natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
APSA har bl.a. fżlgende udfordringer: a) Den finansielle og institutionelle kapacitet i de vigtigste involverede organer (AU og SRO'erne) skal styrkes b) Der skal tages konkrete skridt til at afhjžlpe manglen p politisk vilje til at adressere visse spżrgsml og kriser39 c) Der er ingen mekanisme til at hndhžve beslutninger d) Der er behov for et bedre samarbejde mellem de forskellige organer og institutioner e) Forholdet mellem AU og SRO'erne skal pržciseres, navnlig med hensyn til subsidiaritet40 F.eks. 
Challenges for the APSA include the following: (a) the financial and institutional capacity of the key bodies involved (the AU and the SROs) need to be strengthened; (b) specific steps are needed to overcome the lack of political will to address certain issues and crises39; (c) there is no mechanism to enforce decisions; (d) there is a need for better cooperation between different bodies and institutions; (e) the relationship between the AU and the SROs should be clarified, particularly regarding subsidiarity40; (f) there should be better coordination with complementary initiatives such as the African Governance Architecture41.
Institute for Security Studies, PSC Report 90, "Denialism plagues Africa's early warning system", april 2017. 
Institute for Security Studies, PSC Report 90, "Denialism plagues Africa's early warning system", April 2017.
Anvendelsen af subsidiaritetsprincippet og spżrgsmlet om lederskab i forholdet mellem AU og SRO'erne er fortsat et meget żmtleligt emne. 
The application of the principle of subsidiarity and the question of leadership between AU and the SROs remains a highly sensitive issue.
For at kunne gennemfżre APSA effektivt er det derfor afgżrende, at institutionernes roller og ansvar p nationalt, regionalt, kontinentalt og multilateralt plan defineres pržcist. 
A precise definition of roles and responsibilities of institutions on the national, regional, continental and multilateral levels is therefore crucial for the effective implementation of the APSA.
I APF-vurderingerne fra 2010 og 2013 blev det anbefalet at pržcisere anvendelsen af subsidiaritetsprincippet. 
2010 and 2013 APF evaluations recommended clarifying the application of the principle of subsidiarity.
Der blev imidlertid ikke gjort store fremskridt i denne henseende: I APSA-kżreplanen for 2016-2020 blev det igen fremhžvet, at manglen p fžlles forstelse af subsidiaritetsprincipperne var en af APSA's svagheder. 
However, there was little progress in this regard: the APSA roadmap for 2016-2020 still highlighted the lack of common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity as one of APSAŐs weaknesses.
20 38 39 40 
21 39 40 41
Freds-og Sikkerhedsrdet 36. 
Peace and Security Council 36.
Freds-og Sikkerhedsrdet (PSC) er det vigtigste beslutningsorgan i APSA og har indtaget holdninger til centrale spżrgsml ved at fordżmme kup og indfżre sanktioner. 
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is established in its role as the main decision-making organ of the APSA and has taken positions on key issues by condemning coups and imposing sanctions.
Det har ogs bidraget til at lżse konflikter, f.eks. i Burundi, Mali og Somalia42. 
It has also contributed to resolving conflicts, for example in Burundi, Mali, and Somalia42.
PSC str imidlertid over for visse udfordringer, og flere problemer pvirker fortsat dets arbejde. 
However, the PSC faces challenges and several problems continue to affect its work.
Eksempelvis har Den Afrikanske Unions forsamling af stats-og regeringschefer ofte ikke fulgt PSC-protokollens principper for vurdering af potentielle PSC-kandidaters overholdelse af fastsatte kriterier. 
For example, the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State has frequently failed to adhere to principles set out in the PSC Protocol to assess prospective PSC candidatesŐ compliance with set criteria.
Lande, der var berygtede for benlyst at lade hnt om AU's beslutninger eller for at udvise forfatningsstridig adfžrd, er blevet optaget i Rdet. 
Countries that gained notoriety for openly flouting the decisions of the AU or for exhibiting unconstitutional behaviour, have been included into the Council.
Dette har begržnset kvaliteten og effektiviteten af PSC's beslutninger. 
This has limited the quality and effectiveness of the PSCŐs decisions.
PSC har ogs oplevet problemer p grund af den betydning, som det tillžgges at opn enstemmighed i beslutningsprocessen. 
The PSC has also experienced problems because of the importance assigned to reaching unanimity in decision-making.
Dette forvžrres, hvis stater mangler politisk vilje til at tage stilling til spżrgsml, som de ikke anerkender som vžrende i deres interesse, eller hvis de ikke bent vil konfrontere en anden medlemsstat43. 
This is exacerbated by the lack of political will of some states to take a position on issues which they do not recognise as being in their interest, or if they do not wish to openly confront a fellow member state43.
Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission 38. 
African Union Commission 38.
AU-Kommissionen gennemfżrer Freds-og Sikkerhedsrdets beslutninger, og dens freds-og sikkerhedsafdeling (PSD) stżtter de andre sżjler i APSA samt andre freds-og sikkerhedsprogrammer, f.eks. gržnsemarkeringsprogrammet og strategien for hndvben og lette vben. 
The AU Commission implements PSC decisions and its Peace and Security Department (PSD) supports the other pillars of the APSA as well as other peace and security programmes, such as the demarcation of borders, and the strategy on small arms and light weapons.
Freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingen koordinerer ogs forholdet mellem AU og SRO'erne med hensyn til freds-og sikkerhedsspżrgsml. 
The PSD also coordinates relations between the AU and the SROs on peace and security matters.
Freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingen spiller en vigtig rolle i driften af APSA, men den utilstržkkelige finansiering fra AU betżd, at to tredjedele af dens stillinger var ubesatte. 
The PSD has an important role in the APSAŐs operation, but inadequate funding by the AU left two-thirds of its posts vacant.
I 2010 adresserede EU, AU og andre internationale partnere dette ved at oprette en fžlles finansieringsmekanisme, som kaldes en "fžlles finansieringsordning" (JFA)44. 
In 2010, the EU, the AU and other international partners addressed this by setting up a common funding mechanism called a ŇJoint APSA Assessment Study 2014.
Denne džkkede lżnomkostningerne for yderligere 172 "kortvarigt" ansatte i freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingen (figur 5). 
This covered the salary costs of additional 172 Ňshort-termÓ staff members of the PSD (Figure 5).
Selv om det ikke var alle stillingerne, der blev besat, gjorde det ekstra personale det muligt for freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingen at fortsžtte sit arbejde45. 
Although not all of the posts were filled, the additional staff members allowed the PSD to continue to function45.
Figur 5 - Stillinger og ledige poster i AU-Kommissionens freds-og sikkerhedsafdeling Kilde: Referat af det 11. mżde i styringskomiten om den fžlles finansieringsordning for stżtte til ansžttelse af personale i AU-Kommissionen til at arbejder med freds-og sikkerhedsprogrammet, april 2017, og oversigt over freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingens personale, juli 2016. 
Figure 5 - AU Commission Peace and Security Department posts and vacancies Source: Minutes of the 11th Steering Committee meeting on the Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the employment of AUC personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme, April 2017, and PSD staff overview, July 2016.
Freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingen har et begržnset antal "professionelle" ansat, som beskžftiger sig med kernespżrgsml vedrżrende fred og sikkerhed p det afrikanske kontinent. 
The PSD has a limited number of ŇprofessionalÓ staff dealing with core peace and security issues of the African continent.
Personalets vigtigste opgave er at opfylde APSA's brede kżreplan for 2016-2020, som er et dokument, der angiver fem strategiske prioriteter, 32 specifikke ml og 116 output. 
The main task of the staff is to fulfil the APSAŐs broad 2016-2020 roadmap, a document which specifies 5 strategic priorities, 32 specific objectives and 116 outputs.
De utilstržkkelige ressourcer og politikken om at ansžtte personale kortvarigt (punkt 57) gżr dette til en vanskelig opgave. 
The inadequate amount of resources allocated and the policy of Ňshort-termÓ staff recruitment (paragraph 57) make this a difficult task.
Figur 6 - Kilder til finansiering af stillinger i AU-Kommissionens freds-og sikkerhedsafdeling Fordeling af stillinger i kontorer/enheder JFA AU's ordinžre budget I alt Generel tjeneste Professionelle Generel tjeneste Professionelle Kommissžrens kontor 2 2 1 2 7 Direktżrens kontor, herunder AU's forbindelseskontorer til REC'er/RM'er 9 10 3 1 23 Divisionen for konfliktforebyggelse og tidlig varsling 6 15 7 6 34 Divisionen for krisestyring og genopbygning efter konflikter 4 8 1 18 31 Divisionen for fredsstżttende operationer 3 32 6 12 53 Divisionen for forsvar og sikkerhed 2 6 1 3 12 Freds-og Sikkerhedsrdets sekretariat 2 6 1 2 11 Projektstyringsgruppen 2 9 1 2 14 Divisionen for finansiering af fred og sikkerhed 10 14 - - 24 Andet (registerkontor, HR, intern revision mv.) 
Figure 6 - Source of funding for AU Commission Peace and Security Department posts 24 Distribution of staff posts by office / unit JFA AU Regular Budget Total General Service Professional General Service Professional Office of the Commissioner 2 2 1 2 7 Office of the Director including AU LOs to RECs/RMs 9 10 3 1 23 Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division 6 15 7 6 34 Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Division 4 8 1 18 31 Peace Support Operations Division 3 32 6 12 53 Defence and Security Division 2 6 1 3 12 PSC Secretariat 2 6 1 2 11 Project Management Team 2 9 1 2 14 Peace and Security Finance Division 10 14 - - 24 Other (Registry, HR, Internal Audit, etc.)
20 10 Ikke relevant - p tvžrs af afdelinger I alt 60 112 21 46 239 Kilde: Referat af det 11. mżde i styringskomiten om den fžlles finansieringsordning for stżtte til ansžttelse af personale i AU-Kommissionen til at arbejder med freds-og sikkerhedsprogrammet, april 2017, og oversigt over freds-og sikkerhedsafdelingens personale, juli 2016. 
20 10 N/A - cross-departmental Total 60 112 21 46 239 Source: Minutes of the 11th Steering Committee meeting on the Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the employment of AUC personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme, April 2017, and PSD staff overview, July 2016.
EU og andre donorer kanaliserer ogs penge gennem AU-Kommissionen for at stżtte et netvžrk af AU-forbindelseskontorer, der opererer i 14 konfliktlande og postkonfliktlande i Afrika. 
The EU and other donors also channel money jointly through the AU Commission to support a network of AU Liaison Offices operating in 14 conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa.
Det rlige EU-bidrag til finansiering af AU-forbindelseskontorerne belżber sig til ca. 3,5 millioner euro (ca. 25 % af det rlige budget). 
The yearly EU contribution to funding the AU Liaison Offices amounts to approximately Ű3.5 million (around 25 % of the annual budget).
Netvžrket har omkring 200 ansatte, og forholdet mellem stżttepersonale og operationelt personale er hżjt (ca. 70:30). 
The network has around 200 members of staff, of which the ratio of support to operational staff is high (about 70:30).
PSC fastsžtter forbindelseskontorernes mandater, der spžnder fra overvgning af begyndende kriser, forebyggende diplomati og krisestyring til genopbygning efter konflikter. 
The PSC sets the mandates of the Liaison Offices, which range from monitoring emerging crises, preventative diplomacy and crisis management to post-conflict reconstruction.
Kontorerne repržsenterer AU p stedet og spiller primžrt en politisk rolle46. 
The offices represent the AU on the ground and have a primarily political role46.
En nylig EU-finansieret evaluering47 ppegede, at AU-forbindelseskontorerne havde spillet en konstruktiv og vžsentlig rolle i krisesituationer i Mali, Den Centralafrikanske Deres roller og aktiviteter er beskrevet i projektdokumenter om den fžlles finansieringsordning for AU-forbindelseskontorerne og AU-Kommissionens fžlles beskrivende rapporter. 
The evaluation found that the Liaison OfficesŐ impact had been ŇmixedÓ, but that their work had made Ňa reasonable contribution The role and activities are described in project documents for the JFA AU Liaison Offices and AU Commission Joint Narrative Reports.
"Mid-term evaluation - Sustaining and strengthening African Union's Liaison Offices in post-conflict countries", Den Afrikanske Union, januar 2017. 
Mid-term evaluation, ŇSustaining and strengthening African UnionŐs Liaison Offices in post-conflict countriesÓ, African Union, January 2017.
46 47 
46 47
Ligeledes konkluderedes det i en nylig rapport fra World Peace Foundation, at forbindelseskontorerne var vigtige, og fortsat burde stżttes48. 
Similarly, a recent report by the World Peace Foundation concluded that the Liaison Offices were Ňimportant, and should continue to be supportedÓ48.
Panel of the Wise 43. 
Panel of the Wise 43.
Panel of the Wise blev etableret under PSC-protokollen som et rdgivende organ bestende af fem respekterede afrikanske personligheder. 
The PSC Protocol set up the Panel of the Wise as an advisory organ made up of five respected African personalities.
Panelets rolle er at arbejde med konfliktforebyggelse, hvilket det f.eks. gjorde ved at arrangere workshopper og mżder p hżjt plan. 
Its role is to work towards conflict prevention, which it carried out, for example by convening workshops and high-level retreats.
Panelets rolle er blevet udvidet til at omfatte missioner fżr valg og mžgling49. 
The PanelŐs role has expanded to include pre-election missions and mediation work49.
Trods en stigende arbejdsbyrde er panelets ressourcer ikke blevet żget. 
Despite an increasing workload, the PanelŐs resources have not increased.
Eksempelvis har panelets sekretariat kun n politisk analytiker, hvis lżn stżttes af EU under den fžlles finansieringsordning. 
For example, the PanelŐs secretariat has only one political analyst, whose salary is supported by the EU under the JFA.
Panelet har ogs oplevet koordineringsproblemer med PSC og andre organer, der arbejder med konfliktforebyggelse og -lżsning. 
The Panel has also encountered coordination issues with the PSC and other bodies tasked with conflict prevention and resolution.
Kontinentalt system for tidlig varsling (CEWS) 44. 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) 44.
Det kontinentale system for tidlig varsling (CEWS) er et system, som anvendes til at indsamle og analysere data med henblik p foregribelse og forebyggelse af konflikter. 
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a system for collecting and analysing data in order to anticipate and prevent conflicts.
EU bidrog med teknisk og finansiel stżtte til at oprette det og finansierer fortsat driftsudgifterne gennem de kontrakter om lżnninger under den fžlles finansieringsordning og om APSA-stżtteprogrammet, som vi reviderede (bilag IV). 
The EU contributed technical and financial support towards setting it up and continues to finance operating costs under the JFA Salaries and APSA Support Programme contracts we audited (Annex IV). 45.
World Peace Foundation, "African Politics, African Peace", 2016. 
World Peace Foundation, ŇAfrican Politics, African PeaceÓ, 2016.
Ifżlge den endelige rapport om kontrakten JFA-lżnninger II (som džkkede perioden 1.4.2013-1.7.2015), havde Panel of the Wise p davžrende tidspunkt f.eks. gennemfżrt ni missioner til lande, der forberedte sig p valg, samt seks opgaver vedrżrende mžgling, forebyggende mžgling og mellemkomst. 
For example according to the final report for the JFA Salaries II contract (covering 1.4.2013 Đ 1.7.2015), the Panel of the Wise then carried out nine missions to countries preparing for elections as well as six mediation, preventive mediation and Ňgood officesÓ engagements.
Et af panelets medlemmer gennemfżrte mellemkomstmissioner til DRC i 2015 og 2016. 
One of the members of the panel undertook good offices missions to the DRC during 2015 and 2016.
48 49 
48 49 50
Visse faktorer begržnser dog systemets effektivitet. a) I APSA-kżreplanen ppeges behovet for at adressere de forskellige funktionsniveauer i de regionale systemer for tidlig varsling og forbedre forbindelserne mellem centrale, regionale og nationale systemer51. b) Freds-og Sikkerhedsrdet har fremhžvet, at der til stadighed mangler sammenhžng mellem tidlig varsling og tidlig indsats52, og konkluderet, at AU-medlemsstaterne ofte ikke er opmžrksomme p tidlige signaler om fremtidige kriser, hvilket undergraver dets konfliktforebyggende kapacitet og ofte fżrer til konflikter53. 
26 (a) The APSA roadmap points to the need to address the varying levels of functionality of the regional early warning systems, as well as to improve the connections between central, regional and national systems51. (b) The Peace and Security Council has highlighted Ňa persistent gap between early warning and early responseÓ52, and concluded that AU member states often pay no attention to early warning signals of future crises, thereby undermining the CouncilŐs conflict-prevention capacity, often leading to conflicts53.
African Standby Force (den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke) 46. 
African Standby Force 46.
Den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke er en tvžrfaglig reservestyrke, som AU's forsamling og PSC kan benytte til hurtig indsžttelse i konfliktramte omrder. 
The African Standby Force (ASF) is a multidisciplinary reserve force designed for rapid deployment to conflict areas by the AU Assembly and the PSC.
Den omfatter militžr, politi og civile enheder54. 
It includes military, police and civilian units54.
EU-stżtte blev brugt til at finansiere kapacitetsforbedringer i den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke og dens regionale komponenter under fredsfaciliteten for Afrika og RVP'erne. 
EU support funded improvements to the capacity of the African Standby Force and its regional components under the African Peace Facility and the RIPs.
Stżtten džkkede personaleomkostninger og operationelle aktiviteter (forbedring af planlžgning, logistik og politikudvikling samt styrkelse af politikomponenten og den civile komponent) samt indkżb af IT-infrastruktur (C3IS) (jf. listen over kontrakter i bilag IV). 
Support covered staff costs and operational activities (improving planning, logistics, and policy development and strengthening the police and civilian components) as well as the procurement of IT infrastructure (C3IS) (Annex IV for the list of contracts).
EU finansierede ogs uddannelse af beredskabsstyrkerne, herunder stżtte til feltżvelser (AMANI AFRICA II-stżtteprogrammet). 
The EU also funded training to the stand-by forces, including support for field exercises (AMANI AFRICA II Support Programme).
"APSA Roadmap 2016-2020", s. 
APSA Roadmap 2016Đ2020, p.
PSC-mżde (30. maj 2016), pressemeddelelse, www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-601st-psc-meeting-on-early-warning-30-may-2016.pdf. 
51 52 601st PSC meeting (30 May 2016) Press Statement, www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-601st-psc-54
De interessenter, vi interviewede, satte spżrgsmlstegn ved, om den var operationel, idet de ppegede, at: a) dens kommando-, kontrol-, kommunikations-og informationssystem endnu ikke er operationelt (tekstboks 6) b) den mangler kapacitet til at indsžtte enheder hurtigt p grund af logistiske begržnsninger ssom utilstržkkelig strategisk lufttransportkapacitet c) sproglige og kulturelle problemer kan potentielt reducere effektiviteten af dens indsžttelse p tvžrs af regioner. 
27 (b) the ASF lacks the capacity to deploy units rapidly because of logistical constraints such as insufficient strategic airlift capability; (c) linguistic and cultural problems have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of deployment across regions.
Trusler mod resultaternes bžredygtighed 48. 
Threats to the sustainability of results 48.
De stżrste risici vedrżrende manglende bžredygtighed af de opnede resultater med hensyn til opbygningen af APSA's kapacitet skyldes AU's og SRO'ernes svage finansielle, institutionelle og operationelle kapacitet og den manglende politiske vilje hos en ržkke AU-medlemsstater (punkt 34). 
The main risks to the sustainability of the results achieved in building the APSAŐs capacity are rooted in the weak financial, institutional and operational capacity of the AU and SROs, and in the lack of political commitment by a number of AU member states (paragraph 34).
De planlagte reformer med henblik p at adressere svagheder i de institutionelle rammer for AU-Kommissionen55, ECOWAS56 og ECCAS57 har indtil videre kun givet f resultater. 
Reforms planned with the aim of addressing weaknesses in the institutional frameworks of the AU Commission55, ECOWAS56 and ECCAS57 have yielded few results to date.
Beslutning om den institutionelle reform af Den Afrikanske Union, juli 2016, Ref. 
Technical assistance experts have often acted as project managers, providing a Ňshort-term Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union, July 2016, Ref.
Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII), efterfulgt af "Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union", af H.E. Paul Kagame (29. januar 2017). 
Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII), followed by the Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, by H.E. Paul Kagame (29 January 2017).
I ECOWAS startede den institutionelle reform i 2013, og ECOWAS indgik kontrakt med en international virksomhed om en intern institutionel revision. 
In ECOWAS, the institutional reform started in 2013, and an internal institutional audit was contracted by ECOWAS to an international firm.
Revisionen varede to r og udmżntede sig i tre modeller for institutionel reform, der blev pržsenteret internt, men hverken revisionsresultaterne eller anbefalingerne blev delt med EU eller de żvrige donorer. 
The audit lasted 2 years and produced three institutional reform options that were presented internally but neither the audit findings nor the recommendations were shared with the EU or the other donors.
P tidspunktet for revisionen var ECOWAS endnu ikke formelt blevet enig om en model for institutionel reform. 
At the time of the audit, ECOWAS had not yet formally agreed on one institutional reform option.
Den institutionelle revision fżrte til et ansžttelsesstop, hvilket igen resulterede i overcentralisering og flaskehalse, og dette komplicerede mange igangvžrende initiativer og finansieringsforhold. 
The institutional audit led to a freeze in recruitment which resulted in over-centralisation and bottlenecks, complicating many ongoing initiatives and funding.
Med hensyn til ECCAS blev der i det RVP-finansierede program under EUF omtalt en reform af Centralafrikas Freds-og Sikkerhedsrds grundlžggende tekster, men der blev ikke opnet nogen resultater, fordi der manglede politisk vilje blandt ECCAS-medlemsstaterne. 
For ECCAS, under the EDF RIP-funded programme, provision was made for a reform of the fundamental texts of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, but no result was achieved because of a lack of political will among ECCAS member states.
Aktiviteten er opfżrt igen i det nuvžrende EUF-program. 
The activity is scheduled again for the current EDF programme.
Omkostningerne ved dette har ofte vžret meget betydelige. Der blev f.eks. ydet et tilskud p 6,7 millioner euro til fred, sikkerhed og stabilitet under ECOWAS, mens omkostningerne til teknisk bistand vedrżrende gennemfżrelsen af tilskuddet var p yderligere 4,9 millioner euro: 73 % af det oprindelige tilskud. 
The cost of doing so has often been very significant: for example, the amount of the ECOWAS Peace, Security and Stability grant provided by the EU was Ű6.7 million, while the cost of technical assistance for implementing the grant was a further Ű4.9 million: 73 % of the initial grant.
Gennemfżrelsen af EU's stżtte blev pvirket af forsinkelser, inkonsekvent brug af finansieringsinstrumenter og utilstržkkelige oplysninger om de opnede resultater 51. 
The implementation of EU support was affected by delays, incoherent use of financing instruments and insufficient information on results achieved 51.