natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Der havde godt nok vžret tre epizootier med mere end tyve udbrud (det hżjest mulige antal ifżlge Kommissionens scenario), men der havde kun vžret fire epizootier p otte r (mod tretten epizootier p ti r ifżlge det samme scenario). 
There had, in fact, been three epidemics that involved more than 20 outbreaks (the maximum possible in the scenario used by the Commission), but on the other hand, there had only been four crises in eight years (compared with thirteen in ten years according to the same scenario).
Til gengžld var visse risici for indslžbning og spredning af virus blevet stżrre siden 1993: Trans-porten af dyr var żget (24) med gennemfżrelsen af det indre marked, antallet af slagterier var faldet (25), hvilket betżd, at flere dyr samledes p t sted med żget risiko for smitte til fżlge, mens belžgningsgraden p bedrifterne, navnlig for s vidt angr fr, geder og svin, var żget (26). 
On the other hand, a number of risks conducive to the spread of the virus had increased since 1993: the number of livestock movements had increased (24) with the completion of the single market, the number of abattoirs had fallen (25), leading to increased concentrations of animals and an enhanced risk of infection, while stocking densities, particularly of sheep, goats and pigs, had soared (26).
Allerede i februar 1998 gjorde FAO (27) de 33 medlemsstater i Den Europžiske Kommission for Bekžmpelse af Mund-og Klovesyge opmžrksom p, at transport af dyr over lange afstande og den deraf fżlgende stigende belžg-ningsgrad nr som helst ville kunne f nye og żdelžggende epizootier til at bryde ud i Europa (28). 
In February 1998 the FAO (27) drew the attention of the 33 Member States of the European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease to the fact that, at any time, ÔEurope may face further devastating animal disease epidemics due to long-distance transport of animals and increasingly dense livestock unitsŐ (28).
(24) For kvžg er der tale om, at tre millioner dyr flyttes om ret. 
(24) In the case of cattle, there are movements involving around three million head per year.
(25) Antallet af slagterier i Det Forenede Kongerige var faldet fra 1 400 i 1990 til 400 i 1999. 
(25) The number of abattoirs in the United Kingdom fell from 1 400 in 1990 to 400 in 1999.
(26) Mellem 1987 og 1997 var belžgningsgraden for svin p bedrifterne mere end tredoblet i Irland, og den var żget med mere end 50 % i Nederlandene, i Det Forenede Kongerige og i Frankrig. 
(26) Between 1987 and 1997 the density of pigs per farm had more than tripled in Ireland, and increased by more than 50 % in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France.
Belžgningsgraden for fr p bedrifterne var ligeledes żget betydeligt i Spanien, Irland og sžrlig i Det Forenede Kongerige, hvor den var p nžsten 500 dyr pr. bedrift, hvilket er mere end fire gange s mange som gennemsnittet i Unionen (137,9 dyr pr. bedrift). 
The density of sheep per holding had also increased substantially in Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom in particular, where it reached almost 500 head per holding, four times higher than the average density for the Union (137,9 head per holding).
Belžgningsgraden for geder p bedrifterne var ogs żget i lżbet af perioden, navnlig i Gržkenland, Spanien, Frankrig, Italien og Nederlandene (Structure des exploitations agricoles Rsultats historiques-Enqutes de 1966/1967  1997-Version finale: oktober 2000 Eurostat, s. 
The stocking density for goats increased likewise over the period, especially in Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands. (Structure of agricultural holdings Historic results Ń Surveys from 1966/1967 to 1997 Ń Final version: October 2000 Eurostat, p.
88, 89 og 92). 
88, 89 and 92).
(27) De Forenede Nationers Levnedsmiddel-og Landbrugsorganisation (Food and Agriculture Organization). 
(27) United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.
(28) Pressemeddelelse fra FAO, 98/05. 
(28) FAO press release 98/05.
C 54/10 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 3.3.2005 19. 
C 54/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 19.
Hertil kom, at svinepestepidemien i 1997/1998 havde medfżrt vžsentlige omkostninger for Fžllesskabet (29), medlemsstaterne og producenterne. 
Moreover, the swine fever epidemic in 1997/1998 had generated significant costs for the Community (29), Member States and producers.
I lyset af denne erfaring havde Kommissionen selv fundet foranstaltningerne i direktiv 85/511/EŻF mod mund-og klovesyge ufuldstžndige (30). 
In the light of that experience, the Commission itself judged the anti-FMD measures provided for in Directive 85/511/EEC incomplete (30).
P grundlag af eksperternes udtalelser havde Kommissionens tjenester derfor pbegyndt en revision af direktivet, da epizootien i Det Forenede Kongerige den 20. februar 2001 afbrżd deres arbejde. 
Based on expert opinion the Commission then began to revise the Directive, but its work was interrupted when the disease broke out in the United Kingdom on 20 February 2001.
Efter at den nye strategi blev vedtaget i 1990, har Kommissionen ikke foretaget en udtżmmende evaluering. 
The strategy has not been fully evaluated by the Commission since its adoption in 1990.
Endvidere har Kommissionen ikke hvert tredje r forelagt en rapport for Rdet og Europa-Parlamentet om betingelserne for gennemfżrelsen af beslutning 90/424/EŻF vedrżrende EF-foranstaltningerne til udryddelse af sygdommen og det finansielle tilskud, der ydes hertil (31). 
Furthermore, the Commission has not submitted a report to the Council and the Parliament every three years on the conditions of application of Decision 90/424/EEC concerning Community eradication measures and the financial aid granted for that purpose (31).
Den har heller ikke ajourfżrt den undersżgelse, som Generaldirektoratet for Landbrug udarbejdede i 1992 om veterinžrtjenesterne i medlemsstaterne, selv om en ajourfżring af denne ville have givet den mulighed for at kontrollere, om disse tjenester var tilstržkkelige til at sikre, at strategien kunne gennemfżres (jf. punkt 48 og 49). Kommissionens overvgning var p visse punkter utilstržkkelig, og bestemmelserne var ufuldstžndige og blev ikke suppleret i tide 21. 
Neither has it updated the study of Member StatesŐ veterinary services carried out by the Directorate-General for Agriculture in 1992, even though the updated study would have enabled it to check whether they were in an adequate state to ensure that the strategy succeeded (see paragraphs 48 to 49) Commission supervision was insufficient in some respects and deficiencies in the regulations were not remedied in time 21.
Retten mener, at kontrollen i perioden forud for krisen i 2001 burde have vžret rettet mod de helt nżdvendige foranstaltninger til forebyggelse og bekžmpelse af mund-og klovesyge, som er defineret i EF-direktiverne, og mod medlemsstaternes inkorporering af dem i national ret. 
In the period preceding the 2001 crisis the inspections required by the regulations should have focused, in the CourtŐs opinion, on the essential measures for preventing and controlling FMD that are defined in Community directives and with the transposition of them into the national law of the Member States.
Disse foranstaltninger omfatter bl.a.: a) veterinžr-og sundhedsmžssig kontrol ved gržnserne af importerede dyr og animalske produkter b) kontrol af dyrefoder med henblik p at undg smitte af dyr eller kontaminering af animalske produkter (29) I 1997 og 1998 blev der i alt udbetalt 650,5 millioner euro over fžllesskabsbudgettet. 
Those measures include: (a) veterinary and health checks at frontiers in the case of imports of animals and animal products; (b) checks on animal feed in order to avoid contamination of animals or animal products; (29) A total of 650,5 million euro was charged to the Community budget for 1997 and 1998.
Rettens sžrberetning nr. 1/2000, punkt 1. 
Court Special Report No 1/2000, paragraph 1.
(30) KOM(2002) 736 endelig udg. af 13. december 2002, s. 
(30) COM (2002) 736 final of 13 December 2002, p.
(31) I henhold til artikel 43a i beslutning 90/424/EŻF skal Kommissionen hvert tredje r forelžgge Europa-Parlamentet og Rdet en rapport om betingelserne for gennemfżrelse af denne beslutning. 
(31) Article 43a of Decision 90/424/EEC requires the Commission to submit a report on the conditions of its application to the Parliament and the Council every three years.
(32) Direktorat F i Generaldirektoratet for Sundhed og Forbrugerbeskyttelse. c) medlemsstaternes udarbejdelse af beredskabsplaner, som sikrer, at der vil kunne mobiliseres menneskelige ressourcer og materiel og stables en passende organisation p benene, hvis der skulle opst en krise d) medlemsstaternes etablering af systemer til identifikation og sporing af flytninger af dyr samt et net for kommunikation mellem medlemsstaterne (ANIMO), som er af afgżrende betydning for, at man hurtigt kan finde frem til og aflive smittede dyr. 
(32) Directorate F of the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection. (c) drawing-up of contingency plans by the Member States to ensure that human resources, equipment and adequate organisation can be drawn upon, should a crisis arise; (d) the drawing-up by Member States of systems for identifying and tracking animal movements and a system of messages between Member States (ANIMO), all of which are essential for tracing and slaughtering contaminated animals quickly.
Det kontrolleres ikke systematisk, om EF-direktiverne er korrekt inkorporeret i national ret 22. 
Transposition of Community directives into national law not systematically verified for compliance 22.
Kommissionen kontrollerer s godt som systematisk, om medlemsstaterne formelt har inkorporeret EF-direktiverne i national ret inden for de fastsatte frister. 
The Commission verifies quasi systematically the formal transposition of legislation by Member States within the time allowed by Community directives.
Til gengžld foretages der ikke systematisk overensstemmelseskontrol. 
Compliance tests, on the other hand, are not operated systematically.
I praksis foretages der fżrst overensstemmelseskontrol i forbindelse med Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontorets inspektioner (33) i medlemsstaterne, eller nr der er fremsat en klage af tredjeparter. 
In practice they are only carried out when there are HVO inspections (33) in Member States, or following complaints by third parties. The risks of non-compliant transposition are thus high and may still exist now.
Kommissionen fremsatte et stort antal pkrav over for medlemsstaterne, fordi de ikke havde inkorporeret direktiverne i tide. 
The Commission has addressed to the Member States a large number of warnings for not transposing directives in time.
For s vidt angr direktivet om identifikation af dyr, navnlig fr, som medlemsstaterne skulle have inkorporeret pr. 1. januar 1995, fremsatte Kommissionen mellem 1993 og 1996 en ržkke pkrav over for medlemsstaterne, fordi de ikke havde informeret den om de nationale foranstaltninger. 
As regards the directive on animal identification, and identification of sheep in particular, which Member States were to transpose by 1 January 1995, the Commission had sent warnings to Member States for not communicating national measures between 1993 and 1996.
Mellem 1994 og 1997 henlagde den sagerne, fordi medlemsstaterne formelt havde inkorporeret direktivet i national ret, men den kontrollerede ikke, om inkorporeringen var korrekt. 
Between 1994 and 1997 it archived the files, following formal transposition of the Community law in the Member States, without making a compliance check.
Under krisen i 2001 pviste Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret imidlertid, at der var vžsentlige punkter, hvor ingen af de medlemsstater, der var ramt af mund-og klovesyge (bortset fra Nederlandene), overholdt dette direktiv, og det havde negativ effekt p spredningen af epidemien i 2001 (jf. punkt 35). 
During the 2001 crisis, however, the HVO pointed out that in all the Member States affected by FMD (apart from the Netherlands) there were significant omissions regarding the Directive and they had had a negative impact on the spread of the epidemic in 2001 (see paragraph 35).
(33) Under inspektionerne p stedet kontrollerer Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret ogs, om medlemsstatens inkorporeringsforan-staltninger er effektive, og fremsžtter anbefalinger til Kommissionen, navnlig nr det vurderer, at medlemsstatens foranstaltninger ikke er i overensstemmelse med EF-normerne. 
(33) During on-site visits the HVO also checks that the national transposing measures are effective and makes recommendations for the attention of the Commission if, amongst other things, it considers that the national measures are not in accordance with Community norms.
3.3.2005 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende C 54/11 Overvgningen af veterinžr-og sundhedskontrollen ved Unionens gržnser var god, men visse risici var ikke džkket godt nok i bestemmelserne 24. 
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/11 Health and veterinary checks at Union frontiers well supervised but certain risks not adequately covered by regulations 24.
Forud for krisen havde Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret foretaget mange veterinžr-og sundhedskontroller ved gržnsekontrolstederne i medlemsstaterne for at kontrollere, at kun produkter, som overholdt EF-normerne for dyresundhed og fżdevaresikkerhed, blev indfżrt p Fžllesskabets omrde via disse kontrolsteder. 
The HVO carried out numerous health and veterinary checks at Member StatesŐ border inspection posts (BIPs) in order to check that only products that met the Community standards for animal health and food safety entered the Community territory through the BIPs.
I tilfžlde af konstaterede mangler inddrager Kommissionen midlertidigt gržnsekontrolstedernes godkendelse, og for at f denne godkendelse tilbage traf medlemsstaterne derfor relativt hurtigt de saneringsforanstaltninger, som Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontoret kržvede, f.eks. mere personale og flere veterinžrkontroller, forbedring af hygiejnen vedrżrende anlžg og udstyr, bedre systemer til registrering af de indfżrte partier, vete-rinžrcertifikater samt registre. 
In cases where deficiencies were found the Commission temporarily suspended BIPsŐ approval, and in order to have the suspensions lifted Member States were fairly quick to take the corrective action required by the HVO, for example, providing additional personnel, stepping up veterinary controls, improving hygiene in installations and equipment, strengthening the systems for recording batches introduced, veterinary certificates and registers.
Det er umuligt at gardere sig 100 % mod ydre smittekil-der, men p det tidspunkt, da krisen brżd ud, var der en ržkke mangler i EF-bestemmelserne med hensyn til beskyttelse ved gržnserne, navnlig i forbindelse med fżdevarer transporteret af enkeltpersoner og muligheder for at oplagre produkter, som ikke var i overensstemmelse med EF-reglerne, i frizoner (jf. punkt 91.a)). 
Even though it is impossible to provide total protection against external sources of contamination, there were nevertheless a number of shortcomings in the Community regulations at the time of the crisis. They mainly concerned border-protection, especially as regards the carriage of foodstuffs by travellers and the possibility of storing in free zones products that did not comply with Community regulations (see paragraph 91(a)).
Fżr krisen havde Kommissionen foreslet, at animalske produkter ikke mtte indfżres p Fžllesskabets omrde, medmindre de opfyldte EUŐs dyresundhedsbestemmelser, men forslaget blev fżrst vedtaget i 2002(34). 
Before the crisis the Commission had proposed that introduction into the Community territory be limited to products of animal origin, which meet European animal health standards, but the proposal was only adopted in 2002 (34).
Fżrst efter krisen, i november 2002, foreslog Kommissionen at styrke kontrollen med import af animalske produkter til eget forbrug, og beslutningen herom blev vedtaget i december 2002 (35). 
Not until November 2002, after the crisis, did the Commission propose reinforcing controls on imports of products of animal origin intended for personal consumption. The Decision was adopted in December 2002 (35).
Levnedsmiddel-og Veterinžrkontorets inspektioner vedrżrende dyrefoder blev foretaget p et sent tidspunkt, en del af dem fżrst efter krisen. 
The HVO inspections concerning animal feed were carried out late, partly after the crisis.
Kontoret fremhžvede manglerne (34) Rdets direktiv 2002/99/EF af 16. december 2002 om dyresund-hedsbestemmelser for produktion, tilvirkning, distribution og indfżrsel af animalske produkter til konsum (EFT L 18 af 23.1.2003, s. 
The HVO highlighted the gaps (34) Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption (OJ L 18, 23.1.2003, p.
(35) Kommissionens beslutning 2002/995/EF af 9. december 2002 om midlertidige beskyttelsesforanstaltninger over for import af animalske produkter til eget forbrug (EFT L 353 af 30.12.2002, s. 
(35) Commission Decision 2002/995/EC of 9 December 2002 laying down interim safeguard measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption (OJ L 353, 30.12.2002, p.
1). i medlemsstaternes kontrol af behandlingen af affald anvendt til dyrefoder. 
1). in Member States Ő checks on the treatment of waste used for animal feed.
Risikoen forbundet med denne type foder er sledes blevet pvist, men delvist fżrst efter krisen. 
In so doing it brought to light the risks associated with this type of feedstuff, but partly only after the crisis.
Allerede i 1997/98 havde der imidlertid vžret eksempler, som viste, hvilken risiko der var forbundet med denne type dyrefoder. I Tyskland skyldtes udbruddet af svinepest f.eks., at der som foder til svin var anvendt flydende og fast kżkkenaffald, som ikke var tilstržkkeligt behandlet og dermed ikke overholdt EU-bestemmelserne. 
The risks associated with this type of animal feed had already been illustrated however in 1997/1998, when there was an outbreak of swine fever in Germany as a consequence of using for pig food catering waste and swill that had been inadequately treated and thus infringed Community legislation.
Nogle medlemsstater havde derfor allerede fżr mund-og klovesygekrisen i 2001 forbudt anvendelsen af svel ubehandlet som behandlet kżkkenaffald p deres omrde (Frankrig og Nederlandene), mens andre ikke havde indfżrt et sdant forbud (Tyskland og Det Forenede Kongerige). 
For that reason some Member States had forbidden the use of catering waste on their territory before the 2001 FMD crisis, even if the waste had been treated (France and the Netherlands). Others (Germany and the United Kingdom) had not done so.
P fžllesskabsniveau var det fortsat p trods af Kommissionens forslag lovligt at anvende behandlet kżkkenaffald i foder til svin i februar 2001 (36). 
At the Community level, the use of processed catering waste in pig feed was still legal in February 2001 (36), despite the CommissionŐs proposals.
I Det Forenede Kongerige havde den producent, hos hvem sygdommen fżrst brżd ud, tilladelse til at anvende kżkkenaffald i foderet til sine svin p den betingelse, at affaldet var behandlet. 
In the United Kingdom the farm where the crisis originated was licensed to feed catering waste to pigs, provided that it had been treated.
I praksis indsamlede producenten kżkkenaffald fra restauranter, hoteller, skoler og kaserner i nabolaget og oplagrede det foran sin bedrift, fżr det blev transporteret til to behandlings-anlžg, som l i nžrheden. 
In practice the farmer collected catering waste from restaurants, hotels, schools and an armed forces establishment in the vicinity, and stored it outside the farm before sending it to two processing establishments close to the farm.
Nr kżkkenaffaldet var behandlet, blev det givet til svinene. 
Once it had been treated the catering waste was given to the pigs.
Ved ministeriets kontrol efter krisens udbrud blev der imidlertid pvist abnormt affald i fodertrugene, hvilket var et synligt bevis p, at kżkkenaffaldet ikke var tilstržkkeligt behandlet (37). 
However, inspections carried out by the Ministry after the start of the outbreak revealed the presence of abnormal waste in the feeding troughs, clearly demonstrating that the waste had not been adequately treated (37).
Det har ikke kunnet pvises med sikkerhed, hvor virus af typen Čpan-asiatisk OÇ stammer fra. 
The exact provenance of the pan-Asiatic O type virus could not be established with certainty.
Muligheden for, at den skulle vžre indslžbt via gržnsekontrolstederne, afvises normalt, og man har haft mistanke (38) til illegale vareforsendelser, som ikke er anmeldt som fżdevarer, og som er solgt en gros til restauranter eller kantiner. 
The possibility of the virus having entered via BIPs was more or less ruled out and suspicion fell on illegal shipments of products presented as non-food imports for wholesale outlets or for sale to restaurants or canteens (38).
(36) I 2000 havde Kommissionen forelagt et forslag for Parlamentet og Rdet (KOM (2000) 574) om at forbyde kżkken-og madaffald som foder til husdyr, men forslaget blev fżrst vedtaget i 2002 (forordning (EF) nr. 1774/2002 (EFT L 273 af 10.10.2002, s. 
(36) The Commission presented a proposal to the Parliament and the Council concerning a ban on the use of catering waste and swill in animal feed (COM (2000) 574) in 2000, but it was not adopted until 2002 (Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002, OJ L 273, 10.10.2002, p. 1).
I januar 2001, lige inden krisen, havde den ogs fremsat forslag om at forbyde anvendelsen af kżkkenaffald i foder til svin, men forbuddet blev fżrst vedtaget den 23. oktober 2001, Rdets direktiv 2001/89/EF af 23. oktober 2001 om EF-foranstaltninger til bekžmpelse af klassisk svinepest (EFT L 316 af 1.12.2001, s. 
In January 2001, just before the crisis, it also presented a proposal for a ban on the use of catering waste as pig feed, but it was not adopted until 23 October 2001.
(37) Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, juni 2002. 
(37) Origin of the UK foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), June 2002.
(38) Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be learned Inquiry, s. 
(38) Foot-and-mouth disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry, p.
C 54/12 DA Den Europžiske Unions Tidende 3.3.2005 Kriterierne for medlemsstaternes beredskabsplaner var utilstržkkelige og kontrollen mangelfuld 29. 
C 54/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 Insufficient checks and criteria for Member StatesŐ contingency plans 29.
I 1990 kržvede Rdet (39), at medlemsstaterne skulle udarbejde beredskabsplaner med angivelse af de foranstaltninger, der skal tržffes, hvis der udbryder mund-og klovesyge. 
In 1990 the Council (39) called on the Member States to draw up contingency plans setting out the action to be taken if an outbreak of FMD occurred.
Disse planer skulle give adgang til de anlžg, det udstyr, det personale og alle andre egnede materialer, som er nżdvendige for en hurtig og effektiv udryddelse af sygdommen. 
The plans were to facilitate access to the plant, equipment, personnel and all other appropriate materials necessary for the rapid and efficient eradication of an outbreak.
Kommissionen skulle fastlžgge de kriterier, der skulle overholdes ved udarbejdelsen af disse planer, gennemg dem for at fastsl, om de gżr det muligt at n det żnskede ml, og foresl medlemsstaten eventuelle žndringer heri. 
The Commission was to lay down the criteria to be applied in drawing up the plans, examine them in order to determine whether they provided a feasible means of achieving the desired objective, and suggest to the Member States where they could be amended.
Rdet havde endvidere fastsat, at planerne senere kunne žndres eller suppleres under hensyn til udviklingen i situationen. 
The Council had provided for the possibility of supplementing or amending the plans later, to take account of any changes in the situation.