natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
23 Direktiv 2014/24/EU (der erstatter direktiv 2004/18/EF), direktiv 2014/25/EU (der erstatter direktiv 2004/17/EF) og et nyt direktiv om koncessionskontrakter: direktiv 2014/23/EU. 24 Jf. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-20_en.htm?locale=en. 
23 Directive 2014/24/EU (replacing directive 2004/18/EC), Directive 2014/25/EU (replacing directive 2004/17/EC) and a new directive on concession contracts: Directive 2014/23/EU 24 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-20_en.htm?locale=en.
53 25 Retten bemærkede følgende i sin udtalelse nr. 4/2011 om Kommissionens grønbog om modernisering af EU’s politik for offentlige indkøb: »Det er Rettens erfaring fra revision af offentlige indkøb, at tilbagevendende problemer med manglende regeloverholdelse har rod i svagheder ved gennemførelsen af de eksisterende regler, og at der stadig er store muligheder for forbedring på gennemførelsesniveau« og: »Retten bemærker, at der kan ske forbedringer med henblik på at reducere de administrative byrder for såvel den ordregivende myndighed som virksomhederne, men dette bør ikke ske på bekostning af centrale principper som lige adgang, loyal konkurrence og produktiv anvendelse af offentlige midler. 
53 25 In its opinion No 4/2011 on the Commission’s Green Paper on the Modernisation of Public Procurement Policy the Court noted that: ‘The Court’s experience when auditing public procurements suggests that recurrent problems of non-compliance are related to weak implementation of existing rules and that there is still substantial room for improvement at implementing level.’ and that ‘The Court observes that some improvements could be made to reduce administrative burdens for both contracting authorities and enterprises; but this should not be done at the expense of the key principles of equal access, fair competition and efficient use of public funds.
Huller, uklare eller flertydige områder i det nugældende retsgrundlag medfører en risiko med hensyn til at sikre alle aktørers retssikkerhed og for procedurernes integritet. 
Some loopholes, obscure or ambiguous areas in the current legal framework entail risks to legal security of all operators, and to integrity of procedures.
Det kan betyde, at reglerne skal forklares tydeligere.« http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/OP11_04/ OP11_04_DA.PDF 26 Jf. også særberetning nr. 16/2013, punkt 11 og tekstboks 2, hvor dette forklares i detaljer. 
This may require rules to be specified more clearly.’ http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/OP11_04/OP11_04_EN.PDF 26 See also special report No 16/2013, paragraph 11 and Box 2, for a comprehensive explanation.
27 For de medlemsstater, der modtog over 2 % af betalingerne i regnskabsårene 2009-2013, svarer stikprøvestørrelsen mere nøjagtigt til betalingerne end for de medlemsstater, der modtog under 2 % af betalingerne. 
27 For Member States receiving more than 2 % of payments in the years 2009 to 2013 the sample size is more closely aligned with payments than for those Member States receiving less than 2 % of payments.
Dette skyldes, at der udtages klyngestikprøver af betalinger foretaget af Kommissionen (jf. også Rettens »Håndbog i finansiel revision og juridisk-kritisk revision«, afsnit 1, punkt 2.3.8: http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/ FCAM_2012/FCAM_2012_DA.PDF). 
This is a result of clustering samples at the level of payments made by the Commission (see also FCAM part 1 section 2.3.8; http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/FCAM_2012/FCAM_2012_EN.PDF).
28 Disse transaktioner udgør 81 % af det samlede antal transaktioner i regnskabsårene 2009-2013, som Retten undersøgte. 
28 These transactions represent 81 % of the total number of transactions examined by the Court in the years 2009-2013.
29 Punkt 1.18-1.35 i årsberetningen for 2009 og punkt 1.32-1.50 i årsberetningen for 2012. 
29 Paragraphs 1.18 to 1.35 of the 2009 and paragraphs 1.32 to 1.50 of the 2012 annual report.
30 Inddrivelser anvendes hovedsagelig på landbrugsområdet. 
30 Recoveries are mainly used in agriculture.
31 Punkt 1.32-1.50 i årsberetningen for 2009, punkt 1.19-1.35 i årsberetningen for 2012 og punkt 1.13-1.15 i årsberetningen for 2013. 
31 Paragraph 1.32 to 1.50 of the 2009 annual report, paragraph 1.19 to 1.35 of the 2012 annual report, paragraph 1.13 to 1.15 of the 2013 annual report.
3, litra c), i forordning (EU, Euratom) nr. 966/2012 om de finansielle regler vedrørende Unionens almindelige budget: »indtægter fra tilbagebetaling i overensstemmelse med artikel 80 af uretmæssigt udbetalte beløb«. 
32 This type of revenue is called assigned revenue as defined by Article 21(3)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union: ‘revenue arising from the repayment, in accordance with Article 80, of amounts wrongly paid’.
33 Jf. Rettens særberetning nr. 7/2010 om landbrug: »Revision vedrørende proceduren for regnskabsafslutning«, punkt 68-73 og figur 3, og særberetning nr. 
33 See the Court’s special report No 7/2010 for agriculture ‘Audit of the clearance of accounts procedure’, paragraphs 68 to 73 and Graph 3 and special report No 3/2012 for cohesion ‘Structural funds: did the Commission successfully deal with deficiencies identified in the Member States’ management and control systems?’.
34 »Beskyttelse af Den Europæiske Unions budget indtil udgangen af 2013« (COM(2014) 618 final af 29.9.2014). 
34 Protection of the European Union budget to end 2013. COM(2014) 618 final of 29.9.2014.
35 COM(2014) 618 final af 29.9.2014: »Beskyttelse af Den Europæiske Unions budget indtil udgangen af 2013«. 
35 Communication COM(2014) 618 final of 29.9.2014, ‘Protection of the EU budget to end 2013’.
36 Punkt 1.19 i årsberetningen for 2013. 
36 Paragraph 1.19 of the 2013 annual report.
37 Årsberetningen for 2013, punkt 3.8, 4.8, 5.32 og 6.24. 
37 2013 annual report, paragraphs 3.8, 4.8, 5.32 and 6.24.
38 Kommissionen definerer det risikobehæftede beløb som værdien af den brøkdel af transaktioner, som vurderes ikke fuldt ud at opfylde de gældende lovbestemte og kontraktlige krav, når alle de kontroller (korrigerende foranstaltninger), som skal mindske overholdelsesrisikoen, er gennemført. 
38 Amount at risk is defined by the Commission ‘as the value of the fraction of the transactions which is estimated not to be in full conformity with the applicable regulatory and contractual requirements after application of all controls (corrective measures) intended to mitigate compliance risks.’
Kilde: »Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of Auditors. 
Source: ‘Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of Auditors.
Synthesis of the Commission’s management achievements in 2013«. 
Synthesis of the Commission’s management achievements in 2013’.
Jf. link: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/synthesis_report_2013_annex_en.pdf. 39 Dette rapporteres i årsberetningen for 2011 i punkt 4.33-4.44, i årsberetningen for 2012 i punkt 4.26-4.39 og i årsberetningen for 2013 i punkt 4.22-4.30. 
See also link: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/synthesis_report_2013_annex_en.pdf 39 For the 2011 annual report, this was reported in paragraphs 4.33-4.44, for the 2012 annual report in 4.26-4.39 and for the 2013 annual report in 4.22-4.30.
40 Punkt 3.67 i årsberetningen for 2009, punkt 3.54 i årsberetningen for 2010 og punkt 3.41 i årsberetningen for 2011. 
40 Paragraphs 3.67 of the 2009 annual report, 3.54 of the 2010 annual report and 3.41 of the 2011 annual report.
54 41 For så vidt angår arealrelaterede foranstaltninger til udvikling af landdistrikter udføres kontrollen af visse nøgleelementer, f.eks. det støtteberettigede areal, via IFKS. 
54 41 For area-related rural development measures, verification of certain key elements such as eligible area is made through IACS.
Andre støtteberettigelseskrav er underlagt specifikt udformede kontroller. 
Other eligibility requirements are governed by specifically designed controls.
42 Ifølge Rettens metodologi kan systemer klassificeres som effektive med hensyn til at mindske risikoen for fejl i transaktionerne, delvis effektive (når der er svagheder, som svækker den operationelle effektivitet) eller ikke effektive (når der er gennemgribende svagheder, som fuldstændig undergraver den operationelle effektivitet). 
42 Under the Court’s methodology systems are classified as being effective in mitigating the risk of error in transactions, partially effective (when there are some weaknesses affecting operational effectiveness) or not effective (when weaknesses are pervasive and thereby completely undermine operating effectiveness).
GD AGRI’s årlige aktivitetsrapport for 2013, s. 119: en restfejlforekomst på 7,44 % for markedsforanstaltninger (uden for IFKS), og side 133: en restfejlforekomst på 2,33 % for direkte betalinger (IFKS). 
43 See DG AGRI annual activity report 2013, page 119: 7,44 % residual error rate for market measures (NON IACS) and page 133: 2,33 % residual error rate for direct payments (IACS).
44 Særberetning nr. 16/2013 »Status over én enkelt revision (»single audit«) og Kommissionens anvendelse af de nationale revisionsmyndigheders arbejde på samhørighedsområdet«, punkt 83. 
44 Special report No 16/2013 ‘Taking stock of “single audit” and the Commission’s reliance on the work of national audit authorities in cohesion’, paragraph 83.
45 Punkt 5.46-5.50 og 5.55-5.58. 
45 Paragraphs 5.46-5.50 and 5.55-5.58.
46 Særberetning nr. 16/2013, punkt 35-40. 
46 Special report No 16/2013, paragraphs 35 to 40.
47 Den Interne Revisionstjeneste: IAS.B2-2014-REGIO-003 »Final Report on the Limited Review of the Calculation and the Underlying Methodology of DG REGIO’s Residual Error Rates for the 2013 Reporting Year«, side 3. 
47 IAS Report: IAS.B2-2014-REGIO-003 ‘Final Report on the Limited Review of the Calculation and the Underlying Methodology of DG REGIO’s Residual Error Rates for the 2013 Reporting Year’ page 3.
48 Den generelle arealbetalingsordning, som er fastsat i forordning (EF) nr. 73/2009, skulle være ophørt den 31. december 2013. 
48 The single area payment scheme laid down in Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 was due to end on 31 December 2013.
I forbindelse med reformen af den fælles landbrugspolitik fik de medlemsstater, der anvender denne ordning, mulighed for at fortsætte med den i en overgangsperiode, der højst kan vare til udgangen af 2020. 
In the context of the reform of the CAP, Member States applying this scheme were allowed to continue applying it for a further transitional period until the end of 2020 at the latest.
49 Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1303/2013. 
49 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
50 Udtalelse nr. 7/2011 om forslag til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning om fælles bestemmelser for Den Europæiske Fond for Regionaludvikling, Den Europæiske Socialfond, Samhørighedsfonden, Den Europæiske Landbrugsfond for Udvikling af Landdistrikterne og Den Europæiske Hav-og Fiskerifond, som er omfattet af den fælles strategiske ramme, om generelle bestemmelser for Den Europæiske Fond for Regionaludvikling, Den Europæiske Socialfond og Samhørighedsfonden og om ophævelse af Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 
50 Opinion No 7/2011 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (OJ C 47, 17.2.2012, p.
51 Disse planer omfatter et projekt eller en gruppe af projekter, der gennemføres som led i et operationelt program, hvor EU-midlerne er direkte knyttet sammen med opnåelse af specifikke mål og output, aftalte milepæle og resultatindikatorer. 
51 These comprise a project or a group of projects as part of an operational programme, where EU funds are directly linked to the respect of specific objectives and outputs, agreed milestones, results indicators.
53 Artikel 59, stk. 5, litra b), i forordning (EU, Euratom) nr. 
53 Article 59(5)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
54 »En sådan udtalelse skal fastslå, hvorvidt regnskaberne giver et retvisende billede, hvorvidt de udgifter, for hvilke der er søgt om godtgørelse fra Kommissionen, er lovlige og formelt korrekte, og hvorvidt de indførte kontrolsystemer fungerer ordentligt. 
54 ‘That opinion shall establish whether the accounts give a true and fair view, whether expenditure for which reimbursement has been requested from the Commission is legal and regular, and whether the control systems put in place function properly.
Det skal også fremgå af udtalelsen, hvorvidt revisionsarbejdet rejser tvivl om de påstande, der er fremsat i forvaltningserklæringen, som er omtalt i første afsnit, litra a).« Artikel 59, stk. 
The opinion shall also state whether the audit work puts in doubt the assertions made in the management declaration referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph.’
5, andet afsnit, i forordning (EU, Euratom) nr. 
Article 59(5)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
55 Regnskaberne og revisionspåtegningerne skal forelægges i februar år n. 
55 The accounts and the audit certificate must be presented in February of year n.
Kommissionen kan give medlemsstaterne en ekstra måneds frist. 
The Commission can grant Member States one additional month to do so.
Landbrugsområdet har en lignende tidsplan, men her afsluttes betalingsorganernes regnskaber pr. 15. oktober år n-1. 
A similar timeframe exists in agriculture, however for agriculture the accounts of paying agencies are closed on 15 October of year (n-1).
På samhørighedsområdet slutter regnskabsåret pr. 30. juni år n-1. 
For cohesion the financial year ends at 30 June year (n-1).
SÅDAN FÅR MAN FAT I PUBLIKATIONER FRA EU Gratis publikationer: • et eksemplar: via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu) • flere eksemplarer eller plakater/kort: hos Den Europæiske Unions repræsentationer (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_da.htm) hos delegationerne i ikke-EU-lande (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_da.htm) ved at kontakte Europe Direct (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_da.htm) eller ringe på 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (frikaldsnummer fra overalt i EU) (*). (*) Oplysningerne er gratis ligesom de fleste opkald (nogle operatører, telefonbokse eller hoteller kan dog kræve penge for opkaldet). 
Free publications: HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS • one copy: via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); • more than one copy or posters/maps: from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm); from the delegations in non‐EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm); by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).
Betalingsabonnementer: • via Den Europæiske Unions Publikationskontors salgskontorer (http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_da.htm). 
Priced subscriptions: • via one of the sales agents of the Publications Office of the European Union (http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm).nts/index_en.htm).
DEN EUROPÆISKE REVISIONSRET QJ-05-14-011-DA-N 
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS QJ-05-14-011-EN-N
Meddelelse til Europa-Parlamentet vedrżrende Europa-Parlamentets anmodning om at blive holdt orienteret om problemet med adgang til oplysninger i forbindelse med Den Europžiske Centralbank, jf. punkt 29 i beslutningen i forbindelse med dechargen for 2016 (2017/2188 (DEC)) Vedtaget af Afdeling IV p mżdet den 13. december 2018 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi Đ L-1615 Luxembourg T +352 4398 Đ 1 E eca-info@eca.europa.eu eca.europa.eu 
Communication to the European Parliament concerning the European ParliamentŐs request to be kept informed regarding the problem of access to information in relation to the European Central Bank, as laid down in paragraph 29 of the 2016 discharge procedure (2017/2188(DEC)) Adopted by Chamber IV at its meeting of 13 December 2018 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi Đ L-1615 Luxembourg T +352 4398-1 E eca-info@eca.europa.eu eca.europa.eu
Baggrund 01 Den Europžiske Revisionsret er Den Europžiske Unions uafhžngige eksterne revisor og den uafhžngige beskytter af unionsborgernes finansielle interesser. 
Background 01 The European Court of Auditors (ECA) is the European UnionŐs independent external auditor and the independent guardian of the financial interests of the citizens of the Union.
I denne egenskab foretager Revisionsretten forvaltningsrevisioner1 med henblik p at fremme forsvarlig żkonomisk forvaltning, ansvarlighed og gennemsigtighed. 
In this capacity, the ECA conducts performance audits1 to improve sound financial management, accountability and transparency.
Revisionsretten offentliggżr resultaterne af disse forvaltningsrevisioner i sžrberetninger. 
The ECA publishes the results of these performance audits as special reports.
02I november 2016 offentliggjorde Revisionsretten sin fżrste sžrberetning (nr. 29/2016)2 om den fžlles tilsynsmekanisme (FTM). 
02 In November 2016, the ECA published its first special report (29/2016)2 on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
FTM er systemet for tilsyn med banker i euroomrdet. 
The SSM is the prudential supervision system for banks in the Euro area.
Under denne revision havde Revisionsretten meget svžrt ved at indhente revisionsbevis fra Den Europžiske Centralbank (ECB), som er FTM's centrale tilsynsmyndighed. 
During this audit, the ECA faced severe difficulties in obtaining audit evidence from the European Central Bank (ECB), the central supervisor of the SSM.
Eftersom ECB ikke fremlagde mange af de nżdvendige dokumenter3, blev revisionens omfang nżdvendigvis begržnset, hvilket betżd, at en ržkke vigtige omrder ikke blev revideret. 
As the ECB did not provide many of the required documents3, the scope of the audit was of necessity limited and, thus, a number of important areas remained unaudited.
03I december 2017 offentliggjorde Revisionsretten sin fżrste sžrberetning (nr. 23/2017)4 om Den Fžlles Afviklingsinstans (SRB). 
03 In December 2017, the ECA published its first special report (23/2017)4 on the Single Resolution Board (SRB).
SRB er afviklingsmyndighed for store banker i euroomrdet. 
The SRB is the resolution authority for large banks in the Eurozone.
Under denne revision insisterede SRB p at fjerne alle data hidrżrende fra ECB fra det revisionsbevis, som den fremlagde for Revisionsretten, og den fremlagde ikke dokumenter hidrżrende fra ECB. 
During this audit, the SRB insisted on removing any data originating from the ECB from the audit evidence provided to the ECA and did not provide any documents it possessed that originated from the ECB.
Dette forhindrede Revisionsretten i at vurdere fuldstžndigheden af afviklingsplaner og rigtigheden af en stor del af de oplysninger, der hidrżrte fra genopretningsplaner. 
This prevented the ECA from assessing the completeness of resolution plans and the accuracy of much of the information originating from recovery plans.
04 I januar 2018 offentliggjorde Revisionsretten sin anden sžrberetning (nr. 2/2018), denne gang om ECB's krisestyring i forbindelse med sine banktilsynsopgaver5. 
04 In January 2018, the ECA published its second special report (02/2018), this time on the ECBŐs crisis management in relation to its banking supervision tasks5.
Igen nžgtede ECB at give adgang til de dokumenter, der var nżdvendige for, at Revisionsretten kunne udfżre sin opgave. 
Again, the ECB denied access to the documents needed for the ECA to perform its task.
Revisionsretten offentliggjorde derfor kun forelżbige konklusioner om nogle aspekter af ECB's krisestyring i forbindelse med P grundlag af den internationale standard for overordnede revisionsorganer ISSAI 300. 
Therefore, the ECA only published provisional conclusions on some aspects of the ECBŐs crisis Based on International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAI) 300.
29/2016: Den fžlles tilsynsmekanisme - God start, men der er behov for yderligere forbedringer. 
ECA special report 29/2016: Single Supervisory Mechanism - Good start but further improvements needed.
Jf. isžr punkt 19 og bilag II i Revisionsrettens sžrberetning nr. 29/2016. 
See in particular paragraph 19 and Annex II of ECA special report 29/2016.
23/2017: Den Fžlles Afviklingsinstans: Arbejdet p en udfordrende bankunionsopgave er begyndt, men der er langt igen. 
ECA special report 23/2017: Single Resolution Board: Work on a challenging Banking Union task started, but still a long way to go.
Revisionsrettens sžrberetning nr. 2/2018: Er ECB's krisestyring for banker effektiv i operationel henseende? 
ECA special report 02/2018: The operational efficiency of the ECBŐs crisis management for banks.
banktilsynsopgaver. 
management in relation to banking supervision tasks.
Dette betżd, at Revisionsretten ikke kunne bekržfte, at ECB's krisestyring er effektiv i praksis. 
As a result, the ECA was not able to confirm the efficiency of the ECBŐs crisis management in practice.
05 I forbindelse med sin 2016-decharge til Kommissionen anerkendte Europa-Parlamentet i april 2018 Revisionsrettens indsats og de problemer, den str over for. 
05 In April 2018, in the context of the 2016 Commission discharge, the European Parliament acknowledged the ECAŐs efforts and the problems faced.
Parlamentet konkluderede navnlig, at det ud fra et ansvarlighedssynspunkt var uacceptabelt, at den reviderede enhed egenrdigt beslutter, hvilke dokumenter den eksterne revisor m have adgang til. 
The Parliament concluded in particular that it was unacceptable from an accountability point of view for the auditee to decide single-handedly to which documents the external auditor may have access.
Det opfordrede ECB til at samarbejde med Revisionsretten og give fuld adgang til de nżdvendige dokumenter. 
It called on the ECB to cooperate with the ECA and to provide full access to documents required.
Endvidere anmodede Parlamentet Revisionsretten om senest i november 2018 at oplyse det om, hvorvidt der er fundet en lżsning p problemet med adgang til oplysninger. 
Furthermore, the Parliament asked the ECA to inform it by November 2018 as to whether a solution was found to the problem of access to information.
Problemet og Revisionsrettens indsats 06 Ekstern offentlig revision er et vžsentligt element i demokratiske samfund og i forbindelse med EU's retsstatsforhold. 
The problem and the ECAŐs efforts 06 External public audit is an essential element of a democratic society and the rule of law in the EU.
Denne revision spiller en vigtig rolle med hensyn til at sikre produktivitet, ansvarlighed, effektivitet og gennemsigtighed i den offentlige forvaltning6. Retsstatsprincippet er et grundlžggende demokratiprincip, som garanterer, at alle medlemmer af samfundet (herunder dem, der sidder i regering) uden forskel er underlagt offentligt oplyste juridiske regelsžt og processer. 
It plays an important role in ensuring efficiency, accountability, effectiveness and transparency of public administration.6 The rule of law is a key principle of democracy that guarantees that all members of society (including those in government) are equally subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes.
Ansvarlighed og gennemsigtighed sikrer, at borgerne og deres parlament kan holde deres repržsentanter og dem, der gennemfżrer beslutninger, ansvarlige for deres handlinger. 
Accountability and transparency enable citizens and their parliament to hold their representatives and those who are implementing decisions accountable for their actions.
Den eksterne revisors uafhžngige beretninger er et vigtigt bidrag til denne ansvarlighedsproces. 
The independent reports produced by the external auditor are an important contribution to this accountability process.