natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Forvaltning og kontrol V. Forvaltningen af fiskeriaftalerne svžkkes, fordi nogle af bestemmelserne ikke anvendes eller anvendes uhensigtsmžssigt, og fordi der ikke er krav om udveksling af oplysninger. 
Management and control V. Managementofthefisheriesagreementsisunderminedbythefaultyorunsuitableapplicationofcertain clauses and by the fact that they do not stipulate any compulsory exchange of information.
C 210/3 
C 210/3
VI. nens og medlemsstaternes kontrol. 
VI. TheCourtŐsauditidentifiedshortcomingsintheimplementationandmonitoringofthechecksmadeby the Commission and the Member States.
I partnerskab med medlemsstaterne bżr den ogs fastlžgge retningslinjer for disses detaljerede kontrolbestemmelser. ling af sdanne rettigheder og anvendelsen af dem defineret. 
Together with the Member States, it should also lay down guidelines on the detailed arrangements for their inspections.
Fiskerivarer er en vigtig fżdevareressource for medlemsstaterne. 
Fishery products are an important food resource for the Member States of the EU.
Der er indfżrt en fžlles fiskeripolitik for at bevare fiskeressourcerne, forvalte og tilpasse medlemsstaternes erhvervsstrukturer, gennemfżre den fžlles markedsordning og indg fiskeriaftaler med lande uden for Den Europžiske Union. 
A common fisheries policy has been set up for conserving fish stocks, managing and adapting the development of the Member StatesŐ industrial structures, ensuring the common organisation of the market and concluding fisheries agreements with non-Community countries.
Princippet om fri adgang til det bne hav mistede gradvist sin betydning fra midten af halvfjerdserne efter FNŐs tredje havrets-konference. 
The principle of free access to the high seas gradually disappeared from the mid-1970s onwards and in the wake of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Flere og flere tredjelande besluttede dengang at udvide den eksklusive żkonomiske zone fra 12 til 200 sżmil, og dermed kom ca. 90 % af fiskeressourcerne under kyststaternes kontrol. 
Around that time,moreandmorethirdcountriesdecidedtoextendtheir exclusive economic zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles and thus about 90 % of fish resources came under the control of coastal countries.
Som fżlge heraf blev medlemsstaternes flder forment adgang til disse omrder, som de tidligere fiskede i (og som džkkede 9 % (1) af forbruget i Fžllesskabet). 
As a consequence, the fleets of the European Union Member States, which had previously fished these waters, no longer had access to them (representing 9 % (1) of Community consumption).
Derfor, og fordi der var behov for at sikre en forsvarlig forvaltning af de knappe fiskeressourcer, indgik Fžllesskabet en ržkke fiskeriaftaler med tredjelande, sledes at medlemsstaternes flder kunne fortsžtte deres tidligere aktiviteter. 
As a result of this state of affairs, plus the need for sound management of fish stocks in short supply, the Community negotiated fisheries agreements with third countries, thus enabling the Member StatesŐ fleets to continue their previous activities.
1. januar 2001 havde Kommissionen undertegnet fiskeriaftaler med 33 lande, og 14afdisseaftalervarstadiggžldende. 
By 1 January 2001, the Commission had signed fisheries agreements with 33 countries, 14 of which were still in force.
I aftalerne er retten til at drive fiskeri i de pgžldende tredjelandes eksklusive żkonomiske zoner samt betingelserne for tilde-(1) Kommissionens ČIfremer/CepÇ -evaluering (Institut franais de recherche pour lŐexploitation de la mer/Centre dŐtudes de projets), september 1999, s. 
Nature of the fisheries agreements 4. Theseagreementsdefinethelevel,thetermsofallocationand theuseoftherightsofaccesstofishresourcesintheexclusive (1) The CommissionŐs evaluation, carried out by Ifremer/CEP (Institut franais de recherche pour lŐexploitation de la mer/Centre dŐetudes de projets), p.
Sigtet med andengenerationsaftalerne er, at private erhvervsdrivende stifter blandede selskaber (joint ventures), der varetager forvalt-ningenafEU-fartżjerne,ogsomtildelesfiskekvoteritredjelande- nes farvande (aftalerne kan omfatte finansielle modydelser for fiskekvoterne). 
The second-generation agreements aim at the setting-up by private operators of joint ventures, which are responsible for the management of European vessels and which are allocated fishing quotas in the waters of third countries (the agreements may provide for financial compensation for the fishing quotas).
Formlet med disse aftaler er endvidere, at dele af medlemsstaternes flder permanent eller midlertidigt overfżres til tredjelande (Argentina, Estland, Letland og Litauen f.eks.). 
Furthermore, their objective is for vessels making up the fleets of Member States to be definitively or temporarily transferred to the fleets of third countries(forexampleArgentina,Estonia,Latvia,Lithuania).
Formlet med fiskeriaftalerne har fra fżrste fžrd vžret at sikre, at EUŐs fiskerflder fortsat kunne drive deres aktiviteter mod til gengžld at yde finansiel stżtte eller give fiskerimuligheder, hvilket bekržfter disse aftalers kommercielle karakter. 
From the outset, the purpose of the fisheries agreements has been to safeguard the continued activity of the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets, in return for financial contributions or fishing opportunities, thus confirming that these agreements are commercial in nature.
De vigtigste parter i forbindelse med fiskeriaftalerne 6. 
The main parties involved in the fisheries agreements 6.
De forskellige parter i fiskeriaftalerne har fżrst og fremmest fżlgende ansvarsomrder: Vžsentligste ansvarsomrder Budgetmyndighed, giver Kommissionen mandat til at forhandle en aftale, herunder omfanget af fiskerimulighederne, vedtager aftalen ved forordning og undertegner den Budgetmyndighed, afgiver udtalelse Forhandler aftalerne og varetager den administrative, finansielle og tekniske forvaltning Deres rolle varierer fra aftale til aftale, en sžrlig ČfiskerienhedÇ varetager den decentraliserede forvaltning i henhold til aftalebestemmelserne Ansvarlige for at anvende kontrolbestemmelserne og de żvrige bestemmelser i fiskeriaftalerne Forhandler aftaler og foretager kontrol og overvgning i egne havne og eksklusive żkonomiske zoner Betaler licensafgift til tredjelandet som modydelse for fiskerirettigheder i henhold til de Čaftaler, der indebžrer en finansiel modydelseÇ (jf. punkt 4.b)); skal overholde eventuelle sžrlige betingelser (ansžttelse af lokale sżfolk f.eks.) Rdet Europa-Parlamentet Kommissionen: Bruxelles Kommissionen: delegationerne Medlemsstaterne Tredjelandene Rederne Sigtet med revisionen og dens omfang 7. 
The main responsibilities of the parties involved in the fisher-iesagreementsareasfollows: Main responsibilities Budgetary authority; gives the Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement, including the level of fishing opportunities; adopts the agreement by means of a regulation and signs it Budgetary authority; consulted for an opinion Negotiates the agreements; takes care of the administrative, financial and technical management On a case-by-case basis, deconcentrated management by a fisheries unit in accordance with the provisions of the agreement Responsible for applying the control measures and other provisions of the fisheries agreements Negotiate the agreements; control and supervision in their ports and exclusive economic zones For the Őagreements involving financial compensationŐ mentioned in paragraph 4(b), payment of licence fees to the third country in return for access rights; compliance with any specific conditions (for example crews to consist of nationals of the third country) Council Parliament Commission: Brussels Commission: Delegations Member States Third countries Shipowners Objective and scope of the audit 7.
Mlet for revisionen var at undersżge, om Kommissionen havde defineret mlene for de internationale fiskeriaftaler klart og indfżrt hensigtsmžssige systemer til kontrol af deres effektivitet. 
The objective of the audit was to examine whether the Commission had clearly defined the objectives of the international fisheries agreements and whether it had set up adequate performance monitoring systems to measure their achievement.
Revisionen vedrżrte forvaltningen af aftalerne med Marokko, Mauretanien, Grżnland, Senegal og Argentina i perioden 1993-1999. Disse aftaler tegnede sig for 92 % af de udbetalte belżb i regnskabsret 1999. 
The audit examined the management, during the period 1993 to 1999, of the agreements made with Morocco, Mauritania, Greenland, Senegal and Argentina, which together accounted for 92%ofthepaymentschargedtothefinancialyear1999.These are agreements involving financing by the Community budget.
Disse aftaler er ogs de vžsentligste for s vidt angr fangstmuligheder, og demestomfattendeafaftalerneafČfżrsteÇogČandenÇgeneration. 
Taken as a whole, they are also the most important in terms of fishing opportunities and in terms of first or second generation agreements.
Retten foretog en dokumentanalyse af forvaltningssystemerne, identificerede nżgleaktiviteter og udfżrte kontroltest. 
Through documentary analysis of the management systems, the key activities were identified and then underwent audit tests.
Retten aflagde revisionsbesżg i Kommissionen, i medlemsstaterne (Spanien, Frankrig og Portugal) og i Kommissionens delegation i Marokko, i Mauretanien og i Senegal. 
Audit visits were conducted at the Commission, in the Member States (Spain, France and Portugal) and in the CommissionŐs delegations in Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal.
Der blev tilvejebragt pli-deligtrevisionsbevisvedrevisionafdokumenterogregistre,iagt- tagelse af havneaktiviteter, anmodning om og bekržftelse af oplysninger, samt samtaler med repržsentanter for tredjelande og udvalgte organisationer. 
Audit evidence was obtained by checks on documents and registers, the observation of port activities, requests for and confirmation of information, supplemented by interviews with representatives of third countries and selected organisations.
10. I rsberetningen for regnskabsret 1999 gjorde Retten allerede opmžrksom p, at Kommissionen i henhold til de internationale fiskeriaftaler havde indget retlige forpligtelser svarende til et belżb, som oversteg de disponible bevillinger med 129 millioner euro, og at regnskabsrets forpligtelser derfor var ansat for lavt (1). 
10.InitsAnnualReportconcerningfinancialyear1999,the Court stated that, for budget headings relating to international fisheries agreements, the Commission had entered into legal obligations which exceeded available appropriations by 129 million euro and that, as a consequence, the commitments for the finan-cialyearhadbeenunderstated(1).Thisquestionhasthereforenot beendealtwithinthisReport.
Budgetmžssige aspekter 11. 
Budgetaryaspects 11.
I bilag I vises budgetudgifterne til de internationale fiskeriaftaler i perioden 1993-2000 og forholdet mellem disse udgifter og de samlede udgifter til den fžlles fiskeripolitik. 
Annex I shows the budgetary expenditure for the interna-tionalfisheriesagreementsfortheperiod1993to2000,andits relationship with the total expenditure borne by the common fisheries policy.
Det fremgr, at der i perioden mellem 1993 og 1997 var en tendens til stigning i de belżb, der udbetaltes til partnerlandene som modydelse for fiskerirettigheder, og at disse belżb siden 1998 har ligget p samme niveau (jf. figur). 
Between 1993 and 1997 there was an upward trend in the amounts paid to the partner countries in return for fishing rights, but since 1998 the level of these amounts has stabilised (see the Graph).
(1) Rettens rsberetning for regnskabsret 1999 (EFT C 342 af 1.12.2000, s.189). 
(1) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 189).
C 210/6 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 27.7.2001 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 Figur Internationale fiskeriaftaler Ń Forpligtelser og afholdte betalinger, fangsternes vžrdi Forpligtelser Betalinger Fangsternes vžrdi 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 r 1998 1999 som grundlag for at vurdere, i hvilket omfang mlene for aftalerne er blevet opfyldt. 
C 210/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities Graph InternationalfisheriesagreementsŃCommitmentsandpayments(implementation),valueofcatches 27.7.2001 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 Commitments Payments Value of catches 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year NB: Figures for catches not available at the Commission for 1998 and 1999. 12.
I Rdets (fiskeri) konklusioner af 30. oktober 1997 opfordredes Kommissionen til at gennemfżre en costbenefitanalyse ved forhandlingen (eller genforhandlingen) af hver enkelt aftale i god tid inden undertegnelsen. 
These analy-sesrequirethedefinitionofcriteriaandindicatorsmakingitpos- sible to evaluate the extent to which the agreementsŐ objectives havebeenachieved.IntheFisheriesCouncilŐsconclusionsof 30 October 1997, the Commission was requested to draw up cost-benefit analyses for each agreement (or renegotiation of an agreement) well before they were signed.
Kommissionen ansatte en ekstern konsulent til at evaluere (4) de internationale fiskeriaftaler i perioden 1993-1997. Evaluerin-generenundersżgelseafforskelligeaspektervedaftalerne,men der er ikke tale om en fuldstžndig costbenefitanalyse. 
Theevaluationoftheinternationalfisheriesagreementsfor the period 1993 to 1997, for which the Commission used the services of an external consultant (4), consists of an examination of variousaspectsoftheagreements,butdoesnotconstituteafull cost-benefit analysis.
I denne evaluering tages der forbehold for kvaliteten af de disponible oplysninger, og der udtrykkes tvivl om, hvorvidt de er fuldstžndige, relevante og plidelige. 
This evaluation contains reservations concerning the quality, completeness, relevance and reliability of the information available.
Disse forbehold svžkker konklusionerne og viser, at Kommissionen bżr forbedre indsamlingen af data i medlemsstaterne. 
These reservations undermine the conclusions of the evaluation and indicate that the Commission needs to improve its collection of data from the Member States.
4 ( ) Ifremer/Cep. 
4 ( ) Ifremer/CEP.
27.7.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 210/7 15. 
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 210/7 15.
I evalueringen blev der pvist svagheder og anfżrt relevante konklusioner og anbefalinger vedrżrende forvaltningen og overvgningen af aftalerne, men Kommissionen er ikke kommet lžngere end til at undersżge, hvordan den i givet fald kan omsžtte disse til praksis. 
Although this evaluation pinpointed weaknesses and set out useful conclusions and recommendations on the management and monitoring of the agreements, the Commission is still studying whether and how to implement these findings.
Evalueringen og anbefalingerne i den bżr imidlertid danne grundlag for udvikling af et lżbende overvgningssystem, der ogs omfatter en costbenefitanalyse. 
However, this evaluation, together with its recommendations, ought to be used as a basis for developing an ongoing monitoring system which also incorporates a cost-benefit analysis.
Nogle af aftalerne tilfżrer Fžllesskabet en stżrre vžrditilvžkst end andre, og for nogle af aftalernes vedkommende er vžrditilvžksten endda negativ. 
For the Community, the added value of some agreements is higher than others and, in some cases, it is even negative.
Fra 1993 til 1999 steg bevillingerne til betalinger i forbindelse med disse aftaler med 42 %. 
Between 1993 and 1999 there was a 42 % increase in the appropriations for payments under these agreements.
I samme periode er de fiskerimuligheder, aftalerne giver, blevet lidt fžrre. 
The same period saw a slight decline in the fishing opportunities offered by the agreements.
Som anfżrt ovenfor skyldes en del af den żgede budgetbelastning forskellige faktorer (f.eks. en hżjere sats for finansiel godtgżrelse i forbindelse med visse aftaler, og at fiskeressourcerne er blevet mindre). 
As pointed out above, the increase in the cost to the budget can in part be attributed to various factors (such as the increase in the rates of financial compensation under some agreements, or the depletion of fish stocks).
Kommissionen udfžrdiger datablade med tekniske specifikationer for hver enkelt aftale, men fire af de otte datablade, Retten undersżgte, indeholdt ingen oplysninger om fangstmžngderne, og ingen af databladene angav fangsternes vžrdi. 
As regards the technical data sheets drawn up by the Commission for each individual agreement, four of the eight sheets examined by the Court did not contain data on catch quantities and none of them contained information on the value of these catches.
Selv om databladene omfatter nogle af de elementer, der indgr i en costbenefitanalyse, og de efterhnden er blevet bedre, er nogle af nżgletal-lene stadig for upržcise til, at de kan anvendes som grundlag for en grundig analyse. 
Although these data sheets contain certain aspects of a cost-benefit analysis and have improved since they were first introduced, some of the key data are still too vague to allow a meaningful analysis.
Databladene er heller ikke en tilfredsstillende reaktion p den opfordring fra Rdet, som omtales i punkt 13. 
They also fail to satisfy the requests made by the Council, referred to in paragraph 13.
Aftalerne udnyttes ikke fuldt ud 19. 
Underutilisation of the agreements 19.
Disse overslag vil kunne f indflydelse p de omkostninger, der skal forhandles om, p balancen i fiskeressourcerne og p udnyttelsen af fiskemulighederne, og Kommissionen bżr derfor vurdere dem og anvende sin vurdering som grundlag for de aftaler, der skal forhandles. 
The CommissionŐs evaluation of these estimates ought to bethebasisfortheagreementstobenegotiated,giventheimpact they may have on the cost to be negotiated, on the balance of fish stocks and on the level of take-up of fishing opportunities.
I praksis har medlemsstaternes fiskerflder tendens til at ansžtte deres behov for hżjt, hvilket kan gżre aftalen dyrere, og det kan ogs medfżre, at de fangstmuligheder, der er fastsat i aftalen, ikke udnyttes fuldt ud. 
In practice, the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets tend to overestimate their needs, which may lead to extra cost for the agreement, but also to underutilisation of the catch opportunities provided for by the agreement.
Denne praksis kan til dels forklares med, at rederne żnsker at bevare muligheden for at fiske i det pgžldende farvand, selv om det ikke er żkonomisk rentabelt. Deres interesse er baseret p spekulation, fordi Fžllesskabet betaler en finansiel godtgżrelse for hele den oprindeligt fastsatte fangstmžngde, ogs nr EU-fiskernes fangstmuligheder ikke udnyttes fuldt ud. 
This underutilisation may to some extent be explained by the shipownersŐ wish to safeguard for themselves the possibility of fishing in these waters, even if the latterarenoteconomicallyviable.Theirinterestisspeculativein so far as, even where the fishing opportunities available to Community fishermen are not fully used, the Community pays financial compensation for the total catches initially provided for.
To af aftalerne (Senegal og Grżnland) er f.eks. ikke blevet udnyttet fuldt ud, selv om prisen blev forhżjet, da aftalerne blev forlžnget for kort tid siden. 
By way of example, two of the agreements (Senegal, Greenland) were underused, despite price increases at recent renewals.
Aftalen lżber over en lžngere periode (1997-2001), og derudover kan der konstateres en stigning i de samlede fžllesskabsbidrag p 33 % om ret. 
The Senegal Agreement continues to be underused: in addition to the longer period of the new Agreement (1997 to 2001), the total Community contribution has increased by 33 % per year.
Kommissionens finansinspektżr har kritiseret dette (1). 
This has been criticised by the CommissionŐs own Financial Controller (1).
Aftalen (2) omfatter endvidere den nye fiskerikategori Čfrysetrawlere til pelagisk fiskeriÇ, der slet ikke er udnyttet, men som Kommissionen alligevel betaler for. 
Furthermore,thisAgreement(2)coversthenewcategoryoffish-ing, Ôpelagic freezer trawlersŐ, which has not been used at all, but the cost of which has been borne by the Commission.
Kommissionen betaler nemlig et samlet belżb for hver aftale, uden at udgifterne fordeles p de forskellige fiskerikategorier. 
The problem is that the Commission pays an overall amount for each agreement, without the costs being divided up between the various fishing categories.
Det fremgr af Kommissionens datablade (3), at de afholdte udgifter for de fleste af de fangstrettigheders vedkommende, som var omfattet af aftalen for 1995-2000, ikke havde fżrt til nogen gevinst i form af fangst p grund af den lave udnyttelsesgrad. 
The CommissionŐs technical data sheets (3) pointed out that, owing to the low utilisation rate, the costs involved had not brought any benefit in terms of catches for most of the fishing possibilities provided for by the 1995 to 2000 Agreement.
Det fremgr af de disponible videnskabelige oplysninger, at den manglende udnyttelse af denne aftale navnlig skyldes en meget alvorlig nedgang i fiskebestandene. 
The scientific data available show that the underuse of this Agreement is largely due to a severe depletion of fish stocks.
EU har sledes betalt for potentielt ikke-eksisterende fangst, dvs. for fisk, der kun har eksisteret p papiret (jf. tabel). 
The EU has therefore paid for catches which potentially did not exist, i.e. for ÔpaperŐ fish (see the Table).
Aftalen med Grżnland er senere blevet fornyet i 2000, uden at Kommissionen har taget tilstržkkeligt hensyn til de hżje udgifter, der er forbundet med den, og heller ikke til evalueringen fra oktober 1999 eller til sine egne datablade. 
In the meantime, the agreement with Greenland was renewed in 2000, without the Commission taking sufficient accountofitshighcost,theOctober1999evaluationorevenits technical data sheets.
Kommissionen bżr sikre sig, at medlemsstaternes fiskerflder forpligter sig til at udnytte fangstmulighederne, sledes at man undgr unżdige udgifter. 
The Commission should ensure that the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets undertake actually to make use of the catch opportunities, so as to avoid unnecessary costs.
Der er behov for et snžvert samarbejde mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne p dette punkt. 
There needs to be close cooperation between the Commission and the Member Statesinthisrespect.
(1) Brev fra GD for Finanskontrol til GD for Fiskeri af 5. oktober 1997. 
(1) Letter from the Financial control DG sent to the Fisheries DG on 5 2 October 1997.
(2) Aftalen lżber fra 1. maj 1997 til 30. april 2001. 
(3) Agreement lasting from 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2001.
(3) Kommissionensarbejdsdokumentaf2.februar2000,s.9. 
(4) Commission working paper of 2 February 2000, p.
(4) Normalt skal den reder, der ejer tunfiskerfartżjerne, betale en afgift beregnet p grundlag af 20 euro pr. ton og en minimumsfangst-mžngde, der varierer fra aftale til aftale. 
9. () Usually, the owners of tuna fishing vessels have to pay fees calculated on the basis of 20 euro per tonne, with a minimum catch which varies from one agreement to another.
Dette belżb kaldes ČforskudÇ og skal betales, for at rederen kan opn fiskeritilladelse. 
In this context, this amount is called an ÔadvanceŐ. The shipowner has to pay it in order to obtain a fishing licence.
Ved udgangen af fiskeperioden foretages der en afregning, og hvis fangsten overstiger den aftalte mžngde, skal rederen betale differencen. Til gengžld tilbagebetales forskuddet ikke. 
At the end of the fishing period, there is a settlement procedure and, if the catch is higher than foreseen, the shipowner paysthedifference.Theadvance,bycontrast,isnotrefunded.
C 210/8 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 27.7.2001 Disponibel kvote/fangstmulighed Grżnland (t) (alle arter) Ń udnyttelse Ń i procent Finansiel modydelse (mio. EUR) 37,7 Kilde: Internt dokument fra Kommissionen af 2. februar 2000. 
C 210/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2001 Quota available/fishing opportunity Greenland (t) (all species) Ń Utilisation Ń Percentage Financial compensation (mio EUR) 37,7 Source: Internal Commission document of 2 February2000.
Fordelingen af den finansielle byrde 24. 
Sharing out the financial burden 24.