natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I undersøgelsen anføres det i stedet blot, at disse postoperatører anses for »veldrevne og tilstrækkeligt udstyrede, fordi der ikke foreligger dokumentation, som viser, at de er ineffektive, eller at de har incitamenter til at operere ineffektivt«.
The Altmark judgment itself refers to incurred costs and receipts which identifies without doubt the cost allocation methodology while the NAC relies essentially on the notion of avoided costs (which are by definition not incurred).
Dette argument er imidlertid vanskeligt at acceptere, eftersom gruppen omfatter befordringspligtige operatører, som har modtaget kompensation for befordringspligt, og for hvilke Kommissionen allerede har vedtaget afgørelser, hvori den konkluderer, at deres omkostninger ikke kan anses for effektive omkostninger.
The cost allocation methodology was included in the 2005 SGEI Framework which applied from 29 November 2005 until 31 January 2012, and served as the basis for several Commission decisions on compensation for USOs in that period.
De spanske myndigheder og/eller Correos hævder, at Kommissionen i afgørelserne om kompensation for befordringspligten ydet til Hellenic Post og Poste Italiane ikke formelt anfører, at operatøren ikke var effektiv (se betragtning 62 og 95).
It is also the methodology to be used under the 2012 SGEI Framework if the NAC methodology cannot be applied.
Det kan bemærkes, at Kommissionen har afvist en lignende tilgang i afgørelsen om Poste Italiane fra 2012 ud fra en sammenligning med en gruppe postoperatører med den begrundelse, at det af de tilgængelige oplysninger ikke kunne udledes, at disse operatører var effektive.
The NAC methodology was only introduced formally by the Commission, as a valid way to calculate the net cost of the USO, in Directive 2008/6/EC (which entered into force on 1 January 2011) and the 2012 SGEI Framework (which entered into force on 31 January 2012).
Kommissionen fastholder sit synspunkt om, at det ikke blot kan antages, at postoperatører i gennemsnit er omkostningseffektive, særligt i lyset af den løbende omstrukturering, som påvirker denne sektor.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified that the notion of State aid is an objective and legal concept defined directly by the Treaty.
Kompensationen til Correos for befordringspligten er endvidere fastsat på grundlag af den spanske metode, som ifølge de spanske myndigheder er en gennemførelse af net avoided cost-metoden.
It would then seem incorrect to modify over time the methodology used to appreciate the presence of aid under the Altmark judgment to align it with the options chosen by the Commission in the 2012 SGEI Framework which describes the conditions for the compatibility of certain SGEI compensations.
Dette er umiddelbart i strid med den fjerde Altmark-betingelse, som henviser til en veldrevet virksomheds omkostninger.
In any case as explained in recital 172, such interpretation is contrary to the letter of the judgment.
Som forklaret i betragtning 167-168 finder Kommissionen endelig, at den tredje Altmark-betingelse ikke er opfyldt, fordi den metode, som de spanske myndigheder har anvendt, tilsyneladende har ført til kompensationsbeløb, der oversteg Correos' nettoomkostninger ved befordringspligten (inklusive en rimelig fortjeneste).
The Commission therefore disagrees that the NAC methodology could be used to verify the compliance with the 3rd criterion of the Altmark judgment.
Selv om det blev accepteret, at Correos' omkostninger svarer til en veldrevet virksomheds omkostninger, betyder dette, at kompensationen til Correos ikke kan anses for at være blevet fastsat på grundlag af disse omkostninger.
The Spanish methodology is a valid implementation of the NAC methodology
Det kan følgelig ikke konkluderes, at størrelsen af den kompensation, der er ydet til Correos, blev fastsat på grundlag af en analyse af de omkostninger, som en veldrevet og tilstrækkeligt udstyret gennemsnitsvirksomhed i den samme sektor ville have ved at opfylde forpligtelserne, idet der skal tages hensyn til de hermed forbundne indtægter og til en rimelig fortjeneste ved opfyldelsen af forpligtelserne.
The Spanish authorities and/or Correos defend that the Spanish methodology is a valid implementation of the NAC methodology recognized as an appropriate method to calculate the net cost of the USO in Directive 2008/6/EC and the 2012 SGEI Framework.
Konklusion
The Commission considers that, even if the NAC methodology could be used to verify compliance with the 3rd criterion of the Altmark judgment, quod non, the Spanish methodology can clearly not be considered as a valid implementation of the NAC methodology.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at to af de fire kumulative Altmark-betingelser ikke er opfyldt i den foreliggende sag, og at kompensationen derfor må anses for at give Correos en fordel.
First, it can be observed that, as recognized by the Spanish authorities themselves, the Spanish method applies the cost allocation methodology to the USO Reserved area (see recital 139).
Fordrejning af konkurrencevilkårene og påvirkning af samhandelen
According to the Spanish authorities, only the approach applied to the USO non-reserved area (where the net cost is equal to the sum of the losses of the loss making segments of the USO non-reserved area) could potentially be compared to a NAC (see recital 139).
Offentlig støtte til virksomheder udgør kun statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, hvis den »fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene«, og kun i det omfang den »påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
Such dual approach seems in itself contradictory with the NAC methodology as described and implemented by the Commission in its decision practice which implies to compare the situation of the whole company with and without the public service obligation (in this case the USO).
Med hensyn til princippet om konkurrencefordrejning anses en foranstaltning, der ydes af en medlemsstat, for at fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene, hvis det er sandsynligt, at den vil forbedre modtagerens stilling i konkurrencen i forhold til andre virksomheder, som den konkurrerer med.
Even considering only the USO non-reserved area, the Spanish methodology also presents a number of differences with the NAC methodology as described and implemented by the Commission in its decision practice.
Af praktiske grunde antages der således at være tale om konkurrencefordrejning, når staten giver en virksomhed en økonomisk fordel i en liberaliseret sektor, hvor den er eller kan være i konkurrence.
First, the Spanish methodology does not seem to be built on a realistic counterfactual scenario which is a major element of the net avoided cost methodology.
Med hensyn til princippet om påvirkning af samhandelen har EU-Domstolen fastslået, at støtte, som begunstiger virksomheder, der er aktive på det indre marked, kan påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstater.
Indeed, it simply considers ex-post the losses of the loss making cost centres.
I henhold til statsstøttereglerne udelukker den lokale eller regionale karakter af en leveret tjeneste ikke på forhånd, at samhandelen kan være påvirket.
The Spanish authorities argue that it is built on an implicit counterfactual scenario: any private operator would discontinue these loss-making centres in the absence of public service obligations (see recital 139).
Der er ikke fastsat en streng grænseværdi eller en procentsats, hvorunder samhandelen mellem medlemsstater ikke anses for at blive påvirket, men det begrænsede omfang af økonomisk aktivitet, som f.eks. dokumenteres ved en meget lille omsætning, reducerer sandsynligheden for en påvirkning af samhandelen.
However, such an approach does not seem to describe a real business strategy which would require determining ex-ante the cost centres to discontinue as an operator could not be expected to know in advance exactly which cost centres would be loss-making.
Med hensyn til den foreliggende sag bemærker Kommissionen, at Correos har været aktiv på markedet for postforsendelser og pakker, som er præget af intens konkurrence med andre operatører fra forskellige medlemsstater (dvs. Deutsche Post, TNT, La Poste, UPS, CTT Correios Portugal og Royal Mail).
Moreover, the Spanish methodology seems to imply that costs centres could be discontinued and recreated at will from one year to the other over the assessment period which is not a realistic counterfactual scenario.
Følgelig er der ingen tvivl om, at enhver foranstaltning, som begunstiger Correos, kan påvirke konkurrencen og samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Furthermore, the Spanish methodology does not correct for the impact of the cessation of delivery of those unprofitable traffic flows on the profitability of other (USO or non-USO) products and services, as also required by the NAC methodology.
På grundlag af ovennævnte finder Kommissionen, at den kompensation for befordringspligten, der blev ydet til Correos i henhold til postloven af 1998, opfylder de kumulative kriterier i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og at foranstaltningen derfor udgør statsstøtte i henhold til samme bestemmelse.
Finally, the Spanish methodology does not take into account intangible and market benefits nor does it contain incentives for cost efficiency, as required by the NAC methodology.
EKSISTERENDE ELLER NY STØTTE
Considering the above, the Commission does not consider that the Spanish methodology is a valid implementation of the NAC methodology.
I henhold til artikel 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/1589 forstås ved eksisterende støtte »enhver form for støtte, der eksisterede inden TEUF's ikrafttræden i de pågældende medlemsstater«.
As explained in recitals 172 to 175, the Commission does not consider that the NAC methodology is appropriate to verify the 3rd Altmark criterion, moreover as explained in recitals 176 to 183, the Commission does not consider the Spanish methodology as a valid implementation of the NAC methodology.
Enhver støtteforanstaltning, der eksisterede i Spanien inden landets tiltrædelse af Unionen den 1. januar 1986, bør følgelig anses for eksisterende støtte.
As a consequence, the Commission considers that the compensations granted to Correos according to the Spanish methodology do not correspond to the NAC of the USO and that even if they did this would not be sufficient to ensure compliance with the 3rd Altmark criterion.
I henhold til samme forordnings artikel 1, litra c), forstås ved »ny støtte«: »enhver støtte, dvs. støtteordninger og individuel støtte, som ikke er eksisterende støtte, herunder ændringer i eksisterende støtte«.
The Spanish authorities and/or Correos claim that Spain could have legitimate expectations regarding the fulfilment of the 3rd Altmark criterion by the use of the NAC methodology and the Spanish methodology.
For at fastslå, om en støtte er blevet ændret, er det ifølge Domstolen afgørende, at det undersøges, om bestemmelserne vedrørende støtten er blevet ændret.
The Court of Justice has held, in respect of State aid, that where the aid has not been notified to the Commission, and is therefore unlawful aid, there can be no recourse to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations.
I efterfølgende domme har Domstolen og Retten uddybet, hvilke former for ændring af bestemmelserne der bevirker, at eksisterende støtte bliver til ny støtte.
Accordingly, a legitimate expectation that aid granted is lawful cannot, barring exceptional circumstances, be entertained unless that aid was notified to the Commission.
Ifølge Retten »er det kun i det tilfælde, hvor ændringen påvirker selve indholdet af den oprindelige ordning, at denne ordning bliver en ny støtteordning.
Spain has never notified the USO compensations to the Commission despite the publicity made by the Commission on its State aid decisional practice in the postal sector.
Der kan imidlertid ikke være tale om en væsentlig ændring, når det nye element klart kan adskilles fra den oprindelige ordning«.
In particular, several State aid decisions of the Commission in the postal sector publicly available assess the compliance with the Altmark conditions and none of them has accepted the NAC methodology as an appropriate mean to verify the 3rd Altmark criterion.
Det bør i denne forbindelse bemærkes, at Correos modtog direkte kompensation fra det spanske statsbudget for sine samlede nettounderskud (uanset om de udsprang af aktiviteter omfattet af befordringspligten eller af andre aktiviteter), inden postloven af 1998 trådte i kraft.
Moreover, several decisions provide guidance on the approach of the Commission regarding the NAC methodology and it is clear on that basis that the Spanish methodology does not correspond to the NAC methodology as implemented by the Commission (as explained in recitals 177 to 183).
Efter vedtagelsen af postloven af 1998 begrænsede staten det offentlige tilskud til Correos til kompensationen for opfyldelsen af den netop fastsatte og begrænsede befordringspligt og dækkede ikke længere virksomhedens samlede nettounderskud.
The Commission considers that the NERA report issued in 1998 (which had no binding effect) cannot generate legitimate expectations as regards the assessment of the presence of aid in public service compensations which has been clearly framed by the 2003 Altmark judgment and by the decisional practice of the Commission since this judgment.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at karakteren af kompensationen for befordringspligten blev grundlæggende ændret på to måder.
The Spanish authorities suggest different approaches to calculate the overcompensation of the USO (see section 5.3.1).
For det første blev omfanget af kompensationen reduceret ved postloven af 1998, idet den blev begrænset til aktiviteter omfattet af befordringspligten, mens alle Correos' aktiviteter (dvs. herunder aktiviteter, der ikke var omfattet af befordringspligten) tidligere var berettiget til kompensation.
Without taking a position at this stage on these alternative approaches, the Commission notes that they also lead to the conclusion that Correos has been overcompensated for the delivery of the USO Non reserved services.
Det bør bemærkes, at en sådan reduktion af omfanget anses for at udgøre en grundlæggende ændring og ikke blot en reduktion af kompensationen.
On that basis, the 3rd Altmark criterion would not be fulfilled.
Afhængigt af den finansielle situation for befordringspligttjenester og andre tjenester kan ændringen føre til en forøgelse eller en reduktion af kompensationen.
The fourth Altmark criterion
For det andet blev metoden til at beregne størrelsen af kompensationen også ændret ved Plan de Prestación af 2000 (se betragtning 26).
Concerning the fourth Altmark criterion, it is undisputed that the USO was not awarded as a result of an open public procurement procedure, but was directly entrusted to Correos by the Spanish authorities.
Mens kompensationen for befordringspligt indledningsvis var baseret på Correos' nettounderskud, skulle der i henhold til Plan de Prestación anvendes en specifik metode (se betragtning 27 og 28) til at bestemme størrelsen af denne kompensation.
However, the Spanish authorities argued that Correos is compensated according to the costs of a typical well-run undertaking.
STØTTEFORANSTALTNINGENS LOVLIGHED
In support of that claim, the Spanish authorities have provided a study by Frontier Economics to the Commission.
Kommissionen bemærker, at den kompensation for befordringspligt, der er omfattet af denne afgørelse, for så vidt som den udgør statsstøtte i henhold til traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, ikke er blevet anmeldt i henhold til traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3.
The study aims to present a comparative analysis of Correos' costs with the costs of other European postal operators responsible for providing the USO in order to prove that the USO compensations granted to Correos fulfil the fourth Altmark criterion.
Kompensationen for befordringspligt udgør derfor ulovlig statsstøtte som omhandlet i artikel 1, litra f), i forordning (EU) 2015/1589.
The study uses an econometric model to estimate the costs of a hypothetical typical well-run undertaking on the basis of information from several European postal USO providers.
FORENELIGHED MED DET INDRE MARKED
Correos' actual costs are compared to the costs that this hypothetical typical well-run undertaking would have incurred should it have been in a situation (e.g. with regard to the network density) similar to that of Correos.
Retsgrundlag
The study's results suggest that Correos' costs in the period 2005-2010 were lower than those of the hypothetical typical well-run undertaking as estimated by the econometric model.
A. Forenelighed efter traktatens artikel 106, stk. 2
The Commission expressed doubts in the 2016 Opening Decision that the hypothetical typical well-run undertaking defined in the study would actually be an efficient postal operator.
For så vidt som kompensationen for befordringspligten til Correos udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, skal dens forenelighed med det indre marked vurderes.
Indeed, it has not been demonstrated that the USO providers used to establish this benchmark are themselves efficient operators.
Grundene til, at en statsstøtteforanstaltning kan eller skal erklæres forenelig med det indre marked, er anført i traktatens artikel 106, stk. 2, og artikel 107, stk. 2 og 3.
Instead, the study simply mentions that these postal operators are considered ‘well-run and adequately provided, because there is no evidence of any kind that would show them to be inefficient, or that would indicate that they have incentives to operate inefficiently’.
Eftersom de spanske myndigheder konsekvent har gjort gældende, at den kompensation for befordringspligten, der blev ydet til Correos i henhold til postloven af 1998, udgør kompensation for udførelse af tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse, skal foreneligheden af denne kompensation med det indre marked vurderes på grundlag af traktatens artikel 106, stk. 2.
This argument is however all the more difficult to accept that the set includes USO providers which have received USO compensation, and for which the Commission has already adopted decisions concluding that their costs could not be considered efficient costs.
Denne artikel lyder:
The Spanish authorities and/or Correos argue that the Commission has not formally stated in the decisions on the USO compensations granted to Hellenic Post and Poste Italiane that the operator were not efficient (see recitals 62 and 95).
»Virksomheder, der har fået overdraget at udføre tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse, eller som har karakter af fiskale monopoler, er underkastet traktaternes bestemmelser, navnlig konkurrencereglerne, i det omfang anvendelsen af disse bestemmelser ikke retligt eller faktisk hindrer opfyldelsen af de særlige opgaver, som er betroet dem.
It can be noted that the Commission has rejected a similar approach in the 2012 Poste Italiane decision based on a comparison with a set of postal operators on the ground that it could not be inferred from available information that these operators were efficient.
Udviklingen af samhandelen må ikke påvirkes i et sådant omfang, at det strider mod Unionens interesse«.
The Commission maintains its views that it is not possible to simply assume that in average postal operators are cost-efficient in particular in light of the continuous restructuring which is impacting this sector.
B. Tidsmæssig anvendelse af pakken vedrørende tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse fra 2012
Furthermore, the USO compensation of Correos has been defined on the basis of the Spanish methodology which according to the Spanish authorities is an implementation of the NAC methodology.
Tidligere udsendte og anvendte Kommissionen betingelserne for vurdering af forenelighed i henhold til traktatens artikel 106, stk. 2, i 2005-rammebestemmelserne og beslutningen om tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse fra 2005.
Finally, as explained in recitals 167-168, the Commission considers that the 3rd Altmark criterion is not fulfilled because the methodology used by the Spanish authorities appears to have resulted in compensation amounts that exceeded Correos USO net cost (including a reasonable profit).
Med hensyn til afgørelsen om tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse fra 2012 er kompensationen ikke omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for afgørelsen om tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse fra 2012, jf. afgørelsens artikel 2, da den kompensation for befordringspligten, der blev ydet til Correos i perioden 2004-2010, overstiger 15 mio. EUR om året.
This means that even if it were accepted that Correos' costs are those of a well-run undertaking, it could still not be considered that the compensation granted to Correos were set on the basis of these costs.
Kompensationen er heller ikke omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for beslutningen om tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse fra 2005, jf. beslutningens artikel 2.
Consequentely, it cannot be concluded that the level of compensation granted to Correos was determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs, which a typical undertaking, well-run and adequately provided within the same sector would incur, taking into account the receipts and a reasonable profit from discharging the obligations.
På det nuværende trin i det indre markeds udvikling kan statsstøtte, der ikke er omfattet af anvendelsesområdet for afgørelsen om tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse fra 2012, anses for forenelig med traktatens artikel 106, stk. 2, hvis den er nødvendig for udførelsen af den pågældende tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse og ikke påvirker udviklingen af samhandelen i et sådant omfang, at det strider mod Unionens interesse.
Conclusion
I 2012-rammebestemmelserne beskrives betingelserne for at sikre en sådan balance.
The Commission concludes that two of the four cumulative Altmark conditions are not fulfilled in the present case, so that the compensations must be considered as conferring an advantage to Correos.
I henhold til punkt 69 i 2012-rammebestemmelserne finder de efterfølgende punkter i rammebestemmelserne ikke anvendelse på Kommissionens forenelighedsvurdering i henhold til traktatens artikel 106, stk. 2, da kompensationen for befordringspligten i perioden 2004-2010 udgør ulovlig statsstøtte:
Distortion of competition and effect on trade
punkt 14: tage et rimeligt hensyn til behovet for offentlige tjenester, når leverandøren overdrages en bestemt tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse
Public support to undertakings only amounts to State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty if it ‘distorts or threatens to distort competition’ and only insofar as it ‘affects trade between Member States’.
punkt 19: overholdelse af gældende EU-udbudsregler, når en tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse overdrages
Concerning the principle of distortion of competition, a measure granted by a State is considered to distort or to threaten to distort competition when it is liable to improve the competitive position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with which it competes.
punkt 20: ligebehandling
For all practical purposes, a distortion of competition is thus assumed as soon as a State grants a financial advantage to an undertaking in a liberalised sector where there is, or could be, competition.
punkt 24 (ff.): anvendelse af net avoided cost-metoden til at beregne nettoomkostningerne
Concerning the principle of effect on trade, the case law of the Court of Justice has established that any grant of aid to an undertaking exercising its activities in the internal market can be liable to affect trade between Member States.
punkt 39 (ff.): effektivitetsincitamenter
In the field of State aid rules, an effect on trade is not a priori precluded by the local or regional character of the service provided.
punkt 60: gennemsigtighed.
While there is no strict threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between Member States is not affected, the limited scope of the economic activity, as may be evidenced by a very low turnover, renders the presence of an effect on trade less likely.