natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
103 Anonymiserede tal fra Letlands statslige socialforsikringsorgan. 
103 Anonymised records from the Latvian State Social Insurance Agency.
Del IV - Programmålene blev opfyldt 70 Valutalån udgjorde fortsat en udfordring 175 Den høje andel af lån i udenlandsk valuta i forhold til de samlede udestående lån var en fællesnævner for alle tre lande under betalingsbalancefaciliteten. 
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 70 Foreign exchange loans remained a challenge 175 A common denominator in all three balance-of-payment countries was the high ratio of foreign currency loans to total outstanding loans.
176 Under krisen kunne centralbankerne ikke lade deres valutaer depreciere for at genoprette konkurrenceevnen over for udlandet. 
176 During the crisis, central banks could not let the domestic currency depreciate to restore external competitiveness.
Bekymringen var, at deprecieringen kunne begrænse låntagernes evne til at tilbagebetale deres valutagæld og således påvirke det finansielle systems stabilitet, hvilket ville opveje politikkens gode virkninger på økonomien104. 
The concern was that depreciation might curb the capacity of borrowers to service their debts in foreign currencies and hence affect the stability of the financial system, which would offset the economic benefits of the policy104.
På grund af det høje niveau af långivning i udenlandsk valuta var der også en tendens til, at landene mistede mere af deres valuta-reserver under krisen105. 
Owing to the high level of foreign currency lending, countries also tended to lose more international reserves during the crisis105.
177 Selv om disse forhold havde en betydelig indflydelse på de politikmulig-heder, der var til rådighed, omfattede EU’s finansielle bistand ikke betingelser, der pålagde de nationale myndigheder at gøre noget ved forvaltningen af indenlandske lån i udenlandsk valuta. 
177 Although these issues extensively affected the available policy choices, the EU’s financial assistance did not include any conditions for the national authorities to address the management of domestic lending in foreign currencies.
178 I løbet af programmerne gav den samlede værdi af lån i udenlandsk valuta stadig anledning til bekymring106. 
178 During the programmes, the total value of foreign currency loans remained a concern106.
I Rumænien overhalede den private sektors låntagning i udenlandsk valuta låntagningen i indenlandsk valuta. 
In Romania, foreign currency private-sector borrowing overtook borrowing in the domestic currency.
Andelen af låntagning i udenlandsk valuta begyndte at falde i 2012 i Ungarn, men først i 2014 i Rumænien. 
The share of foreign currency borrowing started to decline in 2012 in Hungary, but not until 2014 in Romania.
104 Denne udfordring blev også anerkendt af Det Europæiske Udvalg for Systemiske Risici i henstilling 2011/1 som risikoen for »forhindringer i de pengepolitiske transmissionskanaler« som følge af den store beholdning af indenlandske lån i udenlandsk valuta. 
104 This challenge was also recognised by the European Systemic Risk Board, in its Recommendation 2011/1, as the risk of ‘hindered monetary policy transmission channels’ stemming from high domestic lending in foreign currencies.
105 Henstilling 2011/1 fra Det Europæiske Udvalg for Systemiske Risici. 
105 Recommendation 2011/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board.
106 For eksempel vurderede den ungarske centralbank i slutningen af juni 2013, at husholdninger og SMV’er havde meget høj valutaeksponering. 
106 For example, at the end of June 2013 the Hungarian central bank considered the exposure of households and small and medium-sized enterprises to foreign exchange rates to be very high.
Konklusioner og 71 anbefalinger Overvågning før krisen 179 Allerede før krisen havde EU en ramme for overvågning af medlemsstaternes offentlige budgetter. 
Conclusions and 71 recommendations Pre-crisis surveillance 179 Before the crisis there was already an EU framework geared towards monitoring the public budgets in the Member States.
180 Kommissionen udførte ikke sin opgave godt nok, hvad angår vurdering af finanspolitiske ubalancer i perioden op til krisen, hvor Kommissionen skønnede, at de offentlige budgetter var stærkere, end de faktisk viste sig at være. 
180 The Commission fell short in its task of assessing fiscal imbalances in the run-up to the crisis, when it estimated public budgets to be stronger that they actually turned out to be.
Det var en væsentlig svaghed i Kommissionens vurderinger før 2009, at der ikke forelå rapporter om opbygning af eventualforpligtelser i den offentlige sektor, som ofte blev til egentlige forpligtelser under krisen. 
One key weakness of the Commission’s assessments prior to 2009 was the lack of reporting on the build-up of contingent public-sector liabilities, which often became real liabilities during the crisis.
Kommissionen var heller ikke tilstrækkelig opmærksom på forbindelsen mellem betydelige udenlandske kapitalstrømme og sundhedstilstanden for bankerne og i sidste ende de offentlige finanser. 
Nor did the Commission pay sufficient attention to the link between large foreign financial flows, the health status of banks and, ultimately, government finances.
Disse mangler i overvågningen betød, at Kommissionen ikke var forberedt på at skulle håndtere opgaven med programforvaltning, da landenes anmodninger om finansiel bistand begyndte at komme (jf. punkt 35-47). 
These surveillance failings meant that the Commission found itself unprepared for the task of programme management when requests for financial assistance started to arrive (see paragraphs 35 to 47).
Programforvaltningsprocessen 181 Kommissionen påtog sig de nye forpligtelser med hensyn til programforvaltning, som omfattede drøftelser med de nationale myndigheder, udarbejdelse af programprognoser og skøn over finansieringsgab samt identifikation af de nødvendige reformer. 
Programme management processes 181 The Commission managed to take on its new programme management duties, which included holding talks with the national authorities, preparing programme forecasts and financing gap estimates and identifying the necessary reforms.
Det var noget af en præstation i lyset af de tidsbegrænsninger, der gjaldt i starten, og den manglende erfaring (jf. punkt 45-50). 
Given the initial time constraints and lack of prior experience, this was an achievement (see paragraphs 45 to 50).
182 Kommissionen var grundig, når det drejede sig om at indhente de nødvendige oplysninger. 
182 The Commission was thorough in obtaining the necessary information.
Kommissionen mobiliserede i stigende grad intern ekspertise og var i kontakt med en lang række interessenter i støttemod-tagerlandene. 
It increasingly marshalled internal expertise and engaged with a wide range of stakeholders in the beneficiary countries.
Kommissionen mobiliserede imidlertid ikke samme omfang af ekspertise i 2008 og 2009, som den gjorde efterfølgende i forbindelse med programmerne for eurolandene, og det var heller ikke nemt for den at søge ekstern ekspertise. 
However, the Commission did not mobilise the same degree of expertise in 2008 and 2009 as it did later in connection with the euro area programmes, nor could it easily acquire external expertise.
Kommissionens politik for menneskelige ressourcer var ikke gearet til at håndtere et så stort og betydningsfuldt europæisk projekt, som løsningen af statsgældskrisen tydeligvis var (jf. punkt 52-54). 
The Commission’s human resources policy was not designed to deal with such a large and important European project as the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis clearly was (see paragraphs 52 to 54).
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 72 Anbefaling 1 Kommissionen bør fastsætte en overordnet ramme for hele institutionen, som giver mulighed for hurtig mobilisering af passende medarbejderres-sourcer og ekspertise fra forskellige dele af Kommissionen eller uden for Kommissionen, i tilfælde af at der skal iværksættes et program for finansiel bistand. 
Conclusions and recommendations 72 Recommendation 1 The Commission should establish an institution-wide framework allowing rapid mobilisation of appropriate human resources and expertise available in the different parts of the Commission or outside the Commission if a financial assistance programme emerges.
I forhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 472/2013 bør Kommissionen udvikle procedurer for skærpet overvågning og forvaltning af eventuelle nye programmer for finansiel bistand. 
In relation to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Commission should develop procedures for the enhanced surveillance and management of possible new financial assistance programmes.
Procedurerne bør udtrykkeligt dække et scenario, hvor disse aktiviteter udelukkende udføres af EU-institutioner. 
The procedures should explicitly cover the scenario where these activities will be carried out by the EU institutions only.
Kvalitetskontrollen var hovedsagelig begrænset til afstemning af prognosernes forskellige dele, uden at ledelsen spurgte ind til baggrunden for antagelserne i prognoserne. 
Quality control was limited mainly to reconciling the various parts of the forecasts, with no inquiry by management into the reasoning behind the forecasting assumptions.
Det var meget vanskeligt at vurdere sandsynligheden af de vigtigste antagelser, f.eks. de finanspolitiske multiplikatorer, ikke kun i en efterfølgende gennemgang, men også for ledelsen under den egentlige udarbejdelse af prognoserne (jf. punkt 55-70). 
It was very difficult to assess the plausibility of key assumptions such as fiscal multipliers, not only in any subsequent review but also, by management, during the actual production of forecasts (see paragraphs 55 to 70).
Anbefaling 2 Programteamene bør pålægges systematisk at registrere de centrale antagelser, der er anvendt, og det arbejde, der er udført i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af prognoser. 
Recommendation 2 Programme teams should be required to record systematically the key assumptions made and work done in preparing forecasts.
Kommissionen bør have værktøjer, der letter do-kumentationsprocessen. 
The Commission should put in place tools to facilitate documentation.
Kvalitetskontrolprocedurerne bør omfatte flere kontroller af de væsentlige underliggende antagelser og parametre, som landeafdelingerne har valgt. 
Quality control procedures should incorporate more checks on the key underlying assumptions and parameters chosen by country desks.
For eksempel kan der i kvalitetskontrollen anvendes en prognose baseret på en generel model til at påpege områder, hvor en prognose baseret på dømmekraft afviger betydeligt fra en sådan modelbaseret prognose. 
For instance, a reference model-based forecast could be used in the quality review to flag areas where a judgement-based forecast significantly departs from the model-based forecast.
Det ville give mulighed for mere målrettede kvalitetskontroller. 
This would allow for more targeted quality checks.
184 Programmerne var for det meste velforankret i EU-politikkernes prioriteringer og den aktuelle økonomiske viden. 
184 The programmes were mostly soundly rooted in EU policy priorities and current economic knowledge.
Kommissionens procedurer var dog generelt påvirket af mangel på systematisk registrering. 
However, the Commission’s procedures were commonly affected by a lack of systematic record-keeping.
Procedurerne var ikke gearet til evaluering af beslutningsprocessen med tilbagevirkende kraft. 
Procedures were not geared towards the retrospective evaluation of decision-making.
Det kan delvis forklares med krisen, tidspresset i starten, og at denne form for programforvaltning var en ny opgave for Kommissionen. 
This can be partly explained by the crisis context, the initial time constraints and the novelty, for the Commission, of this type of programme management.
Tilgængeligheden af dokumentation blev efterhånden forbedret, men selv for de nyeste programmer manglede der vigtige dokumenter (jf. punkt 71 til 75). 
The availability of records improved with time, but even for the most recent programmes some key documents were missing (see paragraphs 71 to 75).
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 73 Anbefaling 3 For at sikre intern gennemsigtighed med hensyn til faktorerne bag programbeslutningerne: a) bør medarbejdere, der beskæftiger sig med programforvaltning, registrere al nødvendig dokumentation i forhold til elementerne i programmernes udformning, valget af betingelser og Kommissionens overvågning af programmernes gennemførelse, og b) programcheferne bør være forpligtede til at kunne dokumentere afgørende programbeslutninger i en beslutningslog, så de nemt kan spores. 
Conclusions and recommendations 73 Recommendation 3 To ensure the factors underlying programme decisions are internally transparent: (a) staff involved in programme management should keep all necessary records in relation to the features of the programme design, the selection of conditions and the Commission’s monitoring of programme implementation; and (b) programme heads should be required to document key programme decisions in a decision log so that they are easily traceable.
185 Betingelserne i aftalememoranda blev hovedsagelig begrundet med specifik henvisning til Rådets beslutning. 
185 The conditions in memoranda of understanding were mostly justified by specific reference to the Council decision.
Betingelserne havde dog ikke tilstrækkelig fokus på Rådets overordnede betingelser for den økonomiske politik (jf. punkt 76-79). 
However, conditions were not sufficiently focused on the general economic policy conditions set by the Council (see paragraphs 76 to 79).
186 Betingelserne for støtte blev forvaltet forskelligt i de forskellige programmer. 
186 The conditions for assistance were managed differently in each programme.
I nogle programmer var de generelt mindre strenge, hvilket gjorde det lettere at overholde dem. 
In some programmes they were less stringent overall, which made compliance easier.
En sammenligning af lande med tilsvarende strukturelle svagheder viste, at de påkrævede reformer ikke altid stod i forhold til landenes problemer, eller at de gik i meget forskellige retninger. 
When comparing countries with similar structural weaknesses, it was found that the required reforms were not always in proportion to the problems faced or that they pursued widely different paths.
For nogle, men ikke alle landene, blev underskudsmålet lempet mere, end den økonomiske situation tilsyneladende berettigede (jf. punkt 80-91). 
Some, but not all, countries’ deficit targets were relaxed more than the economic situation would appear to justify (see paragraphs 80 to 91).
187 Risikoen for inkonsekvens i behandlingen af landene eller for at forlange unødvendige reformer er fortsat en udfordring i programforvaltningspro-cessen. 
187 The risk of treating different countries inconsistently or demanding unnecessary reforms remains a challenge to the process of programme management.
I lyset af programmernes krise-karakter var det svært at udvikle detaljerede retningslinjer for at begrænse programteamenes og de nationale myndigheders manøvrerum i udarbejdelsen af og forhandlingen om dokumenter som Rådets beslutninger eller aftalememoranda. 
The crisis nature of the programmes has made it difficult to develop detailed guidelines to restrict the room for manoeuvre of programme teams and national authorities when preparing and negotiating documents such as Council decisions or memoranda of understanding.
Enhver løsning bør derfor være baseret på skærpet tilsyn med Kommissionens ansattes arbejde og bør gå hånd i hånd med forbedringer af gennemgangsprocessen. 
Any solution must therefore be based on strengthening supervision of the work of Commission staff, and must go hand in hand with improvements to the review process.
188 Kommissionens ansattes arbejde munder ud i et sæt programdokumenter, som danner grundlag for beslutninger truffet af Kommissionen (eller kommissæren på Kommissionens vegne) og Rådet. 
188 The work of Commission staff culminates in a set of programme documents which provide the basis for decisions by the Commission (or the Commissioner on its behalf) and the Council.
Der er sket betydelige forbedringer af både programdokumenterne og den underliggende analyse siden ultimo 2008. 
Both the programme documents and the underlying analysis have improved significantly since the end of 2008.
Selv de senere programdokumenter manglede imidlertid en række væsentlige oplysninger (jf. punkt 97-99). 
However, even the more recent programme documents lacked some essential information (see paragraphs 97 to 99).
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 74 189 Et fælles træk for alle områder af programforvaltningen er, at man forlod sig på eksperternes dømmekraft inden for specifikke områder. 
Conclusions and recommendations 74 189 Common to all areas of programme management is a reliance on the judgement of experts in specific domains.
De centrale dokumenter, der var resultatet af ekspertanalysen, blev gennemgået, men gennemgangen var utilstrækkelig i flere henseender. 
The key documents resulting from expert analysis were subject to review, but this was insufficient in several respects.
De underliggende beregninger blev ikke gennemgået af nogen uden for programteamet, arbejdet blev ikke undersøgt grundigt, og selve kvalitetskontrollen led også under mangel på dokumentation (jf. punkt 93 til 96). 
The underlying calculations were not reviewed by anyone outside the programme team, the work was not scrutinised and the quality control itself also suffered from the lack of documentation (see paragraphs 93 to 96).
Anbefaling 4 Kommissionen bør sikre, at der etableres specifikke procedurer for gennemgang af programforvaltningen og programdokumenternes indhold, idet der tages hensyn til tilgængelige ressourcer. 
Recommendation 4 The Commission should ensure that proper procedures are in place for the review of programme management and the content of programme documents, taking into account available resources.
En tværgående gennemgang bør fungere som en »peerevaluering« af programteamenes arbejde. 
Horizontal review should function as a peer review of the work done by programme teams.
Særlig opmærksomhed bør rettes mod tværgående aspekter som ensartet behandling af landene, og der bør rapporteres til ledelsen. 
It should pay particular attention to horizontal aspects, such as the similar treatment of countries, and report to management.
190 Kommissionen er ansvarlig for at overvåge programmernes gennemførelse. 
190 The Commission is responsible for monitoring programme implementation.
Den vigtigste mangel på dette område vedrører overvågning af gennemførelsen af budgettiltag. 
The main shortcoming in this area relates to the monitoring of fiscal implementation.
I alle programmerne blev underskudsmålet fastsat på grundlag af ENS-underskuddet. 
Each programme’s deficit targets were set on the basis of the ESA deficit.
Det sikrer fuld overensstemmelse med proceduren vedrørende uforholdsmæssigt store underskud, men det betyder også, at når det skal afgøres, om programmet skal fortsætte, er Kommissionens rapportering vedrørende opfyldelse af underskudsmålet ikke alene forbundet med måleusikkerhed, men også med prognoseusikkerhed (jf. punkt 100-103). 
While this ensures full consistency with the excessive deficit procedure, it also means that, when a decision on programme continuation is to be taken, the Commission’s reporting concerning deficit target compliance is subject not only to measurement uncertainty, but also to forecast uncertainty (see paragraphs 100 to 103).
Anbefaling 5 Med sigte på budgetovervågning bør Kommissionen i aftalememorandaene medtage variabler, som kan indsamles på kort tid, f.eks. likviditetssaldo og/eller et restancemål opgjort på kvartalsbasis. 
Recommendation 5 For budget monitoring purposes the Commission should include, in the memoranda of understanding, variables that it can collect with short time lags, such as a quarterly cash balance and/or an arrears target.
Konklusioner og anbefalinger 75 191 Rapporteringen af overholdelse af betingelserne var usystematisk. 
Conclusions and recommendations 75 191 The manner of reporting on compliance with conditions was unsystem-atic.
Manglende overholdelse blev udtrykt på mange forskellige måder, hvilket skabte forvirring. 
Many different terms were used to convey non-compliance, leading to confusion.
For nogle betingelser var der slet ingen rapportering. 
Some conditions were not reported on.
Nogle få betingelser blev rapporteret som opfyldt, men det var de ikke i virkeligheden (jf. punkt 104-107). 
A few conditions were reported to have been met when this was not in fact the case (see paragraphs 104 to 107).
En effektiv intern gennemgang (jf. anbefaling 4) bør reducere risikoen for sådanne fejl. 
An effective internal review (see recommendation 4) should reduce the risk of these errors.
Vores arbejde peger dog også på andre svagheder i anvendelsen af betingelserne. 
However, our work points to other weaknesses in how conditions were used.
Der blev frigjort trancher, selv om der var stor forskel på landenes overholdelse af tidsfrister (jf. punkt 200). 
Instalments were released even though on-time compliance varied greatly between countries (see paragraph 200).
Programmerne indeholdt betingelser, som ikke kunne garantere faktisk gennemførelse af reformer, eller som egentlig ikke var af betydning for kriseløsning og tilbagebetaling af lånene. 
Programmes included conditions, which were unable to guarantee the actual implementation of reforms or were not truly important for crisis resolution and repayment of the loans.
Anbefaling 6 Kommissionen bør præcisere program-betingelsernes rolle: a) Programdokumenterne bør fastlægge betingelsernes relative betydning som forudsætning for frigørelse af trancher. b) Betingelserne bør have fokus på reformer med væsentlig og holdbar virkning. 
Recommendation 6 The Commission should clarify the role of programme conditions. (a) Programme documents should set out the relative importance of conditions as prerequisites for the release of instalments. (b) Conditions should focus on reforms with high and sustainable impacts.
Hvis trancherne gøres betinget af forberedende trin, bør aftalememorandummet indeholde betingelser, som garanterer den efterfølgende vedtagelse af reformer. c) Der bør kun i begrænset omfang anvendes betingelser, og de bør klart vedrøre reformer, som er afgørende for kriseløsning eller tilbagebetaling af støtte. 
If instalments are made conditional upon preparatory steps, the memorandum of understanding should include conditions that guarantee the subsequent adoption of reforms. (c) Conditions should be used spar-ingly, and should clearly relate to reforms that are essential to crisis resolution or the repayment of assistance.
Programteamene bør være forpligtet til at begrunde behovet for hver enkelt betingelse. 
Programme teams should be obliged to justify the need for each and every condition.
Valget af betingelser bør være genstand for intern gennemgang. d) Betingelserne bør være defineret, så overholdelsen kan overvåges med sikkerhed. 
The selection of conditions should be a matter for internal review. (d) Conditions should be defined so that compliance can be monitored with certainty.
Når betingelserne fastlægges, bør programteamene søge at identificere data, der senere kan bruges til at vurdere resultaterne af programforanstaltningerne. 
When conditions are set, programme teams should seek to identify data that may later be used to assess the results of the programme measures.
192 Alle programteam etablerede et velfungerende, uformelt samarbejde med IMF og ECB. 
192 All programme teams established well-functioning informal cooperation with the IMF and the ECB.
At der ikke var nogen formelle samarbejdsordninger, skyldtes tidshorisonten, som forventedes at være kort, og muligvis institutionernes præferencer (jf. punkt 108-114). 
The lack of formal cooperation arrangements was due to the time frame, which was expected to be brief, and possibly to the preferences of the institutions (see paragraphs 108 to 114).