natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I henhold til forordningens artikel 11 kan udpegede embedsmžnd vžre til stede i andre medlemsstater, for eksempel for at f adgang til dokumentation, der opbevares der, eller for at overvžre undersżgelser og mżder med erhvervsdrivende. 
Article 11 of the regulation provides a legal basis for designated officials to be present in other Member States, for example in order to have access to documentation held there or to attend enquiries that take place with traders.
Disse muligheder er ikke blevet udnyttet ret meget (jf. tabel 4). 
Limited use has been made of these possibilities (see Table 4).
I 2006 rapporterede kun seks medlemsstater om tilfžlde, hvor deres embedsmžnd havde vžret til stede i administrationslokaler i andre medlemsstater (i alt 15 tilfžlde). 
For 2006, only six Member States reported cases where their officials had been present in administrative offices in other Member States (15 cases in total).
Kun tre medlemsstater rapporterede om tilfžlde, hvor deres embedsmžnd havde deltaget i administrative undersżgelser i andre medlemsstater (i alt 3 tilfžlde). 
Only three Member States reported cases where their officials had participated in administrative enquiries in other Member States (3 cases in total).
(2) ČB2BÇ str for Čbusiness-to-business supply of servicesÇ. 
(2) B2B means business-to-business supply of services.
(3) En ordning, hvorefter en erhvervsdrivende kun behżver at opfylde sine momsforpligtelser vedrżrende aktiviteter i hele Den Europžiske Union i den medlemsstat, han er etableret i. 
(3) A system whereby a trader could fulfil his value added tax (VAT) obligations for his activities across the European Union solely in the Member State in which he is established.
C 20/16 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende Tabel 4 Anvendelse af andre instrumenter 25.1.2008 Embedsmžnd til stede i administrationslokaler i andre medlemsstater 2005 2006 Belgien 830035 Den Tjekkiske Republik 0 0 0 0 0 0 Danmark i/o0i/o000 Tyskland 050173 Deltagelse i administrative undersżgelser Foretagne samtidige kontroller 2005 2006 2005 2006 Estland Gržkenland Spanien Frankrig 101044 Irland 111032 Italien i/oi/oi/oi/o00 Cypern 000000 Letland 000000 Litauen 000000 Luxembourg i/o0i/o000 Ungarn 000001 i/o0i/o00 1 i/o0i/o0i/o 0 0i/o0i/o0 0 Malta Nederlandene Żstrig Polen Portugal Slovenien Slovakiet Finland Sverige Det Forenede Kongerige i/o0i/o0i/o0 1331101 010004 000000 000000 000000 000000 000110 120002 700002 Ialt 19 15 5 3 28 25 Kilde: Medlemsstaternes statistikker i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1925/2004. i/o Ń Medlemsstaterne har ikke opgivet tal. 2006-statistikkerne er forelżbige. 
C 20/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 25.1.2008 Table 4 Use of other instruments Number of presences in administrative offices in other MS 2005 Belgium 830035 Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 Denmark n/c0n/c000 Germany 050173 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 Number of participations in administrative enquiries in other MS Number of simultaneous controls organised Estonia Greece Spain France 101044 Ireland 111032 Italy n/cn/cn/cn/c00 Cyprus 000000 Latvia 000000 Lithuania 000000 Luxembourg n/c0n/c000 Hungary 000001 n/c0n/c001 n/c0n/c0n/c0 0 n/c 0 n/c 0 0 Malta The Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Slovenia Slovak Republic Finland Sweden United Kingdom n/c0n/c0n/c0 1331101 010004 000000 000000 000000 000000 000110 120002 700002 Total 19 15 5 3 28 25 Source: Member State statistics pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1925/2004. n/c Ń Figures not communicated by the Member States.
Samtidig og multilateral kontrol 73. 
Simultaneous and multilateral controls 73.
I henhold til forordningens artikel 12 kan to eller flere medlemsstater p hver sit omrde foretage samtidig kontrol af en eller flere erhvervsdrivendes skattemžssige situation, som er af fžlles eller komplementžr interesse. 
Article 12 of the regulation allows for two or more Member States to conduct simultaneous controls, in their own territory, on the tax situation of one or more operators who are of common or complementary interest.
Efter forordningen skal en medlemsstat udpege den afgiftspligtige person, den har til hensigt at foresl samtidig kontrol af. 
The regulation provides that a Member State shall identify the taxable person whom it intends to propose for a simultaneous control.
De żvrige berżrte medlemsstater skal derefter beslutte, om de żnsker at deltage i den samtidige kontrol. 
The other Member States concerned shall then decide whether they wish to take part in the simultaneous controls.
I 2006 blev der rapporteret om i alt 25 (1) sdanne samtidige kontroller. 
In 2006, a total of 25 (1) such simultaneous controls were reported.
(1) Tallet kan omfatte dobbelttžllinger, da nogle kontroller blev ivžrksat p fžlles initiativ. 
(1) This figure may include some double-counting, as some controls were jointly initiated.
Samtidig kontrol kan have form af multilateral kontrol som fastsat i beslutningen om Fiscalis-programmet. 
Simultaneous controls can take place in the form of multilateral controls as provided by the decision on the Fiscalis Programme.
I henhold til denne beslutning afholder Fžllesskabet rejse-og opholdsudgifter. 
Under this decision, funding for travel and subsistence expenses is available.
Proceduren for ivžrksžttelse og gennemfżrelse af sdanne kontroller, som typisk kržver megen koordinering, er blevet forenklet og pržciseret vžsentligt (2). 
The procedure to launch and conduct such controls which typically involve a high need for coordination, has been significantly simplified and clarified (2).
I 2005 ivžrksatte fem forskellige medlemsstater i alt 12 sdanne multilaterale kontroller. 
In 2005, a total of 12 such multilateral controls were organised by 5 different Member States.
Det er flere end i rene 2001-2004 (3), men fžrre end i rekordret 2000, hvor der blev udfżrt 16 multilaterale kontroller. 
Although this was a higher figure than in the years 2001 to 2004 (3), it falls short of the peak reached in 2000 when 16 multilateral controls took place.
(2) Multilateral Control Guide Ń Version 2004. 
(2) Multilateral Control Guide Ń Version 2004.
(3) rligt antal multilaterale kontroller: 2001: 8 ivžrksat af 6 medlemsstater Ń 2002: 5 ivžrksat af 5 medlemsstater Ń 2003: 3 ivžrksat af 2 medlemsstater Ń 2004: 7 ivžrksat af 6 medlemsstater. 
(3) Annual number of MLCs: 2001: 8 organised by 6 MS; 2002: 5 organised by 5 MS; 2003; 3 organised by 2 MS, 2004: 7 organised by 6 MS.
25.1.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 20/17 77. 
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/17 77.
Ifżlge de nederlandske myndigheder kan sdanne kontroller fżre til, at der plžgges betydelige belżb i supplerende moms. 
According to the Dutch authorities, such controls can lead to the imposition of significant amounts of additional VAT.
I n af de tre multilaterale kontroller, som blev ivžrksat af Nederlandene og afsluttet i 2005, blev der fastlagt et supplerende momsbelżb p i alt 35 millioner euro. 
In one of the three multilateral controls organised by the Netherlands and finalised in 2005, a further VAT amount of 35 million euro was established.
Skattemyndighederne i Luxembourg rapporterede (1) om et tilfžlde, hvor en multilateral kontrol, som det igennem mere end tre r havde gennemfżrt sammen med de britiske myndigheder, resulterede i, at det lykkedes at afslżre et netvžrk, som stod bag svindel med mobiltelefoner til 80 millioner euro. 
The tax administration in Luxembourg reported (1) a case where a multilateral control conducted over more than three years together with the UK authorities resulted in the successful dismantling of a network behind an 80 million euro fraud with mobile phones.
Kommissionens fremme og evaluering af det administrative samarbejde 78. 
Promotion and evaluation of administrative cooperation by the Commission 78.
I henhold til forordningen har Kommissionen til opgave at stżtte og fremme det administrative samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne og evaluere det i samarbejde med dem. 
The regulation attributes to the Commission the role of supporting and promoting administrative cooperation between Member States and to evaluate it together with them.
Desuden skal Kommissionen samle medlemsstaternes erfaringer med henblik p at forbedre samarbejdet. 
Furthermore, the Commission is required to pool the Member StatesŐ experience with the aim of improving cooperation.
I SCAC har Kommissionen stillet forslag til forbedring af det administrative samarbejde. 
In the SCAC, the Commission has made proposals for improving administrative cooperation.
Eksempler herp er Kommissionens initiativ til forkortelse af tidsfristerne for udarbejdelse af oversigter over leveringer inden for Fžllesskabet eller forslaget om, at VIES skal give flere oplysninger om de erhvervsdrivende. 
Examples are the initiative of the Commission to reduce the timeframes for the production of recapitulative statements of intra-Community supplies or the suggestion to provide more information about traders in VIES.
Hovedparten af disse forslag er ikke blevet fulgt. 
Most of these proposals were not followed.
P anmodning af SCAC har Kommissionen udformet en sžrlig formular (ČTrend formÇ), som skal bruges til at oplyse om de udviklinger, der konstateres i forbindelse med svig, der involverer strmandsselskaber (Čmissing traderÇ-svig). 
At the request of the SCAC, the Commission has designed a specific form (Trend form) to indicate developments in the operations of Missing Trader Fraud.
Men hidtil har ingen af medlemsstaterne brugt formularen til at give oplysninger med. 
However, so far no Member State has used the form to provide information.
Og Kommissionen har heller ikke fet oplysninger om alle bilaterale aftaler mellem medlemsstaterne om de spżrgsml, forordningen džkker. 
Likewise, the Commission has not been informed of all bilateral agreements between Member States on matters covered by the regulation.
I sin meddelelse fra 2006 om det nżdvendige i, at der udvikles en samordnet strategi til forbedring af bekžmpelsen af skattesvig (2), erklžrede Kommissionen, at den fandt, at tiden var inde til at indfżre et overvgningssystem p grundlag af kvantificerbare indikatorer for at sikre, at hver enkelt medlemsstat var i stand til at yde de żvrige medlemsstater effektiv bistand og rent faktisk ogs gjorde det. 
In its 2006 communication concerning the need to develop a co-ordinated strategy to improve the fight against fiscal fraud (2), the Commission stated that it considered that the moment had come to set up a monitoring system, on the basis of quantifiable indicators, in order to ensure that each Member State is able to and actually does provide efficient assistance to other Member States.
Men forelżbig har Kommissionen ikke stillet noget konkret forslag til lovgivning om indfżrelse af et sdant overvgningssystem. 
However, so far the Commission has not made any concrete legislative proposal for the introduction of such a monitoring system.
Tre r after, at forordningen var trdt i kraft, havde Kommissionen i żvrigt endnu ikke evalueret organisationsstrukturen for det administrative samarbejde i medlemsstaternes og vurderet, om det er i overensstemmelse med forordningen. 
Furthermore, three years after the entry into force of the regulation, the organisational set-up for administrative cooperation in the Member States and its compliance with the regulation had not yet been assessed by the Commission.
(1) Administration de lŐenregistrement et des domaines, Rapport dŐactivit 2006, s. 
(1) Administration de lŐenregistrement et des domaines, Rapport dŐactivit 2006, p.
(2) KOM(2006) 254 endelig, dateret 31.5.2006. 
(2) COM(2006) 254 final, dated 31.5.2006.
I henhold til forordningens artikel 41, stk. 2, kan kommissionsansatte udelukkende f adgang til de udvekslede oplysninger, hvis det er nżdvendigt med henblik p vedligeholdelse og udvikling af kommunikationsnetvžrket. 
Pursuant to Article 41(2) of the regulation, access of Commission staff to the information exchanged is limited to what is necessary for maintenance and development of the communication network.
Nr Kommissionen ikke har adgang til indholdet af de udvekslede operationelle oplysninger, kan den ikke selv skaffe sig den indsigt, der er nżdvendig for at kunne afslżre rsagerne til problemerne og foresl lżsninger. 
Without access to the contents of the operational information exchanged, the Commission cannot gain on its own all the insights necessary to detect the reasons for problems and put forward solutions.
Andre hindringer for et effektivt samarbejde 84. 
Other constraints on effective cooperation 84.
Under revisionen blev der identificeret en ržkke andre problemer, som forhindrer, at de potentielle fordele ved samarbejdet udnyttes fuldt ud, eller lžgger hindringer i vejen for mulige forbedringer. 
During the course of the audit, a number of other problems were identified which prevent the potential benefits of cooperation from being fully exploited or constrain possible improvements.
Ingen fžlles regler for inddragelse af momsregistreringsnumre 85. 
No common rules for withdrawing VAT identification numbers 85.
Żjeblikkelig inddragelse af en virksomheds momsregistreringsnummer er et vigtigt redskab til standsning af svigagtig virksomhed og til beskyttelse af žrlige erhvervsdrivende. 
The prompt withdrawal of a traderŐs VAT identification number is an important tool to stop fraudulent activities and to protect honest entrepreneurs.
Ud fra en analyse af den relevante fžllesskabslovgivning (3) kan det sluttes, at erhvervsdrivende, som ikke udfżrer nogen reel żkonomisk virksomhed, men kun er involveret i transaktioner, der efterligner sdan virksomhed i forbindelse med momssvig, ikke har ret til et momsregistreringsnummer. 
From an analysis of the relevant Community legislation (3), it can be concluded that traders who do not carry out any real economic activity, but only engage in transactions simulating such activity in the context of VAT fraud are not entitled to have a VAT identification number.
I fžllesskabslovgivningen er der dog ikke fastlagt procedurer eller betingelser for, hvornr et momsregistreringsnummer skal annulleres, som f.eks. i tilfžlde, hvor en erhvervsdrivende er involveret i bde lovlig żkonomisk virksomhed og i svigagtige transaktioner. 
However, Community legislation does not lay down procedures or conditions under which VAT identification numbers must be cancelled, for example in cases where traders are involved both in legal economic activity and in fraudulent operations.
Sdanne tilfžlde er underlagt de forskellige nationale lovgivninger og praksis. 
Such cases are subject to diverse national legislation and practice.
Under revisionsbesżgene fik Retten oplyst, at det i nogle medlemsstater (4) er meget vanskeligt at retsforfżlge personer, der er involveret i svigordninger, f.eks. deltagelse i kžder etableret med henblik p karruselsvig, nr det kun er andre medlemsstater, der bliver bedraget. 
Difficulties in cross-border prosecution 88. During its audit missions, the Court was informed that in some of the Member States (4), it is very difficult to prosecute persons involved in fraudulent schemes, for example participating in chains set up for carousel fraud, where only other Member States are defrauded.
Det overordnede revisionsorgan i Det Forenede Kongerige rapporterede (5), at skattemyndighederne i Danmark havde oplyst det om sin mistanke om, at nogle danske selskaber var involveret i forsyningskžder med Čmissing tradersÇ i Det Forenede Kongerige. 
The UK National Audit Office (NAO) reported (5) that Danish tax authorities had informed them that they suspected some Danish companies were involved in supply chains with missing traders in the UK.
Der var dog ikke noget afgiftstab i Danmark, s der kunne kun ivžrksžttes begržnsede kriminalefterforskninger. 
However, there was no tax loss in Denmark and therefore only limited criminal investigations could be undertaken.
(3) Rdets direktiv 2006/112/EF af 28.11.2006 om det fžlles mervžrdiafgiftssystem. 
(3) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.
(4) Frankrig og Luxembourg. 
(4) France and Luxembourg.
(5) Jf. punkt 4.32 i det overordnede britiske revisionsorgans almindelige beretning dateret 7.7.2006 og offentliggjort sammen med rsregnskabet for skatte-og toldmyndighederne i Det Forenede Kongerige for 2005-06. 
(5) See paragraph 4.32 of the Comptroller and Auditor GeneralŐs Standard Report dated 7 July 2006 and published alongside the 2005 to 2006 Accounts of HM Revenue & Customs.
C 20/18 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 25.1.2008 90. 
C 20/18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 25.1.2008 90.
Det fżderale tyske revisionsorgan rapporterede (1), at det ikke var net frem til aftaler med andre medlemsstater med henblik p at retsforfżlge momssvig inden for Fžllesskabet, og at erhvervsdrivende, der er involveret i denne form for svig, efter tysk lovgivning kun kunne retsforfżlges, hvis der var indget sdanne aftaler. 
The German Federal Court of Auditors reported (1) that no mutual agreements with other Member States had been reached in order to prosecute intra-Community VAT fraud. The existence of such agreements were, according to German legislation, the precondition for prosecuting traders involved in this type of fraud.
For at bekžmpe svig skal hver medlemsstat i henhold til konventionen om beskyttelse af De Europžiske Fžllesskabers finansielle interesser (2) i sin nationale lovgivning fastsžtte strafferetlige sanktioner, der er effektive, str i et rimeligt forhold til overtrždelsen og har en afskržkkende virkning, og samarbejde effektivt med andre medlemsstater. 
The Convention on the protection of the European CommunitiesŐ financial interests (2) stipulates that each Member State is to establish effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties in their national law to combat fraud and to cooperate effectively with other Member States.
I henhold til konventionens artikel 1 finder den ogs anvendelse i tilfžlde, hvor den svigagtige handling medfżrer en uretmžssig formindskelse af indtžgterne p EUŐs budget. 
Article 1 of the Convention provides that it also applies in cases where fraud results in the illegal diminution of the resources of the EU budget.
Men ifżlge en forklarende rapport (3) vedrżrende konventionen, som Rdet har godkendt, omfatter den ikke moms (4). 
However, according to an explanatory report (3) on the Convention adopted by the Council, VAT was excluded from its scope (4).
Utilstržkkelig kvantificering og analyse af momssvig 92. 
Insufficient quantification and analysis of VAT fraud 92.
Medlemsstaterne eller Kommissionen kan fżrst mlrette foranstaltningerne til forebyggelse af momssvig inden for Fžllesskabet effektivt, nr der foreligger plidelige overslag over den svig, der finder sted, herunder oplysninger om de erhvervssektorer, der isžr er impliceret. 
Action to prevent intra-Community VAT fraud cannot be effectively targeted by Member States, or the Commission, until they have reliable estimates of fraud occurring, including information about the economic sectors most concerned.
Kommissionen har endnu ikke udviklet en velfungerende fžlles mde at gżre dette p. 
The Commission has not yet developed a successful common approach on how to achieve this.
I sin resolution af 12. december 2006 om fremme af aktiviteter p omrdet mervžrdiafgift gav Kontaktkomiten (5) en arbejdsgruppe bemyndigelse til at udarbejde anbefalinger til n enkelt model for beregning af momstab. 
In its resolution of 12 December 2006 on promoting activities in the field of value added tax, the Contact Committee (5) mandated a working group to produce recommendations for a single model for estimating VAT losses.
Medlemsstaterne vil ogs kunne bruge en sdan fžlles metode til at f fastslet, om svigen virkelig er blevet bekžmpet effektivt, eller om bekžmpelsen af momssvig blot har medfżrt, at svigen nu foregr i andre erhvervssektorer eller andre medlemsstater. 
Such a common approach would also allow Member States to determine whether the fight against fraud was genuinely successful, or whether tackling VAT fraud just resulted in it being displaced to other economic sectors or other Member States.
KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER Konklusioner 94. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions 94.
Trods de nye ordninger, der blev indfżrt i 2004, er det administrative samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne p momsomrdet stadig ikke intensivt nok til at f bugt med momsunddragelse og -svig inden for Fžllesskabet. 
Despite new arrangements introduced in 2004, administrative cooperation between Member States in the field of VAT is still not intensive enough to cope with intra-Community VAT evasion and fraud.
(2) Konventionenblevudarbejdeti1995pgrundlagafartikelK.3itrak-taten om Den Europžiske Union (EFT C 316 af 27.11.1995, s. 
(2) The Convention was drawn up in 1995 on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union (OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p.
(3) EFT C 191 af 23.6.1997, s. 
(3) OJ C 191, 23.6.1997, p.
(4) Dette problem er allerede blevet beskrevet i sžrberetning nr. 9/98, punkt 2.3-2.9. 
(4) The problem was already described in Special Report No 9/98, paragraphs 2.3 to 2.9.
(5) Kontaktkomiten er sammensat af formžndene for de overordnede revisionsorganer i Den Europžiske Union. 
(5) The Contact Committee consists of the heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union.
Indtil nu har hovedparten af medlemsstaterne ikke fuldt ud udnyttet fžllesskabslovgivningens muligheder for at dekoncentrere befżjelser til og ansvar for direkte kontakter med skattemyndighederne i andre medlemsstater til deres lokale eller regionale skattekontorer (jf. punkt 19-23). 
So far, most Member States have not fully exploited the possibilities provided by the Community legislation to devolve competence and responsibility for direct contacts with tax authorities in other Member States to their local or regional tax offices (see paragraphs 19 to 23).
Udvekslingen af oplysninger efter anmodning, som er et vigtigt instrument i det administrative samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne, er pvirket af, at mange af svarene afgives for sent, og at der ikke gives forelżbige svar. 
The exchange of information upon request, a major instrument of administrative cooperation between Member States, is affected by a high proportion of late replies and by the absence of interim replies.
Men frekvensen af for sent afgivne svar varierer meget fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat (jf. punkt 24-31). 
The frequency of late replies varies, however, considerably between Member States (see paragraphs 24 to 31).
Hovedparten af de forsinkede svar skyldes, at de lokale skattekontorer ikke prioriterer anmodningerne sžrlig hżjt. 
Most of the delays in responding to requests occur due to a lack of priority given to requests by local tax offices.
Svagheder ved overvgningssystemerne og/eller i de centrale forbindelseskontorers organisationsstruktur i nogle medlemsstater er medvirkende rsager til forsinkelserne (jf. punkt 32-42). 
Weaknesses in the monitoring systems and/or in the organisational set-up of Central Liaison Offices in some Member States are other reasons which also contribute to delays (see paragraphs 32 to 42).
Evalueringerne viser, at samarbejdet giver resultater. 
Evaluations show that cooperation leads to results.
Nr anmodningerne besvares efter reglerne, gżr de det ofte muligt at afslżre svig eller f bekržftet, at den finder sted, og de kan medfżre, at der opkržves supplerende moms. 
Where requests are answered in accordance with the rules, they often allow to reveal or confirm the existence of fraud and may result in the collection of additional VAT.
Der er dog nogen bekymring for, at de oplysninger, der udveksles i sager, hvor der foreligger mistanke om Čmissing tradersÇ, ikke altid er af s god kvalitet, at der p det grundlag kan gennemfżres en retssag mod bedragerne (jf. punkt 43-49). 
However, there are some concerns that the quality of information exchanged on suspected missing traders is not always sufficient to serve as a basis for successful legal action against the fraudsters (see paragraphs 43 to 49).
Rammerne for udveksling af oplysninger uden forudgende anmodning er ikke defineret godt nok. 
The framework for exchanges of information without prior request is not well defined.