natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Bestemmelserne i artikel 3, litra d), indrømmer udelukkende fritagelse for kapacitetsreguleringsaftaler, der går ud på midlertidige tilpasninger af den fysisk disponible kapacitet, f.eks. ved at trække skibe ud af trafikken eller reducere antallet af afgange for at imødegå en sæsonbetonet nedgang i efterspørgslen.
Article 3(d) provides only for the exemption of capacity regulation agreements consisting oftemporary adjustments in the capacity physically available, such as the withdrawal of ships or reduced frequency of sailings or calls in order to meet a seasonal fall in demand. The Article does not grant exemptionfor capacity non-utilization agreements such as the TAA, because their sole effect is to increase the level ofprices without improving the service offered;
Der hjemles heller ikke fritagelse for aftaler om begrænsning af kapacitetsudnyttelsen, der som
However, where, as in the case of the TAA, an agreement comprises a system of differentiated rates that was established in order to bring independents into the price agreements ofthe former conference members, the Commission considers that such a pricefixing agreement is not a conference agreement and is not eligible for the block exemption;
— De fragtrater, TAA fastsætter for godstransport, er ikke identiske for alle medlemmerne.
374 ANNEX II cover the practice of jointly fixing the inland rates engaged in by the TAA, which moreover is not a liner conference.
Med hensyn til søtransportdelen fandt Kommissionen i øvrigt ikke, at TAA opfyldte nogen af betingelserne for individuel fritagelse efter traktatens artikel 85, stk. 3.
Furthermore, with regard to the maritime sector, the Commission took the view that the TAA did not satisfy anyof the conditions laid down in Article 85(3) of the Treaty for the granting of an individual exemption.
Heller ikke for landtransport delens vedkommende fandt Kommissionen, at der kunne indrømmes individuel fritagelse for TAA, bl.a. fordi aftalen ikke opfyldte de to sidste betingelser i artikel 85, stk. 3, således som de er gengivet i artikel 5 i forordning (EØF) nr. 1017/68.
Nor did the Commission consider that the TAA qualified for individual exemption on the inland sector, in particular becauseit did not satisfy the last two conditions laid down in Article 85(3), as reiterated in Article 5 of Regulation (EEC)No 1017/68.
På baggrund heraf besluttede Kommissionen at nedlægge forbud mod Transatlantic Agreement, dog uden bødepålæg, eftersom aftalen var blevet anmeldt til Kommissionen.
The Commission accordingly decided to prohibit the Transatlantic Agreement, though without imposing anyfines, the TAA having been notified to the Commission.
Den 13. december 1994 godkendte Kommissionen en aftale mellem Kanaltunnelens koncessionshaver, Eurotunnel, og to af de jernbaneselskaber, der kan drive international togtrafik i tunnelen, nemlig BR og SNCF.
On 13 December the Commission approved the agreement between Eurotunnel, the holder of the Channel Tunnelconcession, and BR/SNCF, two rail companies equipped to operate international trains.
Aftalen, som skal gælde i 65 år, gik ud på at opdele tunnelkapaciteten i to lige store dele — den ene halvdel skulle være forbeholdt pendultogtrafik, som Eurotunnel hidtil har været alene om at drive, og den anden halvdel skulle forbeholdes passager- og godstogstrafik mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og det europæiske kontinent.
The agreement, which was concluded for 65 years, divides the Tunnel capacity into two equal parts: one half isreserved for shuttle trains, operated so far exclusively by Eurotunnel, and the other half for passenger and freighttrains linking the United Kingdom and the Continent.
Aftalen gav desuden BR og SNCF ret til til enhver tid at udnytte 50 % af den samlede tunnelkapacitet, dvs. 100 % af den kapacitet, der er forbeholdt international togtrafik, medmindre de afstod en del af denne ret. Afslag på anmodninger herom skulle være begrundede.
Under the agreement, BR and SNCF are entitled throughout the term of the agreement to 50% of the total capacity of the Tunnel, i.e. 100% of the capacity reserved for international trains, unless they agree to surrender part oftheir entitlement, any withholding of such agreement requiring justification.
Til gengæld herfor forpligtede BR og SNCF sig til at indsætte så mange passager- og godstog i tunneltrafikken som muligt, at betale brugsafgifter til Eurotunnel samt at medvirke ved finansieringen af en del af vedligeholdelsen og fornyelsen af infrastrukturerne.
In return, BR and SNCF undertake to run as many passenger and freight trains as possible through the Tunnel andto pay Eurotunnel usage charges.
Endelig forpligtede de to jernbaneselskaber sig også til hver især at tilvejebringe moderne jernbaneinfrastrukturerer i Frankrig og i Det Forenede Kongerige, bl.a. med henblik på højhastighedsforbindelser mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og Frankrig.
The two rail companies have also undertaken to provide in France and the United Kingdom respectively modern rail infrastructures enabling trains, and in particular high-speed trains, to operate between the United Kingdom and France.
Kommissionen fandt, at denne fordeling af tunnelkapaciteten mellem pendultogtrafik og international togtrafik samt den omstændighed, at en betydelig del af timekapaciteten var forbeholdt BR og SNCF, havde konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger.
The Commission took the view that the division of Channel Tunnel capacity between shuttle services and international trains and the reservation of a large share of the hourly paths for BR and SNCF had the effect of restricting competition.
Aftalen havde imidlertid også positive virkninger, som måtte tages med i betragtning. Etableringen af Kanaltunnelen var forbundet med store investeringer, som det vil tage lang tid at amortisere.
However, the positive aspects of the agreement must also be taken into account.
På baggrund heraf ville BR's og SNCF's forpligtelse til at indsætte flest mulige tog og betale en fast brugsafgift i de første 12 år direkte bidrage til at skabe økonomisk balance i projektet.
In this context, the undertakings given by BR and SNCF to operate as many trains as possible and to pay chargesin a lump-sum form throughout the first 12 years make a direct contribution to the project's financial equilibriumand ensure its success.
Disse forpligtelser udgjorde desuden en væsentlig garanti for de banker, der havde finansieret projektet.
They also represent important guarantees for the banks which are providing finance forthe project.
Endelig gav denne aftale allerede fra tunnelens åbning også mulighed for at tilbyde nye former for transportydelser til direkte gavn for brugerne.
Lastly, the agreement enables consumers to benefit directly from the introduction of new transport services assoon as the Tunnel becomes operational.
Kommissionen fastslog på baggrund heraf, at aftalen ville kunne fremme den økonomiske udvikling og derfor burde godkendes, dog således, at det sikres, at konkurrencebegrænsningerne ikke bliver mere vidtgående end strengt nødvendigt, og at andre jernbaneselskaber får mulighed for at drive togtrafik i konkurrence med BR og SNCF.
The Commission therefore took the view that the agreement was likely to promote economic progress and shouldbe authorized, but that conditions must be attached to ensure that the restrictions of competition do not go beyondwhat is strictly necessary and that other rail companies can operate services in competition with BR and SNCF.
I den forbindelse tilkendegav BR og SNCF over for Kommissionen, at de i de første 12 år kun agtede at udnytte 75 % af den kapacitet, der er forbeholdt international togtrafik. Kommissionen har på baggrund heraf gjort sin godkendelse betinget af, at BR og SNCF stiller den timekapacitet, de ikke selv har brug for — dvs. 25 % af den tunnelkapacitet, der er forbeholdt international togtrafik — til rådighed for infrastrukturforvalteren.
Inthis connection, since BR and SNCF have informed the Commission that they intend over the first 12 years to usearound 75% of the capacity reserved for international trains, the Commission made its exemption conditional on BR and SNCF allowing the infrastructure manager to use the hourly paths which they do not need, i.e. 25% of the Tunnel capacity reserved for international trains.
Disse procentsatser skal efter 12 års forløb tages op til fornyet overvejelse i Kommissionen.
These shares will be reviewed by the Commission after 12years.
Med hensyn til de andre aspekter fandt Kommissionen, at aftalen som følge af Kanaltunnelens helt ekstraordinære karakter kunne fritages i 30 år.
As regards the other aspects, the Commission considered that, given the exceptional nature of the Channel Tunnel, exemption could be granted for 30 years.
3, kunne der heller ikke indrømmes individuel fritagelse.
Furthermore, it does not qualify for individual exemption, since it does not fulfil theconditions laid down in Article 85(3) of the Treaty.
Kommissionen pålagde i denne sag FEFC's medlemmer symbolske bøder.
The Commission imposed symbolic fines on the members ofthe FEFC.
Kommissionen havde den 28. april 1989 modtaget en klage fra den tyske afskiberorganisation DSVK over bestemte prisfastsættelsesaktiviteter, som medlemmerne af Far Eastern Freight Conference, FEFC, udøvede i forbindelse med kombineret transport.
On 28 April 1989, the Commission received a complaint from the German Shippers' Council (DSVK) concerning certain pricefixing activities of the FEFC members in multimodal transport.
Følgende fem komponenter indgår i FEFC-medlemmernes kombinerede transport: a) landtransport til udskibningshavnen b) godshåndtering i havnen c) søtransport d) godshåndtering i bestemmelseshavnen e) landtransport fra bestemmelseshavnen til den endelige destination.
Multimodal transport services provided by the FEFC members consist of the following five components:(a) inland transport to the port of embarkation;(b) cargo handling in the port of embarkation;(c) sea transport;(d) cargo handling in the port of destination.(e) inland transport from the port of destination to the place of final destination.
I henhold til gruppefritagelsen for linjekonferencer i forordning (EØF) nr. 4056/86 er prisfastsættelse tilladt ved søtransport.
The block exemption for liner conferences provided for in Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 allows the joint fixingof prices for sea transport services.
DSVK klagede over, at FEFC's medlemmer ikke blot indgik aftaler om priser for søtransport, men også for andre komponenter i den kombinerede transport, herunder land transport.
In its complaint, the DSDK pointed out that the FEFC members agreed pricesbetween themselves not only for sea transport, but also for the other components of multimodal transport, including inland transport.
I sin beslutning nedlagde Kommissionen forbud mod fælles fastsættelse af priser for landtransport inden for EU, som FEFC's medlemmer udfører for afskibere som en del af en kombineret transport af containergods mellem Nordeuropa og Fjernøsten.
The inland transport services supplied by members of the FEFC, within the territory of the European Community, to shippers as part of a multimodal transport operation for the carriage of containerized cargo between northern Europe and the Far East.
FEFC-rederierne gjorde gældende, at alle deres prisfastsættelsesaktiviteter, herunder også for land transportdelen, var dækket af gruppefritagelsen for linjekonferencer i artikel 3 i forordning (EØF) nr. 4056/86.
The FEFC members had argued that all their pricefixing activities, including those relating to inland transportservices, were covered by the block exemption for liner conferences pursuant to Article 3 of Regulation (EEC)No 4056/86.
Fritagelsen i artikel 3 kan imidlertid ikke være mere omfattende end selve forordningen.
However, the scope of the exemption provided for by Article 3 cannot be wider than the scope of the Regulation itself.
I artikel 1, stk. 2, i forordning (EØF) nr. 4056/86 hedder det, at forordningen »finder anvendelse på international søtransport til og fra en eller flere havne i Fællesskabet«.
Article 1(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4065/86 stipulates that the Regulation 'shall apply only to internationalmaritime transport services from or to one or more Community ports'.
— Andre leverandører af landtransport uden for konferencen, som ikke måtte fastsætte priser, ville blive udsat for konkurrencefordrejninger, hvis konferencemedlemmerne fik lov til at fastsætte deres fragtrater på landtransportdelen kollektivt.
The FEFC suggested that, if inland rates were set on an individual basis rather thancollectively, conference members would be tempted to compete on such prices and would therefore undermine
Kommissionen pålagde FEFC-rederierne symbolske bøder (10 000 ECU til hvert rederi) for at understrege, at der var tale om en overtrædelse, og at de pågældende rederier og de andre virksomheder, som måtte deltage i tilsvarende aktiviteter, for fremtiden skulle overholde EU's konkurrenceregler.
The Commission set fines at a symbolic level (ECU 10 000 for each conference member): the fines underline thefact that an infringement was committed and the need for the undertakings in question and other undertakingsthat may be involved in similar practices to comply with the Community competition rules in future.
Den 13. april 1994 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning i henhold til artikel 15, stk. 6, i forordning nr. 17 i ovennævnte sag, hvorved den ophævede den bødefrihed, der normalt er en følge af en anmeldelse.
On 13 April the Commission adopted a Decision under Article 15(6) of Regulation No 17 in the above case, withdrawing the immunity from fines which normally results from a notification.
Med denne beslutning fastslog Kommissionen foreløbigt, at den certificeringsordning for mobilkraner, som er indført af to nederlandske virksomheder, FNK (nederlandsk sammenslutning af kranudlejere) og SCK (virksomhed for certificering af kraner), er uforenelig med artikel 85, stk. 1, og at en fritagelse efter artikel 85, stk. 3, ikke er berettiget.
In its Decision the Commission found, on a preliminary basis, that the certification scheme for mobile cranes, setup by two Dutch undertakings, the FNK (Dutch crane-hire association) and the SCK (crane certification association), was incompatible with Article 85(1) of the Treaty and that an exemption under Article 85(3) was not justified.
Aftalen forbyder deltagerne at indleje kraner hos ikke-tilsluttede virksomheder.
The agreement prohibits participants from hiring cranes from nonmember firms.
En deltagende virksomhed, der indlejer kraner hos ikke-tilsluttede virksomheder, risikerer at blive udelukket fra at deltage i systemet.
Any participating firm that hires cranes from non-affiliated firms risks expulsion from the system.
Ordningerne påvirker ikke blot kranudlejningsfirmaer i Nederlandene, men også i de medlemsstater, der grænser op til Nederlandene.
The arrangements affectcrane-hire firms not only in the Netherlands, but also in neighbouring Member States.
Det konstateres, at ordningerne først og fremmest begrænser konkurrencen, fordi de i realiteten er ensbetydende med, at det nederlandske kranudlejningsmarked udelukkende forbeholdes deltagere i certificeringssystemet.
The arrangements werefound to restrict competition mainly because they virtually reserve the Dutch crane-hire market to participants inthe certification system.
Betingelserne for en fritagelse efter artikel 85, stk. 3, er ikke opfyldt.
The conditions for an exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty are not fulfilled.
Begrænsningerne er ikke nødvendige, idet de fleste af de sikkerhedskrav samt de ¡kke-sikkerhedsrelaterede krav, som pålægges af SCK, allerede er omfattet af lovfæstede krav.
The restrictions are, in particular, not indispensable since most of the safety requirements as well as the non-safety requirements imposed bythe SCK are already covered by statutory requirements.
Kommissionen fortsætter sine undersøgelser af sagen med henblik på at vedtage en endelig beslutning.
The Commission will continue its examination of the case with a view to a final decision.
Ved beslutning af 22. september 1993 i henhold til artikel 14, stk. 3, i forordning nr. 17/62 påbød Kommissionen Akzo Chemicals BV at underkaste sig en kontrolundersøgelse vedrørende virksomhedens aktiviteter på visse saltmarkeder.
On 22 September 1993, in a Decision pursuant to Article 14(3) of Regulation No 17, the Commission ordered Akzo Chemicals B V to submit to an investigation into its activities on certain salt markets.
Akzo Chemicals BV underkastede sig ikke fuldstændig kontrolundersøgelsen, som fandt sted den 6. og 7. oktober 1993, idet virksomheden: a) den 6. oktober 1993 afgav en ukorrekt mundtlig forklaring, ifølge hvilken Akzo Chemicals BV ikke havde nogen kontorer i Arnhem b) den 7. oktober 1993 ikke efterkom anmodningen om at give adgang til direktørens kontor i Arnhem med det formål at foretage kontrolundersøgelsen.
Akzo Chemicals BV did not fully submit to the investigation, which took place on 6 and 7 October 1993, in that:
Akzo Chemicals BV hævdede, at Kommissionen i sin beslutning af 22. september 1993 skulle have begrænset kontrolundersøgelsen til virksomhedens hovedsæde i Amersfoort og underafdelingen i
(a) on 6 October 1993, it provided incorrect oral information to the effect that there was no office of Akzo Chemicals BV in Arnhem,
Dette synspunkt holder ikke stik.
This argument put forward by Akzo Chemicals BV was unfounded.
Strukturen i artiklerne i beslutningen af 22. september 1993 viser, at omfanget af kontrolundersøgelsen og dermed den berørte virksomheds pligt til at medvirke ikke er geografisk begrænset.
The structure of the Articles of the Decisionof 22 September 1993 makes it clear that the scope of the investigation, and hence the obligation on the relevantundertaking to cooperate, is not limited geographically.
Kommissionen har især bestemt, at Akzo Chemicals skulle give Kommissionens repræsentanter adgang til alle sine lokaler, grunde og transportmidler.
In particular, the Commission stipulated that Akzo Chemicals BV was required to allow the Commission officials access to all its premises, land and means of transport.
I øvrigt angives det i artikel 3 i beslutningen af 22. september 1993, hvem den er bindende for »i alle enkeltheder« i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 189, stk. 4.
Article 3 of the Decision of 22 September 1993 specifies, pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Article 189 ofthe EC Treaty, those for whom it is binding 'in its entirety'.
Beslutningen af 22. september 1993 var udtrykkelig rettet til Akzo Chemicals BV.
The Decision of 22 September 1993 is expresslyaddressed to Akzo Chemicals BV.
Når der i denne sammenhæng blev anført både Akzo Chemicals BV's hovedsæde i Amersfoort og underafdelingen i Hengelo, havde det udelukkende til formål at udpege den virksomhed, som beslutningen var rettet til, så præcist som muligt.
If in this connection both the registered office of Akzo Chemicals BV in Amersfoort and its branch establishment in Hengelo are specified, the purpose of such information is solely toindicate as precisely as possible the undertaking to which the Decision is addressed.
Akzo Chemicals BV hævdede endvidere, at de af direktørens kontorer, der ligger i Arnhem, tilhører moderselskabet Akzo NV.
Akzo Chemicals BV also argued that the offices of its director situated in Arnhem belonged to its parent company Akzo NV.
Ifølge Kommissionen kan denne opfattelse ikke accepteres.
In the Commission's view, this notion cannot be accepted.
Kontorerne er »virksomhedens lokaler« i betydningen i artikel 14, stk. 1, litra d), i forordning nr. 17 fra det øjeblik, hvor virksomhedens aktiviteter udøves deri.
Offices are 'premises of undertakings' within themeaning of Article 14(l)(d) of Regulation No 17 if and to the extent that the business of the undertaking is carried out in them.
Det er hævet over enhver tvivl, at funktionen som direktør falder ind under en virksomheds aktiviteter.
Without any doubt, the function of statutory director forms part of the business of an undertaking.
Derfor udgør det kontor, som direktøren for Akzo Chemicals BV har i Arnhem, en del af denne virksomheds lokaler.
Consequently, the office of the director of Akzo Chemicals BV in Arnhem forms part of the premises of thatundertaking.
Kommissionens repræsentanter havde derfor beføjelse til at få adgang til disse lokaler med henblik på at foretage kontrolundersøgelsen, uanset de aftaler vedrørende dette kontor, der eventuelt bestod mellem Akzo Chemicals BV og Akzo NV. Akzo Chemicals BV's opfattelse kunne føre til, at virksomhederne delvis kan unddrage sig en kontrolundersøgelse ved at placere deres ledelse i lokaler, der civilretligt hører til et andet selskab.
The Commission officials were therefore authorized to enter such premises in order to carry out theinvestigation, irrespective of any arrangements that might have existed concerning such office between Akzo Chemicals BV and Akzo NV The view put forward by Akzo Chemicals BV, taken to its logical conclusion, wouldmean that firms could partially evade investigations by housing their management in premises which, under civillaw, belonged to another company.
Således ville også virksomhedernes samarbejdspligt og dermed effektiviteten af en kontrolundersøgelse blive begrænset på en uacceptabel måde.
This would mean that the obligation incumbent on undertakings to cooperate,and hence the effectiveness of investigations, would be curtailed in an unacceptable manner.
Der var således grund til at fastsætte det daglige beløb for en tvangsbøde for at tvinge Akzo Chemicals BV til at underkaste sig kontrolundersøgelsen ').
It was therefore necessary to impose a periodic penalty payment in order to compel Akzo Chemicals BV to submit to the investigation.'
På denne baggrund lykkedes det at gennemføre kontrolundersøgelsen.
On this basis, the investigation was successfully completed.
Ved beslutning af 14. oktober 1994 straffede Kommissionen Akzo Chemicals BV for at have overtrådt sin juridiske pligt til fuldstændig og omgående at underkaste sig en kontrolundersøgelse, som er påbudt i henhold til artikel 14, stk. 3, i forordning nr. 17/62.
In its Decision of 14 October 1994, the Commission fined Akzo Chemicals BV for the breach of its legal obligation to submit fully and immediately to an investigation ordered by Decision pursuant to Article 14(3) of Regulation No 17.
Størrelsen af den bøde, der pålægges denne virksomhed, beløber sig til 5 000 ECU, hvilket svarer til det maksimale beløb i sådanne tilfælde.
The fine imposed, ECU 5 000, was the maximum allowed for such cases.
M Pressemeddelelse nr. IP(93)893 af 19.10.1993.
1 Press release No 1P(93)893, 19.10.1993.
Offentliggjort i EFT
Published in OJ
Meddelelse i henhold til artikel 5, stk. 2, i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3975/87
Publication pursuant to Article 5(2) of Council Regulation(EEC) No 3975/87
Meddelelser i henhold til artikel 12, stk. 2, i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 4056/86 og artikel 12, stk. 2, i forordning (EØF) nr. 1017/68
Publication pursuant to Article 12(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No4056/86 and Article 12(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68
LEDSAGEFORANSTALTNINGER I FORBINDELSE MED REFORMEN AF DEN FÆLLES LANDBRUGSPOLITIK — FØRTIDSPENSIONERING OG OMSTILLING INDEN FOR LAND BRUGET — STØTTE TIL FREMSKYNDET OPHØR MED LANDBRUGSVIRKSOMHED I IRLAND
MEASURES ACCOMPANYING THE REFORM OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: EARLYRETIREMENT AND RESTRUCTURING IN AGRICULTURE (AID FOR EARLY RETIREMENT FROMFARMING IN IRELAND)
KOMMISSIONEN HAR AFVIST EN BEGÆRING FRA SEA CONTAINERS OM IVÆRKSÆTTELSE AF FORELØBIGE FORHOLDSREGLER OVER FOR STENA SEALINK
COMMISSION REJECTS APPLICATION FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES LODGED BY SEA CONTAIN-ERS AGAINST STENA SEALINK
KOMMISSIONEN FORLÆNGER DEN FRITAGELSE, DER ER INDRØMMET DET INTERNATIONALE ENERGIAGENTUR I HENHOLD TIL EF-TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 85
COMMISSION RENEWS EXEMPTION GRANTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCYUNDER ARTICLE 85 OF THE EC TREATY
FIAT ÅBNER RESERVEDELSMARKEDET FOR KONKURRENCE
IP/94/159FIAT OPENUS UP SPARE-PARTS MARKET TO COMPETITIONIP/94/160
UDTALELSE FRA JOAN DE DEUS PINHEIRO VEDRØRENDE UIP'S KOMMENTARER TIL HANS BEMÆRKNINGER TIL JOURNALISTER FOR NYLIG
STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER PINHEIRO REGARDING UIP COMMENTS ON HIS RECENTREMARKS TO JOURNALISTS