natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selve konventionsteksten (artikel 156, stk. 2) tillægger nemlig kun udtrykkeligt stater status som medlemmer af Myndigheden, og for at være medlem af forsamlingen og eventuelt tillige Rådet, skal man være »medlem af Myndigheden« (3).
Section 5: Community participation in institutions responsible for the implementation and supervision of the international agreements to which it is party
Ej heller er det ved den flere gange nævnte konvention af 1979 om grænseoverskridende luftforurening over store afstande klart fastlagt, hvorledes EØF som part i aftalen skal have sæde i organisationens forvaltningsorgan.
At its own level and with its own means, the Community generally assumes the same rights and obligations as the States by virtue of agreements to which it is party.
Dette spørgsmål blev drøftet efter underskriften af konventionen i FN's økonomiske kommission for Europa, hvor det kom frem, at EØF ifølge opfattelsen hos visse parter i aftalen, navnlig de østeuropæiske lande, kun skulle have sæde i dette organ med samme observatørstatus, som det har i FN's økonomiske Kommission for Europa.
There is one area, however, where it sometimes does not find itself on exactly the same footing as the States, namely as regards its participation in institutions responsible for implementation and supervision of the international agreements.
Kun efter vanskelige forhandlinger nåede man til et kompromis mellem disse landes og EØF's standpunkter, idet EØF krævede ret til del tagelse på fuldstændig lige fod med staterne.
Under many international agreements to which the Community has become party, bodies have been set up for the implementation and supervision of the provisions of those agreements.
Ud over disse tilfælde har Fællesskabets deltagelse i forvaltningsorganer oprettet ved in ternationale aftaler navnlig drejet sig om, under hvilken form deltagelsen skulle finde sted.
This applies, in particular, to most of the bilateral agreements which the Community has concluded with nonmember countries and, specifically, to the trade agreements concluded by the Community alone, and to the association and cooperation agreements concluded by both the Community and its Member States (see pp. 64 and 66 above).
Samtlige aftaler fastlægger de to institutioners beføjelser, idet det nærmere angives, ef ter hvilke regler de træffer deres beslutninger (enstemmighed eller consensus, kvalificeret stemmeflerhed, simpel stemmeflerhed mv.).
Community participation in these bilateral bodies has not as yet posed any problem within the sphere of application of international law.
Når man ser bort fra ovennævnte »tvivlsomme« tilfælde, har EØF altid opnået status som medlem af de besluttende forsamlinger i organer oprettet ved multilaterale aftaler, hvori det er part.
The same is not true of its participation in managing bodies set up by multilateral agreements.
Som regel kan det ligeledes vælges til medlem af de mindre omfattende kollegiale organer. I visse tilfælde er der dog ikke blevet tillagt det valgbarhed.
It appeared to us useful to take a look at some of the difficulties which this question has raised and at the solutions adopted.
De stemmerettigheder, der følger med status som medlem af den besluttende forsamling og det mindre omfattende kollegiale organ, tillægges snart efter princippet »én stat, én stemme«, snart efter et vægtet system (').
The acceptance of the Community as member of the managing bodies for agreements to which it is party has not, generally, raised any special problem.
Dette system gælder navnlig for beslutninger truffet inden for forvaltningsorganerne i verdensaftalerne om basisprodukter.
In some cases, however, this question has not been clearly resolved by the Community participation clause in corporated in the agreement.
Her har hver stat almindeligvis et fast og begrænset antal »basisstemmer«, hvortil kommer et antal stemmer, der står i forhold til deres andele i produktionen (og eksporten) eller for bruget (og importen) af det pågældende produkt. Det antal stemmer, der herved tillægges den enkelte stat, er yderligere begrænset til en bestemt værdi, således at en enkelt stat ikke alene kan opnå majoritet i forvaltningsorganet.
This is so, for example, in the case of the participation clause included in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea,1 which does not specify whether, by becoming party to the convention, the EEC would be a member of the In ternational Seabed Authority2and could be a member of its various institutions (Assembly, Council, etc.).
I de internationale organer, hvoraf EØF er medlem, har det almindeligvis selv stemme ret.
The actual text of the convention (Article 156.2) in fact explicitly confers the status of member of the Authority only on States which are parties and it is necessary to be a 'member of the Authority' in order to be a member of the Assembly and, where appropriate, of the Council.3
1 de af disse organer, der er oprettet ved aftaler, hvori Fællesskabets medlemsstater ikke selv er parter (aftaler indgået i form af »rene EF-aftaler«), har EØF en stemmeret, der er undergivet samme bestemmelser som de deltagende staters.
Similarly, the already-mentioned 1979 Convention on long-distance transboundary air pollution did not establish clearly on what basis the EEC, which is a party to this agree ment, would be allowed to sit on its managing body.
Hvor der for denne ret gælder grundsætningen »én stat, én stemme«, har EØF kun én stemme. Dette gælder f.eks. dets stilling i den besluttende forsamling (»Generalrådet«) i den nordatlantiske fiskeri organisation, der er oprettet ved den allerede nævnte konvention af 1978.
This question was discussed in the Economic Commission for Europe after the convention had been signed and it emerged that some parties to the agreement, and in particular the East European countries, held the view that the EEC should participate in that body with only the same status of observer that it holds with the Economic Commission for Europe.
Hvis forvaltningsorganet ifølge aftalen virker efter et system med vægtet stemmeret, har EØF dels et fast antal stemmer, dels et forholdsmæssigt fastsat antal stemmer, der bereg-
It required difficult negotiations to arrive at a compromise between the position held by those countries and that of the EEC which claimed the right to participate on a completely equal footing with the States.
nes efter samme regler, som gælder for stater. Dette er f.eks. tilfældet i »Rådet« i den internationale olivenoverenskomst af 1979 (').
With the exception of these cases, the question ofCommunity participation in manag­ing bodies set up by international agreements has been mainly directed to the terms and conditions of such participation.
Der opstår nemlig her to særlige problemer.
Β ­ Terms and conditions of participation
I de af EØF og dets medlemsstater indgåede aftaler har det altid været anerkendt, at det første af disse problemer (hvem skal stemme?) skal reguleres efter de kompetencefordelingsregler, der gælder ifølge fællesskabsretten, og at tredjelandene i hvert enkelt tilfælde må tage Fællesskabets og dets medlemsstaters standpunkt til efterretning.
Very often, the managing bodies set up by multilateral agreements include a delibera­tive assembly, of which all parties to the agreement are full members, and a restricted collegiate body, whose members are elected by the deliberative assembly. Each agree­ment determines the respective powers of the two institutions and specifies how deci­sions shall be taken (unanimity or consensus, qualified majority, simple majority, etc.).
Under disse omstændigheder har EF-parterne næsten altid skønnet det hensigtsmæssigt at bestemme i aftalerne, at staterne skulle afholde sig fra at stemme, når Fællesskabet af giver stemme og vice versa (2).
Other than in the 'doubtful' cases discussed above, the EEC has always been given the status of member of the deliberative assemblies of the institutions set up by multilateral agreements to which it is party.
Denne bestemmelse om ikke at udøve »dobbelt stemme ret« giver ikke Fællesskabet anledning til problemer.
As a rule, it is also entitled to be elected to membership of the restricted collegiate bodies.
Dets »interne retssystem« udelukker nemlig principielt enhver form for »parallelle« eller »konkurrerende« beføjelser for EØF og dets medlemsstater vedrørende samme spørgsmål (3).
In some cases, however, such entitlement has not been granted to the Community.
Det andet problem (hvilken »vægt« skal Fællesskabets stemme have?) er ligeledes altid blevet særlig behandlet i bestemmelser i overenskomsterne.
For example, the EEC could not be a member of the 'executive committees' set up under the 1975 Cocoa Agreement and the 1976 Coffee Agreement.
Når Fællesskabet er part, kunne man tænke sig kun at tillægge det én stemme, således som det gøres i de tilfælde, hvor dets medlemsstater ikke er parter i aftalen.
Even assuming that it can sit in the 'Assembly' of the International Seabed Authority (see p.
Derimod kunne man vanskeligt tænke sig, at der ikke blev tillagt hver enkelt medlemsstat stemmeret i lighed med alle andre stater.
85 above) it will certainly not be able to be a member of the 36­member Council ofthat Authority.
I så tilfælde måtte det tillige fastsættes, at Fælles skabet kunne afgive én stemme i de tilfælde, hvor det havde kompetence hertil, medens medlemsstaterne kunne afgive det antal stemmer, der tilkom dem som parter i aftalen.
Similarly, the EEC will be able tobe a member of the deliberative assembly {Council of Governors) of the Common Commodity Fund set up by the previously­mentioned 1980 Geneva Agreement but it appears certain that it will not be able to be a member of the Fund's 28­member 'Management Board'.
Dette system er blevet forkastet, da det ville bevirke uligevægt mellem antallet af de stemmer, der kunne afgives af Fællesskabet og af dets medlemsstater, hvilket er i uoverensstemmelse med den politiske og økonomiske virkelighed.
The voting rights attached to the status of member of the deliberative assembly and of the restricted collegiate body are allocated sometimes in accordance with the principle of'one State, one vote' and sometimes by a weighted system.'
Desuden ville vedtagelse af et sådant system kunne anspore Fællesskabet og dets medlemsstater til at gøre systematisk brug af sidstnævntes stemmer og bevirke, at tredjelande kunne føle sig fristet til at hælde til den modsatte løsning. Dette kunne kun være til skade for fællesskabsretten og dens autonome karakter.
The general rule is that each State has a fixed, limited number of 'basic votes' to which are added a number of votes proportionate to its share in output (and exports) or in consumption (and imports) of the product in question.
(') Det bemærkes, at det forholdsmæssigt fastsatte antal stemmer, der er tillagt EØF som overvejende importerende medlem beregnes uden hensyn til handelen med olivenolie mellem dets medlemsstater (handelen »på det indre marked«).
In international bodies of which it is a member, the EEC generally has its own right to vote.
For at undgå disse ulemper har forhandlerne ved aftalernes indgåelse foretrukket et »neutralt« system, der består i at tillægge EØF et antal stemmer, der svarer til antallet af de stemmer, der er tillagt de af dets medlemsstater, som tillige er parter i den pågældende aftale. Denne regel er benyttet både i organer, der fungerer efter princippet »én stat, én stemme« (') og i organer, der har bestemmelser om vægtet stemmeret (2).
In bodies set up by agreements to which its Member States are not parties (agreements concluded by the procedure known as 'Community' agreements) the EEC has a right to vote on the same terms and conditions as the States which are parties.
Canberra-konventionen af 1980 (jfr. ovenfor) om bevarelsen af havets fauna og flora ved Antarktis betegner en begrænset undtagelse fra denne regel.
If a weighted voting system is used in the body which manages the agreement, the EEC has a number of base votes and a number of proportional votes, calculated as if it were a State.
EØF har nemlig her kun én stemme i den »kommission«, der er oprettet ved konventionen (3), og hvori det har sæde sammen med visse af sTne medlemsstater.
This is the case, for example, in the 'Council' for the 1979 International olive oil agreement.'
Ved afstemninger kan der derfor blive uligevægt mellem antallet afstemmer afgivet i spørgsmål, der hører under Fællesskabet og i afstemninger om andre spørgsmål.
When the EEC and its Member States are jointly parties to a multilateral agreement ('mixed' agreement), the question of the Community's right to vote in the managing bodies for that agreement is much more complex.
Denne situation vil dog næppe opstå, idet afgørelser som oftest skal træffes ved consensus (4).
There are two specific problems: the first is which, out of the EEC and its Member States, will be entitled to vote; the second is to determine the 'weight' of the vote which will be cast in one case or the other (assuming, of course, that decisions do not have to be unanimous or arrived at by consensus). sus).
Desuden har forhandlerne kun haft det ganske særlige tilfælde ifølge konventionen for øje, hvori »kommissionen« anmodes om at træffe foranstaltninger, der både skal anvendes inden for zoner, hvor EØF har den territoriale kompetence og zoner, der ikke er dækket af EØF's territoriale kompetence ifølge Traktaten, som f.eks. farvandene ved Kerguelen og Crozet, der er under fransk overhøjhed.
Agreements concluded by the EEC and its Member States have in all cases recognized that the first of these problems (who should vote?) should be resolved in accordance with the power-sharing rules laid down in Community law and consequently that nonmember countries should, in all cases, rely on the information they are given by the Community and its Member States.
I dette tilfælde bestemmer konventionen, at EØF skal have stemmeret i tilslutning til de af dets medlemsstater, der har sæde i kommissionen, men at antallet af disse stemmer ikke må overstige antallet af EØF-medlemsstater, der er parter i kommissionen (5).
This being so, the Community's partners have in almost all cases seen fit to stipulate in agreements that if the Community votes on a question, the Member States should re frain from doing so, and conversely.2 This 'no plural voting' clause is no problem for the Community.
Det ses, at Canberra-konventionen angår en situation, hvor der er tale om »dobbelt stemmeret«, som ikke er reguleret ved de øvrige multilaterale aftaler, som EØF og dets medlemsstater er parter i.
Its 'internal law' excludes in principle any 'parallel' or 'concurrent' powers of the EEC and its Member States on the same question.3
Den danner altså for så vidt ikke noget fortilfælde i modstrid med reglen om »neutralitet« i disse aftaler.
The second problem (what 'weight' should the Community vote have?) has also been the subject of specific provisions in all agreements.
C) Se f.eks. den ovenfor omtalte Pariserkonvention af 1974 vedrorende landbaseret forurening, artikel 19.
Once the Community has the status of party to an agreement, it would have been possible to give it one vote only, as in the case when its Member States are not parties.
(2) Se f.eks. ovennævnte internationale naturgummioverenskomst af 1979. artikel 5. stk. 2.
Con versely, it was hardly conceivable that each Member State should not have the right to
Kapitel II: De europæiske Fællesskabers deltagelse i andre internationale retsakter end traktater
Chapter II - Participation by the European Communities in acts and decisions of international law other than treaties
I dette kapitel vil vi behandle de beslutninger, resolutioner, erklæringer, henstillinger mv., hvori der udtrykkes konklusioner fra en række forhandlinger, der føres inden for rammerne af internationale organisationer og konferencer af verdensomspændende og regional karakter.
This chapter considers decisions, resolutions, declarations, recommendations, etc. embodying the conclusions of various negotiations conducted in international organizations and at international conferences, at both world and regional level.
Indholdet af disse akter, reglerne for deres vedtagelse, deres form og deres retsvirkninger er lige så forskelligartede som institutionerne selv, og der findes næppe heller nogen fæl lesnævner for de forhold, hvorunder de bliver til, anden end den, at de almindeligvis be virker mere vage forpligtelser for de parter, der vedtager dem, end forpligtelser ifølge traktater, og giver dem en større margen for at skønne over, hvilke midler de vil bruge til gennemførelsen.
These instruments whose content, conditions of adoption, forms and effects are as varied as the institutions and circumstances which produce them have very little by way of common denominator, except that in general they impose on the accepting parties obligations of a much more flexible character than those resulting from treaties and leave the parties much wider discretion regarding methods of implementation.
Den nøjagtige rækkevidde af de forpligtelser, der indeholdes i sådanne akter, er langt fra altid klar, navnlig hvor der er tale om bestemmelser, hvis benævnelse (slutakt, charta, adfærdskodeks mv.) og ordlyd med forsæt er holdt i tvetydige vendinger for at tilvejebringe et kompromis mellem de berørte parters modstående synspunkter.
The exact scope of the commitments they involve is by no means always clear, particularly when they emanate from texts deliberately described (final act, charter, code of conduct, etc.) and drafted in ambiguous terms in order to help reach a compromise between the opposing views of the interested parties.
FN-generalforsamlingens forskellige resolutionerom oprettelse af »en ny verdensøkonomisk ordning«, slutakten fra konferencen om sikkerhed og samarbejde i Europa (Helsinki 1975) ('), kodeksen vedrørende kontrol med restriktive former for handelspraksis (FN, 1980) (2) er »modeller« for sådanne kompromiser.
'Models' of such compromises are the various resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the establishment of a 'new international economic order', the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1975),' the Code for the control of restrictive business practices (United Nations, 1980).2
De internationale organisationers og konferencers virke er naturligvis ikke begrænset til eksempler på diplomatisk virtuositet, men omfatter i adskillige tilfælde akter, hvis rækkevidde er klart fastlagt.
The activity of international organizations and conferences is clearly not confined to exercises of diplomatic virtuosity and also includes, in many areas, the adoption of in struments whose scope is clearly defined.
I den udstrækning, hvori beslutninger, resolutioner, erklæringer og henstillinger fra in ternationale organisationer og konferencer angår spørgsmål, der hører under Fællesskabernes kompetence, og hvori de har mulighed herfor i de pågældende institutioner, del tager de dels i udarbejdelsen og vedtagelsen af disse akter (afsnit 1), dels i deres gennem førelse (afsnit 2).
their status with such institutions ensures them the necessary means, the European Communities participate in the drafting and adoption of such instruments (Section 1) and in their implementation (Section 2).
Afsnit 1: De europæiske Fællesskabers deltagelse i udarbejdelsen og vedtagelsen af de internationale organisationers og konferencers retsakter
Section 1: Participation of the European Communities in the drafting and adoption of acts and decisions of international organizations and conferences
Alt, hvad der er anført i første del af dette værk vedrørende Fællesskabernes deltagelse i forhandlinger, der føres inden for rammerne af internationale organisationer og konferencer, gælder bl.a. for de forhandlinger, der munder ud i vedtagelse af beslutninger, re solutioner, erklæringer, henstillinger mv. Der er således ikke grund til her at give nogen særlig fremstilling af de regler, hvorefter Fællesskaberne deltager i udarbejdelsen af disse akter.
Everything said in the first part of this study concerning participation by the Communities in negotiations conducted in international organizations and conferences applies, in particular, to such negotiations which culminate in the adoption of decisions, resolutions, declarations or recommendations. Nothing further need be said here, therefore, concerning the terms on which the Communities take part in the drafting of such in struments.
Fællesskabernes deltagelse i vedtagelsen af disse akter giver derimod anledning til særlige problemer, der ikke har været behandlet ovenfor.
By contrast, participation by the Communities in the adoption of these instruments raises specific problems which have not yet been discussed.
Når et af Fællesskaberne er medlem af en organisation eller et internationalt organ, og det har stemmeret heri, har det sædvanligvis uden videre ret til på sit kompetenceområde at deltage i vedtagelsen af akter, der forelægges disse organisationer eller organer til afstemning.
When one or other of the Communities is a member of an international organization or body and has the right to vote, it is usually entitled ipsofacto to take part, within the limits of its powers, in the adoption of instruments submitted to those organizations or bodies for approval.
Alt hvad der er anført i kapitel I her i anden del (s. 85 ff.) om Fællesskaber nes ret til at stemme i organer, der er oprettet ved aftaler, hvori de er part, gælder også i det her omhandlede tilfælde.
All the points made in Chapter 1 of the present Part Two (p. 86 et seq.) concerning the Communities' right to vote in bodies set up by agreements to which they are party also apply to the case now considered.
Der er intet at tilføje.
There is nothing to add.
Man må blot erindre, at antallet af de organisationer eller internationale organer, hvori Fællesskaberne har stemmeret, er be grænset (navnlig forvaltningsorganerne for de verdensomfattende overenskomster ved rørende basisprodukter og kommissionerne forde regionale fiskeriorganisationer).
It simply has to be recalled that the international organizations or bodies in which the Communities have the right to vote are few in number (managing bodies for world agreements on basic commodities and commissions for regional fisheries organizations in particular).
I de fleste internationale organisationer (FN, disses særorganisationer, OECD, Europa-Rådet m.fl.) har Fællesskaberne kun status som observatør uden stemmeret.
In most international organizations (UN institutions and special agencies, OECD, Council of Europe, etc.) the Communities attend only as observers without voting rights.
Fællesskaberne kan således principielt ikke deltage i vedtagelsen af disse organisationers akter.
Normally, therefore, they can take no part in the adoption of instruments emanating from those organizations.
Der er grund til at undersøge, om denne situation er forenelig med fællesskabsrettens krav, og i benægtende fald undersøge, hvorledes denne uoverensstemmelse i givet fald kan afhjælpes.
It has to be considered whether this state of affairs is compatible with the requirements ofCommunity law and, if not, to consider how this incompatibility can be resolved, as and when necessary.
enskomst om naturgummi, der var udarbejdet inden for rammerne af UNCTAD, har Domstolen udtalt, at EØF-traktatens artikel 116 »er udformet med henblik på med lemsstaternes fælles optræden i de internationale organisationer, som Fællesskabet ikke er medlem af«.
In its Opinion 1/78 (previously mentioned) handed down on 4 November 1979 con cerning the compatibility of the International Natural Rubber Agreement, worked out withing Unctad, with the provisions of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice of the European Communities maintained that Article 116 of the EEC Treaty 'was framed so that the Member States should take common action in international organizations to which the Community does not belong'.
»I en sådan situation«, hedder det i dommen, »er det eneste middel en samordnet og solidarisk optræden fra de medlemsstater, der er medlemmer af nævnte organisationer«.
'In these circumstances', declared the Court, 'the only appropriate means is concerted joint action by the Member States, as members of the said organizations'.