natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
EU-Udenrigstjenesten bżr: - give missionerne praktisk vejledning om operationelle procedurer, standardmodeller, der kan tilpasses lokale forhold, og eksempler p bedste praksis fra tidligere missioner og uddannelse. Kommissionen bżr: - bevžge sig hen imod at give missionschefen delegerede befżjelser til at godkende indkżb, dog underlagt Kommissionens efterfżlgende kontrol. 39 Anbefaling 1 - Tržffe foranstaltninger til at forbedre missionernes operationelle effektivitet 
38 Recommendation 1 Đ Take measures to improve the operational efficiency of Missions The EEAS should: - provide the Missions with practical guidance on operational procedures, standard templates that can be adapted to local circumstances, examples of best practice from earlier Missions and training; The Commission should: - move towards delegating the power to authorise purchases to the Head of Mission, subject to ex post checks by the Commission;
EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen bżr: - forbedre stżtten til missionerne ved at levere udstyr fra det fžlles lager og udvide rollen for missionernes stżtteplatform. Mldato: udgangen af 2018. 
39 The EEAS and the Commission should: - improve support to the Missions by providing equipment from the common warehouse and expanding the role of the Missions Support Platform. Target Date: End of 2018.
Missionernes vigtigste ressource er deres personale, men i gennemsnit var blot tre fjerdedele af stillingerne besat. 
The most important resource of the Missions is their staff, yet only three-quarters of posts were occupied on average.
Ansžttelsesprocedurerne var tidskržvende og ofte uden resultat. 
Recruitment procedures were time-consuming and often unsuccessful.
De stillinger, der var vanskeligst at besžtte, var dem, der var forbeholdt personale udstationeret fra EU-medlemsstater (jf. punkt 31-33). 
The posts most difficult to fill were those reserved for staff seconded from EU member states (see paragraphs 31 to 33).
40 Anbefaling 2 - Forbedre besžttelsesgraden for stillinger i missionerne EU-Udenrigstjenesten bżr finde lżsninger, der vil gżre det muligt at besžtte alle ledige stillinger i missionerne hurtigt og effektivt, f.eks. ved at tilbyde udstationeringer til missionerne fra EU's medlemsstater af lžngere varighed, anvende kontraktansatte mere bredt og udarbejde generelle indkaldelser af bidrag, der kan benyttes til at opstille reservelister over potentielt personale med henblik p at fremskynde udsendelsen, nr der opstr ledige stillinger. 
Recommendation 2 Đ Improve the occupancy rate of staff posts in the Missions The EEAS should find solutions that will allow Mission vacancies to be filled quickly and efficiently, for example proposing longer secondments to the Missions from the EU member states, using contract staff more widely and preparing general calls for contributions which can be used to draw up reserve lists of potential staff to speed up deployment when vacancies arise.
Mldato: udgangen af 2018. 
Target Date: End of 2018.
Missionernes torige mandater tilskynder til kortsigtet planlžgning, og de rlige budgetter gżr ofte indkżbsprocessen for udstyr og tjenester s kort, at den er umulig at forvalte. 
The MissionsŐ two-year mandates encourage short-term planning and the annual budgets often make the equipment and services procurement cycle unmanageably short.
Andre interessenter i Sahel og stżttemodtagerne finder, at omfanget af opgaverne i Niger og Mali betyder, at missionerne er nżdvendige p mellemlang til lang sigt. 
Other stakeholders in the Sahel and the beneficiaries of support consider that the scope of the tasks in Niger and Mali means that the Missions are needed for the medium to long-term.
Det er ikke hensigten, at missionerne skal blive permanente organer i vžrtslandene, men EU-Udenrigstjenesten har ikke fastsat bestemmelser om en klar exitstrategi (jf. punkt 34 og 35). 
At the same time, even though the Missions are not intended to become permanent bodies in the host countries, the EEAS has not made a provision for a clear exit strategy (see paragraphs 34 and 35).
41 Anbefaling 3 - Fastsžtte mandater og budgetter, som svarer til operationerne, og fastsžtte en exitstrategi EU-Udenrigstjenesten bżr foresl mandater for missionerne, som giver dem mulighed for at n deres ml, og fastlžgge en tydeligere kurs hen imod en exitstrategi. 
40 Recommendation 3 Đ Set mandates and budgets to match operations and provide for an exit strategy The EEAS should propose mandates for the Missions that allow them to meet their objectives, and define a clearer path towards an exit strategy.
Kommissionen bżr fastsžtte budgetperioder, der svarer til de operative behov. 
The Commission should set budgetary periods that match operational necessities.
Mldato: udgangen af 2019. 
Target Date: End of 2019.
EUCAP Sahel-missionerne styrkede kapaciteten i de indre sikkerhedsstyrker ved at levere uddannelseskurser, udstyr og rdgivning. 
The EUCAP Sahel Missions strengthened capacity in the internal security forces through providing training courses, equipment and advice.
Begge missioner arbejdede p at gżre deres aktiviteter bžredygtige, men med begržnset succes. 
Both Missions worked to make their activities sustainable, but with little success.
Dette skyldtes dels vžrtslandenes manglende ejerskab eller politiske vilje, dels at missionerne ikke afsatte tilstržkkelige ressourcer til at sikre bžredygtighed og fżlge op p den praktiske gennemfżrelse og anvendelse af den givne undervisning og det leverede udstyr (jf. punkt 37-54). 
This was partly due to lack of ownership or political will in the host countries, and partly because the Missions did not devote adequate resources to ensuring sustainability and following up on the practical application and use of the training given and the equipment supplied (see paragraphs 37 to 54).
Anbefaling 4 - Żge fokus p bžredygtighed Missionerne bżr koncentrere ressourcerne om at gżre aktiviteterne bžredygtige ved, hvor det er relevant, at tržkke sig fra vellykkede aktiviteter s hurtigt som muligt for at fremme FSI'ernes autonomi og undg overdreven afhžngighed og i stedet fokusere p at yde stżtte og backup, og ved at fżlge op p anvendelsen af den givne uddannelse og det leverede udstyr. 
Recommendation 4 Đ Increase focus on sustainability The Missions should focus resources on making activities sustainable, by withdrawing, as appropriate, from successful activities as soon as feasible to encourage autonomy in the ISFs and avoid over-reliance, focusing instead on providing support and back-up, and by following up the use made of training given and equipment provided.
Missionerne gjorde kun begržnsede og langsomme fremskridt med hensyn til at n deres ml. 
The Missions made only limited and slow progress towards achieving their objectives.
De fleste af de indikatorer, der var udarbejdet for Niger, kunne ikke anvendes til at mle fremskridt, fordi de blot nžvnte de aktiviteter, som var fastsat for opgaverne. 
Most of the indicators drawn up for Niger could not be used to measure progress because they simply listed activities set for the tasks.
Indikatorerne for Mali var bedre, men indeholdt ikke kvantificerede ml. 
The indicators for Mali were better, but did not include quantified targets.
Indikatorerne udgjorde ikke et godt grundlag for at mle opgavernes effektivitet eller deres bidrag til at n mlene (jf. punkt 55 og 56). 
The indicators did not provide a good basis for measuring the effectiveness of the tasks or the contribution made towards achieving objectives (see paragraphs 55 and 56).
Ingen af missionerne havde gode systemer til evaluering af aktiviteter i den reviderede periode, og de havde heller ikke vžret underlagt en uafhžngig ekstern evaluering (jf. punkt 57-60). 
Neither Mission operated good systems for evaluating activities during the period audited neither had they been subject to an independent external evaluation (see paragraphs 57 to 60).
42 Anbefaling 5 - Forbedre indikatorer, overvgning og evaluering EU-Udenrigstjenesten bżr: - opstille RACER-indikatorer (relevante, accepterede, trovžrdige, enkle og robuste), som fokuserer p kvantificerede output og p resultaterne af missionernes aktiviteter, og som er knyttet til relevansen for missionernes mandater. - opstille mlrettede benchmarks, som kan fastsžttes med henblik p at vise fremskridt vedrżrende mlopfyldelse - give missionenervejledning til og uddannelse af missionerne om overvgning og evaluering - foretage eksterne evalueringer af missionerne og mere omfattende vurderinger af deres effekt. 
41 Recommendation 5 Đ Improve indicators, monitoring and evaluation The EEAS should: - set RACER (Relevant, Acceptable, Credible, Easy and Robust) indicators that focus on quantified outputs and on outcomes of the MissionsŐ activities and that are linked to the relevance to the MissionsŐ mandates; - set targeted benchmarks which can be set to demonstrate progress towards achieving objectives; - provide guidance and training to the Missions on monitoring and evaluation; - make external evaluations of the Missions and more comprehensive assessments of their impact.
P Revisionsrettens vegne Klaus-Heiner Lehne Formand 
For the Court of Auditors Klaus-Heiner LEHNE President
EU NAVFOR MED Siden 2015 Igangvžrende FSFP-missioner og operationer BILAG I 1 EUPOL COPPS Palžstinensiske omrder Siden 2006 EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnien-Hercegovina Siden 20 EUTM Mali Siden 2013 Kilde: EU-Udenrigstjenesten. DEN EUROPŽISKE UNION FSFP-MISSIONER & -OPERATIONER 2017 04 EULEX Kosovo Siden 2008 *EUBAM Moldova og Ukraine Siden 2005 EUBAM Libya Siden 2013 EUBAM RAFAH Palžstinensiske omrder Siden 2005 Militžremissioner & operationer Civilemissioner EUAM Ukraine Siden 2014 EUMM Georgien Siden 2008 Militžre missioner/operationer Civile missioner EUAM Iraq Siden 2017 EUCAP Sahel Mali Siden 2014 Mere end 5 000 mennesker udsendt p nuvžrende tidspunkt EUTM Somalia Siden 2010 EUCAP Sahel Mali Siden 2014 EUTM RCA Den Centralafrikanske Republik Siden2016 EU NAVFOR Atalanta Siden 2008 Ml: At bevare freden, forebygge konflikter, styrke den internationale sikkerhed,stżtte retsstatsprincippet, forebygge menneskehandel og pirateri. 
EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories Since 2006 Ongoing CSDP Missions and Operations EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS & OPERATIONS 2017 ANNEX I 1 *EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine Since 2005 EUAM Ukraine Since 2014 EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia Herzegovina Since 2004 Military Missions/Operations Civilian Missions EUMM Georgia Since 2008 EULEX Kosovo Since 2008 EUBAM RAFAH Palestinian Territories Since 2005 EU NAVFOR MED Since 2015 military Missions & Operations civilian Missions EUTM Mali Since 2013 EUBAM Libya Since 2013 EUAM Iraq Since 2017 EUCAP SAHEL Mali Since 2014 EU NAVFOR Atalanta Since 2008 More than 5,000 people currently deployed EUCAP SAHEL Niger Since 2012 Source: EEAS.
EUCAP Somalia Siden 2012 *Denne mission forvaltes ikke inden for FSFP-strukturerne, men dens mlsžtninger er meget lig andre missioner, og vi har derfor ladet den indg her. 
EUTM RCA Central African Republic Since 2016 EUTM Somalia Since 2010 Objectives: Keeping the peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, preventing human trafficking and piracy. EUCAP Somalia Since 2012 *This MissionisnotmanagedwithinCSDPstructures, butits objectivesareverysimilartotheotherMissions, soweincludeithere.
Š Tjenesten for EU's Optržden Udadtil Ń EU-Udenrigstjenesten, januar 2018 
Š European External Action Service - EEAS, January 2018
BILAG II 1 Uddrag af Rdets afgżrelser (FUSP) 2016/1172 (Niger) og 2017/50 (Mali) EUCAP Sahel Niger EUCAP Sahel Mali Mandat at stżtte kapacitetsopbygningen blandt de nigerske sikkerhedsaktżrer med henblik p bekžmpelse af terrorisme og organiseret kriminalitet. at gennemfżre en civil mission i Mali til stżtte for Malis indre sikkerhedsstyrker (FSI'er) (politi, politisoldater og nationalgarde). 
ANNEX II Extracts from Council Decisions (CFSP) 2016/1172 (Niger) and 2017/50 (Mali) 1 EUCAP Sahel Niger EUCAP Sahel Mali Mandate To support the capacity building of the Nigerien security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime. To conduct a civilian Mission in Mali in support of the Malian internal security forces (ISFs) (police, gendarmerie, national guard).
Styrkelse af COR'et i Agadez 5.9 Stżtte til politi og dommere i Agadez i forbindelse med retlige procedurer 5.10 Eksekutivsekretariat for platformen om migrationskoordinering 5.12 Koordinering med andre interessenter i migrationsspżrgsml, som er til stede i Agadez 5.13 Gržnseoverskridende foranstaltninger med EUCAP Mali og EUBAM Libya 5.14 Udvikling af en migrationsstrategi med EU-delegationen vedrżrende kommunikation 1 Gode fremskridt Langsomme fremskridt/vanskeligheder Ingen fremskridt/betydelige vanskeligheder Kilde: 2016-2018 OPLAN, undtagen for s vidt angr opgave 1.3 (OPLAN 2014). 
Reinforcement of Agadez COR 5.9 Support in legal procedures for police and magistrates in Agadez 5.10 Executive secretariat of the platform on migration coordination 5.12 Coordination with other stakeholders in migration present in Agadez 5.13 Crossborder actions with EUCAP Mali and EUBAM Libya 5.14 Development of a migration strategy with the EU delegation for communication Good progress Slow progress/ Difficulties encountered No progress/ Significant difficulties encountered Source: 2016-2018 OPLAN, except in the case of task 1.3 (OPLAN 2014).
BILAG IV Revisionsrettens overblik over, hvor langt EUCAP Sahel Mali er net med sine opgaver Beslutningspunkter (DP'er)-baseret p 2016 OPLAN Fremskridt 1. 
ANNEX IV ECA overview of progress made by EUCAP Sahel Mali towards achieving tasks Decision points (DP) - Based on 2016 OPLAN Progress 1.
Rdgivning DP 1.1 Missionen indsžttes via strategisk rdgivning p direktżrniveau i FSI'erne og ministerierne Undtagen opgave 1.1.2.1: Styrke de interne kontrolstrukturer i FSI'erne DP 1.2 FSI'erne har indfżrt de strukturer, som er nżdvendige for at koordinere deres aktiviteter og żge deres operationelle effektivitet DP 1.3 Menneskelige ressourcer - der er udarbejdet lovtekster, og de anvendes i praksis DP 1.4 Menneskelige ressourcer - procedurer og strukturer er blevet žndret (f.eks. en database) DP 1.5 Den maliske kapacitet for s vidt angr gržnseforvaltning er blevet styrket DP 1.6 FSI'ernes kapacitet til at bekžmpe terrorisme og organiseret krimininalitet er blevet styrket 2. 
Advice DP 1.1 Through strategic advice, the Mission is inserted at director level in the ISFs and the Ministries Excluding task 1.1.2.1: Enhance the internal control structures in the ISFs DP 1.2 The ISFs have put in place the structures needed to coordinate their activities and increase their operational efficiency DP 1.3 Human Resources - legal texts have been drafted and are applied in practice DP 1.4 Human Resources - procedures and structures have been reformed (e.g. a database) DP 1.5 The Malian capacity with regard to border management has been reinforced DP 1.6 The ISFs capacity to fight against terrorism and organised crime has been reinforced 2.
Uddannelse DP 2.1 Missionen er blevet integreret i FSI'ernes og ministeriernes uddannelsesstrukturer DP 2.2 Uddannelseskurserne og -programmerne, herunder deres indhold, er blevet udarbejdet og er ved at blive gennemfżrt Undtagen opgave 2.2.1.1: udarbejdelse af jobbeskrivelser Undtagen opgave 2.2.1.1: udarbejdelse af et uddannelseskatalog og uddannelsesprogrammer DP 2.3 Antallet og kvaliteten af kursusdeltagere fra FSI'erne er i overensstemmelse med de identificerede behov, og uddannelsen er underlagt evaluering. DP 2.4 Kurser til uddannelse af undervisere tilrettelžgges med henblik p at sikre, at missionens foranstaltninger er bžredygtige DP 2.5 Der blev i FSI'ernes direktorater fastlagt en uddannelsesramme 3. 
Training DP 2.1 The Mission has been incorporated into the training structures of the ISFs and the Ministries DP 2.2 The training courses and programmes, including their content, have been drawn up and are being implemented Excluding task 2.2.1.1: job descriptions are drafted Excluding tasks 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.1: creating a training catalogue and training programmes DP 2.3 The number and quality of trainees from the ISFs are in line with the needs identified and training is subject to evaluation DP 2.4 Train-the-trainers courses are organised to ensure sustainability of the Mission's actions DP 2.5 A framework for training was identified within the directorates of the ISFs 3.
Koordinering DP 3.1 Koordinering med MINUSMA gżr det muligt at styrke og optimere fžlles aktioner og at undg, at aktionerne overlapper hinanden. DP 3.2 Koordinering med andre EU-partnere/-instrumenter og EU-medlemsstater er vedvarende og foretages p grundlag af regelmžssig informationsudveksling og udvikling af fžlles aktioner DP 3.3 Aktioner, som gennemfżres af lokale og internationale interessenter, tredjelande og NGO'er i samme sfžre som missionens (mere specifikt uddannelse og evaluering), identificeres og koordineres med missionens aktiviteter. 
Coordination DP 3.1 Coordination with MINUSMA allows joint actions to be reinforced and optimised and overlap of the actions to be avoided DP 3.2 Coordination with other EU partners/instruments and EU member states is continuous and effected on the basis of regular exchange of information and the development of joint actions DP 3.3 Actions carried out by local and international stakeholders, third countries, and NGOs in the same sphere as the Mission's (more specifically, training and evaluation) are identified and coordinated with the Mission's activities Source: 2016 OPLAN.
1 Gode fremskridt Langsomme fremskridt/vanskeligheder Ingen fremskridt/betydelige vanskeligheder Evaluering endnu ikke mulig Kilde: 2016 OPLAN 
1 Good progress Slow progress/ Difficulties encountered No progress/ Significant difficulties encountered Not yet possible to evaluate
KOMMISSIONENS OG EU-UDENRIGSTJENESTENS SVAR P DEN EUROPŽISKE REVISIONSRETS SŽRBERETNING "Styrkelse af kapaciteten hos de indre sikkerhedsstyrker i Niger og Mali: Kun begržnsede og langsomme fremskridt" RESUM: I. EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen vil gerne fremhžve, at EU's medlemsstater samt de lokale myndigheder og partnere konsekvent har rost EUCAP Sahelmissionerne i Niger og Mali for deres bestržbelser og de fremskridt, der er gjort, siden disse blev udsendt i henholdsvis 2012 og 2014, til trods for de udfordrende omstžndigheder. 
REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION AND THE EEAS TO THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS "Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali : only limited and slow progress" EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: I. The EEAS and the Commission wish to highlight that EU Member States and local authorities and partners have consistently commended the efforts and progress of EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali since their launch in 2012 and 2014 respectively, despite the challenging context.
Mandatet for bde EUCAP Sahelmissionen i Niger og EUCAP Sahelmissionen i Mali har fokus p en strukturel indsats til stżtte for institutionerne i begge lande p disses anmodning. 
Both EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali MissionsŐ mandates are focusing on structural efforts to support at their request the institutions of Mali and Niger.
En sdan indsats kržver, at det internationale samfund forpligter sig over en lžngere periode. 
Such efforts require a long-term commitment from the international community.
For nuvžrende er sikkerhedssituationen i Sahel ekstremt udfordrende. 
The current security situation in Sahel is extremely challenging.
I Mali er sikkerhedssituationen i de centrale regioner forvžrret siden 2017. 
In Mali the security situation in the Central regions has deteriorated in 2017.
Migrationspresset er en ekstra udfordring for Niger, der har skullet hndtere en pludselig tilstrżmning af migranter til landet. 
The migratory pressure is an additional challenging element for Niger, which had to cope with a sudden influx of migrants in the country.
Under disse vanskelige forhold er det imidlertid lykkedes begge missioner at żge sikkerheden og modstandsdygtigheden i Mali og Niger i tžt samarbejde med det internationale samfund og inden for rammerne af EU's brede integrerede tilgang. 
However, even under those difficult circumstances, both Missions have substantially enhanced the security resilience of Mali and Niger, in close cooperation with the international community and within the EU wider integrated approach.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten anerkender, at medlemsstaterne i Nigers tilfžlde accepterede, at der var en ekstra risiko forbundet med den ekstra hurtige udsendelse af missionen, som har haft konsekvenser for, hvor godt forberedte det udsendte personale var. 
The EEAS recognises that in the case of Niger, the Member States accepted the additional risk linked to the fast-track launch of the Mission, which had consequences on the level of preparedness of the Mission staff.
Hvad angr Mali blev det centrale hold af medarbejdere imidlertid behżrigt uddannet i Bruxelles i 10 dage og fik selskab af EU-Udenrigstjenesten i missionens fżrste fase. 
However, in Mali, the Core team was duly trained for ten days in Brussels and accompanied by the EEAS during the first phase of the Mission.
V. EU-Udenrigstjenesten vil gerne fremhžve, at bde de og Kommissionen konstant er opmžrksomme p bemandingsprocenterne. 
V. The EEAS wishes to highlight that staffing rates are a constant point of attention for the EEAS and the Commission.
Som en del af arbejdet med det civile FSFP's reaktionsevne er der bevidste bestržbelser p at żge bemandingsprocenten. 
As part of the work on responsiveness of civilian CSDP, a conscious effort is being taken forward to increase the manning rate.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten pskżnner, at Retten i denne forbindelse anerkender vigtigheden af at tildele passende ressourcer til sikring af bžredygtigheden i de civile FSFP-missioner. 
The EEAS appreciates that the ECA recognises, in this context, the importance of devoting adequate resources to ensuring sustainability in Civilian CSDP Missions.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten tilslutter sig denne bemžrkning. 
The EEAS agrees with this observation.
Det er i sandhed en udfordring at fastsžtte relevante og kvantificerbare indikatorer til vurdering af mandatets fremskridt og de mulige virkninger heraf. 
Establishing relevant and quantifiable indicators to assess progress in the mandate delivery and the possible impact is indeed a challenge.
Der er visse begržnsninger som fżlge af FSFP-kontekstens specificitet og medlemsstaternes tilgang til FSFP-missioner, jf. kommentarerne til punkt 55. 1 
There are some limitations due to the specificity of the CSDP context and the Member StatesŐ approach towards CSDP Missions Đ see comments on paragraph 55. 1
BEMŽRKNINGER: 23. 
OBSERVATIONS : 23.
Formlet med oprettelsen af en central kapacitet for reaktionsevne, der omfatter en styrket missionsstżtteplatform, er at stille de retlige og finansielle midler til rdighed, der er nżdvendige for, at vi hurtigt og gnidningslżst kan oprette nye missioner i fremtiden. 
The set-up of the Core Responsiveness Capacity, which includes a reinforced Mission Support Platform (MSP), shall provide the legal and financial means to enable a smooth and rapid set up of future Missions.
Tekstboks 2. 
Box 2.
Det er korrekt, at det ikke-refusionsberettigede belżb for det fżrste rs mandat endnu ikke er fastslet, eftersom det er afhžngigt af resultaterne af den kontradiktoriske procedure for EUCAP Sahelmissionen i Niger. 
The ineligible amount for the first year mandate has indeed not been established, as this depends on the results of the contradictory procedure with the EUCAP Sahel Niger Mission.
For s vidt angr vejledning udleverer Kommissionen skriftlig vejledning om alle aspekter af missionens mandat (budget, finanser, offentlige udbud), og sagsbehandlere fżrer dagligt tilsyn med gennemfżrelsen af mandatet. 
Regarding the guidance given, the Commission provides written guidance on all features of the MissionŐs mandate (budget, finances, procurement), and monitor on a daily basis the implementation of the mandate through the desk officers.