natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(6) EFT L 57 af 27.2.2001, s. 
(6) OJ L 57, 27.2.2001, p.
C 170/6 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 21.7.2006 Revisionens omfang og ml 9. 
C 170/6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 Scope and objectives of the audit 9.
Retten reviderede kun Kommissionens humanitžre bistand. 
The scope of this audit is limited to the CommissionŐs humanitarian aid response.
Den humanitžre bistand indbefatter i overensstemmelse med ECHOŐs mandat katastrofenżdhjžlp og en ržkke kortsigtede rehabiliteringsarbejder, men ikke genopbygning p lang sigt. 
This includes the emergency response and some short-term rehabilitation work, consistent with DG ECHOŐs mandate, but does not include longer term reconstruction.
De finansieringsafgżrelser, der er omfattet af revisionen, er anfżrt i tabel 1. 
The financial decisions corresponding to the audit scope are shown in table 1.
Revisionen džkkede ogs enheder, der ligger uden for ECHOŐs aktivitetsomrde, men som indvirker p ECHOŐs humanitžre indsats, ssom civilbeskyttelsesordningen. 
The audit has also examined entities on the periphery of DG ECHO, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, when they impact on DG ECHOŐs humanitarian response.
Tabel 1 Kommissionens humanitžre bistand Dato 26.12.2004 30.12.2004 31.12.2004 9.2.2005 15.12.2005 Afgżrelse Varighed Belżb Regionalt 3 mneder 3,0 3,0 6 mneder 10,0 6 mneder 10,0 18 mneder 80,0 13,7 18 mneder 20,0 Afgżrelser i alt 123,0 16,7 Indonesien 10,0 30,5 10,0 50,5 40,2 31,3 Midlernes fordeling Sri Lanka Indien (millioner euro) Maldiverne Thailand 8,3 1,7 I alt indget kontrakt om pr. december 2005 24,3 10,0 8,0 2,0 40,6 12,0 32,5 10,0 24,8 6,5 1,0 0,5 2,7 0,5 2,7 0,5 2,2 0,4 102,6 16,7 I alt udbetalt pr. december 2005 78,8 13,6 Kilde: ECHO. 
Date 26 December 2004 30 December 2004 31 December 2004 9 February 2005 15 December 2005 Decision Duration Amount Regional Indonesia 3 months 3,0 3,0 6 months 10,0 6 months 10,0 10,0 18 months 80,0 13,7 30,5 18 months 20,0 10,0 Allocation of funding Sri Lanka India (million euro) Maldives Thailand Table 1 Humanitarian aid granted by Commission Total decisions 123,0 16,7 50,5 24,3 10,0 8,0 2,0 40,6 12,0 32,5 10,0 24,8 6,5 1,0 0,5 2,7 0,5 2,7 0,5 2,2 0,4 8,3 1,7 Total contracted by December 2005 Total disbursed by December 2005 Source: DG ECHO.
Revisionsmetode 11. 
Audit approach 11.
Revisionen omfattede gennemgang af dokumentation, interviews, besżg p stedet og gennemgang af andre revisioner og evalueringer. 
The audit was based on an examination of documentation, on interviews, on on-the-spot visits and on a review of other (b) Were DG ECHOŐs actions effectively coordinated with those audits and evaluations.
ECHOŐs forvaltnings-, overvgnings-og kontrolsystemer blev efterprżvet i ECHOŐs hovedkvarter, og resultaterne af denne undersżgelse blev sammenholdt med resultaterne af revisorernes besżg p ECHOŐs kontorer p stedet, hos partnere og p projekter i Sri Lanka og Indonesien. 
DG ECHOŐs management, monitoring of other Commission services, international organisations and control systems were assessed at HQ level and corroborated and other countries? by visits to DG ECHOŐs field offices, partners and projects in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
Tabel 2 viser de projekter og projektpartnere, der blev kontrolleret p stedet. 
Table 2 shows projects and partners visited on the spot.
De projekter, der blev kontrolleret p stedet, blev udvalgt p grundlag af fżlgende kriterier: sektor, beliggenhed, belżb, gennemfżrelsesstadie og partnertype, s revisorerne kunne danne sig et nogenlunde džkkende billede af forholdene. 
Projects for on-the-spot visits were selected according to criteria of sector, location, amount, stage of implementation and type of partner in order to obtain a reasonable overall (c) Were DG ECHOŐs monitoring and control procedures picture.
Retten besżgte ikke projekter, som allerede var blevet kontrolleret p stedet af ECHOŐs Kontor for Finansielle Spżrgsml og Revision. 
Projects which had already received an on-the-spot veri-designed to ensure that projects implemented by partners fication by DG ECHOŐs Finances and Audit Unit were not were relevant, timely and efficiently implemented? revisited.
21.7.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 170/7 Tabel 2 Humanitžre bistandsprojekter, som blev kontrolleret p stedet i Indonesien og Sri Lanka Finansieringsafgżrelse Partnertype Projektbeskrivelse INDONESIEN Kommissionsmidler (euro) 4 000 000 528 798 550 000 484 820 476 792 1 336 266 7 376 676 571 534 1 200 000 672 720 2 067 480 3 900 000 8 411 734 FN-agentur Bistand til bżrn, vandforsyning og sanitet 10 millioner euro Ngo Ngo Rent vand Ngo Forbedring af lokalsamfundenes pleje-og stżtteaktiviteter Psykosocial bistand 80 millioner euro Ngo Genskabelse af fiskeriet som eksistensgrundlag Ngo Vand og sanitet Samlet vžrdi af de projekter, som blev kontrolleret p stedet i Indonesien SRI LANKA Ngo Vand og sanitet 10 millioner euro Ngo Ngo Psykosocial bistand Vand, sanitet, fżdevarer og ikke-fżdevarer 80 millioner euro International Nżdboliger, registrering og organisation eksistensgrundlag FN-agentur Fiskeri og landbrug Samlet vžrdi af de projekter, som blev kontrolleret p stedet i Sri Lanka BEMŽRKNINGER Reagerede Kommissionen hurtigt og hensigtsmžssigt? Hurtig respons med et tilstržkkeligt budget 12. 
21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/7 Table 2 Humanitarian aid projects visited on the spot in Indonesia and Sri Lanka Financial decision 10 million euro 80 million euro Type of partner UN agency NGO NGO NGO NGO NGO Project description INDONESIA Response to children, water and sanitation Psychosocial support Safe water Enhancing community care and support Recovery of fisheries livelihoods Water and sanitation SRI LANKA Water and sanitation Water, sanitation, food and non-food Psychosocial support Shelter, registration and livelihood Fisheries and agriculture Commission funding (euro) 4 000 000 528 798 550 000 484 820 476 792 1 336 266 7 376 676 571 534 1 200 000 672 720 2 067 480 3 900 000 8 411 734 Total value of projects visited in Indonesia 10 million euro 80 million euro NGO NGO NGO International organisation UN agency Total value of projects visited in Sri Lanka OBSERVATIONS Rapidity and appropriateness of the CommissionŐs response Rapid response with an appropriate budget 12.
For at strżmline beslutningerne vedrżrende humanitžr bistand vedtog Kommissionen i 2001 en ržkke procedurer (1), som gav generaldirektżren for ECHO bemyndigelse til at tržffe afgżrelser om primžr nżdhjžlp for op til 3 millioner euro for en periode p tre mneder. 
Procedures for streamlining humanitarian decisions were adopted by the Commission in 2001 (1) giving the Director-General of DG ECHO the power to take decisions for primary emergency humanitarian aid up to 3 million euro for a period of three months.
Kommissžren med ansvar for humanitžr bistand fik befżjelse til at tržffe afgżrelser om nżdhjžlp for op til 30 millioner euro til aktioner, der varede op til seks mneder. 
The Commissioner responsible for humanitarian aid was given the power to take emergency decisions up to 30million euro directly for operations lasting up to six months.
Disse procedurer kombineret med ECHOŐs system med permanent bemanding i ferieperioder gjorde det muligt for Kommissionen at reagere hurtigt p tsunamien. 
These procedures, combined with DG ECHOŐs system of permanent cover during holiday periods, enabled the Commission to respond rapidly to the tsunami.
Samme dag, som katastrofen indtraf, den 26. december 2004, blev der truffet en afgżrelse om 3 millioner euro til primžr nżdhjžlp i tre mneder. 
A primary emergency decision for 3 million euro with a three-month timescale was taken on 26 December 2004, the same day as the disaster.
Afgżrelsen džkkede nżdhjžlp i form af nżdboliger, ikke-fżdevarehjžlp og lžgemidler og medicinsk udstyr, som skulle leveres af Det internationale Forbund af Rżde Kors-og Rżde Halvmneselskaber. 
This decision covered the emergency response for shelters, non-food aid and medical supplies to be provided by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Denne afgżrelse blev efterfulgt af en afgżrelse (1) SEK(2001) 873. om 10 millioner euro til Sri Lanka og Maldiverne den 30. december 2004 og endnu en afgżrelse om 10 millioner euro til Indonesien den 31. december 2004, begge med en varighed p seks mneder, hvorved den samlede stżtte kom op p 23 millioner euro. 
This was followed by a decision of 10 million euro for Sri Lanka and the (1) SEC(2001) 873. Maldives on 30 December 2004 and a further decision for 10 million euro for Indonesia on 31 December 2004, both with a timescale of six months, bringing the total aid to 23 million euro.
P tsunamikonferencen i Djakarta gav Kommissionen den 6. januar 2005 tilsagn om yderligere 100 millioner euro i humanitžr bistand og anmodede derfor budgetmyndigheden (Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet) om dette belżb. 
On 6 January 2005, the Commission pledged an additional 100 million euro for humanitarian aid at the Jakarta Tsunami Aid Conference and therefore requested this amount from the budgetary authority (Parliament and Council).
Belżbet blev godkendt den 19. januar 2005, hvorefter der kunne tržffes en afgżrelse om 80 millioner euro den 9. februar 2005 og en afgżrelse om 20 millioner euro den 15. december 2005, begge med en varighed p 18 mneder. 
This amount was approved on 19 January 2005 enabling an 80 million euro decision to be taken on 9 February 2005, and a 20 million euro decision to be taken on 15 December 2005, both with an 18-month timescale.
De fżrste 23 millioner euro blev anvendt til at finansiere nżdhjžlpsaktiviteter herunder sundhedsaktioner, lžgemidler og medicinsk udstyr, nżdboliger, epidemivarslingssystemer, rent drikkevand og sanitetsfaciliteter, fżdevarenżdhjžlp, psykosocial bistand, bżrnebeskyttelse og logistisk stżtte ssom satellittelefo-ner. 
The first 23 million euro was used to fund emergency activities including health care, medical supplies, shelter, epidemic early warning systems, safe water and sanitation facilities, food relief items, psychosocial assistance, child protection and logistical support such as satellite phone services.
De efterfżlgende afgżrelser om henholdsvis 80 millioner og 20 millioner euro finansierer kortsigtet rehabilitering ssom nżdindkvartering og midlertidig indkvartering, genanbringelse af internt fordrevne, sikring af et eksistensgrundlag, fżdevaresikkerhed, rent drikkevand og sanitetsfaciliteter, logistisk og faglig bistand og katastrofeforebyggelse. 
The subsequent 80 million and 20 million euro decisions are funding short-term rehabilitation including emergency and transitional shelter, relocation of internally displaced people, livelihood recovery, food security, water and sanitation facilities, logistical and technical assistance and disaster prevention.
Fotoene i beretningen viser nogle af de forskellige stżttetyper, ECHO har finansieret. 
Pictures in the report illustrate some of the different types of aid funded by DG ECHO.
C 170/8 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 21.7.2006 15. 
C 170/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 21.7.2006 15.
I henhold til de gode donorprincipper for humanitžr bistand, der blev vedtaget i Stockholm i juni 2003, bżr midler til humanitžr bistand bevilges i forhold til behovene og p grundlag af behovsvurderinger. 
The Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, agreed in Stockholm in June 2003, state that humanitarian funding should be allocated in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
Efter tsunamien fremgik det imidlertid ikke klart af de tilgžngelige oplysninger, hvad der reelt var behov for, og det var af afgżrende betydning at finde balancen mellem żnsket om en velfunderet reaktion og nżdvendigheden af en hurtig indgriben. 
However, following the tsunami, real needs were not clear from the information available, and it was essential to balance the desirability of an informed response with the necessity for a rapid response.
I denne usikre kontekst viste Kommissionen med sit tilsagn om at yde stżtte, at den var indstillet p at hjžlpe, og de store stżttebelżb viste sig at vžre berettigede blandt andet af fżlgende rsager: a) Finansieringsafgżrelsen af 15. december 2005 om et belżb p 20 millioner euro skulle džkke endnu ikke opfyldte behov i en periode p 18 mneder fra januar 2006. 
In this uncertain context the CommissionŐs pledge demonstrated its commitment, and the high level of funding proved appropriate, due partly to the following factors: (a) the financial decision for 20million euro taken on 15 December 2005 was to meet remaining needs for 18 months from January 2006.
Overgangsfa-sen mellem nżdhjžlp og genopbygning, som man oprindeligt havde forventet ville have vžret ovre inden udgangen af 2005, blev lžngere end forventet, fordi den stżrste del af genopbygningsarbejdet endnu ikke var pbegyndt ved udgangen af 2005. b) I august 2005 blev afgżrelsen om de 80 millioner euro žndret, s den ogs omfattede den konfliktramte befolkning (jf. tekstboks 1). relevante projekter trods overfloden af finansielle midler og projekter, der skyldtes, at der var ankommet en lang ržkke nye ngoŐer med private midler, som var fast besluttede p at ivžrksžtte projekter i distrikter, som allerede var overvžldet med hjžlp. 
The transitional phase between relief and reconstruction, initially expected to be over before the end of 2005, was longer than expected because the major part of the reconstruction work had yet to start at the end of 2005; (b) in August 2005 the 80 million euro decision was modified to include also the conflict affected population (see box 1). arrangement enabled DG ECHO to fund the implementation of relevant projects in spite of the situation of overfunding and overcrowding caused by the large number of newly arrived NGOs with private funding determined to start a project in districts overwhelmed with aid.
I modsžtning til i Sri Lanka, havde ECHO ikke arbejdet i Aceh inden tsunamien, fordi internationalt personale fra humanitžre organisationer (med undtagelse af enkelte repržsentanter for FN-organisationer og Rżde Kors) ikke havde adgang til provinsen under den undtagelsestilstand, som den indonesiske regering havde erklžret. 
In contrast to Sri Lanka, DG ECHO did not have a presence in Aceh prior to the tsunami as access to international staff of humanitarian organisations (with the exception of a few representatives of UN organisations and the Red Cross) was not allowed under the civil emergency status declared by the Indonesian Government.
Efter tsunamien blev der givet fri adgang til Aceh fra den 28. december 2004. 
Following the tsunami, free access to Aceh was allowed from 28 December 2004.
ECHO udvalgte derfor partnere, som kunne arbejde p stedet med det samme, og som havde erfaring p de forskellige relevante omrder, bl.a. FN-agenturer inden for bżrnebeskyttelse, vandforsyning, sanitet og sundhed. 
DG ECHO therefore selected partners able to work immediately in the field and with expertise in the different areas to be covered, such as UN agencies in child protection, water supply, sanitation and health.
Alle kontrakter, der havde relation til de to nżdhjžlpsafgżrelser om 10millioner euro, var indget med partnerne inden den 18. januar 2005 for Sri Lankas vedkommende og inden den 27. januar 2005 for Indonesiens vedkommende. 
All the agreements with partners for the two 10 million euro emergency decisions had been signed by 18 January 2005 for Sri Lanka and by 27 January 2005 for Indonesia.
Der blev ydet mere i international stżtte, end partnerne kunne absorbere 18. 
High level of international funding exceeds financial needs of partners 18.
Den internationale finansielle stżtte, som blev stillet til rdighed efter tsunamien, oversteg nogle af partnernes absorberingskapacitet (jf. tekstboks 2). 
The high level of international funding available in response to the tsunami exceeded the absorption capacity of some partners (see box 2).
Mere end 360 humanitžre organisationer ankom til Sri Lanka og 450 til Indonesien med store belżb i private midler. 
Over 360 humanitarian organisations arrived in Sri Lanka and 450 in Indonesia with large amounts of private funding.
Konkurrencen om ressourcer var med til at żge inflationen og gżre det vanskeligere at fremskaffe varer og rekruttere kvalificeret personale. 
The competition for resources contributed to inflation and difficulties in obtaining goods and in recruiting qualified staff.
Rehabiliterings-og genopbyg-ningsagenturet (BRR (1)) rapporterede et r efter tsunamien, at priserne og lżnningerne steg med 30-40 % i Aceh i 2005. 
The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Office (BRR (1)) report one year after the tsunami described how prices and wages in Aceh rose by 30 to 40 % in 2005.
Tekstboks 1 Det hżje stżtteniveau gżr det nemmere at anvende en ČkonfliktfżlsomÇ strategi Den vžbnede konflikt i Sri Lanka resulterede i, at 800 000 mennesker blev fordrevet mellem 1983 og 2002. 
Box 1 High level of funding helps to meet the need for a conflict sensitive response The armed conflict in Sri Lanka caused the displacement of 800 000 people between 1983 and 2002.
Efter vbenhvilen i februar 2002 begyndte mange fordrevne at vende tilbage, og da tsunamien ramte landet sidst i 2004, var nžsten 400 000 vendt tilbage. 
A massive wave of return started after the ceasefire in February 2002 resulting in almost 400 000 returnees by the time of the tsunami at the end of 2004.
Imidlertid var kun ca. 15 % af den konfliktramte befolkning ogs direkte berżrt af tsunamien og kunne nyde godt af den gene-rżse bistand, donorerne ydede som fżlge af tsunamien. 
However, only about 15 % of the conflict affected population were directly affected by the tsunami and could therefore benefit from the generous response of the donor community to the tsunami.
Der blev ydet langt mere bistand til den tsunamiramte befolkning end til den konfliktramte befolkning i det samme omrde. 
The quantity of aid provided to the tsunami affected population was much higher than the aid provided to the conflict affected population in the same area.
Omkostningerne til midlertidig indkvartering af tsunamiofre var for eksempel p omkring 450 euro mod 125 euro til midlertidig indkvartering af ofrene for konflikten. 
The cost of a tsunami related temporary shelter, for example, was in the order of 450 euro compared with 125 euro for a conflict related temporary shelter.
Den mnedlige fżdevarehjžlp til en tsunamiramt familie var p 70 euro mod 10 euro til en konfliktramt familie. 
Monthly food support for a tsunami affected family was 70 euro compared with 10 euro for a conflict affected family.
For at undg forskelsbehandling af srbare befolkningsgrupper, som var fordrevet inden tsunamien, žndrede Kommissionen i august 2005 finansieringsafgżrelsen om de 80 millioner euro, s den ogs omfattede den konfliktramte befolkning, der boede i de tsunamiramte omrder. 
In order to avoid discrimination against vulnerable people displaced prior to the tsunami, the Commission modified the 80 million euro decision in August 2005 to include also the conflict affected population living in the tsunami districts.
Tekstboks 2 Midlerne oversteg partnernes finansielle behov Ń generel kontekst Nogle af ECHOŐs eksisterende partnere i Sri Lanka havde ikke kapacitet til at absorbere de midler, Kommissionen ydede, fordi der var stillet s mange private midler til rdighed. 
Box 2 General context of funds exceeding partnersŐ financial needs In Sri Lanka, because of the high level of private funding, some of DG ECHOŐs existing partners have not had the capacity to absorb available Commission funding.
F.eks. blev der indget aftale med en ngo om et projekt til kun 570 000 euro, selv om ECHO oprindeligt havde haft til hensigt at yde 1 million euro af 10 millioner euro-afgżrelsen til den. 
For example, a project of only 570 000 euro was agreed with an NGO although DG ECHO initially intended to allocate 1 million euro of the 10 million euro decision to them.
Til trods for, at denne ngo har żget sin kapacitet i Sri Lanka siden tsunamien, har den ikke fremlagt et forslag til finansiering over 80 millioner euro-afgżrelsen. 
Despite increasing their capacity in Sri Lanka since the tsunami this NGO has not submitted a proposal in the context of the 80 million euro decision.
Fra oktober 2005 arbejdede ECHO derfor med fire partnere (ud af i alt 21 partnere), som var nye i Sri Lanka. 
From October 2005, DG ECHO therefore worked with four partners new in Sri Lanka (out of a total of 21 partners).
Valg af partnere 16. 
Selection of partners 16.
Efter koordinering med FN og andre donorer besluttede ECHO at samarbejde med eksisterende partnere, primžrt i den nordlige og żstlige del af Sri Lanka, hvor det siden 1994 og inden tsunamien havde arbejdet med den konfliktramte befolkning. 
After coordinating with the UN and other donors, DG ECHO decided to work with existing partners mainly in the north and east of Sri Lanka where it had been working with the conflict-affected population prior to the tsunami since 1994.
P denne mde kunne ECHO finansiere implementeringen af (1) BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi) blev oprettet i april 2005 af den indonesiske regering og har til forml at yde bistand i forbindelse med koordineringen af rehabiliteringen og genopbygningen af Aceh og Nias. 
This (1) The BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi) was established in April 2005 by the Government of Indonesia to help coordinate the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias.
21.7.2006 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 170/9 I Indonesien havde et FN-agentur ikke kapacitet til at bruge alle pengene fra Kommissionen i lżbet af den seksmneders gennemfżrelsesperiode, nżdhjžlpsafgżrelsen džkkede. 
21.7.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 170/9 In Indonesia, a UN agency did not have the capacity to spend all Commission funds during the six-month implementing period of the emergency decision.
Mange af ECHOŐs normale partnere havde ikke indsendt projektforslag i Indonesien, fordi de allerede havde modtaget flere penge fra andre donorer, end de kunne absorbere. 
Many usual partners of DG ECHO did not submit project proposals in Indonesia because the funding they had received from other donors already exceeded their absorption capacity.
Denne analyse af den manglende kapacitet til at absorbere de midler, der var stillet til rdighed, bekržftes af en ngo, som understregede, at dens programmer udelukkende skulle vžre baseret p behov og ikke p et żnske om at bruge penge, der var i overskud. 
This analysis concerning the lack of capacity to absorb available funding is reinforced by the position of one NGO which stressed that its programmes should be driven by need alone, not by a desire to spend surplus funds.
Selv om ngoŐen stoppede med at tage imod bidrag til tsunamiofrene mindre end en uge efter katastrofen, modtog den ikke desto mindre 110 millioner euro, hvilket skal sammenholdes med, at den skulle bruge 25 millioner euro til at gennemfżre tsunamiprogrammerne for 2005. 
Although it stopped accepting funds for victims of the tsunami less than a week after the disaster, it nevertheless received 110 million euro compared with the 25 million euro needed to run tsunami programmes for 2005.
Donorerne blev spurgt, om ngoŐen mtte se bort fra restriktionerne p bidragene og anvende pengene til andre nżdhjžlpsfor-anstaltninger, og 99 % indvilligede i dette. 
Donors were asked for their permission to remove restrictions on donations so that they could be used for other emergencies, and 99 % agreed.
Ved udgangen af 2005 var 65 millioner euro af de bidrag, der oprindeligt var ydet til tsunamien, blevet anvendt til džkning af behov andre steder, ssom hun-gersnżden i Niger, konflikten i Dafur og jordskžlvet i Pakistan. 
By the end of 2005, 65 million euro of donations originally intended for the tsunami had been used to meet needs elsewhere such as the nutritional crisis in Niger, the conflict in Darfur and the earthquake in Pakistan.
Behovsanalysernes kvalitet varierede meget 19. 
Contrasting situations for accurate needs assessments 19.