natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selv om mange lande i de senere år har indfort ny konkurrencelovgivning, kan det forholde sig således, at en bestemt adfærd ikke er ulovlig i det land. hvor den finder sted. eller at myndighederne i det pågældende land ikke er indstillet på at bekæmpe den.
Although new competition legislation has been introduced in many countries in recent years, some behaviour might not be unlawful in the country where it is being carried out, or the authorities there may be unwilling to condemn it.
De forskellige konkurrencemyndigheder kan også drage forskellige eller endog direkte modstridende konklusioner i en sag. hvor de begge hævder at have jurisdiktion.
Alternatively, incoherent or even directly contradictory conclusions might be reached by different enforcement authorities, both of which may claim jurisdiction over the same subject-matter.
Dette indebærer ikke blot risiko for. at der opstar strid mellem lande eller handelsblokke, som vi sa sidste ar i forbindelse med uenigheden mellem USA og EU om den planlagte fusion mellem Boeing og MDD. men skaber også betydelig usikkerhed og store omkostninger for virksomheder, der opererer på internationalt plan.
Such divergent treatment not only entails the risk of precipitating a dispute between countries or trading blocks, as was illustrated by the initial disagreement between the US and the EU over the proposed Boeing/MDD merger last year, but is also a source of considerable uncertainty and cost for companies engaging in global transactions.
Det er derfor indlysende, al et samarbejde er nødvendigt for en effektiv losning af de konkurrencepolitiske problemer, der gør sig gældende på tværs al' landegrænserne.
It is clear, therefore, that cooperation is necessary in order to deal effectively with competition problems having transnational characteristics.
Der eksisterer i forvejen et vist bilateralt samarbejde mellem myndighederne, og der er grund til al se optimistisk på den fremtidige udvikling.
There is already a degree of bilateral cooperation between authorities and there is reason for optimism that this will continue apace.
Jeg er dog overbevist om. at det ud over at fastlægge de organisatoriske rammer for samarbejdet er nødvendigt også at indgå en fælles international aftale om de grundlæggende konkurrenceretlige principper, hvis samarbejdet skal være effektivt.
In order for such cooperation to be effective, however, I am convinced that it is necessary not only to put in place arrangements regarding the logistics for cooperation, but also that there should be some common agreement at the international level regarding the content of a basic set of substantive principles of competition law.
Efter min opfattelse vil et sådant samarbejde ikke kun komme industrilandene til gode: det vil også i vidt omfang gavne udviklingslandene.
In my view, the advantages of such cooperation will not accrue to the industrialised countries of the world alone.
1998 har været præget af uro og usikkerhed for mange af verdens nye økonomier, ¡sær i Asien.
Indeed, I believe that developing countries can benefit substantially from enhanced cooperation of this kind.
FORORD VED KARELVAN MIERT
FOREWORD BY MR KAREL VAN MIERT
De udarbejdede en rapport, der anbefalede, at man i fremtiden satte ind på følgende to områder: for det første en yderligere udvidelse af Kommissionens bilaterale samarbejde med tredjelande og for det andet udarbejdelse af multilaterale regler, der kunne sikre, at alle involverede lande overholdt en række grundlæggende konkurrenceregler.
They compiled a report which recommended that efforts should in the future be made on two parallel fronts: firstly, to further extend the Commission's bilateral cooperation with third countries; and, secondly, to develop a multilateral framework ensuring compliance with certain basic competition rules by all countries involved.
I de senere år har EU aktivt udbygget sit bilaterale konkurrencesamarbejde med sine vigtigste handelspartnere.
The European Union has in recent years been actively advancing bilateral cooperation in the field of competition with its main trading partners.
Det bedste eksempel herpå er aftalerne med USA, hvoraf den første blev indgået i 1991 og trådte i kraft i 1995.
The best example of such cooperation is provided by the agreements concluded with the USA, the first of which was concluded in 1991 and entered into force in 1995.
Da denne første aftale blev indgået, stod EU og USA over for en kraftig vækst i de transatlantiske kommercielle transaktioner, samtidig med at de indså, hvilke farer der er forbundet med grænseoverskridende konkurrencebegrænsende praksis.
When this first agreement was conceived, the EU and the USA were witnessing a rapid growth in the number and importance of transatlantic commercial transactions and, at the same time, coming to recognise the dangers posed by the emergence of crossborder anticompetitive practices.
Parterne erkendte derfor, at det var vigtigt at undgå modstridende beslutninger og at samordne håndhævelsen af reglerne i et sådant omfang, at det ville være til gensidig fordel.
There was consequently a common recognition of the importance of avoiding conflicting decisions, and of coordinating enforcement activities to the extent that this would be mutually beneficial.
Aftalen gik i korte træk ud på at lette samarbejdet mellem Kommissionen på den ene side og USA's konkurrencemyndigheder på den anden.
In substance, the agreement was designed to facilitate logistical cooperation between the Commission, on the one hand, and the US Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission, on the other.
Ifølge aftalen skal den ene myndighed give den anden meddelelse, når den behandler sager, der måtte påvirke den anden parts vigtige interesser, og myndighederne kan udveksle oplysninger, der ikke er fortrolige, ligesom de kan samordne deres håndhævelse af reglerne og bistå hinanden: endelig kan den ene myndighed anmode den anden om al gribe ind (den såkaldte »positive comity«), ligesom den ene myndighed kan lage hensyn lil den anden parts vigtige interesser i forbindelse med sin egen håndhævelse (»traditional comity«).
It provides for: the reciprocal notification of cases under investigation by either authority, where those cases may affect the important interests of the other party; the exchange of non-confidential information between the authorities; the possibility of coordination by the two authorities of their enforcement activities, and of rendering assistance to each other; and, finally, the possibility for one authority to request the other to take enforcement action (ªpositive comityº), and for one authority to take into account the important interests of the other party in the course of its enforcement activities (ªtraditional comityº).
EU og USA har således forpligtet sig til at samarbejde om håndhævelsen af konkurrencereglerne og ikke at handle ensidigt og eksterritorialt, medmindre mulighederne i henhold til »comity«-proceduren er udtomt.
This amounts to a commitment by the EU and the USA to cooperate with respect to antitrust enforcement, and not to act unilaterally and extraterritorially unless the avenues provided by comity have been exhausted.
Denne forpligtelse er blevet styrket ved den »positive comity«-aftale, der blev indgået med USA i 1998. og som yderligere styrkede bestemmelserne i aftalen af 1991.
This commitment has been strengthened by the positive comity agreement concluded with the US in 1998, which further reinforced the provisions contained in the 1991 accord.
Den nye aftale går ud på. at parternes respektive konkurrencemyndigheder normalt vil udsætte eller indstille deres behandling af konkurrencebegrænsende praksis, der hovedsagelig foregår på eller er rettet mod den anden parts omrade, hvis den anden part ønsker at behandle sagen.
The new agreement provides that each party's respective authority will normally defer or suspend its enforcement activities in respect of anticompetitive practices which occur principally in, and are directed principally towards, the other party's territory, where that other party is prepared to deal with the matter.
Kommissionens erfaringer med aftalen med USA siden 1991 har vist. at et sådant samarbejde kan være særdeles effektivt, idet det i væsentligt omfang reducerer risikoen for forskellige eller modstridende afgørelser.
The Commission's experience in operating the agreement with the US since 1991 has demonstrated that such cooperation can be highly effective, substantially reducing the risk of divergent or incoherent rulings.
Det hidtidige samarbejde har bidraget til at styrke tilliden mellem Kommissionen og USA's konkurrencemyndigheder og har gjort del lettere at samordne markedsanalyserne og indgrebene.
Cooperation to date has helped to build confidence between the Commission and the US competition authorities, and has facilitated an increasingly convergent approach toward the analysis of markets and regarding appropriate remedies.
I 1998 blev dette transatlantiske samarbejde styrket, ¡f. f.eks. de nært samordnede parallelle undersøgelser af fusionerne WorldCom/MCI og Dresser/Haliburton.
1998 saw an intensification of this transatlantic cooperation including, for example, the closely coordinated parallel investigations of the WorldCom/MCI and Dresser/Haliburton mergers.
Kommissionen har færdigbehandlet en aftale med den canadiske regering, der stort set svarer lil aftalen mellem HU og USA af 1991.
The Commission has finalised a bilateral agreement with the Canadian Government which is closely analogous to the 1991 EU/US agreement.
Det forventes, al denne aftale vil blive indgået i løbet af 1999.
It is expected that it will be adopted, during the course of 1999.
Det skal bemærkes, at der også findes tilsvarende samarbejdsarrangcmenlcr mellem en række andre lande, f.eks. mellem LJ'SA og Canada og mellem Australien og New Zealand.
It is also worth noting that similar cooperative arrangements also exist between some other countries, for example between the USA and Canada, and between Australia and New Zealand.
Bilateralt samarbejde med henblik på udvidelsen
Bilateral cooperation with a view to enlargement
EU har indgået bilaterale konkurrenceaftaler af en noget anden art med de central- og østeuropæiske lande.
The EU has entered into bilateral arrangements regarding competition of a somewhat different kind with the countries of central and eastern Europe.
Østblokkens opløsning har givet os en enestående lejlighed lil al udjævne forskellene i Europa og bistå ved overgangen fra plan- til markedsøkonomi, hvor et vigtigt aspekt også er indførelsen af en funktionel konkurrencepolitik.
The demise of the Eastern bloc has provided us with an unprecedented opportunity to heal the wounds of our continent and to assist in the transition from command to market economies, an essential aspect of which process involves the introduction of a functional competition policy.
Fællesskabet har siden udviklet nære forbindelser med de central- og østeuropæiske lande, herunder de baltiske lande, og de såkaldte »Europa-aftaler« tager sigte på at bane vej for deres fremtidige medlemskab af EU.
The Community has since developed close relationships with the central and eastern European countries, including the Baltic States, and the so-called ªEurope Agreementsº are aimed at paving the way for future membership of the EU.
Det samme gælder Cypern og Malta, der har ansøgt om medlemskab, og søm EU har indgået associeringsaftaler med. Harmoniseringen af konkurrence reglerne, herunder statsstøttereglerne, er en vigtig del af disse aftaler og dermed af Fællesskabets strategi for perioden indtil disse landes optagelse.
The same applies to Cyprus and Malta, candidates for membership with which the Community has concluded association agreements. The harmonisation of competition rules Ð including those governing state aid Ð is an important feature of these agreements, and hence of the Community's pre-accession strategy with respect to these countries.
Der forventes også oprettet konkurrencemyndigheder.
Enforcement bodies are also expected to be put in place.
Af samme årsager som inden for Fællesskabet anses konkurrencereglerne for at være nødvendige for, at afskaffelsen af handelshindringerne mellem landene ikke omgås af en konkurrencebegrænsende kommerciel adfærd og statsføranstaltninger med samme virkninger.
In line with the same logic as applies within the Community, the competition rules are considered necessary to ensure that the elimination of trade barriers between countries should not be circumvented by anticompetitive commercial conduct and state measures producing the same effects.
Udviklingen med hensyn til vedtagelse af kartel- og monopolregler og oprettelse af konkurrence myndigheder er efter min opfattelse lovende.
Progress in relation to the adoption of antitrust rules and the establishment of appropriate competition enforcement authorities is, in my view, promising.
Der venter dog stadig et stort arbejde med indførelsen af tilstrækkelige regler for kontrol med statsstøtte.
There still remains considerable work to be done, however, in relation to the introduction of adequate frameworks for the control of state aid.
Der er også indgået udførlige samarbejdsaftaler mellem Kommissionen og de forskellige konkurrencemyndigheder.
Detailed arrangements have also been put in place for cooperation between the Commission and the various enforcement authorities.
Bilateralt samarbejde med andre lande
Bilateral cooperation with other countries
Toldunionsaftalen med Tyrkiet i 1995 er et af de bedste eksempler i de senere år på en bilateral aftale, der indeholder udførlige bestemmelser om konkurrence og statsstøtte.
The 1995 Customs Union Agreement with Turkey is one of the best examples in recent years of a bilateral agreement containing detailed provisions dealing with competition and state aid.
Frihandelsaftaler mellem Fællesskabet og tredjelande, som f.eks. de associeringsaftaler, der i de seneste par år er indgået med flere middelhavslande, indeholder normalt også sådanne bestemmelser.
Free trade agreements concluded between the Community and third countries, such as the Association Agreements concluded over the last few years with several Mediterranean countries, have also usually included such provisions.
Fællesskabet har for nylig indgået en række såkaldte partnerskabs- og samarbejdsaftaler med Rusland. Ukraine og flere andre stater i det tidligere Sovjetunionen.
The Community has recently concluded a series of so-called Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Russia, Ukraine, and several of the other exSoviet states.
Disse aftaler, der ganske vist er mindre ambitiøse end Europa aftalerne, indeholder dog en forpligtelse for disse lande til gradvis al tilnærme deres konkurrence- og statsstøttelovgivning til Fællesskabets.
These agreements, while less ambitious than the Europe Agreements, none the less involve a commitment by these countries to move progressively towards an approximation of their competition and state aid legislation with that of the Community.
Der foreligger endnu ingen formelle bilaterale aftaler om Fællesskabets konkurrencesamarbejde med de øvrige vigtige handelspartnere, især Japan.
There is as yet no formal bilateral framework for the Community's cooperation in the field of competition with its other principal trading partners, most notably Japan.
Ikke desto mindre føres der regelmæssige kontakter mellem Kommissionen øg de japanske konkurrencemyndigheder, idet der bl.a. holdes et årligt bilateralt møde på højt niveau, og parterne underretter hinanden om sager, der påvirker hinandens vigtige interesser.
Notwithstanding this, regular contacts Ð including an annual high-level bilateral meeting and the reciprocal notification of cases affecting each other's important interests Ð take place between the Commission and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission.
Multilateralt samarbejde — behov for nye verdensomspændende regler
Multilateral cooperation Ð the need for a new worldwide framework
Desuden har mange lande stadig ingen konkurrence lovgivning.
Moreover, many countries still have no competition legislation at all.
Til trods for en stærkt øget interesse for indførelsen af konkurrenceregler i de sidste ti ar. er det stadig kun ca. halvdelen af Verdenshandelsorganisationens (WTO) medlemslande, der har en konkurrencelovgivning.
Despite a marked increase in enthusiasm for introducing competition rules over the past decade, still only about half the World Trade Organisation's member countries have competition
11 antage, især nar flere medlemsstater kæmper med truslen fra et internationalt kartel.
11 laws. The substance of these rules, and the zeal with which they are enforced in the various countries, also show considerable divergence.
Henstillingerne er dog kun rettet til OECD's medlemslande og er ikke engang bindende for dem.
The recommendations are addressed only to OECD member countries, however, and are not binding even on them.
WTO's nuværende regler er heller ikke tilstrækkelige til at løse konkurrencemæssige problemer, hvilket klart illustreres af WTO-panelets afgørelse af april 1998 i striden mellem LISA øg Japan, der bl.a. omfattede påstande om. at Fuji havde udvist konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd for at forhindre sin amerikanske konkurrent Kodak i at få adgang til det japanske marked for fotografiske film og fotopapir.
Nor are the current WTO rules adequate for dealing with competition problems. The WTO Panel's ruling in April 1998 on the dispute between the USA and Japan, which involved allegations of anticompetitive behaviour by Fuji aimed at denying its US rival Kodak access to the Japanese market for photographic film and paper, provided a clear illustration of this inadequacy.
Jeg er derfor overbevist om. at der som et nødvendigt supplement til liberaliseringen af handelen må indgas en verdensomspændende, multilateral aftale om anvendelse af fælles grundlæggende konkurrenceregler.
I am therefore convinced that a comprehensive worldwide multilateral framework, providing for the application of a basic set of common competition rules, needs to be established as a necessary complement to trade liberalisation.
Da handel og konkurrencepolitik hører sammen, bør en sådan aftale indgås inden før rammerne af WTO. der er den internationale organisation, der er mest velegnet hertil.
Because of this complementary relationship between trade and competition policy, the WTO would appear to be the multilateral organisation best suited to house such a framework.
Tanken øm en overnational struktur af denne art blev behandlet i en kommissionsmeddelelse til Rådet i 1996. hvor det blev foreslaet. at WTO skulle nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe til at undersøge, om dette var ønskeligt.
The idea of creating a supranational structure of this kind was the subject of a Commission Communication to the Council in 1996, which proposed that the WTO should set up a working group with a remit to explore the desirability of going down that path.
Dette forslag, som Rådet godkendte, var grundlaget for den ministerielle beslutning, der blev truffet i Singapore i december 1996 øm at nedsætte en arbejdsgruppe under WTO til at undersøge samspillet mellem handel og konkurrencepolitik.
This proposal, which was endorsed by the Council, provided the principal inspiration for the ministerial decision, taken in Singapore in December 1996, to establish a WTO working group to study the interaction between trade and competition policy.
Selv om den interesse, som både industri- og udviklingslande (herunder en række lande, der ikke selv har nogen konkurrencelovgivning) har vist. er meget opmuntrende, er det for tidligt at udtale sig om. hvorvidt drøftelserne i sidste instans vil føre til. at der indledes formelle forhandlinger mellem WTO's medlemmer.
Although the degree of interest shown by both the industrialised and the developing countries (including some countries which have no domestic competition rules) in the discussions is very encouraging, it is too early to say whether they will ultimately lead to the launching of formal negotiations between the members of the WTO.
Det er dog i høj grad mit håb. at dette vil ske som led i den næste multilaterale forhandlingsrunde.
It is very much my hope that they will, as part of the next Round of multilateral negotiations.
Disse forhandlinger kunne fokusere på følgende lire forslag til en eventuel aftale: for det første kan medlemmerne vedtage, at de hver især vil indføre nationale konkurrenceregler og oprette konkurrencemyndigheder.
Such negotiations could focus on the following four proposals for possible agreement: firstly, the members could agree to each adopt domestic competition rules, and to the establishment of appropriate enforcement bodies.
Dette vil betyde fastlæggelse af grundlæggende regler før behandling af konkurrencebegrænsende praksis, misbrug af markedsstyrke og fusionskontrol, indførelse af til strækkelige håndhævelsesbestemmelser samt virksomhedernes ret til at få adgang til konkurrence myndighederne og domstolene.
This would mean the adoption of basic rules for dealing with restrictive business practices, abuse of market power and mergers, together with adequate enforcement provisions, and a right of access for companies to the enforcement authorities and courts.
For det andet kan medlemmerne samtidig vedtage en række fælles grundprincipper for bekæmpelse af konkurrencebegrænsende praksis af international dimension.
Secondly, the members could at the same time agree on a common set of core principles for addressing anticompetitive practices with an international dimension.
I begyndelsen vil det være rimeligt, at man koncentrerer sig om den praksis, hvis skadelige virkninger er almindelig kendt især horisontale begrænsninger, såsom fastsættelse af priser øg produktion, markedsdeling, manipulering af tilbud og eksportkarteller.
Initially, it would seem reasonable to concentrate on practices whose harmful nature is generally recognised Ð in particular horizontal restrictions such as price and output fixing, marketsharing, bid rigging and export cartels.
Det kan være vanskeligere at opnå enighed om andre former før praksis, såsom misbrug af markedsstyrke og vertikale begrænsninger, men det kunne være en målsætning pa længere sigt.
Agreement on other practices, such as abuse of market power and vertical restraints may prove more difficult, but could be envisaged in the longer term.
For det tredje kunne der udarbejdes et multilateralt samarbejdsinstrument.
Thirdly, the elements of an instrument for multilateral cooperation could also be developed.
Dette skal tage sigte pa at lette samarbejdet mellem konkurrencemyndighederne og kunne omfatte regler for konsultation, forhindring af konflikter, udveksling af oplysninger, der ikke er fortrolige, gensidig underretning og »comity«.
This would be designed to facilitate cooperation between enforcement authorities, and could include provision for consultation, avoidance of conflicts, exchanges of non-confidential information, reciprocal notification and comity.
Endelig ville det også være logisk at indføre en ordning for bilæggelse af uoverensstemmelser under nærmere angivne omstændigheder.
Finally, it would also seem logical to provide for a mechanism to enable the settlement of disputes in clearly specified circumstances.
Dette kunne indebære en tilpasning af WTO's nuværende forligsordning ved f.eks. at sikre, at der indføres regler for håndhævelse af konkurrenceregler, der påvirker handelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
This could involve the adaptation of the present dispute mechanism of the WTO to that purpose by, for example, ensuring that patterns of failure to enforce competition law affecting trade between member countries are dealt with.
Det ville dog ikke være hensigtsmæssigt at udvide en sådan forligsordning til at omfatte individuelle tilfælde.
To extend such a mechanism to settlement in individual cases, however, would not be appropriate.
Disse forslag skal ikke opfattes som en opfordring til at etablere en ny international organisation med egne undersøgelses- og håndhæv elsesbeføjelser.
These proposals should not be interpreted as a call for the establishment of a new international organisation, with its own powers of investigation and enforcement.