natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Fra 1995 til 1997 var Indhentningsprocessen mest markant i Est­land, hvor BNP pr. indbygger steg fra 32% til 37% af EU­gennemsnit, i Polen, hvor det steg fra 36% til 40%, og Slovakiet, hvor det steg fra 43% til 47%.
Between 1995 and 1997, the catching­up process was most marked in Estonia, where GDP per head in­creased from 32% of the EU average to 37%, in Po­land, where it rose from 36% to 40% and Slovakia, where it rose from 43% to 47%.
I Slovenien var stigningen fra 65% til 68%, dvs. et 1997­niveau, der stort set svarede til Grækenland.
In Slovenia, the in­crease was from 65% to 68% — to much the same level in 1997, therefore, as in Greece.
Væksten i Tjek­kiet var en smule lavere end i EU, så landets relative BNP pr. indbygger er forblevet stort set uændret, mens BNP faldt i Rumænien og Bulgarien, og afstan­den til EU dermed øgedes.
Growth in the Czech Republic was a little below that in the EU, so that its relative level of GDP per head has remained much the same, while in Romania and Bulgaria, GDP fell sc that the gap with the EU widened.
Udviklingen I landbruget har været mere uensartet.
The development of agriculture has been more di­verse.
I de fleste lande faldt produktionen brat i overgangs­periodens første år, da landbrugene blev privatiseret og kollektivbrugene blev opgivet. Det førte til flere pri­vate bedrifter, lavere gennemsnitsstørrelse og ned­sat effektivitet.
In most countries, production declined sharply in the early years of transition as farms were priva­tised and collectivisation was abandoned, leading to an increase in the number of separate units, a reduc­tion in average size and reduced efficiency.
Faldet i produktion blev forstærket af, at statsstøtten bortfaldt, og i 1995 udgjorde land­brugsproduktionen i de fleste CØE­lande under 10% af BNP.
The fall in output was reinforced by the withdrawal of subsidies and by 1995, agricultural production accounted for less than 10% of GDP in most CEE countries.
Faldet var særlig markant i Polen, de baltiske lande og Ungarn, der alle havde haft en stor land­brugsproduktion.
The de­cline was especially marked in Poland, the Baltic States and Hungary, in all of which agriculture had been a major source of output.
Det var også betydeligt i Tjekkiet, Slovakiet og Slovenien, hvor sektoren havde mindre betydning.
It was also significant in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where the sector was less important.
Regionerne Budapest, Warszawa og Tjekkiets og Slovakiets hovedstæder er, sammen med Slovenien, de eneste regioner, hvor BNP pr. indbygger var på mere end halvdelen af
By contrast, in Bulgaria and Romania, agricultural production has remained
BNP pr indbygger i Central- og Østeuropa, 1995 og 1997
GDP per head in Central and Eastern Europe, 1995 and 1997
Modsat industrien betød den underudviklede servi­cesektor inden reformerne og den opsparede efter­spørgsel, som overgangen udløste, at der er sket en betydelig stigning i denne sektors output.
The CEE countries have experienced a significant shift in the sectoral composition of production during the transition, with, in general, a decline in industrial output and an expansion of services.
Stigningen har været mest udpræget i detailsektoren, hotel­ og
This reflects, in part, the underdeveloped nature of the latter and the inability of many enterprises in the industrial sector to compete with imports from market economies as trade barriers were reduced and subsidies with­drawn.
4 Udvidelse
4 Enlargement at much the same level in relation to GDP as before the transition began.
marked (Slovakiets hovedhandelspartner), mens de østlige egne har været udsat for et kraftigt fald i industriproduktionen, selv om Kosice tilsyneladende har kunnet bevare et forholdsvis højt BNP pr. indbygger.
Reliable data for GDP per head by region are not yet available for the CEE countries, but preliminary estimates suggest the following (Map 47). In all regions apart from Prague and Bratislava, GDP per head was below 75% of the EU average in 1995.
Dertil kommer, at landdistrikterne, der hovedsagelig ligger i landets nordøstlige og sydlige-centrale del, er blevet svækket af faldet i landbrugsproduktionen.
The regions of Budapest, Warsaw and the Czech and Slovak capitals are, to gether with Slovenia, the only ones in which GDP per head was over half the EU average.
Omvendt er de fleste andre regioner generelt blevet mere påvirket af faldende industri- og/eller land brugsproduktion, der kun tildels er blevet udlignet af en voksende servicesektor.
Conversely, most other regions have generally been more affected by the decline in industrial and/or agricultural production which has only partially been compensated by expanding services.
Det gælder især for det østlige Polen, det nordøstlige Rumænien og større dele af Bulgarien, Letland og Litauen, hvor BNP pr. indbygger i 1995 var på under 30% af EU-gennemsnittet.
This is particularly the case for Eastern parts of Poland, North-Eastern Romania and major parts of Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania where GDP per head was below 30% of the EU average in 1995.
De regionale uligheder i Rumænien afspejler hoved sagelig de geografisk betingede virkninger af økonomisk og især industriel lavvækst.
Regional disparities in Romania mainly reflect the spatially-differentiated impact of economic and, in particular, industrial decline.
De østlige (og især de nordøstlige) regioner har det laveste BNP pr. ind bygger, mens niveauet er højt i Bukarest, om end under 50% af EU-gennemsnittet i 1995.
The Eastern regions, es pecially the North-East, have the lowest GDP per head, while the level is highest in Bucharest, though below 50% of the EL) average in 1995.
I Bulgarien er BNP pr. indbygger højest i hovedstaden Sofia og dens omegn, samt i Burgas i det vestlige Bulgarien, mens det i resten af landet (og især i nord) var mindre end 30% af EUs gennemsnit i 1995.
In Bulgaria, GDP per head is highest in the capital, Sofia, and the surrounding region as well as in Burgas in the West, whereas in the rest of the country, especially in the North, it was under 30% of the EU average in 1995.
I Tjekkiet er den økonomiske aktivitet forholdsvis ens artet fordelt over landet, og de regionale uligheder er små.
In the Czech Republic, economic activity is spread relatively evenly across the country and regional disparities are small.
Det centrale Bøhmen har det laveste BNP pr. indbygger, men det afspejler sandsynligvis den ud prægede pendling til Prag, hvilket også forklarer hovedstadens høje BNP pr. indbygger.
Central Bohemia has the lowest GDP per head, but this is probably a reflection of ex tensive commuting to the capital which largely ex plains the high GDP per head in Prague.
Samtidig har Prag helt klart nydt godt af væksten i servicesektoren og de internationale forbindelser.
At the same time, Prague has clearly benefited from the expansion of services and international contacts.
Det samme gælder Budapest, og det er antagelig forklaringen på, at nær ved 60% af de samlede direkte udenlandske investeringer og over 50% af samhandelen med udlandet går til Ungarn.
This is also true of Budapest, which is estimated to account for close to 60% of total FDI going to Hungary and over 50% of foreign trade.
Resultatet er, at BNP pr. indbygger i Budapest City i 1995 var på over 75% af EU-gennemsnittet, selv om det samtidig lå lavere i re gionen som helhed.
As a result, GDP per head in the city of Budapest was over 75% of the EU average in 1995, though the level was below this in the re gion as a whole.
De regionale skævheder er mere udprægede i Ungarn, hvor de østlige (og især nordøstlige) egne var særlig hårdt ramt af faldende industri- og landbrugsproduktion.
Regional disparities are more pronounced in Hungary, with Eastern parts, notably the North-East, particularly affected by declining in dustrial and agricultural production.
I overgangsperioden er antallet af beskæftigede faldet betydeligt i CØE-landene, hvilket dels afspejler det store fald i produktionen, dels rationaliserings- og omstillingsprocessen for at nedsætte overbemandingen.
The number in employment has declined substantially in CEE countries over the transition period, partly reflecting the large fall in output, partly the process of rationalisation and restructuring to reduce overmanning.
Grundet dataproblemer i de første overgangsår — problemer, der siden stort set er blevet løst ved, at alle landene har indført husstandsbaserede undersøgelser af arbejdsstyrken — er det svært at sige noget præcist om den indskrænkning af beskæftigelses graden, der skete først i 1990-erne.
Because of data problems in the early transition years — problems which have subsequently been largely resolved through the introduction of household-based labour force surveys in nearly all the countries — it is difficult to be precise about the con traction of employment which occurred in the early 1990s.
Overslag tyder dog på, at der i disse lande er sket et fald i antallet af beskæftigede (med undtagelse af de baltiske lande) på noget over6 millioner mellem 1989 og 1995, et fald på ca. 14%.81 de baltiske lande skønnes antallet af beskæftigede at være faldet med 0,5 millioner.
However, estimates suggest a fall in the number employed in the countries excluding the Baltic States of somewhat over 6 million between 1989 and 1995, a reduction of some 14%.H In the Baltic States, employment is estimated to have contracted by V? million.
Gen erelt skete de største fald i de tidlige overgangsår (1989 til 1993).
In general, the largest fall occurred in the early years of transition (1989 to 1993). By 1994 or 1995,
Kort 47 BNP pr indbygger fordelt på regioner (KKE) i Central-og Østeuropa, 1996
Map 47 GDP per head by region in Central and Eastern Europe, 1996
BG, CZ, RO: 1995 Regionale tal er anslåede og foreløbige
BG.CZ. R0: 1995 Regional figures are approximate
4 Udvidelse på, at man stadig beskyttede arbejdspladserne mod markedskræfterne i denne periode, og at beskæftigelsen således blev holdt på et højere niveau, end hvis mere vidtgående reformer var blevet iværksat.
4 Enlargement employment had stabilised with some countries even registering a small rise.
Kvindernes beskæftigelse har været mere stabil end mændenes.
centage points in Bulgaria and 13 percentage points in Slovakia.
Bortset fra Tjekkiet er kvindernes be skæftigelsesgrad faldet mindre end mændenes.
In Romania, the total employed was still around 74% of workingage population in 1997, higher than in most EU Member States.
Det kan næppe overraske i betragtning af den sektor mæssige fordeling af faldet i beskæftigelsen: Det skete hovedsagelig i industrien, en traditionel 'mandesektor', mens servicesektoren, der har et uforholdsmæssig stort antal kvindelige ansatte, udvidede.
Despite the scale of the fall in employment, in a number of countries (Bulgaria and Romania, in particular), it was markedly less than the reduction in output, suggest ing that jobs were still being protected against market forces during the period and that, accordingly, em ployment was maintained at a higher level than if more farreaching reforms had been implemented.
Grundet manglende pålidelige data er det vanskeligt at vurdere ændringerne i beskæftigelsen i de baltiske lande.
The change in employment in the Baltic States over the period is difficult to assess because of the lack of reliable data.
Almindeligvis går man dog ud fra, at faldet i beskæftigelsen har været mindre, idet hovedreformerne blev indført senere end i de andre lande.
The reduction in employment, however, is generally believed to have been smaller since the main reforms were introduced later than in the other countries.
Indtil slutningen af 1992 havde Litauen f.eks. lovbestemte begrænsninger på afskedigelser, og arbejdsgiverne brugte orlov uden løn og kortere arbejdstid for at ned bringe mængden af arbejdskraft.
Lithuania, for example, had legal limitations on lay-offs until the end of 1992, and employers relied on unpaid leave and shorter working hours to cut labour inputs.
Samtidig underdriver de registrerede tal — også dem der er baseret på arbejdskraftundersøgelser beskæf tigelsens virkelige niveau (på samme måde som BNP underdriver de faktiske output- og indtjeningsniveauer), idet ganske mange mennesker arbejder i den uformelle, eller 'sorte' økonomi.
At the same time, the recorded figures, including those based on labour force surveys, understate the true level of employment (just as the GDP figures un derstate the actual level of output and income) be cause of the significant numbers working in the informal, or black economy.
For eksempel menes ikke-registeret beskæftigelse at udgøre 15-20% af den aktive befolkning i Letland og ca. 25% i Slovenien.
For example, unrecorded employment is thought to represent 15 20% of active population in Latvia and around 25% in Slovenia.
Ifølge nationale kilder udgør indtjeningen ved ik-ke-registreret beskæftigelse i Polen skønsmæssigt 2,2 million.9 Beskæftigelse i den skjulte økonomi kan dog være midlertidig og mindre sikker, et tilskud til husholdningen sammen med hovedindtjeningen i den formelle økonomi.
According to national sources, in Poland, unrecorded employment is estimated at around 2.2 million.'1 However, employment in the hidden economy can be temporary and less secure, supplementing household income alongside the principal source of earnings in the formal economy.
Ændringer i beskæftigelsens sektormæssige, sammensætning
Shifts in the sectoral structure of employment
Fra 1993 stabiliserede beskæftigelsen sig i CØE-landene og havde endog en svagt stigende ten dens 1995.1 Tjekkiet, Ungarn, Estland og Litauen var beskæftigelsen lavere i 1997 end i 1993 (Graf 40), men nedgangen var koncentreret i første del af perio den, og fra 1995 steg antallet af beskæftigede.
From 1993 on, employment in CEE countries stabilised and even tended to increase after 1995. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania, employment was lower in 1997 than in 1993 (Graph 40), but the decline was concentrated in the first part of the period and, after 1995, the number employed rose.
Sam let set faldt beskæftigelsen i Litauen i hele treårsperioden med 6%, mens den i Ungarn faldt med 5,5% Og i Estland med 9%. I de to baltiske stater, af spejler faldet den forsinkede start på reformprocessen.
Over the four years as a whole, employment in Lithuania contracted by 6%, while in Hungary, it fell by 5'/ > % and in Estonia by 9%, in the two Baltic States, the fall reflecting the delayed start of the reform pro cess.
Alligevel var der i hele perioden en markant stigning i Slovenien (6,3%) og Slovakiet (4,3%).
Nevertheless, there was a marked rise over the whole period in Slovenia (6.3%) and Slovakia (4.3%).
De fleste af landene har derfor oplevet et betydeligt fald i deres beskæftigelsesgrad (idet det samlede an tal beskæftigede i forhold til befolkningen mellem 15 og 64 år).
Most of the countries have, therefore, experienced a significant fall in their employment rates (the total em ployed in relation to population 15 to 64).
I 1989 var beskæftigelsesgraden fra 70% i Bulgarien til 83% ¡Tjekkiet.
In 1989, the employment rate ranged from 70% in Bulgaria to 83% in the Czech Republic.
I 1993 var tallene kommet ned under 70% i alle landene, undtagen i Tjekkiet (72%) og Rumænien (72%).
By 1993, rates were below 70% in all countries apart from the Czech Republic (72%) and Romania (72%).
Det mest markante fald sås i Ungarn og Bulgarien.
The fall was most marked in Hungary and Bulgaria.
I det førstnævnte land var beskæftigelsen kun på 55% af befolkningen i den er hvervsaktive alder, et fald på ca. 20 procentpoint, mens det faldt med 17 procentpoint i Bulgarien og med 13 procentpoint i Slovakiet.
In the former, employment was only 55% of workingage population, a fall of some 20 percentage points, while it fell by 17 per-
Siden overgangsperioden startede er mange store statslige virksomheder — især indenfor sværindustri en — enten lukket eller har nedskåret, mens antallet af private virksomheder er steget betydeligt, overvejende i form af ganske små firmaer indenfor service og let industri.
Since the transition began, many large state enter prises, particularly in heavy industry, have either closed or been reduced in size, while the number of private firms, predominantly very small ones in services and light industry, have increased significantly.
Hvad angår ændringer i beskæftigelsens sektormæssige sammensætning, er det endnu sværere at sammenligne med perioden inden over gangen, end når det drejer sig om ændringer i den samlede beskæftigelse, idet systemet og klassifikationsmåden er blevet ændret, og det har betydet, at mange job, der tidligere hørte under landbrug eller industri, er blevet overført til servicesektoren.
Comparisons with the pre-transition period are even more difficult to make for changes in the sectoral distribution of employment than for changes in the total, because of revisions to the system and method of classification, which has meant that many jobs previously allocated to agriculture or industry have been reassigned to services.
Men det er ubestrideligt, at der er sket sådan en vækst, selv om dens præcise omfang ikke kendes.
This, therefore, terds to ex-
4 Udvidelse af den aktivitetens sektormæssige mønster.
4 Enlargement aggerate the shifts between broad sectors which have occurred and to overstate the relative growth of services.
Regioner med koncentrationer af sværindustri er ganske særlig hårdt ramt.
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that such a growth has occurred, even though the precise extent is uncertain.
Skønt mange regioner i landdistrikter med høj beskæftigelse ved landbruget også har lidt et uforholdsmæssigt stort tab af arbejdspladser, er ten densen mindre udbredt, og specielt i Rumænien har landdistrikterne mærket meget til den faldende be skæftigelse.
have been more pronounced in countries (such as Hungary and the Czech Republic) where service em­ployment was already high by CEE standards. By 1997, service sector employment accounted for 59% of total employment in Hungary, 58% in Lithuania, 57% in Estonia, 53% in Latvia and the Czech Repub­lic and 52% in Slovakia.
Samtidig har den stigende beskæftigelse indenfor serviceerhverv været koncentreret i store byområder, ¡sær hovedstæderne, og det har ofte kunnet udjævne faldet i industriarbejdspladser.
In Romania, however, the share of employment in services was just 31%, well below that in any EU Member State (in Greece and Portugal, the countries with the lowest shares, it was 58% and 56%, respectively).
I an dre CØE-lande er primærsektorens andel af beskæftigelsen stadig høj (20% i Polen og 21% i Letland og Li tauen), selv om den i Polen er faldet siden starten af overgangsperioden og fortsat er faldet i de seneste år (fra 23% i 1994). I Rumænien var tallet så højt som 39%.
In other CEE countries, the share of pri­mary sector employment remains high (20% in Po­land and 21% in Latvia and Lithuania), though in Poland, it has fallen since the transition began and has continued to decline in recent years (from 23% in 1994).
Beskæftigelsen ved landbrug er dog ikke faldet over alt.
Ag­ricultural employment, however, has not declined ev­erywhere.
Især i Rumænien er den steget, både forholdsmæssigt og i absolutte tal, overvejende på grund af de økonomiske reformer, især privatiseringen af jorden, men også faldet i industrien.
In Romania, in particular, it has increased both in absolute and relative terms, largely due to the economic reforms, especially the privatisation of land but also the decline in industry.
I Bulgarien og Letland er andelen steget siden 1994, mens den i Slovenien stort set var den samme i 1997 som tre år tidligere.
In Bulgaria and Lat­via, the share has risen since 1994, while in Slovenia, it was much the same in 1997 as three years earlier.
Den faldende beskæftigelse i industrien har ¡sær ramt traditionelle industrier som f.eks. elektro- og maskinteknik, stål- og kemikalieudvinding.
The fall in employment in CEE countries has affected some regions much more than others, largely accord­ing to the sectoral pattern of activity.
Inden overgangsperioden var industriens beskæftigelsesandel ca. 40-50% i de fleste af landene. I 1997 var denne andel faldet til 25%-33% i Estland, Letland, Polen, Ungarn og Rumænien.
Regions with concentrations of heavy industry have been particu­larly hard hit.
I Litauen var dog kun omkring 20,5% af arbejdsstyrken beskæftiget i industrien, færre end i noget EU-medlemsland.
At the same time, the growth of employ­ment in services has been concentrated in the large urban areas, especially the capital cities, and this has tended to offset the decline in industry.
Det samme gælder i det nordlige Ungarn, hvor den faldende beskæftigelse i Syd-Transdanubia og den nordlige del af pusztaen overvejende skyldes, at færre og færre arbejder ved landbrug.
The decline of industrial employment has particularly affected traditional industries such as electrical and mechanical engineering, steel, chemicals and min­ing.
Selv om der har været udstrakt vækst indenfor service erhvervene i hele regionen, ligger andelen stadig et stykke under EU-gennemsnit (65,5%).
Prior to transition, the share of employment in in­dustry was around 40­50% in most countries.
Selv om denne stigning er fælles for alle CØE-landene, ser den ud til at have været
By 1997, the share had fallen to between 25% and 33%
I Polen har faldet i beskæftigelsen været større i provinser med en stor beskæftigelsesandel indenfor industri en.
In the Czech Republic, employment has declined in all regions but North Bohemia and both Moravian re­gions have been particularly affected.
Omvendt har mange provinser med høj beskæftigelse i landbruget klaret sig bedre. Dette er dog ikke et ensartet mønster.
These regions have, because of their high degree of industrialis­ation, suffered from the decline of heavy industry.
Ændringer i beskæftigelse i Central- og Østeuropa, 1990-97
Change in employment in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-97
Ungarn og Tjekkiet), hvor beskæftigelsen i forvejen var høj i forhold til CØE niveau et.
0 in Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary and Romania.
11997 udgjorde beskæftigelsen i ser viceerhverv 59% af den samlede be skæftigelse i Ungarn, 58% i Litauen, 57% i Estland, 53% i Letland og Tjekkiet og 52% i Slovakiet.
In other countries, the share remains significantly higher than in the EU at 37% in Bulgaria, 39% in Slovakia, 42% in the Czech Republic and 43% in Slovenia.
I Rumænien var an delen af beskæftigede i servicesektoren dog kun 31%, noget under alle EU-medlemslandene (i Grækenland og Portugal — der havde den laveste andel i EU — var den hhv. 58% og 56%).
In Lithuania, how­ever, only some 201/2% of total employ­ment was in industry, less than in any EU Member State.
Den faldende beskæftigelse i CØE-landene har ramt nogle regioner meget mere end andre, mest på grund
While the growth in service employ­ment has been widespread across the region, the share is still well below the EU average (651/2%).
Dette maskerede, at meget af beskæftigelsen var forholds­vis uproduktiv, og under markedsvilkår ville det ofte have medført ledighed.
This is also the case in Northern Hungary, while the decline of employment in South-Transdanubia and the Northern Great Plain is largely due to falling numbers working in agriculture.
Nogle kilder mener, at den 'ægte arbejdsløshed' i CØE­landene ville have været så høj som 20­30% i 1980­erne.
Similarly, in Western and Central Transdanubia, as well as in Budapest, the decline of employment has been smaller as service sector employment increased.
det været mere påvirket af faldende beskæftigelse end de østlige regioner, mens beskæftigelsen i Slovakiet er faldet mere I de østlige dele.
cantly higher in Budapest than in the North. This is also the case in Poland.
Den eneste undtagelse blandt regionerne er Warszawa, hvor beskæftigelsen steg mellem 1990 og 1995. Tilsvarende steg beskæfti­gelsen i Bratislava i samme tidsrum, mens den i alle an­dre slovakiske regioner faldt.
In Slovakia, the employment rate in Bratislava is artificially high as a result of largescale commuting, though even adjusting for this, it is significantly above rates in the East of the country, while in the Czech Republic, there is less of a differ ence between regions.