natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I periodens lżb er antallet af attester med forbehold faldet, men i 1998 blev nžsten en tredjedel af de samlede udgifter anmeldt af betalingsorganer, over for hvis regnskaber der var taget forbehold (jf. punkt 51). 
Whilst the number of accounts qualified has diminished over the period, for 1998 almost one third of the total expenditure was declared by paying agencies whose accounts were qualified (see paragraph 51).
Forligsproceduren Forligsproceduren har givet medlemsstaterne mulighed for at anfžgte de foreslede korrektioner. 
The conciliation procedure Recourse to the Conciliation Body has given Member States the opportunity to contest proposed corrections.
Det har resulteret i et samlet fald i korrektionerne p ca. 275 millioner euro (jf. punkt 65). 
This has led to an overall reduction in corrections of some 275 million euro (see paragraph 65).
Alligevel er det kun i f tilfžlde lykkedes at forlige Kommissionens og medlemsstaternes modstridende synspunkter (jf. punkt 65). 
Nevertheless, the Conciliation Body has largely failed to conciliate the opposing views of the Commission and the Member States (see paragraph 65).
Forligsorganet bżr tage klar stilling i alle de sager, det fr forelagt, og komme med konkrete forslag til, hvor stor en korrektion der skal foretages. 
The Conciliation Body should take a clear position on all cases presented to it and come up with concrete suggestions with regard to the level of correction that should be applied.
Kommissionen bżr acceptere disse forslag, medmindre den klart kan pvise, at forligsorganet har taget fejl. 
The Commission should accept these suggestions unless it can clearly demonstrate that the Conciliation Body is mistaken.
Det vil mske kunne resultere i flere endelige forlig, og i at fžrre sager indbringes for EF-Domstolen (jf. punkt 71). 
This might result in more final settlements and fewer cases before the European Court of Justice (see paragraph 71).
Beslutninger om regnskabsafslutning Det samlede belżb for korrektioner for et givet r er mindre under den reviderede ordning end under den gamle (jf. punkt 74). 
Clearance decisions The total amount of corrections for a given year is lower under the reformed system than it was under the old (see paragraph 74).
Det skyldes til dels, at dataene endnu ikke er komplette. 
This is partly due to the fact that the data are still not complete.
Andre rsager er, at der nu foretages bedre kontrol, fżr betalingerne gennemfżres (det integrerede forvaltnings-og kontrolsystem, IFKS), at der gžlder en 24-mnedersregel, at fejl, som de attesterende organer finder, ikke anvendes som grundlag for korrektioner, hvis medlemsstaterne selv har truffet de fornżdne forholdsregler, samt forligsorganets indsats. 
Other reasons are: the impact of better pre-payment controls (IACS); the 24-month rule; errors found by the Certifying Bodies are not used as the basis for corrections if the Member States have taken appropriate action; the effect of the Conciliation Body.
Kommissionen har ikke kunnet afslutte alle betalingsorganernes regnskaber i april-beslutningen om regnskabsafslutning. 
It has not been possible for the Commission to clear all paying agency accounts in the April financial decision.
Betydelige belżb har mttet udskilles i 1996 (jf. punkt 81). 
Significant amounts had to be disjoined in 1996 (see paragraph 81).
Der er nu get mere end tre r siden det fżrste r, den reviderede ordning blev anvendt (1996), og den endelige overensstemmelsesbeslutning er endnu ikke truffet. 
For the first year of the reformed system (1996) more than three years have passed and the final conformity decision has yet to be taken.
Konklusion Der er ikke noget, der tyder p, at den reviderede procedure, hvor det fżrst skal afgżres, om regnskaberne er rigtige, og derefter om udgifterne er i overensstemmelse med EF-reglerne, generelt har gjort det hurtigere at f afsluttet regnskaberne over udgifterne for et givet EUGFL-regnskabsr. 
Conclusion There is no evidence that the reformed clearance procedure has accelerated the overall timescale for clearing the expenditure in both financial and conformity terms for a given EAGGF year.
Reformen af proceduren for regnskabsafslutning har dog gjort medlemsstaterne mere ansvarlige og bżr betragtes som en vžsentlig forbedring (jf. punkt 90). 
Nevertheless, the reform of the clearance procedure has resulted in improved accountability at Member State level and should be regarded as a considerable achievement (see paragraph 90).
2.3.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 69/5 INDLEDNING Forml 1. 
2.3.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 69/5 INTRODUCTION Objectives 1.
Formlet med denne beretning er at give en generel vurdering af, hvordan den reviderede ordning for regnskabsafslutning (1) fungerer, med sžrlig vžgt p det arbejde, der udfżres af de attesterende organer, og forligsproceduren. 
The purpose of this Report is to evaluate the operation of the reformed clearance of accounts (1) system generally, with particu-Table 1 Clearance decisions and delays in respect of EAGGF years 1991 to 1998 lar emphasis on the work of the Certifying Bodies and the conciliation procedure.
Retten har tidligere Ń i forbindelse med regnskabsafslutningen for 1996 (2) Ń gennemget forskellige aspekter ved ordningen, bl.a. godkendelsen af betalingsorganerne. 
The Court has previously examined certain features of this system, in particular the accreditation of paying agencies in the context of the 1996 clearance of accounts (2).
Beretningen džkker EUGFL-regnskabsrene 1991 til 1998 begge inklusive, men analyserer ikke selve beslutningerne om regnskabsafslutning, eftersom Rettens konklusioner herom indgr i dens rsberetninger og andre publikationer (tabel 1). 
The period covered relates to EAGGF years 1991 to 1998 inclusive but does not analyse the clearance decisions per se since the CourtŐs findings in this respect are included in its annual reports and other publications Table 1).
Regnskabsr 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1 2 97/609/EF O1 1999/186/EF O2 1999/350/EF O3 1999/603/EF O4 2000/216/EF EFT L 120 af 11.5.1994, s. 
Financial year Decision (1) OJ Delay (2) Court Reports/ Opinions OJ 1991 94/281/EC 29.4.1994 94/871/EC 21.12.1994 1992 96/311/EC 10.4.1996 96/701/EC 20.11.1996 1993 96/311/EC 10.4.1996 97/333/EC 23.4.1997 97/608/EC 30.7.1997 1994 98/358/EC 6.5.1998 1995 1999/187/EC 3.2.1999 1999/596/EC 28.7.1999 2000/197/EC 1.3.2000 L 120, 11.5.1994, p.
59 L 352 af 31.12.1994, s. 
59 L 352, 31.12.1994, p.
82 L 117 af 14.5.1996, s. 
82 L 117, 14.5.1996, p.
19 L 323 af 13.12.1996, s. 
19 L 323, 13.12.1996, p.
26 L 117 af 14.5.1996, s. 
26 L 117, 14.5.1996, p.
19 L 139 af 30.5.1997, s. 
19 L 139, 30.5.1997, p.
30 L 245 af 9.9.1997, s. 
30 L 245, 9.9.1997, p.
20 L 163 af 6.6.1998, s. 
20 L 163, 6.6.1998, p.
28 L 61 af 10.3.1999, s. 
28 L 61, 10.3.1999, p.
37 L 226 af 27.8.1999, s. 
37 L 226, 27.8.1999, p.
26 L 61 af 8.3.2000, s. 
26 L 61, 8.3.2000, p.
15 L 138 af 29.5.1997, s. 
15 L 138, 29.5.1997, p.
24 L 245 af 9.9.1997, s. 
24 L 245, 9.9.1997, p.
25 L 61 af 10.3.1999, s. 
25 L 61, 10.3.1999, p.
34 L 133 af 28.5.1999, s. 
34 L 133, 28.5.1999, p.
60 L 234 af 4.9.1999, s. 
60 L 234, 4.9.1999, p.
6 L 67 af 15.3.2000, s. 
6 L 67, 15.3.2000, p.
37 L 141 af 13.5.1998, s. 
37 L 141, 13.5.1998, p.
38 L 49 af 25.2.1999, s. 
38 L 49, 25.2.1999, p.
42 L 61 af 10.3.1999, s. 
42 L 61, 10.3.1999, p.
37 L 124 af 18.5.1999, s. 
37 L 124, 18.5.1999, p.
28 L 57 af 2.3.2000, s. 
28 L 57, 2.3.2000, p.
31 L 133 af 28.5.1999, s. 
31 L 133, 28.5.1999, p.
10 mdr. Over 2 r 6 mdr. 96/311/EF 97/333/EF 97/608/EF 98/358/EF 1999/187/EF 1999/596/EF 2000/197/EF 10.4.1996 23.4.1997 30.7.1997 6.5.1998 3.2.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 5.5.1997 30.7.1997 3.2.1999 4.5.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 29.4.1998 10.2.1999 3.2.1999 4.5.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 30.4.1999 14.2.2000 4.5.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 97/316/EF 1997 1 98/324/EF 2 1999/151/EF O1 1999/186/EF O2 1999/350/EF O3 1999/603/EF O4 2000/216/EF 1998 1 1999/327/EF 2 2000/179/EF O2 1999/350/EF O3 1999/603/EF O4 2000/216/EF (1) : O: overensstemmelsesbeslutning. rlig beslutning om regnskabsafslutning. 
37 3 years 4 years 3,5 years 3,5 years 4 years 6 months 3 months more than 3 years 6 months 10 months more than 2 years 6 months 10 months Opinion No 6/95 SR No 1/97 SR No 1/97 SR No 2/98 SR No 2/98 AR 1998 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 2000 SR No 21/98 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 2000 AR 1998 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 2000 AR 1998 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 1999 AR 2000 C 338, 11.11.1996 C 52, 21.2.1997 C 52, 21.2.1997 C 121, 20.4.1998 C 349, 3.12.1999, paragraphs 2.63 to 2.77 C 389, 14.12.1998 C 349, 3.12.1999, paragraphs 2.78 to 2.102 C 349, 3.12.1999, paragraphs 2.54 and 2.55 1996 F1 97/316/EC F2 97/609/EC C1 1999/186/EC C2 1999/350/EC C3 1999/603/EC C4 2000/216/EC 1997 F1 98/324/EC F2 1999/151/EC C1 1999/186/EC C2 1999/350/EC C3 1999/603/EC C4 2000/216/EC 1998 F1 1999/327/EC F2 2000/179/EC C2 1999/350/EC C3 1999/603/EC C4 2000/216/EC (1) F: financial decision.
(2) Til og med 1995 fra rets slutning (15.10.) frem til datoen for den endelige beslutning om regnskabsafslutning. Fra og med 1996 fra rets slutning (15.10.) frem til datoen for den fżrste beslutning om regnskabsafslutning, derefter perioden mellem den fżrste og den anden beslutning om regnskabsafslutning og fra rets slutning (15.10) frem til datoen for den sidste overensstemmelsesbeslutning vedrżrende det pgžldende EUGFL-regnskabsr. 
C: conformity decision. 5.5.1997 30.7.1997 3.2.1999 4.5.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 29.4.1998 10.2.1999 3.2.1999 4.5.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 30.4.1999 14.2.2000 4.5.1999 28.7.1999 1.3.2000 (2) Till 1995 included, from year end (15.10.xxxx) to final decision date; from 1996 on, from year end (15.10.xxxx) to the date of the first financial decision, then delay between the first and the second financial decisions and from year end (15.10.xxxx) to the date of the last conformity decision regarding that EAGGF financial year.
(1) Under den fžlles landbrugspolitik er det medlemsstaternes opgave at sikre, at udbetalingerne foretages korrekt med anvendelse af tilstržkkelig nżje kontrolmekanismer. 
(1) Under the common agricultural policy, it is the task of the Member States to ensure that payments are correctly made under suitably tight control mechanisms.
Med denne ordning forvaltes udgifterne praktisk talt 100 % af medlemsstaterne, mens Kommissionen skal varetage rollen som žrlig og upartisk kvalitetsgarant. 
Under this regime, virtually 100 % of expenditure is in the hands of the Member States, with the Commission having to fill the role of an honest and impartial quality assurer.
Den pgžldende medlemsstat kan enten acceptere denne beslutning eller anfžgte den bilateralt via forligsorganet, eller, hvis det slr fejl, indbringe sagen for Domstolen, som er endelig opmand (PE 285.788/A). 
The Member State concerned can either accept this decision or challenge it bilaterally, with the Conciliation Body or if this fails before the European Court of Justice, which acts as a final arbiter (PE 285.788/A).
2 ( ) Sžrberetning nr. 21/98 om godkendelses-og attesteringsproceduren i forbindelse med regnskabsafslutningen for 1996 (EFT C 389 af 14.12.1998). 
2 ( ) Special Report No 21/98 concerning the accreditation and certification procedure as applied to the 1996 clearance of accounts for EAGGF-Guarantee expenditure (OJ C 389, 14.12.1998).
C 69/6 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 2.3.2001 Kort redegżrelse for baggrunden for regnskabsafslutningsproceduren 2. 
C 69/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 2.3.2001 A brief history of the clearance of accounts procedure 2.
Indtil 1996 var beslutningen om regnskabsafslutning primžrt baseret p revisioner foretaget af et sžrligt kontor i Kommissionens Generaldirektorat for Landbrug og omfattede navnlig gennemfżrelsen af foranstaltningerne i medlemsstaterne. 
Prior to 1996, the clearance of accounts decision was based mainly on audits done by a specific unit within the CommissionŐs Directorate-General for Agriculture, focused on the implementation of measures in the Member States.
Betalingsorganerne blev ikke revideret, og deres regnskaber blev ikke attesteret, men revisionerne kunne resultere i, at de udgifter, medlemsstaterne havde anmeldt til Kommissionen, blev korrigeret. 
Although there were no audits of the paying agencies as such and their accounts were not subject to certification, these audits could lead to corrections of the expenditure declared by the Member States.
Nr alle korrektioner for et givet EUGFL-regnskabsr forel, vedtog Kommissionen n samlet beslutning om regnskabsafslutning, som omfattede disse korrektioner. 
When all the corrections for a given EAGGF year were known they were included in a single clearance of accounts decision taken by the Commission.
I april 1991 nedsatte Kommissionen en arbejdsgruppe, der skulle komme med forslag til, hvordan ordningen for regnskabsafslutning kunne žndres. 
In April 1991, the Commission set up a working party to suggest how the clearance of accounts system might be reformed.
Arbejdsgruppens rapport fra okto-ber1992 (ČBelle-rapportenÇ efter arbejdsgruppens formand) banede vejen for to grundlžggende žndringer: Der skal nu tržffes to sžrskilte beslutninger, n om regnskabernes rigtighed og n om udgifternes overensstemmelse med EF-reglerne, og der blev indfżrt en forligsprocedure. 
The working party report of October 1992 (referred to as the ÔBelleŐ report, after its chairman) paved the way for the introduction of two fundamental changes: separate financial and conformity decisions and the introduction of a conciliation procedure.
I rapporten anbefaledes det, at man skulle sżge at forebygge problemerne frem for at idżmme sanktioner, og at der burde satses p et tžttere samarbejde og partnerskab mellem medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen. 
It advocated a prevention rather than punishment philosophy and greater cooperation and partnership between the Member States and the Commission.
Det var hensigten, at den reviderede procedure skulle tržde i kraft allerede for EUGFL-regnskabsret 1992, men med undtagelse af forligsproceduren blev den udskudt til 1996. 
It was the intention that this reformed procedure would come into operation with reference to the 1992 EAGGF year but with the exception of the conciliation procedure, its introduction was delayed until 1996.
Reformerne var indeholdt i et forslag til žndring af Rdets forordning (EŻF) nr. 729/70 (1) om finansiering af den fžlles landbrugspolitik. 
The reforms were contained in an amendment to Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 (1) concerning the financing of the CAP.
I sin udtalelse fra december 1994 om de foreslede žndringer (2) bekržftede Retten, at den gr ind for princippet om n samlet rlig beslutning om afslutning af regnskaberne, men erkendte samtidig, at det eksisterende system gav anledning til problemer i form af store forsinkelser i regnskabsafslutningsproceduren og svagheder ved den interne kontrol. 
In its opinion of December 1994 on the proposed amendments (2), the Court expressed its commitment to the principle of a single, annual clearance decision whilst at the same time recognising the problems associated with the extant system, namely long delays in the clearance decision and weaknesses in internal control.
Retten fandt, at den nye ordning med to sžrskilte beslutninger var en kompro-mislżsning og ikke fuldstžndig kunne afhjžlpe de problemer, der var konstateret i forbindelse med regnskabsafslutningsproceduren. 
The Court considered that the new split decision system was a compromise rather than a solution to the clearance problems.
Den anbefalede, at Kommissionen holdt sig forsigtighedsprincippet for żje, og foreslog, at ordningen blev indfżrt i en for-sżgsperiode, og at Kommissionen foretog en komplet evaluering af den inden den 31. december 1998. 
It recommended a degree of prudence and suggested that it should be trialled and subjected to a full evaluation by the Commission before 31 December 1998.
1287/ 95 (3). 
The proposal became Council Regulation (EC) No 1287/95 (3).
Rettens forslag om en forsżgsperiode efterfulgt af en evaluering blev ikke fulgt. 
The CourtŐs suggestion of a trial period and consequent need for an evaluation was not adopted.
De vigtigste žndringer bestod i, at betalingsorganerne skulle godkendes af de kompetente myndigheder i medlemsstaterne, og at betalingsorganernes regnskaber, som er grundlaget for Kommissionens beslutning om regnskabsafslutning, skulle attesteres hvert r. 
The main changes were the accreditation of paying agencies by the competent authorities in the Member States and the annual certification of paying agency accounts, which forms the basis for the CommissionŐs financial clearance decision.
Det (1) Rdets forordning (EŻF) nr. 729/70 af 21. april 1970 om finansiering 2 af den fžlles landbrugspolitik (EFT L 94 af 28.4.1970, s. 
Compliance of pay-(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of 21 April 1970 on the financ-2 ing of the CAP (OJ L 94, 28.4.1970, p.
I Belle-rapporten anbefaledes det, at Kommissionen skulle have ansvaret for at godkende betalingsorganerne, og at den ogs skulle godkende de attesterende organer, men Rdet accepterede ikke Kommissionens forslag. 
The Belle report recommended that the Commission should be responsible for the accreditation of the paying agencies and the approval of the appointment of the Certifying Bodies but the Council did not accept the CommissionŐs proposal.
Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 
Detailed rules for the application of the reformed clearance procedures were laid down in Commission Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 (4).
1663/95 (4) indeholder detaljerede bestemmelser om anvendelsen af de reviderede procedurer for regnskabsafslutning samt retningslinjer (i form af et bilag) for, hvilke kriterier medlemsstaterne skal lžgge til grund, nr de godkender et betalingsorgan, og hvilken karakter og opgaver det attesterende organ skal have. 
This Regulation provides a guideline, in the form of an Annex, for the criteria that should be taken into account by Member States when accrediting a paying agency and the nature and tasks of the Certifying Body.
Det attesterende organ skal udarbejde en rapport og en attest for hvert betalingsorgan inden den 31. januar det r, der fżlger efter det regnskabsr, regnskaberne vedrżrer. 
The Certifying Body must produce a report and a certificate for each paying agency by 31 January of the following year.
Attesten, rapporten og regnskaberne skal sendes til Kommissionen inden den 10. februar. 
The certificate, report and accounts must be submitted to the Commission by 10 February.
Kommissionen har frist til den 31. marts til at kontrollere disse oplysninger og informere medlemsstaterne om resultaterne af sin undersżgelse. 
The Commission has until 31 March to verify this information and inform the Member States of its position.
P grundlag af disse oplysninger skal Kommissionen tržffe en beslutning om regnskabsafslutning senest den 30. april. 
On the basis of this information the Commission must take a financial clearance decision no later than 30 April.
I henhold til artikel 5, stk. 2, litra b), i forordning (EŻF) nr. 
Article 5(2)(b) of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 (5) states that the financial decision shall cover the Ôintegrality, exactitude and veracity of the accounts submittedŐ.
Artikel 5, stk. 2, litra c), giver Kommissionen befżjelse til at beslutte, hvilke udgifter der skal udelukkes fra EF-finansiering, fordi de ikke er afholdt i overensstemmelse med EF-reglerne. 
Article 5(2)(c) empowers the Commission to decide on expenditure that is to be excluded from Community financing because it does not comply with Community rules.
Der er ikke fastsat tidsfrister for sdanne overensstemmelsesbeslutninger, men korrektioner kan kun foretages med tilbagevirkende kraft i hżjst to r (6), og den pgžldende medlemsstat skal p forhnd underrettes skriftligt. 
Such conformity (also known as compliance) decisions are not subject to any deadline but the corrections can only be applied retrospectively for a maximum of two years (6) preceding written notification to the Member State concerned.
GODKENDELSE Betalingsorganer 9. 
ACCREDITATION Number and nature of paying agencies 9.
Artikel 4 i forordning (EŻF) nr. 729/70 indeholder generelle bestemmelser om, hvad der kržves, for at et udbetalende organ kan godkendes, men der str intet nžrmere om, hvilken form betalingsorganerne skal have, blot at de skal vžre Čkontorer og organer i medlemsstaterneÇ (artikel 4, stk. 
Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 states in general terms what is required for a paying agency to be accredited but does not specify what form paying agencies should take, merely that they be Ôauthorities and bodies of the Member StatesŐ (Article 4(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 729/70).
Det er kun medlemsstaterne, der kan godkende betalingsorganerne. 
Only the Member States can accredit paying agencies.
Hovedparten af betalingsorganerne er opbygget som uafhžngige organer, organiseret efter markedsordninger (Frankrig, Nederlandene) eller geografisk (Tyskland, Spanien, (4) Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 
For the most part, paying agencies are independent structures organised along market lines (France, Netherlands) or on a geographical basis (Germany, Spain, Austria).
1663/95 af 7. juli 1995 (EFT L 158 5 af 8.7.1995, s. 6). () Rdets forordning (EŻF) nr. 
In some Member States there is only one paying agency (4) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1663/95 of 7 July 1995 (OJ L 158, 5 8.7.1995, p.
729/70 af 21. april 1970, žndret ved 6 forordning (EF) nr. 1287/95 (jf. fodnote 3). () Denne frist gžlder ikke, hvis der er tale om svig. 
6). () Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 of 21 April 1970 as amended 6 by Regulation (EC) No 1287/95 (see footnote 3). () Fraud cases are not subject to this time limit.
8.6.1995, s. 
8.6.1995, p.
2.3.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 69/7 Żstrig). I nogle medlemsstater er der kun t betalingsorgan (Danmark, Gržkenland, Sverige) eller et generelt organ med nogle f langt mindre, specialiserede kontorer (Belgien, Italien, Portugal). 
2.3.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 69/7 (Denmark, Greece, Sweden) or one general agency with a few much smaller specialised agencies (Belgium, Italy, Portugal).
I visse tilfžlde har betalingsorganet ingen sžrskilt struktur, idet det bestr af et helt ministerium (Irland, Luxembourg, Finland, Det Forenede Kongerige). 
In some cases the paying agency is amorphous in that it consists of an entire ministry (Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, United Kingdom).
Det kan gżre det vanskeligt at vurdere, om de lokale kontorer skal behandles som delegerede organer. 
This can lead to problems in determining whether or not local offices should be treated as delegated bodies.
I Tyskland (Bayern og Baden-Wrttemberg) er betalingsorganet en sžrlig enhed eller en ržkke sžrlige enheder (Bayern), men godkendelsen vedrżrer ministerierne som helhed, og det har betydning for det attesterende organs uafhžngighed. 
In Germany (Bavaria, Baden-Wrttemberg), the paying agency is a specific unit or a number of specific units (Bavaria) but the accreditation concerns the Ministries as a whole and has implications for the independence of the Certifying Body.
I samme artikel str der desuden, at medlemsstaterne skal begržnse antallet af betalingsorganer mest muligt. 
The same article requires the Member States to limit the number of paying agencies to the minimum necessary.
Retten har tidligere givet udtryk for bekymring over det stigende antal betalingsorganer og peget p mulighederne for rationalisering (sžrberetning nr. 21/98 (1) og senere ogs rsberetningen for 1998 (2). 
The Court has previously expressed its concern over the increasing number of paying agencies and the scope for rationalisation (Special Report No 21/98 (1) and more recently Annual Report 1998 (2)).
Żstrig har nedlagt tre mindre betalingsorganer, men i andre medlemsstater anmeldte 16 betalingsorganer tilsammen under 10 millioner euro i 1998. 
Austria has closed three small paying agencies but in other Member States, 16 paying agencies declared less than 10 million euro in 1998.
I 1998 var der i alt 91 betalingsorganer (tabel 2). 
In 1998, there were 91 paying agencies (Table 2).