natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Husholdningernes forbrugsstruktur er ændret kraftigt siden begyndelsen af 1970'erne.
The structure of household consumption has undergone significant changes since the early 1970s.
Det første aspekt heraf vedrører indkomstens fordeling mel lem lønindkomst og erhvervs- og formueindkomst ').
The first aspect is the distribution of factor income between compensation of employees and non-labour income.'
I be gyndelsen af 1970'erne steg lønindkomsterne 2 procentpoints mere om året end erhvervs- og formueindkomsterne (13,6 % mod 11,6%, jf. tabel 5.1), hvilket stemmer overens med de i kapitel 3 omtalte indikatorer og kan fortolkes som en forskydning i indkomstfordelingen i denne periode til fordel for lønningerne.
In the early 1970s, compensation of employees grew annually by 2 percentage points more than other factor income (13.6% against 11.6%. see Table 5.1). which is consistent with indicators presented in Chapter 3 and suggests a shift in the income distribution in favour of wages in this period.
Udviklingen kulminerede under recessionen i 1974-1975, hvor lønindkomsternes årlige stigningstakt var 5 procentpoints højere.
This trend culminated in the recession of 1974/75, the difference in annual growth rates rising to 5 points in favour of labour income.
I anden halvdel af 1970'erne og i begyndelsen af 1980'erne skete der en vis tilpasning, idet
In the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s
Udsvingene i husholdningernes indkomst og forbrug spillede en fremtrædende rolle både under recessionen i 1980-1982 og under det efterfølgende opsving.
Fluctuations in household income and consumption have been a dominant factor both in the recession of 1980/82 and in the subsequent recovery.
Groft sagt er den økono miske politik blevet lagt om for at rette op på den uholdbare indkomstudvikling i 1970'erne.
Broadly speaking, economic policy has been reorientated towards adjusting the unsustainable income trends of the 1970s.
Denne omlægning, som i nogle medlemsstater blev indledt i begyndelsen af 1980'erne, er efterhånden blevet iværksat i næsten alle EF-lande.
This policy change, starting in some Member States at the beginning of the 1980s has been adopted subsequently by most of them.
Om lægningen bidrog i begyndelsen til at reducere husholdning ernes disponible indkomster og det private forbrug, men ansporede senere til øget forbrug.
Initially it contributed to a fall in disposable household income and in private consumption, but it encouraged household expenditure at a later stage.
Disse forbrugsstimulerende virkninger af en udbudspolitik, som faldt sammen med et varigt fald i inflationen, er i de fleste økonomiske prognoser blevet undervurderet.
These stimulatory effects on private consumption from supply side oriented policies which went together with a durable lowering of inflation have been underrated by most forecasters.
Det private forbrug i Fællesskabet har i 1983 og 1984 været betydelig mere dynamisk end anslået i sidste års økonomiske årsoversigt.
Private consumption in the Community has indeed been more dynamic in 1983 and 1984 than estimated or forecast in last year's annual review.
I august 1983 blev stigningen i det private real forbrug anslået til 0,4% om året i såvel 1983 som 1984.
In autumn 1983, private con sumption at constant prices was forecast to rise by 0,4% annually in both 1983 and 1984.
Imidlertid er det private realforbrug nok steget 1,2% om året.
Instead, real private con sumption is likely to have risen by 1,2% per year.
') Begrebsmæssigt og statistisk er det vanskeligt at aggregere de enkelte medlemsstaters opgørelser vedrørende husholdningerne til en samlet størrelse for Fællesskabet som vist i tabel 5.1.
The aggregation of household accounts of the individual Member Slates to a total for the Community as presented in table 5.1 involves a number of conceptual and statistical problems.
Der anvendes nemlig ikke samme definition af husholdningssektoren ¡ de forskellige national regnskaber.
The definition of lhe household sector is not uniform among the different national accounts.
I de fleste lande medtages virksomheder uden nogen bestemt registreret selskabsform, uanset om deres transaktioner hører til på pro duktions- eller forbrugssiden.
In most countries unincorporated businesses are included, regardless of whether ihc transactions recorded for these units belong to the production or to the consumption side.
Derimod defineres husholdningerne funktionelt i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland og til dels også i Nederlandene; i disse to lande opføres transaktioner af erhvervsmæssig karakter under virksomhedssektoren.
By contrast, households are defined in a functional way in Germany and, slightly less rigorously, in the Netherlands; transactions related lo entrepreneurial activities arc recorded in the enterprise sector in these two countries.
Hverken driftsoverskud eller investeringer indgår i de tyske opgørelser vedrørende husholdningerne.
Neither operating surplus nor investment is a relevant item in the German household accounts.
Indkomst af erhvervsmæssig virksomhed og af virksomheder uden nogen bestemt registreret selskabsform overføres helt (Nederlandene) eller delvis (Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland) fra virksomhedssektoren til husholdningssektoren under posten »fradrag i kvasi-selskabers erhvervsmæssige indkomst«.
The income gener aled by ihc entrepreneurial activities or unincorporated businesses is transferred fully (Netherlands) or partly (Germany) from ihc enterprise sector to ihc household sector under the heading 'Withdrawals from the entrepreneurial income of quasi-corporate enterprises'.
I Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland betragtes huslejeindtægter på samme måde.
In Germany, income from letting dwellings is also treated in Ihis way.
Ikke-udloddet overskud i tyske virksomheder uden nogen bestemt registreret selskabsform er forsøgt medtaget under husholdningssektoren.
An attempi has been made lo include undistributed profits of unincorporated businesses in Germany in Ihc household sector.
For så vidt angår Det forenede Kongerige, vedrører dette kapitel den personlige sektor (personal sector).
As far as the UK is concerned this chaplcr deals with the personal sector.
Blandt andre problemer kan nævnes manglende data for nogle lande for bestemte perioder eller poster.
Among other problems are the non-availability of dala for some countries cither for certain periods or for certain items.
I disse tilfælde er der anvendt løse skøn ved aggregeringen.
In these cases rough estimates have been applied for aggregation.
De seneste års justeringspolitik kommer til udtryk i væksten i husholdningernes samlede indkomster og også i ændrin gerne i indkomststrukturen.
The adjustment policies of the last few years are reflected in the rates of increase of total household income as well as in its changes in structure.
De strukturmæssige ændringer skal ses i sammenhæng med udviklingen i 1970'erne.
The achievements with respect to the latter have to be seen against the developments in the 1970s.
Økonomisk årsoversigt 1984-1985
Annual Economic Review 1984­85
Husholdningernes indkomster og udgifter1
Income and expenditure of households,1
') Inkl. private almennyttige institutioner. :) Baseret på skøn for nogle lande: aggregeret på grundlag af kobekraflspariteter (bortset fra tal i ECU).
Including privine non­profit institutions. Based on estimâtes for some countries; aggreg; tied on [lie basis ol 'purchasing po\ ver parities (except lor levels expressed in ECU).
Kilde: Euroslat og Kommissionens tjenestegrene.
Sources: Eurostal and Commission services.
lønindkomsterne voksede knapt så kraftigt som erhvervsog formueindkomsterne.
1970s and the early 1980s, thus reinforcing the distribution of income in the European economy towards non­profit incomes.
Dette var imidlertid langt fra til strækkeligt til at skabe den nødvendige forbedring af virksomhedssektorens profitter.
Here again a reversal of the trend is discernible in 1984 and 1985, when, for the first time since the early 1970s transfers received are estimated or forecast to grow by less than factor income (6,2% and 4,9% in 1984 and 1985 respectively).
Fra og med 1982 og inklusive prognosen for 1985 viser tallene dog en markant ændring af den tidligere udvikling, idet erhvervs- og formueindkomsterne er steget betydelig kraftigere end lønningerne (dette gælder dog ikke 1983).
However, from 1982 onwards and including the forecast for 1985, the figures suggest that a substantial change in the earlier trend is now underway, with non­labour income rising noticeably more strongly than wages (though this recent trend was interrupted in 1983).
I 1984 vil lønindkomsterne formentlig være steget 5,75 % mod 9 % for andre indkomstformer.
In 1984, compensation of employees is likely to have risen by 53Λ%, against an increase of 9% in other income.
Væksten i lønindkomsterne skyldes en kombination af et yderligere fald i antallet af lønmodtagere på 0,2 % og en stigning i aflønningen pr. beskæftiget på 6,0 %.
The rate of increase of labour income reflects a further reduction of the number of wage and salary earners by 0,2% and an increase in the compensation of employees per head by 6,0%.
Sidstnævnte tal betyder, at reallønnen pr. beskæftiget er steget med 0,9%.
This latter rate implies that real wages per head have risen by 0,9%.
I 1985 forventes de samlede lønindkomster at stige med 5,2 % og erhvervs- og formueindkomsterne med 7,8 %.
In 1985, total compensation of employees is forecast to rise by 5,2% and non­labour income by 7.8%.
Da beskæftigelsen forven tes at forblive stabil, er dette ensbetydende med, at lønningerne pr. beskæftiget vil stige mindre end i 1984 (5,2%); men på grund af lavere inflation vil reallønnen pr. beskæftiget stige med 1 % i 1985.
With dependent employment expected to remain stable, this means that wages per head would increase less than in 1984 (5,2%); but with lower inflation, per capita wages in real terms would rise by 1,0% next year.
Dette kan såvel tilskrives udbygningen af de sociale sikringsordninger som den stigende arbejdsløshed.
The 1970s were also marked by greater income redistribution via transfers.
Tal lene tyder imidlertid på, at nettooverførslerne til hus holdningerne udviste tendens til stigning fra midten af 1970'erne og indtil begyndelsen af 1980'erne, idet overførslerne til husholdningssektoren steg kraftigere end overførslerne fra denne sektor.
Current transfers received by households, which by and large are income flows from general govern­ment, have risen more than factor income throughout the
1970'erne var også præget af større omfordeling af indkomsterne via overførslerne.
By contrast, direct taxes paid by households continued to rise more than proportionally ­— a trend which, in turn, has certainly contributed to European tax push inflation and which, thus, has to be seen as a substantial part of the total picture.
De løbende overførsler til hus
In fact, in all the periods or years shown in Table 5.1. direct taxes rose faster than total factor income.
Derimod er husholdningernes direkte skatter fortsat steget kraftigere end indkomsterne; denne udvikling har uden tvivl
The impression of a rising tax burden is not altered substantially
Husholdningssektoren : indkomst og formue, opsparing og forbrug af 1970'erne.
Household sector: income and wealth, savings and consumption
For 1984 anslås stigningen i den disponible realindkomst til 1,2 %; der forventes en noget større stigning i 1985 (1,4%), hvor en yderligere nedgang i pengeindkom­sternes stigningstakt (fra 6,3% i 1984 til 5,7% i 1985) vil blive mere end opvejet af et fald på 0,9 procentpoints i forbrugerprisernes stigningstakt.
1984 to 5,7% next year), which is more than outweighed by a decrease of consumer price inflation of 0.9 percentage points.
I alle de perioder eller år, der er vist i tabel 5.1, er de direkte skatter faktisk steget hurtigere end de samlede løn­, erhvervs­og formueindkomster.
if one allows for the fact that parts of transfer income are also subject to tax payments and that in the past this kind of income has risen faster than factor income.
Udviklingen skyldes næsten ude­lukkende en inflationsbestemt stigning i skatteprovenuet (fiscal drag).
This trend was mostly due to inflationary 'fiscal drag'.
Forøgelsen af skattebyrden vil formentlig af­tage fra og med 1984, hvilket både afspejler faldende infla­tion og regeringernes ændrede holdning til beskatningspro­blematikken.
The rising trend in the tax share is likely to flatten out from 1984 on. which reflects both less inflation and a changing attitude of govern­ments towards taxation.
Ændringerne i stigningstakten for de disponible pengeind­komster i de forskellige perioder, der er vist i tabel 5.1, skyldes hovedsagelig udsvingene i inflationen.
The changes in the rate of increase of disposable income in nominal terms in the various periods depicted in Table 5.1 mainly reflect the ups and downs of inflation.
Når de nomi­nelle stigninger deflateres med stigningerne i forbrugerpri­serne, bekræfter tallene, at husholdningernes disponible real­indkomst enten er steget beskedent eller endog er faldet siden det første olieprischok, hvilket står i skarp kontrast til den dynamiske lønudvikling, man var vidne til i begyndelsen
After deflating the nominal rise by the increase in private consumption prices, the figures confirm that the real disposable income of households has grown modestly or has even declined since the first oil shock, contrasting with the dynamism in the early 1970s. In 1984 real disposable income is estimated to have grown by 1,2%; a slightly higher rate of increase is expected for 1985, (1,4%), as the combined result of a further slowdown of nominal income growth (from 6,3% in
Denne udvikling i realindkomsterne for Fællesskabet som helhed dækker over ret så forskelligartede forløb i de enkelte lande i de sidste par år.
These trends in real income for the Community as a whole conceal rather divergent developments between individual countries over the last few years.
Den forbigående nedgang i realind­komsterne i Det forenede Kongerige i forbindelse med »kon­solideringspolitikken« varede kun indtil 1983, medens man i næsten alle andre lande, som havde iværksat tilsvarende politikker senere end i Det forenede Kongerige, oplevede en yderligere nedgang i husholdningernes realindkomst (tabel 5.2).
The transitory drop of real income which was associated with the 'consolidation policy' in the UK came to an end in 1983. when in almost all other countries the effects of similar policies, started later than in the UK. made real household income decrease further (Table 5.2).
I 1984 synes realindkomsterne at være steget igen i alle lande bortset fra Frankrig og Belgien, hvor tilpasningspoli­tikken blev iværksat senere eller var særlig drastisk.
In 1984 real income is seen to have again been on a rising trend in most countries except in those where adjust­ment policy had started later or had to be particularly severe (France. Belgium).
Denne prognose synes at pege på, at større konvergens i den økonomiske politik i sidste instans fører til mere konvergerende udvikling i husholdningernes indkomster.
This forecast suggests that greater convergence in economic pol­icy eventually leads to a more convergent development of household income.
') Nominel disponibel bruttoindkomst dcflateret med det implicite forbrugerprisindeks.
Nominal gross disposable income deflated by implicit price index of private consumption.
Hovedårsagen til, at det private forbrug under det seneste opsving er blevet undervurderet, er, at husholdningerne har forbrugt en større del af deres indkomst end ventet.
The main reason for the underestimation of private con­sumption in the recent recovery has been the fact that households spent more of their income than expected.
Sammenholdt med prognoserne tegner faldet i opsparingskvoten sig for 2/3 af undervurderingen af det private realforbrug og for 0,4 procentpoints af BNP i faste priser for 1983 og 1984 under ét.
In­deed the drop in the savings ratio compared to what was forecast accounts for two thirds of the underestimation of real private consumption and for 0,4 percentage points of real GDP in the years 1983 and 1984 taken together.
Opsparingskvoten i Fællesskabet faldt fra 16,5% i 1981 til 14,5% i 1984 (tabel 5.1). I 1985 forventes kvoten at stige en smule (14,7 %) ').
The savings ratio in the Community fell from 16 'Λ % in 1981 to 14!Λ% in 1984 (Table 5.1).
Husholdningernes for brug tegner sig for ca. 60 % af Fællesskabets BNP, og den kortsigtede direkte og automatiske efterspørgselseffekt på væksten i BNP i faste priser af et fald i opsparingskvoten på 1 procentpoint på år-til-år basis er på ca. 0,5 procentpoints (under forudsætning af uændret import/forbrugsstruktur).
Household spending makes up about 60% of GDP in the Community, and the shortterm direct and mechanical demand impact of a fall of the savings ratio by 1 percentage point from one year to the next on real GDP growth is about 0,5 percentage point (an unchanged imports/ consumption structure being assumed).
Det er værd at erindre sig den økonomiske baggrund for de seneste par års fald i EF-husholdningernes opsparingskvote.
It is worthwhile recalling the economic context in which the recent decline of the household savings ratio in the Community took place.
Perioden 1981-1984 dækker sidste del af recessionen og de sidste to års tøvende opsving.
The period between 1981 and 1984 covers the latter part of the recession and the hesitant recov­ery of the last two years.
Arbejdsløsheden har været stigende, hvorimod inflationen er faldet betydeligt, idet for brugerprisstigningen i Fællesskabet aftog fra 11,1 % i 1980 til 5,1% i 1984.
Unemployment has been on a rising trend while inflation has decreased substantially, the rate of increase of consumer prices in the Community falling from 11.1% in 1980 to 5,1% in 1984.
Husholdningerne kan have antaget, at størstedelen af dette fald var af permanent karakter, så meget mere som den økonomiske politik i højere grad er blevet rettet mod udbudsforholdene på mellemlang sigt.
Most of this fall may have been perceived by private households as a durable reduction of inflation and this the more so as the orientation of economic policy has shifted towards giving more weight to mediumterm supply considerations.
Rentesatserne har været høje.
Interest rates have been high.
Indkomstfordelingen er blevet ændret til fordel for erhvervs- og formueindkomsterne, hvor ved der til dels er blevet rettet op på den kraftige forskydning henimod lønningerne i midten af 1970'erne.
The distribution of income has changed in favour of non-labour income thus correcting some of the strong shifts towards wages in the mid-1970s.
Hver af disse faktorer kan bidrage til at forklare forbrugsadfærden i denne periode, selv om det er vanskeligt at bestemme deres relative styrke, især da de er indbyrdes afhængige.
Each of these factors may contribute to explain the behaviour of consumers over this run of years, though it is difficult to determine the relative importance of each, especially when they are inter­related.
Det fremgår af diagram 5.1, som viser opsparingskvoten i Fællesskabet i de sidste 15 år, hvor vanskeligt det er at pege på bestemte faktorer som årsag til denne udvikling.
Graph 5.1, which depicts the savings ratio of the Community over the last 15 years, underlines the difficulty of ascribing its trend to single factors.
I nogle perioder, især i 1974-1975, bevægede opsparingskvoten sig i takt med inflationen.
In some periods, notably in 1974/75, the ratio moved in parallel with inflation.
I 1980-1982 er det imidlertid meget vanskeligere at påvise en sådan sammenhæng.
In 1980/82 the correlation is, however, much less evident.
Husholdningernes opsparing udgjorde i 1981-1982 62-63 % af bruttoopsparingen i Fællesskabet (tabel 5.3).
Household saving made up 62-63% of total gross saving in the Community in 1981/82 (Table 5.3).
Denne andel er formentlig faldet til 56% i 1984 og forventes at falde yderligere til 54 % i 1985.
The share may have decreased to 56% in 1984 and is forecast to decline further to 54% in 1985.
Virksomhedernes bruttoopsparing anslås at være steget fra 42 % i 1981 til 50 % i 1984, og den offentlige sektores negative opsparing er øjensynlig faldet noget i 1984, i 1985 regnes der med et betydeligt fald.
The proportion of gross enterprise saving has risen from 42% in 1981 to an estimated 50% in 1984, and that of the general government's dissaving is likely to have declined somewhat in 1984, and is forecast to decrease substantially in 1985.
Procenterne afspejler de seneste par års bestræbelser på at tilpasse økonomierne i Fællesskabet ved at flytte finansielle
These ratios reflect the efforts of the last few years to readjust the economies of the Community by shifting financial resources from private and public con­sumption to productive purposes.
Offentlig sektor Bruttoopsparing
Private households Enterprises
Kilde: Euroslat og Kommissionens tjenestegrene.
Source: Eurostat and Commission ser\ice
Husholdningssektoren : indkomst og formue, opsparing og forbrug
Household sector: income and wealth, savings and consumption life-cycle.
DIAGRAM 5.1 : Opsparingskvote, forbrugerprisstigning og „. forbrugertillidsindeks, EF
GRAPH 5.1 : Savings ratio, consumer price inflation and consumer confidence indicator, EC
Økonomiske analyser viser klart, at det relevante indkomstbegreb til bestemmelse af forbrugsad­færden er langtidsindkomsten snarere end den løbende ind­komst.
It has been firmly established by economic analysis that the relevant income notion in consumer behaviour is permanent income rather than current income.
Hvis man skal forklare faldet i opsparingskvoten på denne baggrund, må det antages, at forbrugerne i de seneste par år har anset langtidsindkomsten for at være højere end den løbende indkomst.
In order to explain the drop in the savings ratio in this perspective it must be assumed that permanent income as perceived by consumers has been higher than current income in the last couple of years.
Det er sandsynligt, at dette faktisk har været tilfældet.
It is likely that this has indeed been the case.
Omlægningen af den økonomiske politik med henblik på at nedbringe inflationen og konsolidere de offentlige finanser, betalingsbalancerne og lønomkostning­erne har uden tvivl bidraget til faldet i realindkomsterne i Fællesskabet i de seneste par år.
The reorientation of economic policy towards disinflation and consolidation of public finances, external balances and lab­our costs has certainly contributed to the decline of real income over the last few years in the Community.
Forbrugerne kan have betragtet denne politik som en nødvendig tilpasning med henblik på at øge væksten og indkomsterne i fremtiden og sikre beskæftigelsen på mellemlang sigt (under tilpasningen er arbejdsløsheden dog steget noget).
Consumers may have considered this policy as a necessary adjustment in order to achieve more growth and income in the future, with less mediumterm employment risks (although unem­ployment actually was rising somewhat during the process).
Dette stemmer overens med udviklingen i forbrugertillidsindekset for EF, der udar­bejdes regelmæssigt af Kommissionens tjenestegrene, og som er steget — om end noget ujævnt — siden slutningen af 1981, samtidig med at opsparingskvoten er faldet.
This is consistent with the trend in the indicator of consumer confidence in the Community established regularly by the Commission services, which has been recovering — albeit not smoothly — since the end of 1981, along with the decline of the savings ratio.
Her blev meget betydelige beløb, der for nogle år siden blev bundet i opsparingskontrakter som led i offentlige ordninger til fremme af opsparingen, frigjort i 1983, og disse midler blev til dels anvendt til køb af varige forbrugsgoder.
have partly been used for the purchase of consumer durables.
Tilsvarende specifikke påvirkninger af opsparingen kan også påvises i de fleste andre lande.
Similar specific influences may be found in most other countries as well.
Faldet i opsparingskvoten siden 1981 har været meget uensartet fra land til land (tabel 5.4).
The decline in the saving rate since 1981 has indeed been of quite different size among the individual countries (Table 5.4).