natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På baggrund af ovenstående finder Kommissionen ikke, at NLB's beslutning om at deltage i foranstaltning 4 kan tilregnes Slovenien.
In addition, the Commission has no reasons to doubt that the private tourist agencies decided to invest in Adria for profit-seeking motives.
Efter afklaringen af, at AUKN's og PDP's handlinger kan tilregnes staten, skal Kommissionen vurdere, om de giver Adria en selektiv uretmæssig fordel.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that measure 3 did not entail an undue advantage to Adria and therefore excludes the presence of State aid, without it being necessary to assess further whether the rest of the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU would be met.
Slovenien gør for det første gældende, at bankernes beslutning om at investere i Adria blev truffet samtidigt med statens, hvilket i sig selv udelukker tilstedeværelsen af en fordel.
On 30 September 2011, Slovenia subscribed in cash 70 % (EUR 49,5 million) of the 2011 capital increase of Adria.
Kommissionen minder for det første om, at den allerede har konkluderet, at Adria var en kriseramt virksomhed i 2011, da foranstaltning 4 blev tildelt (se betragtning 66).
Slovenia invested the money through the Capital Assets Management Agency of Slovenia (AUKN).
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at bankernes deltagelse i kapitalforhøjelsen i 2011 tog form af en konvertering til aktier af 26 % af deres eksisterende tilgodehavender hos Adria.
In addition, PDP subscribed in cash an additional 1 % (EUR 0,5 million).
Ifølge Slovenien påtog bankerne sig en ny risiko ved konverteringen, som kunne sidestilles med en indsprøjtning af frisk kapital, ca. [10-20] mio. EUR.
It is thus clear that AUKN's actions were imputable to the State and that they entailed State resources, which moreover is not contested by Slovenia.
Kommissionen har vurderet oplysningerne fra Slovenien og konkluderer, at der var fuld og tilstrækkelig sikkerhed for [10-20] mio. EUR af de 19,7 mio. EUR konverteret til aktier gennem pant, navnlig i Adrias fly.
As an additional element, the Commission highlights a press release of 23 June 2011 of the Office of the Prime Minister of Slovenia: ‘At today's session, the Government […] decided that [AUKN] would contribute EUR 49,5 million to the equity of Adria Airways, d. d., and the joint stock company [PDP] would pay EUR 500000 […].
Adria fastsatte de pågældende flys værdi på grundlag af rapporten »Aircraft Value Reference« offentliggjort i april 2011 af det uafhængige selskab Aircraft Value Analysis Company (»AVAC«).
With its active engagement in this process, the Republic of Slovenia would also in the future like to meet its interests in the field of scheduled air services provided by a carrier with the seat in Slovenia’ [36].
I denne rapport oplyses om nuværende og fremtidige værdier og leasingafgifter for forskellige typer fly med værdier for den nedre og den øvre grænse.
In relation to PDP, the Commission considers that there are a number of indicators in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law [37] which allows it to conclude that PDP was set up to carry out policies decided by the Slovenian public authorities and that its decision to invest in measure 4 is imputable to the State and entails State resources.
Ved vurderingen af de fly, der var pantsat som sikkerhed, blev der anvendt værdier, der lå betydeligt under den øvre AVAC-grænse.
In the first place, the Commission notes that the Slovenian State indirectly owns 100 % of PDP (through KAD, SOD and DSU).
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er rapporten et pålideligt grundlag for fastsættelse af flyenes værdi i lyset af AVAC's uafhængige karakter og den udbredte anvendelse i sektoren.
In this sense, the Commission reminds its decision in the ELAN case [38] in which it concluded that the actions of KAD and DSU, two of the owners of PDP, were imputable to the State.
Der var imidlertid ikke fuld sikkerhed for [0-10] mio. EUR konverteret til aktier.
In addition, the State has the totality of votes in the shareholders' committee, which in turn appoints the Board of Directors of the company.
Hvad angår denne del, kan Kommissionen ikke konkludere, at den kan sidestilles med en kapitalindsprøjtning, og at bankerne påtog sig en ny risiko.
Following Article 19 of the Articles of Association of PDP, the Board of Directors must authorise the purchase of securities when the value of the transaction exceeds EUR 500000.
Derudover blev vilkårene for den resterende gæld bedre, og det samlede risikoniveau blev betydeligt lavere, da sikkerhedsstillelsen for den udestående (ikkekonverterede) del af gælden var den samme som før konverteringen.
The Commission also reminds, in line with its opening decision, the statement of former Slovenian Minister of Finance at the end of his term on 28 October 2011 (i.e. after measure 4 had taken place): ‘With the establishment of the special restructuring company (PDP) we provided Slovenian firms with new sources of finance, knowhow and expertise based on cases of good practice for the restructuring of firms.
Den samlede risiko blev yderligere reduceret, da Adria som en forudsætning for konverteringen af gæld til aktier var nødt til at […].
Adria Airways and Unior are definitely the most resounding successes’ [39].
I nogle tilfælde er betingelserne for den udestående gæld (renter, tilbagebetalingsplan osv.) derudover […].
This statement can be considered indirect evidence of imputability to the State in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law.
Det fremgår således, at bankernes stilling ikke kunne sidestilles med statens, da bankerne besluttede at investere i Adria.
The arguments provided by Slovenia that this statement should be seen in the political context of the end of term of the Minister of Finance as a ‘bold and simple enough [statement] to be successfully communicated through the media’ do not appear convincing.
Det kan heller ikke udelukkes, at statens adfærd påvirkede bankernes beslutning om at investere i Adria.
Finally, the Commission adds as an additional indirect evidence the press release of 23 June 2011 of the Office of the Prime Minister of Slovenia (see recital 88), which shows that the Slovenian Government had decided that PDP would contribute EUR 0,5 million to the 2011 capital increase.
I Adrias årsberetning for 2011 anføres det, at Sloveniens regering indtog en klar holdning den 20. januar 2011 og tog stilling til Adria Airways' betydning som det nationale flyselskab for den slovenske økonomi, slovenske borgere og udenlandske gæster, og at regeringen i sin beslutning fastsætter en plan, der skal sikre, at Adria Airways forbliver Sloveniens nationale flyselskab.
In light of the above, the Commission is of the view that the participation of PDP to the 2010 capital increase entailed State resources and that PDP's actions are imputable to the State.
Denne beslutning, der blev truffet længe inden vedtagelsen af omstruktureringsplanen i september 2011, kan have gjort det nemmere for bankerne at investere, da staten allerede havde givet udtryk for sin store interesse i at støtte Adria [41].
With regard to the banks, the Commission observes, in line with its opening decision, that Abanka Vipa d.d., Unicredit Bank of Slovenia d.d. and Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank d.d. are purely private entities.
På baggrund af ovennævnte argumenter kan Kommissionen ikke godtage Sloveniens argumenter om, at staten og bankerne investerede på pari passu-vilkår.
In relation to NLB, at the time when measure 4 took place, it was majority-owned by the State, either directly (45,62 % of the shares) or indirectly through SOD (4,07 %) and KAD (4,03 %) [40], with KBC Bank as the only other significant shareholder (25 %).
Kommissionen skal imidlertid undersøge, om Sloveniens investering i Adria er i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene.
The State's majority ownership of NLB, which translates into majority of votes in the Management Board and Supervisory Board, is an indication of the imputability of the measures to the State.
De slovenske myndigheder påpeger, at de besluttede at deltage i foranstaltning 4 på grundlag af omstruktureringsplanen fra september 2011, der bør anses for at være i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
However, from the Articles of Association of NLB the Commission cannot conclude with certainty that its decision to invest in Adria was imputable to the State.
Kommissionen bemærker indledningsvis, at kapitalforhøjelsen i 2011 fandt sted, uden at der forelå nogen vurderingsrapport, hvilket ikke var tilfældet ved de tidligere kapitalforhøjelser.
Also, the Commission has not identified from the management structure of NLB any interference on the side of the public authorities.
I henhold til retspraksis ville en privat investor, som overvejer at foretage kapitalindskud i en virksomhed med betydelig gæld, desuden kræve en omstruktureringsplan, der kunne gøre virksomheden rentabel [42].
The Commission did not find either any indirect evidence in this respect in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law.
I den pågældende sag påpeger de slovenske myndigheder, at de besluttede at deltage i kapitalforhøjelsen i 2011 på grundlag af omstruktureringsplanen fra september 2011.
For the reasons above, the Commission considers that NLB's decision to participate in measure 4 is not imputable to Slovenia.
Kommissionen har imidlertid allerede konkluderet, at Adria var en kriseramt virksomhed i 2011 (se betragtning 66).
Once clarified that the actions of AUKN and PDP are imputable to the State, the Commission must assess whether they entailed a selective undue advantage to Adria.
Det gør det i sig selv usandsynligt, at staten kunne forvente, at Adria generede et normalt afkast af den investerede kapital inden for en rimelig tidshorisont.
Slovenia first claims that the decision of the banks to invest into Adria was concomitant to the decision of the State, which per se would exclude the presence of advantage.
Kommissionen fastholder endvidere sin holdning i indledningsafgørelsen om, at omstruktureringsplanen ikke kan betragtes som et tilstrækkeligt grundlag for at anse kapitalforhøjelsen i 2011 for at være i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The Commission first reminds its conclusion that Adria was a firm in difficulty in 2011, at the time when measure 4 was granted (see recital 66).
I omstruktureringsplanen (i den oprindelige version fra september 2011) blev der for det første med hensyn til rentabiliteten i 2013 forventet meget lave fortjenstmarginer (EBT-marginer).
In addition, the Commission notes that the participation of the banks to the 2011 capital injection took the form of a conversion into equity of 26 % of their existing claims against Adria.
I det realistiske scenarie var fortjenstmarginen […] % i 2013, […] % i 2014 og […] % i 2015.
On the other hand, the State and PDP injected cash.
Kommissionen bemærker imidlertid, at de foreløbige rapporter vedrører perioden 2011-2012, hvorimod omstruktureringsplanen indeholdt prognoser frem til 2015, […].
According to Slovenia, the banks would have assumed new risk with the conversion, which could be seen as equivalent to an injection of fresh money of EUR [10-20] million.
På denne baggrund mener Kommissionen, at de foreløbige rapporter ikke tilvejebragte de manglende oplysninger, der var nødvendige for, at omstruktureringsplanen kunne opfylde MEIP-testen.
The Commission has assessed the information provided by Slovenia and concludes that indeed EUR [10-20] million out of the EUR 19,7 million converted into equity were fully and adequately collateralised with pledges mainly on aircrafts owned by Adria.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at kapitalforhøjelsen i 2011 gav Adria en uretmæssig fordel.
In order to establish the value of these aircraft, Adria relied on the ‘Aircraft Value Reference’ report published in April 2011 by the independent company Aircraft Value Analysis Company (‘AVAC’).
Denne fordel var i sagens natur selektiv, da Adria var enemodtageren.
This report provides current and future values and lease rentals of multiple types of aircraft, with high and low value boundaries.
Endelig skal Kommissionen overveje, om foranstaltning 4 kunne fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne ved at give Adria en fordel i forhold andre konkurrenter, der ikke modtager offentlig støtte.
In order to assess the aircraft pledged as security, values considerably below the AVAC high value were used.
Foranstaltning 4 gjorde det således muligt for Adria at fortsætte driften, således at virksomheden i modsætning til andre konkurrenter ikke skal håndtere de konsekvenser, de finansielle vanskeligheder normalt ville have.
The Commission is of the opinion that the report constitutes a reliable basis for determining the value of the aircraft, given the independent character of AVAC and its widespread use in the sector.
På baggrund af ovennævnte argumenter konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltning 4 udgjorde statsstøtte til Adria efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
However, EUR [0-10] million of debts converted into equity were not fully collateralised.
Foranstaltning 5: Afhændelsen af AAT i 2010-2011
For this part, the Commission cannot conclude that it was equivalent to a cash injection and that the banks assumed new risk.
I sin indledningsafgørelse og af de grunde, der er nævnt i betragtning 41 og 42, drog Kommissionen den foreløbige konklusion, at PDP's og Aerodrom Ljubljanas erhvervelse af aktier i AAT gav Adria en uretmæssig fordel.
Moreover, the terms of the remaining debt improved and the overall level of risk significantly decreased, given that the outstanding (unconverted) part of the debts remained with the same level of collateral as before the conversion.
I lyset af den forskellige karakter af PDP's og Aerodrom Ljubljanas bidrag (kontantindskud versus konvertering af gæld til aktier) og begrundelsen for foranstaltning 4 (se betragtning 94-101) konkluderer Kommissionen, at pari passu-argumentationen ligeledes kan udelukkes i forbindelse med foranstaltning 5.
This overall risk is further reduced by the fact that as a pre-condition for the debt-to-equity conversion, Adria had to […].
Kommissionen skal imidlertid vurdere, om PDP's og Aerodrom Ljubljanas investeringsbeslutninger var økonomisk rationelle, dvs. om en forsigtig operatør i en markedsøkonomi på tilsvarende vilkår ville have handlet på samme måde.
In addition, in some cases, the conditions of the outstanding debt (interest rate, repayment schedule, etc.) […].
Kommissionen bemærker i denne forbindelse for det første, at den samlede pris, som Aerodrom Ljubljana og PDP betalte, dvs. 14,7 mio. EUR, lå inden for det værdiinterval, der var fastsat i AAT-vurderingsrapporten.
On the other hand, Slovenia assumed full risk for at least EUR 49,5 million since it only became shareholder of Adria upon the 2011 capital injection.
Kommissionen rejste imidlertid tvivl om vurderingsrapporten og påpegede, at AAT (på daværende tidspunkt Adrias flyserviceselskab SVL) burde have været værdisat som en selvstændig enhed i rapporten uden hensyntagen til koncerninterne synergier.
The banks assumed new risk but not at the same level as Slovenia, given that they saw their position improved as a result of the debt conversion.
Kommissionen bemærkede ligeledes, at der var en betydelig tidsforskel mellem vurderingen af AAT/SVL ([…]) og afhændelsen af AAT (november 2010 — marts 2011).
On this basis, it appears that when the banks decided to invest into Adria they were not in a comparable position to the State.
Med hensyn til tidsforskellen mellem vurderingen og afhændelsen af aktierne har Slovenien forklaret, at vurderingsrapporten var baseret på Adrias finansielle situation pr. 31. december 2009, dvs. de seneste eksternt reviderede data.
Adria's 2011 annual report notes that ‘[t]he Government of […] Slovenia clearly formulated its opinion on 20 January 2011 and took a position on the importance of Adria Airways as the national air carrier for the Slovenian economy, Slovenian citizens and guests from abroad.
Kommissionen bemærker, at foranstaltning 5 blev gennemført i november 2010, dvs. mindre end et år efter datoen for vurdering af AAT i henhold til vurderingsrapporten.
In its decision the Government set out its plan for Adria Airways to remain Slovenia's national air carrier […]’.
Der er desuden taget højde for negative prognoser for Adrias udvikling i AAT-vurderingsrapporten, som også omfattede en detaljeret vurdering af forretningssegmentet vedligeholdelse, reparation og eftersyn, og det blev konkluderet, at Adrias negative udvikling ikke angik AAT, og at AAT var en rentabel enhed.
This decision, taken well before the adoption of the restructuring plan in September 2011, could have eased the decision of the banks to invest, given that they State had already signalled its strong interest in supporting Adria [41].
En detaljeret gennemgang af vurderingsrapporten viser endvidere, at AAT/SVL blev vurderet som en selvstændig forretningsenhed, og der blev rent faktisk ikke taget hensyn til potentielle synergier med Adria.
On the basis of the arguments above, the Commission excludes the arguments of Slovenia that the State and the banks invested on pari passu terms.
I denne forbindelse blev vurderingsrapporten tilsyneladende udarbejdet på et tidspunkt, hvor det var kendt, at AAT ville begynde at levere tjenester inden for vedligeholdelse, reparation og eftersyn til andre eksterne kunder, navnlig Spanair, der i sidste ende ville blive AAT's største kunde i stedet for Adria.
However, the Commission must analyse whether Slovenia's investment in Adria would be market-conform.
På baggrund af ovenstående og da rapporten var baseret på de senest tilgængelige reviderede finansielle data om AAT, da den var udarbejdet af en uafhængig ekspert, og da den tydeligvis var baseret på alle relevante forretningsaspekter, kan den bruges som reference i forbindelse med den pågældende foranstaltning.
Slovenia claims that it decided to participate in measure 4 on the basis of the restructuring plan of September 2011, which should be considered MEIP-conform.
I november 2010, da PDP og Aerodrom Ljubljana besluttede at overtage AAT, var prognoserne for BNP-vækst i Slovenien i 2010, 2011 og 2012 rent faktisk igen positive (henholdsvis 1,1 %, 1,9 % og 2,6 %) [43].
In addition, according to the case-law, a private investor contemplating a recapitalisation of an undertaking with significant debts would have required a restructuring plan capable of making the company viable [42].
Under disse omstændigheder ville en privat investor ikke nødvendigvis have foretaget en ny vurdering, da den pågældende investor kunne antage, at vurderingsrapporten baseret på tal fra 2009 tegnede et retvisende billede af virksomheden.
In the case at hand, the Slovenian authorities claim that they decided to participate in the 2011 capital increase on the basis of the restructuring plan of September 2011.
Nok så vigtigt har Slovenien forelagt dokumentation for, at AAT var rentabel og ikke havde forfalden gæld, og at overskuddet fra gennemførelsen af foranstaltning 5 kunne anvendes til at betale af på gælden.
However, the Commission has already concluded that Adria was in difficulty in 2011 (see recital 66).
Slovenien forelagde ligeledes dokumentation for, at Aerodrom Ljubljana traf sin afgørelse om at investere i AAT på grundlag af økonomiske overvejelser.
In itself, this makes it unlikely that the State could expect Adria to produce a normal return on the capital invested within a reasonable time.
I august og september 2010 vurderede Aerodrom Ljubljanas bestyrelse og tilsynsråd muligheden for at erhverve aktier i AAT.
Moreover, the Commission maintains its views of the opening decision that the restructuring plan cannot be deemed sufficient to justify the 2011 capital increase as MEIP-conform.
Aerodrom Ljubljana vurderede fordelen ved indfrielse af en række udestående fordringer hos Adria i lyset af foranstaltningens vilkår, herunder et fast afkast på 8 % på præferenceaktier i AAT, […].
First, the restructuring plan (in its original version of September 2011) foresaw viability in 2013 with very low profit (EBT) margins (the realistic scenario foresaw profit margins of […] % in 2013, […] % in 2014 and […] % in 2015).
Selv om aktiekursen blev vurderet lavere i en anden vurderingsrapport, konkluderede Aerodrom Ljubljanas tilsynsråd, at konverteringsvilkårene ([…]) begrundede en højere aktiekurs.
The insufficient return for the shareholders is also demonstrated by the fact that the plan forecasted particularly low levels of equity for the same period, in the range of EUR […] in 2011 to EUR […] in 2015.
Med hensyn til den anden etape i afhændelsen af AAT fremgår det af referatet af mødet i Aerodrom Ljubljanas tilsynsråd den 21. januar 2011, at fordelene og ulemperne ved de forskellige aktiekurser og udløbet af Aerodrom Ljubljanas salgsoption blev drøftet.
This would mean that the capital injected in September 2011 — EUR 69,7 million — was significantly reduced during the restructuring period and thus would not bring any actual return.
Der blev navnlig givet afkald på salgsoptionen, da de ordinære aktier blev erhvervet i starten af 2011, men Aerodrom Ljubljanas tilsynsråd konkluderede alligevel, at det var økonomisk rationelt at gøre dette, da Aerodrom Ljubljana i stedet fik lige andel i ledelsen af AAT, selv om Aerodrom Ljubljana havde færre aktier end PDP.
Slovenia provided a number of interim reports prepared by Airconomy and Adria dated April-September 2011 (i.e. predating the restructuring plan of September 2011), which were supposed to include the quantifications missing in the restructuring plan and which apparently were provided to all shareholders of Adria at the time as well as to the State.
Tilsynsrådet bemærkede endvidere, at erhvervelsen af AAT ville være til fordel for Aerodrom Ljubljana, idet lufthavnens anslåede indtjening i 2011 var blevet reduceret med […] %, hvis Adria havde indstillet sine aktiviteter.
However, the Commission observes that the interim reports refer to the period 2011-2012, whereas the restructuring plan included forecasts until 2015, […].
Slovenien forelagde ligeledes dokumentation for, at PDP's ledelse besluttede at erhverve præferenceaktierne og de ordinære aktier i AAT på et økonomisk rationelt grundlag.
On this basis, the Commission is of the opinion that the interim reports did not provide the necessary missing information in order for the restructuring plan to fulfil the MEIP test.
Det fremgår rent faktisk af referaterne fra ledelsesmøderne i PDP, at ledelsen selv havde vurderet AAT og var nået frem til en kurs på mellem […] EUR og […] EUR, hvilket lå inden for intervallet i vurderingsrapporten som omhandlet i betragtning 34.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that the 2011 capital increase conferred an undue advantage to Adria.
Selv om det interne afkast på PDP's investering ville beløbe sig til […] %, lykkedes det PDP at opnå bedre betingelser hos AAT, herunder et fast afkast på 8 %.
This advantage was selective in nature given that its sole beneficiary was Adria.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at PDP's og Aerodrom Ljubljanas beslutning om at deltage i foranstaltning 5 ikke gav Adria en uretmæssig fordel, da begge investorer optrådte som forsigtige markedsoperatører og traf deres egne investeringsbeslutninger på et solidt økonomisk grundlag.
Finally, the Commission has to consider whether measure 4 was likely to distort competition and affect trade between Member States, by providing Adria with an advantage over competitors not receiving public support.
Det er således ikke nødvendigt at vurdere, om de øvrige kumulative betingelser i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF var opfyldt.
It seems clear that measure 4 was able to affect intra-EU trade and competition as Adria competes with other EU airlines, in particular since the entry into force of the third stage of liberalisation of air transport (‘third package’) on 1 January 1993.
Konklusion vedrørende forekomsten af statsstøtte
In addition, for travels of relatively shorter distances within the EU, air travel is in competition with road and rail transport, and therefore road and rail carriers might also be affected.