natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Men efter at SEA's bestyrelse afviste tilbuddet af 10. september 2002, blot få måneder efter at SEA Handling var stiftet, overvejede man aldrig at ændre tabsdækningsstrategien.
Even if a private investor had embarked on a long-term loss coverage strategy, that investor, always supposing there were no binding legal restrictions, would have reviewed the strategy whenever asked to provide funds to eliminate SEA Handling’s losses.
For det andet kan en beslutning, der er så vigtig som en kapitaltilførsel, der er genstand for generalforsamlingens godkendelse, anses for blot et skridt i gennemførelsen af en generel beslutning om at dække fremtidige tab.
More specifically, as SEA made clear in its observations, the failed negotiations with […] in 2002 significantly compromised the possibility of achieving the objective of returning SEA Handling to profitability by 2005.
For det tredje blev der ikke nævnt noget om beslutninger om dækning af fremtidige tab over flere år i de strategiske forretningsplaner for SEA Handling eller SEA.
But after SEA’s board of directors rejected the offer on 10 September 2002, just a few months after SEA Handling was set up, no changes to the loss coverage strategy were ever considered.
SEA's ledelsesorganer indgik ikke en formel, bindende forpligtelse baseret på en forretningsplan med bestemmelser om bestemte kapitaltilførsler fra SEA gennem en bestemt årrække.
Second, a decision as important as an injection of capital, which is subject to the approval of the general meeting, cannot be regarded as merely a step in the implementation of a general decision to cover future losses.
Beslutningerne, der blev truffet i 2002 og 2007, omhandlede højst SEA Handlings omstrukturering og ikke dækning af tab over mange år.
Third, the decisions to cover future losses over several years were not mentioned in the strategic business plans of SEA Handling or SEA.
En privat investor ville under alle omstændigheder ikke have afgivet tilsagn om at dække tab over flere år uden i det mindste at have et foreløbigt skøn over den samlede omkostning.
SEA’s governing bodies did not enter into any formal, binding commitment based on a business plan providing for stated capital injections by SEA over a stated number of years.
Det følger heraf, at støtten blev ydet hvert år i undersøgelsesperioden og især på de datoer, hvor SEA besluttede at øge SEA Handlings kapital, primært for at dække selskabets tab, og indgik bindende juridiske forpligtelser i den henseende.
The decisions taken in 2002 and 2007 were concerned at most with the aspect of SEA Handling’s restructuring, rather than with the coverage of losses over multiple years.
Imidlertid kan Kommissionen ved analysen af kapitaltilførslerne ikke se bort fra de foregående tilførsler.
A private investor would in any event not have given a commitment to cover losses over several years without having at least a preliminary estimate of the total cost.
Foranstaltningerne var tæt indbyrdes forbundne.
It follows that aid was granted in each of the years under investigation, and in particular on the dates when SEA decided to increase the capital of SEA Handling, primarily in order to cover its losses, and undertook binding legal obligations in that respect.
Ifølge de italienske myndigheder indgik de i én strategi.
However, in analysing the injections of capital, the Commission cannot ignore the preceding injections.
De havde samme mål, nemlig at udligne tabene i SEA Handling for at sikre selskabets overlevelse og genskabe rentabiliteten.
The measures were closely interlinked.
Set fra et kronologisk perspektiv udgjorde de en løbende proces, idet de blev vedtaget hvert år som reaktion på de fortsatte vanskeligheder hos modtageren.
According to the Italian authorities, they formed part of a single strategy.
På grund af den vanskelige situation, som SEA Handling havde befundet sig i siden stiftelsen, mener Kommissionen, at en fornuftig privat investor ville have vurderet risikoen for, at foranstaltningerne siden den første kapitaltilførsel udgjorde ulovlig og uforenelig statsstøtte, og derfor ville have undersøgt den virkning, som den eventuelle tilbagebetaling af en sådan støtte ville få for rentabiliteten af vedkommendes investering.
They pursued the same objective, namely to offset the losses of SEA Handling in order to ensure the firm’s survival and restore its profitability.
De italienske myndigheder har aldrig fremlagt dokumentation for, at en sådan vurdering blev foretaget.
From a chronological perspective, too, they formed a continuous process, in that they were adopted each year, in succession, to respond to the ongoing difficulties of the recipient.
Kapitaltilførsler i 2002
Given the situation of difficulty in which SEA Handling found itself since it was set up, the Commission considers that a prudent private investor would have evaluated the risk that, from the first injection of capital, the measures might constitute illegal and incompatible State aid, and would therefore have studied the impact which the possible recovery of such aid would have on the profitability of its investment.
Det bestrides ikke, at SEA Handling, da den første kapitaltilførsel fandt sted, var en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til 1999-rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering.
The Italian authorities have never provided any evidence to show that such an assessment was performed.
I punkt 16 og 17 i disse rammebestemmelser hedder det, at når offentlige myndigheder tilfører kapital til en virksomhed i finansielle vanskeligheder, er det sandsynligt, at finansieringen udgør statsstøtte (idet det er yderst vanskeligt for en sådan investering at generere et afkast, som ville være acceptabelt for en fornuftig privat investor, der handler på markedsøkonomiske vilkår, i betragtning af den indbyggede risiko).
Capital injections in 2002
Sådanne kapitaltilførsler skal derfor anmeldes til Kommissionen på forhånd for at få blive tilladt som statsstøtte.
It is not contested that when the first capital injection took place SEA Handling was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the 1999 Restructuring Guidelines.
I 2002 så de italienske myndigheder bort fra indholdet af 1999-rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering, hvilket de også gjorde i forbindelse med de senere kapitaltilførsler, og valgte at foretage tilførslerne, selv om de ikke synes at have bygget deres beslutning på en detaljeret forretningsplan, der kunne vise, at SEA Handling var i stand til at vende nedgangen og genoprette rentabiliteten inden for en rimelig frist.
Points 16 and 17 of those Guidelines state that where capital is provided by public authorities to an enterprise that is in financial difficulties, it is likely that the funding will constitute State aid (it being extremely difficult for such an investment to generate a profit that would be acceptable to a prudent private investor operating in a market economy, considering the risks involved).
Kommissionen mener, at en markedsinvestor ikke ville have udført kapitaltilførslerne i 2002 uden en tilstrækkeligt detaljeret forretningsplan baseret på sunde, pålidelige hypoteser, som præcist beskriver de foranstaltninger, der er nødvendige for at genoprette rentabiliteten i selskabet, have analyseret de forskellige mulige scenarier og påvist, at investeringen ville generere et afkast, som tilfredsstillede investoren (under hensyntagen til den iboende risiko) med hensyn til udbytte, øget aktieværdi og andre fordele.
Such capital injections must therefore be reported to the Commission in advance in order to be authorised as State aid.
Derfor synes de første kapitaltilførsler i 2002 ikke at opfylde det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, og de gav SEA Handling en fordel, som selskabet ikke ville have fået under normale markedsvilkår.
In 2002 the Italian authorities ignored the indications in the 1999 Restructuring Guidelines, as they did in the case of the later capital injections too, and chose to carry out the injections even though they do not seem to have based their decision on a detailed business plan showing that SEA Handling was capable of reversing its fortunes and returning to profitability within a reasonable time.
Baggrunden på beslutningstidspunktet
The Commission considers that a market investor would not have carried out the 2002 capital injections without a sufficiently detailed business plan based on sound, reliable hypotheses, which precisely described the measures needed to restore the profitability of the company, analysed the various possible scenarios, and demonstrated that the investment would generate a return that satisfied the investor (taking account of the intrinsic risk) in terms of dividends, increased share value, or other advantages.
Med hensyn til den baggrund, som støtten blev ydet på, hvilket Kommissionen skal tage i betragtning, når den anvender det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, vil Kommissionen nu bruge sin egen fremgangsmåde som svar på de spørgsmål, som de italienske myndigheder og SEA har rejst.
Accordingly, the first capital injections, in 2002, do not seem to satisfy the market-economy private investor test, and conferred an advantage on SEA Handling that it would not have received in normal market conditions.
For det første med hensyn til virkningen for SEA's beslutninger af Italiens specifikke lovramme og den særlig skarpe konkurrence, den skabte, er det Kommissionens ansvar at sikre, at målet med direktiv 96/67/EF, nemlig at skabe et indre marked for ground handling-ydelser i EU ved at liberalisere sektoren, hvilket medfører større konkurrence mellem operatørerne, ikke kompromitteres af ydelse af statsstøtte, som kunne fordreje konkurrencen.
Context at the time the decisions were taken
Det følger heraf, at foranstaltninger, som medlemsstaterne har vedtaget til gennemførelse af direktivet, ikke er dokumentation for, at en finansiel støtte ydet til en given operatør for at udligne virkningerne af et økonomisk klima med skærpet konkurrence opfylder det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Regarding the context in which the aid was granted, which the Commission must take into account when it applies the private investor test, the Commission will now set out its own approach, in response to the points raised by the Italian authorities and by SEA.
Men i denne afgørelse og nærmere bestemt i analysen heri af den adfærd, som en privat investor ville have valgt i en situation som den, SEA var i, vil Kommissionen tage hensyn til, at Italien havde valgt fuld liberalisering af ground handling-markedet, og at ENAC havde godkendt 84 leverandører som operatører i Malpensa og Linate.
First, with regard to the impact on SEA’s decisions of Italy’s specific regulatory framework and the particularly high competitive pressure it generated, the Commission is responsible for ensuring that the objective of Directive 96/67/EC, namely to create a single market for ground handling services in the European Union by liberalising the sector, which entails greater competition between operators, is not compromised by the granting of State aid that might distort competition.
Mange andre medlemsstater har valgt en lignende form for liberalisering (Danmark (København), Spanien, Irland (Dublin), Det Forenede Kongerige (London) og Frankrig (Paris)).
It follows that measures adopted by a Member State to implement the Directive are no evidence that financial support granted to a given operator in order to offset the effects of a more competitive economic environment complies with the prudent private investor test.
Den gældende lovramme er under alle omstændigheder den samme for alle den italienske sektors leverandører, hvis antal efter SEA's mening er højt, nemlig 84 godkendte operatører.
But in this Decision, and more especially in its analysis of the course of conduct that a private investor would have adopted in a situation such as that of SEA, the Commission will take into account of the fact that Italy had opted for full liberalisation of the ground handling market, and that ENAC had authorised 84 providers to operate at Malpensa and Linate.
De italienske myndigheder har ikke anført, at disse ydelser er tjenesteydelser af almen økonomisk interesse, som markedet ikke ville kunne garantere.
Many other Member States have opted for a similar form of liberalisation (Denmark (Copenhagen), Spain, Ireland (Dublin), UK (London), France (Paris)).
Uanset det faktum, at SEA valgte en juridisk adskillelse af sine aktiviteter (og derfor af regnskaberne), finder artikel 4 i direktiv 96/67/EF stadig anvendelse, idet der står, at operatørerne »skal foretage en streng, regnskabsmæssig adskillelse efter gældende forretningspraksis af de aktiviteter, der er forbundet med levering af disse tjenesteydelser, og deres øvrige aktiviteter«, og at der ikke må overføres »finansielle midler mellem forvaltningsorganets aktiviteter som lufthavnsmyndighed og dets ground handling-aktiviteter«.
The applicable regulatory framework is in any case the same for all providers in the sector in Italy, the number of which is high, in SEA’s opinion, with 84 providers authorised to operate.
Denne regnskabsmæssige adskillelse og forbud mod overførsel af finansielle midler mellem forvaltningsorganet og ground handling-enheden er rettet mod at garantere egnede betingelser for at udvikle effektiv konkurrence på ground handling-markedet ved at sikre, at ground handling-aktiviteten hos vertikalt integrerede operatører ikke tilføres specifikke fordele frem for andre operatører.
The Italian authorities have not argued that the services are services of general economic interest which the market would not be able to guarantee.
Koncessionshaverens dækning af tab ved hjælp af overførsel af finansielle midler mellem koncessionshaverens aktivitet og ground handling-forretningen strider mod direktiv 96/67/EF og dets målsætninger.
Irrespective of the fact that SEA opted for a legal separation of activities (and, therefore, of accounts), Article 4 of Directive 96/67/EC still applies: it states that operators ‘must rigorously separate the accounts of their ground handling activities from the accounts of their other activities, in accordance with current commercial practice’, and prohibits ‘financial flows between the activity of the managing body as airport authority and its ground handling activity’.
Derfor ændrer det forhold, at SEA har valgt ikke blot en regnskabsmæssig adskillelse, men også en juridisk adskillelse af sine aktivitetsområder, ikke Kommissionens konklusion om, at der er tilført SEA Handling en uretmæssig fordel.
This separation of accounts and prohibition of financial flows between the managing body and the ground handling entity are aimed at guaranteeing suitable conditions for developing effective competition in ground handling markets, by ensuring that the ground handling activity of vertically integrated operators does not receive any specific advantage over other operators.
Med hensyn til påstanden om, at SEA har pligt til at garantere levering af alle ground handling-ydelser, bemærker Kommissionen, at denne »lovfæstede forpligtelse« kun betyder, som de italienske myndigheder selv anfører, at ansvaret kan varetages af lufthavnen selv, eller at lufthavnen kan koordinere leveringen af ydelserne med eksterne leverandører.
Coverage of losses by the airport manager involving financial flows between the activity of the manager and the ground handling business runs counter to Directive 96/67/EC and its objectives.
Som Kommissionen udtalte i betragtning 95 i indledningsbeslutningen, er SEA på ingen måde forpligtet til at garantere en sådan levering, hverken direkte eller gennem sit datterselskab SEA Handling.
Consequently, the fact that SEA has opted not just for an accounting separation but for a legal separation of its areas of activity does not change the Commission’s finding that there is an unfair advantage conferred on SEA Handling.
Koncessionshaverens generelle ansvar i tilfælde af driftsforstyrrelser kan derfor ikke påberåbes for at vise, at der ikke var alternativer til dækning af tabene i SEA Handling.
Regarding the affirmation that SEA is obliged to guarantee the provision of all ground handling services, the Commission observes that this ‘legal obligation’ means only, as the Italian authorities themselves indicate, that the responsibility may be exercised by the airport itself, or that the airport may coordinate the operations of outside providers.
Selv om man accepterede SEA's påstand om, at ground handling-forretningen generelt giver et lavt overskud og ringe rentabilitet, kan Kommissionen dernæst ikke godtage i forbindelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, at markedssituationen i sig selv berettigede kapitaltilførslerne, især på grund af størrelsesordenen af SEA Handlings tab i hele den omhandlede periode.
As the Commission said in paragraph 95 of the opening decision, SEA is in no way obliged to guarantee such provision either directly or through its subsidiary SEA Handling.
Tværtimod bekræftes det på s. 5 i den strategiske plan for 2007-2012, at de mest effektive lufthavnsoperatører i Europa har udliciteret ground handling-aktiviteterne.
The general responsibility of the airport manager in the event of a malfunction cannot, therefore, be invoked to show the absence of alternatives to covering the losses of SEA Handling.
Dette gentages på s. 7 i den strategiske plan for 2009-2016, og det bekræftes på s. 28 i samme dokument, at markedstendensen i 2001 gik i retning af udlicitering af ground handling-ydelserne.
In the second place, even accepting SEA’s claim that the ground handling business generally offers low profit margins and low levels of profitability, the Commission cannot accept that the market context proper justified the capital injections for purposes of the market-economy private investor test, especially given the scale of the losses incurred by SEA Handling throughout the period in question.
Dokumentationen modsiger tanken om, at vertikal integration mellem lufthavnsoperatører og leverandører af ground handling-ydelser er afgørende for at garantere kvaliteten, og at det ved udsigten til beskedne marginer var rimeligt ikke at udlicitere.
On the contrary, on p. 5 of the 2007-2012 strategic plan it is confirmed that the most efficient airport operators in Europe have subcontracted ground handling activities.
Især på et marked med lave marginer skulle SEA i stedet for at dække SEA Handlings tab have truffet langt mere radikale foranstaltninger for at øge SEA Handlings effektivitet og nedbringe personaleomkostningerne væsentligt, da disse ifølge de italienske myndigheder selv udgør en betydelig del af omkostningsstrukturen i et selskab i denne sektor, hvor der er et stort konkurrencemæssigt pres.
This same point is reiterated on p. 7 of the 2009-2016 strategic plan.
Alternativer til dækning af SEA Handlings tab
It is confirmed on p. 28 of that document that the market tendency in 2001 was towards the subcontracting of ground handling services.
Kommissionen mener ikke, at SEA's synspunkt om, at der ikke var alternativer til omstruktureringen af SEA Handling og dækning af dets tab, svarer til en privat investors adfærd under normale markedsvilkår.
This evidence contradicts the idea that vertical integration between the airport operator and the ground handling service provider is essential in order to guarantee quality, and that in view of the meagre profit margins in ground handling it was reasonable not to subcontract.
De mulige alternativer var bl.a. fuld eller delvis udlicitering af ydelserne eller etablering af en strategisk alliance gennem overdragelse af en del af SEA Handling til en strategisk partner.
In particular, in a market that offers such low profit margins, rather than covering SEA Handling’s losses SEA should have taken far more radical measures to increase SEA Handling’s efficiency, significantly reducing staff costs, which according to the Italian authorities themselves make up a considerable part of the cost structure of a company in this sector, a sector subject to intense competitive pressure.
Desuden var der som påpeget i forrige afsnit intet til hinder for, at SEA traf mere radikale omstruktureringsforanstaltninger rettet mod at øge effektiviteten i SEA Handling inden en tidsfrist, der ville være acceptabel for en privat investor.
Alternatives to coverage of SEA Handling’s losses
Med hensyn til muligheden for en overdragelse kan Kommissionen ikke bedømme SEA's indsats for at etablere en sådan alliance, som kunne have gjort det muligt at få gavn af synergieffekten fra integrationen i et internationalt netværk.
The Commission considers that SEA’s view that there were no alternatives to the restructuring of SEA Handling and the coverage of its losses does not correspond to the conduct of a private investor in a market economy.
Kommissionen bemærker dog, at SEA i sine bemærkninger kun nævner to forsøg på et delvist salg, nemlig det med […], hvor forhandlingerne forliste i 2002, og det, som blev igangsat, men ikke fuldført i 2007-2008.
Possible alternatives included a full or partial outsourcing of services, or the establishment of a strategic alliance through the transfer of part of SEA Handling to a strategic partner.
Siden da har muligheden for et salg tilsyneladende været afhængigt af, at SEA Handlings rentabilitet blev genoprettet med andre midler.
Moreover, as pointed out in the previous paragraph, there was nothing to prevent SEA from adopting more radical restructuring measures aimed at increasing the efficiency of SEA Handling within a timeframe acceptable to a private investor.
Kommissionen mener, at den indlysende mangel på interesse blandt private selskaber for at investere i SEA Handling er en indikator for selskabets mangel på solide udsigter til rentabilitet.
Regarding the possibility of a transfer, the Commission cannot pass judgment on the efforts made by SEA to establish such an alliance, which might have allowed it to benefit from synergies deriving from its integration into an international network.
Med hensyn til den eventuelle udlicitering af alle eller en del af ground handling-aktiviteterne har de italienske myndigheder først og fremmest hævdet, at der ikke fandtes nogen operatører, der ønskede at overtage forretningen.
The Commission notes, however, that in its comments SEA mentioned only two attempts at partial sale:
Kommissionen bemærker, at statsstøtten blev indberettet af […], og at […] også udtrykte sin modstand mod foranstaltningerne.
the one that led to the failed negotiations with […] in 2002, and the one that was initiated but not concluded in 2007-2008.
Yderligere er hverken udtalelsen eller den mere specifikke påstand om, at potentielle eksterne operatører kun er interesseret i visse mere rentable ydelser (såkaldt »cherry picking«), baseret på en klar iagttagelse af en tydelig mangel på interesse, f.eks. efter en udbudsprocedure igangsat af SEA med henblik på levering af de omhandlede tjenesteydelser.
Since then the possibility of a sale seems to have been made dependent upon a recovery of SEA Handling’s profitability by other means.
Med andre ord støttes denne påstand ikke af specifik dokumentation, mens en række operatører er godkendt til at tilbyde deres tjenesteydelser i Italien og især i Malpensa og Linate.
The Commission considers the evident lack of interest among private companies in investing in SEA Handling as an indicator of the company’s lack of solid prospects of profitability.
Med hensyn til eksterne operatørers kapacitet har de italienske myndigheder insisteret på, at der ikke fandtes operatører, som var i stand til at garantere den servicekvalitet, der var nødvendig i SEA's forretningsmodel, nemlig en hub- eller self-hub-lufthavn.
With regard to the possible outsourcing of all or part of the ground handling activities, the Italian authorities have argued in the first place that no operator wanted to take over the business.
SEA mente at have behov for en leverandør, som kunne tilbyde alle sine ground handling-ydelser, og at dette var umuligt, fordi de øvrige operatører på markedet ikke havde de materielle, økonomiske eller især menneskelige ressourcer, der var nødvendige for at sikre hele viften af ydelser.
The Commission observes that the State aid was reported by […], and that […] also expressed its opposition to the measures.