natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Twin-ningprojekterne vedrżrende offentlige indkżb og intern finanskontrol sluttede i 2012 og 2013, og i rapporterne blev der lagt vžgt p behovet for at konsolidere resultaterne (jf. bilag III, projekt nr. 2 og 4). 
Twinning projects on public procurement and internal financial control ended in 2012 and 2013, with reports stressing the need for the consolidation of results (see Annex III, projects No 2 and 4).
Indsatsen p disse omrder fortsžtter gennem SIGMA og politisk dialog. 
Efforts in these areas continue, through SIGMA and policy dialogue.
De specifikke betingelser, der er fastsat for SBS til politiske reformer af de offentlige finanser, afhjžlper ikke disse svagheder. 
However, the specific conditions of the SBS for public finance policy reforms do not address these weaknesses.
EU-finansierede rdgivere (under EUHLPAM-projektet) blev udsendt til institutioner, der er relevante for forvaltningen af de offentlige finanser, som for eksempel det statslige skatteinspektorat, men ingen blev placeret i de tre institutioner, der gennemfżrer budgetstżtteprogrammet (det overordnede revisionsorgan, finansministeriet og parlamentet). 
EU-funded advisers (under the Euhlpam project) were deployed in institutions that are relevant for public financial management, such as the state tax inspectorate, but none took office in any of the three institutions implementing the SBS programme (Court of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, Parliament).
63 Men Kommissionen har siden 2014 lagt stżrre vžgt p at skabe synergi mellem SBS og projekter, hvilket fremgr af et twinningprojekt i Moldovas overordnede revisionsorgan (jf. bilag III, projekt nr. 5) og af den planlagte udsendelse af en EUHLPAM-rdgiver til Parlamentet i 2016. 
63 However, since 2014, the Commission has paid better attention to creating synergies between the SBS and projects, as evidenced by a twinning project at the Moldovan Court of Accounts (see Annex III, project No 5) and the planned deployment of an Euhlpam adviser at the Parliament in 2016.
44 SIGMA (Stżtte til forbedret regeringsfżrelse og forvaltning) er et fžlles EU-OECD-initiativ. 
44 SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) is an EU and OECD joint initiative.
SIGMA-eksperter yder bistand p seks nżgleomrder inden for offentlig forvaltning. (http:// www.sigmaweb.org). 
SIGMA experts provide assistance in six key areas of public administration. (http:// www.sigmaweb.org)
Bemžrkninger 30 Resultaterne var ikke altid bžredygtige som fżlge af manglende politisk vilje og andre eksterne faktorer 64 Projekterne leverede generelt de forventede output. 
Observations 30 The results were not always sustainable due to lack of political will and other external factors 64 Overall, projects delivered the expected outputs.
Som eksempler p konkrete resultater kan nžvnes en onlineplatform for overvgning af aktiviteter, der udfżres af civilsamfundsorganisationer i Moldova, ydelse af strategisk rdgivning til forskellige ministerier, et udkast til lov om statsstżtte og en hndbog i procedurer for forvaltning af EU-stżtte. 
Examples of such concrete achievements include an online platform for monitoring activities carried out by civil society organisations in Moldova, the provision of strategic advice to various ministries, a draft law on state aid or a manual of procedures for the management of EU aid.
65 Der er bekymringer med hensyn til bžredygtigheden af de resultater, der er opnet med projekterne, hvilket ofte skyldes, at de nationale myndigheder mangler politisk vilje til at tackle nogle af hindringerne for en styrkelse af de offentlige myndigheder (jf. tekstboks 7). 
65 Concerns exist on the sustainability of the results achieved with the projects, often due to an insufficient political will on the part of the national authorities to tackle some of the obstacles to strengthening public authorities (see Box 7).
Som det fremgr af bilag III (spżrgsml 1.3), blev der udtrykt en vis bekymring med hensyn til halvdelen af de fjorten projekter, der blev evalueret, og vžsentlige bekymringer med hensyn til resten. 
As shown in Annex III (question 1.3), there were partial concerns for half of the fourteen projects evaluated, and substantial concerns for the rest.
66 Kommissionen ydede teknisk bistand til at stżtte Moldovas statskancelli inden for rammerne af TTSIB-projektet (jf. tekstboks 7) fra 2011 til 2013. 
66 The Commission provided technical assistance to support the Moldovan State Chancellery in the context of the TTSIB project (see Box 7), from 2011 to 2013.
Formlet med dette projekt var at opbygge statskancelliets kapacitet til teknisk lederskab med henblik p identificering, forberedelse og gennemfżrelse af aktiviteter, der finansieres med ekstern bistand, men TTSIB-konsulenterne leverede ogs tjenester, som delvis erstattede de operationelle opgaver, statskancelliets personale udfżrte. 
While the purpose of this project was to build the State Chancellery’s capacity for technical leadership for the identification, preparation and implementation of activities funded by external assistance, TTSIB consultants also provided services which partly replaced the operational tasks of the State Chancellery staff.
Rapporterne om TTSIB-projektet fastslog, at mange af de forventede resultater var blevet opnet, men at statskancelliet ikke havde tilstržkkelig kapacitet til at udfżre opgaver, tilegne sig uddannelse og anvende de opnede fžrdigheder. 
TTSIB project reports considered that, while many expected results had been achieved, the State Chancellery did not have a sufficient capacity to carry out tasks, absorb training and apply acquired skills.
67 I betragtning af de manglende bžredygtighedselementer i tidligere projekter tilskyndede EU-delegationen som et eksempel p god praksis til, at der blev udarbejdet exitstrategier for bde TTSIB-og EUHLPAM-projekterne i fase III. 
67 As a good practice, in view of the absence of sustainability elements in previous projects, the EU delegation encouraged the development of exit strategies for both the TTSIB and the Euhlpam projects in phase III.
Strategien blev imidlertid ikke gennemfżrt i forbindelse med TTSIB, da de moldoviske myndigheder mente, at den var for ressourcekržvende. 
However, in the case of the TTSIB, the strategy was not implemented, as the Moldovan authorities felt that it was too resource intensive.
Bemžrkninger 31 Bžredygtighedsproblemer i forbindelse med et projekt: teknisk bistand til at bist Moldova med at opbygge kapacitet til gennemfżrelsen af stżtteordninger (1,9 millioner euro) Et projekt for teknisk bistand havde til forml at bist Moldovas statskancelli med den overordnede koordinering af EU-stżtte og mere specifikt med at opbygge kapacitet til at anvende twinning-, TAIEX-45 og SIGMA-instrumenter og til at forberede og gennemfżre det omfattende program for institutionsopbygning (TTSIB-projek-tet, jf. bilag III, projekt nr. 6). 
Observations 31 Sustainability issues with a project: technical assistance to support Moldova in building the capacity for the application of aid schemes (1.9 million euros) A technical assistance project supported the Moldovan State Chancellery in the overall coordination of EU aid, and more specifically, in building the capacity for the application of the twinning, TAIEX45 and SIGMA instruments, and in the preparation and implementation of the comprehensive institution-building programme (TTSIB-project, see Annex III, project No 6).
Efter projektets afslutning i 2013 blev en del af koordineringsfunktionen for EU-stżtten overfżrt fra statskancelliet til udenrigsministeriet. 
After the end of the project in 2013, part of the EU aid coordination function was transferred from the State Chancellery to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
De moldoviske myndigheder sikrede ikke, at den viden, statskancelliet havde erhvervet gennem rene, blev bevaret, enten ved overfżrsel af uddannet personale eller coaching af ministeriets ansatte. 
The Moldovan authorities did not ensure that the knowledge acquired over the years by the State Chancellery was preserved, either by transferring trained staff or by coaching staff at the Ministry.
EU-delegationen planlagde et projekt om teknisk bistand for ministeriet, omend af mere begržnset omfang end TTSIB. 
The EU delegation programmed a technical assistance project for the Ministry, albeit one of more limited scope than the TTSIB.
Der er planer om at flytte koordineringsfunktionen tilbage til statskancelliet, men en vžsentlig del af statskancelliets ansatte har forladt kancelliet siden 2013. 
Plans are ongoing to move the coordination function back to the State Chancellery, but a substantial part of the State Chancellery’s staff has left since 2013.
45 TAIEX er Europa-Kommissionens instrument for teknisk bistand og informationsudveksling. 
45 TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European Commission.
TAIEX stżtter offentlige myndigheder i forbindelse med tilnžrmelse til og anvendelse og hndhžvelse af EU-lovgivning samt fremme af udveksling af bedste praksis i EU. 
TAIEX supports public administrations with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation as well as facilitating the sharing of EU best practices.
Konklusioner 32 og anbefalinger 68 EU str over for betydelige udfordringer i forbindelse med implementeringen af bistand i Moldova. 
Conclusions and 32 recommendations 68 The EU faces significant challenges with regard to implementing assistance in Moldova.
Politisk og makrożkonomisk ustabilitet, ringe forvaltningspraksis og svag offentlig forvaltning reducerer i betydelig grad Kommissionens muligheder for at tilskynde til reformer. 
Political and macroeconomic instability, poor governance and weak public administration significantly reduce the Commission’s leverage to encourage reform.
69 Vi undersżgte, om EUŐs bistand til Moldova havde bidraget effektivt til at styrke den offentlige administration. 
69 We examined whether EU assistance provided to Moldova had contributed effectively towards strengthening the public administration.
Med dette for żje vurderede vi, hvor godt Kommissionen havde udformet og implementeret den finansielle stżtte, der blev ydet dels via SBS-programmer, dels via traditionelle projekter. 
To this end, we assessed how well the Commission had designed and implemented the financial support provided via SBS programmes, on the one hand, and by traditional projects on the other.
Revisorerne gennemgik projekter og SBS-programmer i de sektorer, der modtog den stżrste del af EU-stżtten: retsvžsenet, de offentlige finanser, sundhed og vand. 
The audit looked at projects and SBS in the sectors receiving the bulk of EU support: justice, public finance, health and water.
70 P grundlag af revisionen konkluderede vi, at EUŐs bistand kun delvist havde bidraget til at styrke den offentlige administration. 
70 On the basis of our audit work, we concluded that the EU assistance only partially contributed to strengthening the public administration.
Nogle af de mangler, vi konstaterede, kunne forklares med eksterne faktorer. 
External factors explained a number of the shortcomings observed.
Andre skyldtes svagheder i udformningen og gennemfżrelsen af de reviderede programmer og projekter. 
Others could be attributed to weaknesses in the design and implementation of the audited programmes and projects.
71 Der var kun gjort ringe fremskridt i mlsektorerne, og vi konkluderede derfor, at budgetstżtte havde begržnset effekt med hensyn til at styrke den offentlige administration (jf. punkt 38 til 47). 
71 Since little progress had been made in the sectors targeted, we concluded that budget support had a limited effect in strengthening the public administration (see paragraphs 38 to 47).
72 Vi konstaterede ogs, at Kommissionen kunne have reageret hurtigere, nr stżtterelaterede risici materialiserede sig. 
72 We also found that the Commission could have responded more quickly when risks associated with the support materialised.
Programmerne var ikke tilstržkkeligt tilpasset til Moldovas strategier (jf. punkt 13 til 28). 
Programmes were not sufficiently aligned to Moldovan strategies (see paragraphs 13 to 28).
73 De potentielle fordele ved programmerne blev reduceret, fordi mulighederne for konditionalitet ikke var blevet udnyttet tilstržkkeligt: Visse specifikke betingelser blev opfyldt i perioden mellem programforhandlingerne og SBS-programmets start eller kunne ikke mles direkte. 
73 The potential benefit of the programmes was reduced because conditionality was not sufficiently exploited: some specific conditions were fulfilled between programme negotiation and the start of the SBS or were not directly measurable.
Kommissionen kunne have vžret strengere, nr den vurderede, om betalingsbetingelserne var opfyldt (jf. punkt 29 til 34). 
The Commission could have been more stringent when assessing compliance with disbursement conditions (see paragraphs 29 to 34).
Tildelingen af supplerende incitamentsbaserede midler var heller ikke tilstržkkeligt begrundet (jf. punkt 35 til 37). 
Also, the granting of additional incentive-based funds was not fully justified (see paragraphs 35 to 37).
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 33 74 Vi konstaterede, at projektudformningen generelt var relevant. 
Conclusions and recommendations 33 74 Project designs were generally found to be relevant.
75 Omfanget og timingen af projekterne var ikke altid godt nok koordineret med SBS-programmerne (jf. punkt 52 til 63). 
75 The scope and timing of projects was not always well coordinated with SBS programmes (see paragraphs 52 to 63).
Den specifikke SBS-relaterede tekniske bistand til udvikling af den administrative kapacitet kom fżrst flere mneder efter selve SBS-programmet. 
The specific, budget support related, technical assistance for the development of administrative capacity did not start until months after the main budget support programme.
Der blev ikke altid anvendt anden teknisk bistand og twinningprojekter til at forberede eller understżtte SBS-programmerne. 
Other technical assistance and twinning projects were not always used to prepare or support budget support programmes.
76 Projekterne leverede generelt de forventede output. 
76 Projects generally delivered the expected outputs.
Men resultaterne var ikke altid bžredygtige p grund af manglende politisk vilje og andre eksterne faktorer (jf. punkt 64 til 67). 
However, the results were not always sustainable due to lack of political will and other external factors (see paragraphs 64 to 67).
77 P grundlag af ovenstende konklusioner fremsžtter vi fżlgende anbefalinger: Anbefaling 1 Afbżde de risici, der er forbundet med budgetstżtteaktioner Kommissionen bżr anvende de eksisterende foranstaltninger inden for rammerne af systemet for tidlig varsling mere konsekvent til at forebygge eller afbżde risici og mere klart fastlžgge, hvad der skal gżres, hvis risiciene bliver til virkelighed. 
77 Based on the above conclusions, we formulate the following recommendations. Recommendation 1 Mitigate risks linked to budget support operations The Commission should apply the existing measures in the context of the early warning system more rigorously to prevent or mitigate risks and set out more clearly the course of action to be followed where risks become a reality.
Anbefaling 2 Tilpasse SBS-programmerne til en veldefineret national reformstrategi Kommissionen bżr i hżjere grad koble SBS-programmerne sammen med nationale strategier. 
Recommendation 2 Align SBS programmes with a well‐defined national reform strategy The Commission should better link the budget support programmes to national strategies.
Den bżr sekvensinddele stżtten og sikre, at der er en veldefineret national reformdagsorden. 
It should sequence the aid, ensuring that there is a well-defined national reform agenda.
Den bżr specifikt vurdere relevansen og trovžrdig-heden af landets strategi i forhold til de disponible institutionelle og finansielle ressourcer. 
It should specifically appraise the relevance and credibility of the country’s strategy in relation to the available institutional and financial resources.
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 34 Anbefaling 3 Kommissionen bżr styrke anvendelsen af konditionalitet. 
Conclusions and recommendations 34 Recommendation 3 The Commission should strengthen its use of conditionality.
Dette bżr omfatte: i) opstilling af klare og relevante betingelser og resultatindikatorer for bedre at kunne bedżmme og pvise resultater ii) beslutsom, rimelig og hurtig indgriben, hvis Moldovas regering ikke udviser tilstržkkelig vilje til at opfylde de aftalte betingelser. 
This should involve (i) setting clear and relevant conditions and performance indicators to better assess and demonstrate results, (ii) responding firmly, proportionally and quickly where the Moldovan government shows insufficient commitment to comply with what has been agreed.
Anbefaling 4 Knytte supplerende incitamentsbaserede midler klarere sammen med pviselige fremskridt Incitamentsbaserede midler bżr tildeles p basis af en mere stringent anvendelse af de eksisterende metoder. 
Recommendation 4 Link additional incentive‐based funds more clearly to demonstrable progress Incentive-based funds should be allocated on a more stringent application of the existing methodology.
Anbefaling 5 Koordinere projekter og SBS-programmer Kommissionen bżr mere systematisk anvende projekter til at forberede eller understżtte SBS-programmerne. 
Recommendation 5 Coordinate projects with SBS programmes The Commission should use projects more systematically to prepare or support SBS programmes.
Den tekniske bistand i forbindelse med SBS bżr planlžgges bedre, s der kan ydes stżtte til SBS-programmer fra begyndelsen. 
SBS technical assistance should be better timed to provide support for SBS programmes from the outset.
Anbefaling 6 Sikre projekternes bžredygtighed Kommissionen bżr sikre, at bžredygtighedsaspekter integreres i planlžgningen af alle projekter ved mere systematisk at vurdere de offentlige myndigheders kapacitet og politiske engagement til at fastholde resultaterne. 
Recommendation 6 Ensure the sustainability of projects The Commission should ensure that sustainability aspects are embedded in the planning of all projects, by more systematically assessing the capacity and political commitment of public authorities to sustain outcomes.
P Revisionsrettens vegne Vtor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA Styrke anvendelsen af betingelser og resultatindikatorer Formand 
For the Court of Auditors Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA Strengthen the use of conditions and performance indicators President
1.1 Var projekterne udformet hensigtsmžssigt? 
Annexes 39 1.1 Were projects well-designed?
1.3 Gav projekterne konkrete og bžredygtige resultater? 
1.3 Did projects produce tangible and sustainable results?
Kommissionens og 40 EU-Udenrigstjenestens svar Resum V Kommissionen ppeger, at der var sket fremskridt, om end begržnsede, i to ud af fire reviderede budgetstżttesek-torer (vand og folkesundhed), mens der for de to andre (retsvžsen og politiske reformer af de offentlige finanser) stadig var nyere programmer i kraft, s det endnu ikke var muligt at mle deres endelige resultater. 
Replies of the Commission 40 and the EEAS Summary V The Commission points out that there was progress, albeit partial, in 2 of 4 audited Budget Support sectors (water and health) while the other two (justice and public finance policy reform), more recent programmes remain ongoing and their final results can therefore not be measured yet.
Kommissionen reagerede faktisk hurtigt p risici, nr begivenhedsforlżbet og de interne beslutninger tages i betragtning, hvilket fremgr af svarene p punkt 13-28. 
The Commision's response to risk was actually quick taking account of the actual unfolding of events and internal decisions as indicated in the replies to paragraphs 13-28.
Hvad angr udbetaling af budgetstżtte, er den aktuelle situation i Moldova, at alle udbetalinger er suspenderet og afventer opfyldelse af alle generelle betingelser, herunder makrożkonomisk stabilitet og gennemsigtighed i budgettet. 
The present situation with regards to budget support payments in Moldova is that all disbursements are on hold, pending fulfilment of all general conditions, including macro econcomic stability and budget transparency.
En IMF-aftale spiller en nżglerolle her. 
An IMF agreement is essential in this respect.
Hvad angr tilpasning til nationale strategier, opfatter Kommissionen ikke strategier som statiske og formelle. 
Regarding alignment with national strategies, the Commission’s concept of a strategy is not static and formal.
Kommissionen var opmžrksom p de grundlžggende og betydelige elementer i en strategi og tilpassede sig samtidig lżbende til de presserende behov fra en ambitiżs associeringsdagsorden og geopolitiske udfordringer. 
The Commission was attentive to the essential, substantial elements of what should constitute a strategy while constantly adjusting to the pressing needs dictated by an ambitious association agenda and a challenging geopolitical environment.
Kommissionen gik uden tżven videre end de undertiden snžvre nationale strategier, og det viser faktisk, at Kommissionen sikrede de stżrst mulige fremskridt med reformerne under de givne betingelser. 
The fact that the Commission did not hesitate to go beyond the sometimes narrow scope of certain national strategies actually demonstrates that the Commission did ensure that maximum reform leverage would be made from conditions.
Kommissionen understreger, at budgetstżtte som bistandsform bestr af en omfattende pakke af foranstaltninger, herunder udbetaling af midler, kompetenceudvikling, politisk dialog og pržstationsindikatorer. 
The Commission emphasises that Budget Support as an aid modality is a comprehensive package of measures including funding, capacity building, policy dialogue and performance indicators.
Politisk dialog, selv under programmets udarbejdelsesfase, kan medfżre, at regeringen indfżrer foranstaltninger, fżr midlerne er udbetalt, hvilket er meget positivt. 
Policy dialogue, even in the formulation phase of the programme, can result in measures taken by the Government before any funds being transferred which is very positive.
Endvidere understreger Kommissionen, at delvis opfyldelse af pržstationskriterierne ville medfżre delvis udbetaling. 
The Commission further underlines that partial fulfilment of performance criteria would warrant partial disbursement.
Kommissionen anerkender, at vurderingen navnlig i et bestemt tilfžlde kunne have vžret strengere, om end det ikke er systemisk. 
The Commission recognises that in one case, in particular, the assessment could have been more stringent but this is not systemic.
Kommissionen ppeger, at der blev tildelt Čmere for mereÇ-midler efter en intern gennemgang. 
The Commission points out that ‘more for more’ funding was awarded after internal reviews.
Kommissionen traf disse beslutninger i kraft af sit mandat til at gennemfżre ekstern bistand, med politisk vejledning fra EU-Udenrigstjenesten, og medlemsstaterne tiltrdte beslutningerne under fuld hensyntagen til komitologi. 
Those decisions were taken by the Commission under its implementation mandate of external assistance, with political guidance from the EEAS, and endorsed by Member States, in full respect of comitology.
VI Revisionsretten peger med rette p projektudformningens kvalitet samt projekternes effektivitet og output. 
VI The Court rightly points to the quality of project design, their effectiveness and their outputs.
Kommissionen er enig i, at der er behov for at afstemme ržkkefżlgen af teknisk bistand, twinningprojekter og budgetstżtte. 
The Commission agrees on the need for sequencing between technical assistance, twinning projects and Budget Support.
Under de nuvžrende finansielle regler vil der dog altid g nogen tid mellem teknisk bistand eller twinning og budgetstżtte. 
However, in the context of the present financial rules, there will always be a lead time between technical assistance or twinning and budget support operations.