natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(413) I retningslinjerne for luftfart fra 2005 anføres det imidlertid, at »Kommissionen undersøger foreneligheden af (…) startstøtte, som ydes uden bemyndigelse og dermed i strid med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, [nu traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3] på grundlag af nærværende retningslinjer, hvis man er begyndt at yde støtten, efter at retningslinjerne er blevet offentliggjort i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende« [123].
In particular, such obligations can only be imposed with regard to a specific route or group of routes, and not with regard to any generic route originating from a given airport, city or region.
10/2010) I PERIODEN 2010-2013
Indeed, air transport is a sector where the Union legislator has decided to restrict the wide margin of discretion normally enjoyed by Member States when qualifying certain activities as SGEIs, by imposing conditions set out in Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008.
Eftersom forenelighedskriterierne for startstøtte i punkt 79 i luftfartsretningslinjerne fra 2005 er kumulative, skal det blot fastslås, at en af disse betingelser ikke er opfyldt, med henblik på at påvise, at støtten til luftfartsselskaberne ikke er forenelig.
However, routes that are the object of public service obligations in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, which exist in Sardinia [112], are explicitly excluded from the scope of application of Law 10/2010, which is clearly designed as a system parallel to the system of public service obligations under Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008.
I sin vurdering af foreneligheden af de her berørte støtteforanstaltninger vil Kommissionen ikke desto mindre undersøge flere af de betingelser, der er fastlagt i luftfartsretningslinjerne fra 2005.
Therefore, the funding provided by airport operators to airlines under Law 10/2010 cannot be considered as compensation provided to airlines for the operation of genuine services of general economic interest.
I punkt 79, litra d), i luftfartsretningslinjerne fra 2005 kræves der en langsigtet rentabilitet og en degressiv opdeling i rater af den pågældende støtte: »Den rute, der støttes, skal forekomme at være bæredygtig på lang sigt, dvs. at den mindst skal kunne dække sine omkostninger, uden offentlig finansiering.
As a result, one of the four cumulative conditions of the Altmark judgment, namely the first one, is not satisfied.
Det er grunden til, at startstøtte bør være degressiv og tidsmæssigt begrænset«.
As to the application of the MEOP, it should first be noted that Italy has not relied on that principle [113].
Dertil kommer betingelsen vedrørende kompensation for ekstra startomkostninger i punkt 79, litra e), i luftfartsretningslinjerne fra 2005: »Støttebeløbet skal hænge nøje sammen med de ekstra startomkostninger, der er forbundet med lanceringen af en ny rute eller indsættelsen af en ny afgang, og som operatøren ikke længere skal afholde senere i forløbet«.
There are also no indications that the Region acted as a market economy operator in establishing the scheme; in fact, it is clear that it sought to achieve public policy objectives, in particular strengthening of the regional economy by attracting more tourist flows, rather than profits in its capacity as airport owner.
Den regionale finansiering er ikke knyttet til specifikke startomkostninger, og der er intet i det system, der er etableret ved lov nr. 10/2010, der sikrer, at støtten er begrænset til sådanne omkostninger.
Second, the Region provides funding to airlines through various airport operators in the framework of a regional scheme applicable to several airports.
Italien har aldrig fremlagt dokumentation for, at regionens finansiering i forbindelse med aktivitet 1 og 2 blev beregnet på grundlag af luftfartsselskabernes startomkostninger eller var begrænset til sådanne omkostninger.
It cannot be considered as an airport operator, all the more so since the Region only controls one of the airport operators concerned.
Ved at finansiere lufthavnsoperatørerne havde regionen til hensigt at udvikle lufttrafikken ved at åbne nye ruter, øge hyppigheden for eksisterende ruter, mindske sæsonudsvingene for de eksisterende ruter og forbedre den regionale udvikling og turisme gennem markedsføring gennemført af luftfartsselskaber.
Thus the ‘ex ante incremental profitability analysis’ presented in points 61 to 66 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines cannot be applied in this case.
Regionen havde således aldrig til hensigt at kompensere luftfartsselskaberne for yderligere startomkostninger.
According to that method, in order to assess whether an airport operator, when entering into arrangements with an airline, behaved as a market economy operator guided by profitability prospects would have done under similar circumstances, it should be assessed whether the arrangements in question could be expected, when they were concluded, to incrementally contribute to the profitability of the airport and are part of an overall strategy leading to profitability in the long term.
Denne betingelser er derfor ikke opfyldt.
However, this test is not applicable in this case because the measures under assessment are a scheme established by a public authority, for reasons of public policy, that covers several airports, and not an individual arrangement between an airport and an airline.
I punkt 79, litra f), i retningslinjerne for luftfart fra 2005 fastsættes endvidere betingelserne for intensitet og varighed: »Støttebeløbet pr. år må ikke overstige 50 % af de støtteberettigede omkostninger i det pågældende år og for hele støtteperioden ikke nå op over gennemsnitligt 30 % af de støtteberettigede omkostninger«.
When granting the financing concerned to airlines in the context of activity 1 and activity 2, the Region could not expect any return that a profit-driven market economy operator would have taken into consideration in similar circumstances.
Italien har ikke på noget tidspunkt nævnt begrebet »støtteberettigede omkostninger« som forklaret i retningslinjerne eller tærskler for sådanne omkostninger.
The expected effects of the financing was an increase in the number of passengers travelling by air to Sardinia, which as such does not give rise to dividends, capital gains or any other form of profit for the Region.
Lufthavnsoperatørerne fremlagde deres aktivitetsplaner for regionen med angivelse af det samlede omkostninger til gennemførelsen af foranstaltningerne.
Italy has failed to identify any profitability element expected to arise for the Region as a result of the financing at issue.
Regionen fastsatte derefter det beløb, der skulle udbetales til hver lufthavnsoperatør hvert år, men dette beløb var aldrig begrænset til 50 % af omkostningerne i det pågældende år.
The main effect of the increase in air traffic is to stimulate economic development in the region, particularly at the level of certain sectors such as tourism, retail, restaurants etc., with positive effects on regional economic development and employment.
Det er ikke dokumenteret, at de regionale udgifter i forbindelse med aktivitet 1 og 2 beløb sig til det dobbelte af denne støtte.
However, according to settled case law [114], such ‘public policy benefits’ would not be taken into consideration by a profit-driven market economy operator and are thus to be disregarded when applying the MEOP.
I punkt 79, litra h), i retningslinjerne for luftfart fra 2005 tilføjes betingelsen vedrørende ikkediskriminerende tildeling: »Enhver offentlig enhed, der planlægger at yde et selskab startstøtte (evt. via en lufthavn) til en ny rute, skal offentliggøre sit projekt med en tilstrækkelig frist og offentlighed til, at alle interesserede luftfartsselskaber kan udbyde deres tjenester.
For the same reasons, a benchmarking exercise, as described in points 54 to 60 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines, is not relevant in the present case.
Den offentliggjorte meddelelse skal bl.a. indeholde en beskrivelse af ruten og de objektive kriterier for støttens størrelse og varighed.
In any event, Italy has not submitted any business plan, ex ante profitability analysis or internal documents showing clearly that an analysis conducted before the granting of the public financing revealed that financial returns such that a profit-driven market economy operator would take into consideration could be expected by the Region as a result of the financing in question.
Det betyder i givet fald, at reglerne og principperne for offentlige indkøb og koncessioner skal overholdes«.
Nor did the Region carry out a benchmarking exercise, as defined in points 54 to 60 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines.
Hverken regionen eller lufthavnsoperatørerne tilrettelagde udbudsprocedurer, der var i overensstemmelse med de offentlige udbudsregler, med henblik på at udvælge de luftfartsselskaber, der skulle være ansvarlige for gennemførelsen af aktivitet 1 og 2.
Italy failed in particular to provide a comparison of airport charges, net of any benefits provided to the airlines (such as marketing support, discounts or any other incentive), across a sufficient number of suitable ‘comparator airports’, whose operators behave as market economy operators.
Kommissionen har ikke modtaget oplysninger om udbud tilrettelagt af lufthavnsoperatører, og luftfartsselskaberne blev ifølge Italien udvalgt på grundlag af de mest attraktive kommercielle tilbud, som lufthavnsoperatørerne modtog efter offentliggørelse af udbudsbekendtgørelser på deres websteder.
This confirms that the Region did not behave vis-à-vis airlines as a market economy operator guided by profitability prospects.
Punkt 81 i retningslinjerne for luftfart fra 2005 finder ifølge Kommissionens opfattelse derfor ikke anvendelse i denne sag, da flere af betingelserne i punkt 79 ikke er opfyldt.
In addition, despite the provisions of Law 10/2010, no tender procedure was put in place with a view to selecting airlines and funding the activity plans.
Disse betingelser skal overholdes, inden startstøtte kan anses for forenelig.
Airport operators published notices on their respective websites and they chose the best offer, meaning that the financial support provided to airlines did not follow an open and transparent tender procedure.
Eftersom betingelserne for forenelighed i punkt 79 ikke er opfyldt, er støtten ikke forenelig med det indre marked.
In addition, as already explained, the scheme is conceived in the first place to disburse public funds to airlines and this financing does not correspond either to compensation for genuine public service obligations or to remuneration for products or services fulfilling genuine needs of the Region.
Den finansielle kompensation, som lufthavnsoperatørerne har ydet til luftfartsselskaberne med henblik på finansiering af aktivitet 1 og 2 i henhold til lov nr. 10/2010 i perioden 2010-2013, kan ikke anses for forenelig med det indre marked, da betingelserne for forenelighed i punkt 79 i retningslinjerne for luftfart fra 2005 ikke er opfyldt.
As a consequence, even if proper tender procedures had been followed to select airlines, this could not have ruled out the existence of an advantage.
Den statsstøtte, der er ydet til luftfartsselskaberne af regionen, udgør derfor ulovlig statsstøtte, som er uforenelig med det indre marked.
Under these circumstances, there is also no scope for assessing the individual financial relationship between the airports and the airlines that result from the application of the scheme in the manner foreseen in points 53-66 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines.
TILBAGESØGNING
Those points provide guidance to determine whether the prices charged by an airport that has public resources comply with the MEOP.
I henhold til traktaten og Domstolens faste retspraksis er Kommissionen, når den har fundet støtte uforenelig med det indre marked, kompetent til at beslutte, at den pågældende medlemsstat skal ophæve eller ændre den [125].
In the present case, however, it is clear that the airport operators were not acting as market economy operators when entering into the various contracts with the airlines.
Ifølge Domstolens faste retspraksis har en medlemsstats forpligtelse til at ophæve den støtte, som Kommissionen anser for at være uforenelig med det indre marked, til formål at genoprette den oprindelige situation [126].
They were implementing an aid scheme devised by the Region to increase air transport for the general benefit of the territory).
I den sammenhæng har Domstolen fastslået, at dette mål er nået, når modtageren har tilbagebetalt de beløb, der er tildelt som ulovlig støtte, hvorved modtageren mister den fordel, der var opnået på markedet i forhold til konkurrenterne, og situationen fra tiden før ydelsen af støtte genoprettes [127].
In view of all the above, the Commission concludes that the funding provided by the Region to airlines through airport operators for the financing of activities 1 and 2 in the framework of the scheme conferred an economic advantage on the airlines concerned.
Fordi de foreliggende foranstaltninger blev gennemført i strid med traktatens artikel 108 og desuden anses for at være ulovlige og uforenelig statsstøtte, skal de således betales tilbage med henblik på at genoprette situationen, som den var på markedet forud for tildelingen af dem.
In the present case, the financing of the scheme by the Region cannot be seen as a scheme of general application.
Tilbagesøgning skal finde sted fra det tidspunkt, hvor støttemodtageren opnåede fordelen, dvs. da støtten blev stillet til rådighed for støttemodtageren, og der bør betales renter af de tilbagesøgte beløb, indtil beløbene er tilbagebetalt.
The Commission considers indeed that the design and the implementation of the scheme was for the exclusive benefit of certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity, namely airlines funded by the Region through airport operators under the scheme under scrutiny [115].
Med hensyn til de beløb, der skal tilbagesøges, vil Kommissionen tage de beløb, som regionen reelt har betalt, og som er videregivet af GEASAR og SOGAER til luftfartsselskaberne i perioden 2010-2013 med henblik på gennemførelsen af aktivitet 1 og 2.
Airlines flying to Sardinia, which have not concluded these agreements, did not benefit from the same financial support from the Region, or not under the conditions provided for by Law 10/2010.
Som det fremgår af tabel 6 i betragtning 89, har lufthavnsoperatørerne i praksis udbetalt større beløb, end de har modtaget fra regionen: Lufthavnsoperatører er blevet underkompenseret af regionen, da de skal betale rente af de modtagne finansielle forskud [128], og da de regionale bidrag for 2014 endnu ikke er blevet udbetalt til operatørerne af Cagliari og Olbia lufthavn.
Since the beneficiaries of the economic advantage concerned are limited to some specific undertakings of a specific one sector (air transport), the measures are selective.
I tabel 14 opsummeres disse konstateringer.
Distortion of competition and effect on trade
Tabel 14
When aid granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Union trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid.
Nettobeløb, som lufthavnsoperatørerne faktisk har modtaget fra regionen (B)
The compensation paid to airline companies through airport operators is an economic advantage for the airlines in question, which is capable of strengthening their position on the market.
Samlet beløb betalt af lufthavnsoperatørerne til luftfartsselskaberne til aktivitet 1 og 2 (C)
The air transport sector is characterised by intense competition between operators from different Member States, in particular since the entry into force of the third stage of liberalisation of air transport (‘third package’) on 1 January 1993.
Tabel 15
It follows that the measures affect trade between Member States and distorts or threatens to distort competition in the air transport sector.
Betalinger modtaget af luftfartsselskaberne fra operatørerne af Olbia og Cagliari lufthavn
Therefore, the financial compensation provided through airport operators to airline companies for the financing of activities 1 and 2 (Law 10/2010) in the period 2010-2013 distorts or threatens to distort competition and affects trade between Member States.
BETALINGSDATO
EXISTENCE OF STATE AID IN FAVOUR OF THE AIRPORT OPERATORS
[8-20 mio.]
In this subsection, the question is whether the funding provided by the Region to the operators of Sardinian airports under Law 10/2010 constitutes State aid to those airports.
[0-10 mio.]
The Commission will now assess whether the criterion related to the presence of an economic advantage is fulfilled.
[0-1 mio.]
Only the effect of the measures on the undertaking are relevant, not the cause or the objective of the State intervention.
og 4.11.2011
As explained in Section 7.2.1, under Law 10/2010, the airport operators passed on in full funds received from the Region to finance financial incentives for the expansion of air transport services as well as marketing agreements, which they co-financed through their own resources.
og 4.1.2012
The airport operators were thus intermediaries and did not retain the funds received from the Region.
[2-10 mio.]
Hence, they cannot be considered as the direct beneficiaries of the aid scheme.
[0-7 mio.]
However, since the financial incentives and marketing payments to the airlines were intended and had the effect of increasing air traffic, it must be assessed whether that increase in air traffic confers an indirect advantage to the airports concerned.
og 23.5.2011 og 2.8.2011
In its recent notice on the notion of State aid [116], the Commission indicated that ‘[…] indirect advantages should be distinguished from mere secondary economic effects that are inherent in almost all State aid measures (for example through an increase of output).
Det samlede beløb, som de lufthavnsoperatører har modtaget fra regionen, er blevet anvendt til at finansiere de tre aktiviteter 1, 2 og 3.
For this purpose, the foreseeable effects of the measures should be examined from an ex ante point of view.
Kommissionen har ikke modtaget oplysninger fra Italien vedrørende den præcise fordeling af de regionale midler efter foranstaltningstype og luftfartsselskab.
An indirect advantage is present if the measures are designed in such a way as to channel its secondary effects towards identifiable undertakings or groups of undertakings.
Kommissionen foreslår derfor en fordeling efter foranstaltningstype og luftfartsselskab baseret på de procentdele, der er beregnet ud fra beløbene i tabel 16.
This is the case, for example, if the direct aid is, de facto or de jure, made conditional on the purchase of goods or services produced by certain undertakings only (for example only undertakings established in certain areas).’
Som det fremgår af tabel 7 i betragtning 91 og gentages i tabel 16, er fordelingen mellem aktivitet 1 og 2 (betalt til luftfartsselskaber) og aktivitet 3 (betalt til eksterne tjenesteudbydere) anført som en procentdel af det samlede beløb.
The notice continues in a footnote [117] to that passage: ‘By contrast, a mere secondary economic effect in the form of increased output (which does not amount to indirect aid) can be found where the aid is simply channelled through an undertaking (for example a financial intermediary) which passes it on in full to the aid beneficiary.’
Tabel 16
The activities under assessment in this case have not been designed to channel their secondary effects towards the Sardinian airports.
Pengestrømme fra GEASAR og SOGAER til luftfartsselskaber og eksterne tjenesteudbydere til finansiering af aktivitet 1, 2 og 3
Instead, the activities have been designed to benefit a large group of undertakings in the region, in particular those offering services to tourists.
For hver lufthavnsoperatør anvender Kommissionen de procentdele, der repræsenterer anden af aktivitet 1 og 2 i den samlede finansiering, der er ydet af lufthavnsoperatørerne, på det nettobeløb, som de to lufthavnsoperatører reelt har modtaget fra regionen.
As already established, the purpose of the scheme consists in channelling public funds to several airlines and other services providers with a view to opening new routes (or increasing frequencies) as well as advertising Sardinia as a touristic destination accessible by air transport.
Resultatet bør give en foreløbig indikation af den offentlige finansiering, regionen reelt har ydet og brugt på aktivitet 1 og 2 (jf. tabel 17).
Under the mechanism put in place by the Region through Law 10/2010 (as described in Section 2.7.2), the Region transfers the corresponding public funds to airport operators, which should in turn pass them on to third parties in accordance with the detailed specifications of the activity plans approved by the Region.
Tabel 17
The Commission therefore concludes that the aid is channelled through the airport operators which pass it on in full to the airlines, which are the only real beneficiaries of the scheme.
Vejledende beløb modtaget fra regionen og brugt på aktivitet 1 og 2
The airport operators should be considered de jure (because of the provisions of Law 10/2010) and de facto (because of the effective financial flows analysed by the Commission) as vehicles used to pass on public funding to airlines
Nettobeløb, som lufthavnsoperatørerne faktisk har modtaget fra regionen og brugt på aktivitet 1 og 2
The Commission notes that the airport operators may benefit from the increase in air traffic that is brought about by the aid to airlines under the scheme.
Den årlige fordeling pr. lufthavn og den andel af finansieringen, der er ydet til luftfartsselskaberne til gennemførelsen af aktivitet 1 og 2 og modtaget fra regionen, er anført i følgende tabeller:
Such effects are, however, similar to the positive effects on economic operators in other sectors whose revenues are linked to the number of air passengers, in particular tourism (car rental, hotels, restaurants, catering, fuelling, retail etc.…).
Tabel 18
Those sectors are highly dependent on the number of passengers arriving at/departing from the Sardinian airports.
Årlig fordeling pr. lufthavnsoperatør til finansiering af aktivitet 1 og 2
Therefore, the Commission considers that the scheme has not been designed in such a way as to channel its secondary effects towards the airport operators, but rather so as to benefit the many tourism-related sectors in Sardinia.
Finansiering af aktivitet 1 og 2
Furthermore, the effect of the measures on airports is inherent in the nature and objective of the scheme, which is to increase air traffic to Sardinia by providing appropriate incentives to airlines.
Andel af finansieringen af aktiviteter, der er modtaget fra regionen (%)
The fact that the airlines purchase airport services from the operators of the three Sardinian airports concerned is an inherent feature of the scheme and cannot be detached from it, given that the scheme consists in providing airlines with financial incentives to increase air traffic.
Kommissionen vil anvende disse procentdele på det niveau af finansiering, som hver lufthavnsoperatør yder til de modtagende luftfartsselskaber, som det fremgår af tabel 15, med henblik på at få det beløb, der skal tilbagesøges for hver lufthavn og hvert luftfartsselskab.
It is thus not an additional, independent condition concerning the acquisition of goods or services that the Region added to the design of its scheme in order to produce an effect other than the main expected effect of the scheme, namely the increase in air traffic to Sardinia.
De vejledende beløb, som Italien skal tilbagesøge fra de forskellige luftfartsselskaber, er anført i tabel 19, på grundlag af de oplysninger, der er tilgængelige for Kommissionen.
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that activities 1, 2 and 3 do not confer an indirect advantage on airport operators.
Tabel 19
Since one of the cumulative conditions for the presence of State aid is not fulfilled, the Commission also concludes that activities 1 and 2 do not constitute State aid.
Vejledende beløb, der skal tilbagesøges fra luftfartsselskaber
For the reasons set out above, it is concluded that the airport operators concerned did not receive State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
BELØB, DER SKAL TILBAGESØGES
LAWFULNESS OF THE AID TO THE AIRLINES
skal fastsættes
The measures were notified to the Commission on 30 November 2011.