natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvis et bestemt vandinfrastrukturprojekt tilslutter flere brugere eller sikrer stżrre vandbesparelser end et andet, bżr dette projekt alt andet lige prioriteres hżjest, hvis det er i overensstemmelse med medlemsstatens strategi for udvikling af infrastruktur. 
For instance, all else being equal, if one water infrastructure project connects more users than another project, or generates higher water savings, it should be prioritised, if this is in line with the Member State’s strategy for developing infrastructure.
Effektiv anvendelse af udvžlgelseskriterier er et krav i den relevante EU-lovgivning18. 
Effectively applying selection criteria is a requirement of the relevant EU legislation18.
Selv hvis budgettet p et givet tidspunkt er s stort, at alle de stżtteberettigede projekter kan godkendes, bżr medlemsstaterne derfor fastsžtte et minimumpointtal, som de stżtteberettigede projekter skal opn for at blive udvalgt. 
Therefore, even in cases when the budget is sufficient to approve all eligible projects at a given time, Member States should set a minimum score (a threshold) that projects would have to reach in order to be selected.
18 Artikel 71, stk. 2, i forordning (EF) nr. 1698/2005 fastsžtter fżlgende: ČUdgifter kan kun komme i betragtning til et bidrag fra ELFUL, hvis de er plżbet i forbindelse med operationer, som der er truffet beslutning om af det pgžldende programs forvaltningsmyndighed eller under dennes ansvar, og i henhold til de af den kompetente myndighed fastsatte udvžlgelseskriterier.Ç Tekstboks 7 
18 Article 71(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 states that: ‘Expenditure shall be eligible for EAFRD contribution only where incurred for operations decided on by the Managing Authority of the programme in question or under its responsibility, in accordance with the selection criteria fixed by the competent body.’
Bemžrkninger 26 Mlretning af stżtten ved hjžlp af en effektiv udvžlgelsesproces PROJEKTANSŻGNINGER UDELUKKELSE AF IRRELEVANTE PROJEKTER Stżtteberettigelses-kriterier STŻTTEBERETTIGEDE PROJEKTER Udvžlgelseskriterier UDVŽLGELSE AF DE BEDSTE PROJEKTER DE BEDSTE PROJEKTER TIL OPFYLDELSE AF LDP-MLENE Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret. 
Box 7 Observations 26 Targeting the aid through an effective selection process PROJECT APPLICATIONS EXCLUDING IRRELEVANT PROJECTS Eligibility criteria ELIGIBLE PROJECTS Selection criteria SELECTING THE BEST PROJECTS BEST PROJECTS ADDRESSING RDP OBJECTIVES Source: European Court of Auditors.
45 Retten konstaterede, at de reviderede medlemsstater ikke havde fastlagt udvžlgelseskriterier eller havde fastlagt kriterier, som ikke altid fżrte til en reel prioritering af projekterne p grundlag af LDP-mlene. 
45 The Member States audited either did not set selection criteria or, if they did do so, the criteria set did not always lead to actual prioritisation of projects in relation to the RDP objectives.
Dette forekom i tilfžlde, hvor det programmerede budget for foranstaltningerne var s stort, at alle de stżtteberettigede projektansżgninger kunne imżdekommmes, og hvor udvžlgelseskriterierne ikke var relevante for LDP-mlene. 
This happened in cases where the budget programmed for the measures was sufficient to support all eligible project applications and where the selection criteria were not relevant for the RDP objectives.
46 I Tyskland (Sachsen) og Spanien (Extremadura) var udvžlgelsesprocessen utilstržkkeligt dokumenteret, den var ikke baseret p specifikke udvžlgelseskriterier, og den fżrte ikke til en rangordning af projekterne (jf. tekstboks 8). 
46 In Germany (Saxony) and Spain (Extremadura), the project selection process was insufficiently documented, not based on specific selection criteria and did not produce a ranking of projects (see Box 8).
Bemžrkninger 27 Eksempler p ugennemsigtige og uverificerbare udvžlgelsesprocedurer, der ikke fżrte til, at de mest omkostningseffektive projekter blev udvalgt Spanien (Extremadura) Projekter, der tilsammen tegnede sig for 73 % af de anvendte midler under infrastrukturforanstaltning 125 og 323 (49 ud af 67 millioner euro), blev forvaltet direkte af regionalforvaltningen. 
Observations 27 Examples of non-transparent and unverifiable project selection procedures hindering the selection of the most cost-effective projects Spain (Extremadura) Projects representing 73 % (i.e. 49 out of 67 million euro) of the funds spent under infrastructure measures 125 and 323 were managed directly by the regional administration.
Forvaltningsmyndigheden indsamlede projektforslag (som var udarbejdet p dens eget initiativ eller efter uformelle anmodninger fra kom-munerne) og godkendte derefter projekterne p en ugennemsigtig og uverificerbar mde. 
The managing authority collected project proposals (prepared on its own initiative or following the informal requests of municipalities) and subsequently approved projects in a non-transparent and unverifiable way.
Udvžlgelsesproceduren var ikke baseret p specifikke udvžlgelseskriterier, og den fżrte ikke til en rangordning af projekterne. 
The selection procedure was not based on specific selection criteria and did not result in a ranking of projects.
Tyskland (Sachsen) Projekterne under foranstaltning 321 og 322 blev generelt19 udvalgt p to forskellige niveauer: fżrst p lokalt niveau af ČkoordineringsgrupperÇ og derefter p centralt niveau af forvaltningsmyndigheden. 
Germany (Saxony) The selection of projects under measures 321 and 322 was generally19 carried out at two subsequent levels: first at local level by ‘coordination groups’, and then at central level by the managing authority.
Forvaltningsmyndigheden gav hver koordineringsgruppe et bestemt budget til finansiering af projekter. 
The managing authority provided coordination groups their own dedicated budget under which they could fund projects.
Projektansżgnin-ger kunne kun g videre til centralt niveau, hvis de fik en positiv udtalelse fra koordineringsgruppen. 
Project applications could be passed on to the central level only if they received a positive vote from the coordination group.
Koor-dineringsgruppernes beslutningsproces var utilstržkkeligt dokumenteret og fżrte ikke til en rangordning af projektansżgningerne. 
The decision process of the coordination groups was insufficiently documented and did not result in a ranking of project applications.
Forvaltningsmyndigheden godkendte alle de stżtteberettigede projekter, der havde fet en positiv udtalelse fra koordineringsgrupperne, eftersom der var tilstržkkelige midler til rdighed under disse foranstaltninger. 
The managing authority approved all eligible projects with a positive vote from the coordination groups, as sufficient funds were available under these measures.
19 Kun i ganske sžrlige tilfžlde (f.eks. midlertidig direkte finansiering til skoleprojekter) blev projekterne udvalgt direkte p centralt niveau af forvaltningsmyndigheden. 
19 Only in exceptional cases (e.g. temporary direct funding for school projects) was project selection carried out directly at central level by the managing authority.
47 Polen fastlagde ingen udvžlgelseskriterier under foranstaltning 125, som finansierer vandinfrastruktur, der skal beskytte landbrugsjord mod over-svżmmelse. 
47 Poland did not set selection criteria under measure 125, which finances water infrastructure to protect agricultural land from floods.
Alle de stżtteberettigede projekter blev godkendt efter Čfżrst til mżlleÇ-princippet. 
All eligible projects were approved on the basis of the ‘first come, first served’ principle.
Dette indebar, at forvaltningsmyndigheden ikke prioriterede de mest omkostningseffektive projekter. F.eks. godkendte den to projekter med vidt forskellig omkostningseffektivitet (henholdsvis 150 euro og nžsten 10 000 euro i offentlig stżtte pr. beskyttet ha). 
In this context, the managing authority did not prioritise the most cost-effective projects; for example, two projects were both approved although their cost-effectiveness ratio was vastly different (150 euro compared to almost 10 000 euro of public support per protected ha).
48 Vi fandt eksempler p, at der var fastlagt udvžlgelseskriterier (i Italien (Sicilien), Polen og Rumžnien). 
48 Examples were identified where selection criteria were established (in Italy (Sicily), Poland and Romania).
I Italien (Sicilien) blev udvžlgelseskriterierne imidlertid kun anvendt effektivt under delforanstaltning 125-A, og alle stżtteberettigede projekter under de andre reviderede foranstaltninger blev godkendt. 
However, in Italy (Sicily), the selection criteria were effectively applied only under sub-measure 125-A, as all eligible projects were approved under the other audited measures.
I Polen og Rumžnien var udvžlgelseskriterierne generelt i overensstemmelse med LDP-mlene, og der var fastsat et minimumpointtal for at sikre de udvalgte projekters kvalitet. 
In Poland and Romania, the selection criteria were generally in line with RDP objectives and a minimum threshold was used to ensure the quality of the selected projects.
Udvžlgelseskriterierne havde imidlertid ikke altid relation til projekternes bidrag til opfyldelse af LDP-mlene (jf. tekstboks 9). 
However, the selection criteria were not always related to the projects’ contribution to the RDP objectives (see Box 9).
Bemžrkninger 28 Eksempler p udvžlgelseskriterier, der ikke prioriterede projekterne p grundlag af deres bidrag til opfyldelse af LDP-mlene Polen Et af de udvžlgelseskriterer, der blev anvendt under foranstaltning 322/323, skulle fżrst tilgodese stżrre projekter og derefter (senere i programmeringsperioden) mindre projekter med det forml at sikre en afbalanceret adgang til EU-midler. 
Observations 28 Examples of selection criteria which did not prioritise the projects based on their contribution to RDP objectives Poland A selection criterion used under measures 322/323 was designed to first promote larger projects and then (later in the programming period) smaller projects, with the aim of ‘ensuring balanced access to EU funds’. This was not stated in the RDP.
Italien (Sicilien) Udvžlgelseskriterierne under delforanstaltning 125-B, som finansierer kunstvandingssystemer, kunne ikke kvantificeres, og vandbesparelsesprojekter i omrder med store behov for begržnsning af vandtab blev ikke prioriteret. 
Italy (Sicily) Under sub-measure 125-B, which finances irrigation systems, the selection criteria were not quantifiable and did not prioritise projects aimed at saving water in areas where there was a greater need to reduce water losses.
Det fżrte til, at projekter i omrder uden vandmangel blev rangeret hżjere end projekter i omrder med alvorlig vandmangel. 
This led to the high ranking of projects in areas not affected by water shortages and the low ranking of projects in areas affected by a serious lack of water.
Rumžnien Et udvžlgelseskriterium under foranstaltning 322 prioriterede ansżgere, der ikke tidligere havde modtaget EU-stżtte til lignende investeringer, men dette kriterium afspejlede ikke, i hvilket omfang projektet opfyldte LDP-mlene. 
Romania A selection criterion under measure 322 prioritised applicants that had not previously received EU support for a similar investment, although this criterion did not reflect the extent to which the project met the RDP objectives.
49 Kun i Tyskland (Sachsen) fandt Retten kriterier for omkostningseffektivitet, som prioriterede de projekter, der gav mest valuta for pengene (jf. tekstboks 10), og disse kriterier blev ikke anvendt i praksis. 
49 Cost-effectiveness criteria prioritising projects offering the highest value for money were identified only in Germany (Saxony) (see Box 10), although these were not applied in practice.
Et eksempel p et kriterium for omkostningseffektivitet, der ikke blev anvendt i praksis Tyskland (Sachsen) Under foranstaltning 125 fastlagde de tyske myndigheder fire udvžlgelseskriterier, der skulle anvendes p populationen af stżtteberettigede projekter, hvis budgettet ikke var stort nok. 
An example of cost-effectiveness criterion being set, but not applied in practice Germany (Saxony) Under measure 125, the German authorities set four selection criteria, to be applied to the population of eligible projects in the case of insufficient budget.
Et af kriterierne var projekternes omkostningseffektivitet og prioriterede projekter med de laveste omkostninger pr. lżbende meter anlagt skovvej. 
One of them was a simple cost-effectiveness ratio which prioritised projects costing less per linear metre of forest road built.
Da fristen for indsendelse af projektansżgninger var udlżbet (hen imod udlżbet af programmeringsperioden 2007-2013), fik foranstaltning 125 imidlertid tildelt ekstra midler. 
However, once the deadline for receiving project applications had elapsed (towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period), additional funds were shifted to measure 125.
Eftersom der nu var tilstržkkelige budgetressourcer til rdighed, blev alle ansżgningerne imżdekommet, og rangordningen efter dette udvžlgelseskriterium fik aldrig nogen effekt. 
With sufficient budgetary resources available, all applications were granted funding, and so the ranking produced using this selection criterion was never put into effect.
Tekstboks 10 Tekstboks 9 
Box 10 Box 9
Bemžrkninger 29 Kontrollen af omkostningernes rimelighed og anvendelsen af offentlige udbud begržnsede ikke effektivt risikoen for uforholdsmžssigt hżje projektomkostninger 50 Nr stżttesatserne er hżje, hvilket er almindeligt i forbindelse med infrastrukturforanstaltninger, har projektlederne ingen eller nžsten ingen risiko. 
Observations 29 Checks on the reasonableness of costs and public procurement procedures did not effectively limit the risk of excessive project costs 50 High aid rates, which are common in infrastructure measures, result in little or no risk for project promoters. This reduces their incentive to limit the project costs.
Det er derfor sžrlig vigtigt, at medlemsstaterne opstiller forholdsmžssige krav og kontroller, der kan sikre, at omkostningerne er rimelige. 
It is therefore particularly important that Member States establish proportionate requirements and checks for ensuring reasonableness of costs.
De reviderede medlemsstater anvendte generelt referencepriser og offentlige udbud til at sikre, at investeringsomkostningerne var rimelige20. 
The Member States audited generally relied on the use of reference prices and public procurement procedures to ensure the reasonableness of the investment costs20.
Disse vžrktżjer blev imidlertid ikke brugt hensigtsmžssigt, hvilket Retten allerede har bemžrket i tidligere beretninger21. 
However, these tools were not adequately applied, as the Court has already noted in its previous reports21.
De vžsentligste svagheder, der blev konstateret under denne revision, er beskrevet nžrmere i det fżlgende. 
Details of the main weaknesses identified by this audit are provided below.
51 Medlemsstaterne anvendte i vidt omfang systemer baseret p referencepriser, men systemerne havde alvorlige svagheder, hovedsagelig fordi referencepriserne kom fra byggefirmaer og derfor sandsynligvis var hżjere end de reelle markedspriser, der kunne opns efter forhandlinger eller konkurrencebaserede udbud. 
51 Although widely used, the systems based on reference prices had serious limitations, mainly because the reference prices were provided by construction companies and were thus likely to overstate the real market prices following negotiations or competitive tenders.
I Spanien (Extremadura), Italien (Sicilien) og Polen konstaterede Retten, at der efter udbud normalt blev opnet gennemsnitlige besparelser p 30 % til 40 % i forhold til referencepriserne. 
In Spain (Extremadura), Italy (Sicily) and Poland, the audit identified that average savings of 30 % to 40 % compared to the reference prices were normally obtained following a tender procedure.
52 Kun i Rumžnien blev referencepriserne fastlagt p grundlag af konkrete forhandlinger mellem regeringen og byggefirmaer. 
52 Only in Romania were reference prices established on the basis of actual transactions between the government and construction companies.
Der forel imidlertid kun priser for et begržnset udvalg af offentlige bygge-og anlžgsarbejder, og de var ikke blevet ajourfżrt siden 2009. 
Prices were, however, available only for a limited range of public works and had not been updated since 2009.
Forvaltningsmyndigheden i Tyskland (Sachsen) accepterede automatisk afvigelser p op til 50 % i forhold til referencepriserne uden at foretage yderligere undersżgelser. 
The managing authority of Germany (Saxony) automatically accepted deviations of up to 50 % compared to the reference prices, without performing further inquiries.
53 Risikoen ved at anvende kunstigt hżje referencepriser kan mindskes, nr de endelige omkostninger fastlžgges p grundlag af et fair og konkurrencebaseret udbud, men der er ingen sikkerhedsforanstaltninger i forbindelse med projekter, der ikke er omfattet af konkurrencebaserede udbud (hvilket gžlder bestemte foranstaltninger og stżttemodtagere i Spanien (Extremadura) og Italien (Sicilien)), og i tilfžlde, hvor der er alvorlige svagheder i procedurerne for offentlige indkżb. 
53 While the risk of using inflated reference prices may be mitigated when the final costs are established based on a fair, competitive tender, there is no safeguard for projects that are not subject to a competitive tender (as is the case for certain measures and beneficiaries in Spain (Extremadura) and Italy (Sicily)) and in cases where the public procurement procedures are affected by serious weaknesses.
54 Vi konstaterede flere af den slags svagheder, der forhindrede fair konkurrence og var żdelžggende for omkostningernes rimelighed (jf. tekstboks 11). 
54 The audit identified several such weaknesses that hindered fair competition and the reasonableness of costs (see Box 11).
2, litra d), i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 65/2011 af 27. januar 2011 om gennemfżrelsesbestemmelser til Rdets forordning (EF) nr. 
20 Article 24(2)(d) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures (OJ L 25, 28.1.2011, p.
8), at medlemsstaterne som led i den administrative kontrol af stżtteansżgninger skal kontrollere, om de anslede projektomkostninger er rimelige. 
8) specifies that Member States should verify the reasonableness of project costs submitted as part of the administrative checks on applications for support.
Dette skal evalueres ved hjžlp af et passende system, som f.eks. referenceomkostninger, en sammenligning af flere tilbud eller en evalueringskomit. 
This evaluation must be performed using a suitable system, such as reference costs, the comparison of a number of offers or an evaluation committee.
2, litra c), i samme forordning, at medlemsstaterne skal kontrollere, at den operation, som der ansżges om stżtte til, er i overensstemmelse med de gžldende nationale bestemmelser og EU-bestemmelser, isžr, hvis det er relevant, bestemmelserne om offentlige indkżb, statsstżtte og andre obligatoriske normer, som er fastsat i den nationale lovgivning eller i landdistriktsprogrammet. 
Furthermore, Article 24(2)(c) of the same regulation specifies that Member States should check the compliance of the operation for which support is requested with applicable national and Union rules on, in particular, and where relevant, public procurement, State aid and other appropriate obligatory standards established by national legislation or established in the rural development programme.
Bemžrkninger 30 Eksempler p offentlige indkżbsprocedurer, som ikke sikrede gennemsigtighed, fair konkurrence og rimelige omkostninger Spanien (Extremadura) Forvaltningsmyndigheden valgte vilkrligt at tildele et statsejet byggefirma kontrakter til en vžrdi af 18 % (ca. 
Observations 30 Examples of public procurement procedures that hindered transparency, fair competition and reasonableness of costs Spain (Extremadura) The managing authority arbitrarily decided to award to a state-owned construction company contracts for 18 % (i.e. some 14 million euro) of the allocation to measure 125.
Forvaltningsmyndigheden begrundede dette med bygge-og anlžgsarbejdernes hastende karakter og sžrlige art/type og med fortrolighedshensyn. 
The managing authority justified this based on the ‘urgency’ of the works, ‘specificity/type of works’ and ‘confidentiality’.
Myndighederne kunne imidlertid ikke dokumentere disse begrundelser. 
However, the authorities could not provide any evidence to support such justifications.
Projektomkostningerne blev godtgjort p grundlag af en prisliste, der var aftalt mellem firmaet og de nationale myndigheder. 
The project costs were reimbursed based on a price list agreed between the company and the national authorities.
Denne fremgangsmde er mske nok hurtigere end et udbud, men den sikrer ikke, at de opnede priser svarer til markedspriserne. 
While this procedure may be quicker than organising a tender, it does not ensure that the prices obtained are in line with market prices.
Selv i de tilfžlde, hvor der blev afholdt formelle udbud, var tildelingskriterierne somme tider formuleret s uklart, at de ikke kunne kontrolleres. 
Even when formal tenders were organised, award criteria were in some cases insufficiently defined and therefore unverifiable.
Det var tilfžldet i forbindelse med et projekt til en anslet vžrdi af 11 millioner euro, hvor 48 af de 100 mulige point blev tildelt p grundlag af vage kriterier ssom Čkendskab til projektet, omrdet og forslagets kvalitetÇ, Čoverholdelse af sikkerhedsreglerÇ, ČmiljżforanstaltningerÇ og Čandre foreslede forbedringerÇ. 
This was the case of an audited project, having an estimated cost of 11 million euro, for which 48 out of 100 scoring points were awarded based on vague criteria, such as ‘the knowledge of the project, the area and the quality of the proposal’, ‘the respect of safety rules’, ‘the environmental measures’ and ‘other improvement proposed’.
Rumžnien Ogs her konstaterede vi drligt formulerede tildelingskriterier. 
Romania The audit also identified poorly defined award criteria.
F.eks. blev Čden korteste tid for udfżrelsen af bygge-og anlžgsarbejderÇ brugt som tildelingskriterium i forbindelse med ni af de 11 undersżgte projekter uden angivelse af acceptable tidsplaner eller kontrol af, om den foreslede tid var realistisk. 
For example, the ‘shortest duration of the works’ was used as an award criterion in 9 out of the 11 projects reviewed, without indicating acceptable timeframes or checking whether the proposed durations were realistic.
Den tid, der var angivet i vinderbuddene og senere i kontrakterne, blev i praksis langt overskredet, idet bygge-og anlžgsarbejderne varede op til otte gange s lang tid som fastsat i kontrakterne (24 mneder i stedet for tre mneder). 
The duration indicated in the winning offers and subsequent contracts was largely exceeded in practice, with works lasting up to eight times longer than the contractual term (24 months instead of 3 months).
Drlige vejrforhold kunne kun delvis forklare disse forsinkelser. 
Adverse weather conditions could only partially explain such delays.
Italien (Sicilien) Kontrakter om offentlige bygge-og anlžgsarbejder blev tildelt p grundlag af konkurrencebaserede udbud efter en fremgangsmde, der automatisk udelukkede de laveste bud22 som ČunormaleÇ uden nžrmere analyse. 
Italy (Sicily) Contracts for public works were awarded through competitive tenders using a methodology that resulted in the automatic exclusion of the lowest offers22, which were disregarded as ‘abnormal’ without further analysis.
Denne procedure gjorde det ikke muligt at udvžlge det żkonomisk mest fordelagtige bud, og den giver generelt ikke de bydende incitament til at afgive det laveste bud. 
This procedure did not allow for selection of the most economical offer and, in general, does not provide an incentive for the bidders to offer their lowest price.