natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som begrundelse for prisforskellene er der desuden fremsat en lang række andre argumenter, herunder forskelle i de afgifter, der skal svares ved anskaffelse eller indregistrering, priskontrollen i en af medlemsstaterne og den omstændighed, at ikke alle EF-landes markeder er lige åbne over for import fra tredjelande.
They also put forward a series of other argumentsto justify price differentials, including differences in taxation on purchase or on registration, the control of prices in one of the Member States and the differing degrees towhich national markets are open to imports from non-Community countries.
Kommissionen har i øvrigt gentagne gange understreget, at forskelle i de vejledende forbrugerpriser eksklusiv moms så vidt muligt bør holdes inden for de rammer, der er fastlagt i Kommissionens meddelelse, og at produktforskelle udelukkende bør bero på egentlige markedsbetingede forskelle.
The Commission has on a number of occasions pointed out that recommended retailprices exclusive of VAT in the various Member States must as far as possible be keptin line with the ranges specified in its notice and that product differences must be limitedto real market requirements.
Kommissionen traf den 26. marts 1990 foreløbige forholdsregler over for PSA-koncernen i form af et påbud om, at bilmellemhandleren, Ecosystem, fortsat skulle kunne købe hos belgiske og luxembourgske Peugeot-forhandlere.
On 26 March 1990, the Commission ordered interim measures against the PSAgroup so as to allow the motor vehicle purchasing intermediary Ecosystem to maintainits volume of purchases from Peugeot's Belgian and Luxembourg networks.
PSA havde givet sine forhandlere instrukser om ikke længere at efterkomme ordrer fra mellem handleren, Ecosystem.
PSA hadinstructed its network to stop accepting orders placed through Ecosystem.
Ecosystem er et selskab, der optræder som mellemhandler
The Commission pointed out in its decision that, in assessing the information in its possession within the meaning of Article 6 of Regulation No 99/63, it had
I henhold til fællesskabsretten har den alene pligt til at undersøge de af parterne anførte forhold og argumenter, at tage formel stilling til en klage og til eventuelt at tage sagen til behandling ud fra hensynet til Fællesskabets interesser.
49 discretionary power to attach degrees of priority to the cases brought to its attention.The only duty incumbent upon it under Community law was to examine the facts andarguments put forward by the parties, to adopt a formal position on a complaint andpossibly to pursue the case in the Community interest.
Kommissionen fandt, at der ikke ud fra hensyn til fællesskabsinteresser var grund til at skride ind i den her omhandlede sag, ikke mindst i betragtning af, at sagen allerede var indbragt for en national domstol.
The Commission took the viewthat, in the case in question, the Community interest did not justify action on its part,especially since the facts had already been brought before the national court.
Kommissionen modtog i 1990 ni anmodninger om fritagelse af aftaler efter indsigelsesproceduren i Rådets forordninger på transportområdet, heraf fire inden for luftfart (forordning nr. 3975/87)2), fire inden for søtransport (forordning nr. 4056/86)3) og en inden for landevejstransport (forordning nr. 1017/68)4).
During the period covered by the Report, the Commission received nine requestsfor application of the opposition procedures provided for in the Council regulationsapplicable to transport, namely four relating to air transport (Regulation No 3975/87),l four relating to sea transport (Regulation No 4056/86)2 and one relating to land transport(Regulation No 1017/68).3 In one of the cases, the Commission notified the parties thatthere were serious doubts as to the applicability of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.
I et af disse tilfælde meddelte Kommissionen ansøgerne, at det i høj grad kunne betvivles,
The Commission also raised objections in one case which had been the subject of two requests4 during the previous year.
J) Jf. dom afsagt af EF's Førsteinstansret den 10.7.1990 (Sag T 64­89), nr. 153­168 i denne beretning.
The Commission adopted three new block exemption Regulations in the field of airtransport5and sent the Council a proposal for a Regulation authorizing it (the Com- mission) to adopt a block exemption in the sea transport sector.6
4) EFTL 175 af 23.7.1968.
OJ L 175,23.7.1968.The: requestswere notincluded in the last Report.
§ 4 — Cementering af grundlaget for det indre marked
§ 4 — Underpinning the internal market
Der er også andre områder, hvor en strengere håndhævelse af konkurrence reglerne kan yde et meget væsentligt bidrag til at nedbryde de barrierer, der fortsat lægger hindringer i vejen for samhandel og konkurrence inden for EF.
The Commission has also been intensifying its activities in areas where a morerigorous application of the rules of competition will most facilitate the breakdown ofbarriers to intraCommunity trade and competition.
For at understøtte udviklingen henimod det indre marked har Kommissionen derfor intensiveret sin indsats på disse områder.
Its policy therefore underpins themoves towards completing the internal market.
Af særlig betydning er her Kommissionens tiltag inden for telekommunikation, post, energi, transport og forsikring samt i den audiovisuelle sektor.
Of particular importance are the Commission's efforts in the field of telecommunications, postal services, energy, transport, assurance, and the audiovisual sector.
I det følgende gennemgås hovedtrækkene i den udvikling, der er sket på disse områder såvel som på programmel- og ølmarkedet.
The major developments in these fields aswell as for software and the beer market are described below.
Med sin konkurrencepolitik vil Kommissionen ligesom hidtil sætte ind på at fjerne de mange barrierer for samhandel og konkurrence inden for EF, der er skabt af virksomhederne selv. I den nuværende fase af den økonomiske integration inden for EF er det imidlertid Kommissionens opfattelse, at de største barrierer findes på de markeder, der for øjeblikket reguleres af det offentlige.
Whilst many barriers to intraCommunity trade and competition are created by companies themselves, and competition policy will as in the past continue to tackle theseproblems, it is felt that at the present stage of economic integration in the Communitythe barriers are greatest in markets currently subject to State regulation.
Uden en effektiv håndhævelse af konkurrencereglerne på de regulerede markeder vil det ikke lykkes at skabe et ægte indre marked i disse sektorer, der tegner sig for en stigende andel af de enkelte landes nationalindkomst.
Unless the rulesof competition are effectively applied in the area of regulated markets there will be noreal internal market for those products which account for an increasingly large share ofnational income.
For forbrugerne vil en øget konkurrence desuden give større gevinst på de regulerede markeder end på de markeder, hvor der allerede findes en rimelig konkurrence.
Furthermore the potential gains to consumers from introducing morecompetition into these regulated sectors is greater than in sectors where workablecompetition already exists.
Ud fra forskellige politiske hensyn, herunder hensyn til forsyningssikkerhed eller ønsket om at sikre hele befolkningen de mest grundlæggende ydelser, har regeringerne i de fleste medlemsstater reguleret markederne for visse varer, navnlig energi og vand, telekommunikation og radiospredning.
For various public policy goals, such as ensuring security of supply or ensuring theprovision of a basic service to the whole population, governments in most Member Stateshave intervened to regulate the markets for certain products, notably utilities (energyand water), telecommunications and broadcasting.
Ønsket om at tilvejebringe alle disse ydelser til den brede offentlighed har ofte ført til oprettelse af offentlige virksomheder, der i mange tilfælde har fået et lovbestemt monopol.
This desire for the provision of publicservices often led to the establishment of public undertakings in many cases withstatutory monopoly protection.
Ofte har regeringerne også betragtet offentlige virksomheder som det bedste middel til at regulere visse sektorer, hvor etableringen af et supplerende distributionsnet (f.eks. telefon- og el-ledninger) var forbundet med så store omkostninger, at man fandt, at det ikke ville være økonomisk rationelt, hvis den pågældende ydelse blev leveret af mere end et selskab, der ejede nettet og derfor måtte have et »naturligt« monopol.
Such a public undertaking was also seen by governmentsas the best way to regulate sectors where, because of the costs of duplicating an expensivedistribution network (e.g. cables for telephones and electricity), it seems that the servicein question could only be provided economically by one company which owned thenetwork and which would therefore have a 'natural' monopoly.
Kommissionens mål er at finde frem til en løsning, der er forbundet med færrest mulige konkurrencebegrænsninger, men samtidig ikke lægger hindringer i vejen for tilvejebringelse af ydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse (jf. artikel 90, stk. 2).
The Commission's aim is to find a solution that is the least restrictive of competitionwhilst at the same time not prejudicing the operation of services of general economicinterest (in the sense of Article 90(2) of the EEC Treaty).
Det bør undersøges nærmere, om etablering af et lovbestemt monopol med visse enerettigheder er den eneste mulige måde, hvorpå visse fundamentale eller særlige ydelser kan tilvejebringes, eller om der findes andre, mindre konkurrencebegrænsende muligheder.
An examination will haveto be carried out to see if a statutory monopoly with certain exclusive rights is the onlyfeasible way to provide certain key or reserved services or if a less restrictive way ispossible. Furthermore the definition of these reserved services where a statutorymonopoly may be permitted will have to be drawn as tightly as is possible andcompetition will be introduced for non-reserved services.
De områder, hvor det fortsat vil kunne accepteres, at der findes
In addition, in cases where itis uneconomic to duplicate the network it may be possible to allow providers ofcompeting services to use the network, thereby opening up the possibility for compe-
Dette problem, der navnlig gør sig gældende inden for telekommunikation og el­forsyning, var et af emnerne i Kommissionens undersøgel­sesprogram J). Medmindre de ydelser, der tilbydes af disse lovbestemte monopoler, er af almindelig økonomisk interesse, jf. artikel 90, stk. 2, og medmindre de pågældende monopolvirksomheder ville blive ude af stand til at tilbyde disse ydelser, hvis de blev udsat for konkurrence, er de underlagt konkurrencereglerne (artikel 90, stk. 1) og kan ikke sikre sig mod konkurrence fra andre ved at påberåbe sig lovbestemte rettigheder eller misbruge deres dominerende stilling i artikel 86's forstand.
In other cases technology is making the construction of alternative networks afeasible way of competing with a hitherto unique network and the rules of competitionmust be applied to ensure that market regulation puts no brake on this development.This problem in telecommunications and electricity supply have also been the subjectof investigation under the studies programme.l Unless the services provided by thesestatutory monopolies are of general economic interest covered by the derogation of Article 90(2) of the EEC Treaty and exposing them to competition would prevent themfrom providing their services, these monopolies are subject to the rules of competition(Article 90(1) of the EEC Treaty) and cannot use these statutory rights or any abusivebehaviour in the sense of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to protect themselves fromcompetition.
Kommissionen har i stigende grad gjort brug af artikel 90, dels i form af direktiver, og dels ved at tage beslutninger for at løse problemer i forbindelse med lovbestemte monopoler og for at håndhæve konkurrencereglerne.
The Commission has had increasing recourse to Article 90 of the EEC Treaty eitherthrough Directives or decisions to tackle problems raised by statutory monopolies andapply the rules of competition.
Hvert enkelt konkret tilfælde må ganske vist behandles særskilt, men Kommissionen venter et stigende antal sager på dette område.
Although each case will have to be studied on its merits,the Commission expects activity in the field to increase.
I denne forbindelse må man ikke glemme, at privatisering af et statsligt monopol kan have helt konkurrenceneutrale virkninger og altså ikke nødvendigvis i sig selv skabe øget konkurrence.
In this respect it is importantto realize that the privatization of a State monopoly may be a neutral operation froma competition viewpoint and does not in itself increase competition.
Bestemmelserne i artikel 86 om dominerende selskaber vil derfor blive anvendt på samme måde, uanset om der er tale om et nationaliseret eller et privatiseret selskab.
The rules ofcompetition with respect to dominant companies (Article 86 of the EEC Treaty) willtherefore be applied without discrimination regardless of whether a company is nationalized or privatized.
I forlængelse af direktivet af 28. juni 1990 om liberalisering af markedet for teletjenester3) har Kommissionen gjort en stor indsats for at håndhæve artikel 85 og
Following up its Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets fortelecommunications services,3the Commission pursued a very active policy of imple- menting Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty in the telecommunications sector in aneffort to put an end to restrictive practices and abuses of dominant positions in the sector.As a result, an end was put to restrictions on the use of telecommunications circuitsimposed by telecommunications organizations or recommended by associations of themand to agreements on prices within such associations.
86 i telekommunikationssektoren for at få sat en stopper for konkurrencebegræns­ninger og misbrug af dominerende stilling i denne sektor.
The Commission also adopted a position on various forms of cooperation which havebeen introduced and laid down certain principles to be complied with in this respect soas to ensure effective competition on the market.
Den er således skredet ind over for begrænsninger i brugen af telekredsløb pålagt af teleselskaber eller anbefa­
Pursuing this active policy of implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty in thetelecommunications sector will be even more necessary once the regulatory obstacles
) Jf. afsnittet om offentlige virksomheder — telekommunikation, nr. 355, og afsnittet om undersøgelser, Fjerde del, Kapitel II i denne beretning.
See Part Four, Chapter II of this Report.See also Public undertakings — Telecommunications, point 355 of this Report, and Studies, Part Four,Chapter II of this Report.OJ L 192, 24.7.1990.
Denne aktive håndhævelse af bestemmelserne i artikel 85 og 86 i telekommunikationssektoren vil få endnu større betydning, når alle de lovbestemte hindringer er blevet afskaffet efter ikrafttrædelsen af ovennævnte direktiv af 28. juni 1990. Kommissionen vil udsende en meddelelse om de retningslinjer, den agter at følge med hensyn til anvendelsen af konkurrencereglerne i telekommunikationssektoren.
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES have been removed as a result of the application of the abovementioned Directive of28 June 1990.
Kommissionen er skredet ind over for det belgiske telegraf- og telefonvæsen, RTT, efter at en privat leverandør af tillægstjenester havde klaget over RTT's vilkår for udlejning af kredsløb med påstand om, at der var tale om misbrug af en dominerende stilling.
Following a complaint against an abuse of a dominant position lodged by a privatesupplier of value-added telecommunications services regarding the conditions underwhich lines are leased by the Regie des telegraphes et telephones (RTT) in Belgium,the Commission made representations to the RTT.
På Kommissionens foranledning gik RTT ind på ikke længere at anvende de generelle kontraktbestemmelser for tredjemands adgang til et inter nationalt datatransmissionsnet.
The RTT agreed to stop applyingthe general contractual conditions governing the access of third parties to aninternational data-transmission network.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse indebar disse betingelser en række begrænsninger, der kunne skade konkurrencen.
In the Commission's view, such conditionscontained restrictions that were liable to affect competition.
Hvad angår lejede internationale kredsløb gav RTT også tilsagn om ikke længere at pålægge sine nuværende eller fremtidige kunder nogen anden begrænsning end forbud mod blot at foretage en simpel dataoverførsel.
The RTT also agreed tostop imposing on its existing or potential customers wishing to lease the abovementionedinternational lines any restriction other than that they should not carry out a simpletransfer of data.
Kommissionen er skredet ind over for Den Europæiske Konference af Postog Teleadministrationer, CEPT, efter at denne i april 1989 havde ændret sin rekommandation vedrørende de generelle principper for udlejning af internationale telekommunikationskredsløb.
The Commission contacted the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) following the revision in April 1989 of its Recommendation on the general principles for the lease of international telecommunicationscircuits.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse måtte denne rekommandation betragtes som en takstaftale, der mærkbart begrænsede konkurrencen inden for EF.
In the Commission's view, the recommendation constituted a price agreementthat appreciably restricted competition within the Community.
I rekommandationen blev det bl.a. henstillet, at der blev opkrævet et pristillæg på 30 % eller en tilslutningsafgift for fremføring af trafik for tredjemand på en lejet international telelinje eller ved sammenkobling med et offentligt telenet.
The Recommendationprovided, amongst other things, for the imposition of a 30% surcharge or an accesscharge where third-party traffic was carried on a leased international telecommunications line or a leased line interconnecting to a public telecommunications network.The Recommendation also provided for the application of uniform tariff coefficients forthe establishment of the price of leased international lines.
Det blev desuden henstillet, at der blev anvendt ensartede takstkoefficienter ved fastsættelsen af prisen for leje af internationale linjer.
Cooperating with the Commission, the CEPT abolished the Recommendation; competition between telecommunications organizations in the supply of leased international lines was thus restored,to the benefit of users and particularly of suppliers of value-added services.
På dette møde udtalte Kommissionen, at disse rekommandationer og nogle af de revisionsforslag, der var blevet fremlagt på mødet, ville kunne betragtes som aftaler mellem virksomheder om takster og andre kommercielle vilkår, der kunne begrænse konkurrencen mellem teleselskaberne.
In the Commission's view, the recommendations and some of theproposals tabled at the meeting with a view to revising them were liable to constituteagreements between undertakings on prices and other business conditions that werelikely to restrict competition between the telecommunications organizations.
Kommissionen henledte opmærksomheden på, at disse rekommandationer således kunne falde ind under artikel 85, stk. 1.
The Commission therefore drew the CCITT members' attention to the possible application of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty to the recommendations.
Formålet med dette indlæg fra Kommissionen var at indskærpe visse konkurrenceretlige aspekter, således at medlemmer af CCITT kunne tages hensyn hertil i deres videre arbejde med revisionen af disse rekommandationer.
As a result of the Commission's representations, the CCITT members were able to continue their work onreviewing the recommendations taking fuller account of European competition law.
Kommissionen har udtalt sig om, hvilke betingelser der i alt væsentligt vil blive krævet opfyldt, for at samarbejdsaftaler mellem teleselskaber om visse ikkemonopoliserede teleydelser, som f.eks. MDNS' tjenester (Managed Data Network Services), kan opnå fritagelse efter artikel 85, stk. 3.
The Commission indicated what were the essential conditions for granting exemptions under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to cooperation agreements betweentelecommunications organizations in the supply of non-reserved telecommunicationsservices such as managed data-network services (MDNS).
Kommissionen havde fået forelagt et udkast til en sådan samarbejdsaftale mellem 22 teleselskaber. Disse planer blev i sidste instans opgivet, men de gav Kommissionen lejlighed til at udtale sig om mulighederne for at fritage denne form for aftaler.
A draft agreement of this typebetween 22 telecommunications organizations had been submitted to the Commission.Although the draft was finally abandoned, the Commission took the opportunity ofgiving its views on the possible exemption of this type of agreement.
Kommissionen udtalte, at selv om sådanne aftaler kan virke konkurrencebegrænsende, kan de dog også være forbundet med mange fordele for brugerne, bl.a. i form af étstedsbestilling, fremskyndelse af standardiseringsprocessen, omkostningsbesparelser og bedre ser vicekvalitet. I princippet vil der dog kun kunne indrømmes fritagelse på visse betingelser, der skal sikre, at teleselskaberne ikke på nogen måde forskelsbehandler private leverandører af teletjenester, og at teleselskabernes forvaltning af datatransmissionsnet ikke krydssubsidieres.
The Commissionindicated that, although such agreements restricted competition, they could neverthelessoffer benefits to consumers, namely a one-stop shop, a speeding-up of the standardization process, a reduction in costs and an improvement in the quality of services.However, exemption could in principle be granted only under certain conditions thatwould prevent any discrimination by the telecommunications organizations againstprivate suppliers of telecommunications services or cross-subsidization of MDNS activities performed by the telecommunications organizations.
Kommissionen meddelte den 27. juli 1990l) negativattest til et konsortium, som tre store europæiske elektronik- og telekommunikationsselskaber, nemlig det tyske selskab AEG Aktiengesellschaft, det fransk-nederlandske selskab Alcatel NV og det finske selskab OY Nokia, havde oprettet til udvikling af et fælleseuropæisk mobiltelefonsystem.
On 27 July 1990, the Commission granted negative clearance to a consortium ofthree large European electronics and telecommunications companies — the Germancompany AEG Aktiengesellschaft, the Franco-Dutch company Alcatel NV and the Finnish company Oy Nokia — to develop a pan-European mobile telephone system.l
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES purchasers of the system (known as the GSM system) are at present the national networkoperators in the CEPT member countries or the undertakings acting on their behalf.
Dette samarbejde mellem AEG, Alcatel og Nokia blev udmøntet i et konsortium, ECR 900, til fælles udvikling, produktion og salg af det celleopbyggede digitale mobiltelefonsystem og komponenterne hertil.
In order to participate in this new project, AEG, Alcatel and Nokia set up a consortiumknown as ECR 900, whose task is to develop, produce and distribute jointly thepan-European digital cellular mobile telephone system and parts thereof.
De fleste øvrige virksomheder inden for telesektoren samarbejder også med andre for effektivt at kunne afgive bud på kontrakter, der udbydes af netoperatørerne (PTT).
Most of theother undertakings operating in the telecommunications sector have also combined inorder to be able to respond efficiently to the invitations to tender published by thenetwork operators (PTTs).
Der er således mere end et halvt dusin konsortier, der er med i udviklingen af det fælleseuropæiske system.
More than half a dozen consortia are involved in the currentdevelopment of the pan-European system.