natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
4) Dom af 12.12.1974. sag 36/74, Walrave, Sml. 1974, s. 1405, præmis 21-25.
Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] ECR 1405, at p.
117 kollektivt regulerer arbejdslønnen, og for aftaler mellem private« ').
Page 117
Denne »horisontale virkning«, der ikke vedrører forholdet mellem myndighed og borger (den »vertikale virkning«), men derimod for holdet mellem borgerne indbyrdes, og som EF-Domstolen tillagde Traktatens bestemmelser, giver en ny dimension til princippet om den direkte virkning, således som dette er blevet forstået siden Van Gend & Loos-dommen. 101.
This recognition by the Court that provisions of the Treaty could have direct effect in the horizontal relations between individuals, as well as in the vertical relations between the individual and the State, gave a new dimension to the doctrine of direct effect as it had been understood since the Van Gend & Loos judgment. 101.
Der findes naturligvis også bestemmelser, som EF-Domstolen ikke har villet tillægge direkte virkning.
There are of course provisions that the Court has found not to be directly effective.'
Det er ikke uden interesse at undersøge denne retspraksis med henblik på modsætningsvis at fast lægge kriterierne for en sådan virkning mere præcist4).
It is interesting to look at these cases for the light they throw a contrario on the criteria that must be met for direct effect to be present.
I Costa/ENEL-sagen afviste Domstolen at artikel 102 og artikel 93, med undtagelse af sidste punktum i sidstnævnte artikels stk. 3, har direkte virkning.
In Costa ν ENEL, the Court refused to recognize direct effect in Article 102 and Article 93, with the exception of the last sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 93.
Ifølge artikel 102 skal en medlemsstat rådføre sig med Kommissionen, når der er grund til at frygte, at indførelse af en lovbestemmelse kan fremkalde en »konkurrencefordrejning«.
Article 102 requires Member States to consult the Commission before introducing new or amended legislation which there is reason to fear could cause a distortion of competition.
Efter Domstolens opfattelse har medlemsstaterne således over for Fællesskabet påtaget sig »en forpligtelse, der binder dem i deres egenskab af stater, men som ikke medfører rettigheder for borgerne, som de nationale retsinstanser skal beskytte«.
The Court found that by this clause the Member States had undertaken an obligation to the Community which binds them as States, but which does not create individual rights which national courts must protect.
Endvidere har medlemsstaterne, ved at have accepteret i god tid at underrette Kommissionen om deres påtænkte støtteforanstaltninger og ved at underkaste sig procedurerne i artikel 93, indgået en forpligtelse, som Domstolen kvalificerer i samme vendinger som for artikel 102, »dog ikke med hensyn til den sidste bestemmelse i stk. 3 i nævnte artikel, som denne sag ikke angik« 5).
Similarly, by undertaking to inform the Commission before granting aid and by accepting the procedures laid down for this purpose in Article 93, the States had entered into an obligation with the Community which likewise did not create individual rights, except the final sentence of Article 93(3), which, however, was not at issue in the case.2
') Dom af 8.4.1976, sag 43/75, Defrenne II, Sml. 1976, s. 455, præmis 39.
Thus the direct effect of the prohibition extends to all aid which has been implemented without being notified and, in the event of notification, operates during the preliminary period, and where the
Forholdet til national ret
Relationship to national law
I artikel 93, stk. 3, sidste punktum, forbydes det medlemsstaterne at yde en støtte, før Kommissionen har afsluttet sin undersøgelse af den påtænkte foranstaltning.
Commission sets in motion the contentious procedure, up to the final decision.'1
Man mente, at det af denne retspraksis kunne udledes, at medlemssta ternes rent proceduremæssige forpligtelser kun vedrørte forholdet mellem staterne og Fællesskabet og således ikke havde direkte virkning.
In other words, a private firm or individual could challenge a Member State's failure to notify a new aid measure to the Commission in the national courts.
I en dom af 13. juli 1989 redegjorde Domstolen for sine synspunkter vedrørende de følger, det har for borgerne, at en med lemsstat tilsidesætter en proceduremæssig forpligtelse.
In a judgment handed down in 1989 the Court clarified the position regarding non-compliance with another type of procedural obligation.
Det drejede sig i den pågældende sag om et direktiv om forebyggelse og bortskaffelse af affald, ifølge hvilket medlemsstaterne var forpligtet til rettidigt at underrette Kommissionen om udkast til de bestemmelser, de havde til hensigt at vedtage på dette område.
The case concerned a 1975 directive on the prevention and disposal of waste. This required the Member States to communicate proposed legislation in this area to the Commission in advance.
Domstolen påpegede, at direktivet hverken fastlagde nogen procedure for fællesskabskontrol af disse udkast eller gjorde de påtænkte bestemmelsers ikrafttræden afhængig af Kommissionens godkendelse eller stiltiende samtykke.
The Court noted that the directive did not say how the Community authorities were to proceed in checking the draft legislation or require that the Commission must have approved it or not raised any objection to it before it could be implemented.
Forpligtelsen til underretning hænger udelukkende sammen med nødvendigheden af at kunne vurdere behovet for, at der på fællesskabsplan træffes harmoniseringsforanstaltninger samt af at undersøge, om de påtænkte bestemmelser er forenelige med fællesskabsretten.
The obligation to communicate draft legislation was imposed solely to enable the Commission to assess whether it was necessary to adopt harmonization measures and to scrutinize the drafts to see whether or not they were in conformity with Community law.
Domstolen konkluderede, at hverken ordlyden eller formålet med den pågældende bestemmelse giver grund til at antage, at en medlemsstats tilsidesættelse af forpligtelsen til forudgående underretning i sig selv medfører, at de således trufne bestemmelser er ulovlige 2).
The Court concluded: 'Neither the words nor the purpose of the provision support the view that a Member State's failure to observe the obligation to notify proposed legislation in advance entails of itself the illegality of the legislation thus enacted. '2
Der er således en tydelig forskel fra den ordning, der er omhandlet i artikel 93, stk. 3.
The difference between this provision and that in Article 93(3) of the EEC Treaty is clear.
Eksistensen af skønsbeføjelser for institutionerne og medlemsstaterne er uforenelige med den direkte virkning.
For this reason, the Court does not recognize the right of a private party to challenge an existing aid measure in his national court.
) Dom af 11.12.1973, sag 120/73, Sml. 1973, s. 1471, præmis 8. )
Case 120/73 [1973] ECR 1471, at p.
Dom af 13.7.1989, sag 380/87, Etlichem Base, Montedipe, Solvay o.a./Comune de Cinisello Balsamo, endnu ikke offentliggjort i Sml.; jf. dog dom af 18.2.1986, sag 174/84, Bulk OU, Sml.
Case 380/87 Etlichem and Others ν Comune de Cinisello Balsamo, not yet reported in ECR (paragraphs 19-22).
1986, især side 594, præmis 62.
See also the earlier judgment in Case 174/84 Bulk Oil [1986]
Det var ligeledes eksistensen af skønsbeføjelser, denne gang ikke for institutionerne men for medlemsstaterne, som førte til, at EF-Domstolen afviste en direkte virkning for artikel 32 (sidste punktum) og artikel 33 vedrørende toldkontingenter2) såvel som for artikel 97 vedrørende medlemsstaternes beføjelser til at fastsætte gennemsnitssatser med henblik på at afbøde virkningerne af visse diskriminerende kumulative flerledsafgifter3). Denne retspraksis har ikke længere betydning for så vidt angår det første tilfælde som følge af overgangsperiodens udløb, og for så vidt angår det andet som følge af indførelsen af merværdiafgift (moms), der træder i stedet for den kumulative flerledsafgift.
It was also because of the discretion that the provisions allowed to those responsible for applying them, in this case not the Community institutions but national governments, that the Court denied direct effect to Articles 32 (last sentence) and 33, on the abolition of quotas in intra-Community trade,' and Article 97, which permitted Member States to charge average rates of multi-stage sales tax on imports as a means of removing discrimination from such tax systems.2 The issues that were at stake in these cases are no longer relevant now that the transitional period for the removal of trade barriers has long since ended and VAT has been introduced in place of multi-stage sales taxes.
Men det anvendte kriterium, nemlig at der foreligger en skønsbeføjelse, har stadigvæk gyldighed.
But the criterion eliminating direct effect, namely the existence of discretion, is still valid.
Af samme grund afviste EF-Domstolen, at artikel 67 om frie kapitalbevægelser har direkte virkning.
For the same reason the Court denied direct effect to Article 67 on the free movement of capital.
Domstolen udtalte, at artikel 67, stk. 2, »har fået en anden formulering end bestemmelserne om den frie bevægelighed for varer, personer og tjenesteydelser, og kun opstiller en forpligtelse til at liberalisere kapitalbevægelserne 'i det omfang, det er nødvendigt for fællesmarkedets tilfredsstillende funktion'.
It noted that Article 67(1) differs from the provisions on the free movement of goods, persons and services in the sense that there is an obligation to liberalize capital movements only 'to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market'.
Denne begrænsning, der også gælder efter overgangsperiodens udløb, virker med forskellig styrke til forskellige tider, afhængig af, hvorledes fællesmarkedets behov og fordele og ulemper ved en liberalisering vurderes på baggrund af dets øjeblikkelige situation og navnlig det opnåede integrationsniveau på områder, for hvilke kapitalbevægelserne har særlig betydning«4).
The scope of that restriction, which remained in force after the expiry of the transitional period, varies in time and depends on an assessment of the requirements of the common market and on an appraisal of both the advantages and risks which liberalization might entail for the latter, having regard to the stage it has reached and, in particular, to the level of integration attained in matters in respect of which capital movements are particularly signif icant.3It was therefore for the Council to determine the need to liberalize a particular category of capital movements.
Det tilkom Rådet at vurdere, på hvilke områder det var nødvendigt med en liberalisering af kapitalbevægelserne.
The Council had so far not seen a need to liberalize restrictions on the export of banknotes, the offence of which the defendant was charged.
Rådet havde ikke indtil da fundet, at en liberalisering af udførslen af pengesedler, som Guerrino Casati var tiltalt for, udgjorde en sådan nødvendighed.
Consequently, the Court held that restrictions on this category of operation could not be considered to be illegal after the end of the transitional period.
Begrænsningerne i sådanne kapitalbevægelser kunne altså ikke anses for afskaffet.
This situation has been changed by Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988.
') Z«mii?///-dommen, jf. ovenfor, præmis 11 og 12.
In this connection judgments can be cited concerning the powers of the Community in the monetary sphere.
) Dom af 3.4.1968, sag 28/67, Molkerei-Zentrale. Sml. 1965-1968, s. 481. )
Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 453, at p. 461.
Dom af 11.11.1981, sag 203/80, Casati, Sml.
Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, at p.
1981, s. 2595 ff, navnlig s. 2614, præmis 10.
2614 (paragraph 10). OJ L 178, 8.7.1988, p. 5.
Domstolen fik forelagt spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt artikel 5 og artikel 107 i Traktaten såvel som resolutionen af 22. marts 1971 fra Rådet og repræsentanterne for medlemsstaternes regeringer vedrørende den etapevise gennemførelse af Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union skulle fortolkes som inde holdende et forbud mod, at medlemsstaterne lod deres valutaer flyde.
Relationship to national law was asked whether Articles 5 and 107 of the Treaty and the resolution which the Council and representatives of the Member States' Govern ments had adopted on 22 March 1971 on the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union should be interpreted as prohibiting Member States from allowing their currencies to float.
Efter at have fastslået, at »et af Traktatens vigtigste formål er skabelsen af et økonomisk enhedsområde frit for interne hindringer, hvori Toldunionen og Den Økonomiske Union gradvis skal realiseres«, og at »dette formål kræver faste forhold mellem de forskellige medlemsstaters valutaer«, og at »artikel 3, litra g), foreskriver til dette formål, at man anvender fremgangsmåder, der gør det muligt at samordne medlemsstaternes økonomiske politik og modvirke ulige vægt på deres betalingsbalancer«, konstaterede EF-Domstolen, at »så længe de i denne bestemmelse foreskrevne fremgangsmåder ikke er iværksat, har medlemsstaterne ifølge artiklerne 5 og 107, for så vidt angår den enkelte stats forpligtelse til at behandle sin valutapolitik som et spørgsmål af fælles interesse, en beslutningsfrihed, som for hindrer, at den i artiklerne 5 og 107 indeholdte forpligtelse skaber rettigheder for Fællesskabets borgere, som det påhviler de nationale domstole at beskytte« 2).
Although noting that 'one of the cardinal aims of the Treaty is to create a single economic region, free from internal restrictions, in which economic and'customs union may be progressively achieved', that 'this requires the parities between the currencies of the various Member States to remain fixed', and that 'Article 3(g) provides for the procedures to be followed in order to coordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy any disequilibria in their balances of payments', the Court nevertheless held that 'until the procedures envisaged by this provision have been put into operation, Articles 5 and 107 allow Member States, despite the duty imposed on each of them to regard its policy on rates of exchange as a matter of common concern, such freedom of decision that the obligation contained in these Articles 5 and 107 cannot confer on interested parties rights which the national courts would be bound to protect'.' tect'.'
I Defrenne //-dommen sondrede Domstolen mellem direkte diskrimination, der kan konstateres alene ved hjælp af de i artikel 119 opstillede kriterier (»lige løn ... for samme arbejde«), og indirekte diskrimination, som kun kan afskaffes ved hjælp af egnede fællesskabsforanstaltninger og nationale foranstaltninger.
In Defrenne II the Court distinguished between direct discrimination which could be established solely by reference to the criteria of Article 119 (equal pay for equal work) and indirect discrimination which could only be combated by appropriate Community and national legislation.
Ifølge Domstolen er forbuddet mod direkte diskrimination »i det mindste« egnet til at finde direkte anvendelse3).
The Court held that Article 119 was directly applicable at least where direct discrimination against women in the form of lower pay for the same work could be established.2It went on to say in
I Defrenne III-dommen konstaterede Domstolen, at da der ikke er truffet bestemmelser til gennemførelse af artikel 117 og 118, hvis karakter af ren programerklæring understreges, kan den ikke fortolke artikel 119 som
Defrenne III, however, that in the absence of legislation to give effect to Articles 117 and 118, whose manifesto-like character it emphasized, it was impossible to regard the direct effect of Article 119 as extending to discrimination in other terms and conditions of employment.3
1973. s. 1135, præmis 38 og 39.
Case 9/73 Schlüter [1973] ECR 1135, at pp. 1160-1161 (paragraphs 38-39).
3) Den førnævnte dom, Defrenne II, præmis 19 og 24.
Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455, at pp. 473-474 (paragraphs 19 and 24).
121 værende en bestemmelse, der foruden lige løn også fastsætter ensartede arbejdsbetingelser ').
Page 121
Forordninger
(ii) Regulations
Forordninger gælder ifølge artikel 189, stk. 2, umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.
As already noted, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, regulations are directly applicable in all Member States.
Da de er umiddelbare retskilder i medlemsstaterne, kan de både have »vertikal virkning« og »horisontal virkning«, et forhold, der et gjort nærmere rede for i forbindelse med Traktatens bestemmelser.
They are thus a direct source of rights for individuals in both the vertical and horizontal senses which have just been described in relation to provisions of the Treaties.
Ved en formulering, som herefter skulle forblive uforandret, anerkendte Domstolen i en dom af 14. december 1971 2), efter at have henvist til ordlyden i artikel 189, stk. 2, at
In a wording repeated verbatim in many later decisions the Court held in the Politi judgment,' after recalling the terms of the second paragraph of Article 189, that:
»det er en følge af enhver forordnings karakter og funktion i Fællesskabets retskildesystem, at den har umiddelbare virkninger og som sådan er egnet til at give borgerne rettigheder, som de nationale retter skal beskytte«.
'Therefore, by reason of their nature and their function in the system of the sources of Community law, regulations have direct effect and are, as such, capable of creating individual rights which national courts must protect.'
Meget ofte drejede det sig om forordningsbestemmelser vedrørende de fælles landbrugsordninger, hvis indhold var nært beslægtet med de bestemmelser i Traktaten, som vedrører Toldunionen, og hvis direkte virkning Domstolen har fastslået.
Many of the cases in which the direct effect of regulations was raised concerned regulations establishing common agricultural market regimes which were similar in content to the provisions of the Treaty on the customs union, whose direct effect the Court had recognized.
Orsolina Leonesio, en italiensk landbruger, havde slagtet et antal køer og krævede i den anledning forgæves den italienske stat for udbetaling af de præmier, som fællesskabsforordningerne gav hende ret til.
Mrs Leonesio, an Italian farmer, had slaughtered cows for which she was eligible for a subsidy under Community regulations.
Den italienske stat henviste til den i forfatningens artikel 81 indeholdte forpligtelse, hvorefter der kræves lovhjemmel til udbetaling af de omhandlede præmier.
The Government had refused to pay her the subsidy on the ground that it was obliged by Article 81 of the Italian Constitution to pass legislation before it could do so.
Domstolen fastslog, at så snart de i disse forordninger indeholdte betingelser er opfyldt og ved udløbet af den frist, der begynder at løbe, når bevis for slagtning foreligger, »har de nævnte forordninger skabt en ret for landbrugeren til at kræve præmien betalt, og den pågældende medlemsstat kan ikke modsætte sig betalingen under henvisning til sin lovgivning eller administrative praksis«.
The Court held that, once the conditions laid down by the regulations had been met and the period allowed for paying the subsidy after the furnishing of evidence of slaughter had elapsed, the abovementioned regulations give the farmer the right to require payment of the subsidy without that Member State's being able to rely on arguments based on any legislative provisions or administrative practices to withhold such payment.
Domstolen udtalte, at »for at fællesskabsforordningerne kan have samme bindende virkning for borgerne i alle medlemsstater,
It pointed out that so as to apply with equal force with regard to nationals of all the Member States, Community regulations become part of the legal system applicable within the national territory, which must permit the direct effect provided for in Article 189 to operate in such a way that reliance thereon by individuals may not be frustrated by domestic provisions or practices, and that budgetary provisions of a Member State cannot hinder the direct applicability of a Community provision and consequently of the exercise of individual rights created by such a provision.2
') Den førnævnte dom, Defrenne III. præmis 12-24. 2) Sag 43/71, Politi, Sml. 1971, s. 321.
The ruling in Leonesio was, of course, an application of the principle of the supremacy of Community over national law, be the national law in question of a constitutional nature. As such it was in line with
Der var her helt klart tale om anvendelse af princippet om fællesskabs rettens forrang for national ret, selv når denne følger af en forfatningsbestemmelse. Leonesio-dommen ligger hermed på linje med den retspraksis, som Domstolen har fulgt siden Coslaj EN EL-dommen.
Relationship to national law the settled case-law of the Court since Costa ν ENEL.
Det skal dog nævnes, at det her drejede sig om gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, som ikke bidrog til at fastlægge borgerens ret.
It should be noted, however, that in this case the implementing legislation was not needed to establish what the rights of individuals were.
Hvis nationale eller fællesskabsretlige bestemmelser derimod er nødvendige for at fastlægge borgerens rettigheder, kan fællesskabsreglerne ikke påberåbes, før sådanne gennemførelsesforanstaltninger er truffet.
If further national or Community legislation is necessary to determine the extent of individuals' rights, the basic regulations cannot be invoked to claim those rights until the legislation has been passed.
Det samme gælder med hensyn til nationale love, som forudsætter udstedelse af gennemførelsesforanstaltninger.
This, of course, is also true of national legislation when it provides for certain provisions to come into effect only after the issue of statutory instruments.
For så vidt angår forordningsbestemmelsernes »horisontale virkning«, henvises til EF-Domstolens retspraksis vedrørende forbuddet mod forskelsbehandling i forbindelse med udøvelse af retten til fri bevægelighed for arbejdstagerne, som både vedrører traktatbestemmelsernes og forordningernes retsvirkninger 2).
As far as the direct effect of regulations in the horizontal relations between individuals is concerned, reference may be made to the Court's decisions on the prohibition of discrimination against nation­als of other EC countries in employment, which was held to apply to provisions of the Treaty and regulations alike. '
Mange regeringer og juridiske forfattere mener, at der af artikel 189, stk. 2, om forordninger modsætningsvis må udledes, at de beslutninger, der er rettet til medlemsstaterne, og direktiverne ikke har direkte virkning.
A substantial proportion of commentators and governments to Member States, held that the absence of any reference to direct applicability in the and directives descriptions of directives and decisions in Article 189, by contrast with that of regulations, implied that decisions addressed to Member States and directives did not have direct effect.
EF-Domstolen, som fastholder sit oprindelige stand punkt, har ikke fulgt denne argumentation.
The Court of Justice, true to its original approach towards the question, dismissed this argument.
Den har udtalt sig til fordel for beslutningers og direktivers direkte »vertikale« virkning.
It found in favour of the vertical direct effect of decisions and direc­tives.
I Grad-dommen tog Domstolen stilling til den kombinerede virkning af en beslutning, hvorved en merværdiafgift erklæredes for uforenelig med andre omsætningsafgifter, og af direktivet om indførelsen af moms.
In the Grad case the Court was asked to rule on the combined effect of a decision declaring that after the introduction of VAT other specific sales taxes on transport should be abolished, and of the directive introducing the VAT system.