natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Parten satte derimod endnu en gang spørgsmålstegn ved Kommissionens metode og anfægtede de forklaringer, der allerede var blevet givet tidligere i proceduren, jf. betragtning 59-83.
The Commission gave the Chinese exporting producers sufficient time to comment on the additional elements disclosed to them.
Sent fredag eftermiddag den 26. januar 2018 inden fristen for bemærkninger mandag den 29. januar 2018 fremsatte parten desuden en række nye spørgsmål og krav, som ikke tidligere var blevet rejst som led i proceduren eller for høringskonsulenten, og påstod, at manglende svar på og fremlæggelse af disse spørgsmål ville være i strid med virksomhedens ret til forsvar.
In its submission, however, one Chinese exporting producer did not limit itself to making comments on the points raised by the Hearing Officer for which the Commission provided additional explanations.
Som svar herpå mindede Kommissionen først om, at den som følge de retlige og proceduremæssige faser og frister for afslutning af en fornyet undersøgelse ikke havde mulighed for at acceptere fortsatte argumenter, krav og spørgsmål, som indgives på et sent tidspunkt i proceduren, da dette ville bringe en rettidig afslutning af undersøgelsen i fare, navnlig da parterne havde haft rig mulighed for og tid til at fremsætte bemærkninger tidligere.
Instead, it once more questioned the methodology followed by the Commission by contesting the explanations already provided earlier in the procedure, as outlined in recitals (59) to (83).
Dette var især tilfældet i den aktuelle sag, hvor metoden var blevet udførligt forklaret for de interesserede parter under flere høringer og i flere forskellige fremlæggelsesdokumenter.
Moreover, late on the Friday afternoon 26 January 2018 before its deadline for comments on Monday 29 January 2018, it put forward a number of new questions and demands, not previously raised either during the procedure or before the Hearing Officer, and claimed that the absence of answer to and disclosure on those questions would infringe its rights of defence.
Netop derfor havde Kommissionen i sine præciseringer efter høringerne udtrykkeligt anmodet den kinesiske eksporterende producent om at begrænse sine bemærkninger til de specifikke spørgsmål, hvorom denne foran høringskonsulenten havde påstået en tilsidesættelse af sin ret til forsvar, og som denne efterfølgende modtog yderligere præciseringer af.
In reply thereto, the Commission first recalled that the legal and procedural steps and the deadlines for concluding a review investigation did not allow it to accept continuing arguments, demands, and questions submitted at a late stage of the procedure as this would jeopardise the timely conclusion of the investigation especially where there had been ample opportunity and time for the parties to comment earlier.
Den kinesiske eksporterende producent kunne ikke godtgøre, hvorledes dennes ret til forsvar var blevet tilsidesat, eller dokumentere, hvordan de pågældende punkter kunne have påvirket de generelle resultater af undersøgelsen.
This was all the more true in the present case where the methodology was explained at length during several hearings and in multiple disclosure documents to interested parties.
Ud over at anfægte den anvendte metode til fastsættelse af den normale værdi påstod den kinesiske eksporterende producent fortsat, at dennes dumpingmargen var blevet forhøjet gennem en sammenligning mellem rør til militære og nukleare anvendelser og rør til almindelige anvendelser.
It is for those reasons that the Commission, explicitly, in its post-hearing clarifications requested the Chinese exporting producer to limit its comments to the specific matters for which it claimed a violation of its rights of defence before the Hearing Officer, and pursuant to which it received further clarifications.
Der blev imidlertid ikke foretaget en sådan sammenligning, jf. betragtning 79, og der blev ikke fastsat en normal værdi for sådanne specifikke varetyper.
The Chinese exporting producer did not demonstrate how its rights of defense were infringed, nor did it substantiate how the points raised could have affected the overall findings of the investigation.
Desuden anmodede den eksporterende producent for første gang på dette sene tidspunkt i proceduren om en justering for en rimelig prissammenligning baseret på en påstand om, at dennes produktivitet var 2,5 gange så høj som den indiske referencelandsproducents.
In addition to contesting the methodology for normal value determination, the Chinese exporting producer continued to claim that its dumping margin has been inflated by a comparison between pipes for military and nuclear use and pipes for common use.
Virksomheden fremhævede også den indiske producents fortjenstmargen og anmodede om en nedjustering af den normale værdi med den begrundelse, at hjemmemarkedssalget i Indien i NUP var mere rentabelt end den målfortjeneste, som var blevet fastsat for EU-erhvervsgrenen i den oprindelige undersøgelse.
However, as explained in recital (79), no such comparison was made and no normal value was determined for such specific product types.
Tilsammen medførte de to påstande en nedjustering af den normale værdi på 28 %, hvorved der angiveligt opstår en negativ dumpingmargen.
Moreover, the exporting producer, for the first time at this late stage of the proceeding, claimed an adjustment for fair price comparison based on the allegation that its productivity was 2.5 times that of the Indian analogue producer.
Den første påstand blev fremsat på et tidspunkt, hvor det ikke var muligt at kontrollere den.
It also highlighted the profit margin of the Indian producer and requested a downward adjustment of the normal value determination on the grounds that the domestic sales in India in the RIP were more profitable than the target profit established for the Union industry in the original investigation.
Selv om den første påstand allerede blev fremsat på et tidligere tidspunkt i proceduren, var den under alle omstændigheder ikke dokumenteret og opfyldte således ikke kravene i grundforordningens artikel 6, stk. 8.
Both claims together amounted to a downward adjustment of the normal values by 28 %, thereby creating an alleged negative dumping margin.
Den anden påstand var ubegrundet, da den normale værdi blev baseret på referencelandsproducentens faktiske salgspriser på hjemmemarkedet, jf. betragtning 48-51, og ikke beregnet på grundlag af omkostninger og fortjeneste.
The first claim was made at a stage where verification had become impossible.
Fortjenesten af referencelandsproducentens hjemmemarkedssalg blev taget i betragtning ved afgørelsen af, om hjemmemarkedssalget fandt sted i normal handel, som forklaret i betragtning 50.
In any case, even if the first claim had been made at an earlier stage of the proceeding, it was uncorroborated by evidence and therefore did not satisfy the requirements set out by Article 6(8) of the basic Regulation.
Derimod afspejlede EU-erhvervsgrenens målfortjeneste den fortjeneste, som kunne være blevet opnået i en situation uden dumpingimport.
The second claim was unfounded, as the normal value was based on the actual domestic sales prices of the analogue country producer, as set out in recitals (48) to (51), and not constructed on the basis of costs and profits.
Rentabiliteten på hjemmemarkedet og EU-erhvervsgrenens målfortjeneste var som sådan ikke sammenlignelige.
The profitability of the analogue country producer's domestic sales was taken into account in the determination that the domestic sales were made in the ordinary course of trade, as explained in recital (50).
Begge påstande blev derfor afvist.
By contrast, the target profit of the Union industry reflected the profit that could have been achieved in the absence of dumped imports.
Som følge af afvisningen af justeringen på 28 % ville den kinesiske eksporterende producents alternative dumpingberegning, selv hvis den var blevet accepteret, ikke have ændret ved konklusionen om, at der forekom fortsat dumping i NUP.
As such, the domestic profitability and the Union industry's target profit were not comparable.
Under høringen den 5. februar 2018 henviste den kinesiske eksporterende producent gentagne gange til afgørelsen fra WTO's appelorgan vedrørende importen af »fasteners from China« (sag DS397).
Both claims were therefore rejected.
Parten hævdede, at Kommissionen på baggrund af denne afgørelse burde have fremlagt alle omkostninger, priser og normale værdier for hver af den indiske referencelandsproducents, de samarbejdsvillige amerikanske producenters og EU-erhvervsgrenens varetyper, og påstod, at virksomhedens ret til forsvar ellers ville blive tilsidesat.
As a result of the rejection of the 28 % adjustment, also the Chinese exporting producer's alternative dumping calculation, even if otherwise accepted, would not have changed the finding that dumping continued in the RIP.
Kommissionen bemærkede imidlertid, at det af afgørelsen fremgik, at metoden til fastsættelse af den normale værdi kun skulle fremlægges for så vidt angår varetyper eksporteret af den kinesiske producent for derved at sikre fuld dækning af eksporten.
At the hearing of 5 February 2018, the same Chinese exporting producer repetitively referred to the ruling of the WTO Appellate Body concerning imports of Fasteners from China (case DS397).
Afgørelsen indebærer derimod ikke, at fortrolige virksomhedsoplysninger om alle parters samlede aktiviteter skal gøres tilgængelige for den eksporterende producent.
It alleged that based on that ruling, the Commission should have communicated all cost, prices and normal values of each product type of the Indian analogue country producer, the cooperating US producers and the Union industry, and alleged that otherwise it rights of defence were breached.
Under høringen den 5. februar 2018 hævdede samme kinesiske eksporterende producent fortsat, at de reviderede koefficienter, som Kommissionen havde fastsat, også var forkerte.
However, the Commission noted that the ruling instructed the disclosure of the methodology of normal value determination only for the product types exported by the Chinese producer, thereby ensuring full coverage of the exports.
Parten anfægtede de reviderede koefficienter for stålsort og for den mindste diameter.
By contrast, the ruling did not imply that confidential company data on the entire activity of all parties should become available to the exporting producer.
Parten hævdede, at koefficienter fastsat på grundlag af oplysninger fra de amerikanske eksporterende producenter burde være blevet baseret på standardomkostninger.
At the hearing of 5 February 2018, the same Chinese exporting producer continued to allege that also the revised coefficients established by the Commission were wrong.
Virksomheden fremlagde en alternativ dumpingberegning med alternative koefficienter, som viste en negativ dumping som følge af justeringen på 28 %, jf. betragtning 88-89.
It contested the revised steel grade coefficients and the coefficients for the smallest diameters.
Kommissionen fortsatte med at afvise de alternative koefficienter, da de var baseret på en standardprisliste for et andet tidsrum end NUP, som forklaret i betragtning 80.
It claimed that any coefficients determined on the basis of data of the US exporting producers should have been based on standard costing.
Kommissionen bekræftede, at man i antidumpingundersøgelser skal anvende faktiske omkostninger, nemlig standardomkostninger justeret for mængde og prisvariationer.
It submitted an alternative dumping calculation using the alternative coefficients, which showed a negative dumping due to the 28 % adjustment explained in recitals (88) to (89).
Desuden svarede de reviderede koefficienter generelt til de alternative koefficienter, som den kinesiske eksporterende producent havde fremlagt.
The Commission continued to reject the alternative coefficients, because they were based on standard price lists, from a different time period than the RIP, as explained in recital (80).
Under alle omstændigheder var de alternative koefficienter, selv hvis de var blevet accepteret, ikke i sig selv tilstrækkelige til at ændre den konklusion, at der fortsat fandt dumping sted i NUP.
The Commission confirmed that in anti-dumping investigations actual costs should mandatorily be used, meaning standard costs adjusted by quantity and price variances.
Sandsynlighed for fortsat dumping fra Kina
Furthermore, the revised coefficients were broadly in line with the alternative coefficients submitted by the Chinese exporting producer.
Ud over konstateringen af dumping i den nuværende undersøgelsesperiode undersøgte Kommissionen, om der var sandsynlighed for fortsat dumping, hvis foranstaltningerne blev ophævet.
In any event, the alternative coefficients on their own, even if accepted, were not sufficient to change the finding that dumping continued in the RIP.
Følgende yderligere indikatorer blev analyseret: produktionskapaciteten og den uudnyttede kapacitet i Kina, de kinesiske producenters prisadfærd på andre markeder og EU-markedets tiltrækningskraft.
Likelihood of continuation of dumping from the PRC
Produktionskapaciteten og den uudnyttede kapacitet i Kina
Further to the finding of the existence of dumping during the review investigation period, the Commission investigated the likelihood of continuation of dumping, should the measures be repealed.
Kapacitetsudnyttelsen hos de to kinesiske producenter i stikprøven lå i intervallet fra [40 %-60 %].
The following additional elements were analysed: the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC, pricing behaviour of producers in the PRC to other markets and the attractiveness of the Union market.
Den uudnyttede kapacitet var på [40000-50000 ton] for de to producenter i stikprøven.
Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC
Ansøgeren anslog den samlede kapacitet for alle producenter i Kina til over 1 mio. ton.
The capacity utilisation rate of the two sampled Chinese producers was found to be in the range of [40 % to 60 %].
Ansøgeren anslog det samlede forbrug på hjemmemarkedet i Kina til 310000 ton på grundlag af den hjemlige produktion i Kina, importen og eksporten.
Furthermore, it was found that there were plans to construct additional capacity.
Da den uudnyttede kapacitet svarede til over 150 % af det anslåede forbrug på hjemmemarkedet i Kina, blev det anset for usandsynligt, at forbruget på hjemmemarkedet i Kina ville kunne stige med 150 % og absorbere den store uudnyttede kapacitet.
The total capacity of all producers in the PRC was estimated by the applicant to be above 1 million tonnes.
Det blev derfor konkluderet, at der fandtes en meget stor uudnyttet kapacitet, som i et vist omfang kunne dirigeres til EU-markedet, hvis foranstaltningerne over for Kina fik lov at udløbe.
Based on the capacity utilisation rate of the sampled producers, the total spare capacity in the PRC was thus estimated to be approximately 500000 tonnes, over four times the Union consumption.
Kinas prisadfærd på andre markeder
Even if the capacity utilisation rates of the other exporting producers would have been higher than those of the sampled producers, the total Chinese spare capacity would still be significant and equivalent to more than the total Union consumption.
Der er indført antidumpingforanstaltninger over for importen af den pågældende vare fra Kina i Den Eurasiske Økonomiske Union (Belarus, Kasakhstan og Rusland) og i Ukraine.
The applicant estimated the total domestic consumption in the PRC to be 310000 tonnes on the basis of the Chinese domestic production, imports and exports.
Disse foranstaltninger har godtgjort, at den kinesiske industri som helhed var involveret i dumpingpraksis med hensyn til den pågældende vare på andre markeder.
As the spare capacity corresponded to over 150 % of the estimated Chinese domestic consumption, it was considered unlikely that the domestic consumption in the PRC could increase by 150 % and absorb the large spare capacity.
Desuden blev det konstateret, at den kinesiske eksport til alle tredjelande generelt foregik til lavere priser end ved eksport til Unionen.
It was therefore concluded that there was very significant spare capacity that could be directed to the Union market at least in part, should the measures against the PRC be allowed to lapse.
På grundlag af de kinesiske eksportstatistikker var de gennemsnitlige kinesiske eksportpriser til tredjelande 23 % lavere end priserne ved eksport til Unionen.
Pricing behaviour of the PRC to other markets
Kommissionen konkluderede, at hvis de nuværende foranstaltninger blev ophævet, var det sandsynligt, at de kinesiske eksporterende producenter ville omdirigere deres eksport til Unionen til dumpingpriser.
Anti-dumping measures on imports of the product concerned from the PRC were in force in the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia) and Ukraine.
EU-markedets tiltrækningskraft
These measures demonstrated the existence of dumping practices of the Chinese industry as a whole with respect to the product concerned on other markets.
EU-markedet var på over 100000 ton og anslås til at være det næststørste marked i verden efter Kina og større end USA.
Furthermore, the Chinese exports to all third countries were found to be made generally at lower prices than the exports to the Union.
EU-markedet var således allerede i kraft af sin størrelse et attraktivt marked for de kinesiske eksportører.
On the basis of the Chinese export statistics, the average Chinese export prices to third countries were 23 % lower than the export prices to the Union.
For det andet var de gennemsnitlige kinesiske eksportpriser til Unionen væsentligt højere end de gennemsnitlige kinesiske eksportpriser til andre markeder, hvilket var et yderligere bevis på EU-markedets tiltrækningskraft.
The Commission concluded that, if the current measures were to be repealed, it was likely that the Chinese exporting producers would redirect exports towards the Union at dumped prices.
De kinesiske eksportpriser til tredjelande var, jf. betragtning 100, 23 % lavere end priserne ved eksport til Unionen.
Attractiveness of the Union market
For det tredje begrænsede de gældende antidumpingforanstaltninger på andre markeder såsom Rusland og Ukraine antallet af andre markeder for den kinesiske eksport.
The Union market size was over 100000 tonnes, estimated to be the second-largest in the world after the PRC, and larger than the USA.
Det er derfor sandsynligt, at den kinesiske eksport, hvis foranstaltningerne udløber, igen vil blive rettet mod EU-markedet og sandsynligvis vil opnå en markedsandel, som er tættere på andelen før indførelsen af foranstaltningerne, dvs. 18 %.
Thus the Union market was already by its size an attractive market for Chinese exporters.
Kommissionen konkluderede således, at EU-markedet sandsynligvis vil være meget attraktivt for den kinesiske eksport, hvis foranstaltningerne ophæves.
Second, the average Chinese export prices to the Union were found to be significantly higher than the average Chinese export prices to other markets, which was a further demonstration of the attractiveness of the Union market.
Konklusion vedrørende sandsynligheden for fortsat dumping
As outlined in recital (100) the Chinese export prices to third countries were 23 % lower than the export prices to the Union.
Undersøgelsen viste, at importen fra Kina fortsatte med at trænge ind på EU-markedet til dumpingpriser i den nuværende undersøgelsesperiode.
Third, the anti-dumping measures in force in other markets like Russia and Ukraine restricted the range of other markets available for Chinese exports.
Undersøgelsen viste også, at den uudnyttede kapacitet i Kina var meget betydelig i forhold til EU-forbruget i den nuværende undersøgelsesperiode.
Therefore, it is likely that should the measures lapse the Chinese exports would be again directed towards the Union market and likely to reach a market share closer to the share they had before the imposition of the measures, which was 18 %.
Denne uudnyttede kapacitet vil sandsynligvis i et vist omfang blive dirigeret til EU-markedet, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
In conclusion, the Commission found that the Union market would likely be a very attractive destination for Chinese exports, should the measures be lifted.
Desuden er der på andre markeder indført antidumpingforanstaltninger over for importen af den pågældende vare fra Kina, og de kinesiske priser ved eksport til andre markeder var lavere end priserne ved eksport til Unionen.
Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation of dumping
Prisadfærden for den kinesiske eksport på tredjelandes markeder støtter sandsynligheden for fortsat dumpingimport til Unionen, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
The investigation showed that Chinese imports continued to enter the Union market at dumped prices during the review investigation period.
Endelig kan man på grund af EU-markedets tiltrækningskraft i form af størrelse og priser og den omstændighed, at andre markeder stadig er lukkede som følge af antidumpingforanstaltningerne, antage, at den kinesiske eksport sandsynligvis vil blive omdirigeret til EU-markedet, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
It also demonstrated that the spare capacity in the PRC was very significant in comparison with the Union consumption during the review investigation period.
Ud fra ovenstående konkluderede Kommissionen, at der var stor sandsynlighed for, at en ophævelse af antidumpingforanstaltningerne vil føre til væsentlig dumpingimport fra Kina til Unionen.
This spare capacity is likely to be directed at least in part to the Union market, should the measures be allowed to lapse.
SITUATIONEN PÅ EU-MARKEDET
In addition, other markets had in place anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of the product concerned from the PRC, and Chinese export prices to other markets were lower than the prices to the Union.
Definition af EU-erhvervsgren og EU-produktion
This pricing behaviour of the Chinese exports in third markets supports the likelihood of continuation of dumping to the Union, should the measures be allowed to lapse.
Samme vare blev fremstillet af 23 kendte EU-producenter, hvoraf nogle er indbyrdes forbundne, i den nuværende undersøgelsesperiode.
Finally, the attractiveness of the Union market in terms of size and prices, and the fact that other markets remain closed due to anti-dumping measures, indicated that it is likely that Chinese exports would be directed towards the Union market, should the measures be allowed to lapse.
De udgør EU-erhvervsgrenen som omhandlet i grundforordningens artikel 4, stk. 1.
Given the above, the Commission concluded that there was a strong likelihood that the repeal of the anti-dumping measures would result in significant dumped imports from the PRC to the Union.
Den samlede produktion i Unionen i den nuværende undersøgelsesperiode blev fastsat til ca. 117000 ton på grundlag af oplysninger fra ansøgeren.
SITUATION ON THE UNION MARKET
De stikprøveudvalgte virksomheder i undersøgelsen tegner sig for 54 % af EU-produktionen og 55 % af EU-salget.
Definition of the Union industry and Union production
Oplysningerne fra stikprøven er således repræsentative for EU-erhvervsgrenens situation.
The like product was manufactured by 23 known producers, some of them related to one another, in the Union during the review investigation period.
EU-forbrug
They constitute the Union industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation.
Kommissionen fastsatte EU-forbruget ud fra i) EU-erhvervsgrenens salgsmængde på EU-markedet baseret på oplysninger fra ansøgeren og ii) importen fra tredjelande baseret på oplysninger fra Eurostats database.
The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around 117000 tonnes on the basis of data provided by the applicant.
Denne database indeholder de mest nøjagtige data, idet den ud over importen i den normale ordning også omfatter import under ordningen for aktiv forædling.
The sampled companies in the investigation account for 54 % of Union production and 55 % of Union sales.
EU-forbruget udviklede sig som følger:
The data of the sample is considered representative for the situation of the Union industry.