natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
MON-877Ø8-9 × MON-89788-1-sojabønne i produkter, der indeholder eller består af denne sojabønne, til enhver anden anvendelse end som angivet i punkt 1 og 2, undtagen til dyrkning.
MON-877Ø8-9 × MON-89788-1 soybean in products containing it or consisting of it for any other use than those provided in points (1) and (2), with the exception of cultivation.
Den genetisk modificerede MON-877Ø8-9 × MON-89788-1-sojabønne, som beskrevet i ansøgningen, udtrykker proteinet DMO, som giver tolerance over for dicambabaserede herbicider, og proteinet CP4 EPSPS, som giver tolerance over for glyphosatbaserede herbicider.
The genetically modified MON-877Ø8-9 × MON-89788-1 soybean, as described in the application, expresses the DMO proteins which confer tolerance to dicamba-based herbicides and the CP4 EPSPS protein which confers tolerance to glyphosate-based herbicides.
Ved anvendelse af mærkningskravene i artikel 13, stk. 1, og artikel 25, stk. 2, i forordning (EF) nr. 1829/2003 samt i artikel 4, stk. 6, i forordning (EF) nr. 1830/2003 er »organismens navn« »sojabønne«.
For the purposes of the labelling requirements laid down in Articles 13(1) and 25(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, and in Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003, the ‘name of the organism’ shall be ‘soybean’;
Begivenhedsspecifikke kvantitative realtids-PCR-metoder til MON-877Ø8-9 og MON-89788-1-sojabønner, påvisningsmetoderne er valideret på begivenheder med enkeltegenskaber og verificeret på genomisk DNA ekstraheret fra frø af MON-877Ø8-9 × MON-89788-1-sojabønne.
Event specific real-time quantitative PCR based methods for MON-877Ø8-9 and MON-89788-1 soybeans; the detection methods are validated on the single-trait events and verified on genomic DNA extracted from seeds of MON-877Ø8-9 × MON-89788-1 soybean.
Valideret af det EU-referencelaboratorium, der er oprettet ved forordning (EF) nr. 1829/2003, offentliggjort på http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/statusofdossiers.aspx;
Validated by the EU Reference Laboratory established under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, published at http://gmo-crl.jrc.ec.europa.eu/statusofdossiers.aspx;
Referencemateriale: AOCS 0311-A og AOCS 0906-A (for MON-877Ø8-9) og AOCS 0906-B og AOCS 0906-A (for MON-89788-1), der fås via American Oil Chemists Society (AOCS) på adressen http://www.aocs.org/LabServices/content.cfm?ItemNumber=19248
Reference Material: AOCS 0311-A and AOCS 0906-A (for MON-877Ø8-9), and AOCS 0906-B and AOCS 0906-A (for MON-89788-1) accessible via the American Oil Chemists Society at http://www.aocs.org/LabServices/content.cfm?ItemNumber=19248
[Clearingcentret for Biosikkerhed, Record ID: published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
[Biosafety Clearing-House, Record ID number: published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed when notified].
Krav om overvågning af fødevarens anvendelse til konsum efter markedsføring:
[Link: plan published in the Community register of genetically modified food and feed]
Bemærkning: Det kan blive nødvendigt senere at ændre link til relevante dokumenter.
Post-market monitoring requirements for the use of the food for human consumption:
Rådets afgørelse (EU) 2016/1218
Council Decision (EU) 2016/1218
om indgåelse af en protokol til Euro-Middelhavs-aftalen om oprettelse af en associering mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab og dets medlemsstater på den ene side og Den Libanesiske Republik på den anden side for at tage hensyn til Republikken Bulgariens og Rumæniens tiltrædelse af Den Europæiske Union
on the conclusion of a Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, to take account of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union
under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde, særlig artikel 217 sammenholdt med artikel 218, stk. 6, litra a), og artikel 218, stk. 8,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 217, in conjunction with point (a) of Article 218(6) and Article 218(8) thereof,
Protokollen til Euro-Middelhavs-associeringsaftalen om oprettelse af en associering mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab og dets medlemsstater på den ene side og Den Libanesiske Republik på den anden side (i det følgende benævnt »protokollen«) blev undertegnet på Unionens og dens medlemsstaters vegne den 18. juni 2015.
The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, (‘Protocol’) was signed on behalf of the Union and its Member States on 18 June 2015.
Protokollen til Euro-Middelhavs-aftalen om oprettelse af en associering mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab og dets medlemsstater på den ene side og Den Libanesiske Republik på den anden side for at tage hensyn til Republikken Bulgariens og Rumæniens tiltrædelse af Unionen godkendes herved på Unionens og dets medlemsstaters vegne [1].
The Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part, is hereby approved on behalf of the Union and its Member States to take account of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the Union [1].
Denne forordning træder i kraft på dagen for vedtagelsen.
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
Protokollen er knyttet til afgørelsen om dens undertegnelse.
The Protocol attached to the Decision on signature.
Rådets afgørelse (EU) 2016/1222
Council Decision (EU) 2016/1222
om konstatering af, at Spanien ikke har truffet virkningsfulde foranstaltninger til opfølgning af Rådets henstilling af 21. juni 2013
establishing that no effective action has been taken by Spain in response to the Council recommendation of 21 June 2013
I henhold til traktatens artikel 126 skal medlemsstaterne undgå uforholdsmæssigt store offentlige underskud.
According to Article 126 of the Treaty, Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits.
Stabilitets- og vækstpagten omfatter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1467/97 [1], der blev vedtaget for at fremme en hurtig korrektion af uforholdsmæssigt store offentlige underskud.
The Stability and Growth Pact includes Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 [1], which was adopted in order to further the prompt correction of excessive general government deficits.
Rådet, der træffer afgørelse på grundlag af en henstilling fra Kommissionen, fastslog den 27. april 2009 i overensstemmelse med artikel 104, stk. 6, i traktaten om oprettelse af Det Europæiske Fællesskab, at der forelå et uforholdsmæssigt stort underskud i Spanien, og rettede i overensstemmelse med nævnte traktats artikel 104, stk. 7, en henstilling om at korrigere det uforholdsmæssigt store underskud senest i 2012.
The Council, acting upon a recommendation by the Commission, decided on 27 April 2009, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, that an excessive deficit existed in Spain and issued a recommendation to correct the excessive deficit by 2012 at the latest in accordance with Article 104(7) of that Treaty.
Den nominelle BNP-vækst blev anslået til 0,1 % og 2,0 % i henholdsvis 2013 og 2014 og til 2,6 % og 3,2 % i de efterfølgende to år.
In its recommendation of 21 June 2013, the Council recommended that Spain reach a headline deficit target of 6,5 % of GDP in 2013, 5,8 % of GDP in 2014, 4,2 % of GDP in 2015, and 2,8 % of GDP in 2016, which was consistent with an improvement of the structural balance of 1,1 %, 0,8 %, 0,8 %, and 1,2 % of GDP in the years 2013-2016, respectively, based on the Commission 2013 spring forecast extended to 2016.
I sin henstilling af 21. juni 2013 fastsatte Rådet i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i artikel 3, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 1467/97 den 1. oktober 2013 som fristen for at træffe virkningsfulde foranstaltninger.
To achieve that improvement, Spain was asked to implement additional measures amounting to 2 %, 1 % and 1,5 % of GDP in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively.
Denne procedure er siden da blevet suspenderet.
Furthermore, Spain was requested (i) to strengthen the effectiveness of the institutional framework by raising further transparency in the implementation of the Budgetary Stability Law as well as by establishing an independent fiscal council to provide analysis, advice and monitor compliance of fiscal policy with national and Union fiscal rules; (ii) to undertake concrete steps to rein in the increasing structural deficit in the social security system; and (iii) to give greater emphasis to the growth-friendliness of the consolidation, including by conducting systematic reviews of expenditure and the tax system.
I efterfølgende vurderinger blev risiciene for manglende efterlevelse af Rådets henstilling af 21. juni 2013 igen fremhævet.
Finally, to ensure the success of the fiscal consolidation strategy, the recommendation also pointed out that it was important to back the fiscal consolidation with comprehensive structural reforms, in line with the Council recommendations addressed to Spain in the context of the European Semester and the macroeconomic imbalances procedure.
I juli 2015 konkluderede Rådet på baggrund af sin vurdering af stabilitetsprogrammet for 2015, at der var risiko for, at Spanien ikke ville overholde bestemmelserne i stabilitets- og vækstpagten.
Nominal GDP growth was forecast at 0,1 % and 2,0 % in 2013 and 2014, respectively, and at 2,6 % and 3,2 % in the two following years.
I Kommissionens udtalelser om Spaniens udkast til budgetplaner for 2014, 2015 og 2016 blev det ligeledes konkluderet, at der var risiko for, at Spanien ikke ville overholde reglerne i stabilitets- og vækstpagten.
In its recommendation of 21 June 2013, the Council established a deadline of 1 October 2013 for effective action to be taken in line with the provisions of Article 3(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
Kommissionen fremhævede navnlig risiciene ved, at den strukturelle indsats i henhold til budgetplanerne var lavere end den i Rådets henstilling.
On 15 November 2013, based on the Commission 2013 autumn forecast, the Commission concluded that Spain had taken effective action to comply with that recommendation, although it pointed to risks of non-compliance in 2014.
Kommissionen fremhævede desuden risiciene for manglende opfyldelse af målene for det samlede underskud.
On that basis, the Commission considered that no additional steps in the excessive deficit procedure were necessary at that point in time.
Den 9. marts 2016 konkluderede Kommissionen endvidere på baggrund af sin vinterprognose 2016, at der var risiko for manglende overholdelse af fristen for korrektion af det uforholdsmæssigt store underskud, i betragtning af at underskuddet fortsat forventedes at ligge betydeligt over det mellemfristede mål for 2015 om en samlet saldo på 4,2 % af BNP, og at den indtil da opnåede finanspolitiske indsats var meget mindre i forhold til den, der fremgik af henstillingen.
Since then the excessive deficit procedure has been held in abeyance.
En ny vurdering af de foranstaltninger, som Spanien har truffet for at rette op på det uforholdsmæssigt store underskud senest i 2016 til opfølgning af Rådets henstilling af 21. juni 2013, fører til følgende konklusioner:
Risks of non-compliance with the Council recommendation of 21 June 2013 were highlighted again in subsequent assessments.
Ifølge de oplysninger, som Spanien indberettede i foråret 2016, og som Kommissionen (Eurostat) validerede den 21. april 2016, udgjorde det offentlige underskud 5,9 % af BNP i 2014 og 5,1 % af BNP i 2015, hvilket er højere end Rådets mellemfristede mål på henholdsvis 5,8 % og 4,2 % af BNP.
In July 2014, the Council concluded that the measures underpinning the budgetary strategy set out in the 2014 stability programme needed to be specified further and that additional efforts were needed to fully comply with that recommendation.
Underskuddet i 2014 blev påvirket af en nedjustering af det nominelle BNP, som blev foretaget i oktober 2015 som led i den anden indberetning under proceduren for uforholdsmæssigt store underskud, samt af underskudsforøgende aktiviteter i finanssektoren svarende til 0,1 % af BNP.
Based on its assessment of the 2015 stability programme, the Council in July 2015 concluded that there was a risk that Spain would not comply with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Ifølge Kommissionens forårsprognose 2016 er ændringen af den strukturelle saldo i 2015 anslået til – 1,0 % af BNP, hvilket er væsentligt lavere end de 0,8 % af BNP i Rådets henstilling.
In particular, the Commission pointed out risks related to the structural effort in the plans being lower than those recommended by the Council.
Den kumulative ændring af den strukturelle saldo i perioden 2013-2015 udgjorde 0,6 % af BNP, hvilket langt fra når op på de 2,7 % af BNP i Rådets henstilling.
Moreover, the Commission pointed out risks to the achievement of the headline deficit targets.
Med – 0,7 % af BNP i 2015 og – 0,2 % af BNP i perioden 2013-2015 nåede den strukturelle indsats, der er tilpasset virkningerne af den reviderede potentielle outputvækst og de uventede indtægter eller udgifter sammenlignet med det basisscenarie, der dannede grundlag for henstillingen, heller ikke op på det henstillede niveau.
On 9 March 2016, based on the Commission 2016 winter forecast, the Commission also concluded that there was a risk of non-compliance with the deadline to correct the excessive deficit, given the still significant expected excess over the 4,2 %-of-GDP intermediate headline balance target for 2015 and the fact that the fiscal effort achieved until then fell well short of the recommended one.
Målt i henhold til bottom-up-metoden udgør den finanspolitiske indsats – 0,5 % af BNP i 2015, og der lader ikke til at være gjort nogen indsats i perioden 2013-2015 sammenlignet med den henstillede indsats på henholdsvis 1 % og 3 % af BNP.
On that basis, the Commission issued a recommendation to Spain to step up efforts to ensure compliance with the Council Recommendation of 21 June 2013.
Konsolideringsforanstaltningerne, f.eks. i forbindelse med reformen af den offentlige forvaltning og reformen af pensionssystemet, var ikke tilstrækkelige til at opveje virkningerne af visse ekspansive foranstaltninger, der blev gennemført i 2015, som f.eks. nedsættelser af den personlige indkomstskat og selskabsskatten og en delvis tilbagebetaling af tidligere forfaldne julegratialer.
To that end, Spain was recommended (i) to take measures to ensure a timely and durable correction of the excessive deficit, including by making full use as appropriate of the preventive and corrective tools set out in Spain's Stability Law to control for slippages at the sub-central government level from the respective deficit, debt and expenditure rule targets; and (ii) to report to the Commission on measures in response to the Commission recommendation in its updated 2016 draft budgetary plan or, at the latest, in a dedicated section of its forthcoming 2016 stability programme.
I perioden 2013-2015 var inflationen i Spanien (målt ved BNP-deflatoren) klart lavere end det makroøkonomiske basisscenarie, der dannede grundlag for henstillingen (den var endda negativ i 2014, nemlig – 0,4 %), hvilket gjorde det sværere at nå de finanspolitiske mål.
A new assessment of the action taken by Spain to correct the excessive deficit by 2016 in response to the Council recommendation of 21 June 2013 leads to the following conclusions:
Den lave eller sågar negative inflations indvirkning på Spaniens finanspolitiske resultater blev dog i høj grad opvejet af en realvækst i BNP, der var højere end forventet, også takket være de reformer, der er gennemført som reaktion på krisen, og den vellykkede fuldførelse af det finansielle bistandsprogram.
Based on the data notified by Spain in spring 2016 and validated by the Commission (Eurostat) on 21 April 2016, the general government deficit was 5,9 % of GDP in 2014 and 5,1 % of GDP in 2015, above the intermediate targets set by the Council of 5,8 % and 4,2 % of GDP, respectively.
Trods en mindre dynamisk udvikling i BNP-deflatoren viste det nominelle BNP i 2015 sig kun at være 1 % lavere end det, der var forventet i basisscenariet, eftersom det reale BNP voksede meget hurtigere i løbet af samme periode.
The 2014 deficit outcome suffered from a downward revision of nominal GDP carried out at the time of the second EDP notification in October 2015 as well as deficit-increasing financial sector operations worth 0,1 % of GDP.
Desuden medvirkede en hurtig jobskabelse og en skatteindbringende vækstsammensætning til, at gælden blev nedbragt yderligere.
The expansionary fiscal policy in 2015 had a large impact on the fiscal outcome.
Overordnet set medvirkede en situation med lave rentesatser og et økonomisk opsving, som var stærkere end forventet, bl.a. takket være de reformer, der blev gennemført som reaktion på krisen, den vellykkede fuldførelse af det finansielle bistandsprogram og den positive udvikling på arbejdsmarkedet, til, at Spanien kunne mindske sit offentlige underskud i 2014 og 2015.
Based on the Commission 2016 spring forecast, the change in the structural balance in 2015 is estimated at – 1,0 % of GDP, significantly less than the 0,8 % of GDP recommended by the Council.
I stedet blev finanspolitikken lempet, navnlig gennem skattereformen og den dynamiske vækst i udgifterne.
The cumulative change in the structural balance over the 2013-2015 period amounted to 0,6 % of GDP, thus falling significantly short of the 2,7 % of GDP recommended by the Council.
Ifølge Kommissionens forårsprognose 2016 forventes gældskvoten at stige igen i 2016 til 100,3 % for derefter at falde.
Moreover, when adjusted for the effects of revised potential output growth and revenue windfalls or shortfalls compared to the baseline scenario underpinning the recommendation, the structural effort amounts to – 0,7 % of GDP in 2015 and – 0,2 % of GDP over 2013-2015, which is well below the recommended effort.
Siden 2012 er Spaniens finanspolitiske rammer blevet styrket for bl.a. at forhindre afvigelser og sikre samtlige forvaltningsniveauers overholdelse af deres respektive underskuds-, gælds- og udgiftsmål.
When measured according to the bottom-up method, the fiscal effort amounts to – 0,5 % of GDP in 2015 and there appears to have been no effort over the 2013-2015 period, against recommended efforts of 1 % and 3 % of GDP, respectively.
Siden Rådets henstilling af 21. juni 2013 har Spanien yderligere styrket de nationale finanspolitiske rammer ved at ændre stabilitetsloven fra 2012 for at skabe incitamenter til, at de offentlige forvaltninger reducerer restancer i den offentlige sektor over for kommercielle leverandører, samt ved at oprette en uafhængig finanspolitisk institution (AIReF) i november 2013.
Consolidation measures, for instance in the context of the reforms of the public administration and the pension system, were insufficient to offset the impact of some expansionary measures implemented in 2015, such as personal and corporate income tax reductions and a partial pay-back of previously foregone Christmas bonuses.
Efter Kommissionens henstilling af 9. marts 2016 er den spanske regering begyndt overfor regionale myndigheder at håndhæve de korrigerende bestemmelser i stabilitetsloven, som ikke tidligere var blevet gennemført.
However, the negative impact of low or even negative inflation on Spain's fiscal outcomes was largely offset by higher-than-expected real GDP growth, also thanks to reforms undertaken in response to the crisis and the successful completion of the financial assistance programme.
I december 2013 vedtog Spanien en reform med henblik på at revidere indeksreguleringen af pensioner og fra 2019 at indføre en automatisk tilpasning af fremtidige pensionisters nye pensioner for at tage højde for ændringer i den forventede levetid.
Furthermore, fast job creation and a tax-rich composition of growth further benefitted the deficit reduction.
Derudover har landet siden juni 2013 gennemført en reform af den offentlige forvaltning for at høste effektivitetsgevinster.
Overall, throughout 2014 and 2015, a low interest rate environment and a stronger-than-expected economic recovery, also thanks to reforms undertaken in response to the crisis, the successful completion of the financial assistance programme and favourable labour market developments, helped Spain to reduce its general government deficit.
Samtidig vedtog Spanien i 2014 en reform af selskabsskatten og den personlige indkomstskat, som havde nogle positive træk, f.eks. ved at mindske skattekilen, men som ikke var fuldt ud finansieret.
At the same time, the fiscal consolidation process was hampered by a negative inflation surprise relative to the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the Council Recommendation of 21 June 2013.
Dette fører til den konklusion, at Spaniens opfølgning af Rådets henstilling af 21. juni 2013 har været utilstrækkelig.
However, windfall gains, especially in 2015, were not used to accelerate the deficit reduction.
VEDTAGET DENNE AFGØRELSE:
Instead, fiscal policy was relaxed, in particular through the tax reform and dynamic expenditure growth.
Artikel 1
The Commission 2016 spring forecast projects a general government deficit of 3,9 % of GDP in 2016 and 3,1 % of GDP in 2017.
Spanien har ikke truffet virkningsfulde foranstaltninger til opfølgning af Rådets henstilling af 21. juni 2013.
The 2016 stability programme targets a deficit at 3,6 % and 2,9 % of GDP in 2016 and 2017, respectively.
Artikel 2
Therefore Spain is not set to achieve a timely and durable correction of its excessive deficit in 2016.
Denne afgørelse er rettet til Kongeriget Spanien.
The public-debt-to-GDP ratio declined slightly from 99,3 % in 2014 to 99,2 % in 2015, thanks to net sales of financial assets more than offsetting the impact of the deficit growing faster than nominal GDP growth.
Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 12. juli 2016.
According to the Commission 2016 spring forecast, the debt ratio is expected to rise again in 2016 to 100,3 % and to decline thereafter.
P. Kažimír
Since the Council recommendation of 21 June 2013, Spain has further strengthened its domestic fiscal framework by amending the 2012 Stability Law to provide incentives for public administrations to reduce public sector arrears to commercial suppliers and by creating in November 2013 an independent fiscal institution (AIReF).
Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1467/97 af 7. juli 1997 om fremskyndelse og afklaring af gennemførelsen af proceduren i forbindelse med uforholdsmæssigt store underskud (EFT L 209 af 2.8.1997, s. 6).
However, while Spain's Stability Law includes tools to prevent and correct deviations from the domestic fiscal targets, the experience over 2014 and 2015 shows that they could have been used to a greater extent.
Alle dokumenter i relation til proceduren i forbindelse med uforholdsmæssigt store underskud over for Spanien findes på: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/spain_en.htm.
Following the Commission recommendation of 9 March 2016, the Spanish government has started to enforce corrective provisions in the Stability Law on regional government that had not previously been implemented.
Siden da har Rådet på grundlag af artikel 126, stk. 7, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde rettet tre henstillinger til Spanien (den 2. december 2009, den 10. juli 2012 og den 21. juni 2013), hvori fristen for at korrigere det uforholdsmæssigt store underskud blev forlænget til henholdsvis 2013, 2014 og 2016.
Moreover, the Central Government adopted expenditure cuts amounting to EUR 2 billion.
I alle tre henstillinger fandt Rådet, at Spanien havde truffet virkningsfulde foranstaltninger, men at der var opstået uventede negative økonomiske forhold med store ugunstige virkninger for de offentlige finanser [2].
In December 2013 Spain adopted a reform revising pension indexation and introducing as from 2019 an automatic adjustment of future retirees' new pensions to take account of changes in life expectancy.