natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Se bl.a. sag C-387/92, Banco Exterior de España SA mod Ayuntamiento de Valencia, Sml. 1994 I, s. 877.
See among others Case C-387/92 Banco Exterior de España SA v Ayuntamiento de Valencia, ECR [1994] I-877.
[63] Afsnit 18 i meddelelsen.
Paragraph 18 of the notice.
Se afsnit J i adfærdskodeksen.
See Section J of the Code of Conduct.
Forenede sager T- T-346/99, T-347/99 og T-348/99, Territorio Histórico de Álava m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2002 II, præmis 84.
Joined Cases T- T-346/99, T-347/99 and T-348/99, Territorio Histórico de Álava and others v Commission, ECR [2002] paragraph 84.
Sag C-5/89, Kommissionen mod Tyskland, Sml. 1990 I, s. 3437, præmis 14, sag C-169/95, Kommissionen mod Spanien, Sml. 1997 I, s. 135, præmis 51, sag C-24/95, Land Rheinland-Pfalz mod Alcan Deutschland GmbH, Sml. 1997 I, s. 1591, præmis 25.
Case C-5/89, Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 14; Case C-169/95, Commission v Spain [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 51; Case C-24/95, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Alcan Deutschland GmbH [1997] ECR I-1591, paragraph 25.
Sag C1-09, Centre d'Exportation du Livre Français (CELF), Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication mod Société Internationale de Diffusion et d'Édition, dom af 11.3.2010 (endnu ikke offentliggjort).
Case C1-09 Centre d'Exportation du Livre Français (CELF), Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication v Société Internationale de Diffusion et d'Édition, judgment of 11.3.2010 (not yet published).
Se også sag C-91/01, Italien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2004 I, s. 4355, præmis 66 og 67.
See also Case C-91/01 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-4355, paragraphs 66 and 67.
Sag C-5/89, Kommissionen mod Tyskland, Sml. 1990 I, s. 3437, præmis 14, og Regione Autonoma della Sardegna mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2005 II, s. 2123, præmis 64.
Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 14 and Regione Autonoma della Sardegna v Commission [2005] ECR II-2123, paragraph 64.
Sag C-5/89, Kommissionen mod Tyskland, Sml. 1990 I, s. 3437, præmis 14, sag C-169/95, Spanien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1997 I, s.135, præmis 51.
Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, paragraph 14, Case C-169/95 Spain v Commission [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 51.
Forenede sager C-183/02 P og C-187/02 P, Demesa and Territorio Histórico de Álava mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2004 I, s. 10609, præmis 51.
Joined Cases C-183/02 P and C-187/02 P Demesa and Territorio Histórico de Álava v Commission [2004] ECR I-10609, paragraph 51.
Sag T-290/97, Mehibas Dordstelaan mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2000 II, s. 15, og sag C-182/03 og C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2006 I, s. 5479, præmis 147.
Case T-290/97, Mehibas Dordstelaan v Commission [2000] ECR II-15 and cases C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v Commission [2006] ECR I-05479, paragraph 147.
Se fodnote 54 og 55 med henvisning til Tilsynsmyndighedens afgørelse om skattelempelser på industriproduktion, glasemballages fritagelse for en grundafgift og vedrørende regionalt differentierede socialsikringsafgifter.
See footnotes 54 and 55 referring to Authority decisions on tax reliefs on industrial production, a tax exemption from a basic tax for glass packaging and regarding regionally differentiated social security taxation.
Kodeksen, som blev vedtaget den 1. december 1997, blev beskrevet som værende en »skelsættende aftale« om forebyggelse af unfair konkurrence på skatteområdet.
The code, adopted on 1 December 1997, was described as a ‘landmark accord’ on preventing unfair tax competition.
EU's medlemsstater var enige om at fryse reglerne for selskabsskat ved begyndelsen af 1998 og rådføre sig med Kommissionen før gennemførelsen af ny selskabsskattelovgivning.
EU Member States agreed to freeze corporate tax rules at the beginning of 1998 and to consult with the Commission before implementing new corporate tax legislation.
Selv om beslutningen fra 1984 ikke blev offentliggjort, blev der henvist til den i den 14. konkurrenceberetning.
Although the 1984 decision was not published, it was referred to in the 14th Competition Report.
Adfærdskodeksen anfører (i afsnit J) at, »Kommissionen har til hensigt at vurdere og fra sag til sag foretage en fornyet vurdering af gældende skatteordninger samt nye udkast i medlemsstaterne, idet der sikres sammenhæng og lige behandling, når traktatens regler og målsætninger finder anvendelse« ( EFT C 2 af 6.1.1998).
The Code of Conduct states (at Section J) that ‘the Commission intends to examine or re-examine existing tax arrangements and proposed new legislation by Member States case by case, thus ensuring that the rules and objectives of the Treaty are applied consistently and equally to all’ ( OJ C 2, 6.1.1998).
Kommissionen nåede samme dag samme konklusion om de nederlandske internationale finansieringsaktiviteter (K(2003) 568 om Kongeriget Nederlandenes støtte til fordel for internationale finansieringsaktiviteter (EUT L 180 af 18.7.2003, s. 52).
On the same day, the Commission reached the same conclusion regarding the Dutch International Financing Activities regime (C(2003) 568 on State aid implemented by the Netherlands for international finance activities (OJ L 180, 18.7.2003, p. 52)).
Se ikke kun beslutningen om de belgiske koordinationscentre (EUT L 282 af 30.10.2003, s. 25), men også andre sager om skattebegunstigelse, som bedømmes at ligne, herunder Kommissionens beslutninger K(2002) 3740 om koordinationscentre gennemført i Luxembourg (EUT L 170 af 9.7.2003, s. 20) og K(2003) 568 om Kongeriget Nederlandenes støtte til fordel for internationale finansieringsaktiviteter (EUT L 180 af 18.7.2003, s. 52).
See not only the Belgian coordination centres decision (OJ L 282, 30.10.2003, p. 25), but also other cases involving preferential tax treatment that were deemed to be similar, including Commission decisions C(2002) 3740 on coordination centres implemented by Luxembourg (OJ L 170, 9.7.2003, p. 20) and C(2003) 568 on State aid implemented by the Netherlands for international finance activities (OJ L 180, 18.7.2003, p. 52).
EFT C 309 af 6.11.2001, s. 4.
OJ C 309, 6.11.2001, p. 4.
Og således også myndighederne i Liechtenstein.
And indeed the Liechtenstein authorities.
Selskab K fremsatte bemærkninger i december 2008 og april 2009.
Company K provided comments in December 2008 and April 2009.
Det gav udtryk for overraskelse over, at den skattelovgivning, der har været gældende i Liechtenstein i de seneste ti år, ville medføre tildeling af uforenelig statsstøtte.
It expressed its surprise that the tax legislation applicable in Liechtenstein for the last 10 years would entail the grant of incompatible State aid.
Liechtensteins myndigheder giver afkald på indtægter svarende til den manglende betaling af indkomstskat, betalingen af en nedsat kapitalskattesats samt den manglende betaling af kuponskat.
The Liechtenstein authorities forego revenue corresponding to the non-payment of income tax, the payment of a reduced capital tax rate as well as the non-payment of coupon taxes.
Med den begrundelse mener Tilsynsmyndigheden, at de særlige skatteregler, der finder anvendelse på koncerninterne forsikringsselskaber, ydes gennem statsmidler.
For these reasons, the Authority considers that the special tax rules applicable to captive insurance companies are granted through State resources.
Med henvisning til EU-Domstolens konklusioner i GIL Insurance-sagen [39]»Artikel 87, stk. 1, EF kræver en stillingtagen til, om en statslig foranstaltning som led i en bestemt retlig ordning kan begunstige »visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner« i forhold til andre virksomheder, der under hensyntagen til det formål, der forfølges med den pågældende foranstaltning, befinder sig i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation«.
By reference to the European Court of Justice’s conclusions in the GIL Insurance case [39], ‘Article 87(1) EC requires it to be determined whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour “certain undertakings or the production of certain goods” in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by the system in question, are in a comparable legal and factual situation’.
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer, at virksomheder i samme retlige og faktiske situation i dette tilfælde er dem, der betaler den (fulde) indkomst-, kapital- og kuponskat i Liechtenstein — og i sammenligning med dem får koncerninterne forsikringsselskaber i Liechtenstein en selektiv fordel.
The Authority concludes that the undertakings in the same legal and factual position in this case are those who pay the (full) income, capital and coupon taxes in Liechtenstein — and in comparison to those, captive insurance companies in Liechtenstein receive a selective advantage.
Kommissionen skønnede ligeledes (i beslutningen vedrørende Ålandsøerne), at betingelserne for foranstaltningen (evnen til at etablere et koncerninternt forsikringsselskab) implicit krævede en vis økonomisk styrke og derfor kun kunne gælde selskaber af en tilstrækkelig størrelse [41].
The Commission also considered (in the Åland decision) that the conditions under which the measure applied (the ability to form a captive) implicitly required a certain economic strength, and therefore could apply only to sufficiently large companies [41].
Tilsynsmyndigheden er derfor af den opfattelse, at foranstaltningen kun er tilgængelig for og kan gælde virksomheder med tilstrækkelige ressourcer til at etablere et koncerninternt forsikringsselskab, og bemærker, at en restriktion af denne art førte til, at Retten i Første Instans konkluderede, at skattefritagelser i Territorio Histórico de Álava-sagen [42] var selektive. Der blev under undersøgelsen også henvist til Europa-Kommissionens beslutning vedrørende den irske ordning for holdingselskaber.
The Authority is of the view, therefore, that the measure is available and applicable only to undertakings that have sufficient resources to form a captive insurance company, and notes that a restriction of this nature led the Court of First Instance to conclude that tax exemptions in the Territorio Histórico de Álava case [42] were selective.Reference was also made during the investigation to the European Commission’s Decision on the Irish Company Holding Regime.
Principperne gælder imidlertid kun under ekstraordinære omstændigheder, og en virksomhed kan ikke normalt have berettigede forventninger om, at støtten er lovlig, medmindre den er givet i overensstemmelse med proceduren for anmeldelse af støtten til Tilsynsmyndigheden (eller Europa-Kommissionen, alt efter tilfældet [66]).
The principles only apply, however, in exceptional circumstances and an undertaking cannot normally entertain legitimate expectations that aid is lawful unless it has been granted in accordance with the procedure for notifying the aid to the Authority (or the European Commission as the case may be [66]).
Dette princip er for nylig blev bekræftet igen af Domstolen, som følger: »I en situation som den i hovedsagen foreliggende kan tilstedeværelsen af en ekstraordinær omstændighed ikke gøres gældende i forhold til retssikkerhedsprincippet, idet Domstolen allerede i det væsentlige har fastslået, at så længe Kommissionen ikke har vedtaget en beslutning om godkendelse, … har støttemodtageren ikke vished med hensyn til lovligheden af støtten, hvorfor hverken princippet om beskyttelse af den berettigede forventning eller retssikkerhedsprincippet kan påberåbes« [67].Domstolens retspraksis har i princippet fastslået, at en berettiget forventning om, at den pågældende støtte er lovlig, ikke kan påberåbes, medmindre denne støtte er givet i overensstemmelse med proceduren i artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I i protokol 3 [68], hvori det bemærkes, at en påpasselig erhvervsdrivende normalt er i stand til at forvisse sig om, at denne procedure er fulgt [69]. Uanset dette har Domstolen også accepteret, at en modtager af støtte, som er givet ulovligt, fordi den ikke var anmeldt, under ekstraordinære omstændigheder kan påberåbe sig berettigede forventninger om, at støtten var lovlig for at modsætte sig tilbagebetaling heraf [70].
This is a principle recently reaffirmed by the Court of Justice as follows: ‘In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the existence of an exceptional circumstance also cannot be upheld in the light of the principle of legal certainty, since the Court has already held, essentially, that, so long as the Commission has not taken a decision approving aid, … the recipient cannot be certain as to the lawfulness of the aid, with the result that neither the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations nor that of legal certainty can be relied upon.’ [67].In principle, the case-law of the Court of Justice has stated that a legitimate expectation that aid is lawful cannot be invoked unless that aid has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down in Article 1(3) in Part I of Protocol 3 [68], remarking that a diligent business man should normally be able to determine whether that procedure has been followed [69].Notwithstanding this the Court has also accepted that in exceptional circumstances a recipient of aid which is granted unlawfully because it was not notified may rely on legitimate expectations that the aid was lawful in order to oppose its repayment [70].
Ifølge Domstolen kan en enhed påberåbe sig princippet om beskyttelse af berettigede forventninger, hvis en fællesskabsmyndighed har givet berettigede forventninger [71].
The Court of Justice has held that an entity may rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations where a Community authority has caused it to entertain expectations which are justified [71].
Det betyder i denne sammenhæng, at en stat eller en støttemodtager skal have påberåbt sig Tilsynsmyndighedens tidligere foranstaltninger f.eks. ved godkendelse af samme eller lignende støtteforanstaltning.
This means in this context that a State or beneficiary must have relied on the previous actions of the Authority in, for example, approving the same or a similar aid measure.
Tilsynsmyndigheden er endvidere af den opfattelse, at det i den bredere EØS-sammenhæng er muligt, at støttemodtagere i EFTA-staterne kunne have påberåbt sig Europa-Kommissionens foranstaltninger eller Domstolens retspraksis.
Captive insurance companies in Liechtenstein may, therefore, have been entitled to expect that taxation of the intra-group service they provide (insurance) could be taxed differently without this involving State aid. Further, the Authority is of the view that in the wider EEA context, it is possible that beneficiaries in the EFTA States could have relied on the actions of the European Commission or on the case-law of the Court of Justice.
Business insurance sector inquiry — Inquiry into the European business insurance sector pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 — Interimsrapport, januar 2007.
Business insurance sector inquiry — Inquiry into the European business insurance sector pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 — Interim report January 2007.
Tilgængelig på: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/inquiries/interim_report_24012007.pdf.
Available under: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/inquiries/interim_report_24012007.pdf
Der henvises til FSA-rapporten, hvori det angives, at forklaringer fra interviews med kunder gjorde det klart, at brugen af koncerninterne forsikringsselskaber og alternativ risikooverførsel var begrænset til store erhvervskunder. Selvforsikring var også mere almindeligt blandt store erhvervskunder, selv om ca. 33 % af virksomhederne i beløbsrammen GBP 20-100 mio. bruger selvforsikring til dækning af visse risici (Evidence from interviews with clients made clear that the use of captives and Alternative Risk Transfer products was limited to large corporate customers. Self-insurance was also more common among large corporate customers although around 33 % of firms in the £20m-£100m range use self-insurance to cover some risks), og kompetitiv disciplin inden for formidling fra alternativer til forsikring, f.eks. selvforsikring, koncerninternt forsikringsselskab og alternativ risikooverførsel, er begrænset til store selskaber (Competitive discipline on intermediation from alternatives to insurance such as self-insurance, captive insurance companies and Alternative Risk Transfer products is limited to large companies).
Reference is made to the FSA report which stated that: ‘Evidence from interviews with clients made clear that the use of captives and alternative risk transfer products was limited to large corporate customers. Self-insurance was also more common among large corporate customers although around 33 % of firms in the GBP 20 million to GBP 100 million range use self-insurance to cover some risks’, and ‘Competitive discipline on intermediation from alternatives to insurance such as self-insurance, captive insurance companies and alternative risk transfer products is limited to large companies.’ The Authority also considers it significant that the Commission’s Report on the business insurance market found that there were only approximately 5200 captive insurance companies in existence worldwide in 2005.
Tilsynsmyndigheden skønner det også signifikant, at det i Kommissionens rapport om erhvervsforsikringsmarkedet blev konstateret, at der i 2005 kun var ca. 5200 koncerninterne forsikringsselskaber på verdensplan. Dette tal, i forhold til antallet af selskaber på verdensplan, er tydeligvis meget lavt og underbygger Tilsynsmyndighedens konklusion om, at etableringen af et koncerninternt forsikringsselskab ikke er en mulighed for flertallet af virksomheder.
This figure, compared to the number of companies worldwide, is obviously very low and supports the Authority’s conclusion that the establishment of a captive insurance company is not an option for most undertakings.
Se præmis 52 i beslutningen vedrørende Ålandsøerne.
See paragraph 52 of the Åland decision.
Kommissionen estimerede, at etableringen af et koncerninternt forsikringsselskab indebar, at den koncern som forsikringskontrakterne blev indgået med, ville være stor nok til at generere en omsætning, der gør det muligt at dække de faste omkostninger samt at give overskud.
The Commission estimated that the formation of a captive company implied that the group with which insurance contracts would be concluded would be large enough to generate a turnover that would allow it to cover the fixed costs and obtain a profit.
I henhold til art. 82a, stk. 1, i skatteloven skal: »forsikringsselskaber i overensstemmelse med definitionen i loven om forsikringstilsyn, der udelukkende beskæftiger sig med koncerninterne forsikringsaktiviteter (»Eigenversicherung«), betale en kapitalskat på 1 ‰ af selskabets egenkapital, jf. art. 82a, stk. 1, i skatteloven.
Article 82a paragraph 1 of the Tax Act states as follows: ‘insurance companies in accordance with the definition of the Insurance Supervision Law, which exclusively engage in captive insurance (“Eigenversicherung”), pay a capital tax of 1 ‰ on the company’s own capital, cf. Article 82a(1) of the Tax Act.
Ved en kapital på over 50 mio. CHF reduceres satsen til ¾ ‰ og ved en kapital på over 100 mio. til ½ ‰« [5].
For capital exceeding 50 million the tax rate is reduced to ¾ ‰ and for capital in excess of 100 million to ½ ‰’ [5].
Selskab K redegjorde for selskabets historie og betonede, at det ville være skattefritaget i Schweiz og i øvrigt kun forsikrer koncerninterne risici.
Company K explained the history of the foundation of the company, which would be tax exempted in Switzerland and only insures risks within the Company K group.
Det er et nonprofitselskab, og det forsikrer også risici, som der ikke er eller ikke er fuldstændig dækning for på forsikringsmarkedet, og dets præmier beregnes på grundlag af skadeshyppighed/-forløb.
It is not profit making, it insures also risks that are not or not fully covered in the insurance market and its premiums are calculated on the basis of the claims history/experience.
Selv om de skulle levere tjenesteydelser på det »frie« marked, sikrer det liechtensteinske system, at de almindelige skattesatser gælder for disse aktiviteter på det frie marked. Efter de liechtensteinske myndigheders mening, er det kun i det omfang, at selskaberne beskæftiger sig med disse »frie« aktiviteter, at de skal klassificeres som virksomheder.
Even if they were to provide services on the ‘free’ market, the Liechtenstein system ensures that the regular tax rates apply to these free market activities. In the opinion of the Liechtenstein authorities, it is only to the extent that the companies engage in those ‘free’ activities that they should qualify as undertakings.
Den årlige nettoindkomst hos selskaber i Liechtenstein er underlagt selskabsskat (»Ertragssteuer«) [34] på mellem 7,5 % og 15 % [35]. I slutningen af selskabets regnskabsår (normalt den 31. december) betaler selskaber beliggende i Liechtenstein også kapitalskat (»Kapitalsteuer«) af indbetalt aktiekapital, andre typer aktiekapital eller startkapital samt af de af selskabets reserver, der udgør egenkapital, til en sats på 0,2 % [36]. Der opkræves desuden en kuponskat på kuponrenten på værdipapirer eller dokumenter svarende til værdipapirer udstedt af en »nationalbank« til en sats på 4 % på al udbetaling af udbytte.
The annual net income of companies in Liechtenstein is subject to business income tax (‘Ertragssteuer’) [34] at a rate between 7,5 % and 15 % [35]. At the end of the company’s financial year (generally on 31 December) companies located in Liechtenstein also pay a capital tax (‘Kapitalsteuer’) on the paid-up capital stock, joint stock, share capital, or initial capital as well as the reserves of the company constituting company equity at a rate of 0,2 % [36]. Further, a coupon tax is levied on the coupons of securities or documents equal to securities issued by a ‘national’ at a rate of 4 % on any distribution of dividends or profit shares.
Afslutningsvis har der været henvist til Kommissionens beslutning om »groepsrentebox-ordningen«, en hollandsk foranstaltning rettet mod en mindskelse af forskellen i den skattemæssige behandling mellem to finansieringsinstrumenter inden for samme koncern, gæld og egenkapital. I henhold til foranstaltningen beskattes den positive balance mellem modtagne og betalte renter på finansieringstransaktioner inden for samme koncern i en »groepsrentebox« med en sats på 5 % i stedet for 25,5 %, som er standardselskabsskattesatsen.
Under the measure, the positive balance between received and paid interests on intra-group financing transactions is taxed in an ‘interest group box’ at the rate of 5 %, instead of the 25,5 % standard corporate tax rate. The Commission considered that the advantage given to a company providing a loan to a related company cannot be considered as discriminatory, since a loan to a related company cannot be compared to a loan to an unrelated company.
Eftersom de forsikringsydelser, som de egnede virksomheder leverer, er aktiviteter, der gøres til genstand for samhandel mellem de kontraherende parter, skønnes handelen i EØS også at være påvirket [52].
It constitutes an incentive for certain groups of undertakings to establish their own insurance companies to insure risks which had otherwise been insured in the open market.Since the insurance services which the eligible companies carry out are activities which are the subject of trade between the Contracting Parties, intra-EEA trade is equally deemed to be affected [52]. In addition, trade is deemed to be affected as the measure could also benefit the groups to which the captive insurers belong, and which may be active in markets open to cross-border competition.1.4. Conclusion