natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De enheder, der betaler skat på juridiske personer, er alene skattepligtige med hensyn til en del af de indtægter, de genererer ved havneaktiviteterne, nemlig lejeværdien af deres ejendomme beliggende i Belgien og kapitalafkast og indtægter fra ejendomme [62].
As far as cases N390/2005 Construction of transhipment facilities on the railway line Lanaken – Maastricht [51] and N478/2004 Coras Iompair Eireann [52] are concerned, the Commission points out that they relate to the financing of the construction of railway infrastructure and not to making available port infrastructures against remuneration, and that in any case, the position taken by the Commission in those cases no longer corresponds to the Court of Justice case-law [53] or even to the Commission's current decision-making practice, according to which the construction of infrastructure to be exploited economically constitutes an economic activity.
Derfor omfatter det skattepligtige beløb i henseende til skat på juridiske personer ikke havnenes samlede fortjeneste, f.eks. de afgifter, som kunderne betaler for de tjenesteydelser, som havnene udbyder, eller for benyttelsen afhavneinfrastrukturen.
Finally, the judgment of the Court of Justice in case C-18/01 Korhonen [54] does not concern State aid law but Council Directive 92/50/EEC [55].
Hvad angår den del af disse indtægter, der pålignes skat på juridiske personer, er satserne endvidere generelt mindre [63] end selskabsskattesatsen (33,99 %).
Concerning making available land and infrastructure to undertakings against remuneration
Det beløb, der betales i skat af de økonomiske aktiviteter, er derfor mindre end det beløb, der ville skulle betales i selskabsskat.
The Commission Decision in case SA.36346 [56], referred to in paragraph 17(f) of the Notice of 19 July 2016 and cited by the interested parties and the Belgian authorities, does not imply that the management or development of the port area and, in particular, the renting or making available of specific land and infrastructure against remuneration, is a non-economic activity.
Det er heller ikke muligt at følge den flamske havnekommissions argumenter om, at fordelen ved fritagelsen fra selskabsskat i alt væsentligt blot tjener til at kompensere havnemyndighederne for den stigende finansiering af ikkeøkonomiske infrastrukturer, som ikke hører under deres kompetence.
Case SA.36346 in fact concerned support for the revitalisation of public land and not the renting of land or infrastructure against remuneration.
Ingen national lovbestemmelse garanterer nemlig, at fordelen beløbsmæssigt begrænses til nettoomkostningen ved disse ikkeøkonomiske infrastrukturer [64].
The Commission practice has already been to consider that renting public property against remuneration constitutes an economic activity, especially where the port's co-contractor provides port services to its customers [57].
Fritagelsen for selskabsskat, som betales med et beløb, der er proportionalt med det genererede overskud, udløser derfor en fordel, der ikke står mål med den eventuelle omkostning ved finansieringen af ikkeøkonomiske infrastrukturer.
It can also be inferred from the tariff conditions published by the port authorities [58] that the concession fees are subject to VAT, which is evidence of their economic nature.
Derfor finder Kommissionen, at de omhandlede havne har opnået en fordel efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF, som svarer til forskellen mellem selskabsskatten, som havnene skulle have betalt af deres økonomiske aktiviteter, og den del af skatten på juridiske personer, som kan tilskrives disse økonomiske aktiviteter.
Similarly, the renting of land by the ports constitutes an economic activity subject to VAT [59].
5.1.3.
The Commission also notes that, in their comments, the ports of Antwerp and Zeebrugge emphasise that the choice of concessionaire is made after an ‘invitation to tender’, which confirms that these ports, where they give access to the port infrastructure, offer goods or services on a market.
STATSMIDLER OG TILREGNELSE TIL STATEN
Concerning the ancillary or principal nature of the economic activities
Det er fast retspraksis, at statens afkald på midler, der principielt skulle have været indbetalt til statskassen, udgør en overførsel af statsmidler [65].
The fact that the economic activities of an entity are minor or marginal in relation to its non-economic activities does not in principle allow these economic activities to be regarded as exempt from the State aid rules.
I modsætning til, hvad de belgiske myndigheder hævder, kommer staten nemlig til at mangle et skatteprovenu, hvis beskatningen af havnenes økonomiske aktiviteter med skat på juridiske personer medfører en gunstigere beskatning af den skattepligtige, end selskabsskatten ville have medført (se afsnit 5.1.2 ovenfor om forekomsten af en økonomisk fordel).
In addition, and without it being necessary to undertake a port-by-port evaluation of the proportion of the different economic activities, it can be inferred from the preceding arguments that a very large part of the activities considered to be non-economic by the interested parties and the Belgian authorities (renting of land, access to infrastructure against remuneration) are, in reality, economic.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at denne foranstaltning udgør en overførsel af statsmidler efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF
As indicated above, it is not contested that the port charges and concession fees account for the vast majority of the turnover of the Belgian ports and this revenue even exceeds total current expenditure in the case of the port of Antwerp.
I øvrigt kan den tilregnes staten, idet det omhandlede skattesystem er en del af belgisk lovgivning og ikke pålagt Belgien ved en EU-retlig bestemmelse [66].
Finally, although the Commission accepts that, if the infrastructure is used almost exclusively for a non-economic activity, its funding may fall outside the State aid rules in its entirety, provided the economic use remains purely ancillary [60], the fact that the ports engage in non-economic activities does not mean that the port infrastructure itself is used almost exclusively for a non-economic activity.
For at blive betegnet som statsstøtte skal en foranstaltning være selektiv, dvs. den skal begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF [67].
Conclusion
Ifølge fast retspraksis [68] foretages vurderingen af den materielle selektivitet ved en foranstaltning, der letter byrder, som normalt belaster en virksomheds budget, f.eks. en skattefritagelse, i følgende tre trin: For det første er det nødvendigt at bestemme, hvad der er den almindelige eller »normale« skatteordning i den pågældende medlemsstat (den såkaldte »referenceordning«).
The Commission therefore considers that the activities carried out by the Belgian ports covered by the measure are – at least in part – economic activities.
Er dette tilfældet, er foranstaltningen umiddelbart selektiv.
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
For det tredje er det vigtigt at fastslå, om foranstaltningens karakter af undtagelse er begrundet i referenceskatteordningens karakter eller almindelige opbygning, med andre ord dens indbyggede logik [69].
According to the Court of Justice, an advantage comprises not only a positive benefit, but also all the measures which in various forms mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking [61].
I løbet af proceduren har de belgiske myndigheder successivt forsvaret to antagelser.
Therefore, the ports are not required to bear the costs normally borne by entities subject to corporate tax.
I deres svar på det spørgeskema, der blev sendt ud den 3. juli 2013 af Kommissionens tjenestegrene, har de belgiske myndigheder for det første angivet, at artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR var retsgrundlaget for fritagelsen af havnene for ISoc.
The tax on legal persons is not levied on total profits.
Begrebet statsstøtte er et objektivt begreb, og kun virkningerne af foranstaltningen skal tages i betragtning.
For entities subject to the tax on legal persons, tax is levied only on part of the revenue generated by the port activities, namely on the cadastral income of property located in Belgium and on the income and proceeds from investment capital and movable assets [62].
I deres bemærkninger af 19. december 2016 hævder de belgiske myndigheder, at artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR ikke har stiftende retsvirkninger, men er en ren konstatering.
Consequently, the taxable amount for the tax on legal persons does not include the total profits made by the ports, for example, the port charges and fees paid by customers in consideration for services offered by the ports or the fees and rentspaid for the use of port infrastructure.
De belgiske myndigheder hævder nemlig, at disse havne ikke er »selskaber« efter artikel 1 og 2 i CIR.
In addition, Belgium did not submit any evidence of a nature to alter this conclusion by the Commission during the cooperation procedure launched on 9 July 2014 or in its comments after the opening of the formal investigation procedure on 8 July 2016.
Hverken Belgiens eller tredjeparternes bemærkninger tilfører oplysninger, der på overbevisende måde kan underbygge denne antagelse.
It did not challenge the comments presented by the Dutch ports either, according to which the ports of Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ghent have a real tax rate well below the corporate tax rate in Belgium (33,99 %).
Kommissionen vurderer tværtimod, at havnene i princippet i indkomstskattemæssig henseende er »selskaber« i kraft af den væsentligste del af deres aktiviteter, og at de udøver økonomiske aktiviteter, der kan begrunde betegnelsen »virksomhed« efter artikel 107 i TEUF.
It is not possible either to subscribe to the arguments of the Flemish Port Commission, according to which, essentially, the advantage resulting from the corporate tax exemption is designed only to compensate for the increasing financing, by the port authorities, of non-economic infrastructure outside their remit.
Kommissionen bemærker da også, at den antagelse, som de belgiske myndigheders argumentation bygger på, er i strid med de officielle bemærkninger til CIR, med andre nationale lovtekster samt med den belgiske regerings officielle holdning.
This is because there is no provision of national law guaranteeing that the amount of the advantage is limited to the net cost of such non-economic infrastructures [64].
Kommissionen er heller ikke enig i, at havnene ville blive fritaget for ISoc i kraft af de generelle kriterier i artikel 1 og 2 i CIR, selv om artikel 180, stk. 2, blev ophævet.
The exemption from corporate tax, the amount of which is proportional to the profit made, therefore leads to an advantage disproportionate to any cost of financing non-economic infrastructures.
På baggrund af oplysningerne i foregående betragtning finder Kommissionen tværtimod, at havnene, som i medfør af de generelle regler i national belgisk lovgivning er »selskaber« efter artikel 2 i CIR, burde selskabsbeskattes, hvis de ikke formelt og ubetinget var fritaget herfor ved artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the ports at issue benefit from an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU which corresponds to the difference between the corporate tax that the ports should have paid for their economic activities and the proportion of the tax on legal persons which can be attributed to these economic activities.
I lyset af ovennævnte oplysninger finder Kommissionen, at den normale anvendelse af de generelle regler i belgisk ret ville bevirke, at havnene blev pålagt at svare selskabsskat af indtægterne fra deres økonomiske aktiviteter.
It is settled case-law that waiving revenues that would – in principle – otherwise have been paid to the State constitutes a transfer of State resources [65].
I så fald ville det belgiske system i sig selv være selektivt [79].
Contrary to the arguments put forward by the Belgian authorities, since the taxation of the economic activities of the ports in the form of the tax on legal persons leads to taxation which is more favourable to the taxpayer than taxation in the form of corporate tax would have been (see section 5.1.2 above concerning the existence of an economic advantage), it gives rise to a shortfall in tax revenue for the State.
Selv om artikel 1 og 2 i CIR således udgjorde retsgrundlaget for fritagelse af de belgiske havne for ISoc, ville denne fritagelse derfor umiddelbart være en selektiv foranstaltning, for så vidt angår havnenes økonomiske aktiviteter.
Consequently, the Commission considers that this measure constitutes a transfer of State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Vurdering af selektiviteten, hvis artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR udgør retsgrundlaget for de belgiske havnes fritagelse for betaling af ISoc
In addition, since the tax system at issue comes under Belgian law and is not imposed on Belgium by Union legislation, it is imputable to the State [66].
Som det fremgår af redegørelsen ovenfor, finder Kommissionen, at artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR alene danner retsgrundlaget for fritagelsen af de belgiske havne for betaling af ISoc, og at havnene uden denne bestemmelse ville betale ISoc som ethvert andet selskab eller enhver anden virksomhed, der genererer skattepligtige indtægter ved en økonomisk aktivitet.
To be considered State aid, a measure must be selective, in the sense that it favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU [67].
Artikel 170 bekræfter, at de selskabsskattepligtige enheder er de hjemmehørende selskaber.
Second, it is necessary to determine whether the measure in question derogates from the reference system by differentiating between economic operators which, in the light of the objective pursued by the reference tax regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation.
I mangel af den udtrykkelige og specifikke fritagelse i artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR ville de belgiske havne — som de øvrige hjemmehørende selskaber — faktisk automatisk være selskabsskattepligtige.
In their replies to the questionnaire sent on 3 July 2013 by the Commission, the Belgian authorities first pointed out that Article 180(2) of the CIR was the legal basis for the exemption from corporate tax in favour of the ports.
Undtagelse fra referenceordningen, hvorved der skelnes mellem virksomheder, der under hensyntagen til det formål, der forfølges med den pågældende referenceskatteordning, befinder sig i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation
However, they then argued, in their comments dated 19 December 2016, that it was not merely as a result of applying the general rules of the CIR provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the CIR that the ports were not subject to corporate tax, since ports were not ‘companies’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the CIR.
Det fremgår af ovenstående, at artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR afviger fra de generelle indkomstbeskatningsregler for »selskaber« (såvel ved henvisning til de generelle regler i artikel 1 og 2 i CIR som ved henvisning til de mindre generelle regler i artikel 179 i CIR) og indfører forskelsbehandling af virksomheder, der under hensyntagen til det formål, der forfølges med den pågældende referenceskatteordning, befinder sig i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation.
State aid is an objective concept and only the effects of the measure must be taken into account.
Uanset den valgte referenceordning (ISoc eller skat på hjemmehørende juridiske personer generelt) er formålet med indkomstskatten at beskatte indtægter, hvilket sætter alle virksomheder i samme faktiske og retlige situation med hensyn til fortjenesten ved deres økonomiske aktiviteter.
The fact that the Belgian ports do not pay corporate tax is not contested, but the basis for this absence of payment of corporate tax, according to the Belgian authorities, can be either Article 180(2) of the CIR or Articles 1 and 2 of the CIR.
Begrundelse i ordningens karakter eller almindelige opbygning
The Belgian authorities maintain that the ports are not ‘companies’ within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the CIR.
Som angivet ovenfor påhviler det medlemsstaten at påvise, at undtagelsen er begrundet i referenceskatteordningens karakter eller almindelige opbygning.
In this scenario, the reference system would be constituted by Articles 1 and 2 of the CIR, which provide that ‘companies’ are subject to corporate tax, whereas resident legal persons other than companies are subject to the tax on legal persons.
I den forbindelse har den belgiske forfatningsdomstols afgørelse nr. 151/2016 af 1. december 2016 under alle omstændigheder ikke den retsvirkning, som de belgiske myndigheder forsøger at tillægge den.
In so far as ports are not ‘companies’, the rules relating to the tax on legal persons could also be considered to be a narrower reference system.
I øvrigt er der ikke fastlagt en lignende fritagelse for ISoc, som den havnene nyder godt af, for de øvrige »selskaber«, såfremt deres indtægter ikke dækker omkostningerne.
The Commission considers, on the contrary, that the ports are in principle ‘companies’ for the purposes of taxation of income as regards the bulk of their activities and that they carry out economic activities of a nature to classify them as ‘undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU.
I tråd hermed kan det forhold, at visse omkostninger, der ikke er uløseligt knyttet til en virksomheds formål, ikke ville kunne fradrages i selskabsskatten i medfør af artikel 49 i CIR, heller ikke begrunde fritagelsen af havnene for ISoc.
Nor is this classification as companies called into question by any provision of national law.
Ifølge artikel 49 i CIR er »de udgifter, som den skattepligtige har pådraget sig eller afholdt i skatteåret til at skabe eller bevare skattepligtige indtægter«, fradragsberettigede.
The Commission notes that the assumption on which the Belgian authorities base their reasoning is in contradiction with the official comments on the CIR, with other domestic texts and with official positions adopted by the Belgian Government.
For det første er fritagelsen af havnene for ISoc ikke knyttet til det forhold, at havnene skulle være finansielt hæmmede af artikel 49 i CIR, idet ISoc-fritagelsen gælder det samlede overskud og ikke er begrænset til det overskud, der følger af, at visse udgifter i medfør af artikel 49 i CIR eventuelt ikke kan fradrages.
The official comments on the CIR state that legal persons who are ‘unconditionally’ excluded from corporate tax (notably the ports pursuant to Article 180(2) of the CIR) should ‘in principle be regarded as taxpayers subject to corporate tax’ [71].
Fritagelsen af havnene for ISoc er således ikke begrundet i en grundregel i det belgiske skattesystem, hvis det da antages, at artikel 49 i CIR udgør en sådan grundregel.
Also in view of their legal form (and the characteristics generally associated with this legal form), the majority of the ports listed in Article 180(2) of the CIR – which are public limited companies (SA), private limited companies (SPRL) or autonomous municipal authorities – should also be subject in principle to corporate tax [72].
Disse to kriterier er tæt knyttet til hinanden.
Therefore, the Commission does not concur with the position that, even if Article 180(2) were deleted, the ports would not be subject to corporate tax under the general criteria provided for in Articles 1 and 2 of the CIR.
Ifølge retspraksis konstateres det generelt, at der er tale om konkurrencefordrejning, når staten giver en virksomhed en økonomisk fordel i en liberaliseret sektor, hvor den er eller kan være i konkurrence [86].
In the light of the references cited in the previous recital, the Commission considers, on the contrary, that, pursuant to the general rules of Belgian national law, the ports, which are ‘companies’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the CIR, should be subject to corporate tax, in the absence of formal and unconditional exemption from this tax under Article 180(2) of the CIR.
Men det er ubestrideligt, at der hersker konkurrence i havnesektoren, og at den skærpes af transportsektorens art og egenskaber, især søtransport og flodtrafik.
For the same reasons, the Commission disputes that the rules relating to the tax on legal persons constitute the reference system for the taxation of the ports.
Transporttjenester, der udbydes af havnene, er i det mindste i en vis udstrækning i konkurrence med tilbuddene fra andre havne og andre transporttjenesteudbydere i Belgien og i andre medlemsstater.
In their comments, the Belgian authorities and certain interested parties maintain that the exemption from corporate tax for the ports is inferred, quite apart from the general rules of the CIR (Articles 1 and 2), from other general rules of national law (a general principle of law, a rule derived from case-law according to which public services, tasks and goods are not taxed unless explicitly provided for by law, or even by the Belgian Constitution itself).
I forbindelse med den offentlige høring af interesserede parter vedrørende et forslag til forordning på havneområdet understregede »alle berørte parter […], at det er nødvendigt med stabile og retfærdige vilkår […] for konkurrencen mellem havnene i EU […]« [87].
In the light of the references cited above, the Commission considers that the normal application of the general rules of Belgian law would result in the ports being subject to corporate tax with respect to the income from their economic activities.
Ligeledes er havnene, især kæden af indlandshavne i flodtrafikken og i det hele taget transporten ad indre vandveje, i konkurrence med andre transportformer.
Incidentally, even if, contrary to what the Commission has just shown, the national rules in question – or their interpretation by the administration – were such as to result in the non-payment of corporate tax by Belgian ports, these rules would introduce discrimination between ‘undertakings’ engaging in economic activities within the meaning of Article 107 TFEU (see section 5.1.1. above).
I øvrigt har påstanden om, at der findes lignende statsstøtteforanstaltninger i andre medlemsstater, og Kommissionens holdning til disse eventuelle foranstaltninger ingen indflydelse på betegnelsen af den omhandlede foranstaltning som statsstøtte, idet foranstaltningen til fordel for de belgiske havne jf. artikel 180, stk. 2, i CIR udløser en forbedring af deres konkurrencemæssige stilling i forhold til en referencesituation, hvori de ville blive beskattet efter de normale vilkår i selskabsbeskatningssystemet [88].
In particular, the fact that the ports do not seek a profit [78] is not sufficient to consider that they are in a different situation from that of other operators subject to corporate tax.
Selv om havnene kan anses for at have et lovligt monopol på at tilbyde deres tjenester inden for det havneområde, de driver, er de transporttjenesteydelser, de tilbyder, endvidere i det mindste til en vis grad konkurrence med dem, som andre transporttjenesteudbydere tilbyder, især havnene i andre medlemsstater.
In this scenario, the Belgian system would itself be selective [79].
Den nederlandske konkurrencemyndigheds udtalelse, som de interesserede parter nævner, er ikke relevant i forbindelse med nærværende undersøgelsesprocedure.
Therefore, even if Articles 1 and 2 of the CIR constituted the legal basis for non-payment of corporate tax by the Belgian ports, this non-payment would be a measure which is prima facie selective with respect to the economic activities of the ports.
Den vedrører nemlig ikke vurderingen af ordningen i forhold til artikel 107 i TEUF, som nødvendiggør en særlig undersøgelse af konkurrencevilkårene.
Assessment of selectivity if Article 180(2) of the CIR constitutes the legal basis for non-payment of corporate tax by the Belgian ports
Artikel 25 i det flamske havnedekret af 2. marts 1999 viser i øvrigt, at havnenes afgiftssatser påvirker deres konkurrencemæssige stilling [89].
As results from the arguments developed above, the Commission considers that Article 180(2) of the CIR is the only legal basis for non-payment of corporate tax by the Belgian ports and that, in the absence of this provision, the ports would pay corporate tax like any other company or undertaking deriving taxable income from an economic activity.