natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I perioden fra 2005 til 2008 steg Kaupthings samlede udlån til Exista og dermed forbundne parter [10] stadigt fra 400-500 mio. EUR til 1400-1700 mio. EUR, og i løbet af 2007 og 2008 var disse udlån næsten lige så store som bankens kapitalgrundlag.
Much of the banks' growth was facilitated by access to international financial markets, capitalising upon good credit ratings and access to European markets through the EEA Agreement.
Denne stigning i udlån til de største aktionærer indtraf, til trods for at Kaupthing begyndte at få problemer med likviditet og refinansiering.
The Icelandic banks borrowed 14 billion euros on foreign debt securities markets in 2005 on relatively favourable terms.
Lån til dermed forbundne parter blev også ofte ydet uden særlig sikkerhed [11].
When access to European debt securities markets became more limited, the banks financed their activities on US markets, with Icelandic debt securities packaged into collateralised debt obligations.
Kaupthings pengemarkedsfond var den største fond i Kaupthing Banks aktivforvaltningsselskab, og i 2007 investerede fonden kraftigt i obligationer udstedt af Exista.
In the period before the collapse, the banks were increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing, leading to major and, according to the SIC, foreseeable re-financing risks.
Ved årets udgang ejede de værdipapirer til en værdi af omkring 14 mia. ISK.
The gearing of the banks' owners
Dette udgjorde ca. 20 % af fondens samlede aktiver på daværende tidspunkt.
In the case of each major Icelandic bank, the principal owners were among the biggest debtors [9].
Robert Tchenguiz ejede aktier i Kaupthing Bank og Exista og sad også i Existas bestyrelse.
The SIC was of the view that certain shareholders had abnormally easy access to borrowing from the banks in their capacity as owners.
Derudover modtog han store lånefaciliteter fra Kaupthing Bank i Island, Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg og Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF).
The biggest shareholder in Kaupthing Bank was Exista hf., with just over a 20 % share in the bank.
I alt havde Robert Tchenguiz og dermed forbundne parter fra Kaupthing Banks moderselskab modtaget omkring 2 mia. EUR i lånefaciliteter, da banken brød sammen [12].
Exista was also one of the bank's biggest debtors.
Koncentration af risici
During the period from 2005 to 2008, Kaupthing's total lending to Exista and related parties [10] increased steadily from 400-500 million euros to 1400-1700 million euros and during 2007 and 2008 such lending was nearly equal to the bank's capital base.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om unormal eksponering for store aktionærer var undersøgelseskommissionens konklusion, at der ikke var tilstrækkeligt stor spredning i bankernes aktivporteføljer.
This increase in lending to major shareholders occurred despite the fact that Kaupthing was starting to face liquidity and refinancing problems.
Undersøgelseskommissionen var af den opfattelse, at de europæiske bestemmelser om stor eksponering blev fortolket meget stramt, især for så vidt angår aktionærerne, og at bankerne havde søgt at omgå reglerne.
Loans to related parties were also often granted without any specific collateral [11].
Svag egenkapital
Kaupthing's Money Market Fund was the biggest fund of the Kaupthing Bank Asset Management Company and in 2007 the fund invested significantly in bonds issued by Exista.
Skønt Kaupthings og andre af de store islandske bankers kapitalkoefficient altid blev angivet som en anelse højere end det ved lov fastsatte minimum, konkluderede undersøgelseskommissionen, at disse koefficienter ikke gav et retvisende billede af bankernes finansielle styrke.
At year end it owned securities to the value of around 14 billion ISK.
Dette skyldtes risikoeksponeringen af bankernes egne aktier gennem primær sikkerhedsstillelse og terminsforretninger på aktierne.
This represented approximately 20 % of the fund's total assets at that time.
Egenkapital finansieret af selskaberne selv, som undersøgelseskommissionen betegnede som »svag egenkapital« [13], udgjorde over 25 % af bankernes kapitalgrundlag (eller over 50 %, hvis den vurderes i forhold til kapitalens kerneelement, dvs. egenkapital minus immaterielle aktiver).
Robert Tchenguiz owned shares in Kaupthing Bank and Exista and also sat on the board of Exista.
Hertil kom problemer, der skyldes den risiko, som bankerne var eksponeret for, fordi de ejede aktier i hinanden.
He also received major loan facilities from Kaupthing Bank in Iceland, Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg and Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF).
Medio 2008 udgjorde bankernes direkte finansiering af deres egne aktier og krydsfinansiering af de to andre bankers aktier omkring 400 mia. ISK, ca. 70 % af kapitalens kerneelement.
In total, the loan facilities Robert Tchenguiz and related parties had received from Kaupthing Bank's parent company at the collapse of the bank amounted to around 2 billion euros [12].
Undersøgelseskommissionen fandt, at det udgjorde en trussel mod systemets sikkerhed, at egenkapitalen i så høj grad blev finansieret ved at låne fra systemet selv.
Concentration of risk
Bankerne havde en betydelig andel af deres egne aktier som sikkerhed for deres udlån, og i takt med at aktiekurserne faldt, mindskedes værdien af deres låneporteføljer.
Related to the issue of the abnormal exposure to major shareholders was the conclusion of the SIC that the banks' portfolios of assets were insufficiently diversified.
Dette påvirkede bankernes resultater og lagde et yderligere pres i nedadgående retning på deres aktiekurser.
The SIC was of the view that European rules on large exposure were interpreted in a narrow way, in particular in the case of the shareholders, and that the banks had sought to evade the rules.
Bankernes reaktioner herpå (vurderede undersøgelseskommissionen på baggrund af de foreliggende oplysninger) var at forsøge kunstigt at skabe en unormal efterspørgsel på deres egne aktier.
Weak equity
Bankernes størrelse
Although the capital ratio of Kaupthing and the other two major Icelandic banks was always reported to be slightly higher than the statutory minimum, the SIC concluded that the capital ratios did not accurately reflect the financial strength of the banks.
I 2001 udgjorde de tre største bankers (samlede) balance, hvad der svarede til lidt over et års bruttonationalprodukt (BNP) i Island.
This was due to risk exposure of the banks' own shares through primary collaterals and forward contracts on the shares.
Ved udgangen af 2007 var bankerne blevet internationale og havde aktiver til en værdi, der svarede til ni gange Islands BNP.
Share capital financed by the companies themselves, referred to by the SIC as ‘weak equity’ [13], represented more than 25 % of the banks' capital bases (or over 50 % when assessed against the core component of the capital, i.e. shareholders' equity less intangible assets).
Det fremgår af undersøgelseskommissionens rapport, at observatører i 2006 bemærkede, at banksystemets kapacitet var større end CBI's, og at de nærede tvivl om, hvorvidt den kunne udfylde sin funktion som sidste lånemulighed.
Added to this were problems caused by the risk that the banks were exposed to by holding each other's shares.
Ved udgangen af 2007 var Islands kortfristede gæld (der især stammede fra finansiering af bankerne) 15 gange højere end valutareserverne, og de udenlandske indskud i de tre banker var også otte gange højere end valutareserverne.
By the middle of 2008 direct financing by the banks of their own shares, as well as cross-financing of the other two banks' shares, amounted to approximately 400 billion ISK, around 70 % of the core component of the capital.
Indskyder- og investorgarantifonden lå inde med minimale ressourcer sammenlignet med de bankindskud, de formodedes at sikre.
The SIC was of the opinion that the extent of financing of shareholders' equity by borrowing from the system itself was such that the system's stability was threatened.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderer, at disse forhold udsatte Island for en risiko for stormløb mod landets banker.
The banks held a substantial amount of their own shares as collateral for their lending and therefore as share prices fell the quality of their loan portfolios declined.
Bankernes pludselige vækst sammenholdt med den lovgivningsmæssige og finansielle infrastruktur
This affected the banks' performance and put further downward pressure on their share prices; in response to which (the SIC assumed from the information in their possession), the banks attempted to artificially create abnormal demand for their own shares.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede, at de relevante tilsynsorganer i Island manglede den fornødne troværdighed i en situation, hvor den sidste lånemulighed ikke rådede over tilstrækkelige ressourcer.
The size of the banks
Rapporten konkluderer, at FME og CBI manglede ekspertise og erfaring til at regulere bankerne i økonomisk vanskelige tider, men at de kunne have gjort noget for at reducere bankernes risikoniveau.
In 2001 the balance sheets of the three main banks (collectively) amounted to just over a year of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Iceland.
FME voksede f.eks. ikke i samme takt som bankerne, og tilsynsmyndighedernes praksis fulgte ikke med bankaktiviteternes hastige udvikling.
By the end of 2007 the banks had become international and held assets worth nine times the Icelandic GDP.
Rapporten er også kritisk over for regeringen og konkluderer, at myndighederne burde have grebet ind for at mindske bankernes potentielle indvirkning på økonomien ved at reducere deres størrelse eller kræve, at en eller flere banker flyttede deres hovedsæde til udlandet [14].
The SIC report notes that by 2006, observers were commenting that the banking system had outgrown the capacity of the CBI and doubted whether it could fulfil the role of lender of last resort.
Ubalance i og uforholdsmæssig ekspansion af den islandske økonomi som helhed
By the end of 2007 Iceland's short-term debts (mainly incurred due to financing of the banks) were 15 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves, and the foreign deposits in the three banks were also 8 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves.
Undersøgelseskommissionen henviser i sin rapport til begivenheder vedrørende økonomien i bredere forstand, som også indvirkede på bankernes hurtige vækst og bidrog til ubalancen i størrelse og påvirkning mellem finanssektoren og den resterende økonomi.
The Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund held minimal resources in comparison with the bank deposits that it was meant to guarantee.
I rapporten konkluderer man, at regeringens politikker (især finanspolitikken) sandsynligvis bidrog til overeksponeringen og ubalancen, og at CBI's pengepolitik ikke var tilstrækkeligt restriktiv.
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
Undersøgelseskommissionen beskriver også lempelsen i den islandske boligfinansieringsfonds udlånsregler som »en af de største fejltagelser i den penge- og finanspolitiske forvaltning i perioden op til bankernes sammenbrud« [15].
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
Rapporten er også kritisk over for den lethed, hvormed bankerne kunne låne af CBI.
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
CBI's beholdning af kortfristede lån med sikkerhedsstillelse steg således fra 30 mia. ISK i efteråret 2005 til 500 mia. ISK i begyndelsen af oktober 2008.
The report concludes that the FME and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
Den islandske króna, underskud over for udlandet og CDS spreads
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
Det fremgår af rapporten, at værdien af den islandske króna var uforsvarligt høj i 2006, Islands underskud på de løbende poster var over 16 % af BNP, og passiver i udenlandsk valuta minus aktiver nærmede sig det samlede årlige BNP.
The report is also critical of the Government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [14].
Forudsætningerne for en finanskrise var på plads.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Ved udgangen af 2007 faldt kronens værdi, og credit default swap spreads (CDS) på Island og bankerne steg eksponentielt.
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Foranstaltninger til genopbygning af banksektoren
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Efter de tre største kommercielle bankers (herunder Kaupthing) sammenbrud i oktober 2008 stod de islandske myndigheder over for en hidtil uset udfordring, nemlig at sikre fortsatte bankaktiviteter i Island [16].
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [15].
Finansministeren fik beføjelse til på finansministeriets vegne at bruge midler til at etablere nye finansvirksomheder.
The report is also critical of the ease with which the banks were able to borrow from the CBI, with the stock of CBI short-term collateral loans increasing from 30 billion ISK in the autumn of 2005 to 500 billion ISK by the beginning of October 2008.
Under konkursbehandlingen af finansvirksomheder fik indskud forrang frem for andre fordringer.
The Icelandic króna, external imbalances and CDS spreads
Regeringen erklærede, at indskud i nationale kommercielle banker og sparekasser og deres afdelinger i Island ville blive fuldt beskyttet.
The report notes that in 2006, the value of the Icelandic króna was unsustainably high, the Icelandic current account deficit was over 16 % of GDP, and liabilities in foreign currencies less assets neared total annual GDP.
I de første uger efter sammenbruddet udarbejdede den islandske regering også et økonomisk program i samarbejde med Den Internationale Valutafond (»IMF«), som den 20. november 2008 førte til godkendelsen af Islands anmodning om en toårig standbyordning fra IMF, der omfattede et lån på 2,1 mia. USD fra IMF med det formål at styrke Islands valutareserver.
By the end of 2007 the value of the króna was depreciating and credit default swap spreads (CDS) on Iceland and the banks rose exponentially.
Yderligere lån på op til 3 mia. USD blev sikret fra andre nordiske lande og visse andre samhandelspartnere.
Measures taken to reconstruct the banking sector
Af lånet fra IMF blev 827 mio. USD stillet til rådighed med det samme, mens det resterende beløb blev udbetalt i otte lige store rater, betinget af kvartalsvise vurderinger af programmet.
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Kaupthing) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [16].
IMF's program var et bredt baseret stabiliseringsprogram med fokus på tre hovedmålsætninger.
The policy followed by the Icelandic Government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [17] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
For det første for at stabilisere og genoprette tilliden til kronen og dermed begrænse krisens negative indvirkninger på økonomien.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
Foranstaltningerne omfattede indførelse af kapitalkontrol for at sætte en stopper for kapitalflugten.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
For det andet indebar programmet en omfattende bankomstruktureringsstrategi, hvis endemål var at genoprette et levedygtigt finanssystem i Island og sikre landets internationale finansielle forbindelser.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
Blandt delmålene var at sikre en rimelig vurdering af bankernes aktiver, maksimere inddrivelse af aktiver og styrke tilsynspraksis.
The Government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
For det tredje sigtede programmet mod at sikre bæredygtige offentlige finanser ved at begrænse socialiseringen af tab i de konkursramte banker og gennemføre et mellemlangsigtet finanspolitisk konsolideringsprogram.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
De islandske myndigheder har understreget, at de rent politisk havde begrænsede muligheder på grund af de ekstraordinære omstændigheder i forbindelse med banksystemets størrelse i forhold til finansministeriets kapacitet.
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
Løsningerne var derfor på mange måder forskellige fra de foranstaltninger, som andre landes regeringer traf imod trusler mod deres finansielle stabilitet.
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
På grundlag af nødloven blev de tre store kommercielle banker Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands og Kaupthing Bank opdelt i »gamle« og »nye« banker.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
Finansministeren etablerede tre aktieselskaber, som skulle overtage de gamle bankers nationale aktiviteter og udnævnte disses bestyrelser.
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
FME overtog kontrollen med de gamle banker, allokerede i det store og hele deres nationale aktiver og passiver (indskud) til de nye banker, der videreførte bankaktiviteterne i Island, mens de gamle banker blev sat under tilsyn af deres respektive likvidationskomitéer.
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
Udenlandske aktiver og passiver blev i det store og hele placeret i de gamle banker, som senere blev omfattet af afviklingsprocedurer, og i sidste instans ophørte alle udenlandske aktiviteter.
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
[19]
Secondly, the program included a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy, ultimately aimed at rebuilding a viable financial system in Iceland as well as safeguarding the country's international financial relations.
I de foreløbige primobalancer for de tre nye banker pr. 14. november 2008 blev det anslået, at bankernes samlede, kombinerede aktiver ville udgøre 2886 mia. ISK, og at staten skulle tilvejebringe en egenkapital på 385 mia. ISK.
Among subsidiary goals was to ensure fair valuation of the banks' assets, maximise asset recovery and strengthen supervisory practices.
Den samlede værdi af de obligationer, som de nye banker skulle udstede til de gamle banker som betaling for den værdi af de overførte aktiver, der oversteg passiverne, blev anslået til 1153 mia. ISK.
Thirdly, the program aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances, by limiting the socialisation of losses in the failed banks and implementing a medium-term fiscal consolidation program.
Det stod klart, at parterne ville få svært ved at nå til enighed om værdiansættelsen, da den nødvendigvis afhang af forskellige skøn, som parterne sandsynligvis ikke var enige om.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland, while the old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees [18].
Statens mål var at nå til enighed om grundevalueringer, som skulle udgøre et solidt grundlag for den indledende kapitalisering af de nye banker.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations [19].
Priser på aktiver, der lå over grundevalueringen, kunne gives til kreditorerne i form af betingede obligationer eller stigninger i værdien af bankernes aktiekapital, da det under forhandlingerne kom frem, at likvidationskomitéerne for Glitnir og Kaupthing og et flertal af deres kreditorer ville være interesserede i at erhverve kapitalandele i de nye banker, og dette ville gøre det muligt for dem at få del i potentielle stigninger i værdien af de overførte aktiver.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Regeringen indgik i sin egenskab af eneejer af de tre nye banker aftaler med likvidationskomitéerne for de gamle banker i forhold til, hvordan kompensationen for overførslen af nettoaktiverne til de nye banker skulle beregnes og betales.
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
Med hensyn til to af de nye banker, Íslandsbanki og Arion Bank, omfattede dette betingede aftaler om, at de gamle banker skulle tegne størsteparten af egenkapitalinteresserne i de nye banker.
In this process it transpired that the independent assessment would not result in fixed values of net assets transferred but valuations within certain ranges.
På grundlag af ovenstående tentative aftaler besluttede de gamle bankers likvidationskomitéer i oktober 2009 (Glitnir) og december 2009 (Kaupthing Bank og Landsbanki Islands) at benytte sig af de forhandlede valgmuligheder og tegne aktier i de nye banker.
It also emerged that the banks' creditors raised disagreements concerning the valuation process, which they considered not to be impartial, and complained that they were unable to protect their interests.
Det viste sig senere, at finansministeriets bidrag til de nye bankers aktiekapital blev reduceret betydeligt, fra de oprindeligt forventede 385 mia. ISK til 135 mia. ISK i form af aktiekapital og — for to af de tre banker, Íslandsbanki og Arion Bank — omkring 55 mia. ISK som tier II-kapital i form af efterstillede lån eller i alt 190 mia. ISK.
It was clear that it would be difficult for the parties to reach agreements on the valuations as they were evidently subject to numerous assumptions on which the parties were likely to disagree.
De nye bankers samlede kapitalisering udgjorde derfor ca. 346 mia. ISK.
The full capitalisation of the three new banks and the basis of agreements with the creditors of the old banks was announced on 20 July 2009.
De gamle bankers kreditorers overtagelse af to af de tre banker løste store problemer i forbindelse med genopbygningen af finanssektoren og skabte et mere solidt kapitalgrundlag for de nye banker, men der var stadig mange svagheder, som ikke var blevet afhjulpet.
With regard to two of the new banks, Íslandsbanki and Arion Bank, this included conditional agreements for the old banks to subscribe for majority equity interests in the new banks.