natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
RP (1998-2002)Ó Forvaltningen af indirekte FTU-aktioner under det femte rammeprogram (5. RP) for forskning og teknologisk udvikling (1998-2002) Forelžggelse for Budgetkontroludvalget (COCOBU) ved Franois Colling (medlem af Retten) Europa-Parlamentet, Strasbourg, den 19. april 2004 CLU000034DA02-04PP-FP5-TR.ppt COCOBU, 19.4.2004 1 
Special Report 1/2004 ŇFP5 (1998 to 2002)Ó Management of indirect RTD actions under the 5th Framework Programme (FP5) for Research and Technological Development (1998 to 2002) Presentation to Budgetary Control Committee (COCOBU) by Mr Franois COLLING (Member of the Court) European Parliament, Strasbourg, 19.
Ľ Resumafbemžrkningeroganbefalinger Ľ Konklusion CLU000034DA02-04PP-FP5-TR.ppt COCOBU, 19.4.2004 2 Dagsorden 
April 2004 CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 1
RP ... 
Ľ WhyanauditofFP5?Somebackgroundinformation...
5. RPŐs budget og struktur 
Ľ What is the budget and the structure of FP5?
5. 
Ľ Summaryofobservationsandrecommendations Ľ Conclusion CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 2 Agenda
5. 
million euro Programme periods and budgets of the successive European RTD framework programmes Ľ FP4: 1994 to 1998 Ľ FP5: 1998 to 2002 Ľ FP6: 2002 to 2006 16 000 14 960 CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 5 18 000 17 500 14 000 13 215 FP4 FP5 FP6 12 000 Budget and structure of FP5
5. Sžrberetning nr. RP (1998-2002)Ó: Revisionsml og -metode Ľ Blev 5. 
Audit objectives and approach for Special Report 1/2004 ŇFP5 (1998 to 2002)Ó Ľ Was FP5 managed economically, efficiently and effectively?
Ľ Specifikke revisionsml: Đ TilskudsordningerneogreglerneforEUŐsfinansielledeltagelse Đ Denorganisatoriskestrukturogprocedurerneogmetodernetilgennemfżrelseafindirekte FTU-aktioner Đ It-systemer Đ Deinternekontrolsystemer Đ Rapporteringentildenoverordnedeledelse Ľ beskrivelse af forvaltningssystemet, test af en stikprżve p 53 kontrakter om indirekte FTU-aktioner (stikprżven džkkede alle generaldirektorater og alle sžrprogrammer) igennem hele forlżbet fra start til slut (dvs. fra modtagelsen af et forslag til kontraktens udlżb) og analyse af andet revisionsbevis (ssom gennemgang af retsgrundlag, interne dokumenter, undersżgelser, analyse af statistikker mv.) 
Ľ Specific audit objectives addressed: Đ InterventionmechanismsandrulesapplicabletotheCommunityŐsfinancialparticipation Đ OrganisationalstructureandproceduresandmethodsforindirectRTDactions Đ InformationTechnology(IT)systems Đ Internalcontrolsystem Đ Reportingtoseniormanagement Ľ description of management system by Court, testing of a sample of 53 contracts for FP5 indirect RTD actions (of all Directorates-General and all specific programmes) throughout their Ňlife cycleÓ (i.e. from reception of proposal to closure of contract) and analysis of other audit evidence (such as review of legal basis, internal documents, surveys, analysis of statistics, etc.)
Ľ stedlig revision af 28 kontrakter i 9 medlemsstater (Żstrig, Belgien, Frankrig, Tyskland, Gržkenland, Italien, Spanien, Sverige og Det Forenede Kongerige) CLU000034DA02-04PP-FP5-TR.ppt COCOBU, 19.4.2004 6 Revisionsml og -metode 
Ľ on-the-spot audits of 28 contracts in 9 Member States (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 6 Audit objectives and approach
Tilskudsordninger Ľ Parlamentet og Rdet var meget lžnge om at vedtage afgżrelsen om programmet, gennemfżrelsesforordningen og standardkontrakterne blev vedtaget p et meget sent tidspunkt, og reglerne for Fžllesskabernes finansielle deltagelse er alt for komplicerede Struktur, procedurer og metoder Ľ de gžldende regler for forvaltningen af forslag, kontrakter og projekter er unżdigt komplicerede (f.eks. et meget stort antal standardkontrakter, kontrakterne skal underskrives af alle deltagere) It-systemer Ľ kontrollen af, om de udgifter, de endelige stżttemodtagere har anmeldt, er afholdt og rigtigt beregnet, er ikke fyldestgżrende, og der plžgges ikke sanktioner Interne kontrolsystemer det bżr gżres til en regel, at der skal forelžgges regnskaber, der er attesteret af en ekstern revisor, og der bżr indfżres synlige og afskržkkende sanktioner (som kan afholde deltagerne fra at anmelde for store omkostninger) Đ gennemfżrt under 6. RP Rapportering CLU000034DA02-04PP-FP5-TR.ppt COCOBU, 19.4.2004 7 under et kommende 7. RP anbefales det, at princippet om solidarisk hžftelse styrkes yderligere, og at ordningerne for godtgżrelse af omkostninger forenkles betydeligt Bemžrkninger og anbefalinger 
Intervention mechanisms Ľ Decision by EP and Council, implementing regulation and model contracts adopted late and rules for fixing the CommunityŐs financial participation overly complicated Structure, procedures and methods Ľ legal requirements for proposal, contract and project management unnecessarily complex (for instance large number of model contracts, contract signature by all participants) IT systems Ľ insufficient control over reality and accuracy of costs declared by final beneficiaries and lack of sanctions Internal control system mandatory certification of financial statements by an external auditor and introduction of visible and dissuasive sanctions (as deterrent to participants overclaiming costs) - done in FP6 Reporting CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 7 further strengthening of joint and several liability and drastic simplification of cost systems recommended for a future FP7 Observations and recommendations
Tilskudsordninger Ľ betydelige organisatoriske problemer i startfasen og problemer med at f ansat personale med de nżdvendige fagprofiler Struktur, procedurer og metoder Ľ uproduktive procedurer og administrative praksis bidrager til administrative forsinkelser1 og gżr hele systemet mindre produktivt Đ men specielt fżres der ikke tilstržkkeligt videnskabeligt tilsyn med indirekte FTU-aktioner It-systemer Interne kontrolsystemer forenkling af den organisatoriske struktur (ŇRP-aktiviteterne lžgges sammen i n enhedÓ) og der oprettes centrale support-funktioner Đ delvis gennemfżrt under 6. 
Intervention mechanisms Ľ fragmentation of programmes between Directorates-Generals resulting in a dilution of responsibilities, duplication of functions and increased need for co-ordination Structure, procedures and methods Ľ inefficient procedures and administrative practices contributing to administrative delays1 and reducing the overall system efficiency Đ but in particular insufficient scientific monitoring of indirect RTD actions IT systems Internal control system simplification of organisational structure (Ňmerger of FP-activities in one entityÓ) and setting-up of centralised support functions Đ partly done in FP6 Reporting streamlining procedures (aiming at halving of time-to-contract) and strengthening the role of the co-ordinator 1 time-to-contract (i.e. from reception of proposal to signing of contract) averaging 8 to 9 months, and 12 months from publication of the call for proposal concentration of Community funding on projects with highest likelihood of success based on mandatory mid-term evaluation by external experts CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 8 Ľ significant organisational problems in starting phase and difficulties in recruiting staff with required profiles Observations and recommendations
Tilskudsordninger Ľ Kommissionens (lokale og centrale) edb-systemer til forvaltning af forslag, kontrakter og projekter er ikke p tilstržkkeligt niveau, det skyldes ikke mindst, at der ikke er investeret nok p dette omrde Struktur, procedurer og metoder Ľ i hele 5. RPŐs programperiode var der tekniske og operationelle problemer i de fleste generaldirektorater, disse problemer medfżrte ogs, at Kommissionens statistikker blev mindre plidelige It-systemer Interne kontrolsystemer der indfżres et fžlles og integreret it-system for alle generaldirektorater, som forvalter FTU-rammeprogrammerne indfżrt under 6. 
Intervention mechanisms Ľ inadequacy of the CommissionŐs (local and central) computerised systems for the proposal, contract and project management, not least due to insufficient investment Structure, procedures and methods Ľ technical and operational problems persisted in most Directorates-General throughout the FP5 programme period, diminishing also the reliability of the CommissionŐs statistics IT systems Internal control system deployment of a common and integrated IT system for all Directorates-General operating the RTD framework programmes Đ done for FP6 Reporting significant potential for efficiency gains through phasing out of paper-based transactions during FP6 and fully electronic data exchange in a future FP7 CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 9 Ľ absence of common or integrated information technology (IT) system Observations and recommendations
Tilskudsordninger Ľ test af centrale kontroller viste, at ikke alle kontroller var blevet foretaget effektivt af Kommissionens tjenester. Nogle kontroller blev slet ikke foretaget (fżrst og fremmest kontroller af forhandlingen af forslag til aktioner), men fejlniveauet var ikke vžsentligt Struktur, procedurer og metoder Ľ hżj fejlfrekvens Đ de endelige stżttemodtagere havde anmeldt omkostninger med for store belżb, og betalinger var foretaget for sent (af Kommissionen, men navnlig af koordinatorerne til andre kontrahenter) It-systemer Interne kontrolsystemer retsgrundlaget forenkles, s Kommissionen ikke lžngere skal foretage alt for detaljerede kontroller og undersżgelser (som realistisk set ikke kan gennemfżres med de personaleressourcer, der i dag er til rdighed) Rapportering Ľ forbedringer i den interne kontrol, fordi Kommissionens interne kontrolstandarder er blevet gennemfżrt lidt efter lidt, men der er store forskelle mellem generaldirektoraterne Kommissionens tjenestegrene bżr i fžllesskab fastlžgge kontrolforanstaltninger, som er relevante og nżdvendige, og bruge forebyggende kontroller. 
Intervention mechanisms Ľ improvements in internal control thanks to gradual implementation of CommissionŐs internal control standards, but considerable differences between Directorates-General Structure, procedures and methods Ľ tests of key controls revealed that not all had been operated effectively by Commission services and some controls were found to be lacking (mainly with regard to negotiation), but level of error not material IT systems Ľ significant incidence of overdeclaration of costs by final beneficiaries and late payments (by Commission but in particular by co-ordinators to other contractors) Internal control system simplification of legal base, reducing need for excessively detailed checks and verifications by Commission (which realistically cannot be carried out with the current level of staff resources) Reporting CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 10 joint definition of relevant and necessary controls by all Commission services and use of preventive controls, as well as better monitoring of the operation of internal controls Observations and recommendations
Tilskudsordninger Ľ de fem generaldirektorater har ikke fastlagt fžlles (eller i det mindste harmoniserede) operationelle ml for forskningsomrdet og for gennemfżrelsen af FTU-rammeprogrammerne Struktur, procedurer og metoder Ľ Rapporteringen til Kommissionens direktżrer og generaldirektżrer džkkede ikke alle relevante oplysninger, og der var ikke fastlagt resultatindikatorer for ikke-finansielle/ikke-budgetmžssige aspekter It-systemer Ľ der var ikke indfżrt procedurer, der kunne sikre, at til tiden informationerne til ledelsen udarbejdes, og at rapporterne udarbejdes i et standardformat Interne kontrolsystemer de fem generaldirektorater definerer i fžllesskab operationelle ml og indikatorer, som muliggżr benchmarking mellem Kommissionens tjenestegrene og programmerne Rapportering der udvikles et omfattende rapporterings-og tilsynssystem, s der kan fżres det nżdvendige tilsyn med FTU-rammeprogrammerne, og s det kan kontrolleres, at de interne kontrolforanstaltninger fungerer produktivt og effektivt CLU000034DA02-04PP-FP5-TR.ppt COCOBU, 19.4.2004 11 Bemžrkninger og anbefalinger 
Intervention mechanisms Ľ Lack of common (or at least harmonised) operational objectives at the five Directorates-General for the research area and for the implementation of the RTD framework programmes Structure, procedures and methods Ľ CommissionŐs reporting to Directors and Directors-General did not capture all relevant information and performance indicators for non-financial/budgetary aspects were missing IT systems Ľ lack of procedures to ensure that management-level information is prepared on time and that reports are presented in a standardised format Internal control system joint definition by the five Directorates-General of operational objectives and indicators allowing for a benchmarking of Commission services and programmes Reporting development of a comprehensive reporting and controlling system to permit an adequate monitoring of the RTD framework programmes and the efficient and effective functioning of internal controls CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 11 Observations and recommendations
RP var kendetegnet ved meget komplicerede regler for tilskudsordningerne, som deltagerne i de indirekte FTU-aktioner i mange tilfžlde ikke forstod fuldt ud Ľ det forhold, at fem generaldirektorater i fžllesskab forvaltede 5. RP, samt den organisatoriske struktur i Kommissionens tjenester var ikke med til at sikre den mest produktive anvendelse af fžllesskabsmidlerne Ľ der var ikke tilstržkkelige personaleressourcer til at sikre fyldestgżrende intern kontrol, mulighederne for centraliserede support-funktioner var ikke udnyttet fuldt ud, og support-redskaberne (dvs. manualer, it-systemer, rapportering) džkkede ikke Kommissionens tjenesters behov godt nok Rettens revisionsresultater og anbefalinger tages i betragtning ved udformningen af et kommende 7. 
CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 12 Overall conclusion Ľ FP5 was characterised by the complexity of rules applicable to its intervention mechanisms, often not fully understood by participants in indirect RTD actions Ľ joint management of FP5 by five Directorates-General and organisational structure within the Commission services was not conducive to the most efficient use of Community funds Ľ staff resources were insufficient to ensure adequate internal control, potential for centralised support functions was not fully exploited and support tools (i.e. manuals, IT systems, reporting) did not adequately address the needs of the Commission services CourtŐs findings and recommendations to be taken into account for the design of a future FP7 after 2006
19.5.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 119/1 I (Meddelelser) REVISIONSRETTEN SŽRBERETNING Nr. 2/2006 om resultaterne af de projekter, der finansieres under Tacis i Den Russiske Fżderation, med Kommissionens svar (artikel 248, stk. 4, andet afsnit, EF) (2006/C 119/01) INDHOLD FORKORTELSER ....................................................................... 
19.5.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 119/1 I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 2/2006 concerning the performance of projects financed under TACIS in the Russian Federation together with the CommissionŐs replies (pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC) (2006/C 119/01) TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................
RESUM .................................................................. 
SUMMARY ................................................................
Tacis-programmet....................................................... 
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................
TacisiDenRussiskeFżderation ............................................ 
TheEUandtheRussianFederation .........................................
EUogDenRussiskeFżderation ............................................ 
OBSERVATIONS............................................................
Projektidentifikationog-planlžgning ........................................ 
Rarenationalco-financing ............................................
Projektplanlžgningsprocessenvarforlang ................................ 
Delaysinimplementation .............................................
Dervarsjžldentydetnationalsamfinansiering ............................ 
Ineffectivesteeringcommittees .........................................
I-VII 1-16 1-8 9 10-11 12-16 17-53 18-19 20-22 23-34 23-24 25 26-28 29-31 32-34 35-38 35-36 37-38 39-49 39-40 41 42 43-46 47 Punkt Side 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 
I-VII 1-16 1-8 9 10-11 12-16 17-53 18-19 20-22 23-34 23-24 25 26-28 29-31 32-34 35-38 35-36 37-38 39-49 39-40 41 42 43-46 47 Paragraph Page 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9
C 119/2 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 19.5.2006 Punkt Side Overvgningseksperternearbejdedetilfredsstillende ......................... 48-49 9 Udbredelseafresultater,bžredygtighedogevaluering ........................... 
C 119/2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 19.5.2006 Themonitorsperformedwell .......................................... Dissemination,sustainabilityandevaluation ..................................
50-53 10 Ringeudbredelseafresultater .......................................... 
Conclusions............................................................
50-51 10 Ringebžredygtighed................................................. 
Recommendations ......................................................
56 11 Kommissionens svar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 
ABBREVIATIONS AP Action Programme CBC Cross-Border Cooperation CIS Commonwealth of Independent States DG Directorate-General EuropeAid Europe Aid Cooperation Office MIP Multi-annual Indicative Programme PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement PCM Project Cycle Management RCoA Russian Chamber of Accounts RELEX DG External Relations SME Small and Medium Enterprise SP Strategy Paper TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States ToR Terms of Reference Paragraph Page 48-49 9 50-53 10 50-51 10 52 10 53 10 54-56 10 54-55 10 56 11 TheCommissionŐsreplies ..............................................................
19.5.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 119/3 RESUM I. Under Tacis (1) -programmet har Den Europžiske Union i perioden 1991-2006 ydet over 7 000 millioner euro i bistand til det nye Samfund af Uafhžngige Stater (SNG), som blev oprettet efter Sovjetunionens oplżsning. 
19.5.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 119/3 SUMMARY I. From 1991 to 2006 over 7 000 million euro have been allocated by the European Union for the TACIS (1) programme devoted to assist the newly created Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Mlet for programmet var og er stadig at lette overgangen til markedsżkonomi og styrke demokratiet og retsstaten i modtagerlandene. 
The objective of this programme was and still is to promote the transition to market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the recipient countries.
Europa-Kommissionens tjenester er i gang med at udarbejde et nyt koncept og retsgrundlag for den bistand, der skal ydes fra og med 2007 (jf. punkt 1-8). 
The European Commission services are in the process of devising a new concept and legal basis for assistance from 2007 onwards (see paragraphs 1 to 8).
40 % af alle de midler, der er ydet over programmet, er Den Russiske Fżderation den stżrste stżttemodtager under Tacis. 
The Russian Federation is the largest beneficiary of the TACIS programme, having received about 40 % of all funding under the programme.
200 millioner euro i Tacis-midler til Den Russiske Fżderation om ret. 
In total the TACIS funding allocated to the Russian Federation has been about 200 million euro annually.
Tacis har til sigte at medvirke til at skabe betingelserne for en sund żkonomisk vžkst i Den Russiske Fżderation og udvikle et sandt partnerskab mellem Den Russiske Fżderation og EU (jf. punkt 9-11). 
TACIS aims to help create the conditions for sound economic growth and develop a true partnership between the Russian Federation and the EU (see paragraphs 9 to 11).
Mlet for Rettens revision var at undersżge, om Kommissionen havde forvaltet Tacis-projekterne i Den Russiske Fżderation p en sdan mde, at projekterne havde vžret effektive. 
The objective of the CourtŐs audit was to assess whether the Commission had managed the TACIS projects in the Russian Federation in such a way that these projects had been effective.
Retten reviderede 29 kontrakter (projekter) ud af de i alt 275 kontrakter, som var indget i 2000 eller senere, og som udlżb inden udgangen af 2003, dvs. de seneste projekter, for hvilke bžredygtigheden kunne mles. 
The Court examined 29 contracts (projects) out of a total of 275 from the contracting year 2000 or later and with an expiry date no later than the end of 2003, i.e. the most recent projects for which the sustainability could be assessed.
Disse projekter blev finansieret over handlingsprogrammerne for 1997-2000, og de fleste af dem var blevet gennemfżrt i 2002 og 2003. 
These projects were financed under the Actions Programmes 1997 to 2000, and implemented mainly in 2002 and 2003.
De reviderede kontrakter belżb sig til mere end 56 millioner euro ud af en samlet population p 109 millioner euro (jf. punkt 12-16). 
The total value of the contracts audited was over 56 million euro out of a total population of 109 million euro (see paragraphs 12 to 16).
Rettens generelle konklusioner var, at ni af de reviderede projekter opfyldte mlene. 
Overall the Court concluded that nine of the audited projects achieved their objectives.
Resultaterne af fem af de reviderede projekter var bžredygtige. 
The results of five of the projects were sustainable.
Ovennžvnte revisionsresultater viser, at effektiviteten af de anvendte Tacis-midler har vžret lav. Retten kan derfor ikke give en positiv vurdering af resultaterne af Tacis-projekterne i Den Russiske Fżderation. 
Considering the above audit results, which show that the effectiveness of the use of TACIS funds has been low, the Court cannot assess the performance of TACIS projects in the Russian Federation positively.
Revisionen viste imidlertid, at kontrahenterne og overvgningseksperterne havde opfyldt kravene i deres kontrakter (jf. punkt 55). 
However, the audit revealed that the performance of contractors and monitors met the requirements of their contracts (see paragraph 55).
V. Retten konstaterede, at Kommissionens programmeringssystemer var džkkende. 
V. The Court observed that the Commission had exhaustive programming systems.
Programmeringsprocessen tog imidlertid lang tid, og til trods for Kommissionens indsats var der ikke en egentlig dialog mellem Kommissionen og de russiske myndigheder og stżttemodtagerne. 
However, the programming process took long and, despite the CommissionŐs efforts, there was a lack of a real dialogue between the Commission and the Russian authorities and beneficiaries.
Som fżlge heraf havde de russiske myndigheder i nogle tilfžlde taget imod bistand, som de endelige stżttemodtagere ikke virkelig żnskede. 
As a consequence there were some cases where the Russian authorities accepted assistance, which the final beneficiaries did not actually want.
Det forringede projekternes effektivitet (jf. punkt 20-22). 
This had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the projects (see paragraphs 20 to 22).
Retten bemžrkede ogs, at projektmlene nogle gange var upržcise og ikke-mlelige, og i nogle tilfžlde var der slet ikke fastsat ml. I nogle tilfžlde var de antagelser, der l til grund for mlene, ogs urealistiske (jf. punkt 26-31). 
Other observations were that projectsŐ objectives were sometimes imprecise and not measurable, or sometimes missing, and in some cases underlying assumptions were unrealistic (see paragraphs 26 to 31).
I nogle tilfžlde havde valget af stżttemodtagere ikke vžret hensigtsmžssigt, og det var ikke lykkedes at inddrage stżttemodtagerne (jf. punkt 32-34). 
The selection and involvement of beneficiaries on some occasions was not successful (see paragraphs 32 to 34).