natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Diagram 9 Stikprżven af producentorganisationer: fremskridt med hensyn til opfyldelse af EU-mlene 
Diagram 9 Sample of producer organisations: progress towards EU objectives
20.11.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 282/47 Kommissionens data om producentorganisationerne 69. 
20.11.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 282/47 Commission data on producer organisations 69.
Som det fremgr af del I, har Kommissionen ikke benyttet sig af lejligheden og udnyttet de evalueringer, som producentorganisationerne har foretaget i deres endelige rapporter, til at kontrollere gennemfżrelsen af mlene for driftsprogrammerne. 
As shown in Part I, the Commission has not taken the opportunity of exploiting the evaluations made by producer organisations in their final reports to monitor achievement of the operational programme objectives.
Ydermere har Kommissionen endnu ikke opfyldt den forpligtelse til at evaluere politikken, som den har i henhold til EUŐs finansforordning. 
Furthermore, the Commission has not so far complied with its obligation under the EU Financial Regulation to evaluate the policy.
Der er planlagt en evalueringsundersżgelse, der skal begynde i 2008, og resultaterne forventes at foreligge i 2009. 
An evaluation study is scheduled to start in 2008, with the results expected in 2009.
Kommissionen har dog nogle oplysninger om producentorganisationerne. 
Nevertheless, the Commission does have some information on producer organisations.
Kommissionen fr data om mžngden af den overskudsproduktion, der tržkkes tilbage fra markedet, og som der anmodes om stżtte for. 
It obtains data on the quantities of surplus produce withdrawn from the market for which aid is claimed.
Siden 2000 har Kommissionen ogs kržvet oplysninger om driftsprogrammerne og kržvet flere oplysninger om producentorganisationerne i medlemsstaternes rlige statistiske rapporter. 
Since 2000, it has also required information on operational programmes and extended the information collected on producer organisations in an annual statistical report from the Member States.
Oplysningerne om driftsprogrammerne er begržnset til oversigter over den stżtte, der er udbetalt pr. udgiftskategori. 
The data on operational programmes is limited to breakdowns of the aid paid by categories of expenditure.
Det viser, hvad stżtten til driftsprogrammerne anvendes til, men ikke, hvad der opns med denne stżtte. 
This indicates what the operational programme aid is being spent on, but not what is being achieved with that aid.
Kommissionen kržver flere data om producentorganisationerne, navnlig om deres medlemmer, produktion og salg. 
The Commission requires a more extensive set of data on producer organisations, in particular on their membership, their production and their sales.
Rettens kontrol af disse oplysningers plidelighed blev vanskeliggjort af, at Kommissionen ikke har et egentligt forvaltningssystem til registrering af oplysningerne. 
The CourtŐs checks on the reliability of this information were made difficult, as the Commission does not have a proper management information system for recording the data.
Kommissionen sendte adskillige forespżrgsler til medlemsstaterne i 2004 og 2005 vedrżrende uoverensstemmelser i dataene, men fulgte ikke op p dem. 
The Commission addressed numerous queries to the Member States in 2004 and 2005 on inconsistencies in the data, but did not follow these up.
Der mangler vigtige data, navnlig for de tre stżrste frugt-og grżntsagsproducerende medlemsstater Italien, Spanien og Frankrig. 
Important data is lacking, particularly for the three largest fruit and vegetable producing Member States: Italy, Spain and France.
Det er vanskeligt at analysere oplysningerne, da de er ufuldstžndige, og da der er mange uoverensstemmelser, der gżr, at de ikke er plidelige nok til, at de kan bruges til andet end til at pege p overordnede tendenser. 
Analysis of the data is hampered by its incompleteness and the large number of inconsistencies, making it insufficiently reliable for indicating anything other than broad trends.
Den vigtigste indikator, der kan udledes af disse data, er producentorganisationernes andel af den samlede produktion i EU. 
The main indicator that can be derived from this data is the share of producer organisationsŐ output in the EU total.
Den viser, hvor meget af produktionen der er koncentreret i producentorganisationer, hvilket er det overordnede ml for politikken for frugt-og grżntsagssektoren. 
This shows how much production is concentrated in producer organisations, which is the overall aim of the policy for the fruit and vegetable sector.
Den giver ogs et fingerpeg om, hvorvidt ordningen mere generelt er vellykket, idet den viser, hvor stor en procentdel af frugt-og grżntsagsproducenterne der vžlger at deltage i EU-stżtteordningen. 
It also indicates the broader success of the policy by showing what proportion of fruit and vegetable growers choose to participate in the EU aid scheme.
I budgetdokumenterne for 2005 satte Kommissionen fżlgende ml for denne indikator: en rlig stigning med henblik p at n 60 % i 2013. 
In the 2005 budget documents the Commission set a target of 60 % for this indicator by 2013, with an annual increase.
Som fżlge heraf har Kommissionen, selv om den ligger inde med data om tilbagekżb og koncentration af udbuddet, ingen indikatorer, der viser de fremskridt, producentorganisationerne har gjort for at n de andre politikml, som f.eks. prisre-duktion og kvalitets-og miljżforbedring. 
Consequently, while it has data on withdrawals and the concentration of supply, the Commission has no indicators to show the progress made by producer organisations towards achieving the other policy objectives such as reducing costs, stabilising prices, improving quality and the environment.
Analyse af data om tilbagekżb og koncentration af udbuddet 75. 
Analysis of data on withdrawals of surplus produce 75.
Med reformen af den fžlles markedsordning for frugt og grżntsager i 1996 blev der skret ned p den overskudsproduktion, som kunne tržkkes tilbage under tilbagekżbsstżtteordnin-gen, og p den godtgżrelse, som producenterne kunne f udbetalt i forbindelse hermed. 
The reform of the fruit and vegetable policy in 1996 limited the quantities of surplus produce that could be disposed of under the withdrawals aid scheme, and cut the compensation paid to growers for those withdrawals.
Det fremgr af Kommissionens data, at det har medfżrt en vžsentlig reduktion i de tilbagekżbte mžngder inden for EU-stżtteordningen (jf. diagram 10). 
The Commission data shows that this has resulted in a substantial reduction in the quantities of withdrawals within the EU aid scheme (Diagram 10).
Det er i overensstemmelse med resultatet af Rettens stikprżve, der viste, at 90 % af producentorganisationerne havde reduceret de tilbagekżbte mžngder, eller fortsat ikke havde foretaget tilbagekżb. 
This is in line with the result of the CourtŐs sample that 90 % of producer organisations had reduced withdrawals, or maintained them at zero.
Diagram 10 Tilbagekżb af frugt og grżntsager, som der var blevet udbetalt stżtte for 1994-2004 (EU-15 76. 
Diagram 10 Withdrawals of fruit and vegetables for which aid was paid 1994-2004 (EU 15) 76.
Et af mlene for ordningen med stżtte til driftsprogrammer var at stżtte de foranstaltninger, som producentorganisationerne traf for at reducere tilbagekżbene. 
One of the objectives set for the operational programme aid scheme was to support measures taken by producer organisations to reduce withdrawals.
Denne reduktion af tilbagekżb beviser imidlertid ikke nżdvendigvis, at stżtten til driftsprogrammer har medfżrt, at producentorganisationerne har planlagt og tilpasset deres produktion til efterspżrgslen: Producentorganisationerne forklarede, at de reducerede stżttesatser for tilbagekżb, som gradvist blev indfżrt i 1996, sammen med stigende kontrol ikke lžngere gżr det vžrd at anmode om stżtte for overskydende produktion. 
However, this reduction in withdrawals does not necessarily prove that the operational programme aid has resulted in producer organisations planning and adjusting their production to the demand: producer organisations explained that the reduced aid rates for withdrawals phased in since 1996, together with increased controls, make it no longer worthwhile to claim the aid on their surplus production.
Analyse af data om koncentration af udbuddet 77. 
Analysis of data on the concentration of supply 77.
Formlet med den ordning, der blev indfżrt i 1996, var at yde stżtte til producentorganisationerne, s de kunne tilpasse sig den nye situation og klare sig godt p markedet, samt at give andre producenter et incitament til at blive medlem af en producentorganisation. 
The policy introduced in 1996 should result in a situation where the aid helps producer organisations to adapt and succeed and other growers are encouraged to join.
Begge disse faktorer skulle f producentorganisationernes omsžtning til at stige og Čkoncentrere udbuddetÇ hos dem. 
Both of these factors should increase the turnover of producer organisations, Ôconcentrating supplyŐ in their hands.
C 282/48 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 20.11.2006 Diagram 11 Producentorganisationernes andel af vžrdien af den samlede afsatte produktion (EU-15) 78. 
C 282/48 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.11.2006 Diagram 11 Share of producer organisations in total value of marketed production (EU 15) 78.
Det fremgr imidlertid af Kommissionens data, at indikatoren koncentration af produktionen er faldet: Producentorganisationernes andel af den samlede produktion faldt fra 40 % i 1999 til 31 % i 2003 (diagram 11). 
However, the CommissionŐs data shows that the concentration of supply indicator has decreased: producer organisationsŐ share of the total output fell from 40 % in 1999 to 31 % in 2003 (Diagram 11).
(Tallet for 2004 er forelżbigt, da to af de stżrste medlemsstater, Frankrig og Italien, ikke har afleveret fuldstžndige data). 
(The figure shown for 2004 is provisional, as two of the largest Member States, France and Italy, have not reported complete data).
Mens vžrdien af den afsatte produktion i den samlede frugt-og grżntsagssektor steg med 45 % fra 1999 til 2003, steg vžrdien af producentorganisationernes produktion kun med 12 %. 
While the value of marketed production of the total fruit and vegetable sector increased by 45 % from 1999 to 2003, that of producer organisations increased by only 12 %.
Som beskrevet i punkt 72 kan man ikke stole alt for meget p disse data; de kan kun bruges til at angive en overordnet tendens. 
As described in paragraph 72, it is not possible to place too much reliance on this data, other than to indicate the broad trend.
I 2003 rapporterede Kommissionen f.eks. en forkert procentsats p grund af en fejl, som skyldtes manglende data for Gržkenland. 
The 2003 percentage was incorrectly reported by the Commission, for example, because of an error concerning missing data for Greece.
Retten kunne let finde og korrigere denne fejl, men Kommissionen kunne ikke bevise over for Retten, at de andre data var tilstržkkeligt plidelige. 
While the Court was able to easily find and correct this, the Commission could not demonstrate to the Court that the other data is sufficiently reliable.
Dataene viser ogs de fortsatte geografiske skžvheder med hensyn til i deltagelsen i stżtteordningen (diagram 12). 
The data also shows the continuing geographical disparity in participation in the aid scheme (Diagram 12).
Portugal og Gržkenland, der er de medlemsstater, hvor frugt og grżntsager udgżr den stżrste del af landbrugsproduktionen, har den laveste deltagelse i stżtteordningen, og deltagelsen er ikke steget nžvnevžrdigt. 
Portugal and Greece, the Member States in which fruit and vegetables represents the largest share of agricultural output, have the lowest participation rates, and have not shown any significant increase.
P grund af den lave deltagelse i producentorganisationer modtager kun 6 % af Portugals frugt-og grżntsagssektor og 13% i Gržkenland stżtte til driftsprogrammer sammenlignet med 80 % i Nederlandene. 
Because of this low participation in producer organisations, only 6 % of PortugalŐs fruit and vegetable sector receives aid for operational programmes, and 13 % in Greece compared to 80 % in the Netherlands.
Stżtteordningen er udformet sdan, at den belżnner succes, i og med at stżtten udbetales som en procentsats af producentorganisationernes omsžtning. Meningen var, at mindre producenter med produktion af lavere vžrdi og med stżrst behov for tilpasning til de stigende kvalitetskrav og miljżstandarder skulle tilskyndes til at tilslutte sig en producentorganisation. 
The design of the aid scheme, which rewards success by paying aid as a percentage of producer organisationsŐ turnover, should create an incentive for smaller producers with lower value production, and with the most need for adapting to the marketŐs increasing quality and environmental standards and concentrated demand, to join producer organisations.
Det fremgr af dataene, at det i nogle medlemsstater ikke er sket. 
The data shows that in some Member States, this has not happened.
Ordningen har i stedet resulteret i, at stżtten er blevet dirigeret til store producentorganisationer med produktion af hżj vžrdi. 
Instead the scheme has had the result of directing the aid to large producer organisations with high value production.
Kommissionen mangler oplysninger om forskellene mellem producentorganisationernes og andre avleres resultater og kan sledes ikke forklare, hvorfor det lader til, at sektoren uden for producentorganisationerne har en hżjere vžkstrate end producentorganisationerne. 
The Commission lacks information on the differences in performance of producer organisations and other growers and so cannot explain why the sector outside producer organisations appears to be growing at a faster rate than producer organisations.
For at forklare de manglende fremskridt med hensyn til koncentration af udbuddet er det ogs nżdvendigt at finde ud af, hvorfor producenterne ikke tilslutter sig en producentorganisation. 
To explain the lack of progress in the concentration of supply, it is also necessary to find out why growers do not join producer organisations.
Kommissionen har ikke foretaget nogen systematisk rundspżrge blandt producenterne for at finde frem til de virkelige begrundelser herfor. 
The Commission has not questioned producers in any systematic way to find the real reasons for this.
I svaret til Rettens rsberetning for 2000 udtalte Kommissionen, at: Čsfremt flertallet af producenterne ... foretržkker at undlade at tilslutte sig en effektiv producentorganisation, m de ogs bžre konsekvenserne af deres afgżrelse. 
In its reply to the CourtŐs Annual Report 2000, the Commission stated Ôif the majority of producers ... prefer not to join an effective producer organisation, they must also take the consequences of their decision.
Kommissionen har imidlertid ikke overvget producentorganisationernes medlemmers indtžgter for at kunne foretage denne sammenligning. 
However, the Commission has not monitored the revenues of producer organisation members to be able to make this comparison.
20.11.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 282/49 Diagram 12 Producentorganisationernes andel af den samlede vžrdi af den afsatte produktion 2000-2004 Udvikling af landdistrikter 84. 
20.11.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 282/49 Diagram 12 Producer organisationsŐ share of the total value of marketed production 2000-2004 Rural development 84.
En sžrlig risiko, som Kommissionen identificerede tidligt i forlżbet, er, at de midler, der er til rdighed til udvikling af landdistrikter, kan have gjort producenternes motivation til at tilslutte sig eller danne producentorganisationer mindre, da der over denne ordning kan ydes stżtte svarende til stżtten til driftsprogrammer, uden at der stilles krav til producenterne om, at de skal vžre medlem af en producentorganisation (jf. tekstboks 18). 
One particular risk, identified by the Commission at an early stage, is that the availability of rural development funding may have undermined the incentive to join or form producer organisations by offering aid similar to operational programmes without requiring the growers to be members of producer organisations (see Text box 18).
Forordningen om udvikling af landdistrikterne tog fat p dette problem (ved at fastsžtte, at frugt-og grżntsagsproducenter ikke er berettigede til at modtage stżtte til udvikling af landdistrikter, hvis der kan ydes lignende stżtte over driftsprogrammerne), men gav mulighed for undtagelser fra denne regel. 
Although the rural development regulation addressed this issue (by providing that fruit and vegetable producers are not eligible for rural development aid to the extent that similar aid is available under operational programmes), exceptions were allowed.
Der kan ydes stżtte til udvikling af landdistrikter til en ržkke tilsvarende aktiviteter, fra kunstvandingsprojekter til pak-kemaskiner, og stżtten kan ydes til bde producentorganisationer og producenter. 
As a result of these exceptions, Rural Development funding is available for a similar range of activities, from irrigation projects to packaging machinery, for producer organisations and other growers alike.
En vžsentlig del af projekterne vedrżrende udvikling af landdistrikter under foranstaltningerne Činvesteringer i landbrugsbedrifterÇ og Čforbedringen og afsžtningen af landbrugsprodukterÇ vedrżrer frugt og grżntsager. 
A significant proportion of Rural Development projects under the measures Ôinvestments in agricultural holdingsŐ and Ôimproving the processing and marketing of agricultural productsŐ concern fruit and vegetables.
Trods den potentielt store risiko, der er for, at programmerne for udvikling af landdistrikter underminerer producentorganisationerne, der er hjżrnestenen i EUŐs politik for frugt-og grżntsagsproducenter, har Kommissionen ikke kontrolleret, hvordan medlemsstaternes procedurer til sikring af overensstemmelse fungerer, eller indhentet oplysninger herom eller foretaget nogen vurdering af, i hvilket omfang det kan vžre sket. 
Despite the potential importance of the risk of the Rural Development programmes undermining producer organisations, which are the cornerstone of the EUŐs policy for fruit and vegetable producers, the Commission has not checked the operation of Member StatesŐ procedures for ensuring consistency, or collected information or undertaken any assessment of the extent to which this may have occurred.
KONKLUSIONER Driftsprogrammernes effektivitet Er stżtteordningen blevet gennemfżrt p en sdan mde, at det sikres, at driftsprogrammerne sandsynligvis vil vžre effektive? 
CONCLUSIONS The effectiveness of operational programmes Has the aid scheme been implemented in a way to ensure that operational programmes are likely to be effective?
Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne har fokuseret p, om aktionerne i driftsprogrammet var stżtteberettigede i henhold til deres art, men har ikke samtidig set p, om de bidrog til, at producentorganisationen kunne opfylde mlene for driftsprogrammet. 
Member States have focused on the eligibility of operational programme actions by the nature of the expenditure, without also considering whether they represent a step forward for the producer organisation towards achieving the operational programme objectives.
Medlemsstaterne anvendte ikke princippet om effektivitet, som er en Tekstboks 18 Centrale elementer i de to stżtteordninger Kan stżtten kun ydes til producent-organisationer? 
As a result, Member StatesŐ procedures do not Text box 18 Key features of the two aid schemes Aid only available to producer organisations? Multiannual programme?
Omfatter mlene planlžgning og tilpasning af produktionen til efterspżrgslen, reduktion af omkostninger, kvalitets-og miljżforbedring? 
Objectives include planning and adapting production to demand, reducing costs, improving quality and environment?
Gennemfżres og medfinansieres de foreslede foranstaltninger af modta-geren? 
Measures proposed, implemented and co-funded by beneficiary?
Godkendes og kontrolleres foranstaltningerne af medlemsstaten? 
Measures approved and checked by Member State?
Evaluering ved programmets afslut-ning? 
Evaluation at end of programme?
Udvikling af landdistrikter Driftspro-grammer Nej Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja 
Rural Operational development programmes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
C 282/50 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 20.11.2006 del af princippet om forsvarlig żkonomisk forvaltning, da de godkendte driftsprogrammerne. 
C 282/50 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.11.2006 ensure that all operational programme actions are likely to be effective.
Kommissionen har koncentreret sin kontrol om udgifternes overensstemmelse med stżtteberettigelseskriterierne og har ikke undersżgt, om medlemsstaternes procedurer for godkendelse og overvgning af driftsprogrammerne fungerer p en sdan mde, at programmerne sandsynligvis vil vžre effektive. 
Commission checks have focused on compliance with the criteria for the eligibility of expenditure and not on whether the Member State procedures for approving and monitoring operational programmes operate in a way to ensure that the programmes are likely to be effective.
Stżtteordningen har vžret dyr at gennemfżre for medlemsstaternes administrationer og for producentorganisationerne. 
The aid scheme has been costly to implement for the Member State administrations and for producer organisations.
Medlemsstaterne har formelt fulgt de krav til programmerne, der var fastsat i forordningerne, med vžsentlige omkostninger til fżlge, men uden virkelige fordele. 
The programming elements required by the regulations have been followed nominally, at a significant cost but without real benefits.
Kriterierne for udgifternes stżtteberettigelse var ikke klare, og det medfżrte usikkerhed og żget behov for kontrol for at sikre overensstemmelse. 
The criteria for the eligibility of expenditure were not clear, resulting in uncertainty and an increased need for controls to ensure compliance.
Nžsten halvdelen af de aktioner, der finansieres i driftsprogrammerne, havde medfżrt vžsentlige fremskridt i forhold til producentorganisationernes udgangssituation med hensyn til opfyldelsen af mindst t af de 11 ml og kan derfor anses for at have vžret effektive. 
Almost half of the actions financed in operational programmes resulted in a significant advance from the producer organisationsŐ initial situation towards at least one of the 11 objectives, and can therefore be considered effective.
Medlemsstaterne har ogs ydet stżtte til aktioner med lav effektivitet, der kun medfżrte sm žndringer. 
Member States have also granted the aid for operational programme actions with low effectiveness that achieve little change.
I disse tilfžlde kunne stżtten blive mere effektiv, hvis den blev mere mlrettet. 
In these cases, the aid could be more effective if better targeted.
Producentorganisationernes fremskridt Har producentorganisationerne gjort fremskridt med hensyn til at opfylde de ml, der er fastsat for stżtteordningen? 
Progress made by producer organisations Have producer organisations made progress towards achieving the objectives set for the aid scheme?
Producentorganisationerne har tilpasset sig žndringerne i efterspżrgslen og har nžrmet sig de ml, der er fastsat i Rdets forordning. 
Producer organisations have adapted to the changing demand and made progress towards the objectives set in the Council regulation.
Driftsprogrammerne har bidraget hertil, men de er ikke den eneste faktor. 
Operational programmes have contributed to this, but are not the only factor.
Producentorganisationer og andre frugt-og grżntsagsproducenter kan ogs modtage stżtte til udvikling af landdistrikter til at gennemfżre lignende aktiviteter med tilsvarende ml som for driftsprogrammerne. 
Rural development funding is also available to producer organisations, and to other fruit and vegetable growers, to support similar activities, with similar objectives to operational programmes.