natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selv om soda kun udgør 13 % af færdigvarens vægt, tegner det sig for op til 70% af de samlede råmaterialeomkostninger.
Although it is only 13% by weight of the finished product, it accounts for up to 70 % of the raw material batch cost.
Sodaomkostningerne på virker således glasproducenternes rentabilitet og kon kurrenceevne.
The cost of soda-ash thus affects the profitability and competitive position of glass manufaaurers.
Hver af de nævnte aftaler vil i sig selv knytte kunden til Solvay, således at det udelukker konkurrenterne.
Even considered on their own, each of the arrangements described would tend to bind the customer to Solvay in such a way as to exclude competitors.
De forskellige foranstaltninger virker tilsammen på en sidan mide, at de beskytter Solvays dominerende stilling næsten 100% mod konkurrence.
The combined effea of the various devices is such as to ensure that Solvay's dominant position is almost wholly proteaed from competition.
Artikel 86 omfatter ikke kun misbrug, der direkte kan skade kunderne, men også misbrug, der skader dem indirekte ved at ødelægge den effektive konkurrencestruktur inden for fællesmarkedet, som omhandlet i EØF-Traktatens artikel 3, litra f).
Article 86 covers not only abuse which may direaly prejudice consumers but also abuse which indirectly prejudices them by impairing the effective competitive struaure in the common market as envisaged by Article 3 (f) of the EEC Treaty.
Solvays rabatordning har til formål og til følge at udelukke konkurrencen, men desuden falder det ind under det udtrykkelige forbud mod anvendelse af ulige vilkår for ydelser af samme værdi, jf. artikel 86, litra c).
In addition to its exclusionary object and effea, the rebate system applied by Solvay also falls under the express prohibition in Article 86 (c) against the application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transaaions.
Rabatterne og de andre finansielle incitamenter afspejlede ikke forskelle i omkostningerne baseret på de leverede mængder, men tog sigte på at dække hele kundens behov eller den størst mulige del deraf.
The rebates and other financial inducements did not reflea possible differences in costs based on the quantities supplied but were referable to securing the whole or the largest possible percentage of the customer's requirements.
I en bestemt medlemsstat var der betydelige forskelle både med hensyn til rabattens og de andre incitamenters størrelse og den mængde, der udløste en sådan rabat.
Within a particular Member State there were considerable differences both as to the size of the rebate and other inducements and the 'trigger' tonnage at which it was activated.
Den særlige »checkrabat« har tilsyneladende også varieret fuldstændig vilkårligt.
The amount of the special 'cheque rebate' also seems to have varied in a wholly arbitrary way.
Solvays loyalitetsbonus og andre incitamenter påvirker handelen mellem medlemsstater ved at styrke forbindelserne mellem kunderne og den dominerende leverandør.
The fidelity rebates and other inducements to exclusivity applied by Solvay affea trade between Member States by reinforcing the links between the customers and the dominant supplier.
Konkurrerende leverandørers muligheder for at komme ind på nye markeder eller hverve nye kunder er stort set væk, fordi kundens behov for ekstramængder leveres af Solvay til priser, som de ikke kan konkurrere med. Solvays forskellige metoder til at knytte kunderne til sig medførte stivere strukturer og en opdeling af sodamarkedet efter nationale skel og skadede eller risikerede at skade gennemførelsen af EF's indre marked.
The opportunities for competing suppliers to enter new markets or obtain new customers are effeaively removed since the customer's marginal tonnage requirements for which they would bp competing are currently being supplied by Solvay at prices which they would be unable to meet. The various devices employed by Solvay to tie customers had the result of reinforcing the struaural rigidity and the division of the soda-ash market on national lines, and thus harmed or threatened to harm the attainment of the objective of a single market between Member States.
Den omstændighed, at Solvays foranstaltninger hovedsagelig tog sigte på importen fra USA, berører ikke anvendelsen af artikel 86.
The faa that Solvay's measures were aimed principally at imports from the United States does not affea the application of Article 86.
Import af natursoda fra USA blev betragtet som den alvorligste trussel mod
Imports of natural ash from the United States were seen as the main
Rabatordningen i Tyskland var teoretisk set ikke blot en ulempe for de kunder, der måske ikke ville dække hele deres behov eller størsteparten deraf ved indkøb hos Solvay (det drejer sig kun om nogle få), men medførte også forskelsbehandling mellem de kunder, der gjorde det.
The result of the rebate system in Germany was not only in theory to disadvantage customers who might not take their full or the major part of their requirement from Solvay (only a few did not do so) but also to discriminate as between customers who did.
En stor kunde kunne meget vel betale betydeligt mere pr. ton end en mindre producent, selv om de begge dækkede deres samlede behov ved køb hos Solvay.
Thus a large customer might well pay substantially more per tonne than a smaller producer even though both were buying their total requirement from Solvay.
Solvays dominans pi sodamarkedet pi det vesteuropæiske fastland. Importen af betydelige mængder natursoda ville have fået stor indvirkning på den aftalte opdeling af markedet mellem ICI og Solvay.
The arrival in substantial quantities of natural ash would also have had a considerable effea upon the agreed division of the market between ICI and Solvay.
Aktiviteterne påvirkede derfor den grundlæggende konkurrencestruktur inden for sodaindustrien i EF.
The activities therefore affected the basic competitive structure of the soda-ash industry within the Community.
Kommissionen vil pilægge Solvay at ophæve ordning en med loyalitetsbonus og at underrette Kommissionen udførligt om eventuelle nye rabatordninger for at sikre, at de er i overensstemmelse med Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler.
Solvay will be required to abandon its system of fidelity rebates and will have to notify to the Commission the details of any new system of discounts or rebates in order to ensure its conformity with Community competition rules.
Hvis Solvay indfører nye rabat ordninger, skal de pi en rimelig og objektiv mide afspejle omkostningsbesparelserne i forbindelse med store leverancer.
Any new system of rebates applied by Solvay will have to be confined to refleaing in a fair and objective manner the cost savings involved in large tonnage orders.
Det skal ogsi bemærkes, at hvis de største glasproducenter var nødt til at importere soda fra USA i betydelige mængder, ville de formodentlig gøre det for at kunne levere til deres anlæg i flere medlemsstater.
It should also be noted that were the major glass producers to import soda-ash from the United States in substantial quantities, they would probably do so in order to supply their works in several Member States.
Solvays konkurrencebegrænsende foranstaltninger tog derfor ikke blot sigte pi amerikanske producenter, men ogsi pi mindre EF-producenter af industrielt fremstillet soda.
Furthermore, Solvay's exclusionary measures were aimed not only at the United States producers but also at smaller producers of synthetic ash located inside the Community.
Alle disse producenter har siden 1982 leveret fra deres egne nationale markeder til andre EF-lande, selv om deres muligheder var meget begrænsede på grund af Solvays prispolitik.
Ail of these producers have since 1982 made deliveries from their own national market to other Community Member States although their opportunities were severely constrained by Solvay's pricing policies.
Inden for samme tidsrum skal Solvay genforhandle alle sine leveringsaftaler for soda i EF, således at de opfylder kravene i denne beslutning, samt underrette Kommissionen om de foranstaltning er, den har truffet for at efterkomme .denne beslutning. ning.
Solvay will also be required within the same period to renegotiate all its supply agreements for soda-ash in the Community so as to conform with the requirements of this Decision and shall notify the Commission of the measures it has taken in that regard.
Alle klausuler i aftalerne, og eventuelle uofficielle arrangementer med det formål at forpligte kunden til at dække hele sit behov eller næsten hele sit behov ved køb hos Solvay skal ophæves.
In particular, all clauses in agreements, and any unofficial understanding or arrangement tending to tie the customer to Solvay for the whole or substantially the whole of its requirements must be deleted or terminated.
Konkurrenceklausuler eller andre bestemmelser, der virker konkurrencebe grænsende, skal ophæves eller ændres, siledes at de ikke forhindrer kunderne i eller afskrækker dem fra at købe hos en konkurrent, hvis tilbud giver anledning til en pristilpasning fra Solvays side.
'Competition clauses' or other devices which operate in an anticompetitive manner must be deleted or amended so as not to deter or prevent thé customer from ever purchasing from a competitor whose offer matches that of Solvay.
Hvis Kommissionen konstaterer, at der foreligger en overtrædelse af Traktatens artikel 86, kan den pålæg ge den pågældende virksomhed at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør, jf. artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17.
Where the Commission finds that there- is an infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty it may require the undertaking concerned to bring such infringement to an end in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation No 17.
Anvendelsen af »evergreen«-aftaler for størsteparten af kundens behov og med en lang opsigelsesfrist skal også opgives.
The practice of 'evergreen contracts' for the major part of the customer's requirement and with a long notice period must also be abandoned.
Kunderne skal frit kunne bestemme, hvilken mængde de ønsker at aftage fra Solvay i henhold til »evergreen«-aftaler.
Customers should be free to decide for themselves the tonnage they wish to commit to Solvay under 'evergreen' contracts.
De skal også kunne skifte leverandør med højst seks måneders varsel, hvad enten det gælder deres samlede forsyninger eller en del deraf.
They should also be able to change to another supplier for the whole or a part of their business on giving no more than six months' notice.
Leveringsaftaler med fast løbetid må ikke gælde længere end et år.
Fixed-term supply contraas should not exceed one year.
I nærværende sag fandt overtrædelserne af artikel 86 sted i dyb hemmelighed og fortsatte på det tidspunkt, hvor denne procedure blev indledt.
In the present case the infringements of Article 86 were effected in conditions of considerable secrecy and were still continuing at the date these proceedings were commenced.
Kommissionen finder det derfor rimeligt at vedtage en beslutning om, at Solvay bringer sin overtrædelse af artikel 86 til ophør.
The Commission therefore considers that it is appropriate in the case of the infringement of Article 86 by Solvay to issue a termination order.
Foruden at pålægge virksomhederne at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør kan Kommissionen træffe særlige forholdsregler for at sikre, at overtrædelsen ikke gentages eller fortsættes.
Besides requiring the undertakings to bring the infringement to an end, the Commission may also specify particular measures to ensure that the infringements are not repeated or continued.
Domstolen har i sin dom i de forenede sager 6 og 7/73 — Commercial Solvents (') fastslået, at Kommissionen har diskretionære beføjelser til at tage forholdsregler for at sikre, at dens beslutning efterkommes.
It was established by the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 — Commercial Solvents v. Commission (*), that the Commission has a discretionary power to order measures ensuring that its decision is effective.
Disse beføjelser er ikke begrænset til adfærd, der direkte påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstater, især
The power to order such measures is not confined to aas direaly affeaing trade between Member States particularly where the objective is the maintenance or
I henhold til artikel 15, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 17 kan Kommissionen ved beslutning pålægge virksomheder bøder på mindst 1 000 og højst 1 mio. ECU, idet sidstnævnte beløb dog kan forhøjes til 10% af omsætningen i det sidste regnskabsår i hver af de virksomheder, som har medvirket ved overtrædelsen, såfremt de forsætligt eller uagtsomt overtræder artikel 86.
Under Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings fines of from ECU 1 000 to ECU 1 million, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 86.
Ved fastsættelsen af bødens størrelse skal der tages hensyn til både overtrædelsens grovhed og dens varighed.
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard is to be had to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement.
Kommissionens indstilling af proceduren — og har varet lige siden —
(a) Gravity and the closure of the Commission's file — and have continued up until the present time,
Efter Kommissionen opfattelse er der i nærværende sag tale om yderst grove overtrædelser.
In the present case the Commission considers that the infringements were of extreme gravity.
Solvay er den største sodaproducent i EF, og overtrædelserne gjorde det muligt for virksomheden at kon solidere sin stilling på markedet ved at udelukke den effektive konkurrence pi store dele af Fællesmarkedet. det.
Solvay is the major producer of soda-ash in the Community and the infringements enabled it to consolidate its hold over the market by excluding effective competition in a large part of the Common Market.
Solvay et Cie SA (SOLVAY) har fra omkring 1983 og indtil nuværende tidspunkt overtrådt EØF-Traktatens artikel 86 gennem adfærd, der tog sigte på at udelukke eller stærkt begrænse konkurrencen, og som bestod i:
Solvay et Cie SA ('Solvay') has infringed Article 86 of the EEC Treaty from about 1983 to the present time by a course of conduct aimed at excluding or severely limiting competition and consisting of:
Solvay har forårsaget vedvarende skade på det pågældende markeds struktur, til skade for forbrugerne, ved i lang tid at have udelukket konkurrenterne fra markedet.
By foreclosing for a long time sales opportunities for all competitors, Solvay has caused lasting damage to the structure of the market concerned, to the detriment of consumers.
I betragtning af sagens nærmere omstændigheder er denne overtrædelse alvorligere end 'den overtrædelse af artikel 85, som Solvay også var involveret i.
This infringement is under the specific circumstances of the case more serious than the infringements of Article 85 in which Solvay was also involved.
a) indgåelse af aftaler med kunderne, hvorved disse for pligtes til at dække hele deres behov for soda eller en væsentlig del deraf ved køb hos Solvay i en ubegrænset eller usædvanlig lang periode b) betydelige rabatter og andre finansielle incitamenter i forbindelse med ekstramængder i forhold til kundens aftalte basismængder for at sikre, at de dækkede hele deres behov eller størsteparten deraf ved køb hos Solvay vay c) rabatter, der var afhængige af, om kunderne indvilligede i at dække hele deres behov ved indkøb hos Solvay.
(b) the granting of substantial rebates and other financial inducements referable to marginal tonnage over and above the customer's basic contracted tonnage in order to ensure that they buy all or most of their requirements from Solvay;
På baggrund af de udførlige forhandlinger med Kom missionen i 1980 til 1982 var Solvay udmærket klar over, hvilke krav artikel 86 stiller med hensyn til eksklusivitet.
Solvay was well aware from its extensive negotiations with the Commission between 1980 and 1982 of the requirements of Article 86 in relation to exclusivity.
Den var også klar over, at loyalitetsbonus er forbudt.
It was also clearly cognisant of the prohibition of fidelity rebates.
Det materiale, der er hentet hos Solvay, viser, at virksomhedens ledelse var klar over risikoen, men alligevel fortsatte den ulovlige adfærd.
The documentation obtained from Solvay shows that company officials at a high level knew the risk involved but nevertheless persisted in the abusive conduct.
Når Kommissionen skal fastlægge bødens størrelse, vil den tage hensyn til, at den ved sine forhandlinger med Solvay i 1980 til 1982 accepterede en opsigelsesfrist på to år for »evergreen«-aftaler og ikke rejste indvendinger imod konkurrenceklausulerne i den form, hvori de forelå.
In assessing the amount of the fine the Commission will take account of the faa that in the negotiations with Solvay between 1980 and 1982 it accepted a notice period of two years in the case of evergreen contraas and did not object to the competition clauses in the form in which they were drafted.
Det er også muligt, at Solvay kan have troet, at der kunne indgås langvarige mængdeaftaler, som begrænsede indkøb fra andre leverandører til 15% af kundens behov.
It is also possible that Solvay was led to believe that longterm tonnage contraas could be concluded which limited purchases from other sources to 15% of the customer's requirements.
For den i artikel 1, litra b) og c), omhandlede overtrædelse af artikel 86 pålægges Solvay en bøde på 20 mio. ECU.
A fine of ECU 20 million is imposed on Solvay in respect of the infringement of Article 86 specified in Article 1 (b) and (c).
Kommissionen vil derfor pålægge Solvay at ophæve disse bestemmelser og vil under disse omstændigheder kun pålægge en bøde for loyalitetsbonus og de uofficielle eksklusivaftaler.
It will therefore require Solvay to abandon those provisions but in the circumstances will impose a fine only in respect of the fidelity rebates and the 'unofficial' exclusivity agreements.
Den i artikel 3 omhandlede bøde indbetales senest tre måneder efter meddelelsen af denne beslutning på følgende konto:
The fine imposed by Article 3 shall be paid within three months of the date of notification of this Decision to the following bank account:
Kommissionen har tidligere ved adskillige lejligheder pålagt Solvay betydelige bøder for hemmelige aftaler inden for kemiske industri, nemlig vedrørende peroxygcner, polypropylen og PVC.
Solvay has been the subjea on several previous occasions of substantial fines imposed by the Commission for collusion in the chemicals industry: Peroxides; Polypropylene; PVC.
b) Overtrædelsernes varighed
(b) Duration
Overtrædelserne begyndte omkring 1983 — meget kort tid efter forhandlingerne med Kommissionen og
The infringements began in about 1983 — very shortly after the negotiations with the Commission
Ved periodens udløb påløber der automatisk rente efer den sats, som Den Europæiske Fond for Monetært Samarbejde anvendte for sine ecu-transaktioner den første arbejdsdag i den måned, hvor denne beslutning blev vedtaget, plus 3,5 procentpoints, dvs. 14%.
On expiry of that period, interest shall automatically be payable at the rate charged by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund on its ecu operations on the first working day of the month in which this Decision was adopted plus 3,5 percentage points, i.e. 14%.
Hvis bøden indbetales i national valuta i den medlemsstat, hvor den angivne indbetalingsbank er beliggende, anvendes den valutakurs, der var gældende dagen før betalingen.
Should payment be made in the national currency of the Member State in which the bank nominated for payment is situated, the exchange rate applicable shall be that prevailing on the day preceding payment.
Leon BRITTAN Næstformand
For the Commission
KOMMISSIONENS BESLUTNING af 19. december 1990 om en procedure i henhold til EØF-Traktatens artikel 86
COMMISSION DECISION of 19 December 1990 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
ICI's overtrædelse af artikel 86
Infringement of Article 86 by ICI
(2) under henvisning til Traktaten om Oprettelse af Det Euro pæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab, under henvisning til Rådets forordning nr. 17 af 6. februar 196.2, første forordning om anvendelse af bestemmelserne i Traktatens artikel 85 og 86 ('), senest ændret ved akten vedrørende Spaniens og Portugals tiltrædelse, særlig artikel 3 og 15,
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty ('), as last amended by the Aa of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Articles 3 and 15 thereof,
ICI har formodentlig siden 1983 misbrugt sin dominerende stilling på sodamarkedet i Det Forenede Kongerige ved at yde sine største kunder loyalitets- og meromsætningsrabatter (»top slice« rebates) ved at indgå aftaler, som sikrer ICI eneleverancer, og ved at gennemføre andre ordninger, der har haft til formål og til følge at udelukke konkurrencen ved at forpligte de nævnte kunder til at foretage alle deres indkøb hos ICL under henvisning til Kommissionens beslutning af 19. februar 1990 om at indlede en procedure på eget initiativ i henhold til artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17,
From about 1983 until the present time ICI has abused the dominant position which it holds in the market for soda-ash in the United Kingdom by applying to its major customers a system of loyalty rebates and discounts by reference to marginal tonnage ('top-slice' rebates), contraaual arrangements tending to ensure an effective exclusivity of supply for ICI and other devices which have had the object and effect to tying the said customers to ICI for the whole of their requirements and of excluding competitors.
B. Baggrund efter at have givet den pågældende virksomhed lejlighed til at udtale sig vedrørende de af Kommissionen fremførte klage punkter, jf. artikel 19, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 17 samt Kommissionens forordning nr. 99/63/EØF af 25. juli 1983 om udtalelser i henhold til artikel 19, stk. 1 og 2, i Rådets forordning nr. 17 (2), i Det Forenede efter høring af det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel- og Monopolspørgsmål, og
Having given the undertaking concerned the opportunity to make known its views on the objections raised by the Commission, pursuant to Article 19(1) of Regulation No 17 and Commission Regulation No 99/63/EEC of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17 (2).
ICI's stilling på sodamarkedet Kongerige ud fra følgende betragtninger:
ICI's position in the United Kingdom soda-ash market
Med hensyn til produktet og sodamarkedet henvises der til del I, afsnit B, i Kommissionens beslutning 91/297/EØF (Solvay-ICI) (').
Details of the product and the soda-ash market reference are set out in Part IB of Commission Decision 91/297/EEC (ICI-Solvay) (3).
ICI er den eneste sodaproducent i Det Forenede Kongerige.
ICI is the only soda-ash market producer located in the United Kingdom.
Den såkaldte Page 1000-aftale af 1945 (der erstattede et tidligere kartel) medførte, at Solvay og ICI ikke måtte konkurrere på hinandens traditionelle markeder.
The 'Page 1000' agreement of 1945 (replacing an earlier cartel agreement) recognized that Solvay and ICI would not compete in each other's traditional markets.
Denne beslutning er en følge af de kontrolundersøgelser, Kommissionen foretog i marts 1989 hos sodaproducenter i EF i henhold til artikel 14, stk '. 3, i forordning nr. 17.
The present Decision arises out of investigations carried out by the Commission in March 1989 pursuant to Article 14 (3) of Regulation No 17 at the premises of Community producers of soda-ash.
Ved disse kontrolundersøgelser og efterfølgende begæringer om oplysninger i henhold til artikel 11 i forordning nr. 17 er Kommissionen kom met i besiddelse af materiale, der beviser, at Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) har overtrådt artikel 86.
By means of the said investigations and subsequent enquiries under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 the Commission discovered documentary evidence showing that an infringement of Article 86 had been committed by Imperial Chemical Industries pic (ICI).
Overtrædelsen kan sammenfattende beskrives siledes:
The infringement can be summarized as follows: