natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved de anfægtede beslutninger, der var truffet på grundlag af såvel Traktatens artikel 93, stk. 2, første afsnit, som Rådets direktiv 87/167/EØF, havde Kommissionen for det første fundet det stridende med fællesmarkedet, at de belgiske myndigheder i 1989 havde støttet skibsbygningsindustrien ved en række kreditter, da deres subventionsækvival ens overskred maksimumsgrænsen for 1989; for det andet havde den pålagt den belgiske regering at tage kreditvilkårene op til ny behandling med henblik pá at nedsætte dem til den nævnte grænse.
In the contested decisions, adopted on the basis of the first subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty and Council Directive 87/167/EEC, the Commission declared incompatible with the Common Market a series of aids to shipbuilding granted in the form of credits by the Belgian authorities during the course of 1989 because the grant equivalent of those aids exceeded the ceiling fixed for 1989; it also required the Belgian Government to revise the terms on which credits are granted in order to bring them within that ceiling.
Den belgiske regering gjorde gældende, at der med henblik på fastsættelsen af grænsen alene skulle tages hensyn til støtte, der faktisk var til rådighed som produktionsstøtte, hvorimod driftsstøtte ikke burde medtages.
In the Belgian Government's view the only aid which ought to be taken into consideration when determining the ceiling is aid actually available as production aid, whereas operating aid ought to be excluded.
Domstolen udtalte herom, at der ved direktivet er indført et konsekvent system, som med henblik på fastsættelsen af størrelsen af en støtte, som der er givet tilsagn om ved bygningen af et skib, ikke blot tager hensyn til direkte støtte, men også indirekte støtte, som staten kan yde sin skibsbygningsindustri.
The Court noted, in that respect, that Directive 87/167/EEC had instituted a consistent system which took into consideration, when determining the amount of aid accorded for the building of a ship, not only direct aid but also indirect aid which a State may grant to its shipbuilding industry.
Dette fremgår klart af direktivets artikel 4, stk. 4, hvorefter grænsen ikke blot gælder for alle former for produktionsstøtte, der ydes direkte til værfterne, men også for den i artikel 3, stk. 2, omhandlede støtte; sidstnævnte bestemmelse tager sigte på samtlige former for støtte til rederier eller tredjemænd, når støtten faktisk anvendes til bygning eller ombygning af skibe på Fællesskabets værfter.
That is clearly apparent from Article 4(4) of the Directive under which the ceiling applies not only to all forms of production aid granted directly to the yards but also to the aid covered by Article 3(2), the latter provision being directed at all forms of aid to ship owners or to third parties where those aids are actually used for the building or conversion of ships in Community shipyards.
Ifølge Domstolen fremgik det af indholdet af de omtvistede beslutninger, at den pågældende støtte faktisk skulle anvendes til bygning af skibe på belgiske værfter.
In the case in point, the Court stated that it was apparent from the wording of the contested decisions that the aid in question was actually intended for the building of ships in Belgian yards.
Den belgiske regering sås ikke at have anført omstændigheder, der kunne godtgøre det modsatte, hvorfor Domstolen fandt det ubestrideligt, at støtten var omfattet af direktivet.
As the Belgian Government had not submitted any evidence to the contrary, it could not be disputed that the aid fell within the scope of the Directive.
Det andet anbringende vedrørende betydningen af grænsen ifølge direktivets artikel 4, stk. 1
The scope of the ceiling referred to in Article 4(1) of the Directive
Den belgiske regering kritiserede Kommissionen for, at den, som følge af at den tillægger den fælles grænse ifølge direktivets artikel 4, stk. 1,
In the Belgian Government's opinion the Commission was wrong, in attributing an absolute limit to the common ceiling instituted by Article 4(1) of the
afgørende betydning, ganske enkelt blot fastslog, at den omtvistede støtte overskred nævnte grænse og på dette grundlag automatisk anså støtten for uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
Directive, to confine itself to establishing merely that the aid in question exceeded the above ceiling in order to conclude automatically as a result that it was incompatible with the Common Market.
Domstolen bemærkede, at Rådet i overensstemmelse med tanken bag artikel 92, stk. 3, og med udgangspunkt i den konstatering, at støtte til skibsbygning er retsstridig, tog hensyn til en række økonomiske og sociale krav, som foranledigede den til at anvende sin traktatfæstede mulighed for alligevel at anse den pågældende støtte for forenelig med fællesmarkedet, forudsat at støtten opfyldte di rekti vets undtagelsesbeti ngelser.
In accordance with the reasoning underlying Article 92(3) and starting from the basis of the incompatibility of aid to shipbuilding, the Council had taken account of a series of economic and social requirements which had led it to make use of the power, provided for in the Treaty, to consider such aid as nevertheless compatible with the Common Market provided that it satisfied the criteria in the Directive.
Hvad angår produktionsstøtten til bygning og ombygning af skibe bemærkede Domstolen, at Rådet havde valgt kriteriet om den faste fælles maksimumsgrænse.
With regard, to production aid for the building and conversion of ships, the criteria adopted was that the aid should not exceed a common maximum ceiling.
Denne grænse udtrykker ifølge Domstolen, hvad Rådet anså for ligevægtspunktet mellem hensyn, som er indbyrdes modstridende, nemlig på den ene side overholdelsen af fællesmarkedets regler og på den anden side bevarelse af et tilstrækkeligt aktivitetsniveau på de europæiske værfter og hensynet til, at den europæiske skibsbygningsindustri kan overleve som en effektiv og konkurrencedygtig sektor.
That ceiling was the point at which the Council had considered that a balance was achieved between the conflicting requirements that the rules of the Common Market be observed and that a sufficient level of activity in European naval yards be maintained for the survival of an effective and competitive European shipbuilding industry.
Det måtte klart følge heraf, at overholdelsen af den omtvistede grænse er den afgørende betingelse for, at en støtte til skibsbygningen kan erklæres for forenelig med fællesmarkedet, og at overskridelse af grænsen i sig selv medfører, at den pågældende støtte bliver retsstridig.
It therefore appeared that the observance of the ceiling in question was the essential precondition for a shipbuilding aid to be considered as compatible with a common market and that exceeding that ceiling resulted in the aid in question being automatically incompatible.
Kongeriget Belgien betaler sagens omkostninger, herunder omkostningerne i sagen om foreløbige forholdsregler."
The Kingdom of Belgium is ordered to pay the costs, including the costs relating to the application for interim measures."
Generaladvokat Marco Darmon fremsatte forslag til afgørelse i retsmødet (Domstolens plenum) den 16. december 1992.
Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered his Opinion on 16 December 1992.
Kommissionen betaler sagens omkostninger, herunder omkostningerne i sagen om foreløbige forholdsregler."
Order the Commission to pay the costs including the costs relating to the application for interim measures."
Spørgsmålet var blevet rejst under sag anlagt af Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft, der er en registreret, ikke-erhvervsdrivende forening med hjemsted i München, mod Yves Rocher GmbH, som er et datterselskab af det franske selskab Laboratoires de biologie végétale Yves Rocher, vedrørende en annonce fra Yves Rocher, der indeholdt en sammen ligning af gamle og nye priser for selskabets produkter.
That question had been raised in the course of a dispute between the Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V., registered in Munich, and Yves Rocher GmbH, a subsidiary of the French company, Laboratoires de biologie végétale Yves Rocher. That dispute concerned an advertisement circulated by Yves Rocher comparing old and new prices for its products.
Indtil 1986 var annoncering med prissammenligninger mellem samme virksomheds priser tilladt, for så vidt den ikke var illoyal eller egnet til at vildlede forbrugerne.
Prior to 1986, advertising by way of comparisons between the prices of the same undertaking was lawful provided that it was not unfair or liable to mislead the consumer.
Efter pres fra visse kredse inden for detailhandelen indsatte den tyske lovgiver i § 6 e i "Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb" (lov om forbud mod illoyal konkurrence - herefter benævnt "UWG") et forbud mod annoncering med sammenligninger mellem individuelle priser.
At the request of certain groups of retailers, the German legislature included in Article 6(e) of the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Law on unfair competition) the prohibition of advertising in which individual prices are compared.
Formålet med dette forbud er at beskytte forbrugere og konkurrenter mod annoncering med prissammenligninger. Forbuddet i henhold til UWG's artikel 6 e er imidlertid ikke absolut.
That prohibition is intended to protect consumers and competitors against advertising by way of price comparison.
Der findes således en undtagelse med hensyn til ikke-iøjnefaldende ("blickfangmässig") sammenligninger og annoncering i kataloger.
A derogation is provided for price comparisons which are not "eye-catching" {blickfangmassig) as well as for advertising in catalogues.
Domstolen bemærkede, at når der ikke findes en fælles ordning vedrørende forhandling, må hindringer for samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet, der beror på forskelle i de nationale lovgivninger, accepteres i det omfang, disse bestemmelser uden forskel anvendes på indenlandsk fremstillede og indførte produkter og er uomgængeligt nødvendige af hensyn til bl.a. forbrugerbeskyttelse og god handelsskik.
The Court stated that, in the absence of common rules relating to marketing, obstacles to the free movement of goods within the Community resulting from disparities between national laws had to be accepted in so far as such rules were applied to domestic and imported products without distinction and in so far as they could be justified as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating inter alia to consumer protection or the fairness of commercial transactions.
Som Domstolen imidlertid har fastslået flere gange, skal bestemmelserne stå i rimeligt forhold til det forfulgte mål.
However, as the Court had stated on numerous occasions, the rules had to be in proportion to the objective pursued.
Da beskyttelsen af forbrugerne mod vildledende reklame er et legitimt mål i henhold til fællesskabsretten, måtte Domstolen undersøge, om de nationale bestemmelser er egnede til at nå de forfulgte mål, og om de går længere end nødvendigt.
The protection of consumers against misleading advertising was regarded by Community law as a legitimate objective, and it had therefore to be considered whether the national provisions were likely to achieve the intended objectives and did not go beyond what was necessary for that purpose.
Domstolen bemærkede for det første, at et forbud som det i hovedsagen omhandlede finder anvendelse, når prissammenligninger - uanset om de er korrekte - er iøjnefaldende.
In that respect, the Court noted that a prohibition of the kind in question in the main proceedings applied when the price comparisons were eye-catching, irrespective of whether they were correct or not.
Forbuddet finder således ikke anvendelse på prissammenligninger, der ikke er iøjnefaldende.
Thus, that prohibition did not apply to price comparisons which were not eye-catching.
I denne sag er annonceringen ikke forbudt, fordi den påstås at være forkert, men fordi den er iøjnefaldende.
In the case in point, the advertising was not forbidden because of its alleged inaccuracy but because it was eye-catching.
Enhver iøjnefaldende annoncering med prissammenligninger er således forbudt, uanset om den er rigtig eller forkert.
It followed that all eye-catching advertising using price comparisons was forbidden, whether it was true or false.
Sådanne sammenligninger kan være meget nyttige, for at forbrugeren kan have alle relevante oplysninger, når han træffer sit valg.
Moreover, the prohibition in question went beyond the requirements of the objective pursued in so far as it affected advertising that was in no way
Tværtimod kan en ordning, der medfører, at sådanne sammenligninger forbydes, begrænse konkurrencen.
The Court stated that the prohibition of the type in question in the main proceedings was therefore not in proportion to the objective pursued.
Domstolen besvarede det forelagte spørgsmål således:
With regard to the protection of fair trading, and consequently of competition, the Court stated that correct price comparisons, prohibited by a rule of the type in question, could in no way distort competitive conditions.
"EØF-Traktatens artikel 30 skal fortolkes således, at den er til hinder for, at der i henhold til lovgivningen i en medlemsstat A anvendes en bestemmelse, hvorefter det er forbudt for en i denne stat hjemmehørende virksomhed, der efter katalog eller salgsbrochure pr. postordre sælger varer, som er indført fra medlemsstaten B, at annoncere med priser således, at der sammen med en iøjnefaldende fremhævelse af den nye pris henvises til en højere pris, der har været anført i et tidligere katalog eller en tidligere salgsbrochure."
"Article 30 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as rendering inapplicable legislation of Member State A which prohibits an undertaking established in that State and engaged in the mail order sale by catalogue or prospectus of goods imported from Member State Β from advertising by means of prices when a new price is contrasted in a eye-catching manner with a higher price indicated in an earlier catalogue or sales prospectus."
Generaladvokat Marco Darmon fremsatte forslag til afgørelse i retsmødet (Domstolens plenum) den 15. september 1992.
Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered his Opinion on 15 September 1992.
"EØF-Traktatens artikel 30 skal fortolkes således, at den er til hinder for, at der i henhold til lovgivningen i en medlemsstat A anvendes en bestemmelse, hvorefter det er forbudt en i denne stat hjemmehørende virksomhed, der efter katalog eller salgsbrochure pr. postordre sælger varer, som er indført fra medlemsstaten B, at annoncere med priser således, at der sammen med en iøjnefaldende fremhævelse af den nye pris henvises til en højere pris, der har været anført i et tidligere katalog eller en tidligere salgsbrochure."
"Article 30 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as rendering inapplicable legislation of Member State A which prohibits an undertaking established in that State and engaged in the mail order sale by catalogue or prospectus of goods imported from Member State Β from advertising by means of prices when a new price is contrasted in a eye-catching manner with a higher price indicated in an earlier catalogue or sales prospectus."
Formalitetsspørgsmålet for Retten
(Appeal - ECSC - Non-contractual liability of the Community) (Full court)
Retten havde ikke taget en afvisningspåstand til følge, der var støttet på, at visse af de omtvistede beslutninger ikke forinden var blevet annulleret. Retten bemærkede, at den løsning, Domstolen havde valgt med hensyn til anvendelsen af EØF-Traktatens artikel 176, måtte udvides til også at
By application lodged at the registry of the Court on 3 September 1991, the Commission of the European Communities appealed against the judgment delivered on 27 June 1991 by the Court of First Instance in Case T-120/89 Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG ν Commission of the European Communities ([1991] ECR 11-279) in so far as it had declared several decisions of the Commission concerning delivery quotas of the applicant between 1985 and 1988 to be vitiated by a fault of such a nature as to render the Community liable; held that that undertaking had suffered direct and special loss as a result of
- 7 - omfatte EKSF-Traktatens artikel 34, og at udtrykkelige eller stiltiende retsakter, der i det væsentlige har samme indhold som den annullerede retsakt, og som er udstedt mellem datoen for dennes ikrafttræden og annullationsdommen, derfor må ligestilles med den annullerede retsakt.
- 7 - those decisions; and required the Commission to pay the majority of the costs of the proceedings.
For Domstolen gjorde Kommissionen gældende, at analogien mellem EØF-Traktatens artikel 176 og EKSF-Traktatens artikel 34 ikke er fuldstændig og ikke vedrører de betingelser, der i sidstnævnte artikel er fastsat med hensyn til fremme af et erstatningssøgsmål anlagt ved Domstolen til realitetspåkendelse, idet det efter bestemmelsen kræves, at de omtvistede beslutninger forinden er annulleret.
It considered that the solution adopted by the Court with respect to the application of Article 176 of the EEC Treaty could be extended to the application of Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty and that, consequently, express or implied measures that were essentially the same as an annulled measure and adopted between the date on which the annulled measure entered into force and the date of the judgment annulling them had to be treated in the same way as the annulled measure.
Domstolen bemærkede, at der i henhold til EKSF-Traktaten er to muligheder for at gøre ansvar gældende over for Fællesskabet, og at Domstolen allerede har fastslået, at den omstændighed, at der findes specifikke bestemmelser i artikel 34, ikke er til hinder for, at en virksomhed, som mener at have lidt en direkte skade som følge af en EF-beslutning, der ikke er blevet annulleret, kan gøre ansvar gældende over for Fællesskabet i henhold til artikel 40, stk. 1.
The Commission claimed that the analogy between Article 176 of the EEC Treaty and Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty was only a partial one and did not concern the conditions for admissibility of an action for damages before the Court of Justice as laid down in that latter article, which required the prior annulment of the decisions in question.
Med hensyn til det erstatningskrav, Peine-Salzgitter havde gjort gældende, er det uden betydning, hvilken af de to artikler kravet støttes på, idet der efter begge bestemmelserne kan opnås erstatning for en skade, der er forårsaget af beslutninger, der er hæftet med en mangel, der begrunder ansvar for Fællesskabet.
The Court stated that it had to be borne in mind that the ECSC Treaty had provided two ways in which the Community's liability could be called into question and that the Court had already held that the existence of the specific provisions of Article 34 could not prevent an undertaking that considered itself to have suffered a loss directly caused by a Community decision that had not been annulled from establishing the liability of the Community on the basis of the first paragraph of Article 40.
Retten havde bemærket, at det med henblik på i videst muligt omfang at sikre en ensartet anvendelse af fællesskabsretten for så vidt angår spørgsmålet om ansvar som følge af ulovlige generelle retsakter er hensigtsmæssigt at fortolke begrebet mangel, der begrunder ansvar for Fællesskabet, jf. EKSF-Traktatens artikel 34, stk. 1, i lyset af de kriterier, Domstolen i sin praksis har fastsat vedrørende EØF-traktatens artikel 215, stk. 2.
With regard to the right to compensation that Salzgitter claimed, it was irrelevant which of the two articles relied on was to be applied because both those means of legal recourse enabled compensation to be obtained for damage caused by decisions vitiated by a fault of such a nature as to render the Community liable.
Følgerne af, at Domstolen i den første dom af 14. juli 1988 fastslog, at Kommissionens individuelle beslutninger var ulovlige
The Court of First Instance had considered that it was appropriate, in order to ensure as far as possible the uniform application of Community law relating to non-contractual liability resulting from unlawful legislative measures, to interpret the term "fault of such a nature as to render the Community liable" in the first paragraph of Article 34 of the ECSC Treaty in the light of the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in its decisions on the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty.
For Domstolen anfægtede Kommissionen de følger, Retten udledte af, at Domstolen i dom af 14. juli 1988 i sagen Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG mod Kommissionen (sag 103/85, Sml. s. 4131) havde fastslået, at den individuelle beslutning var ulovlig, og gjorde først gældende, at Retten ikke fuldt ud havde taget hensyn til, at Fællesskabet i henhold til Domstolens praksis kun kan ifalde ansvar, såfremt der foreligger en åbenbar og grov overskridelse af de grænser, der nødvendigvis må gælde med hensyn til et organs udøvelse af sine beføjelser.
The Court stated that even though the Court of First Instance had rightly pointed out similarities between the liability rules under the ECSC Treaty and those under the EEC Treaty, and even though it had rightly been guided by
Kommission anførte endvidere, at Retten havde sidestillet denne betingelse fra praksis med et kriterium om uagtsomhed, og at Retten havde lagt særlig vægt på subjektive forhold, mens en anvendelse af de kriterier, Domstolen har fastsat, afhænger af, om der foreligger objektive omstændigheder. Endelig anførte Kommissionen, at Retten ikke havde taget hensyn til Kommissionens forvaltningspraksis, hvorefter det er situationen under ét for en virksomhed, der skal tages i betragtning, og ikke situationen for enkelte produktgrupper.
- 8 - principles common to different situations in which the Community institution had a wide power of appreciation in order to deal with complex problems, the Court of Justice had to consider, in the light of the criteria laid down for the application of Articles 34 and 40 of the ECSC Treaty, whether the Court of First Instance had, on the basis of the findings of fact and appreciation of those facts which were within its sole jurisdiction, classified the facts in an exact legal manner and adequately characterized the fault or faults of a nature such as to render the Community liable.
Til den første del af anbringendet bemærkede Domstolen blot, at i modsætning til, hvad Kommissionen havde anført, havde Retten, som i øvrigt ikke var forpligtet til konkret at henvise konkret til det kriterium, ikke alene taget stilling til, om den overskridelse, der foreholdes institutionen, var åbenbar, men også til spørgsmålet om dens grovhed.
In order to contest the conclusions drawn by the Court of First Instance from the unlawful measures censured by the Court of Justice's judgment of 14 July 1988 in Case 103/85 Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter AG ν Commission of the European Communities [1988] ECR 4131, the Commission claimed that the Court of First Instance had not fully taken into account the fact that the Court of Justice has held that the liability of the Community only came into question where an institution of the Community has manifestly and seriously exceeded the limits of its powers.
For så vidt angår den anden del af anbringendet bemærkede Domstolen, at når en mangel nærmere skal kvalificeres på grundlag af ansvarsregler, der bygger på culpa, forudsætter det en vurdering af de faktiske omstændigheder, der nødvendigvis må bero på subjektive synspunkter.
It alleged that the Court of First Instance had treated that requirement of the Court's case-law as a requirement that negligence be established and had based itself on subjective matters, whereas the application of the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice depended on the existence of objective factors.
Med hensyn til den tredje del af anbringendet fastslog Domstolen blot, at den forvaltningspraksis, Kommissionen havde påberåbt sig, og som Domstolen i øvrigt erklærede ulovlig i Domstolens første dom af 14. juli 1988, ikke kunne side stilles med en retsforskrift.
Finally, it claimed that the Court of First Instance had disregarded the Commission's administrative practice which took into consideration the situation of an undertaking as a whole and not the individual product categories concerned.