natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Da det som forklaret ovenfor er i EU's egen interesse at stżtte APSA, er der ingen direkte begrundelse for at standse finansieringen af de grundlžggende finansielle driftsomkostninger, s lžnge Kommissionen, EU-Udenrigstjenesten og 3 Kommissionens afgżrelse C(2017) 8294 final af 12.12.2017. 2 
Since, as explained above, it is in the EU's own interest to support the APSA, there is no direct justification to stop financing its basic operational costs as long as the Commission, the EEAS and the EU Member States continue to view this support as a relevant strategic tool to stabilise Africa. 3 Commission Decision C(2017) 8294 final OF 12.12.2017 2
Kommissionen og EU-Udenrigstjenesten anvender partnerejerskabsprincippet som fastsat i adskillige internationale aftaler, ssom Monterrey-aftalen fra 20034. 
The Commission and the EEAS refer to the principle of partner ownership as set out in several international agreements, such as the agreement of Monterrey 20034.
Disse principper betyder, at det overordnede ejerskab af stżtten skal ligge hos partnerne (se ogs vores svar under 28). 
These principles mean that overall ownership of support should be in the hands of the partners (see also our reply under 28).
Den Afrikanske Union har vedtaget en klar plan for at opn finansiel bžredygtighed i 2020. 
The African Union has adopted a clear plan to achieve financial sustainability by 2020.
EU, der finansierede de tekniske eksperter, der blev hyret af AUC til at hjžlpe med udarbejdelsen af planen, glžder sig over de foranstaltninger, der er indeholdt deri. 
The EU, which financed technical experts hired by the AUC to assist developing the plan, has welcomed the measures included in it.
Bžredygtighedsforanstaltningerne indeholdt i planen skal sikre AU-medlemsstaternes bidrag, s 100 % af AUC's driftsomkostninger og 25 % af fredsstżttens driftsomkostninger er džkket af disse i 2020. 
EU's future support will be aligned with the plan. Measures to ensure sustainability included in the plan entail ensuring AU Member States contributions so that 100% of AUC operational costs and 25% of peace support operations costs are covered by them by 2020.
En specifik afgift p 0,2 % p relevant import er ved at blive indfżrt af AU-medlemsstaterne til dette forml (Kaberuka-planen). 
A specific 0.2% levy over eligible imports is being put in place by AU MS to this end (Kaberuka plan).
Endvidere stżtter EU Den Afrikanske Unions Kommissions reform af dens finansielle og administrative ledelsessystemer for at vžre i overensstemmelse med internationale standarder. 
In addition, the EU is supporting African Union Commission's reform of its financial and administrative management systems to become compliant with international standards.
Kommissionen har stżttet sdanne reformer med teknisk bistand for at styrke regnskabsfżrelsen, den interne revision, indkżb og forvaltning af aktiver, og fremskridt blev dokumenteret i en gennemgang af AUC's systemer i april 20185. 
The Commission has supported such reforms by technical assistance to strengthen accountancy, internal audit, procurement and asset management and progress is acknowledged in a review of AUC's systems of April 20185.
Kommissionen har til hensigt at vurdere AUC's systemer yderligere i slutningen af 2018. 
The Commission intends to further assess the AUC systems in depth by the end of 2018.
Tekstboks 3 Đ Fordele og ulemper ved et regionalt system for tidlig varsling Andet afsnit: Gennem EU-stżtte (hovedsageligt PAPS II Đ Politiske anliggender, fred og sikkerhed Đ i henhold til den 10. EUF RVP) er MARAC's (Mcanisme d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique Centrale) muligheder blevet udvidet. 
Box 3 - The ups and downs of a regional early warning system Second alinea: Through EU support (mainly PAPS IIĐ Political Affairs, Peace and Security - under the 10th EDF RIP), the capabilities of MARAC (Mcanisme d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique Centrale) have been developed.
Det blev eksempelvis muligt at kżbe og anskaffe udstyr til dets strategiske advarselsrum. 
For example, it enabled the acquisition and provision of equipment for its Strategic warning room.
Ved slutningen af PAPS II lykkedes det ikke CEEAC at bygge videre p disse fremskridt, navnlig fordi en vžsentlig del af det tekniske personale blev afskediget. 
However, following the end of PAPS II, ECCAS failed to build upon this progress, notably because a significant part of the technical staff was laid off.
EU og CEEAC anerkendte dette problem og aftalte, at en minimumsstandard for den fortsatte drift skulle stżttes gennem det APF-finansierede APSA-stżtteprogram III. 
Acknowledging this issue, the EU and ECCAS agreed that a minimum standard of business continuity ought to be supported through the APF-funded APSA Support Programme III.
Dette er rsagen til, at programmet indeholder specifikke bestemmelser om at stżtte visse MARAC-kapacitetsopbygningsaktiviteter i CEEAC's arbejdsprogrammer for 2017 og 2018. 
This is the reason why this programme contains specific provisions to support some MARAC capacity building activities in the 2017 and 2018 ECCAS work plans.
Et af de forventede resultater af det kommende program er at fortsžtte med at styrke MARAC's kompetencer, samtidig med at erfaringerne fra PAPS II vedrżrende bžredygtighed udnyttes. 
One of the expected results of this upcoming programme is to keep on strengthening MARAC's capacities, while using the lessons learnt from PAPS II in terms of sustainability.
Kommissionen og EU-Udenrigstjenesten mener, at der allerede er truffet foranstaltninger i denne retning. 
The Commission and the EEAS consider that steps are already being taken in this direction.
Med hensyn til den fžlles finansieringsordnings (JFA) lżnprogram er der sket fżlgende fremskridt for 2018: * Sammenlignet med den tidligere fase af denne EU-stżtte (JFA Lżn IV) er EU's andel af det samlede budget reduceret fra 34 % til 15 %. 
Taking the example of the JFA (Joint Financing Arrangement) Salaries programme, the following progress has been made for 2018: * As compared to the previous phase of this EU support (JFA Salaries IV), the EU's share of the total budget is reduced from 34 % to 15%.
Endvidere udgżr AU-medlemsstaternes andel af forpligtelser for 2018 stżrstedelen af det samlede budget som et resultat af AUC's indsats for at begržnse antallet af stillinger, der finansieres af partnere. 
Moreover, AU Member States' pledges share for 2018 represents the majority of the total budget as a result of the efforts of the AUC to reduce the number of positions to be financed by partners.
4 5 http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf Vurderingen blev udfżrt af Ernst & Young, og rapporten blev udgivet den 16. april 2018 (Ares(2018)2249815). 3 
4 5 http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf The assessment was carried out by Ernst & Young and the report was issued on 16/04/2018 (Ares(2018)2249815) 3
* Stillinger finansieret af partnere er begržnset til P3 og P4 (dvs. specialiseret personale), mens alle generelle stillinger er overtaget af AUC. 
* Positions financed by partners are limited to P3 and P4 (i.e. specialized staff) while all general staff positions have been taken over by the AUC.
I żjeblikket udgżr de 12,6 % af de stillinger, der finansieres under den nuvžrende JFA, hvilket er en stor forbedring i forhold til tidligere r. * Partnerne og AUC er blevet enige om, at AUC fortsat gradvist skal džkke omkostningerne til det personale, der gennemfżrer freds-og sikkerhedsprogrammer, s partnerne kan flytte deres stżtte fra driftsomkostningerne til programomkostninger. 
At present, they represent 12.6% of the positions financed under the present JFA, which is a major improvement as compared to the previous years. * Partners and the AUC have agreed that the AUC will continue to progressively cover the staff costs of its personnel implementing peace and security programmes to enable partners to shift their support from operational to programmatic costs.
Denne aftale er en del af JFA-exitstrategien. 
This agreement is part of the JFA exit strategy.
Kommissionen og EU-Udenrigstjenesten anvender princippet om partnerejerskab og mener, at der var fastsat specifikke prioriteter for deres stżtte til APSA. 
The Commission and the EEAS refer to the principle of partners' ownership, and consider that they did set specific priorities for their support to APSA.
Disse blev drżftet og vedtaget med Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission og afrikanske regionale żkonomiske fžllesskaber under formuleringen af APSA-kżreplanen 2016-20206. 
These were discussed and agreed with the African Union Commission and African Regional Economic Communities during the formulation of the APSA Roadmap 2016-20206.
Kżreplanen har en klar mlsžtning om at stżtte afrikanske lżsninger p afrikanske freds-og sikkerhedsproblemer. 
The Roadmap has a clear objective to support African solutions to African peace and security problems.
Gennemfżrelsen af denne kżreplan stżttes gennem en ržkke programmer, navnlig den igangvžrende tredje fase af APSA-stżtteprogrammet ("APSA III"). 
The implementation of this Roadmap is supported through a set of programmes, in particular the ongoing third phase of the APSA Support Programme ('APSA III').
Aktiviteterne under APSA III er mere detaljeret beskrevet i rlige arbejdsplaner7, der giver mulighed for at prioritere EU's stżtte og benchmarke konkrete resultater i forhold til konkrete ml. 
The activities under APSA III are further detailed through annual work plans7, which allow for a prioritisation of EU's support and for benchmarking of concrete results against concrete objectives.
For at kunne skabe disse resultater džkker Kommissionen en ržkke aktiviteter, hvis gennemfżrelse kržver stżtte til driftsomkostninger, ssom uddannelse, rejser og lżn. 
In order to deliver on those results, the Commission therefore covers a set of activities, the implementation of which requires supporting operational costs such as trainings, travels, and salaries.
Finansieringen af disse omkostninger har haft afgżrende betydning for at kunne n mlsžtningen for EU's stżtte. 
Financing these costs has been essential to achieve the objective of the EU support.
30. (c) EU besluttede at overfżre hele IGAD RVP-bevillingen til trustfonden, bl.a. med henblik p sammenhžng. 
30. (c) The EU decided to transfer the entire IGAD RIP allocation to the Trust Fund for purposes of coherence, among other things.
Det meste af bevillingen anvendes til aktiviteter inden for fred og sikkerhed, modstandsdygtighed og migration. 
Most of the allocation is being directed to activities related to peace and security, resilience and migration.
Brugen af trustfonden skabte stżrre sammenhžng, f.eks. i tilfžlde hvor aktiviteter, som var planlagt under RVP, var mere relevante for eller bidrog vžsentligt til trustfondens nżdmigrationsrelaterede ml. (d) Bekymring over denne risiko er en af rsagerne til, at EU forpligter sig til fortsat at arbejde med AU. (e) Militžre eksperter er tilgžngelige i EU's delegation for AU, hvor programmet forvaltes. 
Using the Trust Fund provided greater coherence Đ for example, where the actions envisaged under the RIP were more appropriate for or contributed substantially to the emergency migration-related objectives of the Trust Fund. (d) The concern with this risk is one of the reasons why the EU remains committed to continue working with the AU. (e) Military expertise is available in the EU delegation to the AU where the programme is managed.
Disse eksperter kan om nżdvendigt tržkke p eksperter fra EU's regionale delegationer. 
This military expertise can rely, when necessary, on expertise available at EU regional delegations.
Der er endvidere rekrutteret yderligere eksperter ved EU-Udenrigstjenestens hovedkvarter i 2018. 
Additional expertise has been recruited at EEAS headquarters in 2018.
For aktiviteter under RVP er der ikke behov for personale med militžre profiler, da disse programmer er udviklingsprogrammer. 
For activities under the RIP, staff with military profiles are not required as these programmes are development programmes.
Endvidere blev en ržkke nye Kommissionsposter tildelt til delegationer for at hndtere arbejde i forbindelse med trustfonden for Afrika, hvoraf en del vedrżrer freds-og stabilitetsml. 
Additionally, a number of new Commission posts were allocated to Delegations in order to manage work related to the Trust Fund for Africa, part of which relates to peace and stability objectives.
Vedrżrende enstemmighed fremgr det af artikel 13 i AU's freds-og sikkerhedsrds protokol, at enstemmigt flertal (ved procedurepunkter) og to tredjedels flertal (alle andre punkter) er tilstržkkeligt. 
Regarding unanimity, article 13 of the AU PSC (Peace and Security Council) protocol states that single majority (on procedural points) and two-third majority (any other point) suffice.
En ekstern revision udfżrt i april 20188 viser, at AUC-systemerne er blevet bedre. 
An external review performed in April 20188 indicates that AUC systems have been strengthened.
6 7 8 http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/annex-9-ausp-3_en_0.pdf Vurderingen blev udfżrt af Ernst & Young, og rapporten blev udgivet den 16. april 2018 (Ares(2018)2249815). 4 
6 7 8 http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/annex-9-ausp-3_en_0.pdf The assessment was carried out by Ernst & Young and the report was issued on 16/04/2018 (Ares(2018)2249815) 4
CEEAC's statschefer drżftede i marts 2018 en žndring til et mandat med klart fokus p fred og sikkerhed, og CEEAC arbejder nu p en ny "centralafrikansk kommission", der skal overtage CEEAC's aktiviteter. 
ECCAS Heads of State discussed in March 2018 a reorientation towards a mandate clearly focused on peace and security and ECCAS is now working on a new "Central African Commission" to take up ECCAS' activity.
For s vidt angr ECOWAS gik reformerne i st p grund af manglende enighed blandt medlemsstaterne, og som fżlge heraf er žndringer i forretningsprocesserne udskudt til juni 2018. 
Regarding ECOWAS, reforms were stalled due to lack of consensus by its Member States and consequently changes in its business processes have been postponed to June 2018.
En EU-sżjlevurdering af ECOWAS-kommissionen er planlagt til fżrste kvartal af 2019. 
An EU pillar assessment of the ECOWAS Commission is envisaged in the first quarter of 2019.
Kommissionens tilgang til at yde teknisk bistand til Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission er blevet revideret. 
The Commission's approach to the provision of technical assistance to the AU Commission has been revised.
Teknisk bistand ydes nu p mlrettet basis og p baggrund af anmodninger fra Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission. 
Technical assistance is now being provided on a targeted basis and based on requests made by the AU Commission.
I lżbet af 2017 blev der ansat ni eksperter. 
Over the year 2017, 9 experts were deployed.
Deres opgaver vedrżrte ikke specifikke programmer, men fokuserede mere p tvžrgende og organisatoriske problemer med afgżrende betydning for funktionen af Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission og udviklingen af APSA. 
Their assignment was not specific to programmes but rather focused on transversal and organisational issues critical to the functioning of the AU Commission for APSA development.
De fleste kontraktforsinkelser skyldes AUC's og de selvregulerende organisationers vanskeligheder med at fremlžgge finansieringsforslag af acceptabel kvalitet i rette tid. 
Most of the contracting delays are due to the AUC and SROs difficulties to present financing proposals of acceptable quality in due time.
Efter drżftelser p et mżde i styringsudvalget for Europa-Kommissionen/Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission den 24. maj 2017 har AUC i 2018 styrket sit programforvaltningsteam, der er ansvarlig for EU-finansierede programmer, ved at ansžtte yderligere fire personer. 
Following discussions at the European Commission/African Union Commission Steering Committee of 24th May 2017, the AUC has reinforced in 2018 the Programme management team in charge of EU funded programmes by contracting 4 additional staff.
Kommissionen forventer, at dette vil medfżre en forbedring af kvaliteten af disse forslag og i rapporteringen til EU. (c) De tekniske problemer med Kommissionens informationssystem har kun haft marginal betydning for forsinkelser af kontrakter, finansiering og gennemfżrelse, navnlig set i forhold til de problemer, der er fremhžvet i punkt 53 (a) og (b). 
The Commission expects that this will result in an improvement in the quality of proposals and reporting to the EU. (c) The technical problems with the Commission's information system have had a very marginal impact on contracting, financing and implementation delays Đ especially when compared to problems highlighted in points 53 (a) and (b).
I praksis pvirkede de tekniske problemer kun to af de reviderede kontrakter og forsinkede deres undertegnelse med hver et par uger. 
In substance, such technical problems only affected two of the audited contracts and delayed their signature by a few weeks each.
De fleste tilfžlde af kontraktforsinkelser og finansiering med tilbagevirkende kraft skyldes ofte forsinkede anmodninger og utilstržkkelig information fra de organisationer, der gennemfżrer EU-stżtten. 
Most of the contracting delays and retroactive financing is often due to belated requests and insufficient information from the Organizations implementing EU's aid.
Kommissionen har allerede etableret specifikke foranstaltninger, herunder en forżgelse af de menneskelige ressourcer til forvaltning af APF-programmer. 
Specific measures have already been put in place by the Commission, including an increase of available human resources to manage APF programmes.
AUC har ligeledes truffet foranstaltninger i den forbindelse ved i 2018 at styrke dens freds-og sikkerhedsafdelings programforvaltningsteam, der er ansvarlig for at forvalte EU-finansierede kapacitetsopbygningsprogrammer. 
The AUC has also taken measures in this regard by reinforcing in 2018 its Peace and Security Department's Programme Management Team, which is in charge of managing EU-funded capacity building programmes.
Tekstboks 5 Đ Finansiering med tilbagevirkende kraft i forbindelse med APSA-stżtteprogrammerne Andet afsnit: For s vidt angr kontrakten om det andet APSA-stżtteprogram skal det bemžrkes, at det primžre output blev leveret p trods af kontraktforsinkelser, da forretningskontinuiteten muliggjorde fžrdiggżrelsen af APSA-kżreplanen. 
Box 5 -Retroactive financing of the APSA Support Programmes Second alinea: With regard to the second APSA Support Programme contract, it should be noted that, in spite of contracting delays, the main output was actually delivered, since business continuity allowed the finalisation of the APSA Roadmap.
Kommissionen og EU-Udenrigstjenesten er enige om, at der findes et bredt udvalg af potentielle instrumenter, og de bekržfter, at der er truffet foranstaltninger til at optimere de komparative fordele af disse instrumenter. 
The Commission and the EEAS agree that there is a wide range of potential instruments and confirm that steps have been taken to optimise the comparative advantages of these instruments.
Eksempelvis finder der koordinering sted mellem APF og RVP'erne, herunder den seneste personaleomkostningsvurderings-og overflytningsżvelse. 
There is for instance coordination between the APF and the RIPs Đ including the recent staff cost assessment and transfer exercise.
Siden 2016 har der vžret en klar opdeling af arbejdet baseret p komparative fordele mellem RVP'er og APF, sledes at begge instrumenters rolle er klart defineret. 
Since 2016, there is a clear division of labour based on comparative advantages between RIPs and APF, so that the role of both instruments is clearly defined.
Kommissionen har etableret et uformelt netvžrk af APSA-fokuspunkter, der omfatter regionale delegationer, geografiske enheder og enheder med ansvar for forvaltning af fredsfaciliteten for Afrika (APF). 
The Commission has put in place an informal network of APSA focal points which includes regional delegations, geographical units and the unit in charge of managing the APF.
Netvžrket gennemfżrer hżringer med Kommissionen i forbindelse med identifikation og formulering af fredsfaciliteten for Afrikas APSA-stżtteprogrammer og RVP-programmer. 
The network facilitates consultations within the Commission during the identification and formulation of both APF APSA support programmes and RIP programmes.
Kommissionen/EU-Udenrigstjenesten i interne kvalitetsstżttegrupper, hvor freds-og sikkerhedsprogrammerne drżftes, og komplementariteten mellem instrumenterne gennemgs. 
In addition all relevant Commission Services /EEAS participate in internal Quality Support Groups during which peace and security programmes are discussed and complementarity between instruments is reviewed.
Inden for rammerne af APSA-kżreplanen prioriteres behovene for operationalisering af APSA p regionalt plan i de regionale programmer under det 11. 
Within the framework provided by the APSA Roadmap, the needs for the operationalisation of APSA at regional level are prioritized by regional programmes under the 11th EDF RIPs. 5
Endvidere er fredsfaciliteten for Afrika ikke blot velegnet til finansiering af kortsigtede behov. 
Moreover, the APF is not only well suited for financing short-term needs.
De forskellige instrumenters rolle er veldefinerede i deres respektive basisretsakter samt i vejledningsnoterne. 
The roles of the different instruments are well defined in their respective basic acts as well as in the guidance notes.
Fredsfaciliteten for Afrikas anvendelsesomrde er mere omfattende end finansieringen af kortsigtede afrikansk ledede militžre PSO'er, da dens ultimative ml er opbygning af afrikanske kompetencer inden for fred og sikkerhed, navnlig omkring APSA. 
The APF scope is wider than financing short-term African-led military PSOs, since its ultimate objective is the building of African capacities in the peace and security domains, notably around the APSA.
Dette er pr. definition en langsigtet indsats, som fredsfaciliteten for Afrika hovedsageligt finansierer gennem flerrige APSA-stżtteprogrammer. 
This is Đ by definition Đ a long term endeavour, which the APF is mainly financing through pluriannual APSA Support Programmes.
Se ogs svaret p punkt 58. 
See also reply to paragraph 58.
Finansieringen af JFA-lżnkontrakterne for langvarige stillinger er en overgangsforanstaltning, der er aftalt af internationale partnere, mens AUC udformer og gennemfżrer den igangvžrende reform af de menneskelige ressourcer. 
The JFA Salaries contracts funding for long-term staff posts is a transitory measure agreed by international partners to cover long term positions while the AUC designs and implements its ongoing Human Resources reform.
Udover det uformelle netvžrk, der er omtalt i punkt 56, findes der flere eksempler p ad hoc-koordinering med henblik p en supplerende og sammenhžngende brug af alle relevante instrumenter. 
In addition to the informal network mentioned in paragraph 56, there are multiple instances of ad hoc coordination for a complementary and coherent use of all relevant instruments.
Dette er bl.a. tilfžldet i fżlgende situationer: * For s vidt angr Somalia mżdes EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen p jžvnlig basis for at formulere og gennemfżre en omfattende tilgang til at stżtte overgangen fra konflikt til genopbygning. 
This is for example the case in the following instances: * for Somalia, EEAS and Commission meet regularly to formulate and implement a comprehensive approach to support the transition from conflict to recovery.