natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen havde ved beslutning pålagt Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening en bøde i anledning af forskellige vedtægtsmæssige be stemmelser og udøvelsen af forskellige former for samordnet praksis, som begrænsede konkurrencen dels mellem andelsselskabet og tredjemand og dels mellem selve andelshaverne indbyrdes.
The Commission hadby decision imposed a fine on Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening on account of variousclauses in its rules and certain concerted practices which restricted competitionbetween the association, whose business is the sale of skins, and third parties,and also between the association's members themselves.
Efter at have konstateret, at de pågældende produkter ikke figurerer på Traktatens bilag II, og at forordning nr. 26/62 derfor ikke kunne finde anvendelse i sagen, gik Førsteinstansretten i gang med at undersøge, om de af Kommissionen anfægtede konkurrenceklausuler, leveringsforpligtelser og former for samordnet praksis rent faktisk var konkurrencebegrænsende.
After pointing out that the products concerned were not mentioned in Annex II to the Treaty, which rendered Regulation No 26 inapplicable here, the Courtconsidered whether the no-competition clauses, the supply obligations and theconcerted practices to which the Commission took objection in its Decisionwere actually restrictive of competition.
Førsteinstansretten fulgte i al væsentlighed Kommissionens ræsonnement, men an nullerede dog visse dele af beslutningen, fordi der ikke var ført tilstrækkeligt bevis eller givet den fornødne begrundelse.
The Court accepted most of the Commission's arguments, but annulled someof the articles of the Decision for lack of proof or sufficiently precise reasoning.
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182 COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES
§ 3 — Anvendelse af artikel 85 på et selektivt distributionssystem
§ 3 — Application of Article 85 to a selective distribution system
I 1985 fik Kommissionen anmeldt selskabet Vichys distributionssystem i Frankrig, hvorefter kun apoteker måtte sælge Vichys produkter.
In 1985, the French cosmetics manufacturer Vichy notified to the Commission its system of distributing its products in France exclusively throughdispensing chemists.
I 1988, efter at de franske myndigheder ved en række afgørelser havde erklæret di stributionssystemet for ulovligt i henhold til EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, ændrede Vi chy distributionssystemet, således at anmeldelsen blev overflødig.
In 1988, following various decisions by the French authorities declaring thesystem to be contrary to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, Vichy revised it, therebyrendering the notification null and void.
I 1989 anmeldte Vichy et nyt system gældende for samtlige EF-lande med undtagelse af Danmark.
In 1989 a new system was notified, applicable to all Member States with theexception of Denmark.
I Frankrig er betingelsen for at blive antaget som forhandler, at ved kommende er uddannet farmaceut, mens forhandlerne i de øvrige EF-lande skal være apotekere.
In France the grant of approval as a distributor of Vichyproducts was subject to possession of a diploma in pharmacy, whereas in theother Member States distributors had to bepractising dispensing chemists.
Efter at have tilsendt Vichy en meddelelse af klagepunkter i relation til distributionssystemets anvendelse i de andre EF-lande end Frankrig, samt efter at have under kastet Vichy en høring, traf Kommissionen en beslutning i henhold til artikel 15, stk. 6, i forordning nr. 17.
The Commission sent Vichy a statement of objections concerning the distribution system in Member States other than France, giving it an opportunity tosubmit its observations, and subsequently adopted a Decision under Article15(6) of Regulation No 17.
Det var denne beslutning, der blev indbragt til domstols prøvelse.
It was that Decision which was the subject of theapplication.
Der var tale om en foreløbig beslutning, hvori Kommissionen ophævede den bødeimmunitet, som en anmeldelse medfører.
It was a preliminary Decision whereby the Commission withdrewthe benefit of theimmunity from fines which attached to the notification.
I den af Førsteinstansretten afsagte dom1) gav retten en sammenfatning af EF-Domstolens retspraksis vedrørende selektiv distribution.
In itsjudgment* the Court summed up the case law of the Court of Justice onselective distribution.
I det foreliggende tilfælde fandt retten, at godkendelseskriteriet var kvantitativt og under alle omstændigheder ikke stod i rimeligt forhold til det tilsigtede mål. Dette kriterium havde nemlig ind virket på samhandelen mellem medlemslandene, navnlig ved at eliminere parallelimport.
It declared that, in the present case, the criterion forapproval was quantitative in nature and that by all estimates it was disproportionate and had affected trade between Member States by eliminatingparallel imports.
Hvad angår artikel 85, stk. 3, understregede retten bl.a., at det ikke var godt gjort, at rådgivningsfunktionen kun kunne varetages af et apotek inden for distributionsnettet og ikke lige så godt kunne varetages af en uddannet farmaceut, der handler uden for det pågældende distributionsnet.
As far as Article 85(3) was concerned, the applicant had notproved that assistance could be given to customers only bypractising dispensingchemists and not by a qualified chemist who was notpractising.
Det ville med andre ord sige, at dette system ikke sikrede forbrugerne en rimelig andel af fordelene.
To that extent,the consumer would not receive a fair share of any benefit.
Dom af 27.2.1992, sag T-19/91.
Judgment of 27 February 1992, Case T-19/91, not yet reported.
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AF EF-DOMSTOLEN OG AF EFS FØRSTEINSTANSRET
MAIN CASES DECIDED BY THE COMMUNITY LAWCOURTS 183
§ 4 — Ikke basis for anvendelse af artikel 85 på lovbetingede import- og eksportrestriktioner for elektricitet1 )
§ 4 — Non-applicability of Article 85 to statutory restrictionson imports and exports of electricity
Kommissionen havde dog antydet, at der i givet fald ville blive indledt en overtrædelsesprocedure over for Nederlandene.
The Commissionhad, however, indicated that proceedings would be brought under Article 169of the Treaty against the Dutch Government for the latter's failure to fulfil itsobligations.
Ifølge Førsteinstansretten kunne sagen tages til påkendelse, selv om Rendos klage vedrørende elimporten ikke var blevet afvist, idet sagen var blevet indstillet under traktatbrudsproceduren.
The Court found that, although Rendo's complaint concerning electricityimports had not been rejected but had remained pending during the Article 169proceedings, the application was admissible.
Da klagernes proceduremæssige rettigheder er mindre ved en procedure efter artikel 169, var deres retsstilling rent faktisk blevet berørt, og det var tilstrækkelig til, at de kunne anlægge annullationssøgsmål.
The complainants' proceduralrights would be more circumscribed in Article 169 proceedings, so that theirlegal position had indeed been affected, which was sufficient grounds for themto be able to bring an action for annulment.
Sagen kunne derimod ikke tages til påkendelse, hvad angår de eksportbegrænsninger, der gjaldt for den offentlige forsynings vedkommende.
The application was, on the other hand, inadmissible as far as it related to therestrictions on exports in the area of public supply.
Selv om spørgsmålet var blevet omtalt i betragtningerne til beslutningen, kunne man ikke på grundlag af de dispositive bestemmelser, som var de eneste afgørende, danne sig noget indtryk af, hvad der var Kommissionens endelige holdning.
Although the question hadbeen raised in the Decision's recitals, the substantive provisions, which werethe only part that was relevant, did not give any indication as to what the Commission's definitive position was.
Førsteinstansretten gjorde også opmærksom på, at den omstændighed, at klagerne var identificeret i beslutningen, ikke gav dem adkomst til at anfægte denne i sin helhed, da genstanden for deres klage var mere begrænset. De var således ikke individuelt berørt i et omfang, der gik ud over indholdet af deres klagepunkter.
The fact that the complainants were mentioned in the Decision did not allowthem to contest it as a whole when the scope of their complaint was narrower,as they were not individually concerned by matters outside their complaint.
Endelig understregede Førsteinstansretten, at den ikke havde beføjelse til at give Kommissionen påbud.
The Court stressed it had no power to issue direct orders to the Commission.
Hvad realiteten angår, var Førsteinstansretten af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen ikke har pligt til at konstatere en overtrædelse, medmindre genstanden for klagen henhører under dens enekompetence.
On the substance of the case, the Court held that the Commission was notobliged to act on a complaint that an infringement had been committed unless
) Forstcinstunsrcttcns dom af 18.11.1992, Rendo m.fl. mod Kommissionen, sag T-I6/91. ) Beslutning af 16.1.1991, EFT L 28 af 2.2.1991, s. 32.
Judgment of 18 November 1992 in Case T-16/91, not yet reported.Decision of 16 January 1991, OJ L 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32.
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER ten, at hvis en klage er rettet mod en virksomhed, der har fået tillagt varetagelsen af offentlige serviceydelser, har Kommissionen slet ikke pligt til at skride ind, hvis undersøgelsen af klagen fører til en vurdering af, om den nationale lovgivning er lovlig eller ej.
Moreover, where a complaint concerned an undertaking entrusted with the operationof services of general economic interest, the Commission was a fortiori notobliged to act if the investigation of the complaint led to a national law'scompatibility with the Treaty being assessed.
Endvidere var det Førsteinstansrettens opfattelse, at når en begrænsning dels skyldes en national lovgivning, dels en aftale mellem virksomheder, er det i første række lovgivningen, der må undersøges, og det må ske ved en traktatbrudsprocedure, da aftalen kun har praktiske virkninger i det omfang, den indeholder begrænsninger, der går ud over lovens bestemmelser.
Where a restriction stemmed from the existence both of a national law and ofan agreement between undertakings, the law had to be examined first, applyingthe procedure for failure to fulfil an obligation, as the agreement could nothave any practical effects except in so far as the restrictions it laid downexceeded those arising from the law.
I det tilfælde vil klagerens situation helt klart blive berørt, men traktatbrudsprocedurens forrang er ikke til hinder for, at klagen derefter behandles af Kommissionen.
In that event, the complainant might, ofcourse, be adversely affected, but the priority given to the failure to fulfilthe obligation meant that the complaint would remain pending before the Commission and hence would be investigated subsequently.
Endelig fastslog Førsteinstansretten i det foreliggende tilfælde, at Kommissionen ikke havde undersøgt, om importbegrænsningerne var berettigede på grundlag af artikel 90, stk. 2, og at de derfor udgjorde en overtrædelse af artikel 85, så længe dette spørgsmål ikke var afklaret.
In the present case, the Commission had not considered whether the restrictionson imports were justified under Article 90(2). They therefore constituted aninfringement of Article 85 as long as that question had not been settled.
Retten gav altså ikke klagerne medhold i, at aftalen var gyldig indtil videre, så længe artikel 90, stk. 2, ikke var blevet erklæret for uanvendelig. delig.
The Court did not accept the complainants' argument that the agreement wasprovisionally valid as long as Article 90(2) had not been declared inapplicable.
§ 5 — Ingen fritagelse til fastprissystem for importerede bøger
§ 5 — Refusal to exempt a net price system for imported books
I sagen Publishers Association mod Kommissionen1) skulle Førsteinstansret ten tage stilling til, om det var berettiget, at Kommissionen havde nægtet at meddele fritagelse til de af Publishers Association anmeldte aftaler.
In Publishers Association v Commission1the Court of First Instancehad to consider whether the Commission's refusal to exempt a set of agreementsnotified by the Publishers Association was justified.
Publishers Association, som langt de fleste britiske forlag er medlemmer af, havde nemlig indført en ordning med faste salgspriser for alle boglader i Det Forenede Kongerige.
The Association, whichrepresents the vast majority of publishers in the United Kingdom, had introduced a system for the sale of books in the UK at collectively fixed prices.
Kommissionen havde fastslået, at disse aftaler — i det omfang de også gjaldt samhandelen med bøger mellem medlemsstaterne — var i strid med EØF-Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1, og ikke kunne fritages, eftersom aftalerne indebar unødvendige begrænsninger2).
The Commission had taken the view that, in so far as they applied to trade in booksbetween Member States, the agreements were contrary to Article 85(1) of the Treaty and did not qualify for exemption as they involved restrictions whichwere not indispensable.2
Sagsøgernes hovedpåstand var, at Kommissionens beslutning ikke var tilstrækkeligt begrundet.
The applicant's main contention was that the reasoning on which the Decisionwas based was incorrect.
Denne påstand blev imidlertid afvist af Førsteinstansretten, der stadfæstede beslutningen på alle punkter.
This contention was rejected by the Court, whichupheld the Decision in its entirety.
I sin dom henviste Førsteinstansretten til, at det er op til anmelderne at bevise, at deres aftale opfylder alle betingelserne i Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 3, medens Kom missionen lige indtil vedtagelsen af den endelige beslutning kan efterprøve, om samt lige betingelser er opfyldt.
In its judgment, the Court stated that it was for those making a notification toprove that their agreement satisfied all the conditions laid down in Article 85(3)of the Treaty, whereas the Commission was entitled at any time before thedefinitive adoption of the Decision to find that any one of the conditions wasnot met.
I den konkrete sag havde Kommissionen i øvrigt med rette fastslået, at det ikke havde nogen berettigelse, at fastprissystemet var kollektivt. Såvel forlag som boglader ville nemlig også kunne fungere i et system, hvor hvert forlag fastsatte sine egne salgsvilkår.
The Commission had been right to maintain in the present case that there wasno need for the net price system to be collective.
') Dom af 9.7.1992, sag T-66/89. 2) Beslutning af 12.12.1988, se Attende Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken, nr. 52.
Judgment of 9 July 1992, Case T-66/89, not yet reported.Decision of 12 December 1988; Eighteenth Competition Report, point 52.
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§ 6 — Påvirkning af samhandelen mellem medlemsstater
§ 6 — The concept of effect on trade between Member States
I planglassagen1) udtalte Førsteinstansretten, at en aftale om priser og salgsvilkår mellem de førende italienske planglasproducenter ikke kunne undgå at påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstater.
In the 'flat glass' cases,1the Court of First Instance held that anagreement between the leading Italian flat-glass producers dealing with pricesand conditions of sale was necessarily capable of affecting trade between Member States.
I en straffesag mod en kørelærer, der havde overtrådt en lov om, at kørelærere ikke måtte give køreundervisning uden for den kommune, hvor køreskolen er etableret, havde Tribunal da relação i Lissabon forelagt EF-Domstolen et præjudicielt spørgsmål om, hvorvidt en sådan lov var i strid med Traktatens artikel 85, stk. 1.
In the context of criminal proceedings against a driving instructor whohad broken a law prohibiting the giving of driving lessons in a district otherthan that in which the driving school was situated, the Lisbon Court of Appealasked the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on the question whether Article 85(1) of the Treaty precluded such a restriction.
Domstolen svarede, at det ikke var tilfældet2), og udtalte, at selv om medlemsstaterne i henhold til Traktatens artikel 5, stk. 2, skal afholde sig fra at træffe eller op retholde foranstaltninger, der er egnede til at bringe virkeliggørelsen af konkurrence reglernes målsætning i fare, finder artikel 85 kun anvendelse i det omfang, hvor en konkurrencebegrænsende praksis kan påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstater. Denne betingelse var imidlertid kun opfyldt, hvis det blev godtgjort, at den nationale lovgivning førte til, at nye konkurrenter ikke kunne få adgang til markedet, hvilket ikke var tilfældet med den her omhandlede lovgivning.
The Court replied in the negative,2ruling that, although Member States wererequired under the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty to refrainfrom enacting or maintaining in force any measure capable of rendering thecompetition rules ineffective, Article 85 applied only to the extent that the anticompetitive practices were capable of affecting trade between Member States.This condition was fulfilled only if it was established that the national legislationhad the effect of denying new entrants access to the market, which was not thecase with the legislation in question.
§ 7 — Misbrug af kollektivt dominerende stilling
§ 7 — Abuse of a collective dominant position
I denne beslutning havde Kommissionen fastslået, at tre italienske planglasproduccnter havde overtrådt Traktatens artikel 85 ved at samordne deres priser og salgsvilkår over for de største italienske grossister samt over for Fiat-koncernen og en anden kunde, ved at fastsætte kvoter for de to sidstnævnte kunder, og endelig ved at udveksle produkter med henblik på at foretage en markedsdeling.
In its Decision the Commission had found that three Italian flat-glass producerswere infringing Article 85 of the Treaty by participating in concerted practicesrelating to their prices and conditions of sale to the principal Italian wholesalers,the Fiat group and another customer, by fixing quotas for the last two customersand by exchanging products with a view to sharing the market.
Kommissionen havde desuden anført, at disse virksomheder besad en kollektivt dominerende stil ling, for så vidt de dels afskar kunderne fra at udnytte en priskonkurrence mellem leverandørerne og dels fastsatte kvoter for bilindustrien.
The Commissionhad also found that the firms occupied a collective dominant position in so faras they denied customers the possibility of bringing price competition into playbetween suppliers and fixed quotas for the automotive market.
Den vigtigste konklusion, der kan drages af denne dom (præmis nr. 357-360), er, at også kollektiv dominans kan være i strid med artikel 86.
The main lesson to be learned from the judgment delivered by the Court of First Instance (paragraphs 357 to 360) is that the Court has acknowledged that Article 86 can be infringed by a collective dominant position.
Dette kan være tilfældet, når der mellem to uafhængige virksomheder består sådanne økonomiske forbindelser på et konkret marked, at de tilsammen indtager en dominerende stilling i forhold til andre virksomheder. Som eksempel på sådanne forbindelser nævnte Retten den situation, hvor disse virksomheder i fællesskab (via aftaler eller licenser) besidder teknologiske fordele frem for deres konkurrenter.
This can be thecase where two or more independent economic entities are united by sucheconomic links in a specific market that together they hold a dominant positionvis-a-vis other operators.
Retten henviste desuden til forord ning (EØF) nr. 4056/86 om linjekonferencer i strid med artikel 85, stk. 1.
The Court found support for itsinterpretation in the wording of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86, which providesthat liner conferences are incompatible with Article 85(1).
Men en overtrædelse af Traktatens artikel 86 kunne dog ikke påvises alene ud fra omstændigheder i strid med Traktatens artikel 85.
However, to establish an infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty, it is notsufficient to 'recycle' the facts constituting an infringement of Article 85.
I den konkrete sag fandt Førsteinstansretten ikke alle de påståede overtrædelser be vist. Den annullerede Kommissionens beslutning i relation til en af virksomhederne og annullerede den delvis i relation til de to andre, samtidig med at den reducerede bøderne i overensstemmelse hermed.
In the present case the Court found that not all the infringements that werealleged to have taken place had been established, and it annulled the Decisionin its entirety in respect of one undertaking and partially in respect of the othertwo, reducing the fines accordingly.
En anden vigtig konklusion, der kan drages af denne dom, er, at bevismaterialet i Kommissionens beslutninger og den måde, hvorpå det fremlægges, har overordentlig stor betydning.
There is another lesson to be learned fromthis judgment, namely the extreme importance of documentary evidence andthe way it is presented in a Commission decision.
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I PVC-sagen kom Kommissionens forretningsorden til at spille en særlig rolle.
The 'PVC caseslturned on the interpretation of the Commission's rulesof procedure.
I henhold til forretningsordenens artikel 12 skal alle retsakter vedtaget af Kommissionen underskrives af Kommissionens formand og generalsekretær på det eller de sprog, som de har bindende virkning på.
Article 12 of those rules provides that acts adopted by the Commission are to be authenticated in the language or languages in which theyare binding by the signatures of the President and the Executive Secretary.
Førsteinstansretten fandt, at denne regel i forretningsordenen var blevet tilsidesat ' ).
The Court of First Instance held that the rules had been infringed in thesecases.
Retten udtalte for det første, at de beslutningsudkast, som Kommissionen den 14. de cember fik forelagt på engelsk, fransk og tysk, afveg fra de beslutninger, selskaberne senere fik meddelt.
Firstly, the draft Decisions submitted to the Commission on 14 December 1988in English, French and German differed from the Decisions ultimately servedupon the companies.
Disse forskelle blev anset for at være mere end blot sproglige rettelser og berørte såvel betragtningerne som den dispositive del af beslutningerne. Retten statuerede derfor, at disse ændringer var i strid med princippet om, at ved tagne retsakter ikke må ændres, og dermed også med EØF-Traktatens artikel 1902).
The differences were more than just linguistic and affectedboth the reasoning on which the Decisions were based and the Decisions'substantive provisions.
For det andet udtalte Retten, at det ansvarlige kommissionsmedlem ikke havde kompetence til at udstede de anfægtede beslutninger.
Secondly, the Member of the Commission responsible was not competent toissue the contested Decisions.
Af Kommissionens mødeprotokol fremgik, at beslutningerne ikke blev vedtaget på nederlandsk og italiensk, som i henhold til forretningsordenens artikel 12 skulle være de autentiske udgaver. Retten fandt, at artikel 27 i denne forretningsorden ikke giver Kommissionen adgang til at uddelegere udarbejdelsen af sådanne akter.
It was clear from the minutes of the Commissionmeeting that the Decisions had not been adopted in Dutch and Italian, whichwere authentic texts within the meaning of Article 12 of the rules of procedure.In the Court's view, Article 27 of the rules did not allow the Commission todelegate the preparation of such instruments.
Kommissionsmedlemmet var derfor ikke kompetent til at underskrive beslutningerne på disse sprog.
The Member of the Commissiontherefore had no authority to sign the Decisions in those languages.
Desuden havde kommissionsmedlemmet ifølge Førsteinstansretten heller ikke tidsmæssig kompetence til at underskrive.
Nor washe competent to sign ratione temporis.
Da han — på den sidste dag af sin funktionsperiode — underskrev de skrivelser, hvormed beslutningen blev meddelt parterne, forelå de forskellige sproglige udgaver endnu ikke og kunne derfor ikke fremsendes.
When, on the last day of his term ofoffice, he signed the letters notifying the contested measures, the variouslanguage versions of those measures had not yet been finalized and couldtherefore not be notified.