natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen mener, at der kan opns stżrre mervžrdieffekt, hvis EF-initiativprogrammerne i stedet for blot at lżse de gržnserelaterede problemer medvirker til at oprette gržnseoverskridende żkonomiske centre. 
The Commission considers that added value is greater if CIPs contribute to creating cross-border economic centres rather than simply resolving problems still existing at borders.
Valget af denne tilgang gżr det lettere at fastlžgge standardindikatorer, om end der stadig er plads til forbedringer p dette omrde. 
The choice of this approach affects the possibility of laying down standard indicators, even if improvements are possible in this field.
X. Kommissionen vil udarbejde retningslinjer og metodebeskrivelser i god tid, inden den nžste programmeringsperiode starter. 
X. The Commission will present the guidelines and methodology documents well before the next programming period gets under way.
Kommissionen vil som led i forberedelsen af de nye regler overveje, hvilken rolle forhndsevalueringen skal have. 
The Commission is reviewing the role of ex ante evaluation in preparing the new regulations.
Kommissionen vil overveje Revisionsrettens henstilling som led i forberedelsen af den nžste programmeringsperiode. 
The Commission will examine the CourtŐs recommendation when preparing the next programming period.
Den arbejder i żjeblikket p samarbejdets juridiske instrumenter. 
It is working on the legal cooperation instruments.
INDLEDNING 4. a) Kommissionen understreger, at der i retningslinjerne for Interreg III er taget hensyn til henstillingen i punkt 4 a). 
INTRODUCTION 4. (a) The Commission would point out that the recommendation made in 4(a) has been taken into account in the guidelines for Interreg III.
Den henviser til Revisionsrettens konstatering i punkt 7 b). 
It would refer to the CourtŐs observations at 7(b).
KOMMISSIONENS RETNINGSLINJER 12. 
THE COMMISSION GUIDELINES 12.
Kommissionen er enig med Revisionsretten i, at det er vigtigt, at retningslinjerne vedtages, fżr forberedelsen af programmerne begynder. 
The Commission shares the CourtŐs view that it is important that guidelines are adopted before the preparation of programmes starts.
Hvad angr tidspunktet for, hvornr retningslinjerne for Interreg III bliver tilgžngelige, henviser Kommissionen til sit svar p punkt 28. 
On the question of making available the guidelines for Interreg III, the Commission would refer to its reply to paragraph 28.
Med hensyn til spżrgsmlet om specifikke, operationelle og mlelige ml samt mlrettede foranstaltninger henviser Kommissionen til sine svar p punkt 17-25. 
On the question of specific operational and measurable objectives and targeted measures, it would refer to its replies in paragraphs 17 to 25.
15. b) I visse regioner har gržnseoverskridende institutioner vžret indblandet i Interreg-programmerne. 
15. (b) Cross-border institutions had been involved in Interreg programmes in some regions.
P grund af de forskellige juridiske forhold i medlemsstaterne kunne Kommissionen imidlertid ikke etablere egentlige samarbejdsstrukturer, og retningslinjerne blev derfor begržnset til at kržve fžlles forvaltningsorganer. 
However, the different national legal situations meant that the Commission could not prescribe cooperation structures and the guidelines therefore limited themselves to requiring joint governing bodies.
C 303/30 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 7.12.2004 16. 
C 303/30 EN Official Journal of the European Union 7.12.2004 16.
I sine retningslinjer nžvner Kommissionen europžiske żkonomiske firmagrupper (EŻF) som en af de muligheder, der bżr udforskes, hvilket man ogs har gjort i en ržkke programmer, men med temmelig skuffende resultater, jf. punkt 44. 
In its guidelines the Commission gives European economic interest groupings (EEIGs) as one of the avenues to be explored; this was done in a number of programmes but the results were rather disappointing, as is stated in paragraph 44.
Den endelige rapport om den efterfżlgende evaluering af Interreg II, der blev offentliggjort i december 2003, har siden bekržftet, at EŻF-instrumentet ikke er gearet til samarbejdet mellem offentligretlige myndigheder, samt at det er meget tids-og ressourcekržvende at etablere og medfżrer visse problemer i praksis. 
The Final Report on the ex post evaluation of Interreg II published in December 2003 has since confirmed that the EEIG instrument is not geared towards cooperation between public law based authorities and that it is very time and resource consuming to set up and created practical difficulties in operation.
Som afslutning p arbejdet vedrżrende samarbejdets juridiske instrumenter overvejer Kommissionen som et forslagene i den tredje rapport om żkonomisk og social samhżrighed at skabe et juridisk instrument, der kan gżre det lettere at forvalte samarbejdsprogrammerne. a) Nogle af Interregs stżrste mervžrdieffekter kan slet ikke mles. 
On completion of the work carried out in the wake of the study on legal cooperation instruments, the Commission envisaged, in the proposals contained in the third report on economic and social cohesion, creating a legal instrument to facilitate the management of cooperation programmes. (a) Some of the most important benefits of Interreg are not quantifiable.
En af de vigtigste er, at der, ofte for fżrste gang, skabes en ramme for samarbejdet mellem enkeltpersoner, offentlige og private institutioner og virksomheder p tvžrs af gržnserne. 
One of the main ones is to create, often for the first time, a context where cooperation between individuals, public and private institutions and enterprises across borders can take place.
Jo stżrre immaterielt indhold i projekterne, desto svžrere er det at fastlžgge indikatorer. 
The greater the intangible content of projects, the greater the difficulty of developing indicators.
Kommissionen har koncentreret sig om at udvikle indikatorer til at mle de konkrete resultater af gržnseoverskridende og tvžrnationalt samarbejde under bestemte programmer. 
The Commission has concentrated on developing indicators to measure the concrete results of cross-border and transnational cooperation in particular programmes.
De nuvžrende sžt af indikatorer, der er udviklet i forbindelse med hvert enkelt Interreg III-program, er et skridt i denne retning. b) Selv om det i sagens natur er vanskeligt at kvantificere virkninger, der er af udpržget immateriel karakter, har Kommissionen i sine dokumenter forsżgt at give eksempler p indikatorer, der kan anvendes i praksis. Kommissionen erkender, at man p baggrund af de erfaringer, der er gjort med indikatorerne, kan forbedre vejledningen p dette omrde. c) Kommissionen havde kendskab til behovene hvad angr tvžrregionalt samarbejde (linje C). 
In the light of the experience gained in using the indicators, the Commission recognises that there is room for improvement in the guidance on indicators. (c) The Commission was aware of the needs in terms of interregional cooperation (strand C).
I perioden 1994-1999 afholdt den sledes fem indkaldelser af forslag og fik svar fra 1 500 tilbudsgivere, der repržsenterede en ržkke forskellige partnere. 
Over the period 1994 to 1999, it had organised five calls for proposals which had attracted over 1 500 applications each representing a number of partners.
Resultatet af disse indkaldelser var ca. 150 samarbejdsprojekter, der blev finansieret og overvget af Kommissionen. 
In response to these calls it financed and monitored some 150 cooperation projects.
Kommissionen har ud fra disse erfaringer besluttet at koncentrere denne form for samarbejde om at effektivisere regionaludviklings-og samhżrighedspolitikker og -instrumenter. 
On the basis of this experience the Commission decided to focus this type of cooperation on improving the effectiveness of regional development and cohesion policies and instruments.
Kommissionen gżr opmžrksom p, hvor brugbar denne form for samarbejde er i en Union med 25 medlemsstater, hvor regionaludviklingspolitikkerne og -foranstaltningerne forvaltes af adskillige organer og myndigheder. 
The Commission would emphasise the usefulness of this type of cooperation in an enlarged, 25-member Union with many bodies and authorities conducting policies or managing regional development measures.
Kommissionens fremgangmde gik ud p at give medlemsstaterne frit valg blandt en bred vifte af muligheder, fordi forholdene i regionerne er s forskelligartede. 
The Commission adopted the approach of a basket of options from which the Member States could choose because of the diversity of situations in the regions.
Bl.a. som fżlge af de begržnsede midler, der var til rdighed, blev medlemsstaterne bde i retningslinjerne og under forhandlingerne opfordret til at koncentrere hvert enkelt program om sžrlige prioriterede foranstaltninger, der var fastlagt ud fra en sociożkonomisk analyse af forholdene i de pgžldende regioner. 
Both in the guidelines and during the negotiations the Member States were recommended, inter alia, because of the limited funds available, to focus the actions in each programme on certain prioritised measures deriving from the socio-economic analysis of the situation in the regions concerned.
Kun NUTS III-omrder langs med gržnsen var stżtteberettigede. 
Only NUTS III areas along the border could be included.
Sdanne regioner kan vžre ringere stillet end gennemsnittet af de NUTS II-regioner, som de er en del af. 
Such regions may be disadvantaged in comparison with the average of the NUTS II regions to which they belong.
F.eks. er NUTS III-omrder langs gržnsen mellem Bayern og Tjekkiet i en anden sociożkonomisk situation end gennemsnittet af NUTS II-omrderne i Nie-derbayern eller Oberpfalz, som ligger tžt p gennemsnittet for de 15 EU-lande i 2001. 
For example the NUTS III areas on the Bavarian-Czech border face a different socio-economic situation than the average of the NUTS II areas of Niederbayern or Oberpfalz, which are close to the 2001 EU15 average.
Kommissionens hensigt var at lade de decentraliserede myndigheder bestemme, hvilke omrder de żnsker at samarbejde p for at forbedre deres udviklingspolitikker og -instrumenter. 
The Commission wanted to leave the decentralised public authorities the choice of areas in which they wished to cooperate to improve their development policies and instruments.
Derved er styringsudvalgene i stand til at udvžlge de projekter, der bedst kan opfylde mlene for regionaludvikling og samhżrighed. 
This allows steering committees to select the projects best suited to the regional development and cohesion objectives.
17. a) De gržnseoverskridende programmer har stort set de samme ml som de traditionelle strukturfondsprogrammer, bortset fra det sžrlige ml, der er nžvnt i retningslinjernes punkt 9, nemlig Čat oprette gržnseoverskridende żkonomiske og sociale centreÇ. 
17. (a) Cross-border programmes have similar objectives to those of traditional Structural Fund programmes, but with the specific feature set out in point 9 of the guidelines, namely the development of cross-border economic and social centres.
Dette ml kan kun ns ved at skabe s mange forbindelser som muligt mellem sociożkonomiske nabostrukturer, der er adskilt p grund af de nationale gržnser. 
This can only be achieved by developing as many links as possible between neighbouring socio-economic fabrics which, because of borders, have no links.
Det grundlžggende problem for gržnseregionerne er nemlig, at der er s f udvekslinger mellem de aktżrer, der befinder sig p hver sin side af den samme gržnse. 
The fundamental problem for border areas is the limited exchanges between actors on the two sides of the border.
Mange af Interreg-foranstaltningerne er af immateriel karakter, og derfor er det vanskeligt at kvantificere deres virkninger. 
The intangible nature of a great many Interreg operations make it difficult to quantify the impact.
Kommissionen henviser til sine kommentarer til punkt 21 a). b) Kommissionen mener, at den havde adgang til de analy-18. ser, der var nżdvendige for at fastlžgge de generelle ml i retningslinjerne. 
The Commission would refer to its remarks in paragraph 21(a). (b) The Commission believes that the analyses at its disposal 18. were adequate for defining the general objectives in the guidelines.
Retningslinjerne for Interreg III angiver de generelle ml, der skal ns. 
The Interreg III guidelines state the general aims and objectives to be pursued.
De specifikke former for foranstaltninger, der skal indg i et program, bżr imidlertid afhžnge af de forhold, der gżr sig gžldende i den enkelte gržnseregion. 
It is, however, the situation in a particular border region that should determine the specific types of action that need to be covered by a programme.
Medlemsstaternes myndigheder fastlžgger i overensstemmelse med nžrhedsprincippet de konkrete ml og prioriteter for programmerne p grundlag af retningslinjerne for Interreg. 
The definition of the concrete objectives and priorities for the programmes by the Member StatesŐ authorities on the bases of the Interreg guidelines is in line with the principle of subsidiarity.
Da der er tale om meget forskelligartede situationer, har Kommissionen ikke żnsket at fastlžgge fžlles indikatorer p forhnd, men har i stedet givet medlemsstaterne eksempler p mulige indikatorer. 
Given the diverse situations the Commission preferred not to set common indicators ex ante; instead it suggested examples of indicators to Member States.
For at vžre relevante skal indikatorer fastlžgges trin for trin og i samarbejde mellem Kommissionen, forvaltningsmyndigheder og overvgnings-og styringsudvalg. 
Defining indicators is a process which must be carried out on an ongoing basis and in partnership between the Commission, the management authorities and the monitoring and steering committees.
7.12.2004 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 303/31 25. 
7.12.2004 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 303/31 25.
Nr interventionerne koncentreres, lžgges der vžgt p projekter med et hżjt samarbejdsniveau, uanset det pgžldende omrde, af de grunde, der er angivet i punkt 17 og 22 for gržnseoverskridende projekter, og i punkt 25 for tvžrregionale projekter. 
In concentrating operations, preference is given to projects with a heavy cooperation content, whatever the area, for the reasons explained in paragraphs 17 and 22 for cross-border projects and 24 for interregional projects.
En sektorspecifik koncentration er hensigtsmžssig i regioner med udtalte sektorspecifikke problemer, men ikke i et omrde, hvis generelle problem er et svagt sociożkonomisk netvžrk p grund af gržnsen. 
Sectoral concentration is appropriate in regions which have marked sectoral problems but not for a territory confronted with the general problem of weak socio-economic links because of the border.
Det er navnlig p dette omrde, at samarbejdets immaterielle resultater begržnser mulighederne for at udforme pržcise evalueringsindikatorer. 
In this area at least it is the intangible nature of the effects of cooperation, in particular, which limits the possibilities of precise indicators for evaluation purposes.
Kommissionen bestržbte sig p ikke at gżre programmernes forvaltning for kompliceret, da andre definitioner end dem, der gžlder for NUTS III-omrderne, ville gżre det vanskeligere at gennemfżre analyser og organisere partnerskabet. Desuden ville det give anledning til uoverensstemmelser om, hvilke geografiske omrder der er stżtteberettigede under projekterne. 
The Commission was concerned not to complicate programme management, as any definition of areas not based on NUTS III would make analyses and the organisation of partnership more difficult and would also lead to disputes about the geographical eligibility of projects.
Kommissionen drżftede forskellige udkast til retningslinjerne med Komiten for Udvikling og Omstilling i Regionerne henholdsvis den 30. november og den 13. og den 20. december 1999. 
The Commission discussed drafts of the guidelines with the Committee for the Development and Conversion of Regions on 30 November and 13 and 20 December 1999.
Desuden var Kommissionens tjenestegrene inden den formelle godkendelse af retningslinjerne jžvnligt i kontakt med regionerne og rdgav om programmernes udformning. 
Before the formal approval of the guidelines the Commission services were also in regular contact with the regions and gave advice on the drafting of programmes.
Udkast til den sžrlige vejledning om forhndsevaluering og indikatorer i forbindelse med Interreg III var allerede tilgžngelige for medlemsstaterne i den tekniske evalueringsgruppe i november 1999. 
Drafts of the specific guidance on ex ante evaluation and indicators for Interreg III were available to Member States in the Technical Group on Evaluation as early as November 1999.
Som nžvnt i punkt 28 var retningslinjerne kendt, lžnge inden de blev endeligt offentliggjort. 
As stated in paragraph 28 the content of the guidelines was known well before they were finally published.
Derfor tror Kommissionen ikke, at offentliggżrelsesdatoen kan have pvirket kvaliteten af de foreslede programmer. 
The Commission does not therefore believe that the date of publication affected the quality of the proposals.
KOMMISSIONENS GENNEMGANG AF FORSLAGENE TIL EF-INITIATIV-PROGRAMMER 32. 
THE COMMISSIONŐS PROCEDURE FOR EXAMINING CIP PROPOSALS 32.
Under den anden fase af undersżgelsen af forslag blev der foretaget hżringer p tvžrs af tjenestegrenene, hvilket udmżntede sig i et positionspapir, som blev udarbejdet i overensstemmelse med interne instrukser til sikring af programmernes kvalitet. 
The second phase of the examination of proposals involved inter-service consultations and culminated in a position paper. This was drawn up in accordance with internal instructions intended to ensure that the programmes were of good quality.
Det blev lagt til grund for forhandlingerne med myndighederne i medlemsstaterne. 
It served as a basis for negotiations with the Member StatesŐ authorities.
Alle bemžrkninger, der blev fremsat under hżringerne, og al korrespondance med medlemsstaterne blev arkiveret elektronisk og i papirform. 
All the comments made during the inter-service consultation and all correspondence with the Member States were filed in the computer system and in hard copy.
De ansvarshavende tjenestemžnd har systematisk fulgt op p de spżrgsml, der blev rejst i positionspapirerne og drżftet under forhandlingsmżderne. 
Desk officers systematically followed up the points raised in the position papers and discussed in the negotiation meetings.
Ifżlge den žndrede version af programmet, der blev anset for antagelig, skulle der nu ogs nedsžttes et egentligt FTS for at stżtte den samlede forvaltning af programmet (ved forvaltningsmyndighe-den) og delprogrammerne for de interventioner, som de centrale myndigheder har ansvar for i de to lande. 
The corrected version of the programme, which was judged admissible, added the creation of a genuine JTS for support for the overall management of the programme (in the managing authority) and of the subprogrammes as regards operations coming under the responsibility of the central authorities of the two countries.
For ikke at forsinke programmets start accepterede Kommissionen dette forslag, som den ikke betragtede som ideelt, men dog som et fremskridt. 
In order not to delay programme start-up, the Commission accepted this proposal which it felt was not ideal but was an improvement.
Kommissionen har efterfżlgende flere gange taget initiativ til at anmode om en forbedring af FTSŐets situation. b) Det fżrste forslag til programmet for Spanien-Portugal blev afvist efter en kontrol den 18. december 2000. 
Subsequently the Commission took a number of steps to ask for the position of the JTS to be improved. (b) The Spain-Portugal programme proposal was found inadmissible after the check of the first proposal of 18 December 2000.
Forslaget blev antaget den 14. februar 2001, efter der var forelagt yderligere oplysninger. 
The proposal was found admissible on 14 February 2001 after additional documentation had been supplied.
Koordinationsenhedens bemžrkninger til, om programmet for det vestlige Middelhav var antageligt ej, var af kvalitativ art og kunne ikke anvendes som begrundelse for at erklžre programforslaget for uantageligt. 
The comments of the coordination unit on the admissibility of the MEDOC programme were of a qualitative nature and could not be used to justify declaring the programme proposal inadmissible.
Der blev taget stilling til bemžrkningerne i forbindelse med positionspapiret. 
The comments were of a type to be considered in the context of the position paper.
Efter Kommissionen mening var de interne instrukser tilstržkkelige til at sikre en konsekvent og gennemsigtig hndtering af programmerne og samtidig ogs smidige nok til at tage hżjde for de meget forskelligartede programomrder og kvalitetsni-veauer i programforslagene. 
The Commission considers that the internal instructions were adequate to ensure a consistent and transparent treatment of the programmes, while allowing the necessary flexibility to deal with the wide variety of programme areas and of quality in the programme proposals.
Den mener ogs, at medlemsstaterne modtog nok instrukser til at udarbejde forslag (jf. svaret p punkt 28). 
It also considers that the Member States received adequate instructions for drafting proposals (see reply to paragraph 28).
Hvis der var givet flere instrukser, ville det have vžret i strid med nžrhedsprincippet og behovet for at forenkle reglerne mest muligt. 
Further instructions would have run counter to the principle of subsidiarity and to the need to keep rules as simple as possible.
Fristerne for at godkende programmerne blev hovedsagelig overskredet, fordi programmyndighederne var forsinkede med deres revision af forslagene, som fżrst skulle afstemmes med deres partnere (jf. Revisionsrettens bemžrkning i punkt 37.c)). 
The exceeding of the time limit for the approval of programmes was largely due to delays in programme authoritiesŐ revision of their proposals, which first had to be agreed with their partners (see the CourtŐs observation in paragraph 37(c)).
Ogs i Kommissionen var det en stor udfordring at gennemg s mange sagsdokumenter p samme tid, idet nžsten halvdelen af programforslagene blev indgivet i de sidste par uger op til afleveringsfristen. 
Within the Commission, too, it was a considerable challenge to process a large volume of dossiers at the same time, with nearly half of the programme proposals arriving within the space of a few weeks around the deadline for submission.
7/2003 (jf. FN 19) mener Kommissionen ikke, at de fastsatte frister var sžrlig realistiske, navnlig ikke for Interreg. 
As stated in its reply to paragraph 19 of Special Report No 7/2003 (see FN 19), the Commission believes that the regulation time limits were not very realistic, particularly for Interreg.
37. c) Kommissionen henviser til sit svar p punkt 36. 
37 (c) The Commission would refer to its reply to paragraph 36.
Kommissionen har meddelt, at programtillžggene vil blive slżjfet i den nžste programmeringsperiode. 
The Commission has announced that programme complements will be dropped for the next programming period.
C 303/32 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 7.12.2004 39. 
C 303/32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 7.12.2004 39.
Mange aktżrer var stadig beskžftigede med projekter under de gamle Interreg II-programmer, der kunne gennemfżres indtil udgangen af 2001. 
Many actors were still occupied with projects under the old Interreg II programmes, which could be implemented until the end of 2001.
I praksis indskržnkede dette potentialet for nye projekter under de nye programmer, hvilket dermed ogs mindskede virkningerne af den forsinkede offentliggżrelse af retningslinjerne og godkendelse af programmerne. 
This reduced in practice the potential for new projects under the new programmes and therefore also reduced the effect of the delay in the publication of the guidelines and in the approval of programmes.