natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved fastsættelsen af bødens størrelse skal der tages hensyn til både over trædelsens grovhed og dens varighed.
In fixing the amount of the fine, regard is to be had to both the gravity and the duration of the infringement.
I 1980 til 1982 foretog Kommissionen desuden en undersøgelse af de to producenters sodavirksomhed.
Furthermore, the activities of both producers in the soda-ash sector itself were the subject of scrutiny by the Commission between 1980 and 1982.
Selv om Kommissionen på det pågældende tidspunkt især var opmærksom på producenternes eksklusive leveringsaftaler med kunderne, kan de ansvarlige for sodaaktiviteterne ikke have været uvidende om, at det var nødvendigt at efterkomme fællesskabsretten.
Although at that time the Commission was more particularly concerned with the producers' exclusive supply agreements with customers, those responsible for the soda-ash activities cannot have been ignorant of the need to comply with Community law.
b) Overtrædelsens varighed a) Overtrædelsens grovhed
Gravity
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er der i nærværende sag tale om en alvorlig overtrædelse.
In the present case the Commission considers that the infringement was of considerable gravity.
I en lang periode har de to største sodaproducenter i EF bevidst samordnet deres forretningspolitik for at undgå enhver form for indbyrdes konkurrence om et vigtigt industriprodukt og om et marked, der andrager omkring 900 mio. ECU årligt.
Over a long period of time the two major producers of soda-ash in the Community have knowingly concerted their commercial policies so as to avoid all competition between them in an important industrial product and a market worth some ECU 900 million annually.
Hvis ikke Kommissionen havde opdaget det relevante bevismateriale, er der stor sandsynlighed for, at de ville have fortsat deres konkurrencebegrænsende samarbejde under en eller anden form i en ubegrænset periode.
But for the discovery of the relevant evidence by the Commission, there is every likelihood that they would have continued their anticompetitive cooperation in some form for an indefinite period.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at der bør pålægges både Solvay og ICI betydelige bøder for overtrædelsen. I 1988 afsatte Solvay og ICI soda i EF for henholdsvis [. . .] mio. ECU og [. . .] mio. ECU.
The Commission therefore considers that substantial fines should be imposed on both Solvay and ICI in respect of this infringement.
Kommissionen finder det ikke rimeligt at behandle de to producenter forskelligt hvad angår bødens størrelse.
The Commission does not however consider it appropriate in the present case to distinguish between the two producers as regards the amount of the fine.
Begge producenter opnåede væsentlige fordele ved overtrædelsen.
Each producer derived a considerable benefit from the infringement.
De er begge multinationale koncerner, og medens ICl's afsætning af soda udgør under en tredjedel af Solvays', er dens samlede omsætning tre gange større end Solvays —
Both are large multinational concerns and while ICI's soda-ash sales are less than one-third those of Solvay's, its turnover for all products is three times greater than that of Solvay,
Beskyttelsen af hjemmemarkederne giver de medvirkende producenter mulighed for at fore en forretningspolitik på deres eget marked, som er afskåret fra konkurrence fra andre medlemsstaters side.
The protection of home markets allows the producers involved to pursue a commercial policy in their own market which is insulated from competition from other Member States.
Det for hold, at der slet ikke har været nogen import til Det Forenede Kongerige fra andre medlemsstater, har utvivlsomt bidraget til at opretholde ICI's dominerende stilling (en markedsandel på over 90 % ).
The complete absence of imports to the United Kingdom from other Member States has undoubtedly contributed to the maintenance of ICI's dominant position (over 90 % markef share).
Solvay var også beskyttet mod konkurrence fra den næststørste EF-producent.
Solvay was also protected from any competitive pressure from the second largest Community producer.
Den manglende konkurrence mellem de to største EF-producenter har i vidt omfang medført, at sodamarkedet blev opdelt efter nationale skel.
The absence of competition between the two major Community producers to a large extent ensured that the market for soda-ash was partitioned along national boundaries.
Dette må også have været en væsentlig årsag til de fortsat betydelige prisforskelle for dette produkt mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og de øvrige med lemsstater på kontinentet.
It must also have been an important factor in the maintenance of the substantial price differences which exist between the United Kingdom and the Member States in continental western Europe for this product.
Solvay et Cie SA (Solvay) og Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) har overtrådt EØF-Traktatens artikel 85 ved siden 1.
Solvay et Cie SA ('Solvay') and Imperial Chemical Industries pic ('ICI') infringed Article 85 of the EEC Treaty by
Overtrædelsen var forsætlig, og begge parter må have vidst, at det var indlysende, at deres aftaler var klart uforenelige med fællesskabsretten.
The infringement was deliberate and both parties must have been well aware of the obvious incompatibility of their arrangements with Community law.
Ved periodens udløb påløber der automatisk rente efter den sats, som Den Europæiske Fond for Monetært Samarbejde anvendte for sine ECU­transaktioner den første arbejdsdag i den måned, hvor denne beslutning blev vedtaget, plus 3,5 procentpoints, dvs. 14%.
On expiry of that period, interest shall automatically be payable at the rate charged by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund on its ECU operations on the first working day of the month in which this Decision was adopted, plus 3,5 percentage points, i.e. 14%.
januar 1973, og i hvert fald indtil Kommissionen indledte proceduren i nærværende sag, at have deltaget i en samord­net praksis, hvorved de begrænsede deres afsætning af soda i EF til deres respektive hjemmemarkeder, nemlig det europæ­iske fastland for Solvays vedkommende og Det Forenede Kongerige og Irland for ICI's vedkommende.
participating since 1 January 1973 until át least the institution of the present proceedings in a concerted practice by which they confined their soda-ash sales in the Community to their respective home markets, namely continental western Europe for Solvay and the United Kingdom and Ireland for ICI.
For den ι artikel 1 omhandlede overtrædelse pålægges neden­stående virksomheder følgende bøder:
The following fines are imposed upon the undertakings named herein in respect of the infringement found in Article 1 :
De i artikel 3 omhandlede bøder indbetales senest tre måneder efter meddelelsen af denne beslutning på følgende konto:
The fines imposed under Article 3 shall be paid within three months of the date of notification of this Decision to the following bank account:
under henvisning til Traktaten om Oprettelse af Det Euro pæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, can be summarized as
Overtrædelsen kan sammenfattende beskrives således:
The infringement follows:
Solvay's og CFK's overtrædelse af artikel
Infringement of Article 85 by Solvay and CFK
85 under henvisning til Rådets forordning nr. 17 af 6. februar 1962, første forordning om anvendelse af bestemmelserne i Traktatens artikel 85 og 86('), senest ændret ved akten vedrørende Spaniens og Portugals tiltrædelse, særlig artikel 3 og 15, under henvisning til Kommissionens beslutning af 19. februar 1990 om at indlede en procedure på eget initiativ i henhold til artikel 3 i forordning nr. 17,
Having regard to the Commission Decision of 19 February 1990 to open a proceeding on its own initiative pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation No 17,
Fra et ukendt tidspunkt omkring 1987 til i hvert fald 1989 har Solvay og CFK deltaget i en aftalcog/eller samordnet praksis i strid med EØF-Traktatens artikel 85; ifølge denne aftale eller samordnede praksis har Solvay for hvert af årene 1987, 1988 og 1989 garanteret CFK en mindsteafsætning på 179 kiloton beregnet på grundlag af CFK's faktiske afsætning i Tyskland i 1986 og ydet CFK kompensation for fald i afsætningen ved at opkøbe de mængder hos den, der var nødvendige for at bringe salget op på det garanterede minimum.
Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity to make known their views on the objections raised by the Commission, pursuant to Article 19 (1) of Regulation No 17 and Commission Regulation No 99/63/EEC of 25 July 1963 on the hearings provided for in Article 19(1) and (2) of Council Regulation No 17 (2),
efter at have givet de pågældende virksomheder lejlighed til at udtale sig vedrørende de af Kommissionen fremførte klage punkter, jf. artikel 19, stk. 1, i forordning nr. 17 samt Kommissionens forordning nr. 99/63/EØF af 25. juli 1963 om udtalelser i henhold til artikel 19, stk. 1 og 2, i Rådets forordning nr. 17 (2), efter høring af Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel-og Monopolspørgsmål, og ud fra følgende betragtninger:
From a date unknown in about 1987 to at least 1989 Solvay and CFK have participated in an agreement and/or concerted practice contrary to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty by which, for each of the years 1987, 1988 and 1989, Solvay guaranteed CFK a minimum sales tonnage calculated by reference to a formula based on CFK's achieved sales in Germany during 1986 of 179 Kt and compensated CFK for any shortfall by purchasing from it the tonnages required to bring its sales to the guaranteed minimum.
Solvays og CFK's overtrædelse af artikel 85
The infringement of Article 85 by Solvay and CFK
Med hensyn til produktet og sodamarkedet henvises der til del 1, afsnit B, i Kommissionens beslutning 91 /297/EØF(Solvay-ICI)()), hvor der gives en detaljeret beskrivelse deraf.
Β of Commission Decision 91/297/EEC (SoIvay-ICI) (3).
CFK er et datterselskab af Kali & Salz AG (BASF-kon-cernen) og den ene af tre producenter af industrielt fremstillet soda i Tyskland. Virksomheden har for øjeblikket en produktionskapacitet på ca. 260 kiloton. CFK's markedsandel i Tyskland er på ca. 15%. 1.
CFK is a subsidiary of Kali & Salz AG (BASF Group) and is one of three producers of synthetic soda-ash located in Germany. It currently has a production capacity of around 260 Kt. CFK's market share in Germany is around 15%. 1.
Denne beslutning er en følge af de kontrolundersøgelser, Kommissionen foretog hos sodaproducenter i EF i marts 1989 i henhold til artikel 14, stk. 3, i forordning nr. 17.
The present Decision arises out of investigations carried out by the Commission in March 1989 pursuant to Article 14 (3) of Regulation No 17 at the premises of Community producers of soda-ash.
Ved disse kontrolundersøgelser og efterfølgende begæringer om oplysninger i henhold til artikel 11 i forordning nr. 17 fandt Kommissionen materiale, der (bl.a.) beviser, at følgende virksomheder har overtrådt EØF-Traktatens artikel 85:
By means of the said investigations and subsequent enquiries under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 the Commission discovered documentary evidence showing (inter alia) that an infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty had been committed by the following undertakings:
Solvay er langt den største producent, der leverer til det tyske marked, og virksomheden har en marked sandel på over 50%.
Solvay is by far the largest producer supplying the Germany market and has a market share of over 50 %.
På alle de relevante tidspunkter
At all material times it conducted its soda-ash business
Nr. L 152/17 reel vækst på det tyske sodamarked, totn i 1986 og 1987 androg ca. 1 080 kiloton i alt.
NoL 152/17 foresee that there would be any real growth in the German soda-ash market which in 1986 and 1987 was about 1 080 Kt in total.
udøvede den sin sodavirksomhed i Tyskland gennem sit datterselskab Deutsche Solvay Werke (DSW).
in Germany through its subsidiary Deutsche Solvay Werke (DSW).
Indtil 1985 havde Solvay også et andet danerselskab inden for denne sektor, Kali Chemie, men dettes virksomhed blev i 1985 lagt ind under DSW.
Until 1985 another Solvay subsidiary, Kali Chemie (KC) was also active in the soda-ash sector but its operations were then fully integrated in those of DSW.
I både 1987 og 1988 var CFK's afsætning højere end det garanterede minimum på 179 kiloton (henholdsvis 183 og 180 kiloton).
For both 1987 and 1988, CFK's achieved sales were somewhat over its guaranteed minimum of 179 Kt (183 Kt and 180 Kt respectively).
Efterspørgslen i Tyskland var nemlig begyndt at stige mere, end man tidligere havde forventet, og ved udgangen af 1988 stod det klan, at den samlede afsætning for 1988 ville komme til at andrage ca. 1 170 kiloton, dvs, en stigning på ca. 8,3% i forhold til det foregående Ir.
Indeed demand in Germany had started to increase beyond earlier expectations and by the end of 1988 it had become apparent that the total sales for that year would come to some 1 170 Kt, an increase of some 8,3 % over the previous year.
I november 1989 bebudede Solvay, at den agtede at omorganisere sin virksomhed i Tyskland ved at oprette et nyt hclejet holdingselskab, Solvay Deutschland GmbH, der skal kontrollere KC og overtage 59,7% af aktierne i Deutsche Solvay Werke.
In November 1989 Solvay announced plans to re-organize its activities in Germany by setting up a new wholly-owned holding company Solvay Deutschland GmbH controlling KC and holding 59,7% of the shares in Deutsche Solvay Werke.
Aftaler ne berører ikke Solvays ansvar for overtrædelsen.
The arrangements do not affect the responsibility of Solvay for the infringement.
I 1985 forsøgte DSW at svække CFK's stilling på det tyske marked ved at overtage dens leverancer til en række større kunder, men CFK skaffede sig kompensation for den handel, den havde mistet, ved selv at tage kunder fra den anden tyske producent Matthes & C Weber. Som følge af den stigende efterspørgsel krævede CFK nu en minimumsgaranti for 1988 og 1989 på 194 kiloton.
In 1985 DSW attempted to weaken the position of CFK in the German market by taking the business of some of its major customers, but the smaller producer compensated for the lost business by itself taking customers from Matthes & Weber, the other German producer. As a result of the growth in demand, CFK demanded a minimum guarantee for 1988 and 1989 of 194 Kt.
CFK forlangte således en »kompensation« for 1988 på 14 kiloton (194-180), dvs. 11 kiloton, når der blev taget hensyn til overskuddet for 1987.
CFK was thus claiming retrospective 'compensation' for 1988 of 14 Kt (194-180) which after taking account of the credit for 1987 left 11 kt.
CFK's interne prognoser for 1989, der blev redvidcret i januar samme år, viser, at virksomheden havde ændret sin oprindelige planlægning og havde regnet med at sælge 11 kiloton til Solvay i 1989.
CFK's internal forecasts for 1989, as revised in January of that year, confirm that it had altered its original planning so as to provide for 'co-producer' sales in 1989 of HKt.
Solvay havde ved udgangen af december 1988 købt 2,5 kiloton, og der var således 8,5 kiloton tilbage, som CFK ønskede, at Solvay skulle købe i 1989.
Solvay had in fact purchased 2,5 Kt at the end of December 1988 leaving a balance of 8,5 Kt which CFK wanted it to buy during 1989.
I 1986 konstaterede Solvay, at CFK førte lavprispolitik for at bevare eller erobre markedsandele.
During 1986 Solvay realized that CFK was applying a policy of price cutting in order to retain or regain market share.
I en telefonsamtale mellem DSW og Solvays hovedkontor i Bruxelles den 24. oktober 1986 drøftede man, om det var muligt at indgå en »våbenhvile« mellem Solvay og CFK.
In a telephone conversation between DSW and Solvay's headquarters in Brussels on 24 October 1986, the possibility of an 'armistice' between Solvay and CFK was discussed.
Ifølge DSW ville en »våbenhvile« med CFK være umulig, medmindre der var tale om en prisforhøjelse i 1987.
According to DSW, an 'armistice' with CFK would be impossible unless there was talk of a price increase in 1987.
Solvay i Bruxelles mente, at det skulle meddeles CFK, at der eventuelt kunne indledes drøftelser om en prisforhøjelse, efter at der forsøgsvis var indgået en »våbenhvile«, måske i andet kvartal 1987.
The position of Solvay Brussels was that CFK should be told that after a trial period of the 'armistice', perhaps in the second quarter of 1987, there might be discussions about a price increase.
Solvay reagerede på CFK's krav ved at tilbyde en maksimumskompensation for 1988 på 4 kiloton i stedet for 8,5 kiloton. For 1989 foreslog Solvay, at garantien kun blev forhøjet med 5,3% i stedet for 8,3 %, idet der skulle medregnes en »neutral zone« på 3%.
In response to CFK's claim, Solvay offered maximum compensation for 1988 of 4 Kt instead of the 8,5 Kt.
Garantien for 1989 ville dermed blive pi 190 kiloton i stedet for 194 kiloton, som CFK oprindeligt havde forlangt.
The guarantee for 1989 would thus be 190 Kt instead of the 194 Kt which CFK had originally demanded.
Både Solvay og CFK afviser, at de nogensinde har indgået aftale om en »våbenhvile« (svar i henhold til artikel 11).
Both Solvay and CFK insist that no 'armistice' was ever agreed (replies pursuant to Article 11).
Denne afvisning skal dog vurderes på grundlag af det bevismateriale, der omtales i det følgende.
This denial has however to be judged in the light of the documentary evidence referred to in the following paragraphs.
Af det bevismateriale, Kommissionen fandt, fremgår det, at der var indgået en aftale eller en ordning mellem Solvay og CFK, hvorved Solvay »garanterede« CFK en årlig mindste afsætning på det tyske marked.
The documentary evidence discovered by the Commission shows that an agreement or arrangement had been made between Solvay and CFK by which Solvay 'guaranteed' CFK an annual minimum sales tonnage on the German market.
Den 14. marts 1989 blev der afholdt et møde mellem repræsentanter for CFK's ledelse og for dens moderselskab Kali & C Salz på den ene side og DSW på den anden. Det er bemærkelsesværdigt, at der ikke blev udarbejdet noget officielt referat af dene møde, og der findes intet spor af det hos hverken CFK eller Kali & Salz. Man fandt dog hos DSW et kortfattet håndskrevet notat fra dette møde. Det er klart, at mødet havde til formål at løse det eneste tilbageværende problem, nemlig om kompensationen skulle ydes tilbagevirkende. Der var ingen unenighed om de grundlæggende spørgsmål: Solvays notat lyder således: »Verständnis System: I.O.« (= in Ordnung). Solvay foreslog ganske vist en række ændringer, men var tilsyneladende tilfreds med den måde, hvorpå ordningen fungere de (»Schiff laufen lassen und nach vorn orientieren«). Det fremgår af notatet, at parterne var blevet enige om, at Solvay i de kommende otte måneder skulle købe 1 000 tons om måneden hos CFK. (6)
A meeting was held on 14 March 1989 attended by senior representatives of CFK and its parent company Kali & Salz on the one side and DSW on the other. It is highly significant that no official record or minute was made of this meeting and indeed no trace of it whatever exists at either CFK or Kali & Salz. However a brief handwritten note of this meeting was found at DSW. It is clear that the object was to resolve the one outstanding point, namely whether the compensation was to be made retrospective. There was no dispute about the basic machinery: the Solvay note reads 'Verständnis System: i.o.' ('Agreement system: OK'). Solvay, while proposing some changes, was satisfied with the way the scheme was working ('Schiff laufen lassen und nach vorn orientieren.'). It appears from the note that both sides had agreed that for the next eight months Solvay would purchase from CFK at the rate of 1 000 tonnes per month. If CFK's sales in Germany fell below the guaranteed minimum, Solvay would buy the shortfall from CFK.
Oprindelig blev CFK's garanti fastsat til 179 kiloton, hvilket tilsyneladende var baseret på CFK's faktiske afsætning i Tyskland i 1986.
Originally, CFK's guarantee was set at 179 Kt, a figure apparently based on CFK's achieved sales in Germany during 1986.
På det pågældende tidspunkt forudså parterne ikke, at der ville ske nogen
At the time, the parties did not
Kompensationen blev i praksis ydet ved, at Solvay i første halvår 1989 købte de 8,5 kiloton hos CFK, som sidstnævnte havde forlangt.
The compensatory mechanism was put into practice with Solvay buying in from CFK during the first half of 1989 the additional 8,5 Kt which had been claimed by CFK.
Parternes argumenter
Arguments in defence
Artikel 85. stk. 1
Article 85 (1)
Både Solvay og CFK benægter, at de skulle have indgået nogen hemmelig aftale eller være enedes om nogen hemmelig ordning.
Both Solvay and CFK deny that any collusive agreement or arrangement was made between them.
Solvay forklarer det belas­tende materiale, der blev fundet hos DSW, med, at virksomheden alene udarbejdede en ordning pi det tidspunkt, hvor den overvejede at overtage CFK, dvs. omkring 1988.
The incriminating documentary evidence found at DSW is explained by Solvay as referable to a scheme which was conceived on a wholly unilateral basis when it was considering acquiring CFK's business in about 1988.
For at holde CFK i drift, mens forhandlingerne stod pi (siger Solvay), beregnede den (igen uden at kontakte CFK), hvor store mængder den pågældende virksomhed var nødt til af afsætte pi det tyske marked for at udnytte sit anlæg i en sådan grad, at det kunne sikre dens fortsatte eksistens.
In order to maintain CFK as a going concern pending the negotiations (says Solvay), it calculated (again without any contact with CFK) the tonnage which that undertaking would need to sell on the German market in order to load its plant at a level that would guarantee its survival.
(Solvay har dog ikke forklaret, hvorfor den skulle føre en politik, der betød, at den skulle betale mere i forbindelse med CFK, end det ellers ville være tilfældet. Den har heller ikke forklaret, hvorfor den henviste specielt til salget pi det tyske marked, hvis det kun var et spørgsmål om at sikre CFK en optimal udnyttelsesgrad).
(It is not however explained by Solvay why it should follow a policy that would lead it to pay a higher price for CFK's business than would otherwisse be the case, nor, if it were only a matter of ensuring an optimal plant utilization rate for CFK, it should need to refer specifically to its sales on the German market.)
Solvay havde beregnet den nødvendige mængde til 179 kiloton for 1986.
This 'survival tonnage' Solvay assessed at 179 Kt for 1986.
Solvay hævder, at hverken de hyppige referencer i dokumenterne til CFK's »krav« og de meget detaljerede beregninger i denne forbindel­se eller referencerne til Solvays »tilbud« eller et »kompromis« indebærer, at der har været kontakter med CFK.
The frequent references in the documents to a 'claim' or 'demand' by CFK, and the very detailed calculations on this question do not, Solvay asserts, imply any contact with that undertaking any more than do the references to an 'offer' by Solvay or to a 'compromise'.