natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det er et af de mest veletablerede princip per i EU's konkurrencelovgivning, at det er for budt at opsplitte det indre marked gennem private aftaler og at opretholde prisforskelle ved hjælp af konkurrencebegrænsende klausulerom total territorial beskyttelse.
It is one of the most well-established principles of Community competition law that producers are forbidden to divide the internal market by private agreements and to maintain price differences by arranging anticompetitive absolute territorial protection.
Adfærd af denne art fortsætter imidlertid med at optræde på markedet, men når den kommer frem i lyset, kan der forventes strenge sanktioner fra Kommissionens side.
However, such behaviour continues to occur on the market and, where it comes to light, one can expect severe action by the Commission.
Priserne på lægemidler varierer betydeligt medlemsstaterne imellem.
Prices for pharmaceutical products differ significantly between Member States.
Det forklares normalt med forskelle mellem medlemsstaternes nationale priskontrolsystemer og sygesikringsordninger.
This is usually explained by the differences in national price control and health care systems.
Ved flere lejligheder har Domstolen fastslået, at der ikke må blokeres for parallelimport af lægemidler, uanset hvilke faktorer der er skyld i prisforskelle.
On several occasions, the Court of Justice has ruled that parallel imports should not be blocked, irrespective of the factors that determine price differences.
Inden for lægemiddelsektoren har Kommissionen derfor altid anvendt konkurrencereglerne på aftaler og adfærdsmønstre, der begrænser den parallelle handel med lægemidler.
Hence, in the pharmaceutical sector, the Commission has consistently applied the competition rules to agreements or conduct which restrict parallel trade in drugs.
Det er opfattelsen, at markedskræfternes frie spil på denne måde vil kunne fungere som katalysator for en gradvis indbyrdes tilnærmelse af ikke blot priser, men også pris kontrolsystemer.
It is believed that the unrestricted operation of market forces in this way is likely to act as a catalyst for the gradual convergence not only of prices but also of price control mechanisms.
Priserne i de dyre lande skulle således falde, mens priserne i de billige lande i sidste ende må forventes at stige som reaktion på en reel trussel fra lægemiddelproducenterne om tilbagetrækning af produkter, hvis de ikke får sikkerhed for et rimeligt afkast af deres investeringer.
Prices in the high-cost countries should fall, while those in the low-price countries should, if they fail to offer pharmaceutical companies a reasonable return on investment, ultimately increase in reaction to the real threat of product withdrawal.
Nogle medlemsstater med høje priser på lægemidler stimulerer sågar parallelimporten for at reducere landets samlede medicinudgifter.
Some Member States with high drug prices even stimulate parallel imports in order to bring about a reduction in their country's overall drug bill.
Organon er et britisk datterselskab af Akzo (Nederlandene), som er specialiseret i fremstilling og markedsføring af p-piller.
Organon is a British subsidiary of Akzo (Netherlands) which specializes in the manufacture and marketing of contraceptive pills.
:) »Virkningen af valutakurssvingninger på det indre marked«. Med delelse fra Kommissionen til Det Europæiske Råd, den 31.10.1995. punkt 25.
On 4 May 1994, Organon changed the price regime applicable to its contraceptive pills Mercilon and Marvelon, the latter holding substantial market shares throughout the Community.
I en beslutning af 12. juli 19955) pålagde Kommissionen den tyske producent af autoreparationslak BASF Lacke + Farben (et datterselskab af BASF-koncernen), en bøde på 2,7 mio. ECU, mens BASF's eneforhandler i Belgien og Luxembourg, Accinauto S.A., blev pålagt en bøde på 10 000 ECU. Sagen udsprang af en klage fra to engelske parallelimportører af Gla-surit-produkter.
In a decision of 12 July 1995,4the Com mission imposed a fine of ECU 2.7 million on the German car refinish paint producer BASF Lacke + Farben, a subsidiary of the BASF group, and a fine of ECU 10 000 on BASF's exclusive distributor in Belgium and Luxembourg, Accinauto S.A. The case originated with a complaint by two English parallel importers of Glasurit car refinish paint products.
De hævdede, at Accinauto, hos hvem de købte Glasurit-produkterne, havde standset leverancerne til dem i sommeren 1990 efter ordre fra BASF.
They alleged that Accinauto, from whom they bought the Glasurit products, had ceased deliveries to them in the summer of 1990 on the instructions of BASF.
Kommissionen gennem førte kontrolundersøgelser hos BASF og Accin
The Commission carried out investigations on the premises of BASF and Accinauto and found out that Accinauto was bound by a contractual obligation to transfer to BASF all orders from customers from outside its exclu
I — KARTELLER OG MONOPOLER: ARTIKEL 85 OG 86 ked for at tage konkurrencen op med de eksiste­rende markedsdeltagere.
I — ANTI-TRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86
Indtil da ydede Orga­non en rabat på 12,5% på alle produkter leveret til sine kunder, uanset produkternes slutdestina­tion.
Before that date, Organon applied a discount of 12.5% on all products supplied to its customers, irrespective of their final destination.
Det nye prisfastsættelsessystem differen­tierede mellem piller til afsætning i Det Forene­de Kongerige og piller beregnet til eksport.
The new price regime differentiated between those pills to be sold in the UK and those intended for export.
Kun på førstnævnte blev der nu givet en rabat på 12,5%.
Only the former qualified for the 12.5% discount rate.
Nye konkurrenter kan hindres i at trænge ind på et marked ved hjælp af vertikale aftaler mellem eksisterende leverandører og deres for­handlere.
New competitors can be prevented from entering the market by vertical arrangements between existing suppliers and distributors.
Dette er især tilfældet, når et stort antal forhandlere på markedet er bundet af en forpligtelse til kun at sælge varer fra den produ­cent, med hvilken de har indgået en kontrakt eller en anden ordning, der har en udelukkelse­seffekt for tredjeparter.
This is in particular the case where a large num­ber of retailers on the market are tied by an obligation to sell only the products of the manu­facturer with which they have a contract or arrangements having a similar exclusionary effect on third parties.
Sagerne vedrørende markedet for impuls­is (Unilever/Mars) er eksempler herpå.
The cases concerning the impulse ice cream market (Unilever/Mars) are examples of such arrangements.
I andre sager formenes tredjeparter adgang til markedet på grund af en horisontal aftale eller samordnet praksis mellem reelle eller potentiel­le konkurrenter. Det skete på det nederlandske kranudlejningsmarked (Van Marwijk/FNK­SCK).
In other cases, access by third parties to the market is impeded through a horizontal agree­ment or concerted practice between actual or potential competitors.
Efter at have modtaget adskillige klager og en anmeldelse fra Organon af det nye prisfastsæt­telsessystem indledte Kommissionen en proce­dure over for Organon og udsendte en klage­punktsmeddelelse med henblik på at ophæve den bødeimmunitet, der fulgte af anmeldelsen.
Following several complaints and Organon's notification of the new pricing system, the Commission initiated proceedings against Organon and issued a statement of objections aimed at withdrawing the immunity from fines brought about by notification.
I Kommissionens øjne udgjorde det nye prisfast­sættelsessystem ­ der er en del af de løbende forretningsforbindelser mellem Organon og Organons grossister og derfor en aftale som omhandlet i artikel 85, stk. 1') ­ en alvorlig overtrædelse af konkurrencereglerne, da syste­met medførte en prismæssig forskelsbehandling mellem produkterne alt efter deres geografiske bestemmelsessted.
For the Commis­sion, the new price regime, which forms part of continuous business relations between Organon and its wholesalers and therefore constitutes an agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1),' constituted a serious infringement of the com­petition rules in that it gave rise to discrimina­tion in the prices of the products according to their geographical destination.
Resultatet heraf var, at kun­derne ikke længere kunne nyde godt af den pa­rallelle handel.
As a result, con­sumers could no longer enjoy the benefits of parallel trade.
Især i Nederlandene, hvor Mar­velon­pillen af nederlandsk oprindelse ikke refunderes 100% af sygesikringen, men hvor prisen på den britisk producerede pille af sam­me mærke svarer til den pris, som den neder­landske sygesikring refunderer, mistede forbru­gerne fordelen af at kunne vælge den britiske Marvelon­pille, som sparede dem for et beløb, der lå ud over refunderingsloftet.
In the Netherlands in particular, where the Marvelon pill of Dutch origin is not fully reimbursed by the social security scheme, whereas the price of the British pill allows it to be offered at a price equal to the Dutch social security reimbursement level, consumers were no longer able to opt for the UK­produced Mar­velon and thus to benefit from not having to pay an amount over and above the reimbursement price.
Adgangen til markedet kan også blokeres af et monopolmisbrug eller en dominerende udby­ders misbrug af essentielle faciliteter eller tjene­ster.
Access to the market can also be blocked through abuse by a monopoly or dominant provider of essential facilities or services.
Dette er et stadig større problem inden for forskellige sektorer.
This is a problem of increasing importance in various sectors.
Når en dominerende virksomhed ejer eller kontrollerer en facilitet, som konkurrenterne har behov for adgang til for at kunne udøve deres virksomhed, må den dominerende virksomhed ikke nægte dem adgang hertil, og den skal give dem adgang her­til på et ikke­diskriminerende grundlag.
Where a dominant company owns or controls a facility access to which is essential to enable its competitors to carry on business, it may not deny them access and it must grant access on a non­discriminatory basis.
Hvad enten der er tale om transportsektoren, navnlig lufttransportsektoren, banksektoren eller tele­kommunikationssektoren, håndhæver Kommis­sionen dette generelle princip i EU's konkurren­celovgivning for at fremme udviklingen af ny konkurrence2).
Be it in the transport sector, in particular air transport, in banking or in the telecommunications sector, the Commission applies this general principle of EU competition law2in order to foster new competition.
Sagen vedrørende adgang til den franske havn Roscoff (ICG/CCI Morlaix) rejser samme problemstilling.
The case concerning access to the port of Roscoff in France (ICG/CC1 Morlaix) raises the same issue.
Organon besluttede at opgive det nye prisfast­sættelsessystem, som Kommissionen havde gjort indsigelse imod, og genindførte de tidlige­re prisvilkår.
Organon, however, decided to abandon the new pricing regime, which the Commission had opposed, and reintroduced the previous price conditions.
Med status quo ante genetableret afsluttede Kommissionen sin procedure, men forbeholdt sig ret til at gennemgå det nye pris­fastsættelsessystem, som Organon har planer om at indføre.
The status quo having been restored, the Commission suspended its pro­ceedings and reserved the right to examine the forthcoming pricing system which Organon intends to bring in.
Et virkeligt konkurrencepræget indre mar­ked kræver også, at der ikke lægges hindringer i vejen for nye virksomheders adgang til et mar­
A truly competitive internal market also implies that companies are free to enter the mar­ket to compete with existing market players.
:) Dette generelle princip har fundet støtte i Domstolens dom af 6. april 1995 i sagerne C­241/91 Ρ og C­242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireaan (RTE) og Independant Television Publications Ltd mod Kommissionen (Magill), sml. 1995, s. 1­743.
The Commission is therefore particularly keen to keep open markets and has in fact intervened where companies, be it through restrictive agreements or by unilateral action, have im­peded access to the market by new entrants.
Unilever stillede fryseskabe til rådighed for forhandlerne på den betingelse, at kun Unilevers produkter blev opbevaret i fryseskabene (»fryser-eksklusivitet«).
in providing freezer cabinets to retailers subject to a condition of exclusivity whereby only Unilever products could be stored in the cabinets ('freezer exclusivity').
Desuden var omkostningerne forbundet med tilrådighedsstillelse af fryseskabe indregnet i den pris, som alle Unilevers forhandlere skulle betale for Unilevers is, uanset om de rådede over et Unilever-fryseskab eller ej.
Moreover, the cost of cabinet provision was included in the price of the ice cream charged to all retailers, irrespective of whether they had a Unilever freezer cabinet.
Foruden FNK's vejledende priser for udlejning af kraner og de samordnede priser, der blev anvendt mellem medlemmerne af FNK, angreb Kommissionen forbuddet mod, at SCK-certifi-katindehavere lejede kraner hos virksomheder, der ikke var tilsluttet SCK.
Apart from FNK's recommended prices for the hiring­out of cranes and the concerted prices applied between members of FNK, the Com­mission attacked the ban on SCK certificate­holders hiring cranes from firms not affiliated to SCK.
Kommissionen men te, at SCK-forbuddet var i strid med artikel 85, stk. 1, eftersom SCK's certificeringssystem ikke opfyldte kriterierne om åbenhed og anerkendelse af andre systemers tilsvarende garantier.
It considered that the SCK hiring ban was caught by the prohibition of Article 85(1) as the SCK certification system did not fulfil the con­ditions of openness and acceptance of other equivalent quality guarantee systems.
Kommissionen konkluderede, at forbuddet ikke blot begrænsede SCK-medlemmernes handle frihed, men også i høj grad var til hinder for tredjeparters adgang til det nederlandske marked. ked.
It con­cluded that the ban not only restricted the free­dom of action of the affiliated firms but also considerably impeded access by third parties to the Dutch market.
I sin beslutning tilkendegav Kommissionen, at skønt dens certificeringspolitik giver plads for privatretlige certificeringssystemer, der indebærer en supplerende kontrol med overholdelsen af lovfæstede forskrifter, ændrer dette ikke ved det forhold, at sådanne systemer skal overholde konkurrencereglerne.
In its decision, the Commission indicated that, while its policy on certification allows scope for private­law certification systems designed to provide supplementary monitoring of com­pliance with statutory provisions, such systems should be in accordance with the competition rules.
Efter at have modtaget en klage fra Mars foretog Kommissionen en undersøgelse af Unilevers forhandleraftaler i Irland.
On a complaint from Mars, the Commission examined the distribution arrangements operat­ed by Unilever in Ireland.
Kommissionen fandt frem til, at hvis en forhandler kun havde Unilever-fryseskabe på sit salgssted, var salgsstedet sædvanligvis forbeholdt ene og alene salg af Unilever-is; hovedparten af alle is-salgssteder i Irland faldt inden for denne kategori.
It found that, where a retailer has only one or more Unilever freezer cabinets in his outlet, that outlet is in practice tied exclusively to the sale of Unilever ice cream as a result; the majority of all outlets offering impulse ice cream in Ireland fall into this category.
Kom missionen tog allerede i 1992 afstand fra denne salgsstedseksklusivitet i en sag vedrørende det tyske marked for impuls-is').
Such outlet exclusivity has already been condemned by the Commission in 1992 with regard to the German impulse ice cream market.'
Unilever-aftalernes kumulative effekt indebar en betragtelig begrænsning af konkurrencen ved at hindre andre konkurrenter adgang til det pågældende marked.
The Unilever agreements had the cumulative effect of appreciably restricting competition by preventing third competitors' access to the market.
Kommissionen fandt også, at aftalerne var udtryk for et misbrug af Unilevers dominerende stilling på markedet.
The arrangements were also found to be an abuse of Unilever's domi­nant position on the market.
Unilever accepterede imidlertid at ændre sin praksis med henblik på at åbne markedet op, navnlig ved at give de detailhandlende flere valgmuligheder.
Unilever, however, agreed to alter its practices with the aim of freeing up the market, in partic­ular by giving wider choice to retailers.
Kommissionen har efterfølgende udtalt, at de nye aftaler synes at opfylde betingelserne for indrømmelse af en fritagelse2).
The Commission has accordingly announced that the new arrangements appear to meet the condi­tions for the granting of an exemption.2
I sin beslutning af 29. november 19955) pålagde Kommissionen FNK og SCK bøder4)
In its decision of 29 November 1995,' the Commission imposed fines4on FNK and SCK
') I 1992 vedtog Kommissionen en negativ beslutning mod Langnese (Unilever) og Schöller, der indtager en duopolistisk stilling på det tyske marked for impuls-is.
In 1992, the Commission took a negative decision against I..mu­ñese (Unilever) and Schöller, who are in a duopolistic position on the German impulse ice cream market.
I den pågældende sag skred Kom missionen ind over for de aftaler om salgsstedseksklusivitet, ifølge hvilke de detailhandlende er forpligtet til kun at sælge is fra den producent, med hvem han har indgået en aftale.
In that case, the Com­mission acted against 'sales outlet exclusivity' arrangements under which a retailer undertakes to sell only the products of the manufacturer with whom he has a contract.
Kommissionen besluttede, at den kumulative effekt af de pågældende aftaler inde bar en betragtelig begrænsning af konkurrencen fra Langneses og Schöllers side.
The Commission decided that the cumulative effect of the agreements in question amounted to an appreciable restriction of competition by Lang­nese and Schöller.
Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG mod Kommissionen (sml. 1995, s. 11-1611). for overtrædelse af artikel 85, stk. 1, på det nederlandske kranudlejningsmarked.
This finding was appealed against by the par­ties but was upheld by the Court of First Instance in its judg­ments of 8 June 1995 in Case T­7/93 Langnese­lglo GmbH ν Commission ¡19951 ECR 11­1533 and in Case T­9/93 Scholier Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG ν Commission [19951 ECR II­1611. 20
') Muligheden for bødefritagelse som følge af anmeldelserne fra FNK og SCK i begyndelsen af 1992 blev trukket tilbage med hen visning til artikel 15, stk. 6. i forordning nr. 17 i Kommissionens beslutning af 13. april 1994 (EFTL 117 af 7.5.1994).
The immunity from fines resulting from the notifications by FNK and SCK in early 1992 was withdrawn under Article 15(6) of Regulation No 17 by Commission Decision of 13 April 1994 (OJL 117,7.5.1994).
Det er nødvendigt, at følgerne af denne udvikling afspejles i konkurrencepolitikken for ikke at kvæle den innovative og hastige udvikling på distributionsfronten.
ICG had complained to the Commission and further negotiations had taken place.
Undersøgelsen vil tage form af en grønbog, hvori der vil blive redegjort for de forskellige alternativer for den fremtidige politik.
The review will take the form of a Green Paper which will set out different alternatives for future policy.
Efter planen vil grønbogen i løbet af det næste års tid blive sendt ud til en bred og grundig høring blandt alle de berørte politiske og socioøkonomiske aktører - Europa-Parlamentet, medlemsstaterne, producenter, forhandlere, forbrugere osv.
The intention is to submit this option paper next year to a wide and indepth public consultation of all interested political and socio-economic partners (the European Parliament, Member States, producers, distributors and consumers).
Grænseoverskridende pengeoverførsler førsler
Cross-border credit transfers
Desuden fandt den, at CCI Morlaix - ved uberettiget at nægte ICG adgang til havnefaciliteterne i Roscoff - havde misbrugt denne dominerende stilling.
It also found that, by its unjustified refusal to give ICG access to the port facilities of Roscoff, CCI Morlaix had prima facie abused its dominant position.
Kommissionen beordrede derfor den 16. maj 1995 en række foreløbige foran staltninger for at forpligte CCI Morlaix til at tage de nødvendige skridt til at give ICG adgang til havnen i Roscoff indtil sommersæsonens afslutning.
The Commission could therefore order interim measures on 16 May 1995 obliging CCI Morlaix to take the necessary steps to allow ICG access to the port of Roscoff until the end of the summer season.
Banksektoren er stadig ikke kendetegnet ved et ordentligt fungerende indre marked.
The banking sector is still not characterized by a properly functioning internal market.
Gebyrerne på finansielle transaktioner er en vigtig omkostningsfaktor for virksomhederne, og de kan udgøre en alvorlig hindring for det indre markeds problemløse virke.
Pay ments for financial transactions are an important cost factor for companies and may act as a significant impediment to the smooth operation of the internal market.
Efter at Kommissionen var skredet ind, lykkedes det parterne at indgå en femårig kontrakt om ICG's benyttelse af havnefaciliteterne i Roscoff. Dette var ikke blot til parternes gensidige fordel, men især til fordel for de rejsende, som dermed har fået flere transportmuligheder at vælge imellem i Roscoff-området.
After the Commission's intervention, the parties concluded a five-year contract for the use of the Roscoff port facilities by ICG; this was not only to their mutual benefit but, more importantly, to the benefit of travellers, who now have a wider choice of transport services and activities in the Roscoff area.
I september vedtog Kommissionen en med delelse om anvendelsen af konkurrencereglerne på grænseoverskridende pengeoverførsler1).
In September, the Commission adopted a notice on the application of the EC competition rules to cross-border credit transfers.'
Grønbog om vertikale konkurrence begrænsninger
Green Paper on vertical restraints
Denne meddelelse indgår i en samling af foran staltninger truffet af Kommissionen - herunder et forslag til direktiv - med det formål at forbedre bankernes grænseoverskridende pengeoverførselssystemer2).
The notice is part of a package of measures adopted by the Commission, including a proposal for a directive, with a view to improving the cross-border credit transfer services offered by banks.2
Disse systemer anvendes af bankerne til overførsel af penge på deres kun ders vegne mellem forskellige EU-lande.
These systems are used by banks to transfer money on behalf of customers between differ ent countries in the Union.
Meddelelsen ajourfører og erstatter konkur renceprincipperne fra 1992.
The notice updates and replaces competition principles published in 1992.
Det hedder i med delelsen, at Kommissionen generelt vil se med
This cooperation should not, however, go so far as to eliminate competition between banks.
KOM(94) 436 af 19. oktober 1994. EU-Bull. 9-1995, punkt 1.3.12.
Commission communication 'EU funds transfers: transparency, performance and stability', COM(94) 436, 19 October 1994; Bull.
Skønt konkurrencepolitikken vis-a-vis vertikale begrænsninger hidtil har tjent EU vel, er det på tide at undersøge, om EU's politik på dette område vil kunne leve op til distributions sektorens og forbrugernes behov i fremtiden.
Moreover, the main block exemptions in the field of vertical restraints come up for renewal soon: exclusive selling and buying in 1997 and
Meddelelsen belyser to emner af særlig betydning, nemlig markedsadgang og priskonkurrence. kurrence.
The notice addresses two issues of particular importance: market entry and price competition. tion.
Kommissionen har fortsat sin jagt på hemmelige karteller, der i fællesskab fastsætter priser og opdeler markeder, og som bliver ved med at dukke op inden for større industrisektorer.
The Commission continued its active pursuit of secret cartels, involving price fixing or market sharing, which still appear to exist in major industries.