natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
EUA indkomst inkl. sociale ydelser med den indkomst, de ville have, såfremt der ikke fandtes noget socialbeskyt­telsessystem.Hvis fattigdomsgræn­sen i et land defineres som 50% af den gennemsnitlige indkomst, der er til rådighed pr. forbrugsenhed, hvil­ket er det hyppigst anvendte mål, vi­ser resultaterne af ovennævnte un­dersøgelse, at en væsentlig del af husstandene ligger under fattigdoms­grænsen i samtlige medlemsstater, selv efter at de har modtaget sociale ydelser (se indrammet artikel, som giver en forklaring på de metoder, der er anvendt for at standardisere hus­standsindkomsten).
If the poverty line in any country is defined as 50% of average dispos­able income per consumption unit, which is the most frequent measure used, the results of the exercise de­scribed above show that in all Mem­ber States, even after receiving social benefits, a significant proportion of households fall below the poverty line (see Box for an explanation of the methods used to standardise household income).
Denne andel er i almindelighed større for de fattigere lande end for de rigere.
This proportion, is in general greater for the poorer countries than for the more pros­perous.
I Grækenland udgjorde den i midten af 80'erne 20% og i Italien og Irland 17­18%, mens den i Nederlandene kun var på 7% og i Belgien knap 6% (graf 8).
In Greece in the mid-1980s it amounted to 20% and in Italy and Ireland, 17-18%, while in the Netherlands, the proportion was only 7% and in Belgium, just under 6% (Graph 8).
Indikatorer for effektiviteten af sociale beskyttelsessystemer, i midten af 80'erne
Indicators of the effectiveness of social protection systems, mid-1980s
Det bør dog understreges, at den her anvendte definition af fattigdom ikke nødvendigvis er en, som alle landene i undersøgelsen ville tilslutte sig, og det er endnu mindre en definition, der typisk anvendes ved forvaltningen af socialsikringsordninger.
It should be emphasised, however, that the definition of poverty used here is not necessarily one which would be agreed by all the countries included in the analysis, still less is it one which is typically used in the administration of social security sys­tems.
I forhold til de opstillede nationale mål indebæ­rer ovenstående resultater således ikke nødvendigvis, at det ikke er lyk­kedes systemerne at forhindre folk i at leve i fattigdom og nød.
In terms of the national objec­tives set, therefore, the above results do not necessarily signify a failure on the part of these systems to pre­vent people living in poverty and deprivation.
Indikator 2 = Procentvis indsnævring af fattigdomskløften
Indicator 2 = % reduction in the poverty gap
Men som bemærket ovenfor giver disse tal, selv når der tages hensyn til
As noted above, however, even in terms of the definition of poverty chosen, these figures in themselves
Indikatorer for effektiviteten af socialbeskyttelsessystemer definitionsforskelle, kun til dels op lysning om den sociale sikrings ef fektivitet i de forskellige lande, da de ikke siger noget om, hvor stort problemet er.
Indicators of the effectiveness of social protection systems give only a partial indication of the effectiveness of social security in the various countries, since they say nothing about the scale of the problem which is being addressed.
Med andre ord er det ved enhver vurdering vigtigt også at se på det niveau, indkomsten ville have ligget på uden social beskyttelse.
In other words, it is important in any assessment also to consider what the levels of income would have been without social protection.
Der er to hovedmetoder til måling af socialbeskyttelsessystemers virkning på fattigdom.
There are two main ways of measuring the effects of systems of social protection on poverty.
Den ene går ud på at tælle antallet af husstande eller enkeltpersoner, hvis indkomst falder under et bestemt niveau, før og efter at der er taget hensyn til sociale overførsler.
One consists of counting the number of households or individuals whose income falls below a specified level before and after taking account of social transfers.
Den anden går ud på at måle den såkaldte "fattigdomskløft", dvs. måle i hvilken udstrækning fattige husstandes eller enkeltpersoners indkomst falder under det fastlagte ind komstniveau før og efter sociale overførsler.
The other consists of assessing the socalled "poverty gap", ie the extent to which the income of poor house holds or individuals falls below the level of income so specified before and after social transfers.
Ved en fuldstændig vurdering skal der tages hensyn til begge disse indikatorer.
A complete evaluation needs to take account of both of these indicators.
Med andre ord skal successen af et hvilket som helst socialbeskyttelsessystem måles på grund lag af såvel antallet af husstande eller enkeltpersoner, hvis indkomst bringes op over fattigdomsgrænsen, som antallet af husstande og enkelt personer, der forbliver under fattigdomsgrænsen selv efter at have modta get sociale overførsler.
In other words, the success of any social protection system in alleviating poverty needs to be measured in terms of both the number of households or individuals whose income it raises above the poverty line and the extent to which households or individuals remain below the poverty line even after receiving social transfers.
Resultaterne af denne beregning er noget overraskende meget forskellig fra de resultater, man når, når der tages hensyn til de sociale overførslers virkning.
The results of this calculation, some what surprisingly, differ markedly from the position including the effect of social transfers.
For det første er forskellene mellem den andel af husstande, der ligger under fattigdomsgrænsen, meget mindre, nemlig fra 46% i Frankrig og Irland til 3839% i Grækenland og Luxembourg (graf 8).
In the first place, the extent of variation between Member States in the proportion of households falling below the poverty line is much less, varying from 46% in France and Ireland to 38-39% in Greece and Luxembourg (Graph 8).
Det synes således, som om det oprindelige omfang af det problem, der søges afhjulpet ved social beskyttelsesordninger, er stort set det samme i de forskellige medlemsstater. ter.
This would seem to indicate, there fore, that the initial scale of the problem which social protection systems are trying to alleviate is much the same in the different Member States.
Forskellene mellem de for skellige vurderingsmetoder kan beskrives i diagrammet, hvor den vandrette akse vi ser antallet af husstande ordnet efter indkomstniveau med de fattigste til venstre, og den lodrette akse viser den disponible net toindkomst.
The difference between various methods of evaluation can be described in the diagram in which the horizontal axis shows numbers of households ranked by the level of income, with the poorest households on the left, and the vertical axis shows the net disposable in come.
For det andet er andelen af husstande med under 50% af gennemsnitsindkomsten forholdsvis lav i USA, nem lig 35%, mod et fællesskabsgennemsnit på over 40%.
Secondly, the proportion of house holds with under 50% of average income is comparatively low in the US, at 35%, as against an average Community figure of over 40%.
— B+C = størrelsen af de overførselsindtægter, der modtages af husstande med en indkomst, der ligger under fattigdomsgrænsen før de sociale overførsler;
B+C equals the amount of transfers received by households whose income is below the poverty line before social transfers;
— A+B = fattigdomskløften før sociale overførsler; og
A+B equals the poverty gap before social transfers; and
— A = fattigdomskløften efter sociale overførsler.
A equals the poverty gap after social transfers.
— B/(A+B) viser, hvor meget fattigdomskløften er indsnævret;
B/(A+B) which equals the extent to which the poverty gap is reduced;
B/(B+C+D) er lig med den andel af sociale overførsler, der går til at indsnævre fattigdomskløften;
B/(B+C+D) which equals the proportion of social transfers which goes towards reducing the poverty gap;
(B+C)/(B+C+D) er lig med den andel af sociale overførsler, der udbetales til husstande, hvis indkomst før overførslerne ligger under fattigdomsgrænsen.
(B+C)/(B+C+D) which equals the proportion of social transfers paid to households whose income before transfers is below the poverty line.
For det tredje bevirker den sociale beskyttelse i USA kun et fald i andelen af husstande under fattigdomsgrænsen på ca. 10%. Dette er langt mindre end i noget EF-land.
Thirdly, the effect of social protec tion in the US is to reduce the proportion of households below the poverty line by only around 10%.
Selv i Grækenland, der synes at have det mindst effektive system, formindsker sociale overførsler andelen med 18%, mens tallet i de øvrige lande bortset fra Italien, hvor nedsættelsen er 25%, ligger på ca. 30% eller der over. Belgien synes målt på denne måde at have det mest effektive system med en nedsættelse på 36%.Således lykkedes det for Belgien via
Even in Greece, which seems to have the least effective system, social transfers reduce the proportion by 18%, while in the other Member States, apart from Italy, where the reduction is 25%, the figure is around 30% or more, with Belgium seemingly having the most effective system in these terms with a reduction of 36%.
Kapitel 4 - Socialbeskyttelsens omfang i medlemsstaterne socialbeskyttelsessystemet at mindske antallet af husstande under fattigdomsgrænsen, som defineret her, med 86% i midten af 80'erne, mens tallet for Nederlandene og Luxembourg lå på over 80% og for de andre EF-lande, bortset fra Grækenland, på ca. 60% eller derover (graf 9).
Belgium, therefore, through its social protection system, succeeded in the mid-1980s in reducing the number of households falling below the poverty line, as defined here, by 86%, while for the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the figure was over 80% and in the other Community countries, apart from Greece, around 60% or above (Graph 9).
På den anden side lå ca. 50% af de husstande, der ville have ligget under fattigdomsgrænsen uden socialsikringssystemet, i Grækenland og Katalonien fortsat under denne grænse selv med systemet.
In Greece and Catalonia, on the hand, around 50% of households which would have fallen below the poverty line without the social security system remained below it even with the system.
undersøgelse.
the results of the previous exercise.
Således brugte Belgien i midten af 80'eme 96% af det beløb, der ville have været nødvendigt for at afskaffe husstandes fattigdom som defineret her, mens Nederlandene og Luxembourg brugte over 90%.
Thus Belgium in the mid-1980s spent 96% of the amount which would have been required to eliminate household poverty as defined here, while the Netherlands and Luxembourg spent over 90%.
På den anden side var udgifter ne i Tyskland også nær ved 90% af det nødvendige beløb, mens de i Frankrig og Irland lå over 80%, selv om det i disse tilfælde var en meget mindre andel af husstandene, der kom over fattigdomsgrænsen — 70% i Tyskland, 67% i Frankrig og 63% i Irland.
On the other hand, expenditure in Germany was also close to 90% of the amount necessary and in France and Ireland it was over 80%, even though in these cases, a much smaller proportion of households were raised above the poverty line — 70% in Germany, 67% in France, 63% in Ireland.
Dette viser, at de husstande, der forblev under fattigdomsgrænsen efter de sociale udgifter i disse lande i gennemsnit havde høje re indkomstniveauer — dvs. lå mindre under grænsen — end Beneluxlandene.
This indicates that the households which remained below the poverty line after social expenditure in these countries had on average higher levels of in come — ie were less below the line — than in the Benelux countries.
Ikke desto mindre var resultaterne i disse to områder af Fællesskabet stadig meget bedre end i USA, hvor socialbeskyttelsessystemet kun fik bragt indkomsten i 29% af de fattige husstande over fattigdomsgrænsen.
Nevertheless, the performance in these two parts of the Community was still much better than in the US where the social protection system only succeeded in raising the income of 29% of poor households above the poverty line.
For alle EF-lande, for hvilke der foreligger oplysninger, var værdien af denne effektivitetsindikator større end for USA, hvor det faktiske socialbeskyttelsesbudget kun lå på ca. halvdelen af det beløb, der synes at være nødvendigt for at afskaffe fattigdom i husstandene efter denne de finition.
For all Community countries for which data are available, the value of this indicator of effectiveness was greater than for the US, where the actual budget on social protection was only around half of that which seems to have been required to eliminate household poverty on this de finition.
Bortset fra Grækenland, hvor tallet var 64%, brugte samtlige medlemsstater 75% eller mere af det krævede beløb.
Apart from Greece, where the figure was 64%, all Member States spent 75% or more of there quired amount.
Sammenligningen mellem antallet af husstande med indkomster under fattigdomsgrænsen med og uden social beskyttelsessystemer er ét mål for de res effektivitet.
The comparison of the number of households with income below the poverty line with and without social protection systems is one measure of their effectiveness.
Men som nævnt ovenfor tages der herved ikke hensyn til, i hvilken udstrækning husstande falder under fattigdomsgrænsen selv efter at have modtaget social overførselsindkomst.
However, as noted above, this leaves out of account the extent to which house holds, even after benefiting from social transfers fall below the poverty line.
Derfor kan effektiviteten tillige måles ved det beløb, der faktisk anvendes inden for rammerne af socialbeskyttelsessystemet for at bringe husstandene op til fattigdomsgrænsen, i forhold til det beløb, der ville være nødvendigt for at sikre, at ingen husstand faldt under grænsen — dvs. hvorvidt fattigdomskløften indsnævres (se indrammet afsnit — indikator 2 i graf 9 er et mål for B/(A+B)).
A further indicator of effectiveness is, therefore, given by the actual amount spent under the social protection system to bring house holds up to the poverty line in relation to the sum which would need to be spent in order to ensure that no household fell below the line — ie the extent to which the poverty gap is reduced (see Box - indicator 2 in graph 9 is a measure of B/(A+B)).
Resultaterne af denne beregning lig ner, men er på ingen måde identiske med resultaterne af den foregående
The results of this calculation are similar but by no means identical to
Kapitel 5 - Foranstaltninger med henblik på social og erhvervsmæssig integration
Chapter 5 - Measures for social and economic integration
Foranstaltninger med henblik på social og erhvervsmæssig integration rods de forholdsvis høje væk
Measures for social and economic integration espite relatively high rates of economic growth in most parts
T strater i de fleste dele af Fælles erhvervsmæssig reintegration af arbejdsløse eller andre uden beskæftigelse, og udgifterne sættes i forhold til udgifterne til de såkaldte passive indkomststøtteforanstaltninger.
D port for those unable to find employ ment. These socalled passive measures, in the form of unemployment benefit and social assistance, have in most Member States swallowed up the major part of budgets allocated to helping the unemployed.
Ved undersøgelsen af de fire landes politik er målet at fokusere på resultaterne af de forskellige programmer snarere end at beskrive de trufne for anstaltninger i detaljer. Herefter diskuteres visse typiske integrationstilfælde i Fællesskabet.
Expenditure on active labour market policies, such as training and job creation, aimed at helping the unem ployed back into work — or into first-time jobs for those who have not worked before — has tended, by contrast, to be relatively small.
Aktiv arbejds markedspolitik skabet i sidste halvdel af 1980'erne lå arbejdsløshedstallet fortsat på et uacceptabelt højt niveau i de fleste områder, og situationen blev yderligere forværret, da recessionen satte ind i 1991.
of the Community in the second half of the 1980s, unemployment remained at unacceptably high levels in most regions and since the onset of recession in 1991 has increased even further.
Samtidig er der, hovedsagelig af denne grund, tegn på voksen de fattigdom og nød.
At the same time, largely as a result of this, there are indications of growing poverty and deprivation.
Såvel de enkelte medlemsstater som EF-Kommissio-nen har taget en række initiativer til bekæmpelse af arbejdsløshed og fattigdom og har søgt at sikre, at disse problemer ikke fører til social og er hvervsmæssig udstødelse.
Both individual Member States and the European Commission have taken a number of initiatives to combat unemployment and poverty and have sought to ensure that they do not lead to social and economic exclusion.
Fællesskabet har arbejdsmarkedspolitikken i de senere år især
The countries have been chosen to be representative, to some extent, of the Community as a whole.
I Rådets henstilling af juli 1992 hed det udtrykkeligt, at medlemsstaterne skulle kombinere en effektiv social og erhvervsmæssig integrationspolitik med effektive indkomststøtte foranstaltninger.
The Council Recommendation in July 1992 was explicit in stating that Member States need to combine effective policies of integration, both into so ciety and into the labour market, with effective measures of income support.
taget sigte på at give indkomststøtte til dem, der ikke kan finde arbejde.
In analysing the policies implemented by the four, the aim is to focus on the outcomes of the various programmes rather than on describing the measures taken in any detail.
Disse såkaldte passive foranstaltninger i form af arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse og bistandshjælp har i de fleste medlemsstater udtømt største delen af de midler, der bevilges til hjælp til de arbejdsløse.
Following this, some typical cases of integration across the Community are discussed.
I kapitlets anden del undersøges de erfaringer, fire medlemsstater — Tyskland, Frankrig, Danmark og Portugal — har gjort, for at illustrere de mange forskellige initiativer til fremme af social og erhvervsmæssig integration, der er i gang.
The first part of this chapter reviews expenditure on active labour market policies in Member States, which are aimed at reintegrating the unemployed or inactive back into employment, and relates this to spending on socalled passive measures of income support.
Disse lande skulle i et vist omfang være repræsentative for Fællesskabet som hel hed.
Active labour market policies ithin the Community, the main emphasis of labour mar
Danmark og Portugal er begge små lande, og i visse henseender re præsenterer de også yderpolerne i Fællesskabet: de postindustrielle lande i nord og landbrugslandene i syd.
According to the latest information available, only three countries in the Community — Germany, Portugal and Italy — devoted significantly more than a third of total labour market expenditure to active measures in 1991-92 (and in the case of Italy, the proportion is overstated because much of the income support for the unemployed is not included in the figures for unemployment benefit).
Tyskland og Frankrig er store lande, der ligger centralt i det kontinentale Europa og i en vis udstrækning re præsenterer hovedstrømningen i Europa for så vidt angår arbejdsmarkedsstruktur og velfærdspolitik.
In five countries — Belgium, Den mark, Spain, Luxembourg and the UK — the proportion was only around a quarter or less (Graph 10 — where for the countries listed in the note, the data are for 1991, the last year available, rather than for 1992).
I den første del af dette kapitel gennemgås udgifterne til aktive arbejdsmarkedsforanstaltninger i medlemsstaterne, som tager sigte på
In the second part of the chapter, the experiences of four Member States — Germany, France, Denmark and Portugal — are examined in order to illus ket policies in recent years has been on providing means of income sup
Udgifter til aktive og passive arbejdsmarkedsforanstaltninger i procent af BNP, 1992
Expenditure on active and passive labour market policies in relation to GDP, 1992
Aktive arbejdsmarkedsudgifter i procent af de samlede arbejdsmarkedsudgifter samt arbejdsløshedsprocenten, 1992
Active labour market expenditure in relation to total labour market expenditure and the unemployment rate, 1992
5 10 15 Arbejdsløshedsprocent (% af arbejdsstyrken)
5 10 Unemployment rate (% labour force)
En af hovedårsagerne til de forholds­vis lave udgifter til en aktiv erhvervs­mæssig integrationspolitik er den store arbejdsløshed.
It is not by chance, therefore, that the countries which in 1992 (or 1991 in some cases) devoted the highest pro­portion of labour market spending to active measures tended to be those — such as Portugal and Germany — where unemployment was relatively low (Graph 11).
Selv om regerin­gerne i Fællesskabet generelt har væ­ret tilbøjelige til at fremhæve betyd­ningen af aktive foranstaltninger med henblik på at støtte de arbejdsløse på
Similarly, the coun­tries which spent relatively little on active policies — such as Spain and the UK — had relatively high rates of unemployment. There are excep­tions, however—such as Ireland and Luxembourg — which do not
Udgifter til arbejdsmarkedspolitikken i procent af BNP, 1992
Expenditure on Labour Market pol cies, 1992 (% GDP)
Offentlig arbejdsanvisning og administration
Public employment services and administration
Arbejdsmarkedsuddannelse
Labour market training
Foranstaltninger for de unge
Youth measures na
Beskæftigelse med løntilskud
Subsidised employment
Passive foranstaltninger
Passive measures
Arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse
Unemployment compensation
Samlede udgifter til aktive og passive foranstaltninger
Total expenditure on active and passive measures
Kilde: OECD Employment længere sigt, har de fleste i praksis fundet det vanskeligt for ikke at sige umuligt at flytte udgifterne bort fra de passive foranstaltninger.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1993 being exceptions — job subsidies were of negligible importance.
Således går en stor del af udgifterne i de fleste af landene til uddannelse eller til hjælp til unge arbejdsløse, som ofte har form af ud­dannelse (tabel 18).
of expenditure goes on training or measures to help the young unem­ployed, which often take the form of training (Table 18).
I Grækenland, Frankrig, Irland, Portugal og Det Forenede Kongerige tegner disse to poster sig tilsammen for noget over halvdelen af de aktive udgifter i 1991­92.
In Greece, France, Ireland, Portugal and the UK, these two together accounted for well over half of active expenditure in 1991-92.
Det er derfor ikke tilfældigt, at de lande, som i 1992 (eller 1991 i visse tilfælde) brugte den største andel af deres arbejdsmarkedsudgifter til ak­tive foranstaltninger, var dem, der som Portugal og Tyskland havde en forholdsvis lav arbejdsløshed (graf
conform to this general rule, where spending on active measures is either higher or lower than would be ex­pected given the level of unemploy­ment. In the case of Ireland, this perhaps reflects the scale of support for active policies from the Com­munity's Structural Funds, while in the case of Luxembourg, it might reflect the very small numbers of people out of work.
I de øvrige lande, hvor uddannelse er forholdsvis mindre vigtig — men
In the other countries, where training is proportionately — though not ab­solutely — less important, expendi­ture on subsidies to support employment is significant.
Spanien og Det Forenede Kongerige — en forholds­vis stor arbejdsløshed.
While the form which active labour market policies take is similar in most Member States, there are never­theless some marked differences in the relative scale of expenditure on particular types of measure.
Der er dog undtagelser, som f.eks.
Thus in the majority of countries, a large part
Irland og Lu­xembourg — der ikke følger denne hovedregel, men hvor udgifterne til aktive foranstaltninger er enten høje­re eller lavere, end man ville forvente ud fra arbejdsløshedstallet.
The same countries, together with the Netherlands, also devoted a rela­tively high proportion of expenditure to measures aimed at integrating the disabled or handicapped into econ­omic activity.