natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Tjekkoslovakiet, MODUS i Ungarn og 0B0P i Polen hver især mellem 1000 og 1500 personer ved besøg pá de adspurgtes bopæl.
10ECOMA in Czechoslovakia, HODUS in Hungary and OBOP in Poland polled between 1000 to 1500 people in each country face-to-face at hoae fro« 20th October to 3rd Noveaber 1990.
I Ungarn blev der anvendt et kortere spørgeskema.
A shorter questionnaire was used in Hungary.
DetalJerede oplysninger findes i bilagene.
See Annexes for »ore technical information.
Selv om man på nuværende tidspunkt ikke kan forvente, at undersøgelser, som gennemføres i Central- og Østeuropa, er af samme tekniske standard som undersøgelser gennemført I Vesten, giver resultaterne af disse nye meningsmålinger os et enestående indblik i holdningerne blandt tjekkoslovakker, ungarere og polakker i en tid, hvor de oplever en revolutionsagtig omvæltning i deres lands historie.
Although the same technical standards for surveys available in the 'West' cannot be expected in Central and Eastern Europe at the present time, the results of these new polls allow us a unique insight into the attitudes of Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles as they face revolutionary times in their own country's history.
Pá tidspunktet for meningsmålingens gennemførelse mente et flertal blandt tjekkoslovakkerne og polakkerne, at udviklingen i deres respektive lande generelt set gik i den rigtige retning.
At the time of the poll, more Czechoslovakians and Poles believed that things in their country were generally going in the right direction rather than the wrong direction.
Blandt tjekkoslovakkerne udgjorde de positivt indstillede (53%) mere end dobbelt så mange som de negativt indstillede (26%).
Twice as many Czechoslovakians were positive (53%) rather than negative (26%).
Polakkerne var mindre overbeviste (43% mod 30%) om, at situationen udviklede sig i den rigtige retning (Tabel 49), hvilket er en bemærkelsesværdig ændring i forhold til marts 1990, hvor polakkerne ¡følge en undersøgelse, som blev gennemført af det polske CBOS-insti tut, i langt mindre grad gav udtryk for tvivl (51% mod 20%).
Poles were less certain (43% versus 30%) about how the situation was developing (Table 49), a significant change from March 1990, when the Polish Institute CBOS showed Poles expressing much less doubt (51% versus 20%).
De mest optimistiske blandt tjekkoslovakkerne var højtuddannede (71%), administratorer i ledende stillinger (69%) og tilhængere af den politiske højrefløj (69%).
The most optimistic Czechoslovakians were those with higher education (71%), senior white collar workers and people on the right of the political spectrum (both 69%).
Slovakkerne var langt mere pessimistiske (42% "rigtig retning" mod 36% "forkert retning") end tjekkerne (58% mod 21%).
People from Slovakia were much more pessimistic (42% "right" versus 36% "wrong" direction) than Czechs (58% versus 21%).
I Polen var tilhængerne af fagforeningen Solidaritet (57%) og tilhængerne af den politiske højrefløj (52%) de mest positive.
In Poland, Solidarity trade unionists (57%) and those on the right of the political spectrum (52%) were the most positive.
Som den eneste gruppe mente de polske landmænd, at udviklingen snarere gik i den forkerte retning end i den rigtige (46% mod 33%), og denne utilfredshed er ikke uden betydning, når man ved, at to femtedele af Polens befolkning stadig bor på landet.
Polish farmers were the only group who felt things were going wrong rather than right (46% versus 33%), a significant source of discontent if one remembers that twofifths of Poland's population still lives in villages.
Flere central- og østeuropæiske lande kæmper med store strukturreformer med det formål at indføre markedsøkonomi.
Many Central and Eastern European countries are in the throes of major structural reforms to try and bring about a market economy.
Pá grund af de konkurser og den arbejdsløshed, som er fulgt i kølvandet på de omstruktureringer, der allerede har fundet sted, er den økonomiske vækst faldet:
The readjustment already taking place have brought about a decline in economic growth as bankruptcies and unemployment take their toll for the first time:
I Polen er væksten i BNP i faste priser faldet brat, siden den økonomiske omlægning startede i januar 1990.
For Poles, the drop in real GDP growth since their economic 'Big Bang' started in January 1990 has been precipitous.
Selv om næsten halvdelen af de adspurgte polakker gav udtryk for, at deres egen økonomi var blevet værre inden for de seneste 12 måneder, indrømmede de fleste dog, at landets økonomi var blevet bedre.
Despite almost half of them saying that their household finances had got worse over the last twelve months, most acknowledged that their country's economy was in better shape.
Herudover mente et relativt flertal af polakkerne, at landets økonomi fortsat ville blive bedre, men de var usikre på, om borgerne ville få fordel af denne forbedring (Diagram 4.1 og 4.2, Tabel 50-53).
Furthermore, a relative majority of Poles felt that their country's economy would continue to improve but they were uncertain if the benefits of that improvement would be passed onto them.
Heroverfor var tjekkoslovakkerne og ungarerne noget mere forbeholdne over for de umiddelbare udsigter.
By contrast, Czechoslovakians and Hungarians were much more gloomy about their immediate prospects.
Tre fjerdedele af de adspurgte ungarere (74%) mente, at deres lands og deres egen økonomi ville blive forværret inden for de næste 12 måneder.
Three-quarters of Hungarians (74%) felt that their country's economy and their own household finances would get worse over the next twelve months.
Størstedelen af tjekkoslovakkerne mente ikke, at der ville ske en opbremsning I forværringen af husholdningernes økonomi; men selv om næsten tre fjerdedele (72%) af de adspurgte gav udtryk for, at deres økonomi var blevet forværret Inden for de seneste 12 måneder, var der dog færre (51%), der mente, at denne forværring ville fortsætte i det kommende år.
Most Czechoslovakians felt that there would be no respite in the deterioration of their household finances; however, although almost three-quarters (72%) of them said their economy had got worse over the past twelve months, fewer (51%) thought it would continue to deteriorate during the next year.
Antallet af adspurgte, der gav udtryk for, at de personligt følte sig hårdt ramt af den økonomiske nedtur i Tjekkoslovakiet, var størst blandt husmødre (35% "betragtelig forvarrlng af husholdningernes økonomi"), lavtlønnede (33%), landboere (29%) og slovakker (27%).
Those who said they were personally the hardest hit by the downturn in Czechoslovakia were housewives (35% "household finances a lot worse"), low income earners (33%), villagers (29%) and people from Slovakia (27%).
I Polen var det først og fremmest husmødre (24%), pensionister (22%), personer over 60 år (21%) og bemærkelsesværdigt nok opinionsledere (24%), der gav udtryk for, at de tilheirte de dårligst stillede.
In Poland, housewives (24%), pensioners (22%), those aged over 60 (21%) and, significantly, opinion-leaders (24%) were the most likely to say they were much worseoff.
Trods alle disse problemer gik flertallet (58-62%) i alle tre lande ind for en fri markedsøkonomi (Diagram 4.3, Tabel 54).
Despite all this hardship, most people (58%-62%) from all three countries said they were committed to the free market (Figure 4.3, Table 54).
Holdningen blandt ungarerne var ikke meget anderledes end blandt de andre adspurgte, selv om man her inden for de seneste to årtier har eksperimenteret med markedsøkonomi.
Hungarian experimentation with market economics over the past two decades did not seem to make their views much different from others polled.
Antallet af personer til venstre I det politiske spektrum, som mente, at udviklingen gik for hurtigt, var mere end dobbelt så stort (33%) som til højre I det politiske spektrum (14%).
People on the left of the political spectrum were more than twice as likely to say that things were going too fast (33%) than those on the right (14%).
Blandt tjekkerne var der et flertal for at fremskynde reformen (35% "for langsomt" mod 18% "for hurtigt"), mens slovakkernes holdning hertil var uafklaret (24% mod 30%).
Czechs were convinced that reform could speed up (35% too slow versus 18% too fast), while people from Slovakia were undecided (29% versus 30%).
Polakkerne blev spurgt, om de mente, at det ville lykkes Polen ved hjælp af sit reformprogram, som er det mest vidtgående I Central- og Østeuropa, at rette op på den skæve polske økonomi (Diagram 4.4, Tabel 56).
Poles were asked whether they felt their country's reform programme - the most radical in Central and Eastern Europe - was likely to succeed or fail in curing the ills of the Polish economy (Figure 4.4, Table 56).
Af svarene fremgår det, at polakkerne er usikre med hensyn til programmets udfald, idet 32 % svarede, at det ville blive en succes, 35% en fiasko og 33% ved ikke.
The answer showed that Poles were uncertain as to whether the programme was succeeding (32%) or failing (35%), with many saying they were not sure (33%).
Antallet af personer, der mente, at det ville blive en succes, var størst blandt personer med en højere uddannelse (50% "en succes" mod 30% "en fiasko") og medlemmer af Solidaritet (44% mod 27%), mens de mest utilfredse var at finde blandt de polske landmænd (28% mod 44%).
Those most likely to say that things were succeeding were white collar workers with higher education (50% "succeeding" versus 30% "not succeeding") and Solidarity trade unionists (44% versus 27%), while Polish farmers were the most disgruntled (28% versus 44%).
De Økonomiske reformer fremskyndes af indførelsen af f lerpartidemokratler i Central- og Østeuropa.
Economic reform is being fuelled by the advent of multi-party democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
I første halvdel af 1990 blev der i Bulgarien, Tjekkoslovakiet, Østtyskland, Ungarn og Rumænien afholdt parlamentsvalg med deltagelse af flere partier.
In the first half of 1990, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Romania all held multi-party parliamentary elections.
I Polen, som var det første land til at bryde med fortiden i denne henseende, er magten stadig delt mellem de tidligere kommunister og Solidaritet, hvorimod Solidaritet vandt præsidentval-
Poland, the first country to break with the past in this respect, continued its power-sharing arrangements between former communists and Solidarity
- 51 - get i november/december 1990 efter en bitter valgkamp.
EUROBAROMETER 34 while the bitterly-fought presidential elections during November/December 1990 gave Solidarity the presidency.
Også i Jugoslavlen blev der ved udgangen af 1990 afholdt valg med deltagelse af flere partler til regeringerne I de seks delrepublikker.
Yugoslavia had also held multi-party elections for the government of each of its six republics by the end of 1990.
Trods disse grundlæggende ændringer var et flertal af ungarerne (75%) og tjekkoslovakkerne (55%) utilfredse med den demokratiske reformproces, hvorimod holdningen blandt polakkerne var mere uklar (38% "tilfredse" mod 37% "utilfredse") (Diagram 4.5,
Despite these fundamental changes, a majority of Hungarians (75%) and Czechoslovakians (55%) were dissatisfied with the way democracy was progressing, while Poles were only lukewarm about it (38% "satisfied" versus 37% "dissatisfied") (Figure 4.5, Table 57).
Som begrundelse for at de var utilfredse, anførte tjekkoslovakkerne og polakkerne, at ændringerne gik for langsomt.
Czechoslovakians and Poles said that they were dissatisfied because changes were going too slowly.
De adspurgte sagde, at de ikke var vant til den partipolitiske kævl og strid, og de mente, at man endnu ikke var blevet fortrolig med demokratiet.
People said they were not used to the bickering of party politics and felt their country still had to master democracy.
De forværrede økonomiske vilkår, social uretfærdighed og den faldende levestandard var afgørende faktorer for deres desillusion.
Worsening economic conditions, social injustices and the falling standard of living all played significant roles in their disillusionment.
De utilfredse syntes at dele sig i to store grupper: pá den ene side sympatisører med det tidligere kommunistiske parti og deres ligesindede (fx medlemmer af den tidligere statsstyrede fagforening OPZZ i Polen) og pá den anden side desillusionerede arbejdere, som er de mest udsatte ved faldet I den økonomiske vækst.
There seemed to be two main groupings of dissatisfied people: former communist party sympathisers and their offspring (such as the formerly-official OPZZ Polish trade unionists); and disillusioned workers most threatened by the economic downturn.
Herudover var slovakkerne utilfredse med situationen.
People from Slovakia were also unhappy about the situation :
Antal utilfredse med demokratiet på nuværende tidspunkt angivet I % Tjekkoslovakiet Ungarn Polen VenstrefløjstiIhængere (66%) Faglærte arbejdere (83%) Personor med uddannnelse pá gymnasialt niveau (52%)
% Most dissatisfied with democracy at the present time
Slovakkere (62%)
Czechoslovakia Left-wing supporters (66%) People from Slovakia (62%) Jun.white collars (61 %)
Medlemmer af OPZZ fagfor stillinger (61%) enlngen (48%)
(52%) Jun.white collars (51%) OPZZ trade unionists (48%)
Den personlige frihed og en fri presse var (Især for polakkerne) de vigtigste grunde til, at man var tilfreds med demokratiet.
Personal liberty and a unfettered media (especially for Poles) were the most important reasons to be satisfied with democracy.
Man fremhævede ligeledes religionsfriheden, afslutningen på et-partistyret og fremvæksten af politisk pluralisme som væsentlige grunde. Man håbede, at demokratiet ville føre til forbedringer i befolkningens levestandard.
Freedom of religion, the end of one-party rule and the growth of political pluralism were applauded.
Især tjekkoslovakkerne så frem til, at der blev etableret private virksomheder, og at det blev muligt at rejse udenlands.
Czechoslovakians in particular looked forward to the advent of private enterprise and the possibilities of travelling abroad.
4.2 TILNÆRMELSE TIL EF
4.2 ASPIRATIONS TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY
I princippet er ungarerne (81%), tjekkoslovakkerne (79%) og i mindre omfang polakkerne (68%) tilhængere af en forening af Europa med oprettelse af "Europas Forenede Stater" som endeligt mål, inklusive deres egne lande (Tabel 58).
In principle, Hungarians (81%), Czechoslovakians (79%) and, to a lesser degree, Poles (68%) are in favour of the unification of Europe, leading to the formation of a "United States of Europe", including their respective country (Table 58).
Ungarerne syntes at være de mest Europa-orienterede.
Hungarians seem to be more European-orientated than the others.
Mens 66% af ungarerne "ofte" eller "undertiden" tænkte pá sig selv som europæere, var dette kun tilfældet for ca. halvdelen af tjekkoslovakkerne (53%) og polakkerne (51%) (Diagram 4.6, Tabel 59).
While two-thirds (66%) thought of themselves as Europeans "often" or "some times", only around half of Czechoslovakians (53%) and Poles (51%) did (Figure 4.6, Table 59).
Imidlertid vil det for østeuropæerne være nødvendigt at forlige sig med deres forskelligartethed, som pá ingen måde er forsvundet, men som i over 40 år har været undertrykt pá grund af deres medlemskab af den samme politiske blok (Tabel 60).
Nevertheless, Central and Eastern Europeans still have to reconcile their many differences which had been suppressed, but by no means erased, by over forty years of membership of the same political bloc (Table 60).
Et flertal af tjekkoslovakkerne gav udtryk for, at de Ikke stolede pá russere (62%), bulgarere (64%), ungarere (67%), polakker og rumænere (77%).
A majority of Czechoslovakians said they did not trust Russians (62%), Bulgarians (64%), Hungarians (67%), Poles and Romanians (both 77%).
Herudover sagde et flertal af polakkerne, at de ingen tillid havde til slovakker (51%), bulgarere (56%), tjekkere (61%), hviderussere (63%), rumænere (64%), russere (69%), tyskere (70%) og ukrainere (75%).
Furthermore, most Poles said they distrusted the Slovaks (51%), Bulgarians (56%), Czechs (61%), Byelorussians (63%), Romanians (64%), Russians (69%), Germans (70%) and Ukrainians (75%).
Amerikanerne var de udlændinge, som flest tjekkoslovakker (73%) og polakker (59%) havde tillid til.
Americans were the most trusted foreigners by Czechoslovakians (73%) and Poles (59%).
Kendskabet i Østeuropa til Det Europæiske Fællesskab er ret stort. Flere ungarere (87%) og tjekkoslovakker (84%) end polakker (75%) har hørt om EF (Tabel 61).
Awareness of the European Community is quite high.
(24%-27%) en neutral og næsten ingen (1%-3%) en negativ opfattelse (Diagram 4.7, tabel
In the three countries, around half (48%-51%) had a positive impression of the Community, a quarter (24%-27%) neutral and virtually none (l%-3%) negative (Figure 4.7, Table 62).
Ifølge en fælles erklæring afgivet af Det Europæiske Økonomiske Fællesskab og COMECON indgik Fællesskabet handels- og samarbejdsaftaler med Tjekkoslovakiet og Ungarn i 1988 og med Polen i 1989.
Following a Joint Declaration signed between the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Community signed trade and cooperation agreements with Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1988 as well as Poland in 1989.
Da den politiske omvæltning tog fart, blev EF-Kommiss ionen i 1989 anmodet om at iværksætte PHARE-programmet med det formål at koordinere det store hjælpeprogram, som 24 industrialiserede lande (24 lande-gruppen) havde besluttet at iværksætte til støtte for omlægningen af Polens og Ungarns økonomier.
As political change gathered speed, the Commission was asked to set up the PHARE operation in 1989 to coordinate a major assistance programme provided by the 24 industrialised countries (G24) to restructure the economies of Poland and Hungary.
I Juli 1990 blev det besluttet at udvide programmet til også at omfatte Bulgarien, Tjekkoslovakiet, Østtyskland og Jugoslavien.
The decision was taken in July 1990 to extend the programme to cover Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia as well.
Tre fjerdedele af de adspurgte tjekkoslovakker (79%) og ungarere (77%) og godt halvdelen af de adspurgte polakker (55%) sagde, at de havde hørt om dette hjælpeprogram (Diagram
Three-quarters of Czechoslovakians (79%) and Hungarians (77%), as well as just over half of all Poles (55%) said they had heard of this assistance programme (Figure 4.8, Table 63).
Imidlertid syntes der ikke at være nogen særlig forbindelse mellem størrelsen af de beløb, som 24- landegruppen havde bevilget, og befolkningens tendens til at mene, at støtten var af stor betydning.
However there seemed to be little correlation between the amount of funds committed by G 24 and the tendency for people to say that the assistance was having a major impact.
% af de adspurgte, som mener, at den er af stor betydning Støtte i alt
Czechoslovakia % Saying Major Impact 27% Assistance/Total 34 MECU
I december 1990 blev der mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab og Tjekkoslovakiet, Ungarn og Polen indledt forhandlinger om indgåelse af associeringsaftaler med det formål at øge det politiske og økonomiske samarbejde.
The European Community began negotiations in December 1990 to conclude treaties of association for closer political and economic cooperation between the Community and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.
Næsten fire ud af fem (78%-79%) gik ind for, at deres land blev knyttet tættere t i I EF gennem sådanne aftaler.
Almost four out of five people (78%-79%) supported their country having closer ties with the Community through such treaties.
Kun mellem 2% og 4% var modstandere af denne ide (Diagram 4.9, Tabel 64).
Only 2%-4% were against the idea (Figure 4.9, Table 64).
Et flertal af polakkerne (55%) og ungarerne (51%) ønskede, at deres land blev optaget som fuldt medlem af Fællesskabet med det samme (Diagram 4.10, Tabel 65).
Most Poles (55%) and Hungarians (51%) wanted their country to be full members of the Community immediately (Figure 4.10, Table 65).
Tjekkoslovakkerne mente, at de behøvede mere tid (25% "med det samme" mod 37% "om fem år").
Czechoslovakians felt they should take more time (25% "immediately" versus 37% "in five years' time").
Kun 2% i hvert land var Imod et sådant medlemskab.
Only 2% from each country were against joining.
Dette bekræfter den positive holdning til EF-medlemskab, som Eurobarometers tidligere meningsmålinger har vist. Disse meningsmålinger viste, at 90% af tjekkoslovakkerne og 84% af ungarerne var for medlemskab af EF.
This confirms the positive attitudes towards Community membership expressed in earlier Eurobarometer polls which showed 90% of Czechoslovakians and 84% of Hungarians in favour of joining the European Community.
En generel forbedring af økonomien og afhjælpning af mangelen pá varer ville ifølge de adspurgte være langt den største fordel ved medlemskab af EF.
By far the most important benefit of Community membership was perceived to be the overall improvement of the economy and the disappearance of shortages.
I Polen, hvor man har tradition for at skaffe udenlandsk valuta ved at arbejde i udlandet, var man særlig ivrig efter, at grænserne til EF-landene blev åbne.
The Poles, with a tradition of earning foreign exchange by working abroad, were particularly keen about the opening of frontiers with Community countries.
Tjekkoslovakkerne håbede, at et EF-medIemskab ville gøre det lettere at indføre en fri markedsøkonomi. Sammenlignet med de økonomiske fordele talte kun relativt fá om de politiske fordele ved et EF-medIemskab.
Czechoslovakians hoped that the creation of a free market economy would become -easier.
Senerelt blev der givet udtryk for et ønske om højere levestandard. Ca. en tredjedel sagde, at de ikke kunne komme i tanke om nogen fordele ved et EF-medIemskab, eller at der ingen var.
The overall sentiment was a desire to see people's standard of life increase.
Dmvendt sagde mere end tre fjerdedele af de adspurgte tjekkoslovakker, ungarere og Dolakker, at de ikke mente, at det ville være forbundet med ulemper for deres land at slive fuldt medlem af EF.
By contrast, more than three-quarters of Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles said that they did not know of any drawbacks in their country becoming full members of the Community.
Bekymringerne var især koncentreret om frygten for at blive Jomineret af udenlandske firmaer med deraf følgende fallitter og arbejdsløshed.
Any worries were centred mainly on fears of dominance by foreign companies, leading to bankruptcies and unemployment.
Et mindre untai adspurgte frygtede ligeledes, at deres land kunne blive politisk og kulturelt Jomineret af udlandet.
A small number were also concerned about possible political and cultural domination.
11 Herudover modtog både Ungarn og Polen 51 mio. ECU i humanitær bistand i 1990.
11 Both Hungary and Poland also received 51 MECU of humanitarian aid in 1990.
Efter en gennemgang af nogle af de områder, hvor der ville kunne indledes et samarbejde mellem EF og disse østeuropæiske lande, viste det sig, at der blandt tjekkoslovakker og polakker var en overvældende interesse for at øge forbindelserne bl.a. om miljø og industri (Diagram 4.11, Tabel 66).
Reviewing some of the areas where cooperation between the Community and these countries may be fostered, there was overwhelming interest among Czechoslovakians and Poles in furthering such ties in the fields of environment, industry and many others (Figure 4.11, Table 66).
Polske landmænd gik ind for et tættere samarbejde pá landbrugsområdet med 90% for og 2% imod.
Polish farmers approved of closer cooperation in agriculture by 90% to 2%.
De eneste områder, hvor der syntes at være nogen tvivl, var forsvar og i mindre omfang udenrigspolitik.
The only areas where some doubts surfaced were in defence were and, to a lesser degree, foreign policy.
Direkte modstand mod et forsvarspolitisk samarbejde var der imidlertid kun blandt tjekkoslovakker pá venstrefløjen, hvor 35% var ¡mod tanken, mens 27% var for.
Nevertheless, the only outright opposition to defence cooperation came from Czechoslovakians on the left of the political spectrum, who were 35% to 27% against the idea.
4.3 VIDEN OG INFORMATION OM EF's VIRKSOMHED
4.3 KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMMUNITY'S WORK