natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Belżbene udbetalt til modtagerne 3.2. 
Amounts received by beneficiaries 3.2.
Stżrrelsen af den stżtte, de endelige modtagere fr udbetalt, afhžnger af de finansielle mellemled, eftersom de kan f del i rentegodtgżrelserne ved at regulere rentesatsen eller andre elementer i de ln, de tilbyder (f.eks. provision, valutakurs eller valżr-dage). 
The amount of aid actually received by final beneficiaries is determined by the behaviour of the financial intermediaries, who may retain part of the subsidy by manipulating the level of the interest rate or other features of the loans they propose (such as fees, exchange rates or value dates).
Der er dermed risiko for, at de finansielle mellemled beregner sig en hżjere rente end fastsat, og at stżtten til modtagerne uretmžssigt nedsžttes tilsvarende. 
There is a risk that these inter-mediariesŐ remuneration will exceed that stipulated and that the aid intended for beneficiaries will be reduced proportionately, in contravention of the regulations.
Eftersom Kommissionen har delegeret forvaltningen af rentegodtgżrelserne til EIB, kontrollerer den ikke betingelserne for de ln, der i givet fald udbetales af de finansielle mellemled. I żvrigt har den almindeligvis ikke engang de nżdvendige oplysninger til at foretage sdan kontrol. 
However, where the Commission has delegated the management of interest subsidies, it does not check the terms governing the loans in cases where they are paid out by financial intermediaries and, moreover, generally does not even possess the information needed for this purpose.
Hertil kommer, at ikke alle banker kan udbetale rentegodtgżrelser, men kun et begržnset antal udvalgt af EIB, og det kan pvirke konkurrencen i sektoren. 
Furthermore, the fact that interest-rate subsidies may not be paid out by all members of the banking system, but only by a restricted number of intermediaries selected by the EIB, is likely to affect competition within the sector.
I de tilfžlde, hvor lnene ydes over ln optaget direkte med henblik p udln, bżr rentemarginalen kontrolleres. 
In cases where loans are directly back-to-back with borrowings, the spread between the rates needs to be checked.
Retten har ikke mulighed for at revidere EIBŐs rentemarginal p udln af lnte midler. 
The EIB enjoys margins on the loans it grants from its outside borrowings that are not subject to auditing by the Court.
Det er ikke fastsat i lnekontrakterne, at betingelserne kan žndres, s lntagerne kan tilbydes gunstigere vilkr i tilfžlde af en positiv markedsudvikling. 
No provision is made in the contracts for the terms to be adjusted to enable borrowers to benefit from more advantageous terms in the event that market conditions improve.
Nr der ydes EIB-ln af EIBŐs egne midler sammenlignes rentesatserne ikke med markedsrenterne. 
As regards loans financed from the EIBŐs own resources, the rates for such loans are not compared with those in the market.
EIB har sžrlige privilegier (22) og monopol p tildeling af visse rentegodtgżrelser, og derfor kan markedskržfternes frie spil ikke sikre, at EIBŐs rentemarginaler holdes inden for de gržnser, der er fastsat i Bankens vedtžgter(23). 
Given that the EIB enjoys special privileges (22) and has a monopoly over the allocation of certain subsidies, the competition mechanism does not guarantee that its margins are in accordance with the regulations laid down in its statutes (23).
Der er i żvrigt en sammenhžng mellem dette spżrgsml og EIBŐs viderefakturering af administrationsomkostninger for Bankens forvaltning (24) i henhold til Kommissionens mandat og for dennes regning, jf. 
This matter also has a bearing on the volume of administrative expenditure that is reinvoiced (24) by the EIB in respect of its management of operations under mandate from and on behalf of the Commission.
Rettens bemžrkninger i rsberetningen for regnskabsret 1994 (punkt 8.36-8.43) og 1993 (punkt 10.26-10.30). 
Observations were made in this regard in the CourtŐs Annual Reports concerning the financial years 1994 (paragraphs 8.36 to 8.43) and 1993 (paragraphs 10.26 to 10.30).
De EIB-forvaltede projekters stżtteberettigelse og overvgningen af dem 3.6. 
Eligibility and follow-up of projects entrusted to the EIB 3.6.
Kommissionen har undertiden intet kendskab til projekterne eller de endelige modtagere og bliver derfor stillet over for et fait accompli. 
The Commission, which on occasion has no knowledge of the projects or the final beneficiaries, is thus faced with a fait accompli.
Det sker ogs, at det er Kommissionen der tržffer afgżrelse om stżtte p grundlag af oplysninger fra EIB, men i praksis godkender den s blot de forslag, den fr forelagt af Banken (25). 
Decisions to grant subsidies may also be taken by the Commission on the basis of information provided by the EIB, but in practice this merely involves the Commission rubbber-stamping the proposals submitted to it by the EIB (25).
Nr EIB indsender situationsrapporter til Kommissionen om de igangvžrende investeringer Ń hvilket Banken ikke altid gżr Ń analyserer Kommissionen dem ikke. Kommissionens interesse for disse dokumenter er meget begržnset. Den mener nemlig ikke, at det er dens opgave at gżre et arbejde om, som EIB allerede har udfżrt, og betragter som den vžsentligste risiko ved disse transaktioner, at lnene ikke bliver tilbagebetalt, hvilket EIB imidlertid fżrer omhyggeligt tilsyn med. 
The CommissionŐs interest in these documents is all the less as it believes that it is unnecessary to repeat the work already done by the EIB, that the main risk connected with these operations is that of loans not being recovered, a matter that is meticulously monitored by the EIB and, lastly, that the cost to the budget in these cases is often relatively low, especially in cases where subsidies are accompanied by other more costly measures.
Rentegodtgżrelsernes effektivitet 3.8. 
Effectiveness of the subsidies 3.8.
I de fleste tilfžlde er der ingen direkte sammenhžng mellem rentesatsen p ln med rentegodtgżrelse og markedsrenten, som svinger meget efter lnets lżbetid, og hvilket land der er tale om. Rentesatsen p ln med rentegodtgżrelse fastsžttes ikke p grundlag af en analyse af, hvor renteniveauet skal ligge, for at rentegodtgżrelsen virkelig skal fungere effektivt. 
In the case of most measures the subsidy rates bear no direct relation to market rates, which vary greatly over time and according to the country concerned, and are not based on an analysis to determine the threshold above which the subsidy is likely to be truly effective. (23) Article 2 of the Statutes of the EIB, which refers to Article 198, of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
( 22 ) Protokollen vedrżrende De Europžiske Fžllesskabers privilegier og immuniteter, tilknyttet som bilag til Bruxelles-traktaten af 8. april 1965. 
( 22 ) Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities, annexed to the Treaty of Brussels of 8 April 1965.
C 217/8 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 29.7.1999 3.9. 
C 217/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 29.7.1999 3.9.
Mlene for de fleste af de berżrte foranstaltninger er defineret meget generelt. 
As far as most of the measures involved are concerned, the objectives are defined in an extremely general manner.
Derfor, og nr der heller ikke er sat tal p mlene, er det vanskeligt at vurdere, i hvilket omfang mlene faktisk er opfyldt. 
This being the case and in the absence of costed objectives, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the objectives have actually been achieved.
I praksis nżjes Kommissionen med at registrere de gennemfżrte projekter og de afholdte udgifter. 
In practice, the Commission is content to draw up a list of projects implemented and sums spent.
Efter Rettens opfattelse er en hżj udnyttelsesgrad ikke ensbetydende med effektivitet. Om denne form for stżtte kan give positive resultater (hvilket ikke er det samme som effektivitet), afhžnger nemlig bl.a. af, om den er et interessant tilbud ikke kun for de endelige modtagere, men ogs for de finansielle mellemled. 
In general, the Court believes that a high utilisation rate is not synonymous with effectiveness In fact, the success (which is different from effectiveness) of this type of aid is not only dependent on, inter alia, its appeal to final beneficiaries, but also its attractiveness to financial intermediaries.
Men de finansielle mellemled ČmarkedsfżrerÇ stżtten under hensyntagen til deres egne interesser (f.eks. for at tiltržkke nye interessante kunder eller for at holde p de kunder, de allerede har), og selv om disse interesser ikke er i modstrid med mlene for EU-stżtten, svarer de ikke nżdvendigvis til dem. 
But the latter promote such aid in the light of their own interests (for example, to attract worthwhile new customers or develop the loyalty of existing customers), which, while not conflicting with them, are not necessarily the same as the EUŐs objectives.
For de to foranstaltninger, der er betinget af oprettelse af arbejdspladser (SMV-faciliteten og ln i henhold til artikel 56, KS), anvendes antallet af oprettede arbejdspladser som effektivitetskriterium. 
With regard to the two measures conceived specifically to create jobs (TF SMEs and Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty), the number of jobs created is used as a criterion for judging their efficiency.
Kommissionen fremlžgger imidlertid resultaterne i statistisk form uden at analysere rsagssammenhžngen mellem de oprettede arbejdspladser og de udbetalte rentegodtgżrelser. 
However, the Commission presents the results in statistical terms, without analysing the causal connection between the jobs created and the subsidies paid out.
Retten har foretaget undersżgelser omfattende en ržkke stżttemodtagere og er net frem til fżlgende konklusion om disse to foranstaltninger: Den faktiske effekt af rentegodtgżrelserne har stort set vžret lig nul, og de har snarere betydet en ekstrafortjeneste for modtagerne, som af andre rsager har foretaget jobskabende investeringer og dermed har kunnet opn fžllesskabsstżtte. 
The Court carried out audits of both measures on the premises of the beneficiaries, from which it has concluded that the subsidies had almost no real impact and were more like a windfall for the beneficiaries who, by virtue of investing in job creation, had received this Community aid, even though their investments had been made for reasons unconnected with the measures.
Regnskabsfżringen af rentegodtgżrelserne 3.12. 
Entry of the subsidies in the accounts 3.12.
Kommissionen regnskabsfżrer i de fleste tilfžlde de rentegodtgżrelser, den udbetaler til EIB, uden at kontrollere beregningerne. Den kontrollerer ikke engang beregningerne, nr rentegodtgżrelserne udbetales som forskud og beregnes til nutidsvžrdi. 
For most measures the Commission enters the subsidies it pays to the EIB in the accounts without checking the related calculations, even when the subsidies concerned were paid in advance and calculated in present value terms.
I forbindelse med det almindelige budget og EUF (det forholder sig anderledes med EKSFŐs aktionsbudget) regnskabsfżres udgifterne i form af rentegodtgżrelser, nr der indgs forpligtelser for dem, og derefter, nr de udbetales. 
In the case of the general budget and the EDFs (the situation is different as regards the ECSC operating budget), expenditure on interest-rate subsidies is entered in the accounts at the time the respective commitments are entered into and then when the respective payments are made.
Nr belżbet udbetalt til EIB for et ln med flere rs lżbetid svarer til nutidsvžrdien af de samlede rentegodtgżrelser (jf. punkt 2.15), opfżrer Banken den del af belżbet, der vedrżrer de fżlgende regnskabsr, p passivsiden, s lžnge den har belżbet stende (321,6 mio. ECU i rentegodtgżrelser modtaget som forskud pr. 31. december 1997), da den kunne blive nżdsaget til at tilbagebetale en del af belżbet til EF eller EUF, f.eks. hvis de ln, som rentegodtgżrelserne er knyttet til, tilbagebetales fżr forfaldstid. 
When the amounts paid to the EIB correspond to the total sum of the present value of the subsidies in respect of a loan lasting several years (see paragraph 2.15), the Bank enters the portion relating to subsequent financial years under its liabilities for as long as it holds this portion (subsidies received in advance amounted to ECU 361,6 million on 31 December 1997), as it could be required to pay part of it back to the EC or the EDF, for example, in the event of early repayment of the corresponding loans.
Til gengžld har hverken EF eller EUF indikatorer (f.eks. fordringer eller fordringsoverslag), der tvinger dem til at vžre opmžrksomme p, hvad der sker med rentegodtgżrel-serne, efter at de er udbetalt, eftersom de tilsvarende belżb ikke opfżres p aktivsiden p EFŐs (26) eller EUFŐs balance. 
On the other hand, neither the EC nor the EDF have any sort of indicator (for example, to denote claims or forecast claims) which would require them to focus their attention on what becomes of these subsidies once paid, as the corresponding amounts are not entered on the assets side of the EC (26) or EDF balance sheets.
Problemet er et andet i forbindelse med SMV-faciliteten, for rentegodtgżrelserne blev udbetalt samlet som forskud (93,5 mio. ECU fra 1994 til 1996). Det skyldtes hovedsagelig, at der var midler til rdighed p budgettet. 
In connection with the TF SMEs, the problem is different, as the subsidies were paid globally in advance (ECU 93,5 million between 1994 and 1996), basically for reasons of budgetary availability, and were paid over to the beneficiaries by the EIB (ECU 93,4 million) between 1995 and 1998.
Denne tidsforskydning fremgr ikke af EUŐs regnskaber. 
The time lag involved is not discernible in the EUŐs financial statements.
31. december 1997 androg de rentegodtgżrelser, der endnu ikke var udbetalt til modtagerne, 0,1 mio. 
At 31 December 1997 subsidies that had still not been paid over to beneficiaries amounted to ECU 0,1 million.
ECU. Endvidere var renteindtžgterne af midlerne p den lżbende konto i EIB (ca. 
In addition, the interest earnings generated by the funds held on current account at the EIB (some ECU 9 million) have not been established as budgetary revenue.
For s vidt angr NIC-lnene til genopbygning efter jordskžlv og Madeira-lnet, betales rentegodtgżrelserne hver gang, der forfalder renter. 
With regard to NCI earthquake loans, and Madeira, the subsidies are paid over on each interest maturity date.
I overensstemmelse med kasseregnskabsprincippet regnskabsfżres godtgżrelser for plżbne renter, som endnu ikke er forfaldet til betaling, ikke. Endvidere er de ikke-plżbne renter, der skal betales senere, og som pr. 31. december 1997 androg i alt 6,1 mio. 
Under the cash-accounting system, accrued interest-rate subsidies not yet due are not entered in the accounts. Furthermore, the unaccrued amounts that are to be paid at a later date, which amounted to ECU 6,1 million for NCI earthquake loans and ECU 3,3 million for Madeira on 31 December 1997, are not shown outside the balance sheet.
Det fremgr af de tre foregende punkter, at samme żkonomiske realitet afspejles forskelligt i regnskaberne alt efter den tekniske opbygning af foranstaltningerne. 
The three preceding paragraphs show that the same economic situation is presented in the accounts in different ways, depending on the technical set-up of the operations.
Man kan ikke danne sig et klart billede af forholdene ved at lžse regnskaberne. 
It is therefore difficult to gain an understanding of the situation by examining the financial statements.
Kommissionen bżr for at sikre en forsvarlig żkonomisk forvaltning af rentegodtgżrelserne: Ń sikre sig, at finansielle mellemled ikke kržver alt for hżje ren-ter; sdanne finansielle mellemled bżr udvžlges p et gennemskueligt og rimeligt grundlag, s det undgs, at visse finansieringsinstitutter stilles gunstigere end deres konkurrenter Ń evaluereforanstaltningerneseffektivitet,dvs.mlesvelmlop-fyldelsesgraden, nr det er muligt (jf. punkt 3.9), som rente-godtgżrelsernes faktiske effekt (jf. punkt 3.10-3.11). 
As regards the sound financial management of the subsidies, the Commission should: Ń ensure that where intermediaries are used, they do not receive unreasonable levels of remuneration and that certain financial institutions have not been favoured over other competitors, but have been selected in a satisfactorily transparent and equitable manner, Ń evaluate their efficiency by measuring the rate of achievement of the set objectives, wherever possible (see paragraph 3.9), and by determining the real impact of the subsidies (see paragraphs 3.10 to 3.11).
(26) Rettens revisionserklžring om aktiviteterne i forbindelse med det almindelige budget for regnskabsret 1997, EFT C 349 af 17.11.1998, punkt 8.6-8.7. 
(26) The CourtŐs Statement of Assurance concerning activities financed from the general budget for the financial year 1997 (OJ C 349, 17.11.1998 paragraphs 8.6 to 8.7).
29.7.1999 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 217/9 4.2. 
29.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 217/9 4.2.
Regnskabsfżringen af rentegodtgżrelserne i EUŐs og EUFŐs regnskaber kunne harmoniseres bedre, s det blev lettere at lžse regnskaberne, som bżr indeholde mere fuldstžndige oplysninger (jf. punkt 3.13-3.16). 
Harmonisation of the entry of the interest-rate subsidies into the accounts contained in the EUŐs and the EDFŐs financial statements could be improved to provide a clearer picture, and be accompanied by more comprehensive information (see paragraphs 3.13 to 3.16).
Endvidere bżr Kommissionen kontrollere beregningerne af de anvendte kalkulationsrenter og undersżge, om de er berettigede (jf. punkt 3.12). 
The Commission should also check the calculations and verify the appropriateness of the discount rates applied (see paragraph 3.12).
Nr EIB fordeler rentegodtgżrelserne (jf. tabel 1), foretager Kommissionen s godt som ingen kontrol og forlader sig alt for meget p EIB. 
When the EIB is involved in the distribution of subsidies (see Table 1), the Commission carries out hardly any controls and relies excessively on its agent.
Delegering af forvaltning betyder ikke delegering af ansvar, og derfor bżr Kommissionen: Ń sikre sig, at rentegodtgżrelsesbelżbet svarer til den stżtte, som de endelige modtagere rent faktisk modtager, fratrukket den fastsatte rentemarginal (jf. punkt 3.2-3.5) Ń systematisk sikre sig, at de planlagte investeringer er stżtteberettigede, og at modtagerne opfylder lnebetingelserne (jf. punkt 3.6) Ń i rette tid sikre sig, at de gennemfżrte investeringer eller de investeringer, der er ved at blive gennemfżrt, svarer til overslagene (jf. punkt 3.7). 
Given that delegating management is not tantamount to delegating responsibility, the Commission should: Ń ensure that the amounts of the subsidies correspond to the aid actually received by the final beneficiaries, net of the stipulated margins (see paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5), This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors 1999. Ń ensure on a systematic basis that the planned investments are eligible and that the beneficiaries meet the requisite conditions (see paragraph 3.6), Ń ensure in good time that the investments made or being made are in line with estimates (see paragraph 3.7).
Kommissionen bżr indfżre centraliseret kontrol af den żkonomiske forvaltning af rentegodtgżrelserne og af alle banklignende instrumenter generelt, s det sikres, at disse instrumenter forvaltes mere ensartet, og ogs, at der redegżres mere ensartet for dem i regnskaberne. 
The Commission should introduce centralised control of the financial management of interest-rate subsidies, and even of banking-type instruments in general, to ensure greater homogeneity in the management of the instruments involved and their presentation in the financial statements.
Det ville desuden lette samarbejdet med EIB, fordi det ville betyde, at EIB ikke lžngere ville have s mange forskellige kontaktpersoner i Kommissionen, og samtidig ville det styrke kontrollen af den forvaltning, Banken er ansvarlig for p vegne af Kommissionen. Vedtaget af Revisionsretten i Luxembourg p mżdet den 16. og 17. juni 1999. P Revisionsrettens vegne Jan O. KARLSSON Formand for Retten I dennes fravžr underskrevet af Bernhard FRIEDMANN Fungerende formand 
This would also facilitate relations with the EIB by limiting the number of Commission staff involved in dealings with the EIB, while increasing control over the management that the Bank has been left to exercise on the CommissionŐs behalf. in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 16 and 17 June For the Court of Auditors In the absence of Jan O. KARLSSON President of the Court Bernhard FRIEDMANN Acting President
C 217/10 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 29.7.1999 AVS EIB EKSF EUF EFRU MEDA EŻS-FM NIC SMV TSM MTL OLT TEN EU FORKORTELSER Landene i Afrika, Vestindien og Stillehavet Den Europžiske Investeringsbank Det Europžiske Kul-og Stlfžllesskab De Europžiske Udviklingsfonde Den Europžiske Fond for Regionaludvikling Ledsageforanstaltninger i forbindelse med reformen af de żkonomiske og sociale strukturer inden for rammerne af Euro-Middelhavs-partnerskabet Det Europžiske Żkonomiske Samarbejdsomrdes finansieringsmekanisme Det ny fžllesskabsinstrument Sm og mellemstore virksomheder Tredjelandene i det sydlige Middelhavsomrde Tredjelandene i Middelhavsomrdet Oversżiske lande og territorier Transeuropžiske net Den Europžiske Union 
C 217/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 29.7.1999 ACP ECSC EDF EEA-FM EIB ERDF EU GB MEDA MNCs NCI OCT SMCs SMEs TENs TF SMEs LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS African, Caribbean and Pacific States European Coal and Steel Community European Development Fund Financial mechanism for the European Economic Area European Investment Bank European Regional Development Fund European Union General budget of the European Union Measures to accompany the reform to the economic and social structures in Mediterranean non-member countries Mediterranean non-member countries New Community instrument Overseas countries and territories Southern Mediterranean countries Small and medium-sized enterprises Trans-European networks Temporary facility for SMEs
29.7.1999 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 217/11 INDLEDNING Rapporten anlžgger en horisontal strategi i sin analyse og evaluering af en ržkke foranstaltninger vedrżrende rentegodtgżrelse, som ikke blot er ret forskellige med hensyn til ml og betingelser for stżtteberettigelse, men ogs vanskeligt sammenlignelige. 
29.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 217/11 INTRODUCTION The report adopts a horizontal approach in analysing and assessing a range of interest rebate measures that are not only quite diverse in terms of objectives and eligibility conditions, but also difficult to compare.
De vedrżrer sledes forskellige żkonomiske realiteter, som ikke er tidsmžssigt sammenfaldende, og den enkelte foranstaltnings berettigelse er i vid udstržkning bestemt af den generelle politiske og żkonomiske sammenhžng, den indgr i. 
Indeed, they address different economic realities at different moments in time, and each measureŐs rationale is largely determined by the general political and economic context in which it originated.
Kommissionen mener ligesom Retten, at disse parametre m tages i betragtning ved evalueringen af foranstaltningernes effektivitet, virkning og forvaltning. 
The Commission, like the Court, considers that these parameters need to be taken into account in the assessment of the measuresŐ efficiency, impact and management.
BESKRIVELSE AF FORANSTALTNINGERNE 6. og 7. EUF 2.15. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEASURES Sixth and seventh EDFs 2.15.
For ikke at forrsage forvridninger p kapitalmarkederne anvendes stżtten til forml, der supplerer den finansielle transaktion (forżgelse af mellemledenes kapacitet, forbedring af projekt-evalueringen, delvis džkning af valutarisiko mv.). 
To avoid distortion of the financial markets, the subsidy is used for purposes which are complementary to the financial operation (increasing the capacity of intermediaries, improving project evaluation, partial cover of exchange risks, etc.).