natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
BL's adfærd, der betød, at britiske forbrugere mistede fordelen ved at købe BL­køretøjer andre steder i EF, blev betragtet som groft misbrug.
81 its shares in its flat glass producing subsidiary, Boussois, and seven distribution subsidiaries.1 This sale agreement, constituting a mere transfer of business, does not in itself give rise to any restrictions of competition.
Under en indgående undersøgelse accepterede BL dog, at højrestyrede køretøjer indgik i virksomhedens standardsortiment og skulle kunne købes i alle EF­lande.
This is truenotwithstanding the minority interests Mecaniver continues to hold in Boussoisand the Spanish flat glass producer, Llodia: BSN cannot influence in any waywhatsoever the competitive behaviour of these two competitors in view of thefact that effective and full control in both these enterprises has been vested inthe majority shareholders.
BL bekræftede desuden, at selskabet ville tilbyde ejere af BL­køretøjer, som de selv har importeret, det første serviceeftersyn på nøjagtigt samme vilkår som ejere af BL­køretøjer, der er købt i Det forenede Kongerige.
Moreover, since the majority shareholders in both Boussois (PPG) and Llodio (Guardian Industries Corp. USA, which alreadyhad production capacity in the EEC), both have options to purchase Mecaniver'sminority holdings, the latter's holdings are merely temporary, representing thefinal stage of BSN's strategic plan to withdraw from the flat glass market.BSN's previous sale of its several and only other interests in flat glass to Pilkington Brothers Ltd, (UK) and Asahi Glass Co. (Japan) represented theearlier stages of this strategic withdrawal.'2
Ved beslutningen krævede Kommissionen, at selskabet ophørte med at forlange 100 UKL for at oplyse typegodkendelsesnumre, og pålagde virksomheden en bøde på 350 000 ECU.
Furthermore, the clause restricting BSN from competing with PPG is not morein duration and geographical extent than is necessary in the circumstances ofthis particular case to ensure the performance of the sellers' obligation totransfer the full commercial value of the business.
§ 7 — Anvendelse af artikel 85 og 86 på virksomheds­overdragelse
Finally, in the light of the facts of this case the increase in market share from4% to 11% obtained by PPG following its acquisition of a holding in BSNcannot be considered an abusive strengthening of a dominant position whichwould justify the application of Article 86.
Dette gælder uanset de minoritetsinteresser, som Mecaniver fortsat besidder i Boussois og den spanske planglasproducerende virksomhed Llodio.
In May 1982, the Commission commenced proceedings and issued astatement of objections in respect of certain agreements concluded in 1981 by Philip Morris Inc.
Da majo­ritetsaktionærerne i både Boussois (PPG) og Llodio (Guardian Industries Corp. USA, der i forvejen havde produktionskapacitet i EF), desuden har forkøbsret til Mecanivers minoritets interesser, er sidstnævntes kapitalinteresser kun af midlerti­dig karakter og udgør sidste fase i BSN's planer om at trække sig ud af markedet for planglas.
('PM'), a US corporation with substantial interests in thecigarette industry, and Rembrandt Group Ltd ('Rembrandt'), a South Africancompany.3Under those agreements, Rembrandt sold to PM one-half of itswholly-owned subsidiary, Rothmans Tobacco Holding Ltd, a holding companywith a controlling interest in Rothmans International pic ('RI').
De første faser bestod i, at BSN solgte sine øvrige interesser inden for planglas til Pilkington Brothers Ltd (Det forenede Kongerige) og til Asahi Glass Co. (Japan)2).
In addition, PMand Rembrandt concluded a partnership agreement providing for cooperation inthe conduct of RFs affairs.
R.I. har datterselskaber, der driver virksomhed inden for cigaretindustrien i EF som helhed, hvor de på et oligopolistisk marked konkurrerer direkte med P.M.'s datterselskaber.
RI has subsidiaries operating in the cigarette industry throughout the EEC,where they are in direct competition in an oligopolistic market with PM'ssubsidiaries.
Koncernerne P.M. og Rothmans regnes til verdens største cigaretvirksomheder og hører til den lille gruppe af multinationale koncerner, der domi nerer verdensmarkedet for cigaretter.
The PM and Rothmans groups are among the largest cigarettecompanies in the world and form part of the small group of multinationalconglomerates which dominate world cigarette markets.
Ved aftalerne mellem P.M. og Rembrandt i 1981 opnåede P.M. vetoret over en majoritetsinteresse i R.I. i kraft af sin absolutte ligestilling med Rembrandt i hol dingselskabets styrelse, og parterne aftalte at samarbejde som interessenter med hensyn til R.I.'s virksomhed.
As a result of the 1981 agreements between PM and Rembrandt (i) PM had aright of veto over a controlling interest in RI by virtue of its position of absoluteparity with Rembrandt on the board of the holding company; and (ii) PM hadagreed with Rembrandt to cooperate as partners in relation to RI's affairs.
Kommissionen mente, at artikel 85, stk. 1, fandt anvendelse på P.M.'s og Rembrandts aftale om salg og køb af aktier i holdingselskabet og af visse konvertobligationer i R.I. på grund af de særlige aftalebetingelser og markedsforhold, der gjorde sig gældende.
The Commission considered that Article 85(1) applied to the agreementbetween PM and Rembrandt for the sale and purchase of shares in the holdingcompany and of certain convertible bonds in RI because of the specific contractual and market contexts in which it was set.
Der blev især taget hensyn til den indvirkning på R.I.'s virksomhed — og den deraf følgende indvirkning på P.M.'s egen adfærd — som P.M.'s deltagelse i holdingselskabets bestyrelse samt P.M.'s vetoret medførte.
In particular, regard was had tothe influence over RI's affairs—and the consequential impact on its ownbehaviour—to which PM's presence on the board and right of veto in theholding company gave rise.
R.I.'s investeringer og forretningspolitik kunne kun have været fastlagt af P.M. og Rembrandt i fællesskab, såfremt ingen af parterne alene kunne have overtaget den faktiske kontrol med R.I.'s beslutninger uden den anden parts samtykke.
In effect, the investment and commercial strategiesof RI could only have been determined jointly by PM and Rembrandt in thatneither party could have assumed sole effective control of RI's strategic decisionswithout agreement from the other party.
På grundlag af en analyse af aftalens bestemmelser vedrørende samarbejde og samordning samt EF- i) Jf. EF-Bull. 3-1984, punkt 2.1.43.
Therefore, the analysis of the expresscontractual provisions regarding cooperation and coordination and the oligopolistic structure of the EEC cigarette market enabled the Commission to reachthe provisional view in the statement of objections that, in view of all thecircumstances, the agreement providing for transfer of equity capital involvedin this case fell within Article 85(1).
På baggrund af P.M.'s minoritetsaktiepost og stemmeandel, samt det forhold, at virksomheden trak sig ud af holdingselskabets bestyrelse, og at de aftalebestemmelser, hvorved P.M. og Rembrandt forpligtede sig til at samarbejde med hensyn til R.I., blev ophævet, kunne det ikke konkluderes, at de nye aftaler havde til formål eller til følge at begrænse eller fordreje konkurrencen, eller at aftalerne gennem misbrug styrkede en dominerende stilling.
83 and voting position, together with its withdrawal from the board of theholding company and the abrogation of contractual provisions whereby PM and Rembrandt undertook to cooperate in regard to RI, made impossible theconclusion that restriction or distortions of competition were the object oreffect of the new agreements or that the agreements gave rise to an abusivestrengthening of dominant positions.
P.M. har forkøbsret til Rembrandts aktieposter i R.I., og Kommissionen fik P.M. og Rembrandt til at afgive en række forpligtende tilsagn, der sikrer, at koncernerne P.M. og Rothmans fortsat vil konkurrere med hinanden i EF, og at Kommissionen omgående kan gribe ind, såfremt forholdet mellem koncernerne ændrer sig.
PM retains certain first refusal rights inrespect of Rembrandt's holdings of equity in RI and the Commission soughtand obtained various undertakings from PM and Rembrandt which ensure thatrelations between the PM and Rothmans groups in the EEC remain competitiveand that, should those relations change, the Commission will be able to actpromptly.
Artikel 85, stk. 1, finder normalt ikke anvendelse på aftaler om køb eller salg af aktier men måtte dog anvendes i dette tilfælde, da der var tale om specielle mekanismer og strukturer i forbindelse med særlige aftalebetingelser og markedsforhold.
Thus, while as a general rule Article 85(1) does not apply to agreements forthe sale or purchase of shares, in this case it did because of specific corporatemechanisms and structures in the particular contractual and market contexts.Article 85(1) ceased to be applicable when those circumstances were changedsignificantly.
Artikel 85, stk. 1, kunne ikke længere anvendes, da disse forhold blev ændret væsentligt.
Control over the affairs of RI is now exercised by Rembrandt and PM is no more than a minority shareholder without any means of influencing themanagement of RI.
Det er nu Rembrandt, der udøver den fulde kontrol med R.I.'s virksomhed, medens P.M. blot er minoritetsaktionær og ikke har mulighed for at påvirke administrationen af R.I. Artikel 86 fandt heller ikke anvendelse, fordi der ikke i virksomhedernes forbindelser var tale om nogen form for kontrol eller afgørende indflydelse, og dermed heller ikke misbrug af en dominerende stilling.
Moreover, Article 86 ceased to be applicable because, inthe absence of any relationship of control or decisive influence, no dominantposition was abused.
Ved formelle beslutninger, der dog ikke blev offentliggjort, tilbageviste Kom missionen derfor de klager, som tre andre større cigaretvirksomheder havde indgivet over de oprindelige aftaler1).
The Commission subsequently, by means of formal albeit unpublisheddecisions, rejected the complaints which had been lodged by three other majorcigarette companies against the original agreements.*
§ 8 — Anvendelse af EKSF-traktatens artikel 65
§ 8 — Application of Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty
Kartel mellem producenter af ferromangan
Cartel between ferromanganese producers
Ved kontrolundersøgelser hos en række producenter af ferromangan konstaterede Kommissionen, at de største producenter af dette produkt i og uden for EF anvendte en samordnet praksis, der gik ud på, at hvert af de deltagende selskaber fik tildelt leveringskvoter for ferromangan med højt kulstofindhold i EF, og at de enkelte selskabers afsætning i de forskellige lande skulle meddeles en central organisation. nisation.
During inspections carried out at a number of ferromanganese producers,the Commission found that the major Community and nonCommunity producers of this product were engaged in a concerted practice involving theallocation to each participating company of delivery quotas for high-carbonferromanganese (HC FeMn) in the Community and the reporting of eachcompany's sales in the various countries to a central organization.
Denne praksis var baseret på et endnu ikke undertegnet udkast til en aftale, der vedrørte salgspriser og leveringskvoter og indeholdt en bestemmelse om, at der kunne pålægges bøder, såfremt kvoterne ikke blev overholdt.
The practice was based on an as yet unsigned draft agreement which dealt withselling prices as well as delivery quotas and provided for pecuniary penalties ifquotas were not observed.
I betragtning af, at selskaberne omgående bragte denne praksis til ophør efter Kom missionens kontrolundersøgelse, og at bestemmelsen om bøder aldrig var blevet anvendt i praksis, besluttede Kommissionen, at den ikke ville indlede en formel procedure over for selskaberne for overtrædelse af EKSF-traktatens artikel 65.
In view of the fact that the companies immediately terminated the practiceafter the inspectors' visit and that the penalty clause had never actually beenapplied, the Commission decided not to open formal proceedings against thecompanies for an infringement of Article 65 ECSC.
Kommissionen fører dog stadig tilsyn med markedet, og den vil gribe hårdt ind, såfremt den konstaterer, at man på ny er begyndt at anvende denne praksis eller har indgået en tilsvarende aftale, ikke blot når det gælder ferromangan med højt kulstofindhold, som er et produkt, der henhører under EKSF-traktaten, men også når det gælder andre substitutionslegeringer, der henhører under EØF-lraktaten.
The Commission is, however, continuing to watch the market and will takevery strong action if it finds that the practice has been resumed or any similaragreement has been made, not only with regard to high-carbon ferromanganese,a product falling within the ECSC Treaty, but also with regard to any othersubstitute alloys falling withing the EEC Treaty.
Specialiseringsaftaler mellem Arbed SA og Cockerill-Sambre SA
Specialization agreements between Arbed SA and Cockerill-Sambre SA
Den 28. maj gav Kommissionen Arbed SA i Luxembourg og Cockerill-Sambre SA i Seraing tilladelse til at indgå aftaler om rationalisering og specialisering af deres produktion af en række flade og lange produkter1). Tilladelsen gjaldt i første omgang for ti år.
On 28 May, the Commission authorized for an initial period of 10 yearsagreements made between Arbed SA, Luxembourg, and Cockerill-Sambre SA,Seraing, for rationalizing and specializing their production of a range of bothflat and long steel products.1These agreements identify product sectors inwhich one or other of the parties is particularly efficient and had a leadingrole.
Aftalerne vedrører sektorer, hvor parterne er særlig effektive og indtager en førende stilling.
Within this framework the parties agree to exchange certain productionfacilities in order to improve plant utilization.
Parterne har aftalt at holde produktionskapacitet til rådighed for hinanden for at sikre en bedre udnyttelse af anlæggene.
The parties also agree to coordinate their medium and long-term investment policy in order to avoidduplication and overcapacity.
Parterne vedtog desuden at samordne deres mellem- og langsigtede investeringspolitik for at undgå overlapning og overskudskapacitet.
The agreements also envisage that there will becommercial cooperation between the parties, in a form still to be decided; the Commission will make a separate decision on the commercial aspects whenprecise proposals are submitted.
Aftalerne indeholder endvidere bestemmelser om handelsmæssigt samarbejde mellem parterne, men den form, hvorunder dette samarbejde skal finde sted. er endnu ikke fastlagt.
The examination of the specialization agreements indicated that they should make a valuable contribution towards restructuring in the steel industry.
Kommissionen vil vedtage en særskilt beslutning om
They provide for reductions in capacity, improvements in plant utilization and operating efficiency and the avoidance of investment duplication.
87 de handelsmæssige aspekter, når den får forelagt konkrete forslag.
Page 87
Koncentrationer inden for stålindustrien
Mergers in the steel industry
De koncentrationer, som Kommissionen i 1984 tillod i henhold til EKSF-traktatens artikel 66, er i fuld overensstemmelse med dens generelle strukturomlægningspolitik for stålindustrien, idet de indebærer rationalisering og samarbejde med det formål at opnå en bedre udnyttelse af de supplerende ressourcer og at tilpasse udbud og efterspørgsel efter hinanden.
The mergers authorized by the Commission in 1984 under Article 66ECSC are in complete accordance with its general restructuring policy for thesteel industry, in that they involve rationalization and cooperation aimed atmaking better use of complementary resources and bringing supply and demandmore closely into balance.
Kommissionen gav tilladelse til, at Phénix Works SA (et helejet datterselskab af Cockerill-Sambre), Hoogovens Groep BV og Sidmar NV oprettede to fælles sel skaber, nemlig Société Européenne de Galvanisation (SEGAL) og SEGAL Commercial '). Formålet med SEGAL var at opføre en ny galvaniseringslinje med en årlig kapacitet på 260 000 tons i Flémalle i Belgien.
The Commission authorized Phenix Works SA (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cockerill-Sambre), Hoogovens Groep BV and Sidmar NV to set uptwo joint companies, Societe Europeenne de Galvanisation (Segal) and Segal Commercial.1 Segal was to build a new galvanizing line at Flemalle, Belgium,with a capacity of 260 000 tonnes a year, mainly of sheets galvanized on oneside only, though during the start-up period the line would use up any sparecapacity by producing sheets coated on both sides.
Der skulle hovedsagelig produceres plader, som kun er galvaniseret på den ene side, selv om man dog i indkøringsperioden ville anvende en eventuel ekstra kapacitet til produktion af plader, der er galvaniseret på begge sider.
Each party will be able to use a third of Segal line's capacity. It supplies itsown raw material (sheet) and sells the output (galvanized sheet) itself.
Produktionen af plader, der kun er galvaniseret på den ene side, ville få førsteprioritet og tager primært sigte på at dække den stigende efterspørgsel efter dette produkt, navnlig inden for automobilindustrien.
Segal Commercial is a 'cost centre' charged with coordinating the technicalcooperation within Segal.
Parterne kan hver især disponere over en tredjedel af SEGAL-linjens kapacitet.
The market for galvanized sheets, one of the few markets still growing, ishighly competitive.
De leverer selv råmaterialerne (plader) og varetager selv salget af produktionen (galvaniserede plader).
The Commission therefore considered that the proposal meets the conditionsfor authorization laid down in Article 66(2) ECSC.
Rasselstein AG i Neuwied, der er et fælles datterselskab af Thyssen AG i Duisburg og Eisen- und Hüttenwerke AG i Køln, som selv er datterselskab af koncernen Otto Wolff AG, fik af Kommissionen tilladelse til at erhverve en majoritetsaktiepost i Karl Jiingel & Co. KG i Leverkusen '). Rasselsteins aktiepost skal senere overdrages til Thyssen AG og Eisen- und Hüttenwerke AG med 50% til hver, hvorved de to koncerner, Thyssen og Otto Wolff, opnår fælles kontrol med Karl Jüngel.
The Commission authorized Rasselstein AG, Neuwied, a joint subsidiaryof Thyssen AG, Duisburg, and Eisen- und Hiittenwerke AG, Cologne, itself asubsidiary of the Otto Wolff AG group, to acquire a majority stake in Karl Jiingel GmbH & Co KG, Leverkusen.1 Rasselstein's holding is later to be transferred on a 50-50 basis to Thyssen AGand Eisen- und Hiittenwerke AG, giving the two groups, Thyssen and Otto Wolff, joint control of Karl Jiingel.
Efter at have undersøgt transaktionen på grundlag af EKSF-traktatens artikel 66 konkluderede Kommissionen, at overtagelsen af Karl Jüngel ikke ville medføre, at aktiebeholdningerne inden for stålsektoren blev koncentreret på Karl Jüngel og koncernerne Otto Wolff og Thyssen.
After scrutinizing the transaction under Article 66 ECSC the Commissionconcluded that the takeover of Karl Jiingel is unlikely to lead to a group effectbetween Karl Jiingel and the Otto Wolff and Thyssen groups in the steelstockholding sector.
Karl Jüngel er teknisk set klassificeret som en forhandler, men er i praksis en industrielt organiseret stålforarbejdende virksomhed, der hovedsagelig er beskæftiget med genbrug og oparbejdning af affaldsmaterialer og produkter, der ikke svarer til standarden; den sælger sine produkter i små mængder, afhængigt af kundernes individuelle behov.
Although technically classed as a dealer, in practice Karl Jiingel is a steelprocessing firm organized on industrial lines whose main business is therecycling and upgrading of waste material and substandard products and thesale of the resulting more valuable products to its customers in small quantitiesaccording to their individual requirements.
89 eneforhandlingsret til de produkter, der fremstilles af Rasselstein og Stahlwerke Bochim (der kontrolleres af Otto Wolff og Thyssen i fællesskab), hvorved koncernen opnår en rimelig provision.
Besides the fact that Jiingel serves a differentmarket in its sales activities from Otto Wolff and Thyssen, both in the quantitiesand types of products sold and its circle of customers, Otto Wolff has theexclusive distribution rights for the products of Rasselstein and Stahlwerke Bochum (jointly controlled by Otto Wolff and Thyssen) on which it earns anappropriate commission.
Desuden vil Jüngel i henhold til de nye vedtægter fortsat kunne føre en selvstændig politik med hensyn til køb og salg.
Furthermore, under its new articles Jiingel will continue to have complete independence in its buying and selling policies.
Klöckner-Krupp (smedningsvirksomhed)
Klockner-Krupp (forging businesses)
De produkter, der er tale om, er smedestave, frismedede produkter, rullende materiel til jernbaner, sporskiftere og overskæringer samt titan-mellemprodukter.
The purpose of the merger, which was decided upon against a background ofstructural overcapacity for forgings on the German, European and worldmarkets, is to rationalize and thereby secure the survival of the merged businesses.
Samt lige produkter er omfattet af EØF-traktaten.
The products concerned by the merger are forged bars, open die forgings,railway rolling stock material, points and crossings and titanium alloy semis.All these products come under the EEC Treaty.
Kommissionen foretog på grundlag af EKSF-traktatens artikel 66 en undersøgelse af, hvilke virkninger projektet ville kunne få for de EKSF-mellemprodukter, der anvendes som udgangsprodukter i moderselskabernes sammensluttede smedeafsnit (moderselskaberne er omfattet af EKSF-traktatens artikel 80), og det fremgik af denne undersøgelse, at koncentrationen, som ikke er forbundet med nogen kapacitetsforøgelse, ikke vil føre til nogen forbedring af de to moderselskabers interne afsætningsmuligheder for EKSF-mellemprodukter inden for det fælles marked, idet de i forvejen selv dækker 99% af smedeafsnittenes forsyningsbehov.
A scrutiny of the proposed merger under Article 66 ECSC for its potentialeffects on the ECSC intermediate products used as inputs in the merged forgingbusinesses of the parent companies (which are steel undertakings within themeaning of Article 80 ECSC) showed that since the merger did not involve anyincrease in capacity and the two parent companies already supplied 99% ofthe businesses' steel requirements, it would not improve the two companies'internal sales outlets for the ECSC intermediate products within the commonmarket.
Desuden vil de to koncerners leverancer af EKSF-produkter til fællesforetagendet kun udgøre ubetydelige mængder i forhold til deres samlede produktion af råstål.
Moreover, the two groups' deliveries of ECSC products to the jointventure company represent fairly small quantities compared with their totalcrude steel production.
Af disse årsager og på grundlag af andre EF-stålproducenters stillingtagen konkluderede Kommissionen, at koncentrationen opfyldte betingelserne i EKSF-traktatens artikel 66, stk. 2, og derfor kunne tillades.
For these reasons and in view of the positions of other Community steelproducers, the Commission concluded that the merger satisfied the tests forauthorization in Article 66(2) ECSC.
Koncentrationen blev desuden undersøgt på grundlag af EØF-traktatens artikel 86, idet smedeprodukter er omfattet af EØF-traktaten.
The merger was also scrutinized in relation to Article 86 EEC since forgingscome under the EEC Treaty.
Det blev med hensyn til de pågældende produkter fastslået, at de deltagende virksomheder ikke på fællesmar- i) Kommissionens beslutning af 17.5.1984; EF-Bull. 5-1984, punkt 2.1.50.
It was found that neither of the firms involved inthe merger has a dominant position for one or more of the products concernedin the common market or a substantial part of it which would be so strengthenedby the planned merger that the operation would constitute an abuse under Article 86.