natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I modsžtning hertil havde CARDS-programmet et meget hżjt tempo for kontraktindgelse (jf. figur 3) i Kosovo, Bosnien-Hercegovina og Serbien, men fik p grund af efterslžbet fra tidligere programmer en relativt langsom start i Albanien og Kroatien. 
In contrast the CARDS programme had a very high contracting speed (see Graph 3) in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia but due to the backlog of earlier programmes a relatively slow start in Albania and Croatia.
37. Kroatien havde ogs problemer: De decentrale implementeringsstrukturer i Albanien og a) I Albanien blev programmer, der involverede den albanske udviklingsfond (AUF), viderefżrt, selv om Kommissionen ikke havde vurderet, om AUF kunne leve op til sit ansvar i henhold til den finansforordning, der var gžldende i 2003. 
37. and in Croatia also had problems: The decentralised implementation structures in Albania (a) in Albania, programmes involving the Albanian Development Fund (ADF) continued without the Commission having assessed whether the ADF was capable of meeting its responsibilities, according to the provisions of the Financial Regulation applicable in 2003.
P grund af de problemer, Kommissionen kom ud for med AUF, besluttede den at reducere den decentraliserede del af det albanske CARDS-program kraftigt og dekoncentrerede det til delegationen. b) I 2002 blev der i Kroatien taget mlrettede skridt mod formel decentralisering, men det tempo, EuropeAid ans for hensigtsmžssigt at gennemfżre decentraliseringen i, var for 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Figur 3 Kontraktindgelsesgrad i CARDS-landene Forpligtelser 2002-2004 indget inden for t r Albanien Bosnien-Hercegovina Kroatien Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien Kosovo Serbien (1) Jf. artikel 2 i Kommissionens afgżrelse C(2006) 264 (E/148/2006), hvori det hedder, at for CARDSŐ vedkommende finder denne afgżrelse anvendelse p en ržkke projekter som aftalt mellem Kommissionen og Kroatien i CARDS-finansieringsaftalen for 2003 (undertegnet den 2. september 2003) og i CARDS-finansieringsaftalen for 2004 (undertegnet den 29. november 2004). 
Due to the problems encountered with the ADF, the Commission decided to strongly reduce the decentralised part of the Albanian CARDS programme and devolved it to the Delegation; (b) in 2002, in Croatia, specific steps were taken towards formal decentralisation.
C 285/12 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 27.11.2007 39. 
C 285/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.11.2007 39.
I Albanien gav behovet for at kompensere for denne forsinkelse en meget hżj koncentration af kontraktindgelser siden hen: 63 % af de CARDS-kontrakter, der blev underskrevet i perioden 2001-2005, blev underskrevet i 2004, s der blev implementeret mange kontrakter samtidig, hvad der gjorde udfordringen til modtagernes absorberingskapacitet endnu stżrre (1) (jf. tekstboks 4). 
In Albania the need to compensate this delay led, later on, to a very high concentration of contract signatures: 63 % of the CARDS contracts signed in the period from 2001 to 2005 were signed in 2004, thus leading to the simultaneous implementation of a high number of contracts and an increased challenge to the beneficiariesŐ absorption capacity (1) (see Box 4).
Forsinkelser af det rlige program for 2001 betżd, at der i Kroatien blev gennemfżrt to rlige programmer samtidig. 
Delays in the 2001 annual programme meant that in Croatia two annual programmes were implemented at the same time.
Tekstboks 4 Overbelastning af den nationale administrative kapacitet i Albanien Ikke blot havde Albanien en hżj koncentration af projekter inden for en kort periode, men hovedparten af bistanden var ogs koncentreret i sektoren retlige og indre anliggender. 
Box 4 Overstretched national administrative capacity in Albania In Albania in addition to high concentration of projects in a short period of time, most of the assistance was concentrated in the Justice and Home Affairs sector.
Da revisionen fandt sted, var mindst 48 forskellige projekter under gennemfżrelse samtidig p omrdet retlige og indre anliggender. 
At the time of the audit, there were at least 48 different, simultaneously on-going projects in the Justice and Home AffairsŐ area.
13 af dem var finansieret af EU, og 35 af andre donorer. 
13 of them were financed by the EU and 35 by other donors.
Det fremgik f.eks. af revisionen, at udformningen af EURALIUS-projektet i Albanien (European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System, den europžiske bistandsmission til retssystemet i Albanien) havde et meget hżjt ambitionsniveau. 
For example in the Euralius project in Albania (European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System), the audit found out that the level of ambition of the project design was very high.
Ti specifikke ml skulle ns, og de involverede 15 forskellige slags projektpartnere p n gang. 
Ten specific objectives had to be achieved involving 15 different types of project partners simultaneously.
Hvert af de ti ml involverede mange forskellige projektpart-nere. 
Each of the ten objectives involved numerous different project partners.
Justitsministeriet, den primžre bistandsmodtager, ville sledes komme til at hndtere 78 forskellige planlagte aktiviteter. 
As a result, the Ministry of Justice, the principal beneficiary, would be dealing with 78 different foreseen activities.
En vžsentlig utilsigtet bieffekt ved det hżje tempo for kontraktindgelse, som Kommissionen havde opfordret til, var en risiko for, at modtagerne ikke fik det fulde udbytte af projekterne, med andre ord, at deres effektivitet og virkning blev reduceret. 
One of the main unintended side effects of the high contracting speed, encouraged by the Commission was that beneficiaries might not fully benefit from the projects, thus reducing their effectiveness and impact.
Med henblik p at sikre, at projekterne bliver effektive, er fžllesskabsbistanden til stabiliserings-og associeringsprocessen blevet gjort betinget, og hvis betingelserne ikke opfyldes, kan Kommissionen tržffe passende foranstaltninger. 
To ensure project effectiveness Community assistance under the stabilisation and association process is conditional and failure to respect the conditions could lead the Commission to take appropriate measures.
Men nogle projekter blev gennemfżrt, selv om bistandsmodtageren ikke opfyldte betingelserne, og blev dermed mindre nyttige end oprindelig forventet. 
However, there are projects which were implemented in cases where conditionalities were not respected by the beneficiary, thus providing less added value than originally expected.
Et eksempel herp var stżtten til retssystemet i Kroatien, som beskrives i tekstboks 5. 
An example in this respect was the support to the Croatian Court System described in Box 5.
(1) Kulminationen p den albanske kontraktindgelse i 2004 skyldes i hvert fald til dels, at der i december 2003 fra Kommissionens hovedsžde blev udsendt en mission til verifikation af dekoncentreringen. 
(1) The Albanian contracting peak of 2004 is at least partly a consequence of a Commission HQ devolution verification mission carried out in December 2003.
Missionen konkluderede, at den endelige bekržftelse af dekoncentre-ringens uddelegering afhang af, at der blev net et ml for udbud p 25 millioner euro inden for en frist p seks mneder. 
The mission concluded that the final confirmation of the devolution sub-Delegation was conditional to achieving a tender target of 25 million euro within a delay of six months.
Tekstboks 5 Stżtten til retssystemet i Kroatien Twinning-projektet finansieret over 2002-programmet blev gennemfżrt, selv om ingen af de betingelser, der var defineret i projektudformningen, var opfyldt p det tidspunkt, hvor projektet blev startet. n af betingelserne var, at der skulle vžre vedtaget en strategi for reformen af den dżmmende magt. 
Box 5 Support to the Croatian Court System The Twinning project financed by the 2002 programme was implemented despite the fact that none of the conditionalities defined in the project form were fulfilled at the time of the project start-up. One of the conditionalities presumed the existence of a strategy for the reform of the judiciary.
Da projektet var en absolut prioritet for Kommission, blev det pnżdet bistandsmodtageren. 
Given that the project was an absolute priority for the Commission, it was imposed on the recipient.
Af ovennžvnte rsager har de anbefalinger, som bistandsmodtageren fik, trods accept og anerkendelse fra justitsministeriet i Kroatien ikke fremkaldt stżrre foranstaltninger p alle omrder. 
For the above reasons recommendations made to the recipient, although accepted and recognised by the Croatian Ministry of Justice, have not produced major actions in all areas.
Kommissionens forvaltningstilgang fremmer ikke udvidelsen af modtagerlandenes ansvar 42. 
CommissionŐs management approach not conducive to increasing the responsibility of recipient countries 42.
Ud over at nžvne bidraget til SAP beskriver pržamblen til CARDS-forordningen ogs det andet hovedforml med bistanden sledes: Den eksisterende fžllesskabsbistand bżr ... udvide de bistandsberettigede landes og instansers ansvar med hensyn til denne [SAP-]proces. 43. 
In addition to the contribution to the SAp, the preamble of the CARDS Regulation describes the other main objective of the assistance as: ÔThe existing Community assistance should ... increase the responsibility of the recipient countries and entities in relation to that [SAp] process.Ő 43.
Som nžvnt i punkt 31 var den vžsentligste grund til, at netop disse forvaltningsstrukturer blev oprettet, at de skulle sikre hurtig ydelse af bistand. 
As set out in paragraph 31, the main reason behind the management structures established was to ensure quick delivery of aid.
En ulempe ved denne tilgang er, at modtagerstaterne involveres mindre. 
The downside of this approach is reduced recipient state involvement.
Tilgangen var velegnet i genopbygningsfasen, men mindre velegnet, efterhnden som bistanden bevžgede sig fra infrastruktur-til institutionsopbygningsprojekter. 
This approach was appropriate in the reconstruction phase but less so as the assistance moved from infrastructure projects to institution building projects.
I forordningen defineres der ingen specifikke ansvarsomrder for modtagerlandene. 
The regulation does not define any specific responsibilities for the recipient countries.
Den benbare politiske vilje til s hurtigt som muligt at skaffe landene ind i Den Europžiske Union, har ikke afspejlet sig i nogen stigning i landenes ansvar for forvaltningen. 
Despite the apparent political will to bring the countries as rapidly as possible into the European Union, this has not been matched by any increase in the countriesŐ management responsibilities.
Retten fandt ikke nogen angivelse af en formel bistands-forvaltningsstrategi hos Kommissionen Ń hverken generelt eller landespecifikt Ń om gradvis at udvide modtagerlandenes ansvar. 
The Court did not find any indication of a formal aid management strategy on the CommissionŐs part Ń general or country specific Ń to increase progressively the responsibility of the recipients.
Modtagerlandenes ansvar i projektidentifikations-og udbudsfaserne er begržnset 45. 
Limited recipient country responsibilities in the project identification and tendering phases 45.
Retten vurderede, i hvor hżj grad Kommissionens forvaltning af CARDS-programmet bidrog til at udvide modtagerlandenes ansvar p bestemte kritiske trin i forvaltningen af projektforlżbet, og vurderede fżlgerne af et utilstržkkeligt ejerskab. 
The Court assessed to what degree the CommissionŐs management of the CARDS programme contributed to increasing the responsibility of recipient countries in certain critical steps of the project cycle management, and assessed the consequences of insufficient ownership.
27.11.2007 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 285/13 46. 
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/13 46.
Kommissionens retningslinjer for projektidentifikation og pfżlgende udarbejdelse af rlige programmer (1) fremmede ikke modtagernes deltagelse i beslutningstagningen. 
The CommissionŐs guidelines for the identification of projects and subsequent drafting of the Annual Programmes (1) did not promote beneficiary participation in the decision-making.
I de instruktioner, EuropeAid udstedte for den rlige planlžgning af 2001 og 2002, blev der ikke specificeret nogen form for involvering af modtagere. 
The instructions issued by EuropeAid for the 2001 and 2002 annual programming did not specify any kind of beneficiary involvement.
Retningslinjerne for de rlige programmer for 2003 og 2004 specificerede en vis Ń om end begržnset Ń grad af involvering, idet der skulle tages indledende kontakt til potentielle modtagere under det forberedende arbejde, og delegationen eller EGA skulle sende udkast til projektplaner til modtagerne, mindst to uger fżr arbejdet p det rlige program afsluttedes. 
The guidelines for the 2003 and 2004 annual programmes specified some involvement Ń albeit limited Ń requiring initial contacts to be taken with potential beneficiaries during the preparatory work, and draft project fiches to be sent by the Delegation or EAR to the beneficiaries at least two weeks before finalising the annual programme.
Retten vurderede omfanget af modtagernes involvering gennem interview p stedet med ca. 
The audit assessed the extent of the involvement of the beneficiaries through on-the-spot interviews with around 30 beneficiaries.
Isžr i Bosnien-Hercegovina, Kroatien og Serbien fandt Retten eksempler p, at Kommissionen og EGA havde forsżgt at udvide modtagerlandenes ejerskab (jf. tekstboks 6). 
The Court found some examples, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, where the Commission and the Agency had tried to increase recipient country ownership (see Box 6).
Tekstboks 6 Eksempel p god ejerskabspraksis Tilfžlde nr. 1: Styrkelse af direktoratet for europžisk integration i Bosnien-Hercegovina (BIH) Beslutningstagningsprocessen vedrżrende planlžgningen af CARDS for 2006 i BIH giver en god illustration af udviklingen i ejerskab og regnskabspligt. 
Box 6 Example of good practices in ownership Case 1: Strengthening the Directorate of European Integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) The decision-making process for the CARDS 2006 programming in BiH is a good illustration of ownership and accountability development.
Allerede i de rlige programmer under CARDS for 2004 og 2005 begyndte Kommissionen sammen med modtagerlandet at opbygge kapaciteten, for eksempel ved at oprette stillinger for ledende tjenestemžnd, der skulle tage sig af planlžgningen, i res-sortministerier og agenturer i BIH og ved at stżtte direktoratet for europžisk integration. 
Already in the CARDS 2004 and 2005 annual programme, the Commission started to build capacity with the recipient country, for example by introducing senior programming officer posts in BiH line ministries and agencies and by supporting the Directorate for European Integration.
P grund af disse bestržbelser blev projektplanerne i CARDS-programmets sidste r udarbejdet af BIH-myndighederne. 
Because of the efforts made, in the last year of the CARDS programme, project fiches were prepared by the BiH authorities.
Tilfžlde nr. 2: Nikola Tesla-projektet i Serbien Selv om EGAŐs retsgrundlag (dvs. indirekte central forvaltning) ikke er det bedst egnede til at udvide modtagerlandets ejerskab, kunne EGA stadig finde en innovativ lżsning vedrżrende et kraftvžrksprojekt i Serbien (Nikola Tesla Unit A5). 
Case 2: Nikola Tesla project in Serbia Although the AgencyŐs legal framework (i.e. indirect centralised management) is not the most appropriate for enhancing the ownership of the recipient country, the Agency was still able to find an innovative solution in the case of a power plant project in Serbia (Nikola Tesla A5).
(1) De rlige programmer omfatter en detaljeret liste over projekter Ń skaldte projektplaner Ń der skal finansieres, og specificerer de relevante belżb. 
(1) The annual programmes contain a detailed list of projects Ń so called project fiches Ń to be financed and specify the relevant amounts.
Siden 2005 er projektplanerne blevet grupperet og konsolideret i sektorplaner. 
Since 2005 project fiches are being grouped and consolidated in sector fiches.
Formelt var projektplanerne ikke et led i Kommissionens finansieringsafgżrelse og derfor ikke juridisk bindende modsat sektorplanerne. 
Formally the project fiches were not part of the Commission financing decision therefore not legally binding unlike to sector fiches.
Det innovative tržk ved projektgennemfżrelsen var, at man brugte en ČtilskudsaftaleÇ. 
The innovative feature of the implementation of the project was the use of a ÔGrant AgreementŐ.
Med denne ordning blev ansvaret for planlžgningen, herunder definitionen af de tekniske specifikationer, og forvaltningen af projektet overdraget til modtageren, det serbiske elektricitetssel-skab. 
Through this arrangement the responsibility for the planning, including the definition of the technical specifications and management of the project was entrusted to the beneficiary, the Serbian electricity utility.
De tekniske specifikationer blev kontrolleret og godkendt af den kontraktansatte tilsynsfżrende, og EGA varetog udbuddet og kontrollen af betalingerne. 
The technical specifications were checked and approved by the contracted supervisor and the tendering procedure and control of payments was maintained by the Agency.
Alle parter, inklusive modtageren, var sžrdeles tilfredse med ordningen, og det kan sledes konkluderes, at ejerskabet var s fuldstžndigt, som det kan forventes under de gžldende ordninger. 
All parties, including the beneficiary, were very satisfied with the arrangement and thus it can be concluded that the ownership was as complete as can be expected under the present arrangements.
I de fleste tilfžlde forsżgte Kommissionen dog ikke konsekvent at udvide modtagerlandets ansvar ved udviklingen af de skaldte projektplaner og senere projektbetingelser. 
However, in most cases the Commission was not consistent in promoting recipient country responsibility when developing the so-called project fiches and later the terms of reference.
Deltagelsen varierede fra land til land p grundlag af de foranstaltninger, delegationerne eller EGA traf ud fra kapaciteten i de pgžldende lande. 
Participation varied from country to country on the basis of initiatives taken by the Delegations or the EAR depending on the capacities of the countries concerned.
Selv om Retten noterede sig et voksende input fra modtagerlandene, forblev ejerskabet begržnset. 
While the Court noted increasing input from recipient countries, ownership remained limited.
Medfinansiering af projekter med nationale midler er en af indikatorerne for ejerskab og interesse fra modtagerlandenes side. 
The co-financing of projects with national funds is one indicator of recipient country ownership and interest.
Selv om CARDS-retningslinjerne tilskynder til national medfinansiering, blev det nžsten ikke brugt (2). 
Although the CARDS Guidelines encourage the use of national co-financing, it was hardly used (2).
En positiv undtagelse herfra, den eneste blandt de 31 projekter uden tilskudskontrakt, Retten reviderede, er det kroatiske jordmatrikelprojekt, hvor medfinansieringen var stor, og de kroatiske myndigheder ledede donorkoordineringen effektivt. 
A positive exception, i.e. the only one out of the 31 non-grant projects audited, in this respect is the Croatian land cadastre project, which was significantly co-financed and where the donor coordination was effectively led by the Croatian authorities.
Tilsvarende var tilskudsmodtagerne meget engagerede (3). 
Similarly the commitment of the beneficiaries of grants was also high (3).
50. n mde at udvide modtagerstaternes ejerskab p er at involvere de nationale myndigheder i budbedżmmelsesudval-gene. 
50. One way of increasing recipient country ownership is to involve national authorities in tender evaluation committees.
Men ifżlge EuropeAid-instruktionerne, der er bindende for delegationerne og vejledende for EGA, skal flertallet af de stemmeberettigede medlemmer af bedżmmelsesudvalgene repržsentere Kommissionen (jf. tekstboks 7). 
However, the EuropeAid instructions binding the Delegations and acting as guidance for the EAR, require that the majority of the voting members of the evaluation committees represent the Commission (see Box 7).
Det er i modsžtning til mange andre omrder inden for foranstaltninger udadtil, hvor Kommissionens repržsentant ikke er stemmeberettiget i bedżmmelsesudvalgene, men har vetoret. 
This contrasts with many other areas of external actions where the Commission is not represented as a voting member on evaluation committees, but retains the right of veto.
(2) Undtagen for s vidt angr tilskudskontrakterne, hvor medfinansiering er obligatorisk. 
(2) (3) Except with the grant contracts where the co-financing is an obligation.
Et tilskud er en direkte betaling af ikke-kommerciel art fra Det Europžiske Fžllesskab, som den specifikke modtager fr for at gennemfżre en aktion som led i en EU-politik. 
A grant is a direct payment of a non-commercial nature by the European Community to a specific beneficiary to implement an action forming part of EU policy.
(3) De reviderede projekter omfattede f.eks. et turistcenter i Travnik-fortet i Bosnien-Hercegovina og en bogbus i byen Zadar i Kroatien. 
Projects audited included for example a tourist centre in the Travnik fortress in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a mobile library in the city of Zadar in Croatia.
C 285/14 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 27.11.2007 Tekstboks 7 Sammensžtningen af budbedżmmelsesudvalgene Retten vurderede 177 budbedżmmelsesudvalg, der džkkede perioden 2002-2005. 
C 285/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.11.2007 Box 7 Composition of tender evaluation committees The Court assessed 177 tender evaluation committees covering 2002 to 2005.
I gennemsnit var 55 % af de stemmeberettigede medlemmer projektforvaltere fra delegationerne eller fra EGAŐs operative centre, og 13 % af de stemmeberettigede medlemmer var uafhžngige eksterne eksperter. 
On average 55 % percent of the voting members were task managers from the Delegations or EAR operational centres and 13 % of the voting members were independent external experts.
Modtagerorganisationernes repržsentation var i gennemsnit 32 %, bortset fra i Kroatien, hvor deres andel var p hele 52 %, og Bosnien-Hercegovina, hvor de stemmeberettigede modtagere kun udgjorde 24 %. 
The average representation of beneficiary organisations was 32 % with the exception of Croatia, where the percentage increased significantly to 52 % and Bosnia and Herzegovina where the trend of beneficiary voting members decreased to 24 %.
Ifżlge EuropeAid-instruktionerne skal bedżmmelsesudvalgene omfatte mindst fire ansatte fra Kommissionens delegation/EGA (nemlig formanden, sekretžren og to bedżm-mere) mod n ekstern bedżmmer og yderligere to ansatte fra Kommissionens delegation/EGA for hver yderligere bedżmmer, der repržsenterer modtagerne. 
The EuropeAid instructions require evaluation committees to comprise a minimum of four EC Delegation/EAR staff (i.e. chairman, secretary and two evaluators) for one external evaluator and an additional two EC Delegation/EAR staff for every additional beneficiary evaluator.
Det tržkker alt for meget p delegationernes menneskelige ressourcer og hindrer samtidig modtagerlandet i at f udvidet sit ejerskab. 
This draws excessively on the human resources of the Delegations while preventing improved country ownership.
En af hindringerne for decentraliseringen var, at der i modtagerlandene ikke var kendskab nok til Europa-Kommissionens kontraktindgelsesprocedurer. 
One of the obstacles to decentralisation was a lack of knowledge by recipient countries of the European CommissionŐs contract procedures.
I Kroatien tilskyndede delegationen systematisk de nationale myndigheders repržsentanter til at deltage i bedżmmelsesudvalgsmżderne som observatżrer uden stemmeret. 
In Croatia, representatives from national authorities were systematically invited by the Delegation to participate in the evaluation committee meetings as non-voting observers.