natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De interne revisorer konstaterede p grundlag af resultaterne af deres arbejde, at KFBŐs forvaltning var for lemfžldig p fżlgende omrder: a) der var kun foretaget bilagskontrol i begržnset omfang b) evalueringen var mangelfuld c) princippet om medfinansiering var ikke overholdt d) KFB havde undertegnet tillžgskontrakter uden forhndsgod-kendelse fra GD, og e) KFB var for lžnge om at behandle sagerne. 
At the end of these audits the internal auditors drew attention to a lack of rigour in the TAOŐs management as evidenced by: (a)thelimitednatureofchecksonthesupportingdocuments; (b) deficiencies in the evaluation; (c) non-respect of the principle of co-financing; (d) signature of supplements to contracts by the TAO without prior approval by the DG; and (e) delays in the processing of files.
GD fik ikke i tide truffet de nżdvendige korrigerende foranstaltninger, s KFB kunne f rettet op p manglerne og opfylde kravene til forsvarlig forvaltning af fžllesskabsmidler. 
The DG was slow to take, in good time, the corrective measures which were necessary to enable the TAO to respond satis-factorilyandtofulfiltherequirementsrelatingtothesoundman- agement of Community funds.
Sidelżbende med Rettens revision foretog Kommissionens GD for Finanskontrol dybtgende revision af KFBŐs driftsudgifter. 
The CommissionŐs Financial Control DG carried out an in-depth audit, at the same time as the Court, of the TAOŐs administrative expenditure.
Kommissionens revisionsresultater stemte overens med Rettens, navnlig bemžrkningerne om risikoen for interessekonflikt. 
Its work led to the same findings as those noted by the Court, in particular with regard to the risk of confusion of interest.
EVALUERING AF PROGRAMMERNE 91. 
EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAMMES 91.
819/95/EF af 14. marts 1995, at Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne i fžllesskab skal overvge Socrates-programmet og regelmžssigt foretage en fžlles evaluering, og at Kommissionen skulle 
According to Decision No 819/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 1995, the Commission, in partnership with the Member States, was to ensure the regular
7.6.2002 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 136/19 forelžgge en forelżbig beretning om ivžrksžttelsesfasen senest den 30. september 1998 og en endelig beretning om Socrates-programmets gennemfżrelse senest den 30. september 2000. 
7.6.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 136/19 monitoring and evaluation of the Socrates programme. It was supposed, not later than 30 September 1998, to submit a mid-term report on the launch phase, and not later than 30 September 2000, a final report on the implementation of the programme.
P grundlag af en ekstern evaluering afsluttet i juni 1998 offentliggjorde Kommissionen imidlertid fżrst den forelżbige beretning (1) den 12.februar1999 og den endelige beretning fżrst den 12. februar 2001 (2) efter en ekstern evaluering. 
However, the Commission only published the mid-term report (1) on 12 February 1999, on the basis of an external evaluation completed in June 1998, and the final report was only published on 12 February 2001 (2), following an external evaluation.
I denne forbindelse skal det ppeges, at selv om Erasmus-aktionen blev mere og mere populžr, blev det oprindelige ml, som var at give 10 % af de 11 millioner studerende, der er indskrevet ved universitetskur-ser, mulighed for et ophold i udlandet, ikke net. 
It should be recalled at this point that, in spite of growing popularity, the objective initially set for Erasmus, which was to permit 10 % of the 11 million students immatriculated at universities to be able to study abroad, has not been achieved.
I den endelige beretning anslr Kommissionen, at kun ca. 460 000 studerende har haft gavn af programmet i perioden 1995-1999. 
In its final report, the Commission estimated that only some 460 000 students took advantage of this programme during the 1995 to 1999 period.
Tabel 6 viser fordelingen p hjemland af de studerende, der har modtaget stżtte. 
Table 6 shows the distribution by country of origin of the numbers of students who received grants.
I henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rdets afgżrelse nr. 818/ 95/EF af 14. marts 1995 skulle Kommissionen tržffe de nżdvendige foranstaltninger til overvgning og lżbende evaluering af UFE-programmet. 
According to Decision No 818/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 1995, the Commission wastotakethenecessarymeasurestoensurethemonitoringand continuous evaluation of the Youth for Europe programme.
Kommissionen skulle i lżbet af programmets tredje r forelžgge en evalueringsrapport, der skulle džkke de fżrste to r af programmet, og som skulle danne grundlag for en eventuel omlžgning og tilpasning af retningslinjerne for programmet. 
During the third year of the programme, the Commission was to present an evaluation report covering the first two years of programme implementation, which was to serve to redefine and possibly adjust the guidelines for the programme.
Denne rapport (3) blev fżrst offentliggjort den 6. februar 1998 efter en ekstern evaluering. Rapporten om denne evaluering blev offentliggjort i november1997. 
This report was not published until 6 February 1998 (3) following an external evaluation, the report on which was drawn up in November 1997.
I modsžtning til Socrates-afgżrelsen plžgger UFE-afgżrelsen ikke Kommissionen at forelžgge en endelig beretning, nr programmet er afsluttet. 
In contrast with the Socrates Decision, the Youth for Europe Decision does not require the Commission to submit a final report at the end of the programme.
Resultaterne af Rettens revision 93. 
Results of the CourtŐs audit 93.
Det fremgik af de foreliggende beretninger, at et stigende antal stżttemodtagere deltog i begge programmer, og at Socrates-foranstaltningerne p afgżrende mde havde vžret med til at sžtte gang i og fremme det tvžrnationale samarbejde mellem uddannelsesinstitutioner. Under revisionen konstateredes der imidlertid svagheder ved evalueringsprocedurerne, og revisionsresultaterne rejste tvivl om vžrdien af nogle af evalueringsresultaterne. 
Although it could be concluded from the existing reports thatanincreasingnumberofbeneficiariesparticipatedinboth programmes and that the Socrates measures were crucial for initiating and promoting the transnational cooperation between traininginstitutions,theauditrevealedweaknessesintheevalu-ation procedures and questions arose as to the validity of some evaluation results.
Der var ikke fastlagt klare parametre eller andre resultatindikatorer, mlgruppen var upržcist defineret (Ungdom for Europa), og der forel ikke plidelige og ajourfżrte statistiske data om de endelige modtagere. Alle disse forhold gżr det meget vanskeligt at foretage en kvantitativ vurdering af mlopfyldelsen for de to programmer. 
The lack of clear parameters or other performance indicators, an imprecise definition of the targeted population (Youth for Europe) and an absence of reliable and permanently updated statistical data on the final beneficiaries all impose significant constraints on the quantitative assessment of the achievement of objectives for both programmes.
(1) KOM(1999) 60 endelig. 
(1) COM(1999) 60 final.
(2) KOM(2001) 75 endelig. 
(2) COM(2001) 75 final.
(3) KOM(1998) 52 endelig. 
(3) COM(1998) 52 final.
De forudgende vurderinger af Ungdom for Europa-og Socrates-programmerne for perioden 2000-2005 blev udarbejdet, fżr midtvejsevalueringen og den endelige evaluering af programmerne for perioden 1995-1999 var afsluttet. 
The ex ante evaluations of the Youth for Europe and Socrates programmes (2000 to 2005) were established before the finalisation of the mid-term evaluations of the 1995 to 1999 programmes.
Retten konstaterede, at den eksterne midtvejsevaluering af Ungdom for Europa var foretaget af et konsulentfirma, hvis indehaver havde vžret direktżr for det KFB, der forvaltede dette program. 
In the case of Youth for Europe it was noted that the external mid-term review was performed by a consulting company owned by a former director of the TAO managing this programme.
Allerede ved starten af Erasmus-aktionen og Socrates-programmet indgik Kommissionen kontrakter med eksterne konsulenter om en lang ržkke undersżgelser. 
The Commission awarded, from the beginning of the Erasmus action and Socrates programme, numerous studies to external consultants.
Retten fandt ikke bevis for, at Kommissionen havde udnyttet alle disse undersżgelser, eller at de havde haft en vžrdiskabende effekt. 
No evidence could be found that all of these studies were adequately exploited by the Commission or gave an essential added value.
Revisionen af sdanne kontrakter viste, at t universitet havde en pržferencestilling p dette omrde (en halv snes kontrakter, hvor der var ydet et samlet EU-bidrag p over 1 million euro). 
The audit of these contracts revealed that one university had a preferential position in this field (approximately a dozen contracts with a total EU contribution of more than one million euro).
Denne kontrahent havde ogs gennemfżrt undersżgelser p et tilsvarende omrde (empiriske sociożkonomiske undersżgelser) under en anden kontrakt for andre kommissionstjenestegrene. 
This contractor also carried out another study contract for other Commission services in a similar area which was of a comparable nature (empirical socioeconomic inquiries).TwoofthesecontractsarebeinginvestigatedbyOLAF.
Under revisionen af den kontrahent, der havde fet overdraget det stżrste antal Socrates-relaterede undersżgelser, konstateredes der uregelmžssigheder p forskellige niveauer, for eksempel: Mange tilfžlde, hvor der uden forudgende godkendelse var indget kontrakter med underkontrahenter, ukorrekte udgiftsanmeldelser, som havde resulteret i, at der var džkket udgifter, som ikke var stżtteberettigede. Der var foretaget ensidige žndringer af de kontraktligt aftalte arbejdsopgaver. Der var ukorrekte oplysninger i midtvejsrapporterne. 
The audit at the main contractor of the Socrates-related studies revealed irregularities on various levels, for example fre-quentsubcontractingwithoutpriorauthorisation,incorrectcost declarations leading to the reimbursement of unjustified expenditure, unilateral changes of the contractually agreed work items, incorrect statements in the mid-term reports, publication of EU financed studies without prior approval by the Commission, a chronicled non-respect of contractually agreed time limits and an ignorance of other contractual clauses.
Det konstateredes, at kontrahenten l inde med store mžngder empiriske resultater og data, som han anvendte til sine egne undersżgelser, selv om de tilhżrte Kommissionen. 
It was noted that huge amounts of empirical results and data, despite being the property of the Commission, were kept by the contractor and were exploited for further own studies.
Kommissionen havde ikke sżrget for at gemme dette materiale. 
The Commission omitted to save these data.
Under revisionen konstateredes det desuden, at den endelige Socrates-evalueringsberetning, som Kommissionen havde godkendt, ikke omfattede en indgende vurdering af Socrates-forvaltningsprocedurerne (selv om det var fastsat i kontakten). 
The audit revealed furthermore that the final evaluation report for Socrates, which was accepted by the Commission, did not deal in depth with the assessment of the Socrates management procedures (although this was foreseen in the contract).
Der kunne ikke findes bevis p, at de statistiske data i denne analyse var repržsentative, og det var heller ikke muligt at finde ud af, hvordan stikprżven var udtaget. 
No evidence could be found that the statistical data of this analysis were representative, nor how the sample was drawn.
Metoden til indsamling af data hos stżttemodtagerne (pr. brev) var s besvžrlig og dyr, at det rejser tvivl om, om den var produktiv. 
Given the cumbersome and expensive way of collecting the data (by mail) from the beneficiaries, the efficiency of this approach can also be questioned.
C 136/20 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 7.6.2002 Nye programmer (perioden 2000-2006) 103. 
C 136/20 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 7.6.2002 New programmes (2000 to 2006) 103.
Under de nye programmer viderefżres de vžsentligste aktioner under de tidligere programmer, men indholdet er žndret. 
The new programmes continue the main actions of the previous programmes while introducing changes to their content.
Comenius-aktionen under Socrates-programmet vil blive styrket, og budgetbevillingerne vil blive forhżjet vžsentligt (27 % af de 1 850 millioner euro). 
For instance, within the framework of the Socrates programme, Comenius will be reinforced and will benefit from a substantial increase in budgetary appropriations (27 % of the 1 850 million euro).
Programmet Den Europžiske Volontżrtjenesteordning er blevet integreret i UFE. 
As for Youth for Europe, it is taking over the European Voluntary Service programme.
Derudover er der kommet forskellige nye elementer ind i disse nye programmer. Mlene for UFE er defineret mere pržcist, Tyrkiet kan deltage, og allerede eksisterende aktioner er samlet under to nye benžvnelser, Grundtvig og Minerva. 
In addition, these new programmes incorporate new features of various types such as an improved definition of the objectives of Youth for Europe, giving Turkey access to participation and regrouping former actions under two new names, Grundtvig and Minerva.
Grundtvig omfatter alle aktioner vedrżrende voksenuddannelse og andre uddannelsesforlżb og Minerva aktioner vedrżrende ben undervisning og fjernundervisning og informations-og kommunikationsteknologi p uddannelsesomrdet. 
The former covers actions in the field of adult education and other educational pathways and the second those in the field of open and distance learning, information and communications technologies in the field of education.
Bevillingerne til Grundtvig er blevet forhżjet vžsentligt og er p 7 % af tildelingen til Socrates p 1 850 millioner euro. 
Grundtvig has received a substantial increase in appropriations and accounts for 7 % of the 1 850 million euro allocated to Socrates.
Samtidig med žndringerne af Grundtvig-programmet har man ogs žndret reglerne for fordeling mellem medlemsstaterne af det samlede belżb til aktioner forvaltet i samarbejde med NAŐerne. Maksimumssatsen for fžllesskabsmedfinansiering af projekterne er i żvrigt forhżjet til 75 %. 
The changes introduced for the latter programme are accompanied by a reform of the method of distributing the overall budget between the Member States for the actions managed in cooperation with the NAs, and the maximum rate of Community cofinancing for the projects has been raised to 75 %.
Til gengžld er der i de nye afgżrelser ikke pržcise tal for de fastsatte ml eller oplysninger om, hvordan der skal sžttes tal p de fastsatte ml Ń det var der heller ikke i de gamle. 
In contrast, the new decisions, just like the old ones, provide no precise information or instructions on quantification of the objectives laid down.
KONKLUSION 106. 
CONCLUSIONS 106.
Programmerne har ubestrideligt haft en vžsentlig betydning for de unge og de studerende som gruppe. 
The programmes have had an undeniable impact on young people and the student population.
Rettens revision har imidlertid afdžkket en lang ržkke svagheder ved de to fžllesskabsprogrammer Socrates og UFE, bde ved konceptet, forvaltningssystemet og gennemfżrelsen af de aktioner og projekter, som revisionen omfattede (jf. punkt 10-18). 
The CourtŐs audit nevertheless revealed numerous deficiencies both in the design and in the management systems of both the Socrates and Youth for Europe Community programmes and in the implementation of the actions and projects specifically targeted by the inquiry (paragraphs 10 to 18).
Disse svagheder skyldes, at der var for mange og for upržcist definerede ml, navnlig for SocratesŐ vedkommende, hvad der gjorde det vanskeligt at evaluere effekten af programmerne efterfżlgende. 
The cause of these deficiencies lies in the excessive number of objectives and in the fact that they are too vaguely defined, particularly in the case of Socrates, which makes an ex post evaluation of the programmesŐ impact difficult.
Evalueringen vanskeliggjordes ogs af, at der hverken var fastsat indikatorer eller pržcise evalueringsmetoder (jf. punkt 11). 
This evaluation is made all the more difficult by the fact that neither precise indicators nor evaluation methods were laid down (paragraph 11).
Ved revisionen af forskellige fžllesskabsprogrammer har Retten r efter r konstateret fżlgende forhold: delegation af offentlig myndigheds befżjelser til KFB uden noget retsgrundlag; hżje omkostninger forbundet med de leverede ydelser; iboende risici for interessekonflikt i en struktur, hvis ledelse Ń uanset administratorernes kvalifikationer Ń kommer fra programmernes stżt-temodtagergrupper; og praksis med at opfżre midler, som faktisk tilhżrer Det Europžiske Fžllesskab, p balancens aktivside (jf. punkt 25-38). 
The delegation of public-sector powers to the TAO in the absence of a legal base, the cost of the services rendered, the risks of confusion of interests inherent in a structure where the managers are drawn from the ranks of those who benefit from the programmes (notwithstanding the personal qualities of the managers) and the entering in the balance sheet of assets which actually belong to the European Community are features that the Court has been encountering for years in various Community programmes (paragraphs 25 to 38).
Tunge og komplekse administrative og finansielle procedurer forsinkede forvaltningen p alle stadier. 
Cumbersome and complex administrative and financial procedures led to delays at every stage of management.
Den vžsentligste effekt af disse kumulerede forsinkelser var, at der gik alt for lang tid, fżr stżttebelżbene blev udbetalt, og at der var problemer ved afslutningen af de finansieringsaftaler, Kommissionen og NAŐerne havde indget (jf. punkt 39-51). 
The main consequence of this accumulation of delays was excessively long delays in paying aid and difficulties during closure of financial agreements concluded between the Commission and the NAs (paragraphs 39 to 51).
Effekten af disse mangler blev forstžrket af, at forvaltningssystemerne og -strukturerne var behžftet med svagheder, og at der ikke var tildelt nok midler til, at programmernes ambitiżse ml, for s vidt angik gennemfżrelsen af bde de decentraliserede og de centraliserede aktioner, kunne opfyldes (jf. punkt 53-84). 
The effects of these deficiencies were aggravated by inadequate management systems and structures and by the inadequacy of the funds allocated with regard to the ambitions formulated for the programmes, in respect of the implementation of both the decentralised and the centralised actions (paragraphs 53 to 84). 111.
111. rsagen til mange af de konstaterede mangler og uregelmžssigheder var, at de nationale administratorer og fžllesskabsadministratorerne ikke havde en rigtig ČkontrolkulturÇ (jf. punkt 85-90). 
The lack of a genuine audit culture on the part of the national and Community managing bodies was the source of many of the shortcomings and irregularities found (paragraphs 85 to 90).
Evalueringsberetningerne blev udarbejdet for sent til, at de kunne f indvirkning p gennemfżrelsesfasen eller p planlžgningen af de efterfżlgende programmer. 
The evaluation reports were produced at too late a stage to have an impact on the implementation phase or on the subsequent programming.
Der forel ikke repržsentative og opdaterede statistiske data, og der var vžsentlige svagheder ved Kommissionens forvaltning af eksterne kontrakter (jf. punkt 91-102). 
The availability of representative and permanent updated statistical data was non-existent and the management of external contracts by the Commission showed significant weaknesses (paragraphs 91 to 102).
ANBEFALINGER 113. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 113.
Manglerne ved KFBŐs forvaltning er mangler, der er pvist r efter r, og derfor kan Retten kun opfordre Kommissionen til at fortsžtte bestržbelserne p at f oprettet offentligretlige EF-agenturer, som skal st for gennemfżrelsen af programmerne. 
In view of the fact that the deficiencies in the TAOsŐ management continue to recur, the Court can only encourage the Commission to pursue the efforts it has made to set up Community public-law agencies, which would be entrusted with the implementation of the programmes.
Derfor bżr de kontraktlige forhold mellem Kommissionen og de nationale myndigheder defineres klart, og begge parters forpligtelser og ansvar bżr lžgges helt fast, s parternes fžlles forvaltning bliver effektiv, og s det sikres, at fžllesskabsmidlerne forvaltes i overensstemmelse med principperne for forsvarlig żkonomisk forvaltning. 
In view of the probability of increased decentralisation in future, the contractual relationship between the Commission and the national authorities should be clearly defined, setting out precisely, for each party, the obligations and responsibilities for securing efficient joint management in the interest of sound management of Community funds.
Det forvaltende generaldirektorat bżr fżre et egentligt regnskab over udstedte forpligtelsesforslag og betalingsordrer og regelmžssigt sammenholde de regnskabsfżrte tal med Sincom-dataene, s man kan konstatere eventuelle afvigelser og foretage de nżdvendige korrektioner. 
The managing Directorate-General should keep proper administrative accounts of commitment proposals and payment orders issued and regularly reconcile them with the Sincom data in order to identify any discrepancies and to carry out the necessary regularisation.
De nationale myndigheder bżr have tilstržkkeligt personale og tilstržkkelige materielle og finansielle ressourcer til, at de meget vigtige opgaver kan udfżres effektivt. 
The national authorities should be provided with sufficient human, material and financial resources to permit them to perform effectively the important task assigned to them.
Kommissionen bżr sammen med de kompetente nationale myndigheder definere, hvilke opgaver NAŐernes forvaltning skal varetage Ńog alle aspekter af forvaltningen bżr tages i betragtning Ń og fastsžtte regler for den praktiske gennemfżrelse af forvaltningen (kriterier, modeller, manualer mv.). 
The Commission, together with the relevant national authorities, should define the tasks and practical administrative arrangements (criteria, models, manuals, etc.) relating to all aspects of the NAsŐ management.
7.6.2002 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 136/21 118. 
7.6.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 136/21 118.
Der bżr fastsžttes regler, som sikrer en effektiv kontrol af projektregnskaberne(kontrolafbilagenesartogform,analyseraf rsregnskaber ved hjžlp af evalueringsskemaer mv.). 
Rules should be laid down to ensure efficient controls of the final financial accounts for the projects (nature and type of supportingdocuments,analysisoffinancialstatementswiththe help of evaluation grids, etc.).
Reglerne bżr forpligte NAŐerne til at foretage kontrolbesżg. 
The rules should be accompanied by an obligation for the NAs to carry out on-the-spot audits.
Kvaliteten af de rapporter, der sendes ind til Kommissionen, bżr forbedres, s Kommissionen fr plidelige statistiske oplysninger om gennemfżrelsen af projekterne og aktionerne. 
The quality of the reports addressed to the Commission should be improved in order to provide the latter with reliable statistics on the execution of the projects and actions.
Sdanne oplysninger er absolut nżdvendige for evalueringen af programmerne, nr de er afsluttet. 
Such data are essential for the ex post evaluation of the programmes.
Med et mere effektivt it-system, som er bedre koordineret mellem NAŐerne og Kommissionen og mellem NAŐerne indbyrdes, burde informationen om programmerne blive bedre. 
A more powerful information system, with better coordination between the NAs and the Commission and between the NAs themselves, would not only help to improve information activities but would also broadcast the results more widely, thereby advertising and publicising the programmes.