natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Bilag III - Nyere lovgivningsinitiativer vedrørende EU's bekæmpelse af svig o Direktivet om strafferetlig bekæmpelse af svig rettet mod Den Europæiske Unions finansielle interesser" (BFI-direktivet) blev vedtaget af Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet den 5. juli 2017. 
Annex III — Recent legislative initiatives in the EU’s area of the fight against fraud o The Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive) was adopted by the co-legislators on 5 July 2017.
Medlemsstaterne har to år (indtil den 6. juli 2019) til at gennemføre det i national ret. 
Member States have two years (until 6 July 2019) to transpose it into their national legislation.
Det harmoniserer definitionen af fire strafbare handlinger (svig, korruption, hvidvask af penge og misbrug af midler) såvel som sanktioner og forældelsesfrister. o Forordning 2017/1939 om oprettelse af EPPO blev vedtaget i oktober 2017. 
It harmonises the definition of four criminal offences (fraud, corruption, money laundering and misappropriation) as well as sanctions and limitation periods. o Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO has been adopted in October 2017.
EPPO forventes at blive operationel i slutningen af 2020 eller begyndelsen af 2021 i 22 medlemsstater, og den vil have beføjelser til at efterforske forbrydelser rettet mod EU's budget, herunder alvorlig grænseoverskridende momssvig på over 10 millioner euro. o Forslaget til ændring af forordning nr. 883/2013 (COM(2018) 338) om undersøgelser, der foretages af OLAF, for så vidt angår samarbejdet med EPPO og effektiviteten af OLAF's undersøgelser, blev vedtaget i maj 2018. o Den nye finansforordning trådte i kraft i juli 2018. 61 
The EPPO is expected to start operating from late 2020 or early 2021 onwards in 22 Member States and will be competent to investigate crimes against the EU budget including serious cross-border VAT fraud over €10 million. o The proposal to amend the OLAF's Regulation 883/2013 (COM(2018) 338) concerning investigations conducted by the OLAF as regards cooperation with the EPPO and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations adopted in May 2018. o The new Financial Regulation entered into force in July 2018.
Bilag IV - Hændelser, der får medlemsstaterne til at indberette sager om svig under strafferetlig efterforskning til Kommissionen 62 Hændelse BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK Efter tiltale √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Efter første dom √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Efter endelig domfældelse √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Andet √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Annex IV — Events triggering Member States to report cases of fraud under criminal investigation to the Commission 60 Event BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK After indictment √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ After initial sentence √ √ √ √ √ √ √ After definitive sentence-final court decision √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ Other √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Vedkommende skal eventuelt selv træffe * Høring af OLAF vedrørende alle andre foranstaltninger i planlægnings-og gennemførelsesfaserne er frivillig, medmindre disse foranstaltninger er baseret på en henstilling fra OLAF. ** Har ifølge sit charter og internationale standarder intet forvaltningsansvar på noget trin i processen for bekæmpelse af svig. *** Clearing House-gruppen kan informeres fra sag til sag, ikke efter en generel systemisk tilgang. **** Revisionsopfølgningsudvalget informeres indirekte om forhold, der opstår på disse områder, dvs. på grundlag af interne og/eller eksterne revisionsresultater. 
They may be required to take action as a result of the outcome; • Not involved. * Consultation of OLAF on all other actions in the Planning and Implementation Phases is facultative, except where such actions are based on a recommendation by OLAF. ** Following its Charter and International standards, does not have any management responsibility at any stage of the anti-fraud cycle *** TheClearingHouseGroupcanbeinformedonacasebasedapproachnotonageneralsystemicapproach. ****TheAPCisinformedofissuesarisingintheseareasindirectly,i.e onthebasisofinternaland/orexternalauditfindings. TheAPCisinformedaboutkeypointsoftheAARsandofthedraftAMPR.
Bilag VI - Referencer Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Controlling corruption in the European Union, Berlin. 
Annex VI — List of references Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013), The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Controlling corruption in the European Union, Berlin.
Fabio Giuffrida, "The European Public Prosecutor's Office: King without kingdom?" (2017), CEPS forskningsrapport nr. 3/2017, s. 
Fabio Giuffrida, ‘The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: King without kingdom?’(2017), CEPS Research Report No 3/2017, p.
14, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/european-public-prosecutor %E2 %80 %99s-office-king-without-kingdom. 
14, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/european-public-prosecutor %E2 %80 %99s-office-king-without-kingdom.
Golden, Miriam og Picci, Lucio (2005), Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, and Tests using Italian Data, Economics and Politics. 
Golden, Miriam and Picci, Lucio (2005), Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, and Tests using Italian Data, Economics and Politics.
Vol. 
Vol.
17, 2005, s. 37-75. 
17, 2005, pp. 37-75.
Mark Button og Jim Gee (2015), The financial cost of fraud 2015 - What the latest data from around the world shows, PKF Littlejohn LLP and PKF; jf. også Brooks, G., Button, M. og Gee, J. 
Mark Button and Jim Gee (2015), The financial cost of fraud 2015 - What the latest data from around the world shows, PKF Littlejohn LLP and PKF; See also Brooks, G., Button, M. and Gee, J.
(2012), The scale of healthcare fraud: a global evaluation, Security Journal, Vol. 
(2012), The scale of healthcare fraud: a global evaluation, Security Journal, Vol.
25 nr. 2, s. 76-87. 
25 No. 2, pp. 76-87.
Mark Button, Chris Lewis, David Shepherd, Graham Brooks og Alison Wakefield (2012), Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth. 
Mark Button, Chris Lewis, David Shepherd, Graham Brooks and Alison Wakefield (2012), Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth.
Mihaly Fazekas og Peter Lawrence King (2018), Perils of development funding? 
Mihaly Fazekas and Peter Lawrence King (2018), Perils of development funding?
The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe.
Mihaly Fazekas og Gábor Kocsis (2017), Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Public Procurement Data. 
Mihaly Fazekas and Gábor Kocsis (2017), Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Public Procurement Data.
British Journal of Political Science, på nettet. 
British Journal of Political Science, av. online.
Mihaly Fazekas, István János Tóth og Peter Lawrence King (2016), An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data. 
Mihaly Fazekas, István János Tóth and Peter Lawrence King (2016), An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data.
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), s. 
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), pp. 369–397.
Mihaly Fazekas og István János Tóth (2017), Corruption in EU Funds? 
Mihaly Fazekas and István János Tóth (2017), Corruption in EU Funds?
Europe-wide evidence on the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting. 
Europe-wide evidence on the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting.
I J. Bachtler et al. (Eds.), EU Cohesion Policy. 
In J. Bachtler et al (Eds.), EU Cohesion Policy.
Reassessing performance and direction. kap. 
Reassessing performance and direction. Ch.
Routledge, London, s. 
Routledge, London, p.
186-205. 
186-205.
Paulo Mauro (1996), The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure, International Monetary Fund, WP/96/98. 
Paulo Mauro (1996), The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure, International Monetary Fund, WP/96/98.
Paulo Mauro (1998), Corruption and the composition of government expenditure, International Monetary Fund, Journal of Public Economics 69. 
Paulo Mauro (1998), Corruption and the composition of government expenditure, International Monetary Fund, Journal of Public Economics 69.
Jajkowicz, O. og Drobiszova, A. 
Jajkowicz, O. and Drobiszova, A.
(2015), The Effect of Corruption on Government Expenditure Allocation in OECD Countries, Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Vol. 63. 
(2015), The Effect of Corruption on Government Expenditure Allocation in OECD Countries, Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Volume 63. 63
65 Akronymer og forkortelser AAR: Årlig aktivitetsrapport AMPR: Årlig forvaltnings-og effektivitetsrapport BFI: Beskyttelse af Den Europæiske Unions finansielle interesser CAFS: Kommissionens strategi for bekæmpelse af svig EDES: Systemet for tidlig afsløring og udelukkelse EPPO: Den Europæiske Anklagemyndighed EU-Domstolen: Den Europæiske Unions Domstol FFR: Flerårig finansiel ramme GD: Generaldirektorat IMS: Systemet til indberetning af uregelmæssigheder OLAF: Det Europæiske Kontor for Bekæmpelse af Svig 
Acronyms and abbreviations AAR: Annual activity report AFCOS: Anti-fraud coordination services AFS: Anti-fraud strategy AMPR: Annual management and performance report AOD: Authorising officer by delegation CAFS: Commission anti-fraud strategy DG: Directorate-General ECJ: European Court of Justice EDES: Early detection and exclusion system EPPO: European Public Prosecutor’s Office IBOAs: EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies IMS: Irregularity management system MFF: Multi-annual financial framework OLAF: European Anti-fraud Office PACA: Primary administrative or judicial finding PIF: Protection of the European Union’s financial interests 64
Bedre regulering: Udformning af politikker og lovgivning på en sådan måde, at de når deres mål med minimale omkostninger. 
Glossary Better regulation: The design of policies and laws so that they achieve their objectives at minimum cost.
Bedre regulering handler om at sørge for, at EU faktisk når de ambitiøse politikmål, som det har sat sig. 
Better regulation is about making sure that the EU actually delivers on the ambitious policy goals it has set itself.
Det drejer sig om at sikre, at den valgte politikløsning er den bedste og mindst byrdefulde måde at nå disse mål på. 
It is about ensuring that the policy solution chosen is the best and least burdensome way to reach those objectives.
Det er en arbejdsmetode, der sikrer, at politiske beslutninger udformes på en åben, gennemsigtig måde, der anvender den bedste tilgængelige dokumentation og understøttes af omfattende inddragelse af interessenter. 
It is a way of working to ensure that political decisions are prepared in an open, transparent manner, informed by the best available evidence and backed by the comprehensive involvement of stakeholders.
(Kilde: Værktøjskassen for bedre regulering). 
(Source: Better regulation toolbox).
Domfældelse: En domstolsafgørelse, hvor den sagsøgte kendes skyldig i at have begået en lovovertrædelse. 
Conviction: A court’s judgement by which the defendant is found to be guilty of having committed a crime.
En person kan først betragtes som domfældt, når afgørelsen er endelig. 
A person can be considered convicted only when the judgement is final.
Fejl: En uregelmæssighed, der skyldes manglende overholdelse af retlige og aftalemæssige krav. 
Error: An irregularity arising from non-compliance with legal and contractual requirements.
Finansielle korrektioner: Finansielle korrektioner kan gennemføres af en medlemsstat ved fratrækning af regelstridige udgifter på en betalingsanmodning, ved betaling af en indtægtsordre udstedt af Kommissionen eller ved frigørelse. 
Financial corrections: can be implemented by a Member State by deducting irregular expenditure from the Member State’s payment claim, by paying a recovery order issued by the Commission, or by decommitment.
Konsekvensanalyse: Konsekvensanalyser bidrager til EU's beslutningsproces ved systematisk at indhente og analysere oplysninger om planlagte interventioner og vurdere deres sandsynlige effekt. 
Impact assessment: Impact assessments contribute to EU decision-making processes by systematically collecting and analysing information on planned interventions and estimating their likely impact.
Med nogle klart definerede undtagelser skal der foretages konsekvensanalyser af alle omfattende politiske initiativer (f.eks. initiativer, 67 der fremlægges i den årlige politikstrategi (APS) eller senere i Kommissionens lovgivnings-og arbejdsprogram). 
Impact assessments must be carried out for all major policy initiatives (i.e. those presented in the annual policy strategy (APS) or, later, as part of the Commission’s legislative work programme (CLWP)), with some clearly defined exceptions.
Endvidere kan andre væsentlige initiativer omfattes af sådanne analyser på ad hoc-basis. 
In addition, other significant initiatives can be covered on a case-by-case basis.
Systemet til indberetning af uregelmæssigheder (IMS): Systemet til indberetning af uregelmæssigheder er et sikkert elektronisk værktøj til indberetning, håndtering og analyse af uregelmæssigheder. 
Irregularity Management System (IMS): The Irregularity Management System is a secure electronic tool for reporting, management and analysis of irregularities.
IMS er en del af informationssystemet til bekæmpelse af svig (AFIS), som er udviklet og vedligeholdes af OLAF, og som letter udvekslingen af oplysninger mellem OLAF og de relevante myndigheder. 
IMS is part of the Anti-fraud Information System (AFIS), developed and maintained by OLAF, which facilitates the exchange of information between OLAF and relevant administrations.
Revisionsholdet Revisionsrettens særberetninger præsenterer resultaterne af dens revisioner vedrørende EU-politikker og -programmer eller forvaltningsspørgsmål i forbindelse med specifikke budgetområder. 
Audit team The ECA’s special reports set out the results of its audits of EU policies and programmes, or of management-related topics from specific budgetary areas.
Denne forvaltningsrevision blev udført af Afdeling V - Finansiering og forvaltning af EU, der ledes af Lazaros S. Lazarou, medlem af Revisionsretten. 
This performance audit was carried out by Audit Chamber V Financing and administration of the EU, headed by ECA Member Lazaros S. Lazarou.
Revisionsarbejdet blev ledet af Juhan Parts, medlem af Revisionsretten, med støtte fra kabinetschef Ken-Marti Vaher og attaché Margus Kurm, ledende administrator og opgaveansvarlig Judit Oroszki, viceopgaveansvarlig Tomasz Plebanowicz og revisorerne Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Daria Bochnar, Jana Janeckova og Anzela Poliulianaite. 
The audit was led by ECA Member Juhan Parts, supported by Ken-Marti Vaher, Head of Private Office and Margus Kurm, Private Office Attaché; Judit Oroszki, Principal Manager and Head of Task; Tomasz Plebanowicz, Deputy Head of Task; Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Daria Bochnar, Jana Janeckova and Anzela Poliulianaite, Auditors.
Michael Pyper ydede sproglig støtte, og Valérie Tempez-Erasmi ydede sekretariatsassistance. 
Michael Pyper provided linguistic support and Valérie Tempez-Erasmi provided secretarial assistance.
Fra venstre til højre: Ken-Marti Vaher, Judit Oroszki, Tomasz Plebanowicz, Juhan Parts, Michael Pyper, Daria Bochnar, Anzela Poliulianaite, Jana Janeckova, Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Valérie Tempez-Erasmi, Margus Kurm. 
From left to right: Ken-Marti Vaher, Judit Oroszki, Tomasz Plebanowicz, Juhan Parts, Michael Pyper, Daria Bochnar, Anzela Poliulianaite, Jana Janeckova, Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Valérie Tempez-Erasmi, Margus Kurm.
Begivenhed Dato Revisionsplanens vedtagelse/revisionens start 4.4.2017 Officiel fremsendelse af udkastet til beretning til Kommissionen (eller en anden revideret enhed) 26.6.2018 Vedtagelse af den endelige beretning efter den kontradiktoriske procedure 14.11.2018 Modtagelse af Kommissionens (eller en anden revideret enheds) officielle svar på alle sprog EN: 8.1.2019 PDF ISBN 978-92-847-1474-2 doi:10.2865/460851 QJ-AB-18-030-DA-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-1485-8 doi:10.2865/377600 QJ-AB-18-030-DA-Q 
Event Date Adoption of Audit Planning Memorandum (APM) / Start of audit 4.4.2017 Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee) 26.6.2018 Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 14.11.2018 Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all languages EN: 8.1.2019 PDF ISBN 978-92-847-1460-5 doi:10.2865/951680 QJ-AB-18-030-EN-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-1466-7 doi:10.2865/057159 QJ-AB-18-030-EN-Q
Beskyttelse af EU’s finansielle interesser mod svig er en af Europa-Kommissionens centrale ansvarsopgaver. 
Protecting the EU’s financial interests against fraud is a key responsibility of the European Commission.
Kommissionens egne generaldirektorater og forvaltningsorganer samt dens kontor for bekæmpelse af svig (OLAF) samarbejder med en lang række andre organisationer, herunder myndigheder i medlemsstaterne og den fremtidige europæiske anklagemyndighed (EPPO). 
The Commission ‘s own Directorates-General, Executive agencies and Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) work with a large number of other organisations, including authorities in the Member States and the future European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).
I denne revision vurderede vi, om Kommissionens håndtering af risikoen for svigagtige aktiviteter til skade for EU-budgettet er hensigtsmæssig. 
In this audit we assessed whether the Commission is properly managing the risk of fraudulent activities to the detriment of the EU budget.
Vi konstaterede, at Kommissionen mangler fyldestgørende og sammenlignelige data om omfanget af afsløret svig i forbindelse med EU’s udgifter. 
We found that the Commission lacks comprehensive and comparable data on the detected fraud level in EU spending.
Endvidere har den endnu ikke vurderet omfanget af uafsløret svig eller foretaget en detaljeret analyse af, hvad der får økonomiske aktører til at udøve svigagtige aktiviteter. 
Moreover, it has so far not carried out any assessment of undetected fraud, nor detailed analysis of what causes economic actors to engage in fraudulent activities.
Dette reducerer den praktiske værdi og effektiviteten af Kommissionens strategiske planer for beskyttelse af EU’s finansielle interesser mod svig. 
This reduces the practical value and effectiveness of the Commission’s strategic plans for protecting the EU’s financial interests against fraud.
Det nuværende system, hvor OLAF’s administrative undersøgelse af sager med mistanke om svig efterfølges af en strafferetlig efterforskning på nationalt plan, lægger beslag på megen tid i et stort antal sager og reducerer dermed chancerne for at opnå retsforfølgning. 
The current system, whereby OLAF’s administrative investigation of suspected fraud is followed by a criminal investigation at national level, takes up much time in a considerable number of cases and thus it decreases the chances to achieve prosecution.
Hertil kommer, at OLAF’s endelige rapporter ofte ikke indeholder tilstrækkelige oplysninger til at kunne tjene som grundlag for inddrivelse af uretmæssigt udbetalte midler. 
In addition, OLAF’s final reports often do not provide sufficient information to initiate the recovery of unduly disbursed funds.
Under halvdelen af OLAF’s undersøgelser har ført til retsforfølgning af mistænkte for bedrageri, og under en tredjedel af de uretmæssigt udbetalte EU-midler er blevet inddrevet. 
Fewer than half of OLAF investigations have led to prosecution of suspected fraudsters and resulted in recovery of less than a third of unduly paid EU money.
DEN EUROPÆISKE REVISIONSRET 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi 1615 Luxembourg LUXEMBOURG Tlf. +352 4398-1 Kontakt: eca.europa.eu/da/Pages/ContactForm.aspx Websted: eca.europa.eu Twitter: @EUAuditors ©Den Europæiske Union, 2019. Tilladelse til at anvende eller gengive fotos eller andet materiale, hvortil Den Europæiske Union ikke har ophavsretten, skal indhentes direkte hos indehaveren af ophavsretten. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi 1615 Luxembourg LUXEMBOURG Tel. +352 4398-1 Enquiries: eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/ContactForm.aspx Website: eca.europa.eu Twitter: @EUAuditors © European Union, 2019 For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the European Union copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.
DA 2019 Særberetning nr. 04 Ordningen for kontrol af økologiske produkter er blevet bedre, men der er fortsat nogle udfordringer (artikel 287, stk. 
EN 2019 Special Report NO 04 The control system for organic products has improved, but some challenges remain (pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
4, andet afsnit, TEUF) Glossar Resumé Indledning Punkt I-VII 1-23 5-14 9-11 12-14 15-18 19 20-23 24-28 29-89 29-49 30-35 36-47 48-49 50-80 54-64 65-71 72-74 75-80 EU's ordninger for økologikontrol Kontrolordningen for produkter, der er fremstillet i EU Kontrolordningen for produkter, der importeres til EU Et hurtigt voksende marked Finansiel støtte til økologisk produktion i EU EU's retlige rammer for økologisk produktion Revisionens omfang og revisionsmetoden Bemærkninger INDHOLD Tilsynet med ordningen for kontrol af økologiske produkter fremstillet i EU er forbedret Kommissionens overvågning af kontrolordningerne i medlemsstaterne er forbedret Mange svagheder afhjulpet i medlemsstaternes tilsyn med kontrolorganerne Informationsudvekslingen er forbedret, men kunne være hurtigere og mere omfattende Udfordringen med at føre tilsyn med ordningen for kontrol af importerede økologiske produkter er delvis løst Kommissionen er begyndt at foretage revisioner uden for EU, men de fleste ækvivalente kontrolorganer er endnu ikke blevet revideret Informationsudvekslingen er forbedret, men Kommissionen kunne udnytte den bedre og hurtigere Kommissionens håndhævelse var vanskelig og tidskrævende, men kommende regelændringer skal gøre den hurtigere og mere effektiv Svagheder i medlemsstaternes kontrol med import af økologiske produkter 2 
Glossary Executive summary Introduction Paragraphs I - VII 1 - 23 5 - 14 15 - 18 19 20 - 23 24 - 28 29 - 89 29 - 49 30 - 35 36 - 47 48 - 49 50 - 80 54 - 64 65 - 71 72 - 74 75 - 80 81 - 89 The EU organic control systems A rapidly growing market Financial support for organic production in the EU The EU legal framework for organic production Audit scope and approach Observations The supervision of the control system for organic products produced in the EU has improved CONTENTS Commission monitoring of the control systems in Member States has improved Many weaknesses addressed in Member States’ supervision of control bodies The exchange of information has improved, but it could be quicker and more comprehensive The challenge of supervising the control system for imported organic products was partially met The Commission has started audits outside the EU, but most equivalent control bodies have not been audited so far The exchange of information has improved, but the Commission could use it better and more quickly Enforcement by the Commission was difficult and lengthy, but upcoming changes to the rules are intended to make it faster and more effective Weaknesses in the Member States’ checks on organic imports Traceability has improved, though some weaknesses remain 2
Sporbarheden er forbedret, men der er fortsat nogle svagheder Sporbarheden er forbedret inden for EU, men ikke alle producenter kunne spores Vores sporbarhedsundersøgelse afslørede problemer med mærkning og certifikater Konklusioner og anbefalinger Bilag - Vurdering af gennemførelsen af anbefalingerne i SB nr. 
Traceability has improved inside the EU, but not all producers could be traced Our traceability exercise reveals problems with labelling and certificates Conclusions and recommendations 84 - 88 89 90 - 98 Annex – Assessment of the level of implementation of the recommendations included in SR No 9/2012 Replies of the Commission 3