natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Bortset fra en stigning i krigsfrygten til 32 % i 1980­81 under den anden oliekrise har procentdelen i de undersøgte perioder ligget mellem 10 og 18 %.
Apart from 1980-81 (the second petrol crisis), when the number of pessimists grew to 32% this proportion used to vary between 10 and 18%.
Troen på fred har således aldrig været større end i dag.
Confidence in peace has never been as great as it is today.
D Europæernes relative optimisme (eller i hvert fald formindskede pessimisme i forhold til perioden 1980­85) skyldes i lige så høj grad objektive vilkår i det økonomiske og sociale liv som den enkeltes læsning og fortolkning.
□ This relative optimism (or at least, the decrease in pessimism compared to the period 1980-85) is due as much to the objective conditions governing economic and social life as to the reading and interpretation given to events by the individual European.
Hver gang begrebet »europæerne« optræder, skal det forstås som »borgerne ¡ de tolv medlemslande i Det Europæiske Fællesskab«.
For economy, the word 'Europeans' has been used in parts of the text and should be understood to mean 'citizens of the 12 member countries of the European Community'.
2 ) For at lette læsningen af procentsatserne og af tabellerne angår tallene kun de personer, der har svaret pá spørgsmålene. Ikke­svarerne er således ikke medregnet i beregningerne.
In order to facilitate the reading of percentages and tables, the figures relate only to those who replied to the particular question ('no answers' are excluded from the calculations).
Udviklingen fra 1973 til 1988 i den positive holdning til samlingen af Europa (i %)
Evolution between 1973 and 1988 of attitudes favourable to the unification of Europe {as %}
Kilde: Euro-barometer.
Source; Eurobarometer.
dem, at det kommende år, 1989, bliver enten klart eller noget bedre.
When people were asked to evaluate changes in the global economic situation in relation to preceding years, 37% in 1988 forecast that the following year would be a definite improvement or a bit better.
Siden 1982 har optimisternes procentandel udviklet sig således: 14 % i 1982, 22 % i 1983, 25 % i 1984, 28 % i 1985, 36 % i 1986 og 28 % i 1987.
Since 1982, this percentage of optimists has evolved as follows: 14% (1982), 22% (1983), 25% (1984), 28% (1985), 36% (1986), 28% (1987).
Hvis spørgsmålet derimod drejer sig om at bedømme ændringerne i den private økonomiske situation i forhold til de foregående år, er europæernes optimisme noget mere afdæmpet: 25 % af dem vurderer i 1988, at deres økonomiske situation har bedret sig meget eller noget. Det tilsvarende tal i 1982 var 15 %, i 1983 og 1984 17 %, i 1985 19 %, i 1986 23 % og i 1987 22 %.
On the other hand, when it came to assessing changes in their domestic financial situation vis-à-vis preceding years, the optimism of Community citizens was tempered slightly. 25% of them considered that their financial situation was either greatly or a little improved.
I forlængelse af disse tal kan man spørge, i hvilket omfang europæerne er tilfredse med det liv, de lever: Tre fjerdedele af dem er tilfredse.
All this raises the question whether people in the European Community are satisfied with the lives they lead.
Siden 1973 har denne andel næsten ikke ændret sig i EF.
Three quarters of them are.
75 % blev som det laveste gennemsnit nået i 1976 og i 1985, højeste gennemsnit på 80 % blev nået i 1973, 1977, 1978 og 1984.
Since 1973, this Community average has scarcely changed — the minimum level of 75% of those satisfied was recorded in 1976 and 1985, the maximum of 80% in 1973, 1977, 1978 and 1984.
I 1988 kan der, som også tidligere, iagttages store forskelle fra det ene land til det andet: I Grækenland er der således 66 % tilfredse og i Portugal 63 % i forhold til 90 % i Luxembourg og 93 % i Nederlandene.
In 1988, as in previous years, there were significant differences between countries. For example, 66% of satisfied persons in Greece and 63% in Portugal as compared with 90% in Luxembourg and 93% in the Netherlands.
Omkring europæernes syn på demokratiet og dets funktion i deres land er der lidt flere tilfredse end utilfredse: 60 % af borgerne er tilfredse mod 40 %, der er mere pessimistiske.
Here there are rather more satisfied persons than dissatisfied ones. 60% belong to the first group while 40% are more pessimistic.
Igen er der her tale om gennemsnitstal, der tilslører stærkt forskellige nationalopfattelser: Fra 77 % tilfredse i Nederlandene og 75 % i Tyskland og i Luxembourg falder tallet ned til 46 % i Italien.
Yet again, these Community averages conceal strongly contrasting national percentages: from 77% of satisfied persons in the Netherlands and 75% in Germany and Luxembourg to 46% in Italy.
Alligevel har niveauet af tilfredshed været meget stabilt siden 1973: I 24 undersøgelser, hvor dette spørgsmål er blevet stillet, repræsenterer gruppen af tilfredse mellem 50 og 60 % af europæerne. Fortolkningen af disse tal kan selvsagt ikke adskilles fra den kendsgerning, om det politiske parti, som den adspurgte støtter, har siddet i regering eller ikke i den pågældende periode.
However, the level of satisfaction appears very stable since 1973. This question was asked in 24 surveys and those who declared themselves satisfied always represented between 50 and 60% of Europeans.
Europæernes fundamentale holdning til samfundet
Basic attitudes of Europeans towards society
Π Når europæerne bedes om at vælge en grundholdning til det samfund, de lever i, og de kan vælge mellem revolutionære aktioner, udvikling gennem reformer og forsvar af det bestående, er der kun få afgørende forskelle fra det ene land til det andet.
□ When people in the Community are asked to choose a basic attitude towards the society in which they live, and when the choice of attitudes proposed ranges from revolutionary to reformist to reactionary, very little significant differences are recorded between countries.
I efteråret 1988 fordeler EF­gennemsnitstallene sig således: 4 % mener, at »hele vort samfunds organisation skal ændres radikalt gennem en revolutionær aktion«, — 73,5 % mener, at »vort samfund skal ændres gradvist gennem reformer«, — og 22,5 % mener, at »vort nuværende samfund skal forsvares mod alle undergravende kræfter«.
In autumn 1988, Community averages were as follows: 'The whole structure of our society must be changed radically by revolutionary action' — 4%; Our society must be improved gradually by reforms' — 73.5%; 'Our society must be defended courageously against all subversive forces' - 22.5%.
Forskellene i den offentlige mening omkring disse forhold afhænger overvejende af andre faktorer end nationalitet, f.eks. uddannelsesniveau og graden af lederskab.
Variations in public opinion on this matter depend not so much on nationality as on other factors, such as level of education or the degree of'leadership'.
Blandt de 4 % med revolutionære holdninger findes — uanset hjemland — først og fremmest unge mænd af høj uddannelse og med stor indflydelse på andre personer.
Among the 4% of the population with revolutionary attitudes one finds above all, no matter what their country of origin, young people with a high level of education
□ For hvilke store sager er europæerne i dag rede til at yde ofre?
□ What are the great causes to which people in the Community are today ready to devote themselves and for which they will accept sacrifices?
Som Tabel I viser, har freden i alle lande førsteprioritet for to ud af hver tre europæere.
As shown in Table I, there is a priority here which is the same for all countries.
Derefter kommer fire andre store sager, der opnår en høj procentandel: menneskerettig­hederne (43 %), kampen mod fattigdommen (41 %), naturbeskyttelsen (38 %) og den personlige frihed (36 %).
For two out of three Europeans, the priority is peace. After that, there are four major issues with a high percentage in their favour: human rights (43%), the fight against poverty (41%), the protection of nature (38%) and individual freedom (36%).
Til gengæld har revolutionen ikke europæernes bevågenhed: Kun mindre end 3 % vi! yde ofre for den.
Revol­ution, on the other hand, does not really hold the attention of Europeans; only less than 3% consider it to be worth sacrifices.
Andre store sager opnår mellem 10 og 20 % tilslutning, idet man kan bemærke sig det beskedne antal europæere ( 11 %), der er rede til at yde ofre for Europas samling.
Other major causes have average percentages of between 10 and 20%; it is worth noting, however, the small number (11%) of persons ready to make sacrifices for European unification!
Tabel I — Store sager, som europæerne ville acceptere ofre for ­ Gennemsnit af målinger i Í982 og 1987
Table I — Great causes for which European Community citizens would accept sacrifices — average of survey results between 1982 and 1987
Kilde: Euro­barometer nr. 17 og 28
Source: EurobarometerNos 17 and 28.
Europæernes grundholdning til EF
Attitudes of Europeans towards the Community
Hvad mener europæerne om institutionen »Europa«, der nu har eksisteret i mere end 30 år?
What do the people of the Community think of the institution of'Europe' which has now existed for over 30 years?
Til afklaring af dette stilles regelmæssigt en række spørgsmål.
In order to find out, several questions are asked regularly.
Den grafiske fremstilling i tabellerne viser udviklingen siden 1973 i den positive holdning til samlingen af Europa.
G One very general question, to find out whether Europeans are for or against efforts to unify Europe, has been posed more or less systematically since 1973.
land: der er kun 50 % positive svar i Danmark og Storbritannien mod mere end 80 % i Holland og Luxembourg og mere end 85 % i Italien.
Once again, there are differences between countries: only 50% of positive appreciation in Denmark and the United Kingdom as against more than 80% in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and in excess of 85% in Italy.
Π I 1983 blev endnu et spørgsmål føjet til dem, der måler graden af støtte til EF i offentligheden: Medfører EF­medlemskabet fordele for et land?
D In 1983, a further question was added to those measuring the degree of support for the European Community: it relates to the advantages derived by a particular country from Community membership.
I efteråret 1988 vurderede 67 % af europæerne, at deres land har draget fordel af medlemskabet. Siden 1983 har EF­gennemsnittet været 62 %. Seks medlemslande når op til 80 % eller mere (Grækenland, Irland, Italien, Luxembourg, Holland og Portugal), mens to andre lande når omkring 50 % eller mindre (Storbritannien med 54 % og Spanien med 33 %).
In autumn 1988, 67% of Community citizens considered that their country was benefiting from membership (since 1983, the Community average in this respect is 62%).
Siden 1983 har følelsen af at have draget fordel af EF været relativt stabil i hvert land undtagen to — Belgien og Tyskland ­ hvor forskelle på mere end 20 % har kunnet iagttages fra den ene undersøgelse til den anden.
Since 1983, this feeling of having benefited from the Community has remained relatively stable for each country, with the exception of two — Belgium and Germany — where variations greater than 20% have been recorded between one survey and another.
Π En anden måde at opgøre den europæiske offentligheds grundholdning til EF på er at iagttage reaktionen (beklagelse eller lettelse) på en eventuel meddelelse om udtræden af Fællesskabet.
□ A different way of assessing real public attitudes towards the European Community is to envisage the regret or relief that would be felt if it were announced tomorrow that the Community was no more.
Dette spørgsmål er ofte blevet stillet siden 1973, og i efteråret 1988 ville 49 % af europæerne modtage en sådan meddelelse med stor beklagelse, mens 43 % ville være ligegyldige og kun 8 % ville være meget lettede.
This question has been posed many times since 1973. In autumn 1988, 49% of Community citizens indicated major regrets, 43% said they would be indifferent and only 8% intimated that they would be greatly relieved.
Udsvingene i disse tal har været relativt svage siden 1973, også selv om man kan konstatere en let forrykning fra »stor beklagelse« til »Ligegyldighed«.
Variations in these proportions have been relatively slight since 1973, although a slight transfer from 'major regrets' to 'indifference' has been noticed.
Ligesom med andre støttetilkendegivelser over for EF er også her store forskelle mellem visse nationale holdningstræk og EF­gennemsnittet.
As with other indicators of support for the European Community, there are strong differences between some national public opinions and the Community average.
Mindre end 1 % af italienerne og luxembourgerne ville være lettede i forhold til 21 % af portugiserne og 31 % af danskerne.
As against less than 1 % of Italians or Luxembourgers who would experience great relief, there are 21% of Portuguese and 31% of Danes.
I Danmark er der kun 28 % ligegyldige, mens tallet af 50 % for Belgien, Holland og Storbritannien.
From only 28% indifferent in Denmark, a proportion of more than 50% is to be found in Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Af svarene på de fire foregående spørgsmål kan man udlede, at den offentlige mening i EF mellem 1973 og 1988 har talt omkring 62 % positive, 25 % ligegyldige og 13 % negative over for udviklingen i den europæiske integration.
From the answers given to the four preceding questions, it can be deduced that between 1973 and 1988, public opinion in the Community averaged approximately 62% of persons in favour, 25% indifferent and 13% opposed to the maintenance and development of European integration.
I forbindelse med en række problemer er europæerne mere tilbøjelige til at ville overlade løsningen til EF end til deres regeringer.
For a whole range of problems, people are more inclined to trust the Community than their own governments.
I 1987 erklærede et stort flertal af de adspurgte sig for en fælles EF­indsats uanset problemets art (se Tabel II) i stedet for at vælge separate nationale indsatser.
In 1987, in answer to the question whether they
Bekæmpelse af terrorismen Hjælp til udviklingslandene Natur­ og miljøbeskyttelse Sikring af energiforsyning Forsvar af nationale interesser over for supermagterne
preferred joint (Community) action or separate (national) action, a large majority of those questioned declared themselves in favour of joint action, no matter what the problem (see Table II).
Øgede forsvarsinvesteringer Udjævning af sociale forskelle Bekæmpelse af arbejdsløsheden Udjævning af regionale forskelle
Table II — Percentage of Community citizens who consider it preferable that certain problems be dealt with at Community level
Kilde: Euro­barometer nr. 28.
Source: Eurobarometer No 28.
Denne tillid til EF som problemløser er ikke ny for europæerne, og den stiger tilmed.
This trust in the Community for dealing with the problems that preoccupy its citizens is not new — actually it has grown.
I tidsrummet 1976­1987 er procentsatsen for personer, der er positive over for EF­aktioner gået fra 42 til 65 % angående kampen mod arbejdsløsheden, fra 56 til 81 % angående naturbeskyttelsen og fra 57 til 66 % angående forsvarsproble­merne.
Between 1976 and 1987, the percentage of people more in favour of Community action has increased from 42% to 65% with regard to the fight against unemployment, from 56% to 81% for the protection of nature and from 57% to 66% for defence problems.
Bortset fra visse nationale særtræk fra det ene problem til det andet er ni lande ud af de tolv i EF tæt på EF­gennemsnittet uanset problemets art. Kun Danmark, Irland og Spanien skiller sig ud angående visse af problemerne.
Though there are differing national emphases on different problems, nine countries out of the 12 are close to the Community average for all problems; only Denmark, Ireland and Spain record marked differences regarding certain questions.
Når problemet angår arbejdsløsheden er 65 % i Danmark og 58 % i Irland for en national indsats, mens 60 % af spanierne ønsker at sikre deres forsvar ved en national indsats.
In Denmark and in Ireland, when the issue in question is unemployment, preference is given to national action (65 and 58% respectively); in Spain, a majority want to retain responsibility for their own defence (60%).
EF's fremtid
The future of the Community
I en særlig undersøgelse i anledning af 30 års­dagen for Rom­Traktaten er en række spørgsmål angående EF's fremtid formuleret.
In an exceptional Eurobarometer survey to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, questions dealing with the future of the European Community were broached.
□ Hvis man præsenterer europæerne for en række på ti projekter, der skal gennemføres inden år 2000, vurderer et stort flertal, at virkeliggørelsen af disse projekter er helt realistisk.
Π When people were provided with a series of 10 possible scenarios for the year 2000, a large majority of them believed that the realization of these hypotheses was feasible: 92% believed in the emergence of a European television channel; 83% considered that joint action would be possible against ecological disasters; 83% believed in a joint fight against terrorism; 72% counted on freedom of movement, residence, study and work within the European Community; 71% believed that the individual would speak a greater number of languages than at
92 % af dem tror således på oprettelsen af en europæisk TV­kanal, 83 % anser det for muligt med en fælles indsats mod miljøkatastrofer, ligeledes 83 % forudser en fælles kamp mod terrorismen, 72 % regner med fri bevægelighed og fri opholds­, studie­ og arbejdsret i EF, 71 % tror, at enhver vil kunne tale flere sprog end nu, 68 % tror på en folkeafstemning om en europæisk forfatning, 63 % forudser valg af en europæisk regeringschef, 62 % tror på et fælles forsvar, 60 % regner med en europæisk møntenhed, og endelig regner 56 % med, at Europa bliver behandlet på lige fod med USA og USSR.
present; 68% considered a referendum on a European constitution was possible; 63% envisaged the election of a European head of government; 62% believed in joint defence; 60% counted on a European currency and 56% considered it possible that Europe would be treated on the same level as the USA and the USSR.
D På baggrund af de foregående tal kan man spørge, hvor langt den europæiske offentlighed vil gå i retning af europæisk integration.
D Given these figures, it may be asked how far the people of the Community want to go.
Faktisk er to ud af tre positive over for dannelse af en europæisk regering, der er ansvarlig over for Europa­Parlamentet, og mere end tre ud af fire europæere erklærer sig positive til dannelsen af »Europas Forenede Stater«.
More than two out of three favour the formation of a European government responsible to the European Parliament and more than three out of four say that they support the establishment of a 'United States of Europe'.
Et flertal af europæerne støtter således EF's udvikling frem mod en politisk union, selv om kun omkring 25 % anser virkeliggørelsen af en sådan union for sandsynlig i løbet af dette århundrede.
The development of the European Community into a political union is therefore supported by a majority of Europeans, even though the actual realization of this before the end of this century is viewed as probable by only 25% of the population.
Det kan noteres, at for 60 % af europæerne betyder »Europas Forenede Stater« ikke tab af deres nationale, historiske eller kulturelle identitet, ligesom heller ikke deres nationale økonomiske interesser vil blive ofret.
It is worth noting that for 60% of Europeans, a 'United States of Europe' does not signify the end of their national, historical or cultural identity; nor does it mean that their national economic interests would be sacrificed for it.
Kun 24 % af de adspurgte mener sig meget foruroligede over konsekvenserne af den politiske union for deres nationale identitet og for deres nationale økonomiske interesser, og 16 % er temmelig foruroligede.
Only 24% of those questioned indicated that they were greatly worried about the consequences of political union for their national identity or for their national economic interests while 16% said they were moderately worried.
Disse procentsatser varierer selvsagt fra det ene land til det andet: I Italien føler 78 % af de adspurgte ingen frygt angående deres nationale identitet, og i Frankrig gælder det samme for 72 %. Derimod føler
These percentages vary from one country to another. In Italy, 78% of those questioned felt no fear for their national identity and in France 72% gave the same response.
55 % af danskerne, 38 % af briterne og 36 % af irlænderne sig meget foruroligede for forsvaret af deres nationale identitet og deres nationale økonomiske interesser.
By contrast, 55% of Danish, 38% of British and 36% of Irish said that they were very worried for the defence of their national identity and for their national economic interests.
Europæerne og det indre marked i 1992
Europeans and the 1992 deadline
Π Hvordan er forventningerne til det indre marked i 1992, der jo ikke er ukendt for den europæiske offentlighed?
□ The 1992 deadline is not unknown to public opinion in the European Community.
I efteråret 1988 kendte tre ud af fire europæere begrebet »Det Europæiske Indre Marked 1992«.
In autumn 1988, three out of four were familiar with the concept of the 'large European market of 1992'.
Tre ud af fire europæere erklærer ligeledes, at de knytter store forhåbninger til virkeliggørelsen af enhedsmarkedet.
Three out of four Community citizens said that they placed great hopes on the establishment of this single market.
60 % vurderer, at det indre marked bliver en god ting for dem og for andre, mens kun 8 % er pessimister, og 32 % mener, at det hverken er en god eller en dårlig ting.
60% believed that 1992 would be a good thing for them (and for people like them) while only 8% of those questioned were pessimistic and for a further 32%, it was neither a good or a bad thing.
Π Hvordan opfatter europæerne fordele og ulemper ved det indre marked i 1992?
D How do the citizens of the European Community see the advantages or disadvantages of the European market of 1992?
Tilskyndet til at bedømme forskellige elementer ved det indre marked afgiver europæerne som helhed meget positive svar (se Tabel III).
When invited to assess different elements of the large market as beneficial or otherwise, people give, on the whole, very positive responses (see Table III).
Når det drejer sig om de sociale problemer, er europæerne næsten enige om at se fordele ved det indre marked i 1992, og dette gælder både for harmoniseringen af sikkerheds­ og sundhedsbestemmelserne, hvor 94 % ser den som en fordel, og for den gensidige anerkendelse af diplomer, hvor tallet er 91 %.
When it comes to social problems, public opinion is almost unanimous in seeing more advantages than disadvantages in 1992.
Endvidere ser 88 % fordele ved en fælles aftale om principperne for indførelse af ny teknologi, 87 % ser fordele ved fastlæggelse af fælles regler for arbejdernes medindflydelse, 85 % ved fleksibilitet i arbejdet, og 84 % ser fordele ved forhandling i europæisk målestok om kollektive overenskomster.
This applies as much to the harmonization of safety and hygiene regulations (94% see advantages in this) as to the mutual recognition of diplomas (91%), the joint definition at Community level of principles for the introduction of new technology (88%), the determin­ation of common rules for worker participation (87%) and for flexibility in work (85%), and even the negotiation at Community level of collective agreements (84%).
Alene danskerne bryder billedet ved for 54 % vedkommende at se flere ulemper end fordele ved kollektive overenskom­ster mod 46 %, der finder fordele ved dem.
Only the Danes disturb this unanimity by finding more drawbacks than advantages in European Community collective agreements (54% against 46%).
Dette var nogle oplysninger fra de meningsmålinger, som Europa­Kommissionen har gennemført, og særlig fra den seneste af dem. I 15 år har disse »Euro-barometer«
This is some of the significant information to emerge from the public opinion surveys undertaken by the Commission of the European Communities, particularly from the most recent survey.