natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Forventninger om efterfølgende prisreduktioner betyder ikke, at der ikke var nogen økonomisk fordel forbundet med de priser, som kontrakterne blev overført til Mesta AS til.
Expectations of subsequent price reductions do not imply that there was no economic advantage involved in the prices at which the contracts were transferred to Mesta AS.
Myndighederne forsøger at retfærdiggøre prispolitikken ved at hævde, at markedet ikke var helt åbent for konkurrence i 2003-2006.
The authorities try to justify the pricing policy by arguing that the market was not entirely open to competition in 2003–2006.
Mesta AS drog imidlertid fordel af overpriserne i kontrakterne, som stadig var i kraft, da markedet blev åbnet.
However, Mesta AS benefited from the overpriced contracts still in force during the opening of the market.
Mesta AS' gennemsnitlige priser er steget i overgangsperioden, mens Skanskas gennemsnitlige priser har været stabile.
Indeed Mesta AS’ average price level has increased during the transitional period while Skanska’s average price level has been stable.
Dette viser, at de kontrakter, der blev overført til Mesta AS, gav en økonomisk fordel, som udgjorde statsstøtte.
This shows that the contracts transferred to Mesta AS involved an economic advantage amounting to State aid.
OMSTRUKTURERINGS- OG OMLÆGNINGSFORANSTALTNINGER
RESTRUCTURING AND REORGANISATION MEASURES
De norske myndigheder har gjort gældende, at statens finansiering af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Norwegian authorities have argued that no State aid is involved in the State funding for restructuring measures.
I denne forbindelse har de norske myndigheder anført, at Mesta AS, da selskabet blev etableret den 1. januar 2003, havde en række ulemper som følge af, at produktionsafdelingen var en del af centraladministrationen, og at medarbejderne havde tjenestemandsstatus.
In this regard the Norwegian authorities have argued that Mesta AS was established on 1 January 2003 with a number of disadvantages originating in the fact that the Production Department formed part of the State administration and that the employees held a civil servant status.
Disse ulemper omfattede overførslen af et alt for stort antal medarbejdere (1700), hvis tjenestemandsrettigheder (eller alternative rettigheder) blev opretholdt i en overgangsperiode.
Disadvantages included the transfer to Mesta AS of an excessive number of employees (1700) for whom civil servant pension rights (or alternative rights) were maintained for a transitional period.
Mesta AS betalte meromkostningerne ved at opretholde sådanne rettigheder i overgangsperioden [128].
Mesta AS paid the additional costs of maintaining such rights during the transitional period [128].
Formålet med at yde støtte til Mesta AS til omstruktureringsforanstaltninger var at kompensere Mesta AS for, at selskabet blev etableret med høje omkostninger i forhold til at skulle operere på det åbne marked, som f.eks. ekstra pensionsomkostninger for tjenestemænd, som ingen konkurrenter har.
The intention behind granting Mesta AS funding for the restructuring measures was to compensate Mesta AS for having been established with costs which are inappropriate for commercial operations, such as the additional pension costs of civil servants, and which no competitors have.
De norske myndigheder mener, at sådanne omkostninger (som bliver kompenseret) er knyttet til forpligtelser, der er opstået som følge af, at produktionsafdelingen har været en del af centraladministrationen, hvorfor de udgør en forpligtelse for staten.
The Norwegian authorities consider that such costs (which are subject to compensation) derive from obligations incurred as a consequence of the Production Department having formed part of the State administration and constitute therefore a State liability.
Af denne grund udgør kompensation for sådanne omkostninger ikke en økonomisk fordel for Mesta AS.
Hence compensation for such costs does therefore not constitute an economic advantage for Mesta AS.
Desuden har de norske myndigheder gjort gældende, at de kunne have opnået samme resultat ved at gennemføre de relevante omstruktureringsforanstaltninger før omdannelsen af produktionsafdelingen til Mesta AS.
In addition, the Norwegian authorities have submitted that it could have achieved the same result by undertaking the relevant restructuring measures prior to the transformation of the Production Department into Mesta AS.
Dette ville imidlertid have været tidskrævende, mindre omkostningseffektivt og ville derfor have forsinket liberaliseringsprocessen.
However, this would have been time consuming, less cost efficient and consequently delayed the liberalisation process.
I denne forbindelse bemærker de norske myndigheder, at hvis omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne var blevet gennemført før omdannelsen, ville der ikke have været nogen støtte, og nettoresultatet for Mesta AS er det samme, uanset om foranstaltningerne blev gennemført før eller efter.
In this context the Norwegian authorities note that if the restructuring measures would have been undertaken prior to the transformation no aid would have been involved and the net effect for Mesta AS is the same irrespectively of whether the measures are carried out before or after.
De norske myndigheder mener, at det, at den alternative fremgangsmåde ikke ville rejse nogen spørgsmål om statsstøtte, viser, at kompensation for omstruktureringsomkostninger ikke udgør en økonomisk fordel for Mesta AS.
In the view of the Norwegian authorities the fact that the alternative approach would not raise State aid issues shows that compensating for restructuring costs does not entail an economic advantage for Mesta AS.
Til støtte for deres argumenter henviser de norske myndigheder til Combus-sagen, hvor Retten i Første Instans fandt, at kompensation for foranstaltninger, der har til formål at udligne en strukturel ulempe, ikke udgør statsstøtte [129].
In support of their arguments the Norwegian authorities refer to the Combus case where the Court of First Instance found that compensation for measures intended to offset a structural disadvantage does not constitute State aid [129].
I denne sag betalte den danske stat 100 mio. DKK til tjenestemandsansatte for at opgive deres tjenestemandsstatus (og de dermed forbundne rettigheder) i forbindelse med overflytningen til Combus.
In that case the Danish Government paid DKK 100 million to civil servants for waiving their civil servant status (and related rights) in the context of being transferred to Combus.
De norske myndigheder påpeger også, at Retten i Første Instans anførte, at den danske stat kunne have opnået samme resultat ved ikke at overflytte tjenestemændene til Combus: »… ville den danske stat (…) have kunnet opnå samme resultat ved at genplacere de pågældende tjenestemænd andetsteds i den offentlige forvaltning uden særlig godtgørelse, hvorved Combus ville have haft mulighed for straks fra begyndelsen at rekruttere personale på overenskomstvilkår.« [130]De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at det springende punkt i henhold til Combus-dommen er, hvorvidt kompensation »letter de byrder, som normalt belaster en virksomheds budget.
The Norwegian authorities also point out that the Court of First Instance stated that the Danish Government could have achieved the same result by not transferring the officials to Combus: ‘… the Danish Government could have obtained the same result by reassigning their officials within the State, without paying any particular bonus, which would have enabled Combus to employ immediately employees on a contract basis falling under private law.’ [130]The Norwegian authorities have argued that based on the Combus judgment the decisive issue is whether compensation lightens the burdens normally assumed in an undertaking’s budget.
Myndighederne mener ikke, at kompensation for sidstnævnte omkostninger udgør en økonomisk fordel, idet den blot opvejer en strukturel ulempe, som konkurrenterne ikke har.
The authorities consider that compensation for the latter costs does not amount to an economic advantage but compensates merely for a structural disadvantage which its competitors do not have.
I et andet spørgsmål har de norske myndigheder gjort gældende, at hvis den finansielle forpligtelse er »indregnet« i indskuddet af naturalier, vil dette reducere den samlede nettoværdi af virksomheden, hvorfor den overdragende part kan kompensere for sådanne finansielle forpligtelser for at holde dem neutrale.
Separately from this, the Norwegian authorities have argued that if the financial obligation is ‘included’ in the contribution in kind this reduces the overall net value of the business and the transferor may therefore compensate for such financial obligations so as to keep them neutral.
Indskuddet af naturalier i Mesta AS omfattede en række genstande, som gav ulemper, der ikke var egnet til kommerciel drift.
The contribution in kind to Mesta AS involved a number of items involving disadvantages not suited for commercial operations.
I stedet for at reducere værdien af indskuddet af naturalier, bevarede myndighederne den oprindelige værdi og kompenserede i stedet for ulemperne ved omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne.
Instead of reducing the value of the contribution in kind the authorities have maintained the original value and instead compensated for the disadvantages of the restructuring measures.
Til støtte for argumentet om, at værdien af indskuddet af naturalier ikke blev berørt af de finansielle forpligtelser (og at myndighederne derfor skulle kompensere for de negative følger af sådanne forpligtelser), har de norske myndigheder henvist til beregningen af Mesta AS' nettonutidsværdi og egenkapital.
In support of the argument that the value of the contribution in kind remained unaffected by the financial obligations (and that the authorities should therefore compensate for the negative impact of such obligations) the Norwegian authorities have referred to the Net Present Value calculation and the equity of Mesta AS.
I denne forbindelse henviser de til Deloitte & Touche, som i sin rapport af 12. december 2002 [131] anfører, at »Omkostningerne [til omstrukturering] er anslået på grundlag af eksisterende planer om nedskæringer i arbejdsstyrken og de eksisterende lønaftaler. Selskabet vil overtage de eksisterende ansættelseskontrakter og skal betale disse omkostninger, men omkostningerne hidrører fra forpligtelser indgået af staten og vil derfor blive dækket af bevillinger i 2003, 2004 og 2005.« og »Omstruktureringen af selskabet kræver omkostninger, som må betragtes som et levn fra fortiden som en offentlig enhed og er derfor allerede afholdt på etableringstidspunktet. Selskabet vil overtage de eksisterende ansættelseskontrakter og skal betale disse omkostninger, men omkostningerne hidrører fra forpligtelser indgået af staten og vil derfor blive dækket af bevillinger i 2003, 2004 og 2005.« Deloitte & Touche anfører også, at dette var årsagen til, at Mesta AS fik bevilliget støtte til dækning af omstruktureringsomkostningerne (som ikke indgik i åbningsbalancen) løbende over tre år.
In this regard reference is made to Deloitte & Touche which in its 12 December 2002 Report [131] states that ‘The [restructuring] costs are estimated on the basis of existing plans for reductions in the workforce and existing salary agreements. The company will take over the existing employment agreements and must cover these costs, but the costs derive from obligations belonging to the state and will therefore be covered through appropriations in 2003, 2004, and 2005.’ And ‘The restructuring of the company implies costs that must be observed as a lag from the past as a public entity and are as such already incurred at the time of establishment. The company will take over the existing employment agreements and must cover these costs, but the costs derive from obligations belonging to the state and will therefore be covered through appropriations in 2003, 2004 and 2005.’ Deloitte & Touche also states that this was also the reason that Mesta AS was granted funding to cover the restructuring costs (which did not form part of the opening balance) on an ongoing basis over three years.
De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at ejeren skal kunne opveje samme ulemper, som en privat køber ville have krævet, hvis produktionsafdelingen var blevet solgt uden at være omfattet af statsstøttereglerne: Hvis produktionsafdelingen var blevet solgt, ville køberen opdage, at dens struktur var uegnet til kommerciel drift og kræve i) et nedslag i købsprisen svarende til værdien af ulemperne, eller ii) at sælger (dvs. myndighederne) betaler udgifterne til at gøre virksomheden klar til kommerciel drift.
The Norwegian authorities argue that the owner must be able to offset the same disadvantages as a private purchaser would have required if the Production Department would have been sold without being caught by the State aid rules: If the Production Department would have been sold, a purchaser would discover that the structure would be inappropriate for commercial operations and demand (i) a reduction, corresponding to the disadvantages in the purchase price; or (ii) that the seller (i.e., the authorities) covers the costs necessary to make the business fit for commercial operations.
Ifølge de norske myndigheder er det ikke korrekt, at en sådan ordning betød, at Mesta AS kunne udnytte disse medarbejderes arbejdskraft uden at betale de fulde omkostninger forbundet med deres ansættelse.
According to the Norwegian authorities it is incorrect to maintain that such an arrangement implies that Mesta AS received the benefit of the work carried out by such employees without paying the full costs of their employment terms.
Det ville have været dyrere for staten at beholde de ansatte i stedet for at overflytte dem til Mesta AS og refundere Mesta AS for udgifterne til førtidspensionsordninger [132].
It would have been more expensive for the State to keep the employees than to transfer them to Mesta AS and reimburse the latter for early pension arrangements [132].
Derfor falder kompensation for førtidspensionering uden for EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at kompensation for opretholdelse af tjenestemandspension er en direkte konsekvens af medarbejdernes tidligere tjenestemandsstatus, hvorfor det bør betragtes som en forpligtelse for de norske myndigheder.
Hence compensation for early pension falls outside Article 61(1) EEA.The Norwegian authorities argue that compensation for maintenance of civil servant pension is a direct consequence of the employee’s previous status as civil servant and should therefore be considered as a liability of the Norwegian authorities.
Det samme gælder for opretholdelse af den særlige pensionsalder (som visse medarbejdere fik tilbudt i forbindelse med deres ansættelse i produktionsafdelingen).
The same conclusion applies to maintenance of the special retirement age scheme (from which certain employees benefited during their employment in the Production Department).
I begge tilfælde har kompensationen kun dækket differencen mellem meromkostningerne til tjenestemandspensioner eller ordningen med den særlige pensionsalder på den ene side og en almindelig pensionsordning på den anden.
In both cases the compensation has only covered the difference between the additional costs for civil servant pensions or special retirement age scheme, on the one hand, and an ordinary pension scheme, on the other.
Der er ingen af Mesta AS' konkurrenter, der har fået pålagt sådanne forpligtelser for deres medarbejdere, hvorfor kompensation for disse foranstaltninger ikke udgør statsstøtte i den i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, anførte forstand.
No competitors of Mesta AS have been imposed such obligations in respect of their employees and hence compensation for these measures do not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA.
Flytning af kontorer, flytning af støttefunktioner og vedligeholdelsesafdelinger, overførsel af arkiver, flytning
Moving offices, moving of support and maintenance offices, transfer of archives, moving
Omkostningerne til flytning af kontorerne var ikke forbundet med aktiviteter udført i Mesta AS, men blev udløst af produktionsafdelingens geografiske placering.
The costs of moving of offices were not a result of activities carried out in Mesta AS but were incurred as a consequence of the geographical location of the Production Department.
Endvidere stammer omkostningerne til flytning af støttefunktioner og vedligeholdelsesafdelinger fra aktiviteter, der blev gennemført før Mesta AS' etablering, og kan derfor ikke betragtes som byrder, som normalt belaster en virksomheds budget, men må betragtes som omkostninger knyttet til statens forpligtelser.
Also, the costs for moving support and maintenance offices originate from activities carried out prior to the establishment of Mesta AS and can therefore not be considered as costs normally assumed in an undertakings budget but derive rather from State obligations.
Det samme gælder omkostningerne til overførsel af arkiver.
The same goes for the costs for transferring archives.
I modsætning til, hvad Tilsynsmyndigheden anfører i sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren, gælder dette også for flytteomkostningerne for personalet i produktionsafdelingen, der var nødt til at flytte for at arbejde på Mesta AS' nye adresse.
Contrary to the Authority’s statement in the Opening Decision this is also true for the moving costs incurred by personnel of the Production Department which had to move domiciles to take up employment in the new premises of Mesta AS.
I denne forbindelse har de norske myndigheder også påpeget, at det var nødvendigt at tilbyde nøglemedarbejderne incitamenter for at minimere risikoen for, at de ville tage deres afsked.
In this regard the Norwegian authorities have also pointed out that it was necessary to offer key personnel incentives in order to minimise the risk that they would resign.
Endelig var transportomkostninger i to år (dvs. frem til 1. januar 2005) for nøglemedarbejdere også resultatet af produktionsafdelingens forsøg på at afholde dem fra at forlade Mesta AS.
Finally, commuting costs during two years (i.e., up until 1 January 2005) for key personnel were also a result of the activities in the Production Department to discourage such personnel from leaving Mesta AS.
Konklusion og argumenter om forenelighed
Conclusion and arguments on compatibility
På grundlag af ovenstående konkluderer de norske myndigheder, at ingen af de foranstaltninger, der er ydet omstruktureringsstøtte til, indebærer en økonomisk fordel for Mesta AS.
Based on the above, the Norwegian authorities conclude that none of the measures for which restructuring funding has been provided involves an economic advantage to Mesta AS.
Eftersom staten kun har bevilliget 993,6 mio. NOK til Mesta AS til dækning af omstruktureringsomkostninger (selv om de anslåede samlede omstruktureringsomkostninger udgør 1097,8 mio. NOK), blev Mesta AS faktisk underkompenseret med ca. 104,2 mio. NOK [133].
In fact, since the State has awarded Mesta AS only NOK 993,6 million to cover restructuring costs (although the estimated total restructuring cost amount to NOK 1097,8 million) Mesta AS is undercompensated with about NOK 104,2 million [133].
Hvis Tilsynsmyndigheden alligevel når til den konklusion, at omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne indebærer statsstøtte, har de norske myndigheder gjort gældende, at støtten i medfør af artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), er forenelig, idet i) foranstaltningerne opfylder et mål af fælles økonomisk interesse, ii) Mesta AS' omstrukturering er nødvendig for opfyldelsen af dette mål, og iii) støtten ikke ændrer samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.
Should the Authority nonetheless come to the conclusion that State aid is involved in the restructuring measures, the Norwegian authorities have submitted that the aid is compatible by reference to Article 61(3)(c) as (i) the measures pursues an objective of common European interest; (ii) the restructuring of Mesta AS is necessary to achieve this objective; and (iii) the aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent which is contrary to the common interest.
Hvad angår opfyldelsen af et mål af fælles europæisk interesse gør de norske myndigheder gældende, at åbning af markeder for konkurrence er et fællesskabsmål af fælles europæisk interesse [134].
As to the pursuit of a common European interest, the Norwegian authorities argue that the opening up of markets to competition is a Community objective in the common European interest [134].
I den foreliggende sag var etableringen af en statsejet virksomhed, som skulle konkurrere på lige konkurrencevilkår med nye markedsaktører, et nødvendigt skridt i retning af et åbent marked.
In the present case the establishment of a State owned undertaking to compete on a level playing field with new entrants was a necessary step in the context of opening up the market.
De norske myndigheder minder om, at de nationale myndigheder kan beslutte, hvordan en sådan åbning af markedet skal gennemføres.
The Norwegian authorities recall that the national authorities remain free to decide on how the opening of the market should take place.
Myndighederne bemærker også, at åbningen af markederne for drift og vedligeholdelse af vejnettet for konkurrence er bedre for konkurrencen end nogen af alternativerne, som er at fortsætte med at udøve aktiviteterne i staten eller kun at åbne markedet delvist.Endelig skal der i forbindelse med vurderingen af indvirkningen på konkurrencen tages højde for den generelle økonomiske virkning af omstruktureringen af vedligeholdelsen og driften af vejnettet: Mesta AS blev etableret med en strukturel ulempe i forhold til sine konkurrenter.
The authorities also note that the opening of the road operation and maintenance markets for competition is better for competition than any of the alternatives of continuing to carry out the services within the State, or open up the market for competition only in part.Finally, when the effect on competition is considered account must be taken of the overall economic effect of restructuring the road maintenance and operation activities: Mesta AS was established with a structural disadvantage compared to its competitors.
Fra et økonomisk perspektiv var Mesta AS derfor ikke i samme situation som sine konkurrenter, da Mesta AS bar byrden fra den tidligere produktionsafdeling i staten.
Hence from an economic perspective Mesta AS was not in a situation comparable to that of its competitors as Mesta AS bore the burden derived from the former Production Department within the State.
Derfor skal der i forbindelse med analysen af indvirkningen på konkurrencen tages højde for neutralitetsprincippet i EØS-aftalens artikel 125.
Therefore, when analysing the effects on competition account must be taken of the principle of neutrality set out in Article 125 EEA.
De norske myndigheder mener, at dette betyder, at det må være acceptabelt at kompensere Mesta AS for strukturelle ulemper med henblik på at etablere et kommercielt levedygtigt selskab.
In the view of the Norwegian authorities this means that it must be acceptable to compensate Mesta AS for structural disadvantages for purposes of establishing a commercially geared company.
Myndighederne bemærker også, at støtten til omstruktureringsforanstaltninger var begrænset til det, der var nødvendigt for at åbne markedet for konkurrence.
The authorities also note that the aid for the restructuring measures was limited to what was necessary in order to open up the market for competition.
Endelig har processen ikke ændret samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.
Finally, the process has not adversely affected trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
OVERGANGSKONTRAKTER
TRANSITIONAL CONTRACTS