natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Der manglede dog klarhed mellem AU og de forskellige SRO'er vedrżrende strategien for opdeling af ansvaret mellem dem, isžr med hensyn til spżrgsmlet om subsidiaritet (punkt 34). 
There was, however, lack of clarity between the AU and the different SROs regarding the strategy for dividing up responsibilities between them, notably on the question of subsidiarity (paragraph 34).
De mekanismer, som EU oprettede for dialog med de regionale organisationer, fungerede mindre problemfrit. 
The mechanisms which the EU set up for dialogue with the regional organisations ran less smoothly.
I ECOWAS' tilfžlde blev der f.eks. ikke afholdt regelmžssige mżder p ministerplan (der blev afholdt mżder i 2017, men ikke i 2016, selv om man prżvede at f dem i stand). 
In the case of the ECOWAS, for example, ministerial-level meetings were irregular (they took place in 2017 but, despite efforts, not in 2016).
I andre tilfžlde var politikdialogen kompliceret (f.eks. p grund af manglende institutionel reform, meget langsomme fremskridt med den regionale integration eller langsomme reaktioner fra modparterne vedrżrende forslag og forespżrgsler). 
In other cases, policy dialogue was complicated (for example due to lack of institutional reforms, due to very slow advancing of the regional integration, or due to slow responsiveness of the counterparts on One for the period from 2011 to 2013 and another for the period from 2016 to 2020.
Der var behov for at forbedre, intensivere og konsolidere dialogen, f.eks. med hensyn til de subregionale EU-strategier for Sahel og Guineabugten. 
The dialogue needed to be improved, intensified and consolidated, for example in respect of the sub-regional EU Sahel and Gulf of Guinea strategies.
Nogle gange blev dialogen vanskeliggjort af, at organisationerne manglede administrativ kapacitet, f.eks. ECCAS. 
Sometimes dialogue was difficult because organisations lacked administrative capacity, for example ECCAS.
APSA's finansiering afhžnger af donorernes bidrag 20. 
APSAŐs funding depends on donorsŐ contributions 20.
AU-medlemsstaternes mangelfulde bidrag til AU-budgettet (punkt 5) og fredsfonden (punkt 6) betżd, at APSA var underfinansieret. 
The shortfall in contributions by the AU member states to the AU budget (paragraph 5) and the Peace Fund (paragraph 6) left the APSA underfunded.
Dette er fremhžvet i den seneste APSA-kżreplan, hvor det ppeges, at APSA trods flere afgżrelser fra AU's forsamling af stats-og regeringschefer og/eller bestemmelser fastlagt i forbindelse med oprettelsen af Freds-og Sikkerhedsrdet stadig lider under, at AU-Kommissionen og REC'erne/RM'erne ikke har taget finansielt ejerskab, og at den er meget afhžngig af donorer25. 
This issue was highlighted in the last APSA Roadmap: ŇDespite several decisions by the AU Assembly of heads of State and Government and/or provisions made in the establishment of the PSC, APSA still suffers from the absence of financial ownership by the AUC and RECs/RMs, and from a high dependency on donors25.
Eksperter har understreget, at Afrika ikke kan forventes at tage ejerskab til kontinentets freds-og sikkerhedsdagsorden, fżr denne dagsorden bliver żkonomisk uafhžngig26. 
Also experts have emphasized that African ownership of the continentŐs peace and security agenda could not be expected until that agenda became financially autonomous26.
14 21. 
21.
I erkendelse af problemerne ved at vžre afhžngig af donorer valgte AU-medlemsstaterne i juli 2016 en ny mekanisme til finansiering af AU's operationelle budget og fredsfonden27. 
Acknowledging the problems associated with relying on donors, the AU member states decided in July 2016 on a new mechanism for financing the AUŐs operational budget and the Peace Fund27.
EU har stżttet dette initiativ, som bestr i fra 2017 at plžgge alle stżtteberettigede varer, der importeres til Afrika, en afgift p 0,2 %. 
The EU has supported this initiative, which consists of imposing a 0.2 % levy on all eligible goods imported into Africa, starting in 2017.
I januar 2018 var 14 medlemsstater begyndt at opkržve afgiften28, fredsfonden var begyndt at operere, og den havde en forvaltningsstruktur. 
By January 2018, 14 member states had started collecting the levy28, the Peace Fund was beginning to operate, and it had a governance structure.
I juni 2017 opfordrede AU EU til at indtržde i fredsfondens bestyrelse. 
In June 2017, the AU invited the EU to join the Peace FundŐs board.
P tidspunktet for revisionen var det endnu for tidligt at vurdere effektiviteten af de nye ordninger. 
At the time of the audit, it was too early to assess the effectiveness of the new arrangements.
Hertil kommer, at nogle afrikanske stater kan vžre nżdt til at vžlge, om de vil bruge deres knappe midler til at finansiere AU eller SRO'erne30. 
In addition to this, some African states may find they have to take decisions regarding whether to use scarce funds to finance the AU or the SROs30.
EU finansierede driftsomkostninger og havde ingen planer om at give stżtten nyt fokus 23. 
EU financed operational costs with no plan for refocusing support 23.
I den reviderede periode blev det meste af EU's APSA-finansiering anvendt til at betale driftsomkostninger ssom personalerelaterede udgifter (figur 4). 
During the audited period, most of the EUŐs funding of the APSA was used to meet operational costs such as staff-related expenses (Figure 4).
I de tidlige stżtter (fra 2010) begrundede EU finansieringen af driftsomkostningerne med henvisning til betydningen af at gżre den nye struktur operationel. 
In the early years of its support (since 2010), the EU justified the funding of the operational costs by pointing out the importance of making the new structure operational.
Men efter nžsten syv r havde EU's stżtte fortsat fokus p at stżtte džkningen af grundlžggende driftsomkostninger. 
However, after nearly seven years, the focus of EU support remained to provide support for basic operational costs.
Kilde: ECCAS, via Europa-Kommissionen. 
Source: ECCAS, via the European Commission.
Institute for Security Studies, PSC Report 89, "The new funding model tests the commitment of AU member states", marts 2017. 
Institute for Security Studies, PSC Report 89, "The new funding model tests the commitment of AU member states", March 2017.
Vi forventede, at EU havde udarbejdet en langsigtet plan for at vise, hvordan stżtten ville udvikle sig over tid og i sidste ende blive udfaset. 
We expected the EU to have prepared a long-term plan to show how its provision of support would evolve over time and eventually be phased out.
Vi fandt ingen beviser p, at den havde gjort dette. 
We found no evidence that it had done this.
EU havde heller ikke aftalt med AU og SRO'erne, hvordan den gradvis ville tilpasse den mžngde stżtte, den ydede, og omfordele midlerne til mere kapacitetsopbygning (f.eks. til konfliktforebyggelse, effektiv indsats og genopbygning efter konflikter) og strategiske stżtteforanstaltninger (organisatoriske og operationelle reformer, forbedring af systemer, tilvejebringelse af sžrlig knowhow og uddannelse osv.) med henblik p at udvikle kapacitet p lang sigt. 
The EU had also not agreed with the AU and the SROs how it would gradually adapt the amount of support it was providing and reallocate funds towards more capacity building (for example for conflict prevention, effective response and post-conflict reconstruction) and strategic support measures (such as organisational and operational reforms, improvements of systems, provision of specific know-how and training, etc.), in order to develop long-term capacities.
EU havde ikke gjort sin stżtte betinget af, at kravene blev opfyldt, f.eks. kravet om, at AU eller SRO'erne skulle fortsžtte finansieringen af initiativer, der tidligere blev stżttet af EU. 
The EU had not made provision of its support contingent upon conditions being met, such as the requirement for the AU or the SROs to continue financing initiatives previously supported by the EU.
I n kontrakt, finansieringsaftalen indeholdt en sdan bestemmelse, overholdt den berżrte SRO ikke aftalen og fortsatte ikke finansieringen af de poster, som tidligere blev finansieret under EUF (tekstboks 3). 
In one contract where such a provision was included in the financing agreement the SRO concerned did not respect the agreement and did not go on to fund the posts previously funded under the EDF (Box 3).
16 Tekstboks 3 - Op-og nedture for et regionalt system for tidlig varsling Et system for tidlig varsling er et system af vžrktżjer og procedurer, som anvendes til at indsamle og analysere data med henblik p foregribelse og forebyggelse af konflikter. 
16 Box 3 - The ups and downs of a regional early warning system An early warning system is a system of tools and procedures used for collecting and analysing data in order to anticipate and prevent conflicts.
Centrale og regionale systemer for tidlig varsling er afgżrende for, at APSA kan fungere. 
Central and regional early warning systems are key to the functioning of the APSA.
I den centralafrikanske region blev der i 2007 oprettet et sdant system ved navn "Mcanisme d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique Centrale" (MARAC). 
In the central region of Africa, such a system, called ŇMcanisme d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique CentraleÓ (MARAC), was set up in 2007.
EU ydede finansiering fra EUF til at udvide systemet, installere IT-og kommunikationssystemer og ansžtte og uddanne personale. 
The EU provided funds from the EDF for expanding the system, installing IT and communications systems and hiring and training staff members.
Der blev oprettet et netvžrk bestende af 30 korrespondenter i flere centralafrikanske stater. 
A network of 30 correspondents was set up across several central African states.
Flere af de interessenter, vi interviewede, henviste til MARAC's effektive og positive bidrag til konfliktforegribelse og - forebyggelse. 
Several of the stakeholders we interviewed referred to MARACŐs effective and positive contribution to conflict anticipation and prevention.
Men efter at EU's stżtte ophżrte i 2016, overholdt SRO'en ikke de aftalte krav om at fortsžtte med at finansiere personalet i systemet for tidlig varsling, og den opbyggede kapacitet gik tabt. 
However, after EU support ended in 2016, the SRO did not comply with the agreed requirement to continue to finance staff for the early warning system and the capacity that had been built up was lost.
Der blev kun ydet minimal stżtte under fredsfaciliteten for Afrika i 2017, og p tidspunktet for vores revision var MARAC's personale faldet til niveauet fżr EU-stżtten. 
Only minimal financial support was provided under the African Peace Facility during 2017 and by the time of our audit, MARACŐs staff numbers had dropped to the pre-EU support level.
Der var kun tre ansatte tilbage (selv om fuld operationalitet kržver 15), og netvžrket af korrespondenter var ikke lžngere aktivt. 
Only a skeleton staff of three people remained (compared to the 15 needed for it to operate at full capacity) and its network of correspondents was no longer active.
Vi forventede ogs, at der i kontrakterne var bestemmelser, som bde reducerede den samlede finansiering og sikrede en overgang fra at stżtte operationelt personale til at stżtte specialiseret personale. 
We also expected to see provisions in contracts for both reducing overall financing and moving away from support for operational staff and towards funding specialised staff.
Nr AU og SRO'erne overtager de daglige driftsomkostninger32, kan EU fokusere p at tilfżre mervžrdi ved at finansiere personale med specialiserede uddannelser i f.eks. konfliktforebyggelse og -lżsning. 
With the AU and the SROs taking over day-to-day running costs32, the EU could then focus on adding value by financing staff trained in specialist skills, such as conflict prevention and resolution.
I de fleste af de kontrakter, vi reviderede, var dette ikke tilfžldet. 
In most of the contracts we audited this was not the case.
Men tekstboks 4 viser dog et eksempel, hvor denne tilgang lykkedes. 
However, Box 4 shows an example where this approach succeeded.
Der blev ikke i tilstržkkelig grad anvendt prioriteter ved tildelingen af EU-stżtten 27. 
The allocation of EU support was not sufficiently prioritised 27.
I erkendelse af den risiko, som konflikterne i Afrika udgżr for EU's borgere (i form af voldelig terrorisme, masseżdelžggelsesvben og organiseret kriminalitet), er EU begyndt at kanalisere sin stżtte med henblik p at forebygge, at sdanne konflikter forekommer, og lżse dem, nr de gżr35. 
Aware of the risk to EU citizens of conflicts in Africa (violent terrorism, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime), the EU has started to channel its support towards preventing such conflicts from happening, and resolving them when they The 2013 APF evaluation recommended that ŇThe EU should explore options to jointly develop with the AU a plan for the latter to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs of key APSA components currently financed through the APFÓ.
I overensstemmelse med Pariserklžringen om stżtteeffektivitet36 og principperne i JAES har EU generelt ydet stżtte til APSA p grundlag af de behov, som AU og SRO'erne har givet udtryk for i APSA-kżreplanen. 
In line with the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness36 and the principles set out in the JAES, the EU has in general provided support for the APSA in accordance with the needs expressed by the AU and the SROs in the APSA roadmap.
Behovene var imidlertid meget bredt formuleret, og prioriteterne var ikke konkrete eller tydelige. 
However, the needs defined were very broad and the priorities not specific or clear.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen udarbejdede ikke nogen specifikke EU-finansieringsprioriteter og udviklede ikke nogen retningslinjer for tildelingen af ressourcer til de forskellige APSA-komponenter. 
The EEAS and the Commission did not draw up specific EU funding priorities or develop guidelines for allocating resources to the various APSA components.
Kommissionen og EU-Udenrigstjenesten granskede imidlertid finansieringsforslagene fra AU og SRO'erne, og Rdets Udenrigs-og Ifżlge referatet fra det 11. mżde i styringskomiten om den fžlles finansieringsordning (27. april 2017) blev det besluttet, at over 50 % af de kortvarigt ansatte i freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingen i AU's hovedkvarter skal betales med AU-medlemsstaternes midler. 
However, the Commission and the EEAS scrutinised funding proposals received from the AU and SROs, and the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU assessed the Ňpolitical appropriatenessÓ of providing the funding.
Bilag II viser som eksempel beslutningsprocedurerne i fredsfaciliteten for Afrika. 
Annex II shows the example of the decision-making procedure of the African Peace Facility.
Vi analyserede de 14 reviderede kontrakter for at se, hvordan de afspejlede prioriteterne for APSA. 
We analysed the fourteen contracts audited to see how they reflected the priorities set for the APSA.
Vi konstaterede, at den mde, hvorp midlerne blev pržsenteret i kontrakternes budgetter, i otte tilfžlde gjorde det umuligt at se, hvor mange penge der var blevet tildelt til hver enkelt APSA-sżjle eller -prioritet. 
We found that in eight cases the way in which funds were presented in the contractsŐ budgets made it impossible to see how much money had been allocated to each of the APSA pillars or priorities.
Vi konstaterede ogs, at de enkelte kontrakter var ret brede og rettet mod mange prioriteter: 11 af de 14 kontrakter var rettet mod mindst fire af de fem strategiske APSA-prioriteter (bilag III). 
We also found that the individual contracts had a wide scope in terms of targeting priorities: eleven of the fourteen contracts targeted at least four of the five APSA strategic priorities (Annex III).
Risici i forbindelse med at tildele flere midler til regionale organisationer 30. 
Risks associated with allocating more funds to regional organisations 30.
I den seneste programmeringsperiode besluttede EU at kanalisere en stżrre andel af den samlede finansiering til APSA gennem RVP'erne (punkt 10). 
In the latest programming period, the EU decided to channel a greater proportion of total funding for the APSA through the RIPs (paragraph 10).
Formlet var at give SRO'erne en stżrre rolle i beslutningstagningen i overensstemmelse med subsidiaritetsprincippet. 
The aim was to give SROs a greater role in decision-making, in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
Vi konstaterede, at der er risici forbundet med denne žndring. a) SRO'erne havde p tidspunktet for vores revision ikke tilstržkkeligt personale med de nżdvendige fžrdigheder til at hndtere den yderligere finansiering effektivt. b) Den regionale institutionelle ramme er meget kompleks. 
We found there to be risks associated with this change. (a) The SROs did not, at the time of our audit, have sufficient staff members with the necessary skills to manage the additional funding effectively. (b) The regional institutional framework is very complex.
Der er 10 SRO'er med et mandat inden for fred og sikkerhed med overlappende medlemskaber. 
There are ten SROs with a mandate in peace and security, with overlapping memberships.
AU-staterne er i gennemsnit medlem af mindst to SRO'er, og nogle stater er medlem af helt op til fire. 
On average, AU states are members of at least two SROs and some states belong to as many as four.
Den manglende klarhed betyder, at nogle afrikanske stater ikke er villige til at deltage i deres SRO'er, hvilket svžkker deres kapacitet. 
The lack of clarity leaves some African states unwilling to commit to their SROs, leading to weaknesses in capacity.
Europa-Kommissionens strategi til hndtering af denne komplekse regionale ramme var at stżtte t fžlles RVP i hver region. EU finansierer aktuelt SRO'erne under tre RVP'er. c) Fire af de 10 SRO'er med et mandat inden for fred og sikkerhed er ikke omfattet af et RVP, og to af disse fire vil fortsžtte med at modtage stżtte under APF. 
The EU CommissionŐs strategy to deal with this complex regional framework was to support one joint RIP in each region; the EU currently funds the SROs under three RIPs. (c) Four of the ten SROs with a mandate in peace and security are not covered by a RIP and two of these four will continue to receive funding under the APF.
Hertil kommer, at EU's Nżdtrustfond for Afrika finansierer kapacitetsopbyggende foranstaltninger for n SRO (Den Mellemstatslige Organisation for Udvikling) og for organisationer uden for APSA (f.eks. 
In addition, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa funds capacity-building measures for one SRO (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and for organisations outside the APSA framework (for example, the Sahel G537).
Sahel G537). Dette kan underminere sammenhžngen i EU's finansieringstilgang. d) Der er en risiko for, at en reduceret rolle for AU kan svžkke den overordnede sammenhžng og koordinering af EU's stżtte til APSA. e) Trods en betydelig stigning i de belżb, der tildeles freds-og sikkerhedsforanstaltninger under RVP'erne, er antallet af ansatte, der arbejder i de relevante regionale EU-delegationer, ikke steget tilsvarende. 
This could undermine the coherence of the EUŐs funding approach. (d) there is a risk that a reduced role for the AU may weaken overall coherence and coordination of EU support to the APSA. (e) despite the significant increase in the amounts allocated to peace and security measures under the RIPs the number of staff working in the relevant regional EU delegations had not increased accordingly.
Der var f.eks. ingen militžreksperter blandt personalet i delegationerne til ECOWAS og ECCAS, s disse delegationer gjorde brug af militžr ekspertise i EU-medlemsstaternes ambassader. 
For example, there were no military experts on the staff of the delegations to ECOWAS and ECCAS, meaning that these delegations were relying on military expertise made available by EU Member StatesŐ embassies.
Trods EU-stżtten str APSA over for flere udfordringer, og driften er afhžngig af fortsat ekstern stżtte 31. 
Despite EU support, the APSA faces several challenges and its operation depends on continued external support 31.
I dette afsnit undersżger vi, om EU's stżtte bidrog til opnelse af resultater. 
In this section, we examine whether EU support contributed to results being achieved.
Vi ser p, i hvilket omfang de EU-finansierede kontrakter leverede stżtte i overensstemmelse med deres ml. 
We look at the extent to which EU-funded contracts delivered support according to the objectives set for those contracts.
Vi undersżger ogs de udfordringer, som de forskellige komponenter i APSA str over for. 
We also examine the challenges faced by the different components of the APSA.
Endelig vurderer vi, om EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen havde identificeret og adresseret risiciene vedrżrende manglende bžredygtighed af EU-stżttens resultater. 
Finally, we assess whether the EEAS and the Commission had identified and addressed risks to the sustainability of the results of EU support.
Halvdelen af kontrakterne havde leveret resultater, da revisionen fandt sted 32. 
Half of the contracts had delivered at the time of the audit 32.
Vi reviderede 14 EU-stżttekontrakter. 
We audited fourteen EU support contracts.
Seks af disse, som primžrt vedrżrte personaleomkostninger, havde leveret de fleste af deres samlede forventede resultater p revisionstidspunktet. 
Six of them, which mainly concerned staff costs, had mainly delivered their overall expected results by the time of the audit.
Vi havde dog ikke tilstržkkelige oplysninger til at vurdere, om hvert enkelt output var blevet leveret (punkt 59 og 60). 
However, we did not have sufficient information to judge whether each individual output had been achieved (paragraphs 59 and 60).
Yderligere to kontrakter havde delvis leveret deres output, og n kontrakt havde tydeligvis ikke leveret de forventede output. 
Two more contracts had partially delivered outputs and one contract had clearly not delivered the expected outputs.
I fem tilfžlde betżd gennemfżrelsesforsinkelser, at vi ikke kunne vurdere, om kontrakten havde leveret de forventede output eller ej (punkt 53 og bilag IV). 
In five cases, implementation delays meant that we could not assess whether the contract had achieved the expected outputs or not (paragraph 53 and Annex IV).
APSA str over for flere udfordringer 33. 
The APSA faces several challenges 33.
Interessenterne og donorerne har hżje forventninger til APSA. 
Stakeholders and donors have high expectations of the APSA.
Vurderinger38 viser, at AU og SRO'erne spiller en vigtig rolle i hndteringen af konflikter i Afrika. 
Assessments38 have concluded that the AU and the SROs play an important role in addressing conflicts in Africa.
APSA har potentiale til at blive en effektiv ramme for fred og sikkerhed i Afrika, selv om den str over for mange vanskelige udfordringer og har behov for yderligere udvikling af sin kapacitet, sine instrumenter og sin samlede drift. 
The APSA has a potential to become an effective framework for peace and security in Africa, although it faces many difficult challenges and needs further development of its capacities, its instruments and its overall operation.