natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Se f.eks. Kommissionens beslutning i COMP/M.5675, Syngenta/Monsanto, hvori Kommissionen analyserede fusionen mellem de to vertikalt integrerede solsikkekerneproducenter ved både at undersøge i) leverandørleddet for handel med (navnlig udveksling og meddelelse af licens på) sorter (forældrelinjer og hybrider) og ii) markedet for salg af hybrider i aftagerleddet.
Such agreement is inherent in the establishment of the pool and cannot in itself be considered restrictive of competition.
I COMP/M.5406, IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal AG, afgrænsede Kommissionen både et marked for produktion af højkvalitetsmelamin og et teknologimarked for forsyning af produkter til melaminproduktion i leverandørleddet.
In certain circumstances it may be more efficient if the royalties of the pool are agreed before the standard is chosen, to avoid that the choice of the standard increases the royalty rate by conferring a significant degree of market power on one or more essential technologies.
Se desuden COMP/M.269, Shell/Montecatini.
However, licensees must remain free to determine the price of products produced under the licence.
Se også Kommissionens beslutning COMP/M.5675, Syngenta/Monsanto, og afgørelse COMP/M.5406, IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal AG.
Where the pool has a dominant position on the market, royalties and other licensing terms should be non-excessive and non-discriminatory and licences should be non-exclusive [100].
Se også punkt 119-122 i meddelelsen fra Tilsynsmyndigheden om retningslinjer for anvendelsen af EØS-aftalens artikel 53 på horisontale samarbejdsaftaler (»horisontale retningslinjer«) ( EUT C 362 af 12.12.2013, s. 3, og EØS-tillæg nr. 69 af 12.12.2013, s. 1).
These requirements are necessary to ensure that the pool is open and does not lead to foreclosure and other anti-competitive effects on down-stream markets.
Se også punkt 157.
These requirements, however, do not preclude different royalty rates for different uses.
Hvis der er tale om virksomheder, der generelt har forpligtet sig til at meddele licens på visse intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder, kan der ikke foreligge en blokerende stilling mellem parterne på grundlag af disse intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder.
It is in general not considered restrictive of competition to apply different royalty rates to different product markets, whereas there should be no discrimination within product markets.
Forenede sager T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 og T-388/94, European Night Services m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1998 II, s. 3141, præmis 137.
In particular, the treatment of licensees of the pool should not depend on whether or not they are also licensors.
Sag T-461/07, Visa Europe Ltd og Visa International Service mod Europa-Kommissionen, Sml. 2011 II, s. 1729, præmis 167.
The Authority will therefore take into account whether licensors and licensees are subject to the same royalty obligations.
Sag T-461/07, Visa Europe Ltd og Visa International Service mod Europa-Kommissionen, Sml. 2011 II, s. 1729, præmis 189.
Licensors and licensees should be free to develop competing products and standards.
Se meddelelsen om aftaler af ringe betydning, jf. fodnote 22.
They should also be free to grant and obtain licences outside the pool.
I henhold til artikel 3, stk. 2, i kapitel II i protokol 4 til tilsyns- og domstolsaftalen kan aftaler, som kan påvirke samhandelen mellem EFTA-stater, men som ikke er forbudt i henhold til artikel 53, ikke forbydes ved national konkurrenceret.
These requirements are necessary in order to limit the risk of foreclosure of third-party technologies and ensure that the pool does not limit innovation and does not preclude the creation of competing technological solutions.
Gruppefritagelsesforordningen vil nu kunne dække den teknologioverførselsaftale, der blev vurderet i Kommissionens beslutning i Moosehead/Whitbread (EFT L 100 af 20.4.1990, s. 32), se navnlig nr. 16.
Where pooled technology is included in a (de facto) industry standard and where the parties are subject to non-compete obligations, the pool creates a particular risk of preventing the development of new and improved technologies and standards.
Se sag 262/81, Coditel (II), Sml. 1982, s. 3381.
Grant-back obligations should be non-exclusive and limited to developments that are essential or important to the use of the pooled technology.
EUT L 102 af 23.4.2010, s.1, indarbejdet i EØS-aftalen ved afgørelse 77/2010 (EUT L 244 af 16.9.2010, s. 35, og EØS-tillæg nr. 49 af 16.9.2010, s. 34).
This allows the pool to feed on and benefit from improvements to the pooled technology.
Udtrykkene »licensering« og »meddelelse af licens« i disse retningslinjer omfatter også overdragelses-, ikke-påberåbelses- og forligsaftaler, så længe der finder en overførsel af teknologirettigheder sted som beskrevet i dette afsnit.
It is legitimate for the parties to ensure by grant-back obligations that the exploitation of the pooled technology cannot be held up by licensees, including subcontractors working under the licence of the licensee, that hold or obtain essential patents.
Se yderligere om forligsaftaler punkt 234 ff.
One of the problems identified with regard to technology pools is the risk that they may shield invalid patents.
Se betragtning 6 i gruppefritagelsesforordningen og afsnit 3.2.6.
Pooling may raise the costs/risks for a successful challenge, because the challenge might fail if only one patent in the pool is valid.
Se nærmere herom i punkt 248.
The shielding of invalid patents in the pool may oblige licensees to pay higher royalties and may also prevent innovation in the field covered by an invalid patent.
Se fodnote 39.
In this context, non-challenge clauses, including termination clauses [101], in a technology transfer agreement between the pool and third parties are likely to fall within Article 53(1).
EUT C 362 af 22.11.2012, s. 1, og EØS-tillæg nr. 65 af 22.11.2012, s. 1.
Pools often include both patents and patent applications.
EFT L 153 af 18.6.1994, s. 30, og EØS-tillæg nr. 15 af 18.6.1994, s. 29.
If patent applicants who submit their patent applications to pools, where available, use the patent application procedures that allow for a faster granting, this will achieve faster certainty on the validity and scope of these patents.
Se punkt 3 i Tilsynsmyndighedens meddelelse om underleveranceaftaler, jf. fodnote 44.
OJ L 259, 4.10.2007, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 46, 4.10.2007, p. 1.
Se også afsnit 3.2.6.1.
The TTBER replaces the act previously referred to in point 5 of Annex XIV to the EEA Agreement, i.e. Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements (OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 11), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 42/2005 of 11 March 2005 (OJ L 198, 28.7.2005, p. 42 and EEA Supplement No 38, 28.7.2005, p. 24).
Det sidstnævnte tilfælde er imidlertid omfattet af forordning (EU) nr. 1217/2010, jf. fodnote 50, se også afsnit 3.2.6.1. nedenfor.
See by analogy Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge [2000] ECR I-1365, paragraph 130, and point 106 of the Authority guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement (OJ C 208, 6.9.2007, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 42, 6.9.2007, p. 1).
EUT L 335 af 18.12.2010, s. 43, indarbejdet i EØS-aftalen ved afgørelse 3/2011 (EUT L 93 af 7.4.2011, s. 32, og EØS-tillæg nr. 19 af 7.4.2011, s. 7).
Following the Agreement amending Protocol 4 to the Agreement of the EFTA states on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice of 24 September 2004, which entered into force on 20 May 2005, Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement reflects to a large extent in the EFTA pillar Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).
EUT L 335 af 18.12.2010, s. 36, indarbejdet i EØS-aftalen ved afgørelse 3/2011 (EUT L 93 af 7.4.2011, s. 32, og EØS-tillæg nr. 19 af 7.4.2011, s. 7).
In the following the term ‘agreement’ includes concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings.
Se også vejledningen »Konkurrencepolitikken i Europa — Konkurrencereglerne for leverings- og distributionsaftaler«, Europa-Kommissionen, Den Europæiske Unions Publikationskontor, 2012, Luxembourg.
See Authority guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement (OJ C 291, 30.11.2006, p. 46 and EEA Supplement No 59, 30.11.2006, p. 18).
Henholdsvis fodnote 39 og fodnote 44.
In the following the term ‘restriction’ includes the prevention and distortion of competition.
Se f.eks. den nævnte retspraksis i fodnote 18.
Which includes rental rights.
Se punkt 18 i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for anvendelsen af EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 3, jf. fodnote 4.
See in this respect Case 158/86, Warner Brothers and Metronome Video [1988] ECR 2605 and Case C-61/97, Foreningen af danske videogramdistributører [1998] ECR I-5171.
Sag T-17/93, Matra, Sml. 1994 II, s. 595, præmis 85.
This principle of EEA exhaustion is for example enshrined in Article 7(1) of the act referred to in point 9h of Annex XVII to the EEA Agreement, i.e. Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ L 299, 8.11.2008, p. 25, incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 56/2007 of 9 June 2007 (OJ L 266, 11.10.2007, p. 17 and EEA Supplement No 48, 11.10.2007, p. 13)), which provides that the trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the territory covered by the EEA Agreement under that trade mark by the proprietor or with its consent, and Article 4(2) of the act referred to in point 5 of Annex XVII to the EEA Agreement, i.e. Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (OJ L 111, 5.5.2009, p. 16, incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 39/2011 of 1 April 2011 (OJ L 171, 30.6.2011, p. 40 and EEA Supplement No 37, 30.6.2011, p. 47)), which provides that the first sale in the territory covered by the EEA Agreement of a copy of a program by the right-holder or with its consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the territory covered by the EEA Agreement of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof.
Se punkt 98 i retningslinjerne for anvendelsen af EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 3, jf. fodnote 4.
See, e.g. Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 429.
Dette er også tilfældet, når den ene part meddeler den anden part licens og accepterer at købe et fysisk input af licenstageren.
The methodology for the application of Article 53(3) is set out in the Authority guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in footnote 4.
Købsprisen kan tjene samme funktion som licensafgiften.
See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière [1966] ECR 337, and Case C-7/95 P, John Deere [1998] ECR I-3111, paragraph 76.
Se sag 193/83, Windsurfing International, Sml. 1986, s. 611, præmis 67.
See in this respect, e.g. the judgment in Consten and Grundig cited in footnote 11.
Se fodnote 44, punkt 51.
See in this respect the judgment in Société Technique Minière cited in footnote 13 and Case 258/78, Nungesser [1982] ECR 2015.
Begrænsninger med hensyn til anvendelsesområde er nærmere behandlet i punkt 208) ff.
For examples see points (126) to (127).
For en generel definition af passivt salg henvises der til punkt 108 i disse retningslinjer og til punkt 51 i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for vertikale begrænsninger (jf. fodnote 44).
See in this respect, e.g. Case C-49/92 P, Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-4125, paragraph 99.
Denne hardcore-begrænsning gælder for teknologioverførselsaftaler vedrørende handel inden for EØS.
See Joined Cases 29/83 and 30/83, CRAM and Rheinzink [1984] ECR 1679, paragraph 26, and Joined Cases 96/82 and others, Anseau-Navewa [1983] ECR 3369, paragraphs 23-25.
Med hensyn til teknologioverførselsaftaler, der drejer sig om eksport til eller import/reimport fra lande uden for EØS, henvises der til Domstolens dom i sag C-306/96, Javico mod Yves Saint Laurent, Sml. 1998 I, s. 1983.
Case T-491/07 Groupement des cartes bancaires v Commission, judgment of 29 November 2012, paragraph 146.
I dommen statuerede Domstolen i præmis 20, at »en aftale, hvorved forhandleren forpligter sig over for producenten til at lade de af aftalen omfattede varer være bestemt til at forhandles på et marked, der ligger uden for Fællesskabet, ikke kan antages at have til formål mærkbart at begrænse konkurrencen på det fælles marked eller at kunne påvirke handelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers [2008] ECR I-8637, paragraph 21.
Se i denne forbindelse sag 26/76, Metro (I), Sml. 1977, s. 1875.
Further guidance with regard to the notion of restriction of competition by object can be obtained in the Authority guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in footnote 4.
Se sag 65/86, Bayer m.fl. mod Süllhofer, Sml. 1988, s. 5249.
See also Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I-9291, paragraphs 59 to 64.
Med hensyn til anfægtelse af ejerskab til et varemærke, se Kommissionens beslutning i Moosehead/Whitbread (EFT L 100 af 20.4.1990, s. 32).
Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers [2008] ECR I-8637, paragraphs 21 to 39.
Sag 193/83, Windsurfing International, Sml. 1986, s. 611, præmis 92.
Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I-4529, paragraphs 31 and 36 to 39 and Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others, judgment of 14 March 2013, paragraphs 33 to 38.
I forbindelse med en aftale, der ikke i teknisk forstand er en eksklusivaftale, og hvor en opsigelsesklausul derfor ikke er omfattet af gruppefritagelsesforordningens sikre havn, kan licensgiver i en konkret sag befinde sig i et tilsvarende afhængighedsforhold til en licenstager med betydelig købekraft.
See the judgment in John Deere cited in footnote 13.
Der vil blive taget hensyn til et sådant afhængighedsforhold i den individuelle vurdering.
Guidance on the issue of appreciability can be found in the Authority notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (OJ C 67, 20.3.2003, p. 20 and EEA Supplement No 15, 20.3.2003, p. 11.).
Se punkt 14 ovenfor.
The notice defines appreciability in a negative way.
Se punkt 36 ovenfor.
Agreements, which fall outside the scope of the de minimis notice, do not necessarily have appreciable restrictive effects.
Se punkt 42 i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for anvendelsen af EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 3, jf. fodnote 4.
An individual assessment is required.
Det følger imidlertid af gruppefritagelsesforordningens artikel 7, stk. 2, at hvis en af de EFTA-stater, som henstillingen er rettet til, meddeler EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden, at den ikke accepterer henstillingen, meddeler Tilsynsmyndigheden Kommissionen dette svar.
Case T-321/05 Astra Zeneca v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, paragraph 267.
Hvis Kommissionen ikke tilslutter sig den pågældende EFTA-stats holdning, finder EØS-aftalens artikel 92, stk. 2, anvendelse.
The Authority's guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement, point 26, cited in footnote 4.
Se punkt 8 i Tilsynsmyndighedens meddelelse om aftaler af ringe betydning, jf. fodnote 22.
See Article 1(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.
Se i denne forbindelse sag T-228/97, Irish Sugar, Sml. 1999 II, s. 2969, præmis 101.
Notice of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on the definition of the relevant market for the purpose of competition law within the European Economic Area (EEA) (OJ L 200, 16.7.1998, p. 48 and EEA Supplement No 28, 16.7.1998, p. 3).
Se punkt 36 i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for horisontale samarbejdsaftaler, jf. fodnote29.
See for example Commission Decision COMP/M.5675 Syngenta/Monsanto where the Commission analysed the merger of two vertically integrated sunflower breeders by examining both: (i) the upstream market for the trading (namely the exchange and licensing) of varieties (parental lines and hybrids); and (ii) the downstream market for the commercialisation of hybrids.
Forenede sager C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P og C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services m.fl. mod Kommissionen m.fl., Sml. 2009 I, s. 9291, præmis 82.
In COMP/M.5406, IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal AG, the Commission defined besides a market for the production of high-grade melamine also an upstream technology market for the supply of melamine production technology.
Se i den forbindelse Kommissionens beslutning af 3. marts 1999 i TPS-sagen (EFT L 90 af 2.4.1999, s. 6).
See also COMP/M.269, Shell/Montecatini.
Tilsvarende finder forbuddet i EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 1, kun anvendelse, så længe aftalen har til formål eller til følge at begrænse konkurrencen.
See also Commission Decision COMP/M.5675 Syngenta/Monsanto and Decision COMP/M.5406, IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal AG.
Jf. fodnote 44.
See also points (119) to (122) of the Authority guidelines on the applicability of Article 53 of the EEA Agreement to horizontal cooperation agreements (‘Horizontal Guidelines’) ( OJ C 362, 12.12.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 69, 12.12.2013, p. 1).
Se især betragtning 106 ff.
See also point (157).
Med hensyn til disse begreber henvises der til afsnit 4.4.1.
In a scenario where undertakings have given a general commitment to license certain intellectual property rights, the parties cannot be considered to be in a blocking position on the basis of these intellectual property rights.
Se punkt 85 i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for anvendelsen af EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 3, jf. fodnote 4.
Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services and Others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141, paragraph 137.
Idem., punkt 98 og 102.
Case T-461/07, Visa Europe Ltd and Visa International Service v European Commission [2011] ECR II-1729, paragraph 167.
Se pr. analogi præmis 130 i de forenede sager C-395/96 P og C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge, jf. fodnote4.
Case T-461/07, Visa Europe Ltd and Visa International Service v European Commission [2011] ECR II-1729, paragraph 189.
Tilsvarende udelukker anvendelse af EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 3, ikke anvendelse af EØS-bestemmelserne om fri bevægelighed for varer, tjenesteydelser, personer og kapital.
See in this respect the notice on agreements of minor importance cited in footnote 22.
Disse bestemmelser finder under visse omstændigheder anvendelse på aftaler, vedtagelser og samordnet praksis som omhandlet i artikel 53, stk. 1.
According to Article 3(2) of Chapter II of Protocol 4 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, agreements which may affect trade between EFTA states, but which are not prohibited by Article 53, cannot be prohibited by national competition law.
Se i den forbindelse sag C-309/99, Wouters, Sml. 2002 I, s. 1577, præmis 120.
The TTBER could now cover the technology transfer agreement assessed in the Commission Decision in Moosehead/Whitbread (OJ L 100, 20.4.1990, p. 32), see in particular paragraph 16 of that decision.
Se sag T-51/89, Tetra Pak (I), Sml. 1990 II, s. 309.
See in this respect Case 262/81, Coditel (II) [1982] ECR 3381.
Se også punkt 106 i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for anvendelsen af EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 3, jf. fodnote 4 ovenfor.
OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 1, incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision 77/2010 (OJ L 244, 16.9.2010, p. 35 and EEA Supplement No 49, 16.9.2010, p. 34).
Dette er med forbehold af den mulige anvendelse af artikel 54 på fastsættelse af royalties (se sag 27/76, United Brands Company mod Europa-Kommissionen, Sml. 1978, præmis 250, samt sag C-385/07 P, Der Grüne Punkt — Duales System Deutschland Gmbh, Sml. 2009 I, s. 6155, præmis 142).
The terms ‘licensing’ or ‘licensed’ used in these guidelines does also include assignment, non-assertion or settlement arrangements as long as a transfer of technology rights takes place as described in this section.
Se Nungesser-dommen, jf. fodnote 15.
See further on settlement agreements points (234) ff.
Se Kommissionens meddelelse i Canon/Kodak-sagen (EFT C 330 af 1.11.1997, s. 10) og i IGR Stereo Television-sagen, der er omhandlet i XI Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken, nr. 94.
See recital 6 of the TTBER and further Section 3.2.6.
Med hensyn til analysegrundlaget henvises der til afsnit 4.2.7 og punkt 129 ff. i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for vertikale begrænsninger (se fodnote 44).
See for more details point (248).
Se fodnote 44.
See footnote 39.
Gruppefritagelsesforordningen og retningslinjerne er ikke til hinder for anvendelse af artikel 53 på forligsaftaler, som ikke indeholder en licensaftale.
OJ C 362, 22.11.2012, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 65, 22.11.2012, p. 1.
Sag 193/83, Windsurfing International mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1986, s. 611, præmis 92.
OJ L 153, 18.6.1994, p. 30 and EEA Supplement No 15, 18.6.1994, p. 29.
Jf. sag 65/86, Bayer mod Süllhöfer, Sml. 1988, s. 5259, præmis 15.
See point 3 of the Authority notice on subcontracting agreements cited in footnote 44.
Se f.eks. Kommissionens afgørelse i Lundbeck-sagen, endnu ikke offentliggjort.
See also Section 3.2.6.1.
Jf. sag C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2012 I, endnu ikke offentliggjort.
However, this last example is covered by Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 cited in footnote 50, see also Section 3.2.6.1 below.
Vedrørende behandlingen af standarder og af standardiseringsaftaler, se punkt 257 ff. i retningslinjerne for horisontale samarbejdsaftaler, jf. fodnote 29
OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 43, incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision 3/2011 (OJ L 93, 7.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 19, 7.4.2011, p. 7).
Se Kommissionens pressemeddelelse IP/02/1651 om patentlicenser til tredje generation (3G) af mobiltjenester.
OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 36, incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision 3/2011 (OJ L 93, 7.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 19, 7.4.2011, p. 7).
Sagen drejede sig om fem teknologipuljer, som skabte fem forskellige teknologier, der alle kunne benyttes til at fremstille 3G-udstyr.
See also the brochure ‘Competition policy in Europe — The competition rules for supply and distribution agreements’, European Commission, Publications Office of the European Union 2012, Luxembourg.
Der findes nærmere oplysninger om informationsudveksling i de horisontale retningslinjer, punkt 55 ff., nævnt i fodnote 29.
Respectively footnote 39 and footnote 44.
Se John Deere-dommen, jf. fodnote 13.
See, e.g. the case-law cited in footnote 18.
Der findes nærmere oplysninger om FRAND i de horisontale retningslinjer, punkt 287 ff., nævnt i fodnote 29.
See point 18 of the Authority guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in footnote 4.
Hvis en teknologipulje ikke har nogen markedsstyrke, vil meddelelse af licens fra puljen imidlertid normalt ikke være i strid med artikel 53, stk. 1, selv hvis disse betingelser ikke er opfyldt.
Case T-17/93, Matra [1994] ECR II-595, paragraph 85.
Jf. afsnit 3.5.
See in this respect point 98 of the guidelines on the application of Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement cited in footnote 4.
af 4. februar 2015
This is also the case where one party grants a licence to the other party and accepts to buy a physical input from the licensee.
om vedtagelse af en meddelelse:
The purchase price can serve the same function as the royalty.
I år 1 solgte virksomhed B produkter produceret ved hjælp af de frit tilgængelige teknologier til en værdi af 25 mio. EUR.
See in this respect Case 193/83, Windsurfing International [1986] ECR 611, paragraph 67.
I år 2 meddeler virksomhed A virksomhed B licens til at producere Xeran.
See footnote 44, point 51.
I det år sælger virksomhed B produkter produceret ved hjælp af de frit tilgængelige teknologier til en værdi af 15 mio. EUR og Xeran til en værdi af 15 mio. EUR.
Field of use restrictions are further dealt with in points (208) ff.