natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Derefter mżdtes vi med personale med ansvar for forvaltning af missionerne fra Bruxelles: Den Civile Planlžgnings-og Gennemfżrelseskapacitet og Direktoratet for Krisestyring og Planlžgning i EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Generaldirektoratet for Internationalt Samarbejde og Udvikling samt FPI i Kommissionen. 
Following this, we met staff responsible for managing the Missions from Brussels: the EEASŐ CPCC and CMPD, and the CommissionsŐ Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development and FPI.
Vi interviewede ogs repržsentanter for Udvalget for de Civile Aspekter af Krisestyring (Civcom) fra fire af EU's medlemsstater25, EU's sžrlige repržsentant for Sahel og den tidligere missionschef for EUCAP Sahel Niger. 
We also interviewed representatives of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) from four of the EU member states25, the EU Special Representative for the Sahel and the former Head of Mission of EUCAP Sahel Niger.
Vi besżgte bde Niger og Mali, hvor vi interviewede personale fra begge missioner (herunder det lokale kontor i Agadez, Niger), repržsentanter for de nationale myndigheder og for de indre sikkerhedsstyrker. 
We visited both Niger and Mali, where we interviewed staff from both Missions (including those at the field office in Agadez, Niger), representatives of the national authorities and of internal security forces.
Vi mżdtes ogs med EU's delegationer i bde Niger og Mali og repržsentationerne i disse lande for fire EU-medlemsstater26 samt USA, Japan og Canada. 
We also met with the respective EU Delegations and the representations of four EU member states26 to both Niger and Mali, as well as the United States, Japan and Canada.
Vi interviewede internationale organisationer og donorer, der er involveret i sikkerhedssektoren, ssom De Forenede Nationers multidimensionelle integrerede stabiliseringsmission i Mali (MINUSMA), EU's uddannelsesmission i Mali, Civipol, Expertise France, Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) og Den Internationale Organisation for Migration. 
We interviewed international organisations and donors involved in the security sector, such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the EU Training Mission in Mali, CiviPol, Expertise France, the Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the International Organisation for Migration.
Vi gennemgik dokumenter og foretog kontrol p stedet af 46 af i alt 446 uddannelseskurser afholdt i Niger og 16 af i alt 135 uddannelseskurser afholdt i Mali samt 12 projekter, der er etableret med henblik p at indkżbe udstyr eller renovere FSI'ernes Belgien, Tyskland, Spanien og Frankrig. 
We reviewed documents and carried out on-the-spot checks on 46 of a total of 446 training courses given in Niger and 16 of a total of 135 training courses given in Mali, 12 projects set up to purchase equipment or refurbish training rooms of the ISFs in Niger and nine projects in Mali.
Belgien, Tyskland, Spanien og Nederlandene. 
Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands.
BEMŽRKNINGER EU's reaktion p sikkerhedsstyrkernes kapacitetsopbygningsbehov led under operationel ineffektivitet 22. 
OBSERVATIONS The EUŐs response to the security forcesŐ capacity-building needs suffered from operational inefficiencies 22.
Vi undersżgte, hvordan Rdet, EU-Udenrigstjenesten, Kommissionen og personalet i Niger og Mali oprettede, forvaltede og drev de to missioner. 
We examined how the Council, EEAS, Commission and staff in Niger and Mali set up, managed and operated the two Missions.
Vi vurderede, om EU-Udenrigstjenesten: a) havde taget tilstržkkeligt hensyn til erfaringer fra tidligere FSFP-missioner b) tildelte tilstržkkelige menneskelige og logistiske ressourcer til missionerne c) gav missionspersonalet tilstržkkelig praktisk vejledning og uddannelse forud for udsendelsen d) fulgte passende administrative procedurer e) planlagde missionerne korrekt. 
We assessed whether the EEAS: (a) had taken into account lessons learnt from earlier CSDP missions; (b) allocated sufficient human and logistical resources to the Missions; (c) provided sufficient practical guidance and pre-deployment training to Mission staff; (d) followed suitable administrative procedures; (e) planned the Missions appropriately.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten gjorde brug af erfaringerne fra EUCAP Sahel Niger ved oprettelsen af EUCAP Sahel Mali 23. 
The EEAS made use of the lessons learnt from EUCAP Sahel Niger when setting up EUCAP Sahel Mali 23.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen aflagde besżg i Niger og Mali for at vurdere de indre sikkerhedsstyrkers kapacitetsopbygningsbehov forud for oprettelsen af missionerne. 
The EEAS and the Commission visited Niger and Mali to assess the capacity-building needs of the internal security forces before setting up the Missions.
Vurderingen af behovene i Niger begyndte i januar 2012, og EU-Udenrigstjensten fžrdiggjorde et detaljeret forslag i form af et krisestyringskoncept i marts 2012. 
The assessment of NigerŐs needs began in January 2012 and the EEAS completed a detailed proposal in the form of a Crisis Management Concept by March 2012.
Missionen oplevede i lżbet af sine fżrste 18 mneder logistiske og operationelle problemer, som skyldtes, at den var blevet etableret med stor hast (jf. tekstboks 2). 20 
Due in part to the haste with which it was set up, the Mission experienced logistical and operational problems in the first 18 months of its existence (see Box 2). 19
EU-Udenrigstjenesten oprettede EUCAP Sahel-missionen i Mali som en juridisk enhed i 201428, hvilket gjorde det muligt for den nye mission at undg mange af de problemer, som EUCAP Sahel Niger stżdte p. 
The EEAS set up the EUCAP Sahel Mission in Mali as a legal entity in 201428, which allowed the new Mission to avoid many of the problems encountered by EUCAP Sahel Niger.
P baggrund af sine erfaringer i Niger sżrgede EU-Udenrigstjenesten for: - at personalet fik privilegier som diplomater, s snart missionen var oprettet - at Rdet godkendte et indledende oprettelsesbudget for at sžtte missionen i stand til at ansžtte administrativt personale og sikkerhedspersonale og indkżbe udstyr, fżr operationerne blev pbegyndt. 
Drawing on its experience in Niger, the EEAS ensured that: - staff received privileges granted to diplomats as soon as the Mission was set up, and - the Council approved an initial set-up budget for the Mission to enable the employment of administrative and security staff and the purchase of equipment before operations began.
Utilstržkkelig uddannelse forud for udsendelsen og utilstržkkelig stżtte fra EU-Udenrigstjenestens hovedkvarter fżrte til forsinkelser 25. 
Insufficient pre-deployment training and support from EEAS headquarters led to delays 25.
Vi konstaterede, at mange af de ansatte med ansvar for fastlžggelse af projekter og udarbejdelse af tekniske specifikationer ikke var tilstržkkeligt bekendte med EU's Det endelige belżb afhžnger af resultatet af den kontradiktoriske procedure med EUCAP Sahel Niger. 
We found that many of the staff responsible for identifying projects and preparing technical specifications were not sufficiently aware of EU procedures and rules before they arrived at the Missions in Niger and Mali. This led to delays in procurement procedures and cancelled contracts. The final amount depends on the outcome of the contradictory procedure with EUCAP Sahel Niger.
Ingen af missionens regnskabsr var blevet afsluttet, da revisionen fandt sted. 
None of the financial years of the Mission had been closed by the date of the audit.
18/2012 om EULEX i Kosovo anbefalede Revisionsretten Rdet og Kommissionen at sikre, at kommende FSFP-missioner fik status som juridiske personer. 
In Special Report No 18/2012 on EULEX in Kosovo, the ECA recommended that the Council and the Commission ensure that future CSDP Missions had a legal personality.
21 Tekstboks 2 - Juridiske vanskeligheder, som EUCAP Sahel Niger mżdte under sit fżrste mandat 1. 
20 Box 2 - Legal difficulties encountered by EUCAP Sahel Niger during its first mandate 1.
Dettogmissionen18mnederatbliveenjuridiskenhed,hvilketbetżd,atmissionschefen underskrev alle dokumenter i eget navn og bar det żkonomiske og juridiske ansvar. 
Ittook18monthsfortheMissiontobecomealegalentity,meaningthattheHeadofMission signed all documents in his own name and bore the financial and legal responsibility.
Missionenfikikketildeltetsžrligtbudgettiloprettelsesfasenogmodtogkunbegržnset administrativ og logistisk stżtte fra Bruxelles. 
TheMissiondidnothaveabudgetspecificallyallocatedfortheset-upphaseandreceivedonly little administrative and logistical support from Brussels.
Den var heller ikke i stand til at ansžtte sikkerhedspersonale. 
It was also unable to recruit security staff.
Dette medfżrte en langsom start for udfżrelsen af aktiviteter, svžkkede missionens trovžrdighed og udsatte personalet for store sikkerhedsrisici. 
This meant a slow start to carrying out activities, weakened the credibility of the Mission and exposed staff to greater security risks.
I de fżrste seks mneder var personalet indkvarteret p og arbejdede fra hoteller. 
In the first six months staff were accommodated in and worked from hotels.
De havde ingen computere, kontorer eller mobiltelefoner. 
They had no computers, offices or mobile phones.
I det fżrste regnskabsr blev der indget kontrakter til et anslet belżb af 554 000 euro vedrżrende indkvartering og driftsudgifter uden anvendelse af reelle udbudsprocedurer27. 
In the first financial year, contracts covering accommodation and running costs were signed without proper procurement procedures for an estimated amount of Ű554 00027.
I Niger var dette f.eks. ikke begržnset til etableringsfasen (jf. tekstboks 2), men fortsatte i de efterfżlgende r af missionens drift. 
In Niger, for example, this was not limited to the set-up phase (see Box 2), but continued in the subsequent years of the MissionŐs operation.
For s vidt angr seks reviderede projekter nede indkżbt udstyr frem lžnge efter, at de uddannelseskurser, det skulle bruges til, havde fundet sted. 
In the case of six projects audited equipment purchased arrived long after the training courses for which it had been intended had taken place.
I fem andre tilfžlde var det personale, der havde defineret, hvilket udstyr der var behov for, eller havde udarbejdet specifikationerne til en kontrakt, rejst, da varerne ankom. 
In five other cases, staff that had defined equipment needs or drawn up the specifications for a contract had left by the time the goods arrived.
Nyansat personale mtte overtage projekter og udbud uden at have den nżdvendige uddannelse, hvilket medfżrte forsinkelser i gennemfżrelsen af missionernes operationer. 
Newly recruited staff had to take over projects and procedures without having the necessary training, leading to delays in implementing the MissionŐs operations.
I anerkendelse af de svagheder, der var konstateret i forbindelse med oprettelsen af FSFP-missioner, erklžrede EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen i deres svar p vores beretning om EUPOL Afghanistan, at de ville oprette "et fžlles servicecenter for alle FSFP-missioner" og optimere "anvendelsen af FSFP-lageret til at forvalte aktiverne fra igangvžrende missioner". 
In recognition of the weaknesses observed in setting up CSDP Missions, the EEAS and the Commission stated in their reply to our report on EUPOL Afghanistan that they would develop Ňa shared service centre for all CSDP MissionsÓ and optimise Ňthe use of the CSDP warehouse to manage the assets of ongoing MissionsÓ.
Dette var ikke p plads, da vores revision fandt sted. 
This was not in place at the time of our audit.
Den 13. november 2017 godkendte Rdet imidlertid oprettelsen af en styrket missionsstżtteplatform, som skal vžre fžrdig i maj 2018. 
However, on 13 November 2017 the Council approved the set up of a reinforced Mission Support Platform that is to be completed by May 2018.
Denne platform vil stille "hurtigt indsatsklare aktiver og planlžgningselementer fra medlemsstaterne, herunder, nr det er aftalt, specialiserede hold og multinationale formationer ssom den europžiske gendarmeristyrke", til rdighed for nye civile FSFP-missioner. 
This Platform will make Ňrapidly deployable assets and planning elements from EU member states, as well as, where agreed, specialised teams and multinational formations such as the European Gendarmerie Force" available to new civilian CSDP Missions.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten er ogs ved at gżre klar til at oprette et centralt lager til central opbevaring af produkter til hurtig distribution og dermed reducere det antal udbud, der skal gennemfżres af eksisterende missioner. 
The EEAS is also preparing to set up a central warehouse to hold a centralised stock of items for rapid distribution and so reduce the number of procurement procedures conducted by existing Missions.
Kommissionens regler og procedurer er ikke tilpasset forholdene i Niger og Mali 28. 
Commission rules and procedures not adapted to conditions in Niger and Mali 28.
Kommissionen lod missionspersonalet i Niger og Mali anvende fleksible udbudsprocedurer29 p grund af den vanskelige kontekst, de var nżdt til at arbejde i30. 
The Commission allowed Mission staff in Niger and Mali to apply flexible procurement procedures29 because of the difficult context in which they had to operate30.
I t tilfžlde bestilte EUCAP Sahel Niger udstyr, men rammekontraktens loft for udgifter til Nr missionerne har tilladelse til at anvende fleksible procedurer (dvs. udbud med forhandling uden forudgende offentliggżrelse i overensstemmelse med artikel 266, stk. 2, og artikel 134, stk. 1, litra c), i gennemfżrelsesbestemmelserne), fritager det dem i overensstemmelse med artikel 128, stk. 
Although these procedures were used, staff carrying out procurement in the Missions considered that FPI When Missions are allowed to use flexible procedures (i.e. negotiated procedures without prior publication pursuant to Articles 266(2) and 134(1) point (c) RAP), it also relieves them pursuant to Article 128(3) point (b) RAP of the necessity to negotiate with several potential contracting parties, as required by usual European Commission rules (see Article 128 RAP).
Anvendelse af fleksible procedurer gżr indkżb enklere og hurtigere. 
Applying flexible procedures makes purchasing simpler and quicker.
Kommissionen tillader dette i krisesituationer (jf. definitionen i artikel 190, stk. 
The Commission allows this in crisis situations (see for a definition Article 190(2) RAP) after adopting a crisis declaration.
Som fżlge af Revisionsrettens sžrberetning om Kosovo ptog EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen sig at "gennemg Kommissionens programmerings-og udbudsprocedurer for at sikre, at de opfylder EULEX' operationelle behov". 
Following ECAŐs Special Report on Kosovo, the EEAS and the Commission undertook to Ňreview Commission programming and procurement procedures to ensure they are responsive to EULEXŐs operational needsÓ.
23 29 30 
21 29 30
Som fżlge heraf var missionerne nżdt til at ivžrksžtte udbud med henblik p indkżb af disse produkter lokalt. 
As a result, the Mission had to launch procurement procedures for these items locally.
I andre tilfžlde kunne tilbehżr til udstyr indkżbt under rammekontrakten ikke indkżbes lokalt. 
In other cases, supplies for equipment purchased under the framework contract could not be procured locally.
EUCAP Sahel-missionerne skal have forudgende tilladelse fra Kommissionen til indkżb p over 20 000 euro. 
The EUCAP Sahel Missions require the CommissionŐs prior authorisation for purchases over Ű20 000.
Denne proces tager lžngere tid, end nr missionerne foretager direkte indkżb. 
This process takes longer than when the Missions make purchases directly.
Kommissionen accepterede anbefalingen i Revisionsrettens rsberetning for 2013 om, at FPI burde akkreditere alle civile FUSP-missioner i overensstemmelse med en vurdering p grundlag af "seks sżjler"31. 
The Commission accepted the recommendation in the ECAŐs 2013 Annual Report that the FPI should accredit all civilian CSDP Missions in accordance with the Ôsix-pillar assessmentŐ31.
Dette betyder, at s snart missionerne har styrket deres systemer med henblik p at opfylde kravene fra bedżmmerne, modtager missionscheferne delegerede befżjelser til at godkende indkżb, samtidig med at Kommissionen fortsat gennemfżrer efterfżlgende kontroller. 
This means that once the Missions have strengthened their systems to meet the requirements of the assessors, Heads of Mission receive delegated powers to authorise An assessment of key processes by an independent auditor (internal control; accounting; external audit; grants; procurement; financial instruments).
Kort tid efter vores besżg i missionerne blev de begge underlagt processen med en vurdering p grundlag af seks sżjler32. 
Shortly after our visit to the Missions, both began to undergo the process of six-pillar assessment32.
Manglende vejledning fra EU-Udenrigstjenestens hovedkvarter resulterede i svage procedurer 30. 
Lack of guidance from EEAS headquarters resulted in weak procedures 30.
Vi s p den vejledning, der var til rdighed for missionerne, og ans den for at vžre utilstržkkelig, da den hovedsagelig vedrżrte administrative procedurer33. 
We looked at the guidance available to the Missions and found it to be inadequate since it related mainly to administrative procedures33.
Der blev kun i begržnset omfang givet operationel vejledning med eksempler p god praksis eller standardmodeller fra tidligere civile FSFP-missioner, der kunne anvendes til at uddanne nyansatte medarbejdere. 
There was little operational guidance, with examples of good practice, or standard templates from the previous civilian CSDP Missions, that could be used to train newly recruited staff.
24 31 32 33 p at fastlžgge og etablere sine egne procedurer, som ikke altid var effektive i operationel henseende. 
Each EUCAP Sahel Mission spent considerable time and resources on defining and setting up its own procedures, which were not always operationally efficient.
EU-medlemsstaterne leverede ikke tilstržkkeligt personale til at besžtte de ledige stillinger 31. 
The EU member states did not provide enough staff to fill the posts available 31.
Den vigtigste ressource for EUCAP Sahel-missionerne er deres ansatte, bde dem, der er udstationeret og aflżnnes af EU-medlemsstaterne, og dem, der er ansat lokalt af missionerne og finansieres over EU-budgettet. 
The most important resource of the EUCAP Sahel Missions is their staff, both those seconded and paid for by the EU member states and those contracted locally by the Missions and funded out of the EU budget.
Missionerne oplevede konsekvent problemer med at besžtte ledige stillinger for udstationeret personale. 
The Missions consistently experienced problems filling vacancies for seconded staff.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten opfordrer EU-medlemsstaterne til at levere kandidater til udstationering via indkaldelser af bidrag, som er tidskržvende og omkostningsfulde at afholde. 
The EEAS invites the EU member states to provide candidates for secondment through calls for contributions, which are time-consuming and expensive to organise.
Der blev gennemfżrt 24 indkaldelser af bidrag for EUCAP Sahel Niger mellem 2012 og 2016 og 14 for EUCAP Sahel Mali mellem 2014 og 2016. 
24 calls for contributions were made for EUCAP Sahel Niger between 2012 and 2016 and 14 for EUCAP Sahel Mali between 2014 and 2016.
Blot halvdelen af de offentliggjorte ledige stillinger i Niger og blot to tredjedele i Mali blev besat som fżlge af disse indkaldelser af bidrag (jf. tabel 2 og 3). 
These calls for contributions only resulted in filling half of the vacant posts published for Niger, and only two-thirds for Mali (see Tables 2 and 3).
Civcom beslutter, hvilke stillinger der offentliggżres udelukkende for udstationeret personale, og hvilke stillinger der ogs er bne for kontraktpersonale. 
The CIVCOM decides which posts are published exclusively for seconded staff and which are also open to contracted staff.
Kontraktansat personale kan kun rekrutteres til stillinger for udstationeret personale, hvis to p hinanden fżlgende indkaldelser af bidrag ikke leverer passende kandidater til udstationering. 
Contracted staff can only be recruited to posts for seconded staff if two consecutive calls for contributions fail to produce suitable seconded candidates.
Tabel 2 - EUCAP Sahel Niger: Resultater af indkaldelser af bidrag (2012-2016) 25 EUCAP Sahel Niger Almindelige indkaldelser af bidrag Ekstraordinžre indkaldelser af bidrag Antal opslede stillinger i alt 276 59 Opslet som "Udstationeret" 132 48 % 20 34 % Opslet som "Udstationeret/kontraktansat" 144 52 % 39 66 % Besatte stillinger 163 59 % 29 49 % Ubesatte stillinger 113 41 % 30 51 % Stillinger, for hvilke der ikke blev modtaget ansżgninger 33 12 % 9 15 % Stillinger, for hvilke der kun blev modtaget n ansżgning 71 26 % 9 15 % Kilde: EUCAP Sahel Niger. 
Table 2 Đ EUCAP Sahel Niger: results of calls for contributions (2012-2016) 24 EUCAP Sahel Niger Ordinary Calls for Contributions Extraordinary Calls for Contributions Total number of posts published 276 59 Published as 'Seconded' 132 48% 20 34% Published as 'Seconded/Contracted' 144 52% 39 66% Posts Filled 163 59% 29 49% Posts Not filled 113 41% 30 51% Posts for which no applications were received 33 12% 9 15% Posts for which only one application was received 71 26% 9 15% Source: EUCAP Sahel Niger.
Tabel 3 - EUCAP Sahel Mali: Resultater af indkaldelser af bidrag (2014-2016) 26 EUCAP Sahel Mali Almindelige indkaldelser af bidrag Ekstraordinžre indkaldelser af bidrag Antal opslede stillinger i alt 198 21 Opslet som "Udstationeret" 127 64 % 5 24 % Opslet som "Udstationeret/kontraktansat" 71 36 % 16 76 % Besatte stillinger 139 70 % 14 67 % Ubesatte stillinger 59 30 % 7 33 % Stillinger, for hvilke der ikke blev modtaget ansżgninger 7 4% 0 0% Stillinger, for hvilke der kun blev modtaget n ansżgning 26 13 % 1 5% Kilde: EUCAP Sahel Mali. 
Table 3 Đ EUCAP Sahel Mali: results of calls for contributions (2014-2016) EUCAP Sahel Mali Ordinary Calls for Contributions Extraordinary Calls for Contributions Total number of posts published 198 21 Published as 'Seconded' 127 64% 5 24% Published as 'Seconded/Contracted' 71 36% 16 76% Posts Filled 139 70% 14 67% Posts Not filled 59 30% 7 33% Posts for which no applications were received 7 4% 0 0% Posts for which only one application was received 26 13% 1 5% Source: EUCAP Sahel Mali.
De vanskeligheder, som missionerne i Niger og Mali oplevede med at f udstationeret personale fra EU's medlemsstater, er de samme som de vanskeligheder, tidligere civile FSFP-missioner har haft34. 
The difficulties faced by the Missions in Niger and Mali in obtaining seconded staff from EU member states are similar to those faced by previous civilian CSDP Missions34.
Dette skyldes blandt andet den omstžndighed, at der stilles hżje krav for s vidt angr de kvalifikationer og den ekspertise, som de pgžldende medarbejdere skal have, og at de skal kunne arbejde p fransk35. 
The reasons include the fact that the qualifications and level of expertise required of such staff are high, and they need to be able to work in French35.
Potentielle kandidater skal ogs overveje de usikre sikkerheds-og levevilkr. 
Potential candidates also have to consider the precarious safety and living conditions.
Endelig er besžttelse af stillinger i civile FSFP-missioner ikke altid en hżj prioritet for EU-medlemsstaterne. 
Lastly, staffing civilian CSDP Missions is not always a high priority for EU member states.
Som et resultat af dette var besžttelsen af ledige stillinger i EUCAP Sahel-missionerne i Niger og Mali i gennemsnit p henholdsvis 72 % og 77 % i de relevante perioder. 
34 35 posts in the EUCAP Sahel Missions in Niger and Mali averaged 72 % and 77 % respectively in the relevant periods.
Udstationeringsvarigheden for medarbejdere fra EU-medlemsstaterne er i gennemsnit to r eller blot t r for visse EU-medlemsstater. 
The length of secondment of staff from EU member states is two years on average or just one year for some EU member states.