natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det er i praksis kun få tredjelande, der søger at øve indflydelse på Fællesskabernes og deres medlemsstaters valg, men valget har dog betydning for dem.
The bilateral agreements concluded under the aegis of the ECSC are rather special.
Den »rene EF-aftale« og den »blandede aftale« kan nemlig både på politisk og retligt plan have forskellige virkninger i forhold til dem.
Firstly, they merely supplement, in respect of the products or fields covered by the ECSC Treaty, trade or commercial cooperation agreements concluded by the EEC (alone) or the commercial sections of association of cooperation agreements concluded by the EEC (alone) or the commercial sections of association or cooperation agreements concluded by the EEC and its Member States.
Den »rene fællesskabsaftale« indebærer, navnlig hvor der er tale om en bilateral aftale, at det eller de pågældende tredjelande i højere grad i politisk henseende anerkender Fællesskabernes identitet og deres egne beføjelser, end det er tilfældet ved en »blandet aftale« hvori disse beføjelser kun fremtræder som støttet og begrænset af deres medlemsstater. stater.
Secondly, some of these agreements have been concluded simultaneously by the ECSC and its Member States;3 others have been concluded by the ECSC Member States acting together but without the participation of the ECSC itself.4 Strictly speaking, therefore, the latter are not Community agreements.
Under disse forhandlinger viste det sig klart, at Comecon's forhandlere ganske vist ønskede at »normalisere« deres forbindelser med Fællesskabet gennem en aftale, men at de dog ikke var villige til fuldt ud at anerkende Fællesskabet, dets mål og beføjelser, dets institutionelle regler og forskellige former for praksis.
In each case, the choice to be made between the 'Community' agreement and the 'mixed' agreement depends solely on the extent of the powers vested in the Communites by the establishing Treaties.
Det er utvivlsomt denne vægring, der fik dem til i lang tid at fastholde ønsket om, at Fællesskabets medlemsstater skulle være deltagere i den aftale, man måtte nå frem til, hvilket ønske ikke deltes af Fælles skabet.
The way in which the relevant provisions of these Treaties are interpreted - frequently involving a considerable degree of latitude - is the sole responsibility of the institutions of the Communities and their Member States.
At en stat foretrækker en »blandet aftale« kan udspringe af et helt andet motiv end dens modvilje mod fuldt ud at anerkende Fællesskabet.
Nonmember countries have no say in this exercise.
(') F.eks. aftaler indgået af EKSF's medlemsstater med: Tyrkiet (EFT nr. L 293/72). Island. Schweiz (EFT nr. L 350/73). Israel (EFT nr. L 165/75), Algeriet (EFT NR. L 263/78), Tunesien (EFT nr. L 265/78). Marokko (EFT nr. L 234/78). Egypten. Libanon.
This position is based on a restrictive interpretation, not supported by the Commission, of the powers which the EEC enjoys pursuant to Article 238 of the EEC Treaty ('The Community may conclude with a third State ... agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures...').
Mange stater er endnu uvant med at forhandle med Fællesskabet, og har ofte et utilstrækkeligt kendskab til dets mekanismer og ansvarsområder.
In practice, few countries attempt to influence the decisions made by the Communities and their Member States.
Erfaringen har vist, at regeringerne i Fælles skabets medlemsstater er lydhøre over for disse synspunkter, når valget mellem en »ren EF-aftale« og en »blandet aftale« skal træffes.
In reality, the 'Community' agreement and the 'mixed' agreement may well have differing political and legal repercussions for these.
På retligt plan kan lande, der har besluttet sig til at indgå aftale med Fællesskabet, også have grunde til at foretrække enten den ene eller den anden af de to former for aftale.
This applies in particular to the negotiations - now at a standstill - which the EEC con ducted over several years (1976-80) with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Member States ofthat organization.
Da indgåelsen af en »blandet aftale« almindeligvis ikke indebærer nogen særlig under retning til det eller de pågældende kontraherende tredjelande angående opdelingen af de sagsområder, som er genstand for aftalen, efter de beføjelser, som Fællesskabet har, og de beføjelser, der hører under dets medlemsstater, synes en sådan aftale med hensyn til samtlige de forpligtelser, som den europæiske part påtager sig, at kunne betragtes som bindende både for Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater.
It emerged clearly from these negotiations that the Community's opposite numbers wanted to normalize their relations with the Community by means of an agreement but were not prepared fully to recognize the Community, its aims and powers, and institutional rules and practices.
Dette særegne træk ved den »blandede aftale« kan navnlig i tilfælde af tvist indebære fordele for Fællesskabets part nere.
It was undoubtedly this unwillingness which led them to keep reiterating the wish - not shared by the Community - that the individual Member States of the Community should accede to any agreement.
Dette spørgsmål vil vi komme tilbage til i tredje del (se s. 126 og 144).
A particular State's preference for the 'mixed' agreement formula may have nothing whatsoever to do with its reluctance to grant full recognition to the Community.
Det synes imidlertid, som om den forvirring, den »blandede aftale« skaber med hensyn til fastlæggelsen af de forpligtelser og ansvarsområder, som henholdsvis Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater har påtaget sig, som oftest giver tredjelandene grund til uro.
Many States are still unused to dealing with the Community and often have little know ledge of its structure and responsibilities.
Det er i denne henseende slående at bemærke, hvor stærkt adskillige af disse lande under for handlingerne insisterer på at få nærmere oplyst, hvorledes ansvarsområder og forpligtelser er fordelt, og i øvrigt på at få forvisning om, at dette, at både Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater deltager i aftalen, ikke betyder, at de i de instituioner, der oprettes ved aftalen, skal have stemmerettigheder ud over dem, som ville være blevet tillagt med lemsstaterne, hvis Fællesskabet ikke havde været part i aftalen.
On the other hand, many have a long-standing and special relationship with the Member States of the Community and the 'mixed' agreement formula may appear attractive to the extent it helps foster a direct dialogue with those States.
På retligt plan synes den »blandede aftale« således ikke set med tredjelandenes øjne at have afgørende fordele i forhold til den »rene EF-aftale« (')·
Experience has shown that the governments of the Member States of the Community have always taken this attitude into account when choosing between a 'Community' agreement and a 'mixed' agreement.
Fællesskabernes ret til at være part i internationale aftaler anerkendes i dag aflangt de fleste stater.
Countries wishing to conclude an agreement with the Community may also have legal reasons for preferring one or other of the two formulae.
(') Dette gælder så meget mere som EØF's aftaler »er bindende for... medlemsstaterne« i medfør af EØFT artikel 228.
Since, in general, there is no requirement under a 'mixed' agreement to provide specific information to the contracting country or countries on which areas of the agreement come under Community jurisdiction and which come under the Member States'jurisdiction, such an agreement may be regarded as involving a concurrent commitment for both the Community and its Member States in respect of each of the obligations devolving upon the European party.
Vi skal komme tilbage til dette spørgsmål i Tredje Del (s. 124).
This particular feature of the 'mixed' agreement may
Dette følger af, at stater i stigende omfang har været nødt til enten individuelt at erklære sig rede til at indgå bilaterale aftaler med Fællesskaberne eller til kollektivt at støtte Fællesskabernes krav om at blive deltagere i multilaterale aftaler.
offer advantages for the Community's partners, especially in the event of a dispute. This point will be discussed further in Part Three (see pp. 132 and 150).
Det er aldrig nogen let opgave for Fællesskaberne at opnå denne støtte, navnlig når der er særlig mange stater, der skal overbevises om det berettigede i Fællesskabets krav om at blive deltager i en aftale.
It would appear, however, that the confusion created by the 'mixed' agreement as re gards determination of the commitments and responsibilities entered into respectively by the Community and its Member States often causes concern for the nonmember countries.
Mange stater indser ikke altid klart nødvendigheden af, at Fællesskabet bliver part i en multilateral aftale, navnlig hvis det skal deltage i tilslutning til sine medlemsstater.
From the legal standpoint, the nonmember countries do not appear to gain any more marked benefit from a 'mixed' agreement than they would from a 'Community' agree ment.'
I årenes løb har der kunnet skabes adskillige »fortilfælde«, og erfaringen har vist, at in gen stat nogensinde har nægtet at yde Fællesskabet en støtte, som den allerede havde ydet det i tidligere tilfælde.
The Communities' right to be party to international agreements is now recognized by the great majority of States.
Fællesskabernes deltagelse i internationale aftaler er derimod altid stødt på modstand fra den gruppe stater, der består af USSR og dets allierede i Comecon og Warszawapagten.
Getting this support is not always easy for the Communities, particularly when a very large number of States have to be convinced that there are good grounds for a request to participate in an agreement.
Som bekendt (') har disse lande indtil i dag nægtet officielt at anerkende Fælles skaberne på nogen måde (2).
This is especially true of the multilateral agreements negotiated under the auspices of international organizations of a universal character such as the United Nations, its subsidiary organs and its specialized agencies.
I tråd med dette standpunkt har USSR og dets allierede næsten altid forsøgt at lægge hindringer i vejen for Fællesskabets krav om deltagelse i multilaterale aftaler.
Many States do not always see clearly the need for the Community to become party to a multilateral agreement especially when such participation is in addition to that of its Member States.
(') Se første del. s. 20-21. (;) Selv om visse af disse stater har set sig foranlediget til at indgå aftaler eller ordninger med EØF (de allerede nævnte aftaler af 1980 mellem EØF og Rumænien og aftalerne mellem EØF og Bulgarien angående handlen med tekstilvarer (EFT nr. L 330/82), EØF og Polen (EFT nr. L 107/82). overnnævnte aftaler mellem EØF, Bulgarien, Ungarn, Polen og Tjekkoslovakiet angående fåre- og gedekød samt ovennævnte aftaler mellem EKSF og Bulgarien, Ungarn.
Especially as, under the EEC's own 'constitution' (Article 228 of the EEC Treaty), EEC agreements are 'binding upon the Member States'.
I sjældne tilfælde, hvor disse lande indtog en magtposition på grund af det ringe antal deltagere i aftalen, er disse bestræbelser blevet kronet med held. Det er således lykkedes for USSR og visse af de øvrige østlande at afskære EØF fra deltagelse i miljøbeskyttelseskonventionen for Østersøen.
Furthermore, the Community's requests for participation sometimes come up against tactical objections from the other parties, fearing that the Community's participation might further complicate already very difficult negotiations and delay their outcome.
I alle øvrige tilfælde har Fællesskabet med støtte fra en flerhed af stater kunnet overvinde disse landes modstand.
In practice, the Communities have always been able to overcome these difficulties since at least their own Member States have been in favour and the nonmember States in­volved have not in principle been opposed to recognition and affirmation of the Com­munities' identity and international powers.
Hvor disse ikke har kunnet modsætte sig selve dette, at Fællesskabet blev deltager i multilaterale aftaler, har de adskillige gange forsøgt at begrænse den politiske og retlige rækkevidde af Fællesskabets deltagelse.
A number of precedents have been set over the years and experience has shown that no State has ever refused to give the Community the kind of support which it had given on previous occasions.
Hvor USSR og de øvrige østeuropæiske lande ikke kan modsætte sig optagelse i en multilateral aftale af en bestemmelse, hvorefter Fællesskabet kan blive kontraherende part i aftalen på lige fod med stater, fremsætter de under forhandlingerne, ved underskriften eller ved deponeringen af ratifikationsdokumenterne vedrørende aftalen en ensidig er klæring, hvori de tilkendegiver, at deres deltagelse i traktaten ikke bevirker nogen ændring i deres standpunkt »over for visse internationale organisationer« (').
By contrast, the Communities' participation in international agreements has always met with hostility from the Soviet Union and its Comecon (CMEA) and Warsaw Pact allies.
Dette vil sige, at deltagelsen ikke skal indebære nogen officiel anerkendelse af Fællesskabet.
As already stated,1these countries have so far refused all official recognition of the Communities.2
I talrige tilfælde er USSR og andre østlande gået videre og har fremsat en ensidig erklæring, ifølge hvilken Fællesskabets deltagelse i en multilateral aftale, hvori de samtidig selv var parter, ikke indebærer nogen retlig forpligtelse for dem i forhold til Fællesskabet. bet.
Accordingly, the USSR and its allies have, on almost every occasion, attempted to block the Community's requests to participate in multilateral agreements.
Fællesskabet har i hvert enkelt tilfælde protesteret over for en sådan erklæring, når den pågældende aftale klart forbød parterne at tage forbehold med hensyn til bestemmelsen vedrørende Fællesskabets deltagelse.
On rare occasions, where the small number of parties to the agreements has meant that these countries were in a strong position, this attempt has succeeded.
Fællesskabets protest er i samtlige tilfælde blevet meddelt depositarstaten ifølge aftalen gennem formanden for Rådet for De europæiske Fællesskaber på både Fællesskabets og dets medlemsstaters vegne.
For example, the USSR and certain other Eastern European countries were able to block the EEC's ap­plication to accede to the Convention on the protection of the marine environment of the Baltic Sea area.
Det skal bemærkes, at det kun er aftaler indgået i form af »blandede aftaler«, der har givet anledning til den netop omtalte erklæring.
In all other cases, support from a majority of States has enabled the Community to overcome the opposition from these countries.
USSR og dets allierede har aldrig løbet risikoen ved at fremsætte samme erklæring i forbindelse med multilaterale aftaler der skulle indgås i form af »rene EF-aftaler«, hvilket jo ville have været det samme som at benægte enhver retlig gyldighed af den godkendelse af de pågældende aftaler, der var meddelt af Rådet for De europæiske Fællesskaber, dvs. af en institution, der består af re-præsen tanter for medlemsstaterne.
Finding themselves unable to oppose the actual principle ofCommunity participation in multilateral agreements, these same countries have frequently tried to restrict the po­litical and legal scope of the Community's participation.
Dette gælder først og fremmest, når Fællesskaberne ønsker at blive part i en multilateral aftale, der allerede er underskrevet eller sat i kraft, og hvortil der alene er åbnet adgang forstater.
In 1979, for example the USSR proposed that the text presented by the EEC to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea with a view to being accepted as a contracting party to the convention drawn up by this Conference, be replaced by a provision under which the EEC would have been allowed oniy to deposit a unilateral declaration committing itself to acceptance of the rights and obligations laid down by the Convention.
Adgang for Fællesskaberne til at deltage i en sådan aftale må således ske ved en efterfølgende ændring af bestemmelserne i aftalen.
This counter-proposal was rejected by the EEC and most of the States participating in the Conference.
Noget sådant gælder naturligvis ikke, hvor der er tale om ændring af en allerede indgået aftale på et enkelt punkt.
This means that their participation will not result in any official recognition of the Community.
I betragtning af disse vanskeligheder har Fællesskabet adskillige gange skønnet, at det burde afholde sig fra at kræve ret til deltagelse i eksisterende aftaler. De tilfælde, hvor det har indtaget det modsatte standpunkt angår aftaler, hvori kun få stater var deltagere, og disse for de flestes vedkommende tillige var medlemmer af Fællesskabet.
On several occasions, the USSR and other Eastern European countries have gone even further by issuing a unilateral declaration stating that the fact that the Community is party to the same multilateral agreement as they are themselves will not involve them in any legal obligation vis-à-vis the Community.
Ligeledes bør nævnes Kommissionens betydningsfulde forslag (2), der er godkendt af Europa-Parlamentet (3), om, at Fællesskaberne skal tilslutte sig Den europæiske Men neskerettighedskonvention af 1950(4).
In each case, the Community's objection has been notified to the depositary of the agreement through the offices of the President of the Council of the European Communities, acting on behalf of both the Community and its Member States.
(3) Udtalelse offentliggjort i EFT nr. C 304'82. (4) Se N. Brown og J. Mac Bride, Observations on the proposed Accession by the European Community lo lhe
The Communities' participation in international agreements may sometimes be thwarted by obstacles even more difficult to overcome than those already mentioned.
Disse almindelige bestemmel ser (') giver ikke mulighed for, at andre kollektive enheder end stater kan blive medlem mer af disse konventioner.
One example is where the Communities wish to become party to a multilateral agree ment already signed or implemented, to which only States have been allowed to accede.
EØF har mødt vanskeligheder i forbindelse med en af ILO's konventioner, der behandler områder, der hører ind under EØF's kompetence (2). Efter anmodning fra EF-
Post hoc amendments to the provisions of such an agreement are therefore required if it is to be opened to the Communities.
Kommissionen og i øvrigt også fra visse arbejdsgiver-og fagforeninger, der er repræsenteret ved ILO, undersøgte Det internationale Arbejdskontor spørgsmålet om regionale organisationers deltagelse i organisationen og nåede til det resultat, at ILO's forfatning faktisk var til hinder for en sådan deltagelse (3).
Such an operation may take considerable time, particularly if there is no simplified re vision procedure to invoke and if a large number of States have to agree to the changes being made. Furthermore, the Community's need to amend the agreement means that its position as an applicant is even more awkward that it would be if it were seeking the inclusion of a clause allowing participation in an agreement still in process of negotia tion.
Det internationale Arbejdskontor har dog foreslået accept af en eventuel akt fra EØF, hvorved dette tiltræder en af organisationen udarbejdet aftale, der skal have samme gyldighed som en ratifikation af konventionen for samtlige EF-medlemsstaters side.
In the latter case, acceptance of the Community's request may be expedited by the wish of the States participating in the negotiations to settle this and other matters as soon as possible in order to bring the discussions to a close. Obviously, this cannot happen when the amendment of an isolated point in an agreement already adopted is in volved.
Denne løsningsmulighed har givet anledning til forskellige vurderinger, der i hvert fald i visse kredse inden for Fællesskabet har været imødekommende på det praktiske plan, men er, som man kan tænke sig, blevet mødt med en nærmest afvisende holdning fra lande som f.eks. USSR.
In view of these difficulties, the Community has often thought it better to refrain from seeking the right to accede to existing agreements. The circumstances in which the opposite line has been taken relate to agreements to which there were only a few signatory States, most of whom belonged to the Community.
Afsnit 3: De nærmere regler om åbning af adgang for De europæiske Fælllesskaber til deltagelse i internationale aftaler
In both cases, EEC participation was made possible by the adoption of a special accession protocol by the parties to these agreements.'
Under visse omstændigheder får Fællesskabet adgang til deltagelse i en international af tale på betingelser og efter regler, der ikke afviger fra dem, der gælder for stater, således at det ikke er nødvendigt i konventionen at indsætte nogen særlig bestemmelse vedrørende Fællesskabet.
Mention should also be made of the important Commission proposal,2 approved by the European Parliament3in favour of the Communities' accession to the 1950 European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.4
Dette har hidtil været tilfældet med bilaterale aftaler.
The second case deserving of mention is that of the international conventions negotiated and adopted under the auspices of the International Labour Organization.
Det samme gælder visse multilaterale overenskomster, hvori det allerede fra starten er aftalt, at Fællesskabet skal have ad gang til at deltage på fuldstændig lige fod med de øvrige parter.
This or ganization has a 'constitution' which lays down, through general provisions, all the conditions and procedures applicable to the conclusion and implementation of the con-
Her skal bl. a. nævnes Bonn-aftalen af 1976 (jfr. ovenfor) vedrørende beskyttelse af Rhinen mod kemisk forurening, konventionerne af 1978 og 1980 (se ovenfor) om det fremtidige multilaterale sam-
It will enter into force once all the parties to the convention have ratified it; in the meantime, the EEC is apply ing the provisions of the Convention on an independent basis (see Directive 77/489 of 18.7.1977, OJ L 22, 1977).
(') Se særlig artikel 19, stk. 5 i ILO's forfatning.
Under an additional agreement, the EEC became a member of the International Commission for the protection of the Rhine against pollution (Bonn, 3.12.1976: text in OJ L 240, 1977).
(2) Konvention nr. 153 om arbejds- og hviletid i landtransportsektoren. (3) Se ovennævnte ILO-dokument nr. GB. 215/SC/4/1 af februarmarts 1981
Document COM(79) 210 final of 2.5.1979.
arbejde vedrørende fiskeriet i det nordøstlige Atlanterhav samt ovennåvnte aftale af 1982 om vejtransport af passagerer.
ventions drawn up by the organization. Moreover, these general provisions' do not al low entities other than States to become party to such conventions.
Bortset fra disse tilfælde tillægges der altid Fællesskaberne ret til at blive kontraherende part i en multilateral aftale ved særlige bestemmelser, der indsættes i denne.
The EEC came up against these provisions in connection with an ILO Convention deal ing with matters within its sphere of competence.2 At the request of the Commission of the European Communities and also of some of the employers' and trade union organizations represented in the ILO, the International Labour Office considered the question of the participation of regional organizations in ILO conventions and concluded that the ILO constitution did in fact preclude such participation.3 The International Labour Office did, however, contemplate acceptance of the idea that the deposit by the EEC of an instrument of acceptance of a convention drawn up by the organization should be regarded as equivalent to the ratification ofthat convention by all the Member States of the Community.
Formålet med disse bestemmelser er i passende juridiske vendinger at fastlægge den politiske aftale, der er truffet mellem de stater, der har deltaget i forhandlingen, vedrørende principperne for og de nærmere regler om Fællesskabets deltagelse i aftalen.
This compromise has received a mixed welcome -very favourable, at least from a practical point of view, in certain Community circles but rather unfavourable, one suspects, in countries such as the USSR.