natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På nuværende tidspunkt findes der ingen fælles bestemmelser om kursmanipulation på EU-plan , og direktivet om insiderhandel ( 2 ) forhindrer kun misbrug af intern viden , hvorimod man i de forskellige medlemsstater har vidt forskellige regler om markedsmisbrug .
Currently , there are no common provisions against market manipulation at the level of the European Union and the Insider Dealing Directive ( 2 ) is limited to the prevention of misuse of privileged information whereas , at the level of the Member States , there is a great deal of variation in the rules dealing with market abuse .
Direktivforslaget har til formål at fuldfłre det retlige grundlag i EU med henblik på at beskytte markedets integritet .
The proposed directive intends to complete the existing Community legal framework in order to protect market integrity .
Det fastsætter desuden , at hver medlemsstat udpeger Øn kompetent administrativ myndighed til behandling af markedsmisbrug .
It also provides that a single competent authority of an administrative nature should be designated in each Member State to deal with market abuse .
Det stigende antal grænseoverskridende aktiviteter kræver et forbedret samarbejde og regler for informationsudveksling mellem de kompetente nationale myndigheder .
Increasing cross-border activities require improved cooperation and a set of provisions for the exchange of information between competent national authorities .
Direktivforslaget bestemmer endvidere , at medlemsstaterne skal sikre , at forbuddet mod at foretage kursmanipulation eller udnytte intern viden gælder for alle fysiske og juridiske personer , samt at enhver overtrædelse af forbuddet eller kravene i direktivforslaget hurtigt og effektivt pålægges sanktioner .
The proposed directive also provides that Member States shall ensure that the prohibition on engaging in market manipulation or taking advantage of inside information shall be applicable to any natural or legal person and that any infringement of the prohibitions or requirements laid down by the proposed directive should be promptly and effectively sanctioned .
Endelig forudses i direktivforslaget anvendelse af komitologiproceduren i overensstemmelse med resolutionen fra Det ( 1 ) EFT C 240 E af 28.8.2001 , s. 265 ( vedtaget af Europa-Kommissionen den 30.5.2001 ) .
Finally , the comitology procedure is envisaged by the proposed directive , following the resolution of the Stockholm European Council of 23 March 2001 ( which ( 1 ) OJ C 240 E , 28.8.2001 , p. 265 ( adopted by the European Commission on 30.5.2001 ) .
( 2 ) Rådets direktiv 89/592 / EØF af 13 . november 1989 om samordning af retsforskrifterne om insiderhandel ( EFT L 334 af 18.11.1989 , s. 30 ) .
( 2 ) Council Directive 89/592 / EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing ( OJ L 334 , 18.11.1989 , p. 30 ) . endorses the recommendations of the Committee of Wise Men ) .
ECB finder , at direktivforslaget udgłr et vigtigt skridt i retning af en harmonisering af de nugældende divergerende nationale regler om kursmanipulation og insiderhandel .
The ECB considers that the proposed directive constitutes an important step towards the harmonisation of the currently divergent national rules addressing market manipulation and insider dealing .
ECB kan derfor tilslutte sig dette bidrag til indfłrelse af sunde og ensartede standarder , der yderligere vil fremme de europæiske finansmarkeders integritet , łge investorernes tillid og sikre , at markederne er velfungerende .
Consequently , the ECB welcomes this contribution to the establishment of sound and consistent standards , which should further promote the integrity of European financial markets , enhance investor confidence and ensure smooth functioning of the market .
ECB ser det ligeledes som positivt , at direktivforslaget gennemfłrer de på Det Europæiske Råds młde i Lissabon i marts 2000 vedtagne konklusioner , hvori det fremhævedes , at der burde tages skridt til at fremskynde gennemfłrelsen af det indre marked for finansielle tjenester , samt konklusionerne fra Det Europæiske Råds młde i Stockholm i marts 2001 , hvor det blev anfłrt , at oprettelse af et dynamisk og effektivt europæisk værdipapirmarked er et afgłrende led heri .
The ECB also welcomes the proposed directive as it implements the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 , which stressed that steps should be taken to accelerate the completion of the internal market for financial services and those of the Stockholm European Council of March 2001 , which stated that the creation of a dynamic and efficient European securities market is an essential element thereof .
Desuden fłlger direktivforslaget op på Øn af målsætningerne med handlingsplanen for finansielle tjenester , dvs . formuleringen af fælles regler , der skal forhindre markedets aktłrer i at manipulere markederne .
Furthermore , the proposed directive responds to one of the objectives of the financial services action plan , i.e. the setting of common rules to prevent market players from rigging the market .
Det er ECB 's opfattelse , at direktivforslaget vil bidrage positivt til opnåelsen af disse målsætninger .
In the view of the ECB , the proposed directive would contribute positively to the achievement of these objectives .
I overensstemmelse med Vismandsudvalgets anbefalinger , som blev godkendt på Det Europæiske Råds młde i Stockholm , ser ECB med tilfredshed på anvendelsen af komitologiproceduren , som tilsigtet i direktivforslaget , med inddragelse af Udvalget af Europæiske Værdipapirtilsynsmyndigheder og Det Europæiske Værdipapirudvalg .
In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Wise Men endorsed by the Stockholm European Council , the ECB welcomes the use of the comitology procedure as envisaged by the proposed directive , with the involvement of the Committee of European Securities Regulators and of the European Securities Committee .
ECB finder , at brugen af komitologiproceduren sikrer den nłdvendige fleksibilitet , hvilket muliggłr en hensigtsmæssig og rettidig indsats over for dynamiske udviklinger i markedet .
The ECB considers that the use of the comitology procedure provides the necessary flexibility , enabling the response in an adequate and timely manner to dynamic market developments .
Principielt har ECB den opfattelse , at der ved anvendelsen af komitologiproceduren ved lovgivning på værdipapirmarkedet błr tages hensyn til den rådgivende rolle , som traktaten tildeler ECB , ved at give mulighed for at inddrage ECB 's synspunkter i lovgivningsprocessen .
Generally , the ECB holds the view that the application of the comitology procedure to securities market regulation should take account of the advisory role that the Treaty confers upon the ECB , by allowing for the incorporation of the views of the ECB in the regulatory process .
Mere konkret og for at sikre klarhed og effektivitet i denne procedure kan der være behov for en klar identifikation af de gennemfłrelsesbestemmelser , der błr vedtages i overensstemmelse med den procedure , der henvises til i direktivforslagets artikel 17 , stk . 2 ( dvs .
More specifically , and for the sake of the clarity and efficiency of this procedure , there may be a need for a clear identification of the implementing measures that should be adopted in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 17 ( 2 ) of the proposed directive ( i.e. the comitology procedure ) .
Det kan derfor være tilrådeligt enten i artikel 17 , stk . 2 , udtrykkeligt at gentage de artikler , hvor komitologiproceduren forudses anvendt , eller i det mindste at samle alle de forskellige typer gennemfłrelsesbestemmelser , der skal vedtages efter komitologiproceduren , i Øn enkelt artikel .
It may therefore be advisable either to expressly enumerate the articles which envisage the use of the comitology procedure in Article 17 ( 2 ) or , as a minimum , to assemble all categories of implementing measures to be adopted according to the comitology procedure in one single article .
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ECB stłtter direktivforslagets brede anvendelsesområde for så vidt angår de omhandlede finansielle instrumenter og markeder ( artikel 9 ) såvel som forslagets brede geografiske anvendelsesområde ( artikel 10 ) , der må antages at bidrage til at etablere lige konkurrencevilkår på de europæiske finansmarkeder .
The ECB supports the wide scope of application of the proposed directive in terms of the financial instruments and markets covered ( Article 9 ) , as well as its wide geographical application ( Article 10 ) , which should contribute to creating a level playing field within the European financial markets .
ECB bemærker undtagelsen fra direktivforslagets anvendelsesområde af » transaktioner , der som led i penge - eller valutakurspolitikken eller styringen af den offentlige gæld gennemfłres af en medlemsstat , Det Europæiske System af Centralbanker , en national centralbank eller ethvert andet officielt udpeget organ eller af enhver person , der handler på deres vegne . «, som anfłrt i artikel 7 .
The ECB notes the exemption from the scope of the proposed directive of  transactions carried out in pursuit of monetary , exchange-rate or public debt-management policy by a Member State , by the European System of Central Banks , a national central bank or any other officially designated body , or by any person acting on their behalf , as stated in Article 7 .
2 i traktaten er de grundlæggende opgaver , der skal udfłres af Det Europæiske System af Centralbanker (» Eurosystemet «) blandt andet at formulere og gennemfłre Fællesskabets monetære politik , at foretage transaktioner i udenlandsk valuta samt besidde og forvalte medlemsstaternes officielle valutareserver .
According to Article 105 ( 2 ) of the Treaty , the basic tasks to be carried out by the European System of Central Banks ( Eurosystem ) shall be , inter alia , to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community , to conduct foreign exchange operations and to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States .
På disse områder har ECB 's Styrelsesråd eksklusiv kompetence og er som sådant altid i besiddelse af intern viden , der ikke błr være til hinder for , at rådet udfłrer de nłdvendige transaktioner til gennemfłrelse af sine politikker , hvilket błr komme til udtryk i bestemmelserne vedrłrende denne undtagelse .
In these areas , the Governing Council of the ECB has sole competence and as such always has inside information at its disposal that should not prevent it from carrying out the necessary transactions to implement its policies and this should be reflected in the provisions on this exemption .
Så længe der findes medlemsstater med dispensation , bevarer disses nationale centralbanker i henhold til artikel 122 , stk . 3 , i traktaten desuden deres kompetence på disse områder .
In addition , as long as there are Member States with a derogation , their NCBs retain competence in these areas pursuant to Article 122 ( 3 ) of the Treaty .
Angående direktivforslagets artikel 7 skal det bemærkes , at en lignende undtagelse er indeholdt i artikel 2 , stk . 4 , i direktivet om insiderhandel .
It should be noted , regarding Article 7 of the proposed directive , that a similar exemption is included in Article 2 ( 4 ) of the Insider Dealing Directive .
delingen mellem de forskellige involverede parter i lyset af målet om at sikre finansmarkedernes integritet . ECB łnsker derfor at fremkomme med fłlgende kommentarer .
ISD , in particular in respect of the legal concepts used in these different legal texts and of the allocation of responsibilities between the different parties concerned with regard to the aim of safeguarding the integrity of the financial markets .
For det fłrste kræver direktivforslagets artikel 6 , stk .
In this respect , the ECB would like to submit the following comments .
5 , at » fysiske eller juridiske personer , der som led i deres erhverv gennemfłrer transaktioner med finansielle instrumenter , undlader at gennemfłre en sådan transaktion og afviser ordrer på deres kunders vegne , hvis det med rimelighed kan antages , at transaktionen er baseret på intern viden eller udgłr kursmanipulation .
First , Article 6 ( 5 ) of the proposed directive requires that  a natural person , or an entity , professionally arranging transactions in financial instruments shall refrain from entering into transactions , and reject orders on behalf of its clients , if it reasonably suspects that a transaction would be based on inside information or would constitute market manipulation .
« Det kunne være nyttigt med afklaring af , om denne bestemmelse også omfatter back office-aktiviteter såsom matching af ordrer .
It may be helpful to clarify whether this provision also covers back office activities such as order matching .
Desuden kunne det i direktivforslaget understreges , at det er łnskeligt , at markedsoperatłrerne har installeret systemer , der hurtigt afslłrer misbrug eller unormale aktiviteter .
Furthermore , the desirability for market operators to have mechanisms in place which promptly detect abusive or anomalous activities may also be highlighted in the proposed directive .
For det andet kunne det være nyttigt , at det præciseres i direktivforslaget , hvorvidt og under hvilke betingelser kompetente myndigheder , som defineret i artikel 11 , har mulighed for at uddelegere dele af deres tilsynsansvar til markedsoperatłrer for så vidt angår kontrol - og overvågningsaktiviteter .
Secondly , it may be helpful to specify in the proposed directive whether and under which conditions competent authorities within the meaning of its Article 11 may have the possibility to delegate parts of their supervisory responsibilities to market operators in terms of monitoring and surveillance activities .
En sådan præcisering kunne være łnskelig , idet den aktuelle formulering i direktivforslaget kun indeholder bestemmelse om samarbejde mellem de kompetente myndigheder og » andre myndigheder , inklusive retslige myndigheder «.
Such clarification might be desirable as the current wording of the proposed directive only provides for collaboration of competent authorities with  other authorities , including judicial authorities .
For det tredje skal det anbefales med henblik på at sikre ensartethed , at listen over finansielle instrumenter inkluderet i direktivforslaget er identisk med den liste , der er vedlagt som bilag til ISD , når det formelt er ajourfłrt , samt at sidstnævnte er så udtłmmende som muligt .
Thirdly , for the sake of consistency , it is recommended that the list of financial instruments included in the proposed directive be identical to the list annexed to the ISD , once formally upgraded , and that the latter be as exhaustive as possible .
ECB forstår , at direktivforslaget har til formål at omfatte markedsmisbrug både i form af insiderhandel og i form af kursmanipulation ( jf . betragtning 9 i direktivforslaget ) .
The ECB understands that the proposed directive is intended to cover market abuse both in the form of insider dealing and in the form of market manipulation ( recital 9 of the proposed directive ) .
ECB skal i denne forbindelse anbefale , at de centrale definitioner angående formålet om beskyttelse af markedsintegriteten præciseres i selve direktivforslaget for derved at undgå afvigelser mellem de forskellige nationale love i medlemsstaterne .
The ECB recommends in this respect that the core definitions related to the purpose of the protection of market integrity be clarified in the proposed directive itself , so as to avoid any discrepancy between the various national laws of Member States .
ECB er enig i synspunktet i begrundelsen om , at ajourfłringen af listen over finansielle instrumenter defineret i afsnit A i direktivforslagets bilag błr tage nye udviklinger i finansmarkederne i betragtning .
As stated in the explanatory memorandum , the ECB shares the view that the updating of the list of financial instruments defined in Section A of the Annex to the proposed directive should take into account new developments in financial markets .
ECB bemærker , at Kommissionen i sine forelłbige forslag angående den kommende revision af investeringsservicedirektivet ( ISD ) ( 1 ) forudser en mulighed for , at der i det reviderede ISD indarbejdes bestemmelser , som vil supplere de forpligtelser og forbud , der på nuværende tidspunkt er indeholdt i direktivforslaget .
The ECB notes that the European Commission envisages , in its preliminary suggestions regarding the future review of the Investment Services Directive ( ISD ) ( 1 ) , the possible incorporation in the revised ISD of some provisions which would supplement the obligations and prohibitions currently enshrined in the proposed directive .
Sådanne bestemmelser kunne især omhandle individuelle ansvarsområder for de kompetente myndigheder , som er defineret i direktivforslaget , for markedsoperatłrer og for investeringsselskaber .
Such provisions might address , in particular , individual responsibilities attributed to competent authorities within the meaning of the proposed directive , to market operators and to investment firms .
Uden på forhånd at tage stilling til et fremtidigt forslag fra Kommissionen til direktiv til revision af ISD , kan det anbefales , at der på nuværende tidspunkt sikres overensstemmelse mellem direktivforslaget og det reviderede ISD , især for så vidt angår de juridiske begreber , der anvendes i disse forskellige retstekster , og for så vidt angår ansvarsfor ( 1 ) Rådets direktiv 93/22 / EØF af 10 . maj 1993 om investeringsservice i forbindelse med værdipapirer ( EFT L 141 , 11.6.1993 , s. 27 ) .
Without prejudging any future Commission proposal for a directive revising the ISD , it might be recommended at this stage that consistency be ensured between the proposed directive and the revised ( 1 ) Council Directive 93/22 / EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field ( OJ L 141 , 11.6.1993 , p. 27 ) .
ECB bemærker endvidere , at direktivforslaget indeholder bestemmelser om konkret samarbejde ( såsom gensidig bistand og informationsudveksling ) mellem de kompetente » enkelte administrative myndigheder « ( i det fłlgende benævnt » administrative myndigheder «) med henblik på at sikre anvendelsen af direktivforslagets bestemmelser .
The ECB also notes that the proposed directive provides for specific cooperation ( such as mutual assistance and sharing of information ) between the competent  single administrative authorit [ ies ]  in order to ensure the application of the provisions of the proposed directive ( hereinafter referred to as the  administrative authorities ) .
Efter ECB 's opfattelse er dette grænseoverskridende samarbejde virkelig værdifuldt , og ECB ser positivt på de pågældende bestemmelser i direktivforslaget .
In the view of the ECB , this cross-border cooperation is certainly valuable and the ECB welcomes the relevant provisions in the proposed directive .
ECB skal derudover foreslå , at en udvidelse af anvendelsesområdet for samarbejde overvejes , ved at inkludere en mulighed for eller endog en forpligtelse til at samarbejde og udveksle oplysninger , som rækker videre end blot samarbejde mellem administrative myndigheder .
In addition , the ECB suggests that broadening the scope of cooperation should be considered , by including a possibility , or even an obligation , of cooperation and sharing of information that goes beyond mere cooperation between administrative authorities .
Dette er særlig relevant set i lyset af direktivforslagets artikel 9 og 10 , der omtaler det stadig vigtigere grænseoverskridende aspekt af misbrugsformer på finansmarkederne .
This is of particular relevance in the light of Articles 9 and 10 of the proposed directive which recall the increasing cross-border dimension of abusive practices in financial markets .
ECB finder , at der kan være fordele ved et tættere samarbejde mellem de administrative myndigheder og kompetente myndigheder med tilsynsansvar for kreditinstitutter , investeringsselskaber , forsikringsselskaber og muligvis institutter for kollektiv investering ( regulerede enheder ) for så vidt de er forskellige fra de udpegede administrative myndigheder .
The ECB sees potential benefits in a closer cooperation between the administrative authorities and the competent authorities in charge of supervising credit institutions , investment firms , insurance undertakings and , perhaps , collective investment undertakings ( regulated entities ) , to the extent that they are distinct from the designated administrative authorities .
Disse regulerede enheder deltager aktivt i regulerede markeder , og deres ansatte er ofte i besiddelse af intern viden .
These regulated entities participate actively in regulated markets and their staff often possess inside information .
Som en del af den operationelle risiko er disse regulerede enheder udsat for risikoen for , at deres ansatte eller ledelse overtræder direktivforslagets bestemmelser .
As part of the operational risk , these regulated entities are exposed to the risk that their staff or management may breach the provisions of the proposed directive .
Sådanne overtrædelser kan have en betydeligt negativ indvirkning på investorer og kan også indebære væsentlige omdłmmemæssige risici for den pågældende regulerede enhed .
Such breaches may have a significant negative impact on investors and also mean significant reputational risk for the regulated entity involved .
ECB mener derfor , at et tæt samarbejde mellem de administrative myndigheder og de » kompetente myndigheder « vil være til gavn for
The ECB therefore believes that close cooperation between the administrative authorities and the  competent
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bestræbelserne på at opfylde disse myndigheders respektive målsætninger .
authorities  will be beneficial to the pursuit of the respective objectives of these authorities .
National lovgivning på dette område giver faktisk allerede i visse tilfælde mulighed for et sådant samarbejde .
In fact , national legislation in this field already provides , in certain instances , for such cooperation .
Det kan derfor være formålstjenligt at indfłre et sådant grundlag for gensidigt samarbejde i hele det indre marked .
Consequently , it may be worthwhile to introduce such a framework of mutual cooperation for the entire single market .
Men for at opnå dette resultat er der behov for en revurdering ikke kun af direktivforslagets bestemmelser ( særlig artikel 12 og 16 ) men også af sektordirektivernes relevante bestemmelser om tavshedspligt og tilsynsmæssigt samarbejde ( jf . artikel 30 i det konsoliderede bankdirektiv ( 1 ) og de tilsvarende bestemmelser i andre sektordirektiver ) .
However , in order to achieve this result , a re-examination not only of the provisions of the proposed directive ( in particular Articles 12 and 16 ) but also of the relevant provisions of the sectoral directives on professional secrecy and supervisory cooperation ( see Article 30 of the Consolidated Banking Directive ( 1 ) and the corresponding provisions in the other sectoral Directives ) is warranted .
Ved en sådan revurdering måtte det undersłges  i overensstemmelse med den ovennævnte komitologiprocedure  hvorvidt de respektive bestemmelser i disse direktiver giver mulighed for et sådant samarbejde ( 2 ) .
Such a re-examination would have to investigate , in accordance with the abovementioned comitology procedure , whether the respective provisions of these directives allow such cooperation ( 2 ) .
For at sikre klarhed skal ECB desuden anbefale , at Kommissionen underrettes om de enkelte administrative myndigheder , som udpeges af medlemsstaterne i henhold til direktivforslagets artikel 11 ( dvs . » de koordinerende myndigheder «) , samt at deres navne offentliggłres i De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende .
For the sake of clarity , the ECB also recommends that the single administrative authorities designated by Member States in accordance with Article 11 of the proposed directive ( i.e. the  coordinating authorities ) be notified to the European Commission and their names published in the Official Journal of the European Communities .