natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Omfanget og karakteren af den globale finansielle krise i 2007-2008 var uden fortilfælde, og krisen skabte pludselige ubalancer under uordnede forhold i en række EU-lande. 
The magnitude and nature of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis was unprecedented. This determined the abrupt and disorderly materialisation of imbalances in several EU countries.
Krisen viste, at overvågningsrammen før krisen ikke var fuldt ud tilstrækkelig til at identificere risikoen forbundet med de underliggende budgetstillinger i en økonomisk krisesituation uden fortilfælde. 
The crisis showed that the pre-crisis surveillance framework was not fully adequate in identifying the risk in the underlying fiscal positions in times of unprecedented economic crisis.
Den understregede ligeledes omfanget af følgevirkningerne mellem landene og behovet for at anvende en bredere tilgang til overvågning i banksektoren og den bredere makroøkonomiske overvågning. 
It also highlighted the extent of spillovers between countries and the need to take a wider approach to surveillance in the banking sector and wider macroeconomy.
De finansielle markeders reaktion – der var afgørende for krisens hurtige udvikling – var imidlertid en ny og meget vanskelig virkning at forudsige. 
The reaction of financial markets — which was critical in the acceleration of the crisis — was, however, a new and particularly difficult effect to predict.
På det tidspunkt, hvor landene anmodede om bistand, var den forværrede situation blevet overvåget i kulis-serne, og Kommissionen var i tæt kontakt med de nationale myndigheder. 
At the point when countries applied for assistance, behind-the-scenes monitoring of a deteriorating situation had been under way and the Commission was in close contact with the national authorities.
Kommissionens svar 87 Det skal anerkendes, at prognosticering ikke er en eksakt videnskab. 
It must be recognised that forecasting is not an exact science.
Kommissionens prognoser har ofte vist sig at være nøjagtige. 
The Commission’s forecasts have a good track record of accuracy.
I EU-rammen for økonomisk styring før krisen var der primært fokus på finanspolitik, og overvågningen af den finansielle risiko blev navnlig overladt til centralbanker og nationale tilsynsmyndigheder. 
The pre-crisis EU economic governance framework focussed primarily on fiscal policy, leaving the monitoring of financial risk, in particular, to central banks and national supervisory authorities.
Da der ikke var nogen integreret europæisk tilsyns-og reguleringsstruktur for finansielle institutioner, blev de vigtigste risici ikke systematisk identificeret. 
As a result of the absence of an integrated European supervisory and regulatory architecture for financial institutions, key risks were not flagged in a systematic way.
Der er sket betydelige fremskridt i afhjælpningen af disse institutionelle og styringsmæssige svagheder siden krisens indtræden. 
Notable progress in addressing these institutional and governance shortcomings has been made since the crisis.
Tilsynsrammen er blevet gennemgået, og der er blevet etableret tættere kontakt mellem Kommissionen og det nyligt oprettede Europæiske Udvalg for Systemiske Risici (ESRB) og de europæiske tilsynsmyndigheder (ESA). 
The supervisory framework has been overhauled and closer contact has been established between the Commission and the newly established ESRB and the European supervisory authorities.
Det var imidlertid vanskeligt at forudse, at regeringerne på grund af omfanget og karakteren af den finansielle krise uden fortilfælde traf foranstaltninger til støtte for finanssektoren, der undertiden havde betydelig indvirkning på de offentlige finanser. 
Nevertheless, the fact that, as a consequence of the unprecedented nature and magnitude of the financial crisis, governments took measures in support of the financial sector which had a sometimes substantial impact on public finances could not easily have been foreseen in advance.
V Den makroøkonomiske overvågningsramme er en komplementær proces, der ikke indgår i stabilitets- og vækstpagten (SVP). 
V The macroeconomic surveillance framework is a complementary process which does not form part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
SVP omfatter en række retsakter og politiske dokumenter om budgetovervågning. 
The SGP consists of a set of legal and political acts relating to fiscal surveillance.
På tidspunktet for krisens indtræden havde SVP været implementeret i ti år, og pakken var netop blevet revideret i 2005 for at sætte større fokus på den underliggende finanspolitiske linje. 
At the onset of the crisis the SGP was 10 years old, and had just been revised in 2005 in order to give a more prominent role to the underlying fiscal stance.
Kommissionen lægger vægt på at afhjælpe de mangler, der viser sig, og reviderede pakken yderligere i 2011, 2013 og 2014. 
The Commission is committed to learning from the shortcomings that became apparent, and revised it further in 2011, 2013 and 2014.
Ved sammenknytningen af SVP’en og Kommissionens parathed til at forvalte programmerne tages der ikke højde for, at formålet med reformerne af SVP’en og indførelsen af makroøkonomisk overvågning var at afhjælpe manglerne i overvågnings-mekanismerne. 
Making the link between the SGP and the Commission’s preparedness to administer programmes does not take into account the point that both the reforms to the SGP and introduction of macroeconomic surveillance served to address the shortcomings in surveillance mechanisms.
Dette gør det muligt at identificere ubalancer i tide og træffe de politiske beslutninger, der er nødvendige for at gøre landene bedre forberedt på at håndtere en krise. 
This allows imbalances to be identified in time to take the policy decisions needed to make countries better prepared to face a crisis.
Forvaltning af finansiel bistand er ikke knyttet til identificering af risici. 
The management of financial assistance is a separate point from the identification of risks.
Kommissionens svar 88 VIII I beretningen peges der med rette på anvendelsen af en række regneark og indledende problemer med dokumentation. 
Reply of the Commission 88 VIII The report rightly points to the use of several spreadsheets and initial problems with documentation.
Kommissionens prognosered-skaber er ikke mere komplicerede end nødvendigt. 
The Commission’s forecasting tools are not more complex than required.
Økonomiske prognoser kan ikke foretages ved hjælp af en simpel applikation. 
Forecasting an economy is not an exercise that can be undertaken using a simple application.
Kommissionens prognoser skal dække en lang række variabler. 
The Commission’s forecasts have to cover a large set of variables.
Dette indebærer nødvendigvis, at de landeansvarlige skal basere deres prognoser på et stort og ret komplekst datasæt. 
This necessarily leads to a large and rather complex set of data that country desk officers have to handle when preparing a forecast.
Det kræver ekspertise og faglig vurdering at anvende regnearkene. 
Using the spreadsheets requires expertise and professional judgement.
Kommissionens prognosemetode er i overensstemmelse med praksis i andre organisationer, der opstiller økonomiske prognoser. 
The Commission’s forecasting method is in line with the practice of other organisations engaging in economic forecasts.
Kommissionen er ikke enig i Rettens bemærkninger om vanskelighederne forbundet med at vurdere antagelserne i prognosen. 
The Commission disagrees with the Court’s statement related to the difficulty of assessing the assumptions in the forecast.
De antagelser, der ligger til grund for prognoserne, er beskrevet i det positionspapir, der udarbejdes i starten af hver prognoserunde. 
The assumptions underlying the forecasts are described in the position paper that is produced at the beginning of each forecast round.
Antagelserne ajourføres herefter før hver efterfølgende prognose, og de offentliggøres i de enkelte prognoser. 
The assumptions are then updated ahead of each subsequent forecast storage, and they are published in each forecast.
Der afholdes en række møder under forberedelserne af Kommissionens regelmæssige prognoser med deltagelse af landeansvarlige, eksperter fra horisontale enheder og den øverste ledelse. 
Several meetings during the preparation of the Commission’s regular forecasts bring together country desk officers, experts from horizontal units and top management.
Drøftelsen af de antagelser, der ligger til grund for prognoserne, er et centralt punkt på disse møder. 
The discussion of the assumptions underlying the forecasts is a key part of these meetings.
Horisontale enheder kontrollerer desuden systematisk den matematiske og økonomiske overensstemmelse i de prognoser, som landeafdelingerne har udarbejdet. 
Moreover, horizontal units systematically check the mathematical and economic consistency of the forecasts prepared by the country desks.
Kommissionen har navnlig redegjort indgående for dens vurdering af de finanspolitiske multiplikatorer, der ligger til grund for prognosen (se f.eks. tekstboks I.5 på s. 41 i efterårsprognosen fra 2012). 
In particular, the Commission has carefully explained its assessment of fiscal multipliers underlying the forecast (see for instance Box I.5 on page 41 of the 2012 autumn forecast).
I 2013 foretog GD ECFIN en vurdering af den implicitte værdi af de finanspolitiske multiplikatorer. 
In 2013 DG Economic and Financial Affairs carried out an exercise to assess the implicit fiscal multiplier.
Multiplikatorerne ligger godt inden for det interval, der er anført i den empiriske og teoretiske litteratur. 
The multipliers lie well within the range found in the empirical and theoretical literature.
IX Kommissionen vil gerne understrege betydningen af at skelne behørigt mellem at tilvejebringe de oplysninger, der er nødvendige for at træffe en velunderbygget beslutning på det pågældende tidspunkt, og muligheden for at hente hele dokumentationen på et senere tidspunkt. 
IX The Commission would like to underline the importance of properly distinguishing between providing the information needed to make a well-informed decision at the time and whether complete records could be retrieved at a later date.
I programmernes tidlige fase arbejdede Kommissionen under et stort tidspres og stod over for at skulle indføre forsvarlige og effektive krisestyringsprocedurer. 
In the early phase of the programmes the Commission was operating under severe time pressure and needed to put in place sound and effective crisis management procedures.
Kommissionen anerkender, at der var svagheder i dokumentforvaltningen i programprocessernes tidlige fase, og at det var en »learning by doing«-proces. 
The Commission accepts that there were weaknesses in document management in the early part of the programme processes, and that there was a process of ‘learning by doing’.
Kommissionen gav Retten en betydelig mængde oplysninger, herunder regneark, om de data og antagelser, der ligger til grund for de indledende beregninger af finansieringsgabet. 
The Commission provided the Court with a substantial amount of information, including spreadsheets, on the data and assumptions behind the initial calculations of the finance gap.
Der blev tilvejebragt baggrundsdokumenter for alle berørte programlande. 
Background documents were provided on all programme countries concerned.
X Kommissionen er ikke enig i, at de nyeste programdokumenter manglede væsentlige oplysninger. 
X The Commission does not agree that the most recent programme documents lacked essential information.
Programdokumenterne for Portugal og Irland var meget grundige. 
The programme documents for Portugal and Ireland were very thorough.
XI Kommissionen er ikke enig i, at der i visse betingelser i aftalememorandaene (MoU’er) ikke var fokus på Rådets overordnede betingelser for den økonomiske politik. 
XI The Commission does not agree that there were conditions in the memoranda of understanding (MoUs) that were not focused on the general economic policy conditions set by the Council.
Rådets overordnede betingelser for den økonomiske politik er »overordnede«, og det er ikke hensigten at opstille en udtømmende liste over betingelser. 
The general economic policy conditions set by the Council are ‘general’ and not intended to provide an exhaustive list of conditionality.
Overholdelsen af disse betingelser – navnlig i forbindelse med strukturelle aspekter – nødvendiggør ofte en lang række foranstaltninger i afta-lememorandummet, der skal styrke en økonomis underliggende stilling. 
Their attainment — particularly in relation to structural issues — often necessitates a broad range of measures in the MoU to strengthen the underlying position of an economy.
Aftalememoranda er desuden resultatet af forhandlinger med den pågældende medlemsstats politiske myndigheder, og deres input er afgørende for programmets succes. 
Furthermore, MoUs are the result of negotiations with the political authorities of the Member State concerned, whose input is crucial to the success of the programme.
Kommissionens svar 89 Forskellige metoder Efter Kommissionens opfattelse var det hensigtsmæssigt, at de enkelte programmer afspejlede landespecifikke økonomiske betingelser, institutionelle rammer, omstændigheder og præferencer. 
Different approaches In the Commission’s view it was appropriate that each programme reflected country-specific economic conditions, institutional settings, circumstances and preferences.
XII Selv om Kommissionen er enig i, at risikoen for inkonsekvens i behandlingen af landene eller for at forlange unødvendige reformer fortsat er en udfordring i programforvaltningsprocessen, mener Kommissionen, at det var passende og nødvendigt at forvalte programmerne landespecifikt. 
XII Though the Commission agrees that the risk of treating different countries inconsistently or requesting unnecessary reforms remains a challenge to the process of programme management, it is of the view that it was appropriate and necessary that the programmes were managed in a country-specific way.
Denne fleksibilitet var hensigtsmæssig i lyset af de forskellige økonomiske, politiske og administrative betingelser i de forskellige lande og modtagerlandets vigtige rolle i programmets udformning og udvikling. 
This flexibility was desirable given the diverse set of economic, political and administrative conditions in the different countries, and the important role of the recipient country in programme design and evolution.
Modtagerlandenes input til programmernes udformning og udvikling, der ikke kun afspejler deres forskellige situationer, men også forskellige politiske præferencer, er den vigtigste faktor til at sikre, at de bevarer ejerskabet over reformprogrammet. 
The input of the recipient countries in the programme design and evolution, which reflects not just their different circumstances but also their different political preferences, is the most important factor in ensuring that they retain ownership over the reform programme.
Kommissionen anerkender, at der er plads til forbedringer med hensyn konsekvensen i klassificeringen af betingelserne. 
The Commission accepts that there is room for improvement in the consistency with which the conditions were categorised.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er begrebet »strukturelt indhold«, som anvendes af Retten, ikke en meningsfuld metrik til at analysere politiske foranstaltninger og drage konklusioner om deres betydning. 
In the Commission’s view the concept of ‘structural content’ used by the Court is not a meaningful metric for analysing policy measures and drawing conclusions about their importance.
Derudover ændrer betingelserne sig over et programs levetid. 
It is also the case that conditionality evolves through the lifetime of a programme.
En strukturreform, som Retten i sidste ende klassificerer som »højt indhold«, kan kræve flere indledende skridt med »lavt indhold«, inden den kan vurderes og forberedes behørigt. 
A structural reform that the Court would ultimately class as ‘high content’ may require several ‘low content’ preliminary steps in order to be assessed and prepared properly.
Lempelsen af en række underskudsmål var baseret på en overordnet stillingtagen til, om de indledende mål stadig var relevante. 
The relaxation of some deficit targets was based on an overall view of whether the initial targets remained appropriate.
Dette blev vurderet på grundlag af en grundig analyse under hensyntagen til den landespecifikke udvikling og ikke kun væksten i BNP. 
This was done on the basis of a careful analysis, taking several country-specific developments into account and not only GDP growth.
Kommissionens svar 90 Definitionen af mål i overensstemmelse med ENS hindrer imidlertid ikke Kommissionen i at anvende andre nødvendige tilgængelige informations-og datakilder i sin overvågning. 
Reply of the Commission 90 However, the definition of the targets in line with the ESA does not preclude the Commission from using other available sources of information and data in its monitoring, where necessary.
Dette kan omfatte finanspolitiske data efter kasseregnskabsmetoden, navnlig i lyset af deres hurtigere tilgængelighed i forhold til periodiserede data. 
This may include fiscal cash-based data, especially given their faster availability compared to accrual data.
Data efter kasseregnskabsmetoden skal behandles under behørig hensyntagen til deres forskellige begrebsmæssige grundlag. 
Cash-based data must be interpreted with due consideration of their different conceptual underpinnings.
En korrekt anvendelse af flere datakilder med forskellige begrebsmæssige grundlag kan generelt kun medvirke til at forbedre overvågningen af programmålene og støtte beslutningstagningen, når det er nødvendigt. 
Overall, the proper use of more sources of data with different conceptual underpinnings and availability can only help to improve the monitoring of the programme targets and to support decision-making, where necessary.
XVI Den finanspolitiske tilpasningssti i programmerne blev fastlagt i overensstemmelse med SVP-kravene og under hensyntagen til landespecifikke betingelser og programmål. 
XVI The programmes set fiscal adjustment paths consistent with SGP requirements, taking into account country specific conditions and programme objectives.
Selv om der i programmerne tages hensyn til de relevante faktorer i fastlæggelsen af strukturforbedringens tempo, kan det endelige resultat være berørt af en bredere vifte af ydre faktorer. 
However, while the programmes take account of the appropriate factors in designing the pace of structural improvement, the eventual out-turn may be affected by a wider range of factors relating to the external environment.
Disse omfatter ekstraordinære omstændigheder (f.eks. dybere recessioner end oprindeligt forudset), inflationssatser, vækstsammensætningen, markedsstemning, der påvirker låneomkostninger, og efterfølgende datarevisioner. 
These include exceptional circumstances (e.g. deeper recessions than initially foreseen), inflation rates, the composition of growth and market sentiment affecting borrowing costs, as well as ex post data revisions.
Der skal således være fleksibilitet til at tilpasse sig nye betingelser. 
Therefore, flexibility in adjusting to new conditions is necessary.
Dette anerkendes også i EU’s rammer for finanspolitisk overvågning. 
This is also recognised under the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework.
Engangstiltag kan være uundgåelige i nogle situationer (domstolsafgørelser, redningsstøtte til banker), men deres klassificering som engangstiltag sikrer, at de betragtes som midlertidige. 
One-off measures may not be avoidable in some situations (Court decisions, bank rescue operations), but their classification as such ensures that they are recognised as temporary.
De er ikke inkluderet i den strukturelle saldo, netop for at undgå, at regeringerne anvender sådanne foranstaltninger i for høj grad. 
They are not included in the structural balance precisely to avoid governments resorting excessively to such measures.
Det er desuden helt naturligt, at forskellige landes strukturelle saldi ændrer sig i varierende tempo. 
Moreover, it is only natural that the structural balances of different countries change at different paces.
XVII Stramme tidsfrister for gennemførelse af reformer kan til tider efterfølgende betegnes som urealistiske, men de blev fastsat meget ambitiøst for at tilskynde til en hurtigere indgriben. 
XVII Tight deadlines to implement reforms could sometimes be characterised as unrealistic ex post, but they were set very ambitiously to encourage faster action.
Kommissionen er ikke enig i, at overholdelsen af de vigtigste betingelser blev udsat til programperiodens slutfase. 
The Commission does not agree that implementation of the most important conditions was left for the latter part of the programmes.
Kriseforholdene og det politiske reformtempo betød, at der var fokus på vigtige og vanskelige reformer i en tidlig programfase. Anbefalinger Kommissionen accepterer anbefaling a. 
The crisis conditions and political momentum for reform meant that important and difficult reforms were concentrated early on in the programme. Recommendations The Commission accepts recommendation (a).
Kommissionen forbedrede sin mobilisering af ekspertise i kriseårene. 
The Commission improved its mobilisation of expertise over the years of the crisis.
Den var i stand til at mobilisere mere ekspertise i programmerne for eurolandene, der blev iværksat efter programmerne for lande uden for euroområdet. 
It was able to mobilise more expertise in the euro area programmes, which started later than the non-euro area programmes.
Strukturreformtjenesten (SRSS) er blevet oprettet for nylig i Kommissionens regi. 
The Structural Reform and Support Service (SRSS) has recently been set up within the Commission.
Kommissionen vil undersøge, hvordan en række vigtige principper for hurtig mobilisering af den nødvendige ekspertise kan styrkes yderligere, eventuelt i en institutionel ramme. 
The Commission will examine how some key principles for rapid mobilisation of the expertise needed could be further strengthened into an institution-wide framework where appropriate.
Kommissionen vil tage hensyn til behovet for at udvikle procedurer for skærpet overvågning og forvaltning af eventuelle nye programmer for finansiel bistand til eurolandene inden for twopack-forordningerne. 
The Commission will take on board the need to develop procedures for the enhanced surveillance and management of possible new financial assistance programmes for euro area countries, in the context of the two-pack.
Kommissionen accepterer anbefaling b og understreger behovet for at sikre, at registreringen ikke må pålægge prognosemagere en uforholdsmæssig byrde, navnlig i programsammenhæng. 
The Commission accepts recommendation (b), while highlighting the need to ensure that recording activity does not place a disproportionate burden on forecasters, particularly in a programme context.
Kommissionen har allerede forbedret procedurerne og dokumentforvaltningen efter iværksættelsen af de første programmer. 
The Commission has already improved procedures and document management since the first programmes were put into place.
Den vil træffe yderligere foranstaltninger for at forbedre gennemførelsen af sin politik for dokumentforvaltning og kvalitetskontrol. 
It will seek to further improve the implementation of its document-management and quality-control policy.
Kommissionens svar 91 Kommissionen accepterer delvist anbefaling g. Kommissionen har allerede opstillet retningslinjer for samarbejde med IMF og ECB og tager i øjeblikket andre skridt til at fremme det institutionelle samarbejde under programmerne. 
Reply of the Commission 91 The Commission partially accepts recommendation (g). It has already set out guidelines for cooperation with the IMF and the ECB, and is taking other steps to facilitate interinstitutional cooperation during programmes.
Kommissionen er imidlertid af den opfattelse, at man i forbindelse med fremme af dette samarbejde bør undgå formalisering, der gør beslutningsprocessen tung, navnlig i lyset af tidspresset. 
However, the Commission considers that clarifying this cooperation should avoid formalisation, making the decision-making process burdensome, especially given the time pressures involved.