natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I 2016 meddelte projektet, at det under en ny auktionsordning ikke havde været i stand til at sikre indkomststøtte, fordi medlemsstaten havde fjernet øremærkningen af midler til havenergisektoren fra den pågældende ordning. 
In 2016, the project reported that under a new competitive auctioning scheme, it had failed to secure revenue support because the Member State had removed the ring fencing for the ocean sector from that scheme.
I mangel af alternative finansieringskilder til dækning af det deraf følgende finansieringskløft var projektet ikke i stand til at træffe en endelig investeringsbeslutning inden den 31. december 2016 og trak sig. 
In absence of alternative funding sources to cover the ensuing funding gap, the project was not able to reach FID by 31 December 2016 and withdrew.
Tekstboks 6 - CCS-projekter under EEPR og lovgivningsmæssig usikkerhed EEPR-projektet i Tyskland indledte arbejdet før tiden, efter at det allerede med succes havde idriftsat et pilotanlæg og en dermed forbundet landbaseret lagerfacilitet. 
Box 6 – EEPR CCS projects and regulatory uncertainty The EEPR project in Germany started works early after it had already successfully deployed a pilot plant and associated onshore storage facility.
Trods indledende tilsagn fra medlemsstaten om støtte til denne teknologi og dette projekt, fik forsinkelser i gennemførelsen af CCS-direktivet og den endelige udformning af den nationale CCS-lovgivning projektsponsoren til at konkludere, at projektet ikke var rentabelt. 
Despite initial commitment from the Member State to this technology and project, delays in the transposition of the CCS Directive and the final design of the national CCS legislation made the project sponsor decide that the project was unviable.
Projektsponsoren annullerede derfor projektet i 2013, selv om Kommissionen allerede havde udbetalt 15 millioner euro. 
It thus cancelled the project in 2013 while the Commission had already paid out 15 million euro.
EEPR-projektet i Det Forenede Kongerige havde afgivet et bud i landets anden indkaldelse af forslag til CCS-projekter (2012-2015)37: en national ordning til støtte af to CCS-demonstrationsprojekter, der omfattede hele forsyningskæden. 
The EEPR project in the UK had submitted a bid in the country’s second CCS competition (2012-2015)37: a national scheme to support two full-chain CCS demonstration projects.
I oktober 2012 undlod regeringen at udvælge dette projekt til støtte, selv om den havde godkendt opførelsen af projektet på den oprindelige liste over forhåndsudvalgte projekter under EEPR i 2009. 
In October 2012, the government did not select this project for support, even if it had endorsed its inclusion in the original list of pre-selected projects for EEPR in 2009.
Projektet opnåede heller ikke NER300-støtte i 2012. 
The project then also failed to get a NER300 grant in 2012.
Kommissionen har dog i alt udbetalt 120 millioner euro til projektet siden 2009 under EEPR. 
However, the Commission paid a total of €120 million to this project since 2009 under EEPR.
Den kendsgerning, at projektet ikke fik den forventede offentlige støtte fra andre kilder, og de langvarige drøftelser mellem medlemsstaten og Kommissionen om, hvordan der kunne ydes støtte til projektet 37 Jf. 
Not getting the expected public support from other sources and prolonged discussions between the Member State and the Commission on how the project might be supported through other mechanisms at later stages compromised the viability of the project and the value obtained for the paid EU funds.
"Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support", rapport fra Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, af 20.1.2017. 
These ought to be aligned with international climate agreements and long-term emission reduction 37 See ‘Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support’, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, 20 January 2017.
Programmet skulle bidrage med 100 millioner pund til finansiering af 75 % af to tilbudsgiveres design-og anlægsomkostninger (FEED-undersøgelser). 
The programme would spend 100 million pound to fund 75 % of two bidders’ design and engineering costs (FEED studies).
Op til 900 millioner pund ville være tilgængelige i kapitalstøtte til de to projekter. 
Up to 900 million pound would be available towards capital support for the two projects.
Otte projekter havde afgivet tilbud, mens nogle også havde ansøgt om NER300-tilskud. 
Eight projects had made bids, while some had also applied for NER300 grants.
De bør være i overensstemmelse med internationale klimaaftaler og langsigtede målsætninger for reduktion af emissioner (dvs. frem til 2050 og derefter). 
objectives (i.e. towards 2050 and beyond).
Når der ikke er fastsat sådanne klare målsætninger for klima og energi (f.eks. i lovgivningen), og der ikke er stabile langsigtede perspektiver, giver det imidlertid anledning til yderligere usikkerhed, hvilket skaber ugunstige investeringsvilkår for denne type innovative og risikable projekter. 
However, when such climate and energy objectives are not clearly established (e.g. enacted in law) and do not have a stable long term outlook, this creates further uncertainty harming the investment conditions for this type of innovative and risky projects.
Tekstboks 7 beskriver kort, hvorfor der stadig skal arbejdes intensivt med dette spørgsmål. 
Box 7 describes briefly how there is still much work to be done on this matter.
32 Tekstboks 7 - Strategier for kulstoffattig udvikling og deres indvirkning på energiinnovationen I henhold til forordningen fra 2013 om overvågningsmekanismen (MMR-forordningen) skulle medlemsstaterne senest i 2015 indgive deres strategier for kulstoffattig udvikling for 2050 og ajourføringer vedrørende fremskridtene i marts 2017. 
31 Box 7 – Low carbon development strategies and their impact on energy innovation Under the 2013 EU Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (MMR), Member States were required to submit to the European Environment Agency by 2015 their ‘Low-Carbon Development Strategies’ for 2050, and report progress in March 2017.
Ifølge en ny undersøgelse38 havde kun 13 ud af de 28 medlemsstater i 2017 strategier, der kunne karakteriseres som strategier for kulstoffattig udvikling i henhold til projektets kriterier. 
According to a recent study38, by 2017, only thirteen out of twenty-eight Member States had strategies that qualified as low carbon development strategies under criteria developed by the project.
Ifølge undersøgelsen varierer kvaliteten af de indsendte strategier meget, og ikke alle strategier og politikker i dokumenterne er gennemført i lovgivningen. 
The study reported that the quality of the strategies submitted varies a lot and that not all strategies and policies included in these documents are enacted in law.
Ifølge forslaget til forordningen om energiunionen fra november 2016 skal medlemsstaterne løbende udarbejde nationale energi-og klimaplaner for perioden 2021-2030 og årtierne derefter. 
The proposed Energy Union Regulation of November 2016 requires Member States to produce national energy and climate plans (NCEPs) for the period from 2021 to 2030 and later decades on a rolling basis.
Medlemsstaterne skal også i januar 2020 og hvert tiende år udarbejde og indgive deres langsigtede lavemissionsstrategier med en tidshorisont på 50 år. 
Member States will also have to prepare and report to the Commission by January 2020 and every ten years their long-term low emission strategies with a 50 years perspective.
Ud over mange andre store udfordringer var priserne på CO2-markedet under EU ETS, som var lavere end forventet, en væsentlig hindring. 
32 challenges, a key factor keeping them from doing so was the lower than expected carbon market price under EU ETS.
Figur 9 illustrerer denne udvikling. 
Figure 9 shows the evolution.
Figur 9 - Historiske priser på EU ETS-kvoter (euro/ton CO2-ækvivalent) 2008-201739 33 Kilde: Revisionsretten på grundlag af det månedlige gennemsnit for syv futurekontrakter vedrørende EU-emissionskvoter (Quandl). 
Figure 9 – Historical price of EU ETS allowances (euros/ tonne of CO2e) 2008-201739 Source: ECA, based on monthly average of seven EUA futures contracts (Quandl).
Revisionsretten konstaterede, at CCS-projekter, der ansøgte om et EEPR-tilskud i 2009, havde brugt de høje og stigende CO2-priser som grundlag for deres finansielle planer. 
We found that CCS projects when they had applied in 2009 for an EEPR grant had relied on high and increasing carbon prices to underpin their financial plans.
En gennemgang af EEPR-tilskudsansøgninger indsendt i 2009 af de seks projektledere, der 39 Fra midten af 2017 begyndte markedsprisen på EU ETS-kvoter at stige og toppede på 16 euro pr. ton CO2 i maj. januar -09 januar -10 januar -11 januar -12 januar -13 januar -14 januar -15 januar -16 januar -17 
A review of the EEPR grant applications submitted in 2009 by the six promotors that were later awarded grants showed that they expected the carbon price to range between 20 and 40 euro per tonne of CO2 during the construction and demonstration phases.
Et projekt beskrev, hvordan dets finansielle plans rentabilitet også afhang af elpriserne. 
One project showed how the viability of its financial plan also depended on electricity prices.
Projektet vurderede, at kun en pris på mellem 65-90 euro pr. ton CO2 reelt ville gøre det muligt at gennemføre CCS-demonstrationsprojektet uden tab. 
It estimated that only a carbon price ranging between 65 and 90 euro per tonne of CO2 would actually enable the CCS demonstration project to run without losses.
Ifølge deres finansieringsplaner forventede projekterne ofte at modtage betydelig finansiering fra NER300 i fremtiden, selv om den endelige udformning af NER300 ikke var kendt på daværende tidspunkt (i 2009). 
In their financing plans, these projects frequently expected to receive significant funding from NER300 in the future, even though at that time (in 2009) the final design of NER300 was not known.
Tekstboks 8 beskriver, hvordan CO2-markedsprisen også afgjorde det maksimale NER300-tilskudsbeløb40. 
Box 8 describes how the carbon market price also determined the maximum size of NER300 grants40.
Kommissionen accepterede disse meget usikre finansielle planer, undertegnede tilskudsaftalerne og udbetalte 43 % af de bevilgede midler under EEPR. 
The Commission accepted these highly uncertain financial plans, signed the grant agreements and paid 43 % of the awarded funds under the EEPR.
Tekstboks 8 - ETS-kvoternes faldende værdi medførte lavere NER300-tilskud Med udgangspunkt i medlemsstaternes bekræftelser og EIB's due diligence-rapporter foretog vi beregninger for otte projekter i CCS-energisektoren og nåede frem til, at omkostningerne41 under NER300 til udbredelse og drift af deres CCS-infrastruktur gennemsnitligt beløb sig til 1,4 milliarder euro. 
33 Box 8 – The fall in the value of ETS allowances led to smaller NER300 grants Based on Member State confirmation letters and EIB due diligence reports we calculated for eight CCS power sector projects, that the costs41 under NER300 to deploy and operate their CCS infrastructure on average amounted to 1.4 billion euro.
ETS-direktivet fastsatte et loft over NER300-tilskud på 15 % af de 300 millioner tilgængelige rettigheder (dvs. svarende til 45 millioner rettigheder). 
The ETS Directive capped the size of a NER300 grant at 15 % of the 300 million available allowances (i.e. equal to 45 million allowances).
Da CO2-markedsprisen faldt fra 15 euro pr. rettighed i 2010 til omkring 7,5 euro i 2011, faldt det forventede størst mulige beløb for et NER300-tilskud også fra 675 millioner euro til 337 millioner euro. 
When the carbon market price dropped from €15 per allowance in 2010 to approximately €7.5 in 2011, this also reduced the expected largest possible size of a NER300 grant from €675 million to €337 million.
Kommissionen fastsatte det i sidste ende til 300 millioner euro. 
The Commission finally set it at €300 million.
For kapitalintensive CCS-projekter, der forventede at modtage et langt højere tilskud fra NER300, var det et alvorligt tilbageslag. 
For capital-intensive CCS projects that expected to receive much higher support from NER300, this was a major setback.
Det skete, mens projektsponsorerne indgav og afventede behandlingen af deres forslag i 2011-2012. 
It happened as project sponsors submitted and awaited the evaluation of their proposals in 2011-2012.
Da Kommissionen havde rangordnet CCS-projekterne og anmodede medlemsstaterne om bekræftelse, meddelte Kommissionen medlemsstaterne, at den antog, at de ville dække den deraf følgende forskel mellem det størst mulige forventede NER300-tilskud på 337 millioner euro og det samlede behov for offentlig finansiering til disse projekter. 
When the Commission had ranked the CCS projects and sought Member State confirmation, it announced to these Member States that it assumed that they would make up for the resulting gap between the largest expected NER300 grant of €337 million and the total public funding needed for these projects.
Denne forskel kunne beløbe sig til flere hundrede millioner euro, som medlemsstaterne ikke var villige til at dække. 
This gap could amount to hundreds of millions of euros, which Member States were not willing to plug.
CCS-projekterne under EEPR i Det Forenede Kongerige og Nederlandene (de eneste, der fortsatte efter 2013) blev aldrig i stand til at (gen)etablere deres finansielle bæredygtighed på grund af de faldende priser. 
The EEPR CCS projects in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (the only ones to continue after 2013) were never able to (re-)establish their financial viability in light of the 40 See the relevant NER300 sections of the evaluation of the EU ETS Directive carried out within the project “Support for the review of the EU Emissions Trading System” of November 2015, prepared by the Austrian Umweltbundesamt in cooperation with Ecologic and SQ Consult in November 2015 under a service contract with the European Commission.
De forventede finansielle fordele ved at opsamle og lagre CO2 og dermed undgå høje omkostninger under EU ETS materialiserede sig ikke som forventet. 
The expected financial benefits of capturing and storing CO2 and thereby avoiding high costs under the EU ETS would not materialise as expected.
I 2012 foretog Kommissionen en intern analyse42 af konsekvenserne af den faldende CO2-markedspris. 
In 2012, the Commission made an internal assessment42 of the impact of the decreasing carbon market price.
Den bemærkede, at det var blevet meget vanskeligt for projekterne at træffe en endelig investeringsbeslutning. 
It noted that it had become very difficult for these projects to take a final investment decision.
Den opretholdt ikke desto mindre EEPR's finansielle støtte og tillod, at et vist arbejde med transport-og lagringspakker i Det Forenede Kongerige og Nederlandene fortsatte. 
It nevertheless maintained EEPR financial support and allowed some work on transport and storage packages in the UK and the Netherlands to continue.
Kommissionen brugte det argument, at projekterne potentielt kunne være til gavn for andre udledere inden for samme områder, hvis de gav anledning til opførelse af infrastruktur til fælles brug. 
The Commission applied the rationale that those projects could potentially benefit other emitters in the same areas if they would enable the construction of infrastructure for shared use.
Kommissionen og projektsponsoren besluttede i 2011 at bremse projektarbejdet i Nederlandene som følge af de lave CO2-markedspriser. 
The Commission and the project sponsor had decided in 2011 to slow down the work of the project in the Netherlands in view of the low carbon market prices.
Kommissionen gjorde en stor indsats i 2015-2017 for at finde ekstra finansieringskilder til at dække finansieringsbehovet. 
The Commission made significant efforts in 2015-2017 to identify extra funding sources to cover the gaps.
Den arrangerede flere rundbordsdrøftelser med centrale interessenter fra industrien og medlemsstaterne i Bruxelles og søgte at fremme fælles interesser i at videreføre projektet. 
It organised various roundtable meetings with key industry and Member State stakeholders in Brussels and sought common interests to continue the project.
Målet var som minimum at opføre den krævede infrastruktur og drive den i en kort demonstrationsperiode. 
The goal was to at least construct the required infrastructure and operate it for a short demonstration period.
Projektsponsoren endte med at trække sin støtte til projektet i 2017. 
The project sponsor finally withdrew its support from the project in 2017.
Den manglende finansielle bæredygtighed er den primære hindrende faktor for udbredelse af CCS i EU. 
The lack of financial viability is the main blocking factor for CCS deployment in the EU.
Det kraftige fald i CO2-markedsprisen og den kendsgerning, at ingen af EEPR-projekterne har været i stand til at sikre tilstrækkelig ekstra offentlig finansiering via 42 Intern kommunikation mellem GD ENER og GD BUDG om udbetalingerne i EEPR's første år, som var langt lavere end forventet. 
The sharp decrease of the carbon market price and the failure of any EEPR project to secure an adequate amount of extra public funding through NER300 or national programmes by 2012 or other revenues, compromised their viability.
Kommissionen undlod på daværende tidspunkt at suspendere eller ophæve sin finansielle støtte til CCS-demonstrationsprojekter under EEPR og fortsatte efter 2013 udbetalingerne til to projekter, der i sidste ende mislykkedes. 
The Commission did not suspend or terminate its financial support to the demonstration of CCS under EEPR at that time and continued after 2013 to make payments to two projects that ultimately failed.
NER300's udformning begrænsede Kommissionens og medlemsstaternes mulighed for at reagere på de skiftende forhold. Vi undersøgte, om NER300-programmets overordnede udformning opfyldte de identificerede behov, og om projektudvælgelsesprocedurerne sikrede, at der blev bevilget tilskud til de bedste tilgængelige projekter. 
The design of NER300 limited the Commission and Member States’ ability to respond to changing circumstances We examined whether the general design of the NER300 programme matched identified needs and whether the project selection procedures ensured that it would award 42 Internal exchanges between DG ENER and DG BUDG about the much lower than expected payment rates in the first years of EEPR.
Revisionsretten undersøgte desuden, om forvaltningen af NER300 gav mulighed for effektiv og fleksibel udførelse af opgaver i de enheder, der forvalter dette innovationsprogram. 
We further examined whether the NER300 governance arrangements allowed for an effective and flexible performance of tasks by the entities managing this innovation programme.
Den valgte NER300-finansieringsmodel nedbragte ikke på effektiv vis risici i forbindelse med demonstrationsprojekter Kommissionen skal foretage en konsekvensanalyse af sine største initiativer og de initiativer, der vil få de mest vidtrækkende konsekvenser. 
The chosen NER300 funding model did not effectively de-risk demonstration projects The Commission is required to perform an impact assessment for its most important initiatives and for those that will have the most far-reaching impacts.
Dette gælder ændringen i 2009 af ETS-direktivet (som senere skulle blive til retsgrundlag for oprettelsen af NER300) samt Kommissionens afgørelse fra 2010 om gennemførelsesbestemmelser for NER300. 
This applies to the 2009 amendment of the ETS Directive (which would later become the legal basis for the creation of NER300) as well as to the 2010 Commission decision laying down NER300 implementing provisions.
I forbindelse med gennemgangen af de konsekvensanalyser af retsgrundlaget for NER300, som Kommissionen havde udarbejdet, konstaterede vi, at Kommissionens oprindelige forslag43 til ændring af EU ETS-direktivet ikke indeholdt en mekanisme til fremme af CCS-demonstrationsprojekter. 
When reviewing the impact assessments for the NER300 legal basis prepared by the Commission, we found that the initial proposal43 from the Commission for the EU ETS review did not include a mechanism to incentivise CCS demonstration projects.
Kommissionens ledsagende konsekvensanalyse44 indeholdt dermed heller ikke nogen relevant behovsvurdering vedrørende retsgrundlaget for NER300. 
The accompanying Commission impact assessment44 thus also did not include any relevant needs assessment for the legal basis for NER300.
En sådan vurdering ville f.eks. have kortlagt finansieringsbehovet i forbindelse med demonstrationsprojekter inden for alle støtteberettigede teknologiske kategorier. 
Such an assessment would, for example, have mapped the funding needs of demonstration projects in all technology categories envisaged to receive support.
også have identificeret de tilgængelige nationale støttemekanismer og begrundet behovet for et EU-program som supplement hertil. 
It would have also identified available national support mechanisms and justified why an EU-level programme was required to supplement these.
Idéen til mekanismen opstod først i lovgivningsprocessen i forbindelse med ændringen af ETS-direktivet. 
The idea for the mechanism first appeared during the legislative process for the ETS review.
I sit dokument fra 2008 med politiske løsningsmodeller "Financing large scale demonstration of emerging energy technologies (f.eks. CCS Demonstration Plants)" bemærkede Kommissionen, at kun et begrænset antal medlemsstater sandsynligvis ville støtte en CCS-mekanisme. 
In its 2008 policy options paper ‘Financing large scale demonstration of emerging energy technologies (e.g. CCS Demonstration Plants)’ the Commission had noted that only a limited group of Member States was likely to support a mechanism for CCS.
NER300's endelige udformning omfattede både CCS og innovative vedvarende energikilder. 
The final design of NER300 included both CCS and innovative renewables.
Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet havde indsat en artikel, der fastsatte retsgrundlaget for NER300 i det ændrede ETS-direktiv og udvidede dets anvendelsesområde til at omfatte vedvarende energi. 
The European Parliament and Council had inserted the article establishing the legal basis for NER300 in the revised ETS Directive and extended its scope to cover renewable energy.
Vi fandt, at der ikke forelå tilstrækkelig dokumentation for behovet for en supplerende finansieringsmekanisme af denne art på EU-niveau. 
We found that insufficient evidence was available justifying the need for an additional funding mechanism of this type at EU level.
Der forelå ikke en tilfredsstillende vurdering til at understøtte retsgrundlaget for NER300 med en redegørelse for, hvilken form for støtte projekter inden for tidlig demonstration af en bred vifte af vedvarende energiteknologier og CCS ville have behov for, og hvorfor levering af støtte efter idriftsætningen ville opfylde alle projektkategoriers behov for risikobegrænsning. 
No satisfactory assessment was available to underpin the legal basis of NER300 explaining what type of support early demonstration projects of a wide range of renewable energy technologies and CCS would need and why delivering support after entry into operation would meet the de-risking needs of projects from all categories.
Vi undersøgte desuden, om bestemmelserne i den nye artikel om NER300 i 2009-ajourføringen af ETS-direktivet forhindrede muligheden for udbetaling af midler i de tidlige projektfaser. 
We also verified whether the provisions of the new NER300 article in the 2009 update of the ETS Directive prevented the possibility of paying funds at early projects stages.
I henhold til direktivet skal tildelingen af tilskud baseres på verificerede undgåede CO2-emissioner. 
The Directive determined that grant allocation should occur based on verified avoided CO2 emissions.
Kommissionens juridiske fortolkning var, at det kunne være en forudsætning for udbetaling, men også en betingelse for tilbagebetaling, hvis projektet slår fejl. 
The Commission’s legal interpretation was that this could be a pre-condition for disbursement but also a condition for repayment in case of project failure.