natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Bemærkninger 28 Revisionsopfølgningsudvalgets rolle/sammensætning og udvalgte revisionsudvalg sammenlignet med bedste praksis anbefalet af »Good Governance in the Public Sector Framework« Bedste praksis anbefalet af »Good Governance in the Public Sector Framework« Kommissionens revisions­ opfølgnings­ udvalg2 Udvalgte revisionsudvalgs rolle1 Verdensføde­ vareprogrammets revisionsudvalg Den Europæiske Investeringsbanks revisionsudvalg Verdensbank­ gruppens revisionsudvalg FN’s Uafhængi­ ge Rådgivende Revisionsudvalg Giver sikkerhed med hensyn til risikohåndteringsordninger x √ √ √ √ Giver sikkerhed med hensyn til interne kontrolordninger x √ √ √ √ Giver sikkerhed med hensyn til ordninger for rapportering af finansielle og ikkefinansielle resultater x √ √ √ √ Fører tilsyn med den interne revision √ √ √ √ √ Forstærker effektiviteten af den eksterne revision x √ √ √ x Flertal af uafhængige medlemmer x √ √ √ √ 1 Kilder: Verdensfødevareprogrammet: Vedtægter for Verdensfødevareprogrammets revisionsudvalg (november 2011), Den Europæiske Investeringsbank: Revisionsudvalgets charter (juni 2007), Verdensbankgruppen: Verdensbankens stående afviklingsudvalg (2009), bilag A til revisionsudvalgets vedtægter, FN: Vedtægter for det uafhængige rådgivende revisionsudvalg og styrkelse af FN’s Interne Overvågningskontor (juni 2007). 
Observations 28 Role/composition of Audit Progress Committee and selected audit committees compared to best practices recommended by Good Governance in the Public Sector Framework Best practices recommended by Good Governance in the Public Sector Framework Commission’s Audit Progress Committee2 Role of selected audit committees1 World Food Programme Audit Committee European Investment Bank Audit Committee World Bank Group Audit Committee United Nations Independent Advisory Committee Provide assurance on risk management arrangements x √ √ √ √ Provide assurance on internal control arrangements x √ √ √ √ Provide assurance on arrangements for reporting on financial and non-financial performance. x √ √ √ √ Oversee internal audit √ √ √ √ √ Reinforce effectiveness of external audit x √ √ √ x Majority of independent members x √ √ √ √ 1 Sources: World Food Programme: Terms of reference for the Audit Committee of the World Food Programme (November 2011), European Investment Bank: Audit Committee Charter (June 2007), World Bank Group: World Bank Resolution Standing Committees (2009), Annex A Terms of Reference of the Audit Committee, United Nations: Terms of reference for the Independent Audit Advisory Committee and strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services (June 2007).
2 Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
2 Source: ECA.
APC-chartret henviser også til ekstern revision (jf. punkt 30). 
The APC Charter also refers to external audit (see paragraph 30).
31 Som fastslået i Kommissionens meddelelse om APC-chartret spiller revisionsudvalg en tiltagende vigtig rolle med hensyn til at sørge for den gennemsigtighed og ansvarlighed, som borgerne og andre interessenter med rette kræver af offentlige institutioner48. 
31 As stated in the Commission communication on the APC Charter, ‘audit committees play an increasingly important role in delivering the transparency and accountability citizens and other stakeholders rightly demand of public bodies’48.
APC er i øjeblikket Kommissionens revisionsudvalg. 
The APC is currently the ‘audit committee’ of the Commission.
Vi sammenholdt APC med kriterierne for bedste praksis (tekstboks 8) og de internationale organisationer, som blev udvalgt som benchmarks (tabel 2). 
We examined the APC against the criteria of best practice (Box 8), and international bodies selected as benchmarks (Table 2).
Det bemærkes, at alle medlemmer af revisionsudvalgene i disse internationale organisationer er uafhængige. 
Notably, all members of audit committees in these international bodies are independent.
I Kommissionens tilfælde er syv ud af ni medlemmer af APC interne. 
In the case of Commission, seven out of nine members of the APC are internal.
48 C(2015) 3014 final »Charter of the Audit Progress Committee of the European Commission«, s. 
48 C(2015) 3014 final ‘Charter of the Audit Progress Committee of the European Commission’, p.
Bemærkninger 29 Tilpasning af interne kontroller og regnskabsaflæggelse til internationale standarder Kommissionen valgte COSO-rammen som grundlag for sine interne kontrolstandarder ... 
Observations 29 Aligning internal controls and financial reporting with The Commission chose the COSO framework as the basis for its internal control standards ... international standards Internal control ‘Internal control is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance of achieving objectives relating to operating, reporting and compliance’49.
49 Definition givet af COSO, Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission, 2013 COSO Internal Control — Integrated Framework. © Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 
49 Definition of COSO, Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission, 2013 COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework. © Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).
Alle rettigheder forbeholdt. 
All rights reserved.
Anvendt med tilladelse. 
Used with permission.
32 Kommissionen ændrede sine interne kontrolordninger (jf. tekstboks 9) som en del af Prodireformen (jf. figur 1 og tekstboks 3). 
32 The Commission modified its internal control (see Box 9) arrangements as part of the Prodi reform (see Figure 1 and Box 3).
De nye ordninger markerede en skelsættende fravigelse af det forudgående system, der var baseret på finansinspektørens centraliserede godkendelse (påtegning). 
The new arrangements represented a significant departure from the previous system based on the centralised approval (visa) of the financial controller.
Kommissionen baserede kontrolordningerne på COSO 1992-rammen (jf. tekstboks 10) og indføjede COSO’s definition af intern kontrol i finansforordningen50. 
The Commission based the control arrangements on the COSO 1992 framework (see Box 10) and introduced the COSO definition of internal control into the Financial Regulation50.
33 I 2001 indførte Kommissionen 24 kontrolstandarder suppleret med en række grundlæggende krav, der fastsætter de specifikke praktiske foranstaltninger, som bør ligge til grund for hver enkelt tjenestegrens interne kontrolsystem. 
33 In 2001 the Commission introduced 24 control standards complemented by a set of baseline requirements defining the specific practical actions which should underlie each department’s internal control system.
Den krævede af GD’erne, at de hvert år vurderer og rapporterer om deres grad af overholdelse af de grundlæggende krav. 
It required DGs to assess and report on their level of compliance with the baseline requirements each year.
Disse rapporter bygger på interne gennemgange, selvevalueringer af forvaltningen og relevante revisioner udført af IAS og Revisionsretten. 
These reports rely on internal reviews, management self-assessments and relevant audits performed by the IAS and the ECA.
Vi rapporterede om fremskridtene med hensyn til at gennemføre disse standarder i vores årsberetninger fra 2002 til 2008. 
We reported on progress in implementing these standards in our annual reports from 2002 to 2008.
2, i forordning (EU, Euratom) nr. 
50 Article 32.2 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.
Bemærkninger 30 34 Kommissionen reviderede sin ramme for intern kontrol i 2007 og reducerede antallet af standarder til 16. 
Observations 30 34 The Commission revised its internal control framework in 2007, reducing the number of standards to 16.
Den anmodede GD’erne om at rapportere i undtagelsestilfælde (kun når de ikke anvendte en standard). 
It asked DGs to report on an exception basis (only when they did not apply a standard).
I 2014 reducerede den antallet af krav yderligere. 
In 2014 it further reduced the number of requirements.
I 2014 vurderede GD’erne deres egne fremskridt og rapporterede, at de på tværs af Kommissionen havde gennemført 98 % af de interne kontrolstandarder51. 
In 2014 DGs assessed their own progress and reported that, across the Commission, they had implemented 98 % of the internal control standards51.
I 2016 agter Kommissionen at opdatere sin interne kontrolramme i overensstemmelse med COSO 201352. 
In 2016 the Commission intends to update its internal control framework to bring it in line with COSO 201352.
51 Overview of the state of internal control in the Commission services in 2014, ARES (2015) 1930721-07/05/2015, s. 
51 Overview of the state of internal control in the Commission services in 2014, ARES (2015) 1930721 — 07/05/2015, p.
52 Årlig forvaltnings-og effektivitetsrapport vedrørende EU-budgettet for 2015. 
52 2015 Annual Management and Performance Report for the EU Budget.
Retningslinjer for god forvaltning COSO-rammen BEDSTE PRAKSIS Kontrolmiljø Risikovurdering Kontrolaktiviteter Information og kommunikation Overvågningsaktiviteter Kilde: 2013 COSO Internal Control — Integrated Framework. © Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 
GOOD GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES COSO framework BEST PRACTICE ©2013, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Used by permission. Source: 2013 COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework. © Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).
COSO-rammen er en ramme, der blev frigivet i 1992 i USA og oprindeligt var tilsigtet private virksomheder. 
COSO is a framework released in 1992 in the United States, that was originally aimed at private companies.
Den bliver nu anvendt i vid udstrækning i både den private og den offentlige sektor på verdensplan. 
It is now widely applied by both private and public sectors worldwide.
COSO udsendte en opdateret ramme i maj 2013. 
COSO issued an updated framework in May 2013.
COSO påtænkte, at 1992-rammen skulle afløses af 2013-reviderin-gerne efter en overgangsperiode, som sluttede i december 2014. 
COSO considered the 1992 framework to be superseded by the 2013 revisions after a transition period that ended in December 2014.
2013-rammen introducerede 17 principper, som alle er nødvendige for en effektiv intern kontrol. 
The 2013 framework introduced 17 principles that are all necessary for effective internal control.
Ledelsen kan beslutte, at et princip ikke er relevant på grundlag af dens omstændigheder. 
Management may determine that a principle is not relevant, based on its circumstances.
Hvis et princip er relevant, men ikke er til stede og ikke fungerer, så er der en mangel i det interne kontrolsystem. 
If a principle is relevant, yet not present and functioning, a major deficiency exists in the system of internal control.
De nye COSO-krav har et større fokus på forvaltningskoncepter, herunder behovet for at indføre et tilsynsansvar for bestyrelsen og dets udvalg for hver del af den interne kontrol (vi kortlægger kravene i COSO 2013 i forhold til kravene i GGPS i bilag I). 
The new COSO requirements have a greater focus on governance concepts, including the need to establish oversight responsibilities for the board and its committees for each component of internal control (we map the requirements of COSO 2013 against the requirements of GGPS in Annex I). Box 10
Bemærkninger 31 ... men det er en udfordring at fuldføre overgangen til den opdaterede COSO-ramme 35 I bilag I beskriver vi kravene i COSO 2013 og GGPS. 
Observations 31 ... but completing transition to the updated COSO framework is challenging 35 In Annex I we present the requirements of COSO 2013 and GGPS.
Kommissionens interne kontrolstandarder omfatter de fleste af principperne i COSO 2013. 
The internal control standards of the Commission cover most of the principles of COSO 2013.
Det er imidlertid en udfordring at fuldføre overgangen til den nye COSO-ramme, fordi rammen stiller krav til organisationer vedrørende forvaltningsstrukturer og fremhæver de styrende organers ansvar for at føre tilsyn med resultaterne i alle leddene i det interne kontrolsystem (jf. tekstboks 11, COSO-princip 2) og kræver, at alle dele af kontrollen er indført og fungerer, for at en organisation lever op til COSO-standarderne (jf. bilag I). 
However, completing transition to the new COSO framework is challenging because it makes demands of organisations at the level of governance structures, highlighting the responsibility of governing bodies to oversee the performance of all components of the internal control system (see Box 11 COSO principle 2), and requires all elements of control to be in place and working before an organisation meets COSO standards (see Annex I).
I punkt 36-39 drøfter vi tre udfordrende dele af COSO-rammen. 
In paragraphs 36 to 39 we discuss three challenging elements of the COSO framework.
Udfordrende dele af den nye COSO-ramme COSO-princip 2 Bestyrelsen agerer uafhængigt af ledelsen og udøver tilsyn med den interne kontrols udvikling og resultater. 
Challenging elements of the new COSO framework COSO Principle 2 ‘The board of directors demonstrates independence from management and exercises oversight of the development and performance of internal control’.
COSO-princip 5 Organisationen holder enkeltpersoner ansvarlige for deres ansvar over for den interne kontrol i bestræbelserne på at nå målene. 
COSO Principle 5 ‘The organisation holds individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives’.
COSO-princip 8 Organisationen tager risikoen for svig i betragtning, når den vurderer risiciene forbundet med at opnå målene53. 
COSO Principle 8 ‘The organisation considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the achievement of objectives’53.
53 Kilde: 2013 COSO Internal Control — Integrated Framework. © Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 
53 Source: 2013 COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework. © Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).
Bemærkninger 32 36 At bringe Kommissionens kontrolramme i overensstemmelse med COSO 2013 (COSO-princip 2) vil kræve en funktion på centralt plan til at føre tilsyn med det interne kontrolsystem. 
Observations 32 36 Bringing the Commission’s control framework into line with COSO 2013 (COSO Principle 2) would require a central level function to provide oversight of the internal control system.
Kommissionen meddelte os, at begrundelsen for ikke at have sådan en funktion er, at man vil bibeholde en klar fastlæggelse af ansvarsområder og ansvarlighed på GD-plan. 
The Commission told us that the reason for not having such a function is to maintain a clear definition of responsibilities and accountability at the level of DGs.
Kommissionen mener, at den nuværende struktur udelukkende placerer ansvaret for det interne kontrolsystems drift hos de enkelte ved delegation bemyndigede anvisningsberettigede, og at en central tilsynsfunktion kan føre til en overdragelse af ansvar54. 
The Commission considers that the current structure places responsibility for the operation of the internal control system exclusively on individual authorising officers by delegation and that a central oversight function may lead to a transfer of responsibility54.
CFS udgav årlig et dokument om »Overview on the state of Internal Control in the Commission« (oversigt over den interne kontrols stade i Kommissionen) indtil 201455, dette var dog ikke en uafhængig kilde til sikkerhed, men et beskrivende sammendrag. 
While the CFS issued an annual document on the ‘Overview on the state of Internal Control in the Commission’ until 201455, this was not an independent source of assurance, but a descriptive summary.
37 Kommissionen afskaffede finansinspektørfunktionen med henblik på at gøre generaldirektørerne ansvarlige for lovligheden og den formelle rigtighed af deres GD’ers udgifter. 
37 The Commission abolished the financial controller function in order to make the directors-general responsible for the legality and regularity of spending by their DGs.
GD’erne rapporterer årligt om deres forvaltning i de årlige aktivitetsrapporter (jf. punkt 55). 
DGs report annually on their management via the AAR (see paragraph 55).
Men mekanismerne til at holde enkeltpersoner ansvarlige for deres bidrag til den interne kontrol (COSO-princip 5) er relativt uudviklede. 
But mechanisms to hold individuals to account for their contribution to internal control (COSO Principle 5) are relatively undeveloped.
Kommissionen har ikke indført personalebedømmelseskriterier forbundet med denne målsætning. 
The Commission has not put in place staff evaluation criteria linked to this objective.
De årlige aktivitetsrapporter giver en potentiel mekanisme til at opnå sådan en forbindelse for generaldirektørerne. 
The AAR provides a potential mechanism to achieve such a linkage for directors-general.
I praksis har Kommissionen dog ikke skabt et grundlag for at bestemme, hvorvidt de årlige aktivitetsrapporters erklæringer er velbegrundede56, eller opstillet et benchmark som grundlag for at holde GD’erne ansvarlige. 
However, in practice the Commission has not established a basis to determine whether the declarations made within AARs are well-founded56, or established a benchmark against which to hold DGs accountable.
38 I 2001 efter vedtagelsen af den første samlede strategi til bekæmpelse af svig57 (COSO-princip 8) og i kølvandet på hvidbogen om den administrative reform meddelte Kommissionen, at en enhed i OLAF ville udvikle en samlet strategisk tilgang til bekæmpelse af svig; denne burde målrette nye udkast til lovgivning med væsentlige økonomiske konsekvenser på områder, der er behæftede med en risiko for svig. 
38 In 2001, following the adoption of the first overall anti-fraud strategy57 (COSO Principle 8) and in the wake of the White Paper on administrative reform the Commission announced that a unit within OLAF would ‘develop an overall strategic approach to fraud prevention. This should target new draft legislation with significant financial implications in areas at risk of fraud’.
I 2011 udviklede Kommissionen en ny strategi for bekæmpelse af svig58, der omfattede alle dimensionerne af bekæmpelsen af svig lige fra forebyggelse og afsløring af svig til undersøgelser, sanktioner og inddrivelse af misbrugte midler, og som ligeledes klarlagde de forskellige involverede parters ansvar. 
In 2011 the Commission developed a new anti-fraud strategy58 covering the whole ‘anti-fraud cycle’ from the prevention and detection of fraud to investigations, sanctioning and recovery of misused funds and also clarifying the responsibilities of the various parties involved.
39 Kommissionens retningslinjer for risikoforvaltning tager hensyn til risikoen for svig, og GD’erne skal rapportere årlig om forebyggelse og afsløring af svig i et særligt afsnit i deres årlige aktivitetsrapporter. 
39 The Commission’s risk management guidelines take the risk of fraud into account and DGs are required to report annually on fraud prevention and detection in a specific section of their AARs.
Kommissionens nuværende interne kontrolstandarder behandler ikke risikoen for svig direkte, som det er påkrævet af COSO-princip 8 (jf. bilag I). 
The Commission’s current internal control standards do not, as required by COSO principle 8 (see Annex I), address fraud risk directly.
Kommissionen meddelte os, at den vil dække dette punkt i den næste revision af de interne kontrolstandarder. 
The Commission told us that they will cover this point in the next revision of the internal control standards.
54 IAS rejste et lignende spørgsmål i arbejdsdokumentet til støtte for den samlede udtalelse for 2015, med en udtalelse om, at der var behov for et overblik på institutionsplan, hvis almene processer såsom forhindring og opdagelse af svig skulle være effektive med hensyn til at beskytte institutionen som helhed; IAS henstillede, at der blev truffet centrale foranstaltninger på institutionsniveau, der skulle sikre en konsekvent, pålidelig, fuldstændig og omfattende tilgang på operationelt plan og et samlet overblik over institutionsomfattende spørgsmål og over de trufne foranstaltningers omkostningseffektivitet; de centrale tjenestegrene burde styrke deres vejledning til GD’erne/tjenestegrenene for at forbedre effektiviteten af kontrollerne på operationelt GD-/tjenestegrensplan; alle henstillingerne var under behandling som led i handlingsplaner. 
54 A similar issue was raised by the IAS in the Working paper supporting the 2015 Overall Opinion: ‘an overview at the level of the institution is necessary if common processes, such as fraud prevention and detection, are to be effective in protecting the institution as a whole. The IAS recommends that at the corporate level central measures should be taken to ensure a consistent, reliable, complete and comprehensive approach at the operational level and an overall view on the Commission-wide issues and on the cost-effectiveness of the measures taken.
55 Udarbejdelsen af dette dokument ophørte i 2015. 
55 The document was discontinued in 2015.
56 Til støtte for den årlige aktivitetsrapport udsender IAS en begrænset konklusion om intern kontrol, ikke en årlig udtalelse. 
56 The IAS issues a ‘limited conclusion on internal control’ in support of the AAR rather than an ‘annual opinion’.
57 KOM(2000) 358 endelig af 28. juni 2000 »Beskyttelse af Fællesskabernes finansielle interesser - Bekæmpelse af svig - Hen imod en samlet strategisk tilgang«. 
57 COM(2000)358 final of 28 June 2000 ‘Protection of the Communities’ financial interests. The fight against fraud For an overall strategic approach’.
58 KOM(2011) 376 endelig af 24. juni 2011 om Kommissionens strategi til bekæmpelse af svig. 
58 COM(2011) 376 final of 24 June 2011 ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy’.
Dette bygger på meddelelsen om forebyggelse af svig (KOM(2007) 806 endelig). 
This built upon the Communication on fraud prevention (COM(2007) 806 final).
Bemærkninger 33 Udarbejdelsen af årsregnskaberne i overensstemmelse med internationale standarder forbedrede regnskabsaflæggelsen IPSAS De internationale regnskabsstandarder for den offentlige sektor (IPSAS), der udgives af »International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board« (IPSASB), giver den mest fuldstændige pakke med periodiseringsbasere-de IFRS-standarder, der er udviklet specifikt til den offentlige sektor59. 
Observations 33 Producing annual accounts in line with international standards improved financial reporting IPSAS The International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) issued by the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB), ‘provide the most complete suite of accrual-based international financial reporting standards developed specifically for the public sector’59.
59 CIPFA/IFAC, »International Framework: Good Governance in the Public Sector«, 2014, s. 
59 CIPFA/,IFAC, ‘International Framework: Good Governance in the Public Sector’, 2014, p.
40 Som det kan ses i figur 5, blev det periodiserede regnskab indført i to faser. 
40 As can be seen in Figure 5, accrual accounting was introduced in two stages.
Kommissionen tog sit første skridt mod periodisering med nogle ændringer af regnskabsaflæggelsen i 2001. 
The Commission first moved towards accruals, with some changes to financial reporting in 2001.
En meget større ændring fandt sted i 2005 (jf. punkt 8), da Kommissionen gik over til at basere sin regnskabsaflæggelse på internationale standarder. 
A much bigger change took place in 2005 (see paragraph 8) when the Commission moved to base its financial reporting on international standards.
Virkningen af disse ændringer var, at forelæggelsen før 2000 af en delvis balance blev erstattet med en fuldstændig forelæggelse af aktiver og passiver. 
The impact of these changes was that the pre-2000 presentation of a partial balance sheet was replaced with a complete presentation of assets and liabilities.
41 Kommissionens nye regnskabssystem fandt for første gang anvendelse i 2005, og vi kunne for første gang afgive en »blank« revisionserklæring om pålideligheden af årsregnskabet for 2007. 
41 The Commission’s new accounting framework first applied in 2005, and we were able for the first time to issue an unqualified opinion on the reliability of the 2007 annual accounts.