natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
LÅNEAFTALE INDGÅET MED ARION
Therefore, ISB sought to renegotiate the debt with the CBI, in order to convert it into a long-term debt with a reasonable amortisation profile, to avoid a further negative impact on ISB's liquidity position.
I oktober 2008 stod det klart, at Kaupthing ikke længere kunne reddes, og finanstilsynet overtog derefter bankens aktiviteter.
Following negotiations between ISB and the CBI, an agreement was reached on 11 September 2009, resulting in ISB issuing a stand-alone bond to the CBI in the amount of ISK 55,6 billion.
I overensstemmelse med lov nr. 125/2008 om myndigheden med ansvar for udbetalinger fra statskassen som følge af usædvanlige omstændigheder på det finansielle marked osv. (herefter »nødloven«), som blev vedtaget den 6. oktober 2008, besluttede finanstilsynet at opdele Kaupthing i en gammel og en ny bank.
The bond was asset-backed with the same, or similar, mortgage loan portfolio as the covered bonds that were issued by Glitnir in the past.
Den nye bank, som senere blev til Arion, overtog i princippet de fleste indenlandske aktiver og passiver.
The bond is over-collateralised with a loan-to-value (‘LTV’) ratio of 70 % [15].
De sikrede passiver over for den islandske centralbank og den pågældende sikkerhed, herunder boliglåneporteføljen, blev dog ikke overført [16].
The bond's maturity is 10 years, with an interest rate of 4,5 %, CPI linked (i.e. consumer price-indexed).
Den gamle bank blev underlagt en likvidationskomité og kom senere under likvidationsbehandling med det formål at afvikle alle aktiviteter.
LOAN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH ARION
Kaupthing, regeringen og Arion indgik den 3. september 2009 en aftale om kapitalisering af Arion og grundlaget for kompensation fra Kaupthing til Arion (»Kaupthing-kapitaliseringsaftalen«).
In October 2008, it was clear that Kaupthing could no longer be saved and the FME therefore took over the operations of the bank.
Ifølge denne aftale havde Kaupthing mulighed for at erhverve kontrol over Arion ved at tegne ny aktiekapital og skulle betale for den nye aktiekapital med den gamle banks egne aktiver (dvs. de aktiver, der ikke var blevet overført ifølge finanstilsynets beslutning omhandlet ovenfor).
In line with the Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (the ‘Emergency Act’), which was passed on 6 October 2008, the FME decided to split Kaupthing into an old and a new bank.
Inden Kaupthing kunne afgøre, om den ville erhverve aktiemajoriteten i Arion, skulle der indgås en aftale med den islandske centralbank om afviklingen af de udestående fordringer, da nogle af de aktiver, den skulle bruge til at betale for den nye aktiekapital, var blevet stillet som sikkerhed for lån ydet af den islandske centralbank til Kaupthing, herunder boliglåneporteføljen.
The new bank, which later became Arion, in principle took over most domestic assets and liabilities.
Finansministeriet, den islandske centralbank og Kaupthings likvidationskomité indgik derfor den 30. november 2009 en forligsaftale om afviklingen af den islandske centralbanks fordringer mod Kaupthing (»forligsaftalen«).
However, the secured liabilities towards the CBI and the respective collateral, including the housing loan portfolio, were not transferred [16].
Forligsaftalens artikel 3 omhandlede afviklingen af dag-til-dag-lån og bestemte, at Arion Bank skulle overtage Kaupthings gæld til den islandske centralbank ved at udstede en obligation på ca. […] [17] mia. ISK i en specifik formular vedhæftet aftalen som tillæg II, og at den islandske centralbank til gengæld skulle overdrage boliglåneporteføljen til Arion.
The old bank was placed under the supervision of a resolution committee and later became subject to winding-up procedures, with the aim of eventually closing all operations.
Den 22. januar 2010 indgik Arion og den islandske centralbank en låneaftale, som ifølge den islandske centralbank og Arion udgjorde den formelle opfyldelse af forligsaftalens artikel 3 og kapitaliseringsaftalen, dvs. da Kaupthings kreditorer blev ejere af Arion.
Kaupthing, the Government and Arion reached an agreement on 3 September 2009 regarding the capitalisation of Arion and the basis for compensation from Kaupthing to Arion (the ‘Kaupthing capitalisation agreement’).
Låneaftalen erstattede ovennævnte obligation.
According to this agreement, Kaupthing had the option of acquiring control of Arion by subscribing to new share capital and was to pay for the new share capital with the old bank's own assets (i.e. the assets that had not been transferred pursuant to the FME decision as described above).
Låneaftalen afspejlede i det væsentlige vilkårene for obligationen med den undtagelse, at hovedstolen i låneaftalen er angivet i EUR, USD og CHF i stedet for i ISK.
Before Kaupthing could decide whether it would acquire a majority stake in Arion, an agreement needed to be reached with the CBI on the settlement of the outstanding claims as some of the assets it would need to pay for the new share capital had been placed as collateral against loans provided by the CBI to Kaupthing, including the housing loan portfolio.
Denne ændring i valutaen var i overensstemmelse med vilkårene i forligsaftalen, der trods hovedstolens valutaangivelse bestemte, at Arion skulle betale renter og afdrag i udenlandske valutaer, for så vidt som banken var i stand til dette.
Therefore, on 30 November 2009, the Ministry of Finance, the CBI and the Kaupthing Resolution Committee entered into an agreement on the settlement of the CBI's claims against Kaupthing (the ‘settlement agreement’).
Hvis Arion ikke kunne betale i udenlandske valutaer og i stedet ønskede at betale i ISK, skulle den ifølge afviklingsaftalen skriftligt begrunde dette over for den islandske centralbank.
The settlement of overnight loans was the subject of Article 3 of the settlement agreement and there the parties agreed that Arion Bank would assume Kaupthing's debt towards the CBI by issuing a bond in the amount of approximately ISK […] [17] billion, in a specific form attached to the agreement as Appendix II, with the CBI in turn assigning the housing loan portfolio to Arion.
Låneaftalen omfattede et syvårigt lån, der kunne forlænges med to til tre år, på et beløb af […] mio. EUR, […] mio. USD og […] mio. CHF.
On 22 January 2010, Arion and the CBI concluded a loan agreement, which, according to the CBI and Arion, represented the formal completion of Article 3 of the settlement agreement and the capitalisation agreement, i.e. when the creditors of Kaupthing became owners of Arion.
Den islandske centralbank fik stillet boliglåneporteføljen som sikkerhed.
The loan agreement replaced the aforementioned bond.
KLAGEN
The loan agreement essentially reflected the terms of the bond, except that the principal amount of the loan agreement was denominated in EUR, USD and CHF instead of ISK.
Ifølge klageren blev låneaftalerne mellem ISB, Arion og den islandske centralbank ikke taget i betragtning i forbindelse med Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutninger vedrørende godkendelse af omstruktureringsstøtten til ISB og Arion [18].
This change in currency denomination was in line with the terms of the settlement agreement which provided that, despite the denomination of the principal, Arion should pay interest and instalments in foreign currencies to the extent the bank was able to.
Klageren gør derfor gældende, at støtten var selektiv, da den alene blev ydet til bestemte finansielle institutter, som konkurrerede på det islandske bankmarked.
Arion was permitted to change the combination of the currencies in which the loan was to be repaid.
Gennem lånet til ISB modtog banken ifølge klageren støtte for at undgå den islandske centralbanks håndhævelse af realkreditobligationerne, og for Arions vedkommende blev lånet ydet for at sikre en hensigtsmæssig balance i bankens valutarisiko.
The interest payable was EURIBOR/LIBOR + 300 bps.
Klageren fremfører, at andre finansielle institutter, som ikke modtog sådan støtte, var tvunget til at afhænde aktiver på markeder, som var gunstige for køberne.
The housing loan portfolio of Arion served as collateral to the CBI.
Ifølge klageren gav låneaftalerne ISB og Arion en klar fordel i form af langsigtet finansiering med gunstige rentesatser under markedssatserne, som ikke var tilgængelige for andre markedsdeltagere.
THE COMPLAINT
Ingen privat investor ville ifølge klageren have indgået sådanne aftaler på dette turbulente tidspunkt for de finansielle markeder.
According to the complainant, the loan agreements between ISB, Arion and the CBI were not assessed in the Authority's decisions approving restructuring aid to ISB and Arion [18].
Som begrundelse for påstanden om, at renterne var lavere end markedsrenten på daværende tidspunkt, fremlagde klageren den islandske regerings rentespænd for credit default swaps (»CDS«) i 2009 og renterne på obligationerne HFF150224 og HFF150434 udstedt af den islandske boligfinansieringsfond (»HFF«) i 2009.
Since the measures were not addressed in these cases, the complainant considers it important to obtain the opinion of the Authority on (i) the compatibility of these additional alleged aid measures with the EEA Agreement, and (ii) the consequences of the failure by the Icelandic authorities to notify these measures.
Ifølge klageren styrkede foranstaltningerne ISB og Arion på bankmarkedet, og de påvirkede derfor de øvrige markedsdeltageres stilling.
The complainant alleges that, at the time the CBI entered into the loan agreements with Arion and ISB, other banks in Iceland were not given the opportunity to receive such financing from the CBI or other government agencies.
Endelig anfører klageren, at ISB's Arions omstruktureringsplaner, som blev gennemført af den islandske regering, og som ifølge Tilsynsmyndigheden udgør forenelig støtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), var tilstrækkelige til at afhjælpe turbulensen i den islandske økonomi.
The complainant therefore argues that the aid was selective as it was granted exclusively to certain financial institutions competing on the Icelandic banking market.
Ifølge klageren var yderligere støtteforanstaltninger gennemført ved hjælp af ovennævnte aftaler ikke nødvendige, hensigtsmæssige eller forholdsmæssige for genopretningen af det islandske banksystem og udgør derfor uforenelig støtte.
According to the complainant, by granting a loan to ISB, the bank was granted aid to avoid enforcement by the CBI on the covered bond issue; and in Arion's case, the loan was granted to secure an appropriate balance on the bank's currency risk.
BEGRUNDELSE FOR INDLEDNING AF DEN FORMELLE UNDERSØGELSESPROCEDURE
The complainant argues that other financial institutions, which did not receive such aid, were forced to sell off assets in markets that favoured buyers.
I beslutning nr. 208/15/KOL vurderede Tilsynsmyndigheden foreløbigt, om de kortfristede kreditfaciliteter, som den islandske centralbank ydede til Glitnir og Kaupthing, og de låneaftaler, der var indgået mellem den islandske centralbank og både Arion og ISB, kunne udgøre statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, og om statsstøtten i givet fald kunne anses for forenelig med EØS-aftalens funktion.
According to the complainant, the loan agreements gave ISB and Arion a clear advantage in the form of long-term funding with favourable interest rates below market rates and which were not available to other market participants.
Med hensyn til den islandske centralbanks kortfristede udlån mod sikkerhedsstillelse til banker og andre finansielle institutter fandt Tilsynsmyndigheden, at betingelserne i bankretningslinjerne [19] vedrørende likviditetsstøtte og centralbankfaciliteter var opfyldt.
According to the complainant, no private investor would have entered into such agreements at this turbulent time on the financial markets.
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderede følgelig, at de kortfristede kreditfaciliteter, som den islandske centralbank ydede til Glitnir og Kaupthing, ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
In order to substantiate its claim that the interest rates were below market rates at the time, the complainant submitted credit default swap (‘CDS’) spreads of the Icelandic government in 2009 and interest rates in 2009 on bond issues HFF150224 and HFF150434 by the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund (‘HFF’).
Med hensyn til låneaftalerne mellem den islandske centralbank og både Arion og ISB på angiveligt gunstige vilkår nåede Tilsynsmyndigheden til den foreløbige konklusion, at det ikke kunne udelukkes, at de udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.
The complaint maintains that the measures strengthened ISB and Arion on the banking market and therefore affected the position of other market participants.
I beslutning nr. 208/15/KOL anførtes følgende aspekter:
Finally, the complainant argues that the restructuring plans of ISB and Arion, implemented by the Icelandic government and which the Authority found compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement, were sufficient to remedy the disturbance in the Icelandic economy.
Tilsynsmyndigheden bemærkede, at offentlig støtte ydet af en centralbank kan tilregnes staten og derfor udgør en overførsel af statsmidler.
According to the complainant, the additional aid measures implemented by way of the abovementioned agreements were not necessary, appropriate or proportionate to restore the Icelandic banking system and therefore entail incompatible state aid.
Tilsynsmyndigheden udtrykte tvivl med hensyn til, hvorvidt de omhandlede foranstaltninger var i overensstemmelse med en privat kreditors handlemåde i en tilsvarende retlig og faktisk situation.
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
Tilsynsmyndigheden foreløbige vurdering viste således, at en økonomisk fordel for ISB og Arion ikke kunne udelukkes.
In Decision No 208/15/COL, the Authority preliminarily assessed whether the short-term credit facilities provided by the CBI to Glitnir and Kaupthing, as well as the loan agreements concluded between the CBI and both Arion and ISB, could constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement; and, if so, whether the state aid could be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Eftersom det ikke var dokumenteret, at de angiveligt gunstige låneaftaler var tilgængelige for alle virksomheder, der befandt sig i samme retlige og faktiske situation som ISB og Arion, konkluderede Tilsynsmyndigheden foreløbigt, at foranstaltningen var selektiv.
With regard to CBI's short-term collateral lending to banks and other financial institutions, the Authority found that the conditions set out in the Banking Guidelines [19] concerning liquidity assistance and central bank facilities were fulfilled.
Endelig bemærkede Tilsynsmyndigheden, at ISB og Arion, selv om de i dag primært opererer på det islandske marked, beskæftiger sig med leveringen af finansielle tjenesteydelser, som generelt er åbne for konkurrence og handel i EØS.
Accordingly, the Authority concluded that the short-term credit facilities provided by the CBI to Glitnir and Kaupthing did not involve state aid.
Tilsynsmyndigheden fandt derfor indledningsvis, at foranstaltningen truede med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke handlen i EØS.
However, with respect to the loan agreements between the CBI and both Arion and ISB on allegedly favourable terms, the Authority came to the preliminary conclusion that it could not be excluded that these constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Ifølge Tilsynsmyndigheden skulle der fremlægges yderligere dokumentation, for at den kunne afgøre, om lånevilkårene kunne anses for forenelige med EØS-aftalens funktion.
The following aspects were identified in Decision No 208/15/COL:
Efter den indledende vurdering tvivlede Tilsynsmyndigheden følgelig på, om de omhandlede foranstaltninger og lånevilkårene udgjorde statsstøtte, og i givet fald, om de kunne anses for forenelige med EØS-aftalens funktion.
The Authority noted that public support granted by a central bank could be regarded as attributable to the State and thus constitutes a transfer of state resources.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DEN ISLANDSKE CENTRALBANK
The Authority expressed doubts as to whether the measures under assessment were consistent with the conduct of a private creditor finding himself in a comparable legal and factual situation.
GENERELT
Hence, the preliminary assessment of the Authority showed that an economic advantage in favour of ISB and Arion could not be excluded.
Den islandske centralbank bemærker, at omstruktureringen af Islands finansielle system, dets retsgrundlag og regeringens gennemførelse heraf tidligere er blevet undersøgt af Tilsynsmyndigheden, herunder i beslutningerne om omstruktureringsstøtte til ISB og Arion.
Since no evidence had been provided demonstrating that the allegedly favourable loan agreements were made available to all undertakings in a comparable factual and legal situation as ISB and Arion, it was the Authority's preliminary view that the measures appeared to be selective.
Ifølge den islandske centralbank er det ikke logisk, at isolere de omhandlede foranstaltninger fra deres sammenhæng og vurdere dem som enkeltstående instrumenter.
Finally, the Authority noted that although ISB and Arion today operate mostly on the Icelandic market, they are nevertheless engaged in the provision of financial services, which are fully open to competition and trade within the EEA.
Det er ifølge den islandske centralbank urealistisk, at en centralbank skulle håndhæve sikkerhed såsom den i sagen vedrørende Kaupthing (Arion) og ISB omhandlede.
Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure was liable to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA.
Ved at overføre sådan sikkerhed ville den islandske centralbank have påtaget sig rollen som en kommerciel bank med en af de største låneporteføljer for husholdninger i Island.
According to the Authority, further evidence needed to be provided in order to be able to determine whether the lending terms could be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Dette ville have været uforeneligt med dens rolle som centralbank.
Consequently, following its preliminary assessment, the Authority had doubts whether the measures in question and the lending terms in particular constituted state aid, and if so, whether they could be found to be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
Der var også en alvorlig risiko for at destabilisere driften af Arion og ISB, hvilket ville have bragt den finansielle stabilitet i fare.
COMMENTS FROM THE CBI
Tilsynsmyndigheden skal være opmærksom på, at den islandske centralbank har en lovfæstet forpligtelse til at fremme finansiel stabilitet.
GENERAL
Hvis den islandske centralbank havde inddrevet fordringen mod ISB, ville ISB's likviditet være blevet for svag til, at denne kunne fungere som en sund bank, og den islandske centralbank ville ikke have kunnet inddrive hele sin fordring.
The CBI notes that the restructuring of the Icelandic financial system, its legal foundation, and the government's execution of it, have been previously addressed by the Authority, inter alia, in the ISB and Arion restructuring aid decisions.
Den islandske centralbank bemærker, at bankretningslinjerne desværre ikke angiver, hvad der skal ske, hvis fordringer, der følger af pengepolitiske operationer, misligholdes, og en centralbank tvinges til at træffe foranstaltninger for at inddrive fordringer og overføre aktiver, der er anvendt som sikkerhed.
According to the CBI, it is not logical to take the measures under investigation in this case out of their context and to assess them as stand-alone instruments.
Den islandske centralbank anfører, at omlægningen af den islandske centralbanks fordringer til låneaftaler bør anses for en naturlig videreførelse af kreditorernes foranstaltninger for at maksimere inddrivelsen af fordringer, der hidrører fra kortfristede kreditfaciliteter, og ikke som ny finansiering ydet til Arion og ISB.
According to the CBI, it is unrealistic for a central bank to enforce collateral like the one in question in the case of Kaupthing (Arion) and ISB.
STATSSTØTTE
In appropriating such collateral, the CBI would have taken on the role of a commercial bank with one of the largest household loan portfolios in Iceland.
Den islandske centralbank påpeger, at den har en lovfæstet forpligtelse til at sikre den finansielle stabilitet og føre tilsyn med kreditinstitutternes valutabalancer.
This would have been inconsistent with its role as a central bank.
Den islandske centralbank havde derfor en lovfæstet forpligtelse til at imødegå den alvorlige situation, der herskede på daværende tidspunkt.
There was also an important risk of destabilising the operations of Arion and ISB, which would have jeopardised financial stability.
Indgåelsen af låneaftalerne var den bedste rationelle økonomiske beslutning under disse omstændigheder.
The Authority must bear in mind that the CBI has a legal obligation to promote financial stability.
Den islandske centralbank påpeger, at en overførsel af sikkerheden ville have været uforenelig med dens rolle som centralbank og samtidig ville have bevirket, at den islandske centralbank kun kunne inddrive en mindre del af den kortfristede gæld.
If the CBI had collected the claim on ISB, ISB's liquidity would have been rendered too weak to operate as a healthy bank and consequently the CBI would not have been in a position to collect all of its claim.
Vilkårene i låneaftalerne, dvs. renterne og sikkerheden, var ifølge den islandske centralbank desuden gunstige for centralbanken.
The CBI notes that the Banking Guidelines unfortunately do not address what happens when claims stemming from monetary policy operations fall into default and a central bank is forced to take steps to collect claims and appropriate collateral assets.
Vilkårene i låneaftalerne var derfor ifølge den islandske centralbank i begge tilfælde i fuld overensstemmelse med de normale markedsvilkår på daværende tidspunkt og i fuld overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
THE PRESENCE OF STATE AID
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt disse låneaftaler var selektive, gør den islandske centralbank gældende, at alle virksomheder, der befandt sig i samme retlige og faktiske situation, blev behandlet ens.
With respect to whether the loan agreements conferred an advantage on the banks, the CBI first argues that the initial delay in payments did not involve state aid, given the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Iceland after the collapse of the banking system in October 2008.
Den islandske centralbank bemærker i denne forbindelse, at Straumur, en privat islandsk investeringsbank, også indgik en aftale med den islandske centralbank om afvikling af dens kortfristede gæld [21].
The settlement of payments with ISB in September 2009 and with Kaupthing in November 2009 cannot be considered a delay, according to the CBI, as Iceland was undergoing a comprehensive bank restructuring with the assistance of the IMF and there was a high degree of uncertainty about the valuation of the banks' assets.
MP Bank befandt sig desuden ifølge den islandske centralbank ikke i samme faktiske eller retlige situation, da dens kortfristede gæld ikke var sikret med aktiver, der kunne sidestilles med boliglåneporteføljen, men med offentlige værdipapirer som f.eks. statslige instrumenter og lignende sikre instrumenter, dvs. letomsættelige aktiver med en fast værdi uden overførselsomkostninger.
The CBI highlights that is has the legal obligation to preserve financial stability and to supervise credit institutions' foreign exchange balances.
Den islandske centralbank afviser derfor påstanden om, at andre banker i Island ikke fik tilbudt muligheden for at modtage sådan finansiering fra den islandske centralbank eller andre offentlige instanser.
Therefore, the CBI had a legal obligation to address the severe situation prevailing at the time.