natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
14/2001 Opfżlgning af Rettens sžrberetning nr. 19/98 om BSE, med Kommissionens svar 4, andet afsnit, EF) (2001/C 324/01) INDHOLD RESUM ................................................................... 20. 2 
20.11.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 14/2001 Follow up to Special Report No 19/98 on BSE, together with the CommissionŐs replies C 324/1 (pursuant to Article 248(4)(2) EC) (2001/C 324/01) CONTENTS SUMMARY .................................................................
SŽRBERETNINGENSVŽSENTLIGSTEKONKLUSIONER ............................. 
SCOPEOFTHEFOLLOWUPREPORT............................................
BSEŃRSAGEROGKONSEKVENSER .......................................... 
IncidenceofBSE ..........................................................
DecentraleelementeriKommissionensBSE-strategi .............................. 
Epidemio-surveillance ......................................................
Udsmeltningsmetoderogreglerfordyrefoder .................................... Forbudmodanvendelseafkżd-ogbenmelfrapattedyrifoder ...................... 
Renderingmethodsandregulationofanimalfeed ................................ Mammalianmeatandbonemeal(MBM)feedban ................................. Animalmovementandidentification ..........................................
Transportogidentifikationafdyr ............................................. 
CONCLUSIONS..............................................................
Tilsynoghndhžvelse...................................................... 
RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................
Vurdering af medlemsstaternes gennemfżrelse af BSE-strategien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TheCommissionŐsreplies ....................................................
Punkt I-VII 1-2 3-4 5 6-10 9-10 11-46 11-16 17-18 19-23 24-27 28 29-35 36-39 40-46 40-42 43 44-46 47-54 55 ........... ........... 
Paragraph I-VII 1-2 3-4 5 6-10 9-10 11-46 11-16 17-18 19-23 24-27 28 29-35 36-39 40-46 40-42 43 44-46 47-54 55 ........... ........... ........... ...........
C 324/2 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende RESUM I. Retten konkluderede i sžrberetning nr. 19/98, at de finansieringsforanstaltninger, som blev vedtaget p grund af BSE, ikke blev hndhžvet og heller ikke gennemfżrt konsekvent nok i medlemsstaterne, og at der ikke blev fżrt tilstržkkelig kontrol med, at forbuddet mod at fodre drżvtyggere med kżd-og benmel fra pattedyr blev overholdt (jf. punkt 2). 
C 324/2 EN Official Journal of the European Communities SUMMARY I. The CourtŐs Special Report No 19/98 concluded that financing measures taken as a result of BSE were not implemented rigorously or consistently within the Member States, and that the ban on feeding ruminants with mammalian meat and bonemeal (MMBM) was not adequately monitored (see paragraph 2).
Retten ppegede ogs at EU burde udforme en BSE-strategi, og at det var vigtigt, at der blev oprettet džkkende og plidelige dyreregistre. 
The report also identified the need for the EU to develop a BSE strategy, as well as the importance of establishing comprehensive and reliable animal registers.
EUŐs udgifter til BSE-foranstaltninger gennemfżrt efter BSE-krisen i 1996 var hżje (4,7 milliarder euro) (jf. punkt 1). 
The costs borne by the EU for the BSE measures implemented after the 1996 BSE crisis were high (4,7 billion euro) (see paragraph 1).
Den stżrste modtager var Det Forenede Kongerige, hvor 99 % af BSE-tilfžldene blev konstateret (jf. punkt 9). 
The United Kingdom where 99 % of the BSE cases had occurred (see paragraph 9), has been the largest recipient.
Rettens opfżlgning var en undersżgelse af de BSE-foranstaltninger, som EU traf med henblik p at styre risikoen for dyre-og folkesundheden (jf. punkt 5). 
The CourtŐs follow up assessed the action the EU took to manage the risk of BSE to animal and human health (see paragraph 5).
Retten konstaterede under opfżlgningen, at Kommissionens BSE-strategi er rigtig og baseret p de foreliggende forskningsresultater, men at den ikke har fungeret s effektivt, som den burde, fordi medlemsstaterne ikke har gennemfżrt foranstaltningerne godt nok, og fordi Kommissionen ikke har muligheder for at tržffe effektive korrigerende foranstaltninger over for medlemsstaterne (jf. punkt 44-46). 
The Court found that the CommissionŐs BSE strategy is generally sound and based on available scientific knowledge, but its effectiveness has been hampered by inadequate implementation by the Member States and by lack of effective measures available to the Commission to enforce corrective action on Member States (see paragraphs 44 to 46).
Forbrugere og dyr blev udsat for risiko i forskellig grad i medlemsstaterne, dels fordi BSE-kontrolforanstaltningerne ikke var blevet gennemfżrt effektivt nok, dels fordi der ikke findes en fžlles EU-definition af specificeret risikomateriale (SRM) (jf. punkt 25-27). 
Through a combination of poor implementation of BSE control measures and a lack of EUĐwide definition of specified risk materials (SRMs) (see paragraphs 25 to 27), consumers and animals were exposed to different levels of risk in the Member States.
Kommissionens tjenester er blevet omorganiseret, s ansvaret for forbrugersundhed og -beskyttelse er blevet klart adskilt fra forvaltningen af markedet for oksekżd (jf. punkt 12.a). 
The Commission services have been reorganised so that consumer health and protection is clearly separated from the beef market management (see paragraph 12(a).
Kommissionens Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontor er blevet styrket (jf. punkt 40), men en hżj personaleomsžtning har skabt problemer (jf. punkt 41), og antallet af BSE-relaterede inspektioner kunne med fordel żges (jf. punkt 42). 
The CommissionŐs Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) was reinforced (see paragraph 40), but high staff turnover has caused some problems (see paragraph 41), and the number of BSEĐrelated inspections could be increased (see paragraph 42).
De rdgivende videnskabelige komiter er ogs blevet omorganiseret (jf. punkt 12.b), og der er afsat yderligere midler til BSE-forskning (jf. punkt 12.c). 
The scientific advisory committees have also been reorganised (see paragraph 12(b)) and increased funding has been provided for research into BSE (see paragraph 12(c)).
V. De vžsentligste retsakter om forebygning af BSE var blevet vedtaget, inden den fżrste BSE-krise begyndte i 1996, men det viste sig at vžre vanskeligt at f medlemsstaterne til at acceptere en ržkke af de foranstaltninger, som Kommissionen senere foreslog, isžr fjernelse af SRM (jf. punkt 24-27), og de institutionelle procedurer for vedtagelse af retsakter har ogs skabt forsinkelser (jf. punkt 17-18). 
V. Whilst the major BSE prevention legislation was passed before the 1996 BSE crisis, the acceptance by Member States of certain measures proposed subsequently by the Commission, especially the removal of SRMs was difficult (see paragraphs 24 to 27), and delays have also been caused by the institutional procedures for adoption of legislation (see paragraphs 17 and 18).
Det hidtil konstaterede antal tilfžlde af BSE er sandsynligvis for lavt. 
The number of BSE cases is likely to have been under-reported in the past.
P det seneste har man konstateret flere BSE-tilfžlde takket vžre den obligatoriske epidemiologiske overvgning, som blev indfżrt i 1998 (jf. punkt 20), og anvendelsen af diagnostiske BSE-hurtigtest (jf. punkt 19). 
More BSE cases have been reported recently due to better surveillance, with the introduction of compulsory epidemiological surveillance in 1998 (see paragraph 20) and the use of rapid diagnostic BSE tests (see paragraph 19).
Der er konstateret BSE i dyr fżdt efter 1994-forbuddet mod anvendelse af kżd-og benmel fra pattedyr, hvilket beviser, at forbuddet ikke er blevet gennemfżrt og kontrolleret godt nok, og ifżlge inspektionsrapporter fra Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret er kontrollen vedrżrende handel med kżd-og benmel mangelfuld. 
Animals with BSE born after the 1994 mammalian MBM feed ban provide evidence that the ban has not been properly implemented and controlled, and there is evidence from FVO inspections of lack of controls on trade in MBM.
Selv om problemerne i forbindelse med opsżgning af sikre rmaterialer, forarbejdning, anvendelse og krydskontaminering af kżd-og benmel har vžret kendt siden 1996, og selv om to medlemsstater (Portugal og Det Forenede Kongerige) har indfżrt nationale forbud mod anvendelse af kżd-og benmel fra pattedyr i husdyrfoder, forbżd Kommissionen fżrst fra 1. januar 2001 anvendelsen af animalske proteiner i foder til alle husdyr i hele EU, fordi der ikke fandtes en test, som gjorde det muligt at skelne mellem proteiner fra forskellige dyr (jf. punkt 31). 
Although the problems of safe sourcing, processing, use and cross contamination of MBM have been known since 1996, and two Member States (Portugal and the United Kingdom) had their own national bans on using mammalian MBM for farmed animals, the Commission, in the absence of a test capable of differentiating between protein of different species, banned the use of animal proteins in feed for all farmed animals in the whole of the EU only from 1 January 2001 (see paragraph 31).
20.11.2001 b) EUŐs stżtte til ekstensivt opdržt og ekstensiv fodring. 20.11.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 324/3 c) d) Behovet for at omlžgge stżtten i oksekżdssektoren, s produktionsstżtten afskaffes, samtidig med at landbrugerne sikres en rimelig levestandard (jf. punkt 16). 
20.11.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 324/3 (c) reorienting subsidy payments in the beef and veal sector away from production, while at the same time respecting the need to provide a reasonable standard of living for farmers (see paragraph 16); (d) animal welfare issues, especially as regards the transport of live animals across the EU, with the resultant risk of spreading disease.
I beretningen rejser Retten desuden spżrgsmlet om, hvorvidt Kommissionen bżr tildeles sžrlige befżjelser til at tržffe foranstaltninger over for medlemsstater, som ikke overholder den gžldende lovgivning mht. levestandard (jf. punkt 51). Og Retten rejser spżrgsmlet om, hvorvidt Kommissionen skal have yderligere, specifikke befżjelser, nr medlemsstaterne ikke accepterer forslag, der vedrżrer beskyttelse af folke-og dyresundhed (jf. punkt 50). 
The follow up report also draws attention to whether the Commission should have additional powers to enforce action against Member States which do not comply with the relevant legislation (see paragraph 51), and whether it requires specific additional powers where Member States do not accept proposals related to animal or human health and protection (see paragraph 50).
SŽRBERETNINGENS VŽSENTLIGSTE KONKLUSIONER 1. 
MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURTŐS SPECIAL REPORT 1.
I 1998 offentliggjorde Revisionsretten sžrberetning nr. 19/98 om BSE (bovin spongiform encephalopati) (1), som hovedsagelig omhandlede EUŐs indkomststżtteforanstaltninger og sžrlige foranstaltninger i Det Forenede Kongerige til udryddelse af dyr, der havde risiko for at f BSE. 
In 1998, the Court of Auditors produced Special Report No 19/98 on BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) (1) relating mainly to EU income support measures, and specific United Kingdom measures for eradicating animals at risk of BSE.
EU-budgettets udgifter til disse markedsforanstaltninger, herunder offentlig intervention og privat oplagring, andrager 4 696 millioner euro for perioden 1996-2000 (jf. figur 1), heraf 1 189 millioner euro for perioden 1998-2000. 
The total cost borne by the EU budget for these market measures, including public intervention and private storage, amounts to 4 696 million euro for the period 1996 to 2000 (see Figure 1), of which 1 189 million euro relates to 1998 to 2000.
Disse belżb omfatter ikke udgifter, som blev afholdt af medlemsstaterne selv, og heller ikke indtžgtstab som fżlge af fald i forbruget eller tabte markeder. 
These amounts do not include the costs borne by the Member States themselves, nor the loss in earnings due to the drop in consumption or lost markets.
Den stżrste stżttemodtager var Det Forenede Kongerige, som tegnede sig for 43,7 % af udgifterne (jf. figur 2). 
The United Kingdom was the largest recipient, with 43,7 % of expenditure (see Figure 2).
Sžrberetningens vžsentligste konklusioner var fżlgende: a) Der var et ptržngende behov for, at EU udformede og vedtog en strategi, der skulle fżlges under denne form for krise (2) (jf. punkt 11). b) Foranstaltningerne inden for og mellem medlemsstaterne blev ikke hndhžvet strengt nok og heller ikke gennemfżrt konsekvent nok (3). c) Der blev ikke fżrt tilstržkkelig kontrol med, at forbuddet mod anvendelse af kżd-og benmel fra drżvtyggere i foder til drżvtyggere blev overholdt (4) (jf. punkt 29-33). d) Retten understregede behovet for at f oprettet džkkende og plidelige kreaturregistre i medlemsstaterne (5) (jf. punkt 36-39). (1) Sžrberetning nr. 
The main conclusions of the CourtŐs report concerned: (a) an urgent need for the EU to design and adopt a strategy to deal with this type of crisis (2) (see paragraph 11); (b) lack of rigour and consistency in the implementation of the measures within and between Member States (3); (c) failure to adequately monitor the feed ban(4) (see paragraphs 29 to 33); (d) the importance of establishing comprehensive and reliable animal registers in the Member States (5) (see paragraphs 36 to 39).
19/98 om Fžllesskabets finansiering af visse foranstaltninger truffet som fżlge af BSE-krisen (EFT C 383 af 9.12.1998). 
(1) Special Report No 19/98 concerning Community financing of certain measures taken as a result of the BSE crisis (OJ C 383, 9.12.1998).
(2) Sžrberetning nr. 19/98, punkt 96. 
(2) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 96.
(3) Sžrberetning nr. 19/98, punkt 93. 
(3) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 93.
(4) Sžrberetning nr. 19/98, punkt 92. 
(4) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 92.
(5) Sžrberetning nr. 
(5) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 91.
EUR Offentlig intervention 1 386,7 mio. EUR 29,5 % Forarbejdningspržmie for kalve 326,6 mio. EUR (F, IRL, P, UK) 7% Pržmie for tidlig markedsfżring af kalve 4,4 % Privat oplagring 0,4 % 27,9 % Selektiv slagtning (D, F, IRL, P, UK) 2,5 % Kilde: Revisionsrettens gennemgang af oplysninger fra Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug. 
C 324/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities Figure 1 BSE related expenditure from the EAGGF, 1996 to 2000 (Total amount 4 696 Mio EUR) 20.11.2001 Calf early marketing premium scheme 4,4% Private storage 0,4% Selective calf culling (B, F, NL) 1,1% Direct income support payments 1 309,9 Mio EUR 27,9% Public intervention 1 386,7 Mio EUR 29,5% Calf processing scheme 326,6 Mio EUR (F, IRL, P, UK) 7% Source: Court of Auditors review of information provided by DG AGRI.
EL, L, P, FIN, S 1,9 % 
EL, L, P, FIN, SV 1,9%
20.11.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 324/5 DECHARGEMYNDIGHEDENS ANBEFALINGER 3. 
20.11.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 324/5 DISCHARGE AUTHORITYŐS RECOMMENDATIONS 3.
I forbindelse med dechargeproceduren for 1997 anbefalede Rdet (1), at Kommissionen udformede en BSE-strategi. 
In the 1997 discharge procedure, the Council recommended (1) that the Commission should formulate a BSE strategy.
Parlamentet bemžrkede (2), at Kommissionen havde fulgt de fleste af dets anbefalinger (3), men anmodede Kommissionen om at tilbagesżge samtlige belżb, som var udbetalt i strid med de gžldende forordninger, og om at fortsžtte arbejdet med at udforme et omfattende system til identifikation og registrering af kvžg. 
Parliament noted (2) that the Commission had complied with most of its recommendations (3), but requested the Commission to recover in full the amounts paid out in contravention of the regulations in force and to continue its work on setting up a comprehensive system for the identification and registration of bovine animals.
I 1996 indfżrte Det Forenede Kongerige ordningen for kvžg p over 30 mneder for at fjerne dyr p over 30 mneder fra fżde-og foderkžden. 
In the United Kingdom, Ôthe over thirty months schemeŐ (OTMS) was introduced in 1996 to eliminate cattle over 30 months from the human food and animal feed chains.
I nogle tilfžlde blev destruktionen af disse dyr ikke kontrolleret og dokumenteret korrekt, og som fżlge heraf udelukkede Kommissionen i maj 1999 (4) udgifter p i alt 32,7 millioner euro fra EF-finansiering indtil august 1997 (grundlaget for denne beregning var ikke-anerkendelse af 10 % af de dyr, som var anmeldt indtil den 4. juli 1996, og ikke-anerkendelse af 5 % af de dyr, som var anmeldt i perioden 4. juli 1996 Đ 4. august 1996), og det forventes, at der vil blive foretaget en yderligere korrektion p ca. 8 millioner euro (beregnet p grundlag af ikke-anerkendelse af 5 % af dyrene) i den endelige betaling. 
Due to failures to control and account for the destruction of these animals properly, in May 1999 (4) the Commission excluded 32,7 million euro from Community financing for expenditure up to August 1997 (calculated on the basis of a 10 % disallowance for animals claimed up to 4 July 1996, and a 5 % disallowance for animals claimed between 4 July 1996 and 4 August 1996), and a further correction of about 8 million euro (calculated on the basis of a 5 % disallowance) is foreseen for the final payment.
For ca. halvdelen af de andre medlemsstaters vedkommende, som har konstateret tilfžlde af BSE, er der foreslet mindre finansielle korrektioner p grund af svagheder i gennemfżrelsen af indkomststżtteforanstaltninger, der er blevet indfżrt som fżlge af BSE-krisen. 
For about half of the other BSE-reporting Member States, smaller financial corrections have been proposed for weaknesses in implementation of income support schemes introduced as a result of the BSE crisis.
OMFANGET AF OPFŻLGNINGEN 5. 
SCOPE OF THE FOLLOW UP REPORT 5.
I 2001 undersżgte Retten de BSE-foranstaltninger, som EU traf og gennemfżrte med det forml at identificere og styre risikoen for, at BSE forekommer, spredes og udgżr en fare for folke-og dyresundheden. 
In 2001, the Court carried out a review of the BSE measures introduced and implemented by the EU in order to identify and manage the risk of BSE occurring, being propagated and posing a risk to human and animal health.
De involverede tjenester i Kommissionen var fżrst og fremmest Generaldirektoratet for Sundhed og Forbrugerbeskyttelse og Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug. 
The main Commission services concerned were DG Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO), and DG Agriculture (DG AGRI).
Der blev ikke aflagt revisionsbesżg i nogen af medlemsstaterne. 
None of the Member States have been visited.
BSE Ń RSAGER OG KONSEKVENSER 6. 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF BSE 6.
BSE (5) er n af flere overfżrbare spongiforme encephalopatier og er en hjernesygdom, som er kendetegnet ved forekomsten af en abnorm art protein, kaldet et prion. 
BSE(5) is one of a number of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), and is a disease of the brain characterised by the presence of an abnormal form of a protein called a prion.
I 1986 blev BSE for fżrste gang konstateret i kvžg i Det Forenede Kongerige. Oprindelsen til sygdommen kendes ikke, men den er ikke smitsom. De foreliggende resultater af videnskabelig forskning tyder p, at sygdommen kan opst, nr kvžg žder foder med kżd-og benmel, som indeholder det infektiżse agens, og at der i sjžldne tilfžlde forekommer maternel overfżrsel (under 10 %). 
BSE was first identified in cattle in the United Kingdom in 1986, and whilst its origins are not known, it is not contagious and scientific evidence to date suggests that it is probably acquired by eating feed containing meat and bonemeal (MBM) contaminated by the infectious agent as well as a low level of maternal transmission (less than 10 %).
I 1996 meddelte Det Forenede Kongeriges regering, at der kunne vžre en forbindelse mellem BSE og en ny variant af Creutzfeldt-Jacobs sygdom (NvCJD), som er en dżdelig, degene-rativ hjernesygdom hos mennesker, svarende til BSE hos kvžg og scrapie hos fr. 
In 1996, the United Kingdom Government announced that there was a possible link between BSE and a new variant of Creutzfeld-JacobŐs disease (NvCJD), a fatal degenerative disease of the brain in humans, similar to BSE in cattle and scrapie in sheep.
S vidt det vides p nuvžrende tidspunkt (6), er den mest sandsynlige rsag til sygdommen, at mennesker udsžttes for BSE ved at spise kżd fra inficeret kvžg, men der kan vžre andre, stadig ukendte smitteveje. 
According to current knowledge (6), the most probable cause is exposure to BSE by eating flesh of infected cattle, although there may be other transmission routes as yet unknown.
Pr. april 2001 var der konstateret 99 bekržftede eller formodede tilfžlde af NvCJD i EU (7), hovedsagelig hos unge mennesker. 
As at April 2001, there were 99 confirmed or suspected NvCJD cases in the EU (7), mostly in young people.
Figur 3 viser, at dyr slagtet til menneskefżde anvendes p mange mder. 
Figure 3 shows that a wide use is made of animals slaughtered for human consumption.
Biprodukterne/det animalske affald anvendes til forskellige forml i mange forskellige produkter, men de fleste dele af de slagtede dyr ender som menneskefżde, direkte eller indirekte. 
The by-products/animal waste are used for a variety of ends in many different products, but most parts of animals slaughtered end up in the human food chain, either directly or indirectly.
Forekomsten af BSE 9. 
Incidence of BSE 9.
Det Forenede Kongerige havde konstateret i alt 179 804 bekržftede tilfžlde af BSE pr. 31. maj 2001, mens der i den samme periode var konstateret 1 738 tilfžlde i de andre EU-lande og 1 637 tilfžlde i resten af verden. 
The United Kingdom has reported a total of 179 804 confirmed cases up to 31 May 2001, compared to 1 738 cases in other EU countries and 1 673 cases in the rest of the world during the same period.
Det stżrste antal tilfžlde i Det Forenede Kongerige blev konstateret i 1992, og antallet har vžret faldende lige siden. 
The number of United Kingdom cases peaked in 1992 and has been declining since then.
Siden 1996 har forekomsten af BSE i resten af EU vžret stigende. 
Since 1996, the incidence of BSE in the rest of the EU has been increasing.
I 2000 konstaterede Det Forenede Kongerige 1 428 tilfžlde, mens tallet var 482 for de andre medlemsstater; men fra januar til maj 2001 vendte billedet: Det Forenede Kongerige konstaterede 246 tilfžlde, mens de andre medlemsstater konstaterede 323 tilfžlde (jf. figur 4). 
In 2000 the United Kingdom reported 1 428 cases, compared to 482 in other Member States; while from January to May 2001, this situation reversed, and the United Kingdom reported 246 cases, compared to 323 cases in other Member States (see Figure 4).
Hvis denne udvikling fortsžtter, er den konstaterede forekomst af BSE i de andre medlemsstater i kraftig stigning. 
If this trend continues, it would indicate that the reported incidence of BSE in the other Member States is increasing significantly.
5 () Kilder til tekniske detaljer i dette afsnit: Udtalelser fra Den Videnska-6 belige Styringskomit og Rettens sžrberetning nr. 19/98. () Kilde: Den Videnskabelige Styringskomits udtalelse af 13.-14. april 2000 ČOral exposure of humans to the BSE agent: Infective dose and 7 species barrierÇ. () Alle tilfžlde er konstateret i Det Forenede Kongerige p nžr 3 i Frankrig og 1 i Irland. 
5 () Sources for technical details in this section: various opinions by the 6 Scientific Steering Committee, and Special Report No 19/98. () Source: Opinion of the Scientific Steering Committee of 13 and 14 April 2000 ÔOral exposure of humans to the BSE agent: infective 7 dose and species barrierŐ. () All cases have occurred in the United Kingdom apart from three in France and one in Ireland.
(2) Anden anvendelse end nonfood/industriel. 
(2) Use other than non-food/ industrial.
Kilde: Generaldirektoratet for Sundhed og Forbrugerbeskyttelse. 
Source: DG SANCO.