natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det var derfor nødvendigt at foretage en helt ny konkurrenceretlig vurdering pa basis af forhold i relation til den aktuelle situation på markedet, herunder også de dele af den anlæglede beslutning, som Domstolen havde stadfæstet (f.eks. markedsdefinitionerne).
It was therefore necessary to undertake a completely new competitive assessment based on facts pertaining to the current market situation, including also those parts of the contested decision which had been upheld by the Court (such as the market definitions).
Heraf fulgte, at den oprindelige anmeldelse var ufuldstændig på domsafsigelscstidspunktct.
It followed that the original notification was, at the time of the judgment, incomplete.
Det blev imidlertid fundet nødvendigt at fravige ex nunc-princippet ved den konkurrenceretlige vurdering hvad angår det »failing company«-argument, som parterne oprindeligt havde gjort gældende, eftersom den situation, der lå til grund herfor, ikke længere bestod og ikke kunne genopretles.
It was, however, found necessary to make an exception to the ex nunc basis of the competitive assessment in the case of the ªfailing company defenceº originally advanced by the parties, since the situation to which it related no longer obtained and could not be re-created.
Den overtagne virksomhed. MdK. var blevet reorganiseret og omdannet til et aktieselskab efter lysk rel. og det ville have været umuligt at splitte denne nyetablerede økonomiske enhed op i dens tidligere bestanddele i vurderingsøjemed, dvs. blot for at fastslå, om den kunne være hievet overtaget af andre eller ej.
The acquired company MdK was subsequently restructured and transformed into a limited company under German law, and it would have been impossible to have separated this newly created economic entity into its former component parts for assessment purposes Ð e.g. in order to decide whether or not there might be a potential alternative acquirer.
Efter modtagelse af en fuldstændig anmeldelse foretog Kommissionen på normal vis sin indledende gennemgang af sagen på det ovennævnte grundlag.
On receipt of the complete notification, the Commission carried out an initial examination of the case on the above basis, in the usual way.
Den fandt, at der under de aktuelle omstændigheder ikke kunne antages at ville blive lale om skabelse eller styrkelse af nogen dominerende stilling på de relevante markeder, der ligesom før blev defineret som markederne for kalibaserede produkter til landbrugsformål i hhv. Tyskland og resten af EU.
It found that in the present circumstances no dominant position was likely to be created or reinforced in the relevant markets, which, as before, were those for potash-based products for agricultural use in Germany, and in the rest of the EU, respectively.
Af de grunde, der blev anført i Kommissionens oprindelige beslutning og derefter stadfæstet af Domstolen (bl.a. »failing company«-argumentet. der som nævnt ovenfor måtte vurderes ex tune), ville den planlagte fusion imidlertid ikke viere årsagen lil forværringen af konkurrencestrukturerne på markedet.
However, for the reasons outlined in the Commission's original decision and subsequently upheld by the Court (notably, the ªfailing firm defenceº, which Ð see above Ð had to be examined ªex tuncº) the proposed concentration would not be responsible for a deterioration in the competitive structure of the market.
Efter at de kommercielle forbindelser mellem SCPA og Kali + Salz var bragt til ophør, var SCPA nu også begyndt at levere til Tyskland.
Moreover, following the ending of the commercial links between SCPA and Kali und Salz, SCPA was also now supplying Germany.
I den øvrige del af EU lå parternes kombinerede markedsandel nu pa under 50%. og det eksportkartel, der blev påvist under de oprindelige undersøgelser, bestød ikke længere, hvilket også var tilfældet med de tætte kommercielle forbindelser mellem Kali + Salz og hovedkonkurrenten SCPA.
In the rest of the EU, the combined market share of the parties was now below 50%, and the export cartel that was observed in the original investigation had been ended, as had the close commercial links between Kali und Salz and the other main competitor, SCPA.
Fusionen blev derfor godkendt efter fusionsforordningens artikel 6. stk. 1. litra b).
Accordingly the operation was cleared (Article 6(1)(b) of the regulation).
Boder for overtrædelse af forordningen
Fine imposed for breach of the regulation
Kommissionen har i ãr for første gang palagt en virksomhed en bøde for ikke al have anmeldt en fusion i tide og gennemført fusionen uden Kommissionens godkendelse.
The Commission this year imposed the first fine on a company for failure to notify a concentration under the regulation in time, and for putting it into effect without the Commission's authorisation.
I februar fik den koreanske virksomhed Samsung palagt en bøde pã i alt 33 000 ECU i forbindelse med sin overtagelse af AS'I'
In February, the Korean company Samsung was fined a total of ECU 33 000 in respect of the acquisition of AST Research Inc.
Boks 7: Anvendelsen af den nye artikel 2, stk. 4, i fusionsforordningen
Insert 7: Implementation of the new Article 2(4) of the Merger Regulation
Den nye fusionsforordning, der trådte i kraft den 1. marts 1998, indeholder en række ændringer, der har udvidet fusionsforordningens anvendelsesområde til også at omfatte de såkaldte selvstændigt fungerende joint ventures oprettet i samarbejdsøjemed. Efter denne ændring gælder fusionsforordningen nu også for en række joint ventures, som tidligere skulle behandles efter forordning nr. 17/62.
The new Merger Regulation came into force on 1 March 1998, incorporating a number of amendments which extended the regulation's scope to include joint ventures known as fullfunction cooperative joint ventures.
Artikel 2, stk. 4, gælder for alle joint ventures, der udgør en fusion efter artikel 3, i det omfang, hvor de »har til formål eller til følge at samordne fortsat uafhængige virksomheders konkurrenceadfærd«.
Article 2(4) applies to all joint ventures constituting a concentration within the meaning of Article 3, albeit only ªto the extent that [they have as their] object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independentº.
I 1998 måtte 13 af de i alt 76 joint venture-sager, der blev behandlet efter den ændrede fusionsforordning, også analyseres efter artikel 2, stk. 4.
In 1998, 13 of the 76 joint venture cases decided under the amended Merger Regulation necessitated an analysis under Article 2(4).
De mest dybtgående analyser blev foretaget i sager i telesektoren og internetsektoren.
The most indepth analyses were made in cases within the telecommunications and Internet areas.
Kun i en sag (sag nr. IV/M.1327 — Canal+/ CDPQ/BankAmerica, beslutning af 3. december 1998, se nærmere nedenfor) var det nødvendigt at afkræve parterne tilsagn for at imødekomme indsigelser efter artikel 2, stk. 4.1 en anden sag (sag nr. JV.15 — BT/AT & T) måtte der iværksættes fase 2-undersøgelser.
So far, remedies to settle Article 2(4) concerns have been included in only one case (Case No IV/M.1327 Ð Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica of 3 December 1998, see below). A secondphase examination was opened in one other case (Case No JV.15 Ð BT/AT & T, see below).
I Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica-sagen blev der konstateret overlapning på et marked, der lå forud for joint venture-virksomhedens marked, nemlig markedet for engrossalg af tvrettigheder i Spanien (selv om den anmeldte transaktion drejede sig om det efterfølgende marked i Frankrig).
In the Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica case, the spillover effects were found on a market upstream from the joint venture, namely in the market for the wholesaling of TV rights in Spain (although the notified transaction concerned the downstream market in France).
På det spanske marked havde Canal-I- en stærk eller dominerende stilling på markedet for betalings-tv såvel som på det forudgående marked for programindhold.
On the Spanish market, Canal+ had strong or dominant positions on the pay-TV market and on the upstream market for content.
Det fremgik, at den anmeldte transaktion i kraft af ejerforholdene i joint venture-virksomheden ville give Canal+ et stærkt incitament til at favorisere Cableuropa (der kontrolleres af CDPQ og BankAmerica) ved salg af spanske betalings-tv-rettigheder.
The notified transaction was found, through the balance of power in the joint venture, to give Canal+ a strong incentive to favour Cableuropa (controlled by CDPQ and BankAmerica) in the sale of Spanish pay-TV rights.
Den løsning, man nåede frem til, gik ud på at forhindre diskrimination af andre konkurrenter på det spanske marked for betalings-tv.
The remedies accepted will eliminate the possibility of discrimination against other competitors on the Spanish pay-TV market.
For det første ville den anmeldte transaktion hverken skabe eller styrke nogen dominerende stilling for Canal-i-, men skabte derimod en situation, hvor virksomhedens kommercielle incitamenter ville blive ændret, således at der ville opstå en øget risiko for diskrimination af andre betalings-tv- m
Firstly, the notified transaction did not create or strengthen the dominant position of Canal+; rather, it gave rise to a situation where the company's commercial incentives would change so that there would be an increased risk of discrimination against other pay-TV operators in Spain.
udbydere i Spanien. For det andet indebar den løsning, man nåede frem til, en indskrænkning af Canal+'s fremtidige handlefrihed på det spanske marked for betalings-tv, men medførte ingen strukturelle ændringer i den anmeldte transaktion.
Secondly, the remedy basically sets a benchmark for Canal+'s future behaviour on the Spanish market for pay-TV content, but leaves the notified transaction structurally unchanged.
Uden den nye artikel 2, stk. 4, kunne det have været vanskeligere at nå frem til denne løsning efter fusionsforordningen.
In the absence of Article 2(4), this remedy could have been more difficult to accept under the Merger Regulation.
Telia/Telenor/Schibsted-sagen fortjener særlig opmærksomhed, da den bidrog til at få fastlagt en metode for håndtering af artikel 2, stk. 4-spørgsmål efter fusionsforordningen. Telia, som er den traditionelle teleoperatør i Sverige, Telenor, som er den traditionelle norske operatør, og Schibsted, som er et norsk forlags- og tv-selskab, gik sammen i et joint venture, der skulle udbyde gatewaytjenester til Internet og hjemmesideproduktionstjenester.
The Telia/Telenor/Schibsted case is worth describing in detail as it helped to establish the Commission methodology in handling Article 2(4) issues under the Merger Regulation.
Gatewaytjenester har til formål at give internetbrugerne lettere adgang til data på Internettet.
Internet gateway services are designed to enable users of the Internet to access content more easily.
Denne tjeneste kan leveres af gatewaytjenesteudbyderen eller tredjeparter, og den kan være gratis for brugeren (normalt reklamefinansieret), eller der kan være tale om, at brugeren skal betale for at få adgang (»betalingsadgang«).
This content may be provided by the gateway service provider or other third parties and may be free of charge to the user (normally financed by advertising) or content for which the user has to pay for access (ªpaid-for contentº).
I sin analyse af sagen fandt Kommissionen, at udbud af gatewaytjenester ikke udgør et marked i sig selv, men at reklamer på websites og betalingsadgang kunne anses at udgøre relevante markeder.
In its analysis of the case, the Commission found that the supply of gateway services in themselves did not amount to a market as such, but that advertising on web pages and paid-for content could be considered relevant markets.
I relation til spørgsmålet om dominerende stilling måtte disse to markeder betragtes som relevante markeder, ligesom markedet for produktion af hjemmesider.
These two markets were relevant markets for the purposes of dominance, as was the production of web sites. Website production was also considered to be a
Det fremgik desuden, at markedet for hjemmesideproduktion måtte undersøges nærmere i relation til samordningsaspekterne efter artikel 2, stk. 4, da både det nye joint venture og to af moderselskaberne (Telia og Telenor) var aktive på dette marked.
XXVIIITH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1998 Ð SEC (99)743 FINAL candidate market for the analysis of coordination under Article 2(4) as the joint venture and two of the parent companies (Telia and Telenor) were present on this market.
For det første var der på markedet for hjemmesideproduktion tale om, at både det nye joint venture og to af dets moderselskaber var til stede på samme marked.
First, the website production market involved the presence of the joint venture and two of the parent companies on the same market.
Moderselskaberne og joint ventureselskabet ville tilsammen få en markedsandel på under 10% på basis af den snævrest tænkelige og for parterne mindst favorable markedsafgrænsning.
The combined market share of the parent companies and the joint venture was less than 10% on the narrowest possible and most unfavourable market definition to the parties.
Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at selv om moderselskaberne skulle samordne deres aktiviteter på dette marked, ville det ikke føre til nogen mærkbar begrænsning af konkurrencen.
Accordingly, the Commission concluded that, even if the parent companies were to coordinate their activities on this market, it would not amount to an appreciable restriction of competition.
I den anden del af sin artikel 2, stk. 4vurdering, der drejede sig om markedet for opkaldsadgang til Internettet i Sverige, konstaterede Kommissionen, at markedet var præget af høj vækst, relativt ubetydelige adgangsbarrierer og lave omkostninger ved at skifte leverandør.
In the second part of its Article 2(4) reasoning, on the dial-up Internet access market in Sweden, the Commission found that that market was characterised by high growth, relatively low barriers to entry and low switching costs.
På dette marked havde Telia og Telenor markedsandele på hhv. 25-40% og 10-25%, men Kommissionen fandt, at disse markedsandele var uden større betydning på et så vækstpræget marked, og at markedsstrukturerne derfor ikke virkede til fremme for en samordning af konkurrenceadfærden.
The market shares which Telia and Telenordia enjoyed on this market were 25-40% and 10-25% respectively, but the Commission found that these market shares were of limited significance in such a growing market and, therefore, the market structure is not conducive to the coordination of competitive behaviour.
Desuden blev sandsynligheden for samordning mindsket yderligere af den relative størrelse af markedet for opkaldsadgang til Internet (der tegnede sig for over 90% af internetindtægterne i Sverige) set i forhold til de andre markeder, hvor det nye joint venture skulle operere.
In addition, the likelihood of coordination was reduced further by the relative size of the dial-up Internet access market (which accounted for over 90% of Internet revenue in Sweden) compared with the size of the other markets on which the joint venture would be active.
Kommissionen har desuden behandlet 8 sager i telesektoren, hvor den måtte foretage en vurdering efter artikel 2, stk. 4.
The Commission also considered eight cases in the field of telecommunications which involved an investigation under Article 2(4).
Kommissionen besluttede at indlede tilbundsgående undersøgelser af et planlagt joint venture mellem British Telecommunications og AT & T, som er to af verdens største teleoperatører.
The Commission decided to open a detailed enquiry into a proposed joint venture between British Telecommunications and AT & T, two of the world's largest telecommunications operators.
Det nye joint venture skulle udbyde et bredt spektrum af teletjenester til multinationale erhvervskunder såvel som internationale bærertjenester til andre tjenesteudbydere.
The joint venture will provide abroad range of telecommunications services to multinational corporate customers and international carrier services to other carriers.
Kommissionen besluttede at iværksætte fase 2undersøgelser af joint venture-virksomhedens virkninger på flere globale telemarkeder, bl.a. nogle i Det Forenede Kongerige.
The Commission decided to carry out a secondphase inquiry into the effects of the venture on several global telecommunications markets and also some in the UK.
Efter sine indledende undersøgelser har Kommissionen peget på følgende problemer: parternes kombinerede markedsstilling på markederne for udbud af globale teletjenester til store multinationale selskaber og internationale bærertjenester, risikoen for skabelse eller styrkelse af en dominerende stilling inden for visse teletjenester i Det Forenede Kongerige og mulighederne for samordning i Det Forenede Kongerige mellem ACC, som er et helejet datterselskab af AT & T, og BT og Telewest, som AT & T er medejer af via TCI.
Subsequent to its preliminary inquiry, the Commission has expressed concerns in the following areas: the parties' combined market position on the markets for the provision of global telecommunications services to large multinational companies and for international carrier services, the effect of the creation of the joint venture being the possible creation or strengthening of a dominant position for certain telecommunications services in the UK; and the possible coordination effects of the proposed joint venture in the UK between ACC, a wholly owned subsidiary of AT & T, and between BTand Telewest, in which AT & T through TCI will have a jointly controlling stake.
Også selve markedernes karakter spiller en rolle for Kommissionens vurdering.
The nature of the markets themselves will also play apart in the Commission's assessment.
Figur 4 Antal endelige beslutninger hvert år siden 1992 og antal anmeldelser'
Figure 4: Number of final decisions adopted each year since 1992 and number of notifications1
[] endelige beslutninger (fo. 4064/89)
Final decisions (R.4064/89)
Β anmeldelser (fo. 4064/89)
Notifications (R.4064/89)
For de endelige beslutninger (forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89) har Kommissionen ændret talserien for at få beslutninger efter artikel 9, stk. 3 (delvis henvisning til medlemsstater), med: + 1 beslutning i 1992, + 1 beslutning i 1994 og + 6 beslutninger i 1997.
The Commission has modified the set of figures concerning final decisions (Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89) to take account of decisions adopted under Article 9(3) (partial referral to Member States): +1 decision in 1992, +1 decision in 1994, +6 decisions in 1997.
Figur 5 Sagernes fordeling på fusionstype (1992-1998)
Figure 5: Breakdown by type of operation (1992-98)
Overtagelse af majoritet 38%
Acquisition of majority 38%
Forbedring af effektiviteten af kontrollen med statsstøtte
Improving the efficiency of state aid monitoring
Kommissionen videreførte i 1998 sit initiativ med henblik på omlægning og modernisering af statsstøttekontrollen.
In 1998 the Commission continued with its initiative for the reorientation and modernisation of state aid monitoring.
ECLJ. svarende til 3% af værditilvæksten, eller 1 238 ECU pr. job i fremstillingssektoren i de femten EU­lande.
The sixth Survey on state aid in the European Union, adopted by the Commission in July, covers the period 1994-96.88 Over this period an average of ECU 38 billion a year, or 3% of value added and ECU 1 238 per job, was granted to the manufacturing sector in the Union of Fifteen.
Oversigten viser, at efter at have toppet i 1993 og 1994 er statsstøtten nu på vej nedad.
The survey reveals that, after peaking in 1993 and 1994, state aid volumes are now showing a downward trend.
Sadan som det allerede var tilfældet med den forrige oversigt, kan den mest markante tendens konstateres i den fortsat høje støtte, der ydes på ad hoc­grundlag til enkelte virksomheder, som falder uden for ordninger til fremme af horisontale, sektormæssige eller regionale målsætninger.
As with the previous survey, the most marked trend can be observed in the continuing high volumes of aid granted on an ad hoc basis to individual enterprises and not covered by schemes promoting cross-industry, sectoral or regional objectives.
Ad hoc­støtte. der hovedsagelig ydes til redning og omstrukturering af virksomheder, steg størrelsesmæssigt fra 6% af den samlede støtte til disse sektorer i 1992 til 16% i 1996.
Ad hoc aid, which is granted mainly for rescuing and restructuring companies, increased in volume from 6% of total aid to these sectors in 1992 to 16% in 1996.
Fløje statsstøtteniveauer er fortsat en konkurrencefordrejende faktor.
High levels of state aid continue to create distortions of competition.
En streng statsstøtte­politik og kontrol hermed er fortsat af stor betydning, hvis Europa skal styrke sin konkurrenceevne på verdensmarkederne.
A tough state aid policy and close monitoring remain important if Europe is to become more competitive on world markets.
Pã Det Europæiske Råd i Cardiff understregede medlemsstaterne faktisk behovet for at fremme konkurrencen og reducere fordrejende foranstaltninger såsom statsstøtte.
At the European Council meeting in Cardiff, Member States emphasised the need to promote competition and to reduce distortions such as state aid.
Formålet med moderniseringsinitiativet er at øge gennemsigtigheden og retssikkerheden, styrke effektiviteten af systemet til kontrol af statsstøtte, forstærke kontrollen, navnlig i store sager med ad hoc­støtte. samt forenkle kontrolsystemet for mindre betydningsfulde sager.
The aim of the modernisation drive is to improve transparency and legal certainty, to make the state aid monitoring system more efficient, to reinforce vetting, in particular in cases involving large volumes of ad hoc aid, and to simplify the monitoring system for more minor cases.
I 1998 koncentrerede Kommissionen sine bestræbelser om at forenkle og klarlægge procedurereglerne og om at samle ressourcerne om en strengere kontrol med de alvorligste tilfælde.
In 1998 the Commission focused its efforts on simplifying and clarifying the procedural rules and on concentrating resources on closer monitoring of the most important cases.
Det hedder i denne artikel, at Rådet på forslag fra Kommissionen kan udstede de nødvendige forordninger om kontrol med statsstøtte.
This article provides that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may make any appropriate regulations for reviewing state aid.
Kommissionen har fremsat forslag til to sådanne forordninger: den 16. november 1998 godkendte Rådet et forslag fra Kommissionen om en procedureforordning89. Den 7. maj 1998 vedtog Rådet Kommissionens forslag til forordning, som skal sætte Kommissionen i stand til at fritage visse kategorier af horisontal statsstøtte for anmeldelseskravene'"'.
The Commission presented proposals for two such regulations: on 16 November the Council agreed a Commission proposal for a procedural regulation,89 and on 7 May it adopted the Commission proposal for a regulation enabling the Commission to exempt certain categories of horizontal, or cross-industry, aid from the notification requirement.90
Foruden disse forordninger vedtog Kommissionen den 11. november en meddelelse om anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne på foranstaltninger vedrørende direkte beskatning af virk­somhederne'".
In addition to these regulations, the Commission adopted a notice on the application of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation on 11 November91 and a framework on
Forslag lil Radels forordning (EF) om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF­traktatens artikel 93, EFT C 116 af 16.4.1998.
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ C 116, 16.4.1998).
Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 994/98 al 7. maj 1998 om anvendelse af traktalens arlikel 92 οχ 93 pà visse former for horisontal statsstøtte. EFF L 142 af 14.5.1998. EFT C 384 af 10.12.1998.
Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to certain categories of horizontal state aid (OJ L 142, 14.5.1998).
Gruppefritagelser for statsstotte
Block exemptions for state aid