natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I de andre tilfžlde mler de anvendte evalueringsindikatorer kun den samlede operationelle aktivitet (3), men giver ikke oplysninger om en specifik region eller et specifikt fiskeri. 
In other cases, the evaluation indicators employed only measured overall operational activity (3) and supplied no information about specific regions or fisheries.
De gżr det sledes ikke muligt at udtale sig om effektiviteten af kontrol-og inspektionsaktiviteten. 
It was therefore not possible to form an opinion regarding the effectiveness of control and inspection activity.
EF-Fiskerikontrolagenturet (Vigo), et koordineringsredskab med begržnset kompetence 86. 
The Community Fisheries Control Agency (Vigo), a coordination instrument with limited powers 86.
Der er oprettet et EF-fiskerikontrolagentur med hovedsžde i Vigo (Spanien), der skal Čtilrettelžgge den operative koordinering af medlemsstaternes fiskerikontrol og -inspektion og bist dem med at samarbejde med henblik p at overholde bestemmelserne i den fžlles fiskeripolitik for derigennem at sikre disses effektive og ensartede anvendelseÇ (4). 
A Community fisheries control agency, with its headquarters in Vigo (Spain), has been created Ôto organise operational coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by the Member States and to assist them to cooperate so as to comply with the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in order to ensure its effective and uniform applicationŐ (4).
I modsžtning til hvad man kunne forvente i betragtning af agenturets navn, har det ingen egentlig kompetence p omrdet fiskerikontrol. 
Contrary to what its name might suggest, the Agency has no powers of its own in relation to fisheries control.
(1) I Spanien er en bestemt regions indre farvande det omrde, der gr fra kysten og ud til en tžnkt lige linje (ČLineas de Base RectaÇ), der forbinder de to kystpunkter, der ligger lžngst fra hinanden i denne region. 
(1) In Spain internal waters means, for a given region, the area extending from the coast to an imaginary straight line (Lneas de Base Recta) between the two furthest coastal points of that region.
(2) I Frankrig mler man den relative forekomst af overtrždelser (forhol-det: antal konstaterede overtrždelser/antal inspektioner); den relative forekomst, som myndighederne offentliggjorde, er 6,6 %, og den, der blev beregnet p grundlag af de data, revisorerne fik, er 12,4 %. 
(2) France measures the offending rate (ratio of the number of infringements found/number of inspections); the figure published by the authorities is 6,6 % and the rate calculated on the basis of the data received by the auditors is 12,4 %.
(3) Samletantalinspektionertillandsellertilsżs,samletantaltimerbrugt p inspektion osv. 
(3) Total number of inspections on land or at sea, total number of hours spent on inspections, etc.
(4) Rdetsforordning(EF)nr.768/2005af26.4.2005omoprettelseafet EF-fiskerikontrolagentur og om žndring af forordning (EŻF) nr. 2847/93 om indfżrelse af en kontrolordning under den fžlles fiskeripolitik (EUT L 128 af 21.5.2005, s. 
(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 768/2005 of 26 April 2005 establishing a Community Fisheries Control Agency and amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy (OJ L 128, 21.5.2005, p.
28.12.2007 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 317/17 87. 
28.12.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 317/17 87.
Agenturet har vedtaget sit fżrste arbejdsprogram, for 2007, og det er derfor endnu for tidligt at udtale sig om, hvorvidt dets aktiviteter har haft en effekt p de svagheder, der blev identificeret i lżbet af revisionen, men man kan allerede nu beklage, at de skaldte EF-inspektżrers (1) befżjelser er begržnset til aktioner til sżs, og at samarbejde om opfżlgning af overtrždelser og sanktioner for overtrždelser ikke hżrer ind under agenturets kompetenceomrde. 
Since the first work programme adopted by the Agency was the programme for 2007, it is still too soon to judge the eventual impact of its activities on the various weaknesses identified during the audit.
88. Et effektivt system til opfżlgning af overtrždelser og sanktioner forudsžtter, at hver formodet overtrždelse behandles, og at de sanktioner, der fastsžttes, virker afskržkkende. 
An effective system for following up infringements and imposing penalties presupposes that every presumed offence is dealt with and that when a penalty is imposed, it serves as a deterrent.
Det gžlder svel for de overtrždelser, som erhvervsdrivende begr, og som er underlagt de nationale myndigheders jurisdiktion, som for de tilfžlde, Kommissionen har konstateret, hvor medlemsstaterne ikke har opfyldt deres forpligtelser. 
This applies equally to infringements by operators subject to the jurisdiction of national authorities and Member States whose failings have been identified by the Commission.
De nationale systemer er generelt ikke sžrlig skrappe 89. 
National systems on the whole lack severity 89.
Ifżlge fžllesskabsbestemmelserne skal de nationale opfżlgnings-og sanktionssystemer sżrge for, at der tržffes passende foranstaltninger i forbindelse med alle overtrždelser, herunder, hvor det er relevant, en afskržkkende sanktion(2). 
National systems for following up offences and imposing penalties must, according to Community law, ensure that every infringement is subject to appropriate follow-up proceedings leading, if necessary, to a deterrent penalty (2).
Svagheder svel ved de gžldende procedurer som ved de fastsatte sanktioner hindrer opfyldelsen af denne forpligtelse. 
Weaknesses at both the procedural level and in the sanctions imposed are a hindrance to the observance of this obligation.
Opfżlgningsaktionerne er undertiden begržnsede af proceduremžssige eller juridiske rsager 90. 
Follow-up actions are sometimes limited for legal or procedural reasons 90.
I nogle tilfžlde anvendes de gžldende procedurer ikke, fordi de ansvarlige myndigheder finder, det er for dyrt, eller af juridiske rsager, hvilket forhindrer enhver domfžldelse: a) I Det Forenede Kongerige, nžrmere betegnet England og Wales, er 90 % (3) af de overtrždelser, der blev konstateret i 2005, ikke blevet genstand for retsforfżlgning, og inspektżrerne har kun givet advarsler, fordi der ikke fandtes et system med administrative sanktioner og p grund af vurderingen af hensigtsmžssigheden i en strafforfżlgning (vurdering af den almene interesse), der navnlig var baseret p, at omkostningerne ved en sdan procedure blev vurderet til at vžre for hżje i forhold til den bżde, der kunne opkržves. b) I Frankrig blev oplysninger om de usždvanlige forhold, der blev konstateret ved registreringen af fangstdata, af juridiske rsager ikke videresendt til inspektżrerne med henblik p eventuel retsforfżlgning (jf. punkt 35). 
Hence, 90 % (3) of infringements identified in 2005 were not pursued through the Courts and led only to a warning from the inspectorate; (b) in France, for legal reasons, anomalies identified in the registration of catch data were not forwarded to the inspectors with a view to possible judicial proceedings (see paragraph 35).
(1) Der er faktisk tale om nationale inspektżrer udpeget af medlemsstaterne til at deltage i inspektioner inden for rammerne af de aktioner, som agenturet koordinerer. 
(1) In fact, they are national inspectors designated by each Member State to take part in inspections in the context of operations coordinated by the Agency.
(2) Forordning (EF) nr. 2371/2002, artikel 25. 
(2) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25.
(3) For 202 overtrždelser, der blev konstateret ved landingsinspektion ved kontrol om bord, blev der givet 167 mundtlige advarsler, 14 skriftlige advarsler, 20 sager overgik til de juridiske myndigheder, og en sag henstod uafgjort. 
(3) Out of 202 infringements found during landing inspections (including on-board controls) there were 167 oral warnings, 14 written warnings, 20 cases passed to the judicial authorities and one case pending.
Ufuldstžndigt kendskab til sanktioner og fortilfžlde 91. 
Incomplete information about sanctions and previous history 91.
I flere af de besżgte medlemsstater findes der ikke noget centralt edb-register med alle oplysninger om overtrždelser p fiskeriomrdet og om overtržderne. 
In several Member States visited, there is no central computerised repository for all the information relating to fisheries offences and perpetrators of them.
Da der desuden ikke findes oplysninger om de sanktioner, der er truffet for hver enkelt overtrždelsestype, er det ikke muligt at evaluere, hvor effektiv inspektionsindsatsen er, og det kan vžre en hindring for en god strategisk planlžgning og en pržcis mlretning af kontrollerne (jf. punkt 63). 
Moreover, due to the lack of information about the penalties awarded for each type of offence it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of inspection activities, and that same lack is therefore an impediment to good strategic planning and appropriate targeting of inspections (see paragraph 63).
I Det Forenede Kongerige, Frankrig, Italien og Spanien findes der ingen database med oplysninger om alle de sanktioner, der er truffet p fiskeri-omrdet. 
In Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom there is no database that contains all sanctions imposed in the area of fisheries.
I Danmark fik man fżrst en sdan database i 2004. 
In Denmark, it has only existed since 2004.
Manglende integration og harmonisering p fžllesskabsniveau 92. 
Lack of integration and harmonisation at Community level 92.
Den manglende integration og harmonisering p fžllesskabsniveau svžkker sanktionernes effektivitet. 
The lack of Community integration and harmonisation impairs the effectiveness of sanctions.
For det fżrste er det vanskeligt at plžgge en udenlandsk statsborger en sanktion, nr denne forlader det juridiske kompetenceomrde i den medlemsstat, hvor han har beget overtrždelsen. 
An initial difficulty is that of effectively applying the penalty imposed on a foreign national once he or she is beyond the jurisdiction of the State in which the offence was committed.
For det andet er det vanskeligt, for ikke at sige umuligt, for myndighederne i en medlemsstat at tage overtrždelser konstateret i en anden medlemsstat i betragtning, enten fordi de ikke har adgang til oplysningerne, eller af juridiske rsager. 
A second is the difficulty, or even impossibility, of the authorities in one country taking into account infringements recorded by another Member State, whether for reasons of access to information or for legal reasons.
Det katalog over foranstaltninger, som medlemsstaterne skal anvende i forbindelse med alvorlige overtrždelser (4), og som Rdet skal udarbejde, er endnu ikke blevet lavet. 
A catalogue of measures to be applied by Member States in relation to serious infringements (4) was to be drawn up by the Council, but has not yet been created.
Kommissionen har stadig ikke fremsat forslag til Rdet med henblik herp. 
To date, the Commission has still not presented the Council with a proposal to this end.
Ifżlge Kommissionen er sanktionerne generelt meget lidt afskržkkende 94. 
Penalties, on the whole, insufficient deterrent, according to the Commission 94.
Selv uden pržcise instrumenter, er Kommissionen imidlertid kommet til den konklusion, at sanktionerne generelt er meget lidt afskržkkende. 
Nevertheless, even without precise tools, the Commission was able to conclude that overall the penalties imposed were not a good deterrent.
Kommissionen har udtrykt det offentligt p fżlgende mde: Čdet belżb, som fiskerierhvervet betalte som fżlge af sanktionerne [...] [svarer] til ca. to tusindedele af vžrdien af landingerne [...]. 
It stated it publicly in these terms, Ôthe amount paid by the fisheries industry as a consequence of sanctions imposed [...] is roughly equal to two thousandths of the [...] landing value.
Belżbet er af en stżrrelsesorden, der gżr, at der er fare for, at fiskerierhvervet betragter sanktioner for overtrždelser af reglerne for den fžlles fiskeripolitik som almindelige driftsudgifter, og at der ikke er noget virkeligt incitament til at overholde reglerneÇ (5). 
Such an amount entails the risk that the fishing industry may consider penalties imposed for infringements to the CFP rules just as an ordinary running cost for the enterprise and see no real incentive to be compliantŐ (5).
(4) Forordning (EF) nr. 2371/2002, artikel 25, stk. 
(4) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25(4).
4. 
(5) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Ń Reports from Member States on behaviours which seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2004, COM(2006) 387, 14.7.2006.
Se ogs tredje udgave af the Common Fishery Policy Compliance Scoreboard (s. 40). 
See also third edition of the Common Fisheries Policy Compliance Scoreboard (page 40).
C 317/18 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 28.12.2007 Pressionsmidlerne over for medlemsstaterne er kun undtagelsesvis effektive 95. 
C 317/18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 Means of applying pressure on Member States are effective only exceptionally 95.
For at f medlemsstaterne til at overholde deres forpligtelser kan Kommissionen enten indlede overtrždelsesprocedure ved Domstolen eller bruge en af de procedurer, der er specifikke for den fžlles fiskeripolitik. 
In order to get Member States to respect their obligations, the Commission may either have recourse to the Court of Justice and the general procedure for failure to fulfil an obligation, or it may use one of the procedures specific to the CFP.
Disse procedurer er dog alle i kraft af deres natur vanskelige at anvende og kun undtagelsesvis effektive. 
Each of these procedures, however, has features that make it difficult to use and effective only exceptionally.
Langsommelige, tunge og kun undtagelsesvis effektive overtrždelsesprocedurer ... 
Proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation are long, cumbersome and effective only exceptionally ...
Inden overtrždelserne kan indbringes for Domstolen, skal de omtales i en bningsskrivelse og derefter i en begrundet udtalelse. 
In fact, before they reach the Court of Justice the observed failure must be the subject of a formal notice, then of a reasoned opinion.
Hver etape kržver ikke kun et stort forberedelsesarbejde og en hżring af de involverede afdelinger i GD FISH, men ogs at Kommissionens juridiske tjeneste deltager. 
Each of these stages not only requires extensive preparatory work and formal consultation between the relevant departments of DG Fish, but also involves the CommissionŐs legal service.
Oven i den tid, som alle disse etaper tager, kommer, at Kommissionen kun tržffer beslutninger for s vidt angr overtrždelser en gang hvert kvartal. 
The delays inherent in each of these tasks are compounded by the fact that decisions on infringements are taken by the Commission only once in every quarter.
Endvidere kržver overtrždelsesprocedurer p grund af utilstržkkelig ivžrksžttelse af kontrol-, inspektions-eller sankti-onsprocedurer, at Kommissionen udfżrer et stort inspektionsar-bejde. 
Furthermore, proceedings for failure in the implementation of control, inspection or sanctions procedures require a significant volume of inspection work on the part of the Commission.
Nr der ikke findes evalueringskriterier, der nemt kan kontrolleres, er Kommissionen nżdt til at have flere beviser for at kunne vise, at overtrždelserne bde er generelt udbredte og vedvarende. 
Due to the absence of easily verifiable assessment criteria, the Commission has to increase the volume of evidence in order to demonstrate that the failure is both general and permanent.
Det kržver mange kontrolbesżg, navnlig fordi Kommissionens inspektżrer i praksis ikke kan konstatere overtrždelser, hvis der ikke er nationale inspektżrer til stede. 
This requires numerous missions; especially as in practice Commission inspectors cannot officially record an infringement without national inspectors being present.
P grund af opgavens omfang er det endvidere i virkeligheden meget vanskeligt at fżre mere end en af disse sager ad gangen (1). 
All in all, the size of the task in fact makes it difficult to pursue more than one case of this type at a time (1).
Endelig er en dom, en medlemsstat fr for at have tilsidesat sine forpligtelser (2), ikke i sig selv effektiv, eftersom medlemsstaten kun forpligtes til at gennemfżre de til dommens opfyldelse nżdvendige foranstaltninger. 
And lastly, a judgment of failure to fulfil an obligation (2) is not in itself effective, since the Member StateŐs obligation is confined to taking the measures required to execute the judgment.
Hvis der skal plžgges en finansiel sanktion, er det nżdvendigt, at den fżrste dom efterfżlges af endnu en dom (3), fordi bestemmelserne i den fżrste dom ikke er blevet fuldbyrdet. Og for at gżre det skal Kommissionen fżre bevis for, at der siden den fżrste dom stadig og uden afbrydelse er sket overtrždelser. 
In order to result in a financial penalty, the first judgment must be followed by a second one (3), for non-implementation of the provisions of the first one. For that the Commission must bring evidence that the failure has continued without any interruption since the first judgment.
(1) Kommissionen har vurderet, at dens inspektionsenhed mtte bruge 15 % af sine ressourcer i 2005 p tvisten med Frankrig. 
(1) The Commission estimated that in 2005 15 % of its inspection unitŐs resources had to be assigned to work linked to the legal action against France.
(2) Jf. traktatens artikel 226. 
(2) Under Article 226 of the Treaty.
(3) Jf. traktatens artikel 228. 
(3) Under Article 228 of the Treaty.
I praksis findes der p fiskeriomrdet kun t tilfžlde, hvor en medlemsstat er blevet dżmt til at betale en bżde (4). 
In practice, in the area of fisheries, there has only been one case in which a Member State was sentenced to pay a financial penalty (4).
Dommen blev afsagt i 2005 for manglende fuldbyrdelse af en dom fra 1991 vedrżrende en sag, hvor de fżrste overtrždelser var blevet konstateret allerede i 1984, dvs. 
The judgment in question was delivered in 2005 for non-compliance with a 1991 judgment concerning a case in which the first infringements had been recorded in 1984, 21 years earlier.
Denne enkeltstende afgżrelse har dog haft en meget vžsentlig effekt. 
Nevertheless the impact of this one decision was very important.
Den har gjort det muligt for de nationale myndigheder p nogle mneder at f gennemtvunget indfżrelsen og anvendelsen af adskillige procedurer, der hidtil ikke havde fandtes eller fungeret, selv om de havde vžret obligatoriske i adskillige r, og det gjaldt ikke kun i den medlemsstat, der fik bżden, men ogs i de andre medlemsstater, der var indledt en tilsvarende procedure mod. ... og specifikke procedurer, der er begržnsede og vanskelige at ivžrksžtte ... 
It allowed national authorities to impose within months the introduction and application of numerous procedures that had previously been absent or deficient, despite having been compulsory for many years, not only in the country fined but also in the other Member States against which similar proceedings were in progress. ... and limited specific procedures which are difficult to implement ...
Et af de specifikke aktionsmidler, Kommissionen rder over, er muligheden for at tržffe forebyggende foranstaltninger (5), nr der er risiko for, at fiskeri kan fżre til en alvorlig trussel mod bevarelsen af ressourcerne. 
One of the specific lines of action available to the Commission is the possibility of taking preventive measures (5) where there a risk that fishing activities pose a serious threat to conservation of resources.
Men vanskeligheder forbundet med at indsamle de nżdvendige beviser og overholde proportionalitetsprincippet har hidtil afholdt Kommissionen fra at anvende det, s meget desto mere som ržkkevidden af en sdan afgżrelse ville vžre begržnset, da den hżjst er gyldig i seks mneder. 
But the difficulty of gathering the necessary evidence and observing the principle of proportionality have so far dissuaded the Commission from taking such action, especially as the effect of such a decision would be limited, with a maximum application period of six months.
Hvis der i żvrigt konstateres overskridelse af en tidligere kvote (6), kan Kommissionen begržnse de fremtidige fiskerimuligheder for den medlemsstat, der har overskredet kvoten (7). 
On the other hand, where it is found that previous quotas were exceeded (6), the Commission has the power to reduce the future fishing opportunities of the offending Member State (7).
Denne mulighed kržver, at Kommissionen fr tilstržkkelige beviser for, at de endelige fangsttal, som medlemsstaterne har fremsendt, er forkerte. 
This possibility requires the Commission to obtain sufficient evidence that the final catch figures submitted by the Member States are erroneous.
I praksis har det kun vžret muligt at anvende denne bestemmelse en enkelt gang (8) og p grundlag af oplysninger fra nationale inspektioner i en af de straffede medlemsstater. 
In practice it has been possible to implement this provision only once (8), on the basis of information obtained in national inspections of one of the Member States sanctioned.
Kommissionen kan ikke fjerne den stżtte, en medlemsstat modtager inden for rammerne af den fžlles fiskeripolitik, som sanktion for, at medlemsstaten har undladt at anvende kontrolreglerne. 
The Commission does not have the possibility of suspending aid allocated to a Member State under the CFP in case of failure to apply the control rules.
(4) Sag C-304/02, Kommissionen/Frankrig, angende et traktatbrudssżgs-ml i henhold til artikel 228 EF; idżmmelse af betaling af et fast belżb p 20 millioner euro og en tvangsbżde p 57,8 millioner euro for hver periode p seks mneder (dom afsagt den 12.7.2005). Det endte med, at Frankrig betalte det faste belżb og en tvangsbżde. 
(4) Case C-304/02 Commission/France; action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 228 EC; sentenced to pay a lump sum of 20 million euro and a penalty payment of 57,8 million euro for each period of six months (judgment given on 12 July 2005); in fact France paid the lump sum and one penalty payment.
(5) Forordning (EF) nr. 2371/2002, artikel 26, stk. 
(5) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 26(3).
3. (6) Dvs. andre end dem, der vedrżrer det senest afsluttede r, for hvilket der findes en forvaltningsmekanisme, der p visse betingelser gżr det muligt at fordele overskridelsen vedrżrende et r p kvoter for det fżlgende r. 
(6) That is to say, other than those relating to the last complete fisheries year for which an administrative mechanism exists, allowing the reat-tribution, under certain conditions, of excess amounts from one year against the relevant quotas for the following year.
2371/2002, artikel 23, stk. 4. (8) Kommissionensforordning(EF)nr.147/2007af15.2.2007omjuste-ring af visse fiskekvoter fra 2007 til 2012 i henhold til artikel 23, stk. 
(8) Commission Regulation (EC) No 147/2007 of 15 February 2007 adapting certain fish quotas from 2007 to 2012 pursuant to Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy.
28.12.2007 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 317/19 104. 
28.12.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 317/19 104.
I żvrigt har Kommissionen aldrig evalueret, i hvilket omfang medlemsstaterne opfyldte deres forpligtelse til at inddrive den stżtte, der var blevet udbetalt inden for rammerne af strukturfondene for fiskeri, fra modtagere, der ikke overholdt reglerne for den fžlles fiskeripolitik (1). ... medfżrer det, at det kan tage lang tid at afhjžlpe alvorlige mangler i medlemsstaterne 105. 
Furthermore, it has never assessed the extent to which Member States have implemented the obligation imposed upon them to recover aid granted under the fisheries structural funds from beneficiaries who do not comply with CFP rules (1). ... allowing serious shortcomings to persist in the Member States 105.