natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som følge af Konkurrencerådets og Kommissionens indgreb har Miljøpuljen nu annulleret sit krav om, at indehaveren af en benzinstation, der ønsker at genåbne stationen efter en oprensning inden år 2005, skal betale et gebyr på 250 000 DKR.
As a result of the action by the Danish authoritiesand the Commission, the Environmental Pool abandoned its requirement that a station-owner who wanted toreopen a station after clean-up before the year 2005 had to pay a penalty of DKR 250 000.
Ud over at godtgøre Miljøpuljen dens administrations-, kontrol- og oprensningsomkostninger samt renteudgifterne i forbindelse hermed skal den pågældende nu kun tegne en miljøforsikring til dækning af den fremtidige forurening og over for Miljøpuljen dokumentere, ae forsikringen nu også er tegnet.
Now the only obligation on any such person — in addition to reimbursing the Pool for administration fees, inspection costs, clean-up costs and interest — is to take adequate insurance covering the risk of future pollution and tocertify to the Pool that he has such insurance.
Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence konkluderede herefter, at der ikke var nogen grund til at foretage sig yderligere, hvorfor sagen blev henlagt, idet ordningen skulle forvaltes efter ovenfor anførte kriterier.
The Directorate-General for Competition concluded that there were no grounds for further action and the casewas closed on the basis of the scheme's operation in accordance with the criteria set out above.
Kommissionen godkendte den 7. september 1994 en aftale mellem 13 europæiske jernbaneselskaber om etablering af et interessefællesskab inden for transport af biler (»Communauté d'Intérêts Automobiles«).
On 7 September the Commission authorized an agreement between 13 European rail companies setting up amotor vehicle interest grouping.
Der var tale om en rammeaftale, hvorved der blev etableret et samarbejde mellem de pågældende jernbaneselskaber inden for international transport af nye biler.
The grouping is based on a framework cooperation agreement between rail companies relating to the international carriage of new motor vehicles.
Kommissionens generelle holdning er, at jernbanetransport for visse produkters vedkommende, bl.a. fabriksnye biler, er en særlig hensigtsmæssig transportform, som derfor bør udbredes.
In general, the Commission is of the opinion that rail transport is a particularly suitable form of transport for certain products, such as new motor vehicles leaving factories, and that its use should therefore be encouraged.
Kommissionen godkendte den 23. september 1994 en aftale mellem British Rail (BR), Deutsche Bahn (DB), Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF) og Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Beige (SNCB) om passagertransport med nattog mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og kontinentet.
On 23 September the Commission authorized an agreement between British Rail (BR), Deutsche Bahn (DB),Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), the Societe nationale des chemins de fer frangais (SNCF) and the Societenationale des chemins de fer beiges (SNCB), to run night passenger trains between the United Kingdom and the Continent.
Denne nattogsforbindelse, som skulle drives af et joint venture mellem jernbaneselskaberne, »European Night Services Ltd« (ENS), skulle imødekomme transportbehovet hos tre kundekategorier:
Such night trains, operated by European Night Services Ltd (ENS), a joint subsidiary of the rail companies, areintended to meet the needs of three kinds of passenger:
— forretningsrejsende, der sædvanligvis rejser med fly, men som kan tænkes i stedet at vælge en nattogsforbindelse af høj kvalitet
(i) business travellers who normally travel by air but may prefer a high-quality night rail service;(ii) leisure travellers looking for a high level of comfort;
ENS skulle fra 1995 køre med et tog hver nat i hver retning på hver af følgende ruter:
(iii) leisure travellers looking for lower fares and willing to accept a lower level of comfort.ENS should, from 1995, be running one train per night in each direction on each of the following routes:
ENS ville ikke selv råde over lokomotiver, men købe banetrækkraft af jernbaneselskaberne.
ENS will not have its own locomotives but will purchase traction from the rail companies.
Kommissionen fastslog, at denne aftale kunne begrænse konkurrencen mellem parterne og mellem dem og andre transportører, der ikke rådede over samme ressourcer og ville blive hindret i at få adgang til dette marked.
The Commission took the view that the agreement was likely to restrict competition between the parties to it andbetween them and other operators, who will not have the same resources and will be faced with an obstacle toentering the market in question.
Aftalen var imidlertid også forbundet med ikke ubetydelige fordele for transportbrugerne.
However, such an agreement also has advantages for consumers.
Såvel forretningsrejsende som turistrejsende ville helt klart få fordel af, at der tilvejebringes en ny jernbaneforbindelse af høj kvalitet.
Both business and leisure travellers will clearlybenefit from the new high-quality rail services.
Kommissionen fandt derfor, at aftalen opfyldte betingelserne for fritagelse i 8 år efter artikel 5 i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 1017/68.
The Commission therefore took the view that the agreement satisfied the conditions for granting an exemption for a period of eight years pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68.
For at sikre, at også andre transportører får mulighed for at levere tilsvarende transportydelser, gav Kommissionen imidlertid jernbaneselskaberne påbud om at sælge de samme jernbaneydelser, som de har forpligtet sig til at levere til deres datterselskab, og på samme vilkår til de transportører, der måtte have behov for det.
In order not to prevent other operators from offering similar services, the Commission required the rail companies to sell to them the rail services they have agreed to sell to their subsidiary, on the same terms.
Kommissionen godkendte den 15. september 1994 en samarbejdsaftale mellem Ducros Services Rapides, DHL Worldwide Express og sidstnævntes tyske datterselskab, Elan International GmbH, der gik ud på at etablere et europæisk net for hurtig pakketransport med garanterede leveringstider. der.
On 15 September the Commission authorized a cooperation agreement between Ducros services rapides, DHLWorldwide Express and the latter's German subsidiary, Elan International GmbH, for the setting-up of a European network of rapid delivery services with guaranteed deadlines.
Aftalen omfattede eksprestransport af forsendelser på under 3 tons af varer med høj værditilvækst.
The agreement covers the rapid delivery of batches of less than three tonnes of products with high added-value.
Denne form for transportservice var traditionelt blevet varetaget af Ducros i Frankrig og af Elan i Tyskland. De to virksomheder ville samle deres respektive midler og net i ét europæisk net, som i første omgang skulle dække Frankrig, Tyskland, Italien, Spanien, Det Forenede Kongerige og Benelux-landene.
The established pattern had been that Ducros provides these services in France, while Elan covers Germany.
Ydelserne skulle markedsføres under et fælles handelsnavn og med en fælles strategi.
It willbe operated under a common commercial name and with a common strategy.
Meningen var, at parterne via dette net ville betjene deres europæiske kunder i fællesskab, og de gav hinanden gensidig eneret på deres respektive områder.
Within this framework, the partieswill share their European customer-base and will grant each other reciprocal exclusive rights in respect of services in their respective territories.
ACI skulle drive kombineret jernbanetransport af lastbiler, containere, veksellad og trailere fra terminal til terminal mellem Det Forenede Kongerige og destinationer i Italien, Spanien, Schweiz, Østrig, Tyskland og Frankrig via Kanaltunnelen.
ACI's aim is to provide combined rail transport for road vehicles, containers, swap bodies and semi-trailers fromterminal to terminal between the United Kingdom and destinations in Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Germanyand France via the Channel Tunnel.
Med henblik herpå ville ACI leje specialvogne hos BR og hos SNCF's og Intercontainers datterselskab, FME.
In order to carry out its activities, ACI will rent specialized wagons from BR and FME, a subsidiary of the SNCFand Intercontainer.
Jernbanetrækkraften skulle leveres af de jernbaneselskaber, der betjener ACI's ruter.
The rail traction will be sold by the rail companies involved on the routes operated by ACI.
Kommissionen fastslog, at denne aftale havde til formål og til følge at begrænse konkurrencen mellem parterne, der rådede over de tekniske og økonomiske midler til at levere disse ydelser hver for sig.
The Commission took the view that the agreement had the object and effect of restricting competition betweenthe parties, each of whom had the technical and financial means of providing the services individually.
På baggrund af de særlige forbindelser mellem ACI og dets moderselskaber, der leverer jernbanetrækkraften, var der desuden risiko for, at andre transportører ville blive stillet i en ugunstig konkurrencesituation.
Furthermore, the preferential relationships between ACI and its parents, who provide the rail traction, could place otheroperators at a competitive disadvantage.
Der måtte dog også tages hensyn til aftalens positive virkninger.
However, the positive aspects of the agreement must also be taken into account.
I særdeleshed vil det kunne fremme den økonomiske udvikling, at der lige fra åbningen af Kanaltunnelen tilvejebringes et regelmæssigt udbud af kombineret transport.
The introduction of regular combinedtransport services as soon as the Channel Tunnel becomes operational is likely to promote economicprogress.
Kommissionen besluttede derfor at fritage aftalen i 5 år, jf. artikel 5 i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 1017/68.
Accordingly, the Commission decided to exempt the agreement for five years pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68.
Til denne fritagelse blev der imidlertid knyttet den betingelse, at de pågældende jernbaneselskaber på et ikkediskriminerende grundlag skal levere de jernbaneydelser, som de leverer til deres joint venture, til enhver anden transportør, der måtte ønske at købe disse ydelser af dem.
However, this exemption is subject to the requirement that the rail companies in question must sell to all transportoperators, on a non-discriminatory basis, the same traction services which they have undertaken to sell to theirsubsidiary.
BR og FME skal desuden acceptere at leje de af deres disponible specialvogne, der ikke har været i brug i mindst seks måneder, ud til andre transportører.
Furthermore, BR and FME must agree to hire out to other operators if required any specialized wagons which they have available and which have not been used for at least six months.
Kommissionen modtog en klage mod Deutsche Bahn for anvendelse af diskriminerende priser inden for jernbanetransport af søcontainere.
The Commission received a complaint that Deutsche Bahn was applying discriminatory pricing on the market forthe rail transport of seaborne containers.
Klagen blev indbragt af en organisation af virksomheder, der opererer i Rotterdams havn, HOV-SVZ.
The complaint was lodged by HOV SVZ, an association of undertakingsoperating in the port of Rotterdam.
Ifølge denne organisation havde Deutsche Bahn i en årrække misbrugt sit monopol inden for jernbanetransport i Tyskland ved for jernbanetransport udført via kombitransportøren Intercontainer at anvende lavere takster for containerne transporteret i transit via tyske havne (Bremen, Bremerhaven og Hamburg) end for containere transporteret via belgiske og nederlandske havne, med det formål at fremme DB's egen virksomhed.
According to the complainant, Deutsche Bahn had for many years been using its monopoly on the market for railservices in Germany to impose cheaper rail transport tariffs, charged by the combinedtransport operator Intercontainer, for the combined transport of seaborne containers transiting through the German ports (Bremen, Bremerhaven and Hamburg) rather than through the Belgian and Dutch ports, so as to favour its own services.
Efter modtagelsen af denne klage iværksatte Kommissionen en undersøgelse af sagen, som bekræfte de disse påstande.
The investigation carried out by the Commission bore out the complaint.
For visse tyske destinationers vedkommende var kilometerprisen ganske vist lavere fra Rotterdam end fra Hamburg.
In 1992, the price per kilometre for the carriage of full containers from Rotterdam to Germany was higher (by asmuch as 42%) than the price per kilometre from Hamburg.
Men det blev konstateret, at der i disse tilfælde altid var tale om destinationer, der lå længere væk fra Rotterdam end fra Hamburg.
In the case of certain destinations within Germany, the price per kilometre is admittedly lower from Rotterdamthan from Hamburg.
Den samlede pris, afskiberen blev afkrævet, var altid lavest, når transporten udgik fra Hamburg.
However, such destinations are always much further from Rotterdam than from Hamburg.Consequently, the total price charged to the consignor remains lower from Hamburg.
Den reduktion af kilometerprisen, der blev anvendt for transporter via Rotterdam i disse tilfælde, havde således ingen indvirkninger på markedet.
This means that the advantage in terms of price per kilometre enjoyed in such instances by Rotterdam has no practical effect on the market.
Som det blev fremhævet af repræsentanter for klagerne under sagsbehandlingen, var disse takstforskelle helt uacceptable, ikke mindst fordi der er langt hårdere konkurrence fra andre transportformer på de vestgående end på de østgående ruter, hvilket i praksis burde have resulteret i, at priserne tværtimod generelt skulle være lavere på de vestgående ruter.
Such price differences are all the more unacceptable since, as the representatives of the relevant undertakingsemphasized during the proceeding, competition from other means of transport is much fiercer on the westernroutes than on the northern routes, so that in overall terms prices should be lower on the western routes, contraryto the situation that actually applies.
Ved at påtvinge lidet konkurrencedygtige takster for jernbanetransport via nederlandske og belgiske havne havde DB rent faktisk stillet den kombinerede godstransport med brug af jernbanen ringere i konkurrencen med vejtransport.
By imposing uncompetitive prices for rail transport via the western ports,DB was in fact worsening the competitive position of combined rail transport of goods as compared with roadtransport.
Denne praksis indebar en mærkbar begrænsning af konkurrencen, såvel mellem jernbaneselskaberne og kombitransportørerne på disse forskellige ruter som mellem tyske havne og havne i andre
These practices appreciably restricted competition, firstly, between the railway companies and the combinedtransport operators serving the various routes and, secondly, between the German ports and other ports in the Community.
Der var helt klart tale om misbrug af dominerende stilling i strid med EF-traktatens artikel 86.
Such conduct is clearly an abuse of a dominant position, in breach of Article 86 of the EC Treaty.
At DB havde monopol på sine infrastrukturer, kunne principielt ikke anfægtes, men det gjorde det ikke mindre uacceptabelt, at en virksomhed, der nød godt af en retlig beskyttelse mod eventuelle konkurrenter, misbrugte sit monopol til at fremme sine egne og sit datterselskabs aktiviteter.
Although, at thetime of the facts, the principle of DB's monopoly on its infrastructures was not at issue, it was none the less unacceptable for an undertaking that enjoyed statutory protection against any competitors to abuse its monopoly inorder to promote its own activities and those of its subsidiary.
I øvrigt bevirkede denne praksis en omdirigering af trafikstrømmene og dermed en afskærmning af markederne, hvilket var i strid med en af traktatens grundlæggende målsætninger.
Furthermore, the practices at issue were designed to deflect trade and thus to segregate markets, which is contraryto one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.
Med denne praksis begrænsede DB tillige konkurrencen mellem havnene, på bekostning af Antwerpen og Rotterdam og hovedsagelig til gunst for Hamburg.
DB's conduct also restricted competition between ports, at the expense of Antwerp and Rotterdam and mainly tothe benefit of Hamburg.
Endelig bemærkes, at DB's ansvarlige ledere var helt klar over, at DB anvendte diskriminerende priser, og at denne overtrædelse havde strakt sig over en lang årrække.
Lastly, DB's management was fully aware of what it was doing in charging discriminatory prices, and theinfringement was committed over a long period.
Kommissionen besluttede derfor at pålægge DB en bøde på 11 mio. ECU for denne overtrædelse af artikel 86.
Consequently, the Commission decided to impose a fine of ECU 11 million on DB for infringement of Article 86.
I øvrigt havde DB i 1988 indgået en aftale med SNCB, Nederlandse Spoorwegen, Transfracht og Intercontainer, der gik under navnet »Maritime Container Network«.
In addition, DB concluded in 1988 an agreement with SNCB, Nederlandse Spoorwegen, Transfracht and Intercontainer, known as the 'Maritime container network Agreement'.
Denne aftale gik ud på, at DB, SNCB, NS, Transfracht og Intercontainer i fællesskab skulle markedsføre kombineret transport på basis af en fælles tarif.
The purpose of the Agreement was the jointmarketing (by DB, SNCB, NS, Transfracht and Intercontainer) of combinedtransport services on the basis of ajoint tariff grid.
Aftalen, som blev indgået som reaktion på den diskrimination, DB udøvede, levede imidlertid ikke op til parternes forventninger, da den gav DB en anledning til at forstærke sin dominerende stilling over for de andre aftaleparter.
The Agreement, which was a reaction to the discriminations imposed by DB, proved a disappointment to the parties, since it enabled DB to increase further the effects of its dominant position vis-a-vis itspartners.
Aftalen blev i øvrigt ophævet, efter at Kommissionen havde fremsendt en klagepunktsmeddelelse.
The Agreement was terminated after the Commission sent its statement of objections.
Derfor fik de deltagende virksomheder ikke pålagt nogen bøde for denne aftale, som ikke desto mindre var i strid med artikel 85.
Accordingly, no fine wasimposed for participation in the Agreement, which nevertheless constituted an infringement of Article 85.
Kommissionens beslutning i denne sag falder helt i tråd med Rådets og Kommissionens bestræbelser på at fremme jernbanetransport og kombitransport.
This decision is fully in line with the measures taken by the Council and the Commission to promote rail transport and combined transport.
Forudsætningen herfor er, at afskiberne kan få deres gods transporteret af konkurrencedygtige kombitransportører, som er i stand til at arbejde effektivt på europæisk plan.
Such a policy means that consignors must be able to draw on the services of combinedtransport operators that are competitive and able to provide efficient services on a European scale.
Det kan derfor ikke accepteres, at virksomheder, der indtager en dominerende stilling, misbruger deres dominans til at skaffe sig selv størst mulig indtjening og afskære kombitransportører fra at tilbyde mere konkurrencedygtige takster og derved handler i strid med den almene interesse.
It istherefore not acceptable for undertakings in a dominant position to abuse it so as to maximize their income bypreventing combinedtransport operators from offering more competitive prices, and for such undertakings thusto work against the general interest.
TAA-rederierne tegner sig for ca. 80 % af dette marked og ca. 70 % af hele markedet for containertransport i linjefart mellem Nordeuropa og USA (inkl. transport til og fra USA via canadiske havne).
They hold about 80% of that market and some 70% of the market for containerized liner shipping servicesbetween northern Europe and the United States (including access to the United States via the Canadian ports).
TAA-aftalen indeholdt bestemmelser om, at medlemmerne skulle træffe beslutninger om priser, transportvilkår og kapacitet i fællesskab.
The TAA provides for its members to take joint decisions on matters such as prices, conditions of carriage andcapacity.
— Der kunne ikke indgås kontrakter for årlige fragtmængder på under 200 containere à 20 TEU (»Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit«).
The TAA members draw up tariffs for both the maritime and inland sectors and publish them jointly.The service contracts concluded by the TAA members must conform to certain rules, in particular:(i) no contracts may last for longer than one year;(ii) no contracts may be signed for annual volumes of less than 200 TEUs (20-foot equivalent units).
Samtlige TAA-rederier var med i et kapacitetsstyringsprogram, som kun blev iværksat i trafikken fra Europa til USA.
All the members of the TAA participate in a capacity management programme, which is implemented only in thewestbound, i.e. Europe-United States, sector of the trade.
Formålet med dette program var at begrænse fragtudbuddet på markedet uden dermed at reducere rederiernes reelle kapacitet.
The purpose of the programme is to limit the supply oftransport on the market without reducing the real available capacity of shipowners.
Det gjaldt bl.a.:
These practices included:
— deres prisfastsættelse, som ikke var omfattet af nogen fritagelse, idet der var tale om toleddet tarifstruktur med én tarif for de tidligere konferencemedlemmer og en anden for de uafhængige TAA-rederier
(i) a non-exempted pricefixing practice which established a two-tier tariff structure between former conferencemembers and independents;
I kraft af denne aftale, der omfattede en betydelig del af trafikken, og som var suppleret med aftaler om priser og kapacitet, var TAA-rederierne i stand til at gennemtvinge meget store fragtrateforhøjelser i 1993 og 1994.
As a result of the TAA, which affects a substantial proportion of the trade, and the combined impact of the agreements on prices and capacities, the TAA members were able to impose very large price increases in 1993 and1994.
Prisforhøjelserne og den kunstige fastfrysning af kapaciteten alene i den vestgående trafik var til skade for de europæiske eksportører.
The price increase and the freezing of capacity in the westbound sector (Europe-United States) artificiallypenalized European exporters.
Disse bestemmelser i TAA-aftalen faldt ikke ind under gruppefritagelsen for linjekonferencer efter artikel 3 i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 4056/86:
The practices covered by the TAA do not fall within the scope of the block exemption from liner conferences provided for in Article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 because:
— Forordningens artikel 3, litra d), omfatter ikke en fastfrysning af kapacitetsudnyttelsen, der er ensbetydende med, at en del af den disponible kapacitet ikke udnyttes, og som hovedsagelig tager sigte på en forhøjelse af fragtraterne.
(i) Article 3(d) of the Regulation does not provide for exemption for the freezing of capacity utilization, i.e. thenon-utilization of part of the capacity available, aimed mainly at increasing freight rates.
En sådan fastfrysning er i øvrigt overhovedet ikke nogen traditionel konferencepraksis, eftersom konferencerne traditionelt har foretaget kapacitetstilpasninger ved at begrænse antallet af farter eller etablere pool'er.
Furthermore, suchfreezing of capacity does not in any way constitute a traditional liner conference activity, since liner conferences have traditionally implemented capacity adjustment mechanisms by limiting the number of trips or byusing pools.