natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Domstolen i Saarbrücken spurgte desuden, om denne ugyldighed også ramte de enkelte ordrer, der var afgivet i henhold til rammeaftalen, og de kontraktmæssige leveringer, der allerede havde fundet sted.
This finding was based on the one hand on the central position heldby Pioneer (Europe) in relation to the national sole distributors and on the other, oncertain initiatives and measures taken by the firm.
I sit svar udtalte Domstolen, at bestemmelser i leveringsaftaler, som indskrænker aftagerens frihed til at bruge den leverede vare i overensstemmelse med sine egne
Pioneer had forwardedcomplaints from the French sole distributor, MDF, to Melchers & c Co. The firmhad also organized a meeting of sole distributors in Antwerp where the problem ofparallel imports into France was discussed in detail. Only after this action by 1
1969, s. 295 og 302; Pioneer-dommen, præmis nr. 85. 4) Præmis nr. 81-87.
Ground 51.
Med hensyn til artikel 85, stk. 2, udtalte Domstolen på linje med en række tidligere domme 2), at den heri omhandlede ugyldighed ganske vist er absolut, således at de aftaler, der falder ind under denne bestemmelse, ikke har nogen retsvirkninger i aftaleparternes indbyrdes forhold, men at den på den anden side kun rammer de kontraktbestemmelser, der er uforenelige med artikel 85, stk. 1.
Pioneer did Melchers & Co. and Shriro.actually take steps to impede deliveries to France.1 According to the case law of the Court, agreements, decisions and concertedpractices aimed at preventing parallel imports and consequently sealing offnational markets, are likely to have an appreciable effect on intra-Communitytrade.
Spørgsmålet om, hvilke virkninger denne ugyldighed har for kontrakten i øvrigt, skulle derfor ikke afgøres ud fra EF­retten, men derimod ud fra den nationale ret. Det samme gjaldt eventuelt afgivne ordrer og gennemførte leveringer ifølge kontrakten og de heraf følgende betalingsforpligtelser3).
This is to be presumed in particular where the firms concerned hold largemarket shares.2 Where the parties concerned are in a weak position, an agreementmay not fall within the scope of Article 85(1) if its actual or foreseeable influence onmarket conditions is slight.3The Court did not believe that there was such anexceptional situation in the Pioneer case, but pointed out that even taking as a basisthe market shares claimed by the parties themselves (which amounted to 3% of thenational market in hi-fi products for both Shriro and MDF) and the annualturnover of the two firms established by the Commission (between 10 million and15 million ECU for both) the contested concerted practices were capable ofappreciably affecting trade between Member States.4
c) Artikel 85, stk. 3
(b) Article 85(1) and (2)
I Navewa­Anseau­dommen præciserede Domstolen fortolkningen af artikel 4, stk. 2, pkt. 1, i forordning nr. 174).
In Ciments et Betons a reference for a preliminary ruling gave the Court theopportunity to expand upon the scope of Article 85(2).
I henhold til denne bestemmelse er aftaler, hvori kun deltager virksomheder fra én medlemsstat, og som ikke vedrører indførsel eller udførsel mellem medlemsstater, fritaget fra pligten til forudgående anmeldelse, som i princippet er betingelsen for, at en aftale kan fritages efter artikel 85, stk. 3.
The Oberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Saarbriicken asked whether a five-year basic agreementconcluded between a French company and a German company for annualdeliveries of approximately 40 000 tonnes of cement was to be considered voidunder Article 85, where the German contracting party undertook not to deliver inthe Saarland the cement supplied by its French partner, in the event of deliveries inthe Karlsruhe area to have regard to the French company's interest in works at Wossingen, Germany and to consult the French company on each occasion beforesoliciting business there.
Denne undtagelsesbestemmelse er indført for at lette administrationen.
In addition, the abovementioned court asked whethersuch nullity affected also the individual contracts of sale made in performance ofthe basic agreement and the physical transactions made in performance of anyparticular contract of sale.
Den omfatter kun karteller, der ganske vist kan falde ind under artikel 85, stk. 1, men som på grund af deres særlige karakter generelt må anses for mindre skadelige for konkurrencen, og som derfor med stor sandsynlighed ville kunne fritages i henhold til artikel 85, stk. 35).
The Court stated that clauses in supply contracts which restrict the customer'sfreedom to use die goods supplied in his own economic interests constituterestrictions of competition within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty. Acontract which obliges the customer to use the goods supplied for his ownrequirements, not to resell them in a certain area and to solicit business in another
1971, s. 949 og 962; dom af 30.6.1966, Socieie technique sag 63/75, Sml. 1976, s. Ill minière/Machinenbau Ulm, sag 56/65, Sml.
Nauewa-Anseau Grounds 26 to 28.
1966, s. 281 og 304. ')
Grounds 81 to 87.
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER pricipperne for et fælles marked.
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES area only after prior consultation with the seller is designed to distort competitionwithin the common market.
Da parterne ikke havde anmeldt aftalen, kunne der allerede af den grund ikke være tale om anvendelse af artikel 85, stk. 3:).
If such an agreement accounts for some 10% ofexports of the goods concerned from France to the Federal Republic of Germany, itis also liable to affect appreciably trade between Member States.
Anvendelse af artikel 85 på selektive distributionssystemer
Under thoseconditions the disputed agreement infringes the prohibition laid down by Article 85(1) and is therefore void.1
Men legitime hensyn — f.eks. ønsket om at opretholde en specialforretning, som kan præstere bestemte serviceydelser i forbindelse med produkter af høj teknisk standard og kvalitet — kan dog retfærdiggøre en begrænsning af priskonkurrencen til fordel for andre faktorer. Selektive distributionssystemer, som tilsigter et lovligt resultat, der som helhed bidrager til en forbedring af konkurrencen, er således en konkurrencefaktor, som er forenelig med artikel 85, stk. 1.
Article 85 (3) cannot in principle be granted, is not required for agreements to whichthe only parties are undertakings from one Member State and do not relate either toimports or to exports between Member States.
De i et selektivt distributionssystem indbyggede begrænsninger kan dog kun tillades, dersom de rent faktisk tilsigter en forbedring af konkurrencen på andre områder end prisen; i modsat fald kan de ikke retfærdiggøres, idet deres eneste virkning da vil være at begrænse priskonkurrencen 3).
It is limited to restrictive agreements andpractices which may be covered by Article 85(1), but because of their particularfeatures appear in general to be less harmful from the point of view of the objectivesof this provision and therefore very probably qualify for exemption under Article 85(3).5
1977, s. 1875), at disse systemer tillades, »såfremt udvælgelsen af videreforhandlere sker på grundlag af objektive kvalitetskriterier for videreforhandlerens og hans personales faglige dygtighed og hans salgslokalers beskaffenhed, og såfremt disse betingelser fastsættes ens for alle mulige videreforhandlere og anvendes uden diskrimination«.
The Court took the view that the disputed agreement, which concerned theintroduction of a standard conformity label, did not satisfy the conditions forexemption from notification, since it was aimed at impeding parallel imports andtherefore inconsistent with the principles of a single market.
Heraf følger, at anvendelsen af et selektivt distributionssystem, som er baseret på andre kriterier end de nævnte, udgør en overtrædelse af artikel 85, stk. 1.
Since the parties hadnot notified the agreements, application of Article 85(3) could in any case not beconsidered for reasons of form.6
Afslaget på eller tilbagekaldelsen af autorisationen havde nemlig til formål at sikre overholdelsen af de konkurrencebegrænsende aftaler, som dannede grundlag for kontrakterne mellem fabrikanterne og de autoriserede forhandlere ]).
In view of the increasingpopularity of this type of marketing, this judgment is of considerable importance tothe Commission's future competition policy on distribution agreements.
Ved vurderingen af det selektive distributionssystem, der blev praktiseret af AEG-Telefunken, nåede Domstolen frem til det resultat, at virksomheden bevidst havde fulgt en politik, der gik ud på at opretholde høje priser og diskriminere nye distibutionsformer, navnlig varehuse og supermarkeder2).
In considering the legal scope of selective distribution systems, the Court stated thatthey necessarily influence competition in the common market. However, legitimaterequirements—such as the maintenance of a special line of business capable ofsupplying specific services in respect of high-quality, hightechnology goods—could justify a restriction of price competition where other aspects benefited.Selective distribution systems thus constitute an aspect of competition compatiblewith Article 85(1), since they are designed to attain a lawful consequence thatcontributes to reinforcing competition as a whole.
AEG-Telefunken havde således ved antagelsen af nye forhandlere stillet irrelevante betingelser for autorisation, som f.eks. tilsagn om at anvende bestemte priser eller beskytte etablerede forhandlere mod yderligere konkurrence, og søgt direkte eller indirekte at påtvinge de autoriserede forhandlere bestemte salgspriser.
To ensure that selective distribution systems serve this purpose only, and areneither established nor used to attain objectives inconsistent with Community law,the Court decided in its judgment of 25 October 1977 in Case 26/76 Metro ([1977]ECR 1875) that such systems are admissible 'provided that resellers are chosen onthe basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to the technicalqualifications of the reseller and his staff and the suitability of his trading premisesand that such conditions are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and arenot applied in a discriminatory fashion.'
Skønt Kommissionen kun havde påvist et begrænset antal enkelttilfælde, var der dog ført tilstrækkeligt bevis for en systematisk adfærd fra AEG-Telefunkens side3).
Accordingly, use of a selective distributionsystem based on other objectives constitutes an infringement of Article 85(1), asdoes a distribution system which is in principle compatible with Community law,but incompatible in the way in which it is applied.
Virksomheden kunne tilregnes de tyske, belgiske og franske datterselskabers konkurrencefordrejende adfærd, fordi disse i det væsentligste havde fulgt moderselskabets anvisninger4).
Such conduct must be consideredunlawful where the manufacturer, so as to maintain a high price level or to excludecertain modern marketing methods, refuses to approve distributors who satisfy thequalitative criteria of the system.3
') Præmis nr. 38 og 39. 2) Præmis nr. 40-43 og 67-76.
Refusals or withdrawals of approval are intended in particular to
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES ensure compliance with the arrangements in restraint of competition underlyingthe contracts between the manufacturers and appointed dealers.1
IG KL-dommenl) fastslog Domstolen, at artikel 86 finder fuldt ud anvendelse på den adfærd, der udvises af nationale selskaber til udnyttelse af ophavsrettigheder, som i de enkelte medlemsstater indtager en faktisk monopolstilling.
The GVL case1 confirms the applicability of Article 86 to the conduct ofnational copyright collecting societies enjoying a de facto monopoly in theindividual Member States.
Den omstændighed, at disse selskaber er underlagt særligt offentligt tilsyn, var efter Domstolens opfattelse ikke tilstrækkelig til, at de kunne sidestilles med de i EØF-traktatens artikel 90, stk. 2, nævnte virksomheder, der har fået overdraget at udføre tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse og derfor kun i begrænset omfang er underlagt konkurrencereglerne2).
In the Court's view, the fact that such societies have beenmade subject to particularly strict official supervision is not sufficient for them tobe regarded as undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of generaleconomic interest within the meaning of Article 90(2) and consequently subject tothe rules on competition to only a limited extent.2
De nationale selskaber, der varetager ophavsrettigheder, må ikke begrænse deres virksomhed til kun at omfatte kunstnere med bopæl i indlandet, da de også skal tilbyde deres ydelser til udøvende kunstnere med bopæl i udlandet, for så vidt disse ønsker at gøre brug af deres rettigheder i indlandet.
The national copyright collecting societies must not limit their services to artistsresident within the country, but must also offer them to artists established abroadwho wish to claim their rights within the country.
En virksomhed med et faktisk monopol, der således afslår at stille sin tjeneste til rådighed for alle, der kan have behov herfor, men som ikke er omfattet af en bestemt personkreds, som denne virksomhed har fastlagt på grundlag af nationalitet eller bopæl, må anses for at misbruge en dominerende stilling efter traktatens artikel 86, stk. 13). En sådan adfærd kan også føre til en begrænsning af handelen mellem medlemsstater, fordi den hindrer fri udveksling af tjenesteydelser inden for Fællesskabet4).
A refusal by an undertakinghaving a de facto monopoly to provide its services to all those who may be in needof them but who do not come within a certain category of persons defined by theundertaking on the basis of nationality or residence is to be regarded as an abuse ofa dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty.3 Such conductis also liable to affect trade between Member States, since it obstructs freedom toprovide services within the Community.4
I M/'c/2e/i/2-dommen stadfæstede Domstolen i det væsentligste Kommissionens beslutning, hvori sagsøgerens rabatpolitik over for dækforhandlerne blev anset for at være misbrug af en dominerende stilling5).
The Michelin case essentially confirms the Decision in which the Commission declared that the plaintiff's discount policy with regard to tyre dealerswas an abuse of a dominant position.5
Domstolen tilsluttede sig fuldt ud Kommissionens holdning med hensyn til den geografiske og saglige afgrænsning af det relevante marked og fastslog, at Michelin i det pågældende tidsrum indtog en dominerende stilling på markedet for nye reservedæk til lastbiler, busser og tilsvarende køretøjer i Nederlandene og dermed
The Court fully endorsed the Commission's thinking on the definition of therelevant geographical and product markets and found that, during the period takeninto consideration, Micbelin had held a dominant position on the market in new
') Se også Kommissionens beslutning af 29.12.1981, EFT L 370 af 28.12.1981, s. 49; Ellevte Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken, nr. 102.
Commission Decision of 29.10.1981: OJ L 370,28.12.1981;Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, point 102.
2) Præmis nr. 29-33; se også Kommissionens beslutning af 2.6.1971, GEMA I, EFT L 134 af 20.6.1971, s. 15 og 27, samt Domstolens dom af 27.3.1974, BRT II, sag 127/73, Sml.
Grounds 29 to 33; Commission Decision of 2.6.1971 GEMA1: OJ L 134, 20.6.1971: Case 127/73
115 i en væsentlig del af det fælles marked '). Den var også enig med Kommissionen i, at den af Michelin anvendte ordning med variable rabatter, som blev ydet, når bestemte salgsmål, der var fastsat individuelt for hver enkelt forhandler, var nået, og udbetalt som forskud på den årsbonus, som skulle ydes ved årets udgang, måtte anses for et misbrug i artikel 86's forstand.
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES replacement tyres for lorries, buses and similar vehicles in the Netherlands andhence in a substantial part of the common market.1It also concurred with the
Efter Domstolens opfattelse kunne sådanne rabatordninger, der var baseret på salgsmål, hverken sidestilles med kvantumrabatter eller loyalitetsrabatter.
In the Court's view, such discounts geared to sales targets are comparable neitherwith quantity discounts nor with fidelity discounts.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt denne rabatordning er forenelig med artikel 85, afhænger herefter af de nærmere økonomiske omstændigheder, navnlig kriterierne og betingelserne for ydelsen af rabatterne.
Their compatability with Article 86 therefore depends on the accompanying economic circumstances as awhole, particularly on the criteria for granting the discounts and the way in whichthey are granted.
I det konkrete tilfælde nåede Domstolen til det resultat, at det omtvistede rabatsystem til trods for rabatternes beskedne størrelse — mellem 0,2 og 0,4 % — førte til, at forhandlerne, navnlig ved årets slutning, blev udsat for et betydeligt pres for at nå Michelins salgsmål, hvilket var nødvendigt for ikke at lide tab, som konkurrenterne kun vanskeligt kunne opveje med de rabatter, de var i stand til at tilbyde.
In the case in point, the Court concluded that, despite the modestlevel of the discounts, which ranged between 0.2% and 0.4%, the system in disputeresulted in dealers being put under considerable pressure, particularly towards theend of the year, to achieve Michelin's sales targets and thus to avoid suffering lossesthat would hardly have been offset by the discounts which competitors were able tooffer.
Dermed havde Michelin indskrænket forhandlernes mulighed for at vælge mellem flere leverandører og vanskeliggjort konkurrenternes adgang til markedet2).
Thus Michelin had restricted the dealer's ability to choose between severalsources of supply and had made market access more difficult for its competitors.2
Derimod fandt Domstolen ikke Kommissionens påstand om forskelsbehandling af handelsparterne tilstrækkeligt bevist3).
However, the Court held that the Commission's further charge of discriminationbetween trading partners was not sufficiently proved.3Nor did it share the
Den delte heller ikke Kommissionens betænkeligheder med hensyn til en ekstraordinær bonus, som Michelin havde udbetalt til sine forhandlere i 1977 4).
Commission's misgivings concerning an extra bonus which Michelin had grantedits dealers in 1977.4Consequently, the fine imposed by the Commission was reduced from 680 000 ECU to 300 000 ECU.
Anvendelse af de enkelte landes og Fællesskabets konkurrenceregler i medlemsstaterne
Application of national and Community competition lawin the Member States
§ 1 — Hovedlinjerne i de enkelte landes konkurrencepolitik
§1 — Main developments in national competition policies
Loven af 27. maj 1960 om beskyttelse mod misbrug af økonomisk magt er ikke blevet ændret i 1983. Det nye foreløbige forslag til ændringslov, som blev omtalt i den foregående beretning, er fortsat genstand for konsultationer.
The Act of 27 May 1960 on protection from the abuse of economic powerwas not amended in 1983.
Conseil du Contentieux Economique har afgivet udtalelse i to sager vedrørende arrangementet af udstillinger, den ene for møbler og den anden for kød.
The Council for Economic Disputes delivered an opinion in two casesconcerning the organization of exhibitions, one in the furniture sector and the otherin the meat sector.
I begge tilfælde har denne institution afgivet følgende udtalelse: den indklagede part, »som udøver en dominerende økonomisk magt som arrangør af udstillinger og messer... har misbrugt denne magt ved at udelukke udstillere, der ligegyldigt på hvilket tidspunkt har deltaget på andre fagmesser i Belgien, fra at udstille på messer, som sagsøgte har arrangeret«.
In both cases, the Council's opinion was worded as follows: thedefendant, 'who occupies a dominant economic position on the market in theorganization of trade exhibitions and fairs, ...has abused his dominant economicposition by banning from the trade fair organized by him exhibitors who havetaken part at any time in other trade fairs in the Kingdom'.
Økonomiministeren var enig med Conseil du Contentieux Economique i de af dette afgivne udtalelser og meddelte parterne sine henstillinger.
The Minister for Economic Affairs agreed with the Council's opinions andinformed the parties of his recommendations.
Disse blev godkendt og er indeholdt i en aftale med følgende ordlyd: den indklagede part »forpligter sig til som arrangør af handelsmesser ... med øjeblikkelig virkning ikke at udelukke nogen virksomhed fra deltagelse i en anden messe eller udstilling, bortset fra et tidsrum svarende til halvdelen af intervallet mellem to på hinanden følgende messer. Desuden forpligter den indklagede sig til ikke bevidst at vanskeliggøre arrangementet af andre lignende messer i Belgien«.
These were accepted and formed thebasis of an agreement the substance of which is as follows: the defendant'undertakes in connection with the organization of trade fairs henceforth not toreject any company on the ground of its participation in another fair or exhibitionsave during a period equal to half of the interval between two successive fairs.Moreover, the defendant undertakes to do nothing knowingly which might hinderthe organization of other similar fairs in Belgium'.
I de to sager vedrørende distribution af presseartikler er Conseil du Contentieux Economique ved at undersøge et system, ifølge hvilket der inden godkendelsen af et nyt salgssted for aviser skal indhentes udtalelse fra en af de regionale rådgivende kommissioner, der er fordelt i provinserne, og hvori deltager fire parter, nemlig dagbladsudgivere, udgivere af tidsskrifter, detailforhandlere af presseartikler samt
In two cases involving the distribution of press publications, the Council for Economic Disputes has called into question the system whereby the approval of anew point of sale for newspapers is conditional on a favourable opinion from one of
KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN OVER FOR VIRKSOMHEDER virksomheder, der beskæftiger sig med distribution af disse artikler (for det meste AMP ')). Kommissionens henstillinger er ganske vist ikke bindende for udgiverne, som selv kan bestemme, om de vil levere eller ej, men i praksis synes udgiverne alligevel at efterkomme disse henstillinger.
COMPETITION POLICY TOWARDS ENTERPRISES the Regional Consultative Committees, which are organized on provincial linesand have a quadripartite constitution, being composed of newspaper publishers,the publishers of periodicals, newsagents and the distributors of such publications(more often than not, the AMP).1Although the opinion of the Regional Consultative Committees is not binding on publishers, and while the latter remainfree to decide whether or not to supply, in practice they seem to act in accordancetherewith.
Desuden påpeger Conseil du Contentieux Economique, at anvendelsen af dette selektive distributionssystem sker vilkårligt, og at de anvendte kriterier ikke har relation til det forfulgte mål, nemlig en geografisk spredning samt et stort sortiment på hvert salgssted.
The Council notes, moreover, that this selective distribution system is implementedin an arbitrary manner and that the criteria applied are unrelated to the objectivepursued, namely geographical dispersal and the availability of a wide variety ofpublications at each point of sale.
Også økonomiministeren var af den opfattelse, at der var tale om misbrug af en dominerende stilling og rettede henstillinger til de pågældende parter, der fulgte dem.
The Minister for Economic Affairs also took the view that a dominant position hadbeen abused and sent recommendations to the parties concerned, who acceptedthem.
Der er indgået en aftale på følgende vilkår: »Aftaleparterne forpligter sig til straks i de omtalte regionale rådgivende kommissioner at ophøre med enhver form for samordning... af praksis for anmodninger om levering af presseartikler skal efter kommes eller ej.
An agreement was reached along the following lines: 'The parties to theagreement undertake to cease forthwith all consultations within the said Regional Consultative Committees concerning the response to applications for the supply ofpress publications.