natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Når det i klausulen hed: »... anerkender jeg«, var dette ikke en formule­ring, der i sig selv ensidigt begunstigede sagsøgeren, og som kun skulle binde sagsøgte, men ikke sagsøgeren, til retten i Treviso.
Although the clause contained the words 'I shall accept...', that was not in itself a formula which unilaterally benefited the plaintiff and which bound the defendant, but not the plaintiff, to the court in Treviso.
Det kunne heller ikke hævdes, at sagsøgte med valget af Treviso havde villet begunstige sagsøgeren.
The intention could also not be imputed to the defendant that he had wanted to benefit the plaintiff through the choice of Treviso; even though at the time the contract was concluded he already had a place of residence in Germany in which he spent the greater part of the year, he might, as an Italian national, have considered it important to have disputes arising under the contract dealt with before the courts of his native country, whose language he understood.
Selv om sagsøgte allerede ved kontraktens indgåelse havde bopæl i Tyskland og opholdt sig der størstedelen af året, kunne han nemlig meget vel som italiensk statsborger have lagt vægt på, at omstridte spørgsmål i forbindelse med aftalen blev afgjort ved retten i hans hjemland, hvis sprog han beherskede.
Heidemann GmbH, which had its registered office in Bocholt (Germany), brought pro­ceedings for payment of goods supplied against Jongen before the Netherlands court for the place where Jongen had its registered office. The defendant disputed the juris­diction of the court seised and referred to a clause in the plaintiffs conditions of supply and payment which provided that 'Bocholt ... shall be the place of performance and
Jongen rejste indsigelse mod rettens kompetence under henvisning til et vilkår i Heidemann GmbH's leverings­ og betalingsbetingelser, hvori det hed: »Opfyldelsessted og værneting for alle ydelser i henhold til leveringsaftalen (...) er Bocholt«.
(continued I) forum for everything covered by the contract of supply'.
Heroverfor gjorde Heidemann GmbH gældende, at denne klausul udelukkende var optaget i selskabets leverings­ og beta­lingsbetingelser og — i det konkrete tilfælde — i aftalen mellem parterne til fordel for selskabet, således at det fortsat havde adgang til at sagsøge Jongen ved enhver anden ret, der havde kompetence i henhold til konventionen.
Against this, the plaintiff con­tended that the clause in question had been included exclusively for its benefit in the conditions of business and specifically in the contract between the parties, with the re­sult that it remained free to bring proceedings against the defendant before any other court which had jurisdiction under the Convention.
Arrondissementsrechtbank tog indsigelsen til følge, idet den ikke fandt det godtgjort, at værnetingsklausulen opfyldte kravene i konventionens artikel 17, stk. 4 (tidligere stk. 3), således som disse nærmere er fastlagt ved Domstolens dom i sag 22/85 (jfr. ovenfor under 1­17.3 — A 1).
The Rechtbank upheld the objection of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that it had not been proved that the jurisdiction clause satisfied the requirements of the fourth (formerly the third) paragraph of Article 17, as formulated by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Case 22/85 Anterist ν Crédit Lyonnais (supra, 1­17.3 — A 1).
Parternes fælles vilje til at begunstige en af dem fremgik således ikke af klausulens ord­lyd, og det kunne ikke antages, at klausulen var aftalt for at begunstige en af parterne, blot fordi der i klausulen henvistes til den pågældende parts hjemsted.
In the first place, no common intention to benefit one of the parties could be inferred from the words of the disputed clause.
Kontrakten kun­ne heller ikke i øvrigt antages at give holdepunkter for en sådan fortolkning.
For that reason, the clause could not be regarded as having been drafted for the benefit of one party alone simply on the ground that it referred to the place where that party had its registered office.
Den omstændighed, at klausulen var optaget i almindelige forretningsbetingelser, som der
Moreover, there was nothing else in the contract to support such a presumption.
— hvilket er det almindelige — ikke var ført yderligere forhandlinger om, kunne ikke være tilstrækkelig hertil.
The fact that the clause was included in the general conditions of business, which (as was normally the case) had not been the subject of further negotiation, was insufficient for that purpose.
Tværtimod kunne begge parter påberåbe sig de almindelige forretningsbetingelser, og Heidemann GmbH havde ikke fremført særlige omstændig­heder til støtte for, at Jongen's påberåbelse af klausulen skulle udgøre et misbrug af processuelle beføjelser.
Rather, both parties could rely on the general conditions of business and the plaintiff had failed to point to any special circumstances which would suggest that reliance by the defend­ant on the clause would be abusive.
Jongen kunne således også have interesse i, at pådømmelsen fandt sted ved den i kontrakten udpegede retsinstans.
The defendant too might have an interest in a deci­sion by the court agreed on.
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — aftalen kun indgået til fordel for en af parterne — værnetingsklausul, som gjorde det muligt for en bank at anlægge sag mod flere garan­ter ved én og samme ret
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Agreement concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties — Jurisdiction clause allowing a bank to bring all actions against vari­ous sureties before the same court
Det libyske firma fik garantibeløbene udbetalt af den libyske bank, som fik beløbene godtgjort af indstævnte. Denne henvendte sig først til sin ordregiver, Sicop Coignet, og — da dette selskab var ude af stand til at betale — derefter til appellanten.
The Libyan firm obtained payment of the guarantee amounts from the Libyan bank, which then secured reimbursement of the amounts by the respondent; the respondent in turn applied first of all to its client, Sicop Coignet, and then, when the latter turned out to be insolvent, to the appellant.
Da sidstnævnte nægtede at betale, anlagde indstævnte sag mod selskabet ved Tribunal de commerce de Paris.
Since the appellant refused to pay, the respondent brought proceedings against it before the Tribunal de commerce, Paris.
Appellanten gjorde gældende, at de franske retter savnede kompetence, og påberåbte sig i den forbindelse en værnetingsklausul til fordel for Tribunale civile di Milano, som var indeholdt i det af selskabet underskrevne dokument, hvori det havde påtaget sig ga­rantien over for indstævnte.
The appellant raised an objection that the French courts lacked jurisdiction and relied in that connection on a jurisdiction clause in favour of the Tribunale civile, Milan, con­tained in a document which it had signed and in which it had assumed the guarantee vis­à­vis the respondent.
Tribunal de commerce tog ikke indsigelsen om manglende kompetence til følge.
The Tribunal de commerce rejected the objection of lack of jurisdiction.
Cour d'appel stadfæstede denne afgørelse.
The Cour d'appel confirmed that decision.
Den fastslog, at værnetingsaftalen til fordel for Tribunale civile di Milano på indstævntes hjemsted udelukkende var blevet indgået til fordel for indstævnte; i medfør af konventionens artikel 17, stk. 3, stod det derfor denne frit for at give afkald på at gøre den gældende.
It held that the agreement conferring juris­diction on the Tribunale civile, Milan, where the respondent's registered office was situated, had been concluded exclusively for the respondent's benefit who was there­fore at liberty under the third paragraph of Article 17 to refrain from insisting on it.
Appellanten havde støttet sig på Domstolens dom i sag 22/85 (jfr. ovenfor under 1­17.3 — Al), hvorefter det forhold, at der er aftalt værneting i en stat, hvor en af parterne har bopæl, ikke i sig selv er tilstrækkeligt til, at det kan antages, at parterne har villet gi­ve denne part en fordel.
The appellant had relied on the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case 22/85 Anterist ν Crédit Lyonnais (supra, 1­17.3 — A 1), under which the nomination of the court of a State in which one party is resident or has its registered office is not sufficient by itself to prove that the parties intended to benefit one particular party.
Appellanten gjorde gældende, at den omstændighed, at der fo­relå en række andre garantier, også bevirkede, at de øvrige garanter blev inddraget, og at det måtte antages, at værnetingsaftalen også var til fordel for dem og ikke kun til for­del for indstævnte.
It argued that the existence of several other sureties also brought the respondent's other guarantors into play and raised the assumption that the agreement conferring jurisdiction had also been in their interest and not only in that of the respondent.
Efter Cour d'appel's opfattelse virkede disse andre garantier tværtimod til fordel for indstævnte, da aftalen snarere skulle gøre det lettere for denne at gøre alle sine garanti­fordringer gældende for retten.
In the opinion of the Cour d'appel, however, the existence of those other sureties had a more favourable effect for the respondent, as the agreement was designed to facilitate it in bringing legal proceedings to enforce all its claims under those sureties.
At dette var formålet, var så meget mere klart, som værnetingsaftalen stod i åbenbar kontrast til aftalen om, at fransk lovgivning skulle fin­de anvendelse på garantiaftalen.
That objec­tive was all the more evident as the agreement on jurisdiction stood in obvious contrast to the agreed choice of law by the parties to the guarantees.
Det eneste, der kunne retfærdiggøre denne kontrast, var, at man havde villet give indstævnte en fordel i forhold til garanterne.
Such a contrast could be justified only by the objective of benefiting the respondent vis­à­vis the sureties.
Ved dom af 4. december 1990 (Bull.civ. 1990, I, 273; Rev.crit.dr.int.pr.
In its judgment of 4 December 1990 (Bull.civ. 1990, I, 273; Rev.crit.dr.int.pr. 1991, 613, Note: Gaudemet­Tallon; Riv.dir.int.priv.proc.
1­18 — Β 1 Arbeidshof Antwerpen, dom af 10. juni 1983, Roux mod Jaklin og PVBA Bagrat
1­18 — Β 1 Arbeidshof, Antwerp, Judgment of 10 June 1983, Roux ν Jaklin and PVBA Bagrat
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — sagsøgtes fremmøde for den ret, ved hvilken sagen er anlagt — først fremmøde uden forbehold — senere bestridelse af kompeten­cen samtidig med fremsættelse af realitetsindsigelse — retten havde kompetence i medfør af artikel 18
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Entry of appearance by the defendant — Initially appearance entered unreservedly — Lack of jurisdiction pleaded later at the same time as defence entered — Jurisdiction under Article 18 affirmed
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence —formkrav (artikel 17, stk. 1) — en kontrahe­rende stats regler om det sprog, der skal anvendes — ikke overholdt — følger for an­vendeligheden af artikel 17
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Formal requirements (Art. 17, first para.) — Provisions of a Contracting State concerning the use of languages — Non­com­pliance — Consequences with regard to the applicability of Article 17
I maj 1976 ændredes arbejdsforholdet, således at Bagrat PVBA indtråd­te som arbejdsgiver; dette selskab havde hjemsted på det sted i Belgien, hvor Roux hav­de bopæl.
In May 1976 the employment relationship was re­sumed, with PVBA Bagrat as the employer; that company had its registered office at Mr Roux's place of residence in Belgium.
Da arbejdsforholdet ophørte i 1980, kom det til en tvist om de beløb, Roux havde krav på.
When the employment relationship came to an end in 1980, a dispute arose over sums owed to Mr Roux.
Roux anlagde sag mod Jaklin og Bagrat PVBA ved Arbeidsrechtbank Turnhout.
Mr Roux sued Mr Jaklin and PVBA Bagrat in the Arbeidsrechtbank, Turnhout.
Han rejste over for begge krav om betaling af forskellige beløb, bl.a. erstat­ning for uberettiget opsigelse, godtgørelse for tabt kundekreds, tilgodehavende provi­sion samt ferietillæg.
He claimed from both defend­ants payment of various sums of money, including damages for termination of the con­tract, compensation, outstanding commission and holiday pay.
På grund af den meget nære sam­menhæng mellem de to dele af kravet, måtte de afgøres under ét, hvilket sagsøgeren i medfør af artikel 705 i Gerechtelijk Wetboek kunne opnå ved, at han anlagde sag ved en af de stedligt kompetente retter, i det foreliggende tilfælde Arbeidsrechtbank Turn­hout; dette havde sagsøgeren da også gjort.
Because of the very close connec­tion between the two parts of the action, they should be heard together and the plaintiff was able to achieve that end under Article 705 of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek by bringing the action before one of the courts with territorial jurisdiction, in the event the Ar­beidsrechtbank, Turnhout; this was what the plaintiff had done.
I appelinstansen tilsluttede Arbeidshof Antwerpen sig det resultat, retten i første in­stans var kommet til med hensyn til sin kompetence, men begrundede resultatet på en anden måde.
On appeal the Arbeidshof, Antwerp, reached the same result as the court of first in­stance with regard to its jurisdiction, but gave different reasons for its decision.
(fortsat 1)
1968 ­ ARTICLE 18
Jaklin havde nemlig (i juni 1980) givet møde i sagen uden overhovedet at tage forbehold, og havde først i oktober 1980 gjort gældende, at retten savnede kompetence, for så vidt som sagen støttedes på den oprin­delige, i 1972 indgåede arbejdsaftale. Han havde altså ikke taget forbehold, før han fremsatte realitetsindsigelse, men samtidig hermed.
(continued 1) entered an appearance (in June 1980) unreservedly; it was not until October 1980, not before he entered a defence but at the same time, that he submitted that the court lacked jurisdiction, on the ground that the action was based on the original employ­ment contract concluded in 1972.
Desuden var Arbeidshof af den opfattelse, at værnetingsklausulen i aftalen af 1972 ikke opfyldte det krav, der fulgte af de belgiske regler om anvendelsen af sprog, hvorefter aftalen skulle have været affattet på nederlandsk, da den vedrørte ansættelsen af Roux med det formål, at han skulle arbejde i Turnhout i Belgien.
The Arbeidshof held further that the jurisdiction clause in the 1972 contract did not comply with the requirement under the Belgian rules on the use of languages for the contract to be drawn up in Dutch, since it concerned the appointment of Mr Roux to work in Belgium, in the Turnhout area.
Uden at omtale Domstolens dom af 24. juni 1981 i sag 150/80 (Elefanten Schuh mod Jacqmain, jfr. ovenfor under 1­18 — A 1), nåede Arbeidshof til det resultat, at arbejdsaftalen mellem parterne, der var affattet på tysk, derfor var en nullitet og værnetingsklausulen heri ugyldig, således at konventionens artikel 17 ikke kunne finde anvendelse.
Without considering the judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 1981 in Case 150/80 (Elefanten Schuh v Jacqmain, supra, 1­18 — A 1), the Arbeidshof reached the conclusion that the employment contract drawn up in German between the parties was therefore void and the jurisdiction clause contained therein invalid; consequently Article 17 of the Convention was not applicable.
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — sagsøgtes fremmøde for den ret, ved hvilken sa­gen er anlagt — indsigelsen om manglende kompetence kun fremsat subsidiært i forhold til anbringenderne vedrørende realiteten — indsigelsen uden retsvirkning
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Entry of appearance by the defendant — Defence entered on the substance with want of jurisdiction being pleaded only in the alter­native — Objection as to want of jurisdiction ineffective
Den italienske statsborger Lothar Luz anlagde ved Tribunale di Varese sag mod to ty­ske statsborgere med bopæl i München med påstand om betaling af et pengebeløb, som skyldtes for forskellige byggegrunde i Italien, som var solgt til de sagsøgte i tiden mel­lem 1968 og 1977, og for et beboelseshus, som de havde ladet opføre.
Lothar Luz, an Italian national, brought an action before the Tribunale di Varese against two German nationals resident in Munich for payment of money due on sales made between 1968 and 1977 of various plots of land in Italy to the defendants and the construction of a house on their instructions.
De sagsøgte gav møde for retten og gjorde i første række gældende, at stævningen var ugyldig, fordi der herskede fuldstændig uklarhed om sagsøgerens person; de havde nemlig indledt et kontraktsforhold med Imitalia s.n.c, som sagsøgeren var direktør for, men ikke med ham selv som selvstændig erhvervsdrivende.
The defendants entered an appearance and pleaded principally that the writ of sum­mons was invalid on the ground that the identity of the plaintiff was not properly speci­fied; they had entered into contractual relations with Imitalia SnC, a company of which the plaintiff was the director, but not with him personally as a sole trader.
For det tilfælde, at det måt­te blive statueret, at stævningen var gyldig og havde retsvirkning, gjorde de imidlertid subsidiært gældende, at den ret, ved hvilken sagen var anlagt, savnede kompetence i medfør af Bruxelles­konventionens artikel 17, da de med Imitalia indgåede aftaler indeholdt en klausul om, at Köln skulle være opfyldelsessted og værneting; denne klausul var indføjet i de almindelige forretningsbetingelser på bagsiden af aftaledoku­menterne, og der var udtrykkelig henvist til den på forsiden over underskrifterne.
In the event that the court were to hold the writ valid, they submitted in the alternative that the court lacked jurisdiction by virtue of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention, because the contracts concluded with Imitalia had contained a clause in the general conditions of business printed on the back to which express reference was made on the front above the signatures, according to which Cologne was to be the place of performance and the courts at Cologne were to have jurisdiction.
På et tidspunkt, hvor sagen allerede var sendt til afdelingen til afgørelse, indgav de sagsøgte en begæring til Corte di cassazione om afgørelse af spørgsmålet om den internationale kompetence.
The case had already been remitted to the chamber for decision when the defendant applied to the Corte di cassazione for a rul­ing on the question of international jurisdiction.
Kompetence — prøvelse af kompetencen og af sagens antagelse til påkendelse — udsættelse af afgørelsen, når sagsøgte ikke giver møde — tvangsfuldbyrdelse af afgifts­krav — udlæg i fordringer — proceduren vedrørende realisation af fordringer efter neder­landsk ret (verklaringsprocedure) — meddelelse om udlægget til skyldneren — »sagens indledende processkrift«
Jurisdiction — Examination as to jurisdiction and admissibility — Stay of proceedings where defendant does not enter appearance — Enforcement of a tax assessment — Attachment of a debt — Attachment procedure under Netherlands law (verklarings­procedure) — Service of attachment order on garnishee — 'Document instituting the proceedings '
Den nederlandske finansförvaltning havde udstedt en række — efter nederlandsk ret umiddelbart eksigible — afgiftssættelser (dwangbevelen) mod en tysk virksomhed med hjemsted i Forbundsrepublikken, som havde afviklet forretninger i Nederlandene.
The Netherlands tax authority had issued several tax assessments (dwangbevelen) against a German undertaking based in the Federal Republic of Germany which had carried out transactions in the Netherlands.
Ansættelserne var også blevet forkyndt for den tyske virksomhed.
Those assessments, which under Nether­lands law were immediately enforceable, were served on the undertaking.
Under tvangsfuld­byrdelsen lod forvaltningen gennem vedkommende nederlandske fogedret foretage udlæg i fordringer, som den tyske virksomhed havde mod det nederlandske televæsen.
In the course of enforcing the assessments the tax authority directed the responsible Netherlands en­forcement officers to attach debts owed to the German undertaking by a third party, the Netherlands telecommunications authority.
Meddelelsen om dette udlæg blev forkyndt for den tyske afgiftsskyldner i henhold til nederlandsk ret; denne ytrede sig ikke hertil.
Notice of the attachment was served on the German taxpayer in accordance with the law of the Netherlands; no communica­tion was received from the taxpayer.
Under den sag, som påfulgte udlægget — den såkaldte »verklaringsprocedure« — ned­lagde finansförvaltningen påstand om, at televæsenet, som havde anerkendt, at for­dringen bestod, skulle dømmes til ät erlægge til sig.
In the proceedings relating to the attachment — (verklaringsprocedure) — the tax auth­ority sought an order requiring the third­party debtor, which had admitted the exist­ence of the debt, to pay the amount due to the authority.
Retten udsatte sagen og udtalte, at den ifølge domskonventionens artikel 20, stk. 2, var forpligtet hertil, indtil det var fast­slået, at det havde været muligt for afgiftsskyldneren at modtage det processkrift, som lå til grund for udlægget, i så god tid, at denne havde kunnet varetage sine interesser under sagen, eller at alle hertil fornødne foranstaltninger var blevet truffet.
The court stayed proceedings and declared that it was obliged to do so under the second paragraph of Article 20 of the Brussels Convention so long as it was not shown that the taxpayer had been able to receive the document instituting the attachment proceedings in sufficient time to enable it to arrange for its defence, or that all necessary steps had been taken to that end.
Retten begrundede dette med, at udlægget kunne efterprøves [efter nederlandsk ret kan skyldneren begære afgørelsen prøvet ved »verzet«, jfr. Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering, artikel 477], samt at udlægsfundamentet (beslagexploit) således måtte ligestilles med »sagens indledende processkrift« (konventionens artikel 20, stk. 2).
The court based its decision on the fact that the attachment could give rise to appeal proceedings [under Netherlands law the debtor has a right of appeal against the attach­ment of a debt; see Article 477 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure], and there­fore the document effecting the attachment (beslagexploit) should be treated as a 'docu­ment instituting the proceedings' (second paragraph of Article 20 of the Convention).
For­dringshaveren måtte derfor godtgøre, at skyldneren havde modtaget dette processkrift rettidigt.
Consequently the tax authority had to show that the taxpayer had received the docu­ment in sufficient time.
Kompetence — prøvelse af rettens kompetence og sagens formalitet i øvrigt — det indle­dende processkrift i sagen — sag om tredjemands opfyldelse af en forpligtelse og indkal­delse — tilstrækkelig tid til at varetage sine interesser
Jurisdiction — Examination as to jurisdiction and admissibility — Document instituting the proceedings — Summons in guarantee proceedings — Sufficient time to arrange for a defence
Det nederlandske firma Trans­Italia BV's konkursbo (herefter benævnt indstævnte) havde anlagt sag mod det italienske firma Ferrerò som tredjemand til opfyldelse af en forpligtelse.
The receiver of the Dutch firm Trans­Italia BV ('the respondent') brought an action against the Italian firm Ferrerò on 24 August 1977; he issued a writ requiring Ferrerò to appear at the sitting on 30 September 1977.
Den 13. januar 1978 fastslog underinstansen, Rechtbank, at Ferrerò var udeblevet, og den 3. februar 1978 afsagde retten udeblivelsesdom, hvorefter Ferrerò fremsatte begæring om genoptagelse.
On 13 January 1978 the Rechtbank took note of the fact that Fer­rerò had failed to enter an appearance and on 3 February 1978 gave judgment against Ferrerò in default; Ferrerò applied to set aside that judgment.
I denne forbindelse gjorde Ferrerò gældende, at forkyndel­sen var ugyldig, da stævningen var tilgået firmaet for sent. Rechtbank forkastede dette anbringende, da stævningen var tilgået Ferrerò så tidligt, som det var nødvendigt for, at firmaet kunne varetage sine interesser.
It argued that it had re­ceived the writ of summons too late, and that the writ was therefore void.