natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Producentorganisationen kunne ikke forklare, hvilken sammenhžng der var mellem foranstaltningen og det erklžrede ml om at Čreducere tilbagekżbÇ. 
The producer organisation could not demonstrate a relation between the action and the stated objective of Ôreducing with-drawalsŐ.
Tekstboks 10 En fransk producentorganisation medtog en foranstaltning til 50 400 euro vedrżrende ČtjenesteydelserÇ i sit driftsprogram. 
Text box 10 In an operational programme in France, a producer organisation included an action described as Ôprovision of servicesŐ a cost of 50 400 euro.
25 % af disse omkostninger var afsat til mlet om at Čhżjne kvalitetenÇ og 25 % til mlet om at Čforbedre miljżpraksisÇ. 
25 % of this cost was allocated to the objective of Ôimproving qualityŐ and 25 % to Ôimproving environmental practicesŐ.
Vi var ikke i stand til at identificere det EU-ml, som de resterende 50 % af omkostningerne skulle vedrżre. 
We were unable to identify the EU objective related to the remaining 50 % of the costs.
Tekstboks 11 Et kunstvandingsprojekt i Italien fik tildelt stżtte til opfyldelse af mlet om at Čforbedre kvalitetenÇ i overensstemmelse med de nationale retningslinjer fra 1997. 
Text box 11 An irrigation project in Italy was allocated to the objective of Ôimproving qualityŐ in accordance with the 1997 national guidelines.
Efter en žndring af retningslinjerne blev mlet i 1999 žndret til at Čkoncentrere udbuddetÇ. 
Following a revision of the guidelines it was given the objective of Ôconcen-tration of supplyŐ in 1999.
I 2002 blev samme aktion klassificeret under mlet om at Čreducere omkostningerneÇ. 
In 2002 a further revision classified the same action under the objective Ôreducing costsŐ.
Producentorganisationernes mlopfyldelsen evalueringsrapporter viser ikke Tekstboks 8 Et operationelt program i Nederlandene omfattede et elektronisk fżl-geseddelsystem til 135 000 euro, der skulle Čplanlžgge og tilpasse produktionen til efterspżrgslenÇ. 
Text box 8 An operational programme in the Netherlands included an electronic delivery note system at a cost of 135 000 euro with the objective Ôplanning and adjusting production to the demandŐ.
Producentorganisationen kunne ikke bevise en forbindelse mellem aktionen og dette ml. 
The producer organisation could not demonstrate a relation between the action and this objective.
Det egentlige ml, at reducere omkostningerne, var ikke nžvnt i det operationelle program. 35. 
The real objective, the reduction in costs, was not mentioned in the operational programme.
20.11.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 282/41 36. 
20.11.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 282/41 36.
Medlemsstaterne brugte kun sjžldent evalueringerne i de endelige rapporter (1), og de blev behandlet som endnu en formalitet, der skulle overholdes for at opfylde kravene i forordningen. 
The evaluations in the final reports were little used by the Member States (1), and were treated as another formality required for compliance with the regulation.
I Gržkenland, Spanien (2) og Portugal blev de endelige rapporter blot arkiveret af det udbetalende organ, og de myndigheder, der var ansvarlige for at godkende driftsprogrammerne, lžste dem ikke. 
In Greece, Spain (2) and Portugal, final reports were simply filed by the paying agency and not examined by the authorities responsible for approving operational programmes.
Der var stor forskel p rapporternes indhold; det kunne dreje sig om alt fra mindre end n sides generelle ikke underbyggede erklžringer som f.eks., at Čkvaliteten var forbedretÇ, til over 100 sider med detaljerede redegżrelser og tal vedrżrende gennemfżrelsen af hver enkelt aktion i programmet. 
The content of the reports varied widely, from less than one page of general unsubstantiated statements such as that Ôquality has been improvedŐ, to over 100 pages of detailed facts and figures on the implementation of the programme, action by action.
Medlemsstaterne kržvede ikke, at de endelige rapporter indeholdt samme (1) Medlemsstaterne bemžrkede, at med de frister, der er fastsat i gen-nemfżrelsesforordningen, modtager de fżrst de endelige rapporter, nr de allerede har godkendt den pgžldende producentorganisations nžste driftsprogram. 
Member States did not require final reports to contain a (1) Member States commented that, according to the deadlines set in the implementing regulation, final reports are received after they have already approved the next operational programme for the producer organisation concerned.
Forordningen er blevet revideret adskillige gange siden 1997, men denne inkonsekvens er der ikke blevet rettet op p. 
Although the regulation has been revised several times since 1997, this inconsistency has not been amended.
Der kunne stilles krav om, at evalueringsrapporterne skulle afleveres tidligere i programmets sidste r, f.eks. samtidig med anmodningen vedrżrende det fżlgende program. 
Evaluation reports could be required earlier in the final year of the programme, simultaneous with the request for the following programme, for example.
(2) Dette vedrżrer sžrlig det nationale udbetalende organ. slags oplysninger, sledes at det blev muligt at overvge programmernes effektivitet p regionalt eller nationalt plan, og p grund af rapporternes forskellighed var det umuligt at foretage en sdan analyse. 
(2) This concerns the national paying agency in particular. common set of information to allow monitoring of the effectiveness of the programmes at regional or national level, and the diversity of the reports made any such analysis impractical.
Medlemsstaterne anvender ikke effektivitetskriterier, nr de godkender driftsprogrammerne 38. 
Member States do not apply effectiveness criteria when approving operational programmes 38.
I praksis godkendte medlemsstaterne programmerne efter arten af de foreslede udgifter, og ikke efter hvad man forventede at opn med programmet. 
In practice, Member States approved the programmes according to the nature of the proposed expenditure, not in terms of what the programme was expected to achieve.
Der blev ikke anvendt effektivitetskriterier, som f.eks. additionalitet, nr det skulle afgżres, om der skulle ydes EU-stżtte til en aktion. 
Effectiveness criteria, such as additionality, were not applied in deciding whether or not to approve the financing of an action with EU aid.
Det er blevet overflż-digt at tage hensyn til faktorer, som dem, der specifikt er nžvnt i forordningen, f.eks. udgangssituationen og mlene, den tekniske kvalitet og programmets żkonomiske holdbarhed, og det er kun blevet gjort i det omfang, det var nżdvendigt for at overholde bestemmelserne i forordningen. 
Consideration of factors specifically required by the regulation, such as the initial situation and objectives, the technical quality and economic consistency of the programme, has become redundant and has only been done to the extent necessary to demonstrate compliance with the letter of the regulation.
Medlemsstaterne anvendte i stedet en anden metode, hvor de fokuserede p, at kriterierne for stżtteberettigelse skulle vžre opfyldt, og p udbetaling af stżtte som illustreret i diagram 6. 
Instead, Member States followed a different approach, with the focus placed on compliance with the eligibility criteria and the payment of subsidy as illustrated in Diagram 6.
Diagram 6 Tilskudsmetode 
Diagram 6 Subsidy approach
C 282/42 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 20.11.2006 40. 
C 282/42 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.11.2006 40.
Det skyldes for en stor del žndringerne af Kommissionens gennemfżrelsesforordning, hvorved der blev indfżrt Čstżtte-berettigelseslisterÇ, som driftsprogrammerne har skullet vžre i overensstemmelse med siden 1999. 
This is largely a result of the amendment of the Commission implementing regulation to introduce Ôeligibility listsŐ with which operational programmes since 1999 have had to comply.
I disse lister er angivet de udgiftsarter, der kan, og de udgiftsarter, der ikke kan, medtages i driftsprogrammerne (tekstboks 12). vil dog vžre nżdt til at kunne begrunde deres afgżrelse over for producentorganisationen, og de vil ogs kunne sagsżges. 
These list the types of expenditure that can and cannot be included in operational programmes (Text box 12). have to be able to justify their decision to the producer organisation and also may face legal challenges.
Medlemsstaterne kan undg at skulle tržffe en sdan vanskelig afgżrelse ved at godkende samme aktion for alle producentorganisationer, som anmoder herom, uagtet den enkelte producentorganisations ml eller situation (tekstboks 13). 
Member States can avoid these difficult decisions by approving the same action for all producer organisations that request it, regardless of the objectives or situation of each particular producer organisation (Text box 13).
Tekstboks 12 Eksempel p stżtteberettigelseskriterier: transportomkostninger Stżtteberettigede: Ń investeringer i kżlebiler Ikke stżtteberettigede: Ń omkostninger ved indsamling eller transport (intern eller ekstern) Ń investeringer i transport med henblik p afsžtning eller distribution. 
Text box 12 Example of eligibility criteria: transport costs Eligible: Ń investments in transport equipped with cold storage. Ineligible: Ń costs of collection or transport (internal or external), Ń investments in transport for marketing or distribution.
Tekstboks 13 Eksempel: pallekasser I ti af de 30 tilfžldigt udvalgte driftsprogrammer havde medlemsstaterne godkendt kżb af pallekasser, tremmekasser eller lignende beholdere til indsamling, transport og opbevaring af frugt og grżntsager for i alt 1,7 millioner euro. 
Text box 13 Example: pallet-boxes In 10 of the 30 randomly selected operational programmes, Member States had approved the purchase of pallet-boxes, crates or similar containers for collecting, transporting and storing fruit and vegetables at a combined cost of 1,7 million euro.
Kommissionen anser denne udgift for at vžre stżtteberettiget. 
The Commission considers this expenditure to be eligible.
De ml, der var angivet for driftsprogrammerne, var: Ń at regulere produktionspriserne Ń at forbedre produkternes kvalitet Ń at żge produkternes handelsvžrdi Ń at reducere produktionsomkostningerne Ń at fremme miljżvenlige metoder Ń at koncentrere udbuddet Ń at nedbringe tilbagekżbene. 
The objectives given in the operational programmes included: Ń stabilising producer prices, Ń increasing product quality, Ń boosting productsŐ commercial value, Ń reducing production costs, Ń improving environmental practices, Ń concentration of supply, Ń reducing withdrawals.
I nogle tilfžlde udgjorde kżbet et fremskridt i forhold til udgangssituationen med hensyn til at opfylde et bestemt ml: En producentorganisation erstattede tremmekasser i trž med mere hygiejniske kasser i plastik for at levere til en producent af babymad (anfżrte ml: at forbedre produkternes kvalitet). 
In some cases, the purchase represented an advance from the initial situation to achieve an objective: one producer organisation replaced wooden crates with more hygenic plastic in order to supply a baby-food manufacturer (objective given: improving quality).
I andre tilfžlde drejede det sig ganske enkelt om erstatning af gamle eller żdelagte kasser eller kasser, der var blevet vžk, eller om kżb af flere kasser p grund af stżrre produktion, uden at der var en klar forbindelse med de anfżrte ml. 
In other cases these were simply replacements of old, lost or damaged crates, or additional purchases needed for increased production levels, without any clear relation to the given objectives.
I den fżrste gennemfżrelsesforordning fra 1997 var der ikke fastsat detaljerede kriterier for stżtteberettigelse, bortset fra at producentorganisationernes administrations-og driftsudgifter var udelukkede. 
The initial implementing regulation in 1997 did not set detailed criteria for eligibility, except to exclude producer organisationsŐ administrative and operating expenditure.
Medlemsstaterne var usikre p, hvad Kommissionen ville godtage som stżtteberettigede udgifter i forbindelse med regnskabsafslutningsproceduren, og som svar p anmodninger fra medlemsstaterne udsendte Kommissionen en ržkke fortolkende noter. 
Member States were uncertain of what the Commission would accept as eligible expenditure in the Clearance of Accounts process and, in response to queries from the Member States, the Commission issued a series of ad hoc interpretive notes.
Disse fortolkende noter havde ingen officiel status, og derfor žndrede Kommissionen gennemfżrelsesbestemmelserne og indfżrte en liste over aktioner og udgifter, der ikke var stżtteberettigede. 
As these interpretive notes had no official status, the Commission amended the implementing legislation to introduce a list of ineligible operations and expenditure.
Samtidig kržvede den, at medlemsstaterne skulle kontrollere stżtteberettigelsen af omkostningerne til de foreslede driftsprogrammer efter denne liste, inden de godkendte dem. 
At the same time, it required Member States to check the eligibility of proposed operational programme expenditure against this list before approving operational programmes.
I 2001 tilfżjede Kommissionen en liste over, hvad der kunne medtages i et driftsprogram, og i 2003 blev de fortolkende noter trukket tilbage, og de to lister blev revideret igen. 
In 2001 the Commission added a list of what could be included in operational programmes and in 2003 the interpretive notes were withdrawn and both lists were revised again.
Listerne tillod nogle undtagelser fra bestemmelsen om, at producentorganisationens produktions-og driftsomkostninger ikke var stżtteberettigede, f.eks. lżnninger til visse former for ansatte, genbrugsemballage og omkostninger ved naturlig skadedyrs-og sygdomsbekžmpelse. 
The eligibility lists allowed some exceptions to the exclusion of producer organisationsŐ production and operating costs such as certain staff salaries, recyclable packaging and costs of natural pest and disease controls.
Disse stżtteberettigelseslister hindrer ikke medlemsstaterne i ogs at se p producentorganisationernes udgangssituation og ml og p, om det er sandsynligt, at de foreslede aktioner vil vžre effektive. 
The existence of these eligibility lists does not prevent Member States from also considering the producer organisationsŐ initial situation and objectives and the likely effectiveness of the proposed actions.
De medlemsstater, der ikke vil godkende foreslede udgifter, som er stżtteberettigede i henhold til forordningen, To metoder anvendes sidelżbende, og det har skabt stżrre kompleksitet og medfżrt flere omkostninger 44. 
However, Member States that refuse to approve proposed expenditure defined in the regulation as eligible would The coexistence of the programming model and subsidy approach has increased complexity and costs 44.
I virkeligheden har medlemsstaterne i hżjere grad fulgt en ČtilskudsmetodeÇ end en programmeringsmetode, selv om pro-grammeringselementerne i forordningen stadig er pkržvede, og det har gjort stżtteordningen mere kompleks end nżdvendigt, og har medfżrt stżrre administrations-og kontrolomkostninger. 
In effect, a Ôsubsidy approachŐ has been followed by Member States rather than a programming approach, while the programming elements of the regulation are still required. The result is that the aid scheme has become more complex than necessary, with increased costs of administration and control.
Det skyldes bde, at stżtteberettigelseslisterne er uklare, og at de anvendes sammen med programmeringsmodellen. 
This results from the lack of clarity of the eligibility lists as well as from the coexistence of the programming model.
Hvis driftsprogrammerne, de rlige gennemfżrelsesrapporter og evalueringerne ved programafslutningen skal udarbejdes ordentligt, medfżrer det vžsentlige udgifter for producentorganisationerne. 
If done properly, preparing operational programmes, annual implementation reports and end-of-programme evaluations entails significant costs for producer organisations.
Og det mžrkes mere end andre steder i Italien og Nederlandene, hvor myndighederne kržver, at der ogs forelžgges detaljerede rlige driftsprogrammer til godkendelse. 
This is all the more so in Member States such as Italy and the Netherlands, which require detailed annual operational programmes also to be submitted for approval.
20.11.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 282/43 45. 
20.11.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 282/43 45.
De stżtteberettigelseslister, der er offentliggjort i forordningen, kan aldrig blive s pržcise, at de kan džkke alle mulige aktioner i en s forskelligartet og hurtigt skiftende sektor, og de er derfor skrevet i temmelig generelle vendinger som f.eks. 
The eligibility lists published in the regulation can never be precise enough to cover all possible actions in such a diverse and fast-changing sector and so are written in quite general terms such as Ôquality improvement measuresŐ.
Det medfżrer uundgeligt spżrgsml, og de forskellige medlemsstater og endda de forskellige regioner i de enkelte medlemsstater fortolker listerne forskelligt. 
Inevitably, queries arise, and the lists are interpreted differently by different Member States and even by different regions within Member States.
Selv efter at ordningen havde fungeret i otte r, fandt Kommissionen som led i regnskabsafslutningen i 2005 stadig eksempler p udgifter, der ikke var stżtteberettigede i Spanien, Frankrig, Italien og Det Forenede Kongerige, hvor medlemsstaterne ikke altid havde fortolket stżtteberettigelsesreglerne p samme mde som Kommissionen. 
Even after eight years of operation of the scheme, examples of ineligible expenditure continued to be found by the Commission in the 2005 Clearance enquiries in Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom where the Member States had not always interpreted the eligibility rules in the same way as the Commission.
P baggrund af den uvished, der er med hensyn til stżtteberettigelse og de dermed forbundne risici, foretager myndighederne i flere medlemsstater flere kontroller, end det kržves i forordningen (1), og nogle besżger hver enkelt producentorganisation flere gange rligt. 
In the light of the uncertainty on eligibility and the associated risks, several Member State administrations undertake more checks than required by the regulation (1), some visiting every producer organisation several times a year.
Det medfżrer yderligere omkostninger ikke kun for medlemsstaten, men ogs for producentorganisationen. 
This adds costs not only for the Member State but also for the producer organisation.
Denne uvished med hensyn til stżtteberettigelse samt administrationsomkostningerne og de omfattende kontroller af aktiviteterne kan ogs afskržkke producentorganisationerne fra at tage den risiko, det er at gennemfżre innovative foranstaltninger, som i sidste ende mske ikke vil blive godkendt som stżtteberettigede. 
This uncertainty on the eligibility, the costs of administration and extensive checks of their activities may also deter producer organisations from risking innovative measures, which may ultimately be disallowed.
Det kan f dem til kun at medtage foranstaltninger i deres driftsprogrammer, som helt sikkert er stżtteberettigede. 
This may encourage them to include only those measures in their operational programmes where the eligibility has been clearly established.
Der er risiko for, at der er godkendt ineffektive aktioner 48. 
There is a risk that ineffective actions have been approved 48.
Programmeringsmodellen er ikke blevet implementeret korrekt, og der har derfor vžret żget risiko for, at EU-budgettet ikke anvendes effektivt, dvs. for, at der godkendes aktioner, der ikke bidrager til opfyldelsen af EUŐs ml. 
As the programming model has not been properly implemented, the EU budget has been exposed to an increased risk of ineffectiveness: the risk that actions will be approved that do not result in progress towards the EUŐs objectives.
Nogle medlemsstater gżr gžldende, at de ikke behżver at bekymre sig om programmernes effektivitet, da producentorganisationerne normalt vil tržffe de kommercielle beslutninger, der er bedst for deres virksomhed. 
Some Member States have argued that they do not need to concern themselves with the effectiveness of the programmes, as producer organisations will normally make the best business decisions for their circumstances.
Nr alt kommer til alt, skal medlemmerne af producentorganisationen jo finansiere 50 % af omkostningerne til programmet. 
After all, the members of the producer organisation have to co-finance 50 % of the costs of the programme.
I denne revision har vi dog fundet eksempler p, at nogle producentorganisationer anvender stżtten til at džkke omkostningerne ved allerede eksisterende aktiviteter, hvilket ikke er et fremskridt i forhold til deres udgangssituation. 
However, the examples seen in this audit show that some producer organisations use the subsidy to support the costs of their existing activities, which do not represent a step forward from their initial situation.
Ud fra en żkonomisk synsvinkel giver dette mske mening for den enkelte producentorganisation, navnlig hvis den er under pres i en konkurrencesituation, men det bidrager ikke til opfyldelsen af mlene for EU-stżtteordningen. 
While this may make business sense for the producer organisation, particularly when under competitive pressure, it does not contribute to achieving the objectives of the EU aid scheme.
Eksemplet fra Spanien (tekstboks 14) viser, hvordan der kan medtages omkostninger, der ikke er ČaktionerÇ eller ČforanstaltningerÇ, der skal (1) Hvert r skal mindst 20 % af producentorganisationerne og mindst 30 % af det samlede stżttebelżb kontrolleres. gennemfżres for at n mlene for driftsprogrammet, men som bare er almindelige omkostninger, som enhver producent af frugt og grżntsager har. 
The example in Spain (Text box 14) illustrates (1) Annual checks of at least 20 % of producer organisations representing 30 % of expenditure. the inclusion of costs which are not ÔactionsŐ or ÔmeasuresŐ designed to achieve operational programme objectives, but are normal costs of any fruit and vegetable producer.
Selv om det ikke er almindeligt for driftsprogrammer at medtage s stor en andel af genbrugs-eller genanven-delig emballage (2), har medlemsstaterne godkendt vžsentlige belżb hertil. 
Although it is not common for operational programmes to include such a high proportion of recyclable packaging(2), Member States have approved significant amounts of expenditure for this.
I ti driftsprogrammer i Rettens stikprżve p 30 programmer var der medtaget udgifter til genbrugelig emballage p i alt 4,9 millioner euro. 
Ten operational programmes in the CourtŐs sample of 30 included a combined total of 4,9million euro for recyclable or reusable packaging.
Tekstboks 14 Eksempel: De regionale myndigheder i Spanien havde godkendt et program i stikprżven, der omfattede 2,7 millioner euro til genbrugelige papkasser. 
Text box 14 Example: Regional authorities in Spain had approved one operational programme in our sample, which included 2,7 million euro for recyclable cardboard boxes.
Dette belżb udgjorde 83 % af det samlede program for 2000-2003. 
This represented 83 % of the total programme for 2000-2003.
I 2001 godkendte myndighederne en žndring af programmet, hvorved de planlagte investeringer i drivhuse og kunstvanding blev opgivet, og forhżjede budgettet til genbrugelige kasser til 98 % i alt. 
In 2001 they approved a revision to the programme which deleted planned investments in greenhouses and irrigation, and increased the budget for recyclable boxes to 98 % of the total.
Den eneste anden ČaktionÇ var lżn til en tekniker. 
The only other ÔactionŐ was the salary of a technician.
Har de foranstaltninger, der er finansieret i driftsprogrammerne, vžret effektive? 
Have the measures financed in operational programmes been effective?
Den foregende del viste, at den metode, medlemsstaterne fulgte, nr de skulle godkende driftsprogrammer, giver risiko for, at de finansierede foranstaltninger ikke er effektive. 
The previous section showed that the approach followed by the Member States in approving operational programmes results in a risk that the measures financed may not be effective.