natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Figur 6 viser, at selv om der var involveret flere SMV i FTU-projekterne end under RP5, er EF-bidraget til SMV under RP6 faldet, bde i relative og i absolutte tal. 
Figure 6 shows that, although more SMEs were involved in RTD projects when compared to FP5, the EC contribution allocated to SMEs under FP6 has decreased both in relative and absolute terms.
Kommissionens bedste skżn er, at SMV fik tildelt hżjst 10 % af det samlede budget for RP6Ős udvalgte temaer, dvs. ca. 
The Commission’s best estimate indicates that no more than 10 % of the total budget for the FP6 thematic priorities was allocated to SMEs, representing some 1,2 billion euro.
Det er en lavere procent end under RP5Ős tematiske programmer (12 %, dvs. ca. 1,4 milliarder euro). 
This is a lower rate than achieved under FP5 Thematic Programmes (12 %, representing around 1,4 billion euro).
De fżrste resultater viser, at SMVŐs deltagelse er faldet yderligere under RP724. 
Concerning FP7, first results show that the participation of SMEs is further declining24.
De har en mere lokal/regional dimension og har ifżlge deres natur hżjere adgangs-barrierer, som isžr skyldes de komplekse ansżgningsprocedurer og omkostningerne forbundet med at indgive forslag. 
They have a more local/regional dimension and face by nature higher entry barriers, mainly caused by the complex application procedures and the costs of submitting proposals.
Samarbejde med store forskningsorganisationer kan hžmmes af de stżrre finansielle og tekniske risici. 
Cooperation with large research organisations can be hindered by higher financial and technical risks.
Desuden er SMV, som det gžlder private deltagere generelt, ikke altid rede til at indg langsigtede kontraktlige forpligtelser af frygt for at miste fleksibilitet, s de ikke mere kan tilpasse sig skiftende behov. 
Also, like for private participants in general, SMEs are not always prepared to subscribe to long-term contractual commitments for fear of losing flexibility to react to changing needs.
22 Specifikke mlrettede projekter. 
22 Specific targeted projects.
23 Ud over finansieringen under de udvalgte temaer omfattede RP6 et specifikt programomrde, der skulle stżtte horisontale forskningsaktiviteter, der involverede SMV (475 millioner euro). 
23 In addition to the funding foreseen under the thematic priorities, FP6 included a specific programme area intended to support horizontal research activities involving SMEs (EUR 475 million).
24 RP7 har et lignende ml for SMV (mindst 15 % af den finansiering, der er til rdighed under programmets samarbejdsdel). 
24 Also FP7 has a similar target for SMEs (at least 15 % of the funding available under the ‘Cooperation’ part of the programme).
Kommissionens data (oktober 2008) viser, at SMV tegner sig for 8,2 % af projektdeltagelsen og for 8,5 % af EF-bidraget. 
Commission data (October 2008) show that SME participation accounts for 8,2 % of project participations and 8,5 % of the EC contribution awarded.
8/2009 Ń ČEkspertisenetteneÇ og Čde integrerede projekterÇ i Fžllesskabets forskningspolitik Ń nede de deres ml? 24 FIGUR 6 57 % 37 % 28 % 13 % 8% 2% 1% 58 % 37 % 31 % 12 % 10 % 1% 1% UDVIKLINGEN I RP-DELTAGELSE (UDVALGTE TEMAER) PROJEKTDELTAGELSEN (ANTAL INDIVIDUELLE DELTAGELSER) FORDELT P RP6ŐS DELTAGERE 53 % RP5 RP6 Offentlig 49 % RP5 RP6 RP5 RP6 Privat (ikke-SMV) Privat (SMV) EF-BIDRAGET FORDELT P RP6ŐS DELTAGERE RP5 RP6 Ikke defineret RP5 RP6 Offentlig RP5 RP6 RP5 RP6 RP5 RP6 Privat (ikke-SMV) Privat (SMV) Ikke defineret Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret p grundlag af Kommissionens tal. 
24 FIGURE 6 57 % 37 % 28 % 13 % 8% 2% 1% 58 % 37 % 31 % 12 % 10 % 1% 1% EVOLUTION OF FP PARTICIPATION (THEMATIC PRIORITIES) BREAKDOWN OF FP6 PARTICIPANTS BY PROJECT INVOLVEMENT (NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATIONS) 53 % FP6 FP5 FP6 FP5 FP6 FP5 FP6 Private (non-SME) Private (SME) Undefined BREAKDOWN OF FP6 PARTICIPANTS BY EC CONTRIBUTION RECEIVED 49 % FP5 Public F P5 FP6 FP5 FP6 FP5 FP6 FP5 FP6 Public Private (non-SME) Private (SME) Undefined Source: European Court of Auditors, based on Commission data.
Hertil kommer, at en ržkke RP6-bestemmelser faktisk afskržkkede private virksomheder fra at deltage. 
Moreover, some FP6 provisions did discourage the participation of private companies.
Det gjaldt bestemmelsen om konsortiernes kollektive tekniske og finansielle ansvar for implementeringen af projektet over for Kommissionen. 
This was the case for the rule establishing consortia’s collective technical and financial responsibility towards the Commission for the implementation of the project.
Bestemmelsen fandt anvendelse over for private organisationer, men ikke over for offentlige, og gav dermed reelt denne mlgruppe en ekstra byrde. 
This provision was applied to private organisations but not to the public ones, creating de facto an additional burden for this target group.
Det kollektive finansielle ansvar er blevet afskaffet under RP7 og erstattet med en garantifond finansieret med en del af de forskud, der udbetales til programdeltagerne. 
Collective financial responsibility has been removed under FP7 and replaced by a guarantee fund financed by part of the advances paid to programme participants.
Denne bestemmelse var et negativt incitament til privat deltagelse, navnlig for SMV, som ikke kunne konkurrere p lige fod med stżrre organisationer. 
This provision resulted in a disincentive for private participation, in particular for SMEs which could not compete on equal terms against larger organisations.
Under RP7 har konsortierne stżrre frihed til at fastlžgge adgangen til eksisterende viden med hensyn til intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder. 
Under FP7 more freedom is given to consortia when defining access to existing knowledge in terms of Intellectual property rights.
KOMMISSIONENS FORVALTNING AF DE NYE INSTRUMENTER 44. 
THE COMMISSION’S MANAGEMENT OF NEW INSTRUMENTS 44.
Kommissionens forvaltning har en afgżrende rolle med at sikre, at RP6-aktiviteterne bliver vellykkede, isžr med at gżre det attraktivt for potentielle deltagere og styre projektforlżbet. 
The Commission’s management has a decisive role in ensuring the success of FP6 activities, in particular by making it attractive to potential participants and steering project progress.
Strukturer, der er til at forvalte, klare ml, hurtige og enkle procedurer og džkkende projektovervgning er alle afgżrende faktorer for, om instrumenterne er effektive. 
Manageable structures, clarity of objectives, rapid and straightforward procedures, and adequate project monitoring are all determinants of the instruments’ effectiveness.
I denne sammenhžng analyserede Retten implementeringen af otte indkaldelser af forslag og undersżgte nogle udvalgte forvaltningsprocesser, der indvirkede stžrkt p instrumentets resultater (nemlig forhandlingen og projektstyringen). 
In this context, the Court analysed the implementation of eight calls for proposals and examined selected management process having a key impact on the instruments’ performance (namely negotiation and project monitoring).
USIKKERHED OM INSTRUMENTERNES SPECIFIKKE ROLLE 45. 
UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE INSTRUMENTS SPECIFIC ROLE 45.
Som vist i figur 7 opnede en ržkke aktżrer (isžr deltagere og Ń i mindre udstržkning Ń ogs koordinatorer) ingen eller kun en utilstržkkelig forstelse af, hvilke specifikke ml instrumenterne skulle opfylde, og hvordan instrumenterne forventedes at fungere. 
As shown by Figure 7, a number of actors (mainly participants and to a lesser extent also coordinators) reached no or insufficient understanding about the specific objectives that the instruments were to achieve and the way in which the instruments were supposed to work.
Undersżgelsens resultater viser, at navnlig ekspertisenettene hovedsagelig blev anset for et instrument til etablering af netvžrk, mens mlet var at fremme varig integration af netvžrkets partnere. 
In particular for NoEs, the survey results indicate that they were mainly understood as a networking instrument, while the objective was that of favouring lasting integration among networked partners.
RP6Ç start var pržget af nogen usikkerhed blandt de potentielle ansżgere, navnlig for s vidt angr ekspertisenettene, og det gav yderligere problemer, at udmel-dingerne fra Kommissionens tjenester var modstridende25. 
The start of FP6 was characterised by some confusion among potential applicants, particularly concerning NoEs. And further problems were caused by inconsistent communication from the Commission services25.
Kommissionen skal sikre, at de forskellige aktżrer er klar over, hvilke ml der stržbes efter. 
The Commission has to ensure that different actors are clear about the goals to be pursued.
I denne henseende bżr der fokuseres p koordinatorernes rolle, da deres forstelse er bedre end deltagernes. 
In this respect the role of the coordinators should be highlighted, as they show a far better understanding than participants.
Det viser, at konsortierne har et internt kommunikationsproblem, som formodentlig forvžrres af, at der er s mange deltagere (jf. punkt 51). 
This indicates a problem of communication within consortia, probably aggravated by the high number of participants (see paragraph 51).
25 Jf. ogs Expert Group on the future of Networks of Excellence, op.cit., sektion 3.3 (s. 
25 See also the Expert Group on the future of Networks of Excellence, op.cit, Section 3.3 (p.
18) og bilag 3 (s. 
18) and Annex 3 (p.
26 FIGUR 7 Mener De, De fuldt ud forstod forskellene mellem de vžsentligste samarbejdsinstrumenter (ekspertisenet og integrerede projekter), da De valgte, hvilket De ville stille forslag om? 
26 FIGURE 7 Do you feel you properly understood the differences between the main collaborative instruments (NoE and IP) when you selected which one to use for the proposal?
Godkendte ansżgere Koordinatorer Deltagere Koordinatorer Deltagere Afviste ansżgere Koordinatorer Deltagere Koordinatorer Deltagere AKTŻRERNES FORSTELSE AF DE UNDERSŻGTE INSTRUMENTERS ROLLE Ekspertisenet Integrerede projekter Ja, afgjort Ja, i nogen grad Nej, ikke helt Nej, afgjort ikke Ja, afgjort Ja, i nogen grad Nej, ikke helt Nej, afgjort ikke 86 % 11 % 0 % 3 % 75 % 0 % 25 % 0 % 53 % 33 % 8 % 6 % 67 % 33 % 0 % 0 % 84 % 13 % 3% 0% 60 % 20 % 20 % 0 % 62 % 25 % 12 % 2% 58 % 27 % 13 % 2 % Kilde: Undersżgelse udfżrt af Den Europžiske Revisionsret. Sžrberetning nr. 8/2009 Ń ČEkspertisenetteneÇ og Čde integrerede projekterÇ i Fžllesskabets forskningspolitik Ń nede de deres ml? 
Succesful applicants Coordinators Participants Coordinators Participants Unsuccesful applicants Coordinators Participants Coordinators Participants ACTORS’ UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE AUDITED INSTRUMENTS’ ROLE NoE IP Yes, definitely Yes, somewhat No, somewhat not No, definitely not Yes, definitely Yes, somewhat No, somewhat not No, definitely not 86 % 11 % 0 % 3 % 75 % 0 % 25 % 0 % 53 % 33 % 8 % 6 % 67 % 33 % 0 % 0 % 84 % 13 % 3% 0% 60 % 20 % 20 % 0 % 62 % 25 % 12 % 2% 58 % 27 % 13 % 2 % Source: Survey conducted by the European Court of Auditors.
TALRIGE LOVBESTEMMELSER OG IKKE ALTID VEJLEDNING NOK 47. 
MULTIPLE LEGAL PROVISIONS AND NOT ALWAYS SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE 47.
Lovbestemmelserne om instrumenterne blev spredt p en ržkke retsak-ter26. 
The legal provisions governing the instruments were spread across a range of legal texts26.
Det var p forskellige stadier, at Rdet og Europa-Parlamentet vedtog at oprette instrumenterne og opstille deres specifikke ml (med en fastsžttelse af, p hvilke programomrder de kan finde anvendelse), og at Kommissionen vedtog bestemmelserne vedrżrende implementeringen af instrumenterne (bl.a. med en specifikation af, hvilke af de basale fžllesskabsbidragsmekanismer der skulle knyttes tžt til hvert enkelt instrument) og endelig standardkontrakten for RP6 (med en specifikation af bestemmelser for programdeltagere, der implementerer indirekte FTU-aktioner i form af specifikke instrumenter). 
At different stages decisions were taken by the Council and the European Parliament to set up the instruments and their specific objectives (stating in which programme areas they might be applied), or by the Commission concerning the provisions for implementing the instruments (specifying in particular the basic Community contribution mechanisms that were narrowly applicable to each instrument) and finally the model FP6 contract (specifying provisions for programme participants implementing indirect RTD actions in the form of specific instruments).
De forskellige gžldende bestemmelser stemte ikke altid overens. 
The different applicable provisions were not always consistent.
Vejledningen var ikke fuldstžndig, da de fżrste indkaldelser af forslag under RP6 blev igangsat i december 2002. 
Guidance was not complete when the first FP6 calls for proposals were launched in December 2002.
De forsinkelser, der ramte udarbejdelsen og offentliggżrelsen af retningelinjerne, afspejlede sig i sidste ende i den forsinkede vedtagelse af standardkontrakterne. 
The delays affecting the preparation and publication of guidelines were traceable, ultimately, to the late adoption of model contracts.
Som reaktion p offentliggżrelsen af evalueringen fra 200427, ivžrksatte Kommissionen korrigerende foranstaltninger med det sigte at understrege forskellene mellem instrumenterne. 
In response to the publication of the 2004 evaluation27, the Commission took corrective action aimed at differentiating between the instruments.
Resultatet var en bedre forstelse af instrumenternes art, men nogle omrder kunne stadig misforsts. 
This resulted in a better understanding of the nature of the instruments, but areas of misunderstanding persisted.
Derfor blev der givet yderligere vejledning i adskillige aspekter ved projektforvaltningen under RP6, som ikke var blevet taget op i de oprindelige programvejledninger28. 
As a result, further guidance was provided on several aspects of FP6 project management not addressed by the initial programme guides28.
Konsortierne havde derfor ikke andet valg end at g i gang med projekterne, fżr kontrakten var underskrevet. 
As a result, consortia had no choice but to start projects before the contract had been signed.
Dette medfżrte en juridisk og finansiel risiko for stżttemodtagerne, og det stemmer ikke overens med mlet om at tilskynde til forskningsaktiviteter. 
This entailed a legal and financial risk for the beneficiaries, which is at odds with the objective of encouraging research activities.
P den anden side blev projektets džkningsomrde (konsortiets sammensžtning, lżbetid, arbejdspro-gram) p Kommissionens initiativ žndret i en ržkke tilfžlde (11 ud af 14 gennemgede projekter) under forhandlingsprocessen uden eksplicit henvisning til programmets ml. 
On the other hand, the project scope (composition of the consortium, duration, work programme) was modified in several cases (11 out of 14 projects audited) at the initiative of the Commission during the negotiation process, without explicit reference to the objectives of the programme.
26 Jf. f.eks. bilag III til afgżrelse nr. 1513/2002/EF, bilag III til Rdets beslutning 2002/834/EF (EFT L 294 af 29.10.2002, s. 
26 See for example Annex III to Decision No 1513/2002/EC, Annex III to Council Decision 2002/834/EC (OJ L 294, 29.10.2002, p.
1) og Europa-Parlamentets og Rdets forordning (EF) nr. 2321/2002 (EFT L 355 af 30.12.2002, s. 
1) and Regulation (EC) No 2321/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p.
27 Evaluation of the effectiveness of the New Instruments of Framework Programme VI, op. cit. 
27 See Evaluation of the effectiveness of the New Instruments of Framework Programme VI, op. cit.
Vejledningen om intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder udkom i marts 2004. 
The guide on Intellectual Property rights appeared in March 2004.
29 ČTime-to-contractÇ er defineret som den tid, der gr fra fristen for indsendelse af forslag, til kontrakten er undertegnet. 
29 Time to contract is defined as the time elapsed between a call closing date and a contract signature.
60 i sžrberetning nr. 1/2004 om forvaltningen af indirekte FTU-aktioner under der femte rammeprogram (EUT C 99 af 23.4.2004). 
30 See page 60 of Special Report No 1/2004 on the management of ‘indirect’ RTD actions under the fifth framework programme (OJ C 99, 23.4.2004).
FŽRRE OG STŻRRE PROJEKTER, MEN STADIG MANGE DELTAGERE 51. 
FEWER AND LARGER PROJECTS BUT STILL A LARGE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 51.
Der findes ikke onesize for antal af deltagere, men der et klart, at jo flere deltagere, des vanskeligere er projektet at forvalte (organisatoriske begržnsninger, omkostninger). 
Although there is not a ‘once size fits all’ number of participants, it is clear that the larger the number of participants, the more difficult the project is to manage (organisational constraints, costs).
Der blev indget fžrre kontrakter under RP6 end under RP5 og med stżrre konsortier. 
Compared to FP5, fewer contracts were signed under FP6 and they involved larger consortia.
Men i gennemsnit er der flere deltagere pr. kontrakt under RP6 (ekspertisenettene involverede i gennemsnit 30 deltagere, og de integrerede projekter ca. 25 partnere). 
However, on average, the number of participants per contract is higher in FP6 (NoEs involved on average 30 participants and IPs around 25 partners).
Under RP7 er antallet af deltagere blevet reduceret (bde ekspertisenettene og samarbejdsprojekter, der minder om de integrerede projekter, involverer i gennemsnit lidt under 20 partnere). 
Under FP7 the number of participants has been reduced (both NoEs and IP-like collaborative projects involve on average slightly less than 20 partners). WEAKNESSES IN PROJECT MONITORING 52.
Kommissionen udfżrte regelmžssig teknisk overvgning af alle indirekte FTU-aktioner, der blev implementeret under RP6. 
All indirect RTD actions implemented under FP6 were subject to periodic technical monitoring by the Commission.
For ekspertisenet og integrerede projekter bżr den tekniske overvgning stżttes af uafhžngige eksperters projektundersżgelser (jf. fodnote 11). 
For Networks of Excellence and Integrated Projects, technical monitoring should be supported by project reviews carried out by independent experts (see footnote 11).
Retten konstaterede, at to afdelinger i Kommissionen ikke fuldt ud havde overholdt det retlige krav om rlige projektundersżgelser foretaget af uafhžngige eksperter. 
In particular, the Court found that two Commission departments had failed to fully comply with the legal requirement to have annual project reviews performed by independent experts.
Hvor Kommissionens afdelinger faktisk opfyldte dette krav, var projekt-undersżgelserne ikke harmoniseret nok til, at resultaterne af dem kunne bruges effektivt som en resultatindikator p bde projekt-og programplan. 28 Sžrberetning nr. 8/2009 Ń ČEkspertisenetteneÇ og Čde integrerede projekterÇ i Fžllesskabets forskningspolitik Ń nede de deres ml? 
Where the Commission’s departments did meet this requirement, harmonisation of project reviews was insufficient to allow the effective use of review results as a performance indicator, at both project and programme levels. 28 Special Report No 8/2009 — ‘Networks of Excellence’ and ‘Integrated Projects’ in Community research policy: did they achieve their objectives?
FREMME AF FTU-INVESTERINGER 54. 
STIMULATION OF RTD INVESTMENT 54.
Den samlede vžrdi af FTU-investeringerne under RP6Ős udvalgte temaer androg 19 milliarder euro. 
The total value of RTD investment carried out under FP6 thematic priorities amounted to 19 billion euro.
EUŐs budget finansierede 63 % af denne investering. 
The EU budget funded 63 % of this investment.
Den private sektor (inklusive SMV) bidrog med 22 %. 
The private sector (including SMEs) contributed up to 22 %.
De sidste 15 % blev finansieret af nationale offentlige kilder31. 
The remaining 15 % was funded by national public sources31.
FLERE EU-MIDLER MOD RELATIVT MINDRE FTU-INVESTERING FRA DELTAGERNES SIDE 55. 
MORE EU FUNDS FOR RELATIVELY LESS PARTICIPANTS’ RTD INVESTMENT 55.
Sammenligningen mellem RP6 (udvalgte temaer) og forgžngeren (RP5 tematiske programmer32) viser, at den samlede investering og EU-bidraget er steget i absolutte tal (med henholdsvis 8 % og 15 %). 
The comparison of FP6 (thematic priorities) with its predecessor (FP5 thematic programmes32) shows that total investment and EU contribution have increased in absolute terms (by 8 % and 15 %, respectively).
Men forholdet Čsamlet investering/EU-bidragÇ er faldet fra 1,69 euro (RP5) til 1,59 euro (RP6). 
However, the ratio ‘Total investment/EU contribution’ has declined from 1,69 euro (FP5) to 1,59 euro (FP6).
Den vžsentligste rsag hertil er, at den private sektors deltagelse generelt er lavere end under RP5 (jf. figur 6). 
The main reason is that the participation of the private sector in general has declined when compared to FP5 (see Figure 6).
Revisionen viste tydeligt, at der var en risiko for, at offentlige organer, der deltog i programmet, engagerede sig meget lavprofileret. 
The Court’s audit highlighted a risk of ‘low-profile’ commitment of public bodies participating in the programme.
Retten konstaterede i nogle tilfžlde (12 ud af 14 vurderede projekter), at omfanget af egne midler var meget lavere (mellem 30 % og 80 % mindre) end de omkostninger, Kommissionen33 faktisk refunderede. 
Cases were found (12 out of 14 projects assessed) where the volume of own resources was much lower (between 30 % and 80 % less) than the costs actually reimbursed by the Commission33.
I sdanne tilfžlde er investeringsincitamentet reduceret, hvad der muliggżr, at EU-midler simpelthen erstatter deltagernes egne midler. 
In such cases, the stimulation of investment is reduced, with the possibility that EU funds simply substitute participants’ own resources.
31 De eneste oplysninger, der foreligger til analyse, svarer til de kontraktligt aftalte skżnnede stżtteberettigede omkostninger og det tilsvarende fžllesskabsbidrag. 
31 The only data available for analysis correspond to the contractually agreed estimated eligible costs and the related Community contribution.
Da der mangler mere detaljerede oplysninger, navnlig de samlede faktiske investeringer, der blev foretaget p grund af deltagelse i programmet, kan der ikke fortages nogen yderligere analyse. 
The lack of more detailed information, in particular the total investment actually carried out as a result of the participation in the programme, makes impossible any further analysis.
32 FP5Ős tematiske programmer er forgžngerne til FP6Ős udvalgte temaer. 
32 FP5 thematic programmes are the predecessors of FP6 thematic priorities.
Der er fire af dem: Člivskvalitet og forvaltning af bioressourcerÇ, Čet brugervenligt informationssamfundÇ, Čkonkurrence og bžredygtig vžkstÇ og Čenergi, miljż og bžredygtig udviklingÇ. 
They were four: ‘Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources’, ‘User-friendly Information Society’, ‘Competitive and Sustainable Growth’ and ‘Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development’.
33 Efter den model, mange offentlige organer (navnlig universiteter) anvendte, skulle deltagerne stille egne midler i et omfang svarende til, hvad Fžllesskabet finansierede. 
33 According to the model applied by a significant number of public bodies (mainly universities), participants should allocate a volume of own resources equivalent to those funded by the Community.
Sledes ville princippet om samfinansiering vžre fulgt. 
In this way the principle of co-financing would be satisfied.
Kommissionen overvgede dog ikke denne betingelse, som den burde. 
However, this condition was not adequately monitored by the Commission.
30 KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER 57. 
30 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 57.
Retten skal minde om, at der under RP6 mangler en eksplicit interventionslogik til at forklare, hvordan de forskellige instrumenter og programmer formodedes at styrke det videnskabelige og teknologiske grundlag for Fžllesskabets industri og at fremme udviklingen af dens internationale konkurrenceevne34. 
The Court recalls the lack in FP 6 of an explicit intervention logic, explaining how the different instruments and programmes were supposed to strengthen the scientific and technological bases of Community industry and to encourage it to become more competitive at international level34.