natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den franske franc og det irske pund kom under yderligere pres i begyndelsen af januar 1993 .
In early January 1993 , the French franc and the Irish pound came under further pressure .
Det fornyede angreb på den franske franc var forholdsvis kortlivet , og presset lettede efter offentliggrarelse af en ny fælles erklæring fra de franske og tyske myndigheder , der blev understrattet af en stigning i Banque de France 's rente på genkrabsarrangementer .
The renewed attack on the French franc was rather short-lived , with pressures easing after the release of a new joint statement from the French and German authorities , supported by an increase in the Banque de France repurchase agreement rate .
På denne baggrund og efter en markant forhrajelse af de officielle rentesatser styrkedes også det irske pund .
Against this background , and following a sharp rise in official interest rates , the Irish pound also firmed .
En yderligere sznkning af renterne i England og et markant fald i det engelske pund frarte i slutningen af januar til en genopblussen af et stzerkt pres på det irske pund .
In late January , however , a further cut in interest rates in the United Kingdom and a sharp drop in the pound sterling rekindled intense pressure on the Irish pound .
Officielle rentesatser i Irland blev igen hævet til et ualmindelig hrajt niveau , med konsekvenser for markedsrenterne , der i lyset af den indenlandske situation blev anset for uholdbare , og den 30 . januar blev der opnået enighed om en devaluering på 10 % af det irske pund .
Official interest rates in Ireland were raised once more to exceptional levels , but with consequences for market rates that were perceived as unsustainable in the light of domestic conditions , and a 10 % devaluation of the Irish pound was agreed on 30th January .
Få dage senere kom den danske krone under fornyet angreb .
A few days later , the Danish krone came under renewed attack .
En kombination af fælles stratte gennem intramarginal intervention fra flere af F ~ llesskabets centralbanker , en stigning i de danske rentesatser og en reduktion i de officielle tyske renter hjalp med til at genoprette roen på markedet .
A combination of collective support through intramarginal intervention by several Community central banks , a rise in Danish interest rates and a cut in official interest rates in Germany helped to restore calm in the market .
Derefter var der tilbagestrramning af kapital .
Capital subsequently reflowed into the Danish krone .
I de frarste uger efter deres u d t r ~ d e n ERM faldt både den italienske lire og af det engelske pund markant .
In the first weeks following their withdrawal from the ERM , both the Italian lira and the pound sterling depreciated sharply .
Efter i begyndelsen af oktober at have nået et rekordlavt niveau i forhold til D-mark genvandt begge valutaer noget af det tabte uagtet , at forholdene på markedet derefter forblev ustabile .
After falling to record lows against the Deutsche Mark at the beginning of October , both currencies recovered ground although market conditions remained volatile subsequently .
Ved udgangen af 1992 var liren faldet 12 % og pundet 13 % i forhold til D-marken sammenlignet med markedskurserne den 16 .
At the end of 1992 , the lira had lost 12 % and the pound 13 % against the Deutsche Mark compared to market exchange rates on 16th September .
september . Begge valutaer svækkedes yderligere i de fnrste to måneder af 1993 .
In the first two months of 1993 , both currencies came under further downward pressure . The turbulence in the ERM also affected the Greek drachma .
TABEL 4 : INDIKATORER FOR KUMULATIVE RNDRINGER I KONKURRENCEEVNE ( a ) Kilde : BIS , undtagen for spanske og italienske data , som blev stillet til radighed af de respektive nationalbanker .
In September 1992 , pressures on the drachma were considerable , leading the Bank of Greece to raise its official lending rate from 30 % to 40 %, to intervene heavily in the foreign exchange market , and to tighten capital controls , while the speed of depreciation of the Greek currency accelerated .
... Tal foreligger ikke .
tensions eased , the official lending rate was reduced and the imposed capital controls were lifted .
( a ) Negative tal angiver tab .
The sharp movements in nominal exchange rates in the latter part of 1992 have substantially modified competitive positions within the Community ( see Table 4 ) .
( b ) Undtagen Grækenland . ( c ) Fremstillingssektoren .
In those countries which recorded the largest losses of intra-ERM competitiveness in the period before TABLE 4 : INDICATORS OF CUMULATIVE COMPETITIVENESSCHANGES ( a ) per cent Relative to other Relative to Relative to other Relative to EC countnes ( b ) EC countries ( b ) industrial countries industrial countries Unit Producer Producer Umt Producer Producer Unit Unit Labour Prices Prices Labour Pnces Labour Pnces Labour Costs ( c ) Costs ( c ) Costs ( c ) Costs ( c ) 1987-December 1992 ( e : 1987-August 1992 4.0 3.6 1.7 5.6 6.4 0.5 1.3 - 0.5 - 3.8 2.7 3.8 - 5.5 0.9 - 1.9 - 4.3 1.9 4.1 - 6.6 - 0.3 - 4.9 - 5.5 0.3 1.9 - 8.6
( d ) Spanien : juni 1989 ; Portugal : april 1992 ;
Belgium Denmark Germany ( western ) Greece France Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain Portugal United Kingdom
England : oktober 1990 . ( e ) Skan .
n.a. - 15.6 n.a. - 10.2 13.3 7.9 3.3 7.2 35.7 27.9 6.4 1.3 - 7.0 - 3.0 - 9.8 - 6.3 5.2 1.5 1.9 - 1.4 Slnce ERM entry ( d ) - August 1992 - 8.1 - 13.8 - 7.5 - 2.1 - 4.6 n.a. - 6.9 n.a. - 0.4 - 4.0 - 1.7 - 1.7
Turbulensen i ERM påvirkede også græske drachmer . Presset på drachmer var betydeligt i september 1992 , og faldet i den græske valuta accelererede .
- 10.8 n.a. n.a. - 13.4 1.7 8.1 5.1 3.1 - 1.9 26.6 - 0.6 23.6 8.2 5.7 4.6 11.1 - 3.9 2.1 0.1 - 2.6 Since ERM entry ( d ) - December 1992 ( e ) - 2.2 0.5 4.2 - 6.2 - 9.5 n.a. - 9.5 n.a. 13.2 8.7 13.2 8.3
På den baggrund h = vede den græske centralbank den officielle udlånsrente fra 30 % til 40 %, intervenerede kraftigt i valutamarkedet samt strammede kapitalrestriktionerne . Da spændingerne aftog , blev den officielle udlånsrente nedsat , og de indfnrte kapitalrestriktioner blev ophævet .
Source : BIS , except for the Spanish and Italian data , which were provided by the respective central banks . @) Exclud ~ ng Greece .
De store bevægelser i valutakurserne i den sidste del af 1992 har i væsentlig grad ændret landenes konkurrenceevne inden for FaAIesskabet ( se tabel 4 ) .
( c ) Manufacturing sector . ( d ) Spain : June 1989 ;
Af de lande , som i perioden fnr krisen havde haft det stnrste tab i konkurrenceevnen i forhold til de mrige ERM-lande , har de seneste valutakursfald mere end opvejet tabet for Italien siden den seneste kursjustering i 1987 ;
( a ) Negative numbers indicate losses . the crisis , recent depreciations have more than fully offset the losses in Italy since the last realignment in 1987 ;
for England har faldet i pundkursen fnrt til en markant forbedring i konkurrenceevnen målt i forhold til indgangspositionen for pundet i oktober 1990 ;
have led to a significant improvement in the competitive position of the United Kingdom relative to the entry point of the pound sterling in October 1990 ;
mens konkurrenceevnen for Spanien har nærmet sig det niveau , der var gældende , da pesata indtrådte i ERM i juni 1989 .
while in Spain competitiveness has approached the levels prevailing when the peseta entered the ERM in June 1989 .
I de fleste andre ERM-lande betnd stigningen i valutakursen , at konkurrenceevnen ved udgangen af året kom tættere på niveauet i 1987 , selv om Frankrig fortsatte med at have gevinst og Tyskland tab i konkurrenceevnen sammenlignet med de mrige ERM-lande .
In most other ERM countries , the exchange rate appreciation by the end of the year returned competitiveness closer to 1987 levels , although France continued to show gains , and Germany losses , in intra-Community competitiveness relative to this date .
Myndighedernes reaktion på ERM-krisen Basel-Nyborg aftalen fra 1987 opfordrer de monetære myndigheder til at udnytte mulighederne for en mere aktiv , fleksibel og koordineret brug af tre instrumenter , som kan anvendes til at imradegå spzndinger inden for ERM : Rentezndringer , valutakursbevægelser inden for båndet og officiel intervention i valutamarkedet .
Policy responses to the ERM crisis The 1987 Basle-Nyborg Agreement calls on the monetary authorities to exploit the scope for a more active , flexible and concerted use of three instruments to counter tensions in the ERM : interest rate changes ; exchange rate movement within the band ;
Det er imidlertid nradvendigt at justere valutakursen , når kurserne ikke er i overensstemmelse med de underliggende rakonomiske faktorer , og det ikke er muligt at gennemfrare den nradvendige genoprettende rakonomiske politik .
and official intervention in foreign exchange markets . However , when exchange rates are out of line with fundamentals and the implementation of corrective domestic policies is not possible , realignments become necessary .
Renterne blev anvendt til at imradegå de seneste spzndinger , idet omfanget af zndringerne og det tempo , hvormed renten blev zndret , dog varierede fra land til land og fra tilfælde til tilfzlde .
Interest rates were used to counter recent tensions , although the size of the changes and the speed of response differed from country to country and from occasion to occasion .
Mulighederne for renteændringer som reaktion på valutakurspres var i nogle lande begramsede , fordi hrajere renter blev anset for enten at forvzrre recessionen som i England , hvor hovedparten af långivningen er knyttet til de korte renter - ogleller at forvzrre problemerne med at opnå budgetmæssig konsolidering i lande med en stor udestående mængde af kortfristet offentlig gzld - som i Italien .
In some countries , the scope for interest rate increases in response to exchange rate pressure was limited , because higher interest rates were seen either to aggravate the severity of the recession - as in the United Kingdom where the bulk of lending is at short-term rates andlor to add to the difficulties of achieving fiscal consolidation where large stocks of shortterm government debt existed - as in Italy .
I Irland blev renterne hævet markant og gentagne gange til et niveau , som endte med at blive uholdbart .
In Ireland , interest rates were increased sharply and repeatedly to levels which ultimately became unsustainable .
Forsvaret af de eksisterende centralkurser gennem rentestigninger kunne ikke fuldfrares i disse tre tilfælde .
The defence of the existing central parities through interest rate increases did not in the end prove feasible in these three cases .
I de lande , hvor valutakursen styrkedes , var mulighederne for at tilpasse rentepolitikken begrznset , især i Tyskland , af den indenlandske prisudvikling .
In countries facing upward pressure on their currencies , domestic price developments , in particular in Germany , restricted the scope for adjusting interest rate policy .
De officielle renter blev i disse lande reduceret en anelse i midten af september , og de korte rentesatser faldt hurtigt med omreduktion i spzndingerne på valutamarkring l %, uden at dette dog bragte nogen v ~ sentlig kedet .
Official interest rates in these countries were cut slightly in mid-September , and short-term market rates rapidly declined by about l %, without , however , bringing about a significant reduction in foreign exchange tensions .
inden for båndet i nogle tilfælUnder krisen resulterede valutakursbev ~ gelser de i stabiliserende spekulation , hvilket bidrog til at mindske presset .
During the crisis , in some instances exchange rate movement within the band resulted in stabilising speculation which helped to dampen pressures .
I andre tilfzlde blev valutakursspændingerne dog forraget , når valutaerne nåede den nedre grznse .
In other situations , however , exchange rate tensions were exacerbated when currencies hit the lower limit .
Der blev interveneret inden for margenerne i de tilfælde , hvor der var bekymring for , at en bevægelse til den nedre margen kunne blive fortolket af markedsdeltagerne som en svækkelse af troværdigheden til centralkursen .
When there was a concern that a movement to the lower margin could be interpreted by market participants as weakening the credibility of the central parity , interventions were made within the margins .
Intervention - både inden for og på margenen - blev foretaget i et hidtil uset omfang , hvilket afspejlede de massive kapitalbevzgelser , som skete i et miljra af nzsten fuldstændig liberaliserede kapitaltransaktioner og en hraj grad af finansiel integration inden for Fzllesskabet .
Intervention - both within and at the margins - was undertaken in unprecedented amounts , reflecting the massive capital movements which occurred in an environment of almost fully liberalised capital transactions and a high degree of financial integration within the Community .
Interventionernes effektivitet afhang af graden af stratte fra anvendelsen af andre instrumenter , især zndringer i renterne .
The effectiveness of intervention depended on the degree of support from other instruments , in particular interest rate changes .
Koordineret intra-marginal intervention omfattende flere centralbanker viste sig til tider nyttig .
At times , simultaneous intra-marginal intervention by several central banks proved helpful .
Omfanget af interventionerne havde betydelige konsekvenser for pengeforholdene og indebar en begrænsning i pengeudbuddet for valutaer under pres og en ekspansion , hvor det modsatte var tilfzldet .
The scale of intervention had important monetary consequences , exerting a contractionary impact on the money supply where currencies were subject to downward pressure , and an expansionary effect where the opposite occurred .
Voldsomheden af spændingen i ERM i efteråret 1992 medfrarte , at nogle lande indfrarte forskellige former for midlertidige tiltag med henblik på at modvirke kapitaludstrramning for at afskzrme deres valutaer mod spekulation , iszr hvor denne tog form af « short sales » .
The virulence of the tension in the ERM during the autumn of 1992 led some countries to take temporary measures of varying types to discourage capital outflows to protect their currencies from speculation especially when this took the form of « short sales » .
I alle tilfzlde var tiltagene ophzvet ved udgangen af året .
In all cases the measures were phased out by the end of the year .
Når myndighedernes indsats for at stabilisere valutainarkederne viste sig at v z re uden succes , blev en kursjustering uundgåelig .
When the efforts of the authorities to stabilise exchange markets proved unsuccessful , a realignment became unavoidable .
Det hidtil usete tilfzlde af fire kursjusteringer inden for fem måneder understregede myndighedernes vanskeligheder med at genoprette ro på markederne .
The unprecedented occurrence of four realignments in five months emphasised the difficulty facing the authorities in restoring calm in the markets .
Dette kan vzre forbundet med en opfattelse i markedet af , at tiltag med henblik på at irnardegå spzndingerne blev taget stykvis med utilstrækkelig opmærksomhed rettet mod genetablering af troværdigheden til paritetsgitteret som helhed .
This may be related to perceptions in the market that policy measures to counter tensions were being taken on a piecemeal basis , with insufficient attention devoted to the restoration of the credibility of the parity grid as a whole .
0KONOMISKE UDSIGTER OG SP ~ RGSMAL FOR PENGEPOLITIKKEN
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND MONETARY POLICY ISSUES
Da Centralbankchefkomiteen ved udgangen af 1992 foretog ex ante koordinationen med henblik på at vurdere den passende pengepolitik i medlemslandene og undersarge de nationale pengepolitikmålsztninger for 1993 , var forudsigelserne for den arkonomiske udvikling i Fzllesskabet behzftet med stor usikkerhed .
When , at the end of 1992 , the Committee of Governors conducted the ex-ante coordination exercise to assess the appropriate thrust of monetary policies in the Member States and to examine national monetary policy intentions for 1993 , forecasts of economic developments in the Community were surrounded by a large margin of uncertainty .
Desuden var spzndingerne på valutamarkederne endnu ikke aftaget .
In addition , tensions in the exchange markets had not yet abated .
Okonomiske udsigter Ifarlge de internationale institutioners seneste skran vil den okonomiske v ~ k s it Fzllesskabet i 1993 formentlig kun blive stimuleret svagt fra mrige landes eftersparrgsel .
Economic prospects According to the latest forecasts by international institutions , economic activity in 1993 within the Community is likely to receive only a modest stimulus from external demand .
Der er forventning om opgang i verdenshandelen , selv om forbedringen formentlig vil v z r e langsom .
An upswing in world trade is expected , though the pace of the recovery is likely to remain quite slow .
I USA er der Mare tegn på , at en mere vedvarende konjunkturopgang vil finde sted i 1993 , mens de seneste ekspansive finans - og pengepolitiske indgreb i Japan skulle bidrage til , at en opgang begynder i larbet af året .
In the United States , there are clear signs that a more sustained upturn will unfold in 1993 , while in Japan the recent expansionary fiscal and monetary measures should help a recovery to get underway in the course of the year .
Et moderat opsving vil måske også finde sted i EFTAlandene , selv om dette vil vzre meget afhzngig af udvikligen inden for Fzllesskabet som farlge af de nzre handelsforbindelser mellem de to blokke .
A moderate upswing may also take place in EFTA countries , although this is closely dependent on developments within the Community in the light of the strong trade links between the two blocs .
På baggrund af den langsomme vzkst vil priserne i verdenshandelen opgjort i national valuta sandsynligvis forblive forholdsvis lave .
Against this background of slow growth in activity , world trade prices are likely to remain relatively soft in national currency terms .
Det forventes , at det moderate bidrag fra den globale eftersparrgsel vil blive opvejet af en svag indenlandsk eftersparrgsel givet det lave niveau for erhvervslivets og forbrugernes tillid i Fællesskabet ved udgangen af 1992 .
The modest boost from world demand is expected to be counterbalanced by weak domestic spending given the low level of business and consumer confidence in the Community at the end of 1992 .
Som et resultat heraf kan den arkonomiske vzkst i F ~ llesskabet 1993 komme under 1 % .
As a result , economic growth within the Community in 1993 may dip below 1 %.
i Det samlede budgetunderskud vil formentlig fortsat vzre stort i 1993 .
The overall fiscal deficit is likely to remain large in 1993 .
Reduktioner i budgetunderskuddene forventes i nogle fzllesskabslande , som havde et forholdsvis hnjt niveau for offentlig gzld eller underskud i 1992 - iszr i Belgien , Grzkenland , Spanien , Italien og Portugal - selv om forlzngelsen af konjunkturnedgangen besvzrliggarr fremskridt mod budgetmzssig konsolidering .
Reductions in budget deficits are expected in some Community countries which had relatively high levels of public debt or deficits in 1992 - in particular , in Belgium , Greece , Spain , Italy and Portugal although the prolongation of the cyclical downswing may make progress towards fiscal consolidation more difficult .
Derimod kan både de automatiske stabilisatorer og gennemfarrelsen af visse finanspolitiske tiltag give anledning til harjere budgetunderskud i andre lande , navnlig i England og Frankrig .
In contrast , both the operation of automatic stabilisers and the implementation of some discretionary measures may lead to higher budget deficits in other countries , most notably in the United Kingdom and France .
Budgetunderskuddet i Tyskland vil formentlig stige opgjort i forhold til BNP til trods for , at nogle konsoliderende tiltag blev annonceret i januar 1993 .
In Germany , the fiscal deficit is likely to increase relative to GDP , although some consolidation measures were announced in January 1993 .
I ex ante ovelsen blev det vurderet , at en vis lettelse af omkostningspresset i lobet af 1993 var sandsynlig for Fællesskabet under ét .
In the ex-ante exercise , some easing of cost pressures during 1993 was judged likely in the Community as a whole .
Eftersom produktionen forventes at forblive under den potentielle , og forholdene på arbejdsmarkedet forudses at forblive svage , skulle lonmoderation reducere presset på arbejdsomkostningerne .
As output is expected to remain below potential and labour market conditions to remain slack , wage moderation should reduce labour cost pressure .
Eksterne prispåvirkninger kan også i gennemsnit blive relativt favorable , selv om opgangen i dollaren i slutningen af 1992 vil begrznse denne effekt , hvis opgangen er vedvarende .
External price influences may also be relatively favourable on average , although the rebound in the dollar in late 1992 will limit the benefit if it is sustained .
Desuden vil der ske en stigning i importpriserne i de lande , hvis valutaer er deprecieret , og stigninger i de indirekte skatter eller i offentligt administrerede priser kan bidrage til det inflationzre pres i nogle lande , f. eks . Tyskland , hvor de indirekte skatter blev hzvet i begyndelsen af 1993 .
Moreover , a rise in import prices will occur in the countries where currencies have depreciated and increases in indirect taxation or in public sector administered prices may add to inflationary pressure in some countries , for instance in Germany , where indirect taxes were increased in early 1993 . 32 .
Pengepolitiske spergsmål
Monetary policy issues
Mål for pengepolitikken i 1993 Da ex ante koordinationen blev foretaget af Centralbankchefkomiteen i december 1992 , blev vurderingen af de nationale pengepolitiske målsztninger for 1993 besvzrliggjort af stor usikkerhed om de okonomiske udsigter og af fortsat ustabilitet i ERM .
Monetary policy orientationsfor 1993 When the ex-ante co-ordination exercise was conducted by the Committee of Governors in December 1992 , the assessment of national monetary policy intentions for 1993 was made more difficult by major uncertainties in the economic outlook and by remaining instability in the ERM .
Med en sådan usikkerhed er det imidlertid især vigtigt , at pengepolitikken sorger for et nominelt stabilitetsanker , som udgor en forudsætning for en bæredygtig vzkst .
However , precisely when uncertainties prevail it is of the utmost importance that monetary policy provides an anchor of nominal stability , which constitutes a prerequisite for a sustainable recovery of economic activity .
Af denne grund understregede Komiteen behovet for at opretholde en mellemfristet orientering af pengepolitikken , som sikrer en yderligere reduktion i inflationen i Fællesskabet .
For this reason , the Committee emphasised the need for maintaining a medium-term oriented monetary policy which ensures a further decline in inflation in the Community .
Blandt de ERM-lande , som opstiller pengemængdemålsætninger , kommer kontinuiteten i Tyskland i den anti-inflationzre pengepolitikpolitik til udtryk i et mål for væksten i M3 i 1993 på 4,5% til 6,5 % ( se tabel 3 side 18 ) .
Among the ERM countries setting monetary targets , the continuity of the antiinflationary monetary stance in Germany is reflected in a target for M3 growth in 1993 of 4.5% to 6.5% ( see Table 3 on page 18 ) .
Den lille stigning sammenlignet med sidste års målsætning på 3,5% til 5,5% tager flere faktorer i betragtning : En noget hojere s b n net potentiel okonomisk vzkst i det ~ s t l i g e Tyskland ;
The small increase compared to last year 's target of 3.5% to 5.5% takes account of various factors : a somewhat higher estimated potential economic growth in eastern Germany ;
en forventet storre nedgang i niveauet for pengenes omlobshastighed ;
a larger decline envisaged in the trend in the velocity of circulation of money ;
og prisstigninger som folge af administrative indgreb , primzrt i det ostlige Tyskland .
and price rises due to administrative measures , primarily in eastern Germany .