natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvis man stillede krav herom, kunne dette medføre, at hverken Fællesskabet eller dets medlemsstater blev parter i en aftale, hvilket ville være i modstrid med et af de mål, der almindeligvis forfølges under forhandlingerne om multilaterale aftaler, nemlig at få så mange stater som muligt til at ratificere disse.
The answer to this question must be 'No'. Treaty law in fact admits that certain rules of the internal law of States and international organizations must be respected, as other wise their consent to be bound by international agreements could be completely value less.
Det er klart, at Fællesskaberne i lighed med andre internationale organisationer kun har begrænsede beføjelser, og at de følgelig ikke kan indgå en hvilken som helst internatio nal aftale.
It is against this background that consideration will now be given to the validity in in ternational law of obligations which have been imposed on the Communities in a number of cases, as a condition for their right to become party to an international agree ment.
Under disse omstændigheder henhører fortolkningen af de traktater, hvorved Fælles skabernes beføjelser er fastlagt, alene under Fællesskaberne, og folkeretskommissionens »udkast til artikler« inden for folkeretten om traktater mellem stater og internationale organisationer eller mellem to eller Here organisationer bekræfter, at disse organisationers beføjelser i forhold til tredjelande bestemmes ved deres »herom gældende regler« og deres »veletablerede praksis«.
Special consideration will be given to the case of international agreements which have subordinated the right of the Communities to declare their consent to be bound either to the condition that all their Member States, or at least the majority of them, have expressed their consent or to the condition that the Communities attach to the notification or deposit of their instrument of acceptance a declaration specifying the parts of the agreement in respect of which they have powers or to both conditions simultaneously.
I folkeretskommissionens udkast (artikel 26) hedder det dog (på samme måde som i artikel 26 i Wienerkonventionen om traktat retten), at enhver traktat, der gælder foren in ternationale organisation, skal opfyldes i god tro af denne. Denne forpligtelse kan ingen organisation påtage sig, dersom den har underskrevet en aftale, som den allerede fra før ste færd vidste, at den ikke havde faktisk eller retlig mulighed for at opfylde.
A - Compulsory joint participation by the Community and its Member States in international agreements
I øvrigt hedder det i artikel 46, stk. 3 i folkeretskommissionens udkast (på samme måde som i artikel 46 i Wiener-konventionen): »Den omstændighed, at en international organisations samtykke til at være bundet af en traktat er fremsat under overtrædelse af en bestemmelse i dens regler vedrørende kompetence til at indgå traktater, kan ikke påberåbes af organisationen som grund til at gøre samtykket ugyldigt, medmindre denne overtrædelse var åbenbar og vedrørte en regel af grundlæggende betydning«.
Jurists in some States consider that the answer to this question is 'Yes' and their in fluence is not unconnected with the fact that some multilateral agreements have embodied a clause subordinating EEC participation to the complementary participation of all its Member States (for example, the previously-mentioned 1973 Kyoto Convention on the simplification and harmonization of customs procedures) or of a majority of them (for example, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea).
Uden at tage afstand fra folkeretskommissionens forslag synes man at kunne hævde, at Fællesskabet uden støtte fra sine medlemsstater gyldigt kan deltage i aftaler, der delvis angår forhold, der klart falder uden for dets beføjelser.
The EEC and its Member States had themselves held the view that the 'mixed' agree ment procedure should be used for the conclusion of these agreements.
Det skulle så være tilstrækkeligt, at det samtidig med afgivelsen af sin erklæring om at være forpligtet ved en sådan aftale, erklærer, at forpligtelsen kun gælder de områder inden for aftalen, med hensyn til hvilke det er kompetent.
The only ques tion to arise during the negotiation of the said agreements was, therefore, whether this freely-made choice could legally be transformed into an international obligation.
Det kunne endda hævdes, at en sådan erklæring ikke er nødvendig.
Before considering this point, it may perhaps be useful to assess the practical consequences of the solution adopted for the agreements just mentioned.
Man kan nemlig mene, at de stater, der har deltaget i forhandlingen om en international aftale, ved at acceptere Fællesskabet som deltager i denne, »ipso facto« har anerkendt, at dette kun kunne påtage sig rettigheder og forpligtelser inden for de områder i aftalen, som ikke klart falder uden for dets kompetence.
It is always difficult for a State to say, at a time when negotiations for an international agreement have not been completed, whether or not it will ratify the agreement in ques tion.
Dette ville også gælde, hvis staterne for deres vedkommende var forpligtet til at acceptere samtlige bestemmelser i aftalen eller kun kunne gøre deres accept betinget af forbehold, som f.eks. at deres deltagelse i aftalen under alle omstændigheder omfatter større områder end Fællesskabets deltagelse.
It is even more difficult to obtain such an indication from 10 States which have not only to decide whether they will participate in the agreement, in their own right or whether the Community should also be included.
At en sådan forpligtelse eventuelt ikke blev udfyldt af en forpligtelse for medlemsstater ne, ville ikke være uforeneligt med det i aftalen fastlagte system med hensyn til forbehold. hold.
The intention or wish of these States to be individual parties to the agreement and the intention and wish that the Community should participate may be based on different considerations and it would appear difficult to demand that they commit themselves, in advance, to linking the two operations. tions.
Disse stater gjorde gældende, at hvis forpligtelserne ikke blev gjort indbyrdes afhængige, kunne EØF' medlemsstater opnå en gunstigere stilling end de øvrige stater, efter som disse på grund af den meget begrænsede karakter af de forbehold, der kan tages ifølge konventionen, kun har adgang til at gå ind på den eller forkaste den som helhed.
Insistence that they should do so might have the result that neither the Community nor its Member States would become party to the agreement, which would be contrary to one of the aims generally pursued in the negotiation of multilateral agreements, which is to have them ratified by as many States as possible.
For at gardere sig mod denne risiko krævede de pågældende stater og gennemførte i øvrigt også, at reglen om, at EØF og dets medlemsstater kun kan deltage som enhed, blev indføjet i selve konventionsteksten (bilag IX, artikel 2).
It is clear that, like other international organizations, the Communities have only limit ed powers and are therefore not entitled to conclude any and every international agree ment.
Hvis man betragter Fællesskaberne som internationale organisationer med status som juridiske personer og beføjelser der er helt selvstændige i forhold til deres medlemsstaters, og med evne til selvstændig deltagelse i internationale aftaler, er det utvivlsomt uberettiget ikke at betragte dem som »fuldgyldige« parter og underkaste deres udøvelse af deres rettigheder til at deltage i aftaler den betingelse, at deres medlemsstater samtidig skal deltage.
Furthermore, the draft produced by the International Law Commission (Article 46.3) provides (like Article 46 of the Vienna Convention) that 'the fact that the consent of an international organization to be bound by a treaty was given in breach of a provision of the organization's rules regarding powers to conclude treaties cannot be invoked by the organization as invalidating its consent, unless such breach was obvious and involves a rule of fundamental importance'.
Hvis man derimod finder, at Fællesskaberne, selv om de tilhører kategorien internatio nale organisationer, sammen med deres medlemsstater udgør uadskillelige bestanddele af et samlet hele, der alene kan påtage sig samtlige rettigheder og forpligtelser ifølge en aftale, kan det være berettiget at kræve, at alle de folkeretlige retssubjekter, der danner denne helhed, underskriver i fællesskab og i givet fald tillige ratificerer (eller accepterer) aftalen.
Without departing from the proposals of the International Law Commission it would appear that it can be argued that, even without the support of its Member States, the Community could validly participate in agreements partly dealing with matters clearly outside its competence.
I dette tilfælde ville det ikke være tilstrækkeligt blot at betinge Fællesskabernes ret til deltagelse af, at deres medlemsstater tillige deltog.
It would be enough for the Community to attach to its declara tion of consent to be bound by such an agreement a statement specifying that its consent covers only matters in the agreement for which it is competent.
Man måtte tillige gøre med lemsstaternes deltagelse afhængig af, at også Fællesskaberne deltog.
Such a declaration might not even be necessary.
Der er således efter vor opfattelse gode argumenter for både at bekæmpe og forsvare den opfattelse, at en pligt for Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater til sammen at deltage i in ternationale aftaler, der ikke helt er dækket af Fællesskabets beføjelser, opfylder et folkeretligt krav.
And this would apply even if the States were, on their side, required to accept the whole of the agreement or could only restrict their acceptance by reservations such that their participation in the said agreement would, in any case, extend to matters wider than those covered by the Community's commitment.
Man kan under alle omstændigheder anføre, at den løsning, der blev valgt i forbindelse med havretskonventionen af 1982 (bilag IX, artikel 2) er et lidet tilfredsstillende kom promis, eftersom den dels er begrænset til kun at betinge EØF' deltagelse af, at dets medlemsstater tillige deltager, men ikke betinger medlemsstaternes deltagelse af, at Fællesskabet tillige deltager, og dels kun betinger Fællesskabets deltagelse af, at en flerhed af dets medlemsstater deltager, og i øvrigt bestemmer (bilag IX, artikel 8 c ii), at EØF fortsat kan være part i konventionen så længe blot ét af dets medlemsstater er part.
In the course of the negotiations which raised the question of EEC participation in the future Convention on the Law of the Sea,' a view opposite to that just stated was main tained by States which were in favour of establishing a compulsory link between participation by the EEC and by its Member States.
Efter vor opfattelse er disse bestemmelser meningsløse, idet EØF's manglende beføjelser til alene at deltage i en international aftale som f.eks. havretskonventionen kun kan afhjælpes ved at samtlige dets medlemsstater tillige deltager.
The States in question argued that, in the absence of such a link, the Member States of the EEC might find themselves in a privileged position in relation to the other States, because in view of the very limited nature of the reservations allowed by that convention, they would only be able to accept or reject it en bloc.
Bestemmelserne imødekommer desuden kun ufuldstændigt et ønske, der var blevet udtalt af visse delegationer under forhandlingerne om konventionen, om ikke at give de af dets medlemsstater, der ikke ratificerede konventionen, mulighed for at benytte EØF's deltagelse til uretmæssigt at drage fordel af de bestemmelser i konventionen, der hører under Fællesskabets beføjelser, uden at være forpligtet på linje med de øvrige stater til at overholde de øvrige be stemmelser i aftalen.
By having the EEC participate in the convention and by refraining from ratifying themselves, the Member States would be able to choose to assume only some of the rights and obligations provided for in the convention, which would be con trary to the nature of the package deal it comprised.
Under disse omstændigheder finder vi ikke, at havretskonventionen danner noget skoleeksempel på reguleringen af spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt det eren folkeretlig nødvendig hed, at både Fællesskaberne og deres medlemsstater skal deltage i forening.
To forestall this risk, the States in question sought and obtained agreement for the principle of compulsory joint participation by the EEC and its Member States to be embodied in the text of the convention (Annex IX, Article 2).
B. Fællesskabets meddelelse om de områder indenfor en international aftale, på hvilke det er kompetent
It in fact raises the whole question of the nature of the European Communities in relation to the categories of international law.
Når det er fastslået, at en international aftale skal eller bør tiltrædes af både Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater, ytrer de øvrige stater ofte ønske om at få klart oplyst, hvilke
On this point, see, in particular J.F. Buhl, 'The European Economic Community and the Law of the Sea', Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 11, Nos 3-4,1982, pp. 181-200.
Dette ønske, som i sig selv er helt legitimt, har fundet stærkt udtryk i forbindelse med forhandlingen om adskillige aftaler og har medført, at visse stater har krævet, at bestemmelsen om Fællesskabets deltagelse i disse aftaler skulle suppleres med en pligt for Fæl lesskabet til ved deponeringen af eller meddelelsen om sin tiltrædelsesakt at give en for tegnelse over de bestemmelser i aftalerne, der omhandler forhold, der falder ind under dets kompetenceområde.
If they are deemed to be international organizations with legal personality and powers wholly distinct from those of their Member States, and to be capable of participating independently in international agreements, it is unquestionably not legitimate not to regard them as being 'full' parties and to subordinate their right to participate in such agreements to simultaneous participation by their Member States.
Fællesskabets standpunkt vedrørende det første forhold støttes af de af folkeretskommissionen foreslåede bestemmelser, ifølge hvilke omfanget af en international organisations beføjelser fastlægges ved de akter, hvorved den er oprettet og dens »veletablerede praksis«.
If it is considered, conversely, that by their inclusion in the category of international or ganization, the Communities together with their Member States, constitute a single en tity made up of inseparable components, alone capable of assuming all the rights and obligations stipulated by an agreement, it may be legitimate to require that all subjects of international law forming that entity should jointly sign and, if necessary, ratify (or accept) the agreement.
Vedrørende det andet punkt må den af Fællesskabet anførte begrundelse ses på bag grund af, at dets beføjelser formentlig vil blive stadig mere udstrakte, således at en for tegnelse over disse pr. en given dato meget vel kan blive unøjagtig med tiden.
In that case, it would not be sufficient to subordinate participation by the Communities to that of their Member States; the latters' participation would also have to be subordinated to that of the Communities.
Yderligere ville det være en forudsætning for oprettelse af en sådan fortegnelse, at man kunne forlige medlemsstaternes divergerende opfattelser med hensyn til Fællesskabets beføjelsers nøjagtige omfang, hvilket er lidet realistisk og iøvrigt meget vel kan medføre, at man ikke længere kan benytte sig af den fordel, der ofte ligger for Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater i fremgangsmåden med »blandede aftaler«, der jo netop gør det muligt for dem at undgå at udtale sig om dette vanskelige spørgsmål.
We consider, therefore, that there are good arguments both for contesting and defending the thesis that the obligation laid on the Community and its Member States to participate jointly in international agreements not wholly covered by the Community's powers is a requirement of international law.
For at imødekomme legitime ønsker fra visse staters side har Fællesskabet flere gange foreslået, at det i stedet for at påtage sig den efter dets opfattelse for vidtgående og urealistiske forpligtelse til at levere en fuldstændig fortegnelse over sine beføjelser med hensyn til de i en international aftale omhandlede områder, skulle give stater, der måtte ønske det, oplysning om omfanget af dets rettigheder og forpligtelser i nøje angivne tilfælde. Dette forslag har navnlig angået tilfælde af tvister med de pågældende stater.
In any case, it may be observed that the solution adopted in the case of the 1982 Con vention on the Law of the Sea (Annex IX, Article 2) constitutes an unsatisfactory compromise since, firstly, it confines itself to linking EEC participation with that of its Member States but does not subordinate the latters' participation to participation by the EEC and, secondly, it requires only that EEC participation shall be combined with that of a majority of its Member States, and moreover accepts that the EEC may remain party to the convention at least so long as at least one of its Member States also does so (Annex IX, Article 8 (c) (ii)).
Et modforslag af denne karakter blev navnlig fremsat under forhandlingerne om ovennævnte konvention af 1979 om beskyttelse af nukleare materialer, anlæg og transporter og havretskonventionen af 1982.
In our view such provisions have little meaning, because any lack of competence on the part of the EEC to participate alone in an international agreement such as the Convention on the Law of the Sea can validly be made good but by the additional participation of its Member States.
Det blev imidlertid ikke vedtaget og de to konventioner bestemmer nu, at Fællesskabet skal tilkendegive sine beføjelser på de områder, der er omhandlet i begge disse traktater.
In addition, such provisions do not completely satisfy the point argued by certain delegations during the negotiations on the convention, namely that Member States which did not ratify the convention should not be allowed the possibility of using EEC participation as an indirect method of benefiting from the provisions of the convention falling within the competence of the Community, without being re quired, like the other States, to assume the obligations stipulated in the other provisions of the agreement.
nukleare materialer, anlæg og transporter, der henhørte under Euratom's beføjelser, og hvilke der henhørte under dets medlemsstaters beføjelser (').
Β - Notification by the Community of matters in an international agreement for which it is competent
Desuden har EØF udtrykkeligt understreget, at »udøvelsen af beføjelser, som medlemsstaterne i medfør af traktaterne har overført til Fællesskabet, ifølge sagens natur stadig vil udvikle sig. Derfor forbeholder Fællesskabet sig ret til at fremkomme med nye deklarationer senere.
When it is seen that an international agreement will or should be accepted by both the Community and its Member States, other States often indicate that they wish to be in­formed exactly how the matters covered by the agreement fall within the respective competence of the Community and its Member States.
Afsnit 5: Fællesskabets deltagelse i institutioner, der har til opgave at gennemføre og administrere internationale aftaler, hvori Fællesskabet er part
This concern, which is in itself completely legitimate, has been expressed in strong terms during the negotiations for several agreements and has led a number of States to demand that the clause on Community participation in those agreements should make it obligatory for the Community to submit, when depositing or notifying its instrument of acceptance, a list of the provisions of those agreements which deal with matters within its sphere of competence.
Fællesskabet påtager sig i almindelighed i det omfang og med de midler, der er til dets rådighed, samme rettigheder og forpligtelser som stater i medfør af de aftaler, hvori det er part.
The Community has so far refused to accept such an obligation arguing, firstly, that it would constitute interference in its internal affairs and, secondly, that it could not be properly implemented.
Der er imidlertid et område, hvor det af og til ikke står på helt lige fod med stater. Det drejer sig om dets deltagelse i de institutioner, som det påhviler at gennemføre og admi nistrere aftalerne.
On thejirst point, the Community's position finds support in the text proposed by the International Law Commission, under the terms of which the extent of an international organization's powers depends on its 'constitutive instruments' and 'its established practice'.
Ved en række internationale aftaler, i hvilke Fællesskabet er blevet part, er der nemlig oprettet organer, der skal gennemføre og administrere bestemmelserne i aftalerne.
On the second point, the Community's argument is based on the fact that the extent of its powers is likely to change, so that any list which might be provided at a given time would be liable to be wrong some time later.
Dette gælder navnlig de fleste af de bilaterale aftaler, som Fællesskabet har indgået med tredjelande, og særlig handelsaftaler, der er indgået alene af Fællesskabet, samt associerings- og samarbejdsaftaler, der både er indgået af Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater (se s. 66 og 68 ovf.).
Moreover, the establishment of such a list would presuppose that the differences of view between Member States as to the exact extent of the Community's international powers had been resolved and this would appear to be a highly unrealistic assumption; further­more, it would be liable to destroy the advantage frequently offered to the Community and its Member States by the procedure of the 'mixed' agreement, which precisely avoids their having to decide on this difficult issue.
Ved disse aftaler er der under forskellige betegnelser (blandede komitéer, associeringsråd, samarbejdsråd m.v.) oprettet forvaltningsorganer, hvoraf Fællesskabet og i givet fald tillige dets medlemsstater naturligvis er fødte medlemmer.
In response to the legitimate concern expressed by certain States, the Community has several times proposed that, instead of what it regards as the excessive and unrealistic obligation to supply a complete list of its powers in respect of matters covered by an in­ternational agreement, it should provide States so wishing with information concerning the extent of the rights and obligations which it is assuming in clearly specified cases.
Fællesskabets deltagelse i disse organer har ikke hidtil givet anledning til problemer af folkeretlig karakter.
This proposal was directed in particular to the case of a dispute with the States in ques­tion.
Det synes hensigtsmæssigt her at fremdrage visse af de vanskeligheder, som dette spørgsmål har givet anledning til, og de løsninger, man har valgt.
consequence that both these conventions require the Community to declare its powers in the matters covered by each of them.
At der tillægges Fællesskabet status som medlem af forvaltningsorganerne inden for af taler, som det er deltager i, har almindeligvis ikke voldt særlige problemer.
In the second case, that of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the EEC has made a declaration specifying the fields in which it has exclusive competence pursuant to express provisions of the Treaty or as the result of the adoption of'common rules'.
Det er dog forekommet, at dette spørgsmål ikke har været reguleret klart ved den i aftalen indsatte bestemmelse om Fællesskabets deltagelse.
In ad dition, the EEC has been at pains to point out that 'the exercise of the competence that the Member States have transferred to the Community under the Treaties is, by its very nature, subject to continuous development.
Dette gælder f.eks. den pågældende bestemmelse i havretskonventionen af 1982 ('), der intet siger om hvorvidt EØF som part i konventionen skal være medlem af Myndigheden (2) eller kan blive medlem af dets or ganer (Forsamlingen, Rådet m.v.).
As a result, the Community reserves the right to make new declarations at a later date.'