natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette gžlder ogs EU-ml i form af bindende internationale forpligtelser21. 
This also concerns EU objectives in the form of binding international commitments21.
EU's forskellige politikomrder har overlappende ml vedrżrende f.eks. territorial balance/samhżrighed, social inklusion og bekžmpelse af fattigdom. 
Different EU policy areas have overlapping objectives regarding, for example, territorial balance/cohesion, social inclusion and reduction of poverty.
Vi fandt f.eks. ikke meget, der tyder p, at mlene om komplementaritet og synergi mellem ESI-fondene blev udmżntet praktisk i partnerskabsaftalerne (som blev indfżrt i perioden 2014-2020) og i landdistriktsprogrammerne. 
For example, we found little evidence that the aims of complementarity and synergy between the ESI funds were put into practice in the partnership agreements (introduced for 2014-2020) and in the rural development programmes.
Inputtene i den fžlles landbrugspolitik 21 Hvad Kommissionens meddelelse siger om input: Ľ For ikke at foregribe resultatet af den igangvžrende bredere debat om den fremtidige finansiering af EU's budget omtaler meddelelsen ikke stżrrelsen af budgettet for den fžlles landbrugspolitik efter 2020. Ľ Meddelelsen angiver ikke en klar forbindelse mellem de fremtidige input og vurderingen af performance. 
CAP inputs 18 What the Commission’s Communication says on inputs: • In order not to pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing broader debate about the future of EU finances, the Communication does not address the size of the post-2020 CAP budget. • The Communication does not provide a clear link between future inputs and the assessment of performance.
Tildelingen af midler er ikke i tilstržkkelig grad baseret p behovene eller den forventede EU-mervžrdi 31. 
The allocation of funds is not sufficiently based on needs or expected EU value added 31.
Midlerne under den fžlles landbrugspolitik tildeles medlemsstaterne i form af nationale "rammebelżb", som ikke er fastlagt p grundlag af medlemsstaternes behov eller p grundlag af forpligtelser til at levere konkrete resultater. 
CAP funds are allocated to Member States in the form of national ‘envelopes’, which are not determined on the basis of Member States’ needs nor commitments to deliver specific results. Instead, Member States then have to come up with measures to spend the pre-defined ‘envelopes’.
Denne metode udgżr en risiko for udgifternes resultatorientering. 
This method poses risks to the performance orientation of spending.
Vi bemžrkede, at landdistriktsprogrammerne ofte ikke giver en overbevisende begrundelse for fordelingen af midler blandt de forskellige foranstaltninger og ml. 
We noted that rural development programmes often do not provide convincing justification for the allocation of funds between measures and objectives.
Det kan forekomme, at finansiering tildeles omrder, hvor den sandsynligvis vil blive opbrugt helt, snarere end omrder, hvor den adresserer centrale behov og skaber resultater. 
Funding may be allocated where it is likely to be fully spent, rather than where it addresses key needs and produces results.
Dette afspejler en udgiftsorienteret kultur snarere end en performanceorienteret kultur. 
This reflects a spending rather than a performance culture.
Medfinansieringssatserne afspejler generelt ikke forskellene mellem de forskellige foranstaltningers potentiale til at skabe EU-mervžrdi. 
Co-financing rates do not, in general, reflect differences between different measures’ potential to deliver EU value added.
En omprioritering af EU-midlerne med fokus p de foranstaltninger, der giver den hżjeste EU-mervžrdi, ville forbedre den forsvarlige żkonomiske forvaltning af politikken. 
Refocussing EU funds on measures with the highest EU value added would improve the sound financial management of the policy.
OECD22 definerer resultatbudgettering som budgettering, hvor de tildelte midler kždes sammen med mlbare resultater. 
The OECD22 defines performance budgeting as "budgeting that links the funds allocated to measurable results".
Kommissionen accepterede ikke vores nylige anbefaling om at anvende konceptet om et resultatorienteret budget, der forbinder hver stigning i ressourcer med en stigning i output eller andre resultater, til finansiering af interventioner inden for samhżrighedspolitikken i perioden efter 2020, hvor det er relevant. 
The Commission did not accept our recent recommendation to apply the concept of a performance budget which links each increment in resources to an increment in outputs or other results, to the funding of cohesion policy interventions for the post-2020 period where appropriate.
Efter at have argumenteret for, at EU-budgettet er et "pržstationsbudget", der giver mulighed for at tage hensyn til pržstationsoplysninger ved budgetprocessen, anfżrte Kommissionen, at den ikke ans det for gennemfżrligt eller anvendeligt i forbindelse med EU-budgettet at anvende en metode, der eksplicit kžder de tildelte ressourcer sammen med output eller resultater. 
While arguing that the EU budget is a ‘performance budget’ with the possibility to take performance information into account during the budgetary process, the Commission stated in its replies that it did not consider the approach of explicitly linking resources allocated to outputs or results feasible or applicable for the EU budget.
Ľ Der bżr gżres mere brug af innovative finansielle instrumenter. 22 OECD: "Policy Brief March 2008, Performance Budgeting: A Users' guide". 
19 22 OECD: Policy Brief March 2008, Performance Budgeting: A Users’ guide.23 OECD: Evaluation of Agricultural Policy Reforms in the European Union: The Common Agricultural Policy 2014-20.
Det vil kržve bedre og hurtigere information at udforme omkostningseffektive instrumenter under den fžlles landbrugspolitik 35. 
CAP processes Better and quicker information needed to design cost-effective CAP instruments 35.
Den fžlles landbrugspolitiks instrumenter er ikke altid udformet p grundlag af solid dokumentation. 
CAP instruments are not always designed on the basis of solid evidence.
Det skyldes delvis det vedvarende problem med EU's politikcyklus, at planlžgningen af en ny programmeringsperiode finder sted, fżr der foreligger tilstržkkelige relevante data om udgifterne og resultaterne i de foregende perioder. 
This is partly due to the perennial problem of the EU policy cycle, where planning for a new programming period takes place before adequate, relevant data are available as regards spending and results from previous periods.
Mangel p tilstržkkelige data (om en ržkke forskellige spżrgsml, f.eks. biodiversitet og jordbundsforhold, efterspżrgslen efter viden og rdgivning eller landbrugshusholdningernes levestandard) og en deraf fżlgende upržcis identificering af de reelle behov (jf. punkt 20-23) fżrer til drlig mlretning af stżtten. 
A lack of sufficient data (on a variety of issues, such as biodiversity and soil, demand for knowledge and advice, or farm households’ living standards) and the consequently imprecise identification of actual needs (see paragraphs 20-23) lead to poor targeting of support.
Kommissionen har for nylig ivžrksat udgiftsrevisioner, men vi har endnu ikke set dens metode. 
The Commission has recently launched spending reviews but we have not yet seen the methodology.
I forbindelse med bestemte stżtteberettigede aktiviteter, hvor risikoen for disse virkninger er sžrlig hżj, kunne finansielle instrumenter overvejes som en mulighed. 
For certain eligible activities, where this risk is particularly high, financial instruments could be considered as an option.
EU besluttede at finansiere klimarelaterede aktioner ved at indarbejde eller "mainstreame" klimaindsatsen i forskellige EU-finansieringsinstrumenter, herunder den fžlles landbrugspolitik. 
The EU decided to fund climate-related action by incorporating, or “mainstreaming”, climate action within different EU funding instruments, including the CAP.
Vi konstaterede imidlertid, at der inden for landbrug og udvikling af landdistrikter ikke er sket nogen betydelig omlžgning i retning af en żget klimaindsats, og at det ikke er alle de potentielle muligheder for at finansiere klimarelaterede aktioner, der er blevet udnyttet fuldt ud. 
However, we found that, in the areas of agriculture and rural development, there has been no significant shift towards climate action and not all potential opportunities for financing climate-related action have been fully explored.
Sikring af sammenhžng mellem den fžlles landbrugspolitik og andre EU-politikker og mellem forskellige instrumenter under den fžlles landbrugspolitik 38. 
Achieving consistency between the CAP and other EU policies and between different CAP instruments 38.
Den fžlles landbrugspolitik udsender somme tider modstridende signaler ved at stżtte foranstaltninger med uforenelige virkninger. 
The CAP sometimes sends conflicting signals by supporting measures with incompatible impacts.
OECD anfżrer f.eks., at den potentielle effekt af 23 Ľ Den fžlles landbrugspolitik vil forbedre sin komplementaritet med andre EU-politikker vedrżrende landomrderne. 
For example, the OECD argues23 that the potential impact of greening was largely offset by the impact of voluntary coupled support.
Nogle fżlgevirkninger er ikke klart identificeret. 
Certain trade-offs are not clearly identified.
F.eks. kapitaliseres indkomststżtten i jordpriserne, hvilket skaber yderligere adgangsbarrierer for yngre landbrugere. 
For example income support becomes capitalised in land prices, increasing barriers to entry for younger farmers.
De yngre landbrugere fr udbetalt ekstra stżtte, som har en betydelig dżdvžgtseffekt og ogs indvirker p jordpriserne. 
Extra support is paid to younger farmers, with a significant deadweight effect, and a further impact on land values.
Forgrżnnelseskravene er imidlertid generelt beskedne og gžlder kun for et mindretal af stżttemodtagerne. 
However, greening obligations are generally undemanding and only apply to a minority of beneficiaries.
Krydsoverensstemmelseskravene gžlder de fleste stżttemodtagere under den fžlles landbrugspolitik, men deres ret til stżtte afhžnger ikke af, at de overholder kravene. For de individuelle landbrugere er sanktionerne for manglende overholdelse generelt lave udtrykt i procent, men ved bred anvendelse kan der opns en vžsentlig effekt. 
While cross-compliance requirements apply to most CAP beneficiaries, the entitlement to CAP support does not depend on following them, and penalties for non-compliance for individual farmers, expressed as a percentage, tend to be low, although through broad application their impact can be significant.
Vi har tidligere anbefalet, at landbrugere kun bżr have adgang til direkte betalinger, hvis de overholder et sžt grundlžggende miljż-og klimakrav, som omfatter de nuvžrende krav vedrżrende krydsoverensstemmelse og forgrżnnelse. 
We recommended to make access to any direct payments conditional upon meeting a set of basic environmental and climate requirements encompassing the current cross-compliance and greening rules.
Der er ogs behov for bedre koordinering med politiske instrumenter uden for den fžlles landbrugspolitik. 
Better coordination with policy instruments outside the CAP is also needed.
Der er overlapning mellem de projekter, der finansieres af Den Europžiske Landbrugsfond for Udvikling af Landdistrikterne (den fžlles landbrugspolitiks anden sżjle), og dem, der finansieres af andre europžiske struktur-og investeringsfonde, hovedsagelig Den Europžiske Fond for Regionaludvikling. 
There is an overlap in scope between the projects funded from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (CAP pillar 2) and those funded from other European Structural and Investment funds, mainly the European Regional Development Fund.
F.eks. kan investeringer i vedvarende energi bde stżttes af ELFUL og af flere andre fonde. 
For example investments in renewable energy can be supported by the EAFRD and several other funds.
Der er behov for forenkling, men ikke p bekostning af effektiviteten 41. 
Simplification needed, but not at the cost of effectiveness 41.
Et eksempel p kontraproduktiv kompleksitet kan ses i landdistriktsprogrammerne, som ofte er flere hundrede sider lange og indeholder pržskriptive detaljer om bestemte gennemfżrelsesaspekter, men ikke giver specifikke oplysninger om de forventede resultater. 
One example of counter-productive complexity is rural development programmes, which often are several hundred pages long and provide prescriptive details of certain aspects of implementation, while remaining unspecific on the expected results.
24 23 klimavenlige landbrugsforanstaltninger og, i mindre grad, krydsoverensstemmelse. 
Another example is the overlapping requirements of greening, the agri-environment-climate measure and, to a lesser extent, cross compliance.
En vis grad af kompleksitet kan dog vžre nżdvendig for at sikre, at en politik er effektiv og produktiv. 
However, a certain degree of complexity may be needed for policy to be effective and efficient.
Vi har tidligere anbefalet, at Kommissionen undgr overlapning mellem stżtteberettigelsesperioderne ved i videst muligt omfang at sikre sammenfald mellem stżtteberettigelses-og programperioden og tilpasse den flerrige finansielle ramme til EU's strategiperioder. 
Sufficient time must be allowed to roll out the next CAP reform 42. We have previously recommended that Commission should avoid overlaps of eligibility periods, aligning as far as possible the eligibility with the programme period and align the multiannual financial framework with the EU’s strategy periods.
Gennemfżrelsen af de nuvžrende landdistriktsprogrammer startede sent, hvilket delvis skyldtes de komplekse regler og den tid, det tager Kommissionen at gennemg og godkende de omfattende programmeringsdokumenter. 
Implementation of current rural development programmes started late, partly due to complex rules, and the time needed for the Commission to review and approve the voluminous programming documents.
Output, udfald og eksterne faktorer i den fžlles landbrugspolitik Der er behov for et effektivt performancesystem, der forbinder output, resultater, effekt og ml 43. 
22 CAP outputs, outcomes and external actors Need for an effective performance system linking outputs, results, impacts and objectives 43.
Kommissionen har p nuvžrende tidspunkt en kompleks og forskelligartet ramme for performancerapportering med mange indikatorer. 
The Commission currently has a complex and diverse performance reporting framework with numerous indicators.
Vi har anbefalet den at reducere antallet af indikatorer og koncentrere sig om dem, der bedst kan mle EU-budgettets performance. 
We have recommended reducing the number of indicators so as to focus on those that best measure performance of the EU budget.
Ofte giver indikatorerne ikke oplysninger, der er relevante for vurderingen af politikkens resultater og effekt. 
The indicators often do not provide information that is relevant for assessing policy results and impacts.
Ofte er det sdan, at de "resultatindikatorer", som Kommissionen bruger, ikke mler resultater, men output (eller i nogle tilfžlde input), og at der mangler en klar forbindelse til EU's ml25. 
The ‘result indicators’ which the Commission uses often do not measure results, but rather outputs (or, in some cases, inputs), and lack a clear link to EU objectives25.
Med hensyn til den foregende programmeringsperiode (2007-2013) konkluderede vi, at Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne ikke i tilstržkkelig grad havde pvist, hvad der var opnet i relation til mlsžtningerne for politikken for udvikling af landdistrikterne. 
For the previous programming period (2007-13) we concluded that the Commission and Member States had not sufficiently shown what had been achieved in relation to the rural development policy objectives.
Vi konstaterede, at mlene ikke var tilstržkkelig klare, og at medlemsstaterne trods stżtte fra Kommissionen ikke havde udarbejdet overvgnings-og evalueringsoplysninger, der var tilstržkkelig plidelige, sammenhžngende og relevante til at vise de opnede resultater i forhold til de fastsatte mlsžtninger. 
We found that the objectives were not sufficiently clear and that despite support from the Commission, Member States had not produced reliable, consistent and relevant enough monitoring and evaluation information to show the results achieved in relation to the objectives set.
Indfżrelsen af det nuvžrende fžlles overvgnings-og evalueringssystem var et skridt fremad, men oplysningerne om politikkens performance er stadig ufuldstžndige og somme tider uplidelige. 
The introduction of the current Common Monitoring and Evaluation System was a step forward but information on policy performance remains incomplete and sometimes unreliable.
I 2016 ppegede Kommissionens Interne Revisionstjeneste vžsentlige svagheder ved de fastsatte ml, de anvendte indikatorer og de indsamlede data og bemžrkede, at dette kunne forringe GD for Landbrug og Udvikling af Landdistrikters evne til at fżre tilsyn med, evaluere og indberette om resultaterne af den fžlles landbrugspolitik for perioden 2014-202026. 
In 2016, the Commission’s Internal Audit Service identified serious weaknesses in the objectives set, indicators used and data collected, and noted that this may impair DG Agriculture and Rural Development’s ability to monitor, evaluate and report on the performance of the 2014-2020 CAP.
Vi rapporterede endvidere, at Kommissionens resultatdokumenter ikke altid indeholder en vurdering af kvaliteten af de anvendte data. 
We also reported that the Commission’s performance documents do not always assess the quality of the data used26.
Sammenhžng mellem de udbetalte midler og opnelsen af de aftalte performanceml 47. 
Link between money paid and achievement of agreed performance targets 47.
Resultatreserven giver ikke meget tilskyndelse til et stżrre fokus p resultater, idet dens evaluering primžrt er baseret p udgifter og output. 
The performance reserve provides little incentive for a better result orientation since its evaluation is mostly based on spending and outputs.
Vi bemžrkede imidlertid, at passende konditionalitet og en lžngere overvgningsperiode żger sandsynligheden for, at projekterne er nyttige. 
However, we noted that appropriate conditionality and a longer monitoring period increase the likelihood of projects being useful.
Politikken bżr overvges - og justeres, nr det er nżdvendigt 48. 
Policy should be monitored and – when necessary – adjusted 48.
Vi har anbefalet, at Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne i perioden 2014-2020 indsamler rettidige, relevante og plidelige data, der giver nyttige oplysninger om resultaterne af de finansierede projekter og foranstaltninger. 
For the 2014-2020 period we recommended that the Commission and the Member States should collect timely, relevant and reliable data that provide useful information on the achievements of the projects and measures financed.
Disse oplysninger bżr gżre det muligt at drage konklusioner om de anvendte midlers produktivitet og effektivitet, identificere de foranstaltninger og typer af projekter, der bidrager mest til at opfylde EU-mlene, og danne et solidt grundlag for at forbedre forvaltningen af foranstaltningerne Ansvarlighed for den fžlles landbrugspolitik 49. 
This information should allow conclusions to be drawn on the efficiency and effectiveness of the funds spent, identify the measures and types of projects delivering the greatest contribution to the EU objectives and provide a sound basis for improving the management of the measures. 24 26 27 COM(2017) 497 final – IAS 2016 Annual Report.
Vores horisontale analyse af EU's ordninger for ansvarlighed og offentlig revision identificerede seks centrale elementer i en stžrk ansvarligheds-, gennemsigtigheds-og revisionskžde: Ľ en klar definition af roller og ansvarsomrder OECD: "Budgeting and performance in the European Union: A review by the OECD in the context of EU budget focused on results". 
OECD: Budgeting and performance in the European Union: A review by the OECD in the context of EU budget focused on results.
27 Hvad Kommissionens meddelelse siger om ansvarlighed: Det vil vžre nżdvendigt at tilpasse sikringsprocessen til de krav, der fżlger af en resultatorienteret politikudformning, herunder udarbejdelse og anvendelse af solide og mlbare indikatorer og af trovžrdig resultatovervgning og -rapportering. 27 
Accountability for the CAP 25 What the Commission’s Communication says on accountability: The assurance process would need to be adapted to the requirements of a results-driven policy design including the development and application of solid and measurable indicators and of credible performance monitoring and reporting.
28 Ľ en ledelseserklžring om opfyldelsen af de politiske ml og anvendelsen af midlerne Ľ fuldt demokratisk tilsyn Ľ feedback, der gżr det muligt at tržffe korrigerende foranstaltninger/foretage forbedringer Ľ et stžrkt mandat til uafhžngig ekstern revision med hensyn til regnskabs-, overholdelses-og resultatkontrol Ľ implementering af revisionsanbefalinger og opfżlgende revision. 
Our Landscape Review on EU accountability and public audit arrangements identified six key elements for a strong accountability, transparency and audit chain: • clear definition of roles and responsibilities; • management assurance about the achievement of policy objectives and the use of funds; • full democratic oversight; • feedback loops to allow for corrective action/improvements; • a strong mandate for independent external audit to verify accounts, compliance and performance; • implementation and follow-up of audit recommendations.
KRITERIER TIL VURDERING AF DEN FREMTIDIGE POLITIK - MED FORKLARINGER 50. 
CRITERIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSING FUTURE POLICY 50.
Vi glžder os over Kommissionens ambition om at g i retning af en resultatbaseret gennemfżrelsesmodel. 
We welcome the Commission’s ambition to move towards a performance based delivery model.
Hvis en sdan model implementeres hensigtsmžssigt, kan den forbedre den fžlles landbrugspolitiks produktivitet og effektivitet. 
If well implemented, such a model may improve the CAP’s efficiency and effectiveness.
P grundlag af vores analyse fremsžtter vi her en ržkke kriterier til vurdering af den fremtidige fžlles landbrugspolitik (vedrżrende de enkelte faser af den programlogiske model) og fremhžver nogle af de vigtigste udfordringer. 
On the basis of our review, we formulate a set of criteria for assessing the future CAP (per stage of the programme logic model) and highlight some of the key challenges ahead.
Vurdering af behovene i forbindelse med den fžlles landbrugspolitik KRITERIER: 1.1. 
Assessing CAP needs 26 CRITERIA: 1.1.
Behovene er identificeret p grundlag af solid dokumentation. 
Needs are identified on the basis of solid evidence.
Det er dokumenteret, at det giver mervžrdi at adressere disse behov p EU-niveau. 
Value added in addressing these needs at EU level is demonstrated.
Forslagene under den fžlles landbrugspolitik tager hensyn til langsigtede tendenser. 
CAP proposals take account of long-term trends.
Den stżrste udfordring med hensyn til at sikre, at den kommende fžlles landbrugspolitik bliver vellykket, vil vžre at identificere de behov, der skal adresseres, ved hjžlp af relevante og plidelige data. 
To ensure the success of the next CAP, a key challenge will be to identify the needs to be addressed using relevant and reliable data.
Beslutningen om, hvilke behov der skal adresseres, bżr bygge p en vurdering af den potentielle EU-mervžrdi. 
The decision on which needs to address should be based on an assessment of potential EU value added.
Eftersom nogle betalinger under den fžlles landbrugspolitik vil fortsžtte indtil 12 r efter fremsžttelsen af politikforslagene, skal disse forslag tage hensyn til langsigtede tendenser. 
Since some CAP payments will continue until 12 years after the policy proposals have been presented, these proposals will need to take account of long-term trends.
Endelig er et velfungerende indre marked for landbrugsprodukter et vigtigt ml for den fžlles landbrugspolitik. 
Lastly, a functioning agricultural single market is an important achievement of the CAP.