natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
kan eksempelvis nžvnes, at den foreslog formidling gennem RAN for 16 ud af 20 ISEC-finansierede projekter14, der var blevet afsluttet siden 2011 (hvor RAN blev oprettet), og som den havde vurderet som gode, meget gode eller fremragende. 
For example, out of 20 ISEC-funded projects14 which have ended since 2011 (when the RAN was set up), and which the Commission assessed as good, very good or excellent, it proposed dissemination through the RAN for 16 of them.
Vi konstaterede imidlertid, at formidlingen i over halvdelen af disse tilfžlde ikke fandt sted i praksis. 
However, we found that for over half of these projects this did not happen in practice.
P tidspunktet for vores revision var kun 7 af disse projekter (44 %) faktisk blevet forelagt for en RAN-arbejdsgruppe, p en workshop eller p en konference d) De belgiske myndigheder fortalte os, at fagfolk fra sm organisationer i marken uden forbindelser til regeringen (f.eks. netvžrk af lokale grupper af mżdre til udenlandske krigere) ikke inddrages tilstržkkeligt i RAN til at sikre en egentlig bottom-up-tilgang e) RAN sigter mod at forbedre bottom-up-kommunikationen fra fagfolk til de politiske beslutningstagere. 
23 14 The Belgian authorities informed us that practitioners from small organisations on the ground without links to government (e.g. networks of local groups of foreign fightersŐ mothers) are not sufficiently involved in the RAN to ensure a genuine bottom-up approach.
Det var imidlertid under halvdelen af respondenterne i en spżrgeundersżgelse henvendt til RAN-fagfolk, som RAN selv havde gennemfżrt i 2016, der mente, at RAN havde hjulpet dem til at pvirke de politiske beslutningstagere. 
The RAN aims to improve bottom-up communication from practitioners to policymakers. However, less than half of respondents to a survey of RAN practitioners carried out by the RAN itself in 2016 felt that the RAN had helped them to influence policymakers.
Endvidere anfżrte fire respondenter i vores spżrgeundersżgelse, at forbindelsen mellem RAN og de politiske beslutningstagere kunne styrkes, f.eks. gennem formelle udvekslinger af tilgange og ider. 
In addition, four respondents to our survey suggested that the link between the RAN and policymakers could be strengthened, for example by formal exchanges of approaches and ideas.
Der kan g for lang tid, fżr de behov, der konstateres af fagfolk, bliver integreret i Kommissionens politiske ramme. 
It can take too long for needs identified at practitioner level to find their way into the CommissionŐs policy framework.
F.eks. er spżrgsmlet om radikalisering i fžngsler siden 2011 blevet drżftet af fagfolk (f.eks. fžngselspersonale og tilsynsvžrger, lžrere og socialarbejdere) i RAN's arbejdsgruppe om fžngsler og prżvetid under tilsyn. 
For example, the issue of radicalisation in prisons has been discussed since 2011 at practitioner level (e.g. prison and probation staff, teachers and social workers) by the RAN Prison and Probation Working Group.
Men fżrst i 2015 udpegede Kommissionen specifikke aktioner finansieret af programmet for retlige anliggender, der kunne adressere dette problem. 
However, it was not until 2015 that the Commission identified specific actions financed by the Justice Programme to address this issue.
Kommissionens ramme for resultatvurdering er ikke tilstržkkelig udviklet 29. 
The CommissionŐs framework for assessing results is insufficiently developed 29.
Vi undersżgte, om Kommissionen har resultatindikatorer til at vurdere effektiviteten af sin samlede stżtte, og om der var fastsat realistiske ml. 
We examined whether the Commission has performance indicators for assessing the effectiveness of its overall support and whether realistic targets were set.
I forbindelse med de individuelle aktioner undersżgte vi, om Kommissionen vurderer effektiviteten af sin stżtte for at finde ud af, hvad der virker, og hvad der ikke virker, og hvorfor. 
At the level of individual actions, we examined whether the Commission assesses the effectiveness of its support in order to find out what works and where, and what does not work and why.
Kommissionen har brug for disse oplysninger, s den: a) kan reagere p anmodninger fra Europa-Parlamentet om at evaluere EU's strategi for bekžmpelse af radikalisering og rekruttering til terrorgrupper15 b) lżbende kan forbedre og justere sin politik og stżtte som reaktion p žndringer i trusselssituationen og brugernes behov c) kan formidle og udbrede eksempler p vellykkede projekter for at maksimere synergier (og undg udbredelse af ineffektive eller kontraproduktive projektresultater) d) kan dokumentere over for borgerne, at initiativerne sandsynligvis vil vžre effektive. 
25 respond to requests from the European Parliament to evaluate the EUŐs strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist groups15; improve and adjust its policy and support continuously in response to changes in the threat situation and usersŐ needs; disseminate and scale up examples of successful projects to maximise synergies (and avoid disseminating ineffective or counter-productive project results); demonstrate to citizens that the initiatives are likely to be effective.
Kommissionen evaluerer ikke sin samlede succes med hensyn til at opfylde politikmlene 30. 
The Commission does not evaluate its overall success in achieving policy goals 30.
Vi konstaterede, at Kommissionen ikke i tilstržkkelig grad havde udviklet sin ramme for vurdering af, om dens politik for at stżtte medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering er effektiv og giver valuta for pengene. 
We found that the Commission had not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its policy for supporting Member States in addressing radicalisation is effective and offers value for money.
F.eks. har Kommissionen ikke: a) opdelt de overordnede ml for sin politik for bekžmpelse af radikalisering i mere specifikke og mlbare ml b) fastsat hensigtsmžssige indikatorer og mlsžtninger for anvendelsen af EU-midler for at mle resultaterne med hensyn til at bekžmpe radikalisering c) udarbejdet en omfattende oversigt over de EU-finansierede aktioner til bekžmpelse af radikalisering (jf. punkt 26) d) redegjort for de fulde omkostninger til bekžmpelse af radikalisering. 
For example, the Commission has not: broken down the overall objectives of its counter-radicalisation policy into more specific and measurable objectives; established appropriate indicators and targets for EU funds used, in order to measure performance in addressing radicalisation; provided a comprehensive overview of EU-financed counter-radicalisation actions (see paragraph 26); fully set out the cost of addressing radicalisation.
27 15 indeholdt ingen oplysninger om finansieringsbelżb. 
The 2014 ŇCommunication on preventing radicalisation to terrorismÓ included no information on amounts of funding.
Kommissionen forklarede, at aktionerne ville blive gennemfżrt ved hjžlp af eksisterende ressourcer, men angav ikke hvilke. 
The Commission explained that actions would be implemented using existing resources, but did not specify which ones.
Meddelelsen fra 2016 om stżtte til forebyggelse af radikalisering, der fżrer til voldelig ekstremisme, gav visse oplysninger om finansiering og omkostninger, og det samme gjorde den omfattende vurdering af EU's sikkerhedspolitik fra juli 201716. 
The 2016 ŇCommunication on supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremismÓ provided some information about See, for example, the European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations.
Det skal dog bemžrkes: i) at nogle aktioner er udeladt, f.eks. projekter finansieret af Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi ii) at der for nogle aktioner ikke er beregnet omkostninger, navnlig under EU IRU, EU's internetforum, programmet om styrkelse af civilsamfundet og det europžiske strategiske kommunikationsnet iii) at finansieringsoplysningerne om de forskellige aktioner džkker forskellige perioder iv) at der ikke skelnes mellem omkostninger til aktioner, der specifikt er udformet til at bekžmpe radikalisering (f.eks. 25 millioner euro til RAN-ekspertisecentret), og omkostninger til andre aktioner, som ikke desto mindre bidrager til at forebygge radikalisering (f.eks. 25,6 milliarder euro fra Den Europžiske Socialfond til at fremme social inklusion af drligt stillede grupper). 
However: (i) some actions, such as the projects financed by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ, are omitted; (ii) some actions are not costed, notably the EU IRU, the EU Internet Forum, the Civil Society Empowerment Programme and the European Strategic Communications Network; (iii) funding information for the various actions covers different periods; (iv) no distinction is made between the costs of actions which are specifically designed to address radicalisation (e.g. the Ű25 million for the RAN Centre of Excellence) and those which are not, but which nevertheless help to prevent it (e.g. the Ű25.6 billion from the European Social Fund to foster the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups).
Som fżlge heraf findes der ingen samlet rapport om omkostningerne til og resultaterne af de EU-finansierede aktioner til bekžmpelse af radikalisering. 
As a result, there is no overall report covering the cost and achievements of EU-financed counter-radicalisation actions.
I stedet er spżrgsmlene omhandlet i forskellige rapporter, som beskriver, hvad der er blevet gjort, i stedet for at mle resultaterne med hensyn til at opfylde politikmlene (jf. tekstboks 8). 
Instead, the issues are covered in various reports which describe what has been done rather than measuring success in achieving policy goals (see Box 8).
Kommissionen kan ikke dokumentere, hvor effektive dens enkelte aktioner faktisk er 32. 
The Commission cannot demonstrate how effective its individual actions actually are 32.
Mere aktivitet betyder ikke nżdvendigvis stżrre effektivitet. 
More activity does not necessarily mean greater effectiveness.
Vi konstaterede, at vurderingerne af Kommissionens aktioner til at hjžlpe medlemsstaterne med at bekžmpe radikalisering ofte mler aktivitetsmžngden (f.eks. antallet af mżder eller dokumenter) snarere end effektiviteten (f.eks. hvilken viden, RAN-deltagerne har fet, hvordan de har anvendt den, og hvordan den har pvirket deres job). 
We found that assessments of Commission actions to help Member States address radicalisation often measure achievements in terms of amount of activity (e.g. the number of meetings held or documents produced) rather than effectiveness (e.g. the knowledge acquired by RAN participants, how they applied it, and its impact on their job).
Den nylige omfattende vurdering af EU's sikkerhedspolitik fremhžvede behovet for ogs at evaluere resultaterne og effektiviteten af de aktioner, der har til forml at forebygge terrorisme. 
The recent ŇComprehensive Assessment of EU Security PolicyÓ also highlighted the need to evaluate the results and effectiveness of actions which aim to prevent terrorism.
Der er planlagt evalueringer af de projekter, der finansieres af Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi. 
Evaluations are planned for projects funded by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ.
Projekterne mangler imidlertid ofte effektivitetsindikatorer. 
However, projects often lack effectiveness indicators.
vurderede Kommissionen med hensyn til tre18 af de fem projektforslag, der blev udvalgt efter indkaldelsen i 2014 af forslag til projekter vedrżrende bekžmpelse af radikalisering (jf. punkt 19 b)), at deres evaluerings-og overvgningsstrategier var svage, uklare eller basale, og at de manglede indikatorer til mling af projekternes faktiske effektivitet. 
For example, out of the five successful project proposals in response to the 2014 call for proposals on radicalisation (see paragraph 19(b)), the Commission considered that three of these18 had scarce, vague or basic evaluation and monitoring strategies, and lacked indicators for measuring how effective projects actually were.
I forbindelse med ISEC (den fond, der var forgžnger for Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi) gennemgik Kommissionen den endelige rapport19 for hvert projekt og beskrev de opnede resultater i form af konkrete output. 
For ISEC (the fund which preceded the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ), the Commission reviewed the final report19 for each project and described the results achieved in terms of concrete outputs.
Den vurderede ogs resultaternes kvalitet, dvs. om de var nyttige og kunne overfżres, og hvorvidt og hvordan de burde udbredes. 
It also assessed the quality of results, i.e. whether they were useful and transferable, and whether and how they should be disseminated.
Disse gennemgange indeholdt imidlertid ikke en evidensbaseret evaluering af projekternes effekt. 
18 19 reviews did not provide an evidence-based evaluation of project impacts.
EU IRU i Europol markerer terrorrelateret onlineindhold og indberetter det til de tjenesteydere, der huser det, s de kan fjerne det. 
The EU IRU at Europol flags online terrorist content and refers it to the service providers that host it so that they can remove it.
Resultatmlingen er baseret p mžngden og omfanget af det indberettede indhold, der fjernes af tjenesteydere (jf. figur 5). 
Performance is measured in terms of the amount and proportion of referred content which is removed by service providers (see Figure 5).
Disse statistikker har fżlgende begržnsninger: a) at de ikke viser, hvor meget indhold der er blevet fjernet udelukkende som fżlge af EU IRU's aktioner. 
These statistics have the following limitations: They do not show how much content was removed solely as a result of the EU IRUŐs actions.
EU IRU kan f.eks. bede internetvirksomheder om at fjerne terrorpropaganda, der er ogs blevet markeret af medlemsstater20. 
Indeed, the EU IRU may ask internet companies to remove terrorist propaganda which has also been flagged by Member States20.
Nr EU IRU undersżger propaganda p ikke-EU-sprog (f.eks. arabisk, russisk eller tyrkisk), som i mindre grad undersżges af de nationale internetindberetningsenheder, er risikoen for dette lavere. 
When the EU IRU examines propaganda in non-EU languages (e.g. Arabic, Russian or Turkish) which national Internet Referral Units examine less, the risk is lower.
EU IRU har ingen oplysninger om, hvor meget terrorrelateret indhold der er blevet fjernet af internetvirksomheder p dens anmodning alene uden ogs at vžre markeret af nationale internetindberetningsenheder, civilsamfundet eller FIRST LINE, LIAISE II og SAFFRON. 
The EU IRU does not have information on how much terrorist content has been removed by internet companies at its request alone, without also having been flagged by national IRUs, civil society or the internet companies themselves.
Internetvirksomhederne giver ikke feedback om, hvorfor indhold er blevet fjernet b) at de ikke dokumenterer effektiviteten med hensyn til den mžngde terrorpropaganda, der forbliver p internettet. 
Internet companies do not provide feedback on why content has been removed. They do not demonstrate effectiveness in terms of the amount of terrorist propaganda that remains on the internet.
De 10 respondenter i vores spżrgeundersżgelse, der gav udtryk for en holdning, mente, at det er en udfordring for EU IRU, at den fjernede propaganda blot bliver genuploadet eller flyttet til andre platforme (kendt som "whack-a-mole-effekten"). 
The 10 survey respondents who expressed an opinion felt that one challenge faced by the EU IRU is that the removed propaganda is simply re-uploaded or moved to other platforms (known as the Ňwhack-a-moleÓ effect).
P det mżde, EU's internetforum afholdt i december 2016 (jf. tekstboks 2), pržsenterede en ržkke centrale internetvirksomheder et initiativ, der skal medvirke til at forebygge, at propaganda bliver genuploadet. 
At the December 2016 EU Internet Forum (see Box 2), key internet companies presented an initiative to help prevent propaganda being re-uploaded.
De franske myndigheder, vi mżdte, understregede behovet for at dokumentere effektiviteten af denne mekanisme. 
The French authorities we met stressed the need to demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism.
De fremhžvede ogs den udfordring, der ligger i at finde den rette balance mellem at gżre terrorpropaganda mindre tilgžngelig p internettet og at tvinge terrorister til at anvende mere komplekse og skjulte meddelelsessystemer, som kan gżre efterforskning svžrere c) at de ikke mler reaktionshastigheden, f.eks. den tid, det tager EU IRU at identificere mistžnkeligt indhold, efter at det er blevet uploadet, og den tid, det tager internetvirksomheder at fjerne indholdet, nr de har fet meddelelse om det. 
28 20 The UK Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit refers approximately 100 000 items per year. They do not measure response speed, e.g. the time the EU IRU takes to identify suspicious content once it has been uploaded and the time internet companies take to remove such content once they have been notified of it.
Figur 5 - EU IRU-statistikker 31 1. juli 2015 til 1. juli 2016 1. juli 2016 til 1. juni 2017 Forslag til indberetninger 9 787 20 174 Stykker indhold fjernet af tjenesteydere 8 949 16 143 Succesrate 91,4 % 80,0 % Kilde: Europols "EU IRU Year One Report" og data fra Europol. 
Figure 5 - EU IRU statistics 29 1 July 2015 to 1 July 2016 1 July 2016 to 1 June 2017 Proposals for referral 9 787 20 174 Content removed by service providers 8 949 16 143 Success rate 91.4 % 80.0 % Source: Europol - EU IRU Year One Report and Europol data.
GD for Migration og Indre Anliggender fastsžtter detaljerede og kvantificerede mlsžtninger for RAN i de rlige aktivitetsplaner og evaluerer fremskridtene i kvartalsvise og rlige statusrapporter. 
DG Migration and Home Affairs sets detailed quantified targets for the RAN in the annual activity plan, and reviews progress in quarterly and annual progress reports.
Disse planer og rapporter opregner imidlertid kun aktiviteter, f.eks. antal mżder, deltagere, forberedende dokumenter, studiebesżg, seminarer, konferencer, nyhedsbreve, kurser, workshops, politikdokumenter og oplžg. 
However, these plans and reports only list activities, e.g. numbers of meetings, participants, ex-ante papers, study visits, seminars, conferences, newsletters, training courses, workshops, policy papers and issue papers.
Kommissionen har ikke udbedt sig oplysninger fra RAN-ekspertisecentret med henblik p at overvge dets effektivitet, f.eks. i form af deltagernes tilfredshed, opnede viden og kontakter, deres anvendelse og udbredelse af den opnede viden i medlemsstaterne og effekten heraf p deres job eller p organisationens resultater (f.eks. om uddannelse faktisk hjalp politiet til at identificere radikaliserede personer og mindske den risiko, de udgjorde). 
The Commission has not asked the RAN Centre of Excellence for information to monitor its effectiveness, e.g. participant satisfaction, the knowledge and contacts acquired, how these were used and disseminated within Member States, and their impact on the job or on the organisationŐs results (e.g. whether training actually helped the police to recognise radicalised individuals and mitigate the risk they posed).
RAN-ekspertisecentret har imidlertid p eget initiativ gennemfżrt spżrgeundersżgelser, som giver et fingerpeg om, hvor nyttige dets produkter er. 
On its own initiative, the RAN Centre of Excellence has, however, carried out surveys which provide some indication of how useful its products are.
F.eks. viste en undersżgelse i august 2016, at nžsten 90 % af deltagerne i RAN's arrangementer mente, at deres deltagelse ville f en positiv indvirkning p deres daglige arbejde. 
For example, one survey in August 2016 found that nearly 90 % of participants at RAN events felt that their attendance would have a positive impact on their daily work.
KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER 37. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37.
Medlemsstaterne har ansvaret for deres nationale sikkerhed, herunder for at bekžmpe terrorisme. 
Member States are responsible for their national security, including fighting terrorism.
EU har ogs en rolle at spille med hensyn til at sikre et hżjt sikkerhedsniveau ved at fremme udveksling af oplysninger, operationelt samarbejde og udveksling af viden og erfaringer. 
The EU also has a role in ensuring a high level of security by facilitating exchanges of information, operational cooperation and sharing of knowledge and experiences.
I 2005 fastlagde EU sin terrorbekžmpelsesstrategi, der bygger p fire sżjler. 
In 2005, the EU set out its counter-terrorism strategy, organised around four pillars.
Formlet med fżrste sżjle er at forhindre, at mennesker griber til terrorisme, ved at tackle rsagerne til radikalisering og rekruttering. 
The first pillar aims to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the causes of radicalisation and recruitment.
Eftersom radikalisering skyldes flere faktorer, anvendes der en bred vifte af foranstaltninger til at adressere problemet. 
As radicalisation is caused by several factors, a wide range of actions are deployed to address the problem.
Kommissionen tržkker derfor p en stadig bredere vifte af eksisterende EU-fonde med henblik p at stżtte medlemsstaterne. 
The Commission therefore draws on an increasingly wide range of existing EU funds to support Member States.
Vi undersżgte, om Kommissionens forvaltning af sin stżtte til medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering, der fżrer til terrorisme, var hensigtsmžssig. 
Our audit examined whether the Commission appropriately managed its support for Member States in addressing radicalisation leading to terrorism.
Samlet set konstaterede vi, at Kommissionen adresserede medlemsstaternes behov, men at der var nogle mangler i koordineringen og evalueringen. 
Overall, we found that the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but there were some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation.
Kommissionen fremmede samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne gennem relevante initiativer ssom netvžrket til bevidstgżrelse omkring radikalisering (RAN), EU's internetforum og det europžiske strategiske kommunikationsnet (jf. punkt 15-21). 
The Commission promoted cooperation between Member States through relevant initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network (see paragraphs 15 to 21).
Kommissionen koordinerede sin tvžrgende stżtte, f.eks. ved hjžlp af tvžrtjenstlige hżringer mellem generaldirektoraterne i forbindelse med godkendelse af 32 arbejdsprogrammer. 
The Commission coordinated its cross-cutting support, for example, by means of consultation between directorates-general when approving work programmes.
F.eks. omfatter Kommissionens overblik over de EU-finansierede aktioner p dette omrde ikke dem, der forvaltes af medlemsstaterne, selv om dette ville vžre nyttigt med henblik p at udnytte potentielle synergier optimalt. 
For example, the CommissionŐs overview of EU-funded actions in this area does not include those managed by Member States, which would be useful to make the most of potential synergies.
Vi konstaterede ogs, at RAN, som er et af Kommissionens vigtigste initiativer, ikke blev udnyttet fuldt ud til at formidle resultaterne af vellykkede EU-finansierede projekter (jf. punkt 22-28). 
We also found that the RAN, one of the CommissionŐs main initiatives, was not used to its full potential to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects (see paragraphs 22 to 28).
33 Anbefaling 1 - Forbedring af rammen for den overordnede koordinering af aktioner til bekžmpelse af radikalisering Kommissionen bżr forbedre rammen for overordnet koordinering af EU-finansierede aktioner vedrżrende stżtte til medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering. 
The Commission should improve the framework for overall coordination of EU-funded actions to support Member States in addressing radicalisation.
Kommissionen bżr navnlig: a) medtage de store EU-finansierede aktioner, der forvaltes af medlemsstaterne, p listen over EU-finansierede aktioner til bekžmpelse af radikalisering. 
In particular the Commission should: include the major EU-funded actions managed by Member States in the list of EU-funded radicalisation actions.