natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det var imidlertid en betingelse herfor, at der var tale om med arresten at sikre et krav, for hvilket kreditor kunne opnå et i Nederlandene eksigibelt eksekutionsfunda­ment, at skyldneren ikke blev unddraget det værneting, som var kompetent med hensyn til hovedsagen, samt at stadfæstelsen alene måtte have til formål at videreføre arresten i en fuldbyrdelsessag, efter at afgørelsen i hovedsagen var blevet erklæret for eksigibel.
However, such relief could only be granted subject to satisfaction of the following conditions : first, that the attachment should be intended to provide security for a claim in respect of which the creditor could obtain a judgment enforceable in the Netherlands; secondly, that the debtor should not thereby be removed from the jurisdiction of the court which is competent in the substantive action ; and thirdly, that the sole purpose of the confirmation should be to enable the attachment to be transferred to the enforcement proceedings after the decision in the substantive action has been declared enforceable.
I det foreliggende tilfælde havde det været muligt for rekvirenten fra den kompetente italienske ret at opnå en retsafgørelse i hovedsagen, som rekvirenten kunne have begæret forsynet med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning i Nederlandene på grundlag af den nederlandsk­italienske fuldbyrdelseskonvention fra 1959 og domskonventionens artikler 31 ff. Afgø­relsen vedrørende stadfæstelsen af arresten kunne have været udsat i det tidsrum, der var nødvendigt herfor.
In the present case it had been open to the applicant to obtain a decision on the principal claim from the appropriate Italian court and apply for an order for its enforcement in the Netherlands under the 1959 Convention between the Netherlands and Italy on the enforcement of judgments and under Article 31 et seq. of the Brussels Convention. A de cision on the confirmation of the protective attachment could have been deferred for the period of time required to do that.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt rekvirenten på sagens nuværende trin skulle have mulighed for at benytte denne udvej, besvarede retten benægtende, da rekvi­renten end ikke i mellemtiden havde anlagt retssag ved italienske domstole.
The question whether at the present stage of the proceedings the applicant should still be given an opportunity to pursue that course of action was answered by the court in the negative because in the meantime the applicant had not even commenced proceedings on the principal claim in the Italian courts.
Da retten herefter ikke kunne forvente at modtage et eksekutionsfundament og således ikke var kompetent til at stadfæste arresten, var det ikke nødvendigt at tage stilling i hen­hold til domskonventionens artikel 20 til, om det sagsøgte selskab havde haft mulighed for at modtage sagens indledende proceskrift i så god tid, at det havde kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen.
Since therefore, in the absence of any expectation of the enforceable judgment, the court had no jurisdiction to confirm the attachment, it was not necessary to inquire, pursuant to Article 20 of the Brussels Convention, whether the defendant had received the document instituting the proceedings in sufficient time to enable it to arrange for its defence.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — udtømmende reguleret i konventionen — eksigibel retsaf gørelse fra en kontraherende stat — ny sag mellem de samme parter om samme sagsgenstand ved retterne i en anden kontraherende stat — ikke tilladt
Recognition and enforcement — Conclusive rules of the Convention — Enforceable judg­ment obtained in a Contracting State — Fresh action between the same parties concerning the same subjectmatter before the courts of another Contracting State — Barred
I denne sag havde sagsøgeren i sagen for den nationale ret opnået en eksigibel dom over et nederlandsk selskab ved en belgisk ret og senere anlagt ny sag ved en nederlandsk ret med samme påstand, fordi en tvangsfuldbyrdelse af den første dom — på grund af de nederlandske regler om advokattvang — ville koste mere end den nye sag.
The plaintiff subsequently brought fresh proceeding seeking a similar order in a court in the Netherlands because proceedings for the enforcement of the first judgment would have entailed greater expense than the fresh action owing to the requirement in the Netherlands that a lawyer be instructed in such proceedings.
Efter at sag søgeren havde fået medhold i første instans, iværksatte Procureur-Generaal kassationsanke ved Hoge Raad, idet han antog, at der var sket en tilsidesættelse af domskonventionen.
After the court of first instance had upheld the claim, the Procureur Generaal appealed to the Hoge Raad on the ground that the Brussels Convention had been infringed.
Hoge Raad forelagde derefter EF-Domstolen det spørgsmål, om konventionen i det foreliggende tilfælde var til hinder for det nye sagsanlæg.
The Hoge Raad thereupon submitted to the Court of Justice of the EEC the question whether the provisions of the Convention prevented the bringing of the sub­sequent action in the case in question.
Domstolen udtalte, at det ikke ville kunne forenes med indholdet af konventionens be stemmelser om anerkendelse af retsafgørelser, der var afsagt i andre kontraherende sta ter, om et søgsmål, der havde samme genstand og samme parter som en sag, som en ret i en anden kontraherende stat allerede havde afgjort, blev taget under realitetsbehandling.
The Court of Justice stated that to accept the admissibility of an action concerning the same subjectmatter and brought between the same parties as an action upon which judgment had already been delivered by a court in another Contracting State would be incompatible with the meaning of the provisions of the Convention.
Den ret, for hvilken sagen blev forelagt på ny, ville nemlig, hvis den admitterede sa gen, kunne træffe afgørelse i strid med en ældre udenlandsk dom og således tilsidesætte forpligtelsen til at anerkende den.
If the court dealing with matters afresh were to treat the application as admissible it could be led to conflict with a previous foreign judgment and, therefore, to fail in its duty to recognize that judg­ment.
Det fulgte ligeledes af konventionens artikel 21 — som har til formål at undgå, at dom stolene i to kontraherende stater træffer afgørelse i én og samme sag — at en ny retssag ikke kunne forenes med konventionens målsætning.
It also followed from Article 21 of the Convention — by means of which it was intended to prevent the courts of two Contracting States deciding the same legal dispute — that fresh proceedings were incompatible with the aims of the Convention.
Endelig ville en anerkendelse af en
Finally, to accept the duplication of the main actions might result in the creditor's possessing two orders
(fortsat 1) dobbelt behandling af hovedsagen kunne føre til, at kreditor på grundlag af én og samme fordring forsynedes med to eksigible retsafgørelser.
(continued 1) for enforcement on the basis of the same debt.
At den i konventionens arti­kel 33 ff nævnte fremgangsmåde til tider på grund af de nationale retsregler kunne være dyrere end en ny sag vedrørende realiteten, kunne ikke føre til andet resultat.
Those considerations were not invalidated by the fact that there might be occasions on which, under the national law applicable, the procedure set out in Articles 31 et seq. of the Convention might be found to be more expensive than bringing fresh proceedings on the substance of the case.
Konventio­nen, der har til formål at tilvejebringe en forenkling af formaliteterne burde foranledige de kontraherende stater til at drage omsorg for, at omkostningerne ved den i konventio­nen anviste fremgangsmåde fastsattes således, at de opfyldte dette hensyn til forenkling.
The Convention, which was intended to secure the simplification of formalities, ought to induce the Con­tracting States to ensure that the costs of the procedure described in the Convention are fixed so as to accord with that concern for simplification.
Herefter besvarede Domstolen det præjudicielle spørgsmål således:
The question submitted for a preliminary ruling was accordingly answered as follows :
»Konventionen... er til hinder for, at en part, der i en kontraherende medlemsstat har opnået en for ham gunstig retsafgørelse, som i henhold til konventionens arti­kel 31 kan forsynes med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning i en anden kontraherende stat, ved en ret i denne sidste stat nedlægger påstand om, at den anden part i sagen dømmes til noget, hvortil han allerede er dømt i den førstnævnte stat.«
"The provisions of the Convention ... prevent a party who has obtained a judgment in his favour in a Contracting State, being a judgment for which an order for enforce­ment under Article 31 of the Convention may issue in another Contracting State, from making an application to a court in that other State for a judgment against the other party in the same terms as the judgment delivered in the first State."
Den afgørelse i sagen for den nationale ret, der blev truffet i tilslutning til denne dom, er omtalt under 1­25.0 — Β 1.
For the decision given in the main proceedings following upon this judgment see 1-25.0 - Bl, infra.
Jf. i øvrigt vedrørende spørgsmålet om advokattvang under fuldbyrdelsesproceduren ifølge konventionen nu den nederlandske lov af 14. september 1978 (Staatsblad 1978, nr. 468).
On the question of obligatory legal representation in enforcement proceedings under the Convention see now the Law of the Netherlands of 14 September 1978 (Stb. 1978, No 468).
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — udsættelse af afgørelsen i tilslutning til ordinær appel eller genoptagelse i domsstaten (artiklerne 30 og 38) — begrebet »ordinær appel eller genopta­gelse« — selvstændigt begreb i konventionen — begrebsbestemmelse
Recognition and enforcement — Stay of proceedings following the lodging of an ordinary appeal in the State in which judgment was given (Articles 30 and 38) — Concept of "ordi­nary appeal" — Independent concept of the Convention — Meaning
Det belgiske firma Industrial Diamond Supplies blev ved Tribunale civile e penale di Torino dømt til at betale repræsentant Riva et bestemt beløb som provision. Rechtbank Antwerpen efterkom i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 31 ff Riva's begæring om tvangsfuldbyrdelse af dommen i Belgien. Efter italiensk ret var dommen eksigibel.
A Belgian firm, Industrial Diamond Supplies, was ordered by the Tribunal Civile e Pe­nale, Turin, to pay a certain sum by way of commission to its commercial representa­tive, Riva.
In­dustrial Diamond Supplies anfægtede denne fuldbyrdelsespåtegning ved Rechtbank Antwerpen under henvisning til konventionens artikler 36 og 37. Desuden iværksatte fir­maet kassationsanke mod den i Torino afsagte dom til den italienske Corte di cassa­zione; det var ikke bestridt, at kassationsanken ikke opsatte den af retten i Torino af­
Industrial Diamond Supplies appealed against the enforcement order to the Rechtbank van Eeerste Aanleg, Antwerp, in accordance with Articles 36 and 37 of the Convention.
Udsendelse l/februar 1981
It also brought be­ tone 1/February· 1981
Det stod ligeledes fast, at Industrial Diamond Supplies ikke i Italien begærede fuldbyrdelsen udsat.
It was also established that Industrial Diamond Supplies had not sought a stay of execution in Italy.
Det belgiske firma nedlagde ved Rechtbank Antwerpen principalt påstand om udsættelse af fuldbyrdelsen af den af ankeinstansen i Torino afsagte dom, indtil der var truffet endelig afgørelse i sagen mellem parterne i Italien.
The Belgian firm primarily requested the Antwerp court to suspend the proceedings re­lating to the enforcement of the judgment given by the Turin court until final judgment had been delivered between the parties in Italy.
Rechtbank Antwerpen forelagde med henblik på at kunne træffe afgørelse vedrørende denne begæring EF-Domstolen to spørgsmål om fortolkningen af begrebet »ordinær appel eller genoptagelse« i konventionens artikler 30 og 38.
So as to be able to reach a decision on that request, the Antwerp court referred to the Court of Justice of the European Commu­nities two questions on the interpretation of the concept of "ordinary appeal" used in Ar­ticles 30 and 38 of the Convention.
Ifølge det nederlandske firma skulle der ved »ordinær appel eller genoptagelse« forstås ethvert retsmiddel, der anses som sådant i den kontraherende stat, hvori den af gørelse er truffet, som skal anerkendes eller fuldbyrdes.
On that matter the Belgian firm took the view that any appeal considered to be an ordinary appeal in the Contracting State in which the judgment the recognition or enforcement of which is sought was given must be classified as an "ordinary appeal".
Denne opfattelse støttedes af regeringen for Det forenede Kongerige og af EF-Kommissionen.
That view was also supported by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Com­mission of the European Communities.
Ifølge regeringen for Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland skulle det pågældende begreb derimod fortolkes ud fra konventionen selv, uden hensyn til disse retsmidlers betegnelse i domsstatens ret. Dom stolen tiltrådte dette standpunkt.
On the other hand, according to the Govern­ment of the Federal Republic of Germany, the expression in question must be interpret­ed within the context of the Convention itself, regardless of the classification of the ap­peals by the national law of the State in which the judgment was given.
Domstolen anførte, at det fremgik af en sammenligning af retsordenerne i Fællesskabets forskellige medlemsstater, at sondringen mellem »ordinære« og »ekstraordinære« rets midler i nogle stater beror på selve lovgivningen, medens der i andre retssystemer er tale om en i det væsentlige eller endog udelukkende retsteoretisk sondring, og at denne sondring overhovedet "ikke findes i en tredje gruppe stater.
The Court pointed out that a comparison of the legal position in the various Member States of the Community showed that, although in some States the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" appeals was based on the law itself, in other legal systems the classification was made primarily or even purely in the works of learned authors while in a third group of States this distinction was completely unknown.
Det stod desuden fast, at i de rets ordener, som i lovgivning eller teori sondrer mellem »ordinære« og »ekstraordinære« retsmidler, inddeles de forskellige retsmidler forskelligt i forhold til denne sondring.
It was established moreover that in the legal systems in which the distinction between "ordina­ry" and "extraordinary" appeals was acknowledged by legislation or by learned au­thors, the classification of the various appeals for the purposes of that distinction gave rise to varying classifications.
En fortolkning af begrebet »ordinær appel eller genoptagelse« gennem en henvisning til na tional retsorden — hvad enten der er tale om domsstatens eller anerkendelses-eller fuldbyrdelsesstatens retsorden — gør det således i visse tilfælde umuligt at bestemme et givet retsmiddel med den ønskede sikkerhed i forhold til konventionens artikler 30 og 38.
It seemed therefore that if the concept of "ordinary ap­peal" were to be interpreted by reference to a national legal system, whether the legal sys­tem of the State in which the judgment was given, or that of the State in which enforce­ment or recognition was sought, it would in certain cases be impossible to classify a spe­cific appeal with the required degree of certainty for the purposes of Articles 30 to 38 of the Convention.
Des uden ville en henvisning til den ene eller den anden nationale retsorden forpligte den ret, som har fået en sag forelagt i henhold til konventionens artikler 30 og 38, til eventuelt at kvalificere retsmidler af samme art forskelligt, alt efter om de tilhører retsordenen i den ene eller den anden af de kontraherende stater.
Moreover, reference to a particular legal system might perhaps oblige the court required to make a decision under Articles 30 and 38 of the Convention to clas­sify appeals of the same type inconsistently according to whether they belonged to the legal system of one or other of the Contracting States.
Dette fortolkningskriterium ville så ledes medføre en retsuvished, som forstærkes ved, at artikel 38 kræver, at den ret, der be handler fuldbyrdelsessagen, ikke alene skal tage hensyn til allerede udnyttede retsmidler, men også retsmidler, som kan anvendes inden for bestemte frister.
The effect of the application of that criterion of interpretation would therefore be to create even greater legal uncer­tainty since Article 38 required the court before which an order for enforcement of the judgment was sought to take into consideration not only appeals which had been lodged
(fortsat 2) ne 30 og 38 til særligt formål at hindre, at retsafgørelser obligatorisk anerkendes og fuld byrdes i andre kontraherende stater på et tidspunkt, hvor der stadig er mulighed for, at de ophæves eller ændres i domsstaten.
Although, as a whole, the Convention was intended to ensure the rapid enforcement of judgments with a minimum of formalities when those judg ments were enforceable in the State in which they were given, the specific purpose of Articles 30 and 38 was to prevent the compulsory recognition or enforcement of judg ments in other Contracting States when the possibility of their being quashed or amended in the State in which they were given still existed.
Det er med dette formål for øje, at artiklerne 30 og 38 blandt andet giver den ret, som har fået forelagt en begæring om genoptagelse af en retsafgørelse, som tillader fuldbyrdelse, mulighed for at udsætte sin afgørelse, når rets afgørelsen i domsstaten er anfægtet eller vil kunne anfægtes inden for bestemte frister.
For that purpose, Articles 30 and 38 reserved to the court before which a request for recognition or an appeal against a de cision authorizing enforcement had been brought in particular the possibility of staying the proceedings where, in the State in which the judgment was given, the judgment was being contested or might be contested within specific periods.
Der er ifølge konventionen ikke tale om en pligt for den ret, som behandler anerkendelses- eller fuldbyrdelsesspørgsmålet, til at udsætte sin afgørelse, men blot om en mulig hed herfor.
According to the Convention, the court before which recognition or enforcement was sought was not under a duty to stay the proceedings but merely had the power to do so.
Dette forhold forudsætter en så vid fortolkning af begrebet »ordinær appel eller genoptagelse«, at den pågældende ret kan udsætte sin afgørelse, når der kan opstå rimelig tvivl om den endelige afgørelse af den i domsstaten trufne afgørelse.
This fact presupposed a sufficiently broad interpretation of the concept of "ordinary appeal" to enable that court to stay the proceedings whenever reasonable doubt arose with regard to the fate of the decision in the State in which it was given.
Dette kriterium giver i sig selv mulighed for at træffe afgørelse om udfaldet af en begæring om anerkendelse eller om fuldbyrdelse, som støttes på en dom, der i domsstaten er genstand for en anfægtelse, som vil kunne medføre ophævelse eller ændring af den pågældende rets afgørelse.
It was possible by applying that criterion alone to decide the outcome of a request for recognition or enforce ment based on a judgment which, in the State in which the judgment was given, was currently the subject of an appeal which might lead to the quashing or amendment of the judgment in question.
Retten kan blive stillet over for en vanskeligere bedømmelse, såfremt den får forelagt en begæring om udsættelse i henhold til konventionens artikel 38 på et tidspunkt, hvor fristerne for iværksættelse af retsmidler i domsstaten endnu ikke er udløbet.
A more difficult appraisal was involved in deciding a request for a stay of proceedings under Article 38 of the Convention which was presented at a time when the periods for lodging appeals had not yet expired in the State in which the judgment was given.
I dette til fælde skal der ud over kriteriet, den mulige virkning af et retsmiddel mod en afgørelse, også tages hensyn til ethvert andet relevant forhold, som følger af de pågældende rets midlers art og virkemåde.
In such a case, it was also necessary to bear in mind, in addition to the criteria based on the possible effect of an appeal, all the relevant considerations arising from the nature and conditions for the application of the judicial remedies in question.
Ud fra dette synspunkt skal udtrykket »ordinær appel eller genoptagelse« fortolkes som en betegnelse for ethvert retsmiddel, som er et led i en rets sags normale forløb, og som i denne egenskab udgør en processuel udvikling, som par terne med rimelighed kan påregne.
Considered from this point of view, the expression "ordinary appeal" must be understood as meaning any appeal which formed part of the normal course of an action and which, as such, con stituted a procedural development which any party must reasonably expect.
Som en sådan udvikling skal anses ethvert retsmiddel, som af loven er bundet til en bestemt frist, og som finder anvendelse i henhold til selve den retsafgørelse, som begæres fuldbyrdet.
Any appeal bound by the law to a specific period of time which started to run by virtue of the actual decision the enforcement of which was sought must be regarded as constituting such a development.
Udtrykket »ordinær appel eller genoptagelse« i konventionens artikler 30 og 38 omfatter derfor ikke et retsmiddel, som enten afhænger af begivenheder, som på tidspunktet for den oprindelige retsafgørelse ikke kan forudses, eller af søgsmål fra tredjemænd, der ikke er bundet af de tidsfrister, som følger den oprindelige afgørelse. Det tilkommer den ret, der behandler en begæring i henhold til artikel 36 på et tidspunkt, hvor fristerne for anvendelse af retsmidler i doms staten endnu ikke er udløbet, at udøve sit i artikel 38 hjemlede skøn i så henseende.
Consequently it was impossible to regard as "ordinary apeais" within the meaning of Articles 30 and 38 of the Convention in particular appeals which were dependent either upon events which were unforeseeable at the date of the original judg ment or upon the action taken by persons who were extraneous to the case and who were not bound by the period for entering an appeal which started to run from the date of the original judgment.
Den afgørelse i sagen for den nationale ret, der blev truffet i tilslutning til denne dom, er omtalt under 1­38 — Β 4.
For the decision given in the main proceedings following upon this judgment see 1-38 — Β 4 infra.
(Jfr. også 1­51 ­ B 1)
(See also 1­51 ­ Β 1)
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — udtømmende reguleret i konventionen — eksigibel retsaf­gørelse fra en kontraherende stat — ny sag mellem de samme parter om samme sagsgen­stand ved retterne i en anden kontraherende stat — ikke tilladt
Recognition and enforcement — Conclusive rules of the Convention — Enforceable judg­ment obtained in a Contracting State — Fresh action between the same parties concerning the same subject­matter before courts of another Contracting State — Barred
Med denne afgørelse afsluttedes den sag, hvori EF­Domstolen på begæring af Hoge Raad afsagde sin dom af 30. november 1976 (sag 42/76, jfr. ovenfor punkt 1­25.0 — A 1 ; jfr. også anførte sted om de faktiske omstændigheder og de forudgående retsforhand­linger).
This decision disposed of the proceedings in the context of which the Court of Justice, at the request of the Hoge Raad, delivered its judgment of 30 November 1976 (Case 42/76,1­25.0 — A 1, supra, to which reference should be made for the facts and previous procedure).
På grundlag af EF­Domstolens dom ophævede Hoge Raad dommen fra den nederlandske førsteinstans og afviste sagen.
On the basis of that judgment the Hoge Raad quashed the decision of the court of the first instance in the Netherlands and dismissed the action as inadmissible.