natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Når først cigaretterne fysisk er undervejs og bliver transporteret ad landevejen, kan de samtidig gennemgå procedurer, der tjener til at camouflere deres oprindelse.
Once physically on the move, cigarettes travelling by road can similarly undergo procedures which will serve to disguise their origins.
I forbindelse med afslørede tilfælde af cigaretsmugleri i Europa har udvalget utvetydigt fået at vide, at "de fleste" tilfælde på et eller andet tidspunkt omfatter transit gennem schweiziske frizoner.
In the cases of detected cigarette frauds in Europe, the Committee has unequivocally been told that the "majority" involve transit through Swiss free zones at one point or another.
Trods de schweiziske myndigheders bedyrelse af, at disse frizoner ikke er "Ali Baba-huler"23, har de ud fra bedragerens synspunkt den fordel, at i) det er på schweizisk territorium og dermed falder ind under den schweiziske lovgivning om bankhemmelighed, og at ii) det giver mulighed for yderligere salg af varen uden forpligtelse til at underrette toldvæsenet om ejerskiftet24. Desuden er det stadig ikke ifølge schweizisk lovgivning nogen forbrydelse at begå skattesnyderi, såfremt det ikke skader schweiziske økonomiske interesser.
Despite the Swiss authorities' claim that these zones are not "Ali Baba caves",23 from the fraudster's point of view, they have the merit (i) of being on Swiss territory, thus falling under Swiss banking secrecy laws, and (ii) of allowing further sales of the merchandise without there being the obligation to notify customs of the change in ownership.24Furthermore, it is still not an crime under Swiss law to commit a fiscal offence if it does not affect Swiss financial interests.
De pågældende enkeltpersoner nyder på den måde en form for immunitet, selv om deres identitet er kendt (hvilket ofte er tilfældet).
Thus a form of immunity is given to the individuals concerned even if their identity is known (which it frequently is).
Desuden gør den schweiziske bankhemmelighed økonomiske transaktioner utilgængelige for efterforskning, og de schweiziske myndigheders manglende evne til at samarbejde på retligt niveau med EU-staterne om, hvad de betegner som "skattesvig", bidrager til at beskytte smuglere med hjemsted der AJt i alt er de schweiziske faciliteter og hemmelighedslove "en sand velsignelse for bedragere", for at citere lederen af Kommissionens enhed for bekæmpelse af bedrageri, UCLAF25.
Moreover, Swiss banking secrecy makes financial transactions inaccessible to investigators and the inability of the Swiss authorities to cooperate at the judicial level with EU states on what they define as "tax evasion" conspires to protect smugglers based there. All in all, to quote the Head of the Commission's antifraud unit, UCLAF, Swiss facilities and secrecy laws are "a boon to fraudsters".25
For undersøgelsesudvalget gælder det ikke så meget om at fastslå, om cigaretproducenterne medvirker passivt eller aktivt til bedragerivirksomhed, men snarere om at fremhæve det relativt lille antal storproducenters mulighed for at kontrollere en stor del af rækken af ejermænd til deres
The importance of this issue from the point of view of the Committee of Inquiry is less to establish the passive or active complicity of cigarette producers in fraudulent activities, but more to underline the capacity of relatively few large-scale producers, in a market which is still
produkter på et marked, som stadig er temmelig stift inden for de nationale rammer.
fairly rigid along national lines, to control large parts of the chain of ownership of their products.
Med dette standpunkt kommer forpligtelsen til at erkende de store pengesummer, der står på spil for de offentlige kasser, og et ansvar til at gøre en mere målrettet indsats for at rydde op på cigaretmarkedet i samarbejde med de lovhåndhævende myndigheder.
With this position comes the obligation to acknowledge the large volumes of money at stake for the public purse and the responsibility to act more decisively, in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, to clean up the cigarette market.
I øjeblikket har de mulighed for at gøre mere.
At the moment, there is scope for them to do more.
En sådan indsats ville ikke blot være i skatteydernes og samfundets interesse som helhed, den ville også bidrage til at fjerne den resterende tvivl - som der lejlighedsvis er givet udtryk for, ikke mindst over for undersøgelsesudvalget - om cigaretproducenternes præcise rolle på det marked, de betjener.
Not only would such action be in the interests of the taxpayer and the community as a whole, it would also help set to rest residual doubts, which have on occasion been expressed -not least to the Committee of Inquiry - concerning the precise role of cigarette producers in the market they serve.
Det produkt, forsendelsesbedrageren som oftest retter sin interesse mod, har hele tiden været cigaretter.
The product most often targeted by the transit fraudster has consistently been cigarettes.
Som folge af indforeisen af100%kautionen harforsky dningseffekten bevirket en tilbagevenden til smugleri sammenlignet med "rent" forsendelsesbedrageri, idet forsendelsesordningen dog stadig ofte anvendes til at flytte cigaretter til et sted, hvorfra det er mest fordelagtigt at gennemføre smugleriet Cigaretter, der i sig selv er et lovligt produkt, giver bedrageren en enorm potentielfortjenstmargin mellem den afgiftsfrie købspris og salgsprisen på EU-landenes hjemmemarkeder.
Following the introduction of the 100% guarantee, the displacement effect has led to a return to smuggling as opposed to "pure" transit fraud, though the transit system is still frequently used to move cigarettes to a place from which the smuggling can most advantageously be carried out Cigarettes, in themselves a legal product, offer the fraudster a huge potential margin between the duty-free cost and the domestic sale-price in EU countries.
Endvidere har der i nogle år eksisteret højtudviklede sortborsdistributionsnet i en række europæiske lande
Moreover, highly developed black-market distribution networks have existed in a number of European countries for some time.
Smuglercigaretter er blevet sporet til generelt at stamme fra lande udenfor EU, idet de ofte forsendes via EU-havne, særlig Antwerpen.
Contraband cigarettes have been identified as generally originating outside the EU, though often transit through EU ports, Antwerp in particular.
Det er naturligvis også muligt illegalt at reimportere tidligere eksporterede EU-producerede cigaretter.
It is also possible, of course, illicitly to re-import previously exported EU-produced cigarettes.
Lovhåndhævende myndigheder har fundet frem til en række ruter, der typisk anvendes af cigaretsmuglere, ofte omfattende legitime forsendelser via Schweiz til de tidligere østbloklande, hvorfra de illegalt vender tilbage til Tyskland og Italien.
Law enforcement agencies have identified a number of routes typically used by cigarette smugglers, often involving legitimate transit operations via Switzerland into the former Eastern bloc countries, from where they return clandestinely into Germany and Italy.
Søruter til fiktive afrikanske bestemmelsessteder åbner mulighed for at slippe af med smuglervarer langs den spanske kyst, hvilket også bruges meget Typisk for cigaretsmugleroperationerne er meget avancerede finansielle transaktioner og anvendelse af visse ikke-EU-lande med en lovgivning, der passer bedrageren godt, såsom Schweiz og Cypern, samt en række kendte offshore-skattely, enten som kilde til ulovlige betalinger eller som etfristed f or den, der organiserer cigaretkriminaliteten.
Sea routes to fictitious African destinations allowing contraband to be dropped off along the Spanish coast are also much used. A characteristic of cigarette smuggling operations are highly sophisticated financial operations and the involvement of certain nonEU countries offering legislation convenient to the fraudster, such as Switzerland, Cyprus, and a range of familiar offshore tax-havens, either as the source of illicit payments or as a haven for those organising cigarette crime.
Der rejser sig uvægerligt en række spørgsmål om ved de store cigaretproducenters rolle Selv om disse helt klart ved, at deres produkter er genstand for kriminelle aktiviteter, er der ikke fremlagt beviser for nogen direkte indblanding i cigaretsmugleri.
Inevitable question marks arise over the role of major cigaretteproducers. Though these are clearly aware that their products are the subject of criminal activity, no evidence has been produced of any direct involvement in cigarette smuggling.
Alligevel er det stadig svært at tro på, at producenter altid er uvidende om deres cigaretters sandsynligvis ulovlige bestemmelsessted, og at der derfor ikke kan gores en storre indsats for at samarbejde med lovhåndhan'ende myndigheder eller for at sikre, at de kunder, der kober cigaretter af producenterne og grossisterne, er lovlydige
Nevertheless, it remains hard to believe that producers can always be unaware of the likely illicit destination of their cigarettes, and that therefore greater efforts could not be made to cooperate with law-enforcement agencies or to ensure the legitimacy of the clients acquiring cigarettes from the producers and wholesalers.
Cigaretsmugleriets udbredelse i Tyskland blev beskrevet indgående af dr. Rump fra det tyske toldvæsens efterforskningsenhed under vidneforklaringen i udvalget den 27.6.1996.
The expansion of cigarette smuggling in Germany was described in detail by Dr Rump of the German customs investigation branch in evidence to the Committee on 27.6.96
Dette blev bekræftet af Currie på Kommissionens vegne: vidneforklaring den 17.7.1996 (Meddelelse til medlemmerne nr. 54 - PE 220.261).
This point was confirmed by Mr Currie of the Commission: evidence of 17.7.96 (Notice to Members no. 54 - PE 220.261)
Den græske regering har givet udvalget særlig oplysninger om den albanske forbindelse, jf. meddelelse til medlemmerne nr 14 - PE 219.432.
The Greek Government provided the Committee with specific information on the Albanian connection: Notice to Members no. 14 - PE 219.432
Dvs. at en kunde hos en mellemhandler opdager, hvem mellemhandlerens leverandør er, og derefter handler direkte med denne.
i.e. the customer of an intermediary discovering the intermediary's supplier and henceforward dealing direct with them
Oplysninger fra de schweiziske myndigheder om frizoner : bidrag nr. 41 : PE 220.873.
Information on free zones provided by the Swiss authorities: Contribution no. 41 - PE 220.873
Per Brix Knudsen: citat fra Financial Times den 4.12.1996.
Per Brix Knudsen: quoted in "Financial Times" - 4.12.96
ANALYSE (V) ­ TOLDKONTROL AF FÆLLESSKABSFORSENDELSER
ANALYSIS (V) - CUSTOMS CONTROL OF TRANSIT
Indførelsen af det europæiske indre marked i 1993 med den efterfølgende fjernelse af interne toldgrænser betragtede de fleste medlemsstaters regeringer som en begrundelse for en mærkbar nedskæring i antallet af ansatte ved de nationale toldvæsener.
The introduction of the European Single Market in 1993, with the consequent removal of internal customs borders, was seen by most Member States' governments as a justification for substantial reductions in the numbers of staff employed in national customs services.
Med Italien som den eneste undtagelse har alle EU­lande oplevet sådanne nedskæringer, lige fra en nedskæring på 41%, som Portugal stod for, til en relativt moderat nedskæring på 7% i Østrig.
With the single exception of Italy, such reductions have affected all EU countries, ranging from the 41% reduction seen in Portugal to the relatively moderate 7% in Austria.
Nedenstående skema viser svarene på spørgsmål nr. 13 i udvalgets spørgeskema om, hvor mange toldembedsmænd der er i hver enkelt medlemsstat.
The following table shows the replies received to question 13 of the Committee's questionnaire, inquiring as to numbers of customs agents in each Member State:
' Tysklands lal omfatter fra 1991 det tidligere DDR's personale " Antal embedsmænd, der er fuldtidsbeskæftiget med forsendelsesordningen.
German figures include personnel of former GDR from 1991 * number of officers 100% dedicated to the transit regime.
De her nævnte personalenedskæringer har utvivlsomt ikke blot indvirket på toldvæsenernes evne til at klare det store papirarbejde i tilknytning til forsendelsesordningen, men har også helt klart gjort toldmedarbejderne langt dårligere motiverede.
Not only have the staff reductions described above undoubtedly had an effect on the ability of customs to cope with the volumes of paperwork connected with the transit system, but they have also clearly demotivated some customs services considerably.
Flere vidner har nævnt denne demotivering som en af årsagerne til, at toldvæsenerne ofte er uvillige til at foretage detaljerede undersøgelser'.
Several witnesses have cited this demotivation as one of the reasons that customs are often unwilling to pursue detailed investigations1.
Nogle medlemsstater har endog foretaget en systematisk nedskæring af deres toldpersonale i håb om derved at få hjælp til at opfylde Maastricht­kriterierne for Den Monetære Union2. Et godt eksempel er Tyskland, som siden har revideret denne politik ud fra den overbevisning, at toldvæsenets effektivitet led herunder.
Some Member States even applied a systematic reduction to their customs personnel in the hope that this would assist them in achieving the Maastricht criteria for monetary union2.
De vesteuropæiske toldvæsener forventes generelt at være inde i forsendelsesproceduren og bestemmelserne herom, men toldvæsenerne i Visegrad-landene, som siden 1. juli 1996 har haft ansvaret for at forvalte det fælles forsendelsesprogram, er ikke i samme situation, da de ofte oprindelig er uddannet som grænsevagter.
Although Western European customs services are generally expected to be familiar with transit procedure and the rules affecting it, customs services in the Visegrad countries, often originally trained as border guards, which since 1 July 1996 have the responsibility of managing the common transit programme, are not in the same position.
Den Europæiske Union har som led i sit PHARE-program tilbudt støtte til uddannelse af embedsmænd i Visegrad-landene, men der er nogen tvivl om, hvor effektivt man her har kunnet nå ud til personalet på gulvet.
The European Union, through its Phare programme, has offered support for training for officials in the Visegrad countries, but there are some doubts as to how effective this has been in reaching officers on the ground.
F.eks. er der ifølge hr. Tweddle fra Verdenstoldorganisationen (World Customs Organisation) trods pæne fremskridt stadig langt igen, og de central- og østeuropæiske lande har stadig brug for megen støtte, hvis deres toldvæsener skal blive effektive3. Hr. Dusquesne mente også, at hovedproblemet, selv om den PHARE-støttede uddannelse var god, var, at støttemodtagerne i praksis er placeret spredt og ikke har nogen chance for at praktisere deres uddannelse4.
For instance, in spite of "good progress" so far, Mr Tweddle of the World Customs Organisation thought that "there is still quite a long way to go and that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe still need a great deal of support if their customs services are going to be effective".3 Mr Dusquesne also suggested that, while Phare-funded training was good, the essential problem was that the beneficiaries are in practice "dotted about" and "have no chance of putting their training into operation. "4
I EU-medlemsstaterne finansierer Fællesskabet MATTHÆUS-programmet for at fremme uddannelse på europæisk plan for toldembedsmænd.
In the EU Member States, the Community funds the Matthaeus programme in order to promote training at a European level for customs officials.
Udvalget er blevet overbevist om, at toldembedsmændene slet ikke er klar over, hvilke beføjelser, hvilken kompetence og hvilke aktiviteter deres kolleger i andre medlemsstater står for.
It has become apparent to the Committee that in spite of the existence of this programme, customs officers are insufficiently aware of the powers, competences and activities of their colleagues in other Member States.
Dette har en negativ indvirkning på forskellige tjenesters evne til at samarbejde i tilfælde af behov herfor (jf. nedenstående).
This affects adversely the ability of different services to cooperate in case of need (see below).
Det er helt sikkert, at de forskellige medlemsstaters toldvæsener gøres til genstand for forskellige former for politisk prioritering i deres egne lande.
The customs services of different Member States clearly enjoy varying degrees of political priority in their own countries.
Under udvalgets besøg i Antwerpen klagede belgiske toldembedsmænd f.eks. over, at de havde forholdsvis begrænset, adgang til den politiske magts løngange i Belgien (i hvert fald sammenlignet med forholdene i Nederlandene), og at den finansielle støtte fra statens side til dem derfor prioriteredes lavere5.
During the Committee's visit to Antwerp for example, Belgian customs officials complained that their access to the corridors of political power in Belgium was comparatively limited (certainly as compared to the Netherlands), and that therefore the priority for state funding afforded to them was lower5.
På den anden side klagede nederlandske toldembedsmænd under Budgetkontroludvalgets besøg i Rotterdam over uvisheden om statsstøtte til nyt containerscanningsudstyr6.
During the visit of the Committee on Budgetary Control to Rotterdam on the other hand, Dutch customs officials complained of uncertainties connected with state funding for new container scanning equipment6.
Den måske mest usædvanlige situation, udvalget fik kendskab til, var i forbindelse med det tyske toldvæsen, hvis kontorer tilsyneladende undertiden hverken er udstyret med fax eller computerudstyr7.
Perhaps the most extraordinary case to come to the attention of the Committee was that of the German customs service, whose offices apparently are at times equipped with neither fax machines nor computer equipment7.
Ironisk nok har udvalget også hørt, at man i Visegrad-staterne og navnlig i Den Tjekkiske Republik har langt bedre computerudstyr end hos landets store EU-nabo.
Ironically, the Committee has also heard that the Visegrad states, in particular Czech Republic, are far better equipped with computer equipment than their large EU neighbour.
Ifølge udvalgets vidne fra den tyske speditørsammenslutning vil den ungarske og den tjekkiske forvaltning blive meget overrasket over, hvor langsomt og gammeldags forvaltningerne i de eksisterende EU-stater behandler henvendelser8.
According to the Committee's witness from the German freight forwarders association: "the Hungarian and the Czechian administration will be very surprised at the slow and old-fashioned way the administrations of the existing EU states deal with them. "8
Det står helt klart, at toldvæsenerne i de forskellige medlemsstater selv føler sig forskelligt behandlet af deres egne regeringer med hensyn til, hvilke budgetmidler der står til deres rådighed9.
What is clear is that the customs services in different Member States feel themselves differently treated by their own governments in terms of the budgetary resources available to them.9In many respects, resources available reflect the customs "culture" of each country.
I mange henseender afspejler de disponible ressourcer det enkelte lands "toldkultur". I Frankrig har toldvæsenet f.eks. en meget høj prestige og administrative beføjelser, der er blandt mest udviklede i EU.
In France, for example, the customs service enjoys a high level of prestige and aclrninistrative powers amongst the most highly developed in the EU.
Dette giver sig f.eks. udtryk i , at der allerede er sørget for avanceret udstyr til containerscanning i Le Havre
This is reflected for example in the provision of sophisticated container scanning equipment which is already available in Le Havre.
Fysisk kontrol og risikoanalyse
Physical Checks and Risk Analysis
Toldvæsenernes forebyggende aktivitet par excellence består i fysisk varekontrol, der foretages ved grænserne og i lufthavne.
The preventive activity par excellence of customs services is constituted by physical checks of merchandise carried out at borders and in airports.
I betragtning af den altid eksisterende og sandsynligvis voksende fare for fejldeklarering af varer og i hvert fald gammeldags indsmugling af varer findes der intet fornuftigt alternativ til fysisk kontrol som afskrækkende og forebyggende foranstaltning.
Given the ever present, and probably increasing risk of misdeclaration of goods and indeed old-fashioned smuggling of merchandise, there is no reasonable alternative to physical checks as a dissuasive and preventive measure.
I spørgeskemaet til medlemsstaterne anmodede udvalget om at få oplyst, hvor mange fysiske kontroller af varer toldvæsenerne havde gennemført som led i forsendelsesproceduren10.
In its questionnaire to Member States, the Committee requested details of the number of physical checks carried out by customs services of goods under the transit procedure10.
Resultatet fremgår af nedenstående skema:
The results are summarised in the following table:
Fysisk kontrol af forsendelsesvarer (%)
Physical checks earned out on transit goods ias a
? ("stikprøvekontrol afalle varer")
? ("random checks on all goods")
10 følsomme varer: 100% andre varer: 1%
10 sensitive goods: 100%; others: 1%
Hvad der falder i øjnene ved dette skema, er forskellen mellem antallet af kontroller, der er foretaget i de forskellige medlemsstater Inden for EU foretager de nederlandske myndigheder fysisk kontrol af 0,5% af varerne under forsendelse, mens andre søger at komme op på 10%.
What is striking about this table is the disparity between the number of checks carried out between different Member States. Within the EU, the Dutch authorities physically check 0.5% of goods in transit while others attempt to approach 10%.
Det omvendte forhold gør sig gældende mellem den påståede procentdel kontroller og den tid, det tager at kontrollere en container.
An inverse relation is observable between the claimed percentage level of checks and the time taken to check a container.
De nederlandske myndigheder siger, at en sådan kontrol kan tage op til 12 timer, mens spanierne anslår den til at vare 10 minutter.
The Dutch authorities say that a container can take up to 12 hours to check while the Spanish set the time taken at 10 minutes.
Der er helt klart en principiel forskel mellem disse medlemsstater på, hvilken form en fysisk kontrol bør have.
There is clearly an underlying difference between these Member States as to what form a physical check should take.
omfattende trafik, der går igennem deres største havn Rotterdam.
Their position is clearly conditioned by the volume of traffic passing through their main port, Rotterdam.
Lederen af det nederlandske toldvæsen sagde:
To quote the head of the Dutch customs service :
"Er det muligt at kontrollere alt?
"Is it possible to check everything?
Nej, man kan ikke kontrollere alt. Gjorde vi det, ville vi have en kø afventende helt ud midt på Nordsøen eller Atlanten ....
No, you cannot check everything.
Hos det nederlandske toldvæsen har vi foretaget et meget bevidst valg til fordel for systemet med risikoanalyse."11
We in Dutch customs made a very conscious choice in favour of the system of risk analysis."11
Det har indgået aftaler med rederier, hvorved det kan konsultere ladningsfortegnelseme over indgående skibe, før de ankommer, og derved effektivt målrette kontrollen.
It has concluded agreements with shipping companies which allow it to examine the manifests of incoming vessels before they arrive in order effectively to target controls.
Systemet siges at have haft betydelig succes: Som et eksempel nævnte Nepperus, at der den dag, Budgetkontroludvalget var på besøg, blev taget 14 containere ud til fysisk kontrol i Delta-containerterminalen i Rotterdam, og at der for halvdelens vedkommende konstateredes uregelmæssigheder af en eller anden art.
A significant degree of success is claimed for the system: Mrs Nepperus mentioned, as an example, the fact that of the 14 containers stopped for physical checks in the Delta container terminal in Rotterdam on the day that the Committee on Budgetary Control visited, half showed irregularities of one sort or another.