natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Da det stod fast, at sagsøgtes vedtægtsmæssige hjemsted var i Perth (Skotland), havde sagsøgte i henhold til arti kel 10 i Burgerlijk Wetbok's første bog intet hjemsted i Nederlandene.
Since it was not disputed that according to its articles of association the defendant had its seat in Perth (Scotland), by virtue of Article 10 of Book 1 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek it had no seat in the Netherlands.
Efter konventionens artikel 4, stk. 1, var det derfor som udgangspunkt nederlandsk national ret, der måtte anvendes ved bestemmelsen af værnetinget.
Accordingly, under the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention jurisdiction had in principle to be determi­ned according to the domestic law of the Netherlands.
I det foreliggende tilfælde måtte sag søgte dog i medfør af konventionens artikel 8, stk. 3, stilles, som om selskabet havde hjemsted i Nederlandene, da der i det konkrete tilfælde var tale om en sag »vedrørende driften« af sagsøgtes kontor i Amsterdam.
However, in the present case the defendant had to be deemed to be domiciled in the Netherlands by virtue of the third pa­ragraph of Article 8 of the Convention, since the case concerned a dispute "arising out of the operations" of its Amsterdam office.
Det var uden betydning, at bilisten, der havde været involveret i ulykken, havde indgået forsikringsaftalen med sagsøgtes kon tor i Antwerpen, idet tvisten ikke vedrørte denne forsikringsaftale, men sagsøgtes for pligtelser ifølge aftalen.
The fact that the insurance contract with the driver involved in the accident was concluded by its office in Antwerp was not decisive since the dispute did not concern that insurance contract, but the defendant's obliga­tions arising thereunder.
Begrebet »driften« af en forsikringsgivers fiial eller agentur i den i artikel 8, stk. 3, anførte forstand omfattede ikke blot afslutning af forsikringsaftaler, men også afviklingen af heraf flydende krav.
The "operations" of an insurer's branch or agency within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 8 covered not only the conclusion of insu­rance contracts, but also the settlement of claims under insurance contracts.
Da denne afvikling siden 1973 i dette tilfælde var sket fra sagsøgtes kontor i Amsterdam, var retten dér kompetent i henhold til konventionens artikel 8, stk. 3.
Since in the present case negotiations for the settlement of such a claim had been undertaken by the defendant's Amsterdam office since 1973, the local court had jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Article 8 of the Convention.
Sagsøgtes subsidiære påstand om henvisning af sagen til retten i Dendermonde på grundlag af konventionens artikel 22, stk. 2, kunne ikke tages til følge, heller ikke selv om det antoges, at denne ret var kompetent, idet det efter nederlandsk ret ikke var muligt at henvise en sag til en domstol i en anden kontraherende stat.
The defendant's alternative request for the case to be transferred to the court in Dender­monde under the second paragraph of Article 22 of the Convention could not be grant­ed, even if that court had jurisdiction, as there was no provision in the law of the Nether­lands for the transfer of a case to a court of another Contracting State.
Spørgsmålet, om retten i henhold til konventionens artikel 22, stk. 1, af retsplejemæssige hensyn skulle udsætte sin afgørelse, indtil dommen fra retten i Dendermonde forelå, kunne endnu ikke besvares, da denne sag endnu ikke var moden til påkendelse.
The question whether in the interests of the proper administration of justice the court should stay pro­ceedings under the first paragraph of Article 22 until the court in Dendermonde gave judgment could not yet be answered, as a decision in the main action was not yet due.
Afdeling 4 - KOMPETENCE VED VISSE FORMER FOR KREDITKØB OG LÅN (artikel 13 — artikel 15)
Section 4 ­ JURISDICTION IN MATTERS RELATING TO INSTALMENT SALES AND LOANS (Articles 13 to 15)
Kompetence — visse former for kreditkøb og lån —køb, hvor købesummen skal betales i rater — selvstændigt begreb i konventionen — materielt indhold — købekontrakt med afbetalingsbestemmelse i forbindelse med en erhvervsmæssig virksomhed — ikke »køb, hvor købesummen skal betales i rater« i konventionens forstand
Jurisdiction — Instalment sales and loans — Sales on instalment credit terms — Indepen­dent interpretation of the Convention — Substantive contents — Contract of sale with an agreement on instalment credit terms in connexion with trade or professional activities — Not a "sale on instalment credit terms " within the meaning of the Convention
Et tysk selskab havde ved Landggericht Stuttgart erhvervet udeblivelsesdom til betaling af en retskøbesum over et selskab med hjemsted i Frankrig. Til grund for sagen lå en købekontrakt vedrørende en værktøjsmaskine, som det franske selskab havde købt.
A German company had obtained judgment in default in the Landgericht Stuttgart against a company with its seat in France, whereby the French company was ordered to pay the balance of the price due under a contract for the purchase by it of a machine tool.
Ifølge kontrakten skulle købesummen erlægges ved to lige store veksler, der forfaldt efter hen holdsvis 60 og 90 dage. Den tyske dom blev først erklæret for eksigibel i Frankrig.
It had been agreed in the contract that the purchase price would be paid by way of two bills of exchange for equal amounts payable at 60 and 90 days.
Domstolen udtalte, at begrebet afbetalingskøb er forskelligt fra medlemsstat til med lemsstat alt efter de enkelte lovgivningers formål.
The Court of Justice ruled that the concept of a contract of sale on instalment credit terms varied from one Member State to another, in accordance with the objectives pur­sued by their respective laws.
(fortsat 1) med fælles for alle medlemsstaterne.
(continued 1) relations and to the settlement of disputes in the context of intra-Community relations in matters of the sales of goods on instalment credit terms, to consider that concept as being independent and therefore common to all the Member States.
Også af hensyn til sammenhængen mellem konventionens artikler 13 til 15 var det uomgængeligt nodvendigt at give dette begreb et ensartet materielt indhold, som knytter sig til Fællesskabets retsorden.
Also it was indispensable, for the coherence of the provisions contained in Articles 13 to 15 of the Convention, to give that expression a uniform substantive content allied to the Community order.
Ved begrebsbestemmelsen inddrog Domstolen de regler, der er fælles for medlemsstaternes lovgivning i så henseende. Ifølge disse regler skulle køb af løsøregenstande, hvor købesummen skal betales i rater, forstås som en retshandel, hvor pengeydelsen skal er lægges i flere rater, eller som er forbundet med en finansieringsaftale.
It was clear from the rales common to the laws of the Member States that the sale of goods on instalment credit terms was to be understood as a transaction in which the price was discharged by way of several payments or which was linked to a financing con tract.
En snæver fortolkning af artikel 14, stk. 2, i overensstemmelse med formålene med afdeling 4, førte til, at denne fordelagtige værnetingsregel udelukkende måtte forbeholdes købere, som har behov for beskyttelse, idet deres økonomiske stilling er kendetegnet ved deres svaghed i forhold til sælgerne, fordi de er private, endelige forbrugere, og købet afvaren mod rate betaling ikke star i forbindelse med en forretnings- eller erhvervsmæssig virksomhed.
A restrictive interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 14, in conformity with the objectives pursued by Section 4, entailed the restriction of the jurisdictional ad vantages granted by those provisions to buyers who were in need of protection, their economic position being one of weakness in comparison with sellers by reason of the fact that they were private final consumers and were not engaged, when buying the product acquired on instalment credit terms, in trade or professional activities.
Domstolen besvarede følgelig det præjudicielle spørgsmål således:
Accordingly, the Court of Justice answered the preliminary question as follows:
»Begrebet køb af løsøregenstande, hvor købesummen skal betales i rater, som nævnt i artikel 13 i Bruxelles-konventionen af 27. september 1968, kan ikke forstås således, at det omfatter et selskabs køb af en maskine hos et andet selskab mod betaling med veksler, der forfalder i rater.«
"The concept of the sale of goods on instalment credit terms within the meaning of Article 13 of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 is not to be understood to extend to the sale of a machine which one company agrees to make to another company on the basis of a price to be paid by way of bills of exchange spread over a period."
[kompetence i sager om fast ejendom]
[Jurisdiction in proceedings relating to immovable property]
1-16.1 — A 1 Dom af 14.12. 1977, Sanders mod van der Putte, sag 73/77, (anmodning om præjudiciel afgørelse, indgivet af Nederlandenes Hoge Raad) Sml.
1-16.1 — A 1 Judgment of 14 December 1977, Case 73/77, Sanders ν Van der Putte
1977, s. 2383 (Forslag til afgørelse fra generaladvokat H. Mayras, s. 2392)
[1977] ECR 2383 (Preliminary ruling requested by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) Advocate General: H. Mayras (p. 2393)
Kompetence — enekompetence — sager om leje eller forpagtning affasi ejendom (artikel 16, nr. 1) —forpagtning af en forretning — ikke »leje eller forpagtning« i artikel 16, nr. 1 's forstand
Jurisdiction — Exclusive jurisdiction — Proceedings relating to tenancies of immovable property (Article 16 (1) — Lease of a shop — Not a "tenancy" within the meaning of Arti­cle 16(1).
Sagsøgeren i en for Nederlandenes Hoge Raad verserende retssag drev indtil februar 1973 en blomsterforretning i lejede lokaler i Wuppertal (Forbundsrepublikken Tysk land).
The plaintiff in an action pending before the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands ran a flo­rist's shop in rented premises in Wuppertal (Federal Republic of Germany) until Febru­ary 1973.
Han aftalte derefter med sagsøgte, at denne skulle overtage driften af forretningen mod en månedlig »forpagtningsafgift« ; også lejen for forretningslokalerne skulle bæres af sagsøgte, som desuden forpligtede sig til at betale et bestemt beløb for goodwill.
He then agreed with the defendant that the latter would run the shop in return for a monthly rent; the rent for the business premises was also to be borne by the defen­dant, who further undertook to pay a certain amount for the goodwill.
Sag søgeren anlagde på grund af manglende opfyldelse af disse forpligtelser sag i Nederlandene, hvor parterne havde bopæl, med påstand om betaling af disse beløb.
Alleging that those obligations had not been performed, the plaintiff brought an action in the Nether­lands, where the parties were domiciled.
Sagen blev appelleret til anden instans, der antog, at de tyske retter ikke var enekompetente i sagen i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 16, nr. 1.
The appeal court answered in the negative the question whether the German courts had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter under Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention.
Under sagsøgtes kassationsanke forelagde Hoge Raad EF-Domstolen en række spørgsmål, bl.a. om udtrykket »leje eller forpagtning af fast ejendom« i konventionens arti kel 16, nr. 1, også omfattede en aftale om »forpagtning« af en forretning, der drives i en fast ejendom, som bortforpagteren har lejet af tredjemand, og om det for besvarelsen af dette spørgsmål gjorde nogen forskel, om sagsøgte (»forpagteren«) under sagen havde bestridt aftalens eksistens.
The defendant appealed on a point of law to the Hoge Raad, which referred to the Court of Justice of the European Communities questions asking inter alia whether "tenancies of immovable property" within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of the Convention also in­cluded an agreement to rent under a usufructuary lease a retail business carried on in im­movable property rented from a third party by the lessor and whether the answer to that question was affected by the fact that in the proceedings the defendant (the tenant under the usufructuary lease) had contested the existence of the agreement.
Domstolen fastslog i sin dom først, at ved de i artikel 16, nr. 2 til 5, nævnte eksklusive værneting, er det tydeligt, at det er disse retter, der bedst er i stand til at afgøre vedkommende tvister.
In its judgment the Court of Justice ruled that as regards the matters listed under subpa­ragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 16 it was clear that the courts which were given ex­clusive jurisdiction were those best placed to deal with the disputes in question.
(fortsat 1) beliggende, og sådanne sager kræver ofte efterprøvelse, forespørgsler og syns- og skønsforretninger, som nødvendigvis skal afholdes på stedet, hvorfor indrømmelsen af en ene kompetence modsvarer de krav, som hensynet til en god retspleje kræver.
State in which the property was situated in matters relating to rights in rem in, or tenancies of, immovable property (Article 16 (1)); in fact, actions concerning rights in rem in immovable property were to be judged according to the rules of the State in which the im movable property was situated since the dispute which arose resulted frequently in checks, inquiries and expert assessments which had to be carried out on the spot, with the result that the assignment of exclusive jurisdiction satisfied the need for the proper administration of justice.
Leje og for pagtning af fast ejendom er i almindelighed undergivet særlige regler, og disse regler bør, blandt andet på grund af deres komplicerede beskaffenhed, alene kunne anvendes af retterne i det land, hvori de gælder.
The Court went on to state that, as tenancies of immovable property were generally governed by special rules, it was preferable, in the light of their complexity, that those rales be applied only by the courts of the States in which they were in force.
Disse betragtninger forklarer, hvorfor retterne i det land, hvor ejendommen er beliggende, er tillagt enekompetence med hensyn til leje eller forpagtning af fast ejendom i egentlig forstand, dvs. navnlig med hensyn til stridigheder mellem parterne om eksistensen eller fortolkningen af vedkommende aftale om er statning for skader, forvoldt af lejeren, og om ejendommens rømning.
Those considerations explained the assignment of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the State in which the immovable property was situated in the case of disputes relating to tenancies of immovable property properly so called, that is to say, in particular, disputes between lessors and tenants as to the existence or interpretation of leases or to compensation for damage caused by the tenant and to giving up possession of the premises.
Domstolen antog herefter, at de samme grunde ikke gør sig gældende, når kontraktens hovedformål er et andet, for eksempel forpagtning af en forretning.
Those considerations did not apply where the principal aim of the agreement was of a different nature, in particular, where it concerned the operation of a business.
Videre anførte Domstolen, at den enekompetence, der af hensyn til en god retspleje er tillagt en kontraherende stats retter i henhold til konventionens artikel 16, desuden har den virkning, at parterne fratages den ret til valg af værneting, som de ellers ville have, og at de i visse tilfælde kan sagsøges ved en ret, som ikke er deres hjemting.
Furthermore, the assignment, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one Contracting State in accordance with Article 16 of the Convention resulted in depriving the parties of the choice of the forum which would otherwise be theirs and in certain cases resulted in their being brought be fore a court which was not that of the domicile of any of them.
Artikel 16 må derfor ikke fortolkes videre, end dens formål kræver.
Having regard to that con sideration the provisions of Article 16 should not be given a wider interpretation than their objective required.
Udtrykket »sager... om leje eller forpagtning af fast ejendom« i konventionens arti kel 16, skulle derfor ikke fortolkes således, at det omfatter en kontrakt om forpagtning af en forretning, der drives i en fast ejendom, som bortforpagteren har lejet af en tredje mand.
Therefore, the concept of "matters relating to... tenancies of immovable property" within the context of Article 16 of the Convention should not be interpreted as including an agreement to rent under a usufructuary lease a retail business carried on in immovable property rented from a third person by the lessor.
Domstolen anførte desuden, at det udtrykkeligt fremgår af ordlyden af konventionens artikel 16, at en tvist om, hvorvidt den til grund for retssagen liggende aftale er kommet til eksistens, ikke bevirker nogen ændring i det svar, der er givet på spørgsmålet om ar tiklens anvendelsesområde.
The Court stated further that it emerged from the clear terms of Article 16 of the Con vention that the fact that there was a dispute as to the existence of the agreement which formed the subject of the action did not affect the reply given as regards the applicability ofthat article.
Domstolen besvarede derfor de forelagte spørgsmål således:
Accordingly, the Court ruled in answer to the questions referred:
En tvist om, hvorvidt den til grund for retssagen liggende aftale er kommet til eksistens, bevirker ikke nogen ændring i det svar, der er givet på spørgsmålet om an vendelsesområdet for konventionens artikel 16.«
The fact that there is a dispute as to the existence of the agreement which forms
Den i tilslutning til denne dom trufne afgørelse i sagen for den nationale domstol er om talt under 1-16.1 — B 3.
Note: For the decision given in the main action following the above judgment see 1-16.1 — Β 3.
(Jfr. også 1­17.2 ­ B 1)
(See also 1-17.2 - Β 1)
Kompetence — enekompetence — sager om leje eller forpagtning affasi ejendom (artikel 16, nr. 1) — krav på leje — artikel 16, nr. 1, fandt anvendelse
Jurisdiction — Exclusive Jurisdiction — Proceedings relating to tenancies of immov­able property (Article 16 (I)) — Claim for rent — Article 16 (1) held applicable
Konventionens fortolkning — protokollen af 3. juni 1971 — forelæggelse for Dom­stolen af etfortolkningsspørgsmål — rettens skøn (artikel 3, stk. 2)
Interpretation of the Convention — Protocol of 3 June 1971 — Request for interpre­tation by the Court of Justice — Within the discretion of the court (Article 3 (2))
Parterne i denne sag var tyske statsborgere og havde bopæl i Tyskland.
The parties were German nationals domiciled in Germany.
Sagsøgeren havde udlejet et hus, som han ejede i Nederlandene, til sagsøgte og påstod under sagen betaling af leje.
The plaintiff let his house in the Netherlands to the defendants and brought proceedings against them claiming payment of the rent.
Den tyske rets kompetence støttede han på en bestemmelse i lejekon­trakten, hvorefter tysk lov skulle gælde for retsforholdet, og hvorefter der var aftalt værneting i Aachen. Landgericht Aachen, hvortil sagen blev indanket, afviste sagen, fordi nederlandske retter var enekompetente i henhold til konventionens artikel 16, nr. 1.
His view that the German court had jurisdiction was based on a clause in the lease stating that it was governed by German law and conferring jurisdic­tion on the courts in Aachen.
Retten udtalte, at artikel 16, nr. 1, også gælder for sager, som alene vedrører betaling af leje.
The Court held that Article 16 (1) also applied to actions confined to a claim for payment of rent.
Med den modsatte opfattelse, som var forsvaret i den sagkyndiges beretning vedrø­rende konventionen, oversås det, at bestemmelser i den nationale lejeret vedrørende genstanden for lejemålet eller forpagtningen kan være afgørende i sager om betaling af leje.
The contrary view expressed in the report on the Convention by the government experts overlooked the fact that proceedings for payment of rent could depend on the provisions of national law concerning the property leased.
En sondring mellem sager, som udelukkende vedrører betaling af leje, og andre sager ville desuden i praksis føre til vanskelige afgrænsningsspørgsmål.
Besides it was not easy in practice to draw a line between pure rent claims and other actions.
Retten forelagde ikke fortolkningsspørgsmålet for EF­Domstolen med henblik på præ­judiciel afgørelse i henhold til artikel 3, stk. 2, i protokollen af 3. juni 1971. Artikel 3, stk. 2, overlader denne afgørelse til rettens skøn.
The court decided not to refer the question of interpretation to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for a preliminary ruling in accordance with Article 3 (2) of the Protocol of 3 June 1971 which left that decision to the discretion of the court.
Skønt de tyske lovforarbejder inde­holdt en anden opfattelse end den, retten havde fremført, anså den det ikke for nødven­digt at forelægge EF­Domstolen et fortolkningsspørgsmål, idet den afvigende opfattelse ikke var nærmere begrundet.
Al­though the view expressed in the German preparatory works differed from that of the court, it did not consider that reference of the question to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for interpretation was necessary, because detailed reasons were not given for the differing opinion.
Retten var ikke bekendt med retsafgørelser, som fulgte denne opfattelse og tillige begrundede den nærmere.
The court was not aware of any judicial decisions which followed that opinion and which gave detailed reasons for doing so.
Kompetence — enekompetence — sager om rettigheder over fast ejendom (artikel 16, nr. 1) — sag om betaling af en konventionalbod på grund af misligholdelse af en aftale om køb af en fast ejendom — artikel 16, nr. 1, fandt ikke anvendelse
Jurisdiction — Exclusive jurisdiction — Proceedings concerning rights in rem in immovable property (Article 16 (1)) — Action for payment of a contractual penalty for breach of a con­tract for the sale of land — Article 16 (1) held inapplicable
To franske selskaber havde suspensivt betinget solgt en hollænder en fast ejendom, som lå i Frankrig.
Two French companies sold land situated in France to a citizen of the Netherlands sub­ject to a condition precedent.
En del af købesummen skulle betales ved betingelsens indtræden.
Part of the purchase price had to be paid when the condi­tion precedent was fulfilled.
Køberen betalte ikke og indstævnedes for sit hjemting til betaling af en konventionalbod.
The purchaser failed to pay and was sued in the court for the place where he was domiciled for a penalty under the contract.
Retten anså sig for kompetent.
The court held that it had jurisdiction.
Sagen angik ikke ejendomsretten til den faste ejendom i Frank­rig, men alene den obligationsretlige forpligtelse til betaling af en konventionalbod på grund af misligholdelse.
The action was not concerned with property rights in the land situated in France, but merely with the personal obligation to pay a penalty for non­perfor­mance of a contract.
Kompetence — enekompetence — sag om leje eller forpagtning affasi ejendom (artikel 16, nr. 1) — forpagtning af en forretning — ikke »leje eller forpagtning« i artikel 16, nr. l's forstand
Jurisdiction — Exclusive jurisdiction — Proceedings relating to tenancies of immovable property (Article 16 (1)) — Lease of a shop — Not a "tenancy" within the meaning of Arti­cle 16(1)
Denne afgørelse afsluttede den sag, i hvilken EF­Domstolen på Hoge Raad's anmod­ning afsagde dom af 14. december 1977 (sag 73/77, ovenfor under 1­16.1 — A 1, hvortil tillige henvises med hensyn til sagens omstændigheder og de forudgående retsforhand­linger). På grundlag af denne dom stadfæstede Hoge Raad Gerechtshof Arnhem's dom.
This decision concluded the proceedings in which the Court of Justice of the European Communities delivered its judgment of 14 December 1977 at the request of the Hoge Raad (Case 73/77, supra, 1­16.1 — A 1, to which reference should be made for the facts and previous procedure).