natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For projekter, der ikke skaber vžsentlige nettoindtžgter (f.eks. veje), kan der gives op til 100 % i stżtte, da infrastruktur er en nżdvendig forudsžtning for en hvilken som helst form for udvikling i landdistrikter. 
For projects which do not generate substantial net revenues (such as local roads) the aid rate is up to 100 % as infrastructure is a necessary pre-condition for any development in rural areas.
Der blev modtaget et stort antal ansżgninger vedrżrende sdanne projekter, og den hżje stżttesats er en af de vžsentligste rsager, der nžvnes som forklaring p denne succes. 
High numbers of applications were received for such projects, and the high rate of aid financing is one of the principle reasons frequently stated for this success.
I forbindelse med alle andre projekter kržves det af modtagerne, at de finansierer mindst 50 % af projektomkostningerne af deres egne midler eller gennem ln, eftersom stżttesatsen her hżjst kan udgżre 50 %. 
For all other projects, as the aid rate is limited to 50 %, beneficiaries are required to finance at least 50 % of the project costs from their own funds or through loans.
Sapard-betalinger til modtagerne skal baseres p opgżrelser over afholdte udgifter. 
Sapard payments to beneficiaries must be based on declarations of expenditure incurred.
Det betyder, at modtagerne ofte skal forudfinansiere udgifterne i en periode p flere mneder, hvilket er den tid, det tager for Sapard-kontoret at behandle en betalingsanmodning og effektuere betalingen. 
This means that they have to pre-finance the expenditure, often for a period of several months, which is the time it takes for the Sapard Agency to handle the payment claim and make the payment.
Besvžrlige administrative procedurer har forlžnget denne periode (jf. punkt 93). 
Heavy administrative procedures have prolonged this period (see paragraph 93).
Det fremgik af en undersżgelse af de vžsentligste hindringer for anvendelsen af Sapard-stżtten, som Sapard-kontoret havde foretaget blandt landbrugere og landbrugsrdgivere i Polen(1), at de tre vžsentligste vanskeligheder var de hżje omkostninger forbundet med bankln, kravet om forudfinansiering og manglen p egne midler til investeringen. 
An enquiry by the Sapard Agency amongst farmers and agricultural advisors in Poland investigated the main obstacles in applying for Sapard aid (1). This showed that the three main difficulties were the high cost of bank credit, the requirement to pre-finance and the lack of own resources for the investment.
Sapards potentiale er ikke desto mindre stort, hvilket fremgr af den succes, den polske nationale stżtteordning har, hvor staten yder ln til landbrugere p op til 80 % af udgifterne til projektet. 
The potential for Sapard is nevertheless high, which can be seen by the success of the Polish national aid scheme, under which the State provides loans to farmers of up to 80 % of the project.
I 2002 modtog over 24 000 landbrugere stżtte under denne ordning, hvilket er ti gange s mange som under Sapard-programmet (2). 
In 2002, more than 24 000 farmers were supported under this scheme, which is 10 times that of the Sapard programme (2).
Ansżgerne har store problemer med at sikre sig forudfinansiering og supplerende finansiering. 
Applicants have major problems in securing advance financing and complementary funding.
Det skyldes navnlig, at de mangler driftskapital og investeringskapital, og at bankerne fżrer en restriktiv udlnspolitik, hvilket forvžrres af et underudviklet ejendomsmarked og banksystem. 
This is mainly because of the lack of working and investment capital, combined with a restrictive credit policy of banks, which is exacerbated by an underdeveloped property market and banking system.
Det er et generelt problem i alle Sapard-lande og har vžret rsagen til en af de flaskehalse, der er opstet i forbindelse med gennemfżrelsen af Sapard, og en af hovedrsagerne til, at der er blevet gennemfżrt fžrre projekter end forventet. 
This is a general problem in all Sapard countries, and has been one of the bottlenecks for implementing Sapard and one of the main reasons for lower-than-expected project implementation.
I selve Sapard-programmet gives der ingen mulighed for at behandle dette problem, og de berżrte lande har selv forsżgt at lżse det p forskellige mder. 
The Sapard programme itself does not include the possibility of addressing this problem, and the countries have tried to solve this themselves in different ways.
(1) ČOpinions on Sapard Measure 2 programme expressed by Agricultural Advisory Centres and potential beneficiaries of the programmeÇ, Warszawa, den 30. november 2002. 
(1) Opinions on the Sapard Measure 2 programme expressed by Agricultural Advisory Centres and potential beneficiaries of the programme, Warsaw, 30 November 2002.
(2) Der blev undertegnet 2 377 aftaler med landbrugere fra september 2002 til november 2003. 
(2) 2 377 contracts were signed with farmers in the period September 2002-November 2003.
C 295/14 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 30.11.2004 85. 
C 295/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 30.11.2004 85.
De bulgarske myndigheder var af den opfattelse, at en lneordning ville gżre det muligt at lżse disse problemer og dermed gżre det lettere at gennemfżre Sapard. 
The Bulgarian authorities were of the opinion that a credit scheme would help to solve these problems, and thus facilitate the implementation of Sapard.
Fżlgelig blev der godkendt en ordning, sledes at der kunne ydes ln til Sapard-modtagere, og der blev afsat 60 millioner euro til denne ordning i det nationale budget for 2003. 
Consequently, a scheme which would provide credit to Sapard beneficiaries was approved, and 60 million euro was allocated to it in the 2003 national budget.
Den bulgarske landbrugsmini-ster underrettede Kommissionen om ordningen i juni 2003. 
The scheme was notified by the Bulgarian Minister of Agriculture to the Commission in June 2003.
I sit svar fra juli 2003 anfżrte Kommissionen, at den mente, at ordningen mske indeholdt visse elementer af statsstżtte, og at det i s fald var nżdvendigt at foretage visse žndringer for at overholde konkurrencereglerne (1). 
In its reply in July 2003, the Commission stated that it was of the opinion that the scheme might include certain elements of state aid and that in that case certain changes were required in order to respect competition rules (1).
De finansielle detaljer i den bulgarske ordning blev draget skriftligt i tvivl, men Bulgarien modtog ingen hastebistand eller rdgivning og endte med at tržkke forslaget tilbage. 
Apart from questioning the financial details of the Bulgarian scheme by letter, no urgent assistance or advice was provided and, in the event, Bulgaria withdrew the proposal.
Og dermed blev de 60 millioner euro, der var afsat til at afhjžlpe et centralt gennemfżrelsesproblem i Sapard, ikke brugt, fordi Kommissionen ikke aktivt fulgte op p problemet. 
Thus, the 60 million euro available to address a key implementation problem in Sapard was not used because the Commission did not actively follow up the problem.
Andre lande har allerede gennemfżrt lignende ordninger, som Kommissionen imidlertid ikke har undersżgt. 
Other countries have already implemented similar schemes, which were, however, not examined by the Commission.
De litauiske myndigheder har f.eks. oprettet en garantifond, der udsteder garantier til eventuelle Sapard (og ikke-Sapard) modtagere med henblik p ln. 
The Lithuanian authorities, for example, have set up a guarantee fund which issues guarantees to potential Sapard (and non-Sapard) beneficiaries for loans.
Dele af denne ordning kan mske ogs betragtes som statsstżtte. 
Elements of this scheme might also be considered as state aid.
De rumžnske kommuner havde store vanskeligheder med at betale kontrahenterne, da de belżb, det drejede sig om, ofte var stżrre end hele deres samlede rlige budget. 
Romanian municipalities faced considerable difficulties in making payments to contractors, as the amounts concerned were frequently greater than their whole annual budget.
Ifżlge reglerne mtte Sapard-kontoret ikke betale kontrahenternes fakturaer direkte. 
The rules prevented the Sapard Agency from paying contractorsŐ invoices directly.
Det litauiske Sapard-kontor, der var i en tilsvarende situation, har sledes udbetalt ca. 1 million euro (2) direkte til de kommunale myndigheder og dermed overtrdt Sapard-reglerne. 
Faced with a similar situation, the Lithuanian Sapard Agency did make such payments directly to municipalities, thus violating the Sapard rules for an amount of around 1 million euro (2).
For at nedsžtte den finansielle byrde, der phviler modtagerne ved forudfinansiering, udbetalte Litauen og Rumžnien mellemliggende belżb til modtagerne, efterhnden som projekterne skred frem. 
In order to reduce the financial burden of pre-financing on the beneficiary, Lithuania and Romania made interim payments to beneficiaries as projects progressed.
Ikke alle landene anvendte denne praksis, da den efter deres mening medfżrte en stigning i den administrative byrde. 
This practice was not applied in all countries as this was considered to increase the administrative workload.
I Rumžnien er der yderligere det problem, at de kommunale myndigheder er forpligtede til at afholde vedligeholdelsesomkostningerne efter et projekts afslutning, hvilket er en af betingelserne for stżtteberettigelse i forbindelse med den berżrte foranstaltning. 
An additional problem which exists in Romania is the commitment for municipalities to bear maintenance costs after project completion which is a condition of eligibility for the measure concerned.
De fleste projekter vedrżrte veje, og de kommunale myndigheder havde ikke beregnet det faktiske omfang af denne fremtidige forpligtelse til vedligeholdelse korrekt, og Sapard-kontoret havde draget beregningen i tvivl. 
Most projects concerned roads and the actual extent of this future commitment to maintenance was not properly calculated by the municipalities or questioned by the Sapard Agency.
De kommunale myndigheder kendte end ikke de forelżbige tal, og da Rettens revisorer forhżrte sig derom, kunne de ikke give et begrundet overslag eller et realistisk bud p, hvordan de ville kunne betale disse omkostninger af deres begržnsede budgetter. 
Even provisional figures were not known and when questioned by the CourtŐs auditors the municipalities were unable to give a reasoned estimate or indicate how these costs might be realistically funded from their limited budgets.
De fleste kommunale myndigheder ans spżrgsmlet om vedligeholdelse for at (1) Man m ikke overskride det loft p 50 %, der er fastsat for offentlig stżtte fra alle kilder. 
Most (1) A ceiling of 50 % of public aid from all sources cannot be exceeded.
Eftersom Bulgarien anvendte en stżttesats p 50 %, ville enhver form for stżtte, der indgik i stżtteordningen, overskride dette loft. 
Since Bulgaria applied a grant rate of 50 %, any subsidy element in the grant scheme would exceed this ceiling.
(2) Pr. 31. marts 2003. vžre af sekundžr betydning. 
(2) As at 31 March 2003. municipalities considered the question of maintenance as being of secondary importance.
Det var vigtigere at f godkendt projektet. 
It was more important to have the project approved.
Det nuvžrende system i Rumžnien giver dermed ingen garanti for, at investeringerne er bžredygtige, hvilket er en vžsentlig svaghed. 
The current system in Romania thus does not guarantee the sustainability of the investments which is a major weakness.
Kommissionen identificerede ikke sdanne gennemfżrelsesproblemer og var derfor ikke i stand til at lżse dem p en konsekvent mde. 
The Commission did not identify such implementation problems and so was unable to address them in a consistent manner.
Sapard-programmet gav ikke i sig selv mulighed for at lżse problemerne, og derfor blev der fundet ad hoc-lżsnin-ger. 
Because the Sapard programme itself does not have the means to solve them, ad hoc solutions were arrived at.
Resultatet var, at Sapard-landene vedtog forskellige praksis, hvoraf nogle var gode og andre i strid med reglerne. endvidere var de administrative procedurer besvžrlige 91. 
The result was that different practices were adopted by the Sapard countries, some of which were good, while others violated the rules. and there were heavy administrative procedures 91.
Ni mneder efter at gennemfżrelsen af Sapard-programmet var begyndt i Polen, var der modtaget 977 ansżgninger, heraf blev 472 (48 %) afvist. 
After the first nine months of Sapard implementation in Poland, 977 applications were received, of which 472 (48 %) were rejected.
Det fremgr af en analyse af disse tal, at ansżgningerne isžr blev afvist, fordi de ikke var forberedt ordentligt, navnlig fordi der skulle vedlžgges et stort antal dokumenter, og fordi det var svžrt at f fat i disse. 
An analysis of these figures showed that the main reason for rejection was that the applications were not prepared properly. The difficulties relate mainly to the large number of documents to be provided and the difficulty in obtaining them.
I Bulgarien konstateredes samme problem, der kan illustreres af et af de projekter, som Retten reviderede. 
The same problem was found in Bulgaria, which can be illustrated by one of the projects reviewed by the Court.
For dette relativt enkle projekt vedrżrende kżb af en mejetžrsker og en plov var ansżgningen med bilag p 2 477 sider, og betalingsanmodningen p 601 side. 
For this relatively simple project for the purchase of a combine harvester and a plough, the number of pages in the application file was 2 477 and for the file with the payment request 601 pages.
Her er et andet eksempel p de besvžrlige procedurer: Nr Sapard-kontorerne konstaterer, at en ansżgning er mangelfuld, giver de modtagerne mulighed for at fremsende de manglende dokumenter. 
Another example of this is that when the Sapard Agencies find that an application is incomplete, beneficiaries are given the opportunity to provide the missing documents.
Men den tidsfrist, de giver, er ofte for kort, og derfor afvises ansżgningen. 
The time available for this is often insufficient. Consequently, the application is rejected.
F.eks. manglede der kun et dokument i ansżgningen vedrżrende et projekt om forbedring af en kommunal vej i Polen. 
For instance, only one document was missing for the application for a project to upgrade a local road in Poland.
Dette dokument, budgettet for det fżlgende r, kržvede, at kommunalbestyrelsen trdte sammen, hvilket ikke kunne ske inden for den fastsatte frist. 
This document, the budget for the following year, required a meeting of the municipalityŐs Council, which could not be held within the time allowed.
Projektet blev derfor afvist. 
The project was rejected.
Det tager ofte lang tid at behandle ansżgningerne, og det tager ogs modet fra potentielle ansżgere. 
The length of time often taken for processing applications also discourages potential applicants.
Forsinkelserne i behandlingen af betalingsanmodningerne forlžnger forudfinan-sieringsperioden yderligere, hvilket afskržkker mulige modtagere. 
The delays in processing payment requests further extend the period of pre-financing and deter possible beneficiaries.
I de besżgte lande gr der mellem to og tre mneder, fra betalingsanmodningen indsendes, og til midlerne udbetales. 
The time from the payment claim to the actual day of payment is two to three months for the countries visited.
Ud over den tid det tager at evaluere betalingsanmodningen, kan der ogs g lang tid, efter at betalingsordren er udarbejdet. 
Apart from the time for evaluation of the payment claim the total time also includes the waiting time after the payment order has been prepared.
I Polen mtte en landbruger vente nžsten seks mneder p at f refunderet sine penge, fordi han havde fžrdiggjort sit projekt inden den forventede afslutningsdato i ansżgningen. 
In Poland, one farmer had to wait almost six months to be reimbursed because he completed the project before the expected completion date stated in his application.
De polske embedsmžnd hžvdede, at de ikke kunne godkende en betalingsanmodning inden den planlagte dato. 
The Polish officials stated that they could not accept a payment request before the date forecast.
I alle de tilfžlde, hvor Retten vurderede, at procedurerne forrsagede vanskeligheder med gennemfżrelsen, har Sapard-landene anvendt striksere procedurer end de procedurer, der var fastsat af Kommissionen. 
In all the cases where the Court identified that procedures cause difficulties in implementation, Sapard countries have applied stricter procedures than those required by the Commission.
30.11.2004 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 295/15 Sapard-landene ikke at have vžret i stand til at lżse dem. 
30.11.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 295/15 even if they hampered an efficient implementation of Sapard.
P grund af modtagernes forpligtelse til at forudfinansiere projekterne og de besvžrlige administrative procedurer begunstiger Sapard-systemet modtagere, der har en god żkonomi, og som er godt organiserede og har tilstržkkelig kapital eller mulighed for at optage ln. 
Due to the requirement on beneficiaries to pre-finance projects and the heavy administrative procedures, the Sapard system favours the financially strong and the better organised with sufficient capital or access to loans.
Det er et vžsentligt handicap for mindre bedrifter og virksomheder, der har svžrest ved at opfylde standarderne, modernisere deres produktion og forbedre deres effektivitet. 
For smaller farms and firms which have the greatest efforts to make in meeting standards to modernise and increase efficiency this is a major handicap.
P grundlag af undersżgelsen af de 13 bedrifter, som blev besżgt p stedet i de fire lande, konstaterede revisorerne, at landbrugerne generelt havde forudfinansieret projekterne og finansieret deres eget bidrag med egne midler, hvilket andre, fattigere landbrugere ikke kunne gżre. 
Based on the 13 farms visited on the spot by the Court in the four countries, the auditors found that the farmers generally prefinanced the project and financed their own contribution from their own resources, which other, poorer, farmers were unable to do.
Det var navnlig tilfžldet i Litauen, hvor det var et centralt element, der har medfżrt, at alle de besżgte landbrugere modtog stżtte til mere end et projekt. 
This was particularly the case in Lithuania, where this was a key element which has led to all the farmer beneficiaries visited being granted aid for more than one project.
Ifżlge gennemfżrelsesbestemmelserne til Sapard kan der afholdes generalomkostninger p op til 12 % af de samlede stżtteberettigede udgifter over projektet (1). 
Sapard rules allow that general costs of up to 12 % of total eligible costs may be charged to the project (1).
Disse omkostninger kan vžre honorarer til arkitekter, ingeniżrer og konsulenter, omkostninger i forbindelse med juridisk rdgivning, gennemfżrligheds-undersżgelser og erhvervelse af patenter og licenser med henblik p at forberede og gennemfżre et projekt. 
These costs can be architectsŐ, engineersŐ and consultantsŐ fees, legal fees, feasibility studies and acquisition of patents and licences for preparing and implementing a project.
Indtil nu har generalomkostningerne navnlig vedrżrt udarbejdelse af modtagernes forretningsplaner. 
To date, the general costs charged were largely for the costs of preparing beneficiariesŐ business plans.
De hżjeste belżb blev konstateret i Bulgarien og Litauen, hvor Retten anslog, at EU frem til udgangen af 2003 havde udbetalt 700 000 euro. 
The highest amounts were found in Bulgaria and in Lithuania, where the relevant amount paid by the EU up to the end of 2003 is estimated by the Court to be 700 000 euro.
I andre lande blev der kun betalt meget sm belżb til disse forretningsplaner. 
In other countries very little was charged for business plans.
Forskellen mellem de belżb, der blev betalt i de forskellige lande, burde i sig selv have vžret nok til at f Kommissionen til at undersżge denne sag. 
The difference in the amounts charged between the countries should alone have led the Commission to examine this matter.
Disse omkostninger er forbundet med risiko, navnlig omkostningerne i forbindelse med konsulenthjžlp til udarbejdelsen af forretningsplaner, fordi der, uanset om der er tale om en lille eller en stżrre investering, ikke er noget direkte forhold mellem, hvor meget et projekt koster (udstyr osv.), og hvor meget det koster at udarbejde en forretningsplan. 
The risk related to these costs is high, in particular for consultancy costs for the preparation of business plans, because there is no direct relationship between the cost of the project (equipment etc.) and preparing a business plan, whether it relates to a small or large investment.
Ved at basere godtgżrelsen af omkostningerne p en bestemt procentdel af projektet, (1) Bulgarien nedsatte generalomkostningerne til forberedelse af forretningsplaner til 5 %, og Rumžnien nedsatte dem i nogle tilfžlde (for projekter, der ikke vedrżrer byggeri og kun for to foranstaltninger) til 3 % eller 5 % afhžngigt af foranstaltningen. sikrer man ikke, at princippet om sparsommelighed er overholdt. 
The risk is further increased because the rules allow that this expenditure is (1) Bulgaria reduced the general costs for the preparation of business plans to 5 %, and Romania in certain cases (for projects which do not include construction and for two measures only) to 3 % or 5 % depending on the measure. paid in cash.
Ved Rettens revision blev det konstateret, at der, trods denne risiko, ikke blev fżrt tilstržkkelig kontrol med disse omkostninger. 
The CourtŐs audit found that, despite this risk, there were insufficient checks for these costs.
Der blev typisk ikke givet nogen begrundelse eller forklaring p de belżb, der blev betalt, og der blev ikke foretaget kontrol af, at omkostningerne stod i et rimeligt forhold til de ydede tjenester, eller om tjenesterne overhovedet var blevet ydet. 
There was typically no justification or explanation for the amounts charged, and no checks were made that the costs were in relation to the services provided or indeed that the services were provided in the first place.
Ved kontrollen blev det blot sikret, at det fastsatte maksimumsbelżb ikke var overskredet, og at der var vedlagt bilag (faktura og bevis for betalingen). 
It was merely ascertained that the maximum laid down was not exceeded and that appropriate supporting documentation (invoice and proof of payment) was present.
Det bulgarske Sapard-kontor rapporterede til overvgningsudvalget i 2003, at modtagerne i nogle tilfžlde havde forelagt falske fakturaer fra kontrahenter, navnlig for konsulenttjenester. 
Thus, the Bulgarian Sapard Agency reported to the Monitoring Committee in 2003 that: Ôthere were cases of beneficiaries presenting counterfeit invoices from contractors, especially for consultancy servicesŐ.
Det er Rettens opfattelse, at gržnsen p 12 % er alt for generżs, hvis modtageren ikke skal give yderligere oplysninger, og at der bżr fastsžttes et maksimumsbelżb for forretningsplanerne, og at modtagerne aktivt bżr opfordres til at benytte sig af de gratis eller billigere tjenester, som landbrugsrdgivningstjene-sterne tilbyder i deres eget land. Disse tjenester er udviklet med Phare-midler. 
The Court believes that the 12 % limit is far too generous without further explanation by the beneficiary of why a fixed maximum amount for a business plan should be set, and that beneficiaries should be actively encouraged to use free or cheaper services provided by the agricultural advisory services in their own countries, which had been developed using Phare funding.
Retten konstaterede problemer i flere af de undersżgte projekter. 
The Court identified problems in several of the projects reviewed.
I nogle tilfžlde havde modtagerne f.eks. indsendt en ansżgning vedrżrende et nyt projekt og medtaget udgifterne til en forretningsplan igen, selv om den nye plan var nžsten identisk med den fżrste. 
For instance, there were cases where beneficiaries applied for a second project, for which they again included the costs of a business plan, despite the fact that the second plan was almost identical to the first.