natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette bekržftes af de eksterne observatżrer, som bemžrker, at selv om tildelingskriterierne generelt er forstet korrekt, havde individuelle eksperter i en ržkke tilfžlde forskellige forstelser af evalueringskriterierne. 
This view is corroborated by the external observers, who note that, although the award criteria are generally well understood, individual experts had a different understanding of the evaluation criteria in a number of cases.
Disse forskelle mellem evalueringerne (jf. eksemplerne i tekstboks 3) blev drżftet, og man nede frem til en fžlles holdning p konsensusmżder. 
These discrepancies among evaluations (see examples in Box 3) were discussed and a common position was found in consensus meetings.
Kun i CEF-E og - siden 2018 - i CEF-T findes der detaljerede skriftlige vejledninger til eksperterne om tildelingskriteriernes fortolkning. 
Detailed written guidance for experts on the interpretation of award criteria is available in CEF-E and, since 2018, in CEF-T.
29 Tekstboks 3 Eksempler p problemer vedrżrende tildelingskriteriernes fortolkning De eksterne observatżrers rapporter fremhžver forhold, som vedrżrer kriteriernes klarhed: Sżrg for, at de detaljerede beskrivelser af tildelingskriterierne og underkriterierne er konsekvente under hele evalueringen: P nogle konsensusmżder havde eksperterne f.eks. brugt lidt forskellige beskrivelser af de kriterier, der ikke var angivet i materialet fra indkaldelsernes udarbejdelse. 
29 Box 3 Examples of issues with the interpretation of award criteria The external observers’ reports highlight issues with the clarity of criteria: “Ensure that the detailed descriptions of the award criteria and sub-criteria are consistent throughout the evaluation: e.g. in some consensus meetings, the experts had used slightly different descriptions of the criteria that were not listed in the call preparation material.”
(CEF-IKT, 2017-indkaldelser) Der er altid nogle problemer med tildelingskriteriernes fortolkning og anvendelse. [...] 
(CEF ICT, 2017 calls) “There are always some problems with the interpretation and application of the award criteria. (...)
I denne fase var det, som det jžvnligt bemžrkes, vigtigt en gang imellem at minde evaluatorerne om, hvad de specifikke evalueringskriterier betyder i specifikke sammenhžnge (f.eks. hvordan man fortolker modenhed i forbindelse med bygge-og anlžgsprojekter, undersżgelser og blandede projekter), og at pointgivningen skal stemme overens med kommentarerne og bemžrkningerne. 
During this phase it was important, as regularly observed, to occasionally remind evaluators what specific evaluation criteria mean in specific contexts (for instance, how to interpret maturity in the case of works, studies and for mixed projects) and that marks must be consistent with comments and remarks.
P nogle konsensusmżder blev det bemžrket, at eksperterne havde forskellige holdninger til, hvad der fremgik udtrykkeligt i forslaget, og hvad der kunne udledes af forslagets beskrivelse. 
In some consensus meetings it was observed that experts took different views on what was explicit in the proposal and what could be inferred from the description of the proposal.”
(CEF-T, 2014-indkaldelser vedrżrende rlige og flerrige arbejdsprogrammer) 55 En grundig vurdering af kriterierne "modenhed" og "kvalitet" er vigtig med henblik p at foregribe forhold, der kan true projekternes rettidige gennemfżrelse. 
(CEF-T, annual and multi-annual work programme calls, 2014) 55 The thorough assessment of the criteria “maturity” and “quality” is key for anticipating issues that may affect the timely implementation of projects.
INEA angav utilstržkkeligt realistisk planlžgning som en af hovedrsagerne til, at gennemfżrelsen er forsinket i forhold til tidsplanen. 
Insufficiently realistic planning was cited by INEA as one of the main reasons why implementation lags behind schedule.
De vigtigste problemer, som de eksterne eksperter identificerede med hensyn til projekternes modenhed, vedrżrte opkżb af jord, miljżkonsekvensvurderinger og żkonomisk eller teknisk modenhed. 
The main issues identified by external experts with regard to the maturity of projects concern land acquisition, environmental impact assessments and financial or technical readiness.
56 Vi konstaterede, at eksperterne ikke altid kan vurdere projekternes modenhed korrekt ud fra de dokumenter, der indsendes i ansżgningerne. 
56 We found that experts cannot always properly assess the maturity of projects based on the documents submitted in an application.
Arbejdet kan starte op til 18 mneder efter indsendelsen af et forslag. 
Works can start up to 18 months after the submission of a proposal.
Projekter kan omfatte bde undersżgelser og bygge-og anlžgsarbejde, men bygge-og anlžgsarbejde kan ogs udfżres sidelżbende med undersżgelser i et separat projekt. 
Also, projects may include both studies and works, or works may be carried out in parallel with studies in a separate project.
Det betyder, at en projektansżgning kan indsendes, selv om bygge-og anlžgsdelen stadig er i en tidlig modenhedsfase. 
This means that a project may be submitted although the works component is still at an early stage of maturity.
Vurderingen af et sdant projekts modenhed er en udfordring, da mange afgżrende oplysninger fżrst vil foreligge, nr undersżgelsen er afsluttet. 
The assessment of maturity for such projects is challenging, because much relevant information will not be known until the study is completed.
Der er risiko for, at CEF ikke bliver gennemfżrt fuldt ud 57 Vi undersżgte status for gennemfżrelsen af CEF-budgettet og de foranstaltninger, INEA har truffet for at sikre, at det bliver brugt. 
There is a risk that the CEF will not be fully implemented 57 We examined the state of play regarding the implementation of the CEF budget and the action INEA has taken to ensure it is being used.
transport-, energi-og telekommunikationssektorerne bżr budgettet forvaltes forsvarligt og anvendes til finansiering af relevante og egnede investeringsprojekter, som derefter gennemfżres rettidigt. 
To achieve concrete benefits in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors, the budget needs to be managed soundly and spent on relevant and suitable investment projects which are then implemented on a timely basis.
Der er risiko for en ufuldstžndig gennemfżrelse af CEF 58 CEF-forordningens egne skżn over finansieringsbehovene i transport-, telekommunikations-og energisektorerne var vžsentlig hżjere end de 33 milliarder euro, der er til rdighed i budgettet for 2014-202024. 
There is a risk of under-execution of the CEF 58 The CEF Regulation itself estimated funding needs for transport, telecommunications and energy that were substantially higher than the €33 billion available in the 2014-2020 budget24.
Forordningen vedrżrende det tidligere program, TEN-T-programmet for 2007-2013, indeholdt tilsvarende skżn. 
The regulation for the predecessor 2007-2013 TEN-T programme gave a similar assessment.
59 Trods det angivne behov var det ikke hele TEN-T-budgettet for 2007-2013, der blev anvendt. 
59 Despite these stated needs, the 2007-2013 TEN-T budget was not entirely used.
Absorptionsgraden ved afslutningen var 74 % af budgettet, idet 5,5 milliarder euro af det samlede belżb p 7,4 milliarder euro blev brugt25. 
The absorption rate, at closure, was 74 % of the budget, with €5.5 billion actually used out of a total of €7.4 billion25.
Det betyder, at hver fjerde euro p budgettet ikke blev investeret. 
Thus every fourth euro of the budget was not invested.
Ikke desto mindre var hele budgettet blevet tildelt projekter. 
However, the entire budget had been awarded to projects.
Forsinkede og ufuldstžndigt gennemfżrte infrastrukturprojekter var hovedrsagen til den langsomme anvendelse af midlerne, som i sidste ende indvirkede negativt p den samlede programgennemfżrelse. 
Delayed and under-executed infrastructure projects were the main reason for the slow use of funding, which eventually adversely impacted overall programme implementation.
60 INEA overvger fremskridtene i gennemfżrelsen, men sammenligner dem ikke - efter de fornżdne žndringer - med gennemfżrelsesgraden for det tidligere program. 
60 INEA monitors the progress of the implementation, but does not compare it, mutatis mutandis, to the implementation rate for the predecessor programme.
Der er dog flere ting, der tyder p, at anvendelsen af EU-finansiering stadig er langsom under det nuvžrende program. 
Nevertheless, several elements indicate that the use of EU funding is still slow for the current programme.
INEA havde planlagt samlede budgetforpligtelser p 19 milliarder euro i 2018, men det faktiske niveau var 14 milliarder euro, dvs. 26 % lavere end forventet26. 
INEA had planned for the cumulative amount of budgetary commitments to be €19 billion in 2018, but the actual level stood at €14 billion, i.e. 26 % lower than expected26.
I januar 2019 - fem r inde i den syvrige programmeringsperiode - var under en fjerdedel af de CEF-midler, der var tildelt projekter, blevet omsat i betalinger (jf. tabel 4). 
By January 2019, five years into the programming period, less than one quarter of the CEF funds awarded to projects had resulted in payments (see Table 4).
24 I betragtning 3 i forordning nr. 1316/2013 om CEF skżnnedes investeringsbehovet for transeuropžiske net inden for transport-, telekommunikations-og energisektorerne for perioden frem til 2020 at udgżre 970 milliarder euro. 
Table 4 – Implementation of the 2014-2020 CEF, € million 30 Grants awarded to projects Budgetary commitments Payments % payments / grants Transport 22 870 11 868 5 416 24 % Energy 2 400 1 836 416 17 % 24 Recital 3 to Regulation No 1316/2013 estimated that the investment requirement for trans-European networks in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors for the period to 2020 was €970 billion.
25 Absorptionsgraden for TEN-T ville have vžret endnu lavere, hvis TEN-T EA ikke havde bevilget ca. en tredjedel af budgettet to gange ved at genbruge finansiering fra ikkepržsterende projekter til nye tilskud gennem "tilbagefżrselsindkaldelser" vedrżrende i alt 2,3 milliarder euro. 
25 The absorption rate for TEN-T would have been even lower if TEN-T EA had not managed to commit about one third of the budget twice, by reinjecting funds from non-performing projects into new grants through “reflow calls” worth €2.3 billion.
26 Efter tilskudsaftalernes underskrivelse bevilger INEA midler i overensstemmelse med de planlagte betalinger for det relevante r. 
26 After signing grant agreements, INEA commits funds in line with planned payments for the relevant year.
Dermed afspejler budgetforpligtelserne kun en del af det bevilgede budget til projekter. 30 
Thus, budgetary commitments only reflect part of the budget granted to projects.
Tabel 4 - Gennemfżrelsen af CEF for 2014-2020, millioner euro 31 Tilskud bevilget til projekter Budgetforpligtelser Betalinger % betalinger/ tilskud Transport 22 870 11 868 5 416 24 % Energi 2 400 1 836 416 17 % Telekommunikation 228 208 100 44 % Synergi 21 21 8 40 % Tilsammen 25 519 13 933 5 940 23 % Kilde: Oplysninger fra INEA, januar 2019. 
31 Telecom 228 208 100 44 % Synergy 21 21 8 40 % Grand total 25 519 13 933 5 940 23 % Source: Information provided by INEA, January 2019.
61 Betalingssatsen er sžrlig lav for CEF-E og CEF-T, hvor den udgżr henholdsvis 17 % og 24 % af det oprindelige budget. 
61 The payment rate is particularly low for CEF-E and CEF-T at 17 % and 24 % respectively of the initial budget.
Den lave sats hžnger sammen med projekternes forsinkede gennemfżrelse. 
This low rate is traceable to the delayed implementation of projects.
I januar 2019 blev tilskudsaftalerne for 76 projekter (med samlede EU-tilskud p 4 milliarder euro) žndret for at udsžtte gennemfżrelsesfristen med mindst et r. 
By January 2019, the grant agreements for 76 projects (total EU grants of €4 billion) were modified to postpone the implementation deadline by at least one year.
Vi konstaterede dog, at disse žndringer kun afspejler et lille antal forsinkelser. 
However, we found that these changes only reflect a small number of delays.
I virkeligheden er der langt flere projekter, som er forsinkede, sdan som det fremgr af INEA's interne analyse: o For CEF-T's vedkommende gjorde en midtvejsgennemgang status over gennemfżrelsen af en stikprżve p 356 projekter. 
In reality, far more projects are delayed, as demonstrated by INEA’s internal analysis: o For CEF-T, a mid-term review (MTR) took stock of the implementation of a sample of 356 projects.
Mere end halvdelen af projekterne var forsinkede: 156 med et r eller mere, og 50 med under et r. 
More than half of the projects were delayed: 156 by a year or more and 50 by less than a year.
I gennemsnit var der en forsinkelse ved afslutningen p 10,7 mneder. o For CEF-E's vedkommende konstaterede INEA ved en gennemgang af 39 igangvžrende projekter, at ca. to tredjedele af dem ved udgangen af 2017 ikke var helt p rette spor: I gennemsnit var der en forsinkelse p 6,5 mneder. 
On average, the delay at completion was 10.7 months. o For CEF-E, at the end of 2017, around two thirds of 39 ongoing projects reviewed by INEA were not fully on track: average delay 6.5 months.
Projekter med forsinkelser manglede ofte modenhed ved indsendelsen 62 De overordnede GD'er planlžgger indkaldelserne af forslag og tržffer sledes beslutning om budgettets fordeling (punkt 39 og 40). 
Projects incurring delays often lacked maturity when submitted 62 The parent DGs plan calls for proposals, and thus decide on the distribution of the budget (paragraphs 39 to 40 ).
Af denne rsag bevilgede INEA en stor del af CEF-budgettet som tilskud tidligt i programmeringsperioden, f.eks. blev 85 % af CEF-T bevilget i forbindelse med 2014-og 2015-indkaldelserne. 
For this reason, INEA granted much of the CEF budget early in the programming period, with 85 % of CEF-T awarded through the 2014 and 2015 calls.
Alene CEF-T-budgettet for 2014 var p 12 milliarder euro - 52 % af det samlede budget for perioden p 23 milliarder euro. 
The CEF-T budget for 2014 alone was €12 billion - or 52 % of the total of €23 billion for the period.
63 Fordi s stor en del af budgettet blev afsat til de fżrste indkaldelser, og fordi det var svžrt for ansżgerne at forudse senere indkaldelser, var nogle af de udvalgte projekter ikke modne nok. 
63 Because so much of the budget was allocated to the first calls, and it was difficult for applicants to predict future calls, some projects selected were not mature enough.
64 Eftersom der ikke forel nogen flerrig planlžgning af indkaldelser, indsendte stżttemodtagerne deres ansżgninger, selv om nogle projekter med fordel kunne vžre indsendt p et senere tidspunkt, nr de var mere modne. 
64 In the absence of multiannual call planning, beneficiaries submitted applications despite the fact that the maturity of some projects could have benefitted from submission at a later stage.
INEA's interne analyse viste, at de oprindelige forslags begržnsede modenhed var en almindelig rsag til projektforsinkelser. 
INEA’s internal analysis revealed that the low maturity of initial proposals was a common cause of delayed projects.
Tekstboks 4 beskriver et umodent projekt. 
of an immature project.
I forbindelse med otte af de 12 projekter27, som hidtil er blevet bragt til ophżr fżr tiden, var rsagen projekternes umodenhed. 
For eight of the 12 projects27 that have so far been terminated prematurely, the reason was the immaturity of the projects.
32 Tekstboks 4 Et umodent projekt: Anlžggelse af en energisammenkobling mellem to medlemsstater To ansżgninger vedrżrende udformning og anlžgsarbejde i forbindelse med en energisammenkobling mellem to medlemsstater blev indsendt under en CEF-E-indkaldelse i 2014. 
32 Box 4 Example of an immature project: Construction of an energy interconnection between two Member States Two applications relating to design and construction works for an energy interconnection between two Member States were submitted in a 2014 CEF-E call.
Eksperterne gav kun bygge-og anlžgsprojektet tre ud af fem point for modenhed. 
The experts awarded the works project only three out of five points for maturity.
Projektet opnede minimumsscoren for finansiering, men den overordnede vurdering var, at det ikke var modent. 
The project received the minimum score for financing, but the overall assessment was that it was not ready.
Begge projekter blev udvalgt, men bygge-og anlžgsprojektet skulle ikke starte fżr maj 2016. 
Both projects were selected, with the works project not due to start until May 2016.
Ved udgangen af 2018 var undersżgelsesprojektet 22 mneder forsinket. 
At the end of 2018, the study project was delayed by 22 months.
Bygge-og anlžgsprojektet var 24 mneder forsinket. 
The works project was delayed by 24 months.
Forsinkelserne overvges, men dette sikrer ikke, at der tržffes effektive korrigerende foranstaltninger i tide 65 Det er afgżrende, at INEA nżje overvger den tekniske og żkonomiske gennemfżrelse af projekterne, s der kan tržffes effektive korrigerende foranstaltninger i tide. 
Delays are monitored, but this does not ensure that effective corrective measures are taken on time 65 It is essential for INEA to monitor the technical and financial implementation of projects closely so that effective corrective measures can be taken in time.
Udnyttelsen af finansieringen kan fremskyndes ved at frigżre midler fra underpržsterende projekter og genbruge dem til andre projekter. 
The use of funding can be accelerated by decommitting funds from underperforming projects and reinjecting them into others.
Hvis et projekt ikke udnytter hele sit tilskud, kan det uudnyttede belżb stilles til rdighed for andre projekter gennem en ny indkaldelse af forslag. 
If a project does not use its entire grant, the unused amounts can be made available for other projects through a new call for proposals.
Dette er kun muligt, hvis 27 Det er dog kun en lille andel af de 1 233 udvalgte projekter. 
This is only possible if the status of projects is sufficiently closely monitored to detect weak implementation.
Tilskudsaftalerne kžder ikke finansieringen direkte sammen med opfyldelsen af delml 66 INEA fżrer tilsyn med gennemfżrelsen af de stżttede aktiviteter p grundlag af tilskudsaftalerne. 
Grant agreements do not directly link funding to the achievement of milestones 66 INEA supervises the implementation of supported activities on the basis of grant agreements.
Aftalerne indeholder bestemmelser, der gżr det muligt for INEA at bringe en foranstaltning til ophżr, hvis fremskridtene er utilstržkkelige, men fristerne for opfyldelsen af specifikke delml er ikke direkte forbundet med EU-finansieringen. 
Though the agreements contain provisions that allow INEA to terminate an action if there is insufficient progress, the deadlines for the implementation of specific milestones are not directly linked to the EU funding.
Aktionsstatusrapporterne viser ikke altid projektforsinkelser 67 INEA bruger aktionsstatusrapporter til at overvge den tekniske og finansielle gennemfżrelse af CEF-E-og CEF-T projekter. 
Action status reports do not always disclose project delays 67 INEA uses action status reports (ASRs) to monitor the technical and financial implementation of CEF-E and CEF-T projects.
Aktionsstatusrapporter er rlige situationsrapporter, der udarbejdes af stżttemodtagerne. 
prepared by the beneficiary.
De giver en vis indikation af projektfremskridtene, men der er risiko for, at de ikke altid beskriver forsinkelsernes eller underudnyttelsens fulde omfang, selv om tilskudsaftalerne forpligter stżttemodtagerne til at rapportere om dette. 
They give some indication of project progress, but there is a risk that they will not always describe the full extent of delays or underspending, despite the fact that grant agreements require beneficiaries to report this.
Vores analyse af en stikprżve af aktionsstatusrapporter28 viste, at forsinkelser med indvirkning p projekternes gennemfżrelsesperiode ikke altid blev rapporteret fuldt ud. 
Our analysis of a sample of ASRs28 indicated that delays with an impact on the project implementation period were not always fully reported.
Kun CEF-T har en midtvejsgennemgang og en fast slutdato for gennemfżrelsen 68 I 2010 besluttede GD MOVE - som var klar over de udfordringer, som ikkepržsterende projekter skabte for en effektiv anvendelse af midlerne - at midler, der ikke blev anvendt af et projekt inden for en bestemt periode, ville blive trukket tilbage fra dette projekt og returneret til budgettet for at blive omfordelt til andre. 
Only CEF-T has a mid-term review and a fixed end date for implementation 68 In 2010, aware of the challenges posed by non-performing projects for the effective use of funds, DG MOVE decided that funds not used by a project within a specified period would be withdrawn from that project and returned to the budget to be reallocated to others.
I den forbindelse fastsatte GD MOVE slutdatoen for CEF-T's gennemfżrelse til den 31. december 2023, s ingen tilskudsaftale kunne underskrives efter eller forlžnges ud over denne dato. 
In this context, DG MOVE established a final deadline of 31 December 2023 for the implementation of CEF-T, meaning that no grant agreement could be signed or extended beyond that date.
Dette er et nżdvendigt grundlag for frigżrelser, da projekterne ellers ville kunne forlžnges ubegržnset, selv uden fremskridt. 
This is a necessary basis for decommitments, since otherwise projects could be extended indefinitely even without progress.
Ved 2017/2018-midtvejsgennemgangen af 356 projekter foretog INEA en omfattende analyse af projektportefżljens gennemfżrelsesstatus. 
Furthermore, through the 2017/2018 MTR of 356 projects, INEA conducted an extensive analysis of the implementation status of the CEF-T project portfolio.
Med hjžlp fra eksterne eksperter vurderede INEA projektfremskridtene og foreslog tilpasninger af det tekniske omfang, budgetterne og gennemfżrelsesbetingelserne. 
With the help of external experts, it assessed project progress and proposed adaptations to technical scope, budgets and implementation conditions.
INEA analyserede situationen p en mere realistisk mde, som afslżrede flere forsinkelser end aktionsstatusrapporterne, og gjorde det dermed muligt at justere udgiftsprofilerne for flere projekter (jf. figur 4). 
By analysing the situation more realistically, it revealed more delays than the ASRs and thus allowed the spending profiles of several projects to be adjusted (see Figure 4).
28 F.eks. konstaterede vi i fem af de ti bygge-og anlžgsprojekter under CEF-T, som vi gennemgik, at gennemfżrelsesperioden fżrst blev žndret efter midtvejsgennemgangen. 33 
33 28 For example, in five of the 10 CEF-T works projects we reviewed the implementation period was only modified after the MTR exercise.
Figur 4 - Sammenligning af de samlede udgiftsprofiler for CEF-T-projekter ifżlge tilskudsaftalerne, aktionsstatusrapporterne og midtvejsgennemgangen, i milliarder euro 34 9,0 8,0 7,0 6,0 5,0 4,0 3,0 2,0 1,0 0,0 7,8 8,0 7,8 7,5 4,1 6,4 7,3 0,8 1,5 1,1 1,1 2015 0,7 0,7 2,8 2,8 4,0 4,0 6,5 6,3 7,5 6,7 7,2 0,0 6,5 2014 2016 2017 2018 Efter 20 20 Stżtteberettigede omkostninger (gžldende tilskudsaftale) Stżtteberettigede omkostninger (midtvejsgennemgang) 2019 2020 Stżtteberettigede omkostninger (aktionsstatusrapport) NB: En udgiftsprofil er det budget, der tildeles et projekt over de r, hvor det gennemfżres. 
Figure 4 – Comparison of aggregated spending profiles of CEF-T projects, according to grant agreements, ASRs and the MTR, in billion € 34 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 7.8 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.2 7.3 7.5 6.4 6.7 4.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 2014 1.5 1.1 1.1 2015 2016 2017 Eligible Costs (GA in force) 2018 Eligible Costs (ASR) 2019 Eligible Costs (MTR) 2020 After 2020 2.8 2.8 4.0 4.0 6.5 6.3 0.0 6.5 NB: A spending profile is the budget allocated to a project over the years of its implementation.
Kilde: INEA's midtvejsgennemgang, 2018. 
Source: INEA mid-term review, 2018.
69 Dette fżrte til inddrivelse af 46 millioner euro fra disse 139 projekter. 
69 This led to the recovery of €46 million from these 139 projects.