natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det samme gjorde sig gžldende med katastrofens art og det land, hvor katastrofen indtraf. 
The same holds for the type of disaster and the country where the disaster took place.
Et eksempel p analysen af forskellene p den tid, det tog at f stżtte fra fonden, er vist i tabel 6. 
An example of the analysis of variation in time taken for obtaining aid from the Fund is presented in Table 6.
Her vises forholdet mellem katastrofens art og ansżgningsfasens varighed. 
There the relationship between the type of disaster and the duration of the application phase is shown.
Det fremgr, at katastrofens art ikke i vžsentlig grad forklarer forskellene p den tid, det tog ansżgeren at forelžgge sagen for Kommissionen. 
As can be seen, the type of disaster does not account for a significant part of the variation in time the applicant needs to present the case to the Commission.
Tabel 6 Ansżgningsfasens varighed set i forhold til katastrofens art Katastrofens art Standard-afvigelse 67 12 106 17 58 24 70 17 64 61 67 2 72 70 74 2 55 55 55 0 79 79 79 0 79 79 79 0 68 68 68 0 66 12 106 15 Oversvżmmelse 19 Skovbrande 11 Storm 5 Jordskžlv 2 Olieudslip 1 Ugunstigt vejr 1 Vulkanudbrud 1 Eksplosion 1 Alle katastrofer 41 Antal ansżgninger Antal Mindste Stżrste dage i antal antal gennem-dage dage snit Kilde: GD for Regionalpolitiks register over ansżgninger. 
Table 6 Duration of the application phase in relation to the type of the disaster Type of disaster Number of applications Average number of days 67 58 64 72 55 79 79 68 66 Minimum number of days 12 24 61 70 55 79 79 68 12 Maximum number of days Standard deviation Flooding 19 106 17 70 17 67 2 74 2 55 0 79 0 79 0 68 0 106 15 Forest fires Storm Earthquake Oilspill Adverse weather Volcanic eruption Explosion All disasters 11 5 2 1 1 1 1 41 Source: Regional Policy DG records of applications.
Rettens analyse viser, at den tid, det tager at mobilisere 22. midlerne, hovedsagelig afhžnger af: a) hvilke administrative regler, der skal anvendes b) hvor hurtigt Kommissionen reagerer, herunder med oversžttelse c) hvor hurtigt de nationale myndigheder svarer Kommissionen d) kvaliteten af de oplysninger, ansżgeren indsender. 
22. mobilise funds depends mainly on: (a) the administrative rules to be applied; (b) the rapidity of the Commission, including the need for translation; (c) the promptness of the national authoritiesŐ replies; and (d) the quality of the information provided by the applicant.
Kan man p baggrund af den faktiske behandlingstid hžvde, at fonden reagerede hurtigt over for ansżgerne? 
Can the time actually taken be regarded as showing that the Fund provided a rapid response to the applicants?
Retten forsżgte at sammenligne fondens hurtighed med hurtigheden i lignende fonde eller aktiviteter. 
An attempt was undertaken to benchmark the rapidity of the Fund against similar funds or activities.
Det viste sig, at nżdhjžlpsreserven under Kommissionens Generaldirektorat for Humanitžr Bistand ligner fonden mest. 
The closest equivalent was found to be the CommissionŐs Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid The CourtŐs analysis suggests that the time necessary to
Selv om der er ligheder mellem nżdhjžlpsreserven og fonden, er de dog ikke s ens, at der kan fastsžttes et benchmark for fondens hurtighed. 
However, despite there being similarities between the two funds, they are not sufficiently similar to provide a benchmark for the rapidity of the Solidarity Fund.
For nżdhjžlpsreserven gžlder der specifikke bestemmelser og procedurer, som sikrer, at den kan yde żjeblikkelig bistand (f.eks. varer vurderingsfasen under en uge, og reserven har sin egen budgetpost). 
The Emergency Aid Fund has a specific regulatory and procedural framework which is designed to ensure that it can provide immediate relief (e.g. an assessment phase of less than one week and a fixed budget line).
I forbindelse med sin dataanalyse bemžrkede Retten imidlertid, at de fżrste fire ansżgninger fżrte til betaling i lżbet af 100-150 dage fra den dato, hvor katastrofen indtraf, i gennemsnit 131 dage. 
However, when analysing the data, the Court noted that the first four applications were paid within a time span of between 100 and 150 days from the date of the disaster, on average in 131 days.
Kommissionen begyndte at behandle de fżrste fire ansżgninger, fżr fonden var endeligt oprettet. 
The Commission started to deal with the first four applications before the Fund was fully set up.
Behandlingstiden for disse fire ansżgninger er et benchmark, som behandlingstiden for senere ansżgninger kan bedżmmes ud fra. 
The processing time for those four applications provides a standard of comparison against which the processing time for subsequent applications can be judged.
Hvis der i forbindelse med en ansżgning modtaget i 2003 eller derefter, hvor fonden var endeligt oprettet, gr mere end 150 dage fra den dato, hvor katastrofen indtržffer, til den dato, hvor stżtten modtages fra fonden, kan behandlingstiden betegnes som lang. 
If for an application received in 2003 or later when the Fund was fully set up the processing time, i.e. the time from the date of disaster to the date of obtaining aid from the Fund, exceeds 150 days, it can be considered as long.
Den gennemsnitlige behandlingstid for de 19 ansżgninger, der blev godkendt efter de fżrste fire, var 415 dage, dvs. over det netop fastsatte benchmark. 
The average processing time for the 19 successful applications after the first four applications was 415 days, hence above the benchmark just defined.
Retten mener derfor ikke, at fonden har vžret hurtig til at yde stżtte i rene efter 2002. 
Therefore, the Court does not consider the Fund to be rapid in providing aid in the years after 2002.
Fonden behandlede de fżrste fire ansżgninger langt hurtigere end de efterfżlgende. 
The Fund was much more rapid in dealing with the first four applications than it was in dealing with the subsequent ones.
En undersżgelse af de fire benchmarksager kan mske bidrage til at identificere, hvordan behandlingen af nye sager kan gżres hurtigere. 
The four benchmark cases could help to identify how to speed up the process in new cases.
For disse fire sager gjaldt det: a) at vurderingen i gennemsnit kun varede ni dage, fordi Kommissionen modtog vžsentlig dokumentation i de indledende stadier (fżr indsendelsen af den formelle ansżgning) b) at budgetfasen i gennemsnit kun varede otte dage, fordi Kommissionen sendte sit forslag til Europa-Parlamentet, samme dag som den traf sin principbeslutning c) at man i tilskudsbeslutningsfasen sparede meget tid, fordi begge parter underskrev aftalen samme dag. 
In these four cases: (a) the assessment lasted on average only nine days because significant documentation was provided to the Commission in the preliminary stages (before the formal application); (b) the budget phase lasted on average only eight days since the Commission sent the proposal to the Parliament on the same day that the decision in principle was taken; and (c) in the grant decision phase, a significant amount of time was saved by the signature of the agreement by both parties on the same day.
Retten undersżgte, om ansżgerne mente, at processens varighed havde haft en indvirkning p gennemfżrelsen af de udbedrende foranstaltninger. 
The Court examined whether the applicants considered that the duration of the process had had an impact on the implementation of remedial mesures.
Rundspżrget viste, at de fleste ansżgere ikke mente, at processens varighed havde haft nogen indvirkning p gennemfżrelsen af de udbedrende foranstaltninger. 
The survey revealed that most of the applicants considered that the duration of process had not had any effect on the implementation of remedial measures.
Det skyldes formentlig, at fonden primžrt anvendes til godtgżrelse af en lille del af de omkostninger, der fżlger af katastrofen (jf. diagram 1). 
This opinion is probably due to the fact that the Fund is mainly used for the reimbursement of a small part of the costs caused by the disaster (see Graph 1).
Diagram 1 Modtagerstaternes rundspżrgesvar om fondens indvirkning p gennemfżrelsen af de udbedrende foranstaltninger 
Graph 1 Survey based opinion of beneficiary states on the effect of the Fund on the implementation of remedial measures
18.6.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 153/9 Effektivitet 27. 
18.6.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 153/9 Efficiency 27.
Det er et krav, at fonden skal vžre effektiv. 
The Fund is required to be efficient.
Det er fastsat i forordningen, at Čde administrative procedurer skal justeres med dette for żje og begržnses til det absolut nżdvendigeÇ (1), uden at dette dog defineres nžrmere. 
The regulation stipulates that Ôadministrative procedures should be adjusted accordingly and confined to an absolute minimumŐ without defining the concept further (1).
Retten undersżgte de procedurer, som modtagerstaterne skal fżlge med hensyn til udbud, kontraktindgelse, gennemfżrelse, rapportering og revision. 
The Court reviewed the procedures that the beneficiary states are required to comply with in respect of tendering, contracting, implementing, reporting and auditing the grant.
Retten konkluderede, at kravene til fondens modtagerstater er mindre besvžrlige end kravene til de żvrige EU-fondes modtagerstater. 
The Court concluded that the requirements for beneficiary states of EUSF are less cumbersome than those receiving other EU funds.
Det kan derfor sluttes, at de administrative procedurer er begržnset til et niveau, som sikrer, at de er effektive for modtagerstaterne. 
It can therefore be considered that the administrative procedures have been reduced to a level which ensures that the procedures are efficient for beneficiary states.
Retten undersżgte de administrative procedurer i Kommissionen for at vurdere, om de var begržnset til et minimum. 
The Court reviewed the administrative procedures at the Commission to assess whether they were confined to a minimum.
Retten konkluderede, at s lžnge fonden har sin nuvžrende form (som en solidaritetsfond snarere end en nżdhjžlpsfond), er alle fem faser i de administrative procedurer nżdvendige, og ingen af dem kan undvžres. 
The Court concluded that within the current framework of the Fund (i.e. a solidarity and not an emergency fund) all the five phases of administrative procedures were necessary and none of them was redundant.
Kommissionen har ikke et regnskabssystem med data, som gżr det muligt at beregne fondens omkostninger, men Retten skżnner, at de gennemsnitlige direkte omkostninger ved forvaltningen af fonden er ca. 0,06 % (under 0,1 %) af de ydede belżb, jf. tabel 7. 
Despite the fact that the Commission does not have an accounting system providing data to calculate the costs of the Fund, the average direct cost of managing the Fund can be estimated to be around 0,06 % (or less than 0,1 %) of the amount granted as shown in Table 7.
Siden fondens oprettelse i 2002 har to personer haft det som deres faste opgave at forvalte fonden. 
Since the establishment of the Fund in 2002, two people have been permanently allocated to the task of managing the Fund services.
De tager sig af hele processen fra de indledende ansżgninger til afslutningen af stżtteinterventionerne. 
They deal with the process from the initiation of applications up to the closure of the aid.
I et forsżg p at beregne de samlede omkostninger ved Kommissionens forvaltning af fonden bad Retten bde Direktoratet for Ressourcer og Direktoratet for Revision om yderligere oplysninger om andre ansatte, der var beskžftiget med denne opgave, om hyppigheden af og omkostningerne ved tjenesterejser for operationelle enheder og revisionsenheder samt om andre administrationsomkostninger og omkostninger ved overvgning og kontrol p stedet. 
In an effort to calculate the total cost of managing the Fund by the Commission additional information was requested from both Human Resources and Audit Directorates on other personnel assigned to this task, mission frequency and cost by operational and audit units as well as other administrative, monitoring and control on-the-spot costs.
Der forel kun begržnsede oplysninger. 
Limited information was available.
For at fastsžtte et benchmark til brug ved sin vurdering foretog Retten derfor et skżn over alle de nžvnte omkostninger p rsbasis. 
So in order to create a ÔbenchmarkŐ for evaluation purposes, the Court calculated an estimate for all above costs on a yearly basis.
Det gav et gennemsnitligt rligt belżb p 170 000 euro. 
This sums up to an average annual amount of EUR 170 000.
Som det fremgr af tabel 7, er administrationsomkostningerne minimale i forhold til de belżb, der forvaltes. 
In Table 7 it can be seen that the administrative costs are minimal when compared to the amount managed.
I 2002, hvor der kun var fire sager at forvalte, svarede administrationsomkostningerne sledes kun til 0,02 % af den ydede stżtte. 
As an indication, in 2002, a year with only four cases to manage, the administrative costs represented 0,02 % of the aid granted.
Resultaterne af Rettens undersżgelse viser, at Kommissionen forvalter fonden effektivt. 
The CourtŐs findings indicate that the Commission manage the Fund in an efficient way.
(1) Betragtning 8 i forordning (EF) nr. 2012/2002. 
(1) Recital (8) of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.
Tabel 7 Fondens administrationsomkostninger og arbejdsmžngde pr. r 2002 2003 0,15 0,16 4 10 728 107 Rettens skżn over omkostningerne og GD for Regionalpolitik. 
Table 7 Administrative costs and workload of the Fund per year Year 2002 0,15 4 10 11 12 4 728 107 20 205 24 CourtŐs estimation of the costs and Regional Policy DG.
GD for Regionalpolitiks rlige administrationsomkostninger (millioner euro) Antal ansżgninger Kilde: 2004 2005 2006 0,17 0,18 0,19 11 12 4 Ydet stżtte (millioner euro) 20 205 24 Smidighed 32. 
Annual administrative costs of DG REGIO (million EUR) Number of applications Source: 0,16 0,17 0,18 0,19 Aid granted (million EUR) Year Year Year Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 Flexibility 32.
Ved smidighed forsts i denne analyse, at et system let kan tilpasses til andre anvendelser eller miljżer end dem, som det specifikt blev udformet til. 
In the context of this analysis flexibility is defined as the ease with which a system can be adjusted for use in applications or environments other than those for which it were specifically designed.
Fonden blev udformet med henblik p stżrre katastrofer. 
The Fund was designed for the major disasters.
Fonden skal give Fžllesskabet mulighed for at reagere smidigt p katastrofesituationer, men sžrlige tilfžlde skal behandles meget nżje (2). 
The Fund should enable the Community to respond flexibly to emergency situations, but exceptional cases must be treated with the utmost rigour (2).
Fondens smidighed m ikke fżre til overtrždelse af princippet om retfžrdig behandling. 
The flexibility of the Fund must not compromise the principle of equitable treatment.
Hvordan behandler fonden regionale katastrofer? 
How are regional disasters treated by the Fund?
Retten undersżgte fondens behandling af regionale og stżrre katastrofer og fokuserede p smidighed med udgangspunkt i princippet om retfžrdig behandling af ansżgningerne. En retfžrdig behandling indebžrer, at Kommissionen foretager en rimelig vurdering af de indsendte ansżgninger og anvender sammenhžngende og konsekvente kriterier for godkendelse eller afvisning af ansżgningerne. 
The Court reviewed the treatment of regional and major disasters. The analysis focused on ÔflexibilityŐ from the perspective of the equitable treatment of applications. This means the fair assessment of the requests submitted by the applicants and the use of coherent and consistent criteria by the Commission for the approval or rejection of applications.
Af de 18 ansżgninger, der blev afvist(3), vedrżrte 15 (83 %) regionale katastrofer. 
Of the 18 applications that were rejected (3), 15 (83 %) concerned regional disasters.
Grunden til de mange afvisnin-ger er, at definitionen af regionale katastrofer er temmelig uklar, (2) Artikel 2, stk. 2, i forordning (EF) nr. 2012/2002. 
The reason for this very high level of rejection is that the definition of regional disaster is rather (2) Article 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.
(3) Herunder to ansżgninger, der blev trukket tilbage. 
(3) Including two withdrawn applications.
C 153/10 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 18.6.2008 og at det er mere kompliceret at vurdere, om de giver ret til stżtte fra fonden. 
C 153/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.6.2008 vague and their eligibility for the Fund is more complex to assess.
I forbindelse med hver afvisning begrundede Kommissionen sin beslutning. 
Each rejection by the Commission is justified by a set of reasons.
De hyppigste rsager var: a) at ansżgningen blev indsendt for sent og/eller var ufuldstžndig b) at de anmeldte skader ikke berżrte stżrstedelen af befolkningen og ikke kunne klassificeres som en regional katastrofe c) at medlemsstaten havde angivet en forkert dato for katastrofens indtržffen. 
The main reasons that the Commission gave for rejection were: (a) applications were submitted late and/or were incomplete; (b) damage reported in the application did not affect a major part of the population and was not classified as regional disaster; (c) incorrect information about the date of the disaster given by Member States.
Retten hžvder ikke, at afviste sager skulle have vžret godkendt, men den bemžrker, at der i to sager er uklarhed om de anvendte kriterier eller i den begrundelse, der blev givet til medlemsstaten (jf. tekstboks 3). 
Whilst the Court does not claim that cases which have been rejected should have been accepted, it notes that there are two cases where there is a lack of clarity in the criteria applied or in the justification presented to the Member State (see Textbox 3).
Diagram 2 Ansżgernes mening om Kommissionens afvisningsgrunde Tekstboks 3 Stżttekriterier anvendt i forbindelse med regionale katastrofer Med hensyn til en ansżgning vedrżrende skovbrand, som blev afvist i 2005, angav Kommissionen som et af sine argumenter, at skovbran-den ikke havde berżrt stżrstedelen af befolkningen (jf. betingelserne i punkt 2). 
In one case the eligibility conditions as regards the level of population affected has not been applied as in equivalent cases. Graph 2 ApplicantsŐ opinion of CommissionŐs reason for rejection Textbox 3 Some eligibility criteria applied for regional disasters For one forest fire rejected in 2005 Ń the Commission alleged, as one argument, that it did not affect a major part of the population (see conditions in paragraph 2).
Dette argument blev imidlertid ikke brugt ved afvisningen af en lignende sag i 2003. 
However, it did not use the same argument to reject another similar case in 2003.
Tvžrtimod forklarede Kommissionen selv i sin EUSF-rsberetning for 2002-2003, hvorfor kriteriet ikke fandt anvendelse i netop den sag. 
On the contrary, the Commission itself explained in its annual EUSF report 2002-2003 why that condition was not applicable for this particular case even though the condition makes little sense for either of the rejected forest fire applications.
Det er imidlertid ikke et krav i forordningen, at fžllesskabsordningen skal anvendes. 
Activating this mechanism is, however, not a compulsory requirement under the Regulation.
Retten sammenholdt denne sag med en afvist oversvżmmelsessag i 2005, hvor Kommissionen ogs henviste til ordningen for civilbeskyttelse, men anfżrte, at dette element ikke var relevant i den pgžldende sag. 
This case was compared to another rejected flooding case in 2005, where the Commission also referred to the mechanism for Civil Protection, but then in this case stated that this element was not relevant.
Retten undersżgte, om de afviste ansżgere vedrżrende alle kategorier af katastrofer var enige i Kommissionens begrundelse for afvisning. 
The Court examined whether the applicants for all categories of disaster whose applications were rejected agreed with the CommissionŐs reasons for rejection.
Som det fremgr af diagram 2, viser rundspżrgets resultater, at 45 % af ansżgerne var enige i Kommissionens argumenter for at afvise deres ansżgning. 
The survey data indicates that 45 % of the applicants agreed with the CommissionŐs arguments for rejecting their application as shown in Graph 2.
Nr ansżgerne ikke var enige i Kommissionens argumenter, angav de fżlgende rsager: a) I en nżdsituation, hvor de umiddelbare behov prioriteres hżjest, er det umuligt for de berżrte regioner at efterkomme Kommissionens krav om forelžggelse af meget nżjagtige data inden for den meget korte tidsfrist. 
The rejected applicants did not agree with the CommissionŐs arguments for the following reasons: (a) the impossibility for the regions concerned to provide the data requested by the Commission to the level of accuracy requested and in a very short time period prescribed Ń in an emergency context in which priority is given to immediate needs;
18.6.2008 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 153/11 b) c) Det er somme tider vanskeligt at foretage en rent żkonomisk opgżrelse af den skade, der rammer befolkningen: I sm landkommuner er det for eksempel ikke kun beboernes ejendom, men ogs deres levevis og generelle livsbetingelser, der żdelžgges. 
18.6.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 153/11 (b) (c) it is sometimes difficult to quantify exclusively in economic terms the impact of damage to populations; for instance in small rural communes there is damage not just to property but to a way of life and general living conditions.
Anvendelse af fonden efter Čsžrlige kriterierÇ (regional katastrofe) er reglen snarere end undtagelsen (58 % af katastroferne var regionale). 
The mobilisation of the Fund under the Ôexceptional cri-terionŐ (regional) is the rule and not the exception (58 % of disasters were regional disasters).
Men det er uhyre vanskeligt at opfylde de nżdvendige betingelser og f godkendt en ansżgning efter reglerne for usždvanlige regionale katastrofer, som kržver, at sagerne skal behandles meget nżje. 
Moreover, the conditions for a successful application under the extraordinary regional disaster criterion which are required to be examined with the utmost rigour are extremely difficult to meet.
Derfor blev 83 % af ansżgningerne vedrżrende regionale katastrofer afvist efter en lžngere vur-deringsperiode. 
So 83 % of applications for regional disasters were rejected after a longer assessment period.
Afvisningerne skyldtes ikke, at der ikke var midler til rdighed, for fra oprettelsen i oktober 2002 til udgangen af 2006 har fonden kun ydet stżtte med et samlet belżb, der svarer til lidt mere end t rs budget. 
The rejections were not due to the non-availability of funds since from its creation in October 2002 up to the end of 2006 the Fund has granted aid for not much more than its budget for one year.
Er ansżgerne tilfredse med fonden? 
Are applicants satisfied with the Fund?
Alle de ansżgere, der besvarede Rettens spżrgeskema, var tilfredse med fonden. 
All applicants that have replied to the survey were satisfied with the Fund.
Isžr i de nye medlemsstater opfatter man fonden som et tegn p solidaritet og mener, at den bidrager til at give EU et positivt omdżmme. 
The Fund is perceived as a sign of solidarity, with a positive impact on public opinion, especially in the new Member States.