natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dispensationsbetingelser
Conditions for exemption
Β — 7.3.2.3, nr. 4 og 5
Β — 7.3.2.3, Nos 4, 5
1. »[Dispensation i medfør af] artikel 85, stk. 3, fra forbudet i artikel 85, stk. 1, er be­tinget af, 1) at aftalen bidrager til at forbedre produktionen eller fordelingen af va­rerne eller til at fremme den tekniske eller økonomiske udvikling, 2) at den sikrer for­brugerne en rimelig andel af fordele herved, 3) at den ikke pålægger de pågældende virksomheder begrænsninger, som ikke er nødvendige for at nå disse mål, 4) at den ikke giver disse virksomheder mulighed for at udelukke konkurrencen for en væsent­lig del af de pågældende varer.
"Article 85 (3) renders exemption from the prohibition pursuant to Article 85(1) subject to the following conditions: (i) the agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, (ii) it must allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, (iii) it must not impose restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objec­tives and (iv) it must not afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of elimi­nating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Med hensyn til den ovenfor nævnte første betingelse, skal det bemærkes, at såvel [de leveringsaftaler for seks måneder, som SABA påtvinger de autoriserede grossister], som hensynet til markedets sandsynlige vækst gør det muligt at sikre dels en vis stabi­litet i leveringen af de pågældende artikler, hvilket medfører en bedre dækning af de kunders behov, som grossisten leverer til, dels en på grund af disse leveringsaftalers relativt korte varighed ... sådan grad af fleksibilitet, som giver mulighed for at til­passe produktionen til de vekslende markedsbehov.
With regard to the first condition set out above, the conclusion of supply contracts for six months [imposed by SABA on accredited wholesalers] taking account of the probable growth of the market should make it possible to ensure both a certain sta­bility in the supply of the relevant products, which should allow the requirements of persons obtaining supplies from the wholesaler to be more fully satisfied, and, since such supply contracts are of relatively short duration, a certain flexibility, enabling production to be adapted to the changing requirements of the market
Herved sikres en mere regelmæssig afsætning til gavn for producenten, som får del i den forventede udvidelse af markedet for det pågældende produkt, såvel som for grossisten, som sikres sin levering, og i sidste instans også for de virksomheder, som forsyner sig hos grossisten, idet udvalget af disponible artikler bliver større.
Thus a more regular distribution is ensured, to the benefit both of the producer, who takes his share of the planned expansion of the market in the relevant product, of the wholesaler, whose supplies are secured, and, finally, of the undertakings which ob­tain supplies from the wholesaler, in that the variety of available products is in­creased.
En anden salgsforbedring indeholdes i den samarbejdsaftalebestemmelse, som for­pligter SABA til at betale grossisterne for deres garantiydelser og til at levere de reservedele, som er nødvendige for at garantireparationerne kan udføres.
Another improvement in distribution is provided under the clause in the cooperation agreement obliging SABA to compensate wholesalers for service performed under guarantee and to supply spare parts necessary for repairs under guarantee.
Desuden er leveringsaftaler for et rimeligt tidsrom en stabiliserende faktor for be­skæftigelsen, hvilket betragtet som en forbedring af de almindelige produktionsvil­kår, navnlig under en økonomisk lavkonjunktur, hører til de mål, som artikel 85, stk. 3, giver mulighed for at forfølge.«
Furthermore, the establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period consti­tutes a stabilizing factor with regard to the provision of employment which, since it improves the general conditions of production, especially when market conditions are unfavourable, comes within the framework of the objectives to which reference may be had pursuant to Article 85 (3)."
Dom af 25. oktober 1977: sag 26/76, Metro/Kommissionen, Sml. 1977, s. 1875, 1912 f.
Judgment of 25 October 1977, Case 26/76, Metro ν Commhsion, [197η ECR 1875, 1915 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1919).
Selv om det kan betvivles, at konkurrencepresset skulle være tilstrækkeligt til, at SABA og grossisterne videregiver en andel af den fordel til forbrugerne, som er en følge af rationaliseringen af salgsnettet, og at kravet herom i artikel 85, stk. 3, skulle være opfyldt, kan den fordel, som forbrugerne opnår i kraft af en forbedret forsyning, imidlertid i den foreliggende sag anses som tilstrækkelig begrundelse for fritagelsen.«
Even if it is doubtful whether the requirement in this connexion of Article 85 (3) can be said to be satisfied by the assumption that the pressure of competition will be suffi­cient to induce SABA and the wholesalers to pass on to consumers a part of the bene­fit derived from the rationalization of the distribution network, the grant of exemp­tion may, however, in the present case be considered as sufficiently justified by the ad­vantage which consumers obtain from an improvement in supplies."
Dom af 25. oktober 1977: sag 26/76, Metro/Kommissionen, Sml.
Judgment of 25 October 1977, Case 26/76, Metro ν Commhsion, [1977] ECR 1875, 1917 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 1919).
»Da disse aftaler endvidere garanterede Theal en i kraft af forhindringen af paral­lelimport absolut områdebeskyttelse, der endvidere blev forstærket af det af Watts ud­stedte importforbud, bidrog de ikke til at forbedre produktionen eller fordelingen af varer eller til at fremme den tekniske eller økonomiske udvikling, og de kunne ... ikke — selv om de var blevet behørigt anmeldt eller havde været fritaget for anmel­delse — omfattes af fritagelsen efter artikel 85, stk. 3, idet betingelserne heri ikke var opfyldt.«
3. "... these agreements, which by preventing parallel imports secured for Theal ab­solute territorial protection which was made still more effective by the prohibition on exports imposed by Watts, did not contribute either to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress and could not therefore — even if they had been duly notified or exempted from notification — be exempted as provided for in Article 85 (3) since the requisite conditions for the appli­cation ofthat article do not exist."
Dom af 20. juni 1978: sag 28/77, Tepea/Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, s. 1391, 1416 (Forslag: Capotorti, s. 1420).
Judgment of 20 June 1978, Case 28/77, Tepea ν Commhsion, [1978] ECR 1391, 1418 (Opinion: Capotorti, p. 1421).
Eksistensen af et meget stort antal salgssteder i Belgien letter ubestrideligt forbrugernes indkøb af cigaretter, selv om det skal nævnes, at forbrugerne kun finder et meget stort udvalg af mærker hos et begrænset antal specialiserede eller delvis specialiserede detailhandlere; især nye og små mærker sælges gennem disse detailhandlere.
The existence of a very large number of sales outlets in Belgium undoubtedly facilitates the purchase of cigarettes by the consumer even though it must be observed that there is a very wide range of brands only from a limited number of spedalist or semi­spedalist retailers who con­stitute an outlet in particular for new brands or those with a small turnover.
Antallet af forhandlere og mærker er imidlertid ikke ubetinget hovedkriteriet for en forbedring af fordelingen i artikel 85, stk. 3's forstand.
Nevertheless the number of intermediaries and brands is not necessarily an essential criterion for improving distribution within the meaning of Article 85 (3).
En distributionssektors kvali­tet afhænger nemlig først og fremmest af dens kommercielle fleksibilitet og af dens evne til at reagere på påvirkninger dels fra producenterne, dels fra forbrugerne.
The quality of a distribution sector may be judged above all by its commercial flexibility and ca­pacity to react to stimuli both from manufacturers and consumers.
Hvad dette sidste aspekt angår, afhænger distributionens effektivitet navnlig af, at indsatsen koncentreres om de varer, som forbrugerne anser for de bedste, og ligele­des af evnen til at tilpasse sig eventuelle nye købevaner fra forbrugernes side.
As regards the lat­ter the effectiveness of distribution implies that it can concentrate its activities on products which have the greatest performance in the eyes of consumers and is to be judged also according to its adaptability to new purchasing habits which may be­come apparent.
Det fremgår ... af de tal, som Kommissionen har fremlagt, og som ikke er bestridt af de øvrige parter i sagerne, at stormagasinerne og supermarkederne har haft en langt større salgsfremgang for cigaretter end de øvrige forhandlere, der sælger til forbruge­re, og at det forholder sig således på trods af, at stormagasinerne og supermarkederne kun udbyder et begrænset antal af alle de cigaretmærker, der sælges på det belgiske marked.
It is clear ... that the cigarette sales made by supermarkets have in­creased much more than those made by other retailers and that is so in spite of the fact that supermarkets offer only a restricted number of the complete range of brands of cigarettes sold on the Belgian market.
Det kan således alvorligt betvivles, at de fordele for fordelingen, som henstillingen indebærer, kan opveje de kraftige begrænsninger, den medfører for konkurrencen
It follows from those considerations that it may be seriously doubted whether the benefits in relation to distribution arising from the recommendation are likely suffi­
Β — 7.1.3.1 med hensyn til salgsvilkårene over for forhandlerne, i et sådant omfang, at der er grundlag for at fastslå, at henstillingen i cigaretbranchen bidrager til at forbedre for­delingen i artikel 85, stk. 3's forstand.
Β — 7.1.3.1 ciently to compensate for the stringent restrictions which it imposes on competition in respect of sales terms allowed the trade to justify the conclusion that it contributes to improving the distribution of cigarettes within the meaning of Article 85 (3).
I betragtning af den meget betydelige andel af det belgiske cigaretmarked, som inde­haves af FEDETAB's medlemmer, og særlig af de sagsøgende selskaber, må det [end­videre] fastslås, at henstillingen giver sagsøgerne mulighed for at udelukke konkur­rencen for en væsentlig del af de pågældende varer.
[Furthermore,] having regard to the very large share of the Belgian cigarette market held by the FEDETAB members and in particular by the applicant companies, there must be a finding that the recommendation has the effect of affording the applicants the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Heraf følger, at der under ingen omstændigheder kan meddeles fritagelse for henstillingen i medfør af artikel 85, stk. 3.«
It follows that the recommendation cannot in any event have exemption under Article 85 (3)."
Dom af 29. oktober 1980: foren, sager 209­215 og 218/78, Van Landewyck/Kom­missionen, Sml. 1980, s. 3125, 3278 f.
Judgment of 29 October 1980, Joined Cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, Van Landewyck ν Commhsion, [1980] ECR 3125, 3278 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 3286).
Eneforhandlingsaftaler (forordning nr. 67/67)')
Exclusive agreements (Regulation No 67/67')
1. »I [forordning nr. 67/67's] artikel 1, stk. 1 — som affattet ved Kommissionens for­ordning (EØF) nr. 2591/72 ... — 'erklæres bestemmelserne i artikel 85, stk. 1, i trak­taten indtil den 31. december 1982 uanvendelige på aftaler, hvori der kun deltager 2 virksomheder, og ... b) hvorefter den ene over for den anden forpligter sig til med henblik på videresalg at købe bestemte varer udelukkende af denne...'.
"Under Article 1 (1) of that regulation [No 67/67], as that provision was amended by Regulation (EEC) No2591/72..., 'it is hereby declared that until 31 December 1982 Article 85 (1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agreements to which only two un­dertakings are party and whereby ...(b) one party agrees with the other to purchase only from that other certain goods for resale'.
Der kan ikke gives ... medhold i, at bestemmelsen på trods af sin formulering er uan­vendelig på aftaler [med en eksklusiv købsforpligtelse]..., da disse ikke fastlægger en bestemt del af fællesmarkedet, inden for hvilken videresalg af de pågældende varer skal finde sted.
It is impossible to accept the contention ... that, despite its wording, this provision does not apply to [exclusive supply agreements, such brewery contracts] since they do not define the area of the common market within which resale of the products con­cerned is to take place.
Når en sådan territorial bestemmelse i aftalen udtrykkeligt er gjort til en betingelse for anvendelsen af artikel 1, stk. 1, litra a), i forordning nr. 67/67/EØF om aftaler med en eksklusiv feveringj­forpligtelse, skyldes dette, at fastsættelsen af et område er en nødvendig bestanddel af sådanne aftaler.
The fact that the inclusion of such a territorial stipulation in the agreement is an ex­press condition of the application of Article 1 (1) (a) of Regulation No 67/67, which relates to agreements embodying an undertaking for exclusive supply, is explained by the fact that, in the case of such agreements, the definition of the area to which they are to apply is inherent in this type of contract.
Hvad derimod angår aftaler med en eksklusiv tøfa­forpligtelse er en udtrykkelig fast­sættelse af et område i almindelighed overflødig, navnlig når det drejer sig om brygge­riaftaler som den foreliggende, da det er en selvfølge, at beværteren kun vil afsætte de af aftalen omfattede drikkevarer i sin virksomhed.
On the other hand, in the case of exclusive purchase agreements, an express definition of the area to which they apply is generally unnecessary, in particular in the case of brewery contracts such as that in question since, necessarily, it is only on his own pre­mises that the café owner sells beverages covered by the contract.
Følgelig opfylder de pågældende aftaler betingelserne i artikel 1, stk. 1 litra b), i forordning nr. 67/67/EØF.«
Consequently, agreements such as that in question fulfil the conditions laid down in Article 1 (l)(b) of Regulation No 67/67."
2. »Når [forordning nr. 67/67's] artikel 1, stk. 2, udelukker rent nationale aftaler fra fritagelsen for kategorier, beror dette på, at de anses for i almindelighed at være så uskadelige i deres virkninger på samhandelen mellem medlemsstater, at der ikke er behov for at fritage dem for et forbud, som kun undtagelsesvis rammer dem.
"The fact that under paragraph (2) of Article 1 of the regulation [No 67/67] group exemption is withheld from purely domestic agreements is explained by the fact that, under that article, they are considered, as a rule, to have so little effect on trade be­tween Member States that there is no need for them to be exempted from a prohibi­tion which applies to them only by way of exception.
Herefter bør bestemmelsen fortolkes således, at disse aftaler omfattes af fritagelsen, når de undtagelsesvis rammes af forbudet i traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, idet man alene ved denne fortolkning undgår den urimelige følge, at rent nationale aftaler af den på­gældende art ville blive behandlet ringere end lignende aftaler mellem flere lande, selv om de sidstnævnte sædvanligvis synes at indebære større fare for fællesmarke­dets funktion.
In consequence, Article 1 (2) must be interpreted to mean that such agreements benefit from the exemption when, by way of exception, they are caught by the pro­hibition contained in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty since this interpretation alone makes it possible to avoid the absurd result that purely domestic agreements of a particular
Den nævnte fortolkning må gælde ikke alene aftaler med en eksklusiv leveringsfor­pligtelse, men også aftaler med en eksklusiv købs forpligtelse.«
The said interpretation applies not only to exclusive supply agreements but also to ex­clusive purchaseagreements." agreements."
Dom af 1. februar 1977: sag 47/76, De Ν'orre/'Brouwerij Concordia, Sml. 1977, s. 65, 91 (Forslag: Mayras, s.95).
Judgment of 1 February 1977, Case 47/76, de Norre ν Brouwerij Concordia, [1977] ECR 65, 93 (Opinion: Mayras, p.97).
Bortset fra, at en sådan antagelse savner enhver støtte i forordningens ordlyd, ville den medføre, at forordningen i vidt omfang mistede sit indhold, idet denne netop angår kategorier af aftaler, der ofte er led i sådanne net.
On the contrary, apart from the fact that there is nothing in the text of the regulation to justify this contention, its result would be, to a large extent, to deprive the regula­tion of any purpose, since it specifically relates to categories of agreements which are often part of such networks.
Denne anskuelsesmåde bekræftes af, at forordning nr. 67/67/EØF har til formål at fremme retssikkerheden for de retsundergivne og at lette anvendelsen af Fællesska­bets konkurrencebestemmelser.
This view is confirmed by the fact that Regulation No 67/67 is designed to promote legal certainty for the benefit of parties concerned and to make it easier to apply the Community provisions on competition.
Der er nemlig god grund til, i det omfang traktaten tillader det, samlet at fritage ka­tegorier af aftaler, der kun rammes af forbudet i artikel 85 på grund af den samlede virkning af et eller flere net af tilsvarende aftaler, altså på grund af omstændigheder, der ligger uden for den pågældende aftale, og som derfor sædvanligvis er unddraget parternes nærmere kendskab, og som kun kan vurderes efter en undersøgelse afså tal­rige og sammensatte oplysninger, at dette kan volde de nationale retter overordent­ligt store vanskeligheder.
There is, in fact, every reason for extending, in so far as the Treaty so permits, a group exemption to agreements which come within the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 85 only because of the cumulative effect produced by the existence of one or more networks of similar agreements, that is, because of factors unconnected with the agreement in question, of which, in consequence, the contracting parties would generally have no specific knowledge and an appraisal of which requires the consid­eration of circumstances so numerous and complicated that a national court would be placed in a position of extreme difficulty.
Såfremt Kommissionen finder, at den samlede virkning af de pågældende aftaler i deres helhed er så restriktiv, at [en] gruppefritagelse ikke synes berettiget, kan og skal Kommissionen benytte sig af de beføjelser, der er tillagt den i artikel 7 i forordning nr. 19/65....«
If the Commission were to consider that the cumulative effect of all the agreements involved is so restrictive that group exemption did not appear justified, it would have the right and the duty to use the powers conferred on it by Article 7 of Regulation No 19/65 ..."
Dom af 1. februar 1977: sag 47/76, De Norre/Brouwerij Concordia, Sml. 1977, s. 65, 92 f. (Forslag: Mayras, s. 95).
Judgment of 1 February 1977, Case 47/76, de Norre ν Brouwerij Concordia, [1977] ECR 65, 94 (Opinion : Mayras, p. 97).
Dom af 1. februar 1977: sag 47/76, De Norre/Brouwerij Concordia, Sml. 1977, s. 65, 94 f. (Forslag: Mayras, s. 95).
Judgment of 1 February 1977, Case 47/76, de Norre ν Brouwerij Concordia, [1977] ECR 65, 97 (Opinion: Mayras, p. 97).
Udsendebe 1/mans 1983
Issue l/March 1983
Bestemmebe af det relevante marked 3.
Determination of the market in question 3.
Udsendebe 1/mans 1983
Issue ¡/March ¡983
Dom af 16. november 1977: sag 13/77, Inno/ATAB, Sml. 1977, s.2115, 2144 (For­slag: Reischl, s. 2151).
Judgment of 16 November 1977, Case 13/77 INNO ν ATAB, [1977] ECR 2115, 2145 (Opinion: Reischl, p.2152).
Jfr. tilsvarende: Dom af 13. februar 1979: sag 85/76, Hoffmann­La Roche/Kommissionen, Sml.
Judgment of 13 February 1979, Case 85/76, Hoffmann­La Roche ν Commhsion, [1979] ECR 461, cf. p.
1979, s.461, 520 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 562).
520 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 562).
Når udtrykkene 'dominerende stilling' og 'misbrug' anvendes i artikel 86, henviser be­stemmelsen i øvrigt til begreber, som ikke er nye, men som allerede i det væsentlige er konkretiserede gennem den praksis, der er fastlagt af de myndigheder, der i de fleste medlemsstater har til opgave at føre kontrol med og at bekæmpe konkurrencebegræn­sende adfærd.«
Moreover where Article 86 uses the expressions 'dominant position' and 'abuse' it refers to concepts which are not new, but which have in essence been given a specific meaning as a result of the practice of the authorities responsible in most of the Member States for examining and curbing conduct which restricts competition."
4. »At kontrakter [indeholdende gensidige, eksklusive købsforpligtelser) ... kan falde ind under artikel 85, særlig artikel 85, stk. 3, udelukker... ikke, at artikel 86 kan finde anvendelse, idet denne bestemmelse udtrykkeligt omfatter situationer, som åbenbart udspringer af kontraktsforhold, således at det i disse tilfælde står Kommis­sionen frit for at gennemføre proceduren i henhold til artikel 85 eller i henhold til arti­kel 86, navnlig under hensyn til arten af de gensidige forpligtelser og kontrahenternes konkurrencemæssige stilling på det eller de pågældende markeder.«
"[The fact that agreements whereby the parties undertake to supply each other ex­clusively] might fall within Article 85, and in particular within paragraph (3) thereof, does not preclude the application of Article 86, since this latter article is expressly aimed in fact at situations which clearly originate in contractual relations so that in such cases the Commission is entitled, taking into account the nature of the reciprocal undertakings entered into and the competitive position of the various contracting parties on the market or markets in which they operate, to proceed on the basis of Article 85 or Article 86."
Udsendebe 1/mans 1983
¡ssue 1/March 1983
Jfr. tilsvarende: — dom af 13. februar 1979: sag 85/76, Hoffmann­La Roche/Kommissionen, Sml. 1979, s.461, 520 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 562). — dom af 11. december 1980: sag 31/80, L'Oréal/De Nieuwe AMCK, Sml.
Judgment of 13 February 1979, Case 85/76, Hoffmann­La Roche ν Commhsion, [1979] ECR 461, 520 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 562).
2. »[En dominerende stilling] udelukker, til forskel fra en monopolstilling eller et kvasimonopol, ikke, at der består en vis konkurrence, men den sætter det domine­rende firma i stand til, om end ikke at bestemme, så dog i det mindste mærkbart at øve indflydelse på de vilkår, hvorunder konkurrencen udvikler sig, og under alle omstændigheder i vidt omfang i stand til at handle uden at skulle tage hensyn hertil og uden at denne adfærd er til skade for virksomheden.
A dominant position, unlike a monopoly or quasi­monopoly, does not preclude some competition, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not to determine, at least to influence appredably, the conditions under which that competition will de­velop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it without suffering any adverse ef­fect
Endvidere bør der sondres mellem en dominerende stilling og det parallelle adfærds­mønster, der er karateristisk for oligopolsituationer, idet virksomhedernes adfærd i et oligopol er genstand for gensidig påvirkning, medens en virksomhed, der indtager en dominerende stilling, i vidt omfang selv kan fastlægge sin adfærd.«
A dominant position must also be distinguished from parallel courses of conduct which are peculiar to oligopolies in that in an oligopoly the courses of conduct in­teract, while in the case of an undertaking occupying a dominant position the conduct of the undertaking which profits from that position is to a great extent determined unilaterally.
1979, s. 461, 520 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 562).
520 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 562).
1979, s.461, 532 (Forslag: Reischl, s. 562).
532 (Opinion: Reischl, p. 562).
»Hugin indtager ... på markedet for sine egne reservedele en stilling, der tillader selskabet at optræde uafhængigt af konkurrerende forsyningskilder.
"On the market for its own spare parts ... Hugin is in a position which enables it to determine its conduct without taking account of competing sources of supply.