natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
C 235/16 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 29.9.2006 Overambitiżst projektdesign Tekstboks 11 Et eksempel p et alt for ambitiżst projektdesign Sigtet med projektet til forvaltning af naturskov i Kina (16,9 millioner euro) er i lżbet af fem r at indfżre en helt ny metode til skovforvaltning, som indebžrer, at statsskove skal forvaltes af landsbyboere og virksomheder i fžllesskab. 
C 235/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 29.9.2006 Overambitious design of projects Box 11 An example of an overly ambitious project design The natural forest management project in China (16,9 million euro) seeks in a five-year timeframe to introduce a completely new approach to forestry management in China involving Ôco-managementŐ between State forest villagers and enterprises.
Hvordan ČmedforvaltningÇ skal kunne fungere i Kina er stadig ikke defineret. 
How Ôco-managementŐ should work in the Chinese context is still undefined.
Projektet džkker tre provinser i det sydvestlige Kina (Sichian, Hunan og Hainan), og der vil skulle genemfżres interventioner i seks amter, 11 kommuner og 58 landsbyer i disse tre provinser. 
The project covers 3 provinces in south western China (Sichian, Hunan, Hainan) and will involve interventions in 6 counties, 11 townships and 58 villages across these three provinces.
Udover kernearbejdet, som er at sikre med-forvaltning, indgr der ogs fattigdomslempelse i projektet, og denne del omfatter 290 mindre offentlige infrastrukturprojekter i landsby-erne. 
In addition to the core work on co-management, a poverty alleviation component to the project provides for at least 290 small public infrastructure projects in the villages.
Der skal oprettes nye institutioner som bykommune-medforvaltningskomiter og mikrofinansieringsenheder i hvert enkelt amt og hver enkelt kommune, som er omfattet af projektet. 
New institutions such as village-township co-management committees and micro-finance units are to be created in each project county and township.
Kapaci-teten hos administrationen af statsskovene er lav, og der vil skullle ydes betydelig stżtte til institutionsopbygning p bde provins-og amtsniveau, hvis den skal kunne spille sin rolle i projektet. 
In addition, substantial institution building support will have to be given to the State Forestry Administration at provincial and county level, where capacity is weak, if it is to play its role in the project.
De fżrste 18 mneder gik tabt, fordi udbuddet vedrżrende teknisk bistand til projektet blev annulleret. 
The first 18 months of the project were subsequently lost because the technical assistance tender was cancelled.
Stżrre bilaterale projekter udarbejdes af Kommissionen og modtagerlandenes regeringer i fžllesskab med bistand fra konsulenter. Derefter er det Kommissionen, som er ansvarlig for at godkende dem endeligt, inden der tržffes en finansieringsafgżrelse. 
Larger bilateral projects are jointly designed by the Commission and beneficiary governments with the aid of consultants, the Commission then having responsibility for their final appraisal before a financing decision is taken.
De typisk mindre projekter, som finansieres over budgetposten for miljż og skove, udformes af ngoŐer, selv om Kommissionen ogs er ansvarlig for, at de godkendes. 
The typically smaller projects financed from the Environment and Forestry budget line are designed by the NGOs although the Commission is also responsible for their appraisal.
Et overambitiżst design var et problem for ca. halvdelen af alle de undersżgte projekter, navnlig fordi der skulle ns alt for meget inden for den tidsramme, der var til rdighed. 
Approximately half of all the projects examined suffered from an overambitious design, in particular because they were aiming to achieve too much within the available timeframe.
I udformningen var der i disse tifžlde ikke taget tilstržkkelig hżjde for, at det i forbindelse med miljżprojekter er nżdvendigt Ń hvis projekterne skal vžre effektive Ń at der afsžttes lang tid til hżring af lokalsamfundene, og at man sikrer sig disses aktive medvirken. 
In such cases project design sometimes did not sufficiently take into account the fact that, in order for environment projects to be effective, considerable time has to be devoted to consulting with local communities and securing their active participation.
De projekter, der finansieres over budgetposten for miljż og skove, skulle gennemfżres p hżjst 36 og i nogle tilfžlde p kun 24 mneder. 
The Environment and Forest budget line has required projects to be implemented in a maximum of 36 months and sometimes only 24 months.
I de fleste tilfžlde var dette ikke realistisk. 
This in most cases was not realistic.
De projektforslag, der forelžgges til finansiering, er i konkurrence med andre projekter, og det skaber risiko for, at der opstilles alt for ambitiżse ml, fordi der er stżrre sandsynlighed for, at de projekter, som lover at levere flest resultater, vil blive udvalgt til finansiering. 
The fact that the project proposals submitted for funding are competing against other projects creates the risk that project objectives are overly ambitious because projects promising to deliver more may be more likely to attract funding.
Siden 2002 har finansforordningen stillet krav om, at alle kontrakter til projekterne skal vžre underskrevet senest tre r efter, at budgetforpligtelsen til projektet er indget. 
Since 2002 the Financial Regulation has required that all projects should be fully contracted within three years of the budgetary commitment for the project being established.
Det er en ny betingelse, som det kan vžre sžrlig vanskeligt at opfylde, nr man skal udforme omfattende miljżprojekter som dem, der finansieres med bilateral stżtte. 
This imposes a new constraint which may be particularly difficult to achieve when trying to design the large kind of environment projects funded from bilateral aid.
Mange miljżprojekter gennemfżres i umdelig store og geografisk fjerntliggende omrder. 
Many environment projects are implemented in vast and remote geographical areas.
Alligevel samles flere regioner undertiden uden grund i et enkelt projekt, nr det ville vžre bedre at nżjes med at koncentrere sig om en. 
Despite this, several regions are sometimes unnecessarily included in a single project when it would be better to focus on one.
I sdanne tilfžlde kan grunden til projektets alt for ambitiżse design vžre, at der ikke er taget tilstržkkeligt hensyn til lokale forhold. 
In such cases the overly ambitious approach taken may result from local conditions not being sufficiently taken into account.
I Indonesien havde to af de reviderede projekters omfang mttet reduceres under gennemfżrelsen, fordi designet var alt for ambitiżst. 
In Indonesia, the geographical scope of two projects audited had to be reduced during implementation because the design was overambitious.
De eksterne konsulenter og ngoŐer, som normalt udformer det detaljerede projekt, har ikke altid et detaljeret kendskab til Kommissionens gennemfżrelsesprocedurer, som er relativt langvarige, selv hvis der ikke opstr forsinkelser. 
The outside consultants and NGOs who generally draw up the detailed project designs do not always have a detailed knowledge of the CommissionŐs implementation procedures, which are, even if implemented without delay, relatively lengthy.
En yderligere grund til, at mlene for nogle af projekterne var for ambitiżse, var, at man havde undervurderet den tid, det tager at fżlge disse procedurer. 
The underestimation of the time required to follow these procedures is a further reason why some project objectives were too ambitious.
Siden 2002 har EuropeAid gennem sin kvalitetsstżttegruppe (oQSG) gjort et stort arbejde for at forbedre projektvur-deringsprocedurerne. 
Since 2002 Europeaid has made significant efforts to improve project appraisal procedures through its Office Quality Support Group (OQSG).
Udover disse procedurer i Kommissionens hovedsžde er der imidlertid ogs behov for at sikre, at der afsžttes tilstržkkelige ressourcer til, at kommissionsansatte med tilstržkkelig miljżekspertise og kendskab til de lokale forhold og Kommissionens procedurer kan bedżmme projekterne i marken. 
However, in addition to these review procedures in Commission headquarters there is a need to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to the field appraisal of projects by Commission staff teams which have sufficient environmental expertise and knowledge of local conditions and Commission procedures.
Forsinkelser i forberedelsen og gennemfżrelsen af projekterne 64. 
Delays in project preparation and implementation 64.
Kommissionen har det overordnede ansvar for at udstikke de proceduremžssige rammer for forberedelsen og gennemfżrelsen af projekterne. 
The Commission has overall responsibility for establishing the procedural framework for project preparation and implementation.
Derefter gennemfżrer myndighederne i modtagerlandet eller ngoŐer normalt projekterne, som p hvert stadium kontrolleres i detaljer af Kommissionen. 
The beneficiary country authorities or NGOs then generally implement the projects subject to detailed checks at each stage by the Commission services.
Ofte er projektmlene ikke bare urealistiske, fordi der ikke er taget hżjde for den tid, der skal bruges til gennemfżrelsen under overholdelse af Kommissionens procedurer, men de fleste af de undersżgte projekter havde endvidere ogs oplevet betydelige og uforudsete forsinkelser under forberedelsen og gennemfżrelsen. 
Not only are project objectives often unrealistic because they do not take into account the time required to implement projects in compliance with Commission procedures, in addition most projects examined experienced significant unforeseen delays during their preparation and implementation.
I de fleste tilfžlde var der ikke tale om specifikke problemer i relation til miljżsektoren, men problemer som man ogs vil kunne komme ud for i forbindelse med projekter i andre sektorer. 
In most cases the problems encountered were not of a kind specific to the environment sector but likely to be met in projects in other sectors too.
Ansvaret for disse forsinkelser l bde hos Kommissionen og hos myndighederne i modtagerlandene (eller hos ngoŐerne). 
Responsibility for these delays lay both on the Commission and beneficiary country authorities (or NGO) side.
De forskellige faser i projektforberedelsen fra identifikationen til godkendelsen tog ofte lang tid. 
Projects often experienced long preparation periods from identification to approval.
I modsžtning til gennemfżrelsen er der ingen regler om, hvor lang tid denne proces m vare. 
Unlike the implementation phase, there are no restrictions on how long this phase may be.
For de projekters vedkommende, som finansieres over budgetposten for miljż og skove, gik der alt for lang tid fra indkaldelsen af projektforslag, og til Kommissionen underskrev stżt-tekontrakten. 
In the case of projects funded from the Environment and Forestry Budget Line, the time taken by the Commission to proceed from the issuing of the call for project proposals to the signature of the grant contract has been excessively long.
I forbindelse med den indkaldelse af forslag, som blev offentliggjort i januar 2001, blev kontrakterne vedrżrende ca. 50 % af de godkendte projekter sledes fżrst underskrevet i sidste halvdel af 2002, og de resterende 50 % af kontrakterne blev fżrst underskrevet i anden halvdel af 2003. 
Thus for the call for proposals issued in January 2001, contracts for approximately 50 % of the projects approved for funding were not signed until the second half of 2002, while the other 50 % of contracts were not signed until the second half of 2003.
Sdanne forsinkelser har undertiden haft den effekt, at projekterne er blevet mindre relevante, fordi forholdene havde žndret sig, siden det oprindelige projektforslag var blevet forelagt (jf. tekstboks 12). 
Such delays have sometimes had the effect of reducing project relevance because the project context had changed since the time when the original project proposal was submitted (see Box 12).
Der opstod ofte forsinkelser i den periode, der gr, fra projekterne er blevet godkendt, og til de bliver operationelle. 
Delays frequently occurred between the approval of the projects and their becoming operational.
De hyppigste rsager hertil var forsinkelser i forbindelse med den fżrste 
The two most common causes have been delays in the initial transfer of funds and in the
29.9.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 235/17 overfżrsel af midler og i forbindelse med indkżb af teknisk bistand til projektet. 
29.9.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 235/17 procurement of project technical assistance.
Under gennemfżrelsen er der tendens til, at miljżprojekter i hżjere grad end de mindre projekter, som finansieres over budgetposten for miljż og skove, fr brug for at indg mange forskellige indkżbskontrakter (om infrastruktur, tjenesteydelser og udstyr), samtidig med at der skal udarbejdes og godkendes arbejdsprogrammer med henblik p at n de fastsatte output og resultater. 
During implementation, environment projects, other than the small projects funded from the environment and forest budget line, tend to necessitate a large number of different (infrastructure, services, equipment) procurement contracts, grant contracts as well as the preparation and approval of work programmes to achieve their outputs and results.
Det betyder, at disse projekter lettere kommer ud for forsinkelser end projekter i andre sektorer. 
This means that they are more likely to experience delays than projects in certain other sectors.
Et sžrligt problem har vžret, nr udstyr, som skulle have vžret til rdighed i en tidlig fase i projektet, og som bde skulle anvendes til realisering af projektresultaterne og til at sikre, at der var nok tid til at tilvejebringe teknisk bistand, s de ansatte i modtagerlandet, som skulle arbejde med udstyret, kunne blive uddannet i brugen af det, fżrst blev leveret, nr projektet var ved at vžre afsluttet. 
A particular difficulty has been when equipment which should be available from an early stage in the project, both to achieve project results and to allow sufficient time for beneficiary country staff working with it to be trained by technical assistance, is only supplied at the end of the project.
Projektet Liaoning Integrated Environment i Kina, hvor alt det udstyr, der skulle anvendes til gennemfżrelse af projektets tre dele Ń vandressourcer, luftkvalitet og energi Ń fżrst blev leveret, da projektet var nžsten fžrdigt, er et eksempel herp. 
For example, the Liaoning Integrated Environment Project in China suffered from the fact that equipment for three different components water resource, air quality and energy were all received almost at the end of the project.
Gennemfżrelsen af to projekter i Brasilien, et i Guatemala og et i Marokko blev forsinket, fordi det var nżdvendigt at suspendere projekterne, mens man efterforskede finansielle uregelmžssigheder. 
For two projects in Brazil, one in Guatemala and one in Morocco, project implementation was delayed because of the need to suspend the projects while financial irregularities were being investigated.
I Brasilien startede foranstaltningerne i forbindelse med projekterne igen, da uregelmžsssighederne var blevet opkla-ret. 
In the case of the projects in Brazil, operations were restarted after the irregularities had been cleared up.
I Guatemala og Marokko blev det besluttet, at projekterne skulle lukkes. har medfżrt, at regionale eller lokale myndigheder har fet overfżrt flere miljżbefżjelser. 
In Guatemala and Morocco it was decided that the projects should be closed down. recent decentralisation has led to the transfer of more environmental responsibilities to regional and local level.
Projekter, som ikke omfatter effektiv stżtte til institutionsopbygning, har fžrre udsigter til at blive bžredygtige, ogs selv om de nr de umiddelbare tekniske resultater. 
Projects without effective institution-building support have reduced prospects for becoming sustainable, even if they achieve their immediate technical results.
Nr Kommissionen har ydet stżtte til institutionsopbygning, har den ikke altid undersżgt, om engagementet p hżjt niveau i modtagerlandet var stort nok til at sikre, at stżtten blev effektiv. 
When the Commission has provided institutional building support, it has not always ensured there is enough commitment from a high level in the beneficiary country to ensure that the support is effective.
I Botswana blev et stżrre projekt til 14 millioner euro, som i vid udstržkning var koncentreret omkring institutionsopbygning i departementet for vilde dyr og planter og naturparker (Department of Wildlife and National Parks, DWNP) gennemfżrt uden tilstržkkelig deltagelse og engagement fra ministeriet for vilde dyr og planter, miljż og turisme, som DWNP hżrer under (jf. tekstboks 13). 
In Botswana, a major 14 million euro project, focusing largely on institution-building in the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), was implemented without sufficient participation and commitment from the Ministry of Wildlife, Environment and Tourism, to which the DWNP reported (see Box 13).
Selv om den vigtigste mde at yde stżtte til institutionsopbygning p er teknisk bistand, s har det kun vžret muligt at opbygge kapacitet, nr modtagerinstitutionen har sżrget for, at et tilstržkkeligt antal medarbejdere p et passende hierarkisk niveau blev stillet til rdighed, s de kunne arbejde sammen med konsulenterne. 
Although technical assistance is the main vehicle for institution building, it has only been able to build capacity when enough counterparts at an appropriate hierarchical level are made available by the beneficiary institution to work with it.
I praksis har dette i mange tilfžlde ikke vžret tilfžldet, fordi det typisk hżje niveau for personaleudskiftning har medfżrt, at de uddannelsesmžssige fordele, som ydelsen af teknisk bistand kunne have haft for institutionen, er get tabt. 
In practice, this is frequently not the case, while the typically high levels of staff turnover lead to whatever training benefits have come from the provision of technical assistance being lost to the organisation.
Fordi de modtagende myndigheder ikke stillede tilstržkkeligt lokalt personale til rdighed, har den tekniske bistand i et forsżg p at sikre, at projektresultaterne blev net, i alt for mange tilfžlde mttet spille en ledende og ikke kun en rdgivende rolle, men det er sket p bekostning af udviklingen af bžredygtighed p lang sigt. Endvidere har hżjt kvalificerede bistandsmedarbejdere vžret nżdt til at bruge tid p indkżb og administration i stedet for p spżrgsml i forbindelse med bžredygtighed. 
Too often, in the absence of adequate local personnel from the beneficiary authorities, technical assistance has taken on an executive rather than advisory role in order to try to ensure the achievement of project results, but at the expense of developing longer term sustainability. A further diversion from sustainability issues is the time which highly qualified technical assistance personnel are obliged to spend on procurement and administrative matters.
Hertil kommer, at sammensžtningen af det hold, der skulle yde teknisk bistand til projektet, hyppigt blev žndret en eller flere gange i lżbet af kontraktens varighed, som typisk er p tre til fire r. 
In addition, projects have frequently suffered from one or more changes in the composition of the technical assistance during the course of the typical three to four year contract they are engaged under.
Tekstboks 12 Eksempler p forsinkelser, som har formindsket projekternes relevans Projektet Responsible Coffee Consumption and Production i Nicaragua (1,2 millioner euro) blev fżrst godkendt to r efter, at det var blevet forelagt. 
Box 12 Examples of delays reducing a projectŐs relevance The Responsible Coffee Consumption and Production project in Nicaragua (1,2 million euro) was only approved two years after its submission.
Det betżd, at modtageren nu gennemfżrte centrale aktioner, som f.eks. et program om organisk kaffe og markedsbning, med andre finansielle kilder. 
This resulted in key activities, such as an organic coffee programme and market opening, being implemented by the beneficiary with other financial resources.
Projektet Promotion of Ecologically Sustainable, Socially Equitable, and Economically Viable Forest Management Through Implementation of Credible Certification Systems i Indonesien (0,9 millioner euro) blev ogs godkendt to r efter, at det var blevet forelagt. 
The Promotion of Ecologically Sustainable, Socially Equitable, and Economically Viable Forest Management Through Implementation of Credible Certification Systems project in Indonesia (0,9 million euro) was also approved two years after its submission.
Da projektet var planlagt til at skulle vare to r, betżd det, at antallet af ml-regioner, som oprindelig havde vžret fem, mtte begržnses til tre. 
This, coupled with the planned project duration of only two years, led to the reduction of the initially foreseen five target regions to three.
Projektet Sustainable Development of the Cuiab-Santarem Economic Corridor i Brasilien (1,5 millioner euro) blev ogs godkendt to r efter, at det var blevet forelagt. 
The Sustainable Development of the Cuiab-Santarem Economic Corridor project in Brazil (1,5 million euro) was approved two years after its submission as well.
I mellemtiden var regionen, hvor projekterne skulle gennemfżres, kommet i en bekymrende situation med interessekonflikter og vold, som indvirkede negativt p den ngoŐs aktiviteter, som skulle gennemfżre projektet. 
Meantime, the region where the projects were to take place evolved to a worrying situation of conflicts of interests and violence affecting the activities of the project-implementing NGO.
Tekstboks 13 Et eksempel p problemer i forbindelse med institutionsopbygningsprojekter Ottende EUFŐs program Wildlife Conservation and Management i Botswana (14 millioner euro) er et godt eksempel p mange af de problemer, der kan opst i forbindelse med institutionsopbygningsprojekter. 
Box 13 An example of problems affecting institution-building projects The eighth EDF Wildlife Conservation and Management Programme in Botswana (14 million euro) illustrates many of the problems faced in institution-building projects.
Et projekt betalt over den syvende EUF havde finansieret stżtte til beskyttelse af vilde dyr og planter, men havde ikke gjort meget ved institutionsopbygning. 
A seventh EDF project had financed support to the wildlife sector but had done little to address institution-building issues.
DWNPŐs status har vžret usikker, og der var derfor mulighed for, at det ville blive gjort til en halvoffentlig organisation. 
The status of DWNP has been uncertain, the possibility existing that it would be transformed into a parastatal organisation.
Det har gjort forberedelsen og gennemfżrelsen af projektet vanskeligere. 
This has made project preparation and implementation more difficult.
Den medarbejder, der ledede det hold, der var ansvarligt for den tekniske bistand, arbejdede ikke i DWNPŐs żverste ledelse, men var kun ansat p mellemlederni-veau. 
The TA team leader did not work at a senior level within the DWNP but only at a middle management level.
Hans modpart var ikke en af DWNPŐs embedsmžnd. 
His counterpart was not an official of the DWNP.
DWNP udpegede i stedet en anden udenlandsk bistandsmedarbejder. 
Instead the DWNP assigned another foreign technical assistant.
Det meste af holdlederens tid gik med at administrere projektet, hvilket ikke er en omkostningseffektiv mde at udnytte hans tid p. 
Much of the TA team leaderŐs time is devoted to project administration, which does not represent a cost-effective use of his time.
En central del af projektet var at foretage en forvaltningsrevision af DWNP, men halvvejs gennem projektet var dette ikke sket p grund af manglende stżtte fra DWNP og mangel p engagement hos ministeriet. 
A key part of the project was to be a management audit of the DWNP but halfway through the project this had not been carried out, in the absence of support from the DWNP and involvement by the Ministry.