natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Chemische Fabrik Kalk (CFK) og Matthes & Weber eksporterer en del til Nederlandene, Frankrig og Luxembourg, men også disse virksomheder lægger hovedvægten på deres lokale marked. Sammenholdt med Solvays 70 % har de øvrige pro ducenter markedsandele på mellem 4 % og 11 % i EF-landene, bortset fra Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland. Solvays produktion og afsætning af soda i Vesteuropa er organiseret på nationalt plan, således at et særskilt organ, Direction Nationale varetager de enkelte mar keder.
Thus Rhone-Poulenc conducts 95% of its EEC soda-ash business in France; Chemische Fabrik Kalk (CFK) and Matthes & Weber send some exports to the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg but again their main effort is on their local market. Compared with Solvay's 70 %, the other producers' market shares in the continental EEC Member States range from 4 % to 11%. Solvay's production and marketing operations for soda-ash in western Europe are organized on a national basis with a separate 'DN' serving each of the different markets.
Der er betydelige prisforskelle mellem med lemsstaterne; priserne ab fabrik i Frankrig er således 10 % lavere end i Belgien.
There are considerable price variations between the different Member States with ex-works prices in France some 10 % below the levels in Belgium.
Inden for glasindustrien har der dog i den sidste halve snes år været en markant tendens til oprettelse af koncerner af europæisk dimension.
In the glass sector in particular there has however in the last decade been a marked tendency towards the formation of Europe-wide groups.
Solvay hævder ganske vist, at der foregår prisforhandlinger på nationalt plan (dvs. mellem Solvays DN og det lokale glasproducerende datterselskab af den pågældende koncern), men kunderne bliver i stadig større udstrækning opmærksomme på prisforskellene mellem medlemsstaterne og har for søgt at nedbringe dem.
While Solvay insists that price negotiations take place at a national level (i.e. between the Solvay 'DN* and the local glassmaking subsidiary company of die group concerned), customers are increasingly aware of the price differences between the different Member States and have sought to minimize them.
I nogle tilfælde er det lykkedes kunderne at få nedsat prisforskellen ved at forhandle sig frem til en ordning med Solvay (f.eks. de belgiske glasproducenter St. Roch og Glaverbel).
In some cases customers have succeeded in negotiating a formula with Solvay which reduces the price variation (e.g. the Belgian glassmakers St Roch and Glavcrbel).
Indtil 1980 havde Solvays leveringsaftaler for soda i de forskellige medlemsstater en lang løbetid og indeholdt normalt en forpligtelse for kunden til at dække sit samlede behov ved indkøb hos Solvay.
Up to 1980, Solvay's supply agreements for soda-ash in the different Member States were of long duration and generally required the customer to obtain its total requirements from Solvay.
Solvay har sit største kundeunderlag i glasindustrien, der tegner sig for 66 til 68 % af sodaforbruget i Vesteuropa.
Solvay's principal customer base is in the glass sector which accounts for 66 to 68% of soda-ash consumption in western Europe.
Glasindustriens forbrug er igen opdelt mellem emballageglas og planglas i forholdet 2:1.
The glass sector itself is divided between container glass and flat glass in the proportion 2:1.
Efter at Kommissionen var blevet gjort opmærksom på Solvays leveringsaftaler, drøftede den spørgsmålet indgående med Solvay, som til sidst indvilgede i at ændre sine aftaler; den erstattede således klausulen om »samlede behov« med en bestemmelse om en bestemt mængde, ligesom den nedsatte fristen for opsigelse af aftalen (i mange tilfælde fem år) til to år.
After Solvay's supply agreements had been brought to the attention of the Commission, extensive discussions took place and Solvay eventually agreed to modify its contractual arrangements by replacing the 'total requirements' clause with a clause which stipulated for a particular tonnage and reducing the period of notice for terminating the agreement (in many cases five years) to two years.
Solvay er hoved- eller eneleverandør til praktisk talt alle glasproducenter på det vesteuropæiske fastland.
Solvay is the principal or the sole supplier of virtually all the glass producers in continental western Europe.
Der findes kun ganske få glasproducenter, som har en af de øvrige sodaproducenter som hovedleverandør.
There are only very few customers where one of the other soda-ash producers is the 'first' supplier.
I 1988 tegnede Solvay sig således for 82% af sodaleverancerne til planglasindustrien på det marked i Vesteuropa, der er omfattet af de ni Directions Nationales, inden for emballageglas havde den 74 % af de samlede leverancer.
Thus in 1988, Solvay had 82% of the soda-ash business for flat glass in the market formed by its nine 'DN'; in the container glass sector, it had 74% of the total available business.
Med sin største kunde, St. Gobain-koncernen, har Solvay i de forskellige medlemsstater indgået »ever-
Solvay's largest customer is the St Gobain Group with 'evergreen' contracts in the different Member States terminable on 24 months' notice, covering an offtake
Kommissionen sendte dog Solvay en skrivelse om, at den mængde, kunden var forpligtet til at aftage hvert år, ikke måtte svare til eller ligge i nærheden af kundens samlede behov for soda.
The Commission however informed Solvay by letter that the tonnages which the customer was required to purchase each year should not correspond with or be close to the customer's total requirements of soda-ash.
Selv om Kommissionen desuden bekræftede, at det var tilladt for Solvay at yde rabatter på listeprisen, understregede
Further, while confirming that it was permissible for Solvay to grant rebates and discounts off list price, the
91 den, at Solvays rabatter hverken måtte være en skjult metode til at sikre den fortsatte anvendelse af de ophævede aftaler, der indeholdt en klausul om »sam­lede behov«, eller yde« som loyalitetsbonus.
Commission insisted that any rebates adopted by Solvay should constitute neither a disguised method of ensuring the continuance of the abandoned 'total requirements' contracts nor operate as loyalty rebates.
fylde fra Østeuropa og USA blev indført en ny mindstepris på 163 ECU pr. ton ( = en leveringspris på ca. 170 til 180 ECU), medens Solvays egen gennemsnitlige nettoleveringspris var på under 300 DM (= 150 ECU) i flere lande (hvad Solvay udmærket vidste).
It is significant that in the anti-dumping procedure Solvay was arguing for a new minimum price cleared at EEC border of ECU 163 per tonne to be imposed on dense ash from the East and the United States (= ± ECU 170 — ECU 180 delivered) while (as it well knew) in several countries its own average delivered price was under DM 300 ( = ECU 150).
På baggrund af Solvays skrivelse blev sagen indstillet i 1982, og der blev ikke truffet yderligere foranstalt­ninger, før Kommissionen gennemførte kontrolun­dersøgelser i nærværende sag.
On the basis of Solvay's letter, the file was closed in 1982 and no further action was taken by the Commission until the investigations in the present proceedings.
Til trods for Kommissionens skrivelse og Solvays interne cirkulære har Solvay siden 1983 i stigende grad anvendt både progressive rabatter samt leve­ringsaftaler, som forpligter de største kunder til at foretage alle eller praktisk talt alle deres indkøb af soda hos Solvay.
In spite of the express terms of the Commission's letter and of Solvay's internal circular, Solvay has since 1983 made increasing use both of progressive rebates and of supply contracts which effectively tie the major customers to Solvay for the whole or virtually the whole of their soda-ash requirements.
På baggrund af den faldende efter­spørgsel (indtil 1987) har Solvay især forsøgt at beskytte sin dominerende stilling på det europæiske marked mod utilfredshed fra de mindre producenters side og mod importtruslen fra Østeuropa og USA. Solvay har bl.a. truffet følgende foranstaltninger:
In the face of a fall-off in demand (up to 1987), the main concern of Solvay appears to have been to preserve its dominant position in the European market against 'unrest' from smaller producers, as well as the perceived threat of imports from eastern Europe and the United States.
Antidumpingforanstaltninger
Anti-dumping protection
Forbedring af forholdet til de store kunder (glasin­dustrien og den kemiske industri) gennem øget generel anvendelse af aftaler med det formål at gøre kundene loyale (navnlig St. Gobain, der modtager en superkoncernrabat på 1,5 % i forbin­delse med en aftale om yderligere leverancer (contrat chapeau)) . . . men disse aftaler er stadig forholdsvis »åbne« på grund af EF­reglerne (opsi­gelsesvarsel på højst to år, aftalt mængde på højst ca. 85% af kundens samlede behov for at give sidstnævnte mulighed for at henvende sig til en anden leverandør).
'improving relations with major customers (glassmakers, chemicals industry) by bringing into general use and strengthening our contracts policy, with the aim of "tying in" customers (especially Saint-Gobain which gets a group super-rebate of 1,5 % under a "master" contract) . . . but these contracts are still relatively "open" owing to EEC rules (maximum two years' notice, contract tonnage limited to around 85% of customer's needs to allow customer the possibility of a second supplier)'.
Derer udarbejdeten plan over Solvays forretnings­ og prispolitik (planen er ikke dateret, men stammer formodentlig fra omkring april 1988):
A strategy presentation (undated but probably originating in about April 1988) sets out Solvay's commercial and pricing policy:
En række glasproducenter har udnyttet en bestemmel­se i antidumpinglovgivningen, der gør det muligt for glasproducenterne at undgå antidumpingtold på importeret soda, når denne soda anvendes til frem­stilling af glas, der skal eksporteres til lande uden for EF (aktiv forædling).
A number of glass producers have been taking advantage of a provision in the anti-dumping legislation which permits the glassmakers to avoid anti-dumping duties on imported soda-ash which is used in producing glass for export outside the EEC (inward-processing).
»Det ligger (Solvay) meget på sinde at bevare sin betydelige markedsstilling, navnlig i Europa (dette marked er indbringende og rentabelt),
— a policy of being present for every customer + good market coverage . . .
— imødekommenhed over for samtlige kunder + tilfredsstillende markedsdækning
— a policy favouring customers prepared to agree to longterm commitments = contracts which provide for significant discounts.'
Antidumpingtolden på import fra USA var taget op til ny undersøgelse på det tidspunkt, hvor nærværende procedure blev indledt, og Solvay pressede hårdt på for at få den fornyet og for at få udvidet antidumping­tolden til også at omfatte materiale, der importeres til aktiv forædling. [. . .] (')·
The anti-dumping duties on United States imports were under review at the time of the present proceedings and Solvay was pressing hard for their renewal, as well as the extension of anti-dumping duties to material imported under inward-processing arrangements. [. . .] (').
Det er vigtigt at bemærke, at Solvay under antidum­pingproceduren argumenterede for, at der ved toldbe­handlingen ved EF's grænser af soda med høj masse­
'Defensive strategy consists, and will continue to consist, in:
( ' ) 1 den offentliggjorte udgave af denne beslutning udelades visse af tallene herefter i medfør af bestemmelserne i artikel 21 ι forordning nr. 17 om bevarelse af forretningshemmeligheder
(') In the published version of the Decision, some information has hereinafter been omitted, pursuant to the provisions of Article 21 of Regulation No 17 concerning non-disclosure of business secrets.
— at bevare sin »dominerende stilling« som sodaleverandør til planglas- og emballageglasindustrien. en.
— maintaining its 'dominant position' as soda-ash supplier to the flat glass and container glass industry.
— ekstramængde (rabat 20%):
— Marginal tonnage (rebate 20%)
— rabatpris på sidste tranche (listepris -20%):
— Discount price of last tranche (list price -20%)
Ud over at yde store kunder den sædvanlige mængde rabat på basismængden har Solvay siden 1982 ydet to andre former for rabatter i Tyskland:
Besides the usual quantity rebates on basic tonnage for major customers, Solvay has since 1982 granted two additional forms of rebate in Germany:
— en meromsætningsbonus, eller Spitzenrabatt, på 20% i forhold til listeprisen
— a rebate on marginal tonnage (called 'Spitzenrabatt'), almost invariably of 20% off list price,
I alle de tilfælde, hvor der er ydet en særlig meromsætningsbonus/checkrefusion, har Solvay været kun dens hoved- eller eneleverandør.
In each case where the special top-slice/cheque rebates are given, Solvay is the sole or the principal supplier of the customer.
Det fremgår klart af dokumenterne, at Solvay nøjagtigt kender de enkelte kunders samlede behov og kan beregne sit pristilbud i overensstemmelse hermed.
It is apparent from the documents that in each case Solvay has an accurate idea of each customer's total requirements and can calculate its price offer accordingly.
Den ekstramængde, som rabatterne vedrører, svarer til den mængde, som kunden måske ellers ville have købt hos en konkurrerende leverandør.
The marginal tonnage to which the financial inducements are referable corresponds with the tonnage which the customer might otherwise consider obtaining from a competing supplier.
Checkrefusionen blev allerede anvendt sidst i 1982, og den procentvise meromsætningsbonus blev indført i begyndelsen af 1983.
The cheque refund was already being given in late 1982 and the percentage 'top-slice' was introduced in early 1983.
Systemet er siden 1983 blevet udvidet og forbedret og danner nu grundlag for Solvays prisstruktur i Tyskland.
The system has been extended and refined since 1983 and now forms the basis of Solvay's price structure in Germany.
Da Kommissionen foretog kontrolundersøgelser i marts 1989, modtog praktisk talt alle Solvays største kunder i Tyskland begge former for rabat.
At the rime of the Commission's investigations in march 1989 virtually all the major customers of Solvay in Germany were receiving both forms of inducement.
De pågældende kunder blev af Solvay opfordret til at behandle rabatterne strengt fortroligt og til ikke at afsløre dem over for tredje mand.
The customers in question were enjoined by Solvay to keep the rebates strictly secret from third parties.
Under rabatordningen for store kunder blev basis mængden, normalt svarende til ca. 80% af kundens samlede årlige behov, faktureret til listeprisen med en sædvanlige mængderabat (f.eks. 10%).
Under the rebate system as applied to major customers, the 'core' tonnage, usually corresponding to about 80% of the customer's total annual requirement, was invoiced at list price with the usual· quantity rebate (say 10%).
For mængder ud over kundens basisbehov (ekstramængder) blev der ydet en rabat på 20 % og derudover en betydelig checkrefusion.
For the marginal tonnage over and above the customer's basic requirement, a rebate of 20% was, given, and in addition, a substantial cheque payment was made.
Dette rabatsystem bevirker, at en konkurrent, der forsøger at afsætte sine produkter ved at overtage en del af leverancerne til den pågældende kunde fra Solvay (dvs. ekstramængden), må tilbyde kunden en pris, der i hvert fald svarer til og helst er lavere end Solvays, og det vil i ovennævnte eksempel sige 245 DM.
The effect of the rebate system is that a competitor attempting to enter as second supplier by obtaining from Solvay a part of the customer's business (i.e. the marginal tonnage) has to offer the customer a price for that tonnage which is at least equal to, if not better than, Solvay's: in the example given above, DM 245.
Medens konkurrenten skal tilbyde denne urentabelt lave pris på hele den tilbudte mængde, skal Solvay kun gøre dette på den sidste tranche.
While the competitor has to offer this unprofitably low price on all the tonnage offered, Solvay only has to do so on the last tranche.
Selv om ekstramængden leveres til 245 DM pr. ton, opnår Solvay dog en gennemsnitspris på 320 DM pr. ton for hele sin leverance.
Thus although the marginal quantity is being supplied at only DM 245 per tonne, the average price per tonne for Solvay across the whole tonnage supplied is DM 320.
For Vegla, der indgår i St. Gobain-koncernen og er Solvays største kunde i Tyskland, blev der således ydet følgende rabatter i 1989:
Thus for Vegla, a member of the St Gobain group, and Solvay's largest customer in Germany, the rebate system operated as follows for 1989:
1) en rabat på 10% på de den aftalte basismængde på (. . .] tons
1) on the basic contractual tonnage of [. . .] tonnes, a rebate of 10%;
Hvis med andre ord den konkurrerende leverandør skal gøre sig håb om at overtage nogen leverancer fra Solvay, skal han yde kompensation til kunden for den finansielle fordel, han mister ved ikke at købe hos Solvay. I ovenstående eksempel drejer det sig om ca. 6 850 000 DM.
To put it another way, if the competing supplier is to hope to obtain marginal business from Solvay, he will have to compensate the customer for the loss of the financial advantage which is foregone by not purchasing it from Solvay.
Den anden leverandør skal kun for deleomkostningerne ved at yde denne rabat over [. . .] tons, medens Solvay kan fordele rabatomkostningerne over tre gange så stor en mængde.
The second supplier would have to absorb the cost of granting this rebate on just over [. . .] tonnes while Solvay can average the rebate over three times that quantity.
De store kunder i Tyskland har i de sidste par år betalt
The average net price per tonne paid by large customers in Germany over the last few years has been around DM 340 to DM 360 per tonne. What is not
Kunden føler derfor ikke noget incitament til at henvende sig til en anden leverandør i betragtning
The customer thus has little incentive to seek a second supplier given the favourable price offered by Solvay
modtage nogen checkrefusion.
Official Journal of the European Communities
Dokumenterne under streger også, at Solvays todelte prissystem omfatter et betydeligt tilskud til ekstramængderne for at udelukke konkurrencen.
No L152/25 two-step price system involves a significant subsidy for marginal tonnages in order to exclude competition.
Dette fremgår særlig klart af et notat af 1. februar 1988:
One note of 1 February 1988 makes the point particularly clear: for marginal tonnage, and the second supplier has no incentive to quote for the customer's marginal requirements given the unprofitable price at which he will have to offer.
At den hidtidige prispolitik, som blev støttet på den todelte prisstruktur, gav en ekstra subvention til ekstramængderne og dermed sikrede mod, at konkurrenterne gik ind og tog en tilsvarende del.
That the price policy to date, which was based on the principle of a two-tier pricing structure, gave a special subsidy to marginal tonnage and thereby provided protection against competitors' taking a corresponding part of the customer's requirements.
Det må være en konsekvens for DSW at koncentrere sig om at sikre sig ekstramængderne i de videre forhandlinger for 1988 (eventuelt ved at forhøje checken, dog med den uomgængelige betingelse at stryge enhver ekstra ydelse (check), hvis ekstramængderne skulle bortfalde.«
That in consequence DSW must during the further price negotiations for 1988 concentrate all its efforts on securing the marginal tonnage (perhaps by increasing the amount of the cheque), and in any case to be fully prepared to cut off completely the benefits they currently enjoy in the form of cheques if they do not buy the marginal tonnage from us.'
I de fleste tilfælde, som f.eks. i forbindelse med Vegla, sikrer rabatordningen Solvays stilling som eneleverandør.
In most cases, such as that of Vegla, the rebate system ensures that Solvay is secure in the position of exclusive supplier.
Den sikrer også, at Solvay bevarer sin dominerende andel i det tilfælde, hvor kunderne opdeler deres indkøb på to leverandører.
The rebate system also operates however to ensure that where customers do have a policy of splitting their business between two suppliers the dominant share of Solvay is maintained.
Flachglas, der er Solvays næststørste kunde i Tyksland, deler sine indkøb mellem Solvay og Matthes & Weber i forholdet 70:30. Siden 1983 har Solvay ydet Flachglas en mængderabat på 8,5% for mængder på op til [. . .] kiloton, 20% på ekstramængder samt en check på 500 000 til 750 000 DM. Den supplerende «checkrefusion« betød, at den faktiske pris for mængder ud over [. . .] kiloton var på 250 til 260 DM pr. ton (afhængigt af mængden). Det er særdeles vanskeligt for en anden leverandør at trænge ind på Solvays domæne, der (som Solvays egne dokumenter beviser) er beskyttet af rabatordningerne. Selv om en anden leverandør måske kunne tilbyde den samme faktura pris på 322,40 DM (listeprisen -20%), er det højst usandsynligt, at kunden vil risikere at miste den betydelige checkrefusion, der jo klart er betinget af, at han aftager en rimelig mængde hos Solvay ud over den aftalte basismængde. Dokumenter fra Matthes & C Weber bekræfter, at det var umuligt for dette firma at gøre indhug i Solvays leverancer til Flachglas. 3. Solvays rabatordning i Frankrig
Flachglas, Solvay's second largest customer in Germany, divides its business roughly 70:30 between Solvay and Matthes & Weber. Since 1983, Solvay's pricing conditions to Flachglas involve an 8,5% quantity rebate for tonnage up to [. . .] Kt, 20% on any marginal tonnage, and a cheque for DM 500 000 to DM 750 000. The additional 'cheque rebate' meant that the real price for any marginal tonnage taken over [. . .] Kt was (depending on the quantity) as low as DM 250 or DM 260 per tonne. It is extremely difficult for the second supplier to break into Solvay's 'core' share of the business which (as Solvay's own documents show) is protected by the rebate 'barrier'. While the second supplier might be able to match the invoiced price of DM 322,40 (list price — 20 %) it is highly unlikely that the customer would risk losing the substantial cheque payment which is clearly dependent upon its purchasing an appropriate tonnage from Solvay in addition to the basic contractual tonnage. Documentation obtained from Matthes & Weber confirms that it was impossible for that company to make any inroads on Solvay's share of the Flachglas business. (20)
Af Solvays interne dokumenter fremgår det helt klart, af formålet med rabatordningen i Tyskland var at sikre kundernes loyalitet over for Solvay.
In France Solvay applies a system of rebates on marginal tonnage similar to that operated in Germany.
BSN-koncernen er Solvays største kunde i Frankrig og aftager årligt ca. [. . .] tons.
The BSN group is Solvay's largest customer in France with an annual consumption of around [. . .] tonnes per annum.
Solvay er stort set BSN's eneleverandør i Frankrig. Som det var tilfældet med St. Gobain, var Solvay også meget ivrig efter at forhindre BSN i at finde en anden leverandør blandt USA's producenter af natursoda.
Solvay is to all intents and purposes the sole supplier of BSN in France.
Ved udgangen af 1987 indgik Solvay en aftale med BSN for 1988 om at yde ikke blot den normale mængderabat på 8,5%, men også en yderligere rabat på ekstramængderne.
At the end of 1987 an arrangement was made with BSN for 1988 under which Solvay gave not only the normal tonnage rebate of 8,5% but also an extra rebate on marginal tonnage.
Der ville hvert kvartal blive udbetalt en særlig rabat på 135 ffr. pr. ton ved køb af over [. . .] tons.
A case rebate of FF 135 per tonne was to be paid quarterly on offtake over [. . .] tonnes.
Aftalen med BSN blev forlænget med et år den 11. januar 1989.
The arrangement with BSN was extended for one year on 11 January 1989.
»unødigt svække vor stærke stilling (Veglas samlede behov), der er beskyttet af en »vandtæt« rabatordning«.
If Vegla were permitted to buy from the United States this would constitute an 'unnecessary abandonment of our strong defensive position (Vegla's total requirements), secured by a "watertight" rebate system'.