natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Bestemmelserne i kautionsaftalen, der fandtes i en standardformular fra banken, indeholdt følgende klausul »... le tribunal dans le ressort duquel cette agence est située sera seul compétent pour statuer sur tout ce qui concerne l'exécution des présentes, quelle que soit la partie défenderesse [retten i den retskreds, hvor afdelingen er beliggende, er enekompetent til at påkende alle tvister om aftalens opfyldelse uden hensyn til, hvem der sagsøges]«.
The terms of the guarantee agreement, which were set out on a printed form provided by the bank, included a clause providing that '... le tribunal dans Ie ressort duquel cette agence est située sera seul compétent pour statuer sur tout ce qui concerne l'exécution des présentes, quelle que soit la partie défenderesse [the court within whose jurisdiction that branch is situated shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters concerning the performance of this agreement, irrespective of who is the defendant]'.
Da skyldneren ikke kunne betale, anlagde sagsøgeren sag mod sagsøgte som kautionist ved Landgericht Saarbrücken.
When the debtor became insolvent, the bank brought an action against the guarantor in the Landgericht Saarbrücken.
Sagsøgte gjorde indsigelse mod rettens kompetence med den begrundelse, at kautionsaftalen gjorde retten i Sarreguemines enekompetent.
The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Landge­richt on the ground that the guarantee conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the court of Sarreguemines.
Efter at Landgericht havde givet sagsøgte medhold, fandt Oberlandesgericht, hvortil afgørelsen var appelleret af sagsøgeren, at den pågældende klausul alene begunstigede sagsøgeren, hvorfor den måtte antages kun at være aftalt til fordel for denne, jfr. konventionens artikel 17, stk. 3. Den ophævede derfor dommen og hjemviste sagen til Landgericht.
The Landgericht upheld the defendant's arguments but on appeal the Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken took the view that the clause in question was advant­ageous only to the plaintiff and was therefore to be regarded as having been agreed for the benefit of that party alone within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 17.
i) Processprog: tysk.
Language of the case: German.
I anmodningen om en præjudiciel afgørelse anførte Bundesgerichtshof, at Oberlandesgericht forudsætningsvis havde antaget, at enhver klausul, der henlægger kompetencen til retterne i den stat, hvor en af parterne har bopæl, i henhold til den nævnte bestemmelse må forstås således, at den kun er aftalt til fordel for denne part.
In its request for a preliminary ruling, the Bundesgerichtshof stated that the Oberlandesgericht's decision was based on the view that any agreement conferring jurisdiction on the courts of the State in which one of the parties was domiciled was to be regarded as having been concluded for the benefit ofthat party alone within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Convention.
For at få afgjort, om denne antagelse var holdbar, forelagde Bundesgerichtshof følgende spørgsmål:
In order to determine whether that conclusion as well founded, the Bundesgerichtshof referred the following question to the Court:
»Må det antages, at en værnetingsaftale 'kun er indgået til fordel for én af parter ne', jfr. domskonventionens artikel 17, stk. 3, når forholdet alene er det, at parterne i henhold til domskonventionens artikel 17, stk. 1, gyldigt har aftalt, at den internationale kompetence tilkommer en ret eller retterne i en kontraherende stat, på hvis område denne part har sin bopæl?«
'Is an agreement conferring jurisdiction to be regarded as "concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties" within the meaning of the third paragraph of Ar ticle 17 of the Convention where all that is established is that the parties have effectively agreed, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 17, that a court or the courts of the Contracting State in which that party is domiciled are to have in ternational jurisdiction?'
Domstolen udtalte herom (i præmisserne 13 —16):
The Court stated (paragraphs 13 to 16 of the decision) that:
»13 Det skal indledningsvis fremhæves, at konventionens artikel 17, der findes i afsnit II, afdeling 6 med overskriften 'Aftaler om Kompetence', gør det muligt for parter ne inden for de af bestemmelsens stk. 2 opstillede grænser efter fælles aftale at vælge en ret eller retterne i en kontraherende stat.
'13 It should be pointed out in the first place that Article 17 of the Convention, which appears in Section 6 of Title II headed "Prorogation of jurisdiction", allows the parties, within the limits laid down by the second paragraph of that provision, to choose by mutual agreement a court or the courts of a Contracting State.
Parterne kan således udpege en ret som kompetent, uanset at den efter konventionens almindelige eller særlige be stemmelser ikke er det, eller udelukke kompetencen for en ret, der normalt er kom petent i medfør af disse regler.
The par ties may thus confer jurisdiction on courts which would not have jurisdiction under the general or special provisions of the Convention or exclude the jurisdiction of courts which would normally have jurisdiction under those rules.
Artikel 17, stk. 1, fastsætter enekompetence for den ret eller de retter, der er udpeget ved klausulen, mens stk. 3 sikrer den part, til hvis fordel klausulen er aftalt, ret til at anlægge sag ved enhver anden ret, der er kompetent efter konventionen.
According to the first paragraph of Article 17, the jurisdiction of a court or courts designated by a jurisdiction clause is exclusive, whilst the third paragraph of that article maintains the right of the party for whose benefit the clause was agreed to institute proceed ings in any other court having jurisdiction under the Convention.
14 Da konventionens artikel 17 knæsætter princippet om partsautonomien, skal be stemmelsens stk. 3 fortolkes således, at parternes fælles vilje ved indgåelse af aftalen bør respekteres.
14 Since Article 17 of the Convention embodies the principle of the parties' autonomy to determine the court or courts with jurisdiction, the third paragraph ofthat provision must be interpreted in such a way as to respect the parties' common intention when the contract was concluded.
Følgelig skal parternes fælles vilje til at begunstige den ene part klart fremgå, enten af klausulens ordlyd, eller af den helhed af holdepunkter, som fremgår af kontrakten eller omstændighederne omkring dens indgåelse.
The common intention to confer an advantage on one of the parties must therefore be clear from the terms of the jurisdiction clause or from all the evidence to be found therein or from the circumstances in which the contract was concluded.
15 Klausuler, der udtrykkeligt angiver den part, til hvis fordel de er aftalt, og klausuler, der uanset at de angiver, hvilke retter hver part skal indstævne den anden for, dog giver den ene af parterne større frihed ved valget af værneting, må således an tages at være klausuler, som ifølge deres ordlyd kun er aftalt til fordel for én af par terne.
15 Clauses which expressly state the name of the party for whose benefit they were agreed and those which, whilst specifying the courts in which either party may sue the other, give one of them a wider choice of courts must be regarded as clauses whose wording shows that they were agreed for the exclusive benefit of one of the parties.
KONVENTION AF 27.9.1968 ­ ARTIKEL 17, STK. 3
CONVENTION OF 27. 9.
(fortsat 2) i en lignende sag i en dom af 10. december 1982 — 8 O 57/82 (IPRspr. 1982, nr. 149; kommentar af Jayme i IPRax 1984, 160).
The Landgericht Giessen came to the same conclusion in a similar case in a judgment of 10 December 1982 — 8 O 57/82 (IPRspr. 1982, No 149; Note: Jayme, IPRax 1984, 160).
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — aftalen kun indgået til fordel for en af parter­ne — begreb — sammenhæng med en anden aftale mellem parterne
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Agreement concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties — Definition — Connection with another agreement between the parties
Kompetence — specielle kompetenceregler — modfordring (artikel 6, nr. 3) — betin­gelser
Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Counterclaim (Art. 6(3)) — Conditions
To tyske forsikringsselskaber (i det følgende benævnt »forsikringsselskaberne«) indgik på én og samme dag i Hamburg to aftaler med en nederlandsk virksomhed, Computer Hardware, om gensidig levering af computere. Ifølge den ene aftale solgte forsikrings­selskaberne to computere til Computer Hardware (aftale nr. 1), ifølge den anden solgte sidstnævnte tre computere til forsikringsselskaberne (aftale nr. 2).
Two German insurance companies concluded in Hamburg on the same day two con­tracts with a Netherlands undertaking, Computer Hardware, whereby under one con­tract the insurance companies sold two computers to Computer Hardware (Contract No 1) and under the other Computer Hardware sold three computers to the insurance companies (Contract No 2).
Begge aftaler inde­holdt klausulerne »Hamburg er opfyldelsessted for levering af maskinerne« samt »op­fyldelsesstedet er værneting«.
Both contracts contained the clauses 'Hamburg shall be the place of performance for the supply of the computers' and 'the courts for the place of performance shall have jurisdiction'.
Forsikringsselskaberne anlagde sag ved Rechtbank Amsterdam med påstand om beta­ling af restkøbesummen for de varer, der var leveret til modparten i medfør af aftale nr. 1. Computer Hardware gjorde i første række gældende, at Rechtbank savnede kom­petence, da Hamburg var aftalt som værneting.
The insurance companies brought an action in the Arrondissementsrechtbank, Amster­dam, for the balance of the purchase price of the goods supplied to the other party under Contract No 1.
Uden denne værnetingsaftale kunne Compu­ter Hardware nemlig ikke, hvis der blev anlagt sag mod firmaet på grund af manglende
In the alternative, in the event that the court accepted jurisdic­ lssue ¡/February 1993
(fortsat 1) opfyldelse af en af de to aftaler, gøre en modfordring, der beroede på den anden aftale, gældende ved samme ret.
It was to be presumed that there was a connection between the two contracts and that the Netherlands party to the contract also had an interest in the agreement conferring jurisdiction in the event of disputes which might arise out of Contract No 1 or Contract No 2.
Ifølge konventionens artikel 6, nr. 3, er en rets kompetence til at påkende en modfordring nemlig begrænset til tilfælde, hvor modfordringen støttes på samme kontrakt eller samme forhold som hovedfordringen.
Under Article 6(3) of the Convention the jurisdiction to enter­tain a counterclaim is limited to cases where the counterclaim is based on the same con­tract or facts as the original claim.
Denne betingelse ville ikke være opfyldt i tilfælde, hvor modfordringen netop støttedes på den anden aftale.
That condition would not be satisfied if the counter­claim was based on the other contract.
Gerechtshof anførte endvidere, at det var uden betydning, om det fulgte af værnetings­klausulens ordlyd, at parterne havde villet bestemme, at klausulen skulle have den virk­ning, at den udelukkede andre værneting. Det afgørende var, om værnetingsaftalen kun var indgået til fordel for en af parterne.
The Gerechtshof further stated that it was irrelevant whether it was apparent from the wording of the jurisdiction clause that the parties had intended to give it exclusive ef­fect; the decisive factor was whether the agreement conferring jurisdiction had been concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties.
Ved dom af 4. februar 1983, NJ 1983, nr. 547, stadfæstede Hoge Raad der Nederlanden den ovenfor gengivne afgørelse, idet den tilsluttede sig den af Gerechtshof foretagne fortolkning af artikel 17, stk. 3, og artikel 6, nr. 3.
By judgment of 4 February 1983, NJ 1983, No 547, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden dismissed an appeal in cassation against the above decision inasmuch as it followed the Gerechtshofs interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 17 and of Article 6(3).
Vedrørende sidstnæ/nte bestemmelse havde generaladvokat Franx i sit forslag til afgørelse gjort gældende, at det var så klart, hvordan bestemmelserne skulle fortolkes, at det ikke var nødvendigt at forelægge sagen til præjudiciel afgørelse, jfr. Domstolens dom af 6. oktober 1982 i sag 283/81 (CILFIT mod Ministero della sanità, Sml. 3415).
As far as Article 6(3) was concerned, Advocate General Franx took the view in his Opinion that its interpretation was so obvious within the meaning of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 6 October 1982 in Case 283/81 (CILFITv Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415) that a reference for a preliminary rul­ing was unnecessary.
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — sagsøgtes møde i sagen (artikel 18) — bestri­delse af kompetencen og nedlæggelse af subsidiær påstand vedrørende realiteten — indebærer ikke kompetence f or retten
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Entry of appearance by the defendant (Art. 18) — Claim of lack of jurisdiction and in the alternative entry of appearance in the main proceedings — No appearance forming a basis f or jurisdiction
Almindelige bestemmelser — en parts bopæl i den stat, f or hvis domstole sagen er ind­bragt (artikel 52) — afgøres efter denne stats lovgivning — ingen betydning, om parten har endnu en bopæl
General provisions — One party domiciled in the State whose courts are seised (Art. 52) — Determination in accordance with the law applied by the court seised — Existence of a further place of domicile immaterial
Kompetence — sager om forbrugerkontrakter (artikel 13ff.) — købekontrakt, hvor­efter købesummen skal betales i rater, i forbindelse med erhvervsmæssig virksomhed — ikke »køb, hvor købesummen skal betales irater«, i konventionens forstand
Jurisdiction — Consumer contracts (Art. 13 et seq.,) — Contract of sale with agree­ment on payment by instalments in connection with a trade or profession — Not a 'contract of sale on instalment credit terms' within the meaning of the Convention
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — værnetingsklausul i almindelige forretnings­betingelser — bestanddel af kontrakten — ingen prøvelse af dette spørgsmål efter kon­ventionens artikel 17 — spørgsmålet afgøres efter den lovgivning, som skal anvendes ifølge kollisionsnormerne i den stat, hvor sagen er anlagt
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Jurisdiction clause in the general condi­tions of business — Inclusion in the contract — No examination under Article 17 of the Convention — Law applicable under the conflict rules of the law of the State of the court seised determinant
Kompetence — aftale om kompetence — aftalen kun indgået til fordel for én af parter­ne — begreb — parternes fælles vilje afgørende
Jurisdiction — Prorogation of jurisdiction — Agreement concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties — Concept — Common intention of the parties determinant
Sagsøgte driver en iscafé i Neuwied (Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland) og har i flere år haft en bolig der, li­gesom han har opholdstilladelse i Tyskland.
The court went on to rule that jurisdiction could not be founded on the fact that the de­fendant had entered an appearance (Art. 18 of the Convention).
Købesummen skulle betales i tre rater, henholds­vis ved meddelelsen af ordren, leveringen og »i løbet af sæsonen«. Under den i Tysk­land anlagte sag gjorde sagsøgeren en restfordring gældende.
The defendant, however, had entered an appearance solely in order to contest jurisdiction and thereby maintained his objec­tion of lack of jurisdiction (second sentence of Art. 18).
Sagsøgte fremsatte først og fremmest den indsigelse, at den ret, ved hvilken sagen var anlagt, savnede interna­tional kompetence, og tog kun for en sikkerheds skyld stilling til realiteten. Landge­richts afgørelse, hvorved sagen afvistes, blev stadfæstet i appelinstansen.
Equally according to the case­law of the Court, that could not be altered by the fact that the defendant had at the same time expressed views regarding the case, in view of the fact that he had done so as a precautionary measure and only after raising the objection of lack of jurisdiction.
Uden at henvise til overgangsbestemmelserne i artikel 34, stk. 1, i tiltrædelseskonven­tionen af 9. oktober 1978 anførte Oberlandesgericht for det første, at den nye affattelse af konventionen i henhold til tiltrædelseskonventionen fandt anvendelse i sagen.
The defendant's objection of lack of jurisdiction, however, could not be upheld on the ground that he had no place of domicile in the area covered by the jurisdiction of the court.
Den­ne nye affattelse havde siden den 1. november 1986 også været gældende i forholdet mellem Forbundsrepublikken og Italien, og det sidste retsmøde fandt sted efter dette tidspunkt.
That question, which had, according to the first paragraph of Article 52 of the Convention, to be decided under German law, required to be answered under Para­graph 7 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Code].
Retten anførte herefter, at den ikke var blevet kompetent, ved at sagsøgte havde givet møde for den (konventionens artikel 18).
Under that provision, a person makes a place his place of residence or domicile if he settles there permanently, that is to say, with the intention in law of making that place the centre or principal location of his activities.
Et sådant fremmøde kunne efter Domstolens praksis ganske vist også skabe kompetence, når parterne forinden i medfør af artikel 17 gyldigt havde aftalt, at retten i Treviso skulle have kompetencen, men sagsøgte havde kun givet møde for at bestride rettens kompetence og havde dermed opretholdt indsi­gelsen om rettens manglende kompetence (artikel 18, andet punktum).
That, the court held, was the case with regard to the defendant, who had for many years lived with his family in Germany from early in the year to late autumn, was registered with the German police and managed his ice­cream cafe in Germany.
Efter Domsto­lens praksis gjorde det heller ingen forskel, at sagsøgte samtidig havde taget stilling til realiteten, da han kun havde gjort det for en sikkerheds skyld og først efter at have fremsat indsigelsen om manglende kompetence.
The fact that the defendant might also have a place of domicile in Italy, and conse­quently dual domicile, was, in the court's view, immaterial.
Retten anførte, at den dog ikke kunne tage sagsøgtes indsigelse om manglende kompe­tence til følge med den begrundelse, at sagsøgte eventuelt ikke havde bopæl inden for retskredsen.
The question to be decided was thus whether the parties had rendered jurisdiction based on domicile inoperative by way of a jurisdiction agreement.
Dette spørgsmål, som i henhold til konventionens artikel 52, stk. 1, skal af­gøres efter tysk ret, skal afklares på grundlag af § 7 i Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
Such an agreement would not be ineffective simply on the ground that it might be contrary to the provision contained in Article 15 of the Convention (Art. 17, second paragraph, old version, third paragraph, new version).
Efter denne bestemmelse opnår en person bopæl på det sted, hvor han slår sig ned for en længere periode, dvs. med »retshandelsvilje« til at gøre stedet til midtpunktet eller tyngdepunktet for sine livsinteresser.
The reason for this was that the contract concluded by the parties was neither a matter relating to an instalment sale or loan within the meaning of the old version of Article 13 nor a consumer contract within the meaning of Article 13, as amended.
Dette var tilfældet for sagsøgtes vedkommende, idet han i årevis sammen med sin familie fra foråret til slutningen af efteråret har boet i Tyskland, hvor han har opholdstilladelse og driver sin iscafé.
Although the cafe equipment was to be paid for in three instalments, the Court of Justice had made it clear with regard to the old version of the Convention that the provision had to be construed narrowly in the light of its purpose of protecting a specific group of purchasers and that the privileged jurisdiction of the place of domicile of the purchaser was for that reason to be confined exclusively to purchasers who re­quired protection and whose vulnerability as end consumers was the principal feature of their economic position.
Det var ikke nødvendigt at tage stilling til, om sagsøgte derudover også havde bopæl i Italien, altså havde bopæl to steder.
The defendant, the court held, could not be included among this group of purchasers, even though he might, in economic terms, be the weaker party vis­à­vis the plaintiff, since he had concluded the contract in the course of his trade or profession.
Retten fastslog herefter, at værnetingsklausulen i sagsøgerens almindelige forretnings­betingelser opfyldte formkravene i såvel den tidligere som den nye affattelse af arti­kel 17.
The court held that the jurisdiction clause contained in the plaintiffs general condi­tions of business satisfied the formal requirements of Article 17, in both its original and amended versions.
Et andet spørgsmål var imidlertid, om klausulen også var blevet en bestanddel af kontrakten.
However, the question whether that clause had also become part of the contract was a separate issue.
Dette spørgsmål skulle ikke afgøres efter artikel 17, men efter den lov­givning, som skulle anvendes efter den internationale privatret i den stat, hvor sagen var anlagt.
That question did not fall to be answered under Ar­ticle 17 but rather under national law as determined by the private international law of the State of the court seised.
Det fremgik af den italienske lovgivning (artikel 1341 f. i Codice civile) — der herefter som lovgivningen pá det sted, hvor den ydelse, der var karakteristisk for kontrakten, skulle erlægges, var den lovgivning, der skulle anvendes — at værnetings­aftaler i almindelige forretningsbetingelser kun bliver gyldige, når de udtrykkeligt bekræftes skriftligt af den part, de er til skade for. Dette var imidlertid sket i den fore­liggende sag.
According to Article 1341 et seq. of the Italian Civil Code (Italian law being the law governing the performance characteristic of the contract), agreements on jurisdiction in general conditions of business could be effective only if they were expressly confirmed in writing by the contracting party on whom they were imposed.
Endelig var aftalen heller ikke kun blevet indgået til fordel for sagsøgeren, således at denne i medfør af konventionens artikel 17, stk. 3, i den tidligere affattelse, henholdsvis stykke 4 i den nye, havde bevaret retten til at anlægge sagen ved retten i den stat, hvor sagsøgte havde bopæl.
Finally, the agreement had not been concluded exclusively for the plaintiffs benefit, with the result that the plaintiff would, under Article 17, third paragraph (old version), fourth paragraph (new version), have retained the right to bring proceedings before the courts for the place in which the defendant was domiciled.
Denne bestemmelse skal nemlig efter Domstolens praksis fortol­kes således, at parternes fælles vilje ved indgåelsen af aftalen respekteres.
According to the case­law of the Court of Justice, that provision had to be interpreted in a manner which complied with the declared common intention of the parties.
Det afgøren­de er ikke, hvilken part der i det konkrete tilfælde objektivt begunstiges som følge af værnetingsklausulen, men alene, om kontrahenterne har villet begunstige en af parter­ne.
The issue was not which party might objectively benefit, in the event of a dispute, from the agreement on jurisdiction; it was simply whether the contracting parties had intended to benefit one or other of them­selves.
Det fremgik ikke af den omtvistede aftales ordlyd, at der forelå en sådan fælles vilje, og det kunne heller ikke udledes af aftalen eller omstændighederne omkring afta­lens indgåelse.
Such a common intention could not be gleaned from the wording of the dis­puted agreement and could not be inferred from the contract or from the circumstances attendant on its conclusion.