natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ifølge den hurtige risikovurdering var risikoen for overførsel til EU lav, om end det i visse situationer kunne være berettiget at træffe foranstaltninger i EU, f.eks. med hensyn til turister, der vendte hjem fra Guinea, personer, der havde besøgt familie og venner, og personer, der havde været udsat for sygdommen og søgte lægehjælp i EU. 
According to this rapid risk assessment, the risk of transmission to the EU was low, although certain situations could justify measures in the EU, such as tourists returning from Guinea visiting family and friends or exposed persons seeking medical attention in the EU.
Den 8. august 2014 erklærede WHO ebolaudbruddet for en folkesundhedsmæssig krisesituation. 
The Ebola outbreak was declared a PHEIC by WHO on 8 August 2014.
En uge tidligere havde Kommissionen indkaldt Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed til en audiokonference for at drøfte den hastigt forværrede situation i de ramte lande. 
A week earlier, the Commission had called an HSC audioconference meeting in view of the quickly deteriorating circumstances in the affected countries.
I audiokonferencen deltog mange forskellige kommissionstjenestegrene samt ECDC, WHO og medlemsstaterne. 
Many different Commission services, ECDC, WHO and the Member States attended.
Formålet var at udveksle oplysninger og koordinere de foranstaltninger, der var under udførelse eller planlægning, dels for at identificere yderligere aktioner, der kunne styrke beredskabet, dels for at overveje bistand til de ramte lande. 
The objective was to exchange information and coordinate actions on measures being taken and planned, to identify additional actions to strengthen preparedness and to consider assistance to affected countries.
Mulighederne for medicinsk evakuering af EU/EØS-borgere, der arbejdede i disse lande, blev også drøftet. 
Options for the medical evacuation of EU/EEA citizens working in them were also discussed.
GD for Sundhed og Fødevaresikkerhed havde med bistand fra ECDC udarbejdet et spørgeskema om ebolaberedskabet (for at få overblik over laboratorie-, hospitals-og transportkapaciteten), som var blevet sendt til medlemsstaterne, og som de fleste havde svaret på. 
DG Health and Food Safety, with assistance from ECDC, had drafted a questionnaire on Ebola preparedness (i.e. to obtain an overview of laboratories capacities, hospital facilities for Ebola, suitable transport), which was sent out to the Member States and answered by most of them.
Efter at WHO havde erklæret ebolaudbruddet for en folkesundhedsmæssig krisesituation, steg hyppigheden af udvalgets møder om ebola væsentligt (næsten ét møde om ugen frem til januar 2015). 
After the declaration of the PHEIC by WHO, the frequency of HSC meetings dedicated to Ebola increased significantly (almost weekly until January 2015).
Operationelle emner såsom fælles indkøb og arbejdsgrupper kom først tilbage på udvalgets dagsorden i februar 2015. 
Only from February 2015, did operational topics return to the HSC agenda, such as joint procurement and the working groups.
Revisionsbemærkninger 26 46 Da vores revision fandt sted, var der udarbejdet mandater for fire arbejdsgrupper under Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed: en permanent arbejdsgruppe om beredskab, et permanent kommunikationsnetværk, en ad hoc-arbejdsgruppe om nyankommne migranter og overførbare sygdomme og en ad hoc-arbejdsgruppe om bekæmpelse af antimikrobiel resistens (jf. tekstboks 2). 
Audit observations 26 46 At the time of our audit, the terms of reference had been drafted for four working groups under the HSC: a permanent working group on preparedness, a permanent communicators’ network, an ad hoc working group on newly arrived migrants and communicable diseases, and an ad hoc working group on combating antimicrobial resistance (AMR) (see Box 2).
Udvalget havde imidlertid kun oprettet kommunikationsnetværket og arbejdsgruppen om beredskab formelt. 
However, the HSC only formally established the communicators’ network and preparedness working group.
På grundlag af deres mandat skulle disse arbejdsgrupper udarbejde en årlig arbejdsplan med resultatindikatorer til evalueringsformål. Denne plan skulle forelægges udvalget til godkendelse for at sikre, at der blev arbejdet struktureret med disse emner. 
Based on their terms of reference, these working groups were to prepare an annual work plan, including performance indicators for evaluation, to be submitted and approved by the HSC, to ensure a structured way of working on these topics.
Vi konstaterede ved afslutningen af revisionen (i marts 2016), at udvalget ikke som fastsat i arbejdsgruppernes mandat havde fået forelagt årlige arbejdsplaner med indikatorer til godkendelse. 
We found that at the end of the audit (March 2016) no annual work plans with the indicators required under the working groups’ terms or reference had been submitted for approval to the HSC.
Det betyder, at disse arbejdsgrup-pers arbejde ikke udføres i overensstemmelse med deres mandat, og at deres resultater ikke bliver målt korrekt. 
This means that the work done by these working groups is not implemented in accordance with the terms of reference and that their performance is not measured appropriately.
47 Det er frivilligt at deltage i arbejdsgrupperne under Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed. 
47 Participation in the HSC working groups is voluntary.
Ved afslutningen af vores revision havde samtlige medlemsstater udpeget deres deltagere i kommunikationsnetværket. 
At the end of our audit, all Member States had nominated their participants in the communicators’ network.
Kommissionen havde også sendt anmodninger om udpegelse af deltagere til arbejdsgruppen om beredskab (jf. punkt 42), men i marts 2016 havde kun ni medlemsstater udpeget deres deltagere. 
The Commission had also sent the request to nominate participants to the preparedness working group (also see paragraph 42 above), but by March 2016 only nine EU Member States had done so.
Det er vigtigt, at et stort antal medlemsstater deltager for at sikre, at arbejdsgruppernes output senere bliver støttet af udvalget og anvendt i praksis. 
The participation of a large number of Member States is important to ensure that outputs of the working groups are later supported and taken forward by the HSC.
48 Vi konstaterede, at Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed, da det var et uformelt udvalg med mandat fra Rådet (dvs. indtil 2013), havde arbejdsprogrammer med årlige mål og årlig rapportering samt dokumenterede handlingsplaner med status-rapportering. 
48 We found that when the HSC was still informal and mandated by the terms of reference issued by the Council (i.e. until 2013), it had work programmes with annual objectives and reporting, as well as documented action plans with progress reporting.
Det nuværende Udvalg for Sundhedssikkerhed har en anden status og et andet mandat i henhold til afgørelsen om alvorlige grænseoverskridende sundhedstrusler. 
The status and mandate of the current HSC are different under the decision on serious cross-border threats to health.
I udvalgets dokumenter og i Kommissionen fandt vi imidlertid ikke bevis for, at udvalget nu varetager sine opgaver på grundlag af en vedtaget strategisk planlægning eller en ajourført køreplan med beskrivelse af relevante strategiske emner på længere sigt. 
However, we did not find evidence in the HSC documents or at the Commission that the HSC currently executes its tasks on the basis of an agreed strategic planning or up-to-date roadmap identifying relevant longer-term strategic topics.
Under revisionen gav repræsentanter for medlemsstaterne endvidere udtryk for en vis bekymring med hensyn til karakteren af udvalgets audiokonferencer, idet nogle mente, at der var for meget fokus på tekniske i stedet for strategiske drøftelser. 
During the course of the audit, Member State representatives also expressed some concern over the nature of the HSC audioconferences, perceived by some to be too focused on technical rather than strategic discussions.
Revisionsbemærkninger 27 49 Samlet set har Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed udført et meget vigtigt arbejde, navnlig som reaktion på ebolakrisen, og taget initiativ til udvikling af samarbejdsmekanismer, f.eks. vedrørende brug af laboratorier og medicinsk evakuering, der kan bevares eller genoptages i forbindelse med fremtidige krisesituationer44. 
Audit observations 27 49 Overall, the work of the HSC, in particular in response to the Ebola crisis, has been very important and has initiated the development of collaborative mechanisms, such as for the use of laboratories and for medical evacuation that could be sustained or reactivated for future crises44.
Udvalget blev et vigtigt forum, hvor repræsentanter for de relevante tjenestegrene i Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne gik sammen og begyndte at udveksle oplysninger, også med WHO. 
The HSC became a main platform where representatives from relevant Commission services and Member States joined forces and started exchanging information, including with WHO.
Dette understreger udvalgets store relevans og betydning, som også blev anerkendt af Rådet i konklusionerne om folkesundhedserfaringerne fra ebolaudbruddet i Vestafrika45. 
This further demonstrates the great relevance and importance of the HSC, which was also acknowledged by the Council in its conclusions on the lessons learned for public health from the Ebola outbreak in west Africa45.
50 Det bevismateriale, vi har indhentet, viser imidlertid også, at fra det øjeblik, hvor WHO erklærede ebolaudbruddet for en folkesundhedsmæssig krisesituation af international betydning, handlede det meste af Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerheds arbejde og alle dets audiokonferencer om reaktionen på ebolakrisen - som var en sundhedstrussel med lav risiko for EU46. 
50 However, our evidence also shows that from the moment when Ebola was declared a public health emergency of international concern by WHO, for approximately 6 months, most HSC work and its audioconferences focused on the response to the Ebola crisis — which was a low-risk health threat for the EU46.
Det betød, at udvalgets andre aktiviteter vedrørende den strategiske udvikling og gennemførelsen af den ramme, der er fastsat i afgørelsen om alvorlige grænseoverskridende sundhedstrusler, ikke stod øverst på dagsordenen i denne periode. 
As a result, other HSC activities in relation to the strategic development and implementation of the framework of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health were not at the top of the agenda during this period.
51 De seneste års mange udbrud af alvorlige sygdomme såsom Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-coV), ebola og zika samt manglen på strategisk planlægning i Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed forklarer i nogen grad, hvorfor udvalgets møder ofte har været tekniske og indsatsorienterede snarere end strategiske. 
51 The high incidence of major health events in recent years, such as Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) Corona virus, Ebola and Zika and the absence of strategic planning for the HSC, explain to a certain extent why HSC meetings have often been of a technical, response-oriented nature, rather than strategic.
Vi konstaterede også, at der kun var gjort langsomme fremskridt i de arbejdsgrupper, der skulle udføre eller understøtte udvalgets tekniske arbejde. 
In addition, we identified slow progress on the working groups which should perform or support the HSC’s technical work.
52 Kommissionen selv kan desuden foretage forbedringer med hensyn til udarbejdelse af relevante kortlægninger eller rapporter vedrørende de aktiviteter på dette område, der finder sted i dens tjenestegrene, agenturer og programmer (jf. også punkt 96-102). 
52 The Commission itself can also still improve how it produces relevant mappings or reports on activities that take place in other Commission services, agencies and programmes in this context (also see paragraphs 96 to 102).
Tilsammen viser disse faktorer, at der stadig er muligheder for at styrke det strategiske arbejde i Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed. 
These factors combined indicate that there is still scope for enhancing the HSC’s strategic work.
Dette er vigtigt, fordi udvalget nu har et stærkt mandat, navnlig når det gælder om i samarbejde med Kommissionen at koordinere medlemsstaternes beredskabs-og indsatsplanlægning (jf. punkt 44) og dermed sikre den højest mulige beskyttelse mod sundhedstrusler i EU. 
This is important as the HSC now has a strong mandate, in particular in terms of coordinating, in liaison with the Commission, the preparedness and response planning of the Member States (see paragraph 44) and thereby ensuring the highest possible level of protection against health threats in the EU.
44 Dette berører ikke bemærkninger, som Retten eventuelt senere vil fremsætte som følge af Afdeling III’s igangværende forvaltningsrevision vedrørende krisestyringsstrukturer, hvor EU’s reaktion på ebolaudbruddet også behandles. 
44 Without prejudice to the audit findings the Court might raise as a result of its ongoing performance audit of Chamber III on crisis management structures, which also deals with the EU response to the Ebola outbreak.
45 Rådets konklusioner om folkesundhedserfaringerne fra ebolaudbruddet i Vestafrika - Sundhedssikkerhed i Den Europæiske Union (2015/C 421/04) af 17. december 2015. 
45 Council conclusions on ‘Lessons learned for Public Health from the Ebola outbreak in west Africa — Health Security in the European Union’, (2015/C 421/04) of 17 December 2015.
46 Jf. ECDC’s hurtige risikovurdering »Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa«, 4. ajourføring af 3. september 2014, hvoraf det fremgik, at risikoen for spredning af ebola fra en patient, der ankommer til EU som følge af en planlagt medicinsk evakuering, blev anset for at være ekstremt lav. 
46 See ECDC’s Rapid Risk Assessment ‘Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in west Africa’, fourth update, 3 September 2014, which stated that the risk of Ebola spreading from a patient who arrives in the EU as a result of a planned medical evacuation was considered extremely low.
Revisionsbemærkninger 28 Der er vanskeligt at anvende reglerne for indsatskoordinering i praksis 53 Det anføres i indledningen til afgørelsen om alvorlige grænseoverskridende sundhedstrusler, at medlemsstaterne selv er ansvarlige for at håndtere krisesituationer på folkesundhedsområdet på nationalt plan, men at foranstaltninger, der træffes af individuelle medlemsstater kan krænke andre medlemsstaters interesser, hvis de er i uoverensstemmelse med hinanden eller er baseret på forskellige risikovurderinger. 
Audit observations 28 Applying ‘coordination of response’ rules is difficult in practice 53 The introduction of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health states that although the Member States have a responsibility to manage public health crises at national level, measures taken by individual Member States could damage the interests of other Member States if they are inconsistent with one another or based on diverging risk assessments.
Når medlemsstater agter at træffe folkesundhedsmæssige foranstaltninger til bekæmpelse af en alvorlig grænseoverskridende sundhedstrussel, skal de derfor først underrette og konsultere de øvrige medlemsstater og Kommissionen om foranstaltningerne47. 
Therefore, Member States, when intending to adopt public health measures to combat a serious cross-border threat to health, should47 first inform and consult the other Member States and the Commission on those measures.
Hvis behovet for at beskytte folkesundheden er så hastende, at det er nødvendigt at vedtage foranstaltningerne omgående, kan de øvrige medlemsstater og Kommissionen underrettes efter vedtagelsen. 
If the need to protect public health is so urgent that the immediate adoption of the measures is necessary they may inform the other Member States and the Commission after the adoption.
54 Erfaringerne fra ebolakrisen viser, at det er en udfordring at opfylde kravet om at underrette de øvrige medlemsstater (gennem Udvalget for Sundhedssikkerhed), før der træffes foranstaltninger på nationalt plan. 
54 Experience during the Ebola crisis showed that this requirement to inform other Member States (i.e. through the HSC) before taking measures at national level is challenging.
Nogle medlemsstater valgte at se bort fra ECDC’s og WHO’s risikovurderinger og indførte indrejsescreening i lufthavne, hvor der landede fly fra Vestafrika. 
Some Member States decided to diverge from ECDC and WHO risk assessments and implemented entry screening of travellers at airports receiving flights from west Africa.
ECDC og WHO holdt i deres efterfølgende risikovurderinger fast ved ikke at anbefale indrejsescreening, idet de henviste til omkostningerne, de begrænsede resultater og det forhold, at der i de ramte lande blev foretaget effektiv udrejsescreening48. 
In their subsequent risk assessments, ECDC and WHO continuously did not recommend entry screening measures, pointing at the cost implications, poor results and existence of effective exit screening in the affected countries48.
Kommissionen indbød EU’s sundhedsministre til et koordineringsmøde på højt plan om ebola den 16. oktober 2014, hvor man også drøftede mulige indrejseforanstaltninger ved EU’s grænser. 
The Commission invited EU health ministers to a high-level Ebola coordination meeting on 16 October 2014 where possible entry measures at EU borders were also discussed.
Et af resultaterne blev, at Kommissionen og WHO arrangerede en revision af udrejsescreeningen for ebola i de ramte lande i Vestafrika. 
One of the outcomes was for the Commission and WHO to organise an audit on exit screening for Ebola in the affected countries in west Africa.
Revisionen viste, at processerne for udrejsescreening var godt implementeret, og at screeningerne med stor sandsynlighed ville fange personer med tegn og symptomer på ebola. 
The audit concluded that the exit screening processes were well implemented and that the procedures were very likely to catch persons with signs and symptoms of Ebola.
55 I sin gennemførelsesrapport fra 201549 oplyste Kommissionen derfor, at en af de vigtigste konklusioner, man kunne drage af ebolaudbruddet, var, at der var behov for at forbedre gennemførelsen af bestemmelserne om medlemsstaternes forpligtelse til at samordne de nationale indsatser. 
55 In its 2015 implementation report49 the Commission therefore stated that a major conclusion from the Ebola outbreak was that there was scope for improving the implementation of the provisions which require Member States to coordinate national responses.
Hvis medlemsstaterne ikke på et tidligt tidspunkt giver tilstrækkelige oplysninger om de nationale folkesundhedsmæssige foranstaltninger, som de overvejer at træffe eller har truffet, kan dette påvirke andre medlemsstater. 
If information on national public health measures which Member States are considering taking or have taken is not adequately shared with other Member States at an early stage, this could impact other Member States.
Eksempler på negative konsekvenser er dobbeltkontrol og sporing af personer, der allerede er blevet kontrolleret ved deres indrejse i EU, hvilket kræver ekstra arbejde og ressourcer i andre medlemsstater, eller øget pres fra medierne for at få folkesundhedsmyndighederne til at forklare, hvorfor nogle medlemsstater følger den videnskabelige rådgivning fra WHO eller ECDC, og andre ikke gør. 
Examples include duplications of checks and tracing of people that have already been checked on their first entry to the EU, requiring additional efforts and resources from other Member States or increased media pressure on public health authorities to explain why certain Member States follow WHO or ECDC scientific advice and others do not.
47 Jf. artikel 11 i afgørelse nr. 1082/2013/EU. 
47 According to Article 11 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU.
48 ECDC’s hurtige risikovurdering »Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa«, 4. ajourføring af 3. september 2014, og ECDC’s tekniske rapport »Infection prevention and control measures for Ebola virus disease - Entry and exit screening measures« af 12. oktober 2014. 
48 ECDC’s Rapid Risk Assessment ‘Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in west Africa’, fourth update, 3 September 2014, or ECDC’s Technical Report ‘Infection prevention and control measures for Ebola virus disease — entry and Exist screening measures’, 12 October 2014.
49 Rapport om gennemførelsen af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets afgørelse nr. 
49 Report on the implementation of Decision No 1082/2013/EU, COM(2015) 617 final of 7 December 2015.
Revisionsbemærkninger 29 Det er almindeligt anerkendt, at de eksisterende systemer og procedurer for tidlig varsling og reaktion samt epidemiologisk overvågning spiller en vigtig rolle, men de bør opgraderes 56 Vi undersøgte, om det eksisterende system for tidlig varsling og reaktion og det eksisterende system for epidemiologisk overvågning, der begge har afgørelsen om alvorlige grænseoverskridende sundhedstrusler som retsgrundlag (jf. også figur 1), forvaltes og gennemføres hensigtsmæssigt. 
Audit observations 29 The important role of existing systems and procedures for early warning and response and epidemiological surveillance is widely recognised but there are certain upgrades to be made 56 We examined whether the existing systems for early warning and response and epidemiological surveillance, for which the decision on serious cross-border health threats provides the legal basis (also see Figure 1), are adequately managed and implemented.
Samlet set konstaterede vi, at de eksisterende systemer har været operationelle i årevis, og at deres vigtige rolle på EU-niveau er almindeligt anerkendt af interessenterne, men at der er behov for opgradering af procedurerne og systemerne. 
Overall, we found that these existing systems have been operational for years and that their important role at EU level is widely recognised by stakeholders, but that certain upgrades were needed to procedures and systems.
I de følgende punkter beretter vi om behovet for at forbedre EWRS og sikre kommunikation med andre varslingssystemer samt om det forhold, at den ajourførte EU-tilgang til tidlig varsling og reaktion i forbindelse med alvorlige kemiske trusler og miljøtrusler endnu ikke er blevet testet. 
In the following paragraphs we report on the need for further enhancements of the EWRS and interfacing with other alert systems and the fact that the updated EU-level approach to early warning and response for serious chemical and environmental threats is not yet tested.
Endelig bør der gøres en yderligere indsats for at optimere sammenligneligheden og kvaliteten af dataene i EU’s system for epidemiologisk overvågning. 
Finally, further work is required on the EU system for epidemiological surveillance for optimising data comparability and quality.
EWRS anvendes bredt og er generelt værdsat, men der er behov for yderligere forbedringer, bl.a. vedrørende kommunikationen med andre varslingssystemer 57 Afgørelsen om alvorlige grænseoverskridende sundhedstrusler udgør retsgrundlaget for »systemet for tidlig varsling og reaktion« (EWRS), der anvendes til rapportering på EU-niveau af varslinger vedrørende alvorlige grænseoverskridende sundhedstrusler. 
Despite extensive use and wide appreciation of the EWRS, further enhancements are needed, including for the interfaces with other alert systems 57 The decision on serious cross-border threats to health provides the legal basis for the EWRS for notifying at Union level alerts in relation to serious cross-border threats to health.
EWRS skal gøre det muligt for Kommissionen og de kompetente myndigheder med ansvar for varsling på nationalt plan at opretholde permanent kommunikation med henblik på vurdering af risici for folkesundheden og fastlæggelse af de foranstaltninger, der måtte være nødvendige for at beskytte folkesundheden. 
The EWRS should enable the Commission and the competent authorities responsible at national level to be in permanent communication for the purposes of issuing alerts, assessing public health risks and determining the measures that may be required to protect public health.