natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Både GD CLIMA og GD RTD undersøger således, hvordan de bedre kan udforme deres primære støttemekanismer (dvs. innovationsfonden og InnovFin EDP kombineret med Horisont 2020-tilskud) til demonstrationsprojekter inden for lavemissionsenergi. 
Thus, both DG CLIMA and DG RTD are assessing how to better design their primary support mechanisms (i.e. Innovation Fund and InnovFin EDP combined with H2020 grant) for low carbon energy demonstration projects.
Støtten under Horisont 2020 til mere avancerede energidemonstrationsprojekter (herunder Horisont 2020's bidrag til InnovFin EDP) er også steget siden lanceringen af NER300. 
Funding under H2020 for more advanced energy demonstration projects (including by its contributions to InnovFin EDP) has also increased since the launch of NER300.
Det er uklart, om NER300 (og innovationsfonden) på den ene side og Horisont 2020/RP9 (herunder deres bidrag til finansielle instrumenter) på den anden side vil sikre tilstrækkelig komplementaritet til at berettige parallelle offentlige finansieringsprogrammer med forskellige forvaltningsenheder og tilsynsorganer (i Kommissionen). 
It is not clear whether NER300 (and the Innovation Fund) on one side and H2020/FP9 (including their contributions to financial instruments) on the other will be sufficiently complementary to justify the existence of parallel public funding programmes with different (Commission) managing entities and oversight bodies.
Generelt har Kommissionen endnu ikke nået det mål, den gav udtryk for i 2009 og gentog i 201670, nemlig at sikre en sammenhængende og bedre målretning af ressourcer og finansielle produkter, herunder EU-tilskud, låneprodukter og kapital, der adresserer de enkelte udviklingsstadier i demonstrationsprojekter i stor skala. 
Overall, the Commission has not yet achieved the ambition it stated in 2009 and repeated in 201670 to enable a coherent and better targeting of resources and financial 68 H2020 ends in 2020, and therefore will not overlap with the new Innovation Fund to be launched in 2021.
69 Jf. den sammenfattende rapport, der blev præsenteret på en afsluttende konference med GD CLIMA som vært: Finance for Innovation: towards the ETS innovation fund, Climate Strategy & Partners, 12.6.2017. 
69 See the summary report presented during a closing conference hosted by DG CLIMA: Finance for Innovation: towards the ETS innovation fund, Climate Strategy & Partners, 12 June 2017.
70 COM(2016) 763 final. 
70 COM(2016) 763 final.
NER300's ansvarlighedsordninger er ikke tilstrækkeligt tydelige NER300-midlerne er ikke en del af Den Europæiske Unions almindelige budget, og finansforordningen finder derfor ikke anvendelse på forvaltningen heraf. 
NER300 accountability arrangements are not clear enough NER300 funds are not part of the general budget of the European Union and the EU Financial Regulation thus does not apply to their management.
Det er medlemsstaternes midler, som genereres ved hjælp af et af EU's politiske instrumenter (EU ETS). 
They are Member State funds generated from an EU policy instrument (i.e. EU ETS).
Retsgrundlaget for NER300 (ETS-direktivet og NER300-afgørelsen) henviser ikke udtrykkeligt til finanskontrol (f.eks. i forbindelse med betalinger) og (intern eller ekstern) revision. 
The NER300 legal basis (i.e. the ETS Directive and NER300 Decision) does not include explicit references to financial control (e.g. for payments) or (internal or external) auditing.
De nationale kontaktpunkter, Revisionsretten henvendte sig til under revisionen, opfattede generelt NER300-midlerne som EU-midler71. 
National contact points we consulted during the audit generally perceived NER300 funds as EU funds71.
Der er ikke noget lovkrav om, at Kommissionen skal udarbejde årsrapporter om programmets driftsresultater eller finansielle resultater for at sikre fuld offentlig ansvarlighed. 
There is no legal requirement for annual reporting by the Commission on the operational or financial performance of the programme to ensure full public accountability.
Kommissionens forvaltning af midlerne er ikke underlagt nogen dechargeprocedure. 
There is no discharge procedure for the Commission's stewardship of these funds.
EIB udleverer fortrolige regnskaber til Kommissionen om bankens aktiviteter i forbindelse med forvaltningen af NER300-aktiver og opfører midlerne som en ikkebalanceført post på vegne af en tredjepart72. 
The EIB issues to the Commission confidential financial statements on its NER300 asset management activities and reports the funds as an off-balance sheet item held on behalf of a third party72.
Kommissionen opfører ikke NER300-midler på EU's balance. 
The Commission does not report NER300 funds on the EU balance sheet.
Generelt er finanskontrol-og ansvarlighedsordningerne for NER300-programmet ikke tilstrækkeligt tydelige. 
Overall, the financial control and accountability arrangements for the NER300 programme are not clear enough.
Sådanne ordninger er nødvendige for at give solid sikkerhed for forsvarlig økonomisk forvaltning af disse offentlige midler i de enheder, der er involveret i forvaltningen af programmet. 
Such arrangements are necessary to provide robust assurance of the sound financial management of these public funds by the entities involved in the management of the programme.
71 Jf. henvisningen til NER300-midler som EU-midler på s. 21 i "Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support", rapport fra Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, af 20. januar 2017. 
49 71 See the reference to NER300 funds as EU funds on page 21 of ‘Carbon capture and storage: the second competition for government support’, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, 20 January 2017.
72 Jf. også "Off balance sheet as at 31 December 2016" i EIB Financial Report 2016 og note Z, som fastsætter, at EIB støtter Kommissionen som aktør i gennemførelsen af NER300-initiativet. 
72 Also see ‘Off balance sheet as at 31 December 2016’ of EIB Financial Report 2016, and Note Z: “EIB supports the EC as an agent in the implementation of the NER 300 initiative – [...].
73 Future Financing of the EU, Final report and recommendations of the High Level Group on Own Resources, december 2016, anbefaling 4, litra b). 52 
In 2016, the High Level Group on Own Resources noted that one option for new own resources would be the inclusion of the proceeds from the European Union emissions trading scheme (EU ETS)73.
KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER Revisionsretten anerkender, at markedsvilkårene for denne type aktivitet har været vanskelige siden 2008, men det vores overordnede konklusion, at EEPR og NER300 ikke har støttet de ønskede fremskridt hen imod demonstration af CCS' og en række innovative vedvarende energikilders kommercielle rentabilitet. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS While acknowledging the challenging market conditions for this type of activity after 2008, our overall conclusion is that EEPR and NER300 did not support the intended progress to demonstrate the commercial viability of CCS and a range of innovative renewables.
EEPR nåede ikke sine ambitiøse mål for CO2-opsamling og -lagring, da ingen af de projekter, der modtager EU-støtte, har demonstreret teknologien i kommerciel skala (jf. punkt 20-22). 
EEPR fell short of its ambitious carbon capture and storage objectives as none of the projects receiving EU funding demonstrated the technology at commercial scale (see paragraphs 20 to 22).
Fem ud af seks medfinansierede projekter blev ikke afsluttet. 
Five out of six co-funded projects were not completed.
EEPR-støtten til offshorevindkraftanlæg skulle sikre innovative turbine-og fundamentstrukturer og samtidig øge antallet af nettilslutninger mellem medlemsstaterne. 
The EEPR support to offshore wind aimed to deliver innovative turbine and foundation structures while increasing grid connections between Member States.
Programmet ydede et positivt bidrag til en sektor i rivende udvikling trods flere forsinkelser og to afbrudte projekter (jf. punkt 23-26). 
This programme made a positive contribution to a fast developing sector, despite several delays and two terminated projects (see paragraphs 23 to 26).
Vi konstaterede desuden, at NER300 heller ikke har bidraget til nogen vellykkede CCS-demonstrationsprojekter (jf. punkt 28-30). 
We further found that NER300 also does not deliver any successful CCS demonstration projects (see paragraphs 28 to 30).
Det eneste CCS-projekt, som Kommissionen bevilgede midler til i 2014, standsede sine aktiviteter, efter at medlemsstaten trak sin nationale støtte tilbage i 2015. 
The only CCS project to which the Commission awarded funding in 2014 stopped its activities after the Member State withdrew its national support in 2015.
Projektet kunne derfor ikke træffe en endelig investeringsbeslutning og vil sandsynligvis trække sig fra NER300 i 2018. 
The project could therefore not reach final investment decision and is likely to withdraw from NER300 in 2018.
NER300 er heller ikke på sporet med hensyn til de tilsigtede virkninger på innovative vedvarende energikilder, der endnu ikke var kommercielt tilgængelige, da Kommissionen udvalgte projekterne (jf. punkt 31-36). 
NER300 is also not on track to achieve its intended impact for innovative renewables that were not yet commercially available when the Commission selected projects (see paragraphs 31 to 36).
Trods en beslutning i 2015 om at forlænge alle frister med to år havde syv projekter trukket sig inden begyndelsen af 2018. 
Despite a decision in 2015 to put back all deadlines by two years, seven projects had withdrawn by early 2018.
Disse projekter bruger ikke de bevilgede tilskud og producerer ikke den forventede mængde ren energi. 
These projects do not use the awarded grants and do not deliver their expected clean energy outputs.
Med hensyn til årsagerne til de mislykkede og forsinkede projekter konstaterede vi, at innovative projekter inden for lavemissionsenergi, der modtager støtte fra EEPR og NER300, blev påvirket af ugunstige investeringsvilkår (jf. punkt 37-55). 
50 As regards the reasons for failures and delays, we found that innovative low carbon energy projects supported by EEPR and NER300 were affected by adverse investment conditions (see paragraphs 37 to 55).
Visse af investeringsvilkårene skyldes den mere generelle økonomiske udvikling, mens andre kan fastsættes eller påvirkes af de politiske beslutningstagere. 
While some of the investment conditions are determined by wider economic developments, others can be set or influenced by policy makers.
Usikkerhed med hensyn til de langsigtede klima-og energistrategier og underliggende politikker, lovgivning og offentlig finansiel støtte 53 54 påvirkede projekternes evne til at tiltrække private investeringer og træffe endelige investeringsbeslutninger inden for fristen (jf. punkt 41-48). 
Uncertainty around long-term climate and energy strategies and the underpinning policies, regulations and public financial support affected projects’ ability to attract private investments and reach final investment decision on time (see paragraphs 41 to 48).
Ud over de økonomiske og øvrige faktorer, der er nævnt ovenfor, var de faldende markedspriser for CO2-emissioner under EU ETS siden 2011 en vigtig hindring for CCS-demonstrationsprojekter i EU (jf. punkt 49-55). 
In addition to the economic and other factors referred to above, the falling market price for carbon emissions under EU ETS since 2011 was a key barrier for CCS demonstration projects in the EU (see paragraphs 49 to 55).
Det påvirkede CCS-demonstrationsprojekternes allerede risikable forretningskoncepter, på grundlag af hvilke Kommissionen havde bevilget EEPR-tilskud i 2009. 
This affected the already risky business cases of CCS demonstration projects, based on which the Commission had awarded EEPR grants in 2009.
De lave priser gjorde også, at de tilgængelige støttebeløb under NER300 blev lavere end forventet, hvilket skabte yderligere finansieringskløfter. 
The low prices also caused smaller than expected available grant amounts under NER300, leaving further financing gaps.
Derudover bragte den kendsgerning, at ingen af EEPR-projekterne var i stand til at sikre tilstrækkelig ekstra offentlig finansiering via NER300 eller nationale programmer inden 2012, deres bæredygtighed i fare. 
In addition, the failure of any EEPR project to secure an adequate amount of public funding through NER300 or national programmes by 2012 compromised the viability of these projects.
Kommissionen bestræbte sig på at fremme fortsat arbejde med CCS-demonstration, men suspenderede eller afbrød ikke på daværende tidspunkt sin finansielle støtte til projekter, der i sidste ende mislykkedes. 
The Commission made efforts to enable continued work on CCS demonstration but did not at that time suspend or terminate its financial support to projects that ultimately failed.
Innovative energiprojekter, der bidrager til EU's omstilling til lavemissionsenergi, kræver et bedre investeringsklima. 
Innovative energy projects that contribute to the EU’s low carbon energy transition require a better investment climate.
I den sammenhæng fastsætter den foreslåede forordning om forvaltning af energiunionen, at medlemsstaterne skal udarbejde og indgive nationale klima-og energiplaner, der beskriver deres langsigtede lavemissionsstrategier (jf. tekstboks 7), på grundlag af stabile politikker og bestemmelser til fremme og støtte af brugen af vedvarende energikilder og yderligere reduktion af emissionerne74. 
In this context, the proposed Energy Union governance Regulation, foresees that Member States will prepare and submit to the Commission National Climate and Energy Plans that describe their long-term low carbon development strategies (see Box 7), underpinned by stable policies and regulations to promote and support the use of renewable energy and further reduce emissions74.
74 Allerede i 2014 anbefalede Revisionsretten, at Kommissionen skulle fremme medlemsstaternes etablering af en stabil og forudsigelig lovgivningsmæssig ramme for vedvarende energikilder. 
The Commission will 74 In 2014, the Court already recommended that the Commission should promote the establishment by Member States of stable and predictable regulatory frameworks for renewable energy sources.
Se anbefaling 1 i særberetning nr. 6/2014 "Støtten fra samhørighedspolitikkens fonde til produktion af vedvarende energi - har den givet gode resultater?", Den Europæiske Revisionsret, 2014. 
See Recommendation 1 of Special Report No 6/2014, Cohesion Policy funds support to renewable energy generation – has it achieved good results?, European Court of Auditors, 2014.
Vi konstaterede desuden, at aspekter af NER300's udformning begrænsede Kommissionens og medlemsstaternes mulighed for at reagere effektivt på de skiftende forhold (jf. punkt 56-85). 
We further found that design aspects of NER300 limited the Commission and Member States' ability to respond effectively to the changing circumstances (see paragraphs 56 to 85).
Den valgte NER300-model, hvor der først ydes offentlig støtte til projekter efter deres idriftsætning, var ikke behørigt begrundet i behovsvurderinger og pålagde projektlederne det meste af risikoen. 
The chosen NER300 model to provide public money to projects only after their entry-into operation lacked adequate justification by needs assessments and put most of the risk on project promoters.
Før NER300 blev oprettet med ETS-direktivet, blev der ikke foretaget nogen klar vurdering, der viste, hvilken form for støtte, som ville være nødvendig i forbindelse med projekter inden for tidlig demonstration af en bred vifte af teknologier for vedvarende energi og CCS, som oplever mange forskellige investerings-og reguleringsmæssige udfordringer i hele EU. 
Before the creation of NER300 in the ETS Directive, no clear assessment was made showing what type of support early demonstration projects of a wide range of innovative renewables and CCS technologies facing many different investment and regulatory challenges across the EU, would need.
Det retsgrundlag for den nye innovationsfond, der er vedtaget i 2018, skal sikre risikobegrænsning (jf. punkt 57-65). 
The legal basis adopted in 2018 for the new Innovation Fund aims to remedy the de-risking issue (see paragraphs 57 to 65).
NER300-projektudvælgelses-og -beslutningsprocessen var kompleks (jf. punkt 66-75). 
The NER300 project selection and decision-making processes were complex (see paragraphs 66 to 75).
Kommissionens og medlemsstaternes procedure for udvælgelse af projekter og tildeling af støtte lagde ikke i tilstrækkelig høj grad vægt på projekternes komparative kvalitet og risici med hensyn til den finansielle og økonomiske bæredygtighed. 
The selection and grant award process applied by the Commission and Member States placed insufficient emphasis on the comparative quality and financial and economic viability risks of projects.
Vi kunne heller ikke bekræfte, at medlemsstaterne var tilstrækkeligt bevidste om de risici og anbefalinger, som EIB havde identificeret, inden den godkendte de rangordnede projekter med henblik på Kommissionens tildelingsbeslutning. 
We could also not ascertain that Member States were sufficiently aware of the risks and recommendations identified by the EIB before endorsing the ranked projects for the Commission award decision.
Disse faktorer skabte usikkerhed om, hvorvidt projekterne ville være i stand til at nå deres målsætninger inden for programmets rammer. 
These factors reduced assurance about whether these projects could meet their objectives within the constraints of the programme.
NER300-beslutningsprocessen kan også forbedres, navnlig i forbindelse med anmodninger om større projektændringer, der på nuværende tidspunkt kræver lovændringer. 
There is also scope to enhance the NER300 decision-making, in particular for major change requests to projects that now require changes to the legislation.
Andre aspekter af NER300's udformning forsinkede også programmets reaktion på et miljø i forandring (jf. punkt 80-85). 
Other NER300 design features also slowed down the programme’s response to a changing environment (see paragraphs 80 to 85).
Brugen af specifikke teknologiske kriterier, der var udarbejdet på forhånd i 2009, begrænsede programmets evne til at reagere på markedsudviklingen og den teknologiske udvikling. 
The use of specific technology criteria established in advance in 2009 limited the programme’s ability to respond to market and technology developments.
Projekter, der udvælges ud fra disse kriterier, kan blive mindre disruptive end forventet, når der forekommer forsinkelser. 
Projects selected under those criteria may become less disruptive than intended when delays occur.
Eftersom projekter trak sig, fordi de ikke var i stand til at overholde de (forlængede) frister i programmerne, forsøgte Kommissionen at finde løsninger med henblik på at omfordele de omfattende uudnyttede midler til andre programmer og sikre, at de kunne 56 Anbefaling 2 - Forbedre den fremtidige innovationsfonds projektudvælgelses-og beslutningsprocedurer I lyset af den planlagte lancering af den nye innovationsfond i 2021 bør Kommissionen forbedre kritiske aspekter af projektudvælgelses-og beslutningsproceduren i forhold til NER300. 
As projects withdrew because they could not meet the (extended) programme deadlines, the Commission sought solutions to re-assign large sums of unspent funds to other programmes and ensure that they would be available to increase investment in innovative projects. The nature and objectives of those programmes are not identical to those of NER300, and accountability needs to be ensured for how these funds are spent. 53 Recommendation 2 – Improving project selection and decision-making procedures for the future Innovation Fund In view of the planned launch of the new Innovation Fund in 2021, the Commission should improve critical elements of the project selection and decision-making process as compared to NER300.
Den bør navnlig: a) fastsætte kriterier for tilbagetrækning af finansiering i tilfælde, hvor projekterne ikke når vedtagne milepæle b) vurdere aspekter af projekternes økonomiske bæredygtighed ("bankegnethed"), herunder de aspekter, der er nævnt i anbefaling 1 c) fastsætte præcise og målbare tærskelværdier for hvert af due diligence-/tildelingskriterierne d) stille fortrolige resultater af due diligence-vurderinger til rådighed for medlemsstaternes relevante myndigheder inden tildelingsbeslutningen e) støtte projekter, som i forbindelse med udvælgelsesproceduren har vist, at de sandsynligvis vil bidrage mest til opfyldelse af EU's prioriteter f) forenkle proceduren for anmodninger om ændring af projekter, således at den ikke kræver ændringer i Kommissionens retsakter. 
In particular it should: (a) establish criteria for withdrawing funding in cases where projects do not meet agreed milestones; (b) assess aspects of projects’ economic viability (‘bankability’), including those referred to under Recommendation 1; (c) define precise and measurable thresholds for each of the due diligence/award criteria; (d) make available in confidence the results of the due diligence assessment to concerned Member State authorities prior to the award decision; (e) support projects for which the selection procedure showed that they are likely to contribute the most towards meeting EU priorities; (f) simplify the procedure for project change requests so that it does not require changes to Commission legal acts.
Måldato for gennemførelse: inden udgangen af 2020. 
Target implementation date: by the end of 2020.
En lang række finansieringsmekanismer støtter energiinnovation i EU. 
There are many funding mechanisms supporting energy innovation in the EU.
Vi konstaterede på den baggrund, at der skal rettes op på svagheder for så vidt angår koordinering og ansvarlighed (jf. punkt 86-107). 
Against this background, we found that coordination and accountability weaknesses require improvement (see paragraphs 86 to 107).
Trods langsommere fremskridt end ønsket danner SET-planen grundlag for bedre overensstemmelse mellem europæiske offentlige og private innovationstiltag inden for lavemissionsenergi. 
Despite slower than intended progress, the SET-plan provides a basis for better aligning European public and private action for low-carbon energy innovation.
Revisionen af SET-planen i 2015 var nødvendig for at bringe den oprindelige SET-plan i overensstemmelse med forsknings-og innovationsprioriteterne for energiunionen og anerkendte de manglende fremskridt hen imod visse af de centrale mål. 
The overhaul of the SET-plan in 2015 was important to align the original SET-plan with the Energy Union Research & Innovation priorities and recognised the lack of progress in reaching some of its key ambitions.
Det er dog fortsat vanskeligt klart at identificere og måle de fordele, der følger direkte af samarbejdet i henhold til SET-planen (jf. punkt 87-93). 
It remains difficult however to clearly identify and measure the benefits stemming directly from SET-plan cooperation (see paragraphs 87 to 93).
Vi konstaterede desuden, at der var svagheder i koordineringen mellem Kommissionens egne tjenestegrene med ansvar for innovation inden for ren energi, der eventuelt kunne afholde Kommissionen fra at fremme en mere sammenhængende og produktiv kombination af offentlige midler og finansielle produkter, som er målrettet mod de enkelte faser af demonstrationsprojekter i stor skala (jf. punkt 94-103). 
We also found that coordination between the Commission’s own departments dealing with clean energy innovation showed weaknesses that may keep it from enabling a more coherent and efficient combination of public resources and financial products, targeting the distinct stages of large-scale demonstration projects (see paragraphs 94 to 103).
Ved udgangen af 2017 havde ingen NER300-projekter opnået lån under de EIB-forvaltede finansielle instrumenter, der yder støtte til energidemonstrationsprojekter. 
By the end of 2017, no NER300 projects had obtained any loans under the EIB managed financial instruments that support energy demonstration projects.
Disse projekters særlige karakter gør, at de har svært ved at opfylde bankens almindelige due diligence-krav. 
The specific nature of these projects is such that they struggle to meet the bank’s standard due diligence requirements.