natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Et vigtigt træk ved detailsalget af ispinde er, at producenterne - eller grossisterne - gratis stiller frysekummer til rådighed for detailsælgeren, som til gengæld herfor kun må opbevare den pågældende producents is i kummen.
Retail outlets selling wrapped ice-cream require freezer cabinets; these are supplied free of charge by the producers or wholesalers in exchange for the retailer stocking their brand exclusively.
Denne praksis udgør en barriere for andres adgang til markedet.
The wholesale distribution of ice-cream takes place either through integrated networks or through independentchannels.
Kommissionen fandt dog ikke, at denne adgangsbarriere ville blive forstærket af fusionen, eftersom de to virksomheder i forvejen benyttede denne eksklusive distributionsform.
In view of the situation in France, where independentwholesalers operate at regional or departmental level, and taking account of the positive effect of the two undertakings given by Unilever, namely that it would:
— de særlige forhold på det franske marked (vedvarende vækst, produktudvikling)
The Commission also analysed the possibility of an oligopolistic dominant position, a hypothesis it rejected onthe grounds of: the characteristics of the French market (sustained growth, sensitivity to innovation);the disparity of market shares;the existence of powerful groups among the new entrants.
Desuden bemærkes, at Unilever som reaktion på de konkurrenceproblemer, Kommissionen havde peget på i forbindelse med fusionens virkninger på det tyske ismarked, havde udskilt Ortiz Miko's tyske datterselskab, Warncke, fra fusionen og overdraget Warncke til et forvaltningsselskab, der fik til opgave at afhænde virksomheden inden for en given frist.
It should be noted that, in response to concern expressed by the Commission in its examination of the merger inthe ice-cream industry in Germany, Unilever removed the German subsidiary of Ortiz Miko, Warncke, from thetransaction and transferred it to a trustee with a view to its sale within a given period.
For dybfrostprodukternes vedkommende gav fusionen ikke anledning til nogen problemer.
Lastly, it was noted that the frozen foods sector did not pose any specific problems.
Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva (DMV) (anden procedurefase)
Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva (DMV) (Second stage of the procedure)
I denne sag var der tale om en fusion mellem tre virksomheder tilhørende store stålkoncerner — Dalmine tilhørte ILVA-koncernen, Mannesmann Röhrenwerke tilhørte Mannesmann-koncernen, og Vallourecs hovedaktionær var Usinor-koncernen.
The three parent companies concerned belonged to large steel groups: Dalmine belonged to the Ilva group and Mannesmann Rohrenwerke belonged to the Mannesmann group, while the largest shareholder in Vallourec wasthe Usinor group.
De tre virksomheder agtede at overføre alle deres aktiviteter inden for sømløse rør af rustfrit stål til et nyoprettet joint venture, DMV.
The three firms planned to pool all their seamless stainless-steel tube activities in a new jointventure to be known as DMV
Efter den første undersøgelsesfase nærede Kommissionen alvorlig tvivl om fusionens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet og besluttede derfor at indlede proceduren efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra c), i forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89. I sin endelige beslutning i sagen godkendte Kommissionen imidlertid fusionen efter fusionsforordningens artikel 8, stk. 2.
On completing its initial assessment, the Commission considered that the transaction raised serious doubts as toits compatibility with the common market and took a decision initiating the procedure provided for in Article6(1 )(c) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89.
Af Kommissionens undersøgelser var det fremgået, at forud for denne fusion var udbuddet af sømløse rør af rustfrit stål i Vesteuropa — der blev defineret som det relevante marked i denne sag — koncentreret på seks producenter, der dækkede ca. 90 % af det vesteuropæiske marked.
The Commission's investigation found that, prior to the transaction, the supply of seamless stainless-steel tubesin Western Europe, which was defined as the relevant market, was concentrated in six firms supplying some 90%of the Western European market.
Kommissionen fandt, at denne situation på et marked, hvor der var tale om standardprodukter (»commodity products«), hvor efterspørgslen ville være præget af stagnation på længere sigt og desuden er lidet elastisk over for prisændringer, og hvor der desuden fandtes en betydelig, strukturbetinget overkapacitet, ville kunne give DMV og Sandvik en stærk, fælles interesse i at anlægge en konkurrencebegrænsende parallel adfærd, uden at hverken Tubacex eller Schoeller-Bleckmann ville være i stand til at anfægte det deraf følgende oligopol.
The Commission took the view that, on a market for commodity products which was characterized by long-term,stagnating demand with very little price elasticity and structural overcapacity, this situation would act as a strongincentive for DMV and Sandvik to take anticompetitive parallel action, whilst Tubacex and Schoeller-Bleck-mann would have little chance of successfully opposing the resulting dominant oligopoly.
Kommissionens undersøgelser viste imidlertid også, at hvis DMV og Sandvik skulle anlægge en konkurrencebegrænsende parallel adfærd, ville producenter etableret uden for det geografiske rcferencemarked på kort og mellemlang sigt være i stand til at øge deres leverancer til det vesteuropæiske marked.
However, the investigation by the Commission revealed that, if DMV and Sandvik were to take anti-competitiveparallel action, producers outside the geographic reference market could, in the short and medium term, increasetheir presence on the Western European market.
Der var bl.a. tale om japanske producenter, hvoriblandt Sumitomo sad på ca. 23 % af verdensmarkedet.
This was true of Japanese producers, including Sumitomo with some 23% of the world trade in the products inquestion.
De japanske producenter havde i en årrække tegnet sig for ca. 10 % af det vesteuropæiske marked (hvoraf Sumitomo alene tegnede sig for halvdelen).
Japanese producers accounted over a long period for some 10% of the Western European market, halfof which was supplied by Sumitomo alone.
Efter prisfaldet på det vesteuropæiske marked var deres markedsandel gradvis faldet til 6 % i begyndelsen af 90'erne.
Owing to the collapse of prices on that market, their share fell gradually at the beginning of the 1990s to 6%.
Disse førende aktører på verdensmarkedet havde imidlertid en betydelig overkapacitet, de opfyldte de kvalitetsnormer, der gælder i Europa, og de havde de produktcertificeringer og kommercielle kontakter, der skulle til for hurtigt at kunne øge deres aktiviteter på det vesteuropæiske marked i større målestok i tilfælde af en forhøjelse af prisniveauet.
However, these powerful competitors at world level had considerablesurplus capacity, could provide the quality required by European standards and had the necessary commerciallicences and contacts to expand rapidly on a significant scale on the Western European market for seamless stain-less-steel tubes in the event of an increase in prices.
Kommissionen fandt, at der på baggrund af den gradvise internationalisering af samhandelen med disse produkter og i betragtning af det ovenstående var sandsynlighed for, at de europæiske producenter af sømløse, rustfrie stålrør i stigende grad ville søge ind på vækstmarkederne i bl.a. Fjernøsten, samtidig med at de japanske producenter ville gøre sig mere gældende i Europa.
The Commission considered that, in the context of the gradual globalization of trade in the relevant products, and in view of the foregoing, it was probable that Europeanseamless tube producers would increase their presence on the growth markets, especially in the Far East, while Japanese producers would increasingly turn to the European market.
Kommissionen så også nærmere på de central- og østeuropæiske producenter, som i dag kun opererer på det vesteuropæiske marked for sømløse rør af rustfrit stål i ganske marginalt omfang.
The Commission also examined the situation of Central and East European producers, who are not at presentvery active on the Western European market for seamless stainless-steel tubes.
Kommissionens undersøgelser viste i øvrigt, at et russisk selskab allerede havde opnået det tyske TUV-certifikat for visse sømløse, rustfrie stålrør.
Its investigation revealed that suchproducers face structural handicaps preventing them from supplying, at competitive prices and delivery times,
Med hensyn til babybleer lagde Kommissionen vægt på, at P & G ifølge den anmeldte aftale ville afhænde VPS' interesser på dette område, hvilket ville løse de problemer, P & G's stærke position på dette marked ville have givet anledning til.
With regard to baby nappies, the Commission noted that the proposed divestment by P & G of VPS's nappy business, as provided for in the notified agreement, satisfied its concerns relating to P & G's strong position on thatmarket.
Derimod fastslog Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion ville give P & G en dominerende stilling på det tyske og det spanske marked for hygiejnebind.
On the other hand, the Commission took the view that the proposed transaction would place P & G in a dominantposition on the German and Spanish markets for sanitary towels.
Kommissionen fandt, at der findes tre forskellige markeder for hygiejneartikler - et marked for hygiejnetamponer, et for hygiejnebind og et for trusseindlæg.
It concluded that there were separate markets for tampons, sanitary towels and pantliners.
Den drog desuden den konklusion, at de geografiske referencemarkeder for hygiejnebind var nationale markeder, i den konkrete sag Tyskland og Spanien.
It also considered thatthe geographic reference markets for sanitary towels were national or, in this case, Spain and Germany.
Efter fusionen ville P & G komme til at sidde på over 60-65 % af det tyske marked (målt i værdi), medens selskabets i forvejen store andel af det spanske marked (ca. 75 %) kun ville blive øget en smule.
As a result of the transaction, P & G would acquire 60 to 65% by value of the German market and slightly increaseits present share of three, quarters of the Spanish market.
På det tyske marked ville P & G komme til at kontrollere de to førende mærker, medens den nærmeste konkurrent, Johnson & Johnson (J & J), kun havde 1015 %. På det spanske marked var det også J & J, der var den nærmeste konkurrent, dog med en markedsandel på kun 1 %. P & G's i forvejen dominerende stilling ville blive forstærket, ikke blot i kraft af en øget markedsandel, men også, og i særdeleshed, i kraft af, at det herefter ville være umuligt for andre konkurrenter at trænge ind på det spanske marked ved hjælp af »Camelia«-mærket. Med hensyn til konkurrencesituationen fandt Kommissionen, at disse markeder var præget af betydelige adgangsbarrierer på baggrund af:
On the German market, P & G would control the twoleading brands, while its major competitor, Johnson & Johnson (J & J) holds only 10 to 15%.On the Spanish market, J & J is again its closest competitor but holding only 1%. P & G's existing dominant position would bestrengthened not only by the extra market share but also through the loss of the 'Camelia' brand as a possibleentry to the Spanish market for another party. From a competition standpoint, the Commission took the view that there were considerable barriers to entry tothese markets. It based its view on the following factors:
— forbrugernes relativt ringe prisbevidsthed
(ii) consumers are relatively unaffected by price;
— at der var tale om et allerede veludviklet marked, som andre ville have overordentligt vanskeligt ved at trænge ind på, medmindre de kunne tilbyde et produkt, der af forbrugerne blev opfattet som værende en virkelig nyskabelse på flere punkter.
(iii) the market is already well developed, and it seems extremely difficult to gain access unless the product isperceived by consumers as truly innovative.
Det ville være vanskeligt for en konkurrent at præstere en teknologisk nyskabelse af samme størrelsesorden som den, P & G havde tegnet sig for
It appears to be very difficult for a competitor to achieve thesame level of technological innovation as P & G;
— at en markedsindtrængningsstrategi baseret på en lavprispolitik ikke havde større chancer for at lykkes
(iv) a marketing strategy based on low prices has little chance of success;
— at det blev stadig vanskeligere for nye mærker at vinde indpas i detailhandelen, bl.a. på grund af den stigende koncentration i detailleddet
(v) it is becoming increasingly difficult for new brands to gain access to retail markets, chiefly because of growing concentration in the retail trade;
— at markedsføring og reklame spillede en helt central rolle for en vellykket indtrængning på dette marked.
(vi) advertising and information are key factors in entry to this market.
Kommissionen fandt, at markedsførings- og reklameudgifter var omkostninger, som ikke ville kunne tjenes ind igen, hvis det ikke lykkedes at få fodfæste på markedet, hvilket gjorde den økonomiske risiko ved ethvert forsøg på at trænge ind på markedet så meget desto større, også selv om disse omkostninger ikke i sig selv udgør uoverstigelige hindringer, og selv om der fandtes potentielle konkurrenter, som rådede over de fornødne ressourcer hertil.
The Commission concluded that, as advertising and promotion costs were sunk costs in the event of market failure and the financial risk of gaining access to the market was greater, even if such costs were not in themselves aninsurmountable barrier and even if there were potential competitors with the necessary financial resources, market entry must not only be possible but must also correspond to viable commercial objectives.
Med hensyn til andre producenters muligheder for at anfægte P & G's dominerende stilling på det tyske og det spanske marked fastslog Kommissionen:
As regards the strength of P & G's future dominant position on the German and Spanish markets, the Commissionfound that:
— at hygiejnebind ikke var udsat for større konkurrence fra tamponer
(i) tampons do not put competitive pressure on sanitary towels;
— at detailforhandlerne på dette marked ikke havde nogen reel interesse i at spille på konkurrencen mellem de forskellige producenter og derfor ikke ville danne nogen reel modvægt mod P & G's dominerende stilling
(ii) retailers on this type of market have no real interest in stimulating competition between manufacturers andwould therefore not act as a counterweight to P & G's dominant position;
— at de nuværende konkurrenter - herunder også bindfabrikanter, der producerede bind til salg under forhandlermærker - enten ikke var rede eller også ikke havde de fornødne ressourcer til at tage konkurrencen op med P & G
(iii) existing capacities, being either leading or own-label products, are either not ready or do not have sufficientresources to compete against P & G successfully;
— at der var ringe sandsynlighed for, at potentielle konkurrenter ville kunne trænge ind på det tyske og det spanske marked uden at overtage et eksisterende bindmærke.
(iv) a completely new product or brand on the German and Spanish markets seems unlikely; the only conceivableentry would be through acquisition.
På baggrund af de ovenfor opsummerede hovedelementer i denne sag konkluderede Kommissionen, at P & G i Tyskland og Spanien ville komme til at indtage en dominerende stilling, som ikke var forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
For the reasons outlined above, the Commission concluded that the future dominant position of P & G in Germanyand Spain was not compatible with the common market.
På et ret sent stadium i sagsbehandlingen tilbød P & G at afhænde VPS' interesser inden for hygiejncbindmærket »Camelia«.
At a late stage in the procedure, P & G offered to divest VPS's Camelia-branded feminine hygiene products business.
P & G afgav tilsagn om, at »Camelia« ville blive afhændet inden for en nærmere fastsat frist efter overtagelsen af VPS, at »Camelia«-aktiviteterne i mellemtiden ville blive administreret af et uafhængigt forvaltningsselskab, og at disse interesser ville blive solgt til en køber, der rådede over tilstrækkelige økonomiske ressourcer og ekspertise inden for dagligvaresektoren til at kunne opretholde og aktivt videreudvikle »Camelia«-mærket i konkurrence med P & G's »Always«.
It undertook to do so within a given time following its acquisition of VPS, to appoint an independent trusteeto oversee the management of Camelia, to find a purchaser with the financial resources and necessary expertisein consumer product markets, thereby enabling it to maintain and develop the Camelia business in competitionwith the Always brand of P & G.
P & G skulle frit kunne vælge, hvem »Camelia« skulle sælges til, dog således, at Kommissionen fik ret til at modsætte sig bestemte købere og føre tilsyn med, at P & G opfyldte sine tilsagn.
P & G also gave the Commission the right to object to certain potential purchasers, even if P & G remained free tochoose the final purchaser and to implement its decisions.
Kommissionen fandt, at de af P & G afgivne tilsagn gav en tilfredsstillende løsning på de konkurren ceproblemer, fusionen gav anledning til.
The Commission considered that the undertakings given by P & G constituted a satisfactory response to the competition problems posed by the merger plan.
Samtlige tilsagn er nu blevet indfriet af P & G.
To date, P & G have carried out all their commitments.
Denne sag drejde sig om et joint venture, Sophia, mellem Shell Petroleum NV, som er holdingselskabet i Royal Dutch Shell-koncernen, og Ferruzi-datterselskabet Montedison Nederland, hvis interesser inden for polyolefiner ejes af Montecatini via Himont Inc.
Shell Petroleum NV (the holding company of the Royal Dutch Shell group) and Montedison Nederland (a subsidiary of the Ferruzi group, whose polyolefin interests are held by Montecatini through Himont Inc.) decided toset up a joint venture, Sophia.
Der var oprindeligt tale om, at Montedison og Shell ville overføre alle deres aktiviteter inden for polyoleofiner til det nye joint venture.
Initially, the plan was to transfer all Montedison's and Shell's polyolefin interests to the new entity.
Imidlertid bibeholdt Shell sine interesser i USA (Unipolteknologi) og sit joint venture med BASF, ROW, uden for Sophia.
However,Shell's interests in the United States (especially the Unipol technology) and its joint venture with BASF, ROW,were not transferred to Sophia.
Efter den første undersøgelsesfase havde Kommissionen draget den konklusion, at fusionen kunne føre til en dominerende stilling på to markeder — nemlig dels markedet for meddelelse af licens på den teknologi, der er nødvendig for at kunne producere polypropylen, som er et verdensmarked, og dels markedet for produktion og salg af polypropylen, som fortsat kun omfatter Vesteuropa.
At the end of the first stage of the procedure, the Commission concluded that the concentration could create adominant position on two markets: the market for the granting of licences for the technology involved in the manufacture of polypropylene, a world market, and the market for the production and sale of polypropylene, which isstill a West European market.
På det første af de to markeder findes der to forskellige produktionsteknologier — Spheripol udviklet af Himont, og Unipol udviklet af Shell/Union Carbide.
On the former market, Himont, together with Spheripol, and Shell/Union Carbide, together with Unipol, havedeveloped their own technologies.
Over to tredjedele af den polypropylen, der produceres af andre producenter, som ikke er i besiddelse af denne teknologi, fremstilles imidlertid på licens fra Shell/Union Carbide eller Himont.
More than two thirds of the polypropylene produced in the world by third parties uses one of these two technologies under licence.
Efter fusionen ville Royal Dutch Shell få del i de to mest udbredte teknologier i verden — i Spheripol via Sophia og i Unipol via salget af de katalysatorer, der bruges i forbindelse med Unipol-teknologien.
Following the merger, Royal Dutch Shell would have interests in the two most widely used technologies in the world: in Spheripol through Sophia and in Unipol through itssales of the catalyst used in the Unipol technology.
På baggrund af denne kombination
In the second stage of the procedure, the parties proposed the following changes:
— Montedisons teknologi inden for polypropylenproduktion ville ikke blive overført til Sophia, men derimod forblive under Montedisons kontrol via et joint venture, der ville optræde uafhængigt på markedet.
(i) Montedison's polypropylene technology activities would not be transferred to Sophia but remain under thesole control of Montedison through a joint venture that will operate independently on the market;
— Montedision ville trække sig ud af sit joint venture med Petrofina, Montefina.
(ii) Montedison would withdraw from its joint venture with Petrofina, Montefina.
Efter disse ændringer fandt Kommissionen, at fusionen ikke ville føre til nogen dominerende stilling på markedet for meddelelse af licens på teknologi til polypropylenfremstilling, eftersom der fortsat ville være adgang til Montedisons teknologi som et alternativ på markedet.
Following these changes, the Commission considered that the merger would not lead to a dominant position onthe market for the granting of the licence concerning the polypropylene production technology inasmuch as Montedison's technology is still present on the market as an alternative.
Den fandt desuden, at dens oprindelige indsigelser angående markedet for produktion og salg af polypropylen blev imødekommet ved, at Montedison trak sig ud af Montefina.
It also took the view that Montedison'swithdrawal from Montefina dispelled its original doubts relating to the market for the production and sale ofpolypropylene.
Kommissionen foretog en analyse af, hvilke virkninger den anmeldte fusion ville få på tre produktmarkeder, der hver især var begrænset til kun at omfatte Tyskland.
The Commission analysed the effects of the proposed merger on the three product markets, in the knowledgethat, in each case, the relevant geographic market is Germany.
Det første produktmarked var markedet for administrative og tekniske tjenester til betalings-tv-operatører og andre udbydere af audiovisuelle tjenester, som var et marked, hvor der måtte forventes en meget kraftig vækst efter indførelsen af digitalteknikken.
The first market is that for administrative and technical services for pay-TV operators and other suppliers ofaudiovisual services, a market which is likely to expand rapidly with the introduction of digital technology.
De tjenester, der var tale om, drejede sig hovedsagelig om tilrådighedsstillelse af dekodere og udvikling af et adgangskontrol- og abonnentstyringssystem.
Theseservices consist principally in the provision of decoders, the development of a system of access control and subscriber management.
På dette marked ville MSG komme til varigt at indtage en dominerende stilling, som ville gøre det umuligt eller i det mindste vanskeligt for andre at få adgang til markedet i betragtning af den stærke position, Telekom havde inden for kabelnettet, og de enorme film- og programressourcer, Bertelsmann og Kirch rådede over.
On this new market, MSG would have had a lasting dominant position liable to restrict orprevent access by competitors owing to the strength of Telekom in the field of cable networks and the exceptional film and programming resources of Bertelsmann and Kirch.
Det andet berørte produktmarked var markedet for betalings-tv, hvor digitalteknikken måtte ventes at føre til en meget hurtigt vækst. Bertelsmann og Kirch stod allerede stærkt på dette marked i kraft af deres betydelige ressourcer.
The second market is the market for pay-TV, the supply of which is set to grow rapidly thanks to digitalization.Bertelsmann and Kirch already have sufficient resources to give them a very strong position on this market.