natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Slutdatoen er den dato, fra hvilken import til eller transit gennem Unionen af sendinger af varer fremstillet i et tredjeland, et område, en zone eller et segment ikke længere er tilladt, mens startdatoen er den dato, fra hvilken import til eller transit gennem Unionen af sendinger af varer fremstillet i et tredjeland, et område, en zone eller et segment på ny er tilladt.
The closing date indicates the date from which consignments of commodities produced in a third country, territory, zone or compartment are no longer authorised for import into or transit through the Union, while the opening date indicates the date from which consignments of commodities produced in a third country, territory, zone or compartment are again authorised for import into or transit through the Union.
Oplysningerne i kolonne 6A og 6B er opført i tabellen i del 1 i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 for at forhindre import til og transit gennem Unionen af sendinger af varer, der er fremstillet i spærrezonerne uden for Unionen i den periode, hvor import til og transit gennem Unionen af sådanne sendinger ikke var tilladt i overensstemmelse med reglerne i nævnte forordning.
The entries in columns 6A and 6B are kept in the table in Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 to prevent the import into and transit through the Union of consignments of commodities produced in the restricted zones outside the Union during the period when the import into and transit through the Union of such consignments was not authorised in accordance with the rules laid down in that Regulation.
Oplysningerne vedrørende Canada i tabellen i del 1 i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 omhandler zoner i dette tredjeland, der, efter at HPAI var blevet bekræftet, har gennemført sanering, rengøring og desinfektion og på ny har fået tilladelse til import til og transit gennem Unionen af visse fjerkræprodukter med en startdato for over to år siden.
The entry for Canada in the table in Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 includes zones of that third country which, following the confirmation of HPAI, have applied stamping out, cleaning and disinfection and have been re-authorised for imports into and transit through the Union of certain poultry commodities with an opening date of more than two years ago.
Oplysningerne vedrørende Canada bør derfor ændres.
The entry for Canada should therefore be amended accordingly.
Oplysningerne vedrørende USA i tabellen i del 1 i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 omhandler zoner i dette tredjeland, der, efter at HPAI var blevet bekræftet, har gennemført sanering, rengøring og desinfektion og på ny har fået tilladelse til import til og transit gennem Unionen af visse fjerkræprodukter med en startdato for over to år siden.
The entry for the United States in the table in Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 includes zones of that third country which, following the confirmation of HPAI, have applied stamping out, cleaning and disinfection and have been re-authorised for imports into and transit through the Union of certain poultry commodities with an opening date of more than two years ago.
Oplysningerne vedrørende USA bør derfor ændres.
The entry for the United States should therefore be amended accordingly.
Der er ved forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 også fastsat betingelser for, hvornår et tredjeland, et område, en zone eller et segment kan betragtes som fri(t) for HPAI.
Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 also lays down the conditions for a third country, territory, zone or compartment to be considered as free from HPAI.
Rusland er opført i tabellen i del 1 i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 som et tredjeland, hvorfra import til og transit gennem Unionen af visse fjerkræprodukter er tilladt fra hele landet.
Russia is listed in the table in Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 as a third country from which imports into and transit through the Union of certain poultry commodities are authorised from the whole of its territory.
Den 17. november 2016 bekræftede Rusland tilstedeværelsen af HPAI af subtype H5N8 på en fjerkræbedrift i landet.
On 17 November 2016, Russia confirmed the presence of HPAI of subtype H5N8 in a poultry holding on its territory.
Siden november 2016 har Rusland bekræftet flere udbrud af HPAI på fjerkræbedrifter i landet.
Since November 2016, Russia has confirmed several outbreaks of HPAI in poultry holdings on its territory.
På grund af disse bekræftede udbrud siden november 2016 kan Rusland ikke betragtes som frit for den pågældende sygdom, og Ruslands veterinærmyndigheder er ikke i stand til at attestere sendinger af fjerkrækød til konsum bestemt til import til eller transit gennem Unionen.
Due to those confirmed outbreaks since November 2016 Russia cannot be considered as free from that disease and the veterinary authorities of Russia are not in a position to certify consignments of meat of poultry for human consumption intended for import into or transit through the Union.
Ruslands veterinærmyndigheder har indsendt oplysninger til Kommissionen om udbruddene af HPAI og har bekræftet, at de siden den 17. november 2016 har suspenderet udstedelsen af veterinærcertifikater for sendinger af fjerkrækød til konsum bestemt til import til eller transit gennem Unionen.
The veterinary authorities of Russia have submitted information to the Commission on the outbreaks of HPAI and have confirmed that since 17 November 2016 they have suspended issuing veterinary certificates for consignments of meat of poultry for human consumption intended for import into or transit through the Union.
Siden den dato er der derfor ikke blevet indført sådanne produkter med oprindelse i Rusland til Unionen.
Therefore, no consignments of such products originating in Russia have been introduced into the Union since that date.
Af hensyn til klarheden og retssikkerheden bør denne situation dokumenteres, og den relevante slutdato bør opføres i tabellen i del 1 i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008.
For reasons of clarity and legal certainty, it is appropriate to document this situation and introduce in the table in Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 the relevant closing date.
Dette sikrer også, at sendinger af sådanne produkter, der er fremstillet efter slutdatoen og før den startdato, der fastsættes, hvis Rusland på ny bliver frit for HPAI, ikke vil kunne indføres til Unionen.
This also ensures that, where Russia regains freedom from HPAI and an opening date is established, consignments of such products produced after the closing date and before that opening date will not be eligible for introduction into the Union.
Oplysningerne vedrørende Rusland i del 1 i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 bør derfor ændres, for at tage hensyn til den epidemiologiske situation i dette tredjeland siden november 2016 og for at angive den slutdato, fra hvilken tredjelandet ikke kan betragtes som frit for HPAI.
The entry for Russia in the table in Part 1 of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 should therefore be amended to take account of the epidemiological situation in that third country since November 2016 and indicate the closing date from which that third country cannot be considered as free from HPAI
Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 5. november 2018.
Done at Brussels, 5 November 2018.
EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 74.
OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 74.
Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 798/2008 af 8. august 2008 om fastlæggelse af en liste over tredjelande, områder, zoner og segmenter, hvorfra fjerkræ og fjerkræprodukter kan importeres til og sendes i transit gennem Fællesskabet, og krav vedrørende udstedelse af veterinærcertifikat (EUT L 226 af 23.8.2008, s. 1).
Commission Regulation (EC) No 798/2008 of 8 August 2008 laying down a list of third countries, territories, zones or compartments from which poultry and poultry products may be imported into and transit through the Community and the veterinary certification requirements (OJ L 226, 23.8.2008, p. 1).
»CA — Canada
‘CA-Canada
Hele Canada, undtagen området CA-2
The whole country of Canada excluding area CA-2
S1, ST1«
S1, ST1’
Område af Canada svarende til: ingen
Territory of Canada corresponding to: none
Oplysningerne vedrørende Rusland affattes således:
the entry for Russia is replaced by the following:
»RU — Rusland
‘RU-Russia
Oplysningerne vedrørende USA affattes således:
the entry for the United States is replaced by the following:
Hele USA, undtagen området US-2
The whole country of the United States excluding area US-2
Staten Tennessee:
Territory of the United States corresponding to:
S3, ST1«
State of Tennessee:
Rådets gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2018/1653
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1653
om gennemførelse af forordning (EU) 2017/2063 om restriktive foranstaltninger på baggrund af situationen i Venezuela
implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela
under henvisning til Rådets forordning (EU) 2017/2063 af 13. november 2017 om restriktive foranstaltninger på baggrund af situationen i Venezuela, særlig artikel 17, stk. 1,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 of 13 November 2017 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, and in particular Article 17(1) thereof,
Rådet vedtog den 13. november 2017 forordning (EU) 2017/2063 om restriktive foranstaltninger på baggrund af situationen i Venezuela.
On 13 November 2017, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela.
Begrundelsen for en enkelt person på listen i bilag IV til forordning (EU) 2017/2063 bør ændres.
The statement of reasons for one person listed in Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 should be amended.
Bilag IV til forordning (EU) 2017/2063 bør derfor ændres i overensstemmelse hermed —
Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 should therefore be amended accordingly,
Bilag IV til forordning (EU) 2017/2063 ændres som anført i bilaget til denne forordning.
Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.
Denne forordning træder i kraft dagen efter offentliggørelsen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
EUT L 295 af 14.11.2017, s. 21.
OJ L 295, 14.11.2017, p. 21.
I bilag IV til forordning (EU) 2017/2063 affattes nr. 7 således:
In Annex IV to Regulation (EU) 2017/2063, entry 7 is replaced by the following:
Rådets gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2018/1654
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1654
Sikkerhedsrådets komité udpegede den 30. marts 2018 15 skibe til en indefrysning af aktiver og 25 skibe til et forbud mod havneindsejling.
On 30 March 2018, the UNSC Committee designated 15 vessels for an asset freeze and 25 vessels for a port entry ban.
Disse skibe er opført i bilag XIV til forordning (EU) 2017/1509.
Those vessels are listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509.
EUT L 224 af 31.8.2017, s. 1.
OJ L 224, 31.8.2017, p.
I bilag XIV til forordning (EU) 2017/1509 affattes punkt 1 til 15 under overskriften »A. Fartøjer, som er omfattet af beslaglæggelse« således:
ANNEX
»Skibets navn
In Annex XIV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, entries 1 to 15 under the heading ‘A. Vessels subject to a seizure’, are replaced by the following:
IMO-nummer
‘Vessel name
Udpeget som økonomisk ressource for
IMO number
Dato for FN's opførelse på listen
Designated as economic resources of
Det nordkoreanske olietankskib CHON MYONG 1 foretog en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, i slutningen af december 2017.
Date of UN designation
Det nordkoreanske tankskib AN SAN 1 var involveret i skibsoverførsler, sandsynligvis af olie, i slutningen af januar 2018.
DPRK oil tanker M/V CHON MYONG 1 conducted a ship-to-ship transfer, likely for oil, in late December 2017.
Det nordkoreanske handelsskib YU PHONG 5 importerede raffinerede olieprodukter til Nampo, DPRK, den 29. november 2017 gennem en skibsoverførsel foretaget den 26. november 2017.
DPRK tanker M/V AN SAN 1 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations, likely for oil, in late January 2018.
Det nordkoreanske handelsskib SAM JONG 1 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i slutningen af januar 2018.
DPRK merchant vessel M/V YU PHONG 5 imported refined petroleum products to Nampo, DPRK, on 29 November 2017 through a ship-to-ship transfer conducted on 26 November 2017.
Det nordkoreanske handelsskib SAM JONG 2 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i slutningen af januar 2018.
DPRK merchant vessel M/V SAM JONG 1 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations of oil in late January 2018.
Det nordkoreanske olietankskib SAM MA 2 importerede raffinerede olieprodukter i oktober, begyndelsen af november og midten af november 2017 gennem adskillige skibsoverførsler.
DPRK merchant vessel M/V SAM JONG 2 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations of oil in late January 2018.
Det nordkoreanske tankskib JI SONG 6 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i slutningen af januar 2018.
DPRK oil tanker M/V YU JONG 2 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in November 2017.
Det nordkoreanske skib CHON MA SAN var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i midten af november 2017.
M/V YU JONG 2 was also involved in a ship-to-ship transfer operation, likely for oil, with M/V MIN NING DE YOU 078 on 16 February 2018.
Det nordkoreanske råolietankskib NAM SAN 8 menes at have været involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie.
DPRK vessel M/V PAEK MA was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in mid-January 2018.
Det nordkoreanske tankskib YU SON menes at have været involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie.
DPRK tanker M/V JI SONG 6 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations of oil in late January 2018.
Det nordkoreanske lastskib WOORY STAR menes at have været involveret i ulovlige overførsler af forbudte varer fra DPRK.
DPRK vessel M/V CHON MA SAN was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in mid-November 2017.
Det nordkoreanske lastskib JI SONG 8 ejes af Phyongchon Shipping & Marine og menes at have været involveret i ulovlige overførsler af forbudte varer fra DPRK.
DPRK crude oil tanker M/V NAM SAN 8 is believed to have been involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske lastskib HAP JANG GANG 6 ejes af Hapjanggang Shipping Corp og menes at have været involveret i ulovlige overførsler af forbudte varer fra DPRK.
DPRK tanker M/V YU SON is believed to have been involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil.
I bilag XIV til forordning (EU) 2017/1509 affattes punkt 1 til 33 under overskriften »B. Fartøjer, som er forbudt adgang til havne« således:
DPRK cargo vessel M/V WOORY STAR is believed to have been involved in illicit transfers of prohibited DPRK goods.
Supplerende oplysninger: ikke oplyst
DPRK cargo vessel M/V JI SONG 8 is owned by Phyongchon Shipping & Marine and is believed to have been involved in illicit transfers of prohibited DPRK goods.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske olietankskib CHON MYONG 1 foretog en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, i slutningen af december 2017.
Other information: DPRK cargo vessel M/V HAP JANG GANG 6 is owned by Hapjanggang Shipping Corp and is believed to have been involved in illicit transfers of prohibited DPRK goods.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske tankskib AN SAN 1 var involveret i skibsoverførsler, sandsynligvis af olie, i slutningen af januar 2018.
In Annex XIV to Regulation (EU) 2017/1509, entries 1 to 33 under the heading ‘B. Vessels which are prohibited entry into ports’, are replaced by the following:
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske handelsskib YU PHONG 5 importerede raffinerede olieprodukter til Nampo, DPRK, den 29. november 2017 gennem en skibsoverførsel foretaget den 26. november 2017.
Other information: na
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske handelsskib SAM JONG 1 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i slutningen af januar 2018.
Other information: DPRK oil tanker M/V CHON MYONG 1 conducted a ship-to-ship transfer, likely for oil, in late December 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske handelsskib SAM JONG 2 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i slutningen af januar 2018.
Other information: DPRK tanker M/V AN SAN 1 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations, likely for oil, in late January 2018.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske olietankskib SAM MA 2 importerede raffinerede olieprodukter i oktober, begyndelsen af november og midten af november 2017 gennem adskillige skibsoverførsler.
Other information: DPRK merchant vessel M/V YU PHONG 5 imported refined petroleum products to Nampo, DPRK, on 29 November 2017 through a ship-to-ship transfer conducted on 26 November 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske skib PAEK MA var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i midten af januar 2018.
Other information: DPRK merchant vessel M/V SAM JONG 1 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations of oil in late January 2018.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske skib CHON MA SAN var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i midten af november 2017.
Other information: DPRK oil tanker M/V SAM MA 2 imported refined petroleum products in October, early November and mid-November 2017 through multiple ship-to-ship transfers.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske råolietankskib NAM SAN 8 menes at have været involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie.
Other information: DPRK oil tanker M/V YU JONG 2 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in November 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske tankskib YU SON menes at have været involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie.
M/V YU JONG 2 was also involved in a ship-to-ship transfer operation, likely for oil, with M/V MIN NING DE YOU 078 on 16 February 2018.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske lastskib WOORY STAR menes at have været involveret i ulovlige overførsler af forbudte varer fra DPRK.
Other information: DPRK vessel M/V PAEK MA was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in mid-January 2018.
Supplerende oplysninger: ASIA BRIDGE 1 blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul ved Nampo, DPRK, den 22. oktober 2017 og overførte det til Cam Pha, Vietnam.
Other information: DPRK tanker M/V JI SONG 6 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations of oil in late January 2018.
Supplerende oplysninger: Handelsskibet XIN GUANG HAI blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul ved Taean, DPRK, den 27. oktober 2017 og overførte det til Port Klang, Malaysia, den 18. december 2017.
Other information: DPRK vessel M/V CHON MA SAN was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in mid-November 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: HUA FU blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul i Najin, DPRK, den 24. september 2017.
Other information: DPRK crude oil tanker M/V NAM SAN 8 is believed to have been involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil.
Supplerende oplysninger: YUK TUNG var involveret i en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, med RYE SONG GANG i januar 2018.
Other information: DPRK tanker M/V YU SON is believed to have been involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil.
Supplerende oplysninger: KOTI var involveret i en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, med KUM UN SAN 3 den 9. december 2017.
Other information: DPRK cargo vessel M/V WOORY STAR is believed to have been involved in illicit transfers of prohibited DPRK goods.
Supplerende oplysninger: DONG FENG 6 blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul i Hamhung, DPRK, den 11. juli 2017 til eksport i strid med FN's sanktioner.
Other information: M/V ASIA BRIDGE 1 loaded DPRK coal at Nampo, DPRK, on 22 October 2017 and transferred it to Cam Pha,Vietnam.
Supplerende oplysninger: HAO FAN 2 blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul i Nampo, DPRK, den 3. juni 2017 til eksport i strid med FN's sanktioner.
Other information: Merchant vessel M/V XIN GUANG HAI loaded DPRK coal at Taean, DPRK, on 27 October 2017 and transferred it to Port Klang, Malaysia, on 18 December 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: HAO FAN 6 blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul i Nampo, DPRK, den 27. august 2017.
Other information: M/V HUA FU loaded DPRK coal at Najin, DPRK, on 24 September 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: JIN HYE var involveret i en skibsoverførsel med CHON MA SAN den 16. december 2017.
Other information: M/V YUK TUNG engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer, likely for oil, with M/V RYE SONG GANG in January 2018.
Supplerende oplysninger: FAN KE blev lastet med nordkoreansk kul i Nampo, DPRK, i september/oktober 2017.
Other information: M/V KOTI engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer, likely for oil, with M/V KUM UN SAN 3 on 9 December 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: WAN HENG 11 var involveret i en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, med RYE SONG GANG 1 den 13. februar 2018.
Other information: M/V DONG FENG 6 loaded DPRK coal at Hamhung, DPRK, on 11 July 2017, for export in violation of UN sanctions.
Wan Heng 11, et skib, der tidligere førte Belizes flag, opererer nu som et skib, der fører DPRK's flag under navnet KUMJINGANG3 eller Kum Jin Gang 3.
Other information: M/V HAO FAN 2 loaded DPRK coal at Nampo, DPRK, on 3 June 2017, for export in violation of UN sanctions.
Supplerende oplysninger: MIN NING DE YOU var involveret i en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, med YU JONG 2 den 16. februar 2018.
Other information: M/V HAO FAN 6 loaded DPRK coal at Nampo, DPRK, on 27 August 2017.
Findes ikke
Other information: M/V JIN HYE engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer with M/V CHON MA SAN on 16 December 2017.
Det nordkoreanske olietankskib YU JONG 2 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i november 2017.
Other information: M/V FAN KE loaded DPRK coal at Nampo, DPRK, in September/October 2017.
YU JONG 2 var også involveret i en skibsoverførsel, sandsynligvis af olie, med MIN NING DE YOU 078 den 16. februar 2018.
Other information: M/V WAN HENG 11 engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer, likely for oil, with M/V RYE SONG GANG 1 on 13 February 2018.
(MMSI-nummer: 620233000)
Wan Heng 11, formerly a Belize-flagged vessel, is now operating as a DPRK-flagged vessel named the KUMJINGANG3 or Kum Jin Gang 3.
(MMSI-nummer: 341985000)
Other information: M/V MIN NING DE YOU engaged in a ship-to-ship transfer, likely for oil, with M/V YU JONG 2 on 16 February 2018.
(MMSI-nummer: 514569000)
DPRK oil tanker M/V YU JONG 2 was involved in ship-to-ship transfer operations for oil in November 2017.
Supplerende oplysninger: Det nordkoreanske olietankskib YU JONG 2 var involveret i skibsoverførsler af olie i november 2017.
M/V YU JONG 2 was also involved in a ship-to-ship transfer operation, likely for oil, with M/V MIN NING DE YOU 078 on 16 February 2018.
Formand
Phyongchon Shipping & Marine
Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2018/1658
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1658
om godkendelse af en ændring af varespecifikationen for en beskyttet oprindelsesbetegnelse eller en beskyttet geografisk betegnelse (»Côtes de Montravel« (BOB))
approving an amendment to the specification for a protected designation of origin or a protected geographical indication (‘Côtes de Montravel’ (PDO))
Kommissionen har behandlet den ansøgning, der er indgivet af Frankrig efter artikel 105 i forordning (EU) nr. 1308/2013, om godkendelse af en ændring af varespecifikationen for den beskyttede oprindelsesbetegnelse »Côtes de Montravel«.
The Commission has examined France's application for the approval of amendments to the specification for the protected designation of origin ‘Côtes de Montravel’, submitted under Article 105 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
Kommissionen har i overensstemmelse med artikel 97, stk. 3, i forordning (EU) nr. 1308/2013 offentliggjort ansøgningen om godkendelse af ændringen af varespecifikationen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.
The Commission published the application for approval of the amendments to the specification in the Official Journal of the European Union as required by Article 97(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.
Ændringen af varespecifikationen bør derfor godkendes, jf. artikel 99 i forordning (EU) nr. 1308/2013.
In accordance with Article 99 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 the amendments to the specification should therefore be approved.