natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Begrebet 'det indledende processkrift i sagen' omfatter et dokument som betalingspålægget (Zahlungsbefehl) i tysk ret, hvis forkyndelse efter domsstatens lovgivning giver fordringshaveren mulighed for, såfremt skyldneren intet foretager sig, at opnå en retsafgørelse, der kan anerkendes og fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionens bestemmelser.
The words 'the document which instituted the proceedings' cover any document, such as the order for payment [Zahlungsbefehl] in German law, service of which enables the plaintiff, under the law of the State of the court in which the judgment was given to obtain, in default of appropriate action taken by the de fendant, a decision capable of being recognized and enforced under the provisions of the Convention.
En retsafgørelse som et efter tysk ret afsagt fuldbyrdelsesdekret (Vollstrekkungsbefehl), der afsiges efter forkyndelsen af betalingspålægget, og som kan fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen, er ikke omfattet af begrebet 'det indledende processkrift i sagen'.
A decision such as the enforcement order [Vollstreckungsbefehl] in German law, which is issued after service of the order for payment has been effected and which is enforceable under the Convention, is not covered by the words 'the document which instituted the proceedings'.
Ved afgørelsen af, om sagsøgte har kunnet varetage sine interesser i artikel 27, nr. 2's forstand, skal domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten udelukkende tage hensyn til den frist — som den, der i tysk ret gælder for at rejse indsigelse (Widerspruch) — som sagsøgte har til rådighed for at undgå, at der træffes en udeblivelsesafgørelse, der kan fuldbyrdes på grundlag af konventionen.
In order to determine whether the defendant has been enabled to arrange for his defence as required by Article 27, point 2, the court in which enforcement is sought must take account only of the time, such as that allowed under German law for submitting an objection [Widerspruch] to the order for payment, available to the defendant for the purposes of preventing the issue of a judgment in default which is enforceable under the Convention.
Artikel 27, nr. 2, finder også anvendelse, når sagsøgte har begæret genoptagelse af den under en udeblivelsessag trufne afgørelse, og en ret i domsstaten har afvist begæringen med den begrundelse, at fristen for denne var overskredet.
Article 27, point 2, remains applicable where the defendant has lodged an ob jection against the decision given in default and a court of the State in which the judgment was given has held the objection to be inadmissible on the ground that the time for lodging an objection has expired.
Selv hvis en ret i domsstaten efter en særskilt kontradiktorisk procedure herom har fundet, at forkyndelsen eller meddelelsen er sket forskriftsmæssigt, kræver artikel 27, nr. 2, at domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten fo retager en prøvelse af, om forkyndelsen eller meddelelsen er sket i så god tid, at sagsøgte har kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen.
Even if a court of the State in which the judgment was given has held, in separate adversary proceedings, that service was duly effected Article 27, point 2, still requires the court in which enforcement is sought to examine whether service was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence.
Domstolen i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten kan i almindelighed ind skrænke sig til at efterprøve, om fristen, regnet fra det tidspunkt, da forkyndelsen eller meddelelsen er sket forskriftsmæssigt, har givet sagsøgte tilstrækkelig tid til at varetage sine interesser under sagen ; dog kan retten tage stilling til, om der i den konkrete sag foreligger sådanne ganske særlige omstændigheder, at en for kyndelse, selv om den er sket forskriftsmæssigt, ikke har været tilstrækkelig til, at fristen kan regnes fra det nævnte tidspunkt.
The court in which enforcement is sought may as a general rule confine itself to examining whether the period, reckoned from the date on which service was duly effected, allowed the defendant sufficient time for his defence. It must, how ever, consider whether, in a particular case, there are exceptional circumstances such as the fact that, although service was duly effected, it was inadequate for the purposes of causing that time to begin to run.
1-27.2 - A 1 fortsat 8)
(continued 8)
Konventionens artikel 52 og den omstændighed, at retten i anerkendelses- og fuldbyrdelsesstaten når til det resultat, at sagsøgte efter denne stats lovgivning havde bopæl på statens område, da det indledende processkrift i sagen blev for kyndt eller meddelt, har ikke indvirkning på de ovenfor givne svar.«
Article 52 of the Convention and the fact that the court of the State in which enforcement is sought concluded that under the law of that State the defendant was habitually resident within its territory at the date of service of the document which instituted the proceedings do not affect the replies given above."
I tilslutning til denne dom gav Hoge Raad kassationsappellanten medhold og ophævede den af Arrondissementsrechtbank Roermond den 20. september 1979 afsagte dom, for så vidt som denne stadfæstede den kendelse, der var afsagt af Arrondissementsrechtbank's præsident om tilladelse til fuldbyrdelse af det tyske betalingspålæg og det dertil hørende fuldbyrdelsesdekret (Hoge Raad, dom af 17.9. 1982, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983, nr. 306).
Following this judgment the Hoge Raad allowed the appeal and quashed the judgment of the Arrondissementsrechtbank, Roermond, of 20 September 1979 in so far as it had dismissed the debtor's appeal against the decision authorizing enforcement of the German order for payment and the related enforcement order (Hoge Raad, judgment of 17 September 1982, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1983, No 306).
Arrondissementsrechtbank havde ikke taget stilling til, om betalingspålægget var blevet forkyndt for eller meddelt skyldneren og kassationsappellanten i så god tid, at han kunne have varetaget sine interesser under sagen, og konventionens artikel 27, nr. 2, var således blevet tilsidesat.
The Hoge Raad held that the Arrondissementsrechtbank had failed to ascertain whether the order for pay ment had been served on the debtor and appellant in cassation in sufficient time to al low him to arrange for his defence, thereby infringing Article 27 (2) of the Convention.
Hoge Raad henviste sagen til Gerechtshof 's-Hertogenbosch til videre forhandling og afgørelse og udtalte i denne forbindelse, at retten ved prøvelsen af, om betalingspålægget var blevet forkyndt eller meddelt rettidigt, både skulle tage hensyn til Domstolens afgørelse og parternes indlæg, idet der skulle gives disse lejlighed til at tage stilling til Domstolens fortolkning af artikel 27, nr.2.
The Hoge Raad referred the case for further proceedings and decision to the Gerechtshof, 's-Hertogenbosch, and held that in deciding whether the order for payment had been served in sufficient time that court must consider both the decision of the Court of Justice and the submissions of the parties, who must be afforded an opportunity of stating their views on the Court of Justice's interpretation of Article 27 (2).
(Jfr. også 1­27.1 ­ B 2, 3, 4, 6; 1­27.3 ­ B 1)
(See also 1-27.1 - Β 2, 3, 4, 6; 1-27.3 - Β 1)
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) — retti­digforkyndelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 27, nr. 2) — meddelelse om udmeldelse af sagkyndig samt om afholdelse af syns­ og skønsforretning to dage før den herfor berammede dato — ikke rettidig i artikel 27, nr. 2's forstand
Enforcement — Judgment given in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — Service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the proceedings (Article 27(2)) — Notice of the appointment of an expert and of a site inspection two days before it was due to take place — Insufficient time within the meaning of Article 27
Den i Nederlandene bosatte sagsøgte var ved udeblivelsesdom, afsagt af fredsdommeren i Mol (Belgien), blevet pålagt at betale erstatning for skade, som vilde kaniner havde for­voldt på sagsøgerens jagtterræn.
By a judgment given in default by the Vrederechter in Mol (Belgium) the defendant, who was resident in the Netherlands, was ordered to pay compensation for damage caused by wild rabbits in the plaintiffs hunting-grounds.
Arrondissementsrechtbank anførte, at det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke var ble­vet forkyndt for sagsøgte i så god tid, at han havde kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen, hvorfor det var udelukket at fuldbyrde udeblivelsesdommen efter domskonven­tionen, jfr. dennes artikel 34, stk. 2, og artikel 27, nr. 2.
In the view of the Arrondissementsrechtbank, the document which instituted the pro­ceedings was not served on the defendant in sufficient time for him to be able to arrange for his defence and consequently enforcement of the judgment given in default was ex­cluded by the second paragraph of Article 34 and Article 27 (2) of the Brussels Conven­tion.
Dette fulgte af, at sagens tyngdepunkt måtte an­tages at være syns­ og skønsforretningen.
This was because the proceedings turned on the site inspection.
I henhold til artikel 7a, stk. 3, i den belgiske jagtlov — på hvilken retssagen beroede — skulle parterne fremføre samtlige søgsmåls­grunde og indsigelser senest under syns­ og skønsforretningen.
Under the third paragraph of Article 7 bis of the Belgian hunting law on which the proceedings were based, the parties were bound to present their whole claims and defences no later than the time of the site inspection.
Bortset fra, at sagsøgte først modtog det anbefalede brev i september 1973, var fristen mellem telegrammets af­sendelse den 8. august og syns­ og skønsforretningen den 10. august 1973 for kort til, at sagsøgte havde kunnet varetage sine interesser på forskriftsmæssig vis.
Apart from the fact that the defendant received the registered letter only in September 1973, the period between the dispatch of the telegram on 8 August and the site inspection on 10 August 1973 was too short for a proper de­fence.
Fuldbyrdelse — eksigibel afgørelse — arrestdekret — retsafgørelse i konventionens for­stand (artikel 25) — hindringer for anerkendelse, som udelukker fuldbyrdelsespåtegning (artikel 34, stk. 2) — bevis for forskriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse eller meddelelse (arti­kel 27, nr. 2) — ikke påkrævet ved fuldbyrdelsespåtegning på et arrestdekret
Enforcement — Enforceable judgment — "Arrestbefehl" [Order for attachment in security of a claim] — Judgment within the meaning of the Convention (Article 25) — Reasons for refusing recognition which prevent the issue of an order for enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — Proof of due service in sufficient time (Article 27 (2)) — Not necessary in the case of an order for the enforcement of an "Arrestbefehl"
Landgericht efterprøvede og svarede bekræftende på spørgsmålet, om også arrest — der var en »retsafgørelse« i konventionens artikel 25's forstand — faldt ind under konven­tionens anvendelsesområde.
The Landgericht considered first the question whether an "Arrestbefehl" [order for the attachment of property in security of a claim pendente lite], which was said to be a judg­ment within the meaning of Article 25 of the Convention, fell within the scope of the Convention and held that it did. That was a result of Article 1 of the Convention, and al­so, indirectly, of Articles 34 and 35 of the German Ausführungsgesetz zu dem Überein­kommen [law implementing the Convention] of 29 July 1972 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1972 I 1328).
Da afgørelsen fra den belgiske ret var blevet truffet, uden at den belgiske virksomhed var blevet hørt, undersøgte Landgericht endvidere, om fuldbyrdelsespåtegning kunne meddeles uanset hindringen for anerkendelse i konventionens artikel 27, nr. 2, (jfr. arti­kel 34, stk. 2).
As the order of the Belgian court had been issued without the Belgian respondent having been heard, the Landgericht Hamburg considered further whether the ground for refus­ing recognition contained in Article 27 (2) of the Convention prevented the issue of an order for enforcement (see the second paragraph of Article 34).
Retten kom til det resultat, at denne bestemmelse — hvorefter en retsafgø­relse ikke kan anerkendes, såfremt det indledende processkrift i sagen ikke forskrifts­mæssigt er blevet forkyndt eller meddelt den udeblevne sagsøgte i så god tid, at han har kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen — ikke kunne anvendes i det foreliggende tilfælde »på grund af arrestprocedurens natur«.
It came to the conclu­sion that that provision — whereby a judgment given in default of appearance shall not be recognized if the defendant was not duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence — could not be applied in the present case "because of the nature of the procedure for obtaining an 'Arrestbefehl' ".
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) —for­skriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse eller meddelelse af det indledende processkrift ¡sagen (artikel 27, nr. 2) — prøvelse af'rettidigheden ved den ret, der tager stilling til anerkendelsen eller fuldbyrdelsen — kriterium for prøvelsen — de faktiske omstændigheder i det konkrete tilfælde — uden hensyn til domsstatens procesret
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second para­graph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Examination by the court in which recognition and enforce­ment is sought of the sufficiency of the time — Criteria of assessment — Facts and circum­
(fortsat 2) det foreliggende foreskrev en frist på 90 dage, der dog kunne afkortes indtil det halve (ar­tikel 163 a i Codice di procedura civile).
(continued 1) stances of each case — Procedural law of the State in which the judgment was delivered ir­relevant
Rekvirenten i fuldbyrdelsessagen, et italiensk firma, havde ved civil­ og kriminalretten i Monza (Italien) erhvervet udeblivelsesdom over den i Tyskland hjemmehørende re­kvisitus.
A French company had obtained from the Tribunal de Commerce, Poitiers, a judgment in default against an Italian undertaking based in northern Italy.
Rekvisitus havde ikke reageret og heller ikke taget noget rets­middel i anvendelse imod udeblivelsesdommen, som han havde fået kendskab til.
On the application of the creditor the Corte d'Appello, Turin, issued an order for the enforcement of the judg­ment.
Efter at Landgericht Tübingen havde forsynet den italienske dom med fuldbyrdelsespå­tegning, kærede rekvisitus afgørelsen til Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, der statuerede, at fuldbyrdelsespåtegning ikke kunne meddeles, og således ændrede førsteinstansens afgø­
The debtor, the Italian undertaking, appealed against that order in accordance with Article 36 of the Brussels Convention on the ground that the French judgment in de­fault could not be recognized and enforced in Italy because the defendant had not been duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings in sufficient time to ena­ble it to arrange for its defence (Article 27 (2) of the Convention).
Af konventionens artikel 34, stk. 2, og artikel 27, nr. 2, fulgte, at tvangsfuldbyrdelse ikke kunne ske, når sagsøgte, der ikke havde givet møde under sagen, ikke havde fået for­kyndt det indledende processkrift i sagen på forskriftsmæssig vis og i så god tid, at han havde kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen.
It held, first, that the statement of claim and summons had been duly served by the Italian court officer at the place where the Italian undertaking had its offices at the request of the Procureur de la République attached to the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Poitiers, after the defendant had already received a copy of the statement of claim and the summons.
Den i den foreliggende sag valgte form for forkyndelse opfyldte imidlertid hverken kra­vene i den gamle tysk­italienske konvention af 9. marts 1936 om anerkendelse og fuld­byrdelse af retsafgørelser i civile og kommercielle sager, som i mellemtiden var blevet af­løst af domskonventionen, eller i Haag­civilproceskonventionen af 1. marts 1954.
Service had been carried out in ac­cordance with French procedural law and was also effective under Italian law.
Forkyndelsen blev ikke gyldig af den grund, at sagsøgte ikke havde taget noget rets­middel i anvendelse imod udeblivelsesdommen. Selv om der også i artikel 2, litra c), nr. 2, i den tysk­nederlandske anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelseskonvention af 30. august 1962 fandtes regler for et sådant tilfælde, kunne disse regler ikke anses som udtryk for en almindelig retsgrundsætning, men kun som en undtagelse.
The Italian undertaking's principal contention was that the period of time between the service of the statement of claim and summons by the Italian court officer ( 17 May 1975) and the date of the hearing before the Tribunal de Commerce, Poitiers, (23 June 1975) had not been sufficient for it to arrange for its defence and that service had accordingly not been effected "in sufficient time" within the meaning of Article 27 (2).
Tilsvarende bestemmelser fandtes i øvrigt heller ikke i nogen af de konventioner om anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse af udenlandske domme, som Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland havde afsluttet.
It submitted that service would only have been effected in sufficient time if the French court had ob­served the periods of notice laid down in French procedural law and the Convention be­tween France and Italy on the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial mat­ters of 3 June 1930.
Heller ikke domskonventionen indeholdt sådanne bestemmelser. Tværtimod fandtes der i arti­kel 20, stk. 2, og artikel 27, nr. 2, jfr. protokollens artikel IV, beskyttelsesregler af særlig vægt til fordel for den i udlandet bosatte sagsøgte, for hvem forkyndelse skulle ske.
Under those provisions, the period of notice given by the summons should have been 98 days, whereas the period actually allowed had been substantially shorter.
Oberlandesgericht fore­lagde derfor ved kendelse af 18.10.1978 (6 W 82/78) EF­Domstolen følgende spørgs­mål til præjudiciel afgørelse :
(continued 2) court of the State in which the judgment was given correctly applied the procedural rules of the law ofthat State was excluded.
»Er rekvisitus i en sag om anerkendelse efter konventionens artikel 27 afskåret fra at gøre den indsigelse gældende, at det indledende processkrift ikke rettidigt er blevet forkyndt for ham eller meddelt ham, når han, uanset at han ved en se­nere forkyndelse er blevet sat i kendskab til den verserende sag, ikke har truffet processuelle foranstaltninger til varetagelse af sit forsvar?«
On the basis of those considerations the Corte d'Appello then examined whether the statement of claim and the summons were served in sufficient time having regard to the period which was in fact available to the defendant to prepare its defence (in this case 35 days), the distance between the location of the court and the place where the defendant had its offices (600 kilometres) and the fact that the defendant was conversant with the practice of the French court in question.
En italiensk handlende, der var indehaver af et under firma »Casa di Spedizioni Meoni Mario« i Italien drevet handelsselskab, var ved en nederlandsk ret blevet dømt som udebleven til betaling af et nærmere bestemt beløb.
It was not prevented from reaching that conclusion by the fact that in cases such as the present Italian procedural law prescribed a period of notice of 90 days, which, however, could be reduced by half (Article 163 èis of the Codice di Procedura Civile).
Afgørelsen stadfæstedes imidlertid.
They could not take account of altered factual circumstances within the European Economic Community.
Β 5 fortsat 1) om en — i snæver forstand — formel forkyndelse (notificazione) af stævningen og ind­kaldelsen til at give møde for den udenlandske ret var blevet gennemført, ikke stor betyd­ning.
Article 27 (2) of the Brussels Convention on the other hand required that the concept of service in sufficient time should be supplemented by an assessment of the circumstances of each case.
Sagen blev indbragt for Corte d'appello, der ikke gav rekvisitus medhold.
The Corte di Cassa­zione approved the view taken by the Corte d'Appello.
Fuldbyrdelse — kendelse om fastsættelse af sagsomkostninger, som gik en advokats mandant imod — tilfælde, hvor rekvisitus ikke har svaret i sagen — krav om bevis for, at det indledende processkrift i sagen er forkyndt
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second paragraph of Article 34) — No due service of the document which instituted the proceed­ings (Article 27 (2)) — Not cured by failure to appeal against the judgment given in de­fault when it was served
Fuldbyrdelse — udeblivelsesdom — hindringer for fuldbyrdelse (artikel 34, stk. 2) —for­skriftsmæssig og rettidig forkyndelse eller meddelelse af det indledende processkrift i sagen (artikel 27, nr. 2) — forkyndelse eller meddelelse af en ikke­oversat stævning — efterprø­velse af rettidigheden i forholdet Belgien/1talien talien
Enforcement — Judgment in default — Reasons for refusing enforcement (second para­graph of Article 34) — Due service in sufficient time of the document which instituted the proceedings (Article 27 (2)) — Service of a statement of claim which was not translated — Consideration of "sufficient time" as between Belgium and Italy
Forkyndelsen af det indledende processkrift i sagen var imidlertid rettidig i den nævnte bestemmelses for­stand, hvorved bemærkedes, at appellanten ikke havde hævdet, at den ikke skulle have været forskriftsmæssig.
The regularity of the service of the document which instituted the proceedings was not disputed by the ap­pellant and service had been effected "in sufficient time" within the meaning of that provision.
Mellem forkyndelsen af stævningen og indkaldelsen (27. sep­tember 1975) og retsmødet (7. november 1975) lå et tidsrum på 41 dage, hvilket måtte anses for tilstrækkeligt til forberedelsen af forsvaret i sagen.
Service of the statement of claim and summons (27 September 1975) and the date for the hearing (7 November 1975) were separated by a period of 41 days, which had to be regarded as sufficient for the preparation of a defence.
Når appellanten heroverfor henviste til, at det ikke havde været muligt rettidigt at lade stævningen og indkaldelsen,
The appellant's conten­tion that it had not been possible to have the statement of claim and summons, which were served on it only in Dutch, translated in time did not lead to any different conclu­sion.
1­27.2 ­ Β 9 fortsat I) der alene var blevet forkyndt som affattet på nederlandsk, oversætte, kunne dette ikke føre til en anden bedømmelse.
It had been established that the appellant had had commercial relations with the Belgian respondent.
Det stod fast, at appellanten havde stået i forretningsfor­bindelse med den belgiske modpart; appellanten måtte derfor i Italien eller i Belgien have betjent sig af en sprogkyndig mellemmand.
The appellant must therefore have used some linguistically quali­fied intermediary in either Italy or Belgium.
Denne havde appellanten kunnet sætte sig i forbindelse med og havde således kunnet skaffe sig klarhed over indholdet af de for­kyndte dokumenter.
It could have got in touch with that interme­diary and thus have obtained an understanding of the contents of the document with which it had been served.
I øvrigt havde appellanten kunnet henvende sig til det lokale ita­lienske konsulat eller til ambassaden.
Moreover, it could also have had recourse to the local consu­late or embassy.
Endvidere kunne appellanten ikke støtte nogen indsigelse alene på det forhold, at stæv­ningen og indkaldelsen var affattet på nederlandsk.
Further, the mere fact that the statement of claim and the summons were written in Dutch did not give the appellant any ground of appeal.