natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kontraktvilkår, der indebærer, at producenten, leverandøren eller et andet foretagende inden for nettet indskrænker denne frihed, sortlistes og er automatisk ugyldige.
It therefore sent, in October, astatement of objections to two car manufacturers, charging them with infringement of the competitionrules and giving them the opportunity to present their point of view.
I tilfælde af sådanne overtrædelse kan forbrugerne indbringe sagen for de kompetente nationale domstole, der -lettere end Kommissionen - kan nedlægge forbud og tilkende erstatning.
A final conclusion in this caseis expected in 1997.
Kommissionen kan dog forventes at gribe ind, når virksomheder ved hjælp af konkurrencebegrænsende aftaler eller praksis isolerer nationale markeder ved at begrænse parallelimporten.
Apart from complaints concerning the Italian market, the Commission has had to deal with a numberof complaints by end consumers which concerned other Member States (such as Denmark, Finland,Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain), where dealers either refused to sell to non-residents or wereprepared to sell only at a higher price or imposed certain requirements on end consumers orintermediaries acting on their behalf.
Der erindres om, at Kommissionen i sine halvårlige undersøgelser af forskelle i bilpriserne·1"1 har påvist, at der stadig er betydelige forskelle inden for EU.
Further complaints referred to dealers who refused to honourmanufacturers' warranties for vehicles imported from other Member States.
Da prisforskelle er det største incitament for parallelimport, søger de endelige forbrugere i stigende grad at købe motorkøretøjer i de lande, hvor priser og andre salgsvilkår er de mest fordelagtige.
While some of these caseswere settled after the Commission's active intervention, others required further investigation withmanufacturers and/or their respective importers.
Kommissionen har siden begyndelsen af 1994 modtaget en lang række klager fra endelige forbrugere, der har haft alvorlige vanskeligheder med at købe biler uden for deres eget land.
Manufacturers or suppliers usually give clear guidelines to their dealers on the kind ofauthorization which an intermediary, appointed by a final consumer, has to present.
På baggrund af de dokumenter.
This is to ensurethat unauthorized resellers do not masquerade as intermediaries.
Kommissionen indsamlede i forbindelse med disse undersøgelser, har den foreløbig konkluderet, at de pågældende virksomheder har fulgt en sådan strategi.
Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 on motor vehicle distribution establishes a balance between the supplier'sinterest in safeguarding its selective dealer network and the interest of European consumers in buyinga car within the Community wherever they wish to do so (see Article 3(10) and (11) and point 7 of Article 6(1) of the Regulation).
Den sendte derfor en klagepunktsmeddelelse til to bilproducenter, hvori den anklagede dem
When dealing with individual cases, the Commission takes the viewthat this balance has to be reflected in the requirements which manufacturers and suppliers demandof an intermediary's authorization.
Viho Europe UV mod Kommissionen (endnu ikke offentliggjort).
Thus, if manufacturers or suppliers ask their dealers to accept
Pressemeddelelse IP/96/145 af 15.2.1996 og IP/96/7 2 2 af 29.7.1996.
Press release IP/96/145, 15.2.1996, and press release IP/96/722, 29.7.1996.
I 1996 beskæftigede Kommissionen sig igen med restriktionerne for parallelimport aflægemidler.
In 1996 the Commission once more investigated restrictions on parallel trade in pharmaceuticalproducts.
De ofte meget store prisforskelle for de samme produkter fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat, der i vid udstrækning skyldes forskelle i de nationale priskontrolsystemer og sociale sikringsordninger, får nogle operatører til at foretage varearbitrage i form af parallelimport. Dette kan føre til lavere priser på lægemidler i de medlemsstater, hvor de er dyre, og dermed gavne forbrugerne, de sociale sikringskasser og statskassen.
The differences - often substantial - in the price charged for the same product from one Member State to another, which are due to a large extent to the diversity of national price control andsocial security systems, induce certain operators to make a profit by engaging in parallel trade.
Ved anvendelsen af konkurrencereglerne følger Kommissionen også i denne sektor logikken bag det indre marked.
In applying the competition rules in this sector, the Commission also follows the logic of the singlemarket.
Den har konsekvent og konstant kæmpet imod aftaler og praksis, der begrænser parallelimport af lægemidler.
It has waged a steady campaign against agreements and conduct restricting parallel trade inpharmaceutical products.
Domstolens retspraksis støtter den i øvrigt på dette punkt.
In this it enjoys the support of the Court of Justice.
Domstolen har for nylig i en sag, der rejste tvivl om princippet om varers frie bevægelighed og den industrielle og kommercielle beskyttelse i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 3634, givet medhold til de to britiske virksomheder Primecrown og Ettropharm, der ville importere lægemidler fra Spanien til Det Forenede Kongerige.
In a recent caseinvolving the principle of the free movement of goods and the protection of industrial and commercialproperty under Article 36 of the EC Treaty,14the Court found in favour of two British firms,Primecrown and Europharm, which wished to import pharmaceutical products sold in Spain with aview to reselling them in the United Kingdom.
Priskontrol og manglende patenter i Spanien og Portugal forklarer, hvorfor lægemidler er billige i de to lande.
The existence of price controls and the lack of anypatents in Spain and Portugal mean that drugs are cheap in those countries.
Domstolen har bekræftet, at princippet om varers frie bevægelighed har forrang og afvist fastfrysning af parallelimport, når nationale priskontrolforanstaltninger skaber konkurrencefordrejning.
The Court reaffirmed thepreeminence of the principle of the free movement of goods and rejected the argument to the effectthat parallel imports should be prohibited where national price control measures distort competition.
Dom al' 5. december 1996 i forenede sager C-267/95 og C-268/95.
When one of the wholesalers was found to be exporting, Bayerpenalized him by imposing successive reductions in the volumes supplied.
Merck & Co. mod Primecrown. Beecham mod Europharm (endnu ikke offentliggjort). KONK. BERETN. 1996
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 December 1996 in Joined Cases C-267/95 and C-268/95 Merck & Co.v Primecrown,Beecham v Europharm (not yet reported). in an order made in response to an application for interim measures, the Court of First Instance suspended Article 2of the Commission Decision, which requires Bayer to send a circular to French and Spanish wholesalers stating thatexports are permitted and will not cause any penalty to be incurred and to include that information in the generalconditions of sale (Order of the Court of First Instance of 3 June 1996 in Case T-41/96R Bayer AG v Commission(1996) ECR 11-383).
Kommissionens beslutning af 10. januar i Adalat-sagen er et eksempel på dens kamp mod foranstaltninger, der opdeler markedet.
Community law prohibits anticompetitive behaviour by firms that are in a dominant position onthe market.
Prisen på lægemidlet Adalat fra Bayer-koncernen varierer kraftigt fra en medlemsstat til en anden.
Certain competitive behaviour, which would not normally infringe EC competition rules,may do so when implemented by firms in a dominant position.
Især sælges det i Det Forenede Kongerige til en langt højere pris end i Frankrig og Spanien.
This approach is justified by the muchmore significant impact which the behaviour of such firms has on competition.
Bayer modsatte sig denne paralleleksport, som koncernen opfattede som et stort kommercielt problem.
This is all the moretrue where firms engage in exclusionary practices, i.e. conduct which eliminates a competitor orrestricts or impedes its activities.
Den reagerede ved at indføre systemer til at udpege de grossister, der eksporterede, og begrænse deres leverancer.
While a dominant firm is entitled to defend its position by competingwith rivals, it has a special responsibility not to further diminish the degree of competition remainingon the market.36 Exclusionary practices may be directed against existing competitors on the market orthey may be intended to impede market access by new entrants.
Grossisterne forsøgte derefter på forskellig måde at få leveret større mængder blandt andet ved at fordele de ordrer, der skulle eksporteres, over deres forskellige afdelinger og ved at afgive ordrer gennem andre grossister, der ikke kontrolleres af Bayer. Da en af grossisterne blev afsløret som eksportør, nedsatte Bayer sine leverancer til den pågældende som straf.
Examples of such illegal behaviourinclude: refusal to deal as a means of eliminating a competitor by a firm that is the sole or dominantsource of supply of a product or that controls access to an essential technology or infrastructure;predatory pricing; exclusionary dealing agreements; discrimination as part of a wider pattern ofmonopolizing conduct designed to exclude competitors; and exclusionary rebate schemes.
Det skal bemærkes, at Kommissionen har betragtet tilstedeværelsen af forskellige nationale bestemmelser for prisfastsættelse i lægemiddelsektoren som en formildende omstændighed ved fastsættelsen af den bøde, den har idømt Bayer.
In particular, the Commission has been dealing moreoften with such problems in sectors which are in the process of liberalization such as telecommunications,37 transport38 and energy.39
EU-retten forbyder virksomheder at misbruge deres dominerende stilling på markedet ved at udvise konkurrencebegrænsende adfærd.
For example, the Commission intervened to establish competition in the Finnish market foramusement machines, a previously monopolized sector.
Visse former for konkurrencemæssig adfærd , der normalt ikke krænker fællesskabets konkurrenceregler, kan gøre det, hvis de gennemføres af virksomheder med en dominerende stilling.
However, Pelika RAY, the Finnishstate-owned company that operates amusement machines in over 2 000 independently owned premisesin Finland, had concluded contracts preventing the owners of the premises taking amusement machinesfrom any of its new competitors.
Dette begrundes af den langt større virkning, sådanne virksomheders adfærd har for konkurrencen.
Following discussions with the Commission, Pelika RAY hasvoluntary lifted this restriction, so allowing effective competition between itself and other operatorsand increasing consumer choice.
En virksomhed med dominerende stilling har lov til at forsvare denne stilling ved at konkurrere med sine konkurrenter, men den har et særligt ansvar for ikke yderligere at hæmme den resterende konkurrence på markedet16.
Other companies now also produce similar pendelivery systems, including manufacture of various components (i.e. injection devices, cartridgescontaining the insulin dosage, and disposable needles), some of which are compatible with the Novo Nordisk system.
Udelukkelsespraksis kan rettes mod eksisterende konkurrenter på markedet eller kan have til formål at forhindre, at nye aktører får adgang til det.
Following a complaint by a medical device manufacturer, the Commission found that Novo Nordisk abusively disclaimed liability for the malfunction of its pen products, or refused toguarantee such products, when they were used in conjunction with the compatible components of othermanufacturers.
Denne form for ulovlig praksis kan f.eks. omfatte følgende: at en virksomhed, der er den eneste eller den dominerende leverandør af et produkt, eller som kontrollerer adgangen til en afgørende teknik eller infrastruktur, afviser at handle; ublu prisfastsættelse; eksklusive handelsaftaler; forskelsbehandling som led i overordnet monopoliserende adfærd med henblik på at udelukke konkurrenter samt eksklusive rabatordninger.
Following discussions with the Commission, Novo Nordisk agreed no longer to usedisclaimers in such circumstances.
I 1996 indledte Kommissionen også formel procedure mod AC Nielsen Company (Nielsen) for overtrædelse af artikel 86. Efter en klage fra Information Resources Inc.
In 1996 the Commission also opened a formal procedure against AC Nielsen Company {Nielsen)for infringement of Article 86.
(IR1) fastslog Kommissionen, at Nielsen misbrugte sin dominerende stilling på de europæiske markeder for detailmarkedsundersøgelser til at forhindre IRI i at få fodfæste på markedet.
(IRI) the Commission found that Nielsen abused its dominant position in the European markets for retailtracking services in order to prevent IRI from establishing a competitive presence there.
Mere specifikt havde Nielsen indgået eksklusivaftaler om køb af detailhandleres markedsoplysninger samt kontrakter, der begrænsede detailhandlernes frihed til at levere oplysninger til en eventuel konkurrerende leverandør af detailmarkedsundersøgelser.
In particular,Nielsen had concluded exclusivity contracts for the purchase of market data from retailers as well ascontracts including restriction of the retailer's freedom to supply data to any competing retail trackingservices provider.
I forbindelse med salg af tjenester til multinationale kunder gav Nielsen desuden rabatter, hvis kunderne forpligtede sig til at benytte Nielsens tjenesteydelser i en lang række lande.
Moreover, in relation to the sale of services to multinational customers, Nielsenapplied discounts in exchange for commitments from customers to call upon its services in a widerange of countries.
Dette indebar sammenkædning af tande, hvor Nielsen havde en dominerende stilling, og IRI ville ind på markedet.
This involved the bundling of countries where Nielsen was in a dominant positionin countries that IRI was entering.
Kort efter at have modtaget Kommissionens klagepunktsmeddelelse meddelte Nielsen, at selskabet var villigt til at indgå et forlig med Kommissionen.
Soon after receiving the Commission's statement of objections, Nielsen indicated its willingness toreach a settlement with the Commission.
Sagen blev endeligt afsluttet i november, da Nielsen gav tilsagn om at løse de største konkurrencemæssige problemer og sikre lige vilkår på de europæiske markeder for detailmarkedsundersøgelser.
The case was finally settled in November by an undertakingfrom Nielsen which addresses the main competition concerns and ensures a level playing field in the European markets for retail tracking services.
Det skal bemærkes, at det amerikanske justitsministeriums antitrust-afdeling også var i færd med at undersøge Nielsens kontraktpraksis.
It should be noted that the Antitrust Division of the USDepartment of Justice was also investigating Nielsen's contractual practices.
Da de fleste tilfælde af
As most of the allegedabuses took place in Europe, the Commission took the lead in investigating them.
Dette skete i nært samarbejde med det amerikanske justitsministerium blandt andet i form af udveksling af fortrolige oplysninger med parternes samtykke.
This was done inclose cooperation with the Department of Justice, which included exchanges of confidentialinformation with the consent of the parties.
I lyset af de resultater, der blev opnået i Europa, besluttede det amerikanske justitsministerium også at afslutte sin efterforskning.
In view of the results achieved on the European side, the US Department of Justice also decided to close its investigation.
D - Informationssamfundet
D - Information society
Konkurrencepolitikken spiller fortsat en meget aktiv rolle ved tilblivelsen af informationssamfundet, såvel med hensyn til infrastrukturer som tjenesteydelser.
Competition policy continues to play a highly active role in enabling the information society togrow, both in terms of infrastructure and in terms of services.
Der er sket en markant udvikling i 1996 ikke blot med hensyn til aftaler og tilfælde af dominerende stilling, men også med hensyn til liberalisering40og fusionskontrol41.
There were a number of significantdevelopments in 1996, not only in relation to restrictive practices and dominant positions, but also in relation to liberalization40 and merger control.41
Liberaliseringen af de fleste af informationssamfundets markeder er ifølge Kommissionens tjenestegrene allerede gennemført eller planlagt for 1998 (med nogle undtagelser).
The liberalization of most information society markets has, depending on the services, already beenachieved, been set in train or been decided on for 1998 (with a few derogations).
Samtidig er der sket hurtige teknologiske fremskridt, der indebærer store investeringer i udvikling af de nødvendige produkter og infrastrukturer og omfattende markedsføringsinvesteringer for at overbevise brugerne om, at de skal gå over til de nye tjenester.
An important factoris the rapid pace of technological change, which necessitates substantial investment in order to developproducts and the requisite infrastructure and considerable marketing expenditure in order to convinceusers to adopt the new services.
Endelig er der nogle elementer af informationssamfundet, der hurtigt vinder udbredelse på verdensplan, og EU's politik støtter en åbning (med undtagelse af visse kulturelle aspekter), hvilket forstærker både væksten på markedet i EU, den eksterne konkurrence og behovet for, at EU's erhvervsliv er konkurrencedygtigt i denne sektor.
Some aspects of the information society are rapidly becomingglobalized, and in this context the European Union is pursuing a policy of openness (with theexception of certain cultural matters) which will increase both the growth of the European market,external competition and the need for competitiveness on the part of European enterprises in thissector.
Denne udvikling fremkalder talrige omstruktureringer inden for telekommunikation og medier i form af fusioner, alliancer eller oprettelse af joint ventures. Kommissionen tilskynder til denne tilpasning. Generelt er omstruktureringerne påkrævede for at drage fuld fordel af liberaliseringen, foretage den nødvendige forskning og udvikling, lancere nye tjenester og nedbringe omkostningerne.
These developments are triggering numerous restructuring operations in the telecommunicationsand media sectors in the form of mergers, alliances and joint ventures.
Liberaliseringen bør derimod ikke drages i tvivl af omstruktureringer, der medfører opretholdelse af ublu priser, forhindrer nye virksomheder i at få adgang til tidligere monopoliserede markeder eller på anden måde fører til misbrug eller styrkelse af en dominerende stilling.
37 preventing new companies from entering previously monopolistic markets, or any other abuse orstrengthening of a dominant position.
Konkurrencepolitikken for informationssamfundet tager således udgangspunkt i en balance mellem på den ene side indledning af omstruktureringer og på den anden en nøje kontrol med vilkårene for disse omstruktureringer, eller i flere tilfælde forbud.
Competition policy as it relates to the information society istherefore a balance between, on the one hand, a liberal attitude towards restructuring and, on the other,the need to keep a watchful eye on how such restructuring is carried out, or even to impose a ban insome cases.
Der er desuden forbindelse mellem den reelle åbningsgrad på de relevante markeder, der udvikler sig med tiden, og vilkårene for omstruktureringer.
There is also a link between the degree of actual liberalization of the relevant markets,which evolves over time, and the conditions which may be attached to restructuring operations.
Navnlig bør godkendelsen af sådanne alliancer, der ofte er konkurrencefremmende uden for de nationale markeder, vurderes i forhold til åbningsgraden på de nationale markeder.
Inparticular, the acceptability of alliances, which are often pro-competitive outside domestic markets,must be assessed in the light of the extent to which those markets have been liberalized.
Efter disse principper godkendte Kommissionen i juli oprettelsen af Atlas, som er et joint venture mellem France Télécom (FT) og Deutsche Telekom (DT), der vil tilbyde teletjenester til store brugere i Europa.
Proceeding on this basis, in July the Commission authorized the Atlas project, a joint venturebetween France Telecom (FT) and Deutsche Telekom (DT) aimed at providing telecommunicationsservices to large users in Europe.
Atlas' tjenester omfatter blandt andet nettjenester, ekstemalisering (outsourcing) og VSAT-satellitter.
The services provided by Atlas include network services,outsourcing and very small aperture satellite (VSAT) services.
Kommissionen har ligeledes givet tilladelse til G/o/WO/ie-projektet, der drejer sig om samarbejde mellem Atlas og Sprint om at tilbyde disse tjenester på verdensplan.
The Commission also authorized theproposed GlobalOne joint venture, an alliance between Atlas and Sprint Corporation for the supplyof the above services worldwide.
Gennem GlobalOne vil parterne også tilbyde tjenester for rejsende og teletjenester for andre teleselskaber.
Within GlobalOne, the parties will also provide traveller servicesand telecommunications services to other telecommunications organizations.
På de berørte markeder rejser tjenesteydelser til virksomheder alvorlig tvivl om konkurrencen i EØS. Især på markedet for datatransmission gennem jordbundne net har DT og FT markedsandele på langt over 70% i henholdsvis Tyskland og Frankrig, som yderligere styrkes af retlige monopoler til at stille infrastruktur til rådighed.
In the relevant markets, the services provided to corporate users raise important issues to do withcompetition in the EEA.
Desuden indebar Atlas-projektet, at en konkurrent til DT i Tyskland, nemlig FT's datterselskab Info AG, skulle nedlægges.
In addition, the Atlas project provided for the elimination of a competitor of DT in Germany, namely FT's localsubsidiary, Info AG.
Som led i proceduren har Frankrig og Tyskland i første række givet tilsagn om at liberalisere de alternative infrastrukturer, hvorved konkurrenterne vil blive mindre afhængige af FT's og DT's net. Kommissionen har gjort tildeling af de to første infrastrukturlicenser i Frankrig og Tyskland til en forudsætning for, at Atlas/GlobalOne-aftalen kan træde i kraft.
In the course of the proceedings, France and Germany first of all undertook to liberalize the alternativeinfrastructures, thereby making competitors less dependent on the networks of FT and DT.
Denne betingelse blev opfyldt den 1. december 199642. Derefter udsatte DT og FT indskuddet af deres nationale datatransmissionsnet i joint venture-selskabet til efter den fuldstændige liberalisering af infrastrukturer i Tyskland og Frankrig.
This condition was met on 1 December.42Secondly,DT and FT have postponed the transfer of their domestic data transmission networks to the jointventure pending full liberalization of infrastructure in France and Germany.
Endelig har FT forpligtet sig til at sælge Info AG.
Thirdly, FT hasundertaken to sell Info AG.
Den således ændrede kontraktmæssige ramme gør det sammen med de stramme betingelser og forpligtelser muligt at sikre, at Atlas/GlobalOne ikke vil afskaffe konkurrencen.
This modified contractual framework, and the strict conditions and obligations, will help to ensure that Atlas/GlobalOne does not eliminate competition.
Desuden er fritagelsen gjort betinget af manglende forskelsbehandling og krydssubsidiering.
Exemption is also conditional on there being nodiscrimination or cross subsidisation.
Hvis disse betingelser ikke overholdes, vil fritagelsen ikke længere gælde.
Should these conditions no longer be fulfilled, the exemptionwill be withdrawn.
Mere generelt dækker de to projekter et mere og mere påtrængende behov og kommer til at konkurrere med de få udbydere af teletjenester, der findes på verdensplan.
More generally, the two projects will satisfy the burgeoning demand fortelecommunications services and will compete head-on with the few providers of such servicesworldwide.
Kommissionen vil anvende den samme fremgangsmåde ved den igangværende behandling af anmeldelser af Unisource- og í//uwor/í/-alliancerne.
The Commission proposes to adopt the same approach in its scrutiny of the notifications of the Unisource and Uniworld alliances, which is now under way.