natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Vi undersżgte ogs, om en anden rsag til de langvarige procedurer kunne vžre, at Kommissionen ikke formulerer sine krav specifikt nok. 
We also examined whether another reason for the long procedure could be that the Commission does not formulate its requirements specifically enough.
Vores analyse viste imidlertid, at Kommissionens anmodninger i ni ud af ti tilfžlde var specifikke nok til, at medlemsstaterne kunne ivžrksžtte de kržvede aktioner. 
However, our analysis showed that in nine out of ten cases, the Commission requests were specific enough for the Member State to undertake the required actions.
Hertil kommer, at det i forbindelse med finansielle korrektioner tager tid at fastsžtte det korrekte korrektionsniveau, nr medlemsstaten har accepteret, at der er tale om fejl. 
In addition, when financial corrections are set up, time is needed to determine the appropriate level of correction once the error has been accepted by the Member State.
I mange tilfžlde er Kommissionen enig med den pgžldende medlemsstat i, at der bżr foretages yderligere kontrol for at fastlžgge alvoren af fejlene og fastsžtte den korrekte korrektion. 
In many cases the Commission agrees with the Member State concerned that additional checks should be carried out to establish the seriousness of the errors and the appropriate correction.
Afbrydelse og suspension af betalinger indebžrer en betydelig finansiel risiko for medlemsstaterne 90. 
Payment interruptions and suspensions represent a significant financial risk for Member States 90.
Kommissionens aktioner bżr gżre OP'ets forvaltnings-og kontrolsystem mere effektivt med hensyn til at forebygge, opdage og korrigere fejl. 
The Commission’s actions should make the OP’s management and control system more effective in preventing, detecting and correcting errors.
Sdanne forbedringer foretages ofte hurtigere, hvis der er en finansiel omkostning ved ikke at handle hurtigt. 
Such improvements are often made faster if there is a financial cost associated with not acting swiftly.
Vi vurderede derfor de forebyggende foranstaltningers effekt p medlemsstatsniveau og kommissionsniveau. 
We therefore assessed the impact of the preventive measures at Member State and Commission level. 49
I en vžsentlig del af programmerne blev betalingerne afbrudt eller suspenderet i mellem tre og ni mneder 91. 
Payments interrupted or suspended for a significant share of programmes for between three and nine months 91.
Pr. udgangen af 2015 havde Kommissionen afbrudt betalingsfristen for et belżb svarende til i alt 10 % af samtlige betalinger vedrżrende EFRU/Samhżrighedsfonden og ESF34. 
Until the end of 2015 the Commission interrupted the payment deadline for the amount corresponding to 10 % of all payments made for ERDF/CF and ESF34.
Der var truffet suspensionsafgżrelser vedrżrende 15 % af samtlige programmer. 
Suspension decisions were issued for 15 % of all programmes.
tilbageholdt i over otte mneder som fżlge af afbrydelser og/eller suspensioner. 
Moreover, payments to programmes or part of the programmes for the 2007‐2013 period were stopped due to interruptions and/or suspensions for more than eight months on average.
Kun i fem medlemsstater (Kroatien, Cypern, Danmark, Finland og Irland) var ingen OP'er blevet afbrudt eller suspenderet. 
There were only five Member States (Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland and Ireland) where no OPs were interrupted or suspended.
For langt de fleste medlemsstater gjaldt det, at betalingerne til mindst t af deres programmer som fżlge af afbrydelser og/eller suspensioner i gennemsnit var blevet tilbageholdt i mellem tre og ni mneder. 
For the vast majority of Member States the average period when payments to at least one of their programmes were withheld by the Commission due to interruptions and/or suspensions was between three and nine months.
Vi beregnede en samlet median p 146 dage for betalingsblokeringerne. 
We calculated an overall median of 146 days for payment blockages.
I Italien og Spanien var den gennemsnitlige varighed imidlertid nžsten et r (jf. tabel 3). 
In Italy and Spain, however, the average length was almost one year (see Table 3).
Tabel 3 - Gennemsnitlig varighed af betalingsblokeringerne vedrżrende medlemsstaternes OP'er i programperioden 2007-2013 51 <3 mneder 3-6 mneder 6-9 mneder >9 mneder Medlemsstater Estland Gržkenland Litauen Polen Sverige Frankrig Letland Luxembourg Malta Nederlandene Portugal Rumžnien Slovenien Det Forenede Kongerige Gržnseoverskridende samarbejde Belgien Bulgarien Den Tjekkiske Republik Tyskland Ungarn Żstrig Slovakiet Spanien Italien IALT 5 10 7 2 Note: Tabellen viser den gennemsnitlige betalingsblokering pr. 
50 34 Data source: Annual activity reports of DG Regional and Urban Policy and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion for years 2010 to 2015. Table 3 – Ageing table by Member State of average length of payment blockage to OPs in the 2007‐2013 programme period Note: The table shows the payment blockage per OP averaged for each Member State.
Det betyder ikke, at samtlige OP'er for en given medlemsstat blev blokeret, eller at samtlige blokeringer fandt sted samtidig. 
Nor does it mean that all OPs for a given Member State were blocked, or that all blockages happened at the same time.
Forebyggende foranstaltninger giver medlemsstaterne incitamenter til at forbedre deres systemer 93. 
Preventive measures also incentivise Member States to improve their systems 93.
Hvis man forudsžtter et jžvnt betalingstempo og medregner samtlige udgifter i samtlige 28 medlemsstater, udbetalte Kommissionen i programperioden 2007-2013 i gennemsnit 110 millioner euro hver dag fra EFRU, Samhżrighedsfonden og ESF35. 
Assuming an even payment rhythm and taking all expenditure in all 28 Member States together, for the 2007‐2013 programme period the Commission paid on average 110 million euros each day from the ERDF, CF and ESF35.
Dette illustrerer den potentielle żkonomiske effekt af at tilbageholde betalinger fra EU-budgettet til medlemsstaterne, navnlig til de medlemsstater, der modtager hovedparten af samhżrighedsudgifterne. 
This illustrates the potential monetary impact of delaying payments from the EU budget to the Member States, and in particular those countries receiving the bulk of the Cohesion spending.
Nr betalingsfristen for en betalingsanmodning afbrydes, eller nr de mellemliggende betalinger eller dele af dem suspenderes, fr medlemsstaterne ikke godtgjort udgifter af Kommissionen, selv om de indsender betalingsanmodninger. 
When a payment deadline for a payment claim is interrupted or the interim payments or parts of them are suspended, Member States are not reimbursed by the Commission even if they submit payment claims.
I denne periode skal medlemsstaterne finansiere projekterne over deres egne budgetter, eller ogs ophżrer betalingerne til projekterne. 
During this period, Member States need to finance projects through their own budgets or payments to projects are stopped.
Hvis medlemsstaten er nżdt til at finansiere projekterne over sit nationale budget, vil det dog sandsynligvis give likviditetsproblemer, fordi der kommer fžrre midler ind. 
However, if the Member State needs to finance projects from the national budget, it is still likely to cause cash flow problems due to the reduced volume of funds coming in.
Situationen kan forvžrres, hvis der skal finansieres mange projekter, og/eller rsagerne til afbrydelsen eller suspensionen er komplekse og fżrer til langvarige afhjžlpende foranstaltninger. 
The situation can be aggravated if the volume of projects to be financed is significant and/or if the reasons for interruption or suspension are complex, resulting in lengthy remedial actions.
Risikoen for, at de blokerede udgifter faktisk tabes, stiger desuden hen mod slutningen af programperioden. 
Moreover, towards the end of the programme period the risk increases that the blocked expenditure may actually be lost.
Usikkerhed om betalingsanmodninger kan ogs give Kommissionen budgetforvaltningsproblemer. 
Uncertainty about calls for payments can also lead to difficulties for the Commission in its budgetary management.
Dels kan den mske ikke f brugt de tildelte betalingsbevillinger. 
On the one hand, the Commission may not be able to use the allocated payment appropriations.
Dels kan den f svžrt ved at opfylde alle sine betalingsforpligtelser, hvis flere betalingsafbrydelser eller -suspensioner ophžves samtidig, dvs. den kan f et likviditetsproblem. 
On the other hand, if several payment interruptions or suspensions are simultaneously lifted, it might have problems with fulfilling all its payment obligations, i.e. it would face a cash‐flow problem.
Endvidere kan den f svžrt ved at planlžgge betalingerne og opstille budgettet. 
In addition, the Commission might face difficulties in planning payments and setting up the budget.
Vi undersżgte, om der kunne vžre en risiko for, at Kommissionen for at undg sdanne usikkerhedsmomenter ophžver en betalingsblokering fżr rets udgang, s medlemsstaten ikke taber midler. 
We examined whether to avoid such uncertainties, there could be a risk that a payment blockage was lifted before year end in order to avoid loss of funds by a Member State.
Det var imidlertid ikke tilfžldet i nogen af de undersżgte sager. 
However, this was not the case for any of the cases examined.
Kommissionen ophžver foranstaltninger gradvis for at sikre, at udgifter kan godtgżres s hurtigt som muligt 97. 
Gradual lifting of measures by the Commission to ensure that expenditure can be reimbursed as soon as possible 97.
En betalingsblokering pvirker normalt enten hele programmet eller en del af det (f.eks. en prioritet eller et antal foranstaltninger). 
Blocking of payments usually affects either the whole programme or a part of it (e.g. a priority or several measures).
Det kan ogs indebžre, at der tilbageholdes godtgżrelser af udgifter vedrżrende projekter, som mske ikke er berżrt af de problemer, der har udlżst de forebyggende foranstaltninger, men som indtil modtagelsen af medlemsstatens svar er omfattet af manglende sikkerhed med hensyn til udgifternes lovlighed og formelle rigtighed. 
This also may lead to withholding payments of expenditure related to projects which may not be affected by the problems triggering the preventive measures but for which there is lack of assurance on the legality and regularity of the spending pending the Member State reply.
Under vores gennemgang af sager fandt vi flere tilfžlde, hvor Kommissionen p grundlag af medlemsstaternes oplysninger om żremžrkningsproblemer anvendte en tilgang baseret p proportionalitetsprincippet og ophžvede sine forebyggende foranstaltninger gradvis, s godtgżrelsen af udgifter over EU-budgettet kunne genoptages s hurtigt som muligt vedrżrende den del af programmet, der ikke var berżrt af de mangler, der oprindelig fżrte til afbrydelsen eller suspensionen (jf. tekstboks 3). 
During our file review we found several cases where the Commission, based on the information provided by Member States to ring‐fence problems applied a proportionate approach and gradually lifted its preventive measures so that the reimbursement of expenditure from the EU budget could be resumed as soon as possible for the part of the programme not affected by the shortcomings which initially led to the interruption or 52 suspension (Box 3).
I programperioden 2014-2020 er Kommissionen forpligtet til at anvende denne tilgang36. 
During the 2014‐2020 programme period, the Commission is required to follow this proportionate approach36.
Kommissionen havde svžrt ved at overvge medlemsstaternes gennemfżrelse af finansielle korrektioner og vurdere de langsigtede virkninger af sine korrigerende foranstaltninger Oplysningerne fra medlemsstaterne om deres gennemfżrelse af finansielle korrektioner vedrżrende perioden 2007-2013 muliggjorde ikke en solid overvgning Kommissionen bżr sikre, at medlemsstaterne i alle tilfžlde har gennemfżrt de finansielle korrektioner fuldt ud 99. 
The Commission faced difficulties in monitoring the Member States’ implementation of financial corrections and assessing the long‐term effects of the Commission’s corrective measures Information provided by the Member States on their implementation of financial corrections for the 2007‐2013 period did not allow for robust monitoring The Commission should ensure that the financial corrections imposed have been implemented by the Member States in full in all cases 99.
Med hensyn til perioden 2007-2013 forlader Kommissionen sig p attester eller breve fra attesteringsmyndighederne i forbindelse med sin vurdering af, om medlemsstaterne p deres betalingsanmodninger har fratrukket de aftalte belżb vedrżrende finansielle korrektioner, s de nžste mellemliggende betalinger kan godkendes. 
For the 2007‐2013 period, the Commission relies on certificates or letters sent by certifying authorities to ascertain that the agreed amount of financial correction has been deducted by the Member State from its payment claim so that the subsequent interim payment can be authorised.
Der er ikke fastlagt regler eller retningslinjer for disse dokumenters format og indhold: De indeholder de oplysninger, som den enkelte attesteringsmyndighed anser for relevante. 
The format and the content of these documents are not governed by any rules or guidelines, they contain information that the given certifying authority considers relevant.
I nogle af de undersżgte sager var de oplysninger, Kommissionen havde modtaget, utilstržkkelige til, at den kunne kontrollere, om de finansielle korrektioner var foretaget. 
In some of the cases examined, the information received by the Commission was insufficient for it to check the execution of financial corrections.
Indtil videre har Kommissionen heller ikke systematisk bedt dem om at gżre det. 
So far, the Commission has also not systematically asked them to do so.
Kommissionen fik sledes ingen uafhžngig bekržftelse af, hvordan de finansielle korrektioner blev gennemfżrt i praksis. 
Thus, the Commission did not have an independent confirmation of how financial corrections were implemented on the ground.
Dette gjaldt isžr i programperiodens tidlige r. 
This was particularly the case in the early years of the programme period.
Kommissionen identificerede mangler i medlemsstaternes rapportering om tilbagetržkninger og inddrivelser i perioden 2007-2013 101. 
Shortcomings in the Member States’ reporting on withdrawals and recoveries during the 2007‐2013 period identified by the Commission 101.
I programperioden 2007-2013 skulle medlemsstaterne hvert r sende Kommissionen en oversigt over de belżb, der henholdsvis er trukket tilbage, er inddrevet, endnu ikke er inddrevet og ikke kan inddrives37. 
In the 2007‐2013 programme period, Member States were required to send a statement to the Commission each year identifying the amounts withdrawn, recovered, to be recovered and irrecoverable37.
plagt af Kommissionen og finansielle korrektioner plagt af medlemsstaterne selv. 
This report covers financial corrections imposed by the Commission and those imposed by the Member States themselves.
I 2010 bad Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet Kommissionen om oplysninger om medlemsstaternes korrektionskapacitet vedrżrende programperioden 2007-201338. 
In 2010, the European Parliament and the Council asked the Commission to provide information on the Member States’ corrective capacity for the 2007‐2013 programme period38.
Mellem 2011 og 2015 foretog Kommissionen 47 inddrivelsesrevisioner, som omfattede 19 medlemsstater og 113 OP'er udvalgt p grundlag af en risikoanalyse. 
Between 2011 and 2015 the Commission conducted 47 audits on recoveries covering 19 Member States and 113 OPs selected on the basis of risk.
I 72 af disse 113 OP'er opdagede Kommissionen vžsentlige mangler. 
For 72 of these 113 OPs the Commission detected important shortcomings.
Vores analyse af alle rapporterne med relation til disse revisioner viste, at manglerne navnlig vedrżrte: a) de nationale myndigheders hndtering af uregelmžssigheder (60 %). 
Our analysis of all reports related to these audits showed that the shortcomings were in particular related to (a) the management of irregularities by the national authorities (60 %).
Kommissionen mente, at der i flere medlemsstater gik for lang tid fra opdagelsen af en uregelmžssighed til registreringen af den i ledelsesinformationssystemet og/eller fra registreringen af en uregelmžssighed til afgżrelsen om at tilbagetržkke eller inddrive de berżrte belżb b) fuldstžndigheden og nżjagtigheden af medlemsstaternes artikel 20-rapporter (40 %). 
In several Member States the time periods between the detection of an irregularity and its registration in the management information system, and/or the registration of an irregularity and the decision to withdraw or recover the related amounts were considered too long; (b) the completeness and correctness of the Article 20 reports submitted by the Member States (40 %).
I disse sager havde medlemsstaterne enten undladt at rapportere alle de relevante belżb, der henholdsvis var trukket tilbage, var inddrevet, endnu ikke var inddrevet og ikke kunne inddrives, eller rapporteret belżb, som aldrig var blevet attesteret og anmeldt til Kommissionen, eller som ikke vedrżrte uregelmžssigheder, men derimod vedrżrte administrative fejl/skrivefejl eller projekter, der ikke lžngere var (eller aldrig havde vžret) omfattet af OP'et c) utilstržkkelige inddrivelsesprocedurer (15 %). 
54 amounts of withdrawals, recoveries, pending recoveries and irrecoverable amounts or reported amounts which had never been certified and declared to the Commission or which did not relate to irregularities, but to administrative/clerical mistakes or to projects which were no longer (or had never been) part of the OP; and (c) inadequate recovery procedures (15 %).
Der var sager, hvor regelstridige belżb ikke blev inddrevet fra stżttemodtagerne, eller hvor attesteringsmyndigheden ikke sżrgede for korrekt opfżlgning af de inddrivelsesforanstaltninger, som forvaltningsmyndigheden havde truffet. 
Cases were observed where irregular amounts were not recovered from the beneficiaries, or the certifying authority did not ensure the proper follow‐up of the recovery measures taken by the managing authority.
Vi bemžrker, at Generaldirektoratet for Regionalpolitik og Bypolitik og Generaldirektoratet for Beskžftigelse, Sociale Anliggender, Arbejdsmarkedsforhold og Inklusion anvender omtrent de samme metoder til at redegżre for uplidelige data fra medlemsstaterne om finansielle korrektioner. 
We note that the Directorates‐General for Regional and Urban Policy and for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion apply similar methodologies to account for unreliable data on financial corrections reported by the Member States.
9 % af de rapporterede belżb vedrżrende EFRU/Samhżrighedsfonden og 4 % af de rapporterede belżb vedrżrende ESF er uplidelige. 
Overall, for 2015, the Commission estimates that around 9 % of the amounts reported for ERDF/CF and 4 % reported for ESF are unreliable.
Samlet set indikerer Kommissionens revisioner, at medlemsstaterne bżr foretage vžsentlige forbedringer af deres rapportering om de belżb vedrżrende perioden 2007-2013, der henholdsvis er trukket tilbage, er inddrevet, endnu ikke er inddrevet og ikke kan inddrives. 
Overall, the Commission audits indicated that significant improvements need to be made by Member States to improve their reporting on the amounts withdrawn, recovered, to be recovered and irrecoverable during the 2007‐2013 period.
Vores eget arbejde indikerer ogs, at medlemsstaternes rapportering om finansielle korrektioner ikke er plidelig nok39. 
Our own work also indicates that Member State reporting on financial corrections is not sufficiently reliable39.
Denne risiko vil dog blive mindsket i programperioden 2014-2020 (jf. punkt 124-126). 
This risk will however be mitigated in the 2014‐2020 programme period (see paragraphs 124 to 126).
Uensartet billede med hensyn til den langsigtede effekt af forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner p OP'er i programperioden 2007-2013 106. 
Mixed evidence on the long‐term impact of preventive measures and financial corrections on the error level of a programme during the 2007‐2013 period 106.
De fejlforekomster, der hvert r rapporteres af medlemsstaternes revisionsmyndigheder for hvert OP (eller gruppe af OP'er) og valideres af Kommissionen, kan betragtes som en indikator for effektiviteten af medlemsstaternes forvaltnings-og kontrolsystemer med hensyn til at forebygge og opdage fejl. 
The error rates reported by audit authorities in the Member States for each OP (or group of OPs) and validated each year by the Commission can be considered as an indicator of the effectiveness of the Member States’ management and control systems to prevent and detect errors.
Hvis disse systemer fungerer effektivt, bżr omfanget af regelstridige udgifter ligge under vžsentlighedstžrsklen. 
If these systems work effectively, the level of irregular expenditure should be below materiality.
De validerede fejlforekomster rapporteres i generaldirektoraternes rlige aktivitetsrapporter og er et centralt element i Kommissionens vurdering af forvaltnings-og kontrolsystemerne. 
annual activity reports and are a key element in the Commission’s assessment of the management and control systems.
Hvis Kommissionens forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner er effektive, bżr de validerede fejlforekomster for et OP (eller en gruppe af OP'er) generelt falde p lang sigt efter Kommissionens indgriben. 
If the Commission’s preventive measures and financial corrections are effective, the validated error rates of an OP (or group of OPs) should in general decrease in the long term subsequent to the Commission’s action.
Vedrżrende de 20 udvalgte OP'er undersżgte vi derfor forholdet mellem udviklingen i de validerede fejlforekomster og Kommissionens forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner (jf. tabel 4). 
For the 20 OPs selected, we therefore examined the relationship between the evolution of validated error rates and the Commission’s preventive measures and confirmed financial corrections (see Table 4).
Vores analyse viste, at den langsigtede effekt af forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner p fejlforekomsten i OP'er (eller grupper af OP'er) er uensartet. 
Our analysis showed that preventive measures and financial corrections have a mixed long term impact on the error levels of an OP (or group of OPs).
Tabel 4 - Effekt af Kommissionens indgriben p programmernes fejlforekomster i de efterfżlgende r 4 Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret p grundlag af oplysninger fra Kommissionen. 
Table 4 ‐ Impact of the Commission’s action on the programmes’ error rates in subsequent years 4 Source: European Court of Auditors based on information provided by the Commission.
Vi mener imidlertid ikke, at de validerede fejlforekomster er en perfekt indikator for den langsigtede effektivitet af Kommissionens forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner, isžr fordi de vedrżrer hele OP'et (eller gruppen af OP'er). 
From our point of view however the validated error rates are not a perfect indicator of the long‐term effectiveness of the Commission’s preventive measures and financial 56 Category Number of OPs 1.
Eftersom gennemfżrelsesreglerne (f.eks. stżtteberettigelsesregler, udbudsregler og statsstżtteregler) er temmelig komplekse, kan der opst mange typer fejl i et OP. 
As the rules for implementation (e.g. eligibility rules, rules for public procurement, rules for state aid) are quite complex, many different types of errors may occur within an OP.
Endvidere er Kommissionens foranstaltninger normalt rettet mod specifikke prioriteter, bemyndigede organer, grupper af projekter eller indkaldelser af forslag under et OP. 
Moreover, the Commission’s measures usually address specific priorities or intermediate bodies, groups of projects or certain calls for proposals within an OP.
Endelig er foranstaltningerne rettet mod bestemte fejltyper (f.eks. specifikke restriktive udvžlgelseskriterier eller problemer med 57 Kategori Antal OP'er 1. 
Finally, the measures address particular types of errors (e.g. specific restrictive selection criteria or problems with the method of selecting projects to be co‐financed).