natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
80 Kommissionen vejledte dog medlemsstaterne om de nationale budgetrammer: Ud over kommunikationen under EU Pilot-sagerne blev der også - for det meste uformelt (f.eks. via e-mail, telefon eller på bilaterale møder) - kommunikeret om f.eks. 
80 The Commission did provide guidance on NBFs to Member States: as well as the exchanges during the EU ‘pilot procedures’, there were also mostly informal exchanges (e.g. by emails, phone calls or bilateral meetings) with for example reviews of draft Member State legislation transposing Directive 2011/85.
Dette blev bekræftet af de interessenter, vi mødte, og af vores spørgeundersøgelse henvendt til de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner (jf. figur 6). 
This was confirmed by the stakeholders we met, as well as our survey of IFIs (see Figure 6).
Det er værd at bemærke, at Kommissionen ydede mindre støtte og vejledning for at sikre en effektiv anvendelse af de nationale budgetrammer, end den gjorde for at sikre medlemsstaternes overholdelse af EU's krav. 
It is noteworthy that the Commission provided less support and guidance to ensure effective application of the NBFs than it did to ensure Member States’ compliance with EU requirements.
Figur 6 – Svar på vores spørgeundersøgelse vedrørende Kommissionens vejledning og støtte 36 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Giver Kommissionen medlemsstaterne passende vejledning for at sikre, at de overholder EU's krav? 
35 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Does the Commission provide appropriate guidance to Member States to ensure their compliance with the EU requirements?
Giver Kommissionen medlemsstaterne passende støtte for at sikre, at de overholder EU's krav? 
Does the Commission provide appropriate support to Member States to ensure their compliance with the EU requirements?
Nej Giver Kommissionen medlemsstaterne passende vejledning for at sikre, at de gennemfører de nationale budgetrammer på effektiv vis? 
Does the Commission provide appropriate guidance to Member States to ensure an effective implementation of national budgetary frameworks?
Ja Giver Kommissionen medlemsstaterne passende støtte for at sikre, at de gennemfører de nationale budgetrammer på effektiv vis? 
Does the Commission provide appropriate support to Member States to ensure an effective implementation of national budgetary frameworks?
63 % 60 % 80 % 77 % 37 % 40 % 20 % 23 % Kilde: Revisionsrettens spørgeundersøgelse. 
63 % 60 % 80 % 77 % 37 % 40 % 20 % 23 % No Yes 55 Implementation plans, guidelines, explanatory documents, networks, expert groups, workshops, package meetings, scoreboards serve as ‘compliance promoting tools’.
Kommissionens hidtidige vurderinger har begrænset informationsværdi, enten på grund af timing eller på grund af mandatforhold 81 Vi analyserede Kommissionens vurderinger i henhold til direktiv 2011/85, TSSS og forordning 473/2013. 
Commission assessments to date are of limited informative value, either due to timing or mandate considerations 81 We analysed the Commission’s assessments pursuant to Directive 2011/85, the TSCG and Regulation 473/2013.
Vurdering af anvendelsen af direktiv 2011/85/EU 82 Efter at have foretaget sin overholdelsesvurdering af de nationale gennemførelsesforanstaltninger skal Kommissionen vurdere anvendelsen af direktiv 2011/85. 
Assessment of the application of Directive 2011/85 82 After assessing compliance of the national transposing measures, the Commission is required to monitor and assess the application of Directive 2011/85.
83 Kommissionen er endnu ikke gået i gang med at vurdere anvendelsen af direktiv 2011/85 på en struktureret og systematisk måde. 
83 The Commission has not yet started assessing the application of Directive 2011/85 in a structured and systematic manner.
Det agter den at gøre56, når den har færdiggjort sin vurdering af alle medlemsstaternes gennemførelse af kravene i direktiv 2011/85 i national lovgivning (jf. tabel 3). 
It plans to do so56 once it finishes assessing all Member States’ transposition of the requirements of Directive 2011/85 into national legislation (see Table 3).
84 I oktober 2019 havde Kommissionen endnu ikke udarbejdet en strategi, som fastlægger metoden, kriterierne, delmålene og de forventede resultater fra medlemsstaterne med henblik på at sikre en hensigtsmæssig og rettidig anvendelse af direktiv 2011/85. 
84 As of October 2019, the Commission had not yet put in place a strategy setting out the methodology, criteria, milestones and deliverables from Member States, in order to ensure appropriate and timely monitoring of the application of Directive 2011/85.
85 Nogle medlemsstater (f.eks. Italien og Spanien) har trods gennemførelsen af direktiv 2011/85 ikke forbedret deres finanspolitiske resultater i overensstemmelse med kravene i SVP. 
85 In some cases, despite implementing Directive 2011/85, Member States (for example Italy and Spain) do not show improvements in their fiscal performance in line with the requirements of the SGP.
Men Kommissionen har endnu ikke udøvet sine overvågningsbeføjelser57 ved at foretage en vurdering med fokus på den operationelle effektivitet af centrale elementer i de nationale budgetrammer. 
However, the Commission has not yet exercised its monitoring powers57 by carrying out an assessment focused on the operational performance of key elements of the NBFs.
Denne tilgang anvender IMF f.eks. i sin evaluering af finanspolitisk gennemsigtighed. 
Such an approach is used, for example, by the IMF in its Fiscal Transparency Evaluation.
86 Alternativt kunne Kommissionen anvende PEFA-metoden, som bruges til at vurdere offentlige udgifter og finansiel ansvarlighed (Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability). 
86 Alternatively, it may also use the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) methodology.
Kommissionen har selv udarbejdet PEFA-metoden, i Generaldirektoratet for Internationalt Samarbejde og Udvikling (GD DEVCO), sammen med IMF og Verdensbanken. 
The Commission itself, through the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), developed the PEFA methodology together with the IMF and the World Bank.
Derfor ville den have den nødvendige interne viden til at udføre PEFA-vurderinger. 
Therefore, it would have, in-house, the knowledge needed to carry out PEFA assessments.
Vi noterer os dog 56 Nogle af aspekterne i anvendelsesvurderingen indgik allerede i gennemførelsesvurderingen. 
56 Some aspects of the application assessment were already included in the transposition assessment.
57 Kommissionen (2012), "Report on public finances in EMU 2011", s. 
57 European Commission (2012), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2011’, p.
37 Kommissionens hensigt om at lade denne gennemgang omfatte de mellemfristede budgetrammer. 
However, we take note of the Commission’s intention to include MTBFs in the scope of this review.
89 Trods tidsfristen i december 2018 havde Kommissionen i oktober 2019 endnu ikke offentliggjort sin gennemgang af hensigtsmæssigheden af direktiv 2011/85. 
89 Despite the December 2018 deadline, as of October 2019, the Commission had not yet published its suitability review of Directive 2011/85.
90 Men baseret på en økonomisk undersøgelse konkluderede Kommissionen i januar 2019, at ejerskab til EU's finanspolitiske regler på nationalt plan er blevet styrket i de senere år, fordi der er oprettet stærkere nationale finanspolitiske rammer efter fremsættelsen af lovinitiativer på EU-plan58. 
90 However, based on an economic study, the Commission concluded in January 2019 that “national ownership of EU fiscal rules has been strengthened in recent years thanks to stronger national fiscal frameworks being created, following legislative initiatives put forward at the EU level”58.
I undersøgelsen indgik økonometrisk dokumentation for en sammenhæng mellem kvaliteten af de mellemfristede budgetrammer (målt ved hjælp af indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer, jf. punkt 04) og den konjunkturkorrigerede primære saldo. 
The study looked at econometric evidence showing a link between the MTBFs’ quality (measured by the MTBF index, see paragraph 04) and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance.
Denne stærke sammenhæng fortolkes som bevis på, at ejerskabet på nationalt plan har en positiv indvirkning på den finanspolitiske disciplin. 
This strong link is interpreted as showing a positive effect on fiscal discipline, as a result of national ownership.
91 Indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer vurderer kvaliteten af de nationale budgetrammer på grundlag af 11 kriterier (jf. tabel 4). 
91 The MTBF index assesses the quality of the NBFs on the basis of 11 criteria (see Table 4).
Ét af kravene i direktiv 2011/85 er ikke omfattet af nogen kriterier, og seks af de anvendte kriterier svarer ikke til kravene i direktiv 2011/85, men til andre elementer, som Kommissionen anser for at være ønskelige. 
One of the requirements of Directive 2011/85 is not covered by any criterion, and six of the criteria used do not correspond to requirements of Directive 2011/85 but to other features, which the Commission considers desirable.
38 58 Kommissionen (2019), "Report on public finances in EMU 2018", s. 
37 58 European Commission (2019), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2018’, p.
Tabel 4 – Sammenligning af kravene til mellemfristede budgetrammer i direktiv 2011/85 og kriterierne i indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer vedrørende både den tidligere og den nye (finjusterede) metode 39 Direktiv 2011/85 2017-indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer: kriterier Maks. pointtal pr. kriterium i det nye indeks Maks. standardiseret pointtal, der kan tildeles pr. kriterium dækket af direktiv 2011/85 Artikel 9, stk. 
Table 4 – Comparison between Directive 2011/85 requirements on MTBFs and MTBF index criteria for both old and new (fine-tuned) methodology 38 Directive 2011/85 2017 MTBF index: criteria Max.
2, litra a) C1a – Dækning af målene/lofterne i de nationale mellemfristede budgetplaner 3 0,2 Artikel 13 C1b – Koordinering inden fastsættelse af målene 1 Artikel 10 C2a – Nationale mellemfristede budgetplaner og årlige budgetter: sammenhæng 4 0,13  C2b – Faste mål/lofter i de mellemfristede planer fastsat på forhånd 1  C2c – Veldefinerede korrigerende tiltag i tilfælde af afvigelse fra planer 1  C3 – Det nationale parlament involveret i udarbejdelsen af nationale mellemfristede budgetplaner 3 0  C4 – Den uafhængige finanspolitiske institution involveret i udarbejdelse af nationale mellemfristede budgetplaner 4 0 Artikel 9, stk. 2, litra b) C5a – Fordeling af fremskrivninger af udgifter og indtægter 1 0,1  C5b – Forklaring af fremskrivninger af udgifter og indtægter og elementerne heri 1 Artikel 9, stk. 2, litra c) C5c – Kvantificering af reformers indvirkning i planperioden 1  C5d – Udførlige forklaringer af de budgetmæssige virkninger af de alternative makroøkonomiske scenarier 1 Artikel 9, stk. 
Score per criterion on new index Max. standardised score that can be allocated to criteria covered by Directive 2011/85 Article 9.2.(a) C1a - Coverage of the targets/ceilings included in the national medium-term fiscal plans 3 0.2 Article 13 C1b - Co-ordination before setting the targets 1 Article 10 C2a - National medium-term fiscal plans and annual budget: connectedness 4 0.13  C2b - Fixed objectives/ceilings in medium-term plans that are fixed in advance 1  C2c - Well defined corrective actions in case of deviation from plans 1  C3 - National Parliament involved in national medium-term fiscal plans preparation 3 0  C4 - IFI involved in national medium-term fiscal plans preparation 4 0 Article 9.2(b) C5a - Breakdown of expenditure and revenue projections 1 0.1  C5b - Explanation on revenue and expenditure projections and their components 1 Article 9.2(c) C5c - Quantification of the impact of reforms over the time span of the plan 1  C5d - Detailed explanations on the budgetary impact of the alternative macro scenarios 1 Article 9.2(d) - estimate of impact of new policies on long term debt sustainability    Total potential score 1 Total potential score regarding criteria covered by Directive 2011/85 0.43 Percentage of score allocated based on criteria not covered by Directive 2011/85 57% Note:: not included.
92 Denne analyse er værdifuld, men kan af følgende årsager ikke betragtes som en gennemgang af hensigtsmæssigheden af direktiv 2011/85 for så vidt angår kravene til mellemfristede budgetrammer: o Det indeks for mellemfristede budgetrammer, der anvendes i denne analyse, er baseret på databasen vedrørende finanspolitisk styring (jf. punkt 04), som primært indeholder information fra nationale myndigheder snarere end information fra Kommissionens uafhængige vurdering af de nationale budgetrammers funktionsmåde o De anvendte kriterier til beregning af indekset og kravene i direktiv 2011/85 overlapper kun delvis hinanden (jf. punkt 91) o Et forbedret indeks afspejler måske blot vedtagelsen af en budgetreform, selv om den endnu ikke er operationel, så indekset blot tager højde for reformens udformning og ikke for dens faktiske funktionsmåde (jf. tekstboks 4) o Indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer dækker perioden 2006-2015. 
92 However, this analysis, while valuable, cannot be regarded as a review of the suitability of Directive 2011/85 concerning requirements on MTBFs, for the following reasons: o the MTBF index used in this analysis is based on the Fiscal Governance Database (see paragraph 04), which is mainly fed with information provided by national authorities, rather than information from an autonomous assessment by the Commission of the functioning of the NBFs; o the criteria used for scoring the index and Directive 2011/85 requirements are only partially overlapping (see paragraph 91); o an improvement in the MTBF index may just reflect the enactment of a budgetary reform, even if it is not yet operational, i.e. the index may just capture the conformity of its design rather than its actual functioning (see Box 4); o the MTBF index spans the period 2006‐2015.
Men 2015 ligger før indledningen af EU Pilot-sagerne, så indekset har ikke kunnet afspejle Kommissionens vurdering af gennemførelsen og anvendelsen af direktiv 2011/85 o Indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer viser en forbedring (højere pointtal) for medlemsstater i euroområdet enten i 2011 eller tidligere, undtagen for Frankrig, Tyskland, Finland (med en svag forhøjelse i henholdsvis 2012, 2013 og 2015) og Luxembourg (2014). 
However, 2015 predates the start of the EU ‘pilot procedures’, meaning that the index could not possibly reflect the Commission’s assessment of either the transposition or application of Directive 2011/85; o the MTBF index shows an improvement (increase in the score) for euro‐area Member States either in 2011 or earlier years with the exception of France, Germany, Finland (slight increases in 2012, 2013 and 2015 respectively) and Luxembourg (2014).
Forbedringer, der fandt sted i 2011 og tidligere, kan imidlertid ikke anses for at afspejle effekten af direktiv 2011/85, som først trådte i kraft 13. december 2011. 
However, improvements that occurred in 2011 and earlier years cannot be regarded as reflecting the impact of Directive 2011/85, which entered into force only on 13 December 2011.
I de medlemsstater, der var omfattet af et finansielt støtteprogram (Cypern, Grækenland, Irland, Letland, Spanien og Portugal), var der også forbedringer, og det samme var der i en medlemsstat, der var ved at tilslutte sig euroen (Litauen). 
Member States under a financial assistance programme (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Spain and Portugal) also saw improvements, as did a Member State in the process of joining the euro (Lithuania).
Kommissionens analyse anerkender den rolle, som de finansielle støtteprogrammer spiller, men skelner ikke mellem effekten af direktiv 2011/85 og effekten af forpligtelserne i henhold til de finansielle støtteprogrammer eller den pågældende medlemsstats ambitioner om at tilslutte sig euroområdet. 
However, the Commission’s analysis, while recognising the role played by financial assistance programmes, does not disentangle the impact of Directive 2011/85 from the impact of the obligations under the financial assistance programme or of the Member State’s drive to join the euro area.
41 Tekstboks 4 – Eksempler, hvor højere pointtal i indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer var knyttet til vedtagelsen af budgetreformer og ikke deres faktiske gennemførelse Vi konstaterede, at Kommissionen havde givet nogle af medlemsstaterne i vores stikprøve (Italien, Letland og Luxembourg) højere pointtal i indekset for mellemfristede budgetrammer, umiddelbart efter at de havde vedtaget budgetreformer (i henholdsvis 2009, 2013 og 2014), selv om anvendelsen af disse reformer (og dermed effekten af dem) fandt sted gradvis og ikke var færdig i 2015. 
39 Box 4 – Examples of an increasing score of the MBTF index linked to the enactment and not the actual functioning of budgetary reforms We found that the Commission had upgraded the MTBF index of some of the Member States in our sample (Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg) immediately after they had enacted budgetary reforms (in 2009, 2013 and 2014 respectively), even though the application of these reforms (and hence their effect) was gradual and was not completed by 2015.
I Italien blev der vedtaget en ny regnskabslov i 2009, men med tiden blev der brug for og godkendt adskillige sekundære retsakter. 
In the case of Italy, a new accounting law was passed in 2009, but several secondary legislative acts were needed and were approved over time.
Gennemførelsesprocessen er stadig i gang (ifølge rapporter fra finansministeriet). 
The implementation process is still ongoing (according to reports from the Ministry of Finance).
For Luxembourgs og Letlands vedkommende konstaterede Kommissionen under EU Pilot-sagerne, at den vedtagne reform ikke fuldt ud dækkede kravene i direktiv 2011/85. 
In the case of Luxembourg and Latvia, in the course of the EU ‘pilot procedures’, the Commission identified gaps between the enacted reform and the requirements of Directive 2011/85.
Dette forsinkede afslutningen af EU Pilot-sagerne. 
These delayed the conclusion of the ‘pilot procedures’.
De nationale myndigheder måtte dække disse mangler ved hjælp af lovgivningsmæssige eller administrative ændringer, som først blev foretaget - og derfor først trådte i kraft - efter skæringsdatoen for den økonometriske analyse. 
National authorities had to fill those gaps through legislative or administrative amendments, which took place – and hence took effect – only after the cut‐off date for the econometric analysis.
o Medlemsstaterne har forskellige definitioner på ekstraordinære omstændigheder, der muliggør en midlertidig afvigelse fra deres mellemfristede budgetmålsætning o Medlemsstaterne divergerer med hensyn til, i hvilket omfang korrektionsmekanismen er automatisk, og med hensyn til omfanget af de nødvendige korrigerende tiltag o Alle medlemsstaterne havde vedtaget lovbestemmelser om oprettelse af uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner, men i nogle tilfælde havde Kommissionen betænkeligheder med hensyn til uafhængighedsforanstaltningerne o Mange medlemsstater havde endnu ikke integreret følg eller forklar-princippet i deres retlige rammer (dvs. at en stat skal begrunde tilfælde, hvor den ikke følger den uafhængige finanspolitiske institutions vurderinger), men de forpligtede sig til at anvende det korrekt. 
94 The main conclusions that can be drawn from the report are that: o all Member States have put in place a binding balanced budget rule, although only some at a constitutional level; o Member States differ in their definition of exceptional circumstances allowing a temporary deviation from their MTO; o Member States differ in the extent to which the correction mechanism is automatic and in the scope of the required corrective action; o legal provisions were adopted in all Member States to set up IFIs although the Commission had some concerns regarding the independence safeguards of some of them; o many Member States had not yet integrated the ‘comply‐or‐explain’ principle into their legal framework (i.e. a government has to justify when it does not comply with the assessments of the IFI), but they committed to apply it appropriately.
95 Kommissionens samlede vurdering var positiv, selv om gennemførelsen af finanspagten var langsom og ufuldstændig. 
95 The Commission’s overall assessment was positive, even though the transposition of the Fiscal Compact was slow and incomplete.
Faktisk var Kommissionens positive vurdering af 16 medlemsstaters overholdelse betinget af, at de opfyldte de forpligtelser, de havde indgået. 
In fact, the Commission’s positive assessment of 16 Member States’ compliance was conditional upon their implementation of commitments they had made.
Men som påpeget af ECB60 er forpligtelser ikke en tilstrækkelig erstatning for lovbestemmelser, da de ikke kan håndhæves. 
As pointed out by the ECB60, however, commitments are “not an adequate substitute for legal provisions, as they 59 European Commission (2017), C(2017) 1201 final, ‘Report from the Commission presented under Article 8 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union’.
Kommissionens vurdering var derfor ikke fyldestgørende, og den svækkede kravene ved at acceptere forpligtelser. 
The Commission’s assessment was thus not complete and, by accepting commitments, it weakened the requirements.
Vurdering af gennemførelsen af forordning 473/2013 96 I november 2014 foretog Kommissionen en første vurdering af anvendelsen af forordning 473/2013 i forbindelse med den gennemgang af den økonomiske styring, som omfattede retsakterne i sixpacken og twopacken. 
Assessment of the implementation of Regulation 473/2013 96 The Commission in November 2014 carried out a first assessment of the application of Regulation 473/2013, in the context of the review of the economic governance covering the Six‐Pack and Two‐Pack legislative acts.
Vurderingen førte imidlertid ikke til en klar konklusion, fordi den fandt sted for tidligt efter ikrafttrædelsen af forordning 473/2013. 
However, the assessment was inconclusive, as it came too soon after the entry into force of Regulation 473/2013.
Den næste vurdering finder sted ved udgangen af 2019. 
The next assessment is due by the end of 2019.
97 Kommissionen overvåger desuden status for den nationale lovgivning om de nationale budgetrammer samt anvendelsen af dem i det europæiske semester61, om end i begrænset omfang: Den vurderer, om medlemsstaternes budgetstilling nærmer sig deres mellemfristede budgetmålsætning (jf. punkt 46), men evaluerer ikke udførligt de underliggende nationale budgetrammers funktionsmåde. 
97 The Commission also monitors developments of national legislation on NBFs and their application through the European Semester61, albeit to a limited extent: it assesses whether the Member States’ budget positions are approaching their MTOs (see paragraph 46), but does not evaluate in detail the functioning of the underlying NBFs.
I figur 7 beskrives de forskellige trin nærmere. 
Figure 7 provides further details on the various steps.
43 Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
Source: ECA.
61 EU's årlige cyklus for samordning af de økonomiske politikker, der også omfatter finanspolitikken som fastlagt i SVP. 
61 The annual EU cycle of economic policy coordination also covering fiscal policies as determined by the SGP.
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 98 Vi undersøgte, om Kommissionens tiltag til at styrke EU-medlemsstaternes budgetrammer havde givet de ønskede resultater. 
Conclusions and recommendations 98 We looked at whether the Commission’s actions to strengthen the budgetary frameworks of the EU Member States achieved the results intended.
Vi konkluderer, at Kommissionen ved at stille forslag til direktiv 2011/85 og forordning 437/2013, som er blevet vedtaget, samt forelægge 2017-udkastet til direktiv, for hvilket lovgivningsprocessen fortsat er i gang, bidrog til at skabe forbedringer i de nationale budgetrammer (punkt 17). 
We conclude that by proposing Directive 2011/85 and Regulation 437/2013, which have been adopted, and the 2017 draft Directive, for which the legislative process is still ongoing, the Commission contributed to fostering improvements in national budgetary frameworks (paragraph 17).