natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At de anfægtede skatteafgørelser også giver ASI og AOE en selektiv fordel som følge af Irish Revenues udøvelse af skøn i denne forbindelse, som ikke er baseret på objektive kriterier vedrørende skattesystemet, er endnu et alternativt argument, som underbygger konstateringen af en selektiv fordel i den foreliggende sag [341].
The Commission observes that the criteria listed by Ireland for determining the chargeable profit of a branch — the functions performed, the assets used and the risks assumed by the branch — are essentially the same criteria laid down in Article 7(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention for allocating profit to the permanent establishment of a non-resident integrated company [311].
Denne argumentation fremføres for at imødegå Irlands og Apples påstand om, at section 25 i TCA 97 ikke er underlagt armslængdeprincippet, og at forekomsten af en selektiv fordel skal påvises ved at sammenligne de anfægtede skatteafgørelser med Irish Revenues administrative praksis.
In other words, Ireland has not put forward, and the Commission has been unable to identify, any other objective standard besides the arm's length principle that ensures Section 25 TCA 97 is applied in a consistent manner ensuring that all integrated non-resident companies are treated equally under that provision.
Med undtagelse af dette sidste argument beror Kommissionens konklusion om, at de anfægtede skatteafgørelser giver ASI og AOE en selektiv fordel, ikke på, hvorvidt Irish Revenues skønsbeføjelser til at træffe disse afgørelser er for vide, eller hvordan Irish Revenue udøvede dette skøn, men følger af det forhold, at disse afgørelser indebærer en selektiv nedsættelse af ASI's og AOE's irske selskabsskat sammenlignet med økonomiske aktører i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation.
Moreover, although Ireland only formally introduced the arm's length principle in its national legal system in the 2010 Finance Act, with effect from 1 January 2011, and that legislation excludes arrangements entered into between a branch and its non-resident head office [312], an analysis of Irish Revenue's ruling practice on the allocation of profit to the Irish branches of non-resident companies, for the subsequent application of Section 25 TCA 97, reveal that the arm's length principle underlies the profit allocation methods endorsed by Irish Revenue in a number of those rulings [313].
Selv om Kommissionens konstatering af en selektiv fordel havde været baseret på Irish Revenues udøvelse af skøn, er Apples argument vedrørende »the [skatteafgørelser] derived from the intrinsic principles of section 25 TCA97« [342] uden yderligere forklaring af, hvordan dette skal forstås, eller hvordan det kan begrunde den selektive behandling, for det andet utilstrækkeligt til at begrunde den selektive behandling i den foreliggende sag.
For instance, in the case of the Company [B] [314], extensive reference is made to the arm's length principle in the letter from its tax advisor to Irish Revenue.
De anfægtede skatteafgørelser fører derfor til en nedsættelse af ASI's og AOE's selskabsskat som beregnet efter de almindelige selskabsskatteregler i Irland, hvilket giver disse selskaber en selektiv fordel efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1 [345].
The ruling request puts forward the profit split method, whereby 12,5 % of all profits of the Company [A] are allocated to the Irish branch.
Ved at godkende metoder til fordeling af overskud til ASI's og AOE's irske filialer, som fraviger et markedsbaseret resultat og dermed armslængdeprincippet, fører de anfægtede skatteafgørelser alternativt til en nedsættelse af ASI's og AOE's beskatningsgrundlag sammenlignet med andre ikkehjemmehørende selskaber, der driver virksomhed gennem en filial i Irland.
That approach was accepted by Irish Revenue and used as a basis for the allocation of profits in the case of Company [A]'s Irish branch.
De anfægtede skatteafgørelser fører derfor til en nedsættelse af ASI's og AOE's selskabsskattetilsvar efter section 25 i TCA 97, hvilket giver disse selskaber en selektiv fordel efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1 [346].
In a tax ruling from 2006 regarding Company [F] [316], Irish Revenue agreed to the method proposed by that company for the allocation of profit to its future Irish branch.
KONKLUSION OM FOREKOMSTEN AF STATSSTØTTE
Company [F] is tax resident in […], has an Irish branch and is part of a […] multinational corporate group.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at de anfægtede skatteafgørelser, som Irish Revenue har truffet til fordel for ASI og AOE, giver disse selskaber en selektiv fordel, som kan tilregnes Irland og er finansieret af statsmidler, og fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og kan påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
As the basis for the profit allocation method proposed by Company [F], its consultant used the OECD arm's length principle which ‘requires that the branch profit should be determined on the basis of essentially looking at the branch as a separate entity as far as possible from its head office and that any discussion or negotiation by the branch with its head office should be seen as being on an arm's length basis in terms of determining the profitability of the branch.’
De anfægtede skatteafgørelser udgør følgelig statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
Finally, in a tax ruling regarding Company [M] [317], the tax advisor requests the agreement of the Irish authorities to an ‘allocation of profits between [Company [M]] HO [the head office] and Irish branch [which] will reflect the fact that the risks of the Irish Branch will be limited […]’.
Eftersom de anfægtede skatteafgørelser giver anledning til en nedsættelse af de omkostninger, som ASI og AOE normalt skulle afholde i forbindelse med deres løbende aktiviteter, skal de betragtes som en driftsstøtte til ASI og AOE.
The request further clarifies that ‘the Irish Branch will operate as a toll manufacturer for [Company [M]] HO [the head office] […], receiving an arm's length remuneration’.
MODTAGERNE AF DE ANFÆGTEDE STØTTEFORANSTALTNINGER
Consequently, although the arm's length principle was not explicitly laid down in Irish legislation until 2011 [318], in the absence of any other objective standard put forward by Ireland and in light of the fact that that principle appears to have featured in Irish Revenue's tax ruling practice as early as the 1990s as the basis for determining a non-resident integrated company's taxable profit under Section 25 TCA 97, the Commission submits that the arm's length principle is inherent in the application of Section 25 TCA 97.
De anfægtede skatteafgørelser udgør statsstøtte til ASI og AOE efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
The Commission has already demonstrated, in Section 8.2.2.2 and Section 8.2.2.3, that the contested tax rulings endorse profit allocation methods producing outcomes that depart from a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm's length principle, thereby resulting in a reduction of ASI's and AOE's taxable profit for Irish corporation tax purposes and an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
ASI og AOE indgår imidlertid i en multinational koncern, nemlig Apple-koncernen, som består af utallige selskaber, som alle i sidste ende kontrolleres af Apple Inc.
On the basis of the reasoning contained in those Sections, the Commission equally considers those tax rulings to grant ASI and AOE a selective advantage under the more limited reference system of Section 25 TCA 97, since they result in a lowering of ASI's and AOE's taxable profits under that provision and thus their corporation tax liability in Ireland as compared to other non-resident companies that are also taxed under that provision.
Separate juridiske enheder kan anses for at udgøre én økonomisk enhed med henblik på anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne.
Selective advantage resulting from the exercise of discretion by Irish Revenue in the absence of objective criteria related to the tax system
Denne økonomiske enhed betragtes i så fald som det berørte selskab, der er omfattet af støtteforanstaltningen.
Even assuming that the application of Section 25 TCA 97 is not governed by the arm's length principle, which the Commission contests, the contested tax rulings should still be considered to confer a selective advantage on ASI and AOE for the purposes of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, since they would then be the result of discretion exercised by Irish Revenue in the absence of objective criteria related to the tax system.
I den foreliggende sag ejes ASI og AOE i sidste instans 100 af Apple Inc.
While tax administrations must be afforded a certain discretion to account for the differences between taxpayers when applying their national tax provisions, where a tax administration has broad discretion to determine the beneficiaries or the conditions under which the legislation is applied on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, the exercise of that discretion must be regarded as favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued, are in a comparable factual and legal situation.
[349], og flertallet af medlemmerne af ASI's og AOE's bestyrelser er ansatte hos Apple Inc.
Put differently, rulings that merely contain a correct interpretation of the relevant national tax provisions, without deviating from a consistent administrative practice, do not, in principle, give rise to a selective advantage.
[350], således at Apple Inc., som er den enhed, der kontrollerer Apple-koncernen, også kan anses for at kontrollere ASI og AOE gennem funktionelle, økonomiske og organisatoriske forbindelser.
By contrast, rulings where discretion is exercised by the tax administrations that is not based on objective criteria related to the tax system, give rise to a presumption of selective advantage.
Det er følgelig Apple-koncernen, der som helhed modtager den statsstøtte, Irland indrømmede ASI og AOE i form af de anfægtede skatteafgørelser, eftersom enhver gunstig skattebehandling, som Irish Revenue indrømmer ASI og AOE, i sidste instans gavner Apple-koncernen som helhed ved at frigøre yderligere finansielle ressourcer, som kan anvendes til gavn for hele koncernen.
However, Ireland disagrees with the Commission that Section 25 TCA 97 is governed by the arm's length principle.
Uanset det forhold, at Apple-koncernen er organiseret i forskellige juridiske personligheder, bør denne koncern anses for at udgøre én samlet økonomisk enhed, der modtager statsstøtte fra Irland i form af de anfægtede skatteafgørelser [351].
Assuming Ireland is correct and considering that Ireland has failed to put forward any other objective standard for allocating the profit of a non-resident company for the purpose of applying Section 25 TCA 97, this would mean that Irish Revenue's discretion in applying that provision is not based on objective criteria related to the tax system, which gives rise to a presumption of a selective advantage.
DE ANFÆGTEDE FORANSTALTNINGERS FORENELIGHED
The Commission has already demonstrated, in Section 8.2.2.2 and Section 8.2.2.3, that the contested tax rulings endorse profit allocation methods that result in a reduction of ASI's and AOE's taxable profit for Irish corporation tax purposes and an economic advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
Statsstøtte betragtes som forenelig med det indre marked, hvis den indgår i en af kategorierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 2 [352].
On the basis of the reasoning contained in those Sections, the contested tax rulings should also be considered to confer a selective advantage on ASI and AOE for the purposes of Article 107(1) of the Treaty since they were issued on the basis of Irish Revenue's discretion under Section 25 TCA 97, exercised in the absence of objective criteria related to the tax system.
Statsstøtten kan ligeledes betragtes som forenelig med det indre marked, hvis Kommissionen konstaterer, at den indgår i en af kategorierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 3 [353].
Finally, Ireland and Apple argue that the Commission must show that Apple has been treated favourably as compared to other non-resident companies that have been granted tax rulings by Irish Revenue for the purposes of applying Section 25 TCA 97.
Det påhviler imidlertid den medlemsstat, der tildeler støtten, at påvise, at den statsstøtte, som den har tildelt, er forenelig med det indre marked efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 2 eller 3 [354].
By this line of reasoning, Ireland and Apple appear to argue that the appropriate reference system is not Section 25 TCA 97 itself, but Irish Revenue's tax ruling practice in relation to non-resident companies.
Irland har ikke påberåbt sig nogen grund til, at den statsstøtte, der er ydet gennem de anfægtede afgørelser, skulle kunne findes forenelig efter nogen af disse bestemmelser.
From an examination of the tax rulings Ireland submitted to the Commission dealing with the allocation of profits to Irish branches of non-resident companies [321], which can be considered to cover the entire Irish ruling practice in relation to profit allocation to a branch [322], the Commission was unable to identify any consistent set of rules that generally apply on the basis of objective criteria to all non-resident companies operating through a branch in Ireland.
Som bemærket i betragtning 222 og 415 bør de anfægtede skatteafgørelser desuden anses for driftsstøtte til ASI, AOE og Apple-koncernen som helhed.
In other words, Irish Revenue's profit allocation ruling practice is too inconsistent to constitute an appropriate reference system against which the contested tax rulings could be examined for determining whether ASI and AOE received a selective advantage as a result of the rulings.
En sådan støtte kan normalt ikke betragtes som forenelig med det indre marked efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 3, litra c), idet den ikke fremmer udviklingen af visse erhvervsgrene eller økonomiske regioner, ej heller er de skattemæssige incitamenter tidsbegrænsede, faldende eller i proportion med, hvad der er nødvendigt for at afhjælpe et konkret økonomisk handicap på de berørte områder.
A number of those rulings are described in recitals 385 to 395 [323].
Den statsstøtte, som Irland har ydet gennem de anfægtede skatteafgørelser, er følgelig uforenelig med det indre marked.
Ruling of February 1998 — Irish branch of Company [B]: Company [B] is part of a […] multinational corporate group [324].
STØTTENS ULOVLIGHED
The Irish branch of that company undertakes the manufacturing of […], the organisation of the finishing process and the monitoring and administration of the delivery of the goods to customers.
I henhold til traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3, er medlemsstaterne forpligtede til at underrette Kommissionen om enhver påtænkt støtteforanstaltning (underretningspligt) og må ikke gennemføre de påtænkte støtteforanstaltninger, før Kommissionen har truffet en endelig afgørelse (suspensionspligt).
According to the ruling request, […] manufacturing is, in general, by far the most complex activity in the production chain [325].
Underretningspligten gentages i artikel 2 i Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/1589 [355], og suspensionspligten gentages i samme forordnings artikel 3.
The remuneration to be allocated to the Irish branch for tax purposes, proposed by the company's tax advisor and agreed by Irish Revenue, is equal to 117 % of total costs of the Irish branch [326], composed in particular of costs of sales and overheads.
I henhold til denne forordnings artikel 1, litra f), er ny støtte, der er gennemført i strid med traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3, ulovlig.
Ruling of May 2001 — Irish branch of Company [C2]: Company [C2] is a […] company belonging to a […] multinational […] group [C].
Kommissionen bemærker, at Irland ikke har underrettet den om sin hensigt om at træffe de anfægtede skatteafgørelser og heller ikke har opfyldt sin suspensionspligt.
The ruling endorses a profit allocation to that company's Irish branch, based on the request of the taxpayer, according to which profit for activities described in the ruling as ‘technician purchase and re-sale of products in the context of re-invoicing service’ will not be higher than 9 % of the costs of the administrative shared service centre to be located in Ireland.
Derfor indebærer de pågældende skatteafgørelser i overensstemmelse med artikel 1, litra f), i Rådets forordning (EU) 2015/1589 ulovlig statsstøtte ydet i strid med traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3.
Ruling of May 2003 — Irish branch of Company [A]: Company [A] is part of the […] multinational group […] [327].
PÅSTÅEDE PROCEDUREFEJL
The Irish branch of that company is described in the ruling request as engaging in the production of […], as well as ensuring accounting functions for the entire company of which it is part.
Både Irland og Apple hævder, at Kommissionen har tilsidesat deres ret til at blive hørt, eftersom fokus for Kommissionens undersøgelse angiveligt var blevet flyttet siden vedtagelsen af åbningsafgørelsen, som det fremgår af Kommissionens brev af 17. april 2015, og de angiveligt ikke fik mulighed for at give udtryk for deres synspunkter, hvad angår Kommissionens holdning i dette brev.
In the ruling request, Company [A]'s tax advisor makes reference to the OECD Model Tax Convention to propose a profit allocation to the branch.
Irland og Apple anfører følgelig, at Kommissionen burde have udvidet åbningsafgørelsen eller vedtaget en ny afgørelse om indledning af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, som fastsætter det påståede nye fokus for undersøgelsen.
According to the ruling request, although control over the sales of the […], marketing activities, ownership of IP and treasury functions are all located outside of Ireland, Company [A] does not consider that the Irish branch is a pure ‘contract manufacturer’, given that Ireland is considered to be a key location in the world for the supply of […].
Kommissionen finder, at Irlands og Apples proceduremæssige rettigheder er blevet respekteret fuldt ud i denne sag.
A profit allocation based on the profit split method is therefore proposed whereby 12,5 % [328] of all profits of Company [A] are allocated to the Irish branch, instead of a cost-plus method although the latter would have reduced the taxable profits of Company [A] in Ireland.
Kommissionen bemærker først og fremmest, at anvendelsesområdet for Kommissionens statsstøtteundersøgelse har været det samme mellem åbningsafgørelsen og vedtagelsen af denne afgørelse.
Ruling of September 2003 — Irish branch of Company [N]: Company [N] is an Irish incorporated non-resident company that is part of a […] multinational group.
Begge afgørelser vedrører de samme foranstaltninger (skatteafgørelserne fra 1991 og 2007 truffet af Irish Revenue), de samme støttemodtagere (ASI, AOE og Apple-koncernen) og de samme statsstøtteretlige betænkeligheder (om de overskudsfordelingsmetoder, der godkendes i disse afgørelser, fører til en passende fordeling af overskud til ASI's og AOE's irske filialer eller giver disse selskaber en selektiv fordel ved at give dem mulighed for at fastsætte deres årlige skattepligtige overskud i Irland på en måde, der afviger fra et resultat i overensstemmelse med armslængdeprincippet).
According to the ruling request, the activities of Company [N]'s Irish branch will consist of the manufacturing of […] and the provision of other related services, such as warehousing and shipping.
I åbningsafgørelsen udtrykte Kommissionen indledningsvis tvivl om, hvorvidt de overskudsfordelingsmetoder, der godkendes i de anfægtede skatteafgørelser, er forenelige med statsstøttereglerne, navnlig armslængdeprincippet, som det følger af traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
IP relating to those products would be allocated to the head office of Company [N] outside of Ireland and the Irish branch would operate as a toll or contract manufacturer.
Formålet med den dybdegående undersøgelse, der foretages efter en åbningsafgørelse, er at gøre Kommissionen opmærksom på yderligere fakta og lovgivning.
The Irish branch would carry no risk in relation to marketing, R & D, quality control, product liability and inventory.
Disse elementer kan videreudvikle eller imødegå de indledende betænkeligheder, som Kommissionen har givet til kende i en åbningsafgørelse.
The ruling agrees on an allocation of profits to the Irish branch so as to give rise to the same operating profit in Ireland as would have arisen had the Irish branch been incorporated as a subsidiary of Company [N].
Ved afslutningen af denne procedure kan Kommissionens analyse have undergået ændringer, hvilket indebærer, at den endelige afgørelse kan indeholde visse afvigelser i forhold til åbningsafgørelsen, uden at disse i øvrigt medfører, at den endelige afgørelse anses for mangelfuld [356].
The remuneration agreed in the ruling for the activities of the Irish branch is a mark-up of between 25 and 30 % on the costs of the Irish manufacturing branch.
I den foreliggende sag har Kommissionen videreudviklet sin analyse som følge af de omfattende skriftlige bemærkninger fra Irland og Apple vedrørende de statsstøtteretlige betænkeligheder, som Kommissionen rejste i åbningsafgørelsen.
That mark-up is applied to the operating costs of the branch.
Som svar på en anmodning fra Irland om en uddybning af Kommissionens statsstøttevurdering i lyset af disse elementer og i lyset af Irlands påstand om, at Kommissionens vurdering var baseret på Kommissionens misforståelse med hensyn til den gældende lovgivning, sendte Kommissionens tjenestegrene af hensyn til gennemsigtigheden brevet af 17. april 2015 til Irland, som sidstnævnte videresendte til Apple.
The ruling also confirms that no Irish capital gains tax would apply in the event of a sale of any IP owned by Company [N], as the Irish branch would have no ownership interest in the IP held by Company [N].
Efter vedtagelsen af åbningsafgørelsen har genstanden for Kommissionens statsstøtteundersøgelse imidlertid ikke ændret sig (de overskudsfordelingsmetoder, der godkendes i de anfægtede skatteafgørelser), ligesom dens primær tvivl med hensyn til de anfægtede foranstaltningers overensstemmelse med statsstøttereglerne (om disse metoder førte til et skattepligtigt overskud for ASI og AOE, som er i overensstemmelse armslængdeprincippet) heller ikke har ændret sig.
Ruling of June 2004 — Irish branch of Company [I]: Company [I] is incorporated in Ireland, but resident in […].
Siden Kommissionens brev af 17. april 2015 har Irland haft rig mulighed for at fremsætte sine synspunkter for Kommissionen med hensyn til den holdning, der fremsættes i dette brev, og Irland har udnyttet denne mulighed ved flere lejligheder, både mundtligt og skriftligt [357].
The company, active in […], requests that administrative services provided by its Irish branch will be set at cost plus 10 %.
Med hensyn til Apple minder Kommissionen om, at selskabet som en interesseret part kun har ret til at indgive bemærkninger som svar på åbningsafgørelsen.
According to the ruling request, virtually all IP rights are allocated outside of Ireland.
Apple fik alligevel ved adskillige lejligheder mulighed for at fremsætte bemærkninger til Kommissionen, både mundtligt og skriftligt, siden Kommissionens brev af 17. april 2015 blev videresendt til Apple, og Apple har effektivt udnyttet denne mulighed [358].
The ruling request does not specify which costs are concerned, but confirms that the branch profits of the company, subject to Irish corporation tax, will be limited to those attributable to the actual activities carried out in Ireland by branch employees.
Kommissionen finder følgelig, at Irlands og Apples proceduremæssige rettigheder er blevet respekteret i den foreliggende sag.
Ruling of January 2005 — Irish branch of Company [E]: Company [E] is registered in […] and is part of a […] multinational corporate group.
TILBAGESØGNING
According to the ruling request, the Irish branch produces […].
TILBAGESØGNINGSPLIGTEN
Company [E] only has access to patents and related IP rights by virtue of licence agreements with related group companies.
I henhold til artikel 16, stk. 1, i forordning (EU) 2015/1589 skal Kommissionen kræve ulovlig støtte, der er uforenelig med det indre marked, tilbagebetalt.
Company [E] operates as a ‘contract manufacturer’ in Ireland.