natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efterhnden som programmet udviklede sig, var der imidlertid behov for et skifte hen imod mere institutionsopbygning. 
However, as the programme matured a shift towards more institution building was required.
Dechargemyndigheden bifaldt omlžgningen af bistanden. 
The redirection of assistance was of interest to the discharge authority.
I sin rapport om Det Europžiske Genopbygningsagentur (EGA) offentliggjort i maj 2002, mente Europa-Parlamentet, at EGA burde forhżje EU-bistanden til institutionsopbygning i de to lande (dvs. Forbundsrepublikken Jugoslavien og Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien) meget. 
In its report on the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) published in May 2002, the European Parliament considered that the EAR should significantly increase EU assistance in the two countries (i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in favour of institution building.
Retten analyserede CARDS-projekterne for at fastsl og vurdere andelen af institutionsopbygningsprojekter i forhold til investeringsprojekter (jf. figur 1). 
The Court analysed the CARDS projects in order to determine and assess the proportion of institution building projects compared with investment projects (see Graph 1).
C 285/8 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 27.11.2007 Figur 1 Andel af institutionsopbygningsprojekter i delegationer og i EGA pr. planlžgningsr (1) 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 R (1) Projekter implementeres i deres planlžgningsr og de fżlgende r. 
C 285/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union Graph 1 Proportion of institution building projects in Delegations and in the EAR by programming year (1) 27.11.2007 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 YEAR (1) Projects of each programming year n are implemented in the year n and the following years.
Lige fra starten blev der fokuseret mere p institutionsopbygning i lande, hvor delegationerne (1) forvaltede bistanden, end i lande, hvor EGA (2) forvaltede den. 
From the very beginning the focus on institution building was more pronounced in countries where assistance was managed by the Delegations (1) than in countries where it was managed by the EAR (2).
Twinning anerkendes som et vigtigt instrument (3) til styrkelse af den administrative kapacitet i et land. 
When strengthening the administrative capacity of a country, twinning is recognised as an important instrument (3).
Men twinning var lžnge om at komme i gang i det vestlige Balkan, isžr i Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien, hvor EGA fżrst begyndte at bruge twinning i 2005. 
However, twinning had a slow start in the western Balkans particularly in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where the EAR only started to use twinning in 2005.
En EGA-evaluering af twinning (4) konkluderede, at EGAŐs programledere undertiden kun stżttede twinning i begržnset omfang, og at EGA-ansatte ikke i alle tilfžlde havde tržning nok i brugen af dette instrument. 
An EAR evaluation of twinning (4) concluded that there was sometimes only limited support from the AgencyŐs Programme Managers for twinning and that EAR staff were not always trained sufficiently in the use of that instrument.
(1) Det er Europa-Kommissionens delegationer, der implementerer CARDS-programmerne i Albanien, Bosnien-Hercegovina og Kroatien. 
(1) The EC Delegations are implementing CARDS programmes in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia.
(2) EGAharoperativecentreiDenTidligereJugoslaviskeRepublikMake-donien, Kosovo, Montenegro og Serbien. 
(2) The EAR has operational centres in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.
(3) Kommissionen igangsatte twinning som det primžre instrument til fżrtiltrždelsesbistand til institutionsopbygning allerede i maj 1998. 
(3) The Commission launched twinning as the principal tool of pre-accession assistance for institution building already in May 1998.
Det Europžiske Rd i Thessaloniki i juni 2003 fremhžvede twinnings betydning i det vestlige Balkan. 
The Thessaloniki Summit, in June 2003 underlined the significance of twinning in the western Balkans.
(4) Jf. EGA-evaluering EU/13/040/05 af november 2005. 
(4) Reference made to EAR evaluation EU/13/040/05 of November 2005.
Generelt blev der i lżbet af perioden 2001-2005 lagt 26. fode igen efter krigen, blev der i programudkastene og de tilhżrende projektplaner (5) samt projekterne under implementering taget hensyn til Europa-Parlamentets anmodning om at forhżje EU-bistanden til institutionsopbygning og om nżdvendigt omlžgge den fra investeringsstżtte. 
26. As the countries of western Balkans recovered from the war, the draft programmes and the related Project Fiches (5) as well as the projects under implementation took into account the ParliamentŐs request to increase the EU assistance from investment support to institution building.
Men i en ržkke tilfžlde medfżrte žndringerne af de planlagte projekter, at der blev lagt mindre vžgt p institutionsopbygning (jf. tekstboks 2). 
However, in some cases the changes to the planned projects led to decreased emphasis on institution building (see Box 2).
Tekstboks 2 Omlžgning af et institutionsopbygningsprojekt Ń Integreret gržnseforvaltning i Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien Det rlige program for CARDS 2003 i Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien sigtede blandt andet mod at styrke kontrollen af den grżnne gržnse og afsatte 2,8 millioner euro til dette forml. 
Box 2 Redirecting an institution building project Ń Integrated Border Management in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia The Annual Programme for CARDS 2003 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia envisaged, among other things, to strengthen control of the green border and allocated 2,8 million euro for this purpose.
I henhold til det rlige program var der p kort sigt behov for en ržkke foranstaltninger p omrdet: 1) oprettelse af en mlrettet gržnsebe-vogtningstjeneste, 2) forbedring af ansžttelsesprocedurerne, 3) indfżrelse af en grunduddannelse og et grundigt kursus i gržnse-kontrollering og 4) levering af udstyr til afslżring af falske og forfalskede dokumenter og til hżjteknologisk ransagning af kżretżjer samt vžrktżjer til oplžring i brugen af dette udstyr. 
According to the Annual Programme, there were a number of short-term actions needed in this area: (1) set-up a dedicated border guard service, (2) improve recruitment procedures, (3) provide basic training and in-depth course on border control and (4) supply equipment for detection of forged or falsified documents and for high-tech vehicle searches, together with corresponding training tools.
(5) En projektplan er en kortfattet beskrivelse (4-5 sider i gennemsnit) uden specifikke projektbetingelser. 
(5) A project fiche is a short description (4 to 5 pages in average) without specific terms of reference.
Den indledende beskrivelse omfatter det planlagte projekts interventionslogik, ml, resultater og aktiviteter. 
The initial description includes the foreseen project intervention logic, project objectives, results and activities.
Den giver en vurdering af projektrisici og en definition af objektivt kontrollerbare indikatorer og mder at kontrollere indikatorerne p. 
It assesses the project risks and defines objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) and means to verify these indicators. DEL EAR
27.11.2007 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 285/9 Dette initiativ havde et dobbelt forml: 1) at udbygge de statslige gržnsetjenesters samarbejdskapacitet inden for de eksisterende organisatoriske rammer med henblik p at opfylde presserende behov og 2) at udvikle en ny organisationsstruktur for gržnsepolitiet og operationel kapacitet i overensstemmelse med Den Europžiske Unions standarder. 
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/9 Objectives for this initiative were twofold: (1) To enhance the co-operational capacity of government border services within the existing organisational framework, to fulfil immediate requirements, and (2) to develop a new organisational structure for the border police and operational capacities in compliance with European Union standards.
I stedet for konsekvent at tage fat p ovennžvnte behov, forml og prioriteter brugte EGA hele belżbet p kżb af kżretżjer. 
Instead of consistently addressing the above needs, objectives and priorities, the EAR used the whole amount to purchase vehicles.
Retten fandt ingen beviser p, at CARDS-Udvalget lżbende overvgede projekterne efter godkendelsesstadiet. 
The Court found no evidence of on-going monitoring of projects by the Management Committee after the approval stage.
CARDS-Udvalget interesserede sig med andre ord ikke for, om projekterne blev žndret, nr gennemfżrelsen fżrst var startet. 
In other words the Management Committee did not concern itself with changes to projects once implementation had started.
Produktive forvaltningsstrukturer sikrede, at bistanden blev ydet hurtigt, men gav den nationale administrative kapacitet en udfordring Forvaltningsstrukturerne var ikke altid hensigtsmžssige 28. 
Efficient management structures ensured speedy delivery of aid but national administrative capacity challenged Management structures not always appropriate 28.
I juli 1998 offentliggjorde Retten sžrberetning nr. 5/98 om genopbygningen af det tidligere Jugoslavien (1996-1997). 
In July 1998 the Court published Special Report No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (period 1996 to 1997).
Revisionen omfattede to lande: Bosnien-Hercegovina og i mindre grad Kroatien. 
The audit covered two countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina and to a lesser extent Croatia.
Beretningen kritiserede, at Kommissionen trods EUŐs helt klare hensigtserklžringer ikke formede at omrokere personalet, s der kunne sžttes tilstržkkeligt mange medarbejdere af til genopbygningen af det tidligere Jugoslavien, svel i de centrale tjenestegrene som p stedet i de berżrte omrder. 
The report criticised that despite the EUŐs clear declarations of intent, the Commission was not successful in deploying sufficient human resources to the task of reconstruction in former Yugoslavia, neither at its headquarters nor in the areas under reconstruction.
Retten drog fżlgende konklusioner: a) Det trak i langdrag med at f frigjort de bevillinger, EU havde afsat til genopbygningen, fordi der ikke var udarbejdet en gennemfżrelsesplan, fordi der manglede personale, fordi centraliseringen i Bruxelles var for stžrk, og fordi den lokale administration var behžftet med institutionelle svagheder. b) I 1997 var udnyttelsesgraden for betalingerne vedrżrende EUŐs genopbygningsprogram (29 %) lav i forhold til den gennemsnitlige udnyttelsesgrad for de żvrige donorers betalinger (52 %). c) Det havde vanskeliggjort Kommissionens forvaltning, at de budgetartikler, som genopbygningsforanstaltningerne finansieredes over, var omfattet af tre forskellige forordninger. 
The Court concluded the following: (a) Implementation of the appropriations allocated by the EU for reconstruction was slowed by the lack of an implementation programme, shortage of staff, excessive headquarter centralisation and the institutional weaknesses of the local authorities. (b) In 1997, the disbursement rate of the EUŐs reconstruction programme (29 %) was relatively low compared with the average of other donors (52 %). (c) The co-existence of three separate regulations governing the budget articles used to finance the reconstruction measures hampered the CommissionŐs management.
For at f afhjulpet manglerne ved ydelsen af EU-bistanden anbefalede Retten Kommissionen at dekoncentrere forvaltningen af bistanden til sine delegationer og samtidig gennemfżre aktioner i fžrre sektorer. 
To overcome the deficiencies in EU aid delivery, the Court recommended the Commission should devolve management for its aid effort to its Delegations and focus on a smaller number of sectors.
Som et led i revisionen med henblik p denne beretning vurderede Retten, hvor produktive CARDS-forvaltningsstrukturerne var, og om bistanden blev ydet hurtigt nok, under hensyntagen til ovennžvnte svagheder. 
While taking into account the above-mentioned weaknesses, the CourtŐs current audit assessed the extent to which the CARDS management structures were efficient and whether the aid was delivered with sufficient rapidity.
Revisionen viste, at EU-foranstaltningerne i det vestlige Balkan var blevet vžsentlig mere produktive siden 1998. 
The audit revealed significant improvement in the efficiency of EU operations in the western Balkans since 1998.
Der var sket store forandringer. 
Major changes took place.
For det fżrste samlede CARDS-forordningen retsgrundlaget for foranstaltninger af samme art. 
Firstly, the CARDS regulation unified the legal basis for similar operations.
For det andet blev dekoncentreringsprocessen indledt for at żge tempoet i og hżjne kvaliteten af Kommissionens bistand til tredjelande (1). 
Secondly the devolution process was introduced to improve the speed and quality of EC external aid(1).
For det tredje delegerede Kommissionen en del af implementeringen af bistanden til en ny organisation, der var oprettet specielt til dette forml, Det Europžiske Genopbygningsagentur. 
Thirdly the Commission delegated part of the implementation of the assistance to a new organisation specially created for this purpose the European Agency for Reconstruction.
Alle disse foranstaltninger satte skub i ydelsen af bistanden og gjorde bistanden mere produktiv (jf. tekstboks 3). 
All these actions speeded up aid delivery and improved the efficiency of the assistance (see Box 3).
Tekstboks 3 Eksempel p hżjt tempo i kontraktindgelsen under CARDS EGA blev oprettet, fordi man var nżdt til at handle hurtigt og produktivt for umiddelbart efter krisen i 1999 at tage fat p Kosovobe-folkningens presserende behov ved konfliktens ophżr. 
Box 3 Example of high contracting rates under CARDS EAR was created as a response to the need to act quickly and efficiently when addressing the urgent post-conflict needs of the population in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 crisis.
Retten har under sine tidligere revisioner konkluderet, at EGA-foranstaltningerne i Kosovo umiddelbart efter krisen levede op til de ambitiżse ml, for s vidt angr fundamentale forsyningsanlžg. 
The Court has in its earlier audits concluded that EAR actions in Kosovo immediately after the crisis met the ambitious objectives in the fields of basic services.
Det hżje tempo i kontraktindgelsen er blevet opretholdt i Kosovo igennem hele CARDS-programmet. 
The high contracting rates have been maintained in Kosovo throughout the CARDS programme.
Pr. november 2006 har EGA i Kosovo forvaltet over 1 100 millioner euro p vegne af Kommissionen; ca. 91 % af belżbet er der indget kontrakt om, og ca. 
As of November 2006, the EAR has in Kosovo managed over 1 100 million euro on behalf of the Commission, some 91 % of that money has been contracted and some 86 % disbursed.
Sammen med KFOR-tropperne var EUŐs bistand med til at normalisere livet i Kosovo. 
Along with the KFOR troops, the EUŐs assistance helped normalise life in Kosovo.
I alt blev der brugt fire forskellige tilgange og strukturer (jf. figur 2) til implementeringen af CARDS, hvoraf de fleste ikke gav modtagerstaterne ret megen mulighed for at involvere sig. 
In total CARDS was implemented using four different methods and structures (see Graph 2), most of which left little room for involvement of the recipient states.
Dette skete for at sikre, at bistanden blev ydet hurtigt, og det afspejlede svaghederne ved de nationale forvaltninger. 
This was done in order to ensure speedy delivery of aid and reflected the weaknesses of the national administrations.
(1) Dekoncentreringen har gjort Kommissionens delegationer ansvarlige for projektforberedelsen, indgelse af kontrakter og finansiel og teknisk gennemfżrelse. 
(1) As a result of devolution EC Delegations are responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation.
Som fżlge heraf har den funktion, de centrale tjenestegrene i Bruxelles har, udviklet sig i retning bort fra direkte projektforvaltning hen imod overvgning af og stżtte til delegationerne. 
As a consequence the role of the central services in Brussels evolved away from direct management of projects towards monitoring and supporting Delegations.
C 285/10 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 27.11.2007 Figur 2 CARDS-forvaltningsstrukturerne CARDS-forvaltningstilgange KOMMISSIONEN Central forvaltning fra HS i Bruxelles Ń Regionalt program Ń Told Ń Andet Dekoncentreret forvaltning Delegationen i Ń Albanien Ń Bosnien-Hercegovina Ń Kroatien Decentral forvaltning Ń Albanien (AUF) Ń Kroatien (CFCU) 33. er: a) b) c) d) Hovedtržkkene ved de forskellige forvaltningsstrukturer Central forvaltning gennemfżrt af ELARG (og tidligere Euro-peAid): ELARG forvalter de regionale programmer direkte fra Bruxelles. Regionale programmer fokuserer p styrkelse af den administrative kapacitet f.eks. p toldomrdet og vedrżrende bekžmpelse af organiseret kriminalitet samt stżtte til civilsamfundet. 
Ń Customs Ń Other Devolved management Delegations in Ń Albania Ń Bosnia H. Ń Croatia Decentralised management Ń Albania (ADF) Ń Croatia (CFCU) 33. The main characteristics of the different management structures are as follows: (a) Centralised management by DG Enlargement (and earlier EuropeAid): DG ELARG manages the regional programmes directly from the headquarters. Regional programmes focus on strengthening administrative capacity e.g. in customs, the fight against organised crime and supporting civil society. (b) Devolved management: The EC Delegations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were devolved (1).
Som et resultat af dekoncentreringen blev delegationerne ansvarlige for projektforberedelse, indgelse af kontrakter og den finansielle og tekniske gennemfżrelse. Decentral forvaltning: Kommissionen delegerer implementeringen af nogle programmer til det bistandsberettigede lands (her: Albaniens og Kroatiens) regering. Indirekte central forvaltning: Det Europžiske Genopbygningsagentur (EGA) (2), et uafhžngigt EU-agentur, forvalter programmet i Kosovo (3), Serbien, Montenegro og Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien. 
As a result of devolution, Delegations became responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation. (c) Decentralised implementation: involves the Commission delegating implementation of some programmes to the recipient country Government in Albania and in Croatia. (d) Indirect centralised management: The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) (2), an independent agency of the EU, manages the programme in Kosovo (3), Serbia, Montenegro and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
EGA refererer administrativt til Det Europžiske Rd og til Europa-Parlamentet, men ikke til Europa-Kommissionen. 
The EAR is administratively accountable to the European Council and to the European Parliament, but not to the European Commission.
Retten fandt, at dekoncentreret og indirekte central forvaltning (EGA) sikrede, at bistanden blev ydet produktivt, mens den konstaterede svagheder ved de to andre strukturer (central og decentral forvaltning) (4). 
The Court found that devolved and indirect centralisation (EAR) ensured efficient delivery of aid, whereas weaknesses were noted with the other two structures (i.e. centralised and decentralised) (4).
Bde i delegationerne og i EGA żgede det tempoet for projektforvaltningen, at kapaciteten i de operationelle enheder var udvidet, og at der kunne tržkkes p ansatte med kvalifikationer inden for finansforvaltning og kontraktindgelse p stedet. 
In both Delegations and the EAR, the speed of project management benefited from the increased capacity in the operational units and from having finance and contracts staff available on the ground.
P grund af den żgede kontakt med modtagerne og andre relevante parter og den bedre forstelse af lokale vilkr, risici og muligheder blev resultaterne bedre samtidig med, at problemer kunne lżses hurtigere (5). 
The increased contacts with the beneficiary and other relevant parties and better understanding of local conditions, risks and opportunities improved performance while reducing the time needed to solve problems (5).
Begge de andre implementeringsstrukturer var mindre effektive Ń selv om de mlt i penge var mindre vigtige. 
The two other implementation structures Ń although less significant in monetary terms Ń were less effective.
For den centrale forvaltnings vedkommende Ń et centralt forvaltet regionalt tvžrstatsligt program Ń konstaterede Retten adskillige mangler: a) De midler, der blev afsat til regionalt samarbejde udgjorde kun en meget lille del af af de samlede udgifter (ca. 5 %). 
For centralised management Ń centrally managed regional inter-state programme Ń there were several shortcomings: (a) funds allocated to regional cooperation comprised a very small proportion of total expenditure (around 5 %).
En del heraf blev forvaltet p nationalt, ikke p regionalt niveau, f.eks. integreret gržnseforvaltning. b) Tilsvarende blev hovedparten af programmerne for flygtninges tilbagevenden, som pr. definition er gržnseoverskridende, forvaltet separat i hvert enkelt land. (4) Midtvejsevalueringen af CARDS bekržfter manglerne. 
Some of this was managed at national rather than regional level, e.g. integrated border management; (b) similarly most of the refugee return programmes which, by definition, have cross-border characteristics were managed separately in each country; (4) The shortcomings are also confirmed by the mid-term CARDS evaluation.
(5) Jf. sžrberetning nr. 10/2004 om dekoncentreringen af forvaltningen af EFŐs bistand til tredjelande til Kommissionens delegationer (EUT C 72 af 22.3.2005). 
(5) Reference is made to Special Report No 10/2004 concerning the devolution of EC external aid to the Commission delegations (OJ C 72, 22.3.2005).
27.11.2007 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 285/11 c) I 2003 blev der taget skridt til at involvere modtagerlandene mere i planlžgningen af de regionale CARDS-tildelinger, men alligevel fik landene generelt ikke tilstržkkelige oplysninger om de regionale projekter. hurtigt for det kroatiske finansministerium i praksis. 
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/11 (c) while steps were taken in 2003 to involve beneficiary countries more in the programming of CARDS regional allocations, countries generally did not receive sufficient information of the regional projects. account practical operational realities in the Croatian Ministry of Finance.
Det resulterede i, at decentraliseringsprocessen standsede i perioden 2003-2005. 
As a result the decentralisation process was halted between 2003 to 2005.
S snart CARDS-programmet var overfżrt fra EuropeAid til ELARG i begyndelsen af 2005, tog Kommissionen situationen op til fornyet overvejelse og besluttede i februar 2006 at tage fat p decentraliseringen i Kroatien igen (1). 
Once the CARDS programme moved from EuropeAid to DG ELARG in early 2005, the Commission re-evaluated the situation and decided in February 2006 to restart decentralisation in Croatia (1).
Bistand ydet hurtigt, men uden tilstržkkelig hensyntagen til modtagerlandenes absorberingskapacitet 38. 
Aid delivered rapidly but without taking sufficiently into account recipient countriesŐ absorption capacity 38.
Den Europžiske Revisionsret har i sine beretninger om foranstaltninger udadtil (f.eks. sžrberetning nr. 6/2006 om miljżaspektet i Kommissionens udviklingssamarbejde (2)) flere gange kritiseret Kommissionen for forsinkelser i kontraktindgelsen og gennemfżrelsen af projekterne. 
The European Court of Auditors has in its reports concerning external actions (for instance Special Report No 6/2006 on the environmental aspects of the CommissionŐs development cooperation (2)) repeatedly criticised the Commission of delays in contracting and implementation.