natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I — KONKURRENCEBEGRÆNSENDE AFTALER OG MISBRUG AF DOMINERENDE STILLINGER — ARTIKEL 85 OG 86 væsentlig skade for sig selv, drive konkurrenterne ud af markedet eller i mærkbart omfang forhindre nye virksomheder i at få adgang til markedet.
— ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 sectors where liberalisation is in progress are the high-risk ones.
I en af disse sager besluttede Kommissionen at afvise klagen.
be dealt with equally well on a national level.
Denne holdning svarer til retspraksis i »Automec«domment1)·
This approach complies with the Automec judgment (')·
Proceduremæssigt set har Kommissionen kun pålagt bøder i et enkelt tilfælde i år.
As far as proceedings are concerned, the Commission ultimately imposed fines in only one case this year.
I de øvrige tilfælde har den efter at have fremsendt en klagepunktsmeddelelse godkendt de pågældende virksomheders tilsagn eller ændringer, som bragte den ulovlige praksis til ophør.
In the remainder, it was able, after the complaint-notification stage, to accept from the undertakings involved com mitments or changes to agreements which put an end to the offending practices.
Selv om der bag virksomhedernes holdning i så danne tilfælde ligger en reel vilje til at følge de konkurrenceretlige principper, skal dette efterprøves igen senere, og Kommissionen er derfor meget opmærksom på, at de fremsatte tilsagn overholdes.
The attitude of undertakings reveals a genuine willingness to accept the principles of competition, but the approach must not be relaxed in future. This is why the Commission will continue to see that proposed commitments are honoured.
Som led i tilsynet med gruppefritagelsesforordningen har Kommissionen desuden behandlet to vigtige anmeldelser, der vedrørte standardforhandleraftalen for »Smari«-bilen og Ford-værkstederne.
As regards compliance with the block exemption regulation, the Commission dealt with two important notifications. These concerned the standard distribution agreements for the Smart car and for Ford service outlets.
I førstnævnte sag sendte Kommissionen parterne en administrativ skrivelse efter at have kontrolleret, at sidste version af aftalen var i overensstemmelse med forordning nr. 1475/95 (bl.a. forhandlernes mulighed for salg af andre mærker eller kun desøgning gennem reklamevirksomhed uden for aftaleområdet).
In the first of the two cases, having checked the conformity of the latest version of the agreement with Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 (in particular, the ability of dealers to market other makes or their freedom to seek, through advertising, customers outside the contract territory), the Commission sent the parties a comfort letter.
I andet tilfælde konstaterede Kommissionen, at aftalen ikke faldt ind under forordning nr. 1475/95 og fastslog des uden, at aftalen indebar fordele for forbrugerne, især i form af »nærværksteder«.
In the second case, it found that the agreement did not fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 and recognised the advantages for consumers, especially with regard to having services near to hand.
Denne virksomhed, der er Irlands eneste sukkerproducent og har en andel på 90 % af markedet for afsætning af sukker i Irland, havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling, ikke blot fordi den gentagne gange havde hindret konkurrencen fra de små irske sukkeremballagefirmaer, men også fordi den havde forsøgt at begrænse konkurrencen fra import fra Frankrig og Nordirland. Irish Sugar tilbød f.eks. særlige priser eller prisnedslag til en fransk sukkerimportørs kunder eller tilbød særlige prisnedslag til erhvervskunder, der eksporterede en del af deres produktion til andre medlemsstater.
The undertaking, which is the sole sugar producer in Ireland and has a 90 % share of the Irish sugar retailing market, was found to have abused a dominant position not only on account of its repeated attempts to impede com petition from small Irish sugar-packing com panies but also of its ploys to limit competition from imports from France and Northern Ireland.
Denne praksis medførte, at der blev oprettet kunstige barrierer mellem medlemsstaterne, og skabte for styrrelser i handelsstrømmene.
Such practices led to the erection of artificial barriers between Member States and to the disruption of market fluidity.
EF-traktatens artikel 86 forbyder konkurrencebegrænsende praksis, der udøves af en eller flere virksomheder med en dominerende stilling på et givet marked.
Article 86 of the EC Treaty prohibits anticompetitive practices committed by one or more undertakings in a dominant position on a given market.
Der kan være tale om begrænsning af produktionen, opkrævning af urimeligt høje priser, anvendelse af en diskriminerende eller aggressiv prispolitik, salgsbinding eller andre former for handelspraksis, der ikke sigter mod økonomisk effektivitet.
Such abuses may consist in limiting production, charging excessive prices, discriminatory or predatory pricing, tied sales or other commercial practices not guided by the principle of economic efficiency.
Disse forskellige former for praksis har negativ indvirkning på konkurrencen og er derfor uacceptable, især når de udøves af virksomheder med en sådan markedsstyrke, at de kan se bort fra konkurrenterne og, uden
An exclusive licensing agreement of such a duration and scope concluded between two under takings in a dominant position on neighbouring markets was regarded as likely to be caught by Article 86, in particular since Swedish Match fixed the selling price of Prince cigarettes unilaterally. The agreement there fore had the effect of isolating the Swedish
( ' ) Førsteinstansrettens dom af 18.9.1992 i sag T-24/90 — Automec Sri mod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber.
(2) The Commission also raised the question of the compatibility of the agreement with Article 85 of the Treaty.
Aftalen medførte således en isolering af det svenske marked, hvor Swedish Match kunne handle uafhængigt af sine konkurrenter.
market, on which Swedish Match could act independently of any competitive constraint.
Kommissionen godkendte revisionen af licensaftalen, der betød, at af­sætningen af mærket Prince hovedsagelig kom til at henhøre under Skandinavisk To­bakskompagni, der blandt andet kan fastsætte cigaretpriserne.
The Commission approved the licensing agreement following amendments whereby most of the marketing of the Prince brand is placed under the supervision of Skandinavisk Tobakompagni, which will be able in particu­lar to determine the price of the cigarettes.
Denne ændring af aftalen gav sig omgående udslag i, at der kom en bety­delig konkurrent ind på det svenske marked.
The change in the agreement resulted immediately in the appearance of a major competitor on the Swedish market.
På grundlag af en klage fra den offent­lige franske virksomhed, La Poste, der var nægtet adgang til nettet, anførte Kommissio­nen i en klagepunktsmeddelelse, at SWIFT havde overtrådt bestemmelserne i artikel 86.
objections, that SWIFT had infringed Article 86.
SWIFT indtager nemlig en monopolstiling, fordi selskabet er eneste aktør på de internatio­nale net for overførsel af betalingsmeddelelser og det eneste net, der kan skabe forbindelser til banker hvor som helst i verden.
SWIFT holds a dominant position of a monopolistic nature, since it is the only opera­tor on the international networks for transfer­ring payment messages and the only network to supply connections for banking establish­ments anywhere in the world.
Selskabet er derfor i besiddelse af en så væsentlig infrastruktur, at det, hvis det nægter en virk­somhed adgang til nettet, vil være ensbety­dende med, at den pågældende virksomhed rent faktisk udelukkes fra markedet for inter­nationale overførsler.
It therefore constitutes a basic infrastructure in its own right, since to refuse any entity access to such a network is tantamount to a de facto exclu­sion from the market for international trans­fers.
Endelig har SWIFT klart misbrugt sin dominerende stilling ved at fast­sætte uberettigede adgangskriterier vedrørende generelle betingelser for medlemmemes ud­øvelse af finansielle aktiviteter, og ved at anvende disse kriterier over for La Poste på diskriminerende måde.
Lastly, SWIFT has manifestly abused its dominant position by laying down unjustified admission criteria relating to the general con­ditions for the exercise of the financial activi­ties of its members and by applying these criteria in the case of La Poste in a discrimi­natory manner.
SWIFT var indstillet på at ordne sagen i mindelighed, og selv om selskabet tilbageviste Kommissionens argumenter, forpligtede det sig dog formelt til at give fuldstændig adgang til nettet for enhver virksomhed, der opfylder de kriterier, som Det Europæiske Monetære Institut har fastsat for adgang til nationale betalingssystemer, selv om en sådan adgang hidtil havde været forbeholdt aktionærerne.
Willing to settle the matter amicably, even though it had challenged the Commission's arguments, SWIFT formally undertook to grant complete access to any entity which meets the criteria laid down by the European Monetary Institute for admission to domestic payment systems, whereas hitherto such access was reserved for shareholder members only.
Tilsagnet blev offentliggjort i De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende (2).
This commitment was published in the Official Journal of the European Communi­ties^.
Kommissionen be­sluttede derefter at indstille proceduren mod SWIFT og fastslog, at den ville kontrollere, at tilsagnet blev overholdt.
Consequently, the Commission de­cided to suspend the proceedings initiated against SWIFT and declared its intention to ensure that the commitment was honoured.
Sagen mellem Kommissionen og Belga­com som følge af den klage, som ITT Prome­dia NV indgav i 1995 over misbrug af domi­nans, fik en positiv afslutning i år.
The case in which the Commission took action against Belgacom, following a com­plaint from ΓΤΤ Promedia in 1995 about the abuse of a dominant position, was brought to a positive conclusion this year.
Det belgi­ske datterselskab af den amerikanske udgiver af telefonbøger, ITT World Directories Company, bebrejdede det belgiske teleselskab Belgacom, at det anvendte prisdiskrimination og opkrævede urimeligt høje priser for adgang til oplysninger om sine abonnenter på taletele­fonitjenester.
ΓΓΤ Promedia, which is the Belgian subsidiary of the US telephone directory publisher, ill World Di­rectories Company, had accused Belgacom, the Belgian telecommunications operator, of applying discriminatory and excessive prices for access to the data on its subscribers for voice telephony services.
Kommissionen mente, at der i det tilfælde, hvor udgiverne af telefonbøger var afhængige af teleselskaberne, burde gives adgang til oplysningerne uden forskelsbehand­ling og på grundlag af priser, der var beregnet på grundlag af teleselskabets egne omkostnin­ger.
The Commission considered that, since directory publishers were dependent on telecommunications opera­tors, access to the data should be allowed on nondiscriminatory terms, at prices calculated on the basis of the operator's own costs.
Men Belgacom havde en prisstruktur, som bl.a. tog hensyn til udgiverens omsætning, i dette tilfælde ITT Promedia, og dette skyldtes udelukkende den markedsstyrke, der var for­bundet med Belgacoms dominerende stilling.
Belgacom had a price structure which took account, in particular, of the turnover of the publisher, in this case 111 Promedia. There was no justification for this, except the market power associated with Belgacom's dominant position.
Efter at Kommissionen havde grebet ind, ind­villigede Belgacom i at afskaffe den priskom­ponent, der havde tilknytning til udgiverens omsætning, og anvende en beregningsmetode, der i højere grad var i overensstemmelse med EU­retten. og som byggede på forholdet mel­lem de samlede årlige omkostninger og antal­let af udgivere.
Following the Commission's inter­vention, Belgacom agreed to abolish the turnover price component and adopt a method of calculation based on the ratio of total annual costs to the number of publishers, which is more consistent with Community law.
Dette har medført, at priserne er faldet, og at der er kommet nye virksomhe­
Prices have fallen as a result, and the logic of the system introduced creates a link between the fall in prices and the appearance of new entrants.
På grundlag af klager fra vedligeholdel­sesfirmaer inden for edb­sektoren over den forretningspraksis, der blev udøvet af Digital Equipment Corporation (Digital), og kontrol­undersøgelser, som Kommissionen selv havde foretaget, indledte Kommissionen en overtræ­delsesprocedure mod denne virksomhed efter
Following complaints lodged by suppli­ers of maintenance services in the information technology sector against the commercial practices of Digital Equipment Corporation (Digital) and on the basis of the investigations which it carried out, the Commission initiated proceedings against the company for infring­ing Article 86 (2).
(') Kommissionen rejste desuden spørgsmålet om. hvorvidt aftalen var forenelig med traktatens artikel 85.
Further to a complaint from La Poste, a French public undertaking which had been refused access to the network, the Commission considered, in a statement of
I — KONKURRENCEBEGRÆNSENDE AFTALER OG MISBRUG AF DOMINERENDE STILLINGER — ARTIKEL 85 OG 86 konkurrenceregler (5).
ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 tenance services and other, hardware services for Digital computers.
Dens frem gangsmåde på dette område består i at sørge for, at de nationale teleselskaber, som stadig har en dominerende stilling på de nationale markeder, ikke udnytter disse alliancer, som er nødvendige ud fra et teknisk eller økonomisk synspunkt, til at fastholde en position, som er erhvervet i medfør af et monopol, og til at hæmme den frie konkurrence.
Having received the objections and challenged them, Digital presented the Commission with proposed formal commitments designed to alter its commercial and pricing policy in the field of software maintenance services and other, hardware services.
artikel 86(')· Kommissionen konstaterede i sin klagepunktsmeddelelse, at Digital indtog en dominerende stilling på de europæiske markeder for vedligeholdelse af Digitals software og andre vigtige ydelser i forbindelse med Digitals computere.
Unisource and Uniworld(5). Unisource groups together Sweden's Telia, the Dutch operator PTT Telecom and Switzerland's Swiss Telecom, the Spanish operator Telefonica having decided to withdraw.
Kommissionen fastslog, at Di gital havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling gennem en forretningspolitik, der var karakteriseret ved forskelsbehandling og salgsbinding.
Uniworld is a joint venture between Unisource and AT & T. The aims of these groupings are twofold: to achieve critical mass and extensive geographical coverage, which in this industry means entering into a transadantic partnership.
Alle disse former for praksis viste meget klart, at Digital var indstillet på at forhindre selvstændige virksomheder i at konkurrere med Digital på markederne for vedligeholdelse og andre vigtige ydelser i forbindelse med Digitals computere.
The alliances previously established, between British Telecom and MCI (Concert), on the one hand, and France Télécom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint (Atlas/Global One), on the other, bear witness to this.
Digital bestred Kom missionens klagepunkter, men foreslog at give en række formelle tilsagn om at ændre sin forretnings- og prispolitik inden for vedligeholdelse af software og andre vigtige ydelser.
The agreements creating the two alliances were assessed in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and were approved by means of an individual exemption granted for a period of five years following amendments to the agreements and subject to conditions relating to the structure and behaviour of the parties.
Alliancer mellem operatører
Alliances between operators
Udsigterne til en fuldstændig liberalisering af telemarkederne (4), som vil give sig udtryk i konkurrence mellem selskaberne in den for alle tjenesteydelser, fremskyndelse af den teknologiske udvikling og markedsindtrængning på internationalt plan, har i denne sektor resulteret i forskellige omstruktureringer og alliancer, som skal sætte virksomhederne i stand til at klare de udfordringer, der opstår som følge af disse omvæltninger.
After satisfying itself that the three shareholders in Unisource would not strengthen their pre-existing dominant positions on their respective domestic markets, the Commission exempted the agreements subject to compliance with undertakings designed in particular to prevent any discrimination by the parent companies in network operation, any transfer of confidential information from one entity to another, any crosssubsidisation between Unisource and its parent companies, or any attempt to engage in tied service provision.
I de seneste år har Kommissionen ved flere lejligheder skullet udtale sig om disse aftalers og transaktioners forenelighed med Fællesskabets
The Commission also took note of the undertakings given by the Dutch and Swiss authorities to liberalise their telecommunications markets by 1 January 1998 (liberalisation had already taken place in Sweden).
Unisource tilbyder en bred vifte af teletjenester: mobiltelefoni, satellittjenester, datatransmission og taletelefoni for virksomhederne.
trigger competition between operators across the full range of services, swifter technological progress, and growing interpénétration of world markets, has prompted restructuring op erations and alliances of all kinds in this sector whereby firms are endeavouring to put them selves in a position to take up the challenges inherent in these far-reaching changes.
Disse tjenester ydes af datterselskaber.
The Commission has repeatedly had occasion in recent years to comment on the compatibility of agreements and operations of this nature with the Community competition rules (4), and 1997 was no exception.
Efter at have sikret sig, at de tre aktionærer i Unisource ikke styrkede deres allerede eksisterende dominerende stilling på de respektive nationale markeder, fritog Kommissionen aftalerne, under forudsætning af at der overholdes en række tilsagn, som tager sigte på at forhindre enhver diskrimination fra de stiftende medlemmers side med hensyn til forvaltning af nettene, omdirigering af fortrolige oplysninger fra den ene enhed til den anden, enhver form for krydssubsidiering mellem Unisource og de stiftende medlemmer eller ethvert forsøg på at foranstalte bunden levering af tjeneste-
The approach it takes here is to ensure that national telecommunications operators who still dominate their domestic markets do not use such alliances, which are necessary from a technical or economic standpoint, in order to hold on to positions they acquired through their mon opoly power and restrict competition.
(') Kommissionen rejste desuden spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt nogle af Digitals distributionsaftaler var forenelige med traktatens artikel 85.
Uniworld offers similar telecommunications services, with coverage extended to the United States. Undertakings of the same nature enabled the Commission to exempt the agreements creating Uniworld for a period of five years.
(2) Jf. kapitel II.
(2) See Chapter III below.
(3) Jf. kapitel III. (4) De aspekter af liberaliseringen, som berører statens særlige
(3) Liberalisation aspects which have to do with the prerogatives of public authority are discussed in Chapter II, which deals with the application of Articles 37 and 90 of the EC Treaty.
rettigheder, behandles i kapitel II angående anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 37 og 90.
(4) 1995 Competition Report, points 54 to 59; 1996 Competition Report, points 66 to 83.
Disse aftaler er nødvendige for at samordne GSM-nettene og give abonnenterne mulighed for at maksimere udnyttelsen af deres bærbare telefon, hvor de end befinder sig.
Such agreements are necessary in order to coordinate GSM net works and offer subscribers maximum use of their mobile telephone wherever they happen to be at any point in time.
GSM-netoperatørerne i EU er nemlig tvunget til at overholde nationale regler, herunder regler om udstedelse af licenser, hvilket begrænser udbredelsen af deres net til en medlems stats grænser.
Operators of GSM networks in the European Union have to comply with national rules, in particular those governing the award of operating licences, which means that their network cannot extend beyond national borders.
For så vidt angår de 35 millioner abonnenter i de 15 EU-lande, er det absolut nødvendigt, at disse begrænsninger ikke skaber tvivl om de fordele, der er forbundet med GSM-standarden.
For the 35 million subscribers in the 15 Member States, it is essential that these limitations should not undermine the advantages flowing from the GSM standard.
Når en abonnent forlader den medlemsstats område, hvor han har tegnet et abonnement, skal han således være i stand til at foretage og modtage opkald på en anden medlemsstats område. Dette kan kun lade sig gøre, hvis operatørerne i de forskellige med lemsstater samordner deres aktiviteter.
Thus, when a subscriber leaves the territory of the Member State in which he took out his subscription, he should be able to make and receive calls in another Member State; for this to be possible, operators in different Member States must coordinate their activities.
Kommissionen har afsluttet sin analyse af GEN-afialen (Global European Network), som er en aftale mellem de største nationale teleselskaber i EU.
The Commission finalised its analysis of the GEN (Global European network) agreement, which groups together the largest telecommunications operators in the Union.
Denne aftale ligger til grund for oprettelsen af et lysledernet af høj kvalitet og med stor kapacitet, som vil for bedre kvaliteten af tjenesterne i de transeuropæiske telekommunikationsnet.
The agreement provides for the creation of a highquality, heavy-capacity optical fibre telecom munications network which will enhance the quality of trans-European telecommunications network services.
Kommissionen mente, at visse bestemmelser var uforenelige med Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler, herunder reglerne om fælles prisfastsættelse og udelukkelse af tredjeparter fra adgang til netkapacitet.
The Commission deemed certain clauses of the agreement incompatible with the Community competition rules, in particular those which provided for the joint setting of prices and exclusion of third parties from access to the network.
I forlængelse af Kommissionens bemærkninger har de anmeldende parter ændret deres aftale, således at hvert signatarselskab fører individuelle og ikkediskriminerende forhandlinger med tredjeparter om betingelserne for netadgang, herunder priser. På dette grundlag har Kommissionen givet tilladelse til, at dette system indføres.
In response to the Commission's observations, the notifying parties amended the agreement such that each operator which is a signatory will negotiate with third parties, individually and in a nondiscriminatory manner, the terms on which it offers access to the network, and in particular prices.
Denne sag illustrerer tydeligt den politik, der føres af Fællesskabets instanser. Kommissionen ser positivt på den teknologiske udvikling, men sørger for, at de selskaber, der besidder en dominerende stilling, ikke udnytter denne til at udelukke konkurrerende tredjeparter fra fordelene ved denne udvikling gennem en diskriminerende praksis.
This case provides a clear illustration of the policy pursued by the Community authorities: the Commission welcomes technological progress but makes sure that it is not used by operators in a dominant position in order to deprive competitors of the benefits of such progress through discriminatory practices.
Kommissionen mener, at tilstedeværelsen af en standardformular, der letter denne samordning, har adskillige fordele.
The Commission takes the view that the exist ence of a standard form facilitating such coordination offers a number of advantages.
For operatørerne er det en omkostningsmæssig og tidsmæssig gevinst, og det er desuden en garanti for gennemsigtighed, som bidrager til at reducere risikoen for diskriminering.
For operators, it cuts costs and negotiating times and also guarantees transparency, thereby re ducing the risks of discrimination.