natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Tilsynsmyndigheden præciserer, at kapitalindsprøjtningen til de kommercielle aktiviteter ikke blev ydet på grundlag af den eksisterende støtteordning.
For clarity, the Authority notes that, the commercial activities capital injection was not granted on the basis of the existing aid scheme.
Hvis støtten havde været statsstøtte, ville den derfor være at betragte som ny støtte.
Had it represented state aid, that aid would consequently have been new aid.
I ovenstående vurdering har Tilsynsmyndigheden imidlertid konkluderet, at foranstaltningen ikke udgjorde statsstøtte, idet den blev gennemført i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
In the assessment above, the Authority has however concluded that that measure did not constitute state aid, as it was made in accordance with the market economy investor principle.
De norske myndigheder fremsendte deres svar ved brev af 11. januar 2007.
The Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 11 January 2007.
Tilsynsmyndigheden registrerede brevet den 12. januar 2007 (registreringsnr. 406541).
The letter was registered by the Authority on 12 January 2007 (Event No 406541).
For det andet fastslog EFTA-Domstolen, at Tilsynsmyndigheden ikke havde opfyldt sin pligt til at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure i henseende til den støtte, der var ydet i perioden 1997-2000.
Secondly, the EFTA Court held that the Authority had infringed its obligation to open the formal investigation procedure in respect of aid granted during the period 1997 – 2000.
Domstolen fandt ikke, at Tilsynsmyndigheden kunne udelukke muligheden af, at AS Oslo Sporveier og AS Sporveisbussene havde modtaget støtte, der oversteg tab forbundet med opfyldelsen af forpligtelserne til offentlig tjeneste, og at Tilsynsmyndigheden faktisk havde fastslået, at en sådan overkompensation kunne have eksisteret tidligere.
It found that the Authority could not exclude the possibility that AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene had received aid in excess of the losses associated with discharging the public service obligations, and that the Authority indeed considered that such overcompensation could have possibly occurred in the past.
De norske myndigheder afgav oplysninger ved et telefonmøde den 28. oktober 2011.
The Norwegian authorities responded in a telephone conference on 28 October 2011.
Desuden afgav de yderligere oplysninger på møder i Oslo den 19. november 2011 og i Bruxelles den 9. december 2011 og 17. januar 2012.
Additionally, the Norwegian authorities provided further information in meetings in Oslo on 29 November 2011 and in Brussels on 9 December 2011 and 17 January 2012.
Ved e-mails af 13. december 2011 (registreringsnr. 621639) og 20. januar 2012 (registreringsnr. 622816) fremsendte de også yderligere oplysninger.
By e-mails of 13 December 2011 (Event No 621639) and 20 January 2012 (Event No 622816), the Norwegian authorities submitted further information.
Med hensyn til beregning af kompensationen blev standardaftalen baseret på principperne i artikel 3 i forskriften af 1980.
As regards the calculation of the compensation, the standard agreement was based on the same principles as Article 3 of the 1980 Regulation.
Standardhovedaftalen omfattede også en adskillelse af omkostninger til rutebuskørsel og anden kommerciel virksomhed.
The standard main agreement also provided for a separation of costs between the public transport services and other commercial services.
På dette grundlag blev rutebuskørslen gradvist åbnet for offentlige udbud i fem partier i løbet af 2003-2008.
On this basis, scheduled bus transport was gradually put up for public tender in five lots during the period 2003–2008.
De respektive kontrakter trådte i kraft, året efter at de var givet i udbud.
The respective contracts entered into force the year following that in which they had been tendered out.
AS Sporveisbussene blev fusioneret med Unibuss AS i 2009.
AS Sporveisbussene merged with Unibuss AS in 2009.
Dette selskab beholdt navnet Unibuss AS og overtog funktionen som moderselskab med ejerskab over Unibuss Tur AS og Unibuss Ekspress AS.
That company kept the name Unibuss AS and took over as the parent company retaining ownership of Unibuss Tur AS and Unibuss Ekspress AS.
I henhold til en oversigt over de årlige resultater for AS Oslo Sporveiers og AS Sporveisbussenes busaktiviteter, som de norske myndigheder har indsendt, udgjorde virksomhedernes årlige gennemsnitlige overskud 0,49 % i perioden fra 1994 til 2008.
According to an overview of the annual results of the bus activities of AS Oslo Sporveier and AS Sporveisbussene submitted by the Norwegian authorities, the average annual profit of the companies was 0,49 % in the period from 1994 to 2008.
Dette tal omfatter dog indtægter fra kommerciel virksomhed fra og med 2005.
This figure, however, includes revenues from commercial activities from 2005 onwards.
I 2004 blev den specifikke model for præmie-/bødeordningen fastlagt [46].
In 2004, the specific model of a bonus/malus system was agreed on [46].
Fremover skulle AS Sporveisbussenes resultater vurderes ud fra følgende kriterier: i) den overordnede kundetilfredshed, ii) præcision, iii) sikkerheds- og komfortniveau og iv) chaufførens imødekommenhed.
According to that system, the performance of AS Sporveisbussene is assessed in accordance with the following criteria: (i) total customer satisfaction, (ii) punctuality, (iii) level of safety and comfort, and (iv) the driver being forthcoming.
AS Oslo Sporveier gav AS Sporveisbussene en kvalitetspræmie på 3,9 mio. NOK i 2004.
AS Oslo Sporveier granted a quality bonus to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million in 2004.
Dette udgjorde 0,8 % af AS Sporveisbussene indtægt samme år (483,5 mio. NOK).
This represents 0,8 % of the revenue of AS Sporveisbussene that year (NOK 483,5 million).
Ifølge det norske kredittilsyn (Kredittilsynet) havde AS Oslo Sporveiers pensionskasse kun en dækning på 46,9 % pr. 31. december 1995.
The underfunding had accumulated over several years as the payments of premiums to the pension fund did not take adequate account of increased pension obligations resulting from factors such as increases in the employees’ salaries, longer life expectancy, changes in expected rates of disability etc. According to the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Kredittilsynet), the pension fund of AS Oslo Sporveier had coverage of only 46,9 % per 31 December 1995.
Kommunale pensionskasser med en dækning på under 95 % skal hæves med mindst 1,5 % årligt [53].
Municipal pension funds with coverage below 95 % must be increased with a minimum of 1,5 % per year [53].
Følgelig blev der udarbejdet en betalingsplan for at afhjælpe underfinansieringen inden 2020.
Consequently, a payment plan to eliminate the shortfall by 2020 was laid down.
Planen blev godkendt af Kredittilsynet den 9. juli 1997.
This plan was approved by the Financial Supervisory Authority on 9 July 1997.
Dette skete pr. 1. juni 2004.
The change took effect on 1 June 2004.
Under den dagældende norske lov skulle alle præmier til dækning af underskuddet være betalt fuldt ud, før AS Sporveisbussene kunne overføre sine pensionsforpligtelser fra en kasse til en anden [57].
Under the then applicable Norwegian law, all premiums intended to cover the shortfall had to be paid in full, before AS Sporveisbussene could transfer its pension obligations from one fund to another [57].
Bortset fra det lille underskud på 29000 NOK i 1998 havde aktiviteterne været overskudsgivende siden starten i 1994.
Except for a minor deficit of NOK 29000 in 1998, the operations had run with a profit since the start up in 1994.
De norske myndigheder har desuden fremsendt et strategidokument til Tilsynsmyndigheden fra 2003 for de kommercielle busaktiviteter, som blev drevet af AS Sporveisbussene ("strategidokumentet fra 2003"), hvor målet for 2003 var at generere et bruttooverskud på 1,5 mio. NOK (før faste omkostninger) og en omsætning på 14,1 mio. NOK.
The Norwegian authorities have furthermore provided the Authority with a strategy document from 2003 for the commercial bus operations run by AS Sporveisbussene (“the 2003 strategy document”), where the stated goal for 2003 was to generate a gross profit of NOK 1,5 million (before overhead costs) and a turnover of NOK 14,1 million.
I den sammenhæng understreger de, at Oslo kommune i modsætning til oplysningerne i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren [72] rent faktisk var blevet eneejer af AS Oslo Sporveier i 2002, dvs. før kapitalindsprøjtningen i 2004.
Within that context, they stress that, contrary to the presentation of the facts in the opening decision [72], Oslo Municipality had actually become the sole owner of AS Oslo Sporveier in 2002, before the capital injection was carried out in 2004.
Desuden har de norske myndigheder tilstillet Tilsynsmyndigheden oplysninger om de kommercielle busaktiviteters økonomiske levedygtighed.
In addition, the Norwegian authorities have provided the Authority with information about the financial viability of the commercial bus operations.
Ifølge strategidokumentet for de kommercielle busaktiviteter fra 2003 var målet for 2003 at generere et bruttooverskud på 1,5 mio. NOK (før faste omkostninger) og en omsætning på 14,1 mio. NOK.
According to the 2003 strategy document for the commercial bus operations, the goal for 2003 was to generate a gross profit of NOK 1,5 million (before overhead costs) and a turnover of NOK 14,1 million.
Med hensyn til kapitalindsprøjtningen til den offentlige tjeneste mener Tilsynsmyndigheden desuden, at AS Sporveisbussene modtog kapitalindsprøjtningen til dækning af underfinansieringen af pensionsforpligtelser, der var opstået inden 1997.
Furthermore, as regards the public service capital injection, the Authority considers that AS Sporveisbussene received the capital injection to cover the underfunding of pension obligations that had accrued before 1997.
Hele kapitalindsprøjtningen blev tilsyneladende anvendt til dette formål.
It appears that the entire capital injection was used for this purpose.
Den var forpligtet til at gøre dette hvert år frem til 2008.
It was obliged to do so every year until 2008.
Det er også tydeligt, at kompensationen var ydet og kun kunne ydes til finansiering af den lokale rutebustransport i Oslo.
It is also evident that the compensation was and could only be granted for the purpose of financing local scheduled bus transport in Oslo.
Som beskrevet ovenfor eksisterede bestemmelserne vedrørende ordningen allerede, inden EØS-aftalen trådte i kraft i Norge den 1. januar 1994.
As described above, the provisions providing for the scheme have been in place since before the EEA Agreement entered into force in Norway on 1 January 1994.
Da markedet for lokal bustransport tilsyneladende allerede var udsat for en vis konkurrence på denne dato, mener Tilsynsmyndigheden, at foranstaltningen udgør en eksisterende støtteordning, der fandtes inden januar 1994 og fortsat var i kraft derefter.
As it appears that the market for local bus transport was already exposed to some competition on that date, the Authority is of the view that the measure constitutes an existing aid scheme that existed before January 1994 and remained applicable thereafter.
Den administrative praksis vedrørende finansieringen af transporttjenesten forblev grundlæggende uændret i henhold til transportaftalen, der blev indgået i 1997.
The administrative practice relating to the financing of the transport service remained substantially unchanged under the Transport Agreement concluded in 1997.
Desuden medførte omorgansieringen ingen ændringer af LY eller FKT.
Additionally, the reorganisation did not involve any changes to the CTA or CTR.
Ud over den midlertidige forlængelse blev der ikke foretaget ændringer af den offentlige tjenesteopgave eller betalingen inden for koncessionen, der blev fornyet med virkning fra den 1. januar 2000.
Other than the temporal prolongation, no changes with regard to the public service mission or its remuneration were made to the concession renewed with effect from 1 January 2000.
AS Sporveisbussene fortsatte simpelthen på samme vilkår med at udføre den offentlige tjeneste på AS Oslo Sporveiers vegne på grundlag af koncessionen, som blot udgør en administrativ akt til gennemførelse af bestemmelserne i LY vedrørende drift og finansiering af de offentlige rutetjenester, og som ikke omfattede nogen ændringer af den måde, tjenesterne blev udført på.
AS Sporveisbussene simply continued, on the same terms, to carry out the public service on behalf of AS Oslo Sporveier on the basis of the concession, that merely constitutes an administrative act that implemented the provisions of the CTA concerning the operation and financing of the public scheduled services and which did not involve any changes in the way these services were to be carried out.
AS Oslo Sporveier indførte en ny præmie-/bødeordning i 2004.
AS Oslo Sporveier introduced a new bonus/malus system in 2004.
De norske myndigheder har forklaret, at denne ordning udgør en del af kompensationen for offentlig tjeneste for levering af lokal rutebustransport i Oslo.
The Norwegian authorities have explained that this system constitutes part of the public service compensation for the provision of local scheduled bus transport in Oslo.
Ordningen sigtede mod at øge kvaliteten af de leverede tjenester og blev indført inden for LY den 1. januar 2008.
It aimed at increasing the quality of the services provided and was implemented within the CTA on 1 January 2008.
Som forklaret ovenfor var det gennemsnitlige årlige udbytte af den offentlige tjeneste 1,98 % i perioden fra 1994 til 2005.
As explained above, for the period 1994 to 2005 the average annual return for the public service was 1,98 %.
Systemet for fordeling af fælles omkostninger ved tjenesterne mellem AS Sporveisbussene og dets datterselskaber ændredes i 2003, og et nyt system baseret på faste omkostninger blev indført fra og med 2004.
The system for allocating common costs for the services between AS Sporveisbussene and its subsidiaries changed in 2003 and a new system based on overheads was put in effect as from 2004.
I henhold til dette system afholdt busselskaberne en forholdsmæssig andel af de fælles omkostninger baseret på deres omsætning.
Under that system, the bus companies carried a proportionate share of common costs based on their turnover.
Derfor indførte man en betalingsplan for at rette op på manglerne i fonden inden 2020.
Thus, a payment plan to remedy the fund’s shortfall by 2020 was implemented.
I henhold til planen øgede Oslo kommune kompensationen for offentlig tjeneste til AS Oslo Sporveier for at dække alle omkostninger i forbindelse med levering af den offentlige tjeneste.
In accordance with that plan, Oslo Municipality increased the public service compensation for AS Oslo Sporveier in order to cover all the costs incurred by the provision of the public service.
Disse aspekter blev fjernet i 2006.
These aspects were taken out in 2006.
I praksis henviser cirkulæreskrivelse N-1/2006 til den gamle bestemmelse (artikel 28 i FY), som den var før ændringen, og det fastslås, at kravene i den gamle bestemmelse indtil videre skal betragtes som en retningslinje for indholdet af busruteplanen.
In practice, the Circular Letter N-1/2006 refers to the old provision (Article 28 CTR) as it was before the amendment, and states that the requirements of the old provision, until further notice, shall be considered as a guideline for the content of the route schedule.
Jf. den foreløbige dokumentation, kapitel 10.1 i Prop.
As stated in the preparatory works, chapter 10.1 of Prop.
De to bidrag vil blive betragtet som uafhængige transaktioner, der skattemæssigt skal behandles hver for sig, jf. kendelse 22/05 fra det norske skattedirektorat (på norsk): http://www.skatteetaten.no/Templates/BindendeForhandsuttalelse.aspx?id=28885.
The two contributions would be viewed as separate transactions, to be treated separately for tax purposes, see Advance Ruling 22/05 by the Norwegian Directorate of Taxes, available online (in Norwegian): http://www.skatteetaten.no/Templates/BindendeForhandsuttalelse.aspx?id=28885.
Det betyder, at der kan ydes koncernbidrag i visse situationer, og at skattekonsolidering kan opnås uden at ændre bidragyderens nettoformue.
This entails that under certain circumstances, group contributions could be made and tax consolidation could be achieved without altering the grantors’ net equity.
[…]to qualify as an "existing aid measure" under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement."
[…] to qualify as an “existing aid measure” under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement.”
"garantierne i forbindelse med lån optaget inden den 1. maj 2004 (Ungarns tiltrædelse til Den Europæiske Union) blev stillet forud for tiltrædelsen og meddelt til Kommissionen i henhold til bilag IV.3 til tiltrædelsestraktaten. Selv om det er blevet overført til en ny virksomhed, mener Kommissionen, at der var tale om en rent administrativ handling, eftersom eksisterende lån, der var dækket af allerede godkendte garantier, blev overført til den nye virksomhed. Overførslen var konsekvensen af en simpel omorganisering af MÀV Zrt. uden ændring af de pågældende aktiviteter eller støtteforanstaltningernes indhold. Derfor når Kommissionen til den konklusion, at garantierne trods overførslen stadig må betragtes som eksisterende støtte."
“the guarantees provided in connection with loans taken out prior to 1 May 2004 (accession of Hungary to the European Union) were granted before accession and notified to the Commission in compliance with Annex IV.3 of the Accession Treaty. Although they have been transferred to a new undertaking the Commission considers that this was a purely administrative act since existing loans covered by already approved guarantees were transferred to a new undertaking. The transfer was the consequence of a mere reorganization of MÀV Zrt. without any change in the activities involved or the content of the aid measures. Thus the Commission comes to the conclusion that despite the transfer the guarantees are still considered as existing aid”.
På grundlag af ovenstående finder Tilsynsmyndigheden, at omorganiseringen i 1997 ikke kan anses for at have medført en betydelig ændring af støtteordningen.
On the basis of the above, the Authority finds that the reorganisation of 1997 cannot be held to have involved a substantive change to the aid scheme.
Sag E-5/07, Private Barnehagers Landsforbund mod EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden [2008], EFTA Court Report 62, præmis 78.
Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 62 at paragraph 78.
Nr. 521/12/KOL
No 521/12/COL
om at indstille den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, der blev indledt ved beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL i forbindelse med statsstøtte til tre islandske investeringsbanker i form af låneomlægning på gunstige vilkår (Island)
to close the formal State aid investigation procedure initiated by Decision No 363/11/COL with regard to State aid to three Icelandic investment banks through rescheduled loans on preferential terms (Iceland)
EFTA-TILSYNSMYNDIGHEDEN (i det følgende benævnt »Tilsynsmyndigheden«) har —
THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘the Authority’),
UNDER HENVISNING til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (i det følgende benævnt »EØS-aftalen«), særlig artikel 61 og protokol 26,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 and Protocol 26,
UNDER HENVISNING til protokol 3 til tilsyns- og domstolsaftalen (i det følgende benævnt »protokol 3«), navnlig artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I og artikel 4, stk. 4, og artikel 6 i del II,
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Article 4(4) and Article 6 of Part II.
EFTER AT HAVE OPFORDRET interesserede parter til at fremsætte bemærkninger i henhold til ovennævnte bestemmelser [1], under henvisning til deres bemærkninger, og
HAVING called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to those provisions [1] and having regard to their comments,
Ved brev af 22. juni 2010 modtog EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden (»Tilsynsmyndigheden«) en klage fra den islandske værdipapirvirksomhed H.F.
By letter dated 22 June 2010, the Authority received a complaint from the Icelandic securities firm H.F.
Verðbréf hf. over påstået ulovlig statsstøtte til investeringsbankerne Saga Capital og VBS i form af omlægning af kortfristet gæld til den islandske centralbank til langfristede lån på gunstige vilkår.
Verðbréf hf. alleging that the Icelandic Treasury had in March 2009 granted unlawful State aid to the investment banks Saga Capital and VBS through conversion of short-term debt with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘the CBI’) to long-term loans on favourable terms.
Tilsynsmyndigheden modtog og registrerede brevene den 7. juli 2010 (dok. nr. 563424).
The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 7 July 2010 (Event No 563424).
Efter at have modtaget de relevante oplysninger fra de islandske myndigheder og efter at have drøftet sagen med dem på et møde den 6. juni 2011 [2] besluttede Tilsynsmyndigheden ved beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL af 23. november 2011 at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure over for statsstøtte ydet til tre islandske investeringsbanker ved låneomlægning på gunstige vilkår [3].
Having received the relevant information from the Icelandic authorities and having discussed the case with them in a meeting on 6 June 2011 [2], the Authority decided by Decision No 363/11/COL of 23 November 2011 to initiate the formal investigation procedure with regard to State aid to three Icelandic investment banks through rescheduled loans on preferential terms [3].
I denne beslutning opfordrede Tilsynsmyndigheden interesserede parter til at fremsætte bemærkninger i sagen.
By means of this Decision, the Authority called on interested parties to submit their comments.
Ved brev af 21. februar 2012 (dok. nr. 625875) fremsatte de islandske myndigheder deres bemærkninger til Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL.
By letter dated 21 February 2012 (Event No 625875), the Icelandic authorities submitted comments on the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL.
I juni 2012 modtog Tilsynsmyndigheden oplysninger fra klageren, H.F.
In June 2012 the Authority received information from the complainant, H.F.
Verðbréf hf., vedrørende den igangværende likvidation af Saga Capital hf.
Verðbréf hf., regarding the winding-up process of Saga Capital hf.
(dok. nr. 641907).
(Event No 641907).
Tilsynsmyndigheden modtog også oplysninger om sagen fra andre kilder og fulgte nøje udviklingen i likvidationen for de investeringsbanker, der var genstand for beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL.
The Authority has also received information on this matter from other sources and followed closely the winding-up process of the investment banks that were the subject of the Decision No 363/11/COL.
2 Beskrivelse af foranstaltningerne
Description of the measures
Den islandske centralbanks lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer og værdipapirlån
The CBI’s collateral loans and securities lending scheme
De foranstaltninger, som var under foreløbig vurdering i Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL, vedrørte den islandske centralbanks lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer og ordning med værdipapirlån.
The measures that were under preliminary assessment in the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL are linked to the CBI’s collateral and securities lending scheme.
Den islandske centralbank ydede som centralbank og sidste låneinstans og på linje med andre centralbankers monetære politik kortfristede kreditfaciliteter til finansielle virksomheder i form af lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer [4] i overensstemmelse med den islandske centralbanks bestemmelser herom.
The CBI, as part of its role as a central bank and lender of last resort and in line with the monetary policy of other central banks, provided short-term credit facilities to financial undertaking in the form of collateral loans [4], in accordance with the provisions of CBI rules pertaining thereto.