natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
50 Uden en strategi, der sikrer, at tilstrækkelige investeringer kanaliseres til underudviklede markeder, kan disse risikere at modtage mindre støtte. 
50 In the absence of a strategy ensuring that adequate investment is channelled to underdeveloped markets, they may receive less support.
Denne risiko bekræftes af Kommissionens forudgående evalueringer/konsekvensanalyser af sine interventioner i perioden 2014-2020 (IFE og EFG), som fremhævede, at der var en høj koncentration af venturekapitalinvesteringer i bestemte medlemsstater. 
This risk is confirmed by the Commission’s ex ante evaluations/impact assessments on its interventions in the 2014-2020 period (IFE and EFG), which pointed to a high concentration of venture capital investments in certain Member States.
51 Vi konstaterede, at de to medlemsstater, der havde registreret flest EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde ved udgangen af juni 2018, var Frankrig og Italien med henholdsvis 20 % og 14 % af det samlede antal fonde. 
51 We found that, at the end of June 2018, the two Member States with the highest registration of EU-backed venture capital funds were France and Italy, with 20 % and 14 % of the total number of funds respectively.
Herefter fulgte Luxembourg, Det Forenede Kongerige, Nederlandene, Tyskland og Finland. 
These countries were followed by Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Finland.
I 12 medlemsstater var der ikke foretaget nogen EU-støttede investeringer i fonde (jf. figur 5). 
No EU-backed venture capital funds have invested in funds registered in 12 Member States (see Figure 5).
52 En af de faktorer, som fondsforvalterne tager højde for, når de beslutter, hvor de vil registrere en venturekapitalfond, er den gældende lovgivning. 
52 One of the factors that fund managers take into consideration when deciding where to register a venture capital fund is the applicable regulatory regime.
Ifølge en undersøgelse28 gennemført af EIF ønskede fondsforvalterne støtte til paneuropæiske fonde, flere grænseoverskridende investeringer og en harmonisering af de retlige rammer og skattesystemerne. 
According to a survey28 carried out by the EIF, “the fund managers called for supporting pan-European funds, more cross-border investments, and a harmonisation of legal frameworks and tax systems”.
28 EIF Working Paper 2018/48, "EIF VC Survey 2018 - Fund managers' market sentiment and views on public intervention", april 2018. 24 
28 EIF Working Paper 2018/48, “EIF VC Survey 2018 – Fund managers' market sentiment and views on public intervention”, April 2018. 24
Figur 5 - EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde i de enkelte registreringslande pr. 30. juni 2018 25 Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret på data fra EIF. 
Figure 5 – EU-backed venture capital funds per country of registration as at 30 June 2018 25 Source: ECA based on EIF data.
53 Venturekapitalfonde kan vælge udelukkende at investere i virksomheder i deres registreringsland eller at investere i flere lande. 
53 Venture capital funds may either invest only in companies in their country of registration or have a multi-country focus.
30. juni 2018 investerede 42 % af de EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde i flere lande. 
As at 30 June 2018, 42 % of the EU-backed venture capital funds had a multi-country focus.
54 Hvad angår de beløb, som EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde investerede i virksomheder, viser figur 6, at de medlemsstater, der var attraktive for venturekapital29, havde størst fordel af EU-interventionerne. 
54 In terms of the amounts EU-backed venture capital funds had invested in companies, Figure 6 shows that the Member States which were attractive to venture capital29 benefited the most from the EU interventions.
Frankrig, Tyskland og Det Forenede Kongerige skiller sig ud, da de tegner sig for 50 % af disse investeringer. 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom stand out since they account for 50 % of these investments.
Eftersom disse medlemsstater har EU's største økonomier, bidrager en fokusering på dem ikke til at fremme et europæisk venturekapitalmarked. 
Since these Member States are the largest EU economies, concentrating on them does not help foster a European venture capital market.
55 Medio 2018 havde ingen af de centralt forvaltede EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde investeret i Cypern, Malta, Slovenien eller Slovakiet, og der var 29 Venture Capital & Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index (https://blog.iese.edu/vcpeindex/). 
29 Venture Capital & Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index (https://blog.iese.edu/vcpeindex/).
kun foretaget begrænsede investeringer (29 millioner euro) i Bulgarien, Tjekkiet, Ungarn, Polen og Rumænien. Figur 6 - Investeringer i virksomheder foretaget af EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde pr. 
55 As at mid-2018, none of the centrally managed EU-backed venture capital funds had invested in Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia or Slovakia, and only limited investments (totalling €29 million) had been made in Bulgaria, the Czechia, Hungary, Poland or Romania.
30. juni 2018 26 900 800 700 Egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-600 vindue, delvindue 2 500 400 300 200 100 GIF ESU 2001 0 ESU 1998 Egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-vindue, delvindue 1 EFG Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret på data fra EIF. 
Figure 6 – Investments in companies by EU-backed venture capital funds as at 30 June 2018 26 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 ESU 2001 200 100 0 IFE/EFSI SMEW equity product SW 2 GIF ESU 1998 EFSI SMEW equity product SW 1 EFG Source: ECA based on EIF data.
56 Vores analyse indikerer, at tildeling af bistand på grundlag af efterspørgslen favoriserer de mest udviklede venturekapitalmarkeder. 
56 Our data analysis suggests that allocating assistance on the basis of demand favours the most developed venture capital markets.
Dette bidrager ikke fuldt ud til at opfylde EU's erklærede mål om at fremme et paneuropæisk venturekapitalmarked og til at opfylde bestemte prioriteter, der er nævnt i delegationsaftalerne. 
This does not contribute fully towards the EU’s stated aim of fostering a pan-European venture capital market as well as to some of the priorities mentioned in the delegation agreements.
I retsgrundlagene for de tre nyeste egenkapitalinstrumenter (EFG, IFE og EFSI) henvises der f.eks. altid til en målsætning om at støtte udviklingen af venturekapital på EU-niveau. 
For example, for the three most recent equity instruments (i.e. EFG, IFE, EFSI) the legal base always makes reference to supporting the development of EU level venture capital.
Endvidere hedder det i artikel 2 i GIF's mandataftale, at faciliteten bl.a. har som mål at begrænse ubalancen på markedet for egenkapital og risikovillig kapital med henblik på at forbedre venturekapitalmarkedet i EU. 
In addition, Article 2 of the GIF’s mandate agreement states that one objective of the facility is to reduce the equity and risk capital market gap with a view to improving the EU venture capital market.
Flere evalueringer af de EU-interventioner, der gennemføres af eller på vegne af Kommissionen, har kritiseret den efterspørgselsstyrede tilgang og i stedet anbefalet en mere proaktiv tilgang. 
Several evaluations of the EU interventions carried out by or on behalf of the Commission have criticised the demand-driven approach and recommended that it give way to a more proactive approach.
57 I 2018-konsekvensanalysen af det efterfølgende program, InvestEU (perioden 2021-2027), blev det f.eks. anbefalet at afbalancere den efterspørgselsstyrede tilgang i de enkelte foranstaltninger med en strengere kontrol af, om de er i overensstemmelse med de politiske målsætninger. 
57 For instance, the 2018 impact assessment for the successor programme InvestEU (2021-2027 period) recommends balancing the demand-driven approach at the level of individual operations by more rigorously verifying compliance with policy objectives.
Kommissionen har ikke præciseret, hvordan en sådan balance skal opnås i praksis, eller hvordan den vil påvirke den efterspørgselsstyrede tilgang. 
The Commission has not specified how this balance would be achieved in practice or how it would affect the demand-driven approach.
F ran kri g Tyskland Det Forenede Kongerige Italien Nederlandene Spanien F in la nd Sverige Belgien Irland Danmark P o r t u g al Grækenland Østrig Lux embo urg Estland Letland Tjekkiet Po len Rumænien Litauen Bulgarien USA Schweiz Norge Andre lande millioner euro pr. 30.6.2018 
France Germany UK Italy Netherlands Spain F in la nd Sweden Belgium Ireland Den mark P o r t u g al Greece Austria Lux embo urg Estonia Latvia Czechia Po la nd Romania Lithuania Bulgaria United States Switzerland Norway Other countries million euro as of 30/06/2018
Finansieringsbehovene blev ikke kvantificeret for de enkelte udviklingsfaser eller sektorer 58 Gennem de 20 år, hvor Kommissionen har støttet venturekapitalfonde via sine forskellige centralt forvaltede interventioner, har den investeret i SMV'er i forskellige udviklingsfaser. 
Funding needs were not quantified by development stage or sector of activity 58 Over the 20 years in which the Commission has been supporting venture capital funds through its various centrally managed interventions, it has invested in SMEs at different development stages.
Figur 7 viser, hvor stor en del af de 4,6 milliarder euro, som de EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde investerede i denne periode, der blev anvendt i de enkelte udviklingsfaser. 
Figure 7 shows how much of the €4.6 billion invested by the EU-backed venture capital funds in this period was used at each company development stage.
Figur 7 - De EU-støttede venturekapitalfondes investeringer fordelt på udviklingsfaser Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret på data fra EIF. 
Figure 7 – Investments of the EU-backed venture capital funds per SME development stage Source: ECA based on EIF data.
59 De tidlige faser (dvs. seedfasen og opstartsfasen) tegner sig for 56 % af de samlede investeringer. 
59 Early stages (i.e. seed and start-up) represent 56 % of the total investment.
Typisk investerer venturekapitalfondene i flere virksomheder i de tidlige vækstfaser end i de senere faser. 
Typically, venture capital funds invest in more companies in an early growth stage rather than in the later stages.
De gennemsnitlige beløb, der investeres i de enkelte SMV'er, er dog lavere i de tidlige faser. 
Nonetheless, the average amounts invested per SME are lower in the early stages.
De EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde har gennemsnitligt investeret 1,36 og 2,56 millioner euro pr. SMV i henholdsvis seed-og opstartsfasen, mens de gennemsnitligt har investeret 4,82 og 7,16 millioner euro pr. 
The EU-backed venture capital funds have invested, on average, €1.36 and €2.56 million per SME in the seed and start-up stages respectively, while the average investment in the growth and buy-out stages30 per SME were €4.82 and €7.16 million respectively.
30 Investeringsfaseklassificering anvendt af EIF vedrørende køb af majoritetsandele eller kontrollerende andele af virksomheder, typisk i senere udviklingsfaser såsom vækst-eller opskaleringsfasen. 
30 Investment stage classification used by the EIF on purchasing the majority or controlling stake of an company, typically in an advanced development stage, such as the growth or scale up stage.
27 Buy-out 12 % Seed 11 % Vækst 32 % Opstart 45 % 
27 Buy-out 12 % Seed 11 % Growth 32 % Start-up 45 %
60 I vores spørgeundersøgelse angav 68 % af de venturekapitalfondsforvaltere, der svarede, at anvendelse af offentlig finansiering i venturekapital var mest nødvendig ved investeringer i seedfasen og opstartsfasen. 
60 In our survey, 68 % of the venture capital fund managers who responded considered that public participation in venture capital was most needed for investments in the seed and start-up stages.
61 For så vidt angår den sektormæssige fordeling tegner virksomheder inden for computer-og forbrugerelektronik samt biovidenskab sig for over 50 % af de samlede investeringer, der er foretaget af de EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde (jf. figur 8). 
61 As far as the sectoral distribution is concerned, companies operating in computer and consumer electronics and the life sciences sectors represent more than 50 % of the total investments made by the EU-backed venture capital funds (see Figure 8).
Figur 8 - De EU-støttede venturekapitalfondes investeringer fordelt på sektorer Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret på data fra EIF. 
Figure 8 – Investments of the EU-backed venture capital funds per sector Source: ECA based on EIF data.
62 EU investerede i forskellige udviklingsfaser og sektorer, men fordelingen af midlerne var ikke baseret på en grundig analyse af udbud og efterspørgsel på det europæiske venturekapitalmarked. 
62 Although the EU has invested in different development stages and sectors of activity, the allocation of funds was not based on a thorough analysis of supply and demand on the European venture capital market.
Kommissionens forudgående evalueringer manglede oplysninger om finansieringshullet i de forskellige udviklingsfaser og sektorer (jf. punkt 36). 
The Commission’s ex ante evaluations lacked data on the funding gap for the different development stages or sectors of activity (see paragraph 36).
63 Vi bemærker, at Kommissionen i sin konsekvensanalyse af InvestEU (perioden 2021-2027) foreslog, at egenkapitalinstrumenter kunne målrettes mod sektorer og mod faser i en virksomheds livscyklus (på grundlag af en analyse af 28 Forbrugsvarer og detail 7% Andre sektorer 9% Energi og miljø 10 % Kommunikation 10 % Computer-og forbrugerelektronik 33 % Biovidenskab 19 % Erhvervsprodukter og industrielle produkter 13 % 
63 We note that in its impact assessment for InvestEU (period 2021-2027), the Commission suggested that equity instruments could be targeted “on a sectoral basis 28 Consumer goods and retail 7% Computer and consumer electronics 33 % Other sectors 9 % Energy and environment 10 % Communications 10 % Business and industrial products 13 % Life sciences 19 %
finansieringshuller)31. Konsekvensanalysen nævner ikke målretning mod eller analyser af enkelte medlemsstater. 
[...] and a company life cycle basis (on the basis of a funding gap analysis)”31. The assessment makes no mention of targeting or analysis by Member State.
EU's venturekapitalmarked er ikke attraktivt nok for private investorer 64 I overensstemmelse med nærhedsprincippet og for at opnå merværdi bør EU-støttede interventioner bidrage til at afhjælpe markedssvigt, nærmere bestemt dem, som medlemsstaterne ikke selv kan afhjælpe32. 
The EU venture capital market is not attractive enough to private investors 64 EU-backed interventions should address market failures or, more specifically, those which – to observe the subsidiarity principle and achieve added value – Member States cannot address themselves32.
Endemålet med offentlig intervention er at tiltrække private investorer for at udvikle et bæredygtigt venturekapitalmarked. 
The ultimate objective of public intervention is to attract private investors in order to develop a sustainable venture capital market.
Vi undersøgte, om det var lykkedes Kommissionen at tilskynde andre offentlige og private investorer til at finansiere virksomheder sammen med EU. 
We examined whether the Commission managed to encourage other public and private investors to provide funds alongside the EU.
Den forudgående evaluering af IFE fra 2013 fremhævede lave afkast som en af de primære årsager til private investorers begrænsede interesse i venturekapital. 
The 2013 ex ante evaluation of IFE highlighted low returns as one of the main reasons for private investors’ mute interest in venture capital.
Det blev påpeget, at det gennemsnitlige årlige afkast for europæiske venturekapitalfonde havde ligget under 10 % - undtagen i perioden med den såkaldte dot.com-boble i 1997-2000 - og at det havde været negativt i de seneste ca. ti år, hvor end ikke de bedst forvaltede fondes resultater havde været gode nok til at sikre de institutionelle investorer det ønskede afkast33. 
“Apart from the dot.com bubble period from 1997-2000, the average annual return to European venture capital funds has been below 10 %, and for the past ten years or so, negative, with not even the performance of the best-managed funds high enough to deliver the returns sought by institutional investors”33.
65 For at sikre EU-interventionernes overholdelse af statsstøttereglerne fastsatte Kommissionen minimumsmål for andelen af midler fra private investorer i de EU-støttede venturekapitalfonde. 
65 In order for the EU's intervention to be consistent with state aid rules, the Commission set minimum targets for the share of private investors in the EU-backed venture capital funds.
Disse mål blev fastsat til 50 % i de første instrumenter såsom ESU 1998 og ESU 2001, men blev sænket til 30 % i interventionerne for perioden 2014-2020. 
These targets were fixed at 50 % for the early instruments such as ESU 1998 and ESU 2001, but were then dropped to 30 % by the 2014-2020 interventions.
Dette er især vigtigt, fordi Kommissionen betragter de investeringer, som EIF/EIB og erhvervsfremmende banker foretager på egen risiko, som uafhængige og private. 
This is even more important since the Commission considers own-risk investments by the EIF/EIB and by promotional banks as independent and private.
Bortset herfra fastsatte Kommissionen ingen mål for den private sektors deltagelse. 
Otherwise, the Commission did not set any targets for private sector participation.
66 Kommissionen fastsatte ikke opnåelse af høje afkast som et mål for sine interventioner, og den bad heller ikke EIF om at opnå en fortjeneste med EU-midlerne. 
66 The Commission did not set attaining high returns as an objective for its interventions, nor did it ask the EIF to make a profit with EU funds.
EIF skal dog i henhold til lovgivningen og delegationsaftalerne anvende pari-passu-princippet, i henhold til hvilket offentlige og private investorer deltager på lige fod i 31 Arbejdsdokument fra Kommissionen, konsekvensanalyse, SWD(2018) 314 final af 6.6.2018. 
However, the EIF is required by the legislation and the delegation agreements to apply the pari passu principle, according to which public and private investors participate on an equal 31 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, SWD(2018) 314 final of 6.6.2018.
32 Artikel 209 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 af 18. juli 2018 om de finansielle regler vedrørende Unionens almindelige budget (EUT L 193 af 30.7.2018, s. 
32 Article 209 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p.
33 Kommissionens forudgående evaluering, "Financial instrument facilities supporting access to risk finance for research and innovation in Horizon 2020", 2013. 29 
33 Commission ex ante evaluation, “Financial instrument facilities supporting access to risk finance for research and innovation in Horizon 2020”, 2013. 29
venturekapitalfonde med samme fortjeneste og tab. 
footing in venture capital funds, sharing the same profits and losses.
Den tiltrækning af private investorer, som er afgørende for et bæredygtigt venturekapitalmarked, er kun mulig, hvis investeringerne genererer store afkast. 
Attracting private investors, which is essential for a sustainable venture capital market, is only possible if investments generate high returns.
67 Ifølge årsregnskabet for 2017 har ESU 1998 investeret 101 million euro og registreret et samlet nettotab på 12 millioner euro, siden instrumentet blev introduceret. 
67 According to the 2017 financial statements, ESU 1998 has invested €101 million and posted a global net loss of €12 million since its inception.
Et lignende billede tegner sig med hensyn til ESU 2001's og GIF's realiserede porteføljer (dem, der allerede er afskrevet eller solgt). 
A similar picture emerges from the ESU 2001 and GIF realised portfolios (those already written off or sold).
ESU 2001 rapporterede et realiseret nettotab på 82 millioner euro vedrørende de investerede 207 millioner euro, og GIF et tab på 88 millioner euro vedrørende de investerede 470 millioner euro34. 
ESU 2001 reported a realised net loss of €82 million on the €207 million invested, and GIF a €88 million loss on €470 million34.
Disse sidste to instrumenter har stadig en væsentlig del af deres investeringer i deres porteføljer (ESU 2001: 31 % og GIF: 64 %). 
These last two instruments still have a significant part of their investment left in their portfolios (ESU 2001: 31 %; GIF: 64 %).
Det er endnu for tidligt til, at der kan fremlægges brugbare data om de senere EU-interventioner (jf. tabel 3). 
It is too early to provide meaningful data for the more recent EU interventions [see Table 3].
68 I nogle af sine endelige og mellemliggende evalueringer af de centralt forvaltede programmer hævdede Kommissionen, at pari-passu-princippet ikke havde fungeret, eller at det havde været en hindring for fremme af private investeringer. 
68 Some of the Commission’s final and interim evaluations of the centrally managed programmes declared the pari passu principle a failure or a barrier to stimulating private investment.
Én evaluering (den forudgående evaluering af EFG fra 2011) indeholdt ingen konklusion om, hvorvidt pari-passu-princippet burde tilsidesættes, og udskød beslutningen til efter gennemførelsen af en detaljeret markedsvurdering. 
Another evaluation (the 2011 ex ante evaluation of the EFG) came to no conclusion on whether to deviate from the pari passu principle, deferring the decision until after a detailed market assessment.
Kommissionen havde ikke foretaget en sådan vurdering på tidspunktet for revisionen. 
The Commission had not performed such an assessment at the time of the audit.
Kommissionen tillader kun non-pari passu-investeringer i forbindelse med sociale investeringer under EFSI's SMV-vindue. 
The Commission allows for non-pari passu investments only in the case of social investments under the EFSI SME Window.
69 Et af Kommissionens argumenter for at anvende pari-passu-princippet er, at der ellers er en risiko for, at investeringen kan betragtes som statsstøtte. 
69 One of the arguments the Commission uses for applying the pari passu principle is that otherwise there is a risk of the investment being considered as state aid.
Uforenelig statsstøtte fra medlemsstaterne fordrejer konkurrencen og kan tilbagesøges af Kommissionen. 
Incompatible state aid given by Member States distorts competition and can be recovered by the Commission.
Kommissionens retningslinjer35 og EU-retten36 beskriver imidlertid klart, under hvilke omstændigheder en asymmetrisk profitdeling ikke er i strid med statsstøttereglerne. 
However, Commission guidelines35 and EU law36 clearly set out under which circumstances asymmetric profit-sharing does not contravene state aid rules.
34 Ifølge instrumenternes 2017-regnskaber havde de virksomheder, som stadig var i porteføljerne hos de fonde, der havde fået støtte fra ESU 2001 og GIF (urealiseret fortjeneste), en samlet værdi på henholdsvis 97 millioner euro og 79 millioner euro. 
This would 34 According to the instruments’ 2017 financial statements, the value of the companies that were still in the funds’ portfolio backed by ESU 2001 and GIF (unrealised profits) amounted to €97 million and €79 million respectively.
35 Kommissionens retningslinjer for statsstøtte til fremme af risikofinansieringsinvesteringer (2014/C 19/04), punkt 108-109. 
35 Commission guidelines on state aid to promote risk finance investments (2014/C 19/04), paragraphs 108-109.
651/2014 af 17. juni 2014 om visse kategorier af støttes forenelighed med det indre marked i henhold til traktatens artikel 107 og 108 (EUT L 187 af 26.6.2014, s. 
36 Article 21(13) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p.
Hermed ville den offentlige investor ikke investere på samme vilkår som andre investorer, sådan som det sker i henhold til pari-passu-princippet om investering på lige fod. 
31 mean that the public investor would not invest under the same terms as other investors, contrary to the pari passu principle of equality.