natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne bestemmelse er desuden indføjet, fordi en medlemsstat nærede betænkeligheder over, at direktivets skattelempelser kunne misbruges til at omgå reglerne om arbejdstagernes medbestemmelsesret.
The provision also makes allowance for Member States' fear that the transactions facilitated by the Directive might be misused to evade worker participation laws.
MODER-/DATTERSELSKABSDIREKTIVET a)
THE PARENT/SUBSIDIARY DIRECTIVE
Moder-/datterselskabsdirektivet finder anvendelse på »overskud, som selskaber modtager fra andre medlemsstater« og, omvendt, på »overskud, som selskaber i denne medlemsstat udlodder til selskaber i andre medlemsstater, som de er datterselskaber af«.
The Parent/subsidiary Directive applies to 'distributions of profits received by companies which come from their subsidiaries of other Member States', and 'distributions of profits by companies to companies of other Member States of which they are subsidiaries'.
Ved selskaber i en medlemsstat forstås i direktivet udelukkende de selskaber, der er opført i direktivets bilag.
A 'company of a Member State' must be a company in one of the forms listed in the Annex to the Directive.
Det drejer sig uden undtagelse om kapitalselskaber — som det ligeledes er tilfældet med fusionsdirektivet.
They are all joint stock companies, as in the case of the Mergers Directive.
Moderselskaber defineres som mindst ethvert selskab i en medlemsstat, hvis andel i kapitalen i et selskab i en anden medlemsstat (datterselskab) er på mindst 25 %.
The status of parent company is to be attributed at least to any company of a Member State which has a minimum holding of 25 % in the capital of a company of another Member State (the subsidiary).
Hensigten med at bruge ordet »mindst« to gange er, at det står medlemsstaterne frit for at anerkende, at der består et privilegeret moder-/datterselskabsfor-hold, selv om den ovenfor nævnte kapitalandelsgrænse ikke er nået.
The use of the words 'at least' and 'minimum' is intended to make it clear that Member States are free to provide for a privileged parent/subsidiary relationship even below this minimum holding.
Rent faktisk yder nogle medlemsstater allerede på grundlag af bilaterale aftaler eller unilaterale bestemmelser den særlige selskabsskattelempelse ved lavere kapital-
In reality some Member States have already granted the same corporation tax privilege where the holding is lower, on the basis of bilateral agreements or
Endvidere har medlemsstaterne mulighed for at anvende stemmerettighedskriteriet.
Member States are also free to replace this criterion by that of a holding of voting rights.
I forbindelse med datterselskabers udlodning af udbytte til moderselskaber, der skattemæssigt er hjemmehørende i en anden medlemsstat, påregnes moder­/datterselskabsdirektivet at have følgende retlige konsekvenser:
The legal consequences of the Parent/subsidiary Directive for distributions of profits by a subsidiary to a parent company resident for tax purposes in another Member State are as follows.
■ Afskaffelse af dobbeltbeskatning.
■ No double taxation.
En eventuel (økonomisk) dobbeltbeskatning af udloddede overskud skal undgås derved, at den stat, hvor moderselskabet er hjemmehørende, enten undlader at beskatte dette overskud eller beskatter det, men giver moderselskabet tilladelse til at fratrække »den del af dattersel­skabets skat, der vedrører dette overskud ..., dog højst den tilsvarende nationale skat«.
As far as corporation tax is concerned any (economic) double taxation of distributed profits is to be avoided by the State of the parent company, which can either exempt such profits from tax or, when assessing tax on the parent company, to authorize the parent company to deduct 'that fraction of the corporation tax paid by the subsidiary which relates to those profits ... up to the limit of the amount of the corresponding domestic tax'.
■ Afskaffelse af kildeskat.
■ Abolition of withholding tax.
I det land, hvor datterselskabet er beliggende, fritages det udbytte, som et datterselskab udlodder til sit moderselskab, for kildeskat, i det mindste når moderselskabet har en kapitalandel i datterselskabet på mindst 25 %.
In the State of the subsidiary, profits distributed by the subsidiary to its parent company are to be exempt from withholding tax, at least where the parent company holds a minimum of 25 % of the capital of the subsidiary.
Denne afskaffelse af kildeskatten var under drøftelserne om moder­/dattersel­skabsdirektivet længe den alvorligste hindring for at nå frem til den enstem­mige rådsbeslutning, der i dette tilfælde var påkrævet i medfør af EØF­Traktatens artikel 100.
During discussion of the Parent/subsidiary Directive in the Council the elimination of withholding tax was for a long time the biggest obstacle in the way of the unanimous decision required by Article 100 of the EEC Treaty.
Af grunde, der vedrører det særlige todelte erhvervsbeskatningssystem, der benyttes i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland, er det tilladt Forbundsrepublikken at bibeholde en kildeskat på 5 %, så længe afstanden mellem de to skattesatser udgør mindst 11 procentpoint, dog senest til midten af 1996.
By reason of its differentiated system of corporation tax, Germany is allowed to retain a withholding tax of 5 % as long as the difference between the two rates of corporation tax amounts to at least 11 percentage points, but not beyond mid-1996.
For Portugals vedkommende har det af rent budgetmæssige årsager vist sig nødvendigt at bibeholde kildeskatten gennem en periode på otte år, nemlig med en sats pa 15 % i de første fem ar og på 10 % i de sidste tre år, eftersom Portugal er stærkt afhængig af provenuet fra denne skat.
Portugal is allowed to retain a withholding tax of 15 % for the first five years and 10 % for the next three; this was necessary for purely budgetary reasons, as Portugal is heavily dependent on revenue from withholding taxes.
Denne frist kan forlænges ved enstem­mig rådsbeslutning.
This eight-year period can be extended by a unanimous decision of the Council.
Grækenland må, så længe denne medlemsstat ikke opkræver nogen selskabsskat af udloddede overskud, opkræve kildeskat af overskud udloddet til moderselskaber i andre medlemsstater.
Greece is permitted to levy a withholding tax on profits distributed to parent companies of other Member States for so long as it does not charge corporation tax on distributed profits.
') Nederlandene yder en særlig selskabsskattelempelse fra og med kapitalandele på 5 %.
' The Netherlands grant this inter-company tax concession where the holding is as low as 5 %.
Ved lempelser i medfør af dobbeltbeskatningsaftaler har Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland ensidigt og uafhængigt af den i de hidtidigt gældende dobbeltbeskatningsaftaler fore­skrevne minimumskapitalandel fastsat denne grænse til 10 % (§ 26, stk. 7, i Körperschaft­steuergesetz — den tyske selskabsskattelov), medens Belgien undgår enhver dobbeltbeskatning uden at fastsætte nogen minimumskapitalandel.
Germany has set the double taxation agreement exemption unilaterally at 10 %, regardless of the level in the relevant double taxation agreement (Article 26 (7) of the corporation tax law), while Belgium avoids double taxation without laying down a minimum holding.
Konventionens anvendel­sesområde begrænser sig geografisk til foretagender, der er beliggende i en kontraherende stat (og dermed til Fællesskabet).
enterprises of any of the contracting States, and thus to the Community.
For at prisreguleringer mellem hovedsæde og faste driftssteder også kan falde ind under anvendelsesområdet, definerer konventionen et fast driftssted, der er beliggende i en anden kontrahe­rende stat, som et »foretagende i en kontraherende stat«.
In order to include adjustments of prices charged between an enterprise and its per­manent establishments, a permanent establishment situated in another contrac­ting State is deemed to be an enterprise of the State in which it is situated.
Konventionen finder anvendelse på de skatter, der opkræves af overskud i de enkelte medlemsstater.
The Convention is to apply to the taxes currently levied on profits in the individual Member States.
Det slås udtrykkeligt fast, at skatter af samme eller tilsvarende art, der senere indføres, ligeledes falder ind under konventionens anvendelsesområde.
It is explicitly stated that it will also apply to any identical or similar taxes imposed later.
1 lighed med artikel 9, stk. 1, i OECD's modeloverenskomst bestemmes det i konventionen, at de interne afregningspriser, der aftales mellem forbundne foretagender, kan ændres, hvis de ikke svarer til de priser, der aftales mellem særskilte foretagender under de samme vilkår (»arm's length«­princippet).
In line with Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Convention, the Convention provides that the prices agreed between associated enterprises can be adjusted for tax purposes if they differ from those which would be charged under the same conditions between independent enterprises (the 'arm's length' principle).
Tilsva­rende gælder for regulering af et fast driftssteds overskud.
The same holds for adjustments relating to a permanent establishment.
Konventionens primære sigte er at afskaffe dobbeltbeskatning snarest muligt.
The main purpose of the Convention is to resolve cases of double taxation as rapidly as possible.
Af den grund består der en forpligtelse til forhåndsinformering af skattemyndighe­derne, sa snart der er tale om et tilfælde af overskudsregulering, der falder ind under konventionen.
Tax authorities are accordingly required to inform the enterprise beforehand where they intend to make an adjustment of the kind covered by the Convention.
Derved åbnes der mulighed for pá forhånd at afklare den påtænkte prisregulering med det forbundne foretagende og med den kontrahe­rende stat, hvori det er beliggende, og at undgå yderligere skridt, hvis alle parter erklærer sig indforstået med reguleringen.
This will allow the intended adjustment to be discussed with the associated enterprise and with the contracting State in which it is situated, and if all parties are in agreement the matter need go no further.
Endvidere er det af hensyn til fristerne i forbindelse med den videre procedure vigtigt, at der gives underretning om overskudsreguleringen af de myndigheder, der agter at foretage den.
The date on which the tax authority announces its intention of making an adjustment is also important for some of the time­limits governing later steps.
Såfremt et af de berørte foretagender ikke er indforstået med den påtænkte regulering, fordi det er af den opfattelse, at den er til skade for »arm's length«­princippet, iværksættes en procedure, der er opdelt i to trin.
If either of the enterprises does not accept the intended adjustment, because it feels it is not in accordance with the arm's length principle, a two­stage procedure can be set in motion.
■ I første række indledes en aftaleprocedure, som indholdsmæssigt stort set svarer til den i artikel 25 i OECD's modeloverenskomst fastsatte procedure.
■ In the first place there is a mutual agreement procedure, which broadly corresponds to the procedure laid down in Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention.
Formalet med denne aftaleprocedure er at nå frem til en aftale om ophævelse af dobbeltbeskatningen.
The purpose of this procedure is to arrive at an agreed solution which eliminates double taxation.
■ Andet trin i den procedure, der er fastsat i konventionen, går imidlertid videre end bestemmelserne i artikel 25 i OECD's modeloverenskomst og de bilaterale aftaler, der bygger herpå, og iværksættes, når aftaleproceduren ikke inden for en frist på to ar efter forelæggelsen af sagen har ført til ophævelse af dobbeltbeskatningen.
■ The second stage provided for here goes beyond Article 25 in the OECD Model Convention and the bilateral agreements based on it; it comes into play if the mutual agreement procedure fails to eliminate the double taxation within two years of the date on which the objection was first lodged. The competent authorities of the States involved are then required to set up an 'advisory commission' immediately.
I sa fald er de kompetente myndigheder i de berørte stater nemlig forpligtet til straks at nedsætte et »rådgivende udvalg«.
In the arbitration procedure which follows the sole function of the advisory commission is to deliver its opinion on the elimination of the double taxation in question.
Dette udvalg har i den voldgiftsprocedure, der derved iværksættes, alene til opgave at afgive udtalelse om, hvordan dobbeltbeskatningen skal ophæves.
The advisory commission is to consist of its chairman, two representatives of each competent authority concerned (the authorities may agree to reduce this to one each), and an even number of independent persons of standing.
Disse skal være statsborgere i en af de kontraherende stater (ikke nødvendigvis en af de berørte kontraherende stater) og have bopæl i Fælles skabet. De skal være sagkyndige og uafhængige.
will be an odd number (two plus two representatives of tax authorities, plus an even number of independent persons, plus the chairman), so as to avoid a tied vote.
Det rådgivende udvalg afgiver udtalelse senest seks måneder efter, at en sag er forelagt det.
Six months after the advisory commission was convened it delivers its opinion.
De pågældende kompetente myndigheder har derefter inden for endnu en frist på seks måneder mulighed for på grundlag af det rådgivende udvalgs udtalelse og efter fælles aftale at finde frem til en løsning, der fører til ophævelse af dobbeltbeskatningen.
The competent authorities party to the proceedings then have another six months to agree a solution which will eliminate the double taxation.
I forbindelse hermed kan de — men vel at mærke med det resultat, at dobbeltbeskatningen fjernes — fravige den løsning, der foreslås i det rådgivende udvalgs udtalelse.
They may opt for a solution different from that recommended by the advisory commis­sion.
Kun hvis der ikke foreligger nogen aftaleløsning, får udtalelsen bindende karakter.
Only if they fail to reach agreement does the commission's opinion become binding.
Konventionen giver også en afklaring til fordel for de berørte foretagender på et stridsspørgsmål, som ofte er forekommet som led i aftaleproceduren i henhold til dobbeltbeskatningsaftaler, nemlig at den omstændighed, at en beskatningsbeslutning står ved magt, ikke er til hinder for at iværksætte aftaleproceduren og voldgiftsproceduren.
The Convention also settles a question often raised in connection with mutual agreement procedures under double taxation conventions, and does so to the advantage of the enterprises involved: the fact that a tax assessment has become final does not prevent the mutual agreement and arbitration procedures from being set in motion.
Konventionens erklærede formål om at undgå dobbeltbeskatning betragtes som nået, hvis overskuddet enten kun er medtaget i skatteberegningen i én stat, eller hvis den skat, der opkræves i én stat, indregnes i den skat, der skal svares i en anden stat.
The Convention's objective of eliminating double taxation is considered to be achieved if the profits are included in the computation of taxable profits in one State only, or if the tax chargeable in one State is offset against the tax chargeable in the other.
En medlemsstat kan undlade at benytte aftaleproceduren eller voldgiftsproceduren, hvis et af de berørte foretagender »vil kunne ¡dømmes alvorlig straf på grund af handlinger, som giver anledning til en regulering af overskuddet«.
A Member State is not obliged to take part in mutual agreement or arbitration proceedings if one of the enterprises concerned is guilty of a tax offence for which it is liable to a 'serious penalty'.
Hvilke handlinger, der vil kunne idømmes alvorlig straf for, afviger fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat, hvorfor det forekom hensigtsmæssigt at foretage en nærmere definition heraf i de enkelte medlemsstater i ensidede erklæringer.
The concept of a serious penalty takes different forms in different Member States, so that it was found advisable to leave more precise definitions to the Member States, who have supplied unilateral declarations attached to the Convention.
Det står fast, at kun grove forseelser falder ind under bestemmelsen.
The intention was to make it clear that only major offences are caught by this provision.
Foreligger der ved indledningen af aftaleproceduren eller inden nedsættelsen af det rådgivende udvalg en retlig eller retsgyldig afgørelse om den pågældende forseelse, kan hver af de berørte kompetente myndigheder nægte at indlede proceduren.
Where, at the time that the mutual agreement procedure might be initiated, or before the advisory commission is set up, legal or administrative proceedings have resulted in a final ruling that such a serious offence has been committed, either of the authorities concerned may refuse to go ahead with the procedure.
Såfremt proceduren er indledt, eller såfremt en »procedure med henblik på at fastslå, hvorvidt et af de berørte foretagender vil kunne idømmes alvorlig straf ..., ved iværksættelsen heraf eller derefter er i gang, er det nødvendigt med en beslutning fra begge myndigheders side (»de kompetente myndigheder«) for at suspendere den allerede indledte procedure.
Once arbitration proceedings have been initiated, however, the position is different: if at the time they are initiated or thereafter there are other proceedings pending in which a ruling is sought that one of the enterprises concerned has committed an offence which might incur a serious penalty, the mutual agreement or arbitration proceedings may be stayed only by a joint decision of both authorities ('the competent authorities may stay ...').
Konventionen er indgået for en periode på fem år.
The Convention is concluded for a period of five years.
Seks måneder inden udløbet af denne periode træffer de kontraherende stater afgørelse om, hvorvidt den skal forlænges.
Six months before the expiry of that period, the contracting States are to decide whether it should be extended. There is thus no automatic extension.
Den forlænges altså ikke automatisk.
Practical effects of the new measures
Praktiske konsekvenser af de nye foranstaltninger for erhvervsklimaet i Fællesskabet
an appreciable reduction in the burdens on the enterprises affected.
Derudover vil afskaffelsen af de tidkrævende og administrativt omstændelige refusions­procedurer, som den hidtidige praksis ifølge dobbeltbeskatningsaftaler ofte førte med sig, komme specielt små og mellemstore virksomheder til gode.
The avoidance of the reimbursement proceedings which were often necessary under previous double taxation practice, and which could be costly in terms of time and administrative effort, should be of particular benefit to smaller businesses.
De ved direktivet foreskrevne lempelser vil navnlig være til gavn for selska­berne i de EF­medlemsstater, der ikke råder over et lukket net af dobbeltbe­skatningsaftaler med alle andre medlemsstater1).
The concessions required by the Directive will be especially useful to companies in those Member States which do not have a network of double taxation agreements with all the other Member States.1
De strategiske overvejelser, hvorved koncerner ved indskydelse af holdingsel­skaber søger at opnå den gunstigste kildeskattesats for udloddet udbytte fra udenlandske datterselskaber, vil fremover ikke længere spille nogen rolle for moder­ og datterselskaber, der er beliggende i Fællesskabet.
Between parents and subsidiaries in the Community, there will now be no further role for tactical group structures whereby holding companies are interposed in order to take advantage of the lowest rate of withholding tax on profits distributed by foreign subsidiaries.
Medens moder­/datterselskabsdirektivet udgør den endelige løsning på et problem, som allerede på forhånd delvis var løst gennem bilaterale aftaler, betrædes nye veje med de nye beskatningsregler for grænseoverskridende virksomhedssammenslutninger.
While the Parent/subsidiary Directive merely represents the ultimate solution to a problem which had already in part been resolved on the basis of bilateral agreements, the new tax arrangements for cross-border mergers break new ground.
Fusioner og lignende transaktioner over lan­degrænserne førte efter den hidtidige lovgivning i de enkelte medlemsstater til fuld afdækning af de stille reserver i det overtagende og det overtagne selskab.
As the law in the individual Member States stood previously, mergers and similar transactions which took place across borders meant that the hidden reserves of a transferring company were exposed to tax.
Den deraf følgende skattebyrde umuliggjorde stort set i praksis sådanne transaktioner.
The tax burden thereby incurred made such transactions almost impossible in practice.
Direktivet finder umiddelbar anvendelse på overtagelser af aktiver og ombyt­ninger af aktier, som der i forvejen består et selskabsretligt grundlag for at realisere.
The Directive will apply straight away to transfers of assets and exchanges of shares, for which there is already a basis in company law.
Når det drejer sig om fusion og spaltning, tilvejebringer direktivet de skattemæssige forudsætninger herfor, selv om det selskabsretlige grundlag endnu ikke er til stede.
The Directive establishes the tax environment for mergers and divisions, but here there is as yet no basis in Community company law.
Europa­Parlamentet har endnu ikke afgivet udtalelse om forslaget til tiende direktiv om grænseoverskridende fusioner af aktiesel­skaber, som Kommissionen forelagde Rådet den 14. januar 1985.
The European Parliament has not yet delivered an opinion on the Commission's proposal for a 10th Company Law Directive, on cross-border mergers of public limited companies, which was submitted on 14 January 1985.
Endvidere er det ændrede forslag til statut for Det Europæiske Selskab2) for øjeblikket til
The Council is still considering the revised draft of the Statute for a European company;2a merger of two companies from different Member States would be one of the main ways of setting up a European company.
') Dette er tilfældet i forholdet mellem Grækenland og Danmark, Spanien, Irland, Luxem­bourg og Portugal, mellem Portugal og Luxembourg, Nederlandene og Irland samt
It is worth noting that in both of these cases the necessary tax legislation has been enacted before the company legislation, which is a new departure in European legal history.
■ Med EF­voldgiftskonventionen etableres for første gang en procedure, som pålægger skattemyndighederne at nå til et resultat, der endeligt afskaffer dobbeltbeskatning.
■ The Community Arbitration Convention for the first time establishes a pro­cedure which requires tax authorities to arrive at a solution which eliminates double taxation.
Modsat hvad der hidtil har været tilfældet med dobbeltbe­skatningsaftalerne, får det berørte foretagende på et tidligt tidspunkt mulighed for at deltage i proceduren og derved mulighed for at fremlægge sine synspunkter.
In contrast to the position which held previously under double taxation conventions, the company affected will be involved in the proceedings from an early stage, and will thus be able to put forward its own position.
Ligeledes for første gang er proceduren nu tidsbegrænset, så at der ikke længere kan opstå uafklarede situationer, der varer adskillige ar og giver anledning til ekstraomkostninger.
The length of the proceedings will now also be restricted, so that it will no longer be possible for a disagreement to hang in the balance for many years, with all the extra costs that that entails.
Navnlig sma og mellemstore virksom­heder, som ofte ikke råder over specialafdelinger til at behandle de ofte tid­ og arbejdskrævende dobbeltbeskatningssager, vil nu i højere grad vove skridtet med at overskride grænsen til et europæisk naboland for derved at drage fordel af virkeliggørelsen af det indre marked.
And smaller businesses, which do not have the staff to deal with the frequently demanding and time­consuming area of double taxation cases, will now be more ready to risk stepping over the border and taking advantage of the single market.