natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne forværring af rentabiliteten kan i hvert fald delvis tilskrives det betydelige fald i produktions- og salgsmængde, som påvirkede kapacitetsudnyttelsen, der også faldt, og som havde en negativ indvirkning på de gennemsnitlige produktionsomkostninger.
Table 4
Tabel 4
Sales price, profitability
Salgspris, rentabilitet
Sales price (Euro/ton)
Salgspris (EUR/ton)
Profitability
Rentabilitet
In summary, all main injury indicators showed a significant downturn after the investigation period.
Kort sagt viste alle de vigtigste skadesindikatorer en markant tilbagegang efter undersøgelsesperioden.
Production and sales volume dropped significantly with a negative impact on capacity utilisation.
Produktions- og salgsmængden faldt betydeligt med en negativ indvirkning på kapacitetsudnyttelsen.
Market share remained stable, but which was due to the parallel contraction of the Union market.
Dette skyldtes imidlertid en tilsvarende nedgang i EU-markedet.
The increase in sales prices could not alter this downward development.
Det kan derfor konkluderes, at Unionen led skade i perioden efter undersøgelsesperioden for den oprindelige undersøgelse.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Union injury was suffering injury in the period after the IP of the original investigation.
Resultaterne af udløbsundersøgelsen uden Hubeis eksport
The findings of the expiry review in the absence of Hubei's exports
Kommissionen har også undersøgt, om resultaterne af udløbsundersøgelsen også ville være gyldige uden Hubeis eksport til Unionen i forbindelse med vurderingen af sandsynligheden for fornyet trussel om skade.
The Commission also assessed whether the findings of the expiry review would still hold true without Hubei's exports to the Union in the assessment of the likelihood of a recurrence of a threat of injury.
I denne forbindelse skal det erindres, at da Hubei ikke samarbejdede i forbindelse med udløbsundersøgelsen, modtog Kommissionen ingen oplysninger om virksomhedens import i samme periode.
In this regard, it is recalled that, because Hubei did not cooperate during the expiry review investigation, the Commission did not receive any data concerning its imports during that period.
Desuden var specifikke oplysninger om Hubeis import ikke til rådighed i databasen i henhold til artikel 14, stk. 6.
Specific import data for Hubei's imports was also not available in the Article 14(6) database.
Importen fra Hubei fandt sted under Taric-tillægskode A950, som gjaldt for alle virksomheder, der samarbejdede i den oprindelige undersøgelse, men som ikke er tildelt en individuel toldsats.
Imports from Hubei were made under the TARIC additional code A950, which applied to all companies that cooperated during the original investigation but did not receive an individual duty rate.
Kommissionen havde således kun adgang til aggregerede oplysninger om 16 eksporterende kinesiske producenter (herunder Hubei), som alle er omfattet af Taric-tillægskode A950.
Thus, only the aggregated import data for 16 Chinese exporting producers (including Hubei), all of which were attributed the TARIC additional code A950, was available to the Commission.
Kommissionen kunne derfor ikke anvende disse aggregerede importoplysninger til at udlede data om Hubeis eksport alene.
The Commission could, therefore, not make use of this aggregated import data to distil therefrom Hubei's exports alone.
På grund af den manglende samarbejdsvilje og mangel på statistikker om Hubeis import anslog Kommissionen derfor Hubeis importmængde i undersøgelsesperioden på grundlag af virksomhedens importmængde i den oprindelige undersøgelse.
Accordingly, due to the non-cooperation and in the absence of statistics on Hubei's imports, the Commission estimated Hubei's import volume during the review investigation period on the basis of its import volume during the original investigation.
Disse oplysninger blev indberettet af Hubei i virksomhedens svar på spørgeskemaet i den oprindelige undersøgelse, og de blev kontrolleret af Kommissionen under kontrolbesøget på stedet hos Hubei i oktober 2008.
This information was reported by Hubei in its reply to the questionnaire in the original investigation and was verified by the Commission during the on-spot verification visit that occurred at Hubei's premises in October 2008.
For at opsummere udgjorde importen fra Hubei i den oprindelige undersøgelsesperiode ca. [8-13 %] af den samlede kinesiske import.
To recall, during the original investigation period, imports from Hubei accounted for around [8-13 %] of all Chinese imports.
Kommissionen antog derfor i lyset af Hubeis manglende samarbejdsvilje i udløbsundersøgelsen, at denne procentdel af den samlede import fra Kina forblev uændret.
The Commission, accordingly, assumed that this percentage of the total of Chinese imports remained unchanged in the absence of cooperation from Hubei during the expiry review investigation.
I henhold til forordningen om udløbsundersøgelsen var den samlede import fra Kina til Unionen i undersøgelsesperioden på 67977 ton.
According to the expiry review Regulation, total imports from China into the Union during the review investigation period were 67977 tonnes.
På denne baggrund og ved også at overføre denne procentdel for Hubei af den samlede import fra Kina (dvs. [8-13 %] af den samlede import) til konklusionerne i forordningen om udløbsundersøgelsen, blev Hubeis import beregnet til [6000-7500] ton ud af 67977 ton, der blev registreret i forordningen om udløbsundersøgelsen.
On this basis, and transposing that same percentage of Hubei in the total imports from the PRC (that is to say [8-13 %] of total imports) also to the findings in the expiry review Regulation, Hubei's imports were calculated to be [6000 to 7500] tonnes out of the 67977 tonnes recorded in the expiry review Regulation.
Eftersom ca. [87-92 %] af importen ifølge beregningerne var fra andre kinesiske eksporterende producenter end Hubei, og i betragtning af at grundforordningens artikel 3, stk. 9, kræver en samlet vurdering af disse indikatorer, konkluderede Kommissionen, at udelukkelsen af Hubeis import fra den samlede kinesiske import i undersøgelsesperioden ikke ville sætte spørgsmålstegn ved Kommissionens kvalitative vurdering, der er indeholdt i forordningen om udløbsundersøgelsen.
Given that around [87-92 %] of imports were calculated to be from Chinese exporting producers other than Hubei, and given that Article 3(9) of the basic Regulation requires a global assessment of these indicators, the Commission concluded that the exclusion of Hubei's imports from the total Chinese imports during the review investigation period would not call into question the qualitative assessment of the Commission contained in the expiry review Regulation.
Konklusionerne i betragtning 105 til 109 i forordningen om udløbsundersøgelsen blev derfor bekræftet og kan fastholdes uændret, selv uden importen fra Hubei.
The findings set out in recitals 105 to 109 of the expiry review Regulation were, therefore, confirmed and can be retained without changes thereto, even in the absence of imports deriving from Hubei.
Virkninger af en ophævelse af foranstaltningerne på EU-erhvervsgrenen
Impact of a repeal of measures on the Union industry
Kommissionen vurderede efterfølgende konsekvenserne af ophævelsen af foranstaltningerne mod Kina erga omnes på EU-erhvervsgrenens situation.
The Commission, subsequently, assessed the impact of the repeal of the measures against China erga omnes on the situation of the Union industry.
Det skal her erindres, at de pågældende økonomiske data blev indsamlet i forbindelse med udløbsundersøgelsen, jf. betragtning 2.
Here, it is recalled that the relevant economic data were collected during the expiry review investigation referred to in recital 2.
Disse konklusioner blev baseret på kendsgerninger og dokumentation indsamlet i en senere periode (fra juli 2013 til juni 2014), hvorimod konklusionerne i den oprindelige undersøgelse var baseret på dokumentation indsamlet i perioden fra juli 2007 til juni 2008.
These findings were based on facts and evidence collected during a more recent period (July 2013 to June 2014), while the findings in the original investigation were based on evidence collected for the period July 2007 to June 2008.
Udløbsundersøgelsen viste tydeligt: at hvis foranstaltningerne bliver ophævet, vil erhvervsgrenen fortsat stå over for en betydelig stigning i importen fra Kina til dumpingpriser.
The expiry review investigation clearly indicated the following: should measures be repealed, the industry would be faced with a significant increase of imports from China made at dumped prices.
Det blev fastslået, at importen i betragtning af de lave priser, kunne nå op på et niveau svarende til det, der blev konstateret i den oprindelige undersøgelse.
It was established that import volumes, given the low prices, could reach a similar level to the one found during the original investigation.
Sideløbende hermed viste undersøgelsen et fald i EU-forbruget på 19 % i den betragtede periode.
In parallel, the investigation found a decrease of Union consumption of 19 % during the period considered.
Det blev fastslået, at det forventede prisniveau for importen fra Kina uden antidumpingtold sandsynligvis ville underbyde EU-erhvervsgrenens priser med ca. 40 %.
Indeed, it was established that the expected price level of Chinese imports without anti-dumping duty would be likely to undercut the Union industry prices by around 40 %.
EU-erhvervsgrenen ville ikke kunne modstå en sådan stigning i lavprisimporten.
The Union industry would not be able to cope with an increase of such low-priced imports.
Kunderne ville være i stand til at flytte deres kortfristede ordrer fra EU-producenterne til de kinesiske eksporterende producenter.
Customers would indeed be able to switch their short-term orders easily from the Union producers to the Chinese exporting producers.
Dette vil medføre en betydelig stigning i markedsandelen for importen fra 6,3 % i den fornyede undersøgelsesperiode til op til 30 %.
This would lead to a significant increase in market share of Chinese imports from 6,3 % during the review investigation period expiry review investigation up to 30 %.
I betragtning af den betydelige stigning i den kinesiske produktionskapacitet siden den oprindelige undersøgelse (60 %), ville import fra Kina straks oversvømme EU-markedet og vinde betragtelige markedsandele på bekostning af EU-erhvervsgrenen.
Given the substantial increase of Chinese production capacity since the original investigation (60 %), Chinese imports would imminently flood the Union market and gain substantial market share at the expense of the Union industry.
Desuden afslørede udløbsundersøgelsen en betydelig uudnyttet kapacitet i Kina (mere end det samlede EU-forbrug), som sandsynligvis vil blive rettet mod EU-markedet, der fortsat er meget attraktivt for kinesisk eksport på trods af de gældende foranstaltninger.
Moreover, the expiry review investigation revealed significant spare capacity in China (more than the entire Union consumption) that would be likely oriented to the Union market which remained very attractive for Chinese exports despite the measures in force.
Uudnyttet kapacitet blev vurderet til 2 mio. ton i den fornyede undersøgelsesperiode, hvilket oversteg det samlede EU-forbrug i samme periode.
Indeed, spare capacity was estimated at 2 million tonnes during the review investigation period which exceeded the total Union consumption during the same period.
Kina ville derfor kunne øge sine eksportmængder til Unionen betydeligt.
Therefore, China would be able to increase significantly its export volumes to the Union.
Denne konklusion underbygges af, at en række andre vigtige eksportmarkeder for Kina (f.eks. Canada, USA, Colombia, Mexico og Brasilien) havde indført handelsbeskyttelsesforanstaltninger mod importen fra Kina, og at der i en række andre lande blev gennemført handelsbeskyttelsesundersøgelser.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that a number of other important export markets of China (such as Canada, USA, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil) had trade defence measures in please against Chinese imports of the product concerned and in a number of other countries trade defence investigations were on-going.
Det blev også fastslået, at der på grund af nedgangen i den kinesiske økonomi kombineret med den store overkapacitet var et stærkt pres på de kinesiske producenter for at producere med en høj kapacitetsudnyttelsesgrad.
It was also established that, due to the downturn of the Chinese economy in combination with the high overcapacity, a strong pressure was exerted on the Chinese producers to produce at high capacity utilisation rates.
Hvad angår den sandsynlige prisudvikling for kinesisk import, var de kinesiske importpriser allerede betydeligt lavere end EU-erhvervsgrenens salgspriser i den fornyede undersøgelsesperiode, på trods af de gældende dumpingforanstaltninger.
Regarding the likely price evolution of the Chinese imports, Chinese import prices were already substantially below the Union industry sales prices during the review investigation period, despite the dumping measures in force.
Uden antidumpingtold forventes det, at de kinesiske importpriser ville falde yderligere, og der forventes underbudsmargener fra ca. 40 %.
Without anti-dumping duties, Chinese import prices were expected to decrease even further and undercutting margins from around 40 % would be expected.
Dette pristryk ville sandsynligvis blive større med den forventede kraftige stigning i importmængder fra Kina.
This price pressure would likely be accentuated by the likely imminent surge of Chinese import volumes.
Den fornyede udløbsundersøgelse bekræftede, at lagerbeholdningernes størrelse ikke har nogen særlig betydning for analysen, da EU-producenterne hovedsagelig producerer på grundlag af kundernes kortfristede ordrer, og da lagerbeholdningerne derfor kun udgør en ubetydelig procentdel af EU-producenternes produktion.
The expiry review investigation confirmed that the level of inventories was not of any particular significance for the analysis because the Union producers mainly produced on the basis of short-term orders from customers and the inventories therefore only represented an insignificant percentage of the Union producers' production.
Udløbsundersøgelsen viste også, at den negative indvirkning på EU-erhvervsgrenen ville vise sig i form af, at kunder i Unionen ville skifte til lavprisimporten fra Kina.
The expiry review also showed that the negative effect on the Union industry would manifest in a shift of customers in the Union to the low-priced Chinese imports.
Eftersom EU-kapaciteten ikke forventes at stige, ville dette også føre til en væsentlig stigning i markedsandelen for importen fra Kina på bekostning af EU-erhvervsgrenen.
As Union capacity was not expected to increase, this would also lead to a significant gain in market share of Chinese imports to the detriment of the Union industry.
Dette ville medføre en lavere kapacitetsudnyttelsesgrad for EU-erhvervsgrenen og dermed højere enhedsomkostninger.
This would result in a lower capacity utilisation rate for the Union industry, thus higher unit costs.
På samme tid vil lavprisimporten udøve et pristryk på EU-markedet, som ikke vil give EU-producenterne mulighed for at hæve priserne, og den vil således føre til et fald i rentabiliteten.
At the same time, the low-priced imports would exert a price pressure on the Union market which would not allow Union producers to raise prices, thus leading to a decrease in profitability.
Konklusionen på den fornyede udløbsundersøgelse var således, at en ophævelse af foranstaltningerne sandsynligvis vil føre til fornyet trussel om skade.
Thus, the expiry review concluded that the repeal of the measures would likely to lead to a recurrence of threat of injury.
Denne konklusion blev ikke anfægtet af nogen af de interesserede parter, og Kommissionen var ikke i stand til at finde dokumentation, der kunne rejse tvivl om disse resultater.
That conclusion was not called into question by any of the interested parties, nor was the Commission able to retrieve evidence that would call those findings into question.
Selv uden at tage importmængden fra Hubei i betragtning, ville resultatet af udløbsundersøgelsen ikke have været anderledes, og Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at en ophævelse af foranstaltningerne ville have alvorlige økonomiske konsekvenser for EU-erhvervsgrenen.
Therefore, and considering that even when disregarding import volumes from Hubei, the findings of the expiry review would not have been different, the Commission concluded that, should the measures be repealed, the economic impact on the Union industry would be severe.
E. KONKLUSION OG FREMLÆGGELSE AF OPLYSNINGER
E. CONCLUSION AND DISCLOSURE
I betragtning af alle disse forhold og navnlig de store negative virkninger for EU-erhvervsgrenen, hvis foranstaltningerne ophæves, konkluderede Kommissionen, at det ville være uhensigtsmæssigt at ophæve de gældende foranstaltninger over for andre kinesiske eksporterende producenter end Hubei.
Consequently, on balance and with particular consideration for the significant negative effects for the Union industry should measures be repealed, the Commission considered that it would be inappropriate to repeal the measures in force against other Chinese exporting producers other than Hubei.
Den 28. juli 2017 fremlagde Kommissionen for alle interesserede parter de væsentligste kendsgerninger og betragtninger, som lå til grund for afgørelsen om ikke at ophæve de gældende antidumpingforanstaltninger over for andre kinesiske eksporterende producenter end Hubei, og den opfordrede dem til at fremsætte bemærkninger til disse konklusioner inden for en bestemt frist.
On 28 July 2017 the Commission disclosed to all interested parties the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it decided not to repeal the anti-dumping measures in force for Chinese exporting producers other than Hubei and invited them to comment on these conclusions within a specific time limit.
F. DE INTERESSEREDE PARTERS BEMÆRKNINGER EFTER FREMLÆGGELSEN AF OPLYSNINGER
F. COMMENTS OF INTERESTED PARTIES AFTER DISCLOSURE
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger modtog Kommissionen væsentlige bemærkninger på vegne af CISA og fire eksporterende producenter af sømløse rør.
Following disclosure, the Commission received substantive comments on behalf of the CISA and four exporting producers of SPT.
Disse parter fremførte, at det nærmere var spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt ophævelsen af de gældende antidumpingforanstaltninger ville være lovlig og i overensstemmelse med princippet om god forvaltningsskik, der skulle behandles i stedet for spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt ophævelsen var hensigtsmæssig.
Those parties submitted that the question to be considered was more whether the repeal of the anti-dumping measures in force would be lawful and consistent with the principle of good administration rather than whether the repeal was appropriate.
Til støtte for påstanden redegjorde parterne for, at Domstolen og Retten i Hubei-dommene fandt, at antidumpingforanstaltningerne blev vedtaget uden en korrekt konklusion om skade, jf. grundforordningens artikel 3 (og artikel 3 i WTO's antidumpingaftale), og at de oprindelige foranstaltninger derfor var behæftet med juridiske fejl i deres helhed.
To support that claim the parties argued that, in the Hubei judgments, the Court of Justice and the General Court found that anti-dumping measures were adopted without a proper finding of injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the basic Regulation (and Article 3 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement) and that therefore the original measures were legally flawed in their entirety.
Under henvisning til Domstolens dom i sagen Clark og Puma, fremførte parterne, at en ulovlighed, der konstateredes i en oprindelig forordning, anses for at påvirke lovligheden af den efterfølgende forlængelse af forordningen, og at konklusionen derfor burde være, at hele den oprindelige forordning om sømløse rør var behæftet med samme fejl.
By referring to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Clark and Puma, the parties argued that an illegality found in an original regulation is deemed to affect the legality of the subsequent prolonging regulation, so that it should be concluded that the entirety of the original Regulation on SPT was vitiated by the same error.
Det kan heraf udledes, at Kommissionen ved ikke at ophæve foranstaltningerne over for andre kinesiske eksporterende producenter end Hubei ville handle i strid med grundforordningens artikel 1, artikel 3, stk. 1, og artikel 3, stk. 9, og med artikel VI i GATT 1994 samt artikel 1 og 18.1 i WTO's antidumpingaftale.
It follows that by not repealing the measures vis-à-vis Chinese exporting producers other than Hubei, the Commission would act inconsistently with Articles 1, 3(1) and 3(9) of the basic Regulation and with Article VI GATT 1994, as well as Articles 1 and 18.1 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement.
Samme parter hævdede endvidere, at det heller ikke vil være i overensstemmelse med princippet om god forvaltningsskik at opretholde antidumpingforanstaltningerne.
The same parties further argued that it would also not be in line with the principle of good administration to maintain the anti-dumping measures.
Disse parter har desuden præciseret, at de ikke har anmodet om at ophæve foranstaltningerne erga omnes ved udvidelse af virkningerne af Hubei-dommene.
Those parties moreover clarified that they did not request to repeal the measures with erga omnes effect by extension of the effects of the Hubei judgments.
De påstod, at deres anmodning om at ophæve foranstaltningerne var baseret på grundforordningens artikel 1, artikel 3, stk. 1, og artikel 3, stk. 9, og på artikel VI i GATT 1994 samt artikel 1 og 18.1 i WTO's antidumpingaftale som anført i betragtning 71.
Rather, they argued that their request to repeal the measures was based on Articles 1, 3(1) and 3(9) of the basic Regulation and with Article VI GATT 1994, and Articles 1 and 18.1 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement as mentioned in recital 71.
En sådan ophævelse ville have en ex post-virkning, som retligt ville være adskilt fra udvidelsen af virkningerne af Hubei-dommene, der ville have tilbagevirkende kraft.
Such repeal would have an ex post effect, which would be legally distinct from the extension of the effects of the Hubei judgments which would have a retroactive effect.
Endelig har de pågældende parter bemærket, at eventuelle negative virkninger af en ophævelse af foranstaltningerne på EU-erhvervsgrenens situation bør behandles i en ny antidumpingundersøgelse, som skal indledes i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 5.
Finally, those parties noted that any negative effects of the repeal of the measures on the situation of the Union industry should be addressed in a new anti-dumping investigation to be initiated in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation.
Kommissionen afviste disse påstande.
The Commission rejected those arguments.
Hvad angår påstanden om, at opretholdelsen af de gældende foranstaltninger med hensyn til de andre kinesiske eksporterende producenter af sømløse rør af jern end Hubei ville være i strid med grundforordningens artikel 1, artikel 3, stk. 1, og artikel 3, stk. 9, og med artikel VI i GATT 1994 samt artikel 1 og 18.1 i WTO's antidumpingaftale og jf. betragtning 23, gjorde Kommissionen opmærksom på, at Hubei-dommene begrænsede annullationen af den oprindelige forordning alene til den antidumpingtold, der pålægges Hubei.
Regarding the claim that maintaining the measures in force with regard to the Chinese exporting producers of SPT other than Hubei would be inconsistent with Articles 1, 3(1) and 3(9) of the basic Regulation and with Article VI GATT 1994, as well as Articles 1 and 18.1 of the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement, and as mentioned in recital 23 the Commission recalled that the Hubei judgments limited the annulment of the original regulation to the anti-dumping duties imposed on Hubei alone.