natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De mener, at den nuvžrende regulering af industrien garanterer en sikker forsyning af sukker af hżj kvalitet til EUŐs forbrugere, og at den pris, som forbrugerne betaler for sukkeret, er rimelig, samtidig med at den sikrer industrien og dyrkerne gode, men ikke uforholdsmžssigt hżje indtžgter. 
They consider that the current regulation of the industry guarantees a secure supply of high-quality sugar to EU consumers and that the price to consumers is reasonable while ensuring good, but not excessive revenues for the industry and growers.
(3) 4 ( ) 5 (6) (7) () Det Forenede Kongerige, Nederlandene, Danmark, Sverige, Finland, Gržkenland, Irland, Portugal, Spanien og Żstrig. For eksempel Kommissionens beslutning 97/624/EF (EFT L 258 af 22.9.1997) og 1999/210/EF (EFT L 76 af 22.3.1999). 
(3) United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Greece, 4 Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Austria. () For example, Commission Decisions 97/624/EC (OJ L 258, 22.9.1997) 5 and 1999/210/EC (OJ L 76, 22.3.1999).
Isoglukose og inulinsirup. Rabobank: ČThe World of Sugar and SweetenersÇ, 1999, s. 35. 
(6) Isoglucose and inulin syrup. (7) Rabobank, The World of Sugar and Sweeteners, 1999, p.
Dette belżb svarer til 25 % af de sukkerafgifter, der er opfżrt i EUŐs budget for 2000. 
35. () This figure corresponds to 25 % of the sugar levies entered in the EU budget for 2000.
15.2.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 50/15 88. 
15.2.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 50/15 88.
Forbrugerne og de industrier, der anvender sukker, peger p de mest produktive forarbejdningsvirksomheders store overskud som bevis p, at beskyttelsesniveauet er for hżjt, og de stiller spżrgsmlstegn ved, om landbrugspolitikken bżr regulere og beskytte en forarbejdningsindustri i s hżj grad, som det er tilfžldet. 
Consumers and industrial users of sugar pointed to the high profits being made by the more efficient processing companies as evidence that the level of protection is too high and questioned whether it is appropriate for an agricultural policy to regulate and protect a processing industry so closely.
Kvoterne bliver i fżrste omgang tildelt medlemsstaterne, og derefter fordeles de mellem forarbejdningsvirksomhederne. 
Quotas are allocated in the first place to Member States and then to the sugar-processing companies.
Det har medfżrt, at sukkerdyrkningen er blevet opretholdt i regioner, som ikke er velegnede, og i nogle tilfžlde har det vžret nżdvendigt at yde national stżtte til produktionen. 
This has had the effect of preserving sugar production in regions which are not well suited to it, and which in some cases have required national aids to support production.
Derimod har dyrkerne i de mest produktive dyrkningsomrder ikke kunnet opn stżrre kvoter. 
Conversely, the most efficient production regions have not been able to obtain increased quotas.
Et grundlžggende ml med at fastsžtte kvoter er at lžgge loft over den del af den rlige produktion, der kan sžlges til den garanterede interventionspris. 
A basic aim of setting quotas is to restrict the quantity of annual production eligible for the intervention price guarantee.
Men p grund af ordningerne med refusion af oplagringsomkostninger og eksportrestitutioner udbydes der, trods den store overskudsproduktion, overhovedet ikke sukker til interventionsopkżb. 
But because of the reimbursement of the costs of storing sugar and the availability of export refunds, even with the considerable surplus, no quantities are offered for intervention purchase.
Retten konstaterede, at sukkerpriserne ab fabrik gennemsnitligt l 10 % over interventionsprisen, og at de l betydeligt hżjere i nogle lande. 
Evidence was found that factory-gate sugar prices were on average 10 % above intervention prices and considerably more in some countries.
Dette har bidraget til at skabe en situation, hvor der ikke er effektiv konkurrence. Og der findes ikke et egentligt Čfžlles mar-kedÇ for sukker. 
This has contributed to the situation where competitive forces are not functioning effectively and there is no real Ôcom-mon marketŐ for sugar.
Under Rettens samtaler med de forskellige interesseparter kom det frem, at forarbejdningsvirksomhederne ikke er interesserede i at konkurrere med virksomheder i andre lande og stort set bliver p deres hjemmemarked. 
In discussions with the various stakeholders it became apparent that processors have little interest in competing with processors in other countries and remain largely in their home markets.
Kvoterne og prissy-stemet, ordningen for refusion af oplagringsomkostninger og eksportprogrammet sikrer forarbejdningsvirksomhederne stabilitet og en garanteret indtžgt. 
The quotas and the price system, along with the storage-cost reimbursements and export programme, provide stability and a guaranteed income to processors.
Det er en sjžldenhed inden for den fžlles landbrugspolitik, at forarbejdningsindustrien beskyttes i hżj grad. 
This degree of protection for the processing industry is rare in the CAP.
For forbrugerne er sukker et basisnžringsmiddel, som de vil kżbe uanset prisen, uden at man dog kan se bort fra prisens effekt p husholdningsbudgettet, isžr lavindkomstfamiliernes budget. 
Consumers consider sugar to be a staple product which will be bought at any price, but for which the impact on the household budget, in particular for low-income families, cannot be neglected.
Den nuvžrende fžlles markedsordning, som lader forbrugerne betale stżtten til sukkerroedyrkerne og forarbejdningsindustrien, opfattes derfor af forbrugerne som mindre rimelig, og i hvert fald mindre gennemsigtig, end et system baseret p direkte stżtte til landbrugerne betalt over EUŐs budget. 
As such the current CMO, which makes the consumers pay for the support to beet growers and the sugar processing industry, is seen by consumers as being less fair, and certainly less transparent, than a system based on direct support to farmers from the EU budget.
Den fžlles markedsordning for sukker: 1992-og Agenda 2000-reformerne 93. 
The CMO for sugar: the 1992 and Agenda 2000 reforms 93.
I de sidste ti r er der gennemfżrt to store reformer af den fžlles landbrugspolitik, som begge har haft til forml at styrke den europžiske landbrugssektors konkurrenceevne, men ingen af reformerne har omfattet sukkersektoren. 
There have been two major reforms of the CAP in the last decade, both concerned with the need to improve the competitiveness of the European agricultural sector, but in neither case was the sugar sector involved.
Som det fremgr af nedenstende tabel, er den fžlles markedsordning for sukker stadig nžsten udelukkende orienteret mod forarbejdningsvirksomhederne og det fžrdige produkt, og ikke mod landbrugerne. 
The CMO for sugar remains, as the following table shows, almost entirely targeted on the processing companies and the finished product rather than on the farmer.
Foranstaltninger med direkte virkninger for landbrugerne Basispris for sukkerroer Vžsentlige foranstaltninger med direkte virkninger for forarbejdningsindustrien Basispris for sukkerroer Interventionsordninger og interventionspriser for hvidt sukker Eksportrestitution for hvidt sukker Eksportrestitution for sukker i forarbejdede produkter Produktionsafgift p hvidt sukker Nationale produktionskvoter for hvidt sukker Krav om eksport af sukker produceret ud over kvoterne Mulighed for at overfżre en del af overskuddet Stżtte til oplagring Godkendelse af lagerfaciliteter Afgift p salg af sukker til džkning af oplagringsstżtten Krav om minimumslagre Beskyttelse mod import Produktionsrestitution til den kemiske industri Produktionskvoter for isoglucose og inulinsirup Stżtte til raffineringsindustrien Import af sukker i henhold til pržferenceaftalen med AVS-staterne for at sikre raffinaderierne forsyninger Kontrol af eksport, import, produktion og oplagring af sukker 
Measures directly affecting farmers Minimum price for beet Main measures directly affecting the processing industry Minimum price for beet Intervention arrangements and prices for white sugar Export refunds on white sugar Export refunds for sugar in processed products Levy on production of white sugar National quotas on production of white sugar Obligation to export sugar produced in excess of quota Possibility of carrying forward part of surplus Aid for storage Approval of storage facilities Levy on sales to fund storage aid Obligation to hold minimum stocks Protection from imports Production refunds for chemical industry Quotas on isoglucose production and inulin syrups Aid for refining industry Import of SPS sugar to guarantee supply to refineries Controls on exports, imports, production and storage of sugar
C 50/16 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 15.2.2001 95. 
C 50/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.2.2001 95.
I Agenda 2000-reformen blev der lagt vžgt p konkurrencedygtighed p verdensmarkedet, miljżbeskyttelse, fortsat udvikling af landdistrikterne, forenkling af lovgivningen og stżrre ansvarlighed over for skatteyderne. 
In the Agenda 2000 reform emphasis was placed on competitiveness on world markets, environmental protection, sustained rural development, simpler policies and greater accountability to the taxpayer.
EU-sukker er ganske klart ikke konkurrencedygtigt p verdensmarkedet. 
EU sugar is clearly not competitive on the world market.
75 % af EUŐs interventionspris, for at det overskydende kvotesukker kan sžlges. 
Subsidies of the order of 75 % of the EU intervention price are currently needed to enable the quota surplus to be sold.
ČCÇ-sukker (produktion ud over kvoterne), som der ikke ydes eksportrestitution for, kan kun sžlges med fortjeneste til verdensmarkedspriser, fordi kvotesukker kan sžlges til priser, der kan džkke forarbejdningsvirksomhedernes faste omkostninger. 
C sugar (production in excess of quotas), which receives no export refunds, can only be sold profitably at world market prices because the prices obtained for sales of quota sugar are sufficient to cover all the fixed costs of the processing companies.
Intensiv sukkerproduktion kan have negative konsekvenser for miljżet: Der kržves meget vand til dyrkning af sukkerroer (tre gange s meget som til hvede), og denne afgrżde kržver ogs store mžngder ukrudtsmidler (1). 
Intensive sugar production can have negative consequences for the environment: the water requirement is high (three times that of wheat) and the nature of the crop entails a heavy usage of herbicides (1).
Med hensyn til ansvarlighed er det kun rimeligt, at der ved hjžlp af korrekte opgżrelser og offentlig rapportering sikres gennemsigtighed og ansvarlighed i sukkerpolitikken, nr det tages i betragtning, at hovedparten af omkostningerne betales af forbrugerne, dvs. offentligheden. 
As regards accountability, the fact that the major cost of the sugar policy is borne by the final consumer, i.e., the public, warrants proper quantification and public reporting to ensure transparency.
KONKLUSION 99. 
CONCLUSION 99.
14/2000 om en grżnnere fžlles landbrugspolitik (EFT C 353 af 8.12.2000), punkt 27, og OECD Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Committee for Agriculture, Group on Cereals, Animal Feed and Sugar: ČSugar Policy Reform: Environmental Policy AspectsÇ, 24.9.1998. 
(1) See the CourtŐs Special Report No 14/2000, ÔGreening the CAPŐ, (OJ 353, 8.12.2000) paragraph 27, and the OECD Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Committee for Agriculture, Group on Cereals, Animal Feed and Sugar; Sugar Policy Reform: Environ-mentalPolicyAspects,24September1998.
Rettens gennemgang af sukkerordningen viser, at mange af mlene for den fžlles landbrugspolitik og den fžlles markedsordning bliver net, men der skabes et strukturbetinget overskud, og ordningen indebžrer store omkostninger for EUŐs budget og forbrugerne. 
The review of the sugar regime shows that many of the CAP and CMO objectives are being achieved, but with a structural surplus and at a high cost to the EU budget and to the consumer.
Kommissionen kan ikke holdes eneansvarlig for denne situation, men Kommissionens forvaltning og i sžrdeleshed kvaliteten af dens forslag, beslutninger og aktioner har haft indflydelse p resultaterne. Her er Kommissionen fuldt ansvarlig og kan ogs drages til ansvar. 
While the Commission cannot be held entirely accountable for this situation, the soundness of the CommissionŐs management and in particular the quality of its proposals, decisions and actions has had an impact on the outcomes and for this the Commission is responsible and accountable.
Trods den strukturbetingede overskudsproduktion har Kommissionen gentagne gange blot foreslet, at sukkerordningen skulle viderefżres, og at kvoterne og priserne skulle opretholdes užndrede. 
Despite a situation of structural overproduction, the Commission has repeatedly limited itself to proposing the continuation of the sugar regime and maintaining the levels of quotas and prices unchanged.
Kommissionens tjenester har imidlertid indsamlet omfattende oplysninger og foretaget analyser, som burde vžre lagt til grund for forslag til korrigerende foranstaltninger. 
However, extensive information has been collected, and analyses prepared, by the CommissionŐs services which should have provided the basis for proposing corrective action.
P baggrund af den żgede produktivitet i dyrkningen og forarbejdningen af sukkerroer burde Kommissionen have taget spżrgsmlet om ordningens omkostninger for EUŐs forbrugere op til overvejelse. 
Increases in productivity in sugar beet production and processing should have prompted the Commission to address the question of the costs imposed on EU consumers.
Der er gennemfżrt to store reformer af den fžlles landbrugspolitik i de sidste ti r, men ingen af dem har omfattet den fžlles markedsordning for sukker. 
There have been two major reforms of the CAP in the last decade but in neither case was the sugar CMO involved.
I Agenda 2000-reformen blev der lagt vžgt p konkurrencedygtighed p verdensmarkedet, miljżbeskyttelse, fortsat udvikling af landdistrikterne, forenkling af lovgivningen og stżrre ansvarlighed over for skatteyderne. 
Agenda 2000 placed emphasis on competitiveness in world markets, environmental protection, sustained rural development, simpler policies and greater accountability to the taxpayer.
Den fžlles markedsordning for sukker džkker ikke disse aspekter godt nok. 
None of these aspects are satisfactorily addressed in the sugar CMO.
Den fžlles markedsordning for sukker kommer kun forholdsvis f landbrugere til gode, men de er til gengžld sikret en indtžgt ved dyrkning af sukkerroer, som er betydeligt hżjere end indtžgterne ved dyrkning af andre vigtige afgrżder (jf. bilag II). 
The CMO for sugar benefits relatively few farmers, but for those that do benefit, it provides a level of income from beet growing well above that available from other major crops (see Annex II).
I betragtning af den effekt, som kvotesystemet og de hżje priser har, bżr muligheden for at indfżre alternative foranstaltninger undersżges. 
Given the impacts of the quota system and the high prices, alternative measures should be examined.
Importrestriktionerne beskytter EU-markedet mod verdensmarkedets ustabile priser og beskytter EUŐs sukker-producenter, men en vis liberalisering af EUŐs sukkerindustri bżr overvejes for at żge konkurrencen og f priserne ned. 
While import restrictions insulate the EU market from the volatility of world market prices and protect EU sugar producers, a degree of liberalisation of the EU sugar industry in order to increase competitive forces and reduce prices should be considered.
Nogle interesseparter foreslr, at kvoterne direkte tildeles dyrkerne, og at fleksibiliteten sikres ved, at det bliver tilladt at overfżre kvoter. 
Some stakeholders have suggested that quotas be allocated directly to growers and flexibility ensured by allowing quotas to be transferred.
Andre foreslr, at der kun fastsžttes en basispris for sukkerroer (for at beskytte dyrkerne mod dominerende forarbejdningsvirk-somheder), og at ordningen med kvoter og intervention afvikles, s det er markedskržfterne, der sikrer, at der fortsat fremstilles sukker af en tilstržkkelig hżj kvalitet, mentil en konkurrencedygtig pris. 
Others have argued for only a minimum beet price to be fixed (to protect the farmer from a dominant processor) and for quotas and intervention to be phased out, with market forces ensuring that sufficient high quality sugar continued to be supplied and that the price was competitive.
En tredje mulighed er at fżlge 1992-reformens grundlžggende principper for andre markafgrżder (jf. punkt 93). 
Another option raised is that of adopting the basic principles of the 1992 reform which applied to other arable crops (see paragraph 93).
Det ville medfżre, at en stor del af stżtten ville blive ydet som direkte betalinger til dyrkerne, og at de institutionelle priser ville nžrme sig verdensmarkedspriserne. 
This would imply a substantial proportion of support taking the form of direct payments to growers and the convergence of institutional prices with world market levels.
De forhold, der beskrives i punkt 87-92, rejser tvivl om, hvorvidt mekanismerne i den nuvžrende fžlles markedsordning for sukker er hensigtsmžssige. 
The elements presented in paragraphs 87 to 92 call into question the appropriateness of the mechanisms of the current CMOforsugar.Anumberofalternativesexistwhichthe
15.2.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 50/17 som Kommissionen bżr tage stilling til i sine forslag til den forestende reform af ordningen. 
15.2.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 50/17 Commission should address in its forthcoming proposals for the reform of the regime.
Det bżr ogs undersżges, om det nuvžrende stżtteniveau er rimeligt, nr kvoterne langt overstiger efterspżrgslen i EU, og priserne ikke lžngere er p niveau med priserne for andre vigtige afgrżder. 
It is also necessary to examine whether the current level of support remains appropriate when quotas far exceed the level of EU demand and prices are no longer in line with the other major crops.
I fremtidige forslag bżr fżlgende centrale aspekter derfor tages i betragtning: Ń konsekvenserneafatopretholdekvoternepderesnuvžrende niveau trods det konstante strukturbetingede overskud fżlgende hżje afgifter p import af sukker, som ikke er omfattet af en pržferenceaftale Ń det faktum, at sukkerordningen tager mere sigte p industrien end p dyrkerne Ń denbegržnsedekonkurrencemellemforarbejdningsvirksom-hederne Ń modsžtningerne mellem principperne og mlene for Agenda 2000-reformen og for den nuvžrende fžlles markedsordning for sukker. 
The key issues therefore to be taken into account in future proposals include: Ń the consequences of keeping quotas at their existing levels despite the continuing structural surplus, Ń the justification for the high prices obtaining in the EU market and the resulting high level of duties on non-preferential sugar imports, Ń the extent to which the sugar regime focuses on the industry rather than the growers, Ń the limited competition among processors, Ń the contradictions between the principles and objectives of the Agenda 2000 reform and the current sugar CMO.
Ń rimeligheden af de hżje priser p EU-markedet og de deraf Vedtaget af Revisionsretten i Luxembourg p mżdet den 26. oktober 2000. 
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 26 October 2000.
C 50/18 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 15.2.2001 BILAG I Den fžlles markedsordning for sukker Ń udgifter og afgifter (Mio. 
C 50/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.2.2001 ANNEX I Sugar CMO: expenditure and levies (Mio EUR.
EUR. Faktiske tal for 1995-1999 og budgettet for 2000) 1995 1996 Restitutioner Ń sukker og isoglucose Refusion af oplagringsomkostninger Restitutioner for anvendelse i den kemiske industri Stżttetilafsžtningafrsukker 15,015,414,212,811,212,0 Andreinterventioner 34,723,933,844,139,440,0 UDGIFTER Foranstaltninger Udgifter i alt 1 831,0 726,0 5,9 1,1 542,0 1 711,3 711,6 6,8 1,6 490,8 1 607,8 746,5 6,6 2,2 349,0 1 776,7 780,5 6,4 2,8 280,1 2 112,8 817,5 7,1 2,0 288,5 1 996,0 788,3 6,8 3,0 286,9 1 312,1 1 230,0 398,8 361,1 70,4 80,9 1 115,7 362,4 81,8 1 265,5 349,5 104,8 1 591,1 342,8 128,3 1 493,0 316,0 135,0 1997 1998 1999 2000 AFGIFTER (indtžgter) Produktionsafgifter Ń sukker Produktionsafgifter Ń isoglucose Produktionsafgifter Ń inulinsirup Lagerafgifter Ń sukker Afgifter p produktion af C-sukker og -isoglucose, der ikke eksporteres 0,30,89,90,30,4p.m. 
Actuals 1995 to 1999 and budget 2000) 1995 Export refunds on sugar and isoglucose Reimbursements of storage costs Refundsonsugarusedinthechemicalindustry 70,480,981,8104,8128,3135,0 Measurestoaidthedisposalofrawsugar 15,015,414,212,811,212,0 Other interventions LEVIES (income) Sugar production levies Isoglucose production levies Inulin syrup production levies Sugar storage levies Total expenditure 34,7 1 831,0 726,0 5,9 1,1 542,0 23,9 1 711,3 711,6 6,8 1,6 490,8 33,8 1 607,8 746,5 6,6 2,2 349,0 44,1 1 776,7 780,5 6,4 2,8 280,1 39,4 2 112,8 817,5 7,1 2,0 288,5 40,0 1 996,0 788,3 6,8 3,0 286,9 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 EXPENDITURE Measure 1 312,1 398,8 1 230,0 361,1 1 115,7 362,4 1 265,5 349,5 1 591,1 342,8 1 493,0 316,0 Charges levied on non-exported C sugar and C isoglucose production 0,30,89,90,30,4p.m.
Afgifterpsubstitutionssukkerog-isoglucoseunderC-kvoten0,80,0 0,00,0p.m. Andre afgifter 40,3 1 316,4 514,6 2,1 1 213,7 497,6 0,0 1 114,1 493,7 0,0 1 070,1 706,6 88,1 1 203,6 909,2 77,7 1 162,7 833,3 Afgifter i alt (indtžgter) Budgetudgifter netto 
Charges levied on substituted C sugar and C isoglucose Additional levies Total levies (income) Net budgetary expenditure 0,8 0,0 40,3 2,1 1 316,4 1 213,7 514,6 497,6 0,0 1 114,1 493,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 88,1 1 070,1 1 203,6 706,6 909,2 p.m.
15.2.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende BILAG II EU-MARKEDET OG VERDENSMARKEDET FOR SUKKER Verdensmarkedet 1. 
15.2.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities ANNEX II THE EU AND THE WORLD SUGAR MARKET The world market 1.
De andre hovedprodukter er hżjfruktosesirup og ikke-energigivende sżdemidler. 
High fructose syrups and intense sweeteners are the other main product groups.
Over 70 % af verdens sukker fremstilles af sukkerrżr, som hovedsagelig dyrkes i Asien, Syd-og Mellemamerika, Afrika og Oceanien. 
Over 70 % of the worldŐs sugar is produced from cane, grown mainly in Asia, South and Central America, Africa and Oceania.
Hovedparten af roesukkeret fremstilles i Europa (80 %) efterfulgt af Nordamerika (10 %) og Asien (8 %) (2). 
Most of the beet sugar is produced in Europe (80 %), followed by North America (10 %) and Asia (8 %) (2).
I de seneste r har Brasilien overtaget EUŐs position som den stżrste producent af sukker i verden med 21,4 millioner tons i 1998/99 sammenlignet med EUŐs 17,6 millioner tons. 
In recent years Brazil has overtaken the EU as the largest producer of sugar in the world, with 21,4 million tonnes in 1998/1999 compared to the EUŐs 17,6 million tonnes.
De andre store producenter er Indien (16,9 millioner tons), Kina (9,7 millioner tons) og USA (7,5 millioner tons) (3). 
The next largest producers are India (16,9 million tonnes), China (9,7 million tonnes) and the United States of America (7,5 million tonnes) (3).
AVS-landene har tilsammen en rlig produktion p 3,9 millioner tons (4). 
The ACP countries together have an average annual production of 3,9 million tonnes (4).
Sukkerforbruget p verdensplan stiger stżt Ń i 1990Őerne med et rligt gennemsnit p 1,4 % (3). 
World sugar consumption is growing steadily at an annual average 1,4 % in the 1990s (3).
Stigningerne er mindst i de industrialiserede lande, som tilsammen tegner sig for en tredjedel af verdens forbrug, og i enkelte af disse lande falder forbruget. 
There is little growth, and even some decline, in consumption in the industrialised countries, who together consume about one third of the world total.
Andre steder stiger forbruget stort set i takt med befolkningstilvžksten, som forventes at vžre p ca. 1 % om ret de nžste 25 r (5). 
Elsewhere, consumption is increasing largely in line with population growth, forecast to be about 1 % per annum over the next quarter century (5).
Verdenshandelen domineres af en hndfuld lande. 
World trade is dominated by a handful of countries.