natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne praksis var et klart brud på EF's konkurrenceregler, fordi den begrænsede priskonkurrencen mellem forhandlerne.
This practice was a clear breach of EC competition rules because it restricted price competition between dealers.
Rovers ledelse ophævede denne praksis, hvorefter den frivilligt anmeldte de nye ændringer til Det Forenede Kongeriges Office of Fair Trading og derefter til Kom missionen.
Rover's senior mänagementterminated the practice, following which theyvoluntarily notified the changes they introdu.ed to the United Kingdom's Officeof Fair Trading and subsequently to the commission.
For at afhjælpe situationen meddelte Rover sine forhandlere, at den tidligere førte rabatpolitik var ophørt. Roverkoncernen forpligtede sig endvidere til at tilbagebetale forhandlere eventuelle beløb, der var blevet tilbageholdt.
In order ro remedy thesituation Rover informed its dealers that the discounting policy previouslypursued had been abandoned.Furthermore, the Rover Group undertook toreimburse dealers any margin which had been withheld from them.
Endelig accepterede Rover, efter drøftelser med Kommissionen, at betale et beløb på 1 mio. UKL til finansiering af to projekter til fordel for forbrugere, der køber biler i Det Forenede Kongerige.
Finally, afterdiscussions with the commission, Rover agreed to contribute the sum of UKL 1 million to the funding of two projects designed to benefit consumers whopurchased motor vehicles in the united Kingdom.
Dette ændrer imidlertid ikke de enkelte forbrugeres ret til at kræve erstatning hos Rover eller enhver anden Rover-forhandler og forhindrer ikke de nationale myndigheder i Det Forenede Kongerige i at anlægge sag i henhold til den nationale lovgivning.
However, this does not affect the rights of individual consumers to claim compensation against Rover or any
Under disse omstændigheder agter Kommissionen ikke at indlede en officiel procedure i denne sag.
Under the circumstances the Commission does nor propose to initiate officialproceedings in this case.
Kommissionen sanerer distributionen af reservedele til biler fra Fiat-koncernen i ¡talien
The Commission sees to reorganization of the distribution of Fiatspdre parts in ltaly
På foranledning af en klage fra CICRA (den italienske sammenslutning af fabrikanter af reservedele og tilbehør) har Kommissionen henvendt sig til Fiat Auto for at få selskabet til at ændre sit distributionssystem for reservedele til Fiat-biler i Italien.
Acting on a complaint from Cicra, the Italian associarion of manufacrurersof spare parts and accessories, the Commission contacred Fiat Auto to lead it tomodify its system of disrributing spare parts for irs cars in Italy.
I medfør af den italienske lovgivning kan en bilfabrikant opnå et retligt monopol på karrosserireservedele, hvis han har fået dem indregistreret som industrielle mønstre. Fiat Auto har benyttet denne mulighed og var derfor alene om på lovlig vis at kunne levere visse af disse reservedele.
Under Italian law a motor manufacturer may obtain a legal monopoly overbody parts for which it seeks registrationas industrial designi.Fiat Auio availeditself of this opportunity and was therefore entitled by 1aw to the exclusivesupply- of certain parts.
Rabatterne til reservedelsforhandlere for alle Fiat produkter var nært knyttet til rabatter på reservedele under det retlige monopol.
Moreover, the discounts granted to distributors of spareparts for all Fiat products were closely bound up with the discounts offereä on spare parts covered by the monopoly.
Endelig var rabatterne afhængige af et købsloft, der var godkendt af hver enkelt for handler.
These discounts also dependedon apurchasing threshold accepted by eachdistributor. distributor.
Ved siden af bildistribulionsnettet. der var opbygget i overensstemmelse med Kom missionens forordning nr. 123/85, havde Fiat endvidere oprettet et eksklusivt distributionssystem med et net bestående af 315 specialiserede forhandlere inden for forhandling af reservedele.
Alongside its motor vehicle distribution network, organized in conformiry withcommission block exemption Regulation (EEC) No 123185, Fiat had set up asystem of exclusive distribution through a network of 315 dealers specializingin the distribution of spare parts.
145 homogent, eksklusivt og selektivt distributionssystem og havde således tabt fordelen i form af fritagelse i denne forordning, i det mindste hvad angår reservedelssektoren.
L49 to have such a homogeneous sysfemof exclusive and selective distribution andtherefore lost the benefit of the block exemption, at least as regards the spareparts sector,
Efter Kommissionens henvendelse har Fiat besluttet, at selskabet fra 1. januar 1994 ændrer sit rabatsystem, således at det er i overensstemmelse med konkurrencereglerne. Ændringen betyder bl.a., at selskabet opgiver den rabat, der beregnes for at forhindre forhandlere i at sælge til kunder uden for deres område, eliminerer det loft på 99 mio. LIT, der var obligatorisk for at opnå rabatterne, samt ophæver alle for bindelser mellem rabatter, der indrømmes for reservedele under industriel mønster ret, og rabatter for øvrige reservedele.
Following the Commission's intervention, Fiat decided to modify its system of discounts as from 1 January 1994 to bring it into line with the competition rules.In particular, it proposed to abandon the discount intended to deterdistributors distributors from selling to customers from outside their area, scrap the LIT 99 millionpurchasing threshold that distributors had to reach before they qualified fordiscounts, and abolishany link between the discounts granted on parts coveredby an industrial design right and the discounts granted on other spare parts.
Formålet med disse rabatter var at begrænse tredjemands muligheder for at få adgang til markedet for reservedele til Fiat-biler.
Theeffectof these discounts was to limit access by third parties to the market inspare parts for Fiat vehicles.
Fiat har endvidere besluttet at opgive det særlige forhandlernet inden for reservedclssalget.
Fiat also decided to abolishthe network of distributors specializing in the saleof spare parts.
Kommissionen indstillede i september 1993 den procedure, den i 1991 havde indledt over for linjekonferencen i trafikken mellem Europa og Østafrika (EAC) og dennes rederimedlemmer med hensyn til det opsigelsesvarsel, som gjaldt for udtræden.
Africa (the EAC) and member shipping companies in respect of thi length ofnotice companies wishing to leave the conference had to give.
Kommissionen havde oprindeligt taget sagen op, efter at det belgiske rederi Compagnie Maritime Beige (CMB) i juni 1989 havde klaget over. at EAC lagde hindringer i vejen for, at CMB kunne drive linjeskibsfart i denne trafik uden for konferencen.
The Commission had acted originally in response to a complaint lodged in June1989 by CompagnieMaritime Belge(CMB) against the EAC in respect of the obstacles the conference had placed in the way of CMB's introduction of anon-conference service.
Tvisten mellem parterne tog sin begyndelse, da CMB besluttede ikke længere at sejle i trafikken som konferencemedlem, men derimod som uafhængigt rederi uden for konferencen (»outsider«), og startede en ny linjefart i direkte kon kurrence med EAC's farter.
The dispute between the parties dates back to the timewhen cMB decided it was not going to serve the trade in question any longer asa member of the conference, and offered a new liner service competing directlywith that provided by the EAC.
EAC anlagde derefter flere retssager saml en voldgiftssag for al forhindre CMB i al påbegynde sejladsen inden den 31. december 1990, som var den dato. hvor CMB's opsigelse efter EAC's opfattelse trådte i kraft og løste CMB fra de forskellige for pligtelser og geografiske begrænsninger, der fulgte af konferenceaftalen.
The EAC thereuponwent to court and also referred the matter to arbitration inan attempt to prevent the service from being introduced before 31 December1990,the date on which it considered that the notice given by CMB could havethe effect of rele asing that company from rhe various obligations and geographicalrestrictions contained in the conference agreement.
CMB gjorde gældende, at konferenceaftalens bestemmelser om opsigelsesvarsel ikke faldt ind under gruppefritagelsen for linjekonferencer1). I konferenceaftalen var der fastsat et opsigelsesvarsel på mindst 12 måneder, og aftalen kunne kun opsiges til kalenderårets udgang.
CMB argued that the clause in the agreement relating to rhe length of notice tobe given in order to leave the conference was not covered by the block exemptiongrantedto liner conferences.lThe clause provided for a minimum period ofnotice of 12 months, such notice to expire only at the end of a calendaiyear. year.
Kommissionen fastslog, at de gældende opsigelsesregler i et tidsrum på op til lo år minus en dag ville kunne forhindre et medlemsrcderi i al træde ud af konferencen for derefter at sejle i trafikken som outsider.
The commission found that the currenr arrangements for giving notice couldrestrict, for a period of up to two years less one day, the freedom of a member shipping company wishing ro leave the conference in order ro offer anon-conference service as an outsider.
Kommissionen anerkender, at et opsigelsesvarsel er en naturlig bestemmelse i en konferenceaftale, for eftersom konferencerne bl.a. foretager en vis samordning al' fartplaner og kapacitet, vil et medlems udtræden kunne skabe forstyrrelser i trafik ken.
It acknowledged that the requirement of the giving of notice to leave a conferencewas a normal contractualprovision: conferences involved a certain amount ofcoordination of schedules and capacity, and the withdrawal of one of themembers could cause disruption.
Men Kommissionen anførte, at opsigelsesvarslet i den konkrete sag var urimeligt langt og udgjorde en konkurrencebegrænsning, som ikke opfyldte betingelserne
It found, however, that in the present case the
147 hverken for gruppefritagelse for linjekonferencer, eller for en individuel fritagelse, og at opsigelsesreglerne derfor i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 85, stk. 2, var ugyldige og ikke havde nogen retsvirkning.
As the provision in questiondid not satisfy the conditions necessary for it to benefit from the block exemptiongrantedto liner conferences or from an individual exemption, it was thereforeautomaticallyvoid under Article 85(2) of the EC Treaty.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er der en nær sammenhæng mellem opsigelsesregler i konfcrenceaftaler og eksistensen af en effektiv konkurrence uden for konferencen, dvs. fra outsider-rederier, der udgør den vigtigste modvægt for gruppe fritagelsen for linjekonferencer. Kommissionen ser det ikke alene som sin opgave at sikre, at konkurrencebegrænsende praksis fra de gruppefritagne konferencers side ikke lægger hindringer i vejen for de eksisterende outsiderrederiers aktiviteter.
In the Commission's view,thenotice-giving clausesinconferenceagreements are closely linked to effective non-conference competition fromoutsider companies, which constitutes the main counterweight to the blockexemption granted to liner conferences.
Generelt mener Kommissionen, at opsigelsesvarslet for et medlems udtræden af en konference uden sanktioner som hovedregel ikke bør være på mere end seks måneder og bør kunne gives til enhver tid, og at opsigelsesvarslet endda i visse tilfælde bør være kortere.
The Commission considers that the maximum period of notice required of amember before it can leave a conference without incurring any penalty shouldnot as a rule exceed six months and in some cases might even be shorter, andthat it should be possible for such notice to be given at any time.
Efter at EAC ændrede konferenceaftalen i den af Kommissionen ønskede retning, besluttede Kommissionen at henlægge sagen uden formel beslutning.
The EAC having amended its conference agreement as requested by the Commission, the Commission decided to terminate the proceedings withoutadopting a formal decision.
Stort set alle de rederier, der sejler i trafikken mellem Europa og USA, er med i TAA, hvis formål er at fastfryse kapaciteten i denne trafik.
Almost all shipping lines in the Europe/US trade are parties to thisagreement, which has the objective of freezing capacity on that trade.
Ifølge TAA-rcdcrierne har trafikken i de seneste to år været præget af overkapacitet og store tab for de fleste medlemsrederier.
Accordingto these lines, the trade has suffered during the last two years from overcapacityand heavylossesfor most members.
Den giver medlemsrederierne mulig hed for at fastsætte fælles priser, ikke blot på den del af transporten, der foregår til søs, men også på landtransport i tilknytning til søtransport.
The agreement entered into force on 31 August 7992.It allows the members ofthe TAA to fix prices in common in relation not only to the sea transportsegrnent but also to the land-basedsegment.
Desuden er der i aftalen indført et kapacitetsstyringsprogram, hvorefter den kapacitet, medlemsrederierne hidtil havde udbudt til afskiberne, reduceres med 25%, ved at rederierne undlader at udnytte en del af skibenes disponible kapacitet. Programmet gælder kun for den vestgående trafik, dvs. primært for EF's eksport til USA.
In addition, the TAA established amanagemenr programme for the capacity offered by members which enablesthem to reduce by up to 25o/o the amount of capacity previously offered toshippers by the non-utilization of some of the space available on their vessels.The programme extends only to westboundtraffic and therefore mainly covers Community exports to the United States.
Kommissionen har modtaget adskillige klager fra afskibere (transportbrugere) over denne aftale.
The Commission has received numerous complaints from shippers (transportusers) regarding this agreement.
Den 14. april 1993 sendte Kommissionen TAA-rederierne en meddelelse af klagepunkter i sagen, hvori den anførte, at den havde til hensigt at nedlægge forbud mod aftalen, fordi den umiddelbart antoges at være i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 85 og 86.
On 10 December, the Commission sent to the TAA's members a statement ofobjections on the substance of the case. This statement of objections is based onpresumed infringements of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty and envisages a prohibition of the agreemenr.
Kommissionen modtog en begæring om individuel fritagelse efter artikel 12 i forordning nr. 4056/86 for de såkaldte »Irish Club Rules«, som er en diskussionsaftale indgået mellem seks europæiske rederier, der på verdensplan må belegnes som værende små og mellemstore rederier, og som driver linjefart mellem det vesteuropæiske kontinent og Irland/Nordirland.
The Commission received a request for individual exemption underArticle 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 for an agreemenr known as the Irish Club Rules concluded by six small and medium-sized shipping companiesproviding liner services for the carriage of cargo between the Continent,on theone hand, and Ireland and Northern lreland, on the other.
Ifølge parterne selv udgør aftalen hverken nogen konferenceaftale eller noget konsortium.
According ro rheparties, the agreement was neither a conference nor a consortium agreement.
Som led i indsigelsesproceduren offentliggjorde Kommissionen i juni 1991, jf. arti kel 12, stk. 2, i forordning nr. 4056/86 og nr. 1017/68, en meddelelse, hvori den opsummerede aftalens og begæringens indhold.
As part of the scrutiny procedure, rhe Commission published in June 1991,pursuant to Article 12(2)of Regulations (EEC) Nos 4056/86 and 7017/68,a a ttotice summarizing the essential content of the agreement and of the request forexemption.
Efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse, hvorefter der indkom en lang række bemærkninger fra interesserede tredjeparter, der gik imod en individuel fritagelse af aftalen i dens nuværende form, gav Kommissionen i september 1991, jf. artikel 12. stk. 3, parterne skriftlig meddelelse om, at den nærede alvorlige betænkeligheder over Irish Club Rules, bl.a. fordi aftalen også omfattede den del af Iransporten, der foregår til lands.
Following publication of the notice and the receipt of numerous comments frominterested third partiesvoicing their opposition to the granting of an individualexemption to the agreement as it stood,in September 1,99L the Commission sent,in accordance with Article 1,2(3), a letter to the shipping companies concernedexpressing serious doubts as to rhe applicability of Article 85(3) of the EC Treatyto the Rules.Its main objection wasthat the Rules'scopeincludedtheland-basedsegment of the transport service.
Under de efterfølgende drøftelser med parterne underrettede Kommissionen dem desuden om, at Irish Club Rules ikke kunne fritages på basis af den stabiliseringsmålsætning, som ved forordning nr. 4056/86 er blevet anerkendt som værende tilstrækkelig alene for linjekonferencer, eftersom Irish Club Rules ikke ville have den stabiliserende funktion i den omhandlede trafik, der omtales i forordningens ottende betragtning, og som hovedsagelig beror på et samarbejde mellem rederier om fragtrater, udmøntet i en fælles tarif, hvilket der ikke var tale om i den konkrete sag.
During subsequent talks between it and the parties, the Commission pointedout that the Rules could not be exempted on the strength of any stabilizing effect they might have, as this was acknowledged by Regulation 4056/86 as being asufficient ground only in the case of liner conferences(eighth recital of the
Efter disse ændringer udsendte Kommissionen, jf. artikel 23. stk. 3. i forordning nr. 4056/86 en meddelelse1), hvori den bebudede, at den havde til hensigt at træffe en positiv beslutning i sagen.
Regulation); such an effect was produced primarily by cooperation berween
KOMMISSIONENS VIGTIGSTE BESLUTNINGER OG FORANSTALTNINGER
153 shipping companies on freight rates leading to the adoption of a common tariff,a featurelackinghere. here.
149 bevæggrunde for, at Kommissionen fandt det muligt at indrømme individuel fritagelse for aftalen.
The notice contained a summary of the serious doubtsraised, of the amendments made to the agreement and of the main reasons whythe Commission considered it could grant the Rules an individual exemption.
I betragtning af at Kommissionen ikke efter denne anden meddelelse fik forelagt nogen nye elementer, der kunne få den til at ændre sin vurdering, henlagde den sagen.
Since no new factor capable of modifying the Commission's assessment wasbrought to its attention following publication of the second notice, the Commissionclosedthe file on the case.
Parterne fik ved en administrativ skrivelse underretning om, at sagen var blevet henlagt efter artikel 85, stk. 3.
An Article 85(3) comfort letter was accordingly sent ro rheparries. parries.
b) Havneydelser
(b) Port services
Sea Containers klagede i april 1993 til Kommissionen over, at selskabet af Stena Sealink var blevet nægtet adgang til at benytte havnen i Holyhead til at påbegynde en hurtigtgående færgeoverfart, fordi Stena Sealink ønskede at beskytte sin egen færgeoverfart mod konkurrence.
Sea Containers complained to the Commission in April that Stena Sealink wasrefusing to grant it access to theporr of Holyheadfor rhe purpose of commencing a high-speed ferry service, thereby protecing irs own ferry service fromcompetition.
Sea Containers anmodede Kommissionen om at træffe foreløbige forholdsregler over for Stena Sealink med pålæg om at give Sea Containers adgang til havnen.
Sea Containers asked the Commission to adopt interim measures against Stena Sealink obliging it to grant access to rhe port.
I juli 1993 sendte Kommissionen Stena Sealink en meddelelse af klagepunkter, hvori den anførte, at den fandt, at Sealink misbrugte sin dominerende stilling som havneejer og havnemyndighed i strid med EF's konkurrenceregler, særlig EF-traktatens artikel 86.
In July, the Commission issued a statementof objectionsto Stena Sealinkin which it said that it consideredthat Sealink'sbehaviourconstitutedan abuse of its dominantposition as owner and operator of the port, contrary to Community competitionrules,in particular Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
Kommissionen bebudede, at den agtede at træffe foreløbige foranstaltninger i form af et påbud til Stena Sealink om at give Sea Containers adgang til havnen.
The Commission indicated thatit intended to order interim measures against Stena Sealink obliging it to grant accessto Holyheadto SeaContainers. Containers.
KONKURRENCEREGLER FOR VIRKSOMHEDERNE at Sea Containers ikke via foreløbige forholdsregler havde ret til mere. end hvad Sealink havde tilbudt.
Irr its decision the Commission said that Sea Containers was not entitled,by way of interim measures, to more than Sealink had offered.
Kommissionen slog imidlertid fast. at den umiddelbart fandt, at Sealink havde misbrugt sin dominerende stilling i havnen i Holyhead.
However, it made clear that it considered that Sealink had prima facie abused its dominantposition at the port of Holyhead.
For en virk somhed, som både ejer og selv benytter en væsentlig infrastruktur som en havn. og som nægter sine konkurrenter adgang til denne infrastruktur eller kun giver dem adgang på vilkår, der er mindre fordelagtige end dem. der gælder for dens egen brug af den, handler efter Kommissionens opfattelse i strid med traktatens artikel 86. hvis der kan konstateres en påvirkning af samhandelen mellem medlemsstater.
In its view, a company which both owns and uses an essential facility such as a port, and which refuses its competitors accessto that facility, or grants access only on terms less favourable than those it givesits own services, infringes Article 86 of the EC Treaty if there is an effect on trade between Member States.
Kommissionen mener, at når en virksomhed befinder sig i en situation svarende til Sealinks i den konkrete sag. kan den normalt ikke regne med, at den på tilfredsstillende vis kan opfylde sin forpligtelse til at give andre adgang på ikke-diskriminerende vilkår og løse problemer med interessekonflikter, medmindre den tager skridt til at tilvejebringe en adskillelse mellem driften af den væsentlige infrastruktur og brugen af den.
The Commissionbelievesthat, when a companyis in a position such as that of Sealink in this case, it cannot normally expect to fulfil satisfactorily its duty toprovide nondiscriminatory access and to resolveits conflicts of interest unlessit takes steps to separate its management of the essential facility from its use ofit.
Dette kunne f.eks. ske ved at sikre, at de samme ansatte ikke står for både driften af havnen og driften af færgeoverfarten, ved at indføre ikke-diskriminerende forretningsprincipper, ved at indføre en procedure for høring af andre havnebrugere og ved at fastlægge regler om uafhængig voldgift i tilfælde af tvister.
This could involve, for example, having different employees responsible forthe management of the port than for the management of the ferry service, theestablishment of a nondiscriminatory code of practice, a consultafion procedureinvolving other port users,and arrangements for independent arbitration in theevent of disputes.
Beslutning om takststrukturer inden for kombineret godstransport
Decision on tariff structures in the combined transport of goods
Inden for kombineret godstransport (dvs. transporter med brug af liere transportmåder, f.eks. jernbane og skib) sælger jernbaneselskaberne kun rent undtagelsesvis selv deres transportydelser direkte til transportbrugerne. Kombinerede transportydelser sælges normalt via specialiserede transportvirksomheder — kombiselskaber — der enten kan være uafhængige af jernbanerne eller datterselskaber af disse.
Railway companies only exceptionally sell combined transport services (i.e. services involving more than one means of transport such as, forinstance,rail and seatransport)direct to consignors.Inthe vast majority ofcasessuch,transport servicesare soldthrough specializedoperators, which maybe either subsidiariesof railwaycompaniesor independenftirms.
KOMMISSIONENS VIGTIGSTE BESLUTNINGER OG FORANSTALTNINGER
The agreement establishes a tariff price structure for the sale of rail haulage tothese operators.