natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionens sukkerenhed beregner forbrugstal-let p grundlag af produktions-og handelsdata, som medlemsstaterne indsender i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 779/96 (3). 
The Commission sugar unit derives the consumption figure from data sent in by the Member States on production and trade in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 779/ 96 (3).
Kommissionen kontrollerer imidlertid ikke, om disse data er plidelige. 
However, no checks are carried out by the Commission to verify the reliability of these data.
Retten sammenlignede data fra en ržkke medlemsstater vedrżrende handelen inden for EU og konstaterede vžsentlige forskelle. 
In comparing data on intra-EU trade from several Member States significant differences were noted.
Dataene viser, at der i 1998/99 blev leveret i alt 171 000 tons hvidt sukker til andre EU-medlemsstater. Disse mžngder var ikke registreret som modtaget. 
A total of 171 000 tonnes of white sugar in 1998/1999 are shown as delivered to other EU Member States but not recorded as received.
De stżrste forskelle vedrżrte tyske leverancer (492 000 tons i 1998/99 ifżlge de tyske data), som modtagerlandene kun havde registreret som 379 000 tons. 
The main differences concerned German deliveries (492 000 tonnes in 1998/1999 according to the German data) which were recorded as receipts only of 379 000 tonnes by the other countries.
P samme mde viser franske data leverancer p 965 000 tons, men kun 901 000 tons var registreret af modtagerlandene. 
Similarly, French data shows deliveries of 965 000 tonnes whereas only 901 000 tonnes were recorded as receipts.
De samlede leverancer fra alle EU-landene til Spanien var p 406 000 tons, men Spanien havde kun registreret 333 000 tons. 
Deliveries from all EU countries to Spain amounted to 406 000 tonnes whereas Spain only recorded receipts of 333 000 tonnes.
Kommissionen bżr derfor bestržbe sig p at bruge mere plidelige data, for eksempel ved at anvende eksport-og importcertifikater ved opgżrelsen af net-toeksporten. 
Efforts should therefore be made to use more reliable data, for example by using export and import certificates to establish the net exports.
Administration, kontrol og finansielle ordninger 59. 
Administrative, control and financial arrangements of the CMO 59.
Medlemsstaterne er ansvarlige for administrationen og kontrollen af den fžlles markedsordning, men Kommissionen har det overordnede ansvar for at sikre, at alle ordninger og systemer under markedsordningen fungerer hensigtsmžssigt. 
Member States have clear responsibilities for administration and control of the CMO, but the Commission has overall responsibility to ensure that these arrangements function well.
Ansvaret for at overvge medlemsstaternes administration og kontrol er delt mellem to sektorer i Kommissionen (for udgifternes vedkommende Generaldirektoratet for Landbrugs afdeling for regnskabsafslutning og for indtžgternes vedkommende Generaldirektoratet for Budget). Begge sektorer lžgger mest vžgt p at kontrollere, om lagerfortegnelserne er nżjagtige. 
Responsibilities within the Commission for monitoring the administrative and control arrangements are divided. For both sectors involved (DG Agriculture, Clearance section, for expenditure and DG Budget for receipts), the key controls centre on the accuracy of the stock records.
Begge sektorer benytter risikoanalyse, men de anvender forskellige metoder. 
However, while both use risk analysis, the methodology followed in assessing the risks differs.
Gene-(1) EFT C 312 af 12.12.1989, s. 
Whereas DG BudgetŐs checks are performed frequently, no on-the-(1) OJ C 312, 12.12.1989, p.
(2) EFT C 290 af 7.11.1991. 
(2) OJ C 290, 7.11.1991.
(3) EFT L 106 af 30.4.1996. raldirektoratet for Budget foretager hyppigt kontrol, Generaldirektoratet for Landbrugs afdeling for regnskabsafslutning har ikke foretaget kontrol p stedet af produktion og lagre de seneste fem r. 
(3) OJ L 106, 30.4.1996. spot verification of production and stocks was undertaken during the last five years by DG Agriculture, Clearance section.
I 1999 Ń for fżrste gang i mange r Ń foretog den imidlertid en undersżgelse af eksportrestitutionerne til sukker i nogle medlemsstater. 
However in 1999 it did investigate sugar export refunds in some Member States for the first time in many years.
Der er dog ikke fastlagt en fžlles overvgningsstrategi, og sukkerenheden involveres ikke, nr risiciene skal vurderes. 
No overall monitoring strategy has been developed, and the Sugar unit is not involved in assessing the risks.
Retten bemžrkede under sine besżg i medlemsstaterne, at Kommissionen ikke havde udarbejdet en vejledning med Čbest practiceÇ-normer for kontrolmekanismer. 
In the Member States that the Court visited it was noted that the Commission had not issued guidance on best practice in the design of control mechanisms.
Derfor er det meget forskelligt, hvor hyppigt der foretages kontrol, og der fżlges mange forskellige kontrolstrategier. 
This has led to the development of very different control frequencies and a wide range of control strategies.
I n medlemsstat foretages der for eksempel fysisk kontrol af lżst indladet sukker i alle lagre hver mned, mens der slet ikke foretages fysisk kontrol i en anden medlemsstat. 
For example, physical checks on bulk sugar are performed every month on all stocks in one Member State but not at all in another.
De anvendte metoder spžnder lige fra avanceret kontrol med laserudstyr til opmlinger ved hjžlp af reb eller blot afstemning af lagerfortegnelser i forbindelse med tżmning af lagre. 
The methodologies followed vary from sophisticated checks with laser equipment, to measurement using ropes, to simple reconciliations of stock records at the time of emptying storage facilities.
De fleste af de besżgte medlemsstater forlader sig fuldt og helt p de opgżrelser over sukkerproduktionen, som udarbejdes af virksomhederne. De informationssystemer, som udarbejder disse opgżrelser, bliver imidlertid ikke revideret af medlemsstaternes inspektżrer, og opgżrelserne afstemmes ikke med virksomhedernes regnskaber. 
In most Member States visited it was noted that almost total reliance is placed on sugar production records prepared by the companies but that the information systems that create these records are not audited by the Member StatesŐ inspectors and the records are not reconciled to the companiesŐ financial accounts.
Plidelige lagerfortegnelser har afgżrende betydning for beregningen af svel produktions-som lagerafgifter. 
Reliable stock records are of key importance for the calculation of the production, as well as storage levies.
Derfor bżr Kommissionen fastlžgge en sammenhžngende kontrolstrategi og vejlede medlemsstaterne om Čbest practiceÇ-mindstekrav. 
For this reason the Commission should develop a coherent control strategy and give guidance on good practices and minimum standards.
Kommissionens reaktioner over for de forskellige interesseparter og p begivenheder, der pvirker den fžlles markedsordning 64. 
The CommissionŐs responsiveness to the various stakeholders and to events affecting the CMO 64.
Dog mente de industrier, der anvender sukker, samt forbrugerrepržsentanterne, at der blev taget for lidt hensyn til deres interesser. 
However, industrial users of sugar and the final consumersŐ representatives were of the opinion that insufficient account is taken of their interests.
To vžsentlige begivenheder, som indvirkede p den fžlles markedsordning i 1999, gav anledning til kritik af Kommissionens forvaltning. 
For two major events affecting the CMO in 1999, the soundness of the CommissionŐs management was criticised.
Den fżrste var fastsžttelsen af eksportrestitutionssatser for forarbejdede produkter, som indeholder sukker, hvor Kommissionen i sidste żjeblik og uden varsel og skriftlig begrundelse forelagde Forvaltningskomiten for Produkter, der ikke Omfattes af Bilag I, forslag om nedsžttelser p 10 %. 
The first related to the fixing of export refunds on processed products containing sugar, where the Commission put forward proposals for cuts of 10 % to the Non-Annex 1 Management Committee at the last moment, without notice and with no written justification.
Disse forslag var ikke baseret p en żkonomisk analyse eller andre relevante data, og de blev mżdt med stžrke protester fra eksportvirksomhederne og medlemsstaterne. 
These initial proposals were not based on an economic analysis or other valid supporting data and were met by strong protest from exporting companies and Member States.
Det endte med, at Kommissionen fremlagde et velbegrundet forslag om en mindre omfattende nedsžttelse af restitutionssatserne og om tilpasninger af stżttekriterierne, s restitutionerne blev tildelt de forarbejdede produkter, som havde mest brug for stżtte. Dette forslag blev imidlertid afvist af forvaltningskomiten. 
In the end the Commission presented a well-based proposal for a lower level of cut in the export refunds and adaptations of the conditions for allocating the refunds to those processed products most in need, although this was rejected by the Management Committee.
15.2.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 50/13 67. 
15.2.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 50/13 67.
Det andet kritikpunkt var, at Kommissionen ikke havde forelagt de fastlagte rammer for en gennemgribende evaluering af den fžlles markedsordning for sukker for forvaltningskomiten. 
In the second case the Commission did not consult the Management Committee on the terms of reference for a major evaluation of the CMO for sugar.
GENNEMGANG AF SUKKERORDNINGEN Indledning 68. 
REVIEW OF THE SUGAR REGIME Introduction 68.
Som nžvnt i punkt 8 mener Retten, at det falder ind under Kommissionens forvaltningsansvar at indhente og offentliggżre korrekte oplysninger om resultaterne af sukkerpolitikken. 
As indicated under paragraph 8 the Court considers that it is a fundamental management responsibility of the Commission to obtain and disseminate sound information on the outcomes of the policy.
Kommissionen ivžrksatte i marts 1999 en evaluering af politikken i sukkersektoren, den fżrste evaluering siden den fžlles markedsordning blev oprettet i 1968. 
The Commission launched an evaluation of the policy in the sugar sector in March 1999, the first since the CMO was introduced in 1968.
Ifżlge de fastlagte rammer for denne evaluering skulle det undersżges, om de gžldende foranstaltninger er relevante, effektive og produktive. 
The terms of reference of the evaluation focus on the relevance of the measures in force, as well as their effectiveness and efficiency.
Da denne beretning var under udarbejdelse (juni 2000), havde Retten ikke adgang til resultaterne af evalueringen. 
At the moment of drafting this report (June 2000) the Court did not have access to the results of this evaluation.
Retten er derfor ikke i stand til at bedżmme dens kvalitet og kan heller ikke tage hensyn til resultaterne. a) Roedyrkerne er sikret en hżj indtžgt pr. hektar (op til dobbelt s meget som ved dyrkning af andre afgrżder). b) Markedet er stabilt (der er ingen prissvingninger af betydning). c) Forsyningerne er garanteret (selv i r med drlig hżst er der sukker nok). d) Produktiviteten er żget (stżrre roeudbytte, hżjere sukkerind-hold, hżjere udmalingsgrad og mekanisering). Denne udvikling har imidlertid ikke vžret helt rationel, for nationale kvoter har forhindret, at produktionen er flyttet til de mest produktive omrder. De hżje priser p sukkerroer i forhold til andre afgrżder har indvirket p fordelingen af ressourcer. 
However, on the basis of the information available it can be concluded that for the general CAP objectives for the CMO as set out in the Treaty: (a) a good revenue, per hectare, for beet growers is ensured (up to twice that from alternative crops); (b) the market is stable (no significant price fluctuations); (c) supply is guaranteed (no shortages even in years of poor har-vests); (d) productivity has improved (increased beet yields, sugar content, extraction rates, mechanisation); this development has not been entirely rational, however, as national quotas have prevented production moving to the most efficient areas; the high prices of sugar beet in relation to other crops have affected the allocation of resources.
Med hensyn til det femte ml for den fžlles landbrugspolitik Ń at sikre forbrugerne rimelige priser Ń m det konstateres, at det kun er i Japan og Schweiz, at sukkerpriserne er hżjere end i EU. 
In regard to the fifth CAP objective, a reasonable price for consumers, only in Japan and Switzerland are sugar prices higher than in the EU.
Da revisionen fandt sted, var EUŐs institutionelle priser mere end tre gange s hżje som priserne p verdensmarkedet. 
At the time of the audit, the EU institutional prices were more than three times world market levels.
I sit svar udtaler Kommissionen, at priserne er hżje i mange andre lande. 
The CommissionŐs reply indicates that high prices exist in many other countries.
Den siger imidlertid ikke noget om, hvorvidt EUŐs priser er rimelige. 
However, it does not address the issue of whether the EUŐs prices are reasonable.
Med hensyn til traktatens mlsžtning om at bidrage til en harmonisk udvikling af verdenshandelen m det konstateres, at den store stigning i kvoteproduktionen i EU i 1970Őerne og 1980Őerne (jf. figur 2) har pvirket verdensmarkedet, og at verdensmarkedsprisen er blevet pvirket af den subsidierede EU-eksport og den store produktion af C-sukker. 
In respect of the Treaty objective of contributing to the harmonious development of world trade, the considerable expansion of EU quota production in the 1970s and 1980s (see Chart 2) has had an impact on the world market and the world market price has been influenced by subsidised EU exports and high production of C sugar.
Desuden har pržferencepriser p importeret rżrsukker bevirket, at nogle AVS-lande i hżj grad er żkonomisk afhžngige af ordningen (jf. punkt 42-45). 
Equally, preferential prices for cane sugar imports have led to a high degree of dependence in some ACP countries (see paragraphs 42 to 45).
Der er sjžldent alvorlige konflikter mellem dyrkere og fabrikanter, hvilket vidner om, at begge parter er tilfredse med de priser, de fr. 
There are few serious conflicts between growers and processors, which indicates that both parties are satisfied with the prices they receive.
Da det er forarbejdningsvirksomhederne, der fr tildelt kvoterne, er roedyrkerne imidlertid nżdt til at indg kontrakt med en virksomhed for at kunne opn den fžlles markedsordnings basispris for sukkerroer. 
However, as it is the processor that holds the quotas, beet growers must obtain a contract with the factories in order to be able to benefit from the CMO minimum beet prices.
Ovenstende gennemgang viser, at mange af mlene for den fžlles landbrugspolitik og den fžlles markedsordning faktisk bliver net. 
The above review shows that many of the CAP and CMO objectives are being achieved.
Disse resultater m dog ses i sammenhžng med de dermed forbundne omkostninger, som hovedsagelig bžres af forbrugerne. 
However, these achievements must be viewed in the light of the associated costs, which fall largely on the consumer.
C 50/14 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 15.2.2001 Omkostningerne forbundet med opfyldelsen af mlene 78. 
C 50/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.2.2001 The costs of achieving the objectives 78.
Det har kržvet omkostninger at n mlene for den fžlles landbrugspolitik og den fžlles markedsordning: a) en strukturbetinget overproduktion af sukker b) hżje interne priser i forhold til priserne p verdensmarkedet c) store lagre d) et stžrkt reguleret marked, som ikke tilskynder til konkurrence e) omkostningstung administration og kontrol. 
The costs of achieving the CAP and CMOŐs objectives can be seen in several negative outcomes: (a) a structural surplus in the production of sugar; (b) a high level of internal prices in relation to world market prices; (c) a high level of stocks; (d) a highly regulated framework which does not encourage competition; (e) the need for costly administration and controls.
Retten fandt ingen plidelige, uafhžngige beregninger af alle disse omkostninger under revisionen, men det er muligt at opstille nogle grundlžggende indikatorer, som giver et rimeligt billede af omfanget. 
Whilst the audit did not identify reliable independent assessments of all of these costs, it is possible to establish basic indicators that give a reasonable view of their magnitude.
I henhold til budgettet for 2000 belaster det strukturbetingede overskud rligt budgettet med netto 800 millioner euro, svarende til de samlede omkostninger i forbindelse med eksport af overskudssukker (ca. 1 600 millioner euro) minus produktionsafgifterne. 
The net annual cost of the structural surplus to the EU budget is 800 million euro in the 2000 budget, being the total cost of exporting surplus sugar (approximately 1 600 million euro) less the levies on production.
Under selvfinansieringsordningen betaler forarbejdningsvirksomhederne produktionsafgifter til džkning af omkostningerne ved eksport af ca. halvdelen af overskuddet. 
Under the self-financing system, processing companies pay production levies to cover the cost of exporting approximately half of the surplus.
P grund af den lave elasticitet i efterspżrgslen p sukker kan forarbejdningsvirksomhederne indregne disse afgifter i prisen p sukker, og dermed betales omkostningerne p 800 millioner euro for denne del af overskuddet i sidste ende af EUŐs forbrugere. 
Given the low elasticity of demand for sugar, the processing companies are able to pass on these levies in the price of sugar and so the 800 million euro cost of this part of the surplus is ultimately borne by the EUŐs consumers.
De żkonomiske omkostninger i forbindelse med de hżje EU-priser kan kun opgżres ved hjžlp af detaljerede undersżgelser. 
The economic cost of the high level of EU prices can only be established through detailed studies.
Der er foretaget flere sdanne undersżgelser, men der hersker tvivl om deres uafhžngighed. 
Several are available but their independence has been questioned.
Den enkleste mde at mle omkostningerne p er at beregne differencen mellem EUŐs stżttepris og prisenpverdensmarkedet.Ensdanberegningviser,atdemak-simale rlige omkostninger for EUŐs forbrugere belżber sig til ca. 6 500 millioner euro (1). 
The simplest measure of the cost is the difference between the EU support price and the world market price, which would indicate a maximum annual cost to the EU consumer of around 6 500 million euro (1).
Den nuvžrende lave verdensmarkedspris kan ganske vist ikke betragtes som en objektiv indikator for omkostningerne, men denne enkle beregning viser, hvilken stżrrelsesorden der kan vžre tale om. 
However, the current low world market price cannot be considered a fully objective indicator. Nevertheless, this simple calculation illustrates the possible magnitude of the cost.
Den gennemsnitlige lagerbeholdning de sidste fem r, ca. 2 millioner tons hvidt sukker, kan give en ide om, hvilke omkostninger der er forbundet med de store sukkerlagre. 
An indication of the cost of the high level of stocks can be obtained on the basis of the average stocks over the last five years; around 2 million tonnes of white sugar.
Disse ca. 2 millioner tons svarer til 14 % af kvoteproduktionen, men Kommissionen har kun fastsat et minimum p 3 % (ca. 
This represents 14 % of quota production, whereas the Commission has established a level of 3 % (around 0,4 million tonnes) as the minimum necessary to cover unexpected shortages (2).
Omkostningerne džkkes af lagerafgiften, der 1 (2) Baseret p Kommissionens reviderede budgetoverslag for 2000. () Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1436/96 (EFT L 184 af 24.7.1996, s. 
The annual costs of storage are 1 (2) Based on the CommissionŐs revised estimates for the 2000 budget. ( ) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1436/1999 (OJ L184, 24.7.1996, p.
27). inkasseres hos forarbejdningsvirksomhederne, som s lžgger omkostningerne over p forbrugerne, ligesom det er tilfžldet med produktionsafgifterne (jf. punkt 80). 
These are collected from the processors in the storage levy and passed on to consumers in the same way as the production levies (see paragraph 80).
Ved et simpelt regnestykke, nemlig ved at gange lagerbeholdningen over det fastsatte minimum med oplagringsomkostningerne, nr man frem til, at lagrene rligt koster EUŐs forbrugere over 30 millioner euro. 
This simple calculation of the stocks held above the minimum necessary multiplied by the storage costs gives an annual cost to EU consumers of over 30 million euro.
En opgżrelse af de żkonomiske omkostninger forbundet med reguleringen af sukkerindustrien falder uden for revisionens omfang. 
The economic costs of regulating the sugar industry cannot be determined within the scope of the audit.
I henhold til ordningen fastsžttes der en fast pris for opkżb af rmaterialet (roer eller rżr) og en garanteret salgspris for det endelige produkt Ń hvidt sukker Ń og forarbejdningsvirksomhederne fr tildelt produktionskvoter. 
The scheme provides for a fixed buying-in price of the raw material (beet or cane) and a guaranteed selling price of the final product, white sugar, and allocates production quotas to processing companies.
I dag er det sdan, at kun fem virksomheder har fet tildelt mere end 50 % af den samlede EU-kvote. 
Currently just five companies hold over 50 % of the total EU quota.
Og i 10 af de 14 sukkerproducerende medlemsstater (3) sidder en enkelt eller to virksomheder p hele den nationale kvote. 
Furthermore, in 10 of the 14 sugar-producing Member States (3), the entire national quota is in the hands of only one or two companies.
Det betyder, at der ikke er normal konkurrence, og i flere tilfžlde er sukkervirksomheder blevet idżmt bżder for kon-kurrencefordrejende adfžrd (4). 
As a result, normal competitive forces do not operate and in several cases sugar companies have been fined for abuses of competition (4).
Erfaringer fra andre hżjtudviklede lande tyder p, at hvis der ikke var EU-kvoter for alternative sżdemidler (5), ville disse produkter f en stżrre andel af markedet for sżdemidler p bekostning af sukker, fordi de er billigere og mere velegnede til visse fżdevarer (6). 
Experience in other developed countries indicates that if there were no EU quotas on alternative sweeteners (5) these latter would enjoy a much larger share of the overall sweeteners market, at the expense of sugar, as they are cheaper and more suitable for some food products (6).
P denne mde bremser EUŐs produktionsrestriktio-ner en rationel żkonomisk udvikling. 
The EUŐs production restrictions are in this sense constraining rational economic development.
Omkostningerne i forbindelse med administration af sukkerordningen og kontrol af sukkerindustrien kan kun opgżres skżnsmžssigt. Medlemsstaterne tilbageholder en procentdel af produktions-og lagerafgifterne til džkning af deres omkostninger, som skżnnes at andrage i alt 290 millioner euro rligt (7). 
The quantification of the costs of administration and controls over the sugar industry is only possible in an indicative way; Member States retain a percentage of the production and storage levies to cover their costs, estimated at 290 million euro annually (7).
Ovenstende analyse bekržfter resultaterne i Rettens sžrberetning fra 1991, hvor den konkluderede, at den fžlles markedsordning for sukker pfżrer svel EU-budgettet som den endelige forbruger vžsentlige omkostninger. 
The above analysis confirms the findings of the Court in its 1991 Special Report that the CMO for sugar leads to substantial costs for the EU budget and for the consumer.
MekanismerneidenfžllesmarkedsordningforsukkerŃi sžrdeleshed produktionskvoternes og prisstżttens stżrrelse 87. 
The mechanisms of the CMO for sugar, and in particular the level of production quotas and price support 87.
Forarbejdningsindustrien og dyrkernes organisationer gr stžrkt ind for at bevare hovedelementerne i den nuvžrende markedsordning for sukker, herunder det nuvžrende prisstżtteniveau og de gžldende kvoter. 
The processing industry and growersŐ organisations are strongly in favour of maintaining the main features of the current CMO and the existing levels of price support and quotas.