natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvis de kompetente myndigheder vælger at være omfattet af overvågningen af centrale indikatorer under SREP, skal de ifølge EBA identificere indikatorer og fastsætte tærskler, der er relevante for de særlige forhold, der kendetegner individuelle institutioner eller grupper af institutioner, der deler lignende egenskaber. 
If competent authorities choose to opt for the monitoring of key indicators under SREP, they need, according to the EBA, to identify indicators and set thresholds that are relevant to the specificities of individual institutions or groups of institutions sharing similar characteristics.
Mulige kriterier for anerkendelse af væsentlige forringelser omfatter kvantificerbare kriterier for en sandsynlig overtrædelse af lovgivningsmæssige krav og kan knyttes til et instituts udløsere for genopretningsplaner. 
Possible criteria for recognising a material deterioration include quantifiable criteria for a likely breach of regulatory requirements and could be linked to an institution’s recovery plan triggers.
Dette ville medvirke til at sikre den operationelle effektivitet af forvaltningen af kriseidentifikation og -respons. 
This would assist in ensuring the operational efficiency of the management of crisis identification and response.
ECB's operationelle vejledning om tidlig indgriben behandler spørgsmålet i forbindelse med SREP. 
The ECB’s operational guidance on Early Intervention deals with the topic in the context of the SREP.
Den understreger relevansen af SREP-karakteren som markering af en potentiel krisesituation, som bør udløse tilsynsvurderingen af, om den skal anvende sine beføjelser til tidlig indgriben. 
It emphasises the relevance of the SREP score as a flag for a potential crisis situation that should trigger the supervisory assessment whether there is a need to use its early intervention powers.
Vejledningen henviser desuden til den gældende lovgivning og de relevante EBA-retningslinjer. 
In addition, the guidance makes reference to the applicable legislation and to the relevant EBA guidelines.
ECB angiver, at den anvender alle de nævnte former for udløsere, dvs. SREP-karakteren, materielle ændringer af eller uregelmæssigheder i forbindelse med centrale indikatorer, og væsentlige begivenheder, især reelle overtrædelser af lovgivningsmæssige minimumskrav. 
The ECB represents that it uses all types of triggers mentioned, i.e. the SREP score, material changes or anomalies of key indicators, and significant events, in particular actual infringments of regulatory minimum requirements.
ECB har imidlertid ikke defineret institutionsspecifikke tærskler over minimumskravene, der kunne markere en fremtidig ("sandsynlig") overtrædelse. 
However the ECB has not defined institution-specific thresholds above the minimum requirements that could flag a potential future (“likely”) infringement.
Sagt på en anden måde er den faktiske overtrædelse af et tilsynskrav en indikator for tidlig indgriben. 
In other words, in this system the actual breach of a supervisory requirement is an indicator for an early intervention.
ECB gør heller ikke systematisk brug af de genopretningsindikatorer og -udløsere, som den har godkendt som passende for kriseidentifikation for individuelle banker i forbindelse med genopretningsplanlægning, eller 25 EBA-retningslinjer for udløsere til anvendelse af foranstaltninger for tidlig indgriben i henhold til artikel 27, stk. 
The ECB does also not make systematic use of the recovery indicators and triggers that it has approved as appropriate for crisis identification for individual bank in the context for recovery planning, or the objective elements that may indicate a FOLTF situation according to the EBA guidelines (see also paragraph 84).
For så vidt angår væsentlige begivenheder er ECB-vejledningen ikke blevet præciseret yderligere ud over det, der allerede kan findes i EBA-retningslinjerne. 
On significant events, the ECB guidance has not been further specified beyond what can already be found in EBA guidelines.
Derfor er den eneste systematiske udløser, som ECB har til den operationelle forvaltning af sine krisestyringsaktiviteter, en samlet SREP-karakter, der angiver, at en bank er behæftet med høj risiko26. 
Therefore the only systematic trigger that the ECB has for the operational management of its crisis management activities is an overall SREP score designating that a bank is at high risk27.
SREP-karaktererne fastsættes dog kun én gang om året, nemlig i september gennem den årlige SREP-proces. 
SREP scores are only set once a year through the annual SREP process in September.
ECB har understreget, at karaktererne kan ajourføres oftere på basis af dens egne løbende overvågning af risikoindikatorer. 
The ECB has emphasised that updates to the scores can be made more frequently based on its own continuous monitoring of risk indicators.
Der blev ikke givet konkrete eksempler på SREP-karakterer, der havde bidraget til at identificere en situation i hurtig udvikling, eller på at den faktisk var blevet ajourført i en krisesituation. 
No concrete examples were provided of SREP scores that had helped to identify a rapidly evolving situation or that it had actually been updated in a crisis situation.
Vejledningen fremmer udførelsen af vurderinger af tidlig indgriben i forbindelse med den årlige SREP-beslutningsproces. 
The guidance promotes the performance of early intervention assessments in the context of the annual SREP decision process.
Manglen på formelle udløsere betyder ikke, at ECB slet ikke anvender mere helhedsorienterede helhedsvurderinger baseret på mindre formelle kriterier med henblik på kriseidentifikation. 
The lack of formal triggers does not mean that the ECB is not using more holistic assessments based on less formalised criteria for the purpose of crisis identification at all.
JST'erne overvåger jævnligt en bred række af indikatorer som en del af SREP, selvom det ikke sikres, at dette sker konsistent på tværs af JST'erne, og ikke alle udførte vurderinger er underlagt ledelsesgodkendelse. 
JSTs regularly monitor a broad range of indicators as part of the SREP although it is not ensured that this is done consistently across JSTs and not all assessments made are subject 27 Only the overall SREP score is mentioned, but not the RAS components which are part of the ECB’s crisis identifier according to its internal processes.
ECB har ikke grundigt analyseret, hvilke indikatorer eller andre begivenheder der hovedsageligt har bidraget til at udpege banker i krise. ... og overvågningssystemer skal forbedres 80. 
The ECB has not comprehensively analysed which indicators or other events have mainly contributed to the identification of banks in crisis. ... and monitoring systems need enhancement 80.
Udløsere for genopretningsplaner baseret på institutspecifik indberetning er ikke integreret i det IT-system, der anvendes af ECB. 
Recovery plan triggers based on institution-specific reporting are not embedded in the IT system used by the ECB.
De skal overvåges manuelt af hvert JST - hvis de overhovedet overvåges - og (nær-) overtrædelser markeres ikke automatisk. 
They have to be monitored manually by each JST – if they are monitored at all – and (near-) breaches are not automatically flagged.
Dette påvirker den operationelle effektivitet negativt for så vidt angår forvaltning af kriseidentifikation. 
This adversely affects the operational efficiency of the management of crisis identification.
Forskellige enheder i ECB bidrager til den operationelle forvaltning af kriseidentifikation. 
Various units of the ECB contribute to the operational management of crisis identification.
De frembringer et bredt udvalg af materialer, der indeholder oplysninger, der er relevante for kriseidentifikation, herunder rapporter om overtrædelse af lovgivningsmæssige krav og overvågning af kritiske niveauer for specifikke risici. 
They produce a wide range of material containing information relevant for crisis identification, including reports on breaches of regulatory requirements and the monitoring of critical levels for specific risks.
Vi kunne dog ikke konstatere, at der er en klart fastlagt proces til at indsamle, vurdere, indberette og reagere på disse oplysninger. 
However, we were unable to establish that there is a clearly defined process for collating, assessing, reporting upwards and acting on this information.
Vi var heller ikke i stand til at afgøre, om og i hvilket omfang JST'erne eller den øverste ledelse systematisk anvender disse rapporter til kriseidentifikation. 
We were also unable to determine whether and to what extent JSTs or senior management systematically use these reports for crisis identification.
Derudover bemærkede vi ingen indikationer på eksistensen af ledelsesinformationssystemer, der ville markere en væsentlig forværring, hvis JST'erne undlader at identificere og/eller indberette sådanne tilfælde. 
In addition, we saw nothing to suggest the existence of management information systems that would flag a material deterioration if JSTs fail to identify and/or report such cases.
Der findes heller ingen specifik procedure for sikring af, at overtrædelser af lovgivningsmæssige krav vil tilskynde de ansvarlige JST'er til at undersøge, om der er sket en væsentlig forværring af den økonomiske situation eller om en FOLTF-vurdering er nødvendig. 
There is also no specific process to ensure that breaches of regulatory requirements will prompt the responsible JST to look into whether a material deterioration of the financial condition has occurred or an FOLTF assessment is needed.
Vi fandt især mangler i processen for overvågning af overtrædelser af indikatorer for genopretningsplaner. 
In particular, we found deficiencies in the process to monitor of breaches of recovery plan indicators.
Effektiv overvågning ville imidlertid øge driftskapaciteten til at identificere potentiel krise på et tidligt stadium. 
Efficient monitoring however would enhance the operational capacity to identify potential crisis at an early stage.
Bankerne indberettede overtrædelser med en forsinkelse på mindst fire uger27 i mere end 40 % af tilfældene. 
Breaches were reported by banks with a delay of at least four weeks28 in more than 40 % of cases.
Overtrædelser vedrørende kapitalindikatorer (ca. 30 %), rentabilitetsindikatorer (26 %), indikatorer for aktivernes kvalitet (17 %) og i mindre grad likviditet og markedsbaserede indikatorer. 
Breaches concerned capital indicators (roughly 30 %), profitability indicators (26 %), asset quality indicators (17 %) and, to a lesser extent liquidity and market-based indicators.
Desuden var der tegn på, at JST'erne ikke overholder ECB's procedurer for krisestyring i alle tilfælde. 
Moreover, there was evidence suggesting that JSTs do not adhere to the ECB’s crisis management processes in all cases.
F.eks. blev visse overtrædelser af indikatorerne i genoprettelsesplanerne ikke indberettet til krisestyringsafdelingen, som de skulle have været. 
For example, some breaches of recovery plan indicators were not reported to the CRM as they ought to have been.
Vi kunne ikke bekræfte, at krisestyringsaktiviteter, såsom formelle vurderinger af tidlig indgriben er blevet overvejet selv i tilfælde af overtrædelser af vigtige lovgivningsmæssige regler, selv om det anføres for os, at der i en række af de sager, som blev overvejet, allerede var iværksat foranstaltninger til tilsyn eller tidlig indgriben for at modvirke, at spørgsmålet skulle opstå. 
We were unable to confirm that crisis management activities such as formal early intervention assessments, have been considered even in cases of breaches of important regulatory rules, although it is represented to us that in a number of cases which were considered, there were already supervisory or early intervention measures in place to mitigate the issue arising.
Der var heller ikke noget tegn på en systematisk tilgang til at sikre, at der tages hensyn til mulige virkninger af mikrotilsyn som følge af den makroøkonomiske udvikling og opbygningen af systemisk risiko for at øge effektiviteten af kriseidentifikation. 
There was also no evidence of a systematic approach to ensure that potential micro-prudential impacts of macroeconomic developments and the build-up of systemic risk are taken into account to increase the efficiency of crisis identification.
ECB's tilsyns-og monetære funktioner udveksler oplysninger om udviklingen for så vidt angår makro-og mikrotilsyn. 
The ECB’s supervisory and monetary functions exchange information on macro-and micro-prudential developments.
Vi har imidlertid ikke set dokumentation for, at sådanne udviklinger specifikt tages i betragtning af ECB under dets tilsyn, f.eks. gennem tilpasning af visse risikofaktorer i RAS, eller at de systematisk vurderes i SREP. 
However, we did not see evidence that such developments are specifically taken into account by the ECB in its supervision, for example through the scaling of certain risk factors in the RAS, or systematically assessed in the SREP.
Vi fik heller ikke fremvist en procedure for systematisk opfølgning af systemiske risici angivet af ESRB eller andre makrotilsynsorganer. 
Nor were we shown any process for the systematic follow-up of systemic risks identified by the ESRB or other macro-prudential bodies.
Manglen på en centraliseret overvågning af indikatorer kan også påvirke ledelseseffektiviteten negativt. 
The lack of a centralised monitoring of indicators also has the potential to negatively impact management efficiency.
Vi kunne ikke finde dokumentation for, at ECB's ledelsesinformationssystemer giver ledende medarbejdere en omfattende, ajourført oversigt over alle institutioner under krisestyring. 
We could not find evidence that the ECB’s management information systems provide senior management with a comprehensive, up-to-date overview of all institutions under crisis management.
Sådanne oplysninger ville hjælpe ledelsen med at udføre deres opgaver og dermed bidrage til operationel effektivitet. 
Such a data set would assist management to discharge their tasks and thus contribute to operational efficiency.
Der er ikke noget system til "undtagelsesrapportering" for at sikre, at oplysningerne automatisk bliver eskaleret til de relevante hierarkiske niveauer, hvis de opfylder de kriterier, der er fastlagt på forhånd. 
There is no ‘report by exception’ system to ensure that information is automatically escalated to the appropriate hierarchical levels if it meets pre-defined criteria.
Ingen tydeligt fastlagt opfølgningsprocedure er på plads. 
There does not appear to be a clearly defined follow-up process in place.
Ifølge en intern revisionsrapport anvender JST'erne ikke ECB's opfølgningssystem effektivt til løbende tilsyn, og opfølgningen af langt de fleste krav i bestyrelsens beslutninger blev ikke engang dokumenteret (for så vidt angår en stikprøve udtaget af intern revision blev 81 % af sagerne ikke registreret i systemet, og for 17 %'s vedkommende var der ingen dokumentation for den relaterede handling). 
According to an internal audit report, JSTs do not make efficient use of the ECB’s follow-up system for ongoing supervision, and the follow-up given to the vast majority of the requirements in supervisory board decisions was not even documented (for a sample drawn by internal audit, 81 % of cases were not recorded in the system and for 17 % there was no documentation of the related action).
Det er i høj grad op til tilsynsholdene at afgøre, hvornår der skal foretages vurderinger af tidlig indgriben, og hvordan de skal fremlægges 88. 
It is very much down to supervisory teams to decide just when to make early intervention assessments and how to present them 88.
Dokumentationen vedrørende effektiviteten af ECB's operationelle forvaltning af kriseidentifikation var hverken tilstrækkelig eller repræsentativ. 
The evidence we obtained regarding the efficiency of the ECB’s operational management for crisis identification was neither sufficient nor representative.
Ikke desto mindre fremhævede den visse svagheder med hensyn til udformning. 
Nevertheless, it highlighted certain design weaknesses.
Vi konstaterede på basis af bilag og interviews, at vurderinger af tidlig indgriben hovedsagelig foregår i forbindelse med den årlige SREP-øvelse, dvs. samme tidspunkt hvert år. 
We found from documentation and interviews that early intervention assessments take place principally in the context of the annual SREP exercise, i.e. at the same time every year.
I princippet bør formelle vurderinger af tidlig indgriben også udløses som følge af vigtige 39 begivenheder i løbet af et år. 
In principle, formal early intervention assessments should also be triggered on foot of significant events in the course of a year.
ECB har fastholdt, at sådanne tilfælde finder sted, men det var ikke indlysende i vores stikprøve. 
The ECB has maintained that such cases do occur, but they were not evident in our sample.
Ud fra de begrænsede beviser, vi har til rådighed, virker det, som om visse tilsyneladende væsentlige lovovertrædelser i nogle tilfælde ikke medførte en formel vurdering af tidlig indgriben adskilt fra SREP-processen, selv om dette ikke udelukker muligheden for, at ECB ikke desto mindre overvejede at træffe passende foranstaltninger til tilsyn eller tidlig indgriben. 
In fact, based on the limited evidence available to us, it appears that in some cases apparently important regulatory breaches did not lead to a formal early intervention assessment exercises separate from the SREP process, although, this does not exclude the possibility that the ECB nonetheless considered taking appropriate supervisory or early intervention measures.
Som krævet af EBA-retningslinjerne og ECB's vejledning indeholdt de vurderinger af tidlig indgriben, vi fik fra ECB, generelt udtalelser om, hvorvidt lovgivningsmæssige krav var blevet eller sandsynligvis ville blive overtrådt. 
As required by the EBA guidelines and ECB guidance, the early intervention assessments given us by the ECB generally included statements as to whether regulatory requirements had been or were likely to be infringed.
Alle sager omhandlede overtrædelser (eller sandsynlige overtrædelser) af kapitalkrav, mens ingen omhandlede overtrædelser (eller sandsynlige overtrædelser) af likviditetskrav. 
All cases related to breaches (or likely breaches) of capital requirements, and none to breaches (or likely breaches) of liquidity requirements.
Der var ingen henvisning til overtrædelser af andre lovgivningsmæssige krav, navnlig alvorlige svagheder udpeget inde for en institutions forvaltning og risikostyring i forbindelse med ECB's løbende tilsyn, og der var ingen systematisk omtale af tidligere overtrædelser. 
There was no reference to infringements of other regulatory requirements, in particular serious weaknesses identified in an institution’s governance and risk management framework in the course of the ECB’s ongoing supervision, and no systematic mention of previous infringements.
Samlet set kunne vi ikke konstatere, at alle relevante resultater fra tilsyn er afspejlet i de formelle vurderinger af tidlig indgriben. 
Overall, we were unable to establish that all relevant supervisory findings are reflected in the formal early intervention assessment documents.
De konklusioner, vi så på overtrædelser eller sandsynlige overtrædelser, var hovedsagelig baseret på bankernes indberettede tal og prognoser, selv i tilfælde hvor ECB havde beviser for, at de indberettede tal var tvivlsomme, men vi erkender, at dette kan være blevet afbødet i visse tilfælde af følsomhedsanalyser, der indikerer en række mulige resultater for den pågældende bank, eller andre foranstaltninger. 
The conclusions we saw on breaches or likely breaches were based principally on banks’ reported figures and projections, even in cases where the ECB had evidence that the reported figures were questionable, although we understand this may have been mitigated in some cases by sensitivity analyses indicating a range of possible outcomes for the bank in question, or other actions.
Kriserespons 92. 
Crisis response 92.
Når en bank er identificeret som kriseramt, forventes JST'erne at øge deres tilsynsmæssige kontrol, og de bliver ansvarlige for at fastlægge en passende respons i tæt koordinering med krisestyringsafdelingen. 
When a bank is identified as being in crisis, the JSTs are expected to increase their supervisory scrutiny and are charged with determining the appropriate response in close coordination with the CRM.
Dette indebærer et forslag om anvendelse af tidlig indgriben og andre tilsynsbeføjelser, og kan afhængigt af krisens sværhedsgrad indebære at udføre en FOLTF-vurdering. 
This includes proposing the use of early intervention and other supervisory powers and, depending on the severity of the crisis, may involve performing an FOLTF assessment.
Karakteren og omfanget af intensiveret tilsynsaktivitet er angivet af hvert enkelt JST 93. 
The nature and extent of intensified supervisory activity are defined by each JST 93.
ECB gav os ikke dokumentation for nogen formel vejledning vedrørende fremme af den tilsynsmæssige kontrol (hvordan, i hvilket omfang og med hvilke muligheder). 
The ECB did not give us evidence of any formal guidance concerning the stepping-up of supervisory scrutiny (how, to what extent and with what options).
Vi fik at vide, at den sædvanlige praksis er at øge interaktionen med en banks øverste ledelse og kræve hyppigere og mere detaljerede indberetninger forud for den formelle udløsning af krisestyringsaktiviteter. 
We were told that the usual practice is to increase interaction with a bank’s senior management and require more frequent and detailed reporting prior to the formal triggering of crisis management activities.
Der er fremsat redskaber til overvågning af likviditet ... 
Liquidity monitoring tools have been established ...
Tilgængeligheden af komplette og ajourførte likviditetsdata er afgørende for den operationelle effektivitet af forvaltningen af en bank i krise. 
The availability of complete and up-to-date liquidity data is essential for operational efficiency in the management of a bank in crisis.
ECB har derfor udformet en skabelon for likviditetsrapporter, som bankerne kan anvende i krisesituationer. 
The ECB has therefore designed a liquidity reporting template for banks to use in crisis situations.
Dette dækker over fremlægning af vigtige oplysninger om finansiering og likviditet. 
This covers the provision of key information on funding and liquidity.
Desuden bliver institutionerne bedt om at give deres egen vurdering og forklare deres forventninger. 
In addition, institutions are asked to give their own assessment and explain their expectations.
Bankerne er dog ikke forpligtet til at dele underliggende antagelser. 
However, banks are not required to share underlying assumptions.
En anden potentiel fejl er den kendsgerning, at dataene kun indsamles på koncernniveau, hvilket kan betyde, at en krise i et datterselskab kunne hæmme deres brugbarhed med hensyn til at yde kritiske oplysninger, som ECB har brug for med henblik på at håndtere situationen effektivt. ... men for at være effektiv i operationel henseende, skal processen angive omfanget af opståede eller sandsynlige tab 96. 
Another potential flaw is the fact that the data is collected at group level only, which might mean that a crisis at subsidiary level could hamper its usefulness in providing critical information needed by the ECB to efficiently manage the situation. ... but to be operationally efficient the process would need to quantify incurred or likely losses 96.
Lige så vigtigt for operationelt effektiv krisestyring er identifikation og vurdering af virkningen af negative udviklinger på egenkapitalen. 
Equally important for operationally efficient crisis management is the identification and assessment of the impact of adverse developments on equity.
Da tidlig indgriben har til formål at genoprette en banks levedygtighed, er det nødvendigt at udvikle et syn på ikke-indregnede og sandsynlige tab og andre faktorer, der endnu ikke afspejles i bankens tal. 
As early intervention has the objective of restoring a bank to viability, it is necessary to develop a view on unrecognised 40 and likely losses and other factors that are not yet reflected in the bank’s figures.