natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Parterne aftalte, at AGRi-satsen efter kontrollen i 2007 skulle fastsættes, så man opnåede et internt afkast på […] %, men Autostrada Wielkopolska mener, at det er af afgørende betydning, at AGRi-satsen også var underlagt et absolut loft på vejafgiftssatserne.
In Poland's view, it was impossible to calculate the IRR for the project looking at HGV data only.
Autostrada Wielkopolska foretog i 2005 den forhåndsvurdering, at med skyggeafgiftsmekanismen begrænsede det absolutte loft over vejafgiftssatserne i bilag 6 Autostrada Wielkopolskas forventede interne afkast til […] % (dvs. langt under […] %).
Traffic Studies — Internal Rate of Return
I 2007 blev den AGRi-sats, der var blevet opkrævet i den mellemliggende periode, hævet op til loftet i kontrolrapporten.
As regards recitals 76 to 81 of the decision to open formal investigation procedure, Poland states that the calculation mechanism of the compensation, provided for in the Amendment Act and put in place by Poland, is correct.
Dermed var Autostrada Wielkopolskas forventede afkast […] % efter kontrollen i 2007.
However, the concession holder was overcompensated due to the use of incorrect input data.
Autostrada Wielkopolska anfører, at koncessionsaftalen er en langsigtet og særligt kompleks kontrakt, fordi den omhandler anlæg og drift af en motorvej.
Poland explains that to calculate the IRR, the traffic and revenue study from 1999 was used although a more up-to-date version of that study from 31 December 2004 existed.
For at vurdere, om en ændring af en sådan kompleks aftale mellem en stat og en privat part udgør statsstøtte, bør de principper, som Kommissionen fastlagde i London Underground-sagen, anvendes.
When using the 2004 study, the calculated IRR is significantly lower - […] % instead of […] % if calculated with the 1999 study.
Ifølge disse principper udgør en ændring ikke statsstøtte, hvis:
Poland argues that through this, ‘the concession holder was restored to its financial situation that existed in 2000 instead of that which had existed prior to the effective date of the Amendment Act and the date of Annex 6 (2005)’ and thereby the business risk of operations between 2000 and 2005 was transferred to the State.
den oprindelige koncessionsaftale ikke indebærer statsstøtte
Poland had not guaranteed, however, that any specific IRR would be achieved at the conclusion of the Concession Agreement.
ændringen ikke medfører nogen væsentlig forbedring for koncessionshaveren, eller forbedringen er på markedsvilkår.
Poland argues that the above issue was analysed in detail by Scott Wilson Sp. z o.o.
Autostrada Wielkopolska forklarer, at eftersom koncessionen blev tildelt i en åben, gennemsigtig og ikkediskriminerende udbudsprocedure, antages det, at koncessionsaftalen blev indgået på markedsvilkår og derfor ikke udgør statsstøtte.
(hereinafter: ‘Scott Wilson’), which came to the conclusion, when analysing all the traffic and revenue forecasts presented by Autostrada Wielkopolska in the period from 1998 to 2004, that the use of the study from 1999 was not appropriate given that a more up-to-date study from 2004 existed, as it lead to a significantly higher IRR as compared to the use of the study from 2004.
Ifølge AW S.A. var det forventede interne realafkast af aktionærernes kapital (egenkapital og efterstillet gæld) efter skat ifølge den oprindelige koncessionsaftale […] % ved den finansielle afslutning i denne pågældende sag.
Because Autostrada Wielkopolska was compensated to attain the IRR expected in 2000 and not the IRR Autostrada Wielkopolska could realistically have expected to achieve right before the Amendment Act entered in force, Autostrada Wielkopolska was put in a better situation than it would have been without the change of law and this constitutes an economic advantage.
Eftersom dette var det forventede afkast, der lå til grund for den oprindelige aftale, bør dette afkast betragtes som værende i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene.
Moreover, Poland points out that the Concession Agreement in Article 25.9 limits the compensation to Autostrada Wielkopolska to what it would have obtained without the legislative change.
Autostrada Wielkopolska sammenligner det interne afkast på […] %, som blev forventet efter indgåelsen af bilag 6, med det interne afkast, der fulgte af det indledende tilbud, på […] %.
Compatibility Assessment
Autostrada Wielkopolska forklarer stigningen på […] % med eksterne finansielle forhold, nemlig udskiftning af budgetoverslag med faktiske finansielle resultater og opdatering af inflations- og valutaprognoserne.
In the view of Poland, no grounds exist to consider the aid in question compatible with the internal market.
Ifølge AW S.A. var stigningen derfor fuldt ud berettiget.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
Endvidere var der ingen væsentlig forbedring i Autostrada Wielkopolskas situation udelukkende som følge af skiftet fra brugsafgifter til skyggeafgifter (uanset en eventuel ændring i det interne afkast).
The Commission received comments from Autostrada Wielkopolska as an interested party.
Det gælder navnlig, at skiftet ikke reducerede Autostrada Wielkopolskas eksponering for trafikrisici.
In the introduction, Autostrada Wielkopolska states that Poland's notification of the compensation as incompatible State aid is simply a move in a commercial dispute after Poland lost the proceedings in front of the Arbitral Tribunal and is also now trying to set aside the award.
Autostrada Wielkopolska gør endvidere gældende, at selv hvis den ændring, som Autostrada Wielkopolska ønskede, kunne anses for at være »væsentlig« som i London Underground-sagen (hvilket Autostrada Wielkopolska ikke mener), ville det stadig have betydet, at Autostrada Wielkopolska havde et forventet afkast, som på ingen måde ligger over markedsniveauet.
Autostrada Wielkopolska perceives the notification to the Commission as forum shopping on the side of Poland which should not be supported as this is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the EU's State aid policy.
AW S.A. bemærker, at Polen i sag N 462/2009 anførte, og Kommissionen accepterede, at markedsafkastet for motorvejsprojekter i Polen lå omkring […] %.
Autostrada Wielkopolska considers it would be contrary to public interest if Member States were allowed to abuse State aid rules to void agreements that they entered into at arm's length in commercial settings.
Endvidere gør Autostrada Wielkopolska gældende, at det interne afkast på […] %, som ifølge Polen skulle have været anvendt som benchmark for beregning af skyggeafgiften, ikke er på markedsvilkår, fordi ingen fornuftige private investorer ville have accepteret koncessionsaftalen i 2005, hvis det forventede afkast havde været så lavt som […] %.
Autostrada Wielkopolska considers that under the Concession Agreement, it was entitled to seek compensation after being deprived of the right to collect tolls from HGVs and therefore deprived of that source of income.
Efter Autostrada Wielkopolskas mening synes Polen at være af den holdning, at for at overholde statsstøttereglerne skal enhver kompensation efter loven nødvendigvis afspejle den finansielle situation på tidspunktet umiddelbart før den begivenhed, der udløste kompensationen.
Additionally, Autostrada Wielkopolska points out that it was never disputed that Autostrada Wielkopolska had a right to compensation nor was it disputed that the compensation would be in the form of a shadow toll.
Autostrada Wielkopolska mener, at denne fremgangsmåde ville forhindre den private part i at opfylde sine langsigtede mål og kunne tilskynde medlemsstaterne til at genforhandle OPP'er, når forretningsprognoser viser negative tendenser.
According to Autostrada Wielkopolska, the inclusion of light weight traffic in the shadow toll verification method was necessary to correctly assess the compensation amount and therefore it does not create an advantage to Autostrada Wielkopolska
Endvidere påpeger Autostrada Wielkopolska, at Kommissionen tidligere har vurderet, hvorvidt en aftale mellem en stat og en privat part var nødvendig og rimelig.
Firstly, the company explains that its situation has to be contrasted with that of the A4 motorway's concession holder.
Autostrada Wielkopolska anfører, at de foranstaltninger, der blev aftalt mellem Polen og Autostrada Wielkopolska, var rimelige, navnlig fordi koncessionsaftalen indeholdt beskyttelsesmekanismer, som skulle forhindre, at Autostrada Wielkopolska blev overkompenseret.
The A4 and A2 motorways differ in the way that the A4 is mainly a commuter road where only 20 % of the traffic is made up of HGVs (which Autostrada Wielkopolska estimates represent about 30 % of revenues).
Disse foranstaltninger var fastlagt i bilag 6 samt i den oprindelige koncessionsaftale.
For the A2 motorway, being an export corridor, a bigger share, namely […] % of vehicles were HGVs (representing […] % of all revenues).
I bilag 6 aftalte parterne, at hvis kontrolmodellen viser, at det forventede interne afkast er højere end det, der er beregnet i brugsafgiftsmodellen, vil AGRi-satsen blive nedjusteret.
It was clear to all parties involved that the abolition of a real toll payment would lead to a significant increase in HGVs traffic.
Bilag 6 indeholdt også et absolut loft på skyggeafgiftssatserne.
As a consequence, the attractiveness of the motorway would decrease in a shadow toll scenario (increased congestion, higher maintenance needs resulting in more works with reduced traffic speed), which would result in different route choices and a considerable decrease in the light vehicle flows on the motorway.
I andre bestemmelser i koncessionsaftalen, som bilag 6 ikke ændrede, fastsattes det, at […]
These factors have a significantly higher impact on a motorway in an export corridor than on a commuter road.
Det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip
Therefore, the number of light vehicles had to be updated in the case of the A2 motorway.
Autostrada Wielkopolska gør endvidere gældende, at selv om bilag 6 skaber en betydelig forbedring, vil det stadig ikke udgøre statsstøtte, fordi det blev forhandlet mellem den polske stat og Autostrada Wielkopolska på kommercielt grundlag og på almindelige markedsvilkår.
Secondly, Autostrada Wielkopolska brings forth that Autostrada Wielkopolska was under an obligation to undertake construction works as a function of certain traffic thresholds being exceeded (e.g. a third lane on the Poznan bypass) leading to substantial capital expenditures.
Endvidere accepterede Polen vilkår, som ville have været acceptable for en privat investor i en tilsvarende situation.
A verification of only HGVs would have ignored the implications that the introduction of shadow tolls had on other traffic and the milestones for additional construction work under the Concession Agreement.
Autostrada Wielkopolska anfører, at statens bemærkninger til Kommissionen konsekvent forveksler Autostrada Wielkopolskas udlæg i forhandlingerne i 2005 (et forventet afkast på […] %) med det endelige forhandlingsresultat (et forventet afkast på […] %).
First of all, Autostrada Wielkopolska underlines that when entering, in 2005, the renegotiation of the Concession Agreement it targeted a level of compensation that would allow for an IRR estimate similar to that at the financial closure in 2000, which according to AW S.A was […] %.
Autostrada Wielkopolska mente, at staten ikke accepterede Autostrada Wielkopolskas foreslåede betingelser, hvilken den var berettiget til i kommercielle forhandlinger, men insisterede på to meget vigtige aspekter af finansieringsmekanismen: a) en kontrol af skyggeafgiften efter to år, og b) et absolut loft på skyggeafgifterne uden justering for inflationen eller valutakursudsving frem til udgangen af koncessionsperioden.
While it was agreed by the parties that the AGRi Rate, after the 2007 verification, would be set to target an IRR of […] %, in Autostrada Wielkopolska's opinion it is of critical importance that the AGRi Rate was also subject to an absolute cap on toll rates.
Reelt var det interne afkast i 2005 […] % og i 2007 […] %.
Autostrada Wielkopolska estimated ex ante in 2005 that under the shadow toll mechanism the absolute cap on toll rates contained in Annex 6 limited Autostrada Wielkopolska's expected IRR to […] % (i.e., well below […] %).
Derfor var det endelige resultat af forhandlingerne tættere på Polens end Autostrada Wielkopolskas krav.
In 2007, the Verification Report increased the AGRi Rate charged in the interim period up to the cap.
Endvidere understreger Autostrada Wielkopolska, at »resultatet af forhandlinger mellem to parter med forskellige udgangspunkter normalt er et sted mellem disse to udgangspunkter«.
As the result, after the 2007 verification, Autostrada Wielkopolska's expected IRR was […] %.
Derfor bør det vurderes, hvorvidt resultatet af forhandlingerne lå inden for det, man kan kalde rimelig adfærd, som svarer til en hypotetisk privat investors adfærd.
Autostrada Wielkopolska states that the Concession Agreement is a long-term and a particularly complex contract as it involves the construction and operation of a motorway.
Autostrada Wielkopolska anfører, at hvis en stats handlinger ikke åbenbart ligger langt fra dette, kan det ifølge Domstolens dom i sag C-256/97 forventes, at en hypotetisk privat investor ville have handlet på samme måde.
To determine if an alteration of such a complex agreement between a State and a private party constitutes State aid, the principles established by the Commission in the London Underground case should be applied.
Autostrada Wielkopolska anfører, at et brev fra Ernst & Young til GDDKiA af 14. oktober 2005, som blev fremlagt for voldgiftsretten, viser, at staten under forhandlingerne skulle tage højde for risikoen for, at Autostrada Wielkopolska ikke accepterede bilag 6, hvilket ville have resulteret i ophævelse af aftalen og erstatningssøgsmål.
According to those principles, an alteration does not constitute State aid if:
Når alt dette tages i betragtning, ville det være fornuftig adfærd for en hypotetisk privat investor at acceptere det forhandlede bilag 6 og det interne afkast.
The original Concession Agreement does not entail State aid;
WSA-undersøgelsen fra 2004
The alteration either does not lead to a material improvement for the concession holder or the improvement is at market rate.
Autostrada Wielkopolska kritiserer Polens anvendelse af undersøgelsen fra 2004 som grundlag for beregningerne i bilag 6.
Autostrada Wielkopolska explains that since the Concession was awarded following an open, transparent and non-discriminatory tender, the Concession Agreement benefits from the presumption of being concluded on market terms and therefore does not constitute State aid.
Endvidere gør Autostrada Wielkopolska gældende, at staten havde adgang til en række trafikundersøgelser, dvs. Autostrada Wielkopolskas trafikrådgiver WSA's undersøgelser fra 1999 og 2004, bankens trafikrådgiver SDG's undersøgelse fra 2005 og statens egen trafikrådgiver Faber Maunsells undersøgelse fra 2005.
According to AW S.A, in the case in question, the expected real, post-tax IRR on shareholders' capital (equity and subordinated debt) resulting from the initial Concession Agreement was […] % at the time of financial closure.
Autostrada Wielkopolska gør også gældende, at WSA-undersøgelsen fra 2004 primært var udarbejdet som led i forberedelserne til den anden strækning på motorvej A2 (Swiecko-Nowy Tomysl) og med henblik på den finansielle afslutning for denne strækning.
As this was the expected rate of return implicit in the original agreement, such return should be considered market conform.
Da WSA udarbejdede undersøgelsen mellem december 2003 og den foreløbige version i april 2004, kunne de kun beregne de faktiske trafiktal på de to strækninger af motorvejen, som var blevet anlagt og var i drift på det pågældende tidspunkt, dvs. Krzesiny-Wrzesnia, Wrzesnia-Konin samt Poznan-omfartsvejen.
Autostrada Wielkopolska compares the IRR of […] % expected after the conclusion of Annex 6 with the IRR resulting from the initial tender of […] %.
Autostrada Wielkopolska påpeger også, at trafikprognoserne normalt foretages for en periode på fem år og ikke for 30 år som i WSA-undersøgelsen fra 2004.
Autostrada Wielkopolska explains the increase of […] % results from external financial considerations, namely replacing budget forecasts with actual financial results and updating inflation and foreign exchange forecasts.
Autostrada Wielkopolska anfører, at hvis Kommissionen er uenig i Autostrada Wielkopolskas argumenter og konkluderer, at kompensationen er statsstøtte, er den forenelig i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 3, litra c), i TEUF.
According to AW S.A, the increase was therefore entirely justified.
Autostrada Wielkopolska påpeger, at Kommissionen i sag N 462/2009 konkluderede, at den statsstøtte, der var ydet til Autostrada Wielkopolska til anlæg og drift af strækningen Swiecko-Nowy Tomysl på motorvej A2 (dvs. den tilstødende strækning på motorvejen), var forenelig med det indre marked.
Moreover, there was no material improvement in Autostrada Wielkopolska's position purely as a consequence of the switch from real tolls to shadow tolls (irrespective of any change in the IRR).
Ifølge Autostrada Wielkopolska er den statsstøtte, der er ydet i henhold til bilag 6, af de samme grunde også forenelig.
In particular, the switch did not reduce Autostrada Wielkopolska's exposure to traffic risks.
Endvidere gør Autostrada Wielkopolska gældende, at eftersom motorvej A2 ligger i en region, som er omfattet af undtagelsen i artikel 107, stk. 3, litra a), i TEUF, kan støtten også betragtes som forenelig med det indre marked i henhold til denne artikel.
Autostrada Wielkopolska argues further that even if the alteration that Autostrada Wielkopolska sought could be regarded as ‘material’ within the meaning of London Underground (which Autostrada Wielkopolska does not concede), it would still have resulted in Autostrada Wielkopolska having an expected rate of return which is by no means above market rates.
Autostrada Wielkopolska gør gældende, at motorvejen yder et stort bidrag til den regionale udvikling (f.eks. udvikling af logistikvirksomhederne omkring Poznan og Konin, øget beskæftigelse osv.).
Moreover, Autostrada Wielkopolska argues that the IRR of […] %, which Poland states should have been the benchmark for calculating the shadow toll, is not a market rate as no rational private investor would have agreed to the Concession Agreement in 2005 if the expected rate of return had been as low as […] %.
Med hensyn til kriteriet om proportionalitet forklarer AW S.A., at […].
In Autostrada Wielkopolska's view Poland appears to take the position that to be compliant with State aid rules, any compensation, as a matter of law, necessarily has to reflect the economic situation at the moment immediately prior to the event, triggering the compensation.
Autostrada Wielkopolska beskriver, at hvis Kommissionen træffer en negativ afgørelse, vil EIB-lånet ikke kunne blive refinansieret, og EIB vil anvende statsgarantien.
In Autostrada Wielkopolska's view that approach would deprive the private party of achieving long-term goals and could encourage Member States to renegotiate PPPs when business forecasts display negative trends.
Eftersom staten derefter vil opkræve beløbet fra Autostrada Wielkopolska, som ikke vil være i stand til at betale det, vil Autostrada Wielkopolska gå konkurs, og investorerne vil slet ikke få noget afkast.
Furthermore, Autostrada Wielkopolska points out that in the past, the Commission assessed whether an agreement between a State and a private party was necessary and proportionate.
Derfor gjorde Kommissionen efter Autostrada Wielkopolskas mening ikke ret i at antage, at det var investorerne, der nød godt af kompensationsbetalingerne — alle pengene blev brugt på motorvejen.
Autostrada Wielkopolska states that the measures agreed between Poland and Autostrada Wielkopolska were proportionate, especially since the Concession Agreement contained safeguard mechanisms to prevent that Autostrada Wielkopolska would be overcompensated.
Polen er ikke enig i Autostrada Wielkopolskas bemærkninger, og det gælder både de faktiske omstændigheder og den juridiske vurdering.
In Annex 6, the parties agreed that if the Verification Model shows that the projected IRR is higher than the one calculated in the Real Toll Model, the AGRi rate will be adjusted downwards.
Vedrørende voldgiftskendelsens relevans
Annex 6 also provided for an absolute cap on the shadow toll rates.
Polen bemærker, at voldgiftskendelsen er irrelevant for Kommissionens statsstøttesag, fordi: i) den kun vedrørte gyldigheden af bilag 6, ii) det kun er Kommissionen, som er bemyndiget til at vurdere, om en foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte eller ej.
Other provisions of the Concession Agreement, unchanged by Annex 6, specified that […]
Om Autostrada Wielkopolskas ret til kompensation
Autostrada Wielkopolska, furthermore, argues that even if Annex 6 entails a material improvement it would still not constitute State aid because it was negotiated between the Polish State and Autostrada Wielkopolska on a commercial basis and at arm's length.
Kompensationen måtte imidlertid ikke sætte koncessionshaveren i en gunstigere situation, end denne ville have været i uden ændringsloven.
Autostrada Wielkopolska argues that the State's submissions to the Commission consistently confuse Autostrada Wielkopolska's opening position in the 2005 negotiations (an expected return of […] %) with their actual outcome (an expected return of […] %).
Om lette køretøjer
In Autostrada Wielkopolska's opinion, the State, as it was entitled to do in the context of a commercial negotiation, did not accept Autostrada Wielkopolska's proposed terms but insisted on two very important elements of the funding mechanism: (a) a verification of the shadow tolls after two years and (b) an absolute cap on the shadow tolls without any adjustment for inflation or exchange rate fluctuations until the end of the concession period.
Polen står ikke desto mindre fast på, at det var nødvendigt at medtage trafikken med lette køretøjer, fordi »den anvendte metode krævede, at den finansielle model dækkede hele projektet«.
However, from an ex ante perspective, the absolute cap on the shadow toll rendered that target merely theoretical.
Efter Polens mening var det ikke muligt at beregne det interne afkast for projektet, hvis man kun tog højde for lastvognstrafikken.
Actually, the IRR in 2005 was at […] % and in 2007 at […] %.
Som svar på Autostrada Wielkopolska argument om, at det var nødvendigt at opdatere trafiktallene for andre køretøjer end lastvogne, fordi koncessionshaverens forpligtelse til at udføre anlægsarbejde afhang af trafiktærsklerne (f.eks. en tredje bane på Poznan-omfartsvejen), gør Polen gældende, at dette er irrelevant, fordi de forventede øgede omkostninger allerede var taget i betragtning i forudsætningerne for vignettemodellen ved underskrivelsen af bilag 6, og de har ingen betydning for trafiktallene for lette køretøjer.
Therefore, the actual result of the negotiations was closer to Poland's than Autostrada Wielkopolska's demand.
Om trafikundersøgelserne — Internt afkast
Furthermore, Autostrada Wielkopolska stresses that the ‘outcome of a negotiation between two parties with different starting points is typically somewhere in between the two respective starting points.’
Polen er ikke enig i Autostrada Wielkopolskas holdning om, at den kompensation, som blev forhandlet i september 2005, burde være blevet fastsat til et beløb, som gav Autostrada Wielkopolska mulighed for at opnå det interne afkast, der blev antaget i 2000.
Therefore, it should be assessed whether the outcome of the negotiations was within a ‘range’ of reasonable behaviour compatible with the conduct of a hypothetical private investor.
Polen påpeger, at det interne afkast, som blev antaget på tidspunktet for den finansielle afslutning, for det første, som Autostrada Wielkopolska har oplyst, var baseret på koncessionshaverens overslag, og for det andet at Polen ikke garanterede, at den ikke-offentlige part ville kunne opnå noget bestemt afkast.
Autostrada Wielkopolska states that if a State's behaviour is not manifestly outside that range, then according to the Court Judgment in Case C-256/97, it can be expected that a hypothetical private investor would have behaved in the same way.