natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Court of Appeal anførte, at EØF­Traktatens artikel 220 har til formål at sikre forenk­ling af formaliteter vedrørende gensidig anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser i medlemsstaterne.
The Court of Appeal stated that the object of Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome was to secure simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforce­ment of judgments between Member States.
Imidlertid gælder det tilstræbte fælles grundlag for kompetencen ik­ke overalt, da det følger af konventionens artikel 4, at såfremt sagsøgte ikke har bopæl på en kontraherende stats område, afgøres retternes kompetence i hver enkelt kontra­herende stat efter statens egen lovgivning.
However, the common basis of jurisdiction envisaged did not apply worldwide since under Article 4 of the Convention, if a de­fendant was not domiciled in a Contracting State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Contracting State was to be determined by the law of that State.
Det ville ikke være i modstrid med konven­tionens formål, nemlig at indføre en hurtig, indbyrdes afstemt og sikker procedure for fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser, hvis den engelske retsinstans i et tilfælde, hvor sagsøgte har bopæl i England, erklærede sig inkompetent, fordi det var mere hensigtsmæssigt, at sagen blev behandlet af en retsinstans i et tredjeland; hvis den engelske ret erklærede sig inkompetent, ville der nemlig ikke være en engelsk retsafgørelse, der skulle fuldbyr­des i en anden kontraherende stat.
For the English court to refuse jurisdiction, in a case against a person domiciled in England, on the ground that the court of some non­Contracting State was more appropriate did not impair the Convention's object of establishing an expeditious, harmonious and certain procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, since if it refused jurisdiction there would be no English judgment to be enforced in other Contracting States.
Hvis den engelske ret som følge af konventionens artikel 2 ikke havde beføjelse til at erklære sig inkompetent i en sag mod en sagsøgt med bopæl i England, fordi det var retterne i et tredjeland, der var det hensigtsmæssige værneting, måtte det heraf følge, at den lige så lidt havde beføjelse til at erklære sig in­kompetent i en sådan sag på grund af, at der allerede verserede en sag (lis alibi pen­dens) ved en ret i et tredjeland.
If the English court as a result of Article 2 did not have power to decline jurisdiction to entertain an action against a person domiciled in England on the ground that the courts of a non­Contract­ing State were the more appropriate forum, it must equally have no power to refuse to entertain such an action on the ground of lis alibi pendens, if the lis was pending in the courts of a non­Contracting State.
Konventionen indeholder imidlertid ingen regler for det tilfælde, at der verserer en sag mod en sagsøgt med bopæl i en kontraherende stat ved en ret i denne stat og en (lignende) sag — der måske er anlagt tidligere — i et tredjeland.
There was, however, nothing in the Convention to deal with the situation where there was one lis pending in a court of a Contracting State against a person domiciled in that State and another, possibly earlier, lis pending in a non­Contracting State.
Konventionen indeholder lige så lidt regler for det tilfælde, at parterne har aftalt, at retterne i et tredjeland skal være enekompetente.
There was also nothing in the Convention to deal with the situ­ation where the parties had agreed that the courts of a non­Contracting State should have exclusive jurisdiction.
Hvis artikel 2 imidlertid hav­de en sådan bindende virkning, som High Court antog i Berisford­sagen (jfr. ovenfor under 1­2.1 — B 4), ville de engelske retter være forpligtet til at træffe afgørelse i en sag mod en sagsøgt med bopæl i England, skønt begge parter havde aftalt, at retterne i et tredjeland skulle være enekompetente. Dette ville være i strid med konventionens for­mål.
But if Article 2 had the full mandatory effect which the High Court thought it had in Berisford (supra, 1­2.1 — Β 4), the English courts would be bound to hear and decide an action against a person domiciled in England even though both parties had agreed that the courts of some non­Contracting State should have ex­clusive jurisdiction.
Da der imidlertid kun er tale om en aftale mellem kontraherende stater, vil de bærende elementer i konventionen ikke blive undergravet, hvis den engelske ret i et tilfælde, der ikke berører nogen anden kontraherende stat, har en skønsmæssig beføj­else til at erklære sig inkompetent, fordi retterne i et tredjeland er det hensigtsmæssige værneting.
Since it was merely an agreement between Contracting States, the framework of the Convention would not be destroyed if the English court had a discretion to refuse juris­diction, on the ground that the courts of a non­Contracting State were the appropriate forum, in a case with which no other Contracting State was concerned.
I en yderligere dom af 13. marts 1991 ([1991] 4 All E.R. 348; [1992] Ch. 72; [1991] 3 W.L.R. 423) traf Court of Appeal (England), Civil Division, den afgørelse, at retterne i Argentina var det hensigtsmæssige værneting.
By a further judgment of 13 March 1991 ([1991] 4 All E.R. 348; [1992] Ch.
[kompetencereglerne er udtømmende]
[Exclusion of other rules on jurisdiction]
(Jfr. også 1­16.4 ­
(See also 1-16.4 - Β 4; 157 - Β 12)
Kompetence — udelukkede nationale kompetenceregler codice di procedura civile (forbud mod værnetingsaftaler)
Jurisdiction — Exclusion of national rules on jurisdiction — Article 2 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (prohibition against prorogation of jurisdiction) — Scope of the exclusion
Fortolkningen af konventionen — protokollen af 3. juni 1971 — forelæggelse for Dom­stolen til præjudiciel afgørelse (artikel 3) — klar regel — forelæggelse ikke nødvendig
Interpretation of the Convention — Protocol of 3 June 1971 — Reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling (Art. 3) — Clarity of the rule — Reference not necessary
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — grunde til nægtelse heraf — modstrid med grundlæggende retsprincipper i fuldbyrdelsesstaten (artikel 27, nr. 1) — dom til beta­ling af en højere erstatning end den, der i et lignende tilfælde skal betales efter ita­liensk ret — ingen modstrid med grundlæggende italienske retsprincipper
Recognition and enforcement — Grounds of refusal — Infringement of public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought (Art. 27(1)) — Order for the payment of greater compensation than that provided for under Italian law in a case ofthat kind — Not contrary to Italian public policy
Fuldbyrdelse — meddelelse af fuldbyrdelsespåtegning (artikel 31) — procedure, der henhører under den egentlige retspleje — der kan under denne procedure træffes afgø­relse vedrørende omkostningsspørgsmålet
Enforcement — Issue of order for enforcement (Art. 31) — Proceedings regarding con­tested jurisdiction — Admissibility of a decision on costs given in such proceedings
Winkelmann Mineraria, der havde hjemsted i Italien, havde indgivet i anledning af, at der i Italien var givet tilladelse til fuldbyrdelse af en dom afsagt af Tribunal de com­merce de Bruxelles, hvorved Winkelmann var blevet dømt til at betale et bestemt beløb til Ciprut.
The Corte d'appello, Milan, dismissed an appeal lodged by SpA Winkelmann Mine­raria, a company domiciled in Italy, against an order for the enforcement in Italy of a judgment of the Tribunal de commerce, Brussels, ordering Winkelmann to pay a speci­fied sum to Mr Ciprut.
Winkelmann anfægtede afgørelsen ved kassationsappel; indstævnte i kassa­tionsappelsagen indgav kontraanke.
Winkelmann lodged an appeal in cassation against that deci­sion ; the respondent to the appeal cross-appealed.
Corte di cassazione gav ikke Winkelmann medhold i, at Corte d'appello i forbindelse med sin afgørelse om at tillade tvangsfuldbyrdelse af den belgiske dom skulle have an­set den værnetingsaftale, der var indgået ved, at sagsøgte havde svaret i sagen, for ugyl­dig, da denne var i strid med artikel 2 i Codice di procedura civile, som forbyder par­terne at indgå en værnetingsaftale, hvorefter de italienske domstole ikke skal have kompetencen.
It held that there were no grounds for the argument that the Corte d'appello, when authorizing enforcement of the Belgian decision, should have regarded as ineffective the agreement on jurisdiction pleaded by the defendant in its substantive defence, since that agreement was contrary to Article 2 of the Codice di procedura civile, which pre­cludes the conclusion of an agreement on jurisdiction to the disadvantage of the Italian courts.
Denne bestemmelse fandt ifølge kassationsappellanten anvendelse i det
The appellant in the proceedings before the Corte di cassazione considered that
(fortsat I) foreliggende tilfælde, da forbuddet i konventionens artikel 3 kun gælder til fordel for den udenlandske sagsøgte, ikke til skade for ham. Corte di cassazione fandt derimod, at forbuddet mod værnetingsaftaler i artikel 2 i Codice di procedura civile ikke fandt anvendelse over for personer med bopæl i en kontraherende stat, heller ikke når denne artikel blev gjort gældende for at forhindre virkningerne af en fravigelse af det generel­le kriterium for kompetencen i henhold til konventionens artikel 2.
(continued 1) provision to be applicable in this case, since the exclusion contained in Article 3 of the Convention was only capable of operating in favour of the foreign defendant and could not work to his disadvantage.
I betragtning af, at reglen er klar, var det ikke nødvendigt at forelægge EF­Domstolen et spørgsmål vedrø­rende fortolkningen i medfør af Luxembourg­protokollen af 3. juni 1971.
Given the clarity of the rule, there was no need for a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the question of interpretation pursuant to the Luxembourg Protocol of 3 June 1971.
Corte di cassazione forkastede endvidere det argument, at den udenlandske dom, som fastsatte en højere erstatning for opsigelse af en kontrakt end den, der efter italiensk ret ville være blevet fastsat i et lignende tilfælde, var i modstrid med grundlæggende ita­lienske retsprincipper og derfor ikke kunne anerkendes, jfr. konventionens artikel 27, nr. 1.
The Corte di cassazione also rejected the argument that the foreign judgment, in which compensation for the termination of the contract was assessed in a sum greater than would have been awarded under Italian law in a similar case, was contrary to Italian public policy and was thus precluded from recognition pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Convention.
Corte di cassazione fastslog, at den omstændighed, at den af den udenlandske retsinstans anvendte ret var forskellig fra italiensk ret, ikke i sig selv indebar en tilsi­desættelse af grundlæggende italienske retsprincipper, som førte til, at den udenland­ske dom ikke kunne anerkendes, jfr. konventionens artikel 27, nr. 1.
It held that the mere difference between the foreign law applied by the foreign court and Italian law did not in itself result in an infringement of Italian public policy such as to preclude recognition of the foreign judgment under Article 27(1) of the Convention.
Corte di cassazione gav heller ikke kassationsappellanten medhold i den sidste kassa­tionsgrund, idet retten — i overensstemmelse med sin egen praksis — fastslog, at der i forbindelse med afgørelsen om tilladelse til fuldbyrdelse også kunne træffes afgørelse vedrørende omkostningsspørgsmålet, da proceduren i henhold til konventionens arti­kel 31 ff. ikke henhører under den frivillige, men under den egentlige retspleje.
The Corte di cassazione also rejected the final ground of appeal, holding — and thereby confirming its own case­law in that regard — that, in addition to a decision authorizing enforcement, a decision on costs could also be given, since proceedings under Article 31 et seq. of the Convention involved not voluntary jurisdiction but con­tested jurisdiction.
Denne procedure har samme karakter og samme formål som den almindelige procedure ved­rørende anerkendelse af udenlandske afgørelser (som den er et specielt udslag af). Den skal således endeligt afgøre en reel eller potentiel konflikt mellem subjektive rettighe­der for så vidt angår den udenlandske doms eksigibilitet.
They were of the same nature, and had the same objective, as general proceedings for the recognition of foreign judgments (in relation to which they ranked as special proceedings): they were intended to resolve decisively an existing or potential conflict between rights relating to the enforceability of the foreign judgment.
Proceduren har selv i den før­ste — ikke­kontradiktoriske — fase karakter af egentlig retspleje, idet Corte d'appello skal fastslå, at betingelserne for at tillade fuldbyrdelse er til stede, i en afgørelse, som får retskraft, hvis der ikke indgives begæring om genoptagelse inden for den fastsatte frist.
Although not inter partes, the initial phase of the proceedings was contentious in nature, inasmuch as the Corte d'appello had to find that the conditions for allowing the enforcement of the foreign judgment had been met and that finding was contained in a decision which acquired legal force if an appeal was not lodged within the time allowed.
Kompetence — begrænset kompetence for retterne udenfor den stat, hvor sagsøgte har bopæl — en videre kompetence begrundet i præklusionsregler i national ret — ikke til­ladt — konventionens udtømmende regler har forrang
Jurisdiction — Limitation on jurisdiction of courts outside the defendant's State of domicile — Establishment of further jurisdiction by virtue of rules of national law re­lating to time­limits — Inadmissibility — Primacy of the conclusive rules laid down by the Convention
(fortsat 1) passivitet som en viljeserklæring efter international sædvane — særlig tilknytning til den nationale ret, der gælder for den, der udviser passivitet
(continued 1)
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — opfyldelsesværneting (artikel 5, nr. 1) — sælgers erstatningspligt for ikke­levering af salgsgenstanden — bestemmelse afopfyl­delsesstedet efter den uniforme lov om internationale løsørekøb
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Jurisdiction of the courts for the place of per­formance (Art. 5(1)) — Obligation on the vendor to pay compensation for failure to de­liver the goods purchased — Determination of the place of performance in accordance with the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
Sagsøgeren, som havde bopæl i Tyskland, havde indgået en kontrakt med sagsøgte, en italiensk virksomhed, om køb af sko, som sagsøgte skulle levere.
The plaintiff, domiciled in Germany, concluded a contract with the defendant, an Ital­ian undertaking, for the sale and delivery of shoes by the latter.
Kontrakten blev ind­gået ved en ordre fra sagsøgeren, hvorefter Köln skulle være værneting, og en ordre­bekræftelse fra sagsøgte, som ikke kom ind på værnetingsklausulen.
The contract was con­cluded by the despatch of an order form by the plaintiff, specifying that the courts of Cologne should have jurisdiction to decide any disputes, and by a written acceptance by the defendant, in which the jurisdiction clause was not agreed to.
Da varen ikke blev leveret, anlagde sagsøgeren sag mod sagsøgte ved Landgericht Köln med påstand om erstatning.
Upon the defend­ant's failure to deliver the goods, the plaintiff instituted proceedings for compensation against the defendant before the Landgericht Köln.
Landgericht fastsatte en frist for sagsøgtes indgivelse af svarskrift, som sag­søgte ikke overholdt.
The Landgericht fixed a time­limit for the filing of a defence by the defendant, with which the latter failed to comply.
I et senere indgivet processkrift fremsatte sagsøgte indsigelse om, at retten savnede international kompetence, og tog kun subsidiært stilling til sagens realitet.
In its written pleading, filed subsequently, it raised an objection of lack of international juris­diction and entered an appearance only in the alternative.
Landgericht forkastede indsigelsen i medfør af §§ 282, stk. 3, og 296, stk. 3, i den tyske Zivilprozeßordnung (ZPO), fordi forsinkelsen ikke var undskyldelig, og gav sagsøgeren medhold.
The Landgericht dismissed the objection pursuant to Paragraphs 282(3) and 296(3) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) on the ground of delay without valid excuse, and upheld the claim.
Sagsøgtes appel førte til, at sagen blev afvist.
An appeal by the defendant led to the action being dismissed.
Efter Oberlandesgericht Köln's opfattelse var det med urette, at indsigelsen om mang­lende kompetence blev forkastet, selv om indsigelsen faktisk var blevet fremsat for sent, og undskyldningen ikke var tilstrækkelig.
The Oberlandesgericht Köln took the view that the objection as to lack of jurisdiction had been wrongly rejected, even taking into account the allegation that the objection had in fact been raised out of time and that no adequate excuse had been given for its belated submission.
Forkastelsen af indsigelsen førte nemlig til, at de tyske retter traf afgørelse om sagens realitet, selv om Bruxelles­konventionen fandt anvendelse, og der ifølge denne slet ikke var værneting i Tyskland.
Such rejection resulted in the matter being decided by the German courts despite the fact that, according to the Brussels Convention, which applied to the case, the German courts did not have jurisdiction.
Dette resultat var i modstrid med konventionen, efter hvis artikel 3, stk. 1, personer, der har bopæl på en kontraherende stats område, kun kan sagsøges ved retterne i en anden kontraheren­de stat i medfør af de regler, der er fastsat i afdeling 2 til 6.
Such an outcome was contrary to the Convention, the first paragraph of Article 3 of which provides that persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6 of Title II.
Efter disse regler gælder, at der kun kan opstå værneting som følge af for sen fremsættelse af indsigelse om mang­lende kompetence, såfremt sagsøgte svarer i sagen og først derefter fremsætter indsigel­sen (artikel 18).
According to those Sections, the only circumstance in which jurisdiction may vest as a result of delay in the raising of an objection of lack of jurisdiction is where the defendant pleads as to the substance of the case and only subsequently raises the objection (Art. 18).
Der forelå derfor en konflikt mellem konventionens værnetingsbestem­melser og den uindskrænkede anvendelse af bestemmelserne i ZPO om for sen fremsættelse. Fordi konventionen har forrang, måtte denne konflikt løses til fordel for konventionen.
There was thus a conflict be­tween the provisions of the Convention relating to jurisdiction and the unrestricted ap­plication of the rules of the ZPO regarding failure to comply with time­limits.
For så vidt som anvendelsen af de relevante bestemmelser i ZPO førte til, at tyske retter traf afgørelse i en sag, skønt der efter konventionen ikke var værne­ting i Tyskland, blev disse bestemmelser derfor fortrængt.
To the extent, therefore, that the application of the relevant provisions of the ZPO resulted in German courts deciding disputes over which they had no jurisdiction under the Con­vention, those provisions were to be disregarded.
Dette strenge formkrav følger af formålet med artikel 17, stk. 1, andet punktum, første og andet alternativ, som er at forhindre, at der kan aftales et værne­ting, ved at der ensidigt anføres et værneting, som den anden part hverken udtrykkeligt samtykker i eller gør indsigelse imod.
That strict formal require­ment was apparent from the objective of the first and second alternatives contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 17, which was to prevent the nomi­nation of a forum by one party alone without either the express consent or the express opposition of the other.
Sagsøgerens ordre opfyldte heller ikke de krav, den skriftlige bekræftelse af en tidligere indgået mundtlig aftale skal opfylde i medfør af det andet alternativ i artikel 17, stk. 1, andet punktum.
Nor did the plaintiffs order form satisfy the requirements of the second possibility contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 17, which required there to be written confirmation of an oral agreement previously agreed between the parties.
En sådan bekræftelse skal nemlig i hele sit indhold falde i tråd med den enighed, der tidligere er opnået mundtligt.
Such confirmation had to accord in its entirety with the oral agreement pre­viously reached.
Sagsøgeren havde ikke ført bevis for, at det var tilfældet.
The onus remained on the plaintiff to prove this.
Sagsøgeren kunne heller ikke påberåbe sig principperne vedrørende passivitet over for en ordrebekræftelse i handelsforhold.
Nor could the plain­tiff rely on the principle of failure to react to a commercial letter of confirmation.
Den nævnte bestemmelse for­udsætter, at der føres bevis for en udtrykkelig viljesoverensstemmelse, og det er ikke tilstrækkeligt hertil, at den anden part blot har udvist passivitet over for ordre­bekræftelsen.
The provision referred to was conditional on proof of express consensus, which was not provided by a mere failure to react to a commercial letter of confirmation.
Der kan efter bestemmelsens formål kun gøres undtagelse fra dette prin­cip, hvis der består et løbende forretningsforhold mellem parterne, og der i forbindelse hermed er opnået enighed mellem dem om værnetinget, hvilket ikke var tilfældet i den­ne sag.
The spirit of the provision was such that the only possible exception to it was where the parties regu­larly transacted business together and reached, in the course of that business relation­ship, a consensus as to the forum for disputes, which was not the case in this instance.
En anvendelse af det tredje alternativ i artikel 17, stk. 1, andet punktum, hvorefter der skal tages hensyn til bestående sædvaner inden for international handel, kunne heller ikke føre til, at de tyske retter fik international kompetence.
Nor did the application of the third possibility contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 17, whereby the practices observed in international trade or commerce were to be taken into account, result in the German courts having interna­tional jurisdiction.
Dette alternativ, der bygger på, at bestemte faktiske betingelser er opfyldt, trådte ganske vist først i kraft i forholdet mellem Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland og Italien den 1. november 1986 og dermed ef­ter parternes brevveksling, men det fandt alligevel anvendelse i den foreliggende sag, da det afgørende tidspunkt ved en værnetingsklausul ikke er det tidspunkt, hvor den blev aftalt, men det tidspunkt, hvor sagen blev anlagt.
It was not until 1 November 1986, and thus after the exchange of correspondence between the parties, that the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy was placed on such a footing as to give effect to the factual as­pects of that possibility. However, it was nevertheless applicable to this dispute, since the decisive point in time at which such a jurisdiction clause took effect was not the time when it was agreed but the time when the proceedings were brought.
Oberlandesgericht udtalte, at reglerne vedrørende passivitet over for en ordrebekræftel­se i handelsforhold udgør en international handelssædvane, som er udbredt i en række andre kontraherende stater.
The rules regarding failure to react to a commercial letter of confirmation represented a practice in international trade or commerce commonly recognized in numerous other Contracting States.
Selv hvis betingelserne for, at der var kommet en værne­tingsaftale i stand efter disse regler, var opfyldt, ville det tredje alternativ dog ikke kun­ne anvendes i det foreliggende tilfælde, da sagsøgte ikke havde eller burde have kend­skab til denne sædvane.
Even if the criteria laid down by those rules in relation to the con­clusion of a jurisdiction agreement had been met, nevertheless the third possibility could not have been applicable in the present case, since the defendant was not aware of that trade practice, nor should it have been aware of it.
Udsendelse 5/februar 1993
Issue ¡/February 1993