natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For det fjerde forventedes Djurslandsmotorvejen, som ville skabe hurtigere og bedre transportforbindelse til Tirstrup, at åbne i 2004.
Denmark points out that according to the principal agreement Aarhus airport was obliged to give Ryanair a rebate of DKK […] (for the first […] years, i.e. […]), or DKK […] (for the last […] years, i.e. […]) of passenger service charge (this means […] discount on the applicable passenger service charge), if Ryanair collects a net revenue of DKK […] or less per one-way passenger on the London Stansted route.
Danmark pegede endvidere på, at Storebæltsbroen var blevet åbnet, hvilket gav de rejsende mulighed for at køre fra Aarhus til København, og at SAS havde nedlagt sin rute til London.
Denmark clarifies that this was the case from 1999 onwards.
Danmark oplyser, at rejsetiden mellem Aarhus og København med alternative transportmuligheder (bil/tog/hurtigfærge) efter åbningen af Storebæltsbroen faldt fra ca. fem timer til ca. tre timer.
The 1999 marketing agreement
Danmark bemærker, at Aarhus Lufthavn derfor (jf. betragtning 32 og 33) skulle skabe incitamenter til at tiltrække nye kunder og udnytte den overskydende kapacitet.
Denmark points out that on the same day, 2 November 1999, Ryanair and Aarhus airport concluded a second agreement (‘marketing agreement’).
Ifølge Danmark skønnede Aarhus Lufthavns direktør, at Ryanair årligt ville kunne tiltrække ca. […] ekstra passagerer til lufthavnen.
Denmark explains that the marketing agreement obliged Aarhus airport to pay to Ryanair:
På baggrund af disse passagerprognoser forventedes aftalen at generere nettoindtægter på ca. […] DKK ([…] EUR) i 2001.
an amount equal to […] incurred by Ryanair in accordance with the principal agreement and
Danmark forklarer, at pålideligheden af disse prognoser blev bekræftet af de faktiske resultater, idet nettoindtægterne i 2001 som følge af aftalen beløb sig til […] DKK ([…] EUR).
all increases in the level of passenger service charge at Aarhus airport over DKK […] and over DKK […].
Danmark understreger, at alle lufthavnens omkostninger (f.eks. markedsføring, groundhandling m.m.) i forbindelse med aftalen finansieres direkte gennem de indtægter, der hidrører fra aftalen.
Denmark explains further that, according to the marketing agreement, the reduction of landing/take-off/night fee charges was deemed to be marketing support.
Danmark fremfører desuden, at de nettoindtægter, der genereres gennem aftalen, bidrager til lufthavnens samlede rentabilitet.
Denmark states that Aarhus airport did not know the purpose of the marketing support paid but assumed that it was to share the costs for the Aarhus/London-Stansted route.
Danmark bemærker, at aftalen ikke krævede yderligere investeringer fra Aarhus Lufthavn, fordi lufthavnen allerede kun udnyttede 40 % af sin kapacitet.
Application of the Market Economy Operator Principle and selectivity
I forbindelse med Aarhus Lufthavns driftsomkostninger var det fastsat i aftalen, at lufthavnspersonalet kunne dække op til 60 % af kapaciteten, f.eks. var groundhandling-personalet allerede finansieret gennem lufthavnens øvrige indtægter.
Regarding the application of the Market Economy Operator Principle (‘MEOP’), Denmark is of the opinion that the Commission should compare the behaviour of Arhus airport with the supposed conduct of a private operator guided by prospects of long-term profitability and pursuing a sectoral policy.
For så vidt angår den markedsføringsstøtte, som Aarhus Lufthavn ifølge markedsføringsaftalen skulle yde til Ryanair, bemærker Danmark, at lufthavnens ledelse forventede, at Ryanair ville bidrage til en højere eksponering af lufthavnen.
Denmark states that the profitability of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair needs to be assessed for the entire expected duration of the agreements in questions (this means a period of 10 years).
Det fremføres desuden, at Aarhus Lufthavn samtidig besluttede at skære ned på sin øvrige markedsføring, da den blev erstattet af Ryanair, f.eks. gennem markedsføring af Aarhus Lufthavn på Ryanairs websted og i de øvrige lufthavne, som flyselskabet betjener.
Denmark states that the 1999 agreements had a positive impact on the airport's finances for the period 1999 to 2009.
Danmark bemærker, at Aarhus Lufthavn havde til hensigt at øge sine indtægter gennem en stigning i antallet af passagerer og ikke-luftfartsrelaterede indtægter (f.eks. shopping eller parkering).
Denmark clarifies that, at the time of the conclusion of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair, Aarhus airport was facing the following challenges: First, it was competing for airlines and passengers with Billund airport, which had as the largest airport in the Jutland region a strategically stronger competitive position.
Danmark bemærker desuden, at Aarhus Lufthavn, da aftalen blev indgået, havde en forventning om, at betalingsparkering potentielt ville kunne generere betydelige indtægter.
Second, Aarhus airport was only operating at 40 % of its capacity and had already suffered from a decrease in passengers from approximately 860000 to approximately 596000 from 1996 to 1999, with a further decrease expected in the coming years.
For så vidt angår indtægterne fra shopping, oplyser Danmark, at kun 30 % af lufthavnens kapacitet var lejet ud.
Third, the military activity of the airport, Tirstrup Air Base, had ceased, which meant that the Aarhus annual net costs associated with air traffic control, fire and rescue services, technical and ground services had risen by DKK 10-12 million.
Danmark mener derfor, at aftalen med Ryanair fra 1999 blev indgået i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, eftersom den forventedes at bidrage med ca. […] DKK til lufthavnens rentabilitet mellem 1999 til 2009, og at den derfor øgede lufthavnsforvalterens finansielle levedygtighed.
Fourth, a new motorway (namely, the Djursland motorway) providing a faster and easier transport link with Tirstrup, was scheduled to open in 2004.
Som dokumentation herfor har Danmark indsendt ledelsens forretningsplan og oversigt over forventet rentabilitet.
Denmark explains further that the Great Belt Bridge had been opened (giving travellers the option of driving from Aarhus to Copenhagen) and the SAS route to London had been closed.
Tabel 3 giver et overblik over aftalens forventede rentabilitet:
Denmark points out that the opening of the Great Belt Bridge reduced the journey time between Aarhus and Copenhagen from approximately five hours to approximately three hours for alternative means of transport (car/train/express ferry).
Tabel 3
Denmark points out that against this background (see recitals 32 and 33) Aarhus airport had to provide incentives in order to attract new clients and fill the idle capacity.
Overblik over Aarhus Lufthavns forventede rentabilitet som følge af aftalen med Ryanair fra 1999; i 1000 DKK
Denmark clarifies that Aarhus airport's director estimated that Ryanair would be able to attract to the airport around […] additional passengers per annum.
I alt (nominelt)
Denmark states that, on the basis of these passenger forecasts, the agreements were expected to generate a net income of approximately DKK […] (EUR […]) in 2001.
Indtægter
Denmark explains that the reliability of the director's forecasts was confirmed by the actual results, such as for example in 2001 the net income generated by the 1999 agreements was DKK […] (EUR […]).
Luftfartsrelaterede indtægter
Denmark stresses that all costs (such as, for example, marketing, ground handling and other costs) incurred by the airport in connection with the entry into the agreement with Ryanair are financed directly through the revenue generated by that agreement.
Ikke-luftfartsrelaterede indtægter
In addition, Denmark states that the net income generated by the agreement contributes to the overall profitability of the airport.
Omkostninger
Denmark points out that the 1999 Ryanair agreements did not require any investments from Aarhus airport, because the airport was only operated at 40 % of its capacity.
Groundhandling
Denmark clarifies that also with regard to Aarhus airport's operating costs the 1999 agreements with Ryanair provided that the staff could cover up to 60 % of the capacity, for example the ground handling staff had already been financed from the airport's other income.
Markedsføring
With regard to the marketing support to be paid by Aarhus airport to Ryanair according to the marketing agreement, Denmark points out that the management of the airport expected that Ryanair would assist the airport by increasing its exposure.
Resultater af aftalen fra 1999 med Ryanair
Denmark further clarifies that at the same time Aarhus airport decided to downsize its other marketing activities as these were replaced by Ryanair, such as among others the advertising of Aarhus airport on Ryanair's website and at the airports served.
Danmark oplyser, at Ryanair ikke har en selektiv fordel, da de nedslag, der ydes på baggrund af aftalen, tidligere også blev ydet til SAS.
Denmark clarifies that Aarhus airport's intention was to increase its revenues through the increase in passengers and non-aeronautical revenue (such as shopping or parking revenue).
Danmark oplyser desuden, at Cimber Air A/S og Maersk Air A/S i 1999 fik ydet det samme nedslag på 50 % som Ryanair.
Denmark clarifies further that, at the time when the 1999 Ryanair agreements were concluded, Aarhus airport expected the paid parking to be a major potential income generator.
Desuden havde de regionale luftfartsselskaber Sunair og EasyJet (tidligere Go) ligeledes modtaget tilbud om lignende rabataftaler.
With regard to the shopping revenue, Denmark clarifies that only 30 % of the airport's available capacity was being leased out.
Danmark har indsendt kopier af breve som dokumentation herfor.
For these reasons, Denmark is of the opinion that the 1999 agreements with Ryanair were concluded in accordance with the MEOP as these agreements were expected to contribute in 1999 to 2009 around DKK […] to the profitability of the airport and increased thus the financial viability of the airport operator.
Danmark er af den opfattelse, at aftalen mellem Aarhus Lufthavn og Ryanair blev indgået på markedsvilkår og ikke giver Ryanair en fordel, og at den derfor ikke udgør statsstøtte.
In order to support this position, Denmark provided the business plan and profitability assumptions of the management of the airport operator.
Danmark fremfører desuden, at den forventede rentabilitet blev bekræftet ved lufthavnens faktiske økonomiske resultater.
Table 3 summarises the expected profitability of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair provided by Denmark:
Aarhus Lufthavn havde f.eks. et nettooverskud på omkring 2 mio. DKK i 2010, og der forventes også et positivt resultat for de næste år.
Table 3
Danmark understreger, at overskuddet skyldes den gradvise stigning i antallet af passagerer og den langsigtede overgang fra indenrigs- til udenrigsflyvninger efter åbningen af Storebæltsbroen.
Overview of the expected profitability of the 1999 Ryanair agreements for Aarhus airport in 1000 DKK
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA TREDJEPARTER
Total (nominal)
Kommissionen har modtaget bemærkninger fra tre interesserede parter.
Revenues
I sine bemærkninger af 29. maj 2008 oplyste Ryanair indledningsvis, at selskabet mente, at indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure var ubegrundet og unødvendig.
Aeronautical revenue
Selskabet beklagede ligeledes, at Kommissionen ikke havde givet Ryanair mulighed for at deltage i den indledende undersøgelse.
Non-aeronautical revenue
Hvad angår sagens substans, er Ryanair af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen burde have taget udgangspunkt i standardforretningsaftaler, og at den på den baggrund burde have konkluderet, at aftalen fra 1999 er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, og at den derfor ikke udgør statsstøtte.
Costs
Ryanair mener, at Aarhus Lufthavn har nytte af selskabets tilstedeværelse i lufthavnen.
Ground handling
For så vidt angår det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, oplyser Ryanair, at der på indtægtssiden bør tages hensyn til både luftfartsrelaterede og ikke-luftfartsrelaterede indtægter.
Marketing
På omkostningssiden omfatter de relevante omkostninger, der bør tages højde for, meromkostningerne i forbindelse med indgåelsen af de respektive aftaler med et luftfartsselskab.
Results from 1999 Ryanair agreements
Ryanair er af den opfattelse, at hverken irreversible omkostninger eller faste generalomkostninger bør tages i betragtning.
Denmark clarifies that Ryanair does not receive a selective advantage as the discounts granted on the basis of the 1999 agreements with Ryanair have been previously granted also to SAS.
Selskabet fremfører, at en aftale indgået mellem et luftfartsselskab og en lufthavn, der medfører en stigende rentabilitet, ikke udgør statsstøtte.
Further, Denmark pointed out that in 1999, Cimber Air A/S and Maersk Air A/S were also granted the same 50 % discount as Ryanair.
Ifølge Ryanair kan en aftale i dette tilfælde være rentabel, selv om den synes at medføre høje meromkostninger på undertegningstidspunktet.
Denmark further states that also the regional airline Sunair and EasyJet (previously Go) received offers for a similar discount agreement.
Ryanair fremfører endvidere, at der i forbindelse med vurderingen af aftalen bør tages hensyn til netværksvirkninger, som skyldes aftalen fra 1999.
Denmark takes the view that the 1999 agreements concluded between Aarhus airport and Ryanair were concluded on market terms and do not confer an advantage on Ryanair, and thus do not constitute State aid.
Ryanair mener, at aftalen fra 1999 svarer til en standardforretningsaftale mellem en lufthavn og et luftfartsselskab på et liberaliseret marked.
Moreover, Denmark clarifies that the expected profitability was also confirmed by actual financial results of the airport manager.
Ryanair bemærker, at aftalen bygger på lufthavnens uafhængige beslutning om at forbedre sin kapacitetsudnyttelse ved at øge antallet af passagerer med henblik på at øge sine luftfartsrelaterede og ikke-luftfartsrelaterede indtægter.
Denmark states further that for example Aarhus airport achieved net profits of around DKK 2 million in 2010, also for the next years positive results are expected.
Ryanair fremfører, at Aarhus Lufthavn ved at beslutte, at den bedste måde at øge passagerantallet på er ved at tilskynde luftfartsselskaberne til at tilføre store passagermængder, har fulgt det samme eksempel, som mange private lufthavne i en lignende situation ville følge.
Denmark points out that the profits are the result of the gradual increase in passengers and the long-term switch from domestic to international flights following the opening of the Great Belt Bridge.
Ifølge Ryanair skaber lufthavne sådanne incitamenter under erkendelse af, at de luftfartsselskaber, der tilfører store passagermængder, skaber stordriftsfordele for lufthavnsforvalteren.
COMMENTS FROM THIRD PARTIES
Ryanair fremfører, at Aarhus Lufthavns tilskyndelsesordning er baseret på Ryanairs tilsagn om at generere mindst […] passagerer årligt.
The Commission has received observations from three interested parties.
Ryanair giver eksempler på andre europæiske lufthavne, der følger den samme strategi som Aarhus Lufthavn, f.eks. London Stansted, London Luton og Frankfurt Hahn.
Ryanair
Desuden bemærker Ryanair, at det for at være i overensstemmelse med det makroøkonomiske investorprincip er tilstrækkeligt, at aftalen forbedrer lufthavnens økonomiske situation på lang sigt.
Ryanair began its observations dated 29 May 2008 by stating that in its opinion the initiation of a formal investigation procedure was unjustified and unnecessary.
For så vidt angår spørgsmålet om, hvem aftalen kan tilregnes, fremfører Ryanair, at Aarhus Lufthavn er et uafhængigt selskab.
Ryanair is of the opinion that the manager of Aarhus airport is benefiting from its presence at the airport.
Ryanair oplyser, at ejerne ikke udøver kontrol med lufthavnens forvaltning og økonomi.
With regard to the MEOP, Ryanair states that on the revenue side, both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues must be taken into account.
Ledelsen fastlagde afgifterne og forhandlede om aftalen uden de offentlige myndigheders eller Danmarks deltagelse.
On the costs side, Ryanair points out that the relevant costs to be taken into account are the incremental costs of entering the respective agreements with an airline.
Med hensyn til den selektive fordel finder Ryanair, at eftersom Aarhus Lufthavn ikke har en dominerende stilling på nogen af de europæiske, nationale eller regionale markeder for luftfartstjenester, er den ikke forpligtet til at behandle alle sine kunder på en ikkediskriminerende måde i henhold til EU's konkurrenceregler.
Ryanair is of the opinion that neither sunk costs nor fixed overhead costs should be taken into account.
Ryanair fremfører dog, at Aarhus Lufthavn altid har fulgt princippet om ikkediskrimination og rent faktisk tilbød den aftale, som i sidste ende blev indgået med Ryanair, til en række andre luftfartsselskaber, bl.a. SAS, Cimber Air, Sun Air og Maersk.
Ryanair states that if an airline enters into an agreement with an airport which is incrementally profitable, the agreement does not contain any aid.
Ryanair bemærker, at det forhold, at ingen af disse luftfartsselskaber var interesserede i at udvide deres operationer fra Aarhus Lufthavn, ikke betyder, at Ryanair får privilegeret behandling.
Ryanair states that, in general, a market economy operator is not expected to enter into agreements which are incrementally loss-making.
Ryanair fremfører desuden, at aftalen med Aarhus Lufthavn ikke indeholder nogen henvisninger til eksklusivitet.
On the other hand, Ryanair states that an exception should be made if an airport is inefficient at the time the agreement is concluded, but believes the agreement will, in some way, help it to improve its efficiency.
I lyset af ovenstående mener Ryanair, at aftalen med Aarhus Lufthavn ikke udgør statsstøtte.
In that case, according to Ryanair, the deal could be profitable even if at the time of signing the agreement it appears to be below its incremental costs.
SAS indsendte sine bemærkninger den 16. juni 2008.
Furthermore, according to Ryanair, the Commission should have based its assessment on a comparator approach, comparing the agreements concluded by Ryanair with other public and private airports.
Ifølge SAS er Aarhus Lufthavn ikke uafhængig af sine offentlige ejere (dvs. de offentlige myndigheder).
Ryanair further states that, when assessing the agreements, the network externalities resulting from the 1999 agreements should also be considered.
SAS fremfører, at flertallet af bestyrelsesmedlemmerne udpeges og vælges af lufthavnens offentlige ejere.
It is the view of Ryanair that the investigated 1999 agreements correspond to a standard commercial arrangement between an airport and an airline in a liberalised market.
SAS mener, at bestyrelsesmedlemmerne derfor ikke er uafhængige af deres arbejdsgivere og de ejere, de repræsenterer.
Ryanair points out that it is rooted in the airport's independent decision to improve its capacity utilisation by means of maximising passenger numbers, in order to increase its aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues.
For så vidt angår lufthavnens økonomiske situation, bemærker SAS, at Aarhus Lufthavn har oplyst, at den befinder sig i en sund økonomisk situation, og at Ryanair årligt bidrager netto til lufthavnen med ca. 5-6 mio. DKK.
Ryanair argues that Aarhus airport followed the example of many private airports in a comparable situation, deciding that the best way to maximise passenger numbers is to incentivise airlines to deliver large passenger volumes.
SAS fremfører, at Aarhus Lufthavn, selv hvis dette tal skulle være korrekt, synes at have et negativt resultat på 2311410 DKK i 2007 på trods af en stigning i indtægterne på 12,5 %.
According to Ryanair, airports provide such incentives in recognition of the fact that airlines delivering large passenger volumes generate economies of scale for the airport manager.
SAS fremfører endvidere, at lufthavnsforvalterens svage økonomiske resultater også fremgår af, at det samlede underskud for de seneste fem år beløber sig til mere end 20 mio. DKK.
According to Ryanair, the incentive scheme at Aarhus airport was rooted in Ryanair's commitment to generate at least […] passengers per annum.
SAS fremfører, at lufthavnen ved at give Ryanair privilegeret behandling diskriminerer mod de øvrige luftfartsselskaber, der opererer i lufthavnen.
Ryanair explains that the fees to be paid by SAS cannot be compared to those paid by Ryanair as the level of services provided, such as handling requirements and aircraft operations, of the two airlines are different.
SAS fremfører, at den støtte, som lufthavnsforvalteren yder til Ryanair, ikke har til formål at udvikle en underudviklet region, men snarere at tiltrække yderligere operationer og konkurrere med andre lufthavne.
Ryanair is of the opinion that the 1999 agreements concluded with Aarhus airport are in line with the MEOP.
Endelig fremfører SAS, at aftalen med Ryanair har været gyldig i knap 10 år.
With regard to the imputability of the 1999 agreements, Ryanair is of the opinion that Aarhus airport is an independent undertaking.
SAS mener, at selv om det kan argumenteres, at aftalen som sådan er i overensstemmelse med kriterierne for startstøtte til luftfartsselskaber, jf. 2005-retningslinjerne, medfører selve tidsrammen, at aftalen ikke er i overensstemmelse med de stramme betingelser for modtagelse af sådan støtte.
Ryanair states that the owners do not exercise control over its management and finances.
I lyset af ovenstående mener SAS, at aftalen fra 1999 mellem Aarhus Lufthavn og Ryanair udgør uforenelig statsstøtte.
Ryanair explains that it was the management that determined the charges and negotiated the arrangement with the airline.
Sammenslutningen af Europæiske Luftfartsselskaber
The public authorities or Denmark were not involved in the negotiations.
DANMARKS KOMMENTARER TIL BEMÆRKNINGERNE FRA TREDJEPARTERNE
Further, Ryanair believes that the airport's shareholders retain no control over the setting of charges, including the deal with Ryanair.
Bemærkningerne fra de tre interesserede parter blev videresendt til Danmark.
With regard to the selective advantage, Ryanair is of the opinion that, since Aarhus airport is not in a dominant position in any of the European, national or regional markets for airport services, it is therefore not under an obligation pursuant to EU competition rules to treat all of its airline customers in a non-discriminatory manner.
Danmark indledte sine bemærkninger med at fremføre, at de retningslinjer, som SAS henviser til, ikke er relevante for undersøgelsen af, om aftalen fra 1999 udgør statsstøtte.
Nevertheless, Ryanair clarifies that Aarhus airport has always followed the principle of non-discrimination, and in fact offered the arrangement, eventually taken up by Ryanair, to a number of other airlines, including SAS, Cimber Air, Sun Air and Maersk.
Danmark oplyser, at man ikke er enig med SAS' bemærkning om, at aftalen kan tilregnes staten.
Ryanair points out that the fact that none of these airlines was interested in expanding their operations from Aarhus does not mean that Ryanair enjoys preferential treatment.
Danmark fremfører, at det med henblik på at fastslå, om aftalen kan tilregnes den danske stat, ikke er tilstrækkeligt, at Aarhus Lufthavn er offentligt ejet, men at det skal påvises, at de offentlige myndigheder har været direkte indblandet i lufthavnsforvalterens beslutninger.
In addition, Ryanair states that its 1999 agreements with Aarhus airport do not contain any reference to exclusivity.
Danmark oplyser, at de offentlige myndigheder på intet tidspunkt deltog i forhandlingerne om aftalen.
In view of the above, Ryanair is of the opinion that the agreements concluded with Aarhus airport do not constitute State aid.
Danmark afviser også SAS' bemærkning om, at aftalen ikke indeholder en »volumen-garanti« eller en sanktionsmekanisme i tilfælde af, at Ryanair ikke lever op til sine forpligtelser.
SAS submitted its comments on 16 June 2008.