natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved brev af 27. april 2011 accepterede Kommissionen en forlængelse af fristen indtil den 16. maj 2011.
Marketing costs were not calculated on a per passenger basis, but were estimated, in total, to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Tyskland fremsendte oplysninger den 16. maj 2011.
(315) Table 13 shows that revenues stemming from the 2000 Agreement were expected to exceed costs, leading to an annual surplus of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Den 20. maj 2011 sendte Kommissionen en rykkerskrivelse i henhold til artikel 10, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999, idet den gjorde gældende, at de fremsendte oplysninger var ufuldstændige.
The Commission finds the approach taken by Germany sound.
Svarfristen var den 7. juni 2011.
The estimated average aeronautical revenues were based on the terms of the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Tyskland svarede i et brev af 7. juni 2011 og afviste, at brevet af 20. maj 2011 var en rykkerskrivelse i medfør af forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999, idet to af spørgsmålene tilsyneladende var blevet omformuleret, og fordi spørgsmålene efter landets opfattelse var nye.
The non-aeronautical revenues were expected to be […] % of the aeronautical revenue, which seems to be in line with general expectations as regards non-aeronautical revenues at other airports (see Table 6).
Ved brev af 15. juni 2011 sendte Kommissionen endnu en rykkerskrivelse i medfør af artikel 10, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 til Tyskland, hvori Tyskland fik en frist frem til den 29. juni 2011 til at fremsende oplysninger.
The assumption that the staff number would need to be increased when passenger numbers increase also seems reasonable.
Hvis denne rykkerskrivelse ikke blev efterkommet, ville Kommissionen overveje at udstede et påbud om oplysninger.
The Commission notes that investments related to the expansion of Lübeck airport were not specific to Ryanair but could potentially be exploited by other airlines.
Ved brev af 5. juli 2011 sendte Kommissionen en tredje rykkerskrivelse i medfør af artikel 10, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999, hvori Tyskland fik en frist frem til den 15. juli 2011 til at fremsende oplysninger om de resterende spørgsmål.
This indicates that investment costs did not have to be included in the incremental costs of the Ryanair agreement.
Tyskland svarede ved brev af 15. juli 2011.
In this respect, the Commission notes that Germany emphasised that FLG continuously attempted to attract other airlines and succeeded in this attempt by attracting other airlines (such as Wizz Air).
Som svar anmodede Tyskland i et brev af 14. marts 2012 Kommissionen om at udstrege visse oplysninger med sort i beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren.
In addition, according to Germany, Lübeck airport unsuccessfully tried to initiate negotiations for an agreement with Air Berlin for years.
Kommissionen imødekom delvist anmodningen i brev af 20. marts 2012, hvor den forklarede, at den ikke kunne gå med til at overstrege visse oplysninger med sort.
Germany submitted that in order to successfully privatise Lübeck airport, it was necessary to significantly increase passenger numbers.
Tyskland anfægtede Kommissionens holdning om fortrolighed yderligere i et brev af 3. april 2012.
The Commission accepts that investments were made to prepare Lübeck airport for higher passenger numbers [72].
Kommissionen sendte i denne forbindelse et brev til Tyskland den 25. april 2012 med en anden udgave af beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren og fremførte yderligere argumenter.
The Commission further notes that the 2000 Agreement did not require FLG to make investments [73].
Efter flere udvekslinger mellem Ryanair, Kommissionen og Tyskland fremsendte Ryanair den 27. april 2012 en liste med anmodninger om at fjerne fortrolige oplysninger og kritiserede desuden nogle proceduremæssige forhold.
FLG could have fulfilled its obligations under the contract without investing in an expansion of the airport.
Tyskland fremsendte desuden den 30. april 2012 flere anmodninger fra Ryanair til Kommissionen om at overstrege visse oplysninger.
In the light of those considerations, the Commission concludes that Germany's approach not to attribute investments made at Lübeck airport to the agreement with Ryanair is reasonable.
Den 29. juni 2012 blev den overstregede version af beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren sendt til Ryanair.
Having analysed the information provided by Germany, the Commission disagrees however on one point of the analysis and amends it accordingly.
Som ønsket af Kommissionen den 7. februar 2012 fremsendte Ryanair sine bemærkninger i et brev af 13. april 2012.
The 2000 Agreement sets out as its end date 30 May 2010.
Kommissionen sendte disse bemærkninger til Tyskland den 27. juni 2012.
Germany took into account incremental costs and revenues for the years 2011 and 2012 when calculating the incremental profitability of the 2000 Agreement.
Tyskland fremsatte bemærkninger til Ryanairs indlæg i brev af 10. september 2012.
The Commission considers that it is appropriate to take only into account the incremental costs and revenues generated over the duration of the contract.
I brev af 24. februar 2012 anmodede Kommissionen Tyskland om inden for 20 dage at fremskaffe flere oplysninger om sagerne.
In view of this necessary amendment, the Commission has carried out its own analysis by using directly the incremental profitability analysis submitted by Germany and amending this analysis where necessary as summarised in Tables 14, 15 and 16:
Den 19. marts 2012 anmodede Tyskland om en forlængelse af fristen til den 20. april 2012.
Table 14
Kommissionen accepterede i et brev af 21. marts 2012 en forlængelse af fristen til den 17. april 2012.
Table 15
Tyskland fremsendte de ønskede oplysninger den 17. april 2012.
Table 16
I brev af 18. april 2012 fremførte Kommissionen, at de oplysninger, Tyskland havde fremsendt, var ufuldstændige og anmodede om fremsendelse af de manglende oplysninger inden den 28. april 2012.
The Commission has taken out the revenues and operating costs expected for the years 2011 and 2012, as in those years, the 2000 Agreement was expected to have expired already (see Tables 14 and 15).
Kommissionen tilføjede, at hvis anmodningen ikke blev imødekommet, ville der blive udstedt et påbud om oplysninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 10, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999.
The Commission relied instead on the revenues and operating costs expected for the years 2000-2010, resulting in the revenues and operating costs presented in Table 16.
Den 3. maj 2012 tilstillede Kommissionen Tyskland endnu et brev med en kraftig opfordring til at fremsende de manglende oplysninger inden den 11. maj 2012.
As to the marketing costs, the Commission calculated the average marketing costs per passenger that could have been expected in the best case and in the worst case scenario according to the information provided by Germany.
Den 14. maj 2012 fremsendte Tyskland sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen om beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren.
It then multiplied the average marketing costs per passenger with the number of passengers that could have been expected for the years 2000-2010, resulting in an expected marketing costs of EUR […] in the best case scenario, and EUR […] in the worst case scenario (see Table 16).
Beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren blev offentliggjort i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende den 10. august 2012.
Finally, while the ex ante analysis undertaken by FLG and submitted by Germany did not discount the future payments to the date on which the contract was concluded, it is clear from the figures provided that the contract was expected to be profitable.
Alle interesserede parter fik en frist på én måned til at fremsætte bemærkninger til afgørelsen.
In addition to the data provided by Germany, Oxera has submitted a profitability analysis of the 2000 Agreement [74].
Ved to breve af 16. august 2012 og 22. august 2012 anmodede Ryanair om en forlængelse af fristen frem til den 24. september 2012.
Oxera used outturn data, i.e. data on the actual costs and revenues incurred, from the period prior to the agreement, where possible, to deduct assumptions about FLG's expectations at the time of signing the agreement.
Wizz Air anmodede den 24. august 2012 om en forlængelse frem til den 24. september 2012.
Oxera calculated passenger numbers based on outturn data up until the point of signing the agreement.
Den 31. august 2012 anmodede Infratil om en forlængelse frem til den 10. oktober 2012.
Aeronautical revenues and marketing costs were based on the charges and payments stipulated in the 2000 Agreement.
Hansestadt Lübeck og FLG anmodede den 5. september 2012 Kommissionen om en forlængelse af fristen frem til den 10. oktober 2012.
For the calculation of non-aeronautical revenues and operating costs, Oxera used outturn data from the period after the agreement was concluded.
Den 7. september 2012 anmodede Bundesverband der deutschen Verkehrsflughäfen (»ADV«) [16] om en forlængelse af fristen til den 10. oktober 2012.
The NPV of the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair was estimated to be EUR […].
Samme dag imødekom Kommissionen anmodningerne fra Ryanair, Wizz Air, ADV, Hansestadt Lübeck, FLG og Infratil om en forlængelse af fristen.
Therefore the agreement was expected to be profitable.
Den 10. september 2012 anmodede Flughafen Hamburg GmbH og delstatsregeringen i Schleswig-Holstein Kommissionen om tilladelse til at forlænge fristen for fremsendelse af bemærkninger til den 10. oktober 2012.
Oxera calculated the NPV without attributing investment costs to the 2000 Ryanair agreement.
Kommissionen accepterede forlængelsen den følgende dag.
This is in line with the Commission's finding (see recitals 316 to 320) that investments made at Lübeck airport did not have to be attributed to the 2000 Agreement.
Den 10. oktober 2012 fremsendte ADV, FLG, Infratil og Wizz Air deres bemærkninger til Kommissionen, herunder en rapport fra Oxera.
Oxera stated that it did not have access to ex ante projections of non-aeronautical revenues and operating costs.
Som svar herpå fremsendte Tyskland oplysninger den 27. marts 2014.
The Commission notes that only revenues and costs that the airport expected to incur ex ante, at the time when it entered into the agreement with the respective airline, can be taken into account for assessing whether such agreement was in line with the MEO principle.
Wizz Air fremsendte yderligere oplysninger i brev af 30. april 2014, og Tyskland den 12. maj 2014.
An assessment partially based on ex post data can, however, serve to support the validation of the assumptions taken to determine the ex ante expected revenues and costs.
Ved brev af 2. september 2014, 12. september 2014 og 26. september 2014 fremsendte Ryanair yderligere rapporter udarbejdet af Oxera om Kommissionens seneste tilgang til det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Indeed, the ex ante data reconstructed by Oxera as regards aeronautic revenues (EUR […]) lies between the ex ante expected aeronautic revenues of FLG submitted by Germany in the best case (EUR […]) and the worst case scenario (EUR […]).
FÆLLES SAGSFORLØB FOR SA.21877, SA.27585 OG SA.31149
The ex ante data reconstructed by Oxera as regards marketing costs (EUR […]) is even lower than the one submitted by Germany: FLG expected ex ante marketing costs of EUR […] in the best case and of EUR […] in the worst case.
Den 6. oktober 2014 anmodede Tyskland Kommissionen om tilladelse til at forlænge fristen for fremsendelse af de ønskede oplysninger til den 30. november 2014.
This confirms that the ex ante expectation of FLG was sufficiently conservative.
Kommissionen forlængede fristen frem til den 17. november 2014.
The information provided by Germany indicates that FLG could have expected a positive incremental return on the 2000 Agreement.
Den 21. november 2014 sendte Kommissionen en rykkerskrivelse til Tyskland med anmodning om at fremsende de ønskede oplysninger senest den 3. december 2014.
The assumptions on which that expectation were based appear reasonable.
Kommissionen fremførte, at hvis rykkerskrivelsen ikke blev imødekommet, ville der blive udstedt et påbud om oplysninger i overensstemmelse med artikel 10, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999.
This is supported by the fact that the expected growth of passenger numbers was outperformed by the real growth during the years 2000-2005.
Tyskland fremsendte de ønskede oplysninger den 3. december 2014.
The limits to the growth of the passenger number were largely due to the impossibility to obtain the planning approval and to enlarge the airport, which were not foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the 2000 Agreement.
Efter en telekonference den 18. december 2014 fremsendte Tyskland yderligere oplysninger den 12. januar 2015 og den 14. januar 2015.
The expectations of FLG are supported by the study provided by Oxera.
I e-mail af 20. april 2015 anmodede Kommissionen om yderligere oplysninger vedrørende Yasmina Flughafenmanagement GmbH (»Yasmina«) [17], operatøren af Lübeck lufthavn i 2013 og 2014.
(329) It could therefore have been reasonably expected that the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair would be incrementally profitable for FLG.
Den 4. maj 2015 blev der sendt yderligere spørgsmål om den pris, som Infratil betalte for put-optionen.
Consequently, an MEO would have entered into the agreement, since it incrementally contributed, from an ex ante point of view, to the profitability of the airport.
I e-mail af 22. maj 2015 bad Kommissionen Oxera om præcisering i forbindelse med dens rapporter fra september 2014 og februar 2015 om rentabiliteten af tillægskontrakter fra 2010, der var indgået mellem Ryanair og FLG.
Similarly, in view of the clearly positive contribution the 2000 Agreement can also be considered to be part of the implementation of an overall strategy to lead to profitability at least in the long term.
Kommissionen modtog svar den 28. maj 2015.
The 2000 Agreement between FLG and Ryanair therefore does not confer an economic advantage that Ryanair would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
Svarene blev modtaget den 25. juni 2015 og den 3. juli 2015.
Therefore, it does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Kommissionen sendte yderligere spørgsmål til Tyskland den 29. juni 2015, og den modtog svar på spørgsmålene i brev af 24. juli 2015.
This finding is without any prejudice to the assessment of whether the 2010 Agreements involved State aid to Ryanair.
Hansestadt Lübeck anmodede om en delvis annullation af beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren.
CHARGES FOR THE DE-ICING OF AIRCRAFTS
Retten annullerede beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren vedrørende ordningen for lufthavnsafgifter for Lübeck lufthavn, der blev vedtaget i 2006 (»afgiftsordningen af 2006«) [18].
Selectivity
Beslutningen af 2012 om at indlede proceduren blev derfor endegyldigt annulleret, for så vidt angår afgiftsordningen af 2006.
To fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, a State measure must favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’.
Afgiftsordningen af 2006 bliver derfor ikke behandlet i denne afgørelse.
Hence, only those measures favouring undertakings which grant an advantage in a selective way fall under the notion of State aid.
Lufthavnen forventede, at dette antal ville stige til 2,2 mio. inden 2015.
According to case law of the European Courts, it needs to be determined whether under a particular statutory scheme (the ‘system of reference’), a State measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question.
Dette var imidlertid ikke tilfældet.
A measure which differentiates between undertakings in a comparable situation would be prima facie selective.
I henhold til »deltagelsesaftalen fra 2005« (Beteiligungsvertrag) solgte Hansestadt Lübeck med virkning den 1. december 2005 90 % af sine aktier i FLG til Infratil.
If a prima facie selective measure is justified by the nature or general scheme of the system, it will not be considered selective and will thus fall outside the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU [75].
Hansestadt Lübeck beholdt de resterende 10 % af aktierne som en minoritetsandel.
The Commission therefore has to undertake a three-step-analysis: First, the system of reference needs to be determined.
Købsaftalen blev underskrevet den 14. december 2012, og den trådte i kraft den 1. januar 2013.
Second, it should be determined whether a given measure constitutes a derogation from that system insofar as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the objectives intrinsic to the system, are in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Yasmina erhvervede nogle af FLG's aktiver.
If such a derogation exists (and therefore the measure is prima facie selective), it needs to be established, in the third step of the test, whether the derogation is justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system.
Som følge af lufthavnens løbende underskud erklærede Yasmina lufthavnen for insolvent i april 2014, og der blev derfor indledt insolvensbehandling den 23. april 2014.
In the case at hand, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure in relation to the charges for the de-icing of aircrafts.
Den 1. august 2014 blev Lübeck lufthavn overtaget af en kinesisk investor PuRen Germany GmbH (»PuRen«).
First, the Commission has to determine the system of reference under which the charges for de-icing are to be assessed.
PuRen erklærede lufthavnen insolvent i september 2015, og der blev derfor indledt insolvensbehandling den 30. september 2015.
In this context, the Commission notes that the charges for de-icing of aircrafts at the airport are laid down in a scheme of special charges.
Den 1. juli 2016 blev lufthavnen overtaget af Stöcker Flughafen GmbH & Co. KG (»Stöcker«).
While such scheme of special charges is not part of the general schedule of charges for infrastructure use, the scheme of special charges has certain features in common with the general schedule of charges: the scheme of special charges sets out prices for certain services provided by the airport to airlines and prices for material needed for such services.
I henhold til deltagelsesaftalen af 2005 skulle 90 % af aktierne i FLG overføres fra Hansestadt Lübeck til Infratil den 1. december 2005.
It applies to all airlines using the airport.
For dette betalte Infratil den såkaldte »købspris I« på […] EUR [25] samt yderligere […] EUR til Hansestadt Lübeck, hvilket svarer til en kassekredit, som Hansestadt Lübeck tidligere havde ydet FLG til finansiering af driftsomkostninger og nye investeringer.
It is adapted every few years to cater for changes in the costs of the special services.
Den 29. marts 2010 underskrev Ryanair og Lübeck lufthavn tillægsskrivelse nr. 1 til 2000-aftalen, der omfatter perioden fra 28. marts 2010 til 30. oktober 2010.
In particular, the airport alone is competent to draw up the scheme of special charges.
Denne tillægsskrivelse forlængede 2000-aftalen til 30. oktober 2010 og indførte et nyt incitament pr. passager på […] EUR, som FLG skal betale til Ryanair, foruden betaling for markedsføringsydelser i henhold til 2000-aftalen på […] EUR pr. passager (under 18 turnarounds om ugen) eller […] EUR pr. passager (over 18 turnarounds om ugen).
In its Lübeck judgment, the Court of Justice held that the 2006 schedule of charges of Lübeck airport was to be considered as reference system [76].
I oktober 2010 blev tillægsskrivelse nr. 2 underskrevet.
In light of the similarities between the general schedule of charges and the scheme of special charges, the Commission concludes that the scheme of special charges at Lübeck airport has to be considered the reference framework under which the charges for de-icing of aircrafts at Lübeck airport are to be assessed.
Den bevarede ikke betingelserne fra tillægsskrivelsen af marts 2010, men gik tilbage til ordningen med betaling for markedsføring i henhold til den originale 2000-aftale.
Second, the Commission has to assess whether the scheme of special charges differentiates between economic operators who are in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Tillægsskrivelsen fra oktober 2010 forlængede vilkårene i 2000-aftalen i yderligere 3 år frem til den 1. november 2013.
The Commission observes that the scheme of special charges applies to all airlines using Lübeck airport.
Tyskland argumenterede, at aftalen mellem Infratil og Hansestadt Lübeck skal vurderes på baggrund af den juridiske og økonomiske situation, som lufthavnen Lübeck befandt sig i 2009.
When using the de-icing services for aircrafts, the scheme of special charges does not differentiate between the different airlines.
Dette omfatter den manglende byggetilladelse, de verserende retssager, der omfattede lufthavnen, og den økonomiske og finansielle krise.
Indeed, every aircraft de-iced at Lübeck airport is subject to the same charges, which depend on the take-off weight of the aircraft as well as the amount of de-icing liquid and hot water used.
Det anføres, at der ikke eksisterer nogen flaskehalse, hvad angår ledig kapacitet før tidligst i 2030.
Therefore, the charges for the de-icing of aircrafts at Lübeck airport do not derogate from the system of reference, because they do not differentiate between airlines using the airport.
Desuden kan investeringerne, navnlig instrumentlandingssystemet, ikke anses for tilbagebetaling for en offentlig tjeneste.
The Commission concludes that the de-icing charges are, prima facie, not selective.
Hansestadt Lübecks efterstillede aktionærlån til FLG: SGF er af den holdning, at Lübeck lufthavn er en »kriseramt virksomhed«, og at dette var situationen i 2008/09.
Given that the charges for de-icing are, prima facie, not selective, there is no need to assess whether such charges are justified by the nature or the general scheme of the system.
I den forbindelse anser SGF aftalen om efterstillet gæld som et vigtigt værktøj til at undgå insolvens.
Therefore, the charges for de-icing of aircrafts do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
For det andet kan Hansestadt Lübecks forpligtelse til at betale renter for aktionærlån i perioden fra 1. januar 2009 til 22. oktober 2009 ikke anses som en økonomisk fordel, da Infratil kunne have opnået det samme eller endda et højere afkast af udbyttet af put-optionen i januar 2009.
CONCLUSION
I et hypotetisk scenarie ville Infratil have brugt indtægterne til tilbagebetaling af eksisterende gæld for at spare renterne.
The Commission finds that there is no need to take a decision as to whether potential State aid to FLG constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, and if so, whether such State aid could be declared compatible.
Ifølge SGF gav tillægsaftalen af 2009 Infratil en klar fordel.
Furthermore, even if there was economic continuity between FLG and Yasmina, it would not be possible to recover the aid from Yasmina anymore as Yasmina has been dissolved and its assets were sold in court supervised insolvency proceedings in line with German insolvency law.
Hvad angår anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, påpegede SGF, at der ikke skulle tages højde for de positive virkninger ved en aftale på regionen.
The sale of shares in FLG to Infratil in 2005 did not provide an advantage to Infratil, because Hansestadt Lübeck acted like a MEO when selling the shares.
Derfor konkluderede Air Berlin, at Hansestadt Lübeck kan gøres ansvarlig.
The renegotiation of the put option in 2009 and the taking over of further losses, investments and other costs, as laid down in the 2009 Additional Agreement did not provide an advantage to Infratil either.
Air Berlin finder, at visse erklæringer fra centrale FLG-ansatte desuden er bevis for, at den pågældende aftale kan tilregnes Hansestadt Lübeck.
In that context also Hansestadt Lübeck acted like a MEO.