natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I visse tilfzlde kan en bestemt rentesats sztte en arvre eller en nedre g r m s e for markedsrenterne , mens en anden rentesats anvendes til at styre dem .
In some cases , one rate provides an upper limit or a lower limit to market rates , while a second rate serves to guide them .
I andre tilfzlde kan to rentesatser fastsztte en korridor for de korte markedssatser , som igen styres af centralbankens interventioner på pengemarkedet , således som det er tilfzldet i Belgien .
In other cases , two rates may set a corridor for short-term market rates , the latter being steered through money market interventions by the central bank , as is the case in Belgium .
Centralbanker kan også signalere pengepolitiske intentioner ved at zndre på procedurer , iszr hvad angår auktionsformer og labetider på markedsoperationer .
Central banks can also indicate policy intentions by changing procedures , in particular the auction procedure or the maturity of market operations .
Nogle centralbanker kan f. eks . skifte fra rentetilbudsauktioner til mzngdetilbudsauktioner for at stabilisere markedets forventninger eller for at forstærke virkningen af justeringer i officielle rentesatser , således som Deutsche Bundesbank gjorde i september 1992 .
For instance , some central banks may switch from interest rate to volume tenders to stabilise market expectations , or to reinforce the impact of adjustments in official interest rates , as did the Deutsche Bundesbank in September 1992 . 111 .
INSTITUTIONELLE RAMMER FOR MEDLEMSLANDENES CENTRALBANKER 1 .
INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF COMMUNITY CENTRAL BANKS 1 .
STATUTTER OG UAFHÆNGIGHED
STATUTES AND INDEPENDENCE
Traktaten om Den Europzeiske Union giver et klart mandat til Det Europæiske System af Centralbanker ( ESCB ) til at fastholde prisstabilitet .
The Treaty on European Union lays down a clear mandate for the European System of Central Banks ( ESCB ) to maintain price stability .
For at opfylde dette er det vigtigt , at ESCB 's besluttende myndigheder ikke er underlagt instruktioner fra andre organer , som kunne stå i vejen for opnåelsen af denne målsætning .
To fulfil this mandate , it is important that the decision-making authorities of the ESCB are not subject to directives from other bodies which could stand in conflict with this objective .
Som en konsekvens heraf fastszetter ESCB-statutten en rzekke regler , der skal sikre , at systemet vil vzere uafhzengigt i udforelsen af de opgaver , det har fået pålagt .
In consequence , the ESCB Statute lays down a number of provisions to ensure that the System will be independent in the performance of its assigned tasks .
Specielt specificerer statutten , at ECB , de nationale centralbanker og medlemmerne af disses besluttende organer skal udfore deres opgaver uden at modtage instrukser fra nationale eller fællesskabsmyndigheder .
In particular , the Statute specifies that the ECB , the national central banks and any member of their decisionmaking bodies shall act without receiving instructions from national or Community authorities .
Herudover garanterer statutterne , at medlemmer af de besluttende organer har ansættelsestryghed til at udfore deres opgaver .
Moreover , the Statute guarantees that members of the decision-making bodies are provided with assured tenure to fulfil their duties .
Foruden disse regler om politisk eller institutionel uafhængighed sikres systemets okonomiske og daglige uafhængighed af funktionelle , operationelle og finansielle bestemmelser i statutten .
In addition to the provisions specifying the political or institutional independence , the economic or practical independence of the System is confirmed by the functional , operational and financial provisions embodied in the Statute .
I overensstemmelse med artikel 108 i Traktaten skal hvert medlemsland sikre , at senest på tidspunktet for ESCB 's oprettelse skal det pågzeldende medlemslands nationale lovgivning , herunder statutterne for medlemslandets egen centralbank , være forenelig med Traktaten og statutten .'
In accordance with Article 108 of the Treaty , each Member State shall ensure , at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB , that its national legislation including the statute of its national central bank is compatible with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB .
ten .' 1 Artikel 109e ( 5 ) bestemmes det , at processen , der skal fore til centralbankernes uafhængighed , skal starte i anden fase .
1 Article 109e ( 5 ) stipulates that the process leading to the independence of central banks should start during the Second Stage .
Forbudet mod , at centralbanken giver mulighed for overtræksadgang eller andre former for kreditfaciliteter til den offentlige sektor , som det fremgår af Traktatens artikel 104 , skal gælde fra starten af anden fase ( se artikel 109e ( 3 ) i rakt at en )^ En rzkke lande har allerede besluttet at begynde den proces , der skal fore til afcentralbankernes fuldstændige uafhzengighed .
The prohibition on central banks extending overdrafts or any other type of credit to the public sector provided for in Article 104 of the Treaty will apply as from the start of Stage Two ( see Article 109e ( 3 ) of the treat ^) . ^ A number of countries have decided to begin the process leading towards full central bank independence .
På denne baggrund giver det efterf ~ lgende snit en kort oversigt over de i dag gældende institutionelle forhold i de nationale centralbanker i Fællesskabet ( se tabel 7 ) .
Against this background , the following section presents a brief summary of the current institutional features of national central banks in the Community ( see Table 7 ) .
Beskrivelsen her koncentreres om hovedsporgsmålene , mens Annex II giver en mere detaljeret beskrivelse af de nationale forhold .
This description concentrates on the main aspects whereas Annex I1 offers a more extensive summary of national features .
Denne regel gælder ikke for England , så længe England ikke deltager i tredje fase af 0MU ( Se afsnit 5 og 11 af Protokollen om visse bestemmelser vedrnrende Det Forenede Kongerige Storbritannien og Nordirland ) . Beslutningerne taget af stats - og regeringscheferne ved Edinburgh-topmadet den 11 .
This provision does not apply to the United Kingdom as long as it does not participate in the third stage of EMU ( see Sections 5 and 11 of the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom ) .
- 12 . december 1992 indebærer herudover , at Danmark ( som har meddelt , at det ikke vil deltage i tredje fase af m U ) vil bevare sine nuværende bef ~ jelser med hensyn til pengepolitik i henhold til danske love og forskrifter , herunder Danmarks Nationalbanks befojelser i pengepolitiske anliggender .
Furthermore , the Decision taken by the Heads of State and Government at their Edinburgh Summit meeting on 1lthll2th December 1992 implies that Denmark ( which has given notification that it will not participate in Stage Three of EMU ) will retain its existing powers in the field of monetary policy according to its national laws and regulations , including the powers of Danmarks Nationalbank in the field of monetary policy .
Med undtagelse af de særregler , der gælder i f ~ l g e afsnit 11 i Protokollen om visse bestemmelser vedrnrende Det Forenede Kongerige Storbritannien og Nordirland . Protokollen bestemmer , at den engelske regering kan opretholde sin « Ways and MeansV-facilitet Bank of England , såfremt og så længe England ikke deltager i hos 0 MU' ens tredje fase .
Subject to Section 11 of the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom which grants the government the right to maintain its « ways and means » facility with the Bank of England as long as the United Kingdom does not participate in Stage Three of EMU .
2 TABEL 7 : INSTITUTIONELLE RAMMER FOR MEDLEMSLANDENES CENTRALBA
TABLE 7 : INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF COMMUNITY CENTRA Item PRINCIPAL STATUTORY OBJECTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR : 1 Exchange Rate Regime 2 - Setting targets for monetary growth 3 Changing key interest rates NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM DANMARKS NATIONAL BANK DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK BANK OF GREECE None , although safeguarding To maintain a safe and secure currency system the currency implicit l 2
- Centralbank 2
3 - IGovernment 2 Central Bank ( no target set at present ) 3Central Bank
- Centralbank 1 - Effektuering af penge -
- Government I Government Central Bank 2 Central Bank ( no target set at present ) 3 - Central Bank Central Bank Yes 1 - Yes
- Udstedelseaf penge 3 .
1 - Government 2 - Central Bank 3 - CentralBank
- Betalingssystem - ydelser 4 - Bankernes og regeringens
RESPONSIBILITIES : 1 - Execution of monetary and exchange rate policy 2 - Issue of currency 3 - Payment system services 4 - Bank of banks and government 5 - Supervision of financial institutions 6 - Safeguard financial stability 7 - Official reserve management GOVERNING BODIES
- Tilsyn med finansielle
Yes 1
- Direktioner for centralbanker i Liinderne
1 - Yes
- Censurkorniteen - E
2 - Yes 3 - Yes 4 - Yes
- 5 Ar ( Genudnwnelse - 4
2 - Yes 3 Yes 4 - Yes
1 - Effektuering af penge -
2 - Yes 3 - Yes 4 - Yes 5 - No
- Udstedelseaf penge 3 . - Betalingssystem - ydelser 4 .
2 - Yes 3 - Yes 4 - Yes 5 5 - No 6 Yes 7 - Yes
- Bankernes og regeringens 5 .
5 - No 6 - Yes -
- Tilsyn med finansielle
6 - Yes 7 - Yes 6 - Yes 7 - Yes
- Præsidenten efter slag af ministerrådet
Governor Board of Directors Council of Regency Board of Censors General Council -
ind seresewekrav - Andre institutionelleændringer , der kræves , forat op -
Board of Governors Board of Directors Committee of Directors Royal Bank Commissioner -
kræve traktat fert ind
Central Bank Council Directorate
skrevn
General Council
Ikke alle medlemslandenes centralbanker har en klar lovfzstet målsætning for udfrarelsen af pengepolitikken . Ikke desto mindre er der enighed blandt centralbankerne om , at hovedmålsztningen for pengepolitikken er at sikre pengenes vzrdi eller med andre ord at opnå prisstabilitet .
Managing Board of Land Central Banks Federal President on proposal of Federal Government after consultat ~ on Central of Bank Council Normally 8 years , minimum 2 years ( renewable ) APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR By :
Selv i de tilfælde , hvor dette ikke er en lovfæstet forpligtelse , forudsættes det at være en fundamental pengepolitisk målsztning . Medlemslandenes centralbankers hovedopgave er forholdsvis ensartede .
PLANNED CHANGES Legislation to prohibit « monetary financing » and to ensure central bank independence on monetary policy decisions adopted in March 1993
Alle centralbanker har ansvaret for udfarelsen af pengepolitikken og for valutamarkedsoperationer .
None Consideration of proposals to increase the independence of the central Bank in the near future and to make the Statut more compatible with the Maastricht Treaty
Herudover er det typiske , at medlemslandenes centralbanker udsteder sedler , er de private bankers bank , udfarer opgaver for staten som fiskal agent , varetager placeringen af valutareserverne og har opgaver i forbindelse med betalingssystemer . Centralbanker har også i almindelighed et præcist mandat til at sikre finansiel stabilitet .
TABLE 7 ( CONT' D ) : INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF COMMUNITY CEN CENTRAL BANK OF Item PRINCIPAL STATUTORY OBJECTIVE IRELAND To safeguard the integrity of None , although safeguarding the currency implicit the currency BANCA D' ITALIA INSTITUT MON ~ TAIRE LUXEMBOURGEOIS To promote the stability of the currency NEDERLANDSCHE BA
De fleste centralbanker har lovmzssigt ansvar for banktilsyn med Belgien , Danmark og Tyskland som undtagelser .
To safeguard the value o currency LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR : 1 Exchange Rate Regime 2
Selv om der er bred overensstemmelse , hvad angår hovedopgaver , er der væsentlige forskelle mellem centralbankernes ansvar i forbindelse med tilrettelæggelsen og udfarelsen af pengepolitikken . Formulering og udf ~ relse pengepolitik af Graden af reel uafhængighed for centralbanken varierer betydeligt , hvad angår formuleringen af pengepolitikken , f. eks .
Settlng targets for monetary growth Changing key interest rates 1 Government 1 - Government 2 - Jo ~ nt with Government 2 - Central Bank ( no target set at present ) 3 - Central Bank 3 - Central Bank 1 - Yes 2 - Yes
i fastszttelse af kvantitative målsztninger .
- l - Government 2 Not applicable
Denne er ikke blot afhzngig af konkret lovfastsatte regler , men er også afhængig af historiske traditioner og den praksis , der er udviklet over en lang periode .
l - Government 2 - Central Bank ( no target set at pres 3 - Central Bank 1
De nationale erfaringer varierer over et spektrum spændende fra , hvor centralbanken har fuldstzndig diskretion som i Tyskland , til mellemtilfælde , hvor der er betydelig autonomi i den praktiske udfarelse , men hvor regeringen har visse rettigheder , enten lovfastsatte eller gennem skik og brug til at påvirke eller tage beslutninger ;
RESPONSIBILITIES : 1 - Execut ~ on monetary of and exchange rate policy 2 - Issue of currency 3 - Payment system servlces 4 - Bank of banks and government 5 - Supervision of financial institutions 6 - Safeguard financ ~ al stability 7 - Official reserve management GOVERNING BODIES
og endelig til de tilfælde , hvor regeringen har hovedansvaret for formuleringen af politikken , og hvor centralbanken har en rådgivende rolle .
Board of Directors - Governor , Director-General , 2 Deputy Director-Generals
Graden af frihed til at ændre officielle rentesatser er afgrarende ved fastlæggelse af en centralbanks uafhængighed .
( Directorate ) Board of D ~ rectors Board of D ~ rectors \ nth approval of Government
Juridisk set har hovedparten af medlemslandenes centralbanker retten til at ændre naglesatser .
OBJECTTVES AND TASKS OF CENTRAL BANKS Not all Community central banks have a clear statutory objective in the monetary policy field .
Der er imidlertid i nogle lande en vigtig forskel med hensyn til de juridisk fastsatte regler og den praktiske udfarelse med det resultat , at regeringer er tæt involveret i de vigtigste beslutninger .
Even in the cases where this is not a statutory obligation , this is taken to be a fundamental monetary policy responsibility . The principal tasks of Community central banks are relatively similar .
I England f. eks .
All central banks have responsibility for executing monetary policy and foreign exchange operations .
har regeringen traditionelt haft ansvaret for fastlzggelsen af politikken , idet den dog udfrarer den i samråd med centralbanken .
In addition , Community central banks typically issue bank notes , act as the bank for commercial banks , provide services to the government as a fiscal agent , manage official reserves , and have responsibilities with respect to payment systems .
I Frankrig bliver pengepolitiske beslutninger taget i fzllesskab med regeringen .
Central banks also generally have an explicit mandate to safeguard financial stability . Most central banks have legal responsibilities for banking supervision , but Belgium , Denmark , and Germany are exceptions .
Centralbanker har normalt betydelig frihed til at vzlge sammensætningen af pengepolitiske instrumenter og de teknikker , de vzlger at benytte i deres aktiviteter på pengemarkedet .
In spite of the broad similarity in the principal tasks , there are substantial differences in the extent of central bank responsibility for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy .
I Tyskland f. eks .
Monetary policy formulation and implementation The degree of practical independence of the central bank in the formulation of monetary policy , for example such as the setting of quantified intermediate objectives , varies considerably .
fremgår sættet af instrumenter af centralbankens statutter . In -
It depends not only on legal provisions but also on historical traditions and practices which have evolved over an extended period . National experiences vary across a spectrum : ranging from those where there is complete discretion for the central bank , as in Germany ;
denfor disse rammer er der fuldkommen frihed til at anvende instrumenterne .
through to cases where the government has primary responsibility for policy formulation and where the central bank plays an advisory role .
En generel undtagelse gzlder for brugen af kassereservekrav i medlemslandene .
A key component of central bank independence is the degree of freedom to change official interest rates .
Da reservekrav har fiskale konsekvenser , hvis de ikke forrentes på markedsvilkår , gzlder det , at regeringen ofte har indflydelse på f. eks .
However , in some countries there is an important distinction between legal rights and customary practice to the effect that governments are closely involved with key decisions . In the United Kingdom , for example , the government has traditionally been responsible for policy formulation , though acting in consultation with the central bank .
den maksimumssats , der kan fastszttes , og på definitionen af de finansielle instrumenter , der skal pålzgges kassereservekrav .
As reserve requirements have fiscal implications if they are not remunerated at market rates , there is often government involvement , for example in determining the maximum rate which can be applied , and in specifying the financial instruments subject to the obligation .
Valutakurssystem De fleste af Fællesskabets lande deltager i valutakurssamarbejdet ( ERM ) og i flere lande - Belgien , Holland , Irland , Luxembourg og Portugal - er valutakursen det eneste mellemmal for pengepolitikken .
Exchange rate regime Most Community countries participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism and in several countries - Belgium , Ireland , Luxembourg , the Netherlands and Portugal - the exchange rate is the only intermediate target for monetary policy .
Befnjelserne til at beslutte , om et land skal deltage eller ej i et valutakurssamarbejde , som f. eks . EMS' en , ligger i alle medlemslande hos regeringen .
The power to decide whether or not to participate in exchange rate arrangements , such as the EMS , resides with the government in all Community countries .
Dette gælder også beslutninger om zndring af centralkurser .
This also applies to decisions on changes in central parities .
Centralbanken har dog ofte betydelig handlefrihed , hvad angår den daglige udfarrelse af valutakurspolitikken .
However , central banks are often assigned considerable operational freedom in the day-to-day operation of exchange rate policy .
De fleste centralbanker har f. eks . fuld frihed til at foretage interventioner med undtagelse af Frankrig , hvor Banque de France styrer bevægelser i franc-kursen i overensstemmelse med de af finansministeriet udstedte generelle retningslinjer , og England , hvor Bank of England handler som agent for finansministeriet .
For example , most central banks have the discretion to undertake foreign exchange intervention on their own authority ; exceptions are France , where the Banque de France monitors the fluctuation of its currency , according to the general directions of the Ministry of Finance ;
Politiske myndigheders rolle I adskillige lande findes legale bestemmelser , som kan begrznse centralbankens uafhzngighed , når den foretager beslutninger , selvom disse bestemmelser aldrig har vzret anvendt i praksis . I Holland gælder det f. eks .
and the United Kingdom , where the Bank of England acts as an agent of the Treasury . Role of political authorities In several countries there are currently legal provisions which may limit the independence of central bank decision-making , but in practice these powers have never been invoked .
, at finansministeren har ret til at give direktiver til centralbanken , selvom der er strenge sikkerhedsbestemmelser , der begrznser denne ret . Der findes f. eks .
For example , in the Netherlands , the Minister of Finance has the authority to give directions to the central bank , although there are strict safeguards controlling this privilege , including an appeals procedure and a provision enabling the central bank to publish its opinion .
en appelmulighed og en bestemmelse , der garr det muligt for centralbanken at offentliggnre sin mening . I Belgien ophzvedes i marts 1993 regeringskommissærens og finansministerens ret til at nedlægge veto mod de af centralbankens beslutninger , der angår dens hovedområde .
In Belgium , the statutory power of the government commissioner and the Minister of Finance to suspend or to veto central bank decisions was abolished , as far as the basic tasks of the Bank are concerned , in March 1993 .
I Tyskland kan forbundsregeringen udsztte pengepolitiske ændringer med op til to uger , men herefter gzlder Bundesbankbeslutningen .
In Germany , decisions on policy changes may be delayed by two weeks at the request of the Federal Government , although , thereafter , the decision of the Bundesbank rests supreme .
For andre centralbanker gzlder det også , at der findes officielle tilsynsfnrere eller kommisszrer udpeget af regeringen , hvis hovedopgave det er at kontrollere , at legale forpligtelser overholdes .
In other central banks , too , there are official censors or commissioners appointed by governments , whose broad function is to monitor the observance of legal obligations .
sidder den tilsynsfarrende i generalrådet og kan modsztte sig beslutninger , hvilket indebaerer , at en beslutning skal genovervejes . I Grækenland gzlder det , at den regeringskommissær , der sidder i bestyrelsen uden stemmeret , kan nedlægge veto mod beslutninger , dog kun hvis han finder , at de strider mod landets love .
Formal powers differ , however : in France , for example , the censor sits on the General Council and can raise objections to decisions , in which case the matter is reconsidered ; whilst in Greece , the non-voting government commissioner can veto decisions only if he judges them to be contrary to national law .
Reprzsentanter for regeringen sidder i den spanske centralbanks generalråd og har samme stemmerettigheder som andre medlemmer .
Government representatives sit on the General Council of the central bank in Spain , and have equal voting rights to other members .
UDNÆVNELSESPROCEDURER FOR CENTRALBANKCHEFER
APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES FOR CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS
Politiske myndigheder har en vigtig rolle ved udnzvnelsen af medlemmer til de vigtigste af de besluttende organer i medlemslandenes centralbanker .
The political authorities play an important role in the appointment of members of the principal governing bodies of Community central banks .
En komplet beskrivelse af de enkelte landes procedurer findes i anneks II .
A full description of national procedures is presented in Annex 11 .
For at forenkle beskrivelsen koncentrerer dette afsnit sig om udnævnelse af centralbankchefer , som vil blive medlemmer af Rådet for EM1 og for ECB 's Styrelsesråd eller Generelle Råd .
For simplicity , this section concentrates on the appointment of central bank Governors , who will be members of the Council of the EM1 and of the Governing or General Council of the ECB .
Centralbankchefer bliver normalt udpeget af et lands statsoverhoved efter indstilling fra regeringen , eller regeringen foretager selv udpegelsen .
Central bank Governors are normally appointed either by the Head of State on a recommendation from the government or by the government itself .
De vigtige undtagelser er her Italien , hvor det er bestyrelsen , der foretager udnævnelsen , selvom regeringen skal godkende den , og Holland , hvor det er centralbanken selv , der indstiller personen , mens den formelle udnævnelse sker ved kongelig udnævnelse .
The principal exceptions are Italy , where the appointment is made by the Board of Directors , although with government approval , and the Netherlands , where nominations for Governor are made by the central bank , although formal appointment is by the Crown .
I Tyskland bliver centralbankrådet officielt konsulteret f0r en person indstilles .
In Germany , the Central Bank Council is officially consulted on nominations .
Udnævnelsesperioder varierer betydeligt i de forskellige lande .
Terms of office differ considerably .
På den ene fl0j findes Frankrig og Danmark , hvor der ikke er nogen fast udnzvnelsesperiode , og i princippet kan udnævnelsen tilbagekaldes på ethvert tidspunkt .
At one extreme , there is no fixed term in Denmark and France and , in principle at least , appointments can be revoked at any time .