natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
25.1.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 20/9 Tabel 1 Anmodninger om udveksling af oplysninger (ifżlge bistandssżgende medlemsstater) r 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Anmodninger udvekslet mellem Anmodninger sendt til eller EU-15 modtaget af EU-10 17059 Ń 18162 Ń Antal anmodninger i alt 17 059 18 162 22 101 25 749 29 381 21 587 19 649 20 533 514 6 100 8 848 Kilde: Medlemsstaternes statistikker i henhold til Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/9 Table 1 Number of requests for exchange of information (according to requesting Member States) Year Requests exchanged amongst EU-15 2002 17 059 2003 18 162 2004 21 587 2005 19 649 2006 20 533 Requests sent or received by EU-10 Ń Ń 514 6 100 8 848 Total number of requests 17 059 18 162 22 101 25 749 29 381 Source: Member State statistics pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1925/2004, audit calculations.
I 2006 anfżrte over 3,3 millioner erhvervsdrivende i hele EU, at de havde foretaget erhvervelser fra andre medlemsstater. 
In 2006, more than 3,3 million traders across the EU declared that they had made acquisitions from other Member States.
Det betyder, at selv hvis man forsigtigt gr ud fra, at alle de 29 381 oplysninger, der blev udvekslet efter anmodning i 2006, vedrżrte forskellige erhvervsdrivende, var sandsynligheden for at blive genstand for en sdan udveksling under 0,9 %. 
This means that even with the conservative assumption that each of the 29 381 exchanges of information on request in 2006 concerned different traders, the probability of being subject to such an exchange of information was below 0,9 %.
I virkeligheden var sandsynligheden endda lavere, da der om en ržkke selskaber var fremsat flere anmodninger. 
In reality, the probability was even lower, as a number of companies were subject to several requests.
Begržnset direkte kontakt mellem de lokale kontorer 22. 
Limited direct contact between local offices 22.
En vigtig grund til, at samarbejdet ikke er blevet mere intensivt, er, at forordningens muligheder for decentralisering kun i begržnset omfang er blevet udnyttet. 
An important reason why cooperation has not become more intensive is the limited exploitation of the possibilities of decentralisation offered by the regulation.
Da Rdet vedtog forordningen, erklžrede det (1), at der indtil da ikke havde vžret nok direkte kontakt mellem de lokale afgiftskontorer, da hovedreglen var, at al kommunikation gik via de centrale forbindelseskonto-rer, og at denne centralisering havde resulteret i, at ordningerne for administrativt samarbejde ikke var blevet udnyttet godt nok. 
When adopting the regulation, the Council stated (1) that, up to then, there had not been enough direct contact between local tax offices, with communication between central liaison offices being the rule and that this centralisation had led to under-use of the arrangements for administrative cooperation.
Rdet konkluderede, at der burde gives mulighed for mere direkte kontakt mellem de forskellige tjenester. 
The Council concluded that provisions should be made to bring about more direct contacts between services.
Forelżbig har medlemsstaterne kun i begržnset omfang benyttet sig af denne mulighed. 
Limited use has been made so far by Member States of this option.
Kun f medlemsstater (2) har dekoncentreret befżjelser til territoriale tjenester. 
Only a few Member States (2) have devolved competence to territorial services.
Hvis en sdan decentralisering kun gennemfżres i et ftal af medlemsstater, fr den ikke fuld effekt, da der i de fleste andre medlemsstater ikke er instanser, der kan indg i et decentralt samarbejde. 
If such decentralisation is implemented only in a minority of Member States, it fails to produce its full effects as there are no counterparts for decentralised cooperation in most of the other Member States.
(1) Jf. forordningens betragtning 12. 
(1) See recital 12 of the regulation.
(2) I Finland og Frankrig er denne befżjelse systematisk i vid udstržkning blevet delegeret til de regionale skattekontorer. 
(2) In Finland and France this competence has been systematically and comprehensively delegated to regional tax offices.
Oplysningernes aktualitet Halvdelen af anmodningerne besvares for sent 24. 
Timeliness of replies Half of the requests answered late 24.
Hurtige svar p anmodninger om oplysninger er afgżrende for, at samarbejdet kan blive effektivt. 
Rapid replies to requests for information are critical for effective cooperation.
Hurtige svar gżr det muligt hurtigt at identificere selskaber, der begr svig, og de gżr det vanskeligere for svindlerne at skjule udbytte fra momssvig. 
They allow fraudulent companies to be quickly identified and make it more difficult for fraudsters to hide their gains from VAT fraud.
Derfor skal medlemsstaterne i henhold til forordningen udveksle oplysninger hurtigst muligt og senest tre mneder efter modtagelsen af en anmodning. 
Therefore the regulation obliges Member States to exchange information as quickly as possible and no later than three months after the receipt of a request.
I tilfžlde, hvor den bistandssżgte myndighed allerede ligger inde med de pgžldende oplysninger, nedsžttes fristen til en mned. 
Where the requested authority is already in possession of that information, the time limit is reduced to one month.
Medlemsstaternes statistikker for 2006 viser, at nžsten 50 % af anmodningerne ikke blev besvaret inden for tidsfristen. 
Statistics for 2006 provided by Member States show that almost 50 % of requests were not answered within the deadline.
Det er endnu flere end i 2005, hvor 42 % af svarene blev afgivet efter fristens udlżb. 
This figure was even higher than in 2005 when 42 % of the replies were late.
Det forekommer i alle medlemsstater, at svar afgives for sent, men hvor ofte det sker, varierer meget fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat. 
Late replies occur in all Member States but their frequency varies significantly between Member States.
I 2006 havde to medlemsstater (3) svaret inden for tidsfristen i nžsten 90 % af tilfžldene, mens otte medlemsstater (4) i over 50 % af tilfžldene havde svaret efter fristens udlżb (jf. tabel 2). 
In 2006, two Member States (3) replied within the deadline in almost 90 % of cases, whereas eight Member States (4) replied late in more than 50 % of cases (see Table 2).
(3) Litauen og Slovenien. 
(3) Lithuania and Slovenia.
(4) Danmark, Frankrig, Italien, Luxembourg, Nederlandene, Portugal, Spanien og Den Tjekkiske Republik. 
(4) Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal.
27. For s vidt angr svar afgivet inden for n mned, viste statistikkerne, at antallet af tilfžlde, hvor denne frist var blevet overholdt, var faldet fra 2 154 i 2004 til 1 885 i 2006. 
2006 statistics provisional. 27. cerned, the statistics showed a decrease in the number of times for which this deadline has been met from 2 154 cases in 2004 down to 1 885 in 2006.
Sammenholdt med det samlede antal anmodninger betyder det, at andelen af hurtige svar faldt fra 9,7 % i 2004 til 6,4 % i 2006. 
Compared to the total number of requests, this means that the share of early replies fell from 9,7 % in 2004 to 6,4 % in 2006.
Hertil kommer, at Retten i nogle af de medlemsstater, den besżgte, konstaterede, at en ržkke anmodninger stadig ikke var besvaret efter et r eller mere. 
In addition, in certain Member States visited, a number of requests were found to have remained outstanding for one year or more.
Da Retten aflagde revisionsbesżg i Italien i maj 2006, konstaterede den f.eks. 182 ubesvarede anmodninger alene blandt de anmodninger, der var modtaget i de sidste fire mneder af 2004. 
In Italy for example, there were, at the time of the CourtŐs audit visit in May 2006, 182 unanswered requests received in the last four months of 2004 alone.
I Det Forenede Kongerige var 121 anmodninger fra 2003 og 2004 stadig ikke besvaret i begyndelsen af 2006. 
In the United Kingdom, in early 2006, 121 requests were still outstanding from 2003 and 2004.
F forelżbige svar 29. 
Few interim replies 29.
Det er fastsat udtrykkeligt i forordningen, at nr den bistandssżgte myndighed ikke er i stand til at svare inden for den fastsatte frist, skal den omgende skriftligt underrette den bistandssżgende myndighed om rsagerne hertil og om, hvornr den vil kunne besvare anmodningen. 
The regulation stipulates explicitly that where the requested authority is unable to respond by the deadline it shall inform the requesting authority in writing forthwith of the reasons for this and when it would be able to respond.
Alligevel bliver der kun sjžldent givet forhndsmeddelelse om sandsynlige forsinkelser. 
Nevertheless, prior notice of probable delays is only rarely given.
Medlemsstaternes statistikker for 2006 viste, at de bistandssżgende myndigheder i i alt kun 5 % af sagerne (737 af de 14 565 besvarelser, der overskred fristen) havde fet underretning om forsinkelsen. 
Statistics from Member States for 2006 showed that in only 5 % of all cases (737 out of 14 565 late replies) had delays been notified to the requesting authorities.
Nr den bistandssżgende medlemsstat ikke fr en sdan underretning, er den forhindret i at tržffe alternative foranstaltninger ud fra viden om, at anmodningen ikke vil blive besvaret omgende. 
Absence of such notification prevents the requesting Member State from taking alternative action in the knowledge that the request will not be promptly answered.
25.1.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 20/11 derfor kunne skaffe hurtigt, og senere, nr der var blevet aflagt kontrolbesżg, havde svaret mere udfżrligt. 
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/11 available, followed by a more comprehensive answer once tax control visits had taken place.
De lokale skattekontorer prioriterer ikke anmodningerne hżjt nok 32. 
Lack of priority given to requests by local tax offices 32.
Ved revisionen konstateredes en ržkke faktorer, der er medvirkende rsag til, at svarene afgives for sent. 
The audit revealed a number of factors which impact negatively on the timeliness of replies.
Der er ikke altid mekanismer, der kan sikre, at de lokale skattemyndigheder prioriterer det administrative samarbejde lige s hżjt som deres andre aktiviteter (1). 
Mechanisms are not always in place to ensure that LTOs give as much priority to administrative cooperation as to their other activities (1).
En lignende bemžrkning fremsžttes i en beretning fra Rigsrevisionen (2) i Danmark. 
A similar observation was made in a report provided by the National Audit Office of Denmark (NAOD) (2).
De danske skattemyndigheder har opstillet mltal for overholdelse af tidsfrister vedrżrende sagsbehandling. Da revisionen fandt sted, indgik anmodninger fra andre landes skattemyndigheder dog ikke i SKATŐs mltal for sagsbehandlingen. 
Danish customs and tax authorities had set target figures for compliance with case processing time limits, but, at the time of the audit, requests from the tax authorities of other countries were not included in these target figures.
Ifżlge et opfżlgningsnotat fra Rigsrevisionen har den ansvarlige minister truffet foranstaltninger til at afhjžlpe problemet. 
According to a follow-up report by the NAOD, the minister responsible has taken initiatives to deal with the issue.
Retten konstaterede, at en ržkke andre forhold indvirker negativt p behandlingen af anmodninger om oplysninger. 
A number of other causes were found which have a negative impact on the treatment of requests for information.
Det sker for eksempel, nr afsendermedlemsstaterne ikke bruger formularer til anmodning om bistand hensigtsmžssigt (mange forskellige anmodninger i en enkelt standardformular, felterne til Čfri tekstÇ overudnyttes, der anvendes ikke elektronisk kommunikation mv.), og nr modtagermedlemsstaterne har svžrt ved at forst, hvad det egentlig er, der bliver anmodet om (f.eks. p grund af uklare oplysninger, sprogproblemer eller forkert anvendelse af standardformularerne mv.) og er i tvivl om nytten af visse anmodninger. 
These included: inadequate use of the information request forms (e.g. multiple requests in a single standard form, over use of Ôfree-textŐ boxes of these forms and use of non-electronic communications) by the sending Member States, difficulties in understanding what was actually requested (e.g. due to unclear information, language problems or mistakes in using the standard forms), and doubts about the usefulness of certain requests in the Member States receiving them.
Svagheder ved nogle medlemsstaters overvgningssystemer 34. 
Weaknesses in monitoring systems of some Member States 34.
Forsinkelserne kan ogs skyldes, at ikke alle medlemsstater har indfżrt hensigtsmžssige overvgnings-og forvaltningssystemer, der sikrer, at anmodningerne besvares rettidigt. 
Delays can also be caused by the fact that not all Member States have set up adequate systems for monitoring and managing timely response to requests.
Retten konstaterede positive eksempler p forvaltning af modtagne anmodninger i Det Forenede Kongerige, Luxembourg, Polen og Slovenien, hvor de centrale forbindelseskontorer opstiller interne tidsfrister og effektivt overvger, at de bliver overholdt. 
Positive examples of such management of requests received were found in Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia and the UK, where CLOs set internal deadlines and monitor them effectively.
I Italien, hvor det programmel, det centrale forbindelseskontor har installeret til dette forml, ikke udnyttes effektivt, konstaterede Retten nogle tilfžlde af forkert indlžste eller manglende data, hvilket bevirkede, at anmodningerne var blevet behandlet forkert. 
In Italy, where the software put in place for this purpose by the CLO was not effectively used, cases of input errors and missing data were found which led to mismanagement of requests.
I det centrale forbindelseskontor skulle rykkere til forbindelseskontorer fżrst sendes 10 dage, fżr fristerne udlżb, og det er for sent til, at man kan tržffe de fornżdne foranstaltninger. 
In the CLO reminders to liaison departments were programmed for only 10 days before the expiry of deadlines, too late for necessary action to be undertaken.
(1) For at fremskaffe de oplysninger, som en bistandssżgende myndighed i en anden medlemsstat żnsker, skal den bistandssżgte myndighed i henhold til forordningens artikel 5, stk. 
(1) Article 5(4) of the regulation stipulates that, in order to obtain the information sought by a requesting authority from another Member State, the requested authority shall proceed as though acting on its own account.
(2) Rigsrevisionens beretning afgivet til statsrevisorerne om indsatsen mod momskarruselsvig, september 2006. 
(2) Report to the Public Accounts Committee on measures to counter VAT carousel fraud, The National Audit Office of Denmark, September 2006.
Bde det nederlandske og det franske centrale forbindelseskontor opstiller kortere frister for de lokale skattekontorers besvarelse af modtagne anmodninger, men ingen af de to centrale forbindelseskontorer kunne dokumentere, at tidsplanerne blev overvget. 
Though both the Dutch and French CLOs set intermediate deadlines for the LTOs to respond to requests received, in neither CLO was there evidence of monitoring of these timetables.
Kun nr der kom rykkere fra den bistandssżgende medlemsstat, blev der skredet til handling over for det lokale skattekontor, som havde overskredet svarfristen. 
Only where reminders were received from the requesting Member State was any action taken towards the LTO which was late in providing answers.
Svagheder ved de centrale forbindelseskontorers organisationsstruktur 38. 
Weaknesses in the organisational set-up of CLOs 38.
I nogle af de besżgte medlemsstater, hvor svarene ofte blev afgivet for sent, konstaterede Retten, at komplicerede organisationsstrukturer ogs medvirker til forsinkelser og vanskeliggżr overvgningen. 
In some Member States visited with a high number of late replies, the Court found that complicated organisational set-ups also contribute to delays and create problems in monitoring.
Ud over det centrale forbindelseskontor har Italien tre forbindelseskontorer p centralt medlemsstatsniveau, som alle har lige store befżjelser med hensyn til momssamarbejde. 
In Italy, in addition to the CLO, there are three liaison departments at central Member State level, all of them equally competent in the field of VAT cooperation.
Andre medlemsstater kan hver gang frit vžlge et af de tre forbindelseskontorer og sende deres anmodninger direkte til det. 
Other Member States are free to contact each time any one of the three liaison departments and send the requests directly to the department selected.
Arbejdspro-cedurerne i de tre forbindelseskontorer er ikke harmoniserede, koordineringen mellem dem er ikke god nok, og det centrale forbindelseskontors overvgning af dem er svag. 
Working procedures of the three liaison departments are not harmonised and there is insufficient coordination amongst them and weak supervision by the CLO.
I żvrigt stemmer en sdan organisationsstruktur ikke overens med forordningens bestemmelse (3) om, at forbindelseskontorer skal have en specifik territorial kompetence eller et specialiseret ansvarsomrde. 
Furthermore, such an organisational set-up is not in line with the regulation which provides (3) that liaison departments have to be given specific territorial competence or specialised operational responsibility.
Det nederlandske centrale forbindelseskontor omfatter to uafhžngige operative enheder, en i Amsterdam og en i Almelo, hver med sin forvaltningsstruktur. 
The Dutch CLO comprises two independent operating units, one located in Amsterdam and the other in Almelo, each with its own management structure.
I disse tilfžlde havde de lokale skattekontorer fremsendt deres svar til det centrale forbindelseskontor i Almelo, der overfżrte dem til det centrale forbindelseskontor i Amsterdam, hvorfra de blev sendt til de bistandssżgende medlemsstater. 
In these cases, LTOs had delivered replies to the CLO in Almelo which were transmitted to the CLO Amsterdam from where they were sent to the requesting Member States.
I Tyskland er det centrale forbindelseskontors opgaver ifżlge de oplysninger, de żvrige medlemsstater har adgang til (4), fordelt p tre enheder i det centrale fżderale skattekontor, n baseret i Bonn, de to andre i Saarlouis. 
In Germany, according to the information made available to other Member States (4), the tasks of the CLO have been split between three units of the Central Federal Tax Office, one based in Bonn, the two others in Saarlouis.
De żvrige medlemsstater havde ikke adgang til oplysninger om, hvem der ledede det centrale forbindelseskontor. 
No information was made available to other Member States about who was heading the CLO.
De koordineringsproblemer, som skyldtes de komplicerede organisationstrukturer, og svaghederne ved overvgningssystemerne, er med til at forklare de store uoverensstemmelser mellem de statistikker, som de forskellige medlemsstater har udarbejdet. 
The coordination problems caused by the complicated organisational structures and the weaknesses of monitoring systems contribute to the significant discrepancies in the statistics produced by different Member States.
I flere tilfžlde er der stor forskel mellem det antal anmodninger, som en medlemsstat erklžrer, at den har fet, og det antal anmodninger, andre medlemsstater erklžrer, at de har sendt til den (jf. tabel 3). 
In several cases there are significant differences between the number of requests which a Member State claims to have received and the number of requests which other Member States claim to have sent it (see Table 3).
(3) Artikel 2, stk. 3. 
(3) Article 2(3).
(4) Dokumentet ČKontaktpunkte fr die gegenseitige Amtshilfe im Bere-ich der Umsatzsteuer, Stand: 1. Februar 2007Ç. 
(4) Document ÔKontaktpunkte fr die gegenseitige Amtshilfe im Bereich der Umsatzsteuer, Stand: 1 Februar 2007Ő.
C 20/12 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 25.1.2008 Tabel 3 Afvigelser pr. medlemsstat Antal modtagne anmodninger Belgien Den Tjekkiske Republik Danmark Tyskland Estland Gržkenland Spanien Frankrig Irland Italien Cypern Letland Litauen Luxembourg Ungarn Malta Nederlandene Żstrig Polen Portugal Slovenien Den Slovakiske Republik Finland Sverige Det Forenede Kongerige 552 371 409 642 679 295 6 255 139 132 238 213 652 2 837 296 2 138 259 237 284 2 802 114 139 153 144 180 192 468 456 320 283 Ifżlge den bistandssżgte medlemsstat 1 8 2 2 1 2 Ifżlge de bistandssżgende medlemsstater Afvigelse % 5,5 Đ 9,3 Đ 5,4 32,6 5,3 11,7 Đ 6,5 7,4 9,3 Đ 54,2 Đ 18 6,3 Đ 6,3 2,6 13,1 8,3 Đ 2,5 6,4 Đ 5,3 Đ 4,9 Đ 7,3 Đ 3,2 Đ 3,4 10,9 0 Ń 17,2 1 471 81 Đ38 Đ37 2 040 7 25 Đ 185 158 22 Đ 1 518 25 9 12 12 37 1 54 57 31 25 Đ7 Đ10 179 Đ6 395 43 2 242 Đ1 Đ Đ Đ Đ Đ 13 12 089 2 143 942 885 557 588 481 506 241 89 96 306 316 173 438 2 I alt SAMLEDE BELŻB FOR AFVIGELSER I ABSOLUTTE TAL 4 441 Medlemsstaternes statistikker i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 
C 20/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 25.1.2008 Table 3 Discrepancies by Member State (2005) Number of requests received Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Slovenia Slovak Republic Finland Sweden United Kingdom Source: Quality of reply 43.
Gennemgangen af stikprżven af anmodninger og svar viste, at selv om de oplysninger, der blev givet, undertiden ikke var klare nok, s var de i de fleste tilfžlde omfattende og detaljerede og besvarede de spżrgsml, der var stillet. 
Examination of the sampled requests and answers showed that though the information provided was sometimes inadequately presented, in most cases it was comprehensive and detailed, answering the questions posed.
Som svar p Rettens spżrgsml om opfżlgningen p nogle udvalgte udvekslinger af oplysninger (jf. punkt 15) bekržftede medlemsstaterne, at de svar, de havde fet, havde gjort det muligt at ansžtte momsen korrekt i de pgžldende tilfžlde. 
25 9 12 12 37 1 54 57 31 25 Đ7 Đ10 Đ6 43 Đ1 2 12 143 885 588 506 96 316 179 395 242 25 749 2 Đ Đ 2 2 Total SUM OF ABSOLUTE AMOUNTS OF DISCREPANCIES Ń 4 441 (see paragraph 15), Member States affirmed that the answers received had enabled correct assessment of VAT in the cases concerned.
Evalueringen viser, at samarbejdet kan give resultater 44. 
Evaluation shows cooperation can lead to results 44.
I dag er der ikke noget lovfžstet krav om, at resultaterne af det administrative samarbejde skal vurderes, men nogle f medlemsstater har foretaget sdanne evalueringer. 
Currently there is no legal requirement to assess the results of administrative cooperation but a few Member States have conducted such exercises.
De viser fordelene ved det administrative samarbejde. 
These evaluations demonstrate the benefits of administrative cooperation.
25.1.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 20/13 45. 
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/13 45.
I Frankrig har man ikke evalueret den finansielle indvirkning af samarbejdet, men en analyse udfżrt af de kompetente myndigheder viste, at 34 % af de svar, man fik i 2005, bekržftede eller afslżrede svig i Frankrig eller en anden medlemsstat. 
In France, though the financial impact of the cooperation has not been evaluated, an analysis by the competent authorities showed that 34 % of replies received in 2005 confirmed or revealed the existence of fraud in France or another Member State.
En evaluering, som det centrale forbindelseskontor i Slovenien havde foretaget af 89 anmodninger om administrativt samarbejde, som de slovenske myndigheder havde modtaget i 2005, viste, at de administrative undersżgelser i forbindelse med 21 anmodninger havde resulteret i, at der var blevet opkržvet ca. 
An evaluation by the CLO in Slovenia of 89 requests for administrative cooperation received by their authorities in 2005 showed that in the case of 21 requests, administrative enquiries resulted in the collection of additional VAT of approximately 1,5 million euro.