natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Spørgsmålet var stillet som led i en sag, som Biehl, der er tysk statsborger, lønmodtager, og som indtil oktober 1983 havde bopæl i Storhertugdømmet Luxembourg, havde anlagt mod de luxembourgske skattemyndigheder til prøvelse af en afgørelse, hvorved myndighederne havde afvist at tilbagebetale ham for meget indeholdt indkomstskat vedrørende skatteåret 1983, idet det anførtes, at Biehl havde forladt Storhertugdømmet i løbet af det nævnte år for at tage bopæl andetsteds, hvilket i henhold til artikel 154, stk. 6, i den luxembourgske lov om indkomstskat indebar, at beløbet ikke kunne kræves tilbagebetalt.
That question was raised in a dispute between Klaus Biehl, a German national and employed person residing in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg until October 1983, and the Tax Department of the Grand Duchy concerning the refusal of the department in question to refund to him the overpayment of income tax for the 1983 fiscal year because Mr Biehl left the Grand Duchy in the course of 1983 to take up residence elsewhere, which meant that he lost entitlement to a refund pursuant to Article 154 (6) of the Luxembourg Income Tax Law.
Biehl gjorde gældende, at den nævnte bestemmelse er udtryk for en skjult for skelsbehandling af skattepligtige personer, som er forbudt efter fællesskabsretten, idet bestemmelsen i overvejende grad finder anvendelse på skattepligtige personer, der ikke har luxembourgsk nationalitet.
According to Mr Biehl, the article in question created positive discrimination which infringed Community law inasmuch as the provision applied principally to taxpayers who are not Luxembourg nationals.
Domstolen bemærkede hertil, at selv om bestemmelsen uden forskel finder anvendelse uanset den berørte skattepligtige persons nationalitet, vil en anvendelse af kriteriet om permanent bopæl på luxembourgsk område som betingelse for en eventuel tilbagebetaling af for meget indeholdt skat ofte og navnlig være til skade for skattepligtige personer, der er statsborgere i andre medlemsstater.
The Court pointed out in that regard that, even though it applied independently of the nationality of the taxpayer in question, the condition that the taxpayer must be permanently resident in the national territory in order to obtain any refund of an overpayment of tax risked penalizing, in particular, taxpayers who were nationals of other Member States; it was often they who would leave the country during the year or who would take up residence there.
Netop sådanne statsborgere vil ofte forlade eller tage bopæl i landet i løbet af året, og Ønsket om at sikre, at skatten opkræves progressivt, kunne ikke antages at begrunde en national bestemmelse som den omtvistede.
Concern to ensure that taxation was progressive was not sufficient to justify a national provision such as the one at issue.
Domstolen besvarede spørgsmålet således:
The Court ruled as follows:
"Det er i strid med Traktatens artikel 48, stk. 2, såfremt indeholdelser af skat i løn mv. over for en EF-statsborger, som kun er skattepligtig som hjemmehørende i en medlemsstat en del af året, enten fordi han tager bopæl dér eller forlader den i løbet af skatteåret, ifølge den pågældende stats skattelovgivning tilfalder statskassen og ikke kan kræves tiIbagebetalt."
"Article 48 (2) of the Treaty prohibits a Member State from providing in its tax legislation that sums deducted by way of tax from the salaries and wages of employed persons who are nationals of a Member State and are resident taxpayers during part of the year only because they take up residence in the country or leave it during the course of the tax year are to remain the property of the Treasury and cannot
Generaladvokat Marco Damon fremsatte forslag til afgørelse den 24. januar 1990.
He proposed that the Court should rule as follows:
Han foreslog følgende besvarelse: "Det er i strid «ed Traktatens artikel 48, stk. 1 og 2, og Rådets forordning nr. 1612/68, såfremt indeholdelser af skat i løn mv. over for en EF-statsborger, som kun er skattepligtig som hjemmehørende i en medlemsstat en del af året, enten fordi han tager bopæl dér eller forlader den i løbet af skatteåret, ifølge den pågældende stats lovgivning tilfalder statskassen og ikke kan kræves tilbagebetalt".
"Article 48 (1) and (2) of the Treaty and Regulation No. 1612/68 of the Council preclude a Member State from providing in its tax legislation that sums deducted by way of tax from the salaries and wages of employed persons who are nationals of a Member State and resident taxpayers during part of the year only because they take up residence in the country or leave it during the course of the tax year are to remain the property of the Treasury and cannot be refunded".
(Præjudiciel) "Fri bevægelighed for personer - social sikring - ydelser ved arbejdsløshed" (Første Afdeling)
Case C-163/89: Office National de l'Emploi (ONEM) ν Antonio di Conti - 10 May 1990 (Reference for a preliminary ruling) (Free movement of persons - Social security - Unemployment benefits) (First Chamber)
Ved dom af 28. april 1989, indgået til Domstolen den 9. maj s.a., havde Cour du travail de Liège forelagt et spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af artikel 69, stk. 4, i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71.
By judgment of 28 April 1989, which arrived at the Court on 9 May 1989, the Cour du Travail de Liège referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling a question on the interpretation of Article 69 (4) of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71.
Artikel 69, stk. 4, indeholder en særlig bestemmelse, hvorefter en arbejdsløs, som vender tilbage til den kompetente stat efter udløbet af en frist på 3 måneder, jfr. artikel 69, stk. 1, litra c), generhverver retten til ydelser, såfremt den kompetente stat er Belgien.
That paragraph contained a special provision on an unemployed person who requalified for benefits on returning to the competent State after the expiry of the three month time limit, referred to in Article 69 (1) (c) of the regulation, where the competent State was Belgium.
Den italienske statsborger Antonio di Conti, der oppebar arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse i Belgien, indgav en ansøgning om fortsat, i henhold til artikel 69 i forordning nr. 1408/71, i en periode af 3 måneder at modtage disse ydelser Italien, hvor han havde besluttet sig til at rejse hen for at søge arbejde. Ansøgningen blev imødekommet.
Mr di Conti, an Italian national receiving unemployment benefits in Belgium, claimed and was granted entitlement under Article 69 of Regulation No. 1408/71 to continue to receive the benefits in question for three months in Italy where he had decided to go to seek employment.
Efter udløbet af den fastsatte frist tog di Conti igen ophold i Belgien.
Mr di Conti returned to Belgium after the expiry of the prescribed time limit.
Han genoptog her sit erhverv og ansøgte om understøttelse som delvis arbejdsløs.
He resumed his occupation and claimed partial unemployment benefits.
ONEM afslog denne ansøgning med den begrundelse, at di Conti ganske vist havde haft beskæftigelse i Betgien, i en periode af mere end 3 måneder, hvilket er det krav, der stilles i artikel 69, stk. 4, i forordning nr. 1408/71 for at generhverve retten til ydelser i dette land, men at han ikke havde tilbagelagt den venteperiode, som ifølge belgisk lovgivning generelt kræves for at generhverve retten til arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse.
The ONEM refused to grant him those benefits on the ground that, even though Mr di Conti had been employed in Belgium for more than three months, as required by Article 69 (4) of Regulation No. 1408/71 in order to requalify for benefits in Belgium, he did not satisfy the probation conditions which Belgian legislation generally imposed for the acquisition of the right to unemployment benefits.
"Artikel 69, stk. 4, i forordning (EØF) nr. 1408/71 af 14. juni 1971 om anvendelse af sociale sikringsordninger på arbejdstagere, selvstændige erhvervsdrivende og deres familiemedlemmer, der flytter inden for Fællesskabet, som affattet ved forordning (EØF) nr. 2001/83 af 2. juni 1983, skal fortolkes således, at en arbejdsløs, hvis kompetente stat i denne bestemmelses forstand er Belgien, og som i henhold til den i
"Article 69 (4) of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of 14 July 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community, as amended by Regulation (EEC) No. 2001/83 of 2 June
- 5 - samme bestemmelse fastsatte ordning tager ophold i en anden medlemsstat for dér at søge beskæftigelse og først vender tilbage til Belgien efter den frist på 3 måneder, der er fastsat i artikel 69, stk. 1, litra c), i medfør af artikel 69, stk. 4, generhverver retten tit ydelser ved arbejdsløshed efter den belgiske ordning alene under den forudsætning, at han dets fortsat er ydelsesberettiget i henhold til belgisk lov, dels har været beskæftiget en periode af mindst tre måneder, efter at han igen har taget ophold i Belgien."
1983, is to be interpreted as meaning that an unemployed person whose competent State, within the meaning of that Article, is Belgium and who goes to another Member State in order to seek employment there, in accordance with the provisions of Article 69, and returns to Belgium only after the expiry of the period of three months laid down in Article 69 (1) (c) requalifies for benefits under the Belgian unemployment benefits scheme, pursuant to Article 69 (4), on condition only that he has retained the status of a recipient under Belgian legislation and that he has been unemployed for at least three months since his return to Belgium".
Generaladvokat Carl Otto Lenz fremsatte forslag til afgørelse den 7. marts vm:
Mr Advocate General CO. Lenz delivered his Opinion at the sitting on 7 March 1990.
Generaladvokaten foreslog følgende besvarelse af det forelagte spørgsmål:
He proposed that the Court should rule as follows:
"Artikel 69, stk. 4, i forordning nr. 1408/71 indeholder en undtagelsesbestemmelse, der er vedtaget under hensyntagen til artikel 123 i kongelig anordning af 20. december 1963.
"Article 69 (4) of Regulation No. 1408/71 contains a derogation adopted in view of Article 123 of the Royal Decree of 20 December 1963.
Såfremt en arbejdsløs, som i den her foreliggende sag, efter den fastsatte frist vender tilbage til Belgien efter at have opholdt sig i et andet land, afhænger muligheden for at generhverve den ret til ydelser ved arbejdsløshed, som han som følge heraf har mistet, jfr. artikel 69, stk. 2, alene af, om han forinden har været beskæftiget i Belgien i mindst 3 måneder".
In a situation such as that under consideration, the only condition it laid down for the recovery of a right to unemployment benefit which was lost per se under Article 69 (2) on account of a late return from another Member State, was a prior period of employment of at least three months".
Ved dom af 9. december 1988, indgået til Domstolen den 15. december s.a., stillede Nederlandenes Hoge Raad tre præjudicielle spørgsmål vedrørende for tolkningen af artikel 6, nr. 2, i konventionen af 27. september 1968 om retternes kompetence og om fuldbyrdelse af retsafgørelser i borgerlige sager, herunder handelssager.
By judgment of 9 December 1988, received at the Court on 15 December 1988, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden referred for a preliminary ruling three questions on the interpretation of Article 6 (2) of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
Disse spørgsmål er blevet rejst under en sag mellem selskaberne Hagen, Düsseldorf, og Zeehaghe, Haag.
Those questions had arisen In proceedings between the companies Hagen, whose registered office was in Düsseldorf, and Zeehaghe, whose registered office was in The Hague.
Efter at Hagen havde annulleret den reservation af et stort antal hotelværelser, som selskabet havde foretaget hos Zeehaghe på anmodning af selskabet Schuhgilde, Düsseldorf, og på dettes regning, indstævnede Zeehaghe Hagen for Rechtbank, Haag, og krævede betaling af et vist beløb med renter og omkostninger for manglende opfyldelse af kontraktlige forpligtelser.
Following the cancellation by Hagen of the reservation for a large number of hotel rooms which it had made with Zeehaghe, at the request and on behalf of the Schuhgilde company from Düsseldorf, Zeehaghe summoned Hagen to appear before the Rechtbank, The Hague, and demanded payment of a sum of money, plus interests and costs, because of its failure to carry out its contractual obligations.
Hagen nedlagde påstand om, at den ret, sagen var indbragt for, erklærede sig inkompetent til at påkende kravet, subsidiært, at Schuhgilde blev adciteret som mandant for at svare på kravet om at opfylde garantiforpligtelsen.
Hagen claimed that that court should declare that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim and, in the alternative,
Da Rechtbank ikke gav Hagen medhold i kravet om adcitation af tredjemanden, for at denne kunne svare på kravet om opfyldelse af garantiforpligtelsen, idet retten fandt at en efterkommeise ville sinke og komplicere hovedsagen, appellerede Hagen denne dom til Gerechtshof, Haag, og gjorde gældende, at konventionens artikel 6, nr. 2, forpligter den ret, hvor den oprindelige sag er anlagt, til at tillade adcitation af garanten.
The Rechtbank rejected the preliminary objection to an action on a guarantee on the ground that any consideration of that objection would have delayed and complicated the main proceedings. Hagen appealed against that decision to the Gerechtshof, The Hague, on the ground that Article 6 (2) of the Convention obliged the court seised of the original proceedings to grant leave for the claim in guarantee to be brought.
Gerechtshof forkastede dette anbringende og stadfæstede Rechtbanks afgørelse; Hagen appellerede derefter denne dom til Nederlandenes Hoge Raad.
The Gerechtshof rejected that submission and confirmed the judgment of the Rechtbank, whereupon Hagen brought a further appeal to the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden.
(Præjudiciel) "Beskatning - moms - afgiftspligtige personer - offentligretlige organer" (Første Afdeling)
Case C-4/89: Comune di Carpaneto Piacentino and Others ν Ufficio Provinciale Imposta sul Valore Aggiunto di Piacenza - 15 May 1990 (Reference for a preliminary ruling) (Taxation - Value added tax - Concept of taxable person - Public bodies) (First Chamber)
Ved kendelse af 22. december 1988, indgået til Domstolen den 5. januar 1989, havde Commissione Tributaria di Io grado di Piacenza anmodet Domstolen om at afgøre en række præjudicielle spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af artikel 4, stk. 5, i Rådets sjette direktiv 77/388/EØF.
By order of 22 December 1988, which was received at the Court Registry on 5 January 1989, the Commissione Tributaria di Primo Grado di Piacenza [First Instance Tax Board, Piacenza] referred a number of questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC
Disse spørgsmål var blevet rejst under en sag mellem den nævnte kommune og Provinsen Piacenza's Momskontor, hvorunder det skulle afgøres, om følgende af kommunen gennemførte transaktioner er momspligtige: koncession på kirkegårdsareal og gravsteder, overdragelse af forskelligt gravstedstiIbehØr, overdragelse af byggegrunde til socialt boligbyggeri samt bevilling fremdeles på området for socialt boligbyggeri af overfladerettigheder vedrørende byggegrunde, indtægter for drift af vandledning, indtægter i opkravet afgift for offentlig vejning, salg af hydraulisk genvindingsmateriale, salg af tiloversblevent vejmateriel og salg af træ fra beskæring af vejtræer.
Those questions were raised in a dispute between the municipality and the public body referred to above concerning the classification for purposes of liability to value added tax of the following transactions carried out by the local authorities: concessions in respect of graves and vaults in cemeteries; sale of various fittings for vaults; sale of building land for subsidized housing and concessions in respect of rights over building land in connexion with subsidized housing; contribution towards the payment of expenses incurred in Installing waterworks; fees received for the concession to operate the public weighbridge; sale of salvaged plumbing material; sale of residual pieces of roadway; and sale of wood obtained from the lopping of trees lining paths.
Disse spørgsmål var i alt væsentligt de samme som dem, der var genstand for Domstolens dom af 17. oktober 1989, Carpaneto Piacentino Kommune og Rivergaro Kommune, 213/87 og 129/88 (se "Arbejdet ved De Europæiske Fællesskabers Domstol nr. 21/89, s. 3 ff.)
Those questions were substantially identical to those on which the Court gave a ruling on 17 October 1989 in Cases 231/87 and 129/88 (see the "Proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities -No. 21/89" at pp. 3 et seq).
Artikel 4, stk. 5, andet afsnit, i sjette direktiv, skal fortolkes således, at medlemssstaterne har pligt til at opkrave moms af offentligretlige organer vedrørende deres virksomhed i egenskab af offentlig myndighed, når virksomheden også, og under konkurrencevilkår, kan varetages af private, såfremt manglende opkrævning vil kunne medføre konkurrencefordrejning af en vis betydning.
The first subparagraph of Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that activities pursued "as public authorities" within the meaning of that provision are those engaged in by bodies governed by public law under the special legal regime applicable to them and do not include activities pursued by them under the same legal conditions as those that apply to private traders. It is for the national court to classify the activities in question in the light of that criterion.
Medlemsstaterne har dog ikke pligt til ordret at indføre disse kriterier i national ret eller til at fastsætte de kvantitative begrænsninger for, hvornår opkrævning skal undlades.
The second subparagraph of Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are required to ensure that bodies subject to public law are treated as taxable persons in respect of activities in which they engage as public authorities where those activities can also be engaged in, in competition with them, by private individuals, in cases in which their treatment as non-taxable persons could lead to significant distortions of competition, but they are not obliged to transpose those criteria literally into their national law or to lay down precise quantitative limits for such treatment.
Artikel 4, stk. 5, tredje afsnit, i sjette direktiv, skal fortpikes således, at den ikke pålægger medlemsstaterne pligt til i deres afgiftslovgivning at indføre kriteriet om ikke uvæsentlig karakter som betingelse for at opkræve afgift af transaktionerne på listen i bilag D."
The third subparagraph of Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it does not require the Member States to transpose into their tax legislation the criterion of the non-negligible scale of activities as a condition for treating the activities listed in Annex D as taxable".
Generaladvokat Jean Mischo fremsatte forslag til afgørelse-i retsmødet den 28. marts 1990.
Mr Advocate General J. Mischo delivered his Opinion at the sitting on 28 March 1990.
Hans forslag til afgørelse havde følgende indhold:
He proposed that the Court should reply to the questions referred to it as follows:
Artikel 4, stk. 5, første afsnit, i sjette direktiv, skal fortolkes såle des, at den virksomhed, der udøves "i egenskab af offentlig myndighed", er den, som varetages af offentligretlige organer på grundlag af deres sarlige status. Dette gælder dog ikke virksomhed, som de pågældende organer udøver på samme retlige vilkår som private erhvervsdrivende.
The first subparagraph of Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that activities pursued 'as public authorities' within the meaning of that provision are those engaged in by bodies governed by public law under the special legal regime applicable to them and do not include activities pursued by them under the same legal conditions as those that apply to private traders.
Det påhviler hver enkelt medlemsstat at anvende den retsanordningsteknik, den finder passende, ved gennemførelsen i national ret af den i nævnte direktivbestemmelse fastsatte regel om afgiftsfritagelse.
It is for each Member State to choose the appropriate legislative technique for transposing into national law the rule regarding treatment as a non-taxable person laid down in that provision.
Medlemsstaterne er ikke forpligtet til at momsfritage visse former for virksomhed alene med den begrundelse, at disse former for virksomhed i national ret betegnes som "administrative opgaver" eller pi lignende måde.
The Member States are not required to exclude liability to value added tax in respect of certain activities on the sole ground that under national law they are described as 'administrative functions' or in similar terms.
Ved kendelse af 12. maj 1988, indgået til Domstolen den 23. september s.a., havde Court of Appeal, London, forelagt en række præjudicielle spørgsmål vedrørende fortolkningen af EØF-Traktatens artikel 119 samt Rådets direktiver 75/117/EØF og 76/207/EØF om lige løn til og ligebehandling af mænd og kvinder.
The third subparagraph of Article 4 (5) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it does not require the Member States to transpose into their tax legislation the criterion of the non-negligible scale of activities as a condition for treating the activities listed in Annex D as taxable.
Spørgsmålene var rejst som led i en tvist mellem afdøde Douglas Harvey Barber og hans tidligere arbejdsgiver, selskabet Guardian, og vedrørte Barber's krav om udbetaling af førtidspension som følge af, at han var blevet afskediget af Økonomiske grunde.
Case C-262/88: Douglas Harvey Barber ν Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group -17 May 1990 (Reference for a preliminary ruling) (Social policy - Equal pay for men and women - Compulsory redundancy -Early payment of a retirement pension) (Full Court)
I "Guardian Guide to Severance Terms", der er led i Barber's arbejdskontrakt, var det fastsat, at i tilfælde af afskedigelse af økonomiske grunde ville med lemmerne af Guardian's pensionskasse have ret til øjeblikkelig pension, hvis de havde nået en aldersgrænse, der for mænds vedkommende var 55 år, for kvinders 50 år.
By order of 12 May 1988, which was received at the Court on 23 September 1988, the Court of Appeal in London referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling a number of questions concerning the interpretation of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, Council Directive 75/117/EEC on equal pay for men and women and Council Directive 76/207/EEC on equal treatment for men and women.
Guardian udbetalte ham den i ovennævnte vilkår fastsatte kontante godtgørelse samt den lovbestemte fratrædelsesgodtgørelse og et yderligere beløb på frivilligt grundlag. Han ville være berettiget til alderspension fra det tidspunkt, hvor han fyldte 62 år.
Those questions arose in a dispute between the late Douglas Harvey Barber and his former employer, the Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, concerning Mr Barber's right to an early retirement pension on being made compulsorily redundant.
Med det første spørgsmål måtte den nationale retsinstans i det væsentlige antages at Ønske oplyst, om ydelser, som en arbejdsgiver udbetaler en arbejdstager i forbindelse med dennes afskedigelse af Økonomiske grunde, er omfattet
The Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Guide to Severance Terms, which formed part of Mr Barber's contract of employment, provided that, in the event of redundancy, members of the pension fund established by the Guardian were entitled to an immediate pension subject to having attained the age of 55 for men or 50 for women.
- 10 - af anvendelsesområdet for Traktatens artikel 119, ligelønsdirektivet eller ligebehandlingsdi rektivet.
- 10 - years of service and a deferred pension payable at the normal pensionable age, which was fixed at 62 for men and 57 for women.