natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
34 Selv om de finansielle støttepro-grammers makroøkonomiske mål rakte videre end finanspolitisk tilpasning, viste det sig i alle fem programmer, at budgetstøtte27 spillede en vigtig rolle for, hvordan den finansielle bistand blev brugt. 
34 Although the financial assistance programmes’ macroeconomic objectives went beyond fiscal adjustment, in all five programmes budget sup-port27 turned out to be a key part of how assistance was used.
Det rejser spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt de voksende finanspolitiske risici blev opdaget og identificeret i tide under overvågningsprocedurerne. 
This raises a question as to whether the mounting fiscal risks were detected on time and flagged under the surveillance procedures.
37 I Kommissionens beregninger af den konjunkturkorrigerede budgetsaldo i perioden 2005-2008 blev landenes offentlige finanser systematisk over-vurderet29. 
37 In its cyclically adjusted balance calculations during 2005-2008, the Commission systematically overestimated the strength of countries’ public finances29.
Fejlen skyldtes hovedsagelig ændringer i skønnene over den potentielle BNP-vækst. 
This error was mainly caused by changes in estimated potential GDP growth rates.
Alle fem lande oplevede højkonjunktur, men Kommissionen skønnede i starten, at overop-hedningen var af et mere beskedent omfang, end den efterfølgende viste sig at være. 
All five countries were experiencing an economic boom, but the Commission initially estimated the scale of overheating to be more modest than, with hindsight, we know it to have been.
26 Det var den »forebyggende del« af stabilitets-og vækstpagten, som blev oprettet ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1466/97 af 7. juli 1997 om styrkelse af overvågningen af budgetstillinger samt overvågning og samordning af økonomiske politikker (EFT L 209 af 2.8.1997, s. 
26 This was the ‘preventive arm’ of the Stability and Growth Pact established by Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p.
Overvågningsrammen blev senest ændret i 2005 ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1055/2005 om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 1466/97 (EUT L 174 af 7.7.2005, s. 
The surveillance framework was last reformed in 2005 by Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p.
27 Finansiering af løbende budgetunderskud og tilbagebetaling af offentlig gæld. 
27 The financing of running fiscal deficits and the repayment of government debt.
28 Europa-Kommissionen: Ireland - Macro fiscal assessment - an analysis of the December 2007 update of the stability programme, s. 
28 European Commission, Ireland — Macro fiscal assessment — an analysis of the December 2007 update of the stability programme, p.
29 Sammenlign det første skøn udarbejdet efter årets udgang (dvs. i forårsprognosen) med et nyere skøn (dvs. oktober 2013). 
29 Compare the first estimate made after the year’s end (i.e. in spring forecast) with a recent estimate (i.e. October 2013).
Kommissionen skønnede, at de offentlige budgetter var stærkere, end de faktisk var 35 Der er to hovedtyper af finanspolitiske indikatorer. 
The Commission estimated the public budgets to be stronger than they actually were 35 There are two key types of fiscal indicator.
Den første er den faktiske budgetsaldo, eller forskellen mellem de offentlige indtægter og udgifter. 
The first is the actual fiscal balance, or the difference between government revenue and expenditure.
Denne saldo er imidlertid følsom over for midlertidige faktorer, f.eks. økonomisk vækst, aktivpriser og finanspolitiske engangstiltag. 
However, this balance is sensitive to temporary factors, such as economic growth, asset prices and one-off fiscal measures.
Den anden er de øvrige finanspolitiske indikatorer (f.eks. den konjunkturkorrigerede saldo, den strukturelle saldo), som sigter mod at korrigere disse midlertidige faktorer og således skabe et mere nøjagtigt billede af et lands underliggende budgetstilling. 
The second is other fiscal indicators (e.g. cyclically adjusted balance, structural balance) which aim to correct these temporary factors and thus provide a more accurate view of a country’s underlying fiscal position.
Disse indikatorer kan ikke observeres direkte, men er resultatet af komplekse beregninger. 
These indicators cannot be directly observed but are the result of complex calculations.
36 I perioden op til krisen blev de faktiske budgetsaldi generelt anslået korrekt frem til udgangen af det pågældende år. 
36 During the pre-crisis period, actual fiscal balances were generally correctly estimated no later than at the end of the year in question.
Alligevel var de høje budgetunderskud i 2008 for Irland, Letland, Portugal og Rumænien ikke forudsagt korrekt i Kommissionens underskudsprogno-ser. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of high budget deficits for 2008 in Ireland, Latvia, Portugal and Romania was poorly predicted in the Commission’s deficit forecasts.
Hvad angår f.eks. Irland, anførte Kommissionen i marts 2008, at risiciene i forbindelse med budgetfrem-skrivningerne stort set var neutrale for 200828. 
For example, speaking of Ireland in March 2008, the Commission stated that ‘the risks attached to the budgetary projections are broadly neutral for 2008’28.
Men ultimo 2008 var den faktiske budgetsaldo 7,2 procentpoint af BNP lavere end i prognosen. 
Yet at the end of 2008 the actual fiscal balance was 7.2 percentage points of GDP lower than forecast.
Del I - Kommissionen var ikke forberedt på omfanget af den krise, der brød ud 23 38 Det skønnede omfang af overophed-ningen (størrelsen af et positivt pro-duktionsgab30) var i overensstemmelse med den kraftige stigning i indikatorerne for økonomiens samlede produktionskapacitet. 
Part I — The Commission was unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis that broke out 23 38 The estimate of the scale of overheating (the size of a positive output gap30) was in line with the strong increase in the indicators of the overall production capacity of the economy.
Stigningen skyldtes imidlertid opgangstider på boligmar-kedet, og boliginvesteringerne bidrager ikke til at øge økonomiens potentiale på samme måde som andre mere produktive investeringer. 
However, this increase was generated by the housing booms, and investments in housing do not have the same effect on increasing the economy’s potential as other more productive investments.
39 Kommissionen havde fokus på at vurdere produktionsgabet i realøkonomien uden at tage højde for sektorubalancer i f.eks. finans-eller byggesektoren. 
39 The Commission had focused on assessing the output gap in the real economy, without considering sector imbalances such as in the financial or construction sectors.
Det blev dog klart i løbet af krisen, at overvågning af inflation og produktion ikke er nok til at garantere makroøkonomisk stabilitet og en holdbar budgetsaldo. 
However, it became clear during the crisis that inflation and output monitoring are not enough to guarantee macroeconomic stability and sustainable fiscal balances.
De potentielle finanspolitiske risici blev undervurderet i vurderingerne 41 Ifølge stabilitets-og vækstpagten skal medlemsstaterne indberette den seneste budgetudvikling og de seneste prognoser i deres stabilitets-og kon-vergensprogrammer. 
Assessments underestimated the potential fiscal risks 41 The Stability and Growth Pact requires Member States to report recent fiscal developments and forecasts in their stability and convergence programmes.
Kommissionen vurderer disse programmer og kontrollerer, om prognoserne for BNP og det offentlige budget er plausible. 
These programmes are assessed by the Commission, which checks the plausibility of the trajectories forecast for GDP and the public budget.
42 En væsentlig svaghed i Kommissionens vurderinger før 2009 var, at der ikke forelå rapporter om opbygningen af eventualforpligtelser i den offentlige sektor31. 
42 One important drawback of the Commission’s assessments prior to 2009 was the lack of reporting on the build-up of contingent public-sector liabil-ities31.
Finanspolitiske risici vedrørende finansiel stabilitet, statsejede selskaber eller andre offentlige garantier (f.eks. offentlig-private partnerskaber) blev ikke identificeret. 
Fiscal risks related to financial stability, state-owned enterprises or other public guarantees (e.g. PPPs) were not identified.
43 I sin overvågning vurderede Kommissionen ikke i tilstrækkelig grad konsekvenserne af den store kapital-indstrømning fra udlandet, især i form af gæld, som bidrog til byggeboomet og efterspørgselsboomet, og som potentielt kunne indvirke negativt på banksektoren i en efterfølgende nedgang. 
43 The Commission’s surveillance did not adequately assess the implications of the large foreign financial inflows, especially in the form of debt, which were fuelling construction and demand booms and had the potential to disrupt the banking sector in a subsequent bust phase.
Kommissionen havde ikke været opmærksom på denne sammenhæng, inden den analyserede medlemsstaternes anmodninger om finansiel bistand. 
The Commission did not note this link prior to its analysis of Member State requests for financial assistance.
30 Et positivt produktionsgab er det beløb, hvormed en økonomis faktiske produktion overstiger den potentielle produktion. 
30 A positive output gap is the amount by which the actual output of an economy exceeds its potential output.
31 F.eks. langfristede offentlige pensionsforpligtelser eller betydelige fremtidige budgetudgifter til eventuelle foranstaltninger i forbindelse med en redningspakke. 
31 For example, the long-term liabilities from public pensions or significant future fiscal expenditure resulting from the need to take measures in the event of a bailout.
Ud over de offentlige pensionsforpligtelser rapporterede Kommissionen ikke om andre eventualforpligtelser. 
With the exception of the public pension liabilities, the Commission did not report on other contingent liabilities.
40 Kommissionen identificerede boom i visse sektorer, efter at de havde fundet sted, f.eks. blev der konstateret et byg-geboom i Irland, Letland og Rumænien og boom i udlån til private i alle fem lande. 
40 The Commission identified some sector booms after the event; for instance, a construction boom was noted in Ireland, Latvia and Romania and private credit booms in all five countries.
Den algoritme, der blev anvendt til at beregne produktionsgabet, tog dog ikke højde for disse ubalancer. 
However, the algorithm used to calculate the output gap did not make any allowance for such imbalances.
Del I - Kommissionen var ikke forberedt på omfanget af den krise, der brød ud 24 44 I sine vurderinger havde Kommissionen heller ikke undersøgt budgetsaldienes følsomhed over for en brat rentestig-ning for den offentlige gæld eller tilsvarende pludselige stød til den økonomiske vækst eller valutakurserne. 
Part I — The Commission was unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis that broke out 24 44 Neither did the Commission’s assessments examine the sensitivity of budget balances to a sudden hike in the interest rates applied to government debt, or to equally sudden shocks to economic growth or exchange rates.
Men også disse risici var blevet identificeret, og der var blevet advaret imod dem i forskellige forskningsdokumenter, der var offentliggjort før krisen32. 
Yet these risks too had been recognised or warned against in various research papers published prior to the crisis32.
Kommissionen var derfor ikke parat til at forvalte programmerne 45 Før 2008 havde betalingsbalance-faciliteten ikke været i anvendelse siden 199333. 
As a result the Commission was not ready for the programme management 45 Prior to 2008, the balance-of-payments facility had last been used in 199333.
I 2008 var erfaringen fra første halvdel af 1990’erne gået tabt. 
By 2008 any experience acquired in the first half of 1990s was lost.
Det betød, at det faktisk var en ny aktivitet for Kommissionen at yde lande finansiel bistand. 
So, providing countries with financial assistance was in effect a new activity for the Commission.
46 Eftersom Kommissionen havde undervurderet de finanspolitiske ubalancer og deres konsekvenser for medlemsstaterne, var den ikke forberedt på at skulle forvalte sådanne programmer. 
46 Having underestimated the fiscal imbalances and their implications for the Member States, the Commission was unprepared for the task of programme management.
Navnlig de første programmer skulle stables på benene under et ekstremt tidspres. 
The initial programmes in particular had to be set up under extreme time pressure.
For eksempel var der kun nogle få dage til at udarbejde forslaget til det første program (Ungarn). 
For instance, the proposal for the first programme (Hungary) had to be produced in just a few days.
Kommissionen havde meget lidt intern erfaring i udformning og forvaltning af programmer for finansiel bistand, og den erfaring kunne ikke tilegnes med så kort varsel. 
The Commission possessed very little in-house experience of designing and managing financial assistance programmes, and that experience could not be acquired at such short notice.
47 I løbet af den indledende fase fik Kommissionen hjælp fra IMF-team til at udarbejde dele af programanalysen. 
47 During the initial phase, IMF teams helped the Commission to prepare parts of the programme analysis.
Kommissionens praksis blev desuden udviklet på grundlag af IMF-praksis (jf. punkt 109). 
The practices used by the Commission were also developed on the basis of IMF practices (see paragraph 109).
32 Jf. f.eks. »Fiscal Policies and Financial Markets« i ECB’s Månedsoversigt (ECB Monthly Bulletin) 02/2006, s. 
32 See, for instance, ‘Fiscal policies and financial markets’ in ECB Monthly Bulletin 02/2006, p.
33 Rådets beslutning 93/67/EØF af 18. januar 1993 om et fællesskabslån til Den Italienske Republik (EFT L 22 af 30.1.1993, s. 
33 Council Decision 93/67/EEC of 18 January 1993 concerning a Community loan in favour of the Italian Republic (OJ L 22, 30.1.1993, p.
Del II 25 Processerne var generelt svage 48 Ifølge lovgivningen er det Europa-Kommissionens opgave at varetage den operationelle forvaltning af finansiel bistand. 
Part II 25 Processes were generally weak 48 The regulations entrust the European Commission with the operational management of financial assistance.
En stor del heraf handler om at træffe vigtige programbeslutninger vedrørende den oprindelige tildeling af bistand og (ved hver gennemgang) fortsættelsen af programmet. 
A large part of this is about arriving at key programme decisions concerning the initial granting of assistance and (at each review) the continuation of the programme.
Beslutningsprocessen kræver en række trin og samordning med Rådet og de andre partnere (se figur 4). 
Decision-making requires a sequence of steps and coordination with the Council and the other partners (see Figure 4).
Del II - Processerne var generelt svage 26 Programbeslutninger A Tidslinje for programmerne Program-forhandling Beslutninger om at yde støtte Hvilke beslutninger træffes der? 
Part II — Processes were generally weak 26 Programme decisions A Programme timeline Programme negotiation Decisions on granting assistance What decisions are taken?
1. gennemgang 2. gennemgang Beslutninger om at fortsætte programmet nde gennemgang Beslutninger om at fortsætte programmet B Fastsættelse af generelle programparametre Udarbejdelse af en detaljeret reformdagsorden Rådets beslutning1 Samlet beløb og løbetid Underskudsmål Brede områder for strukturreformer fastsat i et aftalememorandum underskrevet af medlemsstaten og Europa-Kommissionen Ikke alle beslutninger er nødvendige ved hver gennemgang. 
1st review Decisions on programme continuation 2nd review Decisions on programme continuation Council decision1 nth review B Setting of general programme parameters Drawing up of a detailed reform agenda Overall amount and maturity Deficit targets Broad areas of structural reforms Set out in a memorandum of understanding signed by the Member State and the European Commission Not all decisions are needed at each review.
Hvis der for eksempel ikke er behov for at ændre de generelle parametre for støtte, er der ikke behov for at ændre Rådets beslutning. 
For instance if no changes are necessary to the general parameters of assistance, the Council decision does not have to be amended.
Hver beslutning består af tre separate handlinger Frigivelse af betaling Kommissionens beslutning Træffes typisk af næstformanden på Kommissionens vegne 1 I det irske og det portugisiske program blev de generelle programparametre fastsat af både Rådet og EFSF's bestyrelse, dvs. Eurogruppen. 
Each decision consists of three separate acts Release of payment Commission Decision Typically taken by the Vice President on the Commission's behalf 1 In case of the Irish and Portuguese programmes, the general programme parameters were set both by the Council and the EFSF board of directors, i.e. the Eurogroup.
EFSF's beslutningsproces er adskilt fra EU's. 
The EFSF decision-making process is separate from the EU decision-making procedure.
Figur 4 
Figure 4
Del II - Processerne var generelt svage 27 C Processens forløb 1 Politisk notat Forklarende note eller gennemgangsrapport Definerer forhandlings-holdets mandat Udføres parallelt med IMF-og ECB-medarbejdere Melding fra Rådet eller Eurogruppen ved nyt program eller vigtig ændring Drøftelser i EFC og EWG2 Meldinger fra formanden for EFC og EWG Kan tage forskellige former alt efter betydning: Forhandlings-eller gennemgangs-besøg opdatering af forhandlingsmandatet Kommissæren Formanden for EFC og EWG Andre partnere Programdokumenter Samspil med de andre partnere med henblik på samordning af holdninger til en fælles forståelse Forslag til MoU Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
Part II — Processes were generally weak 27 C Sequence of steps 1 Defines the mandate for the negotiation team Carried out in parallel with IMF and ECB staff statement by Council or Eurogroup if new programme or important amendment discussion by EFC and EWG2 indications from chair of EFC and EWG Depending on importance, can take different forms: Council position Policy brief update to the negotiation mandate Commissioner EFC and EWG chair Other partners Negotiation of review visit Programme documents Interaction with the other partners to align their positions to reach a common agreement Explanatory note or review report If changes to reform + agenda are necessary + If new programme or Council conditions are to be changed Draft MoU Draft Council decision 2 Audit areas 3 Internal review by the Commission Decision by the College of Commissioners Consultation in the Economic and Financial Committee and Eurogroup Working Group Council decision Signature of MoU Commission decision Source: ECA.
Processen i Generaldirektoratet for Økonomiske og Finansielle Anliggender 2. 
Process within the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2.
Oplysninger leveret til Rådet og den ansvarlige kommissær 3. 
Information provided to the Council and the Commissioner responsible 3.
Samspillet med andre partnere Betaling 2 EFC - Det Økonomiske og Finansielle Udvalg EWG - Eurogruppens Arbejdsgruppe MoU - aftalememorandum Figur 4 
Interaction with other partners 2 EFC – Economic and Financial Committee, EWG – Eurogroup Working Group MoU – memorandum of understanding Figure 4
Del II - Processerne var generelt svage 28 Kommissionens processer omfattede ikke altid tilstrækkelige kontrolforanstaltninger 50 Kommissionens processer bør - via tilstrækkelige kontrolforanstaltninger - sikre, at programmets oprindelige udformning og eventuelle opdateringer opfylder følgende kriterier: i) fuldstændighed - relevante oplysninger, både i forhold til medlemsstaten og fra økonomisk forskning, bør tages i betragtning ii) konsekvens - der bør være indbyrdes sammenhæng mellem programmets forskellige dele og mindst mulig konflikt mellem de forskellige programmål iii) dokumentation - begrundelserne for beslutningerne om de forskellige programelementer bør registreres behørigt34 iv) overensstemmelse - aftalememorandaene bør være i overensstemmelse med Rådets beslutninger v) upartiskhed - eftersom det for det meste er Kommissionens »pro-gramteam«, der udarbejder pro-grambetingelserne, bør landene behandles ensartet af de forskellige team, idet de samme betingelser bør anvendes under de samme omstændigheder35. 
Part II — Processes were generally weak 28 The Commission’s processes did not always incorporate sufficient checks and balances 50 The Commission’s processes should ensure — through sufficient checks and balances — that the initial programme design and any updates meet the following criteria: (i) comprehensiveness — relevant information, both in relation to the Member State and from economic research, should be taken on board; (ii) consistency — different elements of the programme should be mutually consistent, with a minimum of conflict between the different programme objectives; (iii) documentation — due record should be kept of the reasoning behind the decisions made on various elements of the programme34; (iv) conformity — the memoranda of understanding should be in line with the Council decisions; (v) even-handedness — as programme conditions are mostly drawn up by Commission’s ‘programme teams’, countries should be treated consistently by the different teams, applying similar conditions in similar circumstances35.
51 Programteamenes arbejde bør kontrolleres og efterprøves, så det sikres, at teamene respekterer disse kriterier. 
51 The work of programme teams should be checked and challenged to ensure that teams respect these criteria.
Kommissionen var for det meste grundig, når det drejede sig om at indhente de nødvendige oplysninger til overvågning Kommissionen benyttede sig i stort omfang af intern ekspertise og var også i kontakt med en række aktører i medlemsstaterne 52 Kommissionen baserede sig på den interne ekspertise i Generaldirektoratet for Økonomiske og Finansielle Anliggender. 
The Commission was mostly thorough in obtaining the necessary information for monitoring purposes The Commission extensively relied on internal expertise as well as liaising with a number of actors in Member States 52 The Commission relied on the internal expertise available in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
Med tiden benyttede Kommissionen også i stigende grad specialister fra andre generaldirektorater. 
Over time, it also increasingly consulted specialists from other directorates-general.
Disse andre eksperter gav begrænset input til de oprindelige programmer, hovedsagelig via høringer mellem generaldirektoraterne. 
These other experts provided limited input for the initial programmes, mainly through interdepartmental (‘inter-service’) consultation.
De var i højere grad involveret i programmerne for de to eurolande. 
They were more extensively involved in the two euro area programmes.
Anvendelsen af bredere ekspertise gav mulighed for en grundigere analyse af landenes problemer, navnlig hvad angår strukturreformer. 
The use of wider expertise allowed for a more thorough analysis of countries’ problems, especially in the area of structural reforms.
Kommissionens personalepolitik tillod heller ikke en mere omfattende brug af ekstern ekspertise til bestemte, snævert definerede områder, hvilket er almen praksis i IMF. 
The Commission’s human resources policy also did not allow greater use of external expertise for specific narrowly defined areas, a practice common in the IMF.
34 Kommissionens standard for intern kontrol 8 og 11. 
34 Commission internal control standards Nos 8 and 11.
35 Flere undersøgelser bekræfter, at denne risiko er reel. 
35 Several studies confirm that this risk is real.
En oversigt over relevant akademisk forskning kan f.eks. findes i Hakan Gunaydin: Compliance with the IMF conditions: Selection Bias and Conditions on Social Policy, udarbejdet til PEIO’s generalforsamling i 2014. 
For instance, an overview of relevant academic research can be found in Hakan Gunaydin, Compliance with the IMF conditionality: Selection bias and conditions on social policy — Prepared for the PEIO Annual Meeting, 2014.