natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endelig har Kommissionen vedtaget et udkast til meddelelse om anvendelse af EU's konkurrenceregler på grænseoverskridende kreditoverførsler.
Guidance is given as to non-price competition aspects (membership rules and operational rules) and price com petition aspects.
Udkastet til meddelelse er led i en større pakke af foranstaltninger, her under et direktivforslag, der tager sigte på at forbedre betalingerne på tværs af grænserne.
An important part of the draft notice relates to a collectively agreed interbank fee.
Udkastet til meddelelse gør rede for den ind faldsvinkel, Kommissionen vil bruge ved vurderingen af, om grænseoverskridende kreditoverførselssystemer er forenelige med EU's konkurrenceregler.
The Commission considers that where agreements on multilateral interchange fees are shown to be actually necessary for the successful implementation of certain forms of cooperation, positive in themselves, between a number of banks, agreements on interchange fees may be eligible for exemption under Article 85(3).
Der gives vejledning om andre konkurrenceaspekter end priser (regler for medlemskab og for drift af systemerne) og om aspekter af priskonkurrencen.
Where banks introduce interchange-fee arrangements, the Commission will examine the economic benefit which these arrangements seek to achieve and consider whether consumers will receive a fair share of the resulting benefit and whether the particular interchange-fee arrangements are actually necessary as a means to achieve that benefit.
En stor del af udkastet til meddelelse vedrører kollektivt aftalte interbankgebyrer.
Consultations were also begun regarding the renewal of the Commission's block exemption Regulation on selective distribution for automobiles.
Kommissionen mener, at aftaler om interbankgebyrer kun kan fritages efter artikel 85, stk. 3, hvor det bevises, at aftalerne virkelig er nødvendige for at visse, i sig selv positive, former for samarbejde mellem en række banker kan lykkes.
In the revised draft Regulation, which was published for comments, the Commission takes the view that car dealership arrangements, which are traditional in the Community, continue to merit exemption, but under strict conditions.
Når bankerne ind går aftaler om interbankgebyrer, undersøger Kommissionen, hvilke økonomiske fordele der søges opnået ved aftalerne, om forbrugerne vil få en rimelig andel af fordelene derved, og om de pågældende aftaler virke lig er nødvendige for at opnå disse fordele.
Thus, while it is proposed that car manufacturers may grant dealers an exclusive territory and require all dealers to meet certain minimum
Decentralisering af konkurrencereglerne af 15 landes nationale myndigheder og Kommissionen selv er en væsentlig faktor for integrationen i det indre marked, der kan medvirke til at skærpe konkurrencen og bidrage til at forbedre den europæiske industris konkurrenceevne.
15 national authorities and itself will be a major factor in the integration of the com mon market which can increase the level of competition, and will thereby enhance the competitiveness of European industry.
For at nå dette mål foreslår man at decentralisere anvendelsen af EU's konkurrenceregler, når tre betingelser er opfyldt:
In order to achieve this objective, it is proposed that the application of the Community competition rules be decentralized where three conditions are met:
I lighed med de nationale domstole, der har bemyndigelse til at anvende EU's konkurrenceregler i de sager, de behandler, drøfte de Kommissionen og de nationale myndigheder med ansvar for kartelspørgsmål i 1994 mulighederne for at inddrage myndigheder ne i anvendelsen af EU's konkurrenceregler.
The Commission held discussions in 1994 with the national cartel authorities on ways and means of increasing their involvement in the application of the Community competition rules, in the same way that the national courts have the power to apply the Com munity competition rules in cases appearing before them.
Konklusionerne på disse drøftelser vil frem gå af en meddelelse, som Kommissionen udarbejder i samarbejde med de nationale myndigheder.
The conclusions reached in such discussions will be set out in a communication which the Commission will draw up in collaboration with the national authorities. ities.
2) Der er tale om en klar overtrædelse af EU-reglerne.
(ii) there is a clear infringement of the Com munity rules;
3) Der er ikke mulighed for, at Kommissionen kan fritage den pågældende overtrædelse af grunde, der er nedfældet i EU-retten, og hvis anvendelse hører under Kommissionens enekompetence.
(iii)the infringement has no chance of being exempted by the Commission on grounds which are provided for in Com munity law and for whose implementation the Commission is solely responsible. sible.
Målet med en vis decentralisering af anvendelsen af EU's konkurrenceregler er at gøre reglerne mere effektive på nationalt plan uden dermed at øge kontrolomkostningerne eller svække anvendelsen af ensartede regler for erhvervslivet i det indre marked.
The objective in introducing some decentralization in the application of the Community competition rules is to make the rules more effective at national level without increasing monitoring costs or diminishing the benefits to industry of the existence of uniform com petition rules within the common market.
Den påtænkte decentralisering skal skabe lige vægt mellem den generelle tendens til at anvende nærhedsprincippet og opretholdelsen af et ensartet konkurrencebeskyttelsessystem for alle virksomheder i det indre marked (»level playing field«).
The decentralization aimed at must establish the right balance between the general trend towards subsidiarity, on the one hand, and the maintenance of a system of uniform protection of competition for all firms within the common market (level playing-field), on the other.
Kommissionen mener, at anvendelsen af samme regler
The Commission believes that the application of the same rules of substance by
Denne decentralisering garanterer, at kontrollen bliver foretaget af en enkelt kartel myndighed på det mest passende plan og svarer til ånden i den bestemmelse i fusions forordningen, der åbner mulighed for at henvise en fusion til en medlemsstat.
Such decentralization will ensure that cases are dealt with by a single cartel authority at the most appropriate level and is in line with the spirit behind the provisions in the Mer ger Regulation allowing merger cases to be referred to a Member State.
1994 var på næsten alle områder et glimrende år for Kommissionen med hensyn til antallet af sager og effektiviteten i sagsbehandlingen.
In almost all respects, 1994 was an excellent year for the Commission with regard to the number and efficiency with which cases were handled.
For det første skal det bemærkes, at der blev vedtaget flere formelle beslutninger end nogen sinde før.
First, it should be noted that a greater number of formal decisions were adopted than ever before.
Dette tal skal sammenlignes med de over 3 000 sager, der var uafsluttede sidst i 1980'erne, og en nedgang i forhold til udgangen af 1993 på 168.
This compares with over 3 000 cases that remained open at the end of the 1980s, and a reduction of 168 compared with the end of 1993.
Som følge af den ihærdige indsats for at reducere efterslæbet i de seneste år er næsten alle de »enkle« sager, som kun volder få eller ubetydelige problemer, nu afsluttet, og antallet af uafsluttede sager svarer nu næsten til de sager, der behandles aktivt i øjeblikket.
As a result of the intensive efforts to reduce the backlog over the previous years, almost all the 'simple' cases (presenting little or no substantive problems) have now been closed, and the number of cases remaining open is now approaching that which represents the cases being actively treated.
Af denne grund var nettoreduktionen i den samlede beholdning af sager mindre i 1994 end i de foregående år.
For this reason, the net reduction in the stock of cases achieved in 1994 was less than in previous years.
Fremover vil det blive stadigt sværere at opnå yderligere omfattende reduktioner.
In the future, further significant reductions will be progressively more difficult to achieve.
Ikke desto mindre vil Kommissionen fortsat bestræbe sig på hele tiden at begrænse antallet af uafsluttede sager.
None the less, the Commission remains committed to its attempts to reduce continually the number of cases remaining open.
Dette er meget opmuntrende og er resultatet af en fortsat indsats for at rationalisere og strømline de interne procedurer. Når man ser på de vedtagne sagers vigtighed og kom plekse karakter, er tallet endnu mere tilfredsstillende.
This is very encouraging and represents the fruits of continuing efforts to rationalize and streamline internal procedures; when the importance and complexity of the cases adopted is taken into account, this figure is particularly satisfying.
For det andet er antallet af uafsluttede sager igen blevet reduceret og er nu på 1 058.
Second, the stock of cases remaining open at the end of the year has again been reduced and is now 1 058.
Figur 1 Behandlede sager
Graph 1 Cases dealt with
Øvrige: sager, som afsluttedes, fordi aftalerne ikke længere var gældende, virkningerne var for svage til at begrunde yderligere undersøgelser, klagerne var for tvivlsomme, eller fordi der ved undersøgelser ne ikke var påvist konkurrencefordrejende praksis.
Others: cases closed because the agreements were no longer in force, the impact was too slight to warrant further investigation, because complaints had become moot or because investigations had not revealed any anticompetitive practice.
Figur 2 Sager
Graph 2 Cases
Sager, fortsat under behandling ved årets udgang
Cases remaining open and being treated at the year's end
Sager, afsluttet i løbet af året
Cases closed during the year
Nye sager, indledt i årets løb
New cases opened during the year
Figur 3 Nye sager
Graph 3 New cases
Sager, Indledt på Kommissionens eget initiativ
Cases opened on Commission's own initiative
MONOPOLRETTIGHEDER OG KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN: ARTIKEL 90
MONOPOLY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY: ARTICLE 90
Det er logisk, at konkurrencereglerne kræver grundig undersøgelse af monopolrettigheder.
It is logical that the competition rules should require the careful examination of monopoly rights.
Virkningen af sådanne foranstaltninger er at kuldkaste de mest grundlæggende mål for processen med det indre marked, som f.eks. den frie bevægelighed for varer og tjenesteydelser.
The effect of such measures is to frustrate all the most basic aims of the single market process, such as the free movement of goods and services.
Medlemsstaterne kan være fristet til at give indenlandske virksomheder begrænsede eller endog fuldstændige mono polrettigheder for at beskytte dem mod den stigende konkurrence fra virksomheder i andre medlemsstater.
Member States may be tempted to grant domestic companies limited or even complete monopoly powers in order to protect them from the intensifying competition from firms based in other Member States.
Kommissionens beføjelser på dette område svarer derfor til og supplerer de beføjelser, den har til at gribe ind mod andre handelshindringer indført af medlemsstaterne, som f.eks. skjulte kvoter og forbrugsafgifter.
The Commission's powers in this area are therefore parallel to and com plement those which enable it to act against other trade barriers imposed by Member States, such as hidden quotas and excise duties.
Artikel 90 tager udgangspunkt i, at offentligt såvel som privat ejede virksomheder, der har fået overdraget monopolrettigheder af en medlemsstat, ligesom alle andre virksomheder er underlagt konkurrencereglerne.
Article 90 is based on the underlying principle that an undertaking that has been granted monopoly rights by a Member State, whether it be State-owned or in private hands, is subject to the competition rules in the same way as any other company.
Der med skal de, da monopolvirksomheder pr. definition indtager en dominerende stilling, være ekstra påpasselige med ikke at misbruge denne stilling.
Thus, as monopoly companies by definition hold a dominant position, they must pay particular attention not to engage in abusive activities.
De må f.eks. ikke foretage såkaldt »binding«, dvs. nægte at yde den monopoliserede tjenesteydelse, medmindre kunderne også aftager varer og tjenesteydelser, der er omfattet af fri konkurrence.
They may not, for example, engage in 'tying': refusing to provide the monopoly service unless customers also purchase other goods or services which are open to free competition.
De skal også være forsigtige med ikke at anvende overskud fra deres monopoliserede aktiviteter til at subsidiere salget på andre markeder og dermed udsætte konkurrenterne for kunstig konkurrence.
Equally, they must be careful not to use revenue from their monopoly activities to subsidize sales in other markets, thereby artificially disadvantaging their competitors.
Dette følger af artikel 85 og 86, der gælder for alle virksomheder uden hensyntagen til deres vedtægter.
This flows from Articles 85 and 86, which apply to undertakings irrespective of their statute.
I traktatens artikel 90 suppleres denne grundregel med specifikke bestemmelser om statslige foranstaltninger for virksomheder, der har fået overdraget statslige monopolrettigheder.
Article 90 of the Treaty complements this basic rule, providing specific provisions concerning State measures taken with respect to companies that have been granted State monopoly rights.
I artiklen erkendes ikke blot de særlige konkurrencemæssige problemer, sådanne foranstaltninger kan skabe, men også behovet for at tage hensyn til de særlige opgaver og mål, sådanne virksomheder ofte betros.
It recognizes not only the particular competition problems that may be created by such measures, but also the need to take account of the specific tasks and objectives that such companies are often entrusted with.
Artikel 90 indeholder et grund læggende princip og en undtagelse.
Article 90 contains a basic principle, and an exception.
Det grundlæggende princip er, at medlemsstater ne skal respektere den basale regel om, at virksomheder med monopolrettigheder i princippet skal overholde traktatens bestemmelser og derfor ikke må søge at undergrave den.
Its basic principle is that Member States must respect the underlying rule that companies granted monopoly rights must, in principle, comply with the Treaty's rules, and must not, there fore, act to undermine this.
Undtagelsen i artikel 90 skyldes, at stats monopoler i reglen får overdraget ansvaret for en offentlig tjenesteydelse.
The exception contained in Article 90 results from the fact that State monopolies are usually entrusted with some public service function.
De skal normalt udføre en specifik (og sommetider urentabel) tjenesteydelse af almen interesse.
They are normally required to perform a specific (and sometimes unprofitable) ser vice in the public interest.
Foranstaltninger truffet for at opfylde for pligtelserne om at udføre en offentlig tjene steydelse kan undtages fra konkurrencereglerne og andre af traktatens bestemmelser, hvis de er helt uundgåelige for at nå de legitime mål.
Actions taken to meet these public service obligations can be immune from the competition and other Treaty rules, providing that they are truly indispensable to meet such legitimate aims.
Denne undtagelse fra traktatens bestemmelser fortolkes dog strengt. Der må ikke være andre rimelige og mindre restriktive måder, hvorpå de pågældende mål kan nås.
This exemption from the Treaty rules is, however, strictly applied: there must be no other reasonable and less-restrictive manner of meeting the objectives in question.
De nationale postvæsener overdrages f.eks. den offentlige servicefunktion at sørge for grundlæggende indsamling og udbringning af post til alle borgere til samme pris.
For example, the national postal services are entrusted with the public service function of providing a basic collection and delivery service to all citizens at a uniform price.
På grundlag af bestemmelserne i artikel 90 kunne brug af indtægter fra rentabel lokal udbringning til at finansiere urentabel udbringning til mere fjerntliggende egne undtages fra konkurrencereglerne.
Using revenue generated from profitable local deliveries to finance more remote, loss-making, deliveries could be immune from the competition rules as a result of the Article 90 exception.
Derimod ville brug af indtægter fra monopoliserede aktiviteter til at underbyde konkurrenterne på andre markeder, som f.eks. bankvirksomhed, ikke kunne undtages.
Using revenue generated by monopoly activities to undercut competitors in other markets - such as bank ing - would not, however, be immune.
I første tilfælde må man gribe ind for at nå målet om at yde en offentlig tjenesteydelse, i det andet er det ikke nødvendigt.
The former action is necessary to achieve the public service objectives, the latter is not.
Selv om undtagelsen gælder specifikke for anstaltninger truffet af statsudpegede mono-
Although the exception applies to specific actions of State-granted monopolies which would in normal circumstances infringe the competition rules as well as the question of the legality of the grant or maintenance of
Det betyder ikke blot, at de ikke må træffe foranstaltninger, der vil føre til, at virksomheder med monopolrettigheder overtræder konkurrencereglerne ved f.eks. at »binde« kunderne, men også at overdragelse eller opretholdelse af en monopolrettighed under visse omstændigheder i sig selv kan være en overtrædelse af traktatens bestemmelser om konkurrence og fri bevægelighed og dermed være ulovlig.
This means not only that they may not take measures that will lead companies granted monopoly rights to infringe the competition rules by, for example, tying, but, further more, it means that in certain circumstances the grant or maintenance of a monopoly right can in itself infringe the Treaty provisions on competition and free movement and therefore be illegal.
ningen af sådanne direktiver ikke blot juridisk og økonomisk, men også politisk og socialt.
mer groups, the Member States and Parliament. ment.
Det er en absolut forudsætning for liberalise ring, at man kan fastslå, at åbningen af de pågældende markeder ikke vil gøre det umuligt fortsat at opfylde legitime mål for offentlige tjenesteydelser.
An essential precondition to liberalization is that the opening-up of the market in question to competition will not make it impossible for legitimate public service objectives to continue to be met.
Blandt andet på grund af dette forhold er liberaliseringen i andre dele af verden, især USA og Japan, langt foran Europa.
Partly as a consequence of this concern, liberalization of the telecommunications sector in other parts of the world, notably the United States, has been achieved well in advance of Europe.
EU har dog i de sidste syv år gradvis gennemført et liberaliseringsprogram, der betyder, at markederne for telekommunikationstjenester vil blive åbnet helt for konkurrence i 1998.
How ever, over the past seven years, the Com munity has carried out a step-by-step programme of liberalization that will lead to the full opening of the telecommunications ser vices markets to competition by 1998.
poler, der under normale omstændigheder både ville overtræde konkurrencereglerne og rejse tvivl om lovligheden af overdragelsen eller opretholdelsen af monopolrettigheder ne, er den faktisk langt vigtigere i sidste til fælde end i første.
monopoly rights as such, it is, in fact, more important with respect to the latter than the former.
Kommissionen har tidligere behandlet en række sager, hvor et stats monopol deltog i aktiviteter, der normalt ville svare til misbrug af dominerende stilling, f.eks. »binding«, forskelsbehandling eller manglende vilje til at levere.
In the past, the Commission has dealt with a number of cases where a State monopoly was engaging in an activity that normally constitutes an abuse of a dominant position - tying, discriminating, or refusing to supply, for example.
De pågældende virksomheder har fremført, at deres adfærd var begrundet i deres forpligtelse til at levere en offentlig tjenesteydelse.
The companies in question argued that the conduct was justified by the existence of public service obligations.
Dette argument er blevet afvist i alle tilfælde, fordi det kunne påvises, at der enten ikke var nogen forbindelse mellem misbruget og varetagelsen af den offentlige funktion, eller fordi man kunne have valgt en alternativ og mindre restriktiv fremgangsmåde.
In every case this argument was rejected, because it was possible to demonstrate that either there was no direct link between the abuse and the achievement of the public service objective, or that an alternative and less-restrictive manner of achieving the objective could reasonably have been chosen.
På den anden side har Kommissionen accepteret, at overdragelse og opretholdelse af monopol rettigheder under visse omstændigheder kan være den eneste fornuftige måde at opfylde målsætningen om at udføre en offentlig tjenesteydelse på.
On the other hand, the Commission has accepted that in some circumstances the grant or maintenance of monopoly rights may be the only reasonable manner to achieve public service objectives.
Det første skridt blev taget i 1988 med direktivet om teleterminaludstyr.
The first step was taken in 1988 with the telecommunications terminal equipment Directive.
Heri blev det pålagt medlemsstaterne at afskaffe de mono poler, de havde udstedt til de nationale telekommunikationsoperatører på salg af udstyr som telefoner, modemer og faxmaskiner.
This required the Member States to terminate monopolies granted to their national telecommunications operators for the sale of equipment such as telephones, modems and fax machines.
Det andet og vigtigste skridt blev taget i 1990, hvor Kommissionen vedtog et direktiv om afskaffelse af monopolrettigheder til udbud af alle former for telekommunikationstjenester, med fire vigtige undtagelser:
The second and most important step was in 1990, when the Commission adopted a Directive requiring the abolition of monopoly rights for the provision of all telecommunications services, subject to four significant exceptions:
For at håndhæve artikel 90 kan Kommissionen vedtage beslutninger eller direktiver ret tet til medlemsstaterne, hvori den påpeger, at en given foranstaltning er en overtrædelse af traktaten, og at den skal standses.
In order to enforce Article 90, the Com mission may adopt decisions or directives addressed to Member States stating that a given measure infringes the Treaty and must be terminated.
Til virk somheder kan den rette beslutninger i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 1, og 86, hvori det meddeles, at de har forbrudt sig mod konkurrencereglerne, og at deres adfærd kun kan forsvares under henvisning til undtagelsen i artikel 90 med hensyn til deres forpligtelse til at udføre en offentlig tjenesteydelse.
To companies, it addresses decisions under Articles 85(1) and 86 stating that their actions infringe the competition mies and cannot be defended by recourse to the Article 90 exception by virtue of their public service obligations.
— taletelefonitjenester til den almindelige offentlighed
(i) voice telephone services to the general public,
- radio- og tv-udsendelser til den almindelige offentlighed.
(iv) radio and television broadcasting ser vices to the public.
Selv om sådanne direktiver rettet til med lemsstaterne ved første øjekast kan have karakter af egentlig lovgivning, og det der for kan virke overraskende, at Kommissionen har enekompetence til at vedtage dem, er direktiver efter artikel 90 ikke egentlig lovgivning.
Although at first sight such directives addressed to Member States may appear legislative in nature, and it may therefore be surprising that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to adopt them, in fact Article 90 directives are not legislative; they are simply the clarification, or explicit state ment and enforcement, of existing legal rules set out in the Treaty.
Der er blot tale om afklaring -eller eksplicit fremførelse og håndhævelse -af traktatens retlige bestemmelser.
However, the Commission is well aware of the importance and impact of such directives, not only in legal and economic terms, but also political ly and socially.