natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som Retten med rette udtalte, kunne det, hvis der kun kunne føres kontrol med, at reglerne var blevet overholdt, inden attesteringen af den faktiske og regnskabsmæssige rigtighed af anmodningen om udbetaling af saldobeløbet, forekomme, at medlemsstaten ikke var i stand til at indgive anmodningen til Kommissionen inden for den pågældende frist, med den følge, at der ikke ville kunne ske udbetaling af saldobeløbet af tilskuddet.
As the Court of First Instance rightly held, if checks to establish conformity could be made only before certification that the facts and accounts in a final payment claim were accurate, the Member State might not be in a position to submit that claim to the Commission within the above 10-month period, with the result that final payment of the aid could not be made.
Retten konkluderede derfor med rette, at attestering af den faktiske og regnskabsmæssige rigtighed af en anmodning om udbetaling af saldobeløb, inden der foretages kontrol med, at reglerne er blevet overholdt, eller før kontrollen er tilendebragt, i visse situationer kan være i tilskudsmodtagerens interesse.
The Court of First Instance therefore rightly concluded that, in some cases, certification of the accuracy of the facts and accounts in a final payment claim prior to a check to establish conformity or before its completion might be in the interest of the aid recipient.
Retten kunne derfor fastslå, at intet var til hinder for, at DAFSE benyttede sig af en professionel revisor som IGF til efter attesteringen at kontrollere rigtigheden af oplysningerne i en anmodning om udbetaling af saldobeløb.
It was therefore permissible for the Court of First Instance to state that there was nothing to preclude the DAFSE from having recourse to a professional auditing body such as the IGF in order to check, following the certification date, the accuracy of the facts and accounts in the final payment claim.
Herefter må det tredje anbringende forkastes, idet det er åbenbart grundløst.
That being so, the third plea must be dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
80 Appellanten har gjort gældende, at Retten har tilsidesat princippet om beskyttelse af den berettigede forventning og retssikkerhedsprincippet, da den i præmis 97-
80 The appellant claims that the Court of First Instance breached the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty when it held in
102 i den appellerede dom fastslog, at den anfægtede beslutning var blevet truffet inden for en rimelig frist.
1999 — CASE C-453/98 P paragraphs 97 to 102 of the judgment under appeal that the period within which the contested decision was adopted was reasonable.
81 Ifølge appellanten skal Kommissionen, selv om der ikke er fastsat en bestemt frist, dog træffe afgørelse inden en rimelig frist.
81 In the appellant's view, although the Commission was not subject to a particular time-limit, it ought none the less to have acted within a reasonable period.
Otte år (1989-1997) er for lang sagsbehandlingstid.
A period of 8 years (1989-1997) was excessive.
Appellanten er af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen burde have truffet en afgørelse straks efter modtagelsen af DAFSE's attestering, der var underskrevet den 2. august 1989.
The appellant considers that the Commission should have taken a decision immediately after it received the DAFSE's certification, which was signed on 2 August 1989.
Den lange sagsbehandlingstid skabte en berettiget forventning hos appellanten om, at Kommissionen ville tilslutte sig DAFSE's attestering.
The period created in the mind of the appellant a legitimate expectation that the Commission would endorse the DAFSE's certification.
Denne forventning blev bestyrket af dommen af 12. januar 1995.
That expectation was reinforced by the judgment of 12 January 1995.
Appellanten er af den opfattelse, at der skal sondres mellem to perioder: perioden fra den 2. august 1989 til domsafsigelsen den 12. januar 1995 og perioden fra den 12. januar 1995 til den 16. september 1996, hvor den anfægtede beslutning blev truffet.
The appellant considers that two periods must be distinguished: the period from 2 August 1989 to the judgment of 12 January 1995, and the period from 12 January 1995 to 16 December 1996, the date of the contested decision.
Hvad for det første angår perioden fra den 2. august 1989 til domsafsigelsen den 12. januar 1995 har appellanten gjort gældende, at Retten med urette fandt, at det kun var tiden efter denne dom, der skulle tages i betragtning, eftersom appellanten ikke havde gjort indsigelse mod sagsbehandlingstiden, der var forløbet, inden Kommissionen traf beslutningen af 29. marts 1993.
As regards, first, the period from 2 August 1989 to the judgment of 12 January 1995, the appellant criticises the Court of First Instance for stating that, since it did not challenge the period within which the Commission had adopted its decision of 29 March 1993, only the period after that judgment should be taken into account.
Ifølge appellanten kan der altid rejses spørgsmålet om overholdelse af en rimelig frist.
According to the appellant, the question of a reasonable period may be raised at any time.
Endvidere gør dette sig i særlig grad gældende i den foreliggende sag, hvor Kommissionens første beslutning blev annulleret på grund af mangelfuld
Moreover, that possibility is all the more evident in the present case since, as the Commission's first decision was annulled on grounds of failure to
BRANCO MOD KOMMISSIONEN begrundelse, således at appellanten ikke havde de alle nødvendige oplysninger til at anfægte den.
BRANCO V COMMISSION state reasons, the appellant did not have all the information needed in order to challenge it.
Endvidere er appellanten af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen, efter at Retten havde afsagt dom om annullation, kun kunne opfylde dommen af 12. januar 1995 ved at vedtage en ny beslutning, hvorved anmodningen om udbetaling af saldobeløbet blev efterkommet.
In addition, the appellant considers that, following the annulment ordered by the Court of First Instance, the Commission could give effect to the judgment of 12 January 1995 only by adopting a new decision allowing the application for payment of the claim.
Hvad for det andet vedrører perioden på to år mellem den 12. januar 1995 og den 16. december 1996, har appellanten anført, at dette er en urimeligt lang sagsbehandlingstid.
As regards, second, the period of two years which elapsed between 12 January 1995 and 16 December 1996, the appellant considers that this constitutes an unreasonable period.
Appellanten er af den opfattelse, at Kommissionens begæring om genoptagelse af sagen efter dommen af 12. januar 1995 var ren forhaling, og har gjort gældende, at den eneste handling, der blev foretaget i denne periode, var Kommissionens anmodning til DAFSE om at foretage en revision hos appellanten. ten.
In its view, the proceedings brought by the Commission against the judgment of 12 January 1995 were intended purely to delay matters and it claims that the only action taken during that period was the Commission's application to the DAFSE to arrange a hearing for the appellant.
Det må konstateres, at ingen handling eller undladelse fra Kommissionens eller DAFSE's side kunne give anledning til en berettiget forventning hos appellanten om, at Kommissionen ville tilslutte sig DAFSE's attestering.
No action or inaction on the part of the Commission or the DAFSE could have given rise to a legitimate expectation on the appellant's part that the Commission would endorse the DAFSE's certification.
For det første er det ifølge artikel 6, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 2950/83 Kommissionen, der træffer den endelige beslutning, og som er retlig eneansvarlig for beslutningen over for modtagerne af tilskuddet (jf. dom af 24.10.1996, sag C-32/95 P, Kommissionen mod Lisrestal m.fl., Sml. I, s. 5373, præmis 29).
First, under Article 6(1) of Regulation No 2950/83 it is the Commission which adopts the final decision and takes sole legal liability for such a decision as against the beneficiaries (see Case C-32/95 P Commission v Lisrestal and Others [1996] ECR1-5373, paragraph 29).
Heraf følger, at DAFSE's attestering ikke udgjorde en retsakt, der var bindende for Kommissionen.
Certification by the DAFSE was not therefore an act which was binding on the Commission.
For det andet var denne beslutning ifølge den samme bestemmelse afhængig af, om appellanten havde overholdt de betingelser, der var fastsat for ydelse af tilskuddet.
Second, under the same provision, that decision was dependent on the appellant's complying with the conditions governing the grant of financial assistance.
Det var således med rette, at Retten i præmis 97 i den appellerede dom
The Court of First Instance was therefore right when it held in paragraph 97 of the
90 Endvidere udtalte Retten i præmis 98 i den appellerede dom med rette, at dommen af 12. januar 1995 heller ikke kunne have skabt en berettiget forventning hos appellanten, eftersom Retten ikke i denne dom tog stilling til lovligheden af nedsættelsen af tilskuddet, men blot udtalte sig om spørgsmålet om manglende begrundelse i den pågældende beslutning.
90 The Court of First Instance was also correct to hold in paragraph 98 of the judgment under appeal that the judgment of 12 January 1995 could not give rise to any legitimate expectation on the appellant's part, in so far as the Court of First Instance did not set out its views, in that judgment, on the legality of the reduction in the assistance but ruled only that the decision at issue did not contain a statement of reasons.
91 Herefter må det fjerde anbringende forkastes, idet det er åbenbart grundløst.
91 The fourth plea must therefore be dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.
92 Appellanten har gjort gældende, at Retten ligesom IGF i dennes beretning fejlagtigt fandt, at en del af de udgifter, der indgik i betalingsanmodningen, ikke var tilskudsberettigede, idet Retten med urette lagde følgende oplysninger til grund: For det første var IGF's kontrolmetode forsvarlig, for det andet var benyttelse af underentreprenøren E.B., Ld.aikke nødvendig, da virksomheden ikke var specialiseret i de opgaver, den havde fået overdraget af appellanten, for det tredje kunne Kommissionen anse E.B., Ld.afor at have haft en usædvanligt høj indtægt, for det fjerde var E.B., Ld.a's betaling af honorar til Cooperativa de
92 The appellant claims that the Court of First Instance, like the IGF in its report, found that some of the expenses set out in the claim for payment were ineligible on the following erroneous grounds: first, that the IGF's auditing method was acceptable; second, that E.B. Ld.a did not need to subcontract since it was not an undertaking which specialised in the work entrusted to it by the appellant; third, that the Commission was entitled to take the view that E.B. Ld.ahad achieved a very high level of profits; fourth, that the payment made by E.B. Ld.ato the
Serviços da Area Administrativa de Empresas CRL relevant, for det femte var udgifterne til underentreprenøren Açorlis Ld.a blevet anerkendt, fordi der var tale om et ringe beløb, for det sjette var timelønnen til eleverne ikke i overens stemmelse med gældende portugisisk ret, for det syvende blev der tildelt flidspræmier under anvendelse af højere satser end i henhold til loven, for det ottende var udgifter til edb-udstyr og andre formuegoder for de førstnævntes vedkommende blevet beregnet og for de sidstnævntes vedkommende blevet afskrevet over tolv måneder i stedet for seks.
BRANCO V COMMISSION accepted on the grounds that the amount concerned was not significant; sixth, that the hourly rate of pay for trainees was not in accordance with Portuguese domestic law; seventh, that the regular attendance bonuses were awarded at rates higher than those authorised by law; and, eighth, that the amounts relating to computer equipment were calculated and other assets written off over twelve months instead of six.
Appellanten har gjort gældende, at Retten derved har tilsidesat artikel 5 og 6 i forordning nr. 2950/83 og proportionalitetsprincippet, princippet om beskyttelse af den berettigede forventning og retssikkerhedsprincippet.
93 The appellant considers that the Court of First Instance therefore infringed Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 2950/83 and the principles of proportionality, protection of legitimate expectations, and legal certainty.
Det bemærkes, at disse anbringender støttes på, at Retten skulle have anlagt en urigtig bedømmelse af de faktiske omstændigheder, og at anbringenderne i realiteten har til formål at opnå, at Domstolen foretager en fornyet bedømmelse af de faktiske omstændigheder, Retten lagde til grund.
94 It should be noted in this regard that these complaints are based on an allegedly incorrect appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance and that they actually seek to obtain from the Court of Justice a fresh appraisal of the facts established by that Court.
Appellanten har kun gentaget de argumenter, selskabet fremførte for Retten.
The appellant is merely repeating the arguments that it put forward before the Court of First Instance.
Som allerede anført i præmis 67 i nærværende kendelse kan en appel kun støttes på anbringender vedrørende Rettens tilsidesættelse af retsregler, og ikke på anbringender vedrørende vurderingen af de faktiske omstændigheder.
As has been pointed out in paragraph 67 of this order, an appeal may be based only on grounds relating to the infringement of rules of law by the Court of First Instance, to the exclusion of any appraisal of the facts.
Det falder således uden for Domstolens kompetence at foretage en ny bedømmelse af de faktiske omstændigheder.
It does not lie within the jurisdiction of the Court to carry out a fresh appraisal of the facts.
Endvidere skal et appelskrift i medfør af traktatens artikel 168 A, artikel 51 i EF-statutten for Domstolen og artikel 112, stk. 1, litra c), i Domstolens procesreglement præcist angive, hvilke elementer der anfægtes i den dom, som påstås ophævet, samt de retlige argumenter, der særligt støtter denne påstand. Dette
Moreover, Article 168a of the Treaty, Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(l)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court state that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically
I det omfang appelskriftet ikke indeholder en argumentation, hvormed den anfægtede dom særligt kritiseres, har en sådan appel i realiteten kun til formål at opnå, at de i stævningen for Retten fremsatte påstande pådømmes endnu en gang, hvilket i henhold til artikel 49 i EF-statutten for Domstolen falder uden for dennes kompetence (jf. bl.a. ovennævnte dom i sagen Deere mod Kommissionen, præmis 19 og 20).
That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal confined to reproducing the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those based on facts expressly rejected by that Court; in so far as such an appeal does not contain any arguments specifically contesting the judgment appealed against, it amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction under Article 49 of the EC Statute to undertake (see, in particular, Deere v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 19 and 20).
Det femte anbringende må herefter afvises, idet det er åbenbart, at det ikke kan antages til realitetsbehandling.
The fifth plea must therefore be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible.
Det følger af samtlige ovenstående betragtninger, at det er åbenbart, at appellantens anbringender til støtte for appellen må afvises eller forkastes.
It is clear, in the light of all of the foregoing, that the pleas submitted by the appellant in support of its appeal are either manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.
Appellen må derfor forkastes i medfør af procesreglementets artikel 119.
The appeal must therefore be dismissed pursuant to Article 119 of the Rules of Procedure.
I henhold til procesreglementets artikel 69, stk. 2, som ifølge artikel 118 finder anvendelse i appelsager, pålægges det den tabende part at betale sagens omkostninger, såfremt der er nedlagt påstand herom.
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which is applicable to the appeal procedure pursuant to Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings.
Da Kommissionen har nedlagt påstand herom, og appellanten har tabt sagen, pålægges det appellanten at betale appelsagens omkostninger.
Since the Commission has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to bear the costs.
DOMSTOLEN (Fjerde Afdeling)
THE COURT (Fourth Chamber) hereby orders:
Fungerende formand for Fjerde Afdeling
Acting as President of the Fourth Chamber
Sag C-209/97
Case C-209/97
Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber mod Rådet for Den Europæiske Union
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union
»Forordning (EF) nr. 515/97 — hjemmel — EF-traktatens artikel 235 (nu artikel 308 EF) eller EF-traktatens artikel 100 A (efter ændring nu artikel 95 EF)«
(Regulation (EC) No 515/97 — Legal basis — Article 235 of the EC Treaty (now Article 308 EC) or Article 100a of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment,
Forslag til afgørelse fra generaladvokat A. Saggio fremsat den 11. marts 1999 Domstolens dom (Sjette Afdeling) af 18. november 1999
Opinion of Advocate General Saggio delivered on 11 March 1999 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber), 18 November 1999
De Europæiske Fællesskabers egne indtægter — beskyttelse af Fællesskabets finansielle interesser— bekæmpelse af svig— forordning nr. 515/97 om gensidig bistand mellem medlemsstaternes administrative myndigheder og om samarbejde mellem disse og Kommissionen med henblik på at sikre den rette anvendelse af told- og landbrugsbestemmelserne — hjemmel — traktatens artikel 235 (nu artikel 308 EF)
Own resources of the European Communities — Protection of the Community's financial interests — Fight against fraud — Regulation No 515/97 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters — Legal basis — Article 235 of the Treaty (now Article 308 EC)
(EF-traktaten, art. 100 A og 209 A (efter ændring nu art. 95 EF og 280 EF) og art. 235 (nu art. 308 EF); Rådets forordning nr. 515/97)
(EC Treaty, Arts 100 and 209a (now, after amendment, Arts 95 EC and 280 EC) and Art. 235 (now Art. 308 EC); Council Regulation No 515/97)
SAMMENDRAG — SAG C-209/97 kel 209 A (efter ændring nu artikel 280 EF) i den version, der var gældende ved udstedelsen af den anfægtede forordning, angav det mål, der skulle nås, uden dog at give Fællesskabet kompetence til at oprette et system som det her foreliggende, var det berettiget at benytte traktatens artikel 235.
Community policies, which includes the customs union and agriculture. Since Article 209a of the Treaty (now, after amend ment, Article 280 EC), in the version applicable when Regulation No 515/97 was adopted, indicated the objective to be attained but did not confer on the Com mission competence to set up a system of the kind at issue, recourse to Article 235 of the Treaty was justified.
Forordning nr. 515/97 om gensidig bistand mellem medlemsstaternes administrative myndigheder og om samarbejde mellem disse og Kommissionen med henblik på at sikre den rette anvendelse af told- og landbrugsbestemmelserne er gyldigt udstedt i henhold til traktatens artikel 235 (nu artikel 308 EF), da traktatens arti kel 100 A (efter ændring nu artikel 95 EF) ikke finder anvendelse i dette tilfælde.
Regulation No 515/97 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters was properly adopted on the basis of Article 235 of the Treaty (now Article 308 EC), since Article 100a of the Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 95 EC) is not applicable in this context.
Denne retsakt indfører på de pågældende områder bestemmelser, som i deres helhed netop har det formål og det indhold at bekæmpe svig, hvorfor de tilsigter at beskytte Fællesskabets finansielle interesser.
Indeed, that measure lays down, in relation to the various fields covered, rules the aim and specific content of which, taken as a whole, are the fight against fraud, so that it seeks to protect the financial interests of the Community.
Denne beskyttelse følger ikke af indførelsen af toldunionen, men er et selvstændigt formål, der inden for traktatens system er blevet placeret i afsnit II (finansielle bestemmelser) i femte del om Fællesskabets institutioner, og ikke i tredje del om Fælles skabets politikker, som toldunionen og landbruget hører under. Da traktatens arti
That protection does not fol low from the establishment of the customs union, but constitutes an independent objective which, under the scheme of the Treaty, is placed in Title II (financial provisions) of Part V relating to the Com munity institutions and not in Part III on
Selv om der i øvrigt ved denne forordning oprettes et edbbaseret informationssystem, benævnt »toldinformationssystemet«, er den omstændighed, at indførelsen af et sådant system ikke kan finde sted, uden at der på nationalt niveau gælder principper, der er harmoniseret på fællesskabsniveau, vedrørende beskyttelse af personoplysninger, ikke i sig selv tilstrækkelig til at berettige anvendelse af traktatens arti kel 100 A, idet en sådan tilnærmelse af nationale lovgivninger kun har en virkning, der er accessorisk i forhold til disse bestem melser.
Moreover, although Regulation No 515/97 provides for the creation of an automated information system called the 'Customs Information System', the mere fact that such a system cannot be established unless principles harmonised at Community level concerning the protection of personal data are in force at national level is not a sufficient basis for Article 100a of the Treaty to apply, since such harmonisation of national laws is only an incidental effect of the legislation.
KOMMISSIONEN MOD RÅDET
COMMISSION V COUNCIL
FORSLAG TIL AFGØRELSE FRA GENERALADVOKAT ANTONIO SAGGIO fremsat den 11. marts 1999 *
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SAGGIO delivered on 11 March 1999 *
Under denne sag har Kommissionen nedlagt påstand om annullation af Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 515/97 af 13. marts 1997 om gensidig bistand mellem med lemsstaternes administrative myndigheder og om samarbejde mellem disse og Kom missionen med henblik på at sikre den rette anvendelse af told- og landbrugsbestemmelserne 1 (herefter »forordningen«). Kommissionen har anfægtet hjemmelen for forordningen, der er udstedt i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 43 og 235.
In this action, the Commission is seeking the annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters.
Efter sagsøgerens opfattelse skulle den anfægtede retsakt derimod have været udstedt i hen hold til denne traktats artikel 43 og 100 A. Ved kendelser afsagt af Domstolens præsident den 29. september 1997 og den
The applicant takes the view that the contested regulation should have been adopted instead on the basis of Articles 43 and 100a of the EC Treaty.
1. december 1997 har Europa-Parlamentet og Den Franske Republik fået tilladelse til at intervenere i sagen til støtte for hen holdsvis Kommissionen og Rådets påstande.
By orders of the President of the Court of 29 September 1997 and 1 December 1997, the European Parliament and the French Government were granted leave to intervene in support of the forms of order sought by the Commission and the Council respectively.
institutioner, der deltager i lovgivningsprocessen, har, som med hensyn til de forskel lige flertal, der kræves til udstedelse af den pågældende retsakt.
lative process and the majority required to adopt the measure.