natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det andet element, der er den amerikanske lovgivning under Sherman-antitrustloven og den amerikanske domstolstradition, vedrører specifikt amerikanske forhold og har derfor begrænset værdi ved en sammenligning med europæiske forhold.
The second element — US legislation under the Sherman anti-trust act and US judicial traditions — is specific to the US situation and therefore of limited value for comparison with the European situation.
Det er det første element, der har størst relevans for Europa, i og med at Europa og De Forenede Stater står over for samme omlægning inden for telekommunikationen, nemlig sammensmeltningen af telekommunikation og edb.
It is the first element which is of most relevance for Europe, in so far as Europe and the United States face the same transformation in telecommunications, i.e. the convergence of telecommunications and data processing.
Som det er sket i USA, må Europa belave sig på at udvikle et mere dynamisk marked.
Like the United States, Europe must think about developing a dynamic market.
Japan har siden 1985 foretaget en drastisk liberalisering af sin telesektor, til dels på grund af USA's pres for at åbne dette marked, men egentlig mere på grund af en bred enighed i Japan om, at der er behov for et dynamisk telekommunikationsmarked, dersom Japan skal kunne indtage en førende position i den fremtidige informationsøkonomi på verdensplan (boks 17).
Japan has liberalized its telecommunications system dramatically since 1985 — partly due to US pressure to open its market but much more due to the general Japanese consensus that a dynamic telecommunications market is needed to propel Japan into a position of leadership in the future world information economy (Box 17).
Siden begyndelsen af 1950'erne er de indenlandske teletjenester i Japan blevet drevet af Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), mens alle internationale tjenester er blevet drevet af Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company (KDD).
Since the early 1950s, domestic telecommunications services in Japan have been provided by the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), whilst all of the international services were provided by Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company Ltd (KDD).
Japan begyndte at deregulere i telekommunikationsindustrien i 1985.
In 1985, Japan started to deregulate its telecommunications industry.
Der blev indført to nye love med henblik på deregulering og liberalisering af japansk telekommunikationsindustri: Loven om telekommunikationsvirksomhed og Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabuhiki Kaisha loven (NTT). De to love trådte i kraft den 1. april 1985.
Two new laws were introduced intended to bring about a process of de­regulation and liberalization within the Japanese telecommunications indus­try: the telecommunications business law and the Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabushiki Kaisha law (NTT law).
— åbnet mulighed for en mere liberal brug af telekommunikationsfaciliteterne terne
(iv) provided a framework for allowing competition with KDD in the inter­national marketplace.
På baggrund af definitionsproblemer i forbindelse med »Computer Inquiry II« i USA har man i Japan forsøgt at undgå Computer Inquiry ll-terminologiens skelnen mellem basale tjenester og værdiforøgende tjenester, fordi man ikke har ment, at denne sondring kunne opretholdes.
In the light of the Computer II definition problems in the USA, the Japanese Government has attempted to avoid the US 'basic' versus 'enhanced' ("value-added") distinction of Computer II which it saw as unworkable.
Man har i stedet valgt at skelne mellem »facilitetsleverandører« (type I) og »tjenesteleverandører« (type II).
Instead they opted for a distinction between 'facilities providers' (Type I) and 'service providers' (Type II).
— Televirksomheder af type I : Dvs. televirksomheder, der ejer og driver deres egne transmissionsfaciliteter.
Type I operators : Type I operators are regulated operators who own and operate their own transmission facilities.
Televirksomheder af type I skal fortsat for håndsgodkendes af det japanske Ministerium for Post og Telekommunika tion (MPT).
Type I operators remain subject to prior approval by the MPT, the Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
Både NTT og KDD er ifølge den nye lov televirksomheder af type I.
Both NTT and KDD are established by the new law as Type I oper­ators.
Samtidig har MPT meddelt koncession til fem nye konkurrerende facilitetsleverandører. tetsleverandører.
In the meantime, the MPT has authorized five additional new facilitybased competitors.
Tre af disse nye type I teleselskaber har planer om jordbaserede net (det ene selskab vil anvende mikrobølgetransmission, det andet lyslederkabler langs vejene, og det tredje lyslederkabler langs jernbanerne), mens de to øvrige agter at opbygge deres net på grundlag af satellitteknologi.
Three of these new Type I operators plan terrestrial networks (one using microwave transmission, the second, optical fibre laid along the roads and the third, optical fibre alongside the railway lines), whilst the other two intend to build networks based on satellite technology.
— Televirksomheder af type II: Dvs. alle andre televirksomheder, der er underlagt mindre strenge regler.
(ii) Type II operators: Type II operators are all other telecommunications operators and are less regulated.
Der er reelt tale om televirksomheder, der stiller værdiforøgende tjenester eller merværditjenester til rådighed, og som ikke har egne transmissionsfaciliteter.
In effect these are operators provid­ing enhanced (or value-added) services who do not own transmission facilities.
Der er på nuværende tidspunkt flere hundrede virksomheder af type II i Japan.
There are currently several hundred Type II operators in Japan.
Loven om drift af telekommunikation siger ikke, at kun andre tjenester end taletjenester kan være type II tjenester, men der kan være reel risiko for, at kun datatjenester vil komme på tale.
The telecommunications business law does not restrict Type II services to nonvoice only, but there may be a de facto limitation to data ser­vices.
Selv om KDD fortsætter med at være den dominerende televirksomhed for internationale forbindelser, er det sandsynligt, at MPT vil meddele andre virksomheder koncession på international drift. Der er allerede dannet to konsortier:
Whilst KDD remains as the dominant international telecommunications operator, the MPT is likely to issue further licences for international oper­ations.
Cable & Wireless, har også en stor andel heri. For at sikre, at de dominerende televirksomheder ikke misbruger deres stilling til at vinde indflydelse på andre dele af markedet, udstedte MPT i august 1 986
The privatization of NTT is being carried out in tranches. The rapid increase of the value of NTT shares floated on the Tokyo stock market has made NTT the world's biggest company in terms of market value.
I foråret 1987 indgik Japan en særlig ordning med De Forenede Stater om internationale værdiforøgende tjenester.
In spring 1987, Japan concluded a special arrangement with the United States on the operation of international valueadded services.
Det kan forventes, at Japan i fremtiden vil øve stor indflydelse på markederne for teleudstyr og på de internationale teletjenester.
Japan can be expected to exert major pressure on both the telecommunications equip­ment and international services markets in the future.
Sideløbende hermed har Japans MITI, dvs. Ministeriet for International Handel og Industri, samt MPT, dvs. Ministeriet for Post og Telekommunikation, opfordret Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), der nu er verdens største selskab målt i markedsværdi, til at igangsætte en ambitiøs plan om implementering af et »Information Network System« (INS). Dette projekt er efterhånden blevet til en storstilet langsigtet investeringsplan, der tager sigte på en hurtigere generel digitalisering af NTT-nettet samt hurtig indførelse af ISDN — med den forventede sidegevinst, at man opnår en stærk stilling på det fremtidige marked for digital-terminaler.
In parallel, Japan's MITI, the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and the MPT, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, have encouraged NTT, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and now the world's largest company in market value, to follow the ambitious plan towards implementation of the INS, the information network system which has turned into a huge long-term investment effort for the accelerated general digitization of the NTT network and the rapid introduction of ISDN — with the expected spin-off of a strong position in the future digital terminal markets.
Japan er med sin nyvundne dynamik, der er et resultat af en målbevidst politik for liberalisering af hjemmemarkedet, nu i stand til hurtigt at trænge ind på verdens telekommunikationsmarked.
Based on its newly gained dynamics, by a determined policy towards liberalization in its home market, Japan is currently rapidly penetrating the world telecommunications market. ket.
Det Europæiske Fællesskab har traditionelt haft en stærk stilling på verdens telekom munikationsmarked ') og havde et samlet overskud på 1 mia ecu i 1986.
The European Community traditionally has a strong position on the world telecom munications market, ' with a total surplus of 1 000 million ECU in 1987.
Men siden begyndelsen af 80'erne er denne stilling blevet svækket.
But since the early 1980s this position has been eroded.
Europa fastholder sin stærke stilling inden for telekommunikation i Den Tredje Verden, men har nu et voksende underskud over for såvel USA som Japan.
Europe maintains a strong position in tele communications in the Third World but has a growing deficit with both the United States and Japan.
USA's og Japans eksport er stort set af samme størrelsesorden som Fællesskabets.
Broadly speaking, the US and Japanese exports are of the same order of magnitude as those of the Community.
Forskellene ligger på importsiden.
The differences are on the import side.
I 1986 eksporterede EF telekommunikationsudstyr (inkl. telekommunikationskomponenter) til USA med en samlet værdi af 370 mio ecu og til Japan med en samlet værdi på kun 39 mio ecu.
In 1987, the Com munity exported to the United States a total value of telecommunications equipment — including telecommunications components — of 417 million ECU, and to Japan only 40 million ECU.
Deroverfor står, at EF importerede udstyr fra USA til en værdi af næsten 1 mia ecu og fra Japan til en værdi af 725 mio ecu (fig. 15)2).
Yet it imported from the United States 910 million ECU worth of equipment, and from Japan 984 million ECU worth (Figure 15).2
Efter 1986 har Japan overhalet USA som det land, over for hvilket EF har det største underskud på samhandelen med teleudstyr.
Since 1986, Japan has overtaken the United States as the country with which the Com munity has the largest deficit in telecommunications equipment trade.
Alle medlemsstater udviser et underskud, med Tyskland øverst på listen efterfulgt af Det Forenede Kongerige.
All Member States are in deficit, with the list being led by Germany first and the United Kingdom second.
2) Handelstallene, der er anvendt til beregning af disse varestrømme, inkluderer også komponenter brugt i telekommunikationssektoren.
Section 3. The trade aggregate used to calculate these trade flows also includes components used for telecommunica tions.
ADGANGEN TIL MARKEDERNE: EF's samhandel med USA og Japan i telekommunikationsudstyr
THE PROBLEM OF MARKET ACCESS: Europe's telecommunications equipment trade balance with Japan and the USA
Kilde: Undersøgelse udført af EF-Kommissionen
Source: CEC study
Den omstændighed, at alle medlemsstater udviser underskud — også selv om de enkelte landes lovgivning fortsat udviser meget forskellige grader af åbenhed mht. konkurrence — viser også, at regulering ikke kan bruges til at beskytte et lands industri mod konkurrence på verdensmarkedet.
There are signs that, based on their strong dynamic markets, the United States and Japan are poised to share out between them the lucrative new international telecommunications market, without European participation.
Der er tegn på, at USA og Japan som følge af deres stærke dynamiske markeder er ved at dele det lukrative nye internationale telekommunikationsmarked imellem sig, uden om Europa.
In 1986, the United States and Japan concluded an arrangement on future market development of integrated circuits, the centrepiece of the new information technology. '
I 1986 indgik USA og Japan aftale om den fremtidige markedsudvikling for de integrerede kredsløb, som er hovedhjørnestenen i den nye informationsteknologi ')· I foråret 1987 indgik USA og Japan en aftale om den fremtidige drift af internationale værdiforøgende tjenester.
In spring 1987 the United States and Japan concluded an agreement on the future operation of international valueadded services.
Men den internationale konkurrence vil blive hårdere og hårdere, mens debatten om fremtidens internationale telekommunikationsmiljø går videre.
But the international competition will become tougher, as the discussion on the future international environment for telecommunications proceeds.
En række nye konkurrenter venter i kulisserne: Taiwan, Korea, Hongkong og Singapore.
Other new entrants are waiting in the wings: Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore.
Ifølge statistikker fra USA's Handelsministerium var EF's andel af den amerikanske teleudstyrsimport allerede i 1984 faldet til 3,6% samtidig med, at Japans andel af den amerikanske import var på 51 %, Taiwans på 11,3% og Hongkongs på 7,3%.
According to statistics published by the US Department of Commerce, by 1984 the EC share of US telecommunications equipment imports had already dropped to 3.6%, com pared to a share of US imports from Japan of 51%, from Taiwan of 11.3% and Hong Kong of 7.3%.
Kun hvis EF står samlet, vil dets stemme veje tungt i afgørelsen af, hvorledes verdensmarkedet skal se ud i fremtiden.
Only united will Europe have a strong voice in the future shaping of the world market. ket.
Arven fra fortiden: Prisen for et splittet Europa
The legacy of the past : the cost of 'non-Europe' in more detail
EF's strategi i begyndelsen af 80'erne udviser imidlertid fortsat stor indflydelse fra den praksis, der havde etableret sig tidligere i forbindelse med opbygningen af telefonnettet i 70'erne2).
Nevertheless, strategies in Europe during the early 1980s continued to be influenced by the model of the past which had developed during the build-up of the telephone network of the 1970s.2 The traditional model in Europe is of a national champion, with planning centred principally on the national market — and with access to other networks and markets as an additional feature only.
Europæisk praksis bygger således i ikke ringe grad på en national favorisering af en planlægning koncentreret hovedsageligt om det nationale marked, dvs. således at adgangen til andre net og andre markeder kun opfattes som en biting.
In one of the tra ditional sectors of European strength — public switching systems — the cost structures were completely reversed by the 1980s. In 1970 software accounted for roughly 20% of the total R & D cost and hardware for 80%.
Digitaliseringen, og den dertil hørende nye transmissionsteknik såsom lyslederkabler og satellitter3), har medført en markant forøgelse af industriens F & U omkostninger.
A digital switching system now costs up to 1 000 million ECU in research and develop ment, with a life-cycle of hardly 10 years and with permanent expensive updating of the software which operates the system required.
På et af de områder, hvor Europa traditionelt har stået stærkt, nemlig offentlige centraler,
This compares to a total development cost of 15 to 20 million ECU for an electromechanical switching system in the early 1970s,
I 1970 udgjorde programmel ca. 20% af de samlede F & U omkostninger, mens maskinellet udgjorde 80%. I 1990 vil dette forhold være omvendt: Idet programmellet repræsente­rer 80% og maskinellet 20%.
with an expected life-cycle of 20 to 30 years and no major changes to the system during operation.
Der findes ikke noget enkelt EF­land, der har et telekommunikationsmarked (dvs. den traditionelle basis for de nationale fabrikanter), der udgør mere end 6 % af verdensmarkedet.
No national telecommunications market in the Com munity — the traditional base of national manufacturers — corresponds to more than 6% of the market.
Til trods for disse fundamentale forandringer i basisomkostninger gik europæisk industri 80'erne i møde uden at have omstillet sig til det europæiske marked.
But in spite of these fundamental changes in basic costs, the European industrial scene went into the 1980s without a reorientation towards the European market.
Den kortsigtede og uovervejede praksis med en national favorisering medførte, at der med store udgifter til følge blev udviklet otte digitalcentralsystemer i Europa, men kun 2 i Japan og 3 i USA (hvoraf 1 system, ITT­systemet — system 12 — i vid udstrækning også blev udviklet i Europa).
The simple continuation of the national champion model of the past led to the costly development of eight digital switching systems in Europe, against two in Japan and three in the United States (out of which one, the ITT system — System 12 — was also largely developed in Europe).
Den pris, der måtte betales herfor, var et spinkelt markedsgrundlag for nogle af systemerne samt dublering af arbejdet inden for forskning og udvikling.
The price to be paid was a fragile market base for some of these systems and duplication of research and development.
Mindre iøjnefaldende, men sandsynligvis endnu mere alvorlig, var den pris, som Europa måtte betale for sin splittelse inden for de fremvoksende nye tjenester.
Less obvious but probably even more serious was the cost of' non-Europe ' in the field of the emerging new services.
Den manglende koordinering i forbindelse med indførelsen af nye tjenester og omkostningerne ved i en senere fase at måtte skabe kompatibilitet mellem de nationale net har betydet, at nye tjenester er blevet indført med stor forsinkelse.
The lack of coordination during service introduction and the costly requirement of establishing compatibility ex post between national networks led to substantial delays in the introduction of new services.
Et illustrativt eksempel herpå var de vanskeligheder, man stødte på i forbindelse med indførelsen af offentlige pakkekoblede net i Europa, et ideelt transportnet for mange forskellige værdiforøgende tjenester (boks 18).
One major example was the difficulties encountered during the introduction of public packetswitching networks in Europe — an ideal carrier for many valueadded services (Box 18).
Sidst i 70'erne begyndte man at udvikle en ny type offentlige telenet i Europa, de såkaldte pakkekoblede offentlige datanet (Packet­switched pu blic data networks ­PSPDN).
In the late 1970s a new type of public telecommunications network started developing in Europe: packetswitched public data networks (PSPDNs).
Sådanne net giver en langt mere effektiv — og dermed billigere — datatransmission, end det er muligt med konventionel datatransmissionsteknik. missionsteknik.
They permit far more efficient, and therefore less expensive, data transmission than was ever possible with conventional techniques of data transmission.
Denne fordel kommer rigtigt frem ved transmission over større afstande: PSPDN-priserne er næsten uafhængige af afstanden, ¡det ekstraomkostningerne ved at transmittere over store afstande er minimal, fordi disse net udnytter langdistance-transmissionskapaciteten yderst effektivt.
This advantage comes into its own over long distances: costs for PSPDNs are nearly independent of distance, since the additional cost of transmitting over long distances is negligible as PSPDNs make extremely efficient use of trunk transmission capacity.
Det vil med andre ord sige, at denne teknologi har et ganske særligt potentiel ved kommunikation over Europas indre grænser.
A technology, therefore, with exceptional promise for trans-border com­munications in Europe.
Pakkekoblede tjenester vil blive yderligere styrket som et led i det tjenesteintegrerede digitalnet (ISDN).
Packetswitched services will also be offered at a future stage within the Integrated Services Digital Network, the ISDN.
Pakkekoblede datatjenester egner sig ideelt til sammenkobling af forskellige databaser og edb-centre i hele Europa samt konsultering af disse. Sådanne tjenester kan klart spille en stor rolle som katalysator for økonomiske og videnskabelige aktiviteter generelt.
Packetswitched data services are ideally suited for the interconnection of, and ready access to, different data bases and computer centres throughout Europe, which can clearly play an important role as a catalyst in overall economic and scientific activities.
Denne form for net egner sig glimrende som grundlag for værdiforøgende tjenester.
They are well suited to act as a basis for valueadded services.
I 70'erne tog Europa klart føringen inden for pakkekoblingsteknologi og -standarder.
During the 1970s, Europe took an early lead in the development of packetswitching technologies and standards.
Frankrig indførte sin Transpac-tjeneste, der sidenhen har udviklet sig til at blive Europas største pakkekoblede tjeneste.
France introduced its Transpac ser­vice which has developed, since then, into Europe's largest packet-switch­ing service.
Den grundlæggende standard for pakkekobling, den såkaldte X.25 standard, blev defineret af CCITT på europæisk initiativ.
The basic packetswitching X.25 standard was introduced in the CCITT on a European initiative.
I samme periode skete der en målbevidst europæisk indsats på området.
The same period saw a determined European effort in the field.
Kommissionen besluttede som led i sit program for informationsmarkedet ') at støtte udviklingen og implementeringen af Euronet, et ægte tværeuropæisk pakkekoblet net med koblings- og tilslutningsknudepunkter i de enkelte lande og et samlet europæisk netstyringscenter, der skulle give de forskellige abonnentinstitutioner og -organisationer rundt omkring i Europa adgang til en universel og homogen pakkekoblet tjeneste med afstands-uafhængige tjene ster.
The Com­mission decided, within the framework of its information market pro­gramme, 1to sponsor the development and implementation of Euronet, a true trans-European packetswitched network with switching or access nodes in each country and a single European network management centre, providing a universal and homogeneous packetswitched service between the different European subscriber institutions and organizations, and charg­ing distance-independent tariffs throughout Europe.
Euronet blev sat i drift i 1 980.
Euronet entered into service in 1980.
Sideløbende hermed begyndte de enkelte medlemsstater imidlertid selv at opbygge deres egne pakkekoblede net ud fra deres sædvanlige praksis, hvor vægten blev lagt på opbygning af nationale net.
However, in parallel, from the late 1970s onwards, each Member State started to implement its own national PSPDN, in the tradition of the focus on national network development.
Udbygningen af disse nationale pakkekoblede net fulgte imidlertid indbyrdes forskellige tidsplaner, forskellige kommercielle retningslinjer og prioriteter, og dette har ført til forskellige implementationer og givet vanskeligheder med hensyn til etableringen af en virkelig harmoniseret international pakkekoblet tjeneste af høj kvalitet.
The development of these national PSPDNs followed different time schedules, commercial policies and pri­orities, leading to different implementations and to difficulties in the provi­sion of truly harmonized, high quality, international packetswitched ser­vices.
I 1984 havde de fleste medlemsstater oprettet nationale pakkekoblede net og etableret kommercielle pakkekoblede tjenester.
By 1984, most Member States had implemented national PSPDNs and were offering commercial packetswitched services.
Euronet blev nu erstattet ved, at man mellem de enkelte landes nationale net oprettede diverse forbindelser, enten direkte eller gennem transitnet, med deraf følgende store problemer med manglende kompatibilitet.
Euronet was replaced by international services between national networks, provided through sev­eral interconnections, either directly or via transit networks but encounter­ing substantial problems of incompatibility.