natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Disse regelmžssige besżg p stedet af humanitžre eksperter udgżr det vigtigste redskab for at vurdere, hvorvidt forventede aktiviteter/resultater effektivt finder sted i henhold til planerne (realitetskontrol). 
These regular field visits performed by humanitarian experts constitute the most important tool to assess whether expected activities/results are effectively taking place according to plans (reality check).
Disse besżg p stedet suppleres af lżbende dialog p stedet med partnerne. 
These field visits are complemented by continued dialogue at field level with partners.
39 Finansielle oplysninger er ikke altid tilgžngelige p stedet under de besżg, som Kommissionens personale gen-nemfżrer. 
39 Financial data are not always available at field level during field visits carried out by Commission staff.
Dette forklarer, hvorfor der for det meste ikke rapporteres om Čden finansielle gennemfżrelseÇ i FichOp. 
This explains why ‘financial implementation’ is most of the time not reported upon in the FichOp.
Kommissionen vil overveje, hvordan den kan lżse dette problem. 
The Commission will reflect on how to address this issue.
Tekstboks 3 - Eksempler p manglende analyse af konsekvenserne af de forhold, der var konstateret i rapporterne om besżg p stedet I forbindelse med FNŐs multidonorprojekt vedrżrende fżdevaresikkerhed i Katanga udfżres budgetovervgningen p nationalt niveau og ikke p provinsniveau. 
Box 3 ‐ Examples of lack of analysis of the implications of detected issues in field visit reports In the case of the multi-donor UN food security project in Katanga, budget monitoring of the action is done at national level, and not at provincial level.
Bidrag fra andre donorer finder sted og žndrer sig kontinuerligt i lżbet af ret, sledes at det kun er ved rets udgang, at partneren kan dele det samlede budget for aktionen, nr alle bidrag er registreret. 
Contributions from other donors are ongoing and evolving regularly along the year so it is only at the end of the year that the partner can share the overall budget of the action when all contributions are recorded.
Derfor var der ikke finansielle oplysninger under det besżg p stedet, som Kommissionens personale gennemfżrte, og derfor var det ikke muligt at n frem til en konklusion vedrżrende dette aspekt. 
Therefore, financial data were not available during the field visit carried out by Commission staff and therefore it was not possible to reach any conclusion on that aspect.
Derudover finder FAFA-bestemmelserne anvendelse i multidonoraktioner. 
Furthermore, in a multi-donor action, the provisions of the FAFA are applicable.
I sdanne tilfžlde betragtes de samlede stżtteberettigede omkostninger til den foranstaltning, der henvises til i de sžrlige betingelser, som et skżn, der kan žndre sig under gennemfżrelsen af foranstaltningen, f.eks. hvis det bidrag, der forventes fra andre donorer, ikke materialiserer sig. 
In such cases, the total eligible costs of the action referred to in the Special Conditions is considered as an estimation that can evolve during the implementation of the action, i.e., if the contribution expected from other donors does not materialise.
Žndringer i det samlede budget for aktionen udlżser ikke i sig selv nogen žndring i Kommissionens bidrag. 
Modifications in the overall action budget will not themselves trigger any change in the Commission's contribution.
Derfor informerede partneren ikke formelt Kommissionen om žndringerne i det samlede budget for foranstaltningen og var ikke forpligtet til at indgive en anmodning om žndring. 
For this reason, the partner did not formally inform the Commission of the changes in the overall action budget and was not bound to submit a modification request.
I forbindelse med multidonorak-tioner med mellemfolkelige organisationer eller FN-organer kan partneren opdatere tallene ensidigt i den nžste rapporteringsfase for at afspejle budgetžndringen. 
For multi-donor actions with IOs or UN bodies, the partner may update the figures unilaterally at the next reporting stage to reflect the budget change.
40 Den nuvžrende revisionsstrategi udlżb ved udgangen af 2015, og en ny revisionsstrategi for perioden 2016-20 (herunder en ny stikprżvemetode) er ved at blive godkendt af ECHOŐs żverste ledelse. 
40 The current audit strategy expired at the end of 2015, and a new audit strategy for the period 2016-20 (including a new sampling methodology) is in the course of being approved by ECHO senior management.
Formlet med den nye metode er at skabe flere synergier med overvgningsrammen, navnlig ved at tage hensyn til risikoanalysen vedrżrende partnere og foranstaltninger truffet af de operationelle enheder. 
The new methodology seeks indeed to have more synergies with the monitoring framework, in particular by taking into account the risk analysis on partners and actions made by the operational units.
Kommissionens svar 53 42 Der skulle have vžret foretaget en evaluering for Den Demokratiske Republik Congo i 2016, men den blev ikke lžngere prioriteret som fżlge af den lżbende resultatrevision. 
Reply of the Commission 53 42 An evaluation was foreseen for DRC in 2016 and it became no longer a priority as a result of the ongoing performance audit.
Den vil sandsynligvis blive fżjet til 2017-evalueringsprogrammet. 
It is likely to be added to the 2017 evaluation programme.
44 Det er helt klart et problem, som vil kržve tilpasninger til det nuvžrende informationssystem (APPEL), og Kommissionen vil undersżge mulighederne for at afhjžlpe denne svaghed. 
44 This is clearly an issue that would need some adaptations to the current information system (APPEL), and the Commission will explore possibilities to address this weakness.
47 FicheOp-retningslinjerne, som Kommissionen godkendte i marts 2016, bżr bidrage til at opn en stżrre overensstemmelse med det informationsniveau, der er indeholdt i vurderingen. 
47 The Fiche Op guidelines approved in March 2016 by the Commission should indeed contribute to improve consistency on the level of information contained in the assessment.
48 Proceduren med henblik p at reducere Kommissionens bidrag som fżlge af en drlig/delvis/sen gennemfżrelse anvendes kun sjžldent. 
48 The procedure to reduce the Commission's contribution as a result of poor/partial/late implementation has been seldom used.
Det er udfordrende at vurdere med pržcision og nżjagtighed, hvorvidt utilfredsstillende resultater er en konsekvens af drlige pržstationer eller er kontekstuelle (žndring af sammenhžng, manglende adgang, sikkerhed og logistiske begržnsninger). 
It is challenging to assess with precision and accuracy whether unsatisfactory results are the consequence of poor performance or are contextually related (change of context, lack of access, security and logistical constraints).
Ifżlge bestemmelserne i den nye partnerskabsaftale for 2014 kan Kommissionen reducere sit bidrag, hvis projektet ikke gennemfżres eller i tilfžlde af drlig, delvis eller for sen gennemfżrelse af et projekt. 
The provisions of the new 2014 FPA sets up that the Commission may reduce the grant if the action is not implemented or is implemented poorly, partially or late.
Kommissionen har styrket og pržciseret de interne procedurer for at sikre, at der er et solidt retsgrundlag for enhver reduktion, og at den er afpasset efter manglens grovhed og omfang. 
The Commission has reinforced and clarified the internal procedures to ensure that any reduction is legally sound and proportionate to the gravity and scope of the failing.
Hvis resultaterne ikke blev opnet, skal resultaterne afspejles korrekt i ledelsesudtalelsen fra den kompetente anvisningsberettigede ved subdelegation, hvilket omfatter et bilag, som begrunder reduktionen af bidraget p grund af underpržstation eller en begrundelse baseret p Čforce majeureÇ-argumenter. 
When the results have not been achieved, the certified correct provided by the AOSD includes an annex justifying the reduction of the contribution for underperformance or a justification based on ‘force majeure’ arguments.
Der er dog en meget lille risiko for, at anvendelsen af underpržstationsproceduren kan resultere i tab af budgetmidler, idet eventuelle frigjorte belżb kan stilles til rdighed for andre projekter inden for gennemfżrelsestiden for den relaterede gennemfżrelsesplan for den humanitžre indsats (24 mneder). 
However, there is very little risk that the use of the underperformance procedure could result in the loss of budgeted funds as possible disengaged amounts can be made available for other projects within the implementation time of the related HIP (24 months).
Kapacitetsgenudnyttelsen af eventuelle frigjorte midler fremgr af gennemfżrelsessatsen for ECHO, som har ligget stabilt p omkring 98 % i renes lżb. 
The capacity of reutilisation of possible disengaged funds is testified by the implementation rate of ECHO, stable at around 98 % over the years.
Tekstboks 5 - Programmet ČSpontaneous Site Management and CoordinationÇ i Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (nr. 18) Belżbet p 57 300 EUR blev beregnet p grundlag af de samlede udgifter af resultat 3 (572 998 EUR), resultat delvist opnet som fżlge af forsinkelser i gennemfżrelsen. 
Box 5 ‐ Spontaneous Site Management and Coordination in the DRC (n°18) The amount of 57.300 euros was calculated based on the total costs of the result 3 (572.998 euros), result partially achieved due to delay in the implementation.
Kommissionen har anvendt en underpržstationssats p 10 % foruden fradraget for de ikkestżtteberettigede omkostninger. 
The Commission has applied an under-performance rate of 10 % in addition to the ineligible costs deducted.
Der blev indget kontrakt med partneren det efterfżlgende r, idet det er den bemyndigede partner for koordinering og forvaltning af flygtningelejre (CCCM) p nationalt niveau og derfor en vigtig partner i forhold til at hndtere problemer med fordrivelser af befolkningen i konfliktomrder. 
The partner was indeed contracted the subsequent year, as it is the mandated partner for Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) at national level and therefore is key partner in dealing with population displacement issues in conflict areas.
Kommissionen besluttede imidlertid at reducere sit bidrag, men at bevare et vist minimum af stżtte af strategiske rsager. 
The Commission decided however to reduce its contribution but to maintain some support for strategic reasons.
Kommissionens svar 54 51 Den kendsgerning, at antallet af flygtninge er faldet signifikant i lżbet af rene (fra 250 000 til under 70 000 perso-ner), foranledigede Kommissionen til at rationalisere sin stżtte via det ledende organ (fald i antallet af flygtninge og fżlgelig fald i antallet af finansierede partnere). 
Reply of the Commission 54 51 The fact that the caseload of refugees had significantly decreased over the years (from 250,000 to less than 70,000 people) pushed the Commission to rationalise its support through the leading agency (decrease of caseload, hence decrease in the number of partners funded).
Da Kommissionen imidlertid allerede havde ydet stżtte til partneren i forbindelse med denne foranstaltning i flere r, var det żnskeligt med en problemfri exitstrategi/overdragelse i forhold til det ledende organ for at begržnse den negative virkning, som dette kunne have p modtagerne (sikre kontinuitet i de basale sundhedsydelser). 
However, as Commission support had already been granted for several years to the partner for this action, a smooth exit strategy/hand over with the lead agency was desirable to limit the negative impact it could have on beneficiaries (ensuring continuity of basic health services).
I denne sammenhžng blev der gennemfżrt en žndring, som forlžngede kontrakten med yderligere seks mneder og med yderligere finansiering p 450 000 EUR, i 2013-gennemfżrelsesplanen for den humanitžre indsats ved hjžlp af tilgžngelige midler. 
In this sense a modification extending the contract for 6 additional months, with additional funding of 450,000€, was granted on the 2013 HIP, using available funds.
52 Forlžngelsen af den pgžldende foranstaltnings varighed var primžrt drevet af de prioriterede behov og modtagernes srbarheder. 
52 The extension of the duration of the action mentioned was primarily driven by the prioritised needs and vulnerabilities.
Incitamenterne til at acceptere disse forlžngelser har altid vžret relateret til modtagernes behov Đ ved at give partneren yderligere tid har Kommissionen allerede klart prioriteret opfyldelsen af umiddelbare modtagerbehov. 
The drivers for accepting these extensions have always been related to beneficiaries' needs – in giving additional time to the partner, the Commission has clearly prioritized the fulfilment of immediate beneficiaries needs.
At vžlge at inddrive en del af finansieringen eller omfordele den til andre projekter ville have taget for lang tid og efterladt uopfyldte aktuelle behov. 
Choosing recovery or reallocation to other projects would have taken too much time and left unfulfilled current needs.
Dette blev ikke betragtet som en realistisk mulighed. 
This was not seen as a realistic option.
53 Kommissionens generaldirektorater for humanitžr bistand og udvikling arbejder tžt sammen med henblik p at undersżge alle muligheder for at sikre LRRD og deler normalt oplysninger vedrżrende den humanitžre situation i de forskellige omrder af Den Demokratiske Republik Congo. 
53 The Commission's Humanitarian and Development DGs are closely cooperating in exploring all options possible for ensuring LRRD and usually share information concerning the humanitarian situation in the different areas of the DRC.
Det er fortsat en prioritet p kommissionsniveau, men begržnsningerne i forbindelse med gennemfżrelsen af LRRD er signifikante i forhold til Den Demokratiske Republik Congo. 
It remains a priority at Commission level but constraints associated to the implementation of LRRD are significant in the context of DRC.
For s vidt angr Den Demokratiske Republik Congo, foregr Kommissionens udviklingsbistand i nden fra Cotonou-aftalen, idet regeringen i Den Demokratiske Republik Congo er i fżrersždet og fastlžgger prioriteterne. 
As far as DRC is concerned, the Commission's development works in the spirit of the Cotonou agreement, where DRC Government is in the driving seat and defines priorities.
Den eneste mlsektor med en teoretisk potentiel forbindelse til Kommissionens humanitžre bistand er sundhedssektoren. 
The only focal sector with a theoretical potential link with the Commission's humanitarian aid is health.
Regeringen har en politik med at koncentrere udviklingsbistand og bilateral bistand om forsżmte omrder i ikkekonfliktomrder, fordi de synes at vžre opgivet af de internationale aktżrer sammenlignet med de konfliktramte omrder i det żstlige Congo. 
The Government has a policy of focusing development and bilateral aid to neglected areas in non-conflict areas, because they appear abandoned by international actors when compared to the conflict affected areas in the East.
Det er en naturlig reaktion set fra udviklingsaktżrernes og de nationale myndigheders side at fokusere p disse omrder, fordi de tilbyder stabilitet og sikkerhed og ikke udgżr nogen risiko i forhold til opgivelse af projekter p grund af vold. 
It is a natural reaction from the perspective of development actors and national authorities to focus on these areas, because they offer stability and security and do not present risks regarding projects being abandoned due to violence.
Det er derfor mere sandsynligt, at investeringer i stabile omrder vil have en vis virkning p fattigdomsbekžmpelsen. 
Investing in stable areas is therefore more likely to have some impact on poverty reduction.
Desuden anses konfliktomrderne i den żstlige del af landet (hvor Kommissionens humanitžre bistand er centreret) - og det med rette - for at profitere af tilstedevžrelsen af hovedparten af det humanitžre samfund (ngoŐer), mens der er meget f organisationer til stede i den resterende del af landet til at arbejde med strukturelle problemer og kronisk fattigdom. 
In addition, the conflict areas in the East (where the Commission's humanitarian aid is focused) are perceived - rightly so, as benefiting from the presence of the bulk of the humanitarian community (NGOs), whereas very few organizations are present in the rest of the country to work with structural problems and chronic poverty.
Kommissionen kan ikke forventes at indlede LRRD-drżftelser p omrder, hvor der er en risiko p mellemlang sigt for, at projekterne opgives eller pvirkes alvorligt som fżlge af en nżdsituation. 
The Commission cannot be expected to launch LRRD discussions in areas that present a medium term risk of projects being abandoned or severely affected due to an emergency.
I de seneste fem r er det eneste omrde i den żstlige del af landet, som har oplevet relativ stabilitet, de tidligere LRA-kontrollerede (LordŐs Resistance Army) omrder i Haut Uele og Bas Uele (nordlig del af provinsen Orientale), hvilket er pržcist det sted, hvor Kommissionens tjenestegrene forhandlede sig frem til en vellykket LRRD-overgang. 
In the last 5 years, the only area in the East that has witnessed a relative stability has been the ex-LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) affected areas in Haut Uele and Bas Uele (north part of Province Orientale), which is exactly the place where a successful LRRD transition has been negotiated between Commission services.
I de resterende omrder i den żstlige del af Den Demokratiske Republik Congo, hvor Kommissionens humanitžre bistand er til stede, fortsžtter de ustabile tilstande, og vi kan ikke fremvise et eneste omrde p kortet, som ikke har vžret pržget af bevžbnede grupper, drab og/eller fordrivelse af befolkningen i en periode p mere end et r ad gangen. 
In the rest of the areas of Eastern DRC where the Commission's humanitarian aid is present, instability continues and we cannot show a single area on the map that has been without activity of armed groups, killings and/or displacement for more than a year at a time.
Mulighederne er derfor begržnsede af natur i en sdan sammenhžng, men hvis betingelserne er opfyldt geografisk (omrder bliver stabile) og passer til regeringens prioriteter/mlsektorer (sundhed) samt prioritetsomrder (Kasa Oriental, Lomami, Kasa Central, Nordkivu, Ituri, Haut Uel, Kongo Central), opfordres der kraftigt til LRRD. 
Opportunities are therefore limited by nature in such context but when conditions are met geographically (areas becoming stable), fit with Government priorities/focal sectors (health) and priority areas (Kasaï Oriental, Lomami, Kasaï Central, North Kivu, Ituri, Haut Uelé, Kongo Central), LRRD is strongly encouraged.
Dette scenarie er forekommet n gang i lżbet af tidsrammen for revisionen (se ovenfor) 
This scenario has indeed occurred once during the timeframe of the audit (see above)
Kommissionens svar 55 For nylig har DEVCOŐs og ECHOŐs engagement i drżftelsen af overfżrslen af stżtte til Panzi-hospitalet i Sydkivu-pro-vinsen materialiseret sig ved et DEVCO-projekt til 3 mio. EUR (finansieret i henhold til programmet vedrżrende globale almene goder og udfordringer). 
Reply of the Commission 55 More recently, DEVCO and ECHO engagement in discussing the transfer of support to Panzi Hospital in South Kivu province has materialised in a DEVCO project of 3 million EUR (funded under the Global Public Goods and Challenges programme).
Formlet med denne foranstaltning er at tilpasse centret til standarderne for de almindelige hospitaler, som stżttes af EUFŐs nationale sundhedsprogram, med henblik p at muliggżre en potentiel fremtidig inklusion heri. 
This action will aim at aligning the centre to the standards of the general hospitals supported by the EDF national health programme in order to allow for a potential future inclusion in it.
Andre LRRD-initiativer finder sted i ikkekonfliktomrder (inden for sektoren manglende fżdevaresikkerhed i Kasai-provinserne og inden for sundheds-og vandsektoren i koleraramte omrder). 
Other LRRD initiatives are taking place in non-conflict areas (in the sector of food insecurity in Kasai provinces and in health and water sectors in cholera affected areas).
54 Under hensyntagen til den eksisterende situation i den żstlige del af Den Demokratiske Republik Congo, navnlig hvad sikkerhed angr, har det ikke vžret muligt at gennemfżre mere end et LRRD-projekt indtil nu (sundhed). 
54 Taking into account the prevailing situation in Eastern DRC, particularly in security terms, it was not possible to implement more than one LRRD project so far (health).
Ikke desto mindre vil Kommissionen fortsžtte med at gribe alle eksisterende muligheder for LRRD (eksempelvis initiativet i Sydkivu til stżtte for Panzi-hospitalet eller missionen i Nordkivu, som overvejes af EUŐs delegation i Den Demokratiske Republik Congo). 
The Commission will nevertheless continue to seize any existing opportunity for LRRD (for example: initiative in South Kivu to support Panzi hospital or mission to North Kivu considered by the EU Delegation in DRC).
Kommissionen har hyret en sundhedsekspert til at fortsžtte med at undersżge alle LRRD-muligheder. 
A health specialist has been recruited by the Commission to continue exploring all possible LRRD avenues.
For s vidt angr Uganda, ppeger Kommissionen, at Ugandas regering har udarbejdet en udviklingsplan, der omfatter flygtninge, og ved hjžlp af hvilken aktżrerne inden for humanitžr og udviklingsmžssig bistand bringes sammen for at se p langsigtede lżsninger for flygtningene under inddragelse af vžrtssamfundene. 
In regards to Uganda, the Commission points out that the Government of Uganda has designed a development plan in which refugees are included and through which Humanitarian and Development actors are brought together to look at long-term solutions for the refugees involving the host communities.
55 Det faktum, at dette problem ikke er lżst og vender tilbage hvert r som en prioritet, antyder, at der er en ržkke begržnsninger/udfordringer, som forhindrer det i at ske. 
55 The fact that this issue is not being resolved and comes back every year as a priority suggests that there are a number of constraints/challenges that keeps it from happening.
Adskillige generationer af erfarne eksperter inden for humanitžr og udviklingsmžssig bistand har arbejdet hrdt p at lżse dette problem, men med begržnset succes. 
Several generations of experienced development and humanitarian experts have tried hard to get around that issue, without much success.
Selv MONUSCO med en dedikeret stabiliseringsenhed har udarbejdet planer og afholdt mżder i de seneste to r om at ČstabilisereÇ omrder, der er blevet befriet for M23-op-rżrerne, og kan ikke fremvise et eneste projekt, hvor det er lykkedes, for slet ikke at nžvne, at de tidligere M23-om-rder i dag er en del af de mindst sikre steder for bistandsarbejdere (og endnu mindre hensigtsmžssige for udvik-lingsaktżrer, der har en lavere tžrskel for risikotagning). 
Even MONUSCO, with a dedicated Stabilisation Unit, have been making plans and running meetings for the last two years on ‘stabilizing’ areas liberated from the M23 rebellion, and do not have a single project to show for, not to mention that the ex-M23 areas are today part of the least safe places for aid workers (and even less appropriate for development actors that has a lower risk-taking threshold).
De underliggende problemer, som stopper fremskridt med LRRD, er de samme, som Kommissionens forskellige tjenestegrene har identificeret, dvs. en konfliktsammenhžng, usikkerhed og fordrivelse af befolkningen, hvilket ikke er befordrende for udviklingsforanstaltninger. 
The underlying problems that stop progress on LRRD are the same that have been identified by the different services of the Commission; a context of conflict, insecurity and population displacement that is not conducive to development actions.
LRRD kan kun finde sted, hvis et minimum af forudsžtninger er opfyldt, og i de konfliktomrder, hvor ECHO har arbejdet, eksisterer disse forudsžtninger ikke. 
LRRD can take place only when a minimum of conditions are met and in the conflict areas where ECHO has been working, these conditions do not exist.