natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette burde foere til. at forbrugerne opnaar beskyttelse, dels fra mange virksomhedsaftaler, der paa en urimelig maade forhindrer eller begraenser de normale, konkurrencepraegede markedskraerters udfoldelse, og dels i de tilfaelde hvor misbrug af markedsindflydelse goer det muligt at udnytte forbrugerne.
This should have as a consequence consumers who gain protection from many businessarrangements which might unreasonably prevent or restrict the operation of normal competitive marketforces, or where an abuse of market influence could allow consumers to be exploited.
Konkurrencepolitikken kan ydermere medvirke til at sikre oeget effektivitet i erhvervslivet, forbedre markedsintegrationen samt skabe mere fordelagtige handelsforbindelser mellem medlemsstaterne.
In addition,competition policy can be an aid to securing improved business efficiency, better market integration andcreating more advantageous trading links between Member States.
Traktaterne hjemler indgreb imod aftaler om priser eller forretningsbetingelser, kontrol med produktion, afsaetning. teknisk udvikling eller investeringer, markedsopdeling og foranstaltninger, der forskelsbehandler forbrugere og leverandoerer.
The Treaties envisage possible actions against agreements to fix prices or trading conditions; controlproduction, markets, technical development or investment; market sharing; and actions which arediscriminatory between customers or suppliers.
Det er muligt at goere en undtagelse, naar virksomhedsaftalerne bidrager til produktions- eller distributionsmaessigc forbedringer eller foerer lil tekniske eller oekonomiske fremskridt, forudsat at forbrugeren opnaar en rimelig andel af den mervaerdi, der foelger med disse forbedringer.
Exceptions are possible where business arrangementscontribute to improvements in production, distribution or technical or economic progress, provided thatthe consumer is allowed a fair share of the resulting benefits.
Tilsvarende aktiviteter hos en enkelt virksomhed eller en gruppe virksomheder, der har en dominerende position paa EU's markeder, og hvor aktiviteterne doemmes at vaere et misbrug af dennestilling, er ogsaa ulovlige (artikel 86).
Comparable actions by a single firm, or a group of firms, holding a dominant position in the marketswithin the Union, which are adjudged to be an abuse of that position, are also prohibited (Article 86).
Skoent der er bred tilslutning om traktatens maalsactningcr, er der i praksis et saa omfattende og varieret spekter af aktiviteter, hvor man kan frygte uacceptable aftaler, at det er noedvendigt at skabe en domsmekanisme.
Whilst the objectives as stated in the Treaties are widely supported, in practice the range of activitieswhich can give a cause for concern about unacceptable arrangements is so wide and varied that anadjudication mechanism must be created.
Dette kommer isaer forbrugerne til gode, der faar en bedre kval ilet for en mindre pris«152. Der er imidlertid »graenser for, hvor stor en indflydelse disse mekanismer maa laa. idel der kan opstaa risiko for. at en del af befolkningen udelukkes fra fordelene ...
As the Commission notes, there is a presumption that 'marketforces produce a better allocation of resources..., the principal beneficiary being the consumer, who getsbetter quality at a lower price'.l52 However, 'these mechanisms sometimes have their limits; as a result thepotential benefits might not extend to the entire population...
Del er saa de offentlige myndigheders opgave at soerge for. at det almennyttige formaal tages i betragtning«.
The public authority must then ensure thatthe general interest is taken into account.'
I forbindelse med konkurrencepolitikken kan man desuden overveje det indbyrdes forhold mellem konkurrencepolitiske spoergsmaal og spoergsmaal. der er baseret paa miljoehensyn. I 1995-berctningcn offentliggjorde Kommissionen retningslinjer for behandlingen al' overlappende miljoe- og konkurrencespoergsmaal.
A further possible consideration for competition policy relates to the interrelationship ofcompetition questions and those based on environmental considerations.
Kommissionen er helt klart noedt til at overveje, hvornaar og under hvilke omstaendigheder miljoespoergsmaal retfaerdiggoer fritagelse fra de normale konkurrencekriterier, og
Corporate conduct and State aid policies must be monitored.Judgements are needed to determine when 'market failure' or 'market abuse' need to be addressed.
SEK(97) 628 endelig udg.. punkt 1.3. citat fra en tidligere meddelelse om Forsyningspligtydelser I Europa«.
SEC(97) 628 final, paragraph 1.3 quoting from the earlier Communication on services of general interest in Europe.
Kommissionen maa loebende sikre, at relevante aktioner indberettes og efterforskes, at der traeffes beslutninger om aktioner, som kendes uacceptable, samt at der indfoeres procedurer til at haandhaeve reglerne.
Inevitably, the Commission must continuously ensure that relevant actions are reported and investigated,decisions made on those adjudged unacceptable and enforcement procedures put in place.
Med den voksende globalisering af handelen faar denne proces stadig stoerre betydning for alle virksomheder og forbrugere.
With the increased globalization of trade, this process is gaining increased significance for allbusinesses and all consumers.
Nogle af de nyopdukkede spoergsmaal vcdroerer ikke blot konkurrencepolitikken i EU, men har bredere internationale konsekvenser.
Some of the emerging questions relate not only to competition policywithin the European Union but to wider international implications.
Naar en virksomhed traeffer beslutninger, der vedroerer globale aktiviteter, boer en dominerende stilling i EU ikke blot vurderes paa grundlag af interne markedsaftaler i EU, idet det »relevante marked« er internationalt.
Where the decisions of a businessrelate to activities on a worldwide scale, a dominant position within the EU should be evaluated notsimply with respect to internal EU market arrangements since the 'relevant market' is an internationalone.
Kommissionen er noedt til at tage hoejde for den globale konkurrencesituation, naar den vurderer store enkeltvirksomheders handlinger (som da man for nylig vurderede British Airways' fremgangsmaader eller fusionen af Boeing og McDonnell Douglas).
The Commission needs to take account of the global competitive position in the assessment of theactions of large individual firms (as, for example, in the recent consideration of the actions of BritishAirways or the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas).
Hvad angaar beslutninger vedroerende virksomheder, der er placeret uden for EU, kan det bl.a. vaere mere vanskeligt at overvaage, om de godkendte aftaler overholdes.
A consequence of decisions relating to businesses which are located outside the EU is that it may bemore difficult to monitor compliance with approved arrangements.
Der kan opstaa saerligc problemer 1 forbindelse med at modtage overvaagningsrapporter, indsamle trovaerdigt bevismateriale og sikre, at organisationer baseret i »tredjelande« opfoerer sig efter reglerne, og disse problemer kan nocdvendiggoere internationalt samarbejde (se punkt 3 nedenfor).
Receiving monitoring reports,gathering credible evidence, and ensuring that behavioural obligations are observed from organizationsbased in 'third' countries may pose particular difficulties which require international cooperation (seesection 3 below).
OESU godkender Kommissionens prioritering af: mere tidssvarende konkurrencepolitiske virkemidler, udvikling afpassende analyseredskaber, styrkelse af samarbejdet med medlemsstaterne, opdatering al" de gaeldende rctsinstrumenter og, via Verdenshandelsorganisationen, udvikling af" faciles konkurrencepolitiske principper paa internationalt plan.
The ESC recognizes the importance attached by the Commission to: modernizing the instruments of competition policy;developing appropriate analytical instruments;improving cooperation with Member States;modernizing the legislative instruments and through the WTO, developing an internationalframework of competition rules.
OESU har med saerlig interesse bemaerket henstillingen i punkt 235 om, at der I Verdenshandelsorganisationens regi boer nedsacttes en arbejdsgruppe, som skal indlede det sonderende arbejde med sigte paa at indfoere et sact internationale konkurrenceregler. Dette er et noedvendigt projekt, som er relevant dér, hvor globaliseringen i stigende grad paavirker handelen.
The ESC has noted with particular interest the recommendation (paragraph 235) that the World Trade Organization should set up a working group to do initial work on the development of an internationalframework for competition rules.
Bedre forbindelser med de amerikanske konkurrencemyndigheder har (med de paagacldende virksomheders tilsagn) til en vis grad gjort det lettere at udveksle oplysninger.
Improved relations with the US competition authorities have facilitated, with agreement from thebusinesses concerned, some exchange of information.
De bilaterale aftaler med de amerikanske konkurrencemyndigheder aabner nye muligheder for samarbejde om udveksling af ikkefortroligc oplysninger.
The bilateral arrangements with the US antitrustauthorities opens up further opportunities for cooperation in the exchange of non-confidentialinformation.
Der kan ogsaa udveksles fortrolige oplysninger, men kun med samtykke fra de beroerte virksomheder.
Confidential information can also be exchanged but only with the agreement of the businessinvolved.
Der er dog en fare for, at den relativt aabne sagsbehandling i Kommissionen kan have negative kommercielle konsekvenser for EU-virksomheder, naar konkurrenter uden for EU, eventuelt i USA, maaske faar mulighed for at indhente konkurrencerelevante data, som EU-virksomheder ikke har adgang til paa et gensidigt grundlag.
However, there is a concern that the relative openness of investigations by the Commission canbe commercially disadvantageous to firms in the EU when competitors outside the EU, possibly in the USA, may obtain competitive data that is not available on a reciprocal basis to EU businesses.
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION evaluated not simply with respect to internal EU market arrangements when the 'relevant market' is aninternational one,
Om end det i princippet er let at formulere maalsaetningen, kan det imidlertid i praksis vaere vanskeligt at opnaa internationalt samarbejde i det oenskede omfang.
However, whilst the objective may be easy to express in principle, securing the desirable levels ofinternational cooperation may be difficult to deliver in practice.
OESU haaber. at Kommissionen vil videreudvikle sin strategi, sine politikker og sine metoder vedroerende konkurrencepolitikkens globale aspekter. Enhver undersoegelse af et enkeltfirmas eller en specifik branches konkurreneemaessige stilling i EU boer automatisk ledsages af en analyse af situationen i relation til den globale konkurrence.
The ESC hopes that the Commission willfurther develop its approach, policies and methodology on these global aspects of competition questions.Any enquiries about a firm's competitive position, or that of a specific sector, within the EU shouldsystematically be accompanied by an analysis of the situation in relation to worldwide competition.
En tilsvarende komparativ analyse boer foretages af den finansielle stoette, som medlemsstaterne yder, i sammenligning med andre landes stoette til de samme sektorer.
Asimilar comparative analysis should be made of financial aid given by Member States and compared withthe aid given by other countries to the same sectors.
Der er saerligt akutte muligheder for et udvidet samarbejde med landene i OEsteuropa, hvoraf vissestiler efter EU-medlemskab.
There are particular critical opportunities for extended cooperation with countries in Eastern Europe,some of which have an aspiration to become members of the European Union.
OESU bifalder, at nogle af disse lande har accepteret EU's nuvaerendc konkurrencepolitik.
The ESC welcomes theacceptance by some of these countries of the current EU competition policies.
Kommissionen boer sikre, at en effektiv gennemfoerelse af' konkurrencepolitikken bliver del al" foertiltracdelsesstrategien for de eventuelle nye medlemslande i OEsleuropa.
The Commission should ensure that the effective implementation of competition policy is part of thepre-accession strategy for the potential new Member States in Eastern Europe.
Ydermere vil bistand fra Faellesskabet vaere et vigtigt bidrag, naar disse lande forbereder sig paa optagelse, og vil i overgangsperioden medvirke til at bevare og fremme stabiliteten paa arbejdsmarkedet, i ockonomien og inden for erhvervslivet.
In addition, assistancefrom the Community will be an important contribution as they prepare for entry and would help tomaintain and sustain social, economic and industrial stability during the transition.
Et afgoerende element i foertiltraedelsesfaserne er gennemfoerelsen af nationale regler om tildeling af statsstoette og instrumenterne til haandhaevelse al" disse regler.
A critical feature in the pre-accession stages is the implementation of national rules on the grantingof State aid and the means of enforcing these rules.
OESU bifalder Kommissionens initiativer med henblik paa at sikre, at der i hvert ansocgerland paa et tidligt lidspunkt traeffes passendeforanstaltninger vedroerende statsstoette og konkurrencepolitik.
The ESC endorses the actions of the Commission inits efforts to ensure that appropriate measures on State aids and competition policy are taken in eachaspirant Member State at an early stage.
Udviklingen i konkurrencepolitikken: artikel 85 og 86 - Udviklingen i lovgivningen og fortolkningen af denne
Competition policy developments: Articles 85 and 86 - Changes in legislationand interpretative rules
En vigtig hensigt med artikel 85 og 86 er at sikre, at de forskellige typer virksomhedssamarbejde ikke er til skade for forbrugerne.
A key objective of Articles 85 and 86 is to ensure that the different forms of cooperation betweenbusinesses should not be disadvantageous to consumers.
De boer vaere til gensidig gavn.
They should be mutually beneficial.
I EU ved virksomhederne, al traktaternes artikel 85 og 86 fastsaetter parametrene for deres aktiviteter, hvis de paavirker medlemsstaternes samhandel.
Within the European Union, businesses know that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaties set the parameters for theiractions if they affect trade between Member States.
De generelle retningslinjer er dog efterhaanden blevet praeciscret og tydeliggjort ved hjaelp af bestemte afgocrelser. der afstikker rammerne for mere detaljerede spoergsmaal.
However, the general principles have, over time,been amplified and illustrated by particular decisions which set the framework for more detailedquestions.
For at mindske den administrative sagsbyrde, styrke beslutningstagernes retssikkerhed og forbedre gennemsigtigheden indeholder Kommissionens politik ogsaa det velkomne princip, at man, hvor det er muligt, boer udarbejde yderligere retningslinjer eller regler om form og indhold al' acceptabelt samarbejde i saerlige tilfaelde.
To reduce the burden of administrative investigation, to increase the degree of legal certainty todecision makers and to improve transparency, one of the desirable features of Commission policy is that,where possible, further guidelines, or rules, on the form and content of acceptable cooperation in specificcircumstances should be prepared.
Teknologioverfoerselsaftaler
Technology transfer agreements
Skoent aftalen om gruppefritagelse hilses velkommen, var gennemfoerelsen af denne ikke uden problemer.
Whilst the block-exemption agreement is welcome, its introduction was not without problems.
Aftalen blev vedtaget i marts 1996, men forordning (EF) nr. 240/96 traadte foerst i kraft den 30. januar 1997.
Theagreement was finalized in March 1996 but the Regulation (EC) No 240/96 did not come into force until30 January 1997.
Dette medfoerte en periode af retsusikkerhed.
This created a period of legal uncertainty.
En mere grundig gennemlaesning af forordning (EF) nr. 240/96 vaekker formodning om, at det muligvis er en svaghed, at der mangler en klausul om bestemmelsernes indbyrdes uafhaengighed, hvori det kunne vaere blevet praeciseret, hvordan ikke-fritagelsesklausuler skal behandles.
A more detailed examination of Regulation (EC) No 240/96 suggests that the absence of aseverability clause, which would have clarified the treatment of non-exempt clauses, may be a weakness.
Med henblik paa en fremtidig praecisering anmodes Kommissionen om at overveje en mere praecis fortolkning af forordningen, isaer af begrebet »supplerende bestemmelser« i artikel 10, for at sikre, at det ikke bliver for bcsvaerligt at opfylde forordningens maalsaetninger.
The Commission is invited to consider, for future clarification, a more precise interpretation of the Regulation, in particular the concept of'ancillary provisions' in Article 10, to ensure that the goals of theregulation are not unduly hampered.
OESU stoettcr bcstracbclsernc paa at sikre, at de nationale myndigheder traeffer beslutninger, der er I overensstemmelse med faellesskabslovgivningen, ved at indfoere national lovgivning, som giver
The Committee endorses the efforts to ensure that national authorities adopt decisions which arecompatible with Community law by introducing national legislation enabling their competitionauthorities to apply Articles 85(1) and 86 effectively.
ANVENDELSEN AF KONKURRENCEREGLERNE I DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION medlemsstaternes konkurrencemyndigheder mulighed for at goere effektiv brug af artikel 85. stk. 1. og 86.
APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Som et indledende pilotprojekt kan disse principper udvikles med henblik paa at finde anvendelse paa de aftaler, der er defineret som »vertikale« konkurrencebegraensningcr.
As an initial pilot project, these principles might be developed to apply to those agreements whichare defined as 'vertical' restraints on competition.
Boedefrafald
Nonimposition of fines
Kommissionen har nu skoensbefoejelser til at frafalde eller nedsaette boeden i sager, hvor der frivilligt er givet oplysninger om kartelvirksomhed.
The Commission now has discretionary power to waive or reduce fines in cases where cartel activitieshave been voluntarily disclosed.
OESU forstaar logikken bag denne aendring, idet den kan tilskynde virksomheder til at samarbejde under en sagsbehandling.
The ESC understands the logic of this change since it may offer anincentive to firms to cooperate in an investigation.
Ikke desto mindre rummer detteskoen en fare for. at sagsbehandlingerne foerer til uforudsigelige »studehandler«, der kan skade indtrykket af' den officielle sagsbehandlings uafhaengighed.
Nevertheless, this discretion contains an inherentdanger that investigations will produce unpredictable 'plea bargaining' which may damage the perceptionof the independence of the official investigation.
Om end man kan argumentere for. at saadanne »aftaler« boer vaere fortrolige, er OESU enig med Kommissionens meddelelse i, at man i sager, hvor det er blevet besluttet at nedsaette eller ikke paalaegge en boede, boer oplyse dels navnet paa den virksomhed der har overtraadt reglerne, dels det eksakte beloeb, som den potentielle boede er blevet nedsat med.
Whilst there are arguments that such bargains should beconfidential, the ESC agrees with the Commission notice that where a decision is made that a fine shouldbe reduced, or not imposed, the identity of the offending business should be revealed along with details ofthe scale of the remission of the potential fine,
Kommissionen har foreslaaet, at »de minimis«-reglen. der fastlaegger den omsaetningstaerskel, under hvilken aftaler blev betragtet som vaerende af' ringe betydning, burde udvides lil at omfatte støre virksomheder med beskedne markedsandele.
The Commission has proposed that the de minimis rule, which establishes the turnover thresholds belowwhich agreements are considered to be of minor importance, should be extended to include large firmswith modest market shares.
Forslaget er nu lagt ud til bred hocring.
This proposal is still subject to wide ranging consultations.
OESU gaar dog ind for, at man afskaffer omsaetningskriteriet til fordel for et kriterium baseret paa stoerrelsen af den enkelte virksomheds markedsandel.
However, the ESCwould support the removal of the turnover criterion and the increased reliance on the proportion of themarket share held by individual businesses.
OESU har allerede kommenteret Kommissionens groenbog om vertikale begraensninger"'0.
The ESC has already commented on the Green Paper onvertical restraints160.
Det accepterer, at en graense paa 5 % for horisontale aftaler og paa 10 % for vertikale aftaler forekommer passende.
It accepts that a limit of 5 % for horizontal agreements and 10 % for verticalagreements seems appropriate.
OESU's udtalelse af 9.7.1997. EFT C 296 af 29.9.1997. s. 19.
ESC opinion of 9.7.1997, OJ C 296, 29.9.1997, p. 19.
Der kan traeffes saerlige forholdsregler I sager, hvor en bestemt ansoegning kraever en mere udfoerlig behandling over et laengere tidsrum.
Provision might be made for cases where a particular application merited an extended period fordetailed consideration.
Et paa forhaand fastsat udvidet tidsrum kan undtagelsesvist tillades, hvis det baseres paa en begrundelse, som kan indbringes for EF-Domstolen.
A predetermined extended period might be permitted, exceptionally, on the basisof a reasoned statement which could be challenged in the European Court.
En af de erhvervssektorer, som er under hastig ekspansion, og som frembyder muligheder og problemer, der ogsaa paavirker medlemsstaternes samhandel, er det spekter af virksomheder, der er del af' det (saakaldte) informationssamfund.
One of the sectors of economic activity which is expanding rapidly and is posing opportunities andproblems which also affect trade between Member States is the range of enterprises forming part of (whatis known as) the Information Society.
Som Kommissionen konstaterer, har den nye teknologiske udvikling ikke blot rejst spoergsmaal om aftaler og tilfaelde af dominerende stilling, der paavirker liberaliseringen af informationssamfundets markeder, men har ogsaa sat fokus paa betydningen af omhyggeligt at overveje konsekvenserne af"eventuelle fusioner.
As the Commission notes, the new and emerging technologicaldevelopments have not only raised questions about restrictive practices and dominant positions whichaffect the liberalization of markets but they have also highlighted the need to carefully consider theimpact of possible mergers.
Telesektoren i EU, ja saagar paa verdensplan, kendetegnes bl.a. ved behovet for at skabe balance mellem et eksisterende, separat infrastrukturnets oekonomiske logik og tjenestcleveraiuloerernes muligheder for at faa adgang til nettets kerneelementcr til priser, der ikke er for konkurrencebegraensende.
A feature of the telecommunications sector across the European Union, and indeed on a global scale,is the need to balance the economic logic of an existing single infrastructure network with the provisionof opportunities for service providers to have access to core elements of the network at prices which aredetermined in a manner which does not attempt, unreasonably, to restrict competition.
Kommissionen har vist. at den er parat til at gribe ind hvis de nuvaerende tjenesteleverandoerer saenker afgifterne dér, hvor konkurrencen er mest intensiv, og krydssubsidierer disse tjenester ved hjaelp af hoejere afgifter paa andre tjenester, hvilket reelt er en uhaederlig maade at udnytte brugerne paa.
The Commission has shown that it is prepared to intervene if existing service providers reduce tariffswhere competition is more intense and cross-subsidize these services by higher tariffs on other serviceswhich is effectively a method of unfairly exploiting the consumers.