natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den europæiske valutaenhed (ecu)
The transformation would be eased if the design of ECU is friendly.
Systemets valutaenhed er ecu, og den vigtigste artikel i ØMU-Traktaten er artikel 109, hvori der stir:
A two-faced currency (the national currency on the one face and the ECU on the other) during stage two and then a currency in its own right in stage three would gradually reinforce the change in habits.
Ecu-kurvens valutasammensætning ændres ikke.
During stage two, pricing of exportable goods should be made in ECU.
For det første skabes der en forbindelse mellem EMS og ØMU's første og anden fase. For det andet forbinder ecu'en EMS' tre mekanismer: valutakursen, intervention og kredit med ØMU.
The end-objective of such initiatives would have to be how to create a competitive environment in financial and money markets where financial intermediaries and banks compete for ECU-business.
For det tredje ligger alle traditionelle monetære pengeteorier bag ordene: ecu-kurvens sammensætning ændres ikke og ecu'ens værdi er uigenkaldelig fastlåst.
But the easiest reform and a sign to 'Community determination' to promote the ECU as a parallel currency is to decide that all business of the Community would be conducted in ECUs from January 1993.
Det, der mangler, er en definition af den metode,
Rules on passage to third stage
Der er stadig visse administrative vanskeligheder i nogle medlemsstater, men i det store og hele er disse vanskeligheder ikke et større problem.
the third stage prior to a decision of its government and Parliament - to move gradually to third stage, at the latest, on 1 January 1999.
Det betyder, at ecu'en næsten stir pi lige fod med de nationale valutaer.
The procedure is set on 'binding rules'.
Ecu'ans andel i det internationale værdipapirmarked er steget til ca. 5%.
1 of the Treaty sets four criteria upon which one could assess the high degree of sustainable convergence.
I modsætning hertil har tre aspekter hidtil forhindret en videreudvikling af ecu-markederne. Det første har at gøre med den mide, hvorpå ecu'ens omvekslingskurs og renteniveau fastsættes.
4) an average nominal longterm interest rate that does not exceed that of at most the three best performing Member States by more than 2% points.
ØMU'ens eksisterende artikler giver plads til fortolkning og initiativer.
The evolution of the key convergence indicators are shown in Tables 1 and 2.
Fastlåsningen af ecuvalutakurvens sammensætning kan eventuelt styrke aspektet af stærk valuta, men det ville være mere interessant at forpligte medlemsstaterne til en sidste justering inden overgangen til anden fase.
One could easily assess which Member States fulfil the convergence criteria today (see Table 3).
Der findes intet varigt monetært system, uden at møntenheden er udstyret med et clearingsystem og et betalingssystem.
Secondary criteria such as integration of markets, balance of payments on current account, unit labour costs, etc, would be taken into account in the reports of the Commission and of the EMI, to be submitted to the Council.
Med henblik herpå bør EMI fra overgangen til anden fase oprette et ecu-clearingsystem og et ecu-baseret betalingssystem.
Both the EMI and the Commission shall report to the Council on the progress made relating to the convergence of each Member State.
En tosidet valuta (med den nationale valuta på den ene side og ecu'en på den anden) under anden fase, og så en selvstændig valuta i tredje fase ville gradvist styrke ændringen af indgroede vaner.
3, the European Council, not later than 31 December 1996, acting by a qualified majority, shall decide: i) whether a majority of the Member States fulfils the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency; ii) whether it is appropriate for the community to enter the third stage and thus set a date for its beginning.
Under anden fase bør eksportgoder prisfastsættes i ecu.
However, the more important provision of Article 109j is stated in this fourth paragraph:
Endemålet må være, hvorledes der skabes et konkurrencemæssigt miljø på finans- og pengemarkederne hvor finansielle mellemmænd og banker konkurrerer om ecu-forretninger.
"If by the end of 1997, the date for the beginning of the third stage, has not been set, the third stage will start on 1 January 1999.
Men den nemmeste reform og et tegn på Fællesskabets beslutsomhed med hensyn til at fremme ecu'en som parallelvaluta er at vedtage, at samtlige EF-forretninger vil blive afviklet i ecu fra januar 1993.
Before 1 July 1988, the Council, meeting in the composition of Heads of State or of Government, ..., shall, acting by a qualified majority, ..., confirm which Member States fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency".
Det vanskeligste aspekt af ØMU har været troværdigheden; troværdigheden omkring medlemsstaternes ønske om frivilligt at overdrage monetær suverænitet til en overnational institution; troværdigheden med hensyn til ØMU's velstandsmaksimering; troværdigheden omkring udligningsspørgsmilet og fordelingseffektiviteten.
As to the principles for the transition, these are: a) no Member State may be forced to take part against its will, b) no Member State may oppose the transition to this phase but certain Member States may, where they so request and taking account of their specific situation, be granted longer time-limits enabling them to meet the conditions of EMU, c) no Member States may be excluded from third phase.
I Traktatans artikel 109 J, stk. 1, opstilles fire kriterier for, oa der er opnået an høj grad af holdbar konvergens.
It recognises that the 'UK shall not be obliged or committed to move to the third stage of EMU without a separate decision to do so by its government and parliament.'
Ifølge protokollen, der er knyttet til Traktaten, er disse kriterier:
In the case of Denmark, it is recognised that the 'Danish Constitution contains provisions which imply a referendum in Denmark prior to Danish participation in the third stage of EMU'.
1) en gennemsnitlig inflationstakt (forbrugerprisindeks), som betragtet i en periode pi et ir før undersøgelsen ikke overstiger inflationstakten i de højst tre medlemsstater, der har nået de bedste resultater med hensyn til prisstabilitet, med mere end 1,5% point
However, the essence of the matter is that the central banks of Member States with a derogation or with an exemption or with an 'opting out' clause would retain their power in the field of monetary policy according to national law.
2) intet uforholdsmæssigt stort underskud
The strict nominal convergence criteria and rules of voting at the Council would complicate the passage to third stage.
3) overholdelse af de normale udsvingsmargener i valutakursmekanismen uden alvorlige spændinger i mindst de seneste to ir og ingen devaluering over for en anden medlemsstats valuta
The 'opting out' clause for the UK and Denmark plus the fact that Greece and Portugal would not easily satisfy the criteria would create a blocking minority of 23 votes.
4) en gennemsnitlig nominel kapitalmarkedsrente, som ikke overstiger den nominelle kapitalmarkedsrente i de højst tre medlemsstater, der har nået de bedste resultater, med mere end 2% point.
Assuming that Denmark's referendum is favourable, it would still require a qualified majority of 54 votes out of a total of 76 entailing at least eight Member States.
Udviklingen i de vigtigste konvergensindikatorer fremgår af tabel 1 og 2.
The real test would be Italy and that because of her excessive budget deficit.
Det kan let konstateres, hvilke medlemsstater der på nuværende tidspunkt opfylder konvergenskriterierne (se tabel 3).
Otherwise the EMU would be stalled despite the fact that only 6 out of 12 Member States - according to UK's protocol, para.
Sekundære kriterier såsom markedsintegrationen, betalingsbalancens løbende poster, enhedslønomkostningerne osv. skal ogsi tages i betragtning i Kommissionens og EMI's beretninger til Rådet. Både EMI og Kommissionen skal aflægge beretning til Rådet om hver enkelt medlemsstats fremskridt med hensyn til konvergens.
A solution to this problem lies in the protocol annexed to the Treaty and concerns the 'irreversibility process towards EMU'.
Ifølge artikel 109 J, stk. 3, skal Det Europæiske Råd senest den 31. december 1996 med kvalificeret flertal afgøre: i) om et flertal af medlemsstaterne opfylder de nødvendige betingelser for indførelsen af en fælles valuta ii) om det er hensigtsmæssigt for Fællesskabet at gå over til tredje fase og i så fald fastsætte datoen for indledningen heraf.
EMU is conceived as a process whose economic logic about the determination of real income is constrained by the law of one price: one price for freely tradeable commodities and one interest rate, and whose institutional set up is divorced between a monetary policy that is centralised in one institution, the European Central Bank (ECB) while economic policy remains the competence of Member States.
Den vigtigste bestemmelse i artikel 109 J står dog i stk. 4:
In integrated money and financial markets, interest rates can only differ if national currencies are not considered close substitutes.
"Hvis datoen for indledningen af tredje fase ikke er blevet fastsat ved udgangen af 1997, indledes den tredje fase den 1. januar 1999.
The law of one interest rate would be established and hence, national monetary policy is ineffective and only fiscal policy matters.
Inden den 1. juli 1998 skal Ridet, i sin sammensætning stats- og regeringscheferne, ... med kvalificeret flertal ... bekræfte, hvilke medlemsstater der opfylder de nødvendige betingelser for indførelse af en fælles valuta."
A deviation from this law would be possible if markets view the Member States' credit worthiness differently for historical reasons and if fiscal policy creates divergence in economic performance giving rise to differential returns on assets and thus producing less than perfect substitutability between assets.
Artikel 109 K vedrører reglen for medlemsstater, der har opnået dispensation, og principperne for overgangen til tredje fase.
The rise in interest rates would attract capital which would put pressure on the exchange rates to appreciate.
Principperne for overgangen til tredje fase er følgende: a) ingen medlemsstat kan tvinges til at deltage mod sin vilje b) ingen medlemsstat kan modsætte sig overgangen til denne fase, men visse medlemsstater kan efter anmodning og under hensyntagen til deres særlige forhold få indrømmet en længere frist til at opfylde betingelserne for deltagelse i ØMU c) ingen medlemsstat kan udelukkes fra at deltage i tredje fase.
Limiting the recourse to external borrowing in non-Community currencies is a means aimed at controlling the financing of public sector deficits but also at monitoring the total growth of money and credit from external sources.
Såfremt Det Forenede Kongerige og Danmark indtager en særstatus, betyder dette, at deres stemmeret i Rådet ville blive suspenderet i lighed med medlemsstater, der har fået dispensation.
From the moment the 'divorce' principle is applied to monetary policy, the creation of ESCB embodying an independent ECB that would be fully responsible for monetary policy and indirectly for exchange policy, becomes a logical necessity.
Sagens kerne er imidlertid, at centralbankerne i medlemsstater med dispensation, eller som henholder sig til en undtagelsesklausul eller en opting-out-klausul, fortsat bevarer deres beføjelser vedrørende den monetære politik i henhold til national ret.
The structure of the ESCB and of the ECB as laid down in a protocol annexed to the Treaty and the relevant articles of the EMU Treaty make both the ECSB and the ECB the more efficient monetary institutions in maintaining a low inflation rate without high costs in terms of output stabilisation or growth.
De rent nominelle konvergenskriterier og afstemningsreglerne i Rådet ville komplicere overgangen til tredje fase. Det Forenede Kongeriges og Danmarks opting-out-klausuler og den kendsgerning, at Grækenland og Portugal kun vanskeligt ville kunne opfylde kriterierne, ville skabe et blokerende mindretal på 23 stemmer.
However, when the 'divorce' principle is applied to economic policy, the intergovernmental structure is its logical outcome.
Såfremt folkeafstemningen i Danmark er positiv, ville et kvalificeret flertal på 54 stemmer fortsat være nødvendigt ud af et samlet antal på 76, hvilket ville kræve mindst 8 medlemsstater.
The Monetary Committee, for example, is the one set up by the Rome Treaty and would continue exercising its slightly enlarged responsibility, until the start of the third stage.
Ellers ville ØMU komme ud i et dødvande til trods for, at kun seks ud af 12 medlemsstater - i henhold til artikel 5 i Det Forenede Kongeriges protokol, indgår Det Forenede Kongerige ikke i flertallet - udgør et flertal.
Its 28 members (Member States, the Commission and the ECB each appoints two) are accountable to those who appoint them. And it is the Council who would enact its internal structure.
I denne protokol hedder det: alle medlemsstater skal derfor, uanset om de opfylder de nødvendige betingelser for indførelsen af en fælles valuta eller ej, respektere viljen til, at Fællesskabet hurtigt indtræder i tredje fase; ingen medlemsstat må derfor forhindre overgangen til tredje fase.
The fact that the EMI has legal personality and would assume an important role in the second stage of EMU, accountability would have to be exercised at Community level.
ØMU opfattes som en proces, hvis økonomiske logik om fastsættelsen af realindkomsten begrænses af princippet om enhedsprisen: én pris for frit omsættelige varer og én rentesats, og hvis institutionelle struktur er opdelt mellem en monetær politik, der er centraliseret i én institution, Den Europæiske Centralbank (ECB), medens den økonomiske politik fortsat er medlemsstaternes område.
In short, the 'divorce' principle applied to EMU has not respected the fundamental axiom called for in Parliament's resolutions concerning EMU. This axiom says that "responsibility should be clearly defined but there should be democratic accountability".
På integrerede penge- og finansmarkeder kan rentesatserne kun variere, såfremt de nationale valutaer ikke betragtes som næsten identiske substitutter.
The axiom of the right balance between responsibility and control is not geared into the fine detail of EMU and consequently the democratic deficit is widened.
Men hvis det tredje krav for Den Monetære Union holder (dvs. faste valutakurser), så vil de nationale valutaer blive næsten identiske substitutter, og rentesatserne vil konvergere.
The right blend between decisions in the monetary and economic fields is also missing, despite the fact that the two are integral parts of a single whole.
Hvordan er det muligt?
How could one reduce the democratic deficit?
Under forudsætning af en stigning i de offentlige udgifter, som midlertidigt kunne forhøje både indkomsterne og renteniveauet, så vil det øgede renteniveau tiltrække kapital, som kunne lægge pres på valutakurserne med henblik på en revaluering.
Instrumental to this problem is the universal axiom of democracy that holds the view that all Community institutions are engaged in the process and the right balance is struck.
De faste valutakurser nødvendiggør imidlertid, at de monetære myndigheder griber ind for at udligne kapitaltilstrømningen og dermed den øgede pengeforsyning.
In order to realise this axiom in the context of EMU, the draftsman has proposed an Interinstitutional Agreement.
Den samme logik gælder for budgetunderskud. Fordi underskud finansieres ved en forhøjelse af pengebeholdningen, skaber underskud inflation.
The proposed Interinstitutional Agreement would be concluded between the Parliament and the Council, the Commission and the ECB and would cover only the areas in which the European Parliament plays no role or the areas in which national Parliaments have lost their right of democratic control.
Hvis der indføres bindende regler, ville stigningerne i pengebeholdningen mindskes.
It would not by-pass the Treaty's competence, it would not create confusion, it would not undermine the responsibilities conferred upon the existing institutional structure.
De interne strukturer i både Det Monetære Udvalg og Det Økonomiske og Finansielle Udvalg ligner en mellemstatslig ordning.
As regards economic and monetary union
Pi det monetære område findes der allerede en præcedens.
Concerning other economic aspects
Udvalget om Økonomi, Valutaspørgsmål og Industripolitik anmoder det korresponderende udvalg om at tage hensyn til følgende konk]usioner: pen gkgnomjske cg Monetære Vnjpn
Deplores the fact that the Maastricht European Council made no provision for the decisions concerning tax harmonization to be taken by a majority in the Council in cooperation with Parliament.
3. beklager, at når beslutningsprocessen i forbindelse med den økonomiske politik bliver gennemført, vil dette indskrænke mulighederne for parlamentarisk medindflydelse på nationalt og europæisk plan ved at de nationale parlamenter mister deres sanktionsmulighed over for de nationale regeringer, idet Rådet træffer afgørelse med kvalificeret flertal, medens Europa-Parlamentet blot informeres bagefter; er bestyrtet over bestemmelsen om, at henstillinger til de enkelte medlemsstater i princippet ikke er offentlige, end ikke for parlamentet i den pågældende medlemsstat;
Welcomes the Inclusion of Title XIII on industry, but considers that the only way to compensate for the weakness of European Industry would be to endow the Community with powers and financial resources equal to the task of overcoming the handicaps 1n order to face up to the intensification of international competition. It also regrets that the decisions to be taken by the Council on the basis of these articles remain subject to the unanimity rule, and that Parliament's role 1s confined to delivering a nonbinding opinion.
Tabel 4: Beslutningsprocedurerne og Parlamentets rolle
Table 4: Decision - makino procedures and the role of Parliament
105, stk. 6 ændring af visse artikler i ESCB-statutten overdragelse til ECB af specifikke opgaver i forbindelse med tilsyn
103 § 5 rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure 104a § 2 rules prohibiting a privileged access by national public bodies or Community institutions to credit facilities 104b § 2 prohibition on assuming debts of local authorities and public
105A, stk. 2 foranstaltninger med henblik på at harmonisere den pålydende værdi og de tekniske specifikationer for mønter, som sættes i omløb
debt 105a § 2 measures to harmonize the denominations and specification of circulation of coins
109F, stk. 1 udnævnelse af formanden for EMI Art.
1 nomination of the President of the EMI
109F, stk. 6 betingelser for medlemsstaternes myndigheders høring af
6 rules on consultation of the EMI by Member States
109J, stk. 2 overgang til tredje fase Art.
2 passage to third stage s
109J, stk. 3 fastsættelse af dato for tredje fase og afgørelse om, hvem der opfylder konvergenskriterierne
§ 3 setting the date for third stage and who fulfils convergence criteria
109K, stk. 1 medlemsstater med dispensation Art.
1 Member States with a derogation
103A, stk. 2 finansiel støtte Art.
103a § 2 financial assistance
109, stk. 1 vedtagelse, ændring eller ophævelse af centralkurserne for ecu'en Art.
109 § 1 adoption, adjustment or abandonment of ECU central rate
109B, stk. 3 fremsendelse af ECB's årsberetning generel drøftelse eller høring af formanden for ECB Art.
109b § 3 presentation of the annual report of the ECB; general debate or hearing of the President of the ECB
109C, stk. 2 Det Økonomiske og Finansielle Udvalgs sammensætning EMI-Statutten, Art. 11, stk. 3 høring af formanden for EMI i Europa-Parlamentets kompetente udvalg
Art. 109c § 2 composition of the Economic and Financial Committee EMI Statute, Annual report accompanied by annual accounts addressed to EP; Art. 11.3 President of EMI to be heard by EMAC uOC_ENVRRX205692
73F beskyttelsesforanstaltninger Art. 73, stk. 1 hasteforanstaltninger over for berørte tredjelande Art.
Art. 73c § 2 Art. 73f capital and payment liberalisation and direct investment safeguard measures
Finansielle Udvalg Art 109D Kommissionen anmodet om at fremsende en henstilling eller et forslag Art 109E, stk. 2, vurdering af de fremskridt, der er gjort med hensyn til litra b den økonomiske og monetære konvergens
Art. 73g § 1 economic sanctions on third countries Art. 103a § 1 measures in case of severe difficulties in the supply of goods Art. 104c §6-7 assessment on existence of excessive deficit and recommendation to Member State concerned Art. 109 § 2 general orientation for exchange rate policy in absence of exchange rate system for non-Community currencies Art. 109 § 3 agreements concerning exchange regime matters Art. 109 § 4 position and representation of the Community on the international level Art. 109c § 1 appointment of Members of Monetary Committee Art. 109c § 2 appointment of Members of ECOFIN Committee Art. 109d Commission requested by Council or a Member State to make a recommendation or a proposal Art. 109e § 2b assessment on the progress made with regard to the convergence Art. 1091 § 4 fixity of exchange rates vis-à-vis the ECU and introduction of the ECU as a single currency
På mødet den 20.-21. januar 1992 valgte Udvalget om Udenrigs- og Sikkerhedsanliggender Cassanmagnago Cerretti til ordfører.
At Its meeting of 20 and 21 January 1992 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security appointed Mrs Cassanmagnago Cerrettl draftswoman.
På møder den 26.-27. februar 1992 og den 16.-17. marts 1992 behandlede det udkastet til udtalelse.
At its meetings of 26 and 27 February and 16 and 17 March 1992 it considered the draft opinion.
På sidstnævnte møde vedtog det enstemmigt konklusionerne som helhed.
At the latter meeting it adopted the conclusions as a whole unanimously.
I afstemningen deltog: Baron Crespo (formand), Cassanmagnago Cerretti (næstformand og ordfører), Crampton (næstformand), Baget Bozzo, Belo (for Cravinho), Cheysson, Colajanni (for Castellina), Dury, Ephremidis, Hansen, Holzfuss, Jepsen, Lacaze, Lagakos (for Habsburg), Llorca Vilaplana, Lomas (for Coates), McGowan (for Titley), McMillan Scott, Newens, Onesta, Pesmazoglou, Poettering, Sakellariou, Suarez Gonzalez (for Fernandez-Albor), Trivelli og Walter.
The following took part in the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Cassanmagnago Cerrettl , vice-chairman and draftswoman; Crampton, vicechairman; Baget Bozzo, Belo (for Cravinho), Cheysson, Colajanni (for Castellina), Dury, Ephremidis, Hänsch, Holzfuss, Jepsen, Lacaze, Lagakos (for Habsburg), Llorca Villaplana, Lomas (for Coates), McGowan (for Tltley), McMillan Scott, Newens, Onesta, Pesmazoglou, Poettering, Sakellariou, Suarez Gonzalez (for Fernandez Albor), Trivelli and Walter.
Udvalget om Udenrigs- og Sikkerhedsanliggender har behandlet udkastet til Traktat om Den Europæiske Union, som blev underskrevet i Maastricht den 7. februar, og opfordrer Udvalget om Institutionelle Spørgsmål til at lade følgende elementer indgå i sin udtalelse.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security has examined the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. It invites the Committee on Institutional Affairs to include the following points in its opinion.
Resultaterne af Det Europæiske Råd i Maastricht må vurderes med største forsigtighed.
The outcome of the European Council in Maastricht should be assessed cautiously.
Det skal navnlig fremhæves, at det ud over indførelsen af en fælles mønt fastslås, at processen hen imod den politiske enhed er uigenkaldelig.
It should first of all be noted that alongside the creation of a single currency, the process of political unification has become irreversible.
Den Europæiske Union vil være et fast referencepunkt i det nye internationale billede, der tegner sig efter bortfaldet af blokopdelingen, og dette er af stor betydning for fornyelsen af det politiske system i Europa.
The fact that European Union will constitute a point of reference for the new International reality emerging out of the ashes of the division between the blocs 1s essential for the reorganization of the political system 1n Europe.