natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Disse oplysninger indgår i Kommissionens database vedrørende finanspolitisk styring og anvendes til at beregne indeks for styrken og kvaliteten af disse elementer. 
This information feeds into the Commission’s Fiscal Governance Database and is used to calculate indices on the strength and quality of these elements.
Debrun, X. et al. 
For example: Debrun, X. and al.
(2008), "Tied to the mast? 
(2008), ‘Tied to the mast?
National fiscal rules in the European Union", Economic Policy 23/54, s. 299-362. 
National fiscal rules in the European Union’, economic policy 23/54, pp. 299-362.
IMF (2013), "Reassessing the role and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced economies", politisk oplæg. 
IMF (2013), ‘Reassessing the role and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced economies’, policy paper.
Europa-Kommissionen (2004), "Report on public finances in EMU 2004". 
See for example European Commission (2004), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2004’.
EU-Rådet (2005), "Ecofin Council report to the European Council of 22-23 March 2005 on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact". 
Council of the EU (2005), ‘Ecofin Council report to the European Council of 22-23 March 2005 on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’.
EU-Rådet (2009), "2967th Economic and Financial Affairs Council conclusions on fiscal exit strategy". 
Council of the EU (2009), ‘2967th Economic and Financial Affairs Council conclusions on fiscal exit strategy’.
Retsgrundlag 05 Det første skridt, der blev taget med hensyn til at udarbejde et fælles retsgrundlag som følge af de politiske drøftelser, var vedtagelsen af direktiv 2011/85/EU7, en af de seks lovgivningsmæssige foranstaltninger i den såkaldte "sixpack". 
Legal framework 05 The first step, as a result of political discussions, in developing a common legal framework was the adoption of Directive 2011/857, one of six legislative measures known as the ‘Six-Pack’.
Direktiv 2011/85 fastsætter minimumskrav til de nationale budgetrammer (jf. bilag I for en oversigt over relevante retsakter og deres godkendelseshistorik): i) Medlemsstaternes finanspolitiske planlægning bør baseres på realistiske makroøkonomiske og budgetmæssige prognoser fra en udpeget institution ii) Medlemsstaterne bør have specifikke finanspolitiske regler, og overholdelsen af disse regler skal overvåges af uafhængige organer iii) Medlemsstaterne bør have en realistisk og effektiv mellemfristet budgetramme, der har en finanspolitisk planlægningshorisont på mindst tre år iv) Medlemsstaterne bør have omfattende, sammenhængende og gennemsigtige systemer til budgetregnskabsføring og statistisk indberetning. 
Directive 2011/85 lays down minimum requirements for the NBFs (for an overview of relevant legal acts and the history of their approval, see Annex I): (i) Member States’ fiscal planning should be based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts provided by a designated institution; (ii) Member States should have specific fiscal rules, compliance with which is to be monitored by independent bodies; (iii) Member States should have a credible and effective MTBF that includes a minimum three-year fiscal planning horizon and (iv) Member States should have comprehensive, consistent and transparent systems for budgetary accounting and statistical reporting.
06 Det næste skridt var den mellemstatslige traktat om stabilitet, samordning og styring i Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union (TSSS), som blev undertegnet i marts 2012, navnlig finanspagten (afsnit III), suppleret af en meddelelse fra Kommissionen, som fastsatte syv fælles principper8 i juni 2012 ("Kommissionens fælles principper"). 
06 The second step was the inter-governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), signed in March 2012, and in particular, the Fiscal Compact (Title III), complemented by a Commission Communication setting out seven common principles8 in June 2012 (the “Commission’s common principles”).
De kontraherende parter, der er bundet af finanspagten (alle 19 medlemsstater i euroområdet samt Bulgarien, Danmark og Rumænien), skal i deres nationale lovgivning indarbejde en regel om strukturel budgetbalance og etablere en automatisk korrektionsmekanisme samt en uafhængig finanspolitisk institution (jf. tekstboks 2). 
The contracting parties bound by the Fiscal Compact (all 19 euro-area Member States, Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania) are required to enshrine in national legislation a structural balanced-budget rule and to set up an automatic correction mechanism, as well as an IFI (see Box 2).
8 7 8 Rådets direktiv 2011/85/EU af 8. november 2011 om krav til medlemsstaternes budgetmæssige rammer, EUT L 306 af 23. november 2011 (i dette dokument betegnet direktiv 2011/85). 
8 7 8 Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ L 306, 23 November 2011 (referred to in this document as Directive 2011/85).
Kommissionen (2012), COM(2012) 342 final, "Meddelelse fra Kommissionen - Fælles principper for nationale finanspolitiske korrektionsmekanismer". 
European Commission (2012), COM(2012) 342 final, ‘Communication from the Commission, Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
07 Hensigtsmæssigt udformede uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner opfattes generelt som værende forbundet med bedre finanspolitiske resultater9, bedre overholdelse af finanspolitiske regler10 samt mere præcise og mindre tendentiøse makroøkonomiske og budgetmæssige prognoser11. 
07 Well-designed IFIs are generally seen as being associated with better fiscal performance9, better compliance with fiscal rules10 and more accurate and less biased macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts11.
473/201312, der indgår i den såkaldte twopack, og som bl.a. skulle indarbejde TSSS-bestemmelserne for euroområdets medlemsstater i EU-retten. 
08 The third step was the adoption of Regulation 473/201312, which forms part of the Two-Pack and was meant, among other things, to incorporate into EU law the provisions of the TSCG for the euro-area Member States.
Debrun, X. og Kinda, T. 
Debrun, X. and Kinda, T.
(2014), "Strengthening post-crisis fiscal credibility: Fiscal Councils on the rise — A new dataset", IMF working paper 14/58. 
(2014), ‘Strengthening post-crisis fiscal credibility: Fiscal Councils on the rise — A new dataset’, IMF working paper 14/58.
10 Beetsma, R. et al. 
10 Beetsma, R. and al.
(2018), "The rise of independent fiscal institutions: recent trends and performance", IMF working paper 18/68. 
(2018), ‘The rise of independent fiscal institutions: recent trends and performance’, IMF working paper 18/68.
11 Jonung, L. og Larch, M. 
11 Jonung, L. and Larch, M.
(2006), "Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts", Economic Policy 21/47, s. 492-534. 
(2006), ‘Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts’, economic policy 21/47, pp. 492-534.
IMF (2013), "Case studies of fiscal councils — functions and impact". 
IMF (2013), ‘Case studies of fiscal councils — functions and impact’.
12 Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 473/2013 af 21. maj 2013 om fælles bestemmelser om overvågning og evaluering af udkast til budgetplaner og til sikring af korrektion af uforholdsmæssigt store underskud i medlemsstaterne i euroområdet, EUT L 140 af 17. maj 2013 (i dette dokument betegnet forordning 473/2013). 
12 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, OJ L 140, 17 May 2013 (referred to in this document as Regulation 473/2013).
9 Tekstboks 2 – Hvad begreberne betyder Strukturel saldo: Den faktiske budgetsaldo minus den cykliske komponent samt engangsforanstaltninger og andre midlertidige foranstaltninger. 
9 Box 2 - Concepts explained Structural balance: The actual budget balance net of the cyclical component and one-off and other temporary measures.
Den strukturelle saldo udtrykker den underliggende tendens i budgetsaldoen. 
The structural balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the budget balance.
Reglen om budgetbalance: Den offentlige budgetstilling skal være i balance eller i overskud. 
Balanced budget rule: The budgetary position of the general government must be balanced or in surplus.
I både stabilitets-og vækstpagten og traktaten om stabilitet, samordning og styring i Den Økonomiske og Monetære Union anses denne regel for overholdt, hvis den årlige strukturelle offentlige saldo svarer til den mellemfristede budgetmålsætning. 
In both the SGP and the TSCG, this rule is deemed to be complied with if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its medium-term budgetary objective (MTO).
For euroområdets medlemsstater fastsætter stabilitets-og vækstpagten den nedre grænse for strukturel balance til -1 % af bruttonationalproduktet (BNP), og i finanspagten strammes den yderligere til - 0,5 % (undtagen for medlemsstater med lav gæld og lav holdbarhedsrisiko). 
The SGP specifies -1 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the lower limit of the structural balance for the euro area Member States, which the Fiscal Compact tightens further to -0.5 % (except for Member States with low debt and low sustainability risk).
Automatisk korrektionsmekanisme: En forpligtelse til at gennemføre korrigerende foranstaltninger, der automatisk aktiveres i tilfælde af væsentlige konstaterede afvigelser fra den mellemfristede budgetmålsætning eller tilpasningsstien i retning af denne. 9 
Automatic correction mechanism: An obligation to implement corrective measures that is automatically triggered in the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term budgetary objective or the adjustment path towards it. 9
09 Endelig forelagde Kommissionen i december 2017 Rådet et forslag til direktiv med det formål at indarbejde indholdet af TSSS i EU-retten13 ("2017-udkastet til direktiv"). 
09 Finally, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Directive to the Council in December 2017 with the aim of incorporating the substance of the TSCG into EU law13 (the “2017 draft Directive”).
Da denne beretning blev udarbejdet, var vedtagelsesprocessen i Rådet sat i bero, fordi man afventede Kommissionens vurdering af sixpacken og twopacken. Denne vurdering skal foreligge ved udgangen af 201914. 
At the time of writing this report, the adoption process at the Council was on hold pending the Commission’s assessment of the Six-and Two-Packs, which is due by the end of 201914.
Europa-Parlamentet har heller ikke afgivet udtalelse om forslaget endnu. 
The European Parliament has not yet issued its opinion on the proposal either.
10 I 2015 oprettede Kommissionen Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd ved en afgørelse15. 
10 In 2015, the Commission established the European Fiscal Board (EFB) by means of a Decision (the “EFB Decision”)15.
Denne var baseret på en anbefaling i de fem formænds rapport16 om at oprette et rådgivende europæisk finanspolitisk råd til at styrke EU's styringsramme ved bl.a. at koordinere og supplere de nationale uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner og foretage offentlige og uafhængige resultatvurderinger af budgetter og deres gennemførelse i forhold til EU's finanspolitiske målsætninger. 
This was based on a recommendation made in the ‘Five Presidents’ report’16 to create an advisory EFB to strengthen the EU governance framework, among other things by coordinating and complementing the national IFIs and by providing public and independent performance assessment of budgets and their execution against EU fiscal objectives.
10 13 Kommissionen (2017), COM(2017) 824 final, "Forslag til Rådets direktiv om bestemmelser til styrkelse af den finanspolitiske ansvarlighed og den mellemfristede budgetmæssige udvikling i medlemsstaterne", s. 
10 13 European Commission (2017), COM(2017) 824 final, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States’, p.
14 Det Økonomiske og Finansielle Udvalg (2019), "Draft supplementary EFC findings on the transposition of the Fiscal Compact", ecfin.cef.cpe(2019)1812588. 
14 Economic and Financial Committee (2019), ‘Draft supplementary EFC findings on the transposition of the Fiscal Compact’, ecfin.cef.cpe(2019)1812588.
15 Kommissionens afgørelse (EU) 2015/1937 af 21. oktober 2015 om oprettelse af et uafhængigt rådgivende europæisk finanspolitisk råd samt Kommissionens afgørelse (EU) 2016/221 af 12. februar 2016 om ændring af afgørelse (EU) 2015/1937 om oprettelse af et uafhængigt rådgivende europæisk finanspolitisk råd. 
15 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937 of 21 October 2015 establishing an independent advisory European Fiscal Board; and Commission Decision (EU) 2016/221 of 12 February 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1937 establishing an independent advisory European Fiscal Board.
16 Juncker, J.-C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. og Schulz, M. 
16 Juncker, J.-C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. and Schulz, M.
(2015), De fem formænds rapport: Gennemførelse af Europas Økonomiske og Monetære Union. 
(2015), ‘The Five Presidents’ report: Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union’.
Revisionens omfang og revisionsmetoden 11 Mellem 2016 og 2018 undersøgte vi både den korrigerende17 og den forebyggende del18 af SVP samt proceduren i forbindelse med makroøkonomiske ubalancer19. 
Audit scope and approach 11 Between 2016 and 2018, we examined both the corrective17 and the preventive arm18 of the SGP, as well as the macroeconomic imbalance procedure19.
For at få det fulde billede af den økonomiske styring i EU valgte vi at foretage en revision vedrørende ordninger relateret til finanspolitisk stabilitet. 
In order to complete our picture of the EU economic governance, we decided to carry out an audit on arrangements related to fiscal stability.
12 Formålet med revisionen var at vurdere, om Kommissionens tiltag til at styrke EU-medlemsstaternes budgetrammer havde givet de ønskede resultater, og fokus var på de tre centrale elementer: (i) de finanspolitiske regler og korrektionsmekanismen, (ii) de mellemfristede budgetrammer og (iii) de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner (jf. tekstboks 1). 
12 The audit was aimed at assessing whether the Commission’s actions to strengthen the budgetary framework of EU Member States, with reference to the three key components of (i) the fiscal rules and correction mechanism, (ii) MTBFs and (iii) IFIs (see Box 1), had achieved the intended results.
Vi undersøgte derfor: a) om EU's lovkrav til de nationale budgetrammer var effektive b) om de nationale budgetrammer var blevet styrket ved hjælp af hensigtsmæssig og klar interaktion mellem Kommissionen, de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner og Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd c) om Kommissionen på hensigtsmæssig vis vurderede, hvordan EU's lovkrav var blevet gennemført og anvendt i medlemsstaterne. 
To this end, we examined whether: (a) the EU legal requirements on NBFs were effective; (b) the NBFs were strengthened through appropriate and clear interaction between the Commission, the IFIs and the EFB and (c) the Commission assessed appropriately how the EU legal requirements have been implemented and applied in the Member States.
13 Vi fokuserede på de otte medlemsstater i vores revisionsstikprøve (Grækenland, Spanien, Frankrig, Italien, Letland, Luxembourg, Portugal og Nederlandene)20. 
13 We focused on the cases of the eight Member States in our audit sample (Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Netherlands)20.
Vi inddrog dog også i nødvendigt omfang andre medlemsstater i vores analyse. 
Nevertheless, our analysis also addressed, where necessary, the cases of other Member States.
10/2016, "Det kræver yderligere forbedringer at sikre, at proceduren i forbindelse med uforholdsmæssigt store underskud gennemføres effektivt" (http://eca.europa.eu). 
17 ECA special report 10/2016 ‘Further improvements needed to ensure effective implementation of the excessive deficit procedure’ (http://eca.europa.eu).
18/2018, "Er det vigtigste mål for stabilitets-og vækstpagtens forebyggende del realiseret?" (http://eca.europa.eu). 
18 ECA special report 18/2018 ‘Is the main objective of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact delivered?’ (http://eca.europa.eu).
3/2018, "Revision af proceduren i forbindelse med makroøkonomiske ubalancer (PMU)" (http://eca.europa.eu). 
19 ECA special report 03/2018 ‘Audit of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)’ (http://eca.europa.eu).
20 Disse medlemsstater i euroområdet blev udvalgt, fordi de havde høj gæld, fordi deres budgetrammer var blevet markant forbedret, eller fordi de allerede længe havde haft en uafhængig finanspolitisk institution. 11 
20 These were euro-area Member States selected either because they had high debt, because their budgetary frameworks had shown significant improvement or because they had had an IFI in place for a long time. 11
14 Vi baserede vores revisionskriterier på forskellige kilder: (i) juridiske dokumenter, (ii) Kommissionens dokumenter og benchmarks samt (iii) dokumenter og standarder udarbejdet af forskellige EU-institutioner, af andre internationale organisationer eller af forskere. 
14 We derived our audit criteria from various sources: (i) legal documents; (ii) Commission documents and benchmarks; and (iii) documents issued and standards developed by different EU Institutions, other international organisations or researchers.
Der gives nærmere oplysninger i de relevante afsnit i denne beretning. 
Further details are provided in the relevant sections of this report.
15 Vi indhentede revisionsbevis på grundlag af: a) en gennemgang af relevant dokumentation fra Kommissionen og Det Europæiske Finanspolitiske Råd b) en gennemgang af publikationer, retningslinjer og standarder fra internationale organisationer (IMF, OECD og Verdensbanken) og relevante uafhængige institutter samt akademisk litteratur c) en elektronisk spørgeundersøgelse, som var henvendt til de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner i EU og blev besvaret af 31 institutioner fra 26 medlemsstater21 d) interview med personale fra Generaldirektoratet for Økonomiske og Finansielle Anliggender (GD ECFIN) e) interview med personale fra relevante ministerier, uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner, centralbanker og tænketanke i de otte medlemsstater i vores stikprøve for at indhente feedback vedrørende EU's krav og anvendelsen af dem. 
15 We collected our audit evidence based on: (a) a review of relevant Commission and EFB documentation; (b) a review of publications, guidelines and standards from international organisations (the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank) as well as relevant independent institutes and academic literature; (c) an online survey of IFIs in the EU to which 31 IFIs from 26 Member States21 responded; (d) interviews with staff from the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN); (e) interviews with staff from relevant Ministries, IFIs, Central Banks and think tanks in our sample of eight Member States to obtain feedback on the EU requirements and their application.
16 Hensigten med denne særberetning er at bidrage til drøftelserne i Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om Kommissionens 2017-udkast til direktiv om styrkelse af den finanspolitiske ansvarlighed og den mellemfristede budgetmæssige udvikling i medlemsstaterne. 
16 This special report is intended to contribute to the discussions at the European Parliament and the Council on the 2017 draft Directive on strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States as proposed by the Commission.
12 21 I fem af de 28 medlemsstater deles to institutioner om de opgaver, der skal udføres af en uafhængig finanspolitisk institution. 
12 21 In 5 of the 28 Member States, 2 institutions share the tasks of an IFI.
Bemærkninger EU's lovkrav ansporede til forbedring af de nationale budgetrammer, men de kan forbedres 17 Som forventet ansporede EU's lovgivningstiltag (jf. punkt 05-10) til styrkelse af de nationale budgetrammer i EU's medlemsstater. 
Observations The EU legal requirements provided impetus for improving national budgetary frameworks but leave room for improvement 17 As expected, the EU legislative actions (see paragraphs 05 to 10) provided an impetus to strengthening NBFs in EU Member States.
Som det ses i figur 1, er antallet af nationale finanspolitiske regler og uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner steget markant efter vedtagelsen af direktiv 2011/85. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of national fiscal rules and IFIs have increased significantly following the adoption of Directive 2011/85.
Figur 1 – Nationale finanspolitiske regler og uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner i EU's medlemsstater 13 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 1995 2000 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Regel om budgetbalance Udgiftsregel Gældsregel Indtægtsregel a) Antal nationale finanspolitiske regler i medlemsstaterne efter type, 1990-2017 64 77 102 103 106 113 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1926 1945 1989 1994 2001 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 b) Antal uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner i EU efter det år, hvor de blev operationelle Note: Direktiv 2011/85 blev vedtaget i 2011 (den røde streg). 
Figure 1 – National fiscal rules and IFIs in the EU Member States 13 (a) Number of national fiscal rules in Member States by type, 1990-2017 113 (b) Number of IFIs becoming operational in the EU per year 0 1926 1945 1989 1994 2001 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 120 100 80 60 40 20 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 64 102 103 106 77 01 1990 1995 2000 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Budget-balance rule Expenditure rule Debt rule Revenue rule Note: In 2011 (red line), Directive 2011/85 was adopted.
Kilde: Revisionsretten, baseret på data fra Kommissionen. 
Source: ECA based on Commission’s data.
18 Men de forskellige elementer i de nationale budgetrammer er p.t. underlagt en fragmenteret retlig ramme (jf. figur 2). 
18 However, the different elements of NBFs are currently governed by a fragmented legal framework (see Figure 2).
Disse elementer er: (i) de numeriske finanspolitiske regler, (ii) korrektionsmekanismen, (iii) de mellemfristede budgetrammer, (iv) de uafhængige finanspolitiske institutioner og (v) budgetprocedurerne. 
These different elements are: (i) the numerical fiscal rules, (ii) the correction mechanism, (iii) the MTBFs, (iv) the IFIs, and (v) the budgetary procedures.
Figur 2 – En fragmenteret retlig rammer 14 Forordning 473/2013 2017-udkastet til direktiv Numeriske finanspolitiskeregler Direktiv 2011/85 Finanspagten Korrektionsmekanisme Mellemfristet budgetramme Uafhængige fi na ns politi ske i ns ti tuti oner Budgetprocedurer Omfattede medlemsstater 28* 22 (inklusivede19 medlemsstater i euroområdet) De 19 medlemsstater i euroområdet - Har fokus på Henviser kun vagt til Ingen nye krav Kilde: Revisionsretten. * Nogle bestemmelser gælder ikke Det Forenede Kongerige. 
Figure 2 – Fragmentation of legal framework 14 Regulation 473/2013 2017 draft Directive Numerical fiscal rules Directive 2011/85 Fiscal Compact Correction mechanism MTBF IFIs Budgetary procedures ApplicabilitytoMember States 28* 22 (including 19 euro-area Member States) 19 euro-area Member States - Focused on Only vaguely referred to No new requirements Source: ECA, * Some provisions are not applicable for the United Kingdom.