natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Anvendelse af affaldsglas kan måske nok gøre kunderne mindre afhængige af sodaproducenterne i almindelighed, men det svækker ikke en betydelig sodaproducents mulig­heder for at udelukke mindre producenter af det pågældende produkt fra markedet.
It may well be that the use of cullet reduces the dependence of customers upon soda-ash suppliers generally. It does not, however, reduce the ability of a powerful soda-ash producer to exclude smaller producers of that produa.
Substitutionsmulighederne udgør derfor ikke nogen betydelig begrænsning i udøvelsen af Solvays mar­kedsstyrke over for andre sodaproducenter.
The possibilities of substitution do not therefore an as a significant constraint on the exercise of Solvay's market power vis-à-vis the other producers of soda-ash.
Kommissionen tager i sin vurdering af Solvays mar­kedsstyrke hensyn til muligheden for at substituere soda med kaustisk soda.
In assessing the extent of Solvay's market power, the Commission takes account of the possible substitutability of caustic soda for soda-ash.
Kaustisk soda (natrium­hydroxid) anvendes i vid udstrækning til fremstilling af papir og aluminium og kan også teoretisk set erstatte soda ved fremstilling af alkali i forbindelse med bestemte produkter, navnlig ved produktion af vaskepulver og ved processer i metalindustrien.
Caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) is largely used for the production of paper and aluminium and may also in theory replace soda-ash for certain manufacturing applications as a source of alkali, particularly in the manufacture of detergents and in metallurgical processes.
(Det omvendte er også tilfældet, idet soda teoretisk set også kan anvendes i stedet for kaustisk soda i visse processer.)
(The reverse is also true: soda-ash is in theory also an alternative for caustic soda in some processes.)
Den omstændighed, at det er muligt at bruge kaustisk soda, medfører dog ikke i praksis nogen væsentlig begrænsning af Solvays markedsstyr­ke i EF, som hovedsagelig er baseret på leverancer til glasproducenterne, hvoraf kun ganske få eller måske slet ingen er indstillet på'at bruge kaustisk soda i stedet for soda.
In practice however the possible availability of caustic soda does not constitute a
Kommissionen har vurderet Solvays markedsstyrke pi grundlag af hele det geografiske omride, hvor den udøver sin virksomhed, dvs. de EF-lande, hvor den har produktionsanlæg.
The Commission has assessed Solvay's market power in relation to the whole of the geographic area within which it operates, which for present purposes consists of those Member States in which it has production facilities.
Solvays eget interne materiale viser, at virksomheden betragter de ni DN (Directions Nationales) som et homogent marked.
Solvay's own internal documentation shows that it tends to consider the nine 'Directions nationales' as forming a homogeneous market.
(Dette marked indbefatter to lande uden for EF, nemlig Schweiz og Østrig, og udelukker Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland, der er traditionelle ICI-markeder, samt Danmark og Grækenland, der er markeder uden producenter.) center.)
(This market delineation includes two non-member countries, namely Switzerland and Austria, and excludes the United Kingdom and Ireland which are traditional 'ICI' rriarkets and Denmark and Greece which are 'non-producer* markets.)
Selv om hvert af de nationale markeder, der i særlig grad berøres af Solvays konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd, betragtes særskilt, er Solvay stadig dominerende pi hvert enkelt, og ovennævnte betragtninger gælder derfor i hvert enkelt tilfælde.
However, even if each of the national markets particularly concerned by Solvay's exclusionary conduct is considered as a separate market, Solvay is still dominant in each one, and most of the considerations set out above apply equally.
I modsætning til en mængderabat, der udelukkende er knyttet til den mængde, kunden aftager hos den pågældende fabrikant, indebærer en loyalitetsbonus finansielle fordele, der skal forhindre kunderne i at skaffe sig leverancer hos konkurrerende producenter.
In contrast to a quantity discount, which is linked solely to the volume of purchases from the manufacturer concerned, a fidelity rebate involves offering customers financial advantages in order to prevent them from obtaining their supplies from competing producers and when practised by a dominant undertaking may fall under Article 86.
Når en sådan loyalitetsbonus ydes af en virksomhed med en dominerende stilling, kan den falde ind under artikel 86.
On the basis of the above considerations the Commission. concludes that at all material times Solvay occupied a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at Solvay på alle væsentlige tidspunkter indtog en dominerende stilling som omhandlet i artikel 86.
There is no need, in order for fidelity rebates to fall under Article 86, for a contractual obligation or express stipulation that the customer obtain its supplies exclusively from the dominant undertaking.
Solvay har siden 1982 anvendt en ordning med progressive rabatter, som ifølge virksomhedens eget interne materiale tager specielt sigte på at sikre kundernes loyalitet og udelukke eller begrænse kon kurrencen:
— granting customers substantial financial inducements to obtain from Solvay all or the major part of the marginal tonnage which might otherwise have been obtained from a competitor,
— ved at give kunderne væsentlige økonomiske incitamenter til at lade Solvay levere hele deres ekstramængde eller størstedelen deraf, som de måske ellers ville have købt hos en konkurrent
— making it difficult or impossible for an existing or potential supplier to enter as second supplier for the marginal tonnage, since in order to match the substantial pecuniary advantages offered by Solvay and obtain the order for the top 'tranche' of business, they would have to sell at unprofitable or at 'dumping' prices,
Som Domstolen har bemærket i flere sager, kan en dominerende virksomheds adfærd, der underminerer de i EØF-Traktatens artikel 3, litra f), anførte mål ved at bringe konkurrencestrukturen i fare, indebære en overtrædelse af artikel 86.
As the Court of Justice has observed in several cases, conduct by a dominant undertaking which undermines the objeaives of Article 3 (f) of the EEC Treaty by endangering the structure of competition may constitute an infringement of Article 86.
En adfærd, der udgør en hindring for den faktiske eller potentielle konkurren ce, er blevet dømt ulovlig af Domstolen.
Exclusionary behaviour which hinders existing competition or the development of new competition has been condemned by the Court.
Den praksis, der tager sigte på at hindre konkurrenternes adgang til kunderne ved at knytte sidstnævnte til den dominerende leverandør, er blevet stadfæstet som misbrug i bl.a. følgende vigtige sager: sag 40/73, Suiker Unie mod Kommissionen ('), sag, 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche mod Kommissionen, sag 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden Industrie — Michelin (2).
Practices designed to block the access of competitors to customers by tying the latter to the dominant supplier have been particularly identified as abusive in leading cases: Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Commission ('); Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission; Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden Industrie — Michelin v. Commission (2).
(Jf. også Kommissionens beslutning 89/22/EØF, British Gypsum/BPB Industries (').)
(See also Commission Decision 89/22/EEC British Gypsum/BPB Industries (3).)
— ved at binde kunden til Solvay i en ubegrænset periode og dermed bidrage til den manglende fleksibilitet på markedet
— tying the customer to Solvay for an indefinite period and thereby contributing to the rigidity of the market,
Den foreliggende sag vedrører primært Solvays kun debinding gennem en række foranstaltninger med samme konkurrencebegrænsende formål.
The present case primarily concerns the tying of customers to Solvay by means of a number of devices which all serve the same exclusionary purpose.
— ved at gøre kunderne uinteresserede i at henvende sig til Solvays konkurrenter om levering af nogle af de mængder, de har behov for.
— removing any interest on the part of the customer to canvass Solvay's competitors for some of its requirements.
Nr. L 152/34 i Tyskland, måtte tilbyde en pris ab fabrik pi 245 DM pr. ton for de sidste [. . .] kiloton, sammenholdt med en listepris pi 403 DM pr. ton og en gennemsnitspris i Tyskland på 360 DM pr. ton.
Kt of DM 245 per tonne, compared with a 'list price' of DM 403 per tonne and an 'average' price in Germany of DM 360 per tonne.
Enhver producent af natursoda, der solgte til denne pris, ville have misligholdt antidumpingforpligtelserne vedrørende mindstepristilsagnene.
Any natural-ash producer selling at that price would have been in breach of the anti-dumping minimum price undertakings.
konkurrencebegrænsende i sig selv.
comparable usages is not necessarily anticompetitive on its own.
Men herudover modtager St. Gobain en »koncernrabat« på 1,5 % af sine samlede indkøb overalt i Europa.
However in addition to this stipulation St Gobain receives a 'group rebate' of 1,5 % on the whole of its purchases across Europe.
Det ligger implicit i aftalen, at betalingen afhænger af, at St. Gobain fortsat giver Solvay førsteprioritet som lever andør.
It is implicit in the agreement that payment is dependent upon St Gobain continuing to give Solvay 'priority' as its supplier.
Solvay erkender i sit eget materiale, at denne rabat ganske vist ikke er et »absolut våben«, men bidrager til at sikre koncernens loyalitet. Bemærk ningen om, at den først og fremmest forpligter St. Gobain til at afsløre sig i tilfælde af store indkøb hos konkurrenter (»Elle oblige surtout SG à se démasquer en cas d'achats importants à la concurrence«), viser ogsi, at Solvay ønsker beviser for, at den har første prioritet.
Solvay in its own documentation recognizes that this rebate, although not an 'absolute weapon', contributes to ensuring the loyalty of the group.
En anden leverandørs muligheder for at overtage en del af Solvays leverancer til en større kunde vanskeliggøres endnu mere af forpligtelsen til at opretholde den procentvise rabat og checkudbetalingerne.
The ability of a second supplier to displace Solvay for a part of the business of a major customer is rendered even more difficult by the obligation of secrecy with regard to the percentage rebate and the cheque payment.
Solvay hævdede, at rabatten til St. Gobain-koncernen blot afspejlede omkostningsbesparelserne i forbindelse med koncernens stilling som den største kunde i Europa.
Solvay claimed that the St Gobain rebate did no more than reflect the cost savings attributable to St Gobain's position as the largest customer in Europe.
Dette stemmer ikke med Solvays pistand om, at de enkelte St. Gobain-virksomheder får produkter ne leveret fra de nationale Solvay-virksomheder i hver medlemsstat, og ikke som samlet leverance.
The argument overlooks the fact that at Solvay's insistence the individual St Gobain subsidiaries are supplied by the national Solvay subsidiaries in each Member State and not on any global basis.
Det fremgår også klart af dokumenterne, at formålet med rabatten til St. Gobain var at sikre koncernens loyalitet i andre medlemsstater end Frankrig og dermed at udelukke konkurrenter.
It is also clear from the documents that the whole purpose of the St Gobain rebate' was to secure the loyalty of the group in Member States other than France and thus exclude competitors.
Kommissionens indsigelser mod rabatordningen gælder ikke blot i de tilfælde, hvor Solvay har fuldstændig eksklusivitet, men også i de tilfælde, hvor Solvay er hovedleverandør, men ikke eneleverandør.
The Commission's objections to the rebate system apply not only to cases where Solvay has complete exclusivity but also to those where it is the principal, but not the sole, supplier.
1 sådanne tilfælde bidrager de progressive rabatter til at opretholde Solvays dominerende stilling ved at sikre virksomhedens andel af leverancerne til kunden.
In such cases the progressive rebates contribute to the maintenance of Solvay's Overall dominant position by securing its share of the customer's business.
Den manglende fleksibilitet på markedet gør sig fortsat gældende, fordi det er særdeles vanskeligt for en anden leverandør at få foden inden for hos Solvays faste kunder.
The rigidity of the market is preserved since it is extremely difficult for any second supplier to break into Solvay's 'core' business.
Under iv) foretages en vurdering af konkurrenceklausulen i St. Gobain-protokollen på grundlag af artikel 86.
The assessment of the 'competition' clause in the St Gobain protocol in the light of Article 86 is made under (iv) below.
Solvay fremførte i sit skriftlige svar på Kommissionens meddelelse af klagepunkter, at rabatterne ikke var tænkt som et incitament til at sikre kundernes loyalitet, men at der kun var tale om en form for mængde rabat, som var betinget af, at kunderne aftog bestemte, objektivt fastsatte mængder. Dette argument er slet ikke i overensstemmelse med beskrivelsen af rabatter ne i Solvays egne dokumenter.
Solvay claimed in its written observations in reply to the statement of objections that thé rebates were not intended as an inducement to loyalty but simply represented a form of volume rebate which depended upon the customers reaching an objective and predetermined tonnage threshold.
Denne del af vurderingen gælder især:
This part of the assessment applies in particular to:
Det er også klart, at de forskellige rabatter og de finansielle fordele, der tilbydes, ikke er knyttet til omkostningsbesparelser i forbindelse med de leverede mængder.
It is also clear that the various rebates and financial advantages which they confer are not related to any cost savings associated with the quantities delivered.
Kommissionen havde ί 1981 meddelt Solvay, at virksomheden ikke længere måtte indgå aftaler om, at kunderne skulle dække deres samlede behov ved indkøb hos Solvay.
Solvay had been informed by the Commission in 1981 that it should abandon the system of total requirements contracts.
Den meddelte endvidere, at eventuelle nye mængdeaftaler ikke mitte angive en mængde svarende til kundens samlede behov.
It was also informed that any new tonnage contracts should not in fact stipulate for a quantity which corresponded to the customer's total requirements.
Den hemmelige St. Gobain-protokol havde til formål at understrege Solvays stilling som St. Gobains eneleverandør eller næsten eneleverandør i Vesteuropa bortset fra Frankrig.
The secret St Gobain 'Protocol' was intended to confirm Solvay in the position of St Gobain's exclusive or near-exclusive supplier in western Europe apart from France.
Som DSW selv har udtalt, tog den sigte pi at opretholde status quo, men parterne var tilbageholdende med at meddele dette skriftligt.
As DSW itself said, it was designed to maintain the status quo but the parties were reluctant to say so in writing.
I en række tilfælde er det dog tydeligt,
In a number of cases however it is apparent that:
Bestemmelsen om, at St. Gobain nyder godt af Solvays »bedste betingelser« i hvert land, er ikke nødvendigvis
The provision by which St Gobain benefits from Solvay's 'best conditions' in each country for
— at det klart var underforstået, at kunderne skulle aftage mængder hos Solvay svarende til eller
— even if the supply agreement was expressed in the form of a 'tonnage' contraa the clear
Nr. L 152/35 næsten svarende til deres samlede behov, selv om leveringsaftalen var udformet som en »mængdeaftale«, eller
No L152/35 understanding was that the customer obtained all or substantially the whole of its requirement from Solvay, or the stipulated tonnage corresponded to the customer's total requirements, or intention on the part of the customer to look for other sources of supply (e.g. St Gobain's United States imports in 1988).
I mange tilfælde fremgår det ogsi, at Solvay blev underrettet om kundernes samlede årlige behov.
In many cases it is also shown that Solvay was informed as to the customer's total annual requirements.
Solvay kan derfor ud fra et indgiende kendskab til de relevante dele af tilbuddet (pris, mængde osv.) samt kundens planer og samlede behov sikre sig, at kon kurrencen begrænses eller endog udelukkes.
It can thus, with full knowledge of the relevant details of the offer (price, tonnage, etc.) and the customer's intentions and total requirements, arrange that the competitive effect is limited or even removed.
— at kunden blev underrettet om, at rabatterne var betinget af, at kunden udelukkende handlede hos Solvay.
the customer was informed that the payment of any rebate was dependent upon its taking 100% from Solvay.
Det kan meget vel forholde sig således, at en kunde — i hvert fald for øjeblikket — er tilfreds med at handle udelukkende hos Solvay.
It may well be that in some cases a customer is content — for the time being at least — to purchase all its requirements from Solvay.
Kommissionen anerkender fuldt ud kundernes ret til frit at købe de mængder, de har behov for, hos én enkelt leverandør, hvis de ønsker det.
The Commission fully recognizes the freedom of customers to obtain all their requirements from one supplier if they wish to do so.
Men de må ikke være forpligtede dertil.
They should not however be obliged to do so.
Bortset fra de forskellige finansielle incitamenter over for Vegla (20 % Spitzenrabatt, loyalitetsbonus i form af checks) var det klart — om end uofficielt — at kunden skulle dække hele sit behov ved køb hos Solvay.
In the case of Vegla, apart from the various financial inducements (20% 'Spitzenrabatt', fidelity cheque) there was a clear — if unofficial — understanding that the customer would take its total requirement from Solvay.
Tilsvarende fik Oberlandglas meddelelse om, at de »særlige betingelser« afhang af, at den dækkede hele sit behov ved køb hos DSW.
Similarly, Oberlandglas was informed that the 'special conditions' depended upon its taking its total requirements from DSW.
Ifølge aftalen med Owens Corning i Belgien var rabatten på 150 bfr. afhængig af, at firmaet forpligtede sig til at dække sit samlede behov ved køb hos Solvay.
In the case of Owens Corning in Belgium the agreement makes the Bfrs 150 rebate dependent upon its committing its total requirements to Solvay.
I nogle tilfælde (Vegla, Oberlandglas, Owens Corning) var det udtrykkeligt aftalt, at kunderne skulle aftage alle de mængder, de havde behov for, fra Solvay.
In some cases (Vegla, Oberlandglas, Owens Corning), the express understanding was that the customer would obtain all its requirements from Solvay.
En sådan aftale tager klart sigte på at forpligte kunden til at dække hele sit behov ved køb hos Solvay, og den er konkurrencebegrænsende efter artikel 86.
Any such arrangement is clearly intended to bind the customer to Solvay for its total requirement and is exclusionary under Article 86.
I de øvrige tilfælde svarede den aftalte mængde i »evergreen«-aftalen (der havde en opsigelsesfrist på to år) til kundens forventede samlede behov, men tillod dog en margen op eller ned (på normalt 15%).
In the other cases, the contractual tonnage stipulated in the main 'evergreen' contraa (which required two years' notice of termination) corresponded to the customer's total anticipated requirements but allowed for a margin (usually 15 % ) up or down.
Kunden meddelte i begyndelsen af hvert år Solvay sine nøjagtige behov for den pågældende periode.
The customer indicated to Solvay at the beginning of each year what its exact requirements would be within that range.
iv) Konkurrenceklausuler og andre konkurrencebe grænsende bestemmelser i aftalerne
(iv) Competition clauses and other exclusionary clauses in agreements
Kommissionen mener ikke, at disse aftalers konkur rencebegrænsende virkning blev formindsket som følge af tolerancemargenen, idet aftalerne som bekendt var baseret på forretningsforbindelser af længere varighed.
The Commission does not consider that the exclusionary effect of these agreements, based as they were on the maintenance of a longterm commercial relationship, was alleviated by the tolerance margin.
For det første var kunden, selv om han overvejede at finde en anden leverandør, stadig aftalemæssigt knyttet til Solvay for en stor del af sit behov, så længe »evergreen«-aftalen gjaldt.
The purpose of these various clauses is to give Solvay as the established supplier a built-in advantage over any other supplier attempting to compete for all or even a part of the business of the customer in question.
De forskellige former for konkurrenceklausuler og andre tilsvarende bestemmelser, der alle er'anført i nr. 35 til 38, forstærker kundens tilknytning til Solvay, begrænser hans mulighed for at skifte lever andør og vanskeliggør konkurrenternes adgang til leverancer til de faste Solvay-kunder.
In the first place, even if the customer did consider a second source, it was still contractually bound to Solvay for a very large proportion of its requirements so long as the 'evergreen' contraa was in operation.
Formålet med disse forskellige klausuler er at give Solvay, den faste leverandør, en automatisk fordel frem for andre leverandører, der forsøger at konkurrere om alle leverancerne dl den pågældende kunde eller en del af disse leverancer.
In the case of the Belgian glassmakers there is even a clause providing that if the forecast offtake in one year exceeds the maximum provided in the basic contract of 1 January 1983 (i.e. X tonnes + 15%), the basic contraa tonnage shall be revised upward.
Det er formålet med bestemmelsen, at Solvay forbliver hovedleverandør.
The purpose of the clause is to ensure that Solvay remains the preponderant supplier.
For det andet er det klart, at Solvay ønsker at indhente detaljerede oplysninger om tilbud fra konkurrenter og
Secondly, it is clear that Solvay makes it its business to obtain full details of any competitive offers and any
Konkurrenceklausulerne formindsker absolut ikke den konkurrencebegrænsende virkning af Solvays langvarige leveringsaftaler (med deres loyalitetsbonus og de facto eksklusivitet) men styrker i stedet forbin-
Far from mitigating the anticompetitive effea of the longterm supply agreements with Solvay (with their fidelity rebates and de facto exclusivity), the competition clauses in fact strengthen the tie between Solvay and the customer and are exclusionary in objea and effect. They allow Solvay to be fully
Konkurren ceklausuler, der giver den dominerende leverandør mulighed for at opsige hele aftalen, hvis kunden køber en mindre del af sine forsyninger hos en konkurrent, virker i forvejen konkurrencebegrænsende, idet det er særdeles usandsynligt, at kunden vil sætte sin forsyningssikkerhed på spil under sådanne omstændigheder. der.
'Competition clauses' which give the dominant supplier the option of terminating the whole agreement if the customer obtains even a small part of its supplies from a competitor are already a deterrent to competition: the customer is extremely unlikely to jeopardize its security of supply in such circumstances.
Alle ovennævnte foranstaltninger, jf. nr. 50 til 60, tager sigte pi at begrænse eller helt fjerne andre sodaproducenters eller -leverandørers mulighed for at konkurrere effektivt med Solvay.
All the above measures as set out in recitals (50) to (60) are designed to remove or restria the opportunity of other producers or suppliers of soda-ash to compete effectively with Solvay.
De styrker også Solvays dominerende stilling på en måde, der er uforenelig med det konkurrencebegreb, der ligger i artikel 86.
They also consolidate the dominant position of Solvay in a manner which is incompatible with the concept of competition
Den prismæssige forskelsbehandling har betydeligt indvirkning på de pågældende virksomheders om kostninger.
The price discrimination has a considerable effect upon the costs of the undertakings affeaed.
Inden for glasindustrien (der tegner sig for størsteparten af sodaforbruget) er soda, næst efter brændsel, den største udgiftspost i fabrikationsprocessen.
In the glass seaor (which accounts for the majority of soda-ash consumption) soda-ash is, after fuel costs, the most expensive single item in the manufacturing process.