natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
io Domstolen skal bemærke, at procesreglerne i de kontraherende stater ikke er ens artede med hensyn til, fra hvilket tidspunkt en sag må anses for anlagt.
io It should be pointed out that the rules of procedure of the various Contracting States are not identical as regards determining the date at which the courts are seised.
11 Det fremgår af en retssammenlignende undersøgelse, som er forelagt Domstolen, at i Frankrig, Italien, Luxembourg, og Nederlandene anses en sag for at være anlagt på det tidspunkt, da stævningen forkyndes for sagsøgte.
It appears from information on comparative law placed before the Court that in France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands the action is considered to be pending before the court from the moment at which the document initiating the proceed ings is served upon the defendant.
I Belgien anses sagen for an lagt, når den er indført i retsbogen, hvilket principielt forudsætter, at stævningen er blevet forkyndt for sagsøgte.
In Belgium the court is seised when the action is registered on its general roll, such registration implying in principle prior service of the writ of summons on the defendant.
12 I Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland anses sagen efter §253, stk. 1, i Zivilprozessordnung for at være anlagt, når stævningen er forkyndt for sagsøgte.
12 In the Federal Republic of Germany the action is brought, according to Para graph 253 (1) of the Zivilprozessordnung, when the document initiating the proceed ings has been served on the defendant.
Forkyndelsen foretages på embeds vegne af den ret, ved hvilken stævningen er indleveret.
Service is effected of its own motion by the court to which the document has been submitted.
Processtadiet fra tidspunktet for stævningens indlevering ved retten til dens forkyndelse benævnes 'Abhängigkeit'.
The procedural stage between the lodging of the document at the registry of the court and service is called 'Anhängigkeit'.
Tidspunktet for stævningens indlevering har betydning ved en eventuel forældelse og for beregningen af procesfristerne, men er aldrig afgørende for, fra hvilket tidspunkt litispendensvirkningen indtræder.
The lodging of the document initiating the proceedings plays a role as regards limitation periods and compliance with procedural time-limits but in no way determines the moment at which the action becomes pending.
Af Zivilprozessordnungs §261, stk. 1, fremgår, at litispendensvirkningen indtræder på det tidspunkt, da stævningen forkyndes for sagsøgte.
It is clear from the aforementioned Paragraph 253, read together with Paragraph 216(1) of the Zivilprozessordnung, that an action becomes pending once the document initiating the proceed ings has been served on the defendant.
13 En sammenligning af lovgivningen i de nævnte medlemsstater viser altså, at der ikke på grundlag af en sammenligning af de relevante bestemmelser i de nationale lovgivninger kan opstilles noget fælles litispendensbegreb.
13 It follows from the comparison of the legislation mentioned above that a common concept of lis pendens cannot be arrived at by a rapprochement of the various relevant national provisions.
Så meget desto mindre kan man, som foreslået af sagsøgeren i hovedsagen, udstrække et sådant begreb til også at gælde i de øvrige kontraherende medlemsstater, idet dette begreb er et særligt tysk retsbegreb, som på grund af sin beskaffenhed ikke kan overføres til de øvrige retssystemer.
A fortiori, therefore, it is not possible to extend to all the contracting parties, as is proposed by the plaintiff in the main action, a concept which is peculiar to German law and which, because of its characteristics, cannot be transposed to the other legal systems concerned.
Den angiver navnlig ikke, om li tispendensvirkningen indtræder fra det tidspunkt, stævningen indleveres til retten, eller fra det tidspunkt, stævningen meddeles eller forkyndes for modparten.
It may properly be inferred from Article 21, read as a whole, that a court's obligation to decline jurisdiction in favour of another court only comes into existence if it is established that proceedings have been definitively brought before a court in
(fortsat 3)
(continued 3) another State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties.
15 Da konventionens formål ikke er at harmonisere de nævnte processuelle skridt, som er snævert knyttet til udformningen af procesgangen ved retterne i de enkelte medlemsstater, må spørgsmålet om, fra hvilket tidspunkt der kan antages at foreligge et endeligt sagsanlæg efter konventionens artikel 21, bedømmes og afgøres i henhold til den enkelte rets egen nationale lovgivning.
15 Since the object of the Convention is not to unify those formalities, which are closely linked to the organization of judicial procedure in the various States, the question as to the moment at which the conditions for definitive seisin for the pur poses of Article 21 are met must be appraised and resolved, in the case of each court, according to the rules of its own national law.
Dette indebærer, at den enkelte ret med tilstrækkelig sikkerhed kan fastslå, i hvilken tidsmæssig rækkefølge flere sager, der opfylder kravene i konventionens artikel 21, skal anses for at være anlagt, hvilket altså for den sag, der verserer for den pågældende ret selv, må afgøres i henhold til dennes egen nationale lovgivning, og for den eller de sager, der verserer ved en anden ret, på grundlag af den ved denne ret gældende nationale lovgivning.
That method allows each court to es tablish with a sufficient degree of certainty, by reference to its own national law, as regards itself, and by reference to the national law of any other court which has been seised, as regards that court, the order or priority in time of actions brought within the conditions laid down by the Convention.
16 Det af Oberlandesgericht München forelagte spørgsmål må herefter besvares så ledes, at konventionens artikel 21 skal fortolkes således, at sagen skal anses for 'først ... anlagt' ved den ret, hvor der først må antages at foreligge et endeligt sagsanlæg, hvilken betingelse skal vurderes efter hver af de pågældende retters egen nationale lovgivning.«
16 The answer to the question raised by the Oberlandesgericht München is therefore that Article 21 of the Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the court 'first seised' is the one before which the requirements for proceedings to become definitively pending are first fulfilled, such requirements to be determined in accordance with the national law of each of the courts concerned."
»Artikel 21 i konventionen af 27. september 1968 om retternes kompetence og om fyldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser i borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager, skal fortolkes således, at en sag skal anses for 'først... anlagt' ved den ret, hvor der først må an tages at foreligge et endeligt sagsanlæg, hvilken betingelse skal vurderes efter hver af de pågældende retters egen nationale lovgivning.«
"Article 21 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforce ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters must be interpreted as meaning that the court 'first seised' is the one before which the requirements for proceedings to become definitively pending are first fulfilled, such requirements to be determined in accordance with the national law of each of the courts concerned."
Sagsøgeren havde først fremsat kravet for retten i Ca tania.
In seeking to enforce his claim the plaintiff had had recourse first to the court in Catania.
Han havde dér først begæret arrest foretaget hos sagsøgte og derefter anlagt justifikationssag mod sagsøgte i medfør af artikel 680 i den italienske civilproceslov.
He had first applied for a protective attachment order and had then instituted proceedings on the substance of the case in accordance with Article680 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.
Stævningen var indgået til retten den 22. september 1976 og forkyndt den 23. september 1976.
The document instituting the proceedings was lodged at the court on 22 September 1976 and served on 23 September 1976.
Justifikationssagen verserede stadig i Italien.
The proceedings on the substance of the case were still pending in Italy.
Opfyldelsesværnetinget i henhold til konventionens artikel 5, nr. 1, er ikke eksklusivt. Det fulgte af konventionens artikel 2, at den italienske ret havde kompetence.
The agreement on Munich as the place of performance did not in any way deprive the Italian court of jurisdiction. The
Oberlandesgericht afviste derefter sagsøgerens yderligere anbringende, hvorefter kon ventionens artikel 21 var uanvendelig, fordi sagsøgeren i det foreliggende tilfælde nægtedes retsbeskyttelse på grund af den italienske rets passivitet.
The Oberlandesgericht went on to reject the plaintiffs further argument that Article 21 of the Convention was inapplicable since in this case the Italian court, by its inaction, was denying the parties their legal rights.
Denne indvending var al lerede uberettiget ifølge det af sagsøgeren selv anførte, således at det var unødvendigt på ny at henvende sig til Domstolen for at få afgjort spørgsmålet, om den i konventionens artikel 21 fastsatte »litispendensspærre« bortfalder, hvis den ret, ved hvilken sagen først er anlagt, forholder sig passiv.
The arguments of the plaintiff itself showed that objection to be unfounded, so that there was no reason to make a further reference to the Court of Justice on the question whether the lis alibi pendens barrier established by Article 21 of the Convention should be disregarded in the event of the prolonged fail ure to act of the court first seised.
Denne indvending var for det første uberettiget, fordi den italienske ret havde begrammet det næste retsmøde til den 29. november 1984; for det andet var sagsøgerens påberåbelse af en tidligere tilsidesættelse af hans krav på rets håndhævelse i modstrid med hans egen processuelle adfærd.
That objection was unfounded in the first place be cause the Italian court had set down the next stage of the procedure for 29 November 1984; secondly, the plaintiffs assertion that his right of recourse to the courts had been infringed was contradicted by his conduct of the proceedings.
Som konventionens artikel 21, stk. 1, viser, havde sagsøgeren ikke noget krav på at kunne gøre det samme proces krav gældende samtidig i Forbundsrepublikken og i Italien.
As was clear from the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Convention, the plaintiff had no right to pursue the same cause of action in Germany and in Italy simultaneously.
Da han videreførte den sag, der verserede for den tyske ret, var hans krav på retshåndhævelse allerede af denne grund ikke til sidesat, når den italienske ret ikke fremmede sagen.
Since he pressed on with the proceedings before the German court his right of recourse to the courts was not in fringed by the fact that the Italian court did not proceed further with his case.
I øvrigt kunne det heller ikke hævdes, at sagsøgeren blev nægtet ret til at få sin sag behandlet i Italien, da den italienske ret i medfør af konventionens artikel 21, stk. 2, var berettiget til at udsætte sa gen.
In addition there could be no suggestion of a denial of justice in Italy since the Italian court was justified in staying the proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Con vention.
Sagsøgeren havde selv gjort gældende, at den italienske ret savnede international kompetence.
The plaintiff had himself argued that the Italian court had not jurisdiction.
I medfør af artikel 21, stk. 2, kan den ret, som skulle erklære sig inkompetent, udsætte afgørelsen, såfremt den anden (her den tyske) rets kompetence bestrides — som her af sagsøgte.
Un der the second paragraph of Article 21 the court which would be required to decline jurisdiction might stay its proceedings if the jurisdiction of the other court (in this case, the German court) was contested (as it was by the defendant).
(Jfr. også 1­5.3 ­ B 5 : 1­17.1.2 ­ B 11)
(See also 1-5.3 -
Konneksiteten måtte senest tages i betragtning i første retsmøde efter formalitetsproce­durens afslutning efter begæring eller ex officio ; den ret, hvor sag senest var anlagt, var imidlertid i intet tilfælde forpligtet til at udsætte afgørelsen eller erklære at mangle kom­petence.
The question whether the cases were related had to be raised by one of the parties or by the court of its own motion no later than the first hearing on the substance of the action but a court other than the court first seised was in no circumstances obliged to stay proceedings or decline jurisdiction.
Litispendens (artikel21) — betingelser — krav, »der har samme genstand og hviler på samme grundlag« fremsat for retter i forskellige kontraherende stater — foreløbige foranstaltninger til bevissikring vedrørende en af køberen påstået mangelfuld opfyldelse af en købeaftale — sælgerens senere krav om betaling af købesummen for retten i en anden kontraherende stat — ingen litispendensvirkning
Lis pendens (Article2D — Conditions — Proceedings involving "lhe same cause of action" in lhe courts of different Contracting States — Provisional measures for the preservation of evidence in relation lo the buyer's allegation of defective performance in a contract of sale — Action for the purchase price subsequently commenced by the seller in the court of another Contracting State — Plea of lis alibi pendens rejected
1968 ­ ARTIKEL 21 fortsat 1)
'continued
Indbyrdes sammenhængende krav (artikel22) — betingelser — sagerne anlagt ved domstole i forskellige kontraherende stater
Related actions (Article22) — Conditions — Pendency of both actions before courts of different Contracting States
Et nederlandsk selskab indstævnede et selskab med hjemsted i Belgien for Arrondisse­mentsrechtbank 's­Hertogenbosch til betaling af restkøbesummen i henhold til en aftale om levering af et klimaanlæg til sagsøgte.
A company incorporated in the Netherlands brought an action in the Arrondissements­rechtbank 's-Hertogenbosch against a company based in Belgium. In the action it claimed payment of the balance of the purchase price under a contract for the supply of air-conditioning equipment to the defendant.
Sagsøgte var ganske vist enig i, at retten var kompetent i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 5, nr. 1, men påstod dog sagen hen­vist til handelsretten i Gent (Belgien), da sagsøgte før forkyndelsen af stævningen og ind­kaldelsen for den nederlandske ret selv havde indstævnet sagsøgeren for den nævnte bel­giske ret for med henblik på foreløbig bevissikring at få udmeldt en syns­ og skønsmand.
The defendant submitted that, although the court in which the action had been brought had jurisdiction under Article 5 (I ) of the Brussels Convention, the case should none the less be transferred to the commercial court in Ghent (Belgium) on the ground that prior to service of the document instituting the proceedings before the court in the Netherlands it had brought an action against the plaintiff in the said Belgian court under the procedure for provisional protective meas­ures in order to secure the appointment of an expert.
Den sag, der verserede i Belgien, angik alene tilvejebringelse og sikring af beviser for sagsøgtes påstand om, at sagsøgeren havde handlet uforsvarligt ved installationen af an­lægget, idet der var taget forbehold om alle yderligere foranstaltninger med henblik på retsforfølgning.
The proceedings instituted in Belgium merely concerned the procurement and preservation of evidence in support of the defendant's claim that the plaintiff had acted negligently in the installa­tion of the equipment ; the right to pursue any other form of legal remedy was reserved.
Sagen for handelsretten i Gent vedrørte så­ledes ikke samme krav for den nederlandske ret.
Therefore, the action brought in the commer­cial court in Ghent did not involve the same cause of action as the proceedings brought in the Netherlands.
Den modsatte opfattelse ville føre til, at det var muligt for en part — ved at bringe at foreløbigt retsmiddel i konventionens arti­kel 24's forstand i anvendelse — at unddrage modparten det almindelige værneting i henhold til konventionen.
The contrary view would lead to the result that, by obtaining a provi­sional measure within the meaning of Article 24 of the Convention, a party would be able to remove the opposing party from the jurisdiction of the court which had jurisdic­tion under the Convention.
Heller ikke konventionens artikel 22, som i visse tilfælde giver retten mulighed for på en parts begæring at henvise sagen, fandt anvendelse, da der på det pågældende tids­punkt ikke verserede nogen sag for belgiske retter; uafhængigt heraf bestod der heller ikke, når hensås til de forskellige formål med sagerne, fare for uforenelige afgørelser.
Article 22 of the Convention, which enabled the Court in certain circumstances to have the case transferred on the application of one of the parties, was not applicable, since no action was currently pending before the Belgian court.
Indbyrdes sammenhængende krav (artikel 22) — den ret, hvor sag sidst er anlagt, erklærer at mangle kompetence — betingelser —forening af indbyrdes sammenhæn­gende krav — ikke mulig efter tysk ret
Related actions (Article 22) — A court other than the court first seised may decline jurisdiction — Conditions — Consolidation of related actions — Not possible under German law
Sagsøgeren, et fransk handelsselskab, havde leveret stål til en tysk virksomhed, som senere blev ude afstand til at betale.
The plaintiff, a French trading company, had supplied steel to a German undertaking which subsequently became insolvent.
Vedrørende de på grundlag heraf opståede fordrin­ger, som beløb sig til adskillige millioner DM, indgik sagsøgeren den 2. april 1976 på et arrangement med sagsøgte, en belgisk bank, der via sin tyske filial i årevis havde været den tyske virksomheds bankforbindelse.
The resulting claims, amounting to several mil­lion German Marks, were the subject of an arrangement concluded on 2 April 1976 by the plaintiff and the defendant, a Belgian bank which through its branch in Germany had acted as bankers to the German undertaking for a number of years.
Be­grebet sagsgenstand skulle bedømmes efter tysk procesret; når der var tale om et aner­kendelsessøgsmål på den ene side og et tilsvarende fuldbyrdelsessøgsmål på den anden side, var sagsgenstanden ikke den samme, da der med de to sager forfulgtes forskellige mål.
The term "cause of action" had to be interpreted in accordance with German procedural law; an application for a declaration of the existence of a right and an action for dam­ages did not involve the same cause of action because in each case different objectives were pursued.
Retten kunne heller ikke erklære ikke at være kompetent i henhold til konventio­nens artikel 22, stk. 2 — sagsøgte havde subsidiært nedlagt påstand herom — idet en for­ening af den foreliggende sag med den for handelsretten i Bruxelles verserende sag ikke var mulig efter tysk procesret.
Nor could the court decline jurisdiction under the second paragraph of Article 22 of the Convention, as the defendant had requested in the alternative, because under German procedural law the present action could not be consolidated with the pro­ceedings pending before the Brussels Commercial Court.
I henhold til tysk procesret kunne to sager kun forenes i til­fælde af, at de verserede for samme ret.
Under German procedural law actions could only be consolidated if they were pending before the same court.
Landgericht udsatte heller ikke den sag, som verserede for den selv, indtil afslutningen af sagen i Belgien.
The Landgericht also refused to stay the action pending before it until the conclusion of the proceedings in Belgium.
Anvendelsen af konventionens artikel 21, stk. 2, var ikke mulig, da der ikke var rejst indsigelse mod den belgiske handelsrets kompetence.
Application of the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Convention foundered on the fact that the jurisdiction of the Brussels Commercial Court had not been contested.
Retten gjorde hel­ler ikke brug af sin skønsmæssige beføjelse i henhold til artikel 22, stk. 2, da sagen var moden til påkendelse.
The Landgericht did not make use of its discretionary power under the second paragraph of Article 22 in view of the fact that the case was ready for judgment.
Herefter kunne det også henstå, om domskonventionen overhove­det fandt anvendelse på den foreliggende sag under hensyn til konventionens artikel 1, stk. 2, nr. 2.
In those circumstances the court was able to leave open the question whether, in view of subparagraph (2) of the second paragraph of Article I, the Brussels
Litispendens — krav, der har samme genstand og hviler på samme grundlag, frem­satfor retter i forskellige kontraherende stater — krav om betaling af købesum og krav om forholdsmæssigt afslag — samme krav — kompetence for den ret, ved hvilken sag først er anlagt
Lis pendens — Proceedings involving the same cause of action in the courts of dif­ferent Contracting States — Action f or purchase price and action for reduction in pur­chase price — Same cause of action — Jurisdiction of the court first seised
Denne aftale havde sagsøgte ensidigt an­nulleret; i øvrigt havde sagsøgtes i henhold til tidligere købekontrakter leverede produk­ter været mangelfulde.
The defendant was alleged to have repudiated that contract unilateral­ly; it was also claimed that products supplied by the defendant under previous contracts of sale were defective.
Under en for retten i Milano rejst sag krævede sagsøgeren inden retlig annullation af eneforhandlingsaftalen, forholdsmæssigt afslag på grund af mang­ler ved de leverede varer samt skadeserstatning.
In an action in the Tribunale di Milano, the plaintiff sought rescis­sion of the exclusive distributorship contract, a reduction in the purchase price on ac­count of defects in the goods delivered and damages.
Sagsøgte bestred, at der skulle være kommet en eneforhandlingsaftale i stand og rejste over for kravet om forholdsmæssigt afslag indsigelse mod rettens kompetence under henvisning til, at handelsretten i Has­selt (Belgien), hvor sag først var anlagt, var kompetent med hensyn hertil.
The defendant contested the exist­ence of the exclusive distributorship contract, and in relation to the claim for a reduc­tion in the purchase price it challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the commercial court in Hasselt (Belgium), where proceedings had already been com­menced, had jurisdiction.
Retten i Mi­lano erklærede ikke at være kompetent vedrørende kravet om forholdsmæssigt afslag til fordel for den belgiske ret og frifandt i øvrigt sagsøgte.
The Tribunale di Milano declined jurisdiction in the action for a reduction in the purchase price in favour of the Belgian court and dismissed the re­maining claims.
Under appellen fik sagsøgeren medhold.
The plaintiffs appeal succeeded.
Corte d'appello fastslog, at sagen i Italien vedrørende forholdsmæssigt afslag var anlagt tidligere end den af sagsøgte ved den belgiske ret anlagte sag til betaling af købesummen.
The Corte d'Appello found that the Italian action for a reduction in the purchase price had been commenced before the action for payment of the purchase price had been brought by the defendant in the Belgian court.
Forkyndelse af indkaldelsen til Tribunale di Milano til retsmødet den 30. april 1976 var sket den 13. december 1975, hvorimod forkyndelsen af det indledende processkrift i Belgien til retsmødet den 16. juni 1976 var sket den 25. maj 1976.1 henhold til domskon­ventionens artikel 21 var den ret, ved hvilken sag først var anlagt, kompetent vedrø­rende krav, der har samme genstand og hviler på samme grundlag, således at Tribunale di Milano's kompetence vedrørende kravet om forholdsmæssigt afslag var utvivlsom i de foreliggende tilfælde.
The summons to appear before the Tribu­nale di Milano at the hearing on 30 April 1976 was dated 13 December 1975, whereas the document instituting the proceedings in Belgium and requiring attendance at a hearing on 16 June 1976 was served on 25 May 1976.