natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De fleste af projekterne indeholder bidrag i form af naturalydelser fra stżttemodtagerne ssom forpligtelse til at stille lokalt personale eller lokaler til rdighed for kontrahenten. 
Most of the projects include in-kind contributions from the beneficiaries such as commitments to make local counterpart staff available or to provide the contractor with premises.
I otte tilfžlde var der problemer med denne indirekte samfinansiering, fordi forpligtelsen ikke var blevet opfyldt. Det gjaldt isžr projekterne i Moskva. 
In eight cases there were problems regarding this indirect co-financing because the commitments were not honoured, particularly for projects in Moscow.
I henhold til lovgivningen har ministerierne i Den Russiske Fżderation generelt ikke lov til at stille kontorlokaler til rdighed for kontrahenterne i deres bygninger. 
The ministries in the Russian Federation generally are not legally allowed to provide the contractors with office accommodation within their premises.
Selv om Kommissionen var opmžrksom p dette problem, fortsatte den med at inkorporere sdanne betingelser i projektbeskrivelserne. 
Although the Commission was aware of the problem, it continued to insert such conditions into the ToRs. Project Implementation Delays in implementation 39.
17 projekter var blevet gennemfżrt inden for den fastsatte frist. 
Seventeen projects were implemented within the time set.
Den mest kritiske del var i denne sammenhžng ivžrksžtningsfasen, som normalt varede lžngere end planlagt. 
In this respect the most critical part was the inception phase, which usually took more time than planned.
Disse forsinkelser skyldtes oftest, at projekterne var for drligt forberedt. 
Due to the poor ToR, the projects needed many approvals for changes during inception and implementation.
Proceduren for žndring af projekter via tillžgsbetemmelser er tidskržvende. 
The procedure to change the project approach through addenda is time-consuming.
Dekoncentreringen af projektforvaltningen fra Kommissionens hovedkontor i Bruxelles til delegationen resulterede i mere effektive forvaltningsprocedurer, fordi kontakten mellem dem, der forvaltede projekterne, og dem, der gennemfżrte dem, blev mere direkte. Faktisk reddede delegationens mere proaktive forvaltning endda flere af projekterne fra alvorlige vanskeligheder. 
The devolution of project management responsibilities from Commission headquarters to the Delegation resulted in more effective management procedures through more direct contacts between the project managers and project stakeholders; in fact, more proactive management by the Delegation even sal-vaged several of the projects from serious difficulties.
Disse observationer er i trd med de bemžrkninger, Retten fremsatte i sžrberetning nr. 10/2004 om dekoncentreringen af forvaltningen af EFŐs bistand til tredjelande til Kommissionens delegationer (1). 
These observations are in line with those of the CourtŐs audit of the devolution of EC external aid management to the Commission Delegations published in Special Report No 10/2004 (1).
P grund af denne proces opstod der imidlertid engangsforsinkelser og benlyse forvaltningsmžssige svagheder under gennemfżrelsen af de projekter, som var blevet programmeret og forberedt centralt i Bruxelles, og som i 2002/2003 var blevet overfżrt til EUŐs delegation i Moskva (omkring halvdelen af alle de reviderede projekter). 
However, the implementation of projects which had been programmed and prepared centrally in Brussels and which in 2002/2003 were transferred to the EC Delegation in Moscow (about half of all the projects audited) encountered one-off delays and obvious managerial deficiencies because of this transfer process.
(1) EUT C 72 af 22.3.2005. 
(1) OJ C 72, 22.3.2005.
19.5.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 119/9 Kontrahenternes pržstation var generelt acceptabel 41. 
TACIS Regulation, national 19.5.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 119/9 ContractorsŐ performance was generally acceptable 41.
Selv om mlene ofte ikke eller kun delvist var blevet opfyldt (jf. punkt 18), havde kontrahenterne i de fleste tilfžlde leveret det output (de ydelser), der var fastsat enten i den oprindelige eller i den ved tillžgsbestemmelser žndrede projektbeskri-velse. 
Although the objectives were often not achieved or achieved only partially (see paragraph 18), in most of the cases the contractors had delivered the output (deliverables) as foreseen either in the original ToR or in the ToR amended through addenda.
Nr projekterne blev gennemfżrt i afsidesliggende omrder, var det normalt svžrt for kontrahenterne at rekruttere eller at holde p kvalificerede medarbejdere, nr det oprindeligt tildelte personale ikke var til rdighed. 
A typical problem for the contractors was to find and maintain suitable staff in more remote project locations when the staff originally allocated was not available.
Kun et mindre projekt mislykkedes, fordi kontrahenten ikke leverede noget output. 
Only one small project was a failure due to a lack of output by the contractor.
En anden kontrahent stżdte p finansielle problemer under projektgennemfżrelsen, hvilket forsinkede gennemfżrelsen vžsentligt. 
Another contractor faced financial problems during project implementation, which led to significant delays in implementation.
Styringsudvalgene var ineffektive 42. 
Ineffective steering committees 42.
Udvalgenes befżjelser var blevet begržnset af Kommissionen, og de russiske medlemmer kunne sledes ikke se, hvilken indflydelse et styringsudvalg kunne have, og de deltog derfor ikke aktivt i mżderne. 
The powers of the committees were limited by the Commission so the Russian members did not see what kind of an impact the steering committees could have and were, thus, not actively participating in the meetings.
Kontrahenternes projektansvarlige var nżdt til at overtage (dele af) styringsudvalgenes opgaver. 
The contractorsŐ project managers had to take over (part of) the tasks of the steering committees.
Udstyret blev ikke anvendt til projektet 43. 
Equipment not used for the purposes of the project 43.
I henhold til Tacis-forordningen (Euratom, EF) nr. 1279/96 skal programmet džkke rimelige udgifter til leverancer, som er nżdvendige til gennemfżrelsen af den faglige bistand (1). 
According to the TACIS Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 1279/96 the programme shall cover reasonable costs of supplies required in support of the implementation of the technical assistance (1).
99/2000 fastsžttes det, at hżjst 20 % af det rlige budget kan tildeles til investeringer (2). 
TACIS Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 99/2000 states that a maximum of 20 % of the annual budget can be allocated to investment (2).
I praksis indeholdt servicekontrakterne et afsnit om leverancer, som plagde de faglige bistandskontrahenter Ń i samarbejde med stżttemodtagerne Ń at definere de tekniske specifikationer vedrżrende disse leverancer og at forvalte indkżbsproceduren i overensstemmelse med de regler, der gžlder for Tacis-programmet. 
In practice the service contracts included a supply component which obliged the technical assistance contractors, in cooperation with the beneficiaries, to define the technical specifications of the supplies, and to manage the procurement process in accordance with the TACIS procurement rules.
Der var ikke altid en klar synergi mellem den faglige bistand og det tekniske udstyr, der var blevet stillet til rdighed for projekterne. 
There was not always clear synergy between the technical assistance and equipment provided under the projects.
Der var heller intet bevis for, at udstyret var blevet anvendt til lżsning af opgaver p de specifikke omrder, der er beskrevet (3) i forordningen eller retningslinjerne. 
Nor was there any evidence that the equipment component had addressed the specific areas described (3) in the Regulation or Guidelines.
Stżttemodtagerne betragtede mere udstyret (primžrt kontor-og it-udstyr) som en yderligere bonus, som de fik, fordi de havde accepteret konsulentbistanden. 
The beneficiaries treated the equipment component (mostly office and IT equipment) more as an additional bonus given for accepting the consultancy.
(1) Artikel 3. 
(1) Article 3.
(2) Artikel 6. 
(2) Article 6.
(3) Gržnseoverskridende samarbejde, fremme af sm og mellemstore virksomheder, miljżinfrastruktur og netvžrk af strategisk betydning for Fžllesskabet. 
(3) Cross-border cooperation, promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), environmental infrastructure and networks of strategic importance to the Community.
Ofte var udstyret fżrst blevet leveret, nr projektet var ved at vžre afsluttet, fordi indkżbsproceduren tog s lang tid, og det kunne derfor ikke anvendes til gennemfżrelse af projektet. 
In many cases the equipment was delivered at the end of the project, due to the long procurement procedure, and therefore could not be used for the project activities.
Udstyret kržver vedligeholdelse (herunder levering af for-brugsmaterialer) efter afslutningen af projektet, men det skete ikke altid. 
The equipment needs maintenance (including the supply of consumables) after the project has ended. However, this maintenance did not always take place.
Tekstboks 9 I et tilfžlde havde toldkontorerne ikke tilstržkkelige midler til at kżbe forbrugsmaterialer til laboratoriet. 
Box 9 In one case, the customs offices did not have any budget to buy consumables for the laboratory.
Et andet laboratorium blev nžsten ikke brugt, fordi stżttemodtageren ikke havde egnede lokaler, hvor udstyret kunne bruges. 
Another laboratory remained mainly unused, as the beneficiary did not have adequate premises in which to use the equipment.
En af de fżderale stżttemodtagere nžgtede at acceptere it-udstyret af interne bureaukratiske rsager (stżttemodtageren havde ikke betalt for udstyret og vidste derfor ikke, hvordan det skulle opfżres p balancen). 
One of the federal beneficiaries refused to accept IT equipment for its own bureaucratic reasons (as it did not pay for the equipment it did not know how to book it into the balance sheet).
I et andet tilfžlde solgte stżttemodtageren en del af udstyret, fordi han ikke vidste, hvad det skulle bruges til. 
In another case some of the equipment was sold by the beneficiary because it did not know how to make use of it.
En del af udstyret kunne ikke anvendes, fordi den nżdvendige internetforbindelse ikke var blevet etableret. 
Part of the equipment could not be used because the needed internet connection was not available.
En ržkke fitness-maskiner var ikke egnet til mlgruppen (bżrn), men blev anvendt af soldater fra et lokalt militžraka-demi. 
Some fitness equipment was not suited for the target group, children, but was used by soldiers from a local military acad-emy.
Det var ikke muligt at kżbe momsfrie varer fra nationale leverandżrer 47. Kontrahenterne ppegede ogs problemer med hensyn til indkżb af nationalt udstyr og nationale tjenester. 
Purchases free of VAT from domestic suppliers impossible 47. Contractors indicated problems in domestic procurement of equipment and services as well.
I henhold til Tacis-forordningen (4) er skatter og afgifter ikke stżtteberettigede udgifter. 
According to the TACIS Regulation (4), taxes and duties are not eligible expenditure.
Det var ikke muligt at kżbe momsfrie varer fra nationale leverandżrer i Den Russiske Fżderation, fordi det ikke er tilladt i henhold til russisk afledt ret. 
Purchases free of VAT from domestic suppliers in the Russian Federation were impossible because the Russian secondary legislation does not allow it.
Det er ikke i overensstemmelse med aftalen mellem EU og Den Russiske Fżderation (5). 
This is not in line with the agreement between the EU and the Russian Federation (5).
Overvgningseksperterne arbejdede tilfredsstillende 48. 
The monitors performed well 48.
Et eksternt konsulentfirma var ansvarligt for overvgningen af projekterne, mens de stod p. 
An external consulting company was charged with the monitoring of the projects, during their lifetime.
Konsulenterne (overvgnings-eksperterne) afgiver en udtalelse om projekternes udformning, effektivitet, produktivitet, fżlgevirkninger og bžredygtighed. 
The consultants (monitors) form an opinion about design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the projects.
Kontrakten mellem Kommissionen og konsulentfirmaet omfattede ikke og omfatter stadig ikke en vurdering af projekternes fżlgevirkninger efter afslutningen af projektaktiviteterne. 
Also, assessment of the impact of the projects after the expiry of the projectsŐ activities was and is not part of the contract between the Commission and the monitors.
Der foretages ikke evalueringer for at kompensere for denne manglende vurdering. 
The lack of this assessment was not compensated for by evaluations.
(4) Artikel 9 i forordning (EF, Euratom) nr. 99/2000. 
(4) Article 9 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 99/2000.
(5) General Rules to the technical Assistance of the European Communi-ties, underskrevet af Europa-Kommissionen og regeringen for Den Russiske Fżderation den 18.7.1997. 
(5) General Rules to the technical Assistance of the European Communities signed by the European Commission and the Government of the Russian Federation on 18 July 1997.
C 119/10 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 19.5.2006 49. 
C 119/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 19.5.2006 49.
Generelt opfyldte overvgningseksperterne kravene i deres kontrakter. 
In general the monitors performed according to the requirements of their contracts.
I enkelte tilfžlde henviste overvgningsrapporterne imidlertid til hensigtserklžringer, som om der var tale om resultater, der var opnet som fżlge af projektet. 
However, in a few cases the monitorsŐ reports repeated statements expressing future intentions as if they were merits of the projects.
Disse rapporter afspejlede ikke tilstržkkeligt klart problemerne i forbindelse med gennemfżrelsen, hvilket til dels kan forklare, hvorfor der ikke var blevet truffet korrigerende foranstaltninger. 
Such reports did not reveal clearly enough the implementation problems, which may partly explain the lack of corrective actions.
Udbredelse af resultater, bžredygtighed og evaluering Ringe udbredelse af resultater 50. 
Dissemination, sustainability and evaluation Poor dissemination 50.
Typiske udbredelsesaktiviteter var seminarer, en webside og brochurer. 
Typical dissemination activities were seminars, a webpage and brochures.
I nogle projekter indgik der udbredelsesaktiviteter under projektgennemfżrelsen, men disse ophżrte, nr aktiviteterne afsluttedes. 
Even though some projects had some dissemination activities during project implementation, those ceased when the project activities finished.
For seks projekters vedkommende var de web-sider, der var blevet udarbejdet som led i aktiviteterne, for eksempel ikke blevet opretholdt af stżttemodtageren efter projektets afslutning. 
For example, the web pages created as part of the activities of six projects were not maintained by the beneficiary after the expiry of the project.
Dette viser i en vis udstržkning ogs, hvilken vžrdi man tillagde de opnede resultater, eftersom hverken Kommissionen eller de russiske myndigheder havde afsat de nżdvendige midler til udbredelse. 
To some degree, this also demonstrates the perceived value of the results achieved, as insufficient funds were devoted by the Commission and Russian side to the dissemination of the results.
Kommissionen havde heller ikke et specifikt system og specifikke retningslinjer for effektiv udbredelse af resultaterne af og de indhżstede erfaringer fra Tacis-projekterne. 
Nor had the Commission proper systems and instructions for effectively disseminating the results and lessons learned from the TACIS projects.
Der er for eksempel ikke en offentlig database, hvor alle Tacis-projekterne er samlet. 
For example, there is no consolidated, public database on TACIS projects.
De russiske myndigheder er heller ikke fuldt ud klar over resultaterne af Tacis-projekterne. 
Nor are the Russian authorities fully aware of the results of TACIS projects.
Ringe bžredygtighed 52. 
Poor sustainability 52.
Som anfżrt ovenfor var der mange problemer med at n resultaterne og f udbredt oplysninger om de opnede resultater. 
As noted above, there were several problems in achieving the results of the projects and disseminating information about the results achieved.
Endvidere havde stżttemodtagerne kun sjžldent anvendt outputs ssom rapporter og modeller eller udviklet dem yderligere. 
Furthermore, the beneficiaries have only rarely used or further developed the outputs such as reports and models.
Kun for fem af de reviderede projekters vedkommende var resultaterne bžredygtige. 
The results of only five of the projects audited were sustainable.
Kommissionen gennemfżrer sektorspecifikke eller landespecifikke evalueringer, men evaluerer sjžldent enkeltprojekter. 
The Commission carries out sector or countrywide evaluations, but targets rather seldomly individual projects.
Kun to af de 29 reviderede projekter var blevet evalueret. 
Only two of the 29 projects audited were evaluated.
Det er utilstržkkeligt, eftersom mange af projekterne var pilotprojekter, og i betragtning af, hvor mange midler der var afsat, og det er ikke tilstržkkeligt til at forbedre udformningen af kommende projekter. 
This is inadequate considering the intended pilot nature of many of the projects as well as the amount of money involved, and it is not at the level required to improve the design of future projects.
KONKLUSION OG ANBEFALINGER Konklusion 54. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions 54.
Den Russiske Fżderation er en vigtig handelspartner og politisk partner for EU. 
The Russian Federation is an important trading and political partner of the EU.
Effektiv EU-bistand, som sigter p at skabe betingelserne for demokrati, retssikkerhed og sund żkonomisk vžkst i Den Russiske Fżderation og p at udvikle et sandt partnerskab mellem EU og Den Russiske Fżderation, kan vžre et vigtigt og vžrdifuldt instrument. 
Effective EU assistance aiming at creating conditions for democracy, rule of law and sound economic growth in the Russian Federation and to develop a true partnership between the EU and the Russian Federation can be an important and meaningful instrument.
Omkring en tredjedel af de reviderede projekter opfyldte mlene fuldt ud. 
About one third of the audited projects fully achieved their objectives.
Otte projekter opfyldte mlene delvist, og 12 af projekterne opfyldte ikke mlene (jf. punkt 18). 
In eight cases the objectives were partially reached and in twelve cases they were not reached (see paragraph 18).
Resultaterne af fem af de reviderede projekter var bžredygtige (jf. punkt 52). 
The results of five of the projects audited were sustainable (see paragraph 52).
Ovennžvnte revisionsresultater viser, at effektiviteten af de anvendte Tacis-midler har vžret lav, og Retten kan derfor ikke give en positiv vurdering af resultaterne af Tacis-projekterne i Den Russiske Fżderation. 
Considering the above audit results, which show that the effectiveness of the use of TACIS funds has been low, the Court cannot assess the performance of TACIS projects in the Russian Federation positively.
Revisionen viste imidlertid, at kontrahenterne og overvgningseksperterne opfyldte kravene i deres kontrakter. 
However, the audit revealed that the performance of contractors and monitors met the requirements of their contracts.
De vigtigste svagheder var: a) Kommissionen har udviklet et programmerings-og projekt-cyklusforvaltningssystem til planlžgning og forvaltning af Tacis-programmer og lignende programmer. 
The main failings are the following: (a) for the purposes of planning and management of TACIS and other similar programmes the Commission has developed systems of programming and project cycle management.
Dette system skal sikre, at de midler, der er afsat til en aktivitet, anvendes effektivt, men de nżdvendige forberedelser og godkendelser af programmeringsdokumenter og de hertil knyttede hżringer har gjort programmeringsprocessen lang. 
This system framework is aimed at ensuring effective use of the funds allocated to an activity although the need to prepare and approve the programming documents and the related consultations made the programming process long.
Til trods for de meget detaljerede programmeringssystemer og Kommissionens indsats var der sjžldent en egentlig dialog med de russiske myndigheder og stżttemodtagerne, og det fżrte i nogle tilfžlde til, at de russiske myndigheder accepterede bistand, som de endelige stżttemodtagere egentlig ikke żnskede. 
Despite the exhaustive programming systems and the CommissionŐs efforts, a real dialogue with the Russian authorities and beneficiaries often did not take place resulting in some cases where the Russian authorities accepted assistance, which the final beneficiaries did not actually want.
De dokumenter, der blev udarbejdet, var derfor meget generelle og afspejlede ikke stżttemodtagernes reelle behov (jf. punkt 20-22). b) Det afspejlede sig i udformningen af mange af projekterne. 
Under these circumstances the documents had to be drafted at a very general level, not reflecting the real needs of the beneficiaries (see paragraphs 20 to 22); (b) this was reflected in the design of many projects.
Mlene var nogle gange upržcise og ikke-mlelige, og i nogle tilfžlde var de underliggende antagelser urealistiske. 
Objectives were sometimes imprecise and not measurable and in some cases underlying assumptions were unrealistic.
En ržkke tilsyneladende stżrre projekter var i realiteten sammensat af mange forskellige sm projekter med mange forskellige ml og adskillige stżttemodtagere. 
This resulted in ill-founded project budgets. Some apparently larger scale projects in fact comprised many different small projects with many different objectives and several beneficiaries.
Udvžlgelsen af stżttemodtagere og samarbejdet mellem de forskellige stżttemodtagere var problematisk. 
The selection of beneficiaries and the cooperation between various beneficiaries was problematic.
Stżttemodtagerne opfyldte ofte ikke deres forpligtelse til at give et bidrag i form af naturalydelser (lokalt personale, kontorlokaler) under projektgennemfżrelsen. 
During the implementation the beneficiaries often failed to meet their obligations to contribute in-kind (counterpart staff, office accommodation).
Et specifikt eksempel p, at dialogen mellem Kommissionen og de russiske myndigheder ikke var god nok, var, at det ikke var muligt at kżbe momsfrie varer fra nationale leverandżrer (jf. punkt 25-34). c) Kommissionen tog ikke i tilstržkkelig grad bžredygtighedspotentialet i betragtning, nr den planlagde projekterne, og nr et projekt nede de planlagte resultater, blev disse ikke udbredt p effektiv vis. 
A specific aspect illustrating the insufficient dialogue between the Commission and the Russian authorities is the impossibility of purchases free of VAT from domestic suppliers (see paragraphs 25 to 34); (c) the potential sustainability was not given sufficient consideration by the Commission when planning the projects, and further, when a project achieved its results, they were not effectively disseminated.
Det var derfor begržnset, hvor meget resultaterne blev anvendt, og i hvor stor udstržkning der blev taget ved lžre af dem (jf. punkt 52). 
Thus the replication of activities and learning from the results remained limited (see paragraph 52).
Der blev praktisk talt ikke anvendt samfinansiering med henblik p at skabe en stżrre fżlelse af ejerskab (jf. punkt 37). 
Co-financing was practically not used to get more ownership (see paragraph 37);
19.5.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 119/11 d) Overvgningseksperterne havde ikke til opgave at vurdere projekternes fżlgevirkninger efter afslutningen af aktiviteterne, og der blev ikke kompenseret herfor i form af evalueringer. 
19.5.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 119/11 (d) the assessment of the impact of the projects after the expiry of the projectsŐ activities was not part of the monitorsŐ duties and this was not compensated for by evaluations.