natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Arbejdstagernes pension stod ikke i forhold til deres løn, men udgjorde et fast beløb for alle arbejdstagere.
The pension awarded to workers was not proportional to their wage but was a fixed amount for each worker.
Albany anså ikke denne pensionsordning for at være tilstrækkelig fordelagtig og indgik derfor i 1981 aftale med et forsikringsselskab om en tillægspensionsordning for sine ansatte, således at deres samlede pension efter 40 års ansættelse udgør 70% af deres slutløn.
Albany decided that the scheme was insufficiently generous and in 1981 concluded arrangements with an insurance company for a supplementary pension for its workers so that the total pension to which they would be entitled after 40 years' employment amounts to 70% of their last salary.
Med virkning fra den 1. januar 1989 ændrede Fonden sin pensionsordning.
With effect from 1 January 1989 the Fund changed its pension scheme.
Ordningen giver nu også arbejdstagerne et beløb svarende til 70% af slutlønnen.
Since then its scheme awards workers an amount which likewise represents 70% of their final salary.
Efter ændringen af Fondens pensionsordning anmodede Albany om fritagelse for tilslutning.
Following the change to the Fund's pension scheme, Albany asked to be exempted from affiliation.
Fonden afslog denne anmodning.
Its request was rejected by the Fund.
Fonden blev oprettet i medfør af BPW (lov af 17.3.1949 om obligatorisk tilslutning til en erhvervspensionsfond).
The Fund was established under the BPW (Law of 17 March 1949 on compulsory affiliation to a sectoral pension fund).
Tilslutning til Fonden blev gjort obligatorisk ved en bekendtgørelse af 4. december 1975 fra arbejds- og socialministeren (herefter »bekendtgørelsen om obligatorisk tilslutning«).
Affiliation to the Fund was made compulsory by an order of the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment of 4
Albany påklagede Fondens afgørelse til Verzekeringskamer.
Albany lodged an objection to the Fund's decision with the Insurance Board.
Albany driver en tekstilvirksomhed, som har været tilsluttet Fonden siden 1975.
By decision of 18 March 1992, the Board found that, even if the Fund was not required in the circumstances
nu artikel 2 EF), at Fællesskabet bl.a. har til opgave »at fremme en harmonisk og afbalanceret udvikling af den økonomiske virksomhed« og »et højt beskæftigelsesniveau« samt »et højt socialt beskyttelsesniveau«.
Next, it is important to bear in mind that, under Article 3(g) and (i) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 3(l)(g) and (j) EC), the activities of the Community are to include not only a 'system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted' but also 'a policy in the social sphere'.
Fonden fulgte ikke Vezekeringskamer's udtalelse, og den lod et betalingspålæg forkynde for Albany, hvorved det blev pålagt selskabet at betale 36 700,29 NLG svarende til bidragene for 1989 i henhold til pensionsregulativet samt renter, inkassoomkostninger, udenretslige inkassoomkostninger og udgifter til juridisk bistand.
The Fund did not follow the advice of the Insurance Board and served Albany with a demand for payment of the sum of NLG 36 700.29, representing all statutory contributions payable since 1989 together with interest, collection charges, non-judicial expenses and legal aid costs.
I denne forbindelse fastslås det i EF-traktatens artikel 118 (EF-traktatens artikel 117-120 er erstattet af artikel 136 EF - 143 EF), at Kommissionen har til opgave at fremme et snævert samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne på det sociale område, især for så vidt angår organisationsretten og retten til kollektive forhandlinger mellem arbejdsgivere og arbejdstagere.
In that connection, Article 118 of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty have been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC) provides that the Commission is to promote close cooperation between Member States in the social field, particularly in matters relating to the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and workers.
Albany anlagde sag til prøvelse af dette betalingspålæg ved Kantongerecht, Arnhem.
Albany challenged that demand before the Kantongerecht Arnhem.
Selskabet gjorde bl.a. gældende, at systemet med obligatorisk tilslutning til Fonden strider mod traktatens artikel 3, litra g), EF-traktatens artikel 52 og 59 (efter ændring nu artikel 43 EF og 49 EF) og traktatens artikel 85, 86 og 90.
It contended in particular that the system of compulsory affiliation to the Fund was contrary to Article 3(g) of the Treaty, Articles 52 and 59 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Articles 43 EC and 49 EC), and Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the Treaty.
Kantongerecht, Arnhem, besluttede på denne baggrund at udsætte sagen og forelægge Domstolen nogle præjudicielle spørgsmål.
In those circumstances the Kantongerecht, Arnhem, stayed proceedings pending a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on several questions:
I EF-traktatens artikel 118 Β (EF-traktatens artikel 117-120 er erstattet af artikel 136 EF -143 EF) hedder det endvidere, at Kommissionen bestræber sig på at udvikle dialogen mellem arbejdsmarkedets parter på europæisk plan, idet denne dialog, hvis parterne finder det ønskeligt, kan føre til, at der knyttes aftalemæssige forbindelser.
Article 118b of the EC Treaty (Articles 117 to 120 of the EC Treaty having been replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC) adds that the Commission is to endeavour to develop the dialogue between management and labour at European level which could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement.
Med det andet spørgsmål, som skal undersøges først, ønsker den forelæggende ret oplyst, om traktatens artikel 3, litra g), EF-traktatens artikel 5 (nu artikel 10 EF) og traktatens artikel 85 er til hinder for en beslutning fra de offentlige myndigheders side om på begæring af en bestemt branches arbejdsgiver- og arbejdstagerorganisationer at gøre tilslutning til en erhvervspensionsfond obligatorisk.
Moreover, Article 1 of the Agreement on social policy states that the objectives to be pursued by the Community and the Member States include improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combatting of exclusion.
Endvidere fremgår det af artikel 1 i aftalen om social- og arbejdsmarkedspolitikken (herefter »aftalen om social- og arbejdsmarkedspolitikken«), at Fællesskabets og medlemsstaternes mål bl.a. omfatter en forbedring af leve- og arbejdsvilkårene, en passende social beskyttelse, dialogen på arbejdsmarkedet, en udvikling af de menneskelige ressourcer, der skal muliggøre et varigt højt beskæftigelsesniveau, og bekæmpelse af social udstødelse.
By its second question, which it is appropriate to consider first, the national court seeks to ascertain whether Article 3(g) of the Treaty, Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC) and Article 85 of the Treaty prohibit a decision by the public authorities to make affiliation to a sectoral pension fund compulsory at the request of organisations representing employers and workers in a given sector.
I henhold til artikel 4, stk. 1 og 2, i aftalen om social- og arbejdsmarkedspolitikken kan dialogen mellem arbejdsmarkedets parter på fællesskabsplan, hvis parterne finder det ønskeligt, føre til overenskomstmæssige forbindelser, herunder aftaler, hvis iværksættelse enten finder sted efter de fremgangsmåder og den praksis, arbejdsmarkedets parter og medlemsstaterne normalt anvender, eller, efter fælles anmodning fra de underskrivende parter, ved en afgørelse, som Rådet træffer på forslag af Kommissionen.
Under Article 4(1) and (2) of the Agreement, the dialogue between management and labour at Community level may lead, if they so desire, to contractual relations, including agreements, which will be implemented either in accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States, or, at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council decision on a proposal from the Commission.
Endvidere fremgår det af EF-traktatens artikel 3, litra g) og i) [efter ændring nu artikel 3, stk 1, litra g) og j), EF], at Fællesskabets virke ikke alene skal indebære »gennemførelse af en ordning, der sikrer, at konkurrencen inden for det indre marked ikke fordrejes«, men også »indførelse af en politik på det sociale og arbejdsmarkedsmæssige område«. Det fastslås således i EF-traktatens artikel 2 (efter ændring
It must be noted, first, that Article 85(1) of the Treaty prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.
Kollektive aftaler, der indgås mellem arbejdsgiver- og arbejdstagerorganisationer, har ganske vist nødvendigvis visse konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger. De
It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements
socialpolitiske målsætninger, der forfølges med sådanne aftaler, ville imidlertid blive bragt alvorligt i fare, hvis arbejdsmarkedets paner var underlagt traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, i forbindelse med deres fælles bestræbelser på at finde egnede foranstaltninger til at forbedre beskæftigelses- og arbejdsvilkårene.
Such is the case where a Member State requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85 of the Treaty or reinforces their effects or deprives its own legislation of its official character by delegating to private traders responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere.
Dette er tilfældet, når en medlemsstat enten foreskriver eller fremmer indgåelse af aftaler i strid med traktatens artikel 85 eller forstærker sådanne aftalers virkninger, eller berøver sine egne bestemmelser deres statslige karakter ved til private erhvervsdrivende at uddelegere ansvaret for at træffe beslutninger om økonomisk intervention.
However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment.
Det følger således af en formålsbestemt og sammenhængende fortolkning af traktatens bestemmelser som helhed, at aftaler, der indgås i forbindelse med kollektive forhandlinger mellem arbejdsmarkedets parter med sådanne målsætninger for øje, som følge af deres karakter og formål må anses for ikke at falde ind under traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1.
It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Det skal herefter undersøges, om karakteren af og formålet med den i hovedsagen omhandlede aftale kan begrunde, at den falder uden for anvendelsesområdet for traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1.
Since the agreement at issue in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty, the Member States are free to make it compulsory for persons who are not bound as parties to the agreement.
Da den i hovedsagen omhandlede aftale ikke falder ind under traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, står det medlemsstaterne frit for at gøre ordningen obligatorisk for personer, der ikke er bundet af aftalen.
The next question is therefore whether the nature and purpose of the agreement at issue in the main proceedings justify its exclusion from the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
I lighed med de ovenfor omhandlede aftaler, som udspringer af dialogen på arbejdsmarkedet, er den i hovedsagen omhandlede aftale indgået i form af en kollektiv overenskomst, og den er resultatet af kollektive forhandlinger mellem arbejdsgiver- og arbejdstagerorganisationerne.
It follows from the foregoing considerations that the decision of the public authorities to make affiliation to a sectoral pension fund compulsory does not fall within the categories of legislative measures which, according to the case-law of the Court, undermine the effectiveness of Articles 3(g), 5 and 85 of the Treaty.
Det følger af ovenstående, at en beslutning fra de offentlige myndigheders side om at gøre tilslutning til en erhvervspensionsfond obligatorisk ikke falder ind under de kategorier af lovgivningsforanstaltninger, der efter Domstolens praksis skader den effektive virkning af traktatens artikel 3, litra g), artikel 5 og artikel 85.
First, like the category of agreements referred to above which derive from social dialogue, the agreement at issue in the main proceedings was concluded in the form of a collective agreement and is the outcome of collective negotiations between organisations representing employers and workers.
Hvad angår den i hovedsagen omhandlede aftale bemærkes, at den inden for en bestemt branche opretter en tillægspensionsordning, der administreres af en pensionsfond, hvortil tilslutning kan gøres obligatorisk.
Second, that agreement establishes, in a given sector, a supplementary pension scheme managed by a pension fund to which affiliation may be made compulsory.
En sådan ordning sigter i sin helhed mod at sikre alle arbejdstagerne inden for branchen et vist pensionsniveau, og den bidrager således direkte til en forbedring af et af arbejdstagernes arbejdsvilkår, nemlig deres løn.
Such a scheme seeks generally to guarantee a certain level of pension for all workers in that sector and therefore contributes directly to improving one of their working conditions, namely their remuneration.
Det må derfor konkluderes, at den i hovedsagen omhandlede aftale som følge af dens karakter og formål ikke falder ind under traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1.
By its first question, the national court seeks to ascertain whether a pension fund responsible for managing a supplementary pension scheme set up by a collective agreement concluded between organisations representing employers and workers in a given sector and to which affiliation has been made compulsory by the public authorities for all workers in that sector is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 85 et seq. of the Treaty.
Det bemærkes, at Domstolen tidligere har fastslået, at begrebet virksomhed inden for konkurrenceretten omfatter enhver enhed, som udøver økonomisk virksomhed, uanset denne enheds retlige status og dens finansieringsmåde.
It should be borne in mind that, in the context of competition law, the Court has held that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.
Endvidere bemærkes, at traktatens artikel 85 i sig selv udelukkende vedrører virksomheders adfærd og ikke omfatter ved lov eller administrativt fastsatte bestemmelser, der udgår fra medlemsstaterne. Det fremgår imidlertid af Domstolens faste praksis, at traktatens artikel 85, sammenholdt med artikel 5, pålægger medlemsstaterne ikke ved lov eller administrativt
However, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, Article 85 of the Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 5, requires the Member States not to introduce or maintain in force measures, whether legislative or regulatory, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings.
Endvidere har en erhvervspensionsfond pligt til at fritage en virksomhed, såfremt denne mindst seks måneder før indgivelsen af den begæring, på grundlag af hvilken tilslutning til fonden blev gjort obligatorisk, allerede tilbød sine ansatte en pensionsordning, der gav dem rettigheder, der mindst svarer til dem, de ville erhverve ved tilslutning til fonden.
lodged on the basis of which affiliation to the fund was made compulsory, a pension scheme granting them rights at least equivalent to those which they would acquire if affiliated to the fund.
Endvidere kan fonden i medfør af retningslinjernes artikel 1 fritage en virksomhed, såfremt denne tilbyder sine ansatte en pensionsordning, der giver dem rettigheder, som mindst svarer til dem, fonden giver, idet der, såfremt fritagelsen medfører udtræden af fonden, skal tilbydes en rimelig kompensation efter Verzekeringskamer's skøn for fondens eventuelle tab som følge heraf ud fra et forsikringsteknisk synspunkt.
Moreover, under Article 1 of the Guidelines, that fund is also entitled to grant exemption to an undertaking which provides its workers with a pension scheme granting them rights at least equivalent to those deriving from the fund, provided that, in the event of withdrawal from the fund, compensation considered reasonable by the Insurance Board is offered for any damage suffered by the fund, from the actuarial point of view, as a result of the withdrawal.
Endvidere var de i henhold til lov fastsatte pensionsrettigheder ikke proportionale med de bidrag, der var indbetalt til alderdomsforsikringen. Endelig bidrog ordninger, der gav overskud, til finansieringen af ordninger, der havde strukturbetingede økonomiske vanskeligheder.
Under the sickness and maternity scheme forming part of the system in question, the benefits were the same for all beneficiaries, even though contributions were proportional to income; under the pension scheme, retirement pensions were funded by workers in employment; furthermore, the statutory pension entitlements were not proportional to the contributions paid into the pension scheme; finally, schemes with a surplus contributed to the financing of those with structural financial difficulties.
Denne solidaritet indebar nødvendigvis, at de forskellige ordninger måtte administreres af ét organ, samt at medlemskab af disse ordninger var obligatorisk.
That solidarity made it necessary for the various schemes to be managed by a single organisation and for affiliation to the schemes to be compulsory.
Det følger heraf, at en erhvervspensionsfond som den i hovedsagen omhandlede udøver en økonomisk virksomhed i konkurrence med forsikringsselskaberne.
It follows that a sectoral pension fund of the kind at issue in the main proceedings engages in an economic activity in competition with insurance companies.
Under disse omstændigheder kan det forhold, at den ikke handler med gevinst for øje, og de elementer af solidaritet, Fonden og de regeringer, der har indgivet indlæg, har henvist til, ikke ændre noget ved, at erhvervspensionsfonden er en virksomhed i traktatens konkurrencereglers forstand.
In those circumstances, the fact that the fund is non-profit-making and the manifestations of solidarity referred to by it and the intervening governments are not sufficient to deprive the sectoral pension fund of its status as an undertaking within the meaning of the competition rules of the Treaty.
Domstolen fastslog derimod, at et organ uden gevinst for øje, der forvaltede en alderdomsforsikringsordning, der var indført i henhold til lov som en frivillig ordning til supplement af en obligatorisk forsikring, og som byggede på et kapitaliseringsprincip, var en virksomhed som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 85 ff. Det forhold, at medlemskab af ordningen var frivilligt, at ordningen byggede på et kapitaliseringsprincip, og at ydelserne udelukkende afhang af de betalte medlemsbidrag samt af de økonomiske resultater af forvaltningsorganets investeringer, indebar, at organet udøvede en økonomisk virksomhed i konkurrence med livsforsikringsselskaberne.
In contrast, the Court held that a non-profit-making organisation which managed a pension scheme intended to supplement a basic compulsory scheme, established by law as an optional scheme and operating according to the principle of capitalisation, was an undertaking within the meaning of Article 85 et seq. of the Treaty. Optional affiliation, application of the principle of capitalisation and the fact that benefits depended solely on the amount of the contributions paid by the beneficiaries and on the financial results of the investments made by the managing organisation implied that that organisation carried on an economic activity in competition with life assurance companies.
Med det tredje spørgsmål ønsker den forelæggende ret oplyst, om traktatens 86 og 90 er til hinder for, at de offentlige myndigheder giver en pensionsfond eneret til at administrere en tillægspensionsordning inden for en bestemt branche.
By its third question, the national court seeks to ascertain whether Articles 86 and 90 of the Treaty preclude the public authorities from conferring on a pension fund an exclusive right to manage a supplementary pension scheme in a given sector.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt begrebet virksomhed i traktatens artikel 85 ff. omfatter et organ som den i hovedsagen omhandlede erhvervspensionsfond, skal vurderes på grundlag af ovenstående betragtninger.
The question whether the concept of an undertaking, within the meaning of Article 85 et seq. of the Treaty, extends to a body such as the sectoral pension fund at issue in the main proceedings must be considered in the light of those considerations.
Det bemærkes, at erhvervspensionsfonden selv fastsætter bidragene og ydelserne, og at fonden bygger på et kapitaliseringsprincip.
Accordingly, the amount of the benefits provided by the fund depends on the financial results of the investments made by it, in respect of which it is subject, like an insurance company, to supervision by the Insurance Board.
Indledningsvis bemærkes, at en beslutning fra de offentlige myndigheders side om at gøre tilslutning til en erhvervspensionsfond obligatorisk — som i det foreliggende tilfælde — nødvendigvis indebærer, at der gives fonden en eneret til at opkræve og administrere de bidrag, der betales med henblik på erhvervelse af pensionsrettigheder.
It must be observed at the outset that the decision of the public authorities to make affiliation to a sectoral pension fund compulsory, as in this case, necessarily implies granting to that fund an exclusive right to collect and administer the contributions paid with a view to accruing pension rights.
En sådan fond må derfor betragtes som en virksomhed, som de offentlige myndigheder har indrømmet eksklusive rettigheder som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 90, stk. 1.
Such a fund must therefore be regarded as an undertaking to which exclusive rights have been granted by the public authorities, of the kind referred to in Article 90(1) of the Treaty.
Fondens ydelser afhænger således af de økonomiske resultater af de investeringer, den foretager, og som er undergivet Verzekeringskamer's tilsyn, ligesom det er tilfældet for et forsikringsselskab.
In addition, a sectoral pension fund is required to grant exemption to an undertaking where the latter has already made available to its workers for at least six months before the request was
En erhvervspensionsfond som den i hovedsagen omhandlede, der har eneret til at administrere en tillægspensionsordning inden for en branche i en medlemsstat og dermed på en væsentlig del af fællesmarkedet, kan således anses for at indtage en dominerende stilling som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 86.
It is therefore necessary to consider whether the exclusive right of the sectoral pension fund to manage supplementary pensions in a given sector and the resultant restriction of competition may be justified under Article 90(2) of the Treaty as a measure necessary for the performance of a particular social task of general interest with which that fund has been charged.