natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
16 ČStandard Project Submission FormÇ for s vidt angr de geografiske investeringsfaciliteter, der forvaltes af EuropeAid, ČProject Grant Application FormÇ for s vidt angr WBIF og ČCover SheetÇ for s vidt angr ITF. 
16 The ‘Standard Project Submission Form’ in the case of the geographical investment facilities managed by EuropeAid, the ‘Project Grant Application Form’ for the WBIF and the ‘Cover Sheet’ for the ITF.
ITF-projekt Ń rehabilitering af strżmforsyningssystemet i Benin og Togo Projektet vedrżrte etablering og renovering af eltransmissionsledninger og koblingsstationer til et samlet belżb p 85,7 millioner euro. 
ITF project — Power rehabilitation in Benin and Togo The project concerned the construction and refurbishing of electricity transmission lines and substations for a total of 85,7 million euro.
Mlet med projektet var at forbedre plideligheden og effektiviteten af elek-tricitetsforsyningen i Benin og Togo. 
It aimed to improve the reliability and efficiency of the electricity supply in Benin and Togo.
ITF ydede en rentegodtgżrelse p 12,25 millioner euro, som gjorde det muligt at n det subventionsniveau p 35 %, som IMF kržver (jf. tekstboks 1). 
The ITF granted an interest rate subsidy of 12,25 million euro which enabled the concessionality level of 35 % to be met, as required by the IMF (see Box 1).
Utilstržkkelige oplysninger fra den finansielle institution Den tilskudsansżgningsformular, som de finansielle institutioner indgav, indeholdt ikke data om projektets finansielle og żkonomiske levedygtighed, subventionsniveauet og projektets overensstemmelse med landenes behov, selv om alle disse oplysninger var tilgžngelige i den finansielle institutions dossierer. 
Insufficient information provided by the financial institution The grant application form provided by the financial institutions does not include figures on the financial and economic viability of the project, concessionality and the alignment of the project with the countries’ needs even though it was all available in the financial institution’s files.
Desuden var formularen uklar med hensyn til den forventede mervžrdi af ITF-tilskuddet. 
Furthermore, the form was unclear about the expected added value of the ITF grant.
Uden disse oplysninger kunne Kommissionen ikke foretage en passende vurdering af tilskudsansżgningen. 
Without this information, the Commission could not carry out an ap‐ propriate assessment of the grant request.
Bemžrkninger 15 24 En underliggende rsag til, at oplysningerne fra de finansielle institutioner var begržnsede, var, at projekterne ofte stadig var i den indledende fase p det tidspunkt, hvor tilskudsansżg-ningen blev indgivet. 
Observations 15 24 An underlying reason why the informa‐ tion provided by the financial institu‐ tions was limited was that projects were often still at the preliminary stage when the grant applications were made.
De finansielle institutioner tržffer deres lneafgż-relse p et senere tidspunkt, dvs. efter gennemfżrlighedsundersżgelsen. 
The financial institutions decide on their loans at a later stage, i.e. after the feasibility study.
Deres afgżrelser var derfor baseret p bedre og mere detaljerede oplysninger end dem, Kommissionen havde, da den vurderede tilskudsansżgningen. 
Their decisions were therefore based on bet‐ ter, more detailed information than the Commission had when it assessed the grant applications.
25 Der findes ikke nogen sžrlig vejledning p dette omrde, men Kommissionen har forbedret sin gennemgang af tilskudsansżgninger over tid. 
25 Although there is no particular guid‐ ance for this, the Commission has improved its reviews of grant applica‐ tions over time.
Gennemgangen er dog i vidt omfang baseret p oplysningerne i formularen til tilskudsansżgning og er derfor begržnset af den. 
However, the reviews remain largely based on the informa‐ tion presented in the grant application form and are therefore limited by it.
Kommissionen har ikke fastsat kriterier for żkonomisk levedygtighed. 
The Commission has not established criteria for the eco‐ nomic viability.
Den har i realiteten ingen klare regler eller retningslinjer for, hvilken type udviklings-investeringer der bżr finansieres med enten tilskud, ln eller en blanding af de to. 
In fact, it has no clear rules or guidance as to which type of development investments should be financed by either grants, loans or a blend of the two.
26 De relevante EU-delegationer blev gradvis inddraget i Kommissionens gennemgang, idet de blev hżrt i forbindelse med behandlingen af tilskudsansżgninger. 
26 The Commission’s reviews progressive‐ ly involved the relevant EU delegations by consulting them when assessing grant applications.
Rettens undersżgelse af projekter og interview med ansatte i delegationerne viste, at denne inddragelse stadig var utilstržkkelig, sžrlig i identifikationsfasen. 
The Court’s exami‐ nation of projects and interviews with delegation staff indicated that this in‐ volvement was still insufficient, in par‐ ticular during the identification phase.
Kun 59 % af de 22 EU-delegationer, der deltog i Rettens spżrgeundersżgelse, anfżrte, at de var inddraget i identificeringsprocessen i forbindelse med blandede projekter. 
Only 59 % of the 22 EU delegations that responded to the Court’s survey said they were involved in the identi‐ fication process of blended projects.
Nr finansielle institutioner sżgte om tilskud, anmodede Kommissionen de fleste af delegationerne om at fremkomme med deres synspunkter vedrżrende de projekter, der var udvalgt for deres respektive lande. 
However, once financial institutions applied for a grant, the Commission asked most of the delegations to provide their views on the projects selected for their respective countries.
27 Det gennemsnitlige antal dage, der gr fra forberedelsen af projektet til bestyrelsens endelige godkendelse, er 215 for ITF, 257 for LAIF og 290 for NIF17. 
27 The average number of days from introduction in the pipeline to final board approval is 215 for the ITF, 257 for the LAIF and 290 for the NIF17.
I forbindelse med LAIF og NIF skulle hvert enkelt projekt have en forelżbig og endelig godkendelse bde p teknisk plan og i bestyrelsen, hvilket var tidskržvende. 
In the LAIF and the NIF, each project needed provisional and final approval at both technical and board level, which was time‐consuming.
Denne procedure var noget lettere for ITF, hvor der ikke kržvedes forelżbige godkendelser18. 
This procedure was somewhat lighter for the ITF, which did not require provisional approvals18.
Valg af tilskudstype og -belżb 28 De tilskudstyper, der blev valgt (jf. punkt 1), var egnede til at opn den tilsigtede mervžrdi. 
Selection of grant type and amount 28 The grant types chosen (see para‐ graph 1) were appropriate for the added value they intended to achieve.
Kun ITF ydede rentegodtgżrelser. De żvrige regionale investeringsfaciliteter gjorde ikke, selv om dette var tilladt i henhold til deres forskriftsmžssige og kontraktmžssige rammer. 
Only the ITF provided interest rate subsidies; the other regional invest‐ ment facilities did not, even though this was permitted by their regulatory and contractual framework.
17 De oplysninger, der er nżdvendige for at beregne dette tal, var ikke til rdighed for de andre regionale investeringsfaciliteter. 
17 The information necessary to calculate this was not available for the other regional investment facilities.
Bemžrkninger 16 29 11 af de 30 tilskud, som Retten undersżgte, havde til forml at sikre, at lnet kom op p det minimumssubventions-niveau p 35 %, som IMF kržver (jf. tekstboks 1). 
Observations 16 29 Eleven of the 30 grants examined by the Court aimed to ensure that the loan met the minimum concessionality level of 35 % required by the IMF (see Box 1).
For s vidt angr 7 af disse 11 tilskud kunne Retten hverken fra Kommissionen eller de finansielle institutioner fremskaffe dokumentation for, at subventionsniveauet ikke var hżjere end nżdvendigt for at opfylde IMFŐs krav. 
For seven of these 11 grants, the Court could not obtain evidence from the Commission or the financial institutions showing that the conces‐ sionality level was not higher than needed to meet the IMF requirement.
I et tilfžlde oversteg subventionsniveauet minimumskravet p 35 %, uden at Kommissionen blev gjort bekendt med det. 
In one case, the concessionality level exceeded the minimum of 35 % with‐ out the Commission being informed of it.
30 Der var ingen kriterier for fastsžttelse af tilskudsbelżb, nr hovedformlet var andet end overensstemmelse med IMFŐs krav. 
30 There were no established criteria for setting the amounts of grants where the main objective was other than compliance with IMF requirements.
I de tilfžlde, Retten undersżgte, var det ofte uklart, hvordan belżbene var blevet besluttet. 
In the cases examined, it was often un‐ clear how amounts had been decided upon.
Kommissionen mente endvidere ikke, at det var nżdvendigt at foretage en nżje kontrol af, hvordan de tilskudsbelżb, som de finansielle institutioner anmodede om, var blevet beregnet. 
Furthermore, the Commission did not consider it necessary to carry out a rigorous verification of the way the grant amounts requested by finan‐ cial institutions have been calculated.
31 I teorien kunne de finansielle institutioner fastsžtte en rentesats, som var hżjere end den normale, og f den godkendt af tilskudsmodtageren ved at inkludere et tilskud i den finansielle pakke. 
31 In theory, financial institutions could set an interest rate that is higher than normal and have it accepted by the beneficiary by including a grant in the financial package.
Der er derfor en risiko for, at fordelene ved tilskud ikke overfżres fuldt ud til modtageren. 
Consequently, there is a risk that the benefit of grants is not fully transferred to the beneficiary.
Selv om de offentlige udviklingsfinansieringsin-stitutioner er ansvarlige for at tilbyde de mest hensigtsmžssige finansie-ringsvilkr, kan hverken Kommissionen eller Retten udelukke, at ovennžvnte risiko kan blive en realitet, da de ikke har mulighed for at undersżge dette, fordi fastsžttelsen af rentesatser er fortrolig19. 
Although the public development financial institutions are responsible for providing the most appropriate financing conditions, neither the Com‐ mission nor the Court can exclude that this risk may materialise as they don’t have the means to examine this due to the confidentiality of how interest rates are set19.
Kommissionen udbetaler unżdvendigt store forskud 32 Nr tilskuddene var blevet godkendt, og tilskudsaftalerne var undertegnet, blev der udbetalt betydelige forskud. 
The Commission makes advance disbursements that are unnecessarily high 32 Once grants have been approved and agreements signed, consider‐ able advance disbursements were made.
Kommissionen havde midlerne til rdighed og overfżrte dem, fżr det var nżdvendigt. 
The Commission had the funds available and transferred these before they were needed.
Stżttemodtageren anvendte disse midler langsomt, fordi det tog tid at ivžrksžtte projektet og indg aftaler om de nżdvendige tjenesteydelser og bygge-og anlžgsarbejder, og p grund af gennemfżrelsens varighed. 
The beneficiary used these funds slowly because it took time to set up the project and contract the necessary services and works and because of the duration of implementation.
De overfżrte midler henstod derfor uudnyttede i en lang periode, hvilket er i modstrid med princippet om forsvarlig żkonomisk forvaltning (jf. eksemplet i tekstboks 3). 
The funds trans‐ ferred remained therefore unused for long periods of time, contrary to the principles of sound financial manage‐ ment (see Box 3 for an example).
Som fżlge heraf afspejler budgetgennemfżrelsen ikke faciliteternes faktiske underliggende aktivitet. 
As a consequence, the budgetary outturn does not reflect the actual underlying activity of the facilities.
33 I forbindelse med ITF foretager Kommissionen overfżrsler til fonden, og dernžst overfżrer EIB, som forvalter af fonden, tilskuddene fra fonden til den ledende finansieringsinstitution. 
33 For the ITF, the Commission makes transfers to the fund and then the EIB, as manager of the fund, trans‐ fers grants from the fund to the lead financial institution.
ITFŐs udżvende organ godkender tilskud op til et samlet belżb, der ikke overstiger den likviditetssaldo, der er til rdighed i fonden. 
The ITF’s execu‐ tive board approves grants for a total that does not exceed the cash balance available in the fund.
Med denne forsigtige fremgangsmde sikrer ITF, at fonden vil kunne opfylde sine forpligtelser. 
With this prudent approach, the ITF ensures that it will be able to meet its commitments.
Eftersom det tager tid, fżr projektgennemfżrelsen faktisk pbegyndes, udbetaler modtageren fżrst de pgžldende belżb nogle r senere. 
As it takes time before project implementa‐ tion actually starts, the beneficiary will disburse the respective amounts only some years later.
Som fżlge heraf ligger store belżb passivt hen p fondens bankkonto i flere r (jf. figuren). 
As a result, a large amount of money lies dormant in the fund’s bank account for years (see the Figure).
19 Som Retten allerede har bemžrket i punkt 3.2 i sžrberetning nr. 3/99 om Kommissionens forvaltning og kontrol af rentegodtgżrelser (EFT C 217 af 29.7.1999, s. 
19 As already observed by the Court in paragraph 3.2 of Special Report No 3/99 on the management and control of interest rate subsidies by the Commission (OJ C 217, 29.7.1999, p.
Bemžrkninger 17 NIF-projekt Ń anden fase i TunisŐ hurtige jernbanenet Dette projekt til 550 millioner euro finansierer anlžggelsen af prioriterede stržkninger af to nye linjer af hżj-hastighedsjernbanenettet i Tunis by. 
Observations 17 NIF project — Second phase of the Tunis fast railway network This 550 million euro project finances the construction of priority sections of two new lines of the high‐speed urban railway network of Tunis.
NIF-tilskuddet p 28 millioner euro ydes til teknisk bistand til den ordregivende myndighed og tilsynsmyndigheden. 
The NIF grant of 28 million euro provides technical assistance to the contract‐ ing authority and the supervisor.
Unżdvendigt hżje forskudsbetalinger i forbindelse med NIF-tilskuddet I 2010 overfżrte Kommissionen det samlede tilskud til modtageren. 
Unnecessarily high advance disbursement of the NIF grant In 2010, the Commission transferred the entire grant to the beneficiary.
De finansielle institutioner udbetalte fżrst deres ln, da modtageren havde behov for midler. 
The financial institutions disbursed their loans only when the beneficiary needed the funds.
Da projektet var vžsentligt forsinket, blev de fżrste lnebelżb fżrst udbetalt i 2013. 
As the project experienced significant implementa‐ tion delays, the first loan disbursement took place only in 2013.
Som fżlge af forsinkelserne stod 24,5 millioner euro af NIF-tilskuddet uudnyttet hen i mere end tre r. 
Due to the delays, 24,5 million euro of the NIF grant was left unused for more than 3 years.
ITF Ń cash flow-bevžgelser (millioner euro) 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Kilde: ITFŐs sekretariat. 
ITF Cash flow movements million euro 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Source: ITF Secretariat.
Kumulativ pengetilstrżmning Kassebeholdning Kumulativ udgende pengestrżm 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2013 Figur Tekstboks 3 
Cumulative cash inflow Cash in hand 2007 2008 2009 Cumulative cash outflow 2010 2011 2012 2013 Figure Box 3
Bemžrkninger 18 For subfaciliteternes vedkommende var kriterierne for tildeling af subln vage eller bredt formuleret 34 For de otte subfaciliteter (jf. punkt 11), som Retten undersżgte (jf. bilag VIII), var der ingen bestemmelse om, at de aktiviteter, der skulle finansieres af subfaciliteten, forudgende skulle godkendes enkeltvis af Kommissionen, og kun i t tilfžlde var de godkendt af den finansielle institution. 
Observations 18 In the case of sub-facilities, the criteria for awarding sub-loans were vague or broad 34 For the eight sub‐facilities (see para‐ graph 11) examined by the Court (see Annex VIII), there was no provision that the activities to be financed by the sub‐facility should be individually approved ex ante by the Commission and in only one case were they ap‐ proved by the financial institution.
Samtidig var kriterierne for udvžlgelse af aktiviteter, der var berettigede til subln, i de fleste tilfžlde20 vage eller meget bredt formuleret, og de indeholdt ingen oplysninger om de berżrte sektorer og prioriteter. 
At the same time, the criteria for selecting activities eligible for sub‐loans were vague or very broad in the majority of the cases20, with no mention of the sectors and priorities concerned.
Kommissionen kunne derfor ikke vžre sikker p, at udgifterne havde fokus p EUŐs prioriteter (jf. eksemplet i tekstboks 4). 
The Commission could not therefore be certain that the expenditure focused on EU priorities (see Box 4 for an example).
20 Med undtagelse af faciliteten for geotermisk udvikling (Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility). 
20 With the exception of the Geothermal Risk Mitigation Facility.
NIF-projekt Ń finansieringsfacilitet for SMVŐer SMV-finansieringsfaciliteten med et samlet belżb p 150 millioner euro til tildeling havde to komponenter. 
NIF project — SME Finance Facility The SME Finance Facility, which had a total of 150 million euro to allocate consisted of two products.
Den fżrste bestod af teknisk bistand til lokale finansielle partnerinstitutioner og en tabs-/risikodelingsfacilitet for lneportefżljer. 
The first provided technical assistance to the local partner financial institutions and a loss risk sharing facility to loan portfolios.
Over den anden komponent blev der ydet teknisk bistand og rentefrie ln med det forml at reducere rentesatserne og give en tabs-/risikodelingsstżdpude. 
The second provided technical assistance and interest‐free loans in order to reduce interest rates and provide a loss/risk‐sharing cushion.
Der blev ydet 15 millioner euro i NIF-tilskud til dette projekt. 
The NIF grant for this project was 15 million euro.
Brede kriterier for udvžlgelse af de aktiviteter, der skulle finansieres af subfaciliteten Den ansżgningsformular, som de finansielle institutioner forelagde, angav ikke klart, p hvilket niveau subl-nene skulle godkendes. 
Broad criteria for selecting activities to be financed by the sub-facility The grant application form provided by the financial institutions did not clearly indicate at which level the sub‐loans needed to be approved.
Den ledende finansieringsinstitutions ansvar i bedżmmelses-og udvžlgelsesprocessen blev heller ikke pržciseret. 
It also failed to specify the responsibility of the lead financier in the ap‐ praisal and selection process.
Det var ikke fastsat, at der i udvžlgelsesprocessen skulle tages hensyn til EUŐs prioriteter, idet stżtteberettigelseskriterierne bnede mulighed for investeringer i alle sektorer. 
There was no provision for the selection process to take account of the EU priorities as the eligibility criteria accepted investments in all sectors.
Desuden var rapporteringskravene for opfżlgning p projekter ikke klart angivet. 
Furthermore, reporting requirements for project follow‐up were not clearly specified.
Omfanget af Kommissionens overvgning af gennemfżrelsen af tilskud varierede 35 De regionale investeringsfaciliteters sekretariater er ansvarlige for den overordnede finansielle overvgning af faciliteterne. 
The extent of the Commission’s monitoring of the implementation of grants varied 35 The secretariats of the regional invest‐ ment facilities are responsible for overall financial monitoring of the facilities.
De finansielle institutioner overvger selv gennemfżrelsen af projekterne. 
The financial institutions monitor the implementation of the projects themselves.
P kommissionsniveau ligger ansvaret for opfżlgning af tilskud hos EU-delegationerne. 
At Commission level, responsibility for following up grants lies with the EU delegations.
Omfanget af deres opfżlgning varierede, fordi der ikke findes klare interne retningslinjer (jf. punkt 19), og fordi det var forskelligt, hvor meget delegationerne deltog i identifikationen af projekterne (jf. punkt 26). 
The extent of their follow‐up varied due to the absence of clear internal guidelines (see paragraph 19) and the different levels of involvement by the delegations in the identification of projects (see paragraph 26).
Desuden var de kontraktlige ordninger, som var indget med de finansielle institutioner om forelžggelse af oplysninger, uklare og ikke tilstržkkeligt kržvende. 
In addi‐ tion, contractual arrangements with the financial institutions to provide information were unclear and insuffi‐ ciently demanding.
Bemžrkninger 19 36 Resultatovervgningen har indtil videre vžret begržnset og ustruktureret. 
Observations 19 36 Performance monitoring has been limited and unstructured so far.
Inden for rammerne af EU-platformen for blanding i eksternt samarbejde er der ved at blive udformet et resultatorienteret overvgningssystem, som indeholder standardiserede indikatorer til overvgningsforml. 
Within the EU Platform for Blending in External Cooperation, a results‐based monitoring system is being designed to include a set of standard indicators for monitoring purposes.
37 Som i forbindelse med andre udviklingsprojekter, der finansieres af EU, udvalgte Kommissionen tilfžldigt nogle blandede projekter til resultatorienteret overvgning (ROM). 
37 As with other development projects financed by the EU, the Commission randomly selected blended projects for Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM).
Denne żvelse bestod af korte, mlrettede vurderinger p stedet foretaget af eksterne eksperter p basis af en ensartet metode. 
This exercise consisted of short, fo‐ cused, on‐site assessments by external experts following a consistent meth‐ odology.
I forbindelse med ROM-vurde-ringerne blev en lang ržkke aspekter af projektets gennemfżrelse evalueret p grundlag af fem kriterier: relevans, effektivitet, produktivitet, virkning og sandsynlig bžredygtighed. 
The ROM assessments looked at many aspects of project imple‐ mentation on the basis of five criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, potential impact and likely sustainabil‐ ity.
Men vurderingerne havde ikke specifikt fokus p tilskuddenes mervžrdi. 
However, the assessments did not focus specifically on the added value of the grants.
Med hensyn til ROM-vurderingernes resultater var det ikke klart, hvorvidt det var den finansielle institution eller EU-delegationen, der forventedes at reagere p konklusionerne og anbefalingerne. 
Regarding the results of the ROMs, it was not clear whether the financial institution or the EU delega‐ tion was expected to take action on the conclusions and recommenda‐ tions.
Projekter, der blev stżttet af ITF, var imidlertid ikke omfattet af ROM. 
Projects supported by the ITF, however, were not subject to ROM.
De tilsigtede fordele ved at blande tilskud og ln er endnu ikke net fuldt ud 38 Retten undersżgte, i hvilket omfang de tilsigtede fordele ved blanding er blevet net. 
The intended benefits of blending grants and loans have not been fully achieved so far 38 The Court assessed the extent to which the intended benefits of blend‐ ing have been achieved.
Disse omfatter blandt andet mobilisering af yderligere finansiering, som ikke er tilskud, inddragelse i udformningen af politikker, indflydelse p, hvordan projekter tilrettelžgges og forvaltes, bedre donorkoordination og stżrre synliggżrelse af den europžiske stżtte til udviklingssamarbejde (jf. punkt 4). 
These include mobilising additional non‐grant fi‐ nancing, being involved in the formu‐ lation of policies, having an impact on the way projects are set up and managed, improving donor coordina‐ tion and enhancing the visibility of European development cooperation aid (see paragraph 4).