natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For s vidt angr de netop omtalte svagheder ved sanktionssystemet, er det ikke forbavsende, at Retten kar kunnet konstatere alvorlige mangler i medlemsstaternes anvendelse af foranstaltninger, der skal sikre en bžredygtig forvaltning af fiskeressourcerne, ogs selv om Kommissionen har kendt til disse forhold i mange r. 
Finally, in view of the weaknesses just described in the system of sanctions, it is not surprising that the Court was able to find serious inadequacies in Member StatesŐ application of measures aimed at sustainable management of fisheries resources, even though the Commission has been aware of this situation for several years.
Det hžnger ogs sammen med, at Kommissionen ikke formelt anmoder de nationale myndigheder om at tage stilling til de mangler, den har konstateret i sine inspektionsrapporter, og til eventuelt at forelžgge en plan med henblik p at rette op p disse mangler. 
This situation is also linked to the fact that, following its inspection reports, the Commission does not formally ask national authorities to comment on the failings found and, where appropriate, present an action plan to rectify them.
Overkapacitet er en vžsentlig risikofaktor for et uheldigt udfald af fžllesskabsforanstaltningen 108. 
Examples of differences between scientific opinions and TAC Overcapacity, a major risk factor for the failure of Community action 108.
Overkapacitet kan defineres som en fldes overskydende kapacitet i forhold til det fangstniveau, der ville vžre ensbetydende med en bžredygtig udnyttelse af ressourcen. 
Overcapacity may be defined as a fleetŐs excess catch capacity relative to the level of catch that would allow the resource to be sustainably exploited.
P trods af disse vanskeligheder med mlingen er EF-fldens overkapacitet blevet fremhžvet i grżnbogen. Ifżlge Kommissionen (2) er fisker-flden Čfor żjeblikket (...) alt for storÇ, og det ville Čvžre nżdvendigt at reducere fiskeridżdeligheden med ca. 40 % (...) for at opn en forsigtig forvaltning af bestandenÇ. 
Despite the difficulties in measuring it, the finding of overcapacity in the Community fleet is highlighted in the Green Paper (2). According to the Commission, ÔWhat is clear, in any event, is that the fleet is currently much too largeŐ and Ôthat the necessary reductions of fishing mortality for the prudent management of stocks should be about 40 % and in many cases much higherŐ.
Overkapacitet ansporer til overfiskning 109. 
Overcapacity encourages over-fishing 109.
Overkapacitet pvirker fiskerierhvervets og lovgivers adfžrd, for det nedsžtter virksomhedernes fortjeneste i sektoren, der skal bžre de omkostninger, der er forbundet med en overkapacitet af produktionsredskaber. 
It influences the behaviour of the industry and the legislator, by reducing the profitability of enterprises in the sector, which have to bear the costs associated with the overcapacity of their means of production.
Der er risiko for, at fiskerne underanmelder deres fangster eller kaster de fangster, de kan tjene mindst p, over bord (jf. punkt 25). 
There is a risk of their underdeclaring their catches or throwing the less profitable part overboard (see paragraph 25).
Nr der skal vedtages TAC, skal Ministerrdet mžgle mellem parter med divergerende interesser p kort sigt; miljżmžssige p den ene side og sociożkonomiske p den anden side. 
When the Council of Ministers adopts the TAC and quotas it acts as an arbiter between divergent short-term interests, environmental on the one hand, and socio-economic on the other.
Denne mžgling kan fżre til, at de tillader hżjere fangstmžngder end anbefalet af forskerne (jf. tabel 3) ud fra żnsket om at beskytte fiskerierhvervets umiddelbare sociale og żkonomiske interesser. 
In doing so it may authorise catch quantities that are higher than those recommended by the scientists (see Table 3), in order to protect the immediate social and economic interests of those employed in the industry.
Man har dog aldrig effektivt taget fat p denne situation, som man har vžret bevidst om i adskillige r. Eksempler p differencer mellem videnskabelige udtalelser og TAC overskydende kapacitet p Tabel 3 Torsk Nordsżen Sild Nordsżen < 425 000 454 751 < 245 000 341 063 Hestemakrel Nordsżen < 18 000 42 727 < 18 000 42 727 Hvilling Nordsżen < 17 300 23 800 < 15 100 23 800 Videnskabelig udtalelse 2006 (tons) TAC 2006 (tons) Videnskabelig udtalelse 2007 (tons) TAC 2007 (tons) 0 23 205 0 19 957 (1) Rdets forordning (EF) nr. 
Table 3 2006 scientific opinion (tonnes) TAC 2006 (tonnes) 2007 scientific opinion (tonnes) TAC 2007 (tonnes) 0 23 205 0 19 957 Cod North Sea Herring North Sea < 425 000 454 751 < 245 000 341 063 Horse mackerel North Sea < 18 000 42 727 < 18 000 42 727 Whiting North Sea < 17 300 23 800 < 15 100 23 800 (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector, Article 18 (OJ L 337, 30.12.1999, p.
(2) Grżnbog om den fžlles fiskeripolitiks fremtid (KOM(2001) 135 endelig, del 3.3). 
(2) Green paper on the future of the CFP, COM(2001)135, section 3.3.
C 317/20 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 28.12.2007 Tidligere politikker, der gik ud p at nedskžre fiskerikapaciteten, er slet fejl 112. 
C 317/20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 Failure of past capacity-reduction policies 112.
Det fżrste forsżg p at nedskžre EF-fldens overkapacitet fandt sted i 1986, hvor det fżrste flerrige udviklingsprogram (FUP) blev indledt. 
The first action aimed at reducing the overcapacity in the Community fleet goes back to 1986, the date at which the first multiannual guidance programme (MAGP) was put in place.
Dette program blev efterfulgt af tre tilsvarende programmer, hvor der blev lagt loft over fiskerikapaciteten eller fiskeriindsatsen(1) for forskellige segmenter af EF-flden. 
This was followed by three other similar programmes setting ceilings for capacity or effort (1) for various segments of the Community fleet.
Men mlene var for beskedne, der var problemer med forvaltningen, og der blev anvendt strukturfondsmidler til modernisering og bygning af fartżjer, og kombinationen af dette har medfżrt, at disse programmer er mislykkedes. 
However, the combined effects of over-modest objectives, management problems, and the use of structural funds for shipbuilding and modernisation resulted in the failure of these programmes.
Kommissionen opgav derfor denne metode i 2003. 
This led the Commission to abandon this approach in 2003.
Fra nu af anvendes der en metode, der fortrinsvis bygger p fiskeriindsatsbegržnsning 113. 
An approach now based essentially on limiting fishing effort 113.
Med reformen af den fžlles fiskeripolitik i 2002 har Fžllesskabet overladt befżjelserne til at nedskžre fiskerikapaciteten til medlemsstaterne, og det beskžftiger sig nu kun med de bestemmelser, der vedrżrer styring af fiskeriindsatsen. 
With the reform of the CFP in 2002, the European Community ceded its powers to the Member States as regards reducing fishing capacity and confined itself to provisions that aimed to control the fishing effort.
I stedet for mlene om at nedskžre fiskerikapaciteten har man indfżrt begrebet lofter. 
Abandonment of the Community objective of reducing fishing capacity 114.
Disse lofter udtrykkes i vessel capacity units og er den żvre gržnse, som de nationale flder ikke m overstige. 
Capacity reduction objectives have been replaced by the concept of reference ceilings which are expressed in capacity units and constitute maximum levels which national fleets may not exceed.
Lofterne er fastsat p grundlag af den historiske situation, og de sžnkes kun ved fžllesskabsstżttet udtagelse af fiskerfartżjer. 
These ceilings were set on the basis of historic levels and are only reduced in cases where vessels are decommissioned from the fleet with Community aid.
Denne ordning hverken forpligter eller ansporer medlemsstaterne til at nedbringe deres overkapacitet. 
This system does not oblige, or even encourage, Member States to reduce their overcapacity.
Begržnsninger af fiskeriindsatsen foregr ikke nżdvendigvis ved nedskžringer i fiskerikapaciteten 115. 
Reductions in fishing effort do not necessarily result in capacity reduction 115.
Men da fiskeriindsatsen defineres som produktet af et fartżjs kapacitet (BT eller kW) og Čakti-vitetÇ (havdage), er det enkelt at nedsžtte fiskeriindsatsen ved at reducere den ene af faktorerne, nemlig aktiviteten. 
Community action is now directed essentially towards limiting the fishing effort Since this is defined as the product of capacity (in GT or kW) times activity (days at sea), a reduction in it can be obtained by simply decreasing one of these factors, activity.
P den mde vil overkapacitet fortsat i hżj grad lžgge en džmper p fiskerierhvervets rentabilitet. Der er mske endda nogle, der kan vžre fristet til at kompensere for aktivitetsnedsžttelsen og sžtte produktiviteten i vejret ved at investere i teknologisk udstyr, f.eks. mere effektive sonarer eller fangstredskaber, der reelt vil medfżre en stżrre fiskerikapacitet. 
In this case, overcapacity continues to have a direct bearing on the profitability of the fishing industry, which may even be tempted to compensate for its reduced activity by increasing its productivity and investing in technological equipment, such as sonar or more efficient fishing gear, which will de facto increase its effective fishing capacity.
Bestemmelser, som det er vanskeligt at kontrollere 116. 
Mechanisms which are difficult to check 116.
Bestemmelserne om begržnsning af fiskeriindsatsen finder anvendelse p et stadigt stigende antal fiskerier, og det gżr gennemfżrelsen og kontrollen af dem stadig mere komplekse og problematiske. 
The statutory mechanisms for limiting fishing effort apply to an ever-increasing number of fisheries, making their implementation and control increasingly complex and problematic.
(1) Fiskeriindsatsen er produktet af kapaciteten og varigheden af fiskeriet. 
(1) Fishing effort is the product of capacity times duration of fishing activity.
Endvidere er der to vžsentlige svagheder forbundet med mling af fiskerikapaciteten i tonnage (BT) og maskineffekt (kW); for det fżrste at de referenceenheder, der bruges til at vurdere den reelle kapacitet, er utilstržkkelige, og navnlig produktivitetsstig-ningen som fżlge af den teknologiske udvikling, der ifżlge Kommissionen ligger p 1-3 % pr. r, og endog hżjere for visse fiskerier (2); for det andet at det er vanskeligt at mle tonnage og maskineffekt konsekvent og pržcist (3). 
Furthermore, measurement of fishing capacity in terms of tonnage (GT) and engine power (kW) has two major weaknesses. One is the inadequacy of the standard units used for evaluating the true catch capacity, and especially the productivity gains associated with advanced technology, which, according to the Commission, may be between 1 and 3 % per year, or even more in some fisheries (2).
Den enkelte medlemsstat skal fremsende en rsrapport til Kommissionen om sin indsats for at opn en bžredygtig balance mellem fiskerikapacitet og fangstmuligheder (4). 
Each Member State must also send an annual report to the Commission on the efforts it has employed to achieve a sustainable balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities (4).
Endvidere anvender medlemsstaterne forskellige metoder. 
Moreover, different States use different methodological approaches.
Kommissionen har derfor ikke et samlet overblik over den eksisterende ubalance, og den har endnu ikke vurderet kvaliteten af de indgivne evalueringer. 
Consequently, the Commission does not have a precise picture of the imbalances that exist and has not, so far, verified the quality of the evaluations provided.
Der er risiko for, at kapacitetsforżgelser fžllesskabsstżtten medfżrer 119. 
A risk that Community assistance could lead to increases in capacity 119.
Den nye europžiske fiskerifond (EFF) yder stżtte til udskiftning af fiskerfartżjers motorer p betingelse af, at den nye motor har samme effekt som den gamle eller en lavere effekt. 
The new European Fisheries Fund (EFF) grants aid to renew the engines of fishing vessels, provided that the rating of the new engine is, according to circumstances, lower than or equal to that of the old one.
Denne bestemmelse kan i virkeligheden, nr man kender problemerne med kontrol af kW, medfżre en egentlig forżgelse af fiskerikapaciteten. 
Knowing the problems of monitoring kilowatts, a provision like this could, in fact, lead to a real increase in fishing capacity.
Retten konkluderer, at det ikke har vžret muligt ved hjžlp af fžllesskabspolitikker at f afskaffet den store overkapacitet i EF-flden (5). 
In conclusion, Community policies have not been able to end significant overcapacity in the European fleet (5).
I det nuvžrende system har medlemsstaterne ansvaret for forvaltningen af kapaciteten, og fžllesskabsindsatsen er koncentreret om at begržnse fiskeriindsatsen, og der er ingen bestemmelse, der kan fżre til en reduktion af denne overkapacitet. 
The current system of giving responsibility for managing capacity to the Member States and focusing Community action on fishing effort limitation does not include any measure of constraint which could lead to a reduction in this overcapacity.
Problemet med overkapacitet vil sledes fortsžtte i de kommende r og fortsat gżre det svžrt at overholde reglerne for den fžlles fiskeripolitik i almindelighed og TAC og kvoter i sžrdeleshed. 
The problem of overcapacity therefore seems likely to persist in years to come and will continue to have a bearing on compliance with CFP rules in general, and TAC and quotas in particular.
(2) Meddelelse fra Kommissionen til Rdet og Europa-Parlamentet om bedre fiskerikapacitets-og fiskeriindsatsindikatorer inden for den fžlles fiskeripolitik (KOM(2007) 39 endelig af 5.2.2007). 
(2) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on improving fishing capacity and effort indicators under the common fisheries policy, COM(2007) 39 final of 5.2.2007.
(4) Forordning (EF) nr. 2371/2002, artikel 14. 
(4) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 14.
(5) Den videnskabelige, tekniske og żkonomiske komit for fiskeri (STECF) understreger: ČNot only are the reported reductions rather tri-vial, compared to the existing imbalance between fishing opportunities and fleet capacity, to achieve such a balance, there is a need to reduce the EU fleetŐs capacity (ability) to catch fish, and not simply its physical capacity.Ç, bilag til rsrapporten fra Kommissionen til Rdet og Europa-Parlamentet om medlemsstaternes bestržbelser i 2005 p at opn en bžredygtig ligevžgt mellem fiskerikapacitet og fiskerimuligheder (KOM(2006) 872 endelig af 9.1.2007). 
(5) The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) stresses that ÔNot only are the reported reductions rather trivial, compared to the existing imbalance between fishing opportunities and fleet capacity, to achieve such a balance, there is a need to reduce the EU fleetŐs capacity (ability) to catch fish, and not simply its physical capacityŐ. Opinion on the annual report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Member StatesŐ efforts during 2005 to achieve a sustainable balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities, COM(2006) 872 final of 9 January 2007.
28.12.2007 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 317/21 KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER 121. 
28.12.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 317/21 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 121.
Fangstdataene er ufuldstžndige og kvaliteten usikker, og det hindrer TAC-og kvotesystemet, der er hjżrnestenen i forvaltningen af EF-fiskeressourcerne, i at fungere korrekt. 
The incompleteness and unreliability of catch data prevent the TAC and quota system, which is a cornerstone in the management of Community fisheries resources, from functioning properly.
De gžldende bestemmelser og procedurer sikrer hverken, at alle data bliver indsamlet, eller at uoverensstemmelser bliver opdaget ved valideringen. 
The regulatory framework and the procedures in force guarantee neither the exhaustiveness of data collection, nor the detection of inconsistencies during validation.
Kommissionen kan heller ikke altid pvise fejl og usždvanlige forhold i de data, medlemsstaterne fremsender, og i rette tid tržffe alle de beslutninger, der er nżdvendige for at beskytte ressourcen (jf. punkt 18-51). 
Nor is the Commission in an overall position to identify errors and anomalies in the data forwarded by Member States, and, to take all the timely decisions required to protect the resource (see paragraphs 18 to 51).
Inspektionssystemerne sikrer hverken effektiv forebyggelse eller effektiv konstatering af overtrždelser. 
The inspection systems do not prevent infringements and do not ensure that they are effectively detected.
Der er ingen generelle standarder, og derfor er de nationale systemer forskellige og garanterer hverken et tilstržkkeligt kontrolpres eller en optimering af inspektionsaktiviteterne. 
The absence of general standards has resulted in the existence of divergent national systems that neither ensure adequate inspection pressure nor optimise inspection activities.
Det begržnser ogs i praksis omfanget og ržkkevidden af Kommissionens evaluering af de nationale bestemmelser og dermed Kommissionens evne til at udtale sig om effektiviteten af de nationale systemer taget under et (jf. punkt 52-87). 
Furthermore, it actually limits the scope and effect of the CommissionŐs work of evaluating national arrangements, and as a consequence limits the latterŐs capacity to form an opinion as to the overall effectiveness of the national systems (see paragraphs 52 to 87).
Procedurerne for behandling af de konstaterede overtrždelser gżr det ikke muligt at attestere, at der fżlges op p hver enkelt overtrždelse, endsige at hver enkelt overtrždelse medfżrer en sanktion. 
The procedures for dealing with infringements found do not support the assertion that every infringement is followed up and even less that it is subject to penalty.
Nr en medlemsstat overtržder fžllesskabsreglerne, har Kommissionen kun et redskab, der har vist sig at vžre effektivt, og det er at indlede en overtrždelsesprocedure ved Domstolen. 
With regard to infringements of Community legislation by a Member State, the only instrument of proven effectiveness available to the Commission is an action before the Court of Justice for failure to fulfil an obligation.
Det kan imidlertid kun bruges i begržnset omfang og har ikke tilstržkkelig effekt (jf. punkt 88-106). 
This however has certain features which limit its use and make it an insufficiently responsive instrument (see paragraphs 88 to 106).
Overkapaciteten lžgger en džmper p fiskeriets rentabilitet, og nr de tilladte fangstmžngder samtidig nedsžttes, er det et incitament til ikke at overholde disse gržnser, og det indvirker p kvaliteten af de fremsendte data. 
Overcapacity affects the profitability of the fishing industry and, in a context of decreasing authorised catches, is an incitement to non-observance of these restrictions and affects the quality of the data forwarded.
Efter at programmerne for tilpasning af fiskerikapaciteten er slet fejl, kan den metode, der anvendes nu, og som hovedsageligt bygger p forvaltning af fiskeriindsatsen, ikke lżse problemet med overkapacitet (jf. punkt 107-120). 
After the failure of programmes to adapt fishing capacity, the current approach, based essentially on managing the fishing effort, is unlikely to resolve the problem of overcapacity (see paragraphs 107 to 120).
Alt i alt fremgr det af Rettens revision, at kontrol-, inspektions-og sanktionsbestemmelserne trods nylige forbedringer ikke kan sikre, at reglerne for forvaltning af fiskeressourcerne anvendes effektivt, og navnlig TAC-og kvoteordningen. 
In all, the CourtŐs work has shown that, despite recent improvements, the control, inspection and sanction mechanisms in place are not capable of ensuring that the rules on managing the fisheries resources, and the TAC and quota system in particular, are effectively applied.
Denne situation er endnu mere problematisk, fordi der er et misforhold mellem fangstkapaciteterne og fangstmulighederne, og det giver en situation, der ikke fremmer en spontan overholdelse af reglerne. 
This situation is all the more problematic in that the existing imbalance between capacity and fishing opportunities creates a context that is unlikely to promote spontaneous compliance with the regulatory provisions.
De seneste r er der landet betydeligt fžrre fisk, og hvis der ikke sker žndringer, vil det nżdvendigvis have alvorlige konsekvenser ikke kun for ressourcen, men ogs for selve fiskerierhvervets fremtid og for de omrder, der er afhžngige af fiskeriet. 
After a significant downturn in landings in recent years, the continuance of this situation will inevitably have serious repercussions not only on the resource itself but also on the future of the fishing industry and the regions associated with it.
Hvis politikerne żnsker, at den fžlles fiskeripolitik skal n sit ml om en bžredygtig udnyttelse af fiskeressourcerne, skal de nuvžrende kontrol-, inspektions-og sanktionssystemer styrkes betydeligt, navnlig ved at nedenstende anbefalinger fżlges. 
If the political authorities want the CFP to achieve its objective of sustainable exploitation of the fisheries resources, the present control, inspection and sanction mechanisms must be strengthened considerably, in particular by implementing the recommendations listed below.
Fangsttallenes kvalitet 127. 
Quality of catch data 127.
Hvis de fangstdata, der bruges til forvaltningen af fiskeressourcerne, skal vžre af bedre kvalitet, er det nżdvendigt at forbedre indsamlings-, validerings-og overvgningssystemerne. 
In order to improve the quality of the catch data used for management of fisheries resources the systems for collecting, validating and monitoring catch data should also be improved.
Denne forbedring forudsžtter ogs, at Kommissionen: a) s hurtigt som muligt fastsžtter og vedtager gennemfżrelsesbestemmelser til forordningen om elektronisk registrering og indberetning af fiskerioplysninger og om teledetektionsme-toder (1) og forvisser sig om, at betingelserne for anvendelse af dette redskab s vidt muligt sikrer det mod svig og gżr det lettere for de nationale systemer at samarbejde b) omdefinerer formatet af de rapporter, medlemsstaterne skal fremsende, for at lette analysen heraf og gżre kontrollen mere effektiv c) regelmžssigt benytter sig af sin adgang til kopier af edb-registre med relevante oplysninger, og at den har umiddelbar adgang hertil uden forudgende anmodning d) harmoniserer medlemsstaternes tilpasningskoefficienter for mžngden Čudtrykt i levende vžgtÇ e) forvisser sig om, at de data, Eurostat har modtaget, stemmer overens med de data, GD FISH har modtaget. (1) Rdets forordning (EF) nr. 
This improvement also requires the Commission to: (a) establish and approve as quickly as possible procedures for implementing the Regulation on electronic recording and reporting of fishing activities and on means of remote sensing (1), ensuring that as far as possible the conditions for implementing the tool are impervious to fraud and facilitate the interoperability of national systems; (b) redefine the format of the reports forwarded by the Member States to facilitate analysis of them and achieve effective controls; (c) make regular use of its right of access to the duplicates of IT files containing relevant information: access rights should no longer be subject to advance application; (d) harmonise the conversion factors used in the various Member States for obtaining Ôequivalent live weightŐ quantities; (e) verify the consistency of the data received through Eurostat on the one hand and DG Fish on the other.
C 317/22 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 28.12.2007 Inspektionssystemernes effektivitet 129. 
C 317/22 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 Effectiveness of inspection systems 129.