natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I forordningen angives det kun, hvordan basisprisen for sukkerroer skal beregnes: Den skal fastsžttes ud fra interventionsprisen med fradrag af omkostningerne til forarbejdning og transport samt med tillžg af indtžgterne ved salg af melasse (2). 
The Regulation is specific only about the calculation of the basic beet price: it is to be based on the intervention price less the costs of processing and transport plus receipts from molasses (2).
(1) Rdet, efter hżring af Europa-Parlamentet og Det Żkonomiske og Sociale Udvalg. 
(1) The Council, after consultation with the European Parliament and the 2 Economic and Social Committee. () Molasses is a by-product of refining sugar (whether from beet or cane) and is used in the EU primarily in animal feeds.
C 50/10 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 15.2.2001 33. 
C 50/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.2.2001 33.
I praksis har Kommissionen ikke kontrolleret elementerne i denne beregning i mange r, og en analyse af den grundlžggende dokumentation for 1999/2000 viste, at Kommissionen har utilstržkkelige oplysninger. 
In practice, the Commission has not reviewed the elements of this calculation for many years and analysis of the basic documentation for 1999/2000 showed that it disposes of insufficient information.
Hvad angr hovedelementerne, dvs. omkostningerne ved forarbejdning af roer til hvidt sukker, har Kommissionen kun data, som er stillet til rdighed af det organ, der varetager sukkerindustriens interesser (1). 
For the main part, concerning the cost of processing the beet into white sugar, the Commission only has data provided by the body that defends the interests of the processing industry (1).
Disse data er ikke s detaljerede, at forarbejdningsomkostningerne kan kontrolleres. 
These data are not in sufficient detail to enable the processing costs to be verified.
Det er i det hele taget usikkert, hvor nyttige disse oplysninger er. 
The usefulness of this information is questionable.
Afskrivningerne, som er langt det stżrste element i de anfżrte omkostninger ved forarbejdning, er for eksempel baseret p gen-anskaffelsesvžrdien og ikke p de faktiske omkostninger. 
For example, depreciation figures, which are by far the largest single element in the processing costs given, are based on replacement value rather than actual costs.
De fremlagte data viser, at forarbejdningsomkostningerne i 1996/97 og 1997/98 var 25 % hżjere end det belżb, som er fastsat ved beregningen af basisprisen for sukkerroer, men alligevel er de fleste sukkervirksomheder stadig yderst rentable. 
The data provided imply that the processing costs in 1996/1997 and 1997/1998 were 25 % higher than the amount allowed for in the beet price calculation yet most processing companies continue to be highly profitable.
Kommissionen fr imidlertid ikke dataene kontrolleret af uafhžngige finanseksperter og modtager ikke oplysninger om forarbejdningsomkostningerne fra alternative kilder. 
However, the Commission does not have the data checked by independent financial experts and does not have alternative sources of information on processing costs.
Ganske vist lžgger Kommissionen ikke disse oplysninger til grund for sin beregning af sukkerroeprisen hvert r, men p grund af oplysningernes uplidelighed er Kommissionen ikke er i stand til at dokumentere, at prisen er rimelig. 
Although the Commission does not actually use the information to calculate the beet price each year, its unreliability means that it is not in a position to demonstrate that the prices are reasonable.
P visse punkter har produktionsomkostningerne žndret sig meget i renes lżb. 
Some elements of production costs have undergone considerable changes over the years.
For eksempel har forbedrede dyrkningsmetoder gjort det muligt at forlžnge produktionsperioden i nogle lande, hvilket betyder, at investeringer i anlžgsaktiver udnyttes bedre. Renten er faldet, og der er sket omfattende rationaliseringer i forbindelse med lukninger af mindre, urentable fabrikker. 
For example, improvements in cultivation techniques have allowed production periods to be prolonged in some countries, thereby optimising the use of capital investment; interest rates have fallen and there has been extensive rationalisation with the closure of smaller inefficient factories.
Kommissionen har ikke omtalt disse žndringer i sine prisforslag. 
These changes have not been reported on by the Commission in the price proposals.
Det er blevet stžrkt kritiseret af Kommissionens Forbrugerudvalg (2) og af de industrier, der anvender sukker, at disse oplysninger ikke er blevet fremlagt, fordi det gżr det vanskeligt for beslutningstagerne og andre interesserede parter at bedżmme grundlaget for Kommissionens prisforslag. 
This lack of information, which makes it difficult for the decision-makers and other interested parties to judge the basis for the CommissionŐs price proposals, has been strongly criticised by the CommissionŐs Consumers Committee (2) and by the industrial users of sugar.
De industrier, der anvender sukker, har selv foretaget en skżnsmžssig beregning af forarbejdningsomkostningerne og konkluderet, at den forarbejd-ningsmargen, som er indregnet i interventionsprisen, er for hżj (3). 
The industrial users have made their own estimates of processing costs and concluded that the existing margin allowed in the intervention price is too high (3).
Mlene for den fžlles landbrugspolitik 37. 
Taking account of the CAP objectives 37.
Forordningen indeholder ingen bestemmelser om, hvordan priserne p hvidt sukker skal fastsžttes, men der str i pržamblen til Kommissionens prisforslag, at der ved fastsžttelsen af sukkerpriserne bżr tages hensyn til mlsžtningerne for den fžlles landbrugspolitik, isžr behovet for at sikre landbrugsbefolkningen en (1) CEFS: Det Europžiske Udvalg for Sukkerfabrikanter. 
While the Regulation gives no guidance on how white sugar prices are to be set, it is stated in the preamble to the CommissionŐs price proposals that when sugar prices are fixed, account should be taken of the objectives of the CAP and in particular of (1) CEFS: European Committee of Sugar Manufacturers.
(2) Forbrugerudvalgets udtalelse om reformen af den fžlles landbrugs-3 politik, Bruxelles, 14.6.1999. () Committee of Industrial Users of Sugar (CIUS): ČProposal on the reas-sessment of the institutional manufacturing marginÇ, 22.12.1998. rimelig levestandard, at sikre forsyningerne og at sikre forbrugerne rimelige priser. 
(2) Opinion by the Consumer Committee on the reform of the CAP, 3 Brussels,14June1999. () CIUS, proposal on the reassessment of the institutional manufactur-the need to guarantee a fair standard of living for the farming community and ensure that supplies are available and that prices to the consumer are reasonable.
Det fastsls endvidere, at ligevžgten mellem priserne p de vigtigste landbrugsprodukter bżr opretholdes. 
It adds that the balance between the prices of the principal agricultural products should be maintained.
Kommissionens forslag indeholder imidlertid ingen oplysninger om disse elementer. 
However, the Commission presented no information on these elements in its proposal.
I Kommissionens forberedende dokumenter var der desuden heller ingen analyse af dyrkernes indtžgts-og arbejdslżshedsniveau eller af forslagets konsekvenser for forbrugerne. 
Furthermore, there was no analysis of growersŐ incomes and employment or the impact on consumers in the CommissionŐs preparatory files.
Dyrkernes indtžgter er imidlertid steget i denne periode p grund af det stigende udbytte, som skyldes mekanisering, koncentrering af produktionen p fžrre virksomheder, brug af mere effektive ukrudtsmidler, pesticider osv. 
Nevertheless, growersŐ incomes in this period have been affected by increasing yields, resulting from mechanisation and concentration, use of more effective herbicides, pesticides, etc.
Hertil kommer, at priserne p andre afgrżder er sžnket betydeligt siden 1992. 
In addition, prices for other crops have been reduced substantially since 1992.
Kommissionens Forbrugerudvalg har udtalt (4), at sukkerpriserne efterhnden er ude af trit med priserne p andre markafgrżder, og at der bżr gżres en indsats for at f reduceret den tunge byrde, som bžres af forbrugerne, og for at f begržnset sektorens konkurrenceforvridende virkninger. 
The CommissionŐs Consumer Committee (4) declared that sugar prices were Ôincreasingly out of line with other arable cropsŐ and that Ôan effort should be made to reduce the very high consumer burden and trade distortion effects of the sectorŐ.
Disse spżrgsml er ikke blevet behandlet i Kommissionens forslag. 
These issues have not been addressed in the CommissionŐs proposals.
Prisniveau 39. 
The level of prices 39.
Kommissionen har ikke foreslet žndringer i priserne p hvidt sukker og sukkerroer siden 1991. 
The Commission has not proposed any changes to the white sugar and beet prices since 1991.
Forslagene indeholder ikke vurderinger af den sandsynlige effekt p dyrkernes indtžgter og forbrugerpriserne. 
It has not presented its proposals in terms of the likely impact on growersŐ incomes and consumer prices.
Retten bemžrkede imidlertid ved gennemgangen af Kommissionens dokumenter, at man tidligere seriżst havde overvejet prisnedsžttelser, isžr i 1992, da Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug udarbejdede et forslag, som i lighed med de nedsžttelser, som blev vedtaget for kornsektoren, gik ud p at nedsžtte priserne med 15 % over syv r. 
However, when examining the Commission files, it was noted that price cuts had been seriously considered in previous years and notably in 1992, when the Directorate-General (DG) for Agriculture prepared a proposal for a 15 % cut over seven years analogous with the cuts decided for the cereals sector.
Baggrunden for forslaget var en intern kommissionsarbejdsgruppes analyse af effekten af forskellige alternative lżsninger. 
This followed an internal Commission working group analysis of the impact of various options.
Arbejdsgruppen konkluderede, at en nedsžttelse p 15-20 % uden kompensation ikke ville give sektoren vžsentlige problemer, men kunne nedbringe EUŐs overskudsproduktion af sukker med mellem 2 og 3 millioner tons og give forbrugerne en besparelse p op til 650 millioner euro. 
They concluded that an uncompensated reduction of 15 % to 20 % would not lead to major problems for the sector and could reduce EU surplus sugar production by between 2 and 3 million tonnes and produce a gain for consumers of up to 650 million euro.
Tjenesten for żkonomiske analyser under Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug konkluderede, at det ville kržve en prisnedsžttelse p 25-30 %, hvis suk-kerroeproduktionens rentabilitet skulle ligge p samme niveau som kornproduktionens. 
The economic analysis service of the DG for Agriculture concluded that price cuts of 25 % to 30 % would be required to align the profitability of beet growing with that of cereals.
Som nžvnt ovenfor forelagde Kommissionen hverken disse oplysninger eller forslagene om prisnedsžttelser for beslutningstagerne. 
As described above, neither this information nor the price reduction proposals was put by the Commission to the decision-makers.
Kommissionens tjenester fremlagde alts ikke en vurdering af de forventede konsekvenser af forslagene og sammenholdt dem ikke med alternative forslag, selv om de havde de nżdvendige oplysninger til at kunne gżre det. 
The Commission services therefore did not present an assessment of the likely consequences of their proposals, nor justify them in relation to alternatives, despite having the information necessary to do so.
4 ( ) Forbrugerudvalgets udtalelse om reformen af den fžlles landbrugspolitik, Bruxelles, 14.6.1999. 
4 ( ) Consumer Committee, opinion on the reform of the common agri-ingmargin,22December1998. culturalpolicy,Brussels,14June1999.
15.2.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 50/11 Prisen p rżrrsukker fra AVS-landene 42. 
15.2.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 50/11 The price for ACP raw cane sugar 42.
Den garanterede pris for rżrrsukker fra AVS-landene indgr ikke i prisforslaget, men forhandles sžrskilt i henhold til sukkerprotokollen (1). 
The guaranteed price for ACP raw cane sugar is not part of the EU price proposals but is negotiated separately under the Sugar Protocol (1).
Protokollen giver meget vide rammer for prisfast-sžttelsen, for det er kun fastsat, at den pris, AVS-landene skal have, forhandles inden for den i EU opnede prisramme under hensyntagen til alle relevante żkonomiske faktorer. 
This allows considerable room for manoeuvre in the setting of prices, requiring simply that the price to be paid to the ACP countries be negotiated within the range of prices obtaining in the EU, taking into account all relevant economic factors.
Til dette forml udarbejder de sukkerproducerende AVS-lande hvert r i fžllesskab et ČMemorandum om żkonomiske faktorerÇ. 
To this end, the ACP sugar-producing countries cooperate each year to produce a memorandum on economic factors.
Det land, der drager mest nytte af de sžrlige betingelser i forbindelse med denne ordning, er Mauritius. 
The country benefiting most from the special conditions under the abovementioned arrangements is Mauritius.
Nžsten hele MauritiusŐ sukkerhżst (630 000 tons i 1998) sžlges i henhold til pržferen-ceaftaler; over 95 % af det samlede salg i 1998 gik til EU i henhold til sukkerprotokollen og den sžrlige pržferenceaftale om sukker (2), og yderligere 3 % blev solgt til USA inden for importkvo-ten. 
Almost all of the Mauritius sugar crop (630 000 tonnes in 1998) is sold under preferential arrangements; over 95 % of 1998 sales went to the EU under the Sugar Protocol and special preferential sugar (SPS) (2) arrangements and a further 3 % to the USA under the import quota.
Kun 0,7 % blev solgt p verdensmarkedet, og det var udelukkende fžrdigpakkede specialprodukter. 
Just 0,7 % of sales were on the world market, these being entirely sales of bagged speciality sugars.
Omkostningerne ved fremstilling af sukker p Mauritius er hżjere end de priser, som rsukker eller hvidt sukker kan sžlges for p verdensmarkedet (selv om specialprodukter kan sžlges med fortjeneste). 
The cost of production of Mauritius sugar exceeds the prices that can be obtained for raw or white sugar on the world market (although speciality sugars can be sold profitably).
MauritiusŐ sukkerindustri er derfor meget afhžngig af at have adgang til at sžlge p EU-markedet til garanterede EU-priser. 
The Mauritius sugar industry therefore depends heavily on its access to the EU market at guaranteed EU prices.
Produktionsomkostningerne i Mauritius er mere end dobbelt s hżje som i AVS-landene med mere effektive dyrkningsmetoder (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland osv.). 
Production costs in Mauritius are more than double those of the more efficient ACP countries (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, etc.) because of the high labour costs and the hilly and rocky terrain, which reduces possibilities for irrigation and mechanisation.
Mauritius importerer hvidt sukker til eget forbrug (36 000 tons fra Sydafrika i 1998) for at kunne eksportere mest muligt af landets eget rsukker i henhold til pržferenceaftalerne. 
Mauritius imports white sugar (36 000 tonnes from South Africa in 1998) for local consumption in order to maximise the exports of its own raw sugar under preferential arrangements.
Adgangen til EU-markedet p sžrlige vilkr har s stor żkonomisk betydning, at Mauritius og andre AVS-lande er blevet meget afhžngige af, at disse ordninger viderefżres, og at prisniveauet holdes hżjt. 
The economic importance of access to the EU market at special conditions has created a strong dependence for Mauritius and other ACP countries on the continuation of these arrangements and the prices obtained.
Kommissionen har imidlertid altid foreslet, at den garanterede pris (3) for sukker importeret i henhold til sukkerprotokollen skulle vžre lig med interventionsprisen for rsukker fra sukkerroer, og denne pris er ikke blevet žndret i mange r. 
However, the Commission has always proposed that the guaranteed price (3) for Protocol sugar be simply equal to the raw beet sugar intervention price and this has remained unchanged for many years.
I praksis finder der ingen forhandlinger sted, og Kommissionen tager ikke de żkonomiske faktorer i betragtning. 
In practice, there is no negotiation or consideration of the economic factors by the Commission.
Forvaltning af eksportprogrammet 46. 
Management of the export programme 46.
EU-budgettets udgifter til eksport af overskudssukker belżber sig til ca. 1 500 millioner euro rligt, hvoraf 800 millioner euro kommer ind igen via produktionsafgiften. 
The annual cost to the EU budget of exports of surplus sugar is some 1 500 million euro, of which 800 million euro is recovered through the production levy.
(1) Protokol 3 om AVS-sukker til Lom-konventionen af 28.2.1975. 
(1) Protocol 3 on ACP sugar of the Lom Convention, 28 February 1975.
(2) Aftale om import af pržferencesukker ud over de mžngder, der er fastsat i sukkerprotokollen, for at sikre Fžllesskabets raffineringsindustri tilstržkkelige forsyninger af rsukker. 
(2) Arrangements for the import of preferential sugar in addition to the Sugar Protocol to ensure that the CommunityŐs refining industry has adequate supplies of raw sugar.
(3) Cif-pris: omkostninger, forsikring og fragt. 
(3) CIF: cost, insurance and freight.
Alle bud p eksportlicenser, som l under resultatet af denne beregning, blev antaget. 
All tenders for export licences that were below this amount were accepted.
Kun i sžrlige tilfžlde, isžr mod slutningen af produktionsret, benyttede man en anden fremgangsmde. 
Only exceptionally, especially towards the end of the marketing year, was a different approach followed.
Sukkerhandelsfirmaerne vidste, at deres bud normalt ville blive antaget, hvis de l under den teoretiske restitutionssats minus 0,2 euro pr. ton, s de havde ingen interesse i at konkurrere om eksportlicenser ved at afgive lavere bud. 
Sugar-trading companies knew that their tenders would normally be successful if they were below the theoretical refund less 0,2 euro per tonne, so there was little incentive for them to compete for export licences by submitting lower offers.
Nu er eksportprogrammet imidlertid underlagt GATT-aftalen bde med hensyn til mžngden og vžrdien af det sukker, der eksporteres med restitution, og ogs underlagt stramninger af land-brugsbudgettet. 
However, the export programme is now constrained by the GATT Agreement on both the quantity and value of sugar exported with refunds, and by pressures on the agricultural budget.
Indtil produktionsret 1999/2000 var effekten begržnset, fordi GATT-aftalen tillod fremfżrsler. 
Until the 1999/2000 marketing year the impact was limited because carry-forwards were allowed under the GATT arrangements.
Men for produktionsret 2000/1 er der fastsat et loft for budgetudgifterne til eksport p 499 millioner euro, og Kommissionen skżnner, at det kan blive nżdvendigt at nedsžtte kvoterne med op til 500 000 tons. 
However, for 2000/2001 budgetary expenditure for exports is limited to 499 million euro and the Commission estimates that quota cuts of up to 500 000 tonnes could be required.
Hertil kommer, at der siden Berlin-topmżdet i marts 1999 er blevet lagt stadig mere pres p Kommissionen for at f den til at holde sig inden for budgetrammen og til at spille en mere aktiv rolle i forvaltningen af eksportprogrammet og kontrollen af suk-kerbudgettet. 
Moreover since the March 1999 Berlin summit there is increased pressure on the Commission to remain within the budgetary allocation and to take a more active role in managing the export programme in order to control the sugar budget.
Samtidig er priserne p verdensmarkedet faldet, hvilket har żget omkostningerne ved sukkereksporten. 
At the same time, world market prices have fallen, increasing the cost of each tonne of sugar exported.
I Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug holdes der et ugentligt mżde, hvor de afgivne bud bliver behandlet under hensyntagen til udsigterne p verdensmarkedet, som Kommissionens tjenestemžnd overvger omhyggeligt, og effekten p det disponible budget. 
A weekly meeting is held in the DG for Agriculture at which the tenders are considered in the light of the prospects on the world market, which the Commission officials monitor carefully, and the impact on the available budget.
Det er ikke lžngere sdan, at firmaerne kan vžre sikre p, at deres bud vil blive antaget, hvis de ligger under en forudsigelig restitutionssats. 
There is no longer any predictable refund below which tenders will be accepted.
Det har żget konkurrencen om eksportlicenser og fżrt til budgetbesparelser. 
This has had the effect of increasing competition for export licences with consequent budgetary savings.
Kommissionen traf fżrst foranstaltninger til at f fastsat lavere eksportrestitutionssatser, da der blev gennemfżrt budgetstramninger. 
It was only in the face of budgetary constraints that the Commission acted to obtain lower rates for export refunds.
Organiseringen af udbudsprocedurerne 53. 
The organisation of the tendering procedures 53.
Retten undersżgte udbudsprocedurerne i forskellige medlemsstater og i Kommissionen og konstaterede, at forvaltningskomiten stort set udelukkende blstempler Kommissionens forslag, som kun yderst sjžldent žndres p baggrund af komitens overvejelser. 
The tendering procedures were examined in various Member States and at the Commission and it was found that the Management Committee does little more than rubber stamp the Commission proposal, which is very rarely changed in the light of the CommitteeŐs deliberations.
Der kunne opns store besparelser, hvis man antog fžrre bud p eksportlicenser, nr priserne p verdensmarkedet er lave, og tildelte flere licenser, nr priserne er hżje. 
Significant savings could be made by accepting fewer offers for export licences when world market prices are low, and increasing the issue of licences when prices are high.
Der er dog en betydelig risiko forbundet med denne fremgangsmde, fordi situationen p verdensmarkedet er usikker, og denne risiko har Kommissionen ikke villet lżbe. 
However, given the uncertainty of the world market this approach presents considerable risks which the Commission has not been willing to undertake.
Kommissionen kunne imidlertid overveje at overfżre risikoen til tredjemand ved at afholde et begržnset antal udbud pr. r i stedet for et hver uge. 
The Commission could consider transferring this risk by holding a limited number of tenders each year rather than one each week.
Kommissionen bżr undersżge, hvilke forbedringer der kan opns ved indfżrelse af alternative udbudsprocedurer og procedurer for fastsžttelse af eksportrestitutionssatser. 
The Commission should evaluate the possible improvements from alternative arrangements for tendering and deciding on export refunds.
C 50/12 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 15.2.2001 Selvfinansieringsordningen 55. 
C 50/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.2.2001 Self-financing arrangements 55.
Der opkržves produktionsafgifter til finansiering af omkostningerne ved eksporten af ca. halvdelen af overskudssukkeret. 
Production levies are charged to compensate for the costs of exporting approximately half of the surplus production.
Der opkržves lagerafgifter til džkning af refusioner af oplagringsomkostninger. 
Storage levies are charged in order to recover the payments made to reimburse storage costs.
Dette afgiftssystem omtales ofte som Čselvfinansie-ringsordningenÇ, som Retten omtalte i rsberetningen for 1988 (1) og i sžrberetningen om sukker, som blev offentliggjort i 1991 (2). 
This system of levies is often referred to as the Ôself-financingŐ arrangements, which the Court commented on in its 1988 annual report (1) and in its 1991 special report (2).
Den eksportmžngde, som indgr i beregningen af produk-tionsafgifterne, opgżres fortsat som differencen mellem produktionen inden for kvoterne og det interne forbrug (som fastsat i forordningen). 
The quantity of exports to be taken into account in the production levy calculation continues to be based on the difference between quota production and internal consumption (as laid down in the Regulation).