natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Vilkårene Pak-kartoner for levering (nr. (41) til af (45))
(recitals (41) to (45))
(146) Foruden vurderingen af hver enkelt af de forskellige kontraktbestemmelser kan der drages en række mere
(xxv) Requirement that supplies be obtained exclusively from Tetra Pak
(xxv) en forpligtelse for kunden til udelukkende at forsyne sig hos Tetra Pak generelle konklusioner af ovenstående analyse.
(146) Beyond the specific assessment of the various contractual clauses, a number of more general points emerge from the above analysis.
Denne forpligtelse i kanonlcvcringskontrakten svarer til den allerede nævnte eksklusive købsforpligtelse i salgskontrakterne for udstyr (bestemmelse (x)).
This obligation incorporates into the carton supply contraa the exclusivity requirement already referred to in relation to equipment purchase contraas (clause (x).
Den retlige vurdering deraf gælder således også her (2).
The legal assessment given in that respea is therefore applicable (2).
For så vidt angår Italien, er denne forpligtelse endnu mere konkurrenecbe-
In the case of Italy, the obligation restricts competition even more and has even less
Det er næsten umuligt at forestille sig, at virksomheder, hvis adfærd dikteres af markedet, kan påtvinge sine kunder kontraktbestemmelser, der er lige si bindende som gennemgået ovenfor.
It is barely conceivable that undertakings whose conduct is diaated by the laws of the marka would be able to impose contractual clauses on their clients as restrictive as those outlined above.
Det viser — hvis der da stadig er behov for det — at Tetra Pak besidder en monopollignende stilling på de aseptiske markeder. Det forhold, at Tetra Pak har held med at pålægge disse betingelser i henseende til ikke blot sine aseptiske produkter, men også i henseende til
This confirms, if there is still a need to do so, the quasi-monopolistic power which Tetra Pak wields on the aseptic markets.
(') De kontraktbestemmelser, som Tetra Pak opererer med, er af en sldan an, at de pi en mide skiber en ond cirkel.
(*) The terms imposed by Tetra Pak are such that they have given rise to a kind of vicious circle.
Desto længere løbetid kontrakten har, desto mere mi de betragtes som udtryk for misbrug.
The longer the term of the lease, the more it should be considered an abuse.
Desto konere den er desto mere udtalt og ensidigt er misbruget i henseende til grundlejen.
The shorter this term on the other hand, the more it is the abuse constituted by, and the inequitable nature of, the base rental which is reinforced.
) Jf nr (116) og følgende
) See recitals (116) et seq. above.
Forretningspolitikken inden for salg af kartoner rentabilitet
Trading policy in relation to carton sales above (J) — which exists between the four markets in question.
(nr. (47) til
(recitals (47) to
Som tidligere nævnt (2) opererer de fleste producenter/aftappere pi alle de indbyrdes forbundne aseptiske og ikkeaseptiske markeder.
Carton (SI)) majority of producers/packagers operate on both of the neighbouring and associated aseptic and nonaseptic markets.
(147) mindre uundgåelig leverandør inden for aseptiske produkter — at påtvinge de kunder, der opererer på begge markeder, de samme bindende kontraktforhold pi det ikkeaseptiske marked som på det aseptiske marked, hvilket de konkurrenter, der alene fungerer på det ikkeaseptiske marked, selvfølgelig ikke er i stand til.
On the latter, Tetra Pak has therefore managed, by dint of its position as the virtually inevitable supplier of aseptic produas, to impose, via its clients common to both markets, the same restriaive contractual conditions on the nonaseptic markets too, which ics competitors operating on only one of those markets are clearly unable to do.
Analysen af Tetra Paks kartonsalg og af rentabiliteten heraf har vist, at »aseptisk Brik«, der praktisk taget ikke har nogen konkurrence, både er den mest solgte og mest rentable karton, idet den i samtlige medregnede medlemsstater står for (..) % til [..] % af koncernens samlede fortjeneste og for (..] % til 102 % af fortjenesten på kartoner alene.
(147) Analysing the sales of Tetra Pak cartons and of their respeaive profitability has revealed that the aseptic brick, sheltered as it is from virtually any competition, was both the most sold and most profitable carton, alone accounting for [...] of the group's total profits in all Member States represented, and for [...] 102 % if cartons are taken in isolation.
En analyse af situationen i de enkelte medlemsstater viser, at denne andel af fortjenesten ikke sjældent overskrider de 100 %, det være sig af den samlede fortjeneste eller af fortjenesten på salg af kartoner alene.
The breakdown by Member State shows that it is not rare for this contribution to profits, be they total profits or profits obtained from the sales of cartons alone, to exceed 100 %.
Det betyder i det første tilfælde, at Tetra Paks øvrige produkter (ikke-aseptiske kartoner og maskiner) samlet må give underskud (3), og at den aseptiske Brik understøtter dem.
This means in the former case that Tetra Pak's other produas (non-aseptic cartons and machines) are loss-making overall (3) and that the aseptic brick subsidizes them.
I det andet tilfælde understøtter den (med den sædvanligvis marginale hjælp fra maskinerne) de ikkeaseptiske kartoner.
In the latter case, it (together with che generally small contribution of machines) subsidizes the nonaseptic cartons.
Det fremgår ligeledes af analysen, at de mange forpligtelser, der pålægges handelspartnerne, i varierende grad altid går i samme retning og hænger sammen med en strategi, der — når først salget eller udlejningen af maskinen er sket — går ud på at gøre kunden fuldstændig afhængig af Tetra Pak i hele maskinens levetid og dermed lukker for enhver kon kurrence inden for tilknyttede produkter (teknisk service, reservedele) og kartoner.
An analysis also shows that the many obligations imposed on trading partners are geared, to varying degrees, to the same end and indeed form part of a strategy aimed, once machines have been sold or leased, at making the customer totally dependent on Tetra Pak for the entire life of the machine, thus ruling out any possibility of competition at the level of associated produas (technical services, spare parts) and cartons.
Som modsætning hertil er Rex-kartonen, der er mest udsat for konkurrence, Tetra Paks mindst rentable emballage, og det har vist sig, at den ofte sælges med tab i syv af de otte EF-lande, der har indgået i undersøgelsen: Italien, Det Forenede Kongerige, Bel gien og Luxembourg, Tyskland, Frankrig og Danmark. mark.
Conversely, the Rex carton, the one most exposed co competition, proved to be the least profitable form of packaging produced by Tetra Pak, with frequent sales at a loss in seven of the eight Community countries investigated: Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium/Luxembourg, Germany, France and Denmark.
Af de årsager, der er redegjort for i meddelelsen af klagepunkter (s. 34), har Kommissionen imidlertid kun foretaget en grundig undersøgelse af denne kartons rentabilitet i Italien.
For the reasons oudined in the statemene of objeaions (p. 34), the Commission has not looked further into the question of carton profitability except as regards Italy.
Den har i den forbindelse indhentet tilstrækkeligt klare og entydige oplysninger til at kunne fastslå, at i hvert fald i Italien er de tabsgivende salg resultatet af en bevidst politik, der går ud på at udelukke konkurrence.
It has, however, gathered sufficiently clear and unequivocal data to be able to conclude that, in that country at least, sales at a loss were the result of a deliberate policy aimed at eliminating competition.
Det lader derfor til, at det eneste tidspunkt, hvor konkurrencen virkelig kan spille ind, er i forbindelse med salg af udsryr og ikke af kartoner.
Consequently, the only time when there is any possibility of genuine competition coming into play is at the time of sale of equipment, and not of cartons.
Tetra Pak begrænser således kunstigt konkurrencen på det område, der er mest fordelagtigt for koncernen, for det er inden for udsryr, specielt på det aseptiske område, at dens teknologiske forspring er størst, og hindringerne for adgang er mest uoverkommelige. Og det er netop grunden til, at Tetra Pak i den grad holder fast ved koblingssalgct maskiner/kartoner.
Tetra Pak thus artificially limits competition to the area in which its position is strongest because equipment, in particular aseptic equipment, is the area in which its technological lead is greatest and entry barriers are at their highest.
Dette koblingssalg sikrer koncernen det meste af dens overskud (omkring 95 %) i form af faste ind tægter (som følge af det obligatoriske køb af Tetra Pak-kartoner), der indløber, så snart maskinen er placeret hos kunden.
It enables it to secure virtually all its profits (some 95 %) in the form of income from cartons (as a result of their purchase being compulsory) as soon as the machine is placed with the customer.
(148) ved at sælge eller udleje maskinen med tab, hvilket under alle omstændigheder kun vil være af rent marginal betydning for det økonomiske resultat.
And as far as this latter operation is concerned, the advantage which Tetra Pak obtains from its technological lead may be complemented, if necessary to win an order, by selling or leasing the machine at a loss, which in any event will have only a very marginal effea on financial results.
I betragtning af Tetra Pak-koncernens stilling på markedet og dens helt selvstændige distributionssystem er de konkurrencebegrænsninger, der følger af bestemmelserne i kontrakterne, tilstrækkelige til at kunne isolere de enkelte nationale markeder inden for EF.
In view, finally, of the marka position of Tetra Pak and the independent distribution system it has set up, the restriaions of companion which stem from the abovementioned contractual clauses are sufficient to enable national markets to be compartmentalized within the Community.
Selv om det er vanskeligt at forestille sig, at en adfærd, der i den grad strider mod logikken omkring økonomisk rentabilitet, og som udvises af en særdeles effektiv multinational virksomhed, kan skyldes en simpel ledelscsfejl, må der alligevel foretages en vurdering af, om der forelå usædvanlige begivenhe-
Although it is difficult to conceive how behaviour so opposed to the logic of economic profitability on the part of an extremely efficient multinational company can possibly be the result of a simple management error, it should be examined whether exceptional circumstances independent of Tetra Pak's free will
(·) Jf. nr. (104).
(1) See recital (104) above.
(2) Jf. noce 4, s. 19.
(2) See footnote 4, p. 19.
) Hvorfor koncernen eller visse af dens nationale datterselskaber ville give underskud uden den aseptiske Brik.
) And that, without the aseptic brick, the group or some of its national subsidiaries would thus make losses.
Nr. I. 72/33 der, uafhængige af Tetra Paks kontrol, der har kunnet tvinge koncernen til at lide sådanne tab på nævnte produkt.
No L 72/33 have forced the group to make such losses on sales of this produa. This hardly seems to be the case, however.
Det forekommer usandsynligt: terne er større end de variable omkostninger, og så længe aktiviteterne delvis bidrager til dækning af de faste omkostninger, så må den normalt afstå fra aktiviteter, hvis rentabilitet til stadighed er utilstræk­kelig til at dække de variable omkostninger, og så meget desto mere også aktiviteter, der ikke engang kan dække de direkte variable omkostninger.
costs and the said activities contribute in part to covering fixed costs; but, on the contrary, any entrepreneur must normaly give up any aai vi ties whose profits remain permanently inadequate to cover variable costs, la alone those which do not even cover direct variable costs.
1 ) Det ligger klart, at begyndelsen af den her vurde­rede periode falder sammen med lanceringen af Rex­kartonen i Italien.
On the one hand, the beginning of the period under review does admittedly correspond to the launch of the Rex produa on the Italian market.
Det er imidlertid ikke sandsynligt, at alene startvanskeligheder har kunnet medføre tab af en sådan størrelsesorden og over si lang en periode.
However, it is hardly plausible that teething troubles should be the sole reason for losses on such a large scale and over such a long period.
Denne antagelse er så meget desto mere urealistisk, som Tetra Pak allerede længe havde optrådt — og i en domine­rende stilling — på det italienske marked med kanoner af Brik­typen på det tidspunkt, hvor Rex­kartonen blev lanceret, og havde adgang til hele den nødvendige tekniske og handelsmæssige infrastruktur (').
This is all the more unrealistic when one considers that Tetra Pak had long been present — and in a dominant position — on the Italian market for brick-type cartons when the Rex was introduced, and already had at its disposal all the technical and commercial infrastructure it required (').
I syv år opførte Tetra Pak sig i Italien stik modsat denne teori, idet koncernen solgte Rex­kartoner til priser, der lå langt under de variable omkostninger og sågar de direkte variable omkostninger (2) (bort­set fra i 1982), priser, der visse ir end ikke var tilstrækkelige til at dække omkostningerne til råva­rer, og som — da det drejede sig om importerede kanoner — lå 10 til 34 % under købsprisen (og dét i en periode på otte år).
This is precisely the opposite of what Tetra Pak did for a full seven years in Italy in selling its Rex cartons at prices considerably below their variable and indeed direct variable costs (2) (except in 1982), prices which in some years were too low to cover even the cost of raw materials and which, the cartons being imported, were 10 to 34 % lower than their purchase price (over a period of eight years this time).
2) Det mi ligeledes udelukkes, at det ikke skulle have været muligt for Tetra Pak at hæve priserne til break­even­punktet, og at koncernen skulle have været tvunget af konkurrencen på markedet til at sælge Rex til under kostprisen.
The hypothesis should also be dismissed that Tetra Pak was unable to increase its prices to the break-even point and was compelled by the existing competition on the market to sell Rex at below cost price.
I hele den pågældende periode solgte Tetra Pak Rex­kar­tonen til langt under Elopaks priser på Pure­Pak, og prisforskellen mellem disse to typer kartoner øgedes konstant, nemlig fra nogle få procent i årene 1976 til 1978 til 30% og mere i årene 1980 til 1981 (50% på et tidspunkt), selv om Tetra Paks tab på Rex­kartonen steg.
Throughout the period under review, Tetra Pak sold the Rex at prices significantly below the prices charged by Elopak for the Pure-Pak, and the difference between them only became greater, rising from a few percent in the period 1976 to 1978 to 30 % and more during the years 1980 to 1981 (50 % at one time), even though Tetra Pak's losses on the Rex carton were increasing.
Man kan derfor ikke forestille sig, at der var tale om modtræk fra Tetra Paks side mod pristryk fra Elopaks side.
It is therefore impossible to imagine that this was a response by Tetra Pak to price pressure from Elopak.
li 50) Salget af Rex­kartoner til under kostprisen og endda under de direkte variable omkostninger, omfanget af tabene på dette produkt, som i øvrigt står i skarp kontrast til overskuddet på den aseptiske Brik (...) %, hvor Tetra Pak nærmest har monopol, varigheden af den pågældende periode, prisforskel­len mellem Rex i Italien og i de øvrige europæiske lande (3), ovennævnte prisforskelle mellem Rex og Pure­Pak (Elopaks konkurrerende karton) pi det italienske marked, den omstændighed, at Tetra Pak måtte lancere en karton af Gable Top­rypen for at modvirke fremgangen for Elopaks Pure­Pak, der passede bedre (selv efter Tetra Paks udtalelser) (4) til i hvert fald nogle af kundernes behov end den aseptiske Brik, de dokumenter, der blev fremskaffet under kontrolbesøget hos Tetra Pak i Italien, og bestyrelsens beretninger, alt dette viser, at Tetra Pak
(150) The sale of Rex cartons at considerably below cost price and indeed below their simple direa variable cost, the scale of the losses sustained with regard to this produa, which moreover is in remarkable contrast to the profits made on the aseptic brick carton ( + [...]) for which Tetra Pak holds a virtual monopoly, the length of the period concerned, the differences in price between the Italian Rex carton and Rex cartons sold in other European countries (3), the abovementioned price differences between the Rex and the Pure-Pak (Elopak's rival carton) on the Italian market, Tetra Pak's need to launch a gable-top carton on that marka to meet the breakthrough achieved by Elopak's Pure-Pak carton, which was better suited (as Tetra Pak itself admits) (4) to the needs of customers — or some of them — than the nonaseptic brick, the documents obtained during the inspection of Tetra Pak's premises in Italy and the reports of the Board of Direaors all go to show the Tetra Pak deliberately
Dette bekræfter endnu en gang, at Tetra Pak har udvist en adfærd, der strider mod enhver form for økonomisk fornuft, og som kun kan opfattes som en udelukkelsesstrategi.
This again confirms that Tetra Pak's condua was opposed to any economic rationality other than as part of an eviction strategy.
Selv om det under visse omstændigheder på kort sigt kan være økonomisk berettiget for en virksomhed, at dens aktiviteter ikke er tilstrækkeligt rentable til at dække de samlede omkostninger, så længe indiarg­
In certain circumstances the pursuit of activities having inadequate profitability to cover all the costs involved may indeed be economically justified in the short term, provided income remains above variable
(2) Selv om der findes forskellige definitioner pi grove underbuds­priser (­predatory prices·), si bor det nævnes, at disse hoved­sagelig angir andre situationer end den, der er tale om her, nemlig situationer, hvor salgspriserne ligger mellem gennems­nitsomkostningerne og grænseomkostningerne.
) Although differences do exist with regard to the definition of predatory prices, they essentially relate to situations different to that encountered here, i.e. in which the selling prices charged are between the average cost and the marginal cost.
Derimod kan det næppe bestrides, at priser, der bevidst (med henblik pi at udelukke konkurrenterne) fastsættes pi et niveau, der ligger under grænseomkostningerne eller sigar under de variable grænseomkostninger, er at betegne som grove underbudspriser.
However, there can be hardly any disputing the predatory nature of prices deliberately fixed (with the aim of eliminating competition) below the marginal cost or, a fortiori, the marginal variable cost.
Men selv om det i praksis er vanskeligt at udskille de variable grænseomkostninger, svarer disse — inden for en virksomheds bredt definerede aktivitetsniveauer — til de ι denne beslutning omhandlede direkte variable omkostninger. Her skal erindres om, at Domstolen i præmis 71 i sin dom i sag C­68/86, Akzo (nr. (104)), udtalte, at selv priser, der ligger under de variable omkostninger, skulle anses som misbrug, hvis de blev anvendt af en dominerende virksomhed til at udelukke en konkurrent.
Although it is difficult in practice to identify the marginal variable cost, it is known that, within the company's wide operating thresholds, this is equated with the direa variable cost referred to in this Decision; it will be remembered that the Court of Justice considered, at ground 71 of its judgment in Case C-62/86 Akzo (recital (104) above), that even prices below average variable costs were to be treated as an abuse if they were a means whereby a dominant undertaking attempted to eliminate a competitor.
(J) Der erindres om, at i denne periode var førstnævnte langt lavere end sidstnævnte, jf. nr. (52) og (53). {*) Jf. bl.a. det skriftlige svar pi meddelelsen af klagepunkter, nr. 12.4.32­33
(') Which, moreover, was in all probability not even accounted for at its actual price by Terra Pak in Rex costs (fixed costs assessed at 0,1 to 0,2 of the cost price), and this could only have the effea of undervaluing costs and therefore losses.
(151) Tetra Pak nægtede i første omgang at have solgt Rex-kanoner med tab og forsøgte at give andre forklaringer på Elopaks vanskeligheder på det italienske marked.
(153) Tetra Pak first denied having sold Rex cartons at a loss and attempted to give other explanations for Elopak's difficulties on the Italian market.
Efter at Kommissionen her gennem ført sin undersøgelse, har Tetra Pak ikke længere bestridt disse metoder, men i de skriftlige og mundtlige svar på meddelelsen af klagepunkter har koncernen anført en række begrundelser, som Kommissionen ikke finder særlig plausible, bl.a.: Elopaks »price leadership« (selv om Tetra Pak som tidligere nævnt solgte til langt lavere priser end Elopak), et forretningsmæssigt ønske om ikke at lade stigninger ne i råvarepriser falde over på kunderne (hvilket ingen producent, der sælger med tab, gør på et bærende marked), sammenhængen mellem prisen på Rex-kartoner og prisen på ikkeaseptisk Brik (selv om førstnævnte kanons produktionsomkostninger var betydeligt højere end sidstnævnte kanons og opfattedes forskelligt af forbrugerne) (3).
After the Commission's analysis had been carried out, Tetra Pak no longer disputed that these practices had taken place, but the justifications it gave in its written and oral replies to the statement of objections are considered implausible by the Commission, the main ones being: its claims that it followed Elopak's 'price leadership' (even though, as we have seen, Tetra Pak sold its cartons at prices considerably lower than Elopak's); that it wished for commercial reasons not to pass on the increased price of raw materials to its clients (which no producer selling at a loss does on a buoyant market); and that Rex prices were linked to those charged for the nonaseptic brick carton (even though the produaion costs of the former were considerably higher than those of the latter, and they were perceived differently by the consumer) (3).
t de forskellige (52) til (53)) helt bevidst solgte sine produkter med tab ('), og at det skete som led i en strategi, der tog sigte på at erobre eller tilbageerobre det italienske marked for ikkeaseptisk emballage, hvor Pure-Pak'en havde til kæmpet sig en position, der kunne blive farlig.
Prices States sold at a loss (*) as part of a strategy of conquering or reconquering the Italian nonaseptic packaging market, on which the Pure-Pak had succeeded in acquiring a position which might prove dangerous.
I kraft af sin dominerende stilling på markedet for aseptisk emballage, hvorfra koncernen hentede stort set alle sine indtægter, kunne Tetra Pak tillade sig at sælge til priser, der må betegnes som »eliminerende«, i en sektor, der kun var af marginal betydning for den, og den afskærmning af de nationale markeder, som koncernen havde haft held med at gennemføre, gjorde det i øvrigt muligt for den at foretage en territorial afgrænsning af den tabsgivende virksom hed.
Owing to its dominant position on the aseptic packaging market, from which it drew virtually all its resources, Tetra Pak could afford to sell at prices which must be described as 'eliminatory' in a seaor which was of marginal importance to it, and the compartmentalization of national markets which it had established also allowed it to limit geographically its aaion and the resultant losses.
Denne strategi kostede faktisk utroligt lidt: med tab på 34,4 % på Rex-kartonen i 1981 (det år, hvor tabet var størst) faldt — takket være de små mængder, der stod på spil — koncernens samlede fortjeneste i Italien med kun knap 3,7 % (2).
This policy in faa cost the group very little: with losses of 34,4 % on the Rex carton in 1981 (the year in which they were at their highest), it saw its total profits in Italy fall by barely 3,7 %, because of the small volumes involved (2).
Med andre ord, hvis Tetra Pak ikke havde lidt tab på Rex-kartonen, ville den samlede fortjeneste på salg have ligget på (...) % i stedet for de faktiske (...) %.
In other words, if Tetra Pak had not made losses on sales of Rex cartons, its overall profit on sales would have been [...] instead of the [...] actually made.