natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retten var under ingen omstændighe der forpligtet til at gå så vidt i sin under søgelse af, hvorvidt de samme forhold ligeledes var inddraget i en straffesag på det tidspunkt, hvor sagen verserede for den.
The Court of First Instance was not required to go so far in considering whether the same facts formed the subjectmatter of criminal proceedings at the time when the disciplinary proceedings were pending before it.
Det var ikke nødvendigt for Retten at udsætte sagen eller at afsige dom på et senere tidspunkt.
There was no need for it to stay the proceedings or to reserve judgment.
Den omstændighed, at indbringelse af søgsmål ikke har nogen suspensiv virkning i henhold til EF-trakta-tens artikel 185, bekræfter ligeledes dette.
That is also confirmed by the rule in Article 185 of the EC Treaty that actions brought before the Community judicature are not to have suspensory effect.
Men selv om man ikke følger ovenstående betragtninger, fremgår det af undersøgelsen
Even if the foregoing considerations are not fol
Ifølge appellanten har Retten i sin dom baseret sig på ukorrekte grunde og har hverken hvad angår de faktiske omstændigheder eller de retlige forhold truffet de konklusioner, der kan udledes af sagsakterne.
Mr Tzoanos maintains that the Court of First Instance relied in its judgment on flawed reasoning and did not draw the proper factual or legal inferences from the documents before it.
Han henviser i denne henseende til den anfægtede doms præmis 203, hvori Retten fastslog, at Kommissionen i den pågældende sag ikke begrundede appellantens ansvar for den budgetmæssige og finansielle opfølgning af et projekt med dennes egenskab af betalingsanviser.
He refers in that regard to paragraph 203 of the judgment, where the Court of First Instance states that in the present proceedings the Commission did not base his responsibility for the budgetary and financial monitoring of a project on his capacity as authorising officer for payments.
Appel lanten understreger, at Retten konkluderede, at han ikke kunne fritages for ethvert ansvar på dette område med henvisning til, at han ikke havde denne egenskab.
The Court of First Instance concludes that Mr Tzoanos cannot escape all responsibility in that field by disputing that he acted in that capacity.
Imidlertid vedrører det ansvar, der er henført til ham, netop, ifølge ham, at han blev anset for betalingsanviser. Da han imidlertid ikke har anvist betalinger, kan der ikke, fort sætter han, påhvile ham noget ansvar på dette område.
The responsibility attributed to him nevertheless relates specifically to the powers of authorising officer for payments.
Appellanten henviser i denne henseende til den afgørelse, hvori hans klage udtrykkeligt blev afvist. I denne afgørelse havde Kommissionen — med urette — anset ham som betalingsanviser.
Mr Tzoanos refers in that regard to the decision expressly rejecting his complaint, where the Commission incorrectly describes him as authorising officer for payments.
Kommissionen har således baseret sit klagepunkt herpå.
The Commission therefore based its complaint on his having acted in that capacity.
Det var Rettens opgave at udlede følgerne af det forhold, at han ikke havde udøvet denne funktion.
It was for the Court of First Instance to draw the consequences from the fact that he had not acted in that capacity.
Kun de tilsidesættelser, der henhørte under hans ansvarsområde, kunne gøres gældende mod ham.
Only misconduct coming within the scope of his responsibility could be attributed to him.
I kraft af hans stilling som chef for enheden XXIII.A3 tillægger Kommissionen ham ansvaret for forsømmeligheder, der reelt må tilregnes generaldirektøren.
The Commission, however ascribed to him, as Head of Unit XXIII.A.3, responsibility for breaches which in reality were attributable to the Director-General.
Kommissionen gør heroverfor gældende, at den måde, hvorpå appellanten har citeret den anfægtede dom, er vildledende, for så vidt som appellanten kun fremhæver en bestemt passus i hele argumentationen. Rettens konklusioner hviler ikke på den konstatering, at Kommissionen ikke baserede appellantens ansvar på den nes egenskab af betalingsanviser.
The Commission contends, on the other hand, that the way in which the appellant refers to the judgment gives a false impression, since he picks out just one particular passage from the entire argument.
Retten har uafhængigt af spørgsmålet om funktion som betalingsanviser anført, at som chef for den pågældende enhed var appellanten forpligtet til at efterprøve berettigelsen af ansøgninger om betaling, således at han var personlig ansvarlig, såfremt en betaling viste sig at være uberettiget.
The Court of First Instance stated, independently of the ques tion concerning the duties of authorising officer for payments, that in his capacity as head of that unit Mr Tzoanos was under an obligation to check the validity of requests for payment, so that he was personally responsible where a payment proved to be unjustified.
Kommissionen understreger endvidere, at en sådan for pligtelse hører under Rettens faktiske konstateringer, som ikke kan anfægtes.
The Commission also points out that the existence of that obligation is a finding of fact by the Court of First Instance and is therefore not open to challenge.
derefter, i hvilket omfang Kommissionen havde draget appellanten til ansvar i den anfægtede disciplinærafgørelse.
It then determined the extent of the responsibilities which the Commission had ascribed to him in the contested disciplinary decision.
Derefter undersøgte den i detaljer appellantens argumenter vedrørende de områder, som han ifølge Kommissionen havde ansvaret for med hensyn til den budgetmæssige og finansielle opfølgning af projekter.
It proceeded to examine in detail Mr Tzoanos's arguments in relation to the responsibilities imputed to him by the Commission in connection with the monitoring of the budgetary and financial aspects of the projects.
I dom mens præmis 202 drog Retten den konklusion, at enheden var pålagt visse opgaver, som ligeledes omfattede den budgetmæssige og finansielle opfølgning.
At paragraph 202 of the judgment it reached the conclusion that the Unit had been entrusted with certain tasks which also encompassed budgetary and financial monitoring.
Retten finder endvidere, at disse opgaver ikke er blevet varetaget korrekt, og at ansvaret for de konstaterede forsømmelser under alle omstændigheder påhvilede den tjeneste mand, der var chef for enheden, i det mindste da denne ikke har bevist at have gjort alt for at udføre disse opgaver.
The Court of First Instance further held that those tasks were not properly carried out and that in any event the misconduct established fell within the responsibilities of the official in charge of the Unit, at the very least because he had not shown that he did everything to carry out those tasks.
Retten konkluderer heraf, at appellanten heller ikke kan hævde, at den omstændighed, at han ikke var betalingsanviser, fritager ham fra ethvert ansvar.
The Court of First Instance concluded that Mr Tzoanos could not claim that the fact that he had not authorised payments exempted him from any responsibility.
Det er først efter denne udførlige undersøgelse, som ikke kan anfægtes, at Retten anfører, at der i øvrigt i den foreliggende sag skal henvises til, at Kommissionen ikke baserer appellantens ansvar på dennes egenskab af betalingsanviser. anviser.
Only after carrying out this detailed examination, which cannot be faulted, did the Court of First Instance also observe that in the present proceedings the Commission did not base the applicant's responsibility on his capacity as authorising officer for payments.
Som det fremgår af den anfægtede dom, har Retten ikke blot undersøgt, hvorvidt appellanten skulle drages til ansvar som betalingsanviser, men har først og fremmest — fra og med præmis 187 — undersøgt, hvilke funktioner han var pålagt at varetage. Retten fastslog
As may be seen from the judgment, the Court of First Instance did not merely ascertain whether Mr Tzoanos was to be
Idet Retten således når frem til den konklusion, at de påtalte forsømmelser faldt inden for appellantens ansvarsområde — uanset om han var betalingsanviser eller ej — har den foretaget en faktisk konstatering, som ikke kan efterprøves under en appelsag.
In thus reaching the conclusion that the misconduct referred to fell within the appellant's responsibilities, irrespective of whether he was the authorising officer for payments, the Court of First Instance made a finding of fact which cannot be reviewed in an appeal.
Det andet anbringende
The second ground of appeal is therefore inadmissible in so far as it seeks
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT ALBER — SAG C-191/98 P havde haft mulighed for at gøre sig bekendt med alle de faktiske omstændigheder, som afgørelsen var baseret på.
OPINION OF MR ALBER — CASE C-191/98 P the decision. It was also untrue that he had been able to acquaint himself with all the facts on which the decision was based.
kan således ikke antages til realitetsbehandling, for så vidt det stiller spørgsmålstegn ved Rettens faktiske konstateringer angående appellantens ansvarsområde.
to challenge the findings of fact of the Court of First Instance relating to a matter for which the appellant was responsible.
Dette punkt skal imidlertid ikke behandles videre, da det andet anbringende under alle omstændigheder er ubegrundet, eftersom Retten alligevel har draget de nødvendige og præcise konsekvenser af den omstændighed, at appellanten ikke var betalingsanviser, for så vidt den har baseret sig på det faktiske og ikke blot formelle ansvar, som appellanten var pålagt i enheden.
That point may be left there, however, since the second ground of appeal is in any event unfounded, since the Court of First Instance none the less drew the necessary and proper conclusions from the fact that Mr Tzoanos was not authorising officer for payments, because it based its decision on the actual, and not merely formal, responsibilities which he exercised within the Unit.
Tredje anbringende (spørgsmålet om kontradiktionsprincippet, princippet om parternes ligestilling og begrundelsespligten)
Third ground of appeal (the principles of inter partes proceedings, equality of arms and the obligation to state relevant reasons)
Appellanten gør gældende, at han eventuelt i andre dokumenter kunne have fundet omstændigheder til støtte for sit forsvar og sin argumentation.
The appellant might possibly have found in other documents evidence to support his defence and his arguments.
Ifølge ham fremgår det af dommen i sagen Solvay mod Kommissionen, at den ret til kontradiktion, som appellanten havde under den administrative procedure, bliver alt for indskrænket i forhold til Kommissionens beføjelser, »som indebærer såvel den myndighedsfunktion at meddele klagepunkterne som den at træffe afgørelse, og dette med et dybere kendskab til sagens akter end sagsøgeren«14.
It follows from Solvay v Commission that the rights of the defence which the applicant enjoys during the administrative procedure would be excessively restricted in relation to the powers of the Commission, 'which would then act as both the authority notifying the objections and the deciding authority, while having more detailed knowledge of the case-file than the defence'.14
Kommissionen har heroverfor anført, at Retten i sagen fastslog, at appellanten havde indrømmet at have haft aktindsigt i de samme dokumenter som dem, både Disciplinærrådet og ansættelsesmyndigheden rådede over. Dette punkt anfægtes tilsyneladende heller ikke i appellen.
In that regard, the Commission asserts that the Court of First Instance found in the present case that the applicant had admit ted having had access to the same documents as were available to the Disciplinary Board and the appointing authority.
Under disse omstændigheder er det vanskeligt at se, hvorledes Retten skulle have fejlanvendt princippet om parternes ligestilling.
It is impossible to see, therefore, how the Court of First Instance misapplied the principle of equality of arms.
Appellanten finder, at den anfægtede dom ligeledes bør ophæves, fordi kontradiktionsprincippet og princippet om parternes ligestilling ikke har fundet anven delse.
Mr Tzoanos considers that the judgment should also be set aside on the ground that the principles of inter partes proceed ings and equality of arms were not applied.
Ifølge appellanten har Retten med urette i præmis 329 i dommen fastslået, at appellanten havde haft aktindsigt i de samme sagsakter, som Disciplinærrådet rådede over, da det afgav udtalelse, og som forelå for ansættelsesmyndigheden, da den vedtog sin afgørelse. Det er ligeledes med urette, at den konstaterede, at han
The Court of First Instance was wrong to state at paragraph 329 of the judgment that Mr Tzoanos had had access to the file which was available to the Disciplinary Board when it delivered its opinion and to the appointing authority when it adopted
Hvad angår de øvrige dokumenter, som appellanten havde anmodet om at få frem lagt, understreger Kommissionen, at hver ken Disciplinærrådet eller ansættelsesmyndigheden foretog en udvælgelse af dokumenterne. menterne.
As regards the other documents whose production Mr Tzoanos had requested, the Commission points out that neither the Disciplinary Board nor the appointing authority had carried out a selection of the documents.
vet overholdt, og at appellanten har haft kendskab til alle de dokumenter, som afgørelsen var baseret på.
the decision was based.
Ifølge Retten havde appellanten ligeledes tilstrækkelig meget tid til at fremsætte sine bemærkninger om disse dokumenter.
He had also had sufficient time to submit his observations on those documents.
Retten under søgte derefter, hvorvidt der ville være foretaget andre konstateringer, såfremt appellanten havde haft adgang til andre dokumenter end dem, han havde fået til sendt under den disciplinære procedure.
The Court of First Instance then ascertained whether other findings would have been established if the applicant had had access to documents other than those communicated to him during the course of the disciplinary pro ceedings.
I så fald havde der været tale om en til sidesættelse af retten til kontradiktion, såfremt de af appellanten ønskede dokumenter havde vist, at han ikke havde et budgetmæssigt og finansielt ansvar.
The Court of First Instance observed that in those circumstances it would be necessary to accept that there had been a breach of the rights of the defence if the documents which the applicant sought had shown that he had no responsibility for budgetary or financial matters.
Alle rede på grundlag af de foreliggende — dvs. fremsendte dokumenter — kunne Retten fastslå, uden at begå nogen retlig fejl, at appellanten havde et sådant ansvar.
However, only documents in existence, that is to say communicated, were sufficient for the Court of First Instance to find, without erring in law, that the applicant was responsible.
Ingen af de dokumenter, som ikke var blevet meddelt, kunne således have gjort det muligt for appellanten at anfægte sit ansvarsområde.
None of the documents not communicated to the appellant would therefore have enabled him to deny responsibility.
Derfor kan man også af denne grund ikke påvise nogen fejl i den anfægtede dom.
For that reason, too, no error in the judgment can be established.
Ifølge Kommissionen følger det af dommen i sagen Solvay mod Kommissionen, at man i hver sag bør afgøre og undersøge konkret, hvorvidt en manglende fremlæggelse af visse dokumenter har kun net påvirke procedurens forløb og indholdet af afgørelsen til skade for sagsøgeren. Retten har i den foreliggende sag også foretaget en sådan undersøgelse og konkluderet, at retten til at gøre sig bekendt med andre dokumenter ikke ville have ændret de foretagne konstateringer, da disse var baseret på de dokumenter, som også appellanten havde haft aktindsigt i. Der er her tale om Rettens konstateringer vedrørende faktum, som ikke kan anfægtes under en appelsag.
The Commission maintains that it follows from the Solvay judgment that it is necessary to determine and consider in each case whether the non-disclosure of certain documents may have influenced the proceedings and the content of the decision to the applicant's disadvantage.
Andet klagepunkt
Second complaint
Det skal først og fremmest bemærkes, at Retten i den anfægtede doms præmis 329 understregede, at appellanten ikke under den mundtlige forhandling havde reageret på Kommissionens erklæring om, at han under den disciplinære procedure havde haft aktindsigt i de sagsakter, som også Disciplinærrådet og ansættelsesmyndigheden rådede over.
It should be pointed out, first, that at paragraph 329 of the judgment the Court of First Instance states that the applicant had not responded at the hearing to the Commission's submission to the effect that he had access during the disciplinary pro ceedings to the file which had also been available to the Disciplinary Board and the appointing authority.
Retten udleder heraf, at princippet om parternes ligestilling er ble
The Court of First Instance concluded that the principle of equality of arms had been observed and that Mr Tzoanos had been able to acquaint himself with all the documents on which
Appellanten gør endelig i forbindelse med det tredje anbringende gældende, at klagepunkterne mod ham hverken var tydeligt formuleret eller begrundet. Men da han selv erkender allerede delvist at have påberåbt sig dette klagepunkt under den disciplinære procedure og for Retten selv, må dette argument afvises i appelsagen.
The appellant then claims, in the con text of the third ground of appeal, that the complaints against him were not clearly formulated or reasoned.
Hvad angår det andet projekt — IERAD — fastslår Retten i præmis 278, at i mangel af yderligere oplysninger i den anfægtede afgørelse, bør man undersøge rapporten udarbejdet af GD XX, som denne afgørelse henviser til.
As regards the second project — IERAD — the Court of First Instance states at paragraph 278 that in the absence of further information in the contested decision it was necessary to consider the report of DG XX to which the decision refers.
Det fremgår af nævnte rapport, at de påberåbte uregelmæssigheder netop skyldes appellanten, selv om sidstnævnte ikke nævnes udtryk keligt.
It is apparent from that report that the allegations made are specifically attributable to the appellant, although he is not referred to by name.
Retten fastslår derefter, at henset til disse præciseringer, indholdet af afgørelsen om at afvise klagen og appellantens udta lelser, er det berettiget at anse fire konkrete kritikpunkter for rettet mod ham.
The Court of First Instance then states that in the light of that information, the terms of the decision expressly rejecting the complaint and the applicant's responses, four specific allegations against him can be identified.
Appellanten beskylder Retten for at have sat sig i Kommissionens sted og hvad angår visse projekter selv at have formuleret klagepunkter mod appellanten, som ikke af Kommissionen var præcist formuleret. leret.
The appellant criticises the Court of First Instance for having substituted itself for the Commission and having, in respect of certain projects, itself formulated the allegations against him which the Commission had not precisely formulated.
Retten fremhæver senere, at Kommissionen har præciseret sine klagepunkter i den udtrykkelige afgørelse om afvisning af klagen.
The Court of First Instance goes on to state that the Commission specified the allegations in its decision expressly reject ing the complaint.
Hvad angår det tredje projekt — BDG — fremhæver Retten, at det af rapporten fra GD XX, hvortil der henvises i den disciplinære afgørelse, kan udledes, at der er to uregelmæssigheder, som er lagt appellanten til last.
Also, as regards the third project — BDG — the Court of First Instance states that it can be inferred from the report of DG XX, to which the disciplinary decision refers, that the irregularities attributable to Mr Tzoanos are two in number.
Disse nævnes straks.
They are then specified.
Retten påviser derefter på detaljeret vis, at disse klagepunkter rent faktisk kan gøres gældende over for appellanten.
The Court of First Instance then demonstrates in detail that those allegations can in fact be formulated against the applicant.
Hvad angår det første projekt — IFTO — henviser Retten i dommens præmis 266 til rapporten fra GD XX i mangel af yderligere oplysninger i den anfægtede afgørelse.
As regards the first project — IFTO — the Court of First Instance refers at paragraph 266 of the judgment to the report of DG XX, in the absence of further information in the contested decision.
I denne rapport, som afgørelsen henviser til, angik to kritikpunkter netop appellanten.
That report, to which the decision refers, con tains two specific allegations relating to the applicant.
I henhold til artikel 122 i Domstolens procesreglement træffer denne afgørelse om sagens omkostninger, når der ikke gives appellanten medhold.
Under Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the Court is to make a decision as to costs where the appeal is unfounded.
Da appellanten har tabt sagen, pålægges det ham at betale sagens omkostninger i henhold til procesreglementets artikel 69, stk. 2, første afsnit.
Since the appellant has been unsuccessful in this case, he must be ordered to pay the costs pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure.
Henset til ovenstående bør der træffes følgende afgørelse:
On those grounds, I consider that the Court should:
DOMSTOLENS DOM (Første Afdeling) 18. november 1999*
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber) 18 November 1999 *
I sag C-191/98 P,
In Case C-191/98 P,
Georges Tzoanos, forhenværende tjenestemand ved Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber, Athen (Grækenland), ved advokat E. Boigelot, Bruxelles, og med valgt adresse i Luxembourg hos advokat L. Schiltz, 2, rue du Fort Rheinsheim, appellant, angående appel af dom afsagt den 19. marts 1998 af De Europæiske Fælles skabers Ret i Første Instans (Fjerde Afdeling) i sag T-74/96, Tzoanos mod Kommissionen (Sml. Pers.
Georges Tzoanos, a former official of the Commission of the European Communities, residing in Athens (Greece), represented by E. Boigelot, of the Brussels Bar, with an address for service in Luxembourg at the Chambers of L. Schiltz, 2 Rue du Fort Rheinsheim, appellant,
Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber ved ledende juridisk konsulent G. Valsesia, som befuldmægtiget, bistået af advokaterne D. Waelbroeck og
Commission of the European Communities, represented by G. Valsesia, Principal Legal Adviser, acting as Agent, with D. Waelbroeck and O. Speltdoorn, of the
DOMSTOLEN (Første Afdeling) sammensat af formanden for Femte Afdeling, D.A.O. Edward (refererende dommer), som fungerende formand for Første Afdeling, og dommerne P. Jann og M. Wathelet, generaladvokat: S. Alber justitssekretær: R. Grass, på grundlag af den refererende dommers rapport, og efter at generaladvokaten har fremsat forslag til afgørelse den 9. marts 1999, afsagt følgende
THE COURT (First Chamber), composed of: D.A.O. Edward (Rapporteur), President of the Fifth Chamber, acting as President of the First Chamber, P. Jann and M. Wathelet, Judges,
Ved appelskrift indleveret til Domstolens Justitskontor den 19. maj 1998 har Georges Tzoanos i medfør af artikel 49 i EF-statutten og de tilsvarende bestemmelser i EKSF- og Euratom-statutten for Domstolen iværksat appel af
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 19 May 1998, Mr Tzoanos brought an appeal, pursuant to Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and the corresponding provisions of the ECSC and Euratom Statutes of