natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De udgifter, der skal deles, er den finansielle modydelse, som Fžllesskabet betaler, og den afgift, som de private redere, der żnsker at fiske i tredjelandes farvande, betaler (jf. ovenfor). 
The costs to be shared consist of financial compensation paid by the Community and a fee paid by the private shipowners wanting to fish in the waters of third countries (see also above).
Den del, Fžllesskabet har skullet finansiere over offentlige midler, kan ansls til 85,7 % af de samlede udgifter til aftalerne med finansiel modydelse (1). Som den tidligere har udtrykt, at det var dens hensigt, bżr Kommissionen undersżge, hvordan udgifterne kunne fordeles mere ligeligt, og hvilke konsekvenser en sdan fordeling ville f (2). 
The share of the financing which the Community has had to bearoutofpublicfundscanbeputat85,7%ofthetotalcostof theagreementsinvolvingfinancialcompensation(1).Inthelight of the intentions it has expressed in the past (2), the Commission should investigate the advisability, methods and consequences of sharing out the costs in a more balanced manner.
Grundlžggende oplysninger 26. 
Indispensable information 26.
P trods af ovennžvnte svagheder har Kommissionen ikke kunnet opstille en fuldstžndig opgżrelse over udgifterne til og fordelene ved de internationale fiskeriaftaler siden den sidste evaluering fra 1999. Kommissionen har kunnet tilvejebringe oplysninger om udgifterne, men den har hverken kunnet oplyse fangsternes vžrdi eller aftalernes direkte eller indirekte betydning (f.eks. for beskžftigelsen). 
Lastly, in spite of the weaknesses pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the Commission was not able to draw up a complete balance sheet of the costs and benefits of the international fisheries agreements since the last evaluation, made in 1999: it was able to supply data on costs but not for the value of the catches nor for their direct or indirect impact (on jobs, for example).
Sdanne oplysninger er imidlertid helt nżdvendige i forhandlinger om kommercielle aftaler som de internationale fiskeriaftaler. 
In commercial negotiations, however, as is the case with the international fisheries agreements, it is absolutely vital for these figures to be available.
I żvrigt opfordrede Europa-Parlamentet i beslutning af 15. maj 1997 (3) Kommissionen til at udarbejde et sžt retningslinjer for at muliggżre en ensartet procedure ved evaluering af gennemfżrelsen af protokollerne om fangstmuligheder, nr disse udlżber, eller i forbindelse med forberedelsen af forhandlingerne om nye protokoller eller aftaler. 
Furthermore,initsResolutionof15May1997(3),theEuro-pean Parliament called on the Commission to draw up a set of guidelines to enable a uniform procedure when evaluating the implementation of expiring protocols on fishing opportunities or preparing for negotiations on new protocols or agreements.
(1) Fžllesskabets andel i finansieringen af de samlede udgifter til fiskeriaftalerne i 1992 og 1997 udgjorde henholdsvis 82 og 84 % for aftalen med Marokko, 73 og 82 % for Mauretanien, 89 og 90 % for Senegal 2 og 100 % (fast sats) for Grżnland. 
1 () The CommunityŐs share in the financing of the total cost of the fisheries agreements, for 1992 and 1997 respectively, was 82 % and 84 % for Morocco, 73 % and 82 % for Mauritania, 89 % and 90 % for Sene-2 gal and 100 % (constant figure) for Greenland.
(3) KOM(96)488af30.oktober1998. () Europa-Parlamentets protokol, beslutning om internationale fiskeriaftaler af 15. maj 1997, A4-0149/1997. 
(3) COM(96) 488 of 30 October 1998. () Minutes of the European Parliament, Resolution on international fish-eriesagreements,15May1997,A4-0149/1997.
Tabel Udnyttelsen af fangstmulighederne Ń Aftalen med Grżnland 1995 1996 267 294 148 588 55,6 37,7 1997 253 294 142 388 56,1 37,7 1998 250 034 128 786 51,5 37,7 1999 239 309 90 004 37,6 37,7 267 144 80 330 30,0 AFTALERNES MLSŽTNING Stabile fiskerimuligheder 28. 
Table Utilisation of fishing opportunities Ń Greenland Agreement 1995 1996 267 294 148 588 55,6 37,7 1997 253 294 142 388 56,1 37,7 1998 250 034 128 786 51,5 37,7 1999 239 309 90 004 37,6 37,7 267 144 80 330 30,0 THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS Stability of fishing opportunities 28.
Et af de overordnede ml for disse aftaler er at give medlemsstaternes fiskerflder stabile fiskerimuligheder. 
Oneofthegeneralobjectivesoftheseagreementsistooffer stable fishing opportunities to the fleets of Member States.
I perioden 1993-1999 var der en mindre nedgang i fiskerimulighederne navnlig p grund af nedgangen i fiskerimulighederne i aftalen med Marokko. Fiskerimulighederne i henhold til de żvrige aftaler (4) žndredes ikke eller żgedes lidt. 
During the period 1993 to 1999, there was a slight decline in the fishing opportunities, because of their reduction under the Morocco Agreement, as well as their stability or slight increase in other agreements(4).
I den samme periode steg betalingsbevillingerne til aftalerne imidlertid, hvilket bekržfter, at Kommissionen żnsker stabile fangstmuligheder. 
Nevertheless, during the same period the payment appro-priationsdevotedtotheagreementsincreased,whichconfirms the CommissionŐs wish to ensure that these fishing opportunities have a more stable basis.
Aftalen mellem EU og Marokko udlżb den 30. november 1999, og i de fżlgende 12 mneder blev de samlede fangstmuligheder i henhold til aftalerne vžsentligt reduceret. Det ramte navnlig spanske og portugisiske fiskere. 
In the 12 months following the expiry of the EU-Morocco Agreement on 30 November 1999, there was a substantial overall decrease in the fishing opportunities provided for by the agreements, notably at the expense of the Spanish and Portuguese fishermen.
Markedsforsyning og beskžftigelse 30. 
Supply to the market and aid to employment 30.
Fiskeriaftalerne tager sigte p at forsyne et marked, der i hżj grad er underforsynet, og p at bevare arbejdspladser. 
The fisheries agreements aim to ensure supplies to a market which on the whole has a shortage, and to safeguard jobs.
Kommissionen har ikke fyldestgżrende og ajourfżrte oplysninger om hver enkelt aftales virkning p disse to omrder, der desuden ikke er analyseret systematisk i de datablade, der omtales i det foregende. 
The Commission does not have up-to-date figures on the impact of each agreement on these two aspects, which, moreover, are not systematically analysed in the technical data sheets referred to above.
Den eneste kilde til oplysninger om dette er den evaluering af aftalerne, som Kommissionen har fet foretaget vedrżrende perioden 1993-1997. 
The only source of information in this respect is the evalu-ationoftheagreementsthatwasmadeontheCommissionŐs behalf for the period 1993 to 1997.
Der bżr defineres passende kriterier og indikatorer (f.eks. oplysninger om losning og mžngder og fangsternes vžrdi samt arbejdspladser, der pvirkes direkte eller indirekte), sledes at man systematisk kan mle virkningen af aftalerne p markedsforsyningen og beskžftigelsen. 
In order systematically to measure the impact of the agreements on the supply to the market and on employment, suitable criteria and indicators need to be defined (for example: data on landingsandcatchesintermsoftheirquantityandvalue;direct or indirect jobs).
P den mde ville man endvidere kunne mle den potentielle risiko og konsekvenserne for Kommissionen, 4 ( ) Kommissionens ČIfremerÇ-evaluering, kapitel 4.1, s. 
Furthermore, this would make it possible to evaluate the potential risk and the consequences to which the Commission is laying itself open when agreements are not renewed, 4 ( ) The CommissionŐs ÔIfremerŐ evaluation, Chapter 4.1, p.
27.7.2001 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 210/9 ved at aftalerne ikke fornys, s man p forhnd kunne forberede sig herp. Da aftalen med Marokko ikke blev fornyet i 1999, fik det f.eks. store żkonomiske og sociale konsekvenser i de regioner i Europa (navnlig i Spanien og i Portugal), der var stžrkt afhžn-gigeafden(7000arbejdspladserog470fartżjer). 
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 210/9 andthereforetoanticipatewhattheeffectsofthiswouldbe.In this context, the non-renewal of the agreement with Morocco in 1999 had considerable economic and social repercussions (about 7 000 direct jobs and 470 vessels) in the regions of Europe which were heavily dependent on it (in particular, Spain and Portugal).
Omstruktureringsstrategi 32. 
Restructuring strategy 32.
Mlet for strukturforanstaltningerne i den fžlles fiskeripolitik er navnlig: a) at opn balance mellem fiskerfldernes kapacitet og fiskeressourcerne b) at fremme udviklingen i de omrder, der er afhžngige af fiskeriet c) at afskaffe overskydende kapacitet d) at bygge og modernisere fiskerfartżjer p visse betingelser. 
The structural aspect of the common fisheries policy aims in particular to achieve: (a)abalancebetweenthecapacitiesofthefishingfleetsandfish stocks; (b) promotion of the development of the regions that are dependent on fishing; (c) elimination of surplus capacities; (d) the construction and modernisation of fleets, under certain conditions.
Disse strukturforanstaltninger er bl.a. knyttet til strukturforanstaltningerne i de internationale fiskeriaftaler, og der bżr derfor fastlžgges klare og konsekvente ml, og foranstaltningerne bżr samordnes nżje. 
This aspect of Ôstructural measuresŐ is linked, amongst other things, to that of the international fisheries agreements, and thus clear, consistent objectives need to be set and the measures taken need to be closely coordinated.
Under forhandlingerne om den internationale fiskeriaftale med Marokko i 1994-1995 konstaterede man, at der var tendens til en nedgang i fiskeressourcerne i de marokkanske farvande, og at Marokko havde udviklet sin egen fiskerisektor. 
During the negotiations for the International Fisheries Agreement with Morocco in 1994 and 1995, it was found that fish stocks in Moroccan waters were tending to become depleted and that the fishing sector in Morocco was being developed.
Det burde have udlżstengradvisomstruktureringafdeafmedlemsstaternesfl-der, der fiskede i disse farvande, i overensstemmelse med Kommissionens udtalelser under forhandlingerne. 
This oughttohavepromptedapolicyofgraduallyrestructuringthe fleets of the Member States operating in these waters, as the Commission stated during the negotiations.
P den mde ville man gradvist have kunnet indfżre omstruktureringsforanstaltninger (f.eks. forlžgning af fartżjer) og sociale foranstaltninger for at begržnse konsekvenserne for Fžllesskabets fiskerisektor. 
A policy of this kind would have allowed the gradual implementation of restructuring mea-sures(suchastheredeploymentofvessels)andofsocialmeasures to limit the effects on the Community fishing sector; it would also havemadetheCommunityfleetslessdependentonthisAgree-ment.
Sektorens stabilitet og varige udvikling kunne sledes have vžret sikret. 
The sectorŐs stability and sustainable development could thus have been safeguarded.
Det kan imidlertid konstateres, at Fžllesskabet medfinansierede bygningen af 54 af de i alt 125 nye (navnlig spanske og portugisiske) fartżjer, der fiskede i marokkansk farvand (1995-1999-aftalen). 
As it was, out of a total of 125 new boats (in particular Spanish and Portuguese) having fished in Moroccanwaters(the1995to1999Agreement),54werefound to have been constructed using European Community co-financing.
Kommissionen havde ikke i partnerskab med medlemsstaterne defineret klare ml for tilde-lingenafstżtte(frastrukturfondene)tilkonstruktionafnyefar- tżjer, og den havde ikke kontrolleret den senere udnyttelse af denne stżtte. 
The Commission, in partnership with the Member States, had not set any clear objectives for the granting of the (Structural Fund) aid for the construction of new vessels nor had it monitored the subsequent use of this aid.
Det rejser fżlgende to spżrgsml: Var dette instrument en integrerende del af en overordnet plan for omstrukturering af medlemsstaternes flder? og var nedsžttelsen af antallet af tilladelser til at drive fiskeri, der afspejler, at antallet af fartżjer faldt fra 590 til 477 mellem 1996 og 1999, det eneste resultat af omstruktureringen? 
There are two ques-tionswhichspringtomindhere:wasthisinstrumentanintegral part of an overall plan for restructuring the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets? Was the decline in the number of fishing licences, as reflected in the decrease in the number of vessels from 590 to 477 between 1996 and 1999, the sole outcome of the implementation of the restructuring objective?
For nogle af aftalernes vedkommende har Kommissionen ikke kunnet pvise, at der var nogen forbindelse mellem mlet for forhandlingerne og mlet for den fžlles fiskeripolitik, som er at begržnse fiskeriaktiviteterne i Fžllesskabets farvande (1). 
Thus, for some agreements, the Commission was not able to show any relationship between the negotiating aim and the common fisheries policy objective to reducethefishingeffortinCommunitywaters(1).Thereisthus still a lack of consistency between these two aspects of the common fisheries policy.
Der blev endvidere bygget fartżjer, uden at det systematisk var blevet undersżgt, om fangstkapaciteten svarede til de ressourcer, som var omfattet af aftalerne. 
Furthermore, the construction of the vessels was undertaken without any systematic check as to whether the catch capacities were appropriate for the resources covered by the agreements.
Siden aftalen med Marokko udlżb, og fiskeriet i de marokkanske farvande ophżrte, har de pgžldendefldersomkompensationforindkomsttabetpvisse betingelser modtaget godtgżrelse, som medfinansieres af Fžllesskabet. 
Since the expiry of the Moroccan Agreement and the consequent discontinuation of fishing in Moroccan waters, the fleets concerned have, on certain conditions, received indemnities that are co-financed by the Community and are intended to offset the corresponding losses in income.
I 2000 var der afsat 124 millioner euro hertil, heraf 59 millioner euro fra Fžllesskabets budget. 35. 
For 2000, the amount budgeted for these indemnities was 124 million euro, 59 million euro of which was financed by the Community budget.
Det er navnlig tilfžldet for andengenerationsaftalerne (jf. definitionen i punkt 4), der gennem oprettelse af blandede selskaber tager sigte p at sikre fangstmulighederne for fžl-lesskabsflden, bevare et vist beskžftigelsesniveau (2) i Fžllesskabet og overfżre fiskerfartżjer til tredjelandes farvande. 
35.Otherinitiativesofastructuralnaturehavenotalwayshad theexpectedimpact.Thisapppliestothesecond-generationagree-ments (see definition in paragraph 4) which aim, through the setting-up of joint ventures, to preserve the fishing opportunities available to the Community fleet, to maintain a certain level of Community employment (2) and to transfer fishing vessels to the waters of third countries.
Den eneste aftale af nogen betydning er den, der er indget med Argentina (162 millioner euro). Den muliggjorde overfżrslen af 32 fartżjer og bevarelsen af ca. 1 000 arbejdspladser i Fžllesskabet, indtil Argentina traf beslutning om at hžve det mindsteantal argentinske sżfolk, som disse fartżjer skal ansžtte (p sigt kan denne foranstaltning ramme 600 arbejdspladser i Fžllesskabet). 
The only agreement of importance was signed with Argentina (162 million euro); this allowed the transfer of 32 vessels and the safeguarding of about 1 000 Community jobs, until Argentina decided to increase the minimum number of Argentinian seamen to be included in the crews of these vessels (in the long term, this measure could affect 600 Community jobs).
Denne type aftalers begržnsede effekt skyldes manglende interesse i tredjelandene og nedfiskning af fiskeressourcerne. 
Thelimitedimpactofthistypeofagreementcanbeattributedto a lack of interest on the part of the third countries and the depletion of fish stocks.
Alt i alt bżr Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne afstikke klare ml, inden de tildeler strukturfondsmidler til EU-fiskerfartżjer, der fisker inden for rammerne af de internationale aftaler. 
Allinall,beforeStructuralFundaidisgrantedtotheCom-munity fleet fishing under international agreements, the Commission and the Member States should set clear objectives. The vari-ousaspectsofthecommonfisheriespolicycouldbemademore consistent, in particular with the Structural Funds.
I betragtning af de risici, Fžllesskabet lżber, isžr hvis aftalerne ikke forlžnges, er det sžrlig vigtigt i forbindelse med disse aftaler, at gennemfżrelsenafforanstaltningertiludviklingafenstabilfiske-risektor planlžgges strategisk, og at der fżres effektivt tilsyn med dem. 
Given the risks faced by the Community, in particular in the event of the non-renewal of the agreements, it is especially important under these agreementsfortheretobestrategicplanningandfortheimple-mentation of the measures to develop a stable fishing sector to be monitoredeffectively.
Overensstemmelse mellem fžllesskabspolitikkerne 37. 
Coordination of Community policies 37.
Nogle af de lande, der har undertegnet en international fiske-riaftale, modtager ogs stżtte via andre fžllesskabspolitikker, f.eks. udviklingsbistand, som finansieres over Fžllesskabets almindelige budget, eller stżtte fra Den Europžiske Udviklingsfond (EUF). 
Some of the countries that are signatories of an international fisheries agreement also benefit from other Community policies, such as development aid financed by the Community budget or by the European Development Fund (EDF).
Aktionerne p fiskeriomrdet og p udviklingsomrdet (2) bżr derfor samordnes, og man bżr sikre deres indbyrdes overensstemmelse. 
It is therefore necessary to ensure that there is consistency between and coordination of the measures taken in the fisheries and development fields (2).
Det betyder, at det enkelte omrdes sžrlige karakter (kommerciel karakter og udviklingsbistand), som hver isžr har sin berettigelse, skal respekteres. 
This means that due regard needs to be paid to the specific nature ofeacharea(thecommercialnatureanddevelopmentaid),since each is valid in its own way.
(1) Kommissionens ČIfremerÇ-evaluering, s. 
(1) The CommissionŐs ÔIfremerŐ evaluation, p.
(2) Rdets konklusioner 11784/97 af 4. november 1997. 
(2) Council Conclusions 11784/97 of 4 November 1997.
C 210/10 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 27.7.2001 38. 
C 210/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2001 38.
I nogle tredjelande kan indtžgten fra de internationale fiskeriaftaler udgżre en vžsentlig del af nationalindkomsten. I 1998 udgjorde den f.eks. 15,2 % af nationalindkomsten i Mauretanien og 12,7 % i So Tom og Prncipe. 
In some third countries, the income earned from the international fisheries agreements may form a substantial portion of the national revenue: for example in 1998, this proportion was 15,2 % in Mauritania and 12,7 % in So Tom.
Da aftalen med Senegal udlżb i 1997, kunne Kommissionen ikke acceptere det belżb, der blev kržvet for en forlžngelse. 
When the agreement with Senegal expired in 1997, the Commission was unable to accept the price requested.
En aftale kom i stand, da Kommissionen gjorde gžldende, at EUF-stżtten ville blive forhżjet med et vist belżb (1). I dette tilfžlde blev hverken kravet om benhed og klarhed eller budgetprincippet om specificering overholdt. 
Agreement was reached after the Commission drew attention to an increase ofanundefinedamountintheEDFfunding(1).Inthisinstance, neither transparency nor the budgetary principle of specification of expenditure was abided by.
Budgetmyndighederne bżr altid kunne fastsl de samlede faktiske omkostninger ved fiskerirettighederne. 
The budgetary authorities should always be able to establish the full actual cost of fishing rights.
De to fžllesskabspolitikkers ml er alt for ofte blandet sammen i disse aftaler. 
All too often, the intended purposes of the two Community policies are intertwined in these agreements.
Kommissionen bżr endvidere sżrge for, at alle de tjenester, der gennemfżrer politikker, der kan pvirke EUŐs forbindelser med udviklingslandene, samordner deres arbejde i overensstemmelse med traktatens artikel 178 og Lom-konventionen. 
Furthermore, the Commission should ensure that its own departments act in coordination with one another when implementing all the policies likelytoaffecttheEUŐsrelationswithdevelopingcountries,pur-suant to Article 178 of the Treaty and the Lom Convention.
IVŽRKSŽTTELSEN AF AFTALERNE Svagheder ved forvaltningen 40. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS Management shortcomings 40.
De blandede komiter arbejder i aftalernes samlede gyldighedsperiode. 
These Joint Committees operate throughout the duration of the agreements.
De stżder hovedsageligt p to slags problemer, som ikke altid har kunnet lżses i komiten: finansieringen af udviklingsprojekterne og udvikling og ivžrksžttelse af projekter vedrżrende satellitbaserede fartżjsovervgningssystemer. 
For the most part, they have to deal with two types of difficulty, which they have not always managed to settle satisfactorily: the financing of development projects and the implementation of projects for the satellite surveillance of vessels.
Kommissionens forhandlingsposition er blevet svžkket i de tilfžlde, hvor aftalerne ikke indeholdt en bestemmelse om obligatorisk udveksling af videnskabelige oplysninger, om at betalingerne ophżrte i tilfžlde af uenighed, eller om at de finansielle aspekter ville blive žndret, hvis der tržffes foranstaltninger, der kan pvirke fangstmulighederne. 
The CommissionŐs negotiating hand has been weakened where the agreements do not contain a clause providing for the compulsory exchange of scientific information, the stopping of paymentsintheeventofdisputesortheadjustmentoffinancial componentswhenmeasuresaretakenthatmayaffectthefishing opportunities.
I 1998 og 1999 forlžngede Marokko sledes det biologisk betingede stop for fiskeri af blžk-sprutter med yderligere to mneder oven i de to, parterne allerede var blevet enige om. 
In 1998 and in 1999, for example, Morocco sus-pendedcephalopodfishingfortwomonthsongroundsrelating to the biology of the species, in addition to the two monthsŐ stop already agreed by the parties involved.
Alligevel mtte Kommissionen betale den fulde finansielle modydelse til Marokko, ogs for den periode, som Marokko ensidigt havde forlžnget det biologisk betingede stop med, og som ikke var fastsat i aftalen. 
The Commission will remain committed to paying Morocco the full financial compensation, even for the period covered by this unilateral suspension, not provided for by the agreement.
Aftalerne indeholder bestemmelser om, at en del af den finansielle modydelse kan anvendes til finansiering af sžrlige foranstaltninger og uddannelse med henblik p at bidrage til en bžredygtig udvikling af fiskerisektoren i det pgžldende tredje-(1) Brev 000405 af 4. marts 1997 fra Kommissionen til de senegalesiske myndigheder. land. 
Theagreementsincludeclausesstipulatingthatpartofthe financial compensation may be devoted to financing specific measures and to training, with the aim of contributing to the sustainable development of the fishing sector in the third country.
Nr der er sdanne bestemmelser, ville det vžre logisk, at de personer, der forvalter aftalerne, ogs blev informeret om, hvordan de var blevet anvendt. 
If this (1) Commission letter 000405 of 4 March 1997 to the Senegalese authorities. is the case, it would be logical for those managing the agreements to be informed of how these clauses have been applied.
Tredjelandene betragter imidlertid fżrst og fremmest aftalerne som kommercielle aftaler, hvorved de mod en finansiel godtgżrelse giver adgang til deres territorialfarvande, og derfor mener de, at det mere eller mindre er frivilligt, om der skal finansieres sdanne foranstaltninger. 
However, since the third countries consider that these agreements are above all commercial in nature, giving access to territorial waters in return for financial compensation, they regard the financing of such measures as more or less optional.
Nogle af landene (2) accepterer derfor ikke ekstern kontrol, og Kommissionen har ingenoplysningeromudnyttelsenafdissemidler. 
As a consequence, some of these countries (2) do not allow outside checks and so the Commission does not have any information on the use of these funds.