natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ifølge billetterne var afrejselufthavnen beliggende i den sidstnævnte stat, hvorimod de passagerer, der havde købt billetterne, rent faktisk påbegyndte rejsen i en tysk lufthavn, hvor ruteflyet mellemlandede.
Although the starting point for the journey mentioned in those tickets was situated in that State, passengers who purchased those tickets actually boarded their flight at a German airport where the scheduled flight made a stopover.
De to tyske rejsebureauer havde ved at sælge disse billetter overtrådt den tyske luftfartslov, idet det på tysk område er forbudt at anvende billetpriser, som ikke er godkendt af vedkommende forbundsminister.
It was maintained that by selling such tickets the two German travel agents had contravened the Luftverkehrsgesetz [law concerning air navigation] which prohi­bited the application in German territory of air tariffs not approved by the competent Federal minister.
Rejsebureauerne havde også udøvet illoyal konkurrence, da priserne på de flybilletter, de solgte, lå under de godkendte priser, som konkurrenterne anvendte.
It was further alleged that their actions also constituted unfair competition, in so far as the prices of the airline tickets which they sold undercut the approved tariffs applied by their competitors.
IATA-resolutioner), hvori mindst et luftfartsselskab med sæde i en medlemsstat inden for Det Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab er deltager, ugyldige på grund af overtrædelse af EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, jf. EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 2, også når hverken medlemsstatens myndigheder (EØF-Traktatens artikel 88) eller Kommissionen (EØF-Traktatens artikel 89, stk. 2) har fastslået sådanne aftalers uforenelighed med bestemmelserne i EØF-Traktatens artikel 85?«
The Bundesgerichtshofs first question read as follows: 'Are bilateral or multila­teral agreements regarding airline tariffs (for example, IATA resolutions) to which at least one airline with its registered office in a Member State of the EEC is a party void for infringement of Article 85 (2) of the EEC Treaty as provided for in Article 85 (1), even if neither the relevant authority of the Member State concerned (Article 88) nor the Commission (Article 89 (2)) has declared them incompatible with Article 85?'
Domstolen bemærkede indledningsvis med en henvisning til sin dom af 30. april 1986 (Asjes, sag 209-213/84), at ugyldighed i medfør af Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 2, ikke omfatter prisaftaler, før der i henhold til artikel 87 er vedtaget og ikrafttrådt fællesskabsregler til nærmere afgrænsning af Kommissionens beføjelser til at meddele fritagelser i medfør af artikel 85, stk. 3, og således gennemføre den af Traktaten påbudte konkurrencepolitik, jf. artiklerne 88 og 89.
The Court first pointed out that, as it had held in its judgment of 30 April 1986 (Joined Cases 209 to 213/84, Ministère Public ν Asjes and Others [1986] ECR 1425), subject to the application of Articles 88 and 89 of the Treaty price agreements were not liable to be automatically void under Article 85 (2) until after the entry into force of Community rules adopted pursuant to Article 87 with a view to organizing the Commission's powers to grant exemptions under Article 85 (3) and hence to bringing about the competition policy sought by the Treaty.
Da de eneste fællesskabsregler på luftfartsområdet, som indtil nu er vedtaget i medfør af artikel 87, udelukkende drejer sig om international lufttrafik mellem lufthavne i Fællesskabet, følger det heraf, at prisaftaler for ren indenlandsk lufttrafik eller for trafik til lufthavne i tredjelande forbliver omfattet af overgangsbestemmelserne i artiklerne 88 og 89, dvs. der kræves en forudgående konstatering af deres uforenelighed med artikel 85, foretaget enten af en medlemsstat eller af Kommissionen, for at ugyldigheden indtræder.
To date, the Court went on to state, the Community rules adopted with regard to air transport under Article 87 applied only to international air transport services between Community airports and it had to be inferred from this that price agreements in respect of domestic air transport and air transport to and from airports in non­member countries continued to be subjected to the transitional provisions laid down in Articles 88 and 89, that was to say, it was necessary in
Det fulgte af disse betragtninger, at prisaftaler vedrørende internationale flyvninger mellem medlemsstater uden videre er forbudt i medfør af artikel 85, stk. 2, jf. dog proceduren i artikel 5 i Rådets forordning nr. 3975/87.
order for them to be void for there to be a finding by a Member State or the Commission that they were incompatible with Article 85.
I andet spørgsmål ønskede den forelæggende ret følgende afgjort: »Indebærer det forhold, at man for ruteflyvninger udelukkende anvender sådanne priser, misbrug af en dominerende stilling på fællesmarkedet, jf. EØF-Traktatens artikel 86«.
The Court considered in what circumstances agreements relating to tariffs for scheduled flights between airports in the various Member States were liable to be automatically void. The Court observed that such agreements could not qualify for block exemption under the Commission regulations, since no provision was made for such a possibility in Council Regulation No 3976/87 and Commission Regulation No 2671/88 expressly excluded such a possibility.
Det første problem, behandlet i denne sammenhæng, var, om man ved anvendelsen af artikel 86 skulle foretage den samme sondring som ved anvendelsen af artikel 85, nemlig mellem internationale flyvninger mellem lufthavne i medlems staterne og andre flyvninger.
It followed that the tariff agreements in respect of international intra-Community flights were automatically void under Article 85 (2), subject, however, to the application of Article 5 of Commission Regulation No 3975/87, governing objections.
I modsætning til den britiske regerings og Kommissionens opfattelse måtte spørgsmålet besvares benægtende.
The national court's second question was: 'Does charging only such tariffs for scheduled flights constitute an abuse of a dominant position in the common market within the meaning of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty?'
Selv om aftaler, vedtagelser og samordnet praksis som omhandlet i artikel 85, stk. 1, kan fritages i medfør af artiklens stk. 3, kan misbrug af en dominerende stilling ikke på nogen som helst måde fritages; et misbrug af en dominerende stilling er ganske enkelt i strid med Traktaten, og det påhviler, afhængig af sagen, de nationale myndigheder eller Kommissionen inden for hver deres kompetence område at drage konsekvenserne af dette forbud.
In the Court's view, the first question to be considered was whether for the purposes of the application of Article 86 the same distinction had to be made as in the case of Article 85, that was to say between international flights between airports in the Member States and other flights.
Domstolen konkluderede, at det i Traktatens artikel 86 indeholdte forbud i fuldt omfang gælder for hele luftfartsområdet.
Contrary to the argument put forward by the United Kingdom and the Commission that question had to be answered in the negative.
Det næste problem, det andet præjudicielle spørgsmål rejste, var, om en bestemt billetpris principielt kan udgøre misbrug af en dominerende stilling, såfremt den er resultatet af to virksomheders samordning, der i sig selv kan tænkes at falde ind under forbuddet i artikel 85, stk. 1.
Whereas agreements, decisions and concerted practices covered by Article 85 (1) might qualify for exemption under Article 85 (3), no exemption might be granted in respect of the abuse of a dominant position in any way whatsoever; such an abuse, the Court held, was simply prohibited by the Treaty and it was for the competent national authorities or the Commission, as the case might be, to act on that prohibition within the limits of their powers.
Det afgørende kriterium ved afgørelsen af, om et luftfartsselskab indtager en dominerende stilling på markedet, var, om en flyrute på en bestemt strækning er så speciel i forhold til alternative transportmuligheder, at disse kun i ringe omfang er substituerbare med og kun i meget ringe omfang konkurrerer med flyruten.
The second problem raised by the second preliminary question was whether the application of a tariff might in principle constitute an abuse of a dominant position where it was the result of concerted action between two undertakings which, itself, was capable of falling within the prohibition set out in Art icle 85(1).
Når de nationale myndigheder konstaterer, at et luftfartsselskab indtager en dominerende stilling på det pågældende marked, må de dernæst undersøge, om de priser, som selskabet kræver anvendt af andre luftfartsselskaber, der beflyver samme rute, udgør et misbrug af denne dominerende stilling. Et sådant misbrug
In that connection the Court pointed out that in so far as the new Council regulations provided that Article 86 might be applicable to an agreement which had initially been granted either a block exemption or individual exemption under the oppositions procedure, it followed that in certain cases Article 86 might cover the application of tariffs on scheduled flights on a particular route or routes where those tariffs were fixed by bilateral agreements concluded between air carriers, provided that the conditions laid down in Article 86 were fulfilled.
foreligger især, når de påtvungne priser må anses som ubillige befordringsbetingelser, enten i forhold til konkurrenterne eller i forhold til de rejsende.
Such an abuse might be held to exist in particular where such imposed tariffs must be regarded as unfair conditions of transport with regard to competitors or with regard to passengers.
Sådanne ubillige betingelser kan først og fremmest være, at den påtvungne billetpris er overdreven høj, eller overdreven lav med henblik på at fjerne selskaber uden for aftalen fra markedet, eller også bestå i udelukkende at anvende en bestemt billetpris på en rute.
Such unfair conditions might, in the view of the Court, be due to the rate of tariffs imposed being excessively high, or excessively low in order to eliminate from the market undertakings not party to the agreement, or to the application of only one tariff on a given route.
Såfremt det er blevet konstateret, at et selskab har misbrugt sin dominerende stilling på markedet, og at samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne kan tænkes at blive påvirket heraf, rammes det pågældende selskabs handlemåde af forbuddet i artikel 86.
If it was found that an undertaking had abused its dominant position on the market and that trade between Member States might be affected, the conduct of the undertaking concerned was subject to the prohibition laid down by Article 86.
I det omfang Kommissionen ikke har anvendt sine beføjelser i henhold til Traktaten og dens gennemførelsesbestemmelser til at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør eller godkende den, påhviler det de nationale udøvende eller dømmende myndigheder at drage konsekvenserne af forbuddet og eventuelt fastslå den pågældende aftales ugyldighed på grundlag af deres nationale lovgivning, såfremt der ikke er vedtaget fællesskabsregler på området.
In the absence of intervention by the Commission, pursuant to its powers under the Treaty and rules implementing the Treaty, to put an end to the infringement or impose sanctions, the competent national adminis trative or judicial authorities had to draw the consequences of the applicability of the prohibition and, where appropriate, rule that the agreement in question was void on the basis, in the absence of relevant Community rules, of their national legislation.
Den forelæggende ret har særligt spurgt, om en sådan godkendelse også er uforenelig med Traktatens artikel 5, stk. 2, og artikel 90, stk. 1, når Kommissionen ikke i henhold til artikel 90, stk. 3, har påtalt godkendelsen.
The national court asked in particular whether such approval was not incompatible with the second paragraph of Article 5 and Article 90 (1) of the Treaty, even if the Commission had not objected to such approval under Article 90 (3).
Hertil bemærkede Domstolen først, idet den henviste til sin faste praksis, at selv om konkurrencereglerne i artiklerne 85 og 86 angår virksomhedernes adfærd og ikke de foranstaltninger, som medlemsstaternes myndigheder har truffet, forpligter Traktatens artikel 5 dog medlemsstaterne til ikke at iværksætte eller opretholde foranstaltninger, som kan tænkes at ophæve konkurrencereglernes praktiske virkning.
In that connection, the Court ruled that it had to be borne in mind in the first place that, as the Court had consistently held, while it was true that the competition rules set out in Articles 85 and 86 concerned the conduct of undertakings and not measures of the authorities in the Member States, Article 5 of the Treaty nevertheless imposed a duty on the authorities in the Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which could deprive those competition rules of their effectiveness.
Dette vil navnlig være tilfældet, såfremt en medlemsstat fremkalder eller fremmer indgåelsen af aftaler, som er i strid med artikel 85, eller forstærker deres virkning.
That would be the case, in particular, if a Member State were to require or favour the adoption of agreements contrary to Article 85 or reinforce their effects.
Det fulgte heraf, at godkender luftfartsmyndighederne prisaftaler, som er i strid med artikel 85, stk. 1, er godkendelsen i strid med fællesskabsretten, herunder Traktatens artikel 5.
The Court concluded as a result that the approval by the aeronautical authorities of tariff agreements contrary to Article 85 (1) was not compatible with Commun is
Det er ligeledes en følge, at luftfartsmyndighederne skal afholde sig fra enhver foranstaltning, der kan betragtes som en opfordring til luftfartsselskaberne om at indgå traktatstridige prisaftaler.
ity law and in particular with Article 5 of the Treaty. It also followed therefrom that the aeronautical authorities had to refrain from taking any measure which might be construed as encouraging airlines to conclude tariff agreements contrary to the Treaty.
Når der specielt er tale om billetpriser for rutefly, støttes denne fortolkning af Traktatens artikel 90, stk. 1.
In the specific case of tariffs for scheduled flights that interpretation was borne out by Article 90 (1) of the Treaty.
Ganske vist har Rådet i betragtningerne til forordning nr. 3976/87 udtrykt ønske om skridtvis øget konkurrence inden for luftfartsområdet, men sådanne bestræbelser skal realiseres inden for de af Traktaten afstukne grænser.
Although in the preamble to Regulation No 3976/87 the Council expressed a desire to increase competition in air transport services between Member States gradually, that aim could be respected only within the limits laid down by the provisions of the Treaty.
skal anvendes på visse ruter, så forbyder Traktaten dem dog udtrykkeligt på nogen som helst måde at fremme indgåelsen af aftaler eller samordning af praksis på prisområdet, som er i strid med artikel 85, stk. 1, eller eventuelt med artikel 86.
Whilst, as a result, the new rules laid down by the Council and the Commission left the Community institutions and the authorities in the Member States free to encourage the airlines to organize mutual consultations on the tariffs to be applied on certain routes served by scheduled flights, the Court held that the Treaty nevertheless strictly prohibited them from giving encouragement, in any form whatsoever, to the adoption of agreements or concerted practices with regard to tariffs contrary to Article 85 (1) or Article 86.
Den forelæggende ret har ligeledes henvist til artikel 90, stk. 3, men denne bestemmelse var ikke relevant for løsningen af de problemer, som sagen rejste.
The national court also referred to Article 90 (3), but that provision appeared, in the opinion of the Court, to be of no relevance for the purpose of resolving the questions raised by this case.
Derimod vil artikel 90, stk. 2, efter omstændighederne kunne have betydning for luftfartsmyndighedernes afgørelser vedrørende godkendelse af priser.
In contrast, the Court ruled that Article 90 (2) might entail consequences for decisions by the aeronautical authorities with regard to the approval of tariffs.
Denne bestemmelse kan nemlig finde anvendelse på luftfartsselskaber, som af myndighederne er blevet pålagt at beflyve ruter, som fra et kommercielt synspunkt er urentable, men hvor almene interesser gør beflyvningen nødvendig.
That provision might be applied to carriers, which might be obliged by the public authorities to operate on routes which were not commercially viable but which it was necessary to operate for reasons of the general interest.
I hvert enkelt tilfælde påhviler det de nationale forvaltninger og domstole at undersøge, om det pågældende luftfartsselskab virkelig ved en retsakt, udstedt af en offentlig myndighed, er blevet pålagt at beflyve en sådan rute.
It was necessary in each case for the competent national administrative or judicial authorities to establish whether the airline in question had actually been entrusted with the task of operating on such routes by an act of the public authority.
Virkningen af konkurrencereglerne må imidlertid kun begrænses i henhold til artikel 90, stk. 2, af hensyn til særlige opgaver af almen interesse, såfremt de nationale myndigheder, der godkender priserne, og de domstole, der behandler sager herom, kan fastslå nøjagtigt, hvilke opgaver der er tale om, og hvilken virkning de har på de berørte luftfartsselskabers prisstruktur.
However, the Court held that in order for it to be possible for the competition rules to be restricted under Article 90 (2) by needs arising from performance of a task of general interest, the national authorities responsible for the approval of tariffs and the courts to which disputes relating thereto were submitted had to be able to determine the exact nature of the needs in question and their impact on the structure of the tariffs applied by the airlines in question.
Såfremt der ikke er egentlig transparens i prisstrukturen, er det nemlig vanskeligt, for ikke at sige umuligt, at vurdere, hvilken indflydelse en opgave af almen interesse har på anvendelsen af konkurrencereglerne på prisområdet.
Indeed, where there was no effective transparency of the tariff structure it was, in the Court's view, difficult, if not impossible, to assess the influence of the task of general interest on the application of the competition rules in the field of tariffs.
Det er de nationale domstoles opgave at gennemføre de nødvendige faktiske undersøgelser på dette punkt.
It was for the national court to make the necessary findings of fact in that connection.
Han foreslog Domstolen at besvare de stillede spørgsmål således:
The Court ruled as follows:
Bilaterale eller multilaterale aftaler om priser for befordring med rutefly, hvori et eller flere luftfartsselskaber med hjemsted i en EØF-medlemsstat er part, er med fællesskabsrettens nugældende indhold ugyldige i medfør af EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 2, på grund af overtrædelse af EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1,
(i) in the case of tariffs applicable to flights between airports in a given Member State or between such an airport and an airport in a non-member country : where either the authorities of the Member State in which the registered office of one of the airlines concerned is situated or the Commission, acting under Article 88 and Article 89 respectively, have ruled or recorded that the agreement is incompatible with Article 85;
— såfremt de angår international lufttrafik mellem lufthavne i Fællesska bet — såfremt de angår flytrafik til tredjelande, og det i øvrigt i henhold til form og fremgangsmåde i EØF-Traktatens artikler 88 eller 89, stk. 2, er blevet fastslået, at disse priser er et resultat af aftaler, vedtagelser inden for sammenslutninger af virksomheder eller samordnet praksis, som er i strid med EØF-Traktatens artikel 85.
(ii) in the case of tariffs applicable to international flights between airports in the Community: where no application to exempt the agreement from the prohibition set out in Article 85 (1) has been submitted to the Commission under Article 5 of Regulation No 3975/87; or where such an application has been made but received a negative response on the part of the Commission within 90 days of the publication of the application in the Official Journal; or again where the 90-day time-limit expired without any response on the part of the Commission but the period of validity of the exemption of six years laid down in the aforesaid Article 5 has expired or the Commission withdrew the exemption during that period.
Opkrævningen af sådanne eksklusivpriser for internationale ruteflyvninger mellem lufthavne i Fællesskabet eller for flyvninger til tredjelande kan samtidig, såfremt de faktiske omstændigheder, der kræves i EØF-Traktatens artikel 86, foreligger, udgøre misbrug af en dominerende stilling på fællesmarkedet; opkrævning af sådanne priser er i henhold til EØF-Traktatens artikel 86 forbudt for flyvninger til tredjelande, også selv om det ikke er konstateret i den form og fremgangsmåde, der kræves i EØF-Traktatens artikler 88 eller 89, stk. 2.
The application of tariffs for scheduled flights on the basis of bilateral or multilateral tariffs may, in certain circumstances, constitute an abuse of a dominant position on the market in question, in particular where an undertaking in a dominant position has succeeded in imposing on other carriers the application of excessively high or excessively low tariffs or the exclusive application of only one tariff on a given route;
I det omfang hvor godkendelser drejer sig om priser for befordring med rutefly, som er i strid med fællesskabsretten, jf. besvarelserne af spørgsmål 1 og 2, er godkendelserne af forstå som tilsidesættelser af de forpligtelser, der påhviler medlemsstaterne i henhold til EØF-Traktatens artikler 5, stk. 2, sammen med artikel 3, litra f), 85, 86 og 90, uden at Kommissionen nødvendigvis i henhold til EØF-Traktatens artikel 90, stk. 3, skal fastslå, at der foreligger et traktatbrud.«
In so far as approvals relate to scheduled airline tariffs which are contrary to Community law having regard to the answers to questions 1 and 2, they constitute an infringement of the obligations incumbent upon the Member States under Article 5 (2) of the EEC Treaty in conjunction with Article 3 (f) and Articles 85, 86 and 90, without the Commission having specifically to record that infringement pursuant to Article 90 (3) of the Treaty. '
Efter genoptagelse af forhandlingerne fremsatte generaladvokat Lenz nyt forslag til afgørelse den 17. januar 1989.
Following the reopening of the procedure, Mr Advocate General Lenz delivered a further Opinion at the sitting on 17 January 1989.
Han udtalte: »På baggrund af det, jeg har anført, skal jeg henvise til det forslag til afgørelse, som jeg fremsatte den 28. april 1988, og foreslå, at de af Bundesgerichtshof stillede spørgsmål besvares således, som det fremgår heraf.
He stated as follows : ' In the light of what I have said above I adopt my Opinion of 28 April 1988 and propose that the questions submitted by the Bundesgerichtshof be answered as I suggested in that Opinion.
Den 12. oktober 1988 blev dommere og medlemmer af anklagemyndigheden ved Spaniens højere retsinstanser modtaget på Domstolen.
(a) The Court of Justice continued its traditional contacts with the judges from the Member States by organizing on their behalf the Conference of Members of the Judiciary on 16 and 17 May 1988, and exceptionally, in view of the high number of interested judges, by organizing on two occasions (instead of one) the one-week seminar course for judges in the autumn (from 17 to 19 October and from 21 to 23 November).
Den 7. og 8. december besøgte førstepræsidenten og statsadvokaten ved Cour d'Appel de Paris samt andre medlemmer af denne retsinstans Domstolen.
On 7 and 8 December, the First President and the Procureur Général of the Cour d'appel, Paris, along with the members of that court, paid a visit to the Court of Justice.