natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Men den er også strukturel, vi kan ikke blive ved med at vokse, man kan ikke køre i tre biler samtidig, man kan ikke spise tre hamburgere om dagen.
But that too is structural, we cannot continue to grow, you cannot drive three cars at the same time, you cannot eat five hamburgers a day.
Det er årsagerne til krisen, og hvis det er tabu at tale om det, så flygter man i virkeligheden atter fremad.
These are the causes of the crisis, and if it is taboo to talk about them then you run away again.
De Grønne er imod, at der i øjeblikket presses på for én valuta.
Mr President, the Greens object to a single currency being forced on us at this time.
Medlemsstaterne må i det mindste foreløbig beholde deres valuta som skjold for at beskytte det sociale og økologiske.
The Members States must at least for the time being keep their currency as a shield against social and ecological onslaughts.
De Grønne er imod, at der kommer et valutasystem med to hastigheder, for så suger de stærke valutaer de svage tomme.
The Greens are against a two­speed currency system for the strong currencies would milk the weak ones dry.
Må jeg komme med endnu en bemærkning, hr. formand, til hr. Delors.
May I make just one comment, Mr President, to Mr Delors?
Hr. Delors har fremsat et meget godt forslag til begrænsning af kapitalbevægelsernes fart.
Mr Delors made a very good proposal to limit the speed of capital movements.
Jeg siger til ham: Vi må også begrænse antallet af kilometer, og vi må have en økoskat på kapitalbevægelser.
I would say to him that we also need to limit the number of kilometres and levy an ecotax on capital movements.
RISKÆR PEDERSEN (LDR). - Hr. formand, allerede i Centralbankchefernes seneste årsberetning lå forvarslet om den efterfølgende valutakrise.
RISKÆR PEDERSEN (LDR). ­ (DA) Mr President, the most recent annual report from the Committee of Central Bank Governors foreshadowed the subsequent currency crisis.
Centralbankcheferne slog jo netop fast, at mulighederne for at føre en optimal penge- og valutapolitik på væsentlige områder blev begrænset af medlemslandenes ubalancerede finanspolitik.
The Central Bank Governors stated in fact that possibilities for conducting an optimal monetary and currency policy in significant sectors were limited by the Member States' unbalanced financial policies.
Stigende statsunderskud og øget statsgæld eliminerer nu ikke blot frihedsgraderne i den økonomiske politik, men eliminerer også en nødvendig tilpasning af realrenten i den europæiske økonomi.
Rising public deficits and increased national debts now not only wipe out margins for manoeuvre in economic policy, but also remove the possibility of making necessary adjust­ments to real rates of interest in the European economy.
Disse bemærkninger blev samtidig kædet sammen med en erkendelse af, at den rigoristiske fastlåsning af valutakurserne i EMS'en på mellemlang sigt ville lægge grunden til spændinger, efterhånden som et reelt behov for tilpasning imellem medlemslandenes valutaer måtte opbygges.
These comments were linked to a recognition of the fact that the locking together of currency rates in the EMS in the medium term will give rise to tensions, as a genuine need for adjustment between the Member States' curren­cies progressively makes itself felt.
Årsagen til sammenbruddet - det er det, jeg kalder det - af EMS'en er derfor klar og entydig: Manglende politisk vilje til at leve op til konvergenspolitikken og fraværet af multilateral overvågning med de forudsatte sanktionsprocedurer gør det til en umulig opgave at etablere en situation med
The cause of the collapse ­ yes, collapse ­ of the EMS is therefore in no doubt: A failure of the political will to live up to the policy of convergence and an absence of multilateral supervision equipped with the necessary sanctions pro­cedures makes a situation of currency stability an impos­sible one to establish, when the conditions for it are not met.
PANNELLA indeholdt i Maastricht-Traktaten, mellem Den Politiske Union og Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union rammer os meget stærkt og viser, hvor farlig den nuværende krise er, som allerede har varet ved i 18 måneder.
Reforms of the labour market and of its structures are needed in the interests of mobility and flexibility in the current employment situation.
Vi har været ude for et sådant tab af politisk og valutapolitisk troværdighed, at det virkelig er forkasteligt og letsindigt nu ikke at handle i fællesskab.
And fundamental reforms in the fiscal area, together with the implementation of the Single Market and the conclusion of the GATT negotiations are all important elements.
Vi havde forsikret dem om, at vi ikke blot ønskede det indre marked for det indre markeds skyld, ikke blot Den Monetære Union for Den Monetære Unions skyld, men derimod at vi søgte at opnå disse mål, for at vi kan opnå mere velstand og mere beskæftigelse i Det Europæiske Fællesskab. Det modsatte er desværre tilfældet!
PANNELLA (NI). ­ (¡Τ) Mr President, gentlemen of the Council and the Commission, ladies and gentlemen, if we were living ­ as we should be but are not ­ in a time of democracy, I could perhaps have said that with the excellent statements by Mr Cot and other colleagues we now find ourselves at the stage of the Requiem and the De Profundis.
og alle de europæiske befolkninger, i det mindste har fjernet den skammelige og uudholdelige arrogante tone, der har været kendetegnende for partivældet her i Parlamentet og i Fællesskabets institutioner.
Certainly, we can intone them more clearly now that certain defeats which Europe, and all the peoples of Europe have suffered, have at least got rid of that shameful and intolerably arrogant tone that once marked the 'partitocracy' of this Parliament and of our European institutions.
Hvilken forskel -tillykke, hr. Cot! - med de sidste fire års arrogance, med den vulgære facon, hvorpå man i anden sammenhæng modtog Gorbatjov eller dennes modstander, med det indhold af forslagene, som jeg virkelig må sige, er skammelige, om ustandseligt at ændre husets spilleregler i en så ekstrem grad, at I nu også må forsøge at lukke munden på os Løsgængere.
How different ­ my compliments, Mr Cot! ­ from the arrogance of these past four years, from the vulgarity with which, on another occasion, Gorbachev or his adversary were greeted, from the tone of what I can only call the absolutely shameful proposals continuously to change the rules of play of this House, including those designed in part to shut the mouths of the non­Attached.
Men alt dette er faldet til jorden.
But all this has gone.
Udsvingsmargenerne må i den forbindelse ikke tilbageføres via bilaterale aftaler, men virkelig kun i fællesskab.
At the same time, the establishment of The European Monetary Institute must be given strength and a political platform.
Jeg anser alle andre forslag for at være skæbnesvangre.
The Belgian Presidency must guarantee a proposal for the reform of the EMS.
I dag befinder Europa sig på ny i en katastrofal situation, og det gør man klogt i at indse.
This should contain proposals for the sharing out of the loss incurred through
Jeg vil begrænse mig til at understrege nogle.
Unfortunately, the opposite is the case!
Den medfører dog en meget stor fare, som vi i dag må vogte os for: faren for protektionisme i Det Europæiske Fællesskab.
we are not - a society that obeyed the rules of civilized societies, you would have had to deposit your budgets with the court of law.
Vi har ryddet de fleste af protektionismens torturinstrumenter af vejen - toldskrankerne, de forskellige normer i Det Europæiske Fællesskab - men nu står hvert enkelt EF-medlemsland over for fristelsen til at lade sin valuta forfalde for derved at gøre det vanskeligere at importere til landet og lettere at eksportere. Det ville være en ny form for protektionisme i Det Europæiske Fællesskab.
So it is simply not good enough only to consider a reform of the European monetary system, just to ask what can be improved; instead we need more policy-making in the Community and we must work jointly towards our aims -especially in economic policy.
Det må vi vogte os for.
That is the only chance now.
Problemets alvor varer ved, fordi de økonomiske beslutningstagere, markedet, ikke stoler på de eksisterende valutakursforhold - på trods af de i øvrigt utilstrækkelige justeringer.
The current exchange rate crisis is indeed raising many major questions because it could also fuel an economic decline, which could further accentuate the present stresses in the fields of employment and growth.
Ministerrådet har naturligvis det største ansvar.
However, Mr President, I think we must reply at the right moment.
Hr. Maystadt, De talte om, at denne ordning er midlertidig, og at De vil forsøge hurtigst muligt igen at vende tilbage til de faste udsvingsmargener.
We will reply to you, and we will endeavour to reply to you at the elections, with the ghosts of parties which today have all the signs of representing the death of the ideals that first inspired them.
Realistisk set må vi imidlertid gå ud fra, at netop disse faste udsvingsmargener tidligere har været genstand for spekulation.
We for our part will endeavour to regain what you squandered in such an incredible although foreseeable way, that immense hope that the people of Europe had placed in us and in Europe.
Så længe vi ikke har gjort væsentlige fremskridt i konvergensen af vore nationaløkonomier, vil det sandsynligvis ikke være muligt at vende tilbage til disse faste udsvingsmargener.
This century will not close with the 'lendemain qui chante' that you predicted with your illusions about cutting down on the law and the institutions, with your foolishly ambitious social demagogy, with your petty politics, stopped only by the classic proposals that the European Parliament had put forward in the form of this draft Constitution, which is now the only chance of offering something concrete at the elections.
Vi må på anden vis forsøge at tilnærme valutaerne til hinanden.
We will draw up an answering manifesto, and in fact we are already preparing it.
Økonomiernes reelle konver gens er en sine qua non betingelse, og derfor kan den ikke som hidtil have en andenplads i forhold til den nominelle konvergens.
They could destroy the concept and the reality of the single market, and what would be left of European integration then?
Jeg vil gerne sige noget til den beskatning af spekulation, som hr. Cot foreslog.
In this situation it is important for us to achieve a slow but lasting narrowing of the margins of fluctuation.
Jeg advarer imod den illusion, at der her findes helt simple løsninger, og man med en sådan foranstaltning målrettet kan ramme de »slemme« spekulanter.
If we are to do this the govern ments must show reason, and we need the kind of monetary policy cooperation and coordination that the European Parliament called for from the Council and the central banks a year ago.
Pengemarkederne spiller en vigtig rolle for vor økonomi.
Where is that extra cooperation and coordination that could improve matters?
Hr. Soros har selv givet det rigtige svar på, hvordan vi kan gribe ind over for disse spekulationer i Det Europæiske Fællesskab.
We especially need cooperation and coordination in fixing the exchange rates.
Hermed er det erkendt, at de nationale økono mier inden for EF udviser en meget større indbyrdes forskel, end man længe har villet holde for rigtigt, og at det oven i købet er skadeligt for medlemsstaterne at holde fast ved en politik, som ikke svarer til de økonomiske realiteter.
We can go on quarrelling about interest rates for ever, but unless we can formulate a Community system of monetary policy that really specifies its aims and instruments, and unless the Member States declare themselves willing to apply this system both in theory and in practice, we will not succeed in restoring the confidence that is so sorely needed in this situation.
Vi oplever for øjeblikket en økonomisk krise, og i krisetider kan man normalt kun gøre ting, som koster få penge.
Today Europe once again finds itself in a disastrous situation and we must not delude ourselves.
Det skaber tillid til valutaen i disse lande, uden at der derved opstår yderligere omkostninger.
I say this even though I do not like making apocalyptic predictions, because they can eventually lead to an Apocalypse.
Spørgsmålet er fortsat, hvordan man i 1991 i Maastricht-Traktaten overhovedet har kunnet lægge sig fast på så skrappe tidsfrister for realiseringen af ØMU og aldrig har tænkt på muligheden af recession.
VON WOGAU (PPE). - (DE) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, the decision taken by the ministers of finance in August to let our currencies float within a 15% margin was not a good one, but in the circumstances and at the time it was the least bad decision.
Den sidste tids begivenheder har på ny bevist, at et europæisk monetært system ikke kan være et mål i sig selv, men højst et slutprodukt, udelukkende resultatet at en koherent og konsistent monetær og økonomisk politik fra medlems staterne.
Yet it carries with it a very great risk, against which we must guard ourselves today: the risk of protectionism within the European Community.
Vi skal holde fast ved de strenge kriterier og også være bevidste om, at en monetær union, når den kommer, kun kan bestå, hvis vi samtidig i 1996 også tager skridtene til Den Politiske Union.
We have suffered such a loss of political and economic credibility that it really will be abominable and reckless if we do not act together now.
Derfor finder jeg det ønskværdigt, at vi nu tager realiteterne i øjesyn og tager afstand fra det højttravende ideal om møntunion med dens urealistiske tidsplan.
We have got rid of most of the instruments of torture of protectionism - the customs barriers, the divergent norms in the European Community - but now every single Member State of the European Community is faced with the temptation to let its currency fall, thus impeding imports into the country and facilitating exports from it.
Den monetære krise står i hvert fald ikke isoleret.
That would be a new form of protec-
AMARAL (LDR). - (PT) Hr. formand, det fælles beslutningsforslag er for os en udmærket syntese af hovedaspekterne i Det Europæiske Monetære Systems krise, og derfor skal jeg ikke her gentage alle de argumenter og
The Belgian Presidency has a great responsibility to actually bring everyone to the negotiating table in the present situation, and this is in line not only with our wishes but especially with those of the electorate, to whom we alleged that the Maastricht Treaty would lead to more integration. We assured them we wanted the
Det er vigtigt at stræbe efter at lade medlemsstaternes økonomier vokse imod hinanden, forhåbentlig med monetær stabilitet som resultat. Men det vil ikke kunne forhindre, at medlemsstaterne inden for de nye marginer bruger deres frihed til at træffe de foranstaltninger, som er nødvendige under de indenlandske omstændigheder med stigende arbejdsløshed og offentlige underskud.
were obviously insufficient, it is clear that economic agents, the market, do not trust the existing exchange parities enough for the system to resist pressure or withstand fresh attacks since it continues to display the same inability and lack of political will to introduce the necessary reforms.
En af årsagerne til krisens start var den usikkerhed, der herskede og stadig hersker, med hensyn til Det Europæiske Fællesskabs fremtid, især på grund af tvivlen med hensyn til ratifikationen af Maastricht-Traktaten.
President Maystadt, you spoke of this measure as a temporary one and said you would try to return to the fixed margins of fluctuation as soon as possible. But we must be realistic and remember that it was precisely these fixed margins that became an object of speculation in the past.
METTEN (PSE). - (NL) Hr. formand, vi har hørt en bred vifte afløsninger her i denne sal.
The crisis in the system is, above all, a crisis of credibility of the system itself and, above all, the way in which the system is managed.
Jeg tror, vi kun kan blive enige, hvis vi også kan blive enige om analysen af, hvad der nu præcis er sket.
It is in that sense that the main responsibility lies naturally with the Council of Ministers. ters.
For det andet var der den tyske genforening, som tvinger Tyskland og de øvrige lande til at opretholde en høj rente.
But the objective of EMU will definitely not be attainable unless we are able to define a common monetary policy, which is credible and has the objectives of nominal convergence which are also realistic in terms of dead lines, which also seems at present out of the question.
For det tredje var der lang tids manglende justering af valutakurserne, som var en af de væsentligste årsager til den monetære krise i september 1992.
Real economic convergence is a sine qua non and, it cannot take second place, as it has in the past, to nominal convergence.
Det kan blot nævnes, at 1 trillion dollars dagligt flyttes fra det ene marked til det andet.
The money markets play an important role in our economy.
Så hvad kan centralbankerne gøre, når de forsøger at imødegå så enorme kapitaloverførsler alene, med deres egne valuta reserver?
Mr Soros himself gave the right answer as to what we should do about this speculation within the European Community.
Og som bekendt er det nok, at nogle få institutionelle investorer flytter rundt med kapital og leger med pengemarkederne som de behager.
The best solution is a common currency, because that would make this kind of speculation within the European Community impossible.
Sidste års krise var en krise i systemet, og bagefter siger vi om den: i virkeligheden er kursværdierne, valutaforholdene tilpasset de reelle økonomier. Det var egentlig allerede anderledes ved devalueringen af det irske pund den 1. februar det år.
VAN DER WAAL (NI). - (NL) Mr President, once again the European Community has been brought to its knees, this time with the crisis in the EMS and the choice of wide margins.
Om de ændringer, der er foretaget i valutaforholdene efter krisen, kan vi sige, at en række af de forhold egentlig var mindre i overensstemmelse med den reelle økonomi, end de var det før krisen. Jeg tror, det er et væsentligt element lige at dvæle ved.
This proves that the national economies in the Community are very much more disparate than we were previously prepared to admit and that it harms Member States to stick to a policy which does not correspond to their economic reality.
For det første tror jeg ikke, at den såkaldte inkompatible treenighed kan fortsætte.
We are currently going through an economic crisis and in times of crisis one can normally only do things that do not cost much money.
Vi kan ikke have stabile valuta kurser sammen med frie kapitalbevægelser og selvstændig national monetær politik.
We should try for the near future to do things that cost little money but are useful, such as the very welcome step of making the central banks in France, Belgium, Greece and Spain independent.
Det står ligeledes klart, at det er umuligt at fortsætte det indre marked uden en fælles valuta.
That creates confidence in these countries' currency without incurring extra costs.
For det andet bør spørgsmål, der vedrører centralbanker nes forsvar, også være EF-anliggende.
One still wonders how in 1991 such tight deadlines could have been laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht for the realization of EMU and how the possibility of a recession was never even considered.
Efter min opfattelse er der imidlertid tre ting, som ikke er mulige.
Above all, we must warn against any divergence from the criteria of Maastricht.
For det første kan der ikke på ny sættes begrænsninger for kapitalens bevægelighed, da dette ville være urealistisk. For det andet kan vi ikke have det såkaldte Europa i to hastigheder, da dette er klart imod Maastricht-Traktaten og ville betyde væsentlige tilbageskridt.
We must adhere to the strict criteria and be aware that monetary union, if it happens, will have no substance unless at the same time we take the necessary steps towards political union in 1996.
Jeg tror, at vi så også når konklusionen på spørgsmålet om, hvad den anden krises karakter egentlig har været.
That is why I think we must be realistic and forget the high ideal of a currency union with its unrealistic timetable.
Så må vi naturligvis ikke blot drage som slutning, at det var rene spekulanter, som alle sammen må holde for, naturligvis startede der spekulative bevægelser, man indtog massivt short-positioner mod en række angrebne valutaer.
AMARAL (LDR). - (PT) Mr President, we believe that the draft joint resolution is an excellent summary of the main aspects of the EMS crisis, which I shall not reiterate in all its arguments and conclusions. I just wish to underline one or two points.
Før weekenden blev en angreben valuta udbudt massivt, efter weekenden blev der betalt, men pensionsfonde og andre respektable markedsparter fulgte efter ud fra defensive overvejelser.
We must work towards bringing the economies of the Member States together in the hope that the result will be monetary stability.
Det er en forklaring, men konklusionen er, at det således er muligt at ændre monetære billeder af den reelle økonomi.
But that will not prevent Member States from using their freedom within the new margins to take whatever measures necessary to counteract their rising unemployment and public shortages on the domestic front.
Det kan man ikke i få til at stemme overens med EMS'ens funktion.
METTEN (PSE). - (NL) Mr President, we have heard a whole range of solutions here in this chamber.
Konklusionen må da også være, at løsningen ikke ene og alene kan være at foretage nogle ændringer inden for EMS, men ændringer, som går videre end nu, altså grundlæggende ændringer i EMS.
I believe we can only agree on one solution if we also agree on the analysis of what exactly has happened.
Så må vi tænke på to ting, nemlig hvordan vi kan gøre det mindre interessant for spekulanter at begynde at spekulere i valutaer, og hvordan vi kan gøre det sværere for spekulanterne.
I think it therefore opportune to return to the crisis of September of last year, examine its nature and identify the difference between that crisis and the one last August.
Jeg tror, det også er et spørgsmål, der må tages fat på.
The first is that the EMS crisis is, from our point of view, a politically-rooted crisis.
GRUND (NI). - (DE) Hr. formænd, mine damer og herrer, da man for næsten to år siden i Maastricht traf beslutning om, trods de allerede dengang tydelige divergenser i de deltagende medlemslandes økonomiske data, at indføre en slags matadorpenge, advarede jeg her indtrængende mod de katastrofale følger af en sådan foranstaltning.
The crisis last September was a crisis in the system and with hindsight we say that it was the exchange rate values, the currency relationships adjusted to the actual economy.
Jeg tænkte i den forbindelse på farerne for en »blød« ECU og frarådede alle sparere at anbringe deres penge i ECU-obligationer.
That was quite different from the devaluation of the Irish punt on I February of this year.
ZAVVOS (PPE). - (GR) Hr. formand, den seneste monetære krise er simpelthen en spejling af den bredere krise, der hersker i Europa netop nu, en politisk, økono
In that sense, the seriousness of the problem is main tained precisely because, despite the realignments which
I dag er dette papir kun 19.100 DM værd.
We must see what lessons can be drawn from this crisis.
Er de seneste foranstaltninger, der iværksattes den 2. august, tilstrækkelige?
Firstly, I believe that the so-called unconventional trio cannot go on.
Efter min mening var det nødvendigt at træffe denne foranstaltning, men vil den være tilstrækkelig?
We cannot have stable parities together with free movement of capital and independent national monetary policies.
Et så bredt bånd, der næsten er identisk med et system med flydende valutaer, øger uden tvivl risikoen for konkurrenceforbedrende devalueringer.
It is also obvious that it is impossible to continue the Single Market without a single currency.