natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Beslutningen gør det klart, at leveringsnægtelse for højrestyrede køretøjer og foranstaltninger med tilsvarende virkning, såsom indførelse af prisforskelle mellem højrestyrede og venstrestyrede køretøjer inden for et salgsnet, er i strid med artikel 85, stk. 1, og vil medføre, at der ikke kan indrømmes fritagelse i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 3, for det pågældende salgssystem.
It makes clear that a refusal to supply RHD vehicles and measures of equivalenteffect such as the introduction of price differentials between LHD and RHDvehicles in the operation of a distribution network for cars is contrary to Article85(1) and will lead to a refusal of an exemption under Article 85(3) for thedistribution system in question.
Der blev ikke pålagt bøder for ovennævnte konkurrencebegrænsninger af følgende årsager: For det første gav den pågældende forhandleraftale Peugeot og SODEXA eneret til at sælge højrestyrede køretøjer, og anmeldelsen omfattede derfor leveringsnægtelsen, hvilket udelukkede, at der kunne pålægges bøder (artikel 15, stk. 5, i forordning nr. 17).
Fines were not imposed in respect of the abovementioned restrictive practicesfor two reasons: the distribution agreement in question gave Peugeot and Sodexa the exclusive right to sell RHD vehicles, so that the notification extendedto the refusal to supply and therefore precluded the imposition of a fine (Article15(5) Regulation No 17).
For det andet var det først efter Domstolens dom i Ford-sagen2)
Secondly, it was not entirely clear until the judgmentof the Court of Justice in the Ford case,3handed down on 17 September 1985,what were the obligations of Continental dealers with respect to the sales of RHD cars to customers resident in the United Kingdom.
2) Forenede sager 25 og 26/84, Ford-Werke AG og Ford of Europe Inc. mod Kommissionen, endnu ikke offentliggjort; Femtende Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken, nr. 125.
Thirteenth Competition Report, point 96.Joined Cases 25 and 26/84 Ford-Werke AG and Ford of Europe Inc. v Commission, not yet reported.Fifteenth Competition Report, point 125.Ibid.
Ved to beslutninger1) indrømmede Kommissionen fritagelse i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 3, for standardaftaler på distributionsområdet, som henholdsvis Pronuptia og Yves Rocher havde indgået med franchiseforhandlere af deres produkter — brudekjoler og kosmetik — i flere medlemsstater.
In two decisions ]the Commission granted an exemption under Article85(3) in respect of standard form distribution contracts made between Pronuptiaand Yves Rocher with the franchised retailers of their products, wedding dressesand cosmetics respectively, in several Member States.
I henhold til begge standardaftaler skulle franchisegiveren give franchisetageren eneret til inden for et velafgrænset geografisk område at benytte franchisegiverens industrielle rettigheder (bomærker, varemærker, symboler samt registrerede designs og modeller) til forhandling af deres produkter.
In each case the contracts obliged the franchisor to grant the franchisees theexclusive right, within a defined geographical area, to use its industrial propertyrights (shop signs, trade marks, symbols and registered designs and models)for the retailing of its products.
Franchisegiveren forpligtede sig til at videregive sin kommercielle knowhow til sine franchisetagere og yde dem teknisk og kommerciel bistand.
The franchisor undertook to transfer to itsfranchisees its commercial knowhow and to supply them with technical andcommercial assistance.
I begge tilfælde var franchisetageren i juridisk henseende uafhængige forhandlere, der drev deres virksomhed på egen risiko.
The franchisees, in both cases, were legally independenttraders carrying on business at their own risk.
De skulle selv afholde omkostningerne ved indretning af forretningslokalerne i overensstemmelse med de specifikationer, franchisetageren havde fastsat.
They were responsible for thecost of fitting out their premises in accordance with the specification stipulatedby the franchisor.
Deres forpligtelser bestod i at drive deres forretninger i overensstemmelse med de forretningsmetoder, franchisegiveren havde fastlagt, og udelukkende sælge under franchisegivernes mærke.
Their obligations consisted in operating their outlets inaccordance with the trading methods laid down by the franchisor and in sellingonly under the franchisor's sign.
Franchisetagerne forpligtede sig desuden til at betale et vist beløb til franchisegiveren og til inden for et nærmere afgrænset område ikke at udøve aktiviteter, der konkurrerede med franchisegiverens, i hele aftaleperioden samt i et år efter aftalernes udløb.
The franchisees further undertook to paycertain sums of money over to the franchisor and not carry on a competingbusiness during the lifetime of the agreements and for a period of one yearafter their termination, within a specified territory.
Franchisetagerne kunne frit fastsætte deres egne detailpriser, selv om franchisegiverne dog fastlagde retningslinjer herfor.
The franchisees were free to set their own resale prices although guidelineswere laid down by the franchisors.
Franchisetagerne var i stand til at købe hos eller sælge til hinanden.
Franchisees were able to buy from or tosell to one another.
En række af de forpligtelser, franchisetagerne fik pålagt, indebar ingen konkurrence begrænsninger, eftersom de var en nødvendig forudsætning for, at nettet kunne fungere.
Several obligations imposed on the franchisees did not restrict competitionsince they were a necessary prerequisite for the proper functioning of thenetworks: they were designed either to safeguard their uniformity and reputation or to prevent the use by competitors of the knowhow and commercialknowledge transferred by the franchisor to the franchisee under the terms ofthe contracts.
De havde til formål enten at sikre kædens ensartethed og værne om dens omdømme eller at afskære konkurrenterne fra at udnytte den tekniske og kommer cielle viden, franchisegiveren meddelte franchisetageren i henhold til aftalerne.
Although the franchising contracts provided for a certain degree of marketsharing and restricted competition by granting exclusive territorial protectionto each franchisee, their overall effect was to improve and strengthen competition rather than to restrict it.
') Beslutninger af 17.12.1986, EFT L 8 af 10.1.1987; EFT L 13 af 15.1.1987.
Decisions of 17 December 1986, OJ L 8 and 13, 10 and 15.1.1987.
Aftalerne gav franchisegiveren mulighed for at etablere og udvide sit distributionsnet med ensartede forretningsmetoder og tilbyde kunderne samme produktkvalitet og -udbud uden at måtte investere i etablering af en lang række individuelle forretninger.
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES make available merchandise of a uniform quality and range to the public,without having to invest in numerous individual sales outlets.
Franchisetagerne fik adgang til gennemprøvede forret ningsmetoder og et velrenommeret mærke.
The franchiseeshad access to proven business methods and an established name and reputation.
Brasiliansk kaffe
Brazilian coffee
På baggrund af en klage, som »European Federation of Associations of Coffee Roasters« indgav i december 1985, anmodede Kommissionen i juli 1986 »Instituto Brazilero do Café« (IBC) om at ophæve en række bestemmelser i de aftaler, der var indgået med kaffebrænderierne. Bestemmelserne indeholdt et forbud mod videresalg af råkaffe, hvilket efter Kommissionens opfattelse var en begrænsning, der stred mod Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler, da den medførte forskelsbehandling af kaffebrænderier afhængigt af deres hjemsted og desuden medførte urimelige stigninger i forbrugerpriserne.
Acting on a complaint logded in December 1985 by the European Federation of Associations of Coffee Roasters, the Commission requested the Instituto Brazilero do Cafe (IBC) in July 1986 to delete certain clauses in its contractswith coffee roasters forbidding the resale of green coffee, which it held toamount to restrictions contrary to the Community competition rules sincethey discriminated between coffee processors according to where they wereestablished and resulted in unreasonably higher prices for the consumer.
Dette er ikke første gang Kommissionen har måttet gribe ind for at håndhæve konkurrencereglerne på kaffemarkedet.
This is not the first time that the Commission has had to intervene to enforcethe competition rules in the coffee sector.
Den foreliggende sag understreger den holdning, Kommissionen har indtaget i tidligere tilfælde1).
The present case reinforces theposition adopted by the Commission on earlier occasions.1
Kommissionen har formelt afvist en klage fra »Vereniging Exploitanten Benzinestation« (VEB), der er en sammenslutning af forpagterne af de benzinstationer, som ejes af Shell's nederlandske datterselskab.
The Commission formally rejected a complaint by the Vereniging Exploitanten Benzinestation (VEB), an association of tenants of petrol stations whichare owned by the Dutch sales subsidiary of Shell, that Shell's contract with itspetrol station tenants in the Netherlands infringed the competition rules inthat the discount system operated by Shell amounted to indirect resale pricemaintenance and price discrimination.
VEB havde klaget over, at Shell's aftale med forpagterne af selskabets benzinstationer i Nederlandene var i strid med konkurrencereglerne, fordi den rabatordning, som Shell anvendte, indebar indirekte detailprisbinding og prisdiskrimination.
A retailer could ask for an extra discount off thewholesale price in order to meet the reduction in his margin caused by alowering of prices. Shell appraised local competitive conditions when deciding
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER
MAIN DECISIONS AND MEASURES TAKEN BY THE COMMISSION
Shell vil vurdere de lokale konkurrenceforhold, når selskabet skal afgøre, om der kan ydes en sådan rabat.
67 on whether or not to grant such a discount.
Kommissionen mente ikke, at der i dette tilfælde var tale om indirekte detailprisbinding.
The Commission did not considerthat this practice involved indirect resale price maintenance.
Selv om Kommissionen afviste denne klage, har den dog gjort Shell opmærksom på, at ordningen ikke må føre til forskelsbehandling af konkurrerende forhandlere af samme mærke.
Although the Commission rejected this particular complaint, it has drawn Shell's attention to the fact that the scheme must not lead to discriminationbetween retailers of the same brand competing with one another.
Kommissionen har gentagne gange understreget, at garantier, som fabrikanter af varige forbrugsgoder tilbyder som led i deres eftersalgsservice, skal gælde i hele Fællesskabet, uanset i hvilken medlemsstat det pågældende produkt erhverves1).
The Commission has repeatedly stated that guarantees offered as partof aftersales service by manufacturers of consumer durables must be validthroughout the Community regardless of the Member State in which theproduct is purchased.J
Såfremt en fabrikant afslår at opfylde en garantiforpligtelse for et produkt, som ikke er blevet importeret eller eksporteret gennem fabrikantens eget salgsnet, kan der være tale om en betydelig hindring for samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet.
Refusal to honour a guarantee in respect of a product which has not beenimported or exported through the manufacturer's established network mayconstitute a substantial barrier to trade within the Community.
Hver gang Kommissionen har godkendt distributionsaftaler, har den krævet, at de garantier, der ydes, skal gælde i hele Fællesskabet.
In authorizing distribution agreements, the Commission has at all times insisted upon the availability of Communitywide product guarantees. In a series
) har Kommissionen sikret sig, at den service, der er omfattet af fabrikantens garanti for mærkevarer, ydes af alle de anerkendte for handlere og ikke blot af den forhandler, hvor varen er købt. Denne politik blev
6 electronics, electrical appliances and personal computers, the Commission has ensured that where the manufacturer gave a guarantee on branded goods,the service covered by that guarantee would be available from any approved dealer, not merely the dealer from which it was purchased.
8 stadfæstet af Domstolen i sagerne Hasselblad
8 been confirmed by the Court of Justice in the Hasselblad and Swatch cases.
) Beslutning af 23.10.1978, Zanussi: EFT L 322 af 16.11.1978, s. 36; Ottende Beretning om Konkurren cepolitikken, nr. 116.
Seventh Competition Report, points 17-20.Decision of 28 October 1970, Omega: OJ L 242, 5.11.1970; First Competition Report, point 56.Decision of 13 December 1974, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG: OJ L 29, 3.2.1975; Fourth Competition Report, point 86.Decision of 15 December 1975, SABA: OJ L 28, 3.2.1976; Fifth Competition Report, point 54.Decision of 23 October 1978, Zanussi: OJ L 322, 16.11.1978; Eighth Competition Report, point 116.Decision of 18 April 1984, IBM Personal Computer: OJ L 118, 4.5.1984, p.
) Dom af 10.12.1985, Swatch, sag 31/85; EFT C 347 af 31.12.1985.
Judgment of 21 February 1984, Case 86/82 Hasselblad [1984] ECR, 883.Judgment of 10 December 1985, Case 31/85 Swatch.: OJ C 347, 31.12.1985.
Kontoret for de europæiske Forbrugerorganisationer (BEUC) har meddelt Kommissionen, at en række salgsnet stadig nægter at opfylde garantiforpligtelser for produkter, der er indkøbt i en anden medlemsstat, til trods for at Kommissionen entydigt har tilkendegivet sin politik på dette område gentagne gange.
68 COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES unequivocal statements of policy by the Commission, still refuse to honourguarantees for produce purchased in another Member State.
Kommissionen er i færd med at undersøge de sager, som BEUC har forelagt den. På baggrund af disse klager følte Kommissionen sig i begyndelsen af november forpligtet til at advare1) fabrikanterne om, at deres salgsaftaler kunne blive erklæret uforenelige med konkurrencereglerne, såfremt forbrugerne ikke kunne opnå garantier gældende for hele Fællesskabet for de pågældende produkter, uanset hvor disse blev købt.
The Commission is investigating the cases brought to its attention by BEUC.In the light of these complaints, the Commission, in early November, felt itto be its duty to warn * manufacturers that unless consumers could obtain Communitywide guarantees on products purchased in any Member State,the distribution agreements covering such product might be declared to beincompatible with the competition rules.
Kommissionens aktiviteter inden for servicesektoren i 1986 var hovedsagelig koncentreret om bankvirksomhed.
In 1986 the activity of the Commission in the services sector was mainlyconcentrated on banking.
Kommissionen fortsatte desuden sin politik med hensyn til varebørser og vedtog fem beslutninger.
The Commission furthermore continued its policyon commodity markets and adopted five decisions.
Ingen af beslutningerne vedrører rentesatser, da Kommissionen har besluttet, at den foreløbig vil forbeholde sig sin stilling til dette spørgsmål, indtil der er foretaget en undersøgelse af forholdet mellem de enkelte medlemsstaters rentesatser og deres pengepolitik.
None of the decisions is concernedwith interest rates: the Commission has decided for the present to reserve itsposition on this matter pending an enquiry into the relationship between interestrates and the monetary policy of the individual Member States.
Kommissionen besluttede3), at en række aftaler mellem medlemmerne af »Irish Banks' Standing Committee« (IBSC) ikke begrænser konkurrencen inden for fælles markedet mærkbart som omhandlet i artikel 85, stk. 1, og at der derfor kunne meddeles negativattest.
The Commission decided 3that a number of agreements between membersof the Irish Banks Standing Committee (IBSC) do not appreciably restrictcompetition in the common market within the meaning of Article 85(1) andtherefore granted them a negative clearance.
Der er tale om følgende banker: Allied Irish Banks PLC, Bank of Ireland, Northern Bank Ltd og Ulster Bank Ltd. De betegnes normalt som de »associerede« banker, og er de største clearing- og forretningsbanker i Irland.
The banks are the Allied Irish Banks pic, Bank of Ireland, Northern Bank Ltd and Ulster Bank Ltd. They aregenerally known as the associated Banks and ari the main clearing and retailbanks in Ireland.
Aftalerne vedrører fælles åbningstider, clearingregler og direkte debitering.
The agreements relate to common opening hours, clearingrules and a direct debiting system.
De »associerede« banker havde allerede ophævet en række tidligere aftaler om provision for de serviceydelser, de tilbyder kunderne, efter at Kommissionen havde foretaget en undersøgelse af sådanne bankaftaler inden for Fællesskabet som helhed.
Previous agreements relating to commissionsfor services to customers had already been voluntarily abandoned by the Associated Banks following a Communitywide investigation by the Commission into such agreements in the banking sector.
KOMMISSIONENS VIGTIGSTE BESLUTNINGER OG FORANSTALTNINGER
70 COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES
På Kommissionens foranledning blev en lang række konkurrencebegrænsninger inden for den belgiske banksektor ophævet.
Following Commission intervention, a wide range of restrictive practicesin the Belgian banking sector were abandoned.
Samtidig meddelte Kommissionen fritagelse i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 3, for tre aftaler, der var blevet anmeldt af den belgiske banksammenslutning (Belgische Vereniging der Banken/Association Belges des Banques BVB/ABB) — fordi de fremmer transaktionerne inden for banksektoren. ren.
At the same time, the Commission exemptedlunder Article 85(3) three agreements which were notifiedto it by the Belgian association of banks (Belgische vereniging der banken/Association beige des banques BVB/ABB) — because they were beneficial tothe fluidity of transactions in the banking sector.
BVB/ABB, som ved udgangen af første halvår 1986 omfattede 84 ud af 86 banker i Belgien, havde anmeldt en række konkurrencebegrænsende aftaler, der var indgået på sammenslutningens foranledning.
The BVB/ABB, which at the end of the first half of 1986 comprised 84 of the86 banks in Belgium, had notified a series of restrictive practices, concluded onthe Associations' initiative.
Kommissionen havde i foråret 1985 fremsendt en meddelelse af klagepunkter vedrørende disse aftaler.
These agreements were the subject of a statement ofobjections issued by the Commission in spring 1985.
Klagepunkterne vedrørte bankernes provisionsberegning.
The objections concernedrestrictive practices in respect of commissions charged by the banks for theirservices.
Efter drøftelser med Kommissionen besluttede BVB/ ABB, at de aftaler, som Kommissionen havde rejst indsigelse imod, skulle ophæves fra 1. april 1986 bortset fra tre, der blev delvis bibeholdt.
Following discussions held between the BVB/ABB and the Commission, the BVB/ABB decided to abandon the agreements to which the Commission objected with effect from 1 April 1986, except for three, which wereretained in part.
Disse tre aftaler gælder for relationerne mellem bankerne indbyrdes og indeholder ikke længere bestemmelser om relationerne mellem bankerne og deres kunder.
These three agreements apply to interbank relations and no longer concern therelations between banks and their customers.
De omhandler transaktioner, der omfatter mindst to banker i Belgien, og hvor den ene optræder som mellemmand for den anden. Der er tale om to former for transaktioner, nemlig værdipapirforretninger og internationale betalinger. I første tilfælde påtager den ene bank sig forskellige værdipapirforretninger på sine kunders vegne i stedet for en anden bank, som udstederen har gjort direkte ansvarlig som domiciliatbank for disse værdipapirer.
They govern transactions whichinvolve at least two banks in Belgium, one acting as intermediary for the other.The relevant transactions are of two kinds: they relate either to securities orto international monetary movements and trade.
I andet tilfælde sender den ene bank den anden belgiske bank en ordre, som den har modtaget fra en udenlandsk korrespondentbank.
In the second case, one bank forwards to anotherbank, also in Belgium, an order which it has received as correspondent from abank abroad.
De tre aftaler begrænser konkurrencen som omhandlet i artikel 85, stk. 1, af følgende årsager: To af aftalerne (aftalen om værdipapirforretninger og aftalen om betalinger i udenlandsk valuta eller betalinger fra udlandet) omhandler de provisioner, der kan opkræves for mellemkomst ved disse transaktioner.
The three agreements restrict competition within the meaning of Article 85(1)for the following reasons: two of them (the agreement on securities dealingsand the one on international payments in foreign currencies or originatingabroad) contain provisions concerning, respectively, the actual amount of therebates, and of the commissions charged for acting as intermediary in theseoperations.
Hvad den tredje aftale angår (aftalen om indløsning af checks og veksler fra udlandet), er den konkurrencebegrænsende, fordi den indeholder bestemmelser om opkrævning af provision og de nærmere vilkår derfor.
As regards the third agreement (which concerns the collection ofcheques and commercial bills originating abroad), its restrictive provisionsconsist in laying down the principle of charging a commission and the procedurefor doing so.
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER ændringer i de pågældende tre aftaler samt forelægge Kommissionen nye aftaler, der indgås mellem sammenslutningens medlemmer.
The Commission attached an obligation to the decision: the BVB/ABB isrequired to inform the Commission immediately of any addition or amendmentto the three agreements in question and of any new agreement concludedbetween its members within the Association.
Fritagelsen gælder i ti år fra den 30. maj 1986, dvs. det tidspunkt, hvor den endelige version af de tre aftaler blev anmeldt.
The exemption applies for 10years from 30 May 1986, the date of notification of the final version of thethree agreements.
I 1984 anmeldte den 15 aftaler og henstillinger til Kommissionen.
In 1984it notified 15 agreements and recommendations, to the Commission.
Fem af disse blev senere ophævet på Kommissionens foranledning. Kommissionen erklærede, at syv af de resterende 10 aftaler ikke begrænsede konkurrencen mærkbart og derfor ikke var i strid med artikel 85, stk. 1 ; der blev indrømmet fritagelse i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 3, for de resterende tre, selv om de var konkurrencebegrænsende ' ).
Five ofthese were subsequently abandoned following the Commission intervention.Of the remaining 10, seven have been declared not to restrict competition toan appreciable extent and thus not to violate Article 85(1); the remaining three,although restrictive of competition, were granted an exemption under Article85(3).a
Hvad angår de aftaler, hvortil der blev meddelt negativattest, vedrørte den ene kun tekniske spørgsmål, medens fire omhandlede standardisering og rationalisering af bankernes transaktioner på nationalt plan; da der således kun var tale om trans aktioner i Italien, påvirkede aftalerne ikke handelen mellem medlemsstaterne mærkbart.
With respect to those agreements granted negative clearance, one was concernedwith technical matters only, whilst four dealt with the standardization andrationalization of banking operations on a national level, a matter whichconcerned operations in Italy only and hence did not appreciably affect tradebetween Member States.
To aftaler om minimumgebyrer for udlejning af bankbokse og for lukket depot var ganske vist konkurrencebegrænsende men kunne ikke efter Kommissionens opfattelse anses for at påvirke handelen mærkbart.
Two more agreements on minimum charges for safedeposits, although restrictive of competition, could not, in the Commission'sview, be deemed to have an appreciable effect on trade.