natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ICI's beskrivelse af den manglende konkurrence som »for bindelser styret af historiske værdier, der går tilbage til Brunner-Mond-aeraen«, tyder i høj grad på en mangeårig forståelse mellem de to producenter.
ICI's characterization of the present relationship of noncompetition in terms of the 'historical values of association from Brunner, Mond days' is clearly indicative of a long-standing and continuing understanding between the two producers.
Solvay og ICI kan ikke påpege nogen ændringer i deres forretningspolitik for soda (i modsætning til kaustisk soda), der kan underbygge den påstand, at Page 1 000 bortfaldt i 1962.
Solvay or ICI are unable to point to any alteration in their commercial policies in relation to soda-ash (as opposed to caustic soda) which might support the assertion that 'Page 1000' had become a 'dead letter' by 1962.
Den formelle ophævelse af aftalen ti år senere medførte heller ikke ændringer.
The formal cancellation of the agreement 10 years later likewise did not result in any change.
Den f aktuelle vurdering
Factual assessment
På grundlag af ovennævnte beviser vedrørende de faktiske og økonomiske forhold er Kommissionen ikke enig i, at den skarpe markedsopdeling mellem Solvay og ICI, der præger sodamarkedet i EF, skyldes markedskræfternes frie spil eller de to producenters uafhængige kommercielle beslutninger.
On the basis of the above factual and economic evidence, the Commission does not accept that the strict market division between Solvay and ICI which is a characteristic of the soda-ash market in the Community results from the operation of natural market forces or the independent commercial judgment of the two producers.
Den mener derimod, at markedsopdelingen skyldes en fortsat forståelse mellem de to producenter baseret på
It considers on the contrary that the market separation is the subject of a continued understanding between
(') Jf. A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (1838). {') J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1944).
(') See A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth (1938). (2) J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Dette er heller ikke en sag, hvor de to producenter ikke havde kontakt med hinanden.
Nor is this a case where the two producers concerned have no contact with each other.
Selv om de hyppige kontakter havde til formål at drøfte PFR-ordningeme, førte de ikke til nogen kommerciel rivalisering.
The frequent contacts, even if their immediate purpose was to discuss the 'purchase for resale' arrangements, were not conducive to an atmosphere of commercial rivalry.
I modsætning til, hvad ICI hævder, var de emner, man drøftede, ikke begrænsede til »tekniske« spørgsmål, men omfattede også udveksling af oplysninger om forretningspolitikken generelt, og om spørgsmål, der blev anset for at være af væsentlig betydning for, at ICI fortsat kunne kontrollere det britiske marked.
Indeed, contrary to ICI's assertions, the subjects discussed were not limited to 'technical' matters but included exchanges of information on global commercial strategy and on matters regarded as being of crucial importance to ICI's continuing control of the United Kingdom market.
Det er utænkeligt, at to virksomheder ville have ført drøftelser af en sådan art, medmindre det var klart under forstået mellem dem, at de ikke var potentielle konkurrenter.
It is inconceivable that two undertakings would have conducted discussions of such a nature unless it were clearly understood between them that they were not potential competitors.
Det var også indlysende, at de to producenter havde pålagt at kontakte og konsultere hinanden for at fjerne eventuel usikkerhed med hen syn til deres reaktioner på hinandens adfærd.
It was also clearly envisaged that the two producers would contact and consult each other so as to remove any uncertainty as to their reactions to the other's conduct.
Under alle omstændigheder overvurderede ICI transportomkostningerne fra Det Forenede Kongerige til nabo-medlemsstater ved at fremlægge overslag for transport med tankbil.
In any event ICI overstated the cost of transport from the United Kingdom to neighbouring Member States by producing estimated figures for transport by road tanker.
Ethvert realistisk afsætningsprogram i Vesteuropa ville have omfattet oprettelse af et lager samt leverancer til dette lager pr. skib, hvilket formodentlig ville have halveret de leveringsomkostninger, ICI har anført.
Any realistic marketing programme in continental western Europe would have entailed establishing a depot and supplying it by sea, which would probably have halved the delivery costs quoted by ICI.
Den omstændighed, at de to største EF-producenter i en lang periode har anvendt PFR-ordninger, tyder også på, at de har fælles interesser og agter at opretholde status quo, navnlig den geografiske adskillelse af deres respektive indflydelsessfærer.
The longterm use by the two largest Community producers of product for resale arrangements is also indicative of a shared interest and intention to maintain the status quo, in particular the geographic separation of their respective spheres of influence.
I ICI's egne dokumenter understreges det, at forholdet til Solvay er »af væsentlig betydning for mængder, priser og begrænsning af andre virksomheders adgang til vort marked«.
ICI's own documentation emphasizes that its relationship with Solvay is 'crucial to volume, price and limiting the intrusion of others into our market'.
ICI's og Solvays aftaler om Sydafrika er lige så vigtige i denne forbindelse, som Solvays direkte leverancer til Det Forenede Kongerige.
The ICI-Solvay arrangements relating to South Africa are as important in this connection as the direct deliveries by Solvay to the United Kingdom.
På baggrund af henvisningen i ICI's egne dokumenter til »leverancer til gengæld for en ordentlig opførsel« (jf. nr. 38) kan der ikke være nogen uenighed om, at Solvay som modydelse fortsat skulle afholde sig fra at trænge ind på det britiske marked.
In the light of the reference to a 'trade-off in ICI's own documentation (see recital 38) it cannot be seriously disputed that the quid pro quo was Solvay's continued abstention from the United Kingdom market.
Hvad angår mulighederne for handel i den modsatte retning er de største emballageglasproducenter i Det Forenede Kongerige forholdsvis gunstigt beliggende med hensyn til adgang fra det kontinentale Vesteuropa.
As regards the possibility of trade in the opposite direction, the major container glass customers in the United Kingdom are relatively favourably located in terms of access from continental western Europe.
De prissammenligninger, man fandt hos de to producenter, viser, at det ville have været muligt for Solvay at levere til kunder i navnlig det østlige og sydøstlige England.
The pricing comparisons obtained at the producers themselves show that it would have been perfectly feasible for Solvay to have delivered to customers particularly in the east and south-east of England.
Det forhold, at der ikke foregår nogen handel med soda, er i direkte modsætning til de gældende konkur renceforhold vedrørende kaustisk soda, der prismæssigt kan sammenlignes med soda, men er dyrere og farligere at transportere.
The absence of trade in soda-ash is in direct contrast with the present competitive environment in caustic soda, a product which is comparable in price but more expensive and more hazardous to ship.
ICI forsøgte tilsyneladende i en periode at holde sine produktionsvanskeligheder i Det Forenede Kongerige skjult for Solvay, men dette beviser ikke, som ICI hævder, at der ikke var tale om hemmelige aftaler mellem dem.
The fact that ICI for some time apparently attempted to conceal from Solvay the full extent of its production difficulties in the United Kingdom does not, as ICI argues, disprove the existence of any collusive arrangement between them.
Aftalerne mellem dem om deres indflydelsessfærer i henholdsvis Det Forenede Kongerige og det øvrige Vesteuropa skyldtes ikke uegennytte fra Solvays side, men et sammenfald af interesser. Hvis ICI fik vanskeligheder med at efterkomme efterspørgselen i Det Forenede Kongerige, kunne man dårligt forvente, at Solvay blot skulle se på, medens andre vesteuropæiske producenter drog fordel deraf.
The understanding between them as to their respective spheres of influence in the United Kingdom and continental western Europe respectively was not the result of any altruism on Solvay's part but depended upon a complex interplay of interests.
Aftalen havde udelukkende til formål at opretholde status quo i begge producenters interesse.
The whole object of the arrangement was the maintenance of the status quo in the interests of the two producers.
I betragtning af, at eventuelle hemmelige aftaler ikke ville kunne håndhæves og kun ville blive overholdt, så længe det var i begge parters interesse, kan ICI meget vel have været forsigtig nok til ikke at nære fuld tillid til Solvay på dette punkt.
Given also that any collusive agreement would be unenforceable and would only be respected so long as it was in both parties' interests, ICI may well have been prudent not to trust Solvay entirely on this occasion.
Der er også omfattende beviser for, at ICI var bekymret for, at emballageglasproducenterne i Det Forenede Kongerige ville forsøge at få leveret billig soda fra det kontinentale Vesteuropa.
It is significant that since the institution of the proceedings in the present case, Solvay has started quoting to customers for delivering in the United Kingdom from Germany at prices which are competitive with those of ICI.
Ligeledes udelukker risikoen for »gengæld«, som Solvay og ICI angiver som årsag til, at de afholdt sig fra at trænge ind på hinandens »hjemmemarkeder«, på ingen måde, at der er tale om en aftale mellem dem.
Similarly, the possibility of 'retaliation' which Solvay and ICI claim as the reason for their respective abstention from each other's 'home market' in no way excludes the existence of any understanding between them.
Derimod blev det generelt accepteret af sodaindustrien, at »gengæld« var den normale sanktion for eventuelle brud på »hjemmemarkeds-«princippet; trusler om »gengæld« tjente således til at fremme det fortsatte samarbejde.
On the contrary, it was generally accepted by the industry that 'retaliation' was the normal sanction for any breach of the 'home market' principle: the threat of retaliation thus served to encourage continued cooperation.
Artikel 8S, stk. 1
Article 85 (1)
Før 1980 var prisen i Det Forenede Kongerige lavere end i det kontinentale Vesteuropa, men ICI solgte ikke
Before 1980 the United Kingdom price was lower than price levels in continental western Europe but ICI did not sell the product to other Member States.
I artikel 85, stk. l,er det fastsat, at alle aftaler mellem virksomheder og alle former for samordnet praksis,
Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty prohibits as incompatible with the common market all agreements between undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
91 der kan påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstater, og som har til formål eller til følge at hindre, begrænse eller fordreje konkurrencen inden for fællesmarkedet, er uforenelige med fællesmarkedet, og er forbudt, navnlig sådanne, som består i direkte eller indirekte fastsættelse af købspriser eller af andre forretningsbetingelser samt opdeling af markeder eller forsyningskilder. kilder.
91 or distortion of competition, and in particular those which directly or indirectly fix purchase prices or any other trading conditions and share markets or sources of supply.
Aftale/samordnet praksis
Agreement/concerted practice
Det vigtigste spørgsmål i denne forbindelse er, om den skarpe markedsopdeling og den manglende konkur rence mellem Solvay og ICI skyldes en udtrykkelig eller stiltiende hemmelig aftale mellem dem, eller om den skyldes uafhængige kommercielle beslutninger.
The main issue for present purposes is whether the rigid market separation and absence of competition between Solvay and ICI is the result of express or tacit collusion between them or whether it is the result of their independent business judgment.
Markedsopdelingen stammer fra en udtrykkelig aftale (Alkali Cartel, Page 1 000 osv.).
The market separation has its origins in an express agreement (the 'Alkali cartel', 'Page 1000', etc.).
Selv om aftalen formelt er blevet ophævet, er den opdeling, den medførte, ikke ændret i praksis, idet Solvay og ICI ikke konkurrerer med hinanden på noget EF-mar-ked.
Although that agreement has formally been terminated, the factual separation envisaged therein has continued up to the present: Solvay and ICI do not compete with each other in any Community market.
Unie m.fl. mod Kommissionen, gik Domstolen videre end ovenstående definition af samordnet praksis og udtalte, at kriterierne koordinering og samarbejde, der er fastlagt ved Domstolens retspraksis, og som på ingen måde kræver, at der udarbejdes en faktisk plan, skal ses på baggrund af det begreb, der ligger i Traktatens konkurrenceregler, nemlig at hver enkelt virksomhed uafhængigt skal fastlægge den forretningspolitik, den agter at føre på markedet.
In its later Judgment in relation to the European Sugar Cartel — Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission (3) — the Court of Justice in expanding upon the above definition of a concerted practice held that the criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law of the Court, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must be understood in the light of the concept, inherent in the provisions of the Treaty relating to competition, that each economic operator must determine independently the commercial policy which he intends to adopt in the market.
Dette krav om uafhængighed fratager ikke virksomhederne ret tighederne til at tilpasse sig efter deres konkurrenters faktiske eller formodede adfærd, men det udelukker absolut alle direkte eller indirekte kontakter mellem dem, når det har til formål eller til følge enten at øve indflydelse på en faktisk eller potentiel konkurrents markedsadfærd eller at afsløre over for en sådan konkurrent, hvilken adfærd de selv har vedtaget eller agter at vedtage.
This requirement of independence does not deprive undertakings of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or anticipated conduct of their competitors but it does strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between them the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.
»En aftale anses alene for stadig at have virkning såfremt det af deltagernes adfærd indirekte frem går, at der findes de for en aftale karakteristiske træk af samordning og koordinering, der fører til samme resultat som tilsigtet med den oprindelige aftale.«
It is not disputed by either of the two major Community producers that they each follow a deliberate policy of noncompetition by not marketing soda-ash in the territory of the-other. Nor do they deny that for both of them the whole point of the policy is that it is dependent upon the other producer making the same decision.
Kommissionen accepterer fuldt ud, at der ikke er noget direkte bevis på, at Solvay og ICI udtrykkelig har aftalt, at de fonsat vil overholde Page 1 000 i praksis.
The Commission fully accepts that there is no direct evidence of an express agreement between Solvay and ICI to continue to respect the 'Page 1000' cartel in practice.
I denne forbindelse er det ikke — som ICI hævder — nødvendigt for at der kan foreligge en overtrædelse, at det bevises, at handelen mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og de medlemsstater, hvor Solvay er etableret, ville have været betydelig, hvis ikke den påståede hemmelige aftale havde eksisteret.
In this connection it is not necessary, as ICI argues, that in order for an infringement to be found it has to be proved that but for the alleged collusion there would have been a substantial trade between the United Kingdom and the Member States where Solvay is established.
Det, der skal bevises, er, at de to producenter i praksis begyndte at
What has to be demonstrated is that the two producers in fact substituted practical
Det er dog ikke nødvendigt, at der foreligger en udtrykkelig aftale, for at artikel 8 kan finde anvendelse.
However there is no need for an express agreement in order for Article 85 to apply.
En stiltiende -aftale ville også falde ind under Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler.
A tacit agreement would also fall under Community competition law.
I betragtning af det udtrykkelige forbud mod samordnet praksis i artikel 85 er det dog unødvendigt i det foreliggende tilfælde at fastslå, om der faktisk forelå en udtrykkelig
Given the express prohibition in Article 85 against concerted practices, it is however unnecessary in the present case
Medens man kun kan gisne om, hvor stor handelen i så fald ville have været, er det sikkert, at en sådan handel ville have været kommer cielt gennemførlig i begge retninger.
While any assessment of the volume of trade which might have occurred is speculative, what is shown is that such trade was commercially feasible in both directions.
Hemmeligt samarbejde kan give sig udtryk på mange forskellige måder, og der behøver ikke at foreligge en formel aftale derom.
There are many forms and degrees of collusion and it does not require the making of a formal agreement.
Der kan meget vel være tale om en overtrædelse af artikel 85 i de tilfælde, hvor parterne ikke har indgået nogen aftale, men hvor det på grundlag af parternes adfærd over for hinanden kan sluttes, at der er tale om. gensidige forpligtelser.
An infringement of Article 85 may well exist where the parties have not even spelled out an agreement in terms but each infers commitment from the other on the basis of conduct.
I nærværende sag finder Kommissionen, at der af bevismaterialet fremgår følgende:
In the present case the Commission considers that the documentary evidence shows that:
Domstolens definition af samordnet praksis i dommen i Suiker Unie-sagen kan derfor fuldt ud dække ICI's og Solvays kommercielle adfærd.
The definition of the Court of Justice of a concerted practice as set out in its judgment in Suiker Unie is thus entirely apt to cover the commercial behaviour of ICI and Solvay.
a) den oprindelige markedsopdeling mellem Solvay og ICI var et resultat af en mangeårig, udtrykkelig aftale, hvoraf den seneste, kendte version var Page 1 000
(a) the original separation of markets between Solvay and ICI was the result of a long-standing and express agreement between them, the latest known version of which was 'Page 1000';
Kommissionen finder derfor, at den fortsatte opdeling af de nationale markeder mellem Solvay og ICI skyldes om ikke en egentlig aftale, så i hvert fald en samordnet praksis.
The Commission therefore finds that the continued division of national markets between Solvay and ICI results from and is referable at least to a concerted practice.
b) den formelle ophævelse af Page 1 000 i 1972 ændrede ikke i praksis den skarpe markedsopdeling mellem Solvay og ICI og afspejlede heller ikke nogen ændring deraf
(b) the formal termination of the 'Page 1000' agreement in 1972 did not result in or reflect any alteration in practice of the strict market separation between Solvay and ICI; on trade
(60) både Solvay og ICI var udmærket klar over, at de hver især fortsat fulgte den politik ikke at trænge ind på hinandens markeder, hvilket var til gavn for begge parter, nemlig dominans og kontrol over deres respektive markeder d) den enkelte producents beslutning om ikke at trænge ind på den andens marked afhang af, at den anden førte samme politik
(d) the policy of each producer of abstaining from the other's markets depended upon the other respecting the same policy;
Arrangementer mellem producenter, der har til formål eller til følge at beskytte nationale markeder, er udtrykkeligt forbudt i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 1, litra c).
Arrangements between producers which have the object or effect of protecting national markets are expressly prohibited by subparagraph (c) of Article 85 (1).
En sådan beskyttelse er i strid med et af Traktatens grundlæggende mål, nemlig etablering af et fælles marked.
Such protection is in fundamental conflict with one of the basic objectives of the Treaty, namely the creation of a common market.
I betragtning af de to virksomheders størrelse og deres betydning på sodamarkedet kan der ikke være tvivl om, at arrangementet havde en betydelig indvirkning på handelen mellem med lemsstaterne.
Given the size of the two undertakings concerned and their importance in the market for soda-ash, there can be no doubt that the arrangement had an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States.
Retsmidler og sanktioner der var hyppige kontakter mellem de to producen ter med henblik på at koordinere deres generelle sodapolitik og undgå interessekonflikter
Remedies and sanctions there were frequent contacts between the two producers designed to coordinate their global strategy in soda-ash and avoid any conflict between their respective interests;
(61) g) hele grundlaget for dette fortsatte partnerskab var en forståelse mellem parterne om, at forretningspolitikken, der gik helt tilbage til Brunner-Mond-æraen, skulle opretholdes, dvs. at de skulle anerkende hinandens eksklusive indflydelsessfærer. rer.
(g) the whole basis of this continued partnership was the shared understanding that the commercial policies dating from the 'Brunner, Mond' era, i.e. reciprocal recognition of exclusive spheres of operation, would be maintained.
Hvis Kommissionen konstaterer, at der foreligger en overtrædelse af artikel 85, kan den pålægge de delta gende virksomheder at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør, jf. artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17.
Where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of Article 85, it may require the undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to an end in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation No 17.
Det er højst usandsynligt, at der i dag ville blive udarbejdet noget skriftligt og detaljeret om en sådan
It is indeed extremely unlikely that, given the wellknown legal risks, any written resolution would nowadays be made recording the details of such an
Arrangementerne i det foreliggende tilfælde blev udtænkt og gennemført i hemmelighed, og begge virksomheder har fortsat benægtet, at de skulle have overtrådt artikel 85.
The arrangements in the present case were conceived and implemented in secret and both undertakings have continued to deny the existence of any infringement of Article 85.
Det er derfor uvist, om de definitivt har bragt det hemmelige samarbejde til ophor.
As a result, it is uncertain whether or not they have definitively put an end to the collusion.
Det er derfor nødvendigt at pålægge ICI og Solvay at bringe overtrædelsen til ophør omgående, jf. artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17.
It is therefore necessary, pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17, to require ICI and Solvay to bring the infringement to an immediate end.
Det skal også forbydes parterne at medvirke ved aftaler eller samordnet praksis med tilsvarende virkning. ning.
The parties must also be prohibited from any agreement or concerted practice having equivalent effect.
I henhold til artikel 15, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 17, kan Kommissionen ved en beslutning pålægge virksomheder bøder på mindst 1 000 og højst 1 000 000 ECU, idet sidstnævnte beløb dog kan forhøjes til 10 % af omsætningen i det sidste regnskabsår i hver af de virksomheder, som har medvirket ved overtrædelsen, såfremt de forsætligt eller uagtsomt overtræder artikel 85, stk. 1, eller artikel 86.
Under Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17, the Commission may by decision impose on undertakings fines of from ECU 1 000 to ECU 1 million, or a sum in excess thereof but not exceeding 10% of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 85 (1) or Article 86.