natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
. 8. 17. 87 med mejeriprodukter, men udelukkende i forhold til den del af hele partiet, der faktisk er leveret. 
Official Journal of the European Communities 17. 8. 87 to pay in instalments for milk products, the payments may only be in proportion to the parts of the deliveries that have been completed.
. 
Payment is obviously only due unconditionally where a delivery complies to standard. Rejection by the Commission of expenditure incurred by an intervention agency 4.17 The Commission may refuse to reimburse to the intervention agencies sums that they have wrongly or irregularly expended.in the implementation of Community aid.
. 
It may thus penalize an intervention agency which has overlooked a delivery that did not comply to standard.
. 8. 
The Community's guarantee 4.18.
. 
The recipient concludes an agreement solely with the Community.
. 
It is the latter that undertakes to supply a given quantity of products of a certain nature and quality and obviously it must honour its commitments.
. 
4.19.
. Det samme er tilfældet med søforsikringen ved cif-leveringer og endelig, og ikke mindst, med Fællesskabets garanti. . 
The obligation to implement and, where necessary, to 'reimplement', aid is primarily for the benefit of the recipient, as is marine transport insurance in the case of CIF delivery' and, last but not least, the Community's guarantee.
. 
4.20.
. 
Insurance taken out for intervention cereals primarily protects the intervention agency, which will receive any sums paid out against the policy, whereas insurance for goods 'delivered place of destination' is of benefit to the contractor and is of only indirett assistance as regards the sound implementation of the aid.
. 
The three cases where it is compulsory to insure a product, which at first sight appear to cover all the stages of transport, thus actually represent guarantees of very unequal value, especially for the recipient.
. 1 . 
4.21.
. 
While the objettive of the financial responsibilities placed on the contractor and the intervention agency is to protect Community resources, the three securities serve different purposes.
. 
The objettive of the security against advances and the delivery security, on the other hand, is to cover an intervention agency that has paid an advance or supplied a contractor with a product without requiring him to pay for it first.
. 2. Interventionsorganernes forpligtelser skal dels 'sikre en forsvarlig gennemførelse af fødevarehjælpen i modtage¬ rens interesse, dels beskytte Fællesskabets interesser. Dette gælder f.eks. forpligtelsen til at indhente Kommissionens samtykke forud for betaling af ekstraudgifter. 4. 
But obviously, once the Community has reimbursed the intervention agency for the advance or for the value of the product, the corresponding security then only exists to protect the Community's interests. 4.22. Some of the obligations placed on the intervention agencies aim to ensure that the aid is implemented soundly and in the recipient's interest, whilst others aim to protea the Community; this is true, for example, of the obligation to obtain the Commission's agreement, before any additional sums are expended.
. 3. 
4.23.
. 
The variety of purposes that .these responsibilities and guarantees are intended to serve is significant when it comes to assessing the overall cohesion of the system.
. 
Only guarantees which effectively protea the recipient should be regarded as essential.
. 
When FOB or CIF goods are mobilized on the market, the conservation and transport of the produa up to the place of delivery are not necessarily covered by insurance, unlike the case of delivery at the 'delivered place of destination' stage.
. 
Even in this latter case, the obligation to take out 'appropriate insurance Cover' is vague.
. 
More specific provisions in respea of the point at which the guarantee takes effect and the level of the risks covered would be welcome.
. 5. 
4.25.
. 
Except for marine transport insurance in the case of CIF delivery, there is no guarantee to cover the proper completion of the aid operation downstream of the place and after the time of taking-over.
. 
The guarantees expire at the port of unloading for FOB and CIF deliveries, and the 'delivered place of destination' stage must be seleaed if the operation is to be covered by a series of guarantees up to its arrival at destination.
. 
In particular, it is only in the case of a delivery at the 'delivered place of destination' stage that the ' Commission and intervention agency retain a financial guarantee against thè contractor up to the moment the goods arrive at their destination.
. 4.12). 
The tendering security is itself retained up to the same stage (except in the case referred to under paragraph 4.12 above). 4.26.
. 6. 4. 
In all the other cases (FOB, CIF), which are by far the most frequent, the sum owing to the contraaor is paid after shipment and he is not required to wait until it has been established whether the goods have been unloaded, much less whether they have arrived at their destination in good condition.
. 
Thè fatt is that the contractor is in possession of all the documents required for payment just after shipment and the securities are released on presentation of these same documents.
. 
It is very unsatisfactory that the goods should thus leave Europe without any substantial sum being withheld or guarantee being lodged up to the moment of receipt in the beneficiary country.
. 
For such a guarantee to be meaningful, it would have to be combined with a serious procedure for the reception of goods on arrival at destination. 17.
. 7. 
87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 219/17 Guarantees which may be mobilized directly or via a third party 4.27.
. 
In general, guarantees whose implementation depends upon the cooperation of a third party are of much less value than those which may be mobilized direttly by the holder.
. 4.13), som først kan frigives, når ydelserne er præsteret tilfreds-, stillende, og som dækker varens værdi forhøjet med 10 %. 
Thus, guaranteeing intervention cereals by insurance (paragraph 4.9 above) is less certain than guaranteeing milk products by the compulsory lodging of a security (paragraph 4.13) which cannot be released until after satisfactory completion of the services and which ' covers the value plus 10 %.
. 
Either the intervention agency or the Community assesses whether the conditions for the release of the securities have been met, while in the case of insurance pay-outs, both parties rely upon the insurance, companies, who usually are not short of reasons for refusing payment, by citing one of the many restrictive clauses in the policy.
. 8. 
1 4.28.
. 
In the case of 15 000 t of maize delivered to Mozambique, a flagrant case of poor quality on arrival combined with short weight, the insurance company refused to pay up.
. 
In the case of 974 1 of wheat flour refused by Djibouti in 1982, the insurance company questioned the damage incurred, since the recipient had unwisely refused to unload the goods in question.
. 29. 
4.29.
. 
Similar difficulties arise when certain aspects of food-aid management are delegated in toto to the national intervention agencies.
. 
On the one hand, the intervention agencies, which are intermediaries between-the Community, the recipient and the successful tenderer, are far from taking the view that they are always required to defend above all the formers' interests vis-à-vis the latter.
. 
Some of them sometimes fail to make use of guarantees i which may be used against defaulting contractors.
. 
4.30.
. 
With regard to an allocation of 2 000 t of milk powder to China in 1980, only 500 1 of which was delivered and which, moreover, was not up to standard, the intervention agency reatted very slowly to the news of these infractions, which were established in November 1981.
. 
It was not until October 1983 that it informed the Commission that it intended to institute legal proceedings against the contractor.
. 1 . 
4.31.
. 
On the other hand, the Commission was subjected to repeated pressures from an intervention agency which wanted the penalty . imposed on the contractor to be quashed.
. 
This contractor had loaded food aid onto a boat which was older than the authorized age. He falsely claimed to have used this boat at the request of the Pakistan authorities, whereas in fact he had done so at the request of the Pakistani owner of the boat.
. 
In addition, some of the food aid was missing, so that withholding the tendering security was a good means of ensuring that the contractor fulfilled the contract.
. 
The Commission did not give way to these pressures.
. 2. 
4.32.
. 
In a ruling dated 27 November 1986, the Court of Justice considered that the contractor was not necessarily at fault in making a delivery on a vessel which was over 15 years old, in contravention of the statutory provisions.
. 
It also took the view that a certain sense of proportion should be kept between the penalty and the offence, and that, consequently, in cases of infringements of this type, only a part of the security lodged by the contractor deserved to be forfeited to the Community.
. 
The practical implications of this approach corroborate the Court of Auditor's findings on the ineffectiveness of> the current system of securities.
. 3. 
4.33.
. 
'Where a contractor has defaulted, or even in cases where there is merely doubt as to whether he has correctly fulfilled his contratt, responsibility for not paying over or releasing the securities and for referring the matter to the Commission lies in the first instance with the intervention agency.
. 
If an intervention agency has acted unwisely and paid a defaulting contractor and released his securities, the Community may, of course, as a second resort, refuse to reimburse the intervention agency.
. 
The immediate (that is, monthly) screening of expenditure by the intervention agencies is, however, of limited use.
. 
The intervention agencies' monthly statements are most often accepted as they are.
. 
It is not until several years afterwards, when the accounts are cleared, that the Commission makes a more thorough check of the agencies' expenditure.
. 
Clearance is effected purely by means of sampling and takes place long after the event.
. 4. 
Guarantees to maintain the value of the aid or dissuasive penalties · 4.34.
. 
Obligations and guarantees may serve a dual purpose.
. 
On the one hand, they may represent the threat of a penalty for the contractor or, where appropriate, for the intervention agency and in this respect they constitute a more or less powerful incentive to correct performance of the contratt.
. 
On the other hand, their objettive may be to maintain or make good the financial value of the aid in the event of loss of or damage to the product or failure to implement the aid.
. 5. 
4.35.
. 
The obligation to implement the aid correctly, and the obligation to 'reimplement' where implementation has been unsatisfactory, under penalty of non-payment, may
. 8. 17. 
No C 219/ 18 Official Journal of the European Communities 17. 8.
. 
Similarly, the delivery security and advance security may well represent an almost absolute protection for the intervention agency's finances or for those of the Community and at the same time a very real financial threat for the contraaor.
. 6. 4. 
The same is not, however, true of insurance cover and the' tendering security. 4.36.
. 
Insurance covers offers protection but not very good protection of the interests of the insured party but does not constitute an incentive for the contractor.
. 
This is one of the weaknesses of insurance, as compared with securities.
. Men da sikkerheden kun repræsenterer en beskeden del af leverancens samlede værdi, yder den til forskel fra de øvrige former for sikkerhed ' ingen dækning for fødevare¬ hjælpens økonomiske værdi. , Rækkevidden af det økonomiske ansvar og nærmere defini¬ tion afforpligtelserne 4.37. 
Conversely, tendering securities are designed solely as an incentive for the tenderers, and subsequently the successful tenderer, to observe their obligations, but since they only represent a small percentage of the total value of the supply, unlike the other securities, they do not have the effect of protecting the financial interest involved in the aid.
. Hvis den erhvervsdrivendes ydelse ikke præs¬ teres i overensstemmelse med aftalen, har Fællesskabet en sanktionsmulighed i form af, at det kan nægte at betale hele eller en del af beløbet. 
In theory, financial responsibility is an absolute weapon: if the service rendered by the economic operator is not up to standard, the Community is in a position to penalize him by withholding some or all of the payment.
. 
Then, secondly, if the contractor fails to fulfil his obligations, financial penalties (refusal to pay or withholding of securities) may be imposed.
. 8. 
4.38.
. 
In practice, this system works very badly.
. 
On the one hand, the obligation to reimplement the aid is not systematically enforced.
. 
Of all the unsatisfactory deliveries recorded, the contractor himself only rectified deficiencies in kind in two cases, one of which followed a fraudulent supply of butter to Bangladesh.
. Denne situation skyldes især forsømmel¬ ser fra de garantiberettigedes side og en upræcis afgræns¬ ning af de erhvervsdrivendes forpligtelser. 
On the other hand, the financial penalties are rare and do not by any means reflect the number of cases of deficient quality found. There are two main reasons why this system does not work properly. The first may be ascribed to negligence on the part of the beneficiaries of the guarantees.
. 39. 
Very often the guarantee holder does, not put the guarantee into effect 4.39.
. 
Either the intervention agency declares that they do comply when they do not, as was the case for 15 000 t of maize delivered to Mozambique in 1983, or the goods are unloaded despite the fart that they have been found not to comply to standard.
. 
This was the case for 5 000 t of common wheat dispatched to Benin under the 1980 programme, in spite of the fart that the certificates stated that it was not up to standard.
. 
4.40.
. 
Recipients often fail to make use of the option given them by the legislation to take part in the controls at the time of shipment or to request that such checks be made and to refuse to take the goods over at this stage.
. 
Just as frequently, they refrain from submitting any official complaint even though it has been established, after the arrival of the goods at their destination, that they are of poor quality, and they do not even approach the insurers.
. 
They are hesitant to criticize the quality of a gift and they I do not always carry out a systematic check when the goods arrive.
. 
At the time of the Court's audit visit to Ghana in January 1985, the Ghanaian authorities had not yet . submitted, several months after the goods' arrival, any claims to the insurers for losses. of rice totalling 300 t in respect of two batches under the 1983 programme.
. 
The Tanzanian authorities, who experienced losses of wheat, milk powder and butteroil in 1980 and 1981, submitted their claim to the Commission, instead of applying to the insurers.
. 1 . 
4.41.
. I Indonesien fik en ikke-statslig organisation, som havde modtaget en sådan erstatning, i 1984 Kommissionens godkendelse til at anven¬ de beløbet til afholdelse af et seminar om bedre udnyttelse af fødevarehjælpen. 
The delivery agreements should make reference to this obligation. · In Indonesia one NGO which had received compensation was authorized by the Commisson in 1984 to use the money to organize a seminar to discuss ways of improving the utilization of food aid.
. 2. 
4.42.
. 
It must be admitted that even the threat of the heaviest financial penalties is not always sufficient to sway some particularly unyielding contractors.
. 
The amount at stake in the case of 1 500 1 of skimmed-milk powder delivered to China in December 1981 was almost 1 300 000 ECU.
. 
The contractor nevertheless refused to complete his contract.
. 8. 87 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. C 219/19 til aftaler, hvorefter varen skal leveres »frit bestemmelses¬ sted«. 
17. 8. 87 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 219/19 goods to be delivered in bulk on shipment and 5 % in the case of delivered, place of destination supply agreements.
. 
In the case of a batch of 5 000 1 in bags (usual quantity), a shortage at destination of 250 t, i.e. 5 000 bags of 50 kg, is tolerated.
. 
These tolerances wrongly give preference to the contractor's interests.
. 
Of course, it is true that contraaors are only paid for the quantities actually delivered, but, so long as the shortages stay within the limits authorized by the Community, the contractor is considered to have fulfilled his contract correctly.
. 
The permitted weight discrepancy should be as low as possible at the moment of shipment and the contractor could, at a pinch, be requested to make up any deficiency.
. 
Once the goods arrive at destination, the permitted discrepancy should be far lower than is allowed at present since the transport conditions tend to increase the moisture content and thus the weight.
. 4. 
Cases where the contractor is released from his obligations 4.44.
. 6. 
There are two exceptions not equally justified to the obligation to carry out the aid operation: (i) the first does have some foundation.
. 
The obligation to carry out strictly-defined services involves one major drawback: in most cases, it makes it impossible for the aggrieved party to obtain redress for a failure to complete a contratt because he is unable to produce evidence to show that the failure did indeed relate to one of the stipulated services.
. 7. 
4.47.
. 
The example that best illustrates this weakness is that of the insurance of the goods during sea transport in the case of a CIF supply.
. 
The regulations stipulate that the insurance must cover all the risks. of carriage.
. 
In order to receive compensation, the recipient therefore has to prove that the damage sustained · has been caused by an occurrence during carriage, which will often be difficult, since the carrier is distinctly uninclined to mention hitches or accidents which occurred whilst the goods were in his hands.
. 8. 
4.48.
. Således opdagede Kommissionen fordi der i et bestemt tilfælde manglede 23 t af et parti hvede ved ankomsten til bestemmelsesstedet at tilslagsmodtagerne i Frankrig aldrig tegner forsikring mod tilfælde ' af manko. 
Moreover, it is not true that the insurance policies . cover all the risks of carriage: For example, as a result of 23 t being missing from a consignment of wheat upon arrival at its destination, the Commission found out that in France contractors never insure against shortages.
. 
The 'INCOTERMS' document on delivery stages, published by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, excludes, unless otherwise specified, insurance cover against risks of 'theft, pilferage, leakage, breakage, chipping, sweat' and 'contact with other cargoes', which are regarded as 'special risks'. The successful tenderers, given the price of comprehensive policies, prefer to sign these standard, restrictive policies.
. 
Indeed, it would be very expensive to demand cover for all these special risks.
. 
In the case of an FOB, and especially a CIF, delivery, the fact that the obligations are divided up between the intervention agency, the contraaor and the shipowner very often makes it impossible for the recipient to obtain redress for damage even where it is undeniable discovered at the time of unloading unless he can with certainty attribute the fault or the fraud to one of these three parties involved.
. 
The case of the 15 000 1 of maize delivered to Mozambique in 1983 which was incomplete and unfit for human consumption is typical in this respect.
. 4. 
The insurance company and the intervention agency managed to show that they had no liability, and the contractor was given the benefit of the doubt, pending the outcome of an enquiry which has been under way in the Member State since November 1984.
. 
A series of faulty deliveries of the same product to various countries, carried out in 1985, highlights the same set of problems.
. 8. 17. 7. 
No C 219/20 Official Journal of the European Communities .17.
. 340), er det, selv i tilfælde af en mangelfuld levering frit bestemmelsessted, meget usandsynligt, at en reaktion fra modtagerens side. medfører, at ladningen bliver erstattet. 
87 the case of a faulty delivery at the 'delivered place of destination' stage and in the absence of any ad hoc procedure (see paragraph 3.40), it is highly unlikely that any reaction on the part of the recipient will result in the goods being replaced for him.
. 50. 
4.50.
. Samtidig kan dette kun opnås ved, at der indføres en egentlig forpligtelse til at opnå et bestemt resultat. Denne forpligtelse skal pålægges en enkelt person, og man bør først sørge for, at de forskellige muligheder for at undgå ansvaret ryddes af vejen. 
The Community will not escape from these legal dead-ends without a reversal of the burden of proof. And this can be obtained only by introducing a genuine obligation to achieve a result, entrusted to a single supplier of services, who has previously been deprived · of the various existing legal loopholes, with the exception of the case oí force majeure, itself very strictly delimited.
. 2. 
4.52.
. 
Until recently, the Commission required proof that the fault lay with an operator involved in the execution of the aid operation before agreeing to make good the damage suffered by the recipient and it used this putative liability on the part of one of the operators as an excuse for not acting sooner.
. 
In the case of the 15 000 t of maize for Mozambique, the Commission decided that the damage suffered would not be made good unless the responsibility of the supplier or the insurer was brought into play.
. Såfremt . . . leverandøren er ansvarlig ... vil Kommissio¬ nen gøre alt for at opnå erstatning for den skade, deres land har lidt, men den kan ikke gribe ind, før den kender forsikringsselskabernes reaktion på den sag, modtageren af fødevarehjælpen alene kan indlede« (*). 
In a letter to the Mozambican authorities, it says: 'Insofar as the latter (the supplier's liability) is involved, the Commission will do all it can to obtain redress for the damage suffered by your country, but this action cannot be taken before the Commission knows how the insurers will deal with the claim, and the claim can only be lodged by the aid recipient'.
. Det betyder, at risikoen overgår til modtage¬ ren i lossehavnen, og ikke i lastehavnen, som det synes at fremgå af resten af brevet, som uden tvivl støttes på tilvejebringelsesforordningen, der på dette punkt er i strid med leveringsaftalen. 
This would have been the most advisable course of action, however, especially since the delivery stage specified in the supply agreement made with the recipient was the port of unloading, the transfer of the risks to the recipient taking place only at this port, and not at the port of shipment, as implied by the rest of the letter, which is doubtless based on the mobilization regulation, which contradicts the agreement on this point.
. Generaldirektoratet fulgte derefter en udtalelse fra generaldirektoratet for land¬ brug, hvori det blev foreslået, at man skulle afvente resul¬ tatet af en undersøgelse i en sag, som var indledt mod Frankrig. 
At one point, the Directorate-General for Development, after consulting the Commission's legal service, considered replacing 5 000 1, which was regarded as a fair assessment of the damage suffered, but then it followed the opinion of the Direttorate-General for Agriculture, which suggested deferring any action until the outcome of an infringement enquiry against France was known.
. 
Since this enquiry has not so far come to a conclusion, it is becoming more and more improbable, as time goes by, that the goods will ever be replaced.
. 3. 
4.53.
. 
Take the case of sub-standard milk produtts that were delivered to Tunisia in November 1983: that country will receive compensation from the Community only if an enquiry which the Member State has been asked to make establishes that the contraaor or the intervention agency is liable.