natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nu da Lord Cockfield er ude af billedet, og der er en stadig voksende modstand mod Kommissionens planer, synes det næsten sikkert, at den nye Kommission vil komme under pres for at slå af på — eller i det mindste udsætte — gennemførelsen af visse hovedpunkter i sine momsforslag.
Without Lord Cockfield, and given the mounting chorus of opposition to its plans, it seems almost certain that the new Commission will come under pressure to retreat — or at least delay — on the implementation of key aspects of its VAT proposals.
I løbet af 1989 markerede den nye kommissær for skatteog afgiftspolitik, Christiane Scrivener, sin vilje til at indtage en mere fleksibel holdning.
Indeed, during 1989 the new Commissioner for Fiscal Policy, Mrs Christiane Scrivener, signalled her will ingness to adopt a more flexible stance.
En af mulighederne er, at forslagene vedtages af Rådet, men at enkeltlande, hvor tilnærmelsen giver alvorlige problemer, får tilladelse til at afvige fra reglerne, i hvert fald indtil udgangen af 1992, for således gradvis at komme på linje med de andre.
One possibility is that proposals are adopted by the Council but that individual countries with serious problems in agreeing to approximation may be given derogations, at least until the end of 1992, to gradually fall into line.
Men dette vil formodentlig ikke blive accepteret i Storbritannien, hvor Labour-oppositionen vil forsøge at sikre, at Margaret Thatchers løfte om ikke at beskatte madvarer og børnetøj bliver holdt til punkt og prikke.
But this is unlikely to be accepted in the case of the UK where the Labour Opposition will try to ensure that Mrs Thatcher's pledge not to tax food or children's clothing is honoured to the last detail.
Det »franske problem« vil muligvis kunne løses ved at indsnævre det øvre interval af momssatser for »luksus«-varer — f.eks. fra 16% til 18% — for at undgå fordrejning af handelen over grænserne.
It might be possible to meet the 'French problem' by narrowing the upper band of VAT rates for luxury goods — say from 16% to 18% — to deter crossborder trade distortion.
Men dette ville gøre problemet værre for lande som Danmark, Irland og Luxembourg.
But this would make the problem worse for countries such as Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg.
Det kan muligvis også lade sig gøre at nøjes med at gennemføre momstilnærmelsen i nogle med lemsstater, men ikke alle.
It might also be possible to sanction the VAT approximation in some Member States but not all.
Dette kunne være fristende for visse lande, men vil kunne medføre en opsplitning af det indre marked — og derigennem af Det Europæiske Fællesskab som sådant — således at der opstår et Fællesskab, der kører i to gear, hvilket efter manges opfattelse vil med føre en underminering af dets politiske samhørighed.
This might appeal to some, but would risk the fracturing of the internal market — and by extension the European Community as such — into the kind of two-tier or two-speed Community which many are convinced would eventually undermine its political coherence.
Samtidig rejser den foreslåede harmonisering af punktafgifterne lige så vanskelige problemer. I Danmark vil det kunne føre til, at detailprisen på cigaretter falder med ca. 44%, og hele 90% for Portugals vedkommende; dette kunne føre til en alvorlig nedgang i statens indtægter og vil afgjort kunne blive betragtet som et skridt i den forkerte retning i den offentlige debat om rygning og kræft.
Meanwhile the proposed harmonization of excise duties poses equally difficult problems.
På den anden side forudses det, at en tilnærmelse af momssatserne vil kunne føre til en 170% stigning i de græske cigaretpriser.
On the other hand, there are forecasts that approximation of VAT rates could lead to a 170% increase in Greek cigarette prices.
Og en harmonisering af punktafgifterne vil utvivlsomt medføre modsat rettede bevægelser i priserne på benzin, spiritus, vin og øl. Dette vil uvægerligt levere skudklar ammunition til fjendtlige politiske lobbyer i medlemsstaterne.
And there are almost equally likely to be movements in opposite ways in the price of petrol, spirits, wine and beer, as a result of the harmonization of excise duties.
Den indirekte beskatning er fortsat et vanskeligt og følsomt område, men i efteråret 1989 var udsigterne til at nå en kompromisløsning blevet væsentligt forbedret som følge af Kommissionens nye forslag.
Indirect taxation remains a difficult and sensitive issue, but by the autumn of 1989 the prospects for a compromise agreement had been signally improved as a result of new proposals by the Commission.
Christiane Scrivener, der efterfulgte Lord Cockfield på skatteområdet, nedtrappede den oprindelige plan om at tilnærme de indirekte afgiftssatser.
Mrs Scrivener, who succeeded Lord Cockfield in the taxation portfolio, scaled down the original plan to approximate indirect tax rates.
I 1989 bebudede hun, at Kommissionen var rede til at foreslå et nedre momsinterval på mellem 0 og 9% — således at briterne vil være i stand til at bibeholde nulsatsen for visse følsomme varer som f.eks. fødevarer — samt en højere sats, der skulle ligge på 15% eller derover, uden loft.
In May 1989 she announced that the Commission was ready to propose a minimum VAT band of between zero and 9% — offering the prospect of the United Kingdom being able to keep zero rates for certain sensitive items such as food — and a higher rate starting at about 15% but without a ceiling.
Hvad angår punktafgifter, har Kommissionen fundet ud at, at der er uoverstigelige problemer forbundet med at opnå enighed om en enkelt sats, og vil i stedet foreslå en række afgiftsintervaller eller minimumssatser for forskellige varer som f.eks. benzin, alkohol, cigaretter og parfume.
On the issue of excise duties, the Commission accepted that the problems of agreeing a single rate were insuperable and may propose a series of tax bands or minimum rates for different items such as petrol, alcohol, cigarettes and perfume.
Der er fortsat store uløste problemer, f.eks. den præcise udformning af kompensationsordningen for moms betalt på eksportvarer, idet denne vil indebære en grænsekontrolordning, der underminerer den centrale målsætning, som går ud på at fjerne de indre grænser, efterhånden som EF's indre marked udvikler sig.
Serious problems remain to be solved such as the precise mechanism for compensating countries for the VAT paid on exports with a system of border controls which would undermine the central purpose of scrapping internal frontiers in the developing Community internal market.
Den mest sandsynlige kompromisløsning vil indebære en eller anden form for clearing-ordning til regulering af momstransaktioner mellem medlemsstaterne.
The most likely compromise may involve some kind of clearing house to regulate VAT transaction between Member States.
Erhvervslivet håber imidlertid, at den størst mulige del af handelen vil blive holdt uden for denne ordning.
However, industry is hoping that as much trade as possible will be removed from the clearing house system.
På den anden side vil den forventede løsning med hensyn til punktafgifter uvægerligt betyde dødsstødet for den såkaldt toldfrie handel for rejsende i Det Europæiske Fællesskab.
On the other hand the prospective deal on excise duties will almost certainly spell the death knell of so-called duty-free and shopping for travellers within the European Community.
Hen imod slutningen af 1988 opstod der endnu et uventet problem, der skabte nogen tvivl om, hvorvidt navnlig Frankrig var villig til at gennemføre den lovede fulde liberalisering af kapital bevægelserne.
Towards the end of 1988 a further, unexpected, problem emerged which cast some doubt on the willingness of France in particular to complete the promised full liberalization of capital movements.
Præsident François Mitterrand udtalte over for Det Europæiske Råd under mødet på Rhodos i december 1988, at en fuldstændig ophævelse af kontrollen med valutatransaktioner kun ville være mulig, såfremt Fællesskabet vedtog en harmoniseret ordning for tilbage holdelse af skat på bankindeståender.
President Mitterrand told the European Council at Rhodes in December 1988, that the total abolition of foreign-exchange controls would only be possible if the Community agreed a harmonized system of withholding taxes on bank deposits.
De franske myndigheder var af den opfattelse, at uden en sådan skat ville fjernelsen af kontrol med kapitalbevægelser føre til en massiv destabiliserende kapitalflugt til lande, der ikke tilbageholder en sådan skat.
Without such tax, the authorities in Paris suggested, capital decontrol could lead to a massive destabilizing flight of capital to countries without a capital withholding tax.
Til trods for dette er De Tolv dybt splittede med hensyn til selve princippet i, hvad nogle beskriver som en beskatning af »opsparing«, medens andre betragter det som et vigtigt middel til at tøjle ukontrollable kapitalstrømme i spekulationsøjemed.
In spite of this the 12 are deeply divided about the very principle of what some describe as a tax on savings and others regard as an essential curb on disruptive speculative capital flows.
Som det klart fremgår af Kommissionens egen beretning om gennemførelsen af det europæiske monetære system og liberaliseringen af kapitalmarkedet, er enkeltforslagene i dette omfattende program i høj grad indbyrdes afhængige af hinanden. »Fuldstændig liberalisering af kapitalbevægelser og et velfungerende europæisk monetært system i hele Det Europæiske Fællesskab er en nødvendig, men ikke tilstrækkelig betingelse for at opnå den grad af finansiel integration, der er nødvendig for at skabe et fælles finansielt område«, hedder det i beretningen.
As the Commission's own progress report on the European monetary system and the liberalization of capital markets made clear, the individual items in this comprehensive programme are to a large degree mutually dependent on each other. 'Full capital liberalization and the smooth functioning of the European monetary system throughout the European Community are necessary but not sufficient conditions to attain the degree of financial integration necessary to create a common financial area', the report stated.
»Dette kræver også frihed til at yde finansielle tjenesteydelser, som kapitalbevægelser ofte blot tjener til at støtte«, hedder det videre. »Det kræver, at der ikke sker nogen forskelsbehandling, at konkurrenceforholdene mellem leverandører af finansielle tjenesteydelser ikke fordrejes af faktorer som f.eks. forskelle med hensyn til tilsynsregler eller beskatning« 8).
'This requires also the free provision of financial services, for which, the movement of capital is often only a support,' it went on. 'It requires that there can be no discriminatory treatment, that conditions of competition between suppliers of financial services should not be distorted by factors such as divergences in prudential regulations or excessive disparities in taxation'.8
Dette rejser umiddelbart en række problemer.
Serveral problems suggest themselves in this approach.
For det første vil en fuldstændig liberalisering af kapitalbevægelser kunne være politisk og økonomisk vanskelig for nogle af de sydeuropæiske medlemsstater.
The first is that full capital liberalization may yet prove both politically and economically difficult for some of the southern European Member States.
Risikoen for den græske, irske, portugisiske og spanske økonomi kan ikke bagatelliseres, og vi ved endnu ikke, hvilken virkning liberaliseringen vil kunne få på stærkere økonomier som f.eks.
The risks involved for the Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish economies are not negligible and we do not yet know what would be the impact on stronger economies, such as those of France and Italy, where some controls on capital movements remain in force.
Frankrig og Italien, hvor der fortsat føres en vis kontrol med kapitalbevægelser.
This is already a source of contention between the French and Federal German Governments.
Dernæst er der det hermed beslægtede spørgsmål om et smidigt fungerende EMS.
What is certain is that any steps in the direction of a more supranational EMS are going to arouse nervousness in some Member Slates.
Man kan dårligt være uenig med Kommissionen i, at systemet må styrkes, såfremt der skal være fuldstændig frie kapitalbevægelser i Fællesskabet.
The UK Prime Minister remains hesitant about sterling being fixed in the ERM of the monetary system while the Federal German Government (and in particular the Bundesbank) remain highly suspicious about any changes in the operation of the EMS which might dilute the Federal Republic's anti-inflationary economic policies, or the operational autonomy of the Bundesbank itself.
Et minimumskrav må nok være, at de lande, hvis valuta stadig flyder frit uden for EMS' vekselkursmekanisme, fuldt ud kommer til at deltage i denne mekanisme, det gælder navnlig Storbritannien.
It is not too difficult to foresee a scenario where all these issues get entangled together: no deal on capital liberalization without a stronger EMS including sterling, and no creation of a common market for financial services without comprehensive capital liberalization.
Fuldstændig gennemførelse af frie kapitalbevægelser i hele Fællesskabet vil nemlig, hvis den ikke ledsages af en stærkere EMS og et langt snævrere samarbejde om den monetære politik, kunne fremprovokere en massiv og politisk destabiliserende række af valutakriser.
It is going to take much delicate political footwork to avoid these issues log-jamming into a negotiating crisis. However, in the autumn of 1989, after the successful Madrid summit, there was renewed optimism about the prospects of greater monetary integration.
Men stabilitet vil også kræve en mere afbalanceret ordning for centralbankernes intervention, hvis de faste pariteter skal kunne forsvares uden uacceptable økonomiske risici.
There are some secondary difficulties in achieving a common financial area, moreover.
For øjeblikket påhviler næsten hele ansvaret for intervention og makroøkonomisk tilpasning landet med den svage valuta.
In most EC countries financial services such as banking and insurance are highly regulated, whereas in Britain and the Netherlands there is virtually complete deregulation.
Dette giver allerede nu anledning til splid mellem den franske og den vesttyske regering.
One result is that life insurance premiums are twice as cheap in the United Kingdom as anywhere else in the European Community.
Det er derimod helt sikkert, at ethvert skridt i retning af at gøre EMS mere »supranational«, vil skabe nervøsitet i visse medlemsstater.
This sometimes leads to a rather different tone of voice being adopted by the financial lobbies in the UK and some other EC countries.
Den britiske premierminister står stadig tøvende over for at lade pundet blive inddraget i EMS-valutakursmekanismen, medens den vesttyske regering (navnlig Bundesbank) fortsat er meget mistænksom over for enhver ændring af valutakursmekanismen, der vil kunne udhule Forbundsrepublikkens inflationsbekæmpende politik eller selve Forbundsbankens operationelle autonomi.
At one conference in Brussels the general manager of General Accident, the UK insurance firm, said, 'Although we respect rules, we do not want them to restrict competition'.
Det er ikke vanskeligt at forestille sig et scenarium, hvor alle disse problemer vikles ind i hinanden: ingen aftale om liberalisering af kapitalbevægelser uden en stærkere EMS med deltagelse af det britiske pund, og intet enhedsmarked for finansielle tjenesteydelser uden en omfattende liberalisering af kapitalbevægelser.
In the same debate however, the vice-president of the German Colonia insurance company, Dr Axel Biagosch, said that while they were 'quite unafraid of competition', German insurers 'did not want freedom without proper rules'.
Det vil kræve et omfattende taktfuldt politisk arbejde at und gå, at disse indbyrdes sammenfiltrede spørgsmål fører til en forhandlingskrise.
He added 'Our job is not to open up the market to foreign competitors, but to make sure we do our job as insurers properly."
Og hertil kommer en række sekundære vanskeligheder ved at oprette et fælles finansielt område.
Whereas some progress had been made by the end of 1988 on harmonizing non-life insurance and large risks insured against by businesses, progress on life insurance by individuals is proving very slow.
I de fleste EF-lande er finansielle tjenesteydelser som f.eks. bank- og forsikringsvirksomhed i høj grad reguleret, medens området i Storbritannien og Holland er så godt som fuldstændig ureguleret. Dette har f.eks. medført, at livsforsikringspræmier i Det Forenede Kongerige kun koster det halve af, hvad de koster alle andre steder i Det Europæiske Fællesskab.
Meanwhile, there are many obstacles in the way of regulations on investment bodies given the sharp philosophical gap between countries which practise comprehensive and detailed controls (such as the Federal Republic of Germany) and those (notably the United Kingdom) which run a self-regulating system of supervision.
Dette medfører sommetider, at finansielle lobbyer i Det Forenede Kongerige og i visse andre EF-lande taler med vidt forskelligt tonefald.
The very different structure of the financial markets in the different Community Member States, and divergences of view on the character of both national and Community supervision and control, may further complicate progress in finalizing a free and integrated financial services market.
På en konference i Bruxelles sagde den administrerende direktør for General Accident, et britisk forsikringsselskab: »Skønt vi respekterer regler, ønsker vi ikke, at de skal begrænse konkurrencen«.
Added to which is the, as yet, unresolved question of whether and to what extent, the Community should open its financial markets to third countries.
London City f.eks. fører generelt den åbne dørs politik, når det drejer sig om etablering af tredje landes finansielle institutioner.
The City of London, for example, operates a global open-door policy as far as the establishment of third country financial institutions is concerned.
Storbritannien har indført finansiel selvregulering — i stedet for lovbefalet kontrol — for finansielle institutioner i City.
The UK has also opted for a system of financial self-regulation — rather than control by statute — for City financial institutions.
Som følge heraf bryder City-institutionerne sig ikke om det af Kommissionen foreslåede system til regulering af bank- og investeringsvirksomhed og andre finansielle tjenesteydelser.
As a consequence, the City does not like the proposed system of regulation of banking, investment and other financial services suggested by the Commission.
Ironisk nok frygtes det, at City-Institutionerne vil kunne miste en del af deres forretningsvirksomhed til andre centre, hvor der indføres mindre stramme regler.
Ironically, there are fears that the City might lose business to other centres which end up with less demanding regulations.
Storbritannien var også bekymret over forlydender om, at Fællesskabet muligvis kun ville tillade finansielle institutioner fra tredjelande at operere frit, såfremt der gennem forhandlinger mellem EF og de andre lande var opnået en, hidtil uspecificeret, grad af »gensidighed«.
The UK was also worried at suggestions that the Community might only permit third country financial institutions to operate freely where an as yet unspecified degree of reciprocity has been negotiated between the EC and other countries.
USAs regering anså oprindelig denne fremgangsmåde for at indeholde kimen til en potentielt farlig protektionisme fra Det Europæiske Fællesskabs side.
The United States Administration initially saw in this approach the germ of a potentially dangerous protectionism on the side of the European Community.
Kommissionen gjorde det imidlertid i for året 1989 klart, at den med denne gensidighed kun søgte at forhindre, at europæiske finansielle institutioner blev udsat for forskelsbehandling i USA.
However, the Commission made clear in the spring of 1989 that by reciprocity it merely sought to prevent European financial institutions being discriminated against in the US.
På det tidspunkt gik meget af gassen af gensidighedsspørgsmålet.
At that point much of the transatlantic steam went out of the reciprocity issue.
Andre medlemsstater er bange for, at selvreguleringen og City-institutionernes generelt »tolerante« holdning udgør en potentiel trussel mod sparere og forbrugere af finansielle tjenesteydelser.
Other Member States are suspicious that self-regulation and the City's generally permissive attitude poses a potential threat to savers and consumers of financial services.
Hele spørgsmålet om, hvilken ordning der skal gælde for handelen udadtil, når det indre marked er oprettet, vil kunne blive en anden væsentlig hindring på vejen frem mod 1992.
The whole question of the external trade regime which will operate under the single European market could prove another major obstacle on the road to 1992.
Dette skyldes til en vis grad den debat, der har fundet sted uden for snarere end inden for EF, og hvor problematikken unuanceret er blevet reduceret til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Europa i sin udenrigshandelspolitik vil gå ind for en global liberalisering eller lukke sig inde i et »Fort Europa«.
This is in part because of the debate outside the EC, rather than inside, which has crudely been reduced to whether Europe will adopt a 'Fortress Europe' or a global liberalization philosophy to guide its external trade policies.
I en meddelelse til Ministerrådet i oktober 1988 forsøgte Kommissionen imidlertid at dæmpe frygten for, at den ønskede at gå i protektionistisk retning. Kommissionen understregede, at den
However in a communiqué to the Council of Ministers in October 1988, the Commission moved to allay fears that it was being tempted to travel down the protectionist road.
stadig tilsluttede sig Uruguay-Runden af GATT-forhandlingerne om liberalisering af den internationale handel med varer og tjenesteydelser, og fremhævede, at et indadvendt Fællesskab ikke ville være i de europæiske landes eller folkeslags interesse.
Industrialists such as Mr Jacques Calvet of Peugeot have warned that 1992 might develop into a Trojan horse for opening the doors to Japanese domination of European industrial markets.
Dette budskab blev kraftigt understreget på efterfølgende møder i Det Europæiske Råd — topmøder mellem EF's stats- og regeringschefer — i Hannover og på Rhodos i løbet af 1988.
There is also some national opposition to the Commission's proposal that the five countries which currently operate national restrictions on Japanese imports surrender future regulation to Brussels.10
EF-regeringerne gav i 1989 udtryk for voksende irritation, fordi de blev beskyldt for at være i færd med at planlægge en eller anden form for Fort Europa.
At present, Japanese imports of cars are controlled through voluntary restraint agreements with the United Kingdom — and (more restrictively) with France as well as through legal curbs in the case of Italy.
Den afgående kommissær for forbindelser med tredjelande fortalte i utvetydige vendinger USA's regering, at »Det Europæiske Fællesskab, der er langt den største handelsblok i verden, ikke har nogen interesse i at være indadvendt eller føre en protektionistisk politik«.
It will be no easy matter to negotiate a Community-wide arrangement which does not increase the risk of Japanese import penetration in the markets of those countries whose governments have until now been solely responsible for negotiating voluntary export restraint agreements with Tokyo.
Men valget står ikke blot mellem Fort Europa og et handelsmæssigt åbent Europa; dette er en simplificering, idet der foreligger en langt mere kompliceret vifte af muligheder lige fra ren og skær protektionisme til fuldstændig, parallel og samtidig liberalisering af udenrigshandelen med Fællesskabets vigtigste partnere.
The whole question of imports is linked with the growing problem, as seen from the European Community, of dumping by exporters from Japan, and also newly industrializing countries of the Pacific Rim such as South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Indeed in recent years the EC has strengthened its already formidable armoury of measures against dumping.