natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(50) Artikel 20 i Rdets direktiv 90/425/EŻF (51) ANIMO-nettet blev etableret i 1990, efter at veterinžrkontrollen inden for Unionen var blevet ophžvet. 
(50) Directive 90/425/EEC, article 20. (51) The ANIMO system was introduced in 1990 following the abolition of veterinary controls within the Union.
Det omfatter alle dyr (ikke kun kvžg) og animalske produkter. 
It concerns all animals (not just cattle) and animal products.
Systemet er baseret p, at vete-rinžrenheden p afsendelsesstedet sender en meddelelse til veteri-nžrenheden p bestemmelsesstedet. 
The system is based on the sending of messages from the veterinary unit of origin to the unit of destination.
I disse meddelelser anfżres kun det samlede antal dyr pr. kategori, som er blevet flyttet, og ikke dyrenes individuelle identifikation. 
The messages give only the total number of animals per category being moved, without mentioning the individual identifications of the animals.
(52) Kommissionens beslutning 91/637/EŻF af 3. december 1991 om modellen for de meddelelser, der skal fremsendes via edb-nettet ANIMO (EFT L 343 af 13.12.1991, s. 
(52) Commission Decision 91/637/EEC of 3 December 1991 establishing the model for the message to be transmitted by means of the computerised network ŐANIMOŐ (OJ L 343, 13.12.1991, p.
(53) Sžrberetning nr. 1/2000, punkt 29. 
(53) Special Report No 1/2000 concerning classical swine fever, paragraph 29.
Under krisen i 2001, efter at det fżrste udbrud i Det Forenede Kongerige var blevet bekržftet, havde de żvrige medlemsstater netop brug for at finde frem til de fr, der i mnederne forinden var blevet importeret fra dette land, s de kunne forstžrke overvgningen af dyrene, som var potentielle smittebžrere. 
During the 2001 crisis, following the confirmation of the first outbreak in the United Kingdom, the other Member States did indeed need to trace the sheep that they had imported from that country over the previous month, in order to be able to increase surveillance of animals that were potentially carrying the virus.
Det var af altafgżrende betydning at kende oprindelsesbedriften og transitstederne. 
It was crucial to know the holding of origin of the animals and the transit points.
Men ANIMO-meddelelserne giver stadig ikke disse helt nżdvendige oplysninger. 
However, the ANIMO messages did not always contain this essential information.
Under krisen i 2001 sinkede begge disse mangler lokaliseringen og nedslagningen af dyr, man havde mistanke om, kunne vžre smittede (jf. indrammet tekst nr. 
During the 2001 crisis these two omissions caused delays in locating and slaughtering animals suspected of being contaminated (see Box 2).
Den nederlandske land-brugsminister pržciserede over for Retten, at bekžmpelsen af sygdommen Ń navnlig i den kritiske indledende fase af krisen Ń kunne have vžret meget mere effektiv, hvis det havde vžret obligatorisk af anfżre transitstederne. 
The ministry of agriculture in the Netherlands told the Court that compulsory details of transit points would have made control of the disease much more effective, especially during the critical initial phase of the crisis.
Indrammet tekst nr. 2 De problemer med sporing af dyrene, som Retten konstaterede Under krisen havde myndighederne i Det Forenede Kongerige problemer med at finde frem til, om de fr, der var eksporteret til de andre medlemsstater, stammede fra en kontamineret bedrift, fordi ANIMO-meddelelserne ikke indeholdt oplysninger om oprindelsesbedriften. 
Box 2 Court identified problems with tracing animals During the crisis the authorities in the United Kingdom experienced problems in tracing the farms of origin for sheep exported to other Member States and determining whether the sheep were from contaminated farms, because that information was not given in the ANIMO messages.
Efter at det var bekržftet, at en oprindelsesbedrift var kontamineret, tog det myndighederne fra 6 til 16 dage at finde frem til de fr, der var eksporteret derfra. 
It was only possible for them to establish the link after an interval of between six and sixteen days after confirmation that the farms of origin were contaminated.
De kunne derfor ikke i tide advare de medlemsstater, der havde importeret frene, om risikoen for smitte. 
On account of this they were not able to give Member States that had imported sheep timely warning of the risk of infection.
Da bestemmelsesmedlemsstaterne ikke havde de fornżdne oplysninger, mtte de foretage forebyggende nedslagning af alle de fr, der var importeret fra Det Forenede Kongerige, og som de havde kunnet identificere, eftersom de ikke var i stand til at udskille de fr, man havde mistanke om, kunne vžre smittede. 
Due to the lack of adequate information the Member States of destination had to carry out preventive culling of all sheep identified as having been imported from the United Kingdom, as it was impossible to differentiate between suspect sheep and others.
Frenes manglende sporbarhed har vist, hvor svžrt det var for den kompetente myndighed i Frankrig at finde frem til de franske bedrifter, som var det endelige bestemmelsessted for de fr, der var importeret fra Det Forenede Kongerige. 
The absence of a trail for the sheep was evidence of the difficulties experienced by the responsible authorities in France in tracing the French farms that were the ultimate destination of sheep imported from the United Kingdom.
Hertil kommer, at man i ministeriet ikke var sikre p, at man havde fet aflivet samtlige importerede dyr, og at der derfor fortsat kunne vžre risiko for smitte. 
Furthermore, the ministry was not sure that all the imported sheep had been slaughtered, which meant that there was still a potential risk of contamination.
I Nederlandene bevirkede den manglende angivelse af transitstederne i ANIMO-meddelelserne, at der gik en hel dag, fżr de nederlandske myndigheder fik sporet de dyr, der stammede fra Irland. 
In the Netherlands, because of the absence of details of transit points in the ANIMO messages, it took a day to trace animals from Ireland.
Mellemstationen, hvor disse dyr havde opholdt sig i transit, befandt sig i nžrheden af den bedrift i Frankrig (Mayenne), hvor der tre uger senere udbrżd mund-og klovesyge som fżlge af import af smittede britiske fr. 
The animals had transited via a stopping point close to the farm in France (Mayenne) which, three weeks later, was found to be the site of an outbreak, following the importation of infected British sheep.
Den tid, det tog at finde frem til dokumenterne, forsinkede beskyttelsesforanstaltningerne. 
The time taken to find the documents delayed precautionary action.
Restriktionerne med hensyn til flytning af dyr over hele en medlemsstats omrde 42. 
Restrictions on animal movements throughout Member StatesŐ territories 42.
For at begržnse risikoen for, at en epizooti skal brede sig, fastsžtter direktiv 85/511/EŻF, at der straks skal sżrges for, at dyrene holdes inden for en beskyttelses-og overvgningszone med en radius p mindst 10 km, som oprettes omkring de syg-domsramte bedrifter. 
Directive 85/511/EEC requires immediate imposition of restrictions on animal movements in protection and surveillance areas of a minimum radius of 10 km around infected farms, in order to limit the risks of an epidemic spreading.
Disse foranstaltninger blev truffet i Det Forenede Kongerige, men i betragtning af, at smitten allerede var meget udbredt, endnu fżr det fżrste udbrud var konstateret, var de ikke i sig selv tilstržkkelige til at hindre epizootien i at brede sig. 
These measures were implemented in the United Kingdom, but the restrictions alone could not contain the spread of the epidemic in view of the extent of contamination before the first outbreak had even been detected.
3.3.2005 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 54/15 43. 
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/15 43.
Det Forenede Kongerige forbżd fżrst flytning af dyr over hele landets omrde tre dage efter, at epidemien officielt var blevet bekržftet. 
In the United Kingdom a nationwide ban on animal movements was not introduced until three days after the epidemic had been officially confirmed.
Kommissionen vedtog p grundlag af bestemmelserne i artikel 10, stk. 4, i direktiv 90/425/EŻF, beslutning 2001/190/EF, som forbyder flytning af dyr i andre medlemsstater end Det Forenede Kongerige. 
On the basis of Article 10(4) of Directive 90/425/EEC the Commission, for its part, adopted Decision 2001/190/EC, banning movements of animals in Member States other than the United Kingdom.
I den tid, der gik, fra det fżrste udbrud var bekržftet og til flytninger af dyr i Det Forenede Kongerige blev forbudt, skulle mere end 62 bedrifter ifżlge rapporten fra National Audit Office vžre blevet smittet i syv andre regioner (54). Ifżlge epidemiologiske eksperter betżd dette, at epidemiens omfang og dermed omkostningerne forbundet med den blev mere end fordoblet i forhold til, hvad der ville have vžret tilfžldet, hvis restriktionerne var blevet vedtaget samme dag, som sygdommen var blevet bekržftet (55). 
According to the NAO report, another 62 premises were believed to have been infected in seven other counties in the interval between confirmation of the first outbreak and the introduction of the ban on livestock movements in the United Kingdom (54), with an increase in the scale of the epidemic (and, therefore, its cost) which university epidemiologists estimated to be twice what it would have been had restrictions been imposed on the same day that the disease was confirmed (55).
KOMMISSIONENS AKTION UNDER KRISEN Kommissionens overvgning var effektiv 44. 
COMMISSION ACTION DURING THE CRISIS Effective supervision by the Commission 44.
Under krisen stod Kommissionens tjenester til rdighed 24 timer i dżgnet. 
Commission staff were available 24 hours a day throughout the crisis.
Kommissionen kunne hurtigt tržffe de nżdvendige nżdforanstaltninger, som f.eks. underretning af medlemsstaterne, overvgning, herunder nedslagning af fr, der var importeret fżr krisens udbrud, lukning af markeder mv. 
The Commission was able to take the necessary emergency measures promptly by, for example, notifying Member States of the existence of the disease, carrying out surveillance measures which included the slaughter of sheep imported before the crisis started, closing markets, etc.
Mange af de beslutninger, Kommissionen traf p veterinžromrdet under krisen, blev af medlemsstaterne bedżmt som hurtige og hensigtsmžssige. 
Many of the decisions taken by the Commission in the veterinary area during the crisis were deemed by the Member States to have been timely and appropriate.
En sammenligning mellem datoerne for Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontorets inspektioner og de opstede kriser viser, at det, nr der er tale om selve kriserne, er lykkedes kontoret at foretage sine inspektioner p det rigtige tidspunkt, ogs selv om det har betydet, at det har mttet udskyde andre planlagte inspektioner til et senere tidspunkt. 
Comparisons of the dates of inspections carried out by the HVO and crises arising show that, as far as the crisis itself was concerned, the HVO succeeded in carrying out inspections at the opportune time, even if it meant postponing other planned visits to later dates.
Under krisen anvendte kontoret hasteprocedurer, og beretningerne fra inspektionsbesżgene udarbejdet under hensyntagen til kommentarerne fra de andre afdelinger i Generaldirektoratet for Sundhed og Forbrugerbeskyttelse samt medlemsstaternes svar forel efter to mneder. 
Normal procedures were speeded up during the crisis and HVO inspection reports were available within two months of its consideration of the comments of other departments of the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection and the replies from Member States.
Svagheder i bekžmpelsesordningen og i medlemsstaternes anvendelse af den 46. 
Deficiencies in control arrangements and in the implementation of them in the Member States 46.
Men nogle af de svagheder ved bekžmpelsesordningen, som Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret havde konstateret i Det Forenede Kongerige, som var det land, der var hrdest ramt (54) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, punkt 1.8: ČBetween confirmation and a national movement ban being imposed on 23 February another 62 premises are believed to have been infected.Ç (55) Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be learned Inquiry, Dr. Iain Anderson, som citerer Professeur Woolhouse fra Edin-burghs universitet, s. 
Some deficiencies which the HVO had found in the control arrangements in the United Kingdom (the country most affected by the crisis) could not, however, be dealt with promptly, (54) See The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, p. 14, paragraph 1.8, ÔBetween confirmation and a national movement ban being imposed on 23 February another 62 premises are believed to have been infectedŐ. (55) Foot-and-Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report, Dr Iain Anderson quoting Professor Woolhouse of Edinburgh University, p.
60. af krisen, kunne ikke afhjžlpes i tide, fordi de kržvede, at Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne foretog en tilbundsgende revision af de pgžldende foranstaltninger. 
60. because they required fundamental revision of the measures in question by the Commission and the Member States.
Der er isžr tale om: a) et betydeligt underskud af embedsdyrlžger b) at bekžmpelsesordningens effektivitet afhžnger af, om producenterne straks anmelder sygdommen c) der i nogle tilfžlde gr uacceptabelt lang tid, fżr dyr, man har mistanke om kan vžre smittede, identificeres, sygdommen bekržftes, og dyrene aflives og destrueres (56). 
The main ones are: (a) a significant shortage of government vets, (b) the effectiveness of the control arrangements relied on farmers notifying the disease immediately, (c) in some cases, unacceptable delays in identifying suspected cases, confirming them and slaughtering and disposing of the animals in question (56).
Under revisionen konstaterede Retten ogs de samme svagheder, som dem Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret havde konstateret. 
During the audit the Court also identified shortcomings similar to those found by the HVO.
Fžrre embedsdyrlžger 48. 
Reduced veterinary services 48.
I beretningen fra 1989 havde Kommissionen vurderet (57), at strategien med at g vžk fra profylaktisk vaccination kun kunne lykkes, hvis der var et effektivt offentligt veterinžrtil-syn. 
In its 1989 report the Commission said (57) that the success of abandoning preventive vaccination depended on the availability of a finely-tuned system of government veterinary supervision.
Men selv om Rdet har indfżrt en ržkke sygdomskontroller, som er berettigede til fžllesskabsstżtte, er der ikke afsat fžllesskabsmidler til veterinžrkontrol af ikke-endemiske sygdomme, og dermed er mund-og klovesyge ikke omfattet heraf. 
Although the Council instituted a series of disease controls that qualified for Community funding, there was no Community funding for veterinary controls on non-endemic diseases, and FMD was, therefore, excluded.
Efter krisen i 2001, som havde vist, at der generelt var blevet fžrre embedsdyrlžger, rejste Europa-Parlamentet (58) og den internationale konference i december 2001 (59) spżrgsmlet om epidemiologisk overvgning af husdyrbestanden og finansiering heraf som et effektivt middel til forebyggelse af sygdommen. 
After the 2001 crisis, which brought to light the general decrease in the number of government vets, the European Parliament (58) and the international conference in December 2001 (59) raised the question of epidemiological monitoring of livestock and the funding of it as an effective means of preventing the disease.
Dette spżrgsml, som faktisk vedrżrer alle epizootier, er endnu ikke blevet behandlet tilfredsstillende p fžllesskabsniveau. 
As yet there has been no Community-level response to this question which, in actual fact, concerns all animal diseases.
(56) Jf. konklusionerne i Levnedsmiddel og Veterinžrkontorets endelige beretning fra inspektionsbesżget i Det Forenede Kongerige 12. til 16. marts 2001: ČIn some cases, there had been unacceptable delays in dealing with infected premises, from the identification of suspect disease, through to its confirmation, and the slaughter and disposal of animals. 
(56) See the conclusions in the HVOŐs final report following its inspection in the United Kingdom from 12 to 16 March 2001: ÔIn some cases, there had been unacceptable delays in dealing with infected premises, from the identification of suspect disease, through to its confirmation, and the slaughter and disposal of animals.
These have not only led to an increased risk of spread of the disease, but also undermined public confidence in the slaughter programme.Ç (57) Rapport om medlemsstaternes aktuelle politik med hensyn til bekžmpelse af mund-og klovesyge, punkt 4.10. 
These have not only led to an increased risk of spread of the disease, but also undermined public confidence in the slaughter programme.Ő (57) Report on the policies of the Member States in the control of foot-and-mouth disease, paragraph 4.10.
(58) Europa-Parlamentets betžnkning 2002/2153 om bekžmpelse af mund-og klovesyge i Den Europžiske Union og om fremtidige pržventive foranstaltninger til forebyggelse og bekžmpelse af dyresygdomme i Den Europžiske Union (A5-0405/2002), punkt 99 og 100. 
(58) European Parliament, Resolution 2002/2153, on foot-and-mouth disease-lessons to be learmed and proposals for the future (A5-0405/2002), paragraphs 99 and 100.
(59) International konference om kontrol med og forebyggelse af mund-og klovesyge, Bruxelles, den 12. og 13. december 2001, endelig rapport, konklusioner og henstillinger, punkt 3.1. 
(59) International Conference on Control and Prevention of Foot-and-mouth disease, Brussels 12 and 13 December 2001, Final Report, paragraph 3.1 of the conclusions and recommendations.
C 54/16 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 3.3.2005 49. 
C 54/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 49.
I Cumbria, som var den region, der var hrdest ramt af mund-og klovesyge, og som har fire millioner fr, mere end 880 000 stykker kvžg og 170 000 svin, var antallet af embedsdyrlžger faldet fra 27 i 1967 til kun ni i 2001 (60). 
Cumbria was the region most affected by FMD and has four million sheep, more than 880 000 cattle and 170 000 pigs. In that region the number of government vets went down from 27 in 1967 to only nine in 2001 (60).
Statistikkerne (61) viser, at der i Det Forenede Kongerige var 9,5 embedsdyrlžger for hver million dyr (kvžg, fr og svin) mod et gennemsnit p mere end 20 embedsdyrlžger pr. million dyr i de andre medlemsstater. 
Statistics show (61) that the United Kingdom had 9,5 government vets per million animals (cattle, sheep and pigs), compared with an average of more than 20 vets per million animals for the other Member States.
De fžrre embedsdyrlžger og den tid, der gik, fżr der blev ansat ekstra personale (62), bevirkede, at foranstaltningerne til bekžmpelse af epidemien blev vžsentligt mindre effektive. 
Due to the reduction in the number of government vets in the United Kingdom and the delay in calling up additional manpower (62), the effectiveness of measures to control the epidemic was significantly reduced.
NAO konstaterede (63), at indtil april 2001, blev der ansat fžrre nye embedsdyrlžger under krisen, end der var udbrud, hvilket forklarer, hvorfor der gik s lang tid, fżr dyrene blev aflivet (jf. punkt 57 og 58 og indrammet tekst nr. 3). 
The NAO noted (63) that until April 2001 the increase in the number of government vets employed in the United Kingdom during the crisis lagged behind the increase in the number of infected premises. Hence the culling delays described in paragraphs 57 and 58 and Box 3.
Efter fžllesskabsreglerne skal ejeren af dyrene anmelde sygdommen til tilsynsmyn-digheden, og medlemsstaten skal anmelde den til Kommissionen. 
The aim of the Community regulations is to ensure both that farmers notify the disease to the responsible supervisory authority and, similarly, that the Member State notifies it to the Commission.
For s vidt angr den fżrste af disse anmeldelser, er det medlemsstaterne selv, som i henhold til direktiv 85/511/EŻF skal sżrge for, at de straks underrettes om tilfžlde af mund-og klovesyge eller mistanke herom. 
In the first case Directive 85/511/EEC requires Member States to ensure that they are notified of any suspected or actual cases of FMD immediately.
Om Fžllesskabets foranstaltninger til bekžmpelse af mund-og klovesyge konkret kan lykkes, afhžnger for en stor dels vedkommende af ejerne selv, eftersom de er de fżrste, der kan konstatere dyrenes fysiske tilstand og anmelde eventuelle sygdomme, men paradoksalt nok var det ikke fastsat i fžllesskabsbestemmelserne, at medlemsstaterne skulle involvere producenterne i bekžmpelsesordningen, hżre dem om beredskabs-planerne, informere dem om arten af de forskellige epizootier, og om hvilke foranstaltninger der straks skal tržffes, og ansvarliggżre dem eller p anden mde anspore dem til hurtigt at anmelde sygdommen. 
Paradoxically, although the success of Community control of FMD actually relies substantially on farmers themselves, as they are the first people able to note the physical condition of their livestock and to notify any diseases in the herd, the Community regulations did not require Member States to involve farmers in disease control, consult them over contingency plans, provide them with information about the nature of different animal diseases and immediate action to be taken, make them aware of their responsibilities or encourage them by some other means to notify the disease quickly.
I 2001 informerede den producent, hvis bedrift eksperterne fra det nationale referencelaboratorium p grundlag af en detaljeret epidemiologisk undersżgelse betragtede som det sted, hvor epizootien brżd ud, ikke den kompetente myndighed i Det (60) Inquiry into Infectious Diseases in Livestock, The Royal Society, inspektionsbesżg i Cumbria og Galloway, 1. og 2. november 2001. 
Following a detailed epidemiological enquiry national reference laboratory experts took the view that a certain livestock unit was the origin of the 2001 epidemic, but it had not informed (60) Inquiry into Infectious Diseases in Livestock, The Royal Society, visits to Cumbria and Galloway 1 and 2 November 2001.
(61) Eurostat og Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, r 2000. 
(61) Eurostat and Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, year 2000.
(62) Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be learned Inquiry, afdeling 9.2, 9.7 og 9.8. 
(62) Foot-and-Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry, Dr Iain Anderson, sections 9.2, 9.7 and 9.8.
(63) Report on the 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, punkt 3.37, 14. juni 2002, National Audit Office, Det Forenede Kongerige. 
(63) The 2001 outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, National Audit Office, United Kingdom, 14 June 2002, p.
Sygdommen blev opdaget i en anden region ca. en mned efter, at den var brudt ud, selv om det senere er anslet, at 57 bedrifter p det tidspunkt allerede var smittet(64). 
The disease was detected approximately one month after its appearance in another region, by which time, according to estimates made since then, there were already 57 contaminated holdings (64).
Men i mellemtiden (mellem 1. februar og 21. februar 2001) var 49 796 dyr blevet eksporteret til de andre medlemsstater, hvorved risikoen for, at epizootien skulle brede sig ud over Det Forenede Kongeriges gržnser, żgedes. 
In the meantime (between 1 February 2001 and 21 February 2001), however, 49 796 head of livestock had been exported to the other Member States, increasing the risk of the epidemic spreading beyond the frontiers of the United Kingdom.
For s vidt angr medlemsstatens anmeldelse af sygdommen til Kommissionen og til de andre medlemsstater, var det af altafgżrende betydning under krisen, at disse modtog anmeldelsen s tidligt som muligt, s de kunne tržffe de nżdvendige foranstaltninger. 
As regards the Member StateŐs notification to the Commission and the other Member States, it was essential that the latter be notified as early as possible during the crisis, so that they could take the necessary precautions.