natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Et aggresivt obligationssalg løser imidlertid ikke alle de problemer, der er forbundet med meget store underskud i den offentlige sektor, fordi det fortrænger (»crowd out«) den private sektor, og fordi resultatet kan blive en hurtig vækst i den offentlige gæld.
Further, aggressive bond 'sales do not resolve all the problems associated with excess ive public sector deficits because they 'crowd out' the private sector, and because the result can be a rapid growth of the public debt.
Særlig for Italiens vedkommende kan et sådant obligationssalg skabe en uacceptabel fremtidig rente- og afdragsbyrde; tilsvarende betragtninger gælder for den ovenfor diskuterede situation i Irland og Belgien.
In the Italian case in particular they may build up an unacceptable burden of interest and capital payments for the future; similar considerations apply to the cases of Ireland and Belgium discussed above.
Det må erkendes, at den eneste løsning i sidste instans er at reducere budgetunderskuddet, særlig i nævnte lande.
It has to be recognized that ultimately the only way out is to reduce the budget deficit, particularly in the cases mentioned.
Den voksende concensus om pengepolitikkens rolle i Fællesskabet og den heraf følgende større konvergens omkring en lavere inflationstakt har uden tvivl bidraget til den nye stabilitet i valutakurserne inden for Fællesskabet, som imidlertid også har været understøttet af dollarens styrke (jf. afsnit 7.5 nedenfor).
Within this broad development three episodes can perhaps be identified: the reactions to the realignment of 21 March 1983, the period of pressure on the Belgian franc and, most recently, a period of very close cohesion.
Med henvisning til ordlyden i Det europæiske Råds resolution af 5. december 1978 kan man notere, at EF-politikken har ført »til større intern og ekstern stabilitet«.
Immediately after the last realignment, the devaluing currencies moved to the top of their bands while the German mark and the Dutch guilder were close to their lower intervention points (see Graph 7.5).
Inden for disse brede udviklingslinjer kan man måske fore tage en opdeling på tre perioder: reaktionerne på valutakurs tilpasningen af 21. marts 1983, perioden med pres mod den belgiske franc og, på det seneste, en periode kendetegnet ved et tæt sammenhold.
The guilder was particularly hit by capital refiows but after a rise in the Dutch discount rate at the beginning of May 1983 the currency rose strongly within the system.
Umiddelbart efter den sidste tilpasning bevægede de devaluerende valutaer sig op i toppen af ud svingsmargenen, mens DM og gylden lå tæt på deres nedre interventionspunkter (jf. diagram 7.5).
The gradual tightening of conditions in the German money market (see section 7.2 above) resulted in the mark's joining the guilder and in the last quarter of 1983 there was very close cohesion within the EMS of all currencies except the Belgian franc.
Som sædvanlig efter en justering skete der en væsentlig kapitaltilbagestrømning til de devaluerende lande som følge af, at der blev foretaget en tilbageførsel af de spekulative valutatransaktioner.
The growing consensus on the role of monetary policy in the Community and the ensuing greater convergence on a lower rate of inflation has undoubtedly contributed to the renewed stability of intra-Community exchange rates which has however also been underpinned by the strength of the US dollar (see section 7.5 below).
For skellene mellem markedsvalutakurserne før og efter justeringen var små, og spekulationsgevinsterne var derfor mini male.
In the terms of the resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978, EC policies have been 'conducive to greater stability at home and abroad'.
Den hollandske gylden var særlig berørt af kapitalstrømningerne, men efter en forhøjelse af den hollandske diskonto i begyndelsen af maj 1983 steg valutaen stærkt inden for systemet.
The European Monetary System had, in September 1984, passed through a period of 18months without being subject to a realignment,1the longest such period in its history.
') Der er ikke taget hensyn til den tekniske justering den 17.5.1983, der blev foretaget af hensyn til en ændring i værdien af pund sterling, som ikke deltager i valutakursmekanismen.
This ignores lhe technical realignment of 17.5.1983 undertaken to allow for a change in the value of lhe pound sterling, which does not participate in the exchange rate mechanism.
Pengepolitik og Det europæiske monetære System rede i, at DM'en fulgte den hollandske gylden og i sidste kvartal af 1983 var der et meget tæt sammenhold inden for EMS mellem alle valutaerne bortset fra den belgiske franc.
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System of two points in each of the years 1984, 1985 and 1986. After these measures the Belgian franc was stronger and the Belgian authorities were able to clear by far the greater part of their debtor position in the EMCF in the second quarter.
Den belgiske franc krævede støtte over for den franske franc i oktober og november 1983, og der blev foretaget betydelige træk på det ultrakorte kreditsystem : i tremånedersperioden frem til udgangen af november skete der en kraftig stigning i debitorstillingen over for EFMS.
The rise of the Belgian franc entailed a compression of bilateral spreads and in the late summer of 1984 a remark­able degree of cohesion was established within the EMS: in the middle of September all divergence indicators were within the range ± 30.
En mindre svækkelse af DM i december reducerede presset på den belgiske valuta, men i første kvartal af 1984 vendte den kraftigt opadgående stigning i dollaren, hvilket forårsagede en ny efterspørgsel efter DM­denominerede papirer.
weakening of the German mark in December reduced press­ure on the Belgian currency but in the first quarter of 1984 the strong upward rise of the US dollar was temporarily reversed and the markets were hit by a renewed demand for DM­denominated assets.
Endnu engang blev det den belgiske franc, som mest iøjnefaldende blev ramt af denne ændring i efterspørgselsforholdene.
Again it was the Belgian franc which was most conspicuously hit by this shift of sentiment.
Det var atter nødvendigt med en omfattende støtte i februar 1984, og i begyndelsen af marts voksede debitorstillingen over for EFMS igen mar­kant.
It required substantial support in February 1984 and at the beginning of March the EMCF debtor position published by the Banque Nationale rose markedly again.
Divergensindikatoren for den belgiske franc lå kon­stant et godt stykke over ­85 igennem årets 2 første måneder.
The divergence indicator of the Belgian franc remained well in excess of ­85 throughout the first two months of this year.
De belgiske myndigheder reagerede kraftigt med en rentefor­højelse i anden halvdel af februar, og i udgangen af marts blev der truffet omfattende økonomisk­politiske foran­staltninger ved hjælp af særdekreter, bl.a. en beskæring af dyrtidsreguleringen med 2 points for alle lønindkomster i årene 1984, 1985 og 1986.
The Belgian authorities responded with a sharp rise of interest rates in the second half of February and at the end of March major economic policy measures were passed by special decree, including a cut in the indexation of all wages and salaries
Efter disse foranstaltninger styrke­des den belgiske franc, og de belgiske myndigheder var i stand til at afvikle hovedparten af debitorstillingen i EFMS i andet kvartal.
With growing convergence of inflation rates, real effective exchange rates have undergone only small changes within the EMS this year except in Italy, where there has been a perceptible rise, and in the Netherlands where there has been a fall (see Table 7.6). Since the inception of the EMS the
Økonomisk årsoversigt 1984­1985
Annual Economic Review 1984­85
Overfor 19 partnere
Against 19 partners
Betalingsbalancesituationen i EMS­landene frembyder ikke store problemer i 1984 (jf. kapitel 8), og oplysningerne om priskonkurrenceevnen (eller de reale valutakurser) er til­fredsstillende.
The balance of payments positions of EMS countries seem to present no major problems in 1984 (see Chapter 8), and the information on price competitiveness (or real exchange rates) has been seen to be reassuring.
De fundamentale økonomiske størrelser i EMS­landene peger således ikke på, at der vil være behov for en justering i den nærmeste fremtid.
There thus appears to be no argument from the economic fundamentals of any EMS country strongly indicating that a realignment will be necessary in the foreseeable future.
Kendsgerningerne tyder på fortsat ekstern stabilitet og voksende konvergens inden for EMS.
The facts seem consistent with a continuation of external stability and growing conver­gence within the EMS.
Siden EMS'ens oprettelse har der været en tendens til (hvilket man kunne forvente i et system med faste, men justerbare valutakurser, hvor det i betydeligt omfang er lykkedes nogle deltagerlande at opret­holde prisstabilitet), at de reale valutakurser faldt i lande med lav inflation og steg i lande med høj inflation.
tendency has been (as might be expected in a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates within which some partici­pants have had considerable success in maintaining price stability) for the real exchange rates of the low inflation countries to fall and for those of the high inflation countries to rise.
Det er svært at vide, hvad dette betyder for de nationale økonomier på grund af problemet med at finde et passende reference­punkt: der er ikke noget enkelt svar på dette spørgsmål, men man kan måske anvende 1970 (det basisår, der er anvendt i tabel 7.6), hvor de løbende poster nogenlunde var i balance, eller de gennemsnitlige niveauer for 1960'erne, som repræsenterer den almindelige situation før de voldsomme forstyrrelser i 1970'erne.
It is difficult to know what this means for the national economies because of the problem of finding an appropriate reference point: there is no simple answer to this question but use may perhaps be made of 1970 (the base year used in the table) when current accounts were in approximate balance, or of average levels of the 1960s, which represent the general situation before the extreme disturbances of the 1970s.
Anvendes begge disse referen­cepunkter, har hovedeffekten af EMS'en været at bringe de reale valutakurser tilbage til referenceniveauerne, idet f.eks.
On both these bases the main effect of the EMS has been to bring real exchange rates back towards reference levels with, for example, Germany coming down from 109,1 to 98,5 between 1978 and 1984 and Italy rising from 75,4 to 100,8 (their levels over the 1960s having been 92,6 and 101,4 respectively).
Intervention er et vigtigt instrument på kort sigt i EMS­samarbejdet, men erfaringen, bl.a. fra sidste år, viser, hvor
Intervention is an important instrument for the short run defence of the EMS. but much experience, including that of the last year, shows the value of the timely adjustment of monetary conditions — the more timely the response the less dramatic does it have to be.
Pengepolitik og Det europæiske monetære System
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System now would be to risk loosing much of what has been gained in recent years and would make the future re-establishment of stability very difficult indeed.
DIAGRAM 7.7 : Udviklingen i de toneangivende valutaer og EMS1) i forhold til ECU
a number of indicators in addition to the chosen monetary aggregates in deciding whether monetary conditions correspond to the needs of the economy, and one of those additional indicators is the effective exchange rate.
Men i juli 1984 lå pundet (hovedsagelig som følge af US­dollarens styrke) sandsynligvis inden for et kursinterval, som, i betragtning af beregningernes approksimative karak­ter, ikke længere kunne begrunde en så entydig vurdering.
It remained firm against the ECU in the second half of 1983, having fully recovered the ground lost earlier in the year (see Graph 7.7), but over the first nine months of 1984 it fell by 3,7% against that unit and by 4,9% against the mark: the fall was particularly heavy in March.
Foruden bestemte monetære størrelser undersøger de engel­ske myndigheder en række indikatorer, ved afgørelsen af om de monetære vilkår svarer til økonomiens behov, og én af disse supplerende indikatorer er den effektive valutakurs.
The currency nevertheless remained a good 10% over its initial notional central rate in the EMS. The current account of the UK balance of payments remains in surplus, but its magnitude has diminished rapidly from the record level of 1981.
Svækkelsen af pundet i juli 1984 blev fortolket på den måde, at det var nødvendigt at stramme pengepolitikken, og som nævnt ovenfor blev rentesatserne hævet betragteligt og for­blev høje selv efter en nedadgående justering i august.
By July 1984, however, the pound sterling was (largely as a result of the strength of the US dollar) probably in the range within which, given the approximate nature of the calculations involved, such an unequivocal judgement was no longer justified.
Den græske drakme deltager ikke i EMS' valutakursmeka­nisme, men det blev bebudet den 15. september 1984, at den ville blive medregnet i ECU '). De græske myndigheder har siden den 3. august 1983 tilrettelagt valutakurspolitikken med henblik på at opretholde Grækenlands pris­konkurren­ceevne; det vil imidlertid kun være muligt at anvende valuta­kursen som et uafhængigt inflationsbremsende instrument i dette land, såfremt der gennemføres fundamentale indgreb over for udviklingen i omkostningerne og de offentlige finanser.
The Greek drachma is not a currency of the EMS exchange rate mechanism but it was announced on 15 September 1984 that it would be included in the ECU.1Since 3 August 1983 the Greek authorities have conducted their foreign exchange rate policy with a view to maintaining Greece's price competitiveness; use of the exchange rate as an independent restraining force on the inflationary process in that country would only be feasible in the presence of fundamental actions on costs and public finance.
Under gennemførelsen af denne politik er de græ­ske myndigheder nu mere opmærksomme på drakmens værdi i forhold til EF­valutaerne.
In the execution of this policy they now pay more attention to the drachma's value against Community currencies.
Da inflationen fortsat er høj i Grækenland, og da der var tale om en forringelse af konkurrenceevnen i månederne frem til august 1983, har den førte politik medført et betydeligt fald i drakmens inter­nationale værdi : i tolvmånedersperioden frem til september 1984 faldt den med 13,8% over for ECU og, ifølge be­regninger i Kommissionens tjenestegrene, med 14% på en handelssammenvejet basis.
Since inflation continues to be high in Greece and since there was a loss of competitiveness in the months before August 1983, the chosen policy has involved a considerable slide of the drachma: over the 12 months to the end of September 1984 it fell by 13,8% against the ECU and, according to Commission staff calculations, by 14% on a trade weighted basis.
I forbindelse med drakmens med­regning i ECU forpligtede de græske myndigheder sig til at fortsætte den økonomiske stabiliseringspolitik.
On the occasion of the inclusion of their currency in the ECU the Greek authorities under took to continue to pursue policies for the stabilization of their economy.
Den vigtigste garanti for yderligere fremskridt i EMS­samarbejdet er imidlertid, at der føres en prisstabiliserende politik.
GRAPH 7.7 : Movement of major currencies and the EMS' against the ECU
Den seneste valutakursstabilitet inden for EMS står i skarp kontrast til udviklingen for andre toneangivende internatio­nale valutaer, hvilket fremgår af sammenligningen i diagram 7.4 og 7.7.
The recent stability of exchange rates within the EMS con trasts vividly with developments in the wider world, as can be seen from a comparison of Graphs 7.4 and 7.7.
USD har nu været stærkt stigende i fem år.
The US dollar has now been rising strongly for five years.
Fra et lavpunkt på 0,695 ECU og 1,73 DM ved udgangen af 1979 var den steget med 61 % over for ECU ved udgangen af juni 1983 til 1,12 ECU (og 2,54 DM), og ved udgangen af september 1984 var den steget med yderligere 20% til 1,35 ECU (og 3,02 DM) efter at have fluktueret kraftigt i denne måned.
From a low point of 0,695 ECU and DM 1,73 at the end of 1979, it had risen by 61% against the ECU at the end of June, 1983 to reach 1,12 ECU (and DM 2,54), and by the end of September 1984 it had risen by a further 20% to reach 1,35 ECU (and DM 3,02) having fluctuated widely in that month.
Mellem december 1979 og august 1984 steg
Between December 1979 and August 1984 the nominal effective exchange rate of the USD, as measured by Com-
Det engelskepund deltog stadig ikke i valutakursmekanismen inden for EMS­samarbejdet, men indgik som et element i ECU­kurven.
1 ECU without sterling component.
Dette skal ses i sammenhæng med Ministerrådets beslutning om at revi­dere ECU'ens sammensætning efter en regelmæssig gennemgang som fastsat i artikel 2, stk. 3, i Det europæiske Råds resolution af 5.12.1978.
This was associated with the decision of the Council of Ministers to revise the composition of the ECU after a periodic reexamination as provided for in Article 2 (3) of the resolution of the European Council of 5.12.1978.
Ved revisionen blev der taget hensyn til de underliggende økonomiske kriterier såvel som til behovet for at sikre en gnidningsløs markedsfunk­tion — jf. det tekniske bilag, 2.3.1.
The revision took account of the underlying economic criteria, as well as the need to ensure the 'smooth functioning of lhe markets — see technical annex, 2.3.1.
Pengepolitik og Det europæiske monetære System delvis blevet løst ved kapitalimport fra udlandet: justeringen af den økonomiske politik i november 1979 og den hermed forbundne stigning i valutakursen har, efter et langt lag, resulteret i et hidtil uset underskud på betalingsbalancens løbende poster, der svarer til 3 % af BNP i indeværende år, og taget noget af presset af det amerikanske kreditmarked.
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System payments current account into a totally unprecedented deficit equal to nearly 3% of GNP in the current year which has taken some of the pressure off the US credit market.
USD's nominelle effektive valutakurs ifølge Kommissionens beregninger med 52 %.
mission staff, rose by 52%.
Den japanske yen har stort set fulgt en udvikling, der ligger mellem USD og ECU'en i perioden fra slutningen af 1979 frem til midten af 1983, men fra juni 1983 til september 1984 steg den næsten lige så stærkt i værdi over for ECU som USD (18,0 %).
The Japanese yen took, in broad terms, a middle course between the US dollar and the ECU between the end of 1979 and the middle of 1983. but over the period from June 1983 to September 1984 it rose almost as strongly against the ECU as did the US dollar (18,0%).
En del afstigningen i dollarens internationale værdi de sidste fem år har været en uundgåelig og rigtig korrektion af det fald, som var alt for kraftigt for denne valuta i den forudgående periode.
Some part of the fiveyear rise of the US dollar has been an inevitable and proper correction of the excessive fall of that currency in the preceding period.
I 1980 og 1981 gik de amerikanske myndigheder beslutsomt i gang med at løse inflationsproblemet (en inflation på over 10%) og genoprette tilliden til dollaren ved hjælp af en stram kvantitativ pengepolitik, der indebar en pengemængdestigning, der var væsentlig lavere end væksten i BNP.
In 1980 and 1981 the US authorities attacked the problems of double-digit inflation and lack of confidence in their currency by a tight quantitative monetary policy involving targets substantially lower than the rate of growth of GNP.
I betragtning af at pengemængden prioriteredes højest, medførte denne politik høje nominelle rentesatser, særlig på pengemarkedet, og ved udgangen af 1981 afspejledes situationen i en stigning i de langfristede realrentesatser, der havde ligget på et unormalt lavt niveau (jf. diagram 7.8, del a og b).
Given the primacy newly accorded to the money supply, this policy involved high nominal interest rates, notably on the money market, and by the end of 1981 the situation was reflected in a rise of long term real interest rates from abnormally low levels (see Graph 7.8, parts a and b).
I midten af 1982 kronedes denne politik med held.
By the middle of 1982 this policy had been crowned with success.
Både dollarens interne og følgelig eksterne værdi var sikret, og man kunne måske have forventet et støt fald i rentesatserne, eftersom det nominelle BNP voksede mindre end målvækstraten for pengemængden.
Both the internal and, as a consequence, the external value of the currency was assured and a steady fall of interest rates might perhaps have been expected since nominal GNP was then growing less than the money supply target growth rate.
Der be gyndte faktisk at vise sig et fald på pengemarkedet i både nominelle og reale termer, men faldet blev ikke konsolideret og påvirkede ikke de lange rentesatser, da underskuddet på forbundsbudgettet begyndte at gøre sig gældende.
Such a fall did indeed begin on the money market, in both nominal and real terms, but its further development and its spread to longterm rates came up against the problem of the US Federal Government deficit.
Konflikten har imidlertid også været afspejlet i udviklingen i den amerikanske pengeforsyning og forklarer en del af de overskridelser af M2-pengemængden, der har været observeret siden midten af 1982, da de amerikanske banker overtog stadig større mængder statspapirer.
Nevertheless the conflict has also been reflected in US money supply developments and accounts for some of the overruns of M2 observed since the middle of 1982 as US banks took up ever increasing quantities of government paper.
Centralbankmyndighederne reagerede med at standse faldet i de kortfristede nomi nelle rentesatser i tredje kvartal 1982 for derefter at presse dem opad fra maj 1983; obligationsafkastet2) voksede med 1 point i 8-månedersperioden frem til august 1983 og nåede op på 11,4 %.
The Federal Reserve authorities reacted by stopping the fall of shortterm nominal interest rates in the third quarter of 1982, and then pushing them up from May 1983; bond yields- rose by 1 point over the 8 months to August 1983 to reach 11,4%.
Der var en vis lempelse af pengemarkedsvilkårene i USA i andet halvår sidste år — hvilket ikke gav sig udslag i nogen mærkbar nedgang i obligationsafkastet — men i indeværende år er pengepolitikken gradvis blevet strammere.
There was some relaxation of money market conditions in the USA in the second half of last year -which was not reflected in any noticeable weakening of bond yields — but in the current year policy has become gradually tighter.
I første halvdel af 1984 lå stigningen i M2 inden for målintervallet, men det nylig definerede kreditaggregat3) voksede hurtigt i årets løb og kom et godt stykke over målintervallet.
In the first half of 1984 M2 remained well within its target range, but the newly-defined credit aggregate3has been growing rapidly for over a year and has passed well above its target range.
Medlemmerne af Forbundskomiteen for Markedsoperationer gav på komitémødet i slutningen af marts udtryk for bekymring over, at det nuværende tempo i den økonomiske ekspansion kunne føre til voksende uligevægte og til pris- og lønpres i nogle sektorer i økonomien.
The members of the Federal Open Market Committee, at their end-March meeting, showed themselves to be concerned that the current pace of economic expansion might lead to growing imbalances and to price and wage pressures in some sectors of the economy.
Den officielle politik for pengemarkedet ændredes, og i midten af juni nåede afkastet på statspapirer med en løbetid på 13 uger op på 10 %, og obligationsafkastet kom op på 13 % ved månedens udgang; inflationen var fortsat lav, således at realafkastet lå på et rekordhøjt niveau på ca. 83 %.
The official stance in the money market changed and by the middle of June the 13-week Treasury bill yield had reached 10% and bond yields reached 13 % at the end of that month; inflation has remained low so real yields attained a record high of approximately 8_BAR_%.