natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne tilgang kan begrundes i det forhold, at en lufthavnsforvalter kan have en objektiv interesse i at indgå en transaktion med et luftfartsselskab, når vedkommende med rimelighed kan forvente, at denne transaktion forbedrer indtjeningen i lufthavnen (eller mindsker tabet), sammenlignet med den modsatte situation, hvor denne transaktion ikke bliver indgået, uafhængigt af enhver sammenligning med de betingelser, som tilbydes luftfartsselskaberne af andre lufthavnsforvaltere, eller med de betingelser, som tilbydes andre luftfartsselskaber af samme forvalter.
It is clear from all the above that each marketing services agreement is indissociable from the underlying airport services agreement, forms a single transaction with the latter, and in all likelihood would not have been signed in the absence of the corresponding airport services agreement and the routes covered by these two agreements.
Som Kommissionen har gjort rede for i de nye retningslinjer i henseende til dette sidste punkt, er »prisdifferentiering (…) standardforretningspraksis i det omfang, den er i overensstemmelse med al relevant konkurrence- og sektorlovgivning (…).
Consequently, each marketing services agreement and the airport services agreement signed at the same time should be analysed as a single measure in order to determine whether this agreement constitutes State aid.
Sådanne differentierede prispolitikker bør imidlertid være forretningsmæssigt begrundede for at være i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske princip«.
Application of the MEO test to the CCIPB with regard to the marketing services agreements
I den henseende bør det nævnes, at bemærkningerne fra visse tredjeparter, der reelt bebrejder CCIPB ikke at have anvendt sit generelle prisfastsættelsessystem ensartet på alle luftfartsselskaber, ikke er relevante for anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
In order to apply the MEO test with regard to the marketing services agreements, the hypothetical MEO to be used for analysing the conduct of the CCIPB must be identified.
F.eks. er Air Frances bemærkning som omhandlet i betragtning 169 om, at CCIPB under visse omstændigheder burde have faktureret Ryanair en markeringsafgift, irrelevant.
One approach would be to consider that the CCIPB signed the marketing services agreements as the airport operator, and therefore to compare its conduct with that of a hypothetical airport operator motivated by the prospect of profits.
Det er nemlig ikke selve en lufthavnsforvalters forhandling med et luftfartsselskab om betingelser, der adskiller sig fra forvalterens generelle prisfastsættelsessystem, eller om en anden prisstruktur end det generelle system, der nødvendigvis giver dette selskab en økonomisk fordel.
Another approach would be to consider that the CCIPB acted as a public body entrusted with a general interest mission, in this case the economic development of Pau and its region, and that it purchased these marketing services in order to fulfil that mission, regardless of its capacity as the operator of Pau airport.
Samlet vurdering af lufthavnsforvalterens adfærd og den adfærd, som udvises af CCIPB som helhed
In the context of this second approach, according to the case-law, it needs to be verified, firstly, that the services in question met the ‘actual needs’ of the public purchaser and, secondly, that they were purchased at a price equal to or below a ‘market price’ or, in other words, that an MEO motivated by the prospect of profits and needing equivalent services (without necessarily being an airport operator) would have been prepared to accept similar conditions to those accepted by the CCIPB.
Da Kommissionen besluttede at indlede proceduren, havde den foreløbig vurderet, at den adfærd, som blev udvist af CCIPB som helhed, burde bedømmes sammen med lufthavnsforvalterens og i givet fald med statens eller andre offentlige myndigheders som tilsynsførende for lufthavnsforvalteren eller finansiel bidragyder hertil.
The comments of certain interested third parties tend to favour the second approach, at least implicitly.
Frankrig har erklæret sig enig i den fælles vurdering af adfærden hos lufthavnsforvalteren, CCIPB som helhed og de øvrige offentlige myndigheder.
In particular, notably in its aforementioned study of 20 December 2013, Ryanair has provided information intended to show that the price of the AMS marketing services did not exceed what may be regarded as a market price for such services.
Ved anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip skal der nemlig tages hensyn til den adfærd, som udvises af CCIPB som helhed, og ikke kun af kammerets afdeling for lufthavnsforvaltning.
Further to this argument, it has noted that airport operators cannot be distinguished from other types of AMS customer.
Den afdeling hos CCIPB, der forvalter lufthavnen, er da heller ikke en juridisk person, som er adskilt fra CCIPB.
The CCIPB has provided information leading in the same direction and has also noted that it is responsible for developing the economic attractiveness of the area falling within its competence.
Mens aftalerne om lufthavnstjenester endvidere blev indgået med lufthavnen, der modtager de lufthavnsafgifter, som Ryanair og de øvrige luftfartsselskaber betaler, betales omkostningerne ved marketingaftalerne til gengæld for størstepartens vedkommende over CCIPB's generelle budget og afspejles ikke nødvendigvis i lufthavnens regnskaber.
Accordingly, it states that the sums paid for these marketing services have enabled the assets of Pau and its region to be promoted, with the EUR 56 000 000 that Ryanair passengers spent in 2010 during their stay having directly benefited the accommodation, catering, trade and property sectors (this amount was apparently EUR 8 000 000 in 2005, which the CCIPB claims was very low compared to the impact studies carried out by other airports).
Frankrig anfører i øvrigt i den forbindelse, at CCIPB direkte har påtaget sig disse omkostninger.
This statement suggests that, according to the CCIPB, its conduct should be analysed as that of a public purchaser acquiring the services needed to fulfil its general interest missions.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at adfærden hos lufthavnsforvalteren og CCIPB som helhed i deres forhold til luftfartsselskaberne og disses datterselskaber bør vurderes samlet med henblik på anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The Commission notes in this respect, firstly, that this argument contradicts the theory that the decisions of the CCIPB on the measures in question are not imputable to the State.
Konklusion på de nærmere betingelser for anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip
If the CCIPB maintains that it signed these agreements to fulfil its local economic development task, then it must necessarily accept that its conduct is typically that of a local public authority.
den forventede fremtidige større trafik som følge af idriftsættelsen af disse aftaler, eventuelt under hensyntagen til marketingydelsernes indvirkning på belægningsprocenten på de af aftalerne omfattede ruter
For the reasons detailed in recitals 286 to 313, such an assumption is highly unlikely.
de forventede fremtidige merindtægter som følge af idriftsættelsen af disse aftaler, herunder indtægterne fra lufthavnsafgifterne og groundhandlingydelserne, som skabes af de af aftalerne omfattede ruter, samt indtægterne fra andet end luftfart som følge af den ekstra trafik, der skabes ved idriftsættelse af disse aftaler
Moreover, even if this second approach were used, it would not lead to the conclusion that the marketing services agreements do not confer an economic advantage on Ryanair and AMS.
Anvendelse af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip
A public entity cannot consider that marketing services mainly promoting the activities of one or more clearly defined undertakings form part of this entity’s specific task of promoting local economic development.
Med henblik på vurderingen af de omhandlede aftaler og under hensyntagen til ovenstående betragtninger bør det huskes, at såvel eksistensen som betydningen af elementer af støtte i disse aftaler skal vurderes under hensyntagen til den fremherskende situation på tidspunktet for deres indgåelse og nærmere bestemt under hensyntagen til de tilgængelige oplysninger og den forventelige udvikling på dette tidspunkt.
It is logical for such a public entity to start from the assumption that local undertakings must carry out or finance their own marketing operations, and that its own actions are limited to the general promotion of the area and local economic fabric, without targeting specific undertakings.
I sit brev af 30. maj 2011 anførte Frankrig, at der på tidspunktet for indgåelse af 2005-aftalerne med Ryanair og AMS hverken fandtes markedsundersøgelser eller forretningsplaner til at vurdere og økonomisk underbygge de forpligtelser, som lufthavnen påtog sig over for Ryanair.
Any other approach would mean considering that a public entity responsible for local economic development could, without such measures constituting State aid, purchase marketing services that mainly promote the products or services of certain locally established undertakings, on the grounds that these services encourage local economic development and that they are purchased at ‘market price’.
Af Frankrigs dokumentation fremgår det ligeledes, at CCIPB hverken udarbejdede en markedsundersøgelse, en forretningsplan eller en beregning af rentabiliteten forud for indgåelsen af de andre aftaler, der er genstand for den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, undtagen 2006-aftalen med Transavia, som der blev aftalt en forretningsplan for i december 2005 (i det følgende benævnt »Transavia-forretningsplanen«).
Such an approach would circumvent Article 107(1) TFEU.
Ifølge Ryanair kan manglen på en forretningsplan på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af aftaler som dem, der er omfattet af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, ikke bruges som bevis for, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip ikke er overholdt.
As a result, it seems that the marketing services purchased by the CCIPB from AMS cannot be regarded as meeting an ‘actual need’ of the CCIPB as a public entity invested with a local economic development mission.
Kommissionen mener, at manglen på en forretningsplan i alvorlig grad underbygger den konklusion, at de aftaler, der er indgået med Ryanair og AMS, ikke overholder det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, især fordi hverken Frankrig eller CCIPB med hensyn til disse aftaler har været i stand til at fremlægge den mindste, end ikke ufuldstændige, beregning af rentabiliteten foretaget før indgåelsen af aftalerne.
This conclusion is confirmed by certain information provided by France, according to which, in particular, it is clearly not common practice for CCIs that do not operate an airport to purchase marketing services from airlines.
Frankrig har i det hele taget ikke fremlagt dokumentation for, at lufthavnsforvalteren har foretaget en risikoanalyse vedrørende de gevinster, som aftalerne måtte udløse, på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af aftalerne med Ryanair og AMS.
Consequently, applying the second approach envisaged in recitals 316 to 321 would lead to the conclusion that the marketing services agreements confer an economic advantage on the undertakings having provided these services and on the airlines having directly benefited from the marketing services.
Tværtimod havde CCIPB ifølge Frankrig regionaludvikling for øje.
As a result, based on this approach, the marketing services agreements signed with AMS would constitute aid to AMS as the provider of the marketing services and aid to Ryanair as the direct and main beneficiary of these services.
Dette element er et yderligere tegn på, at aftalerne med Ryanair og AMS ikke opfylder det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Furthermore, when a public entity makes purchases in the exercise of its general interest missions, it is normally expected to minimise its expenditure by organising an invitation to tender, or at the very least by consulting several providers and comparing their offers.
Som forklaret nedenfor bekræftes disse tegn af Kommissionens vurdering af den rentabilitetsanalyse, som en hypotetisk markedsøkonomisk investor ville have udført.
This is particularly the case with highly individual goods or services for which there are no clear market price benchmarks, which is plainly the case with marketing services.
I løbet af proceduren opfordrede Kommissionen Frankrig til at foretage en kvantificeret rekonstruktion af den rentabilitetsanalyse, som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have udført før indgåelsen af aftalerne med Ryanair og AMS, ved at støtte sig til de objektive oplysninger, som CCIPB kendte på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af aftalerne og den forventelige udvikling.
However, in the present case, the marketing agreements were not the result of an invitation to tender.
Som svar på denne opfordring leverede Frankrig en rekonstruktion af de forventede meromkostninger og -indtægter ved hver aftale indgået med Ryanair og AMS.
A call for proposals launched by the CCIPB did not find an airline prepared to operate from Pau airport under the envisaged conditions.
Denne analyse bygger for en stor dels vedkommende på forhold, der har kunnet iagttages efterfølgende, dvs. efter indgåelsen af aftalerne.
This finding confirms that the second approach is unsuitable.
Da denne analyse for en stor dels vedkommende bygger på oplysninger om omkostninger og indtægter, der er konstateret efter indgåelsen af de forskellige aftaler, og ikke nødvendigvis på prognoser fra tidspunktet for aftalernes indgåelse, kan denne metode ikke afspejle den rentabilitetsvurdering, som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have foretaget før sin beslutning om at indgå disse aftaler.
This unsuitability also appears to be confirmed by the comments submitted by the CCIPB on the extension decision.
Hvad endvidere angår de driftsmæssige meromkostninger, tages der ved Frankrigs metode hensyn til de fuldstændige enhedsomkostninger, dvs. alle lufthavnens driftsomkostninger pr. passager, i stedet for meromkostningerne, dvs. de omkostninger pr. passager, der specifikt genereres af den enkelte aftale.
It is in fact notable that, in comparing its own conduct to that of various private undertakings in order to prove that the MEO test is satisfied, the CCIPB mainly compares itself to airport operators.
Men meromkostningerne kan være forskellige fra de fuldstændige enhedsomkostninger og som regel klart mindre i betragtning af den store andel af faste omkostninger i en lufthavn.
It therefore refers to a number of large private British airports, an Italian airport and six French airports.
Anvendelsen af fuldstændige enhedsomkostninger udgør derfor endnu en svaghed i den metode, som Frankrig har foreslået.
This approach tends to confirm the conclusion that the CCIPB signed the marketing services agreements primarily as an airport operator and not as a public authority acting in the context of its local economic development mission.
Den fører desuden også til en klar nedsættelse af visse aftalers rentabilitet og straffer på den måde de luftfartsselskaber, som har indgået de pågældende aftaler.
Furthermore, France has indicated that the tourism promotion of Béarn is the responsibility of the Béarn-Basque Country departmental tourism committee and that the CCIs generally conduct specific actions to promote tourism through their participation in various regional and departmental structures in this area, particularly through the regional and departmental tourism committees.
Derfor har Kommissionen ved anvendelse af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip foretaget sin egen analyse ved at rekonstruere meromkostningerne og merindtægterne ved de forskellige aftaler, sådan som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have vurderet dem på forhånd.
However, the marketing services agreements, which, according to the CCIPB, are mainly intended to promote the tourist and business attractions of Pau and its region, were signed directly by the CCIPB, without the intervention of local structures responsible for tourism promotion.
De valgte hypoteser og resultaterne af analysen præsenteres i betragtning 393-440 nedenfor.
This is an additional factor that tends to confirm that the CCIPB signed the marketing services agreements primarily as an airport operator.
For så vidt angår aftalen med Transavia, har Kommissionen brugt Transavia-forretningsplanen direkte til at foretage sin analyse.
In order to apply the MEO test, the first approach referred to in recital 315 should therefore be used, which involves comparing the conduct of the CCIPB to a hypothetical MEO, motivated by the prospect of profits and operating Pau airport in place of the CCIPB.
Tidshorisont
This conclusion, determined for the agreements signed with Ryanair and AMS, is equally valid, for the same reasons, for the agreement signed with Transavia, particularly as, in the latter case, the airport services and marketing services were covered by one and the same agreement.
Til bedømmelsen af, om det var interessant at indgå en aftale om lufthavnstjenester og/eller en marketingaftale, ville en markedsøkonomisk investor have valgt de pågældende aftalers løbetid som tidshorisont.
Benefits that an MEO could have expected from the marketing services agreements and price that it would have been willing to pay for those services
Med andre ord ville vedkommende have vurderet meromkostninger og merindtægter i aftaleperioden.
It is clear from all the above that, in order to apply the MEO test to the marketing services agreements in question, these agreements must be analysed together with the corresponding airport services agreements, as they form a single transaction with the latter, and that the CCIPB’s conduct must be assessed in relation to the conduct of a hypothetical MEO operating Pau airport in its place.
Det forekommer ikke berettiget at vælge en længere periode.
When analysing each of the transactions in question, the benefits that this hypothetical MEO, motivated by the prospect of profits, could expect from the marketing services should be determined.
Det bør i øvrigt bemærkes, at datoen for idriftsættelsen af de af aftalen omfattede aktiviteter undtagen for visse aftaler ikke er den samme som datoen for indgåelsen af aftalen.
Marketing services may boost passenger traffic on the routes covered by the marketing services agreements and corresponding airport services agreements, as they are designed to promote these routes.
I dette tilfælde er det datoen for idriftsættelsen af aftalen, der blev brugt som udgangspunkt, og ikke datoen for indgåelsen.
Although this effect primarily benefits the airline, it does also benefit the airport operator.
Det skal også bemærkes i forbindelse med anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, at det forhold, at Ryanair ikke drev bestemte ruter i hele den periode, der var fastsat i visse aftaler, ikke blev taget i betragtning, eftersom dette element hverken var kendt eller kunne forudses på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af aftalerne.
An increase in passenger traffic may lead, for the airport operator, to an increase in revenue from certain airport charges and from the provision of groundhandling services, as well as an increase in non-aeronautical revenue from car parks, restaurants and other businesses.
I det følgende vil Kommissionen undersøge de aftaler, som blev indgået med Ryanair og AMS, med hensyn til merindtægter og meromkostninger i lyset af de valgte hypoteser, før den fremlægger resultatet af analysen af aftalerne med Ryanair og AMS og derefter analysen af aftalen med Transavia.
There can therefore be no doubt that an MEO operating Pau airport in place of the CCIPB would have taken this positive effect into account when considering entering into a marketing services agreement and the corresponding airport services agreement.
Kommissionens analyse bygger på den mertrafik (med andre ord antal ekstra passagerer), som en markedsøkonomisk investor, der forvalter Pau lufthavn i CCIPB's sted, kunne har forudsagt ved indgåelsen af aftalerne.
This effect would have been assessed for the entire operating period of the routes in question, as set out in the airport services agreement and marketing services agreement.
Vedrørende aftalen fra 2003 f.eks. skal det fastslås, hvor mange passagerer forvalteren af Pau lufthavn i 2003 kunne have forventet på ruten Pau-London, som Ryanair skulle drive, i aftalens løbetid.
The Commission accepted this point during the procedure as, when it invited France to reconstruct the revenue and cost forecasts that an MEO would have made before entering into marketing services agreements and airport services agreements, it proposed that France take into account the effects of the marketing services agreements on expected traffic.
Kommissionen er gået ud fra en belægningsprocent på 85 % pr. flyvning.
It should be determined whether a hypothetical MEO operating Pau airport in place of the CCIPB could reasonably expect and quantify benefits other than those resulting from the positive effect on passenger traffic of the routes covered by the marketing services agreement for the operating period of those routes, as set out in the marketing services agreement or airport services agreement.
Dette er en gunstig hypotese for Ryanair, idet 85 % er en høj belægningsprocent.
Certain interested third parties support this argument, in particular Ryanair in its study of 17 January 2014.
Denne sats er i øvrigt lidt højere end gennemsnittet for alle Ryanairs flyvninger og større end eller lig med den belægningsprocent, som Frankrig foreslog for de forskellige aftaler i sin rekonstruktion af rentabilitetsanalyserne.
This study of 17 January 2014 is based on the theory that marketing services purchased by an airport operator, such as the CCIPB, may help to improve the airport’s brand image and, as a result, sustainably increase the number of passengers using this airport, and not just the numbers on the routes covered by the marketing services agreement and airport services agreement over the operating period of these routes, as set out in these agreements.
Imidlertid vurderer Kommissionen, at denne høje belægningsprocent kan bruges, selv om det er en gunstig hypotese, til at afspejle marketingydelsernes mulige gavnlige virkning for benyttelsen af de ruter, der er omfattet af de forskellige aftaler, og i mangel af andre tal, der kan kvantificere den forventede virkning af disse ydelser for belægningsprocenten.
In particular, Ryanair found in its study that these marketing services may have sustainable positive effects on passenger traffic at the airport even after the marketing services agreement has expired.
Når en aftaleperiode ikke faldt sammen med det fulde kalenderår, tog Kommissionen hensyn hertil ved for hvert af aftalens driftsår at beregne den forventede trafik i forhold til det antal dage i løbet af året, som aftalen gjaldt.
It should first be noted that there is nothing in this case to suggest that, when the marketing services agreements covered by the formal investigation procedure were signed, the CCIPB ever considered, and still less quantified, any positive effects of the marketing services agreements going beyond the routes covered by these agreements or, in terms of time, going beyond the expected operating period of the routes in question.
Visse aftaler indeholdt angivelser af forventet antal passagerer på de aftalte ruter.
Moreover, neither France nor the CCIPB has proposed any method for estimating the possible value that a hypothetical MEO operating Pau airport in place of the CCIPB would have given to these effects when assessing whether to enter into the marketing services agreements and airport services agreements.