natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De norske myndigheder påpeger, at de priser, som både byggekontrakterne og drifts- og vedligeholdelseskontrakterne blev overført til Mesta AS til, er de samme, som dem, der blev brugt til at vurdere indtægtsskabelsen i forbindelse med den tilbagediskonterede pengestrømsanalyse.
The Norwegian authorities point out that the prices at which both the construction contracts and the operation and maintenance contracts were transferred to Mesta AS are the same as those used for determining the generation of revenue in the context of the discounted cash flow analysis.
Derfor udgjorde kontrakterne som aktiver en del af den samlede værdi af virksomheden, som dermed udgjorde en del af indskuddet af naturalier.
Hence the contracts, as assets, formed part of the assessment of the total value of the business which in turn formed part of the contribution in kind.
Der er derfor ingen statsstøtte i den i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, anførte forstand i kontrakterne som indskud af naturalier.
There is therefore no State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA in the contracts as contribution in kind.
Derfor er det ikke nødvendigt at vurdere, hvorvidt kontrakterne blev overført til Mesta AS til markedspris.
Consequently it is not necessary to assess whether the contracts were transferred to Mesta AS at market price.
Under alle omstændigheder påpeger de norske myndigheder med hensyn til byggekontrakterne, at de fulgte de interne retningslinjer, således at de priser, som byggekontrakterne blev overført til, svarer til prisniveauet i offentlige udbud.
In any event, with respect to the construction contracts the Norwegian authorities point out that due to having followed internal guidelines, the prices at which the construction contracts were transferred correspond to the price level resulting from public tenders.
Hvad angår drifts- og vedligeholdelseskontrakterne var der den 1. januar 2003 ikke nogen markedspris eller nogen pålidelig kilde, der kunne indikere markedsprisen, eftersom alle drifts- og vedligeholdelsestjenester blev udført af produktionsafdelingen [135].
As regards operation and maintenance contracts, on 1 January 2003 there was no market price, or any reliable source indicating a market price since all operation and maintenance services were carried out by the Production Department [135].
De norske myndigheder mener, at markedet for drifts- og vedligeholdelsesarbejde ikke var åbent for konkurrence den 1. januar 2003, men først blev det den 1. september 2003 (og kun delvist) [136].
In the view of the Norwegian authorities the market for operation and maintenance works was not opened for competition on 1 January 2003 but only on 1 September 2003 (and only in part) [136].
Frem til den 1. januar 2003 havde Statens vegvesen været ansvarlig for 100 % af drifts- og vedligeholdelsesarbejdet på det offentlige vejnet.
Until 1 January 2003 the Public Road Administration had been responsible for 100 % of the operation and maintenance works in relation to the public road network.
Eftersom der ikke var noget marked for de relevante tjenester den 1. januar 2003, var der ikke et andet alternativ end at overføre overgangskontrakterne til de omkostningsbaserede priser, der tidligere var blevet fastsat i produktionsafdelingen.
Since there was therefore no market for the relevant services on 1 January 2003, there was no alternative than to transfer the transitional contracts at the cost based prices previously fixed in the Production Department.
Ingen af bemærkningerne fra tredjeparter svækker dette synspunkt.
None of the third party comments weaken this point of view.
I denne henseende har de norske myndigheder også gjort gældende, at grunden til, at der ikke var noget (modent) marked, var, at de private operatører ikke var klar til at yde de relevante tjenester til opretholdelse af trafiksikkerheden den 1. januar 2003 [137].
In this context the Norwegian authorities have also argued that the reason that there was no (mature) market was because private operators were not prepared to provide the relevant services for maintaining road safety on 1 January 2003 [137].
Det blev derfor besluttet, at det var i alles bedste interesse at åbne drifts- og vedligeholdelsesmarkedet gradvist: En gradvis åbning ville sikre en rationel tildeling af kontrakterne, fordi operatørerne ikke ville skulle udarbejde tilbud på den fulde kontraktportefølje på én og samme dag.
It was therefore considered in the best interest of all to open the operation and maintenance market gradually: A gradual opening would ensure a rational allocation of the contracts because operators would be relieved from having to prepare bids in respect of the full contract portfolio on one and the same day.
En gradvis åbning ville også være i overensstemmelse med behovet for, at operatørerne gradvist skulle styrke deres kompetencer som tjenesteudbydere i overgangsperioden og dermed modning af markedet [138].
A gradual opening would also be in line with the need for operators to gradually increase skills as service providers during the transitional period and hence a maturation of the market [138].
Endelig ville en gradvis åbning være nemmere rent administrativt og give Statens vegvesen mulighed for at udvikle sine evner som køber af de relevante tjenester [139].
Finally, a gradual opening would be administratively easier and allow the Public Road Administration to develop the skills as a purchaser of the relevant services [139].
Ifølge de norske myndigheder bekræfter forarbejderne til lovgivningen dette, idet det fremhæves, at disse faktorer var årsagen til, at markedet endnu ikke var modent til konkurrence den 1. januar 2003 [140].
According to the Norwegian authorities preparatory legislative work confirm this approach by highlighting that such elements were the reason that the market was not yet mature for competition on 1 January 2003 [140].
I tilfælde af, at Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer, at markedsoperatørerne var i stand til at yde de relevante tjenester, gør de norske myndigheder gældende, at der ikke var nogen pålidelige kilder, som kunne oplyse om priser, der var lavere end dem, der blev fastsat gennem overgangskontrakterne.
In the event that the Authority should consider that market operators were in a position to provide the relevant services the Norwegian authorities argue that there were no reliable sources referring to prices lower than those fixed in the transitional contracts.
De fem pilotkontrakter kunne ikke være blevet brugt som referencepriser, da de indgik som en del af en proces, som skulle gøre Statens vegvesen mere professionel.
The five pilot contracts could not have been used as reference prices as they formed part of a process for ‘professionalising’ the Public Road Administration.
Denne proces omfattede udarbejdelsen af en modelkontrakt om drift og vedligeholdelse, som skulle afprøves gennem nogle interne drifts- og vedligeholdelseskontrakter [141] og de fem pilotkontrakter [142], hvilket gav Statens vegvesen mulighed for at få erfaring som »ordregivende myndighed«.
This process included the preparation of a model contract on operation and maintenance which should be tested out by means of internal operation and maintenance contracts [141] and the five pilot contracts [142], thereby allowing the Public Road Administration to gain experience as a ‘contracting authority’.
Formålet med pilotkontrakterne var derfor ikke at finde en markedspris på markedet.
The purpose of the pilot contracts was therefore not to test the market for a market price.
Endvidere varierede buddene på pilotkontrakterne betydeligt (f.eks. for Våler/Åsnes-kontrakten var det højeste bud 63 mio. NOK, mens det laveste var 30,4 mio. NOK).
Moreover, the bids submitted for the pilot contracts varied considerably (for example, for the Våler/Åsnes contract the highest bid was NOK 63 million while the lowest was NOK 30,4 million).
Disse forskelle viser, at markedet var umodent, hvorfor priserne ikke kunne fungere som en pålidelig indikation for prisniveauet [143].
Such variety demonstrate that the market was immature and the prices could therefore not have constituted a reliable indication of the price level [143].
Desuden udgør pilotkontrakterne mindre end 2 % af det samlede vejnet (1000 ud af i alt 54000 km), så de dækker et lille geografisk område.
Moreover, as the pilot contracts represent less than 2 % of the total road network (1000 out of a total of 54000 kilometres) they cover a small geographic area.
Endvidere omfattede opgaverne i pilotkontrakterne ekstra arbejde [144].
Furthermore, the duties under the pilot contracts covered additional works [144].
Et illustrerende eksempel er Bærum-kontrakten, som blev vundet af Selmer ASA til en oprindelig kontraktpris på 74940323 NOK.
An illustrative example is the Bærum contract won by Selmer ASA at an original contract price of NOK 74940323.
Ekstra arbejde betød imidlertid, at der skulle lægges 18726793 NOK oveni, hvilket øgede kontraktprisen med 25 %.
However, additional works meant that NOK 18726793 had to be added, thereby increasing the contract price with 25 %.
Mængden af ekstra arbejde i pilotfasen viser, at Statens vegvesen fejlbedømte arbejdsbyrden ved drifts- og vedligeholdelseskontrakterne.
The volume of additional works in the pilot phase shows that the Public Road Administration miscalculated the work load involved in operation and maintenance contracts.
Dette ekstra arbejde blev imidlertid omfattet af de overgangskontrakter, der blev overført til Mesta AS.
However, such additional works were included in the transitional contracts transferred to Mesta AS.
I denne forbindelse henleder myndighederne opmærksomheden på, at der i rapport 118 advares mod at sammenligne erfaringerne fra Bærum-kontrakten med andre kontrakter [145].
In this regard the authorities draw the attention to the fact that Report 118 warns against comparing experiences obtained in the context of the Bærum contract with other contracts [145].
De norske myndigheder mener derfor ikke, at pilotkontraktpriserne kunne bruges som pålidelige indikatorer for markedsprisen.Bortset fra dette bestrider de norske myndigheder påstanden i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren (og som gentaget af Veidekke ASA) om, at prisniveauet i den første gruppe af kontrakter for drift og vedligeholdelse, som blev givet i offentligt udbud i 2003, kunne danne grundlag for at fastsætte et prisniveau for de resterende overgangskontrakter.
In the view of the Norwegian authorities the pilot contract prices could therefore not be used as reliable market price indicators.Aside from this the Norwegian authorities object to the suggestion in the Opening Decision (and as reiterated by Veidekke ASA) that the price level of the first group of operation and maintenance contracts subject to public tendering in 2003 could be representative for establishing a price level for the remaining transitional operation and maintenance contracts.
De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at dette prisniveau ikke er pålideligt, eftersom markedet for drifts- og vedligeholdelsestjenester ikke er modent, heller ikke i dag, i den forstand, at det er umuligt at forudse resultatet af en offentlig indkøbsprocedure.
The Norwegian authorities argue that this price level is not reliable as the market of operation and maintenance services is not mature even today in the sense that it is impossible to foresee the results of a public procurement procedure.
Dette er illustreret ved den store forskel mellem de højeste og laveste bud i kontrakterne.
The significant difference between the highest and the lowest bids in the contracts illustrate this.
Den laveste difference var 2 %, mens den højeste var 113 %.
The lowest difference was 2 % while the highest difference was 113 %.
Dette er ikke et tilstrækkeligt grundlag for at fastsætte en markedspris.
This is not a sufficient basis for identifying a market price.
De norske myndigheder sætter spørgsmålstegn ved, om der kan fastsættes en markedspris på grundlag af det laveste bud på et umodent marked.
The Norwegian authorities questions whether a market price can be established by reference to the lowest bid in an immature market.
Hvis Tilsynsmyndigheden imidlertid konkluderer, at der ikke desto mindre er tale om statsstøtte med hensyn til priserne på de kontrakter, der blev overført til Mesta AS, gør de norske myndigheder gældende, at en sådan støtte er forenelig med EØS-aftalens funktion i medfør af artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), eller 59, stk. 2.
However, should the Authority come to the conclusion that there is nonetheless State aid involved in the prices of the contracts transferred to Mesta AS, the Norwegian authorities argue that such aid is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement by reference to Articles 61(3)(c) or 59(2).
Hvad angår artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), har de norske myndigheder gjort gældende, at Mesta AS blev etableret for at åbne et monopolmarked for fuld konkurrence og skabe et bæredygtigt marked over en overgangsperiode på fire år [146].
As to Article 61(3)(c), the Norwegian authorities have argued that Mesta AS was established to open up a monopolised market to full competition and create a sustainable market over a transitional period of four years [146].
En gradvis åbning var nødvendig for at sikre, at det nationale vejnet drives og vedligeholdes på en sikker måde.
A gradual opening was necessary in order to ensure that national roads are safely operated and maintained.
Som allerede anført bekræfter forarbejderne til lovgivningen, at Statens vegvesens kompetencer skulle forbedres (begrænset erfaring med at købe tjenester og kontrollere relevante kontraktlige forpligtelser) [147].
As already stated preparatory legislative works confirm that the skills of the Public Road Administration (with limited experience as a purchaser of services and a controller of relevant contractual obligations) needed to be improved [147].
Desuden skulle markedsoperatørerne have tid til at tilpasse sig for at kunne udføre de relevante opgaver.
Also market operators needed time to adjust in order to be able to carry out the relevant tasks.
En gradvis stigning i antallet af offentlige udbud blev anset for at give virksomhederne mulighed for at erhverve kompetencer og foretage investeringer, så de kunne håndtere driften og vedligeholdelsen af vejene på en tilfredsstillende måde.
A gradual increase in public tenders was considered to allow companies to gain competence and make investments for handling road operation and maintenance in a satisfactory manner.
Som anført ovenfor sikrer en gradvis åbning af markedet en rationel tildeling af kontrakterne i forhold til, hvis kontrakterne alle blev udbudt på samme tid [148].
As stated above, the gradual opening of the market ensures a rational allocation of the contracts as opposed to if the contracts would all be tendered out at the same time [148].
Trafiksikkerheden skulle opretholdes ved at udbyde de nemmeste kontrakter først og de mere udfordrende kontrakter (omfattende veje i områder med et hårdt klima og skiftende vejrforhold) sidst.
Maintenance of road safety was to be achieved via tendering out the easiest contracts first and the most challenging contracts (involving roads in hard climate areas and changing weather conditions) last.
Endelig anfører de norske myndigheder, at det var berettiget at dække Mesta AS' omkostninger til overgangskontrakterne.
Finally, the Norwegian authorities argue that it was legitimate to provide financing to Mesta AS for the costs of the transitional contracts.
Det ville være urimeligt at påtvinge Mesta AS en forpligtelse til at yde tjenester i henhold til overgangskontrakterne uden at dække omkostningerne, da Mesta AS har højere omkostninger end sine konkurrenter [149].Den støtte, der blev ydet i forbindelse med overgangskontrakterne, var berettiget, idet den højst ville løbe over fire år, og prisen var en fast pris, hvilket giver et incitament til at styrke effektiviteten.
It would be unreasonable to impose the obligation on Mesta AS to provide services under the transitional contracts without covering the costs as Mesta AS has higher costs than its competitors [149].Any aid granted via the transitional contracts was proportional because the duration was limited to maximum four years and the price was a fixed price which gives an incentive to improve efficiency.
Dette viser, at Mesta AS' resultater blev overvåget for at sikre, at der ikke blev overkompenseret.
On this basis the authorities submit that the transitional operation and maintenance contracts were necessary ‘to achieve a sound market opening and fair competition’.
FRITAGELSE FOR STEMPELAFGIFT
EXEMPTION FROM DOCUMENT DUTY
De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at eftersom vurderingen af indskuddet af naturalier (i åbningsbalancen) var baseret på den antagelse, at Mesta AS ikke skulle betale stempelafgift, udgør fritagelsen for stempelafgift og tinglysningsgebyr ikke en økonomisk fordel for Mesta AS.
The Norwegian authorities argue that since the evaluation of the contribution in kind (in the opening balance) was based on the premise that Mesta AS would not pay this, the exemption from document duty and registration fee do not constitute an economic advantage for Mesta AS.
Fritagelsen havde derfor ikke nogen betydning for soliditeten eller kapitalstrukturen, ligesom det ikke påvirkede de samlede værdier i Mesta AS.
The exemption did therefore not have any effect on the solidity or capital structure nor did it have an impact on the total values in Mesta AS.
Hvis der ikke kunne indrømmes en fritagelse, ville betalingen af afgiften være blevet kompenseret gennem et tilsvarende kontant indskud til Mesta AS' egenkapital.
If no exemption could have been granted, payment of the duty would have been compensated by a corresponding contribution in cash forming part of Mesta AS’ equity.
Dette ville have givet samme resultat som fritagelse for stempelafgiften.
This would have lead to the same result as if an exemption would have been granted.
Myndighederne har endvidere anført, at beslutning nr. 318/05/KOL tilsyneladende var baseret på, at der ikke var nogen forbindelse mellem fritagelsen og Entras egenkapital (jf. side 26 i beslutningen) [152].
The authorities have further stated that it seems as if Decision 318/05/COL was based on the absence of a link between the exemption and the extent of equity in Entra (cf. page 26 of the Decision) [152].
De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at dette ikke er tilfældet i denne sag, eftersom der ikke var nogen tvivl om, at afgiften, hvis der ikke blev indrømmet en fritagelse, var blevet dækket af et kontant indskud af et tilsvarende beløb.
The Norwegian authorities argue that this is not the case in the present case since there was no doubt that, in the absence of an exemption, the duty would have been offset by a contribution in cash for a corresponding amount.
Ifølge forarbejderne blev egenkapitalens størrelse fastsat under hensyntagen til Mesta AS' kortsigtede likviditetssituation.
It follows from the preparatory works that the size of the equity was set with regard to Mesta AS’ short-term liquidity situation.
Bortset herfra gør de norske myndigheder gældende, at fritagelsen for stempelafgift ikke er selektiv, idet de henviser til kontinuitetsprincippet, som tager sigte på at fremme gennemførelsen af foranstaltninger, der er gunstige fra et socioøkonomisk perspektiv.
Aside from this the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption from document duty is not selective by reference to the continuity principle which intends to facilitate implementation of measures which are socio-economically desirable.
STATSSTØTTE I DEN I EØS-AFTALENS ARTIKEL 61, STK. 1, ANFØRTE FORSTAND
STATE AID WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 61(1) OF THE EEA AGREEMENT
EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, har følgende ordlyd: »Bortset fra de i denne aftale hjemlede undtagelser er støtte, som ydes af EF-medlemsstater, EFTA-stater eller ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med denne aftale i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem de kontraherende parter.«
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
For at kunne betragtes som statsstøtte efter EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1, skal en foranstaltning opfylde følgende fire kumulative betingelser: i) Foranstaltningen skal give modtagerne en økonomisk fordel, som de ikke ville have opnået under normale omstændigheder, ii) fordelen skal sikres af staten eller ved hjælp af statsmidler, iii) foranstaltningen skal begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner og iv) fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen mellem kontraherende parter.
To be termed State aid, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement a measure must meet the following four cumulative criteria: The measure must (i) confer on recipients an economic advantage which is not received in the normal course of business; (ii) the advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources and must (iii) be selective by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods; and (iv) distort competition and affect trade between Contracting Parties.
I det følgende tages der stilling til, om de fire kumulative betingelser er opfyldt i denne sag.
In the following it is examined whether these four cumulative criteria are met in the present case.
Omstrukturerings- og omlægningsforanstaltninger
Restructuring and reorganisation measures
Mesta AS har modtaget støtte fra staten til finansiering af omkostningerne ved tre former for pensionsordninger, som blev tilbudt de medarbejdere, der blev overflyttet fra deres stillinger i staten til Mesta AS.
Mesta AS has received funding from the State for purposes of the costs related to three types of pension packages offered to employees transferred from their previous state employment to Mesta AS.
Støtten skulle finansiere i) omkostninger ved opretholdelsen af tjenestemandspensionerne (ud over den sædvanlige pensionsordning) mellem den 1. januar 2003 og udgangen af 2007, ii) omkostninger ved opretholdelsen af de ansattes ret til en særlig (tidlig) pensionsalder og iii) omkostninger ved tilbud om førtidspensionering i perioden mellem den 1. januar 2003 og udgangen af 2005.
The funds cover (i) costs of paying pension contributions corresponding to that of a civil servant between 1 January 2003 and the end of 2007; (ii) costs involved in maintaining employees’ entitlement to a special (early) retirement age; and (iii) costs relating to early pension packages offered between 1 January 2003 and the end of 2005.
Først vil Tilsynsmyndigheden kommentere på visse specifikke argumenter fra de norske myndigheder.
As a preliminary point, the Authority will comment on certain specific arguments put forward by the Norwegian authorities.
For det første har de norske myndigheder gjort gældende, at eftersom en potentiel køber af produktionsafdelingen ville have krævet et nedslag i købsprisen svarende til ulemperne ved omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne, udgør den kompensation, som myndighederne har ydet for disse ulemper, ikke statsstøtte.
First, the Norwegian authorities have argued that since a potential buyer of the Production Department would have demanded a reduction in the purchase price proportionate to the disadvantages of the restructuring measures, the compensation by the authorities of such disadvantages does not qualify as State aid.