natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Der er i mellemtiden foretaget en analyse af de tre CEF-sektorers evaluerings-og udvžlgelsesprocedurer, og der er ved at blive udarbejdet en fžlles tilgang med henblik p CEF 2. 
An analysis of the evaluation and selection procedures of the three CEF sectors has been carried out in the meantime and a common approach is being prepared in view of CEF 2.
Overvejelser om score har en mindre indvirkning, fordi CEF-transport ikke har nogen placering. 
Scoring considerations have a lesser impact because there is no ranking for CEF Transport.
Eksperternes anbefaling indeholder ikke kun score, men ogs en kvalitativ vurdering baseret p kriterier, som Kommissionen tager hensyn til ved udvžlgelsen. 
The experts’ recommendation does not only contain scores but also a qualitative appraisal by criterion which the Commission takes into account in its selection.
Kommissionen mener, at den vigtigste rsag til, at de forslag, som eksperterne anbefalede, ikke blev finansieret, er misforholdet mellem det disponible budget og efterspżrgslen efter finansiering, ikke overvejelser om score. 
The Commission considers that the main reason for proposals recommended by the experts not being funded is the mismatch between the budget available and the demand for funding, not scoring considerations.
Kommissionens fžlles svar p punkt 49 og 50: Kommissionen bemžrker, at budgettilgžngeligheden er en stor forskel mellem de tre sektorer. 
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 49 and 50: The Commission notes that the budget availability is a major difference between the three sectors.
Selv efter anbefalingerne fra de eksterne eksperter er der inden for transport fortsat en hżj grad af overtegning, som begržnser Kommissionens mulighed for at afvise forslag af hżj kvalitet i udvžlgelsesprocessen. 
In transport even after the recommendations by the external experts, there is still a high oversubscription which constrains the Commission during the selection process to reject high-quality proposals.
For de to andre sektorers vedkommende er presset ved overtegning derimod mindre relevant, hvorfor der er en tydelig sammenhžng. 
To the contrary for the other two sectors, the pressure by over-subscription is less relevant, hence the reason for an apparent correlation.
Som allerede anfżrt i punkt 48 udgżr de 14 tilfžlde, som Revisionsretten nžvner i forbindelse med udvalgte CEF-T-projekter, og som ikke er blevet anbefalet af de eksterne eksperter, kun 1,9 % af de udvalgte projekter og 3 % af den samlede finansiering. 
As already indicated in paragraph 48, the 14 cases mentioned by the ECA of CEF-T selected projects which had not been recommended by the external experts represent only 1,9% of the selected projects and 3% of total funding.
Kommissionen mener, at begrundelsen for udvžlgelsen i alle 14 tilfžlde klart fremgr af udvžlgelseskomitens protokol og af de enkelte projekters individuelle evalueringsskemaer. 
The Commission considers that in all 14 cases the justification for selection is clearly outlined in the minutes of the selection committee and in the individual evaluation forms of the respective projects.
Kommissionen erkender dog, at der kunne vžre udarbejdet mere detaljerede begrundelser p dette punkt. 
The Commission nevertheless recognises that more detailed justifications could have been elaborated in this respect.
Spżrgsmlet vil blive behandlet i forbindelse med den fžlles tilgang til evaluering og udvžlgelse under CEF 2. 
This issue will be addressed in the context of the common approach for the evaluation and selection process under CEF 2.
Tekstboks 2 Ń Et projekt, der blev afvist af eksperterne og INEA, men udvalgt af CEF-udvžlgelseskomiten Aktionen er ved at blive gennemfżrt i n medlemsstat og vil medfżre betydelige fordele dr, men det er korrekt, at netvžrkseffekten kun vil materialisere sig fuldt ud med elektrificering i nabomedlemsstaten. 
Box 2 - Example of a project rejected by the experts and INEA but selected by the CEF selection committee The Action is being implemented in one Member State and will bring about significant benefits there but it is true that the network impact will only fully materialise with electrification in the neighbouring Member State.
Der er gjort lokale politiske bestržbelser p at fremme elektrificeringen i nabomedlemsstaten. 
There are local political efforts to advance the electrification in the neighbouring Member State.
Kommissionen gentager, at INEA's lżbende overvgning af projektet viser en rettidig og effektiv gennemfżrelse. 
The Commission reiterates that the regular monitoring of the project by INEA shows a timely and effective implementation.
Ud over scorer lžgger Kommissionen ogs sžrlig vžgt p eksperternes kvalitative vurdering af hvert kriterium. 
Next to the scoring, the Commission also places particular importance on the qualitative assessment of each criterion by the experts.
Scorerne er et forsżg p at udtrykke en meget kompleks situation, der er beskrevet i teksten, med en enkelt vžrdi, selv om teksten indeholder flere argumenter og nuancer. 
The scores attempt to express a very complex situation described in the text by a single value, while the text provides more arguments and nuances.
Kommissionen understreger, at forskelle og uoverensstemmelser i bedżmmelsen af tildelingskriterier kan opst af andre rsager end forskelle i forstelsen af evalueringskriterierne, ssom dem, der vedrżrer eksperternes karakteristika og erfaringer. 
The Commission underlines that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the scoring of award criteria may occur for reasons other than differences in the understanding of the evaluation criteria, such as those, related to the characteristics and the experience of the experts.
Der stilles skriftlig eller mundtlig vejledning til eksperter i fortolkning af tildelingskriterier til rdighed for alle CEF-sektorer. 
EN EN Guidance for experts on the interpretation of award criteria is made available, in writing or orally, to all CEF sectors.
Selv om det er en udfordring, mener Kommissionen, at det er muligt at foretage en vurdering af projektets modenhed, da projektets gennemfżrelse over tid kan tilpasses eventuelle problemer (udvidelser, nye afgržnsninger, fjernelse af afgržnsninger, afslutning). 
While indeed challenging, the Commission considers that the assessment of project maturity is possible as the implementation of the project over time may be adapted to any issues (extensions, re-scoping, de-scoping, termination).
Det forklares i de konkrete arbejdsprogrammer og indkaldelser, hvilke former for forslag der forventes (undersżgelser, anlžgsarbejder, blandede arbejder), og hvornr projekterne skal pbegyndes. 
The specific work programmes and call texts explain what kind of proposals are expected (studies, works, mixed) and by when the projects need to start.
Infrastrukturens reelle karakter er meget kompleks med forskellige parallelle faser. 
The reality of infrastructure is highly complex with different phases running in parallel.
I flere og flere tilfžlde byder stżttemodtagerne ud fra et "projekterings-og udfżrelsesgrundlag", der omfatter undersżgelser og arbejder i en enkelt kontrakt. 
In more and more cases, beneficiaries tender on a “design and build” basis which comprises studies and works under a single contract.
Kommissionen mener, at for s vidt angr transportsektoren, betyder žndringen fra prioriterede projekter til en central/omfattende netbaseret tilgang, at det ikke er relevant at foretage en 
The Commission considers that for the transport sector, the change from priority projects to a core/comprehensive network approach makes a comparison not pertinent.
Nr dette er sagt, er Kommissionen stžrkt engageret i at żge absorptionsgraden p 74 %, som er anfżrt i det foregende afsnit, og INEA anvender en meget aktiv portefżljeforvaltning med henblik p at maksimere absorptionsgraden for CEF. 
Having said this, the Commission is highly committed to increasing the absorption rate of 74% stated in the previous paragraph and INEA applies a very active portfolio management in view of maximising the absorption rate of CEF.
For CEF-T er der efter INEA's lżbende gennemgang af projektportefżljen og de deraf fżlgende žndringer af tilskudsaftaler for visse forsinkede projekter blevet udarbejdet tilbagefżrselsindkaldelser for 2019 og 2020 ud fra "use it or lose it"-princippet. 
For CEF-T, following INEA ́s constant review of the project portfolio and resulting amendments to grant agreements of certain delayed projects, in application of the ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ principle, reflow calls are being prepared for 2019 and 2020.
Mlet er at minimere underudnyttelsen af programmets budget. 
The objective is to minimise under-utilisation of the Programme’s budget.
Kommissionen mener, at der ud over overvgning af forsinkelser er andre sikkerhedsforanstaltninger, der skal sikre, at "der tržffes effektive korrigerende foranstaltninger i tide", f.eks. ved at tržffe passende foranstaltninger inden for rammerne af den gžldende retlige og finansielle ramme. 
The Commission considers that, besides the monitoring of delays, there are other safeguards that are designed to ensure that “effective corrective measures are taken on time”, such as taking appropriate action within the remit of the applicable legal and financial framework.
Kommissionen mener, at reduktionen af EU-finansieringen i tilfžlde af forsinkelser ikke altid fżrer til de żnskede resultater med hensyn til gennemfżrelsen. 
The Commission considers that the reduction of EU funding in case of delays does not always lead to the desired results in terms of implementation.
De fleste af de forsinkende faktorer kan ikke fuldt ud forvaltes af stżttemodtagerne alene. 
Most of the delaying factors cannot be fully managed by the beneficiaries alone.
I sidste ende er det vigtigere, at der foretages betydelige investeringer i EU's infrastruktur, selv med visse forsinkelser. 
In the end, it is more important that important investments in EU infrastructure take place even with some delays.
Under sžrlige omstžndigheder giver aktionsstatusrapporterne mske ikke den mest ajourfżrte oversigt over den tekniske og finansielle gennemfżrelse af projekterne. 
In particular circumstances, the action status reports may not give the most up-to-date view of the technical and financial implementation of projects.
Kommissionen bemžrker imidlertid, at aktionsstatusrapporter ikke er det eneste overvgningsredskab, der anvendes af INEA. 
However; the Commission observes that the ASRs are not the only monitoring tool used by INEA.
De forskellige eksisterende overvgningsvžrktżjer, der omfatter midtvejsgennemgangen for transport, gżr det muligt for INEA at afdžkke gennemfżrelsesrelaterede problemer, selv om de ikke fremgr fuldt ud i aktionsstatusrapporten, sledes som det retteligt ppeges i rapporten. 
The set of existing monitoring tools, which includes the MTR for transport, allows INEA to identify implementation issues even if not fully presented in the action status report, as the report rightly points out.
Portefżljerne i de tre CEF-sektorer er ret forskellige og derfor vanskelige at sammenligne. 
The portfolios of the three CEF sectors are quite different and therefore difficult to compare.
Kommissionen bemžrker dog, at reduktion af tilskuddene ikke bżr planlžgges p forhnd, men kun foretages, nr det er nżdvendigt for de enkelte projekter. 
Yet, the Commission observes that reduction of grants should not be planned ex-ante, but carried out only when necessary for individual projects.
Dette er i żjeblikket tilfžldet for alle CEF-sektorer p trods af, at der er tilrettelagt en fuldstžndig midtvejsgennemgang. 
This is currently the case for all CEF sectors, despite of whether or not a fully-fledged MTR exercise has been organised.
Desuden er det den nuvžrende praksis for gennemfżrelsen af projekterne at fortsžtte lžnge efter programmeringsperiodens udlżb (dvs. ved udgangen af 2020). 
Furthermore, it is current practice for the implementation of projects to continue well beyond the end of the programming period (i.e. end of 2020).
Som fastsat i finansforordningen vil INEA indg de endelige forpligtelser indtil udgangen af 2021 og derefter styre udfasningen af programmet. 
As foreseen by the Financial Regulation, INEA will 4 EN EN make the final commitments until the end of 2021 and then manage the phasing out of the programme.
Kommissionen mener, at INEA's mandat klart fremgr af de forskellige forvaltningsdokumenter, og tilskudsaftalerne giver INEA tilstržkkelige redskaber til at tržffe korrigerende foranstaltninger, samtidig med at det sikres, at projekterne fortsat gennemfżres. 
The Commission considers that INEA’s mandate is clearly laid down in the various governance documents and the grant agreements give INEA sufficient tools to take corrective actions while ensuring that projects continue to be implemented.
Samarbejdet mellem INEA og dets modergeneraldirektorater i denne henseende er ogs meget effektivt. 
Cooperation between INEA and its parent DGs is also very effective on this subject.
Kommissionen mener, at INEA har de rette vžrktżjer til at forvalte projekterne. 
The Commission takes the view that INEA has the right tools to manage the projects.
Forpligtelser vedrżrende individuelle projekter er mulige frem til udgangen af 2021, og INEA vil i tžt samarbejde med sine modergeneraldirektorater bruge denne periode bedst muligt til at maksimere brugen af EU-midler. 
Commitments to individual projects are possible until the end of 2021 and INEA, in close cooperation with its parent DGs, will make the best use of this period to maximise the use of EU funding.
Med hensyn til deres respektive roller er INEA ansvarlig for budgetgennemfżrelsen, overvgningen af projekter og rapporteringen til Kommissionen, mens Kommissionen er ansvarlig for overvgningen af programmet som helhed og den dermed forbundne rapportering i programredegżrelserne. 
Concerning their respective roles, INEA is responsible for budget implementation, monitoring of projects and reporting to the Commission, whereas the Commission is responsible for the monitoring of the programme as a whole, and the related reporting in the Programme Statements.
Kommissionen understreger indsatsen for at opn bedre og harmoniserede ml og indikatorer inden for CEF-performancerammen. 
The Commission stresses the effort towards improved and harmonised objectives and indicators in the CEF performance framework.
1, litra a) og b), indeholder de nżdvendige bestemmelser vedrżrende INEA's rapportering. 
It notes that the INEA delegation act includes, in its article 19(1) (a) and (b), the necessary provisions regarding the INEA’s reporting.
Den vil vurdere mulighederne for at pržcisere agenturets rolle i denne henseende i forbindelse med revisionen af retsakten om delegation for perioden 2021-2027. 
It will assess the scope for clarifying the agency’s role in this respect in the revision of the act of delegation for the 2021-2027 period.
Kommissionen mener, at en performanceramme, der skal forbinde de finansierede projekter med programmets mlsžtninger, skal vžre en fžlles indsats fra modergeneraldirektoraterne og INEA. 
The Commission considers that a performance framework to link projects funded to the programme objectives has to be a joint effort by the parent DGs and INEA.
Selv om INEA i hżj grad vil bidrage til en sdan ordning, skal ansvaret deles hensigtsmžssigt mellem de forskellige generaldirektorater og INEA. 
While INEA will greatly contribute to such a scheme, the responsibilities are to be shared appropriately between the parent DGs and INEA.
Tekstboks 5 Đ Eksempel p inkonsekvent rapportering om flaskehalse i forbindelse med projekter af forskellig stżrrelse Kommissionen bemžrker, at tekstboksen blot indeholder en beskrivelse af resultatet af den retlige definition i CEF-forordningen. 
Box 5 - Example of inconsistent reporting on bottlenecks between projects of different magnitude The Commission notes that the box merely describes the outcome of the legal definition of the CEF Regulation.
INEA er imidlertid fuld ud i stand til at rapportere korrekt om projekter af forskellig stżrrelse, da der er mange andre indikatorer end "flaskehalsindikatoren". 
However, INEA is well able to report correctly about projects of different magnitude, as there are many other indicators used than the “bottleneck” indicator.
Kommissionen noterer sig denne bemžrkning og understreger, at der p ny er nedsat en arbejdsgruppe i marts 2019, og at processen derfor er genoptaget. 
The Commission takes note of this observation and stresses that a working group has been re-established in March 2019 and therefore the process has resumed.
Arbejdsgruppen omfatter medlemmer fra alle modergeneraldirektorater og INEA til džkning af alle tre CEF-sektorer. 
The working group includes members from all parent DGs and INEA to cover all three CEF sectors.
Kommissionen mener, at der er rigelig tid til at afslutte denne proces, inden den nžste programmeringsperiode begynder (dvs. for CEF 2). 
The Commission considers that there is ample time to conclude this process before the beginning of the next programming period (i.e. for CEF 2).
Selv om der kan indsamles flere oplysninger om de langsigtede resultater af de investeringer, der er foretaget, understreger Kommissionen, at INEA i żjeblikket specifikt har fet til opgave at forvalte den finansielle stżtte til udvalgte projekter, som i sagens natur fokuserer p output ved projektets afslutning. 
Whereas more information could be collected about long-term results of the investments made, the Commission stresses that currently INEA is entrusted specifically with the management of financial support to selected projects, which by nature focus on outputs at the end of the project.
Mling af de langsigtede virkninger af infrastrukturinvesteringer er en interessant kurs, som Kommissionen er opsat p at engagere sig i. 
Measuring the long-term effects of infrastructure investment is an interesting path in which the Commission is keen to engage.
Selv om de foranstaltninger, der er tale om, er żnskelige, ppeger Kommissionen, at det vil vžre nżdvendigt at foretage en mere systematisk evaluering af resultaterne p programniveau med INEA's bidrag. 
While the measures at stake are desirable, the Commission points out that a more systematic evaluation of the results would need to be foreseen at programme level with the contribution of INEA.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at dette spżrgsml ligger uden for rammerne af den nuvžrende revision, som er rettet mod INEA's resultater. 
The Commission therefore believes that such matter is beyond the scope of the present audit which targets the performance of INEA.
KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER Anbefaling 1 Đ Forbedre potentialet for synergier a) Kommissionen accepterer anbefalingen. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 1 – Improve the potential for synergies (a) The Commission accepts the recommendation.
Kommissionen fremhžver, at forslagene vedrżrende CEF 2 og Horisont Europa allerede lžgger sžrlig vžgt p at udnytte synergier. b) Kommissionen accepterer anbefalingen, i det omfang vurderingen foretages inden for rammerne af den lżbende cost-benefit-analyse. 
The Commission highlights that the proposals related to CEF2 and Horizon Europe already pay particular attention to reaping synergies. (b) The Commission accepts the recommendation insofar as this assessment is carried out in the framework of the ongoing Cost Benefit Analysis.
Kommissionen kan ikke foregribe resultaterne af denne analyse, som vil komme til at omfatte flere scenarier. 
The Commission cannot prejudge the results of this analysis which will consider several scenarios.
Den bemžrker imidlertid, at der i analysen skal tages hensyn til andre elementer Đ som f.eks. at holde agenturerne p en hndterbar stżrrelse, s vidt muligt begržnse antallet af generaldirektorater og konsekvens i forhold til de tiltžnkte stżttemodtagere. 
It, however, notes that other elements - such as keeping agencies at a manageable size, limiting as far as possible the number of parent DGs and consistency in terms of targeted beneficiaries - will have to be taken into account in the analysis.
Med hensyn til fleksibilitet ved omplacering af personale er Kommissionen i żjeblikket i gang med at undersżge mulighederne for at indfżre yderligere fleksibilitetsmekanismer for personalefordeling mellem programmer i et forvaltningsorgan for at opn żget effektivitet i deres forvaltning. 
Regarding the flexibility in staff re-assignement, the Commission is currently looking at possibilities to introduce additional flexibility mechanisms for staff allocation between programmes within an executive agency, in order to reach increased efficiency in their management.
Denne fleksibilitet i personalefordelingen vil dog skulle udformes korrekt for at sikre overholdelse af princippet om specificering, der er fastsat i finansforordningen. 
This flexibility in staff assignment will however need to be properly framed to ensure the respect of the specification principle, which is set out in the Financial Regulation.
Anbefaling 2 Đ Styrke INEA's organisatoriske rammer a) Kommissionen accepterer delvist anbefalingen. 
Recommendation 2 – Strengthen the framework for INEA’s management of the delegated programmes (a) The Commission partially accepts the recommendation.
Den vil vurdere mulighederne for at indfżre yderligere fleksibilitetsmekanismer for personalefordeling mellem programmer i et givet forvaltningsorgan for at opn żget effektivitet i forvaltningen heraf. 
It will assess the possibilities to introduce additional flexibility mechanisms for staff allocation between programmes within a given executive agency, in order to reach increased efficiency in its management.
Kommissionen er imidlertid bundet af overholdelsen af de budgetprincipper, der er fastsat i finansforordningen, og navnlig princippet om specificering. 
However, the Commission is bound by the respect of the budgetary principles set out in the Financial Regulation, and in particular the specification principle.
For at sikre at dette specifikationsprincip overholdes, skal der udformes passende rammer for denne fleksibilitet. 
So that any such flexibility will need to be properly framed to ensure the respect of this specification principle.
Kommissionen og agenturet har forskellige roller: INEA gennemfżrer p Kommissionens vegne, og dets rapportering indgr i Kommissionens rapportering om programmets resultater. 
The Commission and the agency have different roles: INEA implements on behalf of the Commission, and its reporting feeds into the Commission’s reporting on the performance of the programme.
INEA's pržstation som agentur bżr derfor holdes adskilt fra programmernes performanceramme. 
As such, the performance of INEA as an Agency should be distinguished from the performance framework of the programmes themselves.
Anbefaling 3 Đ Sikre harmoniserede og gennemsigtige projektudvžlgelsesprocedurer a) Kommissionen accepterer anbefalingen. b) Kommissionen accepterer anbefalingen. c) Kommissionen accepterer anbefalingen. 
EN EN Recommendation 3 – Ensure greater harmonisation and transparency of project selection procedures (a) The Commission accepts the recommendation. (b) The Commission accepts the recommendation. (c) The Commission accepts the recommendation.
Den risiko, der er forbundet med en fuldstžndig gennemfżrelse af et program, er indbygget i alle (EU's) finansieringsprogrammer, navnlig nr det drejer sig om infrastruktur. 
The risk related to the full implementation of a programme is inherent in all (EU) funding programmes, in particular when related to infrastructure.
Infrastrukturprojekter medfżrer typisk lange udviklings-og gennemfżrelsestider. 
Infrastructure projects typically entail long development and implementation times.
Risikoen er blevet konstateret, og INEA vil fortsžtte med at arbejde for at mindske og reducere den. 
The risk has been identified and INEA will continue to work to mitigate and reduce it.
Endvidere er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at det kan undgs, at forsinkelser kan f fżlgevirkninger, hvis overgangen mellem de to programmeringsperioder forvaltes godt. 
Furthermore, the commission believes that the knock-on effect of delays can be avoided if the transition between the two programming periods is well managed.