natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Der er hovedsagelig tale om et konsortium, der ikke driver containertransport, hvilket betød, at aftalen ikke kunne falde ind under gruppefritagelsen, men kun kunne fritages individuelt.
It is a largely non-containerized consortium whichdoes not therefore qualify for block exemption and must accordingly, if it is to be authorized, begranted individual exemption.
For at indhente bemærkninger fra tredjeparter offentliggjorde Kommissionen et resumé af anmeldelsen50.
The G & C, Medway, Medipag, Medecs, Medsap, Maersk/P & O, and Euro/Asia (Maersk/Sealand) consortia in tradeswith the Far East.
Der indkom ingen bemærkninger hertil, og Kommissionen fastslog inden for den fastsatte 90-dages frist, at betingelserne i artikel 85, stk. 3, var opfyldt, og modsatte sig altså ikke denne aftale.
Agreement for the chartering of space by Lloyd Triestino on Contship vessels operating a service in conjunction withanother shipowner.
Den søtransport, der udføres som led i denne aftale, opnåede således fritagelse i seks år, og parternes landtransportaktiviteter, som i det konkrete tilfælde ikke var særlig omfattende, blev fritaget i tre år.
The Commission sought the views of third parties by publishing a summary of the application.50Nocomments were forthcoming so the Commission considered, at the end of the allotted 90-day period, that the requirements of Article 85(3) were met and accordingly did not oppose the agreement, withthe result that the maritime activities carried on under it are exempted for a period of six years andthe inland activities, which are minor in this case, are exempted for three years,
Linjekonferencers fastsættelse af landfragtrater
Inland rate fixing by liner conferences
Kommissionen lægger stor vægt på dette spørgsmål, således som det klart fremgår af de to beslutninger, den vedtog i 1994, hvor den nedlagde forbud mod prisfastsættelsesaftaler for landtransportdelen. Der er tale om beslutningerne i TAA (Trans Atlantic Agreement)51og i FEFC (Far Eastern Freight Conference)*2 ligesom Kommissionen den 8. juni 199453 udsendte en rapport, hvori den redegør for de overordnede retningslinjer for den politik, den agter at følge på dette område.
The Commission attaches the utmost importance to this question as can be seen from the adoptionin 1994 of two Decisions prohibiting price-fixing agreements on the land leg of a transport operation, the TAA (Trans-Atlantic Agreement) Decision51and the FEFC (Far Eastern Freight Conference)Decision,52and from a report dated 8 June 199453describing the broad thrust of the policy the
Den foreløbige rapport giver stærk opbakning til Kommissionens bestræbelser på at få indført et nyt og mere effektivt system for landtransport af containere, der på en mere afbalanceret måde tilgodeser såvel transportkundemes som rederiernes interesser og samtidig stemme overens med EU's konkurrenceregler.
The interim report firmly supports the Commission's drive to establish a new, more efficientsystem for the inland transport of containers which ensures a better balance between the interests ofshippers and shipowners while being compatible with the Community competition rules.
Selv om denne rapport naturligvis ikke har bindende virkninger for Kommissionens anvendelse af konkurrencereglerne, indgår den ikke desto mindre som et vigtigt element i den konkurrenceretlige vurdering, den er i færd med at foretage af rederiernes fragtratefastsættelse.
The Commission is not, of course, bound by it in its day-to-day application of the competition rules, butit is nevertheless an important factor shaping the Commission's current policy towards this practiceon the part of the shipping industry.
Den 24. juli 1996 vedtog Kommissionen forordning (EF) nr. 1523/9655, hvorved takstkonsultationer inden for luftfragt blev udelukket fra at falde ind under forordning nr. 1617/9356.
On 24 July the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 1523/9655 excluding from the scope of Regulation No 1617/9356 consultations on tariffs for the carriage of freight.
Forordning nr. 1617/93 giver fritagelse for aftaler mellem virksomheder, der bl.a. går ud på taktskonsultationer inden for ruteflyvning med passagerer og fragt.
Regulation No 1617/93 exempts from the prohibition in Article 85(1) agreements betweenundertakings which have as their purpose inter alia the holding of consultations on tariffs for thecarriage of passengers and of freight on scheduled air services.
Forordningen blev vedtaget dels på grund af nødvendigheden af at give virksomhederne tid til at tilpasse sig til den øgede konkurrence og dels ud fra ønsket om at fremme interlining-aftaler.
The reasons behind the Regulation'sadoption were, firstly, the need to give airlines time to adjust to the introduction of competition and,secondly, the wish to facilitate interlining agreements.
Siden vedtagelsen af Rådets forordning nr. 3976/87 har flyselskaberne haft 8 år til at tilpasse sig den nye situation med fuld konkurrence.
Since Council Regulation No 3976/87 was adopted, airlines have had eight years in which to adaptto a more competitive environment.
I løbet af denne periode er der sket gennemgribende ændringer i den måde, hvorpå markedet fungerer, bl.a. som følge af den gradvise liberalisering af sektoren.
Over that period market conditions have changed considerablyowing, among other things, to the gradual liberalization of the industry.
Kommissionen fandt derfor, at de havde haft tid nok til at tilpasse sig den nye situation, og at dette argument ikke længere kunne retfærdiggøre en fritagelse.
The Commission accordinglyconsidered that airlines had had sufficient time to adapt to the new environment and that there wasno longer any justification for an exemption.
Med hensyn til interlining fremgik det af oplysninger fra flyselskaberne, at interliningprocenten er faldet med over 60% i årene fra 1991 til 1994.
In the case of interlining, information furnished by airlines revealed that the rate of interliningexpressed in terms of the number of consignments had fallen by more than 60% between 1991 and1994.
Det fremgik desuden, at takstkonsultationerne har ført til, at der blev fastlagt vejledende takster, der lå væsentligt over markedspriserne, og at de følgelig virkede i retning af højere takster.
It was also established that tariff consultations led to the adoption of recommended tariffs whichwere excessively high compared with market rates and which therefore had as their object a favouringof higher tariffs.
Disse oplysninger viste desuden, at der i visse tilfælde foregår interlining med priser, der er vidt forskellige fra de takster, takstkonsultationerne mundede ud
The information furnished by the airlines also showed that interlining operated insome cases with tariffs which differed considerably from those set during consultations.
Kommissionen fandt derfor, at det ikke længere var godtgjort, at takstkonsultationer inden for luftfragt var absolut nødvendige for interlining, og at man derfor måtte ophæve den fritagelse, flyselskaberne nød godt af på dette område.
The Commission accordingly came to the conclusion that, in the cargo transport sector, tariffconsultations were no longer indispensable with a view to making interlining work and that theexemption enjoyed by airlines in this respect should therefore be withdrawn.
Den ophæves dog først med virkning fra 1. juli 1997.
The withdrawal of theexemption will, however, not take effect until 1 July 1997.
Flyselskaberne har fortsat mulighed for at ansøge om individuel fritagelse, hvis de mener, at visse begrænsede former for takstkonsultation kan opfylde betingelserne i artikel 85, stk. 3.
Airlines may still submit an applicationfor individual exemption if they consider that certain limited forms of tariff consultation fulfil therequirements of Article 85(3).
Samordning af priser og takster er generelt en af de alvorligste former for konkurrencebegrænsninger, som der derfor kun ganske undtagelsesvis kan indrømmes fritagelse for.
On a more general level, tariff consultations between undertakings are one of the most seriousforms of anticompetitive behaviour and they can therefore be exempted from the prohibition onrestrictive practices only in exceptional circumstances.
Selv om sådanne takster undertiden fremstilles som værende "vejledende", ændrer det intet ved deres konkurrencebegrænsende karakter.
The fact that the resulting tariffs are presentedas being "recommended" tariffs makes them no less anti-competitive.
Dette grundlæggende princip blev håndhævet i en beslutning, Kommissionen vedtog den 5. juni angående den nederlandske speditørorganisation Fenex, som havde opstillet vejledende takster for speditionstjenester i havne og ved landegrænser, som den havde udsendt til medlemmerne. Disse
The Commission applied this basic principle when it adopted on 5 June a Decision censuring the Dutch forwarding agents' association Fenex for having drawn up and circulated among its membersrecommended tariffs for shipping services in seaports and at land frontiers.
Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1523/96 af 24. juli 1996 om ændring af forordning (EØF) nr. 1617/93 (EFT L 190 af 31.7.1996. s. 11).
Such arecommendation did not constitute a decision by an association of undertakings within the meaningof Article 85(1).
Denne kommissionsforordning blev vedtagel med hjemmel i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3976/87 af 14. december 1987 om anvendelse af traktatens artikel 85, stk. 3, på visse kategorier af aftaler og samordnet praksis inden for luftfartssektoren (EFT L 374 af 31.12.1987. s. 9).
The companies had agreed on the amount and introductiondate of a surcharge on freight shipments following the devaluation of the pound sterling inSeptember 1992. Although the practice had been of short duration, the Commission considered thatpurely symbolic fines would be inappropriate given the flagrant nature of the infringement.
Endelig havde Fenex helt klart beføjelse til at fastlægge og udsende vejledende takster.
XXVIth REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY - SEC(97)628 final
Aftalen vil føre til en betydelig begrænsning af konkurrencen, specielt på ruterne mellem Tyskland og Skandinavien, men den vil også sætte de to selskaber i stand til at reducere deres omkostninger og udvide deres transportudbud til gavn for forbrugerne.
The agreement will have the effectof appreciably restricting competition, particularly on routes between Germany and Scandinavia, butit will enable the two airlines to reduce their costs and broaden their range of services to the benefitof consumers.
Kommissionen fandt det dog nødvendigt at stille en række betingelser, som kunne sikre andre flyselskaber adgang til ruterne mellem Tyskland og Skandinavien.
The Commission nevertheless considered it necessary to impose conditions aimed atallowing other airlines to operate services on routes between Germany and Scandinavia.
Disse betingelser drejede sig bl.a. om tildeling af slots i bestemte meget travle lufthavne.
Theseconditions concern in particular the giving-up of slots at certain saturated airports.
I løbet af de seneste måneder har flere europæiske luftfartsselskaber indgået samarbejdsaftaler med amerikanske flyselskaber.
They accordingly do not apply to services between the only to air services within the Community.Community and third countries.
Der er tale om aftaler mellem British Airways og American Airlines, mellem Lufthansa og United Airlines, mellem SAS og United Airlines samt mellem Swissair/Sabena/Austrian Airlines og Delta.
For services between the Community and third countries, the Commission must therefore rely on theinterim arrangements laid down in Article 89 of the Treaty.
Desuden har KLM tidligere indgået en aftale med Northwest. Disse aftaler blev fremlagt som "code sharing"-aftaler gældende for ruterne mellem Europa og USA.
The Court confirmed in Nouvelles Frontieres that the Commission could base itself on Article 89 when checking whether these servicescomplied with Articles 85 et seq.
Parternes intentioner er at komme til at fremstå som én samlet enhed på bestemte ruter, samtidig med at de bevarer deres juridiske selvstændighed58.
In the case of services not directly related to air transport (e.g. computerized reservation systems), the Commission applies Regulation No 17.
Kommissionen har endnu ikke taget endelig stilling til, om artikel 85 og 86 finder anvendelse på disse aftaler, men de ser ud til at kunne få ret mærkbare konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger på ruterne mellem USA og Europa samt på visse ruter inden for EU.
In parallel with the proceedings initiated by the Commission, the United Kingdom authorities openedan investigation under Article 88 of the Treaty in the BA/AA case to determine whether Articles 85and 86 had been complied with, and the German authorities opened a similar proceeding in relationto the agreement between Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines.
I sin analyse af disse sager må Kommissionen også tage hensyn til lovgivningsmæssige barrierer (specielt hvilke rettigheder, aftaleparterne har til at beflyve ruter mellem Europa og USA og ruter inden for EU, sammenlignet med andre selskabers rettigheder) samt ikke-lovgivningsmæssige barrierer, bl.a. de store problemer med at få tildelt slots i bestemte lufthavne og sammenlægningen af bonusprogrammer.
These proceedings are limited,however, to services between the Community and the United States since in respect of all otherservices Regulation No 3975/87 (for intra-Community services) and Regulation No 17 (for servicesnot directly related to air transport) provide that Member States may not open or carry on withproceedings based on Community law once the Commission has decided to initiate such proceedings.
Kommissionen har allerede indledt procedure i sagerne på grundlag af tre tekster.
The Nouvelles Frontieres and Ahmed Saeed63 cases pointed up the difficulties inherent in thecurrent arrangements for the application of the competition rules to agreements on services with third countries.
Med hensyn til flyvninger inden for EU er der tale om Rådets forordning nr. 3975/87, som fastlægger gennemførelsesbestemmelser til traktatens artikel 85 og 86 i luftfartssektoren59.
These difficulties show there is a need to extend the scope of Regulations Nos 3975/87 and 3976/87to include all services between the Community and third countries.
Efter at EF-Domstolen i sin dom i "Nouvelles Frontières" havde givet Kommissionen medhold i, at artikel 85 ff. finder anvendelse på luftfart60, blev det nødvendigt at få vedtaget særlige gennemførelsesbestemmelser på dette område, hvor forordning nr. 17/62 ikke gælder.
Such an extension would conferon the Commission powers to apply Articles 85 and 86 directly to restrictive agreements concerningsuch services rather than indirectly through the Article 89 procedure. The Commission thus proposesto present two proposals for Council Regulations in 1997.
Det var formålet med forordning nr. 3975/87 samt forordning nr. 3976/87, som gav Kommissionen bemyndigelse til at vedtage gruppefritagelser for samarbejdsaftaler mellem luftfartsselskaber61.
The first seeks to extend Regulation No 3975/87 to third countries, and the second is an ad hoc Regulation, broadly similar to Regulation No 3976/87, extending the Commission's power to grant certain block exemptions so as to cover thirdcountries.
Disse forordninger gælder imidlertid kun på flyruter inden for Fællesskabet62.
The latter Regulation should also help to increase legal certainty for airlines.
Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3976/87 af 14. december 1987 om anvendelse af traktatens artikel 85. stk. 3, på visse kategorier af aftaler og samordnet praksis inden for luftfartssektoren (EFT L 374 af 31.12.1987, s. 9) som ændret ved Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2344/90 af 24. juli 1990 (EFT L 217 af 11.8.1990. s. 15) og Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2411/92 af 23. juli 1992 (EFT L 240 af 24.8.1992. s. 19).
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certaincategories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector ((OJ L 374, 31.12.1987), as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2344/90 of 24 July 1990 (OJ L217, 11.8.1990) and by Council Regulation (EEC) No2411/92 of 23 July 1992 (OJ L 240, 24.8.1992).
1 forste omgang fandt de kun anvendelse på internationale flyvninger mellem lufthavne i EU-lande. men de blev den 25. august 1992. med vedtagelsen al' Rådets forordning nr. 2410/92 og 2411/92 af 23. juli 1992 (tredje luftfartspakke), udvidet til også al gælde for flyvninger inden for en medlemsstat (cabotage).
Originally, they applied only to international flights between Community airports, but at the time of the third packageof air transport liberalization measures they were extended with effect from 25 August 1992 by Council Regulations Nos 2410/92 and 2411/92 of 23 July 1992 to cover flights within a Member State (cabotage).
Der er også en anden grund til at udvide anvendelsesområdet for forordning nr. 3975/87.
The extension of the scope of Regulation No 3975/87 must also be examined in the light ofanother factor.
Den 17. juni 1996 fik Kommissionen af Rådet mandat til at indlede forhandlinger med USA om en aftale om fælles regler på transportområdet. Med en sådan aftale, hvori konkurrenceregler ville spille en væsentlig rolle, vil flyselskaberne i såvel Europa som USA blive i stand til at operere frit på hinandens områder, på basis af kommercielle principper, der vil sikre dem loyale og lige konkurrencevilkår64.
On 17 June the Commission was authorized by the Council to negotiate with the US Government an agreement establishing between the EU and the United States a common airspace.If such an agreement, in which competition would play a significant part, were to be concluded, itwould enable the airlines of both parties to carry on their activities freely in the EU and in the United States on the basis of commercial principles which ensure that they operate under fair andequivalent conditions of competition.64
Kommissionen har fået flere sager angående energisektoren til behandling (aftaler om salg af elektricitet produceret i uafhængige elværker og aftaler om gasleverancer til kraftværker i Italien og Portugal).
The Commission investigated several cases in this sector (agreements for the sale to thenetwork of electricity generated by independent power stations and contracts for the supply of gas tofuel power stations in Italy and Portugal).
I elsektoren har Kommissionen her under overgangen til et helt frit marked65godkendt en række langfristede aftaler om salg af elektricitet fra uafhængige kraftværker til det nationale elnet, da
As regards electricity, the Commission authorized, during the current run-up to a liberalized market,55long-term contracts for the sale of electricity produced by independent generators to the national network inasmuch as the producers had in fact few alternative takers for their output and the scale ofthe investment necessitated a stable outlet.
Se også kapitel V-B. Se kapitel Il-C.
See also Chapter V.B below.See Chapter II.C below.
FIFA og UEFA underrettede Kommissionen om, at det internationale transfersystem ikke længere ville blive anvendt på spillere, som ved kontraktudløb skifter fra en klub til en anden (i et andet land) inden for EØS.
FIFA and UEFA informed the Commission's departments that the international system oftransfers would no longer be applied to players who, at the end of their contract, changed clubs (indifferent countries) within the EEA.
UEFA bekræftede, at forbundets forretningsudvalg havde besluttet formelt og med øjeblikkelig virkning at ophæve nationalitetsbestemmelseme ("3+2-regIen") for UEFA-kampe mellem klubber inden for EØS.
UEFA confirmed that its Executive Committee had decided toabolish formally with immediate effect the nationality clauses ("3+2" rules) applicable to UEFAcompetitions between clubs within the EEA.
Selv efter ophævelsen af FIFA's og UEFA's internationale transfersystem inden for EU og EØS er der dog stadig behov for at få afklaret visse situationer i relation til EF-traktaten.
Nevertheless, following the abolition of the international system of transfers operated by FIFA and UEFA within the Community and the EEA, the legality of certain situations under the Treaty's rules still remains to be clarified.
FIFA og UEFA havde således anmeldt det internationale transfersystem til Kommissionen, før EF-Domstolen kendte det ulovligt i henhold til traktatens artikel 48.
FIFA and UEFA had notified the international system oftransfers to the Commission before it was censured by the Court under Article 48 of the Treaty.
Anmeldelsen drejede sig således om vedtagelser (reglementer) inden for FIFA og UEFA angående et internationalt transfersystem, der indebar, at når en professionel fodboldspiller ved kontraktudløb skiftede til en klub i et andet EU- eller EØS-land, skulle der betales en overgangssum. Blandt bestemmelserne i de FIFA-reglementer, der blev anmeldt, indgik desuden en regel om, at de nationale fodboldforbund havde pligt til at indføre tilsvarende systemer i de enkelte lande.
Thenotification therefore relates to decisions (rules and regulations) of FIFA and UEFA which implementan international system of transfers imposing the payment of transfer, promotion or training fees forprofessional players or players who have turned professional, irrespective of their nationality, who atthe end of their contract form the subject-matter of an international transfer within the Community orthe EEA.
Kommissionen skulle således tage stilling til, hvorvidt situationer, som EF-Domstolen ikke havde kendt i strid med traktatens artikel 48, var forenelige med artikel 85. Der var tale om betaling af overgangsbeløb, når spillere fra tredjelande ved udløbet af en kontrakt med en klub i et EU- eller et EØS-land skifter til en anden klub inden for EØS, og FIFA's krav om, at de nationale fodboldforbund inden for EU og EØS iværksætter tilsvarende nationale overgangsregler.
Faced with such a notification, the Commission had to decide on the compatibility with Article 85 of situations which the Court has not condemned since they do not infringe Article 48 ofthe Treaty, namely the making of payments at the time of the international transfer, within the EEA,of third-country players at the end of their contracts with a club from a country of the Community orof the EEA, and the obligation imposed by FIFA on national associations in the Community and the EEA to implement national transfer systems.
Anmeldelsen blev imidlertid trukket tilbage af UEFA og FIFA.
The notification was, however, withdrawn by UEFAand FIFA.
Kommissionen har ikke fået anmeldt eller formelt forelagt noget alternativt system.
No alternative system has been notified or formally presented to the Commission.
Den 24. juni godkendte Kommissionen for 10 år en global og i princippet eksklusiv samarbejdsaftale mellem Banque nationale de Paris og Dresdner Bank.
On 24 June the Commission authorized for a period of ten years a full and, in principle,exclusive cooperation agreement at world level between Banque natlonale de Paris and Dresdner Bank.
Samarbejdet skal primært omfatte internationale bankforretninger, men indebærer i Frankrig og Tyskland også, at de parterne hver især lader deres bankprodukter distribuere via den anden part.
Although it is concerned mainly with international business, the agreement provides that, in France and in Germany, each party will make its products available to the other in order that it mightdistribute them through its network.
På dette punkt fik Kommissionen udvirket en ændring af en bestemmelse i den oprindeligt anmeldte aftale, der gav begge parter absolut vetoret mod enhver samarbejdsaftale, den anden part måtte ønske at indgå med en konkurrent på vedkommendes hjemmemarked.
On this point, the Commission insisted on an amendment of theclause of the agreement as originally notified which gave each party an unlimited right to veto anycooperation agreement which the other wished to conclude with a competitor present on its domesticmarket.