natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved Domstolens afgørelser er der blevet fastslået et princip, men disse afgørelser kan ikke anvendes »over en bank« på en folkeretlig tvist mellem Fællesskabet og et tredje land.
At this point the quarrel ceased to be a legal issue and called only for a political reply which was given by the Community during the major tariff negotiations conducted under the auspices of GATT (Kennedy Round and its continuation).
I den første sag, kaldet »Fiskeri: tredjelandes rettigheder«, tog Domstolen stilling til et præjudicielt spørgsmål rejst af Circuit Court i grevskabet Cork, der skulle påkende en sag vedrørende forseelser, der påstodes begået af en spansk fisker i irsk farvand.
Article 105 of the EAEC Treaty reads: 'The provisions of this Treaty shall not be in voked so as to prevent the implementation of agreements or contracts concluded before its entry into force by a Member State, a person or an undertaking with a third State . . . where such agreements or contracts have been communicated to the Commission not later than thirty days after the entry into force of this Treaty.
Tiltalte påberåbte sig til sit forsvar bestemmelserne i London-konventionen som Irland - altså en EF-medlemsstat - og Spanien - altså et tredjeland - var rnedlemmer af, at denne konvention måtte anses for opretholdt i medfør af EØFT artikel 234.
Agreements or contracts concluded between the signature and the entry into force of this Treaty by a person or an undertaking with a third State, an international organization or a national of a third State shall not, however, be invoked as grounds for failure to implement this Treaty if, in the opinion of the Court of Justice, ruling on an application from the Commission, one of the decisive reasons on the part of either of the par ties in concluding the agreement or contract was an intention to evade the provisions of this Treaty.'
Selv om spørgsmålet ikke blev stillet så skarpt, ville et bekræftende svar fra Domstolens side have indebåret, at Fællesskabet, der ikke var medlem af London-konventionen, vil le blive bundet af denne i medfør af artikel 234.
Led by the Soviet member of the commission, a number of members argued that the 'customs union exception' clause, as it appears in the GATT, could not be a general rule capable of being included in a codifying text.
Det kan heraf sluttes, at den automatiske tiltrædelse ved succession i en aftale, der tidligere er indgået af medlemsstaterne, som fastslået ved Domstolens dom i International Fruit-sagen ('), ikke kan generaliseres og i hvert fald ikke udledes af artikel 234.
Under the terms of paragraph 1, a Member State can invoke a provision of an agree­ment which it has concluded before the entry into force of the EAEC Treaty only if it has declared the existence ofthat agreement to the Commission within a certain time after the entry into force of the EAEC Treaty.
Der var således tale om en klar fremhævelse afde særlige omstændigheder i forbindelse med GATT.
This provision protects the rights of third parties.
I fiskerisagen lod Domstolen yderligere de fællesskabsretlige bestemmelsers forrang finde en særlig vidtstrakt anvendelse i forhold til den tidligere af medlemsstater indgåede aftale.
It also has to be deduced, however, that if a Member State has deliberately or otherwise failed to comply with this formality, it is required to apply the EAEC Treaty without being able to plead its previous commitments.
Domstolen fandt nemlig, at bestemmelserne i midlertidige forordninger fandt anvendelse til trods for, at der var indgået tidligere aftaler, indtil der blev indgået en fiskeriaftale med det berørte tredjeland, nemlig Spanien, idet det blev tilkendegivet, at disse forord ninger »indgik i det samarbejde, der er indledt mellem Fællesskabet og Spanien ...« (3).
It is required to cease applying the provisions of previous agreements, to the extent that they are incompatible with the EAEC Treaty.
Domstolen fandt herefter, at der var tale om »et supplement« til en tidligere gældende ordning.
It may then be sued by the States parties to the agreements which it has to denounce.
Dette kan næppe siges at være logisk, idet der ikke kan være tale om, at to indbyrdes modstridende regelsæt supplerer hinanden, når det ene må tillægges forrang fremfor det andet efter et kriterium, der skal fastlægges.
Β - Incompatibility between a previous agreement concluded between Member States and nonmember States and an agreement concluded by the Communities
I andre senere sager med lignende faktiske omstændigheder, men angående aftaler ind gået mellem Spanien og Frankrig, og i hvilke artikel 234 ikke kunne påberåbes, da der var tale om aftaler indgået efter EØF-traktatens ikrafttræden, har Domstolen derimod
By limiting itself to the problem of incompatibility between previous agreements con­cluded by Member States and the EEC Treaty itself, Article 234 ignored the true extent of the problem.
O Domaf 14.10.1980. sag 812/79, jf. ovenfor. Se tillige H. Schermers'kommentar i 18 Common Market Law Review 1981, s. 227-231 og tillige af samme forfatter Rights Giving Treaties: Higher Law. i festskrift til P.H. Teitgen. Paris. Pedone 1984.
The formula applies to the European Communities in relation to their Member States, with the proviso that such succession is partial or by categories and not total.
fundet, at en ordning, der udsprang af forbindelserne mellem Fællesskabet og Spanien var »trådt i stedet for« den ved de fransk-spanske aftaler etablerede (').
The central question regarding the effect of succession on treaties is whether the substitution of one subject of law for another constitutes legitimate grounds for breaking a treaty link.
Man kan heraf slutte, at tredjelande ikke vil få ret i særlig mange tilfælde.
Despite the different context, the question is still a major embarrassment because a balance has to be found between respect for the rights of third parties and the autonomy of the new institution.
Domstolen har dog ikke taget stilling til disse sager som en international domstol, men som en fællesskabsdomstol, der udtalte sig på begæring af en national ret.
The question remained latent for a long time until it was brought to the fore by a series of disputes in which the Court of Justice of the European Communities became in volved.
Disse afgørelser præjudicerer følgelig ikke afgørelsen i en tvist mellem Fællesskabet og et tredjeland, hvor Domstolen ikke er det naturlige forum.
The Court's rulings enunciated a principle but could not be applied in full to an inter national dispute between the Community and a nonmember State.
Tilfælde af tvist mellem Fællesskabet og et tredjeland
Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities: rejection of 'succession'
Den virkelige vanskelighed som følge af uforenelighed mellem en aftale indgået mellem en medlemsstat og et tredjeland og en aftale indgået af Fællesskabet har endnu ikke vist sig.
In the first case on 'Fisheries: rights of nonmember countries' (1980), the Court ruled on an interlocutory question from the Circuit Court of the County of Cork which had to deal with a case of illegal fishing by a Spanish owner in Irish waters.
Det fremgår af ovennævnte domme, at selv om Fællesskabet ikke må hindre en med lemsstat i at opfylde en aftale, der er omfattet af artikel 234, er det på enhver måde frit stillet med hensyn til selv at indgå en aftale på samme område. En sådan aftale kan imidlertid helt eller delvis gøre en tidligere indgået aftale virkningsløs.
The defendant based his defence on the provisions of the London Agreement to which Ireland - a Member State - and Spain - a nonmember State - were parties and argued that this agreement should be deemed to be still in force, by virtue of the terms of Article 234 of the EEC Treaty.
Selv om landet havde gjort dette, ville det have be fundet sig i en vanskelig retlig position, eftersom det tilsyneladende var indforstået med, at de med EF-medlemsstateme indgåede aftaler var blevet erstattet af en aftale indgået med Fællesskabet (2).
Although the question was not put in such clear terms, an affirmative ruling by the Court would have meant that the Community which was not party to the London Agreement, was bound by it by virtue of Article 234.
Man kan tillige antage at Domstolen, hvis den havde lagt til grund, at Fællesskaberne var indtrådt i rettigheder og forpligtelser i medfør afde af medlemsstaterne indgåede af-
However, the Court considered that while Article 234 required the Community institutions 'not to impede the execution of the obligations of Member States arising from a previous agreement' the intention was 'only that the Member State concerned should
taler, kunne have fundet, at bestemmelserne i tidligere aftaler ikke var anvendelige i medfør af reglen »lex posterior derogat priori«, idet man så yderligere måtte have lagt til grund, at aftalerne kun angik samme parter, nemlig vedkommende medlemsstat på den ene side og i alle tilfælde Fællesskabet på den anden side.
be able to fulfil its obligations under the previous agreement, without the Community being bound thereby as regards the State concerned. '
Der kan imidlertid blive tale om, at Fællesskaberne på et tidspunkt må tage stilling til en indsigelse fra et tredjeland om, at en af Fællesskaberne indgået aftale med et andet tredjeland hindrer en medlemsstat i behørigt at opfylde en aftale, som er indgået med dette.
This would suggest that the Community is not bound by agreements previously con­cluded by Member States on the sole grounds that such agreements were concluded on matters within Community competence.
I så tilfælde er der ingen der siger, at det organ, der skal påkende tvisten - og det vil ikke blive EF-Domstolen (medmindre sagen indbringes for den ved en international voldgiftsaftale) - har nogen grund til at finde, at fællesskabsretten skal have forrang. Denne forrang gælder inden for selve fællesskabssystemet, men ikke i forholdet udadtil.
It may be concluded from this that the ma­chinery for access by succession to an agreement previously concluded by the Member States, as accepted by the Court in its International Fruit ruling,2 is not of general appli­cation and in any case cannot be brought under Article 234.
Der vil således blive tale om, at vedkommende dømmende organ skal træffe sin afgørelse på grundlag af almindelige folkeretlige regler og bestemme, i hvilket omfang en fæl lesskabsretlig aftale kan påberåbes som gyldig grund for fuldstændig eller delvis opsigelse af en aftale indgået mellem en EF-medlemsstat og et tredjeland (')·
Referring specifically to this ruling, the Advocate General, Mr Capotorti, made it quite clear that the Community had succeeded to the obligations of Member States under the GATT: 'not solely on the basis of the single fact that it had taken over powers previous­ly exercised by the Member States in the matter governed by the General Agreement but also taking account of at least four other decisive elements: the fact that the Member States were already bound by the GATT when they concluded the EEC Treaty, the consent of the same States to bind the Community by the obligations of the Agreement coinciding with the acceptance by the Community of the aims of the GATT by virtue of Article 110 of the Treaty of Rome, the action in fact taken by the Community institu­tions in the framework ofthat Agreement and the recognition, by the other contracting parties, of the transfer of powers by Member States to the Community'.3 The issue was therefore to show clearly that the GATT case was specific.
C. Uforenelighed mellem en aftale indgået af Fællesskabet og en senere aftale indgået af en medlemsstat med et tredjeland
In the fisheries case, the Court also gave a very broad application to the precedence of Community provisions over the previous agreement concluded by the Member States.
I medfør af bestemmelserne i artikel 5, stk. 1 i EØF-traktaten er en medlemsstats ind gåelse af en aftale, der er uforenelig med Fællesskabsretten (herunder de af Fællesskaberne indgåede aftaler), en handling, der strider mod fællesskabsretten og som kan påkendes efter den i traktatens artikel 169 omhandlede traktatbrudsprocedure.
The Court in fact considered that, in the area in question, despite the provisions of the earlier agreement, the provisions of interim Community regulations applied, pending a fisheries agreement with the non­member State concerned, namely Spain, adding that these regulations 'came within the framework of relations between the Community and Spain...'."
Domstolen er ikke kompetent til inden for rammerne af denne procedure at erklære en aftale indgået af en medlemsstat ugyldig.
In this case, the Court did not intend to say however that the system set up by Com­munity law had taken the place of the previous system.
Domstolen kan alene fastslå, at der foreligger et traktatbrud.
It ruled that the two systems were 'superimposed'.
Det påhviler herefter vedkommende medlemsstat at træffe de fornødne forholdsregler, nemlig at opsige eller ændre den aftale, hvori den er part.
The logic of this ruling may be open to criticism, because incom­patible provisions cannot be superimposed, as one must of necessity prevail over the other in accordance with a criterion to be defined.
(') Vedkommende tredjelands retsstilling kan endog styrkes uder påberåbelse af bestemmelserne i artikel 234, stk. I i EØF-traktaten.
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 14.10.1980, Case 812/79 Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787.
Den kan nemlig hævde, at denne bestemmelse indeholder et egentligt tredjemandslotte, som den kan påberåbe sig.
Judgment of 12.12.1972, Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit [1972] ECR 1219; judgment of 24.10.1973, Case 9/73 Shluter [1973] ECR 1135; judgment of 19.11.1975, Case 38/75 Nederlandse Spoorwe­ gen [197'5] ECR 1439. Findings, Case 812/79, quoted in note 1 above.
I det te tilfælde taler den omtalte praksis ved EF-Domstolen dog for en sådan fortolkning, idet formålet med artikel 234 ifølge Domstolen netop har været at beskytte tredjelandes rettigheder.
See note by H. Schermers, 18 Common Mar­ket Law Review, 1981, pp. 227­231; see also by the same author, 'Rights­giving Treaties: Higher Law', in Mélanges en Γ honneur de P.H. Teitgen, Pedone, Paris, 1984.
Det skal bemærkes, at den pågældende medlemsstat under en sådan sag eventuelt kan gøre gældende, at den påberåbte EF-aftale falder uden for Fællesskabets beføjelser. Det te spørgsmål må i så fald påkendes af Domstolen.
By contrast, in other later cases arising from the same sort of circumstances, but involving agreements concluded between Spain and France, where Article 234 could not be invoked, as the agreements in question had been concluded after the EEC Treaty came into force, the Court took the view that the legal rules resulting from the relations established between the Community and Spain had 'replaced' those resulting from the Franco-Spanish agreements.'
Under alle omstændigheder er den afgørelse, som træffes inden for Fællesskabets rammer, og som gennemføres af den pågældende medlemsstat ikke retskraftig i forhold til tredjelande. Som allerede anført er det klart, at grundsætningen om fællesskabsrettens forrang ikke har gyldighed uden for Fællesskabet.
In any event, it emerges from these decisions that the Court largely took the view that the Communities are free agents within their treaty powers, despite the existence of previous agreements concluded by the Member States.
Medlemsstaten kan måske over for tredjelande påberåbe sig fællesskabsretten som tvingende grund til opsigelse af aftalen.
It may be felt that this line of argument takes little account of the rights of nonmember States.
Afsnit 2: Gennemførelsen af Fællesskabets aftaler inden for Fællesskabets »interne retssystem« og medlemsstaternes retssystemer
In these cases, however, the Court gave judgment, not as an international court but as a Community court, ruling at the request of a national court.
Efter ældre folkeretlige forestillinger ansås internationale aftaler kun at vedrøre inter nationale forbindelser, dvs. at de alene dannede grundlag for en udveksling af ydelser mellem folkeretlige retssubjekter.
These decisions do not, therefore, prejudge the manner in which a dispute between the Community and a nonmember State should be resolved in a case for which the Court of Justice of the European Communities was not the natural judge.
Hvad angår forholdet mellem national ret og gennemførelse af traktater indeholder folkeretten kun én regel, nemlig den, at nationale regler ikke kan påberåbes som grund til et traktatbrud (').
The real difficulty arising from the incompatibility of an agreement concluded between a Member State and a nonmember State with an agreement concluded by the Community has still to be faced.
Det er nemlig alene en part i aftalen - altså et folkeretligt retssubjekt - der i givet fald kan påberåbe sig manglende overholdelse af reglen over for et andet folkeretligt retssubjekt.
Such an agreement might partially or wholly nullify the effects of the previous agreement.
Spørgsmålet om aftalens gennemførelse i intern ret kan derimod måske rejses af nationale retssubjekter, der påberåber sig rettigheder i henhold til aftalen.
In the cases which have so far arisen, the Community's position has been made easier by the fact that it had to deal with an individual who was not a citizen of a Community country but came under the courts of a Member State by virtue of territorial competence and, therefore, within the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Dette spørgsmål rejses så forde interne forvaltnings- eller domsmyndigheder.
In practice, Spain which already had an agreed relationship with the Community had no interest in taking action for its citizen.
(') Med undtagelse af regler om retlige mangler ved selve indgåelsen, jf. nedenfor.
Philip, Annuaire français de droit international, 1981, pp. 322-329; judgment of 28.10.1982, Joined Cases 138 and 139/81 Marticorena-Otazo and Prego Parada [1982] ECR 3819; judgment of 28.10.1982, Joined Cases 137 and 140/81 Campandeguy Sagarzazu and Echeverría Sagasti [1982] ECR 3847.
Dette, at der tillægges en lov forrang fremfor en tidligere indgået traktat, og at en be­stemmelse i en international aftale ikke findes at kunne påberåbes, er imidlertid ikke i sig selv en retsnægtelse, hvis den pågældende borger har kunnet få sin sag behandlet på sædvanlig måde ved domstolene og ikke været udsat for forskelsbehandling
It can even be held that if the Court had accepted the theory that the Communities had succeeded to rights and obligations resulting from agreements concluded by Member States, it might have concluded that the provisions of the earlier agreements were inapplicable on the principle that lex posterior derogat priori (later law cancels previous law), the agreements then being deemed to involve the same parties, namely the Member State on the one hand and the Community on the other in all cases.
Spørgsmålet om en aftales anvendelse i national ret er således forskelligt fra spørgsmålet om dens folkeretlige anvendelse.
The situation could arise, however, in which the Communities would one day have to answer a complaint from a nonmember State arguing that a Community agreement concluded with another nonmember State prevented a Member State from properly implementing an agreement concluded with it (the complainant).
For så vidt angår aftalens folkeretlige anvendelse kan den problematik, der omhandler stater, overføres på Fællesskaberne.
In that hypothetical case, the body deciding the issue (which would not be the Court of Justice of the European Communities unless the case were referred to it by international compromise) would have no reason to argue the precedence ofCommunity law.
Det skal til slut bemærkes, at en aftale, der er bindende for Fællesskaberne, efter Dom­stolens afgørelse er en integrerende bestanddel af fællesskabsretten.
The tribunal settling the case would then have to rule on the basis of the general rules of international law and would have to determine to what extent the existence of the Community agreement could constitute legitimate grounds for the total or partial abrogation of the agreement concluded by the Member State with the nonmember State.2
Det skal herefter undersøges, om Fællesskabernes praksis må ses som udslag af »monis­men« eller »dualismen«, og hvilken stilling en aftale har inden for Fællesskabets system af retskilder, samt endelig i hvilket omfang bestemmelserne i en aftale kan påberåbes af individet (»seif executing« effect).
C - Incompatibility between a Community agreement and a subsequent agreement concluded between a Member State and a nonmember State
I en sag vedrørende et præjudicielt spørgsmål om fortolkning af en bestemmelse i en as­socieringsaftale indgået mellem Fællesskabet og Grækenland har Domstolen antaget, at denne aftale var en integrerende bestanddel af fællesskabsretten og hørte under Dom­stolens beføjelser i medfør af blandt andet artikel 177 (').
Under the terms of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty the conclusion by a Member State of an agreement incompatible with Community law (which includes
Denne afgørelse er af betydelig rækkevidde, idet den bevirker, at Domstolen bliver det dømmende organ med hensyn til fortolkning og gennemførelse af Fællesskabets aftaler i forhold til de nationale retter, der naturligvis skal påkende indsigelser fra borgerne om manglende »national« gennemførelse af en international aftale.
Apart from the further fact that since the conclusion of the London Agreement, the content of the law of the sea has changed substantially, as the Court of Justice pointed out (paragraph 24 of the previously-quoted decision of 16.10.1980). The position of the nonmember State might be strengthened by invoking the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 234 of the EEC Treaty.
Denne regel finder anvendelse på Fællesskabets aftaler, dvs. aftaler, i hvilke Fællesska­bet er part, herunder blandede aftaler, der omfatter både Fællesskabet og medlemssta­terne (2).
It could claim that this provision is a genuine stipulation for others which third parties have the right to invoke on theirown behalf.
Den finder ligeledes anvendelse på aftaler, hvori Fællesskabet er blevet »part«
It is true that, in accordance with treaty law, the existence of such a stipulation is not easy to establish be cause it has to be proved that the authors of the clause really 'intended' to confer a right on third parties.
ikke blot ad sædvanlig vej ved selv at indgå aftalen, men gennem »succession«, hvilket hidtil kun har været tilfældet i forbindelse med GATT (')·
agreements concluded by the Communities) constitutes an act contrary to that law, subject to the procedure for breach laid down in Article 169 of the same Treaty.
Reglen finder derimod ikke anvendelse på aftaler, som alene medlemsstaterne er parter i, selvom de har forbindelse med Fællesskabets retssystem (aftaler i medfør af EØFT artikel 220).
Under this procedure, the Court of Justice of the Communities does not have powers to annul an agreement concluded by a Member State. It can only rule that there has been a breach.
B. Anvendelsen af det »monistiske« princip på Fællesskabernes aftaler
It is then incumbent on the Member State to take the necessary measures, namely, it must terminate or modify the agreement to which it is party.
Desuden findes der mange varianter af begge systemer.
The Court of Justice would then have to rule on this point.
Der findes dog efter vort skøn et uomtvisteligt kriterium, ud fra hvilket man kan adskille de to systemer fra hinanden.
However that may be, any solutions adopted within the Community and implemented by the Member State concerned would have no authority over the nonmember State.
Der er tale om dualisme, når en international aftale i et givet retssystem ikke som sådan anses for en kilde til rettigheder og forpligtelser.
The Member State could not invoke Community law against the nonmember State as binding grounds for abrogating the agreement.
Den eneste kilde hertil er den nationale retsakt, som er vedtaget i anledning af aftalen, og som indfører den, gennemfører den el ler anvender eller henviser til den (2).
Section 2: Implementation ofCommunity agreements under Community 'internal law' and under the law of Member States