natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For hver intervention forventes det, at Kommissionen foretager mellemliggende og/eller efterfølgende evalueringer for at vurdere interventionens virkning. 
For each intervention, the Commission is expected to carry out interim and/or ex post evaluations to assess the intervention’s effectiveness.
Interventionerne var ikke baseret på en korrekt vurdering af markedsbehovene 29 Vi undersøgte, om og hvordan Kommissionen havde fastslået og kvantificeret finansieringshullet i forbindelse med interventionerne i den nuværende programmeringsperiode (2014-2020). 
Interventions were not based on a proper assessment of market needs 29 We examined whether and how the Commission had determined and quantified the funding gap for the interventions in the current programming period (2014-2020).
Vi undersøgte også, om det var blevet gjort både for EU som helhed og for de enkelte medlemsstater. 
We also looked at whether this had been done at both an aggregate EU level and Member State level.
Endelig analyserede vi, om der var fastslået et finansieringshul for de forskellige faser i en virksomheds livscyklus (jf. figur 1). 
Lastly, we analysed whether a funding gap had been established for the different phases in a company’s lifecycle (see Figure 1).
30 Vi konstaterede, at selv om Kommissionen havde foretaget forudgående evalueringer og konsekvensanalyser og analyseret markedsbehovene ved at undersøge udbud og efterspørgsel, var kvantificeringen af finansieringshullet ikke fyldestgørende. 
30 We found that although the Commission had carried out ex ante evaluations and impact assessments and analysed market needs by looking at supply and demand, the quantification of the funding gap was not comprehensive.
Det skyldtes primært, at der manglede data. 
This was mainly due to the lack of data.
Kommissionen bemærkede også, at der i den akademiske litteratur ikke er konsensus om, hvorvidt de lave niveauer for venturekapitalinvesteringer i forhold til BNP i de fleste medlemsstater overvejende er et problem på udbuds-eller efterspørgselssiden, dvs. om der er et utilstrækkeligt 18 
The Commission also noted “no consensus in the academic literature on whether the low levels of venture capital investments compared to GDP in most EU Member States are predominantly a supply or a demand-side problem, i.e. whether there is insufficient venture capital supply or whether there are insufficient companies to invest in”20.
31 I 2011 foretog Kommissionen f.eks. en forudgående evaluering og en konsekvensanalyse af den centralt forvaltede egenkapitalfacilitet for vækst (EFG). 
31 For example, in 2011 the Commission carried out an ex ante evaluation and an impact assessment of the centrally managed Equity Facility for Growth (EFG).
Vi konstaterede, at den tilgrundliggende undersøgelse, der var foretaget på Kommissionens vegne, ikke forklarede baggrunden for Kommissionens skøn vedrørende finansieringshullets størrelse21. 
We found that the underlying study carried out on behalf of the Commission did not explain the reasoning behind its estimate of the funding gap21.
32 I forbindelse med et andet centralt forvaltet instrument, InnovFins egenkapitalfacilitet (IFE), konstaterede vi, at vurderingen i 2013 først blev foretaget, efter at det lovgivningsmæssige forslag var fremsat, og et vejledende budget allerede var blevet drøftet af Kommissionen, Parlamentet og Rådet. 
32 For another centrally managed instrument, the InnovFin Equity Facility (IFE), we found that the 2013 assessment was only carried out after the legislative proposal had been made and an indicative budget had already been discussed among the Commission, the Parliament and the Council.
33 Vi konstaterede også, at Kommissionen, da EFSI blev lanceret i 2015, ikke foretog nogen omfattende forudgående evaluering eller konsekvensanalyse af finansieringshullet eller markedsbehovene. 
33 We also found that when EFSI was launched in 2015, the Commission did not perform a comprehensive ex ante evaluation or an impact assessment of the funding gap or market needs.
Den foretog heller ikke en sådan vurdering i 2017, da EU-garantien blev hævet med 10 milliarder euro (til 26 milliarder euro), og investeringsperioden blev forlænget fra 31. juli 2019 til 31. december 202022. 
Nor did it conduct such an assessment in 2017, when the EU guarantee was increased by €10 billion (to €26 billion) and the investment period extended from 31 July 2019 to 31 December 202022.
34 Også i 2015 blev der foretaget en specifik vurdering på vegne af Kommissionen for at undersøge muligheden for at bruge en fund-of-funds-struktur23. 
34 Also in 2015, a specific assessment was carried out on behalf of the Commission to explore the possibility of using a fund-of-funds structure23.
Vurderingen var baseret på interview med 105 venturekapitalfondsforvaltere og viste, at der var delte meninger om venturekapitalmarkedets tilstand og behov. 
Based on interviews with 105 venture capital fund managers, it showed that opinions were divided on the state and needs of the venture capital market.
Vurderingen kvantificerede ikke finansieringshullet og adresserede ikke spørgsmålet om absorption i forbindelse med anbefalingen vedrørende den finansielle størrelse af den fund-of-funds, der skulle oprettes. 
The assessment neither quantified the funding gap nor addressed the issue of absorption when recommending the financial size of the fund-of-funds to be created.
21 Bilag A til 2011-rapporten, udarbejdet af Economisti Associati srl i samarbejde med EIM Business & Policy Research, the Evaluation Partnership, the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services og Centre for European Studies, s. 
21 Annex A to the 2011 report prepared by Economisti Associati srl in collaboration with EIM Business & Policy Research, the Evaluation Partnership, the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, and the Centre for European Studies, p.
2/2016, "EFSI: Et tidligt forslag om forlængelse og udvidelse", punkt 26, og Revisionsrettens særberetning nr. 3/2019, "Den Europæiske Fond for Strategiske Investeringer: En indsats er nødvendig for at gøre EFSI til en fuldstændig succes", punkt 17. 
22 ECA Opinion No 2/2016, “EFSI: an early proposal to extend and expand”, paragraph 26, and ECA special report 3/2019, “European Fund for Strategic Investments: Action needed to make EFSI a full success”, paragraph 17.
23 Oxford Research Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, "Assessing the Potential for EU Investment in Venture Capital and Other Risk Capital Fund of Funds", oktober 2015. 
23 Oxford Research Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, “Assessing the Potential for EU Investment in Venture Capital and Other Risk Capital Fund of Funds”, October 2015. 19
36 Det er vores opfattelse, at bevilling af øgede budgetmidler til venturekapitalfonde (jf. tabel 1) uden en korrekt kvantificering af finansieringshullet kan føre til en risiko for, at disse midler ikke kan absorberes (jf. tekstboks 3). 
36 In our view, increasing budgetary resources for venture capital funds (see Table 1) without properly quantifying the funding gap may lead to the risk that such funds cannot be absorbed (see Box 3).
20 Tekstboks 3 Øgede offentlige midler uden en korrekt vurdering af markedsstørrelsen kan føre til en risiko for manglende absorption Den betydelige forøgelse af de offentlige midler på venturekapitalmarkedet kan føre til en risiko for manglende absorption, hvis der mangler: i) venturekapitalfonde at investere i, ii) interesserede private investorer, iii) SMV'er med vækstpotentiale at investere i. 
20 Box 3 Increase of public funds without a proper assessment of the market size may lead to a risk of non-absorption The substantial increase of public funds in the venture capital market can lead to a risk of non-absorption if there is a lack of: : (i) venture capital funds to invest in; (ii) interested private investors; (iii) SMEs with growth potential to invest in.
En undersøgelse fra 201124 afslørede, at det ville blive en udfordring for EU at investere over 300 millioner euro om året i perioden 2014-2020 på grund af risici for manglende absorption. 
A 2011 study24 revealed that it would be challenging for the EU to invest more than €300 million a year over the 2014-2020 period due to non-absorption risks.
De midler, som EU bevilger til venturekapital, ligger imidlertid allerede tæt på dette beløb. 
However, the funds allocated by the EU to venture capital are already close to this amount.
De bevilgede midler til egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-vindue blev desuden forøget med 1 050 millioner euro (jf. punkt 07 i bilag II). 
Moreover, the funds allocated to the EFSI SMEW equity product were increased by €1 050 million (see paragraph 07 of Annex II).
Presset for at absorbere midlerne indebærer afsmittende risici. 
The pressure to absorb carries knock-on risks.
Et ambitiøst beløb kan presse de relevante aktører til at forpligte midlerne hurtigt. 
An ambitious amount may create pressure to commit funds quickly.
Eftersom førstegangsfonde og nye markeder kræver mere tid til udvikling, kan dette tidsmæssige pres føre til, at midlerne koncentreres på de "sædvanlige" markeder eller aktører, fordi modne markeder og etablerede fonde prioriteres. 
Since first-time funds or virgin markets require more time for development, this time pressure may lead to a concentration of funds on the “usual” markets or operators, as mature markets and established funds are given priority.
Ifølge 2011-undersøgelsen kan presset for at få forpligtet midlerne desuden føre til, at der ydes finansiering til investeringsmodtagere af lav kvalitet, hvilket uundgåeligt vil føre til lavere afkast af investeringerne. 
Moreover, the 2011 study said "pressure to commit funds may result in the provision of funding to ‘sub-standard’ investees which in due course would inevitably depress returns on investments".
24 Rapport fra 2011 udarbejdet af Economisti Associati srl i samarbejde med EIM Business & Policy Research, the Evaluation Partnership, the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services og Centre for European Studies. 
24 2011 report prepared by Economisti Associati srl in collaboration with EIM Business & Policy Research, the Evaluation Partnership, the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, and the Centre for European Studies.
Utilstrækkelig dokumentation for virkningen af EU-interventionerne 37 Vi undersøgte, om tidligere mellemliggende og efterfølgende evalueringer havde dokumenteret effektiviteten af EU's støtte til venturekapital. 
Insufficient evidence of the impact of the EU interventions 37 We examined whether previous interim and ex post evaluations had demonstrated the effectiveness of EU support to venture capital.
Korrekte mellemliggende og efterfølgende evalueringer giver værdifulde oplysninger, der kan bruges til udformning af nye instrumenter. 
Proper interim and ex post evaluations provide valuable information for the design of new instruments.
38 Siden Kommissionen begyndte at støtte venturekapital, har den fremlagt seks midtvejsevalueringer og to endelige evalueringer. 
38 Since it began supporting venture capital, the Commission has presented six mid-term and two final evaluations.
Evalueringerne rapporterede typisk om output og resultater såsom antallet af støttede venturekapitalfonde eller antallet af virksomheder, som de EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde havde investeret i. 
Typically, the evaluations reported on outputs and results, such as the number of venture capital funds supported or the number of companies in which the EU-backed venture capital funds had invested.
Evalueringerne indeholdt imidlertid ikke nogen analyse af EU-interventionernes indvirkning på venturekapitalbranchen og deres økonomiske virkninger (f.eks. i form af vækst, innovation og bevarede eller skabte arbejdspladser). 
However, the evaluations did not analyse the EU intervention’s impact on the venture capital industry or its economic effects (such as growth, innovation, or jobs maintained and created).
39 Begge efterfølgende evalueringer blev gennemført for tidligt. 
39 Both ex post evaluations were carried out too early.
Den endelige evaluering af faciliteten for hurtigtvoksende og innovative SMV'er blev f.eks. offentliggjort i 2011. 
For example, the final evaluation covering the High Growth and Innovative SME Facility was issued in 2011.
EIF kunne imidlertid godkende kommanditselskabsaftaler med venturekapitalfonde indtil 2013 - hvilket gav dem omkring fem år til at investere i virksomheder. 
However, the EIF could approve limited partnership agreements with venture capital funds up until 2013 – leaving them around five years to invest in companies.
40 Den mellemliggende evaluering af GIF og de efterfølgende evalueringer af ESU 1998 og ESU 2001 var svækket af, at der kun forelå begrænsede data. - Der var ikke fastsat resultatindikatorer for de første instrumenter, iværksætterfaciliteterne under Den Europæiske Teknologifacilitet, der startede i henholdsvis 1998 og 2001. 
40 The interim evaluation of GIF and ex post evaluations of ESU 1998 and ESU 2001 were weakened by the limited availability of data. — The early instruments European Technology Facility Start-up 1998 and European Technology Facility Start-up 2001 had no performance indicators.
Den efterfølgende evaluering af disse instrumenter indeholdt en anbefaling om at bruge veludformede resultatindikatorer. - GIF-instrumentets retsgrundlag fastsatte indikatorer og mål, men de vedrørte primært output. 
The ex post evaluation of these instruments recommended the use of well-designed performance indicators. — Although the legal basis of the GIF instrument set indicators and targets, these mainly related to outputs.
I den mellemliggende evaluering af GIF-instrumentet blev det derfor igen anbefalet at udvikle resultat-og effektindikatorer for at muliggøre en endelig evaluering af effektiviteten. 
The interim evaluation covering the GIF instrument therefore again recommended developing results and impact indicators to allow for a final evaluation of effectiveness.
Kommissionen tilføjede indikatorer, men kunne ikke trække på disse i den endelige evaluering, eftersom den blev foretaget under et år efter midtvejsevalueringen. 
The Commission added indicators, but the final evaluation could not draw on them as it was carried out within a year of the mid-term evaluation.
41 Evalueringerne blev primært udarbejdet ved anvendelse af kvalitative metoder såsom interview og spørgeundersøgelser. 
41 The evaluations relied mostly on qualitative methods such as interviews and surveys.
De indsamlede oplysninger var nyttige, men de blev ikke bekræftet ved anvendelse af kvantitative metoder. 21 
While the information gathered was useful, it was not corroborated by quantitative methods.
42 Kommissionen analyserede ikke det kontrafaktiske scenario i forbindelse med de mellemliggende og endelige evalueringer. 
42 The interim and final evaluations carried out by the Commission did not analyse the counterfactual scenario.
Evaluatorerne vurderede ikke, hvor mange arbejdspladser der var blevet skabt eller bevaret i de selskaber, der havde modtaget venturekapitalfinansiering, sammenlignet med det teoretiske antal, der kunne være skabt uden finansieringen. 
Evaluators did not assess how many jobs were created or 21 maintained by the companies that had benefited from the venture capital funding compared with the theoretical number that might have been created in the funding’s absence.
43 I 2011 blev der i forbindelse med et EU-finansieret forskningsprojekt25 foretaget en sådan kontrafaktisk analyse, som omfattede venturekapital fra alle kilder (ikke kun fra EU) og virksomheder fra syv medlemsstater og ét land uden for EU. 
43 In 2011, an EU-funded research project25 performed such a counterfactual analysis, which considered venture capital from all sources (not only from the EU), and companies from seven Member States and one non-EU country.
I undersøgelsen blev det konkluderet, at resultaterne generelt understøttede det synspunkt, at venturekapitalinvestorerne havde en betydelig positiv indvirkning på virksomhedernes vækst, produktivitet og investerings-og innovationsresultater. 
The analysis concluded: “Findings generally supported the view that venture capital investors had a considerable positive treatment effect on firms’ growth, productivity, as well as investment and innovation performance.
Det blev videre konkluderet, at venturekapitalinvestorerne bidrog til, at deres porteføljevirksomheder klarede sig bedre end virksomheder, der ikke modtog venturekapital, selv under finanskrisen i 2008-2009, og at de gav deres porteføljevirksomheder de ressourcer og kompetencer, der var nødvendige for hurtigt at justere deres produkt/markedsudbud under den globale krise. 
Venture capital investors helped their portfolio firms to outperform firms not backed by venture capital even during the financial crisis in 2008-2009. They provided their portfolio firms with the resources and competencies necessary to rapidly readjust their product/market offer during the global crisis.”
44 Det er positivt, at EIF udgav en serie arbejdsdokumenter om de EIF-støttede investeringers økonomiske bidrag og de støttede opstartsvirksomheders resultater26, inklusive en kontrafaktisk analyse. 
44 On a positive note, the EIF published a series of working papers on the economic contribution of EIF-backed investments and the performance of supported start-ups26, including a counterfactual analysis.
Det eneste forbehold er, at dokumenterne omfattede alle EIF's venturekapitalinvesteringer - ikke kun dem, der blev støttet af EU. 
The only caveat is that the papers examined all EIF venture capital investments – not only those backed by the EU.
45 Hvad angår instrumenterne i programmeringsperioden 2014-2020 har Kommissionen fastsat resultat-og effektindikatorer for EFG, IFE og EFSI. 
45 As far as the instruments in the 2014-2020 programming period are concerned, the Commission has set results and impact indicators for EFG, IFE and EFSI.
For EFG og IFE er der fastsat mål for alle indikatorer, undtagen for de støttemodtagende virksomheders omsætning og antal ansatte (jf. tabel 2). 
For EFG and IFE, targets have been set for all indicators except turnover and the number of employees of the beneficiary companies (see Table 2).
Målene for IFE vedrører desuden ikke kun venturekapital, men kombinerer venturekapital og støtte til gældsfinansiering, hvilket gør det vanskeligt at evaluere hvert enkelt instruments resultater. 
Moreover, the targets for IFE do not only relate to venture capital but combine venture capital and debt financing support, making it difficult to evaluate the performance of each instrument.
25 VICO project, "Final Report Summary - Financing Entrepreneurial Ventures in Europe: Impact on innovation, employment growth, and competitiveness", september 2011 (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88431/reporting/en). 
22 25 VICO project, “Final Report Summary – Financing Entrepreneurial Ventures in Europe: Impact on innovation, employment growth, and competitiveness”, September 2011 (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/88431/reporting/en).
26 EIF Working Paper 2016/34 (Helmut Kraemer-Eis, Simone Signore, Dario Prencipe), "The impact of EIF on the Venture Capital ecosystem", Volume I, The European venture capital landscape: an EIF perspective, 2016. 
26 EIF working paper 2016/34 (Helmut Kraemer-Eis, Simone Signore, Dario Prencipe), “The impact of EIF on the Venture Capital ecosystem”, Volume I of The European venture capital landscape: an EIF perspective, 2016.
22 Tabel 2 - Indikatorer for EFG og IFE 23 Instrument Indikatorer Mål EFG Antal venturekapitalinvesteringer 360-450 Samlet investeringsomfang 2,6-3,6 milliarder euro Løftestangseffekt 4-6 EFG's additionalitet Stigning i andelen af endelige støttemodtagere, som mener, at EFG eller lånegarantifaciliteten yder finansiering, som ikke kunne være opnået på anden vis IFE Samlede investeringer mobiliseret ved hjælp af ventureka pi ta l i nves teri ng er 25 milliarder euro i alt for venturekapital og gældsfinansiering Antal støttede organisationer 5 000 organisationer støttet med venturekapital og gældsfinansiering Private midler mobiliseret 35 milliarder euro i private midler mobiliseret (venturekapital og gældsfinansiering) Virksomhedernes omsætning og antal ansatte Endnu ikke fastlagt Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret på lovgivning og dokumenter fra Kommissionen. 
Table 2 – Indicators for the EFG and IFE 23 Instrument Indicators Target EFG Number of venture capital inves tments 360 - 450 Overall volume invested from €2.6 billion to €3.6 billion Leverage ratio 4-6 Additionality of the EFG Increase in the proportion of final beneficiaries that consider the EFG or the LGF to provide funding that could not have been obtained by other means compared to baseline IFE Total investments mobilised via venture capital investments €25 billion together for VC and debt financing Number of organisations funded 5 000 organisations funded via VC and debt Amount of private funds leveraged €35 billion of private funds leveraged (VC and debt) Company turnover and number of employees To be developed Source: ECA based on legislation and Commission documents.
46 I den mellemliggende EFSI-evaluering blev det anbefalet at redegøre for initiativets indvirkning på det finansielle marked og navnlig dets indvirkning på markedssvigt og eventuel fortrængning ved hjælp af kontrafaktiske scenarier. 
46 The EFSI interim evaluation recommended clarifying the impact of the initiative on the financial market and, in particular, the effect on market failure and possible crowding-out by using counterfactual scenarios.
Den mellemliggende evaluering anerkendte EIB-Gruppens aktuelle bestræbelser på at afprøve sådanne tilgange i forbindelse med EFSI-produkter, navnlig ved at etablere den fornødne datainfrastruktur27. 
The interim evaluation recognised the EIB Group’s current efforts in testing such approaches for EFSI products, particularly in setting up the necessary data infrastructure27.
Kommissionen manglede en omfattende investeringsstrategi 47 Forbedring af virksomheders adgang til finansiering via et paneuropæisk venturekapitalmarked kræver en sammenhængende og omfattende politik og investeringsstrategi, som bl.a. sigter mod at støtte mindre udviklede markeder, mindske afhængigheden af den offentlige sektor og forenkle interventionerne. 
The Commission lacked a comprehensive investment strategy 47 Improving access to finance for businesses through a pan-European venture capital market requires a coherent and comprehensive policy and investment strategy which, inter alia, aims to support less developed markets, decrease dependence on the public sector and simplify interventions.
27 Europa-Kommissionen, "Independent Evaluation of the EFSI Regulation. 
27 European Commission, “Independent Evaluation of the EFSI Regulation.
Final Report", juni 2018, s. 
Final Report”, June 2018, p.
En efterspørgselsstyret tilgang fremmer ikke udviklingen af mindre udviklede venturekapitalmarkeder eller sektorer 48 For at vurdere Kommissionens investeringsstrategi analyserede vi den aktuelle situation med hensyn til, hvilke lande de EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde og de støttemodtagende virksomheder havde hjemsted i, og så desuden på udviklingsfaser og sektorer. 
Demand-driven approach does not favour the development of less developed venture capital markets or sectors 48 To assess the Commission’s investment strategy, we analysed the current state of play in terms of the countries where the EU-backed venture capital funds and beneficiary companies were domiciled, development stages and sectors of activity.
De centralt forvaltede EU-interventioner kom kun i beskedent omfang underudviklede venturekapitalmarkeder til gode 49 Siden Kommissionen indledte sine venturekapitalaktiviteter i 1998, har dens bevilling af midler været baseret på projekternes kvalitet, ikke på venturekapitalfondenes geografiske placering eller de berørte investeringssektorer. 
Underdeveloped venture capital markets benefited little from the EU's centrally managed interventions 49 Since the Commission began its venture capital activity in 1998, its funding allocation has been on the basis of projects’ merit and has not been driven by geographic location of venture capital funds or the investment sector.