natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Rådets direktiv 2001/23/EF af 12. marts 2001 om tilnærmelse af medlemsstaternes lovgivning om varetagelse af arbejdstagernes rettigheder i forbindelse med overførsel af virksomheder eller bedrifter eller af dele af virksomheder eller bedrifter (EFT L 82 af 22.3.2001, s. 16).
This to be measured by the difference between the incremental revenues expected to be generated by the agreement (that is, the difference between the revenues that would be achieved if the agreement were concluded and the revenues that would be achieved in the absence of the agreement) and the incremental costs expected to be incurred as a result of the contract (that is, the difference between the costs that would be incurred if the agreement were concluded and the costs that would be incurred in the absence of the agreement), the resulting cash flows being discounted with an appropriate discount rate.
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] Aug.
As regards the first approach (a comparison with the ‘market price’), the Commission does not consider that, at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports [58].
1896, § 613a 242.
It therefore considers an ex ante incremental profitability analysis to be the most relevant approach for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines.
Kommissionens afgørelse af 4. april 2012 SA.34547 — Frankrig — Overtagelsen af Sernam-gruppens aktiver i forbindelse med gruppens rekonstruktion (EUT C 305 af 10.10.2012, s. 10).
It should be noted that, in general, the application of the MEO principle based on an average price on other, similar markets may prove helpful if such a price can be reasonably identified or deduced from other market indicators.
[43] Kommissionens meddelelse om begrebet statsstøtte i artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (EUT C 262 af 19.7.2016, s. 1), betragtning 94.
Moreover, the liberalisation of the air transport market complicates any purely comparative analysis.
Rettens dom af 13. september 2010, Grækenland mod Kommissionen, T-415/05, ECLI:EU:T:2010:386, punkt 146.
As can be seen in this case, commercial practices between airports and airlines are not always based exclusively on a published schedule of charges.
Retten fandt, at økonomisk inkonsistens kan angive finansiel kontinuitet.
Rather, these commercial relations vary to a great extent.
Domstolens dom af 11. december 2012, Kommissionen mod Spanien, C-610/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:781, præmis 106.
They include sharing risks with regard to passenger traffic and any related commercial and financial liability, standard incentive schemes and changing the spread of risks over the term of the agreements.
Lov om insolvens (»Insolvenzordnung«) af 5. oktober 1994 (BGBl.
Consequently, one transaction cannot really be compared with another based on a turnaround price or price per passenger.
I, s. 2866), senest ændret ved § 16 i lov af 20. november 2015 (BGBl.
In addition, benchmarking is not an appropriate method to establish market prices if the available benchmarks have not been defined with regard to market considerations or the existing prices are significantly distorted by public interventions.
I S. 2010).
Such distortions appear to be present in the aviation industry, for reasons explained in paragraphs 57 to 59 of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines:
Jf. Kommissionens beslutning af 27. februar 2008 om Rumæniens statsstøtte C 46/07 (ex NN 59/07) til virksomheden Automobile Craiova (tidligere Daewoo România) (EUT L 239 af 6.9.2008, s. 12).
‘Publicly owned airports have traditionally been considered by public authorities as infrastructures for facilitating local development and not as undertakings operating in accordance with market rules.
Domstolens dom af 29. april 1999, Kongeriget Spanien mod Kommissionen, C-342/96, ECLI:EU:C:1999:210, præmis 41; Domstolens dom af 11. juli 1996, Syndicat francais de l'Express international (SFEI) m.fl. mod La Poste m.fl., C-39/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:285.
Those airports' prices consequently tend not to be determined with regard to market considerations and in particular sound ex ante profitability prospects, but essentially having regard to social or regional considerations.
XXIII Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken, 1993, s. 255.
In those circumstances, the Commission has strong doubts that at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports.
Domstolens dom af 16. maj 2002, Frankrig mod Kommissionen (»Stardust Marine«), C-482/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294, præmis 71.
Moreover, as the Union courts have recalled, benchmarking by reference to the sector concerned is merely one analytical tool amongst others to determine if a beneficiary has received an economic advantage which it would not have obtained in normal market conditions [61].
Jf. punkt 403 i Kommissionens XXIII Rapport om konkurrencepolitikken, 1993; punkt 4.2.3.1 i Kommissionens meddelelse om begrebet statsstøtte i artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (EUT C 262 af 19.7.2016, s. 1).
Ryanair essentially argued that the MEO test can be applied based on a comparison with the commercial arrangements of other European airports.
Jf. luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014, punkt 53.
In particular, it compared charges paid by Ryanair at Bournemouth, Grenoble, Knock, Maastricht, Nîmes and Prestwick airports with the charges paid by Ryanair under the agreements at Lübeck airport.
Jf. luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014, punkt 59.
The study did not assess whether the sample of benchmark airports fulfilled all the criteria spelled out in the 2014 Aviation guidelines, as it only assessed traffic volumes, type of airport traffic and prosperity of the surrounding area [62].
Jf. Kommissionens afgørelse 2011/60/EF af 27. januar 2010 om statsstøtte C 12/2008 (ex NN 74/07) — Slovakiet — Aftale mellem Bratislava lufthavn og Ryanair (EUT L 27 af 1.2.2011, s. 24), betragtning 88 og 89.
In its 2012 Opening decision, the Commission compared the charges laid down in the March and October 2010 Side letters with charges at Hamburg airport, which led to doubts as to the market conformity of the charges laid down in the Side letters.
Jf. luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014, punkt 57 til 59.
The Commission notes that traffic volume in Lübeck is much lower than in Hamburg airport.
For så vidt angår benchmarking ved henvisning til rentabilitet (i modsætning til prisfastsættelse) i sektoren henvises til Rettens dom af 3. juli 2014, Spanien og Ciudad de la Luz mod Kommissionen, forenede sager T-319/12 og T-321/12, ECLI:EU:T:2014:604, præmis 44.
In fact, Hamburg is the airport with the most traffic in Northern Germany.
Se luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014 punkt 60 for de andre kriterier, der skal vurderes.
Hamburg is used for all segments of air transport, whereas Lübeck was specialised in low cost carriers which required fewer check-incounters and facilities for transfer passengers, no passenger busses, less luggage handling personnel and facilities, less cleaning personnel, and allowed for a shorter circulation time.
Luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014, punkt 64; Kommissionens afgørelse (EU) 2015/1226 af 23. juli 2014 om statsstøtte SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) som Frankrig har iværksat til fordel for handels- og industrikammeret i Angoulême, SNC-Lavalin, Ryanair og Airport Marketing Services (EUT L 201 af 30.7.2015, s. 48); Kommissionens afgørelse (EU) 2015/1584 af 1. oktober 2014 om statsstøtte i sag SA.23098 (C 37/07) (ex NN 36/07) iværksat af Italien til fordel for Società di Gestione dell'Aeroporto Di Alghero So.Ge.A.AL S.p.A. og forskellige luftfartsselskaber, der opererer i Alghero lufthavn (EUT L 250 af 25.9.2015, s. 38); Kommissionens afgørelse (EU) 2016/2069 af 1. oktober 2014 om statsstøttesag SA.14093 (C76/2002) iværksat af Belgien til fordel for Brussels South Charleroi Airport og Ryanair (EUT L 325 af 30.11.2016, s. 63).
In addition to those considerations, the airport infrastructure must be open to all airlines and not dedicated to a specific airline in order to exclude that the advantage resulting from compatible aid to the airport operator is passed on to a specific airline.
Rettens dom af 17. december 2008, Ryanair mod Kommissionen (»Charleroi«), T-196/04, ECLI:EU:T:2008:585, præmis 59.
The Commission also notes in this context that price differentiation is a standard business practice.
Domstolens dom af 21. marts 1991, Den Italienske Republik mod Kommissionen for De Europæiske Fællesskaber (Alfa Romeo), C-305/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:142.
Such differentiated pricing policies should, however, be commercially justified.
Rapporten er nævnt tidligere i afsnit 7.3.1.1 om rentabiliteten af aftalen mellem Hansestadt Lübeck og Infratil.
The Commission considers that arrangements concluded between airlines and an airport can be deemed to satisfy the MEO test when they incrementally contribute, from an ex ante point of view, to the profitability of the airport.
Jf. afgørelse (EU) 2015/1226.
The airport should demonstrate that, when setting up an arrangement with an airline (for example, an individual contract or an overall scheme of airport charges), it is capable of covering all costs stemming from the arrangement, over the duration of the arrangement, with a reasonable profit margin on the basis of sound medium-term prospects [64].
Afgørelse (EU) 2015/1584.
In order to assess whether an arrangement concluded by an airport with an airline satisfies the MEO test, expected non-aeronautical revenues stemming from the airline's activity must be taken into consideration together with airport charges, net of any rebates, marketing support or incentive schemes.
Oxera-rapport, Economic MEOP assessment: Lübeck lufthavn, den 1. september 2014.
Similarly, all expected costs incrementally incurred by the airport in relation to the airline's activity at the airport have to be taken into account.
Dom af 7. marts 2012, British Aggregates Association mod Kommissionen, T-210/02 RENV, ECLI:EU:T:2012:110, præmis 82 og 83; dom af 15. november 2011, Kommissionen og Spanien mod Government of Gibraltar og Det Forenede Kongerige, forenede sager C-106/09 P og C-107/09 P, ECLI:EU:C:2011:732, præmis 74 og 75; dom af 14. januar 2015, Eventech mod The Parking Adjudicator, C-518/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:9, præmis 54 og 55.
Such incremental costs may encompass all categories of expenses or investments, such as incremental personnel, equipment and investment costs induced by the presence of the airline at the airport [65].
Dom af 21. december 2016, Kommissionen mod Hansestadt Lübeck, C-524/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2016:971, præmis 62.
The Commission considers in its constant decision making practice that costs which the airport would have to incur anyway, independently from the arrangement with the airline, should not be taken into account in the MEO test [66].
I 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 og 2006 modtog Kommissionen flere klager fra luftfartsselskabet Air Berlin, en miljø-NGO (Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz) samt private borgere om påstået statsstøtte til Flughafen Lübeck GmbH (»FLG«), Infratil Limited (»Infratil«) [3] og luftfartsselskabet Ryanair [4].
According to the Charleroi judgement [67] when assessing the measures in question the Commission has to take into account all the relevant features of the measures and their context.
Den 7. november 2005 bad Kommissionen Tyskland om oplysninger, som Tyskland fremsendte den 7. februar 2006.
In other words, the Commission has to analyse the expected impact of the agreement with Ryanair on FLG, taking into account all relevant features of the measure in question.
Der blev anmodet om yderligere oplysninger ved brev af 22. marts 2006, som Tyskland besvarede den 12. juni 2006.
The Court declared in the Stardust Marine judgment that, ‘[…] in order to examine whether or not the State has adopted the conduct of a prudent investor operating in a market economy, it is necessary to place oneself in the context of the period during which the financial support measures were taken in order to assess the economic rationality of the State's conduct, and thus to refrain from any assessment based on a later situation.’ [68].
Der blev den 14. oktober og den 4. december 2006 afholdt møder mellem Kommissionens tjenestegrene, Infratil, majoritetsaktionæren i det selskab, der driver lufthavnen, og Hansestad Lübeck (»Hansestadt Lübeck«).
In order to apply the MEO test, the Commission has to place itself at the time when the agreement was concluded.
Ved brev af 10. juli 2007 meddelte Kommissionen Tyskland sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren i henhold til artikel 108, stk. 2, i TEFU med hensyn til finansiering af Lübeck lufthavn, de økonomiske forbindelser mellem Hansestadt Lübeck og Infratil samt lufthavnens økonomiske forbindelser med Ryanair (»åbningsafgørelsen fra 2007«).
The Commission has also to base its assessment on the information and assumptions which were at the disposal of FLG when the agreement was concluded.
Den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure blev registreret under sagsnummer SA.21877 (C 24/2007).
Application of the MEO principle to the 2000 Agreement
Der blev den 24. oktober 2007 vedtaget en berigtigelse af indledningsbeslutningen af 2007.
Preliminary remarks
Beslutningen af 2007 om at indlede proceduren blev offentliggjort den 29. november 2007 i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende [5].
The Commission notes that Air Berlin argued that the agreements between Ryanair and Lübeck airport were not profitable as the losses of FLG increased continuously (see Table 8) after the arrival of Ryanair.
Berigtigelsen blev offentliggjort den 7. december 2007 [6].
As Ryanair and Wizz Air were the only airlines flying regular lines from the airport, Air Berlin concluded that FLG's losses must be attributable to these airlines.
Kommissionen opfordrede interesserede parter til at fremsende deres bemærkninger senest en måned efter meddelelsen af beslutningen.
The Commission notes that even if a significant correlation between the number of Ryanair passengers at Lübeck airport and the losses incurred by FLG could be established, such correlation would not necessarily imply that the losses result from the operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport.
Kommissionen modtog bemærkninger fra Ryanair, Air Berlin, Infratil, FLG, to NGO'er [7], industri- og handelskammeret i Lübeck (»IHK Lübeck«) [8], den tyske sammenslutning af luftfartsselskaber (Bundesverband der Deutschen Fluggesellschaften, »BDF«) og enkeltpersoner [9].
Germany stated that more than […] % of the losses between 2000 and 2005 resulted from investments necessary to adapt the airport to increased passenger numbers.
Tyskland besvarede disse bemærkninger den 17. april 2008.
Such investments were necessary to increase the airport value in the event of the envisaged privatisation and to prepare the airport to attract any airline.
Kommissionens uafhængige konsulent Ecorys anmodede den 24. juli 2008 om oplysninger fra Tyskland for at udarbejde en rapport om spørgsmålet.
In addition, the Commission recalls that the MEO test is based on an ex ante assessment.
Den 1. august 2008 henvendte Tyskland sig til Kommissionen for at anfægte Ecorys' ret til at indhente oplysninger og dokumenter.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, the conduct of a private market operator, which is used to assess the conduct of a public operator, does not need to be aimed at short-term profitability but can be guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term [69].
De oplysninger, der blev anmodet om, blev fremsendt den 18. september 2008.
Even where an airport is loss-making over the period of Ryanair's operation, it is still possible that an airport airline agreement is incrementally profitable to an airport on an ex ante basis.
Den 16. april 2009 anmodede Kommissionen Tyskland om yderligere oplysninger.
As a final remark, the Commission notes that in the context of the present investigation, Ecorys was asked to compile a report on the profitability of the 2000 Agreement between FLG and Ryanair [70].
Tyskland anmodede den 21. april 2009 og igen den 7. juli 2009 om en udskydelse af fristen.
However, the report was based on a total cost approach, rather than an incremental cost approach and will therefore not be taken into consideration.
De oplysninger, der blev anmodet om, blev fremsendt 30. oktober 2009.
Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
Den 29. oktober 2009 anmodede Kommissionen om yderligere oplysninger, som Tyskland fremsendte den 16. december 2009.
As a time frame for assessing the agreement in question a MEO would have chosen as a starting point the date of the signature of the agreement, i.e. 29 May 2000.
Den 17. oktober 2010 modtog Kommissionen oplysninger fra Air Berlin.
As an end date a MEO would have taken the end date as stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, i.e. 31 May 2010.
Den 20. april 2011 imødekom Kommissionen Tysklands anmodning om forlængelse.
For the purpose of assessing the agreement in question and given the findings in recitals 282 to 301, both the existence and the amount of possible aid in this agreement have to be assessed in the light of the situation prevailing at the time it was signed and, more specifically, in the light of the information available and developments foreseeable at that time.
Den 21. april 2011 anmodede Tyskland om endnu en forlængelse, som Kommissionen imødekom den 27. april 2011.
At the time of the negotiation of the agreement, FLG expected the business of Ryanair at Lübeck airport to lead to increased passenger numbers, thereby increasing non-aeronautic revenues, to the expansion of non-aeronautic services, as well as to the attraction of further airlines.
Kommissionen svarede den 15. juni 2011 og anmodede om de manglende oplysninger.
Even though FLG was making losses in the years preceding the agreement, Ryanair's business at the airport was expected to lead to moderate profits in the medium- to long-term.
Den 8. april 2011 sendte Kommissionen et spørgeskema til Ryanair.
Germany provided data on the ex ante expected growth of passenger numbers as well as the expected incremental costs and revenues, in a best-case and worst-case scenario.
Besvarelserne returneredes til Kommissionen den 4. juli 2011.
Incremental revenues that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement include:
Kommissionen videresendte den 18. juli 2011 disse svar til Tyskland, som blev opfordret til at fremsende bemærkninger inden den 18. august 2011.
additional aeronautical revenues from passengers and landing charges paid by Ryanair and
Den 7. februar 2012 anmodede Kommissionen Ryanair om yderligere oplysninger vedrørende Oxera-undersøgelsen, som Ryanair fremsendte den 4. juli 2011.
additional non-aeronautical revenues from, for example, car parking, franchised shops, or directly operated shops.
Den 16. februar 2012 anmodede Oxera Kommissionen om en afklaring af et af de stillede spørgsmål.
Applying the ‘single-till’ principle, the Commission takes the view that both aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues should be taken into account [71].
Kommissionen fremsendte afklaringen den 17. februar 2012.
Germany submitted that based on the charges stipulated in the 2000 Agreement, the airport expected to have average aeronautical revenues of EUR […] per passenger.
Ryanair sendte sine bemærkninger den 13. april 2012.
FLG estimated revenues from non-aviation business as representing […] % of aviation business income.
Kommissionen sendte den 27. juni 2012 disse bemærkninger til Tyskland.
Incremental costs that a private investor would reasonably expect from the agreement would include:
Tyskland kommenterede Ryanairs indlæg i et brev af 10. september 2012.
incremental operational costs directly caused by the Ryanair agreement,
Den endelige rapport fra Ecorys af 29. marts 2011 blev sendt til Tyskland den 29. juni 2011 med en opfordring til at kommentere den.
costs for marketing services,
Den 24. august 2011 blev en oversat udgave af rapporten sendt til Tyskland med en opfordring til at kommentere den inden den 26. september 2011.
investment costs directly linked to the Ryanair agreement.
Tyskland fremsendte sine bemærkninger den 10. oktober 2011.
Germany stated that it was necessary to increase the number of staff of FLG to handle the expected passenger numbers.
Den 30. juni 2011 sendte Tyskland anden del af de oplysninger, som Kommissionen havde anmodet om.
FLG expected incremental operational and personnel costs of EUR […] per passenger.
Den 29. juni 2011 besvarede Tyskland Kommissionens brev af 15. juni 2011.
Based on the 2000 Agreement, FLG expected incremental marketing costs for the period 2000-2012 of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Den 5. juli 2011 anmodede Kommissionen Tyskland om at fremsende de manglende oplysninger.
Regarding investment costs, Germany stated that the airport infrastructure already existed prior to the agreement with Ryanair and that the initially planned operation of Ryanair at Lübeck airport did not require any additional infrastructure investments.
Den 15. juli 2011 fremsendte Tyskland de manglende oplysninger.
Germany submitted the following revenues and operating costs for the best case (Table 11) and the worst case (Table 12):
Den 4. juli 2011 sendte Ryanair sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen, som videresendte dem til Tyskland den 8. august 2011.
Table 11
Tyskland fremsatte bemærkninger hertil den 8. oktober 2011.
Best-case costs and revenues
Den 19. marts 2012 anmodede Tyskland om en forlængelse af fristen til at fremsende oplysninger indtil den 17. april 2012.
year
Kommissionen imødekom denne forlængelse den 21. marts 2012.
passengers
Den 18. april 2012 anmodede Kommissionen Tyskland om at fremsende de manglende oplysninger inden den 28. april 2012, uden mulighed for forlængelse.
aeronautic revenues
Kommissionen fremførte desuden, at hvis anmodningen ikke blev imødekommet, ville der blive udstedt et påbud om oplysninger i henhold til artikel 10, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 [10].
non-aeronautic revenues
Der blev afholdt et møde mellem Kommissionen og Tyskland den 2. maj 2012.
operating costs
Den 3. maj 2012 indrømmede Kommissionen en forlængelse frem til den 11. maj 2012.
Table 12
I brev af 10. april 2013 sendte Ryanair en rapport om Oxeras anvendelse af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip til Kommissionen.
Worst-case costs and revenues
Rapporten blev sendt til Tyskland den 3. maj 2013.
FLG estimated positive financial effects from the 2000 Agreement with Ryanair.
Den 20. december 2013 fremsendte Ryanair yderligere oplysninger til Kommissionen.
In this regard, Table 13 summarises the revenues from aeronautic and non-aeronautic activities, as well as the costs directly attributable to the operation of Ryanair at the airport and marketing costs.
I brev af 24. februar 2014 opfordrede Kommissionen Ryanair til at fremsætte bemærkninger til anvendelsen af luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014 [11].
Table 13
Den 21. marts 2014 opfordrede Kommissionen Infratil til at kommentere luftfartsretningslinjerne af 2014.
Ex ante profitability assessment
Den 15. april 2014 blev der offentliggjort en formel opfordring til alle parter om at fremsætte bemærkninger til luftfartsretningslinjerne fra 2014 [12].
profitability assessment
Tyskland fremsendte sine bemærkninger den 12. maj 2014.
marketing costs
Air Berlin, Infratil og Schutzgemeinschaft gegen Fluglärm Lübeck und Umgebung eV (»SGF«) [13] fremsendte yderligere bemærkninger.
In the best case, Germany rounded passenger numbers to […], leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Tyskland anmodede den 15. juli 2011 om en udskydelse af fristen.
In the worst-case scenario, a total of […] passengers was expected, leading to aeronautic revenues of EUR […].
Ved brev af 20. april 2011 opfordrede Kommissionen Tyskland til at svare på spørgsmålene vedrørende klagerne inden den 28. april 2011.
Since non-aeronautic revenues were expected to amount to […] % of aeronautic revenues, non-aeronautic revenues were calculated to be EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.
Ved brev af 21. april 2011 anmodede Tyskland om en yderligere forlængelse af fristen.
It was calculated that operating costs would amount to a total of EUR […] in the best case and EUR […] in the worst case.