natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det er navnlig kerneenergien, der træder i stedet.
Nuclear energy was seen as the chief alter­native.
I de første år efter den anden oliekrise havde man afgjort succes med bestræbelserne på at komme væk fra olien.
In the years immediately after the second oil crisis, the strategy of reducing dependence on oil as faras possible had considerable suc­cess.
F.eks. holdt EF's brutto­forbrug af primærenergi sig ca. på samme ni­veau fra 1973 til 1985; det steg fra 1 029 mio. toe til 1 053 mio. t i 1980 og faldt igen en smule til 1048 mio. i 1985.
Forexample, Community gross primary energy consumption remained more or less constant between 1973 and 1985: it rose from 1029 million toe to 1053 million toe in 1980, declining slightly again to 1048 million toe in 1985.
I 1973 brugte de nuværende 12 medlemsstater tilsammen 606 mio. t olie, i 1980 kun 552 og i 1985 så­gar kun 457 mio. t — og dette tal ville endda havde været lavere uden de britiske minear­bejderes strejke.
In 1973 the present 12 members of the Community together con­sumed 606 million tonnes of oil.
Olieproduktionen i de 12 EF­lande steg fra 13 mio. tons via 93 i 1980 til 151 mio. t i 1985 (hovedsageligt takket være Nordsøolien).
This had fallen to 552 million tonnes in 1980 and 457 million tonnes in 1985, a figure which was, however, distorted by the miners' strike in the UK, i.e. it was artificially high.
Nettoimporten af olie faldt fra 643 via 497 til 334 mio. t. Det er bemærkel­sesværdigt, at oliens andel af det samlede energiforbrug og afhængigheden af importe­
Oil produc­tion within the 12 Community countries in­creased from 13 million tonnes to 93 million tonnes in 1980 and 151 million tonnes in 1985 (mainly due to North Sea oil); net oil imports fell from 643 million tonnes to 497
dokumentet, at tendensen til opløsning af sammenhængen mellem energiefterspørgsel og økonomisk vækst (med andre ord: den faldende energiintensitet) er blevet svagere, i det mindste i perioden 1982 til 1986.
and Portugal, the de-linking trend had — according to the Commission — actually been reversed. Demand for electricity also exceeded economic growth with an increase of 3.3% per annum between 1982 and 1986.
Energi forbrugets gennemsnitlige årlige vækst var på 2% og dermed næsten lige så høj som bruttonationalproduktets gennemsnitlige år lige vækst, der lå på 2,2%.
The Commission is therefore probably right in concluding that the inclination to conserve energy has diminished in the light of lower energy prices (in particular of crude oil) recently.
Deraf må man vel med Kommissionen slutte, at til bøjeligheden til at spare på energien er taget af, nu da priserne (især på råolie) igen er blevet lavere.
However, the Commission also noted with some concern that the decoupling of energy demand from economic growth (i.e. diminishing energy intensity) had slowed down, at least as far as the period 1982-86 was concerned.
Har europæerne allerede for trængt læren af de to oliechok?
The annual growth in energy demand of 2% per annum on average was almost as high as the mean growth rate in GDP at 2.2%.
Eller er de på vej til at gøre det? Lad os endnu engang se til bage på 1973 og på det, der fulgte.
In some countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland
Detooliechok,derpåfåårdrevprisen på rå­olie op til det tolvdobbelte, virkede hærgen­de på økonomien i Europa som overalt i ver­den.
The two crises which caused oil prices to in­crease twelvefold within a few years had disastrous effects on the economies of Europe and the whole world.
Endnu i dag har de efterladt dybe spor.
The scars are still visible today.
Således er f.eks. krisen i stålbranchen, der har været særlig mærkbar i Europa siden midten af 70erne — der er tale om afsætningsvanske­ligheder, efter at der forinden var skabt over­kapacitet — en direkte følge af, at efterspørg­selen efter stål pludselig faldt.
The crisis in the steel in­dustry with stagnating sales following the build­up of overcapacities, which hit Europe particularly hard from the middle of the 1970s, was a direct consequence of the sud­den drop in demand for steel.
Men den økonomiske situation så helt ander­ledes ud.
The economic situation, however, was tot­ally different.
Produktionskapaciteten var ikke så kraftigt udnyttet, priserne på mange råstoffer var stagnerende eller faldende, og de vigtig­ste stater foretog en bedre koordinering af de­res økonomiske politik.
Capacity utilization was run­ningata much lower rate, prices of many raw materials were stagnating or declining, and the leading industrialized countries were coordinating economic policy more effec­tively.
Derfor lykkedes det i 1979­1980 at undgå en ny recession.
As a result, a second recession in the years 1979­80 was successfully avoided.
Men krisen varede ved i nogle år.
Nevertheless, the crisis persisted for several years.
Vækstraterne i OECD's 24 medlemsstater lå i årene 1980­1982 i gennemsnit på under 1%; i EF var væksten knap 0,8%, i USA var den 0 og i Ja­pan ca. 3%.
Growth rates in the 24 member coun­tries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) averaged less than 1% during the years 1980­82, with just over 0.8% in the European Community, zero in the USA and about 3% in Japan.
Først i årene efter 1983 indledtes et flerårigt opsving, hvor der nåedes vækstra­ter som sidst i 60erne.
It was not until 1983 that a period of recovery set in, in the course of which growth rates regained the levels of the late 1960s.
Beskæftigelsessituationen har næsten ikke bedret sig; ja, nogle steder er den endda ble­vet værre.
The employment situation, by contrast, showed little improvement and in some cases even deteriorated.
I 1974 var der 3,5 mio. arbejdsløse i EF; i 1975 var der 5 mio. og i 1981 hele 10 mio. Fællesskabets udvidelse med Græken­land (1981) og med Spanien og Portugal (1986) betød en væsentlig forøgelse ikke blot af de arbejdsløses antal, men også af arbejds­løshedskvoten, dvs. de arbejdsløses procen­tuelleandel af arbejdsstyrken.
Unemployment in the Community, which affected 3.5 million people in 1974, had risen to 5 million by 1975 and hit the 10 million mark in 1981. The ac­cession to the Community of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 brought with it a substantial increase in unemployment, not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of the working population.
Endnu ved ud­gangen af 1988 var der i de 12 EF­lande 15,5 mio. arbejdsløse, svarende til en arbejdsløs­hedskvote på 10%.
There were still no fewer than 15.5 million people out of work in the Community of the Twelve at the end of 1988, equivalent to an unemployment rate of 10%.
■ EF'S REAKTION PA DEN NYE SITUATION PÅ ENERGIMARKEDET
Although prices increased by approximately the same amount both times, their effects could scarcely be compared.
Men skønt prisforhøjelserne var omtrent lige store i begge tilfælde, var virkningerne næ­sten ikke til at sammenligne.
The first crisis in 1973 came at a time when utilization of production capacities was running at a fairly high level.
Det første chok i 1973 indtraf i en periode med temmelig højtudnyttet produktionskapacitet; desuden var råstofpriserne uden for energisektoren stigende, hvad der sammen med høje dollar­kurser forstærkede oliechokkets inflatoriske virkninger.
In addition, raw material prices outside the energy sector were on the uptu rn which, together with a more expensive dollar, intensified the inflationary effects of the oil crisis.
Prisstigningerne i EF, der i 60erne havde ligget på knap 4% årligt, nåede i 1973­1975 op på gennemsnitligt 12%, dog med store forskelle fra land til land.
Inflation rates in the Commun­ity, which during the 1960s had been run­ning at just over 4%, rocketed to an average of 12% in the years 1973­75, although this figure masks considerable differences from country to country.
I Irland, Italien og Grækenland registreredes en infla­tion på 15­20%. Meget betegnende er det lande, som er særlig stærkt afhængige af im­porteret energi. Hånd i hånd hermed blev betalingsbalancen i de fleste industrilande vendt om.
Inflation rates of 15­20% were recorded in Ireland, Italy and Greece, by no coincidence countries with a par­ticularly high dependence on imported energy.
Gældsætningen tog til, hvilket medførte forstyrrelser i valutasystemet i hele verden og indskrænkning af verdenshande­len.
Indebtedness grew, which in turn led to disruptions in the international monetary system and a further shrinking of world trade.
EF's bruttonationalprodukt faldt i 1975 reelt mere end 1%, og verden oplevede den første virkelige recession siden Anden Ver­denskrig.
The Community's gross domestic product declined in real terms by over 1% in 1975.
Ganske vist noteredes der igen positive vækstrater, men ikke nær så kraftige som først i 70erne.
In short, the world was in its first real recession since the Second World War.
Efter at forbruget af primærenergi var steget ustandseligt fra 1950 til 1973 for sidstnævnte år, da det første oliechok satte ind, at nå 1 mia. toe, blev tendensen med et slag brudt.
The second oil crisis broke before the conse­quences of the changed energy situation had been completely assimilated and adjustment processes were still in train.
Primærenergiforbrug i Fællesskabet
At the same time, the countries affected took measures to damp energy consumption.
I første omgang drejede det sig om at skaffe sig kendskab til de faktiske forhold.
The oil crisis was the overriding issue at the Copenhagen Summit on 14 and 15 December 1973, at which representatives of the OPEC countries were highly prominent, albeit unofficial, guests.
For at kunne opstilleen energipolitik for Fællesskabet måtte man have nøjagtige informationer om udviklingen på energimarkederne, specielt markedet for råolie.
In view of the gravity of the situation, it was agreed that energy policy measures should be drawn up without delay, for which a new body, the Energy Committee, was to be responsible.
Ganske vist havde Kommissionen i henhold til EKSF- og Eura-tom-Traktaterne ret til en række informationer om kul- og kerneenergisektorerne, men først i 1972 vedtog Rådet bestemmelser, der også gav den adgang til informationer om planlagte investeringer inden for sektorerne olie, naturgas og elektricitet, hvormed den blev i stand ti I bed re at vurdere det fremtidige behov og forbrug.
It was to consist of represent atives of the Member States chaired by a Commission Member; its brief was to secure the coordinated implementation of the Com munity measures, facilitate exchange of in formation and consultations between Member States and the Commission and support the Commission in formulating its proposals.
Efter energikrisens udbrud opfordrede Kom missionen medlemsstaterne til en gang pr. kvartal at forelægge oplysninger om udviklingen i de forskellige virksomheders ind førsel af råolie og naturgas, så Bruxelles kun ne få mulighed for at vurdere forsyningssituationen med den nødvendige sikkerhed.
However, under the pressure of events, Member States initially began to decide and implement their own measures without proper coordination.
Fra 1979, dvs. under indtryk af den anden oliekrise, styrkedes overvågningen af råolieimporten ved, at der indførtes registreringspligt.
Designing a common energy policy requires precise information on the development of the energy market, and in particular the crude oil market.
Der med fik Bruxelles indsigt i, på hvilke betingelser disse transaktioner afvikledes. I 1977 besluttede medlemsstaterne endelig at ind-
The Commission did receive information on coal and nuclear energy on the basis of the ECSC and Euratom Treaties, but it was only in 1972 that the Council enacted provisions giving the Commission access to information on planned investments in the oil, natural gas and electricity sectors, important data for the assessment of future demand and consumption. sumption.
sionen overvåger realiseringen af disse mål­sætninger og gennemgår med regelmæssige mellemrum medlemsstaternes energipolitik.
France, for example, fai rly soon left the coor­dinating group set up by the Washington Energy Conference which led to the foun­ding of the International Energy Agency, because it had reservations about some policy aspects.
samle oplysningerom kulimporten fra tred­jelande og at videregive dem til Kommis­sionen.
Nevertheless, the elements of a common energy policy gradually crystallized and still form the backbone of this policy today. They include:
De skulle derimod danne grundlag for et samarbejde mellem med­lemsstaterne med henblik på gennemførelse af fælles politiske retningslinjer og mål.
The first objectives were formulated in 1974. In 1980 they were more precisely defined for the period until 1990.
Sam­arbejdet omfatter ikke blot myndighederne i medlemsstaterne; Kommissionen er også re­gelmæssigt i kontakt med markedets parter, altså med de olieselskaber, som er inddraget i forsyningen af Fællesskabet, med de store transport­ og distributionsselskaber og med producenter af kul og elektricitet.
In the spring of 1988 the Commission presented the objectives for 1995, which will be considered later.
Også for­brugerne er inddraget i samarbejdet, enten gennem organisationer eller individuelt.
The Commission monitors progress towards these objectives and reviews Member States' energy policies at regular intervals;
— Anvendelse af visse Fællesskabsinstru­menter til at supplere medlemsstaternes egen indsats i tilfælde, hvor denne frem­gangsmåde kan forventes at være mere effek­tiv.
After the onset of the energy crisis, the Com­mission called on the Member States to pro­vide quarterly information on the develop­ment of oil and gas imports with a breakdown by company to enable the Com­munity to make a reliable assessment of the supply situation.
Hertil hører f. eks. fælles forsknings­udviklings­ og demonstrationsprogrammer, EF­lovgivning på områder som rationel ener­gianvendelse, harmonisering af de vigtigste prisdannelseselementer og koordinering af relationerne til visse tredjelande.
Two Council regulations adopted in 1974alsorequiredMemberStates to notify the Commission of imports of oil products and exports of hydrocarbons (oil, derived products and gas).
Desuden ydes der støtte til anlægs­ og modernisering­si nvester inger i energisektoren over Fælles­skabets budget og ved hjælp af lån fra Eura­tom, Det Europæiske Kul­ og Stålfællesskab (EKSF), Det Nye Fællesskabsinstrument (NIC) og Den Europæiske Investeringsbank.
From 1979 on­wards, in the light of the second oil crisis, oil imports were subjected to even closer monitoring in the form of a registration obligation.
Således medvirker EF f.eks. til finansiering af kraftværker, udrustning af kulminer og kul­havne, omstilling af oliefyrede anlæg til fy­ring med fast brændsel, udvidelse og fælles­drift af elnet, udvikling af nye energikilder, samt til forskellige energi besparelsesprojek­ter inden for industrien, i offentlige bygnin­ger og i forbindelse med drift af fjern­varmenet.
In this way the Community received some indication of the terms apply­ing to these transactions. Finally, the Member States decided in 1977 to collect and forward to the Commission data on coal imports from non­Community countries.
Alt i alt har Fællesskabets og de enkelte med­lemsstaters indsats afgjort givet resultater.
Of course the Commission did not just col­lect all this information for its own sake.
Fra 1973 til 1983 lykkedes det EF at reducere sin olieimport med 50%.
Its purpose was to serve as a basis for concerted action by the Member States in order to secure the implementation of common political guidelines and objectives.
Man har beregnet at EF takket være mere rationel energianvendelse har nedsat forbruget med, hvad der svarer til 250 mio. tons olie.
Such concerted action has not been confined to the national authorities: the Commission also has regular contacts with market operators, i.e. the oil companies, the major transport and distribution undertakings and the coal and electricity producers.
Samtidig gav oliefore­komsterne i Nordsøen ca. 130 mio. tons, og ved at anvende mere kerneenergi og natur­gas undgik man at importere en tilsvarende mængde.
Con­sumers, too, are involved either individually or through their representative organi­zations.
Forsynet med disse informationer kunne Kommissionen med større succes end tidli­gere give sig i lag med at skabe grundlaget for en fælles energipolitik.
(ii) the useof certain Community instruments designed to supplement action by Member States whenever this is likely to prove more effective.
Først lidt efter lidt kom medlemsstaterne til erkendelse af, at netop på et så vitalt område som energiforsy­ningen og specielt da i en krisesituation er der større udsigt til succes, hvis der føres en fælles politik, end hvis hver enkelt stat optræ­der for sig og handler efter eget tykke.
These include joint research, development and demonstration program­mes, Community legislation in areas such as rational useof energy, harmonization of the key components of price formation and coor­dination of relations with certain non­Com­munity partners.
Erken­delsen bredte sig dog ikke overalt med sam­me hastog intensitet. Således forlod Frankrig ret hurtigt den koordineringsgruppe, der blev nedsat på energikonferencen i Washing­ton og førte til oprettelse af Det Internationa­le Energiagentur, fordi den franske regering tog forbehold over for en række af gruppens indstillinger.
In addition, support for in­vestment in equipment and modernization in the energy sector is provided from the Community budget and through loans from Euratom, the European Coal and Steel Com­munity (ECSC), the New Community Instru­ment (NCI) and the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Alligevel udviklede sig efter­hånden de elementer, der endnu i dag udgør kernen i den fælles energipolitik:
Examples of such assistance in­clude participation in thefinancingof power stations, capital equipment for coal mines and coal terminals, conversion of oil­fired plantto solid fuels, expansion and integrated operation of electricity networks, develop­ment of new energy sources and support for various energy­saving projects in industry, public buildings or in the operation of district heating networks.
— Fastlæggelse af fælles mellemlangsigtede energimålsætninger, som hver medlemsstat efter evne skal bid rage ti I at realisere.
Armed with this information, the Commis­sion was better equipped to create the foun­dations of a common energy policy.
De før­ste målsætninger blev opstillet i 1974; i 1980 blev de nøjere udformet for perioden indtil 1990.1 foråret 1988 forelagde Kommissionen målsætningerne for tiden indtil 1995; dem kommer vi senere nærmere ind på. Kommis­
Member States only gradually came to accept that a common policy offered greater prospects of success in such a crucial area as energy sup­plies, particularly in times of crises, than if every State acted unilaterally.
Men lad os betragte denne ubestridte succes lidt nærmere.
On the whole, the approach by the Com­munity and the individual Member States
Re duktionen af energiintensiteten tog hurtigt af.
COMMUNITY FOSSIL FUEL USE FOR COMBUSTION PURPOSES
I alt primær energi
Total primary energy
holdt sig derefter så godt som uændret (1986: 17%).
(¡v) the share of natural gas in gross energy consumption grew from 11% in 1973 to 16% in 1982, and then remained more or less stable (1986: 17%);
— Fast brændsel tegnede sig i 1973 for 23% af Fællesskabets energiforbrug, i 1982 for 24% og i 1986 for 23%. Her skete der altså stort set ingen ændringer.
(v) the share of solid fuels in the Community's energy balance was 23% in 1973, 24% in 1982 and 23% in 1986, i.e. relatively stable;
— Kulbrinternes andel af elproduktionen faldt fra rundt regnet 42% (1973), til 24% (1982) og videre til 16% (1986).
(vi) the share of hydrocarbons in electricity generation decreased from about 42% in 1973 to 24% in 1982 and 16% in 1986;
og erfaringerne fra forskellige initiativer«, skrev EF-Kommissionen i foråret 1988.»
(vii) the share of solid fuels in electricity generation increased from 45% in 1973 to 48% in 1982, but fell back to 42% in 1986; the spring of 1988 'Most Member States have reviewed their energy efficiency policies in the light of the changed energy market conditions and the experience gained with various initiatives.
Som resultat af revisionen blev de direkte tilskud til investeringer med henblik på rationel energianvendelse reduceret (eller helt af skaffet)«.
The result of this reap praisal has been the reduction (if not the total elimination) of direct subsidy programmes for energy efficiency investments'.
Kun Italien, Nederlandene og Danmark fastholdt i denne periode deres forsknings- og udviklingsudgifter på samme niveau.
Only Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark maintained their R & D spending at the same level during this period.
F.eks. i Forbundsrepublikken skrumpede disse midler ind til under en tredjedel af de 110 mio. ECU, der blev ydet i 1981.
The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, reduced its allocation for energy efficiency R & D by a factor of more than three compared with the figure of ECU 110 million in 1981.
— Fast brændsels andel af elproduktionen steg fra 45% (1973) til 48% (1982), men faldt så ¡gen til 42% (1986).
(viii) the share of nuclear power in electricity generation, however, increased steadily from 8% in 1973 to 21% in 1982 and 37% in 1986.
Denne ganske alarmerende udvikling foregik i en situation, der var præget at betydeligeomstruktureringer.
These alarming developments were situated in a context of fundamental change.
— Kerneenergiens andel af elproduktionen steg derimod støt fra 8% (1973) via 21% (1982) til 37% (1986).
Thefour years from 1982 to 1986 were characterized by the following main trends on the energy markets:
— Det samlede bruttoenergiforbrug i EF lå i 1986 8% højere end i 1982 og 4% højere end i 1973.
(i) gross energy consumption in 1986 for the Community as a whole was about 8% higher than in 1982 and some 4% higher than in 1973;
— Oliens andel af bruttoenergiforbruget faldt fra 63% (1973) via 51% (1982) til 47% (1986).
(ii) the share of oil in gross energy consumption decreased from 63% in 1973 to 51% in 1982 and 47% in 1986;
— Nettoolieimportens andel af Fællesskabets bruttoenergiforbrug faldt fra 62% (1973) til 38% (1982) og videre til 33% (1986).
(iii) the share of net oil imports in gross energy consumption fell from 62% in 1973 to 38% in 1982 and 33% in 1986;
Der er tale om betydningsfulde ændringer, både hvad angår de forskellige energikilder og — hvilket til dels er en følge heraf — an gående Fællesskabets importafhænghed (og dermed dets sårbarhed).
These are significant changes, both with regard to the relative position of the in dividual energy sources and, partly as a consequence of this, the Community's dependence on imports (and hence vulnerability).
Hvordan vurderes situationen indtil 1995?
How are events expected to develop until 1995?
Stemmer udviklingen i perioden 1982-1986 med prognoser ne?
Are the 1982-86 developments in line with the prognoses?
Hvilken rolle spillerdet indre marked fra 1992?
What is the importance of the internal market scheduled for 1992?
Disse spørgsmål behandles i de to næste kapitler.
These are some of the questions we shall consider in the next two chapters.
FÆLLESSKABETS MÅLSÆTNINGER
COMMUNITY OBJECTIVES solid fuel production capacities in the Com­munity should be continued;
■ ENERGIPOLITISKE MÅLSÆTNINGER FOR PERIODEN INDTIL 1995
■ ENERGY OBJECTIVES FOR 1995
— Bestræbelserne for at fremme anvendel­sen af fast brændsel og gøre EF­produktionen heraf mere konkurrencedygtig bør vide­reføres.
(vi) the share of electricity generated from oil and gas should be reduced to under 15% in 1995;
I foråret 1985 forelagde EF­Kommissionen si­ne energipolitiske målsætninger for perio­den indtil 1995.
In spring 1985 the Commission presented its 1995 energy objectives.
— Virkningsgraden i forbindelse med den endelige energiudnyttelse bør forbedres mindst 20%.
The following targets were set in the individual sectors: (i) the efficiency of final energy demand should be improved by at least 20%; (ii) oil consumption should be reduced to around 40% of energy consumption and net oil imports thus maintained at less than one­third of total energy consumption in the Community;