natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Artikel 10-2 til 10-4 i skatteloven.
Articles 10-2 to 10-4 of the Tax Act.
Ifølge skattelovens artikel 10-1 gælder bestemmelserne for koncernbidrag for "aksjeselskap, allmennaksjeselskap samt likestilt selskap og sammenslutning".
According to Article 10-1 in the Tax Act, the rules governing group contributions are applicable for “aksjeselskap, allmennaksjeselskap samt likestilt selskap og sammenslutning”.
Jf. lov af 13. juni 1997 nr. 44, artikel 1-3 og 1-4.
As provided by Act of 13.6.1997 no 44, Articles 1-3 and 1-4.
Artikel 10-4, stk. 1, i skatteloven.
Article 10-4(1) of the Tax Act.
Den faktiske betaling behøver ikke nødvendigvis ske i samme år som indkomsten, forudsat at den sker i form af en reel overførsel af midler på et senere tidspunkt.
The actual payment does not necessarily need to take place in the same year as the income is made, provided that it will be effected by a real transfer of wealth at a later date.
Følgelig er det nok, at den bidragydende virksomhed indgår en ubetinget forpligtelse til at betale bidraget.
Accordingly, it is sufficient that the granting company undertakes an unconditional obligation to make the contribution.
Artikel 10-2, stk. 1, i skatteloven.
Article 10-2(1) of the Tax Act.
Artikel 10-3, stk. 1, i skatteloven.
Article 10-3(1) of the Tax Act.
De norske myndigheder har forklaret, at et moderselskab kan yde et bidrag til et datterselskab, i samme år som samme datterselskab yder et koncernbidrag til moderselskabet.
The Norwegian authorities have explained that a parent company may grant a contribution to a subsidiary in the same year as the same subsidiary grants a group contribution to the parent.
Dette ville være tilfældet, hvis et moderselskab har haft et skattetab af mindst samme størrelse som datterselskabets skattepligtige overskud.
This would be the case if a parent company has incurred a tax loss of at least the same proportions as the taxable profits of its subsidiary.
Datterselskabet kan yde et bidrag til moderselskabet og kræve fradrag herfor.
The subsidiary could grant a contribution to its parent company and claim a deduction for this.
Moderselskabet kan anvende bidraget til at dække sit eget skattetab.
The parent company could set off the contribution received against its own tax loss.
Samtidig kan moderselskabet give datterselskabet sit eget, uafhængige koncernbidrag.
Simultaneously, the parent company could grant its own separate group contribution to the subsidiary.
Dette koncernbidrag er ikke skattepligtigt for det modtagende datterselskab, da moderselskabet på grund af sine egne skattetab ikke ville kunne fratrække det.
The latter group contribution would not be taxable for the receiving subsidiary as the parent company due to its own tax losses would not be in a position to deduct it.
De to koncernbidrag ville betyde, at datterselskabet kunne fjerne sit beskatningsgrundlag uden at røre sin nettoformue.
In effect, the two group contributions would imply that the subsidiary could eliminate its tax base without eroding its net equity.
De norske myndigheder har bekræftet, at der ikke blev foretaget cirkulære bidrag, som omfattede AS Sporveisbussene, i 2000-2004.
The Norwegian authorities have confirmed that no circular contributions involving AS Sporveisbussene were carried out in 2000–2004.
"Standard cost calculation for the scheduled bus operations of AS Sporveisbussene", rapport af Asplan Viak AS dateret 25. maj 2012, vedlagt som bilag 13 til brev fra de norske myndigheder af 4. juni 2012 (registreringsnr. 636738).
“Standard cost calculation for the scheduled bus operations of AS Sporveisbussene”, report by Asplan Viak AS dated 25.5.2012, enclosed as Annex 13 to the letter from the Norwegian authorities of 4.6.2012 (Event No 636738).
Det skal påpeges, at de norske myndigheder trods konklusionerne i Asplan Viak-rapporten i deres egne bemærkninger til beslutningen om at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure ikke anfører, at den kompensation, der er ydet til AS Sporveisbussene, opfylder Altmark-kriterierne, jf. nedenstående vurdering.
It must be pointed out that despite the findings in the Asplan Viak Report, the Norwegian authorities, in their comments to the opening decision, do not argue that the compensation granted to AS Sporveisbussene meets the Altmark criteria, see the assessment below.
Sag SA.21654 (ex NN-69/2007 og C-6/2008) Ålands Industrihus Ab, EUT L 125 af 12.5.2012, s. 33.
Case SA.21654 (ex NN-69/2007 and C-6/2008) Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus, OJ L 125 12.5.2012 p. 33.
Beslutningen er appelleret til Retten (jf. sag T-212/12).
The Decision has been challenged before the General Court (see Case T-212/12).
Det fremgik af de oplysninger, som Tilsynsmyndigheden havde adgang til, da beslutningen om at indlede proceduren blev truffet, at Oslo kommune først blev eneejer af AS Oslo Sporveier i juli 2006 (jf. beslutning om at indlede proceduren, fodnote 27).
The information available to the Authority at the time of the opening decision indicated that Oslo Municipality did not become the sole owner of AS Oslo Sporveier until July 2006 (see the opening decision at footnote 27).
De norske myndigheder præciserede i deres bemærkninger til denne beslutning, at Oslo kommune rent faktisk købte mindretalsaktionærernes aktier i 2002.
In their observations to the opening decision, the Norwegian authorities clarified that Oslo Municipality actually bought the holdings of the minority share holders in 2002.
Jf. beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, pkt. 103-108, særlig pkt. 105.
See the opening decision at paragraphs 103–108, in particular paragraph 105.
Sag C-280/00, Altmark [2003], Sml. I-7747.
Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747.
Jf. bl.a. sag C-409/00, Spanien mod Kommissionen [2003], Sml. I-1487, præmis 47; sag C-88/03, Portugal mod Kommissionen [2006], Sml. I-7115, præmis 54.
See among others Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, paragraph 47; Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-7115, paragraph 54.
EUT L 379 af 28.12.2006, s. 5, indarbejdet i EØS-aftalen i pkt. 1ea i bilag XV.
OJ L 379 28.12.2006 p. 5, incorporated in the EEA agreement at point 1ea of Annex XV.
Se Kommissionens beslutning af 21. september 2005 om den italienske selvstyrende provins Bolzanos anvendelse af støtteordning N 192/1997 (EUT L 383 af 28.12.2006, s. 1, pkt. 129-133), Kommissionens afgørelse af 27. juli 2011 om Belgiens statsstøtte til finansiering af screening for overførbare spongiforme encephalopatier (TSE) hos kvæg (EUT L 274 af 19.10.2011 s. 36), del 6, artikel 1, stk. 133.
See Commission Decision of 21.9.2005 on the implementation of an aid scheme N 192/1997 by Italy – Autonomous Province of Bolzano (OJ L 383 28.12.2006 p. 1, paragraphs 129-133); Commission Decision of 27.7.2011 concerning the State aid for financing screening of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies TSE in bovine animal implemented by Belgium (OJ L 274 19.10.2011 p. 36), part 6, Article 1, paragraph 133.
I denne forbindelse skal det påpeges, at den generelt gældende de minimis-forordning på tidspunktet for kapitalindsprøjtningen var Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001 af 12. januar 2001 om anvendelse af traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på de minimis-støtte.
In this regard, it has to be pointed out that the general de minimis Regulation in force at the time this capital injection took place was Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12.1.2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid.
Denne forordning gjaldt imidlertid ikke for transportsektoren.
This Regulation however did not apply to the transport sector.
Som det hedder i artikel 5, stk. 1, i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006: "[…] denne forordning finder anvendelse på støtte, der inden dens ikrafttræden er ydet til virksomheder i transportsektoren […]".
As stated in Article 5, paragraph 1, of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 “[…] this Regulation shall apply to aid granted before its entry into force to undertakings active in the transport sector […]”.
Sag C-39/94, SFEI mod La Poste [1996], Sml. I-3547, præmis 60.
Case C-39/94 SFEI v La Poste [1996] ECR I-3547, at paragraph 60.
Dette princip forklares i Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer, del VI "Rules on public service compensation, state ownership of enterprises and aid to public enterprises – Application of state aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector".
This principle is explained in the Authority’s guidelines Part VI Rules on public service compensation, state ownership of enterprises and aid to public enterprises, application of state aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector.
Jf. f.eks. general Jacobs forslag til afgørelse, forenede sager C-278/92, C-279/92 og C-280/92 Spanien mod Kommissionen [1994], Sml. I-4103, præmis 28.
Cf. for example Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Joined Cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103, at paragraph 28.
Se også sag 40/85 Belgien mod Kommissionen (Boch) [1986], Sml. 2321, præmis 13, sag C-301/87 Frankrig mod Kommissionen (Boussac) [1990], Sml. I-307, præmis 39-40, sag C-303/88 Italien mod Kommissionen (Lanerossi) [1991], Sml. I-1433, præmis 24.
See also Case 40/85 Belgium v Commission (Boch) [1986] ECR 2321, at paragraph 13; Case C-301/87 France v Commission (Boussac) [1990] ECR I-307, at paragraphs 39–40; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission (Lanerossi) [1991] ECR I-1433, at paragraph 24.
Se også Tilsynsmyndighedens "Guidelines on the application of state aid rules on public service broadcasting", hvor det i pkt. 93 hedder, at: "Når public service selskaber udøver kommercielle aktiviteter, er de forpligtede til at overholde markedsprincipperne, og når de optræder gennem kommercielle datterselskaber, er de forpligtede til at operere uafhængigt i forhold til disse datterselskaber (arm's length-princippet). EFTA-staterne skal sikre, at public service radio- og tv-selskaber overholder arm's length-princippet, foretager deres kommercielle investeringer i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip og afholder sig fra enhver konkurrenceskadelig praksis over for deres konkurrenter på grundlag af deres offentlige støtte".
See also the Authority’s Guidelines on the application of state aid rules on public service broadcasting, where at point 93 it is stated that: “(w)hen carrying out commercial activities, public service broadcasters shall be bound to respect market principles and, when they act through commercial subsidiaries, they shall keep arm’s length relations with these subsidiaries. EFTA States shall ensure that public service broadcasters respect the arm’s length principle, undertake their commercial investments in line with the market economy investor principle, and do not engage in anti-competitive practices with regard to their competitors, based on their public funding”.
Pkt. 105-108.
Paragraphs 105–108.
Artikel 2 i Kommissionens direktiv 2006/111/EF om gennemskueligheden af de økonomiske forbindelser mellem medlemsstaterne og de offentlige virksomheder (EUT L 318 af 17.11.2006, s. 17), indsat i pkt. 1a i bilag XV til EØS-aftalen.
Article 2 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings (OJ L 318 17.11.2006 p. 17), incorporated at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.
Hvad navnlig angår kvalitetsbonussen fra AS Oslo Sporveier til AS Sporveisbussene på 3,9 mio. NOK, har Tilsynsmyndigheden forstået, at midlerne stammer fra statslige ressourcer, eller at betalingen kan tilregnes staten.
As regards, in particular, the quality bonus from AS Oslo Sporveier to AS Sporveisbussene of NOK 3,9 million, the Authority understands that the funds stem from state resources, or that the payment is imputable to the State.
Eftersom Oslo kommune er involveret i alle spørgsmål af kommerciel betydning vedrørende levering af rutebustransport i Oslo-området, og eftersom AS Oslo Sporveier er et offentligt ejet selskab, konkluderer Tilsynsmyndigheden, at transaktionen kan tilregnes staten, og at den derfor udgør statslige midler i henhold til betydningen i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.
As Oslo Municipality is involved in all issues of commercial importance relating to the provision of scheduled bus transport in the Oslo region, and AS Oslo Sporveier is a publicly-owned company, the Authority concludes that the transaction must be held to be imputable to the State and thus represent state resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
Sag C-35/96, Kommissionen mod Italien [1998], Sml. I-3851, præmis 36.
Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECR I-3851 at paragraph 36.
Se også sag T-289/03, BUPA [2008], Sml. II-81.
See also Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81.
Sag C-280/00, Altmark [2003], Sml. I-7747, præmis 89-93.
Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 89–93.
Sag C-280/00, Altmark [2003], Sml. I-7747, præmis 94-95.
Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paragraphs 94–95.
Sag C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline og Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001], Sml. I-8365, præmis 41.
Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke ECR [2001] I-8365, paragraph 41.
Samlede sager E-5/04, E-6/04 og E-7/04, Fesil og Finnfjord m.fl. mod EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden [2005], EFTA Court Report 117, præmis 93.
Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04 and E-7/04, Fesil and Finnfjord and Others v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Court Report 117 at paragraph 93.
Domstolen bemærkede desuden i Altmark-dommen, at adskillige EU-medlemsstater siden 1995 frivilligt har åbnet visse transportmarkeder i byer, byområder og regioner for konkurrence fra virksomheder, der er hjemmehørende i andre EU-medlemsstater.
Moreover, the Court of Justice observed in the Altmark judgment that since 1995 several EU Member States had voluntarily opened up certain urban, suburban or regional transport markets to competition from undertakings established in other EU Member States.
Risikoen for samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne var derfor ikke hypotetisk, men reel, idet markedet var åbent for konkurrence (præmis 69 og 79).
The risk to inter-Member State trade was thus not hypothetical but real, as the market was open to competition (paragraphs 69 and 79).
Præmis 77 og 82 i Altmark-dommen.
Paragraphs 77 and 82 of the Altmark judgment.
Se også sag 102/87, Frankrig mod Kommissionen [1988], Sml. 4067, præmis 19, og sag C-305/89, Italien mod Kommissionen [1991], Sml. I-1603, præmis 26.
See also Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR 4067, paragraph 19; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 26.
Præmis 50 og 53.
Paragraphs 50 and 53.
Jf. artikel 1.1 i del I af protokol 3.
Cf. Article 1.1 of Part I of Protocol 3.
Betegnelserne "støtteordninger" og "støttesystemer" skal efter Tilsynsmyndighedens mening behandles som synonymer.
The terms “aid schemes” and “systems of aid” are to be treated as synonyms in the Authority’s view.
Jf. Sinnaeve/Slot, The new Regulation on State aid Procedures, Common Market Law Review 36/1999, s. 1153, fodnote 28.
Cf. Sinnaeve/Slot, The new Regulation on State aid Procedures, Common Market Law Review 36/1999, p. 1153, footnote 28.
Rådets forordning 659/1999 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 93 (EFT L 83 af 27.3.1999, s. 1).
Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 83 27.3.1999 p. 1).
Se Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 405/08/KOL HFF (EUT L 79 af 25.3.2010, s. 40, og EØS-tillæg nr. 14 af 25.3.2010, s. 20), kapitel II.2.3.1, s. 23: "The State guarantee on all State institutions for all their obligations follows from general unwritten rules of Icelandic public law predating the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. The guarantee is applicable to all State institutions, regardless of when they are established, or of their activities, or changes in those activities. This possible aid measure must be regarded as a scheme falling within the definition in Article 1 (d) in part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement."
See the Authority’s Decision No 405/08/COL HFF (OJ L 79 25.3.2010 p. 40 and the EEA Supplement No. 14, 25.3.2010, p. 20), Chapter II.2.3.1, p. 23: “The State guarantee on all State institutions for all their obligations follows from general unwritten rules of Icelandic public law predating the entry into force of the EEA Agreement. The guarantee is applicable to all State institutions, regardless of when they are established, or of their activities, or changes in those activities. This possible aid measure must be regarded as a scheme falling within the definition in Article 1 (d) in part II of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.”
Se Kommissionens afgørelse i sag E-45/2000 (Nederlandene), Skattefritagelse for Schiphol-gruppen (EUT C 37 af 11.2.2004, s. 13).
See Commission Decision in Case E-45/2000 (Netherlands) Fiscal exemption in favour of Schiphol Group (OJ C 37 11.2.2004 p. 13).
Fra Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 491/09/KOL Norsk Film-koncernen (EUT C 174 af 1.7.2010, s. 3), kapitel II.2, s. 8: "de årlige udbetalinger fra den norske stat siden 1970'erne til Norsk FilmStudio AS/Filmparken AS med henblik på produktion af spillefilm og opretholdelse af den nødvendige infrastruktur for produktion af film var baseret på en eksisterende støtteordning". Tilsynsmyndigheder mener, at i dette tilfælde, hvor der blev foretaget regelmæssige betalinger gennem en meget lang periode, viser praksis, at støtten var et væsentligt element i finansieringen af virksomheden. På dette grundlag mener tilsynsmyndigheden, at de årlige tilskud blev givet under et eksisterende system for statsstøtte i henhold til betydningen i EØS-aftalens artikel 62. I denne sag indledte Tilsynsmyndigheden en formel undersøgelse af betalingen på 36 mio. NOK, der var sket ud over de ordinære betalinger, samt en påstået foranstaltning vedrørende skattebegunstigelse.
From the Authority’s Decision No 491/09/COL Norsk Film group (OJ C 174 1.7.2010 p. 3), Chapter II.2 p. 8: “the yearly payments made by the Norwegian State since the 1970s to Norsk FilmStudio AS/Filmparken AS for the production of feature films and to maintain an infrastructure necessary for the production of films were based on an existing system of aid. The Authority considers that in this case, where regular payments were consistently made over a very long period of time, the practice shows that state support was an essential element in the financing of the company. The Authority considers on that basis that the annual grants were made under an existing system of state aid within the meaning of Article 62 EEA.” In that case, the Authority opened the formal investigation into a payment of NOK 36 million that had been made in addition to the regular payments and an alleged preferential tax measure.
Med afgørelse nr. 204/11/KOL (EUT L 287 af 18.10.2012, s. 14 og EØS-tillæg nr. 58 af 18.10.2012, s. 1) afsluttede Tilsynsmyndigheden proceduren med den konklusion, at betalingen på 36 mio. NOK var sket på grundlag af den eksisterende støtteordning, og at skatteforanstaltningen ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
With Decision No 204/11/COL ( OJ L 287 18.10.2012 p. 14 and the EEA Supplement No. 58, 18.10.2012, p. 1) the Authority closed the procedure on the basis that the NOK 36 million payment was made on the basis of the existing aid scheme and that the tax measure did not constitute state aid.
Se Kommissions afgørelse i sag E-10/2000 (Tyskland), Statsgarantier til offentlige banker i Tyskland (EFT C 150 af 22.6. 2002, s. 6).
See Commission Decision in Case E-10/2000 (Germany) State guarantees for public banks in Germany (OJ C 150 22.6. 2002 p. 6).
Artikel 1, litra d), i del II i protokol 3.
Article 1(d) of Part II of Protocol 3.
Se Kommissionens afgørelse i sag E 4/2007 (Frankrig), Charges aéroportuaires, pkt. 56 (EUT C 83 af 7.4.2009, s. 16).
See Commission Decision in Case E 4/2007 (France) Charges aéroportuaires, paragraph 56 (OJ C 83 7.4.2009 p. 16).
Se også EFTA-Domstolens dom i sag E-14/10 Konkurrenten, præmis 74-75, hvor EFTA-Domstolen udtaler følgende:"In the case at hand, the City of Oslo was entitled, under the provisions of the 1976 Transport Act and the implementing regulations, to provide financial support in order to enable the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services. The fact that the level of the compensation was "negotiated" does not, as such, entail that the payments did not cover actual losses incurred in the operation of those services and were per se not covered by the scheme. The Court considers that in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid.The argument that the aid must be considered as new aid because it was granted on an annual and discretionary basis under the city budget must (…) be rejected."
See to that effect, the judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten, at paragraphs 74-75, where the EFTA Court states as follows:“In the case at hand, the City of Oslo was entitled, under the provisions of the 1976 Transport Act and the implementing regulations, to provide financial support in order to enable the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services. The fact that the level of the compensation was “negotiated” does not, as such, entail that the payments did not cover actual losses incurred in the operation of those services and were per se not covered by the scheme. The Court considers that in so far as the compensation payments were indeed used to finance the operation of non-profitable scheduled bus services, the defendant may correctly have classified those payments as existing aid. The argument that the aid must be considered as new aid because it was granted on an annual and discretionary basis under the city budget must (…) be rejected.”
Jf. sag SA.21654 (ex NN-69/2007 og C-6/2008), Ejendomsselskabet Åland Industrihus (EUT L 125 af 12.5.2012 s. 33), navnlig pkt. 107-109.
Cf. Case SA.21654 (ex NN-69/2007 and C-6/2008) Public Commercial Property Åland Industrihus (OJ L 125 12.5.2012 p. 33) paragraphs 107–109 in particular.
Sag C-44/93, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit [1994], Sml. I-3829, præmis 28.
Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit [1994] ECR I-3829, paragraph 28.
Generaladvokat Trabucchis forslag til afgørelse i sag 51/74, Van der Hulst [1975], Sml. 79.
Opinion of Advocate- General Trabucchi in Case 51/74 Van der Hulst [1975] ECR 79.
Se artikel 4, stk. 1, i den konsoliderede udgave af Tilsynsmyndighedens afgørelse nr. 195/04/KOL af 14. juli 2004 om de i artikel 27 i del II af protokol 3 omtalte gennemførelsesbestemmelser (findes på: ).
See Article 4(1) of the consolidated version of the Authority’s Decision No 195/04/COL of 14.7. 2004 on the implementing provisions referred to under Article 27 of Part II of Protocol 3 (available at: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/decisions/195-04-COL.pdf).
Se også generaladvokat Lenz' forslag til afgørelse i Namur.
See also the opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Namur.
Statsstøtte NN 73/2008 (ex N 240/08) – Hungary – Sharing of loans between MÁV Zrt. and MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt.
State aid NN 73/2008 (ex N 240/08) – Hungary – Sharing of loans between MÁV Zrt. and MÁV-TRAKCIÓ Zrt.
(EUT C 109 af 13.5.2009, s. 5), præmis 59-60.
(OJ C 109 13.5.2009 p. 5) at paragraphs 59-60.
Sag E 14/2005 (Portugal), Kompensationsbetalinger til det offentlige radio- og tv-selskab RTP, præmis 79 (uofficiel oversættelse).
Case E 14/2005 (Portugal) Compensation payments to public service broadcaster RTP, at paragraph 79 (unofficial translation).
Præmis 73, 74 og 76.
Paragraphs 73, 74 and 76.
Den samme logik gælder for ordninger, der er godkendt af Tilsynsmyndigheden eller Europa-Kommissionen.
The same logic applies for schemes that have been approved by the Authority or the European Commission.
Se f.eks. sag C-47/91, Italien mod Kommissionen [1994], Sml. 4635, præmis 25-26.
See for example Case C-47/91 Italy v Commission [1994] ECR-4635, paragraphs 25–26.
Præmis 87 i EFTA-Domstolens dom i sag E-14/10, Konkurrenten.
Paragraph 87 of the judgment of the EFTA Court in Case E-14/10 Konkurrenten.