natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
75 Kommissionen er i fžrd med at undersżge, hvilken type initiativer ("pull-mekanismer") der er nżdvendige for at fremme udviklingen af nye antimikrobielle stoffer. 
75 The Commission, is in a process of exploring what kind of initiatives (Ňpull-mechanismsÓ) are needed in order to boost development of new antimicrobials.
Kommissionen har p nuvžrende tidspunkt ikke fremsat specifikke forslag, men fortsžtter dialogen med medlemsstaterne. 
At this stage, the Commission did not put forward any specific proposal, but continues the dialogue with Member States.
Anbefaling 3 Đ Styrkelse af strategier til fremme af forskning i AMR i EU Kommissionen accepterer anbefalingen. 
Recommendation 3 Đ Strengthening strategies for boosting AMR research in the EU The Commission accepts the recommendation.
2 COM(2019) 128 af 11/03/2019 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-dangersub/pdf/strategic_approach_pharmaceuticals_env.PDF 3 
2 EN EN COM(2019) 128 of 11/03/2019 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-dangersub/pdf/strategic_approach_pharmaceuticals_env.PDF 3
Med henblik p at opn maksimal effekt udvžlger og udformer Revisionsretten sine revisionsopgaver under hensyntagen til de risici, der knytter sig til forvaltningens resultater eller overholdelsen af regler, de pgžldende indtžgters eller udgifters omfang, den fremtidige udvikling samt den politiske og offentlige interesse. 
The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and public interest.
Denne forvaltningsrevision blev udfżrt af Afdeling I - Bžredygtig brug af naturressourcer, der ledes af Nikolaos Milionis, medlem af Revisionsretten. 
This performance audit was carried out by Audit Chamber I Sustainable use of natural resources, headed by ECA Member Nikolaos Milionis.
Revisionsarbejdet blev ledet af Janusz Wojciechowski, medlem af Revisionsretten, og blev i beretningens afsluttende fase fortsat af Nikolaos Milionis, medlem af Revisionsretten, med stżtte fra kabinetscheferne Kinga Wisniewska-Danek og Kristian Sniter, attach Katarzyna Radecka-Moroz, ledende administrator Colm Friel, de opgaveansvarlige Stefan Den Engelsen og derefter Malgorzata Frydel, revisorerne Anna Zalega, Xavier Demarche og Antonio Caruda Ruiz samt sekretariatsassistent Frdrique Hussenet. 
The audit was led by ECA Member Janusz Wojciechowski, then taken over by ECA Member Nikolaos Milionis at the final stage of the report, supported by Kinga Wisniewska-Danek and Kristian Sniter, Heads of Private Office, Katarzyna Radecka-Moroz, Private Office Attach; Colm Friel, Principal Manager; Stefan Den Engelsen, then Malgorzata Frydel, Head of Task; Anna Zalega, Xavier Demarche and Antonio Caruda Ruiz, Auditors; Frdrique Hussenet, Secretarial Assistant.
Fra venstre mod hżjre: Anna Zalega, Katarzyna Radecka-Moroz, Nikolaos Milionis, Colm Friel, Malgorzata Frydel, Kristian Sniter, Xavier Demarche. 
From left to right: Anna Zalega, Katarzyna Radecka-Moroz, Nikolaos Milionis, Colm Friel, Malgorzata Frydel, Kristian Sniter, Xavier Demarche.
Tidslinje Begivenhed Dato Revisionsplanen vedtaget/Revisionen pbegyndt 12.12.2018 Udkastet til beretning officielt sendt til Kommissionen (eller en anden revideret enhed) 26.7.2019 Den endelige beretning vedtaget efter den kontradiktoriske procedure 9.10.2019 Officielle svar fra Kommissionen (eller en anden revideret enhed) modtaget p alle sprog 11.11.2019 
Timeline Event Date Adoption of Audit Planning Memorandum (APM) / Start of audit 12.12.2018 Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee) 26.7.2019 Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 9.10.2019 CommissionŐs (or other auditeeŐs) official replies received in all languages EN: 8.11.2019
Billede under punkt 46: Š Shutterstock / Billion Photos. Bilag II: Š UMC Utrecht - COMBACTE-projekterne. PDF ISBN 978-92-847-3765-9 doi:10.2865/85123 QJ-AB-19-019-DA-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-3750-5 doi:10.2865/059409 QJ-AB-19-019-DA-Q 
For any use or reproduction of the following pictures that are not under the European Union copyright, please request permission directly from the copyright holders: Picture paragraph 20: Š Shutterstock / Olga Reukova Picture paragraph 37: Š Shutterstock / Dusan Petkovic Picture paragraph 46: Š Shutterstock / Billion Photos Annex II: Š UMC Utrecht - COMBACTE project PDF ISBN 978-92-847-3771-0 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/150088 QJ-AB-19-019-EN-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-3739-0 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/487837 QJ-AB-19-019-EN-Q
Antimikrobiel resistens (AMR) udgżr en stigende trussel mod den globale sundhed. 
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a growing threat to global health.
Vi undersżgte, hvordan Kommissionen og relevante EU-agenturer forvaltede deres stżtte til medlemsstaterne og den EU-finansierede forskning med henblik p bekžmpelse af antimikrobiel resistens. 
We examined how the Commission and relevant EU agencies managed their support to Member States and the EU funded research aimed at fighting antimicrobial resistance.
Vi konkluderede, at Kommissionens og agenturernes aktiviteter medfżrte visse fremskridt. 
We concluded that the activities of the Commission and agencies led to some progress.
Der er imidlertid stadig ikke meget, der tyder p, at sundhedsbyrden i forbindelse med AMR er blevet reduceret. 
However, there is little evidence that the health burden of AMR has reduced.
Vi fremsžtter anbefalinger for at forbedre Kommissionens reaktion p AMR via bedre stżtte til medlemsstaternes nationale handlingsplaner, fremme af bedre overvgning og forsigtig anvendelse af antimikrobielle stoffer samt styrkelse af strategierne til fremme af forskning. 
We make recommendations to improve the CommissionŐs response to AMR through better support to Member State national action plans; promoting better monitoring and the prudent use of antimicrobials; and strengthening strategies for boosting research.
4, andet afsnit, TEUF. 53 
ECA special report pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU.
DA 2019 Særberetning 22 EU's krav til de nationale budgetrammer bør skærpes yderligere, og deres anvendelse bør overvåges bedre nr. 
EN 2019 Special Report 22 EU requirements for national budgetary frameworks: need to further strengthen them and to better monitor their application NO
Indhold Resumé Indledning Baggrund Retsgrundlag Revisionens omfang og revisionsmetoden Bemærkninger EU's lovkrav ansporede til forbedring af de nationale budgetrammer, men de kan forbedres Mangler i bestemmelserne om korrektionsmekanismen Mangler i bestemmelserne om mellemfristede budgetrammer Mangler i bestemmelserne om de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner Uensartede vurderinger og svag udformning skaber risici for de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner og Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd Risiko for uoverensstemmelse mellem Kommissionens og de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioners vurderinger vedrørende overholdelsen af EU's finanspolitiske regler Oprettelsen af Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd var et skridt i den rigtige retning, men dets rolle og dets uafhængighed kan styrkes Kommissionen har indtil videre kun begrænset sikkerhed for, at de nationale budgetrammer gennemføres og anvendes korrekt Konklusionerne om den nationale lovgivnings overholdelse af EU's krav blev forsinket på grund af faktorer, der ikke alle var under Kommissionens kontrol Kommissionens hidtidige vurderinger har begrænset informationsværdi, enten på grund af timing eller på grund af mandatforhold Konklusioner og anbefalinger Punkt I-VIII 01-10 01-04 05-10 11-16 17-97 17-41 24-29 30-34 35-41 42-68 45-55 56-68 69-97 72-80 81-97 98-105 2 
Contents Executive summary Introduction Background Legal framework Audit scope and approach Observations The EU legal requirements provided impetus for improving national budgetary frameworks but leave room for improvement Shortcomings in the provisions on the correction mechanism Shortcomings in the provisions on medium-term budgetary frameworks Shortcomings in the provisions on the independent fiscal institutions Inconsistent assessment and weak design create risks for independent fiscal institutions and the European Fiscal Board Risk of inconsistency between Commission’s and independent fiscal institutions’ assessments on compliance with EU fiscal rules Establishing the European Fiscal Board was a good step, but there is room for strengthening its role and independence The Commission so far has only limited assurance that national budgetary frameworks are properly implemented and applied Delays in concluding on the compliance of national legislation with EU requirements due to factors not all under the Commission’s control Commission assessments to date are of limited informative value, either due to timing or mandate considerations Conclusions and recommendations Paragraph I-VIII 01-10 01-04 05-10 11-16 17-97 17-41 24-29 30-34 35-41 42-68 45-55 56-68 69-97 72-80 81-97 98-105 2
Bilag Bilag I – Tidslinje for retsgrundlag og publikationer Bilag II – Kommissionens syn på den mellemfristede budgetramme Bilag III – Uensartethed i de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner Bilag IV – De finanspolitiske regler i den forebyggende del af stabilitets-og vækstpagten og i finanspagten Akronymer og forkortelser Glossar Kommissionens svar Revisionsholdet Tidslinje 3 
Annexes Annex I – Timeline of relevant legal basis and publications Annex II – Commission’s view on the medium-term budgetary framework Annex III – Heterogeneity of independent fiscal institutions Annex IV – The fiscal rules in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact and in the Fiscal Compact Acronyms and abbreviations Glossary Replies of the Commission Audit team Timeline 3
Resumé I Med henblik på at afhjælpe årsagerne til finanskrisen så Kommissionen et behov for at supplere den regelbaserede finanspolitiske ramme med bindende nationale bestemmelser. 
Executive summary I Seeking to remedy the root causes of the financial crisis, the Commission saw the need to complement the rules-based fiscal framework with binding national provisions.
Den foreslog derfor tre retsakter til at styrke de nationale budgetrammer (dvs. den måde, hvorpå der føres budgetpolitik). 
It therefore proposed three legislative acts to strengthen national budgetary frameworks (i.e. the way budgetary policies are conducted).
To af de tre retsakter er blevet vedtaget (i 2011 som del af "sixpacken" og i 2013 som del af "twopacken"), og lovgivningsprocessen vedrørende et direktivforslag fra 2017 er i gang. 
Two of these three acts have been adopted (in 2011, as part of the ‘Six-Pack’, and in 2013, as part of the ‘Two-Pack’), while the legislative process for a proposal for a directive from 2017 is still ongoing.
Endvidere blev en mellemstatslig traktat om stabilitet, samordning og styring i Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union undertegnet af 25 medlemsstater i 2012. 
Moreover, an intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union was signed in 2012 by 25 Member States.
II Ifølge retsakterne skulle medlemsstaterne bl.a. oprette uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner, fastsætte nationale finanspolitiske regler og indføre flerårige regelbaserede budgetrammer. 
II The legislative acts required Member States, among other things, to set up independent fiscal institutions, have in place national fiscal rules and introduce multiannual rule-based budgetary frameworks.
Uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner, der er hensigtsmæssigt udformet, er forbundet med bedre overholdelse af finanspolitiske regler samt mere præcise og mindre tendentiøse makroøkonomiske og budgetmæssige prognoser, og mellemfristede budgetrammer anses generelt for at bidrage til bedre finanspolitiske resultater, fordi de viser, om og hvordan aktuelle politiske afgørelser og fremtidige programmer harmonerer med holdbare budgettildelinger på mellemlang sigt. 
Well-designed independent fiscal institutions are associated with better compliance with fiscal rules and with accurate and less biased macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, while medium-term budgetary frameworks are more generally recognised as contributing to stronger fiscal performance, as they show whether and how current policy decisions and future programmes fit within sustainable medium-term budget allocations.
III Formålet med revisionen var at vurdere, om Kommissionens tiltag til at styrke EU-medlemsstaternes budgetrammer havde givet de ønskede resultater. 
III The audit was aimed at assessing whether the Commission’s actions to strengthen the EU Member States’ budgetary frameworks had achieved the intended results.
Derfor undersøgte vi: a) om EU's lovkrav til de nationale budgetrammer var effektive b) om de nationale budgetrammer var blevet styrket ved hjælp af hensigtsmæssig og klar interaktion mellem Kommissionen, de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner og Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd c) om Kommissionen på hensigtsmæssig vis vurderede, hvordan EU's lovkrav var blevet gennemført og anvendt i medlemsstaterne. 
To this end, we examined whether: (a) the EU legal requirements on national budgetary frameworks were effective; (b) the national budgetary frameworks were strengthened through appropriate and clear interaction between the Commission, the independent fiscal institutions and the European Fiscal Board; (c) the Commission assessed appropriately how the EU legal requirements have been implemented and applied in the Member States.
IV EU's lovgivningstiltag ansporede til styrkelse af de nationale budgetrammer. 
IV The EU’s legislative action provided impetus to strengthen national budgetary frameworks.
Retsgrundlaget kan imidlertid forbedres. 
However, the legal framework leaves room for improvement.
I forhold til internationale standarder og bedste praksis er kravene mildere i flere henseender, navnlig kravene vedrørende mellemfristede budgetrammer og uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner. 
When compared to international standards and best practices, the requirements are softer in several respects, particularly those regarding medium-term budgetary frameworks and independent fiscal institutions.
Det udkast til direktiv, som blev forelagt af Kommissionen i 2017, tager højde for nogle af de svagheder, som vi konstaterede, men ikke alle. 4 
The Directive proposed by the Commission in 2017 addresses some – but not all – of the weaknesses we observed. 4
V Uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner vurderer overholdelsen af nationale finanspolitiske regler. 
V Independent fiscal institutions assess compliance with national fiscal rules.
Foruden Kommissionen er der desuden også en række uafhængige nationale finanspolitiske institutioner, der vurderer medlemsstaternes overholdelse af EU's finanspolitiske regler, enten fordi deres eget retsgrundlag forpligter dem til det, eller fordi de vælger at gøre det frivilligt. 
Moreover, as well as the Commission, some independent national fiscal institutions also assess the Member Sates’ compliance with EU fiscal rules, either because they are obliged to do so by their own legal basis or because they chose to do so on a voluntary basis.
Kommissionens brug af sine skønsbeføjelser og andre faktorer medfører en risiko for uoverensstemmelser mellem Kommissionens og de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioners vurdering af overholdelsen af EU's finanspolitiske regler. 
The Commission’s use of its discretionary powers as well as other factors imply a risk of inconsistency between Commission’s and independent fiscal institutions’ assessment of compliance with EU fiscal rules.
Hvis denne risiko materialiserer sig, vil effektiviteten af EU's finanspolitiske ramme blive reduceret. 
Should the risk materialise, the effectiveness of the EU fiscal framework would be reduced.
VI De fem formænds rapport, som blev offentliggjort i 2015, indeholdt et forslag om oprettelse af et europæisk finanspolitisk råd, som på EU-niveau skulle foretage en offentlig og uafhængig resultatvurdering af nationalbudgetterne og deres gennemførelse i forhold til EU's finanspolitiske målsætninger. 
VI The ‘Five Presidents’ report’ published in 2015 proposed setting up a European Fiscal Board, which would provide a public and independent performance assessment, at European level, of national budgets and their execution against EU fiscal objectives.
Ved en afgørelse oprettede Kommissionen dette råd samme år. 
The Commission established it by means of a Decision in the same year.
Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råds struktur og mandat satte det ikke i stand til at varetage de opgaver, der var beskrevet i denne rapport. 
The set-up and mandate of the European Fiscal Board fell short of the tasks envisaged in this report.
Endvidere kan dets nuværende institutionelle struktur forbedres for så vidt angår dets uafhængighed. 
Moreover, the current institutional set-up leaves room for improvement regarding its independence.
Endelig kan Kommissionen ignorere forslag og anbefalinger fra Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd uden at skulle give en forklaring. 
Finally, the Commission can ignore the proposals and recommendations issued by the European Fiscal Board without providing appropriate explanation.
VII Kommissionen har indtil videre kun begrænset sikkerhed for, at EU's krav til de nationale budgetrammer gennemføres og anvendes korrekt. 
VII The Commission has so far only limited assurance that the EU requirements for national budgetary frameworks are properly implemented and applied.
F.eks. er vurderingen af, om de nationale love opfylder kravene i direktiv 2011/85/EU, endnu ikke afsluttet. 
Indeed, the assessment of the compliance of national laws with the requirements of Directive 2011/85 has not yet been completed.
Vurderingerne af anvendelsen af EU's retlige ramme er enten ikke blevet foretaget endnu, eller blevet foretaget i en for tidlig gennemførelsesfase til at være nyttige. 
The assessments of the application of the EU legal framework have either not yet been carried out or came at too early a stage of implementation to be meaningful.
VIII Vi anbefaler, at Kommissionen: a) styrker samarbejdet med de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner for at minimere forskellene mellem sin egen og deres vurderinger af overholdelsen af EU's finanspolitiske regler b) gennemgår kravene til de nationale budgetrammer, bl.a. under hensyntagen til internationale standarder og bedste praksis c) styrker Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd d) adresserer udestående overholdelsesproblemer og skaffer sig større sikkerhed med hensyn til de nationale budgetrammers funktionsmåde. 5 
VIII We recommend that the Commission: (a) strengthen cooperation with the independent fiscal institutions in order to minimise divergences between the Commission's and the independent fiscal institutions' assessments of compliance with EU fiscal rules; (b) review requirements for national budgetary frameworks also taking into account international standards and best practices; (c) strengthen the European Fiscal Board; (d) address pending compliance issues and enhance assurance on the functioning of national budgetary frameworks. 5
Indledning Baggrund 01 Da statsgældskrisens udbrud i 2009 truede stabiliteten i euroområdet, vedtog EU-lovgiverne adskillige retsakter for at forbedre EU's finanspolitiske styring. 
Introduction Background 01 As the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 threatened the stability of the euro area, the EU legislators adopted several legislative acts to improve the EU’s fiscal governance.
Formålet var at fremme gennemførelsen af stabilitets-og vækstpagten (SVP) og at styrke de nationale budgetrammer1 (jf. tekstboks 1, som beskriver de nationale budgetrammers komponenter). 
The aim was to enhance the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and to strengthen the national budgetary frameworks (NBFs)1 (see Box 1 for the components of NBFs).
6 Tekstboks 1 – De nationale budgetrammer De nationale budgetrammer er de ordninger, procedurer, regler og institutioner, som ligger til grund for budgetpolitikken. 
6 Box 1 - National budgetary frameworks NBFs are the arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions underlying budgetary policies.
De nationale budgetrammers komponenter Statistik og regnskabsføring Uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner Finanspolitiske regler og korrektionsmekanisme Nationale budgetrammer Mellemfristet budgetramme Omfattet af denne revision Prognoser Årlig budgetlægning Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
Components of the NBFs Statistics and accounting Independent fiscal i ns ti tuti ons Fiscal rules and correction mechanism National budgetary frameworks Medium-term budgetary framework Forecas ts Annual budgeting Source: ECA.
1 Det Europæiske Råd (2010), "Report by the Task Force to the European Council on strengthening economic governance in the EU". 
Covered by the scope of the audit 1 European Council (2010), ‘Report by the Task Force to the European Council on strengthening economic governance in the EU’.
02 I den økonomiske litteratur er der bred enighed om, at flerårige regelbaserede budgetrammer er forbundet med bedre finanspolitiske resultater2, da de viser, hvordan aktuelle politiske afgørelser og fremtidige programmer harmonerer med holdbare budgettildelinger på mellemlang sigt. 
02 There is broad consensus in the economic literature that multi-annual, rule-based budgetary frameworks are associated with stronger fiscal performance2, as they show how current policy decisions and future programmes fit within sustainable medium-term budget allocations.
Realistiske mellemfristede budgetrammer kan samtidig hjælpe regeringer til at forene krav om finanspolitisk holdbarhed med den mulige anvendelse af finanspolitikken til at afbøde virkningerne af økonomiske og finansielle chok3. 
Credible medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) can also help governments in reconciling requirements for fiscal sustainability with the possible use of fiscal policies to cushion the effects of economic and financial shocks3.
03 I henhold til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (TEUF) bevarer medlemsstaterne deres suverænitet med hensyn til budgetpolitik. 
03 Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States keep their sovereignty with regard to budgetary policies.
Ikke desto mindre er det nødvendigt, at politikkerne koordineres for at undgå negative afsmittende virkninger og trusler mod den monetære stabilitet i euroområdet. 
Nevertheless, coordination of the policies is needed to avoid negative spill-overs and threats to monetary stability in the euro area.
Kommissionen mente, at en vellykket koordinering krævede integrering af EU's budgetmål i de nationale budgetpolitikker4. 
The Commission considered that for this coordination to be successful, EU budgetary goals must be embedded within national budgetary policies4.
Rådet fandt i 2005, at styringen på nationalt plan burde komplettere EU-rammerne5. 
In 2005, “the Council considered that domestic governance arrangements should complement the EU framework”5.
Men på det tidspunkt forelå der ingen altomfattende analyse af i) svaghederne i de daværende EU-rammer eller ii) den fremtidige koordinering af de to styringsordninger. 
However, at that time, no all-encompassing analysis was provided of (i) weaknesses in the then-existing EU framework or (ii) the future coordination of the two governance arrangements.
I oktober 2009 konkluderede EU-Rådet ("Rådet") atter, at de nationale budgetrammer burde styrkes for at støtte den finanspolitiske holdbarhed på lang sigt6. 
In October 2009, the Council of the EU (the “Council”) again concluded that NBFs should be strengthened to support long-term fiscal sustainability6.
04 Siden 2006 har Kommissionen via spørgeundersøgelser henvendt til de relevante nationale myndigheder indsamlet kvalitative oplysninger og data om hovedelementerne i de nationale budgetrammer (dvs. numeriske finanspolitiske regler, uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner og mellemfristede budgetrammer). 
04 Since 2006, the Commission has been collecting, through surveys of relevant national authorities, qualitative information and data on the main elements of NBFs (i.e. numerical fiscal rules, independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) and MTBFs).