natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at også Venedigkommissionen mener, at en løsning på den aktuelle konflikt vedrørende forfatningsdomstolens sammensætning »skal være baseret på forpligtelsen til at overholde og fuldt ud opfylde forfatningsdomstolens afgørelser«, og at »alle statslige organer, navnlig Sejm, opfordres til fuldt ud at overholde og opfylde afgørelserne« [18].
the lack of publication and of implementation of a number of judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal since March 2016, including the judgments of 9 March and 11 August relating to legislative acts on the Constitutional Tribunal;
MANGLENDE KUNDGØRELSE OG GENNEMFØRELSE AF FORFATNINGSDOMSTOLENS AFGØRELSE AF 9.
the rules applicable to the selection of candidates for the post of President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal and to the appointment of an acting President of the Constitutional Tribunal in the Law on organisation and proceedings and the Implementing Law.
MARTS 2016
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016 [12], the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities implement fully the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 which requires that the three judges that were lawfully nominated in October 2015 by the 7th term of the Sejm can take up their judicial functions in the Constitutional Tribunal, and that the three judges nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm without a valid legal basis do not take up their judicial functions.
Kommissionen anbefalede i sin henstilling af 27. juli 2016, at de polske myndigheder kundgør og til fulde gennemfører forfatningsdomstolens afgørelse af 9. marts 2016 og dens senere afgørelser og sørger for, at kundgørelsen af kommende afgørelser sker automatisk og ikke er afhængig af en beslutning truffet af den udøvende eller lovgivende magt.
As regards the law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal the Commission noted that this law is contrary to the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December.
Endvidere er ingen af de 16 afgørelser fra forfatningsdomstolen, der er blevet afsagt efter den 11. august 2016, indtil videre blevet kundgjort.
Article 90 [13] requires the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to assign cases to all judges who have taken the oath before the President of the Republic but have not yet taken up their duties as judges.
Artikel 89 i loven af 22. juli 2016 blev erklæret forfatningsstridig af forfatningsdomstolen ved dens afgørelse af 11. august 2016, fordi den var uforenelig med principperne om magtfordeling og -balance og domstolenes og retternes uafhængighed af andre magter.
This provision seems targeted at the situation of the three judges which were unlawfully nominated by the 8th term of the Sejm in December 2015.
Det bekræftes i svaret fra den polske regering af 27. oktober, at regeringen fortsat mener, at den har beføjelse til at kontrollere lovligheden af forfatningsdomstolens afgørelser, og at det ikke kan sikres, at afgørelserne automatisk kundgøres.
It would enable these judges to take up their function while using the vacancies for which the previous legislature of the Sejm had already lawfully nominated three judges, as has been held in the judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015.
Denne bestemmelse er et sådant skridt i den rigtige retning.
In addition, the new Law on the status of judges reintroduces a provision [15] similar to Article 90 of the Law of 22 July 2016 which was declared unconstitutional in the judgment of 11 August 2016.
Også Venedigkommissionen bekræftede denne holdning i sine to udtalelser [21].
Likewise, provisions aiming at deploying a similar effect can be found in the Law on organisation and proceedings [16] and in the Implementing Law [17].
Der er endvidere ingen garanti for, at artikel 114, stk. 2, i loven om forfatningsdomstolens organisation og sagsbehandling vil sikre, at den kommende formand for forfatningsdomstolen vil kundgøre alle afgørelser, som er blevet afsagt før dennes embedsperiode.
In its reply of 27 October 2016 the Polish Government considers that the judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015 of the Tribunal did not specify which judges were to take up their function and considers that the new legislature of the Sejm has lawfully nominated the five judges in December 2015.
Denne usikkerhed undergraver effektiviteten af den forfatningsmæssige prøvelse og rejser alvorlige betænkeligheder med hensyn til overholdelsen af retsstatsprincippet.
The reply implies that, with or without the judgments of the Tribunal, the situation would remain the same.
Overholdelse af endelige retsafgørelser er en vigtig iboende forudsætning i retsstatsprincippet.
The reply concedes that in the operative part of the judgment of 3 December 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal addressed the duty of the President of the Republic to immediately take an oath from a judge elected to the Tribunal by the Sejm.
Afvisning af kundgørelsen af en bindende og endelig retsafgørelse forhindrer dennes automatiske og operationelle virkning og er i strid med legalitets- og magtfordelingsprincipperne.
It takes however the view that that judgment cannot bind other authorities to apply provisions in the manner specified in a given case.
PRØVELSE AF LOVEN OM FORFATNINGSDOMSTOLEN OG EFFEKTIVITETEN AF DEN FORFATNINGSMÆSSIGE PRØVELSE AF NY LOVGIVNING
This interpretation limits the impact of the judgments of 3 and 9 December 2015 to a mere obligation for the Government to publish them but would deny them any further legal and operational effect, in particular as regards the obligation for the President of the Republic to take the oath of the judges in question.
Kommissionen foretog i sin henstilling af 27. juli 2016 en detaljeret gennemgang af loven af 22. juli 2016 og dens virkninger under hensyntagen til bestemmelsernes virkninger, både enkeltvis og samlet, og forfatningsdomstolens tidligere retspraksis samt Venedigkommissionens udtalelse.
This interpretation goes against the principle of loyal cooperation between state organs which is, as underlined in the opinions of the Venice Commission, a constitutional precondition in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
I svaret gives også en kort redegørelse for, hvordan ovennævnte lovgivning respekterer de grundlæggende rettigheder.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the Polish authorities should respect and fully implement the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015.
I svaret afvises også forfatningsdomstolens grundlæggende rolle med hensyn til at sikre retsstatsprincippet i Polen.
The relevant provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal raise serious concerns in respect of the rule of law and have been found unconstitutional by the judgment of 11 August 2016 of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Kommissionen bestrider denne udtalelse.
Also this judgment should be respected, published and implemented by the Polish authorities.
Forfatningsdomstolen er nemlig en af de vigtigste garanter for retsstaten i Polen, navnlig da den har til opgave at træffe afgørelse om, hvorvidt polske love er i overensstemmelse med forfatningen.
In addition, provisions [19] aiming at producing a similar result included in the Law on the status of judges, the Law on organisation and proceedings and in the Implementing Law are also inconsistent with these judgments and must not be applied.
Det fremgår klart af den polske forfatning, at forfatningsdomstolen har kompetence til at træffe afgørelse om, hvorvidt lovgivning og internationale aftaler er i overensstemmelse med forfatningen, hvorvidt lovgivning er i overensstemmelse med ratificerede internationale aftaler, hvis ratificering krævede forudgående samtykke i henhold til lovgivningen, hvorvidt retsforskrifter udstedt af centrale statslige organer er i overensstemmelse med forfatningen, ratificerede internationale aftaler og lovgivning, hvorvidt politiske partiers formål eller aktiviteter er i overensstemmelse med forfatningen, samt afgørelse om klager vedrørende overtrædelse af forfatningen [22].
LACK OF PUBLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL JUDGMENT OF 9 MARCH 2016 AND OF THE JUDGMENTS RENDERED SINCE 9 MARCH 2016
Forfatningsdomstolen bilægger også tvister om beføjelser mellem statens centrale forfatningsmæssige organer [23].
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016, the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities publish and implement fully the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9 March 2016 and its subsequent judgments and ensure that the publication of future judgments is automatic and does not depend on any decision of the executive or legislative powers.
Den omstændighed, at statstribunalet ifølge forfatningen skal behandle sager om visse personers [24] overtrædelse af forfatningen eller af lovgivning, og at præsidenten skal sikre overholdelse af forfatningen [25], berører ikke denne grundlæggende rolle, som forfatningsdomstolen har.
On 16 August 2016, the Polish Government, on the basis of Article 89 of the Law of 22 July 2016, published 21 judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal rendered in a period from 6 April 2016 to 19 July 2016.
Kommissionen bemærker, at loven om forfatningsdomstolens organisation og sagsbehandling ikke længere indeholder følgende bestemmelser i loven af 22. juli 2016, der var identificeret som problematiske i henstillingen: artikel 26, stk. 1, litra g), om henvisning af sager til behandling i plenum [26], artikel 38, stk. 3, om behandling af sager i kronologisk rækkefølge [27], artikel 68, stk. 5-8, om udsættelse af voteringer [28], artikel 61, stk. 6, om generalstatsadvokatens mulighed for at forhindre behandlingen af sager [29] og artikel 83-86 om overgangsbestemmelser for verserende sager [30].
However, the two judgments of 9 March and 11 August 2016 have still not been published by the Polish Government, contrary to what had been requested in the Commission's Recommendation.
Den risiko, der blev identificeret i henstillingen, for at det antal dommere, der er nødvendigt for at træffe afgørelse i plenum, måske ikke vil blive nået, er allerede blevet til virkelighed [32].
The reply of the Polish Government of 27 October confirms that the Government still considers to have the power to check the lawfulness of judgments of the Tribunal and that the automatic publication of judgments cannot be ensured.
Endvidere indeholder loven om forfatningsdomstolens organisation og sagsbehandling, loven om dommeres status og gennemførelsesloven andre bestemmelser, der har forværret visse problemer, som blev identificeret i henstillingen (se afsnit 2 vedrørende udnævnelse af dommere og afsnit 3 vedrørende kundgørelse af afgørelser), eller som har givet anledning til nye betænkeligheder vedrørende dommeres situation (se afsnit 4.1) og udnævnelsen af formanden, næstformanden og den fungerende formand for forfatningsdomstolen (se afsnit 5).
Article 114(1) and (2) of the Law on organisation and procedure provides that ‘Adjudications are published in the appropriate official journal, in accordance with the principles and in the manner laid down in the Constitution and the act of 20 July 2000 on the publication of the normative acts and certain other legal acts […]’.
Betænkelighederne vedrørende dommeres situation
Moreover it is provided that ‘The President of the Tribunal orders publication of the adjudications.’
Disciplinærsager
This provision is as such a step in the right direction.
Det hedder som følger i artikel 26 i loven om dommeres status: »En forseelse begået af en dommer ved forfatningsdomstolen, jf. artikel 24, stk. 1, kan anmeldes til formanden for forfatningsdomstolen af […] præsidenten efter anmodning fra generalstatsadvokaten efter høring af den første formand for højesteret« [33].
However, Article 19 of the Implementing Law provides that ‘Judgments of the Tribunal and decisions of the Tribunal adopted in breach of the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015 […] or the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 22 July 2016 and issued prior to the date of entry into force of the Act referred to in Article 1 shall be published in the relevant official gazettes after their publication has been ordered by the acting President of the Tribunal, unless they concern regulatory instruments that have ceased to apply.’
Det hedder som følger i artikel 27, stk. 5: »Hvis den ansvarlige for disciplinærsager ikke finder anledning til at indlede en disciplinærsag efter anmodning fra en bemyndiget enhed, udsteder vedkommende en kendelse om at afvise indledning af disciplinærsag.
A similar provision was already held unconstitutional by the Tribunal in its judgment of 11 August 2016.
Den myndighed, der foretog anmeldelsen, jf. artikel 26, kan klage til disciplinærretten i første instans inden syv dage fra forkyndelsen af denne kendelse«.
The Commission's Recommendation underlined that the indication that judgments have been rendered illegally is contrary to the principle of the separation of powers as it is not for the Sejm to determine the lawfulness of judgments [20].
I henhold til artikel 27, stk. 6, behandler denne ret klagen senest 14 dage efter, at den blev indgivet.
Also the Venice Commission confirmed this position in its two opinions [21].
Hvis kendelsen om at afvise indledning af disciplinærsag ophæves, er disciplinærrettens instrukser vedrørende sagens videre forløb bindende for den ansvarlige for disciplinærsager.
In addition, the exclusion from publication of judgments relating to normative acts which ceased to be applicable, as provided in Article 19 of the Implementing Law, excludes in particular the judgments of 9 March, 11 August and 7 November 2016.
I sin henstilling om retsstaten understregede Kommissionen med hensyn til loven af 22. december 2015, at præsidenten ikke burde have beføjelse til at indlede disciplinærsager, og bemærkede, at fjernelsen af denne bestemmelse i loven af 22. juli 2016 var en forbedring.
As long as the President of the Constitutional Tribunal has not been appointed this provision prevents the full publication of all judgments.
Den omstændighed, at sådanne sager kunne indledes af institutioner uden for retsvæsenet, samt at sådanne institutioner kan klage til disciplinærretten i første instans, hvis den ansvarlige for disciplinærsager ikke finder anledning til at indlede disciplinærsag, kunne påvirke forfatningsdomstolens uafhængighed.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Article 114(2) of the Law on organisation and procedure will ensure that the future President of the Tribunal publishes all the judgments which have been adopted prior to his term of office.
Mulighed for tidlig pensionering
In conclusion, the fact that the Polish Government has so far refused to publish in the Official Journal the judgments of 9 March 2016 and 11 August 2016 relating to legislative acts on the Constitutional Tribunal, and all other judgments rendered by the Constitutional Tribunal since 11 August 2016, creates uncertainty as to the legal basis for the Tribunal's judicial activity and as to the legal effects of its decisions.
Dommere ved forfatningsdomstolen, hvis embedsperiode begyndte før ikrafttrædelsen af [loven om dommeres status], kan inden en måned fra dens ikrafttrædelse indgive en erklæring til forfatningsdomstolens formandskab om, at de fratræder som følge af indførelsen, i deres embedsperiode, af nye regler for udførelsen af hvervet som dommer ved forfatningsdomstolen, jf. artikel 11, stk. 3, og artikel 13 og 14 i denne lov [34].
Compliance with final judgments is an essential requirement inherent in the rule of law.
2.
The refusal to publish a binding and final judgment denies the latter's automatic legal and operational effect and breaches the principles of legality and separation of powers.
En dommers fratræden som omhandlet i stk. 1 får virkning på den første dag i den måned, der følger efter den måned, hvor erklæringen blev indgivet.
REVIEW OF THE LAW ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF NEW LEGISLATION
Fratrædelsen bekræftes ved en kendelse fra forfatningsdomstolens formand«.
In its Recommendation of 27 July 2016, the Commission considered in detail the Law of 22 July 2016 and its impact, taking into account the effect of the provisions both individually and collectively, as well as the previous case law of the Constitutional Tribunal and the opinion of the Venice Commission.
Denne bestemmelse synes at være et incitament til tidlig pensionering, fordi den gør det muligt for dommere ved forfatningsdomstolen — som en undtagelse — at få fuldt udbytte af fordelene ved deres status som pensioneret dommer, herunder modtagelse af en alderspension, uden at have afsluttet deres embedsperiode.
The Commission recommended that the Polish authorities ensure that any reform of the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal respect the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal, including those of 3 and 9 December 2015 and of 9 March 2016, and take the opinion of the Venice Commission of 11 March 2016 fully into account.
For en dommer, der ikke længere ønsker at fortsætte med at arbejde under de nye regler, ville en sådan tidlig pensionering være mere fordelagtig end blot at sige op.
In particular, the Commission recommended that the Polish authorities ensure that requirements such as those relating to the attendance quorum, the handling of cases in chronological order, the possibility for the Public Prosecutor-General to prevent the examination of cases, the postponement of deliberations or transitional measures affecting pending cases and putting cases on hold do not, either separately or through their combined effect undermine the effectiveness of the Constitutional Tribunal as a guarantor of the Constitution.
Ved at tilbyde sådanne fordelagtige ordninger blander den lovgivende magt sig i forfatningsdomstolens uafhængighed, da formålet hermed er at tilskynde de nuværende dommere ved forfatningsdomstolen til at fratræde inden udløbet af deres embedsperiode og at påvirke deres beslutning herom.
In their reply of 27 October 2016, the Polish Government fail to acknowledge that the majority of concerns expressed by the Commission and by the Venice Commission were not taken into account in the Law of 22 July 2016.
Med loven om dommeres status er der blevet indført nye krav til dommere ved forfatningsdomstolen vedrørende finansiel deltagelse i virksomheder [35], formueangivelser [36] og erklæringer om deres ægtefælles økonomiske aktivitet [37].
However, this argument is irrelevant because the Tribunal has been able to do so precisely by not applying the procedural requirements at stake (judgment of 11 August 2016) and the Government is refusing to publish these same rulings of the Tribunal in an attempt to prevent them from taking legal effect.
Endvidere er der i loven fastsat vidtrækkende konsekvenser for manglende overholdelse, idet manglende opfyldelse af de pågældende forpligtelser vil svare til at træde tilbage som dommer ved forfatningsdomstolen.
The reply also presents brief explanations on the compliance of the legislation mentioned above with fundamental rights.
Disse bestemmelser kunne rejse spørgsmål om proportionalitet og, som bemærket af højesteret, om overholdelse af forfatningen [38].
The Commission observes that these explanations by the Government do not remove the need for a genuinely effective constitutional review by the Constitutional Tribunal.
Af disse grunde er effektiv forfatningsmæssig prøvelse af disse bestemmelser særlig vigtig.
The reply also denies the fundamental role of the Constitutional Tribunal in ensuring the rule of law in Poland.
Kommissionen bemærker også, at loven om forfatningsdomstolens organisation og sagsbehandling i væsentlig grad ændrer dens interne organisation, idet forfatningsdomstolens kontor erstattes af to nye organer, nemlig et justitskontor og et sekretariat for forfatningsdomstolens juridiske tjeneste [39].
The Commission contests that statement.
Det er fastsat i gennemførelsesloven, at forfatningsdomstolens kontor vil blive nedlagt senest den 31. december 2017 [40], og at de nuværende medarbejdere ikke har nogen garanti for, at de kan forblive beskæftiget ved forfatningsdomstolen efter denne dato [41].
The Constitutional Tribunal is indeed one of the main guarantors of the rule of law in Poland, in particular as it is bestowed with the task of ruling on the constitutionality of Polish laws.
I den aktuelle situation med verserende tvister vedrørende forfatningsdomstolen samt de betænkeligheder, der er givet udtryk for i afsnit 5 i denne henstilling, vedrørende udnævnelsen af en ny formand og en fungerende formand for forfatningsdomstolen kunne en sådan omorganisering føre til yderligere ustabilitet og påvirke effektiviteten af den forfatningsmæssige prøvelse.
It clearly appears from the Polish constitution that the Constitutional Tribunal is competent to rule on the conformity of statutes and international agreements to the constitution, on the conformity of a statute to ratified international agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute, on the conformity of legal provisions issued by central State organs to the constitution, ratified international agreements and statutes, on the conformity to the constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties, and on complaints concerning constitutional infringements [22].
De centrale bestemmelser i gennemførelsesloven vil træde i kraft uden vacatio legis [42] på dagen efter lovens kundgørelse.
The Constitutional Tribunal shall also settle disputes over authority between central constitutional organs of the State [23].
Centrale bestemmelser i loven om forfatningsdomstolens organisation og sagsbehandling og i loven om dommeres status vil også træde i kraft uden vacatio legis på dagen efter kundgørelsesdatoen, herunder bestemmelser, der gør det muligt for de »dommere, som blev udnævnt på lovlig vis i december«, at påbegynde deres hverv [43].
The fact that according to the constitution the Tribunal of State is to hear cases of violations of the constitution or of a statute committed by certain persons [24], and that the President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the constitution [25], does not affect this fundamental role of the Tribunal.
Bestemmelserne i loven af 22. juli 2016 om forfatningsdomstolen vil ophøre med at gælde på dagen efter datoen for gennemførelseslovens kundgørelse [44].
The Commission notes that the Law on organisation and proceedings no longer contains the following provisions of the Law of 22 July 2016 identified as a concern in the Recommendation: Article 26(1)(1g) on the referral of cases to the full bench [26], Article 38(3) on the handling of cases in chronological order [27], Article 68(5)-(8) on the postponement of deliberations [28], Article 61(6) on the possibility of the Public Prosecutor-General to prevent the examination of cases [29] and Articles 83-86 on the transitional provisions for pending cases [30].
Forfatningsdomstolen vil som følge heraf ikke være i stand til at prøve disse centrale bestemmelsers overensstemmelse med forfatningen, inden de træder i kraft.
The Commission notes that the mere publication of the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 11 August 2016 which had already declared these provisions unconstitutional would have been sufficient to address these issues without a new law being necessary.
En forfatningsmæssig prøvelse under sådanne omstændigheder kan ikke længere anses for effektiv.
Despite these improvements, the Commission notes nevertheless that certain concerns remain.
I den forbindelse bemærkes, at Venedigkommissionen i sin udtalelse af 11. marts 2016 påpegede, at forfatningsdomstolen skal have mulighed for at prøve den lovgivning, der regulerer forfatningsdomstolens funktion, før den træder i kraft.
In particular, the number of judges required to participate in a full bench remains at eleven while it was set at nine in the 1997 Act on the Constitutional Tribunal and in the Law of 25 June 2015.