natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
57. For de fleste GBS-programmers vedkommende er der i sidste ende kun indgået forpligtelser for en del af de midler, der er tildelt til kapacitetsopbygningsstøtte, og dermed er dette element i GBS-programmerne blevet mindre effektivt. 
57. for most gbs programmes, funds allocated to capacity-building support have in the end been only partially committed, thus reducing the effectiveness of this component of gbs programmes. in fact, on average, only approximately 60 % of capacity-building allocations are committed before the closure of the programmes.
Det skyldes til dels, at implementeringsperioden for programmerne ofte er for kort til at udforme og fuldt ud implementere kapacitetsopbygningselementet. 
This is in part because the programme implementation period is often too short to design and fully implement their capacity-building component.
Dette problem er blevet forværret på grund af vanskeligheder med i første omgang at definere behov og derefter på grund af forsinkelser i implementeringen af kapacitetsopbygningsaktiviteterne. 
This problem has been exacerbated by difficulties in first defining needs and then delays in the implementation of the capacity-building activities.
De betingelser, der er knyttet til udbetalingen af GBS, er generelle betingelser vedrørende støtteberettigelse til budgetstøtte, der skal opfyldes, inden der udbetales en fast eller variabel tranche, og specifikke betingelser, der fortrinsvis er knyttet til den mekanisme med variabel tranche, der er forbundet med opfyldelsen af målene for resultatindikatorerne36. 
Conditions attached to the disbursement of gbs comprise general conditions relating to eligibility for budget support which have to be met before the payment of any fixed or variable tranche, and specific conditions mainly linked to the variable tranche mechanism connected to the achievement of performance indicator targets36.
Mekanismen med den variable tranche er et særligt element i Kommissionens budgetstøtteprogrammer og afspejler, at der i stigende grad lægges vægt på resultatorienteret forvaltning i udviklingssamarbejdet. Som en tilskyndelse afhænger det beløb, der udbetales over den variable tranche af, i hvilket omfang målene for udvalgte resultatindikatorer er nået. 
The variable tranche mechanism is a particular feature of the Commission’s budget support programmes and reflects the growing emphasis in development cooperation on managing for results. as an incentive, the amount disbursed from the variable tranches depend on the extent to which targets for selected performance indicators have been reached.
Retten undersøgte, om de betingelser, der var knyttet til udbetalingen af GBS, er relevante i forhold til deres mål, tilskynder landet til at nå målene og gør det muligt at foretage en objektiv vurdering af de opnåede fremskridt. 
The Court examined whether conditions attached to the disbursement of gbs programmes are relevant in relation to their objectives, provide an incentive to the government to achieve the objectives and allow the objective assessment of progress achieved.
Rettens særberetning nr. 6/2007 om effektiviteten af den tekniske bistand, der ydes til kapacitetsopbygning. 
35 see the Court’s special report no 6/2007 on the effectiveness of technical assistance in the context of capacity development.
36 Der er også undertiden en eller to yderligere betingelser knyttet til faste trancher, hvor det kræves, at landet gennemfører specifikke foranstaltninger. 32 Særberetning nr. 11/2010 – Kommissionens forvaltning af generel budgetstøtte i AVS stater og lande i Latinamerika og Asien 
36 fixed tranches sometimes also have one or two additional conditions attached to them normally requiring the government to carry out specific actions. 32 special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
33 betingelseRne eR geneRelt Relevante, men sandsynligvis vil incitamentviRkningen blive mindRe end foRventet 60. 
33 conditions are generally relevant But are unlikely to achieve their incentive eFFect 60.
De generelle betingelser, der er knyttet til betalingen af alle faste eller variable trancher, er relevante, eftersom de er tilpasset landets mål for bevarelse af en makroøkonomisk stabilitet og for fremskridt i relation til forsvarlig PFM og fattigdomsbekæmpelse. I nogle tilfælde kan identifikationen af de prioriterede PFM-foranstaltninger, der skal implemente-res, forbedres37. 
The general conditions attached to the payment of any fixed or variable tranche are relevant since they are aligned with the country’s objectives of maintaining macroeconomic stability and making progress in relation to sound pfm and poverty reduction. in some cases there is scope for improvement in the identification of priority pfm measures to be implement-ed37.
De specifikke betingelser, der er knyttet til GBS-programmernes variable trancher, er også generelt relevante, da de er tilpasset de nationale udviklingsprioriteter i partnerlandet (jf. tekstboks 4). 
The specific conditions attached to the variable tranches of gbs programmes are also generally relevant as they are aligned with the national development priorities of the partner country (see Box 4).
Kommissionen overtager i stigende grad resultatindikatorer fra landenes nationale udviklingsstrategi. I nogle programmer brugte Kommissionen indikatorer, der fokuserede på fattigere regioner i partnerlandene, eller som var opdelt efter køn, for at øge deres relevans for prioriteter til fattigdomsbekæmpelse. 
The Commission is increasingly taking over performance indicators from the country’s national development strategy. in some programmes, the Commission used indicators focused on poorer regions in the partner countries or which were broken down by gender in order to increase their relevance to poverty reduction priorities.
Retten konstaterede, at det var sandsynligt, at incitamentvirkningen fra mekanismen med den variable tranche ville blive mindre end planlagt. Det var ofte vanskeligt at fastsætte egnede mål for resultatindikatorerne. 
The Court found that the incentive effect of the variable tranche mechanism was likely to be less than intended. it was often difficult to set appropriate targets for the performance indicators.
Mål, der ikke er tilstrækkelig ambitiøse, eller mål, der er for ambitiøse, kan nedsætte incitamentvirkningen. Desuden mangler der ofte pålidelige statistiske data, der kan bruges til at fastsætte klare baselines og give oplysninger om tidligere tendenser (jf. punkt 67). 
Targets that are insufficiently challenging or targets that are overly ambitious can reduce the incentive effect. moreover, reliable statistical data to establish clear baselines and to provide information on past trends are often not available (see paragraph 67).
62. Endvidere fremgik det ikke af Kommissionens dokumentation, at der var foretaget tilstrækkelig analyse i forbindelse med processen for fastsættelse af målene for at finde frem til, hvilke reformer og yderligere budgetmidler der ville være nødvendige og mulige for at nå målene. 
62. furthermore, the Commission’s documentation did not demonstrate that there had been sufficient analysis during the target-setting process of what reforms and additional budgetary resources would be necessary and feasible in order to achieve the targets. since proposals for targets increasingly come from the country itself, the Commission has to hold in-depth dialogue with the national authorities to ensure that targets are not set deliberately low or unrealistically high. however, there is insufficient expertise for this in many Commission delegations (see paragraph 74). in addition, occasionally targets were not set until well into the year for which performance was being measured.
TEKSTBOKS 4 34 UDVÆLGELSE AF BETINGELSER God praksis i Kommissionen: Nicaragua GBS-programmet i Nicaragua fokuserer på landdistrikter og udvalgte sociale indikatorer, indikatorer for den private sektor og PFM-indikatorer. 
BoX 4 34 sElEctIon of condItIons Good commission practice: nicaragua The gbs programme in nicaragua focuses on rural areas and selected social indicators, private sector indicators and pfm indicators.
Programmets tre sociale indikatorer er relevante for målene i strategioplægget til nedbringelse af fattigdom, eftersom de vedrører nogle af årsagerne til fattigdom, der er identificeret i den nationale strategi. 
The three social indicators of the programme are relevant to the objectives of the poverty reduction strategy papers since they address some of the causes of poverty identified in this national strategy.
Programmets fire indikatorer for den private sektor vedrører forpagtning af jord og produktionskapacitet, hvilket er i overensstemmelse med strategioplæggene til nedbringelse af fattigdom, hvor investeringer i landdistrikter og behovet for at styrke forbindelsen mellem produktion, konkurrenceevne og arealplanlægning prioriteres højt med henblik på at begrænse fattigdom. En af de to PFM-indikatorer er relevant for anbefalingerne i PFM-handlingsplanen. Ydermere er der i Kommissionens valg af indikatorer taget hensyn til komplementariteten med de to SBS-programmer. 
The four private sector indicators of the programme relate to the issue of land tenancy and productive capacity and this is consistent with the priority given by the poverty reduction strategy papers to investments in rural areas and the need to enhance the link between production, competitiveness and land development in order to reduce poverty. one of the two pfm indicators is relevant to the recommendations of the pfm action plan. furthermore, the Commission’s selection of indicators has taken account of the complementarities with two sbs programmes.
Mangelfuld praksis i Kommissionen: Benin En række svagheder gør resultatindikatorerne mindre relevante: ο alle mål for 2005 vedrørende uddannelsessektoren blev nået og gav indtryk af, at sektoren havde opnået et godt resultat, men den fælles årlige gennemgang38 konkluderede for det år, at implementeringen af reformer i denne sektor var utilfredssstillende ο to af de fire indikatorer, der vedrører foranstaltninger inden for sundhed, måler hyppigheden af besøg til sundhedscentre. Landet prioriterede imidlertid en præventiv indsats mod malaria, og den vil sandsynligvis have den modsatte virkning på indikatorerne. Kommissionen var derfor nødt til at udelukke disse indikatorer fra beregningen af det variable tranchebeløb for 2006 ο PFM-indikatorerne vedrører ikke PFM-reformprocessens centrale behov. 
Weak commission practice: Benin The relevance of the performance indicators is affected by a number of weaknesses. ο all targets for 2005 relating to the education sector were achieved, providing the impression of a good performance by the sector but the joint annual review38 for that year concluded that the implementation of reforms in this sector was unsatisfactory. ο Two of the four indicators that relate to the health sector measure the frequency of visits to health centres. however, a government priority was preventive action against malaria, which is likely to have an adverse effect on the indicators. as a result, the Commission had to exclude these indicators from the calculation of the variable tranche amount for the year 2006. ο The pfm indicators do not address the main needs of the pfm reform process. according to the conclusions of the joint annual reviews as well as of the pefa assessment, improvements were most needed in the areas of external control, financial accountability and tax collection.
Det var også opfattelsen i Kommissionens interne kvalitetsgennemgang med henblik på udformningen af GBS-programmet under 10. 
This was also the view of the Commission’s internal quality review for the formulation of the gbs programme under the 10th edf. however, this programme does not contain a condition concerning the fiscal collection rate and includes only one condition on external control for the variable tranche of 2009 which was not kept for the rest of the programme.
63. I Uganda blev halvdelen af GBS-målene på sundhedsområdet uden forklaring enten sat lavere eller meget højere end baseline. I Laos og Paraguay var en række af målene ikke særlig ambitiøse, nogle gange var de bare sat til samme niveau som baseline. 
63. in uganda half of the gbs targets relating to the health sector were set either below or much above the baseline without explanation. in laos and paraguay a number of the targets set were not very challenging, sometimes simply being set at the same level as the baseline. in nicaragua the government acknowledged that for many targets there was no adequate accompanying budget.
64. En yderligere faktor, der influerer på incitamentvirkningen af den variable tranche, er den andel af GBS-programmet, der er tildelt til denne tranche. 
64. a further factor influencing the incentive effect of the variable tranche is the proportion of the gbs programme allocated to it.
Kommissionen har ingen kriterier for, hvordan midlerne skal fordeles mellem faste og variable trancher, og det fører til væsentlige forskelle i de tildelte andele mellem regioner og lande39. Blandingen af faste og variable trancher kan også variere betydeligt mellem to på hinanden følgende programmer i samme land, uden at der gives en klar forklaring på denne ændring. 
The Commission has no criteria for deciding on the allocation of funds between fixed and variable tranches, which leads to significant differences between regions and countries in the proportions allocated39. indeed the mix of fixed and variable tranches can also vary significantly between two consecutive programmes in the same country and without a clear explanation being given for this change.
Kommissionen mener, at andelen af GBS, der tildeles til den variable tranche, bør være højere i lande, hvor der er større grund til bekymring om landenes vilje til at reducere fattigdom og gennemføre reformer. Men denne metode gengives ikke i Kommissionens interne retningslinjer eller individuelle programdokumenter. I mange GBS-programmer, navnlig i lande i Asien og Latinamerika, bruges der endvidere ikke variable trancher. 
The Commission considers that the proportion of gbs allocated to the variable tranche should be higher in countries where it has more concerns about their commitment to poverty reduction and reforms. however, this approach is not referred to in the Commission’s internal guidelines or individual programme documents. furthermore, in a significant number of the gbs programmes, particularly in asian and latin american countries, variable tranches are not used.
65. Nogle finansieringsaftaler indeholder også bestemmelser om, at hvis resultatindikatorerne for den variable tranche ikke er nået, kan Kommissionen godt udbetale ikke-udbetalte midler ved programmets afslutning, hvis nye betingelser er opfyldt. 
65. some financing agreements also contain provisions to the effect that, when variable tranche performance indicators are not achieved, the Commission may pay out undisbursed funds at the end of the programme if new conditions are met. such a possibility was provided for under gbs programmes in benin, nicaragua and paraguay. in other cases undisbursed funds were reallocated to other Commission programmes or projects in the country.
39 Tildelingerne til de variable trancher udgør mellem10%og91%af GBS-programmernes samlede beløb i AVS-staterne og mellem23%og54%for programmerne i landene i Asien og Latinamerika. 35 Særberetning nr. 11/2010 – Kommissionens forvaltning af generel budgetstøtte i AVS stater og lande i Latinamerika og Asien 
39 variable tranche allocations range between 10 % and 91 % of the total amounts of gbs programmes in aCp countries and between 23 % and 54 % for programmes in asian and latin american countries. 35 special report no 11/2010 – The Commission’s management of general budget support in aCp, latin american and asian countries
36 det eR ofte vanskeligt at vuRdeRe, om betingelseRne eR blevet opfyldt elleR ej 66. 
36 it is oFten diFFicult to assess whether conditions have Been met or not 66.
Denne metode synes at afspejle Kommissionens ønske om at sikre kontinuitet i programmerne, og det er rigtigt, at Kommissionen har forbedret sin analyse på dette område siden begyndelsen af 10. EUF. 
This approach tends to reflect the Commission’s concern to ensure the continuity of its programmes, although it should be acknowledged that the Commission has improved its analysis in this area since the start of the 10th edf.
67. Upålidelige data kan gøre det vanskeligt at vurdere, om de betingelser, der bygger på resultatindikatormål, er opnået eller ej. 
67. unreliable data can make it difficult to assess whether conditions based on performance indicator targets have been achieved or not.
I Verdensbankens gennemgang af resultatbaserede nationale udviklingsstrategier fra 2007 fremhævedes svage statistiske systemer som en væsentlig udfordring for næsten alle de 62 undersøgte lande. 
The world bank’s 2007 review of ‘results-based national development strategies’ highlighted weak statistical systems as a major challenge faced by nearly all the 62 countries it examined.
Problemet forværres af, at Kommissionen fastsætter sine resultatindikatormål for den variable tranche på årsbasis, selv om der på nogle områder realistisk set kun kan forventes små procentvise stigninger fra år til år. Det er vanskeligt at foretage en pålidelig måling af små stigninger. 
The problem is aggravated by the fact that the Commission sets its variable tranche performance indicator targets on an annual basis although year-on-year progress in some areas can only realistically be expected in terms of small percentage increases. such small increases are difficult to measure reliably.
I Kommissionens interne retningslinjer er der kun få oplysninger om målene for og indholdet af dialogen, og om, hvordan dialogen bør føres og dokumenteres på de forskellige trin i programcyklussen. 
The Commission’s internal guidelines provide little information on what the objectives and content of dialogue should be or on how to undertake and document dialogue at the various stages of the programme cycle.
Der stilles dog krav om, at der indføres en passende strategi for dialogen, når der konstateres svagheder, der indvirker på centrale aspekter af GBS-programmet. I praksis har man ikke udformet sådanne strategier, selv om de ville kunne spille en nyttig rolle i alle GBS-programmerne ved systematisk at fremme en effektiv dialog ved at fastsætte klare mål og betingelser og ved at definere de personaleressourcer, der er nødvendige for at gennemføre dialogen. 
They do, however, require ‘an appropriate dialogue strategy’ to be put in place when weaknesses affecting key aspects of the gbs programme are identified. in practice, such strategies have not been drawn up despite the useful role they could play in all gbs programmes in helping to systematically improve effective dialogue by fixing clear objectives and modalities and defining the necessary staff resources needed to conduct the dialogue.
Det er forskelligt, i hvor høj grad GBS-programmerne har etableret et solidt grundlag for dialog. I Laos og Vietnam var målene og betingelserne for dialog klart fastsat i den årlige cyklus i programmerne under strategien til bekæmpelse af fattigdom, der ledes af Verdensbanken, og som Kommissionens GBS-programmer bidrog til, og dialogen fokuserede på reformer, der skulle indføres af de nationale regeringer. 
The extent to which gbs programmes have established a sound basis for dialogue has varied. in laos and vietnam the objectives and modalities of dialogue were clearly laid out in the annual cycle of the world bank-led poverty reduction strategy programmes to which the Commission gbs programmes contributed, with the dialogue focusing on reforms to be introduced by the national governments. in contrast there was little detailed information in uganda and paraguay on what the specific aims of the Commission’s dialogue would be during the course of the programme and in paraguay the modalities to be applied to pursue them were also less clear. in benin, significant progress was made in this respect in the 10th edf compared to the ninth edf.
Det har haft stor betydning, at GBS-programmerne giver Kommissionen mulighed for at føre en dialog om det nationale budget og PFM, og Kommissionens bidrag til GBS-dialogen er generelt mere udviklet på dette område. 
39 the commission’s involvement in dialogue varies But is oFten limited 73. gbs programmes have been particularly important in enabling the Commission to conduct a dialogue on the national budget and pfm and the Commission’s contribution to gbs dialogue is generally more developed in this area.
Resultaterne af PEFA-vurderingerne (jf. punkt 31) har ofte fungeret som katalysator for en styrkelse af PFM-dialogen. På de øvrige områder, hvor GBS-programmerne typisk har mål, begrænser Kommissionen i mange tilfælde sin dialog til forhold, som har relation til vurderingen af, om programmets betingelser for tildeling af variable og faste trancher er overholdt, i stedet for at undersøge regeringens samlede resultater på de pågældende områder. 
The results of pefa assessments (see paragraph 31) have often played a catalytic role in strengthening pfm dialogue. in the other areas on which gbs programme objectives are typically focused, the Commission’s dialogue is in many cases limited to issues relating to assessing compliance with the variable tranche and fixed tranche conditions of the programme rather than addressing overall government performance in the areas concerned. as a result, the Commission often does not play the role in dialogue that could be expected, given its significant financial contributions (see Box 5).
Mangelfuld praksis i Kommissionen: Paraguay Målet for GBS-programmet i Paraguay er at støtte implementeringen af netværket for social beskyttelse, som er et vigtigt element i aksen vedrørende social beskyttelse i den nationale strategi for fattigdomsbekæmpelse. Som følge af de store politiske forandringer efter valget fandt dialogen sted i en særlig politisk sammenhæng. 
Weak commission practice: Paraguay The objective of the gbs programme in paraguay is to support the implementation of the social protection network which is a significant element in the social protection axis of the national poverty reduction strategy. following the major political change after the elections, dialogue took place in a particular political context.
Der er ingen struktureret ramme for dialog med donorkoordine-ringsmekanismer såsom arbejdsgrupper eller fælles årlige gennemgange, der muliggør en detaljeret drøftelse af implementeringen af den nationale strategi for fattigdomsbekæmpelse. 
There is no structured framework in place for dialogue with donor coordination mechanisms such as working groups or joint annual reviews to discuss in detail the implementation of the national poverty reduction strategy.
Kommissionen har koncentreret sin dialog om regeringens opfyldelse af de indikatormål, der anvendes for de variable trancher. Den lagde derfor ikke megen vægt på den samlede implementering af netværket for social beskyttelse og greb ikke muligheden for at få en bredere debat om kvaliteten af de sociale tjenester. 
The Commission has concentrated its dialogue on the government’s compliance with the indicators used for the variable tranches. as a result, it paid little attention to the overall implementation of the social protection network and did not seize the opportunity for a wider debate on the quality of social services. in fact, the Commission’s limited monitoring of the implementation of the social protection network and the pfm action plan places limits on the possible extent of the dialogue.