natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En henstilling fra en sammenslutning af virksomheder, som er et klart udtryk for medlemmernes vilje til at indrette deres markedsadfærd i overensstemmelse med henstillingen, opfylder de nødvendige betingelser for at anvende EØF­traktatens ar­tikel 85, stk. 1.
A recommendation made by an association of undertakings and constituting a faithful expression of the members' intention to conduct themselves compulsorily on the market in conformity with the terms of the recommendation fulfils the necessary conditions for the application of Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty.
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commission, [1980] ECR 3125, Summary, para. 9, cf. p.
EØF­traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, finder også anvendelse på sammenslutninger, som ikke arbejder med gevinst for øje, i det omfang deres egne aktiviteter eller den aktivitet, der udøves af de virksomheder, der er tilsluttet dem, tilsigter at fremkalde de virkninger, som denne bestemmelse er rettet mod.
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty also applies to non-profit-making associations in so far as their own activities or those of the undertakings belonging to them are cal­culated to produce the results which it aims to suppress.
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml. 1980, s. 3125, Smdrg.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commission, [1980] ECR 3125, Summary, para. 10, cf. p.
Domstolen har endvidere... fastslået, at de for begrebet samordnet praksis forudsatte kriterier koordination og samarbejde, som langt fra stiller krav om udarbejdelse af en egentlig plan, skal forstås ud fra den grundtanke, der ligger bag traktatens konkur­rencebestemmelser, hvorefter enhver erhvervsdrivende uafhængigt skal tage stilling til den politik, han vil føre på det fælles marked, og de vilkår, han vil tilbyde sin kun­dekreds.
The Court also stated ... that the criteria of coordination and cooperation necessary for the existence of a concerted practice in no way require the working out of an actu­al 'plan' but must be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition, according to which each trader must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market and the conditions which he intends to offer to his customers.
Selv om dette krav om ufhængighed ganske vist ikke udelukker de erhvervsdrivendes ret til rationelt at tilpasse sig deres konkurrenters konstaterede eller forventede ad­færd, udelukker det imidlertid kategorisk enhver direkte eller indirekte kontakt mel­lem sådanne erhvervsdrivende, som har til formål eller til følge, at der opstår konkur­rencevilkår, som ikke svarer til det pågældende markeds normale vilkår i betragtning af produkternes eller de præsterede tjenesteydelsers art, størrelsen og antallet af virk­somheder på markedet samt dettes omfang.«
Although it is correct to say that this requirement of independence does not deprive traders of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly preclude any direct or indirect contract between such traders, the object or effect of which is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in ques­tion, regard being had to the nature of the products or services offered, the size and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said market."
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml. 1980, s. 3125, jfr. s. 3270 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 3286).
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commission, [1980] ECR 3125, cf. p.3270 (Opinion: Reischl, p.3286).
Jfr. tilsvarende: Dom af 10. juli 1980: sag 99/79, Lancôme/Etos, Sml.
See also: Judgment of 10 July 1980, Case 99/79, Lancôme ν Etos, [1980] ECR 2511, 2536 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 2539).
Forbudet i EØF­traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, rammer en aftale, såfremt det på grundlag af en helhed af objektive, retlige eller faktiske omstændigheder kan forud­ses med tilstrækkelig sandsynlighed, at denne aftale direkte eller indirekte, aktuelt eller potentielt kan påvirke handelsstrømmene mellem medlemsstater på en måde, der kan skade virkeliggørelsen af formålene med et mellemstatsligt enhedsmarked, og såfremt aftalen har til formål eller til følge at begrænse eller fordreje konkurren­cen inden for fællesmarkedet.
An agreement which makes it possible to foresee, on the basis of all the objec­tive factors of law or of fact, with a sufficient degree of probability that it may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States in such a way that it might hinder the attainment of the objectives of a single market between States and which has as its object or effect the restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, comes within the prohibi­tion laid down by Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty.
Dom af 16. juni 1981: sag 126/80, Salonia/Poidomani og Giglio, Sml. 1981, s. 1563, Smdrg.
Judgment of 16 June 1981, Case 126/80, Salonia ν Poidomani and Giglio, [1981] ECR 1563, Summary, para. 3, cf. p.
3, jfr. s. 1578 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 1584).
1578 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1584).
Jfr. tilsvarende: Dom af 25. marts 1981 : sag 61/80, Coöperatieve Stremsel­ en Kleurselfabriek/'Kom­missionen, Sml. 1981, s. 851, 867 (Forslag: Warner, s. 872).
See also: Judgment of 25 March 1981, Case 61/80, Coöperatieve Stremsel­ en Kleurselfabriek ν Commission, [1981] ECR 851, 867 (Opinion: Warner, p. 872).
Selv om den pågældende aftale kun omfatter distribution af indenlandske produkter og ikke distribution af lignende produkter fra de øvrige medlemsstater, kan et lukket distributionssystem, der omfatter de fleste salgssteder for de omhandlede produkter på det nationale territorium, dog også påvirke distributionen af lignende produkter fra de øvrige medlemsstater, når disse sædvanligvis afsættes fra de samme salgsste­der.
Even if the sole subject­matter of the agreement in question is the distribution of na­tional products and the agreement is not concerned with the distribution of similar products from other Member States, a closed­circuit distribution system applying to most of the sales outlets for national products on national territory may, when those outlets are at the same time those where products from other Member States are nor­mally sold, also have repercussions on the distribution of those products.
En sådan aftale vil herefter kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater med de pågældende produkter.
Such an agreement is therefore capable of affecting, as far as the products in ques­tion are concerned, trade between Member States.
Den er kun omfattet af artikel 85, stk. 1, såfremt den mærk­bart påvirker denne handel.
However, it escapes the prohibi­tion laid down by Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty if it has no appreciable effect on such trade.
Når det gælder pressens produkter, må vurderingen af, om en forhandlingsaftale mærkbart kan påvirke markedet i en medlemsstat for aviser og tidsskrifter fra de øv­rige medlemsstater være mere indgående end for andre produkter.
In the case of newspapers and periodicals, an assessment of the appreciability of the effects which a distribution agreement may have in the territory of a Member State on the market in such publications from other Member States is stricter than in the case of other products.
Ved afgørelsen af, om en eneforhandlingsaftale for de indenlandske blade mærkbart kan påvirke markedet for aviser og tidsskrifter fra de øvrige medlemsstater, må der lægges vægt dels på, at dette marked for så vidt angår udbuddet i det område, der undersøges, kan benytte andre distributionskanaler end de af aftalen omfattede, og dels på, at efterspørgslen efter de nævnte produkter er uelastisk, idet den ikke i nævneværdigt omfang påvirkes af den omhandlede aftales ikrafttræden eller ophør.
In order to determine whether an exclusive distribution agreement for national newspapers and periodicals is capable of having an appreciable effect on the market in such publications from other Member States, it is necessary to consider first whether that market may employ for the sale of newspapers in the area concerned, channels of distribution other than those governed by the agreement and, secondly, whether demand for the aforesaid products is rigid inasmuch as it shows no substan­tial variations as a result of the entry into force and the termination of the agreement in question.
Dom af 16. juni 1981 : sag 126/80, Salonia/Poidomani og Giglio, Sml. 1981, s. 1563, Smdrg.
Judgment of 16 June 1981, Case 126/80, Salonia ν Poidomani and Giglio, [1981] ECR 1563, Summary, para. 5, cf. p.
5, jfr. s. 1579 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 1584).
1579 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1584).
En samordnet praksis, der viser sig ved en parallel adfærd bestående i, at ban­kerne opkræver et fast gebyr af de beløb, de overfører for deres kunder fra én med­lemsstat til en anden, vil, allerede fordi den vedrører internationale transaktioner, kunne påvirke »handelen mellem medlemsstater«, jfr. traktatens artikel 85, idet be­grebet »handel« i denne artikel må fortolkes vidt, således at det også omfater penge­transaktioner.
A concerted practice consisting in the debiting of a uniform charge on transfers by banks from one Member State to another of sums from their customers' accounts is capable, precisely because it relates to international transactions, of affecting "trade between Member States" within the meaning of Article 85 of the Treaty, since the concept of "trade" used in that article has a wide scope and embraces currency transactions.
Den vil være omfattet af forbudet i artikel 85, stk. 1, hvis det godtgø­res, at den har til formål eller til følge mærkbart at påvirke konkurrencen på marke­det for bankers overførsel af penge fra en medlemsstat til en anden.
Such a practice would fall within the prohibition contained in Article 85 (1), if it were established that its object or effect was to affect significantly free competition in the market in currency transfers by banks from one Member State to another.
Dom af 1. februar 1977: sag 47/76, De Norre/Brouwerij Concordia, Sml. 1977, s. 65, 89 (Forslag: Mayras, s.95).
Judgment of 1 February 1977, Case 47/76, de Norre ν Brouwerij Concordia, [1977] ECR 65, 91 (Opinion: Mayras, p.97).
Dom af9. juni 1977: sag 90/76, Van Ameyde/UCI, Sml.
Judgment of 9 June 1977, Case 90/76, Van Ameyde ν Ud, [1977] ECR 1091, 1128 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1129).
Bestemmelser i et produktionsandelsskabs vedtægter, hvorefter medlemmerne for­pligtes til at købe alle de produkter af en vis art, de har brug for, hos selskabet, en forpligtelse, der forstærkes af en bestemmelse om, at der skal betales et ikke ubetyde­ligt beløb ved udtræden eller eksklusion, har ganske klart til formål at hindre medlem­merne i at købe hos andre leverandører af de pågældende varer eller at producere disse varer selv, såfremt der skulle være kvalitets­ eller prismæssige fordele forbundet hermed.
The rules of a production cooperative, which require its members to obtain from it all the supplies of certain products which they need and which reinforce that obliga­tion by stipulating the payment of a not inconsiderable sum in the event of resigna­tion or expulsion, have clearly as their objective to prevent members from obtaining supplies from other suppliers of those products or from making them themselves should those alternatives offer advantages from the point of view of quality or price.
Når der er tale om et andelsselskab, der stort set er den eneste leverandør af de pågældende produkter på markedet i en medlemsstat, er sådanne bestemmelser eg­nede til, for så vidt angår forsyningerne, at hindre konkurrencen mellem producen­ter, der forsyner en væsentlig del af markedet i Fællesskabet, og de virker desuden i retning af at forhindre, at der opstår konkurrence på hele det pågældende nationale marked for de nævnte produkter.
Where a cooperative is virtually the only supplier of the products in question on the market of a Member State such rules are of such a nature as to prevent competition at the supply level between producers holding, a large part of the Community market and also tend to rule out the possibility of creating a competitive situation on the whole of the national market in those products.
5. »En parallel adfærd bestående i, at bankerne opkræver et fast gebyr af de beløb, de overfører for deres kunder fra én medlemsstat til en anden, udgør en samordnet praksis, der er forbudt i medfør af traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, hvis den nationale ret finder, at den pågældende adfærd opfylder de betingelser for koordinering og samarbejde, der kendetegner en sådan praksis, og hvis denne mærkbart kan påvirke konkurrencevilkårene på markedet for tjenesteydelser vedrørende disse overførsler.«
"Parallel conduct in the debiting of a uniform bank charge on transfers by banks from one Member State to another of sums from their customers' funds amounts to a concerted practice prohibited by Article 85 (1) of the Treaty if it is established by the national court that such parallel conduct exhibits the features of coordination and cooperation characteristic of such a practice and if that practice is capable of signifi­cantly affecting conditions of competition in the market for the services connected with such transfers."
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml. 1980, S.3125, 3278f.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commission, [1980] ECR 3125, 3278 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 3286).
»Det står fast, at andelsselskabets medlemmer tegner sig for over 90% af den hol­landske osteproduktion og at de hollandske osteproducenter, der står uden for sel­skabet, køber næsten al den løbe, de skal bruge, hos selskabet.
"It is accepted that the members of the Cooperative account for more than 90% of cheese output in the Netherlands and that non­member Netherlands producers also buy virtually all the rennet which they need from the Cooperative.
En regel, der går så vidt som til at indføre en købsforpligtelse for 100%, og som forstærkes af en forplig­telse til at betale et ikke ubetydeligt beløb ved udtræden eller eksklusion, er under disse omstændigheder ikke nødvendig for at nå de i artikel 85, stk. 3, nævnte mål.
In those cir­cumstances provisions of such a constraining nature as a 100% purchasing obliga­tion, reinforced by an obligation to pay a not inconsiderable sum in the event of a re­signation or expulsion, are not indispensable for the attainment of the objects re­ferred to in Article 85 (3).
Des­uden fremgår det af det ovenfor anførte, at disse regler under alle omstændigheder bidrager til at fastholde en situation, hvor konkurrencen udelukkes for en væsentlig del af de omhandlede produkter.
What is more, it follows from the foregoing that those provi­sions in any event contribute to maintaining a situation in which competition is elimi­nated in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Kommissionen har altså korrekt fastslået, at de to sidste betingelser i artikel 85, stk. 3, ikke er opfyldt.«
The Commission was therefore right to find that the last two conditions for the application of Article 85 (3) are not fulfilled."
Dom af 16. juni 1981 : sag 126/80, Salonia/Poidomani og Giglio, Sml. 1981, s. 1563, Smdrg.
Judgment of 16 June 1981, Case 126/80, Salonia ν Poidomani and Giglio, [1981] ECR 1563, Summary, para. 7, cf. p.
7, jfr. s. 1582 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 1584).
1582 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1584).
1. »I [en tidligere sag] ... udtalte Domstolen, at da forbudene i artiklerne85, stk. 1, og artikel 86 ifølge selve deres natur er egnede til at skabe umiddelbare virkninger i forholdet mellem private, fremkalder de nævnte artikler umiddelbart rettigheder for de retsundergivne, som de nationale domsmyndigheder skal beskytte.
"[As the Court has already held,] since the prohibitions contained in Articles 85 (1) and 86 tend by their very nature to produce direct effects in relations between individuals, those articles create direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard.
Det følger heraf, at Kommissionens indledelse af en procedure i medfør af nævnte forordnings artikler 2,­ 3 eller 6 ikke kan fritage en na­tional ret, for hvilken den direkte virkning af artikel 85, stk. 1, påberåbes, fra at træffe afgørelse.
It follows that the initiation by the Commission of a procedure under Articles 2, 3 or 6 of that regulation cannot exempt a national court before which the direct effect of Arti­cle 85 (1) is pleaded from giving judgment.
Dom af 10. juli 1980: sag 37/79, Marty/Lauder, Sml.
Judgment of 10 July 1980, Case 37/79, Anne Marty ν Estée Lauder, [1980] ECR2481, 2500 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 2502).
Dom af 10. juli 1980: sag 37/79, Marty/Lauder, Sml. 1980, s. 2481, jfr. s. 2500 f.
Judgment of 10 July 1980, Case 37/79, Anne Marty ν Estée Lauder, [1980] ECR 2481, cf. p.
De nationale domstole har derfor kun kompetence til at afgøre, om den aftale, vedta­gelse eller samordnede praksis, der forelægges dem til påkendelse, er i overensstem­
The jurisdiction of the national courts is restricted to determining whether the agreement, decision or concerted practice which is the subject of the action before them is in accordance with Article 85(1) and, if appropriate, to declaring the agree­ment, decision or practice in question void under Article 85 (2)."
Indledningen af en procedure i medfør af artikel 9, stk. 3, i forordning nr. 17 af­skærer de nationale myndigheders kompetence, hvilket hovedsagelig består i at sikre virksomheden mod en parallel sag rejst af de nationale myndigheder.
By virtue of Article 9 (3) of Regulation No 17, the initiation of proceedings by the Commission puts an end to the jurisdiction of the authorities in the Member States, which means in effect that the undertaking concerned is protected from paral­lel proceedings brought by the authorities of the Member States.
Dom af 11. november 1981 : sag 60/81, IBM/Kommissionen, Sml.
Judgment of 11 November 1981, Case 60/81, ¡BM ν Commission, [1981] ECR 2639, cf. p.
1981, s. 2639, jfr. s. 2653 (Forslag: Slynn, s. 2657).
2653 (Opinion: Slynn, p.2657).
Af hensyn til såvel retssikkerheden som til en korrekt anvendelse af artiklerne 85 og 86 følger, at de fysiske eller juridiske personer, som i medfør af artikel 3, stk. 2, litra b), i forordning nr. 17 er beføjede til at fremsætte en begæring til Kommissionen om konstatering af en overtrædelse af de nævnte artikler 85 og 86, skal have klagead­gang med henblik på beskyttelse af deres berettigede interesser, såfremt deres begæ­ring helt eller delvis afslås.
It is in the interests of a satisfactory administration of justice and of the proper application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty that natural or legal persons who are entitled, pursuant to Article 3 (2) (b) of Regulation No 17, to request the Commission to establish an infringement of Articles 85 and 86 should be able, if their request is not complied with either wholly or in part, to institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests.
Disse personer må derfor anses for umiddelbart og individuelt berørt af Kommissio­nens beslutning, jfr. traktatens artikel 173, stk. 2, idet beslutningen — selv om den er rettet til en anden person, i den konkrete sag en virksomhed, hvis selektive distribu­tionssystem har fået dispensation i medfør af traktatens artikel 85, stk. 3 — indehol­der et stiltiende afslag på deres begæring.
Such persons must be considered to be directly and individually concerned, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, by a decision of the Commission which, although addressed to another person, in this case the under­taking whose selective distribution system was granted an exemption under Arti­cle 85 (3) of the Treaty, entails an implied rejection of their request.
Dom af 25. oktober 1977: sag 26/76, Metro/Kommissionen, Sml. 1977, s. 1875, jfr. s. 1899 f.
Judgment of 25 October 1977, Case 26/76, Metro ν Commission, [1977] ECR 1875, cf. p.
(Forslag: Reischl, s. 1916).
1901 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1919).
Det følger af nævnte artikels stk. 1, at Kommissionen har ret til at indlede en sådan procedure på eget initiativ.
It follows from paragraph (1) abovementioned that the Com­mission is entitled to open such a procedure upon its own initiative.
Dom af 12. juli 1979: foren, sager 32, 36­82/78, BMW/Kommissionen, Sml. 1979, s. 2435, Smdrg. 1, jfr. s. 2473 f. (Forslag: Warner, s. 2484).
Judgment of 12 July 1979, Joined Cases 32, 36 to 82/78, BMW ν Commission, [1979] ECR 2435, Summary, para. 1, cf. p.
Denne underretning indebærer, at sagen henlægges, uden at Kommis­sionen derfor er afskåret fra at genoptage den, såfremt den finder det hensigtsmæs­
Such a communication implies the discontinuance of the
EØF ­ KONKURRENCE ­ REGLERNES HÅNDHÆVELSE sigt, navnlig såfremt ansøgeren inden for den frist, der er indrømmet ham i henhold til artikel 6, fremkommer med nye oplysninger af retlig eller faktisk art.
EEC - COMPETITION - APPLICATION OF THE RULES proceedings without, however, preventing the Commission from re-opening the file if it considers it advisable, in particular where, within the period allowed by the Commission for that purpose in accordance with the provisions of Article 6, the ap­plicant puts forward fresh elements of law or of fact.
[Den frem­satte] opfattelse, hvorefter den, der har fremsat en begæring i henhold til artikel 3, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 17/62, har krav på, at Kommissionen udsteder en beslutning efter traktatens artikel 189 om, hvorvidt den påståede overtrædelse foreligger, er der­for ikke korrekt.
The ... argument that an appli­cant under Article 3 (2) of Regulation No 17 is entitled to obtain from the Commis­sion a decision within the meaning of Article 189 of the Treaty on the existence of the alleged infringement cannot, therefore, be accepted.
Men også selv om det i øvrigt blev antaget, at en sådan underretning har karakter af en beslutning i den i traktatens artikel 189 forudsatte betydning, der som sådan kan anfægtes i medfør af traktatens artikel 173, følger det ikke uden videre heraf, at an­søgeren efter artikel 3, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 17/62 er berettiget til at kræve, at Kom­missionen træffer en endelig beslutning om, hvorvidt den påståede overtrædelse fore­ligger.
Moreover, even assuming that such a communication is in the nature of a decision with­in the meaning of Article 189 of the Treaty and that it is therefore capable of being con­tested by way of Article 173 of the Treaty, that in no way implies that the applicant with­in the meaning of Article 3 (2) of Regulation No 17 is entitled to require from the Com­mission a final decision as regards the existence or non-existence of the alleged infringe­ment.
Kommissionen kan nemlig under alle omstændigheder ikke være forpligtet til at fortsætte proceduren helt frem til det stadium, hvor den kan træffe en endelig be­slutning.
In fact the Commission cannot be obliged to continue the proceedings whatever the circumstances up to the stage of a final decision.
Artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17/62, hvorefter Kommissionen på visse betingel­ser uden at anvende en beslutning kan pålægge de deltagende virksomheder at bringe en konstateret overtrædelse til ophør, ville efter [en modsat] fortolkning miste enhver betydning.
The [contrary interpretation] would remove all meaning from Article 3 of Regulation No 17 which in certain circumstances allows the Commission the opportunity of not adopting a decision to compel the under­takings concerned to put an end to the infringement established.