natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selv om de tilpasninger eller reformer, der skal gennemfżres under SAF-programmerne, generelt ikke er af kortsigtet art, er hvert enkelt SAF-program indtil videre blevet planlagt og godkendt sžrskilt uden en langfristet forpligtelse med hensyn til programmets kontinuitet. 
Although the adjustments or reforms to be carried out under the SAF are generally not of a short-term nature, SAF have so far been planned and approved on a stand-alone basis, without a long-term commitment for continuity in the programming.
Konditionalitet 22. 
Conditionality 22.
SAF er omfattet af princippet om konditionalitet, hvilket indebžrer, at midlerne udbetales under forudsžtning af, at en ržkke betingelser, som parterne gensidigt har godkendt, er opfyldt. 
SAF follows the principle of conditionality, which means that disbursement is conditional upon compliance with mutually agreed criteria.
Betingelserne i forbindelse med programmerne har indtil nu vžret koncentreret om fremlžggelse af lovforslag, handlingsplaner, budgetter osv., der er udtryk for hensigter snarere end faktiske resultater, der skal opns. 
The programmesŐ conditions have so far focused on the presentation of legislation, action plans, budgets etc, which represents intentions rather than actual results to be obtained.
F.eks. omfattede SAF I for Jordan en betingelse om, at regeringen skulle godkende en konkurrencelov. (4) Under Meda 1 blev der forelagt finansieringsforslag for over 2 millioner euro for et udvalg (MED-udvalget) bestende af repržsentanter for EUŐs medlemsstater, der rdgiver Europa-Kommissionen om gennemfżrelsen af Meda-programmet. 
For example, in Jordan, SAF I contained a condition that a competition law 4 () Under MEDA 1, financing proposals of over 2 000 000 euro were submitted to a Committee (the MED Committee) of representatives of EU Member States which advises the European Commission in implementing the MEDA programme.
C 121/8 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 23.5.2002 Regeringen godkendte loven, men den blev ikke vedtaget af parlamentet. 
C 121/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 23.5.2002 would be approved by the Cabinet.
I Libanon var to af betingelserne for udbetalingen af den anden rate formuleret som bestemte ml, der skulle indg i finans-loven for 2000 (1). Dette indebžrer, at Kommissionen er nżdt til systematisk at fżlge op p betingelserne, selv efter at midlerne er udbetalt, da det er nżdvendigt at tage hensyn til dem, nr der udformes nye programmer. 
In Lebanon, two conditions for disbursement of the second instalment were formulated in terms of certain targets to be included in the Budget Law2000(1).ThisimpliesthattheCommissionneedstofollow up conditions systematically even after disbursement, given the need to take them into account when setting up new programmes.
Det er forbundet med vanskeligheder p grund af de knappe personaleressourcer, som Kommissionen p nuvžrende tidspunkt har afsat til forvaltningen af SAF, isžr da kontrollen i vid udstržkning er koncentreret om at sikre, at betingelserne er opfyldt, inden udbetalingen foretages (jf. punkt 53). 
Given the human resources currently allocated by the Commission to the management of SAF, this is difficult, especially as monitoring is largely focused on ensuring conditions have been met before disbursement (see paragraph 53).
Kommissionen besluttede at gennemfżre sit finansierings-program i Libanon, hvorimod Verdensbanken udsatte sit program p grund af Libanons p davžrende tidspunkt katastrofale makrożkonomiske situation. 
In Lebanon, the Commission decided to carry out its financing programme while the World Bank postponed its programme because of LebanonŐs alarming macroeconomic situation at the time.
Da der ikke forel noget finansieringspro-gram fra Verdensbanken, hvis vurdering Kommissionen kunne basere sig p, blev der p et sent stadium tilfżjet en betingelse om, at Čden fżrste rate fżrst ville blive udbetalt, nr man havde gennemget IMFŐs embedsmandsrapport udarbejdet med henblik p artikel IV-hżringen for r 2000Ç (2). 
In the absence of a World Bank financing programme, on whose appraisal mission the Commission could rely, a condition was added at a late stage, stating that Ôthe disbursement of the first instalment would take into consideration the examination of the IMF staff report for the 2000 Article IV consultationŐ (2).
P det tidspunkt, hvor det var planlagt, at den fżrste udbetaling skulle finde sted, forel der endnu ikke nogen IMF-rapport. 
At the moment that the first disbursement was planned to be made no IMF report was yet available.
Udbetalingen blev til slut foretaget efter en brevveksling mellem Kommissionen og IMF. 
The disbursement was finally made after an Exchange of Letters between the Commission and the IMF.
IMF gav et temmelig blandet billede af den makrożkonomiske situation i Libanon, men Kommissionen vurderede alligevel, at betingelserne for udbetalingen af den fżrste rate var opfyldt godt nok, og den besluttede derfor at udbetale midlerne. 
Although the IMF gave a rather mixed picture of the macroeconomic situation in Lebanon, the Commission, nevertheless, decided to proceed with disbursement as it considered that the conditions of the first tranche as defined by the financing agreement had been sufficiently met.
For at vžre berettiget til at modtage SAF-stżtte skal et land i henhold til bilag II i Meda-forordningen ivžrksžtte et reformprogram, der er godkendt af BWI, eller i samordning med disse institutioner gennemfżre et program, der er godkendt som svarende hertil. 
In order to be eligible to receive SAF support, Annex II to the MEDA Regulation requires that a country undertake a reform programme, approved by the BWI, or implement a programme, recognised as analogous, in coordination with those institutions.
Det fremgr som hovedregel ikke klart af finansieringsaftalerne, hvilke betingelser der er de samme som BWIŐs, eller hvilke der udelukkende er Kommissionens. 
Generally, the Financing Agreements do not clearly indicate which conditions are shared with the BWI, and which are the CommissionŐs alone.
Kommissionen har indfżrt specifikke sektorbetingelser i et generelt SAF-program, sždvanligvis vedrżrende den sociale sektor. 
The Commission has introduced specific sectoral conditions, usually relating to the social sector, in a general SAF.
SAF II for Tunesien omfattede f.eks. bde en betingelse om, at statens engagement skulle begržnses, og betingelser vedrżrende de makrożkonomiske rammer samt om en reform af grundud-dannelsen og den videregende uddannelse. 
For example, Tunisia SAF II contained conditions relating to the reduction of State involvement and to the macroeconomic framework, as well as conditions relating to reforms to basic and higher education.
Der indhentes imidlertid ikke systematisk udtalelse fra Kommissionens tekniske eksperter, nr betingelserne vedrżrende den sociale sektor opstilles og vurderes, og da strukturtilpasningsspecialister ikke altid har tilstržkkelig indsigt i de sociale sektorer, er det ikke sikret, at de specifikke sektorbetingelser er effektive. 
Jordan SAF I contained conditions relating to population strategy and a birth-spacing programme. However, the effectiveness of the specific sector conditions is not ensured as for the preparation and appraisal of social sector conditions technical experts in the Commission are not systematically consulted and as structural adjustmentspecialistsmaylackacomprehensiveviewofsocial sectors.
En ržkke af betingelserne vedrżrende den anden rate af stżtten under SAF I for Jordan og Tunesien var endnu ikke fastlagt p det tidspunkt, da finansieringsaftalen blev undertegnet. 
In JordanŐs and TunisiaŐs SAF I some conditions for the second instalment were left open at the time of signature of the Financing Agreement.
Det er klart, at det, nr man forhandler om et SAF-program, kan vžre vanskeligt p forhnd at kende alle de betingelser, der skal vžre opfyldt, fżr den anden rate udbetales, da forholdene kan žndre sig. 
It is clear that it can be difficult when nego-tiatingaSAFtoknowinadvancealltheconditionsthatshould be met by the second instalment, given that circumstances can change.
Men helt at undlade at fastlžgge betingelser fżrer til uvished om, hvad der endnu kan forhandles om. 
However, leaving conditions open leads to uncertainty over how much is still open for negotiation.
I en kontrakt som en finansieringsaftale m der ikke vžre sdanne lakuner, og der bżr i det mindste vžre fastlagt kriterier og procedurer for de betingelser, som der skal forhandles om p et senere stadium. 
A contract like a Financing Agreement should not have such gaps and should at least lay down properly the criteria and the procedures for conditions to be negotiated at a later stage.
MFA til tredjelande Rammebetingelser 28. 
MFA to third countries Framework 28.
Retsgrundlaget for MFA til tredjelande har hidtil vžret enkelt-afgżrelser, som Rdet har vedtaget i henhold til artikel 308, EF (3) (tidligere artikel 235). 
The legal basis for MFA to third countries has so far been provided by individual Council decisions taken on the basis of Article 308, EC (3) (former Article 235).
Der findes ikke nogen rammeforordning, der fastlžgger den overordnede strategi og de overordnede mlsžtninger, hvilket skyldes, at MFA ikke var tžnkt som et permanent, men som et ekstraordinžrt instrument. 
There is no framework regulation defining the overall strategy and objectives, as MFA was not seen as a permanent4but as an exceptional instrument.
Żkofin-Rdet (4) vedtog dog i 1995 fem principper, som skal regulere MFA-politikken. 
However, the Ecofin Council ( ) agreed in 1995 on five principles which should govern the policy of MFA.
Kommissionen anfżrte i sin 2000-beretning om gennemfżrelsen af MFA (5), at Fžllesskabets transaktioner fortsat er omfattet af disse principper, nemlig: a) ekstraordinžr karakter; b) politiske forhndsbetingelser; (3) Artikel 308, EF: ČSfremt en handling fra Fžllesskabets side viser sig pkržvet for at virkeliggżre et af Fžllesskabets ml inden for fžlles-markedets rammer, og denne traktat ikke indeholder fornżden hjemmel hertil, udfžrdiger Rdet p forslag af Kommissionen og efter at have indhentet udtalelse fra Europa-Parlamentet med enstemmighed 4 passende forskrifter heromÇ. () Konklusionerne fra Żkofin-Rdets samling den 20. marts 1995 om principperne for MFA til tredjelande, som opdaterede Żkofin-Rdets Genval-konklusioner af 9. oktober 1993 om makrofinansiel bistand 5 (de skaldte reviderede Genval-retningslinjer). () Beretning fra Kommissionen til Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet om gennemfżrelse af den makrofinansielle bistand til tredjelande i 2000, KOM(2001) 288 endelig udg. af 1. juni 2001. 
The Commission indicated in its 2000 report on the implementation of MFA (5), that Community operations have continued to incorporate these principles, which are: (a) exceptional character; (b) political pre-conditions; (3) Article 308, EC: ÔIf action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parlia-4 ment, take the appropriate measuresŐ. () Conclusions of the Ecofin Council of 20 March 1995 on principles of MFA to third countries, which updated the Genval Ecofin conclusions of 9 October 1993 on MFA (the so-called revised Genval guide-5 lines). () Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of MFA to third countries in 2000 (COM(2001) 288 final of 1 June 2001).
23.5.2002 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 121/9 c) komplementaritet; d) konditionalitet; stater, kan de ikke nyde fordel af de traditionelle programmer, som IMF eller Verdensbanken er bidragydere til. 
23.5.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 121/9 (c) complementarity; (d) conditionality; (e) financial discipline.
MFA er i en ržkke tilfžlde blevet ordinžr og kontinuerlig snarere end ekstraordinžr. 
In a number of cases the MFA has become regular and continuous rather than exceptional.
Bulgarien og Rumžnien fik i november 1999 lżfte om bistand for fjerde gang siden 1991. 
In November 1999 Bulgaria and Romania were promised assistance for the fourth time since 1991.
Tre andre lande har modtaget MFA tre gange. 
Three other countries have received MFA three times.
Politiske forhndsbetingelser 34. 
Political preconditions 34.
Det andet princip er, at der kun m ydes MFA til tredjelande, der opfylder en ržkke politiske forhndsbetingelser: tžtte politiske og żkonomiske forbindelser til Den Europžiske Union, geografisk nžrhed, fuld overholdelse af de demokratiske principper, herunder et parlamentarisk flerpartisystem, og af retsstatsprincippet og garantier for, at menneskerettighederne overholdes. 
The second principle is that MFA should only be given to third countries which fulfil certain political preconditions: close political and economic links with the European Union, geographical proximity, full respect for effective democratic mechanisms including multiparty parliamentary systems, the rule of law and guarantees of human rights. 35.
35.Ipraksisydesderogsbistandtiltredjelande,somkun opfylder en del af disse politiske forhndsbetingelser. 
In practice, assistance is also provided to third countries in which these political preconditions are only partially met.
Armenien, Georgien og Tadsjikistan blev ikke betragtet som stżtteberettigede i henhold til Genval-kriterierne (jf. fodnote 4, s. 8), eftersom de ikke opfylder forhndsbetingelsen om geografisk nžrhed. 
Regarding geographical proximity, Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan were not considered eligible according to Genval criteria (see footnote 4, page 8) as they do not fulfil this precondition.
Rdet og Kommissionen har givet udtryk for betžnkeligheder med hensyn til menneskerettighederne i nogle af modtagerlandene, isžr hvad angr etniske mindretal (2). 
Regarding human rights, the Council and the Commission expressed their concerns (2), particularly as far as minorities are concerned, in some beneficiary countries.
Ikke desto mindre kan dialogen med de pgžldende lande vedrżrende MFA-stżtten fżre til, at der gżres en sžrlig politisk indsats for at fremme demokratiske styreformer og retsstatsprincippet og sikre, at menneskerettighederne overholdes. 
Nevertheless, the dialogue with the countries in question on the MFA support might provide political leverage to improve democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and to ensure human rights.
Komplementaritet 36. 
Complementarity 36.
I henhold til det tredje princip skal der vžre komplementaritet mellem MFA fra EU og den bistand, der ydes af andre multilaterale eller bilaterale bidragydere. 
Complementarity between EU MFA and the assistance provided by other multilateral or bilateral donors constitutes the third agreed principle.
For at sikre en passende byrdefordeling m EUŐs bistand kun udgżre hżjst 60% (for EU-tiltrždelseslandenes vedkommende) eller en tredjedel (żvrige lande) af den samlede bilaterale stżtte (3). 
EU assistance should be limited to a maximum of 60 % (for EU accession countries) or to one third (other countries) of total bilateral support (3), in order to ensure an adequate burden-sharing.
Princippet om komplementaritet har et andet aspekt: det skal tillige tilstržbes, at der er komplementaritet mellem den makrofinansielle bistand fra EU og anden EU-bistand, hvilket kržver intern samordning. 
The principle of complementarity has a second aspect: complementarity is also to be sought between EU macrofinancial assistance and other EU assistance, which requires internal coordination.
Som hovedregel frigżres den makrofinansielle bistand kun, hvis der er et betydeligt residuelt finansieringsunderskud over for udlandet (4), som overstiger de midler, der er ydet af IMF og 2 () Den Europžiske Unions rsberetning om menneskerettigheder, Rdet for Den Europžiske Union, 8.10.2001. 
In general, MFA is only mobilised if there is a significant residual external financing gap (4), over and above the resources (2) European Union Annual Report on human rights 2001, Council of theEuropeanUnion,8October2001.
European Initiative for Democracy and Human rights, Compen-3 dium 2000, program finansieret af Europa-Kommissionen. (4) Stżtte ydet af enkeltlande (ikke af multilaterale institutioner). () Kommissionen sondrer mellem resterende finansieringsbehov, hvor den finansielle stżtte fra IMF og Verdensbanken ikke er medregnet, og residuelle finansieringsbehov, hvor stżtten fra disse institutioner er tagetibetragtning. e) finansiel disciplin. 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human rights, Compendium 3 2000, programme financed by the European Commission () Support given by individual countries (not by multilateral institu-4 tions). () The Commission distinguishes between the remaining financing needs which exclude financial support from the IMF and the World Bank, and the residual financing needs, which take into account support from these institutions.
Det er sledes ikke udtrykkeligt anfżrt, om Den Europžiske Union forfżlger de samme ml som Verdensbanken og IMF, eller om den har yderligere sžrskilte ml for sin egen aktion. 
C 121/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 23.5.2002 provided by the IMF and the World Bank, which is identified in common with them.
Transaktionerne samordnes sledes sždvanligvis nżje med IMF og Verdensbanken allerede p planlžgningsstadiet. 
Thus there is usually a close coordination with the IMF and the World Bank already at the planning stage.
I forbindelse med det fjerde ln til Bulgarien, som der blev truffet beslutning om i 1999 (100 millioner euro), gik der over et r fra det tidspunkt, hvor det fżrste skżn over de residuelle finansieringsbehov blev udarbejdet, og til det tidspunkt, hvor de midler, der skulle džkke disse behov, blev udbetalt. 
Concerning the fourth loan to Bulgaria decided in 1999 (100 million euro), more than one year passed between the first estimate of the residual financing needs and the actual disbursement to cover these needs.
Kommissionen havde oprindeligt beregnet bistanden p grundlag af IMFŐs overslag over finansieringsbehovene fra september 1998. 
The CommissionŐs original calculation of the assistance was based on an IMF estimate of the financing needs from September 1998.
De skżnnede residuelle finansieringsbehov for 1999 blev imidlertid reduceret betydeligt (1). 
However, the residual financing needs estimated for 1999 diminished considerably (1).
Derfor fandt Kommissionens tjenestegrene ikke, at Bulgarien havde behov for at f udbetalt midler i 1999. 
Therefore, the CommissionŐs services considered that Bulgaria did not need to receive a disbursement in 1999.
Ikke desto mindre blev den fżrste rate af lnet udbetalt i december 1999 (2). 
Nevertheless the first instalment of the loan was disbursed in December 1999 (2).
Den anden rate af lnet til Bulgarien blev udbetalt i september 2000 (60 millioner euro), men der er ikke noget, der tyder p, at punkt 9 i aftalememorandummet mellem Kommissionen og de bulgarske myndigheder blev bragt i anvendelse, fżr det blev foreslet, at midlerne skulle udbetales. 
Concerning the disbursement of the second instalment of the loan to Bulgaria in September 2000 (60 million euro), there is no evidence that paragraph 9 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Bulgarian authorities was applied before the proposal for disbursement: ÔThe amount of the second instalment will be decided following a Commission review of BulgariaŐs residual external financing requirements.
Da der ikke var foretaget en sdan undersżgelse p det tidspunkt, var det ikke muligt at fastsl, om der var residuelle finansieringsbehov i 2000, og det var heller ikke muligt at afgżre, om Fžllesskabets bistand til Bulgarien udgjorde mindre end 60 % af den samlede bilaterale stżtte, der var ydet i 1999 og 2000, og om den dermed var under det loft, der var fastsat for EU-tiltrždelseslande for at sikre en passende byrdefordeling. 
Due account will also be taken of the effective mobilisation of financial assistance to Bulgaria by other bilateral donors ...Ő In the absence of such a review at that time, it was not possible to establish if there were any residual financing needs for 2000 nor was it possible to establish whether the Community assistance to Bulgaria represented less than 60 % of total bilateral support given in 1999 and 2000 and therefore remained within the maximum limit for EU accession countries, which was set to ensure an adequate burden-sharing.
I Kosovo havde de forskellige tjenestegrene i Kommissionen ikke i alle tilfžlde samordnet deres fremgangsmde for at sikre komplementaritet og samordning mellem den makrofinansielle bistand fra EU og anden EU-bistand. 
As far as complementarity and coordination between EU macrofinancial assistance and other EU assistance is concerned, the approach in Kosovo was not always harmonised between the different Commission services.
Det Europžiske Genopbyg-ningsagentur, der har hjemsted i Pristina, og som i 2000 var ansvarligt for forpligtelser p ca. 400 millioner euro, gav udtryk for utilfredshed med den mde, hvorp FNŐs midlertidige administrative mission i Kosovo (UNMIK) varetog sin funktion. 
The European Agency for Reconstruction, situated in Pristina and responsible for commitments of about 400 million euro in 2000, was critical of the efficiency of the United Nations Interim Administration (UNMIK).
UNMIK forelagdeikkerapporterneomanvendelsenafdeEU-midler,som agenturet forvalter, til trods for adskillige pmindelser, herunder en skrivelse fra Kommissionen i Bruxelles, hvori det anfżres, at UNMIK risikerer, at der ikke vil blive foretaget yderligere udbetalinger. 
The UNMIK did not supply the reports on the utilisation of EU funds managed by the Agency despite several reminders, including a letter from the Commission in Brussels, pointing out that UNMIK was putting further payments at risk.
P samme tidspunkt besluttede den tjenestegren i Kommis-(1) Fra 205 millioner USD i september 1998 til 71 millioner USD i september 1999. 
At the same time the Commis-(1) From USD 205 million in September 1998 to USD 71 million in September 1999.
(2) Den blev reduceret fra 50 til 40 millioner euro. sionen, der er ansvarlig for MFA, hurtigt at udbetale den anden rate af bevillingen p 35 millioner euro til KosovoŐs budget, som administreres af UNMIK (jf. bilag III, punkt 1). 
(2) This was reduced from 50 million euro to 40 million euro. sionŐs service responsible for MFA decided to disburse quickly the second instalment of the 35 million euro commitment relating to the Kosovo budget managed by UNMIK (see Annex III, paragraph 1).
I april 1999 besluttede Rdet at yde makrofinansiel bistand til Albanien i form af et ln p 20 millioner euro. 
In the case of Albania in April 1999 the Council decided on MFA of up to 20 million euro in the form of a loan.
P det tidspunkt, hvor Retten gennemfżrte sin revision (februar 2001), var der imidlertid endnu ikke foretaget nogen udbetaling, idet Albanien i vidt omfang fik tilfżrt anden EU-bistand, hovedsagelig i form af gavebistand (ekstraordinžr budgetstżtte under programmet for fżdevaresikkerhed til betaling af udgifter i forbindelse med flygt-ninge). 
However, there was still no payment by the time of the CourtŐs audit (February 2001) because Albania benefited from a large inflow of other EU assistance, mainly in the form of grants (emergency budgetary assistance for costs related to refugees under the Food Security programme).
Da andre lande modtager MFA i form af gavebistand, synes Albanien ikke lžngere at vžre indstillet p at optage ln. 
As other countries are receiving MFA in the form of grants, Albania no longer seems willing to take loans. A cancellation of the loan agreement would seem to be appropriate.
Konditionalitet 42. 
Conditionality 42.
Det fjerde af de principper, der blev vedtaget, var makrożkonomisk konditionalitet. 
Macroeconomic conditionality was agreed as the fourth principle.