natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Antallet af sdanne organer er faldet til 86 i 2000, men Italien har meddelt, at man vil oprette (op til 20) regionale betalingsorganer. 
This number has decreased to 86 in 2000, but Italy has declared that it intends to establish (up to 20) regional paying agencies.
Kontoret for regnskabsafslutning, som skal gennemg og bedżmme 90 rapporter i lżbet af seks uger (fra midten af februar til slutningen af marts), har i forvejen en stor arbejdsbyrde, og hvis der oprettes flere betalingsorganer, m Kommissionen enten afsžtte flere ressourcer til opgaven eller risikere, at kontrollen bliver mindre džkkende, og/eller at beslutningen om regnskabsafslutning m udskydes til efter den frist, der er fastsat i forordningen. 
Given the already difficult task of the clearance of accounts unit, which is required to examine and assess 90 reports in the space of six weeks (mid February until the end of March), further proliferation will require the Commission either to dedicate more resources to this task or risk diluting its coverage and/or delaying its financial clearance decision beyond the regulatory deadline.
Selv om det ikke fremgr udtrykkeligt af forordningerne, kan en godkendelse per definition ikke overfżres. 
Although the regulations do not explicitly say so, accreditation is, by its nature, non-transferable.
Kommissionen bżr derfor insistere p, at alle de nye betalingsorganer, der tržder i stedet for AIMA i Italien og GEDIDAGEP i Gržkenland (3), skal godkendes. 
The Commission should therefore insist that when the new paying agencies take over from AIMA in Italy and Gedidagep in Greece (3), all are subject to the accreditation procedure.
I Irland effektuerede et nyt betalingsorgan (DMNR) betalinger for 33 millioner euro i 1998, men blev fżrst godkendt i december samme r. 
In Ireland a new paying agency, DMNR, made payments of 33 million euro during 1998 but was not accredited until December of that year.
1 (2) ( ) Se fodnote 2, s.5 EFT C 349 af 3.12.1999. 
1 (2) ( ) See footnote 2 on page 5. OJ C 349, 3.12.1999.
(3) Gržkenland har pbegyndt en gennemgribende reform af sit betalingsorgan. 
(3) Greece has undertaken to completely reform its paying agency.
Bl.a. vil Olivenoliekontoret og de forskellige styrelser (bomuld, tobak og mžlk) blive nedlagt. 
Amongst other changes, the olive oil agency and the various Boards (cotton, tobacco and milk) will be abolished.
Et moderniseret og vžsentligt udbygget betalingsorgan (med 1 700 ansatte) skal erstatte GEDIDA-GEP, og der skal oprettes et offentligt attesterende organ (med 50 ansatte). 
A revamped and considerably reinforced paying agency (1 700 staff) will replace Gedidagep and a public Certifying Body will be created (50 staff).
(2) Attesterende organers arbejde gennemget af Retten. 
(2) Certifying BodiesŐ work examined by the Court.
2.3.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 69/9 Manglende opfyldelse af godkendelseskriterierne Kriterierne 13. 
2.3.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 69/9 Failure to meet the accreditation criteria The criteria 13.
Bilaget til forordning (EF) nr. 1663/95 indeholder retningslinjer for godkendelseskriterierne. 
Guidelines for accreditation criteria are set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1663/95.
I forbindelse med regnskaberne for 1996 (1) bemžrkede Retten en ržkke svagheder ved godken-delsessystemet: Den interne kontrol var svag, der var ingen edb-sikkerhed, der blev ikke fżrt tilstržkkeligt tilsyn med de tjenester, der havde fet delegeret funktioner, og der var problemer med regnskabsfżringen. 
The Court commented on a number of weaknesses affecting accreditation in the context of the 1996 accounts (1): poor internal controls, lack of EDP security, inadequate monitoring of delegated services and accounting problems.
Retten fremhžvede i sin rsberetning for 1998 i sžrlig grad, at der fortsat var problemer vedrżrende delegeringen af funktioner og beskyttelsen af EFŐs finansielle interesser. 
In its 1998 Annual Report, the Court placed particular emphasis on the continuing problem with the delegation of functions and the protection of the CommunityŐs financial interests.
Der er siden gennemfżrt visse forbedringer, men der blev fortsat konstateret vžsentlige svagheder, som er nžrmere beskrevet i det fżlgende. 
Whilst some improvements have since been made, important weaknesses were found to persist and are discussed below.
Debitorer 14. 
Debtors 14.
I punkt 2 i bilaget til forordning (EF) nr. 1633/95 anfżres det ogs, at debitorer skal registreres korrekt i regnskaberne. 
Point 2 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 also refers to the need to properly record debtors in the books of account.
Situationen med hensyn til debitorer var ogs utilfredsstillende i hele 1998, hvor de samlede udestende fordringer, som betalingsorganerne havde indberettet, udgjorde ca. 1 000 millioner euro (Rettens rsberetning for 1998, punkt 2.94). 
The situation with regard to debtors remained unsatisfactory during 1998 when the total outstanding debt reported by the paying agencies stood at around 1 000 million euro (Annual Report 1998, paragraph 2.94).
Kommissionen udsendte derfor i juli 1998 en ny udgave af sin vejledning (nr. 5), og kontoret for regnskabsafslutning har aflagt besżg hos de ni betalingsorganer, som har registreret de stżrste belżb i udestende fordringer. 
The Commission consequently released a new version of its guideline (No 5) in July 1998 and the clearance of accounts unit has undertaken a series of visits to nine of the paying agencies with the highest recorded debt.
Kommissionen konkluderede, at forvaltningen af udestende fordringer er blevet bedre siden reformen af regnskabsafslutningsproceduren, men at debitorregnskaberne stadig ikke er fuldstžndige, at en stor del af de udestende fordringer aldrig vil blive inddrevet, og at hovedparten af de fordringer, der omfatter de stżrste belżb, vedrżrer sager, der er indberettet til Det Europžiske Kontor for Bekžmpelse af Svig (OLAF) i henhold til artikel 3 i Rdets forordning (EŻF) nr. 595/91 (2). 
The Commission concluded that there have been improvements in the management of the debts since the reform of the clearance of accounts procedure but that the debtors ledgers are still not complete, that a large amount of debt will never be recovered and that most of the large value debts relate to cases reported to the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) under Article 3 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 (2).
OLAF er ansvarligt for at fżlge inddrivelsen af de fordringer, medlemsstaterne har anmeldt til Kommissionen. 
OLAF is responsible for following up the recovery of debts the Member States have declared.
Hvis fordringerne m anses for at vžre uinddrivelige, foreslr OLAF p grundlag af oplysningerne fra medlemsstaterne, at Kommissionen lader EU-budgettet eller den pgžldende medlemsstat džkke belżbet. 
Based on the information received from the Member States, when the debts are considered to be irrecoverable, OLAF proposes to the Commission to charge them to the Community budget or to the Member State.
Medlemsstaterne skal kun betale, hvis de skżnnes at have udvist forsżmmelighed i forbindelse med inddrivelsen af de pgžldende fordringer. 
Member States are only charged if they are deemed to have been negligent in pursuing the debtors concerned.
De underrettes om korrektionen, som derefter fżlger de normale procedurer for regnskabsafslutning (forlig og formel beslutning mv.). 
They are notified of the correction, which then follows normal clearance procedures (concili-ation and formal decision etc.).
De seneste korrektioner baseret p indberetninger fra OLAF vedrżrer 1994 (beslutning truffet i maj 1998) og 1995 (beslutnin-(1) Se fodnote 2, s.5. 
The most recent corrections based on OLAF notifications relate to 1994 (taken in May 1998) and 1995 (taken in February (1) See footnote 2 on page 5.
595/91 af 4. marts 1991 om uregelmžssigheder og tilbagebetaling af belżb, der uberettiget er udbetalt (EFT L 67 af 14.3.1991, s. 
(2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 of 4 March 1991 concerning irregularities and the recovery of sums wrongly paid (OJ L 67, 14.3.1991, p.
11). ger truffet i februar og juli 1999 og marts 2000). 
11). and July 1999 and March 2000).
Disse korrektioner drejer sig kun om 1 million euro, hvorimod der ifżlge OLAF stadig er udestende fordringer for 1 700 millioner euro. 
These corrections amount to just 1 million euro whereas, according to OLAF 1 700 million euro is outstanding.
I 1999 foretog OLAF en gennemgang af alle de sager, der var indberettet fżr 1995 og endnu ikke afsluttet (svarende til 1 000 millioner euro), for at lade enten EU eller medlemsstaterne džkke de pgžldende belżb. 
During 1999 OLAF undertook a review of all the cases notified before 1995 and still pending (1 000 million euro in value) in order to charge them either to the Community or the Member States.
Der er fremsendt lister over udestende fordringer til seks medlemsstater (3) med forslag til, hvem der skal betale hvad (EU 2,6 millioner euro, medlemsstaterne 57,2 millioner euro (hvoraf 90 % vedrżrer Spanien) og 2,6 millioner euro bżr undersżges nžrmere). 
Lists of debts and proposals regarding which to charge to whom have been sent to six Member States (3) (2,6 million euro Community, 57,2 million euro Member States (of which 90 % relates to Spain) and 2,6 million euro requiring further clarification).
Der er endnu ikke fremsendt lister vedrżrende andre medlemsstater, heriblandt de to stżrste debitorer (Italien og Tyskland, som tegner sig for henholdsvis 75 og 6 % af alle udestende fordringer fżr 1995). 
Lists in respect of other Member States including the two largest debtors (Italy and Germany which account for 75 % and 6 % respectively of all pre-1995 debt) have yet to be communicated.
Intern kontrol 17. 
Internal control 17.
Ifżlge punkt 3 i bilaget til forordning (EF) nr. 1663/95 skal det udbetalende organ have en intern revisionstjeneste, der kan sikre, at det interne kontrolsystem fungerer effektivt, og en teknisk tjeneste, der skal kontrollere de oplysninger, betalingerne til ansżgerne er baseret p. 
Point 3 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 states that the paying agency should have an internal audit service to ensure that internal controls are operating effectively and a technical service to verify the facts on which payments to claimants are based.
Flere af de franske betalingsorganer (Ofival, Firs, Cnasea) har ikke tilstržkkelige interne revisionsressourcer til at opfylde godkendelseskriterierne. 
Several French paying agencies (Ofival, FIRS, Cnasea) do not have sufficient internal audit resources to meet the accreditation criteria.
SDE er en sammenblanding af de 93 DDAFŐer (som hżrer under landbrugsministeriet) og Trsor public (som er en del af finansministeriet), og den interne revision og eksterne kontrol er her utilstržkkelig. 
The SDE is an amalgam of the 93 DDAFs (under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture) and the Trsor public (part of the Ministry of Finance) over which there is inadequate internal audit and external control.
Problemet forvžrres yderligere af, at DDAF p vegne af andre betalingsorganer ogs er ansvarlig for forvaltning og stedlig kontrol af en lang ržkke EUGFL-ordninger (primžrt IFKS-kontrol, 72 % af de udgifter, der blev anmeldt i 1998). 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the DDAFs are also responsible for the administration and on site inspection for a large number of EAGGF schemes (mainly IACS and amounting to 72 % of declared expenditure in 1998) on behalf of other paying agencies.
Delegering af funktioner 19. 
Delegation 19.
I henhold til punkt 2 i bilaget skal betalingsorganet gennemfżre betalinger og aflžgge regnskab for disse. 
Point 2 of the Annex requires the paying agency to execute and account for payments.
I Danmark havde betalingsorganet imidlertid for ledsageforanstaltningernes vedkommende delegeret disse funktioner til Strukturdirektoratet og for skovbrugsforanstaltningernes vedkommende til Skov-og Naturstyrelsen. 
However, in Denmark, the paying agency had delegated these functions for accompanying measures to Strukturdirektoratet and, for forestry measures, to Skov-og Naturstyrelsen.
I Gržkenland har betalingsorganet delegeret betalingsfunktionen til kooperativerne, og belżbene udbetales ofte kontant til de endelige modtagere. 
In Greece, the paying agency has delegated the payment function to the cooperatives and amounts are often paid in cash to the final beneficiaries.
Det er indlysende, at en sdan delegering er i strid med reglerne i bilaget til forordningen. 
It is clear that these delegations go beyond the limits specified in the Annex to the Regulation.
I punkt 4 i bilaget str der, at godkendelsesfunktionen og/eller den tekniske tjeneste kan uddelegeres under forudsžtning af, at 3 ( ) Belgien, Gržkenland, Spanien, Irland, Nederlandene og Portugal. 
Point 4 of the Annex foresees the delegation of the authorisation function and/or the technical service, provided that the responsibilities are clearly defined and that the delegated bodies 3 ( ) Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal.
C 69/10 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 2.3.2001 ansvar og forpligtelser er klart defineret, og at de pgžldende organer har effektive systemer der sikrer, at de varetager deres opgaver tilfredsstillende. 
C 69/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 2.3.2001 have effective systems for ensuring that they fulfil their responsibilities.
Resultaterne af den tekniske kontrol forud for betalingerne skal regelmžssigt meddeles betalingsorganet. 
The results of pre-payment technical controls must be communicated to the paying agency on a regular basis.
Hovedparten af denne kontrol indgr i IFKS-kontrollen eller vedrżrer eksportrestitutioner. 
For the most part, these controls are carried out under IACS or in respect of export refunds.
I Frankrig bżr betalingsorganerne have bedre adgang til DDAF, s det attesterende organ kan sikre sig, at betalingsorganernes procedurer Čgiver rimelig sikkerhed for, at de udgifter, der konteres Fonden (EUGFL), er i overensstemmelse med EF-reglerneÇ. 
In France, the access to the DDAFs by the paying agencies should be improved so as to enable the Certifying Body to ensure that the paying agenciesŐ procedures Ôare such as to give reasonable assurance that the operations charged to the fund (EAGGF) comply with the Community rulesŐ.
Det Forenede Kongerige betragter betalingsorganernes regionalkontorer som en integreret del af betalingsorganet og ikke som organer, hvortil de pgžldende funktioner er delegeret, og det har Kommissionen accepteret med den begrundelse, at det attesterende organ har fuld adgang til dem. 
The United Kingdom considers regional offices of paying agencies to be an integral part of the paying agency rather than delegated bodies and this has been accepted by the Commission, given that the Certifying Body has full access to them.
Den fysiske kontrol af varer, der eksporteres med restitutioner, varetages af de nationale toldmyndigheder. 
Physical inspection of goods exported with refunds is carried out by the national Customs Authority.
Disse myndigheder er uafhžngige organisationer, der er ansvarlige for en lang ržkke former for kontrol af eksportvarer, herunder ogs de produkter, der hżrer under den fžlles landbrugspolitik. 
These authorities are independent organisations responsible for a wide range of controls over exports, including those relating to CAP products.
I denne egenskab optržder de ikke som organer, hvortil der er delegeret bestemte funktioner, og er ikke formelt forpligtet til at give betalingsorganerne nžrmere oplysninger om den kontrol, de har udfżrt. 
As such they are not delegated bodies and are not formally required to provide details of the controls they have carried out to the paying agencies.
Det er dog klart, at betalingsorganerne har brug for disse oplysninger for at kunne sikre sig, at der er udfżrt kontrol, fżr der udbetales eksportrestitutioner (1). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the paying agencies need such information in order to ensure that the pre-payment checks on export refunds have been carried out (1).
Informationsudvekslingen mellem toldmyndighederne og betalingsorganerne har generelt ikke vžret god nok til dette forml, og Kommissionen har insisteret p, at problemet lżses i form af en protokol mellem de to parter. 
The information flow between the Customs Authorities and the paying agencies has generally been inadequate for this purpose and the Commission has insisted that this problem be addressed in the form of a protocol between the two parties.
Der er nu undertegnet sdanne protokoller, men kvaliteten og/eller antallet af toldvžsenets fysiske kontroller i visse medlemsstater (Tyskland, Italien, Sverige) giver fortsat anledning til bekymring, og de indsendte data er endnu ikke s komplette (Gržkenland og Frankrig), at betalingsorganerne har sikkerhed for, at eksportrestitutionerne er udbetalt i overensstemmelse med EF-reglerne. 
Whilst the protocols have been introduced, the quality and or number of physical inspections by customs services continues to be a cause for concern in some Member States (Germany, Italy, Sweden) and the data supplied are not yet sufficient (Greece, France) for the paying agencies to ensure that export refund payments are in conformity with Community legislation.
Sanktioner 23. 
Sanctions 23.
Det er medlemsstaterne og ikke Kommissionen, der i henhold til artikel 4 i forordning (EŻF) nr. 
Member States, not the Commission, have the authority to withdraw accreditation under Article4 of Regulation(EEC) No 729/70.
Som det fremgr af tabel 3, er der i mere end et r taget forbehold over for regnskaberne fra en ržkke betalingsorganer. 
As can be seen from Table 3, the accounts from some paying agencies have been qualified in respect of more than one year.
Medlemsstaterne har vžret tilbżjelige til at forsżge at lżse de specifikke problemer frem for at tržkke en godkendelse tilbage, hvilket kunne f sžrdeles alvorlige konsekvenser i de tilfžlde, hvor det drejer sig om et meget stort eller mske det eneste betalingsorgan. 
Member States have tended to work on the specific problems rather than withdraw their accreditation, the consequences of which could be extremely severe where the paying agency concerned is a very important one or perhaps the only one.
Hvis Kommissionen finder, at en medlemsstat ikke gżr nok for at forbedre situationen, kan den i henhold til artikel 13 i Rdets beslutning 94/729/EF (2) nedsžtte de mnedlige forskud. 
If the Commission considers that a Member State is not doing enough to improve the situation it can reduce the monthly advances under Article 13 of Council Decision 94/729/EC (2).
Denne sanktion er kun blevet anvendt over for Portugal, 5,3 millioner euro (svagheder i IFKS-kontrollen Ń 1999), og over for Gržkenland, 105,7 millioner euro (svagheder i IFKS-kontrollen og manglende opfyldelse af andre godkendelseskriterier Ń 1999). 
This sanction has only been applied to Portugal, 5,3 million euro (IACS weaknesses, 1999) and Greece, 105,7 million euro (IACS weaknesses and non-application of other accreditation criteria, 1999).
(1) Ifżlge punkt 4, nr. iv), i bilaget til Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1663/95 skal betalingsorganet Čregelmžssigt og p de rette tidspunkter informeres om resultaterne af den udfżrte kontrol, sledes at der altid kan tages hensyn til tilstržkkeligheden af denne kontrol, inden der tržffes afgżrelse om en ansżgningÇ. 
(1) The Annex (point 4(iv)) to Commission Regulation No 1663/95 requires that the paying agency be informed Ôon a regular and timely basis of the results of controls effected, so that the sufficiency of these controls may always be taken into account before a claim is settledŐ.
2 ( ) Rdets beslutning 94/729/EF af 31. oktober 1994 om budgetdisciplin (EFT L 293 af 12.11.1994, s. 
2 ( ) Council Decision 94/729/EC of 31 October 1994 (OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p.
2.3.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 69/11 Tabel 3 De attesterende organers forbehold over for betalingsorganernes regnskaber siden 1996 Nr. 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 12 16 17 20 21 22 24 25 26 30 33 34 35 37 40 45 47 48 53 54 Medlemsstat F Udbetalende organ Belżb anmeldt i 1998 % (mio. 
2.3.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 69/11 Table 3 Certifying Bodies qualifications of paying agencies accounts since 1996 Number 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 12 16 17 20 21 22 24 25 26 30 33 34 35 37 40 45 47 48 53 54 57 61 64 66 76 80 85 87 88 89 Member State F I EL UK IRL F DK UK E F F F D B D P UK NL NL D F D E D F NL F P I F NL E E NL D A B E NL 1998 Amounts declared % of total QUAL. (in mio EUR) 1996 ONIC AIMA 3 965,74 10,07 X Gedidagep 2 525,45 6,41 MAFF 2 212,10 5,61 X DAF 1 585,69 4,02 X SIDO 1 424,00 3,61 X EU-Direktoratet 1 163,52 2,95 Paying agency QUAL.
EUR) Forbehold 1996 Forbehold Forbehold 1997 1998 I EL UK IRL F DK UK E F F F D B D P UK NL NL D F D E D F NL F P I F NL E 4 183,05 10,62 X X ONIC AIMA 3 965,74 10,07 GEDIDAGEP 2 525,45 6,41 MAFF 2 212,10 5,61 DAF 1 585,69 4,02 SIDO 1 424,00 3,61 EU-Direktoratet 1 163,52 2,95 X X X IBEA 1 FEGA Ofival Services dconcentrs du Trsor 059,40 2,69 782,93 1,99 714,27 1,81 710,48 1,80 597,11 1,52 591,10 1,50 580,52 1,47 555,42 1,41 550,28 1,40 534,30 1,36 385,04 0,98 362,57 0,92 338,91 0,86 311,40 0,79 303,26 0,77 263,75 0,67 239,37 0,61 146,70 0,37 X X Firs Hamburg-Jonas BIRB Niedersachsen MELF INGA SOAEFD HPA LASER Sachsen-Anhalt ML Onif lhor Baden-Wrttemberg MLR Catalua Thringen TLVwA Cnasea PVE 131,66 0,33 Odeadom 111,18 0,28 IFADAP 99,63 0,25 IGFOR (1) Onivins 76,53 0,19 PT 52,65 0,13 Asturias 36,62 0,09 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 13 11 737,5 29,79 57 61 64 66EPasVasco31,460,08X 76 80 85 87 88 89 NL DLG D Nordrhein-Westfalen LfA A BMLF Abt VI. 
1998 X IBEA 1 FEGA Ofival Services dconcentrs du Trsor 059,40 2,69 X 782,93 1,99 X 714,27 1,81 710,48 1,80 X X X X X FIRS Hamburg-Jonas BIRB Niedersachsen MELF INGA SOAEFD HPA LASER Sachsen-Anhalt ML Onif lhor Baden-Wrttemberg MLR Cataluna Thringen TLVwA Cnasea PVE 131,66 0,33 X Odeadom 111,18 0,28 Ifadap 99,63 0,25 X IGFOR (1) X Onivins 76,53 0,19 X PT 52,65 0,13 X Asturias 36,62 0,09 Pais Vasco 31,46 0,08 DLG 5,50 0,01 X X X Nordrhein-Westfalen LfA BMLF Abt VI.
B.8 (Wein) B Vlaamse Gemeenschap E FROM 0,18 0,38 NL PVis 0,13 0,00 0,00 X 0,00 X X 5,50 0,01 X 1,72 0,00 X 0,59 0,00 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Samlet antal betalingsorganer, over for hvis regnskaber der er taget 21 17 forbehold Samlede udgifter anmeldt af betalingsorganer, over for hvis regnskaber 18 545,9 13 502,0 der er taget forbehold % af samlede anmeldte udgifter 46,32 32,77 (1) IGFOR blev nedlagt i 1997. 
B.8 (Wien) Vlaamse Gemeenschap FROM 0,18 0,00 X PVis 0,13 0,00 X Total number of qualified paying agencies 21 Total of the expenses declared by the qualified paying agencies 18 545,9 % of the total amount of expenses declared 46,32 X X X X X X X 17 13 502,0 32,77 X X 13 11 737,5 29,79 4 183,05 10,62 597,11 1,52 591,10 1,50 X 580,52 1,47 X 555,42 1,41 550,28 1,40 X 534,30 1,36 X 385,04 0,98 X 362,57 0,92 X 338,91 0,86 311,40 0,79 303,26 0,77 263,75 0,67 X 239,37 0,61 146,70 0,37 1,72 0,00 0,59 0,00 0,38 0,00 X X X X X X X (1) IGFOR was closed in 1997.
C 69/12 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 2.3.2001 ATTESTERENDE ORGANER Krav 24. 
C 69/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 2.3.2001 THE CERTIFYING BODIES Requirements 24.
I henhold til artikel 3 i forordning (EF) nr. 1663/95 skal det attesterende organ fungere uafhžngigt af betalingsorganet. 
Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 requires the Certifying Body to be operationally independent of the paying agency.
Det skal basere sin attest p en undersżgelse af procedurerne og en undersżgelse af en stikprżve af transaktionerne. 
It must base its certificate on an examination of procedures and on a sample of transactions.
Det skal anfżres i attesten, om regnskaberne er plidelige, fuldstžndige og nżjag-tige, og om procedurerne for intern kontrol har fungeret tilfredsstillende. 
The certificate must state whether the accounts are true, complete and accurate and whether the internal control procedures have operated satisfactorily.