natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
39 udtrykket Ordinær appel eller genoptagelse' i konventionens artikler 30 og 38 omfatter derfor ikke et retsmiddel, som enten afhænger af begivenheder, som på tids punktet for den oprindelige retsafgørelse ikke kan forudses, eller af søgsmål fra tredjemænd, der ikke er bundet af de tidsfrister, som følger den oprindelige afgørelse; relse;
36 In that case, it is also necessary to bear in mind, in addition to the criterion based on the possible effect of an appeal, all the relevant considerations arising from the nature and conditions for the application of the judicial remedies in question.
40 det tilkommer den ret, der behandler en begæring i henhold til artikel 36 på et tidspunkt, hvor fristerne for anvendelse af retsmidler i domsstaten endnu ikke er udløbet, at udøve sit skøn i så henseende;
37 Considered from this point of view, the expression Ordinary appeal' must be un derstood as meaning any appeal which forms part of the normal course of an action and which, as such, constitutes a procedural development which any party must reasonable expect.
4i dette skøn er forudsat i artikel 38, som giver retten i fuldbyrdelsessagen beføjelse til at give den part, som modsætter sig fuldbyrdelse, men endnu ikke har udnyttet mulighederne for at iværksætte appel eller indgivet begæring om genoptagelse i domsstaten, en frist at foretage sådanne retsskridt.
38 It is necessary to consider that any appeal bound by the law to a specific period of time which starts to run by virtue of the actual decision whose enforcement is sought constitutes such a development.
42 Herefter skal der ifølge konventionens artikler 30 og 38 ved 'ordinær appel eller genoptagelse', som er iværksat eller kan iværksættes mod en udenlandsk retsafgørelse, forstås ethvert retsligt skridt, som vil kunne medføre ophævelse eller ændring af den retsafgørelse, som er genstand for anerkendelses- eller fuldbyrdelsesproceduren i henhold til konventionen, og hvis iværksættelse i domsstaten skal ske inden for en frist, der er fastsat ved lov, og som følger selve den nævnte retsafgørelse.«
39 Consequently it is impossible to consider as 'ordinary appeals' within the mean ing of Articles 30 and 38 of the Convention in particular appeals which are depend ent either upon events which were unforeseeable at the date of the original judgment or upon the action taken by persons who are extraneous to the case, and who are not bound by the period for entering an appeal which starts to run from the date of the original judgment.
(fortsat 5)
1968 ­ ARTIC LIS 25 TO 49 continued 5)
1­25.0 — A 3 Dom af 21. maj 1980 '), sag 125/79, Denilauler mod SNC Couchet Frères (anmodning om præjudiciel afgørelse indgivet af Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main), Sml. 1980, s. 1553 (Forslag til afgørelse fra generaladvokat H. Mayras, s. 1572)
The expression 'ordinary appeal' within the meaning of Articles 30 and 38 of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters must be defined solely within the framework of the system of the Convention itself and not according to the law either of the State in which the judgment was given or of the State in which recog­nition or enforcement of that judgment is sought.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — bestemmelser om prøvelse af forkyndelsen af det indledende processkrift i sagen og den retsafgørelse, som skal fuldbyrdes (artiklerne 2 7, nr. 2, 46, nr. 2, 47, nr. 1) — finder ikke anvendelse på retsafgørelser, der træffes uden høring af modparten, og som skal fuldbyrdes uden forudgående forkyndelse for denne
Within the meaning of Articles 30 and 38 of the Convention, any appeal which is such that it may result in the annulment or the amendment of the judg­ment which is the subject­matter of the procedure for recognition or enforcement under the Convention and the lodging of which is bound, in the State in which the judgment was given, to a period which is laid down by the law and starts to run by virtue ofthat same judgment constitutes an 'ordinary appeal' which has been lodged or may be lodged against a foreign judgment."
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — afgørelser omfattet af konventionen — retsafgørel­ser, der i domsstaten er blevet truffet eller har kunnet træffes efter en kontradiktorisk sagsbehandling
For the decision given in the main proceedings following upon this judgment see 1­38 — Β 4 infra.
Ifølge fransk ret kan den arrest, som kreditor således fik tilladelse til, foretages uden forudgående forkyn­delse for rekvisitus.
46 (2) and 47(1) — Not applicable to decisions given ex parte and enforceable without prior service on the party
1-25.0 - A 3 fortsat 1) uden at debitor var mødt ved nogen af forhandlingerne overhovedet.
1-25.0 - A 3
Kendelsen af 23. marts 1979 blev tilsyneladende først forkyndt for debitor den 3. maj 1979; han kærede omgående kendelsen til Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, der forelagde Dom stolen følgende spørgsmål :
The debtor, who had not taken part in any of the proceedings, did not receive notice of the decision of 23 March 1979 until 3 May 1979; he immediately appealed against that decision to the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, which referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:
Omfatter konventionens artikler 27, nr. 2, og 46, nr. 2, også de sager, i hvilke der uden høring af modparten bliver truffet afgørelse om foreløbige, sikrende retsmidler?
Do Articles 27(2) and 46(2) also apply to proceedings in which provisional protective measures are taken without the opposite party being heard?
Skal konventionens artikel 47, nr. 1, forstås således, at den part, der begærer fuldbyrdelse, også skal fremlægge de dokumenter, hvoraf det fremgår, at den retsafgørelse, som skal fyldbyrdes, er forkyndt, når afgørelsen vedrører et foreløbigt, rent sikrende retsmiddel?
Is Article 47(1) of the Convention to be interpreted as meaning that the party applying for enforcement must also produce the documents which establish that the judgment of which enforcement is sought has been served, even if that judg ment concerns a provisional and purely protective measure?
Kan den part, mod hvem fuldbyrdelsen begæres, uanset bestemmelserne i konventionens artikel 34, stk. 2, under en appel eller genoptagelse efter konven tionens artikel 36, stk. 1, rettet mod tilladelsen til at fuldbyrde en foreløbig, sikrende foranstaltning efter konventionens artikel 24, fremsætte indsigelser mod selve kravet, uanset hvornår de grunde, hvorpå indsigelserne støttes, er opstået? Kan den part, mod hvem fuldbyrdelsen begæres, i sådanne tilfælde navnlig er klære modregning med en fordring på rekvirenten, som den pågældende part al lerede havde, inden det foreløbige retsmiddel blev anordnet i domsstaten?
May the party against whom enforcement is sought and who, in addition to the rule contained in the second paragraph of Article 34 of the Convention, exercises the appeal available under the first paragraph of Article 36 of the Conven tion against authorization of enforcement of a provisional protective measure within the meaning of Article 24 of the Convention, plead objections to the claim itself irrespective of the time at which the grounds for the objection arose; in cases of this sort can therefore the party against whom enforcement is sought set off a claim which he already possessed against the applicant before the provisional measure was taken in the first State?
Såfremt spørgsmål 3 besvares bekræftende: Indebærer den omstændighed, at den part, mod hvem fuldbyrdelsen begæres, har udnyttet det til rådighed stående retsmiddel mod domsstatens afgørelse og støttet dette på de samme indsigelser mod kravet, som den pågældende part har fremsat i appelsagen efter konventionens artikel 36, stk. 1, at den pågældende part er afskåret fra at fremsætte indsigelserne mod selve kravet under en appelsag i henhold til denne bestemmelse?«
If the third question is answered in the affirmative, is it possible in appeal proceedings under the first paragraph of Article 36 of the Convention to oppose the objections relied upon against the claim by the party against whom enforce ment is sought on the grounds that that party has appealed in the proper way against the judgment in the State in which it was given and has founded that appeal on the same objections against the claim itself as he has raised in the appeal under the first paragraph of the said Article 36?"
(Fortsættelse påfølgende blad)
(continued on next recto page/
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — begrebet »retsafgørelse« i konventionen (artikel 25) — af­gørelse om fastsættelse af salær truffet af formanden for advokatkredsen erklæret eksigibel — »retsafgørelse« i artikel 25's forstand
Recognition and enforcement — The term "judgment" for purposes of the Conventior, (Ari. 25) — Costs determined by the Bâtonnier de l'Ordre des Avocats and declared en­forceable — "Judgment" within lhe meaning of Anide 2
Rekvirenten i fuldbyrdelsessagen, en advokat med møderet for Cour d'appel de Paris, havde i anledning af et salærkrav mod to klienter med bopæl i Bruxelles fået formanden for advokatkredsen ved Cour d'appel til at træffe en afgørelse om fastsættelse af salæret.
The applicant, a lawyer at the Cour d'Appel, Paris, had the costs which he claimed against two clients residing in Brussels determined by the Bâtonnier de l'Ordre dei Avocats [President of the Bar Council], Paris.
Salæret var blevet fastsat til 4000 FF efter fremgangsmåden i artikel 97 ff. i det franske dekret nr. 72­468 af 9. juni 1972 om gennemførelse af artikel 53 i lo v nr. 71 ­1130 af 31. de­cember 1971.
In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 97 et seq. of French Decree No 72­468 of 9 June 1972 implementing Ar­ticle 53 of Law No 71­1130 of 31 December 1971, the costs were fixed at FF 4 000.
Afgørelsen af 20. februar 1980 om fastsættelsen af salæret blev ved ken­delse af 1 l.juni 1980 erklæret eksigibel af retsformanden for Tribunal de grande ins­tance de Paris i medfør af de nævnte bestemmelser.
The taxed bill of costs dated 20 February 1980 was declared enforceable by the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, by a judgment dated 11 June 1980 pursuant to the aforesaid provisions.
Rekvirenten fremsatte herefter i Bel­gien begæring om meddelelse af fuldbyrdelsespåtegning på afgørelsen om salæret, der var erklæret eksigibel ved kendelse af 1 l.juni 1980.
The applicant then sought an order for the enforcement in Bel­gium of that judgment.
Som begrundelse herfor anførte han blandt andet, at der var givet hans klienter mulighed for at udtale sig, før afgørelsen om salæret blev truffet, idet der var tilsendt dem et rekommanderet brev med modtagelses­bevis og med en lang frist.
He claimed that before the costs were determined his clients were notified by registered letter and given ample time to submit their comments.
Afgørelsen om fastsættelsen af salæret var også blevet sendt til dem i rekommanderet brev med modtagelsesbevis.
The deci­sion of the Bâtonnier was itself served on them by registered post.
Skyldnerne havde haft lejlighed til inden tre måneder at indbringe denne afgørelse for en højere instans.
They had a period of three months in which to appeal against that decision.
Dermed var af­gørelsen om fastsættelsen af salæret blevet retskraftig, således som retsformanden for Tribunal de grande instance de Paris havde fastslået i sin kendelse, hvori afgørelsen var erklæret eksigibel.
As the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, had verified in his order for enforcement, the decision deter­mining costs had thereby become final.
I konklusionen erklærede den den kendelse, der var afsagt af retsformanden for Tribunal de grande instance de Paris den 1 l.juni 1980 — der var be­
In sub­stance, it held that the judgment of the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, of 11 June 1980, by which the French decision of 20 February 1980 determining the costs payable had been declared enforceable, was enforceable in Belgium.
Retten lod herved den af retsformanden for Tribunal de grande instance de Lille afsagte kendelse, hvorved den franske afgørelse om fastsættelse af salæret var blevet erklæret eksigibel, ude af betragtning, da det indledende processkrift i sagen og den af retsformanden for Tribunal de grande instance afsagte kendelse ikke sås at være forkyndt for skyldneren, og da det følgelig ikke var godtgjort, at denne kendelse var retskraftig.
'resident of the Tribunal de Grande Instance, Lille, by which the French decision de­ermining costs had been declared enforceable, because it was not apparent that the doc­iment w hich instituted the proceedings and the judgment of the President of the Tribù­lai de Grande Instance had been served on the defendant and thus it was not proved hat that order was final.
Anerkendelse og fuldbyrdelse — afgørelse truffet af en nederlandsk ret om tilbagebetaling af social bistand — ikke en »retsafgørelse« i konventionens forstand
Recognition and enforcement — Judgment of a Netherlands court on the determination of ¡aims for the repayment of social henefits — Not a "judgment" for purposes of the Con­dition
Rekvirenten, en nederlandsk kommune repræsenteret af borgmesteren, begærede i medfør af konventionens artikel 31 en afgørelse truffet af Kantongerecht Heerlen forsy­net med fuldbyrdelsespåtegning.
The plaintiff, a municipality in the Netherlands represented by its mayor, sought an > rder pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention for the enforcement of a judgment of the Cantongerecht, Heerlen, described in the judgment of the German court as an order un­ler the Netherlands General Social Benefits Law [Algemene Bijstandswet] determining he costs of social benefits which the defendant was obliged to repay under the provi­ions of the General Social Benefits Law of 13 June 1963. When the court requested the ipplicant to produce the documents referred to in Article 47 ( 1 ) of the Convention, the ipplicant stated that Netherlands law did not provide for a judgment to be served: in­tead, the Netherlands court merely furnished proof that the court had dispatched the udgment. Moreover, the applicant stated that Netherlands law, unlike German law, did lot provide for a separate order for enforcement; all judgments given in the Nether­ands were immediately enforceable. The applicant did not comply with the court's re­[uest that it should submit observations on the legal nature of the judgment in question. The court refused the application on the ground that it was not established that the order mder the General Social Benefits Law was a judgment within the meaning of Article 3 1 )f the Convention.
Kantongerecht's afgørelse, der i den tyske rets ken­delse betegnes som en »beslutning i henhold til bistandsloven«, havde fastsat et bestemt beløb for bistandsydelser, som rekvisitus var forpligtet til at tilbagebetale i henhold til reglerne i den nederlandske bistandslov (Algemene Bijstandswet af 13. juni 1963 — ABW). Efter at retten havde opfordret rekvirenten til at fremlægge de i konventionens artikel 47, nr. 1, nævnte dokumenter, anførte denne, at dommen ifølge nederlandsk ret ikke skulle forkyndes, men at den nederlandske domstol derimod kun skulle dokumen­tere, at den havde afsendt dommen.
As was apparent from Article 54, only a judgment given by a court ollowing the institution of legal proceedings constituted a judgment for the purposes if Article 31. It had not been show η that such a judgment had been given in proceedings ■(inducted before a court.
Endvidere findes der i nederlandsk ret ikke fuldbyr­delsespåtegninger, således som de kendes i tysk ret; alle domme, der afsiges i nederlan­dene, kan fuldbyrdes straks.
The applicant's observations on the en­orceability of Netherlands judgments were therefore irrelevant.
Rekvirenten gjorde ikke rede for afgørelsens retlige karak­ter, således som retten ligeledes havde forlangt.
The order of the Neth­■rlands court was also not an enforceable instrument within the meaning of Article 50 of he Convention, especially since the respondent had not been involved in its being given, ^astly, the applicant had not proved service of the judgment. As the respondent resided
Det kunne ikke fastslås, at en »beslutning i henhold til bistandsloven« varen retsafgørelse i konventionens artikel 3 l's forstand.
Issue 3 Decemb,
Da rekvisitus boede i Forbundsrepublikken, ville det uden videre have været muligt at forkynde beslutningen for ham i overensstemmelse med de interna­tionale konventioner.
(continued 1, in the Federal Republic of Germany he could simply have been served with the judg­ment in accordance with the relevant international agreements.
I medfør af ABW's artikel 62 kan bistandsydelser kræves tilbagebetalt på grundlag af en retsafgørelse.
According to Article 62 of the Netherlands General Social Benefits Law, the repayment of social benefit costs may be required on the basis of a court order.
Sagen indledes ved Kantongerecht på begæring af de sociale myndig­heder; disse og den person, der har modtaget bistanden, er parter i sagen.
Proceedings are insti­tuted on application of the payer of social benefits to the Kantongerecht; the payer of benefits and the defendant are parties to the proceedings.
Ifølge arti­kel 66, stk. 2, er Kantongerecht's afgørelse foreløbig eksigibel, selv om den ikke forelig­ger i sin helhed.
According to Article 66 (2), the judgment of the Kantongerecht is enforceable immediately without any special procedure.
En genpart sendes i medfør af artikel 67, stk. 1, til parterne i sagen i anbe­falet brev.
Under Article67 (I), it is to be sent to the defendant by registered post.
(Jfr. også 1­27.1 ­ B 7)
(continued
Anerkendelse — retskraftvirkningen mellem parterne — rækkevidde — overflødige udtalel­ser i den afgørelse, som begæres anerkendt
Recognition — Judgment binding on the parties — Scope — Obiter dicta in the judgment of which recognition is sought
Parterne havde indgået to aftaler kort efter hinanden om salg og levering af eddikesyre f.o.b.
The parties had concluded two contracts in quick succession for the sale and delivery f.o.b.
Rotterdam fra Chemproha, der havde hjemsted i Nederlandene, til Chemag.
Rotterdam of acetic acid by Chemproha, a company whose seat was in the Nether­lands, to Chemag.
Så­danne forretninger havde de allerede i en årrække afsluttet med hinanden.
They had already been dealing with one another for a number of years.
Under den fo­religgende sag krævede Chemag erstatning af Chemproha på grund af misligholdelse.
In these proceedings Chemag claimed damages from Chemproha for breach of contract.
For en del af dette krav havde selskabet allerede anlagt sag ved en tysk ret i Frankfurt am Main, hvor selskabet havde hjemsted.
As regards part ofthat claim, it had already brought an action before the Land­gericht Frankfurt am Main, the place in which it had its seat.
Landgericht dér havde imidlertid ved dom af 24. september 1975 erklæret sig inkompetent på grundlag af en bestemmelse i Chempro­ha's almindelige forretningsbetingelser, som den anså for anvendelige, og hvorefter ret­terne i Dordrecht skulle være kompetente. Denne dom var blevet stadfæstet af Oberlan­desgericht Frankfurt am Main som ankeinstans ved dom af 2. august 1976.
However, in a judgment of 24 September 1975 that court had declared that it had no jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's general conditions of business, which the court regarded as applicable and which provided that the courts in Dordrecht were to have jurisdiction.
Retten var af den opfattelse, at princippet i Bruxelles­konventionen, hvorefter retterne på det sted, hvor sagsøgte har bopæl, har kompetence, var gældende, og at der ikke forelå nogen af de i konventionen fastsatte undtagelser fra dette princip.
That court held that the principle laid down in the Brussels Con­vention to the effect that the courts of the State in which the defendant was domiciled were to have jurisdiction applied and none of the exceptions to that principle provided for by the Convention applied.
Der var navnlig ikke i nogen af de to aftaler mellem parterne indgået en værnetingsaftale, hvori de tyske retter var ble­vet erklæret kompetente.
In particular, neither of the contracts concluded be­tween the parties contained an agreement conferring jurisdiction on the German courts.
Oberlandesgericht undersøgte endvidere spørgsmålet om, hvis almindelige forretningsbetingelser fandt anvendelse mellem parterne, og kom ved an­vendelse af tysk ret til det resultat, at ingen af parternes almindelige foretnignsbetingel­ser fandt anvendelse på den første aftale, og at Chemproha's almindelige forretningsbe­tingelser fandt anvendelse på den anden aftale.
The Oberlandesgericht also considered which general conditions of business were appli­cable between the parties and by application of German law concluded that neither par­ty's conditions applied to the first contract and the defendant's conditions applied to the second.
Under den for den nederlandske ret verserende sag gjorde Chemproha gældende, at den tyske ret allerede havde truffet en endelig afgørelse vedrørende spørgsmålet om, hvilke almindelige forretningsbetingelser der fandt anvendelse mellem parterne, og at den nederlandske ret var bundet heraf.
In the action before the Netherlands court the defendant claimed that the German court had already conclusively decided which general conditions of business applied as be­tween the parties and the Netherlands court was bound by that decision.
Rechtbank afviste denne opfattelsen og anførte, at Oberlandesgericht's dom ganske vist havde fået retskraft mellem parterne, men at spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt retskraftvirkningen også udstrakte sig til den foreliggende sag, måtte bedømmes efter nederlandsk ret.
The Arrondisse­mentsrechtbank rejected that view and held that, although as between the parties the judgment of the Oberlandesgericht was res judicata, the question whether it had binding force in the present proceedings had to be decided according to Netherlands law.
Ifølge denne har udtalelser, som ikke er nød­vendige for at retten kan komme til sin afgørelse, ikke retskraft.
Under Netherlands law, any statements which the court did not need to make in order to arrive at its decision were not binding.
Rechtbank anså derfor ikke det af den tyske ret anførte vedrørende spørgsmålet om anvendeligheden af Chem­proha's almindelige forretningsbetingelser for nødvendigt for sin afgørelse af kompeten­cespørgsmålet og derfor overflødigt.
The Arrondissementsrechtbank considered that the statements made by the German court on the applicability of the defendant's general conditions of business were not necessary for its decision on jurisdiction and were there­fore obiter dicta.
Anerkendelse — negativt anerkendelsesøgsmål ved en italiensk ret — afvisning på grund af manglende international kompetence — fuldbyrdelsessøgsmål ved en tysk ret med par­terne i de modsatte roller — virkningen af den italienske afgørelse
Recognition — Action before an Italian court for a declaration thai there was no contract — Dismissed for want of jurisdiction — Action for performance of the contract brought by 'he opposite party before lhe German court — Effect of the Italian judgment
Sagsøgeren krævede erstatning af sagsøgte, der var bosat i Italien, på grund af mislighol­delse af en købekontrakt.
The plaintiff claimed damages from the defendant, which was established in Italy, for ireach of a contract of sale.
Sagsøgeren hævdede at have indgået en købekontrakt med sag­søgte om en eksportlicens for hvedemel; sagsøgte havde så imidlertid meddelt sagsøge­ren, at han ikke havde kunnet få den overdragne licens opdelt til fordel for sagsøgeren hos de kompetence italienske myndigheder.
It alleged that it had concluded a contract with the defendant 'or the sale of an export licence for wheat flour; the defendant had then informed it that t had not been possible to have the licence divided by the competent Italian authorities.
Sagsøgte gjorde i første række gældende, at den ret, ved hvilken sagen var anlagt, savnede kompetence.
The defendant's main contention was that the court seised did not have jurisdiction.