natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I dette afsnit undersżger vi, om Kommissionen leverede EU-stżtten til APSA p en rettidig, forudsigelig og konsekvent mde, og om de kontrakter, vi reviderede, blev gennemfżrt som planlagt. 
In this section, we examine whether the Commission provided EU support to the APSA in a timely, predictable and coherent manner and whether the contracts we audited were implemented as planned.
Vi vurderer de overvgnings-og rapporteringsmekanismer, som Kommissionen har indfżrt, og undersżger, om de gav tilstržkkelige oplysninger om de opnede resultater. 
We assess the monitoring and reporting mechanisms put in place by the Commission, and ask whether they provided adequate information on results achieved.
Forsinkelser med hensyn til indgelse af kontrakter og anvendelse af finansiering med tilbagevirkende kraft svžkkede gennemfżrelsen af de planlagte aktiviteter 52. 
Delays in contracting and retroactive financing impaired the implementation of planned activities 52.
Modtagerne af de kontrakter, vi reviderede, var AU og SRO'erne. 
The beneficiaries of the contracts we audited were the AU and SROs.
Formlet med stżtten var at finansiere og uddanne personale til at udfżre komplekse freds-og sikkerhedsmžssige opgaver og sikre, at aktiviteterne blev gennemfżrt p en konsekvent mde p tvžrs af kontinentet. 
The aim of the support was to finance and train staff to carry out complex peace and security tasks, and ensure that activities were implemented in a coherent way across the continent.
Kontrakterne, som er angivet i bilag IV, skulle: a) styrke HR-kapaciteten i AU-Kommissionen og de subregionale organisationer (REC'erne og RM'erne) for at forebygge og/eller reagere p kriser i Afrika 28 b) hjžlpe AU-forbindelseskontorerne til at overvge gennemfżrelsen af fredsaftaler, stżtte forberedelsen og overvgningen af valg og repržsentere AU p mżder med nationale organer og internationale organisationer c) etablere en kontinental struktur, der sžtter AU i stand til hurtigt at anvende strategisk og operationel kommunikations-, kommando-og kontrolkapacitet mellem AU i Addis Abeba, regionerne og missionerne i marken d) yde AU-Kommissionen og SRO'erne eksperthjžlp til deres freds-og sikkerhedsinitiativer e) stżtte SRO'ernes opbygning af deres kapacitet og varetagelse af deres konfliktforebyggelses-og konfliktlżsningsmandater. 
The contracts, listed at Annex IV, sought to: (a) strengthen the HR capacity of the AU Commission and the sub-regional organisations (the RECs and the RMs) to prevent and/or respond to crises in Africa; (b) help the AU Liaison Offices to monitor the implementation of peace agreements, support the preparation and monitoring of elections, and to represent the AU in meetings with national bodies and international organisations; (c) put in place a continental structure enabling the AU to rapidly deploy strategic and operational communication, command and control capabilities between the AU in Addis Ababa, the regional level and the missions in the field; (d) provide the AU Commission and SROs with expertise for their peace and security initiatives;
Rettidighed og forudsigelighed er afgżrende, hvis den institutionelle stżtte skal give de forventede resultater. 
Timeliness and predictability are essential if institutional support is to have expected results.
Nr kontrakter ikke blev indget rettidigt, fżrte det til forsinkelser i gennemfżrelsen og betżd, at finansieringen af aktiviteterne var uforudsigelig. 
The failure to conclude contracts on time led to implementation delays and meant that financing of activities was not predictable.
10 af de 14 kontrakter, vi reviderede, blev underskrevet for sent p grund af et eller flere af fżlgende forhold: a) AU-Kommissionen og SRO'erne indsendte finansieringsforslag for sent eller af ringe kvalitet b) Der var komplicerede forhandlinger om kontraktbudgetter, aktiviteter og żkonomisk forvaltning c) Der var tekniske problemer med Europa-Kommissionens informationssystem. 
Ten out of the fourteen contracts we audited were signed late for one or a combination of the following reasons: (a) the AU Commission and the SROs submitted late or low-quality financing proposals; (b) complicated negotiations concerning contract budgets, activities and financial management; (c) technical problems with the EU CommissionŐs information system.
Derudover havde otte af disse 10 kontrakter finansieret aktiviteter med tilbagevirkende kraft58. 
In addition, eight of these ten contracts had financed activities retroactively58.
Tre af dem blev underskrevet blot dage fżr, de finansierede aktiviteter skulle vžre afsluttet. 
Three of them were signed only days before the activities financed were due to be completed.
Vi konstaterede, at forsinkelser med hensyn til indgelse af kontrakter kombineret med eksisterende interne svagheder i AU og SRO'erne havde en negativ indvirkning p Kommissionen kan bruge midler fra EUF til at finansiere aktiviteter, som allerede har fundet sted, for at "sikre, at projekterne ivžrksžttes hurtigt, og for at undg, at der opstr afbrydelser mellem p hinanden fżlgende projekter eller forsinkelser" - artikel 19 i bilag IV til Cotonouaftalen. 
We found that delays in signing contracts, combined with existing internal weaknesses in the AU and the SROs, had a negative impact on the implementation of activities for six out of the fourteen contracts (Annex IV).
Tekstboks 5 beskriver de negative konsekvenser af den forsinkede kontraktindgelse og anvendelsen af finansiering med tilbagevirkende kraft i forbindelse med to APSA-stżtteprogrammer. 
Box 5 presents the negative impact of contracting delays and of retroactive financing on two APSA Support Programmes.
Tekstboks 5 - Finansiering med tilbagevirkende kraft i forbindelse med APSA-stżtteprogrammerne Gennem APSA-stżtteprogrammerne yder EU finansiel stżtte til AU-Kommissionens og SRO'ernes drift af APSA. 
Box 5 -Retroactive financing of the APSA Support Programmes Through the APSA Support Programmes, the EU provides financial support to the AU Commission and to SROs to operate the APSA.
Vi reviderede den anden og den tredje af disse kontrakter, som var p henholdsvis 5 227 335 euro og 28 770 000 euro. 
We audited the second and third of these contracts, amounting to Ű5 227 335 and Ű28 770 000, respectively.
Kontrakten om det andet APSA-stżtteprogram stżttede aktiviteter ssom fžrdiggżrelse af APSA-kżreplanen for 2016-2020. 
The second APSA Support Programme contract supported activities such as finalising the 2016 to 2020 APSA Roadmap.
Kontrakten blev underskrevet sent, hvorfor mange planlagte aktiviteter ikke blev gennemfżrt eller mtte finansieres fra andre kilder. 
The contract was signed late, meaning many planned activities were not implemented, or had to be financed from other sources.
Trods den forsinkede modtagelse af midlerne fastholdt SRO'erne det meste af det personale, der finansieres under denne kontrakt. 
Despite the delayed receipt of funds, the SROs maintained most of the staff financed under this contract.
Nogle ansatte blev dog afskediget, hvilket resulterede i tab af opbygget kapacitet. 
30 laid off, resulting in the loss of capacity which had been built up.
Som fżlge heraf var det kun 56 % af kontraktens budget, som blev anvendt. 
As consequence, only 56 % of the contractŐs budget was consumed.
Kontrakten om det tredje APSA-stżtteprogram blev fżrst underskrevet i december 2016, selv om gennemfżrelsesperioden omfattede 36 mneder fra januar 2016. 
The third APSA Support Programme contract was only signed in December 2016, although the implementation period covered 36 months from January 2016.
AU-Kommissionen videregav fżrst midler fra kontrakten til SRO'erne i maj 2017 p grund af deres egne kontraktmžssige forsinkelser. 
The AU Commission did not pass on funds from the contract to the SROs until May 2017, due to their own contracting delays.
Manglen p finansiering blev i nogle tilfžlde afhjulpet af andre donorer, men kunne ogs medfżre, at planlagte aktiviteter blev udsat. 
The shortfall in funding was in some cases met by other donors, or resulted in the postponement of planned activities.
Tekstboks 6 viser et eksempel p forsinkelser i forbindelse med kżbet af et informationssystem til den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke. 
Box 6 shows an example of delays in the purchase of an information system for the African Standby Force.
I dette tilfžlde forvžrrede AU's interne svagheder den forsinkelse, som skyldtes, at kontrakten blev underskrevet sent. 
In this case, the AUŐs internal weaknesses compounded the delay caused by the late signature of the contract.
Tekstboks 6 - Forsinkelser i forbindelse med oprettelsen af et kommando-, kontrol-, kommunikations-og informationssystem (C3IS) til den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke EU stżttede udviklingen af den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke og forvaltningen af afrikanskledede fredsstżttende operationer gennem C3IS-kontrakten. 
Box 6 - Delays in establishing a Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS) for the African Standby Force The EU supported the development of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the management of African-led peace support operations with the C3IS contract.
C3IS var en vigtig prioritet i APSA-kżreplanen for 2011-2013. 
The C3IS was a key priority in the 2011 to 2013 APSA Roadmap.
Formlet med systemet var at sžtte AU i stand til hurtigt at etablere strategisk og operationel kommunikation. 
It was designed to enable the AU to rapidly deploy strategic and operational communications.
Det ville f.eks. give AU i Addis Abeba mulighed for at viderebringe ordrer og udarbejde rapporter og kort til styring af operationerne p stedet. 
For example, it would allow the AU in Addis Ababa to convey orders and to generate reports and maps for managing operations on the ground.
30 AU fžrdiggjorde sit finansieringsforslag i februar 2013 og underskrev en aftale om 12,5 millioner euro i EU-stżtte i februar 2014. 
The AU completed its financing proposal in February 2013 and signed an agreement for Ű12.5 million of EU support in February 2014.
EU finansierede med tilbagevirkende kraft AU-Kommissionens forberedende aktiviteter fra marts 2013 og uddelegerede forvaltningen af den komplekse udbudsprocedure til AU-Kommissionen for at fremme AU's ejerskab af systemet. 
The EU funded retroactively the AU CommissionŐs preparatory activities undertaken since March 2013 and delegated management of the complex procurement procedure to the AU Commission to promote AU ownership of the system.
Dette fżrte dog til store forsinkelser i udbuddet, som stadig var i gang p tidspunktet for vores revision. 
However, this resulted in long delays in the procurement procedure, which was still ongoing at the time of our audit.
EU forlžngede kontraktens gennemfżrelsesperiode til 67 mneder fra de oprindeligt planlagte 24 mneder. 
The EU extended the implementation period for the contract to 67 months from the 24 months originally planned.
Denne forsinkelse havde en negativ indvirkning p andre planlagte aktiviteter. 
This delay had a negative impact on other activities planned.
Eksempelvis opgav man en af hovedkomponenterne i en vigtig tržningsżvelse for den afrikanske beredskabsstyrke (AMANI Africa II, som ogs blev stżttet af EU). 
For example, one of the principal components of an essential African Standby Force training exercise (AMANI Africa II, also supported by the EU) was abandoned.
Finansieringsinstrumenterne blev ikke altid brugt p en konsekvent mde 56. 
Financing instruments were not always used coherently 56.
Hverken Europa-Kommissionen eller EU-Udenrigstjenesten havde analyseret de komparative fordele ved alle de instrumenter, de havde til rdighed p omrdet fred og sikkerhed (punkt 9). 
Neither the European Commission nor the EEAS had analysed the comparative advantages of all the instruments at their disposal in the area of peace and security (paragraph 9).
Vi konstaterede, at instrumenterne ikke altid blev brugt p en konsekvent mde. 
We found that the instruments were not always used coherently.
APF er velegnet til kortsigtede finansieringsbehov, eftersom dens finansieringscykler varer 2-3 r. 
The APF is well suited for financing short-term needs, since its funding cycles last two to three years.
Omvendt finansierer RVP'erne i hżjere grad langsigtede behov med en finansieringscyklus p syv r. 
Conversely, the RIPs lend themselves more readily to financing long-term needs, with a funding cycle of seven years.
Vi fandt tilfžlde, hvor kortvarige APF-kontrakter blev anvendt til at finansiere langvarige stillinger, f.eks. kontrakterne om lżnninger under den fžlles finansieringsordning (punkt 39). 
We found cases of short-term APF contracts being used to finance long-term staff posts, for example, under the JFA Salaries contracts (paragraph 39).
I dette tilfžlde svžkkede brugen af revolverende kontrakter p 1-2 r forvaltningen af menneskelige ressourcer og betżd, at antallet og typerne af stillinger blev genforhandlet nžsten hvert r. 
In this case, the use of revolving 1-2 year contracts weakened human resources management and meant that the numbers and types of staff posts were renegotiated almost yearly.
Dette bidrog til at forsinke kontraktindgelserne (punkt 53) og skabte jobusikkerhed, hvilket igen fżrte til tab af erfarne medarbejdere. 
This contributed to delays in contracting (paragraph 53) and to job insecurity, leading to loss of experienced staff.
I andre tilfžlde var RVP'erne blevet brugt til at džkke kortsigtede behov, hvilket de er mindre velegnede til. 
In other cases, the RIPs had been used to address short-term needs, to which they are less well suited.
Europa-Kommissionen og EU-Udenrigstjenesten har ikke oprettet en koordineringsramme, som džkker alle deres instrumenter p omrdet fred og sikkerhed. 
The European Commission and EEAS have not set up a coordination framework covering all their instruments in the area of peace and security.
Siden 2015 har de imidlertid taget skridt til at sikre, at APF og RVP'erne supplerer hinanden mere effektivt, navnlig ved: a) at pržcisere, hvordan stillinger i SRO'erne finansieres. 
However, since 2015, they have taken steps to make the APF and the RIPs complement each other more effectively, notably by: (a) clarifying the way in which staff positions in the SROs are funded.
I denne forbindelse besluttede de, at de EU-stżttede omkostninger til ikkemilitžrt personale i de regionale 31 organisationer bżr overfżres fra APF til RVP'erne. 
To this end, they decided that the cost of non-military staff of the regional organisations supported by the EU should be transferred from the APF to the RIPs.
Denne beslutning blev imidlertid truffet, efter RVP'erne var blevet vedtaget, hvilket gżr den vanskeligere at gennemfżre. 
However, this decision was taken after the RIPs had been adopted, making it more difficult to implement.
I sidste ende blev overfżrelsen udskudt til januar 2018 b) at involvere de regionale EU-delegationer i gennemgangen af de regionale arbejdsplaner vedrżrende APSA-stżtteprogrammet, som finansieres under APF, for at sikre, at disse supplerer de RVP-finansierede programmer c) fra 2017 at inddrage de regionale EU-delegationer i APSA-stżtteprogrammets styringskomit. 
In the end, the transfer was postponed to January 2018; (b) involving the regional EU delegations in reviewing the regional APSA Support Programme work plans financed under the APF to ensure that these complement the RIP-funded programmes; (c) since 2017, including the regional EU delegations in the APSA Support ProgrammeŐs steering committee. 31
Der var etableret overvgnings-og rapporteringsmekanismer, men de gav ikke tilstržkkelige oplysninger om resultater 59. 
Monitoring and reporting mechanisms were set up, but did not provide sufficient information on results 59.
Kommissionen havde oprettet overvgnings-og rapporteringsmekanismer for alle de kontrakter, vi reviderede. 
The Commission had set up monitoring and reporting mechanisms for all the contracts we audited.
Disse omfattede periodisk forelžggelse af beskrivende og finansielle rapporter (for det meste halvrlige), regelmžssige mżder i styringskomiten og uafhžngig ekstern revision af udgifter. 
These included the periodic submission of narrative and financial reports (mostly half-yearly), regular steering committee meetings, and independent external audits of expenditure.
I praksis var Kommissionens overvgningsmekanismer behžftet med svagheder og gav ikke tilstržkkelige oplysninger om resultater. 
In practice the CommissionŐs monitoring mechanisms were affected by weaknesses and did not provide sufficient information on results.
Vi fandt fżlgende eksempler i de kontrakter, vi reviderede: a) I seks af de 14 kontrakter var de planlagte output ikke specifikke eller mlbare. 
We found the following examples in the contracts we audited: (a) the planned outputs were not specific or not measurable in six out of the fourteen contracts.
F.eks. forventedes de stżttede afdelinger eller instrumenter at "udvide deres kapacitet", "styrke deres rolle" eller "blive fuldt operationelle". 
For example, the departments or instruments supported were expected to have their Ňcapacity enhancedÓ, Ňrole strengthenedÓ, or to become Ňfully operationalÓ.
I nogle af disse tilfžlde vedrżrte de underliggende aktiviteter ikke direkte outputtene b) I 12 af kontrakterne angav nogle af indikatorerne input og aktiviteter i stedet for output, der skulle leveres, og de kunne derfor kun i begržnset omfang anvendes til overvgningsforml. 
In some of these cases, the underlying activities did not relate directly to the outputs; (b) some of the indicators drawn up for twelve of the contracts listed inputs and activities, rather than setting outputs to achieve, and were therefore of limited use for monitoring purposes.
I andre tilfžlde manglede der basislinjer og ml, som kunne gżre det muligt at mle fremskridt c) I tre tilfžlde betżd det faktum, at kontrakterne blev underskrevet de allersidste dage af deres gennemfżrelsesperioder, at finansiering med tilbagevirkende kraft i praksis gjorde overvgningsbestemmelserne irrelevante 32 d) De rapporter, som AU og SRO'erne udarbejdede, kom ofte for sent. 
In other cases, baselines and targets needed to measure progress were missing; (c) in three cases, the fact that the contracts were signed on the very last days of their implementing periods meant that retroactive financing made monitoring provisions irrelevant in practice; (d) the reports prepared by the AU and the SROs often arrived late.
Med hensyn til seks kontrakter indeholdt disse rapporter ikke tilstržkkelige oplysninger om de kontraktbestemte output og indikatorer. 
For six contracts, these reports did not contain sufficient details on contractual outputs and indicators.
Generelt havde det EU-personale, vi interviewede, et godt overblik over gennemfżrelsen af kontrakterne, selv om denne viden ikke altid fremgik af rapporterne. 
In general, the EU staff we interviewed had a good overview of the implementation of the contracts, although this knowledge was not always included in reports.
Europa-Kommissionen havde endnu ikke gennemfżrt nogen missioner vedrżrende "resultatorienteret overvgning (ROM)"59 i forbindelse med de reviderede kontrakter. Der var kun foretaget en ekstern evaluering af n kontrakt. 
For the contracts audited, the EU Commission had not yet performed any ŇResults-Oriented Monitoring (ROM)Ó missions59. An external evaluation had been carried out in respect of only one The ROM is the external monitoring system of the European Commission, with a strong focus on results.
Det betżd, at der ikke var andre kilder, der kompenserede for manglen p resultatoplysninger fra AU og SRO'erne. 
This meant that the limited availability of information on results from the AU and the SROs was not compensated for from other sources.
AU-medlemsstaterne oprettede APSA med det forml at sikre en strukturel og langsigtet imżdegelse af udfordringerne med hensyn til fred og sikkerhed p det afrikanske kontinent. 
The AU member states set up the APSA to be a structural, long-term response to the challenges to peace and security on the African continent.
Gennem APSA har AU og de bemyndigede SRO'er adgang til vžrktżjer, som giver dem mulighed for at forebygge, hndtere og lżse konflikter. 
Through the APSA, the AU and mandated SROs have access to tools which help them to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.
EU stżttede APSA gennem Den Europžiske Udviklingsfond. 
The EU provided support for the APSA out of the European Development Fund.
Vi reviderede EU's stżtte over de tre r 2014-2016 og konstaterede, at den har haft ringe effekt og bżr have nyt fokus. 
We audited the EUŐs support over the three years 2014 to 2016 and found that it has had a poor effect and needed refocusing.
EU havde ikke opstillet klare prioriteter for sin stżtte, og EU's strategi manglede en langsigtet vision for udviklingen af stżtten. 
The EU did not set clear priorities for its support and its strategy lacked a long-term vision for the evolution of its support.
I den reviderede periode fokuserede EU f.eks. ikke tilstržkkeligt p at g fra betaling af lżnninger til mlrettet kapacitetsopbygning for at sikre en vellykket EU-stżtte p lang sigt. 
For example, during the period audited, it did not focus sufficiently on the transition from paying salaries to targeting capacity-building to ensure the long-term success of EU support.
AU-medlemsstaternes mangelfulde bidrag til AU-budgettet og fredsfonden gjorde APSA stžrkt afhžngig af stżtte fra donorer, herunder EU. 
The shortfall in contributions by the AU member states to the AU budget and the Peace Fund left the APSA heavily dependent on the support of donors, including the EU.
EU stżttede AU's planer om at opn żkonomisk uafhžngighed for APSA, som blev formaliseret i AU's 2016-beslutning, men gennemfżrelsen var stadig p et tidligt stadium (punkt 16-30). 
The EU supported the AUŐs plans for achieving financial independence for the APSA, formalised in the AUŐs 2016 decision, but implementation was still at an early stage (paragraphs 16 to 30).
Vi konstaterede, at omkring halvdelen af de EU-finansierede kontrakter enten overvejende eller delvis havde leveret de forventede resultater p tidspunktet for revisionen. 
We found that around half of the EU-funded contracts had either mostly or partially delivered the expected results at the time of the audit.
EU har stżttet reformer til forbedring af AU's og SRO'ernes finansielle, operationelle og institutionelle kapacitet, men disse reformer har indtil videre kun givet f resultater. 
The EU has supported reforms to improve the financial, operational and institutional capacity of the AU and SROs, but these reforms have yielded few results to date.
APSA-komponenternes kapacitet varierede betydeligt og blev udfordret af manglende politisk vilje og begržnset finansiering (punkt 32-50). 
The capacity of the APSAŐs components varied considerably and was challenged by a lack of political commitment and by limited funding (paragraphs 32 to 50). criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.
Vi reviderede alle de 14 kontrakter om EU-stżtte til APSA, der blev indget mellem 2014 og 2016. 
We audited all fourteen contracts concluded between 2014 and 2016 under which the EU supported the APSA.
Vi konstaterede, at kontrakterne ikke altid blev forvaltet produktivt. 
We found that contracts were not always managed efficiently.
10 af kontrakterne blev underskrevet sent, hvilket betżd, at midlerne ikke var til rdighed rettidigt og p en forudsigelig mde. 
Ten of the contracts were signed late, which meant that the availability of funds was not timely and predictable.
Dette fżrte til tab af erfarent personale og forsinkelser i gennemfżrelsen af APSA's aktiviteter (punkt 52-55). 
This led to the loss of some experienced staff and resulted in delays in the implementation of the APSAŐs activities (paragraphs 52 to 55).
Vi konstaterede ogs, at selv om der var indfżrt overvgningsmekanismer, fungerede de ikke godt, f.eks. nr kontrakter blev finansieret med tilbagevirkende kraft. 
We also found that while monitoring mechanisms were in place, they did not operate well, for example when contracts were financed retroactively.