natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Her skal blot konstateres, at ingen af dem helt holdt stik.
The single European market needs an energy market without frontiers.
Så sent som i 1950 dækkedes kun 10% af behovet ved hjælp af import.
1985: Forecast and reality a comparison
■ AFHÆNGIGHED OG STRUKTURER INDTIL 1973
By con­trast, only 10% of demand had to be covered from imports in 1950.
Virkelighed 1985
Reality 1985
Anskuer man tingene ud fra et EF­synspunkt har denne udvikling i sidste instans måske li­gefrem gavnet sammenholdet mellem med­lemsstaterne.
Taking a Community view, this development in fact probably boosted solidarity between Member States.
I mangel af tilstrækkelige egne olieforekomster blev alle EF­landene energi­importører, om end i forskellig målestok.
Owing to the lack of suffi­cient own oil resources, all Member States became importers of energy, although to varying degrees.
Det har til en vis grad bestemt deres holdning.
This led to a change in at­titudes.
Før kunne man derimod tydeligt skelne mel­lem dem, der kunne dække en stor del af de­res energibehov ved hjælp af egne forekom­ster, mest kul, og de øvrige, som måtte købe af nabolandene.
Previously, there had been a clear distinction between those countries which were able to cover a large proportion of their energy requirement from own resources, mainly coal, and those which were obliged to buy in energy from their neighbours.
At olie afløste kul som den vigtigste energikil­de har medført væsentlige ændringer i indu­striens placering.
The substitution of oil for coal as the main energy source brought with it major shifts in the location of industry.
Så længe kul spillede hovedrollen, var det naturligt, at de vigtigste industrier placerede sig i eller nær mine­driftsområderne.
So long as coal had a predominant role, it was natural that the key industries were located in or around the coalfields.
I havnene, hvor ol ien blev bragt i land, og i de­res opland grundedes raffinaderier og virk­somheder inden for den petrokemiske indu­stri, som gav stødet til en stækere økonomisk udvikling i disse regioner, der lå langt borte
Oil, however, came into the Com­munity via the ports and coastal areas, and no longer only in the northwest of the Com­munity's territory where the oil industry had
skaber, der havde koncession i landet, et nyt beskatningssystem ved at true med ellers en sidigt at indskrænke produktionsmængden. Reaktionen fra importlandene kom navnlig fra Vesteuropa, hvor der med statsstøtte blev dannet nationale olieselskaber og de allerede eksisterende (i Nederlandene og Italien) blev udvidet. For at sikre den enkelte stat størst mulig uafhængighed måtte disse sel skaber tilstræbe samme »vertikale« spredning— fra udvinding til afsætning — som de bestående multinationale koncerner.
changed distribution offerees was reflected in the imposition by Libya of a new taxation system on the concession companies, under threat of a unilateral cut-back in the production volume.
Snart bredte de sig også ud over hjemlandets grænser.
They very quickly expanded their operations beyond national frontiers.
Hånd i hånd med denne udvikling skete der gennemgribendeændringer i den internationale struktur inden for energisektoren.
This gave it an advantage over its competitors overseas, at least for so long as they obtained their oil supplies hitherto been concentrated.
De store multinationale olieselskaber havde i år tier uanfægtet kunne opretholde deres stilling med deres mangeleddede struktur — ef terforskning, produktion, transport, raffinering, oplagring og afsætning pasamme hånd — med nu begyndte den at vakle, dels fordi de olieproducerende lande ikke længere ville acceptere, at olieselskaberne dominerede markedet, dels fordi der også i mange importlande rejste sig modstand mod afhængigheden. gigheden.
Refineries and petrochemical plants were set up in the ports of entry and in the hinterland, leading to greater economic development in regions far from the coalfields. However, overcapacities have arisen in this sector at these locations, which are still creating problems today.
USA kunne dække sit energibehov ved hjælp af forekomster på eget territorium eller i det mindste på eget kontinent og havde derfor længe en fordel frem for sine oversøiske konkurrenter, i hvert fald så længe de hovedsageligt forsynede sig med olie stammende fra Amerika.
The long unchallenged position of the multinational oil companies with their highly integrated structures — exploration, production, transport, refining, storage and distribution in one hand — gradually began to crumble.
Men efter at præsident Dwight D. Eisenhower besluttede at begrænse råolieimporten fra USA, strømmede me-
Firstly, the oil-producing countries were no longer prepared to accept this domination of the marketand, secondly, opposition also began to stir in some importing countries.
Hvad angår de olieproducerende lande var det først og fremmest oprettelsen af Organisationen af Olieeksporterende Lande (OPEC), der indledte denne udvikling.
On the oil-producing side, the founding of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was primarily responsible for this development.
Alle rede fem år efter sammenslutningens oprettelse, i 1965, ytrede den nye magtfordeling sig i, at den libyske regering påtvang de sel
In 1965, only five years after the organization was set up, the
Der udvindes færre og færre kul i EF...
The Community is producing less and less coal...
... men trods alt dækkede "fast brændsel« stadig ca. 28% af energiforbruget i 1988.
... and yet in 1988 solid fuels •itili accounted for about 28% of total energy production.
gen råolie til Vesteuropa fra landene i Nær­østen, der geografisk ligger meget nærmere, men i mange tilfælde er politisk ustabile.
ΗΗ primarily from American sources. However, a decision by President Eisenhower, de­signed to safeguard American oil supplies, diverted large quantities of oil to Western Europe from the much closer, but politically often highly unstable countries of the Middle East.
Eu­ropa benyttede sig hurtigt af denne mulighed for forsyninger, og det samme gjorde Japan (trods den væsentligt større afstand).
Europe, and Japan, too, despite the distances involved, quickly availed themselves of this supply source.
Det til­skrives i vidt omfang denne udvikling, at ja­panerne og vesteuropæerne navnlig sidst i 60erne oplevede en hastig og mere jævnt for­løbende økonomisk udvikling end USA.
Many observers regard this as the reason why Japan and Western Europe in particular experi­enced faster and more uniform economic growth than the USA at the end of the 1960s.
■ KRISENS OPSTÅEN den i kraft af dollarkursens frigivelse — den­gang som nu afvikledes de fleste oliehandler i dollars — var årsag til stor usikkerhed.
■ THE ROAD TO CRISIS their policies they endeavoured to increase and stabilize theiroil revenue as faras possi­ble, as the situation on the international ex­change markets was characterized by uncer­tainty owing to the floating of the dollar, the currency in which most oil transactions were, and still are, effected.
For mange af de olieproducerende lande er olien den vigtigste, for ikke at sige den eneste indtægtskilde.
Oil revenue is the most important, if not the sole, source of income for many oil­producing countries.
En del lande, f.eks. Algeriet, Iran og, til en vis grad, Irak, havde og har i kraft af deres befolkningsrigdom og deres geografiske forhold udviklingsmuligheder inden for landbruget og den ikke umiddel­bart olieafhængige industri.
Other countries such as Algeria, Iran and, to a certain extent, Iraq have been able to develop their agriculture and non­oil­related industry on the strength of their demographic and geographical resources.
For disse stater var indtægterne fra olieeksporten et yderst kærkomment middel til økonomisk diversifi­kation, ogderes indkøb af produktionsudstyr og komponenter til infrastruktur har industri­landene i Vesten haft stor gavn af.
For them, the revenue from oil exports was a welcome means of diversifying their economies, and the western industrialized countries benefited enormously from their purchases of capital goods and basic in­frastructure.
Andre pro­ducentstater, ¡sær dem på Den Arabiske Halvø, har ikke den mulighed.
Other oil­producing countries, especially in Arabia, did not have this possibility.
Den del af indtægterne, der blev tilbage efter afholdelse af løbende udgifter og efter omfattende inve­steringer i infrastruktur (som oftest størstede­len), har disse lande derfor placeret i udlan­det (»petrodollars«). Disse for det meste kort­sigtede investeringer har udgjort en stor, va­gabonderende kapital, der har om ikke
Consequently, they invested the balance of their income (usually the larger portion) after current expenditure and exten­sive investment in their own infrastructure
Mod slutningen af 1969 aftegnede der sig en ændring i denne situation.
The first sign of change appeared towards the end of 1969.
Først og fremmest fordi verdens energibehov dengang var i kon­stant stigning, som regel hastigere end forud­set i produktionsselskabernes prognoser, og fordi oliens betydning som energikilde yder­ligere tog til, fik producentlandene efterhån­den overtaget, og de var hurtigt opmærksom­me på den nye, fordern meget gunstige situa­tion.
Because world energy demand was rising steadily and usually faster than the oil companies' prognoses, and because the role of oil asan energy source was becoming more important, the oil­producing countries gradually gained the upper hand and were quick to realize the potential of this favourable new situation.
Oliepriser
Oil prices
1990 udløst, så dog været medvirkende årsag til mange farlige valutasvingninger.
1990 than that, was the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973.
Uanset for skellene mellem de pågældende landes situation er de alle interesserede i én ting, nemlig at sikre deres indtægter mod inflation og svindende købekraft.
As on previous occasions, the Arab countries felt there was justification for using oil as a political weapon, although with the decisive difference that this time they did not stop at threats.
Deterdissemål,der har dikteret de olieproducerende landes po litik siden 1970.
In December 1973 the oil-producing countries refused to fix their prices in agreement with the oil companies and announced that they would in future decide prices unilaterally.
De kom til udtryk i Teheranog Tripolis-aftalerne (1971) om forhøjelse af oliepriserne og året efter i flere aftaler, som gik ud på at tilpasse priserne efter kraftige valutaudsving. lutaudsving.
Crude oil prices were immediately tripled and increased again soon after, with the result that ex-producer prices at the beginning of 1974 were more than four times their 1973 level.
Som de allerede havde gjort tidligere, tog de arabiske stater, de olieproduce rende og andre, anledning af konflikten til at sætte olien ind som politisk våben, men med den alvorlige forskel, at det denne gang ikke blev ved truslen.
Whatever the specific differences between the individual countries, they all had a common interest in pro tecting their income against inflation and loss of purchasing power. These objectives were the driving force behind the oil-producing countries' policy from 1970.
I december 1973 nægtede producentlandene at fastsætte priserne i for ståelse med produktionsselskaberne og meddelte, at de for fremtiden ensidigt ville bestemme priserne.
They were reflected in the Teheran and Tripoli Agreements (1971) on higher oil prices and in some agreements in the following year desi gned to adj ust these prices i n the wake of wild currency fluctuations.
Priserne på råolie blev omgående tredoblet og lidt senere yderligere sat i vejret, så de ab producentstat først i 1974 var over fire gange så høje som i 1973.
Many elements of the scenario for the first oi I crisis were therefore already present owing to the increasingly confident assertion by the oil-producing countries of their own in terests. The trigger, but probably no more
Denne pludselige prisstigning havde alvorlige følgerforøkonomien i de vestlige industristater (for ikke at tale om de udviklingslande, som ikke er selvforsynende med olie.
This abrupt increase in prices had serious repercussions for the economies of the western industrialized countries.
For dem betød en mere end firedobbelt olieregning i mange tilfælde, at deres permanente finansielle problemer forstørredes til det gi gantiske).
(The consequences were far more serious for develop ing countries with little or no oil reserves, many of whose financial problems assumed
kommer vi tilbage til i næste kapitel.
gigantic proportions as a result of the quadrupling of their oil bill.)
Her nøjes vi med at konstatere, at energiforbruget overalt i verden faldt mærkbart i årene efter 1973.
We shall return in the following chapter to the far-reaching consequences of the oil crisis, some of which are still in evidence today.
Denne tendens, der også var meget tydelig i Fællesskabet, bevirkedesammen med bestræbelserne for mere rationel og sparsom energianvendelse, at EF uden væsentlige pro blemer kunne sikre sin forsyning til og med 1978.
The effect of this very marked trend, coupled with efforts to make more rational and sparing use of energy, was that the Community was able to cater for de mand without serious problems up to and in cluding 1978.
Faktisk blev olieregningen noget mindre end frygtet, idet den udbredte inflation og dollarens fald virkede modererende.
The actual oil bill was lower than feared, as widespread inflation and the decline in the value of the dollar had a moderating effect.
Dermed var prisen på en tønde råolie i kraft af de to oliechok i 1973/1974 og 1979/1980 steget fra mindre end 3 dollars til 36 dollars.
Thus the price per barrel of crude oil had risen from under USD 3 to USD 36 as a result of the two oil crises of 1973/74 and 1979/80.
På det tidspunkt stod OPEC på højden af sin indflydelse og magt.
This was the time when OPEC was at the zenith of its infl uence and power.
Meget taler for, at organisationen var lige ved at spænde buen for højt.
There were some signs that the organization was about to go too far.
Dertil kommer, at storforbrugerne af energi blandt industrilandene ændrede ad færd. Der var altså tale om flere sammenfaldende faktorer:
Furthermore, the heavy energy users among the industrialized countries adjusted their behaviour considerably.
Krisen fik USA's daværende præsident, Richard Nixon, til at indkalde en international energikonference i februar 1974. Ud over værtsnationen, USA, deltog EF og alle dets medlemsstater, og desuden Canada, Japan og Norge.
The crisis prompted President Nixon to call an international energy conference in February 1974, in which, in addition to the host country the USA, the European Com munity, all its Member States, Canada, Japan and Norway took part.
Konferencen nedsatte en koordineringsgruppe, hvis arbejde resulterede i vedtagelse af en international energiaftale og oprettelse af Det Internationale Energiagentur (IEA).
The conference appointed a coordinating group, whose work led to an international energy agreement and the founding of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
— Industrinationerne løb for første gang siden Anden Verdenskrig ind i en verdensomspændende recession, der varede til først i 1980erne.
(i) the industrialized countries went into the first world-wide recession since the Second World War, which lasted until the early 1980s.
De hidtil kendte vækstrater fik en de. Der optrådte nulvækst og endda tilbage gang (regnet i reelle priser var EF's samlede bruttonationalprodukt i 1975 udtryk for et fald på 1%).
The customary growth rates gave way to zero growth and, in some cases, decline (Community gross domestic product in 1975 diminished by 1% in real terms);
— udarbejdelse og gennemførelse af et pro gram for langsigtet samarbejde om udvikling af energikilder og om energibesparelse
The IEA, which established its headquarters in Paris, has devoted itself to the following main tasks:
— revision af nationale programmer for energibespa reise og udvikl ing af nye energikilder
(i) formulation and implementation of a pro gramme of longterm cooperation in the development of energy sources and in energy conservation,
— forbedring af informationssystemet vedrørende markederne for olie og naturgas
(ii) review of national energy-saving pro grammes and development of new energy sources,
— oprettelse af et center for statistisk oplysninger om energisektoren
(iii) improved information on the oil and natural gas markets,
— Dermed faldt efterspørgselen efter energi, og producentlandene kunne ikke opretholde prisniveauet fra 1980.
(ii) this depressed energy demand, so that the oil-producing countries were unable to maintain the 1980 price level.
Der viste sig spændinger inden for OPEC, som voldte den før så kompakte organisation store problemer.
Tensions surfaced in OPEC, leadingto major problems in the hitherto sol id group.
Navnlig Saudi-Arabien vendte sig mod høj prispolitikken.
Saudi Arabia in par ticular abandoned the policy of high prices.
Igen og igen faldt oliepriser ne, også fordi den stærkere udnyttelse af Nordsøolien svækkede OPEC-kartellets po sition, og den mere omfattende anvendelse af kerneenergi og naturgas erstattede en del af oliebehovet.
Oil prices gradually fell, in part because in creased production in the North Sea weakened OPEC's position and some oil de mand was absorbed by greater use of nuclear power and natural gas;
— udarbejdelse af en procedure til begrænsning af ol ¡eefterspørgselen og fordel i ng af de eksisterende lagre i tilfælde af forsyningskriser.
(v) creation of a mechanism for restricting oil demand and sharing available supplies in times of crisis.
Efter flere år med relativ ro viste der sig i 1979 på ny spændinger på verdensmarkedet.
Following several years of relative calm, new tensions appeared on the world market in 1979.
Iran krisen gav sig i første halvår udslag i et beskedent underskud på udbudssiden.
During the first half of that year, the Iran crisis was reflected in a modest supply deficit.
— Gentagen verdensomspændende valuta uro, først og fremmest i form af voldsomme dollarkursudsving, var ikke blot til skade for industrilandenes finanser.
(iii) persistent international monetary instability, particularly in the form of erratic fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate, did not only damage the finances of the industrialized countries.
Også de olieproducerende landes indtægter faldt som følge af denne udvikling, der ironisk nok i ikke uvæsentlig grad hidrørte fra de petrodollars, som de selv tidligere havde placeret, ofte med kort løbetid.
The oil-producing countries' revenue also deteriorated because of this development, which ironically stemmed in no small measure from their earlier, usually short-term, petrodollar in vestments.
Endelig var de to oliechok også blandt hovedårsagerne til den internationale gældskrise.
Finally, one of the chief causes of
■ EUROPA OG VERDENSMARKEDET FOR ENERGI FRA KRISEN TIL NU ret energi faldtomtrent lige meget, nemligfra 63% (hhv. 65%) via 55% (56%) til 46% (43%).
A fact worth noting is that the share of oil in total energy demand and dependence on im­ported energy declined by practically the same amount: from 63% (65%) to 55% (56%) and 46% (43%) respectively.
Det må i den forbindelse bemærkes, at verdensøkonomiens genopsving i 1985 var begyndt at stabilisere sig.
Notable in this context is that 1985 was a year in which the recovery of the world economy began to stabilize.
Man havde åbenbart taget ved lære af de to oliechok; man var begyndt at anvende energien mere fornuftigt, at benytte nye, mindre energiin­tensive teknologier og at forbedre varmeiso­lationen, og dermed syntes den regel brudt, som siger, at økonomisk vækst altid går hånd i hånd med stigende energiforbrug.
As the lessons drawn from the two oil crises had obviously been taken on board (i.e. energy was being consumed more rationally, new and less energy­inten­sive technologies were being applied and thermal insulation was being improved), it appeared that the iron rule that economic growth always implied increased energy consumption no longer applied.
Den bed­ste indikator herfor er energiintensiteten, alt­så den mængde energi, der er nødvendig for at opnå et givet bruttonationalprodukt. For at opnå en given bruttonationalprodukt­enhed (1 mio. dollars i 1980­priser) brugte man i ver­den som helhed i 1950 616 toe, i 1973 597 toe, men i 1986 kun 551 toe.
The best in­dicator of this relationship is probably energy intensity, i.e. the quantity of energy required to obtain a given volume of gross domestic product.
Det fremgår tydeligt af de hidtil skitserede sammenhænge, at det, som umiddelbart ud­løste det første oliechok og dets følgevirknin­ger, først og fremmest var, at europæerne i det mindste havde affundet sig med en stor af­hængighed af importeret olie, som for stør­stedelens vedkommende stammede fra poli­tisk ustabile regioner som Nærøsten.
It is clear from this summary that the direct cause of the aftermath of the first oil crisis was Europe's de facto tolerance of excessive dependence on oil imports from politically unstable parts of the world such as the Mid­dle East.
De konsekvenser, man drog på internationalt plan, sigtede da også mod at reducere af­hængigheden af sådanne indførsler og der­med så vidt muligt at begrænse økonomier­nes sårbarhed.
The lessons drawn from this interna­tionally were that dependence on such im­ports and thus economic vulnerability had to be reduced at all costs.
Således blev det aftalt på det verdensøkonomiske topmøde i Tokio i 1979, at USA, Canada, Japan og EF skulle følge en fælles strategi til nedbringelse af olieforbru­get og i de følgende fem år fastholde deres import på 1978­ og 1979­niveauet, endvide­re, at de skulle tilskynde til energibesparelse, fremme udvinding og anvendelse af kul og samarbejde om at udvikle alternative energi­kilder.
At the world economic summit in Tokyo in 1979, the USA, Canada, Japan and the European Commun­ity agreed to pursue a common strategy to reduce oil consumption and hold Imports in the subsequent five years at their 1978 and 1979 levels, to promote energy saving and the production and consumption of coal and to coordinate development of alternative energy sources.
Hvad angår reduktion af olieforbruget lykkedes det under indflydelse af det andet oliechok mere end at overholde aftalen.
The target with regard to reducing oil consumption was actually sur­passed under the influence of the second oil crisis.
Energiforbruget blev bremset og importen faldt ret hurtigt til et lavere niveau end det, der var sat som mål i Tokio.
Energy consumption was reined in, and imports quickly dropped below the levels envisaged in Tokyo.
11986 drog også OPEC konsekvenserne af er­faringerne siden 1973 og vendte tilbage til fa­ste priser, som lagde sig på ca. 18. dollars pr. tønde, altså omkring det halve af 1980­priserne. Samtidig aftalte man en gene­rel maksimumgrænse for produktion og pro­ duktionskvoterforhvertproducentland.
In 1986 OPEC had also drawn lessons from its experience since 1973 and returned to the system of fixed prices, the level of which steadied at about USD 18/barrel, or approx­imately half the level of 1980 prices.
På et internt seminar om energipolitik, arrangeret af EF­Kommissionen i marts 1987, ind­rømmede repræsentanter for OPEC udtryk­keligt, at prissvingningerne havde haft nega­tiv nettoeffekt både for oliemarkedet og for verdensøkonomien.
OPEC representatives ex­plicitly conceded at an internal Commission seminaron energy policy in 1987 that the net effect of the price fluctuations had been negative both for the oil marketand the inter­national economy.
Dermed er billedet imidlertid ikke fuldstæn­digt.
The picture, however, is still not complete.
I foråret 1985 konstaterede EF­Kommis­sionen ved forelæggelsen af sin gennemgang af de nationale energipolitikker i lyset af »De energipolitiske målsætninger indtil 1995«, at Fællesskabeter i gang med yderligere at om­lægge sin energiforsyning bort fra olien.
On presentation of its review of Member States' energy policies in the light of the Community's energy objectives for 1995, the Commission noted in February 1985 that the Community was continuing to restructure its energy supply to reduce oil dependence.