natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Tallene for Spanien, Irland, Grækenland og Portugal er måske noget for høje, fordi meningsmålingen kun blev gennemført i større byområder, hvor nyhedsdækningen generelt er bedst.
Results for Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal may be over-stated to a certain degree because only major urban areas - where news in general is more accessible - were polled.
De Forenede Nationer (FN) blev anset for at være den organisation, der bedst ville være i stand til at bidrage til en løsning af Golfkrisen, efterfulgt af De Forenede Stater, Det Europæiske Fællesskab og Sovjetunionen (Diagram 3.2, tabel 38).
The United Nations (UN) was considered the organisation most capable of contributing to the resolution of the Gulf crisis, followed by the United States, the European Community and the Soviet Union (Figure 3.2, Table 38).
Der var størst tillid til FN i alle lande undtagen Luxembourg (FN figurede som nr. to umiddelbart efter USA) og Grækenland (en fjerdeplads).
The UN came top of the list in all countries, with the exception of Luxembourg (where it came a narrow second after the United States) and Greece (fourth place).
Når tilliden t i I FN var så iav i Grækenland, kan det måske skyldes, at FN stadig ikke har været i stand t i I at løse Grækenlands strid med Tyrkiet om Cypern (I en meningsmåling, som pá FN's vegne blev gennemført i forbindelse med Eurobarometers standardundersøgelse nr. 32, var Cypern langt den vigtigste årsag til, at grækerne vurderede FN's indsats negativt).
Trust in the UN may have been lowest in Greece because of the UN's continuing inability to resolve Greece's dispute with Turkey over Cyprus (in an opinion poll on behalf of the UN carried out in the framework of the standard Eurobarometer survey N° 32, Cyprus was by far the most important reason for Greeks giving the UN negative performance ratings).
Generelt er tilliden til FN vokset drastisk i EF siden midten af 80'erne, hvor flertallet af dem, der i Grækenland, Vesttyskland og Det Forenede Kongerige gav udtryk for en mening, fandt FN's generelle indsats ringe.
General public confidence in the UN has increased dramatically in the European Community since the mid-eighties, when a majority of people expressing an opinion in Greece, West Germany and the United Kingdom said the UN's overall performance was poor.
EF blev af flertallet i alle lande anset for at kunne bidrage til en løsning af krisen, og tilliden var størst blandt italienerne (83%), spanierne (77%), hollænderne (74%) og luxembourgerne (73%).
The European Community was felt by a majority of people from all countries as capable of contributing towards the resolution of the crisis, with the Italians (83%), Spanish (77%), Dutch (74%) and Luxembourgers (73%) showing the most confidence in it.
Kun danskerne (51% mod 42%) var noget forbeholdne.
Only the Danes (51% versus 42%) showed any hesitation over the matter.
I de fleste lande mente mindre end halvdelen af befolkningen, at deres eget land kunne bidrage væsentligt t i I en løsning af konflikten.
In most countries, less than half the population felt that their own country could contribute in a major way to the resolution of the conflict.
Tydelige undtagelser herfra var briterne og italienerne (begge 70%) samt franskmændene (67%).
The significant exceptions were among the British, Italians (both 70%) and French (67%).
Grunden til denne holdning blandt briterne og franskmændene er måske, at begge lande er permanente medlemmer af FN's Sikkerhedsråd og havde vist et udtalt engagement ved at sende landstyrker til Golfen.
The reasons for the prevalence of this view among the British and French may be that both countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and had shown strong commitment by sending ground forces to the Gulf.
Italiens formandskab i Minsterrádet kan måske have fået mange italienere til at mene, at også deres land kunne spille en væsentlig rolle.
Italy's Presidency of the Council of Ministers may have also persuaded many of its countrymen that it had a role to play as well.
De adspurgte i de øvrige ni medlemsstater mente, at deres land havde de ringste muligheder for at bidrage til løsning af konfI ikten.
The people of the remaining nine members states ranked their own country as least able to contribute to the resolution of the conflict.
Den 21. august, efter beslutningen om handelsembargo mod Irak, hilste Ministerrådet de forslag velkommen, som Kommissionen forelagde med sigte pá at yde hurtig bistand til flygtninge samt økonomisk og finansielt bistand t i I de lande, der blev hårdest ramt af handelsembargoens følger, nemlig Egypten, Jordan og Tyrkiet.
On 21 August, following the decision to impose a trade embargo on Iraq, the Council of Ministers welcomed the Commission's proposals to provide urgent assistance to refugees as well as economic and financial aid to the countries most affected by the consequences of the trade embargo -Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.
I begyndelsen af september blev der vedtaget en erklæring om relationerne mellem EF og de arabiske lande, der demonstrerede De Tolvs faste vilje til trods krisen at konsolidere og styrke deres historiske bånd med den arabiske verden.
In early September, a Declaration on EC-Arab relations was adopted, demonstrating the Twelve's determination to consolidate and reinforce their historic ties with the Arab world despite the crisis.
Resultaterne af Eurobarometers flash-undersøgelse nr. 3 viser, at der blandt EF-borgerne var overvældende tilslutning til EF's initiativer i forbindelse med Golfkrisen (Diagram 3.3, tabel 39): humanitær bistand til flygtninge blev støttet af 91% af EF-borgerne, mens mere end syv ud af ti tilsluttede sig EF's fremme af langsigtet samarbejde med de arabiske og andre lande i Middelhavsområdet, dets håndtering af embargoen og dets støtte t i I de lande, der blev hårdest ramt af embargoen.
The results of the Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 show there was overwhelming approval by the citizens of the Community of EC initiatives on the Gulf crisis (Figure 3.3, Table 39) : humanitarian aid to refugees received the backing of 91% of EC citizens, while more than seven out of ten people gave a vote of confidence to the EC's promotion of long-term cooperation with Mediterranean and Arab countries; its organisation of the embargo; and its support of countries most affected by the embargo.
Den kraftigste generelle opbakning af foranstaltningerne registreredes blandt hollændere og briter.
Greatest overall backing for the measures came from the Dutch and British.
Mere end tre ud af fem EF-borgere (61%) mente, at deres lands medlemskab af EF havde spillet en vigtig rolle for den holdning, deres regering havde indtaget under krisen.
More than three out of five EC citizens (61%) felt that their country's membership of the European Community had played an important role in the positions taken by their Governments in the crisis.
Dette synspunkt var mest udtalt blandt franskmændene (70%) og italienerne (68%).
The French (70%) and Italians (68%) were the most convinced.
Den eneste undtagelse var Irland, hvor et flertal af dem, der gav udtryk for en holdning, var af den modsatte opfattelse (Diagram 3.4, tabel 40).
The only exception were the Irish, where a majority of those expressing an opinion thought otherwise.
Det at Golfkrisen krævede en så omfattende og kompleks respons fra det internationale samfunds side, satte de forsvars- og udenrigspolitiske bes lutningsmekanismer pá en alvorlig prøve, fordi de endnu ikke var gearet til at håndtere post-ko I dkr igsverdenens realpolitiske udfordringer.
The size and complexity of the international community's response to the Gulf crisis tested the machinery for defence and foreign policy decisionmaking which had not yet been geared to deal with the 'realpolitik' of post-Cold War world.
Og ingen steder var dette mere udtalt end i Europa, hvor den kolde krigs frontlinie, Berlinmuren, lige var gået i opløsning.
In no place was this more true than Europe, where the front-line of the Cold War - the Berlin Wall - had just been broken down.
Rom-Traktaten giver ikke EF hjemmel til at engagere sig i forsvarsspørgsmal.
The Treaty of Rome does not make provision for the Community's involvement in defence matters.
Ikke desto mindre mener mange af EF's politiske ledere og borgere, at tiden nu er inde t i I en ændring på dette punkt.
Nevertheless, many of the Community's political leaders and its citizens both believe the time is now ripe for such a change.
Eurobarometers flash-undersøgelse nr. 3 i begyndelsen af oktober 1990 viste, at 61% fandt en fælles forsvarsorganisation nødvendig for EF, og kun 29% fandt den unødvendig (Tabel 41).
In the Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 in early October 1990, 61% felt that a common defence organisation was necessary for the European Community, while only 29% felt it unnecessary (Table 41).
Efter mødet mellem EF's udenrigsministre i Venedig i midten af oktober, hvor den italienske og belgiske regering slog til lyd for, at der burde overføres langt mere kompetence til EF på udensrigs- og forsvarsområdet, viste Eurobarometers standardundersøgelse nr. 34 i slutningen af oktober, at 70% af EF-borgerne støttede oprettelsen af en fælles forsvarsorganisation, mens kun 17% var imod.
After the Venice meeting of EC Foreign Ministers in mid-October, when the Italian and Belgian Governments suggested that much greater competence should be transfered to the EC on foreign and defence matters, the standard Eurobarometer survey n" 34 in late October showed 70% of EC citizens supporting the formation of a common defence organisation, with only 17% against.
Desuden mente 50%, at der burde oprettes en fælles europæisk interventionsstyrke, der kan gribe ind i sådanne kriser (Diagram 3.5, tabel 42).
In addition, 50% felt a European Rapid Deployment Force should be set up to deal with such crises (Figure 3.5, Table 42).
Oprettelse af en fælles EF-forsvarsorganisation blev i alle EF-lande støttet af de fleste af dem, der havde en mening om spørgsmålet.
Setting up a common EC defence organisation was backed by a majority of people expressing an opinion on the subject in all EC countries.
Idéen om en fælles interventionsstyrke viste sig mere kontroversiel.
The idea of a rapid deployment force proved more controversial.
I lande, der for ikke så længe siden har grebet militært ind i fjerne lande, gik folk kraftigt ind for, at EF også skal have denne funktion; det gælder således briterne (69%), franskmændene (65%) og belgierne (58%).
The people of those countries which have a recent history of military intervention in distant lands - such as the British (69%), French (65%) and Belgians (58%) - were strongly in favour of the EC having such a role as well.
Tilslutningen var desuden mest udtalt fra højre side af det politiske spektrum i Europa, især fra folk, der sympatiserer med Den Europæiske Demokratiske Gruppe (71%), Det Europæiske Højre (67%) og Den Europæiske Demokratiske Alliance (66%).
The idea also received its most emphatic backing from the political right in Europe, especially those sympathetic to the European Democratic Group (71%), the European Right (67%) and the European Democratic Alliance (66%).
De, der var mindst glade for idéen, var tyskerne (35%) og spanierne (33%), tyskerne måske fordi deres forfatning i henhold til den gængse fortolkning forbyder militær indsats uden for NATO's område, spanierne måske pá grund af den udbredte kritik i offentligheden af den spanske flådes engagement i Golfen.
The Germans (35%) and Spanish (33%) liked the idea least, the former perhaps because their constitution is interpreted as forbidding military deployment outside NATO territory, the latter possibly because of considerable public criticism of their navy's involvement in the Gulf.
Eurobarometers flash-undersøgelse nr. 3 viste, at folk var meget delt pá spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt udviklingen henimod en politisk union var blevet gjort lettere (33%) eller vanskeligere (25%) af krisen, eller om den ikke havde haft nogen indflydelse (32%), men de fleste mente dog, at krisen snarere havde fremmet end bremset denne udvikling (Diagram 3.2, tabel 43).
The Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3 showed that people were divided as to whether progress towards political union had been made easier (33%), more difficult (25%) or remained unchanged (32%) by the crisis, although more people believed it had been helped rather than hindered (Figure 3.6, Table 43).
Da EF-borgerne i forbindelse med Eurobarometers standardundersøgelse nr. 34 blev spurgt, om de syntes, at EF skal fremskynde den politiske, økonomiske og monetære integration som følge af krisen, sagde 61% Ja og kun 19% nej.
However, when EC citizens were asked in the standard Eurobarometer survey n° 34 whether they agreed or disagreed that the Community should speed up its political, economic and monetary integration as a consequence of the crisis, 61% said it should, while only 19% said it should not.
Italienerne var dem, der var mest ivrige efter at få fremskyndet integrationen (69%), efterfulgt af tyskerne (67%), portugiserne (66%), belgierne og grækerne (begge 65%).
The Italians were the most enthusiastic about speeding up integration (69%), followed by the Germans (67%), Portuguese (66%), Belgians and Greeks (65% each).
Kun danskerne var meget forbeholdne over for idéen (43% for og 45% imod).
Only the Danes were unsure as to whether it was a good idea (43% agree; 45% disagree).
Som tidligere omtalt har EF under hele Golfkrisen bestræbt sig på at bevare stærke forbindelser til den arabiske verden.
As previously mentioned, the European Community has been concerned throughout the Gulf crisis about maintaining strong links with the Arab World.
I september 1990 gik den italienske og den spanske regering så vidt som t i I at anbefale etablering af en stående konference om sikkerhed og samarbejde i Middelhavsområdet i lighed med den velkendte konference om sikkerhed og samarbejde i Europa.
In September 1990, the Italian and Spanish Governments had gone as far as to suggest the formation of a permanent Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, modelled on the well-known Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Golfkrisen synes ikke at have gjort mange EF-borgere mere negative over for den arabiske verden som helhed (Tabel 44).
The Gulf crisis does not seem to have made many Community citizens more negative about the Arab World in general (Table 44).
I Eurobarometers flash-undersøgelse nr. 3 udtalte 70% af de adspurgte, at deres holdning til den arabiske verden som helhed ikke var blevet ændret som følge af krisen, mens kun 21% udtalte, at de nu forholdt sig mere afvisende.
In Flash Eurobarometer survey N° 3, 70% of EC citizens felt their views about the Arab world in general had not changed as a consequence of the crisis, while only 21% said they had become more negative.
Spanierne (13%), franskmændene (17%) og briterne (17%) udviste mindst forandring i negativ retning, mens holdningen hos belgierne udviste den største ændring i negativ retning (30% sagde "mindre positvt").
The Spanish (13%), French (17%) and British (17%) were the least negatively affected, while Belgian attitudes were the most negatively affected (30% "less favourable").
Det samme gælder i store træk for europæernes holdning t i I de muslimer, der lever i EF.
The same is broadly true concerning European attitudes towards Muslims living in the EC.
77% af EF-borgerne udtalte, at de ikke havde ændret holdning, mens 15% fandt, at de nu havde en mindre positiv indstilling til dem end før Golfkrisen.
77% of EC citizens said their views had not changed about them, while 15% felt they had a less favourable opinion of them than before the Gulf crisis happened.
Her var udviklingen i negativ retning mindst hos irerne (9%) og luxembourgerne (11%) (Diagram 3.7, tabel 45).
This time, the Irish (9%) and Luxembourgers (11%) had been least affected in a negative way (Figure 3.7, Table 45).
3.4 RISIKOEN FOR KRIG INDEN FOR DE KOMMENDE TOLV MANEDER
3.4 THREAT OF WAR OVER THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS
Til trods for Vestens enorme militære opbygning i Golfomrádet syntes der blandt EF-borgerne at herske usikkerhed om, hvorvidt dette i sidste ende ville føre til krig.
Despite the vast Western military build-up taking place in the Gulf, EC citizens seemed to remain uncertain as to whether this would all lead to war in the end. The standard Eurobarometer survey
Eurobarometers standardundersøgelse nr. 34 viste, at lidt over halvdelen af EF-borgerne (52%) i oktober 1990 mente, at det var usandsynligt, at der inden for de kommende tolv måneder ville komme en krig med deltagelse af militærstyrker fra flere europæiske lande.
34 showed that just over half of all EC citizens (52%) felt in October 1990 that war involving military forces from several European countries was unlikely in the next 12 months.
Knap to ud af fem (39%) mente, at en sådan krig var sandsynlig, mens 9% svarede "ved ikke" (Diagram 3.8, tabel 46).
Almost two out of five (39%) said it was likely, while 9% did not know (Figure 3.8, Table 46).
Det synspunkt, at en krig var sandsynlig kom stærkest til udtryk blandt briterne (62%), danskerne (59%) og hollænderne (55%).
The sentiment that war was likely was the strongest among the British (62%), Danes (59%) and Dutch (55%).
Franskmændene, luxembourgerne og portugiserne stod splittet, mens de fleste i de øvrige EF-lande var helt overbevist om, at der ikke ville komme en kr ig.
The French, Luxembourgers and Portuguese were undecided, while a majority of people from other EC members states were quite convinced that war would not happen.
Måske pá grund af Golfkrisen og de tiltagende uroligheder i Sovjetunionen mente halvdelen af EF-borgerne (50%), at den internationale situation som helhed ville blive vanskelig i 19919, hvilket er dobbelt så mange som året før (27%) og det højste tal siden begyndelsen af 80'erne (Tabel 47).
Perhaps as a consequence of the Gulf crisis and growing turbulence within the Soviet Union, half of EC citizens (50%) believed the overall international situation9would be troubled in 1991, almost double the percentage (27%) who made that prediction for the previous year and the largest number since the early eighties (Table 47).
Også her var briterne (67%), hollænderne (66%) og danskerne (57%) dem, der hyppigst gav udtryk for, at de fandt udsigterne problematiske.
The British (67%), Dutch (66%) and Danes (57%) once again were the most convinced that there would be trouble.
Generelt voksede frygten for en verdenskrig inden for de kommende 10 år til niveauet fra 1982-83, hvor præsident Reagan's oprustningspoli t ik var pá sit højeste.
Overall worries about a world war happening in the next ten years rose to the levels of 1982-3, the height of the President Reagan's arms build-up.
Troen på, at der vi I komme en verdenskrig, var mest udtalt blandt irere og briter (Tabel 48).
The Irish and British were the most convinced that a world war might break out (Table 48).
Der kan måske drages en række konklusioner om, hvilke mere langsigtede virkninger denne krise kan få for udviklingen i Europa:
A number of conclusions might be drawn about the effects that this crisis may have in the longerterm on Europe and its development:
*Den højspændte atmosfære, som Golfkrisen har skabt, har fået EF-borgerne til at nyvurdere behovet for øget indbyrdes solidaritet, både politisk og militært.
* The highly-charged atmosphere created by the Gulf crisis has made EC citizens rethink the need for greater solidarity with each other, both in political and military terms.
*De fleste i hvert EF-land støtter de foranstaltninger, EF har taget som følge af krisen.
* Most people from each EC country support the measures that the Community has taken as a consequence of the crisis.
Det ser ud til, at EF også har en stærk folkelig opbakning t i I at indlede drøftelser om oprettelse af en fælles EF-forsvarsorganisation.
It seems that the Community has strong popular backing to begin discussions on the formation of an EC common defence organization as well.
•Briterne, der normalt er forbeholdne over for ethvert skridt, der fører til øget europæisk enhed, er meget ivrige efter at etablere snævrere militære bånd inden for EF, og de er især ivrige efter en fælles europæisk forsvarsorganisation og oven i købet en europæisk interventionstyrke.
* The British, normally reticent about any move leading to greater European unity, are very keen to establish closer military ties within the Community, especially a common European defence organisation and even a European Rapid Deployment Force.
Dette skal imidlertid Ikke ses som en afvisning af NATO, som briterne føler sig stærkt knyttet til, ganske som de Øvrige EF-nationer undtagen irerne (se Eurobarometers rapport nr. 32).
This should not, however, be seen as any rejection of NATO, to which the British are closely wedded, along with all the other members of the Community except the Irish (see Eurobarometer Report N° 32).
Nogle kommentatorer har anført, at Den Vesteuropæiske Union - som ni EF-lande er medlem af - måske kan blive grundlaget for et forsvarssystem, der omfatter hele EF.
Some commentators have speculated that the Western European Union - to which nine EC countries belong - may become the foundation of a Community-wide defence system.
Uanset hvad resultatet af Golfkrisen bliver, kan Iraks invasion af Kuwait vise sig i høj grad at virke befordrende på udviklingen henimod en sådan sikkerhedsstruktur for Fællesskabet.
Whatever the outcome of the Gulf crisis, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq may be an important step towards the development of such a security structure for the Community.
Trods betydelige forskelle i omfanget af de enkelte landes respons på Golfkrisen er det tydeligt, at folkene i EF ønsker at give Fællesskabet indflydelse i forsvarsspørgsmal. og i hvert fald er lederne i Fællesskabet nu nødt t i I at overveje, hvordan de kan etablere mekanismer, der kan reagere mere beslutsomt pá lignende kriser i fremtiden.
Despite major differences in individual country's level of response towards the Gulf crisis, it is evident that the people of the Community wish to give it a say over defence matters. At the very least, the Community's leaders now need to assess how they might create future mechanisms to react more decisively to similar crises in the future.
I kølvandet pá Sovjetunionens gradvise tilbagetrækning fra Central- og Østeuropa er der opstået et politisk og økonomisk tomrum, som har medført meget ustabile forhold og vanskelige levevilkår.
The gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Central and Eastern Europe has created a political and economic vacuum in its wake, which is causing considerable instability and hardship for the region.
De central- og østeuropæiske lande vender sig i stadig højere grad mod Vesten med det formål både at anmode om støtte på kort sigt og at knytte længerevarende forbindelser.
Central and Eastern Europeans are turning more and more to the West, both for short-term assistance and longerterm ties.
Det Europæiske Fællesskab, i hvis "baggård" de central- og østeuropæiske lande nu befinder sig, har de bedste muligheder for at hjælpe dem.
The European Community, in whose 'backyard' Central and Eastern Europe now lies, is in the best position to help them.
Disse dramatiske omvæltninger har også bevirket, at det nu for første gang er muligt for udefra kommende at gennemføre meningsmålinger i Central- og Østeuropa.
These dramatic changes have also now made it possible for Outsiders' to survey public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe for the first time.
I Eurobarometer nr. 33 gengav man resultaterne af meningsmålinger, der var gennemført for Kommissionens kontor for meningsmålinger og analyser i Tjekkoslovakiet, østtyskland, Litauen, Moskva og den europæiske del af Sovjetunionen.
In Eurobarometer Report N° 33, results were given for polls commissioned by "Surveys, Research, Analyses" in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Lithuania, Moscow and the European parts of Soviet Union.
I oktober 1990 blev der gennemført yderligere tre generelle meningsmålinger i Tjekkoslovakiet, Ungarn og Polen10.
In October 19§0, three additional polls were conducted among the general public in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland10.