natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I modsætning til de argumenter, som Liechtensteins myndigheder havde fremført, var det Tilsynsmyndighedens foreløbige vurdering, at skattelovgivningen gav investeringsselskaberne en selektiv fordel, som fordrejede konkurrencen og påvirkede samhandelen inden for EØS.
Contrary to the arguments brought forward by the Liechtenstein authorities, the Authority took the initial view that the tax legislation provided a selective advantage to investment companies which distorted competition and affected trade across the EEA.
På denne baggrund kunne Tilsynsmyndigheden ikke udelukke, at de skatteregler, der gælder for investeringsselskabers egne aktiver (fuldstændig fritagelse for betaling af indkomst- og kuponskat og delvis fritagelse for betaling af kapitalskat), udgør statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.
On this basis, the Authority could not exclude that the tax rules applicable to the own assets of investment companies (full exemption from payment of income and coupon tax and a partial exemption from payment of capital tax) constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Tilsynsmyndigheden udtrykte også tvivl om, hvorvidt disse foranstaltninger kunne anses for at være forenelige med EØS-aftalens statsstøtteregler, især aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c).
The Authority also had doubts that these measures could be considered compatible with the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement, in particular Article 61(3)(c).
Bemærkningerne fra de interesserede parter kan opsummeres således:
The comments from third parties can be summarised as follows:
Under henvisning til Europa-Kommissionens beslutninger om en irsk skattefritagelsesordning (Irish Company Holding Regime) [17] og om et skattefradrag i indtægterne af visse immaterielle aktiver i Spanien [18] fremførte de interesserede parter, at enhver fysisk eller juridisk person kunne oprette en investeringsvirksomhed og dermed opnå skattefritagelser, og at skattefritagelsen derfor ikke var en selektiv foranstaltning.Da lovgivningen blev indført i 1996, var det ikke klart, at statsstøttereglerne ville finde anvendelse på skatteforanstaltninger.
Referring to decisions of the European Commission on an Irish Company Holding Regime [17] and a tax reduction from revenue from certain intangible assets in Spain [18], the third parties argued that any natural or legal person could establish an investment undertaking and therefore benefit from the tax exemptions; on that basis the tax exemption does not constitute a selective measure.In 1996 when the legislation was enacted, it was not clear that the State aid rules would be applicable to tax measures.
Hvis Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderede, at fritagelserne udgjorde statsstøtte, burde de betragtes som eksisterende støtte, idet de havde været gældende siden 1996.
If the Authority concludes that the exemptions were aid, they had been in place since 1996 and should constitute an existing aid measure.
Under henvisning til artikel 15 i protokol 3 (hvor det er fastsat, at tilbagesøgning er omfattet af en forældelsesfrist på ti år) fremførte de interesserede parter, at der ikke kan kræves tilbagebetaling af støtte, fordi skattefritagelsen blev indført i 1996.
With reference to Article 15 of Protocol 3 (according to which recovery shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years), the third parties argued that no recovery of aid can be required because the tax exemption was introduced in 1996.
Det blev fremført, at tilbagesøgning ville stride mod princippet om berettigede forventninger og retssikkerhedsprincippet.
Recovery, it was argued, would contravene the principles of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
I nogle tilfælde kunne der ikke kræves tilbagesøgning, fordi skattefritagelserne ville falde ind under de minimis-reglen.
In some cases, no recovery could be required as the amount of the tax exemptions would fall within the de minimis rule.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA LIECHTENSTEINS MYNDIGHEDER
COMMENTS BY THE LIECHTENSTEIN AUTHORITIES
Ved brev af 17. marts 2010 og 16. juli 2010 fremsatte Liechtensteins myndigheder følgende kommentarer:
In letters dated 17 March 2010 and 16 July 2010, the Liechtenstein authorities commented as follows:
Skattefritagelsen udgør ikke statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, da den ikke er selektiv.
The tax exemption does not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement as it is not selective in nature.
Til støtte for dette argument henviste de også til Europa-Kommissionens to beslutninger om henholdsvis en irsk skattefritagelsesordning (Irish Company Holding Regime) og et skattefradrag i indtægterne af visse immaterielle aktiver i Spanien.
In support of this argument reference was again made to two decisions of the European Commission, on the Irish Company Holding Regime and a tax reduction from revenue from certain intangible assets in Spain.
Subsidiært fremføres det, at eventuel støtte skal betragtes som eksisterende støtte på grundlag af den tiårige forældelsesfrist, der er fastsat i artikel 1, stk. 1, litra b), nr. iv), sammenholdt med artikel 15 i del II i protokol 3, og ud fra den betragtning, at foranstaltningen kun blev til støtte som følge af udviklingen i Det Europæiske Samarbejdsområde (artikel 1, stk. 1, litra b), nr. v), i del II i protokol 3).
In the alternative it is argued that any aid is existing aid on the basis of the 10 year limitation period set out in Article 1(b)(iv) in conjunction with Article 15 of Part II of Protocol 3; and on the basis that the measure only became aid as a result of the evolution of the European Economic Area (Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3).
Hvis Tilsynsmyndigheden ikke accepterede dette, mente Liechtensteins myndigheder ikke, at den burde kræve støtten tilbagebetalt, da dette ville stride mod EØS-rettens generelle principper, især med hensyn til beskyttelse af de berettigede forventninger og retssikkerheden.
Finally the Liechtenstein authorities argue that if this is not accepted the Authority should not order recovery of aid on the basis that this would be contrary to general principles of EEA law, specifically the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, fastsætter følgende:
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement provides that:
Støtteforanstaltningen skal være ydet af staten eller ved hjælp af statsmidler.
The aid measure must be granted by the State or through State resources.
Bevilling af fuldstændig eller delvis skattefritagelse påfører staten et tab af skatteindtægter, der svarer til forbruget af statsmidler i form af skatteudgifter [19].
The granting of a full or partial tax exemption involves a loss of tax revenues for the State which is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal (tax) expenditure [19].
Liechtensteins myndigheder går glip af indtægter svarende til de indkomst-, kapital- og kuponskatter, som ikke bliver betalt.
The Liechtenstein authorities forego revenue corresponding to the non-payment of income, capital and coupon taxes.
Tilsynsmyndigheden mener derfor, at de skatteregler, der gælder for investeringsselskaber, indebærer brug af statsmidler.
For these reasons, the Authority considers that the tax rules applicable to investment companies involve the use of State resources.
Da investeringsselskaberne er fritaget for indkomst- og kuponskat og kun skal betale en nedsat kapitalskat af deres egne aktiver, opnår de en fordel i forhold til andre virksomheder, som er forpligtede til at betale almindelig indkomstskat af deres erhvervsaktiviteter.
By not being obliged to pay any income or coupon tax and only a reduced capital tax on their own assets, investment companies receive an advantage in comparison to other undertakings that are subject to ordinary taxation on revenues from their business activities.
Fordelen er selektiv, da den kun kom de investeringsvirksomheder til gode, der er organiseret som investeringsselskaber.
The advantage is selective as it was granted only to investment undertakings organised in the form of investment companies.
Tilsynsmyndigheden kan ikke godtage de argumenter, som Liechtensteins myndigheder og de interesserede parter har fremsat, nemlig at alle virksomheder i Liechtenstein, der udøver sådanne erhvervsaktiviteter, principielt frit kan vælge den mest fordelagtige retlige organisationsform og dermed opnå skattelettelserne.
The Authority does not accept arguments put forward by the Liechtenstein authorities and third parties that each undertaking in Liechtenstein carrying out such economic activity is in principle free to choose the most advantageous legal form and consequently profit from the tax concessions.
En skattefordel, som er begrænset til en bestemt gruppe virksomheder, kan ikke karakteriseres som en generel foranstaltning med den begrundelse, at alle interesserede virksomheder kan opfylde bestemte kriterier og komme i betragtning, hvis de organiserer sig i en bestemt form [20].EU-Domstolen fastslog i GIL Insurance-sagen [21], at »artikel 87, stk. 1, EF kræver en stillingtagen til, om en statslig foranstaltning som led i en bestemt retlig ordning kan begunstige »visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner« i forhold til andre virksomheder, der under hensyntagen til det formål, der forfølges med den pågældende foranstaltning, befinder sig i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation«.
A tax benefit which is limited to a specified group of undertakings cannot be characterised as a general measure on the basis that any interested undertaking could fulfil specified criteria and qualify if it organised itself in a particular form [20].By reference to the European Court of Justice’s conclusions in the GIL Insurance [21] case, ‘Article 87(1) EC requires it to be determined whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour “certain undertakings or the production of certain goods” in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by the system in question, are in a comparable legal and factual situation’.
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer, at virksomheder i samme retlige og faktiske situation i dette tilfælde er de virksomheder, der betaler den (fulde) indkomst-, kapital- og kuponskat i Liechtenstein — og at investeringsselskaber i Liechtenstein får en selektiv fordel i forhold til disse.
The Authority concludes that the undertakings in the same legal and factual position in this case are all those who pay the (full) income, capital and coupon taxes in Liechtenstein — and in comparison to those, investment companies in Liechtenstein receive a selective advantage.
Især opnår investeringsselskaber fordele i forhold til fondsledelsen i virksomheder, der er organiseret som investeringsfonde, og som udøver samme aktiviteter, men er skattepligtige i lighed med alle andre virksomheder i Liechtenstein.
More specifically, the investment companies benefit in comparison to the fund direction of undertakings organised as investment funds, which engage in the same activity but are subject to tax like all other undertakings in Liechtenstein.
En bestemt foranstaltning kan dog være begrundet i skattesystemets karakter.
A specific tax measure can nevertheless be justified by the logic of the tax system.
De særlige skatteregler, der gælder for investeringsselskaber, er ikke selektive som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, hvis reglen er begrundet i det liechtensteinske skattesystems karakter og generelle forvaltning [22].
The specific tax rules applicable to investment companies would not be selective in the sense of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the rule is justified by the nature and general scheme of the Liechtenstein tax system [22].
I modsætning til mange nylige komplekse skattestøtteordninger er formålene med det pågældende skattesystem ukomplicerede.
Unlike certain recent complex fiscal aid cases, the objectives of the tax system in question are straightforward.
Skatternes formål, eller karakter, er at skaffe staten indtægter.
The objective, or logic, of the taxes is to generate revenue for the State.
Ifølge Liechtensteins skattelov skal juridiske personer, som opererer i Liechtenstein, betale indkomstskat af deres indtægter og kapitalskat af den kapital, der udgør selskabets egenkapital.
According to the Liechtenstein Tax Act, legal entities that operate in Liechtenstein must pay income tax on their revenues and a capital tax on the capital held as the company’s own equity.
Virksomheder, hvis kapital er opdelt i aktier, skal også betale kuponskat af udbyttet.
Companies divided into shares must also pay a coupon tax on dividends.
Ifølge Tilsynsmyndigheden falder skattelettelsen for forvaltningsselskabets egne aktiver hverken ind under formålet med det generelle skattesystem i Liechtenstein, eller noget særligt formål med beskatningen af investeringsvirksomheder.
The Authority considers that the tax relief for the management company’s own assets falls neither within the logic of the general tax system in Liechtenstein, nor within any specific logic of the taxation of investment undertakings.
Efter Tilsynsmyndighedens opfattelse er der intet i investeringsselskabers organisationsform, som kan berettige en særlig skattefritagelse for et investeringsselskabs forvaltningsaktiviteter i forhold til en investeringsfonds forvaltningsaktiviteter [23].
In the view of the Authority, there is nothing in the organisational form of investment companies which would justify a special tax derogation in favour of the management activities of an investment company in comparison with the management activities of an investment fund [23].
Skattenedsættelsen og -fritagelsen for domicilselskaber [24] og investeringsselskaber tog sigte på at fremme disse aktiviteter i Liechtenstein.
The reduction and exemptions applicable to domiciliary companies [24] and investment companies were designed to encourage these activities in Liechtenstein.
Tilsynsmyndigheden indtager derfor det foreløbige synspunkt, at skattefritagelsen for forvaltningsselskabets egne aktiver ikke kan begrundes i det liechtensteinske skattesystems karakter eller generelle forvaltning.
In the Authority’s view, therefore, the tax relief on the management company’s own assets cannot be justified by the nature and overall scheme of the Liechtenstein taxation system.
I 2006 blev lovgivningen ændret, og investeringsselskaber blev derefter underlagt den almindelige erhvervsbeskatning i lighed med investeringsfondes ledelse og alle andre juridiske personer, som udøver virksomhed i Liechtenstein.
In 2006, the legislation was changed and investment companies were subject thereafter to ordinary business taxation in the same way as the fund direction of investment funds and any other legal entity operating a business in Liechtenstein.
Ifølge Liechtensteins myndigheder fjernede dette den »uensartethed« [25], der bestod i, at der ikke blev opkrævet skatter af virksomhedernes egne aktiver tidligere.
In view of the Liechtenstein authorities this eliminated the ‘inconsistency’ [25] of not levying any taxes on the own assets before.
Af disse årsager mener Tilsynsmyndigheden, at foranstaltningerne udgjorde en selektiv fordel for investeringsselskaberne, hvilket blev afhjulpet af den lovgivning, der gjaldt fra 2006 og frem.
For these reasons, the Authority considers that the measures constituted a selective advantage to investment companies, which was remedied by the legislation effective from 2006 onwards.
For det tredje skal støtteforanstaltningen begunstige virksomheder, der udøver økonomiske aktiviteter.
Thirdly, the aid measure must favour undertakings engaged in economic activities.
I BBL-sagen [26] behandlede EU-Domstolen de aktiviteter, der udøves af investeringsselskaber ( »SICAVs« efter belgisk ret), og som består i kollektiv investering i værdipapirer af kapital tilvejebragt ved henvendelse til offentligheden.
In the BBL [26] case, the European Court of Justice considered the activities of investment companies (‘SICAVs’ under Belgian law) which undertook collective investment with the aim of producing income on a continuing basis in transferable securities from capital raised from the public.
Domstolen fastslog, at dette udgør en økonomisk virksomhed i den forstand, hvori udtrykket er anvendt i sjette momsdirektivs artikel 4, stk. 2.
The Court held that this constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4(2) of the Sixth VAT Directive.
Investeringsselskaber beskæftiger sig med at samle og forvalte forskellige investorers aktiver med det formål at opnå fortjeneste via de forskellige gebyrer for de leverede ydelser.
Investment companies are active in assembling and managing the assets of various investors with the intention of making profits via various fees for the services provided.
Tilsynsmyndigheden mener derfor, at investeringsselskaber udøver økonomiske aktiviteter i form af aktivforvaltning og dermed er virksomheder i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1 [27].1.3.
The Authority consequently considers that management companies carry out economic activities in the form of asset management and are thus undertakings within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement [27].1.3.
Konkurrencefordrejning og påvirkning af samhandelen mellem de kontraherende parter
Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties
Støtteforanstaltningen skal fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen mellem EØS-aftalens kontraherende parter.
The aid measure must distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.
Ifølge fast retspraksis gælder forbuddet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, på enhver form for støtte, som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen, uanset beløbet, for så vidt som støtten påvirker samhandelen mellem de kontraherende parter [28].
According to established case-law, the prohibition under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement applies to any aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition, irrespective of the amount, in so far as it affects trade between the Contracting Parties [28].
Kommissionen har også konkluderet, at investeringsvirksomheder opererer på internationale markeder og udøver kommercielle og andre økonomiske aktiviteter på markeder, hvor konkurrencen er intens [29].
The Commission has also concluded that investment vehicles operate in international markets and pursue commercial and other economic activities in markets where competition is intense [29].
Tilsynsmyndigheden er derfor af den opfattelse, at skattelettelserne i forbindelse med investeringsselskabers egne aktiver fra 1996 til 2006 styrkede disse selskabers konkurrencemæssige stilling inden for EØS, fordi skattelettelserne reducerede selskabernes driftsomkostninger i forhold til andre virksomheders omkostninger [30].
The Authority takes the view, therefore, that the tax concessions on the own assets of investment companies from 1996 to 2006 strengthened the competitive position of those investment companies within the EEA, as these tax concessions reduced the ordinary operational costs of these companies compared to others [30].
Investeringsselskaber konkurrerer med andre finansielle virksomheder og opererer på et åbent marked, som er præget af en betydelig samhandel inden for EØS.
Investment companies compete with other financial undertakings and operate in an open market characterised by substantial intra-EEA trade.
Handelen mellem de kontraherende parter påvirkes også [31].
Trade between the Contracting Parties is also affected [31].
Tilsynsmyndigheden indtager derfor det foreløbige synspunkt, at skattelettelserne fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen og påvirker samhandelen mellem de kontraherende parter.
The Authority is therefore of the view that the tax concessions distort or threaten to distort competition and affect trade between the Contracting Parties.
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer, at den lempede beskatning af forvaltningsselskabernes egne aktiver i henhold til Liechtensteins skattelov fra 1996 til 2006 udgjorde statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.
The Authority therefore concludes that the reduced taxation of management companies’ own assets under the Liechtenstein Tax Act between 1996 and 2006 was State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Det er fastsat i artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I i protokol 3, at »EFTA-tilsynsmyndigheden skal underrettes så betids om enhver påtænkt indførelse eller ændring af støtteforanstaltninger, at den kan fremsætte sine bemærkninger hertil (…). Den pågældende stat må ikke gennemføre de påtænkte foranstaltninger, før den nævnte procedure har ført til endelig beslutning«.
Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid (…). The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.
Liechtensteins myndigheder anmeldte ikke støtteforanstaltningerne til Tilsynsmyndigheden.
The Liechtenstein authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority.
Liechtensteins myndigheder har fremført, at støtten udgør eksisterende støtte, idet foranstaltningerne kun blev til støtte på grund af udviklingen inden for EØS og/eller som følge af artikel 1, stk. 1, litra b), nr. iv), og artikel 15 i del II i protokol 3, hvor det er fastsat, at Tilsynsmyndighedens beføjelser til at kræve tilbagesøgning af støtte er underlagt en forældelsesfrist på 10 år.
The Liechtenstein authorities have argued that the aid is existing aid as the measures only became aid due to an evolution of the EEA and/or as a result of Articles 1(b)(iv) and 15 of Part II of Protocol 3 which provides that the powers of the Authority to recover aid shall be subject to a limitation period of 10 years.
Tilsynsmyndigheden mener imidlertid, at EU-Domstolen helt tilbage i 1970'erne gjorde det klart, at skattefritagelser af den art, der er omfattet af denne undersøgelse, kunne være statsstøtte.
The Authority is of the view, however, that the European Court of Justice made it clear as early as the 1970s that tax exemptions of the nature of those under assessment could be State aid.
Domstolen fastslog i 1974 [32], at foranstaltninger, der har til formål at fritage virksomhederne inden for en bestemt sektor for de byrder, som følger af den normale anvendelse af et skattesystem (uden at denne fritagelse er berettiget på grundlag af dette systems karakter eller forvaltning), udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Court held in 1974 [32] that any measures intended to exempt firms in a particular sector from the charges arising from the normal application of a tax system (without there being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or general scheme of this system) constituted State aid.
I 1987 [33] fastslog Domstolen udtrykkeligt, at et skatteprovenutab svarede til brug af statsmidler i form af skatteudgifter. Denne fremgangsmåde afspejles også i Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutninger før gennemførelsen af Liechtensteins skattelov, idet Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderede, at fritagelse for selskabsskat var (uforenelig) statsstøtte i Finland i 1994 [34] og i Norge i 1995 [35] og 1997 [36].
In 1987 [33] the Court explicitly stated that a loss of tax revenue was equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of fiscal expenditure.This approach is also reflected in decisions of the Authority prior to the implementation of the Liechtenstein Tax Act, where it concluded that exemptions from the tax payable by undertakings was (incompatible) State aid in Finland in 1994 [34] and in Norway in 1995 [35] and 1997 [36].
Efter en bred drøftelse af behovet for en samordnet indsats på fællesskabsplan for at bekæmpe skadelig skattekonkurrence vedtog Rådet den 1. december 1997 en række konklusioner og en resolution om en adfærdskodeks for erhvervsbeskatning [37].
On 1 December 1997, following a wide-ranging discussion on the need for coordinated action at Community level to tackle harmful tax competition, the European Council of Ministers adopted a series of conclusions and agreed a resolution on a code of conduct for business taxation [37].