natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne konklusion var baseret p udtalelser fra medlemsstaterne. 
This conclusion was based on statements from Member States.
Medlemsstaterne var ikke i stand til at fremlžgge nogen form for dokumentation, da de blev anmodet herom ved revisionen. 
When questioned during the audit, Member States were unable to produce any evidence for their statements.
FORBEREDELSEN AF 1998-REFORMEN 20. 
PREPARATION FOR THE 1998 REFORM 20.
Retten undersżgte, hvordan Kommissionen havde forberedt sit reformforslag, og konstaterede, at det var blevet udarbejdet p grundlag af en ržkke centrale hypoteser. 
The Court examined the process through which the Commission prepared its reform proposal and noted that it had been prepared on certain key assumptions.
Disse hypoteser gik ud p, at tobak var af vžsentlig betydning for beskžftigelsen og hele befolkningens livsgrundlag i nogle omrder, at alternative afgrżder ikke var rentable, at den eksisterende uligevžgt p markedet og behovet for stżtte i vžsentligt omfang skyldtes, at den producerede tobak var af drlig kvalitet, hvilket igen medfżrte, at der kun blev opnet lave priser. 
These were that tobacco was of material importance for employment and the entire populationŐs livelihood in some areas; alternative cultivation was not viable; the existing market imbalance and the need for significant support was attributable to the poor quality of tobacco produced which resulted in low prices being obtained.
17.2.2005 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 41/7 Begrundelsen for fortsat at stżtte tobaksproduktionen var ikke baseret p plidelige argumenter 26. 
17.2.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 41/7 The justification for continuing to support tobacco production was not soundly based 26.
Da Kommissionen forberedte den nye politik, kom den til den konklusion, at EU-produktionen kun kunne overleve p lžngere sigt, hvis kvaliteten blev forbedret. 
When preparing the new policy, the Commission concluded that, if quality did not improve, EU production was doomed in the medium term.
Det var dens opfattelse, at EU stadig kunne forbedre kvaliteten af den producerede tobak, og derfor besluttede den at tilskynde producenterne til at dyrke bedre tobak ved at gżre pržmien afhžngig af den kvalitet, der blev produceret. 
It considered that the EU still had the potential to produce better quality tobacco, and therefore decided to provide an incentive by linking premium to the quality produced.
Kommissionen gik ud fra, at markedsprisen ville afspejle tobakskvaliteten. 
The Commission assumed that the market price would reflect the quality of tobacco.
Dette var imidlertid ikke i overensstemmelse med de faktiske markedsforhold, og der blev beget andre fejl, da de anvendte data skulle fortolkes. 
However this did not reflect the reality of the market and other errors were made in interpreting the data used.
For det fżrste byggede Kommissionen sin politik p den antagelse, at EUŐs produktion af visse sortsgrupper kunne opfylde efterspżrgslen i EU, hvis en stżrre andel af tobakken var af en bedre kvalitet, og at misforholdet mellem produktion og efterspżrgsel derved ville mindskes. 
Firstly, the Commission based its policy on the assumption that EU production of certain variety groups could meet EU demand if a larger proportion of better quality tobacco was produced, thus reducing the mismatch between production and demand.
Kommissionen tog imidlertid ikke tilstržkkeligt i betragtning, at forbrugerne i EU ikke lžngere efterspurgte cigaretter fremstillet af dark air cured-tobak, men derimod amerikanske og engelske blandinger med tobak, der ikke kan produceres i EU. 
The Commission did not take sufficiently into account however, that EU consumer demand had switched from dark cigarettes, produced from dark air-cured tobaccos, to American and English blends which require tobacco which cannot be produced in the EU.
Kun importerede tobakssorter gav den żnskede aroma og smag. 
Only imported tobacco varieties offered the qualities of aroma and taste which are required.
Disse kvaliteter var resultatet af de agronomiske og klimatiske betingelser, der var fremherskende i oprindelseslandene. 
These qualities derived from agronomic and climatic conditions prevailing in the countries of origin.
For det andet var Kommissionens konklusion om, at det ville medfżre en forbedring af kvaliteten, hvis pržmien blev reguleret i forhold til prisen, baseret p den vurdering, at de hżjere priser, der blev opnet for tobak med ikke EU-oprindelse, udelukkende skyldtes hżjere kvalitet. 
Secondly, the CommissionŐs conclusion that modulation of the premium in relation to price would improve quality was based on its assessment that the higher prices obtained for tobacco originating outside the EU were uniquely a reflection of its superior quality.
Kommissionen antog derfor, at producenterne ville opn bedre priser, hvis der blev produceret tobak af bedre kvalitet i EU. 
Accordingly the Commission considered that, if tobacco produced in the EU was of better quality producers would receive better prices.
Den prissammenligning, den foretog mellem de hżje priser i lande uden for EU og de lavere priser i EU, var imidlertid ikke plidelig af fżlgende rsager: a) I sammenligningen mellem markedspriserne i EU og markedspriserne uden for EU i de tobaksproducerende lande, som var blevet udvalgt til sammenligningen Ń Malawi, Zimbabwe og USA Ń var der ikke blevet taget hensyn til, at det lave prisniveau i EU skyldtes stżtteordningen, og at priserne p tobak med oprindelse uden for EU l p et relativt hżjere c) De priser, Kommissionen anvendte i sammenligningen, svarede ikke altid til de samlede belżb, som de virksomheder, der foretager den fżrste forarbejdning, betalte producenterne for deres tobak. 
However the price comparison it made between the high non-EU prices and the lower internal prices was not reliable for the following reasons: (a) the comparison of EU and non-EU market prices in those tobacco producing countries selected for comparison, Malawi, Zimbabwe and the USA, did not take account of the fact that EU prices were subsidised through aid and that non-EU prices were maintained at relatively higher levels because of price support through production restrictions; (b) the Commission had no assurance that the export prices it used to value raw tobacco sold represented the value of the sales.
F.eks. var de supplerende belżb, som virksomhederne undertiden udbetaler til tobaksproducenterne eller betaler i naturalier (der kan udgżre op til 28 % af pri-sen), ikke medregnet. d) Kommissionen begik fejl, da den sammenlignede import-og eksportpriserne, fordi importpriserne beregnes som CIF-priser (Cost, insurance freight Ń omkostninger, forsikring og fragt), mens eksportpriserne p EU-tobak beregnes som FOB-priser (Free on Board Ń frit ombord). 
For example they did not include the additional amounts sometimes paid by first processors to growers or benefits in kind (which can account for up to 28 % of the price); (d) the Commission made errors in comparing import and export prices because the prices used for imports are on a CIF (cost insurance freight) basis whereas the export prices of EU tobacco are on a FOB (free on board) basis.
Kommissionens rdgivende udvalg (9) havde peget p, at prisen var pvirket af andre faktorer end kvalitet, f.eks. valutakurssvingninger, udsving i lagerbeholdningerne og udbud af store mžngder tobak p verdensmarkedet fra producenter uden for EU. 
The CommissionŐs advisory Committee (9) indicated that price was affected by factors other than quality such as movements in exchange rates, stock levels and major releases of stock onto the world market by non-EU producers.
Endvidere havde det informeret Kommissionen om, at det, at der ikke fandtes et objektivt kvalitetetssorteringssystem, var en hindring for gennemfżrelsen af en politik baseret p kvalitetsmling. 
Moreover, it had advised the Commission that the absence of an objective quality grading system was an obstacle to implementing a policy which relied on measuring quality.
P grund af disse mangler gav Kommissionens markedsanalyse ikke de politiske beslutningstagere en tilstržkkelig, samlet og afbalanceret forstelse af markedet, som de kunne bruge som vejledning, da de skulle udvžlge markedsforanstaltninger. 
Because of these failings the CommissionŐs market analysis did not provide policy-makers with a sufficiently comprehensive and balanced understanding of the market to guide their selection of the market measures.
Mulighederne for alternative afgrżder 31. 
The possibility of alternative cultivation 31.
Kommissionen anfżrte, at det i nogle tilfžlde ikke var muligt at dyrke alternative afgrżder. 
The Commission argued that, in some cases, alternative cultivation was not possible.
For eksempel blev sun cured-sorterne i Gržkenland dyrket p betingelser, der gjorde det umuligt at dyrke andre afgrżder. 
For example in Greece, sun-cured varieties were grown under conditions that made the growing of alternative crops impossible.
Det fremgik imidlertid af et pilotprojekt (10), der var blevet udfżrt for Kommissionen i 1995, at forskellige alternative afgrżder ville kunne dyrkes med godt resultat (11). 
However, a pilot project (10) for the Commission concluded in 1995 that various alternative crops could be grown with good results (11).
Kommissionens analyse tog ikke i betragtning, at markedet havde žndret karakter 32. 
The CommissionŐs analysis did not take into account changes in the character of the market 32.
Den fžlles markedsordning var ogs efter 1998 baseret p den antagelse, at de virksomheder, der foretog den fżrste tobaksforarbejdning, frit kunne fastsžtte betingelserne med hensyn til prisen i de dyrkningskontrakter, de forhandlede med producenterne. 
The post 1998 CMO continued to be based on the assumption that first processors were independent in setting the terms of the cultivation contract prices negotiated with producers.
Denne antagelse var urealistisk, da forholdene havde žndret sig. 
This assumption was unrealistic since the situation had changed.
Indkżb af tobak var nu koncentreret p et lille antal multinationale forarbejdningsvirksomheder, handlende og fabrikanter, og de sidstnžvnte havde stżrre og stżrre indflydelse p prisfastsžttelsen. 
There had been a concentration of purchasing in the hands of a small number of multinational first processors, merchants and manufacturers and the latter had become increasingly dominant in price setting.
(9) Den Stende Gruppe for Tobak oprettet under Den Rdgivende Komit for Specialafgrżder i medfżr af Kommissionens afgżrelse 98/235/EF. 
(9) The Standing Group on tobacco set up under the Advisory Committee on Specialist Products pursuant to Commission Decision 98/235/EC.
Denne gruppe bestr af eksperter, der repržsenterer producenter, handlende, forarbejdningsvirksomheder, fabrikanter og forbrugere. 
This Group comprises experts representing producers, traders, first processors, manufacturers and consumers.
(10) Kommissionens afgżrelse C(92) 3126/3-12-1992 om et pilot-og demonstrationsprojekt i overensstemmelse med artikel 8 i Rdets forordning (EŻF) nr. 
(10) Commission Decision C(92) 3126 3.12.1992 for a pilot and demonstration project according to Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4256/88 (OJ L 374, 31.12.1988, p.
(Projekt nr. 92 EL.06002). 
(Project No 92.EL.06002).
C 41/8 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 17.2.2005 33. 
C 41/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 17.2.2005 33.
Generaldirektoraterne for Landbrug og Fiskeri modtog i februar 1997 en fžlles skrivelse fra producenter og kooperative sammenslutninger om, at problemet med lave priser skyldtes den oligopolitiske struktur p markedet for forarbejdning, men dette blev ikke undersżgt nžrmere p det tidspunkt. 
The Directorates-General for Agriculture and Fisheries received, in February 1997, a joint letter from producers and cooperative unions indicating that the problem of low prices was attributable to the oligopolistic structure of the processing market but this matter was not investigated at the time.
Ved Rettens revision konstateredes det efterfżlgende, at der anvendes konkurrencebegržnsende metoder (jf. punkt 61-71). 
The CourtŐs audit subsequently found out that anti-competitive practices existed (see paragraphs 61 to 71).
8/1993 havde Retten allerede bemžrket, at producentsammenslutningerne i stigende grad var involveret i den fżrste forarbejdning, hvilket gjorde det muligt for dem at begržnse tobaksfabrikanternes indflydelse p priserne. 
In its Special Report No 8/1993, the Court had already noted that the increasing involvement of producer groups in first processing had permitted them to limit manufacturersŐ influence over prices.
Kommissionens analyse fra 1996 tog ikke de negative fżlger for konkurrencen i betragtning, der opstod, da det i 1993 blev forbudt forbehold, Generaldirektoratet for Miljż havde fremsat, i betragtning. 
The CommissionŐs 1996 analysis did not recognise the negative implications for competition arising from the prohibition, in 1993, of such groups from carrying out first processing (12).
Disse forbehold var imidlertid det vžsentligste argument for Kommissionens forslag om at udfase stżtten til produktion af rtobak, der blev fremsat p Det Europžiske Rds mżde i Gteborg i 2001. 
However, it was the main argument for its proposal for phasing out raw tobacco production subsidies presented to the Gteborg European Council in 2001.
Kommissionen henledte ikke Rdets opmžrksomhed p udtalelsen fra Generaldirektoratet for Told og Indirekte Beskatning (GD for Beskatning og Toldunion) om stżttens effekt p detailpriserne (den bidrager til at sžnke dem). 
The Commission failed to draw CouncilŐs attention to the advice given by the Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect Taxation (Taxation and Customs Union DG) that, subsidies impact on retail prices (reduce them).
Denne effekt p detailpriserne forstžrkes af, at de fleste tobaksproducerende medlemsstater har vedtaget at anvende en lavere afgiftssats p deres egen tobak. 
The effect on retail prices is amplified by the excise duty policy adopted by most tobacco producing Member States, who apply a lower rate of duty to their own tobacco.
Frankrig anvender f.eks. minimumssatsen for forbrugsafgifter p cigaretter af mżrk tobak, der fabrikeres lokalt. 
For example, France applied the minimum rate of excise duty to dark-tobacco cigarettes manufactured locally.
Denne sats er 20 % lavere end den sats, der anvendes for importerede cigaretter af lys tobak. 
This is 20 % lower than the rate applied to imported light-tobacco cigarettes.
P den mde begunstiger medlemsstaterne deres nationale cigaretmžrker, der indeholder en stor andel af stżttet tobak (13). 
In this way, Member States favour their national cigarette brands, containing a large proportion of subsidised tobacco (13).
Det medfżrte, at detailpriserne faldt. 
In consequence, retail prices were lowered.
Autoritative kilder som f.eks. Verdenssundhedsorganisationen og Verdensbanken (14) er af den opfattelse, at lavere priser fr forbruget til at stige og i tilknytning hertil antallet af tobaksrelaterede sygdomstilfžlde. 
Authori-tative sources, such as the World Health Organisation and the World Bank (14), consider that lower prices increase consumption levels and by association, the level of tobacco-related disease.
DEN FŽLLES MARKEDSORDNING HAR IKKE HAFT DEN ŻNSKEDE EFFEKT Mlene for de forskellige foranstaltninger er ikke blevet net 38. 
THE CMO HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE DESIRED IMPACT The various measures have not achieved their objectives 38.
Retten undersżgte, om mlene for de foranstaltninger, der er blevet indfżrt efter 1998-reformen, generelt er blevet net, og konstaterede enten, at der var mange omrder, hvor mlene ikke var net s godt, som det havde vžret meningen, eller at det ikke var muligt at mle effekten, sledes at man kunne afgżre, om foranstaltningerne havde haft et positivt resultat eller ej. 
The Court examined whether, overall, the measures introduced since the 1998 reform had achieved the objectives set and found that they had either not been as successful as intended in many respects or impact could not be measured to determine whether they had been successful or not. The impact of aid on growersŐ income cannot be assessed 39.
Ved at kompensere for de hżjere omkostninger forbundet med at producere tobak af bedre kvalitet, var det meningen, at pržmieordningen skulle bidrage til at gżre tobak fra EU lettere at sžlge og dermed sikre producenterne en rimelig indkomst. 
By compensating for the greater costs involved, the premium system was intended to help make EU tobacco more marketable and thus achieve a fair income.
Kommissionen definerede ikke, hvad der skal forsts ved Čen rimelig indkomstÇ fra tobaksdyrkning, og fastsatte ikke mlelige mlsžtninger med hensyn til de forbedringer, der skulle gennemfżres. Den sżrgede heller ikke for at f relevante oplysninger om produktionsomkostninger, priser og indkomst fra plidelige kilder, sledes at den kunne mle effekten. 
The Commission did not define what constitutes a Ôfair incomeŐ from growing tobacco, set quantifiable targets for improvement or ensure that appropriate information on production costs, prices and income from reliable sources was received in order to measure impact.
Den var derfor ikke i stand til at evaluere effekten af pržmien p producenternes samlede indkomst og p deres levestandard (15). 
It was therefore unable to evaluate the impact of premium on growersŐ income overall and their standard of living (15).
(13) Denne situation bekržftes af Domstolens dom af 27. februar 2002, Sag C-302/00, Kommissionen mod Den Franske Republik, vedrżrende forskellig beskatning af cigaretter af brun tobak og Virginia-tobak. 
(13) This situation is confirmed by the Court of JusticeŐs ruling of 27 February 2002, Case C-302/00 Commission v French Republic, concerning differential taxation of dark and Virginia type tobacco.
(14) The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, World Bank Economics of tobacco toolkit: ČEconomic Analysis of Tobacco DemandÇ. 
(14) The WHO Framework Convention on tobacco control, World Bank economics of tobacco toolkit: ÔEconomic analysis of tobacco demandŐ.
(15) Den evalueringsrapport, Kommissionen henviser til, tager ikke indtžgter fra sekundžre aktiviteter i betragtning, selv om det er nżdvendigt, nr producenternes samlede indkomst og deres levestandard skal vurderes. sdanne sammenslutninger at foretage forarbejdning (12). den fżrste Utilstržkkelig overensstemmelse mellem landbrugspolitikken og andre politikker 34. 
(15) The evaluation report referred to by the Commission does not take into account income from secondary activities which is necessary to evaluate growers income overall and their standard of living.
17.2.2005 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 41/9 Producenternes afhžngighed af stżtte har ikke žndret sig 40. 
17.2.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 41/9 The producersŐ dependence on aid has not changed 40.
75 % af producenternes indkomst fra tobaksproduktion, men er net op p nžsten 95 % for produktionen af en bestemt sort i Italien. 
The premium represents around 75 % of producersŐ income from tobacco production but has reached nearly 95 % for production of one variety in Italy.
Formlet med det variable element i pržmien var at opmuntre producenterne til at forbedre kvaliteten og żge vžrdien af deres produkt og p denne mde nedsžtte deres afhžngighed af stżtte. 
The variable element of premium was intended to provide an incentive to producers to improve quality in order to increase the value of their product thus reducing their dependence on aid.
Kommissionen antog, at de yderligere omkostninger, producenterne skulle afholde for at forbedre kvaliteten, ville blive džkket af den variable pržmie og af de hżjere salgspriser, og at de dermed ville blive mindre afhžngige af stżtte. 
The Commission assumed that the costs to the producer of improving quality would be covered by the variable premium and higher sales prices and thus reduce dependence on subsidies.
Den dokumentation, Kommissionen ligger inde med, viste imidlertid det modsatte. 
The evidence available to the Commission however showed the contrary.
Ifżlge de oplysninger, Kommissionen l inde med i 1998, džkkede de salgspriser, medlemsstaterne meddelte, sammen med EU-pržmien ikke produktionsomkostningerne, end ikke for tobak af god kvalitet (jf. punkt 48). 
The information available at the Commission in 1998 indicated that, even for the better quality tobacco, the sales prices communicated by Member States, along with the EU premium did not cover the costs of production (see also paragraph 48).
Endvidere foreligger der ingen oplysninger om, i hvilket omfang de forskellige foranstaltninger under markedsordningen ville have kunnet nedsžtte afhžngighe-den af stżtte. 
Furthermore, there is no information available showing to what extent the different measures of the CMO would have reduced the dependence on subsidies.
De nyeste markedsoplysninger viser, at gennem-snitssalgspriserne i EU i 2003 var lavere end i 2002, og producenterne var sledes mere afhžngige af stżtte i 2003 end i 2002. 
The most recent market information shows that EU average sales prices in 2003 were lower than in 2002 making producers more dependent on subsidies in 2003 than in 2002.
Stżttens effekt p tobakskvaliteten 42. 
The impact of aid on the improvement of tobacco quality 42.
Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug var af den overbevisning, at kvalitetsforbedringer inden for hver enkelt sortsgruppe kunne mles p stigningen i den mžngde tobak af hżjere kvalitet, der blev produceret. 
The Directorate-General for Agriculture considered that improvements in quality within each variety group could be measured by increases in the quantity of tobacco produced of the higher grades.
Det kržvede imidlertid, at der var defineret standarder for kvalitet og ydelse, og at disse kunne mles p et konstant grundlag. 
This however, required a clear definition of quality standards and performance to be measurable on a constant basis.
Der var adskillige faktorer, der modvirkede dette. 
Several factors militated against this.
For det fżrste er der ikke noget standardkvalitetssorteringssystem, og medlemsstaterne opdeler de samme tobakssorter i forskellige kva-litetssorteringer. 
Firstly, there is no standard grading system and there are variations between Member States in the way in which grades are established for the same varieties of tobacco.
For det andet er det nżdvendigt at tage producentsammenslutningernes sammensžtning og de sžrlige kendetegn ved deres produktion i betragtning, hvis kvalitetsforbedringerne skal mles over tid. 
Secondly, in order to measure quality improvements over time, it is necessary to take into account the composition of producer groups and the characteristics of their production.
Hvis en producent, der producerer tobak af lav kvalitet, forlader sin sammenslutning, vil kvaliteten af sammenslutningens tobak taget under et forbedres, uden at kvaliteten af sammenslutningens produktion som sdan er blevet bedre. 
The effect of a low-quality producer leaving a group, would be to increase the quality of the group concerned even though there would be no improvements of production by producers as a whole.
Det var ikke muligt at mle kvalitetsforbedringer, som skyldtes žndringer i producentsammenslutningerne. 
It was not possible to measure the quality improvements because of the changes which occurred in producer groups.
Med 1998-reformen blev der f.eks. indfżrt krav om, at producentsammenslutningerne skulle have en vis stżrrelse, hvilket fżrte til en stżrre omorganisering. 
For example, the 1998 reform introduced minimum size requirements for producer groups which resulted in significant reorganisation.
Desuden žndres medlemssammensžt-ningen i de fleste producentsammenslutninger fra r til r. 
Also, membership of most producer groups changes from year to year.
Den mde, producentsammenslutningerne er organiseret p, kan gżre det vanskeligt at differentiere den variable pržmie. 
The way in which producer groups are organised can work against modulation of the variable premium.