natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I modsætning til »private« betalingstelefoner, som drives af private operatører, f.eks. i hotel- og restaurationsbranchen, og som udgør et marked af europæisk tilsnit, er markederne for »offentlige« betalingstelefoner endnu i dag stærkt nationalt prægede, bl.a. som følge af forskellige tekniske normer og specifikationer i de enkelte lande (bl.a. på sikkerhedsområdet), hvilket gør det nødvendigt at udvikle en særskilt betalingstelefonmodel i hvert fald for hvert af de store EU-landc.
Unlike 'private' payphones run by private operators, as in cafes, hotels and restaurants, whichconstitute a market with a European dimension, 'public' payphone markets are still heavily national,given the specifications and technical standards (particularly as regards safety) laid down by the nationaloperators, which has resulted in an individual payphone model being developed, at least in each of thelarge Member States.
Anvendelse af fusionsforordningen på denne type transaktioner vil ofte være forbundet med ekstraterritorialitetselementer. navnlig når der er tale om virksomheder uden for Den Europæiske Unions grænser, og transaktionen (egentlig fusion, overtagelse eller etablering af et joint venture) også finder sted uden for EU.
The application of the Merger Regulation to operations of this type may involve extraterritorialelements, particularly where the companies are based outside the common borders of the European Union and the operation (full merger, acquisition or creation of a joint venture) also takes place outsidethe Union.
Ud over det rent objektive sporgsmål om udlosning af anmeldelsespligten ved transaktioner, der når op på de i fusionsforordningen fastsatte tærskler, er det afgørende kriterium for EU's kompetence, hvilke virkninger fusionen vil få på fællesmarkedet.
Apart from triggering the notification requirement when the turnover thresholds laid down inthe regulation are reached, the critical element on which competence to act is based is the operationalscope of the transaction within the common market.
Der er ingen tvivl om kompetencen i de tilfælde, hvor det relevante geografiske marked er hele verdensmarkedet, som EU jo udgør en væsentlig del af.
The matter of competence is hardly in doubt in caseswhere the relevant geographic market is defined as global, since the European Union forms a substantialpart of that market.
I sit fald beror kompetencen på fusionens virkninger for konkurrenceforholdene på fællesmarkedet.
Accordingly, competence is then based on the impact of the operation on theconditions of competition in the common market.
Men selv i de tilfælde, hvor det relevante geografiske marked ikke kan antages at være hele verden, kan Kommissionen have kompetence til at behandle en fusion mellem virksomheder, der hverken er hjemmehørende eller har datterselskaber eller filialer inden for EU. når fusionen har indvirkninger på konkurrenceforholdene på fællesmarkedet.
However, even where the relevant market has not beendefined as global, the Commission's competence to examine a merger between companies which do nothave a registered office, subsidiaries or branches on Community territory may be based on the operation'seffect on the conditions of competition in the common market.
Et eksempel herpå var Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, hvor fusionen gik ud pa at skabe verdens største flyproduccrende selskab, og hvor Kommissionen indledte en tilbundsgående undersøgelse på grund af dens indvirkninger på konkurrenceforholdene i EU.
In that context, the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, which led to the creation of the largestaerospace company in the world, gave rise to an indepth investigation in view of its impact oncompetition.
Det fusionerede selskab ville rent faktisk komme til at sidde på over 60 % af verdensmarkedet inden for store trafikjetfly med over 100 sæder, der er et stærkt koncentreret marked eftersom Boeing efter fusionen kun ville have en enkeli konkurrent, nemlig Airbus.
The company resulting from the merger held a market share of more than 60 % of the worldmarket for commercial jet aircraft with more than 100 seats. A market which is extremely concentratedsince, following the operation, only one competitor, Airbus, remains.
Fusionen ville resultere i en styrkelse af Boeings i forvejen dominerende stilling, bl.a. i kraft af den umiddelbare forogelse af Boeings markedsandel og ordrebeholdning.
Boeing already dominated themarket, and its position was strengthened by various factors, such as the immediate increase in its marketshare and order book.
Boeing ville desuden også få styrket sin dominerende stilling på andre væsentlige områder.
Other essential elements helped to strengthen its dominant position.
Kommissionen fastslog bl.a., al fusionen ville give Boeing væsentlige fordele over for de hidtidige McDonnell Douglas-kunder. øgede muligheder for at indgå langsigtede leveringsaftaler med flyselskaberne, en væsentlig større patentbeholdning og en række teknologiske fordele i kraft af den statslige finansiering af F & U-programmer inden for militærfly og rumfart.
The main onesidentified by the Commission include the leverage effect with users of McDonnell Douglas (MDD)aircraft, the enhanced opportunity to enter into long-term exclusive supply deals with airlines, the mergerof patent portfolios and the technological 'spill-over' benefits to the company's defence and spaceactivities resulting from public funding of R & D programmes. 170.
Desuden skal der hvert år indsendes en rapport til Kommissionen angående statsligt finansierede F & U-programmcr.
Throughout the Commission proceedings, the case receivedconsiderable attention from the media which focused on the State interests at stake.
Tilsammen var disse tilsagn tilstrækkelige til at løse de påviste konkurrenceproblemer, og Kommissionen besluttede derfor at godkende fusionen på betingelse af. at tilsagnene blev opfyldt.
The Commissionreached its decision after carrying out an analysis based on the European Union's merger control rulesand in accordance with its own practice and the case-law of the European Court.
Under hele Kommissionens behandling af sagen var den genstand for meget stor bevågenhed i medierne, der navnlig fokuserede på de statsintercsser. der var involveret.
During its indepth investigation, the Commission notified the US authorities of its initial conclusions and concernsand called on the Federal Trade Commission to take account of the European Union's important interestin safeguarding competition on the large commercial jet aircraft market.
Kommissionen traf sin endelige beslutning efter en analyse på grundlag af EU's fusionsregler og i overensstemmelse med sin hidtidige beslutningspraksis og EF-Domstolens retspraksis.
The Commission took its concerns into consideration to the extentconsistent with EU law, and limited the scope of its action to the civil side of the operation, including theeffects of the merger on the commercial jet aircraft market resulting from the combining of Boeing and MDD's defence interests.
1 øvrigt gav sagen anledning til mange kontakter og samråd specielt mellem
In spite of the difficulties inherent to this case, the conditional authorisation
Under sin tilbundsgående undersøgelse underrettede Kommissionen de amerikanske myndigheder om de foreløbige konklusioner, den havde draget, og anmodede Federal Trade Commission om at tage hensyn til EU's væsentlige interesse i at værne om konkurrencen på markedet for store trafikjetfly.
65 given by the Commission on completion of its investigation was therefore a satisfactory and appropriatesolution which maintained effective competition on the large commercial jet aircraft market.
I Anglo American Corporation (AAC)ZLonrho fastlog Kommissionen også, at der var risiko for skabelse af en dominerende stilling på markedet for platin, der er et verdensmarked.
In the Anglo American Corporation (AAC)ZLonrhocase, the Commission also established thatthere was a risk of a dominant position being created on the world platinum market.
Denne risiko skyldtes AAC's gradvise overtagelse af Lonrho, som ville give AAC en dominerende stilling i kraft af de to virksomheders tilsammen meget store markedsandel, som måtte antages at ville blive øget yderligere i betragtning af de meget få nuværende eller potentielle konkurrenter på markedet.
This risk arose when AAC acquired a shareholding in Lonrho through a series of purchases. The dominant position resultedfrom the substantial combined market share of the parties and from the strong probability that it wouldincrease further in the short term, given the very limited actual or potential competition.
Disse problemer kunne ikke løses ved at påbyde en afhændelse, eftersom den eneste mulige anden køber var den tredjestørste platinudbyder, det sydafrikanske selskab Gencor, der selv havde været part i en tidligere fusionsplan, som Kommissionen havde modsat sig i 1996 (Gencor/Lonrho).
A sell-off wasruled out as a possible solution given that the only likely buyer would have been Gencor, the third-largest South African operator, which had itself been involved in a previous putative merger which the Commission had opposed in 1996 (Gencor/Lonrho case).
Anglo American måtte således efterkomme Kommissionens påbud om at nedbringe sin andel af Lonrho til et niveau, der ikke gav kontrol med virksomheden.
Anglo American therefore agreed to the Commission's requirement that it reduce its shareholding in Lonrho to below a threshold giving it overallcontrol of that company.
Det er første gang siden fusionsforordningens ikrafttrædelse, at der har været tale om et sådant tilsagn gående ud på, at et selskab skal nedbringe sin aktiepost i en børsnoteret virksomhed for derved at forhindre, at der opstår en dominerende stilling.
This was the first time since the regulation entered into force that a commitmentalong those lines, consisting in the reduction of a shareholding in a company listed on a financial market,had been proposed, thus avoiding the risk of a dominant position being created.
Denne beslutning stemmer i øvrigt overens med Kommissionens hidtidige praksis, idet Kommissionen også i tidligere beslutninger har fastslået, at minoritetsinteresser i en virksomhed kan danne grundlag for kontrol med den pågældende virksomhed.
The decision alsoconfirmed the Commission's consistent approach, which holds that acquisition of control may result froma qualified minority holding.
Markedsafskærmende virkninger
Market foreclosure effects
I fusionen mellem British Telecommunications og MCI Communications Corporation (BT/MCI) fremgik det af Kommissionens undersøgelser, at der var risiko for, at fusionen ville føre til skabelse eller styrkelse af en dominerende stilling på markedet for internationale taletelefonitjenester mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og USA.
In the BT/MCI case, the merger between British Telecommunications and MCI Communications Corporation, the Commission's investigations showed that the operation might create or strengthen adominant position in the market for international voice telephony services between the United Kingdomand the United States.
Denne risiko beroede navnlig på den relative mangel på transmissionsmidier på kabelforbindelsen over Atlanterhavet mellem Storbritannien og USA, hvilket kunne resultere i flaskehalse på kabelforbindelsen, der er præget af en kraftigt voksende efterspørgsel.
This risk was linked to the relative capacity shortage in transmission facilities ontransatlantic submarine cables between the United Kingdom and the United States which might lead to abottleneck on the cable link, currently facing rapidly expanding demand.
Kommissionen fandt, at der i den konkrete sag ikke var substitution mellem kabel og satellit hvad angår udbud og teletjenester på atlantforbindclserne.
The Commission took the view here that cable and satellite were not substitutable in the supply oftelecommunications services for transatlantic links.
BT og MCI råder over en betydelig kabelkapacitet, og deres position på markedet ville blive styrket betydeligt ved en sammenlægning af deres kapacitet inden for punkt-til-punkt-trafik. Det ville have givet parterne mange særlige fordele (specielt i relation til internationale betalinger).
BT and MCI already had significant cable capacityand their strength would have been further reinforced if their end-to-end international traffic capacitieshad been increased.
Ingen af de konkurrenter, der findes i trafikken mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og USA. ville have haft tilsvarende fordele.
No other competitor on the UK-US link would have enjoyed suchadvantages.
Desuden ville det fusionerede selskab have været i stand til at udkonkurrere andre operatorer.
Moreover, the new enterprise would have been in a position to oppose competition fromother operators.
Som svar på den klagepunktsmeddelelse, Kommissionen fremsendte, tilbod parterne at afgive en række tilsagn, specielt tilsagn om at stille kapacitet til rådighed på kablerne over Atlanterhavet og tilbyde at sælge de pågældende halve kredslob til de andre operatører, der måtte anmode herom. Kommissionen fandt, at disse tilsagn ville løse de påviste konkurrenceproblemer, fordi de ville gore det lettere for konkurrenterne at komme til at fungere som
In reply to the Commission's objections, the parties offered commitments consistingessentially of making transatlantic cable capacity available and selling matched half circuits to otheroperators at their request.
Siemens' tilsagn om at afhænde alle aktiviteter i forbindelse med Elektrowatt/Landis & Gyrs produktion af betalingstelefoner til en uafhængig køber, som desuden ville få ligelig adgang til teknologien, kunne imidlertid forhindre, at der som følge af skabelsen af en dominerende stilling ville opstå et helt lukket marked. 2.3. Portefoljeeffekter
XXVIIth REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1997 — SEC(98) 636 final possibility of potential competitors bringing real pressure to bear because market entry would haveentailed significant investments which would not have been feasible in view of the limited sales potential.The commitment proposed by Siemens, namely to sell off Elektrowatt/Landis & Gyr's payphoneproduction activities to a third party, which would also enjoy fair access to the technology in question,avoided the risk of the market being effectively foreclosed as a result of the dominant position. 2.3.
De virkninger, en omfattende mærkeportefølje kan have for konkurrencen, har særlig betydning inden for dagligvarer såsom drikkevarer og beror hovedsagelig på de yderligere fordele, indehaverne af dominerende mærker kan have.
The question of the potential impact of range effects on competition, which is particularlyimportant with regard to daily consumer goods, such as drinks, arises in connection with the additionalbenefits that may accrue to the owners of dominant brand names.
Disse fordele kan f.eks. bestå i mulighed for en smidig prissætning og markedsføring.
These advantages may be reflected ingreater pricing flexibility and in a wide range of commercial strategy options.
1 Coca-Cola/Carlsberg og Guinness/Grand Metropolitan tog Kommissionen hensyn til. at parterne kom til at råde over stærke drikkevaremærker på flere forskellige produktmarkeder.
In the Coca-Cola/Carhberg and Guinness/Grand Metropolitan cases, the Commission considered the inclusion in arange of drinks of strong brands belonging to separate markets.
Den drog den konklusion, at sammenlægningen af mærkeportefoljer kunne føre til, at hvert al" mærkerne i porteføljen kom til at stå stærkere på markedet, end hvis de blev solgt hver for sig, og at det kunne styrke indehaverens stilling i konkurrencen på flere markeder.
It concluded that the impact of suchinclusion could give each of the brands in the portfolio greater strength on the market than if they weresold individually, and strengthen the competitive position of the portfolio's owner on several markets.
I den anden af de nævnte sager lagde Kommissionen også vægt på, hvilke virkninger det ville få for konkurrencen, at parterne kom til at råde over en beholdning afmærker, som aftagerne vanskeligt kunne komme udenom at købe.
In the second case, the consequences for potential competitors of owning a portfolio of highprofile brand names were also examined.
Som indehavere af dominerende mærker ville parterne komme til at slå stærkt i forhandlingerne med deres kunder og f.eks. la mulighed for at påtvinge dem eksklusivaftaler, hvilket Kommissionen fandt kunne lægge øgede hindringer i vejen for nye produkters adgang til markedet.
The negotiating leverage resulting from ownership of dominantbrands, which could, for instance, enable exclusive deals to be imposed, was deemed likely to raiseadditional obstacles to the market entry of new products.
Sådanne virkninger kan også gore sig gældende i industrisektoren.
Other range-related effects can also be noted in the industrial sector.
I Boeing/McDonnell Douglas ville fusionen f.eks. ud over Boeings i forvejen eksisterende monopol inden for de største typer bredkroppede fly (Boeing 747) også føre til en monopolstilling inden for de mindste typer smalkroppedc fly, hvor Boeing ville blive den eneste flylåbrikant. der var i stand til at tilbyde en komplet serie slore trafikfly.
For example, in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, leaving aside the previously existing monopoly in the wide-body jetaircraft segment (Boeing 747), the merger resulted in an additional monopoly in the smaller narrow-bodyaircraft segment, thus making Boeing the only aircraft manufacturer offering a complete range of largecommercial aircraft.
Denne position ville ikke kunne anfægtes af nye potentielle konkurrenter, eftersom delle marked var præget af overordentligt store adgangsbarrierer i form af enorme kapitalkrav.
This position could not be contested by new potential entrants, given the extremelyhigh entry barriers on the market, which was highly capital-intensive.
Henvisning af sager til medlemsstaterne
Referrals to the Member States
Fusionen SEHB/VIAG/PE-BEWAG. som fandt sted på baggrund al' privatiseringen af' det berlinske elforsyningsselskab Bewag, var den eneste af sagerne i 1997, hvor Kommissionen henviste hele den anmeldte transaktion til en medlemsstat.
The SEHB/VIAG/PE-BEWAG case, involving the privatisation of the Berlin-based electricitycompany BEWAG, is the only case where an operation notified to the Commission in 1997 was referredin its entirety to a Member State.
Den store detailkoncern Promodès ' overtagelse af konkurrenten Casino berørte et antal lokale detaildistributionsmarkeder, bl.a. Paris og Paris-området.
The takeover bid launched by the retail group Promodes for its competitor Casino affected anumber of local retail markets, including Paris and the Paris area.
Kommissionen besluttede at henvise sagen til de franske konkurrencemyndigheder, bl.a. fordi de bedre var i stand til at foretage en præcis afgrænsning af de særskilte geografiske områder, hvor koncernens butikker stod så stærkt, at der ville være risiko for skabelse eller styrkelse af en dominerende stilling.
The Commission's decision to referpart of the operation was based on a belief that an examination by the French competition authoritieswould enable separate geographic markets on which the position of the group's stores entailed a risk ofcreating or strengthening a dominant position to be determined accurately.
I betragtning af strukturerne i denne sektor og de to koncerners position på markedet fandt den imidlertid, at fusionen kunne godkendes, hvad angår den del af den, som ikke blev henvist.
However, in view of thestructure of the market and the position of the two groups, the Commission decided to approve theoperation as regards the part for which it retained competence.
Preussag, som er en koncern, der er aktiv inden for mange forskellige områder, havde overtaget Hapag-Lloyd og Touristik Union International, som begge opererer inden for turist- og rejsebranchen i Tyskland, via to særskilte transaktioner.
The diversified Preussag conglomerate acquired control of Hapag-Lloyd and Touristik Union International, both of which are active in tourism and travel services in Germany, in two separatetransactions.
Kombinationen af de to overtagelser, hvortil kom en yderligere fusion af nationalt tilsnit, der til dels fandt sted inden for samme sektorer, kunne efter Bundeskartellamts opfattelse resultere i, at der opstod et duopol på markedet i betragtning af de krydsejerskabsforhold, der bestod mellem to førende koncerner på markedet for flyrejser, krydstogter og charterflyvning.
The Federal Cartels Office took the view that the combination of those two operations andanother merger, which took place at the same time in the same industry and had a national dimension,resulted in the creation of a duopolistic structure given the mutual links between the two leading groupson the air travel, sea cruises and charter flights markets.
Under hensyn til de særlige forhold, der gjorde sig gældende i denne sag, henviste Kommissionen den del af den, der drejede sig om Preussags overtagelser på disse markeder, til Bundeskartellamt for at fremme en ensartet og mere sammenhængende behandling af transaktionerne og deres indvirkning på konkurrencen.
In view of the circumstances of the case, the Commission referred the parts of Preussag's acquisitions concerning those markets so as to ensure thatthey were examined on the same basis and that their effects on competition were assessed in a consistentway.
Derimod besluttede den at nægte sin godkendelse af visse andre aspekter ved de anmeldte fusioner, der bl.a. drejede sig om flere markeder inden for transport- og rejseagentursektoren.
However, it decided that the other aspects of the notified mergers, which concerned several marketsin the fields of transport and travel agencies, were compatible with the common market.
Via deres fælles overtagelse af Compagnie Industrielle Maritime kom et ¿^datterselskab og Compagnie Nationale de Navigation til at kontrollere en olieproduktgrossist, der hidtil havde været uafhængig af de store olieselskaber, hvilket indebar en risiko for, at der opstod en dominerende stilling på en række særskilte markeder for oplagring af olieprodukter.
The acquisition of joint control of Compagnie Industrielle Maritime by a subsidiary of Elf and Compagnie Nationale de Navigation meant the takeover of a major oil storage company which hadhitherto been independent of the large oil companies that made up its customer base, and threatened tocreate or reinforce dominant positions on certain separate oil storage markets.
Kommissionen besluttede at henvise denne del al" sagen til de franske myndigheder.
Accordingly, the Commission decided to refer that part of the case to the French authorities.
En række andre særlige aspekter ved sagen, bl.a. i relation til oplagring af råolie med henblik på salg på det internationale spotmarked, rejste ingen alvorlige konkurrenceproblemer, og fusionen blev derfor godkendt på disse punkter.
Other specific aspects, such asthe storage of crude oil traded on the international spot market, did not raise serious competitionconcerns, and were therefore approved.
Lafarges planer om at overtage Redland gav for første gang to medlemsstater lejlighed til at samarbejde med Kommissionen om behandling af visse aspekter ved fusionen, nærmere betegnet i relation til markederne for granulater og færdigblandet beton.
The takeover bid for Redland launched by Lafarge provided a first opportunity, for two Member States to cooperate simultaneously with the Commission in handling certain aspects of the operationconcerning aggregates and ready-mixed concrete.
De franske og britiske myndigheder havde meddelt Kommissionen, at fusionen truede med at skabe eller styrke en dominerende stilling på visse særskilte geografiske markeder.
The French and UK authorities had informed the Commission that the proposed operation would entail a risk of creating or strengthening dominantpositions in a number of distinct geographic markets.
For Frankrigs vedkommende var der tale om 17 geografiske områder, medens Det Forenede Kongerige, hvor Lafarge har mere begrænsede aktiviteter, pegede på to berørte
The French request identified 17 affected areas; inthe request from the United Kingdom (where Lafarge's presence is much smaller) two such areas wereidentified.