natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Argumentet om, at dette kan pvirke salgsprisen, er kun sandt, hvis betingelserne offentliggżres, hvilket ikke er tilfžldet ved de betingelser, der knyttes til makrofinansiel bistand. 
The argument that this may affect the sales price is only true if the conditionality is made public, which is not the case with the conditions attached to macrofinancial assistance.
Det skal bemžrkes, at salget af Biochim ligeledes var en udtrykkelig del af IMF/Verdensbank-betingelserne. 
It should be noted that the sale of Biochim was also explicitly part of the IMF/World Bank conditionality.
P det tidspunkt, hvor anden tranche blev frigivet, kunne Kommissionen kontrollere, at miljżministeriet var ved at udarbejde et nyt lovforslag om vurdering af indvirkning p miljżet for at sikre overholdelsen af EU-direktivet herom. 
At the time of the release of the second tranche, the Commission was able to verify that a new bill on EIA was prepared by the Ministry of Environment to ensure compliance with the EU EIA directive.
De forsikringer, som man fik fra de bulgarske myndigheder vedrżrende vedtagelsen af denne lovgivning, blev betragtet som tilfredsstillende. 
Assurances received by the Bulgarian authorities concerning the adoption of this new legislation were considered sufficient.
Den fulde overholdelse af gžldende fžllesskabsret, der kržves for EU-medlemsskab og som kontrolleres i de regelmžssige rapporter, er en langt mere kržvende betingelse og blev ikke kržvet i aftalememorandumet. 
Full compliance with the acquis communautaire, which is required for EU membership and is reviewed in the regular reports, is a far more demanding requirement and was not asked for in the agreed Memorandum of Understanding.
I aftalen med de bulgarske myndigheder blev det fastsat, at bistanden udbetaltes i to trancher. 
The agreement with the Bulgarian authorities specified that the assistance would be disbursed in two tranches.
Betingelserne for frigżrelsen af anden tranche blev i stort omfang opfyldt i anden halvdel af 1998. 
The conditions for the release of the second tranche were met to a very large extent in the second half of 1998.
I juni 1998 overvejedes det at splitte anden tranche op. 
In June 1998, the possibility of splitting the second tranche was indeed considered.
Dette forsinkedes imidlertid, fordi der var vanskeligheder med visse EU-medlemsstater p grund af gžldsžt-ningsspżrgsmlet. 
The process was delayed, however, for reasons related to difficulties with several EU Member States arising from debt issues.
Den fulde udbetaling blev fżrst foretaget i december 1998, efter at Kommissionen var blevet overbevist om, at betingelserne blev tilstržkkelig overholdt. 
The full payment was only made in December 1998, after the Commission was satisfied that the respect of conditionality was adequate.
Montenegro 6. 
Montenegro 6.
Konsulentens hovedopgave var: at stżtte Montenegros regering med budget-/skattereformen og bist myndighederne med at gennemfżre de żkonomipolitiske betingelser for denne bistand. 
The main task of the consultant was supporting the Montenegrin Government in the area of budget/fiscal reform and helping the authorities to implement the economic policy conditions of this assistance.
Herved gav eksperten naturligvis Kommissionen oplysninger, der var nyttige ved dens kontrol af bistanden. 
In pursuing his tasks the expert obviously provided useful information to the Commission that helped it to monitor the assistance.
Kommissionen fortsatte sin egen kontrol og evaluering af bistanden ved regelmžssige kontakter og ved hjžlp af et kontrolbesżg i december 2000. 
The Commission pursued its own monitoring and evaluation of the assistance through regular contacts and an assessment mission in December 2000.
Konsulenten udfżrte sine opgaver tilfredsstillende, isžr p baggrund af hans korte funktionstid og det vanskelige miljż p det tidspunkt. 
The consultant accomplished his tasks satisfactorily, especially given the short period of his assignment and the difficult environment at that time.
Konsulenten hjalp isžr Montenegros regering med at opn betydelige fremskridt med hensyn til at żge budgettets gennemsigtighed og forbedre budgetprocedurerne. 
In particular, the consultant helped the Montenegrin Ministry of Finance to make substantial progress in enhancing budgetary transparency and improving budgetary procedures.
Kommissionen forventede ikke en klar anbefaling for eller 
The Commission did not expect a clear
23.5.2002 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 121/27 imod udbetalingsbeslutningen, idet den betragtede dette for at vžre dens eget ansvar. 
23.5.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 121/27 recommendation for or against a disbursement decision, since it considered this to be its own responsibility.
Kommissionen foretog et kontrolbesżg for at foretage en vurdering af betingelserne tidligt i december 2000. 
The Commission went on mission to carry out its assessment of conditionality early in December 2000.
P det tidspunkt var konsulenten ogs til stede i Podgorica, og Kommissionen havde lejlighed til at drżfte hans udkast til slutrapport, der forel ved besżgets afslutning. 
At that time the Consultant was also present in Podgorica and the Commission had the opportunity to discuss his draft final report, which was available at the beginning of the mission.
Samrdet med Det Żkonomiske og Finansielle Udvalg var baseret p Kommissionens egen vurdering og konklusionerne i udkastet til slutrapport. 
The consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee was based on the CommissionŐs own assessment and the conclusions in the draft final report.
Kommissionen konstaterede under sit besżg i december 2000, at der var gjort utilstržkkelige fremskridt p nogle omrder. 
During its mission in December 2000, the Commission observed that the progress made in some areas had not been satisfactory.
Den advarede derfor myndighederne i Montenegro om, at det ikke ville vžre muligt at udbetale anden tranche, med mindre der var gjort yderligere vžsentlige fremskridt p de relevante omrder. 
It therefore warned the Montenegrin authorities that without further substantial progress in these areas a disbursement of the second tranche would not be possible.
Kommissionen redegjorde ogs nžrmere for, hvilke foranstaltninger der mtte tržffes, men den lempede p ingen mde betingelserne i aftalememorandumet. 
The Commission also specified action that had to be taken, but in no way softened the conditions laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding.
Det var ogs nżdvendigt at forklare betingelserne nžrmere, fordi oplysningerne om nogle aspekter af den lokale situation og om det politiske miljż havde vžret ufuldstžndige p det tidspunkt, hvor betingelserne blev formuleret. 
It was also necessary to explain the conditions in greater detail, since information about some aspects of the situation on the ground and of the policy environment had been incomplete at the time when the conditions were formulated.
Tunesien a) Salget af fem selskaber: Efter den fžlles evaluering, der blev udfżrt af Verdensbanken/Den afrikanske Udviklingsbank/ Kommissionen, betragtedes denne betingelse som opfyldt, idet bżrskonjunkturerne var blevet yderst ugunstige, og man ikke med rimelig kunne kržve, at de tre resterende selskaber blev sat til salg p de vilkr. 
Tunisia (a) Sale of five companies: the joint World Bank/ADB/Commission evaluation mission considered this condition to have been fulfilled, as the stock market situation was so unfavourable that it would not have been reasonable to demand that the three remaining companies be put up for sale.
Tunesien fremlagde til gengžld en tidsplan for salget, der var mere vidtgende, end hvad der var krž-vet. Det er korrekt, at ser man tilbage, ville proceduren med afkald have vžret mere gennemsigtig i det pgžldende tilfžlde, men lederen af kontrolbesżget (Verdensbanken) vurderede ikke, at den var nżdvendig, og denne procedure findes ikke i Kommissionen. b) Fem af de 35 betingelser for anden tranche blev delvis opfyldt. 
In return the Tunisians provided a timetable for sale going beyond what had been demanded. It is true that, with hindsight, the technical waiver procedure could have been more transparent in this instance, but the head of mission (World Bank) did not consider it necessary and this procedure does not exist at the Commission. (b) Five of the 35 conditions for the second tranche were fulfilled in part.
Dette afspejledes i det dossier, der blev forelagt til generaldirektżrens og senere Finanskomitens godkendelse. 
This was reflected in the file submitted for the approval of the Director-General and subsequently of Financial Control.
Resultatet beregnedes derfor til over 85 %. 
Mathematically, therefore, performance exceeded 85 %.
I betragtning af, at der aldrig bliver en ČopfyldelseÇ p 100 %, at visse betingelser klart er blevet opfyldt i hżjere grad end kržvet, og at Tunesien har garanteret for opfyldelsen af samtlige resterende betingelser, har beslutningstagerne givet grżnt lys for udbetalingen, sfremt den afsluttende erhvervelse af midlerne (dobbelt underskrift) sker efter konstatering af Čfuldstžndig opfyldelseÇ. 
Given that there is never 100 % compliance, that performance of certain conditionalities went far beyond what was demanded, that the Tunisians offered guarantees for total achievement of the remaining conditions, the decision-makers gave the go-ahead for disbursement provided that the funds were not finally acquired (double signature) until Ôfull complianceŐ had been established.
Denne situation gentages ikke, fordi proceduren med underskrift er blevet afskaffet. 
This will not happen again as the double signature procedure has been discontinued.
Ingen kunne p dette tidspunkt vide, at det ville tage seks mneder. 
At the time nobody could have known that it would take six months.
Det er klart, at Kommissionen ikke kan žndre den tunesiske centralbanks vedtžgter. 
It is quite clear that the Commission cannot alter the regulations of the Tunisian Central Bank.
Dette program blev anset for eksemplarisk, isžr med hensyn til koordinering af lngiverne og resultaterne af privatiseringspro-grammet. 
This programme was considered exemplary, in particular in terms of coordination between donors and the delivery of the privatisation programme.
Tidende C 136 De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende ISSN 0378-7001 C 136 45. rgang 7. juni 2002 Side 1 Dansk udgave Informationsnummer 2002/C 136/01 DA [Š] Meddelelser og oplysninger Indhold I Meddelelser Revisionsretten Sžrberetning nr. 2/2002 om fžllesskabshandlingsprogrammerne Socrates og Ungdom for Europa, med Kommissionens svar 
Official Journal C 136 Official Journal of the European Communities ISSN 0378-6986 C 136 Volume 45 7 June 2002 Page 1 38 English edition Notice No 2002/C 136/01 2002/C 136/02 EN [Š] Information and Notices Contents I Information Court of Auditors Special Report No 2/2002 on the Socrates and Youth for Europe Community action programmes, together with the Commission's replies Corrigendum to Special Report No 1/2002 concerning macrofinancial assistance (MFA) to third countries and structural adjustment facilities (SAF) in the Mediterranean countries, together with the Commission's replies
2 RESUM ................................................................... I-IX 3 Svaghedervedkonceptet .................................................... 
SUMMARY ................................................................. Design weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delaysandshortcomingsinimplementation ....................................
9 5 PROGRAMMERNESKONCEPT.................................................. 
Financialallocations .......................................................
10-18 5 Socrates ................................................................. 
Socrates .................................................................
19-21 9 MANGLERVEDFORVALTNINGSSYSTEMET ....................................... 
THEDESIGNOFTHEPROGRAMMES ............................................
22-24 9 Centraliseretforvaltning .................................................... 
Youth for Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39-51 13 Denationalekontorer ................................................... 39-45 13 Forvaltningenafdefinansiellerammeaftaler .................................. 
Thenationalagencies .................................................... Management of the financial framework agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IT systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C 136/2 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende SVAGHEDER VED GENNEMFŻRELSEN AF AKTIONERNE OG VED FORVALTNINGEN AF PROJEKTERNE .............................................................. 
C 136/2 EN Official Journal of the European Communities WEAKNESSES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS..................................................................
Problemerforbundetmeddenationalekontorersforvaltning ..................... 
Individualdeficienciesfoundintheauditedactions .............................
Punktuellesvaghederveddeundersżgteaktioner .............................. Mangler ved forvaltningen af de centraliserede aktioner og projekter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
CONCLUSIONS.............................................................. RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................
ProblemerforbundetmedKFBŐsforvaltning .................................. 
TABLES....................................................................
22 ........... 27 
22 ........... 27
7.6.2002 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende RESUM I. Finansieringsrammen for programmerne Socrates og Ungdom for Europa blev fastsat til henholdsvis 920 millioner euro og 126 millioner euro. 
7.6.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 136/3 SUMMARY I. The Socrates and Youth for Europe programmes have been allocated budgetary funds of 920 million euro and 126 million euro respectively.
Programmerne har bidraget til at styrke samarbejdet mellem universiteter i Unionen og i de żvrige deltagerlande, og de har givet unge mulighed for at deltage i multikulturelle udvekslingsaktioner. 
They have contributed to a strengthening of cooperation between universities in the European Union and in the other participant countries and have made multicultural exchange activi-tiespossibleforthebenefitofyoungpeople.
Under revisionen konstaterede Retten imidlertid svagheder ved begge programmers koncept og ved forvaltningen af gennemfżrelsen. 
Nevertheless, the CourtŐs audit has revealed weaknesses in the design of the two programmes and shortcomings in the management of their implementation.
Svagheder ved konceptet III. 
Design weaknesses III.
De to programkoncepter Socrates (punkt 10-14) og Ungdom for Europa (UFE) (punkt 15-18) er behžftet med svagheder. 
The two programmes Socrates (paragraphs 10 to 14) and Youth for Europe (YfE) (paragraphs 15 to 18) both suffer from shortcomings in their design.
Navnlig Socrates-programmet har en kompliceret opbygning med i alt 38 aktioner, underaktioner og foranstaltninger uden indbyrdes sammenhžng. 
The design of the Socrates programme, in particular, is complex, with a heterogeneous array of 38 actions, sub-actions and measures.
Det har resulteret i meget forskellige fortolkninger og gjort det vanskeligt for medlemsstaterne at samarbejde. 
In consequence the programme was interpreted in different ways and cooperation between the Member States became more complicated.
Fordi der ikke var fastlagt kriterier og parametre, var det vanskeligt at evaluere resultaterne af programgennemfżrelsen. 
Likewise, the absence of definitions of criteria and parameters has made it difficult to evaluate the results obtained following implementation of the programmes.
Endvidere var der ikke fastlagt egnede rammer for, hvordan der kunne opns synergieffekt mellem de forskellige fžllesskabsprogrammer. 
Furthermore, the design did not include an appropriate framework for producing synergy from the various Community programmes.
Bistet af et kontor for faglig bistand (KFB) forvalter Kommissionen i Bruxelles en ržkke aktioner, der derfor kaldes centraliserede, og bistet af nationale kontorer (NA) de aktioner, som forvaltes decentralt i medlemsstaterne og de żvrige stżttemodtagende stater. 
The Commission manages a certain number of actions from Brussels, which, for this reason, are referred to as centralised, through a technical assistance office (TAO), while those subject to decentralised management in the Member States and other beneficiary countries are run through national agencies (NAs).
Retten konstaterede svagheder af forskellig art ved begge forvaltningssystemer (punkt 25 og 51). 
In both cases, the management system was marked by various types of shortcomings (paragraphs 25 and 51).
V. Kommissionen havde delegeret befżjelser til et KFB, og det var rsagen til sdanne mangler og svagheder, som Retten konstaterer gang p gang: Det grundlžggende princip for delegation af befżjelser var ikke fulgt, og befżjelserne var ikke blevet delegeret i overensstemmelse med reglerne, der var interessekonflikter og risici for Fžllesskabets aktiver, og forvaltningen var alt for omkostningskržvende. 
V. The delegation of responsibilities to the TAO gave rise to weaknesses which the Court was to come across repeatedly: irregularities in the delegation of responsibility, both with regard to the principle of delegation and the form its implementation took, various confusions of interest and risks for the CommunityŐs assets, and the costly nature of the management.
Disse mangler og svagheder havde imidlertid ikke fżrt til nžr s alvorlige forhold som dem, Retten har konstateret under revision af andre fžllesskabsprogrammer (punkt 25-36). 
The situations which arose from this were, however, nothing like as serious as those encountered in other Community programmes (paragraphs 25 to 36).
De decentraliserede aktioner var vanskelige at gennemfżre, fordi der ikke var et retsgrundlag, som pržcist fastlagde ansvarsfordelingen mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne, og fordi der ikke var fastlagt egnede regler for NAŐerne, som for hovedpartens vedkommende ikke havde de nżdvendige ressourcer til at lżse de tildelte opgaver (punkt 39-51). 
With regard to the decentralised actions, their implementation suffered both from the absence of a legal framework setting out the precise division of responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States and of an appropriate status for the NAs, which, in the majority of cases, did not have adequate means at their disposal to carry out the tasks entrusted to them (paragraphs 39 to 51).
Forsinkelser og svagheder ved gennemfżrelsen VII. 
Delays and shortcomings in implementation VII.
Lovgiver var s lžnge om at tržffe afgżrelse, at begge programmer kom i gang med forsinkelse, og igang-sžttelsen af nye aktioner blev forsinket, fordi der ikke fandtes de nżdvendige strukturer, og fordi der ikke var fastlagt en oplysningspolitik (punkt 19 og 21). 
Because of the time required by the legislator to adopt the relevant decisions, the start of the two programmes was delayed and there were delays in the implementation of new actions because of the lack of structures and of an appropriate information policy (paragraphs 19 and 21).
Det meget tunge forvaltningssystem resulterede i, at gennemfżrelsen af aktionerne blev yderligere forsinket, og havde specielt den effekt, at det generelle ml, nemlig at projekterne skulle pržfinansieres, blev illusorisk. 
The cumbersome nature of the management system caused additional delays in implementation of the programmes, the main consequence of which was to make achievement of the general objective of prefinancing the projects illusory.
I nogle tilfžlde havde stżttemodtagerne nemlig fżrst fet udbetalt fžllesskabsstżtten, efter at projekterne var gennemfżrt. 
In fact, the beneficiaries sometimes did not receive Community aid until after the projects had been carried out.
Sdanne kumulerede forsinkelser gjorde det umuligt at afslutte aktionerne inden for de frister, der var fastsat i de finansielle rammeaftaler. 
The accumulated delays made it impossible to close the actions by the deadlines set in the financial framework agreements.
Forvaltningen af disse aftaler var generelt mangelfuld (punkt 46-50). 
The management of these agreements was, in general, inadequate (paragraphs 46 to 50).
Det gjorde det ogs vanskeligt at gennemfżre aktionerne, at der blev anvendt it-systemer, som ikke var egnede (punkt 51). 
Implementation was hampered by the use of unsuitable IT network systems (paragraph 51).
Der konstateredes mangler ved forvaltningen i hovedparten af de 27 reviderede NAŐer og i KFB lige fra projektudvžlgelsen til overvgningen af gennemfżrelsen. 
Management shortcomings were found in the majority of the 27 NAs audited and, at the TAO, from the selection of projects to the monitoring of their implementation.
C 136/4 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 7.6.2002 administratorer (punkt 53-56) og fžllesskabsadministratorerne (punkt 75-83) ikke havde en egentlig Čkontrol-og evalueringskulturÇ. 
C 136/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 7.6.2002 any genuine control and evaluation culture on the part of the managing bodies, both national (paragraphs 53 to 56) and Community (paragraphs 75 to 83).
For eksempel gav Rettens revision af en ržkke projekter anledning til mistanke om svig. Retten har derfor indberettet disse sager til Det Europžiske Kontor for Bekžmpelse af Svig (OLAF) (punkt 74 og 98). 
For instance, the audit identified several projects where the Court notified the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) of suspicions of fraud (paragraphs 74 and 98).
De konstaterede svagheder havde generelt set indvirket negativt p aktionernes resultater og samlede effekt (punkt 63-65, 80-83 og 91-92), selv om det ikke i alle tilfžlde er muligt at sžtte tal p denne effekt, fordi der ikke findes relevante statistiske oplysninger. 
On a more general level, these weaknesses had negative consequences for the results and the overall impact of the measures (paragraphs 63 to 65, 80 to 83, 91 and 92), although they cannot always be quantified due to the absence of relevant statistical data.
Sledes forholder det sig med Ungdom for Europa-programmet, hvor det er umuligt at kontrollere, om fžllesskabslovgivers udtrykkelige hensigt, nemlig at hjžlpe drligt stillede unge, er blevet fulgt (punkt 17 og 68). 
This is the case for the Youth for Europe programme, where it is impossible to verify whether the wish expressed by the European legislator, that help should be given to disadvantaged young people, has been fulfilled (paragraphs 17 and 68).
Evalueringsberetningerne blev udarbejdet for sent, og det er tvivlsomt, om de har haft nogen effekt. 
Evaluation reports were delayed and their impact remains questionable.
Bde p kommissions-og kontrahentniveau var kontraktindgelsesproceduren, forvaltningen og overvgningen af undersżgelses-og evalueringskontrakterne behžftet med alvorlige svagheder og uregelmžssigheder (punkt 91-102). 
The contracting procedure and the management and monitoring of study and evaluation contracts revealed serious deficiencies and irregularities occurred at both Commission and contractors level (paragraphs 91 to 102).
Almen uddannelse, erhvervsuddannelse og ungdomspolitikken er nogle af Den Europžiske Unions hżjest prioriterede politikker, fordi de gr ud p at bidrage til udviklingen af et hżjt uddannelsesniveau, at fremme beskžftigelsen og at bringe Europa og borgerne nžrmere hinanden (1). 
Education, training and youth are some of the European UnionŐs top-priority policy areas, in so far as their objective is to contribute to the development of qualifications and employment and to bring Europe closer to its citizens (1).