natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selv om nogle af de rentesatser, som EMPORDEF pålagde ENVC, kunne forekomme temmelig høje (f.eks. 3-måneders EURIBOR plus 8,431 % for låneaftalen af 30. maj 2012), mener Kommissionen ikke, at en privat finansiel institution ville have ydet et sådant lån uden sikkerhedsstillelse til en virksomhed, der tydeligvis var kriseramt.
Selective advantage
Kommissionen bemærker også, at når de første aftaler nåede deres udløb efter 90 dage, ville EMPORDEF have kunnet se, at ENVC hverken havde afdraget hovedstolen eller betalt renter på lånet (se betragtning 51 ovenfor).
As regards whether the past measures provided ENVC with an undue selective advantage, the Commission observes that Portugal considers that this is not the case for most of the past measures since they would be in line with the MEO principle.
På dette grundlag mener Kommissionen ikke, at en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor ville have ydet flere lån til ENVC.
In its opening decision, the Commission indicated that despite the limited information available at the time, it seemed unlikely that any rational private operator would have provided ENVC with the past measures.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at 2012- og 2013-lånene gav ENVC en uberettiget fordel.
Indeed, given the difficulties of ENVC at the time, the Commission was of the preliminary view that a rational market operator, operating under market conditions, would not have provided such financing to a company like ENVC.
Kommissionen vil nu vurdere, om DGTF-lånene på i alt 56 mio. EUR gav ENVC en uberettiget fordel.
The Commission also preliminarily concluded the advantage would be selective in nature given that its sole beneficiary was ENVC.
Portugal angiver, at disse lån forrentes til 6-måneders EURIBOR plus et variabelt spread afhængigt af den enkelte aftale.
As regards the 2006 capital increase, the Commission does not share the opinion of Portugal that a MEO would have opted for increasing the capital of ENVC — instead of liquidating it — in order to allow the company to continue operating in the shipbuilding market, in particular in view of the order book at the time of 15 construction projects for an amount of EUR 386 million (see recital 44 above).
Ifølge Portugal ville denne forrentning være tilfredsstillende for en investor, hvilket udelukker forekomsten af uberettigede fordele og statsstøtte.
In the first place, the Commission observes that a rational market operator would have taken into consideration whether it would be more economically rational to liquidate the company or to provide additional capital, bearing in mind the poor financial performance of ENVC between 2000 and 2006 and considering as well the measures already granted by the State to ENVC before the 2006 capital increase (i.e. one of the DGTF loans for an amount of EUR 30 million granted in January/February 2006, the shipbuilding subsidies in excess of EUR 27 million and the professional training subsidies).
Kommissionen kan ikke erklære sig enig med Portugal i, at fastsættelsen af en rente svarende til 6-måneders EURIBOR plus et variabelt spread ville gøre DGTF-lånene markedslignende.
According to the information provided by Portugal, nothing suggests that EMPORDEF made these considerations at the time of carrying out the 2006 capital increase.
Tabel 4 nedenfor viser den samlede rentesats på DGTF-lånene ved underskrivelsen:
In addition, Portugal notes that according to the restructuring plan prepared by BPI in August 2005, the costs associated to closing down ENVC were estimated at EUR 175 million.
Tabel 4
According to Portugal, in view of the fact that liquidation was more onerous than the capital increase, the former line of action was not retained.
Samlet rentesats gældende for DGTF-lånene
In this regard, the Commission observes that the estimation made by BPI in the restructuring plan is not backed by evidence.
Dato for underskrivelse af låneaftalen
On this basis, the Commission is not able to assess the accuracy of this estimation and conclude whether indeed it was more economically rational for EMPORDEF to carry out the capital increase than to proceed to the liquidation of the company.
Beløb i EUR
Moreover, the Commission observes that the restructuring plan prepared by BPI noted that ENVC on its own did not have the capacity to return to viability and that it needed external funds in an amount of EUR 45-50 million in a base case and EUR 70-80 million is a pessimistic case.
åneders EURIBOR (a)
The amount of the 2006 capital increase (EUR 24,875 million) remains significantly short from these estimations and would not have allowed ENVC to return to viability.
Samlet rente (a) + (b)
Finally, the Commission takes notes that ENVC was in need of in-depth restructuring as acknowledged by the restructuring plan prepared by BPI.
(udbetalt i to trancher hhv. april 2011 og juni 2011)
Although the restructuring plan is merely a draft, it already indicates the difficulties of ENVC and the need for additional external funds.
3,580 % (juni 2011)
However, the restructuring plan makes clear that the return of ENVC to viability would significantly depend on the capacity of the management of the company to honour its contracts and the evolution of the shipbuilding markets.
5,568 % (april 2011)
In this respect, the Commission observes that Portugal has provided no evidence that EMPORDEF took these elements into consideration when carrying out the 2006 capital increase, which — in any event — would fall short from the amounts estimated by the restructuring plan to allow the company to return to viability.
5,241 % (juni 2011)
In view of the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that a prudent market economy operator would not have provided the 2006 capital increase and therefore that it entailed an undue advantage to ENVC.
For at undersøge om den sats, der blev anvendt på DGTF-lånene, er i overensstemmelse med markedet, vil Kommissionen som det bedste tilgængelige alternativ benytte den referencesats, der følger af de dengang gældende regler.
As regards the 2012 and 2013 loans provided by EMPORDEF for a global amount of EUR 101118066,03, it results on the basis of the information provided by Portugal that in the course of 2012 EMPORDEF signed 70 contracts with ENVC, normally short-term with 90-day maturity.
For det første mener Kommissionen som anført i afsnit 6.1 ovenfor, at ENVC i 2006 og 2008 kunne anses for at være en kriseramt virksomhed.
The loans were granted for several different amounts and had different interest rates, mainly 3-month EURIBOR plus a margin.
Navnlig vedrørende DGTF-lånet fra 2006 blev det i Kommissionens meddelelse om metoden for fastsættelse af reference- og diskonteringsrenter fra 1997 [36], som var gældende på det tidspunkt, faslagt, at basisrenten (3,70 % i Portugal i januar 2006) [37] skulle forhøjes med en præmie på mindst 400 basispoint i særligt risikobetonede situationer.
However, some contracts had a fixed interest rate, in particular the contracts signed from October 2012 onwards (see for example the contracts signed on 30 March 2012 for EUR 16,7 million with an interest rate of 2 %, on 2 November 2012 for EUR 10,570 million with an interest rate of 5,871 % or on 1 December 2012 for EUR 1 million with the same interest rate of 5,871 %).
I den forbindelse understreger Kommissionen ENVC's vanskeligheder på det pågældende tidspunkt, og at det befandt sig i teknisk konkurs.
It also appears that the loan contracts were not collateralised.
Ifølge aftalen om DGTF-lånet fra 2006 gik ENVC desuden med til at stille indtægterne fra bygningen af bestemte skibe for Portugals søværn som sikkerhed.
Portugal argues the absence of aid in the DGTF loans given that EMPORDEF applied to ENVC the same interest rates it received from the market.
Det er imidlertid uklart, om en markedsorienteret udlåner ville have accepteret denne sikkerhedsstillelse i lyset af ENVC's problemer med at levere bygninger med overskud og/eller inden de aftalte frister (se nærmere i betragtning 80 og fodnote 28 ovenfor).
Since in any event EMPORDEF would be considered liable for the debts and liabilities of ENVC, given that it was its sole shareholder, Portugal claims that EMPORDEF did not increase its risk by exposing it further to ENVC.
Under alle omstændigheder har Kommissionen ikke modtaget nok dokumentation til at kunne undersøge disse skibsbygningskontrakter.
In the first place, it does not appear that EMPORDEF would be liable for all the debts and liabilities of ENVC, given that EMPORDEF and ENVC are limited liability companies (‘sociedade anónima’).
Som følge heraf ville den gældende referencesats være mindst 7,70 %, hvilket er langt over den rente på 4,198 %, der faktisk blev fastsat af DGTF.
On this basis, by providing the 2012 and 2013 loans to ENVC, EMPORDEF would have incurred additional risks going beyond its shares in the company.
For så vidt angår DGTF-lånet fra 2008 blev det i Kommissionens meddelelse om revision af metoden for fastsættelse af referencesatsen og kalkulationsrenten fra 2008 [38], som var gældende på det tidspunkt, faslagt, at der til basisrenten (2,05 % i Portugal i december 2008) [39] skulle føjes et tillæg afhængigt af den omhandlede virksomheds rating og den tilbudte sikkerhedsstillelse.
In any event, irrespective of the above, the Commission considers that EMPORDEF did not act as a rational market investor when providing the 2012 and 2013 loans to ENVC.
Som følge heraf ville den gældende referencesats være allermindst 12,05 % og dermed også over den rentesats på 4,417 %, som DGTF faktisk fastsatte.
In view of the difficulties of ENVC, the Commission considers that a market economy investor would have assessed the financial situation of ENVC and analysed the ability of the company to pay back the loans and the interests.
Med hensyn til DGTF-lånene fra 2010 og 2011 gentager Kommissionen sin mening om, at ENVC kunne siges at være en kriseramt virksomhed på tidspunktet for ydelsen af lånene (se afsnit 6.1 ovenfor).
In this respect, the Commission observes that several financial institutions — in relation to which the Commission has no reason to suspect that they did not operate as market investors — had refused to provide loans directly to ENVC.
Ifølge Kommissionens meddelelse om revision af metoden for fastsættelse af referencesatsen og kalkulationsrenten fra 2008, som var gældende på det tidspunkt, var basisrenten for Portugal 1,24 % i april 2008 og 1,49 % i april 2011.
This in itself indicates that the markets no longer believed that ENVC would be able to repay the loans.
Hvad angår DGTF-lånet fra 2010, bemærker Kommissionen, at der ikke foreligger en egentlig sikkerhedsstillelse, men blot et løfte fra ENVC om at bruge indtægterne fra en given rammeaftale med forsvarsministeriet til at tilbagebetale lånet med.
By merely replicating the interests it obtained for the loans in the market, EMPORDEF provided an undue advantage to ENVC, since the latter would not have been able to obtain those conditions — as a matter of fact, ENVC did not get any of the loans from the market.
På dette grundlag og under indtryk af ENVC's vanskeligheder på det pågældende tidspunkt mener Kommissionen, at tillægget skulle være på mindst 1000 basispoint.
Although some of the interest rates applied by EMPORDEF to ENVC could appear relatively high (e.g. 3-month EURIBOR plus 8,431 % for the contract signed on 30 May 2012), the Commission considers that no private financial institution would have provided such a loan with no collateralisation to a firm clearly in difficulty.
Hvad endelig angår DGTF-lånet fra 2011, bemærker Kommissionen, at der i lighed med DGTF-lånet fra 2010 ikke foreligger en egentlig sikkerhedsstillelse, men blot et løfte fra ENVC om at bruge indtægterne fra en given rammeaftale med forsvarsministeriet til at tilbagebetale lånet med, hvilket ydermere skulle bekræftes af ENVC's bestyrelse og godkendes af forsvarsministeriet.
On this basis, the Commission considers that a rational market operator would not have provided additional loans to ENVC.
Det er således højst tvivlsomt, om en markedsorienteret udlåner ville anse dette sikkerhedsstillelsesniveau for tilstrækkeligt.
The Commission therefore concludes that the 2012 and 2013 loans entailed an undue advantage to ENVC.
Da ENVC på daværende tidspunkt var en kriseramt virksomhed, mener Kommissionen derfor, at tillægget skulle være på mindst 1000 basispoint, hvilket ville resultere i en referencesats på mindst 11,49 % og dermed langt over den rentesats, der faktisk blev afkrævet ENVC (5,568 % i april 2011 og 5,241 % i juni 2011).
The Commission will now assess whether the DGTF loans for an amount of EUR 56 million provided ENVC with an undue advantage.
I betragtning af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at DGTF-lånene gav ENVC en uberettiget fordel.
Portugal indicates that these loans had an interest rate of 6-month EURIBOR plus a variable spread depending on each contract.
Vedrørende de støtteerklæringer, som EMPORDEF udstedte fra 2007 til 2011, bemærker Kommissionen for det første, at de forekommer meget lig en garanti, idet EMPORDEF i de fleste af disse erklæringer specifikt angav, at det ville gøre alt, hvad der var nødvendigt for at sikre, at ENVC havde de nødvendige midler til rådighed til at honorere den underliggende låneaftale.
According to Portugal, this remuneration would be satisfactory for an investor, thereby excluding the presence of an undue advantage and this of State aid.
Imidlertid har støtteerklæringerne af 8. januar 2007 og 26. juni 2008 en anden ordlyd.
Portugal also notes that the DGTF loans were provided bearing in mind the order book of ENVC.
I disse erklæringer anfører EMPORDEF, at det ejer ENVC 100 %, og at denne kapitalandel ikke vil blive nedbragt.
The Commission cannot share the views of Portugal that setting an interest rate corresponding to 6-month EURIBOR plus a variable spread would make the DGTF loans market-conform.
I modsat fald har den långivende bank lov til at kræve, at ENVC tilbagebetaler lånet før forfald.
Table 4 below summarises the total interest rate applicable to the DGTF loans at the time of their signature:
Denne erklæring tillader ikke i sig selv Kommissionen at anse EMPORDEF for at skulle hæfte for ENVC's misligholdelse af de pågældende lån, og ordlyden forekommer derfor ikke tilstrækkelig til at kunne sammenlignes med garantier.
Table 4
Det er derfor ikke fastslået, at disse erklæringer har givet ENVC en fordel.
Total interest rate applicable to the DGTF loans
For så vidt angår resten af støtteerklæringerne (dvs. dem, der blev afgivet i 2009, 2010 og 2011), hvor EMPORDEF erklærer sig rede til at indtræde i ENVC's sted, hvis ENVC ikke honorerer den underliggende låneaftale, fremgår det klart, at de kan lignes ved garantier, eftersom EMPORDEF forsikrer den långivende finansielle institution, at selskabet vil gøre alt, hvad der er nødvendigt for at sikre, at ENVC har de nødvendige midler til rådighed til at tilbagebetale lånene.
Date of signature of the contract
En normal markedsøkonomisk investor ville have krævet en præmie til gengæld for at give denne type »garanti«, hvilket EMPORDEF imidlertid aldrig gjorde trods den væsentlige risiko for, at ENVC ikke ville kunne tilbagebetale lånene på grund af sine vanskeligheder på daværende tidspunkt.
Amount in EUR
Ifølge afsnit 2.2 i Kommissionens meddelelse om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte i form af garantier [40] (»garantimeddelelsen«) »bør der normalt udbetales en rimelig præmie for at bære risikoen.
onth EURIBOR (a) (%)
Når låntageren ikke behøver at betale præmien eller betaler en lav præmie, opnår vedkommende en fordel.
Spread [34] (b)
Sammenlignet med en situation uden en garanti, sætter statsgarantien låntageren i stand til at opnå finansielle lånevilkår, som er bedre end de sædvanlige vilkår på de finansielle markeder.
Total interest rate (a)+(b) (%)
Ved hjælp af statsgarantien kan låntageren typisk opnå lavere rentesatser og/eller stille mindre sikkerhed.
(paid out in two instalments in April 2011 and in June 2011)
I nogle tilfælde ville låntageren ikke uden en statsgaranti kunne finde et finansieringsinstitut, der i det hele taget var rede til at yde lån«.Det er derfor nødvendigt at undersøge, om garantien i princippet kunne være blevet opnået på markedsvilkår i det finansielle marked, og om markedspræmien for garantien blev betalt [41].
3,907 % (April 2011)
Kommissionen bemærker, at der ikke blev opkrævet betaling for støtteerklæringerne, og at ENVC ikke betalte en præmie til EMPORDEF.
3,580 % (June 2011)
Derfor blev den risiko, som EMPORDEF løb, ikke dækket.
5,568 (April 2011)
Dette er i sig selv nok til at konkludere, at støtteerklæringerne, som er meget lig en garanti, gav ENVC en uberettiget fordel.
5,241 (June 2011)
Hvad angår Portugals argument om, at EMPORDEF under alle omstændigheder i sidste ende ville hæfte for ENVC's gæld, idet det var eneaktionær, henviser Kommissionen til sin argumentation i betragtning 88 ovenfor, som finder tilsvarende anvendelse.
In order to ascertain the market-conformity of the interest rates applied to the DGTF loans, the Commission will use as the best available proxy the reference rates resulting from the applicable rules at the time.
Derfor mener Kommissionen, at støtteerklæringerne fra 2009, 2010 og 2011 gav ENVC en uberettiget fordel.
First, as indicated in section 6.1 above, the Commission considers that in 2006 and 2008 ENVC would qualify as a firm in difficulty.
Hvad angår Atlântida-lånet, bemærker Kommissionen, at EMPORDEF i december 2009 gav ENVC 37 mio. EUR, som det havde lånt af CGD, til at få bilagt striden med Atlanticoline.
As regards in particular the 2006 DGTF loan, the Commission observes that according to the 2009 report of the IGF, as of 31 December 2005, ENVC was in a situation of technical bankruptcy.
På det tidspunkt, da ENVC allerede var en kriseramt virksomhed, ville en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor have vurderet selskabets situation og dets kapacitet til at tilbagebetale lån i stedet for blot at overføre midler til ENVC.
As regards the 2008 DGTF loan, the same report indicates that as of the end of 2008 ENVC was again in a situation of technical bankruptcy (see recital 64 above).
En fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor ville også have vurderet de risici, der var forbundet med driften og muligheden for at sælge fartøjet til en anden køber, hvilket blev det endelige resultat i september 2014 (se betragtning 30 ovenfor).
In particular, concerning the 2006 DGTF loan, the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 1997 [36], applicable at the time, established that the base rate (3,70 % in Portugal in January 2006) [37] was to be increased by a premium amounting to 400bp or more in situations involving a particular risk.
Kommissionen bemærker desuden, at lånet blev ydet til EMPORDEF til en årlig rente af 6-måneders EURIBOR plus 2 %, hvilket på aftaletidspunktet gav en rentesats på 2,993 %.
In this respect, the Commission highlights the difficulties of ENVC at the time and the fact that it was in a situation of technical bankruptcy.
I overensstemmelse med Kommissionens meddelelse om revision af metoden for fastsættelse af referencesatsen og kalkulationsrenten fra 2008, som var gældende på det tidspunkt, var basisrenten for Portugal i december 2009 imidlertid 1,45 %, hvortil der skulle anvendes et tillæg på mindst 1000 basispoint på grund af ENVC's vanskeligheder og manglen på egentlig sikkerhedsstillelse.
Also, according to the 2006 DGTF loan contract, ENVC agreed to have as collateral the revenues resulting from the construction of certain vessels for the Portuguese Navy.
Derfor ville referencesatsen skulle være mindst 11,45 %.
However, it is unclear whether a market-oriented lender would have accepted such collateral in view of ENVC's problems to carry out the constructions at a profit and/or within the contractual deadlines (see in this respect recital 80 and footnote 28 above).
Fordrejning af konkurrencevilkårene og påvirkning af samhandelen i EU
In any event, the Commission has not been provided with evidence allowing it to examine those construction contracts.
De tidligere foranstaltninger vil sandsynligvis påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, idet ENVC er i konkurrence med skibsværfter i andre af EU's medlemsstater og i resten af verden.
The Commission therefore considers that applying a margin of at least 400bp would be reasonable.
De omhandlede tidligere foranstaltninger satte derfor ENVC i stand til, ulig sine konkurrenter, fortsat at drive virksomhed uden at måtte lide under følgerne af sine dårlige økonomiske resultater.
As a result, the applicable reference rate would be at least 7,70 %, which is well above the interest rate of 4,198 % actually applied by the DGTF.
Derfor fordrejede de tidligere foranstaltninger også konkurrencen.
As regards the 2008 DGTF loan, the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 2008 [38], applicable at the time, established that to the base rate (2,05 % in Portugal in December 2008) [39] a margin was to be applied depending on the rating of the undertaking concerned and the level of collateralisation offered.
Konklusion om forekomsten af statsstøtte og kvantificering
In view of the difficulties of ENVC at the time and the low level of collateralisation (see recital 97 above, which applies mutatis mutandis), the applicable margin would be at least 1000bp.
På baggrund af ovenstående vurdering konkluderer Kommissionen, at de tidligere foranstaltninger udgør statsstøtte, eftersom de opfylder de nødvendige kriterier for at blive defineret som statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF med undtagelse af støtteerklæringerne af 8. januar 2007 og 26. juni 2008 (se betragtning 103 ovenfor).
As a result, the applicable reference rate would be at the very least 12,05 %, also above the interest rate of 4,417 % actually applied by the DGTF.
Som angivet i betragtning 68 og 69 ovenfor udgør skibsbygningstilskuddene og tilskuddene til faglig uddannelse statsstøtte for et beløb af henholdsvis 27129933,20 EUR og 257791 EUR.
In relation to the 2010 and 2011 DGTF loans, the Commission reiterates its views that ENVC qualifies as a firm in difficulty at the moment the loans were granted (see section 6.1 above).
For så vidt angår resten af de tidligere foranstaltninger, gentager Kommissionen, at ingen markedsorienteret investor i lyset af ENVC's daværende vanskeligheder ville have ydet selskabet sådanne foranstaltninger.
According to the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates of 2008, applicable at the time, the base rate applicable for Portugal was 1,24 % in April 2008 and 1,49 % in April 2011.
Derfor finder Kommissionen, at ENVC modtog statsstøtte for et beløb, der svarende til hele 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen (24,875 mio. EUR).
As regards the 2010 DGTF loan, the Commission observes that there is no strict collateralisation but merely a promise by ENVC to use the revenues resulting from a given framework-contract with the Ministry of National Defence to repay the loan.
For så vidt angår støtteerklæringerne fra 2009, 2010 og 2011, gentager Kommissionen, at de er meget lig garantier (se betragtning 103 og 104 ovenfor).
On this basis, and bearing in mind the difficulties of ENVC at the time, the Commission is of the view that the applicable margin should be at least 1000bp.
I denne henseende hedder det i garantimeddelelsen, afsnit 4.1: »Kommissionen bemærker, at en eventuel garant, der opererer under markedsøkonomiske forhold, ville kræve en høj præmie af kriseramte virksomheder på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien ydes, på grund af den forventede misligholdelsesgrad.
Therefore, the applicable reference rate would be at least 11,24 %, compared to the much lower 1,964 % charged by the DGTF.
Kommissionen bemærker, at bankerne kun ydede lån til ENVC, fordi der forelå »garantier« (i form af støtteerklæringer) fra EMPORDEF til betryggelse af bankerne om, at EMPORDEF ville gøre, hvad der var nødvendigt for at sikre, at ENVC ville tilbagebetale lånene.
It is thus highly doubtful that this level of collateralisation could be considered adequate by a market-oriented lender.