natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For at sikre dette supplerede Fžllesskabet den interne prisstżtte med et eksternt sluseprissystem. 
To achieve this end the Community supplemented the internal price-support system with an external sluice-gate system.
De interne priser blev beskyttet ved hjžlp af variable afgifter p import af korn fra tredjelande. 
Internal prices were protected by variable levies on imports of cereals from third countries.
Disse afgifter var baseret p tžrskelpriser, som blev fastsat p en sdan mde, at prisen p importeret korn i Fžllesskabets stżrste handelscentre kom til at ligge p et niveau, der var lidt hżjere end indikativpriserne, og forskellen mellem disse priser udgjorde grundlaget for det, der kaldes fžllessskabspržfe-rencen. 
These levies were based on threshold prices, which were fixed in such a way that the price of imported cereals at the Community major consumption centres were slightly above target prices, and the difference between these prices formed the basis of what is termed Community preference.
De variable importafgifter tilfżrtes fžllesskabsbudgettet som egne indtžgter. 
Variable import levies accrued to the Community budget as an own resource.
Overskud, der udgjorde en trussel for det indre marked, blev eksporteret, og eksportżrerne kunne f godtgjort forskellen mellem de hżjere interne markedspriser og de lavere salgspriser p markedet i et tredjeland. 
Surpluses threatening the internal market were exported and the exporters could be refunded the difference between the higher internal market price and the lower sale price obtained on a third countryŐs market.
Nr der blev mangel p forsyninger p det indre marked, kunne der imidlertid plžgges eksportafgifter for at hindre eksport, og/eller importafgifterne kunne sžttes ned, hvilket kun er sket en eller to gange i den fžlles markedsordnings historie. 
However, when internal market supplies fell short, export taxes could be used to discourage exports and/or levies on imports could be lowered, a situation which has occurred only twice in the history of the COM.
Sluseprissystemet skulle oprindeligt vžre selvfinansierende, dvs. at over en periode p flere r skulle indtžgterne fra importafgifterne džkke eksportrestitutionerne. 
The sluice-gate system was initially conceived as a self-financing system in the sense that receipts from import levies would cover export refunds over an average of several years.
Udviklingen p kornmarkedet 2.6. 
Evolution of the cereals market 2.6.
Da den fžlles markedsordning for korn blev indfżrt, var der kun seks medlemsstater, og en betragtelig del af EFŐs basislevneds-midler mtte importeres for at sikre befolkningen tilstržkkelige forsyninger. 
When the COM in cereals was introduced there were only six Member States and a substantial proportion of basic foodstuffs was imported to ensure an adequate supply to the EC population.
I 1968 importerede De Seks mere end 17 mio. ton korn og eksporterede 6,5 mio. ton, hvilket betżd et nettobehov p 10,5 mio. ton, eller at 10 % af Fžllesskabets efterspżrgsel p korn mtte džkkes gennem import. 
In 1968 the Six imported over 17 million tonnes of cereals and exported 6,5 million tonnes, which meant that a net requirement of 10,5 million tonnes, i.e. 10 % of the CommunityŐs cereal demand had to be covered by imports.
C 192/6 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 8.7.1999 2.7. 
C 192/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.7.1999 2.7.
Oliekriserne i 1973 og 1979 medfżrte verdensomspžndende inflation, og i midten af firserne forvžrredes situationen yderligere af de tilbagevendende underskud p USAŐs budget, og den monetžre ustabilitet, de to oliekriser havde fremkaldt, blev forstžrket. 
The oil crises in 1973 and 1979 led to worldwide inflation, and by the mid 1980s continuing US budgetary deficits aggravated the monetary instability caused by the two oil shocks.
P grund af inflationen blev de institutionelle priser (indikativ-, interventions-og tžrskelpriserne) forhżjet markant i flere omgange, og devalueringen af dollaren żgede yderligere forskellen mellem fžllesskabspriserne og markedspriserne p korn. 
Inflation led to a series of substantial increases in institutional prices (target, intervention and threshold) and the devaluation of the dollar further widened the gap between Community and world market prices for cereals.
De hżje stżttepriser gav landbrugerne et stžrkt incitament til at żge produktionen, mens Fžllesskabets forbrug ikke voksede i takt hermed. 
The high support prices provided a strong incentive to farmers to increase production, whereas Community consumption grew at a slower rate.
Kunstige afsžtningsmarkeder finansieret gennem interventionsopkżb eller hżje eksportrestitutionssatser gav et falsk billede af producenternes faktiske markedssituation. 
Artificial outlets, funded by intervention buying or high export-refund rates, gave a false picture of the real market situation for producers.
I 1980 blev det davžrende Fžllesskab bestende af ni medlemsstater sledes nettoeksportżr af korn (jf. tabel 1). 
Thus, in 1980 the Community of nine Member States as it was then, became a net exporter of cereals (see Table 1).
Fra og med 1981 blev produktionen ved med at vžre stżrre end det interne forbrug, importen faldt, og den stżttede eksport steg fortsat. 
From 1981 onwards, production remained higher than internal consumption, imports fell, and subsidised exports increased continuously.
Interventionslagrene blev ogs ved med at vokse. 
Intervention stocks also continued to grow.
Budgetudgifterne til afsžtning af overskudsproduktionen p det indre marked og i udlandet żgedes r for r. 
The disposal of surpluses on the internal market and abroad became increasingly expensive for the Community budget.
I anden halvdel af firserne forsżgte man at vende denne tendens ved at fastfryse eller sžnke de institutionelle priser og tržffe andre stabiliserende foranstaltninger (maksimale garantimžngder, medansvarsafgifter og en jordudtagningsordning (5)). 
Attempts to brake the upward trend in expenditure by freezing or decreasing institutional prices and taking other stabilising measures (maximum guaranteed quantities, coresponsibility levies and a set-aside scheme for taking land out of production (5)) were introduced in the second half of the 1980s.
Det lykkedes ikke med disse foranstaltninger at f nedsat produktionen og mindsket overskuddene vžsentligt, og budgetudgifterne (navnlig interventionsudgifter og eksportrestitutioner) holdt sig derfor fortsat p et hżjt niveau. 
All these measures failed to curb production and surpluses significantly and budgetary expenditure (mainly intervention costs and export refunds) therefore remained high.
Det agromonetžre system, som ved hjžlp af de grżnne kurser skulle beskytte landbrugspriserne mod stadigt hyppigere monetžr ustabilitet, fik priserne til at stige yderligere i de medlemsstater, hvis nationale valutaer faldt i vžrdi, og disse prisstigninger blev kun i begržnset omfang udlignet af prisfald i de medlemsstater, hvis nationale valutaer steg i vžrdi (6). 
The agrimonetary system which was supposed to protect agricultural prices by means of green rates against increasing monetary instability, further increased prices in Member States whose national currencies were undergoing depreciation and led to only small off-sets through price cuts in Member States whose national currencies were rising in value (6).
De relativt hżje interne priser gjorde det stadig attraktivt at żge produktionen, og voksende udbytter forvžrrede problemet med strukturelt betingede overskud. 
The incentives to increased production, caused by relatively high internal prices, remained strong, and increasing yields aggravated the problem of structural surpluses.
Prisstżtte i form af interventionsopkżb og beskyttelse mod korn fra tredjelande ved hjžlp af importafgifter, eksportrestitutioner og det agromonetžre system resulterede sledes i, at producenter og kornhandlere ikke skulle konkurrere p verdensmarkedet p de faktiske vilkr. 
Price support via intervention buying-in and outside protection provided by import levies, export refunds and the agrimonetary system thus managed to insulate cereal producers and traders from the reality of the world market.
Voksende selvforsyning, og i sidste ende kornoverskud, p det indre marked fżrte endvidere til lavere import, og en stadig stżrre del af eksportrestitutionerne kunne ikke džkkes af importafgifter. 
(6) See the CourtŐs Special Report No 1/89 on the agrimonetary system (OJ C 128, 24.5.1989, paragraph 6.13). market led to lower imports and an ever-increasing proportion of export refunds remained uncovered by import levies.
Endelig skulle forbrugerne finansiere systemet ved at betale kornpriser, der l et godt stykke over verdensmarkedspriserne, samtidig med at skatteydernes bidrag til džkning af eksportrestitutionerne ogs steg. 
Finally, not only did consumers have to fund the system by paying cereal prices well above world prices, but taxpayersŐ coverage of intervention and export refunds also increased.
Ved slutningen af produktionsret 1992/93 kulminerede udviklingen med, at 32,2 mio. ton korn, ca. 20 % af rets produktion, var lagt p interventionslagre (jf. tabel 1). 
At the end of the 1992/1993 marketing year, the situation culminated in 32,2 million tonnes of cereals, about 20 % of the yearŐs production, being in intervention warehouses (see Table 1).
Denne mžngde svarede til mere end fire mneders internt forbrug og kostede samme r skatteyderne 2 724 mio. ECU i lageromkostninger og nedskrivninger (jf. tabel 2). 
This tonnage represented more than four monthsŐ internal consumption and in the same year cost the taxpayer ECU 2 724 million in storage and depreciation (see Table 2).
I samme periode steg udgifterne til eksportrestitutioner ogs til 2 789 mio. ECU, mens de samlede afgifter p importerede landbrugsprodukter kun androg 1 000 mio. 
Over the same period export refunds also increased to ECU 2 789 million, while levies on all agricultural products imported amounted to no more than ECU 1 000 million.
Det blev sledes stadig vanskeligere at finansiere land-brugsbudgettet uden at overskride loftet i landbrugsretningslin-jen, som var blevet vedtaget i 1988 som et led i budgetdisciplinen. 
Thus, taking into account the constraints introduced by the agricultural guideline within the framework of budgetary discipline decided in 1988, it became increasingly difficult to finance the agricultural budget.
Stżrstedelen af disse stadigt stigende budgetudgifter kom ikke landbrugssektoren direkte til gode, men derimod lagerholdere og kornhandlere Ń og ofte var lagerholder og kornhandler n og samme virksomhed. 
Moreover, the bulk of this ever-increasing budgetary expenditure did not go directly to the farming sector, but to warehouse owners and grain traders Ń often comprising the same companies.
Landbrugssektoren nżd godt af et system, som kunstigt holdt de interne priser over verdensmarkedspriserne, og handelsselskaberne inkasserede de eksportrestitutioner og interventionsbetalinger, der var nżdvendige for at holde de interne priser p det fastlagte niveau. 
The farming sector benefited from a system which kept internal prices above world prices artificially, and trading companies collected the export refunds and intervention payments necessary to sustain internal prices.
Det sidste r fżr reformen androg disse udgifter 5 512,6 mio. ECU ud af et samlet budget for korn p 6 923,2 mio. 
In the last pre-reform year this expenditure amounted to ECU 5 512,6 million out of a total cereals budget of ECU 6 923,2 million.
Samtidig pressede Fžllesskabets handelspartnere p for at f landbrugsprodukter omfattet af den almindelige overenskomst om told og udenrigshandel (GATT), for at f bnet adgang for deres landbrugsprodukter til Fžllesskabets markeder og for gradvist at f ophžvet enhver stżtte, som direkte eller indirekte indvirkede p samhandelen. 
At the same time the CommunityŐs trade partners pushed for the inclusion of agricultural products in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the opening of Community markets for their agricultural products, and the phasing out of all subsidies that directly or indirectly affect trade.
REFORMEN 3.1. 
THE REFORM 3.1.
Den fžlles landbrugspolitik var kommet under pres fra to sider, internt p grund af budgetstramninger og eksternt i forbindelse med GATT-forhandlingerne under Uruguay-runden. 
Having come under pressure from two sides, i.e. internally, due to budget constraints, and externally, under the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the CAP had to be reformed and
(2) For 1997 forel der intet tal for den anvendelige produktion. 
(2) For 1997, the usable production figure was not available.
Der er i stedet anvendt produktionstal, som er lidt hżjere. 
It has been replaced by the production figure which is a little bigger.
(3) Det af GD VI anslede tal for 1996/97 og 1997/98. 
(3) Figure estimated by DG VI for 1996/1997 and 1997/1998.
(4) Slutlagre pr. 30. juni i hżstret beregnet p grundlag af differencen mellem de żvrige kolonner. : Oplysninger foreligger ikke. 
(4) Ending stocks as at 30 June of the marketing year. They are calculated per difference. na: non available.
NB: Fżr 1990/91 indgr der ikke tal for de nye tyske delstater i tallene for Fžllesskabet. 
NB: Before 1990/1991 the figures for the Community do not contain the figures for the New German Lnder.
Kilde: Eurostat, New Cronos (ajourfżrt september 1998). 
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos (up-date as at September 1998).
11,1 25,8 7,3 29,1 8,9 22,9 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 9,4 11,2 9,2 14,1 10,4 14,4 : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 11,1 23,0 15,3 23,8 16,7 24,1 17,0 17,4 20,8 16,7 21,8 13,4 30,5 10,6 26,1 17,1 24,2 13,8 24,4 12,2 25,1 14,4 98 % 100% 92 % 82 % 87 % 95 % 91 % 90 % Tabel 1 Samlet forsyningsbalance for korn, 1972/73-1997/98 (mio. ton) 
98 % 100% 92 % 82 % 87 % 95 % 91 % 90 % Table 1 Total cereals balance sheet, 1972/1973 to 1997/1998 (million tonnes)
Kilde: Kommissionens EUGFL-finansberetninger 1990-1997. 
Source: CommissionŐs financial reports from 1990 to 1997.
8.7.1999 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende C 192/9 mtte derfor žndres, og igen var kornsektoren et af de mest berżrte omrder. 
8.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 192/9 the cereals sector was, again, one of the areas most affected.
I begyndelsen af 1991 blev der fremlagt forslag om ČMac Sharry-reformenÇ (opkaldt efter den davžrende kommissžr med ansvar for landbrug) (7). 
In early 1991 the ÔMac Sharry reformŐ (named after the Commissioner responsible for agriculture at the time) was presented (7).
Problemerne og svaghederne ved den fžlles landbrugspolitik var velkendte, og det var derfor nemt nok at pege p, hvad mlene for en reform af kornsektoren skulle vžre. 
Given the awareness of the CAPŐs problems and failures up to that time, the objectives for a reform of the cereals sector were easily identified.
Der var imidlertid lange og vanskelige forhandlinger om, hvilke midler der skulle anvendes, og i maj 1992 vedtog Rdet endelig en reform, der var mindre gennemgribende end den, Kommissionen havde foreslet. 
The means, however, were the subject of lengthy and difficult discussion and in May 1992 the Council finally agreed to a less radical reform than the Commission had proposed.
I juni 1992 vedtog Rdet to grundforordninger, Rdets forordning (EŻF) nr.1765/92 og (EŻF) nr.1766/92 af 30. juni 1992 (8). 
In June 1992 the two basic Council Regulations (EEC) No 1765/92 and (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 were adopted (8).
Ved den fżrste blev der indfżrt en ny stżtteordning (hek-tarstżtte) for producenter af markafgrżder generelt (korn, oliefrż og proteinafgrżder, senere suppleret med hżrfrż), og den anden fornyede den fžlles markedsordning for korn. 
The first dealt with the creation of a new support system (area aid) for producers of arable crops in general (cereals, oilseeds and protein plants, later supplemented with linseed) and the second renewed the COM in cereals.
Der blev indfżrt en overgangsperiode fra produktionsret 1993/94 til udgangen af produktionsret 1995/96. 
A transitional period was introduced running from the 1993/1994 marketing year to that of 1995 to 1996, over which time the main features of the new COM were to be introduced.
I den fżlgende periode frem til 1999 skulle reformen kżre videre uden žndringer, og de žndringer, Kommissionen har foreslet i Agenda 2000, markerer afslutningen p denne periode. 
The subsequent period, up to 1999 was viewed as a ÔcruiseŐ period, and the modifications proposed in the CommissionŐs Agenda 2000 mark the end of this cruise period.
85 og 96. a) Forbedring af konkurrenceevnen: Dette ml skulle opfyldes ved, at den gennemsnitlige interventionspris i overgangsperioden gradvist skulle sžttes ned fra 155 ECU/ton (9) til 100 ECU/ton for samtlige kornarter. Lavere interventionspriser skulle medfżre lavere interne markedspriser. Dermed ville korn dyrket i Fžllesskabet blive mere konkurrencedygtigt p det indre marked i forhold til toldfrit importerede kornsubstitutter til dyrefoder (f.eks. maniok, majsgluten mv.), og samtidig ville fžllesskabskorn kunne sžlges p det eksterne marked med lavere eksportrestitutioner eller helt uden, eftersom den faktor, der var bestemmende for eksportrestitutionssatsernes niveau, nemlig forskellen mellem de internationale priser og de interne priser, ville blive mindre. 
The COM thus pursued the following main objectives through the introduction of specific measures: (a) the competitiveness objective: this was to be achieved over the transitional period by gradually decreasing the average intervention price from ECU 155/t (9) to ECU 100/t for all cereals mixed; lower intervention prices were supposed to lead to lower internal market prices; Community-grown cereals would thus be more competitive on the internal market in relation to duty-free imported substitutes used for animal feed (e.g. manioc, corn gluten, etc.); on the external market, cereals would be disposed of at lower or even no export refunds, since the difference between international and internal prices, which determines the rate of export refunds, would be reduced; (7) COM(91) 100 final of 1 February 1991.
EFT L 181 af 1.7.1992, s. 
(8) OJ L 181, 1.7.1992, p.
EFT L 181 af 1.7.1992, s. 
9 OJ L 181, 1.7.1992, p.
Fżr anvendelse af prisstabilisatoren for produktionsret 1991/92. c) (7) (8) 9 ( ) (10) 11 ( ) 
(10) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2079/92 of 30 June 1992 (OJ 11 L 215,30.7.1992 p.
C 192/10 DA De Europžiske Fžllesskabers Tidende 8.7.1999 3.5. 
C 192/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.7.1999 3.5.
(12) Aktuelle adgangskvoter er afgifts-eller toldindrżmmelser vedrżrende nžrmere bestemte produkter, som EF tidligere har indrżmmet en 13 ržkke lande. () Minimumadgangskvoter betyder, at der skal gives muligheder for, at 3 % og senere 5 % af det indenlandske forbrug skal kunne importeres til 36 % af basistoldsatsen. 
(12) Current access quotas are the transcription of levy or duty concessions which the EC has made in the past on certain products for 13 specified countries. () Minimum access quotas are import opportunities which must be opened at 36 % of the basic duty for the equivalent of 3 % rising to 5 % of internal consumption.
VIRKNINGERNE AF REFORMEN Kornbudgettet 4.1. 
EFFECTS OF THE REFORM The cereals budget 4.1.
Et af mlene for Mac Sharry-planen var at bremse stigningen i budgetudgifterne, og sigtet var, at budgetudgifterne i r 2000 skulle ligge under det niveau, man havde beregnet forud for reformen. 
The Mac Sharry plan included among its objectives the curbing of the growth of budgetary expenditure, i.e. the volume of expenditure incurred by the year 2000 was to be below the level forecasted prior to the reform.
Selv om budgetmlet ikke var nžvnt i de forordninger, hvorved Mac Sharry-reformen blev indfżrt, er der god grund til at undersżge, hvad reformen har kostet. 
Although the Regulations introducing the Mac Sharry reform made no reference to the budgetary objective, the question of the cost of the reform is legitimate.
Umiddelbart fżr reformen (1993) androg de samlede udgifter til korn 6 923,2 mio. ECU (jf. tabel 2). 
Just prior to the reform (1993) total expenditure on cereals amounted to ECU 6 923,2 million (see Table 2).
I de fire regnskabsr efter reformens indfżrelse fordobledes udgifterne til korn nžsten og steg i gennemsnit med 17,4 % om ret til 13 167,1 mio. ECU (1997). 
In the four financial years following the reform expenditure on cereals almost doubled growing by a yearly average of 17,4 % to ECU 13 167,1 million (1997).
For s vidt angr udgifternes sammensžtning, faldt eksportrestitutionernes og lagerom-kostningernes andel af de samlede udgifter til korn fra 79,6 % i 1993 til 4,2 % i 1997. 
With regard to the structure of expenditure, the proportion of total expenditure on cereals taken up by export refunds and storage costs fell from 79,6 % in 1993 to 4,2 % in 1997.
Til gengžld steg hektarstżttens andel fra 11,5 % til 93,7 % i den samme periode. 
On the other hand, the proportion of area-aid paid increased from 11,5 % to 93,7 % over the same period.
Som fremhžvet i Rettens rsberetning for regnskabsret 1996 (14) forventedes budgetudgifterne at stige i takt med, at landbrugsstżtten gradvist skulle betales af skatteyderne i stedet for af forbrugerne. 
As outlined in the CourtŐs Annual Report concerning the financial year 1996 (14), budgetary expenditure was expected to increase as the burden of farm support was gradually passed from the consumer to the taxpayer.
Kommissionen regnede faktisk med en udgiftsstigning p 4 003,8 mio. ECU (EU 12) i perioden 1993-1997 (jf. tabel 3). 
Indeed, the Commission forecast an expenditure increase of ECU 4 003,8 million (EU 12) between 1993 and 1997 (see Table 3).
De endelige omkostninger oversteg imidlertid de anslede omkostninger med ca. 2 240 mio. 
However, the final cost outstripped the forecast by about ECU 2 240 million.
Differencen mellem resultatet og budgetoverslagene skyldes, at nogle omkostningselementer var stżrre end anslet. 
The difference between the outturn and budget estimates is due to the fact that some cost elements were higher than estimated.
Stigningen i hektarstżtten skyldes dels agromonetžre reguleringer, dels at der senere blev medregnet anden ensilage end majsensilage, samt hżjere pržmie for jordudtagning, og stżrre basisarealer og udbytter (15) (jf. 
Agrimonetary adjustments, the later inclusion of aid for silage other than that of maize, a higher premium for set-aside, higher base areas and yields (15) and the increase in the area eligible for special aid in respect of durum wheat (16) explain the increase in area aid.
Til gengžld androg eksportrestitutioner og lageromkostninger i perioden 1994-1997 et mindre belżb end forventet som fżlge af hżje internationale priser. 
On the other hand, export refunds and storage costs amounted to less than expected during the period 1994 to 1997 as a result of high international prices.
De hżje priser gjorde det muligt for Kommissionen at f en del af vžrdiforringelsen džkket ind ved at sžlge ud af korn fra tidligere nedskrevne interventionslagre. 
These high prices enabled the Commission to recover some depreciation costs by selling off previously devalued intervention cereals.
14 (15) EFT C 348 af 13.11.1997, punkt 3.5-3.8. () Revisionsrettens rsberetning for regnskabsret 1996, EFT C 348 af 16 13.11.1997, punkt 3.6. () Revisionsrettens rsberetning for regnskabsret 1997, EFT C 349 af 17.11.1998, kapitel 2, del 2. 
14 (15) OJ C 348, 13.11.1997, paragraphs 3.5 to 3.8. () The Court of AuditorsŐ Annual Report concerning the financial year 16 1996 (OJ C 348, 13.11.1997, paragraph 3.6). () The Court of AuditorsŐ Annual Report concerning the financial year 1997 (OJ C 349, 17.11.1998, Chapter 2, Title 2).