natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvad angår mødet mellem DSW og CFK og Kali & Salz den 14. marts 1989, var det blot formålet at drøfte Solvays eventuelle erhvervelse af interesser i CFK's sodaaktiviteter. Pi dette møde gav Solvay for første gang CFK meddelelse om, at den overvejede at hjælpe CFK til at overleve, men der blev ikke vedtaget noget konkret, og mødet førte ikke til noget resul­tat. I artikel 85, stk. 1, er det fastsat, at alle aftaler mellem virksomheder og alle former for samordnet praksis, der kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, og som har til formal eller'til følge at hindre, begrænse eller fordreje konkurrencen inden for fællesmarkedet, er uforenelige med fællesmarkedet og er forbudt.
As for the meeting between DSW and CFK and Kali & Salz on 14 March 1989 its purpose was simply to discuss the possible acquisition by Solvay of an interest in CFK's soda activities: only during this meeting did Solvay for the first time give an indication to CFK that it was considering helping that company to survive, but nothing concrete was agreed and nothing ever resulted from the meeting. Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the common market all agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.
Solvay fandrdet ikke nødvendigt, at man anmodede de involverede personer om at bekræfte dens argu­menter, og den anmodede heller ikke om mundtlig høring.
Solvay did not consider it necessary to propose that the persons involved be found in order to corroborate its factual arguments, nor did it request an oral hearing.
I artikel 85, stk. 1, nævnes specielt en række eksem­pler pi forbudte aftaler, nemlig aftaler, som bestir i direkte eller indirekte fastsættelse af salgspriser, begrænsning af eller kontrol med afsætningen, eller opdeling af markeder mellem producenter.
Article 85 (1) specifically includes as examples of prohibited agreements those which directly or indirectly fix selling prices, limit or control markets, or share markets between producers.
Aftaler/Samordnet praksis
Agreements/concerted practices
CFK benægtede at have vatre involveret i hemmelige aftaler: den kunne ikke redegøre for de dokumenter, man havde fundet hos DSW, og at dette heller ikke pihvilede den, men Solvay. CFK hævdede, at der ikke fandtes noget i dens egne dokumenter, der kunne antyde, at den skulle være indblandet i nogen hemme­lig ordning.
CFK for its part denied any involvement in collusion: it could give no explanation for the documents discovered at DSW, arguing that they were a matter for Solvay and not itself: there was nothing in its own documentation which could connect it with any collusive scheme.
Artikel 85, stk. 1, forbyder bide aftaler og samordnet praksis.
Article 85(1) prohibits both agreements and concerted practices.
Selv om man normalt ikke sondrer mellem disse to former for ulovlige arrangementer, mener kommissionen, at arrangementet mellem Solvay og CFK i nærværende sag nærmest kan betragtes som en aftale efter artikel 85, stk. 1
In the present case, although nothing turns on the distinction between the two forms of prohibited collusion, the Commission considers that the arrangement between Solvay and CFK can most accurately be categorized as an 'agreement' within the meaning of Article 85 (1).
En aftale kan eksistere, nir parterne er niet til enighed om en plan, der begrænser eller vil kunne begrænse
An 'agreement' may exist when the parties have reached consensus on a plan which limits or is likely to limit their commercial freedom by determining the
Kommissionen afviser Solvays forklaringer som helt utroværdige og under alle omstændigheder i modstrid med Solvays egne dokumenter.
The Commission rejects as entirely unbelievable the explanations advanced by Solvay which are in any case in complete contradiction with the terms of its own documents.
Det er ogsi bemærkel­sesværdigt, at nogle af de pigældende dokumenter blev sendt med telefax fra DSW til Solvays hovedkon­tor i Bruxelles, men at modtagelsen af dem ikke kan spores. Hvad CFK's argumenter angir, er det en kendsgerning, at dokumenter, som man finder hos en virksomhed, og som er belastende for en anden, kan
It is also significant that some of the documents concerned were transmitted by telefax from DSW to Solvay headquarters in Brussels but no trace exists of their having been received.
B. Retsmidler og sanktioner
Remedies and sanctions
(15) deres handlefrihed ved at fastlægge retningslinjer for deres fælles virksomhed, eller afholden sig fra at udøve virksomhed pi markedet.
(15) lines of their mutual action or abstention from action in the market.
Det er ikke nød vendigt, at parterne betragter den som juridisk bindende, og i de tilfælde, hvor de udmærket ved, at deres aftale er ulovlig, kan det naturligvis ikke være deres hensigt, at den skal betragtes som gyldig.
It is not necessary that the parties should consider it legally binding, and indeed where they are well aware of the illegality of their arrangement they clearly cannot intend it to have contractual force.
Der kræves ingen procedure for hindhævelse af aftalen, og det er heller ikke nødvendigt, at en sidan aftale er skriftlig.
No enforcement procedures are required; nor is it necessary for such an agreement to be made in writing.
Hvis Kommissionen konstaterer, at der foreligger en overtrædelse af artikel 85, kan den pilægge de pågældende virksomheder at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør, jf. artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17.
Where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of Article 85, it may require the undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation No 17.
Begrænsning af konkurrencen
Restriction of competition
I nærværende sag er det indlysende, at aftalen har til formil og til følge at begrænse konkurrencen.
In the present case it is self-evident that the agreement has the object and effect of restricting competition.
Aftalerne i det foreliggende tilfælde blev gennemført hemmeligt, og pi trods af det foreliggende bevismateriale har både Solvay og CFK fortsat benægtet, at der var tale om hemmelige aftaler mellem dem.
The arrangements in the present case were conducted in secret and despite the overwhelming documentary evidence both Solvay and CFK have continued to deny that any collusive arrangements were made between them.
Det er således uvist, om de har truffet foranstaltninger for at bringe aftalerne til ophør.
As a result, it is uncertain whether or not they have taken any steps to put an end to the collusion.
Det er derfor nødvendigt at pålægge Solvay og CFK omgående at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør, jf. artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17.
It is therefore necessary, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17, to require Solvay and CFK to bring the infringement to an immediate end.
Det skal ogsi forbydes parterne at medvirke ved aftaler eller samordnet praksis med tilsvarende virkning. ning.
The parties must also be prohibited from any agreement or concerted practice having equivalent effect.
Det var klart formålet at skabe betingelser for en kunstig markedsstabilitet.
The purpose was clearly to achieve conditions of artificial market stability.
Mod at føre en prispolitik, som Solvay ikke betragtede som ødelæggende, blev CFK garanteret en mindsteandel af det tyske marked.
In exchange for returning to pricing behaviour which was not considered by Solvay as disruptive, CFK was guaranteed a minimum share of the German market.
Ved at fjerne de mængder fra markedet, som CFK ikke kunne sælge, sikrede Solvay, at priserne ikke faldt pi grund af konkurrence.
By removing from the market the tonnage which CFK could not sell, Solvay ensured that price levels were not brought down by competition.
Det fremgår af bevismaterialet, at aftalerne blev gennemført i praksis og fik den tilsigtede virkning.
It is clear from the documentary evidence that the arrangements were put into practice and had the intended effect.
Sidanne traditionelle karteller begrænser i sig selv konkurrencen som omhandlet i artikel 85, stk. 1.
Such classic cartel-type arrangements by their very nature restrict competition within the meaning of Article 85 (1).
Den garanterede mindsteafsætning vedrørte kun sal get pi det tyske marked, men dette udelukker pi ingen måde anvendelse af artikel 85.
The fact that the minimum guaranteed tonnage related only to sales on the German market in no way excludes the application of Article 85.
Den adfærd, som Solvay i Bruxelles har udvist, gør det klart, af aftalen indgik i dens generelle politik, som tog sigte pi at kontrollere sodamarkedet i EF.
It is clear from the involvement of Solvay in Brussels that the arrangement was part . of its overall policy for controlling the soda-ash-market in the Community.
Aftalen mellem Solvay og CFK tog sigte pi ikke blot at begrænse konkurren cen pi en væsentlig del af fællesmarkedet, men ogsi at opretholde den stive markedsstruktur og opdelingen af markedet efter nationale skel.
The-SolvayAHFK arrangement was intended not only to reduce competition in a major part of the Community but also to maintain the rigidity of the existing market structure and its separation along national lines.
Det er desuden muligt, at den mængde, Solvay aftog i henhold til garantien, eller« ville være blevet afsat af CFK pi andre markeder i EF.
It is also quite possible that the tonnage taken by Solvay' under the guarantee would otherwise have been placed by CFK in other Community markets.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er der i nærværende sag tale om en alvorlig overtrædelse.
In the present case the Commission considers that the infringement was a serious one.
Aftaler om markedsopdeling udgør i sig selv en betydelig konkur rencebegrænsning.
Marketsharing agreements are by their very nature considerable restrictions on competition.
I nærværende sag begrænsede par terne deres indbyrdes konkurrence ved at søge at skabe kunstige vilkir for markedsstabilitet.
In the present case the parties restricted competition between them by means of a device intended to create artificial conditions of market stability.
CFK niede sit mil for afsætningen, uden at den pågældende mængde skulle afsættes pi forbrugermarkedet til konkurrencedygtige priser.
CFK's volume ambitions were accommodated without the tonnage in question having to be placed on the consumer market at competitive prices.
Aftalerne blev ogsi gen nemført i dybeste hemmelighed.
The arrangements were also conducted in conditions of considerable secrecy.
Da virksomhederne nægter at udtale sig, er det umuligt at fastslå præcist, hvornår garantiaftalen blev indgået.
It is not possible, given the refusal of the undertakings to provide any information, to determine exactly when the guarantee agreement was' made.
Ordningen blev første gang anvendt pi CFK's afsætning for 1987.
The arrangements were first applied to CFK's sales for the year 1987.
Ved fastsættelsen af bødernes størrelse vil det derfor være rimeligt at gi ud fra,
It is therefore appropriate to assess fines on
Kommissionen finder derfor, at Solvay og CFK har overtrådt EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, fordi de fra omkring 1986 har deltaget i en aftale, hvorved Solvay garanterede CFK en bestemt årlig mindsteafsætning i Tyskland og aftog de mængder, der var nødvendige for at ni op pi dene minimum.
The Commission therefore considers that Solvay and CFK have infringed Article 85 of the EEC Treaty by participating from about 1986 to the present time in an agreement by which Solvay guaranteed to CFK a certain minimum annual tonnage in Germany and purchased from it the quantities required to reach that minimum.
Artikel 3 at aftalen blev indgået pi et eller andet tidspunkt i 1987.
Article 3 the basis that the agreement was concluded at some time during that year.
For den i artikel 1 nævnte overtrædelse pilægges nedenstående virksomheder følgende bøder: a) Solvay et Cie, Bruxelles, pålægges en bøde pi 3 mio. ECU b) Chemische Fabrik Kalk, Køln, pålægges en bøde pi 1 mio. ECU.
(b) Chemische Fabrik Kalk, of Cologne, a fine of ECU 1 million.
Nir kommissionen fastlægger, hvor stor en bøde producenterne skal pilægges, tager den i betragtning, at Solvay indtager en dominerende stilling på markedet som den førende producent i Tyskland og i EF. Solvay har som sidan et særligt ansvar for at sikre markedets »stabilitet«.
In determining the amount of the fine to be imposed on each producer, the Commission bears in mind Solvay's dominant market position as the leading producer in Germany and in the Community.
CFK er en forholdsvis lille sodaproducent, men virksomheden indgik beredvilligt i det ulovlige arrangement.
CFK is a relatively small producer of soda-ash but it was a willing partner in the collusive venture.
Overtrædelsen var forsætlig, og det mi have været indlysende for parterne, at deres aftale var klart uforenelig med fællesskabsretten.
The infringement was deliberate and both parties must have been well aware of the obvious incompatibility of their arrangements with Community law.
De i artikel 3 omhandlede bøder indbetales senest tre måneder efter meddelelsen af denne beslutning pi følgende konto:
The fines imposed by Article 3 shall be paid within three months of the date of notification of this Decision to the following bank account:
Kommissionen har adskillige gange før ved beslutning pilagt Solvay betydelige bøder for hemmelige aftaler inden for den kemiske industri (beslutning 85/74/ EØF(') (peroxygen-produkter), beslutning 86/398/
Solvay has been the subject on several previous occasions of substantial fines imposed by the Commission for collusion in the chemicals industry: Decision No 85/74/EEC, Peroxides ('); Decision
I 1980 til 1982 foretog Kommissio
Its activities in soda-ash
Ved periodens udløb påløber der automatisk rente efter den sats, som Den Europæiske Fond for Monetært Samarbejde anvendte for sine ecu-transaktioner den første arbejdsdag i den måned, hvor denne beslutning blev vedtaget, plus 3,5 procentpoints, dvs. 14%.
On expiry of that period, interest shall automatically be payable at the rate charged by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund on its ecu operations on the first working day of the month in which this Decision was adopted, plus 3,5 percentage points, i.e. 14%.
nen en undersøgelse af virksomhedens sodaaktiviteter.
have been the subject of scrutiny by the Commission in 1980 and 1982.
Selv om Kommissionen pi det pågældende tidspunkt især var opmærksom på Solvays aftaler om eksklusive leveringsaftaler med kunderne, kan de ansvarlige for sodaaktiviteterne ikke have været uvidende om, at det var nødvendigt at efterkomme fællesskabsretten —
Although at that time the Commission was more particularly concerned with Solvay's exclusive supply arrangements with customers, those responsible for the soda-ash activities cannot have been ignorant of the need to comply with Community law,
Hivs bøden indbetales i national valuta i den medlemsstat, hvor den angivne indbetalingsbank er beliggende, anvendes den valutakurs, der var gældende dagen før betalingen.
Should payment be made in the national currency of the Member State in which the bank nominated for payment is situated, the exchange rate applicable shall be that prevailing on the day preceeding payment.
Solvay et Cie SA (Solvay) og Chemische Fabrik Kalk GmbH (CFK) har overtrådt EØF-Traktatens artikel 85 ved fra omkring 1987 og indtil nuværende tidspunkt at have deltaget i en aftale om markedsopdeling, hvorved Solvay garanterede CFK en årlig mindstafsætning af soda i Tyskland, beregnet pi grundlag af CFK's afsætning i 1986, og ydede CFK kompensation- for fald i afsætningen ved at aftage de mængder, der var nødvendige for at bringe CFK's afsætning op pi den garanterede mindsteafsætning.
Solvay et Cie (SA ('Solvay') and Chemische Fabrik Kalk GmbH ('CFK') infringed Anide 85 of the EEC Treaty by participating from about 1987 until the present time in a marketsharing agreement by which Solvay guaranteed to CFK a minimum annual sales tonnage of soda-ash in Germany calculated by reference to CFK's achieved sales in 1986, and compensated CFK for any shortfall by purchasing from it the tonnages required to bring its sales to the guaranteed minimum.
KOMMISSIONENS BESLUTNING af 19. december 1990 om en procedure i henhold til EØF­Traktatens artikel 86
COMMISSION DECISION of 19 December 1990 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
Solvays overtrædelse af artikel
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABER HAR — under henvisning til Traktaten om Oprettelse af Det Euro­pæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab, under henvisning til Rådets forordning nr. 17 af 6. februar 1962, første forordning om anvendelse af bestemmelserne i Traktatens artikel 85 og 86 ('), senest ændret ved akten vedrørende Spaniens og Portugals tiltrædelse, særlig artikel 3 og 15,
Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty ('), as last amended by the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, and in particular Articles 3 and 15 thereof,
Solvay har formodentlig siden 1983 misbrugt sin dominerende stilling på sodamarkedet i EF (undtagen i Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland) ved at yde sine største kunder loyalitets­ og meromsætningsbonus, ved at indgå aftaler, som sikrer Solvay eneleverancer, og ved at gennemføre andre ordninger, der har haft til formål og til følge at udelukke konkurrencen ved at forpligte ovennævnte kunder til at foretage alle deres indkøb hos Solvay.
From about 1983 until the present time Solvay has abused the dominant position which it holds in the market for soda-ash in the Community (excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland) by applying to its major customers a system of loyalty rebates and discounts by reference to marginal tonnage, contractual arrangements tending to ensure an effective ex­clusivity of supply for Solvay and other devices which have had the object and effect of tying the said customers to Solvay for the whole of their requirements and of excluding competitors.
Baggrund efter at have givet den pågældende virksomhed lejlighed til at udtale sig vedrørende de af Kommissionen fremførte klage­punkter, jf. artikel 19, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 17 samt Kommissionens forordning nr. 99/63/EØF af 25. juli 1963 om udtalelser i henhold til artikel 19, stk. 1 og 2, i Rådets forordning nr. 17 (2),
Having given the undertaking concerned the opportunity to make known its view on the objections raised by the Commission, pursuant to Article 19 ( 1 ) of Regulation No 17 and Commission Regulation No 99/63/EEC of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (62) of Council Regulation No 17 (2),
Solvays stilling pa sodamarkedet i EF efter høring af Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel­ og Monopolspørgsmål, og
After consulting the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions,
Med hensyn til produktet og sodamarkedet henvises der til del 1, afsnit B, i beslutning 91/297/EØF (Solvay­ICI) (3), hvor der redegøres udførligt der­for.
Details of the product and the soda-ash market are set out in Part 1.Β of Commission Decision 91/297/EEC (Solvay-ICI) (J).
Overtrædelsen i korte træk
Summary of the infringement
I Fællesskabet har Solvay anlæg i Belgien, Frankrig, Tyskland, Italien, Spanien og Portugal, og virksomheden leverer sit produkt til forbrugere overalt i EF undtagen Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland.
In the Community it operates plant in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal and supplies the product to consumers throughout the EEC with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland.
Denne beslutning er en følge af de kontrolun­dersøgelser, Kommissionen foretog i marts 1989 hos sodaproducenter i EF i henhold til artikel 14, stk. 3, i forordning nr. 17.
The present Decision arises out of investigations carried out by the Commission in March 1989 pursuant to Article 14 (3) of Regulation No 17 at the premises of Community producers of soda-ash.
Ved disse kontrolundersøgelser og efterfølgende begæringer om oplysninger i henhold til artikel 11 i forordning nr. 17 er Kommissionen kommet i besiddelse af materiale der beviser, at Solvay et Cie SA i Bruxelles (Solvay) har overtrådt artikel 86.
By means of the said investigations and subsequent enquiries under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 the Commission discovered documentary evidence showing that an infringement of Article 86 had been committed by Solvay et Cie SA, Brussels (Solvay).
På de ni vesteuropæiske markeder, hvor Solvay selv har en salgsorganisation (de ni Directions Nationales eller DN, der også omfatter Østrig og Schweiz), har virksomheden haft en konstant markedsandel på omkring 70 %. Dens fire konkurrenter i EF har hun 26% tilsammen.
In the nine west European national markets in which Solvay has its own sales organization (the nine 'Directions nationales' or 'DN' which include Austria and Switzerland) it has had a stable market share of around 70 %.
I EF, bortset fra de britiske Øer (hvor ICI næsten har monopol som følge af «hjemme­markcdsreglen«, jf. beslutning Solvay­ICI), har Sol­vays markedsandel traditionelt ligget på omkring 70 %.
In the EEC excluding the British Isles (where ICI has a near-monopoly as a result of the 'home market' rule: see Decision . . . (ICI)) Solvay's market share has also historically been around 70%.
Med Nederlandene som den eneste undtagelse (stort set overladt til NSI og derpå Akzo som følge af en markedsdelingsaftale i 1955, der ikke er gen­
With the sole exception of the Netherlands (left largely to NSI and then AKZO as a result of a marketsharing agreement made in 1955 which is not the subject of
91 stand for nogen procedure) er Solvay den største, og i visse tilfælde den eneste, sodaleverandør i de EF-Ian-de, hvor den sælger sit produkt.
91 proceedings) Solvay is the largest, or in some cases the exclusive, supplier of soda-ash in each of the Member States in which it sells.
Som den største saltproducent i EF befinder Solvay sig desuden i en meget gunstig situation, når det drejer sig om leverancer af det vigtigste råmateriale til soda fremstilling.
Solvay as the largest producer of salt in the EEC is very favourably placed as regards the supply of the principal raw material for soda-ash.
green«-aftaler, der kan opsiges med et varsel på 24 måneder, og som vedrører en samlet årlig afsætning på over 5O0 000 tons i Vesteuropa.
in western Europe of over 500 000 tonnes per year.
Der er også vedtaget en hemmelig »protokol« om en »koncernrabat« på 1,5 % om året på al afsætning i Europa.
There is also a secret 'protocol' providing for a 'group rebate' of 1,5 % per year on all sales in Europe.
Priser og andre aftalevilkår fastsættes dog efter forhandlinger pi nationalt plan mellem Solvays DN og St. Gobain-selskabet i den pågældende medlemsstat.
Prices and other contractual terms are however negotiated on a national basis between the appropriate Solvay 'DN' and the St Gobain company in the Member State in question.
Mange andre kunder har også en »evergreen«-aftale med Solvay med et opsigelsesvarsel på 24 måneder.
Many other customers also have an 'evergreen' contract providing for a 24-month notice period.
Bortset fra Akzo, der i kraft af sin beliggenhed på den nordhollandske kyst betragter ikke blot Nederlandene, men også Nordtyskland og Danmark som sit naturlige »hjemmemarked«, har de øvrige producenter en ten dens til at koncentrere deres afsætning i EF på deres respektive nationale markeder.
With the possible exception of AKZO, which by virtue of its location on the North Dutch coast claims as its 'natural backyard' not only the Netherlands but also North Germany and Denmark, the other producers tend to concentrate their EEC sales on their respective national markets.