natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Relevante personer bør også omfatte agenter knyttet til selskabet.
When determining the remuneration for tied agents, firms should take the tied agents' special status and the respective national specificities into consideration.
Ved bestemmelse af aflønningen for agenter knyttet til selskabet bør selskaber tage hensyn til agenters særlige status og de pågældende nationale karakteristika.
However, in such cases, firms' remuneration policies and practices should still define appropriate criteria to be used to assess the performance of relevant persons, including qualitative criteria encouraging the relevant persons to act in the best interests of the client.
I sådanne tilfælde bør selskabers aflønningspolitikker og –praksisser dog stadig definere passende kriterier, der kan benyttes til at vurdere resultaterne for relevante personer, inklusive kvalitative kriterier, som tilskynder relevante personer til at handle i kundens bedste interesse.
Where successive personal transactions are carried out on behalf of a person in accordance with prior instructions given by that person, obligations relating to personal transactions should not apply separately to each such successive transaction if those instructions remain in force and unchanged.
Gennemføres der successive personlige transaktioner på en persons vegne i henhold til forud fastsatte instrukser fra den pågældende person, bør forpligtelserne vedrørende personlige transaktioner ikke finde anvendelse separat på hver af disse successive transaktioner, hvis de nævnte instrukser stadig gælder og er uændrede.
Similarly, those obligations should not apply to the termination or withdrawal of such instructions, provided that any financial instruments which had previously been acquired pursuant to the instructions are not disposed of at the same time as the instructions terminate or are withdrawn.
Disse forpligtelser bør heller ikke finde anvendelse, hvis de nævnte instrukser annulleres eller tilbagetrækkes, forudsat at eventuelle finansielle instrumenter, der tidligere var anskaffet i medfør af instrukserne, ikke afhændes, samtidig med at instrukserne annulleres eller tilbagetrækkes.
However, those obligations should apply in relation to a personal transaction, or the commencement of successive personal transactions, carried out on behalf of the same person if those instructions are changed or if new instructions are issued.
Forpligtelserne bør imidlertid finde anvendelse i forbindelse med en personlig transaktion eller iværksættelsen af successive personlige transaktioner, der udføres på den samme persons vegne, hvis disse instrukser ændres, eller hvis der gives nye instrukser.
Competent authorities should not make the authorisation to provide investment services or activities subject to a general prohibition on the outsourcing of one or more critical or important functions.
De kompetente myndigheder bør ikke gøre tilladelse til at yde investeringsservice eller udføre investeringsaktiviteter betinget af et generelt forbud mod at outsource en eller flere afgørende eller væsentlige funktioner.
Investment firms should be allowed to outsource such functions if the outsourcing arrangements established by the firm comply with certain conditions.
Investeringsselskaber bør kunne outsource sådanne funktioner, hvis selskabets outsourcingaftaler opfylder bestemte betingelser.
The outsourcing of investment services or activities or critical and important functions is capable of constituting a material change of the conditions for the authorisation of the investment firm, as referred to in Article 21(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
Outsourcing af investeringsservice eller –aktiviteter eller afgørende eller væsentlige funktioner kan udgøre en væsentlig ændring af betingelserne for meddelelse af investeringsselskabets tilladelse, jf. artikel 21, stk. 2, i direktiv 2014/65/EU.
If such outsourcing arrangements are to be put in place after the investment firm has obtained an authorisation according to Chapter I of Title II of Directive 2014/65/EU, those arrangements should be notified to the competent authority where required by Article 21(2) of that Directive.
Sådanne outsourcingaftaler, der indgås, efter at investeringsselskabet har opnået tilladelse i henhold til afsnit II, kapital I, i direktiv 2014/65/EU, bør meddeles den kompetente myndighed, når det kræves i medfør af artikel 21, stk. 2, i nævnte direktiv.
The circumstances which should be treated as giving rise to a conflict of interest should cover cases where there is a conflict between the interests of the firm or certain persons connected to the firm or the firm's group and the duty the firm owes to a client; or between the differing interests of two or more of its clients, to each of whom the firm owes a duty.
De forhold, der bør anses for at føre til en interessekonflikt, bør omfatte tilfælde, hvor der foreligger en konflikt mellem selskabets eller visse til selskabet eller selskabets koncern tilknyttede personers interesser og selskabets pligt over for kunden eller mellem en eller flere af dets kunders interesser, hvor selskabet har forpligtelser over for den enkelte kunde.
It is not enough that the firm may gain a benefit if there is not also a possible disadvantage to a client, or that one client to whom the firm owes a duty may make a gain or avoid a loss without there being a concomitant possible loss to another such client.
Det er ikke tilstrækkeligt, at selskabet kan opnå en fordel, hvis det ikke også eventuelt er til ulempe for kunden, eller at en kunde, som selskabet har forpligtelser over for, kan opnå en gevinst eller undgå et tab, uden at en anden kunde samtidig eventuelt lider et tab.
Conflicts of interest should be regulated only where an investment service or ancillary service is provided by an investment firm.
Bestemmelserne vedrørende interessekonflikter bør kun omfatte de situationer, hvor et investeringsselskab yder investeringsservice eller leverer accessoriske tjenesteydelser.
The status of the client to whom the service is provided — as either retail, professional or eligible counterparty — should be irrelevant for that purpose.
Det bør i denne forbindelse være irrelevant at tage hensyn til, hvilken status — detailkunde, professionel kunde eller godkendt modpart — den kunde, tjenesteydelsen leveres til, har.
In complying with its obligation to draw up a conflict of interest policy under Directive 2014/65/EU which identifies circumstances which constitute or may give rise to a conflict of interest, the investment firm should pay special attention to the activities of investment research and advice, proprietary trading, portfolio management and corporate finance business, including underwriting or selling in an offering of securities and advising on mergers and acquisitions.
Investeringsselskabet bør ved overholdelsen af sine forpligtelser til at udforme en politik vedrørende interessekonflikter i medfør af direktiv 2014/65/EU, hvori de forhold, der udgør eller kan føre til en interessekonflikt, identificeres, være særlig opmærksom på aktiviteter såsom investeringsanalyser og –rådgivning, egenhandel, porteføljepleje og selskabsfinansiering, herunder afsætningsgaranti eller salg ved udbud af værdipapirer og rådgivning vedrørende fusioner og overtagelser.
In particular, such special attention is appropriate where the firm or a person directly or indirectly linked by control to the firm performs a combination of two or more of those activities.
Det er navnlig vigtigt at være særlig opmærksom, hvis selskabet eller en person, der er direkte eller indirekte forbundet med selskabet ved et kontrolforhold, udfører en kombination af to eller flere af aktiviteterne.
Investment firms should aim to identify and prevent or manage the conflicts of interest arising in relation to their various business lines and their group's activities under a comprehensive conflicts of interest policy.
Investeringsselskaber bør bestræbe sig på inden for rammerne af en overordnet politik vedrørende interessekonflikter at indkredse og forhindre eller håndtere de interessekonflikter, der opstår i forbindelse med deres forskellige forretningsaktiviteter og deres koncerns aktiviteter.
While disclosure of specific conflicts of interest is required by Article 23(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU, it should be a measure of last resort to be used only where the organisational and administrative arrangements established by the investment firm to prevent or manage its conflicts of interest in accordance with Article 23(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that the risks of damage to the interests of the client are prevented.
Selv om det er et krav at underrette om bestemte interessekonflikter, jf. artikel 23, stk. 2, i direktiv 2014/65/EU, bør det være en sidste udvej, som kun benyttes, når de organisatoriske og administrative ordninger fastlagt af investeringsselskabet til at forhindre eller håndtere dets interessekonflikter i henhold til artikel 23, stk. 1, i direktiv 2014/65/EU ikke er tilstrækkelige til med rimelig sikkerhed at kunne sikre forebyggelse af risikoen for, at kunders interesser skades.
Over-reliance on disclosure without adequate consideration as to how conflicts may appropriately be prevented or managed should not be permitted.
Overdreven underretning om interessekonflikter uden passende overvejelser af, hvordan konflikter kan forhindres eller håndteres på passende vis, bør ikke være tilladt.
The disclosure of conflicts of interest by an investment firm should not exempt it from the obligation to maintain and operate the effective organisational and administrative arrangements required under Article 16(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
Et investeringsselskabs underretning om interessekonflikter bør ikke fritage det for pligten til effektivt at opretholde og anvende de organisatoriske og administrative ordninger, der kræves i medfør af artikel 16, stk. 3, i direktiv 2014/65/EU.
Firms should always comply with the inducements rules under Article 24 of Directive 2014/65/EU, including when providing placing services.
Selskaber skal altid overholde tilskyndelsesreglerne i artikel 24 i direktiv 2014/65/EU, inklusive under levering af placeringstjenester.
In particular, fees received by investment firms placing the financial instruments issued to its investment clients should comply with these provisions and laddering and spinning should be considered as abusive practices.
Gebyrer modtaget af investeringsselskaber, der placerer de finansielle instrumenter udstedt til deres investeringskunder, bør opfylde disse bestemmelser, og investeringsteknikkerne »laddering« og »spinning« bør betragtes som markedsmisbrug.
Investment research should be a sub-category of the type of information defined as a recommendation in Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6] (market abuse).
Investeringsanalyser bør være en underkategori af den typeoplysninger, der er defineret som en anbefaling i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 596/2014 [6] (markedsmisbrug).
The measures and arrangements adopted by an investment firm to manage the conflicts of interests that might arise from the production and dissemination of material that is presented as investment research should be appropriate to protect the objectivity and independence of financial analysts and of the investment research they produce.
De foranstaltninger og ordninger, et investeringsselskab indfører med henblik på at håndtere de interessekonflikter, der kan opstå som følge af udarbejdelsen og formidlingen af materiale, der fremstilles som investeringsanalyser, bør være hensigtsmæssige for at beskytte objektiviteten og uafhængigheden hos finansanalytikerne og af de investeringsanalyser, de udarbejder.
Those measures and arrangements should ensure that financial analysts enjoy an adequate degree of independence from the interests of persons whose responsibilities or business interests may reasonably be considered to conflict with the interests of the persons to whom the investment research is disseminated.
Disse foranstaltninger og ordninger bør sikre, at finansanalytikere har en passende grad af uafhængighed i forhold til interesserne hos personer, hvis ansvarsområder eller forretningsinteresser med rimelighed kan anses for at være i strid med interesserne hos de personer, som investeringsanalyserne formidles til.
Persons whose responsibilities or business interests may reasonably be considered to conflict with the interests of the persons to whom investment research is disseminated should include corporate finance personnel and persons involved in sales and trading on behalf of clients or the firm.
De personer, hvis ansvarsområder eller forretningsinteresser med rimelighed kan anses for at være i strid med interesserne hos de personer, som investeringsanalyserne formidles til, bør omfatte personale, der arbejder med virksomhedsfinansiering, og personer, der er involveret i salg og handel på kunders eller selskabets vegne.
Exceptional circumstances in which financial analysts and other persons connected with the investment firm who are involved in the production of investment research may, with prior written approval, undertake personal transactions in instruments to which the research relates should include those circumstances where, for personal reasons relating to financial hardship, the financial analyst or other person is required to liquidate a position.
De ekstraordinære tilfælde, hvor finansanalytikere eller andre personer, der er knyttet til investeringsselskabet, og som er involveret i udarbejdelsen af investeringsanalyser, med forudgående skriftlig tilladelse kan udføre personlige transaktioner i de instrumenter, som analyserne vedrører, bør omfatte de tilfælde, hvor finansanalytikeren eller en anden person på grund af personlige finansielle problemer er nødt til at afvikle en position.
Fees, commissions, monetary or non-monetary benefits received by the firm providing investment research from any third party should only be acceptable when they are provided in accordance with requirements specified in Article 24(9) of Directive 2014/65/EU and Article 13 of Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 [7].
Gebyrer, provisioner, monetære eller ikke-monetære ydelser modtaget af selskabet, som leverer investeringsforskning, fra en tredjepart, bør kun godtages, når de leveres i henhold til kravene angivet i artikel 24, stk. 9, i direktiv 2014/65/EU og artikel 13 i Kommissionens delegerede direktiv (EU) 2017/593 [7].
The concept of dissemination of investment research to clients or the public should not include dissemination exclusively to persons within the group of the investment firm.
Begrebet formidling af investeringsanalyser til kunder eller offentligheden bør ikke omfatte formidling udelukkende til personer i den koncern, som investeringsselskabet tilhører.
Current recommendations should be considered to be those recommendations contained in investment research which have not been withdrawn and which have not lapsed.
Gældende anbefalinger bør betragtes som anbefalingerne i en investeringsanalyse, der ikke er blevet trukket tilbage, og som ikke er udløbet.
The substantial alteration of investment research produced by a third party should be governed by the same requirements as the production of research.
Den væsentlige ændring af investeringsanalyser produceret af en tredjepart bør underkastes samme krav som udarbejdelsen af analyser.
Financial analysts should not engage in activities other than the preparation of investment research where engaging in such activities are inconsistent with the maintenance of that person's objectivity.
Finansanalytikere bør ikke deltage i andre aktiviteter end udarbejdelsen af investeringsanalyser, hvis disse aktiviteter ikke er forenelige med, at personen bevarer sin objektivitet.
These include participating in investment banking activities such as corporate finance business and underwriting, participating in ‘pitches’ for new business or ‘road shows’ for new issues of financial instruments; or being otherwise involved in the preparation of issuer marketing.
Disse omfatter deltagelse i investeringsbankaktiviteter såsom selskabsfinansiering og afsætningsgaranti, deltagelse i promovering af nye aktiviteter eller præsentationer af nyudstedelser af finansielle instrumenter eller deltagelse på anden måde i forberedelsen af markedsføringen af en udsteder.
Given the specificities of underwriting and placing services and the potential for conflicts of interest to arise in relation to such services, more detailed and tailored requirements should be specified in this Regulation.
Grundet de særlige karakteristika ved afsætningsgaranti- og placeringstjenester og muligheden for, at der opstår interessekonflikter i forbindelse med sådanne tjenester, bør der indføres mere udførlige og skræddersyede krav ved denne forordning.
In particular, such requirements should ensure that the underwriting and placing process is managed in a way which respects the interests of different actors.
Sådanne krav bør især sikre, at processen for afsætningsgaranti og placering håndteres på en måde, der tager hensyn til forskellige aktørers interesser.
Investment firms should ensure that their own interests or interests of their other clients do not improperly influence the quality of services provided to the issuer client.
Investeringsselskaber bør sikre, at deres egne interesser og deres kunders interesser ikke uretmæssigt påvirker kvaliteten af tjenester leveret til udstederkunden.
Such arrangements should be explained to that client, along with other relevant information about the offering process, before the firm accepts to undertake the offering.
Sådanne ordninger bør forklares til kunden sammen med andre relevante oplysninger om udbudsprocessen, før selskabet godtager udbuddet.
Investment firms engaged in underwriting or placing activities should have appropriate arrangements in place to ensure that the pricing process, including book-building, is not detrimental to the issuer's interests.
Investeringsselskaber, der deltager i afsætningsgaranti- eller placeringsaktiviteter, bør have passende ordninger på plads for at sikre, at prisfastsættelsesprocessen, inklusive »book building«, ikke skader udstederens interesser.
The placing process involves the exercise of judgement by an investment firm as to the allocation of an issue, and is based on the particular facts and circumstances of the arrangements, which raises conflicts of interest concerns.
Placeringsprocessen omfatter et investeringsselskabs vurdering af allokeringen af en udstedelse og baseres på de særlige fakta og omstændigheder i relation til ordningerne, der giver anledning til bekymringer om interessekonflikter.
The firm should have in place effective organisational requirements to ensure that allocations made as part of the placing process do not result in the firm's interest being placed ahead of the interests of the issuer client, or the interests of one investment client over those of another investment client.
Selskabet bør have fastlagt effektive organisatoriske krav for at sikre, at allokeringer foretaget som del af placeringsprocessen ikke resulterer i, at selskabets interesser prioriteres frem for udstederkundens eller én investeringskundes frem for en anden investeringskundes.
In particular, firms should clearly set out the process for developing allocation recommendations in an allocation policy.
Selskaber bør især tydeligt fastlægge processen for at udvikle allokeringshenstillinger i en allokeringspolitik.
Requirements imposed by this Regulation, including those relating to personal transactions, to dealing with knowledge of investment research and to the production or dissemination of investment research, should apply without prejudice to requirements of Directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 and their respective implementing measures.
Kravene i medfør af denne forordning, herunder kravene vedrørende personlige transaktioner, omgang med viden om investeringsanalyser og udarbejdelse eller formidling af investeringsanalyser, bør gælde uanset kravene i direktiv 2014/65/EU og forordning (EU) nr. 596/2014 og deres respektive gennemførelsesbestemmelser.
This Regulation sets out requirements regarding information addressed to clients or potential clients, including marketing communications, in order to ensure that such information be fair, clear and not misleading in accordance with Article 24(3) of Directive 2014/65/EU.
I denne forordning fastsættes der krav til oplysninger henvendt til kunder eller potentielle kunder, inklusive markedsføringsmateriale, for at sikre, at sådanne oplysninger er reelle, klare og ikke-vildledende i overensstemmelse med artikel 24, stk. 3, i direktiv 2014/65/EU.
Nothing in this Regulation requires competent authorities to approve the content and form of marketing communications.
Der er intet i denne forordning, der kræver, at de kompetente myndigheder godkender markedsføringsmateriales indhold og form.
However, neither does it prevent them from doing so, insofar as any such pre-approval is based only on compliance with the obligation in Directive 2014/65/EU that information to clients or potential clients, including marketing communications, should be fair, clear and not misleading.
De forhindres imidlertid heller ikke i at gøre det, for så vidt som en sådan forudgående godkendelse kun er baseret på overholdelsen af forpligtelsen i direktiv 2014/65/EU om, at oplysninger til kunder eller potentielle kunder, herunder markedsføringsmateriale, skal være reelle, klare og ikke-vildledende.
Information requirements should be established which take account of the status of a client as either retail, professional or eligible counterparty.
Der bør fastsættes oplysningskrav, som tager hensyn til en kundes status som enten detailkunde, professionel kunde eller gyldig modpart.
An objective of Directive 2014/65/EU is to ensure a proportionate balance between investor protection and the disclosure obligations which apply to investment firms.
Et af formålene med direktiv 2014/65/EU er at sikre en forholdsmæssig balance mellem investorbeskyttelse og de oplysningsforpligtelser, som påhviler investeringsselskaberne.
To this end, it is appropriate to establish less stringent specific information requirements with respect to professional clients than to retail clients.
Med dette formål for øje bør der fastsættes mindre strenge, specifikke oplysningskrav til professionelle kunder end til detailkunder.
Investment firms should provide clients or potential clients with the necessary information on the nature of financial instruments and the risks associated with investing in them so that their clients are properly informed The level of detail of the information to be provided may vary according to whether the client is a retail client or a professional client and the nature and risk profile of the financial instruments that are being offered, but should always include any essential elements.
Investeringsselskaber bør give kunder eller potentielle kunder de nødvendige oplysninger om arten af finansielle instrumenter og om de risici, der er knyttet til investering i disse, således at deres kunder er behørigt informeret.
Member States may specify the precise terms, or the contents, of the description of risks required under this Regulation, taking into account the information requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council [8].
Detaljeniveauet for de afgivne oplysninger kan variere, alt efter om kunden er en detailkunde eller en professionel kunde samt efter arten af og risikoprofilen for de finansielle instrumenter, der tilbydes, men bør altid indeholde alle væsentlige elementer.
The conditions with which information addressed by investment firms to clients and potential clients must comply in order to be fair, clear and not misleading should apply to communications intended for retail or professional clients in a way that is appropriate and proportionate, taking into account, for example, the means of communication, and the information that the communication is intended to convey to the clients or potential clients.