natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Medlemsstaterne finansierer ofte sdanne projekter over deres egne nationale, regionale eller lokale budgetter, enten gennem sžrprogrammer (der minder om LDP-foranstaltningerne) eller ved direkte at bevilge midler fra en specifik budgetpost, f.eks. til vejvedligeholdelse. 
The Member States often finance such projects from their own national, regional or local budgets, either through dedicated programmes (organised in a similar way to the RDP measures) or through the direct allocation of funds, for example through a specific budget line for road maintenance.
16 Endvidere kan private stżttemodtagere mske džkke i det mindste en del af omkostningerne til nogle infrastrukturprojekter, da det hovedsagelig er dem, der vil f glžde af investeringer i f.eks. veje og kunstvandingssystemer, der m forventes at forbedre deres żkonomiske resultater. 
16 Furthermore, private beneficiaries may be able to cover at least part of the costs of some infrastructure projects, as they are the main users of investments such as rural roads and irrigation systems that are likely to improve their economic performance.
I forbindelse med vandforsynings-og kloaksystemer džkkes nogle af investeringsomkostningerne af de gebyrer, som brugerne betaler. 
For water supply and sewerage systems, some investment costs are normally recovered from the fees paid by users.
17 For at f mest mulig valuta for pengene bżr medlemsstaterne kortlžgge landdistrikternes udviklingsbehov og blandt disse identificere de vigtigste prioriteter. 
17 In order to achieve optimum value for money, Member States should identify the rural development needs and, from among these, the main priorities.
Efter at have overvejet alle de mulige interventioner, der kan finansieres af de forskellige fonde, bżr medlemsstaterne tržffe en strategisk afgżrelse om, hvilke fonde der er bedst egnet til at afhjžlpe behovene, og koordinere anvendelsen af dem. 
After considering all possible interventions that could be financed by the various funds, Member States should decide strategically which funds are best suited to addressing needs and coordinate their use.
18 Fondene kan koordineres effektivt ved at foretage afgržnsninger (som minimerer overlappende finansiering) og sikre komplementaritet (og sledes minimere finansieringshuller og fremme synergier). 
18 Funds can be coordinated effectively by setting demarcation lines (minimising funding overlaps) and ensuring complementarity (minimising funding gaps and encouraging synergies).
Potentielle finansieringshuller i landdistrikterne er sžrlig skadelige i forbindelse med infrastrukturprojekter, fordi infrastruktur generelt indgr i et net af indbyrdes forbundne elementer (veje, kunstvan-dingsnet, vandforsynings-og kloaksystemer, energinet osv.), og hvert enkelt element er vigtigt for, at hele nettet kan fungere effektivt. 
Potential funding gaps in rural areas are particularly detrimental when they occur with infrastructure projects, given that infrastructure generally operates as a network of interconnected elements (e.g. roads, irrigation networks, water supply and sewerage, power grids), in which each element is important for the effective operation of the entire network.
Figur 2 viser et forenklet eksempel p, hvordan bedre koordinering i en sektor eller et geografisk omrde kan fżre til bedre resultater. 
Figure 2 shows a simplified example of how better coordination in a given sector or territory can lead to improved results.
Bemžrkninger 15 Koordinering af fonde i en sektor eller et geografisk omrde MIDLERNE TILDELES TILFŽLDIGT, FORDI DER MANGLER KOORDINERING DER ER FORETAGET KLAR AFGRŽNSNING, MEN IKKE SIKRET KOMPLEMENTARITET DER ER SIKRET EFFEKTIV KOORDINERING Fond 3 Udžkket behov Ľ Risiko for finansieringsover-lapninger Ľ Risiko for finansieringshuller Ľ Ingen synergier Fond 1 Fond 2 Fond Fond 1 3 Fond 2 Udžkket behov Ľ Risikoen for finansieringsover-lapninger er mindsket Ľ Risikoen for finansieringshuller er užndret Ľ Ingen synergier FŽLLES ML Fond 3 Fond 2 Ľ Risikoen for finansierings-overlapninger og -huller er mindsket Ľ Der opns synergier Fond 1 Fond 4 Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret. 
Observations 15 Coordination of funds in a given sector or territory ARBITRARY ALLOCATION OF FUNDING IN THE ABSENCE OF COORDINATION CLEAR DEMARCATION EXISTS, BUT COMPLEMENTARITY IS NOT ENSURED EFFECTIVE COORDINATION ACHIEVED Fund 3 Need not addressed • Risk of funding overlaps • Risk of funding gaps • No synergies Fund 1 Fund 2 Fund Fund 1 3 Fund 2 Need not addressed • Risk of funding overlaps is mitigated • Risk of funding gaps persists • No synergies COMMON OBJECTIVE Fund 4 • Risks of funding overlaps and gaps are mitigated • Synergies achieved Fund 1 Fund 3 Fund 2 Source: European Court of Auditors.
19 Gennemfżrelsesbestemmelserne til EU-forordningen om udvikling af landdistrikterne i perioden 2007-2013 fastsatte, at medlemsstaternes LDPŐer skulle indeholde afgržnsningskriterier og oplysninger om komplementaritet med andre EU-instrumenter11, men der var ikke fastsat lignende krav med hensyn til medlemsstaternes egne midler og stżtteprogrammer. 
19 The implementing rules for the 2007-2013 EU rural development regulation required Member States to include demarcation criteria and information about complementarity with other EU funds in their RDPs11, but there was no similar requirement with regard to the Member States’ own funds and support programmes.
Medlemsstaterne dokumenterede ikke altid et klart behov for at anvende EU-fondene til udvikling af landdistrikterne 20 Et fżrste skridt til at begrunde behovet for at anvende EU-fonde til udvikling af landdistrikterne (en LDP-interven-tion) er at kortlžgge og kvantificere behovet for infrastrukturinvesteringer i landdistrikterne. 
Member States did not always clearly justify the need for the EU rural development funds 20 A first step in justifying the need for EU rural development funds (RDP intervention) is to identify and quantify the need for investments in rural infrastructure.
De undersżgte LDPŐer forklarede, hvorfor der var brug for stżtte til infrastruktur i landdistrikterne. 
The audited RDPs explained why support was needed for infrastructure in rural areas.
I det polske LDP stod der f.eks., at en del anlžg til beskyttelse mod oversvżmmelse kun fungerede delvis, og at det ville kržve modernisering eller renovering at genoprette deres fulde tekniske kapacitet. Derefter fulgte en liste over de pgžldende anlžg (herunder vandtanke med en samlet kapacitet p 35 000 m3 og 180 pumpesta-tioner). 
For example, the Polish RDP stated that ‘some flood protection facilities only fulfil their tasks to a limited extent, and restoring their full technical capacity may require modernisation or rebuilding’ and listed the facilities concerned (such as water tanks with a total capacity of 35 000 m3 and 180 pumping stations).
1974/2006 af 15. december 2006 om gennemfżrelsesbestemmelser til Rdets forordning (EF) nr. 1698/2005 om stżtte til udvikling af landdistrikterne fra Den Europžiske Landbrugsfond for Udvikling af Landdistrikterne (ELFUL) (EUT L 368 af 23.12.2006, s. 
However, in general, the audited Member States did not attempt to quantify these needs in terms of the financial resources required to address them. 11 Article 5(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006 of 15 December 2006 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ L 368, 23.12.2006, p.
21 Nr de har vurderet deres investeringsbehov, bżr medlemsstaterne identificere de disponible ressourcer til afhjžlpning af disse behov (eksisterende EU-midler, nationale, regionale og lokale midler samt private midler) og kvantificere det finansieringshul, der skal džkkes af EUŐs fonde til udvikling af landdistrikterne. 
Observations 16 21 After assessing their investment needs, Member States should identify the resources available to address those needs (the existing EU funds, national, regional and local public funds, as well as private funds) and quantify the funding gap to be covered by EU rural development funds.
22 LDPŐerne fra alle de reviderede medlemsstater nžvnte andre EU-fonde, der stżttede tilsvarende projekter. 
22 The RDPs of all the audited Member States referred to other EU funds supporting similar projects.
Dette er et lovgivningsmžssigt krav, som Kommissionen kontrollerer, fżr den godkender LDPŐerne. 
This is a legal requirement, checked by the Commission before approving the RDPs.
Andre offentlige eller private finansieringskilder, der kunne afhjžlpe de samme behov, var imidlertid hverken nžvnt eller kvantificeret. 
Other Member State or private funding sources addressing the same needs were, however, not mentioned or quantified.
Kun t LDP (Rumžniens) nžvnte et nationalt program til finansiering af kulturinstitutioner. 
Only one RDP (Romania) referred to a national programme funding cultural establishments.
Retten konstaterede, at medlemsstaterne faktisk havde mange offentlige programmer og midler til finansiering af infrastruktur i landdistrikterne, som de forsżmte at nžvne i deres LDPŐer. 
Despite neglecting to mention them in the RDP, the audit found that the Member States actually had many public programmes and funds dedicated to rural infrastructure.
23 Nr der ikke er udarbejdet en strategi, der koordinerer alle de potentielle finansieringskilder og kvantificerer behovene og det deraf fżlgende finansieringshul, er der ikke noget stžrkt argument for en LDP-intervention. 
23 In the absence of a strategy which coordinates all the potential funding sources and quantifies needs and the resulting funding gap, the justification for RDP intervention is weak.
I sdanne tilfžlde er der stżrre sandsynlighed for, at medlemsstaternes żremžrkede midler til infrastrukturprojekter erstattes med LDP-midler, hvilket skaber en risiko for, at EU-interventionen ikke tilfżrer mervžrdi. 
In this instance, substitution of funds is more likely to occur, whereby Member State funds earmarked for infrastructure projects are replaced by RDP funds, thus entailing the risk of compromising the added value of the EU intervention.
24 I to af de reviderede medlemsstater var der tegn p, at en sdan erstatning af offentlige midler havde fundet sted (jf. tekstboks 2). 
24 In two of the Member States audited, there were indications that substitution of public funds had occurred (see Box 2).
Bemžrkninger 17 Tegn p, at nationale og regionale midler var blevet erstattet med LDP-midler Italien (Sicilien) I 2000, da det blev muligt at f EU-midler til vejprojekter i landdistrikterne, afskaffede Italien (Sicilien) sit eget budget til finansiering af vedligeholdelse af lokale veje og markveje. 
Observations 17 Indications of the substitution of national and regional funds with RDP funds Italy (Sicily) In 2000, when EU funds became available for road projects in rural areas, Italy (Sicily) cancelled its own budget for financing the maintenance of local and farm roads.
Tyskland (Sachsen) Siden 2007, hvor det blev muligt at f LDP-midler til vejprojekter i landdistrikterne, er bevillingerne af nationale og regionale midler til sdanne projekter faldet betydeligt. 
Germany (Saxony) Since 2007, when RDP funds became available for rural road projects, the provision of national and regional funds for such projects has decreased substantially.
Som det fremgr af figuren nedenfor, har den samlede finansiering til veje i landdistrikterne ligget forholdsvis stabilt mellem 140 og 160 millioner euro om ret, idet faldet i de nationale og regionale bevillinger er blevet opvejet af en stigning i LDP-finansieringen (jf. figur 3). 
As shown in the graph below, while the total funding allocated to rural roads has remained relatively stable at between 140 and 160 million euro per year, the decrease in the national and regional funds has been offset by an increase in RDP funding (see Figure 3).
Figur 3 - Bevillinger til veje i landdistrikterne i Tyskland (Sachsen) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Sum af nationale midler, regionale midler og LDP-midler Nationale og regionale midler LDP-midler Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret. 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Risikoen for dżdvžgt var ikke blevet ikke mindsket effektivt, selv om der blev konstateret en ržkke gode praksis 25 Ligesom hele budgetposter kan erstattes med LDP-foranstaltninger, kan det p projektniveau ogs forekomme, at midler erstattes uden nogen ekstra effekt p det opnede resultat. 
Figure 3 — Allocation of funds for rural roads in Germany (Saxony) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Sum of national, regional and RDP funds National and regional funds RDP funds Source: European Court of Auditors 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 The risk of deadweight was not effectively mitigated, though some good practices were identified 25 Just as entire budget lines can be replaced with the RDP measures, substitution of funds can occur at project level, without any additional effect on the outcome achieved.
Risikoen for dżdvžgt er sandsynligheden for, at en stżttemodtager ville have foretaget investeringen ogs uden til-skudsfinansiering. 
The risk of deadweight refers to the likelihood that a beneficiary would have undertaken the investment even without the grant funding.
Risikoen for dżdvžgt reduceres bedst, ved at foranstaltningerne udformes p en sdan mde, at LDP-stżtten rettes mod omrder med finansieringshuller, f.eks. sektorer eller projekttyper, som leverer offentlige goder, men ikke opnr et tilstržkkeligt afkast til at berettige de samlede investeringsomkostninger. 
The primary means of reducing the risk of deadweight is to design the measures in such a way as to direct RDP support to where there is a funding gap, for example to sectors or types of projects providing public goods but for which the financial returns are insufficient to justify the full costs of the investment.
26 De hżje stżttesatser i forbindelse med infrastrukturforanstaltninger i de reviderede medlemsstater var ikke fastsat p grundlag af en vurdering af, hvor stor en offentlig finansiering der er nżdvendig for at tilskynde til investeringer og samtidig mindske risikoen for dżdvžgt. millioner euro Tekstboks 2 
26 The high aid rates set for infrastructure measures by the audited Member States were not backed by an analysis assessing the appropriate level of public funding needed to encourage investments while, at the same time, mitigating the risk of deadweight. million euro Box 2
Bemžrkninger 18 27 Retten fandt kun t tilfžlde, hvor der var en żkonomisk begrundelse for de fastsatte stżttesatser, nemlig stżttesatserne for foranstaltning 125 i Tyskland (Sachsen) i programmeringsperioden 2014-2020. 
Observations 18 27 Only in Germany (Saxony), for the 2014-2020 programming period, did the Court find an economic rationale behind the setting of aid rates for measure 125.
Midtvejsevalueringen fra 2010 havde anbefalet, at man under denne foranstaltning anvendte differentierede satser p grundlag af skovbrugsbedrifternes rentabilitet, og forvaltningsmyndigheden valgte p denne baggrund at žndre systemet, s der ikke lžngere blev givet en standardsats p 80 % til alle bedrifter, men en sats baseret p bedrifternes stżrrelse, der tages som udtryk for deres rentabilitet. 
Following the recommendation arising from the 2010 mid-term evaluation to differentiate the aid rates under this measure on the basis of the profitability of the forest holdings, the managing authority decided to revise the aid rates from a standard 80 % for all holdings to a differentiated aid rate based on the size of the holdings, as a proxy for their profitability.
Stżrre bedrifter (over 200 ha) fr en stżttesats p 75 %, mens mindre bedrifter (op til 200 ha) fr 90 %. 
Larger holdings (above 200 ha) would receive an aid rate of 75 %, while smaller holdings (up to 200 ha) would receive 90 %.
28 Retten konstaterede gode praksis med hensyn til at rette LDP-stżtten mod de omrder, hvor der er mest brug for den. 
28 Still, the audit identified an example of good practice in directing RDP support to where it is most needed.
I Rumžnien (under foranstaltning 322), Polen (under foranstaltning 321 og 322/323) og Italien (Sicilien) (under foranstaltning 125) blev der brugt udvžlgelseskriterier til at prioritere projekter fra kommuner, som har hżje fattigdomssatser og/eller er afsides beliggende (tekstboks 3 viser et eksempel p dette). 
Romania (under measure 322), Poland (under measures 321 and 322/323) and Italy (Sicily) (under measure 125) used selection criteria to prioritise projects submitted by communities with high poverty rates and/or located in remote areas (Box 3 shows an example of this).
LDP-stżtte rettet mod fattige omrder Rumžnien Et af de udvžlgelseskriterier, der blev brugt under foranstaltning 322, betżd, at kommuner med hżje fattigdomssatser (dvs. mellem 60 % og 89,6 %) fik tildelt 10 point ud af et samlet maksimum p 100. 
Directing RDP support to poor areas Romania One of the selection criteria used under measure 322 assigned 10 out of a maximum of 100 scoring points to communes with high poverty rates (i.e., rates between 60 % and 89.6 %).
Kommuner med mellemhżje fattigdomssatser (mellem 40 % og 59,9 %) fik syv point, og kommuner med lave fattigdomssatser (<40 %) fik fem point. 
Communes with a medium poverty rate (between 40 % and 59.9 %) obtained 7 scoring points, and those with a low poverty rate (< 40 %) obtained 5 points.
Fattigdommen blev defineret og beregnet p grundlag af husholdningernes velfžrd ved hjžlp af en metode udarbejdet af Verdensbanken og de nationale myndigheder. 
Poverty was defined and calculated according to a methodology provided by the World Bank and the national authorities, based on the welfare of a household.
29 I projektudvžlgelsesprocessen kan medlemsstaterne ogs mindske risikoen for dżdvžgt ved fżr godkendelsen af stżtteanmodninger i relevante tilfžlde at kontrollere, om ansżgeren har s meget kapital eller s god adgang til kapital, at vedkommende selv kan finansiere hele projektet eller en del af det. 
29 Member States can also mitigate the risk of deadweight through the project selection process, by checking, where appropriate before approving applications for support, whether the applicant had sufficient capital or access to capital to finance all or part of the project.
Retten konstaterede, at fire af de fem reviderede medlemsstater ikke kontrollerede, om ansżgerne var i stand til at finansiere deres projekter med egne midler eller med stżtte fra andre offentlige programmer (jf. tekstboks 4). 
The audit found that four out of the five Member States audited did not check the applicants’ capacity to finance the projects from their own funds or other public programmes (see Box 4).
Bemžrkninger 19 LDP-finansiering bevilget til projekter med adgang til andre midler Et af de undersżgte projekter vedrżrende offentlig vandinfrastruktur i Italien (Sicilien) havde allerede figureret i stżttemodtagerens investeringsplan, fżr ansżgningen om LDP-stżtte blev indsendt, og skulle have vžret finansieret med stżttemodtagerens egne midler. 
Observations 19 Granting RDP funding to projects that had access to other funds In Italy (Sicily), one of the audited projects concerning public water infrastructure had already been included in the beneficiary’s investment plan before the submission of the application for RDP support and was to be funded from the beneficiary’s own resources.
Ikke desto mindre blev projektet godkendt til LDP-finansie-ring. 
The project was nevertheless approved for RDP funding.
Tilsvarende var et andet vandinfrastrukturprojekt allerede blevet godkendt til finansiering under den nationale kunstvandingsplan, da det blev godkendt under LDPŐet. 
Similarly, another water infrastructure project had already been approved for funding under the national irrigation plan at the time of its approval under the RDP.
LDP-godkendelsen blev efterfżlgende trukket tilbage, men disse eksempler viser ikke desto mindre, at forskellige finansieringskilder bruges i flžng, og at nogle af projekterne sandsynligvis ville vžre blevet gennemfżrt ogs uden LDP-midler. 
The RDP approval was subsequently withdrawn; nonetheless, these examples show that funds are used interchangeably and some of the projects would probably have been implemented even in the absence of the RDP funds.
Et af de undersżgte projekter i Spanien (Extremadura) med anslede omkostninger p 11 millioner euro omfattede etablering af et vejnet p 145 km, der skulle forbedre adgangen til 1 629 landbrugsbedrifter. 
In Spain (Extremadura), an audited project with an estimated cost of 11 million euro involved the creation of a 145 km road network to improve the access to 1 629 agricultural holdings.
Selv om vejene sandsynligvis ville żge vžrdien af den privatejede jord og bedrifternes żkonomiske resultat, godkendte myndighederne projektet med offentlig stżtte p 100 % uden at kontrollere, om de private stżttemodtagere kunne have afholdt en del af projektomkostningerne. 
Although the roads were likely to increase the value of the private land and the farms’ economic performance, the authorities approved the project, granting a 100 % public aid rate, without checking whether the private beneficiaries could have borne part of the project costs.
Tilsvarende fik et projekt til 1 million euro, der omfattede instandsžttelse af et kunstvandingsnet med henblik p at begržnse vandtab, en stżttesats p 90 %, uden at stżttemodtageren (kunstvandingsselskabet) skulle dokumentere behovet for tilskud med henvisning til sin finansielle kapacitet og investeringens rentabilitet. 
Similarly, an audited project of 1 million euro, involving the upgrade of an irrigation network to reduce water losses, received a 90 % aid rate without requiring the beneficiary (irrigation community) to demonstrate its need for such a grant with reference to its financial capacity and the profitability of the investment.
Stżttemodtageren kunne mske have finansieret en stżrre del af investeringen, f.eks. ved at forhżje de tariffer, landbrugerne betaler for kunstvanding12, eller ved hjžlp af et ln. 
The beneficiary might, for example, have been able to finance a greater part of the investment by increasing the tariffs paid by farmers for the water irrigation service12 or through a loan.
Disse eksempler viser, at forvaltningsmyndigheden ikke blot fastsatte meget hżje stżttesatser for foranstaltningerne uden żkonomisk begrundelse, men ogs undlod at kontrollere p projektniveau, om der faktisk var behov for s hżje stżttesatser. 
These examples show that the managing authority not only set very high aid rates of the measures without an economic justification but also did not verify at project level the actual need for such high aid rates.
9/2010 ČAnvendes EUŐs strukturforanstaltningsmidler til forbedring af vandforsyningen til husholdningsbrug bedst muligt?Ç, navnlig i punkt 64-67, hvori det konstateres, at Čmedlemsstaterne er tilbżjelige til at maksimere EUŐs finansielle bistand ved at holde taksterne nedeÇ. 
12 For similar findings, see Special Report No 9/2010 ‘Is EU structural measures spending on the supply of water for domestic consumption used to best effect?’, in particular paragraphs 64 to 67, which state that ‘Member States tend to maximise EU financial assistance by keeping tariff levels low’.
30 I Rumžnien blev der foretaget stżt-teberettigelseskontrol for at sikre, at der var behov for LDP-tilskud. 
30 In Romania, an eligibility check was carried out to ensure that the RDP grant was needed.
Kontrollen blev foretaget i forbindelse med indtžgtsskabende aktioner, f.eks. levering af vandforsynings-og kloak-tjenester, som blev stżttet under foranstaltning 322. 
The check was applied in the case of revenue-generating operations, such as the provision of water supply and sewage services, supported under measure 322.
I praksis havde kontrollen imidlertid begržnset relevans, da den var baseret p uplidelige antagelser vedrżrende de fremtidige indtžgter og udgifter i forbindelse med driften af infrastrukturen. 
However, in practice, the check had limited relevance, as it was based on unreliable assumptions regarding the future revenues and expenditure associated with the operation of the infrastructure.