natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Gennem en sådan harmonisering kan det undgås, at de samme problemer løses på forskellig måde, og at virksomhederne føler sig fristede til at henvende sig til den myndighed, der synes at kunne varetage deres interesser bedst.
Such harmonisation will make it possible to prevent divergent solutions to common problems from arising and firms from being tempted to seek out whichever authority seems to them to be the most favourable to their interests.
I med delelsen opfordres de medlemsstater, der endnu ikke har en lovgivning om, at konkurrencemyndigheden kan anvende artikel 85, stk. 1, og artikel 86, til at indføre en sådan lovgivning.
This is why the notice invites those Member States which have not already done so to acquire their own legislation enabling their competition authority to implement Articles 85(1) and 86 effectively. tively.
Allerede i 1993 i forbindelse med vedtagelsen af en meddelelse om rammerne for samarbejdet mellem Kommissionen og med lemsstaternes domstole(') gav Kommissionen udtryk for, at den ønskede at decentralisere anvendelsen af EU's konkurrenceregler.
The Commission had already expressed its wish to decentralise the application of Community competition law when, in 1993, it adopted a notice intended to provide the ground rules for cooperation between its de partments and national courts (').
Med en meddelelse om de nærmere betingelser for samarbejdet mellem Kommissionen og med lemsstatemes konkurrencemyndigheder ved behandling af sager efter artikel 85 og 86 (2), der blev vedtaget den 10. oktober 1997, øn skede Kommissionen at understrege denne opfordring til decentralisering.
So as to strengthen the incentive to decentralise, it adopted, on 10 October 1997, a notice in tended to clarify the conditions for cooperation between itself and the Member States' competition authorities in handling cases caught by Articles 85 and 86 (2).
Meddelelsen blev vedtaget efter en omfattende høring af alle EU's institutioner, medlemsstaterne og repræsentanter for erhvervslivet (3).
The notice is the result of wide consultations with all the Community institutions, the Member States and business representatives(3).
Meddelelsen indeholder retningslinjer for en lige fordeling af opgaverne mellem Kommissionen og de kontrolmyndigheder, der nu findes i de fleste medlemsstater.
The notice lays down the guidelines for an appropriate allocation of tasks between the Commission and the national supervisory authorities, which most of the Member States now have.
Generelt skal de nationale myndigheder behandle de sager, der har størst indvirkning på deres respektive om råder, og som ikke ved en første gennemgang ser ud til at kunne fritages efter artikel 85, stk. 3.
Generally speaking, the national authorities will handle cases the effects of which are felt in their territory and which appear, upon preliminary examination, unlikely to qualify for exemption under Article 85(3), for which the Commission has exclusive competence.
Kommissionen har nemlig enekompetence til at fritage aftaler efter artikel 85, stk. 3, og kan ikke henvise sager, der anmeldes med henblik herpå til behandling i medlemsstaterne. terne.
The Commission cannot therefore decentralise cases which are notified to it with a view to exemption under Article 85(3).
Meddelelsen tager først og fremmest sigte på at decentralisere anvendelsen af EU's konkurrenceregler for at gøre dem mere effektive.
Its purpose, mainly, is to decentralise the application of the Community competition rules so as to make them more effective.
Den fastslår derfor, at medlemsstaternes konkurrencemyndigheder behandler de sager, der fortrinsvis har virkninger på deres respektive områder, samtidig med at Kommissionen bevarer sin enekompetence til at fritage aftaler.
To this end, it provides that each competition authority in the Member States will handle the cases whose effects are basically felt on its territory, though without calling into question the Commission's exclusive power to grant exemptions.
Meddelelsen indeholder retningslinjer for samarbejdet mellem medlemsstaternes konkurrencemyndigheder og Kommissionen.
It describes the practical cooperation sought between the competition authorities of the Member States and the Commission.
Disse retningslinjer tager sigte på etablering af én enkelt kontrolmyndighed for de sager, der henhører under EU's konkurrenceregler, for at formindske risikoen for divergerende beslutninger og så vidt muligt lette virksomhedernes administrative byrder.
The arrangements are designed to ensure the establishment of a one-stop shop for monitoring cases which are covered by Community com petition law, so as to reduce the risk of contradictory decisions and to simplify, as much as possible, the administrative formalities with which firms must comply.
( ' ) Meddelelse om samarbejdet mellem Kommissionen og de nationale domstole om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 85 og 86 (EFT C 39 af 13.2.1993. s. 6).
In the latter category, the Commission recommends that the Member States inform it of the proceedings which they initiate, in particular in cases of special interest for the Community.
() Kommissionens meddelelse om samarbejdet mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaternes konkurrencemyndigheder ved behandling af sager, der henhører under EF-traktatens artikel 85 og 86 (EFT C 313 af 15.10.1997, s. 3).
(') Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 39, 13.2.1993.
I — KONKURRENCEBEGRÆNSENDE AFTALER OG MISBRUG AF DOMINERENDE STILLINGER — ARTIKEL 85 OG 86
ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 itself to be completely reviewed by the end of the fourth year after its adoption.
Meddelelse om afgrænsning af det relevante marked grafisk område, bl.a. på grundlag af de pågældende produkters eller tjenesters anvendelsesformål og pris.
Notice on the definition of relevant market products or services and the marketing areas which are likely to affect or sufficiently limit the competitive behaviour of the firms in question.
Udbudssubstitution kan også tages i betragtning ved markedsafgrænsning i de situationer, hvor den har de samme effektive og direkte virkninger som efterspørgselssubstitution. tution.
Supply-side substitutability may also be taken into account when defining markets in situations where its impact is equivalent to that of demand substitution in terms of effectiveness and immediacy.
For at forbedre gennemsigtigheden i kon kurrencepolitikken for såvel erhvervslivet som juridiske kredse, vedtog Kommissionen den 15. oktober 1997 en meddelelse om afgrænsning af det relevante marked ved anvendelsen af EU's konkurrenceregler('), især forordning nr. 17(2) og fusionsforordningen nr. 4064/89 (3).
To improve the transparency of its com petition policy, both for business and the legal community, the Commission adopted, on 15 October 1997, a notice on the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law(') and, in particular, of Regulation No 17 (2) and Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (3), the Merger Regulation.
Denne afklaring viser Kommissionens reelle vilje til at gøre det lettere for de kredse, der i praksis anvender EU's konkurrenceregler, at forudsige resultaterne af Kom missionens markedsanalyser.
Such clarification is evidence of the Commission's willingness to increase the predictability of its market analyses for practitioners of Community competition law.
Afgrænsningen af det relevante marked er nemlig en særdeles vigtig etape i den konkurrencepolitiske analyse, da der her er tale om at fastlægge rammerne for vurderingen af konkurrencen mellem virksomhederne.
The definition of the relevant market is a very important stage in competition analysis, since it provides the context in which the degree of competition between firms will be assessed.
Det var hensigten at gøre denne meddelelse mindst mulig teoretisk, og den bygger på Kommissionens tidligere beslutningspraksis.
The notice is intended to be as empirical as possible and is based on the Commission's previous case-law.
Den beskriver på en sammenhængende og let forståelig måde de økonomiske principper, som Kommissionen lægger til gmnd, når den skal afgrænse de relevante markeder, ligesom den opregner de elementer, der anvendes som vurderingsgrundlag.
It tries to set out in coherent, readable fashion the economic principles on which the Commission bases its approach to the definition of relevant markets. Thus it lists the types of evidence which make definition possible.
Når det drejer sig om det relevante produktmarked, tager Kommissionen bl.a. hensyn til en eventuel substitution i den seneste tid, økonometriske skøn, oplysninger fra forbruger og konkurrenter, markedsundersøgelser og forbrugerpræferencer.
With regard to the product market, the Commission takes account in particular of actual substitutions in the recent past, the results of econometric estimates, the views of customers and competitors, market research and the degree of resistance to change shown by users.
For at af grænse det geografiske marked tager den bl.a. hensyn til ændringer, der skyldes prisforskelle, de sociokulturelle efterspørgselskarakteristika, kundernes og konkurrenternes adfærd, han delsmønstret og hindringer for adgangen til markedet som f.eks. transportomkostninger.
To establish the geographic dimension of the relevant market, it uses inter alia the movements associated with price variations, the socio-cultural characteristics of de mand, customer and competitor behaviour, trade flows and the various barriers to entry, such as transport costs.
Alle disse parametre fører til afgrænsning af det relevante marked.
The combination of all these factors results in the identification of the relevant market.
Revision af politikken vedrørende vertikale begrænsninger
Review of the policy on vertical restraints
Hovedformålet med markedsafgrænsningen er at fastslå på en systematisk måde, hvilke konkurrencemæssige begrænsninger virksom hederne står over for.
The main purpose of market definition is systematically to identify the competitive constraints on the firms involved.
Afgrænsningen af både produktmarkedet og det geografiske marked tager sigte på at fastslå, hvilke egentlige kon kurrenter der er i stand til at begrænse de involverede virksomheders adfærd og forhindre dem i at handle uafhængigt af et effektivt konkurrencemæssigt pres.
The objective, as regards both the product and geographic dimensions, is to identify those actual com petitors of the firms involved that are capable of constraining the firms' behaviour and of preventing them from behaving independently of effective competitive pressure. Accordingly, the relevant market is an analytical tool which makes it possible, in particular, to calculate firms' market shares.
Det relevante marked er i denne forstand et analyseredskab til bl.a. beregning af virksomhedernes markedsandele, der giver et foreløbigt fingerpeg om disse virksomheders markedsstyrke,, som er relevant for vurderingen af dominans eller for anvendelsen af artikel 85.
These will provide a preliminary indication of their market power, for the purposes of assessing dominance or applying Article 85.
Med andre ord består det relevante marked af en række produkter eller tjenester, som forbrugerne betragter som indbyrdes substituerbare på et givet geo-
In other words, the relevant market is made up of those products or services which the consumer considers to be mutually interchangeable in a given geographic area, in particular as regards use and price.
(') Kommissionens meddelelse om afgrænsning af det relevante marked i forbindelse med Fællesskabets konkurrenceret (EFT C 372 af 9.12.1997. s. 5).
This means that the relevant market, defined as the products or services sold in a given geographic area by the firms involved in the proceedings, comprises the
) Rådets forordning nr. 17 af 6. februar 1962 (EFT 13 af 21.2.1962. s. 204).
(') Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997.
Kommissionen har siden sidste år været i færd med at revidere sin politik for vertikale begrænsninger, hvilket konkret gav sig udslag i offentliggørelse af en grønbog den 22. januar 1997 (4).
Last year the Commission began a re view of its policy on vertical restraints. This was given firmer shape with the publication of a Green Paper, adopted on 22 January 1997 (4).
Denne grønbog gav anledning til en omfattende debat om disse vertikale begrænsningers virkninger og behovet for at revidere Kommissionens nuværende regler og praksis på dette område. I debatten, som også vakte interesse hos vore handelspartnere, deltog bl.a.
The discussion paper triggered wide debate on the effects of vertical restraints and on the need to review the instruments and the Com mission's current practices in this field.
Kommissionens grønbog indeholder fire løsningsforslag: opret-
The Commission's paper contemplates four options: main taining the current system; widening the scope of block exemptions; limiting the scope of current block exemptions; and a rebuttable presumption that Article 85(1) does not apply (5).
Det har derfor vist sig, at det er nødvendigt at revidere EU's politik for horisontalt samarbejde.
Commission's policy on horizontal cooperation has therefore emerged.
Som led i konsultationen modtog Kommissionen over to hundrede bidrag fra de forskellige parter. Der blev tilrettelagt høringer med repræsentanter for medlemsstaterne og erhvervslivet.
The Commission also contacted the competition authorities of the Member States to re quest their assistance in carrying out a com parative study of the various systems of supervising horizontal agreements in the Member States.
Kommissionen vil nu behandle de oplysninger og synspunkter, den har modtaget, og frem lægge et forslag, der afspejler erhvervslivets og de offentlige myndigheders ønsker.
The Commission must now draw together the information and ideas it has gathered and put forward a proposal that reflects the concerns of business and the public authorities.
Kom missionen regner med at fremlægge et sådant forslag i 1998.
It should be able to present a proposal in 1998.
Offentliggørelsen af retningslinjerne (3) har til formål at gøre Kommissionens beslutningspraksis mere gennemsigtig og effektiv.
The publication of the guidelines (2) is intended to improve the transparency and effectiveness of the Commission's decision-taking practice.
De er rettet til virksomhederne og deres juridiske rådgivere samt EF-Domstolene.
It is directed both at firms and their legal advisers and at the Com munities' judicial institutions.
Den er fast besluttet på at ændre eller tilpasse sine regler og sin praksis, hvis der er behov for det, og dette gælder især gruppefritagelsesforordningerne vedrørende aftaler om forskning og udvikling og specialiseringsaftaler, hvis gyldighedsperiode er blevet forlænget med tre år(2) med henblik på en eventuel revision.
It is resolved, if necessary, to revise and adapt the texts and its current practices, in particular the exemption regulations relating to research and development agreements and specialisation agreements, whose validity has been extended for three years (') with a view to possible revision.
Evalueringens første fase har bestået i en indgående undersøgelse af Kommissionens politik på dette område.
The first stage of this exercise was a thorough examination of the Commission's policy in this field.
Ud over GD IV's interne undersøgelse har Kommissionens tjenestegrene konsulteret erhvervslivet.
As well as carrying out an internal study within DG IV, the Commission consulted the business world.
Kommissionen udsendte i juli 150 spørgeskemaer til et bredt udsnit af virksomheder (120) og brancheforeninger (30) for at indhente oplysninger om det horisontale samarbejdes formål, struktur og udvikling og for at vurdere, om de
In July it sent 150 questionnaires to a cross-section of firms (120) and trade associations (30) to gather information on the objectives, forms and patterns of horizontal cooperation and to assess the relevance of the regulations and notices in force.
Retningslinjerne indeholder en vejledende tarif, der ligger inden for grænserne i artikel 15, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 17, eller EKSF-traktatens artikel 65, stk. 5.
The guidelines supplement the arrangements provided for in the Commission notice of 18 July 1996 on the non-imposition or
I — KONKURRENCEBEGRÆNSENDE AFTALER OG MISBRUG AF DOMINERENDE STILLINGER — ARTIKEL 85 OG 86
I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 reduction of fines where an undertaking coop­erates effectively in the proceedings (').
Konkurrencepolitikken bidrager til en af EU's vigtigste målsætninger, nemlig at skabe et indre marked, og den spiller en afgørende rolle i denne forbindelse, blandt andet ved at fremme åbningen af markederne. Artikel 85 og 86 er her effektive instrumenter for Kom­missionen.
Competition policy contributes to the Community objective of creating a single mar­ket and plays a crucial role in bringing it about, in particular by promoting the openingup of markets.
Disse bestemmelser anvendes dels på horisontale virksomhedsaftaler, der tager sigte på at opdele nationale eller regionale markeder, dels på vertikale forbindelser mel­lem producenter og forhandlere, der kan med­føre en isolering af dem, således at integratio­nen enten forsinkes eller hindres kraftigt.
They apply both to horizontal agreements between undertakings, which are designed to divide up national or interregional markets, and to vertical relationships between manufac­turers and distributors, which may isolate those markets so that integration is slowed down or seriously impeded.
Disse be­grænsninger er især uacceptable, når der er prisforskelle mellem medlemsstaterne, og for­brugerne i EU ikke kan få adgang til de markeder, hvor priserne er lavest.
Thus it sent the United Kingdom association of manufacturers and distributors of dental equipment, the British Dental Trade Association (BDTA), a comfort letter regard­ing the latter's rules and regulations on fairs and exhibitions, once it had ascertained that there was no provision or practice which discriminated against undertakings from third countries wishing to display equipment at fairs and exhibitions organised by the BDTA.
De er også uacceptable, fordi de begrænser konkurrencen og forhindrer priskonvergens inden for EU.. Ulempeme herved bliver endnu mere slående, når først Den Økonomiske og Monetære sammenslutningen af tyske stålvirksomheder,
Simi­larly, when joint control of Costa Crociere, an undertaking specialising in Mediterranean cruises, was acquired by Carnival Corporation and Airtours (operating in North America and northern Europe respectively), the Commis­sion considered that the agreements setting up the joint venture were caught by Article 85(1), since they limited the growth of the acquirers on their joint venture's markets (they were reserving the Mediterranean market for Costa Crociere).
omfatte de største tyske producenter. Aftalen, der aldrig blev iværksat, tog sigte på udveks­ling af nye følsomme og konkrete oplysninger om ca. 40 stålprodukter i samtlige medlems­stater.
However, the Commission granted this agreement an exemption, given the ex­pected improvement for the consumer in terms of commercial services and moderate prices.
Informationsudveksling af denne art på mættede markeder, der er præget af stærk koncentration, indebærer en alvorlig konkur­rencebegrænsning, fordi den vil medføre en sådan gennemsigtighed på markederne, at en­hver form for uafhængig konkurrencefrem­mende adfærd ville give anledning til gengæl­delsesforanstaltninger fra de andre konkurren­ters side, idet disse med lethed kan finde frem til ophavsmanden.
Lastly, in another case concerning the creation of a joint venture, for the production of lubri­cants between the undertakings Hydro Texaco Holdings A/S (Texaco) and Preem, both active in the oil industry, the Commission agreed to exempt the agreement only after the parties had changed the clauses which isolated the Swedish market for the distribution of lubri­cants through an exclusive distribution licence granted to Preem by Texaco. When the agree­ments have been changed, the parties will be
( ) Kommissionens meddelelse om bødefritagelse eller bødenedsæt­telse i kartelsager (EFT C 207 af 18.7.1996, s. 4) og 26. beretning om konkurrencepolitikken (1996), nr. 34 og 35.
(') Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 207, 18.7.1996 and 1996 Competition Report, points 34 and 35.
kurrencebegrænsning, som talte imod oprettelsen af det nye selskab.
free to obtain lubricants from the supplier of their choice wherever situated.
gængelige, konstateret, at bilpriserne i EU stadig varierer betydeligt og dermed udgør et stærkt incitament til parallelhandel.
In its biannual reports on car prices (2), which are made widely available to the public, the Commission has found that car prices within the Community still differ substantially, thus providing strong incentives for parallel trade.
Som følge af denne øgede prisgennemsigtighed har Kom missionen fortsat modtaget henvendelser fra endelige forbrugere, fordi de var stødt på hindringer ved køb af biler uden for deres egen medlemsstat, især i Finland, Danmark og Nederlandene.
As a result of this increased price transparency, the Commission has continued to receive letters from final consumers and intermediaries acting on their behalf who have encountered obstacles in buying cars outside their own Member State, in particular in Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
I disse lande har forhandlerne ofte nægtet at sælge til personer, der ikke har bopæl i de pågældende lande, eller krævet et pristillæg.
In these countries, dealers have often refused to sell to non-residents or requested a price supplement.
Som følge af det stærke britiske pund har borgere i Det Forenede Kongerige i stigende grad søgt at købe højrestyrede biler på det europæiske fastland.
As a result of the strength of the pound sterling, residents from the United Kingdom have increasingly been seeking to acquire right-hand drive cars on the continent.
I mange af disse tilfælde er der fundet en løsning, efter at Kommissionen har grebet uformelt ind.
In many cases, a solution has been found follow ing informal intervention by the Commission.
Producenterne og/eller deres leverandører må ikke begrænse de endelige forbrugeres frihed til at købe varer i den medlemsstat, hvor de ønsker det, idet dette er et af EU's grund læggende principper.
Manufacturers and/or their suppliers must not restrict the freedom of final consumers and/or their authorised intermediaries to buy in the Member State of their choice, which is one of the fundamental achievements of the European Community.
Selv om forbrugerens ret ikke modsvares af en forpligtelse for forhandlerne til at sælge, kan en forhandler ikke afslå en forbrugers købstilbud eller kræve en højere pris, blot fordi den pågældende forbruger har bopæl i en anden medlemsstat.
Although the consumer's right is not accompanied by an obligation imposed on dealers to sell, a dealer may not reject a consumer's offer to buy, or ask for a higher price, simply because the consumer is a resident of another Member State.
På den anden side kan en producent modsætte sig, at for handlerne sælger til såkaldte »uautoriserede« forhandlere eller forhandlere på det grå marked, der fungerer som videreforhandlere.
On the other hand, a manufacturer may take measures against sales by its dealership to so-called 'non-authorised' or grey market dealers acting as resellers.
Bestemmelser i forhandlerkontrakten og/eller adfærd, der begrænser denne frihed, er
Contractual provisions in the dealer contract and/or behaviour which restrict this free dom are blacklisted, and their use results in the automatic loss of the benefit of exemption for the manufacturer and/or supplier.
Jf. også 26. beretning om konkurrencepolitikken, nr. 54-56.
In one case, the Commission decided to reject the complainant's application.
(2) Pressemeddelelse IP/97/113 af 14.2.1997, og pressemeddelelse 1P/97/640 af 11.7.1997.
) Press release IP/97/113, 14.2.1997, and press release IP/97/640, 11.7.1997.
Desuden tog den hensyn til, at et fælles franchiseprojekt var blevet opgivet.
See also 1996 Competition Report, points 54 to 56.