natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I henhold til lovens artikel 6, stk. 1, pålægges den del af en detailhandlendes månedlige omsætning fra detailsalg, der ikke overstiger 17 mio. PLN, ingen afgift.
Since Poland has designed the tax in such a manner so as to favour certain undertakings (namely retailers with low levels of turnover – smaller retailers – and retailers operating under a franchise model or independently (not within a chain)), and disadvantage others (namely retailers with high levels of turnover – larger retailers – and retail chains operating under a holding company model), the reference system is selective by design in a way that is not justified in light of the objective of the tax, which is to tax the turnover of all retail operators.
For et betydeligt antal detailhandlende, navnlig i undersektoren for købmandsbutikker, betyder afvigelsen, at de helt er undtaget fra enhver afgift på den omsætning, de skaber fra detailsalget, fordi deres månedlige omsætning fra den aktivitet er under 17 mio. PLN.
Consequently, the Commission considers the appropriate reference system in the present case to be the imposition of a single (flat) rate tax on the monthly turnover generated from retail sales, without the progressive tax structure being a part of that system.
Ifølge offentligt tilgængelige data blev der for september 2016 modtaget 109 angivelser af det afgiftsbeløb, der skulle betales af detailomsætning, mens det polske finansministerium anslår, at der er ca. 200000 aktive detailhandlende i Polen.
Derogation from the system of reference
Det vil sige, at langt størstedelen af virksomhederne i undersektoren for købmandsbutikker i den polske detailsektor ligger under den tærskel, der er fastsat i lovens artikel 6, stk. 1, og følgelig slet ikke betaler detailafgift.
As a second step, it is necessary to determine whether the measure derogates from the application of the rules of reference in favour of certain undertakings which are in a similar factual and legal situation in light of the intrinsic objective of the system of reference.
For så vidt angår detailhandlende med en månedlig omsætning på over 17 mio. PLN, er den del af deres omsætning, der er under grænsen, fritaget for afgiften, den månedlige omsætning over 17 mio. PLN og under 170 mio. PLN pålægges afgiftssatsen på 0,8 %, og den del af omsætningen, der er over 170 mio. PLN, pålægges en afgiftssats på 1,4 %.
Under Article 6(1) the Act, no tax is levied on the part of the retailer's monthly turnover from retail sales not exceeding PLN 17 million.
Polen skelner imellem »trinvis progression« og »samlet progression« og anfører, at eftersom alle afgiftssatser (dvs. afgiftsfritagelse svarende til satsen på 0 % og satserne på 1,4 % og 0,8 %) gælder for alle virksomheder på samme vilkår, er der ikke tale om en afvigelse fra referencesystemet.
For a significant number of retailers, notably in the grocery subsector, that exemption means that they are entirely exempt from any taxation on the turnover they derive from their retail sales, since their monthly turnover derived from that activity falls below PLN 17 million.
Begge typer progressiv beskatning betyder imidlertid, at forskellige virksomheder pålægges forskellige gennemsnitlige satser baseret på deres omsætning — som er genstand for afgiften — og i sidste ende deres størrelse.
According to publically available data, 109 tax declarations establishing the amount of tax due on the retail sales were emitted for the month of September 2016, whereas according to estimates of the Polish Ministry of Finance there are approximately 200000 retail operators operating in Poland.
Følgende eksempel på tre detailhandlende (afgiftspligtige personer), der har en månedlig omsætning på henholdsvis 10 mio. PLN, 100 mio. PLN og 750 mio. PLN illustrerer, at der er stor forskel på den effektive gennemsnitlige afgiftssats for hver af dem, selv om alle detailhandlende er underlagt samme afgiftssatser, og selv om samme del af deres indtægter ligger på de samme tre trin.
Consequently, the vast majority of undertakings operating on the grocery subsector of the retail sector in Poland fall below the threshold established by Article 6(1) and pay no retail tax.
For hver 100 PLN i omsætning betaler detailhandlende 1 ingen afgift, detailhandlende 2 betaler en afgift på omkring 0,7 PLN, og detailhandlende 3 betaler en afgift på omkring 1,2 PLN.
As regards retailers that achieve a monthly turnover in excess of PLN 17 million: their monthly turnover below that threshold is exempted from taxation; their monthly turnover above PLN 17 million but not exceeding PLN 170 million is subject to a tax rate of 0,8 %; and the part of their turnover that exceeds PLN 170 million is taxed at a rate of 1,4 %.
Månedlig omsætning fra detailsalg
Poland makes a distinction between ‘bracketed progressivity’ and ‘global progressivity’ and claims that, since all tax rates (i.e. the tax exemption equivalent to a 0 % rate, and the 1,4 % and 0,8 % rates) are applied on the same terms to all undertakings, there is no derogation from the reference system.
Detailhandlende 1
However, both types of progressive taxation lead to different average effective rates being applied to different companies based on their turnover – which is the object of taxation – and ultimately their size.
10 mio. PLN
As the following example of three retailers (taxable persons) generating monthly turnovers of respectively PLN 10 million, PLN 100 million and PLN 750 million illustrates, although all retailers are subjected to the same tax rates and although the same portion of their income falls within the same three brackets, their effective average tax rates differ considerably.
Detailhandlende 2
Indeed for each PLN 100 of turnover generated, Retailer 1 bears no tax, Retailer 2 bears an amount of tax of around PLN 0,7 and Retailer 3 an amount of tax of around PLN 1,2.
100 mio. PLN
Monthly revenue from retail sales
Detailhandlende 3
Retailer 1
750 mio. PLN
PLN 10 million
Afgift for den del af omsætningen, der ikke overstiger 17 mio. PLN
Retailer 2
Afgift for den del af omsætningen, der er over 17 mio. PLN, men under 170 mio. PLN
PLN 100 million
664000 PLN
Retailer 3
(82999999 PLN × 0,008)
PLN 750 million
1224000 PLN
Tax due on portion of revenue not exceeding PLN 17 million
(152999999 PLN × 0,008)
Tax due on portion of revenue above PLN 17 million but not exceeding PLN 170 million
Afgift for den del af omsætningen, der overstiger 170 mio. PLN
PLN 664000
8120000 PLN
(PLN 82999999 × 0,008)
(579999999 PLN × 0,014)
PLN 1224000
Afgift i alt
(PLN 152999999 × 0,008)
9344000 PLN
Tax due on portion of revenue above PLN 170 million
Effektiv gennemsnitlig afgiftssats
PLN 8120000
Som tabellen viser, er det netop de progressive satser og trin, som satserne gælder for, der resulterer i detailafgiftens forskelsbehandling af de detailhandlende (afgiftspligtig person) afhængigt af deres omsætning og dermed størrelse.
(PLN 579999999 × 0,014)
På grund af satsernes progressive karakter i henhold til loven pålægges virksomheder med høj omsætning både betydeligt højere marginalsatser og betydeligt højere gennemsnitlige afgiftssatser end detailhandlende med lavere omsætning.
Total tax due
Kommissionen finder derfor, at den progressive satsstruktur, som blev indført med loven, er en afvigelse fra referencesystemet — hvor én (enhedssats) detailafgift pålægges detailsalget fra alle detailhandelsvirksomheder i Polen — for fordel for detailhandlende med lav omsætning og således mindre detailhandlende.
PLN 9344000
På baggrund af ovenstående betragtninger finder Kommissionen, at foranstaltningen afviger fra referencesystemet, og at den derfor umiddelbart er selektiv.
Effective average tax rate
Begrundelse i systemets karakter eller forvaltning
As this table demonstrates, it is precisely the progressive rates and the brackets to which they apply that make the retail tax discriminatory between retailers (taxable person) depending on their level of turnover and thus on their size.
Efter at Kommissionen har påvist, at den statslige foranstaltning umiddelbart er selektiv, fordi den i lyset af referencesystemet skelner mellem virksomheder i en sammenlignelig faktisk og retlig situation, skal medlemsstaten fremlægge en begrundelse, der er baseret på systemets karakter eller forvaltning.
Due to the progressive character of the rates laid down by the Act, undertakings with high levels of turnover are subject to both substantially higher marginal rates and to substantially higher average tax rates as compared to operators with low levels of turnover.
En foranstaltning, som afviger fra referencesystemet, er ikke selektiv, hvis dette er begrundet i systemets karakter og forvaltning.
Hence, the Commission considers that the progressive rate structure introduced by the Act derogates from the reference system – consisting of the imposition of a single (flat) rate tax on retail sales of all undertakings involved in the retail trade in Poland – in favour of retailers with lower turnover and thus smaller retailers.
Dette er tilfældet, hvis den selektive behandling er et resultat af indbyggede mekanismer, der er nødvendige, for at systemet kan anvendes og er effektivt.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission considers the measure to derogate from the reference system and that it is therefore prima facie selective.
Polen fremfører, at hvis konklusionen er, at lovens progressive satsstruktur er diskriminerende, hvilket Polen anfægter, retfærdiggøres strukturen af omfordelingsformål på samme måde som overskudsbaserede skatter.
Justification by the nature or general scheme of the system
Polen hævder desuden, at virksomheder med en høj omsætning i højere grad er i stand til at betale, at disse virksomheder nyder godt af stordriftsfordele, at disse virksomheder er i stand til at presse producenters og leverandørers margener til egen fordel, og at disse virksomheder ofte benytter sig af skatteoptimeringsstrategier.
After the Commission has demonstrated that a State measure is prima facie selective since it discriminates between undertakings in a comparable factual and legal situation in light of the reference system, it is for the Member State to provide a justification based on the nature or general scheme of that system.
Kommissionen påpeger, at loven beskatter virksomheder i henhold til deres omsætningsniveau.
A measure which derogates from the reference system is not selective if it is justified by the nature or general scheme of that system.
I modsætning til skatter baseret på overskud tager en omsætningsbaseret afgift ikke højde for omkostningerne ved at skabe omsætningen.
This is the case where the selective treatment is the result of inherent mechanisms necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of the system.
En omsætningsafgift rammer således virksomheder i forhold til deres størrelse og ikke deres overskud eller betalingsevne, deres evne til at effektivisere på baggrund af stordriftsfordele, deres evne til at påvirke producenters og leverandørers margener til egen fordel, og deres evne til at udnytte skatteoptimeringsstrategier, som Polen hævder.
Poland argues that if the progressive tax structure of the Act is found to discriminate, which it disputes, it is justified on the grounds of its redistributive purposes, as is the case for profit-based taxes.
Ingen af disse faktorer kan således anvendes som begrundelse for en progressiv afgift, der pålægges en virksomheds omsætning.
Poland further claims that undertakings with high levels of turnover have a greater ability to pay, that such undertakings enjoy economies of scale, that such undertakings have the ability to exert pressure on producers' and suppliers' margins to their own benefit and that such undertakings often use tax optimisation strategies.
Progressiv omsætningsafgift kan kun begrundes i afgiftssystemets karakter og forvaltning, dvs. den interne logik, hvis det specifikke formål med afgiften kræver progressive satser.
The Commission recalls that the Act taxes undertakings on the level of their turnover.
Hvis formålet med en omsætningsafgift for eksempel er at afbøde nogle negative eksterne virkninger, kan en vis grad af progression retfærdiggøres, hvis det påvises, at de eksterne virkninger, der skyldes de aktiviteter, som afgiften pålægges, også stiger progressivt med en stigning i de afgiftspligtiges omsætning (eller størrelse).
As opposed to taxes based on profit, a turnover-based tax does not take into account the costs incurred in the generation of sales.
De polske myndigheder har ikke fremlagt nogen begrundelse af denne type.
Hence, turnover taxes hit companies in respect of their size rather than their profitability or ability to pay, their ability to generate efficiencies resulting from economies of scale, their ability to influence producers' and suppliers' margins to their own benefit, and their ability to exploit the tax optimisation strategies alleged by Poland.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at de progressive afgiftssatser i omsætningsafgiften ikke kan begrundes i referenceafgiftssystemets karakter og forvaltning.
Consequently, none of those factors can constitute a justification for a progressive tax levied on an undertaking's turnover.
Følgelig giver foranstaltningen en selektiv fordel til detailvirksomheder med lav omsætning (og således mindre virksomheder).
Progressive turnover taxes can only be justified by the nature and general scheme, i.e. the internal logic, of the tax system if the specific objective pursued by the tax requires progressive rates.
Potentiel konkurrencefordrejning og indvirkning på samhandelen i EU
For example in the case of a turnover tax intended to address some negative externalities, a certain level of progressivity could be justified if it was shown that the externalities created by the activities subject to the tax also increase progressively when the turnover (or size) of the taxpayer increases.
I henhold til traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, skal en foranstaltning fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandlen i EU for at udgøre statsstøtte.
No such justification has been provided by the Polish authorities.
Detailafgiften finder anvendelse på alle virksomheder, der skaber omsætning fra visse typer detailsalg i Polen.
Accordingly, the Commission does not consider the progressive tax rates of the retail tax to be justified by the nature and general scheme of the reference tax system.
Detailhandelen i Polen er åben for konkurrence og er karakteriseret ved tilstedeværelse af handlende fra andre medlemsstater.
Therefore, the measure confers a selective advantage on retail undertakings with a lower level of turnover (and thus smaller undertakings).
Ligeledes kan detailvirksomheder i Polen have, eller senere udvikle, aktiviteter i andre medlemsstater.
Potential distortion of competition and effect on intra-Union trade
Enhver støtte til fordel for visse virksomheder i branchen vil således kunne påvirke samhandlen i EU.
According to Article 107(1) of the Treaty, a measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and have an effect on intra-Union trade to constitute State aid.
Progressionen i detailafgiften har påvirket konkurrencesituationen for de virksomheder, der er pålagt afgiften.
The retail tax applies to all undertakings deriving turnover from certain retail sales in Poland.
I det omfang foranstaltningen fritager virksomheder med lav omsætning for en afgift, de ellers skulle have betalt, hvis de havde været underlagt samme afgiftssats som virksomheder med høj omsætning, udgør den selektive fordel, der tildeles som følge af en sådan foranstaltning, statsstøtte.
The retail trade in Poland is open to competition and is characterised by the presence of operators from other Member States.
Domstolen har konsekvent fastslået, at driftsstøtte fordrejer konkurrencen, således at enhver støtte, der tildeles disse virksomheder, bør anses for at fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencen, i kraft af at deres økonomiske stilling på de polske detailmarked styrkes.
Similarly, retail operators established in Poland may have – or develop in the future – activities in other Member States.
Ligeledes kan højere satser for store detailvirksomheder (med høj omsætning) virke afskrækkende på store detailhandlende og deres omsætning og reducere deres markedsandel eller tvinge dem ud af markedet.
Therefore, any aid in favour of certain industry operators is liable to affect intra-EU trade.
Dette ville fordreje konkurrencen, fordi detailhandlende ikke vil konkurrere på baggrund af deres effektivitet og konkurrenceevne på markedspladsen alene, men fordi de også vil være underlagt forskellig behandling, hvad angår afgifter, afhængigt af deres omsætningsniveau, hvilket ikke vil være begrundet i de negative eksterne virkninger, de afstedkommer.
Indeed, the progressivity of the retail tax has an influence on the competitive situation of the undertakings subject to it.
Hvad angår Polens bemærkninger om strukturen i detailsektoren, påpeger Kommissionen, at Polens argument om, at de progressive afgiftssatser begrænser ændringerne i handelsmønstrene (at mindre detailhandlende forsvinder kombineret med en stigning i større detailhandlende), som ifølge Polen i øjeblikket fordrejer konkurrencen, blot bekræfter, at foranstaltningen er vedtaget med henblik på at påvirke konkurrencemiljøet i landets detailsektor.
To the extent the measure relieves undertakings with lower levels of turnover from a tax liability they would otherwise have been obliged to pay, had they been subject to the same tax rate as undertakings with high levels of turnover, the selective advantage granted under those measures constitutes operating aid.
Følgelig konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltningen fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen, og at den påvirker samhandlen i EU.
The Court of Justice has consistently held that operating aid distorts competition, so that any aid granted to those undertakings should be considered to distort or threaten to distort competition by strengthening their financial position on the Polish retail market.
Konklusion
Similarly, higher tax rates for larger (higher turnover) retailers may dissuade large retailer's sales and reduce their market share or force them to exit the market.
Eftersom alle betingelser i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, er opfyldt, konkluderer Kommissionen, at detailafgiften med dens progressive satsstruktur udgør statsstøtte i henhold til den pågældende bestemmelse.
Competition would be distorted as retailers would not compete only on the basis of their efficiency and competitiveness in the market place but would also face differential tax treatment depending on their turnover level which would not be justified by negative externalities they impose.
Støttens forenelighed med det indre marked
Concerning the observations of Poland regarding the structure of the retail sector, the Commission notes that the fact that Poland argues that the progressive tax rates limit adverse changes in the pattern of trade (the disappearance of small-scale trade coupled with the increase in large-format trade), which according to Poland are currently distorting competition constitutes nothing else but the confirmation that the measure has been adopted with the view to influence the competitive environment in the retail sector in the country.
Statsstøtte anses for forenelig med det indre marked, hvis den falder ind under en af kategorierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 2, og den kan anses for forenelig med det indre marked, hvis Kommissionen konkluderer, at den falder under en af kategorierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 3.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the measure distorts or threatens to distort competition and that it has an effect on intra-Union trade.
Det påhviler imidlertid den medlemsstat, der tildeler støtten, at bevise, at den af medlemsstaten tildelte statsstøtte er forenelig med det indre marked i henhold til traktatens artikel 107, stk. 2 eller 3.
Conclusion
Kommissionen bemærker, at de polske myndigheder ikke har fremlagt argumenter for, hvorfor detailafgiften skulle være forenelig med det indre marked.
Since all the conditions laid down by Article 107(1) of the Treaty are met, the Commission concludes that the retail tax with its progressive tax rates structure constitutes State aid within the meaning of that provision.
Polen kommenterede ikke de betænkeligheder, der blev udtrykt i indledningsafgørelsen vedrørende foranstaltningens forenelighed.
Compatibility of the aid with the internal market
Kommissionen konkluderer, at ingen af de undtagelser, der er anført i førnævnte bestemmelser, finder anvendelse, fordi formålet med foranstaltningen ikke synes at falde sammen med målene i disse bestemmelser.
State aid shall be deemed compatible with the internal market if it falls within any of the categories listed in Article 107(2) of the Treaty and it may be deemed compatible with the internal market if it is found by the Commission to fall within any of the categories listed in Article 107(3) of the Treaty.
Derfor kan foranstaltningen ikke erklæres forenelig med det indre marked.
However, it is the Member State granting the aid which bears the burden of proving that State aid granted by it is compatible with the internal market pursuant to Articles 107(2) or 107(3) of the Treaty.
Tilbagesøgning af støtten
The Commission notes that the Polish authorities have not provided any arguments why the retail tax would be compatible with the internal market.
Loven blev aldrig anmeldt eller erklæret forenelig med det indre marked af Kommissionen.
Poland did not comment on the doubts expressed in the Opening Decision as regards the compatibility of the measure.
Fordi foranstaltningen udgør statsstøtte i henhold til traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og ny støtte i henhold til artikel 1, litra c), i forordning (EU) 2015/1589, som finder anvendelse ved krænkelse af standstill-forpligtelsen, der er fastlagt i traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3, udgør foranstaltningen også ulovlig statsstøtte i henhold til artikel 1, litra f), i forordning (EU) 2015/1589.
The Commission considers that none of the exceptions referred to in the aforementioned provisions apply, since the measure does not appear to aim to achieve any of the objectives listed in those provisions.
Følgerne af konklusionen om, at loven udgør ulovlig og uforenelig statsstøtte, er, at støtten skal kræves tilbagebetalt af modtagerne i henhold til artikel 16 i forordning (EU) 2015/1589.
Consequently, the measure cannot be declared compatible with the internal market.
Som følge af påbuddet om indstilling udstedt af Kommissionen i indledningsafgørelsen bekræftede Polen ved brev af 7. november 2016, at man har indstillet opkrævningen af detailafgiften i henhold til loven.
Recovery of the aid
Der har således ikke i praksis været ydet støtte i henhold til foranstaltningen.
The Act was never notified nor declared compatible with the internal market by the Commission.
Derfor er der ikke behov for at kræve tilbagebetaling.
Since it constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty and new aid within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 that has been put into effect in violation of the standstill obligation laid down in Article 108(3) of the Treaty, that measure also constitutes unlawful aid within the meaning of Article 1(f) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589.
KONKLUSION
The consequence of the finding that the Act constitutes unlawful and incompatible State aid is that the aid has to be recovered from its recipients pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589.
Kommissionen finder, at Polen har gennemført den forelagte støtteordning på ulovlig vis, dvs. i strid med traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3.
However, as a result of the suspension injunction issued by the Commission in its Opening Decision, Poland confirmed by letter of 7 November 2016 that it had suspended the payment of the retail tax under the Act.
Denne afgørelse påvirker ikke eventuelle sager i medfør af artikel 258 i TEUF om foranstaltningens overholdelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder, der er fastlagt i traktaten, navnlig retten til fri etablering, der er garanteret i traktatens artikel 49 —
Therefore, no State aid has been effectively granted under the measure.
VEDTAGET DENNE AFGØRELSE:
For this reason, there is no need to require recovery.