natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Bilag 81 Lånefaciliteterne for de fem lande Betalingsbalancestøtte Den europæiske finansielle stabiliseringsmekanisme (EFSM) Den europæiske finansielle stabilitetsfacilitet (EFSF) Institutionel form EU-mekanisme EU-mekanisme Privat selskab ejet af landene i euroområdet Kapitalstruktur Garanteret af EU-budgettet Garanteret af EU-budgettet Garantier fra eurolande Udlånskapacitet i euro 50 milliarder euro 60 milliarder euro 440 milliarder euro Instrumenter Lån, kreditlinjer Lån, kreditlinjer Lån, køb af obligationer på det primære og sekundære marked Varighed Permanent mekanisme Midlertidig mekanisme Midlertidig mekanisme Vigtigste besluttende organer Rådet med kvalificeret flertal efter forslag fra Europa-Kommissionen EFSF’s bestyrelse (dvs. medlemmer af Eurogruppen) Retsgrundlag Finansiering Artikel 143 TEUF Artikel 122 TEUF Mellemstatslig beslutning Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
Annexes 81 The lending facilities for the five countries Balance of payments assistance European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Institutional form EU mechanism EU mechanism Private company owned by euro area countries Capital structure Guaranteed by the EU budget Guaranteed by the EU budget Guarantees from euro area countries Lending capacity in euro 50 billion euro 60 billion euro 440 billion euro Instruments Loans, credit lines Loans, credit lines Loans, bond purchases on the primary and secondary markets Duration Permanent mechanism Temporary mechanism Temporary mechanism Main decision-making bodies Council, acting by qualified majority voting on proposal from European Commission EFSF Board of Directors (i.e. members of the Eurogroup) Legal basis of financing Article 143 TFEU Article 122 TFEU Intergovernmental decision Source: ECA.
Tabellen omfatter ikke de to andre faciliteter - mellemstatslige lån til Grækenland og den europæiske stabilitetsmekanisme - som havde til formål at yde støtte til landene i euroområdet. 
The table does not include the other two facilities — intergovernmental loans to Greece and the European Stability Mechanism — which were put in place to provide financial assistance to euro area Member States.
Bilag 82 Revisionsmetoden Fastlæggelse af revisionskriterier 1. 
Annexes 82 Audit methodology Identification of the audit criteria 1.
Vi udledte god forvaltningspraksis og evalueringskriterier fra evalueringer af IMF-programmer, efterfølgende evalueringer af EU’s betalingsbalancestøtte til tredjelande, tidligere beretninger fra Retten om makrofinansiel bistand, retningslinjer og andre publikationer fra uafhængige institutter og tænketanke samt akademisk forskning. 
We derived the good management practices and evaluation criteria from evaluations of IMF programmes, ex post evaluations of the EU’s balance-of-payments assistance to non-EU countries, previous Court reports on macrofinancial assistance, guidelines and other publications from independent institutes and think tanks, and academic research.
Tabel 1 viser de vigtigste kildedokumenter. 
Table 1 provides the most important source documents.
Tabel 1 - Vigtige kilder til revisionskriterierne IMF og IMF’s uafhængige evalueringskontor, Independent Evaluation Office IMF Conditionality guidelines: IMF Guidelines on Conditionality (2002), Principles Underlying the Guidelines on Conditionality (2006), 2011 Review of Conditionality (2012) Fiscal adjustment in IMF-Supported Programs (2003) Evaluation report: The IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (2003) Evaluation report: Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs (2007) Structural Conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Background documents (2007) Mauro, Paolo: Chipping away at Public Debt, IMF, 2011 Europa-Kommissionen Guidelines on the Programming, Design & Management of General Budget Support (2007) Final Report: Meta-evaluation of Macro-Financial Assistance Operations (2004-2008) (2009) Guidelines for the ex post evaluation of Macro-Financial Assistance and Balance of Payments Operations (2010) Evaluation of Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs’ fiscal surveillance activities (2010) Den Europæiske Revisionsret Særberetning nr. 5/2001 om counterpartmidler hidrørende fra strukturtilpasningsstøtte i form af direkte budgetstøtte (syvende og ottende EUF) Særberetning nr. 2/2005 om budgetstøtten over EUF til AVS-landene: Kommissionens forvaltning af støtten til reform af de offentlige finanser Særberetning nr. 
Table 1 — Key sources of audit criteria IMF and Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF International Monetary Fund guidelines on conditionality (2002); Principles underlying the guidelines on conditionality (2006); 2011 review of conditionality (2012) Fiscal adjustment in IMF-supported programs (2003) Evaluation report: The IMF and recent capital account crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (2003) Evaluation report: Structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs (2007) Structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs: background documents (2007) Mauro, P., Chipping away at public debt, IMF, 2011 European Commission Guidelines on the programming, design & management of general budget support (2007) Final report: Meta-evaluation of macro-financial assistance operations (2004-2008) (2009) Guidelines for the ex post evaluation of macro-financial assistance and balance of payments operations (2010) Evaluation of Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs’ fiscal surveillance activities (2010) European Court of Auditors Special Report No 5/2001: Counterpart funds structural adjustment support earmarked for budget aid (seventh and eight EDFs) Special Report No 2/2005: EDF budget aid to ACP countries: the Commission’s management of the public finance reform aspects Special Report No 11/2010 : The Commission’s management of General Budget Support in ACP, Latin American and Asian countries Annex III
Bilag 83 2. 
Annexes 83 2.
Med henblik på at fastlægge bedste praksis inden for forvaltning af offentlig gæld, investorforhold og gennemsigtighed i gældsudstedelsen benyttede vi os af følgende organisationers relevante arbejde og retningslinjer: a) IMF og Verdensbanken, især de forskellige versioner af retningslinjerne om forvaltning af den offentlige sektors gæld (2001, 2003, 2007 og 2014) og om anvendelse af syndikering (2010 og 2013) b) Organisationen for Økonomisk Samarbejde og Udvikling (OECD), især analysen af flere landes procedurer for udstedelse af offentlig gæld (2009) c) Den Internationale Betalingsbank og d) Sammenslutninger i den private sektor, f.eks. International Capital Market Association, Association for Financial Markets in Europe og Institute of International Finance. 
To identify the best practices in the area of public debt management, investor relations and transparency in debt issuance, we drew on the relevant work and guidelines of the following organisations: (a) the IMF and the World Bank, in particular the various versions of the guidelines on public debt management (2001, 2003, 2007 and 2014) and on the use of syndications (2010 and 2013); (b) the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in particular the cross-country analysis of government debt issuance procedures (2009); (c) the Bank for International Settlements; and (d) private-sector associations such as the International Capital Market Association, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe and the Institute of International Finance.
Analyse af strukturelle betingelser 3. 
Analysis of structural conditions 3.
Analysen af strukturelle betingelser var baseret på en stikprøve (jf. tabel 2). 
The analysis of structural conditions was sample based (see Table 2).
Områderne blev valgt efter en vurdering af deres relative betydning for de enkelte programmer. 
The areas were selected after evaluating their relative importance for each programme.
Tabel 2 - Oversigt over stikprøven Ungarn Letland Rumænien Irland Portugal Antal analyserede betingelser 44 56 67 59 135 Omtrentlig dækning (skøn ved ekstrapolering fra stikprøven) 73 %1 38 % 39 % 15 % 34 % Tematisk dækning Offentlig finansiel forvaltning (f.eks. finanspolitisk ansvar, offentlige indkøb) Strukturfondene Statsejede selskaber, privatisering, offentlig-private partnerskaber x x x x x x Reform af den offentlige forvaltning og/eller offentlige lønninger x x x x Pension x x x x x x x x x Erhvervsklima x x Arbejdsmarkedet (lønfastsættelse, aktive arbejdsmarkedspolitikker, arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse) x x x x Finanssektoren (kapitaldækningsgrad, overvågning af banker) x x x 1 73 % af betingelserne repræsenterer alle strukturelle betingelser. 
Table 2 — Sample overview Hungary Latvia Romania Ireland Portugal Number of analysed conditions 44 56 67 59 135 Approximate coverage (estimate by extrapolation from the sample) 73%1 38% 39% 15% 34% Thematic coverage Public financial management (e.g. fiscal responsibility, public procurement) Structural funds State-owned enterprises, privatisation, public–private partnerships x x x x x x Public service reform and/or wage bill x x x x Pension x x x x x x x x x Business environment x x Labour market (wage setting, active labour market policies, unemployment support) x x x x Financial sector (capital adequacy ratios, banking surveillance) x x x 1 73 % of conditions represent all structural conditions.
De resterende 27 % vedrørte kun budgetrelaterede betingelser. 
The remaining 27 % were only fiscal-related conditions.
Bilag 84 4. 
Annexes 84 4.
Tilsvarende betingelser i de forskellige versioner af aftalememorandaene blev grupperet for at undgå unødige gentagelser. 
Similar conditions in the different versions of the memoranda of understanding were grouped to avoid unnecessary repetitions.
Andelen af grupperede betingelser i forhold til antallet af betingelser i de forskellige aftalememoranda blev anvendt til at måle betingelsernes stabilitet. 
The share of the grouped conditions to the number of conditions in the different memoranda of understanding was used to measure the persistence of conditions.
De grupperede betingelser blev klassificeret i tre kategorier efter strukturelt indhold: i) Lavt strukturelt indhold: Denne kategori omfatter betingelser, som ikke i sig selv medfører reelle økonomiske ændringer. 
The grouped conditions were classified in three categories of structural content: (i) Low structural content: this category covers conditions that would not bring about any meaningful economic changes by themselves.
Disse betingelser kan dog være skridt på vejen til mere betydelige reformer. 
However, these conditions can serve as preparatory steps for more significant reforms.
Eksemplerne omfatter: i) engangsundersøgelser som f.eks. en enkeltstående evaluering, ii) forberedelse og offentliggørelse af planer eller strategier og iii) fortsættelse af en given aktivitet. ii) Mellemhøjt strukturelt indhold: Denne kategori omfatter betingelser, som potentielt kan have en umiddelbar, betydelig virkning på adfærden hos en gruppe økonomiske aktører (f.eks. offentlige embedsmænd, virksomheder, forbrugere, ansatte og licensindehavere). 
Examples include: (i) one-off discovery activities such as a single evaluation; (ii) preparation and publication of plans or strategies; and (iii) continuation of given activity. (ii) Medium structural content: this category covers conditions that can potentially have an immediate significant effect on the behaviour of some group of economic agents (e.g. public officials, enterprises, consumers, employees, and holders of licences).
Der kræves dog yderligere opfølgningstiltag, hvis disse virkninger skal vare længe. 
However, for these effects to be long lasting, additional follow-up measures would be required.
Denne kategori omfatter fire typer betingelser. 
This category includes four types of conditions.
For det første: betingelser, der kræver, at den udøvende magt tager skridt, der sandsynligvis vil have en umiddelbar virkning. 
Firstly: conditions requiring that the executive branch of the government take actions that are likely to have an immediate effect.
Sådanne betingelser kan have endda ekstremt betydelige makroøkonomiske virkninger (f.eks. hvis regeringen beslutter at nedsætte mindstelønnen), men kan nemt rulles tilbage. 
Such conditions can even have extremely significant macroeconomic effects (for instance, if the government decides to reduce the minimum wage), but such conditions are easily reversible.
For det andet: betingelser, som kræver, at regeringen gentagne gange gennemfører en aktivitet (f.eks. regelmæssig budgetovervågning). 
Secondly: conditions that require the government to repeatedly carry out some activity (e.g. regular budgetary monitoring).
For det tredje: betingelser, der kræver gennemførelse af forskellige administrative tiltag, f.eks. omstrukturering af centraladministrationen, eller tiltag til gennemførelse af eksisterende lovgivning. 
Thirdly: conditions requiring implementation of various administrative measures such as reorganisation within the central government, or measures leading to the implementation of existing legislation.
For det fjerde: alle engangstiltag. iii) Højt strukturelt indhold: Denne kategori dækker betingelser, som i sig selv fører til langvarige ændringer i økonomien. 
Fourthly: all one-off actions. (iii) High structural content: this category covers conditions that would bring long-lasting changes in the economy by themselves.
Sådanne betingelser kan have meget brede og væsentlige virkninger, men virkningerne kan også være koncentreret på nogle få økonomiske aktører. 
Such conditions can have very broad and significant effects, but the effects can also be concentrated on a few economic actors.
Typiske betingelser i denne kategori kræver ændringer af lovgivningen ved det nationale parlament. 
Typical conditions in this category require legislative changes by the national Parliament.
Kategorien omfatter også betydelige ændringer af det institutionelle landskab, f.eks. oprettelse af et finanspolitisk råd eller omstrukturering af de lokale myndigheder og privatisering1. 
This category also includes significant changes in the institutional landscape, such as establishment of fiscal council or reorganisation of local government, and privatisation1.
Overholdelsen blev vurderet i forhold til den oprindelige tidsfrist og status for gennemførelsen på revisionstidspunktet. 
Compliance was assessed against the original deadline and against the implementation status at the time of the audit.
Vurderingen var normalt baseret på de foreliggende overvågningsrapporter. 
The assessment was usually based on the available monitoring reports.
Følgende typer betingelser indgik ikke i analysen af overholdelse: i) vage betingelser - dvs. betingelser, som ikke kunne klassificeres ordentligt efter strukturelt indhold ii) permanente betingelser - dvs. betingelser, der kræver udførelse af visse aktiviteter hvert kvartal, og iii) betingelser uden nogen klar tidsfrist. 
The following types of conditions were not considered in the analysis of compliance: (i) vague conditions — i.e. conditions that did not allow for proper classification by the structural content; (ii) permanent conditions — i.e. conditions that require that certain activities be performed at each quarter; and (iii) conditions with no clear deadlines.
1 Nationalisering eller bankstøttetiltag indgår ikke i denne kategori. 
1 Nationalisation or banking support measures are not included in this category.
Bilag 85 7. 
Annexes 85 7.
For at tage højde for situationer, hvor status for overholdelsen ikke kunne bestemmes, blev alle statistiske test altid udført mindst to gange: i) på grundlag af registrerede data uden de tilfælde, hvor det ikke var muligt at bestemme overholdelsesstatus, og ii) på grundlag af alle registrerede data, hvor manglende værdier blev betragtet som manglende overholdelse. 
To account for situations of unobtainable compliance status, all statistical tests were always performed at least twice: (i) on the basis of data records without those where compliance status could not be obtained; and (ii) on the basis of all data records with missing values treated as non-compliance.
Gældsomkostningerne 8. 
Cost of the debt 8.
Hvad angår prissætningen for låntagningen, blev swapaktivrenterne anvendt som indikator for, hvad markederne betragtede som den gældende risikofrie obligationsrente for en given løbetid på udstedelsestids-punktet. 
Concerning the pricing of the borrowings, the swap asset rates were used as the indicator of what markets considered as the prevailing risk-free yield of a given maturity at the time of issuance.
Gennemsnittet af bid-og ask-swaprenter (dvs. mid-swaprenten) blev anvendt som benchmark for den rente ved udstedelse, som EU og sammenlignelige udstedere opnåede2. 
The average of bid and ask swap rates (i.e. mid-swap level) was used as the benchmark for the issue yield achieved by the EU and peer issuers2.
Dataene var fra Bloomberg eller, hvis det ikke var muligt at få dem derfra, beregnet som forskellen mellem udstedelsesrenten og mid-swap-renten på annonceringsdatoen. 
The data was obtained from Bloomberg or, if not available, calculated as the difference between the issue yield and the mid-swap level on the announcement date.
2 Den Europæiske Investeringsbank, den europæiske finansielle stabiliseringsfacilitet, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. 
2 The EIB, the EFSF, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau.
Kommissionens 86 svar Resumé I Kommissionen glæder sig over Revisionsrettens forvaltningsrevision af de programmer, der har modtaget finansiel støtte fra betalingsbalancemekanismen og den europæiske finansielle stabiliseringsmekanisme (EFSM). 
Reply of the 86 Commission Executive summary I The Commission welcomes this ECA performance audit of the programmes supported by balance-of-payments (BoP) and European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) financial assistance.
De vigtigste økonomiske mål for disse programmer er blevet opfyldt, nemlig at sikre landenes tilbagevenden til de finansielle markeder, holdbare offentlige finanser, fornyet vækst og en nedgang i arbejdsløsheden. 
These programmes achieved their core economic objectives, which were for countries to return to financial markets, achieve sustainable public finances and return to growth leading to a fall in unemployment.
Krisens indvirkning og udvikling var uden fortilfælde både i Europa og globalt. 
The impact and evolution of the crisis was unprecedented, both in Europe and globally.
Det var meget vanskeligt at forudse de fulde konsekvenser af den hurtige afvikling af ubalancer. 
Predicting the full consequences of the rapid unwinding of imbalances in advance was very difficult.
I lyset af disse kriseforhold kunne den indbyrdes sammenhæng mellem en række økonomiske variabler ikke længere beskrives i tilstrækkelig grad ud fra almindelige økonomiske reaktionsmønstre. 
In such crisis conditions, standard economic reaction functions lose their ability to adequately describe the interrelationships between a number of economic variables.
Kommissionen og EU var nødt til at gribe hurtigt ind over for en meget høj usikkerhed og systemiske stats-og likviditetskriser, der udgjorde en trussel mod hele det finansielle systems stabilitet og staternes solvens. 
The Commission, and the EU, had to act quickly in the face of very high uncertainty and systemic sovereign and liquidity risks that challenged the stability of the whole financial system and the solvency of sovereigns.
På tidspunktet for krisens indtræden var der allerede en multilateral overvågningsramme, men den viste sig at være utilstrækkelig. 
At the onset of the crisis, a multilateral surveillance framework was already in place, but it did not prove fully adequate.
Selv om Kommissionen havde begrænset erfaring med karakteren og omfanget af den nødvendige intervention, udviklede den hurtigt en række kriseløsningsværk-tøjer. 
Although the Commission had limited experience of the type and scale of intervention needed, it quickly developed a toolkit for crisis resolution.
Der blev omgående og under vanskelige forhold indført programmer for finansiel bistand til EU-medlemsstater ydet under betalingsbalancefaciliteten. 
The BoP financial assistance programmes for EU Member States were put in place urgently and under difficult conditions.
EFSM-programmerne var ligeledes tvingende nødvendige på grund af den højere risiko for følgevirkninger i andre eurolande og de yderligere vanskeligheder forbundet med finansieringen via helt nye finansielle instrumenter. 
The EFSM programmes faced the same urgency due to the higher risk of spillovers to other euro area countries and the additional difficulty of being financed through financial instruments that had just been created.
Kommissionen manglede personaleressourcer, og læringskurven var stejl. 
The Commission faced acute staff resource constraints, and had a steep learning curve.
Programmerne var komplekse instrumenter til håndtering af uforudsigelige krisesituationer. 
The programmes were complex instruments that addressed unpredictable crisis situations.
Modtagerlandenes input til programmernes udformning og udvikling var kritisk. 
The input of the recipient countries in the programme design and evolution was critical.
Det afspejler ikke kun deres forskellige situationer, men også forskellige politiske præferencer, og det er den vigtigste faktor til at sikre, at de bevarer ejerskabet over reformprogrammet. 
It reflects not just their different circumstances but also different political preferences, and is the most important factor in ensuring that they retain ownership over the reform programme.
Uden ejerskab mindskes sandsynligheden for, at et program bliver en succes, betydeligt. 
Without ownership, the probability of a programme succeeding is substantially reduced.
Ved sammenligningen af programmerne er det ligeledes vigtigt at tage højde for de forskellige forhold i modtagerlandene, politiske, administrative og institutionelle begrænsninger og deres udvikling over tid. 
In comparing the programmes, it is also important to take into account recipient countries’ different underlying circumstances and political, administrative and institutional constraints, and how they changed over time.
Lande kan have strukturelle svagheder, der umiddelbart synes at være ens, men som ikke desto mindre løses bedst med forskellige politikker. 
Countries may have structural weaknesses that appear similar on the surface but that nevertheless are best addressed through different sets of policies.
Fleksi-biliteten til at skræddersy og tilpasse programmerne til de enkelte landes behov og begrænsninger er af afgørende betydning for deres succes. 
The flexibility to tailor and adjust the programmes to the needs and constraints of individual countries is critical to their success.
Programmets kvalitet kan ikke evalueres ved benchmarking af antallet af strukturelle betingelser. 
The quality of a programme cannot be evaluated on the basis of benchmarking the number of structural conditions.
Kommissionen har allerede gjort betydelige fremskridt med de reviderede programmer, også efter deres afslutning. 
The Commission has already made substantial progress during the programmes under consideration in this audit and since they ended.
Kommissionen har bl.a. mobiliseret yderligere ekspertise og finansielle ressourcer og styrket EU’s mekanismer for økonomisk styring og finansiel bistand. 
This includes the mobilisation of additional expertise and financial resources, as well as the strengthening of EU economic governance and financial assistance mechanisms.
Kommissionen agter at bygge videre på denne udvikling og gennemføre yderligere forbedringer som anført i Kommissionens svar på revisionsanbefalingerne. 
The Commission intends to build on these changes and effect further improvements, as set out in its response to the audit recommendations.
III Allerede før krisen var der en veletableret ramme for finanspolitisk overvågning. 
III A well-established fiscal surveillance framework was already in place in the pre-crisis period.