natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne stigning i udlån til de største aktionærer indtraf, til trods for at Glitnir begyndte at få problemer med likviditet og refinansiering.
The Icelandic banks borrowed 14 billion euros on foreign debt securities markets in 2005 on relatively favourable terms.
Det var undersøgelseskommissionens opfattelse, at visse aktionærer i deres egenskab af ejere havde unormalt let adgang til at låne fra bankerne.
When access to European debt securities markets became more limited, the banks financed their activities on US markets, with Icelandic debt securities packaged into collateralised debt obligations.
Den konkluderede også, at der var tydelige tegn på, at Baugur Group og FL Group havde forsøgt at udøve utilbørlig indflydelse på bankens ledelse, og at grænserne mellem de største aktionærers og bankens interesser var uklare.
In the period before the collapse, the banks were increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing, leading to major and, according to the SIC, foreseeable re-financing risks.
Fokuseringen på de store aktionærer skete derfor på bekostning af andre aktionærer og kreditorer.
The gearing of the banks' owners
Da banken brød sammen, udgjorde dens udestående lån til Baugur Group og dermed forbundne selskaber omkring 2 mia. EUR eller omkring 70 % af dens egenkapital.
In the case of each major Icelandic bank, the principal owners were among the biggest debtors [13].
Undersøgelseskommissionen satte også spørgsmålstegn ved de pengemarkedsfonde, som bankernes datterselskaber varetog, eftersom de i høj grad var baseret på værdipapirer, der var forbundet med bankens ejere.
Glitnir's loans to major shareholders of the Baugur Group and related parties, in particular the FL Group, were substantial.
Glitnir Funds, et datterselskab til Glitnir, lånte omkring 300 mio. EUR til Baugur Group og FL Group ved at investere omkring 20 % af sin samlede kapital i deres værdipapirer.
In the spring of 2007 a new Glitnir board was appointed after the Baugur and FL Groups significantly increased their shareholdings in the bank.
Koncentration af risici
Over the latter part of 2007 and beginning of 2008 loans to Baugur and companies related to Baugur nearly doubled, and at its peak lending to this group amounted to 80 % of the bank's equity [14].
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om unormal eksponering for store aktionærer var undersøgelseskommissionens konklusion, at der ikke var tilstrækkeligt stor spredning i bankernes aktivporteføljer.
This increase in lending to major shareholders occurred despite the fact that Glitnir was starting to face liquidity and refinancing problems.
Undersøgelseskommissionen var af den opfattelse, at de europæiske bestemmelser om stor eksponering blev fortolket meget stramt, især for så vidt angår aktionærerne, og at bankerne havde søgt at omgå reglerne.
The SIC was of the view that certain shareholders had abnormally easy access to borrowing from the banks in their capacity as owners.
Svag egenkapital
It also concluded that there were strong indications that Baugur and the FL Group had tried to exert undue influence on the bank's management, and that the boundaries between the interests of the largest shareholders and the interest of the bank were blurred.
Skønt Glitnirs og andre af de store islandske bankers kapitalkoefficient altid blev angivet som en anelse højere end det ved lov fastsatte minimum, konkluderede undersøgelseskommissionen, at disse koefficienter ikke gav et retvisende billede af bankernes finansielle styrke.
The emphasis on the major shareholders was therefore to the detriment of other shareholders and creditors.
Dette skyldtes risikoeksponeringen af bankernes egne aktier gennem primær sikkerhedsstillelse og terminsforretninger på aktierne.
When the bank collapsed its outstanding loans to the Baugur Group and affiliated companies was approximately 2 billion euros, around 70 % of its equity.
Egenkapital finansieret af selskaberne selv, som undersøgelseskommissionen betegnede som »svag egenkapital« [15], udgjorde over 25 % af bankernes kapitalgrundlag (eller over 50 %, hvis den vurderes i forhold til kapitalens kerneelement, dvs. egenkapital minus immaterielle aktiver).
The SIC also questioned the operation of money market funds operated by subsidiaries of the banks, which invested heavily in securities connected to the owners of the banks.
Hertil kom problemer, der skyldes den risiko, som bankerne var eksponeret for, fordi de ejede aktier i hinanden.
Glitnir Funds, a subsidiary of Glitnir, lent around 300 million euros to Baugur and the FL Group by investing 20 % of its total capital in their securities.
Medio 2008 udgjorde bankernes direkte finansiering af deres egne aktier og krydsfinansiering af de to andre bankers aktier omkring 400 mia. ISK, ca. 70 % af kapitalens kerneelement.
Concentration of risk
Undersøgelseskommissionen fandt, at det udgjorde en trussel mod systemets sikkerhed, at egenkapitalen i så høj grad blev finansieret ved at låne fra systemet selv.
Related to the issue of the abnormal exposure to major shareholders was the conclusion of the SIC that the banks' portfolios of assets were insufficiently diversified.
Bankerne havde en betydelig andel af deres egne aktier som sikkerhed for deres udlån, og i takt med at aktiekurserne faldt, mindskedes værdien af deres låneporteføljer.
The SIC was of the view that European rules on large exposure were interpreted in a narrow way, in particular in the case of the shareholders, and that the banks had sought to evade the rules.
Dette påvirkede bankernes resultater og lagde et yderligere pres i nedadgående retning på deres aktiekurser.
Weak equity
Bankernes reaktioner herpå (vurderede undersøgelseskommissionen på baggrund af de foreliggende oplysninger) var at forsøge kunstigt at skabe en unormal efterspørgsel på deres egne aktier.
Although the capital ratio of Glitnir and the other two major Icelandic banks was always reported to be slightly higher than the statutory minimum, the SIC concluded that the capital ratios did not accurately reflect the financial strength of the banks.
Bankernes størrelse
This was due to risk exposure of the banks' own shares through primary collaterals and forward contracts on the shares.
I 2001 udgjorde de tre største bankers (samlede) balance, hvad der svarede til lidt over et års bruttonationalprodukt (BNP) i Island.
Share capital financed by the companies themselves, referred to by the SIC as ‘weak equity’ [15], represented more than 25 % of the banks' capital bases (or over 50 % when assessed against the core component of the capital, i.e. shareholders' equity less intangible assets).
Ved udgangen af 2007 var bankerne blevet internationale og havde aktiver til en værdi, der svarede til ni gange Islands BNP.
Added to this were problems caused by the risk that the banks were exposed to by holding each other's shares.
Det fremgår af undersøgelseskommissionens rapport, at observatører i 2006 bemærkede, at banksystemets kapacitet var større end CBI's, og at de nærede tvivl om, hvorvidt den kunne udfylde sin funktion som sidste lånemulighed.
By the middle of 2008 direct financing by the banks of their own shares, as well as cross-financing of the other two banks' shares, amounted to approximately 400 billion ISK, around 70 % of the core component of the capital.
Ved udgangen af 2007 var Islands kortfristede gæld (der især stammede fra finansiering af bankerne) 15 gange højere end valutareserverne, og de udenlandske indskud i de tre banker var også otte gange højere end valutareserverne.
The SIC was of the opinion that the extent of financing of shareholders' equity by borrowing from the system itself was such that the system's stability was threatened.
Indskyder- og investorgarantifonden lå inde med minimale ressourcer sammenlignet med de bankindskud, de formodedes at sikre.
The banks held a substantial amount of their own shares as collateral for their lending and therefore as share prices fell the quality of their loan portfolios declined.
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderer, at disse forhold udsatte Island for en risiko for stormløb mod landets banker.
This affected the banks' performance and put further downward pressure on their share prices; in response to which (the SIC assumed from the information in their possession), the banks attempted to artificially create abnormal demand for their own shares.
Bankernes pludselige vækst sammenholdt med den lovgivningsmæssige og finansielle infrastruktur
The size of the banks
Undersøgelseskommissionen konkluderede, at de relevante tilsynsorganer i Island manglede den fornødne troværdighed i en situation, hvor den sidste lånemulighed ikke rådede over tilstrækkelige ressourcer.
In 2001 the balance sheets of the three main banks (collectively) amounted to just over a year of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Iceland.
Rapporten konkluderer, at FME og CBI manglede ekspertise og erfaring til at regulere bankerne i økonomisk vanskelige tider, men at de kunne have gjort noget for at reducere bankernes risikoniveau.
By the end of 2007 the banks had become international and held assets worth nine times the Icelandic GDP.
FME voksede f.eks. ikke i samme takt som bankerne, og tilsynsmyndighedernes praksis fulgte ikke med bankaktiviteternes hastige udvikling.
The SIC report notes that by 2006, observers were commenting that the banking system had outgrown the capacity of the CBI and doubted whether it could fulfil the role of lender of last resort.
Rapporten er også kritisk over for regeringen og konkluderer, at myndighederne burde have grebet ind for at mindske bankernes potentielle indvirkning på økonomien ved at reducere deres størrelse eller kræve, at en eller flere banker flyttede deres hovedsæde til udlandet [16].
By the end of 2007 Iceland's short-term debts (mainly incurred due to financing of the banks) were 15 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves, and the foreign deposits in the three banks were also 8 times larger than the foreign exchange reserves.
Ubalance i og uforholdsmæssig ekspansion af den islandske økonomi som helhed
The Depositors and Investors Guarantee Fund held minimal resources in comparison with the bank deposits that it was meant to guarantee.
Undersøgelseskommissionen henviser i sin rapport til begivenheder vedrørende økonomien i bredere forstand, som også indvirkede på bankernes hurtige vækst og bidrog til ubalancen i størrelse og påvirkning mellem finanssektoren og den resterende økonomi.
These factors, the SIC concludes, made Iceland susceptible to a run on its banks.
I rapporten konkluderer man, at regeringens politikker (især finanspolitikken) sandsynligvis bidrog til overeksponeringen og ubalancen, og at CBI's pengepolitik ikke var tilstrækkeligt restriktiv.
The sudden growth of the banks in comparison with the regulatory and financial infrastructure
Undersøgelseskommissionen beskriver også lempelsen i den islandske boligfinansieringsfonds udlånsregler som »en af de største fejltagelser i den penge- og finanspolitiske forvaltning i perioden op til bankernes sammenbrud« [17].
The SIC concluded that the relevant supervisory bodies in Iceland lacked the credibility that was necessary in the absence of a sufficiently resourced lender of last resort.
Rapporten er også kritisk over for den lethed, hvormed bankerne kunne låne af CBI.
The report concludes that the FME and CBI lacked the expertise and experience to regulate the banks in difficult economic times, but that they could have taken action to reduce the level of risk that the banks were incurring.
CBI's beholdning af kortfristede lån med sikkerhedsstillelse steg således fra 30 mia. ISK i efteråret 2005 til 500 mia. ISK i begyndelsen af oktober 2008.
The FME, for example, did not grow in the same proportion as the banks and the regulator's practices did not keep up with the rapid developments in the banks' operations.
Den islandske króna, underskud over for udlandet og CDS spreads
The report is also critical of the government, concluding that the authorities should have taken action to reduce the potential impact of the banks on the economy by reducing their size or requiring one or more banks to move their headquarters abroad [16].
Det fremgår af rapporten, at værdien af den islandske króna var uforsvarligt høj i 2006, Islands underskud på de løbende poster var over 16 % af BNP, og passiver i udenlandsk valuta minus aktiver nærmede sig det samlede årlige BNP.
Imbalance and overexpansion of the Icelandic economy as a whole
Forudsætningerne for en finanskrise var på plads.
The SIC report makes reference to events concerning the wider economy that also impacted upon the banks' rapid growth and contributed to the imbalance in size and influence between the financial services sector and the remainder of the economy.
Ved udgangen af 2007 faldt kronens værdi, og credit default swap spreads (CDS) på Island og bankerne steg eksponentielt.
The report concluded that government policies (in particular fiscal policy) most likely contributed to the overexpansion and imbalance and that the CBI's monetary policy was not sufficiently restrictive.
Foranstaltninger til genopbygning af banksektoren
The report also refers to relaxing the Icelandic Housing Financing Fund's lending rules as ‘one of the biggest mistakes in monetary and fiscal management made in the period leading up to the banks' collapse’ [17].
Efter de tre største kommercielle bankers (herunder Glitnir) sammenbrud i oktober 2008 stod de islandske myndigheder over for en hidtil uset udfordring, nemlig at sikre fortsatte bankaktiviteter i Island [18].
The report is also critical of the ease with which the banks were able to borrow from the CBI, with the stock of CBI short-term collateral loans increasing from 30 billion ISK in the autumn of 2005 to 500 billion ISK by the beginning of October 2008.
Under konkursbehandlingen af finansvirksomheder fik indskud forrang frem for andre fordringer.
The report notes that in 2006, the value of the Icelandic króna was unsustainably high, the Icelandic current account deficit was over 16 % of GDP, and liabilities in foreign currencies less assets neared total annual GDP.
Regeringen erklærede, at indskud i nationale kommercielle banker og sparekasser og deres afdelinger i Island ville blive fuldt beskyttet.
The prerequisites for a financial crisis were in place.
De politiske prioriteringer var som udgangspunkt fokuseret på de nationale bank-, betalings- og afviklingssystemers grundfunktioner.
By the end of 2007 the value of the króna was depreciating and credit default swap spreads (CDS) on Iceland and the banks rose exponentially.
I de første uger efter sammenbruddet udarbejdede den islandske regering også et økonomisk program i samarbejde med Den Internationale Valutafond (»IMF«), som den 20. november 2008 førte til godkendelsen af Islands anmodning om en toårig standbyordning fra IMF, der omfattede et lån på 2,1 mia. USD fra IMF med henblik på at styrke Islands valutareserver.
Measures taken to reconstruct the banking sector
Yderligere lån på op til 3 mia. USD blev sikret fra andre nordiske lande og visse andre samhandelspartnere.
Following the collapse of the three biggest commercial banks in October 2008 (including Glitnir) the Icelandic authorities were faced with the unprecedented challenge of safeguarding continued banking operations in Iceland [18].
Af lånet fra IMF blev 827 mio. USD stillet til rådighed med det samme, mens det resterende beløb blev udbetalt i otte lige store rater, betinget af kvartalsvise vurderinger af programmet.
The policy followed by the Icelandic government is primarily laid down in the Emergency Act [19] adopted by the Icelandic Parliament on 6 October 2008.
IMF's program var et bredt baseret stabiliseringsprogram med fokus på tre hovedmålsætninger.
The law grants extraordinary powers to the FME to take control of financial undertakings and to dispose of their assets and liabilities as required.
For det første for at stabilisere og genoprette tilliden til kronen og dermed begrænse krisens negative indvirkninger på økonomien.
The Minister of Finance was authorised, on behalf of the Treasury, to disburse funds in order to establish new financial undertakings.
Foranstaltningerne omfattede indførelse af kapitalkontrol for at sætte en stopper for kapitalflugten.
Moreover, in bankruptcy proceedings of financial undertakings, deposits would be given priority over other claims.
For det andet indebar programmet en omfattende bankomstruktureringsstrategi, hvis endemål var at genoprette et levedygtigt finanssystem i Island og sikre landets internationale finansielle forbindelser.
The government declared that deposits in domestic commercial and savings banks and their branches in Iceland would be fully protected.
Blandt delmålene var at sikre en rimelig vurdering af bankernes aktiver, maksimere inddrivelse af aktiver og styrke tilsynspraksis.
Policy priorities focused initially on securing the basic functioning of the domestic banking, payment and settlement systems.
For det tredje sigtede programmet mod at sikre bæredygtige offentlige finanser ved at begrænse socialiseringen af tab i de konkursramte banker og gennemføre et mellemlangsigtet finanspolitisk konsolideringsprogram.
In the first weeks after the crash, the Icelandic Government also prepared an economic program in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (the IMF), leading to the approval on 20 November 2008 of Iceland's request for a two year stand-by-arrangement from the Fund, which included a 2,1 billion USD loan from the IMF aimed at strengthening Iceland's currency reserves.
De islandske myndigheder har understreget, at de rent politisk havde begrænsede muligheder på grund af de ekstraordinære omstændigheder i forbindelse med banksystemets størrelse i forhold til finansministeriets kapacitet.
Additional loans of up to 3 billion USD were secured from other Nordic countries as well as certain other trading partners.
Løsningerne var derfor på mange måder forskellige fra de foranstaltninger, som andre landes regeringer traf imod trusler mod deres finansielle stabilitet.
Of the IMF loan, 827 million USD was made available immediately, while the remaining amount was disbursed in eight equal instalments, subject to quarterly reviews of the program.
På grundlag af nødloven blev de tre store kommercielle banker Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands og Kaupthing Bank opdelt i »gamle« og »nye« banker.
The IMF Program was a broad-based stabilisation program focusing on three key objectives.
Finansministeren etablerede tre aktieselskaber, som skulle overtage de gamle bankers nationale aktiviteter og udnævnte disses bestyrelser.
Firstly, to stabilise and restore confidence in the króna so as to contain the negative impact of the crisis on the economy.
FME overtog kontrollen med de gamle banker, allokerede i det store og hele deres nationale aktiver og passiver (indskud) til de nye banker, der videreførte bankaktiviteterne i Island, mens de gamle banker blev sat under tilsyn af deres respektive likvidationskomité [20].
The measures included the introduction of capital controls aimed at stemming capital flight.
Udenlandske aktiver og passiver blev i det store og hele placeret i de gamle banker, som senere blev omfattet af afviklingsprocedurer, og i sidste instans ophørte alle udenlandske aktiviteter [21].
Secondly, the program included a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy, ultimately aimed at rebuilding a viable financial system in Iceland as well as safeguarding the country's international financial relations.
I de foreløbige primobalancer for de tre nye banker pr. 14. november 2008 blev det anslået, at bankernes samlede, kombinerede aktiver ville udgøre 2886 mia. ISK, og at staten skulle tilvejebringe en egenkapital på 385 mia. ISK.
Among subsidiary goals was to ensure fair valuation of the banks' assets, maximise asset recovery and strengthen supervisory practices.
Den samlede værdi af de obligationer, som de nye banker skulle udstede til de gamle banker som betaling for den værdi af de overførte aktiver, der oversteg passiverne, blev anslået til 1153 mia. ISK.
Thirdly, the program aimed at ensuring sustainable public finances, by limiting the socialisation of losses in the failed banks and implementing a medium-term fiscal consolidation program.
FME udnævnte Deloitte LLP til at foretage vurderingen af de overførte aktivers og passivers værdi.
The Icelandic authorities have underlined that due to the exceptional circumstances linked to the large size of the banking system in relation to the financial capacity of the Treasury, the policy options available to the authorities were limited.
I denne proces viste det sig, at den uvildige vurdering ikke ville munde ud i faste værdier for de overførte nettoaktiver, men at de ville blive værdiansat inden for visse intervaller.
The solutions relied upon were therefore in many ways different to the measures taken by the governments of other countries facing threats to financial stability.
Desuden gjorde bankernes kreditorer indvendinger mod værdiansættelsesprocessen, som de ikke fandt upartisk, og de klagede over, at de ikke havde mulighed for at beskytte deres interesser.
On the basis of the Emergency Act, the three large commercial banks, Glitnir Bank, Landsbanki Íslands and Kaupthing Bank, were split into ‘old’ and ‘new’ banks.
Disse komplikationer medførte en ændring i politikken for afregningen mellem de nye og de gamle banker, hvilket betød, at parterne i stedet for en værdiansættelse foretaget af en uvildig ekspert ville forsøge at forhandle sig frem til aftaler om værdien af de overførte nettoaktiver.
The Minister of Finance founded three limited liability companies to take over the domestic operations of the old banks and appointed them boards of directors.
Det stod klart, at parterne ville få svært ved at nå til enighed om værdiansættelsen, da den nødvendigvis afhang af forskellige skøn, som parterne sandsynligvis ikke var enige om.
The FME took control of the old banks, allocated essentially their domestic assets and liabilities (deposits) to the new banks which continued banking operations in Iceland, while the old banks were placed under the supervision of their respective resolution committees [20].
Statens mål var at nå til enighed om grundevalueringer, som skulle udgøre et solidt grundlag for den indledende kapitalisering af de nye banker.
Foreign assets and liabilities were in the main placed in the old banks, which were later submitted to winding-up procedures and the eventual closure of all foreign operations [21].
Priser på aktiver, der lå over grundevalueringen, kunne tildeles kreditorerne i form af betingede obligationer eller opskrivninger af værdien af bankernes egenkapital, da det under forhandlingerne kom frem, at likvidationskomitéerne for Glitnir og Kaupthing og et flertal af deres kreditorer ville være interesserede i at erhverve kapitalandele i de nye banker, og dette ville gøre det muligt for dem at få del i potentielle stigninger i værdien af de overførte aktiver.
In the provisional opening balance sheets of the three new banks of 14 November 2008 it was estimated that the banks' combined total assets would amount to 2886 billion ISK, with an equity to be provided by the State of 385 billion ISK.
Den fulde kapitalisering af de tre nye banker og grundlaget for aftalerne med kreditorerne i de gamle banker blev offentliggjort den 20. juli 2009.
The total amount of bonds to be issued by the new banks in favour of the old banks as payment for the value of the assets transferred in excess of liabilities was estimated at 1153 billion ISK.
Regeringen indgik i sin egenskab af eneejer af de tre nye banker aftaler med likvidationskomitéerne for de gamle banker med hensyn til, hvordan kompensationen for overførslen af nettoaktiverne til de nye banker skulle beregnes og betales.
The FME appointed Deloitte LLP to perform assessments of the value of transferred assets and liabilities.
For så vidt angår to af de nye banker, Íslandsbanki og New Kaupthing (senere omdøbt til Arion Bank), omfattede dette betingede aftaler om, at de gamle banker skulle tegne størsteparten af egenkapitalinteresserne i de nye banker.
In this process it transpired that the independent assessment would not result in fixed values of net assets transferred but valuations within certain ranges.