natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Så snarere end at optræde som en privat investor indtrådte staten i rollen som private markedsdeltagere, der ikke ønskede at låne til finansielle virksomheder.
The Authority will take a final view on these measures, which continue to have a bearing on the assessment at hand, in the present decision.
Derfor bekræfter Tilsynsmyndigheden den foreløbige konklusion, som den nåede frem til i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, og anser den særlige likviditetsfacilitet for at udgør en fordel for Íslandsbanki.
As for the compatibility of the measures assessed in the opening Decision, the Authority considered that a final view could only be taken on the basis of a restructuring plan, which had not been submitted when the Authority opened the formal investigation procedure on 15 December 2010.
Med hensyn til overførslen af Straumur Banks aktiver og passiver — Straumur-aftalen — bemærker Tilsynsmyndigheden med tilfredshed, at den samlede transaktion har til formål at yde Íslandsbanki en kompensation, der udelukkende svarer til værdien af de overførte passiver.
It was in particular due to the absence of a restructuring plan more than one year after the establishment of Íslandsbanki that the Authority expressed doubts about the compatibility of the aid.
Men hele risikoen, som skyldes, at Straumurs aktiver havde en lavere værdi end de overførte indlån, og forpligtelsen til at dække en eventuel difference, tillægges staten.
Comments from interested parties
Det virker derfor til, at Íslandsbanki ud over at modtage visse indtægter gennem rentebetalinger på obligationen, er i stand til at opnå goodwill og yderligere markedsandele uden at løbe nogen risiko.
The Authority received a statement on behalf of the creditors of the old bank, in which they emphasised that they were to be considered as interested parties, and indicated to possibly submit further comments at a later stage.
Tilsynsmyndigheden konkluderer, at dette udgør en fordel.
Comments from the Icelandic authorities
Endelig skal Tilsynsmyndigheden også vurdere, hvorvidt den supplerende indskudsgaranti giver Íslandsbanki og islandske banker i almindelighed en fordel.
The Icelandic authorities accept that measures undertaken in establishing New Glitnir Bank, now Íslandsbanki, constitute state aid.
I denne forbindelse bemærker Tilsynsmyndigheden, at da de islandske myndigheder første gang erklærede, at indskuddene ville blive sikret, stod det ikke helt klart, hvordan denne garanti ville fungere i praksis, navnlig hvilken virkning et sådant indgreb ville have for banken, der ikke længere kunne leve op til sine økonomiske forpligtelser over for indskyderne.
In the view of the Icelandic authorities, the measures are however compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of Article 61(3)(b) of the Agreement, as they are necessary, proportionate and appropriate to remedy a serious disturbance in the Icelandic economy.
I mellemtiden lader det til, at en sådan bank ville få lov til at gå konkurs, men at den islandske stat ville sikre — f.eks. ved at overføre indskuddene til en anden bank og kompensere for manglen på aktiver — at indskuddene ville blive betalt fuldt ud, og at indskyderne aldrig ville miste adgangen til deres indlån i deres fulde størrelse.
In the view of the Icelandic authorities the measures taken are in all aspects in line with the principles set out in the Authority's state aid guidelines, and submit that the aid is necessary and limited to the minimum amount necessary.
Tilsynsmyndigheden finder, at det er mindre vigtigt, hvordan staten vil handle for at opfylde den ubegrænsede garanti på indenlandske indskud.
Moreover, the Icelandic authorities emphasise that the former shareholders of Glitnir Bank have lost all their shares and received no compensation from the state, that the aid is well designed to minimize negative spill-over effect on competitors and that the terms of the loans (the Tier II capital) are comparable to market rates.
Dette illustreres f.eks. i en rapport fra det islandske økonomiministerium for nylig, hvori det hedder, at: »islandske finansielle virksomheder drives i øjeblikket i et beskyttet miljø med kapitalkontroller og en generel indskudsgaranti.
The Icelandic authorities have submitted a number of commitments, most of which related to the distortions of competition caused by the aid under assessment, and which are set out in the Annex.
Under sådanne forhold er indskud i banker praktisk taget den eneste sikre mulighed for islandske sparere« [77].
ASSESSMENT
For det andet er det klart, at Íslandsbanki uden garantien lettere kunne være blevet udsat for et stormløb på indskuddene i lighed med sin forgænger [78].
THE PRESENCE OF STATE AID
Dermed vil banken efter al sandsynlighed skulle have betalt højere rentesatser (for at kompensere for risikoen) for at tiltrække eller blot opretholde det samme beløb i indskud, hvis det ikke havde været for den supplerende ubegrænsede indskudsgaranti, som den islandske stat har påtaget sig.
Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
Dermed konkluderer Tilsynsmyndigheden, at indskudsgarantien indebærer en fordel for banken.
‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’
Selektivitet
The Authority will assess the following measures [71] below:
For det andet skal støtteforanstaltningen være selektiv, således at den begunstiger »visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner«.
The initial operating capital provided by the Icelandic State to the new bank;
Kapitaliseringsforanstaltningerne, likviditetsfaciliteten og Straumur-aftalen er selektive, idet de kun begunstiger Íslandsbanki.
The (temporary) full state capitalisation of the new bank;
Eftersom statsstøtte kan være selektiv selv i situationer, hvor en eller flere sektorer i økonomien begunstiges, mens andre ikke gør, betragter Tilsynsmyndigheden også statsgarantien på indskud, der begunstiger hele den islandske banksektor, som selektiv.
The retention by the State of the 5 % share capital remaining after 95 % of the share capital in the new bank was transferred to the creditors of Glitnir; and
Denne konklusion følger også af ovenstående betragtninger, ifølge hvilke banker begunstiges frem for andre virksomheder, der giver mulighed for at opspare og investere penge.
The provision by the State of Tier-II capital to the new bank by way of subordinated debt.
Konkurrencefordrejning og påvirkning af samhandelen mellem de kontraherende parter
The above measures are referred to collectively below as ‘the capitalisation measures’.
Foranstaltningerne styrker Íslandsbankis position i forhold til konkurrenter (eller potentielle konkurrenter) i Island og andre EØS-stater.
In addition, the Authority will assess:
Íslandsbanki er en virksomhed, der som beskrevet ovenfor er aktiv på finansielle markeder, der er åbne for international konkurrence i EØS.
The special liquidity facility agreement;
Selv om de islandske finansmarkeder i øjeblikket er ret isolerede, navnlig på grund af kapitalkontrollerne, findes der stadig (muligheder for) grænseoverskridende handel, som sandsynligvis vil blive øget, så snart kapitalkontrollerne lempes.
The Icelandic Government's statement to guarantee domestic deposits in all Icelandic banks in full; and
Alle de vurderede foranstaltninger må derfor anses for at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem de medlemsstater, der er med i EØS-aftalen [79].
The Straumur agreement.
Konklusion
The Authority also recalls that it has identified Íslandsbanki as a potential beneficiary of aid granted to Byr in the second Byr decision, in particular of the subordinated loan facility that was kept available until Byr could be merged with Íslandsbanki.
Tilsynsmyndigheden når derfor til den konklusion, at de foranstaltninger, som den islandske stat har taget for at kapitalisere den nye bank samt likviditetsfaciliteten, indskudsgarantien og Straumur-aftalerne udgør statsstøtte i betydningen i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.
Moreover, the Authority reiterates that the temporarily approved rescue measures for Byr, which has now been merged with Íslandsbanki, constitute state aid, the final compatibility of which depends on the restructuring plan for the merged entity.
Tilsynsmyndigheden erindrer om, at den nåede frem til den samme konklusion vedrørende kapitaliseringsforanstaltninger, som Byr fik tilladelse til i beslutningerne om Byr.
Presence of state resources
PROCEDUREKRAV
As the Authority already preliminarily concluded in the opening decision, it is clear that the capitalisation measures are financed through state resources provided by the Icelandic Treasury.
Under henvisning til artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I i protokol 3 skal »EFTA-tilsynsmyndigheden underrettes i så god tid, at den kan fremsætte sine bemærkninger til eventuelle planer om tildeling eller ændring af støtte (…).
State resources are also evidently present in the liquidity facility available to Íslandsbanki.
Den pågældende medlemsstat må ikke gennemføre de påtænkte foranstaltninger, før den nævnte fremgangsmåde har ført til endelig beslutning«.
As for the Straumur agreement, the State assumed the risk that the assets of Straumur would be insufficient to cover the transferred liabilities (deposits) of Straumur bank.
De islandske myndigheder underrettede ikke Tilsynsmyndigheden om de støtteforanstaltninger, der er omfattet af beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, inden de blev gennemført.
In essence it guaranteed to make up for the shortfall, which entails a (potential) transfer of state resources.
STØTTENS FORENELIGHED
Regarding the deposit guarantee, the Authority emphasises at the outset that its assessment is limited to the additional deposit guarantee described above, consisting in essence of the statements made by the Icelandic government that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland will be fully covered.
Indledningsvis bemærker Tilsynsmyndigheden, at selv om Íslandsbanki er en ny juridisk enhed, der blev etableret i 2008, er den — for så vidt angår indenlandske transaktioner — tydeligvis Glitnirs økonomiske efterfølger, idet der er tale om økonomisk kontinuitet mellem disse to enheder.
This assessment is without prejudice to the Authority's view on the compatibility of Act No 98/1999 and the actions of the Icelandic Government and the TIF during the financial crisis with EEA law, in particular Directive 94/19/EC.
Eftersom de økonomiske transaktioner, der blev foretaget af Íslandsbanki fra efteråret 2008 og frem, ikke kunne være fortsat uden støtten, betragter Tilsynsmyndigheden banken som en kriseramt virksomhed.
As regards the implementation of Directives 97/9/EC and 94/19/EC the Authority is of the view that to the extent such measures constitute state aid, the use of state resources to comply with obligations under EEA law would generally not raise concerns under Article 61 EEA.
Desuden udgør de foranstaltninger, der er til vurdering, både rednings- og omstruktureringsforanstaltninger.
The present decision is therefore not concerned with those measures.
Som det hedder i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren ville Tilsynsmyndigheden formentlig have givet foranstaltningerne midlertidig godkendelse som tilladt redningsstøtte, hvis de var blevet anmeldt inden gennemførelsen, inden man foretog den samlede vurdering af dem på grundlag af en omstruktureringsplan.
The Authority stated in the opening decision that it would investigate further whether the statements by the Icelandic State described above are sufficiently precise, firm, unconditional and legally binding such as to involve a commitment of state resources [72].
Men eftersom de ikke blev anmeldt i tide, indledte Tilsynsmyndigheden den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure og bad om at få tilsendt en omstruktureringsplan.
In assessing whether these criteria are met, the Authority notes that the declarations entailed an irrevocable commitment of public resources as shown by the fact that the Icelandic state has done its utmost to protect depositors: Not only has it changed the priority of deposit holders in insolvent estates (which would not entail the use of state resources), but it has also made it clear that it would not allow depositors to suffer any losses.
Som angivet ovenfor afhænger den endelige vurdering af, hvorvidt disse foranstaltninger er i overensstemmelse med reglerne, af, hvorvidt omstruktureringsplanen opfylder kriterierne i Tilsynsmyndighedens gældende retningslinjer for kriseramte virksomheder.
The Government's blanket guarantee of all deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks is furthermore distinct from any deposit guarantee scheme based on EEA acts due to the fact that the protection is unlimited in amount and no financial contribution is made by the banks benefitting from the measure.
Retsgrundlag for vurderingen af foreneligheden: artikel 61, stk. 3, i EØS-aftalen og Tilsynsmyndighedens omstruktureringsretningslinjer
The Icelandic government's understanding of its declaration is illustrated by the state interventions in the financial sector that have occurred sector since October 2008 which have been motivated by the intention to honour this declaration.
Selv om statsstøtte til virksomheder i vanskeligheder som Íslandsbanki normalt vurderes i henhold til artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), i EØS-aftalen, kan Tilsynsmyndigheden i medfør af aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), tillade statsstøtte »for at afhjælpe en alvorlig forstyrrelse af en EF-medlemsstats eller en EFTA-stats økonomi«.
Those interventions have included measures to cover deposits of financial undertakings, such as the foundation of the three commercial banks, the transfer of SPRON deposits to Arion Bank, the transfer of Straumur deposits to Íslandsbanki, the CBI takeover of the deposits of 5 savings banks in Sparisjódabanki Íslands, the transfer of deposits in Byr Savings Bank to Byr hf, the transfer of deposits from Keflavík Savings Bank to SpKef and the State's responsibility for deposits in SpKef following the forced merger with Landsbankinn.
Som anført i punkt 8 i retningslinjerne for banker [80] bekræfter Tilsynsmyndigheden på ny, at i henhold til retspraksis og Europa-Kommissionens beslutningspraksis nødvendiggør EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), en restriktiv tolkning af, hvad der kan betragtes som en alvorlig forstyrrelse af et EFTA-lands økonomi.
In fact, the Icelandic authorities have argued in several state aid cases that the Authority is currently investigating, some of which were mentioned above, that the respective chosen measure was the financially least burdensome option for the Icelandic state to comply with its pledge to protect depositors in full.
De islandske myndigheder har som ovenfor beskrevet forklaret, at Islands finansielle system befandt sig i en systemisk krise i oktober 2008, hvilket førte til, at de største banker og de største sparekasser brød sammen inden for nogle få dage.
In the light of the above the Authority considers that there is a legally binding, precise, unconditional and firm measure in place.
Den samlede markedsandel for de sammenbrudte finansieringsinstitutter udgjorde mere end 90 % inden for de fleste segmenter af det islandske finansmarked.
On this basis, the Authority therefore concludes that the statements by the Icelandic state according to which deposits are fully guaranteed entail a commitment of state resources in the meaning of Article 61 EEA
Problemerne hang sammen med et sammenbrud i tilliden til landets valuta.
Favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods
Islands realøkonomi er blevet ramt hårdt af finanskrisen.
Advantage
Selv om der er gået mere end tre år, siden krisen satte ind, befinder det islandske finansielle system sig stadig i en turbulent situation.
First, the aid measures must confer on the new bank advantages that relieve it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.
Selv om situationen er blevet betydeligt bedre siden 2008, er det tydeligt, at foranstaltningerne havde til formål at afhjælpe en alvorlig forstyrrelse i den islandske økonomi på det tidspunkt, hvor de blev gennemført.
In line with the preliminary conclusion it reached in the opening decision, the Authority remains of the view that each of the capitalisation measures confers an advantage on the new bank as the capital provided would not have been available to the bank without state intervention.
Derfor anses EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), for at finde anvendelse i dette tilfælde.
In determining whether an investment in an undertaking, for example by means of a capital injection, entails an advantage, the Authority applies the market economy investor principle, and assesses whether a private investor of a comparable size to that of the public body operating in normal market conditions would have made such an investment [73].
Anvendelsen af omstruktureringsmeddelelsen
As regards capitalisation measures for the benefit of banks in difficulties, since the onset of the financial crisis, the approach taken both by the European Commission (in numerous cases since the financial crisis began [74] and by the Authority [75] has been in general that state recapitalisations of banks amount to state aid given the turmoil and uncertainty that have characterised financial markets since the autumn of 2008.
I Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for statsstøtte vedrørende tilbagevenden til bæredygtighed og vurderingen af omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne i finanssektoren i den nuværende krise i henhold til statsstøttereglerne [81] (»omstruktureringsretningslinjerne«) beskrives de statsstøtteregler, der finder anvendelse på omstruktureringen af finansieringsinstitutter i den nuværende krise.
This general consideration applies in particular to the Icelandic financial markets in 2008 and 2009, when the entire system collapsed.
For at være forenelig med EF-traktatens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra b), gælder ifølge omstruktureringsretningslinjerne følgende for omstruktureringen af et pengeinstitut under den nuværende finanskrise.
Thus the Authority considers the capitalisation measures to confer an advantage on Íslandsbanki notwithstanding the eventual transfer of 95 % of the capital of the new bank to the (largely private sector) creditors.
Den skal:
The private sector involvement in the capitalisation of Íslandsbanki is made up entirely of creditors of the old bank who are solely seeking to minimise their losses [76].
føre til genoprettelse af bankens levedygtighed
Similar consideration apply in so far as the special liquidity facility is concerned, which was negotiated as part of a package of state assistance measures aiming to restore operations of a failed bank in a newly formed bank and to encourage equity participation in the new bank by the creditors of the failed bank.
omfatte et tilstrækkeligt eget bidrag fra støttemodtageren (byrdefordeling)
It is evident that the State stepped in as it was not clear if sufficient liquidity could be obtained by Íslandsbanki on the market.
Genoprettelse af levedygtigheden
Regarding the transfer of assets and liabilities of Straumur Bank — the Straumur agreement, the Authority notes positively that the overall transaction aims at providing Íslandsbanki with compensation equalling solely the amount of the transferred liabilities.
Genoprettelse af den langsigtede levedygtighed for en modtager af omstruktureringsstøtte er hovedformålet med denne støtte, og vurderingen af, hvorvidt omstruktureringsstøtten vil bidrage til dette, er et vigtigt aspekt ved vurderingen af støttens forenelighed.
However, the entire risk of the assets of Straumur being of less value than the transferred deposits, and the obligation to make up for any potential shortfall, is allocated to the State.
Som angivet ovenfor gør turbulensen inden for den islandske økonomi i kølvandet på efteråret 2008, tilstedeværelsen af ekstraordinære foranstaltninger som f.eks. kapitalkontrollerne, et regelsæt i stadig udvikling og makroøkonomiske udsigter, der til trods for den seneste stabilisering fortsat er noget usikre, især på grund af de fortsatte økonomiske problemer i euroområdet, det udfordrende at drive en bank rentabelt og sikre dens langsigtede levedygtighed.
It thus seems that Íslandsbanki, aside from receiving some revenue (through interest payments on the bond) is able to acquire goodwill and additional market shares, without taking on any risk.
Tilsynsmyndigheden understreger som udgangspunkt, at man skal tage hensyn til denne overvejelse ved nedenstående vurdering.
The Authority concludes that this constitutes an advantage.
I afsnit 2 i omstruktureringsretningslinjerne hedder det, at EØS-staten skal fremlægge en omfattende og detaljeret omstruktureringsplan, der indeholder fuldstændige oplysninger om forretningsmodellen, og som genopretter bankens langsigtede levedygtighed.
Finally, the Authority also needs to assess whether the additional deposit guarantee conveys an advantage on Íslandsbanki and Icelandic banks in general.
I punkt 10 i omstruktureringsretningslinjerne kræves det, at man i omstruktureringsplanen identificerer årsagerne til bankens problemer og bankens egne svagheder, og at det skitseres, hvordan de foreslåede omstruktureringsforanstaltninger retter op på bankens underliggende problemer.
In this regard, the Authority notes that when the statement that deposits would be guaranteed were first made by the Icelandic authorities, it was not entirely clear how this guarantee would work in practice, in particular what effect such intervention would have on the bank that could not live up to its financial obligations vis-à-vis its depositors anymore.
Årsagerne til Íslandsbankis problemer præciseres som beskrevet ovenfor i såvel omstruktureringsplanen som i rapporten fra den særlige undersøgelseskommission.
In the meanwhile, it appears that such a bank would be allowed to fail, but that the Icelandic state would ensure — for example by transferring deposits to another bank and making up for the shortfall in assets — that deposits could be paid in full, and the depositors would never lose access to the full amount of their deposits.
Blandt hovedårsagerne, som identificeres i sidstnævnte for så vidt angår banken, var den uforholdsmæssige og uholdbare ekspansion, gearingen af bankens ejere, risikokoncentrationen, en svag egenkapital og bankens størrelse sammenlignet med den islandske økonomi.
The Authority considers that it is of secondary importance how exactly the State would act in complying with the unlimited guarantee on domestic deposits.
Desuden var Glitnir gået ind i kraftigt gearede opkøb [82] og kommercielle realkreditmarkeder uden for Island.
What matters is that it has assumed the obligation to step in if a bank would fail to pay out deposits, to an unlimited extent.
Den benyttede sig også hovedsagelig af kortsigtede engrosforanstaltninger og påtog sig en stor risiko ved at udlåne til sine ejere, og banken havde store enkeltengagementer.
This unlimited guarantee has, in the Authority's view, favoured Íslandsbanki: First, as it provides a valuable competitive advantage — an unlimited state guarantee, and hence a significant safety net — over alternative investment options and providers.
Lovgivningsforanstaltninger vedrørende levedygtighed
This is illustrated for example by a recent report of the Minister of Economic Affairs which states that: ‘Icelandic financial undertakings are currently operating in a sheltered environment with capital controls and a blanket deposit guarantee.
Selv om Íslandsbankis omstruktureringsplan afhjælper mange af bankens svagheder, som identificeres ovenfor, finder Tilsynsmyndigheden, at Glitnirs konkurs og den islandske finansindustris sammenbrud også skyldes en række faktorer, der var specifikke for Island og vedrørte landets begrænsede størrelse og det manglende tilsyn, som den særlige undersøgelseskommission påpegede.
Under such conditions, bank deposits are practically the only secure option for Icelandic savers’ [77].