natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nationale Bank van Belgiel Banque Nationale de Belgique Danmarks Nationalbank Deutsche Bundesbank Bank of Greece Banco de Espaiia
Nationale Bank van Belgiel Banque Nationale de Belgique Danmarks Nationalbank Deutsche Bundesbank Bank of Greece Banco de Espaiia Banque de France Central Bank of Ireland Banca d' Italia Institut MonCtaire Luxembourgeois De Nederlandsche Bank Banco de Portugal Bank of England
E. Hoffmeyer H. Schlesinger E. Christodoulou
E. Hoffmeyer H. Schlesinger E. Christodoulou L. Rojo * J. de Larosikre
M. Doyle C. Ciampi P. Jaans W. Duisenberg M. Beleza
M. Doyle C. Ciampi P. Jaans W. Duisenberg
** R. Leigh-Pemberton
M. Beleza ** R. Leigh-Pemberton
Et medlem af EF-Kommissionen indbydes som regel til at deltage som observat ~ ri Centralbankchefkomiteens marder .
The Commission of the European Communities is , as a general rule , invited to send one of its members as a representative to the meetings of the Committee of Governors .
Efterfulgte M. Rubio med virkning fra den 18 . juli 1992 .
Replaced M. Rubio with effect from 18th July 1992 .
Efterfulgte J. Tavares Moreira med virkning fra den 4 . maj 1992 .
Replaced J. Tavares Moreira with effect from 4th May 1992 .
INDHOLDSFORTEGNELSE INDLEDNING OG VURDERING .....
TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENT .....
Pengepolitik med spændinger på valutamarkedet som baggrund .....
Monetary policy in an environment of exchange market tensions .....
Målszetningerne for pengepolitikken i 1993 .....
Monetary policy orientations for 1993 .....
Forberedende arbejde for overgangen til anden og tredje fase af Den Dkonomiske og Monetære Union ..... 6
Preparatory work for the move to Stages Two and Three of Economic 6 and Monetary Union .....
DEN OKONOMISKE UDVIKLING OG IMPLEMENTERING AF PENGEPOLITIKKEN .....
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MONETARY POLICY 9 IMPLEMENTATION .....
Den okonomiske baggrund for pengepolitikken .....
Economic background to monetary policy .....
Den monetzere udvikling og valutakursudviklingen .....
Monetary and exchange rate developments .....
Dkonomiske udsigter og sporgsmål for pengepolitikken .....
Economic prospects and monetary policy issues .....
Udviklingen på markedet for den private ECU .....
Developments in the private ECU market .....
32 PENGEPOLITISKE INSTRUMENTER OG PENGEPOLITISK STYRING I MEDLEMSLANDENE .....
32 MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES IN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES .....
Hovedinstrumenter .....
Principal instruments .....
Hovedprocedurer .....
Principal procedures .....
Signalering af pengepolitiske hensigter ..... 41 INSTITUTIONELLE RAMMER FOR MEDLEMSLANDENES CENTRALBANKER .....
Signalling monetary policy intentions ..... 41
Statutter og uafhængighed ..... 43 2 .
43 43 1 . Statutes and independence .....
Centralbankernes mål og opgaver .....
Objectives and tasks of central banks .....
Udforelsen af penge - og valutakurspolitik .....
The conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy .....
Udnævnelsesprocedurer for centralbankchefer .....
Appointment procedures for central bank Governors .....
Fremtidige ændringer i centralbanklovgivningen .....
Prospective changes in central bank legislation .....
48 CENTRALBANKCHEFKOMITEENS AKTIVITETER OG FORBEREDELSE AF OVERGANGEN TIL 0MU .....
48 ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOVERNORS AND PREPARATION FOR THE MOVE TO EMU .....
Centralbankchefkomiteens aktiviteter .....
Activities of the Committee of Governors .....
Forberedelse af overgangen til anden og tredje fase af 0 M U ..... 56 ÆNDRINGER I PENGEPOLITISKE INSTRUMENTER OG PROCEDURER SIDEN BEGYNDELSEN AF F0RSTE FASE .....
. ANNEX I : CHANGES IN MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES SINCE THE START OF STAGE ONE .....
ANNEKS I : ANNEKS II : FÆLLESSKABETS CENTRALBANKERS INSTITUTIONELLE STATUS .....
67 ANNEXII : INSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CENTRAL BANKS IN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES .....
71 FORKORTELSER OG SYMBOLER .....
71 ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS .....
Oversigt over tabeller .
List of Tables .
figurer og bokse ( Forkortelser og symboler anvendt i tabeller og figurer er anfurt på side 90 )
Charts and Boxes ( Abbreviations and Symbols used in the Tables and Charts are listed on Page 90 )
Tabeller ( a ) Teksttabeller 1 .
Tables ( a ) Text Tables 1 .
0konomiske og finansielle indikatorer for Fællesskabet .....
Economic and financial indicators for the Community .....
Produktionsgab og cykliske forskelle .....
Output gaps and cyclical divergences .....
Monetzre aggregater : Målsætning og resultat .....
Monetary aggregates : targets and outturns .....
Indikatorer for kumulative ændringer i konkurrenceevne .....
Indicators of cumulative competitiveness changes .....
Finansielle markeder for ECU .....
ECU financial markets .....
Pengepolitiske instrumenter og procedurer .....
Monetary policy instruments and procedures .....
Institutionelle rammer for medlemslandenes centralbanker .....
Institutional features of Community central banks .....
Centralbankfinansiering af offentlig sektor .....
Central bank financing of the public sector .....
59 Referencetabeller BNP i faste priser .....
Reference Tables R1 . Real GDP .....
34 Arbejdsl0shedsprocenter .....
34 R2 . Unemployment rates .....
34 Forbrugerpriser .....
34 R3 . Consumer prices .....
34 bnomkostninger pr.
34 R4 .
beskæftiget .....
Compensation per employee .....
35 Den offentlige sektors balance .....
35 35 R5 . General government financial balances .....
35 Betalingsbalancens Irabende poster .....
35 R6 . Current account balances .....
35 35 Monetære aggregater i bred forstand .....
Broad monetary aggregates ..... 35
Realvækst og inflation i Fællesskabet .....
Real growth and inflation in the Community .....
Kursen på US-dollar og japanske yen over for D-mark .....
Exchange rate of the US dollar and the Japanese yen vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark .
Den offentlige sektors budgetmæssige stilling 1992 .....
General government budgetary positions 1992 .....
Korte rentesatser .....
Short-term interest rates .....
Lange rentesatser .....
Long-term interest rates .....
Officielle eller centrale rentesatser .....
Official or key interest rates .....
Valutakurser over for D-mark .....
Exchange rates vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark .....
Organisationsdiagram for Centralbankchefkorniteen .....
Organisation chart of the Committee of Governors .....
55 Bokse 1 .
55 Boxes 1 .
Den private sektors gældsætning i EF-landene .....
Private sector indebtedness in EEC countries .....
Inflationsudviklingen på sektorniveau .....
Sectoral inflation trends .....
Indlån over landegrænserne .....
Cross-border holdings and monetary analysis .....
Skæringsdatoen for data . der fremgår af denne rapport .
A cut-off date of 28th February 1993 has been applied to the data provided in this Report .
februar 1993 . INDLEDNING OG VURDERING Dette er Centralbankchefkomiteens anden årsberetning , som beskriver Komiteens aktiviteter samt de monetzre og finansielle forhold i Fzllesskabet i 1992 .
INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENT This is the second Annual Report of the Committee of Governors , covering its activities and the monetary and financial conditions in the Community in 1992 .
Arsberetningen er udarbejdet i overensstemmelse med Komiteens mandat som angivet i den zndrede Rådsbeslutning af 12 . marts 1990 .
The Report has been prepared in accordance with the Committee 's mandate as laid down in the amended Council Decision of 12th March 1990 .
Det seneste år har vzret et af de mest udfordrende for samarbejdet mellem centralbankerne i EF 's medlemsstater .
The past year has been one of the most challenging for co-operation among the central banks of the EEC Member States .
Udviklingen på penge - og kapitalmarkederne , iszr i forbindelse med turbulensen på valutamarkederne i andet halvår 1992 , har domineret arbejdet og drraftelserne i Komiteen .
Monetary and financial developments , especially those linked to the turbulence in the exchange markets in the second half of 1992 , have dominated the work and the discussions in the Committee .
Samtidig har Komiteen efter underskrivelsen i februar sidste år af Traktaten om Den Europziske Union i Maastricht taget de frarste skridt med henblik på at fastlzgge betingelserne for implementeringen af Traktaten på det monetzre område . Dette arbejde har iszr vedrrart forberedelse af etableringen af Det Europziske Monetzre Institut ( EMI ) , som vil overtage opgaverne fra Centralbankchefkomiteen , når denne o p l ~ s e sved udgangen af 1993 .
At the same time , following the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht in February last year , the Committee has taken the first steps to establish the conditions for the implementation of the Treaty in the monetary field and , in particular , to prepare the establishment of the European Monetary Institute ( EMI ) which will take over the tasks of the Committee of Governors when it is dissolved at the end of 1993 . 1 .
PENGEPOLITIK MED SPÆNDINGER PÅ VALUTAMARKEDET SOM BAGGRUND
MONETARY POLICY IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF EXCHANGE MARKET TENSIONS
Som understreget i årsberetningen fra sidste år konkluderede Centralbankchefkomiteen i forbindelse med den årlige fremadrettede vurdering af intentionerne for pengepolitikken i 1992 , at de nationale myndigheders planlagte pengepolitik sigtede mod en yderligere reduktion af inflationen i Fzllesskabet .
As pointed out in last year 's Annual Report , when reviewing monetary policy intentions for 1992 in its annual forward-looking assessment , the Committee of Governors concluded that the monetary policies envisaged by the national authorities were geared towards a further decline in inflation in the Community .
Selv om den gennemsnitlige forbrugerprisstigning i Fzllesskabet faldt fra 5,1% i 1991 til 4,3% i 1992 , ville man normalt have forventet en mere markant reduktion givet gunstige ydre påvirkninger og den fortsat svage aktivitetsudvikling i Fzllesskabet ( se tabel 1 og figur 1 ) .
Although the average rate of increase in consumer prices fell in the Community from 5.1% in 1991 to 4.3% in 1992 , a more significant reduction would normally have been expected given the favourable external influences on inflation and the continued weakness of economic activity in the Community ( see Table 1 and Chart 1 ) .
Produktionen i Fzllesskabet under ét steg kun 1,1% i 1992 , hvilket delvis afspejlede den uventede forlængelse af afmatningen i resten af verden , men også den svage indenlandske eftersprargsel i de fleste af F ~ llesskabets lande .
Output in the Community as a whole rose by only 1.1% in 1992 , reflecting partly the unexpected prolongation of the downswing in the rest of the world , but also depressed domestic demand in most of the Member States .
På tidspunktet for den årlige vurdering af intentionerne for den nationale politik noterede Komiteen en række potentielle risici , hvoraf nogle efterfralgende hurtigt realiseredes , herunder isavr at forhåbningerne om en tidlig opgang i den rakonomiske aktivitet fortonede sig , at planerne om budgetmzssig konsolidering ofte viste sig svære at realisere , og at lranomkostningerne i nogle lande fortsatte med at stige i et forholdsvist hurtigt tempo .
At the time of the annual assessment of national policy intentions the Committee had noted a number of potential risks , some of which in fact soon materialised : in particular , hopes for an early recovery of economic activity faded ; plans for fiscal consolidation proved often difficult to realise ;
Endvidere gjorde den accelererende vzkst i pengemavngden og det vedvarende indenlandske pres på prisniveauet det nradvendigt at stramme pengepolitikken i Tyskland ved udgangen af 1991 .
and labour costs continued to rise at a rather rapid pace in some countries . Moreover , accelerating monetary growth and persistent domestic price pressures made it necessary to tighten monetary policy at the end of 1991 in Germany .
I den frarste del af 1992 ogedes pengernzngdevavksten i Favllesskabet , og de monetzre aggregater afveg fra deres målsztning i en r ~ k k af landene .
In the first part of 1992 , monetary growth in the Community quickened and monetary aggregates deviated from their targeted paths in several countries .
Mens renteforskellee ne forblev små , var der en tendens til , at niveauet for de korte renter bevzgede sig opad .
While interestrate differentials remained small , the level of short-term interest rates tended to edge upwards . As economic activity remained sluggish , there were growing concerns about the
- 2 - TABEL 1 : 0KONOMISKE OG FINANSIELLE INDIKATORER FOR FÆLLESSKABET
TABLE 1 : ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS FOR THE COMMUNITY 1987-89 1990 1992 ( a ) 1991 average percentage change over the previous year 3.5 2.8 1.1 1.2 4.1 4.3 5.1 5.7 5.7 7.1 6.1 7.6 per cent of nominal GDP - 0.3 0.4 - 0.9 - 1.0 - 4.2 - 3.6 - 4.7 - 5.3 per cent 11.8 9.6 11.0 11.2 11.2 10.3 9.9 9.4
BNP i faste priser ( b )
Item Real GDP ( b ) Consumer prices ( c ) Compensation per employee ( b ) Current account balance General government financial balance Short-term interest rate ( b ) ( d ) Long-term interest rate ( b ) ( e )
Kilde : Nationale data , BIS .
Source : National data ; BIS .
( a ) Skmn .
( a ) Estimates .
( b ) Beregnet på basis af 1989 BNP-vægte udtrykt i 1989 PPP-valutakurser .
@) Computed on the basis of 1989 GDP weights expressed in 1989 PPP exchange rates .
( c ) Beregnet på basis af 1989 forbrugsvagte udtrykt i 1989 PPP-valutakurser .
( c ) Computed on the basis of 1989 consumer spending weights expressed in 1989 PPP exchange rates .
( d ) 3-måneders indenlandsk pengemarkedsrente .
( d ) 3-month domestic money market rate .
( e ) Rente på statsobligationer eller offentlig sektors obligat ~ oner .
( e ) Government or public sector bond rate .
Med den fortsat svage okonomiske aktivitet steg bekymringen for , om den pengepolitiske stramningsgrad var passende i lande , som havde opnået markante fremskridt med hensyn til at begrænse inflationen , og hvor arbejdslosheden steg hurtigt .
appropriateness of the monetary stance in countries where significant progress had been made in containing inflation and where unemployment was increasing rapidly .
Et vendepunkt blev nået i begyndelsen af juni 1992 , da den snævre danske forkastelse af Maastricht-traktaten udlarste stigende uro på valutamarkederne i Fællesskabet .
A turning point was reached at the beginning of June 1992 when the narrow Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty triggered growing unrest in the exchange markets of the Community .
Forholdene på pengemarkedet blev hurtigt mere uensartede .
Money market conditions quickly became more differentiated .
I Tyskland forblev pengepolitikken stram , og markedsrenterne formindskedes forst fra midten af september i forbindelse med justeringen af den italienske lire .
In Germany , the monetary stance remained firm and market interest rates did not ease before midSeptember on the occasion of the realignment of the Italian lira .
Med henblik på at opretholde den tætte valutakursbinding til D-marken afspejlede ændringerne i Belgien og Holland i centralbankernes pengemarkedsrenter bevægelserne i de tyske rentesatser .
In Belgium and the Netherlands , changes in the central banks » intervention rates closely mirrored the movements in German interest rates to maintain the tight currency links with the Deutsche Mark .
Alle andre lande i fastkurssamarbejdet ( ERM ) var i lobet af andel halvdel af året konfronteret med et - til tider alvorligt - pres på deres valutaer . Med henblik på at imodegå valutakursspændingerne hævede landene i varierende omfang og på forskellige tidspunkter de officielle rentesatser .
All other countries participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism ( ERM ) were faced with - at times very severe - downward pressure on their currencies during the second half of the year and raised official interest rates , though to varying degrees and at different times , as part of their strategies to counter the emerging exchange rate tensions .
Resultatet af den danske folkeafstemning i juni var kun en katalysator for de folgende begivenheder , som kulminerede i september 1992 med den mest alvorlige krise for det Europæiske Monetære System ( EMS ) siden systemets begyndelse .
The outcome of the Danish referendum in June was only a catalyst for the subsequent events which culminated in September 1992 in the most serious crisis of the European Monetary System ( EMS ) since its inception .
Inden for kort tid gennemfortes to valutakursjusteringer og suspension for to valutaer fra fastkurssamarbejdet .
In quick succession , two realignments were agreed and the obligation to respect the prescribed exchange rate margins was suspended for two currencies .
De foregående års bemærkelsesværdige stabilitet i valutakursforventningerne forsvandt inden for en kort periode og blev fulgt af omfattende valutamarkedsspekulationer .
Within a short period , the remarkable stability of exchange rate expectations of the past few years vanished and gave way to intense speculative behaviour .
I forste omgang blev valutaer , som forekom sårbare i lyset af den indenlandske okonomiske situation , udsat for et stærkt pres .
Initially , strong downward pressure was felt by currencies which appeared vulnerable in the light of domestic economic conditions .
Da spændingerne imidlertid spredte sig til andre valutaer , begyndte situationen på valutamarkedet at vise tegn på et rent spekulativt betonet pres , hvor kortsigtede uberettigede valutakursforventninger virkede selvforstærkende .
However , as tensions spread to other currencies , the situation in the exchange market also began to exhibit features of a speculative run with shortterm , unwarranted exchange rate expectations feeding on themselves .
FIGUR 1 : REALVÆKST OG INFLATION I FÆLLESSKABET Procent 7 6 5 - 7
CHART l : REAL GROWTH AND INFLATION IN THE COMMUNITY Per cent I 6
1 ) 6
Real GDP growth1 )
-+--- N
\ / M --+
1 ) Sk0n for realvzckst i BNP i 1992
l ) Estimate for real GDP in 1992 .
Der er ingen tvivl om , at den stigende turbulens på valutamarkedet efter den danske afstemning blev forstærket af en række sammenfaldende begivenheder , herunder at dollaren faldt betydeligt i forhold til europæiske valutaer , at uroen voksede på de nordiske valutamarkeder , og at markederne tilsyneladende blev mere opmzrksomme på myndighedernes håndtering af spændingerne på valutamarkedet , der blev opfattet som utilstrækkelig koordineret .
No doubt the growing market turbulence in the wake of the Danish vote was intensified by concurrent developments : the US dollar depreciated substantially against European currencies ; unrest grew in the Nordic currency markets ;
Mere fundamentalt var der to væsentlige faktorer bag krisen på valutarnarkedet .
and markets seemed to become more attentive to the responses of the authorities to exchange rate tensions which were perceived as insufficiently co-ordinated . More fundamentally , the exchange market crisis must be ascribed to two factors .
For det forste var perioden på fem år med stabile valutakurser ikke udnyttet tilstrækkeligt til at underbygge de eksisterende centralkurser gennem en korrektion af akonomiske ubalancer og stærkere tiltag i retning af storre okonomisk konvergens .
Firstly , the stability of nominal exchange rates in the ERM during the previous five years had not been exploited sufficiently to underpin the existing central parities by correcting economic imbalances and by more vigorous efforts towards greater economic convergence .
Tværtimod gav betydelige budgetunderskud i et stort antal af Fzllesskabets lande anledning til fortsat mangel p balance A mellem finans - og pengepolitikken , og den utilstrækkelige konvergens mod et lavt inflationsniveau havde forårsaget markante ændringer i landenes konkurrenceevne .
On the contrary , owing to substantial budget deficits in a large number of Community countries , unbalanced policy-mixes had persisted and insufficient convergence to a low level of inflation had caused significant changes in international competitive positions .
Med tegn på svindende folkelig opbakning til Maastricht-traktaten i tiden op til den franske folkeafstemning afsvækkedes markedernes tillid til myndighedernes forpligtelse til at opretholde de eksisterende centralkurser og til opnåelse af konvergens i overensstemmelse med traktatens kriterier .
With signs of waning popular support for the Maastricht Treaty in the run-up to the French referendum , the markets » trust in the authorities » commitment to the existing central parities , and to the achievement of convergence in accordance with the Treaty 's criteria , faded .
Den franske folkeafstemning blev således en referencedato for en mulig kursjustering .
The French referendum thus became a reference date for a possible realignment .
Den anden grundlzggende årsag til krisen på valutamarkedet var , at i lobet af 1992 blev den vedvarende svage konjunkturudvikling og de forringede udsigter til en opgang i stigende grad anset som en forvzrring af det dilemma for den okonomiske politik , som fandtes i de lande , hvor inflationen var blevet reduceret markant , men hvor forholdene på arbejdsmarkedet var forvzrret .
The second basic reason for the exchange market crisis was that , in the course of 1992 , the prolonged weakness of economic activity and diminishing prospects for a recovery was increasingly felt to aggravate policy dilemmas for those countries where inflation had been reduced significantly and where labour market conditions had deteriorated sharply .
I disse tilfzlde blev det renteniveau , som var nodvendigt for at opretholde valutaens centralkurs i ERM , i stigende grad anset for at vzre i modstrid med den indenlandske okonomis behov , iszr eftersom realrenten steg i takt med forbedringen af udsigterne for inflationen .
In these cases , the level of nominal interest rates required to maintain the currency 's central rate in the ERM was seen to be increasingly at odds with the needs of the domestic economy , especially as real interest rates rose with an improving outlook for inflation .
Konflikten mellem den eksterne og den interne målsztning blev illustreret ved gentagne opfordringer til lavere renter , både i de pågzldende lande og i Tyskland som folge af sidstnzvntes betydning for penge - og valutakurssituationen andre steder i Fzllesskabet .
The conflict between external and domestic objectives was highlighted by repeated calls for lower interest rates , both in the countries concerned and with respect to German rates , given the latter 's importance for monetary conditions elsewhere in the Community .
Givet pris - og lonudviklingen samt finanspolitikken blev det dog i Tyskland anset , at der var begrznset mulighed for rentenedszttelser .
In Germany , however , it was felt that there was little scope for interest rate reductions , given price and wage developments and the fiscal stance .
På den anden side var der en opfattelse i markedet af , at der var grænser for nogle landes myndigheders villighed til at hæve renterne i forsvaret af pariteterne - iszr i de tilfzlde , hvor den svage okonomiske situation og et hojt niveau af privat ogleller offentlig g ~ l d gjorde okonomierne folsomme over for zndringer i renterne .
On the other hand , there were perceptions in markets that there were limits to the willingness of the authorities in some other countries to raise interest rates in the defence of central parities - especially where because of weak economic conditions and a high level of private andlor public debt the economies were very sensitive to changes in interest rates .
Alle fzllesskabslande , hvis valutaer var udsat for pres , anvendte en kombination af tre instrumenter : Muligheden for bevzgelser inden for ERM-båndene blev i vidt omfang udnyttet , intervention blev foretaget i et hidtil uset omfang , og renterne blev tilpasset , dog i varierende omfang og på forskellige tidspunkter .
All Community countries where currencies were subject to downward pressures made use , in varying combinations , of three instruments : the scope for movements in the ERM fluctuation bands was widely exploited ; intervention was undertaken on an unprecedented scale ;