natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den kommende indførelse af ØMU skaber realistiske forventninger om en makroøkonomisk "policy mix", der er gunstig for en for holdsvis høj vækst i en længere periode.
Coupled with the improvement in the macroeconomic policy­setting brought about by EMU, a high me­dium­term growth path is a realis­tic opportunity which now needs to be grasped in order to generate the jobs the EU badly needs.
I en sådan situation er alle de afgørende faktorer og især de monetære forhold (inklusive den lange rente og valutakurserne) gunstige for en sund forøgelse af efter spørgslen.
Although the introduction of the Euro in itself will not solve the unemployment problem, its advantages are not limited to increased price trans­parency and the elimination of in­ternal exchange rate costs and risks.
Erhvervsfrekvens
Participation rate Employment rate Unemployment rate
Ungdomsarbejdsløshed
Youth unemployment rate
Langtidsledighed
Long term unemployment rate
Midlertidige job (i %)
% temporary employees
Job med mindst 45 timers arbejdsuge (i %)*
%working 45 hours a week or more* n.a.: comparable data not available * Employees in industry and services
Ændring i bekskæftigelse og befolkningen I den arbejdsduelige alder i EU, 1970-2005
Change in employment and working-age population in the Union, 1970-2005
D Personer i den arbejdsduelige alder
S Working-age population Employment
Beskæftigelsesfrekvensen i EU steg kun ganske lidt i 1997 til 60,5% af befolkningen i den arbejdsdygtige al­
Although the recovery is weaker than in the 1980s, it is stronger than in the 1970s and, in the last three years, the Union has
Deltidsarbejde breder sig der, hvilket stadig er hele 2 procent­point under niveauet i 1991 (figur III).
made up half the job losses of the early 1990s. At present, it is still short of achieving the rate of growth of employment necessary to absorb the high levels of unemployment and to provide employment for all those who want to work, but the demographic prospects are some­what different than in the past (Graph II).
Både i forhold til tidligere og i forhold til de andre lande, vi normalt sammenligner os med, er udviklin­gen i beskæftigelsen i EU stadigvæk skuffende.
main differences in employment rates in the first two groups come from lower participation in the la­bour market, depressed by a lack of jobs, rather than from high unem­ployment.
Den nuværende beskæfti­gelsesfrekvens er en lille smule høje­re end i begyndelsen af 1980'erne, men lavere end de 64%, man nåede op på i midten af 1970'erne.
In a period of high growth it should be possible to mo­bilise some of this employment potential and provide jobs for those who want to work but who have little prospect of finding employ­ment.
Både USA og Japan har derimod fortsat kunne registrere stadigt højere be­skæftigelsesfrekvenser (på ca. 74%) i 1997.
Performance in the Member States in creating jobs in services gener­ally, and in these sectors in particu­lar, varies widely.
Denne forskel på beskæftigel­sesområdet afspejler både forskelle i arbejdsløshedsprocenten (figur IV) og forskelle i erhvervsfrekvensen (tabellen).
In three Member States — Germany, France, Italy — which together account for 50% of total EU employment, growth in these sectors has been below aver­age in recent years, as it has been in the economy as a whole.
1997 var det femte år inden for de seneste seks år, hvor der ikke var tale om en nettotilvækst i fuldtids­job i EU.
The gap in employment between the EU and US is not in agriculture, manufacturing or the public sector but in services.
Rent faktisk faldt antallet af fuldtidsbeskæftigede, og deltids­jobbene tegnede sig for mere end den samlede stigning i beskæftigel­sen, der kunne registreres (figur V).
The difference in employment rates is particularly marked in three broad sectors: com­munal services, business services and distribution, hotels and res­taurants.
Stigningen i deltidsarbejdet bety­der, at der i løbet af de seneste tre år er sket en vis reduktion af den gennemsnitlige arbejdstid for alle dem, der er i beskæftigelse.
The differences between the Member States with high and low employment rates essentially lie in these same sectors.
Forskellene mellem medlemsstater med høje og lave be­skæftigelsesfrekvenser går igen in­den for de samme sektorer.
In both historical and international terms, the Union's employment perfor­mance remains unsatisfactory.
Beskæf­tigelsen i Europa er betydeligt lavere end i USA inden for alle service sek­torer borts s et fra offentlig admini­stration. Tallene viser, at dette ikke alene gælder jobs med et lavt kvali­fikationsniveau, men også for dem med et højt kvalifikationsniveau. Der er en forskel på omkring 3 pro­centpoint for hotel­ og restauration, transport, men også for privat og of­fentlig service samt indenfor forret­ningsservice.
The current employment rate is a little higher than in the early 1980s, but falls short of the rates of 64% achieved in the mid­1970s.
Den potentielle beskæftigelsesre­serve er størst blandt kvinder, æld­re mænd og unge.
Employment in Europe is signifi­cantly lower than in the US in all services sectors except public ad­ministration.
I en periode med høj vækst skulle det være muligt at mobilisere noget af dette beskæftigelsespoten­tiale og skaffe job til dem, som gerne vil i arbejde, men som har ringe udsigter til at finde beskæftigelse.
The evidence shows that this applies not only to low skilled jobs but also to highly skilled ones: there is a difference of around 3 percentage points for distribution, hotels and restaurants, but also for
Medlemsstaternes evne til at skabe job inden for service generelt — og specielt inden for ovennævnte sek­torer varierer meget.
For the fifth year in the last six, there was no net addition to full­time jobs in the Union in 1997.
Eftersom befolkningen i den arbejdsdygtige alder voksede en smule i samme periode, forblev beskæftigelsesfrekvensen, udtrykt i fuldtidsækvivalenter, uændret.
In­deed, there was a decline in the number employed full­time and part­time jobs accounted for more than all of the increase in employ­ment that occurred (Graph V).
Ikke blot lå beskæftigelsesfrekvensen, udtrykt i fuldtidsækvivalenter, un­
The growth of part­time working means that there has been some reduction in average hours worked by all
Forskellen i beskæftigelsen mellem EU og USA ligger ikke inden for landbrug, fremstilling eller den of­fentlige sektor, men inden for servi­
The potential employment reserve is highest among women, older workers and young people.
Japan, 1975-97 fuldtidsbeskæftigelse, 1987­97
Change in part­time and full­time employment, 1987­97
% af arbejdsstyrken
IV Unemployment rates in the Union, US and Japan, 1975­97
Særlige træk ved arbejdsmarkedet i medlemsstaterne der niveauet fra 1990 i slutningen af perioden med en kraftig nettostigning i antallet af job, men også under niveauet fra 1986 ved udgangen af recessionen i starten af 1980'erne.
Fewer young unemployed those in employment over the past three years. This would have been larger, however, had the growth of parttime jobs not been accompanied by an increase in the average hours worked by those employed full-time.
Færre unge arbejdsløse
% in the Union over the
Arbejdsløsheden er fortsat høj
2 three years 1994-97, whereas the number of people in work went up by 1V
I begyndelsen af 1980'erne, da arbejdsløsheden steg til de høje niveauer, der fortsat gør sig gældende, var det primært de unge under 25 år, der blev ramt.
In the early 1980s, when unemployment increased to the high levels that persist today, by far the largest group affected were young people under 25.
Som følge dels af det politiske fokus på de unge arbejdsløse, dels af det faldende antal unge i befolkningen og endelig som følge af det forhold, at flere forbliver længere under uddannelse, er den andel af de arbejdsløse, som er under 25 år, faldet fra 45% i midten af 1980'erne til ca. 25% i dag.
As a result partly of the focus of policy on the young unemployed, partly of a decline in the share of young people in the population and partly of more people staying longer in education, the proportion of the unemployed who are under 25 has fallen from 45% in the mid-1980s to around 25% now.
Det mest udtalte fald har gjort sig gældende for de unge under 20 år, som i 1986 udgjorde over 22% af alle arbejdsløse, men i 1997 kun 7%.
The most pronounced fall has been among those under 20, who in 1986 accounted for over 22% of the total unemployed but for only 7% in 1997.
Derimod ligger de 20-24-åriges andel af den samlede arbejdsløshed fortsat højt, nemlig på 18% i 1997 imod 22% i 1986, hvilket er det dobbelte af deres andel i befolkningen i den arbejds dygtige alder.
By contrast, the share of 20 to 24 year olds in total unemployment has remained high at 18% in 1997 as against 22% in 1986, double their share in the working-age population.
De højeste procentsatser finder man i Spanien og Finland, hvor de stadig udgør lidt over 30%, og de laveste i Luxembourg og Østrig, hvor begge steder udgør under 7%.
The highest rates are in Spain and Finland, where they are still over 30%, with the lowest in Luxembourg and Austria, both under 7%.
Flere arbejdsløse blandt folk i den bedste arbejdsdygtige alder
Not only was the FTE employment rate below the level in 1990 at the end of the period of high net job creation, but also below that in 1986 at the end of the recession of the early 1980s.
Arbejdsløsheden har spredt sig mere mellem de øvrige arbejdsgrupper i det seneste tiår.
Unemployment remains high
Selv om det er det lave ste, den har været siden januar 1993, er den kun faldet med 2 procentpoint siden rekordhøjden i 1994.
Unemployment has become a more widespread problem among other age groups over the past decade.
Kun i en enkelt medlemsstat (Østrig) er arbejdsløsheden højere end for et år siden, men i visse andre er den stadig væsentligt højere end før recessionen i starten af 1990'erne (i Tyskland er den dobbelt så høj, og i Finland og Sverige er den fire gange så høj).
Prime-age workers, between 25 and 49, now account for almost 60% of the unemployed in the Union (more than their share in working-age population) as opposed to 45% 11 years ago.
Flere ældre arbejdsløse: situationen i Tyskland
More older unemployed: the case of Germany
Den procentvise andel af over 50-årige, som er arbejdsløse, er også vokset, nemlig fra 10% til over 15%.
The relative number of those of 50 and over who are unemployed has also increased, from 10% to over 15%.
Det kan primært tilskrives en stigning i et enkelt land, Tyskland, hvor de relative andele af henholdsvis ældre og unge arbejdsløse er præcis det omvendte af, hvad der gør sig gældende i andre lande — 30% er 50 år eller derover, og kun 12% er under 25 år, og denne forskel er øget indenfor det seneste tiår.
This predominantly reflects the rise in one country, Germany, where the relative proportions of old and young unemployed are the precise opposite to those elsewhere — 30% are 50 or over and only 12% under 25 and this gap has widened over the past decade.
Selv om det relative antal af arbejdsløse, som er 50 år eller derover, er højere i de nye delstater end i det tidligere Vesttyskland, er forskellen forholdsvis begrænset (33% sammenholdt med 29%). Ikke desto mindre er den procent vise andel vokset ganske betydeligt siden 1991, og tendensen viser ingen tegn på at ville vende.
Although the relative number of the unemployed who are 50 or over in the new Länder is higher than in the West, the difference is relatively small (33% as against 29%).
Langtidsledigheden er uændret
Longterm unemployment unchanged
Langtidsledigheden forblev uændret i 1997, nemlig godt 5% i EU, hvor 49% af de arbejdsløse havde været uden arbejde i et år eller længere.
The rate of longterm unemployment remained unchanged in 1997 at just over 5% in the Union, with 49% of the unemployed being out of work for a year or more.
Andelen af ledige, der har været arbejdsløse i over to år, var ligeledes uændret 30%.
The proportion of those unemployed for more than two years also remained unchanged at 30%.
Selv om langtidsledigheden er størst i Spanien, vokser den hurtigst i Sverige (hvor den fordobledes fra 1996 til 1997 til 3%), og Italien, hvor den var steget til 8% (over to tredjedele af de arbejdsløse) fra 5% i 1992.
Although long term unemployment is highest in Spain, it is rising fastest in Sweden (where it doubled between 1996 and 1997 to 3%) and Italy where it was up to 8% (over two-thirds of the unemployed) from 5% in 1992.
Arbejdsløsheden blandt unge under 25 år er stadig dobbelt så høj som blandt de voksne, således som det har været tilfældet i mange år.
Only one Member State (Austria) has unemployment higher than a year ago, although in some it remains considerably higher than before the recession of the early 1990s (in Germany, it is twice as high, in Finland and Sweden, four times higher).
Den samlede ungdomsarbejdsløshed lå på 19,9% i juli 1998 sammenholdt med 8,7% for dem over 25 år (se det indrammede felt).
Unemployment in Japan is also rising, to 4.2% in July 1998.
En stor del affaldet i arbejdsløsheden blandt mændene skyldes dog lavere arbejdsløs hed blandt unge mænd, for hvem
In the US, continued economic growth has led to further reductions in unemployment and the rate of 4.5% in July was the lowest (apart from April) for 30 years.
senere i EU end handelen med varer, og at der fortsat eksisterer hindringer for handelen med tjenesteydelser på verdensmarkedet, selv om de gradvist reduceres.
GDP and internal trade. This has been accompanied by an even larger expansion of exports of goods to the rest of the world (from 7% of Union GDP in 1991 to 10% in 1997) which, in practice, has led to a growing trade surplus and has served to offset the implications for employment of increasing imports.
Nye job til kvinderne kostninger pr. beskæftiget i EU halvt så meget som arbejdskraftens produktivitet.
Be tween 1994 and 1997, real labour costs per employee in the Union rose by half the rate of growth in labour productivity.
Lønandelen i de fleste medlemsstater er derfor faldet til gennemsnitligt kun godt 60% i EU, hvilket er et godt stykke under niveauet i USA (66%) og Japan (67%).
The wage share in most Member States has, therefore, fallen to an average of only just over 60% in the Union, well below the level in the US (66%) and Japan (67%).
1998 forventes dog at blive et år med op sving, og der er tilsyneladende sket en ændring i retning af øgede investeringer og lageropbygning, som an slås at bidrage med 1% til væksten i BNP.
1998 is expected to be a turning point, however, as there seems to have been a shift towards investment and stock-building, contributing an estimated 1% to GDP growth.
Det synes at bekræfte, at investeringerne måske omsider reagerer på den øgede rentabilitet.
This seems to confirm that investment may finally be respond ing to the increase in levels of profitability. tability.
Kvinderne tegnede sig for 62% af nettostigningen i job i EU 1997, hvilket er en smule mindre end tid ligere år.
Women accounted for 62% of the net additional jobs created in the Union in 1997, a slight decline compared to previous years.
Mændenes beskæftigelse voksede med 0,3%, hvilket er den første stigning siden 1995, medens stigningen i kvindernes beskæftigelse reduceredes til 0,8% sammen holdt med 1% hvert af de to foregående år.
Male employment rose by 0.3%, the first rise since 1995, while female employment growth slowed to 0.8% compared with 1% in each of the previous two years.
Som helhed er kvindernes beskæftigelse steget fire gange hurtigere end mændenes siden 1994.
Overall, female employment has grown 4 times faster than male employment since 1994.
I 1997 var kvindernes beskæftigel sesfrekvens vokset til næsten 51%, og forskellen mellem kønnene på dette felt var reduceret til 20 procentpoint fra 26 procentpoint i 1990.
By 1997, the employment rate for women had risen to almost 51%, and the gender gap was down to 20 percentage points from 26 per centage points in 1990.
Globalisering og beskæftigelse
Globalisation and employment
Lønninger og arbejds kraftomkostninger
Wages and labour costs
Medens EUs andel af verdensmarkederne (uden for EU) generelt er faldet (fra 36% i 1990 til 31% i 1996), er virkningerne heraf for eksporten blevet opvejet af væksten på disse markeder.
While the Union share of world markets (excluding the EU) has tended to decline (from 36% in 1990 to 31% in 1996), the effect of this on exports has been compensated by the growth of these markets.
Det gælder især for de fjernøstlige økonomier, herunder Kina, som er blevet et stadigt vigtigere marked for europæiske producenter (det tegnede sig i 1996 for 13% af EU's eksport af varer til resten af verden imod kun 9% i 1990).
This is particularly true of the East Asian economies, including China, which have become an increasingly important market for European producers (accounting for 13% of Union exports of goods to the rest of the world in 1996 as against only 9% in 1990).
Selv om der forventes et fortsat fald i EU's andel af verdenshandelen i de kom mende år, efterhånden som udviklingslandene bliver industrialiserede og begynder at udligne forskellen i per capitaindkomst i forhold til de udviklede lande, er der ingen grund til, at det skulle få negative virkninger for indkomst- og beskæftigelses niveauet i Europa.
Although the prospects are for a continuing decline in the Union share of world trade in future years as developing countries in dustrialise and close the gap in in come per head with developed countries, there is no reason why this should be detrimental to in come and employment in Europe.
Det, der tæller for europæiske producenter og job, er, at væksten i eksporten opretholdes i forhold til væksten i efterspørgslen efter import fra lande uden for EU, således som det er lykkedes i de foregående år.
What matters for European producers and jobs is that export growth is maintained in relation to
Importen af varer bortset fra energi fra resten af verden udgjorde lidt over 8% af BNP i EU i 1995, hvilket kun er det halve af niveauet for den interne handel mellem medlemsstaterne, men tallet har været voksende i de seneste år i forhold til både BNP og den interne handel.
Pay rises in excess of the growth in labour productivity are liable to lead to increased inflation or to de pressed employment growth or
Denne udvikling har været ledsaget af en endnu større forøgelse af eksporten af varer til resten af verden (fra 7% af BNP i EU i 1991 til 10% i 1997), hvilket i praksis har resulteret i et voksende handelsoverskud og medvirket til at opveje den øgede imports virkninger for beskæftigel sen.
Imports of goods from the rest of the world, excluding energy, amounted to just over 8% of GDP in the Union in 1997, only 60% of the level of internal trade between Member States, but they have been growing in recent years in relation to both
Lønstigninger, der overstiger væk sten i arbejdskraftens produktivitet, kan meget vel resultere i øget inflation eller svække væksten i be skæftigelsen eller begge dele.
Jobs for people — people for jobs: turning policy guidelines into action the growth in demand for imports from outside the Union, as it has been in the past.
Med en økonomisk politik i hele EU, der tager sigte på at holde inflationen nede, og en afvisende holdning hos de ansvarlige for pengepolitikken over for overdrevne lønstigninger, vil lønstigninger ud over produktivitetsstigningen formentlig ramme beskæftigelsen og give anledning til højere arbejdsløshed.
Equally, however, they tend to conceal a third general point, that the nature of the goods exported and imported in terms of their unit value and design could well differ considerably, even though they might be classified to the same industry, designer clothing (exported) and mass-produced, low priced garments (imported) being examples.
Det er ikke ensbetydende med, at stigningen i importpenetrationen på det europæiske marked i de se neste år ikke har nogen konsekvenser for beskæftigelsen overhovedet.
This is not to say that there are no employment implications of the growth in import penetration of the European market over recent years.
De specifikke industrier, hvor det har gjort sig gældende, har mistet job, og den voksende efterspørgsel efter eksportvarer har ikke altid re sulteret direkte i tilsvarende flere job andre steder på grund af stigninger i arbejdskraftens produktivitet (til dels stimuleret af skærpet konkurrence fra udlandet).
The specific industries in which it has occurred have suffered job losses and the increasing de mand for exports has not always led directly to compensating job growth elsewhere because of gains in la bour productivity (partly stimulated by increased competition from outside).
Væk sten i eksporten har dog indirekte haft stor betydning ved at sikre øge de indtægter til at støtte oprettelsen af nye job i andre sektorer af økonomien, især servicesektoren.
Nevertheless, indirectly, export growth has been important in generating income to support job creation in other sectors of the economy, especially services.
Samtidig har importen af tjenesteydelser fra resten af verden kun ændret sig ganske lidt i de seneste ti år (under 3% af BNP i EU, hvilket betyder, at importen af varer og tjenesteydelser tilsammen udgør ca. 11% af BNP i EU), medens handelen med tjenesteydelser mellem medlemsstaterne er vokset (fra 3% af BNP i 1985 til 3,7% i 1995).
Fourthly, trade in services, unlike output and employment in services, has shown little tendency to expand relative to trade in goods. This reflects the inherent nature of services which itself poses an obstacle to trade, though one which stands to be diminished in importance by in formation technology and advances in telecommunications.
Det skyldes muligvis, at handelen med tjenesteydelser blev liberaliseret
Competition in the service sector, however, has taken the form not so much of trade flows but of direct investment, in facilities to deliver services to consumers in markets around the world, but especially in developed economies, in part to provide support for exports of manufactures.
Den nuværende lave nettostigning i antallet af job i EU kan dog vanskeligt undskyldes med overdrevne lønstigninger generelt.
The composition of EU exports to third countries is not significantly different from the composition of imports from them and has not tended to change a great deal in the recent past.
Siden 1980'erne er de reelle arbejdskraft omkostninger pr. beskæftiget per son i EU steget langt mindre end væksten i BNP pr. beskæftiget per son (1,8% om året) og kun med en smule mere end i USA.
In 1996, some 30% of Union exports of goods to the rest of the world consisted of basic manufactured products, only slightly lower than in 1990, and much the same as the share of basic products in Union imports.
Fra 1994 til 1997 steg de reelle arbejdskraftom
Fifthly, because of globalisation, there is a potential threat to growth in Europe from the Asian crisis.
I praksis er det i det store og hele de samme brancher, der berøres af
Employment is increasingly concentrated in the higher-skilled occupations and the
frekvensen i EU, så den kommer tæt­tere på niveauet hos vore vigtigste handelskonkurrenter, og derved gøre brug af det beskæftigelsespo­tentiale, som Europas underudnyt­tede arbejdsstyrke udgør.
'Prevention is better than cure' biggest declines are in unskilled elementary occupations (Graph VI).
Beregnin­ger udarbejdet af Kommissionen viser, at det er muligt at øge beskæf­tigelsesfrekvensen under de rette omstændigheder og på grundlag af den rette politik.
Evidence from a number of Member States suggests that vacancies are also concentrated in the former type of occupation.
voksende import på den ene side og voksende eksport på den anden side.
A person who becomes unemployed today in the European Union stands a significant chance of remaining so and becoming longterm unemployed.
Sammensætningen af EU's eksport til tredjelande er ikke væ­sensforskellig fra sammensætnin­gen af importen fra de samme lande og har heller ikke ændret sig noget videre i de senere år.
There is considerable evidence, however, that tackling the problem of the unemployed at an early stage has the greatest outcome in terms of preventing the drift into longterm unemployment.