natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Forsinkede beslutninger Den forsinkelse, hvormed Kommissionen gennem¬ fører og afslutter regnskabsafslutningen, er af en sådan størrelsesorden, at beslutningen om regn¬ skabsafslutning kommer til at ligge fuldstændig uden for den normale tidsplan for forvaltning og kontrol af EUGFL, garantisektionen. 
Decisions that are late The delay by the Commission in completing the work of clearance is such that the clearance deci¬ sion has lost all contact with the normal timetable for the management and control of the EAGGF Guarantee Section.
Hver gang Revisionsretten har fremsat bemærknin¬ ger i denne forbindelse, har Kommissionen svaret, at den har taget forholdsregler for at indhente forsinkelsen ("). 
To every comment made by the Court on this point since 1978 the Commission's reply has been that it has taken steps to make up these delays (2).
Revisionsretten har imidlertid i O EFT nr. 
(2) OJ No C 313, 30.
12 1978, s. 
1978, p.
27, EFT nr. 
27; OJ No C 326, 31.12.1979, p.
262. 
262.
Nr. C 313/14 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 29. 11. 
No C 313/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 29. 11.
82 1982 konstateret, at forholdet med beslutninger om regnskabsafslutninger stadig ikke er blevet bedre. 
82 However, in 1982, the Court found that the situa¬ tion in respect of clearance decisions had still not improved.
Således som det fremgår af den sammenholdende oversigt i bilag V, viser den seneste beslutning, at der fortsat er en forsinkelse på fem år. 
As can be seen from the comparative table in Annex V, the most recent decision still shows a delay of five years.
Hvis denne situation skulle vare ved, betyder det derfor, at regnskaberne for 1980, som burde have været afsluttet inden udgangen af 1981 med henblik på den decharge, der skal gives i april 1982, først vil være afsluttet i 1986. hold indtil nu kun har omfattet en del af det pågældende beløb, og at det ikke klart fremgår, om resten af de beløb, hvorfor der var givet foreløbigt afslag, skal betragtes som endeligt afvist eller ej. c) Endelig er beslutningerne om regnskabsafslut¬ ning utilstrækkeligt begrundede, for uspecifice-· rede og i visse tilfælde upræcise: 2.7. 
This therefore means that, if such a situation were to continue, the 1980 accounts, which should have been cleared before the end of 1981 with a view to discharge in April 1982, would not in fact be cleared until 1986. previous reservations.
Det skal imid¬ lertid bemærkes, at disse ophævelser af forbe Det er ikke muligt på grundlag af beslutnin¬ gerne om regnskabsafslutning og de. dertil hørende bilag at skelne mellem de forskel¬ lige transaktioner, som beslutningerne om regnskabsafslutning dækker oven manglende berigtigelser, berigtigelser op eller ned. iii) Fra et regnskabsmæssigt synspunkt er det endelig ikke altid muligt på grundlag af beslutningsproceduren i de berørte regnska-' ber at bedømme virkningen af Kommissio¬ nens mange forbehold. 
Decisions that are neither final nor complete inaccurate. (i) The preambles are generally insufficient to provide the external auditor and the dis¬ charge authority with exact and detailed knowledge of the operations which have been recognized as chargeable to the EAGGF Guarantee Section or of those which have not been, and in the latter case, the reasons for the refusal to charge such amounts to the Fund. (ii) The clearance decisions and their annexes do not distinguish between the different operations on which . the clearance deci¬ sions are based: figures left unchanged, or corrected up or down. (iii) The terms of the decisions are such that it is not always possible to measure in book¬ keeping terms the effect of the Commis¬ sion's numerous reservations on the accounts.
Visse forbehold, eller ophævede forbehold, fremgår af betragtnin¬ gerne, men der drages ingen konklusioner om beløbene i de regnskaber, de vedrører (Belgien i 1973 og 1974). 
Some reservations, or with¬ drawals of reservations, appear in the preambles, but no conclusion is drawn as . to the totals in the accounts to which they relate (Belgium in 1973 and 1974).
Det forekommer ligeledes, at forbeholdene er udtrykt på en sådan måde, at det ved en gennemlæsning er umulig at se, om de fore¬ løbige forbehold indgår i de endeligt afviste beløb eller ej (Frankrig i 1975). 
Furthermore, the reservations are formu¬ lated in such a way that it is impossible to tell from reading them whether the provi¬ sional refusals are included in the amounts finally refused or not (France in 1975).
Alt i alt kan ingen af de regnskabsår, om hvilke der er truffet afgørelse om regnskabsafslutning siden finansieringsordningens ikrafttræden ved for¬ ordning (EØF) nr. 729/70, med sikkerhed betragtes som endeligt afsluttede. 
In sum, none of the financial years which has been the subject of. a clearance decision since the entry into force of the financing system established by Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 can be considered with certainty to have been finally cleared.
2.8. Anfægtede beslutninger Det kan ikke umiddelbart sluttes, at de tvistemålssager, der verserer for Domstolen, har direkte for¬ bindelse med ovennævnte uregelmæssigheder. 
It is not clear whether the existence of Htigation in the Court of Justice is directly linked to the mal¬ functioning of the system described above.
Det er imidlertid sikkert, at der er tendens til et sti¬ gende antal tvistemålssager, hvilket er medvirkende til at beslutningerne om regnskabsafslutning bliver endnu mere usikre. 
How¬ ever, there is certainly an increase in the number of cases and this adds further to the uncertainty of the clearance decisions. 29.
V 29. 11. 82 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. C 313/15 økonomiske sanktioner, vil de naturligvis føle sig tilskyndet til at indbringe deres tvister for Domsto¬ len. 
II. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 313/15 Faced with clearance decisions which de facto involve financial sanctions the Member States are, it appears, naturally tempted to take their case to the Court of Justice.
Domstolen har imidlertid indtil nu i sine domme O) bekræftet Kommissionens stilling (·) Sag 11/76 af 7.2.1979 (Nederlandene), 15/76 og 16/76 af 7.2. 1979 (Frankrig), 819/79 af 14. 
Nevertheless, the judgments issued by the Court of Justicei1), with the exception of Case 18/76 of 6 (') Cases 11/76 of 7 February 1979 (Netherlands); 15/76 and 16/76 of 7 February 1979 (France); 819/79 of 14 January 1981 (Federal Republic of Germany); 820/79 of 25 September 1980 (Belgium); 1251/79 of 27 Janu¬ ary 1981 (Italy).
1.1981. af bortset fra sag 18/76 af 6. februar 1979 om afslut¬ ning af Forbundsrepublikken Tysklands regnska¬ ber. 
February 1979 on the clearance of the accounts of the Federal Republic of Germany, have up to now confirmed the views of the Commission.
Det fremgår især af disse domme, at Domsto¬ len mente, at Kommissionens fremgangsmåder ydede medlemsstaterne en god garanti, og at Kom¬ missionens fortolkning i de tilfælde, hvor det var muligt at anlægge flere fortolkningsmuligheder, ikke kunne drages i tvivl bortset fra i tilfælde af åbenbare uregelmæssigheder fra dennes side. 
Essen¬ tially, the view ' taken by the Court of Justice appears to have been that the procedures followed by the Commission offered sound guarantees to the Member States and that, where several interpreta¬ tions were possible, those adopted by the Commis¬ sion could not be called into question unless there was some irregularity on its part.
9. 2. 
2.9.
. 
A working procedure which leads to cumu¬ lative delays The working procedure followed by the Commis¬ sion is such that no stage of the audit of the accounts of a given Member State may be com¬ menced before the previous stage has been com¬ pleted (Annex VI).
. 
Some stages (memorandum prior to the audit, sum¬ mary document prior to the decision) are of a multilateral nature and thus form a corresponding number of periods of waiting for all the Member States, since the multilateral stage can only be commenced after all the previous nine bilateral procedures have been completed.
. 
Moreover, the Commission has developed the cus¬ tom, for practical reasons, of carrying out the bilateral procedures simultaneously.
11. 29. . 
No C 313/16 Official Journal of the European Communities 29. 11.
. 
Generally the Com¬ mission updates the memorandum at the begin¬ ning of the year following the year to be cleared and organizes consultation on the updating in February/March.
1. . 
The document may be considered as final in about March, at a time when it is already physically impossible for the Member States to submit their summary annual accounts within the statutory period (i.e. before 31 March).
82 . 6. . 
For 1981 there has been a slight improvement since the updating was discussed in the EAGGF Committee on 16 February 1982. (c) It should be noted that the later the updating the more difficult it is for the Member States to submit accounts, particularly where the amend¬ ment to the memorandum is intended to obtain a new or different type of information which the Member States, or least some of them, did not consider necessary, on the basis of previous information, to record separately. (d) Finally, the semi-legislative nature of certain parts of the memorandum creates problems of its own.
. 
The question may reasonably be raised whether this document is still a tool to facilitate the work of inspection or has become rather the de facto exercise of a power to give accounting instructions to the administrative departments.
12. 2. . 
2.12. (a) Forwarding of information by the Member States and audits on the basis of support¬ ing documents contribute to the malfunc¬ tioning of the system The information is forwarded late and is incomplete Since it is impossible for them to audit all the intervention measures in the Member States as thoroughly as they should, and as they wish to make up a large part of the delays, the Commis¬ sion departments have adopted a selective audit procedure. They have defined priorities to be fol¬ lowed in planning their on-the-spot visits.
. 
In order to establish these priorities, they apply various criteria such as the volume and growth rate of the expenditure, the innovative nature of the measure or of the amendments to it, the difficulties encountered in the past, the likelihood of fraud and the risks of wrong interpretation, etc.
. 
In practice, on-the-spot audits in the Member States form an important part of the clearance work.
. 
For the audit of the 1974/75 accounts and subsequently of the 1976/77 accounts, the depart¬ ments responsible for clearance devoted and aver¬ age of 527 days/member of audit staff, to which must be added an average of 88 days/member of staff for the presence of staff from the Commis¬ sion's financial control department (point 2.28).
. 
Often the information is trans¬ mitted in several stages, sometimes after a reminder has been sent by the Commission.
. 
Moreover, certain Member States systematically refrain from providing reports from the national audit bodies on the paying agencies, or on the operations financed by the EAGGF Guarantee Sec¬ tion, and only submit descriptions of the national management and control systems as required by Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 1723/72, them¬ selves summary to the point where it is impossible to tell what precautions have been taken in the (b) Inadequate methods of audit (i) The audit is confined almost exclu¬ sively to the paying agencies and to an 2.13. (a) On-the-spot audits Organization of on-the-spot audits
1 3 . a) Kontrol på stedet Tilrettelæggelsen af kontrol på stedet *ί ii) Almindeligvis er kontrollen på stedet mere en sammenholdelse af regnskaber end en analyse af betingelserne for forvaltning af og kontrol med fællesskabsforordningerne. 
82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 313/17 2.14 A procedure intended as a right of reply examination of the files held by these bodies. (ii) In general, these on-the-spot audits consist more of reconciliation of accounts than of analysis of the man¬ agement and control of Community legislation.
For så vidt angår disse forvaltnings-og kontrolbetingelser bliver de kun vurderet når det sker ved gennemgangen af de enkelte sagsakter, som udvælges ved usystematiske stikprøver og ikke ved hjælp af systemanalyse. iii) For så vidt angår udnyttelsen af resultaterne af stikprøvekontrollen foregår den tilsyneladende ikke efter nogle anerkendte regler. 
When the workings of man¬ agement and control are assessed, it is only by examination of individual files, selected by ad hoc methods of sam¬ pling, and not by means of any systems analysis.
Proceduren skulle oprindeligt være kontra¬ diktorisk -'... nemgang akter. af disse organers sags-De medlemsstater, som i begyndelsen havde set bort fra denne fase i regnskabsafslutningsprocessen, ser sig nu i høj grad foranlediget til at omfatte den med langt mere interesse for at sikre sig mod visse følger af forringelsen af ordningen, især den til forsinkelserne knyttede multiplikatorvirkning (jf. pkt. 2.24). 
The Member States, who in the beginning neg¬ lected this stage in the clearance procedure, have now come to show much greater interest in it in order to protect themselves against some of the consequences of the system's deterioration, in par¬ ticular the multiplier effect connected with its delays (point 2.24).
BESLUTNINGERNE LØSER HOVEDSAGELIG FORTOLKNINGSPROBLEMER A POSTERIORI 2.16. 
DECISIONS WHICH ESSENTIALLY SETTLE PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION IN RETROSPECT 2.16.
Beslutningernes dobbelte karakter Det skal fastslås, at de beslutninger om regnskabs¬ afslutning, som træffes efter afslutningen af denne proces, hovedsagelig bygger på en efterfølgende udlægning af forordningerne, og at de i praksis ikke siger noget om, hvorvidt medlemsstaternes administrative og økonomiske forvaltning og kon¬ trol har været forsvarlig eller ej. 
Dual nature of decisions The clearance decisions taken at the end of.this procedure appear to be based mainly on interpreta¬ tion in retrospect of the regulations and pay virtu¬ ally no attention to the quality of the Member States' administrative and financial management and control.
Overvejende fortolkningsproblemer Bortset fra visse berigtigelser som følge af mang¬ lende bilag, bilag, hvis beviskraft blev anset for utilstrækkelig, beregningsfejl af materiel eller anden art, samt fejl i regnskabsføringen, er afvi¬ gende fortolkninger skyld i de væsentligste berigti¬ gelser som følge af beslutningerne om regnskabsaf-. slutning. 
Dominance of problems of interpretation Apart from some corrections based on the absence of supporting documents or their poor probative value, on errors of calculation (material or other¬ wise), and on accounting faults, the main correc¬ tions to which the clearance decisions give rise result from differences in interpretation.
Skønt en løsning af disse problemer forekommer nødvendig for at sikre en forsvarlig forvaltning af EUGFL, garantisektionen, er det meget beklageligt, at den kommer a posteriori, og med betydelig forsinkelse som led i regnskabsafslutningen, hvor¬ ved den mister enhver betydning under forvaltnin¬ gen og netop derfor skaber særlige problemer (jf· pkt. 2.20 og 2.24). 
If the settlement of these problems appears neces¬ sary for the sound financial management of the EAGGF Guarantee Section, it is most regrettable that it occurs after-the event, with considerable delay, as part of the clearance procedure, thus losing any value it might have had during manage¬ ment and even giving rise to problems of its own (points 2.20 and 2.24).
Manglende vurdering af de nationale for¬ valtnings-og kontrolsystemer Når man betænker betragtningerne og det forbere¬ dende arbejde i forbindelse med beslutningerne om regnskabsafslutning tages der ikke heri hensyn til beskaffenheden af de nationale forvaltnings-og kontrolsystemer. 
The absence of any assessment of the national systems of management and control To judge from their preambles and from the pre¬ paratory work, the clearance decisions do not take into account the quality of the national systems of management and control.
Den proces, der fører til beslutningerne om regn¬ skabsafslutning, giver derfor ingen oplysninger om de nøjagtige betingelser for anvendelsen af garanti¬ fondens midler i medlemsstaterne, og Kommissio¬ nen kan derfor kun sjældent anvende resultaterne af kontrollen forud for regnskabsafslutningen som begrundelse for forslag i retning af en harmonise¬ ring af gennemførelsesbetingelserne for EUGFL, garantisektionen, i medlemsstaterne. 
This means that the procedure which leads to the clearance decisions reveals little of how exactly "Guarantee" expenditure is effected in the Member States and, in consequence, that the Commission can rarely base proposals for harmonization of the conditions of; application of the EÀGGF Guaran¬ tee Section, in the Member States, on the results of, its clearance audits. (iii) The use of the results of these audits by sampling does not follow any recog¬ nized rule.
Når kontrollen på stedet hos de udbetalende orga¬ ner er afsluttet, indleder Kommissionen en dialog med medlemsstaterne (breve med bemærkninger, svar fra medlemsstaterne, bilaterale møder, yderli¬ gere skriftlige oplysninger), som efter en sidste multilateral fase (sammenfattende dokument, høring af EUGFL-komiteen), munder ud i vedta¬ gelsen af beslutningerne om regnskabsafslutning. 
A RIGHT OF REPLY THAT TENDS TO BECOME NEGOTIATION As soon as 'the on-the-spot audits on the premises of the paying agencies have taken place, the Com¬ mission commences a "dialogue" with the Member % States (comments by letter, reply of Member States, bilateral meetings, additional written information) which, after a final multilateral stage (summary document, consultation of EAGGF Committee), results in the adoption of clearance decisions.
Helhedsforhandlingen trækker ud Det fremgår af de oplysninger, der er indhentet ved disse indgående drøftelser i medlemsstaterne, at skønt det er nødvendigt med en dialog, er den efterhånden blevet værdiløs (de fleste medlemssta¬ ter mener, at de taler for døve øren) og medfører, at beslutningerne om regnskabsafslutning mister en del af deres betydning, samt at fristerne for vedta¬ gelsen heraf forlænges. 
Prolonged general negotiations The information obtained by the Court during detailed discussions in the Member States shows that, although it meets a need, the "dialogue" has tended to deteriorate (most of the Member States have come to consider it merely as a "dialogue of the deaf"), robbing the clearance decisions of some of their substance and delaying their adoption still further. . -.*.'
Det er derfor ikke overraskende at konstatere,. at skønt der er en tendens til, at forsinkelsen i forbin¬ delse med gennemførelsen af kontrolbesøgene på stedet bliver mindre, bliver den større i forbindelse med dialogfasen og den endelige beslutningstag¬ ning (bilag V). 
In such a context, it is not surprising to find that if the delays tend to decrease during the stage of on-the-spot audits, they increase during the stage of "dialogue" and final decision (Annex V).
Nr. C 313/18 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende 29. 11. 
No C 313/18 Official Journal of the European Communities 29. 11.
Manglerne vedrører forvaltningsansvaret, regnskabsafslutningens omfang, udøvelsen af bud¬ getbeføjelserne og tilrettelæggelsen af de forskellige former for kontrol. 
This malfunc¬ tioning touches upon management responsibilities, the scope of the clearance, the exercise of budge¬ tary power and the organization of the various types of audit.
FORRINGEDE FORVALTNINGSBETINGELSER 2.21. a) . 
DETIORATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF MANAGEMENT 2.21.
2.6. til 2.8) er det positivt vanskeligt på nuværende tidspunkt at kontrollere, om der siden indførelsen af den nye finansieringsordning i 1970 findes en korrekt sammenhæng fra år til år mellem medlemsstaternes regnskaber vedrørende EUGFL, garantisektionen. De berigtigelser, der er foretaget som følge af Domstolens domme eller som følge af delvis ophævelse af forbehold, er ikke altid ledsa¬ get af tilsvarende berigtigelser i de rådighedsregn-skaber, der vedlægges beslutningerne om afslutning af regnskaberne for de pågældende regnskabsår. 
Effect on management of the accounts (a) Lack of continuity in the annual accounts As a result of the delays, the 'defects in the clear¬ ance decisions and their lack of finality (points 2.6 to 2.8), it is in fact physically difficult at present to check whether, since the implementation of the new system of financing in 1970, the accounts of the EAGGF Guarantee Section in the Member States follow on correctly from one year to another. The adjustments made following judg¬ ments of the Court of Justice, or partial with¬ drawals of reservations in the accounts of funds available attached to the clearance decisions of the financial years concerned.
Det samme er ikke altid tilfældet for medlems¬ staterne, hvis udøvende myndigheder ofte må indgive anmodning til budgetmyndigheden for at finansiere de beløb, der er blevet afvist ved regnskabsafslutningen. 
However, the same does not always apply to the Member States, whose executive authorities must often request the budgetary authority to finance the amounts refused upon clearance.
Denne virkning har imidlertid ikke længere praktisk betydning, når afslutningen foretages med de bekendte forsinkelser, og de fleste af de pågæl¬ dende forskrifter ikke længere er gældende eller er blevet ændret. 
This function, however, can never be more than theoretical since, given the known delays in clearance, the majority of the regulations con¬ cerned have ceased to exist or have been amended.
Tværtimod opfatter medlemsstaterne Kommissio¬ nens forholdsregler i forbindelse med regnskabsaf¬ slutningen snarere som en kritik end som et led i den forsvarlige forvaltning af EUGFL, garantisek¬ tionen, og derefter vedtager de en ligefrem defensiv holdning. 
On the other hand, the Member States view inter¬ vention by the Commission in the clearance proce¬ dure more as a censure of their own actions than as a contribution to the sound management of the EAGGF Guarantee Section.
For så vidt angår myndighederne i med¬ lemsstaterne holder de sig stadig hyppigere tilbage med at tage noget ansvar. I visse medlemsstater kan de nemlig drages personligt og økonomisk til ansvar. 
The managers in the Mem¬ ber States for their part are increasingly reluctant to assume responsibility, particularly as in some Member States they may in fact be personally liable.
29. 11. 82 De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende Nr. C 313/19 Under visse interne politiske forhold kan det være meget prekært at indgive en sådan anmod¬ ning, som skyldes en tidligere forvaltningshandling (flere medlemsstater skal i dag løse proble¬ mer i forbindelse med afslutningen af regnska¬ berne for 1971, 1972 og 1973). ii) En anden vanskelighed skyldes, at det underti¬ den er nødvendigt at berigtige regnskaberne for det pågældende regnskabsår. 
29. 11. 82 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 313/19 management, may prove very delicate (at pre¬ sent several Member States have to resolve problems raised by the clearance of the 1971, 1972 and 1973 accounts). (ii) Another difficulty often arises from the need to correct the accounts of the financial year con¬ cerned.
Som følge af visse nationale forskrifter er det simpelthen umuligt at foretage en sådan berigtigelse med flere års forsinkelse og ofte efter, at de øverste nationale revisionsorganer selv har udtalt sig endeligt om de pågældende regnskaber. nen. 
Coming several years late and often after the supreme national audit bodies have made their final decision on these accounts, this is quite simply impossible under the domestic law of certain Member States. MODIFICATION OF THE IMPACT OF CLEARANCE DECISIONS 2.22.
Den fremgangsmåde, der anfægtes i en beslut¬ ning om regnskabsafslutning kan især når den har været fulgt systematisk have haft samme følger over en længere årrække uden at være blevet ændret, så længe den ikke endeligt er blevet draget i tvivl. 
However, this effect takes two opposite forms which do not balance each other out. in a clearance decision may, particularly where it results from routine practice, have produced the same effects over several years and may not have been corrected as long as it has not been finally condemned.