natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De fleste af medlemsstaternes valutaer er blevet handlet med snævre indbyrdes udsving.
The majority of Community currencies have traded in narrow ranges against each other.
De mere markante undtagelser har værel det britiske pund og det irske pund, der begge er steget betydeligt i forhold lil de andre EMS-valutaer i denne periode.
The more notable exceptions have been the pound sterling and the Irish pound, both of which have appreciated sharply against the other EMS currencies in the same period.
Inden for EMS har ti valutaer deltagel i ERM i de sidste to år.
Within the EMS, 10 currencies have participated in the ERM for at least two years.
Det drejer sig om den belgiske/luxembourgske franc (BEF/LUF), den danske krone (DKK), Dmarken (DEM), den spanske peseta (ESP), den franske franc (FRF), det irske pund (IEP), den nederlandske gylden (NEG), den østrigske schilling (ATS) og den por tugisiske escudo (PTE). Den finske mark (FIM) trådte ind i ERM i oktober 1996, mens den italienske lire (ITE) genindtrådte i mekanismen i november 1996.
These are the Belgian franc/Luxembourg franc, the Danish crown, the German mark, the Spanish peseta, the French franc, the Irish pound, the Dutch guilder, the Austrian schilling and the Portuguese escudo.
Den græske drakme (GRD), den svenske krone (SEK) og det britiske pund (GBP) deltog ikke i ERM i undersøgelsesperioden, men GRD trådte ind i mekanismen i marts 1998.
The Greek drachma, the Swedish crown and the pound sterling did not participate in the ERM during the review period, although the Greek drachma entered the mechanism in March 1998.
To vigtige udviklinger har siden marts 1996 været med til at gøre ERM generelt velfungerende, hvilkel er afspejlet i valutakursstabiliteten og den samtidige nedadrettede konvergens i de deltagende medlemsstaters rente satser. Der er tale om:
Two main developments since March 1996 have fostered a generally smooth functioning of the ERM, as reflected in exchange rate stability and a simultaneous downward convergence in interest rates among the participating Member States.
— Stigende forventninger på markedet om, at ØMU vil starte til tiden med el stort antal deltagere. Disse forventninger har afspejlet (1) medlemsstaternes held til at kontrollere inflationen og rette op på deres budget underskud, (2) en støl udvikling' i de retlige, tekniske og institutionelle forberedelser og (3) medlemsstaternes stærke politiske engagement i ØMU.
— Growing market expectations of a timely launch of EMU with a large participation of Member States which have reflected: (i) the achieve ments of the Member States in controlling inflation and redressing budgetar}' imbalances; (ii) the steady progress in legal, technical, and institutional preparations; and, (iii) the strength of political commitment to.
— Den amerikanske dollar er steget betydeligt i værdi.
EMU in the Member States.
ERM's stabilitet i undersøgelsesperioden betød, at der ikke blev foretagel justeringer af ERM's centralkurser, og at langt de fleste af de deltagende valutaer lå tæt op ad centralkurserne.
The stability of the ERM in the review period meant that there were no realignments of ERM central rates and that the vast majority of participat­ing currencies were clustered around their central rates.
Den eneste markante undtagelse har været det irske pund, der blev handlet til noget over sin centralkurs i det meste af undersøgelsesperioden, og som blev opskrevet med 3% i forhold til de øvrige ERM-valutaer i marts 1998, dvs. efter udløbet af undersøgelsesperioden.
The only notable exception was the Irish pound, which traded well above its central rate for most of the review period and was revalued by 3 % against the other ERM currencies in March 1998, i.e. after the close of the review period.
De generelle forhold i ERM kan belyses ved at undersøge spændet mellem den stærkeste og den svageste valuta i paritetsgitteret, som det fremgår af figur 5.1 (5).
Overall conditions in the ERM can be assessed by examining the spread between the strongest and the weakest currency in the grid as illustrated in Graph 5.1 (3).
Dette spænd viser, i hvilken grad valutaerne har udnyttet udsvingsmargenerne på ±15%.
This spread indicates the extent to which currencies have exploited the ±15% fluctuation margins.
Mellem april og november 1996 lå spændet noget under 5%.
Between April and November 1996, the spread remained well below 5%.
Spændet voksede betydeligt fra november 1996 til et højdepunkt på 11,5% i juli 1997 ('"'). Siden da er spændet mindsket markant og lå ultimo februar under 3%.
The spread increased substantially from November 1996 reaching a high of 11.5% in July 1997 ('')■ Since then, the spread has narrowed markedly and was below 3% by end­February.
Figur 5.1 riser også, hvorledes ERM-spændet mindskes, når det irske pund holdes uden for beregningen.
Graph 5.1 also illustrates how the ERM spread is smaller when the Irish pound is excluded from the calculation.
Uden det irske pund viser spændet, at en eller flere bilaterale ERM-kurser i den pågældende periode afveg med mere end 2,25% fra deres centralkurser.
Excluding the Irish pound, the spread indicates that for a substantial part of the period under review one or more ERM bilateral exchange rates have deviated by more than 2.25% from the corresponding central rates.
Man bemærker, at spændet har vist en tendens til at øges i tre forskellige perioder.
There have been three identifiable periods when the spread has tended to widen.
Den første periode var andet kvartal af 1996, hvor den spanske peseta gik op i toppen af pari-
The first period was the
( ') Det ERM-spænd, der omtales her, omfatter ikke den finske mark og den italienske lire inden deres indtræden i mekanismen. (") Delte tal vedrører den største afvigelse fra centralkursen i markedskursen for irske pund over for iranske frane.
(■"') The ERM spread discussed here does not take into account the Finnish märkta and the Italian lira in the period preceding their participation in the mechanism. (") This figure relates to the maximum deviation of the Irish pound/French franc market rate from the corresponding central rate.
Den største afvigelse fra centralkursen i markedskursen for franske franc over lor irske pund var på over 13%.
The maximum deviation of the French franc/Irish pound market rate from the corresponding central rate was above 13%.
ERM-spænd med og uden det irske pund
ERM spread, with and without the Irish pound (*)
FIM's indræden den 14.10.1996
Entry of Finnish markka,
ITL's genindtræden deån 25.11.1996
Re-entry of Italian lira, 25.11.1996
Spænd uden IEP
Spread excluding Irish pound
Anm: ITL og FIM er kun medregnet for den periode, de har deltaget i ERM.
(*) The Italian lira and Finnish markka are included in the calculation only for the period of their participation in the ERM.
tetsgitteret, og spændet nåede op på 3,6%.
second quarter of 1996 when the Spanish peseta moved to the top of the grid and the spread peaked at 3.6%.
De andre perioder var januar 1997 og juli 1997, hvor den finske mark styrkedes markant i gitteret, og spændet toppede med henholdsvis 4,6% og 3,7 %(7).
The other periods were January 1997 and July 1997 when the Finnish markka strengthened sharply within the grid and the spread peaked at 4.6 and 3.7% respectively (7).
Den sidste periode var udtryk for et midlertidigt omslag i en støt tendens til at mindske spændet.
The last period represented a temporary reversal of a steadily narrowing trend in the spread.
Denne tendens fortsatte derefter, og spændet var ultimo februar 1998 (uden det irske pund) under 1%.
The narrowing trend resumed subsequently and the spread (excluding the Irish pound) was below 1 % at end-February 1998.
Udviklingen for ERM-valutaerne
Developments in the ERM currencies
Tabel 5.1 giver en statistisk oversigt over, hvordan de enkelte ERM-valutaer har udviklet sig i forhold til medianvalutaen i den toårige periode frem til februar 1998. Figur 5.2 viser de enkelte ERM-valutaers procentvise afvigelse fra deres centralkurs over for medianvalutaen i den samme periode.
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics on the general behaviour of each ERM currency with reference to the median currency in the two-year period to end-February 1998.
For den finske marks og den italienske lires vedkommende er perioden inden deres indtræden i ERM vurderet i forhold til deres nuværende ERM-cen-tralkurser (under hensyntagen til, at de nationale myndigheder ikke havde givet noget formelt tilsagn om at stabilisere deres valutakurser).
In the case of the Finnish markka and Italian lira, the subperiod preceding their ERM participation is assessed with reference to their current ERM central rates (while taking into account the absence of a formal commitment by the national authorities to target their exchange rates).
Dermed er det muligt at vurdere ERM-valutaerne på et sammenligneligt grundlag.
This allows all the ERM currencies to be assessed on a comparable basis.
Tallene viser, at en gruppe på seks valutaer, nemlig den belgiske/luxembourgske franc, den danske krone, D-marken, den nederlandske gylden og den østrigske schilling, har udvist lav og faldende volatilitet i den pågældende periode.
The evidence indicates that a group of six currencies, comprising the Belgian and Luxembourg franc, the Danish crown, the German mark, the Dutch guilder and the Austrian schilling, have experienced low and diminishing volatility in the review period.
Denne gruppe valutaer er næsten konstant blevet handlet inden for ±1% af deres centralkurs over for medianvalutaen i gitteret, og ingen valuta har overskredet margenen på ±2,25% på noget tidspunkt.
This group of currencies has traded almost continuously within ± 1 % of their central parity against the median currency in the grid with none exceeding the ±2.25% range at any time.
En af disse valutaer har faktisk været medianvaluta i næsten hele perioden.
Indeed, one of these currencies has been the median currency during almost the entire period.
De stabile vekselkurser mellem disse valutaer er blevet afspejlet i de meget små forskelle mellem såvel deres korte som deres lange rentesatser. Ved udgan-
The stability of exchange rates between these cur-
Det store spand skyldtes dog i højere grad den finske marks styrke end ilen franske francs svaghed, da francen på dette tidspunkt la tæl på sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen.
French franc, which at the time was close to its central parity against the median currency.
gen af februar 1998 var den danske krone medianvaluta i gitteret, mens de øvrige fem valutaer i gruppen lå inden for 0,1 % af deres centralkurs over for den danske krone.
rendes has been reflected in very narrow differentials between both their shortterm and their longterm interest rates.
I begyndelsen af undersøgelsesperioden kom den franske franc under el vist salgspres på grund af den svage franske økonomi og som følge af arbejdsnedlæggelser i den offentlige sektor. Den iranske franc faldt til
At end-February 1998, the Danish crown was the median currency in the grid, while the other five cur rencies in the group were within 0.1% of their central rates against the Danish crown.
Spænd i forhold til medianvalutaen
Spread against median currency
Dage i - 2,25 %
Days· C - 2.25 o/o
Standardafvigelse afvigelse snit
Standard deviation
(') Tallene for ITI og FIM er beregnet, som om de havde deltaget i ERM i hele undersøgelsesperioden til deres nuværende centralkurs.
(') Figures for Italian lira and Finnish markka are calculated as if they had participated in the ERM for the whole examination period at their present central parities.
Alle de dage, ITL og FIM lå under -2,25%, gik forud for deres deltagelse i ERM.
All days that Italian lira and Finnish markka were below - 2.25 % occurred before participation in the ERM.
Spænd i forhold til centralkursen over for medianvalutaen i ERM
Spread from the central rate against the median currency in the ERM
Anm: De to lige lodrette streger i nederste figur til højre angiver henholdsvis FIM's indtræden i ERM den 14.10.1996 og ITL's genindtræden den 25.11.96.1 perioden inden deres indtræden er FIM og ITL vurderet i forhold til deres nuværende ERM­centralkurser.
NB: The two straight vertical lines in the bottom right chart indicate the entry of the Finnish markka in the ERM on 14 October 1996 and the re­entry of the Italian lira on 25 November 1996 respectively. In the period pre­ceding participation, the Finnish markka and Italian lira are assessed with reference to their present ERM central rates.
De to valutaer er imidlertid ikke medregnet ved udvæl­gelsen af referencevalutaer i denne periode.
However, these two currencies have not been taken into account in the selection of the refer­ence currency in that period.
Der er desuden angivet et bånd på + 2,25 % omkring cen­tralkursen i alle tilfælde.
A +/■ 2­25 °A band around the central rate is also indicated in all cases.
mere end 2,25% under sin centralkurs overfor medianvalutaen i to dage.
The French franc fell more than 2.25% below its central parity against the median currency for two days.
Tegn j)å et økonomisk opsving styrkede imidlertid efterspørgslen efter franske franc fra og med marts 1996, og francen er blevet handlet til mindre end 1 % under sin centralkurs i det meste af undersøgelsesperioden.
However, evidence of economic recovery supported demand for the French franc from March 1996 onward and the French currency has traded less than 1 % below its central rate throughout most of the review period.
I august 1996 faldt den franske franc til næsten -2.25% over for medianvalutaen, idet politisk usikkerhed og ringe omsætning på valutamarkedet skabte overdrevne valutakursudsving.
In August 1996, the French franc fell close to -2.25% against the median currency as political uncertainty interacted with thin trading volumes to exaggerate movements in the exchange rate.
En faldende trend i den franske korte rente blev midlertidigt standset, og Banque de France greb ind til fordel for francen.
A trend decline in French shortterm interest rates was temporarily interrupted and the Banque de France intervened in support of the currency.
Salgspressel på den franske franc log hurtigt af, og den har siden da ligget stabilt i gitteret.
Selling pressure on the French franc was short-lived and since then the currency has been stable within the grid.
Den franske franc er blevet handlet lil under sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen i næsten hele perioden, men ultimo februar 1998 handledes den praktisk laget til sin centralkurs efter at have været medianvaluta i en kort periode i december 1997.
The French franc traded below its central parity against the median currency for almost the entire review period but had practically converged on its central parity by end-February 1998, having been the median currency for a short period in December 1997.
Den spanske peseta har ligget over sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen gennem hele undersøgelsesperioden.
The Spanish peseta has been above its central parity against the median currency throughout the review period.
I april 1996 var pesetaen over 2,25% stærkere end medianvalutaen.
In April 1996, the Spanish peseta was more than 2.25% stronger than the median currency.
Apprecieringen af pesetaen skyldtes store kapitalstrømme til Spanien, fordi investorerne blev tiltrukket af det for bedrede økonomiske grundlag og et betydeligt rentespænd i forhold til andre medlemsstater.
The appreciation in the Spanish peseta reflected heavy capital inflows to Spain as investors were attracted by improved economic fundamentals and a significant interest rate differential relative to other Member States.
I januar 1997 styrkedes pesetaen igen hurtigt inden for gitteret, og Banco de España greb ind for at begrænse apprecieringstakten. Ultimo februar 1998 var pesetaen imidlertid mindre end 0,3% over sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen.
In January 1997, the Spanish peseta again strengthened rapidly within the grid and the Banco de España intervened to contain the pace of appreciation.
Pesetaens stabilitet styrkede ind snævringen af spændet for såvel den korte som den lange rente mellem Spanien og medlemsstater med lavere rente.
The stability of the peseta supported the narrowing oflong- and shortterm interest rate differentials between Spain and lower-yielding Member States.
Den portugisiske escudo var på intet tidspunkt i undersøgelsesperioden mere end 2,25% under sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen, og den lå konstant over sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen fra september 1996 til periodens udgang.
The Portuguese escudo was never more than 2.25% below its central parity against the median currency in the review period and was continuously above its central rate against the median currency from September 1996 to the end of the examination period.
I januar 1997 steg escudoen til over +2,25% i forhold til medianvalutaen under en kraftig appreciering, som Banco de Portugal havde held til at begrænse.
In January 1997, the Portuguese escudo exceeded +2.25% against the median currency amid a sharp appreciation which was successfully contained by intervention from the Banco de Portugal.
Siden da er escudoens afvigelse fra sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen blevel stadig mindre, og den var tæt på nul ultimo februar 1998. Som i Spanien har den stabile valutakurs fremmet konvergensen i de portugisiske rentesatser henimod renteniveauet i lavrentelandene.
Thereafter, the deviation of the Portuguese escudo from its cen-
ERM-valuta i den toårige undersøgelsesperiode.
As in the case of Spain, the stability of the exchange rate has favoured the convergence of Portuguese interest rates towards rates in the lower yielding Member States.
Det irske punds gennem snitlige afvigelse fra centralkursen over for medianvalutaen var med 4,6% usædvanlig høj sammenlignet med de øvrige ERM-valutaer.
The average deviation in the Irish pound from its central rate against the median currency was exceptionally high at 4.6% when compared to the other ERM currencies.
Det irske pund lå mere end 2.25% under sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen i de første 32 dage af undersøgelsesperioden, men apprecierede kraftigt inden for ERM mellem april og november 1996.
The Irish pound was more than 2.25% below its central rate against the median currency for the first 32 days of the review period but appreciated sharply within the ERVI between April and November 1996.
Denne trend flyttede den irske valuta fra bunden af gitteret til toppen — hvor den blev indtil udgangen af vurderingspei'ioden — hvilket afspejlede en tilsvarende styrkelse af det britiske pund.
This trend brought the Irish currency from the bottom to the top of the grid — where it has remained until the end of the examination period — and mirrored a corresponding strengthening in the pound sterling.
Det irske pund var stærkt i paritetsgitteret i det meste af' 1997, og dets største afvigelse fra centralkursen over for medianvalutaen nåede op på næsten 1 1 %.
The Irish pound was strong within the grid throughout most of 1997 and its deviation from its central rate against the median currency reached a peak of almost 11 %.
Som følge af en svækkelse i markedets forventninger om en revaluering af' det irske punds centralkurs i ERM inden beslutningen om deltagelse i ØMU begyndte pundet at svækkes i slutningen af 1997.
Amid receding market expectations of a revaluation of its ERM central rate ahead of the decision on participation in EMU, the Irish pound began to ease towards the end of 1997.
I begyndelsen af 1998 deprecierede den irske valuta kraftigt og lå ultimo februar inden for 3% i forhold til sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen.
Early in 1998, the Irish currency depreciated sharply and was within 3% of its central rate against the median currency by end-February.
Det irske pund blev opskrevet med 3% i forhold lil de øvrige ERM-valutaer i marts 1998, dvs. efter udløbet af undersøgelsesperioden.
The Irish pound was revalued by 3% against the other ERM currencies in March 1998, i.e. after the close of the review period.
Tallene viser tydeligt, at del irske pund har været forholdsvis variabelt i undersøgelsesperioden.
The evidence clearly indicates that the variability of the Irish pound exchange rate has been relatively high in the review period.
I det meste af perioden blev det irske pund handlet ud over udsvingsmargenen på ±2,25% i forhold til medianvalutaen.
For most of the period, the Irish pound was trading outside of a ±2.25% range against the median currency.
Det irske punds største afvigelse i forhold til medianvalutaen var til den positive side, hvilket afspejler valutaens relative styrke.
The main deviation in the Irish pound against the median currency has been on the positive side, reflecting the relative strength of the currency.
Som allerede nævnt skyldtes det irske punds styrke tendensen til at følge det britiske pund, men det høje aktivitetsniveau i den irske økonomi har også spillet ind.
As already indicated, the strength of the Irish pound was attributable to the tendency for the Irish currency to move in phase with the pound sterling but also to the buoyancy of the Irish economy.
Det britiske pund steg kraftigt i forhold til cle øvrige valutaer i løbet af perioden og trak det irske pund med sig, selv om sammenhængen mellem de to valutaers bevægelser efterhånden blev mindre.
The pound sterling moved sharply higher against the other Community currencies in the period and pulled up the Irish pound, although the degree of correlation between movements in the two currencies became progressively less strong.
Samtidig har Irland haft meget bøj økonomisk vækst kombineret med lav inflation og vedvarende budgetkonsolidering. solidering.
Meanwhile, Ireland has enjoyed very high economic growth combined with low inflation and sustained budgetary consolidation.
Derefter påbegyndte liren en appreciërende trend uden rentestøtte eller nævneværdige valuta· interventionei'C).
Subsequently, the Italian lira resumed an appreciating trend without interest rate support or significant foreign exchange intervention (*).
Liren lå mere end 2,25% under sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen i en samlet periode på 96 dage i løbet af undersøgelsesperioden.
The Italian lira was more than 2.25% below its central parity against the median currency for a total of 96 days in the review period.
Efter sin genindtræden i ERM har den imidlertid holdt sig inden for ±2,25% af sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen, og den lå kun 0,4% derover ultimo februar 1998.
However, since re-entering the ERM, the Italian lira has been within ±2.25% of its central rate against the median currency and was only 0.4% above it by end-February 1998.
Den finske mark dellog i ERM fia den 14. oktober 1996, dvs. at den ultimo februar 1998 havde været med i over 16 måneder.
The Finnish markka has participated in the ERM from 14 October 1996 onward, i.e. for more than 16 months by end-February 1998.
Den finske mark svækkedes i den første del af' perioden, hovedsagelig på grund af den finske økonomis usikre vækstudsigter. Efter maj 1996 førte en forbedring af det økonomiske grundlag imidlertid lil en markant kursændring, og marken bevægede sig fra ca. 4,2% til 1,7% under sin senere centralkurs over for medianvalutaen mellem maj og oktober 1996('').
The Finnish markka depreciated in the earl}' part of the period, maini}· due to uncertain growth prospects in the Finnish economy.
Efter sin indtræden i ERM har den finske mark imidlertid konstant ligget over sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen og ved to lejligheder har den
In July and August 1996, the central bank supported the lira by simplv suspending this kind of 'smoothing' intervention.
været mere end 2,25% over sin centralkurs over for medianvalutaen.
However, since entering the ERM, the Finnish markka has always been stronger than its central rate against the median currency and has been more than 2.25% above its central rate against the median currency on two occasions.
Markens afvigelse fra sin centralkurs nåede op på 3,7% i januar 1997, hvor den blev den næststærkeste valuta i ERM i forbindelse med en generel appreciering af de nordiske valutaer.
The deviation from its central rate reached 3.7% in Januar}' 1997 when the Finnish markka became the second strongest currency in the ERM amid a generalised appreciation of the Nordic currencies.