhold, erkender Solvay dog, at ledende medarbejdere fra begge virksomheder under tiden har forsøgt at gå endnu længere og indhente oplysninger af mere fortrolig karakter, men at dette ikke skulle kunne betragtes som samordning.
While ICI insists that their meetings were concerned only with legitimate matters, Solvay does however acknowledge that on occasions executives on both sides may have attempted to go further and obtain information of a more confidential nature but this, it is said, does not point to concertation.
ICI's økonomiske undersøgelse
The economic survey produced by ICI
Ifølge ICI og Solvay blev ophævelsen af Page 1 000-aftalen i 1972 foretaget i god tro og var blot en formel erkendelse af, at aftalerne ikke havde været anvendt siden 1962.
According to ICI and Solvay, the cancellation of the 'Page 1000' agreement in 1972 was made in complete good faith and indeed was no more than a formal recognition that the arrangments had been a dead letter since 1962.
Der var derfor ikke tale om, at de fortsatte med at anvende de gamle aftaler om markedsdeling, der gik tilbage til Brunner-Mond-æraen.
There was therefore no question of their continuing to respect in practice the spirit of the old market allocation agreements dating back to the 'Brunner, Mond' era.
ICI hævder, at konkurrencen inden for kaustisk soda mellem Solvay og ICI viser, at Page 1 000 slet ikke anvendes længere.
ICI claims that the competition in the caustic-soda sector between Solvay and ICI shows that 'Page 1000' has no longer any application whatever.
En økonomisk ekspert, der af ICI havde fået til opgave at udarbejde en rapport med henblik på Kommissio-
An economics expert commissioned by ICI to produce a report for the purposes of the proceedings concluded
91 gensidig anerkendelse af deres eksklusive indflydelsessfære eller virkeområde.
91 the two producers and based on the mutual recognition of each other's exclusive sphere of influence or zone of operations.
Det argument, at det skyldes individuelle kommerciel le beslutninger, at de afholder sig fra at trænge ind på hinandens markeder, ville være mere overbevisende, hvis der aldrig havde været indgået nogen aftale mellem dem.
The argument that their policy of mutual abstention in the market is the result of 'individual business judgment' might be more persuasive had there never been any agreement between them.
Dette er ikke et tilfælde, hvor to store konkurrenter har stoppet kampen og uafhængigt af hinanden har fastslået, at den intensive rivalisering ikke indebærer nogen fordel for nogen af dem.
This is not a case where two large competitors had fought each other to a standstill and had entirely without any contact decided that intensive rivalry brought no benefit to either one.
Hvis markedsopdelingen udelukkende skulle være en følge af naturlige konkurrencemæssige og geografiske vilkår, er der aldrig givet nogen tilfredsstillende forklaring på, hvorfor de to producenter skulle have fundet det nødvendigt at indgå aftaler som 'Alkali Cartel og Page 1 000.
It has never been satisfactorily explained why, if the division of markets is entirely the result of natural competitive and geographic conditions, the two producers should ever have thought it necessary to conclude agreements such as the 'Alkali Cartel' and 'Page 1000'.
inden for en industri forventer, at andre virksomheder vil opretholde produktionen, uanset hvilke ændringer den enkelte virksomhed foretager (').
This market equilibrium is explained by reference to the 'Cournot' model which is characterized by the expectation of undertakings in an industry that other undertakings will maintain output whatever change the individual makes (').
ICI forsøgte også at forklare den oligopolitiske adfærd inden for denne industri under henvisning til spilteorien (2).
ICI also sought to explain oligopolistic behaviour in the industry in terms of the 'theory of games' (2).
Ifølge ICI skyldes den usmidige markedsstruktur »non-cooperative game«, hvor hver producent erkender risikoen for gengæld og forsøger at undgå, at denne risiko bliver en realitet, ved at opretholde en stabil markedsstilling.
According to ICI the rigidity of the market is the result of a 'non-cooperative game' in which each producer recognizes the risk of retaliation and to avoid the risk becoming a reality tries to maintain a stable market position.
Den »alternative løsning«, nemlig at avancerne kunne forbedres yderligere, hvis virksomhederne handlede i fællesskab som et monopol, afviser ICI med, a) at det ikke ville være muligt inden for en industri med afsætningsnedgang, b) at de potentielle fordele derved ikke var tilstrækkelige til at overvinde de vanskeligheder, der var forbundet med samarbejdet.
The 'alternative solution' in theory that margins could be improved still further by the undertakings acting together as a monopolist, is dismissed by ICI on the grounds that (a) it would not work in an industry with falling sales, and (b) the potential rewards were not sufficient to overcome the difficulties involved in cooperation.
En teoretisk model er dog ikke mere værd end de oplysninger, den bruges til at analysere.
A theoretical model is however only as useful as the information it is used to analyse.
Den økonomiske ekspert indrømmede under den mundtlige høring, at hun ikke havde set det bevis materiale, der var vedlagt som bilag til meddelelsen af klagepunkter. I betragtning af hvad der udtrykkeligt
The economics expert admitted during the oral hearing that she had not even seen the documentary evidence annexed to the statement of objections.
(47) er anført i Page 1 000, er det fuldstændig urimeligt at forklare den historiske markedsdeling som »non-cooperative game«.
Given the express terms of 'Page 1000', it is wholly inapt to explain the historical separation of markets in terms of a 'non-collaborative game'.
Hun havde heller ikke kendskab til det materiale, der viste, at ICI og Solvay havde konsulteret hinanden for at mindske usikkerheden med hensyn til deres reaktion på den anden parts adfærd, hvilket ikke er i overensstemmelse med ovennævnte teori »non-cooperative game«.
Similarly the documentary evidence of consultation between ICI and Solvay so as to reduce uncertainty as to their responses to the other's behaviour, which is inconsistent with the theory of 'non-collaboration', was also ignored.
Rapporten konkluderer, at industriens struktur og producen ternes adfærd skyldes en strategi om ikke at samarbejde, og denne konklusion var dermed draget uden hensyn til det relevante bevismateriale.
The conclusion of the report that the structure of the industry and the conduct of the producers was referable to a non-collaborative strategy was thus reached without consideration of the relevant evidence.
Hvad soda angår er Solvays og ICI's erklæringer fra 1945 vedrørende deres forretningspolitik over for hinanden (i Page 1 000) en korrekt beskrivelse af den politik, de har ført, indtil Kommissionen indledte proceduren i denne sag.
As far as soda-ash is concerned the statements by Solvay and ICI in 'Page 1000' of their commercial policy vis-à-vis the other in 1945 remained an accurate description of their policy up to the date of the present proceedings.
Ingen af dem konkurrerede på den andens »hjemmemarked«, og dette skete i forventning om, at den anden ville føre samme polttik.
Neither competed on the 'home market' of the other and each did so in the expectation that the other would apply the same policy.