natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ECHOŐs projektcyklusforvaltningsmetode lžgger isžr vžgt p projektplanlžgning, udformning og behovsanalyser, s det sikres, at projektet opfylder mlgruppens behov. 
DG ECHOŐs project cycle management approach emphasises the importance of project planning, design and needs analysis in order to ensure that the project will meet the needs of the target group.
De projektforslag, der blev indsendt af partnerne, blev analyseret af ECHOŐs ekspert p stedet (1) og ogs af den landeansvarlige i Bruxelles, inden de blev godkendt. 
Project proposals submitted by partners were analysed by the DG ECHO field expert (1) and also by the desk officer in Brussels prior to their approval.
ECHOŐs beslutning om at arbejde med eksisterende partnere i Sri Lanka sikrede, at projektforslagene blev udarbejdet af organisationer, som havde landekendskab, og som var godt placeret til at foretage behovsanalyser (jf. tekstboks 3). 
DG ECHOŐs decision to work with existing partners in Sri Lanka ensured that project proposals were prepared by organisations with knowledge of the country who were well placed to carry out needs assessments (see box 3).
Nogle partnere inkluderede en behovsanalyse i selve projektet. 
Some partners included a needs assessment as part of the project itself.
I Indonesien var det vanskeligt at foretage nżjagtige behovsanalyser umiddelbart efter tsunamien p grund af den forvirring, der herskede overalt, og manglen p plidelige oplysninger. 
In Indonesia, accurate needs assessments were difficult in the situation immediately following the tsunami due to the general confusion and lack of reliable information.
Det var ikke muligt at f adgang til de ramte omrder, primžrt p grund af de omfattende żdelžggelser og til dels p grund af sikkerhedssituationen, og det forsinkede de humanitžre organisationers ankomst p stedet. 
The lack of access to affected areas, mainly because of the large scale destruction and partly because of the security situation, slowed the deployment in the field of humanitarian organisations.
De fleste organisationer var fżrst godt etableret p Sumatras vestkyst ved udgangen af januar, og derfor var behovsanalyserne af drligere kvalitet, og de blev udarbejdet for sent. 
It was not until the end of January that most organisations were well established on the west coast of Sumatra, which had an impact on the quality and timeliness of needs assessments.
Nogle af de projektforslag, der blev finansieret under nżdhjžlpsafgżrelsen om de 10 millioner euro, indeholdt kun et standardforslag til nżdhjžlpsaktioner og ikke et forslag om specifikke tiltag baseret p en mere nżjagtig behovsanalyse. 
Some project proposals financed under the 10 million euro emergency decision presented a standard emergency response proposal rather than a response to specific findings based on a more accurate needs assessment.
I juni 2005 afholdt FNŐs Kontor for Koordinering af Humanitžre Anliggender (UNOCHA) en regional workshop om erfaringerne fra tsunamien, og her fremgik det, at lokalsamfundene ikke var blevet hżrt tilstržkkeligt om det nżdhjžlps-og genopbygningsar-bejde, der var ivžrksat af det humanitžre samfund som helhed betragtet. 
In June 2005, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) held a regional workshop on lessons learned from the tsunami which highlighted the lack of consultation with communities regarding relief and recovery work undertaken by the humanitarian community as a whole.
Behovsanalyserne vedrżrende de projekter, som der var indget aftale om fra februar 2005, var mere plidelige, fordi der forel flere oplysninger, og der var mere tid til at forberede forslagene. 
The needs assessments of projects agreed from February 2005 were more reliable due to the availability of more information and more time to prepare proposals.
Under forberedelsen af et bdbygningsprojekt i Aceh arbejdede en ngo for eksempel tžt sammen med lokalsamfundet, og det lykkedes den at udforme et projekt, som opfyldte stżttemodtagernes behov. 
For example, in preparing their boat building project in Aceh, an NGO worked closely with the community and succeeded in designing a project which met the needs of the beneficiaries.
Stżtte til sikring af et eksistensgrundlag: fiskerbde i Aceh, Indonesien (Kilde: Revisionsretten) Tekstboks 3 Partnerne i Sri Lanka var godt placeret til at udarbejde projektforslag En Rżde Kors-organisation var ideelt placeret til at forberede projektet for psykosocial hjžlp, fordi den siden 2003 havde bistet Sri Lankas Rżde Kors med at gennemfżre et program for psykosocial hjžlp i den nordlige Jaffna-provins. 
Box 3 Partners in Sri Lanka were well placed to prepar eproject proposals A Red Cross organisation was ideally placed to prepare the psychosocial support project because since 2003 it had supported the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society to implement a psychosocial support programme in the northern province of Jaffna, also supported by the Commission, targeting the internally displaced people uprooted as a result of the conflict.
(1) Ekspert p stedet er en term, der anvendes om Kommissionens faglige bistandspersonale inden for humanitžr bistand. 
(1) Field expert is the term used to refer to the CommissionŐs humanitarian aid technical support personnel.
C 170/10 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 21.7.2006 Effektiviteten af koordineringen ECHO stillede midler til rdighed for en ngo i Aceh, s der kunne indsamles oplysninger om internt fordrevne, og disse oplysninger kunne integreres i HICŐs database. 
C 170/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 Effectiveness of coordination DG ECHO provided funding to an NGO in Aceh to gather data concerning internally displaced people and integrate them into the Humanitarian Information Centre.
I Sri Lanka finansierede ECHO et projekt, som blev gennemfżrt af en international organisation, og som havde til forml at etablere en central database over stżttemodtagere og dermed lżse problemet med, at der manglede pržcise oplysninger. 
In Sri Lanka, DG ECHO funded a project implemented by an international organisation to establish a central beneficiary database aimed to address the problem of lack of clear information.
Selv om projektet oprindeligt blev stżttet af det center for nationale aktioner (Centre for National Operations), som Sri Lankas regering havde oprettet til at forvalte tsunamibistanden, blev det ikke stżttet af de regeringskontorer, som fra februar 2005 overtog ansvaret for nżdhjžlp og genopbygning. 
However, although the project was originally encouraged by the Centre for National Operations, established by the Government of Sri Lanka to manage the response to the tsunami, it was not supported by the government agencies which took over responsibility for relief and recovery from February 2005.
Databasen blev derfor suspenderet indtil september 2005, hvor regi-streringsprocessen startede igen under ledelse af Sri Lankas regering. 
The database was therefore put on hold until September 2005 when the registration process restarted under the leadership of the Government of Sri Lanka.
Koordinering af en lang ržkke humanitžre organisationer 22. 
Coordination of a large number of humanitarian organisations 22.
FNŐs Kontor for Koordinering af Humanitžre Anliggender (UNOCHA) ptog sig rollen som koordinator af hjžlpeagen-turernes aktiviteter med stżtte fra andre FN-agenturer for de forskellige berżrte sektorer. 
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) assumed the role of coordinator for the activities of aid agencies, supported by other UN agencies for the different sectors concerned.
FN stżdte imidlertid p fżlgende problemer, som hindrede en effektiv koordinering: a) Der forel ikke tilstržkkelige oplysninger om skader og behov og heller ikke om planlagte og igangvžrende nżdhjžlpsaktioner. 
However, the UN encountered the following obstacles to effective coordination: (a) there was inadequate information on damages and needs and also on relief action planned and in progress.
Det forhold, at der s sent som i maj 2005 endnu ikke forel nżjagtige og plidelige oplysninger om antallet af internt fordrevne (IDP) i Indonesien, og hvor de befandt sig, illustrerer dette problem. 
The need for accurate and reliable information as late as May 2005 concerning the number and location of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Indonesia illustrates this problem.
P den regionale workshop, som UNOCHA afholdt i juni 2005 om de indhżstede erfaringer, blev det ppeget, at der var behov for bedre oplysninger, et problem, som Kommissionen erkendte og gjorde en indsats for at lżse (jf. tekstboks 4). b) En lang ržkke humanitžre organisationer, som var nye p stedet Ń mange af dem med store belżb i private midler Ń arbejdede ofte uafhžngigt af de etablerede koordi-neringsmekanismer. c) De lokale myndigheder var blevet svžkket som fżlge af menneskelige og materielle tab, og der var ikke etableret systemer, der registrerede ngoŐer, og som sikrede, at de overholdt standarderne eller deltog i de etablerede koordineringsmeka-nismer. 
The June 2005 UNOCHA regional workshop on lessons learned highlighted the requirement for better information, a problem which the Commission recognised and worked to address (see box 4); (b) a large number of newly arrived humanitarian organisations, many with large amounts of private funding, often operated independently of available coordination mechanisms; (c) local authorities had been weakened by human and material losses and there was no functioning system for registering NGOs and ensuring their adherence to standards or participation in established coordination mechanisms.
I EU-rdsformandskabets diskussionspapir af december 2005 om EUŐs indsats i forbindelse med tsunamien (1) sžttes der under Čpunkter, der skal uddybesÇ fokus p spżrgsmlet om, hvad det internationale samfund og EU kan gżre for at hjžlpe regeringerne med at forvalte donorkoordineringen effektivt. 
The points for further discussion in the EU Council Presidency discussion paper of December 2005(1) concerning the EUŐs response to the tsunami focus on the question of what role the international community and the EU can play to support governments in managing donor coordination effectively.
Som fżlge af koordineringsvanskelighederne var der stor forskel p omfanget og kvaliteten af den bistand, der blev ydet af det internationale samfund. 
As a result of the difficulties of coordination, there have been significant variations in the level and quality of assistance provided by the international community.
I Rżde KorsŐ rapport om katastrofer i verden i 2005 (World Disasters Report 2005) beskrives det, hvordan nogle lokalsamfund i Aceh blev overvžldet med bistand, mens andre blev forsżmt. 
The Red Cross World Disasters Report 2005 describes how some communities in Aceh were overwhelmed with aid while others were neglected.
Der blev stillet for megen bistand til rdighed i sundhedssektoren i Indonesien og for mange bde i Sri Lanka, mens andre bistandsaktioner var ufuldstžndige, for eksempel fiskerbde uden fiskenet. 
There was overprovision of aid in the health sector in Indonesia and in the provision of boats in Sri Lanka and some aid was insufficiently complete, for example fishing boats without fishing nets.
I december 2005, et r efter katastrofen, boede omkring 67 000 mennesker stadig i telte i Aceh. 
Furthermore, in December 2005, one year after the disaster, some 67 000 people were still living in tents in Aceh.
Koordineringen mellem ECHO og andre kommissionstjenester var god Ń dog ikke i krisens fżrste faser 24. 
Good coordination between DG ECHO and other Commission services except for immediate response 24.
Under civilbeskyttelsesordningen blev der sendt eksperthold ud til de omrder, der var hrdest ramt af tsunamien. De skulle hjžlpe med at vurdere situationen og koordinere modtagelsen og fordelingen af den civilbeskyttelsesbistand, som medlemsstaterne havde ydet. 
The Civil Protection Mechanism deployed teams of experts to the areas most affected by the tsunami to help assess the situation and coordinate the arrival and distribution of civil protection assistance offered by Member States.
I henhold til det aftalememorandum, der blev undertegnet af ECHO og Generaldirektoratet for Miljż den 16. marts 2003, er en bedre koordinering af aktioner inden for civilbeskyttelse og humanitžr bistand, bde i hovedkvartererne og i marken, en forudsžtning for, at fžllesskabsaktionerne kan opn gode synergier. 
The Memorandum of Understanding of 16 March 2003 between DG ECHO and the Directorate-General for Environment states that enhanced coordination of Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid interventions, both at headquarters and in the field, is paramount to achieve coherent synergies of Community action.
Procedurerne bżr sikre, at der udveksles oplysninger p alle krisens stadier, og mżder p stedet mellem ECHO og civilbeskyttelseskoordineringsholdet bżr sikre, at aktiviteterne komplementerer hinanden. 
Procedures should ensure a mutual exchange of information at all stages of the crisis and meetings in the field between DG ECHO and the Civil Protection Coordination team should ensure that activities are complementary.
I Sri Lanka og i Indonesien var civilbeskyttelsesordningen imidlertid ikke tilstržkkeligt koordineret med den humanitžre bistand. 
However, in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia the Civil Protection Mechanism was insufficiently coordinated with humanitarian aid.
P mżdet i Udvalget for Humanitžr Bistand den 27. januar 2005 blev der fokuseret p svaghederne i koordinationen mellem ECHO og monitorerings-og informationscentret Tekstboks 4 ECHO erkendte og gjorde en indsats for at lżse koordinerings-problemerne ECHOŐs strategi i Indonesien og Sri Lanka var at stżtte FNŐs rolle som koordinator. 
The Humanitarian Aid Committee of 27 January 2005 focused on the weaknesses in coordination between DG ECHO and the Civil Protection Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) Box 4 DG ECHO recognised and worked to address problems of coordination DG ECHOŐs strategy in Indonesia and Sri Lanka was to support the coordination role of the United Nations.
I denne forbindelse ydede ECHO 1 million euro i stżtte til UNOCHAŐs center for oplysninger om humanitžre aktioner (Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC)), s der kunne tilvejebringes informationsredskaber til brug ved planlžgningen, implementeringen og overvgningen af humanitžr bistand. 
In this context DG ECHO granted 1 million euro to support UNOCHAŐs Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) in order to provide information tools for planning, implementing and monitoring humanitarian assistance.
I april 2005 udarbejdede UNOCHA og ECHO i fžllesskab en evaluering af HIC, som indeholdt en ržkke anbefalinger af, hvordan HIC kunne f et samlet overblik over den humanitžre respons og sžtte fokus p behov, som ikke er blevet džkket. 
A joint OCHA and ECHO evaluation of the HIC in April 2005 made recommendations to help it to provide a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian response and to highlight gaps in needs.
(1) The EUŐs contribution to the international response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami: Achievements, next steps and lessons learned. 
(1) TheEUŐscontributiontotheinternationalresponsetothe2004Asian Tsunami: achievements, next steps and lessons learned.
Diskussionspapir til mżdet p hżjt plan, som blev afholdt i Bruxelles den 20. december 2005 under ledelse af Europa-Kommissionen og EU-formandskabet. 
Discussion paper for High-level Meeting Brussels, 20 December 2005, hosted by the European Commission and the EU Presidency.
21.7.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 170/11 (MIC) for civilbeskyttelse, og udvalget anfżrte, at MIC ikke kun havde koordineret civilbeskyttelsesaktiviteter, men havde overlap-pet med det humanitžre omrde, som ikke hżrer under MIC, og givet det indtryk, at det koordinerede al EU-bistand (1). 
21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/11 and considered that the MIC had not confined itself to civil protection activities, but had overlapped with the humanitarian field which is beyond their role and given the impression that it was coordinating all EU assistance (1).
ECHO samarbejder med andre kommissionstjenester, s det sikres, at sammenkoblingen af kortsigtet nżdhjžlp og genopbygning p lžngere sigt forlżber gnidningslżst og effektivt. 
Concerning the link with the reconstruction phase, DG ECHO works with other Commission services to ensure there is a smooth and effective link between short-term relief efforts and longer term reconstruction.
Overgangen mellem nżdhjžlp og genopbygning blev lžngere end forventet (jf. punkt 15.a)), og de meget store belżb fra ECHO var med til at sikre džkning i denne fase. 
The high level of DG ECHO funding helped to bridge the longer than expected transitional phase between relief and reconstruction (see paragraph 15(a)).
I strategien for Sammenkobling af Nżdhjžlp, Rehabilitering og Udvikling (LRRD) i Indonesien og Sri Lanka indgr brug af den hurtige reaktionsmekanisme, der giver adgang til satellitbilleder af tsunamiżdelžggel-ser, som kan vžre til nytte ved planlžgningen af genopbygningen og katastrofeberedskabet. 
The strategy for linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in Indonesia and Sri Lanka involves the use of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism to provide satellite imaging of tsunami damages that could be useful for reconstruction planning and disaster preparedness.
Den hurtige reaktionsmekanisme var ogs med til at finansiere de mžglingsinitiativer, som mundede ud i en fredsaftale i august 2005 mellem den indonesiske regering og AcehŐs Befrielsesbevžgelse (GAM), og som styrkede genopbygningsarbejdet. 
The Rapid Reaction Mechanism also helped finance mediation efforts which led to a peace agreement in August 2005 between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), strengthening the foundations for reconstruction efforts.
Sanitžr bistand: latriner i Aceh, Indonesien (Kilde: Revisionsretten) (1) I februar 2005 drżftede det rdgivende udvalg for FNŐs katastrofebedżmmelse-og koordineringshold (UNDAC) civilbeskyttelsesordningen og udtrykte bekymring for, at der kunne ske overlapninger i forvaltningen af tsunamibistanden. 
Sanitation assistance: latrines in Aceh, Indonesia (Source: ECA) (1) In February 2005, the UN Disaster and Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) Advisory Board discussed the Civil Protection Mechanism and viewed with concern the possible duplication of roles following the tsunami.
FNŐs Kontor for Koordinering af Humanitžre Anliggender (UNOCHA) anmodede derfor om, at der blev etableret klare procedurer, som sikrede, at koordinerings-holdet for EUŐs civilbeskyttelsesordning kun arbejdede inden for rammerne af de internationalt fastsatte ordninger. 
Consequently, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) requested clear procedures for EU Civil Protection Mechanism coordinators to work within the existing internationally agreed mechanisms.
Sikrede overvgningssystemerne, at projekterne var relevante og blev implementeret rettidigt og p en produktiv mde? Et rimeligt džkkende overvgnings-og kontrolsystem 27. 
Role of monitoring systems in ensuring relevance, timeliness and efficiency of implementation A fairly comprehensive monitoring and control system 27.
ECHOŐs overvgning og kontrol af projektgennemfżrelsen er baseret p fżlgende elementer: a) kontrolbesżg, som ECHOŐs eksperter p stedet foretager, og deres rapporter, samt kontrolbesżg, som foretages af de landeansvarlige b) rapporter udarbejdet af ECHOŐs partnere c) besżg, som ECHOŐs Kontor for Finansielle Spżrgsml og Revision foretager p stedet d) kontrol inden afholdelsen af den endelige betaling eller efterfżlgende ekstern revision hos partnerne. 
In order to monitor and control project implementation, DG ECHO relies on the following mechanisms: (a) DG ECHO field expertsŐ monitoring visits and reports supplemented by supervisory monitoring visits of desk officers; (b) DG ECHOŐs partnersŐ reports; (c) on-the-spot visits of the DG ECHO Finances and Audit Unit; (d) checks prior to final payment and later external audits of partners.
P grundlag af disse kontrolbesżg kan der tržffes egnede foranstaltninger p lokalt eller centralt niveau. 
On the basis of monitoring visits, appropriate action can be taken at local or headquarters level.
En overvgningsrapport om et program for psykosocial bistand i Sri Lanka, der blev offentliggjort i april 2005, fremhžvede for eksempel, at der var problemer med at rekruttere lokalt personale. 
For example, the April 2005 monitoring report of a psychosocial support programme in Sri Lanka highlighted problems in recruiting local staff.
ECHOŐs landeansvarlige i Bruxelles kontaktede derfor det berżrte Rżde Kors-hovedkvarter for at sikre sig, at der ville blive underskrevet et aftalememorandum med Sri Lankas Rżde Kors, s der kunne rekrutteres lokalt personale til nžste fase i projektet. 
The DG ECHO desk officer in Brussels therefore contacted the concerned Red Cross headquarters to obtain assurance that a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sri Lanka Red Cross would be signed to allow the recruitment of local staff for the next phase of the project.
Efter tsunamien den 26. december 2004 ankom ECHOŐs ansatte til Sri Lanka den 27. december 2004 og til Djakarta, Indonesien, den 28. december 2004. 
Following the tsunami on 26 December 2004, DG ECHO staff were in Sri Lanka on 27 December 2004 and in Jakarta, Indonesia on 28 December 2004.
De fżrste ECHO-eksperter ankom til Aceh den 1. januar 2005. 
On 1 January 2005, the first DG ECHO experts arrived in Aceh.
ECHO overflyttede tekniske assistenter fra andre regioner, f.eks. Sydamerika, Afrika og Mel-lemżsten, til at bist med de fżrste stżtteforanstaltninger, der blev ivžrksat efter tsunamien. 
DG ECHO redeployed technical assistants from other regions e.g. South America, Africa and the Middle East in order to assist in the initial response to the tsunami.
I januar 2005 blev det klart, at der var behov for permanente eksperter p stedet, og disse eksperter var p plads i Aceh i april 2005. 
The need for permanent field experts was identified in January 2005 and they were in place in Aceh by April 2005.
Efter tsunamien gav Kommissionen tilsagn om at żge antallet af ECHO-eksperter p stedet fra 69 til 150 (2). 
Following the tsunami, the Commission made a commitment to increase the number of DG ECHO field experts from 69 to 150 (2).
I Sri Lanka blev der gennemfżrt 23 kontrolbesżg p de ni projekter, der var finansieret over nżdhjžlpsafgżrelsen om 10 millioner euro. 
In Sri Lanka, 23 monitoring visits were carried out for the nine projects funded by the 10 million euro emergency decision.
I Indonesien blev der gennemfżrt 13 kontrolbesżg p de ti projekter, der var finansieret over nżdhjžlpsafgżrelsen om 10 millioner euro. De fleste kontrolbesżg blev gennemfżrt, efter at de nuvžrende eksperter p stedet ankom i april 2005. 
In Indonesia 13 monitoring visits were carried out for the 10 projects funded by the 10 million euro emergency decision, mostly after the arrival of the current field experts in April 2005.
ECHOŐs eksperter p stedet udarbejdede en kontrolrapport efter hvert kontrolbesżg. 
A monitoring report was produced by the DG ECHO field expert after each monitoring visit.
(2) Meddelelse fra Kommissionen om styrkelse af EUŐs katastrofe-og krisestyring i tredjelande (KOM(2005) 153). 
(2) COM(2005) 153 Ń Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in third countries.
C 170/12 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 21.7.2006 30. 
C 170/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 30.
ECHOŐs eksperter p stedet har ikke fet specifikke retningslinjer for rapporteringen om resultaterne af kontrolbesż-gene. 
There are no specific guidelines for DG ECHO field experts for reporting the findings of monitoring missions.
Efter hvert kontrolbesżg afholder ECHOŐs eksperter p stedet et debriefingmżde med partnerens team p stedet. 
At the end of each monitoring mission DG ECHO field experts have a debriefing meeting with the partnerŐs field team.