natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette er i direkte strid med en af traktatens fundamentale målsætninger, nemlig integreringen af det fælles marked.
The distribution agreements concluded by Tretorn were not notified to the Commission and were therefore noteligible for individual exemption.
Den udviste adfærd gjorde det også muligt for Tretorn og forhandlerne at anvende en differentieret prispolitik.
Furthermore, even if they had been notified, the agreements would not havequalified for exemption because of the export ban which they included, which was not indispensable to the efficiency of Tretorn's distribution system.
Tretorns forhandlingsaftaler var ikke blevet anmeldt til Kommissionen og kunne således ikke henføres under en individuel fritagelse.
In setting the amount of the fines, the Commission took account of the fact that the infringement was such as tothwart the achievement of one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty, namely the integration of the singlemarket, and that Community law was very clear on this point.
Og selv om de var blevet anmeldt, ville det ikke have været muligt at fritage disse aftaler, da de indebar et eksportforbud, som ikke var uundværligt for Tretorns distributionssystem.
As regards the fines imposed on the distributors, the Commission took account of the fact that they bore lessresponsibility for the anticompetitive conduct, since it was reasonable to suppose that, although they were ineffect pursuing their own interests, they were also bowing to Tretorn's wishes.
Som led i den ændring af det spanske oliemonopol, der indtraf i 1993 med ikrafttrædelsen af lov nr. 34 af 22. december 1992!), havde Kommissionen advaret de spanske raffinaderier om, at visse bestemmelser i deres servicestationskontrakter kunne være uforenelige med EU's konkurrenceregler2). ler2).
In the course of the adjustments to the Spanish oil monopoly which took place in 1993 with the entry into force of Law No 34 of 22 December 1992,' the Commission had warned the Spanish refineries that a number of provisions in their service-station agreements were potentially incompatible with the Community competition rules.2
En undersøgelse af samtlige eneleveringskontrakter, der var indgået med de tre spanske raffinaderier, viste, at talrige aftaler med REPSOL, BP OIL og CEPSA indeholdt bestemmelser, som gjorde det umuligt at fritage dem.
An examination of all the exclusive purchasing contracts negotiated by the three Spanish refineries revealed thatmany agreements by Repsol, BP Oil and Cepsa contained clauses which ruled out exemption.
Efter anmodning fra Kommissionen gik de ovenfor nævnte selskaber med til at ændre de pågældende kontrakter.
At the Commission's request, these companies agreed to amend the contracts in question.
Med henblik herpå kom eneleveringsretten til at gælde fra datoen for kontrakternes indgåelse (for de flestes vedkommende mellem 1986 og 1988), og ikke fra det øjeblik, monopolet blev ændret (januar 1993).
The exclusivity periodwas made to run from the date on which the contracts were signed (mostly between 1986 and 1988) and not thedate on which the monopoly came to an end (January 1993).
Endvidere blev eneleveringsretten for smøreolier bragt i overensstemmelse med forordning (EØF) nr. 1984/83, som kun tillader eneleveringsret for smøreolier, der anvendes på servicestationen, såfremt smøringsanlægget er finansieret af leverandøren.
In addition, the exclusivity arrangement for lubricants was made compatible with Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83, under which it may cover lubricants used in theservice station only if the supplier has financed a lubrication bay or other lubrication equipment.
De således ændrede kontrakter kunne henføres under den relevante undtagelsesbestemmelse i forordning nr. 1984/83.
The contracts thus amended were eligible for exemption under Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83.
Herefter besluttede Kommissionen at indstille den procedure, der var indledt over for kontrakterne.
On the basis ofthese elements, the Commission decided to terminate the proceedings against the agreements.
Løsningen på denne sag sikrer, at talrige servicestationer, der i dag forsynes af lokale raffinaderier, på ny kan trænge ind på markedet, hvorved der opstår de fornødne betingelser for et mere konkurrencepræget marked allerede fra 1996 i stedet for fra 2003.
The solution to this case has the merit of bringing many service stations currently supplied by local refineriesback into the market, thereby creating the conditions for a more competitive market from 1996 rather than 2003.
Som led i åbningen af det spanske oliemarked, der blev indledt i 1986 med tiltrædelsen af EU, er der i Spanien kommet 1 919 nye servicestationer til de 3 718 bestående servicestationer, der tidligere indgik i det monopoliserede net.
In the context of the process of opening up the Spanish petroleum market begun in 1986 with accession to the Community, 1 919 new service stations have been added to the 3 718 already existing in Spain in the formermonopolized network.
Kommissionen mener, at liberaliseringen af den spanske oliesektor, der er blevet tilvejebragt ved hjælp af disse forskellige foranstaltninger, fremmer integrationen af energimarkederne i Den Europæiske Union i overensstemmelse med traktatens artikel 7A.
The Commission takes the view that the liberalization of the Spanish oil industry reflected in these various measures promotes greater integration of energy markets in the European Union in accordance with Article 7a of the Treaty.
På foranledning af en klage fra den italienske sammenslutning af producenter af reservedele og tilbehør (CICRA) skred Kommissionen ind over for Fiat Auto.
The Commission contacted Fiat Auto following a complaint lodged by Cicra, the Italian association of manufacturers of spare parts and accessories.
CICRA klagede især over to former for praksis, nemlig ydelsen af rabat til autoriserede forhandlere ved køb af reservedele og etableringen af et net parallelt med det selektive distributionsnet.
Cicra objected to two practices in particular: the granting of discounts tolicensed dealers for the purchase of spare parts and the creation of a network parallel to its selective distributionnetwork.
Disse beslutninger åbner mulighed for konkurrence inden for reservedelssektoren og giver selvstændige reservedelsproducenter mulighed for i fremtiden at få adgang til en kundekreds, som de før var afskåret fra.
These decisions will enable the spare parts sector to be opened up to competition by granting independent manufacturers of spare parts access to distribution channels that were hitherto closed to them,
Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG I en beslutning vedtaget i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 85 gav Kommissionen den 23. december 1992 Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG, der er hjemmehørende i Nürnberg, pålæg om at standse indgåelsen af de aftaler, som indebar en forpligtelse for de detailhandlende i Tyskland til udelukkende at købe småis (»impuls-is«) hos Schöller indtil den 31. december 1997'). Sådanne eksklusive aftaler kan, hvis de dækker en væsentlig del af markedet, begrænse konkurrencen, idet de hindrer andre producenter af impuls-is, navnlig producenter fra andre medlemsstater, i at få adgang til visse salgssteder. Derved påvirker de også handelen mellem medlemsstater. Kommissionen modtog i oktober 1993 oplysninger, der viste, at Schöller ikke overholdt dette forbud.
Scholler Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG On 23 December 1992, in a Decision pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty, the Commission ordered Scholler Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG, which is established at Nurnberg, to stop concluding agreements requiringretailers established in Germany to purchase single-item ice-cream ('impulse ice-cream') only from Scholleruntil after 31 December 1997.' Such exclusivity agreements, if they cover a substantial part of the market, mayrestrict competition in that they foreclose outlets to other producers' impulse ice-cream products, and in particular to those producers established in other Member States and thereby affect trade between Member States. From information which the Commission received in October 1993, it became clear that Scholler was not complying with the ban which had been imposed on it.
Af en efterfølgende undersøgelse fremgik det, at Schöller i 1993 havde indgået ca. 14 000 nye eksklusive aftaler indeholdende en forpligtelse til kun at aftage Schöllers produkter.
A subsequent enquiry established that, in 1993, Scholler concluded about 14 000 new exclusivity agreements containing exclusive purchasing obligations in its favour.
Trods Kommissionens pålæg om, at Schöller skulle bringe overtrædelsen til ophør, jf. beslutningen af 23. december 1992, nægtede Schöller at gøre dette i praksis.
Having been requested by the Commission to cease the ongoing infringement of the Decision of 23 December 1992,Scholler refused to undertake to discontinue this practice.
Selskabet hævdede, at det havde ændret sine aftaler på en sådan måde, at de ikke var omfattet af Kommissionens forbud, idet de ikke længere havde en ubestemt løbetid, men var af en fast varighed på ikke over fem år.
The company argued that it had modified its agreements in such a way that they were not covered by the Commission's ban, in that they were no longer concludedfor an indefinite period but for a fixed term not exceeding five years.
Schöller krævede således, at selskabets nye eneleveringsaftaler skulle henføres under gruppefritagelsen i forordning (EØF) nr. 1984/83.
Scholler thereby claimed the benefit of theblock exemption granted by Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 for its new exclusivity agreements.
De aftaler, som Schöller ikke må indgå indtil den 31. december 1997, er ene og alene karakteriseret ved den eksklusive købsforpligtelse, der gælder for småis.
The nature of the agreements which Scholler may not conclude until after 31 December 1997 is determined solely by the exclusive purchasing requirement for single-item ice-cream.
Leveringsaftalernes varighed er uden betydning i denne henseende.
The duration of the supply agreements is not of any importance inthis regard.
Kommissionen har derfor set sig nødsaget til at pålægge Schöller tvangsbøder på 1 000 ECU.
The Commission was therefore obliged to impose a periodic penalty payment of ECU 1 000 on Scholler.
Schöller vil skulle betale disse tvangsbøder, hvis selskabet indgår nye eneleveringsaftaler af den type, der er beskrevet ovenfor2). Desuden har Kommissionen forbeholdt sig ret til at pålægge Schöller bøder i relation til eneleveringsaftalerne indgået i 1993 og derefter.
This penalty payment will arise if Scholler enters into further exclusivity agreements of the typedescribed above.2 Moreover, the Commission reserved the right to fine Scholler in relation to the exclusivityagreements concluded in 1993 or thereafter.
2) Ifolge kendelsen afsagt af præsidenten for Retten i Forste Instans den 19.2.1993 (Sml. II 1993, s. 131) kan Schöller midlertidigt pålægge de detailhandlende, at de ikke má sælge impuls-is fra Langnese-lglo GmbH.
According to the Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 19 February 1993 ([1993] ECR 11-131), Scholler may provisionally requireretailers not to offer impulse ice-cream marketed by Langnese-lglo GmbH.
Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence meddelte UCB, at virksomheden efter generaldirektoratets mening havde en dominerende stilling på det europæiske »frie« (dvs. uden tvangsbrug) marked for Piracetam som virksomt stof, og at leveringsaftalen på grund af udelukkelseseffekten blev betragtet som et misbrug af denne dominerende stilling.
The Directorate-General for Competition informed UCB that it considered that UCB had a dominant position onthe European 'free' (i.e. excluding captive use) Piracetam-active ingredient-market and that the supply agreement, in view of its exclusionary effect, was considered to form an abuse of this dominant position.
Udelukkelseseffekten var et resultat af kombinationen af Almiralls eksplicitte forpligtelse til at købe en vis procentdel hos UCB og de meget store gratis prøvemængder. Prøvemængderne blev betragtet som loyalitetsrabatter, der skulle formå kunden til også at dække sine supplerende/marginale behov hos den dominerende leverandør (f.eks.
This exclusionary effect resulted from the combination of the explicit obligation on Almirall to buy a certain percentageexclusively from UCB and the substantial free 'sampling' quantities.
Parterne har nu imidlertid ændret deres aftale, idet de har begrænset Almiralls købsforpligtelse til tre år og erstattet loyalitetsrabatterne med normale mængderabatter.
However, the parties subsequently amended their agreement in that they limited the purchasing obligation of Almirall to three years and replaced the fidelity rebates by normal quantity rebates.
Det anses for acceptabelt (jf. artikel 85, stk. 3), at Almirall over 3 år forpligter sig til at købe 50 % af ovennævnte produkt fra en dominerende producent, idet denne forpligtelse danner en modvægt til UCB's forpligtelse til om ønsket at dække hele Almiralls behov.
The three-year 50% purchasing obligation in favour of a dominant producer is considered to be acceptable (under Article 85(3) of the Treaty), as this forms a counterpart for UCB's obligation to fulfil, if so requested, the complete demand of Almirall.
Som aftalen nu er struktureret, kan andre producenter konkurrere med UCB om Almiralls resterende 50 %.
The agreement as it is now structured does allow competing producers to enter intocompetition with UCB for AlmiralPs remaining 50%.
Parterne er informeret herom ved administrativ skrivelse (fritagelse).
The parties were informed by way of an administrative(exemption) comfort letter.
Forordning (EØF) nr. 123/85 - fabrikanters forpligtelse til at yde garanti på køretøjer i hele forhandlernettet i EU
Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 - Honouring of a manufacturer's guarantee onvehicles throughout its EU distribution network
Kommissionen har modtaget et stigende antal klager over, at køretøjer, der er købt hos forhandlere uden for fabrikanters forhandlernet, ikke har været dækket af deres garantiordning.
The Commission has received an increasing number of complaints that vehicles which have been purchased byconsumers from dealers outside the distribution network of a manufacturer were denied guarantee services underthe manufacturer's guarantee.
Dette har været et problem i forbindelse med en række bilfabrikanter, og nogle har forsøgt at begrunde deres garantiafvisning ved at henvise til EF-Domstolens dom af 13. januar 1994 i »Cartier«-sagen.
This problem occurred with a number of car manufacturers, and some tried to justify their refusal to recognize the validity of their guarantee by referring to the 'Cartier'judgment delivered by the European Court of Justice on 13 January 1994.
En sådan adfærd er et brud på princippet i artikel 5 i forordning (EØF) nr. 123/85, hvoraf det fremgår, at en bilfabrikants garanti for det solgte produkt skal gælde i hele EU, og det er ikke tilladt kun at yde garanti, hvis købet har fundet sted hos en godkendt forhandler (i de tilfælde skal bilerne
Such behaviour infringes the principle of Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 123/85, which provides that a carmanufacturer's guarantee for the product it sells must be applicable throughout the EU and does not permit warranties to be honoured only when the consumer bought from an approved dealer (in these cases the cars must firsthave been sold by an approved dealer).
De europæiske og japanske bilfabrikanter — i alt 23 — fremsendte pr. 1. maj og 1. november 1994 priser på henholdsvis 74 (1. maj) og 76 (1. november) af deres mest solgte modeller.
On 1 May and 1 November 1994 a total of 23 European and Japanese car manufacturers submitted the prices of74 (1 May) and 76 (1 November) of their top-selling models.
Priserne var justeret for forskelle i bilernes udstyr og opgivet med og uden afgift i både national valuta og i ECU.
The prices were adjusted for equipment differencesand were given before and after tax, in local currency and in ecu.
Priserne for større ekstraudstyr var opgivet af fabrikanterne (airbag, ABS, klimaanlæg, automatgear, servostyring), ligesom der var opgivet pristillæg for højrestyring samt andre oplysninger.
Prices for major options were given by the manufacturers (airbag system, ABS, air-conditioning system, automatic gearbox, power-assisted steering), togetherwith prices for the right-hand drive supplement and other information.
Tabeller vedlagt analyserne viste med udgangspunkt i et indeks, hvor 100 angav det billigste land, de procentvise forskelle for de øvrige lande.
Tables annexed to the studies showed, onthe basis of an index equal to 100 for the lowest-price country, disparities in percentage terms in relation to theother countries.
Danmark og Grækenland var ikke medtaget på grund af disse landes særlige afgiftspolitik.
Denmark and Greece were excluded in view of their particular taxation policies.
Som ved tidligere lejligheder blev analysen med tabeller fra bilfabrikanter kun offentliggjort for forbrugerorganisationer og fagpresse.
As on previousoccasions, the study including tables from car manufacturers was distributed only to consumer associations andthe specialized press.
Fra maj måned 1994 var Spanien det billigste land for de fleste mindre bilmodellers vedkommende, mens Italien var billigst, hvad angår de større bilmodeller. Frankrig og Tyskland var de dyreste lande.
In May 1994, Spain was the country where most bottom-of-the-range cars were the least expensive, while Italywas the least expensive country for most top-of-the-range cars, with France and Germany continuing to be themost expensive countries.
I forhold til prisopgørelsen fra maj måned blev den på det tidspunkt konstaterede tendens med mindre prisudligninger i det store hele bekræftet.
The November figures confirmed the general tendency, already noted in May, for pricedifferentials to narrow a little.
Hos de europæiske fabrikanter var der for 19 % af modellerne en prisforskel på over 20 % — mod henholdsvis 22,5 % i maj 1994 og 24 % i november 1993 — hvilket viser, at fabrikanterne generelt stadig forsøger at indsnævre forskellene.
Among European manufacturers, the proportion of models with a price differentialof more than 20% was 19% (22.5% in May 1994 and 24% in November 1993), illustrating the fact that manufacturers in general were still tending to reduce price differences.
Hos de japanske fabrikanter var antallet af modeller med en prisforskel på over 20 % steget fra 8 % i november 1993 og 9 % i maj 1994 til 19 % pr. 1. november 1994.
Among the Japanese manufacturers, the proportion of models with a price differential of more than 20% rose from 8% in November 1993 to 9% in May 1994and 19% on 1 November 1994.
En analyse af resultaterne efter segment bekræfter resultaterne i undersøgelsen fra 1. maj 1994, nemlig jo større modeller det drejer sig om, jo mindre er prisforskellene.
Analysis of the November results by segment confirms the results of the May survey: the higher up the productrange one goes, the smaller the price differentials become.
Det viser sig menlig, at 55 % af bilerne i »småbilsklassen«, 68 % af de »mindre familiebiler«, 78 % af bilerne i klassen »sportsvogne og fritidsbiler« samt ca. 85 % af bilerne i »mellemklassen« udviser forskelle på under 20 %.
At present, 55% of mini cars, 68% of small cars, 78%of multipurpose/sports cars and some 85% of medium and large cars have differentials of less than 20%.
Endvidere udviser 93 % af modellerne i segmentet »limousineklassebiler« og 100 % af modellerne i segmentet »luksusklassebiler« forskelle på under 20 %.
In addition, 93%of luxury models and all executive models have differentials of less than 20%.
Forskellene er således generelt blevet udlignet en smule, men denne tendens gør sig ikke gældende hos de japanske fabrikanter, hvor dobbelt så mange modeller udviste forskelle på over 20 % i
Although price differentials once again narrowed slightly overall, this trend was mitigated by the fact that, among Japanese manufacturers, the proportion of vehicles with price differentials of more than 20% doubled between May and November.
BILAG II forhold til maj måned. Valutaudsvingene i forhold til ecuen var stadig mindre, hvilket skulle gøre det muligt for alle fabrikanter at nedbringe deres priser yderligere, og de burde således støttet af markedskræfterne kunne bidrage til en endnu mere markant udligning af de omtalte forskelle.
Exchange-rate fluctuations against the ecu increasingly diminished, and this should allow allmanufacturers to reduce their prices further and, combined with market forces, contribute to an ever greaterreduction in price differentials.
Da offentliggørelsen af analyseresultaterne har været en succes, har Kommissionen ændret sin distributionspolitik, således at resultaterne fremover vil være tilgængelige i:
In view of the demand for the study, the Commission has made a number of improvements to the way it is distributed.
— i INFO-C, Europæiske Kontorer for Forbrugeroplysning i Fællesskabets medlemslande
So as to make it easier to obtain, the study will in future be available: on the RAPID data base;at iNFO-C offices (European consumer information centres) in the various Community countries;at Commission Offices in the various Member States.
Kommissionen modtog den 30. juni 1993 en klage fra Novell, en af verdens største producenter af PC-software, over Microsofts praksis i forbindelse med udstedelse af licens.
On 30 June 1993 the Commission received a complaint from Novell, one of the world's largest PC software companies, concerning the licensing practices of Microsoft.
Novell påstod, at Microsoft lukkede konkurrenter ude fra markedet for operativsystemsoftware til PC'er ved hjælp af bestemte konkurrencebegrænsende foranstaltninger.
Novell alleged that Microsoft blocked competitors out ofthe market for PC operating systems software by certain anticompetitive practices.
Det var især udformningen af Microsofts standardaftaler om udstedelse af licens for software til PC-producenter, der skulle udelukke konkurrenterne fra at sælge deres produkter. En sådan udelukkelsespraksis ville være i strid med artikel 86.
In particular, the structure of Microsoft's standard agreements for licensing software to PC manufacturers was said to exclude competitorsfrom selling their products.
Resultatet heraf blev, at Microsoft afgav et tilsagn over for Kommissionen [og en samtykkeerklæring med samme ordlyd ')].
After investigating the complaint the Commission was concerned that:
I tilsagnet forpligter Microsoft sig til fremover ikke at indgå licensaftaler af mere end et års varighed, ikke at pålægge licenshaverne minimumsforpligtelser og ikke at indgå aftaler af samme type som aftalerne om licens pr. processor.
The undertaking obtained by the Commission provides that Microsoft will not enter into licence contracts with aduration of more than one year, will not impose minimum commitments on licensees and will not use per processor type licences in future.
Det er kun tilladt at indgå aftaler om licens pr. system, hvis det tydeligt fremgår, at licenshaverne frit kan købe produkter, der ikke stammer fra Microsoft, og ikke skal betale royalty i sådanne tilfælde.
Per system licences will be allowed only if licensees are clearly given the freedom topurchase non-Microsoft products and to avoid payment of royalties in such cases.
Samtidig vil alle bestemmelser i eksisterende aftaler, der er i strid med disse bestemmelser, ikke blive håndhævet, ligesom licenshaverne kan vælge at opsige sådanne aftaler.
In addition, any provisions ofexisting licence contracts which breach these provisions will not be enforced, and licensees have an option to endsuch existing contracts.
Tilsagnet gælder i seks et halvt år.
The undertaking is for a period of six and a half years.
Microsofts konkurrenter vil kunne sælge operativsystemsoftware til alle PC-producenter, uden at sidstnævnte vil blive pålagt bøder af Microsoft.
Competitors to Microsoft will be able to sell operating systemssoftware to PC manufacturers without the latter suffering any financial penalty with respect to Microsoft.