natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
71 Ifølge 2015-vurderingen af fund-of-funds-programmet angav de fleste af de interviewede private equity-forvaltere og venturekapitalfondsforvaltere, at hvis EU reelt ønsker at få den private sektor til igen at investere i europæisk venturekapital, bør den private sektor få mulighed for at høste en gevinst til gengæld for at investere i investeringsfaser med højere risiko. 
71 The 2015 assessment on the fund-of-funds states: “Most interviewees from private equity and venture capital fund managers argued that if the EU is serious about encouraging the private sector back to European venture capital, it should allow the private sector to capture the upside in return for investing in higher-risk investment stages.
De interviewede betragtede asymmetriske afkast som et potentielt middel til at afhjælpe hindringerne for tiltrækning af private investorer til funds-of-funds. 
Asymmetric returns were regarded as potentially helping to overcome barriers to attracting private investors at the fund-of-fund level.”
72 Før etableringen af det europæiske fund-of-funds-program nedsatte Kommissionen en arbejdsgruppe, som skulle vurdere programmet. 
72 Before the establishment of the European fund-of-funds programme, the Commission set up a working group for its analysis.
Gruppen foreslog at lade indkaldelsen af interessetilkendegivelser give mulighed for asymmetriske afkast, men at give venturekapitalfonde med pari-passu-bestemmelser forrang. 
The group suggested providing for asymmetric returns in the call for interest, although venture capital funds with pari passu terms should be favoured.
Den foreslog at bruge dette til at afbalancere investeringer i lande med mindre udviklede venturekapitalmiljøer. 
It proposed balancing this against investing in countries with less-developed venture capital environments.
Trods denne anbefaling gav indkaldelsen af interessetilkendegivelser ikke mulighed for asymmetriske afkast. 
Contrary to this recommendation, the call for interest did not allow for asymmetric returns.
73 En anden måde, hvorpå offentlige investorer kan fremme et selvbærende venturekapitalmarked, er ved at give mulighed for gradvis tilbagetrækning, dvs. tidlig exit, fra venturekapitalfonde. 
73 Another way for public investors to foster a self-sustaining venture capital market is to allow for a gradual withdrawal, i.e. early exit, from venture capital funds.
Hverken de kommanditselskabsaftaler, der er indgået mellem EIF og venturekapitalfonde, eller de to fund-of-funds-aftaler, der er indgået af EIF indtil nu, indeholder dog bestemmelser om tidlig exit. 
However, neither the limited partnership agreements signed between the EIF and venture capital funds, nor the two fund-of funds agreements signed so far by the EIF, included provisions for early exit.
Vi bemærker, at det i 2015-vurderingen af fund-of-funds-programmet blev foreslået at indføre mekanismer for tidlig exit. 
We note that the 2015 assessment of fund-of-funds suggested incorporating early exit mechanisms.
Kompleksitet som følge af anvendelsen af mere end én intervention til at yde EU-støtte til venturekapitalmarkedet 74 I de tidligere perioder har Kommissionen kanaliseret sin støtte til venturekapitalmarkedet gennem ét instrument, men i perioden 2014-2020 anvender den tre interventioner til dette formål (EFG, IFE og egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-vindue). 
Complexity resulting from using more than one intervention to deploy EU support to the venture capital market 74 While, in previous periods, the Commission channelled its support to the venture capital market through one instrument, in the 2014-2020 period it is using three interventions to this end (i.e. EFG, IFE and the EFSI SMEW equity product).
Vi undersøgte, om Kommissionen havde sikret sammenhæng mellem disse tre interventioner. 
We examined whether the Commission had ensured coherence among these three interventions.
75 EFG sigter mod at forbedre SMV'ers adgang til egenkapital i deres udvidelses-og vækstfase, mens IFE er rettet mod investeringer i de tidlige faser. 
75 The EFG aims to improve SMEs’ access to equity in their expansion and growth stage, while the IFE targets early-stage investments.
Det var hensigten, at de to instrumenter skulle være komponenter i et enkelt egenkapitalbaseret finansielt instrument. 
The two instruments were intended as two components of a single Union equity financial instrument.
76 Med lanceringen af egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-vindue medio 2016 (jf. bilag II) steg kompleksiteten som følge af kombinationen af en budgetgaranti med et finansielt instrument samt deltagelsen af Kommissionen, EIB og EIF. 
76 With the launch of the EFSI SMEW equity product in mid-2016 (see Annex II), complexity increased due to the combination of a budgetary guarantee together with a financial instrument, plus the involvement of the Commission, the EIB and the EIF.
77 For at undgå, at dette nye produkt overlappede med det eksisterende EFG, besluttede Kommissionen i 2016 at give EFG nyt fokus og primært målrette det mod venturekapitalaftaler i deltagende lande uden for EU37, som egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-vindue ikke kan dække. 
77 To avoid this new product overlapping with the existing EFG, in 2016 the Commission decided to refocus the EFG to target mostly venture capital deals in non-EU participating countries37, which the EFSI SMEW equity product cannot cover.
78 Det forhold, at der er tre instrumenter med lignende målsætninger, som forvaltes af tre forskellige tjenestegrene i Kommissionen, har øget den nødvendige forvaltnings-, rapporterings-og overvågningsindsats. 
78 Having three instruments with similar objectives, managed by three different services within the Commission, meant multiplying the governance, reporting and monitoring efforts.
I henhold til forskellige retlige bestemmelser skal EIF udarbejde særskilte operationelle rapporter for hvert instrument mindst to gange om året. 
According to the various legal provisions, the EIF is required to prepare separate operational reports for each of the instruments, at least biannually.
79 På nuværende tidspunkt skaber EIF's operationelle rapportering om egenkapitalproduktet for EFSI's SMV-vindue ikke tilstrækkelig klarhed med hensyn til de forskellige delvinduer, og det er svært at få et samlet overblik over de kombinerede interventioners struktur. 
79 Currently, the EIF’s operational reporting on the EFSI SMEW equity product does not provide sufficient clarity on the different sub-windows, and it is difficult to obtain a comprehensive overview of the structure of the combined interventions.
80 Vi bemærker, at Kommissionen har anerkendt ineffektiviteten og overlapningerne og foreslår en betydeligt forenklet struktur i det kommende InvestEU-program (2021-2027). 
80 We note that the Commission has recognised the inefficiencies and overlaps and proposed a greatly simplified structure for the future (2021-2027) InvestEU programme.
I stedet for tre instrumenter (EFG, IFE og EFSI) foreslår den et enkelt instrument med en enkelt budgetgaranti. 
The proposal is to have one sole instrument instead of three (the EFG, IFE and EFSI) providing a single budgetary guarantee.
32 37 Cosmeprogrammet er åbent for tredjelandsdeltagere, som skal indgå aftaler med Kommissionen. 
37 The COSME programme is open to third-country participants, which must agree on arrangements with the Commission. 32
EIF er en hovedinvestor, men dens forvaltning af EU-interventioner kan strømlines 81 Kommissionen har overladt gennemførelsen af sine centralt forvaltede venturekapitalinterventioner til EIF, siden de blev indført i 1990'erne. 
The EIF is a cornerstone investor but its management of EU interventions can be streamlined 81 The Commission has channelled its centrally managed venture capital interventions through the EIF ever since their inception in the late 1990s.
Derfor skal Kommissionen sørge for, at EIF gennemfører EU-interventionerne korrekt. 
Therefore, the Commission needs to ensure that the EIF is properly implementing the EU interventions.
EIF er en vigtig aktør 82 Andelen af offentlige midler i EU's venturekapitalbranche fordobledes mellem 2015 og 2016, og den lå i 2018 stadig over førkriseniveauet i 2007 (jf. figur 2). 
The EIF is an important player 82 The funds raised by the EU venture capital industry from public investors doubled between 2015 and 2016 and, in 2018, still exceeded the 2007 pre-crisis level (see Figure 2).
EIF, som forvalter et stadigt stigende antal mandater (jf. punkt 22), er blevet en af de største aktører på det europæiske venturekapitalmarked. 
The EIF, which is managing an ever-growing number of mandates (see paragraph 22), has become one of the biggest players in the European venture capital market.
Alene i 2018 indgik EIF aftaler med venturekapitalfonde om bevilling af 1,4 milliarder euro til investeringer, heraf 214 millioner euro fra de EU-støttede instrumenter. 
In 2018, the EIF alone signed agreements with venture capital funds committing to invest €1.4 billion, including €214 million by the EU-backed instruments.
Vi undersøgte, om EIF forvaltede instrumenterne effektivt. 
We examined whether the EIF managed the instruments efficiently.
83 EIF gennemførte en spørgeundersøgelse i 201838, som viste, at dens deltagelse blev betragtet som vigtig, eftersom den fungerede som hovedinvestor og bidrog til at tiltrække private investorer ved at styrke fondens troværdighed. 
83 The EIF carried out a survey in 201838, which showed that its participation was considered important as it played the role of a cornerstone investor and helped to attract private investors by strengthening the fund’s credibility.
EIF's deltagelse i investeringer blev generelt opfattet positivt af fondsforvalterne i undersøgelsen. 
EIF participation in investments was generally viewed positively by the fund managers concerned.
84 De fleste af de venturekapitalfondsforvaltere, der besvarede vores spørgeundersøgelse, satte pris på EIF's grundige due diligence-proces; dens kvalitet betyder, at den ofte opfattes som en "blåstempling". 
84 Most of the venture capital fund managers who responded to our survey valued the EIF’s thorough due diligence process; its quality means it is often seen as a “seal of approval”.
Nogle respondenter bemærkede dog også, at EIF var formalistisk og fokuserede på regeloverholdelse, og at godkendelsen af ansøgninger om midler tog for lang tid. 
However, respondents also claimed that the EIF was formalistic and compliance-oriented, and that the fund application approval process took too long.
I spørgeundersøgelsen angav 45 % af fondsforvalterne, at EIF brugte over et år på at godkende en ansøgning, og 41 % angav, at det tog mellem seks måneder og et år. 
According to the survey, 45 % of fund managers said that the EIF took more than one year to approve an application, and 41 % reported that it took between 6 months and one year.
De fleste respondenter (66 %) sagde, at de havde været i kontakt med tre til fem personer i EIF under ansøgningsprocessen, og at nogle af disse ansatte ikke altid var bekendt med de særlige nationale forhold. 
Most respondents (66 %) said that they had been in contact with three to five interlocutors at the EIF during the application process, with some interlocutors not always familiar with national particularities.
85 2015-vurderingen af fund-of-funds-programmet fremhævede EIF's kontracykliske rolle med hensyn til at sikre, at innovative opstartsvirksomheder og SMV'er fortsat havde adgang til kapital i perioder med økonomisk afmatning. 
85 The 2015 assessment on the fund-of-funds emphasised “the counter-cyclical role played by the EIF in ensuring that innovative start-ups and SMEs continue[d] to have 38 EIF Working Paper 2018/51, “EIF venture capital Survey 2018 – Fund managers' perception of EIF's Value Added”, September 2018.
33 nævnt, at en række interessenter, navnlig venturekapitalfonde, sammenslutninger af venturekapitalselskaber og visse nationale fund-of-funds-aktører, havde givet udtryk for, at EIF's dominerende rolle som hovedinvestor på det europæiske venturekapitalmarked og som forvalter af funds-of-funds såede tvivl om den langsigtede bæredygtighed. 
But it also stated that “a number of stakeholders, especially venture capital funds, venture capital associations and some national fund-of-funds operators, [had] expressed the view that the EIF’s dominant role as a cornerstone investor in the European venture capital market and as a fund manager of fund-of-funds raise[d] longer-term sustainability questions”.
De EU-støttede instrumenter overlapper med andre EIF-forvaltede instrumenter i stedet for at supplere dem 86 EIF udviklede en politik for bevilling af midler under de forskellige mandater (en tildelingspolitik). 
EU-backed instruments overlap with others managed by the EIF rather than supplementing them 86 The EIF developed a policy for allocating funds from the different mandates (i.e. a deal allocation policy).
Vi undersøgte, om EIF havde gennemført den på passende vis under hensyntagen til de forskellige mandaters karakter. 
We examined whether the EIF had implemented it properly, considering the nature of its different mandates.
87 EIF skal beslutte, hvilken venturekapitalfond den vil investere i, og under hvilket mandat. 
87 The EIF has to decide in which venture capital fund to invest and under which mandate.
De respektive retsgrundlag og delegationsaftaler for de centralt forvaltede EU-finansierede instrumenter enten tillader eller tillader ikke medinvesteringer med midler under andre mandater. 
The respective legal bases and delegation agreements of the centrally managed EU-funded instruments either permit or not co-investment with funds under other mandates.
88 Under ESU 1998 var medinvesteringer med EIF eller med EIF-forvaltede faciliteter udtrykkeligt forbudt39. 
88 Under ESU 1998, co-investments with the EIF or with EIF-managed facilities were expressly prohibited39.
Det skyldtes, at ESU 1998 blev udformet til at supplere de EIF-forvaltede mandater og var rettet mod de SMV'er, som hverken EIB eller EIF kan støtte på grund af deres stramme vedtægtsbestemte risikokriterier40. 
This is because ESU 1998 was designed to complement the EIF-managed mandates by addressing “those SMEs which neither the EIB nor the EIF could support because of their statutory higher risk criteria40”.
89 Begrebet stramme risikokriterier blev opretholdt i ESU 2001 og GIF, selv om medinvesteringer var tilladt. 
89 The concept of higher risk criteria was repeated for ESU 2001 and the GIF, although co-investment was allowed.
Ved udgangen af 2017 havde 30 % af de venturekapitalfonde, der modtog støtte fra disse instrumenter, medinvesteringer fra andre EIF-mandater (hovedsagelig fra EIB's RCR-mandat41). 
At the end of 2017, 30 % of the venture capital funds backed by these instruments had co-investments from other EIF mandates (mostly from the EIB’s RCR mandate41).
Det viser, at de valgte fonde ikke var rettet mod et andet risikosegment end EIF's andre mandater. 
This shows that the selected funds were not targeting a different risk segment from the EIF’s other mandates.
39 Vi konstaterede ét tilfælde af medinvestering med EIF's egne midler, selv om dette ikke var tilladt. 
39 Although prohibited, we found one co-investment using the EIF’s own resources.
40 Europa-Kommissionen, Forslag til Rådets afgørelse om finansielle støtteforanstaltninger for innovative og jobskabende små og mellemstore virksomheder (KOM(1998) 26 endelig af 21.1.1998). 
40 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on Measures of Financial Assistance for Innovative and Job-Creating Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COM(1998) 26 final of 21.01.1998).
41 EIB har givet EIF mandat til at investere 9,5 milliarder euro i risikobærende kapacitet til støtte for teknologisk og industriel innovation. 
41 The EIB has mandated the EIF to invest €9.5 billion in risk-bearing capacity to support technology and industrial innovation.
Med RCR-mandatet investerer EIB i lower mid-market-fonde, som specifikt fokuserer på Europa. 34 
With the RCR mandate the EIB targets early to lower mid-market funds that specifically focus on Europe. 34
90 Retsgrundlaget for EFG, IFE og EFSI anvender ikke længere begrebet stramme risikokriterier. 
90 The legal basis covering the EFG, IFE and EFSI no longer refer to the concept of higher risk criteria.
Alle tre retsgrundlag fastsætter, at instrumenterne skal supplere finansielle instrumenter, der finansieres af nationale eller regionale programmer. 
All three specify that the instruments should complement financial instruments funded by national or regional programmes.
Retsgrundlaget for EFSI tilskynder specifikt til komplementaritet med eksisterende EIB-foranstaltninger og -aktiviteter, mens retsgrundlaget for de to andre instrumenter ikke omtaler dette. 
While the legal basis for EFSI also specifically encourages complementarity with existing EIB operations and activities, the legal basis for the other two is silent on this aspect.
91 EFSI-forordningen fastsætter, at der skal ydes vejledning i at kombinere anvendelsen af EU-instrumenter med EIB-finansiering under EU-garantien med henblik på at sikre komplementaritet. 
91 The EFSI regulation calls for guidance on combining the use of EU instruments with EIB financing under the EU guarantee to ensure complementarity.
Kommissionen udsendte vejledning om komplementaritet mellem EFSI og ESI-fondene. 
The Commission issued guidance on complementarities between EFSI and ESIF.
Der findes ingen vejledning vedrørende medinvesteringer med andre EIF-forvaltede mandater, f.eks. EIB's RCR-mandat. 
No guidance exists regarding co-investments with other EIF-managed mandates, e.g. the EIB’s RCR mandate.
92 Som følge af EIF's stigende antal mandater anbefaledes det i den mellemliggende evaluering af GIF-interventionen, der blev foretaget for Kommissionen, at EIF udviklede en tildelingspolitik42. 
92 Due to the multiplication of mandates under the EIF, the interim evaluation carried out for the Commission on the GIF intervention recommended that the EIF develop a deal allocation policy42.
EIF har haft en sådan politik siden 2009. 
The EIF has had such a policy since 2009.
Efter nogle få opdateringer forblev politikken uændret fra udgangen af 2011 til 2018, hvor den blev revideret. 
Following a few updates, the policy remained unchanged from the end of 2011 until 2018, when an overhaul took place.
93 Ifølge tildelingspolitikken fra 2011 var der ingen nævneværdige overlapninger mellem de forskellige mandater. 
93 The 2011 deal allocation policy saw no noteworthy overlap between the various mandates.
Alligevel blev der i forbindelse med GIF-interventionen foretaget medinvesteringer, dvs. at EIF investerede midler fra flere mandater i de samme venturekapitalfonde43. 
Yet, for the GIF intervention, co-investments took place, i.e. the EIF invested funds from several mandates into the same venture capital fund43.
Tildelingspolitikken fra 2018 omtalte ikke potentielle overlapninger. 
The 2018 allocation policy drew no conclusions on any potential overlap.
I lyset af mandaternes præferencer (f.eks. for bestemte sektorer eller resultater) og deres geografiske fokus er der dog overlapninger mellem de centralt forvaltede EU-interventioner og andre mandater. 
However, considering the mandates’ preferences (for specific sectors or a certain performance, for example) and their geographical focus, there is overlap between the centrally managed EU interventions and other mandates.
94 Den oprindelige politik (der var gældende indtil 2018) overlod helt beslutningerne om tildeling af midler til EIF's faglige vurdering, mens den nye politik omfatter kriterier for en kvantitativ44 og kvalitativ vurdering af, hvilket mandat der egner sig bedst til 42 Europa-Kommissionen, Generaldirektoratet for Erhvervspolitik (GHK og Technopolis), "Interim evaluation of the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme", 2009, s. 
94 While the initial policy (valid until 2018) left deal allocation decisions entirely to the EIF’s professional judgement, the new policy includes criteria for a quantitative44 and qualitative assessment to decide which mandate best suits which venture capital 42 European Commission DG Enterprise and Industry (GHK and Technopolis), “Interim evaluation of the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme”, 2009, p.
43 EIF brugte midler fra andre mandater i forbindelse med 41 % af de GIF-støttede venturekapitalfonde. 
43 The EIF used funds from other mandates for 41 % of the GIF-backed venture capital funds.
44 Der foretages en rangordning, f.eks. baseret på venturekapitalfondens strategi, de sektorer eller faser, den ønsker at investere i, eller dens geografiske fokus. 
44 A ranking is compiled based on, for example, the venture capital fund’s strategy, the sectors or stages it wants to invest in or its geographical focus.
Der er også fastsat 35 hvilken venturekapitalfond. 
35 fund.
EIF gav os ingen dokumentation for, hvordan den vejleder sit personale i at anvende disse kriterier. 
The EIF provided us with no evidence of the guidance it gives staff on how to apply these criteria.
95 EIF testede sin nye politik ved at anvende den på de aftaler, der var indgået i 2017 og 2018. 
95 The EIF tested its new policy by applying it to the deals made in 2017 and 2018.
Resultaterne af denne "back-testing" viste med hensyn til visse investeringer foretaget under de centralt forvaltede EU-interventioner, at EIF alene baseret på den kvantitative vurdering i stedet kunne have anvendt andre offentlige mandater, eftersom disse scorede lige så højt eller højere end de EU-støttede. 
The results of this back-testing exercise showed that, based on the quantitative assessment alone, for some investments made using the centrally managed EU interventions, the EIF could have used other public mandates because the later received equal or higher scores than those backed by the EU.
EIF fremlagde ikke detaljeret dokumentation for, hvordan de enkelte pointtal blev beregnet. 
The EIF did not provide us with detailed evidence showing how the individual scores were calculated.
EIF havde problemer med exit fra EU-støttede fonde 96 En venturekapitalfond opnår et afkast, når den sælger en virksomhed ("exit"). 
The EIF had difficulties exiting EU-backed funds 96 A venture capital fund realises a return once it sells (or “exits”) a company.
Exit finder sted enten ved børsintroduktion (IPO) eller ved salg af virksomheden til enten en industriel investor (trade sale) eller en anden venturekapitalfond eller et private equity-selskab. 
Exiting takes place through either an IPO on the stock market, or a sale of the company to either an industrial investor (trade sale) or another venture capital fund or private equity firm.
Vi undersøgte de exitstrategier, fondene har for at maksimere afkastet af deres investeringer. 
We examined the exit strategy of the funds to maximise the return on investments.
Vi undersøgte endvidere strategien for afslutning af de mandater, vi reviderede. 
In addition, we examined the strategy for closing the mandates under review.
97 Målt i beløb var følgende tre exitmetoder de største på det europæiske venturekapitalmarked i 2018: i) trade sales med 35 %, ii) børsintroduktioner med 22 % og iii) afskrivninger med 12 %45. 
97 In 2018, the three main exit routes on the European venture capital market by amount were: (i) trade sales at 35 %; (ii) IPOs at 22 %; (iii) write-offs at 12 %45.
De europæiske venturekapitalfondsforvaltere betragter exit fra investeringer og markedet for børsintroduktioner som deres største udfordringer46. 
European venture capital fund managers see exiting investments and the IPO market as their biggest challenges46.
98 Start-up Europe Partnership konkluderede i et dokument fra 2017, at kun 2 % af de europæiske vækstvirksomheder bliver børsnoteret, og at omkring 15 % af det udelukkelseskriterier, f.eks. "førstegangsforvaltere", eftersom nogle ikke-EU-mandater ikke tillader førstegangsforvaltere. 
98 A 2017 paper from the Start-up Europe Partnership concluded: “Only 2 % of European scale-ups go public and approximately 15 % of the overall amount raised in Europe has been collected through IPOs [...].