natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Swedish Match, der var Sveriges eneste producent og forhandler af cigaretter, havde nemlig siden 1961 haft eksklusiv licens på produktion, forhandling og salg al'cigaretmærket Prince, der tilhørte det danske selskab Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni, og som havde en stærk stilling på det svenske marked.
Swedish Match, the sole manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes in Sweden, has held an exclusivelicence since 1961 for the manufacture, distribution and sale of the Prince brand of cigarette, whichbelongs to the Danish company Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni and which has a strong position on the Swedish market.
En så langvarig og omfattende eksklusiv licensaftale mellem to virksomheder med en dominerende stilling på tilstødende markeder blev anset for at falde ind under artikel 86, især fordi Swedish Match ensidigt fastsatte salgspriserne for Prince-cigaretter.
An exclusive licensing agreement of such a duration and scope concluded between twoundertakings in a dominant position on neighbouring markets was regarded as likely to be caught by Article 86, in particular since Swedish Match fixed the selling price of Prince cigarettes unilaterally.
Aftalen medførte således en isolering af det svenske marked, hvor Swedish Match kunne handle uafhængigt af sine konkurrenter.
Theagreement therefore had the effect of isolating the Swedish market, on which Swedish Match could actindependently of any competitive constraint.
Kommissionen godkendte revisionen af licensaftalen, der betød, at afsætningen af mærket Prince hovedsagelig kom til at henhøre under Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni, der blandt andet kan fastsætte cigaretpriserne.
The Commission approved the licensing agreementfollowing amendments whereby most of the marketing of the Prince brand is placed under thesupervision of Skandinavisk Tobakompagni, which will be able in particular to determine the price of thecigarettes.
Denne ændring af aftalen gav sig omgående udslag i. at der kom en betydelig konkurrent ind på det svenske marked.
The change in the agreement resulted immediately in the appearance of a major competitor onthe Swedish market.
Sagen mellem Kommissionen og Belgacom som følge af den klage, som ITT Promedia NV indgav i 1995 over misbrug al" dominans, fik en positiv afslutning i år.
The case in which the Commission took action against Belgacom, following a complaint from ITT Promedia in 1995 about the abuse of a dominant position, was brought to a positive conclusion thisyear.
Det belgiske datterselskab af den amerikanske udgiver af telefonboger.
Belgacom had a price structure which took account, in particular, of theturnover of the publisher, in this case ITT Promedia.
ITT World Directories Company, bebrejdede det belgiske teleselskab Belgacom, at det anvendte prisdiskrimination og opkrævede urimeligt hoje priser for adgang til oplysninger om sine
There was no justification for this, except the marketpower associated with Belgacom's dominant position.
Kommissionen rejste desuden spørgsmålet om. hvorvidt aftalen var forenelig med traktatens artikel S5.
The Commission also raised the question of the compatibility of the agreement with Article 85 of the Treaty.
På grundlag af en klage fra den offentlige franske virksomhed. La Poste, der var nægtet adgang til nettet, anførte Kommissionen i en klagepunktsmeddelelse. at SWIFT havde overtrådt bestemmelserne i artikel 86.
Further to a complaint from La Poste, a French public undertaking which had been refused access to the network, the Commission considered, ina statement of objections, that SWIFT had infringed Article 86.
SWIFT indtager nemlig en monopolstiling. fordi selskabet er eneste aktør på de internationale net for overførsel af betalingsmcddelelser og det eneste net, der kan skabe forbindelser til banker hvor som helst i verden. Selskabet er derfor i besiddelse af en så væsentlig infrastruktur, at det, hvis det nægter en virksomhed adgang til nettet, vil være ensbetydende med. at den pågældende virksomhed rent faktisk udelukkes fra markedet for internationale overførsler.
SWIFT holds a dominant position of amonopolistic nature, since it is the only operator on the international networks for transferring paymentmessages and the only network to supply connections for banking establishments anywhere in the world.It therefore constitutes a basic infrastructure in its own right, since to refuse any entity access to such anetwork is tantamount to a de facto exclusion from the market for international transfers.
Endelig har SWIFT klart misbrugt sin dominerende stilling ved at fastsætte uberettigede adgangskriterier vedrørende generelle betingelser for medlemmernes udovelsc af finansielle aktiviteter, og ved at anvende disse kriterier over for La Poste på diskriminerende måde.
Lastly, SWIFThas manifestly abused its dominant position by laying down unjustified admission criteria relating to thegeneral conditions for the exercise of the financial activities of its members and by applying these criteriain the case of La Poste in a discriminatory manner.
SWIFT var indstillet på at ordne sagen i mindelighed, og selv om selskabet tilbageviste Kommissionens argumenter, forpligtede det sig dog formelt til at give fuldstændig adgang til nettet for enhver virksomhed, der opfylder de kriterier, som Det Europæiske Monetære Institut har fastsat for adgang til nationale betalingssystemer, selv om en sådan adgang hidtil havde været forbeholdt aktionærerne.
Willing to settle the matter amicably, even though it had challenged the Commission's arguments, SWIFTformally undertook to grant complete access to any entity which meets the criteria laid down by the European Monetary Institute for admission to domestic payment systems, whereas hitherto such accesswas reserved for shareholder members only.
Tilsagnet blev offentliggjort i De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende".
This commitment was published in the Official Journal ofthe European Communities^''.
Kommissionen besluttede derefter at indstille proceduren mod SWIFT og fastslog, at den ville kontrollere, at tilsagnet blev overholdt.
Consequently, the Commission decided to suspend the proceedingsinitiated against SWIFT and declared its intention to ensure that the commitment was honoured.
På grundlag af klager fra vedligcholdclsesfirmacr inden for edb-sektoren over den forretningspraksis. der blev udøve! af Digital Equipment Corporation (Digital), og kontrolundersøgelser, som Kommissionen selv havde foretaget, indledte Kommissionen en overtrædelsesprocedure mod denne virksomhed efter artikel 861s.
Following complaints lodged by suppliers of maintenance services in the information technologysector against the commercial practices of Digital Equipment Corporation (Digital) and on the basis ofthe investigations which it carried out, the Commission initiated proceedings against the company forinfringing Article 8638.
Kommissionen konstaterede i sin klagepunktsmeddelelse, at Digital indtog en dominerende stilling på de europæiske markeder for vedligeholdelse af Digitals software og andre vigtige ydelser i forbindelse med Digitals computere.
In its statement of objections, the Commission found that Digital had a dominantposition on the European markets for Digital software maintenance services and other hardware servicesfor Digital computers.
Kommissionen fastslog, at Digital havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling gennem en forretningspolitik, der var karakteriseret ved forskelsbehandling og salgsbinding.
The Commission considered that Digital had abused its dominant position bydeveloping a commercial policy typified by discriminatory practices and tied sales.
Alle disse former for praksis viste meget klart, at Digital var indstillet på at forhindre selvstændige virksomheder i at konkurrere med Digital på markederne for vedligeholdelse og andre vigtige ydelser i forbindelse med Digitals computere.
All these commercialpractices revealed a clear desire to obstruct the ability of independent service suppliers to compete with Digital on the markets for maintenance services and other, hardware services for Digital computers.Having received the objections and challenged them, Digital presented the Commission with proposedformal commitments designed to alter its commercial and pricing policy in the field of softwaremaintenance services and other, hardware services.
Sag IV/36.120 - La Poste mod SWIFT + GUF (EFT C 335 af 6.11.1997, s. 3).
Case No IV/36.120-Z.o Poste/SWIFT+ GUF, OJ C 335,6.11.1997.
Kommissionen rejste desuden spørgsmålet om. hvorvidt nogle af Digitals distributionsaftaler var forenelige med traktatens artikel 85.
The Commission also raised the question of the compatibility of certain Digital distribution agreements with Article 85of the Treaty.
Alliancer mellem operatorer
Alliances between operators
Udsigterne til en fuldstændig liberalisering af telemarkederne"", som vil give sig udtryk i konkurrence mellem selskaberne inden for alle tjenesteydelser, fremskyndelse af den teknologiske udvikling og markedsindtrængning på internationalt plan, har i denne sektor resulteret i forskellige omstruktureringer og alliancer, som skal sætte virksomhederne i stand til at klare de udfordringer, der opstår som følge af disse omvæltninger.
The forthcoming full liberalisation of telecommunications markets41, which will triggercompetition between operators across the full range of services, swifter technological progress, andgrowing interpenetration of world markets, has prompted restructuring operations and alliances of allkinds in this sector whereby firms are endeavouring to put themselves in a position to take up thechallenges inherent in these far-reaching changes.
I de seneste år har Kommissionen ved flere lejligheder skullet udtale sig om disse aftalers og transaktioners forenelighed med Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler42. I det forgangne år har Kommissionen også haft lejlighed til at undersøge flere sager af denne type.
The Commission has repeatedly had occasion in recentyears to comment on the compatibility of agreements and operations of this nature with the Communitycompetition rules42, and 1997 was no exception.
Dens fremgangsmåde på dette område består i at sorge for, at de nationale teleselskaber, som stadig har en dominerende stilling på de nationale markeder, ikke udnytter disse alliancer, som er nødvendige ud fra et teknisk eller økonomisk synspunkt, til at fastholde en position, som er erhvervet i medfør af et monopol, og til at hæmme den frie konkurrence.
The approach it takes here is to ensure that nationaltelecommunications operators who still dominate their domestic markets do not use such alliances, whichare necessary from a technical or economic standpoint, in order to hold on to positions they acquiredthrough their monopoly power and restrict competition.
Den 29. oktober 1997 godkendte Kommissionen oprettelsen af to internationale alliancer mellem forskellige teleselskaber, nemlig Unisource og Uni\vorld4i.
On 29 October, the Commission gave the go-ahead to two international alliances betweentelecommunications operators, namely Unisource and Uniworld43.
Unisource omfatter det svenske selskab Telia, det nederlandske PTT Telecom og det schweiziske Swiss Telecom.
Unisource groups together Sweden's
Det spanske selskab Telefonica har trukket sig ud af alliancen.
Telia, the Dutch operator PTT Telecom and Switzerland's Swiss Telecom, the Spanish operator Telefonicahaving decided to withdraw.
Uniworld er et joint venture mellem Unisource og AT & T. Disse sammenslutninger tjener et dobbelt formål: opnåelse af den kritiske størrelse og udbredt geografisk tilstedeværelse, hvilket i denne sektor indebærer, at der etableres et transatlantisk partnerskab.
Uniworld is a joint venture between Unisource and AT & T. The aims of thesegroupings are twofold: to achieve critical mass and extensive geographical coverage, which in thisindustry means entering into a transatlantic partnership.
De tidligere gennemførte alliancer mellem på den ene side British Telecom og MCI (Concert) og på den anden side France Télécom, Deutsche Telekom og Sprint (Atlas/Global One) bekræfter dette.
The alliances previously established, between British Telecom and MCI (Concert), on the one hand, and France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint(Atlas/Global One), on the other, bear witness to this.
De aftaler, der ligger til grund for oprettelsen al' disse to alliancer, er blevet vurderet ud fra artikel 85; efter forskellige ændringer af aftalerne og på en række betingelser af strukturel og adfærdsmæssig art er de blevet godkendt gennem en beslutning om individuel fritagelse i fem år.
The agreements creating the two alliances wereassessed in the light of Article 85 of the Treaty and were approved by means of an individual exemptiongranted for a period of five years following amendments to the agreements and subject to conditionsrelating to the structure and behaviour of the parties.
Unisource tilbyder en bred vifte af teletjenester: mobiltelefoni, satellittjenester, datatransmission og taletelefoni for virksomhederne. Disse tjenester ydes af datterselskaber.
Unisource offers a range of telecommunications services: mobile telephony, satellite services, datatransmission services and corporate voice telephony, which are supplied to users via operationalsubsidiaries.
Efter at have sikret sig, at de tre aktionærer i Unisource ikke styrkede deres allerede eksisterende dominerende stilling på de respektive nationale markeder, fritog Kommissionen aftalerne, under forudsætning af at der overholdes en række tilsagn, som tager sigte på at forhindre enhver diskrimination fra de stiftende medlemmers side med hensyn til forvaltning af nettene, omdirigering af fortrolige oplysninger fra den ene enhed til den anden, enhver form for krydssubsidiering mellem Unisource og de stiftende medlemmer eller ethvert forsøg på at foranstalte bunden levering af tjenesteydelser.
After satisfying itself that the three shareholders in Unisource would not strengthen theirpre-existing dominant positions on their respective domestic markets, the Commission exempted theagreements subject to compliance with undertakings designed in particular to prevent any discriminationby the parent companies in network operation, any transfer of confidential information from one entity toanother, any cross-subsidisation between Unisource and its parent companies, or any attempt to engage intied service provision.
Kommissionen har afsluttet sin analyse af GEN-aftaien (Global European Network), som er en aftale mellem de störste nationale teleselskaber i EU.
The Commission finalised its analysis of the GEN (Global European network) agreement, whichgroups together the largest telecommunications operators in the Union.
Denne aftale ligger til grund for oprettelsen al' et lysledernet af hoj kvalitet og med stor kapacitet, som vil forbedre kvaliteten af tjenesterne i de transeuropæiske telekommunikationsnet.
The agreement provides for thecreation of a high-quality, heavy-capacity optical fibre telecommunications network which will enhancethe quality of trans-European telecommunications network services.
Kommissionen mente, at visse bestemmelser var uforenelige med Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler, herunder reglerne om fælles prisfastsættelse og udelukkelse al' tredjeparter fra adgang til netkapacitet.
The Commission deemed certainclauses of the agreement incompatible with the Community competition rules, in particular those whichprovided for the joint setting of prices and exclusion of third parties from access to the network.
I forlængelse af Kommissionens bemærkninger har de anmeldende parler ændret deres aftale, således at hvert signatarselskab fører individuelle og ikke-diskriminerende forhandlinger med tredjeparter om betingelserne for netadgang, herunder priser.
Inresponse to the Commission's observations, the notifying parties amended the agreement such that eachoperator which is a signatory will negotiate with third parties, individually and in a non-discriminatorymanner, the terms on which it offers access to the network, and in particular prices.
På delte grundlag har Kommissionen givet tilladelse til. at dette system indføres.
On that basis, the Commission allowed the system to be set up.
Denne sag illustrerer tydeligt den politik, der fores af Fællesskabets instanser. Kommissionen ser positivt på den teknologiske udvikling, men sorger for, at de selskaber, der besidder en dominerende stilling, ikke udnytter denne til at udelukke konkurrerende tredjeparter fra fordelene ved denne udvikling gennem en diskriminerende praksis.
This case provides a clear illustration of the policy pursuedby the Community authorities: the Commission welcomes technological progress but makes sure that it isnot used by operators in a dominant position in order to deprive competitors of the benefits of suchprogress through discriminatory practices.
Kommissionen glæder sig over udviklingen i konkurrencen i mobiltelefoniscktorcn og de afledte virkninger, den havde på hele telekommunikationssektoren.
The Commission noted with satisfaction the growth of competition in mobile telephony and theknoek-on effects this was having on the telecommunications industry as a whole.
Nye tjenester, prisfald, nctudvidclser, forøgelse af efterspørgslen og skabelse af arbejdspladser er de mest iøjnefaldende tegn på denne dynamik, som Kommissionen støtter gennem sin konkurrencepolitik.
New services, lowerprices, greater network coverage, stronger demand, and creation of new jobs are the unmistakable signsof this dynamism, which the Commission is supporting through its competition policy.
Kommissionen har til hensigt at følge nøje med i udviklingen for at give konkurrenter lettere adgang til markedet og beskytte forbrugernes interesser, for så vidt angår deres valgfrihed mellem selskaberne og disses tjenesteydelser".
It will remainvigilant in order to facilitate access to the market for competitors and protect the interests of consumersby safeguarding their freedom of choice between operators and their services44.
Kommissionen godkendte i år aftalen mellem de mobiltelefonselskaber, der benytter GSM-standarden, og som deltager i en international sammenslutning med over 200 medlemmer.
The Commission gave its approval to the agreement between mobile telephone operators usingthe GSM standard, who are grouped together in an international association of over 200 members.
Formalet med aftalen er at udarbejde en standardformular af frivillig karakter, som skal lette de bilaterale forhandlinger mellem de operatører, der ønsker at indgå roaming-aftaler.
Theaim of the agreement is to draw up a standard form to be used on a voluntary basis to facilitate bilateralnegotiations between operators wishing to conclude 'roaming' agreements.
Disse aftaler er nødvendige lor at samordne GSM-nettene og give abonnenterne mulighed for at maksimere udnyttelsen af deres bærbare telefon, hvor de end befinder sig.
Such agreements arenecessary in order to coordinate GSM networks and offer subscribers maximum use of their mobiletelephone wherever they happen to be at any point in time.
GSM-netoperatørerne i EU er nemlig tvunget til at overholde nationale regler, herunder regler om udstedelse af licenser, hvilket begrænser udbredelsen afderes net til en medlemsstats grænser.
Operators of GSM networks in the European Union have to comply with national rules, in particularthose governing the award of operating licences, which means that their network cannot extend beyondnational borders.
Når en abonnent forlader den medlemsstats område, hvor han har tegnet et abonnement, skal han således være i stand til at foretage og modtage opkald på en anden medlemsstats omrade.
For the 35 million subscribers in the 15 Member States, it is essential that theselimitations should not undermine the advantages flowing from the GSM standard.
Dette kan kun lade sig gore, hvis operatorerne i de forskellige medlemsstater samordner deres aktiviteter.
Thus, when asubscriber leaves the territory of the Member State in which he took out his subscription, he should beable to make and receive calls in another Member State; for this to be possible, operators in different Member States must coordinate their activities.
I den forbindelse har Kommissionen behandlet to sager vedrørende udstedelse af bevillinger til tien antien íiSMoperator i Spanien og Italien.
Discussions are in this connection, the Commission investigated two cases concerning the award of concessions for the second GSMoperator in Spain and Italy.
Disse er beskrevet i kapitel II vedrørende anvendelsen af artikel 37 og 90.
These are described in Chapter II, which discusses the application of Articles 37 and 90 ofthe Treaty.
Der forhandles stadig med henblik på at finde en løsning på de priser, der anvendes mellem selve selskaberne for betaling af roaming-tjenester. og som ikke er fastlagt på grundlag af reelle omkostninger.
continuing with a view to finding a solution to the prices charged by operators themselves for roamingservices, which are not determined on the basis of real costs.
For så vidt som de nationale teleselskaber stadig besidder en dominerende stilling på deres nationale markeder, navnlig med hensyn til infrastruktur, er det under hensyn til liberaliseringen særdeles vigtigt, at disse operatorer ikke misbruger deres stærke stilling på markedet til skade for konkurrenterne.
In cases where national telecommunications operators still enjoy dominant positions on theirdomestic markets, particularly as far as infrastructures are concerned, it is particularly important, giventhe logic of liberalisation, that these operators should not misuse their market power to the detriment oftheir competitors.
Derfor kontrollerer Kommissionen, at de nationale operatørers konkurrenter kan få adgang til disses infrastrukturer på rimelige og ikke-diskriminerende vilkår, navnlig med hensyn til prisen.
The Commission consequently sees to it that those competing with national operatorsenjoy access to the latters' infrastructures on fair and non-discriminatory terms, particularly as far asprices are concerned.
Kommissionen havde således indledt en procedure mod det tyske teleselskab Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) efter en klage indgivet i 1996 mod betingelserne for tredjeparters adgang til DT's infrastruktur'1".
The Commission accordingly initiated proceedings against Deutsche Telekom AG (DT), the German telecommunications operator, following a complaint made in 1996 against the conditionsimposed on third parties for access to DT's infrastructures43.
Efter at DT havde forelagt et udkast til ny kontrakt om konkurrenternes adgang til nettet, lod Kommissionen et internationalt revisionsfirma foretage en prisundersøgelse, hvoraf det fremgik, at DT ikke var i stand til at påvise, at de benyttede priser stod i forhold til omkostningerne, samt at prisniveauet lå 100 % over niveauet på sammenlignelige konkurrerende markeder. Selv om Kommissionen ikke er og ikke ønsker at være en prisregulerende myndighed, blev DT opfordret til at tilpasse sine priser til de økonomiske realiteter, således at dets takstmæssige praksis ikke udgør et misbrug af dominerende stilling.
After DT had submitted a draft new contractoffering network access to competitors, the Commission had a price survey carried out by aninternational accountancy firm which demonstrated DT's inability to prove that its prices were costorientated and found the price level to be 100 % higher than on comparable competitive markets.Although the Commission is not and does not wish to act as a price regulator, DT was invited to adjustthe tariffs it charges to real economic conditions so that they cannot constitute an abuse of a dominantposition.
DT accepterede endelig at sænke sine takster for netadgang, navnlig for leverandører af tjenester til virksomhederne, med 38 % for adgangen til lokalnet og med 78 % for adgangen til langdistancenet. Kommissionen besluttede derefter at afslutte proceduren.
DT finally agreed to lower its network access tariffs, in particular for providers of businessservices, by 38 % for access to the local network and 78 % for access to the long-distance network, andthe Commission decided to terminate the proceedings.