natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger hævdede en interesseret part, at de eksporterende producenter ikke ville have incitamenter til at øge deres salg til Unionen, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
As shown in Section 4.5 above, the Union industry continued to suffer from injury during the RIP.
Denne hypotese ændrede dog ikke Kommissionens opfattelse.
As outlined in Section 3.3 above, there is a likelihood of continuation of dumping should the measures be allowed to lapse.
Som det fremgår af de underbudsmargener, der blev konstateret, vil de eksporterende producenter kunne øge deres salgsmængder til Unionen, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
In addition, it was established that the exporting producers were selling at dumped prices to third countries and to the Union and would enter the Union market at even lower prices than the ones at which they currently sell to the Union should the measures be allowed to lapse.
Da deres priser i Unionen ville være lavere end EU-producenternes priser, er det rimeligt at forvente, at den kinesiske eksport vil kæmpe for større markedsandele i Unionen.
Spare capacity, trade flows and attractiveness of the Union market and pricing behaviour of the exporting producers in the PRC
Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at den kinesiske import ville komme til Unionen til priser, der er lavere end EU-erhvervsgrenens aktuelle priser, og sandsynligvis vil øge salgsmængden og vinde markedsandele, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
The Chinese production capacity of modules is estimated at 96,3 GW/year for 2015 and is expected to reach 108 GW/year in 2016 [33].
Konklusion vedrørende sandsynligheden for fortsat skade
At the same time global demand was estimated at 50,6 GW in 2015 and was projected to increase to 61,7 GW [34] in 2016 or to 68,7 GW, according to another source [35].
I lyset af ovenstående konkluderede Kommissionen, at der er en betydelig uudnyttet kapacitet i Kina, både for moduler og celler.
Therefore, the Commission concluded that the total spare capacity of the Chinese producers exceeded by large global demand, namely by 47,5 %, in 2015 and will exceed it by 42,9 % or by 36 % in 2016, depending on the source.
EU-markedet er fortsat attraktivt med hensyn til størrelse og salgspriser, navnlig sammenlignet med prisniveauet for den kinesiske eksport til tredjelande, hvilket yderligere bevises af dokumentationen for tidligere omgåelsespraksis.
Another source established that the total global demand was 58 GW [36] in 2015, which would render the excess capacity of the Chinese producers at 39,8 % for 2015.
Derfor fandt Kommissionen, at der er stor sandsynlighed for, at en ophævelse af antidumpingforanstaltningerne ville føre til fortsat dumping og dermed fortsat skade for EU-erhvervsgrenen.
Even if no new capacity was installed in China in the future, the existing capacity would still exceed significantly the projected global annual demand for solar installations.
Årsagssammenhæng
Indeed, in the most probable scenario (so-called ‘Medium Scenario’) the demand would reach 97 GW [37] or 95 GW [38] in 2020, which would be fully covered by the existing Chinese capacity.
Flere interesserede parter fremførte også, både før og efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger, at hvis Kommissionen finder, at EU-erhvervsgrenen stadig lider skade, er denne forårsaget af flere andre faktorer, som tilsammen tegner sig for den samlede skade:
In addition, the Chinese solar module production capacity has been steadily growing in the last 10 years.
ophævelsen af incitamentsordningerne i mange af medlemsstaterne
For example, it has more than doubled between 2012 and 2015, (from 43,8 GW [39] in 2012 to 96,3 GW in 2015).
EU-erhvervsgrenen har endnu ikke opnået stordriftsfordele ved at have en kapacitet på flere GW for at være økonomisk levedygtig og få en indvirkning på det globale marked
In 2016 alone there is additional 2 GW of announced capacity or under construction capacity in China, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (‘BNEF’).
den skade, der skyldes, at EU-producenternes priser på moduler til stadighed er lavere end de kinesiske producenters importpriser.
Therefore, even in the less likely scenario (so called ‘High Scenario’) of increasing global annual demand to up to 120 GW [40] in 2020, it is probable that the Chinese producers alone would be still able to meet the demand in its entirety as they would need to expand their existing capacity at much lower speed than they had done in the past, i.e. by only 11,3 % in 4 years.
I den tidligere undersøgelse fandt Kommissionen imidlertid, at EU-erhvervsgrenen var blevet tvunget til at reducere sine priser, navnlig som følge af presset fra den dumpede import og ikke på grund af ændringer i støtteordningerne [52].
Following disclosure, several interested parties questioned the data on capacity in the PRC and the global consumption used by the Commission.
Derfor var tilstrømningen af kinesiske dumpede produkter den vigtigste årsag til den skade, der blev forvoldt i den tidligere undersøgelse.
They argued that Solar Power Europe was not sufficiently reliable as a source since it takes into account only modules already connected to the grid, while IHS and BNEF provide more accurate outlook as they show the modules purchased for installation.
Hertil kommer, at EU-erhvervsgrenen — på trods af faldet i forbruget med 56 % mellem 2012 og NUP — øgede sin markedsandel for moduler og celler med henholdsvis 40 % og 47 %.
However, the Commission already analysed in the recitals above data and projections coming from IHS, while the data from BNEF does not differ substantially from IHS [41].
Erhvervsgrenen reducerede også sine omkostninger væsentligt (jf. tabel 8a og 8b) og forbedrede sin kapacitetsudnyttelse.
The same parties also contested the amount of total spare capacity established by the Commission.
Til trods for nedgangen i forbruget og i betragtning af de gældende foranstaltninger begyndte EU-erhvervsgrenen at overvinde følgerne af den tidligere skade.
In particular, one interested party submitted that it was 70 GW in 2016.
Dette argument blev derfor afvist.
However, it failed to provide an information source or any methodology on the basis of which it established this figure.
Derimod havde tilstrømningen af store mængder af dumpingimport netop den modsatte virkning på de producenter, som blev udsat for denne illoyale praksis.
Consequently, this argument does not alter the conclusions reached above.
Kommissionen konstaterede i forbindelse med den tidligere undersøgelse [53], at EU-erhvervsgrenen i 2010 opnåede en fortjeneste på 10 % i forbindelse med en lignende eksisterende kapacitet (6983 MW i 2010 og 6467 MW i NUP).
Several interested parties submitted, before and after disclosure, that Tier 1 companies have much less overcapacity than the remaining Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies.
Den massive import af dumpede varer fra Kina forvoldte et drastisk fald i EU-erhvervsgrenens rentabilitet og forhindrede den effektivt i at foretage nye investeringer for at opnå stordriftsfordele.
According to BNEF Tier 1 companies have 46 GW estimated module production capacity in the PRC in 2016, which indeed is lower than the total capacity of tier 2 and 3 companies combined, estimated at 62 GW [44].
Foranstaltningernes beskyttende virkning gjorde det muligt for EU-erhvervsgrenen at konsolidere sig og at nedbringe sine omkostninger væsentligt i 2014 og i NUP, og bragte EU-erhvervsgrenen på rette spor til at opnå stordriftsfordele.
However, all tiers of Chinese companies are active on the global market.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger anfægtede en part denne erklæring.
As far as the Union is concerned, not only Tier 1 companies were exporting after the imposition of the existing measures, but also Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies, albeit in lesser quantities (the latter's share of the total Chinese imports was estimated at 13,6 % in 2014).
Parten hævdede, at investeringerne faldt efter indførelsen af foranstaltninger, og at det ikke var muligt at opnå stordriftsfordele.
Therefore, the Commission considered that the capacity of all types of Chinese exporting producers should be taken into account for the purpose of establishing the spare capacity available in China.
I modsætning til denne erklæring steg investeringerne faktisk i NUP både for moduler og celler i sammenligning med de foregående år.
Following disclosure, one interested party contested the finding that the overcapacity of all types of exporting producers should be taken into account when establishing the spare capacity available in China.
Denne påstand blev derfor også afvist.
The Commission pointed out that already the capacity available at Tier 1 companies constituted 90 % of the total world consumption for 2015 (estimated at 50,6 GW).
For så vidt angår celler var de kinesiske importpriser 4 % højere end priserne ved import fra tredjelande, for moduler var de 1 % lavere.
Finally, the imports of Tier 2 and Tier 3 companies are expected to increase significantly following the recent withdrawals of the undertaking of predominantly Tier 1 companies.
Dette argument var derfor faktuelt ukorrekt og blev derfor afvist.
This claim was thus rejected.
Påstanden om, at importen fra tredjelande gør foranstaltningerne ineffektive, diskuteres i betragtning 324 og 325.
Several parties put forward the argument, both before and after disclosure, that overcapacities in China were largely overstated since demand of solar installations had steadily increased at a global level.
Hvad angår den fjerde påstand viste undersøgelsen, at de gennemsnitlige importpriser for moduler fra Kina konstant lå under EU-producenternes gennemsnitlige EU-salgspriser.
Indeed, global annual demand had increased by 25 % between 2014 and 2015 (from 40,3 GW to 50,6 GW) [45].
F.eks. var den gennemsnitlige importpris fra Kina i NUP på 544 EUR/kW [54], mens EU-gennemsnitsprisen lå på 593 EUR/kW.
However, as specified above, the estimated overcapacity of the Chinese producers exceeds by 47,5 % the current demand.
Denne påstand var også faktuelt ukorrekt og blev derfor afvist.
Therefore, even in the most optimistic scenario for increase of the global demand the Chinese producers would most likely still have sufficient spare capacity in order to meet this demand.
I lyset af ovenstående konkluderede Kommissionen, at EU-erhvervsgrenen fortsat led væsentlig skade, jf. grundforordningens artikel 3, stk. 5.
Regarding cells, the existing capacity of the Chinese exporting producers is estimated at 76,6 GW in 2016, an increase by 12 % in comparison with 2015 (68 GW) [46].
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger fremførte en interesseret part, at skaden er forårsaget af foranstaltningerne, idet de medfører øgede omkostninger til celler for ikke vertikalt integrerede producenter af moduler.
Since the global demand for cells roughly equals the global demand for modules, the Chinese exporting producers had an excess capacity of cells of 25,6 % in 2015 and of 19,5 % in 2016.
Som anført i afsnit 6.4.1 har modulfabrikanterne imidlertid adgang til billige celler fra tredjelande og manglede ikke levering af sådanne celler.
In addition, China had 72,8 % of the global existing capacity of cells in 2016, thereby exceeding significantly all other third countries.
UNIONENS INTERESSER
The next four biggest third countries with available capacities are much smaller than China (Taiwan: 11 GW; Malaysia: 4 GW; Korea: 2,7 GW; Japan: 1,9 GW).
EU-celleproducenternes interesser analyseres i afsnit 6 — delvis interimsundersøgelse.
They contended that the Chinese production of cells and modules would be rather directed towards the rapidly expanding markets in Asia, such as Japan and India.
Der er mere end 100 kendte modulproducenter.
In addition, Chinese domestic demand has been increasing in the last few years, reaching 50 % of Chinese solar module production by the first quarter of 2016.
EU-erhvervsgrenen er repræsenteret ved sammenslutningen EU ProSun, der er ansøger.
China would allegedly have around 20 GW installations per year until 2020.
EU ProSun repræsenterer 31 EU-producenter af wafere, celler og moduler.
Therefore, in the context of an increasing number of solar installations in China, India and other markets in South East Asia, the Chinese solar module production would be primarily destined to satisfy the increasing demand in these markets.
En videreførelse af foranstaltningerne vil give EU-erhvervsgrenen mulighed for at bibeholde sin øgede markedsandel i Unionen og genrejse sig efter væsentlig skade.
It is correct that the Union market is no longer as important as it used to be in the past, when it accounted for up to 60 % of the annual global installed capacity (in 2012).
Som bemærket i betragtning 137 steg EU-erhvervsgrenens markedsandel i Unionen fra 25 % i 2012 til 35 % i NUP.
The Union is also not expected to be among the rapidly expanding markets.
På grund af salgspriserne på kinesiske moduler til tredjelande og den høje uudnyttede kapacitet i Kina vil de kinesiske moduler som fastslået i afsnit 4.6 komme til Unionen til priser under minimumsimportprisen og i større mængder, hvis foranstaltningerne udløber.
The forecasts for growth of the Union market are rather modest in comparison with the rest of the world.
Følgelig vil en videreførelse af foranstaltningerne beskytte EU-erhvervsgrenen mod et intensivt og urimeligt pristryk, som ellers ville blive udøvet af importen fra Kina.
According to Solar Power Europe's medium Scenario, European solar annual consumption is expected to grow from 8,2 GW to roughly 15 GW in 2020 [47].
Hvis foranstaltningerne ikke forlænges, kan de høje kapitalinvesteringer i FoU, som er foretaget i Unionens modulfremstillingsindustri, blive overflødiggjort, da de ikke let kan flyttes til en produktiv anvendelse i andre sektorer.
However, Solar Power Europe's estimates include also non EU countries (Turkey, Switzerland, etc.); its growth forecast for the 28 Member States of the Union is even less optimistic, i.e. approximately 11,6 GW [48] for 2020.
Såfremt EU-modulproducenterne går konkurs, vil de fleste af de 6300 personer, der arbejder med modulproduktion, miste deres job.
Nevertheless, the Union remains an important market representing 14 % of the total global market and its share of the global market is expected to remain important in the future.
Denne arbejdsstyrke er i vid udstrækning højt kvalificeret.
Three of its Member States (UK, Germany and France) were amongst the top ten markets for solar modules in 2015.
Derimod vil en videreførelse af foranstaltningerne give EU-erhvervsgrenen mere tid til helt at overvinde virkningerne af tidligere dumping.
Furthermore, as shown above, the Chinese exporting producers' excess capacity would be capable of meeting the total global demand in the future, including all rapidly growing markets such as China itself, India, Japan, South America taken together.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger opfordrede en part Kommissionen til at identificere de producenter af celler og moduler, der ikke går ind for foranstaltningerne.
Last but not least, the imposition and reinforcement of trade defence measures, inter alia, by Canada and the USA has reduced the attractiveness of these markets, thereby further increasing that of the Union market, should the measures be repealed.
Kommissionen præciserede, at ingen af de parter, der betragtede sig selv som en del af EU-erhvervsgrenen, gav sig til kende og var imod indførelsen af foranstaltningerne.
Despite the imposition of the anti-dumping and countervailing measures in 2013, the Chinese exporting producers remain very interested in the Union market which is demonstrated by the fact that they have maintained a strong position on the Union market.
Den samme part anmodede Kommissionen om at fjerne EU-waferproducenterne fra listen over 31 virksomheder, der var repræsenteret af EU ProSun.
As indicated in Section 4.4 above, the imports of modules and cells from China had a market share of 41 % and 16 % respectively during the RIP and have successfully kept (and even increased in the case of cells) their market position in comparison with imports from third countries.
Kommissionen præciserede, at EU ProSun repræsenterede 29 EU producenter af celler og moduler.
The volume and market share of the Chinese imports of modules are much more important than those from third countries; the latter cumulatively accounted for only 25 %.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger var flere parter uenige i, at foranstaltningerne var i EU-erhvervsgrenens interesse.
Regarding cells, the market share of third countries accounted for 51 % during the RIP, but this means that they dropped significantly (by 32 %) in comparison with 2013 when they had 75 % market share.
Disse parter var også uenige i, at de kinesiske dumpede varer udøvede et urimeligt pristryk på EU-erhvervsgrenen.
In addition, despite the fact that the measures entered into force in 2013, the Chinese imports of cells increased by 77,8 % between 2013 and the RIP.
De hævdede også, at Kommissionen har haft som mål at bevare EU-erhvervsgrenens markedsandel, og at Kommissionen beskyttede en lille brøkdel af solenergiindustrien på bekostning af hele solenergiværdikæden.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the anti-circumvention investigation in 2015, some of the Chinese producers were trying to avoid the measures by circumventing them through Taiwan and Malaysia, the biggest third countries in imports.
Kommissionen mindede om, at målet med handelsforanstaltninger i henhold til grundforordningen er at beskytte EU-erhvervsgrenen mod væsentlig skade som følge af dumping, hvis det er i Unionens interesse.
Following disclosure, several parties contested the finding that the Union market remains an attractive market for the Chinese exporting producers.
I denne udløbsundersøgelse fandt Kommissionen, at der er en sandsynlighed for fortsat dumping og skade, hvis foranstaltningerne udløber.
One of the parties pointed out that the projections for growth of the Union market as a whole should be reduced on the basis of a decline by 18 % of new installations in the Union in the first 9 months of 2016 in comparison with the previous year, thereby leading to a rather pessimistic estimation of 7,1 GW of Union demand in 2016.
Kommissionen fastslog ligeledes, at tilbagegangen på EU-markedet for solcellemoduler skyldtes en række faktorer, som ikke har nogen tilknytning til indførelsen af foranstaltninger, jf. konklusionen i betragtning 270.
This would also result into following a pessimistic development in Union demand until 2020.
Derfor er stigningen i EU-erhvervsgrenens markedsandel den vigtigste indikator for, at foranstaltningerne var effektive.
In addition, it contended that the three major Union markets (UK, Germany and France) would lose further attractiveness in the future.
Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at videreførelsen af foranstaltningerne vedrørende moduler helt klart er i EU-erhvervsgrenens interesse.
In fact, an estimated total Union demand of 7,1 GW, as quoted by the interested party, is a rather good result for 2016 as it is broadly in line with the Solar Power Europe's initial estimation under the medium scenario for 2016 (7,3 GW) [49].
Et betydeligt antal EU-leverandør- og aftagervirksomheder opfordrede enten individuelt eller gennem deres sammenslutninger til ophævelse af foranstaltningerne af hensyn til Unionens interesser.
In any case, even if the demand was to follow the worst possible scenario and the share of the Union market in the global market decreased, this would not necessarily render the Union market unattractive to the Chinese exports as all other considerations described above still stand.
De hævdede, at foranstaltningerne har uforudsete negative konsekvenser for et overvældende flertal af arbejdspladser i den europæiske solenergisektor.
Even though its relative share of global demand may be shrinking, the Union market still remains attractive for the Chinese exports.
De påstod, at foranstaltningerne forårsager en stigning i priserne på solcelleanlæg, hvilket har en dæmpende virkning på efterspørgslen med alle de negative konsekvenser for beskæftigelsen hos aftagere og leverandører.
Otherwise, circumvention practices, as still found in the recent investigations on Malaysia and Taiwan, would not occur.
De overordnede politiske mål for klimaændringer og fremme af vedvarende energi hævdes også at blive påvirket negativt.
Regarding the claims that China would install 20 GW of solar systems annually until 2020, the Commission's investigation has found evidence that the PRC would not be able to maintain this high target.
Ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører
The market intelligence reports that this Chinese target will be lowered due to lack of grid infrastructure, fundamentally oversupplied market and a deficit in the renewable subsidy fund [50].
To ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører af moduler gav sig til kende og besvarede spørgeskemaet, som efterfølgende blev kontrolleret, jf. betragtning 28.
The bust and boom cycles on the Chinese solar market are further discussed in recital 356.
Disse ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører fremsendte ligeledes en række yderligere bemærkninger, hvori de gjorde rede for, hvorfor foranstaltningerne efter deres mening bør bringes til ophør.
Following disclosure, one party quoted a press release by the Chinese National Energy Administration, in which the latter announced that according to the solar power development plan for the next five years, at least 105 GW of photovoltaic power capacity is planned to be installed by 2020.
Importørerne af solcellepaneler lider under en svag rentabilitet.
The party alleged that this would bring further increase in demand in China.
De ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører påstår, at foranstaltningerne øger prisen på solenergi og mindsker efterspørgslen.
The target of 105 GW of cumulative capacity installed is quite low and, according to BNEF [51], will be met already in 2017.
De ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører anførte også, at tilsagnet om en minimumsimportpris medfører ulemper for dem og andre aftagervirksomheder, som er aktive på de internationale markeder, såsom ingeniør-, indkøbs- og bygningsvirksomheder, da den begrænser deres mulighed for at købe moduler fra førende kinesiske tier 1-producenter.
Consequently, this low target is irrelevant as it suggests that no growth should be expected after 2017, contrary to the forecasts that the Chinese market would grow.
Tilsagnet giver ikke mulighed for parallelsalg af den undersøgte vare i og uden for Unionen.
At the same time the Commission already analysed in recital 201 above a scenario of growth of the Chinese market, albeit lower than 20 GW per year until 2020.
Derfor kan de kinesiske eksportører ikke levere moduler til ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører, der også er aktive på markeder uden for EU (f.eks. i Schweiz eller i USA), hvis de er en del af de ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importørers engroshandelsportefølje i Unionen.
Therefore, this argument was rejected.
Dette hævdes at være en betydelig ulempe for disse virksomheders deltagelse som grossister og projektudviklere på det globalt voksende solenergimarked.
The Commission also analysed whether the Chinese imports would come to the Union at prices lower than the current Union prices should the measures be allowed to lapse.
De ikke forretningsmæssigt forbundne importører hævdede også, at foranstaltningerne i deres nuværende form udgør en væsentlig ekstra forretningsrisiko og administrativ byrde.
Almost all exporting producers which sold modules and cells during the RIP from the PRC to the Union had price undertakings and their export prices to the EU were determined by those price undertakings which set a minimum import price.
Efter deres opfattelse forlænger yderligere administrative foranstaltninger, såsom udstedelse af et certifikat fra China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (»CCCME«) og EU-toldmyndighedernes indgående kontrol, den samlede tid fra bestilling til levering fra 7 til 11 uger.
Therefore, prices to third countries of the sampled exporting producers were used instead.