natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
8.7.1999 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 192/11 1) Hektarstżtte Korn og supplerende stżtte til hrd hvede Braklžgning af kornarealer (1) 425,9 362,8 5 540,3 1 456,0 5 890,0 969,0 Đ 349,7 487,0 8 166,6 2 050,7 7 854,0 969,0 312,6 1 081,7 9 867,5 1 771,6 9 817,0 969,0 50,5 802,6 10 867,0 1 475,0 9 817,0 969,0 1 050,0 506,0 1 063,4 2 877,3 2) Andre udgifter til korn Eksportrestitutioner Lageromkostninger Anden intervention Medansvarsafgift I alt 1 788,7 6 996,3 6 859,0 137,3 10 217,3 8 823,0 1 394,3 11 639,1 10 786,0 853,1 12 342,0 10 786,0 1 556,0 3 940,7 3) I alt % difference i forhold til overslag I alt 2 6 134,5 6 923,2 2 090,9 9 087,2 2 579,0 9 438,0 Đ 488,1 Đ 350,8 Đ 3,7 1 445,7 11 663,0 1 911,0 10 734,0 Đ 465,3 929,0 8,7 540,2 12 179,3 682,0 11 468,0 Đ 141,8 711,3 6,2 825,1 13 167,1 141,0 10 927,0 684,1 2 240,1 20,5 Đ 411,1 3 529,6 (1) Beregnet p grundlag af, at der dyrkes korn p 85 % af det samlede Kilde: Kommissionens EUGFL-finansberetninger for 1994-1997. dyrkningsareal (1992). rforme de la PAC, Agrifin 187, Agriorg 241, 8188/92 af 9.9.1992, tabel 2, del A. Rdet: Evaluation des incidences financires de la dcision sur la Udgifter 1993 Udgifter 1994 Udgifter 1995 Udgifter 1996 Udgifter 1997 Kumuleret difference 2 788,8 2 723,8 532,3 89,6 1 513,2 186,7 391,9 Đ 0,9 1 529,0 754,0 336,0 Đ 40,0 Đ 15,8 Đ 567,3 55,9 39,1 1 062,2 36,7 347,6 Đ 0,8 1 089,0 519,0 303,0 0,0 Đ 26,8 Đ 482,3 44,6 Đ 0,8 301,2 Đ 39,7 279,2 Đ 0,5 274,0 199,0 209,0 27,2 Đ 238,7 70,2 Đ 0,5 484,6 67,1 273,4 0,0 Đ 21,0 39,0 123,0 0,0 505,6 28,1 150,4 0,0 490,2 Đ 1 260,2 321,1 37,8 Tabel 3 Udgiftsoverslag sammenlignet med faktiske udgifter til korn siden reformen Ń EU-12 faktiske faktiske anslede difference faktiske anslede difference faktiske anslede difference faktiske anslede difference 1994-1997 0,0 (mio. 
8.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 192/11 1.
C 192/12 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 8.7.1999 4.4. 
C 192/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.7.1999 4.4.
Regnskaberne viser imidlertid ikke den faktiske stigning mellem de to r, fordi der er problemer med at opfżre udgifterne under det r, de vedrżrer. 
However, the accounts do not present the real increase between the two years, because of cut-off problems.
I 1995 betalte Kommissionen Spanien og Portugal et forskud p 1995-hżsten p 738,5 mio. ECU for at kompensere for tżrkens negative finansielle indvirkning p landbrugsbedrifterne i disse to lande. 
In 1995 the Commission paid an advance of ECU 738,5 million on the 1995 harvest to Spain and Portugal in order to compensate the negative financial impact the drought had on farmers in these two countries.
Under normale omstžndigheder ville dette belżb vžre blevet džkket over 1996-budgettet. 
Under normal circumstances this amount would have been paid under the 1996 budget.
1996-udgifterne omfatter endvidere et belżb p 181,1 mio. ECU og 1997-udgifterne et belżb p 160 mio. ECU, som vedrżrer forsinkede betalinger i en ržkke medlemsstater, som ikke havde kunnet afslutte kontrollen af forudbetalingerne rettidigt. 
Furthermore the 1996 expenditure contains an amount of ECU 181,1 million and the 1997 expenditure an amount of ECU 160 million which are linked to late payments in certain Member States who were not able to conclude their prepayment controls in time.
Disse belżb burde have vžret afholdt over budgetterne for de foregende r. 
These amounts should have come under the budgets of previous years.
Hvis alle disse belżb blev opfżrt under de regnskabsr, de faktisk vedrżrer, ville udgifterne for 1996 have andraget 12 892,7 mio. ECU og udgifterne for 1997 13 010 mio. ECU. 
If one reallocates all these amounts to the budget year which generated them, expenditure for 1996 would have amounted to ECU 12 892,7 million and for 1997 to ECU 13 010 million.
Den faktiske udgiftsstigning ville sledes have vžret mindre (117,3 mio. 
Thus the real increase in expenditure would have been less important (ECU 117,3 million) but still quite different from the predicted decrease.
Hertil kom, at efter at eksportrestitutionerne og lageromkostningerne i tre r var faldet stżt, steg de igen. 
Moreover, export refunds and storage costs increased again after three years of continuous decrease.
Budgetudgifterne steg efter reformens indfżrelse, men med det nye system er det mere gennemskueligt, hvor store omkostninger landbrugsstżtten faktisk er forbundet med. 
Although budgetary expenditure increased after the reform, the new system makes the real cost of agricultural support more transparent.
Fżr reformen blev en stor del af denne stżtte ikke opfżrt i budgettet, fordi den blev betalt af forbrugerne, som mtte acceptere vžsentligt hżjere priser end priserne p verdensmarkedet. 
Before the reform a large part of support did not enter the budget, as it was provided by consumers who had to accept prices which were substantially higher than world market prices.
Da prisstżtten i vidt omfang blev erstattet med hektarstżtte, blev denne byrde lagt p skatteyderne. 
This burden was passed on to taxpayers, when area aid replaced much of the price support.
Produktion 4.6. 
Production 4.6.
Nr der ses bort fra rekordhżsten i 1991-92, fremgr det af tabel 1, at EU 12Ős produktion i overgangsrene 1993-1995 stort set holdt sig p niveauet i perioden forud for reformen med et udsving p ca. 165 mio. ton. 
Aside from the bumper crop in 1991 to 1992, Table 1 shows that the EU 12Ős production in tonnes in the three transitional years 1993 to 1995 remained at levels close to those of the pre-reform period, fluctuating at around 165 million tonnes.
I 1996/97 efter overgangsperioden steg EU 12Ős produktion til 191,2 mio. ton og oversteg dermed rekordhżsten i 1991 med ca. 10 mio. ton. 
In 1996 to 1997, after the transitional period, the EU 12Ős production rose to 191,2 million tonnes, thus outstripping the bumper crop of 1991 by about 10 million tonnes.
De tre nye medlemsstater producerede yderligere 14 mio. ton, s EU 15Ős samlede produktion nede op p 205,3 mio. ton i 1996/97 og holdt sig p omtrent samme niveau i det fżlgende produktionsr. 
The three new Member States added another 14 million tonnes, so that global production in the EU 15 reached 205,3 million tonnes in 1996/1997 and stayed at approximately the same level in the following marketing year.
1998/99-hżsten i EU 15 var p 208 mio. ton og dermed ogs en rekord-hżst. 
In 1998/1999, a new record harvest in the EU 15 of 208 million tonnes has been reached.
Hvis der som foreslet i Agenda 2000 indfżres en enheds-stżttesats for oliefrż og korn, risikerer man, at oliefrż til dels vil blive erstattet med korn, da udbytterne og priserne for denne afgrżde er hżjere end for oliefrż. 
The introduction of a single aid rate for oilseeds and cereals, as suggested in Agenda 2000, runs the risk of oilseeds being partly replaced by cereals, as the crop yields and prices of the latter are higher than those of oilseeds.
Disse globale tal džkker over den kendsgerning, at udgifterne har udviklet sig ret forskelligt i de enkelte medlemsstater (jf tabel 4). 
This global situation hides quite different developments within the Member States (see Table 4).
Nr den samlede produktion i overgangsperioden var relativt stabil, skyldtes det, at den markante stigning i den tyske produktion sammenlignet med perioden 1989-1992 forud for reformens indfżrelse blev opvejet af et tilsvarende fald i Spanien (tżrke) og Frankrig. 
The relative stability of total production during the transitional period was due to the fact that the significant increase in German production by comparison with the pre-reform 1989-1992 period was counterbalanced by a corresponding decrease in Spain (drought) and France.
I de fżrste to r efter at reformen var trdt fuldstžndig i kraft (1996/97), kom Frankrigs og Spaniens produktion igen op p niveauet fra fżr reformen, mens den stigende tendens i Tyskland fortsatte. 
In the first two years of full application of the reform (1996-1997) France and Spain returned to pre-reform production levels, while GermanyŐs rising trend continued.
Dette viser, at hvis produktionsvilkrene i Spanien og Frankrig ikke havde vžret s exceptionelt drlige, ville man allerede i overgangsperioden have kunnet konstatere en stigning i den samlede produktion. 
This shows that, had it not been for the exceptionally unfavourable production conditions in Spain and France, the observed jump in total production would already have occurred during the transitional period.
Kornudbytterne stiger konstant, og derfor er tvungen jordudtagning det vigtigste middel til begržnsning af produktionen. 
Given the fact that cereal yields are continually increasing, the main means of limiting production is by imposing compulsory set-aside.
Siden ordningen med jordudtagning blev indfżrt, er produktionen faktisk faldet med i alt ca. 86 mio. ton (perioden 1993-1997). 
Indeed, since set-aside was introduced, it has reduced production by about 86 million tonnes in total (between 1993 and 1997).
Man mente, at fordi verdenspriserne midlertidigt l over de interne priser, ville der opst forsyningsmangel i EU, og derfor blev jordudtagningssatsen sžnket fra 15 % til 12 % i reformens tredje r. 
The argument that world prices that were temporarily higher than internal prices would cause supply shortages in the EU led to the set-aside rate being reduced from 15 % to 12 % in the third year of the reform.
I det fjerde r blev satsen sat ned til 10 % og blev s fastsat til 5 % for produktionsrene 1997/98 og 1998/99. 
In the fourth year the rate went down to 10 % and was then fixed at 5 % for the 1997/1998 and 1998/1999 marketing years.
Sammenlignet med en produktion p mere end 200 mio. ton (1997/98) er effekten af en s lav jordudtagningssats minimal. 
When compared with a production of more than 200 million tonnes (1997/1998), the effect of such a low set-aside rate is minimal.
Det str imidlertid ogs klart, at hvis man alene ved hjžlp af jordudtagning vil bringe produktionen ned p et niveau, der ligger tžttere p behovet p det indre marked, (det vil for żjeblikket sige en nedsžttelse p ca. 30 mio. ton), vil det kržve meget hżje udtagningsprocenter, som vil kunne anspore landbrugerne til yderligere at intensivere produktionen p den tilbagevžrende jord, hvorved den tilsigtede nedsžttelse af produktionen vil blive udlignet. 
However, it also becomes clear that reducing production to levels closer to internal-market needs (i.e. at present, a reduction of about 30 million tonnes would be required) by means of set-aside alone may call for drastic set-aside levels, which would encourage farmers to further intensify production on the remaining land thus offsetting the intended reduction of production.
Procenten skal fastsžttes p grundlag af en anslet forsyningsbalance for korn i produktionsr n og de forventede tal for produktionsrene n+ 1 og n+ 2. 
In addition, the set-aside rates are submitted for a Council decision one year in advance and are based on an estimated cereals balance of marketing year n and projected figures for marketing years n+ 1 and n+ 2.
Ved udgangen af produktionsr n (i juni) har Kommissionen imidlertid ikke plidelige oplysninger om det pgžldende r (plidelige Eurostat-tal foreligger fżrst to r senere), og udviklingen kan heller ikke forudses med tilstržkkelig stor nżjagtighed. 
However, at the end of marketing year n (in June) the Commission will not have reliable information on the year concerned (reliable Eurostat figures are available only two years later), nor can the future situation be forecast with sufficient accuracy.
Systemets vilkrlighed kom klart frem i 1997, da Rdet bad Kommissionen om at fremsžtte et forslag om at fastsžtte jordudtagningssatsen til 5 % (17) . (17) Rdets dokument nr. 
The arbitrariness of this system was revealed in 1997, when the Council demanded that the Commission present a proposal fixing the set-aside rate at 5 % (17).
9462/97 af 27. juni 1997, kompromispakken vedrżrende priser for 1997/98 og tilhżrende foranstaltninger. 
(17) Council document No 9462/97 of 27 June 1997, compromise package on prime and related amounts for 1997/1998.
C 192/14 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 8.7.1999 4.10. 
C 192/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.7.1999 4.10.
Konsekvensen af denne ordning er, at Kommissionen ikke kan vedtage foranstaltninger, der fr umiddelbar virkning. 
The consequence of this system is that the Commission cannot act with immediate effect.
Hvis tallene senere skulle vise sig at vžre forkerte, vil systemet komme ud af balance, og det kan medfżre mangel p forsyninger eller produktionsoverskud. 
If figures subsequently proved incorrect, the system would be destabilised rather than stabilised and a supply shortage or surplus could result.
Ved udgangen af produktionsret 1997/98 fżrte den lave udtagningsprocent p 5 % sledes igen til hżjere produktion og resulterede i interventionslagre p 14,5 mio. ton, det nžsthżjeste niveau siden perioden 1993-1994. 
Indeed, at the end of the 1997/1998 marketing year the low set-aside rate of 5 % again led to higher production and resulted in intervention stocks amounting to 14,5 million tonnes, the second highest level since the 1993 to 1994 period.
Med den produktion, der kan konstateres i 1998-99 (jf. punkt 4.6), er det muligt, at interventionslagrene igen nr op p niveauet fra fżr reformen. 
Based on the production for 1998 to 1999 (see paragraph 4.6), intervention stocks may again reach pre-reform levels.
Sammenligningen viser, at den żgede produktion af dyrefoder var til fordel for fžllesskabskorn. 
The comparison shows that Community cereals benefited by increased production of animal feed.
Men den žndrede sammensžtning af dyrefoder viser imidlertid ogs, hvor hurtigt en komponent erstattes med en anden, nr de relative priser žndrer sig. 
However, the change in the composition of animal feed also shows how readily one ingredient may be substituted with another, when relative prices change.
Priser Producentpriser 4.15. 
Prices Producer prices 4.15.
Et af principperne for den fžlles landbrugspolitik, som grunden blev lagt til p konferencen i Stresa, var princippet om et ČenhedsmarkedÇ. 
One of the principles on which the CAP was founded at the Stresa Conference was that of a Single Market.
Det blev vedtaget at yde prisstżtte ud fra den ubegrundede antagelse, at et enhedsmarked blandt andet ville kržve enhedspriser (19). 
Price support was organised on the unjustified assumption that a single market would require, inter alia, uniform prices (19).
En enhedspris for korn er imidlertid ingen betingelse for et enhedsmarked. Det ville kun vžre tilfžldet, hvis korn var et ensartet produkt, der blev omsat under ideelle konkur-rencebetingelser. 
However, a single price for cereals is not a condition for a single market; it would occur only if cereals were a homogeneous product traded under conditions of perfect competition.
Virkeligheden viste sig at vžre og er stadig en anden (20). 
Reality proved and continues to be different (20).
Fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat og i de enkelte medlemsstater har markedspriserne p de forskellige kornarter og p de forskellige kvaliteter svinget inden for margenen mellem de kunstige indikativ-og interventionspriser. 
The market prices of the various cereals and of the different qualities of any one cereal varied between and within Member States within the margin between artificial target and intervention prices.
Handlen med korn er organiseret af ganske f store selskaber, og det primžre marked er underlagt oligopolagtige betingelser og ikke ideelle konkurren-cebetingelser. 
Trade is organised by a very limited number of large trading companies, hence the primary market meets the criteria governing an oligopsony, rather than those for perfect competition.
Intervention i form af offentlig oplagring har vžret nżdvendig for at holde priserne oppe ved den kunstige formindskelse af udbuddet. 
Intervention in the form of public storage was needed to keep prices high via the artificial reduction of market supply.
Interventionen har undertrykt de prissignaler, som ellers ville have medfżrt, at der blev overfżrt forsyninger fra omrder med overskud til omrder, hvor der var mangel p korn. Der blev rettet op p regionale ubalancer i kornforsyningen ved, at Kommissionen med store omkostninger til fżlge sżrgede for overfżrsler af interventionskorn. 
Because intervention suppressed the price signals which would have transferred supplies from areas with surpluses to those with shortage, regional imbalances in cereal supplies had to be redressed by means of transfers of intervention cereals organised by the Commission at high cost.
Indfżrelsen i 1992 af en enheds-indikativ og interventionspris for alle kornarter, dog p et lavere niveau, fik ikke den fžlles markedsordning til at fungere bedre. 
The introduction in 1992 of a single target and a single intervention price for all kinds of cereals, albeit at a lower level, did nothing to make the COM work better.
P grundlag af den urealistiske antagelse, at enhedspriser var nżdvendige, havde man forventet, at markedspriserne ville falde i takt med de institutionelle priser. 
On the basis of the unrealistic assumption of uniform prices, it was expected that market prices would follow closely the reduction in institutional prices.
1994 og 1995 var imidlertid drlige hżstr i hele verden, og derfor forblev priserne p verdensmarkedet exceptionelt hżje. 
However, owing to bad harvests worldwide in 1994 and 1995, world market prices remained exceptionally high.
Fżlgelig holdt EU-markedspriserne sig ogs p et niveau et godt stykke over den nye indikativpris. 
Consequently, EU market prices also remained well above the new target price.
Tabel 1 viser en klar stigning i det interne forbrug fra og med produktionsret 1993/94. 
Table 1 shows a clear increase in internal consumption from the 1993/1994 marketing year onwards.
Mens det gennemsnitlige forbrug i de fire r fżr reformen var p ca. 138 mio. ton, steg det inden for EU 12 til 152,1 mio. ton i det fjerde r efter reformens indfż-relse. 
While average consumption in the four years before the reform was about 138 million tonnes, it increased within the EU 12 to 152,1 million tonnes in the four years after the reform.
Det meste fžllesskabskorn anvendes til dyrefoder (62 %), og stigningen i det interne forbrug skyldes hovedsageligt, at det i stigende grad anvendes til dyrefoder og i industrien. 
The greater proportion of Community cereals is used for animal feed (62 %) and the increase in internal consumption is due mainly to the fact that their use for animal feed and industrial purposes has increased.
I lżbet af de fire r forud for reformen og de fire r efter dens indfżrelse er der i gennemsnit sket en stigning p ca. 12 %. 
The increase between the four years prior to the reform and the four years following it averaged at about 12 %.
Konsum tegnede sig kun for 24 % af det samlede forbrug i 1996/97. 
Human consumption accounted for just 24 % of total consumption in 1996/1997.
Det steg med 6 % inden for EU 12. 
It rose by 6 % within the EU 12.
Den stigende anvendelse af fžllesskabskorn til dyrefoder skyldes den voksende produktion af blandingsfoder (en stigning p 11 % siden 1992/93) og fžllesskabskornprisens tilnžrmelse til verdensmarkedsprisen p kornsubstitutter (f.eks. gluten, maniok og sżde kartofler), som har gjort EU-korn mere konkurrencedygtigt. 
The increasing use of Community cereals for animal feed is explained by the growing production of compound animal feed (11 % increase since 1992/1993) and the narrowing price gap between the price of Community cereals and the world market price for cereal substitutes (e.g. corn gluten, manioc, and sweet potatoes), which made EU cereals more competitive.
Medens gennemsnitsprisen p kornsubstitutter i 1992/93 kun udgjorde 68 % af gennemsnitsprisen p korn, var den i 1996/97 oppe p 83 %. 
While in 1992 to 1993 the average price of cereal substitutes was just 68 % of the average price of cereals, the ratio increased to 83 % in 1996 to 1997.
Det resulterede i, at dyrefoder i 1997 bestod af 55 % korn, 20 % kornsubstitutter og 25 % proteiner. 
The result was that in 1997 animal feed consisted of 55 % cereals, 20 % substitutes and 25 % of proteins.
I ret inden reformens ivžrksžttelse l disse procenter p henholdsvis 46 %, 26 % og 28 % (18). 
In the year prior to the reform these ratios were 46 %, 26 % and 28 % (18) respectively.
( 18 ) GD VI, arbejdsdokument VI-7316-96. 
Tangermann Stefan, Eurostat, Agricultural price trends in the EC, ISBN ( 18 ) DG VI working document VI-7316-96.
ISBN 92-826-5049-9. 
92-826-5049-9.
8.7.1999 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 192/15 gennemsnitlige producentpriser for alle kornarter (enhedsvžrdier beregnet af Eurostat). 
8.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 192/15 to the average producer prices for all cereals (unit values calculated by Eurostat).
Markedspriserne i de forskellige medlemsstater fulgte imidlertid ikke denne almindelige tendens i samme grad. 
Nevertheless, market prices in the various Member States did not follow this general trend to the same extent.
Markedspri-sen for blżd hvede, der er den kornart, der dyrkes mest af, holdt sig p et ret hżjt niveau i Spanien og Italien og var endog hżjere end den gennemsnitlige interventionspris for 1992 p 155 ECU/ton (21), som blev anvendt som reference for reformen (jf. figur 2). 
The market price for common wheat, the main cereal, remained quite high in Spain and Italy, and even above the average intervention price of ECU 155/t (21) in 1992, which was used as the reference level for the reform (see Graph 2).
Endvidere bevirkede valutaudsving, at fald i de institutionelle priser i nationale valutaer ikke fik den forventede effekt. 
In addition, currency movements worked against the drop of institutional prices in national currencies thus putting the level of price guarantee higher.
De hżje priser i Italien og Spanien skyldes navnlig, at der traditionelt er forsyningsunderskud af hjemmeproduceret korn p markederne i disse medlemsstater. 
The high price levels in Italy and Spain are mainly due to the traditional supply deficit of home-grown cereals in these two Member StatesŐ markets.
Forsyningssituationen forvžrredes yderligere p grund af tżrken, som rammer disse middelhavslande hvert tredje eller fjerde r (Spanien), og fordi effekten af jordudtagningen begyndte at vise sig (Italien). 
The drought which hits Mediterranean countries every three or four years (Spain) and the initial set-aside (Italy) further aggravated the supply situation.
I de żvrige medlemsstater var de offentlige lagre sm, og desuden var transportomkostningerne relativt hżje i forhold til kornpriserne. Det har tilsyneladende bevirket, at det spanske og italienske marked ikke blev forsynet med korn fra andre medlemsstater, og priserne faldt derfor ikke. 
Low public stocks in the other Member States and relatively high transport costs in relation to cereal prices appear to have prevented cereals from other Member States from being put on the Spanish and Italian markets and thereby bringing prices down.
Med reformen blev der ogs fastsat samme indikativ-og interventionspriser for de forskellige kornarter, selv om markedspriserne fortsat var meget forskellige (jf. figur 3). 
The reform also equalised target and intervention prices for different cereals, even though market prices continued to vary quite substantially between one kind of cereal and another (see Graph 3).
Gennemsnitligt er hrd hvede den dyreste kornart p markedet og er 40 % dyrere end rug, som er den billigste. 
On average, durum wheat is the most expensive cereal on the market, being 40 % more expensive than the cheapest, rye.
Produktionsstrukturerne og markedsforholdene varierer fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat, og som det fremgr af tabel 5, varierer kornpriserne derfor ogs. 
Owing to differing production structures and market situations, cereal prices also differ between Member States, as Table 5 shows.