natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I punkt 11 i 2004-rammebestemmelserne tilføjes det, at selv hvis ingen af de i punkt 10 nævnte omstændigheder foreligger, kan en virksomhed alligevel anses for kriseramt, især hvis de sædvanlige tegn på, at en virksomhed er kriseramt, er til stede, såsom voksende underskud, faldende omsætning, voksende lagerbeholdninger, overskudskapacitet, faldende cash flow, stigende gældsætning, stigende finansieringsudgifter og faldende eller opbrugt nettoformue.
The restructuring plan did not quantify the costs associated to the non-fulfilment of the contracts available to ENVC at the time.
Kommissionen bemærker, at ENVC er et selskab med begrænset ansvar, som kontinuerligt har haft betydelige tab siden 2000 eller endda tidligere (se tabel 3 nedenfor):
However, the costs associated to closing down the company (including the dismissal of the employees and the regularization of liabilities) were estimated at EUR 175 million.
Tabel 3
According to Portugal, in view of the fact that liquidation was more onerous than the capital increase, the former line of action was not retained.
ENVC's nettoresultater fra 2000 til 2013
Portugal further explains that the restructuring plan acknowledged the need for support to ENVC, since the company was not able on its own to continue operations in 2005-2007.
Kilde: EMPORDEF's årsregnskaber for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 og 2013 (findes på: http://www.empordef.pt/main.html), ENVC's årsregnskaber for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2010 og 2011.
However, Portugal observes that a 2009 report of the Inspecção-Geral de Finanças — IGF (the entity charged of supervising the Portuguese public companies) noted that the restructuring plan of ENVC had not been sufficiently implemented and that the financial and economic forecasts for the period 2008-2011 were too optimistic.
Desuden havde ENVC haft negativ egenkapital i hvert fald siden 2009, hvor den var – 25,62 mio. EUR, i 2010 – 74,49 mio. EUR, i 2011 – 129,63 mio. EUR, i 2012 – 142,45 mio. EUR og i 2013 – 193,46 mio. EUR [24].
Therefore, the interest rates should be considered at market terms and free of aid.
Ifølge Portugal (se betragtning 43 ovenfor) var 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen nødvendig for at overholde artikel 35 i den portugisiske selskabslov, idet alternativerne var at reducere ENVC's kapital eller likvidere selskabet.
According to Portugal, since EMPORDEF was the sole shareholder of ENVC, it could be considered liable at last instance for the debts and liabilities of ENVC.
Desuden understreges det i omstruktureringsplanen, som BPI udarbejdede i august 2005 (se betragtning 47 ovenfor), at ENVC siden ultimo 2003 var i teknisk konkurs (»falência técnica«).
Therefore, Portugal claims that EMPORDEF did not increase its risk by exposing it further to ENVC by means of the 2012 and 2013 loans.
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at 2009-rapporten fra IGF angiver, at ENVC pr. 31. december 2005 og ultimo 2008 igen var i en teknisk konkurs.
In its submission of 14 February 2014, Portugal clarified that as of February 2014, ENVC had neither reimbursed the 2012 and 2013 loans nor paid any interest.
Derfor fremgår det, at ENVC på disse tidspunkter, hvor det var i teknisk konkurs, udviste alle tegn på konkurs på nær det ene, at det ikke formelt var blevet erklæret konkurs af den kompetente domstol.
Moreover, Portugal also noted that the loans to ENVC were, when necessary, accompanied by comfort letters issued by EMPORDEF.
Dette tyder på, at selskabet ifølge national ret opfyldte alle betingelserne for at blive genstand for en konkursbehandling i overensstemmelse med punkt 10 i 2004-rammebestemmelserne, i hvert fald ultimo 2003, 2005 og 2008.
Concerning the DGTF loans granted in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2011, Portugal is of the view that they were provided on market terms since the interest rate applied was EURIBOR plus a variable spread depending on each loan contract.
På baggrund af ovennævnte konkluderer Kommissionen, at ENVC var en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til 2004-rammebestemmelserne for redning og omstrukturering på det tidspunkt, hvor alle de tidligere foranstaltninger blev ydet.
Portugal also notes that the DGTF loans were provided bearing in mind the order book of ENVC, which would create reasonable expectations that ENVC would be able to pay back the loans.
Forekomst af statsstøtte
Portugal also highlights that the use of comfort letters is normal between private operators as a mechanism to guarantee access to the financial markets for companies with a lower borrowing capacity.
I henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med det indre marked, i det omfang den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Portugal notes that EMPORDEF would in any case be considered liable in last instance for the debts of ENVC given that it was its sole shareholder.
For at afgøre, om der forekommer statsstøtte, skal Kommissionen vurdere, om de omhandlede foranstaltninger hver især opfylder de kumulative kriterier i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF (dvs. overførsel af statsmidler, selektiv fordel, potentiel konkurrencefordrejning og påvirkning af samhandelen i EU).
In any event, Portugal acknowledges that EMPORDEF never charged ENVC for the comfort letters.
Kommissionen bemærker allerede hertil, at Portugal ikke anfægter skibsbygningstilskuddenes karakter af statsstøtte, idet de ifølge de portugisiske myndigheder blev ydet i henhold til lovdekret nr. 296/89 om gennemførelse af direktiv 87/167/EØF.
As regards the shipbuilding subsidies, Portugal claims that they were provided according to Decree-Law 296/89 — implementing Directive 87/167/EEC — and that they would therefore constitute compatible aid to the shipbuilding industry.
Med hensyn til tilskuddene til faglig uddannelse i 2005 og 2006 på i alt 257791 EUR anfører Portugal, at de blev ydet i henhold til Den Europæiske Socialfonds operationelle program for beskæftigelse, erhvervsuddannelse og samfundsudvikling (POEFDS).
In relation to the Atlântida vessel, Portugal observes that as of June 2012 its market value was estimated at EUR 29,24 million, taking into consideration inter alia the economic obsolescence and the physical and functional depreciation.
Statsmidler og tilregnelse til staten
In this context, Portugal claims that there are no reasons to consider that the construction of the vessel entailed an undue advantage to ENVC, bearing in mind that the cost of construction exceeded the contractual price.
Portugal anfægter ikke Kommissionens foreløbige konklusioner i indledningsafgørelsen angående forekomsten af statsmidler og tilregnelse til staten.
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
For det første understreger Kommissionen, at DGTF-lånene, skibsbygningstilskuddene og tilskuddene til faglig uddannelse blev ydet direkte fra statens budget (primært gennem DGTF), hvorfor der ikke er tvivl om, at disse tidligere foranstaltninger udgør statsmidler og kan tilregnes staten.
This decision addresses as a preliminary point the issue of whether ENVC is a firm in difficulty in the sense of the 2004 R&R Guidelines [22].
Hvad angår EMPORDEF, mener Kommissionen også, at dets tiltag udgjorde statslige midler (idet EMPORDEF's budgetmidler kommer direkte fra staten), og at disse tiltag kan tilregnes staten i overensstemmelse med retspraksis fra Stardust Marine-dommen [25].
It then analyses whether the measures under scrutiny entail State aid to ENVC in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and then whether such aid, were it to be present, is lawful and compatible with the internal market.
For det første bemærker Kommissionen, at der er tale om et 100 % statsejet holdingselskab, idet EMPORDEF's eneste aktionær er DGTF, der optræder på statens vegne.
Difficulties of ENVC
Desuden er EMPORDEF underlagt direkte finanstilsyn af finans- og statsforvaltningsministeriet og direkte sektortilsyn af forsvarsministeriet [26].
As noted above in recital 42, Portugal claims that the gravity of ENVC's financial situation became evident only in 2009/2010 and that its irreversibility was only recognised in the annual accounts of the company of 2012.
Ifølge EMPORDEF's webside driver selskabet desuden sin virksomhed i overensstemmelse med de målsætninger, politikker og mål, der er fastlagt af dets eneaktionær, nemlig staten [27].
The Commission reiterates the views it expressed in its opening decision.
Desuden udnævnes bestyrelsesformanden for EMPORDEF og topledelsen direkte af forsvarsministeren [28].
According to recital 9 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines, the Commission regards a firm as being in difficulty when it is unable, whether through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owners/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term.
Ud over ovennævnte fremgik det tydeligt af bestemmelserne om den planlagte privatisering af ENVC (se afsnit 2.2 ovenfor), at den endelige beslutning skulle træffes af den portugisiske regering og ikke af EMPORDEF.
Recital 10 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines clarifies that a limited liability company is regarded as being in difficulty where more than half of its registered capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 months, or where it fulfils the criteria under its domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings.
Med hensyn til indirekte beviser bemærker Kommissionen, at Portugals forsvarsministerium den 4. januar 2012 udsendte følgende pressemeddelelse: »Den 2. juli 2011 besluttede forsvarsministeriet at stille afviklingen af [ENVC] i bero.
Recital 11 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines adds that, even if the conditions in recital 10 are not satisfied, a firm may be considered to be in difficulty in particular where the usual signs of a firm being in difficulty are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value.
I august gav forsvarsministeriet den nye ledelse i EMPORDEF i opdrag at finde en løsning, som kunne forhindre afvikling og lukning af ENVC« [29].
The Commission observes that ENVC is a limited liability company which has continuously registered significant losses since at least 2000 (see table 3 below):
Desuden bekendtgjorde forsvarsministeriet ved flere lejligheder offentligt, hvilke skridt der ville blive taget med hensyn til den planlagte privatisering af ENVC [30].
Table 3
I lyset af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at EMPORDEF's tiltag kan tilregnes staten, og at de tidligere foranstaltninger, det ydede til ENVC, udgjorde statsmidler.
Source: annual accounts of EMPORDEF for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013 (available at http://www.empordef.pt/main.html), annual accounts of ENVC for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2009, 2010 and 2011.
Selektiv fordel
Net result (in EUR million)
Til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt de tidligere foranstaltninger gav ENVC en uberettiget, selektiv fordel, bemærker Kommissionen, at Portugal mener, at det ikke er tilfældet for hovedparten af de tidligere foranstaltninger, idet de var i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
In addition to the significant losses of ENVC, which constitute a first indication of the difficulties of the company, some of the other usual signs of a firm in difficulty in the sense of the 2004 R&R Guidelines are also present.
I sin indledningsafgørelse anførte Kommissionen, at den trods de dengang begrænsede oplysninger, den havde til rådighed herom, fandt det usandsynligt, at en fornuftig privat investor ville have ydet ENVC de tidligere foranstaltninger.
For instance, ENVC's turnover was in constant decrease since at least 2008, passing from EUR 129,62 million in that year to EUR 55,58 million in 2009, EUR 20,22 million in 2010 and EUR 15,11 million in 2011.
På grund af ENVC's vanskeligheder på det tidspunkt var Kommissionen da også af den foreløbige holdning, at en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor ikke ville have ydet denne finansiering til et selskab som ENVC.
Although in 2012 there was an increase in turnover (EUR 30,38 million) due to some additional works for a logistic support vessel [23], this was a one-off event and in 2013 the turnover plummeted again to EUR 3,79 million.
Kommissionen konkluderede også foreløbig, at fordelen var af selektiv art, eftersom den eneste, som nød godt af den, var ENVC.
In addition, ENVC had negative equity since at least 2009: EUR -25,62 million in 2009, EUR -74,49 million in 2010, EUR -129,63 million in 2011, EUR -142,45 million in 2012 and EUR -193,46 million in 2013 [24].
Hvad angår 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen, er Kommissionen ikke enig med Portugal i, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have valgt at forhøje ENVC's kapital — i stedet for at likvidere selskabet — for at lade det fortsætte driften på skibsbygningsmarkedet, især i betragtning af ordrebogens beholdning på det givne tidspunkt af 15 bygninger til en samlet værdi af 386 mio. EUR (se betragtning 44 ovenfor).
According to Portugal (see recital 43 above), the 2006 capital increase was needed in order to comply with Article 35 of the Portuguese Companies Code, the alternatives being a reduction of ENVC's capital or the liquidation of the company.
For det første bemærker Kommissionen, at en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor ville have overvejet, om det ville være mere økonomisk rationelt at likvidere selskabet end at forhøje kapitalen i betragtning af dels ENVC's ringe økonomiske resultater i perioden 2000-2006, dels de foranstaltninger, der allerede var ydet af staten til ENVC før 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen (dvs. et af DGTF-lånene på 30 mio. EUR, der blev ydet i januar/februar 2006, skibsbygningstilskuddene på over 27 mio. EUR og tilskuddene til faglig uddannelse).
Moreover, the restructuring plan prepared by BPI dated August 2005 (see recital 47 above), highlights that since the end of 2003, ENVC was in a situation of technical bankruptcy (‘falência técnica’).
Selv om ordrebogens værdi syntes at overstige værdien af disse tidligere foranstaltninger, mener Kommissionen, at en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor også ville have overvejet, hvor sandsynligt det var, at ENVC ville være i stand til at levere bygningerne med et overskud og/eller levere dem inden kontraktens tidsfrister for at undgå bøder [32].
Finally, the Commission observes that the 2009 report of the IGF indicates that as of 31 December 2005 and at the end of 2008, ENVC was again in a situation of technical bankruptcy.
Ifølge Portugals oplysninger er der intet, der tyder på, at EMPORDEF gjorde sig disse overvejelser, da det foretog 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen.
Therefore, it appears that at those points in time when ENVC was in technical bankruptcy it showed all the signs of bankruptcy except that it had not been formally declared bankrupt by the competent court.
Desuden bemærker Portugal, at omkostningerne ved lukning af ENVC ifølge BPI's omstruktureringsplan fra august 2005 blev anslået til 175 mio. EUR.
This suggests that the company fulfilled the criteria under domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings, in line with recital 10 of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at least at the end of 2003, 2005 and 2008.
I betragtning af at en likvidation var mere bekostelig end en kapitalforhøjelse, blev den tidligere kurs ifølge Portugal ikke fastholdt.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that ENVC was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the 2004 R&R Guidelines at the time when all the past measures were granted.
Hertil bemærker Kommissionen, at BPI's skøn i omstruktureringsplanen ikke er dokumenteret.
Existence of aid
På den baggrund er Kommissionen ikke i stand til at bedømme, hvor nøjagtigt dette skøn var, og konkludere, hvorvidt det faktisk var mere økonomisk rationelt for EMPORDEF at gennemføre kapitalforhøjelsen end at skride til afvikling af selskabet.
By virtue of Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Desuden bemærker Kommissionen, at BPI i omstruktureringsplanen anførte, at ENVC ikke selv havde kapaciteten til at genoprette rentabiliteten, og at det havde brug for eksterne midler i størrelsesordenen 45-50 mio. EUR i et basisscenarie og 70-80 mio. EUR i et pessimistisk scenarie.
In order to conclude on whether State aid is present, it must therefore be assessed whether the cumulative criteria listed in Article 107(1) TFEU (i.e. transfer of State resources, selective advantage, potential distortion of competition and affectation of intra-EU trade) are met for the measures identified.
Værdien af 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen (24,875 mio. EUR) var betydeligt mindre end disse skøn og ville ikke have tilladt ENVC at genoprette rentabiliteten.
The Commission already notes in this respect that Portugal does not contest the State aid character of the shipbuilding subsidies since they were — according to the Portuguese authorities — provided according to Decree-Law 296/89 implementing Directive 87/167/EEC.
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at ENVC havde brug for en gennemgribende omstrukturering, sådan som det også erkendtes i BPI's omstruktureringsplan.
The Commission will assess their compatibility with the internal market in section 6.4 below.
Om end omstruktureringsplanen kun er et udkast, fremgår det allerede, at ENVC var i vanskeligheder og havde brug for yderligere eksterne midler.
In relation to the professional training subsidies provided in 2005 and 2006 amounting to EUR 257791, Portugal states that they were granted under the Operational Programme for Employment, Training and Social Development (POEFDS) sponsored by the European Social Fund.
Men det står også klart, at ENVC's tilbagevenden til rentabilitet i høj grad afhang af, om selskabets ledelse havde kapaciteten til at honorere selskabets forpligtelser, og af udviklingen på skibsbygningsmarkedet.
The Commission observes that these funds constitute per se State aid since they were provided by the Member State in the context of the Structural Funds 2000-2006.
I denne henseende bemærker Kommissionen, at Portugal ikke har dokumenteret, at EMPORDEF tog disse elementer i betragtning, da det gennemførte 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen, som under alle omstændigheder ville være mindre end det beløb, der i omstruktureringsplanen var skønnet nødvendigt for at gøre selskabet rentabelt igen.
Therefore, the Commission will directly assess their compatibility with the internal market in section 6.4 below.
Under indtryk af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor ikke ville have ydet 2006-kapitalforhøjelsen, hvorfor denne gav ENVC en uberettiget fordel.
State resources and imputability
For så vidt angår 2012- og 2013-lånene fra EMPORDEF for et samlet beløb af 101118066,03 EUR, fremgår det af de oplysninger, som Portugal har fremsendt, at EMPORDEF i løbet af 2012 underskrev 70 låneaftaler med ENVC, primært kortfristede med en løbetid på 90 dage.
Portugal does not dispute the preliminary findings of the Commission as per the opening decision in relation to the presence of State resources and imputability.
Lånene blev ydet med forskellige pålydende beløb og forskellige rentesatser, primært 3-måneders EURIBOR plus et tillæg.
In the first place, the Commission highlights that the DGTF loans, the shipbuilding subsidies and the professional training subsidies were provided directly from the State budget (mainly through the DGTF) and therefore there is no doubt that these past measures entail State resources and are imputable to the State.
Visse låneaftaler havde dog en fast rente, især aftaler underskrevet fra oktober 2012 og frem (se f.eks. aftalen af 30. marts 2012 om et lån på 16,7 mio. EUR til 2 %, aftalen af 2. november 2012 om et lån på 10,570 mio. EUR til 5,871 % og aftalen af 1. december 2012 om et lån på 1 mio. EUR til samme rentesats, nemlig 5,871 %).
As regards EMPORDEF, the Commission also considers that its actions entailed State resources (given that the budget of EMPORDEF is provided directly by the State) and that those actions are imputable to the State in the sense of the Stardust Marine case-law [25].
Det fremgår også, at der ikke var stillet sikkerhed for låneaftalerne.
In the first place, the Commission notes that this is a public holding 100 % owned by the State: the sole shareholder of EMPORDEF on behalf of the State is the DGTF.
Portugal hævder, at DGTF-lånene ikke udgør støtte, idet EMPORDEF forlangte samme rente af ENVC, som det kunne få på markedet.
Moreover, EMPORDEF is under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations, as regards financial supervision, and the Ministry of National Defence, as regards sectorial supervision [26].
Da EMPORDEF under alle omstændigheder ville blive anset for at være ansvarligt for ENVC's gæld og forpligtelser, da det var eneaktionær, hævder Portugal, at EMPORDEF ikke øgede sin risiko ved at øge sin eksponering i ENVC.
In addition, according to the web page of EMPORDEF, its operations are consistent with the objectives, policies and goals established by its sole shareholder, i.e. the State [27].
For det første fremgår det ikke, at EMPORDEF ville hæfte for alle ENVC's gældsposter og forpligtelser, idet EMPORDEF og ENVC er selskaber med begrænset ansvar (»sociedade anónima«).
Moreover, the President of EMPORDEF and its Executive Directors are nominated directly by the Minister of National Defence [28].
Som udgangspunkt er medlemmernes (ejerne af kapitalandele) ansvar i selskaber med begrænset ansvar begrænset til den pålydende værdi af deres aktier eller andele ifølge artikel 271 i den portugisiske selskabslov [33].
In addition to the above, the rules governing the planned privatisation of ENVC (see section 2.2 above) clearly indicated that the final decision was to be taken by the Portuguese Government and not by EMPORDEF.
På dette grundlag ville EMPORDEF med ydelsen af 2012- og 2013-lånene til ENVC have løbet en risiko, der rakte ud over værdien af EMPORDEF's aktier i ENVC.
In terms of indirect evidence, the Commission observes that on 4 January 2012, the Portuguese Ministry of National Defence issued a press release stating the following: ‘on 2 July 2011, the Ministry of National Defence decided to suspend the decommissioning of [ENVC].
I lyset af ENVC's vanskeligheder mener Kommissionen, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have vurderet ENVC's finansielle situation og analyseret selskabets evne til at betale renter og afdrage lån.
In August, the Ministry of National Defence mandated the new administration of EMPORDEF to find a solution that would avoid the decommissioning and closure of ENVC’ [29].
I den forbindelse bemærker Kommissionen, at flere finansielle institutioner — hvorom Kommissionen ikke har grund til at tro, at de ikke opererede på markedsvilkår — havde afvist at yde lån direkte til ENVC.
Furthermore, on multiple occasions the Minister of National Defence publicly announced the steps to be undertaken as regards the planned privatisation of ENVC [30].
Dette viser i sig selv, at markederne ikke længere mente, at ENVC ville kunne tilbagebetale lånene.
Once the privatisation plans were discarded, the Portuguese Government empowered EMPORDEF to take the necessary measures as regards ENVC [31].
Ved blot at kopiere de rentesatser, det opnåede på lån i markedet, gav EMPORDEF ENVC en uberettiget fordel, idet ENVC ikke ville have kunnet opnå lignende vilkår, og faktisk fik ENVC ingen af lånene fra markedet.
In light of the above, the Commission concludes that EMPORDEF's actions are imputable to the State and that the past measures it granted to ENVC entailed State resources.