natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I lyset af de fejlforekomster, der blev konstateret i perioden 2007-2013, mener vi, at dette potentielt kan sikre en bedre beskyttelse af EU-budgettet, fordi det giver Kommissionen en tilstržkkelig buffer til at tržffe korrigerende foranstaltninger, selv hvis medlemsstaten slet ikke gennemfżrer finansielle korrektioner. 
Given the error levels observed during the 2007‐2013 period, we consider that this has the potential to ensure better protection of the EU budget since this creates an adequate buffer for the Commission to take corrective action even in a situation where the Member State fails to implement any financial corrections at all.
Det er muligt at anvende finansielle nettokorrektioner hvert r, hvis der konstateres alvorlige svagheder, som medlemsstaten ikke har opdaget 129. 
Net financial corrections possible each year if serious weaknesses are detected that were not identified by the Member State 129.
I programperioden 2007-2013 afhang kriterierne for anvendelse af en finansiel nettokorrektion af, om medlemsstaten godtog Kommissionens bemžrkning (dvs. erkendte fejlen) og bekržftede den dertil knyttede effekt (dvs. anvendte den finansielle korrektion)44. 
For the 2007‐2013 programme period, the criteria for applying a net financial correction depended on whether the Member State accepted the observation (i.e. the error) and confirmed the related impact (i.e. applied the amount of financial correction) or not44.
Hvis den ikke gjorde, mtte Kommissionen tržffe afgżrelse om en finansiel korrektion. 
If this was not the case, the Commission needed to adopt a financial correction decision.
Kun kommissionsafgżrelsen havde en direkte nettoeffekt (jf. punkt 19). 
Only the Commission decision had a direct net effect (see paragraph 19).
Denne ordning er blevet erstattet af et selvkorrigerende system, hvor medlemsstaten skal anvende den finansielle korrektion med det samme. 
This arrangement has been replaced by a self‐correcting system, where the Member State needs to apply the financial correction up front.
Hvis alvorlige systemmangler, som medlemsstaten ikke har opdaget under sine kontroller og revisioner fżr den rlige godkendelse af regnskabet, konstateres i programperioden 2014-2020 (enten af Kommissionen eller i forbindelse med vores revisioner), anvender Kommissionen en finansiel nettokorrektion, der fżrer til tab af midler for medlemsstaten45. 
During the 2014‐2020 programme period, if serious system deficiencies are found that have not been detected by the Member State in the context of its verifications or audits before the annual acceptance of accounts (either by the Commission or through our audits), the Commission will apply a net financial correction leading to loss of funding for the Member State45.
Systemet skal tilskynde medlemsstaterne - og isžr deres revisionsmyndigheder - til at sikre, at EU-midlerne bruges p en lovlig og formelt rigtig mde, og at alle de nżdvendige finansielle korrektioner med henblik p at beskytte EU-budgettet mod regelstridige udgifter er foretaget p nationalt niveau. 
This system aims to further incentivise Member States, and in particular their audit authorities, to ensure that EU funds are spent in a legal and regular manner and that all necessary financial corrections have been applied at national level to protect the EU budget from irregular expenditure.
Dette ansvar ligger primžrt hos forvaltningsmyndighederne. 
This responsibility lies primarily with the managing authorities.
Revisionsmyndighederne vil imidlertid fungere som sidste forsvarslinje med hensyn til at forhindre, at dele af de nationale finansieringsrammer gr tabt allerede under gennemfżrelsen. 
The audit authorities will, however, act as a last line of defence to avoid part of the national envelopes already being lost during programme implementation.
Endvidere vil de finansielle korrektioner blive anvendt p rsbasis og vžre klart knyttet til frigivelsen af den efterfżlgende mellemliggende betaling. 
Moreover, the financial corrections will be applied on an annual basis and be clearly linked to the release of the subsequent interim payment.
Bilag V indeholder en sammenligning af ordningerne for perioderne 2007-2013 og 2014-2020. 132. 
A comparison between the arrangements for the 2007‐2013 and 2014‐2020 period is provided in Annex V. 132.
Vi bemžrkede ogs, at det tog lang tid at afslutte de procedurer, der fżrte til finansielle korrektioner i perioden 2007-2013 (jf. punkt 87). 
We also observed that procedures resulting in financial corrections during the 2007‐ 2013 period took a long time to resolve (see paragraph 87).
I en af vores tidligere sžrberetninger blev lignende forhold konstateret med hensyn til programperioden 2000-200646. 
Similar issues were identified for the 2000‐2006 programme period in one of the Court’s previous special reports46.
Vi mener, at disse procedurers varighed vil blive vžsentlig kortere takket vžre kravet om, at regnskabet skal afsluttes og kontrolpakken indsendes inden en bestemt frist (15. februar det fżlgende r). 
We consider that the duration of these procedures will be significantly shortened by the requirement to close the accounts and submit the assurance package by a set deadline (15 February of the following year).
Dette vil tilskynde medlemsstaterne til at afhjžlpe problemer hurtigere, s de kan inkludere de pgžldende udgifter i regnskabet, og vil sandsynligvis bidrage til at gżre processen vžsentlig hurtigere end i perioden 2007-2013. 
This will incentivise the Member States to remedy problems faster in order to be able to include related expenditure in the accounts, and is likely to contribute to a significant speeding‐up of the process compared to the 2007‐2013 period.
Det er ogs muligt at suspendere betalinger og anvende finansielle korrektioner ved programafslutningen, hvis resultatmlene ikke opfyldes 134. 
Payment suspensions and financial corrections at closure are also possible for non‐ achievement of performance targets 134.
I programperioden 2014-2020 vil det ogs vžre muligt at indlede suspensionsprocedurer og plžgge finansielle korrektioner, hvis de fastsatte ml for resultatindikatorerne ikke opfyldes. 
During the 2014‐2020 programme period it will also be possible to initiate suspension procedures and impose financial corrections if the performance indicators set are not achieved.
De mangelfulde resultater skal imidlertid kunne tilskrives klart identificerede svagheder i gennemfżrelsen, og Kommissionen skal give medlemsstaten meddelelse om disse svagheder47. 
This under‐performance must, however, be due to clearly identified implementation weaknesses and the Commission is required to communicate these weaknesses to the Member State47.
Hvis medlemsstaten ikke har truffet afhjžlpende foranstaltninger til at rette op p disse svagheder, kan Kommissionen suspendere betalinger til medlemsstaten. 
If the Member State has failed to take corrective action to address these weaknesses, the Commission may suspend payments to the Member State.
Hvis medlemsstaten ved afslutningen af programperioden stadig ikke har truffet afhjžlpende foranstaltninger til at rette op p svaghederne, kan Kommissionen anvende finansielle korrektioner. 
At the end of the programme period, if the Member State has still failed to take corrective action to address the weaknesses, the Commission may apply financial corrections.
Vi mener, at dette er et fżrste skridt i retning af at afhjžlpe det forhold, vi gennem lang tid har kritiseret, nemlig at der i programperioden 2007-2013 ikke var nogen retlige bestemmelser, der gav mulighed for at plžgge finansielle korrektioner for mangelfulde resultater (jf. punkt 25). 
We consider that this is a first step towards addressing our long‐standing criticism that there were no adequate legal provisions to impose financial corrections for under‐ performance during the 2007‐2013 programme period (see paragraph 25).
Dog er der i rammen for 2014-2020 stadig ikke nogen egentlige finansielle incitamenter eller sanktioner knyttet til de resultater, der opns med EU-midler48. 
However there are still no real financial incentives or sanctions in the 2014‐2020 framework relating to the results achieved with EU funding48.
Der er indfżrt foranstaltninger knyttet til forsvarlig żkonomisk styring, men de er vanskelige at anvende i praksis 136. 
Measures linked to sound economic governance issues introduced, but difficult to apply in practice 136.
Nžrmere bestemt kan Kommissionen foresl Rdet, at det suspenderer betalinger eller forpligtelser, hvis medlemsstaten ikke har truffet hensigtsmžssige foranstaltninger til at žndre sin partnerskabsaftale50, eller hvis den ikke har truffet effektive foranstaltninger for at rette op p sit uforholdsmžssigt store underskud. 
In particular, the Commission may propose that the Council suspend payments or commitments if the Member State has not taken appropriate action to amend its Partnership Agreement50 or if the Member State has not taken effective action to correct its excessive deficit.
I situationer med tilknytning til żkonomisk styring er det imidlertid ikke kun op til Kommissionen at afgżre, om der skal suspenderes betalinger. 
However, in situations linked to economic governance, the decision to suspend payments does not lie entirely with the Commission.
Kommissionen skal holde Europa-Parlamentet informeret, nr en sdan situation opstr, og indg i en struktureret dialog med Europa-Parlamentet, hvis det anmoder den om det. 
The Commission must keep the European Parliament (EP) informed whenever such a situation arises and must enter into a structured dialogue with the EP if asked to do so.
Derefter skal Kommissionen fremsžtte et forslag til Rdet om at suspendere betalingen, og derefter tržffer Rdet afgżrelse ved en gennemfżrelsesretsakt. 
Following this, the Commission needs to make a proposal to the Council to suspend the payment, and the Council then takes its decision in an implementing act.
Forordningen fastsžtter ogs maksimumsniveauer for suspensioner knyttet til żkonomisk styring, angivet som procentdele af betalingerne eller forpligtelserne. 
For suspensions linked to economic governance, the maximum levels of suspension as a percentage of payments or commitments is also set in the regulation.
Kommissionen overvejede for fżrste gang at foresl betalingssuspensioner knyttet til spżrgsml vedrżrende żkonomisk styring (nžrmere bestemt uforholdsmžssigt store 48 49 50 67 rsberetningen for regnskabsret 2013, punkt 10.16. 
The Commission envisaged proposing payment suspensions linked to economic governance (and in particular the excessive deficit) issues for the first time in the case of Spain and Portugal in 201651.
I lyset af den vanskelige żkonomiske og finanspolitiske situation besluttede Kommissionen i november 2016 ikke at foresl suspension i disse sager. 
In November 2016, the Commission decided not to propose a suspension in the above cases, in view of the challenging economic and fiscal situation.
I stedet anbefalede Kommissionen, at Portugal bragte sit uforholdsmžssigt store underskud til ophżr senest i 2016, og at Spanien gjorde det samme senest i 2018. 
Instead, the Commission recommended that Portugal put an end to its excessive deficit by 2016 and that Spain did so by 2018.
P dette grundlag kan det blive vanskeligt at anvende denne bestemmelse i programperioden 2014-2020. 
On this basis it may be difficult to apply this provision in practice during the 2014‐2020 programme period.
Det giver stżrre juridisk sikkerhed, at reglerne har form af forordninger i stedet for retningslinjer 139. 
Increased legal certainty due to setting rules as regulations rather than guidance 139.
I programperioden 2014-2020 har reglerne vedrżrende finansielle korrektioner en anden retlig form (og dermed en tilsvarende stżrre juridisk vžrdi). 
During the 2014‐2020 period, the rules applicable for financial corrections have a different legal form (and, as a result, corresponding stricter legal value).
Eksempler: a) Metoden til fastlžggelse af finansielle korrektioner og vejledende satser for korrektioner vedrżrende fejl i forbindelse med offentlige indkżb har siden programperioden 2000-2006 vžret fastsat i Kommissionens retningslinjer52. 
For example, (a) the method of determining financial corrections and the indicative rates of corrections to be applied for public procurement errors have, since the 2000‐2006 programme period, been set out in Commission guidelines52.
Disse retningslinjer beskriver den metode, Kommissionen bruger i de pgžldende sager, og medlemsstaterne blev anbefalet at bruge den. 
These guidelines describe the method used by the Commission in the relevant cases and their use was recommended to Member States.
68 b) Kommissionens metode til anvendelse af faste korrektioner i programperioden 2007-2013 var fastsat i en kommissionsbeslutning fra 201154. 
The 2013 update of these rules to be used by the Commission was issued as a Commission Decision53; (b) The Commission’s methodology for applying flat rate corrections for the 2007‐2013 programme period was set in a 2011 Commission Decision54.
De tilsvarende regler for programperioden 2014-2020 blev inkluderet i en delegeret kommissionsforordning55. 
Similar rules for the 2014‐ 2020 programme period were included in a Commission Delegated Regulation55.
Dette styrker Kommissionens muligheder for at hndhžve disse bestemmelser og sikre en mere ensartet tilgang i medlemsstaterne i perioden 2014-2020. 
This puts the Commission into a stronger position to enforce those provisions and to ensure a more consistent approach across Member States during the 2014‐2020 period.
Det forhold, at de gžldende regler har form af forordninger eller kommissionsafgżrelser i stedet for retningslinjer, begržnser ogs Kommissionens skżnsbefżjelser ved fastsžttelsen af korrektionssatsen og giver dermed medlemsstaterne stżrre juridisk sikkerhed. 
Setting out the applicable rules as a Regulation or Commission Decision rather than guidance also leaves less discretion to the Commission when deciding on the level of correction and thus increases legal certainty for Member States.
KONKLUSIONER OG ANBEFALINGER 141. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 141.
Samlet set havde Kommissionen pr. udgangen af 2015 (dvs. fżr afslutningen af programperioden 2007-2013) gjort effektiv brug af de foranstaltninger, som den i programmeringsperioden 2007-2013 rdede over til beskyttelse af EU-budgettet mod regelstridige udgifter. 
Overall, until end 2015 (i.e. before the closure of the 2007-2013 programme period) the Commission has made effective use of the measures at its disposal for the 2007-2013 programming period to protect the EU budget from irregular expenditure.
Vores revision viste, at de finansielle korrektioner vedrżrende perioden 2000-2006 belżb sig til 8 616 millioner euro eller 3,8 % af det samlede budget for EFRU, Samhżrighedsfonden og ESF. 
Our audit showed that financial corrections for the 2000-2006 period amounted to 8.616 million euro or 3.8 % of the total ERDF, CF and ESF budget.
Ved afslutningen var der foretaget finansielle nettokorrektioner i forbindelse med en ržkke EFRU-programmer, ESF-programmer og samhżrighedsfondsprojekter - i 17 medlemsstater for EFRU's vedkommende, i 16 medlemsstater for ESF's vedkommende og i 11 medlemsstater for Samhżrighedsfondens vedkommende. 
At closure there were net financial corrections for a number of ERDF and ESF programmes and CF projects in 17 Member States for the ERDF, 16 Member States for the ESF and eleven Member States for CF.
Disse nettokorrektioner belżb sig til i alt 2 423 millioner euro (eller 1,1 % af det samlede budget). 
The overall amount of these net corrections was 2 423 million euro (or 1.1 % of the total budget).
Vi konstaterede ogs, at EU-Domstolen i det vžsentlige har bekržftet Kommissionens vurderinger af svagheder og dens finansielle korrektioner. 
We also found that the Commission’s assessment of weaknesses and financial corrections was in substance confirmed by the European Court of Justice.
Vi forventer, at situationen er omtrent den samme med hensyn til perioden 2007-2013, men den endelige effekt af de finansielle korrektioner kan fżrst fastsls ved afslutningen. 
While we expect the situation to be similar for the 2007-2013 period, the final impact of financial corrections can be determined only at closure.
P grundlag af vores undersżgelse af afsluttende betalinger vedrżrende perioden 2000-2006 mener vi desuden, 54 55 69 Kommissionens beslutning K(2011) 7321. 
Based on our examination of the 2000-2006 closure payments, we also consider that the Commission needs to remain vigilant when checking the closure declaration submitted by the Member States.
Med hensyn til perioden 2007-2013 anvendte Kommissionen suspension af betalinger i stżrre udstržkning end tidligere, og den nye mulighed for at afbryde betalinger var et nyttigt ekstra vžrktżj. 
For the 2007-2013 period the Commission used payment suspension more extensively than in the past and the newly introduced payment interruptions were a helpful additional tool.
Endvidere brugte Kommissionen forebyggende foranstaltninger tidligere end i den foregende periode. 
Preventive measures were also applied earlier than in the previous period.
Vi forventer, at der relativt vil blive gennemfżrt flere finansielle korrektioner vedrżrende perioden 2007-2013 end vedrżrende den foregende periode. 
In relative terms, we expect that more financial corrections will be implemented for the 2007-2013 period than in the previous period.
Vi konstaterede ogs, at Kommissionen anvendte forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner i overensstemmelse med proportionalitetsprincippet. 
We also found that the Commission imposed its preventive measures and financial corrections in a proportionate manner.
Kommissionens interne procedurer for perioden 2007-2013 skulle sikre en harmoniseret behandling af sager i alle programmer og medlemsstater. 
The Commission’s internal procedures for the 2007-2013 period aimed at ensuring harmonised treatment of cases between programmes and Member States.
Vores analyse bekržftede endvidere, at Kommissionens foranstaltninger vedrżrende perioden 2007-2013 fokuserede p de medlemsstater, der havde de mest risikobehžftede programmer. 
Our analysis also confirmed that the Commission’s measures for 2007-2013 period focussed on those Member States with the riskiest programmes.
Kommissionens korrigerende foranstaltninger lžgger pres p medlemsstaterne for at f dem til at afhjžlpe svagheder i deres forvaltnings-og kontrolsystemer. 
The Commission’s corrective measures put pressure on Member States to address weaknesses in their management and control systems.
De resulterende betalingsafbrydelser og - suspensioner indebžrer en betydelig finansiel risiko for medlemsstaterne. 
The resulting payment interruptions and suspensions represent a significant 68 financial risk for Member States.
Med hensyn til perioden 2007-2013 sigtede Kommissionen derfor mod at ophžve foranstaltningerne gradvis, s godtgżrelsen af udgifter kunne genoptages s hurtigt som muligt vedrżrende den del af programmet, der ikke var berżrt af de mangler, der oprindelig fżrte til afbrydelsen eller suspensionen. 
For the 2007-2013 period the Commission therefore aimed to gradually lift measures to ensure that the reimbursement of expenditure could be resumed as soon as possible for the part of the programme not affected by the shortcomings which initially led to the interruption or suspension.
Vi konstaterede imidlertid ogs, at Kommissionen har svžrt ved at overvge gennemfżrelsen af finansielle korrektioner. 
We also found, however, that the Commission faces difficulties in monitoring the implementation of financial corrections.
Oplysningerne fra medlemsstaterne om deres gennemfżrelse af finansielle korrektioner i perioden 2007-2013 muliggżr endnu ikke en solid overvgning. 
The information provided by the Member States on their implementation of financial corrections in the 2007-2013 period does not yet allow for robust monitoring.
Vi konstaterede ogs, at der tegnede sig et uensartet billede med hensyn til den langsigtede effekt af forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner p programmernes fejlforekomster i perioden 2007-2013. 
We also found mixed evidence of the long-term impact of preventive measures and financial corrections on programme error levels in the 2007-2013 period.
Kommissionens rapportering om forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner gżr det svžrt at f et omfattende og analytisk overblik. 
The Commission’s reporting on preventive measures and financial corrections makes it difficult to get a comprehensive and analytical overview.
Det skyldes hovedsagelig, at oplysningerne om forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner gives i forskellige rapporter og dokumenter. Den ene af rapporterne kendte interessenterne ikke engang til. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the information on preventive measures and financial corrections is presented in several reports and documents, one of which was not even known by stakeholders.
Samtidig giver ingen af Kommissionens rapporter et analytisk overblik over forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner i programperioden 2007-2013 som helhed. 
At the same time, none of the Commission reports provides an analytical overview of preventive measures and financial corrections for the 2007-2013 programme period as a whole.
Anbefaling 2 Kommissionen bżr udsende en ad hoc-rapport om de finansielle korrektioner og afslutningsstatus for programmerne under EFRU/Samhżrighedsfonden og ESF, svarende til den rapport, der i 2013 blev udarbejdet for perioden 2000-2006. 
Recommendation 2 The Commission should issue an ad-hoc report on the financial corrections and status of closure of the ERDF/CF and ESF programmes similar to the report prepared in 2013 for the 2000-2006 period.
Denne rapport bżr indeholde og sammenligne alle oplysninger om forebyggende og korrigerende foranstaltninger vedrżrende de enkelte fonde og de enkelte medlemsstater samt angive de finansielle korrektioners effekt og restrisikoen. 
and corrective measures by fund and Member State and display the impact of financial corrections and the residual risk rate.
Vi konstaterede mangler i de informationssystemer, Kommissionen bruger til at overvge og rapportere om forebyggende foranstaltninger og finansielle korrektioner vedrżrende programmerne i perioden 2007-2013. 
We noted shortcomings in information systems used by the Commission to monitor and report on preventive measures and financial corrections for 2007-2013 programmes.
Navnlig er informationssystemerne ikke 
In particular, the information systems are not integrated and they do not provide an overview for individual cases of all preventive measures and financial corrections.
De lovgivningsmžssige bestemmelser vedrżrende perioden 2014-2020 styrker i vžsentlig grad Kommissionens muligheder for at beskytte EU-budgettet mod regelstridige udgifter. 
The regulatory provisions for the 2014-2020 period significantly strengthen the Commission’s position on protecting the EU budget from irregular expenditure.
Det skyldes hovedsagelig, at medlemsstaternes rapportering om finansielle korrektioner nu er integreret i den rlige kontrolpakke og undersżges af revisionsmyndighederne. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the Member State’s reporting on financial corrections is now integrated into the annual assurance package and examined by the audit authority.
Hertil kommer, at de lovgivningsmžssige bestemmelser vedrżrende perioden 2014-2020 giver Kommissionen flere befżjelser til at sikre, at der ikke lžngere godtgżres regelstridige udgifter over EU-budgettet. 
Moreover the legal provisions introduced for the 2014-2020 period give more power to the Commission to ensure that irregular expenditure is no longer reimbursed from the EU budget.
Endelig giver det stżrre juridisk sikkerhed for medlemsstaterne, at reglerne har form af forordninger i stedet for retningslinjer. 
Finally, there is also increased legal certainty for Member States due to the rules being set as regulations rather than guidance.