natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Corte d'appello di Vene­zia gav sagsøgeren medhold, idet den støttede sin kompetence på konventionens arti­kel 8, stk. 1 ; den udtalte, at da det ikke fremgik af assurancecertifikatet, hvem der var kontrahent i forbindelse med forsikringspolicen, måtte det antages, at kontrahenten og den begunstigede var den samme.
The Corte d'Appello, Venice, gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. It founded its jurisdiction on the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention and held that since the insurance certificate did not indicate who had contracted for the insurance it must be assumed that the contracting party and the beneficiary were the same person.
Den italienske dom blev forsynet med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning af den kompetente Landgericht i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland.
An order for the enforcement of the Italian judgment in the Federal Republic of Ger­many was granted by the appropriate Landgericht.
Rekvisitus indbragte denne afgørelse for Oberlandesgericht, som ændrede Landgericht's afgørelse og afslog begæringen om fuld­byrdelse med den begrundelse, at retten i Venedig ikke havde haft den fornødne kompe­tence.
On appeal by the defendant the Oberlandesgericht reversed the decision of the Landgericht and dismissed the applica­tion for an enforcement order on the ground that the courts in Venice lacked jurisdic­tion.
Ifølge konventionens artikel 8, stk. 1, havde kun retten på det sted, hvor forsik­ringsgiveren eller forsikringstageren har bopæl, kompetence.
The first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention conferred jurisdiction only on the courts for the place of residence of the insurer or the policy-holder (Versicherungs-
1­28 ­ Β 3 fortsat 1) ger i henhold til rammeaftalen, på grundlag af hvilken tilsagnet om dækning var givet.
(continued I) nehmer).1 However, it was clear from the findings of the Italian court that, although the plaintiff was entitled to claim as the insured person under the floating policy, it could on no account be regarded as the policy­holder under the basic contract under which the certificate had been issued.
Rekvirenten indgav herefter »Rechtsbeschwerde« til Bundesgerichtshof og gjorde gæl­dende, at Oberlandesgericht i strid med konventionens artikel 29 havde efterprøvet den italienske afgørelses realitet, idet den trods artikel 28, stk. 2, ikke havde taget hensyn til, at den var bundet af de faktiske omstændigheder, på hvilke den italienske ret havde støt­tet sin kompetence.
Appealing against that judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof on a point of law, the plaintiff contended that the Oberlandesgericht had reviewed the substance of the Italian judgment in breach of Article 29 of the Convention, inasmuch as it had not considered itself bound, in accordance with the second paragraph of Arti­cle 28, by the findings of fact on which the Italian court had based its jurisdiction.
Bundesgerichtshof stadfæstede den anfægtede afgørelse og udtalte under henvisning til konventionens artikel 28, stk. 1, at den italienske dom ikke kunne anerkendes i For­bundsrepublikken Tyskland, da konventionens regler om kompetence i forsikringssager var blevet tilsidesat.
The Bundesgerichtshof confirmed the judgment appealed against and held, referring to the first paragraph of Article 28 of the Convention, that the Italian judgment could not be recognized in Germany since the rules of the Convention on jurisdiction in insurance matters had been infringed.
En kompetence for retterne i Venedig kunne i det foreliggende til­fælde kun følge af konventionens artikel 8, stk. 1.
The courts in Venice could have derived jurisdiction in the present case only from the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention.
Da rekvisitus i fuldbyrdelsessagen, som af Corte d'appello di Venezia var blevet anset for forsikringsgiver, havde sit hjem­sted i Tyskland, ville de italienske retter kun have haft kompetence, hvis den i Venedig bosiddende rekvirent var forsikringstager.
Since the de­fendant, which the appeal court in Venice regarded as the insurer, had its seat in Ger­many, the Italian courts could have had jurisdiction only if the plaintiff, with its seat in Venice, were the policy­holder.
Som det fremgik af artikel 12, nr. 2, sondres der også i konventionen mellem forsikringstageren, den sikrede og den begunstigede.
The Convention itself distinguished between the policy­holder, the insured and the beneficiary, as was clear from Article 12(2).
Den italienske ret havde i sin afgørelse fastslået som en kendsgerning, at rekvirenten havde købt partiet cif Venedig, altså forsikret af sælgeren for dennes regning, og at forsik­ringstageren, der havde indgået forsikringsaftalen med hovedassurandøren, ikke var nævnt i assurancecertifikatet.
In its decision the Italian court had established as facts that the plaintiff had bought the goods "cif Ven­ice", that is to say insured at the seller's expense, and that the insurance certificate did not name a policy­holder who had concluded the contract of insurance with the leading insurer.
Heraf havde den italienske ret draget den retlige konklu­sion, at den begunstigede, altså indehaveren af assurancecertifikatet, også var forsik­ringstager, fordi det ikke kunne være ubestemt eller umuligt at fastslå, hvem forsik­ringstageren var.
From that finding the Italian court had drawn the legal conclusion that the bene­ficiary, that is to say the holder of the insurance certificate, was also the policy­holder, because the person of the policy­holder could not remain unascertained or unascertain­able.
Retten i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten var ifølge konventionens artikel 28, stk. 2, ikke bundet af denne konklusion, som ikke var en konstatering af faktiske om­stændigheder.
Under the second paragraph of Article 28, the courts in the State in which enforcement was sought were not bound by that conclusion, which was not a finding of fact.
Konklusionen stred mod den italienske rets konstatering af det faktiske forhold, at rekvirenten havde købt varen cif Venedig.
It contra­dicted the Italian court's finding that the plaintiff had bought the goods "cif Venice".
Denne konstatering viste, at rekvi­renten i hvert fald ikke kunne være forsikringstager.
That finding showed that the plaintiff could not be the policy­holder.
De italienske retter savnede der­med kompetence, fordi den omstændighed, at rekvirenten var sikret eller begunstigt, ikke kunne begrunde et værneting efter konventionens artikel 8.
But in that event the Italian courts could not have jurisdiction, since the fact that the plaintiff was the in­sured or beneficiary could not found jurisdiction under Article 8 of the Convention.
[forbud mod realitetsprøvelse]
[No review as to substance]
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — grunde til nægtelse heraf — ingen realitetsprøvelse af den udenlandske afgørelse
Recognition and enforcement — Grounds for refusal — No review of the substance of the foreign judgment
Fuldbyrdelse — retsmidler mod tilladelsen til tvangsfuldbyrdelse — udsættelse af sagen — betingelser
Enforcement — Appeal against the order authorizing enforcement — Stay of pro­ceedings — Conditions
Den handlende var af den opfattelse, at hans advokater havde varetaget hans interesser dårligt og desuden først underrettet ham om, at der var blevet afsagt en frifin­dende dom, og at denne var blevet forkyndt, efter at ankefristen var udløbet.
The businessman considered that the had been badly represented by his lawyers, who had moreover failed to advise him of the existence of the judgment dismissing his action until after the expiry of the period for lodging an ap­peal.
Derfor kæ­rede han den af præsidenten for Tribunal de grande instance de Paris afsagte kendelse, hvorefter kendelsen om sagsomkostninger var blevet erklæret eksigibel i Frankrig, til Cour d'appel de Paris i medfør af konventionens artikel 36; han påstod sagen udsat, ind­til der var truffet afgørelse vedrørende en anmeldelse, som han havde indgivet til ankla­gemyndigheden i Teheran, og i øvrigt nedlagde han påstand om, at begæringen om tvangsfuldbyrdelse blev afslået.
He therefore appealed to the Cour d'Appel, Paris, under Article 36 of the Conven­tion against the order of the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, declar­ing the taxing order enforceable in France. In the first place, he requested a stay of pro­ceedings until the outcome of proceedings which he had commenced in Tehran became known; secondly, he contended that the application for an enforcement order was un­founded.
Cour d'appel stadfæstede kendelsen med den begrundelse, at ingen af de grunde til at afslå begæringen om fuldbyrdelse, som er opregnet i artiklerne 27 og 28, som artikel 34, stk. 2, henviser til, forelå i det foreliggende tilfælde.
The Cour d'Appel dismissed the appeal, observing that none of the grounds for refusing to enforce a foreign judgment listed in Articles 27 and 28, to which the second paragraph of Article 34 referred, was applicable in the present case.
I henhold til artikel 34, stk. 3, som udelukker efterprøvelse af den udenlandske retsafgørelse med hensyn til sagens realitet, kunne afslag på at meddele fuldbyrdelsespåtegning ikke støttes på, at den udenlandske rets kendelse om sagsomkostninger var urigtig på grand af fejlagtig bedømmelse af de faktiske omstændigheder i sagen.
Furthermore, in view of the terms of the third paragraph of Article 34, which precluded any review of the substance of the foreign judgment, enforcement could not be refused on the ground that the taxing order made by the foreign court was not justified by reason of the allegedly erroneous appraisal of the circumstances of the case.
Cour d'appel udtalte endvidere, at en anmeldelse, der var indgivet i et tredjeland mod personer, som ikke var parter i den afgørelse, der skulle fuldbyrdes, ikke kunne be­grunde en udsættelse, selv om den kunne få retlige konsekvenser.
The Cour d'Appel also considered that the fact that proceedings had been instituted in a non­contracting State against persons other than the parties to the decision being en­forced and were capable of leading to further litigation could not justify a stay of pro­ceedings.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — grunde til nægtelse heraf — modstrid med grund­læggende retsprincipper i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten (artikel 27, nr. 1) — den dømmende rets tilsidesættelse af reglerne om retskraft — ikke i strid med grundlæg­gende retsprincipper
Recognition and enforcement — Grounds for refusal — Contrary to public policy in the State in which enforcement is sought (Article 27(1)) — Adjudication by the original court on a matter which was res judicata — Enforcement not contrary to public policy in the State of enforcement
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — grunde til nægtelse heraf — efterprøvelse af kompe­tencen for retten i domsstaten ved retten i anerkendelses­ og fuldbyrdelsesstaten (arti­kels, stk. 3) — grænser herfor — retten i domsstaten kompetent i henhold til artikel 5, nr. 1 — ingen efterprøvelse af kompetencen
Recognition and enforcement — Grounds for refusal — Review by the enforcing court of the jurisdiction of the adjudicating court (third paragraph of Article 28) — Limits — Jurisdiction of the adjudicating court founded on Article 5(1) — No review of jurisdiction
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — ingen realitetsprøvelse af den udenlandske afgø­relse (artikel 29) — den dømmende rets tilsidesættelse af reglerne om retskraft — prøvelse af indsigelsen om, at spørgsmålet allerede var afgjort i en tidligere sag, var ensbetydende med realitetsprøvelse
Recognition and enforcement — No review as to substance (Article 29) — Adjudica­tion by the original court on a matter which was res judicata — Consideration of the plea ofres judicata equivalent to review of the substance of the judgment
Amtsgericht Mainz havde ved udeblivelsesdom tilpligtet skyldneren, der havde bopæl i Bruxelles, at betale advokatsalærer, som hun skyldte en advokat for varetagelse af hendes interesser i en sag ved de tyske domstole.
The Amtsgericht Mainz had given a judgment in default ordering a person resident in Brussels to pay fees owed to a lawyer in respect of an action which he had prosecuted before the German courts.
Skyldneren indgav i henhold til kon­ventionens artikel 36 begæring om genoptagelse til Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, som havde afsagt en kendelse, hvorved der var givet tilladelse til fuldbyrdelse af den tyske dom i Belgien.
The Tribunal de Première Instance, Brussels, granted an order for the enforcement of that judgment in Belgium.
Hun bestred Amtsgericht Mainz' kompetence og gjorde end­videre gældende, at fuldbyrdelse i Belgien af en retsafgørelse, som var truffet i strid med en tidligere afgørelses retskraft, var uforenelig med grundlæggende belgiske retsprincip­per.
The judgment debtor appealed against that order to the same court pursuant to Article 36 of the Convention.
Amtsgericht Mainz havde nemlig tilpligtet hende at betale advokatsalærer til mod­parten i genoptagelsessagen, selv om Landgericht Mainz allerede tidligere havde frifun­det i et søgsmål vedrørende det samme krav.
The grounds of appeal were that the Amtsgericht Mainz lacked jurisdiction and that it would be contrary to Belgian public policy to enforce a judgment given on a matter which was already res judicata, it being argued that when the Amtsgericht Mainz ordered the appel­lant to pay the respondent's fees a similar action between the same parties had previ­ously been dismissed by the Landgericht Mainz.
Tribunal de première instance forkastede indsigelsen om, at Amtsgericht Mainz savnede kompetence, i henhold til artikel 28, stk. 3. Da Amtsgericht havde anset sig for kompe­tent i henhold til artikel 5, nr. 1, i afdeling 2 i konventionens afsnit II, efter at den på em­beds vegne havde efterprøvet sin kompetence, således som den var forpligtet til ifølge konventionens artikel 20, fordi sagsøgte ikke gav møde, havde retten i anerkendelses­og fuldbyrdelsesstaten ikke ret til at efterprøve, om retten i domsstaten havde anvendt denne bestemmelse rigtigt.
Applying the third paragraph of Article 28, the Tribunal de Première Instance dismissed the ground of appeal based on the submission that the Amtsgericht Mainz lacked juris­diction : that court had of its own motion considered the question of its jurisdiction, as re­quired by Article 20 of the Convention in view of the defendant's failure to enter an ap­pearance, and had come to the view that it had jurisdiction under Article 5 ( 1 ) — a provi­sion contained in Section 2 of Title II of the Convention; the court in which enforce­ment was sought could not review the application of that provision by the adjudicating court.
Indsigelsen om, at spørgsmålet allerede var afgjort i en tidligere sag, vedrørte efter ret­tens opfattelse realitetsafgørelsen i den dom, der skulle fuldbyrdes. Da sagsøgte ikke be­stred, at hun på forskriftsmæssig måde var blevet underrettet om den sag, sagsøgeren havde anlagt mod hende ved Amtsgericht Mainz, skulle hun have fremført indsigelsen om, at spørgsmålet allerede var afgjort i en tidligere sag, for denne ret eller i givet fald for appelretten.
With regard to the ground of appeal based on the plea of res judicata, the court con­sidered that it went to the substance of the case: since the appellant did not deny having been properly informed of the proceedings which the respondent had instituted against her in the Amtsgericht Mainz, she should have raised the plea of res judicata before that court and in any appeal which might have been lodged.
At foretage en prøvelse af denne indsigelse ville efter den belgiske rets opfattelse være at efterprøve sagens realitet i modstrid med konventionens artikel 29.
Consideration of that plea by the court in which enforcement was sought would amount to reviewing the substance of the case in breach of Article 29 of the Convention.
Da indsigelsen ifølge belgisk ret heller ikke faldt ind under den civilretlige ordre public,
Moreover, under Belgian law the plea of res judicata did not raise a question of public policy in civil matters, so the appel­lant was wrong in her submission that the enforcement of the Amtsgericht's judgment
1­29 ­ Β 2 fortsat 1) kunne sagsøgte ikke gøre gældende, at fuldbyrdelsen af Amtsgericht's afgørelse var i strid med grundlæggende belgiske retsprincipper i konventionens artikel 27, nr. l's for­stand.
(continued 1) would be contrary to Belgian public policy for the purposes of Article 27 ( 1 ) of the Con­vention.
1­31 ­ Β 5 fortsat 2) renter »efter loven«, som rekvisitus ifølge dommen bl.a. skulle erlægge, ifølge arti­kel 1284 i Codice civile blev fastsat til 5%, og den merværdiafgift, som skulle svares af sagsomkostningerne, under henvisning til den italienske lovgivning blev fastsat til 14%.
In accordance with Article 1284 of the Codice Civile a rate of 5% was fixed in respect of the "legal interest" which inter alia the respondent had been ordered to pay and a rate of 14% was fixed, having regard to the Italian legislation, in respect of the value added tax which was payable on the costs of the litigation.
Landgericht Wiesbaden anførte i en kendelse af 5. maj 1978 — sag 9 O 77/78 — om fuldbyrdelseserklæring for en dom afsagt af handelsretten i Antwerpen, at re­kvirenten ikke havde fremsat begæring om, at dommen også erklæredes eksigibel, for så vidt angik de tilkendte »retslige renter« (på originalproget: »gerechtelijke in­tresten«); dommens bestemmelse om renter var for så vidt ganske ubestemt.
By order of 5 May 1980 (Case No 9 O 77/78) the Landgericht Wiesbaden found, with reference to an order for the enforcement of a judgment of the commercial court in Antwerp, that the applicant had not applied for enforcement of that part of the judgment which related to the award of "legal interest" (in the original: "gerechte­lijke intresten").
Det var uklart, hvad den belgiske ret forstod ved »retslige renter«.
In that regard the judgment was completely vague. It was not clear what the Belgian court meant by "legal interest".
Fuldbyrdelse — forpligtelse til at betale underholdsbidrag i henhold til italiensk skilsmisse­dom — fuldbyrdelse i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland — søgsmål ved en tysk ret med på­stand om ændring af dommens bestemmelser om underholdsbidrag — fuldbyrdelsen af den italienske dom stillet ibero
Enforcement — Maintenance order in an Italian divorce decree — Enforcement in the Federal Republic of Germany — Action before a German court for the variation of the maintenance order — Stay of execution of the Italian judgment
Ved dom afsagt af en italiensk ret var parternes ægteskab blevet opløst og sagsøgte til­pligtet at betale månedlige underholdsbidrag til sagsøgeren. Begge parter var italienske statsborgere.
An Italian court had granted a decree dissolving the marriage of the parties, both Italian nationals, and ordering the defendant to pay monthly maintenance to the plaintiff.
Sagsøgte flyttede til Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland og boede nu i Frank­furt am Main.
The defendant moved to the Federal Republic of Germany and now lived in Frankfurt am
1968 ­ ARTIKEL 31 fortsat 1) skulle falde bort.
1968 - ARTICLE 31
Dermed havde sagsøgte ret til at anmode om, at den fuldbyrdelse af den oprindelige dom, som sagsøgeren havde begæret, foreløbig blev stillet i bero i hen­hold til § 769 i Zivilprozessordnung.
Therefore the defendant was entitled to request the court to suspend the enforcement of the original judgment under Paragraph 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Retten udtalte herefter, at Amtsgericht kun burde have stillet fuldbyrdelsen af den ita­lienske dom — sammenholdt med den kendelse fra Landgericht Frankfurt am Main, der krævedes ifølge konventionens artikel 31 — i bero for tiden efter, at modkravet var blevet fremsat, da sagsøgte højst kunne forlange, at hans pligt til at betale underholdsbi­drag faldt bort fra dette tidspunkt.
The court went on to hold that the enforcement of the Italian judgment in conjunction with the order of the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main, which was necessary under Article 31 of the Convention, could be suspended by the Amtsgericht only for the period after service of the counterclaim, since it was from that point, if at all, that the defendant was entitled to seek the cancellation of his maintenance obligations.
Retten anførte, at det i forfatningsmæssig henseende var ubetænkeligt, at fuldbyrdel­sespåtegning i medfør af konventionens artikel 34 meddeltes ensidigt, dvs., uden at den part, mod hvem fuldbyrdelsen begæredes, fik lejlighed til at ytre sig.
The court held that there were no constitutional objections to the fact that the order for enforcement under Article 34 of the Convention was issued in ex parte proceedings without hearing the defendant.
Rekvisitus kunne uden videre — ved hjælp af den i konventionens artikel 36 omhandlede appel eller genoptagelse skaffe sig mulighed for kontradiktion.
The defendant only had to lodge an appeal under Arti­cle 36 of the Convention in order to obtain an opportunity to put his case.
Fuldbyrdelse — tysk udeblivelsesdom uden angivelse afgrunde — kunne fuldbyrdes
Enforcement — Judgment in default given by a German court without a statement of rea­sons — Held enforceable
Corte d'appello anførte, at udeblivelsesdommens beskaffenhed — efter tysk ret var udeblivelsesdomme ikke ledsa­get af grunde — ikke var til hinder for at meddele fuldbyrdelsespåtegning i Italien ; ifølge konventionsbestemmelserne udelukkedes en kontradiktorisk procedure ikke, den blev kun udskudt, idet den part, mod hvem fuldbyrdelse begæredes, i medfør af arti­kel 36 kunne anfægte afgørelsen ved appel eller genoptagelse.
The Corte d'Appello ruled that the nature of a judgment in default, which under German law did not contain any statement of the reasons upon which it was based, did not prevent its enforcement in Italy; the provisions of the Convention did not preclude proceedings in which both parties could put their case; it merely postponed them since the party against whom enforcement was sought could bring an appeal under Article 36.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — arrestdekret afsagt af en fransk ret uden mundtlig for­handling — fuldbyrdelse i en anden kontraherende stat — indsigelser mod kravet — hen­syntagen hertil i fuldbyrdelsessagen — betingelser
Recognition and enforcement — Order for the seizure of goods made by a French court without an oral hearing — Enforceability in another Contracting State — Objections against the application for a seizure order — Consideration of such objections in the en­forcement proceedings — Conditions
Rekvisitus, en tysk handlende, havde over for rekvirenten, en fransk bank, påtaget sig at kautionere som selvskyldner.
The defendant, a German businessman, had entered into a contract of guarantee with the plaintiff, a French bank, under which he assumed liability as principal debtor.
Da banken krævede beløbet betalt, undlod han at betale.
When the bank claimed on the guarantee he refused to pay.
Derefter udvirkede banken, at der ved Tribunal de grande instance de Strasbourg uden mundtlig forhandling blev afsagt et arrestdekret, hvorved der blev gjort arrest hos re­kvisitus for et bestemt maksimumsbeløb.
The bank applied to the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Strasbourg, which granted an order, without holding an oral hear­ing, for the seizure of property belonging to the defendant up to a certain value.
Den franske ret afsagde kendelse om foreløbig fuldbyrdelse afarresten.
The court declared the order immediately enforceable.
Kendelsen blev forkyndt for rekvisitus, og han blev underrettet om muligheden for at rejse indsigelse.
It was served on the defendant with a notice advising him of the possibility of lodging an appeal.
Kendelsen blev på begæring af rekvirenten forsy­net med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning af den kompetente Landgericht i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland.
Upon application to the ap­propriate Landgericht, an order was granted for the enforcement of the French order in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Rekvisitus kærede kendelsen og gjorde gældende, at han var blevet vildledt med hensyn til indholdet af den erklæring, han havde underskrevet.
The defendant appealed against that decision on the ground that he had been misinformed about the contents of the document signed by him.