natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
07 I Den Europžiske Union er ansvarlighed sžrlig vigtig inden for banktilsyn. 
07 In the European Union, accountability is particularly important in banking supervision.
Risici, som opstr p dette omrde, kan true stabiliteten i de finansielle systemer og det indre marked. 
Risks materialising in this area can endanger the stability of financial systems and the single market.
Efter finanskrisen har lovgiver overladt banktilsynet til den fžlles tilsynsmekanisme (FTM), som er placeret inden for ECB's retlige ramme. 
Following the financial crisis, the legislator entrusted banking supervision to the SSM under the legal umbrella of the ECB.
Tilsynsbefżjelserne blev delegeret til ECB, fordi Meronidoktrinen7 begržnser de befżjelser, der kan overdrages til EU-agenturer. 
Supervisory powers were delegated to the ECB because the Meroni doctrine7 limits the powers that can be transferred to EU agencies.
ECB fastlžgger den retlige ramme og udpeger fem repržsentanter til FTM-tilsynsrdet, men de kompetente nationale myndigheder deltager ogs ved at udpege 19 repržsentanter til tilsynsrdet. 
While the ECB provides the legal framework and delegates five representatives to the SSM Supervisory Board, the competent national authorities also participate by delegating 19 of their own representatives to the board.
De bidrager desuden med personaleressourcer, spiller en vigtig rolle i forbindelse med inspektioner p stedet og fżrer direkte tilsyn med mindre banker. 
They also provide staff resources, play an important role in on-site inspections and supervise smaller banks directly.
Resultatet er et Som anerkendt af FN i resolution A/66/209. 
The result is a complex system, in which the ECB enjoys a high degree of discretion based on expert judgement in a very technical and complex area, As recognized by the United Nations in resolution A/66/209.
Som fastslet i sag 9/56 og 10/56, Meroni & Co. Industrie Metallurgiche mod Den Hżje Myndighed, Sml. 1957-1958, s. 
As established in cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133.
Manglende ansvarlighed og gennemsigtighed i et s komplekst system kunne f en stor negativ indvirkning p de offentlige finanser. 
The lack of accountability and transparency of such a complex system could have a huge negative impact on public finances.
Selv nu, hvor den fžlles afviklingsmekanisme er blevet etableret, tillader den retlige ramme under visse betingelser stadig statsstżtte eller afviklingsstżtte til banker. 
Even now that the Single Resolution Mechanism has been established, under certain conditions the legal framework still allows state aid or resolution aid for banks.
Som eksempler kan nžvnes forebyggende rekapitaliseringer, den offentlige stabiliseringsmekanisme og anvendelsen af Den Fžlles Afviklingsfond. 
Examples include precautionary recapitalisations, the government stabilisation tool and the use of the Single Resolution Fund.
08 Som beskrevet i punkt 2 og 4 har Revisionsretten siden 2015 gjort en betydelig indsats for at fremme ansvarlighed vedrżrende banktilsynet i euroomrdet med henblik p at give lovgiverne og offentligheden oplysninger om den opnede effektivitet i det nyetablerede system for EU-džkkende banktilsyn. 
08 Since 2015, as described in paragraphs 2 and 4, the ECA has made a significant effort to promote the accountability of banking supervision in the Euro area with a view to providing information to the legislators and the public about the level of efficiency achieved in the newly established system of EU-wide banking supervision.
ECB nžgtede imidlertid at fremlžgge vigtige oplysninger. 
However, the ECB refused to provide important information.
09 I juni 2015 advarede Kontaktkomiten af Overordnede Revisionsorganer i Den Europžiske Union om, at der var opstet en revisionsmangel vedrżrende banktilsyn, efter at mange tilsynsopgaver var blevet overfżrt til ECB8. I december 2015 svarede Eurogruppens formand i et brev til Kontaktkomiten, at der ikke var opstet nogen revisionsmangel, eftersom Revisionsretten havde tilstržkkelige revisionsrettigheder. 
09 In June 2015, the Contact Committee (CC) of Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union warned that an audit gap regarding banking supervision had emerged after many supervisory tasks were transferred to the ECB.8 In response, in December 2015, the president of the Euro group stated in a letter to the CC that no audit gap had emerged, as the ECA had sufficient audit rights.
Han opfordrede ikke desto mindre Europa-Kommissionen til at undersżge de juridiske muligheder for en eventuel rammeaftale mellem Revisionsretten og ECB. 
Nevertheless, he invited the European Commission to explore the legal feasibility of a possible framework agreement between the ECA and the ECB.
Denne opfordring blev i juli 2016 fulgt op i et fžlles brev til Europa-Kommissionen fra formžndene for de overordnede revisionsorganer i Tyskland og Nederlandene i deres egenskab af ledere af Kontaktkomitens taskforce vedrżrende bankunion. 
This call for action was followed up in July 2016 in a joint letter to the European Commission from the presidents of the Supreme Audit Institutions of Germany and the Netherlands in their capacity as chairs of the CC Task Force on Banking Union.
I december 2017 offentliggjorde Kontaktkomitens taskforce vedrżrende europžisk bankunion en rapport9, hvori det konkluderes, at der som fżlge af ECB's adfžrd stadig var en reel revisionsmangel. 
In December 2017, the Contact CommitteeŐs Task Force on European Banking Union published a report9 concluding that an effective audit gap resulting from the ECBŐs behaviour still existed.
"Report of the Task Force on European Banking Union to the Contact Committee of Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union and the European Court of Auditors" (14/12/2017). 
Report of the Task Force on European Banking Union to the Contact Committee of Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union and the European Court of Auditors (14/12/2017).
10 Kontaktkomitens erklžring (CC 1/2018) af 13. november 2018: https://www.eca.europa.eu/sites/cc/Lists/CCDocuments/CC_STATEMENT_2018/CC-STATEMENT-SSM-DEFICIENCIES-DA.pdf 4 8 9 
10 CC statement (CC 1/2018) from 13 November 2018: https://www.eca.europa.eu/sites/cc/Lists/CCDocuments/CC_STATEMENT_2018/CC-STATEMENT-SSM-DEFICIENCIES-EN.pdf 11 Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 4 8 9
Kommissionens opfordrede ogs ECB og Revisionsretten til at indg en interinstitutionel aftale om, hvordan informationsudvekslingen mere pržcist skal foreg, s Revisionsretten kan f adgang til alle de oplysninger, der er nżdvendige for, at den kan varetage sit revisionsmandat. 
document or information necessary for the ECA to carry out the tasks corresponding to its legal mandate. The Commission review also called on the ECB and the ECA to conclude an inter-institutional agreement to specify the procedures for information exchange to allow the ECA access to any information needed for performing its audit mandate.
11 P baggrund af Kommissionens forslag sendte Revisionsretten i februar 2018 ECB et udkast til et aftalememorandum, som kunne lette Revisionsrettens adgang til alle de oplysninger, der er nżdvendige for, at den kan udfżre sine opgaver, og give ECB sikkerhed med hensyn til behandlingen af fortrolige oplysninger. 
11 Following the CommissionŐs proposal, in February 2018 the ECA provided the ECB with a draft version of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that would facilitate the ECAŐs access to any information required for its tasks and provide assurance to the ECB regarding the processing of confidential information.
12I november 2018 havde ECB hverken givet svar eller kommenteret p Revisionsrettens foreslede aftalememorandum. 
12 As at November 2018, the ECB has not provided answers or comments on the MoU proposed by the ECA.
Som reaktion p en forespżrgsel fra Revisionsretten meddelte ECB i april 2018, at den var ved at hżre de relevante interessenter. 
Following an inquiry by the ECA, the ECB informed the ECA in April 2018 that it was consulting the relevant stakeholders.
Som reaktion p endnu en forespżrgsel i juni 2018 meddelte ECB Revisionsretten, at den afventede et svar fra Kommissionen om dette spżrgsml (jf. bilag I). 
Following another inquiry in June 2018, the ECB informed the ECA that it was awaiting a reply from the Commission on the issue (see Annex I).
Det pržciseres som fżlger i artikel 27, stk. 2, i protokol nr. 4: "Artikel 287 i traktaten om Den Europžiske Unions funktionsmde gžlder kun for efterprżvning af, hvor effektiv ECB's forvaltning er i operationel henseende." 
The ECAŐs position 13 The ECAŐs mandate to conduct independent external audits of the ECB is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.12 It is specified in Art. 27(2) of Protocol No 4, which states: "The provisions of Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall only apply to an examination of the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB".
Endvidere fastsžtter forordningen om etablering af FTM specifikt, at Revisionsretten skal "[tage] hensyn til de tilsynsopgaver, som overdrages til ECB i denne forordning"13. Ordene "i operationel henseende" findes ikke i den franske og den tyske udgave af traktaten, og begrebet "operationel" er ikke defineret i internationale revisionsstandarder, men begrebet "produktiv" - som gengiver traktatens betydning p dette sted mere pržcist end "effektiv" - har derimod lžnge vžret klart defineret i internationale revisionsstandarder samt i finansforordningen for Unionens 11 Forordning (EU) nr. 
Furthermore, the Regulation establishing the SSM specifically asks the ECA to "[...] take into account the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation".13 While the word "operational" does not exist in the French and German versions of the Treaty and is not defined in international audit standards, the concept of efficiency has long been clearly defined in international audit standards as well as in the financial regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union and in the ECAŐs publicly available Performance Audit Manual.14 12 Articles 285 and 287(2) TFEU.
13 Artikel 20, stk. 
13 Article 20(7) Regulation (EU) 1024/2013.
5 6 almindelige budget og i Revisionsrettens offentligt tilgžngelige hndbog i forvaltningsrevision14. 
5
Tilsvarende vil finansielle revisioner fortsat blive udfżrt af uafhžngige private revisorer som fastsat i lovgivningen. 
Similarly, financial audits will continue to be conducted by independent private auditors, as envisaged in the legislation.
Dette gžlder ogs Den Europžiske Revisionsret, der som fastsat i traktaten har ret til at anmode ECB om "alle dokumenter eller oplysninger, der er nżdvendige til gennemfżrelsen af [dens] opgaver"18. Det ville derfor vžre uacceptabelt, hvis en revideret enhed fastlagde adgangen til dokumenter eller begržnsede adgangen til dokumenter p nogen mde. Siden 2015 har ECB imidlertid som revideret enhed egenrdigt besluttet, hvilke oplysninger den finder nżdvendige for, at Revisionsretten kan udfżre sine opgaver. 
15 Based on all applicable international standards, it is the responsibility of the auditor to establish the information it needs to perform their tasks and draw conclusions.16 Furthermore, there is international recognition of the importance for Supreme Audit Institutions to have unrestricted access to information.17 This also applies to the ECA, which has the right to request from the ECB "any document or information necessary to carry out its task"18, as enshrined in the Treaty It would therefore be unacceptable if any auditee were to determine the extent of access to documents or restrict access to documents in any way. However, since 2015 the ECB, as auditee, has single-handedly decided which information it deems necessary for the ECA to perform its tasks.
16 ECB har tidligere anfżrt, at det ikke ville vžre foreneligt med dens uafhžngighed som centralbank at vžre underlagt ekstern forvaltningsrevision. 
16 In the past, the ECB has argued that being subject to external performance audit would not be compatible with its independence as central bank.
Det er imidlertid almindelig praksis i mange hżjtudviklede żkonomier og i EU's medlemsstater, at banktilsynet er underlagt ekstern offentlig revision, selv om det varetages af en 14 Artikel 33 i EU's finansforordning (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 siger om princippet om produktivitet, at det "vedrżrer det optimale forhold mellem de anvendte ressourcer, de gennemfżrte aktiviteter og de ml, der ns". 
However, it is common practice in many advanced economies and in EU Member States for banking supervision to be subject to external public audit, even if the banking supervision is performed by a central bank.19 This proves not only that public external audit is compatible with the independence of central banks and the Basel principles for bank supervisors, but also that it is a fundamental principle of good public administration.
15 Revisionsretten mener ikke, at produktivitet nżdvendigvis betyder det samme i forbindelse med banktilsyn som i forbindelse med pengepolitik. 
In line with these facts, 15 The ECA considers that the interpretation of efficiency in banking supervision is not necessarily the same as in monetary policy.
16 F.eks. 
16 E.g.
ISA 200, ISSAI 1 og ISSAI 10. 
ISA 200, ISSAI 1 and 10.
17 ISSAI 1, sektion 10, og ISSAI 10, princip 4, som anerkendt af FN i resolution A/66/209. 
17 ISSAI 1, Section 10; and ISSAI 10, Principle 4 as recognized by the United Nations in resolution A/66/209.
18 Artikel 287, stk. 
18 Article 287(3) TFEU, which fully applies to the ECAŐs mandate regarding the ECB.
P linje hermed har et medlem af ECB's Styrelsesrd anerkendt behovet for passende ansvarlighedskrav, herunder med hensyn til ekstern offentlig revision (jf. tekstboks 1)20. 7 Tekstboks 1 Uddrag af Yves Mersch's hovedtale om centralbankers uafhžngighed Det fremgr klart af traktatens artikel 130 og EU-Domstolens retspraksis, at ECB's uafhžngighed kun gžlder udfżrelsen af de opgaver, der er plagt Eurosystemet [...]. 
6 7 a Member of the Governing Council of the ECB has also acknowledged the need for adequate accountability requirements, including external public audit (see Box 1).20 Box 1 Extracts from Yves MerschŐs keynote address on ŇCentral bank independence revisitedÓ "Article 130 of the Treaty and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union make it clear that the independence the ECB enjoys is limited to the performance of the tasks conferred on the Eurosystem [...].
Det blev af Domstolen navnlig ppeget, at ECB er omfattet af "Domstolens og Revisionsrettens kontrol"21. 
In particular, the Court of Justice stated that the ECB is subject to "review by the Court of Justice and control by the ECA"21.
Det er ogs blevet fremhžvet, at disse opgaver ganske vist kan overlappe hinanden, men at de er helt forskellige: "[Domstolen skal] i almindelighed orientere sig mod sagens genstand. 
It also stated that while these tasks may overlap, they are completely different: "[...] the Court of Justice does base its decision in general on the subject-matter of the proceedings.
Revisionsretten kan derimod [...] gribe ind p eget initiativ og derved selv fastlžgge genstanden for sin revision under iagttagelse af sine kompetencer"22. 19 F.eks. i USA og Canada (jf. Revisionsrettens sžrberetning nr. 
The Court of Auditors, on the other hand, may also act on its initiative [...] and, in doing so, determine the object of the audit itself, having regard to its powers."22 18 In a statement to a Member of the European Parliament23, the ECB argued that it was not in a position to provide certain information to the ECA due to its confidentiality requirements.
20 Hovedtale holdt af Yves Mersch den 30. marts 2017: "Central bank independence revisited". 
However, the primary law requires any EU institution to "forward to the 20 Keynote address by Yves Mersch on "Central bank independence revisited" on 30 March 2017.
21 Dom af 10. juli 2003, sag C-11/00, Kommissionen mod ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, pržmis 135. 
21 Judgment of 10 July 2003, Commission/ECB, C-11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, paragraph 135.
22 Forslag til afgżrelse fra generaladvokat Trstenjak fremsat den 25. maj 2011, Europa-Kommissionen mod Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland, pržmis 71. 
22 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 25 May 2011, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, paragraph 71.
Revisionsretten har sledes en omfattende ret til at f direkte adgang til alle oplysninger, som den finder nżdvendige for, at den kan udfżre sine revisionsopgaver, herunder om fornżdent fortrolige dokumenter og bankspecifikke oplysninger. 
Court of Auditors, at its request, any document or information necessary to carry out its task."24 Accordingly, the ECA has a broad right to have direct access to all the information it considers necessary in order to perform its audit tasks, including, where necessary, confidential documents and bank-specific information.
Hvis ECB i forbindelse med en fremtidig revision nžgter at fremlžgge revisionsoplysninger for Revisionsretten eller ikke fżlger op p en anmodning fra Revisionsretten om revisionsoplysninger, har Revisionsretten mulighed for at indbringe spżrgsmlet for Den Europžiske Unions Domstol. 
If in the course of a future audit the ECB refuses to provide audit information to the ECA or takes no action with respect to a request by the ECA to provide it with audit information, the ECA has the option to bring the issue before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
19 Det er derfor almindelig praksis for Revisionsretten at vurdere og beskytte fortrolige oplysninger. 
19 It is therefore standard practice for the ECA to assess and safeguard confidential information.
Dette er sket i forbindelse med mange revisioner, herunder revisioner af Den Europžiske Vžrdipapir-og Markedstilsynsmyndighed og Den Fžlles Afviklingsinstans. 
This has been the case in many audits, including audits of the European Securities and Markets Authority or the Single Resolution Board.
Det skal ogs fremhžves, at Revisionsretten og dens personale er underlagt klare forpligtelser vedrżrende tavshedspligt, som er fastlagt direkte i traktaten, i vedtžgten for tjenestemžnd i Den Europžiske Union og i Revisionsrettens etiske rammer25. Disse bestemmelser giver tilstržkkelige garantier til at sikre, at fortrolige dokumenter, som Revisionsretten modtager fra reviderede enheder, ikke deles med uvedkommende26. 20 ECB har tidligere anfżrt, at andre ansvarlighedsordninger, f.eks. dens egne rsrapporter og Kommissionens kontroller, kompenserer for manglen p tilstržkkelig offentlig revision. 
It should also be highlighted that the ECA and its staff are bound by clear professional secrecy obligations arising directly from the Treaty, the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the ECAŐs ethical framework.25 These provisions provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that confidential documents received by the ECA from its auditees are not shared with any unauthorised parties.26 20 In the past, the ECB has stated that other accountability requirements, such as its annual reports or reviews of the Commission, compensate for the absence of adequate public audit.
Det skal imidlertid bemžrkes, at rsrapporter, kontroller foretaget af lovgiverne og svar p lovgivernes forespżrgsler ikke er enestende for EU, da disse elementer ogs er almindelige i de lande, hvor det er muligt at foretage fuld forvaltningsrevision af banktilsynsmyndigheder. 
It should be noted that annual reports, reviews by legislators and replies to their inquiries are not unique to the EU, as they are common in countries that fully allow performance audits of banking supervisors. More importantly, accountability arrangements that depend on the willingness of the institution to disclose information can hardly be effective.
3, i TEUF. 25 Artikel 339 i TEUF, artikel 17 i vedtžgten for tjenestemžnd i Den Europžiske Union og punkt 4 i de etiske retningslinjer for Den Europžiske Revisionsret (afgżrelse nr. 
25 Article 339 TFEU and Article 17 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Section 4 of the Ethical Guidelines for the European Court of Auditors (Decision No 66-2011).
26 Desuden har nogle af Revisionsrettens ansatte sikkerhedsgodkendelse (fra medlemsstaterne), der giver dem adgang til EU's klassificerede informationer op til CONFIDENTIAL eller SECRET. 
26 In addition, some ECA staff have security clearance (obtained by the Member States) that permits them to access EU classified information up to Confidential or SECRET level.
Revisionsretten har ogs en solid fysisk, logisk og organisatoriske informationssikkerhedspolitik. 8 
The ECA also has a robust physical, logical and organisational information security policy in place. 8
Andre ansvarlighedsordninger kan ikke erstatte borgernes og parlamenternes ret til passende offentlig revision, navnlig p et omrde, der omhandler borgernes finansielle interesser svel som det passende tilsyn med banker. 
that concerns the financial interests of citizens as much as the adequate supervision of banks.
Offentlig revision giver sikkerhed med hensyn til og oplysninger om anvendelsen af de offentlige midler og de risici, som skatteyderne er eksponeret for. 
Public audits provide assurance and information on the use of public funds and the risks to which taxpayers are exposed.
Resum og opfordring 22 Revisionsretten har gjort en omfattende indsats for at udfylde sin rolle og fremme ansvarlighed og gennemsigtighed inden for banktilsyn og -afvikling. 
Summary and call for action 22 The ECA has made extensive efforts to fulfil its role and promote accountability and transparency in the area of banking supervision and resolution.
ECB's nuvžrende indstilling til at give Revisionsretten adgang til dokumenter og oplysninger forhindrer imidlertid Revisionsretten i at varetage sit lovbestemte ansvar korrekt. 
However, the ECBŐs current position regarding the ECAŐs access to audit documents and information prevents the ECA from properly carrying out its statutory responsibilities.
Det betyder, at det p banktilsynsomrdet - som er forbundet med betydelige risici for de offentlige budgetter - stadig ikke er muligt at foretage passende offentlig revision, og at ansvarligheden stadig er utilstržkkelig. 
Therefore, in the area of banking supervision, which entails significant risks to the public purse, adequate public audit is still unfeasible and accountability is still insufficient.
23 Revisionsretten gżr derfor navnlig Europa-Parlamentet, Rdet og Kommissionen opmžrksom p de manglende fremskridt i drżftelserne med ECB og anmoder om: o at de udtrykker fuld stżtte til Revisionsrettens opgaver og adgangsrettigheder til dokumenter vedrżrende ECB og navnlig vedrżrende banktilsyn o at de žndrer forordning (EU) nr. 1024/2013 om etablering af FTM med henblik p at pržcisere, at Revisionsretten har befżjelser til at foretage forvaltningsrevisioner vedrżrende ECB's tilsynsfunktioner, og at den i overensstemmelse med traktaten har fuld adgang til alle dokumenter, som den finder nżdvendige til dette forml. 
23 Therefore, especially the ECA calls the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to the lack of progress in discussions with the ECB and asks for: Ľ full support for the ECAŐs tasks and rights to access documents with regard to the ECB and banking supervision in particular Ľ amend Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, establishing the SSM, with a view to clearly stipulating that the ECA is empowered to perform performance audits of the ECBŐs supervisory functions and that, in line with the Treaty, the ECA enjoys full rights to access any document it considers necessary for this purpose.
Bilag I - Tidslinje for Revisionsrettens indsats 10 Dato Offentliggżrelse Beskrivelse Oktober 2011 Kontaktkomiten offentliggjorde en beslutning om iderne til en dybere ŻMU Kontaktkomiten anerkendte de planlagte žndringer i EU's finansielle og żkonomiske styring. 
Annex I - Timeline of the ECAŐs efforts 10 Date Publication Description October 2011 CC published resolution following ideas for a deeper EMU The CC recognised envisaged changes in the EUŐs financial and economic governance.