natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De projekter, der blev gennemfżrt i regionerne, gav ogs generelt bedre resultater, end de projekter, der var rettet mod ministerier p centralt niveau, fordi stżttemodtageren havde et stżrre engagement og en stžrkere fżlelse af ejerskab, og de ansatte var mere motiverede. 
Also projects implemented in the regions generally performed better than projects targeting ministries at central level because of a greater level of commitment and feeling of ownership by the beneficiary, and more staff motivation.
Programmeringsrammen 20. 
Programming framework 20.
Igennem rene har Kommissionen udviklet et system for programmering af bistand til tredjelande. 
Over the years the Commission has developed a system of programming external actions.
I teorien er systemet džkkende og logisk. 
In theory the system is comprehensive and logical.
Det har allerede fungeret stabilt i mange r. 
It has been stable already for many years.
Ligesom ved andre programmer for bistand til tredjelande udarbejdes der en lang ržkke dokumenter p forskellige stadier af Tacis-programmeringen og af gennemfżrelsen af programmet (jf. punkt 4 og 5). 
In line with other external action programmes many documents are drafted at various levels of TACIS programming and implementation (see paragraphs 4 and 5).
Programmeringsprocessen og de interne og eksterne hżringer tager imidlertid lang tid. 
However, the programming process including the internal and external consultations is long.
Det reducerer den tid, der er til rdighed til projektidentificering og udarbejdelse af planlžgningsdokumenter vedrżrende de enkelte projekter, og da fristerne for forelžggelse af projekter nžrmede sig, resulterede det i sidste ende i, at der blev udarbejdet projektbeskrivelser, som ikke var gode nok (jf. punkt 26). 
This put pressure on the project identification and preparation of the planning documents for the individual projects and finally when the deadlines for submission of projects were approaching, resulted in ToRs of insufficient quality (see paragraph 26).
Resultaterne af de reviderede projekter og analysen af de problemer, som projekterne var stżdt p, viste, at programmeringen og den efterfżlgende projektidentifikation, herunder forberedelsen af finansieringsaftaler og individuelle projektbeskrivelser, til trods for Kommissionens indsats under de formelle hżringer var blevet gennemfżrt uden den nżdvendige dialog (jf. punkt 6) med de forskellige instanser, dvs. de russiske myndigheder, der administrerer Tacis-programmet, og stżttemodtagerne (ministe-rier og andre organisationer). 
The results of the projects audited, and the analysis of the problems faced by them, show that, despite the apparent efforts of the Commission during the formal consultations, the programming and subsequent project identification including preparation of financing memoranda and individual ToRs, were carried out in the absence of an adequate dialogue (see paragraph 6) with the various levels, i.e. Russian authorities administering the TACIS programme and beneficiaries (ministries and other organisations).
P en ržkke interventionsomrder udviklede reformprocessen i Den Russiske Fżderation sig ikke, som man havde hbet, eller det politiske miljż p stżttemodta-gersiden var ikke modent nok til, at der kunne etableres en konstruktiv dialog med Kommissionen. 
For some areas of intervention the reform process in the Russian Federation had not advanced as hoped or the political environment on the beneficiary side had not matured enough for a constructive dialogue with the Commission.
Det resulterede i, at de russiske myndigheder i nogle tilfžlde tog imod bistand, som de endelige stżttemodtagere ikke virkelig żnskede. 
As a consequence there were some cases where the Russian authorities accepted assistance which the final beneficiaries did not actually want.
Den manglende dialog og den lange planlžgningsproces (jf. punkt 21) forringede projekternes effektivitet. 
This lack of dialogue and the length of the planning process (see paragraph 21) had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the projects.
Projektidentifikation og -planlžgning Projektcyklusforvaltningsmetoden anvendes ikke optimalt 23. 
Project identification and planning Poor application of the Project Cycle Management System 23.
For at forbedre sin projektforvaltning vedtog Kommissionen i 1992 en forvaltningsmetode (projektcyklusforvaltningsme-tode, PCM) med retningslinjer for finansieringsforslagenes format og indhold og krav om, at der skal udarbejdes en logisk ramme (1). 
In 1992 the Commission adopted the PCM methodology setting out the format and contents of Financing Proposals and including a requirement to draw up a logical framework (1) in order to improve its project management.
Kommissionen gjorde imidlertid fżrst anvendelsen af PCM og de logiske rammer obligatorisk fra 2001. 
However, the use of the PCM methodology and logical frameworks was made obligatory by the Commission only from 2001.
I 2001 offentliggjorde Retten sžrberetning nr. 21/2000 om forvaltningen af Kommissionens programmer for bistand til tredjelande. 
In 2001 the Court published Special Report No 21/2000 on the management of the CommissionŐs external aid programmes.
Et af de forhold, Retten ppegede i beretningen var, at de logiske rammer, der udarbejdes som led i projektcyklusforvaltningen, ofte var drligt forberedt (2). 
One of the findings in the report was that the logical frameworks as part of the PCM were often not well prepared (2).
Denne Tacis-revision viste, at Kommissionen stadig ikke systematisk anvender projekt-cyklusforvaltningsmetoden, herunder de logiske rammer. 
This TACIS audit showed that the Commission still did not use the PCM, including the logical frameworks, systematically.
Revisionen viste ogs, at i de fleste af de tilfžlde, hvor de logiske rammer blev anvendt effektivt, opnede projekterne bedre resultater. 
The audit also showed that in most of the cases where the logical frameworks were used effectively, the projects achieved better results.
Anvendelsen af projektcyklusforvaltningsmetoden betżd, at projekterne skulle planlžgges mere grundigt. Projektplanlžgningsprocessen var for lang 25. 
The use of the PCM framework forced the planning to be done more thoroughly. Long project-planning schedule 25.
Der gik meget lang tid fra det tidspunkt, hvor det fżrste udkast eller anmodningen om finansiering af et projekt blev indsendt og til, at projektet blev ivžrksat. 
The time-span from the original idea or request for project funding to the inception of the actual project was very long.
Det kan tage op til tre r at ivžrksžtte et konsulentprojekt, hvilket er for lang tid, eftersom stżttemodtagernes behov og situation žndrer sig. 
It may take up to three years to launch a consultancy project, which is too long, as the needs and situations of the beneficiaries change.
Som fżlge af forsinkelserne var projekterne Ń isžr dem, der vedrżrte politikudvikling eller krisehndtering Ń allerede foržldede, da de endelig blev ivžrksat. 
Due to the delays, the projects, especially those related to policy development or crisis management, were already outdated when they eventually started.
Eftersom den forlżbne tid havde lżst de oprindelige problemer, blev kontrahenterne nżdt til at žndre projektmetoden, hvilket yderligere forsinkede gennemfżrelsen. 
Consequently, as time had solved the original problems the contractors had to change the projectsŐ approaches which further delayed their implementation.
Tekstboks 2 Inden der blev ydet bistand til anti-hvidvaskning insisterede Kommissionen p, at der skulle gennemfżres en feasibility-undersżgelse. 
Box 2 Prior to providing assistance in the area of anti-money laundering activities the Commission insisted on a feasibility study be produced.
Ivžrksžttelsen af dette forberedende projekt blev forsinket med to r, primžrt p grund af interne koordineringsproblemer mellem Kommissionens tjenester, men ogs fordi modtagerorganisationen var urimelig lang tid om at godkende projektbeskrivelsen. 
Mainly due to internal coordination difficulties between Commission services but also because it took the beneficiary organisation unduly long to approve its ToR, the start of this preparatory project itself was delayed by two years.
Det forsinkede i sidste ende det faglige bistandsprojekt med fem r, selv om det var politisk og żkonomisk vigtigt og ogs presserende for Den Russiske Fżderation. 
Eventually, this delayed the technical assistance project Ń which was politically and economically important and also urgent for the Russian Federation Ń by five years.
(1) De logiske rammer er et vžrktżj, som anvendes til beskrivelse af de principper, der ligger til grund for udformningen af et projekt, dvs. hvordan bestemte input skal resultere i bestemte output, som skal bidrage til at opfylde ml, som igen skal bidrage til opfyldelse af de overordnede ml. 
(1) The logical framework is a tool which makes explicit the underlying logic of the project design, i.e. how particular inputs should produce certain outputs which will help meet objectives which will contribute to wider goals.
(2) EFT C 57 af 22.2.2001, punkt 37. 
(2) OJ C 57, 22.2.2001, paragraph 37.
19.5.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 119/7 De underliggende antagelser og ml var urealistiske 26. 
19.5.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 119/7 Unrealistic underlying assumptions and objectives 26.
Den lange planlžgningsperiode resulterede ikke altid i projektbeskrivelser af god kvalitet. 
The long planning period did not always result in ToRs of good quality.
I ni tilfžlde fżrte utilstržkkelige baggrundsundersżgelser i projektudformningsfasen til, at der blev fastsat urealistiske ml. 
In nine cases insufficient background investigations in the project design phase led to unrealistic objectives.
Ofte blev der ved projektudformningen ikke taget hensyn til retlige begržnsninger for projektgennemfżrelsen, eller mlene l uden for stżttemodtagerens kompetence, eller de var bare for omfattende eller abstrakte til, at de kunne opfyldes inden for rammerne af et enkelt projekt. 
Often, the project designs did not take into account the legal constraints in implementing the project, or the objectives were outside the competence of the beneficiary, or they were just too extensive and abstract to be reached by a single project.
Stżrstedelen af de projekter, hvis ml eller opgaver vedrżrte politikudvikling, herunder vedtagelse af love, opfyldte sledes ikke deres ml. 
For example, most of the projects with objectives or tasks related to policy formulation, including enacting of legislation, were unsuccessful.
Tekstboks 3 Der blev ivžrksat et pilotprojekt til afprżvning af en model, som skulle fremme oprettelsen af nye virksomheder. 
Box 3 A pilot project was established to test a new model for facilitating the start of new businesses.
I midten af 90Őerne var der imidlertid allerede blevet etableret en lignende model i Den Russiske Fżderation med faglig bistand fra Canada. 
However, a similar model had already been established in the Russian Federation with the help of Canadian technical assistance in the middle of the nineties.
Det var meget forskelligt, hvor meget de russiske myndigheder og Kommissionens kompetente generaldirektorater deltog i udarbejdelsen og godkendelsen af planlžgningsdokumen-terne, og i nogle tilfžlde havde de ikke deltaget nok til at sikre, at planlžgningen var realistisk. 
The participation of the Russian counterparts, as well as the line directorates-general at the Commission, in the processes of drafting and approval of the planning documents varied greatly and can be deemed to have been insufficient to secure realistic planning in some cases.
Tekstboks 4 I et tilfžlde var en by involveret i et kommunalt varme-og energiprojekt, men var ikke udvalgt som primžr stżttemodtager. 
Box 4 In one case a city was involved in a district heating and power project but not nominated as a primary beneficiary.
Den godkendte ikke projektbeskrivelsen, og projektet blev derfor forsinket og stżdte p andre forvaltningsmžssige problemer p grund af byr-dets manglende engagement. 
It did not endorse the ToR and as a result, the project was delayed and faced other managerial problems caused by a lack of commitment by the city authorities.
Som eksempler p urealistiske antagelser og ml kan nžvnes: stżttemodtagerens institutionelle rammer var utilstržkkelige, eller der var ikke nogen rammer, mlgruppen var ikke interesseret i de leverede ydelser, de lokale myndigheders samarbejds-potentiale var overvurderet, eller stżttemodtageren havde i henhold til lovgivningen ikke ret til at levere de ydelser eller oplysninger, der var fastsat i projektet. 
Examples of unrealistic assumptions and objectives include: the institutional framework of a beneficiary was not adequate or was non-existent, the target group had no interest in the services provided, the cooperation potential of the local administration was over-estimated or the beneficiary was not, by legislation, allowed to provide the services or information foreseen by the project.
Tekstboks 5 Et afsides og udelukkende lokalt vejforvaltningsprojekt havde et uegnet overordnet ml, nemlig at fremme handelen mellem EU og Den Russiske Fżderation. 
Box 5 A remote and entirely local road management project had an inadequate overall objective, Ôto facilitate trade between the EU and the Russian FederationŐ.
Et andet eksempel p et urealistisk ml var harmonisering af vej-standarder, jf. tekstboksen i punkt 18. 
Another example of an unrealistic objective is presented in the box of paragraph 18 concerning the harmonisation of road standards.
Mlene var upržcise, eller der var ikke fastsat ml 29. 
Imprecise or missing objectives 29. Thirteen projects audited had clear objectives.
I projektbeskrivelsen for 16 af de reviderede projekter var der imidlertid oprindelig enten kun tale om ptžnkte aktiviteter eller input, uden at der var opstillet klare og mlelige ml, eller mlene var formuleret p samme generelle mde som i de politiske programmeringsdokumenter, og kontrahenterne blev derfor nżdt til at definere projektets egentlige forml under gennemfżrelsen. 
However, in sixteen of the projects audited, the initial project objectives in the ToR either described only the intended activities or input instead of setting clear and measurable objectives; or they were formulated in the same general way as in the political programming documents, forcing the contractors to define the actual purpose of the projects during implementation.
Der var ikke opstillet ml for projekterne, som kunne have gjort det muligt at identificere de problemer, der skulle lżses, og der var heller ikke ml, som kunne have vžret anvendt som mlestok for, at resultaterne var blevet net. 
The projects did not have objectives that would have identified the problems to be solved nor did they have such objectives against which the achievements of the projects could have been measured.
For de fleste af de reviderede projekters vedkommende var der ikke opstillet indikatorer, som kunne efterprżves objektivt. 
For most of the projects audited objectively verifiable indicators had not been defined.
I andre tilfžlde, hvor mlene var klare og tydelige, svarede de faktiske projektaktiviteter ikke til de oprindelige ml, som var opstillet i projektbeskrivelsen. 
In other cases, where the objectives were clear and intelligible, there were differences between the actual project activities and the projectŐs initial objectives as described in the ToR.
Projektet sigtede i stedet mod at yde ad hoc-ydelser til et ministerium, men det fremgik ikke klart, hvad der var det pržcise forml med arbejdet. 
Instead it was directed towards providing ad hoc services to a ministry without being clear about the exact objective of the work.
I forbindelse med et andet projekt modtog stżttemodtagerne i den private sektor bistand til udvikling af deres kommercielle aktiviteter, hvilket reelt l uden for projektets overordnede ml. 
In the case of another project the beneficiaries in the private sector received assistance to develop their commercial activities which in fact was outside the scope of the overall objective of the project.
I en ržkke tilfžlde var projektudformningen alt for kompleks og omfattede for mange separate opgaver og ml uden indbyrdes forbindelse. 
For some projects the design was overly complex, including too many separate and not interlinked tasks and objectives.
Tekstboks 6 Et projekt havde 23 forskellige stżrre output eller ml integreret i otte forskellige komponenter. 
Box 6 One project had 23 different major outputs or objectives integrated into 8 different components.
Disse džkkede emner som miljżbeskyttelse i forbindelse med olieproduktion, energibesparende foranstaltninger og undersżgelser vedrżrende fiskeopdržt. 
These covered themes like environmental protection in oil production, energy saving measures and studies of fish hatcheries.
Fordi projektet var s komplekst, blev mange af de opstillede ml, herunder de to vžsentligste, ikke opfyldt fuldt ud. 
As a consequence of this complexity several of the foreseen objectives, including the two most significant ones, were not fully achieved.
Det var meget problematisk at udvžlge egnede stżttemodtagere som projektpartnere, fordi projektmlene nogle gange l uden for projektpartnerens kompetenceomrde, eller fordi stżttemodtageren ikke var klar til at modtage stżtten eller i stand til at drage fordel af den. 
Unsuccessful selection and involvement of beneficiaries 32. Selecting suitable beneficiaries as project partners was very problematic because the project objectives were sometimes outside the competence of the project partner, or the beneficiary was not ready to receive or able to benefit from the support.
I et tilfžlde żnskede Kommissionen af politiske grunde at stżtte et fżderalt agentur med henblik p de forestende samarbejdsforhandlinger mellem EU og Den Russiske Fżderation. 
In one case the Commission wanted to support a federal agency for political reasons, in view of the forthcoming cooperation negotiations between the EU and the Russian Federation.
I sidste ende deltog det pgžldende agentur imidlertid ikke i de faktiske forhandlinger. 
However, this agency was not in the end involved in the actual negotiations.
C 119/8 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 19.5.2006 33. 
C 119/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 19.5.2006 33.
Nr et projekt havde flere stżttemodtagere, opstod der en ržkke problemer under gennemfżrelsen. 
When a project had several beneficiaries, implementation faced a number of problems.
Det var almindeligt, at der intet samarbejde var mellem de fżderale og de regionale myndigheder indbyrdes eller mellem de forskellige fżderale og de forskellige regionale myndigheder. 
Lack of cooperation between the federal and regional authorities or lack of cooperation between different federal and between different regional authorities was usual.
Og selv om dette var en benlys mangel, var der ikke blevet taget hensyn til den i planlžgningen. 
This failing, although apparent, had not been taken into consideration during the planning.
Tekstboks 7 I et tilfžlde opererede den stżttemodtager, som havde taget initiativ til projektet, inden for n region. 
Box 7 In one case the initiating beneficiary was operating only at the level of a region.
For at kunne opfylde minimumskravene til budgettets stżrrelse, skulle projektet udvides til at džkke flere regioner. 
To meet the minimum size requirements of the project budget it had to be expanded to cover several regions.
Som lżsning p problemet blev der opfundet en anden stżttemodtager, men kun p papiret. 
To solve the problem another beneficiary was created but only on paper.
Stżttemodtageren havde ingen juridisk identitet og eksisterede heller ikke p anden mde andre steder end i projektplanlžgningsdokumenterne. 
It did not have legal identity, nor did it otherwise exist outside the project planning documents.
I forbindelse med fem af de reviderede projekter var stżttemodtagerne ikke involverede i projektplanlžgningen, eller de var ikke blevet involveret tids nok til, at de kunne f indflydelse p projektudformningen. 
In five cases audited the beneficiaries were not involved in the project planning, or not early enough, to have an influence on the project design.
Projektfinansiering Problemer i forbindelse med fastlžggelsen af projektets stżrrelse 35. 
Project financing Problems related to the determination of the project size 35.
I henhold til retningslinjerne for programmeringen skal budgettet for Tacis-projekter i Den Russiske Fżderation som minimum vžre p 2 millioner euro, s projekterne kan f tilstržkkelig virkning og synlighed. 
According to the programming guidelines, the minimum budget size of TACIS projects in the Russian Federation should be 2 million euro in order to achieve sufficient impact and visibility.
Programmet kan imidlertid finansiere en ržkke mindre initiativer, herunder Bistro-projekter. 
However, the programme may finance a number of small-scale initiatives, including Bistro projects.
De fleste af projekterne i den stikprżve, som Retten reviderede, havde et budget p mellem 2 og 3 millioner euro (jf. punkt 16). 
Most projects in the audited sample had a budget of between 2 and 3 million euro (see paragraph 16).
I otte tilfžlde fremgik det ikke klart af dokumentationen, hvordan man var kommet frem til projektets budget. 
In eight cases it was not clear from the project documentation how the project budgets had been arrived at.
Nr mlene for projektet ikke er klare, er det svžrt at opstille et velfunderet budget. 
When the projectsŐ objectives are not clear, defining a well-founded budget is difficult.
I nogle tilfžlde skabte dette minimumskrav problemer. 
In some cases this minimum size led to problems.
I stedet for at ivžrksžtte en ržkke veldefinerede og mlrettede projekter samlede man en lang ržkke opgaver, som var lżst forbundet, eller som var uden nogen form for synergi, i n projektbeskrivelse (jf. punkt 31). 
Instead of launching several, well-defined and focused projects, multiple tasks were incorporated into one set of ToR with loose connection or no synergy at all (see paragraph 31).
Revisionsresultaterne viser, at det er usandsynligt, at en sdan budgetstyret fremgangsmde, som kunstigt skaber stżrre projekter, vil kunne żge projekternes virkning og gżre dem mere synlige. 
The audit results show that such a budget-driven approach, which artificially creates larger projects, is unlikely to enhance the projectsŐ impact and visibility.
Tekstboks 8 I forbindelse med et projekt for industriel omstrukturering var der planlagt 30 underprojekter. 
Box 8 In the case of an industrial restructuring project 30 subprojects were planned.
Under opstillingen af budgettet var der i hżjere grad blevet lagt vžgt p, at budgettet skulle n op p den kržvede minimumsstżrrelse end p, at underprojekternes behov blev opfyldt. 
The budget was set in order to reach the minimum size rather than to satisfy the need of the subprojects.
Der var sjžldent ydet national samfinansiering 37. 
Rare national co-financing 37.
I henhold til Tacis-forordningen skal Kommissionen aktivt tilskynde til national samfinansiering af projekterne. 
According to the co-financing of projects was to be actively encouraged by the Commission.
Der er dog sjžldent fastsat krav om samfinansiering i Tacis-projekterne i Den Russiske Fżderation, selv om det formodes at have en positiv effekt p stżttemodtagerens og kontrahentens engagement og indsats for at n de forventede resultater. 
However, co-financing requirements are rare in the TACIS projects in the Russian Federation, even though they are intended to have a positive impact on the beneficiaryŐs and contractorŐs commitment to achieve the expected results.
Kun i forbindelse med to af de reviderede projekter samfinansierede stżttemodtageren aktiviteterne. 
There were only two cases among the audited projects where the beneficiary was co-financing the activities.
Samfinansieringen żgede stżttemodtagernes fżlelse af ejerskab, hvilket resulterede i, at projektmlene blev opfyldt. 
The co-financing had a positive impact on the ownership of the projects by the beneficiaries which led to achievement of the projectsŐ objectives.