natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
32 r 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 UF'er i alt 194,4 207,4 217,8 222,4 189,6 217,7 238,8 267,3 PUUF'er i alt 1,9 2,4 9,4 5,2 4,1 2,8 3,0 8,5 % PUUF'er/UF'er 1,0 % 1,1 % 4,3 % 2,4 % 2,2 % 1,3 % 1,2 % 3,2 % 
32 Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total RAL 194.4 207.4 217.8 222.4 189.6 217.7 238.8 267.3 Total PAR 1.9 2.4 9.4 5.2 4.1 2.8 3.0 8.5 % PAR/RAL 1.0 % 1.1 % 4.3 % 2.4 % 2.2 % 1.3 % 1.2 % 3.2 %
Sammenligning af medlemsstaterne 79 Eftersom de uindfriede forpligtelser for ESI-fondene gennemfżres ved delt forvaltning, kan de ogs analyseres p medlemsstatsniveau. 
A comparison between Member States 79 Since outstanding commitments for ESI funds are implemented through shared management, they can also be analysed at the level of the Member States.
Af de samlede UF'er for ESI-fondene ved udgangen af 2017 (189,9 milliarder euro) var 178,2 milliarder euro (94 %) forpligtelser fra 2014-2020 og 11,7 milliarder euro (6 %) forpligtelser fra 2007-2013. 
Of the total RAL for the ESI funds at the end of 2017 (ш189.9 billion), ш178.2 billion (94 %) consisted of commitments from 2014-2020 and ш11.7 billion (6 %) of commitments from 2007-2013.
Deres fordeling p medlemsstaterne vises i figur 11. 
A breakdown by Member State is given in Figure 11.
Kilde: Revisionsretten, baseret p oplysninger fra Kommissionens rapporter "Analysis of the budgetary implementation of the ESI funds". 
Source: ECA, based on information from the Commission reports тAnalysis of the budgetary implementation of the ESI fundsу.
80 De tre medlemsstater med de hżjeste UF'er i 2017 var dem med de stżrste tildelinger af forpligtelsesbevillinger i FFR. 
80 The three Member States with the highest RAL in 2017 also had the largest allocations of commitment appropriations in the MFF.
Det drejede sig om Polen, Italien og Spanien (henholdsvis 34,6 milliarder euro, 22,3 milliarder euro og 19,2 milliarder euro i UF'er), som tegnede sig for 40 % af 2017-UF'erne for ESI-fondene ved udgangen af 2017. 
They were Poland, Italy and Spain (ш34.6 billion, ш22.3 billion and ш19.2 billion of RAL respectively), representing 40 % of the 2017 RAL for the ESI funds at the end of 2017.
81 I relative tal er medlemsstaterne med de hżjeste UF'er som andel af deres respektive tildelinger under FFR for 2014-2020 Cypern, Italien og Malta med 48 %, 46 % og 44 %. 
81 In relative terms, the Member States with the highest RAL as a proportion of their respective allocations for the 2014-2020 MFF were Cyprus, Italy and Malta, with 48 %, 46 % and 44 %.
Medlemsstaterne med de laveste andele var Finland, Żstrig og Irland, hvor UF'erne udgjorde henholdsvis 19 %, 26 % og 27 % af de samlede tildelinger57. 
The Member States with the lowest ratios were Finland, Austria and Ireland, where the RAL accounted for, respectively, 19 %, 26 % and 27 % of total allocations 57.
82 Ved udgangen af 2017 (det fjerde r i FFR) var 16,4 % af ESI-fondenes budget for perioden blevet gennemfżrt (5,3 % som forfinansiering og 11,1 % som mellemliggende betalinger). 
82 By the end of 2017 (the fourth year of the MFF), 16.4 % of the ESI funds budget for the period had been implemented (5.3 % in pre-financing and 11.1 % in interim payments).
I fjerde r af perioden 2007-2013 var udnyttelsesgraden hżjere, nemlig 22,1 % (8,7 % som forfinansiering og 13,4 % som mellemliggende betalinger). 
In the fourth year of the 2007-2013 period the implementation rate was higher, at 22.1 % (8.7 % pre-financing and 13.4 % interim payments).
Figur 12 viser den kumulerede gennemfżrelse ved udgangen af 2017 i de enkelte medlemsstater. 
Figure 12 shows the cumulative implementation by the end of 2017 in each Member State.
Nžrmere oplysninger findes i bilag II. 
More detailed information is provided in Annex II.
Figur 12 - Medlemsstaternes kumulerede gennemfżrelse ved udgangen af 2017 for perioden 2014-2020 (sammenholdt med tildelingerne) 34 40 % 35 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5% 0% Forfinansiering Mellemliggende betalinger Note: CB er programmer for gržnseoverskridende samarbejde. 
Figure 12 п Cumulative implementation at the end of 2017 by Member State for the 2014-2020 period (compared to allocations) 34 40 % 35 % 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5% 0% Pre-financing Interim payments Note: CB refers to cross border programmes.
Kilde: Kommissionens rapport "Analysis of the budgetary implementation of the European structural and investment funds in 2017". 
Source: Commission report рAnalysis of the budgetary implementation of ESI funds in 2017с.
83 Hvis medlemsstaterne gennemfżrte programmer i nogenlunde samme tempo, burde deres andel af UF'erne vžre proportional med deres andel af de samlede forpligtelsesbevillinger. 
83 If Member States implemented programmes at a roughly comparable rate, their share of the RAL should be proportionate to their share of total commitment appropriations.
Der opstr imidlertid forskelle, fordi medlemsstaterne absorberer midler i forskelligt tempo. 
However, differences arise because Member States absorb funding at different rates.
I forbindelse med FFR for 2014-2020 var medlemsstaterne med de hżjeste absorptionsgrader ved udgangen af 2017 Finland, Żstrig og Irland (alle over 25 %), mens dem med de laveste grader var Italien, Kroatien, Malta og Spanien (alle under 12 %)58. 
For the 2014-2020 MFF, the Member States with the highest absorption rates to the end of 2017 were Finland, Austria and Ireland (all above 25 %), while those with the lowest rates were Italy, Croatia, Malta and Spain (all lower than 12 %)58.
Hovedrsagerne var den sene afslutning af den foregende FFR, den sene vedtagelse af retsakter og vanskelighederne med at tilpasse sig og gennemfżre de vžsentlige žndringer, der blev indfżrt med FFR for 2014-2020. 
The main reasons were the late closure of the previous MFF, the late adoption of legal acts and difficulties in adapting to and implementing 58 Commission report рAnalysis of the budgetary implementation of the ESI funds in 2017с.
Vi har ogs ppeget, at medlemsstaterne kan have udfordringer med hensyn til at identificere tilstržkkelig mange projekter af hżj kvalitet61. 
We also pointed out that Member States may face challenges in identifying sufficient high-quality projects in a short period of time61.
84 De forskellige gennemfżrelsesgrader er illustreret i figur 13, der viser UF'erne som antal rs forpligtelser, der varer mere end et r. 
84 The different implementation rates are illustrated in Figure 13, in terms of the years of commitments lasting more than one year represented by the RAL.
I 2017 svarede de fleste medlemsstaters UF'er til mellem to og tre rs forpligtelser, hvilket m forventes under "n+3-reglen". 
In 2017, the RAL for most Member States accounted for between two and three years of commitments, as can be expected under the трn+3с rule.
Figur 13 - UF'er/gennemsnitlige rlige forpligtelser 35 3,5 3,0 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 - 2014-2020 2007-2013 Kilde: Revisionsretten, baseret p oplysninger fra Kommissionens rapport "Analysis of the budgetary implementation of the European structural and investment funds in 2017". 
Figure 13 п RAL / average annual commitments 35 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 - 2014-2020 2007-13 Source: ECA, based on information from the Commission report рAnalysis of the budgetary implementation of ESI funds in 2017с.
85 De samlede frigżrelser for perioden 2007-2013 belżb sig til 4,4 milliarder euro, bestende af 1,6 milliarder euro i automatiske frigżrelser og 2,8 milliarder euro i frigżrelser ved afslutningen. 
85 Total decommitments for the 2007-2013 period were ш4.4 billion made up of ш1.6 billion corresponding to automatic decommitments and ш2.8 billion to decommitments at closure.
Disse frigżrelser reducerer UF'erne, men belżbene kan ikke anvendes lžngere og er derfor get tabt for de pgžldende medlemsstater og EU-budgettet62. 
These decommitments decrease the RAL, but are amounts that cannot be used anymore and are, therefore, lost for the Member States concerned and the EU budget62.
I sit forslag til FFR for 2021-2027 har Kommissionen foreslet at oprette en "EU-reserve". 
In its proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF, the Commission has proposed to establish a рUnion reserveс.
Den skulle finansieres med de midler, der er forpligtet, men i sidste ende ikke udnyttet, og med de margener, der er tilbage under lofterne for forpligtelser for det foregende regnskabsr63. 
through funds that have been committed but ultimately not used as well as from margins left available under the ceilings for commitments of the previous financial year63.
Figur 14 viser fordelingen af de 4,4 milliarder euro p de 15 berżrte medlemsstater, hvor Rumžnien tegner sig for den stżrste del. 
Figure 14 shows the breakdown of the ш4.4 billion amount amongst the 15 Member States concerned, the largest part of which was due to Romania.
Figur 14 - Kumulerede frigżrelser vedrżrende FFR for 2007-2013 som procentdel af de samlede tildelinger og som absolutte belżb 36 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 53,6 3% 1 644,4 242,7 887,3 254,3 221,6 25,4 2% 1% 0% 306,2 221,2 226,6 6,9 4,9 31,2 28,2 0,4 RO AT BG CZ SK UK SE DE IT ES BE FI FR HU PL Automatiske frigżrelser Frigżrelser ved afslutningen Note: Kilde: Belżb angivet i millioner euro. 
Figure 14 п Cumulative decommitments for the 2007-2013 MFF as percentage of total allocations and as absolute amounts 36 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 53.6 3% 1 644.4 242.7 887.3 254.3 221.6 25.4 2% 1% 0% 306.2 221.2 226.6 6.9 4.9 31.2 28.2 0.4 RO AT BG CZ SK UK SE DE IT ES BE FI FR HU PL Automatic decommitments Decommitments at closure Note: Source: Amounts are expressed in million euros.
Revisionsretten, baseret p tal fra Kommissionens rapporter. 
ECA, based on figures from Commission reports.
63 COM(2018) 321 - Meddelelse fra Kommissionen til Rdet og Europa-Parlamentet - Et moderne budget for en Union, der beskytter, styrker og forsvarer - Den flerrige finansielle ramme for 2021-2027. 
63 COM(2018) 321 п Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament п A modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends п the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027.
Konklusion og vejen frem 86 Mange af de faktorer bag UF'erne, som vi har undersżgt i dette dokument, ligner dem, som Kommissionen beskrev i sin 2002-analyse64 af UF'erne i FFR for 2000-2006. 
Conclusion and the way forward 86 Many of the factors for the RAL that we have examined in this document are similar to those presented by the Commission in its 2002 analysis 64 of the RAL during the 2000-2006 MFF.
Blandt disse faktorer er overlapningen mellem FFR'erne, effekten af reglen om automatisk frigżrelse og den forsinkede start p programmerne. 
They include the overlapping of two MFFs, the impact of the automatic decommitment rule and the delayed start of programmes.
Nye faktorer ssom kravene vedrżrende ESI-fondene under FFR for 2014-2020, har bidraget til UF'ernes aktuelle rekordhżje niveau. 
New ones, such as the requirements for ESI funds under the 2014-2020 MFF, have contributed to reaching the current record level of the RAL.
Det fremgr af bde vores skżn65 og Kommissionens prognoser, at stigningen vil fortsžtte fremover. 
Based on our estimations 65 as well as the Commissionуs forecasts, the increase is set to continue in future.
Historien gentager sig 87 En omprogrammering af samme type som den i 2014 fandt sted i 2000, hvor forpligtelser blev overfżrt fra 2000 til 2001. 
History is repeating 87 A reprogramming exercise similar to the one carried out in 2014 took place in 2000, resulting in the transfer of commitments from 2000 to 2001.
Som allerede nžvnt (punkt 30) var starten p FFR for 2007-2013 ogs pvirket af forsinkelser. 
As we have seen (paragraph 30) the start of the 2007-2013 MFF was also affected by delays.
88 I 2004 var de uindfriede forpligtelser vedrżrende programmerne for 2000-2006 3,7 milliarder euro hżjere, end Kommissionen havde forudset i 2002. 
88 In 2004, the level of outstanding commitments for the 2000-2006 programmes was ш3.7 billion higher than the Commission predicted in 2002.
De uindfriede budgetmžssige forpligtelser vedrżrende programmerne for 1994-1999 var p 3,3 milliarder euro, selv om de ifżlge Kommissionens analyse fra 2002 skulle have vžret indfriet fuldstžndigt66. 
Outstanding budgetary commitments for the 1994-1999 programmes were ш3.3 billion, while the Commissionуs 2002 analysis expected them to have been completely liquidated66.
Dette viser, at de forventede UF-niveauer konstant blev undervurderet. 
This shows that the forecasted levels of RAL were constantly underestimated.
89 Da FFR for 2007-2013 blev vedtaget i maj 2006, var det p grundlag af den antagelse, at UF'erne ville belżbe sig til 180 milliarder euro ved udgangen af 201367. 
89 When the 2007-2013 MFF was agreed in May 2006, it was based on the assumption that the RAL would amount to ш180 billion by the end of 201367.
Det faktiske belżb var 222 milliarder euro. 
The actual amount was ш222 billion.
90 Betalingsprognosen vedrżrende programmerne for 2014-2020 var baseret p historiske data fra de to foregende FFR-perioder (2000-2006 og de fżrste r af 2007-64 COM(2002) 528 - Meddelelse fra Kommissionen til Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet - Udviklingen i strukturfondenes budgetgennemfżrelse, isžr med hensyn til uindfriede forpligtelser. 
90 The payments forecast for 2014-2020 programmes was based on historical data from the previous two MFF periods (2000-2006 and the first years of 2007-2013). The Commission assumed that the delays faced in 2007 and 2008 would not be repeated 64 COM(2002) 528 п Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament п Evolution of the budget execution of the Structural funds, in particular outstanding commitments (RAL).
65 Jf. punkt 2.7 i vores rsberetning for 2017. 
65 See paragraph 2.7 of our annual report for 2017.
66 Jf. punkt 2.20 i vores rsberetning for 2004. 
66 See paragraph 2.20 of our annual report for 2004 п paragraph 2.20.
67 "Working document on outstanding commitments (RAL) and the payments issue" - Europa-Parlamentets Budgetudvalg. 37 
67 Working document on outstanding commitments (RAL) and the payments issue - Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament. 37
Kommissionen antog, at forsinkelserne i 2007 og 2008 ikke ville blive gentaget, og at de nye programmer ville starte tidligere68. 
and that the new programmes would start earlier68.
Denne antagelse viste sig at vžre forkert, og forsinkelserne blev faktisk endnu lžngere end i den foregende periode. 
This assumption proved to be wrong, and in fact, the delays were even longer than in the previous period.
91 Da den aktuelle FFR blev vedtaget i 2013, forventedes det, at UF'erne ved udgangen af 2020 ville vžre p over 260 milliarder euro69. 
91 When the current MFF was adopted in 2013, a RAL of more than ш260 billion was forecast for the end of 202069.
Det faktiske tal forventes nu at blive vžsentlig stżrre, primžrt fordi starten p gennemfżrelsen af ESI-fondene var langsommere end forventet. 
Owing mainly to the slower-than-expected start of the implementation of the ESI funds, the actual figure is predicted to be substantially higher.
Kommissionen opererer i sin 2018-prognose70 med UF'er p 295 milliarder euro ved udgangen af 2020 og 314 milliarder euro ved udgangen af 202371. 
The Commissionуs 2018 forecast70 is for a RAL of ш295 billion at the end of 2020, and ш314 billion at the end of 202371.
92 Kommissionen rapporterer, at det har vžret en ekstremt stor udfordring at udarbejde pržcise prognoser for udviklingen i betalingerne under FFR for 2014-2020, navnlig hvad angr ESI-fondene, idet en žndring p (ą) 1 % i gennemfżrelsestempoet fżrer til en žndring p (ą) 4 milliarder euro i betalingsbehovene72. 
92 The Commission reports that, the accurate forecasting of the evolution of payments for the 2014-2020 MFF has proven to be extremely challenging, in particular as regards the ESI funds. рA (╠) 1 % change in the pace of the implementation leads to a (╠) ш4 billion change in the payment needsс72.
93 Det er en kompleks opgave at forudsige UF'ernes omfang eller det fremtidige behov for betalingsbevillinger, men den er afgżrende med hensyn til at udarbejde fremtidige budgetter og undg, at der ophobes et unormalt betalingsefterslžb. 
93 Even though forecasting the RAL or the future need for payment appropriations is a complex exercise, it is an essential part of preparing future budgets and avoiding the build-up of an abnormal payment backlog.
Vi har konsekvent anbefalet Kommissionen at udarbejde langsigtede betalingsprognoser73 og hilser det derfor velkommen, at finansforordningen fra 2018 plžgger Kommissionen 68 Kommissionens arbejdsdokument SWD (2016) 299 final, der ledsagede meddelelsen fra Kommissionen til Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet "Midtvejsgennemgang/midtvejsrevision af den flerrige finansielle ramme for rene 2014-2020 - Et EU-budget med fokus p resultater". 
Having consistently recommended that the Commission produce long-term payment forecasts 73, we welcome that the 2018 Financial Regulation includes an obligation for the Commission to send the European Parliament and the Council an annual long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows covering the next five years 74. 68 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Mid-term review/revision of the multiannual financial framework 2014-2020, An EU budget focused on results, SWD(2016)299 final.
69 Budgetforslag 2019 - overslag udarbejdet af Kommissionen. 
69 Draft Budget 2019 п Statement of estimates prepared by the Commission.
70 COM(2018) 687 af 10.10.2018 - Rapport fra Kommissionen til Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet "Langsigtet prognose for fremtidige ind-og udgende pengestrżmme i EU-budgettet (2019-2023)". 
70 COM(2018) 687 10.10.2018 - Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council рLong-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2019-2023)с.
71 Ud fra den antagelse, at forslagene til den nžste FFR vedtages som foreslet af Kommissionen. 
71 Under the assumption that the next MFF proposals are adopted as proposed by the Commission.
72 Kommissionens "Medium term payment forecast" - 16. oktober 2017. 
72 Commission medium term payment forecast п 16 October 2017.
73 Jf. vores udtalelse nr. 1/2017 (punkt 110-112), vores rsberetning for 2017 (punkt 2.49), vores rsberetning for 2015 (punkt 2.10) og vores rsberetning for 2014 (punkt 2.22). 
73 See our Opinion 1/2017 (paragraphs 110-112), our 2017 annual report (paragraph 2.49), our 2015 annual report (paragraph 2.10) and our 2014 annual report (paragraph 2.22).
Risici vedrżrende fremtidige budgetter 94 Kommissionen mener, at "[stigningen] i de uindfriede forpligtelser for de europžiske struktur-og investeringsfonde i tredje r af programmeringsperioden er en del af den normale fase i gennemfżrelse af fondene, der tidligere blev fulgt for disse fonde. 
Risks for future budgets 94 The Commission considers that рthe increase in the level of outstanding commitments for the ESI funds in the third year of the programming period is part of the normal cycle of implementation observed previously for these funds.
Den jžvne rsprofil for forpligtelsesbevillingerne i perioden 2014-2020, indfżrelsen af n+3-reglen og den langsomme gennemfżrelse medfżrte en vžsentlig stigning i de uindfriede forpligtelser"75. 
The smooth annual profile of the commitment appropriations over the 2014-2020 period, the introduction of the рn+3с rule and the slow implementation led to a significant increase in outstanding commitmentsс75.
Vi mener imidlertid, at de aktuelle rekordhżje UF'er kan fżre til fżlgende risici vedrżrende EU-budgettet. 
We consider, however, that the current high levels of the RAL could lead to the following risks for the EU budget.
Utilstržkkelige betalingsbevillinger i de sidste r af FFR for 2014-2020 95 Vi har allerede nžvnt i vores rsberetninger, at hżje UF'er żger risikoen for, at der opstr et unormalt betalingsefterslžb ligesom i 2013-2015, i takt med at betalingsanmodningerne stiger betydeligt i de sidste r af FFR for 2014-202076. 
Insufficient payment appropriations in the final years of the 2014-2020 MFF 95 We have already noted in our annual reports that a high RAL increases the risk of an abnormal payment backlog, similar to the one encountered during 2013-2015, as the number of claims is set to rise substantially during the final years of the 2014-2020 MFF76.
96 Denne risiko kan reduceres ved hjžlp af "den globale margen for betalinger", som er et sžrligt instrument, der giver mulighed for at fremfżre uudnyttede margener til senere r77. 
96 This risk can be reduced by the рglobal margin for paymentsс, a special instrument that allows the carry-forward of unspent margins to the following years77.
97 Ifżlge Kommissionen78 var der ikke noget unormalt betalingsefterslžb ved udgangen af 2017. 
97 According to the Commission78, there was no abnormal payment backlog at the end of 2017.
Efterslžbet ved udgangen af 2017, som primžrt bestod af anmodninger vedrżrende programmerne for 2014-2020, der blev modtaget for sent til at blive betalt det r, belżb sig imidlertid til 2,3 milliarder euro. 
However, the backlog at the end of 2017, consisting mainly of claims for 2014-2020 programmes that were received too late to be paid that year, amounted to ш2.3 billion.
Dette efterslžb vil sandsynligvis stige i de kommende r i takt med programgennemfżrelsen. 
This backlog is likely to increase in future years as programme implementation advances.
76 Jf. vores rsberetning for 2017, punkt 2.47. 
76 See our annual report for 2017, paragraph 2.47.
77 Jf. vores rsberetning for 2017, punkt 2.9-2.12. 
77 See our annual report for 2017, paragraphs 2.9 to 2.12.
78 "Commission Active Monitoring and Forecast of Budget Implementation Đ 2017 Information Note", 16. marts 2018. 
78 CommissionActiveMonitoringandForecastofBudgetImplementationп2017 Information Note, 16 March 2018. 39
Det vil sige, at gennemfżrelsesforsinkelserne ogs havde en positiv effekt i budgetmžssig henseende og bidrog til at mindske presset p betalingerne. 
This means that the implementation delays had also a positive effect in budgetary terms and helped to reduce the pressure on payments.
Hvis der ikke havde vžret forsinkelser, ville betalingsbehovene imidlertid have vžret meget stżrre i de fżrste r af den aktuelle FFR. 
However, if there had not been delays, the payment needs would have been much higher in the first years of this MFF.
En situation med utilstržkkelige betalingsbevillinger svarende til situationen i 2011-2015 risikerer at opst i den nžste FFR80 (punkt 38). 
A situation of insufficient payment appropriations, similar to the one of 2011-2015, risks being created for the next MFF80 (paragraph 38).
99 Kommissionen berżrte dette spżrgsml i sin langsigtede prognose81. 
99 The Commission noted this issue in its long-term forecast81.
Den anfżrte, at de vedtagne betalingslofter for 2019-2020 og de foreslede betalingslofter for 2021-2023 er forenelige med de forventede behov vedrżrende programmerne for 2014-2020, og en gnidningslżs indfasning af programmerne for 2021-2027. 
It stated that the agreed payment ceilings for 2019-2020 and those proposed for 2021-2023 are in line with the expected needs of 2014-2020 programmes, and the smooth phasing-in of the 2021-2027 programmes.
Yderligere forsinkelser i gennemfżrelsen af ESI-fondene kan lžgge pres p betalingslofterne for 2021-2023 og pvirke deres evne til at džkke de nye udgiftsprogrammer. 
Any further delays in the implementation of ESI funds may put pressure on the 2021-2023 payment ceilings and affect their ability to cover the new spending programmes.
100 Kommissionen og budgetmyndigheden bżr imżdeg denne risiko i overensstemmelse med Rdets afgżrelse om egne indtžgter82, som fastsžtter, at der skal fastholdes en bestemt balance mellem forpligtelsesbevillinger og betalingsbevillinger. 
100 The Commission and the budgetary authorities need to address this risk in line with the Council decision on own resources82, which requires the maintenance of an orderly balance between commitment and payment appropriations.
Vores rsberetninger for 2016 og 2017 indeholdt anbefalinger vedrżrende dette spżrgsml. 
Our annual reports for 2016 and 2017 have included recommendations addressing this issue.