natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Fra og med programperioden 2007-2013 har Kommissionen beregnet "risikobelżb" for de enkelte programmer. 
Since the 2007‐2013 programme period the Commission has calculated the “amount at risk” for each programme.
Disse belżb aggregeres p medlemsstatsniveau og offentliggżres i den rlige aktivitetsrapport. 
These amounts are then aggregated at Member State level and published in the AAR.
Disse indikatorer angiver programmernes risiko i de enkelte r og viser den mžngde ikke-stżtteberettigede udgifter, der potentielt kan medfinansieres i hvert program eller hver medlemsstat, beregnet p grundlag af Kommissionens oplysninger. 
These indicators present the programmes’ risk for the given year and they show the potential amount of ineligible expenditure co‐financed for each programme or Member State on the basis of the information available to the Commission.
Eftersom Kommissionens foranstaltninger hovedsagelig bżr vedrżre de mest risikobehžftede programmer, er det sandsynligt, at spredningen af risikobelżbene vil korrelere med spredningen af de finansielle korrektioner, Kommissionen har plagt. 
As the Commission’s measures should mostly affect the riskiest programmes, there is likely to be a correlation between the distribution of the amount at risk and the distribution of financial corrections imposed by the Commission.
Vi undersżgte derfor, om der var en sdan korrelation. 
We therefore analysed whether such a correlation exists.
Programrisikoindikatorerne for de enkelte medlemsstater korrelerede med de bekržftede/besluttede finansielle korrektioner 69. 
Programme risk indicator by Member State correlated with confirmed/decided financial corrections 69.
Differencen mellem et "risikobelżb" og Kommissionens og medlemsstaternes finansielle korrektioner er den kumulerede restrisiko (jf. punkt 32 og 33). 
The difference between the “amount at risk” and the Commission’s and Member State’s financial corrections is the cumulative residual risk (CRR) (see paragraphs 32 to 33).
Ved sin vurdering af OP'erne kržver Kommissionen, at de finansielle korrektioner, som medlemsstaterne og 42 30 Artikel 89, stk. 1, litra a), i forordning (EF) nr. 1083/2006. 
When assessing the OPs, the Commission requires that financial corrections imposed by Member 41 30 Article 89.1a of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006.
Kommissionen har plagt, er hżje nok til at sikre, at denne indikator ligger under vžsentlighedstžrsklen p 2 %31. 
States and by the Commission are high enough to ensure that this indicator is below a 2 % materiality threshold31.
Figur 9 viser de enkelte medlemsstaters programrisiko - som beregnet af Kommissionen i form af risikobelżb - og Kommissionens finansielle korrektioner vedrżrende de enkelte medlemsstater i perioden 2007-2013. 
Figure 9 shows the programme risk level by Member State as indicated by the Commission’s amount at risk and the level of Commission’s financial corrections per Member State for the 2007‐2013 period.
Korrelationsanalysen viser ogs tendenslinjen (det samlede forhold pr. medlemsstat mellem programrisikoen og Kommissionens finansielle korrektioner) og 45Ą-linjen (hvor de finansielle korrektioner ville svare til programrisikoen). 
The correlation analysis also displays the trend line (the overall relation for the Member States between the programme risk and the financial corrections imposed by the Commission) as well as the 45 line (points where financial corrections would equal the programme risk level).
Vores korrelationsanalyse viser, at tendenslinjen ligger under 45Ą-linjen (jf. figur 9). 
Our correlation analysis shows that the trend line is below the 45 line (see Figure 9).
Det indikerer, at Kommissionens finansielle korrektioner generelt er lavere end risikobelżbene. 
This indicates that financial corrections imposed by the Commission are generally at a lower level than the amount at risk.
Dette kan forklares af to forhold: - at risikoen for medfinansiering af ikke-stżtteberettigede udgifter (risikobelżb) delvis modvirkes af de finansielle korrektioner, der plžgges p grundlag af medlemsstaternes kontrol, s problemstillingen ikke forelžgges for Kommissionen - at Kommissionen kržver, at de finansielle korrektioner bringer den kumulerede restrisiko ned under vžsentlighedstžrsklen p 2 % (ikke ned p nul). 
This can be explained by two factors: - the risk of co‐financing ineligible expenditure (amount at risk) is partly addressed by the financial corrections already imposed as a result of Member State controls without the issue reaching the Commission; and - the Commission requires that financial corrections bring the CRR below the 2 % materiality threshold (and not to zero).
De fleste af medlemsstaterne ligger tžt p tendenslinjen. 
Most of the Member States are close to the trend line.
Det indikerer, at Kommissionens finansielle korrektioner samlet set korrelerer med de risikobelżb, Kommissionen har beregnet32. 73. 
This indicates that the level of financial corrections imposed by the Commission overall correlates with the Commission’s assessment of the amount at risk32.
31 32 43 Jf. den rlige aktivitetsrapport for 2015 fra GD for Regionalpolitik og Bypolitik, s. 
31 32 42 See AAR 2015 of DG Regional and Urban Policy, p.
75, og den rlige aktivitetsrapport fra GD for Beskžftigelse, Sociale Anliggender, Arbejdsmarkedsforhold og Inklusion, s. 
75 and AAR of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, p.
Korrelationskoefficienten p 0,65 tyder p en moderat positiv korrelation mellem risikobelżb og finansielle korrektioner p medlemsstatsniveau. 
The 0.65 correlation coefficient suggests a positive moderate correlation between the amount at risk and the level of financial corrections at Member State level.
Korrelationskoefficienten er en indikator, der viser, i hvilken grad to variablers bevžgelser er forbundet med hinanden. 
The correlation coefficient is an indicator, which shows the degree to which the movement in two variables are associated.
Dens mulige vžrdier ligger mellem -1 og 1, idet de to yderpunkter angiver henholdsvis en fuldstžndig negativ og en fuldstžndig positiv forbindelse, og nul angiver, at der ikke er nogen forbindelse, dvs. at de to variabler bevžger sig uafhžngigt af hinanden. 
Its possible values range between ‐1 and 1, the two extreme points indicating a perfect negative or positive link and zero indicating no link, i.e. the two variables move independently of each other. 73.
I de tilfžlde, hvor en medlemsstat ligger vžsentlig under tendenslinjen, er Kommissionens finansielle korrektioner lavere end det potentielle risikobelżb, der er angivet for medlemsstatens programmer. 
Where Member States are significantly below the trend line, the level of financial corrections imposed by the Commission is lower than the potential amount at risk indicated for the Member State’s programmes.
Det gžlder f.eks. for Frankrig og Spanien, som begge anvendte finansielle korrektioner p eget initiativ. 
This is, for example, the case for France and Spain, which both applied financial corrections on their own initiative.
Dermed undgik de, at Kommissionen plagde yderligere finansielle korrektioner. 44 
By doing this, they avoided additional financial corrections being imposed by the Commission. 43
Programmer for europžisk territorialt samarbejde (ETS) gennemfżres af mere end n medlemsstat. 
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) programmes are implemented by more than one Member State.
Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret p grundlag af oplysninger fra Kommissionen. 
Source: European Court of Auditors based on information provided by the Commission.
Forholdet mellem de finansielle korrektioner og risikobelżbet pvirkes ogs af sager under behandling. 
The relation between the level of financial correction and the amount at risk is also influenced by ongoing cases.
Sager, der endnu ikke har net det sidste proceduretrin, indgr i beregningen af risikobelżbet, mens de fremtidige finansielle korrektioner, der kan fżlge af disse sager, ikke er gengivet. 
Cases which have not yet reached the final stage of the procedure are included in the amount at risk, while the possible future financial corrections resulting from these cases are not yet reflected in the numbers.
Dette har sžrlig betydning i Spaniens tilfžlde, hvor der pr. udgangen af 2015 var suspenderet 20 operationelle programmer, og betalingsanmodninger vedrżrende yderligere syv programmer var afbrudt (svarende til 70 % af alle igangvžrende forebyggende foranstaltninger). 
This is particularly the case for Spain where 20 operational programmes were under suspension and for a further seven programmes, payment claims were interrupted as of the end of 2015 (representing 70 % of all on‐going preventive measures).
Kommissionens interne procedurer for perioden 2007-2013 skal sikre en harmoniseret behandling af sager i alle programmer og medlemsstater 76. 
The Commission’s internal procedures for the 2007‐2013 period aim to ensure harmonised treatment of cases across programmes and Member States 76.
Kommissionen bżr sikre en harmoniseret behandling af sager i alle programmer og medlemsstater og sikre, at de forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner gennemfżres, fżr betalingerne genoptages. 
The Commission should ensure harmonised treatment of cases across programmes and Member States and that preventive measures and financial corrections are implemented before payments are resumed.
Vi analyserede derfor Kommissionens interne procedurer for plžggelse af forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner samt for godkendelse af, at forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner er gennemfżrt, og undersżgte, hvordan disse procedurer fungerer i praksis. 
We therefore analysed the Commission’s internal procedures for imposing preventive measures and financial corrections, for accepting preventive measures and financial corrections as implemented and verified how these procedures work in practice.
Afgżrelser om afbrydelse og suspension af betalinger samt finansielle korrektioner drżftes og aftales i udvalg under den żverste ledelse 77. 
Decisions on payment interruptions and suspensions and financial corrections are discussed and agreed upon by senior management committees. 77.
Vedrżrende perioden 2007-2013 nedsatte Generaldirektoratet for Regionalpolitik og Bypolitik og Generaldirektoratet for Beskžftigelse, Sociale Anliggender, Arbejdsmarkedsforhold og Inklusion hvert sit udvalg for afbrydelser, suspensioner og finansielle korrektioner (ISFCC). 
For the 2007‐2013 programme period, the Directorate‐General for Regional and Urban Policy and the Directorate‐General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion set up their own Interruptions, Suspensions and Financial Corrections Committees (ISFCC).
Hvert udvalg fungerer som et forum i det pgžldende generaldirektorat, hvor man kan drżfte spżrgsml og tržffe afgżrelser vedrżrende advarsler, afbrydelser, suspensioner og finansielle korrektioner (jf. ogs bilag I). 
These committees provide a forum within each directorate‐general to discuss matters and take decisions related to warnings, interruptions, suspensions and financial corrections (see also Annex I).
Der afholdes regelmžssige mżder i udvalgene, der bestr af generaldirektżren, vicegeneraldirektżren/vicegeneraldirektżrerne, de relevante direktżrer og repržsentanter for de juridiske enheder. 
Both committees meet on a regular basis and consist of the director‐general, the deputy director‐general(s), relevant directors and representatives of the legal units.
ISFCC-mżderne sikrede et bedre overblik over og en bedre drżftelse af samtlige generaldirektoratets sager og procedurer vedrżrende forebyggende foranstaltninger og 46 finansielle korrektioner og bidrog til at harmonisere behandlingen af sager og holde den żverste ledelse underrettet om aktuelle spżrgsml. 
The meetings of the ISFCC ensured a better overview and discussion of all cases and procedures related to preventive measures and financial corrections within the Directorate‐ General to help to harmonise treatment of cases and inform senior management of the ongoing issues. 45
Forvaltningen og opfżlgningen af forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner var meget tids-og personalekržvende 79. 
The management and follow‐up of preventive measures and financial corrections required a significant commitment in terms of time and staff resources 79.
Fżr de forebyggende foranstaltninger kan ophžves og betalingerne genoptages, skal medlemsstaterne generelt foresl planer over foranstaltninger, der kan korrigere systemerne, s der ikke opstr fejl fremover. 
In order to lift preventive measures and resume payments Member State authorities must generally propose measures aimed at correcting systems so as to prevent errors occurring in the future.
De kaldes afhjžlpende handlingsplaner (jf. bilag I). 
These are called remedial action plans (see Annex I).
I vores stikprżve p 20 programmer bad Kommissionen i 44 af de 72 undersżgte sager medlemsstaten om at udarbejde en afhjžlpende handlingsplan (jf. punkt 38). 
Within our sample of 20 programmes, the Commission requested a remedial action plan to be set up in 44 of the 72 cases examined (see paragraph 38).
Dernžst skal medlemsstaten meddele Kommissionen, at den afhjžlpende handlingsplan er blevet gennemfżrt. 
Member States then need to inform the Commission that a remedial action plan has been implemented.
Kommissionen har flere metoder til at vurdere, om betingelserne for at ophžve de forebyggende foranstaltninger er opfyldt: a) For det fżrste gennemgr Kommissionen systematisk de oplysninger, der indsendes af medlemsstatens myndigheder (normalt det berżrte OP's forvaltningsmyndighed) b) For det andet kan Kommissionen ogs bede revisionsmyndigheden om at bekržfte oplysningerne fra forvaltningsmyndigheden. 
The Commission has several ways of assessing whether the conditions for lifting have been fulfilled: (a) first, the Commission systematically reviews the information sent by Member State authorities (generally by the managing authorities of the OPs concerned). (b) second, the Commission may also ask the audit authority to confirm the information provided by the managing authority.
Kommissionen bad om revisionsmyndighedens bekržftelse i 31 af de 44 undersżgte sager vedrżrende 18 af de 20 programmer. 
Of these 44, the audit authority’s validation was requested in 31 cases for 18 of the 20 programmes.
I disse sager opnede Kommissionen yderligere sikkerhed med hensyn til, om de aktioner, medlemsstaternes myndigheder foreslog, var hensigtsmžssige c) For det tredje kan Kommissionen selv fżlge op p sager i medlemsstaterne. Sagerne til opfżlgningsrevision udvžlges p grundlag af en risikoanalyse: Det vil typisk vžre sager, hvor Kommissionen ikke kan sžtte sin lid til revisionsmyndighedens arbejde, eller hvor der er brug for yderligere oplysninger. 
In these cases, the Commission obtained additional assurance regarding the appropriateness of the actions proposed by the Member State authorities. (c) third, the Commission can perform its own follow‐up of cases in the Member States. Cases for follow up audits are selected on a risk basis: where the Commission cannot rely on the work of the audit authority or where additional information is needed.
I alt foretog Kommissionen 62 opfżlgningsrevisioner af handlingsplaner vedrżrende 70 OP'er i programperioden 2007-2013. 
Overall, the Commission carried out 62 follow‐up audits of action plans in relation to 70 OPs in the 2007‐2013 programme period.
Forvaltningen og opfżlgningen af forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner var meget tids-og personalekržvende for generaldirektoraterne. 
The management and follow‐up of preventive measures and financial corrections required a significant commitment in terms of time and staff resources from the Directorates‐General.
Tilbageholdelse af store betalinger fra EU-budgettet til medlemsstaterne er ogs et politisk 47 fżlsomt emne, og Kommissionen holder tžt kontakt til medlemsstaterne for at sikre, at betingelserne for at ophžve foranstaltningerne er opfyldt. 
Holding back large payments from the EU budget to Member States is also politically sensitive and the Commission is in close contact with Member States to ensure that the conditions for lifting measures are in place.
I nogle tilfžlde er det endda ministre eller statsoverhoveder, der drżfter sagerne med generaldirektżrerne og kommissžrerne. 
Some cases are even discussed between ministers or heads of state and Directors‐General and Commissioners. 46
Kommissionens korrigerende foranstaltninger lžgger pres p medlemsstaterne for at f dem til at afhjžlpe svagheder i deres forvaltnings-og kontrolsystemer Forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner vedrżrer normalt komplekse problemer, som det tager lang tid at lżse 82. 
The Commission’s corrective measures put pressure on Member States to address weaknesses in their management and control systems Preventive measures and financial corrections generally deal with complex issues which take a considerable time to resolve 82.
Kommissionens procedurer i forbindelse med forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner bżr vžre s hurtige, som problemernes kompleksitet tillader det. 
Commission procedures related to preventive measures and financial corrections should be as quick as possible, while taking account of the complexity of the issues.
Vi analyserede derfor de 72 sager i vores stikprżve for at fastsl procedurernes samlede varighed og lžngden af de forskellige faser. 
We therefore analysed the 72 cases in our sample to determine the total duration and the length of the different phases of the procedures.
Kommissionens procedure har ikke samme varighed som betalingsblokeringen (jf. punkt 93). 
The duration of the Commission’s procedures does not equal the length of the payment blockage (see paragraph 93).
Kommissionens procedure begynder med den udlżsende begivenhed og varer, indtil den forebyggende foranstaltning ophžves, eller den finansielle korrektion er gennemfżrt. 
The Commission’s procedure starts with the triggering event and lasts either until the preventive measure is lifted or until the financial correction is implemented.
Den er sledes lžngere end betalingsblokeringen, der begynder med den fżrste forebyggende foranstaltning og varer, indtil de forebyggende foranstaltninger ophžves (jf. bilag I). 
It is therefore longer than the payment blockage which starts with the first preventive measure and lasts until the lifting of the preventive measure (see Annex I).
De procedurer, der fżrte til finansielle korrektioner, varede op til 21 mneder i perioden 2007-2013 84. 
Procedures resulting in financial corrections took up to 21 months in the 2007‐2013 period 84.
Figur 10 viser resultaterne af vores analyse af, hvor lang tid det i sagerne i vores stikprżve tog at gennemfżre procedurer i forbindelse med forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner. 
Figure 10 presents the results of our analysis of the cases in our sample as regards the time taken to carry out preventive measures and financial correction procedures.
Den gennemsnitlige varighed af procedurerne fra den udlżsende begivenhed, indtil de forebyggende foranstaltninger blev ophžvet, eller den finansielle korrektion var gennemfżrt, varierede fra 10 til 21 mneder. 
The average length of the procedures from the triggering event until the preventive measure was lifted or the financial correction was implemented varied from 10 to 21 months.
Den lžngste varighed konstaterede vi i sager, der omfattede bde forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner, og den korteste konstaterede vi i sager, der kun omfattede forebyggende foranstaltninger. 48 
The longest was when both preventive measures and financial corrections were involved and the shortest was when there were only preventive measures. 47
Figur 10 - Gennemsnitlig varighed af procedurer i forbindelse med forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner i de undersżgte sager vedrżrende programperioden 2007-2013 (mneder) Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret p grundlag af oplysninger fra Kommissionen. 
Figure 10 – Average length of preventive and financial correction procedures for cases examined from the 2007‐2013 programme period (month) Source: European Court of Auditors based on information provided by the Commission.
De procedurer, der fżrte til forebyggende foranstaltninger, blev for det meste udlżst af medlemsstaternes egne revisioner, og varede kun halvt s lžnge 85. 
Procedures resulting in preventive measures were mostly triggered by Member State’s own audits and take half the time 85.
Ifżlge Kommissionen blev to tredjedele af de forebyggende foranstaltninger udlżst af resultater af nationale revisioner33. 
According to the Commission, two thirds of preventive measures were triggered by national audit results33.
Dette gjaldt ogs i 12 af de 16 sager i vores stikprżve. 
This is also the case for 12 of the 16 cases in our sample.
Disse procedurer er vžsentlig kortere: Det er ikke nżdvendigt at bruge tid p at fastlžgge problemerne, og man kan derfor g direkte til at finde lżsninger. 
The duration of these procedures is significantly shorter: there is no need to spend time on establishing the problems; the time is spent on finding ways of resolving them.
Hovedparten af de resterende finansielle korrektioner udlżses af Kommissionens revisioner. 
Most of the remaining financial corrections are triggered by Commission audits.
I vores stikprżve udlżste Kommissionens revisioner 17 af de 28 sager, der kun omfattede finansielle korrektioner, og 13 af de 28 blandede sager. 
In our sample, 17 of the 28 cases involving only financial corrections and 13 of the 28 mixed cases were triggered by Commission audits.
Det tager meget lžngere tid at lżse disse sager, isžr hvis Kommissionen plžgger finansielle korrektioner. 
These cases take much longer to resolve, in particular if the Commission imposes financial corrections.
En af rsagerne til de langvarige procedurer i forbindelse med finansielle korrektioner er, at de ofte vedrżrer komplekse problemer, og at medlemsstaterne nžsten altid i fżrste omgang anfžgter Kommissionens konstateringer. 
One reason for the lengthy procedures involving financial corrections is that these usually relate to complex problems and Member States almost always initially contest the Commission’s findings.
Fżr der kan fastsls en fejl, skal de konstaterede forhold behandles i en afklaringsprocedure mellem medlemsstaten og Kommissionen, hvilket tager tid. 
In order to establish an error, the issues found need to go through a fact clearing procedure between the Member State and the Commission, which takes time.
I 34 % af sagerne i vores stikprżve accepterede Kommissionen 49 Sager, der kun omfattede finansielle k or r e k t i o ne r (28 sager) Sager med bde forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle k or r e k t i o ne r (28 sager) Sager, der kun omfattede forebyggende foranstaltninger (16 sager) 10,1 17,5 20,8 0 6 (mneder) 12 18 24 33 Jf. den rlige aktivitetsrapport for 2015 fra GD for Regionalpolitik og Bypolitik, s. 
48 10.1 17.5 20.8 cases with only financial corrections (28 cases) cases with a combination of preventive measures and financial corrections (28 cases) cases with only preventive measures (16 cases) 0 6 12 18 24 (months) 33 See AAR 2015 of DG Regional and Urban Policy, p.
imidlertid ikke medlemsstaternes fżrste svar med beskrivelsen af de aktioner, de havde truffet for at afhjžlpe svaghederne, da de ikke gav den oplysninger i tilstržkkeligt omfang og tilstržkkelig kvalitet. 
However, in 34 % of our sampled cases the Commission did not accept the first Member State reply in which the detailed actions taken by the Member State to address the shortcomings were laid down, as Member States did not provide the Commission with information sufficient in volume and in quality.
I disse sager var medlemsstaternes svar alts af en sdan beskaffenhed, at procedurerne mtte gentages. 
This means that in these cases the reply provided by the Member State is such that these procedures need to be repeated.