natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Skønt Landsbankis (og de to andre store bankers) kapitalkoefficient altid blev angivet som en anelse højere end det ved lov fastsatte minimum, konkluderede undersøgelseskommissionen, at disse koefficienter ikke gav et retvisende billede af bankernes finansielle styrke.
When Landsbanki collapsed Samson's co-owner Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson and companies affiliated to him were the bank's largest debtors, while his father and co-owner of Samson, Björgólfur Guðmundsson was the bank's third largest debtor.
Dette skyldtes risikoeksponeringen af bankens egne aktier gennem primær sikkerhedsstillelse og terminsforretninger på aktierne.
In total their obligations to the bank exceeded 200 billion ISK, which was greater than the bank's equity.
Egenkapital finansieret af selskabet selv, som undersøgelseskommissionen betegnede som »svag egenkapital«, udgjorde over 25 % af bankernes kapitalgrundlag (eller over 50 %, hvis den vurderes i forhold til kapitalens kerneelement, dvs. egenkapital minus immaterielle aktiver).
The SIC was of the view that certain shareholders had abnormally easy access to borrowing from the banks in their capacity as owners.
Hertil kom problemer, der skyldes den risiko, som bankerne var eksponeret for, fordi de ejede aktier i hinanden.
This was notable in the case of Landsbanki from the fact that as late as 30 September 2008, when it was clear that Landsbanki did not have sufficient foreign currency to honour its obligations abroad, the bank provided a loan of 153 million Euros to a company owned by Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson.
Medio 2008 udgjorde bankernes direkte finansiering af deres egne aktier og krydsfinansiering af de to andre bankers aktier omkring 400 mia. ISK, ca. 70 % af kapitalens kerneelement.
It also concluded that that there were strong indications that in the case of each bank the boundaries between the interests of the largest shareholders and the interest of the bank were blurred.
Undersøgelseskommissionen fandt, at det udgjorde en trussel mod systemets sikkerhed, at egenkapitalen i så høj grad blev finansieret ved at låne fra systemet selv.
The emphasis on the major shareholders was therefore to the detriment of other shareholders and creditors.
Bankerne havde en betydelig andel af deres egne aktier som sikkerhed for deres udlån, og i takt med at aktiekurserne faldt, mindskedes værdien af deres låneporteføljer.
Concentration of risk
Dette påvirkede bankernes resultater og lagde et yderligere pres i nedadgående retning på deres aktiekurser.
Related to the issue of the abnormal exposure to major shareholders was the conclusion of the SIC that the banks' portfolios of assets were insufficiently diversified.
Bankernes reaktioner herpå (vurderede undersøgelseskommissionen på baggrund af de foreliggende oplysninger) var at forsøge kunstigt at skabe en unormal efterspørgsel på deres egne aktier.
The SIC was of the view that European rules on large exposure were interpreted in a narrow way, in particular in the case of the shareholders, and that the banks had sought to evade the rules.
Bankernes størrelse
Weak equity
I 2001 udgjorde de tre største bankers (samlede) balance, hvad der svarede til lidt over et års bruttonationalprodukt (BNP) i Island.
Although the capital ratio of Landsbanki (and the other two major banks) was always reported to be slightly higher than the statutory minimum, the SIC concluded that the capital ratios did not accurately reflect the financial strength of the banks.
Ved udgangen af 2007 var bankerne blevet internationale og havde aktiver til en værdi, der svarede til ni gange Islands BNP.
This was due to the risk exposure of the bank's own shares through primary collaterals and forward contracts on the shares.
Det fremgår af undersøgelseskommissionens rapport, at observatører i 2006 bemærkede, at banksystemets kapacitet var større end Islands Centralbanks (»CBI«), og at de nærede tvivl om, hvorvidt den kunne udfylde sin funktion som sidste lånemulighed.
Share capital financed by the company itself, referred to by the SIC as ‘weak equity’ represented more than 25 % of the banks' capital bases (or over 50 % when assessed against the core component of the capital, shareholders' equity less intangible assets).
Ved udgangen af 2007 var Islands kortfristede gæld (der især stammede fra finansiering af bankerne) 15 gange højere end valutareserverne, og de udenlandske indskud i de tre banker var også otte gange højere end valutareserverne.
Added to this were problems caused by the risk the banks were exposed to by holding each other's shares.
Indskyder- og investorgarantifonden lå inde med minimale ressourcer sammenlignet med de bankindskud, de formodedes at sikre.
By the middle of 2008 direct financing by the banks of their own shares, as well as cross-financing of the other two banks' shares, amounted to approximately 400 billion ISK, around 70 % of the core component of capital.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderer, at disse forhold udsatte Island for en risiko for stormløb mod landets banker.
The SIC was of the opinion that the extent of financing of shareholders' equity by borrowing from the system itself was such that the system's stability was threatened.
Bankernes pludselige vækst sammenholdt med den lovgivningsmæssige og finansielle infrastruktur
The banks held a substantial amount of their own shares as collateral for their lending and therefore as share prices fell the quality of their loan portfolio declined.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede, at de relevante tilsynsorganer i Island manglede den fornødne troværdighed i en situation, hvor den sidste lånemulighed ikke rådede over tilstrækkelige ressourcer.
This affected the banks' performance and put further downward pressure on their share prices; in response to which (the SIC assumed from the information in their possession), the banks attempted to artificially create abnormal demand for their own shares.
Rapporten konkluderer, at Islands finanstilsyn (»FME«) og CBI manglede ekspertise og erfaring til at regulere bankerne i økonomisk vanskelige tider, men at de kunne have gjort noget for at reducere bankernes risikoniveau.
The size of the banks
FME voksede f.eks. ikke i samme takt som bankerne, og tilsynsmyndighedernes praksis fulgte ikke med bankaktiviteternes hastige udvikling.
In 2001 the balance sheets of the three main banks (collectively) amounted to just over a year of the gross domestic product (‘GDP’) of Iceland.
Rapporten er også kritisk over for regeringen og konkluderer, at myndighederne burde have grebet ind for at mindske bankernes potentielle indvirkning på økonomien ved at reducere deres størrelse eller kræve, at en eller flere banker flyttede deres hovedsæde til udlandet [9].
By the end of 2007 the banks had become international and held assets worth nine times the Icelandic GDP.
Ubalance i og uforholdsmæssig ekspansion af den islandske økonomi som helhed
The SIC report notes that by 2006, observers were commenting that the banking system had outgrown the capacity of the Central Bank of Iceland (‘CBI’) and doubted whether it could fulfil the role of lender of last resort.
Undersøgelseskommissionen henviser i sin rapport til begivenheder vedrørende økonomien i bredere forstand, som også indvirkede på bankernes hurtige vækst og bidrog til ubalancen i størrelse og påvirkning mellem finanssektoren og den resterende økonomi.
By the end of 2007 Iceland's short-term debts (mainly incurred due to financing of the banks) were 15 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves, and the foreign deposits in the three banks were also 8 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves.
I rapporten konkluderer man, at regeringens politikker (især finanspolitikken) sandsynligvis bidrog til overeksponeringen og ubalancen, og at CBI's pengepolitik ikke var tilstrækkeligt restriktiv.
The Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund held minimal resources in comparison with the bank deposits it was meant to guarantee.
Undersøgelseskommissionen beskriver også i rapporten lempelsen i den islandske boligfinansieringsfonds udlånsregler som »en af de største fejltagelser i den penge- og finanspolitiske forvaltning i perioden op til bankernes sammenbrud« [10].
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
Desuden er den også kritisk over for den lethed, hvormed bankerne kunne låne af CBI.
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
CBI's beholdning af kortfristede lån med sikkerhedsstillelse steg således fra 30 mia. ISK i efteråret 2005 til 500 mia. ISK i begyndelsen af oktober 2008.
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
Den islandske króna, underskud over for udlandet og CDS spreads
The report concludes that the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority (the ‘FME’) and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
Det fremgår af rapporten, at værdien af den islandske króna var uforsvarligt høj i 2006, Islands underskud på de løbende poster var over 16 % af BNP, og passiver i udenlandsk valuta minus aktiver nærmede sig det samlede årlige BNP.
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
Forudsætningerne for en finanskrise var på plads.
The report is also critical of the government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [9].
Ved udgangen af 2007 faldt kronens værdi, og credit default swap spreads på Island og bankerne steg eksponentielt.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Foranstaltninger til genopbygning af banksektoren
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Efter sammenbruddet af de tre største kommercielle banker i oktober 2008 (herunder Landsbanki) stod de islandske myndigheder over for en helt ny udfordring, nemlig at sikre fortsatte bankaktiviteter i Island [11].
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Finansministeren fik beføjelse til på finansministeriets vegne at bruge midler til at etablere nye finansvirksomheder.
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [10].
Under konkursbehandlingen af finansvirksomheder fik indskud forrang frem for andre fordringer.
The report is also critical of the ease with which the banks were able to borrow from the CBI, with the stock of CBI short-term collateral loans increasing from 30 billion ISK in the autumn of 2005 to 500 billion ISK by the beginning of October 2008.
De politiske prioriteringer var som udgangspunkt fokuseret på de nationale bank-, betalings- og afviklingssystemers grundfunktioner.
The report notes that in 2006, the value of the Icelandic króna was unsustainably high, the Icelandic current account deficit was over 16 % of GDP, and liabilities in foreign currencies less assets neared total annual GDP.
I de første uger efter sammenbruddet udarbejdede den islandske regering også et økonomisk program i samarbejde med Den Internationale Valutafond (»IMF«), som den 20. november 2008 førte til godkendelsen af Islands anmodning om en toårig standbyordning fra IMF, der omfattede et lån på 2,1 mia. USD fra IMF med henblik på at styrke Islands valutareserver.
The prerequisites for a financial crisis were in place.
Yderligere lån på op til 3 mia. USD blev sikret fra andre nordiske lande og visse andre samhandelspartnere.
By the end of 2007 the value of the króna was depreciating and credit default swap spreads on Iceland and the banks rose exponentially.
Af lånet fra IMF blev 827 mio. USD stillet til rådighed med det samme, mens det resterende beløb blev udbetalt i otte lige store rater, betinget af kvartalsvise vurderinger af programmet.
Measures taken to reconstruct the banking sector
IMF's program var et bredt baseret stabiliseringsprogram med fokus på tre hovedmålsætninger.
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Landsbanki) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [11].
For det første for at stabilisere og genoprette tilliden til kronen og dermed begrænse krisens negative indvirkninger på økonomien.
The policy followed by the Icelandic Government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [12] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
Foranstaltningerne omfattede indførelse af kapitalkontrol for at sætte en stopper for kapitalflugten.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
For det andet indebar programmet en omfattende bankomstruktureringsstrategi, hvis endemål var at genoprette et levedygtigt finanssystem i Island og sikre landets internationale finansielle forbindelser.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
Blandt delmålene var at sikre en rimelig vurdering af bankernes aktiver, maksimere inddrivelse af aktiver og styrke tilsynspraksis.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
For det tredje sigtede programmet mod at sikre bæredygtige offentlige finanser ved at begrænse socialiseringen af tab i de konkursramte banker og gennemføre et mellemlangsigtet finanspolitisk konsolideringsprogram.
The Government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
De islandske myndigheder har understreget, at de rent politisk havde begrænsede muligheder på grund af de ekstraordinære omstændigheder i forbindelse med banksystemets størrelse i forhold til finansministeriets kapacitet.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
Løsningerne var derfor på mange måder forskellige fra de foranstaltninger, som andre landes regeringer traf imod trusler mod deres finansielle stabilitet.
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
På grundlag af nødloven blev de tre store forretningsbanker Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands og Kaupthing Bank opdelt i »gamle« og »nye« banker.
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
Finansministeren etablerede tre aktieselskaber, som skulle overtage de gamle bankers nationale aktiviteter og udnævnte disses bestyrelser.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
Udenlandske aktiver og passiver blev i det store og hele placeret i de gamle banker, som senere blev omfattet af afviklingsprocedurer, og i sidste instans ophørte alle udenlandske aktiviteter [14].
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
I de foreløbige primobalancer for de tre nye banker pr. 14. november 2008 blev det anslået, at bankernes samlede, kombinerede aktiver ville udgøre 2886 mia. ISK, og at staten skulle tilvejebringe en egenkapital på 385 mia. ISK.
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
Den samlede værdi af de obligationer, som de nye banker skulle udstede til de gamle banker som betaling for den værdi af de overførte aktiver, der oversteg passiverne, blev anslået til 1153 mia. ISK.
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
I denne proces viste det sig, at den uvildige vurdering ikke ville munde ud i faste værdier for de overførte nettoaktiver, men at de ville blive værdiansat inden for visse intervaller.
Among subsidiary goals was to ensure fair valuation of the banks' assets, maximise asset recovery and strengthen supervisory practices.
Desuden gjorde bankernes kreditorer indvendinger mod værdiansættelsesprocessen, som de ikke fandt upartisk, og de klagede over, at de ikke havde mulighed for at beskytte deres interesser.
Thirdly, the program aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances, by limiting the socialisation of losses in the failed banks and implementing a medium-term fiscal consolidation program.
Disse komplikationer medførte en ændring i politikken for afregningen mellem de nye og de gamle banker.
The Icelandic authorities have underlined that due to the exceptional circumstances linked to the large size of the banking system in relation to the financial capacity of the Treasury, the policy options available to the authorities were limited.
I stedet for en værdiansættelse foretaget af en uvildig ekspert ville parterne forsøge at forhandle sig frem til aftaler om værdien af de overførte nettoaktiver.
The solutions relied upon were therefore in many ways different to the measures taken by the governments of other countries facing threats to financial stability.
Det stod klart, at parterne ville få svært ved at nå til enighed om værdiansættelsen, da den nødvendigvis afhang af forskellige skøn, som parterne sandsynligvis ikke var enige om.
On the basis of the Emergency Act, the three large commercial banks, Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank, were split into ‘old’ and ‘new’ banks.
Statens mål var at nå til enighed om grundevalueringer, som skulle udgøre et solidt grundlag for den indledende kapitalisering af de nye banker.
The Minister of Finance founded three limited liability companies to take over the domestic operations of the old banks and appointed them boards of directors.
Priser på aktiver, der lå over grundevalueringen, kunne gives til kreditorerne i form af betingede obligationer eller stigninger i værdien af bankernes aktiekapital, da det under forhandlingerne kom frem, at likvidationskomitéerne for Glitnir og Kaupthing og et flertal af deres kreditorer ville være interesserede i at erhverve kapitalandele i de nye banker, og dette ville gøre det muligt for dem at få del i potentielle stigninger i værdien af de overførte aktiver.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland.
Den fulde kapitalisering af de tre nye banker og grundlaget for aftalerne med kreditorerne i de gamle banker om, hvordan kompensationen for overførslen af nettoaktiverne til de nye banker skulle beregnes, blev offentliggjort den 20. juli 2009.
The old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees.
For så vidt angår to af de nye banker, New Glitnir Bank (senere omdøbt til Íslandsbanki) og New Kaupthing (senere omdøbt til Arion Bank), omfattede dette betingede aftaler om, at de gamle banker skulle tegne størsteparten af egenkapitalinteresserne i de nye banker.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations.
På grundlag af aftalerne besluttede de gamle bankers likvidationskomitéer i oktober 2009 (Glitnir) og december 2009 (Kaupthing Bank og Landsbanki Islands) at tegne aktier i de nye banker.
[14]
Den 18. december 2009 meddelte regeringen, at bankomstruktureringen var gennemført, og at der var indgået aftale mellem de islandske myndigheder og de nye banker på den ene side og likvidationskomitéerne for Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands og Kaupthing Bank på den anden.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Aftalerne indeholdt bestemmelser vedrørende aktiver, der var overført fra de gamle banker til de nye, og at de nye banker nu var 100 % finansierede.
The total amount of bonds to be issued by the new banks in favour of the old banks as payment for the value of the assets transferred in excess of liabilities was estimated at 1153 billion ISK.
Finansministeriets bidrag til de nye bankers egenkapital blev reduceret betydeligt, fra de oprindeligt forventede 385 mia. ISK til 135 mia. ISK i form af aktiekapital og — for to af de tre banker, Íslandsbanki og Arion Bank — omkring 55 mia. ISK som tier II-kapital i form af efterstillede lån eller i alt 190 mia. ISK.
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
Derudover gav finansministeriet Íslandsbanki og Arion Bank adgang til visse likviditetsfaciliteter.
In this process it transpired that the independent assessment would not result in fixed values of net assets transferred but valuations within certain ranges.
Aktiekapitalen fra de gamle banker til de nye udgjorde i alt omkring 156 mia. ISK.
It also emerged that the banks' creditors raised disagreements concerning the valuation process, which they considered not to be impartial, and complained that they were unable to protect their interests.
De nye bankers samlede kapitalisering udgjorde derfor ca. 346 mia. ISK.
These complications resulted in a change of policy for settling the accounts between the old and the new banks.
I stedet for at bevare fuldt ejerskab over de tre banker betød aftalerne derfor, at statens andel blev reduceret med ca. 5 % for Íslandsbanki, 13 % for Arion Bank og 81 % for Landsbankinn.
Instead of relying on valuations by an independent expert, the parties would try through negotiations to reach agreements on the value of the net assets transferred.
De gamle bankers kreditorers overtagelse af to af de tre banker løste store problemer i forbindelse med genopbygningen af finanssektoren og skabte et mere solidt kapitalgrundlag for de nye banker, men der var stadig mange svagheder, som ikke var blevet afhjulpet.
It was clear that it would be difficult for the parties to reach agreements on the valuations as they were evidently subject to numerous assumptions on which the parties were likely to disagree.
Siden efteråret 2009 har bankerne koncentreret deres indsats om interne spørgsmål, fastlagt deres overordnede strategi for deres aktiviteter og især omstruktureret deres låneporteføljer, som udgør den største risikofaktor for deres aktiviteter og langsigtede levedygtighed.
The state aimed to reach agreements on base evaluations providing a firm foundation for the initial capitalisation of the new banks.
Omstruktureringsprocessen har været kompleks på grund af mange komplicerende faktorer, herunder højesterets afgørelser om, at lån, der er ydet i ISK, men indekseret i forhold til udenlandske valutaer, er ulovlige.
Price performance of assets in excess of the base evaluation could be attributed to the creditors in the form of contingent bonds or increases in the value of the banks' share capital, as it had emerged in the negotiations that the resolution committees of Glitnir and Kaupthing and a majority of their creditors could be interested to acquire holdings in the new banks, and this would allow them to benefit from potential increases in the values of the assets transferred.