natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette giver ikke personerne tid nok til at opbygge tilstržkkeligt kendskab til de forskellige procedurer og arbejdsvilkr. 
This is not enough time for individuals to build up sufficient knowledge of the various procedures and working conditions.
Vi konstaterede foruden udstationeringernes korte varighed, at det hżje antal ledige stillinger havde en negativ indvirkning p, i hvilket omfang missionerne udfżrte deres aktiviteter (jf. tekstboks 3). 
We found that in addition to the shortness of the secondments, the high vacancy rate had a negative impact on the extent to which the Missions carried out their activities (see Box 3).
27 Tekstboks 3 - Ledige stillinger i begyndelsen af 2017 Ľ EUCAP Sahel Niger: I begyndelsen af 2017 havde missionen 39 ledige stillinger (35 %36) p centrale poster i de operationelle enheder samt i afdelingerne for overvgning, evaluering og indkżb. 
25 Box 3-Vacancies at the beginning of 2017 Ľ EUCAP Sahel Niger: at the beginning of 2017, the Mission had 39 vacancies (35 %36) in key posts in the operational units as well as in the monitoring, evaluation and procurement departments.
Andre ledige stillinger omfattede stillinger som bevžbnede beskyttelsesvagter og en presse-og informationsmedarbejder. 
Other vacancies included those for armed protection officers, and a press and public information officer.
Dette medfżrte: - at der blev afholdt fžrre udbud end planlagt, hvilket betżd, at det udstyr, der var nżdvendigt for at gennemfżre aktiviteterne, ikke var tilgžngeligt - at der ikke blev foretaget evaluering af uddannelser eller projekter - at missionen ikke kunne pbegynde aktiviteter vedrżrende ulovlig vben-og narkotikahandel og ikke formede at gżre sine aktiviteter bžredygtige. 
As a result: - fewer tender procedures were launched than planned meaning the equipment to carry out activities was not available; - there was no evaluation of training or projects; - the Mission was unable to start implementing activities related to arms and drugs trafficking and did not succeed in making activities sustainable.
Ľ EUCAP Sahel Mali: I begyndelsen af 2017 havde missionen 50 ledige stillinger (37 %37), hovedsagelig som rdgivere og undervisere p centrale omrder. 
Ľ EUCAP Sahel Mali: at the beginning of 2017, the Mission had 50 vacancies (37 %37), mainly for advisors and trainers in key areas.
Gennemfżrelsen af visse aktiviteter blev forsinket, men missionen omfordelte arbejdsbyrden mellem de eksisterende ansatte. 
Implementation of some activities was delayed, but the Mission redistributed the workload between existing staff.
Usikkerhed vedrżrende missionernes levetid gjorde det vanskeligt at planlžgge en exitstrategi 34. 
Uncertain lifetime for the Missions made it difficult to plan an exit strategy 34.
P grundlag af forslaget fra EU-Udenrigstjenesten (jf. punkt 7) oprettede Rdet de to missioner i Sahelregionen for at styrke kapaciteten hos de styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed. 
Based on the proposal of the EEAS (see paragraph 7), the Council set up the two Missions in the Sahel region to strengthen the capacities of the forces responsible for internal security.
Rdets afgżrelser fastlagde mlsžtningerne for missionens arbejde, men indeholdt ingen indikationer om, hvor lžnge missionerne kunne tžnkes at eksistere. 
The Council decisions defined the objectives of the MissionsŐ work, but gave no indication of how long the Missions might exist.
Missionerne arbejder p nuvžrende tidspunkt inden for mandater p to r, som kan forlžnges. 
The Missions currently operate within two-year mandates, which are renewable.
EU-Udenrigstjenesten skal udarbejde en exitstrategi for, hvad der skal ske, nr I januar 2017 havde missionen 110 stillinger til udstationeret personale og kontraktansatte. 
The EEAS is required to prepare an exit strategy for when the EU member states decide to end the Missions.
EU's medlemsstater beslutter at afslutte missionerne. 
The EEAS described the end state of the Missions.
Med den fastlagde ikke en detaljeret plan for udarbejdelse af en overgangs-eller exitstrategi. 
However, they did not set out a detailed plan towards reaching a transition or exit strategy.
De interessenter38, vi interviewede, var af den opfattelse, at missionerne mindst ville eksistere p mellemlang sigt for at n de ml, der var fastsat for dem. 
Stakeholders38 we interviewed were of the opinion that the Missions would exist in at least the medium-term in order to achieve the objectives set for them.
Stżrre sikkerhed for s vidt angr missionernes levetid ville give missionerne mulighed for at forbedre den mde, de drives p, samt den mde, de planlžgger operationer p. 
Greater certainty regarding the lifetime of the Missions would allow the Missions to improve the way in which they are run and how they plan operations.
Det ville ogs gżre det lettere at udarbejde en meningsfuld exitstrategi. 
It would also make it easier to draw up a meaningful exit strategy.
EUCAP Sahel-missionerne styrkede sikkerhedsstyrkernes kapacitet, men resultaterne var ikke bžredygtige 36. 
The EUCAP Sahel Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, but results were not sustainable 36.
Vi undersżgte, hvordan EUCAP Sahel-missionerne i Niger og Mali gennemfżrte de planlagte aktiviteter, hvordan de leverede, overvgede og evaluerede resultater, og om resultaterne var bžredygtige. 
We examined how the EUCAP Sahel Missions in Niger and Mali carried out the activities planned, how they delivered, monitored and evaluated results, and whether the results were sustainable.
Vi vurderede: a) om missionerne havde styrket kapaciteten hos de indre sikkerhedsstyrker b) om missionernes resultater var bžredygtige c) om indikatorerne for overvgning af missionernes resultater var passende d) om overvgnings-og evalueringsprocedurerne i missionerne var fokuseret p effekt e) hvordan de andre interessenter i begge lande opfattede missionernes performance. 
We assessed: (a) whether the Missions had strengthened the capacity of the internal security forces; (b) whether the MissionsŐ results were sustainable; (c) whether indicators for monitoring the MissionsŐ results were appropriate; E.g. national ministries in Niger and Mali, embassies of some EU member states and donor organisations, such as GIZ, Civipol and Expertise France.
Missionerne arbejdede under vanskelige forhold og styrkede sikkerhedsstyrkernes kapacitet, om end langsomt 37. 
Working in a challenging context, the Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, albeit slowly 37.
Kapacitetsopbygningsbehovene hos styrkerne med ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed i bde Niger og Mali er store. 
The capacity-building needs of the forces responsible for internal security in both Niger and Mali are high.
EUCAP Sahel-missionerne leverer undervisning, udstyr og rdgivning og fungerer som koordinator for de indre sikkerhedsstyrker gennem en ržkke F.eks. nationale ministerier i Niger og Mali, visse EU-medlemsstaters ambassader og donororganisationer ssom GIZ, Civipol og Expertise France. 
The EUCAP Sahel Missions deliver training, equipment, advice and exercise a coordination function over the internal security forces through a range of tasks and activities.
EU yder ogs stżtte til sektoren for indre sikkerhed via instrumenter ssom Den Europžiske Udviklingsfond og EU's trustfond for Afrika. 
The EU also provides support to the internal security sector through instruments such as the European Development Fund and the EU Trust Fund for Africa.
At bo og arbejde i lande i udkanten af Saharażrkenen med drlig infrastruktur og svag offentlig forvaltning stiller EUCAP-personalet over for betydelige udfordringer. 
Living and working in countries on the edge of the Sahara desert with poor infrastructure and weak public administrations presents EUCAP staff with considerable challenges.
Det er kompliceret at rejse, og personalet skal hele tiden vžre p vagt over for truslen om terrorangreb. 
Travel is complicated and staff must constantly be vigilant against the threat of terrorist attacks.
I Niger er visse gržnseregioner for usikre at besżge, og den centrale og nordlige del af Mali er fuldstžndig forbudt omrde. 
In Niger some of the border regions are too insecure to visit, and the centre and the north of Mali are entirely out of bounds.
For at n deres mlsžtninger gennemfżrer missionerne aktiviteter, som hovedsagelig er vedvarende og viderefżres fra rdsmandat til rdsmandat og fra budgetr til budgetr. 
To meet their objectives, the Missions carry out activities, which are mostly ongoing and rolled over from one Council mandate to another and from one budgetary year to the next.
Vi sammenholdt missionernes gennemfżrelse af de planlagte aktiviteter med de resultater, der var indberettet og blev bekržftet under de interviews, vi gennemfżrte i Niger og Mali. 
We compared how the Missions carried out the activities planned with results reported and confirmed in interviews we held in Niger and Mali.
Nžrmere oplysninger om vores revisionsresultater findes i bilag III og IV. 
See Annexes III and IV for details of our findings.
I nogle tilfžlde gjorde missionerne gode fremskridt, f.eks. i forbindelse med ydelse af uddannelse til bekžmpelse af terrorisme og organiseret kriminalitet i Niger. 
In some cases, the Missions made good progress, such as on providing training to fight terrorism and organised crime in Niger.
I andre tilfžlde var der kun ringe eller slet intet fremskridt, f.eks. i forbindelse med oprettelse af interne kontrol-og revisionstjenester i FSI'erne i Mali. 
In other cases, there was little or no progress, such as on setting up internal control and audit services in the ISFs in Mali.
Uddannelseskurser 40. 
Training courses 40.
Vi undersżgte en stikprżve af uddannelseskurser for hver mission. 
We examined a sample of training courses for each of the Missions.
Hovedmodtagerne af kurserne var politiet, gendarmeriet og nationalgarden. 
The principal beneficiaries of the courses were the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard.
Uddannelseskurserne džkkede omrder som anholdelsesteknikker, gerningsstedsforvaltning, analyse af kriminalteknisk bevismateriale, kriminalefterforskning, vedligeholdelse af kżretżjer og tilbageholdelse af irregulžre migranter. 
The training courses covered areas such as arrest techniques, crime scene management, forensic evidence analysis, criminal investigation, vehicle maintenance and detention of irregular 27
I Niger deltog ogs dommere, det kommunale politi og de vžbnede styrker (jf. tekstboks 4) i kurser, f.eks. vedrżrende menneskerettigheder. 
In Niger, magistrates, the municipal police and the armed forces (see Box 4) also attended courses, for example those concerned with human rights.
29 Tekstboks 4 - De vžbnede styrker i Niger I betragtning af den centrale rolle, som de vžbnede styrker spiller for den indre sikkerhed, navnlig i den nordlige halvdel af Niger, tillod EUCAP Sahel Nigers mandat dem at deltage i relevante kapacitetsopbygningsaktiviteter. 
28 Box 4 - The armed forces in Niger Given the key role played by the armed forces in internal security, notably in the northern half of Niger, EUCAP Sahel NigerŐs mandate allowed for their participation in relevant capacity-building activities.
Missionen ophżrte med at uddanne de nigerske vžbnede styrker i 2016, dels p grund af tvivl om, hvorvidt de var berettigede til at modtage stżtte, og dels p grund af vanskeligheder med at besžtte ledige stillinger i missionen. 
The Mission stopped training the Nigerien armed forces in 2016, partly due to doubts as to whether or not they were eligible for support, and partly because of difficulties filling vacant posts within the Mission.
Vi konstaterede, at den leverede undervisning adresserede centrale omrder med svag kapacitet hos sikkerhedsstyrkerne, og at de var i overensstemmelse med mlene for EUCAP Sahel-missionerne. 
We found that training provided addressed key areas of weak capacity in the security forces and that they were in line with the objectives of the EUCAP Sahel Missions.
EUCAP Sahel Niger var dog p grund af svage administrative procedurer ikke i stand til at give os fuldstžndig dokumentation for de uddannelseskurser, vi reviderede i Niger. 
However, due to weak administrative procedures, EUCAP Sahel Niger was unable to provide us with full documentation for the training courses we audited in Niger.
Der kunne ikke fremlžgges dokumentation for tilstedevžrelse og kursusevalueringer udfyldt af deltagerne for s vidt angr halvdelen af uddannelseskurserne. 
For half of the training courses they could not provide proof of attendance and course evaluation forms completed by the participants.
Selv om hovedparten af uddannelseskurserne blev afholdt i Niamey, rapporterede underviserne kun om dem, der blev afholdt i regionerne. 
Although the majority of training courses were given in Niamey, trainers only reported on those given in the regions.
Dataene om, hvor deltagerne arbejdede, var ufuldstžndige, og missionen kontrollerede ikke, hvorvidt de tidligere var blevet uddannet. 
Data on where the participants worked was incomplete and no check was made by the Mission of whether they had been trained previously.
EUCAP Sahel Mali klarede sig godt p de fleste af de nžvnte omrder (jf. tekstboks 5). 
EUCAP Sahel Mali performed well in most of these respects (see Box 5).
30 Tekstboks 5 - Eksempler p god praksis hos EUCAP Sahel Mali Ľ Missionens undervisere verificerede kompetencerne hos de kursusdeltagere, som FSI'erne foreslog. 
Box 5 - Examples of good practice by EUCAP Sahel Mali Ľ The MissionŐs trainers verified the competences of the trainees proposed by the ISFs for courses run by EUCAP Sahel Mali.
Personalet registrerede kursusdeltagerne i en database og kontrollerede, om de allerede havde deltaget i lignende kurser hos enten EUCAP eller andre organisationer, og om den foreslede uddannelse var relevant for deres aktuelle arbejde. 
The staff registered trainees in a database and checked whether they had already attended similar training courses with either EUCAP or other organisations, and whether the training proposed was relevant to their current job.
Ľ Bde kursusdeltagerne og underviserne evaluerede de uddannelseskurser, som havde fundet sted. 
Ľ Both the trainees and trainers evaluated training courses that had taken place.
Kursusdeltagerne blev derefter registreret i en database efter uddannelseskursus, r og sikkerhedsstyrke. 
The trainees were then registered in a database organised by training course, year and security force.
Ľ EUCAP's personale udarbejdede rapporter om hvert enkelt afholdt uddannelseskursus med en beskrivelse af uddannelsens indhold og ml, kursusdeltagerne, de kompetencer, de tilegnede sig, og eventuelle indhżstede erfaringer. 
Ľ EUCAP staff prepared training reports on each training course given, describing training content and objectives, the trainees, the competences they acquired and any lessons learnt.
Rapporten fremhžvede ogs kandidater til yderligere uddannelse som undervisere. 
The report also highlighted candidates for further training as trainers.
Levering af udstyr 42. 
Providing equipment 42.
Til indkżb af udstyr og tjenesteydelser til missionen og stżttemodtagerne var der afsat 3,3 millioner euro til EUCAP Sahel Niger og 2,9 millioner euro til EUCAP Sahel Mali (tal fra 2016/2017). 
The amounts budgeted for buying equipment and services for the Mission and beneficiaries were Ű3.3 million for EUCAP Sahel Niger and Ű2.9 million for EUCAP Sahel Mali (2016/17 figures).
Indkżbene var til stżtte for missionens aktiviteter, f.eks. uddannelseskurser, og inddelt i projekter. 
Purchases were in support of the Missions activities, for example, training courses, and grouped into projects.
Eksemplerne omfatter kżretżjer, detekteringsudstyr, computere og printere, generatorer, renovering af uddannelsescentre og operationelle centre samt konstruktion og udrustning af mobile vžrksteder. 
Examples include vehicles, detection equipment, computers and printers, generators, the renovation of training and operational centres, and the construction and equipment of mobile garages.
Jf. tekstboks 6 for et eksempel p et 
See Box 6 for an example of a useful project supported by training which, despite complications during implementation, was a success.
31 Tekstboks 6 - Mobile vžrksteder til sikkerhedsstyrkernes kżretżjer i żrkenen De styrker, der har ansvaret for den indre sikkerhed i Niger, rejser ofte over enorme afstande i uvejsomt terržn i Saharażrkenen. 
There were also 30 Box 6 - Mobile garages for security force vehicles in the desert The forces responsible for internal security in Niger often travel huge distances across rough terrain in the Sahara desert.
To af projekterne i vores stikprżve omfattede indkżb af mobile vžrksteder til indre sikkerhedsstyrker, som opererer i forskellige regioner. 
Two of the projects in our sample were for the purchase of mobile garages for internal security forces operating in various regions.
Det ene af dem kunne ikke gennemfżres (i Tillabry) p grund af en forvžrring af den sikkerhedsmžssige situation. 
One of them could not be delivered (to Tillabry) due to a deterioration in the security situation.
Vi besżgte det andet projekt i Agadez. 
We visited another in Agadez.
P trods af indledende problemer leverede det en vžrdifuld service ved at gżre det muligt at reparere kżretżjer og udstyr i felten. 
Despite initial problems, it provided a valuable service, allowing vehicles and equipment to be repaired in the field.
EUCAP Sahel Niger lžrte ogs FSI'ernes personale at betjene vžrkstederne. 
EUCAP Sahel Niger also taught ISFs staff to operate the garages.
Et af disse uddannelseskurser indgik i vores stikprżve. 
One such training course was in our sample.
Mobilt vžrksted i Agadez (nationalgarden). Kilde: Revisionsretten. 
Mobile garage in Agadez (national guard) Source: ECA.
Der var ogs problemer vedrżrende bžredygtighed, f.eks. at det leverede udstyr ikke blev vedligeholdt, at det ikke blev repareret, nr det var beskadiget, eller at der ikke blev indkżbt materialer med henblik p at sikre, at det kunne anvendes. 
issues affecting sustainability, for example the failure to maintain the equipment provided, to repair it when damaged, or to buy consumables to ensure that it could be used.
Rdgivning 44. 
Advice 44.
En af missionernes hovedopgaver er at rdgive vžrtslandenes ministerier og FSI'er. 
One of the MissionsŐ main tasks is to advise the ministries and the ISFs of the host countries.
I Niger udpegede missionen rdgivere til indenrigsministeriet og justitsministeriet og stillede desuden kontinuerligt missionspersonale til rdighed p andre omrder. 
In Niger, the Mission appointed advisors to the Ministries of the Interior and Justice, complemented by the constant availability of Mission staff in other areas.
EUCAP Sahel Mali leverede rdgivere, som var integrerede i centrale nationale ministerier og i FSI'erne. 
EUCAP Sahel Mali provided advisors who were integrated into key national ministries and the ISFs.
Det var et centralt ml for begge missioner at tilskynde FSI'erne til at arbejde tžt sammen om at bekžmpe terrorisme og organiseret kriminalitet ("interoperabilitet"). 
Encouraging the ISFs to work closely together on combatting terrorism and organised crime (ŇinteroperabilityÓ) was a key objective for both Missions.
I Mali mżdtes de tre FSI'er n gang om ugen, men de tillod ikke EUCAP's personale at vžre til stede. 
In Mali, although the three ISFs met weekly, they did not allow EUCAP staff to be present.
Dette begržnsede sidstnžvntes input. 
This limited the input of the latter.
Selv om missionen i Niger investerede betydelige ressourcer i forbedring af interoperabiliten, fuldfżrte den ikke opgaver ssom at tilskynde til informationsudveksling mellem sikkerhedsstyrkerne, og til sidst blev dette opgivet. 
In Niger, despite investing significant resources in improving interoperability, the Mission did not achieve, and eventually abandoned tasks such as encouraging information sharing between the security forces.
Siden 2012 har et af EUCAP Sahel Nigers primžre ml vžret at bist de nigerske myndigheder i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af en national sikkerhedsstrategi. 
Since 2012, one of EUCAP Sahel NigerŐs primary objectives has been to assist the Nigerien authorities in preparing a National Security Strategy.
Fem r senere vedtog de nigerske myndigheder en national strategi for den indre sikkerhed, hovedsagelig fordi dette var en betingelse for at modtage budgetstżtte39. 
Five years later, largely because it was a condition for receiving budgetary support39, the Nigerien authorities adopted a National Internal Security Strategy.
Uden en samlet national strategi, som ogs behandler den eksterne sikkerhed (gržnsekontrol osv.), er virkningen af en strategi for den indre sikkerhed begržnset. 
In the absence of an overall national strategy which also deals with external security (control of borders, etc.), the impact of an internal security strategy is limited.
Missionens personale arbejdede ogs hrdt p at bringe de indre sikkerhedsstyrker sammen ved at etablere otte regionale operationelle centre (centres oprationnels rgionaux - COR'er). 
The MissionŐs staff also worked hard to bring the internal security forces together by setting up eight centres oprationnels rgionaux (CORs).
Centrene er midlertidige organer, som har til forml at samle medlemmer af de regionale regeringer og repržsentanter for de nigerske sikkerhedsstyrker og organer med ansvar for civilbeskyttelse, brandslukning, miljżbeskyttelse og told med henblik p at hndtere kriser, der opstr som fżlge af terrorangreb, organiseret kriminalitet og naturkatastrofer. 
These are temporary bodies intended to bring together both members of regional governments and the Nigerien security forces and bodies responsible for civil protection, firefighting, environmental protection and customs in order to deal with crises arising from terrorist attacks, organised crime and natural disasters.
COR'et i Niamey er velfungerende og er et eksempel p god praksis. 
The COR in Niamey works well and provides an example of good practice.
COR'erne har imidlertid ikke en status, der gżr det muligt at tildele dem personale eller żremžrke et budget til udgifter, der afholdes under kriser, f.eks. til indkżb af bržndstof til kżretżjer. 
However, CORs do not have a status that allows staff to be assigned to them, or a budget to be earmarked for expenditure incurred during crises, e.g. for the purchase of fuel for vehicles.
Missionen bidrog ogs til at styrke gendarmeriets operationelle centre (Centres Oprationnels de Gendarmerie - COG'er)40 i Niamey, Agadez og Zinder. 
The Mission also helped to strengthen Centres Oprationnels de Gendarmerie (COGs)40 in Niamey, Agadez and Zinder.
Hverken COR'erne eller COG'erne fungerede korrekt p tidspunktet for vores revision. 
Neither the CORs nor the COGs were operating properly at the time of our audit.
F.eks. virkede radionetvžrket ikke, og den smule kommunikation, der var, fandt sted via mobiltelefoner. 
For example, the radio network was not working Đ what little communication there was took place using mobile phones.
Begge missioner gennemfżrte aktiviteter til styrkelse af forvaltningen af menneskelige ressourcer i FSI'erne. 
Both Missions carried out activities to strengthen the management of human resources in the ISFs.
I Niger indfżrte GIZ f.eks. informationssystemer for politiet, og EUCAP Sahel Niger bistod de to andre styrker. 
For example in Niger, GIZ introduced information systems for the police and EUCAP Sahel Niger assisted the other two forces.
I Mali udarbejdede rdgivere fra missionen og den amerikanske ambassade stillingsbeskrivelser. 
In Mali, advisors from the Mission and the United States Embassy drafted job descriptions.
Andre opgaver har vist sig at vžre mindre vellykkede, f.eks. indfżrelsen af data om overfżrsler af personale og forfremmelser i det nye informationssystem, hvilket de nationale myndigheder hidtil ikke har accepteret. 
Other tasks have proved less successful, for example, including data on transfers of staff and promotions into the new information systems, which the national authorities have not accepted to do so far.