natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Glossar og forkortelser Resum Indledning Revisionens omfang og revisionsmetoden Bemžrkninger Punkt I-IX 1-16 17-21 22-62 22-35 23-24 25-27 28-29 30 31-33 34-35 36-62 37-48 49-54 55-56 57-60 INDHOLD EU's reaktion p sikkerhedsstyrkernes kapacitetsopbygningsbehov led under operationel ineffektivitet EU-Udenrigstjenesten gjorde brug af erfaringerne fra EUCAP Sahel Niger ved oprettelsen af EUCAP Sahel Mali Utilstržkkelig uddannelse forud for udsendelsen og utilstržkkelig stżtte fra EU-Udenrigstjenestens hovedkvarter fżrte til forsinkelser Kommissionens regler og procedurer er ikke tilpasset forholdene i Niger og Mali Manglende vejledning fra EU-Udenrigstjenestens hovedkvarter resulterede i svage procedurer EU-medlemsstaterne leverede ikke tilstržkkeligt personale til at besžtte de ledige stillinger Usikkerhed vedrżrende missionernes levetid gjorde det vanskeligt at planlžgge en exitstrategi EUCAP Sahel-missionerne styrkede sikkerhedsstyrkernes kapacitet, men resultaterne var ikke bžredygtige Missionerne arbejdede under vanskelige forhold og styrkede sikkerhedsstyrkernes kapacitet, om end langsomt Begge missioner adresserede bžredygtighed, men med begržnset succes EU-Udenrigstjenesten fastsatte ikke passende indikatorer for overvgning af missionernes resultater Overvgningen og evalueringen af missionernes aktiviteter var utilstržkkelig og ikke fokuseret p effekt 2 
Glossary and abbreviations Executive summary Introduction Audit scope and approach Observations Paragraph I - IX 1 - 16 17-21 22 - 62 22 - 35 23 - 24 25 - 27 28 - 29 30 31 - 33 34 - 35 36 - 62 37 - 48 49 - 54 55 - 56 57 - 60 CONTENTS The EUŐs response to the security forcesŐ capacity-building needs suffered from operational inefficiencies The EEAS made use of the lessons learnt from EUCAP Sahel Niger when setting up EUCAP Sahel Mali Insufficient pre-deployment training and support from EEAS headquarters led to delays Commission rules and procedures not adapted to conditions in Niger and Mali Lack of guidance from EEAS headquarters resulted in weak procedures The EU member states did not provide enough staff to fill the posts available Uncertain lifetime for the Missions made it difficult to plan an exit strategy The EUCAP Sahel Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, but results were not sustainable Working in a challenging context, the Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, albeit slowly Both Missions addressed sustainability, but with little success The EEAS did not set appropriate indicators for monitoring the MissionsŐ results The monitoring and evaluation of the MissionsŐ activities were inadequate and not focused on impact 2
Interessenter og modtagere havde et positivt syn p missionernes aktiviteter og p deres koordineringsrolle Konklusioner og anbefalinger Bilag I - Igangvžrende FSFP-missioner og -operationer Bilag II-Uddrag af Rdets afgżrelser (FUSP) 2016/1172 (Niger) og 2017/50 (Mali) 61-62 63-69 Bilag III - Revisionsrettens overblik over, hvor langt EUCAP Sahel Niger er net med sine opgaver Bilag IV - Revisionsrettens overblik over, hvor langt EUCAP Sahel Mali er net med sine opgaver Tjenesten for EU's Optržden Udadtils og Kommissionens svar 3 
Stakeholders and beneficiaries had a positive view of the MissionsŐ activities and of their coordination role 61 - 62 Conclusions and recommendations 63 - 69 Annex I Đ Ongoing CSDP Missions and Operations Annex II Đ Extracts from Council Decisions (CFSP) 2016/1172 (Niger) and 2017/50 (Mali) Annex III Đ ECA overview of progress made by EUCAP Sahel Niger towards achieving tasks Annex IV Đ ECA overview of progress made by EUCAP Sahel Mali towards achieving tasks Replies of the European External Action Service and the Commission 3
GLOSSAR OG FORKORTELSER Civcom Udvalget for de Civile Aspekter af Krisestyring: Et rdgivende organ oprettet af Rdet, der leverer oplysninger, udarbejder henstillinger og rdgiver om civile aspekter af krisestyring. 
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management: an advisory body established by the Council which provides information, formulates recommendations and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis management.
CMC Krisestyringskoncept: Formlet med CMC er at analysere og foresl FSFP-muligheder, beskrive deres mlsžtninger og ml og skabe rammen for en EU-FSFP-missions mulige ml og omfang. 
CMC Crisis Management Concept: the purpose of the CMC is to analyse and propose CSDP options, describe their aims and objectives, and frame the possible goals and scope of an EU CSDP Mission.
CMPD Direktoratet for Krisestyring og Planlžgning: Den afdeling i EU-Udenrigstjenesten, der har ansvaret for den politisk-strategiske planlžgning af civile FSFP-missioner. 
CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate: the department within EEAS responsible for the politico-strategic planning of civilian CSDP Missions.
CMPD's rolle er at sikre sammenhžngen i og effektiviteten af missionerne og udvikle FSFP-partnerskaber, -politikker, - koncepter og -kapaciteter. 
The CMPDŐs role is to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the Missions and develop CSDP partnerships, policies, concepts and capabilities.
Direktoratet er ansvarligt for den strategiske planlžgning af nye FSFP-missioner og for at gennemfżre strategiske gennemgange af eksisterende FSFP-missioner. 
It is in charge of the strategic planning of new CSDP Missions and carrying out strategic reviews of existing CSDP Missions.
COG'er Centres Oprationnels de Gendarmerie (i Niger): Permanente organer, der er etableret for at overvge, hvad der sker i regionen, levere ressourcer til patruljer, indsamle oplysninger, indberette dem til de relevante myndigheder og reagere p krisesituationer. 
COG Centres Oprationnels de Gendarmerie (in Niger):permanent bodies set up to monitor what is happening in the region, provide resources to patrols, collect information, notify it to the relevant authorities and to respond to crisis situations.
COR'er Centres Oprationnels Rgionaux (i Niger): Midlertidige organer, som har til forml at samle medlemmer af governoraterne og repržsentanter for de nigerske forsvars-og sikkerhedsstyrker samt organer med ansvar for civilbeskyttelse, brandslukning, miljżbeskyttelse og told med henblik p at hndtere kriser, der opstr som fżlge af terrorangreb, organiseret kriminalitet og naturkatastrofer. 
COR Centres Oprationnels Rgionaux (in Niger); temporary bodies intended to bring together members of the Governorates and the Nigerien Defence and Security Forces, and bodies responsible for civil protection, firefighting, environmental protection and customs in order to deal with crises arising from terrorist attacks, organised crime and natural disasters.
CPCC Den Civile Planlžgnings-og Gennemfżrelseskapacitet: Den afdeling i EU-Udenrigstjenesten, som planlžgger, leder, koordinerer, rdgiver, stżtter, overvger og gennemgr civile FSFP-missioner. 
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability: the department within EEAS which plans, directs, coordinates, advises, supports, supervises and reviews civilian CSDP Missions.
CPCC udarbejder udkastet til de centrale udformnings-og planlžgningsdokumenter for missionerne, som f.eks. CONOPS og OPLAN. 
The CPCC drafts the key design and planning documents for the Missions: i.e. CONOPS and OPLAN.
Tjenesten for EU's Optržden Udadtil, som er Den Europžiske Unions diplomatiske tjeneste. 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy ECA European Court of Auditors EEAS European External Action Service, which is the European Union's diplomatic service.
Den hjžlper EU's udenrigschef - den hżjtstende repržsentant for udenrigsanliggender og sikkerhedspolitik - med at implementere Unionens fžlles udenrigs-og sikkerhedspolitik. 
It helps the EU's foreign affairs chief Đ the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Đ implement the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Tjenesten for Udenrigspolitiske Instrumenter FPI's centrale opgave er at gennemfżre en ržkke af EU's udenrigspolitiske foranstaltninger. 
The core task of the FPI is to run a number of EU foreign policy actions.
FPI forvalter operationer og deres finansiering. 
The FPI manages operations and their financing.
FPI er en tjenestegren i Europa-Kommissionen, som arbejder sammen med EU-Udenrigstjenesten. 
The FPI is a European Commission department that works alongside the EEAS.
966/2012 om de finansielle regler vedrżrende Unionens almindelige budget ("gennemfżrelsesbestemmelserne til finansforordningen"), som žndret. Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (det tyske agentur for internationalt samarbejde). 
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German Corporation for International Cooperation) HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission ISFs Internal Security Forces: police, gendarmerie and national guard.
De Forenede Nationers multidimensionelle integrerede stabiliseringsmission i Mali, som fokuserer p opgaver ssom at garantere sikkerhed, stabilisering og beskyttelse af civile, at stżtte den nationale politiske dialog og forsoning samt at bist med at genetablere statens myndighed og genopbygge sikkerhedssektoren og beskytte menneskerettighederne i landet. 
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, which focuses on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting in reestablishing State authority, rebuilding the security sector, and promoting and protecting human rights within the country.
MMA Mentorordning, overvgning og rdgivning. 
MMA Mentoring, monitoring and advising.
Mentorordning: Struktureret overfżrsel af viden mellem en mentor og en mentee i overensstemmelse med en plan. 
Mentoring: structured transfer of knowledge between a mentor and a mentee in accordance with a plan.
Overvgning: Observering og vurdering af og rapportering om menteens pržstation med hensyn til levering af uddannelseskurser i FSI'erne. 
Monitoring: observing, assessing and reporting on the performance of the mentee with regard to giving training courses in the ISFs.
OPLAN Operationel plan. 
OPLAN Operational Plan.
PSC Den Udenrigs-og Sikkerhedspolitiske Komit. 
PSC Political and Security Committee.
Komiten overvger den internationale situation, anbefaler Rdet strategiske tiltag og politiske valgmuligheder, opstiller retningslinjer for Civcom, sikrer politisk kontrol med og strategisk ledelse af krisestyringsoperationer. 
This Committee monitors the international situation, recommends strategic approaches and policy options to the Council, provides guidance to the CIVCOM and assures political control over and the strategic direction of crisis management operations.
PSC bestr af EU-medlemsstaternes ambassadżrer i Bruxelles og ledes af repržsentanter for EU-Udenrigstjenesten. 
The PSC is composed of EU member states' ambassadors based in Brussels and is chaired by representatives from the European External Action Service.
6 RESUM I. Usikkerhed i Sahelregionen i Vestafrika har en negativ indvirkning p bde udviklingen i de vestafrikanske lande og Den Europžiske Unions interesser. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. Insecurity in the Sahel region in West-Africa has a negative impact on both the development of its countries, and the interests of the European Union (EU).
Den fžlles sikkerheds-og forsvarspolitik (FSFP) er et EU-instrument, som har til forml at hndtere udfordringerne i forbindelse med vžbnet konflikt, politisk ustabilitet, terrorisme, organiseret kriminalitet og ulovlig migration. 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an EU instrument intended to meet challenges stemming from armed conflict, political instability, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration.
EU gennemfżrer under FSFP civile missioner i Niger og Mali, der leverer undervisning, rdgivning og udstyr med henblik p at styrke kapaciteten i de nationale styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed. 
Under the CSDP the EU runs civilian Missions in Niger and Mali that provide training, advice and equipment in order to strengthen the capacity of the national forces responsible for internal security.
Tjenesten for EU's Optržden Udadtil (EU-Udenrigstjenesten) har etableret kapacitetsopbyggende missioner (EUCAP Sahel-missioner) i Niger (2012) og Mali (2014) p vegne af EU's medlemsstater og planlžgger og styrer deres operationer, mens Kommissionen forvalter deres budgetter, som finansieres af EU (69,46 millioner euro til Niger i perioden 2012-2017 og 66,48 millioner euro til Mali i perioden 2014-2017). 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) has set up EU Capacity Building (EUCAP) Sahel Missions in Niger (2012) and Mali (2014) on behalf of the EU member states and plans and manages their operations, whereas the Commission manages their budgets, funded by the EU (Ű69.46 million for Niger for the period 2012 to 2017 and Ű66.48 million for Mali for the period 2014 to 2017).
Hver mission har sin egen missionschef, som er ansvarlig for operationer i det pgžldende land. 
Each Mission has its own Head of Mission, who is in charge of operations in the country concerned.
Over halvdelen af personalet er udstationeret til missionerne og lżnnes af EU's medlemsstater. 
Over half the staff have been seconded to the Missions and are paid by the EU member states.
Det resterende personale lżnnes over missionernes budgetter. 
The remaining staff are paid for out of the MissionsŐ budgets.
Vi undersżgte, hvordan EUCAP Sahel-missionerne blev etableret og forvaltet, hvordan de fungerede, og om de resulterede i en styrkelse af kapaciteten i de styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed i Niger og Mali. 
We examined how the EUCAP Sahel Missions were set up and managed, how they operated, and whether they succeeded in strengthening the capacity of the forces responsible for internal security in Niger and Mali.
Vi talte med EU-Udenrigstjenesten, Kommissionen, de to EUCAP Sahel-missioner, de nationale myndigheder og de indre sikkerhedsstyrker (FSI'erne) i Niger og Mali samt en bred vifte af interessenter. 
We interviewed the EEAS, the Commission, the two EUCAP Sahel Missions, the national authorities and the internal security forces (ISFs) in Niger and Mali, as well as a range of stakeholders.
Vi konkluderede, at missionerne bidrog til at styrke kapaciteten i de styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed, men at fremskridtene blev forsinket af den vanskelige kontekst, som de arbejdede under, og den operationelle ineffektivitet. 
We concluded that the Missions contributed towards strengthening the capacity of the forces responsible for internal security but that progress was slowed by the challenging context in which they worked and by operational inefficiencies.
Vi konstaterede, at missionernes personale ikke modtog tilstržkkelig praktisk vejledning og, i EUCAP Sahel Nigers tilfžlde, undervisning forud for udsendelsen. 
We found that the Mission staff did not receive adequate practical guidance and, in the case of EUCAP Sahel Niger, pre-deployment training.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen ydede ikke tilstržkkelig stżtte og anvendte i nogle tilfžlde procedurer, der var uegnede til arbejdsforholdene p stedet. 
The EEAS and the Commission did not provide enough support and in some cases applied procedures that were unsuited to the working conditions on the ground.
V. Begge missioner havde et hżjt antal ledige stillinger. 
V. Both Missions had a high number of vacancies.
I gennemsnit var kun tre fjerdedele af stillingerne besat. 
On average only three-quarters of posts were occupied.
Ansžttelsesprocedurerne var tidskržvende og ofte uden resultat. 7 
Recruitment procedures were time-consuming and often unsuccessful. 6
Udstationeringen af personale fra EU's medlemsstater var generelt af en varighed p op til to r. 
Secondment of staff from EU member states generally lasted up to two years.
Alt dette mindsker missionernes operationelle effektivitet, da det ikke tilskynder til mellem-og langsigtet planlžgning. 
All of this reduces the operational efficiency of the Missions because it does not encourage medium or long-term planning.
Det er ikke hensigten, at missionerne skal blive permanente organer i vžrtslandene, men der er p nuvžrende tidspunkt ingen tydelig kurs hen imod en exitstrategi. 
At the same time, even though the Missions are not intended to become permanent bodies in the host countries, at present there is no clear path towards an exit strategy.
Vi konstaterede, at missionerne tog hensyn til bžredygtighed i deres aktiviteter, men med begržnset succes. 
We found that the Missions addressed sustainability in their activities, but with little success.
Dette skyldtes dels vžrtslandenes manglende ejerskab, dels at missionerne ikke afsatte tilstržkkelige ressourcer til at sikre bžredygtighed og opfżlgning p den praktiske gennemfżrelse og anvendelse af den givne undervisning og det leverede udstyr. 
This was partly due to lack of ownership by the host countries, and partly because the Missions did not devote adequate resources to ensuring sustainability and following up on the practical application and use of the training given and the equipment supplied.
Missionerne havde svage resultatindikatorer, og de overvgede og evaluerede ikke fuldfżrelsen af opgaverne p fyldestgżrende vis i lżbet af den reviderede periode. 
The Missions had weak performance indicators and during the period audited they did not adequately monitor and evaluate the achievement of tasks.
EU-Udenrigstjenestens konsekvensanalyser var ikke knyttet til overvgning og evaluering. 
The EEAS impact assessments were not linked to monitoring and evaluation.
Vi konstaterede, at missionerne spillede en vigtig rolle med hensyn til at styrke kapaciteten hos de styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed i Niger og Mali, og med hensyn til at stżtte andre aktiviteter gennemfżrt af EU og dets medlemsstater. 
We observed that the Missions played an important role in strengthening the capacity of the forces responsible for internal security in Niger and Mali, and also in supporting other activities of the EU and its member states.
Andre donorer, EU-medlemsstaterne, de nationale myndigheder og EUCAP-stżttemodtagerne i Niger og Mali gav en overordnet positiv vurdering af EUCAP Sahel-missionernes aktiviteter. 
Other donors, EU member states, the national authorities and the beneficiaries of EUCAP support in Niger and Mali gave an overall positive assessment of the EUCAP Sahel MissionsŐ activities.
Vi fremsžtter fżlgende anbefalinger til EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen: - at tržffe foranstaltninger til at forbedre missionernes operationelle effektivitet - at forbedre besžttelsesgraden for stillinger i missionerne - at fastsžtte mandater og budgetter, som svarer til operationerne, og fastsžtte en exitstrategi - at żge fokus p bžredygtighed - at forbedre indikatorer, overvgning og evaluering. 8 
We make the following recommendations to the EEAS and the Commission: - to take measures to improve the operational efficiency of the Missions; - to improve the occupancy rate of staff posts in the Missions; - to set mandates and budgets to match operations and provide for an exit strategy; - to increase the focus on sustainability; - to improve indicators, monitoring and evaluation.
INDLEDNING Niger og Mali i Sahelregionen 1. 
INTRODUCTION Niger and Mali in the Sahel region 1.
Niger og Mali er skrżbelige stater i Vestafrika. 
Niger and Mali are fragile states in Western Africa.
De er unge parlamentariske demokratier med svage żkonomier og offentlige forvaltninger under udvikling. 
They are young parliamentary democracies with weak economies and developing public administrations.
De to lande er placeret som nummer 187 og 175 ud af de 188 lande, som er opfżrt i indekset for menneskelig udvikling for 2016, og er hjemsted for nogle af de fattigste mennesker i verden. 
Ranking 187th and 175th out of the 188 countries ranked in the 2016 Human Development Index, they are home to some of the poorest people in the world.
Niger og Mali er henholdsvis det sjette og det ottende stżrste land i Afrika og er beliggende i den sydlige del af Saharażrkenen. 
Niger and Mali are the sixth and eighth largest countries in Africa and are located in the southern part of the Sahara desert.
Mange migranter passerer igennem disse to lande p vej til deres endelige bestemmelsessted. 
Many migrants pass through these two countries on their way to their final destination.
Trods en fredsaftale underskrevet i juni 2015 og tilstedevžrelsen af udenlandske fredsbevarende styrker er ekstremistiske grupper stadig aktive i det nordlige Mali, og de nationale sikkerhedsstyrker str over for en ržkke udfordringer. 
Despite a peace agreement signed in June 2015 and the presence of foreign peacekeeping forces, extremist groups are still active in northern Mali, and the national security forces face a number of challenges.
Der er fortsat et hżjt antal ofre og mange terrorangreb. 
There continue to be a high number of casualties and numerous terrorist attacks.
Nigers sikkerhed trues af ustabiliteten i nabolandene Libyen, Nigeria og Mali. 
NigerŐs security is threatened by the instability in neighbouring Libya, Nigeria and Mali.
Regeringen str over for udfordringer ssom bekžmpelsen af menneskehandel og andre ulovlige aktiviteter. 
The government faces challenges such as the fight against human traffickers and other illegal activities.
I marts 2011 vedtog EU en strategi for sikkerhed og udvikling i Sahelregionen, som er baseret p den antagelse, at udvikling og sikkerhed understżtter hinanden, og at problemerne i Sahelregionen kržver et regionalt svar. 
In March 2011 the EU adopted a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel region, based on the premise that development and security are mutually supportive and the issues faced in the Sahel region require a regional answer.
I 2014 blev Niger, Mali, Mauretanien, Tchad og Burkina Faso enige om at skabe en regional organisation, "Group of Five " (G5), for at styrke samarbejdet om udvikling og sikkerhed i Sahelregionen (jf. kortet). 
In 2014 Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso agreed to create a regional organisation, the ŇGroup of FiveÓ (G5), to strengthen cooperation in development and security in the Sahel region (see Map).
EU stżtter dette initiativ p omrder af fžlles interesse som f.eks. sikkerhed, kontrol med migration, bekžmpelse af terror, den humanitžre situation og udvikling. 
The EU supports this initiative in areas of shared interest such as security, control of migration, counter-terrorism, the humanitarian situation and development. 8
Kort - G5-landene i Sahelregionen Mauretanien 10 Mali Burkina Faso Niger Tchad Kilde: Eurostat. 
Map Đ The G5 countries of the Sahel region Source: Eurostat.
Civile FSFP-missioner 4. 
Civilian CSDP Missions 4.
EU's fžlles sikkerheds-og forsvarspolitik (FSFP) fastlžgger Unionens forsvars-og kriseforvaltningsstrukturer og -kapaciteter og udgżr en vigtig del af den fžlles udenrigs-og sikkerhedspolitik (FUSP)1. 
The EUŐs Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) determines the Union's defence and crisis management structures and capabilities, and constitutes a major part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)1.
FSFP, som er omfattet af artikel 42-46 i traktaten om Den Europžiske Union, har fżrt til deployering af missioner2 i udlandet med henblik p Under den flerrige finansielle ramme for 2014-2020 er det belżb, som er afsat til FUSP, p 2 076 millioner euro. 
The CSDP, which is covered by Articles 42 to 46 of the Treaty on European Union, has resulted in the deployment of Missions2 abroad for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Under the 2014 to 2020 multiannual financing framework, the amount allocated to the CFSP is Ű2 076 million.
"Mission" er den officielle term, som EU-Udenrigstjenesten anvender til at definere ikkepermanente uafhžngige juridiske enheder, som etableres i krisesituationer. 
ŇMissionÓ is the offical term used by the EEAS to define non-permanent independent legal entities set up in crisis situations.