natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Q υ e --a Ό Ο Q.O 'OOOO OO OO OO O »O O O fvjro ^t fs| ή OV rv.ro (NOV 00 Ν ΓΟΟ Ό O O O J3 OOfN ΓΟ'-' Μ rH VO VO V0CO Ov Tf ro rO Ö VOfOrH.rt ' OV CO CO VO V0 »Ο »Ο Ν . <Ό VO , , J'fvOO ooTf *tj est c4 S . ·Ν vo rt rt co ro M) . 
00 00 vj OS VI VC vi ay Ul Ον NJ ΝΙ VC Ui Ui Ul 4. VC oo Os OSOS MN ww N100 8S O O O o o o O O 88 O Ul o o o o 88 Ui O O O O O O UJ NI Ul 00 NJ 00 88 ο ο Ul Ui Ui Ui O O o o Nl i-> w NJ Ul 00 Ul v| OO .00 H-Ov Ul VC Ui Ul OS Φ.
Nr;C 339/10 De Europæiske Fællesskabers. 
No C 339/10 Official Journal of the European Communities 31.
Tidende 31.12.85 3. 
85 3.
RETTENS REVISION I MEDLEMSSTATERNE Indledning .3.1. 
INSPECTIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE COURT IN THE MEMBER STATES Introduction 3.1.
I 1984 udførte Retten en revision på stedet i adskillige havne i alle de medlemsstater, hvor der drives fiskeri. 
During 1984, the Court carried out on-the-spot inspections in several ports in all the Member States engaging in maritime activities.
Hovedformålet var at efterprøve pålideligheden og effektiviteten af de systemer, hver enkelt medlemsstat har indført, og dermed kontrollere, at de temmelig komplicerede EF-bestemmelser på området anvendes korrekt. 
The main objective was to check the degree of reliability and effectiveness of the systems introduced in each Member State, in order to ensure that the rather complex Community regu¬ lations were being implemented correctly.
Det var så meget mere påtrængende at foretage denne revision, som Kommissionen indtil tidspunktet for Rettens undersøgelse ikke havde aflagt kontrolbesøg af denne art hos de nationale myndigheder. 
These inspec¬ tions were particularly imperative since, prior to the Court's inspection, the Commission had not made any visits of this type to the national administrations con¬ cerned.
Be¬ mærkningerne i det følgende gengiver resultaterne af revisionen, og de' angår de vigtigste punkter, der er nævnt i det foregående kapitel. 
The observations below are based on the results of the investigations carried out and they refer to the most important points raised in the previous chapter.
Overholdelsen afde fælles markedsnormer 3.2. 
Observance of the common marketing standards 3.2.
For følgende landes vedkommende blev der kon¬ stateret mangler med hensyn til anvendelsen af de fælles markedsnormer for sardiner, ansjoser, sild og makrel: (a) I Italien konstateredes det under besøg på fire fiske¬ markeder, at de sardiner og ansjoser, der blev ud¬ budt til salg, systematisk blev betragtet som hørende under én og samme friskheds-og størrelseskategori (»E 3«), selv om der ifølge fællesskabsbestemmelser¬ ne ud over tre friskhedskategorier gælder fire stør-relseskategorier for sardiner og ansjoser. 
Loopholes were found to exist with regard to the application of the common marketing standards to pelagic species (sardines, anchovies, herring and mack¬ erel). The countries concerned are the following: (a) in: Italy, it was noted during visits to four fish markets that thé sardines and anchovies offered for sale were automatically considered to be of one and the same freshness and size category ('E3'), despite the fact that the Community regulations provide' for four size categories, in addition to three freshness categories, for sardines and anchovies.
Forholdet er det, at fangsten sorteres på fiskerfartøjet og deref¬ ter losses i kasser, som alle antages at have samme indhold, både med hensyn til kvalitet og mængde. 
The fish are graded on the vessel and unloaded in boxes which are all supposed to contain the same quality and quantity of fish.
De partier, der udbydes til salg, er i øvrigt ikke mærket i overensstemmelse med fællesskabsbestem¬ melserne. (b) I Grækenland er situationen den, at de fælles mar¬ kedsnormer i almindelighed overhovedet ikke an¬ vendes på sardiner og ansjoser. (c) På den franske middelhavskyst sælges sardiner og ansjoser normalt uémballeret, og prisen fastsættes efter en stikprøvevis vurdering af fangstens kvalitet og størrelse (den såkaldte »agréage«).. 
In addition, the lots displayed for sale are not labelled in accordance with the Community regulations; (b) in Greece, the common marketing standards are not generally applied at all to sardines and anchovies; (c) in France, on the Mediterranean coast, sardines and anchovies are generally sold in bulk on the basis of a sample assessment of the quality and quantity of the catches (a practice known as 'agréage').
En lignende praksis blev konstateret i Irland og Danmark, hv,or sild og makrel sælges før losningen på grundlag af prøver frá fartøjernes lastrum. og for den tilbagetagelsespris, der skal gælde, idet be¬ stemmelsen af mængde og kvalitet må tages med de forbehold, der følger af salgsmetodernes tilnærmelses¬ vise karakter. 
A simi¬ lar system of bulk sales was observed in Ireland and Denmark in the case of herring and mackerel: here the fish is sold prior tò unloading, on the basis of samples taken in the holds of the vessels. " . quality of the product withdrawn from the market and the applicable withdrawal price are established, as the determination of these factors is subject to reservations that 'result directly from the inaccurate methods applied.
Producentorganisationerne 3.4. 
Producers' organizations 3.4.
Den rolle, producentorganisationerne rent fak-. tisk spiller inden for rammerne af den fælles markeds¬ ordning for fiskerivarer, varierer betydeligt fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat. 
The actual role played by producers' organiz¬ ations in the common organization of the market in fishery products varies considerably from one Member State to the other.
Producentorganisationer¬ nes to hovedopgaver er at udarbejde fangstplaner, der giver mulighed for at tilpasse udbuddet til efterspørg¬ slen i fangstsæsonens løb, samt at koncentrere udbuddet, og regulere priserne. 
The two principal tasks assigned to the producers' organizations are the preparation of fishing plans to enable supply to be adapted to demand during the fishing year and the concentration of supply and the regularization of prices.
Det konstateredes imidlertid, at disse to opgaver ingen steder blev udført i fuld overens¬ stemmelse med bestemmelsernes formål. 
It was observed, how¬ ever, that these two tasks were not carried out anywhere entirely in accordance with the objectives laid down in the regulations.
Fangsternes usikre karakter og den hurtige ud¬ vikling i markedsforholdene, der bl. a. påvirkes af ude¬ fra kommende forhold, som landinger fra tredjelandes .fiskerfartøjer, medfører ofte, at producentorganisatio¬ nerne opstiller fangstplaner, som kun indeholder over¬ slag på grundlag af antallet af fartøjer på fiskeri og resultaterne fra tidligere år. 
The random nature of catches and rapid changes in market conditions, influenced among other things by external factors such as the unloading of vessels from non-Member States, often lead producers' organiz¬ ations to draw up fishing plans which confine them-.selves to defining estimates on the basis of the number of vessels in operation and the results of previous years.
Inden for hojsofiskeriet kan nogle organisationeri.et vist omfang »dirigere« medlemmernes fiskeri ved hjælp af instruktioner, som . hver dag sendes til de fartøjer, der er på havet. 
In the high-sea fishing sector, some organizations may to some extent 'guide' the fishing activities of their members, by means of daily instructions transmitted by radio to the vessels in operation.
Dette system, som uden tvivl bidrager til at rationalisere fiskeriet, fungerer imidlertid snarere som en fleksibel styring af fiskeriet fra dag til dag end som en egentlig gennemførelse af en fangstplan. 
This system, which certainly contributes towards rationalizing fishing, nevertheless has more in common with flexible day-to¬ day management than with the implementation of a plan.
Kommissionen bør i denne forbindelse over for producentorganisationerne give en mere præcis redegørelse for, hvad der .skal forstås ved en fangstplan, idet fangstplaner er et betyd¬ ningsfuldt led i reguleringen af markedet ved hjælp af en regulering af tilførslerne. 
In this connection, the Commission should make it clear to the producers' organizations what should be included under the concept of a fishing plan, which is an essential instrument for the upstream stabilization of the market.
Med hensyn til koncentrationen af udbuddet og reguleringen af priserne begrænses producentorganisa¬ tionernes rolle som følge af, at fangsten i de fleste tilfælde sælges på offentlige auktioner, hvor de samme regler for salget gælder samtlige producenter, uanset om de er medlemmer af en organisation. 
In the case of concentration of supply and regu¬ larization of prices, the role of the producers' organiz¬ ations is limited by the fact that, in most cases, the fish is sold at public auctions where the same rules of sale apply to' all producers, irrespective of whether they belong to an organization or not.
I denne sammenhæng reduceres producentorganisationens rolle, som det har kunnet konstateres i visse situationer, idet organisationen i praksis kun sørger for, at EF-tilbagetagelsesprisen anvendes. 
Within such a context, the role of the producers' organization is neutralized, as has been observed in certain cases, and is limited, in practice, to ensuring that the Community withdrawal price is applied.
I øvrigt indebærer EF-reglerne om producentor¬ ganisationer inden for fiskeriet ikke en forpligtelse til, at fiskerne melder sig ind i en organisation. 
Furthermore, the Community regulations governing producers' organizations in the fisheries sec¬ tor do not place fishermen under any obligation to become members.
Ifølge de oplysninger, der blev indhentet i nogle medlemsstater, skal der stadig findes et betydeligt antal producenter, som driver virksomhed uafhængigt af organisationerne. 
Thus, according, to information obtained in certain Member States, there still appears to be a large number of producers carrying out their ' activities independently of any producers' organization.
Dette forhold bekræftes - af oplysningerne i tabel 7. ' 
This fact is confirmed by the data set out in Table 7.
Disse salgsmetoder, som til tider svarer til, hvor¬ 3.3. ledes fisken traditionelt blev solgt før den fælles mar¬ kedsordning blev indført, er ikke i overensstemmelse med de strenge krav, der stilles i fællesskabsbestemmel¬ serne. 
These methods"~of offering fish for sale, which 3.3. sometimes represent traditional practices going back to before the introduction of the common organization of the market, are not in accord with the formal require¬ ments of Community legislation.
1 FR Tyskland 20 Grækenland 3 Frankrig 28 . Irland 2 Italien 15 Luxembourg ; Nederlandene 2 Det forenede Kongerige lait (herunder produkter der opreg nes i bilag I (A) og (D) i grund forordningen) ι 16 . 
6 65 73 35 25 61 50 (78) " (Products listed in Annex I (A) and (D) of the basic Regulation, included in the total) Table 7 Importance of producers' organizations (situation in 1982) 15 · - 2 16 .
(1 335 000) I procent (b)/(a) 90 44 60 ' 6 65 73 35 25 61 50 (78) Kilde: Eurostat, OECD og oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne til generaldirektoratet for fiskeri. (') Anslået. . 
88 C) , . Source: Eurostat, OECD and data forwarded by the Member States to the Directorate-General for Fisheries. (') Estimate.
(2) Den samlede produktion af produkter, der anvendes tilbagetagelsespriser for. 
(2) Total production of products in respect of which withdrawal prices are applied.
(3) I alt for de produkter, der opregnes i bilag I (A) og (D) til grundforordningen. 
(3) Total of products listed in Annex I (A) and (D) of the basic Regulation.
(4) Herunder to producentorganisationer i FR Tyskland og Frankrig. 
(4) Including two producers' associations in the FR of Getmany and France.
Disse producenter .falder derfor uden for den fælles markedsreguleringspolitik, og det kan alt efter for¬ holdene i de enkelte lande bevirke, at den fælles markedspolitik mister sin gennemslagskraft. 3.8. 
These producers are therefore outside the scope of the common policy'on market regulation, which, depending on the situation existing in the various countries, may jeopardize the effectiveness of the common market policy. (b) in some ports in Scotland and on the Italian Adriatic coast, the producers were already organized into cooperatives or associations for administering their common interests.
Det forholdt sig således, at producenterne til tider ikke betragtede den anerkendte producentorgani¬ sation som en sammenslutning"; der skulle fremme en fælles optræden, men frem for alt som et middel til at få adgang til de interventionsforanstaltninger, som finansieres af EUGFL. 
The recognized producers' organization has virtually no staff and practically no resources of its own and is primarily concerned as in the case of Denmark 'with administering the intervention measures It was observed that producers . sometimes 3.8. regard the producers' organization not as a group estab¬ lished for concerted joint action but primarily as a means of gaining access to the intervention measures financed by the EAGGF.
Dette konstateredes i Danmark, i visse havne i Skotland og nogle steder på den italienske Adriaterhavskyst: (a) I Danmark, hvor fiskeriet har meget stor betydning, fandtes der i 1984 kun én producentorganisation, som repræsenterede ca. 86 % af de danske fiskerfar¬ tøjer og 90 % af landingerne. 
This situation was found to exist in Denmark, in some Scottish ports and in certain places on the Italian Adriatic coast, as described below: financed by the EAGGF. Financial compensation .'.'.· (a) in Denmark, a Member State with a very large fishing industry, only one producers' organization existed in 1984, representing about 86 % of Danish fishing vessels and 90% of the 'tonnage landed.
Når der kun findes én anerkendt organisation,, som tilmed er meget stor, kan dette ikke tages som udtryk for, at de danske fiskere helhjertet går ind for den organisationsstruk¬ tur, som fællesskabsbestemmelserne tager sigte på. 
However, the fact that only one, very large, recog¬ nized organization exists suggests less than total commitment by Danish fishermen to the organiz¬ ation model advocated in the Community legis¬ lation.
Under et besøg på stedet konstateredes det, at den danske producentorganisation ikke spiller en aktiv rolle, hverken med hensyn til at tilrettelægge fiske¬ riet eller salget. 
An on-the-spot visit established that the Dan¬ ish producers' organization does not play an active role in either the organization of fishing activities or marketing.
De anerkendte organisationer råder praktisk talt ikke over eget personale eller egne midler, og deres hovedvirksomhed består lige¬ som i Danmark i at administrere de interventions¬ foranstaltninger, der finansieres af EUGFL. Finansiel udligning Denaturering af varer, der er taget tilbage fra markedet 3.9. I henhold til en af de regler, der gælder om tilbagetagelse fra markedet, skal varerne, når de er landet, klassificeret, udbudt til salg og taget tilbage fra markedet, gøres uegnet til konsum straks efter tilbageta-gelsen (artikel 2, stk. 
It is essentially an accounting and administrative body, responsible for processing application files, with a view to obtaining financial compensation, and for calculating the amounts involved; - Denaturing of products withdrawn from the market 3.9. , According to one of the rules applying to with¬ drawal operations, once the products have been unloaded, graded, offered for sale and withdrawn from the market, they must be rendered unfit for human consumption immediately after withdrawal (paragraph 2 of Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 1501/83 (6)), to prevent them being reintroduced into the standard distribution network.
Den almindeligt anvendte metode til at gøre de varer, der ër taget tilbage fra markedet, uegnet til konsum er denaturering ved hjælp af et farvestof. ' ' 
The method generally used for rendering fish withdrawn from the market unfit for human consumption is that of denaturing by means of a dye. ' .. .
Nr. C 339/12 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 31. 12. 
No C 339/12 Official Journal of the European Communities 31. 12.
85 3.10. 
85 3.10.
Under revisionen konstateredes følgende forhold: Ja) I en fransk middelhavshavn blev de varer, der blev taget tilbage fra markedet specielt sardiner end ikke bragt i land, og de blev ikke denatureret, men blev genudsat. 
The following findings were made: (a) in a French Mediterranean port (Port Vendres), the products withdrawn from the market, particularly sardines^were not even unloaded, did not undergo ' any denaturing process and were, thrown back into the sea.
Genudsætteisen blev således ikke kontrolleret, hverken af vedkommende produ¬ centorganisation eller af de lokale myndigheder, og . der var ikke mulighed for at kontrollere dokumen¬ ter, hvori forholdene var registreret. (b) I Italien og Danmark er der fortsat problemer, og der er ikke udstedt udtrykkelige bestemmelser med henblik på at sikre, at kravet om, at tilbagetagne fiskerivarer gøres uegnet til konsum, overholdes konsekvent. (c) I Irland i en havn, hvor der blev aflagt besøg, sendes de tilbagetagne mængder til forarbejdning i fiske¬ melsfabrikken uden forudgående denaturering, eller også opbevares de uden denaturering i fartøjernes kølerum, indtil de genudsættes. (d) I Nederlandene er der i de nationale retsregler gjort undtagelse fra fællesskabsbestemmelserne (1J) for så vidt angår større tilbagetagne mængder. 
This operation is therefore not monitored either by the competent producers' organization or by the local authorities and it was not possible to . inspect any document relating to this operation; (b) there are still problems in Italy and Denmark, and no formai1 provision has been adopted to ensure ' systematic observance of the requirement that fish withdrawn from the market be rendered unfit for human consumption; (c) at a port visited in Ireland, the quantities withdrawn are either sent for processing at the fish meal factory without prior denaturing or kept, without denatur¬ ing, in the cold storage tanks of trawlers before being thrown back into the open sea'; (d) in the Netherlands, the national regulations have introduced a derogation from the Community regu¬ lations (n) in the case of withdrawals of large quan¬ tities of fish.
Undtagel¬ sen skyldes, at denatureringen ikke sker straks på salgsstedet, men foregår i frysehusets lokaler. 
This is because denaturing does not take place immediately, at the place of sale, but is effected on the premises of cold storage companies.
De forhold, der er konstateret i de nævnte medlemsstater, udgør en egentlig overtrædelse af for¬ pligtelsen til at gøre de tilbagetagne varer uegnet til konsum straks efter tilbagetageisen, og de indebærer, at de væsentlige sikkerhedsforanstaltninger, som er op¬ stillet i fællesskabsbestemmelserne for at fjerne mu¬ ligheden for besvigelser, sættes ud af kraft. 
The situation observed in the. abovementioned Member States amounts to failure to comply with the obligation to render products withdraw from the mar¬ ket unfit for human consumption immediately after withdrawal. In addition, it effectively negates substan¬ tial precautionary measures provided for in Community legislation in order to forestall the possibility of fraud.
Hvis ikke bestemmelserne bliver efterfulgt i højere grad, bør Kom¬ missionen overveje at indføre en egentlig kontrol med tilbagetagelserne. 
If these provisions are not observed more scrupulously, the Commission should consider introducing proper ' measures to supervise withdrawal operations.
Overholdelsen af EF-tilbagetagelsesprisen 3.12. 
Observance of the Community withdrawal price 3.12.
En gennemgang på stedet af dokumentationen vedrørende de salg af fiskerivarer, der er foretaget af de italienske producentorganisationer på de besøgte markeder, viste, at sardiner og ansjoser til tider blev solgt til priser under EF-tilbagetagelsesprisen, selv om de i henhold til bestemmelserne skulle være taget tilbage de grundlæggende betingelser for at yde finansiel udlig¬ ning, og den er i strid med princippet om, at man ved hjælp af markedsreguleringen søger at opretholde producenternes indkomstniveau. 
An on-the-spot inspection of the documen¬ tation relating to sales made by producers' organiz¬ ations in Italy at the fish markets* visited showed that sardines and anchovies are sometimes sold below the Community withdrawal price, whereas they should have been withdrawn from the market according to the regulations. 3.13. Failure to observe the Community regulations is supposed to disqualify the offenders from any entitle¬ ment to financial compensation for the year in question.
Finansielt medansvar for producentorganisationernes med¬ lemmer 3.14. 
Financial solidarity among members of producers' organizations 3.14.
I Italien konstateredes det, at de fire producent¬ organisationer, der blev aflagt besøg hos, blot udbetaler de modtagne finansielle udligningsbeløb til de medlem¬ mer, der er berørt af tilbagetagelserne, uden at der udredes beløb af egne midler. 
In Italy, the four producers' organizations visit¬ ed restrict themselves to paying the sums obtained by way of financial compensation, to those of their mem¬ bers who withdraw products without making any con¬ tribution out of their own funds.
Princippet om, at organi¬ sationen som helhed har et finansielt medansvar (jf. pkt. 2.14), overholdes således ikke. 
The principle of the financial solidarity of the organization as a whole (see paragraph 2.14) is therefore not observed.
Prolongationspræmie 3.15. 
Carry-over premium 3.15.
Anvendelsen af prolongationspræmien indebæ¬ rer, at producentorganisationerne kan benytte deres egne eller andre virksomheders forarbejdnings-og op¬ lagringsfaciliteter, og at de kan afsætte de forarbejdede produkter på et marked, som ofte er et andet end markedet for de ferske varer. 
Applying for this premium brings with it the option, for producers' organizations, of using process¬ ing plants and storage facilities, either on their own or in sub-contracted operations, and being able to dispose of the processed product on a market which will often be different from that of the fresh product.
Prolongationspræmien synes ikke at være et tilstrækkeligt incitament til, at alle de producentorganisationer, der kunne have inter¬ esse heri, giver sig i kàst med forarbejdning og markeds¬ føring, hvilket de ofte hidtil ikke har beskæftiget sig med. ' .3.16. 
The carry¬ over premium does not appear to constitute a strong enough incentive to encourage all the producers' organ¬ izations potentially involved to undertake processing and marketing operations, which are often new to them. 3.16.
Reglerne om prolongationspræmien er kun ble¬ vet anvendt i Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland og i be¬ grænset omfang på grund af de små mængder, der tages tilbage fra markedet i denne medlemsstat. 
The premium has been used only by the Federal Republic of Germany, to a limited extent, on account of the small quantities of fish withdrawn from the market in that country.
I de øvrige medlemsstater har reglerne ikke været taget i anvendel¬ se. 
In the other Member States there was no occasion for use of the premium.
Retten må derfor konstatere, at formålet med fælles¬ skabsbestemmelserne om prolongationspræmien, nem¬ lig at det »undgås at destruere fisk af høj handelsvær¬ di«, kun i ringe grad er opfyldt. 
The Court therefore notes that the objective set by the Community regulations in this respect i.e. to avoid 'the destruction of fish of a high commercial value' hás been achieved only Very incompletely.
Særlig prolongationspræmie Lagerregnskaber 3.17. 
Special carry-over premium Keeping of stock records 3.17.
De græske virksomheder, der har karakter af håndværksvirksomheder, kan dårligt opfylde kravet om, at· der skal føres lagerregnskab. 
The small-scale fishery undertakings to be found in Greece are not easily able to comply with the requirement of keeping records.
Partierne under hver en¬ kelt kontrakt blev ikke fulgt fra det tidspunkt, hvor de ferske eller frosne sardiner blev modtaget, og indtil de blev oplagret som konserves. 
The lots covered by each contract are not monitored from the arrival of the fresh or frozen sardines up to the moment when they are stored ín tinned form.