natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I en meddelelse offentliggjort i henhold til artikel 19, stk. 3, i forordning 17/62 ') opfordrede Kommissionen interesserede tredjeparter til at fremsætte de res bemærkninger.
As it has been modified, theoperation between P & G and Finaf can benefit the consumer without restricting competition in the relevantmarket. Given the parties' commitment to the above changes, the Commission confirmed its favourableattitude regarding the restructured operation. Nevertheless, the Commission reserves its final position, whichwill depend on the outcome of the divestiture and the definitive form the P & G/Finaf transaction will takeat the end of the transitional period. Lloyd's Underwriters' Association and the Instituteof London Underwriters2
Efter denne meddelelse modtog Kommissionen et stort antal bemærkninger fra de nationale myndigheder i visse medlemsstater, fra en europæisk forbrugerorganisation og fra adskillige af parternes konkurrenter.
On 4 December the Commission adopted a decision approving certain arrangements entered into and notifiedby Lloyd's Underwriters' Association (LUA) and the Institute of London Underwriters (ILU).
Der blev givet udtryk for frygt for, at joint venture-projektet mellem P & G og Finaf som følge af P & G's stadige ekspansion på dette marked igennem de seneste tre år og de fortsat positive tendenser for selskabet kunne skabe alvorlige konkurrenceproblemer.
These agreements are known as the Joint Hull Understandings (JHU) and the Respect of Lead Agreement (RLA). Theyboth relate to marine hull and machinery insurance.
Kommissionen, hvis oplysninger stemte overens med denne holdning, bebudede, at den ville anlægge samme vurdering, medmindre parterne fremlagde tilfredstillende løsningsforslag.
ILU and LUA represent the majority of underwriters active in marine insurance in London accounting forapproximately 90% of the UK's total marine insurance capacity.
Efter forhandlinger meddelte parterne, at de ville undlade at lade Finafs bleproducerende virksom hed indgå i transaktionen og afhænde aktiviteterne i denne sektor så hurtigt som muligt og i hvert fald inden for et rimeligt tidsrum under hensyn til den særlige karakter af sådanne afhændelser.
The JHU as notified consisted for the most part of a series of guidelines on the technical detail of policyrenewals.
Par terne er sammen med Kommissionen enedes om en frist herfor.
Three clauses were found to be unacceptable because they limited the freedom of the members of ILU and LUA to determine their own prices.
Såfremt det ikke bliver muligt at afslutte afhændelsen af Finafs interesser inden for bleer inden for den fastsatte frist, har partern, P & G og Finaf Spa afgivet tilsagn om, at deres joint venture inden for samme tidsrum ikke vil om fatte bleer.
At the request of the Commission these clauses were deleted.A fourth clause required that, unless specifically agreed, reinsured business should be restricted to vessels
Kommissionen rejste indsigelse over for tre klausuler i aftalen, fordi de begrænsede ILU- og LUA-medlemmernes ret til fri prisfastsættelse. Disse bestemmelser blev på Kommissionens foranledning slettet.
420 ANNEX III whose country of registration, ownership, and management was the same as that of the reinsured.
Også denne bestemmelse blev ændret til Kommissionens tilfredshed.
Thisclause was satisfactorily amended at the request of the Commission.
Konkurrenceaftalen fastsatte i alt væsentligt, at de ledende assurandører, der først tegnede en kaskoforsikring, skulle kunne fortsætte som ledende assurandører ved fornyelse af policen. Det betød, at der ved policifornyelser ikke kunne blive tale om konkurrence fra andre assurandører.
The RLA provided essentially that the same leaders who first underwrote hull business should be allowedto continue as leaders when the policy came up for renewal.
Også denne aftale blev på Kommissionens foranledning opgivet af LUA og ILU og erstattet af en ny aftale, der giver andre assurandører adgang til at byde på policefornyelser.
This agreement was also abandoned by LUA and ILU at the Commission'srequest and has been replaced by a new text which allows for a competing team to bid for renewal business.
Indtil december 1988 havde teleselskaberne monopol på satellitterne i Europa.
Until December 1988, the satellite sector in Europe was the sole domain of the telecommunicationsorganizations (TOs).
Opsendelsen af den privatejede ASTRA IA betød, at tv-programleverandørerne for første gang fik et alternativ til teleselskabernes satellitter.
The advent of the privately-owned Astra IA meant that television programme providerswould for the first time have had an alternative source of supply to the TO-run satellites.
På det britiske marked tilbød SES imidlertid ikke sit nye produkt direkte til kunderne, men indgik i 1987 aftaler med BT, i henhold til hvilke BT kunne afslutte kontrakter med britiske tv-programleverandører om både uplink-forbindelse til og plads på ASTRA IA-satellitten.
However, withrespect to the UK market, SES did not offer its new product directly to customers, but in 1987 entered intoarrangements with BT whereby BT would conclude contracts with UK television programme providerscomprising both the uplink to and the capacity on the Astra IA satellite.
Disse aftaler blev anmeldt til Kommissionen, som fastslog, at SES og BT var direkte konkurrenter
These arrangements were notifiedto the Commission, which found that SES and BT were direct competitors in the markets for both satellitecapacity and uplinking services.
423 på markederne for såvel satellit­kapacitet og uplink­forbindelser. Aftalerne med BT betød, at britiske kunder ikke direkte med SES kunne indgå kontrakter, der kun omhandlede satellitkapacitet, og de indeholdt desuden bestemmelser, der kunne føre til samordning mellem de to konkurrenters prissæt­ning, og som begrænsede deres kommercielle frihed med hensyn til andre, fremtidige satellitter.
The arrangements with BT denied UK customers the possibility of havingdirect contracts with SES covering the satellite capacity only and furthermore contained provisions whichserved to align the pricing policies of the two competitors, and restricted their commercial freedom withrespect to other, future satellites.
Ar­tikel 85, stk. I, måtte derfor finde anvendelse.
For these reasons, Article 85(1) was applicable.
Betingelserne for fritagelse efter artikel 85, stk. 3, var ikke opfyldt, specielt ikke fordi SES kunne være trængt ind på det britiske marked uafhængigt af konkurrenten BT.
The conditions for exemptionunder Article 85(3) were not fulfilled, in particular as SES could have entered the UK market independentlyof its competitor, BT.
Med hensyn til SES' bekymring over, at selskabets kunder ikke ville have sikker­hed for, at de ville få den fornødne uplink­service af BT, som dengang i realiteten var den eneste uplink­leverandør i Det Forenede Kongerige, måtte det generelle princip i »Retningslinjer for anven­delse af EF's konkurrenceregler i telekommunikationssektoren« gælde: enhver satellitejer, hvis satel­lit opfylder bestemte tekniske krav, må have sikkerhed for, at kunderne kan få ydet den fornødne uplink­service fra licenshavere med monopol på denne service.
With regard to SES's concern that its customers would not be assured of the necessaryuplinking services by BT, then the only de facto uplink provider in the UK, the general principle expressedin the 'Guidelines on the application of the EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector' applies:any satellite owner whose satellite fulfils technical requirements should be assured that customers will getthe necessary uplinking service from the licensed operator which enjoys a monopoly for that service.
Under sagsbehandlingen ophævede BT og SES deres joint venture­aftaler.
During the course of the procedure in this case, BT and SES terminated the joint venture agreements betweenthemselves.
Kommissionens beslut­ning har derfor deklaratonsk virkning for det hidtidige forløb, samtidig med at den fastslår, at de kunder, der indgik stadig eksisterende aftaler med BT om transmission af deres tv­programmer via ASTRA ΙΑ­satellitten i den periode, hvor joint venture­aftalerne bestod, må være frit stillet med hensyn til at genforhandle eller opsige deres kontrakt efter denne beslutning.
The Commission's decision is thus declarative for the past and furthermore indicates thatcustomers who concluded still existing contracts with BT for the transmission of their television programmesvia the Astra IA satellite during the period the joint venture arrangements were intact may if they wishreadjust their position to take account of this decision.
Denne beslutning er indanket af BT
This decision has been appealed by BT.
1) Aftaler mellem rejsearrangører og rejseagenter (Center Pares)
Agreements between tour operators and travel agents(Center Pares)
Efter indgreb fra Kommissionen er rejsearrangøren Center Pares gået med til at ændre sine aftaler med rejseagenter.
Following the Commission's intervention, the tour operator Center Pares has agreed to change its contractswith travel agents.
Kunderne kan nu, hvis de ønsker det, bestille ferieophold i en af Center Pares' ferielandsbyer via en rejsearrangør eller via et af Center Pares reservationskontorer i en anden medlemsstat end deres hjemland til de priser, der gælder i det pågældende andet land.
If they wish to do so, holiday-makers can now book a vacation in one of Center Pares' villages through atravel agent or through a Center Pares reservation office in another Member State than their own at theprices which are applicable in that other Member State.
En reservation kan ikke afvises under henvisning til, at kunden burde have henvendt sig til sin lokale rejseagent eller reservationskontor.
A booking cannot be refused on the grounds thatthe customer should go to his local travel agent or reservations office.
Det betyder, at kunderne herefter har mulighed for at købe ferieopholdet i et land, hvor priserne er lavere end i deres eget land.
This will enable holiday-makers toshop for lower prices than those which are charged in their own Member State.
Kommissionen fik også gennemtvunget, at de rejseagenter, der ønsker det, kan give kunderne andel i deres provisioner.
The Commission has also ensured that travel agents who wish to do so can pass on part of their commissionto customers.
Efter disse ændringer er Center Parc's kontrakter blevet bragt i overensstemmelse med EF's kon­kurrenceret ' ).
These changes bring Center Pares* contracts in line with Community competition law.'
Ifølge EF's konkurrenceregler må rejsearrangører ikke afskære rejseagenter fra at sæl­ge til kunder i andre medlemsstater.
Under these rules,tour operators are not allowed to stop travel agents from selling to customers in other Member States.
Rejseagenterne skal desuden have mulighed for at sælge rejser­ne billigere ved at dele deres provisioner med kunderne.
Travelagents must also be authorized to discount holidays or travel by splitting commission with customers.
STEA, som er en uafhængig forhandler af karburatorer, primært af mærkerne WEBER og SOLEX, som fremstilles af datterselskaber under Magneti Marelh­gruppen, havde indbragt klage mod Mag­neti Marcili for diskriminerende prispolitik.
STEA, which is an independent distributor of carburettors, mainly Weber and Solex carburettors manufactured by subsidiaries of the Magneti Marelli group, lodged a complaint against the group on the groundsthat it was pursuing a discriminatory pricing policy.
Under Kommissionens sagsbehandling foretog Magneti Marelli en reorganisering af sit distributionssystem, således at også STEA blev optaget i nettet, hvorefter STEA trak sin klage tilbage.
While the Commission wasexamining the system, Magneti Marelli reorganized its distribution so as to include STEA, and STEAaccordingly withdraw its complaint.
Kommissionen offentliggjorde den 22. maj 1992 en meddelelse efter artikel 19, stk. 3, om en eksklusivaftale mellem Halifax Building Society og Standard Life Assurance Company.
On 22 May the Commission published an Article 19(3) notice regarding a 'tied agency' agreement between Halifax Building Society and the Standard Life Assurance Company.
Ved denne aftale blev Halifax agent for Standard Life og forpligtede sig til udelukkende at sælge H alifax-produkter.
By virtue of the agreement Halifaxbecomes an agent of Standard Life and agrees to deal exclusively in the latter's products.
I henhold til den britiske Financial Services Aet fra 1986 kræves der autorisation for at sælge for sikringspolicer.
Under the Financial Services Act (FSA) 1986 anyone wishing to sell insurance policies was (and is) requiredto obtain authorization.
Dette krav gælder dog ikke for agenter, der har valgt at blive »udpegede repræsentanter« for en person eller et selskab, som i forvejen har autorisation i henhold til loven. Dette var tilfældet med Halifax og mange andre britiske banker og »building societies«.
This requirement did (and does) not apply to those who opted to become theappointed representative of a person or company which is already authorized under the Act.
En »udpeget repræsentant« må kun handle for én mandant.
An appointedrepresentative may act exclusively for one principal only.
Denne eksklusivitet virker konkurrencebegrænsende, efter som den pågældende agent ikke vil bestræbe sig på at finde det forsikringsprodukt, der er bedst for kunden, blandt alle de produkter, der tilbydes af alle forsikringsselskaber.
This exclusivity produces anticompetitive effectsin that this exclusive agent will not endeavour to find the best insurance product for his client from amongthe range available among all insurance companies.
Derimod virker uafhængige agenter, der foretager en sådan udvælgelse blandt alle tilbudte produkter, fremmende for konkurrencen mellem forsikringsselskaber.
By contrast the independent agent who does make such a selection from across a range of insurance companieshelps to promote competition between insurance companies.
Halifax' beslutning om at blive bundet til ét forsikringsselskab havde derfor konkurrencebegrænsende virkninger på det britiske forsik ringsmarked.
The decision by Halifax to become tied hadtherefore an anticompetitive effect on the insurance market in the UK.
Denne beslutning, som blev truffet af det største »building society« i Det Forenede Kongerige, var kun én af ca. 100 sådanne beslutninger, som andre banker og »building societies« traf i årene efter vedtagelsen af ovennævnte lov.
This decision, taken by the largestbuilding society in the UK, was but one example of some 100 such decisions taken by other banks andbuilding societies in the few years after the adoption of the FSA.
Denne beslutning, som er nedfældet i aftalen mellem Halifax og Standard Life, faldt derfor ind under artikel 85, stk. 1.
The decision as manifested in the agreementbetween Halifax and Standard Life, therefore fell within Article 85(1).
Kommissionen fandt imidlertid, at der kunne indrømmes fritagelse i betragtning af de effektivitetsfordele, bindingerne til et enkelt for sikringsselskab var forbundet med, og som forbrugerne ville få andel i i form af lavere omkostninger.
However, an exemption was consideredto be merited in view of the efficiency benefits involved in becoming 'tied' to a single insurance company,which benefits could be passed on to the consumer in the form of lower costs.
Den anmeldte aftale indeholdt to bestemmelser, som Kommissionen fandt var konkurrencebegræn sende efter artikel 85 og ikke opfyldte betingelserne i artikel 85, stk. 3. Den første var en klausul om, at Standard Life ikke måtte udpege andre »building societies« som agenter for sig.
The notified agreement contained two clauses which the Commission considered to be restrictive ofcompetition within the meaning of Article 85 and to be unjustifiable under Article 85(3).
Den anden dre jede sig om et forbud mod at give nedslag i provisionen. På Kommissionens foranledning blev disse konkurrencebegrænsende bestemmelser slettet.
The secondclause contained a prohibition against rebating its. commissions.
Kommissionen kunne herefter fremsende en administrativ skrivelse til Halifax om, at aftalen ikke var i strid med artikel 85.
Consequently the Commission was able to inform Halifax by administrative letter that the agreement didnot run counter to Article 85.
Kommissionen vurderede imidlertid at Parkers forskellige europæiske datterselskaber var nøje kon trolleret af deres moderselskab og underlagt dettes instrukser.
In its Decision of 15 July 1992 in the Viho/Parker Pen 1 case,1following a complaint for refusal to selllodged by Viho (Netherlands), the Commission found that Parker Pen and Herlitz AG (its distributor in Germany) had infringed Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty by including an export ban in an agreement theyhad concluded, and it imposed fines on the two companies.
Det betød, at datterselskaberne sam men med moderselskabet indgik i en økonomisk enhed, inden for hvilken de ikke selv kunne handle selvstændigt på markedet.
However, the complainant claimed that the requirement imposed on Parker subsidiaries that, in distributing Parker products, they must confine themselves to the territory allocated to them was caught by the loan laiddown in Article 85(1).
Datterselskabernes adfærd var dikteret af moderselskabet.
It thus raised the problem of the application of the ban on restrictive agreements tointernal agreements within a group.
Kommissionen fandt, at det integrerede distributionssystem, Parker benytter til sit salg i Spanien, Frankrig, Tyskland og Nederlandene, som foregår via helejede datterselskaber i disse lande, opfylder de betingelser, EF-Domstolen har opstillet for ikke at bringe artikel 85, stk. 1, i anvendelse (se dom af 31.10.1974, Centrafarm/Sterling Drug, Sml. 1974, s. 1147, dom af 12.7.1984, Hydrotherm Compact, Sml. 1984, s. 2998, og dom af 4.5.1988, Bodson/S.A. Pompes funèbres des régions libérées, Sml. 1988, s. 2479).
The Commission took the view that Parker's various European subsidiaries were strictly controlled by theirparent company and were bound to comply with its instructions. This meant that the subsidiaries formed,with the parent company, a single economic unit within which they could not determine independently theirconduct on the market.
Denne afhængighed af moderselskabet er særlig udtalt i de tilfælde, hvor moderselskabet — som her — giver datterselskabet konkrete anvisninger med hensyn til virksomhedernes ledelse, som de der efter følger.
Subsidiaries are particularly dependent where, as in this case, the parent company gives them specific businesspolicy instructions which they then apply through their actions.
Dette argument bestyrkes af, at alle Parkers datterselskaber kontrolleres fuldstændigt og ikke blot delvis af moderselskabet.
The fact that all of Parker's subsidiaries arewholly and not partially controlled by the parent company reinforces this argument.
Det er i øvrigt tilstrækkeligt, at moderselskabet har ret til at give dem anvisninger eller kan gøre sin vilje gældende på anden vis (f.eks. ved at kontrollere eller have afgørende indflydelse på datterselskabernes personalepolitik).
For the rest, it issufficient for the parent company to have the right to give instructions to its subsidiary or for it to haveother equally effective means at its disposal (for example, control or decisive influence over the staffingpolicy of subsidiaries) to be able to impose its will.
Kommissionen har i henhold til artikel 19, stk. 3, i forordning 17/62 offentliggjort fire meddelelser') i en række sager, der drejede sig om det rabatsystemer, der anvendes af British Gypsum og — i to af sagerne — af Gypsum Industries. Meddelelserne blev udsendt efter forhandlinger med parterne, som i det mindste i en af sagerne resulterede i, at Kommissionen kunne undgå at nedlægge forbud.
Four notices pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No 17 were published in the Official Journal2in casesconcerning rebate schemes operated by British Gypsum and, in the case of two of them, by Gypsum Industries.The notices reflect the result of negotiations with the parties concerned that made it possible, at least in oneof the cases, to avoid adopting a formal decision banning the scheme.
I sagen »Super Stockist Scheme« havde Kommissionen fremsendt en meddelelse af klagepunkter til British Gypsum. Kommissionens klagepunkter drejede sig hovedsagelig om, at det rabatsystem, som British Gypsum havde anmeldt i oktober 1988, virkede diskriminerende, at der var tale om en sam menblanding mellem indkøb og lagre, og at man søgte at binde kunderne til sig.
In the case relating to the 'super stockist scheme', a statement of objections had been sent to British Gypsum.The Commission's objections related essentially to the fact that the rebate scheme as notified by British Gypsum in October 1988 was discriminatory, hybrid in character (covering quantities purchased andquantities stocked) and tended to make for a captive clientele.
Efter den høring, der fandt sted i denne sag i februar 1991, og efter at der var blevet anmeldt yderligere tre nye rabatsystemcr, fandt Kommissionen det mest hensigtsmæssigt at forhandle med parterne i de fire sager under ét.
Following the hearing which took place onthe case in February 1991, three new rebate schemes having also been notified, the Commission thought itappropriate to conduct negotiations with the parties jointly on the four cases.
Kommissionen var allerede tidligere — ved en beslutning af 5. december 1988 2) — skredet ind over for British Gypsum og dets moderselskab, BPB Industries, med bøder til British Gypsum på 3 mio. ECU og til BPB på 150 000 ECU for overtrædelser af EØF-Traktatens artikel 86.1 de fire nye sager foretrak Kommissionen at få British Gypsum og Gypsum Industries til at bringe deres rabatsystemer i overensstemmelse med EF's konkurrenceregler frem for straks at nedlægge et formelt forbud.
Certain practices engaged in by British Gypsum and its parent company BPB Industries had earlier beenprohibited under a Decision of 5 December 1988 3which imposed fines of ECU 3 million on British Gypsumand ECU 150 000 on BPB for infringements of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
I en rapport fra 1990 om det britiske marked for gipsplader havde Monopolies and Mergers Commission således anslået, af BPB's markedsandel i Det Forenede Kongerige på to år var faldet fra 96% til 65%, og konkluderet, at BPB nu havde fået konkurrence, efter at to nye konkurrenter, Knauf og Lafarge, var trængt ind på dette marked.
The Commission took the viewthat it was necessary in the four new cases to get British Gypsum and Gypsum Industries to bring theirrebate schemes into line with Community competition law rather than to adopt immediately a formaldecision prohibiting them.
Efter princippet om et decentraliseret tilsyn med overholdelsen af konkurrencereglerne har Kommissionen afvist at behandle en række klager og henvist dem til de franske domstole og administrative myndigheder. Der var tale om klager, der for flere år siden blev indbragt af diskoteksejere mod SACEM (Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique), som kollektivt administrerer ophavsrettigheder i Frankrig.
In line with the principle of decentralization in monitoring compliance with the competition rules, the Commission dismissed and referred back to the French courts and administrative authorities a number ofcomplaints lodged several years ago by discotheque proprietors against SACEM (Societe des auteurs,compositeurs et editeurs de musique), the performing rights society for the French music business.
Klagerne gik ud på, at SACEM havde misbrugt sin dominerende stil ling ved at anvende for høje royalties for afspilning af musik i diskotekerne.
In theircomplaints, the discotheque proprietors alleged that SACEM was abusing its dominant position by chargingexcessive fees for the public performance of music on their premises.