natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Under omstændigheder som de i spørgsmål 2) angivne er eksportørerne ikke efter almindelige fællesskabsretlige principper berettiget til at beholde hele eller en del af den forudbetalte eksportrestitution.
Those questions have been raised in proceedings brought by Autotrasporti Librandi Snc di Librandi F. & C. against Cuttica Spedizioni e Servizi Internazionali Sri for payment of the balance of the price of road transport services performed for Cuttica. It should also be pointed out that in Centro Serviu Spediporto the Court was faced with a similar question in relation to the Italian legislation in force at the time, which differed essentially from that applicable in the main proceedings in one single respect: the national associations of road hauliers were represented on the central committee by 12 persons instead of 17.
Når henses til besvarelsen af spørgsmål 2), er der ufornødent at besvare spørgsmål 3).
By its first two questions, the national court is asking essentially whether Articles 3(f) and (g), 5,85,86 and 90 of the Treaty preclude legislation of a Member State which provides for roadhaulage tariffs to be approved and brought into force by the State on the basis of proposals submitted by a central committee the majority of
Gennemgangen på grundlag af bemærkningerne i forelæggelseskendelsen af Kommissionens beslutning 96/239/EF af 27. marts 1996 om visse hasteforanstaltninger til beskyttelse mod bovin spongiform encephalopati og af forordning (EF) nr. 773/96 af 26. april 1996 om særforanstaltninger, der fraviger forordning (EØF) nr. 3665/87, (EØF) nr. 3719/88 og (EØF) nr. 1964/82 i oksekødssektoren, har intet frembragt, der kan rejse tvivl om disse retsakters gyldighed.«
In that judgment the Court ruled that neither Articles 3(g), 5, 85, 86 or 90 of the EC Treaty nor Article 30 of that Treaty precluded the legislation of a Member State from providing for roadhaulage tariffs to be approved and brought into force by the State on the basis of proposals submitted by a committee, where that committee was composed of a majority of representatives of
Præjudiciel »Konkurrence — landevejstransport — obligatorisk tarif—statslig regulering — begrebet almene hensyn* (Anden Afdeling) italienske lovgivning, som i det væsentlige adskilte sig fra den, der finder anvendelse i hovedsagen, ved den blotte omstændighed, at kategorierneaf vejgodstransportvirksomhedernes nationale sammenslutninger var repræsenteret i centraludvalget med tolv personer i stedet for sytten.
the public authorities and a minority of representatives of the economic agents concerned and in its proposals had to observe certain public interest criteria, and where, moreover, the public authorities did not relinquish their rights and powers by taking into consideration, before the proposals were approved, the observations of other public and private bodies, or even by fixing tariffs ex officio.
Ved kendelse af 30. december 1996 har Giudice di pace di Genova forelagt seks præjudicielle spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af EF-traktatens artikel 3, litra f) og g), artikel 5, 85 og 86, for at kunne afgøre, om de italienske bestemmelser om fastsættelse af tariffer for landevejstransport er forenelige med fællesskabsretten.
In this regard, it should be observed, that in each of those three judgments the Court examined, in the light of the same criteria, whether the tariff committee in question had to fix tariffs by taking account of interests other than those of the economic agents represented on the committee and whether, before adopting tariffs, the minister had to request the opinion of third parties in relation to those agents.
Disse spørgsmål er blevet rejst under en sag anlagt af Autotrasporti Librandi Sne di Librandi F. & C. mod Cuttica spedizioni e servizi internazionali Sri med henblik på at opnå betaling af et restbeløb for transporter ad landevej, som er udført for sidstnævntes regning. De to første spørgsmål
In so doing, the Court was making it clear that the interests of the collectivity had to prevail over the private interests of individual operators.
I denne dom har Domstolen udtalt, at EF-traktatens artikel 3, litra g), artikel 5, 85, 86 og 90 samt artikel 30 ikke er til hinder for en lovgivning i en medlemsstat, hvorefter tariffer for vejgodstransport godkendes og sættes i kraft af det offentlige efter indstilling fra et udvalg, når et flertal i udvalget er repræsentanter for de offentlige myndigheder og et mindretal repræsentanter for de berørte erhvervsdrivende, og udvalget i sine indstillinger skal overholde visse almene hensyn, og de offentlige myndigheder desuden ikke giver afkald på deres beføjelser, men forud for godkendelsen af indstillingerne tager hensyn til bemærkninger fra andre offentlige og private instanser eller endog selv fastsætter tarifferne.
Those findings are not called in question by the fact that, since the adoption of the Italian Ministerial Decree of 2 February 1994 (G.U.R.I. No 34 of 11 February 1994), which increased the number of representatives of national roadhaulier associations on the central committee from 12 to 17, the representatives of the economic agents are no longer in the minority on the central committee, or by the fact that, according to the information provided by the Italian Government, the 'Inter-ministerial Price Committee', a consultative body, was replaced by a body called 'the Italian Price and Tariffs Monitoring Authority*, or by the fact that the Italian Law maintained the extension of tariffs to various services, such as contracts under invitation to tender and contracts for hire.
Med de to første spørgsmål spørger den forelæggende ret nærmere bestemt, om traktatens artikel 3, litra f) og g), artikel 5,85, 86 og 90 er til hinder for en lovgivning i en medlemsstat, hvorefter tariffer for vejgodstransport godkendes og sættes i kraft af det offentlige efter indstilling fra et centraludvalg, hvis flertal består af repræsentanter for de berørte erhvervsdrivende, og som udvider de obligatoriske tariffer, der gælder for kontrakter om vejgodstransport, til at omfatte andre typer kontrakter vedrørende forskellige tjenesteydelser, navnlig kontrakter vedrørende udbud og kontrakter om befragtning.
First, the change in the majority-minority relationship within the central committee does not warrant the conclusion that a restrictive agreement within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty exists when, under the national legislation in question, the central committee must continue to observe, in adopting its proposals, the public-interest criteria defined by the Italian Law.
Det bemærkes, at Domstolen i dom af 5. oktober 1995, Centro Servizi Spediporto, blev forelagt et lignende spørgsmål vedrørende den dagældende
It is then for the national courts to determine whether the public-interest criteria defined in the national legislation are observed in practice.
Denne konstatering berøres imidlertid ikke af den omstændighed, at de erhvervsdrivendes repræsentanter siden den italienske ministerielle bekendtgørelse af 2. februar 1994 (GURI nr. 34 af 11.2.1994), som har forøget antallet af de nationale vejgodstransportvirksomheders sammenslutningers repræsentanter i centraludvalget fra tolv til sytten, ikke længere udgør mindretallet i centraludvalget, at høringsorganet, som ifølge den italienske regerings oplysninger var »det fællesministerielle
However, it is for the national court to determine, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, that in practice tariffs are fixed subject to observance of the public-interest criteria defined by the Italian Law and that the public authorities are not handing over their prerogatives to private economic agents.
tarifferne, skulle indhente udtalelse fra tredjemand i forhold til disse erhvervsdrivende.
agreements to be concluded which under national law are enforceable against operators which have not signed them, as is the case with those in question in the main proceedings, is liable to constitute a breach of Article 85 of the Treaty.
Domstolen har herved villet fremhæve, at almenhedens interesser skulle have forrang for de individuelle erhvervsdrivendes private interesser.
of 14 December 1982), may be concluded does not have the effect of restricting competition but allows certain derogations from the mandatory tariffs and therefore increases the scope for competition.
prisudvalg«, er blevet erstattet med et organ ved navn »den italienske pris- og tarifobservatør«, og at den italienske lov har opretholdt udvidelsen af tarifferne til at omfatte forskellige tjenesteydelser som f.eks. kontrakter vedrørende udbud og kontrakter om befragtning.
It must be observed, next, that it is for the State concerned to define the group of operators against which collective agreements may be enforced.
Under disse omstændigheder må begreberne almene hensyn (intérêt général) og almene hensyn (intérêt public) anses for at have samme betydning.
In this regard, it must be recalled first of all that the Court has held that the fart that collective agreements, such as those provided for in Article 13 of the Italian Ministerial Decree of 18 November 1982 (supplement to G.U.R.I. No 342
Med det fjerde og femte spørgsmål ønsker den forelæggende ret at få oplyst, om konkrete kriterier, der skal anvendes ved fastsættelsen af tariffer — såsom dem, der er gældende i den italienske retsorden — er i overensstemmelse med almene hensyn i den forstand, hvori udtrykket er anvendt i dommen i Centro Servizi Spediportosagen.
The concept of general interest to which the Court referred in its judgments in Case C185/91 Raff and in Case C-153/93 Delta Schiffahrts- und Speditionsgesellschaft corresponds to the concept of public interest mentioned in its judgment in Case C-96/94 Centro Servid Spediporto.
For at forhindre, at deres handlemåde fører til, at konkurrencen hindres, begrænses eller fordrejes, skal medlemsstaterne nødvendigvis tage almene hensyn i betragtning.
It is for the Member States to determine the specific criteria to be used in fixing tariffs, such as those in force under Italian law, and for the national courts to determine whether the criteria thus defined are respected in practice.
Det tilkommer imidlertid den nationale ret inden for rammerne af sin kompetence at kontrollere, at tarifferne i praksis fastsættes under overholdelse af kriterier vedrørende almene hensyn, som fastsat ved loven, og at de offentlige myndigheder ikke overlader deres beføjelser til private erhvervsdrivende.
The fact that collective agreements such as those provided for in Article 13 of the Ministerial Decree of 18 November 1982 can be concluded and that they are even enforceable under national law against operators who have not signed them does not have the effect of restricting competition wimin the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty.'
Det tilkommer dernæst de nationale retter at efterprøve, om de kriterier vedrørende almene hensyn, der er fastsat i national ret, overholdes i praksis.
Advocate General S. Alber delivered his Opinion at the sitting of the Second Chamber on 5 March 1998.
Med sit sidste spørgsmål ønsker den nationale ret oplyst, om muligheden for at indgå kollektive aftaler som de i hovedsagen omhandlede, der i henhold til national ret kan gøres gældende mod erhvervsdrivende, som ikke har undertegnet dem, kan være i strid med traktatens artikel 85.
Articles 3(f) and (g), 5, 85 and 86 of the Treaty do not preclude national legislation which provides for mandatory tariffs for the carriage of goods by road from being approved and brought into force by a public authority on the basis of a proposal from a committee on which representatives of the
stat at definere og afgrænse kredsen af erhvervsdrivende, som kollektive aftaler kan gøres gældende mod.
interested economic operators are in the majority, provided that it is ensured that those tariffs are fixed with due regard to the public interest criteria specified by law and provided that the public authorities do not delegate their powers to private economic operators.
Det påhviler medlemsstaterne at fastsætte de konkrete kriterier, som skal anvendes ved fastsættelsen af tariffer — så som dem, der er gældende i den italienske retsorden — og de nationale retter at efterprøve, om de således fastsatte kriterier overholdes i praksis.
The concept of 'general interest' referred to by the Court in the Reiff and Delta judgments is the same as the concept of 'public interest' used in a similar legal situation in the Centro Servizi Spediporto judgment.
Muligheden for at indgå kollektive aftaler som dem, der omhandles i artikel 13 i den ministerielle bekendtgørelse af 18 november 1982, selv hvis de i henhold til national ret kan gøres gældende mod erhvervsdrivende, som ikke har undertegnet dem, har ikke til følge, at konkurrencen begrænses som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 85's forstand*
The definition and appraisal of the terms 'general interest' and 'public interest' are the responsibility of the individual Member States.
Generaladvokat S. Alber fremsatte forslag til afgørelse i retsmødet (Anden Afdeling") den 5. marts 1998.
The national court must then ensure that its decision lays down a framework for competition which conforms with national and Community law.
Han foreslog Domstolen at besvare de forelagte spørgsmål således:
Case C-279/95 Ρ Langnese-Iglo GmbH ν Commission of the European Communities Competition
»1) EF-traktatens artikel 3, litra f) og g), artikel 5, 85 og 86 er ikke til hinder for en national lovgivning, hvorefter obligatoriske tariffer for vejgodstransport godkendes og sættes i kraft af det offentlige efter indstilling fra et udvalg, hvori et flertal er repræsentanter for de berørte erhvervsdrivende, såfremt der er truffet de nødvendige foranstaltninger til sikring af, at disse tariffer fastsættes i overensstemmelse med de i loven fastlagte kriterier for iagttagelse af hensynene til almenvellet, og såfremt de offentlige myndigheder ikke har overdraget deres beføjelser til private erhvervsdrivende.
(Competition — Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty — Exclusive purchasing agreements for ice­cream — Comfort letter — Prohibition of concluding exclusive agreements in the future) (Fifth Chamber)
Traktatens artikel 3, litra f) og g), artikel 5, 85 og 86 er ikke til hinder for en national lovgivning, hvorved de obligatoriske tariffer, der gælder for kontrakter vedrørende vejgodstransportydelser,
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 18 August 1995, Langnese- Iglo GmbH brought an appeal, pursuant to Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 8 June 1995 in Case T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo ν Commission [1995] ECR 11-1533 in which that Court dismissed in part its application for the annulment of Commission
Begrebet 'almene hensyn' (på italiensk 'interesse generale'), som Domstolen har anvendt i dommene Reiff og Delta, svarer til det tilsvarende begreb (på italiensk 'interesse pubblico'), som Domstolen har anvendt i dommen Centro Servizi Spediporto i en tilsvarende retlig situation.
It is clear from those points mentioned by the Court of First Instance that the fact that the Commission has issued a comfort letter cannot mean that it is no longer entitled to take account of a factual situation which existed before the letter was sent but was brought to its notice only later, particularly in connection with a complaint lodged at a later stage.
Det er overladt til medlemsstaternes kompetence at definere begrebet 'almene hensyn' og at kontrollere, at disse hensyn iagttages i praksis.
It follows that the first ground of appeal is partly inadmissible and partly unfounded and must therefore be rejected.
Det tilkommer den nationale ret at afklare, om de nationale regler faktisk forhindrer karteldannelser, om almenvellet faktisk iagttages, og om de offentlige myndigheder ikke har overdraget deres beføjelser til private erhvervsdrivende.
By its second ground of appeal Langnese-Iglo contests the conclusion reached by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 94 to 114 that the Commission was right to consider that Langnese-Iglo's exclusive purchasing agreements involved an appreciable restriction of competition on the relevant market and were thus incompatible with Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Den nationale rets afgørelse skal være orienteret med henblik på, at der tilvejebringes sådanne rammer for konkurrencen, som er fastsat i fællesskabsretten og i national ret.«
In that connection it must be observed at the outset that, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice, by virtue of Article 168a of the EC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts.
Sag C-279/95 Ρ Langnese-Iglo GmbH / Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber Konkurrence
According to Langnese-Iglo, that conclusion is based on certain factors which did not appear in the documents before the Court of First Instance and on a misconceived legal assessment of the factual situation.
»Konkurrence — EF-traktatens artikel 85 — eksklusive købsaftaler om konsumis — administrativ skrivelse om henlæggelse -forbud mod i fremtiden at indgå eksklusive aftaler* (Femte Afdeling)
The same applies to Langnese-Iglo's complaint concerning the finding by the Court of First Instance that the Commission undertook, before issuing the comfort letter, only a provisional analysis of the market conditions.
Ved appelskrift indleveret til Domstolens Justitskontor den 18. august 1995 har Langnese-Iglo GmbH iværksat appel af dom af 8. juni 1995 (herefter »den anfægtede dom«), hvorved De Europæiske Fællesskabers Ret i Første Instans delvis frifandt Kommissionen for selskabets påstand om annullation af Kommissionens beslutning 93/406/EØF af 23. december 1992 om en procedure i henhold til EØF-traktatens artikel 85 mod Langnese-Iglo GmbH (Sag IV/34.072).
Langnese-Iglo's argument must be understood as also criticising the Court of First Instance for recognising that the Commission was entitled to depart from the assessment set out in its comfort letter not only because of changes in factual or legal circumstances supervening after the issue of the letter but also because of additional
Langnese-Iglo har under appellen anført, at Kommissionen ikke var berettiget til at fravige indholdet i den administrative skrivelse af 20. september 1985, et såkaldt »letter of comfort« (herefter »den administrative skrivelse«), og forbyde det af Langnese-Iglo oprettede net at eksklusive købsaftaler, medmindre det af
Langnese-Iglo claims that the Court of First Instance infringed the principle of proportionality in that it held that the Commission had not committed any error in
Kommissionens kendskab, især i forbindelse med en senere indgiven klage.
matters of law or of fact which come to fight in the course of the procedure.
Langnese-Iglo har desuden kritiseret den anfægtede dom, for så vidt det heri anføres, at Kommissionen inden meddelelsen af den administrative skrivelse alene havde foretaget en foreløbig undersøgelse af markedsvilkårene.
In the contested judgment the Court of First Instance annulled Article 4 of the contested decision.
Det bemærkes hertil først, at i henhold til Domstolens faste praksis kan en appel i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 168 A og artikel 51, stk. 1, i EF-statutten for Domstolen alene støttes på, at Retten har overtrådt visse retsregler, idet enhver bedømmelse af faktisk karakter er udelukket.
withdrawing the benefit of the block exemption provided for by Regulation No 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements and prohibiting all exclusive purchase contracts concluded by Langnese-Iglo, without first having informed Langnese-Iglo of the extent to which a network of exclusive purchasing contracts was compatible with Article 85(1) of the Treaty and, therefore, without giving it an opportunity to adjust the network to the requirements of that provision.
Ifølge Langnese-Iglo er denne konklusion baseret, dels på flere forhold, som ikke fremgår af sagens akter, dels på en urigtig retlig subsumption af de faktiske forhold.
Langnese-Iglo does not indicate with sufficient precision the paragraphs of the judgment to which it takes exception.
Det må fastslås, at Langnese-Iglo ikke har præciseret den urigtige retsanvendelse, som Retten skulle have foretaget ved sin bedømmelse af de retlige spørgsmål, og at virksomhedens argumentation indebærer en anfægtelse af de af Retten fastslåede faktiske forhold.
The Court of First Instance stated in paragraph 205 that Article 3 of Regulation No 17, confers on the Commission only the power to prohibit existing exclusive agreements which are incompatible with the competition rules.
Det fremgår af det anførte, at andet anbringende må afvises i sin helhed.
In view of that lack of precision, the Court of Justice is not in a position to examine the merits of this part of the plea.
Det tredje anbringende består af to dele.
The first part of the third plea is therefore inadmissible.
Langnese-Iglo anfægter imidlertid den af Retten anlagte vurdering af faktum, når firmaet bestrider de af Retten anførte nye omstændigheder med hensyn til nye konkurrenters indtræden på markedet, samt de opståede yderligere hindringer for adgang til markedet, som Kommissionen først blev bekendt med efter Mars' indgivelse af klagen.
The Commission, supported by Mars, contends that the Court of First Instance's interpretation of Article 3 of Regulation No 17 is incorrect in law.
Denne argumentation må derfor afvises i forbindelse med en appel.
In its view, that provision authorises the Commission to ensure that conduct found to have constituted an infringement of the competition provisions does not continue.
Det samme gælder med hensyn til Langnese-Iglo's klagepunkt vedrørende Rettens konstatering af, at Kommissionen inden den meddelte den administrative skrivelse alene havde foretaget en foreløbig undersøgelse af markedsvilkårene.
It observes that the Court of First Instance found, in paragraph 209 of the contested judgment, that Article 4 of the contested decision infringed that principle because it excluded the benefit of Regulation No 1984/83 for certain undertakings in the future, whereas Langnese-Iglo's competitors could exploit the advantage afforded by that regulation.
Langnese-Iglo's anbringender må forstås således, at virksomheden også kritiserer Retten for at have antaget, at Kommissionen kunne fravige den i den administrative skrivelse anlagte vurdering ikke kun på grund af faktiske eller retlige ændringer, der var indtrådt efter skrivelsens meddelelse, men også på grund af nye forhold, der, selv om de allerede forelå, først var blevet bragt til Kommissionens kendskab efter skrivelsens meddelelse.
It must first be noted that, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 205 to 209 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance correctly decided that the Commission was not entitled to prohibit Langnese-Iglo from concluding any exclusive purchasing agreements in the future. The Court of First Instance's assessment is, moreover, consistent with the case-law of the Court of Justice to the effect that Article 3 of Regulation No 17 is to be applied according to the nature of the infringement found.
Langnese-Iglo har anført, at Retten har tilsidesat proportionalitetsprincippet, da den fastslog, at Kommissionen ikke havde begået en fejl, da den lod den i Kommissionens forordning (EØF) nr. 1984/83 af 22. juni 1983 om anvendelse af traktatens artikel 85, stk. 3, på kategorier af eksklusive købsaftaler omhandlede gruppetilladelse bortfalde og forbød samtlige eksklusive købskontrakter indgået med Langnese-Iglo uden forudgående at have meddelt Langnese-Iglo, i hvilket omfang et net af eksklusive købskontrakter var forenelig med traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, og altså uden at have givet virksomheden mulighed for at tilpasse nævnte aftalekompleks til bestemmelsens krav.
As regards the reference to paragraph 209 of the contested judgment, it is important to note that, in criticising the total prohibition of existing agreements, Langnese-Iglo is relying on a consideration put forward by the Court of First Instance in relation only to future agreements. Accordingly, that reference is irrelevant.