natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Tilskyndelsesvirkningen er en grundlæggende betingelse for, at støtte kan betragtes som forenelig med det indre marked i henhold til retningslinjerne for regionalstøtte.
The incentive effect is a fundamental prerequisite for aid to be regarded compatible under the Regional Aid Guidelines.
Retningslinjerne for regionalstøtte definerer begrebet "påbegyndelsen af arbejdet" som "påbegyndelsen af bygge- og anlægsarbejdet eller det første bindende tilsagn om bestilling af udstyr med undtagelse af forundersøgelser" [105]. Det er en kendsgerning, at arbejdet i den foreliggende sag allerede var påbegyndt i 2008.
The Regional Aid Guidelines define the term “start of work” as “start of construction work or first firm commitment to order equipment, excluding preliminary feasibility studies.” [105] It is an established fact that the work had already started in 2008 in the case at hand.
På det tidspunkt var der ifølge de tilgængelige oplysninger ikke indgået nogen aftaler med myndighederne om fritagelser for kommunal skat.
By that time, no agreement with the authorities as regards municipal tax derogations had been initiated, according to the information available.
Det skyldes, at aftalen med kommunen blev indgået på et endnu senere tidspunkt end investeringsaftalen (som blev indgået i oktober 2009).
This is so, since the agreement with the Municipality was entered into even at a later point in time than the Investment Agreement (entered into in October 2009).
Selv så tidligt som i maj 2009, hvor de islandske myndigheder har hævdet, at kommunen og Verne oprindeligt forhandlede skattefritagelserne på plads, ville kravet om tilskyndelsesvirkning ikke være opfyldt.
Even at a date as early as May 2009, when the Icelandic authorities have claimed that the Municipality and Verne initially negotiated the tax derogations, the requirement of incentive effect would not be met.
Støtten blev ydet i februar 2008.
The aid was granted in February 2008.
Støtten kan ikke betragtes som regional investeringsstøtte, eftersom støtten, da aftalen om køb af fast ejendom blev indgået den 26. februar 2008, og skødet blev undertegnet den 9. maj 2008, ikke var betinget af et tilsagn om at investere i regionen.
The aid cannot be regarded as regional investment aid since when entering into the Real Estate Purchase Agreement on 26 February 2008 and signing of the transfer of title on 9 May 2008 there was no link made between the aid granted and a defined commitment to invest in the area.
Bygningen, som omfatter 4800 m2 tekniklokaler, skulle efter planen være klar til brug i 2011.
The building, with 4800 m2 of technical space, was expected to be ready for use in 2011.
Den skulle bruge 20 MW kraft.
It was to use 20 MW of utility power.
I den anden fase skulle den første bygning belægges fuldt ud inden udgangen af 2012.
The second phase was to encompass bringing the first building to full occupancy by the end of 2012.
Det ville kræve yderligere kapital på […] ifølge de oplysninger, som de islandske myndigheder indsendte.
This would require an additional […] of capital, according to information submitted by the Icelandic authorities.
Jf. lov nr. 176/2006.
Pursuant to Act 176/2006.
Der blev den 8.12.2006 underskrevet en serviceaftale mellem det islandske finansministerium og KADECO om udvikling, forvaltning og afhændelse af fast ejendom på grunden.
A service agreement dated 8.12.2006 was signed between the Icelandic Treasury and KADECO on the development, administration and disposal of the real estate within the area.
Aftalen om køb af fast ejendom og aftalen om leje af jord blev underskrevet af Kjartan Eiríksson på vegne af finansministeriet "ved fuldmagt dateret 8.5.2007", og den supplerende lejeaftale blev underskrevet "på vegne af finansministeriet i overensstemmelse med lov nr. 176/2006 om foranstaltninger efter aftalen med USA om returnering af forsvarsområdet ved Keflavík Airport ved fuldmagt registreret den 8.5.2007".
The Real Estate Purchase Agreement and the Ground Lease Agreement are signed by Mr Kjartan Eiríksson, on behalf of the Treasury, “according to proxy dated 8.5.2007”, and the Supplementary Lease Agreement “[o]n behalf of the State Treasury, in accordance with law no. 176/2006 on provisions following the agreement with the U.S.A. regarding returning the defence area at Keflavík Airport, Kjartan Eiríksson with a registered proxy dated 8.5.2007”.
Eiríksson er KADECO's administrerende direktør.
Mr Eiríksson is the CEO of KADECO,
De seneste oplysninger fra det islandske ejendomsregisters hjemmeside vedrører de transaktioner, der blev registreret i maj 2012.
The latest information available at the website of Registers Iceland are on the transactions registered in May 2012.
De viser, at salgspriserne i forbindelse med registrerede transaktioner konsekvent og generelt overstiger den officielle vurdering, også når det gælder kommercielle bygninger uden for hovedstadsområdet.
They demonstrate that the sales prices in registered transactions are consistently and in general above the official valuation, also for commercial buildings outside the capital area.
I 2006 forlod den amerikanske flåde Island og overlod området med anlæg til den islandske stat. I lov nr. 176/2006, som blev vedtaget af det islandske parlament i december 2006, blev området reguleret, og afgrænsningen af lufthavnsområdet blev defineret (Zone A) [19], der blev defineret et sikkerhedsområde til forsvarsformål (Zone B), og endelig blev der defineret et område til civile formål (Zone C).
In 2006, the US Navy left Iceland and handed the area with its constructions over to the IcelandicState. By way of Act 176/2006 adopted by the Icelandic Parliament in December 2006 the area was regulated and the boundaries of the airport area was defined (Zone A) [19]; a security area, intended for defence purposes was defined (Zone B); and, lastly, an area intended for civilian use was defined (Zone C).
Årsagen til revisionen var påstande i den offentlige debat om, at statens interesser ikke var blevet beskyttet, da aktiver i det tidligere forsvarsområde ved Keflavík Airport blev solgt.
The reason for the examination was assertions in the public debate to the effect that the full interests of the State had not been protected when assets in the former defence area at KeflavíkAirportwere sold. The buildings purchased by Verne are located in the area.
Sag N-357/2008, Fri-El Acerra S.r.l., (Italien), [2009], EUT C 95, s. 20, præmis 40.
Case N-357/2008 Fri-El Acerra S.r.l. (Italy) [2009] OJ C 95, p. 20, paragraph 40.
Se forenede sager E-17/10 og E-6/11, Liechtenstein m.fl. mod EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden, præmis 141 og 142, endnu ikke offentliggjort i EFTA Court Report.
See Joined Cases E-17/10 and E-6/11, Liechtenstein a.o. v EFTA Surveillance Authority, parargraphs 141 and 142, not yet reported in EFTA Ct. Rep.
nr. 290/12/KOL
No 290/12/COL
om omstruktureringsstøtte til Landsbankinn (Island)
on restructuring aid granted to Landsbankinn (Iceland)
EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden (i det følgende benævnt »Tilsynsmyndigheden«) har —
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’)
UNDER HENVISNING til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (i det følgende benævnt »EØS-aftalen«), særlig artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), og protokol 26 hertil,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61(3)(b) and Protocol 26 thereof,
UNDER HENVISNING til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol (i det følgende benævnt »tilsyns- og domstolsaftale«), særlig artikel 24,
HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’ or ‘SCA’), in particular to Article 24,
UNDER HENVISNING til protokol 3 til aftalen om Tilsynsmyndigheden og Domstolen (i det følgende benævnt »protokol 3«), navnlig artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I, artikel 7, stk. 3, i del II og artikel 13 i del II, og
HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I, Article 7(3) of Part II, and Article 13 of Part II,
Derefter var der regelmæssigt yderligere kontakt og brevveksling, bl.a. med brev fra Tilsynsmyndigheden af 18. juni 2009 med en påmindelse til de islandske myndigheder om, at det var nødvendigt at anmelde eventuelle statsstøtteforanstaltninger, og om spærreklausulen i artikel 3 i protokol 3.
Following informal correspondence in October 2008, and the passing of Act No 125/2008 on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (referred to as the ‘Emergency Act’), which gave the Icelandic state wide-ranging powers to intervene in the banking sector, on 6 October by the Icelandic Parliament (the Althingi), the President of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘Authority’) wrote on 10 October 2008 to the Icelandic authorities and requested that state aid measures taken under the Emergency Act be notified to the Authority.
Den 15. september 2010 anmeldte de islandske myndigheder endelig med tilbagevirkende kraft statsstøtte ydet i forbindelse med visse af Landsbankis aktiviteter og genoprettelsen og kapitaliseringen af en ny Landsbanki Bank (»NBI«, senere omdøbt til Landsbankinn) [2].
Further contact and correspondence followed periodically including notably a letter sent by the Authority on 18 June 2009 reminding the Icelandic authorities of the need to notify any state aid measures, and of the standstill clause in Article 3 of Protocol 3.
Ved brev af 15. december 2010 [3] meddelte Tilsynsmyndigheden de islandske myndigheder, at den havde besluttet at indlede proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3, for så vidt angår den islandske stats foranstaltninger til genoprettelse af visse af (gamle) Landsbanki Islands hf's aktiviteter og oprettelse og kapitalisering af New Landsbanki Islands (NBI hf) (beslutningen om at indlede proceduren).
State aid involved in the restoration of certain operations of Landsbanki and the establishment and capitalisation of a new Landsbanki Bank (‘NBI’, later renamed Landsbankinn) was eventually notified retrospectively by the Icelandic authorities on 15 September 2010.
Tilsynsmyndigheden anmodede også om at få tilsendt en detaljeret omstruktureringsplan for Landsbankinn senest 31. marts 2011.
[2]
Ved brev af 31. marts 2011 fremsendte de islandske myndigheder en omstruktureringsplan for Landsbankinn.
By letter dated 15 December 2010 [3] the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 in respect of the measures undertaken by the Icelandic State to restore certain operations of (old) Landsbanki Islands hf and establish and capitalise New Landsbanki Islands (NBI hf) (the opening decision).
Tilsynsmyndigheden anmodede om oplysninger om omstruktureringsplanen den 11. juli 2011 og 13. februar 2012.
By e-mail of 24 March 2011, the Authority received one comment from interested parties, which was forwarded to the Icelandic authorities on 25 May 2011.
Den 20. juni 2012 godkendte Tilsynsmyndigheden med beslutning nr. 212/12/KOL (»SpSv-beslutning«), at den støtte, der var ydet til Landsbankinn, potentielt kunne anvendes til at erhverve SpSv.
The Icelandic authorities did not respond to this comment.
Den 21. juni 2011 godkendte Tilsynsmyndigheden med beslutning nr. 253/10/KOL midlertidigt en redningsstøtteordning, som omfattede betaling af fordringer, der ejedes af Islands Centralbank (»CBI«), på sparekasser, herunder SpSv.
By letter of 31 March 2011, the Icelandic authorities submitted a restructuring plan for Landsbankinn.
Derudover mødtes Tilsynsmyndigheden med de islandske myndigheder den 7. juni 2011 og den : 27. og 28. februar 2012.
The Authority requested information with regards to the restructuring plan on 11 July 2011 and 13 February 2012.
SAGSFORLØB
The request for information was answered by the Icelandic authorities on 17 October 2011 and 13 March 2012.
Tilsynsmyndigheden vil i dette afsnit beskrive de begivenheder, fakta og økonomiske, politiske og lovgivningsmæssige udviklinger i forbindelse med sammenbruddet og omstruktureringen af det islandske finanssystem fra 2008 til dato, som er nødvendige for at bestemme baggrunden for vurderingen af støtteforanstaltningerne.
The final versions of the commitments were submitted on 6 June 2012 and 13 June 2012.
Inden da gives en gennemgang af kronologien bag Landsbankis sammenbrud.
On 20 June 2012, the Authority approved the potential use of state aid granted to Landsbankinn for the acquisition of SpSv in Decision No 212/12/COL (‘the SpSv Decision’).
Landsbankis sammenbrud
The Authority had by its Decision No 253/10/COL, of 21 June 2011, temporarily approved a rescue aid scheme involving settlement of claims owned by the Central Bank of Iceland (‘CBI’) on savings banks, including SpSv.
Islandske banker oplevede massive hævninger af indskud, ikke kun i udlandet, men også i Island, i efteråret 2008.
By decision 127/11/COL of 13 April 2011 the Authority had approved amendments to the rescue aid scheme (‘the Savings Banks Decisions’)
Hævningerne i Island blev så store, at de islandske banker og CBI på et tidspunkt var tæt ved at løbe tør for kontanter.
In addition, the Authority met with the Icelandic authorities on 7 June 2011 and 27-28 February 2012.
De islandske kommercielle banker (især Landsbanki) reagerede ved at akkumulere indskud i udlandet.
BACKGROUND
Fra udgangen af tredje kvartal af 2006 til midten af 2007 tredobledes kundernes indskud i Landsbanki — en stigning på næsten 10 mia. EUR.
The Authority will describe in this section those events, facts and economic, political and regulatory developments relating to the collapse and the reconstruction of the Icelandic financial system from 2008 to date that appear necessary to set out the context in which the assessment of aid measures at hand is undertaken.
Størstedelen heraf stammede fra konti åbnet i Landsbankis britiske afdeling, hvor detailindskuddene var steget fra ingenting til 6,6 mia. EUR, mens engrosindskud (i afdelinger i Det Forenede Kongerige og Nederlandene) var steget til 2,5 mia. EUR.
Before doing so, it will recall in turn the chronology of Landsbanki's breakdown.
Landsbanki anmodning om hjælp fra CBI blev afvist den 6. oktober.
Icelandic banks experienced massive withdrawals of deposits not only abroad but also within Iceland in autumn 2008.
Da banken ikke stillede de midler, som den britiske Financial Services Authority anmodede om, til rådighed, lukkede de britiske myndigheder afdelingen.
Domestic withdrawals became so large that at one stage the Icelandic banks and the CBI were close to experiencing a shortage of cash.
Den følgende dag anmodede Nederlandenes Centralbank om få udpeget en kurator for Landsbankis afdeling i Amsterdam.
Access to foreign debt securities markets had been the main source of the Icelandic banks' growth, in particular between 2003 and 2006.
Også samme dag suspenderede FME i medfør af de beføjelser, den er tillagt i nødloven [4], Landsbankis bestyrelse, overtog de beføjelser, der er tillagt generalforsamlinger, og udnævnte en likvidationskomité i dens sted.
This source of financing however began to diminish, and foreign credit-rating agencies also expressed concern that the ratio of the banks' lending to deposits was low in comparison to other (foreign) banks.
Finanskrisen og hovedårsagerne til de islandske bankers konkurs
The Icelandic commercial banks (in particular Landsbanki) responded by accumulating deposits abroad.
De islandske myndigheder forklarede i deres anmeldelser til Tilsynsmyndigheden, at årsagerne til sammenbruddet i den islandske banksektor og nødvendigheden af deres indgreb var detaljeret beskrevet i en rapport udarbejdet af en særlig undersøgelseskommission, nedsat af Islands Alting [5], der havde fået til mandat at undersøge og analysere de processer, der førte til de tre hovedbankers kollaps.
From the end of the third quarter of 2006 to the middle of 2007, customer deposits in Landsbanki tripled — an increase of almost 10 billion Euros.
Tilsynsmyndigheden opsummerer nedenfor undersøgelseskommissionens konklusioner vedrørende de mest relevante årsager til Landsbankis konkurs.
The largest proportion of this were accounts opened in the Landsbanki UK branch, in which retail deposits had grown from nothing to 6,6 billion Euros, while wholesale deposits (in branches in the UK and the Netherlands) had grown to 2,5 billion Euros.
Oplysningerne stammer fra kapitel 2 (sammendrag) og 21 (årsager til de islandske bankers kollaps — ansvar, fejltagelser og uagtsomhed) i undersøgelseskommissionens rapport.
On 3 October 2008 the European Central Bank issued a margin call to Landsbanki to the amount of 400 million Euros and although this was later withdrawn the bank's UK branch had begun to experience a run on its deposits, meaning that it had to make available large amounts in pounds sterling.
Den globale likviditetsbegrænsning på finansmarkederne, som begyndte i 2007, førte i sidste instans til kollapset i de tre største islandske banker, hvis forretningsaktiviteter i stigende grad var blevet afhængige af at skaffe finansiering gennem internationale markeder.
Landsbanki's request for the assistance of the CBI was turned down on 6 October.
Der var dog mange og komplekse årsager til de islandske bankers sammenbrud.
When the bank failed to make the funds demanded by the UK Financial Services Authority available the UK authorities closed the branch.
Undersøgelseskommissionen afdækkede de årsager, der førte til de største bankers kollaps, og det er interessant, at de fleste af konklusionerne gjaldt for alle tre banker, og at mange af dem er indbyrdes forbundne.
The following day the Dutch Central Bank requested that an insolvency practitioner be appointed for Landsbanki's Amsterdam branch.
Årsagerne til konkurserne i tilknytning til bankernes aktiviteter gengives kortfattet nedenfor.
Also that day the FME suspended the board of directors of Landsbanki, took over the power of shareholders' meetings and appointed a Resolution Committee in its place using its powers under the Emergency Act [4].
Uforholdsmæssig stor og ikkebæredygtig ekspansion
The financial crisis and major causes of failure of the Icelandic banks
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede, at bankerne i årene op til kollapset havde udvidet deres balancer og låneporteføljer ud over deres egen driftsmæssige og ledelsesmæssige kapacitet.
The Icelandic authorities explained in their submissions to the Authority that the reasons for the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector and their need to intervene were set out in considerable detail in a report prepared by a Special Investigation Commission (‘SIC’) established by the Icelandic Parliament [5], whose remit was to investigate and analyse the processes leading to the collapse of the three main banks.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede derfor, at en stor del af stigningen i udlån stammede fra lån til virksomheder, som havde fået afslag på kredit andre steder.
The Authority summarises below the conclusions of the SIC concerning the causes of failure most relevant to the demise of Landsbanki.
Rapportens konklusion var også, at stedse mere risikable investeringsbankydelser var blevet en stadig vigtigere del af bankernes aktiviteter, og at væksten havde bidraget til problemerne.
The information is drawn from Chapters 2 (Executive Summary) and 21 (Causes of the Collapse of the Icelandic Banks — Responsibility, Mistakes and Negligence) of the SIC report.
Begrænset adgang til finansiering på de internationale markeder
The global reduction in liquidity in financial markets that began in 2007 eventually led to the collapse of the three main Icelandic banks, whose business operations had become increasingly dependent on raising funding through international markets.
De islandske banker lånte 14 mia. EUR på udenlandske obligationsmarkeder i 2005 på relativt favorable vilkår.
The SIC investigated the reasons which led to the collapse of the main banks, and it is notable that the majority of the conclusions applied to all three banks and many are inter-related.
Da adgangen til de europæiske obligationsmarkeder blev begrænset, finansierede bankerne deres aktiviteter på amerikanske markeder, hvor islandske obligationer blev pakket til strukturerede kreditobligationer.
Causes of failure related to the banks' activities are briefly summarised below.
I tiden op til sammenbruddet blev bankerne i stigende grad afhængige af kortfristede lån, hvilket førte til store og — ifølge undersøgelseskommissionen — forventelige refinansieringsrisici.
Excessive and unsustainable expansion
Bankejernes gearing
The SIC concluded that in the years leading up to the collapse the banks had expanded their balance sheets and lending portfolios beyond their own operational and managerial capacity.
For alle de store islandske banker gjaldt det, at de vigtigste ejere var at finde blandt de største debitorer [8].
The combined assets of the three banks had increased exponentially from 1,4 trillion ISK [6] in 2003 to 14,4 trillion ISK at the end of the second quarter of 2008.
Samson Holding Company (»Samson«) havde været den største aktionær i Landsbanki siden dens privatisering.
Significantly, a large proportion of the growth of the three banks was in lending to foreign parties, which increased substantially during 2007 [7], most notably after the beginning of the international liquidity crisis.
Da Landsbanki gik konkurs, var Samsons medejer Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson og virksomheder tilknyttet ham bankens største debitorer, mens hans far og medejer af Samson, Björgólfur Guðmundsson, var bankens tredjestørste debitor.
This led the SIC to conclude that much of this increase in lending resulted from loans made to undertakings that had been refused credit elsewhere.
I alt oversteg deres forpligtelser over for banken 200 mia. ISK, hvilket var mere end bankens egenkapital.
The report also concluded that inherently riskier investment banking had become an ever increasing feature of the banks' activities and growth had contributed to the problems.
Det var undersøgelseskommissionens opfattelse, at visse aktionærer i deres egenskab af ejere havde unormalt let adgang til at låne fra bankerne.
The reduction in finance available on the international markets
Dette fremgik tydeligt i forbindelse med Landsbanki af det forhold, at banken så sent som den 30. september 2008, da det stod klart, at Landsbanki ikke havde nok udenlandsk valuta til at honorere sine forpligtelser i udlandet, lånte 153 mio. EUR til et selskab ejet af Björgólfur Thor Björgólfsson.
Much of the banks' growth was facilitated by access to international financial markets, capitalising upon good credit ratings and access to European markets through the EEA Agreement.
Den konkluderede også, at der var stærke indicier for, at grænserne mellem de største aktionærers interesser og bankens interesse var uklare i alle bankerne.
The Icelandic banks borrowed 14 billion Euros on foreign debt securities markets in 2005 on relatively favourable terms.
Fokuseringen på de store aktionærer skete derfor på bekostning af andre aktionærer og kreditorer.
When access to European debt securities markets became more limited, the banks financed their activities on US markets, with Icelandic debt securities packaged into collateralised debt obligations.
Koncentration af risici
In the period before the collapse, the banks were increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing, leading to major and, according to the SIC, foreseeable re-financing risks.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om unormal eksponering for store aktionærer var undersøgelseskommissionens konklusion, at der ikke var tilstrækkeligt stor spredning i bankernes aktivporteføljer.
The gearing of the banks' owners
Undersøgelseskommissionen var af den opfattelse, at de europæiske bestemmelser om stor eksponering blev fortolket meget stramt, især for så vidt angår aktionærerne, og at bankerne havde søgt at omgå reglerne.
In the case of each major Icelandic bank, the principal owners were among the biggest debtors [8].
Svag egenkapital
Samson Holding Company (‘Samson’) was the biggest shareholder in the Landsbanki since its privatisation.