natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Anbefaling 7 Hvis Kommissionen skal samarbejde med de andre programpartnere, bør den tilsigte at formalisere det interinstitutionelle samarbejde. 
Recommendation 7 If the Commission has to cooperate with the other programme partners, it should aim to formalise interinstitutional cooperation.
Mandatet bør specificere mekanismer til udveksling af oplysninger, håndtering af fortrolige oplysninger og løsning af meningsforskelle. 
The terms of reference should specify mechanisms for sharing information, handling confidential information and resolving differences in opinion.
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 76 Lånetransaktioner 193 Kommissionens gældsudstedelse var vellykket, eftersom alle obligationsudstedelserne tiltrak tilstrækkelig efterspørgsel fra kapitalmarkederne til at blive udsolgt. 
Conclusions and recommendations 76 Borrowing operations 193 The Commission’s issuance of debt was an accomplishment, as all bond issues attracted sufficient demand from the capital markets to be sold out.
Kommissionen udstedte obligationerne rettidigt. 
The Commission made the bond issues on time.
De endelige gældsomkostninger var i overensstemmelse med markedsniveauet og sammenlignelige niveauer. 
The final cost of debt was in line with the market and peer levels.
Hvad angår den egentlige procedure, var prissætningen undertiden højere end den prissætning, som lead-bankerne oprindelig havde anført (jf. punkt 115-122). 
In terms of actual procedure, pricing levels were sometimes higher than the pricing level initially indicated by the lead banks (see paragraphs 115 to 122).
194 Der var en række mangler i gældsfor-valtningsprocessen i de første år. 
194 There were a number of gaps in the debt management process in the initial years.
Disse mangler skyldes delvis, at Kommissionen kun havde afsat et begrænset antal ansatte til denne aktivitet. 
These omissions can be partly explained by the limited number of Commission staff assigned to this activity.
Manglerne havde ikke nogen påviselig indvirkning på låntagningsresultatet. 
The gaps did not have a demonstrable impact on the outcome of borrowing.
Manglerne var stort set udbedret i de senere obligationsudstedelser, så anbefalingen vedrører de svagheder, som under revisionen blev identificeret som udestående (jf. punkt 123-136). 
The gaps were largely addressed in the later bond issues, so the recommendation concerns weaknesses identified as outstanding during the audit (see paragraphs 123 to 136).
Anbefaling 8 I relation til gældsforvaltningsproces-sen bør Kommissionen: a) øge gennemsigtigheden omkring tildelingen af udstedelser b) systematisk registrere alle de vigtigste transaktioner vedrørende udstedelser, som den indgår med lead-banker c) insistere på tilsagn fra lead-bankerne både før og efter udstedelserne og d) udføre regelmæssige analyser af terminsmarkedet for at bestemme hver enkelt udstedelses karakteristika og vurdere likviditeten på det sekundære marked. 
Recommendation 8 In relation to the debt management process the Commission should: (a) make more transparent how issues are allocated; (b) keep systematic records of all its main issuance-related dealings with lead banks; (c) insist on commitments by lead banks during the pre-issuance and post-issuance phases; and (d) perform regular forward market analysis to determine the characteristics of each issue and assess the liquidity of the secondary market.
Programresultater 195 Analysen af resultaterne bør undergå yderligere økonomisk forskning med henblik på en bedre forståelse af, hvordan landene håndterede behovet for tilpasning, og hvordan virkningen heraf kan fordeles mere ligeligt i fremtiden. 
Programme achievements 195 The analysis of achievements should be the subject of further economic research to improve understanding of how countries tackled the need for adjustment and how its impact could be more evenly distributed in the future.
Anvendelse af finansiel bistand 196 I de fem lande var det samlede niveau af bistandsmidler hele tiden som planlagt. 
Use of financial assistance 196 In the five countries, the overall level of assistance funding remained as planned.
Der var dog nogle forskelle i rækkevidden af den bistand, der blev ydet. 
However, there were some differences in comfort level.
De første programmer og det irske program havde en betydelig sikkerhedsmargin. 
The early programmes and the Irish programme included a substantial safety margin.
Det gjorde det muligt for de berørte lande at tilbagebetale dyrere IMF-lån før tiden, mindske programfinansieringen eller afhængigheden af egne ressourcer eller overgå målet for valutareserven (jf. punkt 138-139). 
This allowed the countries concerned to repay more expensive IMF loans before their due date, to reduce programme financing or reliance on their own resources or to exceed their foreign exchange reserve targets (see paragraphs 138 to 139).
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 77 197 Portugals finansieringsbehov var derimod betydeligt større end oprindeligt anslået, og finansieringen var stram under det portugisiske program. 
Conclusions and recommendations 77 197 In contrast, Portugal faced significantly higher financing requirements than initially estimated, and financing was tight during the Portuguese programme.
Portugal var nødt til at søge markedsfi-nansiering for at kunne opfylde kravene. 
To meet its requirements, Portugal had to rely on market financing.
Den finansielle bistand til Rumænien var tilstrækkelig til at dække landets betalingsbalancebehov, men finansieringen af den rumænske offentlige sektor viste sig at være mere problematisk (jf. punkt 140-143). 
The financial assistance to Romania was sufficient to cover the country’s balance-of-payment needs, but financing of the Romanian public sector proved to be more problematic (see paragraphs 140 to 143).
Finanspolitisk tilpasning 198 Med nogle undtagelser blev de reviderede underskudsmål opfyldt. 
Fiscal adjustment 198 With some exceptions, revised deficit targets were met.
Den faktiske sammensætning af den finanspolitiske konsolidering svarede stort set til den oprindelige plan, men udhulin-gen af skattegrundlaget udlignede de ekstra indtægter fra en række vigtige nye skattetiltag, der blev gennemført i 2009 (jf. punkt 144-148). 
The actual composition of fiscal consolidation broadly corresponded to what was initially planned, but the erosion of tax bases wiped out the revenue gains from important new tax measures taken in 2009 (see paragraphs 144 to 148).
199 Alle landene forbedrede deres strukturelle underskud, men tempoet varierede, primært fordi landene havde forskellige udgangspunkter. 
199 Each country’s structural deficit improved, but the pace varied, largely because the starting points were different.
Nogle af de finanspolitiske konsolideringstiltag førte til midlertidige resultater med hensyn til afhjælpning af underskuddet, fordi medlemsstaterne benyttede sig af engangstiltag for at opnå målene (jf. punkt 149-154). 
Some fiscal consolidation had non-lasting results on the deficit because Member States used one-off measures to meet their targets (see paragraphs 149 to 154).
Strukturelle betingelser 200 Medlemsstaternes overholdelse af tidsfristerne i aftalememorandaene varierede. 
Structural conditions 200 The degree of Member State compliance with the deadlines set in the memoranda of understanding varied.
Når overholdelsen var forsinket, skyldtes det for det meste årsager, som Kommissionen ikke havde kontrol over. 
Where compliance was delayed, this was mostly for reasons beyond the Commission’s control.
Landene overholdt ikke altid den oprindelige frist, men de overholdt ofte betingelserne med en vis forsinkelse (jf. punkt 155-157). 
Although countries might not meet an original deadline, they did often comply after a certain amount of time had elapsed (see paragraphs 155 to 157).
201 Det var lige så sandsynligt, at vigtige betingelser blev overholdt inden for den oprindelige tidsfrist, som mindre vigtige betingelser. 
201 Important conditions were as likely to be met by the original deadline as less important ones.
Ved slutningen af et program var overholdelsesprocen-ten for de mere vigtige betingelser ofte højere, hvilket tyder på, at Kommissionens fokus blev rettet mere mod de reformer, der var mest brug for, efterhånden som programmerne nær-mede sig afslutningen (jf. punkt 158). 
At the end of a programme the compliance rate with more important conditions tended to be higher, which indicates that the Commission’s focus partly shifted towards the most needed reforms as programmes neared closure (see paragraph 158).
202 Programbetingelserne gav med succes anledning til reformer, som for det meste fortsatte efter programmets slutning, og på revisionstidspunktet var tilbagerulning sjælden. 
202 The programme conditions successfully prompted reforms, and these mostly continued after the end of the programme, with reversals being rare as of the time of the audit.
I de tilfælde, hvor programmerne var målrettet mod reformer på bestemte områder, sås mærkbare forbedringer. 
There were tangible improvements where the programmes targeted reforms in certain specific areas.
I nogle tilfælde bidrog EU til at tilskynde til nye reformer, mens støtteprogrammerne i andre tilfælde gav incitament til at øge tempoet for gennemførelse af eksisterende nationale planer. 
In some cases the EU helped to encourage new reforms, while in others the assistance programmes provided an incentive to accelerate the implementation of existing national plans.
For en række betingelsers vedkommende gav overholdelsen imidlertid stadig ikke den virkning, som var årsagen til, at de var medtaget i programmet (jf. punkt 159-164). 
However, compliance with a number of conditions still did not produce the effects in anticipation of which they were included in the programme (see paragraphs 159 to 164).
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 78 Makroøkonomiske resultater 203 Ud over konsolidering af de offentlige budgetter og stabilisering af den finansielle sektor sigtede programmerne også mod at genoprette balancen over for udlandet ved at øge den økonomiske konkurrenceevne. 
Conclusions and recommendations 78 Macroeconomic achievements 203 As well as seeking to consolidate fiscal accounts and stabilise the financial sector, the programmes aimed at restoring external balance by enhancing economic competitiveness.
I fire ud af de fem reviderede lande rettede de løbende poster sig hurtigere end forventet. 
In four of the five countries audited, the current-account adjustment was more rapid than expected.
Det kan hovedsagelig tilskrives en uventet forbedring af indkomstbalancen og i mindre grad en tilsvarende uventet forbedring af handelsbalancen. 
This can be ascribed, mainly, to an unexpected improvement in the income balance and, to a lesser extent, to a similarly unexpected improvement in the trade balance.
Importen var lavere end forventet, hovedsagelig på grund af et fald i BNP. 
Imports were lower than expected, mainly because of a fall in GDP.
I de tilfælde, hvor eksporten også var lavere end forventet, skyldtes det normalt eksterne faktorer (primært et fald i handelspartnernes BNP) (jf. punkt 165-172). 
Where exports were also lower than expected, external factors (mainly a fall in the GDP of trading partners) were usually the cause (see paragraphs 165 to 172).
204 I tre lande indgik intern devaluering som et centralt element af den makroøkonomiske strategi, idet landene indførte et sæt politikker, som skulle genoprette den internationale konkurrenceevne ved primært at fokusere på at mindske lønomkostningerne. 
204 Internal devaluation was a key element of macroeconomic strategy in three countries, where a set of policies was devised to restore international competitiveness by focusing mainly on reduced labour costs.
I praksis blev lønningerne justeret for nyansatte under recessionen, mens etablerede ansattes lønninger næsten ikke faldt (jf. punkt 173-174). 
In practice, the pay adjustment applied to those newly hired during the recession, but the wages of incumbent workers hardly declined at all (see paragraphs 173 to 174).
Anbefaling 9 Kommissionen bør få en bedre forståelse af, hvordan landene tilpassede sig, så den kan have mere fokus på erfaringerne fra programmerne. 
Recommendation 9 The Commission should improve its understanding of how the countries adjusted so that greater attention can be paid to the lessons learnt from the programmes.
Kommissionen bør blandt andet undersøge følgende nærmere: a) effekten af tiltag til at genvinde konkurrenceevnen, f.eks. intern devaluering b) tilpasningsprogrammets sociale virkninger og byrdefordeling og c) tilpasningstiltagenes rækkefølge. 
Issues that could be further investigated include: (a) impact of the measures to regain competitiveness, such as internal devaluation; (b) social impacts and burden sharing of the adjustment programme; and (c) sequencing of adjustment measures.
Vedtaget af Afdeling IV, som ledes af Milan Martin CVIKL, medlem af Revisionsretten, i Luxembourg på mødet den 11. november 2015. 
This Report was adopted by Chamber IV, headed by Mr Milan Martin CVIKL, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 11 November 2015.
Bilag 79 Begrundelser for anmodning om bistand Krisesituationen i de enkelte lande blev klassificeret efter kategorierne i den akademiske litteratur1. 
Annexes 79 Reasons motivating the request for assistance Each crisis situation was classified using the categories suggested in the academic literature1.
Land Krisetype Vigtigste begrundelser for regeringens anmodning om bistand Ungarn Betalingsbalancekrise Lehman Brothers’ kollaps medførte en nedgang i investortilliden i begyndelsen af oktober 2008. 
Member State Type of crisis Key reasons motivating the government request for assistance Hungary Balance-of-payment crisis The Lehman Brothers collapse generated a downward shift in investor sentiment in early October 2008.
Det førte til afhændelse af statsobligationer, en mislykket obligationsauktion og en brat depreciering af valutaen. 
This led to a sell-off of government securities, a failed bond auction and sharp currency depreciation.
Stress på valutamarkederne medførte et likviditetspres på bankerne, som fandt det vanskeligt at refinansiere valutaswaps. 
The stress in foreign exchange markets prompted liquidity pressures within banks, which faced difficulties in rolling over foreign exchange swaps.
Ungarn anmodede om finansiel bistand på grund af bekymringen over, at den begyndende panik ville vende op og ned på markedsmekanismerne i en sådan grad, at der ville forekomme en pludselig afbrydelse i Ungarns eksterne finansieringkapacitet. 
Hungary requested financial assistance because of the concern that the evolving panic would upset market mechanisms to the extent a sudden disruption in Hungary’s external financing capacity would occur.
Kilde: Kommissionens oprindelige programdokumenter (2008), IMF’s efterfølgende evaluering af Ungarn (2011). 
Source: Commission initial programme documents (2008); IMF ex post evaluation Hungary (2011).
Letland Betalingsbalancekrise Bankkrise I de sidste tre måneder op til anmodningen om bistand var indlånet faldet med 10 %. 
Latvia Balance-of-payment crisis Banking crisis During the 3 months prior to the request for assistance, deposits had fallen by 10 %.
Det skyldtes primært et stormløb på Parex Bank, som kom i alvorlige likviditetsproblemer efter at have mistet over en fjerdedel af sine indlån. 
This was led by a run on the Parex Bank, which encountered severe liquidity problems after it lost more than a quarter of its deposits.
I samme periode faldt de officielle reserver med næsten 20 %, idet centralbanken solgte valuta for at forsvare valutakursbindingen. 
In the same period, official reserves fell by almost 20 % as the central bank sold foreign currency to defend the currency peg.
I november besluttede regeringen at træde til og nationalisere Parex Bank. 
In November the government decided to step in and nationalise the Parex Bank.
I december indførte regeringen restriktioner for hævning af indeståender i Parex. 
In December, the government imposed restrictions on deposit withdrawals from Parex.
Ifølge premierministeren var der tre grunde til, at Letland havde behov for finansiel bistand: for at kunne håndtere Parex Bank, finansiere budgetunderskuddet og stabilisere det finansielle marked. 
According to the prime minister, Latvia was in need of financial assistance for three reasons: to manage the Parex Bank, to finance the budget deficit and to stabilise the financial market.
Voksende bekymringer om Letlands finansielle system og udlandsgæld gav anledning til betalingsbalance-og bankkrisen. 
Increasing concerns regarding Latvia’s financial system and external debt resulted in the balance of payments and banking crises.
Kilde: Letlands anmodning til IMF (2009), Aslund, Anders og Valdis Dombrovskis (2011): ’How Latvia Came Through The Financial Crisis’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Blanchard, Olivier; Mark Griffiths og Bertrand Gruss (2013): ’Boom, Bust, Recovery: Forensics of the Latvia Crisis’, endeligt konferen-ceudkast til »Brookings Panel on Economic Activity«, efteråret 2013. 
Source: Latvia’s IMF request (2009); Aslund, Anders and Valdis Dombrovskis (2011), How Latvia came through the financial crisis, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Blanchard, Griffiths and Gruss (2013), ’Boom, bust, recovery: forensics of the Latvia crisis’, final conference draft to be presented at the Fall 2013 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity.
Rumænien Betalingsbalancekrise De indenlandske finansielle markeder og banksektoren kom under alvorligt pres, da den globale finanskrise brød ud i 2008. 
Romania Balance-of-payment crisis With the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, domestic financial markets and the banking system came under severe stress.
Adgangen til ekstern finansiering var begrænset, hvilket medførte en brat rentestigning. 
Access to external funding was limited, leading to a spike in interest rates.
De aftagende kapitalstrømme førte til en valutadepreciering på over 15 %, hvilket medførte dårligere aktivkvalitet og en yderligere svækkelse af bankernes balancer. 
The slowdown in capital flows led to large exchange rate depreciation of over 15 %, deteriorating asset quality and the further weakening of bank balance sheets.
Centralbanken intervenerede for at stabilisere den rumænske leu. 
The central bank intervened to stabilise the Romanian leu.
Rumæniens kreditvurdering blev nedgra-deret til under »investment grade«, og det øgede både risikopræmier og låneomkostninger. 
Romania’s credit rating was downgraded to below investment grade, which increased both the risk premium and borrowing costs.
Statsobligati-onsrenten steg brat til 9 %. 
Sovereign yields jumped to 9 %.
På baggrund af kraftigt øget risikoaversion, øget pres på valutakursen og en stadig mere begrænset adgang til obligationsmarkedet for offentlig låntagning fremsendte de rumænske myndigheder i marts 2009 en anmodning om finansiel bistand. 
Against a background of strongly increased risk aversion, increased pressures on the exchange rate and increasingly restricted access to the bond market for public borrowing, the Romanian authorities made a request for financial assistance in March 2009.
Kilde: IMF: Romania: Request for Stand-By Arrangement (2009), IMF Ex-post evaluation Romania (2012), Europa-Kommissionen: Overall assessment of the two balance-of-payments assistance programmes for Romania, European Economy, Occasional Papers 156 (2013). 
Source: IMF, Romania: request for a stand-by arrangement (2009); IMF ex post evaluation Romania (2012); European Commission, ‘Overall assessment of the two balance-of-payments assistance programmes for Romania’, European Economy, Occasional Papers 156 (2013).
Bilag I 
Annex I
Bilag 80 Land Krisetype Vigtigste begrundelser for regeringens anmodning om bistand Irland Bankkrise Fra udgangen af 2007 havde investorerne ikke længere tillid til Irlands ejendomssektor på baggrund af bekymringer om et for stort udbud og en prisboble. 
Annexes 80 Member State Type of crisis Key reasons motivating the government request for assistance Ireland Banking crisis From late 2007, investor confidence in Ireland’s property sector had evaporated amid concerns about oversupply and a price bubble.
Irland stod således over for to problemer, nemlig en brat nedgang i de cykliske indtægter fra byggeriet og pludseligt opståede betydelige tab i den indenlandske banksektor. 
This left Ireland facing two problems: a sharp decline in cyclical construction-related revenues and the sudden emergence of large losses in the domestic banking system.
I 2008-2010 havde Irland indført omfattende foranstaltninger for at styrke banksektoren. 
In 2008-2010 Ireland had taken major measures to strengthen its banking sector.
Banksektoren fik tilført kapital svarende til over 20 % af BNP. 
It injected capital amounting more to than 20 % of its GDP into the banking sector.
Det nationale kapitalforvaltningsagentur, National Asset Management Agency, overtog bankernes nødlidende ejendomsrelaterede aktiver. 
The National Asset Management Agency took over banks’ distressed land and property development assets.
Statens forpligtelser over for finanssektoren havde imidlertid resulteret i historisk store rentespænd for statsobligationer og begrænset landets markedsadgang markant. 
However, the government’s obligations to the financial sector had pushed spreads on government bonds to historic highs and significantly reduced market access for the Member State.
Kilde: Ireland: Letter of Intent (2010), IMF: Ireland: Request for an Extended Arrangement (2010), Europa-Kommissionen (2011). 
Source: Ireland: letter of intent (2010); IMF, Ireland: request for an extended arrangement (2010); European Commission (2011).
Portugal Statsgældskrise Perioden inden anmodningen om finansiel bistand var karakteriseret ved en ugunstig udvikling i de offentlige finanser og en forværring af de økonomiske udsigter. 
Portugal Sovereign debt crisis The period before the request for financial assistance was marked by unfavourable developments in public finances and a worsening economic outlook.
Det medførte en nedgang i tilliden og stigende markedspres på Portugals gæld, hvilket blev forstærket af den negative udvikling på euroområdets statsobligationsmarked. 
This led to a deterioration of confidence and rising market pressures on Portuguese debt, accentuated by the negative developments in euro area sovereign bond markets.
I takt med at markedsadgangen blev mere og mere begrænset, havde regeringen i stigende grad benyttet udstedelse af kortfristede værdipapirer og andre typer finansiering (f.eks. private investeringer, syndikeret udstedelse og et betydeligt omfang af kortfristet finansiering fra indenlandske banker). 
As market access tightened, the government had increasingly resorted to shorter-term security issuances and other types of financing (such as private placement, syndicated issue and substantial short-term financing from domestic banks).
I begyndelsen af maj 2011 steg det 10-årige portugisiske spænd i forhold til Bunds (tyske statsobligationer) til 650 basispoint. 
In early May 2011, Portuguese 10-year spreads over Bunds increased to 650 basis points.
På baggrund af kreditvurderingsbureauernes gentagne nedgradering af landets statsobligationer kunne Portugal ikke skaffe refinansiering til rentesatser, der var forenelige med holdbare offentlige finanser på lang sigt. 
Amidst consecutive downgrading of its sovereign bonds by credit rating agencies, Portugal became unable to refinance itself at rates compatible with long-term fiscal sustainability.
Kilde: Europa-Kommissionen: The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal, European Economy, Occasional Papers 79, (2011); IMF: Portugal: Request for Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility (2011). 
Source: European Commission, ‘The economic adjustment programme for Portugal’, European Economy, Occasional Papers 79, (2011); IMF, Portugal: request for arrangement under the extended fund facility (2011).
1 Claessens og Kose (2013), Laeven og Valencia (2012), Kaminsky og Reinhart (1999). 
1 Claessens and Kose (2013); Laeven and Valencia (2012); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).