natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I 2007 og 2008 voksede disse udlån støt, og den islandske centralbank blev de finansielle virksomheders primære kilde til likviditet.
In 2007 and 2008 collateral lending increased steadily and the CBI became the financial undertakings’ main source of liquidity.
Da de tre islandske forretningsbanker kollapsede finansielt i oktober 2008, havde den islandske centralbank oparbejdet et betydeligt tilgodehavende hos indenlandske finansielle virksomheder, som havde forskellige typer sikkerhed bag sig.
At the time of the financial collapse of the three Icelandic commercial banks in October 2008, the CBI had acquired considerable claims against domestic financial undertakings, which were backed by collateral of various types.
På grund af bankernes kollaps faldt værdien af sikkerheden, og det blev klart, at den islandske centralbank havde lidt betydelige tab på grund af sikkerhedens forringede værdi.
Due to the banks’ collapse, the value of the collateral diminished and it became clear that the CBI had sustained losses due to unsound collateral.
Efter altingets godkendelse indgik finansministeriet og den islandske centralbank i januar 2009 en aftale, ifølge hvilken den islandske centralbank skulle overføre en del af sine fordringer fra lånene sammen med de underliggende værdipapirer til finansministeriet.
After the Parliament had given its authorisation, the Treasury and the CBI concluded an agreement in January 2009, according to which the CBI assigned a part of its claims of collateral loans against financial undertakings, along with underlying securities, to the Ministry of Finance.
I februar 2010 enedes ministeriet og den islandske centralbank om, at de fordringer, som den islandske centralbank tidligere havde overført til ministeriet, per 31. december 2009 skulle tilbageføres til Eignarhaldsfélag Seðlabanka Íslands, et nyligt etableret holdingselskab under den islandske centralbank, til en reduceret pris.
In February 2010 the Ministry and the CBI agreed that the claims previously transferred by the CBI to the Ministry should be transferred back to Eignarhaldsfélag Seðlabanka Íslands (ESÍ), a recently established holding company of the CBI, at a reduced price as of 31 December 2009.
Statsgældsforvaltningen i den islandske centralbank tilbyder lånefaciliteter til primary dealers, der handler med statsobligationer.
The Government Debt Management (GDM), which is administered by the CBI, offers lending facilities to primary dealers of government securities.
Formålet med disse værdipapirlån er at få markedet til at fungere bedre og bevare dets likviditet for de obligationsserier, som statsgældsforvaltningen var ved at opbygge.
The purpose of this securities lending is to improve market functionality and to maintain liquidity in the market for bond series that the GDM is building up.
De værdipapirer, som statsgældsforvaltningen accepterede som sikkerhed for statsgældspapirerne, er alle statsobligationer og toneangivende realkreditobligationer, som blev handlet elektronisk på det sekundære marked.
The securities accepted by the GDM as collateral for the Treasury Bonds and Bills are all government bonds and mortgage benchmark bonds traded electronically in the secondary market.
Andre elektronisk handlede værdipapirer kan også accepteres, afhængigt af de kriterier, der er specificeret i faciliteten.
Other electronically traded securities may also be accepted depending on the criteria specified in the facility.
Rentesatsen for disse lån er baseret på den islandske centralbanks reporentesats.
The interest rate for these loans is based on the CBI repo rate.
Den maksimale kontraktperioder er 28 dage [5].
The maximum contract period is 28 days [5].
Omlægning af kortfristede kreditfaciliteter til langfristede lån
Conversion of short-term credit facilities to long-term loans
I marts 2009 indgik finansministeriet aftaler om omlægning af lån med Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. og Asker Capital Investment Bank hf.
In March 2009 the Ministry of Finance concluded loan conversion agreements with Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. and Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
Låneaftalerne blev alle indgået på sammenlignelige vilkår.
The loan agreements were all concluded on similar terms.
De skulle tilbagebetales over de næste syv år med indeksregulering og en rente på 2 % om året.
They were repayable over the next seven years with indexation and an interest rate of 2 % per annum.
Tilbagebetalingsvilkårene for lånet til Askar Capital var tilsvarende, bortset fra, at den årlige rente var 3 %.
The repayment terms of the loan to Askar Capital were similar, except that the annual interest rate was 3 %.
Den samlede nominelle værdi af de tre investeringsbankers gæld udgjorde 52,4 mia. ISK, da de langfristede obligationer blev udstedt. [6]
The total nominal amount of debt, attributable to the three investment banks, at the time of issue of the long-term bonds, was ISK 52,4 billion [6].
De ovennævnte foranstaltninger byggede på forslag fra en arbejdsgruppe, som den 20. januar 2009 fremsendte et memorandum til finansministeren om omlægning af finansielle virksomheders gæld i form lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer fra den islandske centralbank.
The aforementioned measures were based on the proposals of a Working Group which on 20 January 2009 submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Finance for the restructuring of debt owed by financial undertakings due to collateral loan facilities with the CBI.
Memorandummet var baseret på oplysninger vedrørende de finansielle virksomheder og deres evne til at betale gælden tilbage.
The memorandum was based on information regarding the financial undertakings and their ability to repay the debt.
Med tanke på dette og andre omstændigheder ansås det for nødvendigt at træffe visse foranstaltninger for at sikre, at virksomhederne blev i stand til at betale deres gæld tilbage.
Bearing that in mind, along with other considerations, it was considered necessary to make certain arrangements in order to ensure that the undertakings would be able to pay off their debts.
Ifølge de islandske myndigheder havde man i beslutningen om lånevilkårene ikke fokuseret så meget på, hvad en rimelig og normal egenkapitalforrentning burde være, idet det på forhånd havde været klart, at de berørte virksomheder sandsynligvis ikke fuldt ud ville kunne betale deres gæld af.
According to the Icelandic authorities, the decision on the terms and conditions of the interest had not centred on what a fair and normal return on equity should be, since it had been clear in advance that the undertakings in question were unlikely to repay in full the liabilities in question.
I stedet havde arbejdsgruppen lagt vægt på at finde en rente, der var tilstrækkeligt høj til at have betydning for den berørte virksomhed, men ikke så høj, at den ville udelukke muligheden for tilbagebetaling og dermed fjerne virksomhedernes incitament til at sanere deres finanser.
Instead, the Working Group had focused on finding an interest percentage sufficiently high to matter to the undertaking in question but not so high as to preclude the possibility for repayment, thus removing the incentive for these undertakings to restructure their finances.
De islandske myndigheder fastsatte dog visse betingelser for låneomlægningen. Bl.a. måtte debitoren forpligte sig til ikke at udbetale dividender, medmindre der blev betalt tilsvarende af på lånet.
The Icelandic authorities did however set certain conditions for the debt conversion.
Debitor måtte ikke gå ind i større engagementer, som overskred 20 % af kapitalen (kapitalkravsdirektivet). Eventuelle bonusser til debitorernes ansatte skulle være moderate, debitorerne var forpligtet til at fremsende kvartalsrapporter om deres operationer til långiver, og debitorernes kapitalprocent måtte ikke falde til under 10 %.
According to the conditions the debtor was inter alia obliged not to pay dividends, unless there was a corresponding down payment on the loans, the debtor could not enter into any major risk commitments that exceeded 20 % of equity (CAD), any bonuses to the debtors employees should be moderate, the debtors were obliged to provide the lender with detailed quarterly reports on their operations and the debtors’ CAD-ratios should not fall below 10 %.
I tilfælde af, at debitorernes likviditetsstilling fra den islandske centralbanks synspunkt ikke var acceptabel, eller hvis deres kapitalprocent faldt til under 10 % kunne långiveren kræve, at det udestående beløb sammen med renterne og andre relevante omkostninger blev konverteret til egenkapital.
In case the liquidity position of the debtors turned out to be unacceptable in the view of the CBI or their CAD-ratios fell below 10 %, the lender could require that the outstanding amount of the loans together with interest and other relevant costs be converted to equity.
Formålet med disse betingelser var at øge sandsynligheden for fuld tilbagebetaling af lånene og dermed at sikre statskassens interesse.
The purpose of those conditions was to increase the likelihood of full recovery of the loans and thereby to safeguard the Treasury’s interest.
For en mere detaljeret beskrivelse af foranstaltningerne henvises til Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL [7].
For a more detailed description of the measures, reference is made to the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL [7].
Målet med foranstaltningerne og det nationale retsgrundlag
The objective of the measure and the national legal basis
Ifølge de islandske myndigheder havde foranstaltningerne to formål: For det første at forsøge at sikre statens enorme interesser ved at sørge for, at statskassen fik den størst mulige del af sine tilgodehavender tilbage, og for det andet at give de finansielle virksomheder et pusterum og en chance for at løse deres problemer og komme gennem krisen.
The Icelandic authorities considered that the objective of the measures was twofold; firstly, to try to secure the immense interests of the State by maximising the Treasury’s recovery of the claims, and, secondly, to give the financial undertakings a breathing space and a chance to work out their matters and get through the difficulties.
Foranstaltningerne var baseret på en tilladelse fra altinget i punkt 7.20 i det statslige tillægsbudget for år 2008, i hvilket finansministeren fik tilladelse til på vegne af statskassen at købe de virksomhedscertifikater af den islandske centralbank, som banken havde modtaget som sikkerhed for lån, og til at få dem afviklet så rentabelt som muligt.
The measures were based on an authorisation from the Icelandic parliament in paragraph 7.20 of the State supplementary budget for the year 2008, where the Minister of Finance, on behalf of the Treasury, was authorised to purchase from the Central Bank of Iceland commercial papers which had been pledged to the bank as collateral for loans as well as to settle these claims in the most viable manner possible.
Som tidligere nævnt var de tre støttemodtagere ved de ovennævnte foranstaltninger Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. og Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
As previously noted the three beneficiaries to the aforementioned measures were Saga Capital Investment Bank hf., VBS Investment Bank hf. and Askar Capital Investment Bank hf.
De tre støttemodtagere og den efterfølgende udvikling i deres virksomhed beskrives nærmere i afsnit 2.5 og 2.6 i beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL.
For a more detailed description of the three beneficiaries and subsequent developments regarding their operations, reference is made to Sections 2.5 and 2.6 of the Authority’s Decision No 363/11/COL.
3 Begrundelse for indledning af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure
Grounds for initiating the formal investigation procedure
I beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL foretog Tilsynsmyndigheden en midlertidig vurdering af, hvorvidt finansministeriets foranstaltninger til omlægning af kortfristede fordringer til langfristede lån på gunstige vilkår var forenelige med statsstøttebestemmelserne i EØS-aftalen.
In Decision No 363/11/COL, the Authority assessed preliminarily whether the Treasury’s measures to convert short-term claims to long-term loans on favourable terms were compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement.
Idet statens engagement som stor kreditor i forhold til de berørte virksomheder hidrørte fra tidligere foranstaltninger, nemlig den islandske centralbanks lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer og værdipapirlån, var det nødvendigt at vurdere, hvorvidt disse foranstaltninger udgjorde statsstøtte.
However since the State’s involvement as a major creditor to the undertakings concerned derived from earlier measures, namely the CBI collateral loans and securities lending, it was necessary to consider whether those measures possibly constituted State aid.
Tilsynsmyndigheden indledte derfor sin vurdering med at analysere den islandske centralbanks kortfristede lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer til de finansielle virksomheder.
The Authority therefore began its assessment by analysing the CBI short-term collateral loans to financial undertakings.
De islandske myndigheder havde understreget, at de berørte kortfristede kreditfaciliteter indgik i den islandske centralbanks normale monetære politik og finansielle markedsforanstaltninger og i den normale statsgældsforvaltning.
The Icelandic authorities had underlined that the short-term credit facilities concerned belonged to regular monetary policy and financial market measures of the CBI and to the Treasury’s regular government debt management.
Tilsynsmyndigheden stillede ikke spørgsmålstegn ved, at foranstaltningerne indgik i den monetære politik og i politikken for statsgældsforvaltning, eller at foranstaltningerne havde været baseret på de gældende bestemmelser på området.
The Authority did not dispute that these measures belonged to monetary and government debt management policy and that they had been based on relevant rules thereon [8].
Foranstaltningerne var blevet truffet på de berørte finansielle virksomheders initiativ, og den islandske centralbank blev på det tidspunkt ikke bakket op af nogen modgaranti fra staten.
The measures had been taken at the initiative of the financial undertakings concerned and the CBI had not, at the time, been backed by any counter-guarantee of the State.
Derfor konkluderede Tilsynsmyndigheden, at den islandske centralbanks kortfristede lån med sikkerhed i værdipapirer til de finansielle virksomheder samt finansministeriets kortfristede lånefacilitet ikke indebar statsstøtte.
Therefore the Authority concluded that the CBI short-term collateral loans to financial undertakings and the Treasury’s short-term lending facilities did not involve State aid.
Efter Tilsynsmyndighedens foreløbige vurdering udgjorde finansministeriets låneomlægning statsstøtte efter EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.
However, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the Treasury’s loan conversion agreements amounted to State aid in the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Følgende aspekter blev fremdraget i beslutningen om at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure:
The following aspects were indentified in the decision to initiate a formal investigation procedure:
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer, at foranstaltningerne tydeligt var iværksat med statslige midler, idet lånene var blevet bevilliget af finansministeriet på grundlag af en tilladelse i det statslige budget.
The Authority concluded that the measures were clearly granted through State resources since the loans had been granted by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of authorisation provided for in the State budget.
Tilsynsmyndigheden fandt, at foranstaltningerne gav de tre investeringsbanker forretningsmæssige fordele, idet de blev befriet for byrder i form af betaling af renter og andre omkostninger forbundet med de kortfristede kreditfaciliteter fra den islandske centralbank, som normalt ville have belastet deres budget.
The Authority found that the measures conferred on the three investment banks a commercial advantages since they were relieved of charges, in the form of interest payments and other costs associated with the short-term credit facilities with the CBI, that would normally have been borne by their budgets.
Tilsynsmyndigheden udtrykte også tvivl om, hvorvidt foranstaltningerne var forenelige med en privat kreditors adfærd i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation i betragtning af de gunstige vilkår for tilbagebetaling af lånene og til, at vilkårene ikke omfattede en forhøjelse af rentesatsen i tilfælde af en forbedring af debitorernes finansielle situation.
The Authority also expressed doubt as to whether the measures were consistent with the conduct of a private creditor in a comparable legal and factual situation, given the favourable repayment terms of the loans and the fact that they did not foresee a step-up of interest rates in case the financial condition of the debtors improved.
Med hensyn til selektivitet konkluderede Tilsynsmyndigheden, at foranstaltningerne ikke kunne anses for at være af generel karakter, idet de favoriserede tre virksomheder i en bestemt økonomisk sektor, mens andre sektorer ikke nød godt af dem.
With regard to selectivity, the Authority concluded that the measures could not be considered to be general in nature, since they favoured three undertakings in one particular economic sector and other undertakings and sectors did not benefit from them.
Foranstaltningerne måtte derfor anses for at være selektive.
The measures would therefore have to be considered as selective [9].
Desuden havde de islandske myndigheder ikke fremlagt tydelige beviser for, at de gunstige aftaler om omlægning af lån var tilgængelige for alle virksomheder, der befandt sig i en lignende retlig og faktisk situation som Saga Capital, VBS and Askar Capital.
Furthermore the Icelandic authorities had not presented clear evidence that the favourable loan conversion agreements had been effectively made available to all undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation as Saga Capital, VBS and Askar Capital.
Sluttelig konkluderede Tilsynsmyndigheden, at foranstaltningerne kunne fordreje konkurrencen.
Finally, the Authority concluded that the measures were liable to distort competition.
Selv om de berørte investeringsbanker for det meste opererede på det islandske marked og var af en beskeden størrelse, udbød de ikke desto mindre finansielle tjenester, som var fuldt ud åbne for konkurrence og handel inden for Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde.
Even though the investment banks concerned operated mostly on the Icelandic market and were of modest size, they were nevertheless engaged in provision of financial services which were fully open to competition and trade within the European Economic Area.
Tilsynsmyndigheden betvivlede endvidere, at statsstøtten kunne betragtes som forenelig med EØS-aftalen.
Moreover, the Authority doubted that the State aid could be considered compatible with the EEA Agreement.
De islandske myndigheder havde henvist til artikel 61, stk. 3 i EØS-aftalen og til Tilsynsmyndighedens rammebestemmelser for støtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder til støtte for deres argument om, at foranstaltningerne var forenelige med EØS-aftalen.
The Icelandic authorities had referred to Article 61(3) EEA and the Authority’s rescue and restructuring aid guidelines in support of their argument that the measure was compatible with the Agreement.
De islandske myndigheder fremsendte dog ingen dokumentation for foranstaltningernes forenelighed med artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), i EØS-aftalen eller med Tilsynsmyndighedens midlertidige retningslinjer for statsstøtte under den finansielle krise.
The Icelandic authorities did however not submit any evidence in favour of assessing the compatibility of the measure under Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement or the Authority’s temporary State aid guidelines regarding the financial crisis.
Tilsynsmyndigheden understregede, at det i de midlertidige regler for støtte til finansielle virksomheder kræves, at støtten skal begrænses til det absolut nødvendige, at bankens langsigtede rentabilitet skal genoprettes, og at der skal træffes foranstaltninger til sikring mod fordrejning af konkurrencen.
The Authority stressed that the temporary rules on aid to financial undertakings provide for the limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary, the restoration of the long-term viability of the bank and safeguards against undue distortion of competition.
Retningslinjerne fastlagde især regler om en rimelig og passende forrentning af statslige kapitalindskud.
In particular, the guidelines set out rules to secure appropriate and adequate remuneration for State recapitalisation [10].
Vilkårene for tilbagebetaling af de lån, staten ydede, syntes ikke at tage hensyn til disse principper.
The repayment terms of the loans provided by the State appeared not to take account of those principles.
Lånene var blevet ydet med en tilbagebetalingsperiode på 7 år, med indeksering og en fast rentesats på 2 % om året, hvilket var langt under markedsrenten, og der var ikke forudset nogen forhøjelse af rentesatsen som incitament til at tilbagebetale den statslige kapital.
The loans had been granted with a repayment period of seven years, with indexation, and at fixed interest rates of 2 % per annum, which was far below market rates and no step-up of interest rates was foreseen to encourage redemption of State capital.
På den baggrund konkluderede Tilsynsmyndigheden, at denne form for lånevilkår ikke var forenelige med Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for statsstøtte.
In light of this, the Authority concluded that lending terms of this kind were not compatible with the Authority’s State aid guidelines.
4 Bemærkninger fra de islandske myndigheder
Comments by the Icelandic authorities
De islandske myndigheder lægger i deres kommentarer vægt på, at foranstaltningerne efter deres mening var forenelige med EØS-aftalen.
The comments of the Icelandic authorities are focused on their view that the measures were compatible with the EEA Agreement.
Ifølge de islandske myndigheder var foranstaltningerne ikke selektive, idet omstændighederne for de tre investeringsbanker var enestående, og idet andre banker, såsom Straumur, SPB og SPRON, ikke befandt sig i en tilsvarende situation som de tre investeringsbanker.
In their view the measures had not been selective since the circumstances of the three investment banks had been unique and other banks, such as Straumur, SPB and SPRON, had not been in a similar situation as the three investment banks.
Nogle af de andre bankinstitutioner havde allerede standset deres betalinger til deres kreditorer, da aftalerne om låneomlægning blev indgået, og deres bestræbelse på at omorganisere sig var så omfattende, at en låneomlægning hos den islandske centralbank ikke ville have spillet nogen større rolle i deres finansielle omstrukturering.
Some of the other banking institutions had already defaulted on their obligations against their creditors by the time the loan conversion agreements were made and their reorganisation efforts were so substantial that conversion of debts with the CBI would not have been a significant factor in their financial restructuring.
De islandske myndigheder hævdede også, at deres beslutning om at lægge lånene om, var i overensstemmelse med det private kreditorprincip, idet enhver kreditor i samme situation som den islandske stat var i på det tidspunkt, ville have handlet på samme måde.
The Icelandic authorities also maintained that their decisions to convert the loans had been in line with the private creditor principle since any creditor, in the same position as the Icelandic State was in at that time, would have acted in the same manner.
Desuden fremlagde de islandske myndigheder oplysninger om de tre investeringsbankers nuværende situation og om den udvikling, der havde fundet sted, siden Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 363/11/KOL [11] blev truffet.
Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities provided information on the current status of the three investment banks and the developments that had occurred since the Authority issued Decision No 363/11/COL [11].