natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I Frankrig vil pengepolitikken i 1993 fortsat fokusere på opretholdelse af den nuvzrende centralkurs for francen inden for ERM og på kontrol af inflationen .
In France , monetary policy in 1993 will continue to focus on maintaining the current central parity of the franc within the ERM and on the control of inflation .
Af disse grunde blev målet for væksten i M3 sat til mellem 4 % og 6,5% for 1993 , på linje med målsætningen på mellem 4 % og 6 % i 1992 .
For these reasons , the target for M3 growth was set at 4 % to 6.5% for 1993 , similar to the 4 % to 6 % objective in 1992 .
Den ovre grænse for målsætningen blev hzvet en smule for at tage hensyn til udsigterne til et ikke-inflationært opsving i den franske okonomi .
The upper limit of the range was increased slightly to take account of the outlook for a non-inflationary upturn in the French economy .
I Spanien blev målzonen for vækst i 1993 i « ALP » ( likvide aktiver hos borgerne ) sat til mellem 4,5% og 7,5 %.
In Spain , the target range for « ALP » growth in 1993 ( liquid assets held by the public ) has been fixed at 4.5% to 7.5% .
Nedgangen i forhold til målzonen fra 1992 på mellem 8 % og 11 % afspejler dels de moderate vzkstudsigter og behovet for en yderligere reduktion i inflationen , dels en vsekstrate i omlobshastigheden for ALP , som forventes at vil blive tzttere på dens historiske trend .
The decrease from the range of 8 % to 11 % set in 1992 , partly reflects the moderate prospects for economic growth and the need to achieve a further reduction in inflation , as well as a rate of growth of the velocity of circulation of ALP which is expected to be closer to its historic trend .
I de mrige ERM-lande er pengepolitikken hovedsagelig indrettet med henblik på at opnå prisstabilitet gennem en målsztning for valutakursen i forhold til D-marken .
In the other ERM countries , monetary policy is predominantly aimed at achieving price stability by targeting the exchange rate vis-A-vis the Deutsche Mark .
I Danmark har centralbanken en supplerende målsætning for vzksten i den indenlandske pengeskabelse .
In Denmark , the central bank has a supplementary target for the growth of the domestic source of the money supply .
Under de gzldende omstændigheder med stagnerende okonomisk aktivitet og hid - til uset valutauro har forfralgelsen af den supplerende målsztning dog vzret af mindre betydning .
However , in present circumstances of stagnating economic activity and unprecedented currency unrest , adherence to the supplementary target has been of minor importance .
I Holland fastszttes med virkning fra 1993 ikke lzngere en pengemzndemålsztning , og i Portugal er myndighederne ophrart med at opsztte målsætninger for « L - » ( samlet likviditet hos ikke-finansielle indlzndinge ) og M3 .
With effect from 1993 , a monetary target is no longer set in the Netherlands , and in Portugal the authorities have discontinued posting targets for « L - » ( total liquidity held by non-financial residents ) and M3 .
Belgien , Irland og Luxembourg har traditionelt ikke fastsat kvantitative pengepolitiske målsztninger .
Traditionally , quantitative monetary targets have not been set in Belgium , Luxembourg and Ireland .
Blandt de lande , som midlertidigt har suspenderet deltagelsen af deres valutaer i ERM , har man i Italien fastsat en målzone for vzksten i M2 til mellem 5 % og 7 % i 1993 , hvilket også var tilfzldet i 1992 .
In the countries which have temporarily suspended the participation of their currencies in the ERM , the target range of the growth of M2 in Italy was set at 5 % to 7 % for 1993 , as was the case in 1992 .
Pengepolitikken er indrettet på at give borgere og virksomheder stabile rammer og på at undgå , at det seneste fald i lirekursen bidrager til inflation .
Monetary policy is aimed at providing economic agents with a stable framework and at preventing the recent depreciation of the lira from contributing to inflation .
I England har myndighederne lagt nye rammer for pengepolitikken efter suspensionen af sterlings medlemskab af ERM med en eksplicit inflationsmålsztning på mellem 1 % og 4 % for den underliggende prisstigningstakt faldende til 2 % eller mindre på mellemlangt sigt .
In the United Kingdom , the authorities have adopted a new monetary policy framework since the suspension of sterling 's membership of the ERM , with an explicit inflation objective of 1 % to 4 % for underlying inflation , falling to 2 % or less in the mediumterm .
En bred vifte af indikatorer vil blive anvendt med henblik på at vurdere et potentielt inflationært pres , herunder snzvre og brede monetzre aggregater , priserne på formuegoder og valutakursen .
A wide range of indicators will be used to assess potential inflationary pressure , including narrow and broad monetary aggregates , asset prices and the exchange rate .
Endelig vil pengepolitikken i Grzkenland forblive restriktiv .
Finally , in Greece , the monetary policy stance will remain restrictive .
Den ikke-akkommoderende valutakurspolitik vil blive viderefrart , og desuden vil realrenterne forblive hoje i 1993 , idet rentenedszttelser ikke vil blive forceret i forhold til opbremsningen af inflationen .
The nonaccommodating exchange rate policy will continue . Moreover , real interest rates will remain high in 1993 , with nominal interest rates not being reduced at a faster pace than the deceleration of inflation .
En målsztning om vzkst i M3 på omkring 9-12 % er blevet opstillet som vejledende for pengepolitikken .
An M3 growth target of 9-12 % has been set to guide policy .
Udfordhgerfor pengepolitikken Givet de talrige usikkerhedsmomenter , der fortsat hersker med hensyn til såvel den internationale som den nationale rakonomiske baggrund , står myndighederne i medlemsstaterne over for betydelige udfordringer med hensyn til udfrarelsen af deres pengepolitik .
Challenges facing monetary policy Given the numerous uncertainties remaining in the international and domestic economic environment , the national authorities of Member States face considerable challenges in the conduct of their monetary policies .
Det er iszr nradvendigt at genetablere valutakursstabiliteten i en situation , hvor der er risiko for en forlzngelse af den okonomiske afmatning i hele Fzllesskabet .
In particular , exchange rate stability has to be restored in a situation in which there is the risk of a prolongation of the economic slowdown throughout the Community .
Desuden skal pengepolitikken i lande , hvis valutaer for nylig er blevet devalueret , eller hvor deltagelse i ERM er blevet suspenderet , fortsat være påpasselige med henblik på at undgå faren for en opblussen i det inflationzre pres , hvilket ikke kun vil erodere hårdtvundne resultater i de seneste år fra lavinflationen , men også vil indebære risiko for , at den mere balancerede situation for konkurrenceevnen mellem fællesskabslandene , som er resultatet af de seneste valutakurstilpasninger , bringes ud af ligevzgt .
In addition , in countries where currencies have recently been devalued or where participation in the ERM has been suspended , monetary policy must remain vigilant to avoid the dangers of a pick-up in inflationary pressures which would not only erode the hard-won anti-inflationary gains of past years but also risk unsettling the more balanced pattern of international competitiveness among Member States resulting from recent exchange rate adjustments .
Som det allerede blev understreget i sidste års årsberetning , afhænger opnåelsen af de okonomisk-politiske målsztninger i afgrarende grad ikke kun af en passende national pengepolitik , men også af en tilstrzkkelig stratte fra finanspolitikken og lranudviklingen .
As already stressed in last year 's Annual Report , the achievement of macroeconomic policy objectives hinges critically not only on an appropriate national monetary policy but also on adequate support from fiscal policy and wage developments .
Af disse grunde må processen med budgetm ~ ssig konsolidering fortsætte i lande med et uforholdsmzssigt stort budgetunderskud ogleller offentlig gzld .
For these reasons , the process of fiscal consolidation must continue in those countries with excessive budget deficits andfor public debt levels .
I andre lande bor den svagere rakonomiske aktivitet ikke frare til stigninger i underskuddet ud over det , som folger af de automatiske stabilisatorer .
In other countries , weaker economic activity should not lead to increases in the deficit beyond those accounted for by automatic fiscal stabilisers .
Desuden er der , til trods for at lranstigningeme i nogle fzellesskabslande afdzempedes i 1992 , stadig behov for en maerkbar yderligere reduktion , der hvor arbejdsomkostningerne stiger hurtigt .
In addition , while in some Community countries nominal wage growth has moderated in 1992 , a substantial further reduction is still necessary where labour costs rise at a rapid pace .
Givet den afgrarende rolle , som arbejdsmarkedet spiller i rakonomien , brar alle medlemslandene uden forsinkelser gennemfrare de nradvendige strukturelle tiltag med henblik på at forbedre markedets fleksibilitet .
Given the crucial role played by labour markets in the economy , all Community countries should implement without delay the necessary structural measures to improve market flexibility .
Endelig brar passende indgreb på udbudssiden omgående introduceres i de lande , hvor ikke-konkurrencemæssige vilkår på visse markeder for varer og tjenesteydelser hindrer opnåelsen af en hurtigere inflationsbegrzensning .
Finally , in those countries where the presence of non-competitive practices in certain markets for goods and services hampers the achievement of faster disinflation , the appropriate supply-side policies should be promptly introduced .
Sammenfattende er det af afgrarende vigtighed at forbedre balancen mellem finanspolitikken og pengepolitikken og at styrke udbudssiden i medlemslandene .
To conclude , it is of the utmost importance to improve the balance between fiscal and monetary policies and to strengthen supply-side policies in Community countries .
Som den skuffende rakonomiske og finansielle udvikling i 1992 har understreget , er afgrarende fremikke kun for at lzegge fundamentet for vedvarende rakonoskridt på disse områder n ~ dvendig , misk vzekst , men også for at genetablere trovzerdigheden i ERM og opnå den grad af konvergens og markedsfleksibilitet , som er nradvendig for med succes at fuldfrare 0MU-processen .
As the disappointing economic and financial developments in 1992 have highlighted , decisive progress in these fields is required not only to lay the foundations for sustained economic growth , but also to restore credibility in the ERM and to achieve the degree of convergence and market flexibility which are necessary for the successful completion of the EMU process .
UDVIKLINGEN PÅ MARKEDET FOR DEN PRIVATE ECU
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRIVATE ECU MARKET
Den private ECU anvendes fortsat hovedsageligt som et finansielt instrument .
The private ECU has remained essentially a financial instrument .
Dens anvendelse i banksektoren og på værdipapirmarkederne fortsatte med at vokse i 1992 , om end noget langsommere end i de foregående år ( se tabel 5 ) .
Its use in the banking sector and in securities markets continued to grow in 1992 , albeit at a slower pace than in previous years ( see Table 5 ) .
Samtidig blev den private ECU handlet meget aktivt på valuta - og futuresmarkederne .
At the same time , the private ECU was very actively traded in foreign exchange and futures markets .
Denne udvikling blev dog ikke fulgt af nogen vzsentlig ekspansion i dens anvendelse i ikke-finansielle transaktioner , som fortsat er meget begrzenset .
However , these developments were not accompanied by any significant expansion in its use for non-financial transactions which remained very limited .
Den omfattede periode var karakteriseret af to adskilte faser .
The period under review was characterised by two distinct phases .
I frarste halvdel 1992 fortsatte det private ECU-marked med at vokse roligt efter enighed om Maastricht-traktaten i december 1991 .
In the first half of 1992 , the private ECU market continued to grow steadily after the agreement of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 .
Efter medio året var der imidlertid en markant opbremsning i kalvandet på besvzerlighederne med ratifikation af Traktaten og de efterfralgende spaendinger i ERM .
After mid-year , however , there was a marked slowdown in the wake of the difficulties faced in the ratification of the Treaty and the subsequent tensions in the ERM .
S t ~ r r rente - og valutakursudsving i Faellesskabet forragede vzesentligt risikoen forbundet med e investeringer i fordringer i ECU .
Greater interest and exchange rate volatility in the Community increased significantly the risks attached to ECU-denominated investments .
Markedsdeltagerne skiftede enten over til traditionelt stzerke valutaer eller forsragte at dzekke sig ind over for positioner i ECU , hvilket afspejledes i en markant stigning i omsætningen på futuresmarkederne i London og Paris .
Market participants either shifted into traditionally strong currencies or tried to hedge their ECU exposure , as reflected in the sharp increase in the turnover in the ECU futures market in London and Paris .
Dette mranster i udviklingen kom til udtryk både i bank - og obligationssegmenterne af markedet .
This pattern of market developments was reflected in both the banking and the bond sectors of the market .
I modszetning til 1991 steg de samlede udlån i private ECU kun moderat .
In contrast to 1991 , the overall level of lending in private ECUs expanded only moderately .
Mens interbank fordringer voksede noget , var bankernes udlån til ikke-banker stort set uændret i de frarste ni måneder af 1992 .
While interbank claims increased somewhat , bank lending to nonbanks remained broadly unchanged over the first nine months of 1992 .
Bankernes passiver i ECU over for banker og ikkebanker steg markant indtil udgangen af juni , men faldt en smule i tredje kvartal .
Banks » liabilities in ECUs vis-g-vis banks and non-banks increased significantly until end-June but contracted slightly in the third quarter of the last year .
Nedgangen i banksektorens ECU-passiver kan hovedsageligt tilskrives en reduktion i indskud fra centralbankerne .
The decline in ECU liabilities of the banking sector is mainly attributable to the reduction of deposits held by central banks .
Dette var delvis et resultat af interventioner i valutamarkedet i private ECU - centralbankernes reserver i private ECU faldt fra 30,6 mia .
This was partly the result of exchange market intervention in private ECUs - central banks » reserves in private ECUs fell from ECU 30.6 billion at end-June 1992 to ECU 21 billion at endSeptember 1992 - but also reflected the impact of diminishing bond issuing activity of public authorities and the concurrent decline in the flow of new deposits by central banks .
ECU ved udgangen af juni 1992 til 21 mia .
The turnaround in market developments after mid-1992 was particularly pronounced in the securities segment of the ECU financial markets .
ECU ved udgangen af september 1992 - men det afspejlede også effekten af en ned - - 33 TABEL 5 : FINANSIELLE MARKEDER FOR ECU
As demand for ECU securities dried up in the second half of 1992 , a premium emerged in the market long-term ECU bond yield relative to the theoretical ECU yield .
( a ) Som falge af en udvidelse af det rapporterende omrade , er der et brud i serierne i 1991 , og tallene for 1990 og 1991 er ikke sammenlignelige . ( b ) Udelukkende identificerede ikke-banker .
This development made new ECU issues relatively expensive and thus reduced the attractiveness of borrowing programmes , which accordingly were curtailed . As a consequence , the private ECU fell from the third to the sixth place in the rank of currencies which are used for international bond issuance .
( c ) Residual ( inklusive centralbanker ) .
The cutback in ECU bond issues was substantial .
gang i udstedelsen af ECU-obligationer fra offentlige myndigheder og den sammenfaldende nedgang i tilgangen af nye indskud fra centralbankerne .
However , owing to low levels of redemption , the amount of outstanding ECU-denominated bonds increased slightly over the period under review .
Vendingen i udviklingen på det finansielle ECU-marked fra midten af 1992 var iszer udtalt for vzerdipapirer . Eftersom eftersp ~ rgslen efter ECU-fordringer svandt kraftigt ind i andet halvår 1992 , fremkom en przemie på lange ECU-markedsobligationer i forhold til de teoretiske ECU-obligationsrenter .
In contrast , the stock of short-term instruments denominated in private ECU decreased as a result of a contraction in the Euro-note and Euro-commercial paper sector . TABLE 5 : ECU FINANCIAL MARKETS ECU b ~ llion outstanding ( end of period ) Dec. 91 Mar .
Denne udvikling gjorde nye udstedelser i ECU relativt dyrere og reducerede således det attraktive i låneprogrammer , som derfor blev indskrzenket .
92 Jun. 92 75.1 82.8 86.7 40.2 43.1 42.7 6.9 6.9 7.1 9.2 188.3 59.2 129.1 187.4 28.5 158.9 11.6 190.7 56.0 134.7 200.1 33.1 166.9 10.7 192.6 58.1 134.5 204.2 35.5 168.7
Den private ECU faldt som en konsekvens heraf fra en tredje til en sjette plads på listen over valutaer , der anvendes i internationale obligationsudstedelser .
Item International Bonds Domestic Bonds Treasury Bills Euro-commercial paper and notes Bank Assets ( a ) - vis-bvis non-banks ( b ) - vis-bvis banks ( c ) Bank Liabil ~ t ~ es ( a ) - vis-8vis non-banks ( b ) - vis-bvis banks ( c ) Memorandum Item : Central Banks » holdings of pnvate ECUs Source : BIS .
Reduktionen i udstedelsen af ECU-obligationer var markant . Som f ~ l g af det lave niveau af indfrielser , steg mzengden af e udestående ECU-denominerede obligationer dog i den betragtede periode .
( a ) Due to the extension of the reporting area there is a break in series In 1991 , and figures for 1990 and 1991 are not comparable . @) Identified non-banks only .
Derimod faldt m ~ n g d e n korte private ECU-instrumenter som et resultat af reduktioner i « euro-note » og af « euro-commercial paper » sektoren .
( C ) Residual ( including central banks ) .
ECU-markedet udviste styrke på trods af disse problemer .
Despite these difficult conditions , the ECU market showed resilience .
Det demonstrerede iszer evnen til at tilpasse sig de voldsomme bevzegelser i komponentvalutaerne , således som den relativt hurtige tilbagevenden til en lille forskel mellem markedsvzrdien og den teoretiske vzrdi viste , både for ECU-valuiakursen og ECU-renterne .
In particular , it demonstrated its ability to adapt to the sharp fluctuations of its component currencies , as witnessed by the relatively rapid return to a small spread between the market value and the theoretical value of both the ECU exchange rate and interest rates .
I begyndelsen af 1993 blev udstedelse af ECU-obligationer genoptaget .
In early 1993 , there was a resumption of issuance in the ECU bond market .
Den undersiogelse af valutamarkedet , som blev u d f ~ r t april 1992 i de strarste i finansielle centre , viste en stigning i anvendelsen af den private ECU .
The foreign exchange market survey , carried out in April 1992 in the major financial centres , showed an increase in the use of the private ECU .
Sammenlignet med april 1989 , hvor den foregående undersagelse fandt sted , blev den private ECU brugt på den ene side i 3 % af alle transaktioner mod 0,9% tre år tidligere .
As compared to April 1989 , when the previous survey took place , the private ECU was involved in one side of 3 % of all transactions against 0.9% three years earlier .
Inden for Fzellesskabet androg transaktioner , der involverede den private ECU , mellem 5 % og 10 % af den totale omsætning i de fleste medlemsstater .
Within the Community , transactions involving the private ECU accounted for between 5 % and 10 % of total turnover in most Member States . REFERENCE TABLES
REFERENCETABELLER TABEL R I : BNP I FACTE PRISER TABEL R2 : ARBEJDSLBSHEDSPFUICENTER ( B ) kland ( vestlige )( c )
TABLE R2 : UNEMPLOYM perc 1987-89 Gennany ( western ) ( c )
ffilder Nationale data , EF-Kommissionen .
I Sources : National data ; BC Commiss ~ on .
( a ) Skan .
( a ) Estimates .
( b ) For 1892 er de tilsvarende tal 8,1% for astlige Tyskland og 1 .
corresponding figures are : 6.1% for eastern Germany and 1 9 % forthe whole of Getmany .
Q % for hele Tyskland ( c ) 1889 BNP-viegte baseret p & 1989 PPP-valuWurser ( d ) Viegtet standardafvigelse
( c ) 1989 GDP weights based on 1989 PPP exchange rates ( d ) Weighted standard deviation .
Kilde : Eurostat .
Source : Eurostat .
( a ) Standardiseret definition .
( a ) Standardised defdtion .
( b ) S b n ( c ) For 1892 er arbeidsleshedsprocenteme ( national definition ) 14,3 % for mtlige Tyskland og 7,7 % for hele Tyskland . ( dl viegtet standardafvigelse ( e ) Procent af totale arbejdsstyrke
@) Estimates . ( c ) For 1992 , unemploymentrates ( national defmition ) are : 14.3% for eastern Germany and 7 7 % for the whole of Gennany ( d ) Welghted standard deviation ( c ) Percentage of total labour force .
TABEL R3 : FORBRUGERPRISER
TABLE R3 : CONSUMER PRICES percentage change over the
Klider Nationale data . BIS ( a ) Delvis skannet .
BIS . ( a ) Partly estimated .
( b ) Forbrugerpriserne steg 1 1882 med 11 , l % l det sstlige Tyskland Forbrugerprlsstigningen var l de tolv maneder til december 1882 pA 2,8 % i det sstiige Tyskland For hele Tyskland er tallene ikke beregnet ( c ) 1988 forbrugsviegte baseret p & 1989 PPP-valutakurser ( d ) Viegtet standardafvigelse
@) In 1992 , consumer prices rose by 11 1 % in eastem Germany In the tweive months to December 1992 , the rate of consumer price inflation was 2.8% in eastern Germany . For Ule whole of Germany , f ~ u r eare not s constructed ( c ) 1989 consumer spending weights bmed m 1989 PPP exchange rates .
TABEL R4 : LfdNOMKOSTNINGER PR. BESKÆFTIGET ( a )
( d ) Weighted standard deviation . I
TABEL R5 : DEN OFFENTLIGE SEKTORS BALANCE ( a ) ERM Oprindelige snævre band ( d )
TABLE R4 : COMPENSATIONPER EMPLOYEE ( a ) percentage change over the previous year 1987-89
Kilder , Nationale data , EF - Komm ~ ssionen ( a ) Hele skonomien ;
Sources : National data ; EC Commission .
i nominelle termer ( b ) Sksn .
( a ) Whole economy ; in normnal t m .
( c ) For lQS ? er de tilsvarende tal 35,4% for sstlige Tyskland o g 9,7 % for hele Tyskland .
( c ) For 1992 , conespondmg figures are : 35.4% for eastern Gennany and 9 7 % for the whole of Germany .
( d ) 1989 BNP-vægte baseret pA 1989 PPP-valutakurser ( e ) Vægtet standardatvigelse
( d ) 1989 GDP we ~ ghts based on 1989 PPP exchange rates . ( e ) Weighted standard deviation .
Kilder Nationale data , EF-Kommisionen ( a ) Tallene er ikke nedvendigvis i overensstemmelse med de op@arelsesprlncipper , der ligger bag proceduren l Maastricht-Vaktaten om uforholdsmæssigt store underskud , og som fortsat drdtes med henblik at blive harmoniseret ( b ) S b n .
Sources : National data ; EC Commjssion ( a ) Figures may not be consistent with the principles on defmitions underlying the Excessive Deficit Procedure in the Maashicht Treaty which are still under discussion with a new ta bsmg harmonised .
( c ) Frem til 1989 kun vestlige Tyskland . ( Q Lånebehov .
@) Estimates . ( c ) Up to l989 western Germany only .
( e ) Vægtet standardafvigelse TABEL R7 , MONETÆRE AGGREGATER I BRED FORSTAND ( ) s
( d ) Borrowing requirement ( c ) Weighted standard deviation .
TABEL RB : BETALINGSBALANCENS L0BENDE POSTER Procent af BNP lebende priser 1987-89 1 1992 ( a ) 2.3 3-3 1.3 - 2.7 - 3.4 0,2 I -
TABLE R6 : CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES per cent of nominal GDP 1987-89 1990 average 1991 1992 ( a ) 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.3 1 . O - 1 7 1.7 3.3 3.0 4.4 - 1.2 - 1.3 - 5.3 - 3.1 - 2.1 - 2.7 - 3.4 - 1.2 - 3.2 - 3.4 - 0.8 - 0.5 - 0.5 0.2 0.1 - 0.5 3.4 5.7 - 0.7 - 2.0 - 1.3 - 1.8 3.8 2.5 3.0 2.6 - 0.2 - 0.3 - 0.3 - 1.0 - 2.1 - 3.1 - 2.9 - 1.1 0.4 2.6 2.0 2.3 - 2.7 2.8 - 0.3 2.5 1.5 1.8 - 1.4 1.3 - 0.9 1.4 - 0.2 1.4 0.2 2.5 - 1.0 1.7 0.1 1.6 - 1.0 3.2