natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I 1991 havde Kommissionen fastsat de kriterier, som medlemsstaternes beredskabsplaner mindst skulle overholde (40). 
In 1991 the Commission laid down the minimum criteria to be met by Member StatesŐ contingency plans (40).
Disse kriterier skulle sikre, at beredskabsplanerne fżrte til, at de nżdvendige midler i tilfžlde af et udbrud af mund-og klovesyge blev stillet til rdighed, s sygdommen kunne udryddes hurtigt og effektivt. 
The aim of the criteria was to ensure that the contingency plans allowed rapid mobilisation of the resources needed to eradicate the disease quickly and efficiently in the event of an outbreak of FMD.
Kommissionen havde ganske vist kržvet, at medlemsstaterne skulle etablere en basisorganisation til styring af kriserne, som f.eks. en krisestab, lokale sygdomsbekžmpelsescentre og personale til gennemfżrelse af nżdforanstaltningerne, men Retten konstaterede, at Kommissionen ikke havde kržvet, at en ržkke vigtige informationer eller betingelser for bekžmpelsen samt for en effektiv finansiel og administrativ organisation skulle vžre til stede, herunder: a) angivelse af det personale og de midler, der ville vžre nżdvendige i forbindelse med forskellige scenarier (et optimitisk scenario, et mellemscenario og et pessimistisk scenario), og hvordan dette personale og disse midler skulle tilvejebringes b) en fornyet gennemgang af beredskabsplanerne i lyset af de indhżstede erfaringer, udsendelse af planerne til producenterne samt afholdelse af żvelser med regelmžssige mellemrum c) kriterierne for, hvornr der skulle anvendes nżdvaccination d) informationer om, hvilke procedurer der var etableret for at registrere antallet af nedslagne dyr, dyrenes vžrdi og de udbetalte belżb samt krydskontrol med dataene i dyrlžgernes databaser eller med dyrenes identifikationsnumre (39) Direktiv 90/423/EŻF. 
Although the Commission required the Member States to establish a basic crisis management structure such as emergency units, local emergency centres and personnel responsible for emergency measures, the Court noted that some important information and conditions for controlling the disease and for efficient financial and administrative organisation had not been required by the Commission at the time, including: (a) details of personnel and resources needed for different scenarios (optimistic, intermediate and pessimistic) and how the personnel and resources were to be mobilised; (b) a review of contingency plans in the light of experience and circulation of them to farmers, together with regular simulation exercises; (c) the criteria in excess of which emergency vaccination would be used; (d) information on the established procedures for recording the number of animals slaughtered, their value, payments made and cross-checks with existing veterinary and animal identification databases; (39) Directive 90/423/EEC.
(40) Kommissionens beslutning 91/42/EŻF af 8. januar 1991 om fastlžggelse af de kriterier, der skal gžlde for udarbejdelse af beredskabsplaner for bekžmpelse af mund-og klovesyge i henhold til artikel 5 i Rdets direktiv 90/423/EŻF (EFT L 23 af 29.1.1991, s. 
(40) Commission Decision 91/42/EEC of 8 January 1991 laying down the criteria to be applied when drawing up contingency plans for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, in application of Article 5 of Council Directive 90/423/EEC (OJ L 23, 29.1.1991, p.
29). e) angivelse af procedurerne for hasteansžttelse af vurderingsmžnd og de generelle principper for aflżnning af dem f) beskrivelse af ordningen for kompensation til producenterne og angivelse af, om belżbet skulle udbetales fżr eller efter nedslagningen. 
29). (e) the system for recruiting valuers in an emergency and the general principles for remunerating them; (f) the farmer compensation system and its use before or after culling.
Kommissionen har ikke revideret disse kriterier siden 1991. 
The Commission has not revised these criteria since 1991.
Mellem 1993 og 1995 godkendte den medlemsstaternes planer. 
It adopted Member StatesŐ plans between 1993 and 1995.
Af Kommissionens retningslinjer for udarbejdelsen af beredskabsprogrammer fra 1995 (41) fremgr det i strid med dens svar til punkt 33, at den kun bad medlemsstaterne om at sikre, at deres veterinžrtjenester havde kapacitet nok til, at de nr som helst kunne behandle ti udbrud, og at den ikke bad dem om at vžre forberedt p at udvide disse tjenester i forhold til den epidemiologiske situation. 
Contrary to the CommissionŐs reply to paragraph 33, its 1995 Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans (41) only required the Member States to have sufficient veterinary staff to deal with up to 10 outbreaks of disease at any one time, and did not ask them to provide for the number of staff to be increased as a function of the epidemi-ogical situation.
Hertil kommer, at Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontorets fżrste inspektioner vedrżrende disse planer i de medlemsstater, der havde vžret ramt af mund-og klovesyge, fżrst blev foretaget ved udgangen af 2001 og i regnskabsret 2002, efter krisen. 
Moreover, the first on-the-spot inspections of these plans by the Commission (HVO) in the Member States affected by FMD only took place at the end of 2001 and during the 2002 year, after the crisis.
Parlamentet har ogs bemžrket, at Kommissionen inden krisen ikke havde tilendebragt gennemgangen af medlemsstaternes beredskabsplaner Činden for en rimelig tidÇ. 
The Parliament also pointed out that, before the crisis, the Commission did not Ôreview the Member StatesŐ contingency plans within an appropriate periodŐ.
Parlamentet pržciserede endvidere, at Čbortset fra gennemgangen som led i godkendelsen af beredskabsplanerne var gennemfżrelsen af beredskabsplanerne i hverken Det Forenede Kongerige, Nederlandene eller Frankrig blevet kontrolleret, inden krisen brżd ud i 2001Ç (42). 
It went on to say, ÔAt the time of the 2001 crisis Đ apart from the assessments in connection with the approval of the contingency plans Đ [the Commission] had still not reviewed the implementation either of the UKŐs contingency plan or of those of the Netherlands or FranceŐ (42).
Selv om medlemsstaternes planer var godkendt af Kommissionen, kunne de derfor ikke tilpasses til en krise af et omfang uden sidestykke, og som vanskeligt havde kunnet forudses. 
As a consequence the Member StatesŐ plans, although adopted by the Commission, could not be adapted to a crisis that was unprecedented and on a scale that was difficult to imagine.
De opererede f.eks. ikke i tilstržkkeligt omfang med et pessimistisk scenario og tog heller ikke hżjde for de żgede midler, der ville blive behov for i tilfžlde af et sdant, og de omfattede heller ikke den nżdvendige administrative og finansielle organisation. 
The plans had not provided adequately for the worst scenario, made no provision for stepping up the resources to counteract it and did not provide the necessary administrative and financial organisation.
(41) Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans for epidemic diseases, paragraph 6.12: ČEach Member State should ensure that it has immediately available sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any time, up to 10 outbreaks of disease and to properly maintain surveillance in the 3 km radius protection zone associated with each. 
(41) Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans for epidemic diseases, paragraph 6.12: ÔEach Member State should ensure that it has immediately available sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any time, up to 10 outbreaks of disease and to properly maintain surveillance in the 3 km radius protection zone associated with each.
It has been estimated that a trained veterinarian can visit and examine stock at no more than 5 holdings on one day if he/she properly undertakes the required disinfection procedures at each place.Ç (42) Europa-Parlamentets beslutning af 17. december 2002, punkt 54. 
It has been estimated that a trained veterinarian can visit and examine stock at no more than five holdings on one day if he/she properly undertakes the required disinfection procedures at each place.Ő (42) European Parliament, Resolution adopted on 17 December 2002, paragraph 54.
3.3.2005 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 54/13 33. 
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/13 33.
Som eksempel kan nžvnes, at den plan, som Det Forenede Kongerige havde forelagt for Kommissionen, ikke var blevet žndret vžsentligt, siden den blev vedtaget i 1991. 
For example, the plan submitted to the Commission by the United Kingdom had not been substantially reviewed since its adoption in 1991.
I overensstemmelse med Kommissionens retningslinjer indgik der ikke et pessimistisk scenario i den (43), og selv i den nationale plan anvendt lokalt omfattede scenariet kun ti samtidige udbrud (44), og der var ingen procedurer, som kunne sikre, at de nżdvendige ressourcer til nedslagning og destruktion hurtigt kunne mobilise-res. 
In line with the CommissionŐs guidelines it did not make provision for a pessimistic scenario (43) and even in the national plan, the basis for plans at local level, the scenario only covered up to ten outbreaks at any one time (44), without establishing any procedures for rapidly increasing the resources needed to handle culling and destruction.
Procedurerne for hasteansžttelse af vurderingsmžnd og de generelle principper for aflżnning af dem var ikke angivet. 
There was no mention of any system for recruiting valuers in an emergency, nor the general principles for paying them.
Planen var ikke blevet uddelt til producenterne eller til disses reprž-sentanter. 
The plan had not been issued to farmers or farmersŐ representatives.
For Frankrigs vedkommende lykkedes det ved hjžlp af planen at behandle de to udbrud, som opstod samtidig, men der var ikke taget hżjde for de żgede midler, der kunne blive nżdvendige i tilfžlde af et mere pessimistisk scenario. 
In France the plan made it possible to deal successfully with the two outbreaks that occurred simultaneously, but there was no provision for the increased resources needed to deal with a more pessimistic scenario.
Kun Nederlandene, som havde taget ved lžre af svinepestkrisen, havde taget hżjde for de żgede midler, der var nżdvendige for, at de kunne klare de 26 udbrud, idet de anvendte nżdvaccination, s snart midlerne blev utilstržkkelige til, at dyrene straks kunne aflives. 
Only the Netherlands had learned from the swine fever crisis and had provided for the necessary resources to be increased to deal with its 26 outbreaks by introducing emergency vaccination as soon as the resources were found to be insufficient to carry out culling immediately.
Kommissionens interne revision har pvist, at Generaldirektoratet for Sundhed og Forbrugerbeskyttelse, som konstant er konfronteret med kriser i husdyrsektoren, havde indfżrt norma-liserede og standardiserede rutinemetoder, som blev bedżmt som vžrende effektive, men det havde dog ingen skriftlig dokumentation for disse arbejdsmetoder. 
The CommissionŐs internal audit showed that the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection, which is constantly being confronted with crises in the animal sector, had introduced standardised routines, which were judged effective, but these working procedures had not been documented.
Hertil kommer, at der ikke forel noget udstyr eller retningslinjer beregnet til krisestyring. 
Moreover, crisis management materials and manuals were not available.
Selv om Kommissionen handlede hurtigt under krisen (jf. punkt 44), mener Retten, at en ržkke af de problemer, der opstod under krisen i 2001, kunne have vžret undget, hvis Kommissionen havde vžret godt forberedt, navnlig med hensyn til de finansielle bestemmelser, der skulle anvendes i forbindelse med de tilskud, medlemsstaterne skulle have udbetalt (jf. punkt 74-81). 
Although the Commission responded rapidly during the crisis (see paragraph 44), the Court considers that good groundwork by the Commission, especially from the point of view of the financial arrangements for the reimbursement to be granted to Member States (see paragraphs 74 to 81), would have made it possible to avoid some of the problems encountered during the 2001 crisis.
Individuel identifikation og registrering af kvžg er obligatorisk i Fžllesskabet (45). 
At Community level there is a compulsory system for identifying and registering cattle individually (45).
Retten har imidlertid konstateret, at denne ordning ikke gżr det muligt at sikre, at dyr, der flyttes (43) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21. juni 2002, The Stationery Office, London, punkt 3, 2: ČThe plans were based on the most likely scenario and other scenarios were not considered. 
However, the (43) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, The Stationery Office, London, p. 4, section 2, third paragraph: ÔThe plans were based on the most likely scenario and other scenarios were not considered.
In line with Europe guidance, the DepartmentŐs plans were based on the supposition that there would not be more than 10 infected premises at one timeÇ. 
In line with European Commission guidance, the DepartmentŐs plans were based on the supposition that there would not be more than 10 infected premises at any one timeŐ.
(44) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21. juni 2002, The Stationery Office, London, punkt 2.30. 
(44) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, The Stationery Office, London, paragraph 2.30.
Sdanne flytninger vedrżrer rligt ca. tre millioner dyr (ca. 4 % af husdyrbestan-den). 
This covers around three million head per year (around 4 % of the total herd).
Hertil kommer, at medlemsstaternes gennemfżrelse af ordningen fortsat er mangelfuld (46). 
In addition, there are still some weaknesses in its implementation in the Member States (46).
Fra 1. januar 1995 og helt frem til november 2003 var individuel identifikation af fr, som krisen i 2001 fżrst og fremmest vedrżrte, og af svin ikke obligatorisk; for disse dyrs vedkommende var det kun obligatorisk at identificere den enkelte sending(47). 
In the case of sheep (the species mainly affected by the 2001 crisis) and pigs, identification was compulsory from 1 January 1995 until November 2003, but only for batches of animals (47).
Under krisen pviste Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret, at ordningen med identifikation af sendinger var blevet anvendt forkert i tre af de fire medlemsstater, der var ramt af mund-og klovesyge (48). 
During the crisis the HVO pointed out that the system of batch identification had been poorly applied in three out of the four Member States affected by FMD (48).
At fžllesskabsreglerne ikke kržvede individuel identifikation af fr, og at identifikationen af de enkelte sendinger endvidere var mangelfuld, gjorde det vanskeligere at spore dyr, man havde mistanke om, kunne vžre smittede, og forsinkede sledes nedslagningen af dem. 
The fact that Community regulations did not require sheep to be identified individually, and that there were also shortcomings in the system of batch identification, hampered the tracing of animals that were suspected of being infected and so delayed their slaughter.
I Det Forenede Kongerige blev fr, som burde have vžret aflivet, ikke slet ned, og det żgede risikoen for spredning af virus. 
In the United Kingdom sheep that should have been slaughtered were not killed, so adding to the risk of the virus spreading.
(46) Sžrberetning nr. 6/2004 om indfżrelsen af ordningen for identifikation og registrering af kvžg i EU (EUT C 29 af 4.2.2005, s. 
(46) Special report No 6/2004 of the Court of Auditors on the organisation of the system for the Identification and registration of bovine animals in the European Union (OJ C 29, 4.2.2005, p.
(47) Rdets direktiv 92/102/EŻF af 27. november 1992 om identifikation og registrering af dyr (EFT L 355 af 5.12.1992, s. 
(47) Council Directive 92/102/EEC of 27 November 1992 concerning the identification and registration of animals (OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p.
Individuel identifikation af fr blev obligatorisk med Rdets direktiv 2003/85/EF (EUT L 306 af 22.11.2003, s. 
Individual identification of sheep was made compulsory by Council Directive 2003/85/EC (OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p.
16) blev det obligatorisk for medlemsstaterne af oprette en database for svinebedrifter og flytninger af svin. 
Commission Decision 2000/678/EC required the Member States to establish a database of pig holdings and movements of pigs.
Heri hedder det, at for s vidt angr identifikation af fr og geder, var Rdets direktiv 92/102/EŻF ikke blevet anvendt i Irland, inden sygdommen brżd ud. 
(48) The HVOŐs report on the audit visit to Ireland from 14-17 May 2001 said that before the FMD outbreak Council Directive 92/102/EEC had not been implemented in Ireland as far as sheep and goat identification was concerned.
Jf. ligeledes kontorets endelige beretning efter inspektionsbesżget i Det Forenede Kongerige 12. til 16. marts, s. 9 og 10: ČCouncil Directive 92/102/EEC requires identification of small ruminants (sheep and goats) as to their holding of origin (although not on an individual basis). 
See also the HVOŐs final report following an inspection visit to the United Kingdom from 12 to 16 March, pp. 9 and 10, ÔCouncil Directive 92/102/EEC requires identification of small ruminants (sheep and goats) as to their holding of origin (although not on an individual basis).
This Directive should have been transposed into national legislation by 1. January 1995. 
This Directive should have been transposed into national legislation by 1 January 1995.
Official identification of small ruminants in UK, by means of an ear tag bearing the registration number of the holding of birth, has only been compulsory for animals born since 1. January 2001 (the date upon which the Directive was actually transposed for these animals in the UK). 
Official identification of small ruminants in UK, by means of an ear tag bearing the registration number of the holding of birth, has only been compulsory for animals born since 1 January 2001 (the date upon which the Directive was actually transposed for these animals in the UK).
In the absence of an official tagging system, a mixture of unofficial permanent means of identification and temporary identification is used. 
In the absence of an official tagging system, a mixture of unofficial permanent means of identification and temporary identification is used.
The vast majority of animals moving through markets are marked with coloured dyes. 
The vast majority of animals moving through markets are marked with coloured dyes.
There is no compulsory requirement for sheep to be accompanied by any form of official documentation during routine movements.Ç Jf. ligeledes kontorets beretning fra inspektionsbesżget i Frankrig 2. til 6. april 2001. 
There is no compulsory requirement for sheep to be accompanied by any form of official documentation during routine movementsŐ; See also the HVOŐs report on its inspection in France from 2 to 6 April 2001, which stated that the national emergency centre (the FMD unit), together with the local emergency centres, had made a great effort to trace animals, both inside and outside France (...).
Heri hedder det, at det nationale krisecenter (cellule fivre aphteuse) i samarbejde med de lokale sygdomsbekžmpelsescentre har gjort et stort arbejde for at spore dyrene i Frankrig og i udlandet, men at det har skadet indsatsen, at a) kontrollen p de forskellige niveauer var mangelfuld, b) Rdets direktiv 92/102/EŻF ikke var blevet gennemfżrt fuldt ud (der var sm besžtninger med ikke-identificerede dyr, som ikke var blevet registreret), og c) at nogle af oplysningerne i ANIMO ikke var tilgžngelige, og der manglede oplysninger, eller oplysningerne var forkerte. 
Their efforts had been compromised by (a) the weaknesses in the controls at various levels, (b) the incomplete implementation of Council Directive 92/102/EEC (presence of small unregistered flocks with unidentified animals and (c) unavailable, missing or defective information in the ANIMO system.
C 54/14 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 3.3.2005 37. 
C 54/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 37.
Hertil kommer, at medlemsstaterne i henhold til fžllesskabsreglerne (49) havde ret til ikke at sžtte sm bedrifter, hvis besžtninger af fr eller geder er p maksimalt tre dyr, og som ejerne ikke har sżgt om pržmier for, p den obligatoriske liste over bedrifter, som de skal udarbejde og holde ajour. 
The Community rules (49) also allowed Member States not to include on the compulsory list (which they are required to compile and update) of all farms in their territory holding animals, small holdings with a maximum of three sheep or goats for which the farmers do not claim premiums.
I Nederlandene opdagede de kompetente myndigheder sledes under krisen, at 18 000 sm bedrifter eller enkeltpersoner, som holdt et meget begržnset antal dyr, hverken var registreret eller kendt, hvilket udgżr en ekstra risiko for, at man ikke i tide fr opsporet alle de dyr, der skal aflives. 
In the Netherlands, for example, the responsible authority discovered in the course of the epidemic that 18 000 small holdings or individuals with only a very small number of animals were neither registered nor known, constituting an additional risk that it might not be possible to trace in time all the animals that had to be slaughtered.
Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret konstaterede samme problem i Frankrig. 
The HVO found the same problem in France.
Der var mangler i ANIMO-nettet, som ikke blev afhjulpet inden krisen 38. 
Uncorrected deficiencies in the ANIMO system before the crisis 38.
I 1990 blev der vedtaget regler (50) om indfżrelsen af et edb-system for forbindelserne mellem veterinžrmyndighederne, navnlig med henblik p at gżre det lettere for de kompetente myndigheder i afsendelsesomrderne og de kompetente myndigheder i bestemmelsesmedlemsstaten at udveksle oplysninger om flytninger af dyr. 
In 1990, the Community rules (50) introduced a computerised system linking veterinary authorities, one of the main aims being to facilitate exchange of information on animal movements between the competent authorities of the regions of origin and the responsible authorities in the Member State of destination.
Dette system kaldes ANIMO (51). 
This system is called ANIMO (51).
I 1991 udarbejdede Kommissionen modellen for de meddelelser, der skal sendes via dette system (52). 
The Commission developed the model message to be transmitted by this system in 1991 (52).
Men Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret havde allerede inden krisen i 2001 gjort opmžrksom p, at transitsteder under transporten af dyr fra afsendelsesmedlemsstaten til bestemmelsesmedlemsstaten ikke anfżres i ANIMO-meddelelserne. 
Before the 2001 crisis the HVO had already pointed out that the ANIMO messages contained no mention of the transit points used during the transport of animals between a Member State of consignment and a Member State of destination.
Oprindelsesbedriften figurerer heller ikke i modellen. 
The farm of origin did not appear in the model message either.
I sin sžrberetning om svinepest (53) havde Retten ogs konstateret manglerne ved dette system. 
The Court, too, had already drawn attention to the deficiencies of the system, in its special report on classical swine fever (53).
P trods af de žndringer, som Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret og Retten havde anbefalet, havde Kommissionen ikke fremsat forslag om žndring af ANIMO-nettet. 
Despite the HVO and the Court advocating changes to the regulations on these points, the Commission had not proposed any revision of the ANIMO system.
(49) Artikel 18 i direktiv 90/425/EŻF af 26. juni 1990 om veterinžrkontrol og zooteknisk kontrol i samhandelen med visse levende dyr og produkter inden for Fžllesskabet med henblik p gennemfżrelse af det indre marked (EFT L 224 af 18.8.1990, s. 
(49) Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market, Article 18 (OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p.