natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De to missioner foreslog ogs at skabe uddannelsesafdelinger, gennemg uddannelsesprogrammer og udarbejde rlige uddannelsesplaner inden for FSI'erne. 
The two Missions also proposed to create training departments, review training curricula and draw up annual training plans within the ISF.
Det fungerede godt i Mali. 
This worked well in Mali.
I Niger var fremskridtene begržnsede, selv om politistyrken i 2017 udarbejde sin fżrste uddannelsesplan. 
In Niger progress was limited, although in 2017 the police force drew up its first training plan.
Begge missioner adresserede bžredygtighed, men med begržnset succes 49. 
Both Missions addressed sustainability, but with little success 49.
Eftersom de to EUCAP Sahel-missioner kun yder stżtte til Niger og Mali i en begržnset periode, er det af vžsentlig betydning at adressere, hvordan deres aktiviteter kan gżres COG'er er permanente organer oprettet med henblik p at overvge, hvad der sker i regionen, levere ressourcer til patruljer, indsamle oplysninger, indberette dem til de relevante myndigheder og reagere p krisesituationer. 
Since the two EUCAP Sahel Missions provide support to Niger and Mali for only a limited time, addressing how to make their activities sustainable is of key importance41.
Begge missioner gjorde dette ved at give kurser i uddannelse af andre ansatte, hjžlpe med udarbejdelse uddannelsesplaner og udformning af uddannelseskurser, indfżre systemer til forvaltning af menneskelige ressourcer, udarbejde stillingsbeskrivelser og tilskynde FSI'erne til at samarbejde p en struktureret mde. 
Both Missions did this by giving courses on how to train other staff, helping draw up training plans and design training courses, introducing human resource management systems, creating job descriptions and encouraging the ISFs to work together in a structured way.
I Niger planlagde missionen ogs at stżtte de nationale myndigheder i udarbejdelsen af en national sikkerhedsstrategi, at rdgive FSI-personale ved anvendelse af overvgning, mentorordninger og rdgivning og at udstyre styrkerne med mobile vžrksteder og uddanne dem i, hvordan de anvendes. 
In Niger, the Mission also planned to support the national authorities to prepare a National Security Strategy, to advise ISF staff using Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) and to equip the forces with mobile garages and train them how to use them.
Til trods for at EU-Udenrigstjenesten rapporterede om resultater p disse omrder42, konstaterede vi, at det ikke var lykkedes for missionerne at gżre deres aktiviteter bžredygtige. 
32 40 41 achievements in these areas42, we found that the Missions had not succeeded in making their activities sustainable.
Begge missioner afholdt kurser for undervisere for sikkerhedsstyrkerne. 
Both Missions ran train-the-trainer courses for the security forces.
I Niger opbyggede missionen over fire r en pulje med nigerske undervisere i alle FSI'er. 
In Niger, the Mission built up a pool of Nigerien trainers in all ISFs over four years.
Men selv om personalet i FSI'erne selv var begyndt at give uddannelse, fortsatte missionspersonalet ligeledes med dette. 
However, even though ISF staff had begun to provide training themselves, Mission staff continued to do so as well.
Fra 2014 fokuserede missionen p overvgning, mentorordninger og rdgivning med henblik p at reducere FSI'ernes afhžngighed af EUCAP-undervisere. 
From 2014, with the aim of reducing the dependency of the ISFs on EUCAP trainers, the Mission focused on MMA.
Ideen var at plžgge en mentor fra missionen at fżlge og stżtte de FSI-undervisere, som missionen havde uddannet. 
The idea was to assign a mentor within the Mission to follow and support ISF trainers that it had trained.
Dette fungerede imidlertid ikke godt i praksis: Eksperter fra missionen ydede rdgivning p anmodning, men havde ingen procedure for hverken opfżlgning af eller systematisk stżtte til individuelle undervisere. 
However, this did not work well in practice: experts from the Mission provided advice on request, but had no procedure for either following up or providing systematic support to individual trainers.
Vi s kun dokumentation for ydelse af en sdan rdgivning til 20 personer i lżbet af den trerige periode frem til marts 2017. 
We only saw evidence of such advice given to 20 individuals over the three years up to March 2017.
FSI'erne var ikke autonome p noget uddannelsesomrde i de to lande. 
In neither country were the ISFs autonomous in any area of training.
Den hastighed, hvormed der blev gjort fremskridt med aktiviteter til fremme af bžredygtigheden, afhang ofte af, i hvor stor udstržkning vžrtslandene var enige om at prioritetere dem. 
The rate of progress on activities to promote sustainability often depended on the extent to which the authorities in the host countries agreed that they were priorities.
Det kan for eksempel nžvnes, at de nationale myndigheder i Niger og Mali ikke gav nogen officiel anerkendelse eller finansiel belżnning til de ansatte fra FSI'erne, som blev undervisere. 
For example, the national authorities in Niger and Mali did not grant official recognition or financial reward to staff from the ISFs who became trainers.
Det betżd, at der var ringe incitament for personale uddannet af EUCAP til at uddanne andre, da de sandsynligvis ville tjene mere ved at arbejde i en operationel Et af de fem ml i Rdets afgżrelse kržvede udtrykkeligt, at missionen i Niger skulle gennemfżre aktiviteter med henblik p at sikre bžredygtigheden af sine aktioner. 
This meant that there was little incentive for staff trained by EUCAP to train other staff because they were likely to earn more working in an operational unit.
Begge missioner hjalp med at udarbejde lovgivning for at give underviserne en sžrskilt status, men ingen af vžrtslandene havde vedtaget den p tidspunktet for revisionen. 
Both Missions helped to draft legislation to give trainers a separate status, but neither host country had adopted it at the time of the audit.
Undladelsen af at sikre bžredygtigheden af mange aktiviteter skyldtes delvist manglende ejerskab hos de nationale myndigheder og FSI'erne. 
The failure to ensure the sustainability of many activities was partially due to lack of ownership by the national authorities and the ISFs.
P trods af deres positive opfattelse af EUCAP var de nigerske og maliske regeringer ikke altid parate til at vedtage passende lovgivning og gennemfżre nogle af de reformer, som var nżdvendige for at bevare resultaterne af kapacitetsopbygningen. 
Despite their positive view of EUCAP, the Nigerien and Malian governments were not always ready to adopt appropriate legislation and pass some of the reforms necessary for the results of capacity-building to be sustained.
I Mali blev denne situation forvžrret af manglen p politisk stabilitet og de organisatoriske mangler p regeringsplan. 
The situation was exacerbated in Mali by the lack of political stability and organisational deficiencies at government level.
Dette undergravede missionernes bestržbelser p at gżre resultaterne af deres aktiviteter bžredygtige. 
This undermined the MissionsŐ efforts to make the results of their activities sustainable.
Missionerne var ogs ansvarlige for deres egen svage performance med hensyn til at sikre bžredygtighed. 
The Missions were also responsible for their own weak performance in ensuring sustainability.
Der var f.eks. ingen af missionerne, der kontrollerede, om den ydede stżtte var vellykket, ved efterfżlgende at tjekke, om der var gjort brug af den viden, der var indhentet via uddannelseskurser, eller af det modtagne udstyr (jf. tekstboks 7). 
For example, neither Mission verified the success of support provided by checking ex-post the use made of knowledge gained on training courses or of equipment received (for an example see Box 7).
I lżbet af den reviderede periode indsamlede missionerne ikke oplysninger om, hvorvidt personalet i FSI'erne fortsat arbejdede p det omrde, de var uddannet til, efter kurserne, og de vurderede ikke, om kursusdeltagerne havde forstet indholdet og derefter anvendte den viden, de havde tilegnet sig under uddannelsen. 
During the period audited, the Missions did not collect information on whether ISF staff continued to work in the area for which they were trained after the courses or assess whether trainees had understood and went on to apply the knowledge acquired during the training.
Det var tilfžldet for alle typer deltagere, herunder dem, der uddannede sig til undervisere. 
This was the case for all types of participants, including those trained to be trainers.
Missionen i Mali tog et fżrste skridt ved udgangen af 2017 ved at skrive til de maliske FSI'er med et forslag om at fżlge op p de uddannelseskurser, som EUCAP gav, med henblik p at vurdere deres effekt og indhżste erfaringer med henblik p fremtidige uddannelseskurser. 
The Mission in Mali took a first step at the end of 2017 by writing to the Malian ISFs proposing to follow up on training courses given by EUCAP to assess their impact and learn lessons for future training courses.
Missionerne tog efter at have oprettet COR'erne sigte p at gżre dem bžredygtige. 
After creating the CORs, the Missions aimed to make them sustainable.
Det lykkedes dem imidlertid ikke, hvilket skyldtes, at der ikke forel en national sikkerhedsstrategi, og at der var stor personaleudskiftning i FSI'erne og i selve missionerne. 
However, they did not succeed due to the absence of a national security strategy, and the high rotation of staff within the ISFs and within the Mission.
De gennemfżrte f.eks. ikke de planlagte kurser for at lžre FSI'ernes personale at undervise andre, de skabte ikke et nationalt koordinationscenter for at integrere alle COR'erne, og de udarbejdede ikke nationale beredskabs-og indsatssplaner. 35 
For example, they did not carry out the courses planned to teach ISFs staff to train others, create a national coordination centre to integrate all CORs or draw up national emergency and intervention plans. 34
EU-Udenrigstjenesten fastsatte ikke passende indikatorer for overvgning af missionernes resultater 55. 
The EEAS did not set appropriate indicators for monitoring the MissionsŐ results 55.
Vi undersżgte missionernes halvrlige rapporter til EU-Udenrigstjenesten, som registrerer de fremskridt, der er gjort hen imod fuldfżrelse af opgaverne og opfyldelse af mlene i forhold til indikatorer fastsat i OPLAN'erne. 
We examined the MissionsŐ six-monthly reports to the EEAS, which record the progress made towards completing tasks and achieving objectives in relation to indicators laid down in the OPLANs.
De fleste af de "indikatorer", der var fastsat for EUCAP Sahel Niger, nžvnte blot de aktiviteter, som var fastsat for hver opgave. De var derfor ikke RACER-kriterier43 og udgjorde ikke et passende grundlag for mling af fremskridt. 
Most of the "indicators" fixed for EUCAP Sahel Niger simply listed the activities set for each task and were therefore not RACER43 and not an appropriate base for measuring progress.
Den eneste undtagelse fra dette var indikatorerne vedrżrende det femte ml om bekžmpelse af irregulžr migration, som blev tilfżjet missionens mandat i 2015. 
The one exception to this comprises indicators for the fifth objective on combatting irregular migration, which was added to the MissionŐs mandate in 2015.
De var bedre, fordi de fastsatte forventede output for hver enkelt opgave. 
They were better because they defined target outputs for each task.
De indikatorer, der var fastsat for EUCAP Sahel Mali, pržciserede ogs de forventede output. 
The indicators set for EUCAP Sahel Mali also specified the expected outputs.
De var imidlertid ikke s robuste, at de kunne anvendes til at mle fremskridt, eftersom der ikke var fastsat nogen kvantificerede ml44. 
However, they were not sufficiently robust to use to measure progress because no quantified targets were set44.
Relevante, accepterede, trovžrdige, enkle og robuste (relevant, accepted, credible, easy, robust). 
Relevant, Acceptable, Credible, Easy and Robust.
F.eks.: "mżder" (uden angivelse af det kržvede antal mżder), "udvidelse af ...", "forbedring af ...", "der er indget aftale om žndringer","udveksling og fordeling af oplysninger ...", 36 Tekstboks 7 - Centre oprationnel rgional (COR) i Agadez Vi besżgte COR'et i Agadez. 
For example: Ômeetings (without stating the number of meetings required)Ő, Ôextension of...Ő, Ôimprovement of...Ő, Ômodalities have been agreedŐ, Ôexchange and distribution of information...Ő, Őthe capacity is reinforcedŐ, Ôcoordination mechanisms are put in place...Ő, Ôupdate regularly...Ő, etc. 35 Box 7 Đ Centre oprationnel rgional (COR) in Agadez We visited the COR in Agadez.
EUCAP Sahel Niger havde leveret udstyr til dette COR, men vi konstaterede, at det ikke var operationelt, fordi udstyret ikke var p plads: - Der var ingen stole i COR'ets lokale, halvdelen af bordene manglede, og klimaanlžgget virkede ikke. - Stżttemodtagerne kunne ikke vise os de leverede computere, printeren virkede ikke, fordi der ikke var nogen toner, og det installerede radiokommunikationsudstyr virkede ikke. - De to kżretżjer, som COR'et skulle have rdet over for at kunne reagere hurtigt i krisesituationer, var nžsten ikke blevet brugt, og et af dem var uopretteligt beskadiget og havde vžret det siden 2014. 
EUCAP Sahel Niger had supplied equipment to this COR, but we observed that it was not operational because the equipment was not in place: - There were no chairs in the CORŐs room, half of the tables were missing and the air conditioning was not working. - The beneficiaries could not show us the computers provided, the printer did not function because there was no toner and the equipment installed for radio communications was not working. - The two vehicles which should have been at the disposal of the COR to enable it to respond quickly to emergencies had hardly been used and one of them was irreparably damaged, and had been so since 2014.
Ingen af de indikatorer, der blev anvendt i EUCAP Sahel-missionerne, omtalte opgavernes relevans med hensyn til at n mlene45. 
None of the indicators used in the EUCAP Sahel Missions mentioned the relevance of the tasks to accomplishing the objectives45.
Der var heller ingen indikatorer, som kunne danne grundlag for en vurdering af opgavernes resultater eller effekt. 
There were also no indicators on which to base an assessment of the outcomes or impact of tasks.
Overvgningen og evalueringen af missionernes aktiviteter var utilstržkkelig og ikke fokuseret p effekt 57. 
The monitoring and evaluation of the MissionsŐ activities were inadequate and not focused on impact 57.
EUCAP Sahel Niger havde ikke indfżrt procedurer til systematisk at dokumentere og overvge planlžgningen og gennemfżrelsen af sine aktiviteter. 
EUCAP Sahel Niger did not have procedures in place to systematically document and monitor the planning and implementation of its activities.
Fżrst i 2017, mens revisionen var i gang, tog missionen i Niger skridt til at forenkle PMG'en med henblik p at lette overvgningen af de samlede fremskridt. 
Only during 2017, while the audit was ongoing, did the Mission in Niger take steps to simplify the MIP so as to facilitate monitoring of overall progress.
Missionen udviklede projektbeskrivelser og havde planer om systematisk at registrere kursusdeltagere, der allerede havde deltaget i kurser, overvge tilstedevžrelseslisterne og indsamle og vurdere deltagernes kursusevalueringer. 
It developed project fiches and planned to keep systematic records of trainees who had already attended courses, monitor presence lists and collect and assess participantsŐ course evaluations.
EUCAP Sahel Mali skabte passende procedurer for dokumentation og overvgning af aktiviteter og output under sit fżrste mandat. 
EUCAP Sahel Mali created appropriate procedures for documenting and monitoring activities and outputs during its first mandate.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten kržver, at missionerne indsender fżlgende oplysninger: - ugentlige og mnedlige rapporter med oplysninger om budgetgennemfżrelse, menneskelige ressourcer og generelle arrangementer, der har fundet sted - halvrlige rapporter, der sammenholder de gjorte fremskridt med den basislinje, der er fastsat i OPLAN'en, og med de rapporterede fremskridt i tidligere halvrlige rapporter - ca. seks mneder fżr hvert mandat udlżber: strategiske gennemgange af sikkerhedssituationen i landet, EU's og andre interessenters deltagelse, missionernes resultater og deres fremtidige tilgang "kapaciteten er styrket", "koordineringsmekanismerne er ivžrksat ...", "regelmžssig ajourfżring ...". 
The EEAS requires the Missions to provide the following information: - weekly and monthly reports with information on budgetary implementation, human resources and general events that have occurred; - six-monthly reports to compare the progress made in tasks with the baseline set in the OPLAN as well as with the progress reported in previous six-monthly reports; - around six months before each mandate ends, strategic reviews of the security situation in the country, the EUŐs and other stakeholdersŐ involvement, the MissionsŐ results and their future approach; - special reports on specific topics.
I sin sžrberetning om EULEX fra 2012 anbefalede Revisionsretten, at missionernes ml "knyttes til konkrete benchmarks, som gżr det muligt at mle fremskridtene, og at der tages hensyn til mlene for EU's indre sikkerhed". 37 45 
In its 2012 Special Report on EULEX, the ECA recommended that the MissionsŐ objectives be Ňlinked to concrete benchmarks against which progress can be assessed and take into account EU internal security objectivesÓ. 36 45
Vi analyserede disse dokumenter og bemžrkede, at: - rapporteringen om output ikke er klart knyttet til p forhnd fastsatte indikatorer og benchmarks - EU-Udenrigstjenesten og missionerne ikke systematisk vurderede effekten af missionernes aktiviteter. 
We analysed these documents and observed that: - reporting on outputs is not clearly linked to indicators and benchmarks set in advance, and - the EEAS and the Missions did not systematically assess the impact of the MissionsŐ activities.
Ingen af missionerne havde gode systemer til evaluering af aktiviteter i den reviderede periode. 
Neither Mission operated good systems for evaluating activities during the period audited.
Under sit andet mandat udviklede missionen i Mali et evalueringssystem med żget fokus p output, resultater, effekt, bžredygtighed og effektivitet. 
During its second mandate, the Mission in Mali developed an evaluation system with an increased focus on outputs, outcome, impact, sustainability and efficiency.
Da systemet fżrst for nylig var blevet indfżrt, var det for tidligt at vurdere dets resultater. 
As this system had only recently been put in place, it was too early to assess its results.
Missionen i Niger ansatte personale, som skulle begynde evalueringsarbejdet i maj 2017. 
The Mission in Niger recruited staff to start on evaluation work in May 2017.
Endvidere har ingen af EUCAP Sahel-missionerne vžret underlagt en uafhžngig ekstern evaluering. 
Furthermore, neither of the EUCAP Sahel Missions has been subject to an independent external evaluation.
Interessenter og modtagere havde et positivt syn p missionernes aktiviteter og p deres koordineringsrolle 61. 
Stakeholders and beneficiaries had a positive view of the MissionsŐ activities and of their coordination role 61.
Vi interviewede modtagere af EUCAP Sahel-missionernes undervisning, rdgivning og udstyr og en ržkke forskellige interessenter p omrdet indre sikkerhed i Niger og Mali. 
We interviewed beneficiaries of the EUCAP Sahel MissionsŐ training, advice and equipment, and a variety of stakeholders in internal security in Niger and Mali.
Den samlede vurdering af EUCAP Sahel-missionernes aktiviteter var positiv. 
The overall assessment of the activities carried out by the EUCAP Sahel Missions was positive.
Interessenter og stżttemodtagere satte pris p, at missionernes personale stod til rdighed for at rdgive eller yde tjenester, som ikke var tilgžngelige fra nationale kilder. 
Stakeholders and beneficiaries appreciated the availability of the MissionsŐ staff to give advice or provide services that were not available from national sources.
I Niger ppegede sikkerhedsstyrkerne og regeringsrepržsentanterne vžrdien af EUCAP Sahel-missionernes lžngerevarende tilstedevžrelse sammenlignet med mange andre donorer. 
In Niger, the security forces and government representatives pointed to the value of the EUCAP Sahel MissionsŐ longer-term presence compared with that of many other donors.
Begge missioner leverede ogs oplysninger og rdgivning til stżtte for andre EU-instrumenter og de bredere aktiviteter, der blev gennemfżrt af EU og dets medlemsstater. 
Both Missions also provided information and advice in support of other EU instruments and the wider activities of the EU and its member states.
Missionerne bidrog f.eks. til udformningen af projekter under EU's Trustfond for Afrika, indsamlede oplysninger om migrantstrżmme og kortlagde EU's aktiviteter i tilknytning til migration. 
For example, the Missions contributed to the design of EU Trust Fund for Africa projects, gathered information on migratory flows, and mapped EU activities connected with migration.
Donorer og andre interessenter i Niger og Mali understregede den vigtige rolle, som begge EUCAP Sahel-missionerne spiller for koordineringen af aktiviteter inden for sikkerhedssektoren. 
Donors and other stakeholders in Niger and Mali highlighted the important role played by both EUCAP Sahel Missions in coordinating activities in the security sector.
Begge missioner oprettede organer med henblik p at forbedre 38 
Both Missions set up bodies to improve coordination with the national authorities, which experienced problems initially but were broadly successful.
De etablerede ogs gode mekanismer for koordinering og samarbejde med andre donorer og interessenter. 
They also set up good mechanisms for 37 coordination and cooperation with other donors and stakeholders.
I Mali omfattede dette formel donorkortlžgning, som giver fuldstžndige oplysninger om foreslede (men endnu ikke finansierede), planlagte, igangvžrende og afsluttede projekter i sikkerhedssektoren i Mali. 
In Mali, this included formal donor mapping, which gives full details of proposed (but not yet financed), planned, ongoing and completed projects in the security sector in Mali.
KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER 63. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 63.
Rdet skabte EUCAP Sahel Niger og EUCAP Sahel Mali med det forml at adressere den svage kapacitet hos de styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed. 
The Council created EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali to address the weak capacity of the forces responsible for internal security.
De to missioner arbejdede under vanskelige forhold og bidrog til at styrke kapaciteten, men de stżdte begge p vanskeligheder, som reducerede effektiviteten og bžredygtigheden af deres operationer. 
Working in a challenging context, the two Missions contributed to strengthening capacity, but each encountered difficulties, which reduced the efficiency and sustainability of their operations.
Missionernes personale havde i ingen af landene adgang til passende operationel vedledning og uddannelse. 
In both countries, the staff of the Missions did not have access to adequate operational guidance and training.
Hver EUCAP Sahel-mission brugte megen tid og mange ressourcer p at etablere sine egne systemer og procedurer, som ikke altid var tilpasset de lokale forhold. 
Each EUCAP Sahel Mission spent considerable time and resources on setting up its own systems and procedures, which were often not adapted to the local conditions.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten og Kommissionen, som er ansvarlige for forvaltningen af civile FSFP-missioner, ydede ikke tilstržkkelig stżtte og anvendte i nogle tilfžlde procedurer, som var uegnede til arbejdsforholdene p stedet (jf. punkt 25-30). 
The EEAS and the Commission, responsible for managing civilian CSDP Missions, did not provide enough support and in some cases applied procedures that were unsuited to the working conditions on the ground (see paragraphs 25 to 30).