natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den tærskel på 250 mio. ECU i omsætning, som er betingelsen for anvendelsen af fusionsforordningen, var nemlig ikke nået for Dan Airs vedkommende.
The reason was that it appeared that the turnover threshold of ECU 250 million requiredfor the application of the Merger Regulation was not reached by Dan Air.
Dette skyldtes, at Dan Air — i overensstemmelse med en købsaftale indgået med BA — havde opgivet sin chartervirksomhed og solgt de dertil knyttede aktiver.
This stemmedfrom the fact that the airline had, under the takeover agreement with BA, given up its charter activities and sold the relevant assets.
Sagsøgeren henviste til artikel 5, stk. 2, i fusionsforordningen.
The applicant based itself on Article 5(2)of the Merger Regulation, which provides that, where a merger consists in the acquisitionof parts of an undertaking, only the turnover relating to the parts which are the subject ofthe transaction are to be taken into account.
Dette stykke indeholder
The Court rejected this argument.
') Sag T-3/93, Sml. II 1994, s. 21.
1 CaseT-3/93 Air France v Commission [1994] ECR 11-121.
Førsteinstansrettens dom af 19. maj J) vedrørte også et søgsmål anlagt af Air France mod en beslutning, hvori der blev givet tilladelse til en fusion, der involverede British Airways.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance delivered on 19 May also concerned anaction brought by Air France against a decision authorizing a merger involving British Airways.1
British Airways agtede at erhverve 49,9 % af kapitalen i selskabet TAT European Airlines, mens resten af kapitalen fortsat ejedes af TAT SA. Men med hensyn til denne resterende kapital havde British Airways en købsoption.
British Airways wished to acquire 49.9% of the share capital of TAT European Airlines.The remaining 50.1%was to continue to be held by TAT SA, but British Airways was tohave an option to purchase it.
I henhold til en aktionæroverenskomst indgået mellem British Airways og TAT skulle der være en kompetencefordeling inden for TAT European Airlines.
A shareholders' agreement between British Airways and TATprovided for the sharing of power within TAT European Airlines.
Ifølge Air France blev der ikke med denne transaktion skabt et joint venture selskab, der i fællesskab kontrolleredes af TAT og British Airways. På grund af British Airways' globale strategi og British Airways' købsoption var der i realiteten tale om, at British Airways overtog kontrollen med TAT European Airlines.
Air France considered that the operation did not create a joint venture that was jointly controlled by TAT and British Airways.
Retten fastslog for det første, at TAT beholdte kapitalmajoriteten i TAT European Airlines, og for det andet at der ikke kunne træffes nogen vigtige beslutninger af TAT EA's bestyrelse, medmindre mindst en af TAT's repræsentanter stemte herfor.
It noted firstly that TAT retained the majority of the sharecapital of TAT European Airlines and that no major decision could be taken by the board of TAT without the agreement of at least one representative of TAT.
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AE EF­DOMSTOLEN OG AF EF'S FØRSTEINSTANSRET
It was also held that thisconclusion could not be altered by the existence of BA's purchase option.
I samme dom forkastede Førsteinstansretten ligeledes det af Air France fremførte anbringende, hvorefter Kommissionens definition på det relevante marked var forkert.
In the same judgment, the Court also rejected Air France's plea that the Commissionhad wrongly defined the relevant market.
Air France kritiserede Kommissionen for kun at have taget hensyn til de to ruter Paris­London og Lyon­London og ikke til hele markedet for den internationale luftfart.
Air France argued that the Commission hadtaken account only of the Paris-London and Lyons-London routes, and not the whole of theintra-Community market in international air travel.
Ifølge Air France gav den pågældende fusion British Airways mulighed for — takket være TAT European Airlines — at lokke franske kunder til London, fordi de dér kunne nyde godt af British Airways' internationale lufttrafik.
In Air France's view, the concentrationat issue would enable British Airways, through the intermediary of TAT European Airlines,to attract French customers towards London so that they could use its international airtransport services from that city.
Ifølge erklæringen var Kommissionen efter en række uformelle kontakter med aftaleparterne nået til den opfattelse, at fusionen
The Court held that the definition of the market adopted in this instance by the Commission, which had examined the two routes on which there was an overlap between services
') Dom af 1 1.4.1989, sag 66/86, Sml. 1989, s. 803.
1 Case 1-2193 Air France v Commission [1994] ECRII-323.
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AF EF-DOMSTOLEN OG AF EF'S FØRSTEINSTANSRET mellem British Airways og Dan Air ikke var anmeldelsespligtig, da fusionen ikke havde fællesskabsdimension.
In addition, the Court found that Air France had not proved in what way the partial takeover of TAT European Airlines by British Airways created or strengthened a dominantposition on the market defined by the Commission or by itself.
Retten konstaterede, at erklæringen havde bindende retsvirkninger, da den helt klart ændrede sagsøgernes retlige situation.
The Court considered that this statement corresponded to the case-law definition of actsagainst which an action for annulment may be brought.3 It found that the statement produ- ced binding legal effects, substantially altering the legal situation of the applicants.
Denne retsvirkning var evident i forhold til de i fusionen deltagende parter.
Sucheffects were obvious with regard to the parties to the concentration.
Så snart fritagelsen for anmeldelsen til Kommissionen forelå, kunne British Airways opkøbe Dan Air.
The waiving of theneed for notification to the Commission made it possible, as from the Commission's intervention, for British Airways to acquire Dan Air.
Erklæringen havde også retsvirkninger i forholdet til de berørte medlemsstater, dvs. de stater, hvori parterne var lokaliseret. Disse stater kunne gå ud fra, at erklæringen gav dem bemyndigelse til at anvende deres nationale lovgivning om kontrol med fusioner.
The statement also produced effects withregard to the Member States whose territory was more particularly concerned havingregard to the location of the parties.
Førsteinstansretten fandt endvidere, at det var uden videre betydning, at erklæringen kun var afgivet mundtligt, da valg af form ikke kan ændre retsaktens karakter2). Endvidere var Retten af den opfattelse, at erklæringens offentliggørelse i pressen — hvilket ikke influerer på retsakten — var uden indvirkning på dens lovlighed.
The Court further held that it was of slight importance that the statement existed only inoral form, since the choice of form could not change the nature of the measure.4 Similarly, the Court held that the publicity given to the statement in the press, being independent ofthe act itself, had no bearing on its legality.
I to domme tog Førsteinstansretten et søgsmål anlagt af Frankrig, der er konkurrent til British Airways, til påkendelse.
In two judgments, the Court of First Instance accepted the admissibility of actionsbrought by Air France, as a competitor of British Airways.
I Dan Air-sagen blev det fastslået, at Air France ligesom alle British Airways' konkurrenter var direkte berørt af den beslutning, hvori fusionen blev erklæret for ikke at have fællesskabsdimension, og dette på grund af denne beslutnings umiddelbare retsvirkninger på de markeder, der berørtes af fusionen, samt på tredjemands proceduremæssige rettigheder.
In the Dan Air case, it held that Air France was directly concerned by the decision not torecognize the concentration as having a Community dimension, as were all competitors of
De ruter, som Dan Air befløj, før selskabet blev opkøbt, vedrørte primært rejser mellem Frankrig og Det Forenede Kongerige. ge.
See point 485 of this Report.1 Case 60/81 IBMv Commission [1981] ECR 2639.1 Case 101/76/fomgv Council and Commission [1977] ECR 797.
I TAT-sagen fandt Førsteinstansretten, at disse to betingelser var opfyldt, da der i beslutningen var en lang række henvisninger til Air Frances situation.
Air France wasmore individually concerned by the statement, its situation being clearly different fromthat of other international air carriers.
På grundlag af disse henvisninger havde Kommissionen kunnet vurdere den konkurrencemæssige situation på de pågældende markeder.
This was because the routes operated by Dan Airbefore its takeover involved mainly links between France and the United Kingdom.
1) Dom af 11.11.1981, sag 60/81, IBM, Sml. 1981, s. 2639.
In the TAT case, the Court held that these two conditions were met, because of the numerous references to the situation of Air France in the decision.
2) Dom af 5.5.1977, sag 101/76, Honig, Sml. 1977, s. 797.
Such references had beenused by the Commission in assessing the competitive situation on the relevant markets.
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AF EF-DOMSTOLEN OG AF EF'S FØRSTEINSTANSRET
250 MAIN CASES DECIDED BY THE COMMUNITY LAWCOURTS
E. STATSSTØTTE
E - STATE AID
I sag Cl 88/92 (TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH mod Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland) fik EF-Domstolen forelagt en anmodning om en præjudiciel afgørelse af »Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westphalen« om EF-traktatens klageadgange.
In Case C-188/92 (TWO Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany), the Court examined a request for a preliminary ruling from the Higher Administrative Court for the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia concerning the appeals system established by the EC Treaty.
Anmodningen drejede sig navnlig om, hvorvidt modtageren af statsstøtte, der er erklæret ulovlig af Kommissionen — når de nationale myndigheder kræver tilbagebetaling af støtten i henhold til Kommissionens beslutning — kan indbringe denne beslutning for de nationale domstole og for EF-Domstolen i forbindelse med en anmodning om præjudiciel afgørelse fra de nationale domstole i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 177, selv om han ikke har indbragt Kommissionens beslutning direkte for EF-Domstolen i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 173 inden for fristen på to måneder.
The reference related in particular to the question of whether arecipient of State aid which has been declared unlawful by the Commission can, where thenational authorities require the recipient to reimburse the aid pursuant to the Commission'sdecision, dispute the validity of such a decision before the national courts, and before the Court of Justice when the matter is referred for a preliminary ruling by the national courtpursuant to Article 177 of the EC Treaty, even though the recipient had not directly instituted proceedings against the Commission's decision before the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 173 of the EC Treaty within the required two-month deadline.
I sin dom af 9. marts 1994 afklarede EF-Domstolen spørgsmålet ved at henvise til sin faste retspraksis '): En afgørelse, der ikke er blevet anfægtet af modtageren inden for de frister, der er angivet i EF-traktatens artikel 173, anses for endelig.
In its judgment delivered on 9 March 1994, the Court replied to the reference for a preliminary ruling, on the basis of its established case-law:1 a decision against which the addres- see has not brought an action within the time-limits laid down by Article 173 of the ECTreaty becomes definitive vis-d-vis the addressee.
EF-Domstolen har ligeledes påpeget, at en virksomhed, der modtager individuel støtte har ret til — i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 173, stk. 2 — at anlægge annullationssøgsmål, selv hvis Kommissionens beslutning er rettet til en med lemsstat.
The Court also pointed out that anundertaking in receipt of individual aid has the right to bring an action for annulmentunder the second paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty even if the Commission decision is addressed to a Member State.
På grundlag af sagens retlige og faktiske omstændigheder (TWD var individuelt og direkte interesseret og var skriftligt blevet underrettet om Kommissionens beslutning) fandt EF-Domstolen, at en støttemodtager — der er berørt af en beslutning truffet af Kommissionen i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 93, og som kunne have anfægtet denne beslutning, men som har ladet den frist udløbe, der er foreskrevet i EF-traktatens artikel 173, stk. 3, ikke skulle kunne indbringe spørgsmålet om beslutningens gyldighed for de nationale domstole i forbindelse med en sag, hvori de gennemførelsesbestemmelser, de nationale myndigheder har vedtaget, anfægtes.
On the basis of the facts of the case (TWD was individually and directly involved and hadbeen informed in writing of the Commission's decision) and the legal aspects, the Courtheld that it was not possible for a recipient of aid, forming the subject-matter of a Commission decision adopted on the basis of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, who could have challenged that decision and who allowed the mandatory time-limit laid down in this regard by thethird paragraph of Article 173 of the EC Treaty to expire, to call into question the lawfulness of that decision before the national courts in an action brought against the measurestaken by the national authorities for implementing that decision.
EF-Domstolen har taget udgangspunkt i tidligere retspraksis med hensyn til fristerne for søgsmål, der tager sigte på at værne om retssikkerheden ved at forhindre endeløse sager om gyldigheden af bindende EU-retsakter2). EF-Domstolen har således villet undgå, at man, ved at tillade at de interesserede parter kan anfægte en beslutning for de nationale domstole under
The Court based itself onestablished case-law, holding that the time-limits for appeals are intended to safeguardlegal certainty by preventing the indefinite calling into question of Community acts havinglegal effects.2 The Court thus wished to ensure that, by allowing the person concerned tochallenge the implementation of a decision in proceedings before the national court on theground that the decision was unlawful, a situation did not arise where the person concerned could overcome the definitive nature which the decision assumes as against that person once the time-limit for bringing an action has expired.
') Se navnlig dom i sagen Cobiti mod EF-Domstolen af 17.11.1965, Sml. 1965, s. 1045.
1 See in particular Case 20/65 Collotti v Court of Justice [1965] ECR 847.
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AF EF-DOMSTOLEN OG AF EF'S FØRSTEINSTANSRET påberåbelse af, at den skulle være ulovlig, skulle kunne rokke ved den endelige karakter af en beslutning, når fristerne for indsigelse er udløbet.
MAIN CASES DECIDED BY THE COMMUNITY LAWCOURTS 251
Det er den første dom, der præciserer forholdet mellem EF-traktatens artikel 173, 177 og 184 med hensyn til individuelle beslutninger truffet på grundlag af EF-traktatens artikel 93, stk. 2.
This judgment is the first to define precisely the relationship between Articles 173, 177and 184 of the EC Treaty as regards individual decisions under Article 93(2) of the ECTreaty.
I de to forenede sager C-324/90 og C-342/90 (Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland og Pieuger Worthington GmbH mod Kommissionen) skulle EF-Domstolen tage stilling til et annullationssøgsmål anlagt i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 173, stk. 1 og 2, vedrørende Kommissionens beslutning i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 93, stk. 2, hvori Hamburgs støtteordning til forebyggelse af virksomhedsflugt erklæredes for ulovlig.
In Joined Cases C-324/90 and C-342/90 (FederalRepublic of Germany and Pleuger Worthington GmbH v Commission), the Court examined proceedings pursuant to the firstand second paragraphs of Article 173 of the EC Treaty against a Commission decisionunder Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty concluding that an aid programme introduced by theCity of Hamburg to prevent the exodus of firms was unlawful and incompatible with thecommon market.
I den anfægtede beslutning krævedes den støtte, der var blevet udbetalt under denne ordning, tilbage betalt.
The Commission decision also stipulated that the aid disbursed under theprogramme must be repaid.
I sin dom af 13. april 1994 undersøgte EF-Domstolen kun anbringendet om, at EF-traktatens artikel 190 var overtrådt, fordi Kommissionen ikke havde givet en tilstrækkelig begrundelse for eksistensen af Hamburgs støtteordning.
In its judgment delivered on 13 April 1994, the only ground examined by the Court wasthat Article 190 of the EC Treaty had been infringed because the Commission decision didnot state sufficiently the reasons on which it was based as regards the existence of an aidprogramme implemented by the City of Hamburg.
Hvad angår realiteten og de faktiske anbringender, der lå til grund for Kommissionens beslutning (støtte ydet af den samme administrative instans, med samme begrundelse og over den samme budgetpost), udelukkede EF-Domstolen ikke generelt Kommissionens mulighed for at tage udgangspunkt i en række omstændigheder for at påvise, at der faktisk var tale om en støtteordning, men fandt dog, at Kommissionen i den foreliggende sag blot havde fastslået, at støtten i alle tilfælde var ydet efter den samme procedure.
As to the substance of the case, as regards the factual arguments underlying the Commission's decision (aid granted by the same administrative authority, for the same reason andunder the same budget heading), while the Court did not in principle rule out the possibility of the Commission relying on a set of circumstances which taken as a whole indicate thede facto existence of an aid programme, it held that, in this instance, the Commission hadconfined itself to showing that all of the aid had been granted on the basis of one and thesame procedure.
EF-Domstolen mente, at Kommissionen skulle have præciseret nærmere, hvilke normative, administrative, finansielle og økonomiske forhold der gjorde, at alle de pågældende former for støtte hørte under en støtteordning, der faldt uden for andre former for støtte, som Hamburg havde ydet.
The Court considered that the Commission should have provided additional evidence in the form of legislative, administrative, financial or economic factors thatwould have allowed the whole of the aid in question to be characterized as belonging to aprogramme that was separate from other aid granted by the City of Hamburg.
EF-Domstolen fastholdt derfor, at Kommissionen i dette tilfælde ved en midlertidig beslutning skulle have pålagt forbundsregeringen at fremlægge andre oplysninger end dem, der forelå, da proceduren blev indledt.
252 MAIN CASES DECIDED BY THE COMMUNITY LAWCOURTS held that, in the circumstances of the case, the Commission should have required the Federal Government, by provisional decision, to provide other information than that supplied following the initiation of proceedings.
Med denne dom, der falder i tråd med dommene i sagerne Boussac Saint-Frères og Tubemeuse, er der sket en udvikling i retspraksis, idet det gøres til en forudsætning for en endelig negativ beslutning på grundlag af en medlemsstats manglende vilje til at samarbejde om forelæggelse af oplysninger, at Kommissionen forinden har udstedt påbud til medlemsstaten om at udlevere de fornødne oplysninger.
The judgment, which follows on from the Boussac Saint-Freres and Tubemeuse judgments, marks a development in case-law in that it makes the injunction procedure a necessary precondition to any negative final Commission decision based on the lack of cooperation of a Member State in supplying information.
I sag C-387/92 (Banco Exterior de España SA mod Ayuntamiento de Valencia) fik EF-Domstolen forelagt et præjudicielt spørgsmål af Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana vedrørende fortolkning og anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 90 sammenholdt med artikel 92 og 93.
In Case C-387/92 (Banco Exterior de Espana SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia),the Court examined a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justiciade la Communidad Valenciana on a question of interpretation and application of Article 90of the EC Treaty in relation to Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty.
Anmodningen drejede sig navnlig om, hvorvidt artikel 90 sammenholdt med artikel 92 er til hinder for anvendelse af national lovgivning, der giver offentlige virksomheder en skattefritagelse.
The question put waswhether Article 90 in conjunction with Article 92 of the EC Treaty precluded the application of national legislation granting tax exemption to public enterprises.
I sin dom af 15. marts 1994 afklarede EF-Domstolen spørgsmålet under henvisning til retspraksis på følgende områder: a) Det fremgår af EF-traktatens artikel 90, at artikel 92 omfatter alle virksom heder, både private og offentlige, og hele deres produktion, dog med forbehold af EF-traktatens artikel 90, stk. 2 2).
In its judgment delivered on 15 March 1994, the Court drew attention to its case-law on anumber of points:
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AF EF-DOMSTOLEN OG AF EF'S FØRSTEINSTANSRET b) Begrebet støtte er mere generelt end tilskud, idet det omfatter ikke blot direkte udbetalinger, men også interventioner, der under en eller anden form letter de byrder, der normalt belaster en virksomheds budget M.
(b) the concept of aid is wider than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only positivebenefits, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which arenormally included in the budget of an undertaking;2
c) Ifølge traktaten skal afgørelsen af en støttes eventuelle uforenelighed med fællesmarkedet træffes som afslutning på den relevante procedure (EFtraktatens artikel 93), som iværksættes af Kommissionen under EF-Domstolens kontrol2).
(c) the intention of the Treaty is that the finding that an aid may be incompatible with thecommon market is to be made, subject to review by the Court, by means of an appropriate procedure which it is the Commission's responsibility to set in motion.3
På grundlag af de retlige og faktiske omstændigheder i den foreliggende sag fandt EF-Domstolen, at en skattefritagelse, selv om den ikke omfattede overførsel af statsmidler, stillede modtagerne i en bedre finansiel situation end andre skattepligtige (en spansk lov om offentlig kredit fritog de offentlige kreditinstitutter, der kunne godtgøre, at de var skattepligtige, hvilket var tilfældet for Banco de Crédito Industrials vedkommende, fra enhver form for national, regional og kommunal beskatning). Dermed var der tale om statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 92, stk. 1.
On the basis of the legal and factual elements of the case, the Court held that a tax exemption (a Spanish law organizing the public credit system exempting from national, provincial or municipal taxes public credit institutions that possess the status of taxpayers, as wasthe case with the Banco de Credito Industrial), although not involving a transfer of Stateresources, places the recipients in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers and thus constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty.
DE VIGTIGSTE DOMME AFSAGT AF EF-DOMSTOLEN OG AF EF'S FØRSTEINSTANSRET
MAIN CASES DECIDED BY THE COMMUNITY LAWCOURTS 253
I de forenede sager C-278/92 — C-280/92 af 23. marts 1994 appellerede Kongeriget Spanien Kommissionens beslutning om, at den spanske regerings kapitaltilførsler til de to spanske tekstilvirksomheder Hytasa og Intelhorce og skoproducenten Imepiel indeholdt ulovlig statsstøtte, således at den allerede udbetalte støtte skulle tilbagebetales.
In Joined Cases C-278/92 to C-280/92 of 23 March 1994 the Kingdom of Spain lodged an appeal against the Commission's decision that capital contributions made by the Spanish Government to two Spanish textile companies 'Hytasa' and 'Intelhorce' and thefootwear manufacturer 'ImepieF involved incompatible State aid and that the aid alreadypaid should be recovered.
EF-Domstolens dom bekræftede og afklare de yderligere anvendelsen af princippet om den private markedsinvestor og foreneligheden mellem omstruktureringsstøtte til kriseramte virksomheder og fællesmarkedet.
In its judgment the Court confirmed and further clarified theapplication of the private market investor principle and the compatibility with the commonmarket of restructuring aid to firms in difficulty.