natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Derimod fokuserer de offentligt tilgængelige finansielle dokumenter på alle de berørte virksomheders aktiviteter og indeholder ofte oplysninger om hele koncerners konsoliderede regnskaber.
On the one hand, it acquired an existing factory for a low purchase price and, on the other hand, it restructured its debt.
Derfor var konklusioner om EU-erhvervsgrenens økonomiske situation, jf. grundforordningens artikel 3, stk. 5, ikke baseret på de offentligt tilgængelige finansielle dokumenter, men derimod på de mere detaljerede og verificerede oplysninger om situationen i Unionen, der kun fremgår af undersøgelsen.
In 2015 it continued to make significant repayments on its loans, which resulted in a negative cash flow from financing activities.
Desuden var konklusionerne om EU-erhvervsgrenens situation baseret på data fra alle EU-producenter i stikprøven og ikke kun fra SolarWorld og Jabil.
It must be noted that this producer reported a positive cash flow from operating activities and a significant improvement in its operating result as compared to 2014.
Hvad angår Jabil samlede denne virksomhed kun moduler, men påtog sig ikke det fulde kontraktlige ansvar for sit salg, jf. ovennævnte forklaring.
Two other Union module producers had positive and improving cash flow in the RIP, while the other two cell producers had negative, but improving cash flow.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger hævdede en interesseret part, at Kommissionen burde have taget hensyn til virkningerne af store investeringer foretaget af SolarWorld.
Regarding investments, the tables above show that the Union industry increased its investments by 2 % for modules between 2012 and the RIP.
Disse investeringer siges at have haft negative virkninger på virksomheden og erhvervsgrenen som helhed, idet virksomheden udgør en betydelig andel af EU-erhvervsgrenens produktion.
They increased by 40 % between 2013 and 2014 and by 98 % between 2013 and the RIP.
For det første henviser parten til investeringer foretaget i 2015, som vedrørte ikke blot celler og moduler, men også anden produktion i EU, nemlig wafere [31].
The overall investments for cells decreased by 61 % between 2012 and the RIP.
Disse investeringer påvirkede således kun delvis rentabilitetsanalysen af virksomhedens aktiviteter vedrørende moduler og celler.
The general trend for investment for cells was again influenced by the decision of one sampled Union producer to stop production.
Sandsynlighed for fortsat skade
At the same time the investments of the other two sampled producers increased four times between 2014 and the RIP.
Som vist i afsnit 4.5 led EU-erhvervsgrenen fortsat skade i NUP.
First, while this is factually true for the total sample, as indicated in the previous recital this trend was influenced by the decision of one sampled Union producer to stop production.
Som anført i afsnit 3.3 er det sandsynligt, at der fortsat vil ske dumping, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
That producer had significant investments at the beginning of the period but almost none at the end of it.
Det konstateredes desuden, at de eksporterende producenter solgte til dumpingpriser til tredjelande og til Unionen, og at de vil trænge ind på EU-markedet til endnu lavere priser end dem, som de i øjeblikket sælger til til Unionen, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov til at udløbe.
Second, another sampled producer made start-up investments in 2013 which reflects the big increase in the overall investments in that year.
Uudnyttet kapacitet, handelsstrømme og EU-markedets tiltrækningskraft samt de eksporterende kinesiske producenters prisadfærd
Third, after the entry of the measures started affecting the profitability of the companies, the investments of the whole sample increased between 2014 and the RIP, reflecting the fact that the two sampled producers who stayed on the market increased four times their investments during that period.
Derfor konkluderede Kommissionen, at de kinesiske producenters samlede uudnyttede kapacitet langt oversteg den globale efterspørgsel, nemlig med 47,5 % i 2015 og vil overstige den med 42,9 % eller 36 % i 2016 afhængigt af kilden.
Consequently, the argument that the investments were not positively influenced by the imposition of the measures was rejected.
En anden kilde fastslog, at den samlede globale efterspørgsel var 58 GW [36] i 2015, hvilket ville give de kinesiske producenter en overskydende kapacitet på 39,8 % i 2015.
The return on investments (‘ROI’) is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments.
Selv om der ikke blev installeret ny kapacitet i Kina i fremtiden, ville den eksisterende kapacitet stadig ligge markant over den forventede årlige efterspørgsel efter solcelleanlæg på globalt plan.
It remained negative throughout the period considered because of the net losses suffered by the Union industry.
I det mest sandsynlige scenarie (såkaldt »mellemhøjt scenarie«) ville efterspørgslen nå op på 97 GW [37] eller 95 GW [38] i 2020, som vil være fuldt dækket af den eksisterende kinesiske kapacitet.
The ROI for modules improved by 4 percentage points during the period considered; but it improved significantly in 2014 and the RIP in comparison with 2013, by 7 and 8 percentage points respectively.
I øvrigt har den kinesiske kapacitet for produktion af solcellemoduler været støt voksende i de seneste 10 år.
For cells the ROI deteriorated by 25,8-28,4 percentage points during the period considered.
F.eks. er den blevet mere end fordoblet mellem 2012 og 2015 (fra 43,8 GW [39] i 2012 til 96,3 GW i 2015).
Conclusion on injury
Alene i 2016 er der en anmeldt kapacitet eller en kapacitet under opførelse i Kina på yderligere 2 GW ifølge Bloomberg New Energy Finance (»BNEF«).
In overall terms, the Union industry continued to suffer from injury during the period considered given the short period after the imposition of the original measures and the magnitude of dumping and the level of injury found in the previous investigation.
Desuden er der intet, der tyder på, at den kinesiske kapacitet ikke fortsat vil vokse i den nærmeste fremtid, da den er vokset støt i de seneste fem år.
In addition, the circumvention practices found, as indicated in recital 4 above, have also contributed to the continuation of injury.
Selv i det mindre sandsynlige scenarie (såkaldt »højt scenarie«) med stigende global årlig efterspørgsel på op til 120 GW [40] i 2020 er det sandsynligt, at de kinesiske producenter alene stadig ville være i stand til at dække hele efterspørgslen, da de ville være nødt til at udvide deres eksisterende kapacitet i meget langsommere tempo, end de havde gjort tidligere, dvs. kun med 11,3 % i løbet af 4 år.
However, from mid-2013 (the provisional measures entered into force on 6 June 2013), and especially during 2014 (the first full year with anti-dumping measures in force) and during the RIP the Union industry started gradually to recover.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger anfægtede to interesserede parter de oplysninger om kapacitet i Kina og det globale forbrug, der anvendes af Kommissionen.
Indeed, a number of injury indicators showed positive trends.
De fremførte det argument, at Solar Power Europe ikke var tilstrækkeligt pålidelig til at udgøre en kilde, da der her kun tages hensyn til moduler, som allerede er tilsluttet nettet, mens IHS og BNEF giver mere præcise prognoser, da de viser de moduler, der er købt til installation.
Regarding modules, the Union industry increased its Union module sales by 2,8 % and, as a result, its market share increased by 9,4 % between 2014 and the RIP.
I betragtningerne ovenfor har Kommissionen imidlertid allerede analyseret data og fremskrivninger fra IHS, mens dataene fra BNEF ikke afviger væsentligt fra IHS [41].
During the same period, the Union industry increased its captive use and Union sales of cells by 6,3 % and maintained the market share of 33 %.
De samme parter anfægtede også størrelsen af den samlede uudnyttede kapacitet, som blev fastslået af Kommissionen.
It also achieved significant productivity gains, thereby reducing the gap between its sales prices and its average costs of production.
Selv hvis dette tal er korrekt, er den anslåede uudnyttede kapacitet stadig tilstrækkelig til at dække hele den globale efterspørgsel, selv i tilfælde af de mest optimistiske skøn for 2016 (70,7 GW [43]).
Moreover, the previous undercutting from Chinese exports had stopped due to their compliance with the MIP (no undercutting for modules and only marginal undercutting for cells during the RIP).
Ingen af de andre parter fremlagde nogen vurdering eller henviste til en undersøgelse eller en rapport, der kunne tyde på, at den uudnyttede kapacitet, som Kommissionen havde konstateret, bør reduceres.
As a result, although the Union industry was still loss making during the RIP, its losses decreased significantly for modules in comparison with 2012 and 2013.
Påstanden kan således ikke ændre konklusionerne ovenfor.
However, the losses did not decrease for the Union industry for cells because, as explained in recital 165 above, they were influenced by extraordinary events occurring to two of the sampled producers.
Flere interesserede parter fremførte før og efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger, at tier 1-virksomheder har langt mindre overskudskapacitet end de resterende tier 2- og tier 3-virksomheder.
By contrast, the third sampled producer had its losses reduced during the RIP and thus followed the same trend as the one observed for modules.
Ifølge BNEF har tier 1-virksomheder en anslået kapacitet for modulproduktion i Kina på 46 GW i 2016, hvilket faktisk er lavere end den samlede kapacitet for tier 2- og 3-virksomheder, anslået til 62 GW [44].
The Union industry also increased its investments both for modules and cells by 41 % and 63 % respectively between 2014 and the RIP.
Kommissionen fandt derfor, at kapaciteten for alle typer af kinesiske eksporterende producenter burde tages i betragtning ved fastsættelse af den uudnyttede kapacitet i Kina.
In addition, despite the fact that the import volumes of the Chinese exports decreased for modules, their market share was still higher than the one of the Union producers.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger anfægtede en interesseret part konklusionen om, at overkapaciteten hos alle typer eksporterende producenter burde tages i betragtning ved fastsættelsen af den uudnyttede kapacitet i Kina.
Regarding cells, the imports increased significantly in the RIP in volume (by 65 %) in comparison with 2012, gaining market share.
Kommissionen påpegede, at den disponible kapacitet hos tier 1-virksomheder allerede udgjorde 90 % af det samlede globale forbrug i 2015 (anslået til 50,6 GW).
The Chinese imports of cells exercised indirect pressure also on the module market of captive producers which was thus prevented from growing further.
Den omstændighed, at tier 2- og tier 3-virksomheder eksporterede til EU, uanset i hvor små mængder, viser desuden, at de er aktive på EU-markedet og ikke begrænser deres salg til kun det kinesiske og andre markeder.
Therefore, Chinese imports continued to enter the Union market with significant volumes and at prices which were below the cost of production of the Union industry.
Endelig forventes importen fra tier 2- og tier-3-virksomheder at stige væsentligt efter den nylige tilbagetrækning af tilsagnet fra især tier 1-virksomheder.
Following disclosure, several parties claimed that the Commission failed to assess the effects on the Union industry of imports of modules from third countries made in substantial volumes and at prices below the ones of the Chinese exports.
Denne påstand blev derfor afvist.
The Commission acknowledged that the impact from module imports from third countries constitutes an important factor for assessing the state of the EU industry, However, such imports were much less important than the Chinese imports — the market share of the former was 25 % (including modules that in reality were Chinese, but fell under circumvention practices), while of the latter was 41 % during the RIP (and, given circumvention, in reality higher).
Flere parter fremførte det argument både før og efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger, at overkapaciteten i Kina i høj grad var overvurderet, da efterspørgslen efter solcelleanlæg var steget støt på globalt plan.
In addition, the market share of the third countries imports decreased by 10 % between 2014 and the RIP, while the share of the Chinese imports increased by 4,9 % during the same period.
Faktisk var den samlede årlige efterspørgsel steget med 25 % mellem 2014 og 2015 (fra 40,3 GW til 50,6 GW) [45].
These two factors show the much stronger impact of the Chinese imports on the Union industry than the imports from third countries.
Som nævnt ovenfor overstiger den anslåede overkapacitet hos de kinesiske producenter den nuværende efterspørgsel med 47,5 %.
In addition, the prices of modules from third countries were not below the ones of the Chinese exports.
Selv i det mest optimistiske scenarie for en stigning i den globale efterspørgsel vil de kinesiske producenter derfor sandsynligvis stadig have tilstrækkelig overskydende kapacitet til at imødekomme denne efterspørgsel.
As evidenced in Table 4a above, the weighted average price of all imports from third countries was 550 EUR/kW during the RIP, which was higher than the average Chinese export price – 544 EUR/kW.
Hvad angår celler anslås de kinesiske eksporterende producenters eksisterende kapacitet til 76,6 GW i 2016, en stigning på 12 % i forhold til 2015 (68 GW) [46].
Therefore, these arguments were rejected.
De fire største tredjelande med ledig kapacitet efter Kina er langt mindre end Kina (Taiwan: 11 GW, Malaysia: 4 GW, Korea: 2,7 GW og Japan: 1,9 GW).
Concerning cells, several parties claimed that the injury has been caused by third countries imports since the profitability decreased during the RIP compared to 2014, which was caused by the decrease of Chinese imports and the simultaneous increase of imports from third countries.
På det grundlag konkluderede Kommissionen, at Kina også har en betydelig overkapacitet af solcelleproduktion.
First, as indicated in recital 164, the increase in losses during the RIP for the sampled producers was influenced by extraordinary events which occurred to two of the Union cell producers, while the third (and the biggest) producer had an increase in profitability during the RIP in comparison with 2014.
En række parter påstod, at EU-markedet ikke længere er attraktivt for de kinesiske producenter.
Second, although the imports from China decreased by 3 percentage points between 2014 and the RIP, they increased by 7 percentage points between 2013 and the RIP, despite the entry into force of the measures.
De hævdede, at den kinesiske produktion af celler og moduler snarere vil blive rettet mod de hurtigt voksende markeder i Asien, herunder Japan og Indien.
Consequently, the imports from China continued to have an important impact on the Union industry.
Det er korrekt, at EU-markedet ikke længere er lige så vigtigt som tidligere, hvor det tegnede sig for op til 60 % af den årlige globale installerede kapacitet (i 2012).
Third, regarding imports from third countries, indeed they increased with 2 percentage points between 2014 and the RIP, but decreased by 24 percentage points between 2013 and the RIP.
EU forventes heller ikke at være blandt de hurtigt voksende markeder.
Therefore, their impact on the Union industry actually decreased in the period after the imposition of the measures.
Sidst, men ikke mindst har indførelsen og styrkelsen af handelsbeskyttelsesforanstaltninger, bl.a. fra Canada og USA's side, mindsket interessen for disse markeder, hvilket yderligere gør EU-markedet mere attraktivt, hvis foranstaltningerne ophæves.
Following disclosure, the GOC claimed that some injury indicators improved only in the RIP and not immediately after the imposition of the measures.
Trods indførelsen af antidumping- og udligningsforanstaltningerne i 2013 er de kinesiske eksporterende producenter fortsat meget interesserede i EU-markedet, hvilket bekræftes af, at de har opretholdt en stærk position på EU-markedet.
Hence, there is no clear link between the imposition of the measures and the various positive trends.
Som anført i afsnit 4.4 tegnede importen af moduler og celler fra Kina sig for en markedsandel på henholdsvis 41 % og 16 % i NUP, og Kina har bevaret (og endda for celler øget) deres markedsposition i forhold til importen fra tredjelande.
The Commission acknowledged that some injury indicators, for example concerning modules the market share, production and capacity utilisation improved only in the RIP and not in 2014.
Mængden og markedsandelen for den kinesiske import af moduler er langt større end for tredjelande; sidstnævnte tegnede sig tilsammen for blot 25 %.
However, given the magnitude of dumping and injury found in the previous investigation, it took some time to reverse the negative trends applicable for the entire industry.
Hvad angår celler tegnede tredjelandenes markedsandel sig for 51 % i NUP, men det betyder, at de faldt markant (med 32 %) i forhold til 2013, hvor de havde en markedsandel på 75 %.
This can be explained by the fact that at the time of imposition of the original measures, the Union industry was in the process of consolidation whereby many producers were already in the state of bankruptcy or near bankruptcy, but exited the market only during 2014.
På trods af at foranstaltningerne trådte i kraft i 2013, steg den kinesiske import af celler desuden med 77,8 % mellem 2013 og NUP.
This had an important impact on all macro indicators, which also included such companies.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger anfægtede flere parter konklusionen om, at EU-markedet fortsat er et attraktivt marked for de kinesiske eksporterende producenter.
Consequently, this claim was rejected.
En anslået samlet efterspørgsel i Unionen på 7,1 GW, som blev citeret af den interesserede part, er faktisk et temmelig godt resultat for 2016, da det i store træk er på linje med Solar Power Europes oprindelige skøn i et mellemhøjt scenarie for 2016 (7,3 GW) [49].
Several interested parties argued that the Union industry is doing well and has fully recovered from the previous injury.
Partens vurdering af, at efterspørgslen i Unionen på dette grundlag vil følge det lave scenarie indtil 2020, understøttes således ikke af de oplysninger, parten selv fremlagde.
Following disclosure, those parties reiterated these claims.
Selv hvis efterspørgslen fulgte det værst tænkelige scenarie og EU-markedets andel af det globale marked faldt, ville dette under alle omstændigheder ikke gøre EU-markedet uattraktivt for den kinesiske eksport, da alle de andre betragtninger ovenfor stadig gælder.
In particular, the figures reported in the financial statements of SolarWorld and Jabil, by far the biggest Union modules producers, allegedly showed that their Union business had been growing in the last few years and they had increased production volumes, capacity, capacity utilisation, export sales and productivity, while the cost of production and stocks have decreased.
Selv om EU-markedets relative andel af den globale efterspørgsel er faldende, er det stadig et attraktivt marked for den kinesiske eksport.
The sampled Union producers (including Jabil and SolarWorld) have increased their production volumes, capacity, capacity utilisation, export sales and productivity, while they have decreased their cost of production and stocks in 2014 and in the RIP.
I modsat fald ville den omgåelsespraksis, som stadig findes i de seneste undersøgelser om Malaysia og Taiwan, ikke forekomme.
However, the claim that the industry has fully recovered from the previous injury contradicts the findings of the investigation which are based on the actual verified data of the sampled Union producers.
Hvad angår påstandene om, at Kina ville installere solcelleanlæg med en kapacitet på 20 GW årligt indtil 2020, har Kommissionens undersøgelse påvist, at Kina ikke ville være i stand til at opretholde dette høje mål.
In particular, many microeconomic indicators are based only on the sales to independent customers in the Union (such as profitability, cash flow, and return on investments).
Ifølge markedsanalyser vil dette kinesiske mål blive reduceret som følge af manglende netinfrastruktur, et grundlæggende overforsynet marked og underskud i støttefonden for vedvarende energi [50].
In addition, some of the sampled companies have important production outside the Union, which is not included in the microeconomic indicators.
Konjunkturudsvingene på det kinesiske marked for solenergi diskuteres yderligere i betragtning 356.
By contrast, the publicly available financial documents focus on all activities of the companies concerned and often provide information on the consolidated accounts of the entire groups.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger citerede en part en pressemeddelelse fra den kinesiske nationale energiadministration, hvori det hed, at ifølge udviklingsplanen for solenergi for de næste fem år er en kapacitet på mindst 105 GW solenergi planlagt til at finde sted inden 2020.
Therefore, conclusions on the economic situation of the Union industry within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation were based not on publicly available financial documents but on the more detailed and verified information regarding the situation in the Union only provided in the investigation.
Parten hævdede, at dette ville medføre en yderligere stigning i efterspørgslen i Kina.
In addition, the conclusions reached on the state of the Union industry were based on data coming from all sampled Union producers and not only from SolarWorld and Jabil.
Kommissionen analyserede også, hvorvidt den kinesiske import ville komme ind i Unionen til priser, der er lavere end de nuværende EU-priser, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
Finally, regarding Jabil, as explained above, this company only assembled modules, but did not assume full contractual responsibility for their sales.
Næsten alle eksportende producenter, der solgte moduler og celler i NUP fra Kina til Unionen, havde afgivet pristilsagn, og deres eksportpriser til EU blev bestemt af disse pristilsagn, hvorved der fastsættes en minimumsimportpris.
Following disclosure, one interested party claimed that the Commission should have taken into account the effects of large-scale investments made by SolarWorld.
Derfor blev priserne ved salg til tredjelande for de stikprøveudtagne eksporterende producenter lagt til grund i stedet.
The latter are said to have negatively affected the company and the industry as a whole, given its important share in the Union industry's output.
Tallene viser det gennemsnitlige underbud for hver eksporterende producent (den laveste margen mellem virksomhederne og den højeste margen mellem virksomhederne).
Therefore those investments had only partial implications on the profitability assessment of the company's modules and cells business.
For celler er der kun én underbudsmargen, da dette er det gennemsnitlige underbud for den eneste eksporterende producent i stikprøven, som eksporterede celler til Unionen.
Second, as pointed out by other parties, the SolarWorld group achieved positive results in 2016 [32] of its European and non-European businesses.
En af parterne anmodede om en opdeling af den vejede gennemsnitspris for de fire pågældende eksporterende lande (Chile, Indien, Japan og Singapore) med henblik på at fremsætte bemærkninger om resultatet af underbudsberegningerne.
This does not seem to suggest at this stage that the already made investments have negatively affected the company.
Med henblik på underbudsberegningerne blev der ikke taget hensyn til den vejede gennemsnitspris pr. tredjeland, men den vejede gennemsnitspris for alle fire eksporterende lande tilsammen, hvorved man korrekt afspejler mængderne og priserne i forbindelse med eksporten.
Likelihood of continuation of injury
Denne anmodning blev derfor afvist.
To assess the likelihood of continuation of injury if the measures against the PRC were allowed to lapse, the potential impact of Chinese imports on the Union market and the Union industry was analysed in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation.