natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
57 Sygefravžret i Kommissionen steg lidt mellem 2012 og 2017. 
57 The overall sickness rate at the Commission slightly increased between 2012 and 2017.
Der var imidlertid tale om en markant forvžrring i nogle GD'er: De stżrste stigninger i antallet af sygedage pr. medarbejder, inklusive langvarigt fravžr, forekom i GD JUST (fra gennemsnitlig 10,3 dage i 2013-2015 til 17 dage i 2016 og 18,9 i 2017) og GD HOME (fra 9,4 til henholdsvis 14,9 og 15,1). 
However, there was a marked deterioration in some DGs: the greatest increases in the number of sick leave days per head, including long-term absences, were in JUST (from 10.3 days on average in 2013-2015 to 17 days in 2016 and 18.9 in 2017) and HOME (from 9.4 to 14.9 and 15.1 respectively).
58 2014-reformpakken reducerede antallet af rlige feriedage med 42 % (fra 3,5 til 2 dage pr. mned) for medarbejdere i delegationerne og indfżrte žndringer i beregningen af godtgżrelsen for levevilkrene. 
58 The 2014 reforms package reduced the number of days of annual leave by 42 % (from 3.5 to 2 days per month) for staff in delegations and introduced changes to the calculation of the living conditions allowance.
Personalets opfattelse af, at arbejdsvilkrene er blevet forringet, er samlet set stżrre i delegationerne end i Kommissionen som helhed. 
Overall, the staffŐs perception that working conditions have deteriorated is stronger in delegations than at the Commission as a whole.
I 201622 opfattede under 50 % af medarbejderne i delegationerne Kommissionen som en attraktiv arbejdsplads, og kun 21 % mente, at de menneskelige ressourcer matchede arbejdsbyrden. 
In 201622, fewer than 50 % of delegation staff considered the Commission to be an attractive workplace, with only 21 % considering that human resources matched the workload.
59 Et af formlene med de žndringer i personalevedtžgten, der vedrżrer delegationerne, var at opn omkostningsbesparelser23. 
59 One of the drivers for the changes in the SR revision affecting delegations was to generate cost savings23.
Udgifterne til delegationspersonalet tegner sig imidlertid kun for 4,7 % af de samlede udgifter p administrationsbudgettet24. 
However, spending on delegation staff accounts for only 4.7 % of all expenditure from the administration budget24.
Vi konstaterede, at de begržnsede besparelser p budgettet var forbundet med betydelige negative konsekvenser for personalet. 
We found that the small budgetary savings were accompanied by a significant negative impact on staff.
Żget kontrakt-og lżndiversitet 60 Personale ansat efter 2004 og 2014 er ansat p mindre gunstige vilkr end de tidligere vilkr. 
Increased contract and pay diversity 60 Staff recruited after 2004 and 2014 are employed under less favourable conditions than applied previously.
2004-reformen reducerede lżnnen i begyndelseslżnklasserne, og 2014-pakken oprettede AST/SC-ansžttelsesgruppen med en mindre attraktiv lżnskala. 
The 2004 reform reduced entry-grade salaries, and the 2014 package created the AST/SC function group with a less attractive salary grid.
61 I takt med, at brugen af kontraktansatte er blevet mere og mere almindelig, er status-og lżnforskellene steget tilsvarende blandt Kommissionens personale. 
61 As the use of contract staff becomes increasingly common, there has been a corresponding increase in the diversity of status and pay of the CommissionŐs workforce.
Kontraktansatte i ansžttelsesgruppe GF IV, der opfylder de samme minimumsansžttelseskrav (uddannelse og erfaring) som nyansatte administratorer, kan f.eks. tjene 28 % mindre end disse. 
For example, GFIV contract staff meeting the same minimum recruitment requirements (education and experience) as junior administrators may earn 28 % less 22 The full results of the 2018 staff survey were not available at the time of the audit: we used the results of the 2016 survey for DG DEVCO.
P nuvžrende tidspunkt tjener omkring 6 % af personalet, alle kontraktansatte i ansžttelsesgruppe GF I og GF II, mindre end de lavest lżnnede tjenestemžnd (AST/SC1, med en rlig grundlżn p omkring 32 400 euro). 
than the latter. Currently around 6 % of staff, all of them GFI and GFII contract staff, earn less than the lowest paid official (AST/SC1, with a basic yearly salary around Ű32 400).
En tredjedel af personalet (i alle kategorier) tjener op til det dobbelte af det belżb. 
Another third of staff (across all categories) earn up to twice that amount.
62 Der forekommer ogs manglende overensstemmelse mellem lżnklasse og ansvarsniveau blandt tjenestemžnd. 
62 In addition, discrepancies between grade and level of responsibility exist among officials.
Erfarne medarbejdere i de lavere lżnklasser (AD6-AD8) kan have mere ansvar end medarbejdere i hżjere lżnklasser, der blev ansat tidligere. 
Experienced professionals in junior grades (AD6 to AD8) may be assigned greater responsibility than higher graded staff recruited before them.
Ń Kun 22,4 % af rekrutteringen blev foretaget p AD7-niveau mellem 2012 og 2017, og mange erfarne kandidater, der żnskede at arbejde for Kommissionen, ansżgte via udvžlgelsesprżver til stillinger i begyndelseslżnklasserne (AD5/AD6). 
Ń Only 22.4 % of recruitment was at AD7 level between 2012 and 2017, many experienced candidates wishing to work for the Commission applied through entry-grade (AD5/AD6) competitions.
P grund af deres erhvervserfaring og pržstationer fik disse nyansatte ofte hurtigt ansvar (f.eks. som samarbejdsansvarlig i en delegation eller teamleder inden for andre aktiviteter). 
Because of their professional background, and performance, these new recruits were often quickly given responsibilities (e.g. head of cooperation in a delegation, team leader in other activities).
Lżnpakken er blevet mindre attraktiv gennem rene 63 2014-žndringen af personalevedtžgten havde til forml at opretholde attraktive ansžttelsesvilkr. 
Pay package less attractive over the years 63 The 2014 revision of the SR aimed at maintaining attractive recruitment conditions.
Selv om de generelle arbejdsvilkr (herunder startlżnningerne) fortsat er attraktive for de fleste EU-dimittender, har Kommissionen vanskeligt ved at tiltržkke kvalificerede ansżgere fra visse medlemsstater og med visse profiler. 
Even though overall working conditions (including entry-grade salaries) remain attractive for most EU graduates, the Commission faces difficulties in attracting qualified applicants from certain nationalities and with certain profiles.
Hvor attraktiv lżnnen er afhžnger delvis af EU-tjenestemžndenes kżbekraft p de forskellige steder, hvor de arbejder. 
The attractiveness of salaries partly depends on the purchasing power of EU officials in the different locations where they work.
Lżnningerne tilpasses rligt for at sikre "parallellitet" med žndringer i de nationale tjenestemžnds lżnninger og afspejle udviklingen i leveomkostningerne for EU-tjenestemžnd i Belgien og Luxembourg. 
Salaries are updated annually to ensure 'parallelism' with the changes in pay for national civil servants and to reflect the evolution in the cost of living for EU officials in Belgium and Luxembourg.
64 Metoden til rlig tilpasning af EU-tjenestemžndenes lżnninger og pensioner blev žndret i 2004 og igen i 2014. 
64 The annual method for updating the pay and pensions of EU officials was modified in 2004 and again amended in 2014.
65 Uden for Belgien og Luxembourg korrigeres EU-personalets lżnninger og pensioner, sledes at der opretholdes kżbekraftsparitet i forhold til Bruxelles. 
35 65 Outside Belgium and Luxembourg, the pay and pensions of EU staff are corrected to maintain purchasing power parity with reference to Brussels.
Til dette forml beregner Eurostat rlige justeringskoefficienter for bestemte steder. 
For this purpose, Eurostat calculates annual correction coefficients for certain locations.
66 Brugen af metoden har fżrt til regelmžssige stigninger i den nominelle lżn, bortset fra de r, hvor lżnnen var fastfrosset, dvs. i 2011, 2013 og 2014. 
66 Use of the method has led to regular nominal salary increases, except when pay was frozen in 2011, 2013 and 2014.
I 2011-2018 blev EU-tjenestemžndenes lżn justeret som vist i tabel 2. 
In 2011Đ2018 the salaries of EU officials were adjusted as shown in Table 2.
Tabel 2 Đ rlige justeringer af EU-tjenestemžndenes lżn 2011-2018 Kilde: Eurostats rapporter om rlig tilpasning af EU-tjenestemžndenes lżnninger og pensioner. 
Table 2 Đ Annual adjustments to the salaries of EU officials 2011-2018 Source: Eurostat reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of EU officials.
67 Kżbekraften for tjenestemžnd i centraladministrationerne er siden 2003 faldet i hele EU. 
67 The purchasing power of central government civil servants across the EU has declined since 2003.
I overensstemmelse med parallelitetsprincippet er det get samme vej med EU-tjenestemžndenes kżbekraft. 
Consequently, in line with the parallelism principle, the purchasing power of EU officials has followed a similar path.
Fastfrysningerne i 2011, 2013 og 2014 gjorde dog dette fald endnu mere udtalt for EU-personalet (jf. figur 18). 
However, the 2011, 2013 and 2014 freezes made the decline more pronounced for EU staff (see Figure 18).
36 r 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 rlig tilpasningskoefficient baseret p den samlede specifikke indikator og det fžlles indeks for Belgien og Luxembourg 0% (fastfrysning) 0,8 % 0% (fastfrysning) 0% (fastfrysning) 2,4 % 3,3 % 1,5 % 1,7 % 25 I referenceperioden 1.7.2004 til 31.12.2012 blev der beregnet et "internationalt indeks for Bruxelles" i overensstemmelse med personalevedtžgtens bilag XI som žndret ved forordning nr. 
36 Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Annual update coefficient based on GSI and JBLI 0% (freeze) 0.8 % 0% (freeze) 0% (freeze) 2.4 % 3.3 % 1.5 % 1.7 %
Figur 18 Đ Udvikling i kżbekraften for EU-tjenestemžnd i Bruxelles og tjenestemžnd i medlemsstaternes centraladministrationer 37 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10 % -12 % -14 % Personale i medlemsstaternes centraladministrationer (den samlede specifikke indikator) EU-personale i Bruxelles Kilde: Revisionsretten baseret p data fra Eurostat. 
Figure 18 Đ Evolution of the purchasing power of EU officials in Brussels and central governments staff in Member States 37 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10 % -12 % -14 % Central Governments staff in Member States (GSI) EU staff in Brussels Source: ECA, based on Eurostat data.
68 Eurostats rapporter26 indeholder vejledende oplysninger om kżbekraftforskellen mellem EU-ansatte, der arbejder og bor i henholdsvis Luxembourg og Bruxelles. 
68 Eurostat reports26 provide indicative information on the difference in the purchasing power of EU staff working and living in, respectively, Luxembourg and Brussels.
Denne forskel skyldes primžrt, at huslejepriserne stiger hurtigere i Luxembourg. 
This difference mainly results from the faster growth of rental prices in Luxembourg.
Nr der ses bort fra lejeudgifter, var kżbekraften for ansatte i Luxembourg hżjere i 2017 og lavere i 2018. 
Once the cost of rentals is excluded, the purchasing power of Luxembourg-based staff was higher in 2017 and lower in 2018.
I lyset af forskellens stżrrelse er Kommissionen ved at gennemfżre en undersżgelse af, hvor attraktiv den er som institution, og af leveomkostningerne i Luxembourg. 
Given the scale of the difference, the Commission is carrying out a study of its attractiveness as an institution and the cost of living in Luxembourg.
Undersżgelsen forventes afsluttet i tredje kvartal af 2019. 
The study should be completed in the third quarter of 2019.
69 Fordelingen af Kommissionens personale p oprindelseslande afspejler de tilbudte arbejdsvilkrs relative attraktivitet. 
69 The distribution of Commission staff by country of origin reflects the relative attractiveness of the working conditions on offer.
Tilsvarende ses der ubalancer med hensyn 26 "Analytical category reports supplementing the reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of the EU officials" https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/publications. 
Similarly, imbalances are visible in 26 Analytical category reports supplementing the reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of the EU officials https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/publications.
38 til kandidaternes nationalitet i forbindelse med EPSO's udvžlgelsesprżver, hvor nogle lande er underrepržsenteret (f.eks. Tyskland, Frankrig og Nederlandene)27. 
38 the nationalities of candidates in EPSO competitions, with certain countries (e.g. France, Germany and the Netherlands) under-represented27.
70 Vi foretog en detaljeret analyse af Kommissionens statistikker om de ansattes nationalitet for at undersżge, om der kunne konstateres ubalancer, som ikke var berettigede ud fra objektive kriterier. 
70 We conducted a detailed analysis of the CommissionŐs staff nationality statistics to see what imbalances not justified by objective criteria could be observed.
Vi sammenlignede den andel af Kommissionens personale, som de enkelte nationaliteter udgjorde, med landenes andel af EU's erhvervsaktive befolkning (kilden til potentielle medarbejdere) og beregnede, hvor mange medarbejdere de enkelte medlemsstater "burde" levere til de enkelte lżnklasser. 
We compared the share of CommissionŐs staff of each nationality with the corresponding country share of the EUŐs active population (the source of potential recruits), computing how many staff each Member State "should" supply by grade range.
Figur 19 viser resultaterne af analysen. 
Figure 19 presents the results of this analysis.
27 Rapport fra Kommissionen til Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet i henhold til artikel 27 i vedtžgten for tjenestemžnd og artikel 12 i ansžttelsesvilkrene for de żvrige ansatte i Den Europžiske Union (geografisk balance), COM(2018) 377 final. 
27 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council pursuant to Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and to Article 12 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (Geographical balance), COM(2018) 377 final.
71 Fordelingen af Kommissionens personale p oprindelseslande viser betydelige forskelle mellem nationaliteterne, hvor det i alle lżnklasser gžlder, at belgiske statsborgere er mest repržsenteret28, og britiske og tyske statsborgere er mindst repržsenteret. 
71 The distribution of Commission staff by country of origin reveals significant differences between nationalities, with Belgian nationals the most represented28, and UK and German nationals the least represented, at all grades.
Spanske, franske, polske og nederlandske statsborgere er sžrligt underrepržsenteret i fżlgende lżnklasser: Ń de mellemliggende AD-lżnklasser (5-8) for Spaniens, Frankrigs og Nederlandenes vedkommende Ń de mellemliggende AST-lżnklasser (5-9) og hżjere AD-lżnklasser (9-12) for Polens vedkommende. 
Spanish, French, Polish and Dutch nationals are particularly under-represented in the following grades: Ń in the intermediate AD grades (5-8) for Spain, France and the Netherlands, and Ń in the intermediate AST (5-9) and higher AD (9-12) grades for Poland.
72 Vi konstaterede, at mżnsteret for under-og overrepržsentation ikke er det samme i alle lżnklasser. 
72 We found that the pattern of under-and over-representation is not consistent among grades.
Nogle lande er overrepržsenteret i de lavere AST-lżnklasser (Rumžnien og Bulgarien), mens andre er overrepržsenteret i de hżjere AD-lżnklasser (navnlig Sverige, Finland, Gržkenland og Italien). 
Some countries are over-represented in the lower AST grades (Romania and Bulgaria), while other are over-represented in the higher AD grades (most noticeably Sweden, Finland, Greece and Italy).
73 Samlet set har žndringerne i ansžttelsesvilkrene reduceret EU-institutionernes relative attraktivitet som arbejdsplads for ansżgere fra en ržkke lande, der allerede er underrepržsenteret. 
73 Overall, changes in the conditions of employment have reduced the relative attractiveness of working for the EU to some nationalities that are already under-represented.
Den dokumentation, vi indsamlede, viser forskellene i Kommissionens attraktivitet for dimittender. 
The evidence we collected shows disparity in the attractiveness of the Commission for graduates.
Ifżlge Trendence Institutes "graduate barometer" var Kommissionen og EU-systemet den 15. mest populžre potentielle arbejdsgiver i EU i 201629. 
The Trendence Institute's graduate barometer listed 'Commission and EU careers' as the 15th most popular potential employer in the EU in 201629.
Resultaterne for de enkelte lande afslżrer betydelige forskelle med hensyn til, i hvor hżj grad Kommissionen opfattes som attraktiv. I 2017 var Kommissionen nr. 6 (7,4 %) i Żstrig, og i 2016 var den nr. 
The results by country reveal significant disparities in the Commission's perceived attractiveness. In 2017 the Commission was ranked 6th (7.4 %) in Austria, and in 2016 it was ranked 7th (4.8 %) in France and 15th in Spain (3.5 %), but only 31st (2.2 %) in Germany and 48th (1.5 %) in Poland.
En bedre udarbejdelse af 2014-pakken kunne have bidraget til at mindske dens negative konsekvenser 74 I lyset af omfanget og arten af de potentielle żkonomiske og ikkeżkonomiske virkninger af 2014-reformpakken ville vi have forventet, at Kommissionen havde 28 Belgien er et vžrtsland, hvilket har indflydelse p antallet af belgiske medarbejdere i Kommissionen. 
Better preparation of the 2014 package could have helped mitigate its negative consequences 74 Given the size and nature of the potential financial and non-financial impacts of the 2014 reforms package, we would have expected the Commission to have carried out an assessment similar to those made for other major legislative proposals with budgetary implications. 28 Belgium is a host country which has an impact on the number of staff working for the Commission.
29 I en undersżgelse med 300 000 dimittender fra 24 europžiske lande fik Kommissionen 2,94 % positive svar, sammenlignet med 11,54 % for den hżjest placerede arbejdsgiver. 40 
29 In a survey of 300 000 graduates from 24 European countries, the Commission obtained 2.94 % of positive answers, compared to 11.54 % for the first employer cited. 40
Begržnset fokus p ikkeżkonomiske aspekter 75 Kommissionen mente ikke, at den juridisk var forpligtet til at foretage en dybdegende analyse af de foreslede žndringers potentielle konsekvenser. 
Low focus on non-financial aspects 75 The Commission considered that there was no legal requirement to carry out an in-depth analysis of potential consequences of the proposed changes.
Derfor blev der ikke forud for gennemfżrelsen af 2014-pakken foretaget en overordnet analyse af hverken de problemer, der skulle lżses, eller de sandsynlige kort-og langsigtede konsekvenser af de valgte foranstaltninger for HR-forvaltningen. 
As a result, implementation of the 2014 package was not preceded by an overall analysis of either the problems to be addressed or the likely short and long-term consequences of the chosen measures on HR management.
76 Kommissionens forberedende analyse fokuserede primžrt p vurderingen af de sandsynlige żkonomiske virkninger af de foreslede omkostningsbesparende foranstaltninger. 
76 The CommissionŐs preparatory analysis focused largely on estimating the likely financial effects of the proposed cost-saving measures.
Vi konstaterede, at analysen af budgetbesparelserne var baseret p en forsvarlig metode, som forklarede de vigtigste antagelser. 
We found that the analysis of budgetary savings was based on a sound methodology which explained the key assumptions made.
77 For s vidt angr HR-situationen fokuserede Kommissionen primžrt p at udvikle foranstaltninger til afhjžlpning af specifikke konsekvenser af 2004-reformen. 
77 Regarding the HR situation, the Commission focused mostly on developing measures to remedy specific consequences of the 2004 reform.
Disse foranstaltninger var begrundet i analyser foretaget i perioden 2009-2011, navnlig: Ń en Eurostatundersżgelse af de langsigtede budgetmžssige konsekvenser af pensionsudgifterne, der beskžftigede sig med de vigtigste tendenser p omrdet i perioden 2010-2059 Ń en rapport om žkvivalens mellem den gamle (fżr 2004) og den nye karrierestruktur, der konkluderede, at žkvivalensen ikke var opretholdt for alle ansžttelsesgrupper, og at der var brug for en klarere sammenhžng mellem ansvarsniveau og lżnniveau. 
These measures were motivated by analyses done during 2009-2011, in particular: Ń a Eurostat study on the long-term budgetary implications of pension costs, which addressed the major trends forecast in this area from 2010 to 2059; Ń a report on equivalence between the old (pre-2004) and new career structures, which concluded that equivalence was not maintained for all function groups and there was a need for a clearer correlation between levels of responsibility and levels of pay.
78 De HR-relaterede virkninger af de omkostningsbesparende foranstaltninger blev dog ikke alle vurderet lige detaljeret. 
78 However, the HR implications of the cost-saving measures were not all assessed in the same degree of detail.
79 Som fżlge heraf var nogle af ovennžvnte forslag til žndringer af ansžttelsesvilkrene ikke baseret p en analyse af forventede eller identificerede problemer. 
79 As a result, some of the proposed changes to the conditions of employment listed above were not based on an analysis of expected or identified problems.
Nogle af dem blev introduceret under trepartsforhandlingerne og var hovedsagelig begrundet med budgetbesparelser. 
them were introduced during the trilogue stage and their justification came mainly from the budgetary savings perspective.
Utilstržkkelig overvgning af og rapportering om HR-konsekvenser 80 Vi konstaterede svagheder i Kommissionens overvgning af de primžre HR-virkninger af foranstaltningerne i 2014-pakken, f.eks. den lžngere arbejdsuge og nedskžringen p 5 % i antallet af stillinger. 
Insufficient monitoring and reporting on HR consequences 80 We found weaknesses in the CommissionŐs monitoring of the main HR effects of the measures in the 2014 package, such as the increased working week and the 5 % reduction in posts.
81 Hvis der skal tildeles personale til prioriterede omrder, kržver det et system med tilstržkkelig plidelige data til at vurdere arbejdsbyrden i Kommissionen som helhed. 
81 To assign staff to priorities, it is necessary to have a system with sufficiently reliable data for assessing workload across the Commission as a whole.
Information om den andel af ressourcerne, der bruges p bestemte opgaver (mlsžtninger), er en forudsžtning for, at lederne kan stilles til ansvar og afgive udtalelser til underbyggelse af den rlige forvaltningserklžring. 
Information about the resources used for specific tasks (objectives) is a requirement for managerial accountability, which supports the annual declaration of assurance.
82 2014-reformpakken indfżrte en arbejdsuge p mindst 40 timer og omfattede bestemmelser om fleksible arbejdstidsordninger. 
82 The 2014 reforms package introduced a minimum 40-hour working week and included rules on flexible working time arrangements.
Disse nye bestemmelser er baseret p nżje overvgning og forvaltning af arbejdstiden for at lette hndteringen af de begržnsede personaleressourcer. 
These new provisions are predicated upon the careful monitoring and management of working time in order to facilitate the handling of limited staff resources.
83 Overgangen til en arbejdsuge p 40 timer var ikke tilstržkkelig til at kompensere for nedskžringen p 5 % i antallet af stillinger i alle tjenestegrene, eftersom en stor del af personalet allerede arbejdede lžngere, end de juridisk var forpligtet til. 
83 The shift to a 40-hour working week was not enough to compensate for the 5 % reduction in posts in all services, as many staff were already working longer than legally required.
I stedet fżrte personalenedskžringerne til omstrukturering og udvikling af nye arbejdsmetoder i nogle GD'er og tjenestegrene. 
Instead, the reduction in posts led to restructuring and to the development of new methods of working in some DGs and services.