natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen konkluderede dog, at aftalen ikke påvirkede handelen mellem medlemsstaterne og derfor faldt uden for EU's konkurrenceregler.
However,the Commission concluded that this agreement did not affect trade between Member States and wastherefore outside the scope of the European Community's competition rales.
Denne beslutning vedrørte dog kun den anmeldte mundtlige aftale, der gjaldt fra februar 1992 til udgangen af 1994.
This was a factualdetermination relating solely to the notified oral agreement which was in force between February 1992and the end of 1994.
Den 4. oktober 1996 offentliggjorde Kommissionen en meddelelse efter artikel 19, stk. 3, i De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende25.
An Article 19(3) notice was published on the Official Journal on 4 October 1996.25
Britannia-feltet er et stort gaskondensatfeit i den centrale del af Det Forenede Kongeriges kontinentalsokkel.
The Britannia gas condensate field is a relatively large gas field in the central area of the UK Continental Shelf.
Reserverne anslås til 2,3 billioner kubikfod. På det tidspunkt, hvor aftalen blev anmeldt, var feltet ejet af følgende virksomheder: Conoco (UK) Ltd., Conoco Petroleum Ltd., Chevron UK Ltd., Union Texas Britannia Ltd., Santa Fe Exploration (UK) Ltd., Texaco North Sea UK Company, Phillips Petroleum Co. UK Ltd. og Amerada Hess Ltd..
Reserves are estimated at 2.3 trillion cubic feet.
En række tidligere ejere, med mindre andele, herunder British Gas og Oryx, havde trukket sig ud.
In addition, there have been a number of previous owners, who soldout, but whose share was minor, including British Gas and Oryx.
Amerada Hess forlod konsortiet i januar 1996.
Amerada Hess left the consortium in January 1996.
Andre horisontale aftaler
c) Other horizontal agreements
GSM er det digitale mobilsystem, der nu anvendes i Europa, og som har mere end 37 millioner abonnenter i de 15 medlemsstater.
GSM is the digital mobile system now in use in Europe, withmore than 37 million subscribers in the fifteen Member States.
Kommissionen godkendte aftalen på grundlag af en anmeldelse efter EU-traktatens konkurrenceregler (artikel 85 og 86).
The Commission's approval followedconsideration of a notification of the agreement under the competition rules of the EC Treaty (Articles 85and 86).
Standardaftalen om international roaming skal give GSM-brugere i et land mulighed for at bruge GSM-nettet i et andet land.
The standard international roaming agreement is designed to enable GSM mobile phone users inone country to use the GSM network in another country.
Kommissionen konstaterede ved sin undersøgelse, at aftalen frembyder en række klare fordele, men den forlangte aftalen ændret på visse punkter, således at den ikke får konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger.
Upon examination, the Commission found thatthe agreement presents a number of clear benefits and it also secured changes which ensure that thestandard agreement will not have anticompetitive effects.
Inden for EU er operatører af GSM-mobiltelefonnet bundet af nationale licensprocedurer, som kun giver dem mulighed for at etablere og drive net inden for en bestemt medlemsstats grænser.
Within the EU, operators of GSM mobile telephone networks are bound by national licensing procedureswhich allow them to build and operate networks only within the borders of a given Member State.
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION tjenester ville blive stillet hurtigere til rådighed, og standardformen ville skabe mere kontraktmæssig lighed mellem parterne og bidrage til at hindre forskelsbehandling.
In examining the compatibility of the standard agreement with the EU competition rules, the Commission found that the use of a standard agreement presented a number of clear benefits, notably thatthe costs of negotiating individual bilateral agreements would be substantially reduced, that roamingservices would be made available more quickly and that the standard form would enable more contractualfairness between parlies and help to prevent discrimination.
Forbrugerne vil herved hurtigere kunne bruge deres GSM-abonnementer på det størst mulige omrade.
Consumers will thus benefit more quicklyfrom the widest possible area in which to use their GSM subscriptions.
Samtidig blev der påvist en række konkurrencemæssige forhold, der kunne have skadet forbrugerne.
At the same time, a number of competition concerns were identified which could have been detrimentalfor consumers.
Disse potentielle problemer blev lost til Kommissionens tilfredshed gennem ændringer i den anmeldte aftale.
These potential problems were resolved to the Commission's satisfaction throughamendments to the notified agreement.
For det første er det nu klart, at der ikke er noget i aftalen, der forhindrer en forbruger i et land i at tegne abonnement hos en operator i et andet land, hvis taksterne er lavere.
In the first place, it is now clear that nothing in the agreementprevents a consumer in one country from taking out a subscription with a network operating in anothercountry if the tariffs are financially more attractive.
For det andet har parterne forpligtet sig til at sikre, at kommercielt følsomme oplysninger, der udleveres til andre operatører som led i aftalen, kun vil blive stillet til rådighed som led i roaming og ikke til konkurrencebegrænsende formål.
Secondly, the parties undertake to ensure thatcommercially sensitive information provided to other operators in the context of this agreement will onlybe made available in the interest of roaming and not for anticompetitive purposes.
Det er stadig et uafklaret spørgsmål, på hvilket grundlag operatorerne lastsætter deres indbyrdes takster for roaming-tjenester; grundlaget er tilsyneladende ikke omkostningsbetinget. Inden for GSM MoU er man dog i gang med at drøfte, hvorledes det nuværende system, hvor taksterne er baseret på operatørens indenlandske tarif, kan erstattes af en takst, der er forbundet med operatorens omkostninger ved at levere tjenesten, hvilket skulle medføre lavere priser for forbrugerne.
One issue which has not yet been resolved is the basis on which operators charge each other for roamingservices, which does not appear to be cost-oriented.
Denne udvikling forventes at ske inden foten rimelig tid.
This move is expected to take place within a reasonabletime-frame.
Som led i den fuldstændige liberalisering af EU's telemarked den l. januar 1998 vil Kommissionen fortsat føre tilsyn med denne udvikling hen imod omkostningsbetingede takster.
In the context of the full liberalisation of the EU telecommunications market on 1 January1998, the Commission will continue to monitor this development towards cost-oriented tariffs.
Det amerikanske software-selskab. Santa Cruz Operation Inc.
On 31 January The Santa Cruz Operation Inc.
(Santa Cruz), der i vidt omfang udøver virksomhed inden for EØS, sendte den 31. januar 1997 Kommissionen en klage over, at Microsoft overtrådte EU's konkurrenceregler i en kontrakt, som selskabet havde indgået med Santa Cruz.
(Santa Cruz), a US software company with extensiveoperations in the EEA, complained to the Commission accusing Microsoft of breaches of EC competitionlaws in a contract between it and Santa Cruz.
Den pågældende kontrakt blev indgået i 1987 mellem Microsoft og AT & T og indeholdt bestemmelser om, at Microsoft skulle producere en version af UNIX til mikrocomputere ved at kombinere de UNIX-versioncr til mikrocomputere, der på daværende tidspunkt blev tilbudt af Microsoft og AT & T. Santa Cruz havde overtaget kontrakten fra AT & T i forbindelse med sin overtagelse af AT & T's UNIX-virksomhed. De vigtigste begrænsninger i den pågældende kontrakt og deres virkninger var som følger:
The contract at issue was a 1987 contract between Microsoft and AT & T which provided that Microsoft would produce a version of UNIX formicrocomputers by merging the versions of UNIX for microcomputers then offered by Microsoft and AT & T. Santa Cruz had succeeded to AT & T's side of this contract by acquiring the UNIX business of AT & T. The main restrictions identified in the contract at issue, and their effects, were as follows:
(1) Hvis en af parterne producerede en version af UNIX-operativsystcmet til en mikrocomputer, skulle denne version ifølge kontrakten baseres på den første version af UNIX, som Microsoft producerede i henhold til 1987-aftalen. (2) Da enhver UNIX-version, som de kontraherende parter producerede, skulle baseres på Microsofts oprindelige kombinerede produkt, skulle AT & T og dermed også Santa Cruz ifølge kontrakten betale Microsoft en afgift for hvert UNIX-produkt til mikrocomputere, som det producerede og solgte.
(1) The contract required that if either party produced a version of the UNIX operating system for amicrocomputer it be derived from the first version of UNIX produced by Microsoft as a result of the1987 agreement.
139 klagepunktsmeddelelsen.
Microsoft was given the opportunityto make written and oral comments on the statement of objections.
Den indsendte skriftlige bemærkninger, og det blev aftalt, at der skulle afholdes en mundtlig horing den 13. november 1997.
Written comments were received anda date for an oral hearing was set for 13 November.
Den 4. november skrev Microsoft til Santa Cruz og fraskrev sig definitivt »rettighederne« i henhold til de bestemmelser, som Kommissionen havde rejst indvendinger imod. Den 5. november sendte Microsoft en kopi af dette brev til GD IV.
On 4 November Microsoft wrote to Santa Cruz unilaterally and irrevocably waiving the "rights" underthe clauses at issue to which the Commission had objected.
Santa Cruz' forpligtelse til at betale en afgift er blevet ændret, således at det kun skal betale afgiften, hvis det rent faktisk udnytter Microsofts intellektuelle ejendomsret i en UNIX-version.
Santa Cruz's royalty obligation has beenchanged, so that it now has to pay the set royalty only if it actually does use Microsoft intellectualproperty in a version of UNIX.
De resterende dele af kontrakten vil bevirke, at Santa Cruz vil fã ret, men ikke pligt, til at udnytte Microsofts intellektuelle ejendomsret til produktion af UNIX-versioner, og at Santa Cruz, hvis det benytter denne ret, skal betale en afgift pr. eksemplar af produktet.
The effect of the remaining parts of the contract for Santa Cruz will bethat Santa Cruz will have the right but not the obligation to use Microsoft intellectual property to produceversions of UNIX, and if it does so will pay the set royalty per copy of its product.
Den 18. november 1997 skrev Santa Cruz til Kommissionen og trak sin klage tilbage.
On 18 November Santa Cruz wrote to the Commission withdrawing its complaint.
Afdelingen for monopollovgivning under USA's justistsministerium bistod Kommissionen i denne sag.
The antitrust division of the US Department of Justice provided assistance in this matter.
De pågældende begrænsninger skadede Santa Cruz' muligheder for at konkurrere med Microsoft om levering af operativsystemer, især operativsystemer til arbejdsstationer og servere, hvor der er skarp konkurrence mellem Microsofts Windows NT-produkt og en række forskellige UNIX-versioner.
The restrictions at issue harmed Santa Cruz's ability to compete with Microsoft in the provision ofoperating systems, and in particular harmed its ability to compete in the field of operating systems forworkstations and servers where there is vigorous competition between Microsoft's Windows NT productand a variety of versions of UNIX.
Da Microsoft har fraskrevet sig sine rettigheder, kan Santa Cruz formgive sine fremtidige UNIX-produkter, som det ønsker, uden at være forpligtet til at benytte Microsofts intellektuelle ejendomsret, ligesom det har mulighed for i henhold til den resterende del af kontrakten at udnytte Microsofts intellektuelle ejendomsret mod betaling af en afgift.
Microsoft's waiver means that Santa Cruz can design its future UNIXproducts as it wishes, is not obliged to use any Microsoft intellectual property in future UNIX productsand has the option, under the remaining parts of the contract, to use the Microsoft intellectual propertyinvolved at a set royalty.
Der fandtes heller ingen tilsvarende aftaler på det relevante marked, der kunne indebære risiko for kumulative virkninger fra parallelle net.
Relais & Chateaux The Commission applied for the first time its new deminimis notice in Case IV/36.180 Relaiset Chateaux.
Denne holdning er i overensstemmelse med den nye meddelelse om bagatelaftaler, som Kommissionen vedtog den 15. oktober 1997. og hvori Kommissionen forpligter sig til kun undtagelsesvis at skride ind over før aftaler mellem små ou mellemstore virksomheder i henhold til artikel 85. stk. 1.
The Relais & Chateaux association (R & C), which was created in 1954, is a "voluntary" chain of 364hotels and 49 restaurants (three-and four-star and luxury) having a common trade mark and logo. Theassociation notified its articles and regulations setting out all the rules on the admission of applicants.According to these rules, membership of R & C is incompatible with membership of a competing hotel chain.For departmental and regional reservations, however, R & C members remain free to approach bodieswhich offer a specific service (hotel clubs, reservation centres, marketing companies) or tourism offices.Members may withdraw each year when their membership is due for renewal. COMPETITION REPORT 1997
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION d) Aftaler om betalingssystemer
In that notice, the Commission states that it will take action under Article 85(1) against agreements between small and medium-sized enterprises only in exceptionalcircumstances.
TARGET er et betalingssystem, der er oprettet af Det Europæiske Monetære Institut (EMI) og de nationale centralbanker (NCB).
TARGET is a payment system set up by the European Monetary Institute (EMI) and the National Central Banks (NCBs).
Det skal anvendes fra begyndelsen af Den Monetære Unions (ØMU) tredje fase. dvs. den 1. januar 1999.
It is to become operative at the beginning of stage three of economic and monetary union(EMU), i.e. on 1 January 1999.
Det vil blive drevet af Det Europæiske Centralbanksystem (ESCB).
It will be operated by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).TARGET will be a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system.
TARGET er et realtidsbruttoafregningssystem (RTGS) og skal behandle tre betalingskategorier.
It will handle three categories ofpayments.
Den første kategori omfatter betalinger, der er direkte knyttet til den monetære politik, hvor ESCB er enten modtager eller ordregiver i forbindelse med betalingen.
The first category are payments directly related to monetary policy, where the ESCB is eitherthe beneficiary or the originator of the payment.
Den anden kategori er interbankbetalinger til afregning af pengemarkedstransaktioner (arbitragetransaktioner). Tredje kategori omfatter betalingstransaktioner, der berører bankernes kunder, hvad enten de er privatpersoner eller selskaber (tredjemandsbetalinger)26.
The second category are interbank payments throughwhich money market operations are settled (arbitrage transactions).
Efter en række møder mellem EMI og Kommissionens tjenestegrene om spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt traktatens konkurrenceregler finder anvendelse på TARGET, redegjorde kommissær Karel Van Miert for Kommissionens foreløbige synspunkt ved brev af 23. juni 1997.
After a number of meetings between the EMI and the Commission's departments on the applicability ofthe competition rules of the Treaty to TARGET, Commissioner Van Miert indicated those departments'preliminary view by letter of 23 June.
Anvendelse af artikel 85, stk. I
Applicability of Article 85(1)
I brevet gives der udtryk for det synspunkt, at TARGET kan betragtes som et pengepolitisk instrument, der ikke er omfattet af artikel 85, stk. 1, for så vidt som det behandler betalinger af forste kategori.
The letter expresses the view that TARGET can be considered an instrument of monetary policy to which Article 85(1) does not apply in so far as it handles payments of the first category.
Parterne i disse betalingstransaktioner er ikke involveret i erhvervsaktiviteter, og deres aktiviteter falder derfor ikke ind under artikel 85, stk. 1.
Parties involved in thesepayment transactions do not undertake economic activities. These activities therefore fall outside thescope of Article 85(1).
Til gengæld finder artikel 85, stk. 1, anvendelse på TARGET, når det behandler betalinger af anden og tredje kategori.
In contrast, Article 85(1) does apply to TARGET when it handles the second and third categories ofpayment.
Parterne i disse transaktioner er nemlig involveret i erhvervsaktiviteter.
Parties involved in these transactions do indeed undertake economic activities.
Dette er indlysende, når det gælder kundebetalinger, men det gælder også i forbindelse med arbitragetransaktioner, fordi bankerne traditionelt har gennemført denne type transaktioner som en normal del af deres virksomhed.
This is obviousin the case of customer payments.
Forretningsbankerne vil måske finde det nyttigt at benytte TARGET, men de kan fortsat frit benytte andre kanaler.
But it also holds true in the case of arbitrage transactions becausebanks traditionally have been actively involved in this type of transaction as a normal part of theirbusiness.
Selv om der af traktaten eller ESCB's statut kan udledes en forpligtelse til at oprette og drive TARGET, kan en sådan forpligtelse under ingen omstændigheder ændre de pågældende transaktioners erhvervsmæssige art.
It is, of course, true that the integration of the euro money market, and hence the conduct of asingle monetary policy as required by Article 3a(2) of the Treaty, can be achieved only if interbank fundscan be rapidly and reliably transferred throughout the euro area, and that TARGET provides speed andreliability.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene har ikke modtaget nogen formel anmeldelse.
But this does not deprive these euro transfers of their economic nature.
Det forste spørgsmål er planerne om en ensartet samlet pris for betalinger gennem TARGET, som går videre end det.
The first issue is the envisaged uniform end-to-end price for payments handled through TARGET.
Kommissionen hidtil har villet acceptere i forbindelse med betalingssystemer.
This goesbeyond what the Commission has been willing to accept so far in relation to payment systems.
Samtidig med at Kommissionens tjenestegrene stiller sporgsmålstcgn ved, om prisforskelle i praksis ville udgøre en egentlig hindring for gennemførelsen af disse målsætninger, erkender de dog, at TARGET (og den ensartede samlede pris) bidrager til gennemførelsen af mindst to rimelige målsætninger.
However,while questioning whether in practice some price differentials would be a real impediment to theachievement of these objectives, the Commission's departments acknowledge that TARGET (and theuniform end-to-end price figuring therein) contributes to the fulfilment of at least two legitimate objectives.
Den første målsætning er en gnidningsløs pengepolitik og et fælles pengemarked.
The first is the smooth conduct of monetary policy and the singleness of the money market.
I brevet erkendes det fuldt ud, at TARGET er et godt instrument til grænseoverskridende arbitragetransaktioner, som er af væsentlig betydning for et fælles pengemarked inden for euroområdet.
The letterfully recognises the merit of TARGET as an instrument for cross-border arbitrage transactions which arecrucial in securing a single money market within the euro area.
Den anden målsætning er en risikorcduccrcnde politik.
The second objective is contributing to risk-reduction policies.
Anvendelsen af TARGET, der er et RTGS-system, til store betalinger bidrager nemlig til at reducere systemrisikoen inden for euroområdet.
Use of TARGET, which is an RTGSsystem, for large-value payments indeed contributes to reducing systemic risk within the euro area.
Det andet spørgsmål går ud på, at den samlede pris skal omfatte alle omkostninger ved gennemførelsen af transaktionen.
The second issue concerns the so-called full cost recovery principle according to which the end-to-endprice must cover full handling costs.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene støtter naturligvis fuldt ud dette princip, som de finder nødvendigt for at undgå illoyal konkurrence mellem TARGET og andre betalingssystemer. Spørgsmålet er snarere, hvorledes EMI og NCB og senere ECB vil sikre, at dette princip overholdes.
The Commission of course fully supports the idea that full costrecovery is necessary to avoid unfair competition between TARGET and other payment arrangements.The issue was, rather, how the EMI and the NCBs, and later the ECB, would guarantee the properimplementation of this principle.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene erkender, at det først kan påvises et stykke tid efter, at TARGET er iværksat, om dette princip overholdes fuldt ud, idet der først på dette tidspunkt vil foreligge pålidelige tal for, hvor store betalinger der går gennem TARGET.
The Commission's departments understand that observance of the full cost recovery principle can only bedemonstrated ex post, i.e. some time after the launching of TARGET, since fully reliable figures on thevolume of payments handled through TARGET will initially be unavailable.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene har derfor anmodet om at blive holdt underrettet om den yderligere udvikling. De mener, at det vil være muligt at vurdere inden for en periode på to eller tre år, om alle omkostninger er inkluderet.
For that reason, thedepartments have asked to be kept informed of further developments.
De har opfordret EMI til omgående at tilpasse priserne, hvis det skulle være nødvendigt af hensyn til resultaterne af evalueringen, idet de bemærker, at det naturligvis ikke er i nogens interesse, at TARGET'S prispolitik bliver udsat for klager i de kommende år.
They haveinvited the EMI forthwith to adjust, if necessary, prices according to the results of the evaluation, notingthat it is clearly in no-one's interest that TARGET'S pricing policy should become the object ofcomplaints in the years ahead.
Kommissionen modtog i juli 1996 en klage fra La Poste over S.W.I.F.T. (Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunications sc) og GUF (den franske sammenslutning af S.WI.F.T-brugere, dvs. de franske banker).
The Commission received a complaint from the French Post Office (La Poste) in July 1996 against the Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunications sc (SWIFT) and GUF (the Frenchgroup of SWIFT users, i.e. French banks).
S.W.I.F.T. er et kooperativt selskab, der ejes af over 2 000 banker, og driver et specialiseret, internationalt telekommunikationsnet, som tilbyder kreditinstitutter overalt i verden både pålidelig og sikker datatransmission og -behandling.
SWIFT is a cooperative owned by over 2 000 banks. It operates a specific internationaltelecommunications network, which offers reliable and secure data communication and processing tofinancial institutions located all over the world.
S.WI.FT's grundlæggende virksomhed består i international overførsel af betalingsmeddelelser.
The basic activity of SWIFT is the international transferof payment messages.
I et par år har S.W.I.F.T. desuden tilbudt at overføre meddelelser vedrørende bestemte finansielle transaktioner, såsom køb af finansieringsinstrumenter.
For a number of years now, SWIFT has also offered message services linked tospecific financial transactions such as financial instrument purchases.
Dette er en af de funktioner, der udføres af GUF.
Members have access to all the
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION i 1994.
In addition to its postal activities, La Poste operates in the retail banking market in France.
Den 29. marts 1994 svarede GUF La Poste, at den ikke opfyldte optagelseskriterierne, fordi den ikke udøvede samme virksomhed som kreditinstitutter på tilsvarende konkurrencemæssige vilkår og efter samme retsforskrifter.
GUF replied on 29 March 1994 that La Poste did not fulfil the membership criteria because itdid not carry on an activity identical to that of credit institutions in a similar competitive environment andunder equivalent regulatory conditions. La Poste subsequently wrote direct to SWIFT.