natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hovedsigtet med direktiverne var at sikre den praktiske gennemførelse inden for Fællesskabet af etableringsfriheden for EF-selskaber, dvs. selskaber, der i henhold til EØF-Traktatens artikel 58 skal ligestilles med personer, der er statsborgere i medlemsstaterne. Dette gjaldt tydeligvis ikke for selskaber med hovedkontor uden for Fællesskabet, men som kunne gå ind på EF-markedet ved at oprette en filial eller et agentur i en eller flere medlemsstater.
The main purpose of the Directives was to secure the practical application within the Community of the right of establishment for Community undertakings, that is, undertakings which by virtue of Article 58 of the EEC Treaty were to be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States.
Med Traktaten blev det implicit overladt til hver enkelt medlemsstat at gøre brug af den nationale suverænitet til at godkende eller forbyde sådanne filialer eller agenturer.
The Treaty implicitly left it to each Member State to exercise its own sovereignty in deciding to accept or reject such establishment.
Hvis én medlemsstat gav et sådant selskab ret til at oprette en filial på sit område, betød det imidlertid ikke, at det havde ret til eller juridisk grundlag for at oprette en filial i en anden medlemsstat.
Moreover, the acceptance by one Member State of the setting up in its territory of a branch of such an undertaking gave no right or legal precedent for the establishment of a branch within another Member State.
Hermed ikke sagt, at Fællesskabet kunne fralægge sig ethvert ansvar med hensyn til behandlingen af disse filialer.
This did not mean, however, that the Community could afford to wash its hands of the treatment of such branches.
I betragtningerne til 1. skadesforsikringsdirektiv hedder det således:
As the preamble to the first nonlife Directive puts it:
»... de samordnede regler for udøvelse af direkte forsikringsvirksomhed i Fællesskabet skal principielt finde anvendelse på alle de virksomheder, der gør sig gældende på markedet, og altså ligeledes på agenturer og filialer af virksomheder, hvis vedtægtsmæssige hjemsted ligger uden for Fællesskabet«; desuden må man ikke fravige »det princip, at disse virksomheders agenturer og filialer ikke må behandles mere gunstigt end Fællesskabets virksomheder«.
'... the coordinated rules concerning the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance within the Community should, in principle, apply to all under takings entering the market and, consequently, also to agencies and branches where the head office of the undertaking is situated outside the Community'; and it is necessary to observe 'the principle that such agencies and branches should not obtain more favourable treatment than undertakings within the Community'.
Det var ikke noget problem at gennemføre et løbende tilsyn med sådanne filialer og agenturer, da dette tilsyn primært vedrørte oprettelse af tekniske reserver og dækning for disse ved hjælp af egnede aktiver.
There was no difficulty in applying current supervision to such branches or agencies, this relating above all to the constitution of technical provisions and their representation by appropriate assets.
Problemet var, at de væsentligste bestemmelser i direktiverne — om solvensmargenen og myndighedernes tilsyn hermed i den medlemsstat, hvor hovedkontoret var beliggende — ifølge sagens natur ikke kunne anvendes på foretagender med hovedkontor uden for EF, da Fællesskabets beføjelser naturligvis ikke kunne udvides til at omfatte kontrol med eller indhente oplysninger om foretagendets samlede aktiviteter.
The difficulty was that the main rules of the Directives, on the constitution of the solvency margin and its supervision by the authorities of the Member State where the head office was situated, could not, in the nature of things, apply to nonCommunity undertakings because of the impossibility of extending sovereignty to exercise control or even secure adequate information in respect of the total activities of the undertaking.
Den løsning, man fandt frem til, og som er indeholdt i direktivernes afsnit III, foreskriver, at medlemsstater, der på deres område tillader, at et sådant foretagende opretter en filial, skal behandle filialen, som om den er et særskilt foretagende, i hvert fald i det omfang, at det skal opstille en særskilt solvensmargen, beregnet på grundlag af den pågældende filials virksomhed.
The solution found — contained in Title III of the Directives — was to require those Member States that admitted the constitution of a branch of such an undertaking within their territory to treat the branch virtually as if it were a separate undertaking, at least to the extent that it would have to set up a separate solvency margin, the amount of which would be calculated by reference to the activities carried on by the branch in question.
Desuden skal alle de aktiver, der medgår til dækning af solvensmargenen, befinde sig i Fællesskabet, og en del af dem i det land, hvor filialen er placeret.
Further more, all the assets representing the solvency margin would have to be kept within the Community, and a part of them within the country of the branch.
Filialen skal have en garantifond på ikke under halvdelen af den minimumsgarantifond, der kræves for EF-foretagender, og halvdelen af dette beløb skal deponeres som sikkerhed i den pågældende stat.
The branch would be required to have one-half of the minimum guarantee fund required of Community undertakings, and one-half of that amount would have to be deposited as a security in the State concerned.
Direktiverne indeholder en række bestemmelser, som sjældent anvendes, hvorefter kravene til solvensmargen og garantifond kan opfyldes sammenlagt, hvis EF-foretagendet er etableret i flere medlemsstater.
The Directives contain provisions, rarely used, under which a grouping of the solvency margin and guarantee fund requirements may take place where the Community undertaking has establishments in more than one Member State.
Det kræver, at foretagendet ansøger derom, og at de pågældende medlemsstater godkender det.
This requires an application by the undertaking and its acceptance by the Member States concerned.
I henhold til afsnit III skal medlemsstaterne sikre, at virksomheder med hjemsted uden for EF »mindst« opfylder de opstillede betingelser, hvis de gives tilladelse til at oprette en filial eller et agentur.
Title III requires Member States to ensure that nonCommunity undertakings fulfil 'at least' the conditions stated if they choose to grant an authorization.
Dermed synes man at antyde, at medlemsstaterne både kan stille større krav til solvensmargener og garantifond og stille betingelser, som ikke er nævnt i direktivet.
This appears to imply that they may impose both higher solvency margins and guarantee fund requirements and additional conditions not mentioned in the Directive.
Lande, der ikke er medlemmer af EF, har undertiden anset bestemmelserne i afsnit III for at være diskriminerende.
The provisions of Title III have sometimes been regarded as discriminatory by nonCommunity countries.
Det er ikke hensigten med dem.
This is not their intention.
Det er korrekt, at de foreskriver en forskelligartet behandling af virksomheder fra tredjelande, men det er uundgåeligt, eftersom Fællesskabets bestemmelser ikke kan anvendes på disse virksomheder.
It is true that they lay down a different treatment for third-country undertakings, but this is inevitable in view of the fact that the Community provisions cannot be applied to them.
De enkelte medlemsstater kan ganske vist diskriminere ved ikke at give foretagender fra bestemte lande tilladelse til at oprette filialer eller ved at opstille strengere betingelser end dem, der er fastsat i direktivet, men det kan man ikke bebrejde Fællesskabet.
Individual Member States may, it is true, discriminate by refusing to accept the establishment of branches of undertakings from particular countries or by imposing conditions more stringent than the minimum rules laid down in the Directive, but if they do so it is not by virtue of any Community act.
Artikel 29 i 1. skadesforsikringsdirektiv åbner mulighed for en anden fremgangsmåde.
Artide 29 of the first nonlife Directive opens the possibility of a different regime.
Den lyder således:
It reads as follows:
»Fællesskabet kan i de aftaler, det i overensstemmelse med Traktaten indgår med et eller flere tredjelande, blive enige om anvendelse af bestemmelser, der afviger fra de i dette afsnit fastsatte, med det formål på betingelse af gensidighed at garantere en tilstrækkelig beskyttelse af de sikrede i medlemsstaterne«.
'The Community may, by means of agreements concluded pursuant to the Treaty with one or more third countries, agree to the application of provisions different from those provided in this Title, for the purpose of ensuring, under conditions of reciprocity, adequate protection for insured persons in the Member States'.
Næsten umiddelbart efter vedtagelsen af dette direktiv, gav Schweiz udtryk for et ønske om at indgå en sådan aftale, og Kommissionen fik derfor bemyndigelse til at indlede forhandlinger med landet.
Almost immediately after the adoption of the Directive, Switzerland expressed an interest in entering into such an agreement and the Commission was therefore authorized to negotiate a text with the authorities of that country.
Drøftelserne begyndte i 1974, og et aftaleudkast blev paraferet for adskillige år siden.
Talks began in 1974 and a draft text was initialled several years ago.
Generelt ville aftalen medføre, at den schweiziske lovgivning om tilsyn med forsikringsselskaber kom til at indeholde bestemmelser svarende til dem, som medlemsstaterne var forpligtet til at gennemføre i kraft af direktivet.
The general effect of the agreement would be that Swiss insurance supervision law would contain provisions similar to those that the Member States were obliged to implement by virtue of the Directive.
Til gengæld ville schweiziske skadesforsikringsselskaber få mulighed for at etablere sig i de enkelte medlemsstater på lige fod med EF-forsikringsselskaber, som for deres part ville kunne gøre krav på tilsvarende fordele i Schweiz.
In consequence of this, Swiss nonlife insurers would be able to avail themselves within each of the Member States of possibilities of establishment similar to those enjoyed by Community insurers, who in their turn would benefit from similar privileges in Switzerland.
Den foreslåede aftale ville vanskeliggøre senere ændringer af 1. skadesforsikringsdirektiv.
The proposed agreement would have made further amendments of the first nonlife Directive difficult.
Det var nødvendigt at føre flere drøftelser for at finde en løsning på dette problem og for i fællesskabslovgivningen at indkorporere visse forandringer, som var indtruffet efter indledningen af forhandlingerne.
The need to overcome this problem and to incorporate certain develop ments in Community legislation that had taken place since the opening of negotiations made further discussions necessary.
Forhandlingerne blev afsluttet i sommeren 1989.
They were terminated in the summer of 1989.
Aftalen blev endeligt undertegnet i Luxembourg den 10. oktober 1989 af formanden for Rådet og den schweiziske præsident.
The agreement was finally signed in Luxembourg on 10 October 1989, by the President of the Council and the President of the Swiss Confederation.
Den trådte imidlertid ikke straks i kraft, da den først skulle ratificeres i Fællesskabet og Schweiz i overensstemmelse med de respektive procedurer, som for Fællesskabets vedkommende er komplicerede.
Even then it did not enter immediately into force, but has to be ratified by the Community and Switzerland in accordance with their respective procedures which, in the case of the Community, are complicated.
Det vil blive interessant at se, om andre lande uden for EF vil ønske at indgå lignende aftaler.
It will be interesting to see if other non-member States seek negotiations along similar lines.
Hvad de andre EFTA-lande angår, vil det formentlig afhænge af deres samlede stilling i forhold til det indre marked.
As far as the other EFTA countries are concerned, this will perhaps depend upon the totality of their relationship with the evolving single market.
De filialer eller agenturer, der befinder sig i en given medlemsstat, men som tilhører et forsikringsselskab med hjemsted uden for EF, må kun dække risici i andre medlemsstater via grænseoverskridende tjenesteydelser, hvis sidstnævnte medlemsstater ensidigt giver deres samtykke dertil.
The branches or agencies situated within a given Member State but belonging to an insurer from outside the Community may only cover risks in other Member States through crossfrontier services if those States unilaterally so agree.
EØF-Traktatens artikel 59, stk. 2, lyder som følger:
The second paragraph of Article 59 of the EEC Treaty states:
»På forslag af Kommissionen kan Rådet med kvalificeret flertal vedtage at udstrække anvendelsen af bestemmelserne i dette kapitel« (kapitel 3 med over skriften »Tjenesteydelser«) »til tjenesteydere, der er statsborgere i et tredjeland og bosat inden for Fællesskabet.«
'The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, extend the provisions of the Chapter' (Chapter 3, headed 'Services') 'to nationals of a third country who provide services and who are established within the Community'.
I sit oprindelige forslag til 2. skadesforsikringsdirektiv inkluderede Kommissionen da også en bestemmelse, som ville have tilvejebragt dette resultat, men fjernede den, da det under drøftelserne fremgik, at Rådet ikke var rede til at godkende en sådan foranstaltning.
In its original proposal for the second nonlife insurance coordination Directive the Commission did indeed include a provision that would have achieved this result, but withdrew it when it became apparent in the course of discussions that the Council was not ready for such a measure.
På politisk plan i medlemsstaterne synes der at være stemning for, at det er nødvendigt med praktisk erfaring med anvendelsen af 2. direktiv, før man vil kunne overveje at tage et sådant skridt.
The feeling at political level in most Member States seems to be that practical experience of the operation of the second Directive is needed before such a move can be contemplated.
En populær måde, hvorpå forsikringsselskaber fra tredjelande gør forretninger inden for EF, er at benytte et datterselskab, der er placeret i Fællesskabet, men som helt eller delvis ejes af interesser i tredjelande.
The use of a subsidiary company, established within the Community but wholly or partly owned by nonCommunity interests, is a popular way for nonCommunity insurers to do business inside the Community.
Det har givet anledning til uoverensstemmelser, hvor man ofte har anvendt udtrykkene »fæstning Europa« og »gensidighed«, som imidlertid sjældent er blevet defineret.
It has also attracted controversy, in which the expressions 'fortress Europe' and 'reciprocity' were often used but rarely defined.
Hidtil har det været op til den enkelte medlemsstat at afgøre, om den vil tillade sådanne datterselskaber på sit område, og fastsætte vilkårene; og det er en kendt sag, at sådanne tiltag er lettere at gennemføre i nogle medlemsstater end i andre.
In the past, it has been up to the individual Member State whether it will allow such subsidiary companies to be formed at all in its territory and to fix the conditions; and it is well known that such operations are easier in some Member States than in others.
Selskaber, »som er oprettet i overensstemmelse med en medlemsstats lovgivning, og hvis vedtægtsmæssige hjemsted, hovedkontor eller hovedvirksomhed er beliggende inden for Fællesskabet, ligestilles ... med personer, der er statsborgere i medlemsstaterne« (EØF-Traktatens artikel 58), og de har derfor hidtil haft samme rettigheder som forsikringsselskaber, der er 100% ejet af EF-statsborgere.
Such companies 'formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community shall ... be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States' (EEC Treaty, Article 58) and have therefore up to now benefited from the same rights as insurance companies that are wholly owned by Community nationals.
Det må understreges, at uanset hvad der sker, vil der ikke blive pillet ved de rettigheder, som indrømmes datterselskaber, der allerede er etableret i Fællesskabet.
It must be stressed that whatever happens, nothing will be done to take anything away from the rights of such subsidiary companies that are already established within the Community.
Den seneste udvikling er, at procedurer svarende til dem i 2. bankdirektiv nr. 89/646/ EØF af 15. december 1989 er blevet indført i forslaget til 2. livsforsikringsdirektiv (for al livsforsikring) og — noget senere — i forslaget til direktiv om fri udveksling af tjenesteydelser inden for motorkøretøjsforsikring (for al skadesforsikring).
The latest development is that procedures similar to those laid down in the second banking Directive, 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989, have been introduced into the proposal for a second life insurance coordination Directive (for the whole of life insurance) and, somewhat later, into the proposal for a Directive on freedom of services in motor insurance (for the whole of nonlife insurance).
Forslagene foreskriver, at Kommissionen skal:
The proposals provide that the Commission shall:
(i) danne sig et samlet billede over de koncernstrukturer, som vedrører forsikringsselskaber i Fællesskabet, der direkte eller indirekte er datterselskaber af virksomheder, der ligger uden for EF
(i) build up a complete picture of the group structure affecting insurance undertakings within the Community that are direct or indirect subsidiaries of nonCommunity interests;
(ii) holdes underrettet om de vanskeligheder, som EF-forsikringsselskaber møder i forbindelse med etablering eller udøvelse af virksomhed i lande uden for EF.
(ii) be fully informed of all difficulties experienced by Community insurance undertakings in setting up or carrying on business in nonCommunity countries.
Hvis Kommissionen konstaterer, at »faktisk adgang til markedet svarende til den, Fællesskabet indrømmer« (gensidighedsprincippet) ikke indrømmes i et tredjeland, kan den indlede forhandlinger med det pågældende land for at opnå denne adgang.
Where the Commission finds that 'effective market access comparable to that afforded by the Community' (mirror-image reciprocity) is lacking in a nonCommunity country, it may seek negotiations with that country to secure such access.
Manglende gensidighed berettiger ikke Fællesskabet til at gøre meget andet end at indlede forhandlinger.
The mere absence of mirror-image reciprocity does not entitle the Community to do more than negotiate.
Hvis Kommissionen konstaterer, at der faktisk diskrimineres mod EF-forsikringsselskaber i et tredjeland, kan den træffe skrappere forholdsregler.
If the Commission finds that there is effective discrimination against Community insurance undertakings in the nonCommunity country, it may initiate tougher action.
Der er tale om faktisk diskriminering, hvis begge følgende omstændigheder er til stede:
Effective discrimination would exist if both the following were found:
(i) EF-forsikringsselskaber i det pågældende tredjeland nyder ikke national behandling, der giver dem samme konkurrencevilkår som indenlandske forsikrings selskaber, og
(i) Community insurance undertakings do not enjoy national treatment in the country concerned, affording the same competitive opportunities as those enjoyed by national insurance undertakings; and
(ii) betingelserne for faktisk adgang til markedet er ikke opfyldt.
(ii) the conditions necessary for effective market access are not met there.
De skrappere forholdsregler vil bestå i at begrænse eller helt lukke af for:
(i) authorizations to new direct or indirect subsidiaries of interests in the country concerned to carry on insurance business in the Community;
For at anskueliggøre den placering, som forsikringsbranchen i Fællesskabet indtager på verdensplan, må vi gøre brug af nogle andre tal end dem, der viste markedernes relative størrelse.
To indicate the place of the Community insurance industry in the world we must have recourse to a different set of figures from those which gave the relative size of the markets.
I stedet for at angive præmier for dækning af risici, der befinder sig i bestemte lande eller grupper af lande, vil vi forsøge at beregne tallene for de nettopræmier, der håndteres af forsikringsselskaber på kontorer placeret i disse lande eller grupper af lande, uanset hvor forsikringstagerne eller de risici, som disse præmier vedrører, befinder sig. »Nettopræmier« i de efterfølgende tabeller betyder bruttopræmier for direkte forsikring og genforsikring modtaget af disse kontorer, herunder specialiserede genforsikringsselskaber, men minus den afgivne genforsikringsandel, og repræsenterer derfor det samlede selvbehold i det pågældende land eller den pågældende gruppe af lande.
Instead of showing the volume of premiums paid in respect of risks situated within countries or groups of countries, we try to establish the volume of net premiums handled by insurance undertakings at offices situated within those countries or groups of countries, regardless of the location of the policyholders or risks from which those premiums originate. 'Net written premiums' in the table which follows means the gross direct insurance and reinsurance premiums received by those offices, including specialist reinsurers, less the reinsurance ceded by them, and represents therefore the total retentions in the country or group concerned.
Import og eksport af forsikringsydelser, inklusive de internationale genforsikringsstrømme, tages således med i betragtning.
Imports and exports of insurance services, including the international flows of reinsurance, are thus taken into account.
Til dette formål vil vi ty til statistiske oplysninger fra OECD. Disse tal, som stammer fra før 1987, er udtrykt i »særlige trækningsrettigheder« (SDR) i stedet for amerikanske dollars og dækker kun OECD-landene (som ikke desto mindre antages at have tegnet sig for ca. 91% af præmieindtægterne på verdensplan i 1987).
For this purpose we resort to statistics published by the OECD.
Tallene er derfor ikke helt sammenlignelige med de tidligere anførte tal vedrørende forsikringsmarkederne.
They cannot, therefore, be related precisely to the figures given above for insurance markets.
Tallene under »forsikringsmarkeder«, der stammer fra Sigma under Swiss Reinsurance Company, viser, at skadesforsikringsvirksomheden i USA var betydeligt større end livsforsikringsvirksomheden, hvorimod OECD-tallene viser en større præmieindtægt fra livsforsikringer end fra skadesforsikringer.
The figures given under 'Insurance markets', extracted from Sigma, of the Swiss Reinsurance Company, show that nonlife business in the United States was very substantially greater than life business, whereas the OECD figures show a larger premium income from life than from non-life.
Det lader til, at en stor del af den forsikringsvirksomhed, der i Sigmatallene er klassificeret som skadesforsikring, optræder som livsforsikring i OECD-statistikkerne.
It seems that a large segment of business classified in the Sigma figures as nonlife insurance appears in the OECD statistics as life insurance.
Sigmatallene stammer fra for skellige offentlige og private kilder, medens OECD-tallene er baseret på oplysninger indgivet af de nationale delegationer til denne organisations Forsikringsudvalg.
The Sigma figures come from various public and private sources, while the OECD figures were prepared from information supplied to that organization's insurance committee by national delegations.
Denne forskel, som er typisk for dem, der viser sig ved en sammenligning af tal fra forskellige kilder, understøtter den tidligere givne advarsel.
This discrepancy, typical of those found when figures from different sources are compared, reinforces the warning given earlier.