natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
20): En kunde klagede over, at hans bank i 1953 havde rådet ham til at sælge Daimler—aktier og købe andre andele.
1953 his bank advised him to sell his Daimler shares and buy other shares.
Det kunne konstateres, at banken havde givet 45 andre værdipapirkunder tilsvarende anbefalinger og i dette tidsrum forøgede sin egen beholdning af Daimler-aktier.
It was established that the bank had given 45 other securities customers the same advice and during that time had built up its own holding in
Klagen blev dog afvist, da det ikke kunne påvises, at banken dirigerede sin kun devejledning i én bestemt retning og havde til hensigt at favorisere banken selv.
The complaint was rejected because it could not be proved that the bank had conducted its customer consultancy operations uniformly and that it intended thereby to favour itself.
I virkeligheden er det nærliggende, at en bank anbefaler køb eller salg af værdipapirer, alt efter om den ønsker at oprette resp. forøge en egen beholdning eller formindske resp. realisere den.
In fact it is obvious that stocks will be recommended by a bank for purchase or sale according to whether it wishes to create or build up its own holding or to reduce or dispose of it.
Hvis en interessepost måske behøver en afrunding opad for at styrke indflydelsen i det pågældende selskab eller for at opnå den skatteretlige datterselskabslempelse, vil det for rådgiveren ved in vestering være nærliggende at stimulere lysten til at sælge de pågældende aktiver.
If, for example, it is desired to increase participation in order to strengthen the degree of corporate influence or to qualify for the group-company tax concession, it will be natural for the investment adviser to encourage a willingness to sell the shares in question.
Anbefalinger til at købe kan også gives for at påvirke kursværdien af egne beholdninger i gunstig retning.
Recommendations to buy may be made in order to push up the market value of the bank's own investment.
Ligeledes bliver faren for manglende objektivitet i investeringsvejledninger konkret, hvis banken ligger inde med utilsigtede kapitalinteresser.
Similarly, there is a real danger of lack of objectivity in investment advice if the bank holds unplanned participatory investments.
De er ikke et resultat af målrettet investeringspolitik og skal i reglen snart afhændes igen.
These have not come into being as a result of planned investment policy and are usually intended to be sold again rapidly.
En orientering af den købelystne kundekreds herom ville lette afsætningen.
An appropriate willingness to purchase on the part of the bank's customers will facilitate the sale.
Man kalder betegnende dette hændelsesforløb for "aflæsning" af aktieposter til publikum.
This practice is expressively described as "unloading" shares on to the public.
2) Investeringsvejledning og insider informationer
2) Investment advice and inside information
Værdipapirkundernes interesser udsættes ikke alene for risiko ved, at banken ved anbefalinger begunstiger sine egne porteføljedispositioner.
Securities customers' interests are not only endangered by a bank raaking recommendations in order to favour its own portfolio.
hvilke den måtte have fået kendskab som insider, fra publikum, når dette søger vejledning. 21).
The bank may also withhold adverse information about the business of certain companies, which it may have received as an "insider", from the advice-seeking
Interesse i at handle således kan foreligge, hvis virksomhedens omdømme lider skade ved videregivelse af oplysningerne.
It may be in the bank's interest to behave in this way if the undertaking's reputation would be harmed were the information to be passed on.
Dette skaber tvivl om kreditværdigheden og bringer bankens allerede bevilgede kreditter i fare.
Doubt might be cast on its creditworthiness and credits already advanced by the bank might be endangered.
Desuden kan bankens egen kapitalinteresse være en begrundelse. Videre givelsen kunne nemlig føre til et fald i kursen på virksomhedens aktier med be tydelige tab som følge.
Further, the holding of a participatory investment by the bank in the undertaking may be the cause of such conduct.
Det drejer sig her om et forhold, der kan sammenlignes med kursmanipulation.
We are dealing with a procedure similar to share price manipulation.
Den kan ikke forsvares med det argument, at hindring af kurstab på investe ringerne samtidig tjener indlånernes interesser.
It cannot be justified with the argument that defending investments against market losses is at the same time in the interests of the depositors.
Konflikten mellem indskyderne og værdipapirkunderne er meget let at løse.
The conflict between depositors and securities customers is easily soluble.
Beskyttelsen af indlånene be røres nemlig kun meget indirekte.
For the protection of depositors is only very indirectly affected.
Og overfor investorerne er banken forpligtet til at give sandfærdige oplysninger for at hindre, at disse lider tab.
And a bank has a duty to investors to provide true information in order to prevent them suffering losses on their assets.
3) Objektiv investeringsvejledning under konkurrenceforhold?
3) Would competitive conditions produce objective investment advice?
Over for argumenter om interessekonflikter i forbindelse med investeringsvejledning fremholdes nødvendigheden af at varetage kundernes interesse på grund af konkurrencepresset i bankverdenen 22): Den forkert vejledte kunde overfører ikke alene sin konto til en anden bank, men ophører også med anden forretningsforbindelse med den bank, som kortsynet ville vejlede i egen interesse.
(22) sector would ensure that the customers' interests were taken into account*·
Det kan være rigtigt, at der herved er lagt visse bånd på banken.
It may be correct to say that this would impose a certain degree of restraint on a bank.
Men ej heller et stærkt konkurrencepres garanterer en objektiv investeringsvejledning.
But not even strong competitive pressure will guarantee objective investment counselling.
Selv under en sådan markedssituation er en kundes "afvandring" ikke den normale konsekvens af forkert investeringsvejledning.
Even where a market situation of this kind does exist, the "migration" of a customer is not the usual consequence of faulty investment advice.
For det første må kunden nemlig konstatere, at bariken ikke har varetaget hans interesser.
For the customer must first find out that the bank has failed to' have his interests at heart.
Dette er dog kun tænkeligt i undtagelsestilfælde.
But this is only conceivable in exceptional cases.
Hvorledes skal publikum på markedet kunne opdage etablering eller opløsning af kapitalinteresser og konstatere, at de selv har lidt skade?
How is the public supposed to detect the building up or disposal of participatory holdings on the market and establish that their own interests have been injured by this action?
Og selvom en krænkelse af kundens interesser kommer for dagen, er de faktorer, som begrænser hans bevægelsesfrihed, stadig til stede.
And even if the fact of damage to their interests is discovered, there still remain the factors restricting customers' mobility.
Herunder må den eksisterende binding til en fast bankforbindelse henregnes, især når der er indgået omfattende kreditengagementer. løvrigt ville den kunde, som overgår til en konkurrerende bank, møde en lignende risiko for uhensigtsmæssig vejledning, medmindre det drejer sig om et institut, der ikke beskæftiger sig med investe ring i virksomheden.
Moreover, the customer transferring his custom to a competing bank would run a similar risk there, unless it was a house that did not engage in participation business.
Konfliktmulighederne mellem egne porteføljeinteresser og en formålstjenlig vej ledning af og oplysning til værdipapirkunderne afhænger ikke af en forbindelse mellem udlånsvirksomhed og omsætning af værdipapirer inden for den enkelte bank og kan også foreligge hos investeringsbanker under opdelingssystemet.
The possibility of conflict between a bank's own portfolio interests and the provision of proper advice and information to its securities customers is not the result of the connexion between credit business and securities business within the bank: it can also occur with investment banks in the "separation" system of banking.
Interes— sekollisionerne er uafhængige af banksystemet.
The conflicts of interest are not inherent in the system.
De ville kun kunne imødegås, hvis også banker, der er specialiseret i omsætningen af værdipapirer forbydes enten at udføre kommissionsforretninger i værdipapirer eller at investere for egen regning.
They could only be countered by prohibiting specialized investment banks either from carrying on securities business on a commission basis or from investing on their own account.
En sådan løsning er ikke tænkelig.
A solution of this kind is inconceivable.
Afhjælpning kan kun ske ved skærpede krav om offentlighed, hvilke forringer bankernes nøglestilling som rådgivere for værdipapirkunder.
The only remedy here would be to tighten up the disclosure requirements thereby diminishing the banks' key position as advisers of securities customers.
Aktie— og kapitalmarked
The stock market and capital market
En banks vejledning af værdipapirkunder i investeringsspørgsmål er en vigtig funktion inden for formidlingen af opsparing og investering, af kapitaludbud og kapitalefterspørgsel.
Investment counselling of its securities customers by a bank is an important function in the process of acting as an intermediary between savings and investment, the supply of capital and the demand for capital.
Ovenfor er det undersøgt, hvilken betydning bankens egne kapitalinteresser har for denne funktion.
Previously we have examined the importance of the banks' participatory holdings in relation to this function.
Hermed kommer aktiespare— ren i synsfeltet uafhængigt af hans egenskab af bankkunde.
Here the investor also comes under consideration, independently of his characteristic as a bank customer.
1) Bankernes handel med større samlede aktieposter
1) Trading in large parcels of shares by the banks
Omsætningen af større samlede aktieposter hører i medlemsstaterne til de ofte forekommende transaktioner på kapitalmarkedet, med hvilke bankierhuse eller universalbanker med betydelig investeringsaktivitet beskæftiger sig.
Dealing in large parcels of shares is a normal form of activity on the capital market in Member States of the European Community where specialized investment banks or universal banks with substantial participation business
I denne forbindelse skal især nævnes de franske Banques d'Affaires 23), de engelske Merchantbanker og de private tyske storbanker.
The French banques d'affaires^ ^ , the British merchant (23) are active.
Naturligvis er sådanne transaktioner ikke begrænset til bankerne.
Naturally, large-lot dealing is not the exclusive preserve of the banks.
Også andre virksomheder er i stand her til.
Other undertaliings, too, are in a position to carry on such business.
Bankerne har dog, netop når de har specialiseret sig i investeringsvirk— somhed, ganske særlige muligheder for at opbygge eller overtage store aktieposter. ter.
However, the banks in special measure, particularly when they specialize in investment business, have the funds necessary to create or to acquire large parcels of shares.
Handelen med større samlede aktieposter fører til en forøget fleksibilitet på kapitalmarkedet.
Large-lot dealing leads to greater flexibility on the capital market.
Finansieringsinteresser kan tidligere end ellers tilgodeses ved den hurtige udligning af udbud og efterspørgsel.
The interests of finance are well served by the speedy balancing of supply and demand.
Netop i perioder med hurtig industriel ekspansion kan sådame transaktioner være nødvendige ud fra kapi— talmarkedspolitiske synspunkter.
Particularly in times of rapid industrial expansion large-lot trading can be a necessity for the capital market.
Omsætningen af større samlede aktieposter finder sted uden om børsen.
The exchange of large parcels of shares takes place outside the stock exchange.
Dette gælder også, når det drejer sig om børsnoterede papirer.
This is true even of quoted shares.
Herved undgås be lastning af børsen. 24).
When this happens, it is to the benefit of the stock exchanges, although this is not a deliberate
Det undgås, at der opstår heftige kurssvingninger i et selskabs aktier.
Violent price fluctuations in a company's shares are prevented.
Særlig i tilfælde af, at en storaktionær vil frigøre sig fra sine beholdninger, kan det komme til et voldsomt kursfald, som kan føre yderligere salg med sig.
If a major shareholder wishes to dispose of his holdings, this could cause a sharp fall in the share price which would lead to further selling.
Sådanne forhold kan uberettiget nedsætte en virksomheds omdømme på børsen.
Such events could unjustifiably injure the market standing of an undertaking.
På den anden side betyder udelukkelsen af børsen en forringelse af gennemsigtigheden.
On the other hand, the exclusion of the stock exchange from such transactions
25)· Navnlig vil størrelsen af de omsatte aktiebeløb i et selskab være ukendt.
(25) v means a loss of market "transparency"
Herved vanskeliggøres bedømmelsen af aktiernes kurstendens, idet en kursnotering først bliver mere informativ, når de kvantitative komponenter oplyses. 26).
In particular, the turnover in the shares of a company remains unknown.
Den med kapitalinteresserne åbnede mulighed for at omsætte større, samlede aktieposter kan følgelig ikke bedømmes samlet, da positive og negative virkninger for aktiemarkedet er uløseligt forbundet.
A single verdict cannot therefore be passed on the opportunity for large-lot trading which is opened up by participation, since positive and negative effects for the stock market are inseparably joined.
For at bedømme, hvilken vægt der bør tillægges de negative virkninger med hen blik på spørgsmålet interesser, må det for det første tages i betragtning, at omsætningen af større aktieposter som ovenfor nævnt ikke er begrænset til bankerne.
In order to judge what importance should be attached to the negative effects in relation to the question of participation, it should be remembered that large-lot trading, as mentioned above, is not confined exclusively to the banks.
En regulering af barikernes aktiebesiddelse ville derfor nok reducere problemerne med hensyn til omsætning af store aktieposter uden om børsen, men ikke løse dem helt.
Regulation of the banks' shareholdings therefore might well reduce the problems of extra-bourse trading in large parcels but it would not remove them.
Desuden har storhandelen også for børsen en positiv virkning.
Moreover, this trading even has a positive effect for the stock exchange.
Den opfylder desuden en vigtig funktion på kapitalmarkedet.
In addition, it fulfils an important function on the capital market.
Herom kan henvises til redegørelsen om kapitalinteresser som midlertidige poster hos bankerne.
Reference may be made here to what was said earlier on the subject of participatory investments as transitory items held by
27)· Og endelig må det tages i betragtning, at de problemer, der op står i forbindelse med omsætningen af større, samlede aktieposter netop også foreligger med hensyn til bankierhusene, d.v.s. at de er systemindifferente.
And finally it should be noted that the problems arising in connexion with large-lot trading also occur with specialized investment
Aktiebesiddelserne gør det muligt for bankerne at manipulere aktiernes børskurser gennem køb og salg.
Share participation enables banks to manipulate the quoted price of shares by buying and selling.
Betingelsen for en effektiv påvirkning af kurserne er en vis begrænsning af markedet for de som objekter udvalgte aktier og — alt efter formålet, kursfald eller kursstigning — tilstedeværelsen af tilstrækkelige likvide midler og en betydelig egen beholdning. 29).
The prerequisites for effective price manipulation are a rather narrow market for the shares chosen for the operation and, according to the aim in view, a falling or rising market, sufficient liquid funds and a substantial holding of the shares(29) J.
Principielt kan disse betingelser være opfyldt også for investeringsbanker og selv for virksomheder uden for banksektoren.
In principle, these prerequisites could also be valid for investment banks and even for non-banking undertakings.
Man kan dog ud fra de faktiske forhold gå ud fra, at der vil være en tendens til, at disse betingelser snarere vil være til stede hos universalbankerne. 30).
It can be assumed, however, for practical reasons that these prerequisites tend to be more relevant for universal banks J.
Kursmanipulationer påvirker for det første aktiemarkedets gennemsigtighed.
Share price manipulation affects the reliability of the stock market as an indicator /Its "transparency'^.
Kun stigt påvirkede kurser afspejler ikke længere den almindelige vurdering af et selskab under de givne samfundsøkonomiske og politiske betingelser.
Manipulated prices cease to reflect the general assessment of a company's worth under given economic and political conditions.
Investor bliver ved kunstige kursstigninger forledt til at gå med i købene for at delagtiggøre sig i mulige værdistigninger.
iVhen there are artificial rises in a share price the investor is tempted to follow suit by buying, in order to benefit from a possible gain in value.
Omvendt kan et kursfald medføre salg i desperation, som ikke er begrundet i det pågældende selskabs økonomiske stilling.
Conversely, a fall in the price may lead to anxious selling which is not justified by the financial position of the company in question J
3l)· Efter omstændighederne kan et kunstigt frembragt kursfald des uden føre til opsigelse af kreditter mod sikkerhed i værdipapirer, fordi dækning som følge af aktiernes faldende værdi ikke længere er til stede.
In certain circumstances a manipulated fall in the share price can lead to the calling in of a loan against securities because the share cover, in view of the falling price, is no longer adequate.
Den bevidste påvirkning af kurserne på visse aktier kan dog også være i in vestorernes interesse.
Deliberate influencing of the prices of certain shares can, however, also be to the advantage of the investor.
Dette kommer allerede til udtryk i begrebet bankernes kurspleje.
This has already been seen in the concept of price support operations by banks.
Vi har set, at bankerne går denne vej for at beskytte egne porteføljeinteres— ser eller forhindre et kursskred i tilslutning til emissioner.
We have seen that the banks take this course in order to protect their own portfolio interests or to prevent a collapse in a share price following an issue.
Begge dele kan også tjene andre aktionærers interesse.
Support from both these motives can serve the interests of other shareholders.
Dette gælder især, hvis påvirkningen af markedet modvirker kortvarige, teknisk betingede kurssvingninger. 32).
This is particularly true when the market operations
Den ved bankernes aktiebesiddelse skabte mulighed for bevidst påvirkning af bestemte aktier kan således vurderes fra to sider.
The opportunity to influence certain share prices conferred by a bank's participation can thus be appraised in two ways.
Over for forvrængningen af børsbilledet og skadevirkninger for investorerne står varetagelsen af disses interesser ved udligning af kurssvingninger.
On one side there is the fact that the stock exchange picture is distorted and investors' interests harmed; on the other side, investors' interests are safeguarded by the balancing out of price fluctuations.
Hvilken virkning der bør tillægges størst vægt, kan i mangel af erfaringsmæssigt grundlag ikke afgøres.
Which effect has the greater weight cannot be answered for lack of empirical documentary evidence.
Allerede af denne grund kan det fastslås, at bankernes mulighed for kursmanipulation ikke med vægt kan være afgørende for spørgsmålet om regulering af kapitalinteresserne.
For this reason, in the first place, it can be stated that the banks' opportunity for share price manipulation is not of crucial importance in the question of the control of participation.
Hertil kommer, at denne mulighed ikke er begrænset til banksystemet, men også står åben for andre erhvervsgrene, såfremt de råder over tilstrækkelige midler.
In addition, this opportunity is not inherent in the banking system but is available to other firms or persons provided they have the necessary funds.
Dette betyder, at også bankierhuse kan frembyde samme problemer.
This means that even specialized investment banks can be subject to the same problems.
En løsning måtte søges gennem offentligt tilsyn med en vidtgående ret til oplysninger og kontrol.
A solution would have to be sought in the realm of an official supervisory authority with wide powers of obtaining information and carrying out audits.
Kun af denne vej kan en kursmanipulation, som må vurderes negativt, adskilles fra en positivt virkende kurspleje.
Only in this way could share price manipulation, with its negative effects, be separated from price support, with its positive effects.
3) Skjult opbygning af kapitalinteresser
3) The secret building up of participatory holdings
En bank, som beskæftiger sig med omsætning af værdipapirer, har i princippet mulighed for at udligne ordrer fra kunderne.
The bank engaged in securities business has, in principle, an opportunity to carry out "offsetting" with regard to customers* orders.
Købs- og salgsordrer udlignes hos banken uden om børsen.
Incoming buying and selling orders received by the bank are set off against each other without use being made of the stock exchange.
I Tyskland har denne mulighed hjemmel i kommissionsreglerne, som under visse betingelser giver banken adgang til selvindtræde. 33)·
In Germany this opportunity is given by the law on commissions which allows a bank itself
Udligningen af kommissionsordrer på værdipapirer kan benyttes til i investeringshensigt at opbygge større aktiebeholdninger i bankens eller en kundes interesse, uden at det interesserede publikum erfarer noget herom.
The offsetting of buying and selling orders for securities received by a bank as agent can be used in the interests of the bank itself or of a customer to build up large holdings of shares with a view to participation without the members of the public thereby affected being able to find out about it.
Andre investorer ude lukkes fra muligheden for at reagere over for sådanne tildragelser.
Other investors do not have an opportunity to react to occurrences of this kind.
Principielt kan må gå ud fra, at en via børsen opbygget stor aktiepost på grund af den stigende efterspørgsel fører til højere kurser.
In principle it can be assumed that the creation of a large holding of shares through the medium of the stock exchange leads to higher prices because of the increase in demand.
De aktionærer i selskabet, fra hvem en interessepost skal erhverves, kan unddrage sig en tilsynekommende stor aktionærs fremtidige indflydelse ved at sælge deres aktier til en højere kurs.
The shareholders of a company in which a party is. attempting to secure a participatory interest can escape the future influence of an emergent major shareholder by selling their shares at a higher price.
Desuden kan det under opbygningen af interesseposten komme til aktiesalg, som
In addition, it can happen in the course of participatory purchase operations that sales are made simply for profit-taking motives.
kun kan motiveres af muligheden for at realisere en gevinst.
(341 w having recourse to such lines of action
Denne skjulte opbygning af store aktieposter indebærer endnu en fare for det pågældende selskabs aktionærer.
This secret building up of large shareholdings entails a further danger for the shareholders of the company affected.
De konfronteres overraskende, måske på generalforsamlingen, med en storaktionær.
They are suddenly, perhaps at the General Meeting, confronted with a majority shareholder.