natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
2) R. Bernhardt, Fællesskabsrettens kilder: »Fællesskabets forfatning«, i Tredive Års Fællesskabsret, op. cit., s. 80. !)
1 R. Bernhardt, 'The sources of Community law: the Constitution of the Community', in Thirty years of Community law, op. cit., p.
Se afsnit 3 i dette kapitel.
80. ;See Section 3 of this chapter.
') Se udtalelse af 10.4.J956 fra det luxembourgske Conseil d'État, hvortil der henvises af J.M. Hoscheit, Storhertugdømmet Luxembourg, og udkastet til traktat om oprettelse af Den Europæiske Union, i l'Europe de demain, op. cit., s. 289.
' See opinion of the Luxembourg Council of State of 10 April 1956, quoted by J. M. Hoscheit in 'The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the draft Treaty establishing the European Union', in An ever-closer union, op. cit., p. 269.
Men problemet er på denne måde kun blevet fordrejet, og en sådan opfattelse vil ikke a priori bidrage til, at staten gøres mere åben for integrationsprocessen.
Before continuing, however, it is as well to quote from the judgment of the Court of Justice in a case which hinged on the question of the possibility of the powers conferred on the Community reverting back to the Member States. '
Den som postulat fremførte teori om, at en nation må anses for værende enesuveræn til at udstede regler gældende for nationens territorium, er ensbetydende med en underkendelse af de krav om solidaritet, som Fællesskabets retsorden bygger på, idet de mest nationale, ja endog nationalistiske prætentioner besmykkes med et ideal af demokratisk respektabilitet.
'Powers thus conferred could not, therefore, be withdrawn from the Community, nor could the objectives with which such powers are concerned be restored to the field of authority of the Member States alone, except by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty.'
En sådan teori styrker det ræsonnement, der ligger til grund for påberåbelsen af »vitale inter esser« — med henblik på at forhindre vedtagelsen af fælles beslutninger, idet man ignorerer nødvendigheden af en global vurdering af de fordele og ulemper, der er forbundet med deltagelsen i integrationsprocessen. tionsprocessen.
Article 102 of the 1972 Act of Accession had laid down a tran­sitional period expiring on 1 January 1979,3after which — as had been established in previous cases4 — only the Community would have the power to take measures to conserve fish stocks.
En yderligere drøftelse af dette væsentlige problem falder uden for rammerne af denne publikation.
The Council having failed to pass conservation legislation, the British Government had gone ahead with national legislation with­out obtaining authorization from the Commission.
Men forhåbentlig har dette givet anledning til visse overvejelser, der kan bidrage til den offentlige debat vedrørende Fællesskabets retsorden, hvilket er selve formålet med de publikationer der offentliggøres i denne samling.
The Court stressed, first of all, that 'the transfer to the Community of powers in this matter being total and definitive, such a failure (of the Council) to act could not in any case restore to the Member States the power and freedom to act unilaterally in this field'.5
En af EF-Domstolen afsagt dom ') kommer ind på spørgsmålet om den »kompetenceafgivelse«, som tildelingen af beføjelser til Fællesskabet indebærer.
It went on to point out that 'as this is a field reserved to the powers of the Community, within which Member States may henceforth act only as trustees of the common interest, a Member State cannot therefore, in the absence of appropriate action on the part of the Council, bring into force any interim conservation measures which
Sagen vedrørte det i Euratom-traktaten indeholdte kapitel om »Forsyning«.
2 Case 804/79 Commission ν UK [1981] ECR 1045.
Bestemmelserne i dette kapitel skulle inden for en vis frist ændres.
1Joined Cases 185 to 204/78 Van Dam [1979] ECR 2345.
Domstolen forkastede denne påstand, som blev gjort gældende af den sagsøgte stat, idet den gentog visse betragtninger, der allerede var fremført i Costø-dommen, og tilføjede:
The transfer of sovereignty may be required by the situation except as part of a process of collaboration with the Commission ...', and the Member State was under a duty 'not to lay down national conservation measures in spite of objections, reservations or conditions which might be for mulated by the Commission'. '
I denne forbindelse kan det også være interessant at nævne den dom, der blev afsagt den 5. maj 1981 i en sag mellem Kommissionen og Det Forenede Kongerige2).
In June 1985, the Commission followed this principle when, after the Council had failed to agree on new cereal prices proposed by it because of one Member State's opposition, it introduced the prices itself.
1971, s. 295 ff. :) Dom af 5.5.1981, sag 804/79, Sml. 1981, s. 1045 ff.
[1981] ECR, at pp. 1075-76 (paragraphs 30-31).
Da Rådet ikke havde udstedt forordninger, vedtog Det Forenede Kongerige en række bevaringsforanstaltninger uden forinden at have indhentet Kommissionens tilladelse.
This applies both to unilateral measures in areas subject to the common policy2and to trade agreements with non­member countries which only the Community can now conclude.
EF-Domstolen udtalte i den forbindelse: »Det må ... først under streges, at da overførslen til Fællesskabet af beføjelser på dette område er fuldstændig og endelig, kan en sådan undladelse (fra Rådets side) ikke i noget tilfælde genoplive medlemsstaternes kom petence og frihed til at optræde ensidigt på dette område« 3).
This is only an apparent exception from the general principle stated above. In the sphere of the common commercial policy, the stage of exclusive EC jurisdiction was preceded during the transitional per­iod by a stage of coordination of national trade policies prior to their unification and handing over to the Community institutions.
Domstolen udtalte endvidere: »Da der er tale om et område, som er forbeholdt Fællesskabets kompetence, og inden for hvilket med lemsstaterne derfor fremover kun kan handle i den fælles interesse, må en medlemsstat, så længe Rådet endnu ikke har truffet passende foranstaltninger, kun iværksætte sådanne midlertidige bevaringsforanstaltninger, der efter forholdene måtte være nødvendige, i samarbejde med Kommissionen ...«, og staten har »en forpligtelse til ikke at indføre nationale bevaringsforanstaltninger uden hensyn til de indvendinger, forbehold eller betingelser, som måtte være kommet til udtryk fra Kommissionens side«4).
The common trade policy is largely a counterpart of the customs union which was established under Community legislation as early as 1 July 1968, before the end of the transitional period. It would be anomalous if the Member States were able to exercise, through agreements with non­member countries, powers they had lost in the domestic sphere.
Domstolen har således ved en løsning, der stemmer overens »med de systematiske principper, som Fællesskabet hviler på«5), villet undgå, at områder, der henhører under Fællesskabets kompetence, »renationaliseres« på grund af Rådets passivitet.
The Court has endeavoured to treat the common commercial policy in a dynamic fashion by taking a broad view extending beyond the letter of the Treaty. It has acknowledged the right of the Commu­nity to participate in international agreements regulating commodi­ties despite their impact on the general economic policy of the Member States.3It has held that concern for development consider­ ations do not exempt a measure (the generalized system of prefer­ences) from the constraints of the common commercial policy;4the same applies to environmental concerns.5
Det var under henvisning til disse principper, at Kommissionen i juni 1985 lod de priser på korn, som den havde foreslået Rådet, træde i kraft, selv om det på grund af en medlemsstats indsigelse ikke havde været muligt i Rådet at vedtage en beslutning herom.
At the same time, the Court has also been remarkably flexible in determining the limits on the Member States' powers of action in areas where the Community has not fully exercised its powers.
Domstolen henholdt sig til denne domspraksis for at retfærdiggøre, at en medlemsstat midlertidigt og provisorisk havde vedtaget natio-
After holding in Donckerwolcke0that the Member States could act only if the Community has empowered them to do so, it went on to relax this strict construction, as Jacqué has shown,7 when in Bulk Oil,* it
') Dom af 3.7.1979, forenede sager 185-204/78, Van Dam m.fi, Sml. 1979, s. 2345. !)
1 Opinion No 1/75 of the European Court of Justice delivered on 11 November 1975, [1975] ECR 1355­1365.
1981, s. 1075-1076, præmis 30 og 31. !) Sml. 1981, s. 1074, præmis 23.
7'Florence Course', p. 307.
Karakteristika naie forskrifter forud for indførelsen af fællesskabsforanstaltninger på et område, der hører ind under den fælles landbrugspolitik ').
Special characteristics based the Member State's powers on an implied exception from the common policy relating to oil exports dating from 10 years earlier.
Den tyske forfatningsdomstol understregede således i sin kendelse af 9. juni 19715), at en lovlig overdragelse af kompeten cen nødvendigvis indebærer en anerkendelse af virkningerne af de retsakter, der udstedes af den nye kompetenceindehaver, således at disse retsakter nu har direkte virkning i national ret og går forud for herimod stridende national ret.
The exclusion of oil from Regulation No 2603/69 constituted an implied conferment of powers by the Community, enabling oil exports from the United Kingdom to Israel to be banned.
Man må dog ikke drage denne analogi for vidt, da man ellers forvansker det forhold, der faktisk består mellem Fællesskabets kompetence og den nationale kompetence.
As Jacqué has shown, this may have been a pragmatic response to a particularly delicate situation.
For det første er der nemlig ikke tale om, at fælles skabstraktaterne — således som det ofte er tilfældet i forbundsforfatningerne — henlægger omfattende områder til fællesskabsinstitutionerne; for det andet er det sædvanligvis ikke kompetencetildelin-
It is at any rate to be hoped so, but that does not change the fact that the concept of exclusive jurisdic­tion is made all the more vague. '
Europarecht, 1972, s. 51 ff., navnlig s. 56.
See also Neumann, supra, note 2 on p. 12.
21 gen som sådan, men dens udøvelse, som bevirker, at staterne mister beføjelser til at vedtage retsakter, der er i strid med de fælles regler.
21 functioning of the common organization of the market in question, in particular its price system.' '
Så længe unionen ikke benytter en sådan kompetence, bevarer medlemsstaterne beføjelsen til at lovgive på området.
The Court has established criteria to help national courts decide whether or not national legislation is compatible with a common agricultural market organization.2
Dette er det generelle princip, som dog må uddybes nærmere, alt efter hvilken sektor i traktaten, der er berørt, og omfanget af denne kompetenceafgivelse afhænger af karakteren og rækkevidden af fællesskabsreglerne.
In the case of additional measures taken by national governments, the question is whether they are implicitly permitted by the Com­munity legislation and whether or not they prejudice the aims and operation of the market organization.3In such cases the Court looks to the legislative history, to determine whether, for example, silence on a particular point is to be interpreted as tacitly authoriz­ing the Member States to legislate on that point or as expressing the feeling of the Community authorities that neither they nor the Member States should do so.4
Dom af 15.12.1976, sag 41/76, Donckerwolcke, Sml. 1976, s. 1937.
1584; Refer and Delmelle, supra, note 1.
Karakteristika sted af de enkelte staters handespolitik med henblik på at gøre den ensartet samt med henblik på, at Fællesskabets institutioner senere kunne udøve den.
Special characteristics zation. ' Where, however, it has been held that the Council has indeed failed to take proper action by not enacting provisions that are needed for the proper functioning of a common market organi­zation, the fact that a Member State enacts or preserves national measures to achieve that common organization's objectives in its own territory is basically unobjectionable.2
Den fælles handelspolitik er i vidt omfang en afspejling af toldunionen, som allerede før overgangsperiodens udløb, den 1. juli 1968, gennemførtes ved fællesskabsforanstaltninger. Det ville jo være ulogisk, om staterne i kraft af aftaler med tredjelande kunne udøve beføjelser, som de på det interne plan havde mistet.
Relying on its decision in Case 804/79,3the Court held: '... such measures must not be regarded as involving the exercise of the Member State's own powers, but as the fulfilment of the duty to cooperate in achieving the aims of the common organization of the market which, in a situation characterized by the inaction of the Community legislature, Article 5 of the Treaty imposes on them.
Domstolen har bestræbt sig på at give handelspolitikken et evolutivi indhold ved at give den en bredere fortolkning end traktaten, hvis ordlyd må siges at være restriktiv.
Such national measures must be compatible with the principles of the common market organization.
Den har således udtalt, at artikel 113 tillader Fællesskabet at deltage i internationale aftaler om regulering af produktionen af og handelen med råvarer uanset disse aftalers indvirkning på medlemsstaternes almindelige økonomiske politik ').
They may not restrain imports of products lawfully made and marketed in another Member State.
Den har tillige udtalt, at overvejelser vedrørende udvik lingsbistand2) lige så lidt som hensynet til miljøbeskyttelse3) kan give anledning til, at en foranstaltning (den generelle toldpræferenceordning) holdes uden for handelspolitikken.
The Commission must take whatever action is necessary to secure free movement of the relevant products within the Community in the event of divergent rules and regulations or economic disruption caused by the absence of adequate quality controls.
Udelukkelsen af olie fra anvendelsesområdet for forordning nr. 2603/69 betød, at Fællesskabet implicit gav sin bemyndigelse til et forbud mod eksport af olie fra Det Forenede Kongerige til Israel.
The Court applied the same principles in a case concerning a require­ment imposed by German law but not by Community rules that distillers' declarations should include information regarding the types of wine presented for distillation, holding it to be not only in conformity but also necessary for the proper functioning of the
') Udtalelse 1/78 af 4.10.1979, International overenskomst om naturgummi, Sml. 1979, s. 2871.
See Association comité économique agricole régional, supra, note 3 on p.
:) Dom af 26.3.1987, sag 45/86, Kommissionen/Rådet, J) Dom af 29.3.1990, sag C-62/88, Grækenland/Rådet, 4) Dom af 15.12.1976, sag 41/76, Sml. 1976, s. 1921.
Compare, for example, paragraph 8 of the judgment in Commission ν Belgium, supra, note on p.
Dom af 18.2.1986, sag 174/84, Sml. 1986, s. 559.
21, note 3.
23 problemets politiske følsomhed, men det er en kendsgerning, at den slører rækkevidden af begrebet enekompetence ').
23 common organization of the market and the objectives of the distillation scheme. '
På toldområdet kan medlemsstaterne ikke vedtage bestemmelser, der har til formål at ændre rækkeviden af forordninger eller supplere de heri indeholdte bestemmelser 3).
In the cases just outlined, the Commission's role would be to rectify national measures if they were incompatible with the objectives of the common organization or to make up for the Council's failure to agree on measures.
Det fremgår ligeledes af Domstolens afgørelser, at vedrører Fællesskabets prisforskrifter udelukkende produktions- og engrosleddet, berører de ikke med lemsstaternes beføjelse til at træffe egnede foranstaltninger vedrørende prisdannelsen i detail- og forbrugerleddet. Det gælder imidlertid kun, for så vidt de nationale prisforskrifter ikke bringer den fælles markedsordnings målsætning og funktion i fare, navnlig dens prissystem« 4).
The introduction of common policies makes calls on the Member States' loyalty to the Community, expressed in the positive and negative obligations laid upon them by Article 5 of the EEC Treaty.2 These obligations may mean that national legislation regulating specific points under the residual jurisdiction apparently still enjoyed by the Member States is in fact incompatible with Community law.
1976, s. 291; dom af 26.2.1976, forenede sager 88-90/75, Sadam, Sml.
As long as no Community rules have been enacted, governments may introduce national legislation, provided it does not make the later
1976, s. 323; dom af 18.10.1979, sag 5/79, Denkavit, Sml. 1979, s. 3203; dom af 6.11.1979, forenede sager 16-20/79, Joseph Danis m.fl., Sml.
' Case C-158/89 Dietz-Malli [1990] ECR 1-2032, 2036/7. !Article 5 of the EEC Treaty reads: 'Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community.
1979, s. 3327; dom af 17.1.1980, forenede sager 95 og 96/79, Kefer og Delmelle, Sml.
They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
1980, s. 103; dom af 1.7.1987, sag 216/86, Antonini, Sml. 1987, s. 2919 ff.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.'
EF-Domstolen har søgt at opstille kriterier, på grundlag af hvilke den nationale domstol kan tage stilling til, om de pågældende foranstaltninger er forenelige med den fælles markedsordning ').
Sometimes exclusive jurisdiction devolves upon the Community automatically as from a certain date.
EF-Domstolen gør i givet fald brug af de erklæringer, der måtte være fremsat under forarbejderne til en forordning, for at afgøre, om forordningens tavshed kan fortolkes som værende en indirekte bemyndigelse for staterne, eller om institutionernes hensigt tværtimod har været, at de offentlige myndigheder bør afholde sig fra at gribe ind på dette område3).
This was the case with fisheries conservation measures under Article 102 of the 1972 Accession Treaty2after 1 January 1979, the date held by the Court to be that by which the Community was required to introduce legislation.3
') Dom af 29.6.1978, sag 154/77, Dechmann, Sml. 1978, s; 1584, og dom Kefer og Delmelle, j f. ovenfor.
The degree to which national sovereignty is limited by such coordin­ation depends on the extent of the Community's supervision or guidance of policy.
2) M. Waelbroeck har i en artikel, der vedrører dom af 7.2.1984, sag 237/82, Jongeneel Kaas BV, Sml.
Finally, there are matters for which the EC and national govern­ments have concurrent jurisdiction but in distinct fields.
1977, s. 137; dom af 13.3.1984, sag 16/83, Franti, Sml.
This is the case with competition policy.
1984, s. 1299; dom af 28.3.1984, forenede sager 47 og 48/83, Pluimveeslachterij Midden-Nederland og Van Miert, Sml.
As J. H. Kaiser pointed out, the system is 'characterized by the juxtaposition of valid Community and national laws and by the simultaneous application of both laws in a specific case'.5
1984, s. 1721, samt den nedenfor nævnte Kramer-dom. Under den anden kategori kan nævnes dom af 30.10.1974, sag 190/73, Van Haaster, Sml.
The dividing line between the two laws is determined by the criterion of effect on trade between Member States.6 However, as A. Tizzano
1986, s. 3513; 3om af 4.2.1988, sag 255/86, Kommissionen mod Kongeriget Belgien, Sml.
1 Case 32/79 Commission ν United Ringdom [1980] ECR 2403 and Case 804/79 Commis­
1988, s. 693 ff., og dom af 22.9.1988, sag 212/87, Unilec, Sml.
1 sion ν United Kingdom, supra, note 2 on p. 16. Van Dam, supra, note 3 on p. 16.
25 rang går forud, eller fordi de nationale foranstaltninger vil bevirke, at de fælles markedsordninger ikke kan fungere tilfredsstillende ').
25 reminds us, ' national law 'can only be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market of the Community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation of those rules'.2
Når det på den anden side konstateres, at Rådet ikke har sat de bestemmelser i kraft, som skønnes nødvendige, for at en markedsordning kan fungere normalt, »kan der i princippet intet indvendes imod«, at en medlemsstat opretholder eller indfører nationale for anstaltninger, der har til formål på dens område at gennemføre den fælles markedsordnings mål2).
Action undertaken and policies established by the Community and by the Member States would seem capable of being regarded as parallel also in the new areas of activity opened up by the Maastricht Treaty.
Domstolen henviser i den forbindelse til sin dom af 5. maj 19813) og tilføjer: »Sådanne foranstaltninger kan dog ikke betragtes som henhørende under udøvelsen af medlemsstaternes egen kompetence, men må henføres under udførelsen af den forpligtelse til samarbejde, som i henhold til traktatens artikel 5 påhviler dem i en situation, der er kendetegnet ved fællesskabslovgiverens passivitet, med henblik på virkeliggørelse af den fælles markedsordnings for mål.
The Community is given specific objectives to be attained through its own action complementing the action of the Member States.3Community activity relating to culture, education, public health, consumer protection and industry, and policy of develop ment aid, are designed solely to support and amplify the policies operated by the Member States.4What is noteworthy is that the Treaty expressly precludes measures to harmonize the laws of the Member States (see, for example, Article 128(5), first indent).
De af EF-Domstolen anvendte formuleringer er ikke altid ens. Se præmis 8 i EF-Domstolens førnævnte dom i sag 255/86, Kommissionen mod Kongeriget Belgien, hvor Domstolen henviste til sin praksis med hensyn til, hvilke konsekvenser indførelsen af en fælles markedsordning har, og hvor medlemsstaterne ifølge Domstolen er »forpligtet til ikke at træffe nogen forholdsregler, hvorved markedsordningen fraviges eller i øvrigt tilsidesættes«.
The Treaties contain some fundamental rules that are automatically applicable, such as the obligations imposed on Member States to refrain from discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 7 of the EEC Treaty, renumbered Article 6 in the EC Treaty), from discriminatory indirect taxation on the products of other Member States (Article 95 of the EC Treaty), and from introducing customs duties in intra-Community trade (Article 12 of the EC Treaty), etc.
Ordlyden af denne præmis kan således sammenlignes med den tilsyneladende mere radikale formulering i dom af 23.2.1988, sag 216/84, Kommissionen mod Den Franske Republik, hvor Domstolen påberåbte sig sin »faste praksis« for heraf at udlede, »at når Fællesskabet har indført en fælles markedsordning i en bestemt sektor, er medlemsstaterne forpligtet til at afholde sig fra enhver ensidig foranstaltning, som på det pågældende område griber ind i Fællesskabets kompetence«.
However, the most characteristic feature of agreements aiming at nothing less than integration between the parties, as the Treaties do, is the establishment of permanent institutions, endowed with extensive legal powers, to plan and manage the integration, which is typically seen as a step-by-step process in which specific objectives have to be achieved by certain dates.
Man kan måske heraf udlede, at Domstolen i den sidstnævnte sag, der vedrørte et i Frankrig gældende forbud mod indførsel og salg af mælkepulvererstatning og kondensmælkerstatning, var af den opfattelse, at den mekanisme, der var blevet indført for at stabilisere markedet for mejeriprodukter, udgjorde en udtømmende ordning, der ikke rummede mulighed for nationale foranstaltninger.
The transitional period up to the end of 1969 in the EEC Treaty and its division into stages reflect this principle. For each four-year stage certain objectives were set, and the end of the 12-year transitional period (with a possibility of extension to 15 years) was to be 'the latest date by which all the rules laid down must enter into force and all the measures required for establishing the common market must be implemented' (Article 8 of
Jf. dom af 28.3.1984, forenede sager 47 og 48/83, omtalt s. 23, fodnote 3, Sml. 1984,
According to C. F. Durand in Commentaire Mégret, Vol.