natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
C 20/5 V. a) b) c) d) e) Retten fandt dog: at de nye muligheder for at żge omfanget af og tempoet i samarbejdet ikke udnyttes godt nok, og at ikke alle medlemsstater har oprettet administrative strukturer og/eller operationelle procedurer, der egner sig til at sikre, at samarbejdet bliver effektivt at halvdelen af udvekslingerne af oplysninger efter anmodning ikke overholder de tidsfrister, der er fastsat i lovgivningen, og at der kun sjžldent gives meddelelse om overskridelse af svarfristen eller forelżbige besvarelser at svarfristen overskrides i alle medlemsstater, men at det varierer meget fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat, hvor hyppigt det sker. 
C 20/5 V. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) However, the Court found that: insufficient use is made of the new possibilities to enhance and speed up cooperation and not all Member States have set up adequate administrative structures and/or operational procedures for ensuring efficient cooperation; half of the information exchange upon request does not take place within the timescales required by the legislation and notifications of late replies or interim replies are rarely given; late replies occur in all Member States but their frequency varies considerably between Member States.
Undertiden er der store forskelle mellem det antal anmodninger, en medlemsstat hžvder at have modtaget, og det antal anmodninger, andre medlemsstater hžvder at have sendt til den at rammerne omkring udvekslingen af oplysninger uden forudgende anmodning ikke er defineret godt nok, og at de oplysninger, der bliver givet spontant, ikke altid udnyttes systematisk at det żger risikoen for, at unddragelse og svig ikke bliver afslżret, at der gr s lang tid, fżr oplysningerne er tilgžngelige i det nuvžrende momsinformationsudvekslingssystem VIES, og at oplysningerne ikke er plidelige nok. 
There are sometimes significant differences between the number of requests which a Member State claims to have received and the number of requests other Member States claim to have sent it; the framework for exchanges of information without prior request is not well defined and the information which is provided spontaneously is not always systematically exploited; the late availability and lack of reliability of data in the current Value Added Information Exchange System (VIES) increase the risk of evasion and fraud not being detected.
VI. tekontorer og en bedre overvgning, s det kan sikres, at medlemsstaterne yder hinanden effektiv bistand. 
VI. and better monitoring to ensure that Member States provide efficient assistance to each other.
Der er behov for et mere intensivt og hurtigt samarbejde, flere direkte kontakter mellem lokale skat-VII. 
There is a need for more intensive and rapid cooperation, more direct contacts between local tax offices VII.
Man bżr snarest g i gang med at afhjžlpe svaghederne ved VIES for eksempel ved, at tidsfristerne for indsamling og indlžsning af data forkortes radikalt, og ved, at der gives bredere direkte adgang til data med henblik p at muliggżre multilaterale samrd. 
The weaknesses of VIES should be urgently addressed, for example by radically shortening the timescale for collecting and capturing data and by granting broader direct access to data to enable multilateral consultations.
C 20/6 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 25.1.2008 INDLEDNING Baggrund for revisionen 1. 
C 20/6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 25.1.2008 INTRODUCTION Audit background 1.
Momsunddragelse og -svig er konkurrenceforvridende p det indre marked og reducerer medlemsstaternes skatteindtžgter. 
Value added tax (VAT) evasion and fraud distort fair competition in the single market and reduce Member StatesŐ tax revenue.
Som Rdet har understreget det (1), skal den form for svig bekžmpes effektivt og resolut af hensyn til de žrlige virksomheder og medlemsstaternes budgetter. 
As the Council has emphasised (1), such fraud must be tackled effectively and decisively in the interest of honest entrepreneurs and Member State budgets.
Rdet konkluderede den 28. november 2006, at det erkender det presserende behov for at udarbejde en strategi til bekžmpelse af skatteunddragelse p fžllesskabsplan, der skal supplere den nationale indsats for at bekžmpe skatteunddragelse. 
In order to complement national efforts in this regard, the Council agreed on 28 November 2006 on the urgent need to establish at Community level an anti-fraud strategy to combat tax fraud.
Momsunddragelse og -svig indvirker ogs p finansieringen af Den Europžiske Unions budget, da det fżrer til, at behovet for at indkržve egne indtžgter fra medlemsstaterne baseret p bruttonationalindkomsten (BNI) vokser. 
VAT evasion and fraud also impact on the financing of the budget of the European Union, as they result in an increased need to call from Member States own resources based on gross national income (GNI).
BNI-indtžgten skal džkke det restbelżb af de samlede udgifter, som ikke džkkes af andre indtžgter. 
The GNI resource is intended to cover the balance of total expenditure not covered of other resources.
Det fżlger heraf, at tab, der skyldes momssvig, indvirker p den samlede balance i ordningen for egne indtžgter som fastlagt af fžllesskabslovgiver(2). 
It follows that losses caused by VAT fraud affect the overall balance of the own resources system as laid down by the Community legislator (2).
Da moms-og BNI-indtžgten beregnes efter forskellige kriterier, kan disse tab ogs indvirke p fordelingen af den finansielle byrde p medlemsstaterne (3) og sledes underminere lighedsprincippet. 
As the criteria for calculating VAT and GNI resources differ, those losses might also affect the incidence of the financial burden on the Member States (3), thus undermining the principle of equity.
Ganske vist er omfanget af momsunddragelse og -svig ikke blevet efterforsket i alle medlemsstaterne, men der er offentliggjort adskillige skżn. 
Though investigations into the magnitude of VAT evasion and fraud have not been carried out in all Member States, several estimates have been published.
International VAT Association (4) anfżrer et skżnnet momstab p 60-100 milliarder euro rlig i hele Den Europžiske Union. 
The International VAT Association (4) quotes estimates of VAT losses ranging from 60 billion to 100 billion euro per annum across the European Union.
HM Revenue and Customs (skatte-og toldmyndighederne i Det Forenede Kongerige) skżnner, at der i afgiftsret 2005-2006 alene i Det Forenede Kongerige var et tab af momsindtžgter p 18,2 milliarder euro (5). 
In the United Kingdom alone, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) estimate that in the tax year 2005-2006 VAT revenue losses amounted to 18,2 billion euro (5).
Det tyske finansministerium har offentliggjort (6) resultaterne af en undersżgelse, hvoraf det fremgr, at der i 2005 var et skżnnet momstab p 17 milliarder euro. 
In Germany, the Ministry of Finance published (6) the results of a study which estimated, for 2005, VAT losses of 17 billion euro.
Momsunddragelse er i de fleste tilfžlde knyttet til żkonomiske aktiviteter, der ikke opgives til skattemyndighederne (Čsort żkonomiÇ). 
Most of the VAT evasion is linked to undeclared economic activities (shadow economy).
Men en stor del af momsunddragelsen fremkommer (1) Konklusionerne fra mżdet i Rdet (Żkonomi og finans) den 5.6.2007. 
There is, however, also a significant part of VAT evasion that occurs as a side-effect of the VAT arrangements put in place when the single market was introduced (1) Conclusions of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of 5 June 2007.
(2) Rdets afgżrelse 2000/597/EF, Euratom af 29.9.2000 om ordningen for De Europžiske Fžllesskabers egne indtžgter (EFT L 253 af 7.10.2000, s. 
(2) Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European CommunitiesŐ own resources (OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p.
4/2005 om forslag til Rdets afgżrelse om ordningen for De Europžiske Fžllesskabers egne indtžgter og forslag til Rdets forordning om gennemfżrelsesforanstaltninger for korrektion af budgetuligevžgte i henhold til artikel 4 og 5 i Rdets afgżrelse af (...) om ordningen for De Europžiske Fžllesskabers egne indtžgter (EUT C 167 af 7.7.2005, s. 
(3) See paragraph 10 of the CourtŐs Opinion No 4/2005 on a proposal for a Council decision on the system of the European CommunitiesŐ own resources and on a proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementing measures for the correction of budgetary imbalances in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of the Council decision of (...) on the system of the European CommunitiesŐ own resources (OJ C 167, 7.7.2005, p.
(4) International VAT Association (den internationale momssammen-slutning), Combating VAT fraud in the EU Ń the way forward, marts 2007. 
(4) International VAT Association, Combating VAT fraud in the EU Ń the way forward, March 2007.
(5) HM Revenue and Customs, Measuring Indirect Tax Losses Ń 2006, december 2006. 
(5) HM Revenue & Customs, Measuring Indirect Tax Losses Ń 2006, December 2006.
(6) Monatsbericht des BMF Ń januar 2006, s. 
(6) Monatsbericht des BMF Ń January 2006, p.
Ved samhandel inden for Fžllesskabet er de leverede varer fritaget for moms. 
45. in 1993. For intra-Community trade, goods supplied are exempted from VAT.
Den skyldige moms betales s i den medlemsstat, varerne sendes til. 
The VAT due is then payable in the Member State where the goods arrive.
Denne ordning kan give anledning til momsunddragelse enten i leverandżr-landet eller i bestemmelseslandet. 
These arrangements can give rise to VAT evasion either in the supplier country or in the country of destination.
Der er tre hovedtyper af unddragelse: a) Der angives levering inden for Fžllesskabet, mens varerne tilbageholdes med henblik p salg p hjemmemarkedet uden moms. b) Der betales ikke skyldig moms ved ankomsten til bestemmelsesmedlemsstaten. c) ČMissing traderÇ-svig (strmandsselskab (7)). 
Three main types of evasion take place: (a) declaration of intra-Community deliveries whilst retaining goods for sale in the domestic market without VAT; (b) failure to pay VAT due on arrival in the Member State of destination; (c) missing trader fraud (7).
Svigordningerne er ofte avancerede, omfatter flere medlemsstater og involverer mange selskaber. 
Fraud schemes are often sophisticated extending over several Member States and involving numerous companies.
Eurojust rapporterede f.eks. i marts 2007 (8) om et tilfžlde af international momskarruselsvig, der skżnnedes at andrage 2,1 milliarder euro, og som involverede 18 medlemsstater. 
For example, Eurojust reported in March 2007 (8) a case of international VAT carousel fraud estimated at 2,1 billion euro and involving 18 Member States.
Ifżlge det britiske skatte-og toldvžsen (5) kunne tab p 3-4,5 milliarder euro i afgiftsret 2005-2006 alene i Det Forenede Kongerige tilskrives skaldt intrakommunitžr Čmissing traderÇ-svig. 
In the UK alone, according to HMRC (5), losses of between 3 billion and 4,5 billion euro in the tax year 2005-2006 could be attributable to so-called Missing Trader Intra-Community VAT fraud.
Mens varer bevžger sig frit over EUŐs indre gržnser, begržnser de samme gržnser stadig for en stor del de nationale skattemyndigheders handlemuligheder. 
Whilst goods move freely across internal borders, the action of national tax authorities still remains largely constrained by those same borders.
Hvis en erhvervsdrivende foretager leveringer inden for Fžllesskabet, har han ret til refusion af kżbsmomsen. 
If a trader makes intra-Community supplies, he has the right to obtain a refund of the input VAT.
Den erhvervsdrivende i bestemmelsesmedlemsstaten skal s betale den skyldige moms. 
The VAT due is then payable by the trader in the Member State of destination.
Det er derfor nżdvendigt, at myndighederne i medlemsstaterne samarbejder og udveksler de oplysninger, der er nżdvendige for, at momsen kan beregnes korrekt. 
Cooperation between Member StatesŐ authorities is therefore necessary in order to exchange the information needed to assess VAT correctly.
1798/2003 af 7. oktober 2003 om administrativt samarbejde vedrżrende mervžrdiafgift (9) (herefter benžvnt ČforordningenÇ), som trdte i kraft den 1. januar 2004, og hvorved den tidligere forordning (EŻF) nr. 
The common system for the exchange of information between the Member States is governed by Council Regulation (EC) 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax (9) (hereafter called the regulation), which entered into force on 1 January 2004, repealing the former Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 (10).
I forordningen fastsžttes vilkrene for skattemyndighedernes samarbejde indbyrdes og med Kommissionen. 
The regulation lays down the conditions under which tax authorities in the Member States are to cooperate with one another and with the Commission.
Forordningen forhindrer ikke mere omfattende gensidig bistand i henhold til andre retsakter, herunder bilaterale eller multilaterale aftaler. 
The regulation does not preclude more comprehensive mutual assistance on the basis of other legal acts, including bilateral or multilateral agreements.
Nr medlemsstaterne indgr aftaler om supplerende bilaterale ordninger for administrativt samarbejde, skal de straks oplyse Kommissionen og de żvrige medlemsstater om det. 
Where Member States conclude additional bilateral arrangements on administrative cooperation, they are required to inform the Commission and the other Member States thereof without delay.
(7) Jf. ordlisten. 
(7) See glossary.
(8) Jf. Eurojusts pressemeddelelse af 13.3.2007. 
(8) See Eurojust press release dated 13 March 2007.
(9) EUT L 264 af 15.10.2003, s. 
(9) OJ L 264, 15.10.2003, p.
(10) EFT L 24 af 1.2.1992, s. 
(10) OJ L 24, 1.2.1992, p.
25.1.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 20/7 6. 
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/7 6.
Da Rdet vedtog forordningen i oktober 2003, fastslog det (1), at ordningerne for administrativt samarbejde indtil da var blevet udnyttet for drligt. 
When adopting the regulation in October 2003, the Council stated (1) that there had been until then an under-use of the arrangements for administrative cooperation.
Rdet opfordrede til en mere intensiv udveksling af oplysninger, s svig kunne bekžmpes mere effektivt. 
The Council called for exchange of information to be made more intensive to combat fraud more effectively.
I forordningen opereres der med tre typer udveksling af oplysninger (jf. figur 1): a) udveksling af oplysninger via den elektroniske database VIES. 
Three types of exchange of information are foreseen under the regulation (see Figure 1): (a) Exchange of information through the VIES electronic database.
Medlemsstaterne skal lagre oplysninger om de momsregistreringsnumre, de tildeler erhvervsdrivende, og om de leveringer af varer inden for Fžllesskabet, samme erhvervsdrivende angiver. 
Member States are required to input information on VAT numbers attributed to traders and on intra-Community supplies of goods declared by those traders.
Andre medlemsstater kan s hente disse oplysninger i databasen og sammenholde dem med angivelserne fra deres egne erhvervsdrivende b) udveksling af mere detaljerede oplysninger efter udtrykkelig anmodning, for eksempel hvor undersżgelser via VIES giver anledning til mistanke vedrżrende en transaktion og/eller p grundlag af en risikoanalyse c) udveksling af oplysninger uden forudgende anmodning, for eksempel hvor en medlemsstat har grund til at tro, at der er beget en overtrždelse af momslovgivningen i en anden medlemsstat. 
Other Member States can then interrogate the database to obtain this information and check it against declarations made by their own traders. (b) Exchange of more detailed information on specific request, for example where inquiries made through VIES give rise to suspicions about a transaction and/or as a result of risk analysis. (c) Exchange of information without prior request, for example where a Member State has grounds to believe that a breach of VAT legislation has been committed in another Member State.
Udvekslingen af oplysninger i henhold til forordningen kanaliseres hovedsagelig gennem de centrale forbindelseskontorer. 
Exchanges of information under the regulation are mainly channelled through Central Liaison Offices (CLO).
Hver medlemsstat skal udpege et centralt forbindelseskontor som sžrlig ansvarligt for kontakterne til de żvrige medlemsstater. 
Each Member State has to designate a single CLO with principal responsibility for contacts with other Member States.
Derudover kan befżjelsen til at udveksle oplysninger direkte med andre medlemsstater delegeres til andre kontorer eller til individuelle embedsmžnd. 
In addition, competence to exchange information directly with other Member States may be delegated to other departments or to individual officials.
Herudover indeholder forordningen regler for kontrol, der foretages samtidig i to eller flere medlemsstater, og den bner mulighed for, at skatteembedsmžnd kan vžre til stede i andre medlemsstater, for eksempel for at f adgang til dokumentation, der befinder sig der, eller for at deltage i igangvžrende undersżgelser. 
Furthermore, the regulation lays down rules for controls conducted simultaneously in two or more Member States and allows for tax officials to be present in other Member States, for example in order to have access to documentation held there or to attend in ongoing enquiries.
Forordningen tildeler ogs Kommissionen en funktion, idet denne skal fremme og evaluere det administrative samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne. 
The regulation also provides a role for the Commission in promoting and evaluating administrative cooperation between Member States.
Heri bists den af et udvalg sammensat af repržsentanter for medlemsstaterne, Det Stende Udvalg for Administrativt Samarbejde (SCAC). 
In this it is assisted by a committee made up of representatives of Member States, the Standing Committee on Administrative Cooperation (SCAC).
2235/2002/EF om Fiscalis-programmet er forordningen desuden retsgrundlag for Fžllesskabets udgifter (2) til udvikling og vedligeholdelse af operationelle elektroniske systemer til udveksling af oplysninger mellem de nationale administrationer, multilaterale kontrolforanstaltninger, Figur 1 Udveksling af oplysninger (1) Jf. forordningens betragtning 12 og 13. (2) Jf. 
Furthermore, the regulation is, together with Decision No 2235/2002/EC on the Fiscalis programme, the legal basis for Community expenditure (2) to develop and keep operational electronic systems for information exchange between national administrations, multilateral controls, training seminars for tax officials, and the exchange of officials between administrations. The Figure 1 Types of information exchange (1) See recitals 12 and 13 of the regulation.
Den Europžiske Unions almindelige budget for regnskabsret 2007, sektion III, kapitel 14 05 Ń Skattepolitik (EUT L 77 af 16.3.2007, s. 
(2) See the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2007, section III, chapter 14 05 Ń Taxation policy (OJ L 77, 16.3.2007, p.
C 20/8 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 25.1.2008 uddannelsesseminarer for embedsmžnd i afgiftsadministratio-nerne og udveksling af embedsmžnd mellem administrationer. 
C 20/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 25.1.2008 financial framework for Fiscalis for the period from 2003 to 2007 was set at 67,3 million euro.
REVISIONSMETODE OG REVISIONENS OMFANG 12. 
AUDIT APPROACH AND SCOPE 12.
Formlet med Rettens revision var at vurdere, om oplysningerne udveksles rettidigt og effektivt mellem medlemsstaterne, og om der er indfżrt hensigtsmžssige administrative strukturer og procedurer til stżtte for det administrative samarbejde. 
The objective of the CourtŐs audit was to assess whether the information exchanges between Member States are carried out in a timely and effective manner and whether adequate administrative structures and procedures are in place to support administrative cooperation.
Revisionen džkkede: 16. 
16.
I Kommissionen undersżgte Retten de relevante afdelingers funktion og gennemgik i den forbindelse ogs forvaltningen af Fiscalis-programmet. 
At the Commission, the operation of the relevant departments was examined including a review of the management of the Fiscalis programme.
Arbejdet i Det Stende Udvalg for Administrativt Samarbejde (SCAC) blev ogs gennemget. 
The operation of the Standing Committee on Administrative Cooperation (SCAC) was also reviewed.
Derudover har Retten brugt rapporter fra og arbejde udfżrt af nationale revisionskontorer i medlemsstaterne, som har udfżrt tilsvarende revision. 
In addition, use has been made of reports and work of National Audit Offices in Member States that have performed similar audits.
Desuden fulgte Retten op p spżrgsml rejst i tidligere beretninger (3). 
Issues raised in previous Court reports (3) were also followed up.
BEMŽRKNINGER Udveksling af oplysninger efter anmodning 18. 
OBSERVATIONS Exchange of information on request between Member States 18.
I henhold til forordningens artikel 5 skal medlemsstaterne udveksle oplysninger efter anmodning. 
Article 5 of the regulation provides for Member States to exchange information on request.
Som regel kan der fremsžttes anmodning om alle oplysninger, der er nżdvendige med henblik p en korrekt momsansžttelse, herunder alle oplysninger om konkrete sager. 
As a rule, any information that may help to effect a correct assessment of VAT may be subject to a request, including any information relating to specific cases.
For at fremskaffe de oplysninger, skattemyndighederne i en anden medlemsstat żnsker, skal den bistandssżgte myndighed forholde sig p samme mde, som hvis den handlede p egne vegne. 
In order to obtain the information sought by the tax administration in another Member State, the requested authority is required to proceed as though acting on its own account.
Samarbejdets intensitet 19. 
Intensity of cooperation 19.
Siden forordningen trdte i kraft den 1. januar 2004, er antallet af anmodninger om oplysninger steget med 62 %. 
Since the regulation came into force on 1 January 2004, the number of requests for information has increased by 62 %.
Det steg fra 18 162 i 2003 til 29 381 i 2006. 
It went up from 18 162 requests in 2003 to 29 381 in 2006.
Det stigende antal udvekslinger skyldes navnlig udvidelsen 20. 
Increase in exchanges of information mainly due to enlargement 20.
En analyse af de tal, medlemsstaterne har indsendt til Kommissionen (4), viser imidlertid, at denne stigning navnlig ser ud til at skyldes udvidelsen (5), og at der var fžrre anmodninger mellem EU-15 i 2005 og 2006 end i 2004 (jf. tabel 1). 
However, an analysis of the figures provided by Member States to the Commission (4) shows that this increase appears to be mainly attributable to enlargement (5) with the number of requests sent amongst EU-15 in 2005 and 2006 being below the level reached in 2004 (see Table 1).
(3) Sžrberetning nr. 9/98 om beskyttelse af Den Europžiske Unions finansielle interesser p omrdet moms i forbindelse med samhandel mellem medlemsstaterne (EFT C 356 af 20.11.1998, s. 
(3) Special Report No 9/98 concerning the protection of the financial interests of the European Union in the field of VAT on intra-Community trade (OJ C 356, 20.11.1998, p.
1) og rsberetningen for 2001, punkt 1.45-1.55 (EFT C 295 af 28.11.2002, s. 
1) and Annual Report 2001, paragraphs 1.45 to 1.55 (OJ C 295, 28.11.2002, p.
(4) Tallene for 2006 er stadig forelżbige. 
(4) Figures for 2006 are still provisional.
(5) Fra EU-15 til EU-25 den 1. maj 2004. 
(5) From EU-15 to EU-25 on 1 May 2004.