natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
BBF-selskabsdeltagerne og de bydende kunne imidlertid ikke blive enige.
Consequently, it was decided to expand and modernise the existing Schönefeld airport, turn it into the main Berlin airport with the name Berlin-Brandenburg Willy Brandt (‘BER’), and at the same time, close down Tegel and Tempelfhof airports.
Som følge heraf meddelte de offentlige ejere i 2003, at privatiseringen var mislykkedes og bekendtgjorde samtidig, at lufthavnen nu ville blive bygget i offentligt regi [5].
This decision was formalised in an agreement signed by the German Federal Government and the Berlin and Brandenburg Regions (Länder Berlin und Brandenburg) on 28 May 1996.
BESKRIVELSE AF FORANSTALTNINGERNE OG BAGGRUNDENE HERFOR
The shareholders of BBF planned to develop the BER project through a private airport owner and operator.
Ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakten
In 1997, it was decided to launch a privatisation process whereby all shares in BBF would be sold to a private investor, and a concession over the airport would be granted to the future buyer.
Den 6. august 1992 underskrev BBF og BFG en ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakt.
However, BBF’s existing shareholders could reach an agreement with none of the bidders.
Aftalen skulle oprindeligt gælde i fem år med stiltiende forlængelse for en periode på to år og en opsigelsesfrist på et år.
This resulted in the public owners declaring in 2003 that the privatisation process had failed and that the project to develop BER would proceed with public shareholders [5].
En lignende kontrakt blev indgået mellem BBF og FBS.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES UNDER ASSESSMENT AND THEIR CONTEXT
I henhold til tysk ret er der ved en ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakt tale om en kontrakt mellem en virksomhed og et datterselskab, hvor datterselskabet overdrager sin ledelse til moderselskabet.
The control and profit transfer agreement
Desuden er datterselskabet forpligtet til at overføre sine overskud til moderselskabet eller overdrage udligningen af sine underskud til moderselskabet.
BBF and BFG signed a control and profit transfer agreement (Beherrschungs- und Gewinnabführungsvertrag) on 6 August 1992.
I praksis betyder en sådan kontrakt, at overskud og underskud i moder- og datterselskabet sammenregnes og beskattes i overensstemmelse hermed.
This contract was originally foreseen for a duration of 5 years, with tacit renewal for a new period of two years unless a party decides to terminate it with a one-year notice.
På grund af de ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakter, der er indgået mellem BBF og datterselskaberne, blev de forskellige selskaber, for så vidt angår selskabsbeskatning, betragtet som én skattepligtig person.
A similar agreement was signed between BBF and FBS.
I 2003 i forbindelse med fusionen mellem BBF og FBS overgik BBF's rettigheder og forpligtelser, der var fastlagt i ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakten af 6. august 1992, som var indgået med BFG, til FBS.
Under German law, a control and profit transfer agreement between a company and its subsidiary is an agreement whereby the management of the subsidiary is controlled by the parent company and the subsidiary has the obligation to transfer its profits and losses to the parent company.
Derudover mistede den ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakt, der var indgået mellem BBF og FBS, sin betydning i forbindelse med fusionen.
In practice, as a result of such an agreement, the profits and losses of the parent company and its subsidiary are counted together and taxed accordingly.
Derfor tages der ikke yderligere hensyn til denne kontrakt i nærværende afgørelse.
As a result of the control and profit transfer agreements concluded between BBF and its subsidiaries, these various companies were considered as a single taxable entity for corporate tax purposes.
I praksis medførte ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakten af 6. august 1992 (»ledelses- og overskudsoverførselskontrakten«), der var indgået mellem BBF og BFG — i det mindste i visse år — en udligning af de opståede driftsunderskud i Schönefeld lufthavn med de overskud, der blev opnået ved driften af Tegel lufthavn.
In 2003, as a result of the merger between BBF and FBS, the rights and obligations of BBF under the control and profit transfer agreement of 6 August 1992 with BFG were taken up by FBS.
Schönefeld lufthavn havde i hvert fald driftsunderskud indtil 2006.
Moreover, the control and profit transfer agreement between BBF and FBS ceased to have any relevance upon that merger.
Dette illustreres i nedenstående tabel over lufthavnens EBITDA [6] og EBIT [7] i perioden 2003-2006 på grundlag af de udgifter og indtægter, der var umiddelbart relateret til lufthavnsdriften.
This agreement will not be further considered in this decision.
Tabel 2
In practice, the control and profit transfer agreement of 6 August 1992 between BBF and BFG (‘the control and profit transfer agreement’) led to a compensation of the losses generated by the operation of Schönefeld by the profits generated by the operation of Tegel, at least in certain years.
EBITDA og EBIT for Schönefeld lufthavn i perioden 2003-2006
Schönefeld airport indeed generated operating losses, at least until 2006, as illustrated by the following table, which provides the EBITDA [6] and EBIT [7] of the airport for the period from 2003 to 2006, on the basis of the costs and revenues that are directly linked to the operation of this airport:
Bilag 19 til Tysklands bemærkninger af 4. oktober 2007 efter indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
Table 2
(mio. EUR)
EBITDA and EBIT of the Schönefeld airport from 2003 to 2006
Til trods for de dårlige resultater for Schönefeld lufthavn blev der imidlertid ikke sat spørgsmålstegn ved rentabiliteten af koncernen bestående af FBS, BFG og — indtil 2003 — holdingselskabet BBF (»FBS-koncernen«).
Annex 19 to Germany’s comments of 4 October 2007 following the opening of the formal investigation procedure.
FBS-koncernen kunne kontinuerligt stille egne finansielle midler til rådighed eller skaffe de nødvendige finansielle midler på markedet.
(EUR million)
Efter Kommissionens kendskab har FBS-koncernen kun modtaget finansielle midler fra eksterne kilder i forbindelse med finansieringen af BER-projektet og i den sammenhæng med Kommissionens tilladelse [9].
However, the bad performance of the Schönefeld airport has not called into question the viability of the group encompassing FBS, BFG and, until 2003, their holding company BBF (‘the FBS group’).
Dette forhold skyldtes navnlig de relativt gode resultater i Tegel lufthavn, som bidrog til at mindske de negative konsekvenser af driftsunderskuddene i Schönefeld for FBS-koncernen.
The FBS group has consistently been able to generate sufficient own financial resources or find necessary financing on the market.
I perioden fra 1990 til 2005 var Tegel i modsætning til Schönefeld og Tempelhof en moderne lufthavn, der blev benyttet af alle vigtige internationale full service-luftfartsselskaber (luftfartsselskaber, der tilbyder en lang række ydelser), som havde flyvninger til/fra Berlin.
To the Commission’s knowledge, insofar as public funding was provided to the FBS group from sources external to it, this only occurred in relation to the financing of the BER project and was authorised by the Commission [9].
Blandt visse kategorier af passagerer og luftfartsselskaber blev den oven i købet opfattet som den mest attraktive lufthavn i Storberlin.
This situation is due in particular to the relatively good economic performance of Tegel, which mitigated the negative impact of the operating losses generated by Schönefeld on the FBS group.
Derudover kunne der konstateres en generel opadgående tendens i passagerlufttrafikken i Berlin mellem 1990 og 2005, der kom FBS-koncernen som helhed til gode.
Between 1990 and 2005, Tegel, unlike Schönefeld and Tempelhof, was a modern airport, hosting the main international full-service carriers serving Berlin, and was perceived as the most attractive airports of the Berlin agglomeration at least by certain categories of passengers and airlines.
Tabel 1 viser, at passagervolumenet pr. år i Tegel i 1990'erne og fra og med 2004 steg kontinuerligt.
Moreover, there has been overall an upwards trend in the passenger air traffic in Berlin between 1990 and 2005, which benefited the FBS group as a whole.
I modsætning til perioden 1991-2003 fordelte væksten i trafikken sig i absolutte tal næsten ligeligt på de to lufthavne, hvilket betyder, at væksten i trafikken i Schönefeld procentuelt var væsentligt større end i Tegel.
Between 1991 and 2003, the larger part of the traffic growth in Berlin, in absolute terms, was absorbed by Tegel, and not by Schönefeld.
Afgiftsordningerne for Schönefeld lufthavn
Indeed, whereas the number of passengers per year at Schönefeld increased by 600000 over that period, it increased by 4,4 million at Tegel.
I 1990'erne forsøgte FBS-koncernen at overtale luftfartsselskaber til at flytte deres aktiviteter fra den næsten fuldt ud udnyttede Tegel lufthavn til Schönefeld lufthavn, hvis kapacitet slet ikke var udnyttet i tilstrækkeligt omfang [10].
The traffic continued to steadily grow at both airports between 2003 and 2012: as indicated in Table 1, the traffic grew by 417 % at Schönefeld (from 1,7 million to 7,1 million passengers per year), while it grew by 63 % at Tegel (from 11,1 million to 18,2 million passengers per year).
Formålet med disse bestræbelser var at løse flaskehalsproblemerne i Tegel og samtidig udnytte kapaciteten i Schönefeld.
Contrary to the period 1991-2003, the traffic growth in absolute terms was almost equally shared between the two airports, which means that in relative terms, Schönefeld’s growth was much higher than Tegel’s.
Med henblik herpå kontaktede man både luftfartsselskaber, der allerede opererede fra Tegel og Tempelhof, og luftfartsselskaber, som endnu ikke havde flyvninger til/fra Berlin.
The schedules of airport charges at Schönefeld
Flere luftfartsselskaber gav udtryk for deres interesse, men i sidste ende var der af markedsføringsmæssige årsager ingen af dem, som valgte at flytte deres flytrafik til Schönefeld.
In the 1990s, the FBS group tried to encourage airlines to move from Tegel, which was operating at close to full capacity to Schönefeld, which was under-utilised [10].
Dette skyldtes især manglen på en såkaldt ankerbruger [11] i Schönefeld samt den kendsgerning, at infrastrukturen i Schönefeld ikke var så moderne som i Tegel.
The objective was to address the congestion problem at Tegel while optimising the use of Schönefeld’s capacity.
Endvidere blev denne ulempe ikke udlignet af attraktive lufthavnsafgifter eller andre økonomiske incitamenter.
Airlines which were already operating from Tegel and Tempelhof as well as airlines which were not yet operating from a Berlin airport were contacted for that purpose.
Forsøget på at flytte en del af flytrafikken fra Tegel til Schönefeld og derudover få luftfartsselskaber, der ikke tidligere havde haft flyvninger til/fra Berlin, til at etablere sig i Schönefeld, slog altså på dette tidspunkt i det store og hele fejl.
Several carriers showed interest but eventually did not move to Schönefeld for marketing reasons, in particular due to the lack of an anchor tenant [11] at Schönefeld and the fact that Schönefeld’s infrastructures were not as modern as at Tegel, this disadvantage not being offset by attractive airport charges or other financial incentives.
Det tydeliggøres af den allerede nævnte kendsgerning, at passagertallet i Schönefeld i perioden fra 1991 til 2003 kun steg med 600000 passagerer, mens det i samme periode voksede med 4,4 mio. passagerer i Tegel.
Overall, the attempt to shift traffic from Tegel to Schönefeld and to attract to Schönefeld carriers that were not previously flying from Berlin largely failed at that time.
Dette førte til overvejelser om, hvordan Schönefelds økonomiske situation kunne forbedres strategisk inden åbningen af BER.
This is illustrated by the fact that as already indicated, whereas traffic at Tegel increased by 4,4 million passengers between 1991 and 2003, it increased by only 600000 passengers at Schönefeld over the same period.
En midlertidig lukning af lufthavnen blev ikke taget i betragtning som en mulighed.
This triggered strategic reflections as regards the best way to improve the economic situation of Schönefeld pending the opening of the BER airport.
Genstand for de strategiske overvejelser var derimod bl.a. størrelsen af lufthavnsafgifterne samt fastsættelsen heraf i lyset af det stigende trafikvolumen.
The temporary closure of the airport was not considered as an option.
I Tyskland bliver de afgifter, som lufthavnene opkræver af luftfartsselskaberne for at stille infrastrukturydelser til rådighed, beregnet på basis af afgiftsordningen i den pågældende lufthavn.
The strategic reflections touched upon the level of the airport charges and how to set them in order to attract further traffic.
Afgiftsordningerne offentliggøres i Nachrichten für Luftfahrer (det tyske luftfartstidende).
In Germany, airport infrastructure services provided to airlines are priced on the basis of each airport’s schedule of charges as published in the Nachrichten für Luftfahrer, which is the German official journal for air transportation matters.
Den enkelte lufthavn udarbejder sin egen afgiftsordning og skal informere de kompetente civile luftfartsmyndigheder i den pågældende delstat herom.
Each airport prepares its schedule of charges and must notify it to the competent civil aviation authorities of the region (Land).
Siden 2003 gjaldt der forskellige afgiftsordninger i Schönefeld.
Since 2003, there have been different schedules of charges at Schönefeld.
I perioden fra den 1. august 2003 til den 30. april 2004 fandtes der én fælles afgiftsordning for Tegel, Tempelhof og Schönefeld (»afgiftsordningen fra 2003«).
From 1 August 2003 to 30 April 2004, there was a common schedule of charges for Tegel, Tempelhof and Schönefeld (‘the 2003 Schedule’).
Denne afgiftsordnings attraktivitet ansås for at være utilstrækkelig, da den ikke gav luftfartsselskaberne noget incitament til at åbne nye ruter til og fra Berlin eller øge frekvenserne.
That schedule was perceived as insufficiently attractive to incentivise airlines to open new routes or increase frequencies from and to Schönefeld.
På baggrund heraf bad selskabsdeltagerne i FBS i 2003 et konsulentfirma ([…] — »konsulentfirmaet«) om at udarbejde en strategi til forbedring af Schönefelds økonomiske situation frem til åbningen af BER, som hurtigt kunne gennemføres.
Against this backdrop, in 2003 FBS’ shareholders commissioned a consultancy ([…] - ‘the consultant’) to develop a strategy that could improve Schönefeld’s financial situation until the opening of BER and that could be implemented quickly.
Af analysen fra konsulentfirmaet fremgik det, at der af mange forskellige årsager var potentiale for en væsentlig udvidelse af flytrafikken i Berlin.
The consultant’s analysis revealed that there was a potential for a significant expansion of air traffic in Berlin, for a variety of reasons.
Ifølge skøn fra konsulentfirmaet omfattede Berlins opland (»catchment area«) op til 10 mio. potentielle passagerer pr. år.
The consultant estimated that Berlin’s catchment area included up to 10 million potential passengers per year.
Konsulentfirmaet undersøgte en række strukturelle faktorer, som begunstigede en udvidelse af flytrafikken.
The consultant identified a series of structural factors prone to an increase in air traffic.
Blandt de centrale faktorer var den kendsgerning, at store multinationale virksomheder flyttede deres hovedsæde til Berlin, og at Berlin er Tysklands største universitetsby og et omdrejningspunkt for »etnisk trafik« [12] samt det forhold, at Berlin i årene efter årtusindskiftet blev betragtet som en hovedstad i udvikling og turistmagnet [13].
The main core factors were the presence of the headquarters of large multi-national companies, the fact that Berlin is Germany’s largest university city and a centre for ‘ethnic traffic’ [12] and the fact that it was viewed in the early 2000s as a developing capital city and a tourist ‘honeypot’ [13].
Konsulentfirmaet anførte, at Berlin i forhold til andre hovedstæder i 2003 stadig havde et betydeligt potentiale for etablering af og vækst i lavpristrafikken (LCC-trafikken).
The consultant also showed that, compared with other capital city airports, Berlin still had considerable potential in 2003 for the establishment and growth of a low cost carrier (‘LCC’) traffic.
På samme tidspunkt oplevede LCC-trafikken en betydelig vækst i hele Europa [14].
At that time, LCC traffic was enjoying significant growth across Europe [14] and various analyses showed that LCC traffic was generated for the most part by new passengers and therefore could come in addition to traditional traffic.
Af forskellige analyser fremgik det, at LCC-trafikken overvejende kunne tilskrives nye passagerer, hvorfor der ud over den almindelige trafik kunne forventes et tilsvarende volumen.
The consultant forecasted that the potential for additional LCC traffic at Schönefeld amounted to a growth of between 600000 and 900000 additional passengers per year in the short term, namely from 2003 to 2005, and 300000 additional passengers per year in the medium term, namely from 2005 to 2010.
Desuden fastslog konsulentfirmaet, at gennemførelsen af en strategi med det formål at opnå etablering af lavprisselskaber i Schönefeld kun ville kræve begrænsede tilpasninger og ingen omfattende investeringer i infrastrukturen eller væsentlige ændringer af den eksisterende infrastruktur.
The consultant therefore recommended such a strategy (‘the LCC Strategy’).
Konsulentfirmaet anbefalede derfor en sådan strategi (»LCC-strategien«).
It suggested to implement it via a combination of volume-based discounts to airport charges and financial incentives [15].
Med henblik på gennemførelsen heraf blev der foreslået en kombination af mængderabatter på lufthavnsafgifter og økonomiske incitamenter [15].
FBS decided to put in place and implement the LCC strategy and adopted a new schedule of charges (‘the 2004 Schedule’) to that effect.
Afgifter på starter og landinger, navnlig baseret på flyets maksimale startvægt
The 2004 Schedule was specifically designed for Schönefeld, unlike the 2003 Schedule.
Passagerafgifter på basis af antallet af afrejsende passagerer og flydestinationen
This new schedule, which was adopted on 30 April 2004 and applied as of 1 May 2004, foresaw the following types of charges:
Parkeringsafgifter for fly baseret på flyets maksimale startvægt samt parkeringsarealernes anvendelsestid.
take-off and landing fees, based in particular on the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft;
Afgiftsordningen indeholdt forskellige økonomiske tilskyndelsesmekanismer:
passenger fees, based on the number of departing passengers and the destination of the flight;
En »passagermængderabat«, inden for hvilken passagerafgifterne blev tilbagebetalt forholdsmæssigt på grundlag af antallet af transporterede passagerer som følger:
aircraft parking fees based on the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft and the duration of the use of parking areas.
Tabel 3
Various financial incentive mechanisms were embedded in this schedule:
Passagermængderabat i henhold til afgiftsordningen fra 2004
a ‘passenger volume discount’ whereby part of the passenger fees were reimbursed on the basis of the number of passengers transported, as follows:
Antal passagerer pr. år
Table 3
Tilbagebetalingsbeløbets størrelse
Passenger volume discounts according to the 2004 Schedule
over 50000
Number of passengers per year
over 100000
Reimbursement rate
over 150000
More than 50000
over 250000
More than 100000
Et »vækstincitament i form af et destinations- og et frekvensincitament«, som blev tildelt for opstart af nye ruter fra Schönefeld og etableringen af yderligere frekvenser på eksisterende ruter fra Schönefeld.
More than 150000
Størrelsen af frekvensincitamentet udgjorde det første år 60 % og det andet år 40 % af landingsgrundtaksten.
a ‘growth incentive’, made up of a ‘destination incentive’ and a ‘frequency incentive’ which were granted respectively for the opening of new routes from Schönefeld and the creation of additional frequencies on existing routes from Schönefeld.
Inden ændringen gjaldt destinationsincitamentet derimod for nye ruter fra Schönefeld, også selv om den samme rute blev betjent af direkte flyvninger fra andre berlinske lufthavne.
The frequency incentive amounted to 60 % of the Landegrundtarif in the first year and 40 % in the second year.
Destinationsstøttebeløbet udgjorde i den første fartplansæson efter etablering af den nye rute 80 %, i den anden fartplansæson 60 %, i den tredje fartplansæson 40 %, i den fjerde fartplansæson 20 % og i den femte fartplansæson 10 % af landingsgrundtaksten.
The 2004 Schedule was subsequently amended in July 2005.
Derudover forpligtede luftfartsselskaberne sig til en tilbagebetaling af destinationsstøttebeløbet, hvis de opgav den nye rute allerede før udløbet af den femte fartplansæson: i den første fartplansæson 60 % af den gældende landingsgrundtakst, i den anden fartplansæson 40 %, i den tredje fartplansæson 20 %, i den fjerde fartplansæson 10 % og i den femte fartplansæson 0 %.
This amendment ruled that airlines could receive the destination incentive if they opened new routes from the Berlin airport system, that is, routes to destinations that were not previously connected by direct flights with Berlin.
Vækststøttebeløbet kunne tildeles luftfartsselskaber, hvis de i forhold til det pågældende forrige år havde opnået et øget tonnage- eller passagervolumen pr. start- og landingsoperation.
By contrast, the destination incentive was previously open to new routes from Schönefeld even if the same destination was served by direct flights from other Berlin airports.
Vækststøttebeløbet blev beregnet på grundlag af de i afgiftsordningen anførte satser afhængigt af den opnåede vækst.
On 19 January 2006 a new schedule of charges (‘the 2006 Schedule’) was adopted and entered into force retroactively on 1 January 2006.
Resultatet heraf var gradvist faldende rabatter på lufthavnsafgifterne.
In comparison with the 2004 Schedule, the frequency incentive was removed.
Vækststøttebeløbet var begrænset til maksimalt fem år.
The 2006 Schedule foresaw three main different financial incentives: a ‘growth funding’ [16] that is, an incentive linked to an increase in the number of passengers or freight tonnage by flight movement, a ‘destination funding’ awarded for the opening of a new direct route between Berlin and another destination, and a ‘passenger volume discount’.
Derimod blev »passagermængderabatten« kun ændret og udvidet lidt i forhold til afgiftsordningen fra 2004.
According to the 2006 Schedule, a carrier has to choose between the destination funding and the growth funding upon the opening of a new route from Berlin.
I henhold til afgiftsordningen fra 2006 bestod passagermængderabatten, nu under betegnelsen »volumenstøttebeløb«, i en forholdsmæssig tilbagebetaling af start- og landingsafgifterne samt af passagerafgifterne afhængigt af antallet af transporterede passagerer.
The choice had to be made before the new route was to be opened and the carrier was to be bound by this one-off decision.
Rabattrinnene var fastsat som følger:
The destination funding was an incentive set to amount to 80 % of the Landegrundtarif in the first flight season following the opening of the new route, 60 % in the second season, 40 % in the third season, 20 % in the fourth season, and 10 % in the fifth season.
Tabel 4
Besides, airlines were obliged to repay the destination funding as follows if they exited from the new route before the end of the fifth flight season: 60 % of the Landegrundtarif due for the first flight season, 40 % for the second season, 20 % for the third season, 10 % for the fourth season, and 0 % for the fifth season.
Volumenstøttebeløb: Rabatter i henhold til afgiftsordningen fra 2006
As regards the growth funding, a carrier could benefit from it if it achieved an increase in the number of passengers or tonnage of cargo transported per flight movement compared with the previous year.