natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Retten præciserede, at denne mangel kunne have været afhjulpet, hvis Kommissionen havde godtgjort, at han blot havde signeret på kopier af de beslutninger, virksomhederne fik meddelt, og at originalerne var underskrevet af en kompetent person.
This defect could have been remedied had the Commission proved that he had signed only copies of the Decisions notified tothe undertakings and that the originals had been signed by a duly authorizedperson.
Kommissionen var imidlertid ikke i stand til at fremlægge originaludgaverne af disse beslutninger.
However, the Commission was unable to produce the original versions.
Disse ændringer i teksterne og den udstedende myndigheds manglende kompetence kunne have været anført som begrundelse for at annullere beslutningerne.
The textual alterations and the lack of competence of the authority issuing themeasures could have been considered grounds for annulling the Decisions.
185 hæftet med særlig grove og åbenbare mangler.
In the Court's view a measure may be declared nonexistent where it is vitiated by particularly serious and manifest defects.
Spørgsmål om en retsakts nullitet har offentlig interesse, og en domstol kan rejse det på eget initiativ på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt under behandlingen af en sag.
Theplea of non-existence concerns a matter of public interest which may be reliedupon at any time during the proceedings and which a court must raise of itsown motion.
I lyset af de allerede påviste alvorlige mangler gav Retten Kommissionen pålæg om at fremlægge den originale, stadfæste de kommissionsbeslutning.
In the light of the serious defects already found to exist, the Court called upon the Commission to produce the Decisions in their original,authenticated form.
De eneste dokumenter, Kommissionen fremlagde, var bcslutningsudkastenc på tre sprog, to uddrag af mødeprotokollen og skrivelsen af 5. januar 1989 underskrevet af kommissionsmedlemmet.
The only documents submitted by the Commission werethe draft Decisions in the three languages, two extracts from minutes and aletter dated 5 January 1989 signed by a Member of the Commission.
Ifølge Førsteinstansretten kunne det derfor ikke påvises, at artikel 12 var blevet overholdt.
The Court held that, under the circumstances, it could not be establishedthat Article 12 had been complied with.
Denne bestemmelse havde fundamental betydning for retssikkerheden, for kun når en retsakt er vedtaget af den samlede Kommission som kollegium og gyldigt stadfæstet af mødeprotokollen, er det muligt at være sikker på den pågældende retsakts eksistens og indhold og på, at den svarer nøjagtigt til Kommissionens intentioner.
That provision was of fundamentalimportance as a means of creating legal certainty for those subject to measuresadopted by the full Commission, because only adoption by the full Commissionand authentication by the minutes of the meeting made it possible to be certainof a measure's existence and of its content and to be sure that it correspondedexactly to the Commission's intentions.
Betydningen af en gyldig stadfæstelse bestyrkes af, at institutionens forretningsorden skal yde fysiske og juridiske personer en garanti for rettigheder og retssikkerhed.
The importance of authentication wasborne out by the fact that natural and legal persons could rely upon theinstitution's rules of procedure in so far as the provisions thereof created rightsand contributed to legal certainty for such persons.
Førsteinstansretten henviste i den forbindelse til EØF-Traktatens artikel 192, som giver nationale domstole adgang til at efterprøve EF-retsakters ægthed.
The Court referred in thisconnection to Article 192 of the Treaty, which empowers national courts toverify the authenticity of Community measures.
Retten udtalte, at den manglende stadfæstelse i denne sag indebar, at det ikke var muligt med nøjagtighed at afgøre, på hvilken dato disse retsakter var udstedt, hvad der var deres indhold, og hvem der havde udstedt dem. Retten konkluderede, at de ikke kunne betragtes som beslutninger efter EØF-Traktatens artikel 189.
The Court considered that, as a result of the lack of authentication in thepresent case, it was impossible to determine precisely the date and content ofthe measures and the authority issuing them.
Da sagerne var anlagt mod ikkeeksisterende beslutninger, blev de derfor afvist.
Hence the applications had been made in respect of non-existentdecisions and were dismissed as inadmissible.
Kommissionen er på næsten alle punkter uenig med Førsteinstansretten og har der for appelleret denne afgørelse.
The Commission disagrees with virtually all the Court's findings and hasappealed against the judgment.
Kommissionens beføjelser til at afvise at behandle klager
Commission's power to reject complaints
Sag T-24/901) drejede sig om BMW Italias beslutning om ikke at forny sin kontrakt med selskabet Automec om forhandling af BMW-biler i Treviso-provinsen.
Underlying the Automec case* is a decision by BMW Italia not to renewits agreement with Automec for the distribution of BMW vehicles in the Italianprovince of Treviso.
') Dom af 18.9.1992, Automec SRC mod Kommissionen.
Judgment of 18 September 1992, Case T-24/90, not yet reported.
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER
BMW's conduct infringed Article 85 of the Treaty.
Automec's klage blev den 28. februar 1990 afvist ved en beslutning truffet af Kom missionens medlem med ansvar for konkurrencespørgsmål, bl.a. under henvisning til, at sagen ville kunne afgøres af en national domstol.
The complaint was rejected on 28 February 1990 by decision of the Memberof the Commission responsible for competition matters, on the ground inter aliathat the case was one which could be dealt with by a national court.
Det var denne beslutning, Automec indankede for Førsteinstansretten, men som det fremgår af det følgende uden at få medhold.
It wasagainst that decision that Automec lodged this application, which the Court of First Instance dismissed as inadmissible.
Førsteinstansretten måtte først tage stilling til, om Kommissionen efter eget skøn kan afvise at behandle indbragte klager, eller om den tværtimod har pligt til at tage sagen op, hver gang den modtager en klage.
The Court had first of all to decide whether the Commission had a discretionarypower to reject complaints submitted to it, or, on the contrary, whether it wasrequired to open an investigation whenever it received a complaint.
Det er et spørgsmål, der i praksis har betydelig rækkevidde.
The practical significance of this question is considerable.
Retten drog den konklusion, at Kommissionen ikke har pligt til at behandle alle klager.
The Court found that the Commission was not obliged to investigate everycomplaint.
Klagere har således ingen ret til at kræve en beslutning om, hvorvidt der foreligger en overtrædelse eller ej — undtagen når genstanden for klagen henhører under Kommissionens enekompetence, f.eks. når der er tale om at tilbagekalde en fritagelse. se.
Complainants were not entitled to a decision as to the existence orotherwise of the infringement they alleged had been committed, except wherethe subject-matter of the complaint fell within the Commission's exclusivejurisdiction, as was the case, for example, with the withdrawal of an exemption.
Kommissionen kan således frit foretage en prioritering af, hvilke klager den vil be handle.
The Commission was therefore free to define priorities in dealing with complaints.
Dog er den under alle omstændigheder forpligtet til at foretage en indgående vurdering af de faktiske og retlige omstændigheder, den får forelagt af klageren.
Of course, it had always to examine carefully the points of law and fact towhich the complainant had drawn its attention.
I den kon krete sag fandt Førsteinstansretten, at denne betingelse var opfyldt.
In the present case the Courtheld that this condition had been satisfied.The second question which the Court considered in this context was no lessimportant: was the Commission, in determining the degree of priority to beapplied to the examination of alleged infringements, justified in referring to the Community interest of the case?
Også dette spørgsmål besvarede Retten bekræftende, eftersom Kommissionen er en administrativ myndighed, der skal handle i den offentlige interesse.
The Court answered this question too in the affirmative: the Commission wasan administrative authority which had to act in the public interest.
Retten præciserede, at der her ikke er tale om noget abstrakt kriterium.
The Court said that such reference to the Community interest could not bemade in an abstract manner.
Kommissionen har pligt til at redegøre for, ud fra hvilke faktiske og retlige omstændigheder den har konkluderet, at der ikke foreligger nogen tilstrækkelig EF-interesse.
The Commission was required to set forth thefactual and legal considerations which prompted it to conclude that there wasinsufficient Community interest.
Den kan bl.a. tage hensyn til den påståede overtrædelses virkninger for fællesmarkedet, mulighederne for at bevise, at der foreligger en overtrædelse, og omfanget af de undersøgelser, dette vil kræve.
It should take into account inter alia theimpact of the alleged infringement on the functioning of the common market,
Endelig bemærkede Retten, at et af de elementer, Kommissionen kunne tage hensyn til i sin vurdering af den offentlige EF-interesse i at tage en sag op, er, om der foreligger en gruppefritagelsesforordning på det pågældende område.
Lastly, the Court pointed out that the existence of a block exemption Regulation, assuming it was applicable, was a factor the Commission could takeinto account in assessing the Community public interest in carrying out aninvestigation.
For hovedformålet med gruppefritagelsesforordningerne er netop at begrænse antallet af anmeldelser og individuelle undersøgelser af aftaler på det pågældende område.
The principal objective of block exemptions was to limit the needfor notification and individual scrutiny of the contracts employed in the areaof activity concerned.
Sådanne forordninger gør det i øvrigt også lettere for de nationale dommere at håndhæve konkurrenceretten. ceretten.
The existence of such Regulations also facilitated theapplication of competition law by national courts.
I forbindelse med sin indgående analyse af Kommissionens beføjelser til at afvise at tage klager op benyttede Førsteinstansretten lejligheden til i overensstemmelse med den hidtidige retspraksis, bl.a. Delimitis-dommen1), at fremhæve den vigtige rolle, de nationale dommere kan spille med hensyn til anvendelsen af EF's konkurrence ret.
The Court's detailed analysis of the Commission's power to reject a complaintafforded it an opportunity to reaffirm, in the light of previous judgments, inparticular that in Delimitis,1the major role national courts could play inapplying Community competition law.
Dette falder i øvrigt helt i tråd med den meddelelse, Kommissionen har udsendt herom.
This development is taken fully intoaccount by the Commission in its Notice on the subject.
I en dom af 18. september tog Førsteinstansretten stilling til et passivitets- og erstatningssøgsmål mod Kommissionen, som ifølge sagsøgerne havde undladt at be handle en klage over en kartelaftale mellem importørerne af 5 japanske bilmærker i Frankrig, som var indgået med den franske regerings billigelse og havde til formål at forhindre import af biler af andre japanske mærker2).
In Asia Motor France the Court of First Instance pronounced on theadmissibility of an action for failure to act, with an application for compensationfor that failure.2The applicants claimed that the Commission was at fault fornot acting on their complaint concerning the existence of a restrictive agreementbetween the French importers of five makes of Japanese car.
Kommissionen havde afvist klagen med den begrundelse, at de implicerede virksomheder ikke havde kunnet handle uafhængigt i den konkrete sag.
The agreement,which had been concluded under the auspices of the French Government, soughtto prevent the importation into France of other makes of Japanese car.
Klagen blev imidlertid først afvist, efter at passivitetssøgsmålet var blevet anlagt. Retten fandt, at formålet med et sådant søgsmål er at tvinge den passive institution til at handle i henhold til artikel 176.
The Commission had rejected the complaint on the ground that the undertakingswhose conduct was put in question had no operational leeway in the matter.But the Commission's rejection of the complaint had come after the action forfailure to act had been brought.
Har den pågældende institution, således som det her var tilfældet, handlet, efter at søgsmålet blev anlagt, men før dommen blev afsagt, måtte søgsmålets genstand betragtes som bortfaldet.
The Court held that the nature of such an actionwas to require the defendant institution to act, in pursuance of Article 176.Consequently, the action became devoid of purpose if, as in the present case,
') Dom af 28.2.1991, sag C-234/89. 2) Sag T-28/90, Asia Motor France mod Kommissionen.
Case C-234/89 [1991] ECR 1-935.Judgment of 18 September, Case T-28/90 Asia Motor France and Others v Commission, not yet reported.
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER d) Kommissionens beføjelser til at iværksætte foreløbige forholdsregler
Commission's power to adopt interim measures
Ved dom af 24. januar (sag T-44/90, La Cinq) annullerede Førsteinstansretten en beslutning, hvorved Kommissionen havde nægtet at iværksætte foreløbige for holdsregler efter en klage fra en fransk tv-kanal, La Cinq, der påstod, at Den Europæiske Radiounion (European Broadcasting Union — EBU) havde handlet i strid med artikel 85 og 86.
By its judgment of 24 January in Case T-44/90 La Cinq the Court of First Instance annulled the Decision whereby the Commission had refused totake interim measures in response to a complaint by a French television channel,La Cinq, alleging that the conduct of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)infringed Articles 85 and 86.
La Cinq klagede over, at EBU's organer på diskriminerende vis havde afvist at op tage La Cinq i EBU, selv om La Cinq opfyldte de nødvendige betingelser for at blive medlem (hvilket kunne have givet tv-kanalen adgang til Eurovisions-nettet med ny heds- og sportsudsendelser).
La Cinq submitted that it satisfied the criteria for membership of the EBU(which would have afforded it access to the Eurovision network for news andsport), but that the EBU had rejected its application in a discriminatory manner.
Kommissionen havde nægtet at efterkomme La Cinq's anmodning, dels fordi der efter en summarisk gennemgang af sagens omstændigheder ikke umiddelbart antoges at foreligge en overtrædelse, og dels fordi La Cinq ikke var blevet påført uoprettelig skade, idet tv-kanalen under alle omstændigheder via aftaler havde kunnet få adgang til EBU-nettet.
The Commission had refused to act upon the complaint on the grounds, firstly,that it did not appear prima facie from a summary consideration of the factsthat any infringement had been committed, and secondly, that no irreparabledamage had been suffered by La Cinq, which had at all events been able tojoin the EBU network on a contractual basis.
I sin dom erindrede Førsteinstansretten indledningsvis om, at der kun er to betingelser, der kræves opfyldt, for at der kan iværksættes foreløbige forholdsregler: For det første at der foreligger en praksis, som umiddelbart betragtet kan antages at være i strid med konkurrencereglerne, og for det andet, at der er risiko for alvorlig og uoprettelig skade.
In its judgment the Court made the preliminary observation that only twoconditions had to be met before interim measures could be granted: theexistence of practices which were prima facie likely to constitute a breach of thecompetition rules, and a risk of serious and irreparable damage.
Efter Rettens opfattelse indgik der i den anden betingelse også et krav om uopsættelighed.
In the Court'sview, the concept of urgency was included in the second condition.
Retten fastslog derefter, at Kommissionen i den konkrete sag havde begået to juridiske fejl.
The Court went on to state that, in the present case, the Commission hadcommitted two errors of law.
For det første udtalte Retten, at i modsætning til, hvad Kommissionen havde gjort gældende, indebar den første betingelse ikke, at det allerede ud fra en umiddelbar vurdering skal være godtgjort, at der foreligger en klar og åbenbar overtrædelse.
Firstly, contrary to what the Commission had maintained, the first conditiondid not mean that the existence of a clear and flagrant infringement had to beestablished at the stage of the mere prima facie assessment.
Kravet om, at der skal være en umiddelbar formodning for en overtrædelse (»prima facie«), er ikke det samme som det krav om sikkerhed, den endelige beslutning skal opfylde.
The requirementof a prima facie infringement could not be equated with the requirement ofcertainty which a final decision had to satisfy.
For det andet måtte den anden betingelse ikke fortolkes således, at der kun er tale om de tab, der ikke vil kunne oprettes ved nogen senere beslutning.
Secondly, the second condition should not be interpreted as meaning that onlydamage which could not be remedied by a subsequent decision could be
Kommissionen havde således tilsidesat den forpligtelse, der påhviler den, til at tage hensyn til alle relevante elementer i den konkrete sag ved vurderingen af, om der forelå risiko for al vorlig og uoprettelig skade.
It followed that the Commission had failed to fulfil its obligation to takeinto account all the relevant facts in the present case in order to determine theexistence of a risk of serious and irreparable damage.
e) Samarbejde med de nationale myndigheder
Cooperation with national authorities
I sin dom i Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia (DGDC) mod Asociación Española de la Banca Privada m.fl.2), der blev afsagt efter et præjudici elt spørgsmål fra Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia, præciserede EF-Domsto-lcn, hvilke muligheder de nationale konkurrencemyndigheder har for at benytte op lysninger fremsendt af Kommissionen i henhold til artikel 10 i forordning (EØF) nr. 17.
In its judgment in the 'Spanish banks' case,2which was delivered inresponse to a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Spanish Competition Court, the Court of Justice set forth the conditions under which nationalcompetition authorities may use information supplied to them by the Commission under Article 10 of Regulation No 17.
I henhold til denne bestemmelse sender Kommissionen omgående de kompetente nationale myndigheder en kopi af de begæringer og anmeldelser, der indgives af virk somheder i henhold til artikel 2, 4 og 5 i forordning nr. 17, samt de vigtigste dokumenter, den kommer i besiddelse af, herunder også efter begæringer om oplysninger til de pågældende virksomheder efter samme forordnings artikel 11.
That Article provides that the Commission shall forthwith transmit to thecompetent national authorities a copy of the applications and notificationslodged with it by undertakings in accordance with Articles 2, 4 and 5 of Regulation No 17, together with copies of the most important documents sentto it and of any requests for information addressed to the undertakings under Article 11 of the same Regulation.
I den konkrete sag gjorde de spanske banker gældende, at DGDC havde rejst en straffesag mod dem for overtrædelse af den spanske lovgivning på basis af oplysninger, som ikke var blevet indhentet af dem selv, men derimod af Kommissionen.
In the present case, the Spanish banks considered that the competition authority,the DGDC, had initiated proceedings against them for infringing Spanish lawon the strength of information obtained, not by that body itself, but by the Commission.
Den spanske domstol ønskede at få at vide, om en national myndighed med kom petence til at anvende artikel 85 og 86 kan gøre brug af oplysninger, som Kommissionen er kommet i besiddelse af efter en begæring om oplysninger eller ved en an meldelse, når der er tale om udelukkende at anvende den nationale konkurrencelov givning eller udelukkende EF-reglerne eller såvel den nationale lovgivning som EF-rcglcrne.
The court making the reference asked whether the national authority responsiblefor applying Articles 85 and 86 could use information obtained by the Commission following a request for information or a notification where the authority
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER vendelse af national ret, EF-ret eller begge.
In its reply the Court did not draw any distinction based on the nature —whether national, Community or both — of the rules applied.
Domstolen svarede benægtende i alle tre tilfælde, bl.a. på grundlag af de generelle principper i forordning nr. 17.
Basing its considerations on the general scheme of Regulation No 17, it repliedin the negative in all three cases.
Den fastslog specielt, at de oplysninger, de nationale myndigheder får af Kommissionen, fremsendes i henhold til en forordning, der ikke finder anvendelse på de nationale myndigheders sagsbehandling, heller ikke i det til fælde, hvor der er tale om anvendelse af artikel 85, stk. 1, eller artikel 86.
It pointed out in particular that the informationfurnished to national authorities by the Commission was communicated undera Regulation which was not concerned with proceedings conducted by Member States' competent authorities, even where the purpose of those proceedingswas to implement Articles 85(1) and 86.
Disse myndigheders sagsbehandling adskiller sig fra Kommissionens, og de nationale myndigheder skal i deres indsamling af bevismateriale følge den nationale lovgivning.
The proceedings conducted by thoseauthorities were distinct from those conducted by the Commission and thegathering of evidence by those authorities was governed by national law.
Også de nationale myndigheders anvendelse af artikel 85, stk. 1, og artikel 86 er underlagt den nationale retspleje.
Eventhe implementation of Articles 85(1) and 86 by national authorities was subjectto national procedural rules.
Desuden må medlemsstaternes kompetente myndigheder og deres embedsmænd i henhold til forordning nr. 17 ikke videregive fortrolige oplysninger.
Regulation No 17 required Member States' competent authorities and theirofficials to refrain from communicating confidential information.
På konkurrence området er denne bestemmelse således en konkretisering af den generelle tavshedspligt i henhold til Traktatens artikel 214.
That provision thus implemented in its field of application the general obligation ofprofessional secrecy imposed by Article 214 of the Treaty.
I den forbindelse kom Domstolen desuden ind på retten til kontradiktion, som ikke ville blive respekteret, hvis en anden myndighed end Kommissionen kunne gøre brug af oplysninger indhentet i henhold til forordning nr. 17 i sagsforhold, der ikke er omfattet af denne forordning.
In addition, therights of the defence would not be observed if an authority other than the Commission could use information acquired under Regulation No 17 as evidence in proceedings which were not governed by that Regulation.
Domstolen modificerede imidlertid disse udtalelser noget ved at anerkende, at nationale myndigheder, der modtager sådanne oplysninger, kan betragte dem som indicier, der kan lægges til grund for indledning af en national sagsbehandling.
The Court moderated the force of its prohibition, however, by acknowledgingthat such information could be treated by the national authorities receiving itas evidence capable of justifying the initiation of a national proceeding.
Men for at der i en national sagsbehandling gyldigt kan tages hensyn til forhold, der fremgår af sådanne oplysninger, må de kunne bevises, ikke ved hjælp af dokumenter indsamlet af Kommissionen, men derimod ved hjælp af de i den nationale ret hjemlede bevis midler og under overholdelse af de deri fastsatte retsgarantier.
But inorder that facts mentioned in such material might validly form the subject of anational proceeding, proof of their existence had to be established, not by thedocuments gathered by the Commission, but by evidence which was appropriateto national law and which observed the guarantees laid down by that law.
f) Betingelser for anvendelse af artikel 15, stk. 6, i forordning nr. 17
Conditions governing the application of Article 15(6)of Regulation No 17