natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Medlemsstaternes informeres så hurtigt som muligt på det sprog, som er anvendt ved udvekslingen af oplysninger.
Member States are notified as soon as is reasonablypossible in the language of the exchange.
Uvis Kommissionen tilsender de amerikanske myndigheder oplysninger, informeres medlemsstaterne samtidig herom.
Where the Commission sends information to the USauthorities, Member States are notified at the same time.
Kommissionen informerer også den eller de medlemsstater, hvis interesser berøres, så hurtigt som muligt om enhver form for samarbejde eller samordning vedrørende håndhævelsesforanslaltningcr.
The Commission also notifies the Member State or Member States whose interests are affected of anycooperation or coordination of enforcement activities, as soon as is reasonably possible.
En medlemsstats interesser anses for at være berørte, hvis de pågældende håndhævelsesforanstallninger har betydning for medlemsstatens håndhævelsesforanslaltningcr vedrører konkurrencebegrænsende aktiviteter (med undtagelse al' fusioner og overtagelser) på den
It is considered that the interests of a Member State are affected where the enforcement activities inquestion:
Desuden vil Kommissionen mindst to gange om året ved moder med regeringscksperter på konkurrenceområdet informere alle medlemsstater om gennemførelsen af' aftalen, herunder især om,
• are relevant to the enforcement activities of the Member State;involve anticompetitive activities (other than a merger or acquisition) carried out in the Member
INTERNATIONALT 323 hvilke kontakter der har fundet sted med de amerikanske myndigheder vedrørende videregivelse af oplysninger, som Kommissionen har modtaget under aftalen, til medlemsstaterne.
State's territory;involve a merger or acquisition in which one or more of the parties to the transaction, or a companycontrolling one or more parties to the transaction, is a company incorporated or organized under thelaws of the Member State;involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the Member State;involve remedies that would, in significant respects, require, or prohibit conduct in the Member State's territory.
SAGSRELATERET SAMARBEJDE I 1997
Case specific cooperation within 1997
De sager, der anføres nedenfor, falder alle direkte ind under aftalen mellem EF og USA. Nogle sager, for eksempel inden for luftfartssektoren, behandles af en anden myndighed, nemlig det amerikanske trafikministerium DoT (Department of Transportation).
The cases listed below are those which fall directly under the EC/US Agreement.
DoT samarbejder formelt ikke direkte med Kommissionen, men indirekte via DoJ.
The DoT does not formally cooperate with the Commission directly, but does do so indirectly,through the DoJ.
Der er derfor uformelle kontakter mellem Kommissionen og DoT. Disse sager drøftes imidlertid ikke i denne rapport.
There are therefore informal contacts between the Commission and the DoT.
Kommissionen gav meddelelse i 42 sager i perioden 1. januar 997-31. december 1997.
There were the total of forty-two notifications made by the Commission during the period between 1January 1997 and 31 December 1997.
Sagerne er opdelt i fusionssager og ikke-fusionssager og anført i bilag 1.
The cases are divided into merger and non-merger cases and arelisted in the Annex 1.
Kommissionen modtog 36 meddelelser fra de amerikanske myndigheder i samme periode, heraf 24 fra DoJ og 12 fra FTC' (Federal Trade Commission).
Twenty-four were received from the US Department of Justice ("the DoJ") and twelve from the US Federal Trade Commission ("the FTC").
Bilag 2 indeholder en liste over disse sager, igen opdelt i fusionssager og ikke-fusionssager.
A list of these cases is found in the Annex 2, again brokendown in merger and non-merger cases.
De fleste meddelelser fra begge parter vedrørte fusioner.
Merger cases made up the majority of all notifications in both directions.
Kommissionen gav 31 fusionsmeddelelser og de amerikanske myndigheder 20.
There were thirty-one mergernotifications by the Commission and twenty by the US authorities.
De anførte tal angiver antallet af" sager, hvor en eller flere meddelelser fandt sted, og ikke det samlede antal meddelelser. I henhold til aftalens artikel II gives der meddelelse i bestemte faser af proceduren, hvorfor der altså kan være givet flere meddelelser om samme sag. For eksempel gav Kommissionen de amerikanske myndigheder 7 meddelelser i Boeing/McDonnell Douglas-sagen, mens den modtog 6 meddelelser fra FTC i samme sag.
The figures given represent the number of cases in which one (or more) notifications took place and notthe total number of individual notifications.
Tabel I er en oversigt over de meddelelser, der er givet i henhold til aftalen mellem EF og USA fra 1991 i perioden 1. januar 199731. december 1997.
Table 1 sets out in figures the number of cases notified under the 1991 EC/US Agreement during theperiod of 1 January 1997 to 31 December 1997.
Tabel 2 er en oversigt over de meddelelser, der er givet siden den 23. september 1991.
Table 2 sets out in figures the number of cases notifiedsince 23 September 1991.
SAGER
CASES NOTIFIED
Aftalen fra 1991 er rammen om et meningsfyldt og nyttigt samarbejde i konkurrence­sager al' fælles interesse for de to parter.
The 1991 Agreement offers a framework for a meaningful anduseful cooperation regarding competition cases of mutual interest to the two sides.
Denne type samarbejde øg samordning vedrørende håndhævelsesforanstaltninger har været en fordel for både konkurrencemyndighederne og de involverede virksomheder.
This type ofcooperation and coordination of enforcement activities has been beneficial to both competitionauthorities and companies involved.
Ændret rekommandation fra Rådet for Organisationen for Økonomisk Samarbejde og Udvikling om samarbejde mellem medlemslandene vedrørende konkurrencebegrænsninger i den internationale handel, vedlaget den 27.­28. juli 1995.
Revised recommendation of the OECD Council concerning cooperation between Member countries on anti-competitivepractices affecting international trade, adopted 27/28 July 1995
Denne rapport fokuserer på aspekter af sagsbehandlingen i samarbejdet mellem FF og USA.
This report concentrates on aspects of case handling related to the EC/US cooperation.
For nærmere oplysninger om en konkret sag henvises til 27. beretning om konkurrencepolitikken.
For more information on aparticular case see the XXVIlth Report on Competition Policy.
INTERNATIONALT 325 a)
Page 325
Samarbejdet mellem EF og USA var særligt intensivt i Boeing/MDD-fusionen.
EC/US cooperation in the Boeing/MDD merger was particularly intensive.
På den amerikanske regerings vegne meddelte det amerikanske forsvarsministerium og DoJ Europa-Kommissionen, (i) at en beslutning om at forbyde den planlagte fusion kunne skade vigtige amerikanske forsvarsinteresser, (ii) at et frasalg af Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC, McDonnell Douglas' civile luftfartsvirksomhed) på trods af de forpligtelser. Kommissionen måtte pålægge tredjemand som køber, formodentlig ikke ville kunne garantere DAC's fortsatte eksistens som selvstændig producent af nye fly og således medføre en ineffektiv udnyttelse af de af DAC's flyproduktionsaktiviteter, som eventuelt kunne reddes af Boeing, samt tab af arbejdspladser i USA, og (iii) at et frasalg af DAC til en tredjepart, som ikke ville anvende DAC til produktion af nye fly, ville være konkurrencebegrænsende, idet der derved ville blive skabt en virksomhed, der ville være tilskyndet til og have midlerne til at øge priserne og reducere servicen ved levering al'reservedele og tjenesteydelser til DAC's eksisterende flyflåde, som for en stor dels vedkommende ejes af amerikanske flyselskaber.
The US Department of Defense and Department of Justice, on behalf of the US Government, informedthe European Commission of concerns that (i) a decision prohibiting the proposed merger could harmimportant US defence interests, (ii) despite any measures the Commission could impose on a third partypurchaser, a divestiture of Douglas Aircraft Company (DAC, the civil aircraft branch of McDonnell Douglas) would be likely to be unsuccessful in preserving DAC as a stand alone manufacturer of newaircraft, resulting in an inefficient disposition of whatever of DAC's new aircraft manufacturingoperations that potentially could be salvaged by Boeing, and in the loss of employment in the United States, and (iii) any divestiture of DAC to a third party that would not operate DAC as a manufacturer ofnew aircraft would be anticompetitive in that it would create a firm with the incentive and means to raiseprice and diminish service in respect of the provision of spare parts and service to DAC's fleet-in-service,a large portion of which is owned by US airlines.
Kommissionen tog hensyn til disse betænkeligheder i det omfang, det kunne forenes med EF-lovgivningen.
The Commission took the above concerns into consideration to the extent consistent with Communitylaw.
I lyset af de anførte amerikanske forsvarsinteresser har Kommissionen begrænset tiltagene til den civile del af virksomheden og ikke fulgt de betænkeligheder yderligere op, som den i klagcpunktsmcddclclscn fremsætter om fusionens virkning på det internationale marked for kampfly.
In particular, as far as US defence interests were concerned, the Commission has limited the scope ofits action to the civil side of the operation. The Commission has not pursued further the concerns itexpressed in its Statement of Objections concerning the effect of the concentration on the internationalmarket for fighter aircraft.
Med hensyn til DAC mente Kommissionen ikke, at et frasalg var et middel til løsning af de konkurrenceproblemer, som fusionen skabte.
As far as DAC is concerned, the Commission has not considered a divestitureas a remedy to resolve the competition problems created by the concentration.
Selv om der var en række problemer forbundet med denne sag, sikrede godkendelsen med de betingelser, Kommissionen stillede ved afslutningen af undersøgelsen, at der blev opretholdt en effektiv konkurrence på markedet for store trafikfly.
Although this ease had its own difficulties, the authorisation under the conditions put forward by the Commission at the end of its investigation ensured that effective competition was maintained on themarket for large commercial aircraft.
Samarbejde i andre store sager i)
b) Cooperation in other major cases i)
Aspekter vedrørende produktmarkedet
Aspects related to the product market
Sagsbehandlerne fokuserer i deres drøftelser ofte på produktmarkedet for at afgøre, om begge parter er nået frem til samsvarende konklusioner.
Discussions between the case handlers frequently focus on the product market to determine whether bothsides have arrived at similar conclusions.
Disse drøftelser er baseret på generelle oplysninger, der er alment tilgængelige.
These discussions are based on general information which ispublicly available.
Det har i den forbindelse vist sig, at Kommissionens og de amerikanske myndigheders markedsanalyser i hoj grad ligner hinanden.
Undoubtedly these kind of exchanges have disclosed a high degree of similaritybetween the market analyses of the Commission and the US authorities.
Dette er meget vigtigt set ud fra det behov, der er for at gennemføre meningsfyldte meningsudvekslinger, samtidig med at fortrolighcdsbestemmelserne overholdes.
This is very important, given the need to have meaningful exchanges while observing the rules onconfidentiality.
Hvis Kommissionen og de amerikanske myndigheder lige fra begyndelsen havde forskellige opfattelser af, hvordan markedet skulle defineres, ville man måske ikke kunne udforske årsagerne til de forskellige tilgange tilbundsgående uden at drøfte fortrolige oplysninger, som parterne havde stillet til rådighed.
If the Commission and the US authorities took different initial views on market definition,it might not be possible to explore fully the reasons for the different approaches without discussingconfidential information which the parties had provided.
Ifølge gældende regler må det kun ske med parternes samtykke.
Under our present rules this could only be donewith the agreement of the parties.
Der var mange kontakter mellem Kommissionen og DoJ i forbindelse med undersøgelsen af den planlagte ST/iV/CV-fusion.
There were frequent contacts between EC officials and the Department of Justice in the course of theinvestigation of the then proposed BT/MCI merger.
Der blev afholdt møder mellem parterne både i Washington og Bruxelles. Da
Meetings between the two sides were held in both Washington and Brussels.
Yderligere oplysninger om denne sag kan bl.a. findes i: A. Schaub, »International cooperation in antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD proceedings«. Competition Policy Newsletter, nr. 1/1998 (februar), s. 26.
For more details on this case see among other sources: A.Schaub, "International cooperation in antitrust matters: makingthe point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD proceedings", Competition Policy Newsletter, nr.
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION sagen krævede en vurdering af produktmarkederne for udbud af transatlantiske telefontjenester, og da konsekvenserne af fusionen skulle vurderes på baggrund af de internationale lakstberegningsordninger, var drøftelserne mellem de to parter af stor betydning, både når det drejede sig om at præcisere markedsdefinitioner og indsamle viden om retsgrundlaget på begge sider af Atlanten.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION against the background of international accounting rate arrangements, the discussions between the twosides were helpful not only in terms of refining market definitions, but also in pooling knowledge aboutthe regulatory background on each side of the Atlantic.
Der blev også ført mange drøftelser mellem Kommissionen og de amerikanske myndigheder om de forskellige relevante produktmarkeder i Guinness/Grand Metropolitan-sagen.
Also in the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case there was a good deal of discussion between Commissionofficials and their opposite numbers in the United States regarding the different relevant product marketswhich led to compatible remedies.
Drøftelserne resulterede i. at der blev truffet samsvarende forholdsregler.
In the Santa Cruz/Microsoft case there were no differences of opinion on market definition.
I Santa Cruz/Microsoft-sagen var man ikke uenige om definitionen af markedet, og i Boeing/McDonnell Douglas-sagen nåede både FTC og Kommissionen frem til samme definition af produktmarkedet »store trafikfly«.
Also in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case both the FTC and the Commission reached the same product marketdefinition of "large commercial aircrafts".
Efter at have udvekslet synspunkter om. hvordan markedet før Pl'T-film og titaniumdioxyd skulle defineres i DuPont/lCI-sagen måtte man konstatere, at substituerbarheden på udbuds- og efterspørgselssiden i en vis grad var potentielt forskellig i USA og i EF.
After exchanging views on how to define markets for PET filmand Titanium Dioxide in the DuPont/ICI case, certain potential differences were noticed both on demandside and on supply side substitutability in the US and in the EC.
Selv om EF og USA i nogle tilfælde anvendte forskellige definitioner af'produktmarkedet, når de foretog deres vurderinger, gav kontakterne mellem parterne dem mulighed for at forstå hinandens tankegang og præcisere deres analyser i overensstemmelse hermed.
Although the EC and US authorities used sometimes different product market definitions for theirrespective assessments, the contacts between them served the purpose of allowing each to understand thethinking of the other, and to refine their analyses accordingly.
Det tætte samarbejde gav de lo parter mulighed for at undgå at træffe modstridende beslutninger.
Close cooperation allowed the two sides toavoid conflicting decisions.
Aspekter vedrørende det geografiske marked
Aspects related to the geographical market
Der føres i reglen mindre omfattende drøftelser om det geografiske marked, idel Kommissionen og de amerikanske myndigheder normalt fokuserer på de konkurrencemæssige virkninger, den pågældende adfærd eller transaktion får på deres egne markeder, hvilket også gælder i tilfælde, hvor de aktiviteter, der undersøges, har en transatlantisk eller verdensomspændende dimension.
Discussion of the geographical market tends to be more limited, as usually the Commission and the USauthorities are concentrating on the competitive effects of the behaviour or transaction on their own markets,even in cases where the activity under investigation is organized on a transatlantic or worldwide scale.
Aspekter vedrørende konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger
Aspects related to the anticompetitive effects
De generelle drøftelser i Santa Cruz/Microsoft-sagen viste, at Kommissionen og de amerikanske myndigheder i store træk havde samme vurdering af forholdene på sagsbehandlerniveau. Guinness/Grand Metropolilan-sagen var et godt eksempel på, hvordan analyserne al" de konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger supplerede hinanden.
In the Santa Cruz/Microsoft case general discussion established that the Commission and its UScounterpart at the staff level had largely similar views of the facts.-The Guinness/Grand Metropolitancase was a good example of complementary analyses of anticompetitive effects.
Den enighed, som man i denne sag opnåede om definitionen af markedet, resulterede i, at man opnåede enighed om de konkurrencemæssige virkninger og i sidste ende en fælles løsning.
In that caseagreement on market definition led to agreement on competitive effects and ultimately to a commonremedy.
Som følge af" kontakterne mellem Kommissionen og FTC tog begge parter slørre hensyn til de betænkeligheder, den anden part havde med hensyn til de potentielle konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger af fusionen.
Commission/FTC consultations led each side to take greater account of concerns raised by the otherconcerning the potential anticompetitive effects of the merger.
FTC indtog en mere kritisk holdning til Boeings eksklusivaftaler efterhånden som undersøeelsen skred frem.
The FTC took a more critical view of Boeing's exclusive agreements as its investigation progressed.
INTERNATIONALT 327 iv)
Page 327
Det omvendte er tilfældet i forbindelse med erklæringer, hvor et tilsagn over for Kommissionen ikke er retskraftigt på samme måde som det amerikanske consent decree.
Conversely as regards remedies, an Undertaking given to the Commissionis not directly enforceable, in the way that the US consent decree is.
1 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan-sagen var parterne efter at være nået til et vist punkt i forhandlingerne villige til at lade konkurrencemyndighederne drøfte, hvilke forholdsregler der skulle træffes.
In the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case the parties were prepared, once negotiations had reached acertain point, to allow discussions to take place between the antitrust authorities on the proposedremedies.
Disse drøftelser var betydningsfulde, idet man derved kunne opnå en vis koordinering, som man måske ellers ikke ville have kunnet opnå.
This was valuable in ensuring an element of coordination which might not otherwise have beenpossible.
Man sikrede sig således, at de forholdsregler, man endelig blev enige om at træffe i de to jurisdiktioner, var i overensstemmelse med hinanden.
In particular it ensured that the remedies finally agreed upon in each of the jurisdictions wereconsistent with one another.
Selv om FTC i Boeing/MDD-sagen ikke beskæftigede sig med. hvilke foranstaltninger der skulle træffes, da FTC i sidste ende agtede at godkende fusionen, informerede Kommissionen, der tenderede kraftigt til en eller anden form for frasalg af DAC, FTC om denne mulighed.
Although the FTC was not concerned about remedies in the Boeing/MDD case, as they would eventuallyclear the merger, the Commission, which was looking very closely at some form of divestiture of DAC,informed the FTC of such a possibility.
Da FTC imidlertid gjorde forbehold gældende over for en sådan løsning, og Kommissionens undersøgelser viste, at der ikke fandtes nogen potentiel køber til DAC, meddelte Kommissionen FTC. at den ville tage hensyn til FTC's betænkeligheder og derfor afstå fra at kræve DAC frasolgt.
However, as the FTC expressed reservations on the feasibility ofsuch a remedy, and given that the Commission's enquiry showed that there was no potential buyer for DAC, the Commission informed the FTC that it would take into account its concerns and would thereforeabandon the idea of DAC's divestiture.
Kommissionen informerede den 26. juni 1997 de amerikanske myndigheder om dens foreløbige konklusioner og betænkeligheder i Boeing/MDD-sagen og bad FTC om at tage hensyn til den store interesse, som EF havde i at sikre konkurrencen på markedet for store civile fly.
The Commission notified to the US authorities on 26 June 1997 its preliminary conclusions and concernsin the Boeing/MDD case and asked the FTC to take account of the European Union's important interestsin safeguarding competition in the market for large civil aircraft.
FTC svarede samme dag, at de ville tage hensyn til de inleresser. De Europæiske Fællesskaber havde givet udtryk for, når de trafen beslutning.
The FTC responded the same dayindicating that the FTC would take into account the expressed interests of the European Communitieswhen reaching its decision.
De amerikanske konkurrencemyndigheders deltagelse i Kommissionens høringer
Participation of US antitrust authorities in the Commission's hearings
På anmodning af FTC gav høringskonsulenten repræsentanter for de amerikanske konkurrencemyndigheder tilladelse til at deltage som observatører i de offentlige høringer, der blev afholdt i henhold til EF's fusionsforordning i forbindelse med undersøgelsen af Guinness/GrandMetropolitan-fusionen. DoJ's ønske om at deltage (som observatør) i horingen i Boeing/MDD-sagen blev efterkommet.
Following requests put forward by the Federal Trade Commission, officials from the US authority wereauthorised by the Hearing Officer to take part as observers in the public hearings held pursuant to the ECMerger Regulation in the framework of the examination of the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger.Further the US Department of Justice requested and was granted attendance (as observer) at the hearingin the Boeing/MDD merger.
Konkurrencemyndighederne pa begge sider al" Atlanten betragter hyppige kontakter og drøftelser som særdeles nyttige, idet de bidrager til en bedre forståelse af de pågældende spørgsmål.
The services of the two antitrust authorities on both sides perceive frequent contacts and discussions asparticularly useful. They help clarify the understanding of the issues involved.
Kommissionen anser det for vigtigt og nyttigt at kunne danne sig et billede af. hvordan de amerikanske myndigheder agter at reagere på visse forhold i en konkurrencesag.
It was considered efficientand useful to have an idea of how the US enforcement agencies intended to respond to certain events in acompetition case.
På trods af. at parterne kun kan udveksle en begrænset mængde oplysninger, medmindre der foreligger dispensationer, er det en fordel for Kommissionen og de amerikanske konkurrencemyndigheder at kunne gå frem på en samsvarende måde, undgå modstridende afgorelser og inkohærente losninger samt træffe hurtigere beslutninger.
Despite the limited amount of information that we are able to exchange, except whenwaivers are obtained, the Commission and the two US antitrust authorities benefit from being able tobehave in a consistent manner, to avoid conflicting decisions and incoherent remedies, and to obtainquicker decisions.
Fusionssager124
Merger cases
Af fortrolighedshensyn omfatter denne fortegnelse kun undersogclser eller sager, der er offentliggjort. Af fortrolighedshensyn omfatter denne fortegnelse kun undersøgelser eller sager, der er offentliggjort.
Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list includes only those investigations or cases which have been made public Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list includes only those investigations or cases which have been made public
INTERNATIONALT 329
Page 329
MEDDELELSER FRA DE AMERIKANSKE MYNDIGHEDERTIL KOMMISSIONEN 1.1.1997-31.12.1997
ANNEX 2: NOTIFICATIONS BY US AUTHORITIES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION01.01.1997-31.12.1997
Fusionssager126
Merger cases125