natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Europa-Parlamentets og Rdets direktiv (EU) 2017/541 af 15. marts 2017 om bekžmpelse af terrorisme (EUT L 88 af 31.3.2017, s. 6). 
The latest Commission Communication For example, Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism (OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6).
"A European Agenda on Security. 
A European Agenda on Security.
State of Play: June 2017". 
State of Play: June 2017.
KOM(2005) 313 endelig af 21. september 2005 "Rekruttering til terrorisme: faktorer, der bidrager til voldelig radikalisering", COM(2013) 941 final af 15. januar 2014 "Forebyggelse af radikalisering, der kan munde ud i terrorisme og voldelig ekstremisme: Styrkelse af EU's indsats" og COM(2016) 379 final af 14. juni 2016 "Stżtte til forebyggelse af radikalisering, der fżrer til voldelig ekstremisme". 
COM(2005) 313 final of 21 September 2005 ŇTerrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisationÓ; COM(2013) 941 final of 15 January 2014 ŇPreventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EUŐs responseÓ; and COM(2016) 379 final of 14 June 2016 ŇSupporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremismÓ.
8 5 6 7 
7 5 6 7
Kommissionens seneste meddelelse beskriver et net af sociale "push-faktorer" (f.eks. marginalisering og udstżdelse) og ideologiske "pull-faktorer" (f.eks. hververes misbrug af religiżse fortžllinger til at retfžrdiggżre voldshandlinger). 
describes a web of social ŇpushÓ factors (e.g. marginalisation and exclusion) and ideological ŇpullÓ factors (e.g. abuse of religious narratives by recruiters to justify acts of violence).
Kommissionen har den holdning, at det er en mangesidet og kompleks udfordring at stżtte medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering, og at den kun kan lżftes ved en kombination af aktioner p tvžrs af flere politikomrder og ved at samle interessenter p lokalt, regionalt, nationalt og europžisk niveau8. 
The Commission takes the view that supporting Member States in their fight against radicalisation is a multi-faceted and complex challenge which can only be met through a combination of actions across several policy areas and by bringing together stakeholders at local, regional, national and European levels8.
Aktionerne finansieres af forskellige fonde ssom Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed, Horisont 2020-programmet, programmet for retlige anliggender, Erasmus+ og Den Europžiske Socialfond (ESF). 
These actions are financed by various funds such as the Internal Security Fund, the Horizon 2020 Programme, The Justice Programme, Erasmus+ and the European Social Fund (ESF).
Ingen af disse fonde har bekžmpelse af radikalisering som et specifikt ml. 
None of these funds has addressing radicalisation as a specific objective.
Kommissionens forskellige aktioner forvaltes af otte af dens generaldirektorater, Europol, Eurojust og medlemsstaterne (jf. bilaget). 
The CommissionŐs diverse actions are managed by eight of its directorates-general, Europol, Eurojust and the Member States (see Annex).
Kommissionens tilgang til at stżtte medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering vises i figur 1. 
The CommissionŐs approach to supporting Member States in addressing radicalisation is shown in Figure 1.
9 8 Denne tilgang underbygges af strategien for den indre sikkerhed fra 2010 og den europžiske dagsorden om sikkerhed fra 2015. 
8 8 This approach is reinforced by the 2010 Internal Security Strategy and the 2015 European Agenda on Security.
Figur 1 - Hvordan Kommissionen stżtter medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering 10 Udvikling af viden om radikalisering og udveksling af praksis Fremme af inklusive og robuste samfund Bekžmpelse af terrorpropaganda Identificering og hndtering af radikaliserede personer Kilde: Revisionsretten. Bekžmpelse af radikalisering i lande uden for Europa 6. 
Figure 1 - How the Commission supports Member States in addressing radicalisation 9 Developing knowledge of radicalisation and sharing practices Countering terrorist propaganda Promoting inclusive and resilient societies Identifying and dealing with radicalised people Addressing radicalisation in countries outside Europe Source: ECA 6.
Horisont 2020 yder forskningstilskud til udvikling af viden om radikalisering. 
Horizon 2020 provides research grants for developing knowledge of radicalisation.
Forskningsemnerne omfatter aktuelle radikaliseringstendenser og udvikling af en samlet tilgang til voldelig radikalisering. 
Research topics include contemporary radicalisation trends and the development of a comprehensive approach to violent radicalisation.
Gode praksis udveksles via initiativer ssom netvžrket til bevidstgżrelse omkring radikalisering (RAN) (jf. tekstboks 1). 
Good practices are exchanged through initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (see Box 1).
Terrorpropaganda p internettet bekžmpes f.eks. af EU's internetindberetningsenhed (EU IRU) i Europol, af EU's internetforum og af de europžiske strategiske kommunikationsnet (jf. tekstboks 2). 
Online terrorist propaganda is countered, for example, through the EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) based in Europol, the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network (see Box 2).
11 Tekstboks 1 - Netvžrket til bevidstgżrelse omkring radikalisering (RAN) RAN blev oprettet i 2011. 
10 Box 1 - Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) The RAN was established in 2011.
Det forbinder fagfolk i hele Europa ssom psykologer, lžrere, socialarbejdere, politi, fžngselspersonale og tilsynsvžrger, som arbejder direkte med dem, der er srbare over for radikalisering, og dem, der allerede er blevet radikaliseret. 
It connects practitioners around Europe, such as psychologists, teachers, social workers, police, prison and probation officers, who work directly with those vulnerable to radicalisation, and with those who have already been radicalised.
Formlet er at hjžlpe og styrke fagfolk (snarere end politiske beslutningstagere og akademikere), der arbejder med praktisk bekžmpelse af radikalisering eller reintegration af voldelige ekstremister, ved at: - fremme udveksling af erfaringer, f.eks. ved mżder og konferencer - tilskynde til anvendelse af relevante praktiske vžrktżjer - formidle oplysninger og ekspertise. 
It aims to help and empower front-line practitioners (rather than policymakers and academics) in countering radicalisation or reintegrating violent extremists by: - promoting exchanges of experience, e.g. at meetings and conferences; - encouraging the use of relevant practical tools; - disseminating information and expertise.
RAN's ekspertisecenter sżrger for koordinering og yder stżtte til RAN. 
The RAN Centre of Excellence provides coordination and support for the RAN.
Det bruger sin ekspertise til at vejlede RAN's ni arbejdsgrupper (tematiske grupper, hvor fagfolk mżdes for at udveksle ider, viden og erfaringer), tilbyde skržddersyet stżtte (f.eks. workshops og kurser) til de enkelte lande og udbrede viden og praksis. 
It uses its expertise to guide the nine RAN Working Groups (thematic groups in which practitioners meet to exchange ideas, knowledge and experiences), offer tailor-made support (e.g. workshops and training courses) to individual countries, and disseminate knowledge and practices.
Centret forvaltes af en kontrahent og finansieres af en kontrakt under Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi p i alt 25 millioner euro for perioden 2015-2019. 
The Centre is managed by a contractor and financed by an ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ contract totalling Ű25 million for the 2015-2019 period.
Tekstboks 2 - Bekžmpelse af terrorpropaganda EU's internetindberetningsenhed (EU IRU) EU IRU blev oprettet den 1. juli 2015 og er placeret i Det Europžiske Center for Terrorbekžmpelse (ECTC) i Europol. 
Box 2 - Countering terrorist propaganda EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) The EU IRU was set up on 1 July 2015 and is located within the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol.
Den havde et budget p 4,5 millioner euro i 2017. 
It has a budget of Ű4.5 million for 2017.
Enheden har til forml at bekžmpe radikalisering og rekruttering af terrorister p internettet ved at markere terrorrelateret onlineindhold og varsko de tjenesteydere, der huser det, f.eks. YouTube (Google), Microsoft, Facebook og Twitter, ved at udsende en vurdering, der sžtter dem i stand til at afgżre, om indholdet skal fjernes. 
The EU IRU aims to counter online radicalisation and recruitment by terrorists by flagging online terrorist content and alerting the service providers that host it, such as YouTube (Google), Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter, by means of an assessment, that will enable them to decide whether to remove such content.
Efter aftale med medlemsstaterne fokuserer den p islamistisk terrorpropaganda, der gr p tvžrs af gržnserne. 
In agreement with Member States, it focuses on Islamist terrorist propaganda, which cuts across borders.
12 EU IRU bruger ogs sin ekspertviden om internetbaseret kommunikation til at stżtte medlemsstaternes efterforskninger og foretager strategiske analyser for at identificere terrortrusler. 
11 The EU IRU also provides expertise on internet based communication to support Member StatesŐ investigations and provides strategic analysis to identify terrorist threats.
EU's internetforum I december 2015 oprettede Kommissionen EU's internetforum, som finansieres af Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi. 
EU Internet Forum In December 2015 the Commission launched the EU Internet Forum financed by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ.
Ved hjžlp af mżder og konferencer samler forummet regeringer, Europol, internetvirksomheder, antiterrorkoordinatoren, netvžrket for strategisk kommunikation og RAN. 
By means of meetings and conferences, the Forum brings together governments, Europol, internet companies, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, the European Strategic Communications Network and the RAN.
Forummet har to ml: - at begržnse adgangen til terrorrelateret indhold p internettet - at sžtte civilsamfundspartnerne i stand til at żge mžngden af effektive modfortžllinger p internettet. 
It has two objectives: - to reduce accessibility to terrorist content online; - to empower civil-society partners to increase the volume of effective alternative narratives online.
Det europžiske strategiske kommunikationsnet Det europžiske strategiske kommunikationsnet er et netvžrk, hvor eksperter i EU's medlemsstater udveksler god praksis vedrżrende strategisk kommunikation. 
European Strategic Communications Network The European Strategic Communications Network is a network where EU Member StatesŐ experts share good practices on strategic communications.
Dets rdgivningshold giver regeringer rd om udvikling af kommunikationsstrategier og udarbejdelse af modfortžllingskampagner9. 
Its advisory team provides governments with advice on developing a communication strategy and producing counter-narrative campaigns9.
Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi gav tilskud p 2,2 millioner euro til finansiering af kommunikationsnettets aktiviteter i perioden fra januar 2015 til september 2017. 
The ŇInternal Security Fund - PoliceÓ provided grants of Ű2.2 million to finance their activities for the period from January 2015 to September 2017.
Skabelsen af inklusive og robuste samfund fremmes gennem projekter finansieret af Fonden for Intern Sikkerhed - Politi, f.eks. STRESAVIORA (jf. tekstboks 3). 
Inclusive and resilient societies are promoted by means of projects financed by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ such as STRESAVIORA (see Box 3).
Hertil kommer projekter finansieret af Erasmus+ og Den Europžiske Socialfond, der ogs tager sigte p at styrke robustheden og n ud til drligt stillede lokalsamfund. 
In addition, projects financed by Erasmus+ and the European Social Fund also aim to strengthen resilience and reach out to disadvantaged communities.
Selv om deres ml er meget bredere og ikke specifikt er udformet til at bekžmpe radikaliseringen, bidrager de indirekte til at forebygge den. 
Although their objectives are much broader and are not specifically designed to address radicalisation, they indirectly help to prevent it.
Det europžiske strategiske kommunikationsnet udviklede sig fra rdgivningsholdet for strategisk kommunikation om Syrien (SSCAT). 9 
9 The European Strategic Communications Network evolved from the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT).
Kommissionen stżtter medlemsstaternes bestržbelser p at identificere og hndtere radikaliserede personer ved at fremme udvekslingen af oplysninger mellem medlemsstaternes retshndhžvende myndigheder (f.eks. via Schengeninformationssystemet). 
The Commission supports Member States in identifying and dealing with radicalised people by facilitating exchanges of information between Member StatesŐ law enforcement authorities (e.g. through the Schengen Information System).
Den stżtter ogs udviklingen af exitstrategier, der kan hjžlpe personer til at forlade radikaliserede miljżer og reintegrere sig i samfundet ved hjžlp af rehabiliterings-og afradikaliseringsprojekter finansieret af programmet for retlige anliggender. 
It also supports the development of exit strategies to help people disengage from radicalised environments and re-integrate into society by means of rehabilitation and de-radicalisation projects funded by the Justice Programme.
Radikalisering i lande uden for Europa bekžmpes bde gennem sžrlige terrorbekžmpelsesforanstaltninger og integrering af terrorbekžmpelse i andre foranstaltninger. 
Radicalisation in countries outside Europe is addressed both by dedicated counter-terrorism measures and mainstreaming in other measures.
Der er bl.a. tale om programmer finansieret af Den Europžiske Udviklingsfond, Erasmus+, det europžiske naboskabsinstrument og instrumentet, der bidrager til stabilitet og fred. 
This includes programmes financed by the European Development Funds, Erasmus+, the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.
Vi undersżgte, om Kommissionens forvaltning af sin stżtte til medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering, der fżrer til terrorisme, var hensigtsmžssig. 
We examined whether the Commission appropriately managed its support for Member States in addressing radicalisation leading to terrorism.
Formlet med revisionen var at besvare fżlgende spżrgsml: a) Giver Kommissionen medlemsstaterne relevant stżtte? 
The aim was to answer the following questions: Does the Commission provide Member States with relevant support?
For at besvare dette spżrgsml vurderede vi, om Kommissionens politikml og aktioner var udformet, s de afspejlede medlemsstaternes behov b) Bliver de aktioner, der finansieres af de forskellige EU-fonde, koordineret med henblik p at udnytte eventuelle synergier bedst muligt? 
In order to answer this question, we assessed whether the CommissionŐs policy objectives and actions were designed in such a way as to reflect Member StatesŐ needs.
For at besvare dette spżrgsml vurderede vi, om Kommissionen havde de nżdvendige procedurer til at koordinere sin stżtte c) Har Kommissionen indfżrt en ramme til at vurdere, om dens stżtte er effektiv og giver valuta for pengene? 
Are the actions financed by the different EU funds coordinated to make the most of any synergies? In order to answer this question, we assessed whether the Commission had the necessary procedures for coordinating its support.
For at besvare dette spżrgsml undersżgte vi, om Kommissionen havde indfżrt en ramme med de nżdvendige indikatorer og rapporter til at vurdere, om dens politik er effektiv og giver valuta for pengene. 
In order to answer this question, we examined whether the Commission had set up the necessary framework of indicators and reports to assess whether its policy is effective and offers value for money.
Vi undersżgte ogs, om vurderingerne af de enkelte aktioner ikke kun mlte aktivitet, men ogs effektivitet. 
We also examined whether assessments of individual actions measured not only activity, but also effectiveness.
Vi fokuserede primžrt p perioden fra 2014 og frem, sammenfaldende med starten af programmeringsperioden 2014-2020 for Kommissionens fonde og programmer. 
Our focus was mainly on the period from 2014 onwards, to coincide with the start of the 2014-2020 funding periods for the CommissionŐs funds and programmes.
Vores hovedfokus l p forvaltningen af aktioner i EU, hvis primžre forml var at forebygge og bekžmpe radikalisering, men vi s ogs p aktioner med bredere ml, f.eks. social inklusion af ugunstigt stillede grupper. 
We focused mainly on the management of actions within the EU whose primary purpose was to prevent and counter radicalisation, but we also took into account actions which pursue broader objectives, such as the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups.
Vi undersżgte ikke informationssystemer (f.eks. Schengeninformationssystemet) til udveksling mellem medlemsstaterne af oplysninger om radikaliserede enkeltpersoner. 
We did not examine information systems (e.g. the Schengen Information System) for exchanging information between Member States on details of radicalised individuals.
14 
Audit approach 14.
Vores revision p stedet blev gennemfżrt fra november 2016 til marts 2017. 
Our audit fieldwork was carried out from November 2016 to March 2017.
Vores bemžrkninger bygger p fżlgende beviskilder: a) en gennemgang af dokumentation om politikker, procedurer og aktioner vedrżrende stżtte til medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering b) samtaler med de generaldirektorater i Kommissionen, der forvalter EU-midler og vžrktżjer til bekžmpelse af radikalisering, samt med RAN's ekspertisecenter, EU IRU i Europol og Det Internationale Center for Terrorbekžmpelse (en organisation, der fremmer udveksling af viden og ider om terrorbekžmpelse) c) en spżrgeundersżgelse rettet til kontaktpunkterne for terrorbekžmpelse i alle medlemsstaternes faste repržsentationer ved EU. 
We based our observations on the following sources of evidence: a review of documentation on policies, procedures and actions relating to support for Member States in addressing radicalisation; interviews with Commission directorates-general that manage EU funds and tools for addressing radicalisation, as well as with the RAN Centre of Excellence, the EU IRU at Europol, and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (an organisation which promotes the sharing of knowledge and ideas on counter-terrorism); 13
15 af de 28 kontaktpunkter for terrorbekžmpelse besvarede vores spżrgsml, hvilket giver en svarprocent p 54 %. 
15 out of 28 counter-terrorist focal points completed the survey, i.e. a response rate of 54 %.
Undersżgelsen omfattede spżrgsml om relevansen og mervžrdien af den stżtte, der gives til medlemsstaterne, samt udfordringerne i forbindelse med den d) besżg hos nationale myndigheder i Belgien og Frankrig for at vurdere relevansen og mervžrdien af den stżtte, de modtager. 
The survey included questions on the relevance, added value and challenges of the support given to Member States; visits to national authorities in Belgium and France in order to assess the relevance and added value of the support they receive.
BEMŽRKNINGER Stżtten er relevant og veludformet 15. 
OBSERVATIONS Support is relevant and well designed 15.
Vi undersżgte Kommissionens politiske ramme for at vurdere, om den adresserede medlemsstaternes behov, og om der var huller. 
We examined the CommissionŐs policy framework in order to assess whether it addressed Member StatesŐ needs, and whether there were any gaps.
Vi undersżgte ogs, om aktionerne var udformet sdan, at medlemsstaterne havde fordel af, at der blev gjort en indsats p europžisk niveau. 
We also examined whether actions were designed in such a way as to bring benefits to Member States from acting at European level.
Kommissionen adresserede medlemsstaternes behov, med f undtagelser 16. 
The Commission addressed the needs of Member States, with few exceptions 16.
Medlemsstaternes politiske beslutningstagere kan underrette Kommissionen om de omrder, hvor de har brug for stżtte med hensyn til bekžmpelse af radikalisering. 
Member StatesŐ policymakers can inform the Commission about the areas where they need support in addressing radicalisation.
Dette sker gennem forskellige mżder, netvžrk og dokumenter (f.eks. i Rdets arbejdsgruppe om 15 terrorisme, i netvžrket for nationale politiske beslutningstagere p forebyggelsesomrdet, som blev ivžrksat i februar 2017, og i rdskonklusioner), eller som led i godkendelsen af arbejdsprogrammer for EU-fondene. 
This is done through various meetings, networks and documents (e.g. the Council Working Group on Terrorism, the network of prevent policymakers launched in February 2017 and Council Conclusions), or as part of the approval of work programmes for EU funds.
Vi konstaterede, at Kommissionen ved udarbejdelsen af sin politiske ramme for bekžmpelse af radikalisering tog hensyn til de behov, medlemsstaternes politiske beslutningstagere havde givet udtryk for (jf. tekstboks 4). 
We found that when the Commission drafted its policy framework to address radicalisation, it took account of the needs expressed by Member StatesŐ policymakers (see Box 4).
16 Tekstboks 4 - Eksempler, hvor Kommissionen tog hensyn til de behov, medlemsstaterne havde givet udtryk for I november 2015 fremhžvede medlemsstaternes ministre for retlige og indre anliggender i konklusionerne fra Rdet for Den Europžiske Union, at Kommissionen burde stżtte medlemsstaternes bekžmpelse af radikalisering i fžngsler. 
14 Box 4 - Examples where the Commission took account of the needs expressed by Member States In November 2015, the Member StatesŐ Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs used the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union to highlight the need for the Commission to support Member States in addressing radicalisation in prisons.
Som reaktion satte Kommissionen i sin meddelelse fra 2016 om stżtte til forebyggelse af radikalisering, der fżrer til voldelig ekstremisme, bl.a. fokus p radikalisering i fžngsler. 
In response, the 2016 ŇCommunication on supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremismÓ included a focus on radicalisation in prisons.
Medlemsstaternes behov har žndret sig i takt med den skiftende trusselssituation, og det samme har Kommissionens stżtte. 
Just as Member StatesŐ needs have changed in response to the changing threat situation, so has the CommissionŐs support.
Nr Kommissionen foretager žndringer i sin stżtte, tager den hensyn til det arbejde, der udfżres af EU-organer ssom Europol, der giver den oplysninger om trusselssituationen i medlemsstaterne (jf. tekstboks 5). 
In modifying its support, the Commission takes account of the work of European bodies such as Europol which provides it with information on the threat situation in Member States (see Box 5).
Tekstboks 5 - Kommissionens stżtte žndrer sig i takt med trusselssituationen Som reaktion p de nylige terrorangreb i Europa og p baggrund af Europols analyse fremhžvede Kommissionen i sin meddelelse fra 2016 om stżtte til forebyggelse af radikalisering, der fżrer til voldelig ekstremisme, den trussel, som udgżres af hjemvendte udenlandske terrorkrigere (som forlader deres hjem i EU og rejser til andre lande, f.eks. de konfliktramte omrder i Syrien og Irak, for at deltage i terrorkrig eller oplžring i terror). 
Box 5 - The CommissionŐs support changes in response to the threat situation In response to recent terrorist attacks in Europe and EuropolŐs analysis, the 2016 ŇCommunication on supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremismÓ highlighted the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters (those who leave their home in the EU and travel to other countries, e.g. the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq, to take part in terrorist fighting or training).
Den styrkede stżtten til udvikling af exitstrategier, der kan hjžlpe personer til at forlade radikaliserede miljżer og reintegrere sig i samfundet. 
It reinforced support for developing exit strategies to help individuals to disengage from radicalised environments and reintegrate into society.