natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Comenius, aktion 1, under Socrates-programmet tager sigte p at fremme samarbejdet mellem skoler, navnlig inden for rammerne af europžiske undervisningsprojekter, gennem begržnsede tilskud (3 000 euro til koordinatorskolen og 2 000 euro til hver partnerskole). 
The Comenius Action 1 strand of the Socrates programme aims to promote cooperation between school education establishments, in particular within the framework of European educational projects, by means of small grants (3 000 euro for the coordinator and 2 000 euro to each partner establishment).
Sdanne aktiviteter, som skal bidrage til at fremme en bedre forstelse af de forskellige kulturer, skal ogs forbedre stżttemodtagernes sprogkundskaber. 
These activities, which aim to contribute to a better understanding of cultures are also intended to foster the improvement of beneficiariesŐ language skills.
De styrker dermed Lingua, aktion E, under programmet. 
In this respect, it reinforces the Lingua E strand of the programme.
Derfor blev der ogs godkendt projekter, der ikke var af hżj kvalitet, og stżtteberettigelsesperioderne blev udvidet med risiko for overlapninger mellem de finansielle rammeaftaler. 
This situation led to projects being accepted even though the quality was poor and to extension of the periods of eligibility which involved a risk of overlaps between financial framework agreements.
Der blev konstateret fżlgende svagheder ved forvaltningen af aktionen: Der var alvorlige mangler ved NAŐernes registrerings-systemer, der var udbetalt stżrre forskud, end aftalerne gav mulighed for, fžllesskabsfinansieringssatserne var overskredet, selv om det ikke var berettiget, i nogle tilfžlde var udgiftsopgżrelserne ikke baseret p de faktiske omkostninger, eller de omfattede udgifter, som ikke var stżtteberettigede (1). 
Weaknesses revealed in the management of the action included: serious shortcomings in the keeping of files by the NAs, advance payments which were in excess of those authorised by the agreements, unjustified overruns of the rates of Community financingandaccountswhichwerenotbasedonactualcostsor contained ineligible expenditure (1).
Socrates/Lingua, aktion E 66. 
Socrates/Lingua: Action E 66.
Lingua, aktion E, skal gennem fžlles uddannelsesprojekter (FUP) tilskynde de unge til at kommunikere p fremmedsprog. 
The objective of the Lingua E Action is to encourage young people to communicate in foreign languages, through joint educational projects (JEPs).
En nżdvendig forudsžtning for ivžrksžttelsen af et FUP er, at ind-lžringen af arbejdssproget indgr som et led i partnerskolens arbejdsprogram. 
Of necessity, the implementation of a JEP presupposes that learning the working language is part of the curriculum of the partner school.
Revisionen viste, at 15 af de 29 reviderede projekter havde engelsk som arbejdssprog. 
The audits showed that out of 29 projects examined English was used as the working language in 15 cases.
Den kržvede minimumsvarighed p 14 dage pr. udveksling og de hżje omkostninger, som s langvarige ophold medfżrer, gav problemer for projektinitiativtagerne, navnlig nr de skulle finde (1) Retten gennemgik 46 kontrakter og foretog endvidere revisionsbesżg hos 12 modtagere. partnere. 
The compulsory minimum duration of 14 days per exchange and the substantial costs entailed by stays of this length imposed constraints on the project organisers, particularly when looking (1) The examination concerned 46 contracts and was supplemented by on-the-spot visits to 12 beneficiaries. for partners.
Under revisionen konstateredes der punktuelle svagheder p forskellige stadier i forvaltningen. I den forbindelse bżr det bemžrkes, at et NA havde fastsat stżttesatsen generelt til 75 % af de samlede omkostninger ved samtlige projekter. 
In this respect, it should be emphasised that one NA set the rate of aid at 75 % of the total cost for all projects, whereas this rate may only be applied in exceptional cases (young handicapped persons, economically weak persons wherejustified)(2).
Ungdom for Europa, aktion A.I 68. 
Youth for Europe: Action A1 68.
Aktion A.I under UFE har som ml at fremme en bedre forstelse af det europžiske samfunds forskelligartethed og at tilskynde unge til at tage aktivt del i samfundslivet. 
The objective of Action A1 of Youth for Europe is to encourage better understanding of the diversity of European society and to develop active citizenship.
Den stżtter udvekslingsprojekter baseret p en interkulturel indlžringsme-tode, hvor de unge selv skal spille en aktiv rolle p alle stadier af projekterne. 
It supports projects concerning exchanges based on intercultural learning where the young people themselves are called upon to play an active role in all phases of management.
Fžllesskabet stżtter disse projekter med maksimalt 50 % af de samlede afholdte udgifter. 
These projects are subsidised by the Community at a rate of 50 % of the total expenditure incurred.
Denne sats kan undtagelsesvis forhżjes for drligt stillede unge, der har et projekt, som giver dem mulighed for at deltage i international udveksling. 
This rate may, exceptionally, be increased for disadvantaged young people involved in a project which gives them access to international exchanges.
For eksempel var der ydet stżtte til organisationer, hvor de unge ikke spiller en aktiv rolle. 
For example, organisations in which the young people do not play an active role received funds.
I nogle tilfžlde var det vanskeligt at se sammenhžngen mellem aktiviteterne og mlet for programmet. 
In some cases it was difficult to reconcile the nature of the activities with the programme objectives.
Multilaterale projekter er mere omkostningskržvende end bilaterale projekter og er ikke egnede til drligt stillede unge, som naturligvis ikke har midler til at deltage i sdanne projekter. 
Multilateral projects are more costly than bilateral projects and are not suitable for disadvantaged young people who clearly do not have the means to participate in projects of this type.
Under den stedlige revision kunne NAŐerne ikke fremlžgge statistikker over de aktiviteter, der var finansieret til fordel for denne mlgruppe inden for rammerne af denne type projekter. 
As regards the projects of this type at the time of the on-the-spot audits, the NAs were not in a position to provide statistics on the actions financed for the benefit of this target group.
I aftalerne mellem Kommissionen og NAŐerne er det ikke fastsat, at de endelige modtagere skal indsende bilag til underbygning af deres udgiftsanmeldelser, og derfor havde NAŐerne stort set kun gennemget regnskaberne. De havde ikke indfżrt et kontrolsystem, som kunne gżre det muligt for dem at efterprżve, om de anmeldte udgifter faktisk var afholdt. 
As the agreements concluded between the Commission and the NAs do not stipulate that the final beneficiaries should submit supporting documents with their declarations of expenditure, the NAs, for the most part, did no more than only examine the financial accounts without setting up a system of controls which would allow them to verify the reality of the costs declared.
Et af de f NAŐer, som kržvede udgiftsbilag, fandt det vanskeligt, for ikke at sige umuligt, at finde frem til sammenhžngen mellem stżttemodtagernes regnskaber og de bilag, der skulle underbygge dem. 
One of the few NAs which demanded documentary evidence of expenditure found it was difficult, even impossible, to establish a connection between the statements of account forwarded by the beneficiaries and the documents which were supposed to provide the justification for them.
Dette NA var heller ikke i stand til at sžtte tal p bidrag i naturalier til projekterne. 
It was also confronted with the inability to evaluate contributions in kind charged to the projects.
Accepterer man sdanne bidrag, risikerer man alle former for mis-brug. 
Accepting such contributions opens the door to every kind of abuse.
Eksistensen og vžrdien af sdanne bidrag kan nemlig kun konstateres ved kontrol p stedet. 
In actual fact,shortofcarryingoutanon-the-spotcheck,therealityand accuracy of these contributions cannot be evaluated.
P denne mde kan fžllesskabsmidlerne give foreningerne en fortjeneste Ń hvilket i żvrigt ogs konstateredes under revisionen Ń og det er ikke tilladt. 
As the audit demonstrated, associations can make a profit from Community funds in this way, which is not permitted.
(2) Revisionen omfattede en gennemgang af 35 FUP-kontrakter, 14 af dem i forbindelse med stedlig revision. 
(2) The audit entailed examination of 35 JEP contracts and included 14 on-the-spot checks.
7.6.2002 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 136/17 72. 
7.6.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 136/17 72.
Ganske vist er denne sektor meget uformel og ung-domsorganisationernes finansielle midler begržnsede, men under revisionen konstateredes det, at der var anvendt sdanne erklžringer til at dokumentere s meget som 79,50 % af det samlede endelige regnskab Ń det er ikke acceptabelt. 
The audit also revealed excessive resorting to declarations of honour and other self-attestations, a practice which must be con-demned.Evenwhentakingintoaccounttheveryinformalnature of the sector and youth organisationsŐ lack of financial means, the use of such declarations to justify as much as 79,50 % of the total of the final accounts cannot be accepted.
Under revisionen konstateredes der adskillige andre svagheder og uregelmžssigheder, bl.a. fżlgende: a) stżttemodtagerne havde fet udbetalt den samlede stżtte, fżr projektet overhovedet var get i gang, og ikke kun et forskud b) partnerorganisationerne havde ikke sendt NAŐerne deres bekržftelse af den formelle aftale og heller ikke lister over udvekslingsdeltagerne c) stżtten var ikke blevet reduceret forholdsmžssigt i tilfžlde, hvor antallet af udvekslingsdage var blevet skret ned og del-tagerantallet reduceret d) formelt godkendte finansieringssatser var overskredet. 
A number of other weaknesses and irregularities were identi-fiedduringtheaudits: (a) payment of the entire aid to the beneficiaries before a start had been made on implementation, instead of payment of an advance; (b) absence of confirmation to the NAs by the partner organisations of their formal agreement and failure to forward lists of participants in exchanges; (c) non-applicationofaproportionalreductionintheaidincases where theduration of the exchange and the number of participants had been reduced; (d) exceeding the rates of formally authorised financing. 74.
74. rsagen til disse mangler er, at forvaltningen og kontrollerne ikke er hensigtsmžssige. 
These deficiencies are caused by inappropriate management and controls.
Mangler ved forvaltningen af de centraliserede aktioner og projekter Problemer forbundet med KFBŐs forvaltning 75. 
Shortcomings in the management of the centralised actions and projects Problems associated with a TAOŐs management 75.
Revisionsresultaterne viste, at der var problemer forbundet med at anvende faglig bistand, og at det i praksis var vanskeligt bde for GD og for KFB selv at tage sig af gennemfżrelsen af aktionerne og overvgningen af projekterne. KFBŐs stadigt voksende arbejdsbyrde kombineret med gradvise bevillingsnedskžringer (1) gav det store problemer, og det havde vžret nżdt til at overdrage nogle af de opgaver, det havde fet, til underkontrahenter. 
The audit highlighted the constraints which recourse to technical assistance can entail and demonstrated the objective diffi-cultyfortheDGandfortheTAOitselfofimplementingactions and monitoring projects. The combination of a continuous increase in the volume of work and a constant reduction in the resources at its disposal (1) resulted in substantial constraints for the TAO which led it to subcontract some of the tasks entrusted to it.
KFB havde heller ikke kunnet fremlžgge sammenfattende rapporter om de projekter og aktioner, der var finansieret under de to pro-(1) Finansieringen af KFB i kontrakternes lżbetid var fordelt sledes: 1.6.1995-31.5.1996: 9,310 millioner euro 1.6.1996-31.5.1997: 8,175 millioner euro 1.6.1997-31.5.1998: 7,420 millioner euro 1.6.1998-31.5.1999: 6,070 millioner euro 1.6.1999-30.11.2000: 8,710 millioner euro 1.12.2000-31.7.2001: 6,778 millioner euro I alt: 46,463 millioner euro. grammer. 
In addition, the TAO was not in a position, either, to produce summary reports on the projects and the actions financed within the (1) The financing of the TAO was set as follows for the contract period: 1.6.1995 Ń 31.5.1996: 9,310 million euro, 1.6.1996 Ń 31.5.1997: 8,175 million euro, 1.6.1997 Ń 31.5.1998: 7,420 million euro, 1.6.1998 Ń 31.5.1999: 6,070 million euro, 1.6.1999 Ń 30.11.2000: 8,710 million euro, 1.12.2000 Ń 31.7.2001: 6,778 million euro.
For at kunne overholde de strenge tidsfrister for udvžlgelsen af projekterne var KFB nżdt til at udvide det personale, der tog sig af projektudvžlgelsen, med ansatte, der normalt varetog forvaltningen af kontrakterne. Resultatet var de konstaterede forsinkelser i forvaltningen og afslutningen af projekterne. 
In order to be able to comply with the strict deadlines demanded for the selection of the projects, theTAOwasforcedtoincreasethenumberofstaffassignedto this task with staff normally assigned to the management of contracts, which caused the delays noted in the management and closure of the projects.
76. KFB havde beskrevet forvaltningsprocedurerne i de forskellige arbejdsfaser i en Čintegreret operativ kždeÇ og dokumenteret dem, men det var ikke i alle tilfžlde muligt at finde dokumentation i it-systemet for de žndringer, der var foretaget ved projekt-bedżmmelsen (ČgradingÇ). 
76.AlthoughtheTAOdefinedanddocumentedthemanage-ment procedures for the various phases of work in the form of an Ôintegrated operational chainŐ, changes to the grading during evaluation of the projects were not always documented in the information systems.
Utilstržkkelige kontroller 77. 
Inadequate controls 77.
Nr KFB kontrollerede de endelige rapporter, kunne det kun efterprżve, om udgiftsanmeldelserne var rimelige og formelt rigtige. 
The controls carried out by the TAO on the final reports could only verify the plausibility and formal accuracy of the declarations of expenditure.
Det foretog kun bilagskontrol af en stikprżve p 5 % af de endelige rapporter. 
A sample of only 5 % of the final reports was subjected to checks on supporting documents.
Revisions-kontoret i GD for Uddannelse og Kultur har ogs ppeget disse svagheder (jf. punkt 88). 
These weaknesses were also highlighted by the audit unit of DG EAC (see paragraph 88).
Punktuelle svagheder ved de undersżgte aktioner Socrates/Erasmus, aktion 1: Institutionskontrakter (IC) 78. 
Individual deficiencies found in the audited actions Socrates/Erasmus: Action 1: Institutional contracts 78.
Ivžrksžttelsen af ICŐerne var forsinket fra starten (jf. punkt 20), men hertil kom forsinkelser, som skyldtes svagheder i universiteternes organisation og lžrernes uvilje mod at afgive de forvaltningsbefżjelser, de havde haft under det tidligere program, til ledelsen. 
The initial delay which marked the implementation of the ICs (see paragraph 20) was compounded by delays caused by the weaknesses of the universitiesŐ organisation and the reluctance of the teachers to lose management prerogatives which they held under the previous programme in favour of senior management.
Desuden definerede Kommissionen fżrst i 1999 stżtteberettigelseskriterierne og betingelserne for at plžgge sanktioner i forbindelse med de IC, der var indget i 1996 med henblik p det fżrste anvendelsesr (det akademiske r 1997-1998). 
In addition, the eligibility criteria and the rules for the applica-tionofsanctionsrelatingtotheICsconcludedin1996forthe first year of application (academic year 1997 to 1998) were not defined by the Commission until 1999.
Det var grunden til, at afslutningen af disse kontrakter blev forsinket. 
The closure of these contracts was thus delayed.
Analysen af de endelige rapporter viser, at resultaterne, navnlig resultaterne af studenter-og undervisermobilitetsaktionerne, ligger langt under de kontraktlige forpligtelser. Paradoksalt nok blev stżttebelżbene ikke skret ned, tvžrtimod var den oprindelige fžllesskabsstżtte i en ržkke tilfžlde overskredet eller endog blevet fordoblet. 
An analysis of the final reports shows that the results were considerably below the contractual commitments, in particular with regard to the actions relating to student mobility and teach-ingstaff.Paradoxically,thisdidnotleadtoareductioninthe amount of aid but, on the contrary, led in some cases to the initial Community aid being exceeded, even doubled.
Dette forhold skyldes, at universiteterne kan overfżre op til 50 % af det belżb, der er tildelt en aktivitet, til en anden. 
This situation can be explained by the possibility given to the universities to redistribute the funds from one activity to another by up to 50 % of the amount allocated.
C 136/18 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 7.6.2002 Socrates/ben undervisning og fjernundervisning (ODL) 80. 
C 136/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 7.6.2002 Socrates/Open and distance learning (ODL) 80.
Sdanne projekter omfatter mindst tre organer fra mindst tre forskellige lande. 
These projects group together a minimum of three organisations from at least three different countries.
Et sdant koncept komplicerer forvaltningen, for viderefżrelsen af et projekt betyder, at man hvert r skal igennem alle procedurer (ansżgning, evaluering, kontrakt, opgżrelse). 
A design of this kind complicates the management in so far as the development of the project requires the procedures to be repeated annually (application, evaluation, contract, final accounts) and creates a potential risk of premature closure of the file.
Desuden gżr en sdan forvaltning det vanskeligt at fordele udgifterne p to regnskabsr. 
In addition, this kind of management makes it difficult to allocate expenditure which spans two financial years.
Ved denne type aktioner kontrollerer projektkoordinatorerne ikke de udgifter, partnerne anmelder, og partnerne sender ikke udgiftsbilagene, og i nogle tilfžlde heller ikke udgiftsanmeldelserne, til koordinatorerne. 
With this type of action the project coordinators do not control expenditure declared by partners who forward to them neither the documents supporting expenditure nor, in certain cases, the declarations of expenditure.
I nogle tilfžlde var der fżrst blevet undertegnet kontrakter med projektinitiativtagerne og udbetalt forskud til de endelige modtagere efter projektgennemfżrelsen. 
Contracts were signed with the project initiators and advances were paid to the final beneficiaries only after the projects had been carried out.
Sagsbehandlingen i KFB tog alt for lang tid (mellem otte og 19 mneder for de undersżgte projekters vedkommende) og fżrte til tilsvarende forsinkelser i de efterfżlgende faser, nemlig godkendelsen af evalueringsresultaterne og afslutningen og den endelige afregning af projekterne. 
The TAOŐs examination phase proved to be excessively long (between eight and 19 months for the projects examined) delaying by the same amount of time the confirmation of the results of the evaluation and the closure and regularisation of the projects.
I fem af de 13 undersżgte sager oversteg det maksimale belżb i fžllesskabsstżtte den tilladte gržnse p 50 % af omkostningerne. Der var imidlertid ikke tale om deltagerprofiler eller aktiviteter af sžrlig karakter, der berettigede til denne finansiering (1). 
In five of the 13 files checked, the maximum amount of Community aid exceeded the permitted threshold of 50 % of the costs without any justification for the financing, either with regard to the profile of the participants or the special nature of the activities (1).
Ungdom for Europa: aktion D 84. 
Youth for Europe: Action D 84.
UFE, aktion D, finansierer samarbejdet med en ržkke tredjelande, der kan deltage i projekter p omrdet udveksling af unge. 
Action D of Youth for Europe finances cooperation between eligible third countries in the field of exchanges for young people.
De meget tunge og langsommelige beslutningsprocesser, herunder de finansielle beslutningsprocesser (NAŐerne foretager en for-hndsudvžlgelse af projekterne, og Kommissionen tržffer den endelige afgżrelse i udvžlgelsespaneler), bevirkede, at man var lžnge om at f indget kontrakter. 
Theclumsinessandslownessofthedecision-makingandfinan-cial circuits (the NAs are responsible for preselection of the projects and the Commission takes the final decision by selection panels) led to delays in the conclusion of contracts.
KOMMISSIONENS KONTROL 85. 
THE COMMISSIONŐS AUDITS 85.
Kontoret for intern revision i GD for Uddannelse og Kultur (2), som ikke havde klart definerede befżjelser, anvendte revi-(1) I KFB omfattede revisionen 13 kontrakter. 
The Internal Audit Unit of DG EAC (2), whose powers have not been defined, concentrated its efforts on on-the-spot audits in (1) At the TAO the audit covered 13 contracts.
(2) Den interne revision, der oprindelig hżrte under det tidligere GD XXII, blev i 1995 overflyttet til Den Finansielle Enhed. Efter omstruktureringen blev dette kontor med virkning fra 1. oktober 1999 integreret i Afdelingen for revision og evaluering. 
(2) In 1995 the internal audit function was attached to the former DG XXII, Financial Unit, and with effect from 1 October 1999, following structural reorganisation, was incorporated into the Audit and Evaluation Unit of DG EAC.
Selv om kontoret sidenhen har žndret navn, kaldes det i denne beretning ČrevisionskontoretÇ. sionsressourcerne p revision p stedet i NAŐerne, i KFB og hos de endelige modtagere. 
Although the name ÔAudit UnitŐ was subsequently changed, the expression has been retained in this report. the NAs, the TAO and on the premises of the final beneficiaries.
De undersżgte derimod ikke forvaltningssystemerne og -procedurerne i GD. 
In contrast, it did not examine the management systems and procedures applied within the DG.
Det rlige revisionsprogram var ikke opstillet p grundlag af en risikoanalyse. 
Its annual audit programme was not drawn up on the basis of a risk analysis.
Revisionerne fandt i mange tilfžlde sted meget lžnge efter udlżbet af de perioder, rammeaftalerne omfattede, og en ržkke tilskud, f.eks. driftstilskud, var slet ikke med i revisionsomrdet. 
Thus, in the case of decentralised actions, the unit did not succeedinauditingeachNAonceeverytwoyearsasithad intended. Its missions often took place after considerable delay in terms of the periods covered by the framework agreements and some subsidies, such as those for operating expenditure, were excluded from its field of audit.
Hertil kommer, at det er en alvorlig mangel ved kontrolsystemet, at GD ikke har fulgt op p bemžrkningerne fra kontorets revisorer, og at der ikke findes en formaliseret procedure for behandlingen af dem. 
In addition, the lack of follow-up given to the observations of this UnitŐs auditors by the DG and the absence of a formalised procedure for dealing with them represent a major failing in the control system.
Revisionsberetningerne blev ikke sendt til de nationale myndigheder, og kun i f tilfžlde blev der fremsendt skrivelser med revisorernes henstillinger. 
The audit reports were not forwarded to the national authorities and the letters of recommendation were only forwarded on rare occasions.
Ifżlge Kommissionen reviderede revisionskontoret en tilfžldigt udtaget stikprżve p 10 % af de projekter, KFB forvalter. 
According to the Commission, the Audit Unit examined a random sample of 10 % of the projects managed by the TAO.