natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Fjendtligheden manifesterer sig ofte i, at stater stżtter vold i nabolande for at fremme deres egne politiske ml. 
Such antagonism often manifests itself in states supporting violence in adjacent countries in order to further their own political goals.
Dette kan tage form af hemmelige gržnseoverskridende militžroperationer eller skjult eller ben stżtte til oprżrere p den anden side af gržnsen. 
This may take the form of clandestine cross-border military operations, or the covert or open provision of support to insurgents on the other side of the border.
Mange konflikter, der traditionelt betragtes som "interne", udlżses eller opretholdes rent faktisk af denne form for udenlandsk indflydelse. 
Many conflicts conventionally regarded as ŇinternalÓ are actually triggered or sustained by foreign influence of this kind.
Voldelige ekstremistiske bevžgelser forrsager mange voldelige konflikter i Afrika. 
Violent extremist movements cause a great deal of violent conflict in Africa.
Nr fżrst de vinder fodfžste, har de en tendens til at sprede sig p tvžrs af gržnserne. Eksempelvis har vold udżvet af militante bevžgelser i Libyen, Mali, det nordżstlige Nigeria og Somalia spredt sig til nabolandene med yderligere angreb i bl.a. 
Once they gain a foothold, they tend to spread across borders: for example, violence by militants in Libya, Mali, north-eastern Nigeria, and Somalia has spread into neighbouring countries, with further attacks taking place in countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Uganda6.
Inden for rammerne af APSA greb AU og SRO'erne ind i 28 af de 67 voldelige konflikter (42 %), der forekom i Afrika i lżbet af 2016. 
The AU and the SROs intervened under the APSA framework in 28 out of the 67 violent conflicts (42 %) occurring in Africa during 2016.
Interventionerne tog form af diplomati, mžgling og fredsstżttende operationer eller en kombination af disse tre. 
The interventions took the form of diplomacy, mediation and peace-support operations, or a combination of the three.
Evalueringer af de 28 interventioner viste, at det i 21 af dem i det mindste delvis lykkedes at enten forebygge eller nedtrappe konflikten7 (tekstboks 2). 
Evaluations of these 28 interventions indicated that 21 of them were at least partly successful in either preventing or de-escalating conflict7 (Box 2).
Kombinationen af diplomati og en trussel om World Peace Foundation, "African Politics, African Peace", 2016. 
World Peace Foundation, "African Politics, African Peace", 2016.
"APSA Impact Report 2016", Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, oktober 2017. 
APSA Impact Report 2016, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, October 2017.
6 6 7 
5 6 7
AU's medlemsstater oprettede den afrikanske fredsfond (African Peace Fund) for at rejse finansiering til AU's fredsstżttende missioner og operationelle aktiviteter vedrżrende fred og sikkerhed8. 
The AU member states created the African Peace Fund to raise finance for the AU peace support missions and peace and security operational activities8.
Finansieringen skulle primžrt komme fra AU-budgettet med mulighed for yderligere finansiering i form af frivillige bidrag fra andre kilder. 
Funding was to come mainly from the AU budget, with the possibility of further funding in the form of voluntary contributions from other sources.
Men under halvdelen af de afrikanske stater betalte deres bidrag til AU-budgettet rettidigt og fuldt ud9, hvilket resulterede i en manko p 33 % i perioden 2011-201510. 
However, fewer than half African states paid their contributions to the AU budget on time and in full9, resulting in a shortfall of 33 % over the 2011 to 2015 period10.
Som fżlge heraf er det donorer, der finansierer en stor del af AU-budgettet11 (54 % i 201712). 
As a result, donors fund much of the AU budget11 (54 % in 201712).
Endvidere er det kun en lille del af AU's budget, som betales til den afrikanske fredsfond. 
In addition, only a small proportion of the AU budget is paid into the African Peace Fund.
AU-medlemsstaterne blev enige om senest i 2014 at żge finansieringen af den afrikanske fredsfond til 12 % af AU's ordinžre budget. 
The AU member states agreed to increase funding of the African Peace fund to 12 % of the AUŐs regular budget by 2014.
I 2016 svarede det betalte belżb imidlertid kun til 7 % af det ordinžre budget (dvs. under 6 millioner euro)13. 
However, in 2016 the amount paid over corresponded to 7 % of the regular budget (i.e. less than Ű6 million)13.
Den har fem strategiske prioriteter: konfliktforebyggelse, krise-og konfliktstyring, genopbygning Protokollen om oprettelse af Den Afrikanske Unions Freds-og Sikkerhedsrd, artikel 21. 
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 21.
I december 2016 var det kun 25 af AU's 54 medlemsstater, som havde betalt hele deres bidrag for 2016. 
By December 2016, only 25 of the AUŐs 54 member states had paid their 2016 contributions in full.
Kilde: H.E. Paul Kagame "Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union", 29. januar 2017, s. 
Source: H.E. Paul Kagame ŇReport on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African UnionÓ, 29 January 2017, p.
African Union, "Background Paper on Implementing the Kigali Decision on Financing the Union", september 2016. 
African Union, ŇBackground Paper on Implementing the Kigali Decision on Financing the UnionÓ, September 2016.
395 millioner euro) (2017) svarer til ca. 0,018 % af AU's samlede BNP (2,257 billioner euro i 2016). 
The AUŐs USD 446 million (around Ű395 million) annual budget (2017) corresponds to around 0.018 % of the AUŐs total GDP (Ű2.257 trillion in 2016).
Dette omfatter ikke fredsstżttende operationer i Somalia. 
This excludes peace support operations in Somalia.
AU's Eksekutivrds afgżrelse om budgettet for Den Afrikanske Union for regnskabsret 2017, dok. 
See AU Executive Council Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2017 Financial Year, Doc.
AU Peace Fund, "Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa", august 2016. 
AU Peace Fund, Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, August 2016.
8 efter konflikter og fredsskabelse, strategiske sikkerhedsspżrgsml14 og koordinering og partnerskaber inden for rammerne af APSA. 
It has five strategic priorities: conflict prevention; crisis and conflict management; post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building; strategic security issues14; and coordination and partnerships within the APSA framework.
EU-stżtte til APSA 8. 
EU support to the APSA 8.
I 1996 gjorde EU fred og sikkerhed p det afrikanske kontinent til en af sine prioriteter og fastlagde de grundlžggende principper for sin tilgang15. 
The EU identified peace and security on the African continent as one of its priorities and defined the core principles of its approach in 199615.
EU har siden bekržftet disse principper og sin egen interesse i at fokusere p fred og sikkerhed p det afrikanske kontinent i flere strategier for konfliktforebyggelse og sikkerhed p hżjt plan16, senest i EU's globale strategi fra 201617. 
It has reiterated these principles and its own interest in focusing on peace and security on the African continent in several high-level conflict prevention and security strategies16, most recently in the 2016 EU Global Strategy17.
I 2007 lancerede AU og EU den fžlles Afrika-EU-strategi (JAES) som en ramme for samarbejde og politikdialog og understregede betydningen af fred og sikkerhed for begge unioner. 
In 2007, the AU and the EU launched the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) as a framework for cooperation and policy dialogue, and highlighted the importance of peace and security to both unions.
Siden da har det i JAES-handlingsplanerne vžret en prioritet at gżre APSA operationel. 
Since then, the JAES action plans have prioritised making APSA operational.
EU yder sin finansielle stżtte til udviklingen af APSA gennem Den Europžiske Udviklingsfond (EUF)18. 
The EU provides its financial support for the development of the APSA through the European Development Fund (EDF)18.
Den vigtigste kanal for EUF-stżtten er fredsfaciliteten for Afrika Strategiske sikkerhedsspżrgsml omfatter den ulovlige strżm af hndvben og lette vben, bekžmpelse af improviserede eksplosive anordninger og hndtering af spržngstoffer, nedrustning og ikkespredning af masseżdelžggelsesvben, foranstaltninger til terrorbekžmpelse, ulovlige finansielle strżmme, integration af Afrikas integrerede maritime strategi i APSA og bekžmpelse af gržnseoverskridende organiseret kriminalitet og IT-kriminalitet. 
The main channel of EDF support comes through the Strategic security issues include the illegal flow of small arms and light weapons; counter-improvised explosive device/explosives management; weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation; counter-terrorism measures; illicit financial flows; the integration of AfricaŐs Integrated Maritime Strategy into APSA; and the combat of transnational organised crime and cyber-crime.
"EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond" (SEC/96/332) fastlžgger den grundlžggende tilgang til konflikterne i Afrika (betydningen af politisk analyse af strukturelle underliggende rsager, fokus p strukturel stabilitet), listen over foranstaltninger, som EU kan tržffe i forskellige konfliktsituationer, og tilgangen til fremtidige initiativer (konfliktforebyggelse, systemer for tidlig varsling, samarbejde med AU og regionale organisationer samt FN, styrkelse af den afrikanske fredsbevarende kapacitet). 
EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace Building Conflict Prevention and Beyond (SEC/96/32) sets out the basic approach towards the conflicts in Africa (importance of political analysis of structural root causes, focus on structural stability), the list of measures EU could undertake in various conflict situations, and the approach for the future (conflict prevention, early warning system, cooperation with AU and regional organisations as well as the UN, enhancement of African peace-keeping capabilities).
Eksempelvis meddelelsen om konfliktforebyggelse (KOM(2001) 211), den europžiske sikkerhedsstrategi fra 2003 og EU's samlede tilgang til eksterne konflikter og kriser (JOIN(2013) 30). 
For example Communication on Conflict prevention (COM(2001) 211); 2003 European Security Strategy; The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (JOIN(2013)30).
Den globale strategi for Den Europžiske Unions udenrigs-og sikkerhedspolitik fra 2016: "Fžlles vision, fžlles handling: Et stžrkere Europa". 
2016 Global Strategy for the European UnionŐs Foreign and Security Policy Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe.
EUF er hovedinstrumentet for EU's udviklingsbistand til staterne i Afrika, Vestindien og Stillehavet og de oversżiske lande og territorier. 
The EDF is the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and to overseas countries and territories.
Den blev oprettet ved en intern aftale i 1959, og da den finansieres af direkte bidrag fra EU-medlemsstaterne, indgr den ikke i EU-budgettet. 14 15 16 17 18 
Established by means of an internal agreement in 1959, it is financed by direct contributions from EU Member States, and remains 14 15 16 17 18
(APF), som blev oprettet af EU i 200319, samt de regionale vejledende programmer (RVP'er)20. 
9 African Peace Facility (APF), established by the EU in 200319, as well as through the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs)20.
I EUF-perioden 2014-2020 er der tre RVP'er i Afrika, der džkker regionerne Vestafrika, Centralafrika samt det żstlige og sydlige Afrika og Det Indiske Ocean. 
In the 2014 to 2020 EDF period, there are three RIPs in Africa, covering the West Africa, Central Africa and Eastern/Southern Africa/Indian Ocean regions.
Det tildelte belżb til fred og sikkerhed under bde APF og RVP'erne er mere eller mindre fordoblet fra den foregende til den nuvžrende periode (figur 2). 
The amount allocated to peace and security under both the APF and under the RIPs has more or less doubled from the previous to the current period (Figure 2).
De fleste af midlerne (ca. 80 %) blev anvendt til at finansiere fredsstżttende operationer, f.eks. 
Most of the funds (around 80 %) were used to finance peace support operations, such as the African Union Mission to Somalia.
EUF's samlede finansielle ressourcer i perioden fra 2014 til 2020 belżber sig til 30,5 milliarder euro. 
The total financial resources of the EDF in the period from 2014 to 2020 amount to Ű30.5 billion.
3/2003 af 11. december 2003 om anvendelse af midler fra rammebelżbet for langsigtet udvikling under 9. Europžiske Udviklingsfond til oprettelse af en fredsfacilitet for Afrika (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DA/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22003D0003(01)&from=DA). 
Council Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope on the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22003D0003(01)&from=EN).
EU stżtter ogs fred og sikkerhed i Afrika over det almindelige budget ved hjžlp af instrumenter ssom det panafrikanske program (PanAf), instrumentet, der bidrager til stabilitet og fred (IcSP), missioner under den fžlles sikkerheds-og forsvarspolitik (FSFP) og EU's Nżdtrustfond for Afrika. 
The EU also supports peace and security in Africa out of the general budget using instruments such as the Pan-African Programme (PanAf); the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (IcPS); Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions; and the ŇEU Emergency Trust Fund for AfricaÓ.
10 10. 
10.
Omkring 14 % af de samlede midler til fred og sikkerhed under APF og RVP'erne i perioden 2014-2020, gennemsnitlig 50 millioner euro om ret, er blevet tildelt gennemfżrelsen af APSA. 
Around 14 % of overall funding for peace and security under the APF and the RIPs for 2014 to 2020, on average Ű50 million annually, has been allocated to the implementation of the APSA.
Det er en stigning p 150 % i forhold til den foregende programmeringsperiode. 
This is an increase of 150 % compared to the previous programming period.
EU anslr, at det ved at stżtte APSA, navnlig ved at styrke AU's og SRO'ernes evne til at forebygge og lżse konflikter p kontinentet, kan reducere behovet for at finansiere dyre fredsstżttende operationer, der koster op mod 720 millioner euro21 om ret. 
The EU estimates that supporting the APSA, notably by strengthening the AUŐs and the SROsŐ capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts on the continent, may reduce the need to finance expensive peace-support operations, costing up to Ű720 million21 per year.
Samtidig er belżbet til APSA under RVP'erne seksdoblet, hvilket afspejler EU's żgede fokus p konfliktforebyggelse og mžgling p subregionalt niveau (figur 3). 
At the same time, the amount allocated to APSA under the RIPs increased six fold, reflecting the increased EU focus on conflict prevention and mediation at a sub-regional level (Figure 3).
Figur 3 - EU-midler tildelt til gennemfżrelse af APSA under APF og RVP'erne, 2008-2020 (millioner euro) 22 116 2008-13* 2014-20* APF RVP'erne 348 138 138 210 * For fremtidige perioder er de aktuelt tildelte belżb stadig genstand for drżftelser og žndringer. 
78. 11 Figure 3 - EU funds allocated to implementing the APSA under the APF and RIPs, 2008-2020 (million euros) 22 116 348 138 138 210 2008-13* 2014-20* APF RIP *For future periods currently allocated amounts are still subject to discussion and changes.
For tidligere perioder, og s vidt som de er til rdighed, anvendes kontraktbelżb i stedet for tildelte belżb. 
For past periods, and as far as available, contracted amounts are used instead of allocated amounts.
Kilde: Den Europžiske Revisionsret p grundlag af oplysninger fra Europa-Kommissionen. 
Source: European Court of Auditors, based on information provided by the European Commission.
I vores revision undersżgte vi, om EU havde ydet effektiv stżtte til APSA. 
In our audit, we examined whether the EU had provided effective support for the APSA.
78. a) Har EU's stżtte til APSA vžret godt udformet og mlrettet? b) Har EU's stżtte til APSA bidraget til at opn bžredygtige resultater? c) Er EU's stżtte til APSA blevet gennemfżrt godt? 
To do so, we set out to answer three sub-questions. (a) Has EU support for the APSA been designed and targeted well? (b) Has EU support for the APSA contributed to achieving sustainable results? (c) Has EU support for the APSA been implemented well?
Revisionen omfattede EUF-udgifterne gennem fredsfaciliteten for Afrika (APF) og de regionale vejledende programmer (RVP'erne). 
The audit covered EDF expenditure made through the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs).
Vi undersżgte EU-stżtten fra 2014 og fremefter og henviser til evalueringer og vurderinger af tidligere aktiviteter, hvor sdanne er tilgžngelige og relevante. 
We examined EU support from 2014 onwards and refer to evaluations and assessments of previous activities where available and relevant.
Vi reviderede alle de 14 kontrakter, Kommissionen indgik i perioden fra 2014 til 2016 med en samlet vžrdi p 102,5 millioner euro. 
We audited all of the 14 contracts concluded by the Commission in the period from 2014 to 2016, with a total value of Ű102.5 million.
Ni af dem blev finansieret under fredsfaciliteten for Afrika, fire under RVP'et for Vestafrika og n under RVP'et for Centralafrika22. 
Nine of them were financed out of the African 12 Peace Facility, four under the RIP for West Africa and one under the RIP for Central Africa22.
De stżrste kontrakter blev indget med AU, f.eks. om fžlles finansieringsordninger til džkning af lżnninger i AU-Kommissionens freds-og sikkerhedsafdeling og AU-forbindelseskontorerne. 
The largest contracts were signed with the AU, for example, joint financing arrangements to fund salaries in the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission and the AU Liaison Offices.
Andre kontrakter blev indget med regionale organisationer ssom Det Żkonomiske Fžllesskab af Vestafrikanske Stater (ECOWAS) og Det Żkonomiske Fžllesskab af Centralafrikanske stater (ECCAS). 
Other contracts were signed with regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
Bilag I viser finansieringens fordeling p de stżttede organisationer. 
Annex I provides a breakdown of the funding provided to each organisation supported.
Vi medtog ikke fredsstżttende operationer i vores revision, fordi disse udgifter hovedsagelig vedrżrer refusion af godtgżrelser betalt til tropper og ikke stżtte til APSA. 
We excluded peace-support operations from our audit because this expenditure mainly relates to reimbursements of allowances paid to troops and not to support for the APSA.
Vi reviderede ikke de andre EU-instrumenter, der finansierer fred og sikkerhed i Afrika, fordi ingen af deres aktiviteter i den reviderede periode vedrżrte APSA direkte. 
We did not audit the other EU instruments financing peace and security in Africa because during the period audited none of the activities related directly to the APSA.
Vi udfżrte revisionen mellem januar og november 2017. 
We carried out our audit work between January and November 2017.
Vi indsamlede bevis ved at gennemg dokumentation og gennemfżre interview med EU-Udenrigstjenesten, Kommissionen og relevante interessenter ssom andre donorer og modtagerne af EU-stżtten (AU og SRO'erne). 
We gathered evidence by reviewing documentation and by conducting interviews with the European External Action Service, the Commission, and relevant stakeholders, such as other donors and the beneficiaries of EU support (the AU and the SROs).
Vi besżgte Den Afrikanske Unions Kommission, ECOWAS og ECCAS. 
We visited the African Union Commission, the ECOWAS and the ECCAS.
BEMŽRKNINGER EU's stżtte var fortsat fokuseret p driftsomkostninger 15. 
OBSERVATIONS EU support remained focused on operational costs 15.
I dette afsnit undersżger vi, om der var en klar strategi for EU's nuvžrende og fremtidige stżtte til APSA. 
In this section, we examine whether there was a clear strategy covering the present and future provision of EU support to the APSA.
Vi vurderer, om EU's stżtte adresserede APSA's behov, og hvordan den blev udviklet for at rette den mod APSA's nuvžrende og fremtidige problemer. 
We assess whether EU support addressed the APSAŐs needs, and how it evolved to target ongoing and future issues facing the APSA.
EU's stżtte til APSA blev udformet p grundlag af en strategisk ramme 16. 
The EUŐs support for APSA was conceived on the basis of a strategic framework 16.
EU vurderede den freds-og sikkerhedsmžssige situation p det afrikanske kontinent og udviklede en tilgang, som dannede grundlag for EU's stżtte. 
The EU assessed the peace and security situation on the African continent and developed an approach which formed the basis for EU support.
I erkendelse af den vigtige rolle, som bde Den Afrikanske Union (AU) og de afrikanske subregionale organisationer (SRO'erne) spiller inden for fred og sikkerhed, samarbejdede EU med begge niveauer. 
Recognising the important role in the area of peace and security of both the African Union (AU) and the African Sub-regional No contracts in support of the APSA were concluded during the audited period under the other RIPs.
I takt med at der viste sig nye trusler mod freden og sikkerheden, reviderede og opdaterede EU sine strategier (punkt 8). 
As new threats to peace and security emerged, the EU revised and updated its strategies (paragraph 8).
I overensstemmelse med denne strategiske ramme ydede EU politisk og finansiel stżtte til AU og SRO'erne, herunder til udvikling af APSA. 
In line with this strategic framework, the EU provided political and financial support to the AU, and to the SROs, including for the development of the APSA.
EU stżttede udarbejdelsen af AU's og SRO'ernes successive kżreplaner, som bl.a. indeholdt planer for gennemfżrelsen af APSA23. 
The EU supported the preparation of successive roadmaps by the AU and the SROs, which contained plans for the APSAŐs implementation23.
Den Europžiske Union stżttede ogs regelmžssige vurderinger af APSA. 
The European Union also supported regular assessments of the APSA.
Dette betżd, at APSA lżbende modtog feedback (i form af APSA-vurderinger) og rd til videreudvikling (i form af APSA-kżreplaner). 
This meant that the APSA benefited from regular feedback (in the form of the APSA assessments) and guidance for further development (in form of the APSA roadmaps).
Kżreplanerne fastlagde ogs rammerne for donorkoordinering. 
The roadmaps also provided a framework for donor coordination.
En 2017-vurdering af APF pegede imidlertid p svagheder i den seneste APSA-kżreplan. 
However, a 2017 assessment of the APF pointed to weaknesses with the latest APSA roadmap.
Kżreplanen anses for at vžre for kompliceret at arbejde med, den mangler et overordnet perspektiv, og AU-Kommissionen har endnu ikke taget reelt ejerskab til den24. n for perioden 2011-2013 og en anden for perioden 2016-2020. 
The roadmap is considered to be too complex to work with, lacks an overarching perspective and the AU Commission has not yet taken real ownership of it24.
13 18. 
18.
EU oprettede mekanismer for politisk dialog bde i AU og p regionalt plan. 
The EU set up mechanisms for political dialogue at both AU and regional levels.
Den politiske dialog og politikdialogen om freds-og sikkerhedsspżrgsml, herunder om gennemfżrelsen af APSA, fandt sted p de regelmžssige mżder med AU inden for rammerne af JAES, som blev etableret i 2007. 
Political and policy dialogue on peace and security issues, including on the implementation of the APSA, took place during regular meetings with the AU within the framework of the JAES, established in 2007.