natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På basis af ovenstående blev klagerne fra de to organisationer afvist.
On the basis of the above considerations, the complaints of two associations have been rejected.
Den 17. september 1998 blev gennemgangen af de aftaler. EUDIM (European Distributors of Installation Materials) havde anmeldt i november 1995. afsluttet med fremsendelse af en administrativ skrivelse.
On 17 September the examination of the agreements notified by EUDIM (European Distributors of Installation Materials) in November 1995 was concluded with the dispatch of a comfort letter.
EUDIM. der er baseret i Schweiz, er en sammenslutning af grossister inden for vand-, varmeog sanitetsprodukter, generelt med ét medlem pr. land, der har en ledende plads på det nationale marked.
EUDIM, which is based in Switzerland, is an association of wholesalers in plumbing, heating and sanitary (bathroom) equipment, generally one per country, which are leaders in their home markets.
Anmeldelsen af aftalerne var et led i en procedure, som Kommissionen indledte i februar 1991 efter en klage fra Van Marcke NV.
The notification of the agreements was a stage in the proceedings initiated by the Commission in February 1991 following the lodging of a complaint by Van Marcke NV.
Kommissionen sendte derfor i februar 1995 en meddelelse af klagepunkter til EUDIM vedrorende en gentleman-aftale om udveksling af oplysninger, ifølge hvilken hvert medlem af ELJDIM skulle holde sig fra de andre medlemsstaters markeder, hvis ikke der på forhånd var indhentet tilladelse.
The Commission sent EUDIM a statement of objections in February 1995 in which it raised the issue of a gentlemen's agreement in respect of information sharing whereby each member of EUDIM refrained from entering the market of the other members without prior authorisation.
ELJDIM afviste, at der skulle eksistere en aftale om opdeling af markedet men accepterede at supplere og afklare aftalerne for at bringe dem i overensstemmelse med
While denying the existence of a market-sharing agreement, EUDIM agreed to supplement and clarify its agreements so as to bring them into line with
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION konkurrencereglerne.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION the competition rules.
Kommissionen forholdt sig derfor positivt til de anmeldte aftaler og offentlig gjorde det meste af indholdet3'".
The Commission reacted favourably to the notified agreements, publishing a summary of their contents.35
I sin beslutning om at afvise klagen giver Kommissionen en grundig vurdering af konkurrenceforholdene på det omhandlede marked, der gør det muligt at konkludere, al EUDIM ikke har mærkbare konkurrencebegrænsende følger.
In its decision to reject the complaint, the Commission provided an indepth evaluation of the conditions of competition on the relevant market which had led it to conclude that any competition restrictions on the part of EUDIM were not appreciable.
Kommissionen bekræfter ligeledes sin politik, der går ud på ikke at vedtage formelle beslutninger om negativattester for anmeldte aftaler, hvis det ikke har fællesskabs interesse.
The Commission also confirmed its policy of not adopting a formal decision of negative clearance on notified agreements unless this was deemed in the Community interest.
Bortset fra at man ikke kunne påvise eventuelle konkurrencebegrænsninger, tog man ligeledes i betragtning, at der fandtes konkurrencemæssige retningslinjer for samarbejde mellem grossister i lighed med samarbejdet inden for rammerne af EUDIM. al der havde fundei offentliggørelse sted i overensstemmelse med artikel 19. stk. 3, i forordning nr. 17. og at der var genindført sunde konkurrenceforhold efter Kommissionens indgriben, og der skal erindres om, at Kommissionen egentlig ikke er forpligtet til at behandle' klager vedrørende praksis, der er ophørt.
Apart from the fact that any restrictions were regarded as not appreciable in the case in point, account was also taken of the existence of competition-law guidelines on cooperation between wholesalers such as that which took place within EUDIM, the publication of a notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17 and the renewal of healthy competition following the Commission's intervention, together with the fact that the Commission is not obliged to take action on complaints where the practice in question has ceased.
Den 15. oktober 1998 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning, hvori Kommissionen afviste en klage fra den franske virksomhed Micro Leader Business over Microsoft Corporation og datterselskabet Microsoft France'.
On 15 October the Commission decided to reject a complaint lodged by the French company Micro Leader Business against Microsoft Corporation and its subsidiary Microsoft France.
Micro Leader er en fransk virksomhed inden for distribution af software og edb-udstyr, der indkøbte Microsoft-software i Canada på fransk og videresolgte det i Frankrig.
Micro Leader is a French software and hardware distribution company which purchased Frenchlanguage Microsoft software packages in Canada and the n resold them in France.
Softwaret blev solgt i Canada med en licens til brug udelukkende i Canada. Microsoft traf foranstaltninger sammen med de franske toldmyndigheder for at forhindre dette videresalg i Europa og beskytte ophavsrettighederne.
The software distributed in Canada was sold with a licence for use exclusively in Canada.
Micro Leader indgav klage til GD IV den 24. september 1996 med den begrundelse, at Microsofts's foranstaltninger for at forhindre parallelimport fra Canada til Europa af selskabels software var en overtrædelse af EF-traktatens artikel 81 og 82.
Micro Leader lodged a complaint with DGIV on 24 September 1996, claiming that Microsoft's actions to prevent the parallel import of its software into Europe from Canada infringed Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.
Ifølge' Micro Leader viste det sig. at de foranstaltninger, som Microsoft's datterselskaber og distributionsselskaberne i Canada og Frankrig havde truffet, var aftaler og samordnet praksis for at forhindre ulovlig import af produkterne i EØS og fastsætte salgspriser, og der var ligeledes tale om misbrug af en dominerende stilling.
According to Micro Leader, the actions taken by Microsoft's subsidiaries and their distributors in Canada and France constituted agreements and concerted practices designed to prevent, by illegal means, the import of products into the EEA and to set their resale prices within that territory, and as such were also abuses of a dominant position.
Kommissionen mente ikke. at Microsofts foranstaltninger for at forhindre import af kopier af selskabets produkter fra Canada kunne betragtes som resultat af en aftale eller en samordnet praksis mellem Microsoft og selskabets forhandlere med henblik på fastsættelse' af salgspriserne.
The Commission took the view that Microsoft's actions to prevent the import of copies of its products from Canada could not be regarded as resulting from an agreement or concerted practice between Microsoft and its resale agents to fix resale prices.
EDB-programmer er beskyttet af ophavsrettigheder i Den Europæiske Union, således som defineret i Rådets direktiv 91/250/EØF om re-Lig beskyttelse af edbprogrammer (af 14. maj 1991. EFT' L 122/42 af 17. maj 1991).
Computer programs are protected by copyright in the European Union as defined by the directive on the legal protection of computer programs (Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991, OJ L 122 of 17 May 1991).
I dette direktiv foreskrives det. at første gang en kopi af et edb-program sælges i EU af rettighedshaveren eller med dennes tilladelse, er rettighedshaverens ret til at sprede den pågældendekopi inden for EU udtømt.
This directive states that the first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the rightholder, or with his consent, exhausts the distribution right within the Community of that copy.
Køb af en kopi af et edb-program i Canada udtømmer ikke den retsbeskyttelse, der er foreskrevet i ovennævnte direktiv.
The purchase of a copy of a computer program does not exhaust the legal protection provided for in the above-mentioned directive.
Det vil sige, at ethvert forsøg på at bruge eller sælge en sådan kopi i EU vil være en krænkelse af ophavsrettighederne, og Microsoft's foranstaltninger, der tager sigte på at forhindre import af sådanne kopier er et forsøg på al sikre overholdelse af disse rettigheder og ikke en aftale eller en samordnet praksis mellem Microsoft og selskabels forhandlere, uanset om de befinder sig i Canada eller i EU.
Thus any attempt to use or to sell such a copy in the Community would be an infringement of copyright, and any action by Microsoft to prevent the import of such copies would constitute an attempt to enforce its legitimate rights rather than an agreement or concerted practice between Microsoft and its distributors, whether in Canada or in the Community.
Der var endvidere intet, der tydede pá. at Microsoft forsøgte at påvirke forhandlernes priser.
In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that Microsoft sought to influence the prices at which its products were resold by its distributors.
Kommissionen har ikke fundet det nødvendigt at tage stilling til Microsoft's eventuelle dominerende stilling på det omhandlede marked.
The Commission did not consider it necessary to issue a ruling on a possible dominant position by Microsoft on the relevant market.
Hr. og fru Roberts driver en pub. der er ejet af Greene King.
Mr and Mrs Roberts operate a pub owned by Greene King.
De klagede i maj 1997 til Europa-Kommissionen og bad Kommissionen fastslå, at ølbindingen i deres forpagtningsaftale(forpligtelsen til at købe det meste af det øl. de sælger, udelukkende hos bortforpagteren Greene King) var i strid med artikel 81.
In May 1997 they lodged a complaint with the Commission to the effect that the beer tie (the obligation in their lease to buy most of the beer they sell exclusively from Greene King, their landlord/brewer) infringed Article 81.
En sådan afgørelse kunne have givet Roberts mulighed for at købe øl hos andre leverandører, hvorved de kunne have draget fordel af de betydelige rabatter, som disse leverandører tilbyder.
A ruling in the Roberts' favour would allow them to buy beer from the suppliers of their choice, thereby benefiting from substantial discounts.
Vurderingen i sagen er baseret pá to prøver, der er nævnt i Delimitis-dommen, der gør det muligt at fastslå, om et individuelt bryggeris kumulative aftalenet falder inden for anvendelsesområdet for EU's konkurrenceregler.
The assessment in this case is based on two tests set out in the Delimitis judgment whereby it can be decided whether the cumulative network of agreements of individual brewers is caught by the EC competition rules.
Den første prøve går ud pa at fastslå, om der er tale om markedsafskærmning.
The first test is whether the relevant market is foreclosed.
Kommissionen mener på basis af de foreliggende oplysninger, at det britiske marked for øludskænkning stadig er afskærmet.
The Commission takes the view that, in the light of the information currently available, the UK on-trade beer market continues to be foreclosed.
I 1997 var mellem 50 og 58% af omsætningen på det britiske marked for øludskænkning dækket af konkurrencebegrænsende aftaler.
In 1997 between 50 and 58% of throughput on the UK on-trade beer market was covered by restrictive agreements.
Den anden prøve går ud på at fastslå, om et individuelt bryggeris aftalenet bidrager væsentligt til denneafskærmning.
The second test is whether the network of agreements of an individual brewer contributes significantly to that foreclosure.
Kommissionen konkluderede her. at Greene King er for lille et bryggeri til at bidragevæsentligt til afskærmningen af det britiske marked for øludskænkning. da Greene King's salg i de bestyrede, forpagtede og lånbundne pubber kun udgør 1.3% af det britiske marked for øludskænkning.
The Commission has concluded that Greene King is too small to contribute significantly to the foreclosure of the UK on-trade beer market, given that the company's sales in its managed, tenanted and loan-tied estate account for only 1.3% of the UK on-trade market.
Det er betydelig mindre end de 5% (eller mere), som hvert af de store britiske bryggerier (Scottish & Newcastle. Whitbread og Carlsbert-Tetley) omsætter for i deres bundne' net (herunder de konkurrencebegrænsende aftaler med pubselskaber, der ikke har bryggerivirksomhed. Den argumentation, der blev anvendt i Greene King-sagen, gælder ligeledes for andre små og regionale britiske bryggeriers forpagtningsaftaler og for pubselskaber, der ikke har bryggerivirksomhed, og som foretager deres ølindkøb hos flere forskellige bryggerier.
This is considerably less than the 5% (or more) that each of the big UK brewers (Scottish & Newcastle, Bass, Whitbread and Carlsberg-Tetley) realises in its tied network (including restrictive agreements with non-brewing pub companies). The reasoning applied to Greene King is also valid for leases of other small and regional UK brewers and for leases of non-brewing pub companies supplied by more than one brewer. The decision of
Beslutningen af 6.11.1998 < ft om at afv ise klagen kan derfor betragtes som en klar præcedens for disse selskaber, og de pubber de binder.
6 November 199836 to reject this complaint can therefore be considered a clear precedent for the companies concerned and the pubs forming part of their tied networks.
Den 21. september 1998 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning om at afvise en klage samt om foreløbige foranstaltninger for »Ordre professionnel des avocats de Belgique« (ONAB).
On 21 September the Commission decided to reject a complaint and a request for interim measures against Ordre national des avocats de Belgique (ONAB).
Kommissionen mente ikke. at klagen havde tilstrækkelig fællesskabsinteresse, da de anfægtedeforanstaltninger — ONAB's regler for praktikantophold og faglig videreuddannelse, der kræver, al praktikanterne inden udgangen af det andet år af praktikperioden skal bestå en eksamen for at få det
The Commission concluded that the complaint was not of sufficient Community interest owing to the fact that, first, the measures challenged Ð the ONAB rules on pupillage and vocational training, which require students to pass an examination before the end of the second year of training in order to obtain the certificate of aptitude for the practice of law (CAPA), together with the limitations imposed by the local bar associations on the number of trainees per pupil master and the conditions for becoming a pupil master Ð essentially take effect within a single Member State and, second, that the complainant had not exhausted the possibilities of applying to the national competition authorities and/or the
Offentliggjort 1998.htm563.
Published on DGIV homepage: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/entente/closed/en/ 1998.htm#563.
Denne afvisning af foreløbige foranstaltninger blev begrundet med. at Kommissionen kun har beføjelser til at vedtage sådanne foranstaltninger, hvis de forekommer at være absolut nødvendige for at forhindre, at retten til selvbestemmelse efter artikel 3 kan blive virkningsløs eller illusorisk på grund af visse virksomheders initiativer.
The request for interim measures was rejected as the Commission can take such measures only if they are essential in order to prevent the right to take decisions granted by Article 3 from becoming ineffective or even a dead letter as a result of the actions of certain firms.
Resumerende kan det siges, at Kommissionen vurderede, at dens beslutningspraksis hvad angår liberale erhverv, således som bekræftet af EF-Domstolens nylige dom af 18. juni 1998 i sag C-35/96. Kommissionen mod Italien (endnu ikke offentliggjort), var tilstrækkelig klar. således at de nationale konkurrencemyndigheder og/eller de nationale domstole ikke kunne være i tvivl om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 81 og 82 på de liberale erhverv og disse bestemmelser kan anvendes direkte af de nationale myndigheder.
In short, the Commission took the view that its policy with regard to the professions, as recently upheld by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy ([1998 ECR I-3851), was sufficiently clear to leave the national competition authorities and/or national courts in no doubt that Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty are applicable to the professions and may be applied directly by those authorities.
Klagerens påståede vanskeligheder med at fa de belgiske konkurrenceregler anvendt på de liberale erhverv blev ikke anset for uden videre at kunne overføres til den direkte anvendelse af disse to traktakbestemmelser.
The difficulties encountered by the complainant with the application of Belgian competition law to the professions were not regarded as automatically transferable to the direct application of the two Treaty provisions.
Afvisning af en anmodning om foreløbige foranstaltninger
Rejection of application for interim measures
Denne sag vedrører forholdet mellem varemærkerettigheder og EU's konkurrenceregler.
This case concerns the relationship between trade mark rights and the Community rules on competition.
I afvisningen af en anmodning om foreløbige foranstaltninger understregede Kommissionen i den henseende, at det efter en første vurdering med udgangspunkt i konkurrencereglerne ikke så ud til, at en klausul, der giver indehaveren af et varemærke ret til at opsige- en varemærkelicens, nar kontrollen over licenstageren overtages af en anden virksomhed, adskiller sig fra en klausul, der forbyder licenstageren at overdrage licensen eller indgå aftale om underlicens med tredjemand.
In rejecting an application for interim measures, the Commission pointed out that, at the stage of a preliminary appraisal, the assessment under competition law of a clause granting the trade mark owner the power to terminate a trade mark licence on a change of control of the licensee did not seem to be different from that of a provision preventing the licensee from assigning or sublicensing the benefit of the agreement to third parties.
Kommissionen har normalt ikke betragtet en sådan klausul som konkurrencebegrænsende, men erkender, at det er en bestemmelse, der har til formål at give indehaveren af varemærket mulighed for at sikre den kvalitet, der er knyttet til mærket.
The Commission has normally not considered the latter to be anticompetitive, recognising instead that it is intended to provide the trade mark owner with the means to ensure that the quality associated with the mark is maintained.
I januar 1998 indgav Vickers PLC. der er det øverste moderselskab i Rolls-Royce Motors Group, en klage med påstand om, at aftalerne mellem Rolls-Royce Motors Group og Rolls-Royce PLC om førstnævntes anvendelse af Rolls-Royce-navnet og de tilsvarende varemærker udgjorde en over trædelse af artikel 81. stk. 1.
In January, Vickers plc, the ultimate parent company of the Rolls-Royce Motors Group, lodged a complaint in which it alleged that the agreements between Rolls-Royce Motors Group and Rolls-Royce plc, relating to the licensed use by the former of the Rolls-Royce name and relevant trade marks, infringed Article 81(1).
Der skal i den forbindelse mindes om, at Rolls-Royce Motors Group, der fremstiller og sælger luksusbiler af mærket »Rolls-Royce« og »Bentley«, og Rolls-Royce PLC. der navnlig fremstiller gasturbine-drevne eller atomenergidrevne flymotorer, er to adskilte virksomheder, selv om de beggeanvender navnet Rolls-Royce i deres firmanavn.
In this connection it should be recalled that Rolls-Royce Motors Group, which manufactures and sells luxury motor cars under the `Rolls-Royce' and `Bentley' names and trade marks, and Rolls-Royce plc, which manufactures, in particular, gas turbine and nuclear propulsion systems, are two separate and unconnected undertakings, although both use the name `Rolls-Royce' in their company name.
I marts 1973 anmeldte Rolls-Royce (1971 ) Limited nu »Rolls-Royce PLC« — der havde fået ejendomsretten til Rolls-Rovce-mærket og -navnet, efter at det tidligere Rolls-Royce Limited gik konkurs, og Rolls-Royce Motors-koncernen en række aftaler, hvorved Rolis-Royce (1971) Limited gav Rolls-Royce Motors-koncernen ret til at anvende Rolls-Royce-varemærket på de biler og motorer, som koncernen producerede.
In March 1973, Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited, now named Rolls-Royce plc Ð to which ownership of the Rolls-Royce name and trade marks was assigned after the old Rolls-Royce Limited went into receivership Ð and Rolls-Royce Motors Group notified to the Commission a number of agreements whereby Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited granted Rolls-Royce Motors Group the right to use the Rolls-Royce trade marks on motor cars and engines manufactured by the latter.
Kommissionen afsluttede på det tidspunkt anmeldelsen med fremsendelse af en administrativ skrivelse, hvori Kommissionen anførte, at sagen blev betragtet som afsluttet, da aftalerne ikke var konkurrencebegrænsende.
In the present complaint, Vickers objected to a clause in the licence agreements which gave Rolls-Royce plc the right unilaterally to terminate the Rolls-Royce Motors Group's right to use the Rolls-Royce name and trade mark in the event of the motor car business coming under the control of a nonUK resident, including a company or individual resident in another EEA country (residence clause).
Da Vickers havde til hensigt at sælge Rolls-Royce Motors Group, anmodede selskabet Kommissionen om hurtigt at vedtage foreløbige foranstaltninger, idet selskabet anmodede om. at det blev pålagt Rolls-Royce PLC ikke at anvende eller prøve at anvende bopælsklausulen.
Royce plc from enforcing or seeking to enforce the residence clause.
Vickers påstod, at Rolls-Royce PLC's trussel om at anvende bopælsklausulen ville være skadelig for en åben og fri konkurrence i forbindelse med salget af Roll-Royce Motors Group, og Vickers ville ikke have mulighed for at få den rette pris for virksomheden.
Vickers alleged that the threat by Rolls-Royce plc to exercise that clause would disrupt the open and fair competitive auction of Roll-Royce Motors Group and that Vickers would be denied the opportunity of receiving valuable consideration for it.
Ved beslutning af 6. april 1998 afviste Kommissionen Vickers anmodning om foreløbige foranstaltninger med den begrundelse, at betingelserne for vedtagelse af sådanne foranstaltninger ikke var opfvldt.
By decision of 6 April the Commission rejected Vickers' application for interim measures, taking the view that, on the evidence provided, the criteria for the adoption of such measures were not met.
Af ovennævnte grunde konkluderede Kommissionen, at den omhandlede bestemmelse ikke umiddelbart udgjorde en overtrædelse af EU's konkurrenceregler.
For the reason given above, the Commission concluded that the provision at issue was not likely prima facie to constitute an infringement of the Community competition rules.
Så meget mindre som det ikke på det marked, der af Vickers anses for at være det relevante marked, dvs. markedet for luksusbiler, var klart, at den anfægtede bestemmelse havde mærkbare følger for konkurrenceforholdene ved at hindre en køber i et andet land end Det Forenede Kongerige i at købe Rolls-Royce Motors Group.
This was all the more so as, even in the market identified by Vickers as the relevant market, i.e. the luxury car sector, it was not clear that the clause objected to had a significant impact on the conditions of competition by preventing a nonUK resident purchaser from acquiring the Rolls-Royce Motors Group.
Frem for alt kunne Vickers ikke påvise, at overtagelse af en eksisterende virksomhed var den eneste måde. hvorpå man kunne øge sin markedsandel eller komme ind på det omhandlede marked.
In particular, Vickers had failed to show that the purchase of an existing player was the only way for a company to increase its share of, or enter, that market.
Endelig støttede Rolls-Royce PLC salget af Rolls-Royce Motors Group til en udlænding, og det ser saledes ikke ud til at bopælsklausulen har haft den betydning, som Vickers påstod.
Lastly, given that Rolls-Royce plc supported the sale of Rolls-Royce Motors Group to a nonUK resident, it did not seem that, in the present case, the residence clause would have had the significance which Vickers claimed.