natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Danmark forklarer, at aftalen indeholder en mulighed for at genforhandle aftalebetingelserne, hvis det ikke skulle lykkes for Ryanair at generere en minimumsvolumen på […] passagerer i de første par år efter indgåelsen af aftalen.
In the opinion of SAS, Aarhus airport is not independent from its public owners (namely, the public authorities).
Dette er ifølge Danmark en sanktionsmekanisme.
SAS states that the majority of the board members are appointed and elected by the public owners of the airport.
ER DER TALE OM STATSSTØTTE?
SAS states that, even if this figure was correct, Aarhus airport showed a negative result of DKK 2311410 for the year 2007 despite a 12,5 % increase in revenue.
I henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF er »… statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med det indre marked, i det omfang den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.«
SAS further argues that the weak financial performance of the airport manager is also demonstrated by the fact that the accumulated negative results for the last five years amount to more than DKK 20 million.
Betingelserne i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF er kumulative.
SAS believes that without the subsidies granted to Ryanair the financial position of the airport manager would have been significantly better.
Ved vurdering af, om den pågældende foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, skal alle følgende betingelser derfor være opfyldt.
SAS is of the opinion that Ryanair has been granted preferential treatment by Aarhus airport in the form of substantially reduced passenger service charges as well as reduced take-off and landing charges.
Den økonomiske støtte skal:
SAS argues that, by granting Ryanair preferential treatment, other carriers operating at the airport are being discriminated against.
ydes ved hjælp af eller i form af statsmidler
According to SAS, it appears that there is no form of volume guarantee or similar offered by Ryanair in the 1999 agreements with the airport manager.
begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner
In addition, SAS argues that there appears to be no particular penalty sanction in case Ryanair fails to keep the volumes or undertakings that it originally committed to the airport when the arrangement was negotiated back in 1999.
fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og
In addition, SAS states that Ryanair has been starting and closing routes the last few years without any apparent negative impact on the financial benefits granted to it by the airport manager.
påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
In the opinion of SAS, the aid granted to Ryanair by the airport manager is not aimed at developing an underdeveloped region, but rather at attracting additional operations in competition with other airports.
Eftersom Aarhus Lufthavn er offentligt ejet, har den tydeligvis rådighed over offentlige midler.
Finally, SAS states that the 1999 agreements with Ryanair have now been in place for nearly 10 years.
Det er derfor ikke nødvendigt at fastslå, hvorvidt lufthavnen tidligere har modtaget statsstøtte.
SAS believes that, even if it could be argued that the 1999 agreements would satisfy the criteria for start-up aid to airlines as set out in the 2005 Aviation Guidelines, as such, the time frame in itself should render the 1999 agreements incompatible given the strict conditions for approving such aid.
Da aftalen blev indgået i 1999, blev statsfinansiering af lufthavne og lufthavnsinfrastruktur under alle omstændigheder i henhold til luftfartsretningslinjerne fra 1994 anset for at være en almen foranstaltning i økonomisk politik, der ikke kunne kontrolleres af Kommissionen på grundlag af traktatens statsstøtteregler.
In view of the above, SAS is of the opinion that the 1999 agreements between Ryanair and Aarhus airport constitute incompatible State aid.
I Aéroports de Paris-dommen af 12. december 2000 [7] afviste Retten denne fortolkning og fastslog, at drift af en lufthavn udgør en økonomisk aktivitet.
Association of European Airlines
Før denne dom kunne de offentlige myndigheder med rette antage, at offentlig finansiering af lufthavne ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Association of European Airlines (‘AEA’) submitted its comments on 4 July 2008.
På grund af den tvivl, der herskede inden denne afklaring, kan foranstaltninger, der blev ydet inden domsafsigelsen, ikke længere anfægtes med udgangspunkt i statsstøttereglerne.
AEA's comments were fully in line with those provided by SAS.
For at fastslå, om aftalen fra 1999 gav Ryanair en fordel, skal Kommissionen undersøge, om en lufthavn, som opererer under normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår, og som lader sig lede af mere langsigtede rentabilitetsudsigter, under lignende forhold ville have indgået den samme aftale som Aarhus Lufthavn eller en lignende aftale [8].
COMMENTS FROM DENMARK ON THIRD PARTY COMMENTS
Det kan normalt udelukkes, at der foreligger en fordel, hvis a) prisen for lufthavnstjenester svarer til markedsprisen, eller b) hvis en forudgående undersøgelse kan dokumentere, at aftalen med luftfartsselskabet bidrager til lufthavnens rentabilitet, og at den er en del af en overordnet strategi for langsigtet rentabilitet.
Denmark received the comments of the three interested parties.
Lufthavnens infrastruktur skal desuden kunne benyttes af alle luftfartsselskaber (også den infrastruktur, der i højere grad benyttes af bestemte kategorier af luftfartsselskaber, f.eks. lavprisselskaber eller charterselskaber).
Denmark began its observations by stating that the guidelines referred to by SAS are irrelevant for the assessment of the existence of aid regarding the 1999 agreements.
I henhold til Charleroi-dommen [9] skal Kommissionen ved vurderingen af de pågældende foranstaltninger tage højde for alle de relevante forhold og disses sammenhæng.
Denmark states that it does not agree with the observations of SAS that the 1999 agreements are imputable to that Member State.
Med andre ord skal Kommissionen undersøge den virkning, som aftalen fra 1999 kan forventes at få på Aarhus Lufthavn ud fra en integreret tilgang, hvor der tages hensyn til alle relevante forhold vedrørende den pågældende foranstaltning.
Denmark states that to demonstrate the imputability of the 1999 agreements it is not sufficient that Aarhus airport is publicly owned, but the effective involvement in the decisions of the airport manager needs to be shown.
I Stardust marine-dommen udtalte Domstolen, at »… der ved bedømmelsen af, om en stat har iagttaget en handlemåde, som en fornuftig investor ville have fulgt under markedsøkonomiske vilkår, og af, om statens handlemåde er økonomisk rationel, skal foretages en vurdering af situationen, som den var på det tidspunkt, da de finansielle støtteforanstaltninger blev truffet, og at der ikke må tages hensyn til omstændighederne, som de har udviklet sig sidenhen.« [10]
Denmark states that the public authorities were not involved in the negotiations of the 1999 agreements at any point in time.
For at foretage den markedsøkonomiske investortest skal Kommissionen foretage en vurdering af situationen, som den var på det tidspunkt, hvor aftalen mellem Ryanair og Aarhus Lufthavn blev indgået (dvs. den 2. november 1999).
Moreover, Denmark dismisses the observations of SAS that the agreements do not contain a ‘volume guarantee’ or penalty mechanism in the event of non-compliance by Ryanair.
Kommissionen skal også basere sin vurdering på de oplysninger og forudsætninger, som lufthavnen havde til rådighed, da den 10-årige aftale blev indgået.
Denmark explains that the 1999 agreements include the possibility to renegotiate the terms of the agreements, should Ryanair fail to generate the minimum volume of […] passengers in the first few years after the conclusion of the agreements.
Sammenligning med markedsprisen: benchmarking
According to Denmark, this is a penalty mechanism.
Med henblik på at udelukke en økonomisk fordel, som ikke ville være opnået under normale markedsvilkår, fremfører Ryanair, at afgifterne omfattet af aftalen skal sammenlignes med de lufthavnsafgifter, der anvendes på lavprisflyselskaber i andre europæiske lufthavne.
Moreover, Denmark is of the opinion that the start-up aid conditions set out in the 2005 Aviation Guidelines are not applicable to the 1999 agreements.
Kommissionen er af den opfattelse, at benchmarking af lufthavnsafgifter kunne være en hensigtsmæssig tilgang til vurdering af, om der er tale om støtte til luftfartselskaber.
With regard to Ryanair's comments, Denmark explains that the 1999 agreement between Aarhus airport and Ryanair exemplifies and reflects a general development in the regional airports market.
Fastsættelsen af et benchmark kræver dog, at der kan udvælges et tilstrækkeligt antal sammenlignelige lufthavne, der leverer sammenlignelige ydelser på normale markedsvilkår.
EXISTENCE OF AID
I den forbindelse bemærker Kommissionen, at EU's lufthavne på det tidspunkt, hvor aftalen blev indgået, ikke blev betragtet som virksomheder.
By virtue of Article 107(1) TFEU ‘… any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at selv om nogle lufthavne er privatejede eller forvaltes uden samfundsmæssige eller regionale hensyn, kan de priser, der fastsættes af disse lufthavne, være stærkt påvirkede af de priser, der er fastsat af hovedparten af de lufthavnsforvaltere, som modtager offentlig støtte, eftersom sidstnævnte priser tages i betragtning af luftfartsselskaberne under deres forhandlinger med de lufthavne, der ejes eller forvaltes af private virksomheder.
The criteria provided for in Article 107(1) TFEU are cumulative.
I nærværende sag er de lufthavne, der kan anvendes som benchmark, under offentligt ejerskab og/eller har tidligere modtaget offentlig støtte.
Therefore, in order to determine whether the measure in question constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU all of the following conditions need to be fulfilled.
Desuden lader det til, at omfanget af de ydelser, der leveres af lufthavnene, varierer, bl.a. parkering af fly med base i lufthavnen, bilparkering til Ryanair-personale, kontorer, hangar, catering, uddannelseslokaler osv., og også aftalernes tidsrammer varierer.
Namely, the financial support should:
Ud fra disse betragtninger (se betragtning 79-83) finder Kommissionen, at der på nuværende tidspunkt ikke kan defineres et passende benchmark til at fastsætte markedsprisen for ydelser, der leveres af lufthavnsforvaltere.
constitute an advantage;
Rentabilitetsanalyse af aftalen fra 1999
be granted by the Member State or through State resources;
Da der ikke findes et passende markedsbestemt benchmark, finder Kommissionen, at forhåndsanalysen af den gradvist stigende rentabilitet er det mest relevante kriterie til vurdering af de aftaler, der indgås mellem lufthavne og individuelle luftfartsselskaber.
favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods;
Kommissionen anser prisdifferentiering for at være standardforretningspraksis.
distort or threaten to distort competition; and
Sådanne differentierede prisfastsættelsespolitikker bør imidlertid være forretningsmæssigt begrundede for at efterleve det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip [11].
affect trade between Member States.
Danmark fremfører, at Aarhus Lufthavn handlede rationelt, og underbygger sine argumenter med en kopi af Aarhus Lufthavns forudgående beregninger.
Since Aarhus airport is publicly owned, it clearly has public resources at its disposal.
Kommissionen finder, at alle andre luftfartsselskaber også har adgang til den lufthavnsinfrastruktur, som Ryanair benytter.
It is therefore not necessary to determine to what extent it has benefited from State aid in the past.
Kommissionen skal yderligere undersøge, om aftalen fra 1999 er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske princip.
In any event, when the 1999 agreements were concluded, the 1994 Aviation Guidelines considered financing of airports and airport infrastructure by the State to be a general measure of economic policy that could not be controlled under the Treaty rules on State aid.
I den forbindelse kan en aftale indgået mellem et luftfartsselskab og en lufthavn ifølge Kommissionen anses for at være i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, hvis den ud fra en forhåndsvurdering bidrager til gradvist at øge lufthavnens rentabilitet.
In its judgment in the Aéroports de Paris case of 12 December 2000 [7], the General Court rules against that interpretation and held that the operation of an airport constitutes an economic activity.
Lufthavnen skal under aftalens varighed udvise en evne til at dække alle omkostninger hidrørende fra aftalen med et luftfartsselskab med en rimelig fortjeneste [12] på grundlag af sunde udsigter på langt sigt [13], når aftalen udformes.
Until the judgment in the Aéroports de Paris case, the public authorities could legitimately consider that the public funding of airports did not constitute State aid.
For at vurdere om en aftale indgået af en lufthavnsforvalter med et luftfartsselskab lever op til det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, skal forventede ikke-luftfartsrelaterede indtægter, som hidrører fra luftfartsselskabets aktiviteter, lægges til lufthavnsafgifterne, minus eventuelle nedslag, markedsføringsstøtte og tilskyndelsesordninger.
Due to the uncertainty that existed before this clarification of the law, financing measures that were granted before the judgment was pronounced cannot anymore be put into question on the basis of State aid rules.
Ligeledes skal alle forventede meromkostninger, som lufthavnen afholder i forbindelse med luftfartsselskabets aktiviteter i lufthavnen, også medregnes.
In order to determine whether the 1999 agreements granted Ryanair an advantage, the Commission has to examine whether in similar circumstances an airport operating under normal conditions of the market economy and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term would have entered into the same or a similar commercial arrangement as Aarhus airport [8].
Disse meromkostninger kan omfatte alle typer af udgifter eller investeringer, f.eks. ekstra personale, udstyr eller investeringsomkostninger, som skyldes luftfartsselskabets tilstedeværelse i lufthavnen.
The existence of an advantage can normally be excluded if (a) the price charged for airport services corresponds to the market price or (b) if it can be demonstrated through an ex ante analysis that the agreements with the airline incrementally contribute to the profitability of the airport and are part of overall strategy leading to profitability in the long term.
De omkostninger, som lufthavnen under alle omstændigheder ville være nødt til at afholde uafhængigt af aftalen med luftfartsselskabet, skal derimod ikke tages i betragtning, når det vurderes, om det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip er overholdt.
Moreover, the airport infrastructure must be open to all airlines (this includes infrastructure more likely to be used by certain categories of airlines, such as low cost carriers or charters).
I lufthavnsforvalterens rentabilitetsberegninger blev der taget hensyn til Ryanairs forpligtelser i henhold til aftalen og den forventede stigning i antallet af passagerer.
According to the Charleroi judgment [9] when assessing the measures in question the Commission has to take into account all the relevant features of the measures and their context.
Ifølge aftalen forpligtede Ryanair sig til at begynde sine operationer i Aarhus Lufthavn med mindst […] tur-/returflyvning.
In other words, the Commission has to analyse the expected impact of the 1999 agreements on Aarhus airport taking into account all relevant features of the measure in question.
Ryanair forpligtede sig også til at generere mindst […] passagerer årligt til Aarhus Lufthavn i 2001.
The Court declared in the Stardust Marine judgment that,‘… in order to examine whether or not the State has adopted the conduct of a prudent investor operating in a market economy, it is necessary to place oneself in the context of the period during which the financial support measures were taken in order to assess the economic rationality of the State's conduct, and thus to refrain from any assessment based on a later situation.’ [10]
Hovedaftalen indeholder en oversigt over afgifter pr. tur-/returflyvning (se tabel 2).
In order to be able to apply the market economy operator test the Commission has to place itself at the time when the 1999 agreements between Aarhus airport and Ryanair were concluded (that is, on 2 November 1999).
Aarhus Lufthavn ventede, at Ryanair i løbet af de første år af sin tilstedeværelse i lufthavnen ville generere ca. 150000 passagerer om året med en forventet ligelig fordeling mellem udrejsende og ankommende passagerer og med udgangspunkt i […] tur-/returflyvninger.
The Commission must also base its assessment on the information and assumptions which were at the disposal of the airport when the 1999 agreements with a duration of 10 years were signed.
Aarhus Lufthavn ventede også at øge sine ikke-luftfartsrelaterede indtægter proportionelt med det stigende antal passagerer, navnlig som følge af parkeringsindtægter.
Comparison with the market price: benchmarking
Samtidig ventede lufthavnen, at indtægterne hidrørende fra shopping i løbet af aftalen med Ryanair ville stige.
Ryanair argues that in order to exclude an economic advantage that would not be obtained under normal market conditions the charges in the 1999 agreements have to be compared with airport charges applied at other European airports to low cost airlines.
For så vidt angår forventede omkostninger som følge af Ryanairs tilstedeværelse i lufthavnen, ventede Aarhus Lufthavn, at det ikke ville blive nødvendigt at foretage ekstra investeringer for at betjene Ryanair.
The Commission considers that benchmarking of airport charges is indeed a possible approach to assess the presence of aid to airlines.
Inden Ryanair påbegyndte sin aktivitet, udnyttede Aarhus Lufthavn kun ca. 40 % af sin kapacitet.
However, the identification of a benchmark requires first that a sufficient number of comparable airports providing comparable services under normal market conditions can be selected.
Derfor antog Aarhus Lufthavn, at der ikke ville opstå ekstra driftsomkostninger ved start/landing og groundhandling.
In this respect the Commission notes that at the time when the 1999 agreements were concluded EU airports were considered not to be undertakings.
Aarhus Lufthavn medtog omkostningerne ved groundhandling i sine beregninger.
The Commission further notes that, even if some airports are privately owned or managed without social or regional considerations, the prices charged by these airports might be strongly influenced by the prices charged by the majority of publicly subsidised airport managers as these latter prices are taken into account by airlines during their negotiations with the privately owned or managed airports.
Omkostningerne blev beregnet med udgangspunkt i aflønningen af tre medarbejdere for to timers arbejde pr. afgang i forbindelse med check-in og boarding af Ryanair-passagerer, selv om det kan antages, at der ikke er behov for fuld bemanding i de fulde to timer af check-in-tiden.
In this case, the benchmark airports are either publicly owned or received public funding in the past.
Desuden flyver Ryanair uden for spidsbelastningstidspunkterne om morgenen og aftenen.
Moreover, the level of the services provided by the comparator airports seems to be also different, for example such as parking for based aircraft, car parking for Ryanair based staff, base office, hangar, catering facilities, training room etc.; and the agreements are also of a different duration.
Derfor har groundhandling-personalet i Aarhus Lufthavn tid tilovers til at betjene Ryanair, så det ikke var nødvendigt at ansætte yderligere personale.
In those circumstances (see recitals 79 to 83), the Commission considers that at the present time an appropriate benchmark cannot be identified to establish the market price for services provided by the airport manager.
Samtidig har Ryanair kun begrænset behov for groundhandling-tjenester.
Profitability analysis of the 1999 agreements
Aarhus Lufthavn foretager ingen vedligeholdelse af luftfartøjer eller rengøring af Ryanairs fly.
In absence of an identifiable market benchmark, the Commission considers that the ex ante incremental profitability analysis is the relevant criterion for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines.
Der er desuden ikke behov for udskubning af fly eller befordring af passagerer på airside.
The Commission considers that price differentiation is a standard business practice.
Ryanairs passagerer går fra flyet til terminalen.
Nevertheless, such differentiated pricing policies should be commercially justified to satisfy the market economy operator test [11].
Foruden omkostningerne til groundhandling-tjenester medregnede Aarhus Lufthavn også markedsføringsomkostningerne hidrørende fra markedsføringsaftalen fra 1999.
Denmark argues that Aarhus airport acted rationally and substantiates its arguments with a copy of Aarhus airport's ex ante calculations.
Tabel 4 opridser indtægts- og omkostningsberegningerne i forbindelse med aftalen fra 1999 og det positive bidrag til Aarhus Lufthavns rentabilitet i løbet af aftalens varighed.
In this respect the Commission observes that the airport infrastructure used by Ryanair is also open to all other airlines.
Beregningerne er baseret på den forretningsplan, som Danmark har indsendt, og de tidligere beskrevne antagelser om rentabilitet.
The Commission has to further assess whether the 1999 agreements can be deemed in line with the market economy operator test.
Tabel 4
In this respect, the Commission considers that an agreement concluded between an airline and an airport can be deemed in line with the market economy operator test when it incrementally contributes, from an ex ante standpoint, to the profitability of the airport.
Beregning af den stigende rentabilitet i nutidsværdi som følge af aftalen med Ryanair i 1999
The airport should demonstrate that over the duration of the agreement it is capable of covering all costs stemming from the agreement with an airline with a reasonable profit margin [12] on the basis of sound long-term prospects [13] when setting up the arrangement.
Kommissionen bemærker, at den rentabilitetsberegning, der blev foretaget af Aarhus Lufthavns ledelse, omfattede alle omkostninger, som skyldes Ryanairs tilstedeværelse i lufthavnen (dvs. alle meromkostninger).
In order to assess whether an agreement concluded by an airport with an airline complies with the market economy operator test, expected non-aeronautical revenues stemming from the airline's activity should be taken into consideration together with airport charges, net of any rebates, marketing support or incentive schemes.
Ryanairs tilstedeværelse medførte omkostninger i form af markedsføringsstøtte og groundhandling-omkostninger.
Similarly, all expected costs incrementally incurred by the airport in relation to the airline's activity at the airport should be taken into account.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at det ikke har været nødvendigt at ansætte ekstra groundhandling-personale i forbindelse med Ryanairs flyvninger.
Such incremental costs could encompass all categories of expenses or investments, such as incremental personnel, equipment and investment costs induced by the presence of the airline at the airport.
Den bemærker også, at fordi Ryanair flyver uden for spidsbelastningstidspunkterne, kan lufthavnen bedre udnytte sin ledige kapacitet og blive mere effektiv.
On the contrary, costs which the airport would have to incur anyway independently from the arrangement with the airline should not be taken into account in the MEOP assessment.