natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede i sin rapport (side 86, kapitel 21) (se punkt 14 og fodnote 4 i denne afgørelse), at det var centralt, at banken uanset Landsbankis likviditet i ISK ikke havde tilstrækkelig udenlandsk valuta til at honorere sine udenlandske forpligtelser.
The same information and business-transfer forms will be available at the branches of the bank.
Den omfatter ikke balancen for primær indkomst fra udlandet, som har været negativ i de seneste år, især siden 2008.
Provided that competitive service offers are not available, Landsbankinn is willing to offer the following services at a price that will be based on cost plus reasonable margin:
Dette betyder, at Islands samlede løbende poster trods overskuddet på handelsbalancen har været udvist et underskud i de senere år, også selvom det er faldet kraftigt siden 2009.
Payment processing services for ISK.
Dette er en stor fordel for indskydere, ikke mindst her, hvor borgerne stadig har bankernes kollaps i 2008 i frisk erindring.
Payment processing services for FX.
På den anden side er denne bestemmelse sandsynligvis et handicap for bankerne, når de ønsker at sprede deres finansieringssystem.
Distribution of bank notes and coins.
Return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the currents crisis under the State air rules, vedtaget af Tilsynsmyndigheden den 25. november 2009 under kapitel VII: Temporary Rules regarding the Financial Crisis, as extended by the Financial Crisis Guidelines 2012.
RELEVANT ADAPTATIONS AND CHANGES TO THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS IN ICELAND ADOPTED AFTER THE CRISIS
Findes på Tilsynsmyndighedens websted: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VIII---Return-to-viability-and-the-assessment-of-restructuring-measures-in-the-financial-sector.pdf.
The Icelandic authorities have submitted the following overview of amendments made to the legislation which was in effect in the autumn of 2008:
Nye regler om valutabalancen blev vedtaget af CBI og trådte i kraft den 1. januar 2011.
FME's (The Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority) authorisations to intervene (to take over the powers of shareholders' meetings and dispose of assets, cf. the emergency legislation) have been increased; FME has been given expanded supervisory authorisations; additional provisions have been adopted enabling FME to evaluate the operations or behaviour of individual supervised parties.
Formålet med reglerne er at begrænse valutakursrisikoen ved at forhindre, at valutabalancer overstiger bestemte grænser.
These include both decision-making authorisations, such as on the closing of establishments or termination of specific activities without actual revocation of operating licences, as well as a more detailed definition of concepts whose interpretation has been disputed by FME and supervised entities or appellate bodies.
Landsbankinn forpligter sig til ikke at opkøbe finansinstitutioner frem til den 15. december 2014.
Rules on individual large exposures have been clarified and made more specific; both the role and responsibility of risk management have been increased and FME authorised to accord risk management higher status in the organisation of financial undertakings; provisions on the application of stress tests have been tightened.
Med forbehold af denne forpligtelse kan Landsbankinn efter at have fået Tilsynsmyndighedens godkendelse opkøbe finansieringsvirksomheder, navnlig hvis dette er nødvendigt for at sikre finansiel stabilitet.
Provisions for a special registry of larger borrowers have been legalised, in order to provide better overview of large, individual exposures to two or more financial undertakings.
FME overtog kontrollen med de gamle banker, allokerede i det store og hele deres nationale aktiver og passiver (indlån) til de nye banker, der fortsatte med at drive bankvirksomhed i Island.
The registry is important for linking exposures together and assessing their systemic impact if difficulties should arise in the borrowers' operations.
De gamle banker blev sat under tilsyn af deres respektive likvidationskomitéer [13].
Entities not subject to FME supervision, but which are listed in the registries of financial undertakings, must provide FME with information on all their obligations.
RB's kunder er ejerne, Islands Centralbank og andre finansinstitutioner samt regeringen og offentlige enheder.
The time limits allowing financial undertakings to dispose of appropriated assets have been shortened.
Konkurrencemyndigheden har set på to spørgsmål vedrørende RB.
Provisions on financial undertakings' holdings in own shares have been tightened and defined in more detail.
For det første om det fælles ejerskab af og samarbejde mellem bankerne og andre finansvirksomheder i RB-forummet skal betragtes som en overtrædelse af forbuddet mod restriktiv praksis i henhold til artikel 10 i den islandske konkurrencelov.
Holdings of subsidiaries are now considered own shares, as are off-balance-sheet contracts concerning own shares.
Luxembourg
Financial undertakings have been prohibited from extending credit against pledges of their own shares or guarantee capital certificates.
Som det ses af ovenstående fremgår det, hvis man henviser til de to vigtigste aktiver, at Landsbankinns primobalance kun udgjorde omkring 25 % af Landsbankis balance for 30.6.2008.
Both the responsibility and role of internal auditing section has been increased.
Det fremgår af en meddelelse fra premierministerens kontor af 6. oktober 2008, at »Islands regering understreger, at indskud i nationale forretningsbanker og sparekasser samt deres afdelinger i Island vil blive fuldt dækket« [35].
Five-year limits have been placed on the period for which an auditing firm may carry out the audit of the same financial undertaking; financial undertakings' ability to dismiss a ‘difficult’ auditor is reduced.
Denne meddelelse er siden blevet gentaget af den nuværende premierminister i hhv. februar og december 2009 [36].
All provisions on calculation of equity and various other technical aspects have been reviewed.
Desuden nævntes en hensigtserklæring, som den islandske regering sendte til Den Internationale Valutafond (og offentliggjorde på økonomiministeriets og IMF's websteder) den 7. april 2010 (og gentaget i en anden hensigtserklæring dateret 13. september 2010).
Rules on exercising qualifying holdings, i.e. 10 % or more of voting rights, have been reviewed.
Det hedder i brevet (som var underskrevet af den islandske statsminister, finansminister, økonomiminister og direktøren for CBI), at »for indeværende forpligter vi os til at beskytte indskydere fuldt ud, men når der atter er finansiel stabilitet, agter vi gradvist at ophæve denne generelle garant« [37].
FME is authorised to reverse the onus of proof in assessing parties intending on acquiring or adding to qualifying holdings, e.g. when it is uncertain who is/are the beneficial owner/-s of a holding company with a qualifying holding.
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer derfor, at de islandske myndigheder ikke har overholdt deres forpligtelser efter artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I i protokol nr. 3.
FME has adopted rules as to what is considered satisfactory collateral for such transactions.
Rapporten fra den islandske stats kontor for finansielle investeringer, som omtales ovenfor, synes at understøtte denne konklusion.
Rules concerning arrangements for incentive schemes and bonuses to management and employees and on termination contracts have been adopted.
Endelig forpligter Landsbankinn sig til hurtigst mulig at sælge aktieposter i driftsselskaber, som man har overtaget som følge af omstruktureringen i henhold til artikel 22 i loven om finansielle virksomheder nr. 161/2002, den forpligter sig til at følge proceduren og overholde tidsfristerne, som er angivet i denne bestemmelse, og den vil fremlægge ajourførte oplysninger på sit eget (eller et datterselskabs) websted vedrørende datterselskaber og aktieposter, der sættes til salg.
Provisions on the reorganisation and winding-up of financial undertakings have been tightened.
Eksisterende ejere af RB har forpligtet sig til regelmæssigt at sælge dele af deres andele i RB for at gøre det lettere for ikkefinansielle virksomheder at købe sig ind i RB.
An overall revision of special rules on savings banks has been carried out.
Sådanne invitationer skal gives mindst hvert andet år, indtil mindst en tredjedel af alle aktier i RB er blevet solgt til andre end de nuværende aktionærer eller udbudt til salg i et aktieudbud.
The status and rights of guarantee capital owners of savings banks have been clarified, restrictions set on dividends, clear rules have been adopted on guarantee capital transactions, rules have been set on write-downs of guarantee capital and rules on savings banks' authorisations for formal cooperation have been clarified.
Konkurrencemyndigheden bruger termen »erhvervsaktive selskaber« for bankernes aktieandele i normalt ikkefinansielle virksomheder, som bankerne har erhvervet i forbindelse med omstruktureringen af deres låneporteføljer gennem konvertering af gæld til egenkapital eller på andre måder.
Savings banks have been prohibited from altering their legal form.
På samme måde bruger Tilsynsmyndigheden termen »driftsselskab« for en virksomhed i realøkonomien, som ikke tilhører bankens kerneforretning på finansmarkederne.
According to the Icelandic authorities, Icelandic rules in some respects go beyond the pan-European framework.
Rapporteringen af valutabalancen er også mere detaljeret end tidligere, idet aktiver og passiver i fremmed valuta klassificeres efter type: lån, obligationer, egenkapitalinstrumenter, andele i gensidige fonde, indlån, rentebærende aftaler, gæld til centralbanken osv.
The main deviations from rules adopted by the EU which have been taken up in the EEA Agreement are the following:
Hvis valutabalancen afviger fra grænserne i reglerne, skal den pågældende finansvirksomhed indføre foranstaltninger for at fjerne differencen inden for højst tre hverdage.
FME is authorised to restrict the activities of individual establishments of financial undertakings, if it sees reason to do so.
nr. 291/12/KOL
No 291/12/COL
om omstruktureringsstøtte til Arion Bank (Island)
on restructuring aid to Arion Bank (Iceland)
Derefter var der regelmæssigt yderligere kontakt og brevveksling, bl.a. med brev fra Tilsynsmyndigheden af 18. juni 2009 med en påmindelse til de islandske myndigheder om, at det var nødvendigt at anmelde eventuelle statsstøtteforanstaltninger, og om spærreklausulen i artikel 3 i protokol 3.
Following informal correspondence in October 2008, and the passing on 6 October by the Icelandic Parliament (the Althingi) of Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (referred to as the ‘Emergency Act’), which gave the Icelandic state wide-ranging powers to intervene in the banking sector, the President of the Authority wrote on 10 October 2008 to the Icelandic authorities and requested that state aid measures taken under the Emergency Act be notified to the Authority.
Den 20. september 2010 anmeldte de islandske myndigheder endelig med tilbagevirkende kraft og efter yderligere brevveksling og møder statsstøtte ydet i forbindelse med genoprettelsen af visse af (gamle) Kaupthing Banks aktiviteter og oprettelsen og kapitaliseringen af New Kaupthing Bank (omdøbt til Arion Bank pr. 21. november 2009).
Further contact and correspondence followed periodically including notably a letter sent by the Authority on 18 June 2009 reminding the Icelandic authorities of the need to notify any state aid measures, and of the standstill clause in Article 3 of Protocol 3.
Ved brev af 16. december 2010 [2] meddelte EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden (»Tilsynsmyndigheden«) de islandske myndigheder, at den havde besluttet at indlede proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3, for så vidt angår den islandske stats foranstaltninger til genoprettelsen af visse af (gamle) Kaupthing Banks aktiviteter og oprettelsen og kapitaliseringen af New Kaupthing Bank, nu omdøbt til Arion Bank (beslutningen om at indlede proceduren).
Following further correspondence and meetings, state aid involved in the restoration of certain operations of (old) Kaupthing Bank and the establishment and capitalisation of New Kaupthing Bank (renamed Arion Bank as from 21 November 2009) was eventually notified retrospectively by the Icelandic authorities on 20 September 2010.
Tilsynsmyndigheden anmodede ligeledes om at få tilsendt en detaljeret omstruktureringsplan for Arion Bank inden for de følgende seks måneder.
By letter dated 15 December 2010 [2] the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’) informed the Icelandic authorities that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 in respect of the measures undertaken by the Icelandic State to restore certain operations of (old) Kaupthing Bank hf and establish and capitalise New Kaupthing Bank hf, now renamed Arion Bank (the opening decision) [3].
Ved brev af 31. marts 2011 fremsendte de islandske myndigheder en omstruktureringsplan for Arion Bank.
The Authority also required that a detailed restructuring plan for Arion Bank be submitted within six months.
Tilsynsmyndigheden anmodede om oplysninger om omstruktureringsplanen den 11. juli 2011 og 13. februar 2012.
The Icelandic authorities did not respond to this comment.
Derudover mødtes Tilsynsmyndighedens repræsentanter med de islandske myndigheder og repræsentanter for Arion Bank den 7. juni 2011 og 27.-28. februar 2012.
By letter of 31 March 2011, the Icelandic authorities submitted a restructuring plan for Arion Bank.
SAGSFORLØB
An updated restructuring plan was submitted by e-mail on 30 April 2012.
Inden da gives en gennemgang af kronologien bag Kaupthing Banks sammenbrud.
Replies to the requests for information were received from the Icelandic Authorities on 26 October 2011, 16 April 2012, 30 April 2012, 21 May 2012 and 6 July 2012.
Kaupthing Banks sammenbrud
The final versions of the commitments made by the Icelandic authorities and Arion Bank were submitted on 3 July 2012 [5].
I september 2008 begyndte en række store globale finansinstitutioner at få store problemer.
In addition, the Authority's representatives met with the Icelandic authorities and representatives of Arion Bank on 7 June 2011 and 27-28 February 2012.
I de turbulente tider for de globale finansmarkeder fik Islands tre største kommercielle banker, der havde oplevet en usædvanlig vækst gennem de foregående år, problemer med at refinansiere deres kortfristede gæld og var ude for et stormløb mod deres indskud.
BACKGROUND
Lehman Brothers anmodede om konkursbeskyttelse den 15. september, og samme dag blev det meddelt, at Bank of America ville overtage Merrill Lynch.
The Authority will describe in this section those events, facts and economic, political and regulatory developments relating to the collapse and the reconstruction of the Icelandic financial system from October 2008 to date that appear necessary to set out the context in which the assessment of aid measures at hand is undertaken.
Samtidig blev en af Det Forenede Kongeriges største banker, HBOS, overtaget af Lloyds TSB.
Before doing so, it will recall in turn the chronology of Kaupthing Bank's breakdown.
Problemerne i den islandske finanssektor trådte tydeligere frem den 29. september 2008, da Islands regering meddelte, at man havde indgået en aftale med Glitnir Bank om et kapitalindskud på 600 mio. EUR til gengæld for 75 % af bankens kapitalandele.
The collapse of Kaupthing Bank
Regeringens planlagte overtagelse af Glitnir Bank var dog ikke nok til at skabe tryghed på markederne og blev efterfølgende opgivet.
In September 2008 a number of major global financial institutions began to experience severe difficulties.
Kursen på de tre forretningsbankers aktier styrtdykkede, og deres kreditvurderinger blev nedjusteret.
In the midst of the turbulence in global financial markets, Iceland's three biggest commercial banks, which had experienced extraordinary growth over the preceding years, encountered difficulties in refinancing their short term debt and a run on their deposits.
Antallet af opsigelser af indskud fra udenlandske afdelinger af Landsbanki og Kaupthing steg, af afdelingerne i Island oplevede også massive kontanthævninger.
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September, and on the same day it was announced that the Bank of America was to take over Merrill Lynch.
Den første weekend i oktober stod det klart, at en anden af de tre store banker, Landsbanki, havde svære problemer.
Elsewhere, one of the United Kingdom's biggest banks, HBOS, had to be taken over by Lloyds TSB.
Men Kaupthing Banks låneaftaler og gældsbeviser indeholdt generelt en klausul om, at hvis et af bankens store datterselskaber misligholdt sine forpligtelser, ville dette udgøre misligholdelse fra Kaupthing Banks side og medføre, at bankens lån forfaldt.
The problems in the Icelandic financial sector unfolded more clearly on 29 September 2008, when the Icelandic Government announced that it had reached an agreement with Glitnir Bank whereby it would inject 600 million euros of equity into the bank in return for 75 % of its shareholdings.
Den 8. oktober 2008 erklærede de britiske myndigheder Kaupthings datterselskab i Storbritannien, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF), konkurs.
However, the Government's planned take-over of Glitnir Bank failed to reassure markets and was subsequently abandoned.
Dagen efter overtog FME kontrollen med banken i medfør af de beføjelser, der var fastlagt i nødloven.
The share prices of the three commercial banks plummeted and credit ratings were downgraded.
I de islandske myndigheders anmeldelse af statsstøtten til Arion Bank forklarede de, at årsagerne til sammenbruddet i den islandske banksektor og nødvendigheden af deres indgreb var detaljeret beskrevet i en rapport udarbejdet af en særlig undersøgelseskommission, nedsat af Islands Alting [6], hvis mandat var at undersøge og analysere de processer, der førte til de tre hovedbankers sammenbrud.
On the first weekend in October it became clear that another one of the three large banks, Landsbanki, was in severe difficulty.
Tilsynsmyndigheden opsummerer nedenfor undersøgelseskommissionens konklusioner vedrørende de mest relevante årsager til Kaupthing Banks konkurs.
Glitnir Bank and Landsbanki were taken over by the FME on 7 October 2008.
Oplysningerne stammer fra kapitel 2 (sammendrag) og 21 (årsager til de islandske bankers kollaps — ansvar, fejltagelser og uagtsomhed) i undersøgelseskommissionens rapport.
For a while it was hoped that Kaupthing Bank could escape the same fate and on 6 October 2008, the CBI granted Kaupthing a loan to the amount of 500 million euros against collateral in Kaupthing's Danish subsidiary, FIH Erhvervsbanken.
Den globale likviditetsbegrænsning på finansmarkederne, som begyndte i 2007, førte i sidste instans til kollapset i de tre største islandske banker, hvis forretningsaktiviteter i stigende grad var blevet afhængige af at skaffe finansiering gennem internationale markeder.
However, the loan agreements and debt securities of Kaupthing Bank generally contained a clause stating that in the event of one of the bank's large subsidiaries defaulting, this would constitute a default by Kaupthing Bank which could lead to the bank's loans becoming due.
Der var dog mange og komplekse årsager til de islandske bankers sammenbrud.
On 8 October 2008, the UK authorities placed Kaupthing's subsidiary in Britain, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF), under cessation of payments.
Undersøgelseskommissionen afdækkede de årsager, der førte til de største bankers kollaps, og det er interessant, at de fleste af konklusionerne gjaldt for alle tre banker, og at mange af dem er indbyrdes forbundne.
The following day, the FME took control of the bank using powers conferred upon it by the Emergency Act.
Årsagerne til konkurserne i tilknytning til bankernes aktiviteter gengives kortfattet nedenfor.
The financial crisis and major causes of failure of the Icelandic banks
Uforholdsmæssig stor og ikkebæredygtig ekspansion
In their notification of the aid granted to Arion Bank, the Icelandic authorities explained that the reasons for the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector and their need to intervene were set out in considerable detail in a report prepared by a Special Investigation Commission (‘SIC’) established by the Icelandic Parliament [6], whose remit was to investigate and analyse the processes leading to the collapse of the three main banks.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede, at bankerne i årene op til kollapset havde udvidet deres balancer og låneporteføljer ud over deres egen driftsmæssige og ledelsesmæssige kapacitet.
The Authority summarises below the conclusions of the Commission concerning the causes of failure most relevant to the demise of Kaupthing Bank.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede derfor, at en stor del af stigningen i udlån stammede fra lån til virksomheder, som havde fået afslag på kredit andre steder.
The information is drawn from Chapters 2 (Executive Summary) and 21 (Causes of the Collapse of the Icelandic Banks — Responsibility, Mistakes and Negligence) of the SIC report.
Rapportens konklusion var også, at stedse mere risikable investeringsbankydelser var blevet en stadig vigtigere del af bankernes aktiviteter, og at væksten havde bidraget til problemerne.
The global reduction in liquidity in financial markets that began in 2007 eventually led to the collapse of the three main Icelandic banks, whose business operations had become increasingly dependent on raising funding through international markets.
Begrænset adgang til finansiering på de internationale markeder
The reasons for the demise of the Icelandic banks were however complex and numerous.
En stor del af bankernes vækst kan tilskrives adgangen til internationale finansmarkeder, eftersom de nød godt af gode kreditvurderinger og adgang til europæiske markeder gennem EØS-aftalen.
The SIC investigated the reasons which led to the collapse of the main banks, and it is notable that the majority of the conclusions applied to all three banks and many are inter-related.
Da adgangen til de europæiske obligationsmarkeder blev begrænset, finansierede bankerne deres aktiviteter på amerikanske markeder, hvor islandske obligationer blev pakket til strukturerede kreditobligationer.
Excessive and unsustainable expansion
I tiden op til sammenbruddet blev bankerne i stigende grad afhængige af kortfristede lån, hvilket førte til store og — ifølge undersøgelseskommissionen — forventelige refinansieringsrisici.
The SIC concluded that in the years leading up to the collapse the banks had expanded their balance sheets and lending portfolios beyond their own operational and managerial capacity.
Bankejernes gearing
The combined assets of the three banks had increased exponentially from 1,4 trillion ISK [7] in 2003 to 14,4 trillion ISK at the end of the second quarter of 2008.
For alle de store islandske banker gjaldt det, at de vigtigste ejere var at finde blandt de største debitorer [9].
Significantly, a large proportion of the growth of the three banks was in lending to foreign parties, which increased substantially during 2007 [8], most notably after the beginning of the international liquidity crisis.
Det var undersøgelseskommissionens opfattelse, at visse aktionærer i deres egenskab af ejere havde unormalt let adgang til at låne fra bankerne.
This led the SIC to conclude that much of this increase in lending resulted from loans made to undertakings that had been refused credit elsewhere.
Den største aktionær i Kaupthing Bank var Exista hf., der ejede lidt over 20 % af banken.
The report also concluded that inherently riskier investment banking had become an ever increasing feature of the banks' activities and growth had contributed to the problems.
Exista var også en af bankens største debitorer.
The reduction in finance available on the international markets