natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ud over besparelser i forbindelse med 2014-reformpakken skżnnes det, at der blev sparet yderligere 1,4 milliarder euro, fordi metoden til justering af lżnninger og pensioner i 11 Interinstitutionel aftale af 2.12.2013 mellem Europa-Parlamentet, Rdet og Kommissionen om budgetdisciplin, om samarbejde p budgetomrdet og om forsvarlig żkonomisk forvaltning (EUT C 373 af 20.12.2013, s. 
In addition to savings linked to the 2014 reforms package, an estimated further Ű1.4 billion was saved due to the non-11 Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management (OJ C 373 of 20.12.2013, p.
15 16 overensstemmelse med tilsvarende justeringer i en gruppe af referencemedlemsstater ikke blev anvendt i 201112 og 201213. 
15 application in 201112 and 201213 of the method for adjusting pay and pensions in line with equivalent adjustments in a group of reference Member States.
17 Alt i alt vil lżn-og pensionsbesparelsernes direkte budgetindvirkning p FFR for 2014-2020 sandsynligvis belżbe sig til omkring 4,2 milliarder euro, hvilket er mere end planlagt. 
17 All in all, the direct budgetary impact of pay and pensions savings on the 2014-2020 MFF is likely to reach around Ű4.2 billion Ń more than what was planned.
Fastfrysningerne (2011, 2013 og 2014) og den mindre justering (2012) af de ansattes lżn og pension tegner sig for de stżrste besparelser. 
The freezes (2011, 2013 and 2014) and lower adjustment (2012) of pay and pensions form the largest share of the savings.
Figur 4 viser alle budgetbesparelserne fordelt efter kilde og foranstaltningstype. 
Figure 4 shows all budgetary savings by source and type of measure.
Figur 4 Đ Lżn-og pensionsforanstaltninger har sikret de stżrste besparelser i FFR for 2014-2020 Trepartsaftale i 2013 100 % 90 % 80 % 70% 60% 50% 40% 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 4,2 milliarder euro Reduceret rejsetillžg 70 millioner euro Begržnset adgang til de hżjere AD-lżnklasser og andre foranstaltninger 196 millioner euro Reform af AST-karriereforlżbet, ny ansžttelsesgruppe for sekretžrer 81 millioner euro Kommissionens forslag fra 2011 Aftale mellem Rdet og Kommissionen i 2014 efter sag ved Domstolen Rdets forslag fra 2013 Kilder til budgetbesparelser Personalenedskžring p 5 % 855 millioner euro Fastfrysning og lavere tilpasninger af lżnninger og pensioner i 2011 og 2012 1 431 millioner euro Fastfrysning af lżnninger og pensioner i 2013 og 2014 1 536 millioner euro Foranstaltninger til budgetbesparelser Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret p dokumenter fra GD BUDG and GD HR, 2011-priser. 
Figure 4 Đ Pay and pensions measures have brought the biggest savings in the 2014-2020 MFF 16 Trilogue agreement of 2013 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60% 50% 40% 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Ű4.2 billion Reduced travel allowance Ű70 million Limited access to high AD grades and other measures Ű196 million Reform of AST career, new function group for secretaries Ű81 million CommissionŐs 2011 proposal Agreed in 2014 by Council and Commission after ECJ case CouncilŐs 2013 proposal Source of budgetary savings 5 % Staff reduction Ű855 million Freeze and lower adjustment of pay and pensions in 2011 and 2012 Ű1 431 million Freeze of pay and pensions in 2013 and 2014 Ű1 536 million Budgetary savings measures Source: ECA, based on documents received from DG BUDG and DG HR, 2011 prices.
12 EU-Domstolens sag C-63/12, Europa-Kommissionen mod Rdet for Den Europžiske Union, dom af 19. november 2013. 
12 CJEU Case C-63/12, European Commission v Council of the European Union, judgment of 19 November 2013.
Rdet havde afvist at vedtage den foreslede forhżjelse af EU-personalets lżnninger og pensioner, fordi den vurderede, at den aktuelle żkonomiske krise udgjorde en alvorlig og pludselig forvžrring af den żkonomiske og sociale situation i EU, som berettigede en suspension af justeringsmetoden. 
The Council had refused to adopt the proposed increase in salaries and pensions for EU staff, considering that the ongoing economic crisis constituted a serious and sudden deterioration of the economic and social situation within the Union which justified suspending the adjustment method.
Domstolen konkluderede, at Rdets begrundelse var tilstržkkelig som grundlag for dets beslutning om ikke at vedtage den foreslede tilpasning. 
The Court concluded that the Council's justifications were sufficient to back its decision not to adopt the proposed update.
13 Efter dommen i sag C-63/12 fremsatte Kommissionen i december 2013 et nyt forslag om en forhżjelse p 0,9 % i 2011 og 0,9 % i 2012. 
13 Following the judgment in Case 63/12, in December 2013 the Commission put forward a new proposal for an increase of 0.9 % in 2011 and 0.9 % in 2012.
Trepartsforhandlinger fżrte til vedtagelse af forordning 422/2014 og 423/2014, som justerede de ansattes lżnninger og pensioner for 2011 og 2012 med henholdsvis 0 % og 0,8 %. 
Trilogue negotiations led to the adoption of Regulations 422/2014 and 423/2014, adjusting salaries and pensions for 2011 and 2012 by 0 % and 0.8 % respectively.
Endnu stżrre budgetbesparelser p lang sigt 18 En stor del af de langsigtede besparelser p de administrative udgifter vil stamme fra lavere udgifter til pensioner. 
Even higher budgetary savings in the long-term 18 A significant part of the long-term savings in administrative expenditure will come from lower spending on pensions.
2014-reformpakken indfżrte flere foranstaltninger, der direkte og indirekte vil reducere de langsigtede udgifter til pensioner i de kommende 30-50 r (nžrmere oplysninger tabel 1). 
The 2014 reforms package introduced several measures which will directly and indirectly reduce long-term spending on pensions over the next 30 to 50 years (see Table 1 for details).
Tabel 1 Đ Direkte og indirekte foranstaltninger i personalereformpakken fra 2014 til nedbringelse af pensionsudgifterne p lang sigt Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
Table 1 Đ Direct and indirect measures in the 2014 staff reform package to reduce long-term pensions expenditure Source: ECA.
17 Foranstaltninger med direkte virkning Hovedforanstaltninger med indirekte virkning - Forhżjelse af pensionsalderen fra 63 til 66 r med overgangsforanstaltninger for personale ansat fżr 2014 - rlig tilvžkstrate fastsat til 1,8 % for personale ansat efter 1. januar 2014, 1,9 % for personale ansat mellem 1. maj 2004 og 31. december 2013 og 2,0 % for personale ansat fżr 1. maj 2004 - Fastfrysning af lżnninger og pensioner i 2013 og 2014 - Nedskžring p 5 % i antallet af stillinger i stillingsfortegnelsen - Oprettelse af ny SC/AST-ansžttelsesgruppe og žndringer i AST-og AD-karrierestrukturen med begržnset adgang til de hżjeste lżnklasser (AST10 og AST11, AD13 og AD14) 19 Pensionsbesparelserne vil blive stżrre efter 2020. 
17 Measures having a direct impact Main measures having an indirect impact - Increase in the pensionable age from 63 to 66, with transitional measures for staff recruited before 2014 - Annual accrual rate set at 1.8 % for staff recruited after 1 January 2014, 1.9 % for staff recruited between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2013, and 2.0 % for staff recruited before 1 May 2004 - Pay and pensions freeze in 2013 and 2014 - 5 % reduction in establishment plan posts - Creation of new SC/AST function group and changes to AST and AD career structure with limited access to the highest grades (AST10 and 11, AD13 and 14) 19 The pensions savings will be more significant after 2020.
De skżnnes over de nžste 50 r at udgżre 19,2 milliarder euro frem til 2064, og dette belżb skal lžgges til de 24,8 milliarder euro, der forventes genereret af 2004-reformen i perioden 2004-205914. 
Over the next 50 years, they are estimated at Ű19.2 billion by 2064, in addition to the Ű24.8 billion which the 2004 reform is expected to generate during 2004-205914.
P nuvžrende tidspunkt stiger pensionsudgifterne stadig. 
At present, pensions expenditure is still growing.
De medarbejdere, der gr p pension, erstattes dog af medarbejdere, som ansžttes under de mindre gunstige vilkr, der er indfżrt med de successive reformer af personalevedtžgten. 
However, retiring staff are being replaced by staff employed under the less favourable conditions introduced by the consecutive SR reforms.
Derfor forventes de langsigtede budgetudgifter at falde med omkring 30 % inden 2059 sammenlignet med den hypotetiske situation uden 2014-pakken (nžrmere oplysninger i figur 5). 
Therefore long-term budgetary spending is expected to fall by around 30 % by 2059 compared to the hypothetical situation without the 2014 package (see Figure 5 for details).
Rapport fra Kommissionen til Rdet om pensionsordningen for tjenestemžnd og żvrige ansatte ved Den Europžiske Union, COM(2012) 37 final af 7.2.2012, s. 
14 See Report from the Commission to the Council on the Pension Scheme of European Officials and Other Servants of the European Union, COM(2012) 37 final, Brussels 7.2.2012, p.
Figur 5 Đ Forventede budgetbesparelser p pensionsudgifterne (i millioner euro) 18 3 000 2 500 2 000 1 500 1 000 500 0 Forventede budgetbesparelser Pensionsudgifter uden 2014-žndringen af personalevedtžgten Pensionsudgifter med 2014-žndringen af personalevedtžgten 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 Kilde: Kommissionens arbejdsdokument "Eurostat study on the long-term budgetary implications of pension costs", SWD(2016) 268 final af 28.7.2016, s. 
Figure 5 Đ Expected budgetary savings in pensions expenditure (in million euros) 18 3 000 2 500 2 000 1 500 1 000 500 0 Expected budgetary savings Pensions expenditure without 2014 revision of SR Pensions expenditure with 2014 revision of SR 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 Source: Commission Staff Working Document, Eurostat study on the long-term budgetary implications of pension costs, SWD(2016) 268 final, Brussels 28.7.2016, p.
19. 20 Den samlede virkning af de žndringer, der i henholdsvis 2004 og 2014 blev foretaget af lżn-og pensionsreglerne - herunder den torige suspension af lżnstigninger i 2014-reformpakken - bżr sledes sikre store besparelser lžnge efter den nuvžrende FFR. 
19 20 The cumulative effect of the 2004 and 2014 changes to the pay and pensions rules, including the two-year suspension of the salary adjustment from the 2014 reforms package, should therefore bring significant savings well beyond the perspective of the current MFF.
Figur 6 indeholder skżn vedrżrende FFR for 2014-2020 og tiden efter. 
Figure 6 gives estimates for the 2014-2020 MFF and beyond.
Figur 6 Đ Anslede besparelser i lżn-og pensionsudgifter hidrżrende fra de successive reformer 19 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2059 2064 2004-reformen af personalevedtžgten Besparelser i lżn-og pensionsudgifter 8 milliarder euro (2011-priser) Besparelser i pensionsudgifter 24,8 milliarder euro (2008-priser) 2014-žndringen af personalevedtžgten Besparelser i lżn-og pensionsudgifter 2,7 milliarder euro (2011-priser) Besparelser i pensionsudgifter 19,2 milliarder euro (2014-priser) Lavere tilpasninger i 2011 og 2012 Besparelser i lżn-og pensionsudgifter 1,4 milliarder euro (2011-priser) Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret p dokumenter fra GD BUDG og GD HR. 
Figure 6 Đ Estimated savings on staff pay and pensions linked with successive reforms 19 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2059 2064 Staff Regulations reform 2004 Staff pay and pensions savings Ű8 billion (2011 prices) Pensions savings Ű24.8 billion (2008 prices) Staff Regulations revision 2014 Staff pay and pensions savings Ű2.7 billion (2011 prices) Lower adjustment in 2011 and 2012 Pensions savings Ű19.2 billion (2014 prices) Staff pay and pensions savings Ű1.4 billion (2011 prices) Source: ECA, based on documents received from DG BUDG and DG HR.
Reformen har haft forskellige indvirkninger p de menneskelige ressourcer 21 Personalereformpakken fra 2014 har pvirket en ržkke vigtige HR-aspekter i Kommissionen. 
The reform has had various impacts on human resources 21 The 2014 staff reforms package has impacted a number of important aspects of HR at the Commission.
Vi undersżgte, hvordan foranstaltningerne til forbedring af HR-situationen indvirkede p fordelingen af personale p ansžttelsesgrupper og lżnklasser (karrierestruktur), kżnsfordelingen, aldersprofilen, antallet af kontraktansatte og personaleantallet i GD'erne og tjenestegrenene samt p, hvor attraktive ansžttelsesvilkrene er. 
We examined the effects of the HR improvement measures on the distribution of staff by function group and grade (career structure), gender balance, age profile, the number of contract staff, staff numbers in DGs and services, and the attractiveness of employment conditions.
Betydelige žndringer i karrierestrukturen 22 2004-reformen skabte store žndringer i karrierestrukturen for Kommissionens personale. 
Significant changes to the career structure 22 The 2004 reform brought a major change in the career structure of the CommissionŐs staff.
Den fusionerede ansžttelsesgrupperne for sekretžrer, kontorpersonale og assistenter i n ansžttelsesgruppe for assistenter (AST) og skabte et mere linežrt karriereforlżb. 
It merged the categories of secretarial, clerical and assistant staff into one general assistant (AST) function group and created a more linear career progression.
23 Disse žndringer havde den bivirkning, at de afskaffede forbindelsen mellem lżn/lżnklasse og ansvar15. 
23 These changes brought side-effects which disconnected pay and grade from level of responsibility15.
De sžnkede desuden startlżnnen for nyansatte administratorer16 og żgede de langsigtede indtžgtsmuligheder for sekretžrer og kontorpersonale. 
They also lowered the starting pay of junior administrators16 and increased the long-term earning potential of secretarial and clerical staff.
Nžrmere bestemt var fżlgende konsekvenser de vigtigste: Ń Nyansatte administratorer tjente mindre under den nye ordning end under den gamle (nyansatte i lżnklasse AD5 3 % mindre og nyansatte i lżnklasse AD6 11 % mindre) Ń Nyansatte sekretžrer og nyansat kontorpersonale tjente mere under den nye ordning end under den gamle (gennemsnitlig 16 % mere end fżr 2004) Ń Nogle ansatte i Kommissionen tjente i maj 2009 mere end en generaldirektżr, selv om dette er den mest ansvarsfulde post Ń En kontor-eller afdelingschef kunne tjene mindre end samtlige tjenestemžnd under sit ansvar, herunder sekretžrer og kontorpersonale. 
Specifically, the main consequences were: Ń junior administrators earned less under the new scheme than under the old one (3 % less for staff recruited at AD5, 11 % for staff recruited at AD6); Ń newly recruited secretarial and clerical staff earned more under the new system than the old one (on average 16 % more than before 2004); Ń some Commission staff earned more, in May 2009, than their Director-General, despite this being the highest position of responsibility; Ń a head of unit might earn less than all other officials under his or her responsibility, including secretaries and clerical assistants.
24 2014-reformpakken havde til forml at lżse nogle af disse problemstillinger ved at oprette en AST/SC-ansžttelsesgruppe for sekretžrer og kontorpersonale og ved at begržnse forfremmelserne i AST-og AD-ansžttelsesgrupperne. 
24 The 2014 reforms package sought to address some of these situations by creating an AST/SC function group for secretarial and clerical staff and by placing a cap on grade advancement in the AST and AD function groups.
25 Den nye AST/SC-ansžttelsesgruppe skulle forbedre sammenhžngen mellem lżnklasse og ansvar. 
25 The new AST/SC function group was intended to improve the link between grade and responsibility.
Det vil dog tage lang tid at erstatte alle de sekretžrer og alt det kontorpersonale, der p nuvžrende tidspunkt er ansat i AST-ansžttelsesgruppen, med AST/SC-personale. 
However, it will take considerable time to replace all secretarial and clerical staff currently in the AST function group with AST/SC staff.
Baseret p den nuvžrende struktur i denne del af personalet vil den utilsigtede bivirkning af 2004-reformen for s vidt angr sekretžrer og kontorpersonale vžre fuldt afhjulpet i 2040'erne. 
Based on the current structure of this population, the unintended side-effect of the 2004 reform regarding secretarial and clerical staff should be fully corrected in the 2040s.
26 Personalereformerne fra 2014 indfżrte ogs forfremmelseslofter ved lżnklasse AST9 og AD12. 
26 The 2014 staff reforms also capped grade advancement at AST9 and AD12.
Forfremmelser til lżnklasser over AST9 er betinget af ansżgning om en stilling som seniorassistent. 
Promotion above grade AST9 is conditional on applying for a senior assistant post.
Forfremmelser til lżnklasser over AD12 kržver, at medarbejderen fr en seniorekspert-eller lederstilling, og der er kun et begržnset antal stillinger til rdighed. 
Promotion above grade AD12 requires a senior expert or management post, with a limited number of positions available.
Forfremmelseslofterne gjaldt for det eksisterende personale og vedrżrte omkring to tredjedele af det AST-og AD-personale, der var ansat 1. januar 2014. 
The career caps apply to existing staff; they affected around two thirds of AST and AD staff in post on 01/01/2014.
16 Rapport til Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet om žkvivalens mellem den gamle og den nye karrierestruktur af 30.3.2011, KOM(2011) 171 endelig. 20 
16 Report to the European Parliament and the Council, Equivalence between old and new career structures, 30.03.2011, COM(2011) 171 final. 20
27 Samlet set har forfremmelseslofterne begržnset antallet af forfremmelser til de hżjere lżnklasser. 
27 Overall, the capping of careers has reduced promotions to higher grades.
Figur 7 viser lofternes virkning p forfremmelsessatserne. 
Figure 7 shows the effect of capping on promotion rates.
Forfremmelsessatsen er et udtryk for det antal ansatte, der forfremmes i lżbet af et givet r, i forhold til antallet af ansatte i den pgžldende lżnklasse det foregende r. 
The promotion rate is expressed as the number of promoted staff in a given year over the number of staff in that grade in the previous year. Figure 7 Đ Effect of capping careers - promotion rates after 2014.
Figur 7 Đ Virkningen af forfremmelseslofterne Đ forfremmelsessatser efter 2014 21 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5% 0% Fra AD12 til AD13 Fra AST9 til AST10 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Kilde: Revisionsretten p grundlag af data fra Kommissionen. 
21 30 % 25 % 20 % 15 % 10 % 5% 0% From AD12 to AD13 From AST9 to AST10 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Source: ECA, based on Commission data.
28 Samlet set har forfremmelseslofterne fżrt til budgetbesparelser. 
28 Overall, the capping of careers has generated budgetary savings.
De har ogs sikret en bedre sammenhžng mellem lżnklasse og ansvar ved at lade de hżjere lżnklasser vžre forbeholdt ansatte med stżrre ansvar. 
It has also improved the link between grade and responsibility by reserving higher grades for staff with a higher level of responsibility.
Lofterne giver anledning til store HR-udfordringer i GD'er med mange seniormedarbejdere, hvis forfremmelsesudsigter er blevet forringet. 
The caps present significant HR challenges in DGs with many senior staff, whose promotion prospects have been negatively affected.
Problemerne med forfremmelser i lżnklasse AD11 og AD12 er koncentreret i et begržnset antal GD'er: 39 % af det samlede antal AD11-AD12-medarbejdere var ansat i fem af de 45 GD'er (jf. figur 8). 
The issue of career progression for grades AD11 and 12 is concentrated in a limited number of DGs: 39 % of all AD11-12 staff were employed in five of the 45 DGs (see Figure 8).
Figur 8 Đ Andel af AD11-AD12-personale i de enkelte GD'er fżr reformen (pr. 31.12.2013) Kilde: Revisionsretten p grundlag af data fra Kommissionen. 
Figure 8 Đ Share of AD11-12 staff per DG before the reform (at 31.12.2013) Source: ECA, based on Commission data.
Hidtil er der imidlertid kun rapporteret om f tilfžlde i Kommissionen. 
However, so far only few such cases have been reported at the Commission.
Žndringerne har ikke forenklet eller forkortet proceduren. 
The changes have not simplified or reduced the length of the procedure.
Da der skal gives fem p hinanden fżlgende utilfredsstillende rlige udtalelser, fżr en afskedigelse finder sted, er det for tidligt at drage konklusioner om denne foranstaltning. 
As five consecutive unsatisfactory annual appraisal reports are needed before dismissal takes place, it is too early to conclude on this measure.
DGT registrerede f.eks. 12 utilfredsstillende udtalelser i perioden 2014-2017. 
For example, DGT counted 12 unsatisfactory staff reports from 2014 to 2017.
I Kommissionen som helhed skżnnes det, at niveauet ligger p omkring 20 utilfredsstillende udtalelser om ret (under 0,1 % af de ansatte). 
Estimates for the Commission as a whole are around 20 unsatisfactory reports per year (less than 0.1 % of staff).
30 Antallet af stillinger, der er bne for forfremmelser hvert r, fastsžttes p grundlag af satserne i personalevedtžgtens bilag I, punkt B. Disse satser kan bruges til at ansl karriereudviklingen over tid. 
30 The number of posts open for promotion every year is determined on the basis of the rates given in Annex IB to the SR. These rates may be used to estimate career progression over time.
En sats p 33 % betyder, at en tjenestemand, hvis indsats er tilfredsstillende, gennemsnitlig forfremmes efter tre r i sin lżnklasse. 
A rate of 33 % means that, on average, an official whose performance is satisfactory spends 3 years in the grade before being promoted.
Bortset fra ansatte i lżnklasse AST9 og AD12 kan de fleste ansatte med fornuftige resultater forventes at blive forfremmet hvert tredje til sjette r, afhžngig af den sats der er fastsat for deres lżnklasse. 
Except for staff at grades AST9 and AD12, most well-performing staff may expect to be promoted every three to six years, depending on the rate defined for their grade.
22 39 % JRC DEVCO 9% 6% SCIC 6% DGT RTD 13 % 5 % 
22 39 % JRC DEVCO 9% 6% SCIC 6% DGT RTD 13 % 5 %
Bidrag til familievenlige arbejdsordninger og en passende kżnsfordeling 31 2014-reformernes bestemmelser om familievenlige arbejdsordninger (forlžngelse af foržldreorlov og udvidelse af mulighederne for deltidsarbejde, flekstid og fjernarbejde) skulle gżre Kommissionen til en mere moderne og fleksibel administration, der fremmer en passende kżnsfordeling17. 
Contribution to family-friendly working arrangements and gender balance 31 The provisions for family-friendly working arrangements in the 2014 reforms (through the extension of parental leave, part-time work, flexitime and teleworking) were intended to make the Commission a more modern and flexible administration promoting gender balance17.
32 2014-žndringen af personalevedtžgten etablerede fžlles retlige rammer for alle institutionerne, s de kunne indfżre deres egne fleksible arbejdsordninger. 
32 The 2014 SR revision provided a common legal framework for all institutions to establish their own flexible working arrangements.
Kommissionen vurderede imidlertid hverken ved udarbejdelsen af reformerne eller senere institutionernes forventede bidrag til at sikre en mere passende kżnsfordeling. 
However the Commission did not assess the contribution the institutions were expected to make to improving gender balance, either when preparing the reforms or subsequently.
33 Fżr 2014 anerkendte alle institutionerne betydningen af en passende kżnsfordeling og behovet for at żge andelen af kvinder i ledende stillinger. 
33 Before 2014, all institutions recognised the importance of gender balance and the need to improve the share of women in management positions.
GD HR's strategiske plan for 2016-2020 omfattede mangfoldighed som et nżgleprincip og fastsatte et ml p 40 % kvinder i ledende stillinger i Kommissionen senest i 2020. 
DG HR strategic plan for 2016-2020 included diversity as a key principle and established an objective of 40 % of women in management positions at the Commission by 2020.
Andelen af kvinder i ledende stillinger steg fra 30 % i 2014 til 34 % i 2017. 
The share of women occupying senior management positions increased from 30 % in 2014 to 34 % in 2017.