natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne regel, hvorved domstolen skal behandle sager i den rækkefølge, som anmodningerne registreres i, blev indført med ændringsloven af 22. december 2015, og domstolen har allerede erklæret den i strid med bl.a. forordningen under henvisning til, at bestemmelsen griber ind i den dømmende magts uafhængighed og princippet om magtadskillelse.
In particular, the President of the Republic or the Minister of Justice were given the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a Constitutional Tribunal judge [39] and, in particularly serious cases, the Sejm was given the power to take the final decision on the dismissal of a judge following a request to that effect by the Constitutional Tribunal [40].
I henhold til § 38, stk. 3, anvendes denne regel ved anmodninger og ikke ved klager over forfatningskrænkelser.
The Commission considered that the fact that a political body decides on (and hence may refuse to impose) a disciplinary sanction as proposed by the Constitutional Tribunal may pose a problem regarding the independence of the judiciary, as the Parliament (as a political body) could be expected to decide on the basis of political considerations.
Selv om reglen kun anvendes ved anmodninger, påvirker den domstolens evne til at træffe hurtige afgørelser om lovenes forfatningsmæssighed på anmodning fra institutionelle aktører.
Similarly it was not clear why political institutions such as the President of the Republic and the Minister of Justice should have the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
§ 38, stk. 5, giver adgang til, at forfatningsdomstolens formand kan fravige reglen.
Even if such proceedings required approval by the Tribunal or its President, already the fact that they could have been initiated by political institutions could have had an impact on the independence of the Tribunal.
Denne mulighed er imidlertid begrænset til specifikke sager og kan give anledning til forsinkelser, eftersom fem dommere kan anmode formanden om at genoverveje sin beslutning om fastsættelse af datoen for retsmødet.
This raised concerns as regards the separation of powers and the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal as the proposal of the Tribunal to dismiss a judge could be rejected by the Sejm.
Det er desuden ikke klart, hvorvidt betingelserne giver forfatningsdomstolens formand mulighed for at fravige reglen i forbindelse med sager, der kræver en hurtig afgørelse.
Law adopted on 22 July 2016 on the Constitutional Tribunal
Selv om loven af 22. juli 2016 er en forbedring i forhold til loven af 22. december 2015, kan bestemmelsen om prioriteret rækkefølge og dens virkninger for domstolens effektivitet give anledning til betænkeligheder.
In addition to provisions on the appointment of judges of the Tribunal and the publication of its judgments (see sections 2 and 3), the law adopted on 22 July 2016 contains other provisions on the functioning of the Tribunal.
Ifølge § 61, stk. 1, må et retsmøde ikke afholdes tidligere end 30 dage efter meddelelsen af datoen for retsmødet.
The law is inspired by the Law on the Constitutional Tribunal of 1 August 1997 but adds new provisions, inter alia, on the attendance quorum of judges for hearing cases, the majorities needed in the Constitutional Tribunal to hand down judgments by the full bench, the handling of cases in chronological order, the minimum delay for hearings, the role of the Public Prosecutor-General, the postponement of deliberations, transitional provisions for pending cases and vacatio legis.
I henhold til § 60, stk. 3, kan forfatningsdomstolens formand i sager om retsspørgsmål, klager over forfatningskrænkelser og kompetencetvister mellem statens vigtigste forfatningsmæssige myndigheder anordne en halvering af fristen i stk. 1, medmindre klageren, den domstol, der indbringer spørgsmålet, eller ansøgeren gør indsigelse herimod inden for syv dage fra modtagelsen af meddelelsen fra domstolens formand.
The Commission considers that even if certain improvements can be noted as compared to the amending Act adopted on 22 December 2015, and certain concerns have been addressed as set out hereunder, a number of concerns raised already regarding the law adopted on 22 December 2015 remain and a number of new provisions raising concern have been introduced.
Det forhold, at forfatningsdomstolens formand kan kræve perioden på 30 dage halveret, er en forbedring i forhold til loven af 22. december 2015, selv om klageren, den domstol, der indbringer spørgsmålet, eller ansøgeren kan gøre indsigelse mod afkortelsen af perioden.
Overall, the effects of certain provisions of the law adopted on 22 July 2016, taken separately or in combination, raise concern regarding the effectiveness of constitutional review and the rule of law.
Loven af 22. juli 2016 indeholder ingen bestemmelser om inddragelsen af andre statslige institutioner i forbindelse med disciplinærsager, hvori dommere ved domstolen er impliceret.
Article 26(2) states that ‘The examination of a case by the full Tribunal shall require the participation of at least eleven judges of the Tribunal’.
Det er en forbedring i forhold til loven af 22. december 2015, og spørgsmålet giver derfor ikke længere anledning til betænkeligheder.
In addition, Article 26(1)(g) provides that ‘The Tribunal shall rule (…) in the full Tribunal on (…) cases in which three judges of the Tribunal submit an application to that effect within 14 days of receiving copies of a constitutional complaint or of an application or legal question referred to in Article 38(1)’.
Generalstatsadvokatens mulighed for at forhindre behandlingen af sager
Article 26(2) increases the number of judges required to participate in a full bench from nine (as under the 1997 Act on the Constitutional Tribunal and the Law of 25 June 2015 prior to its amendment of 22 December 2015) to 11.
Ifølge § 61, stk. 6, forhindrer generalstatsadvokatens eller dennes repræsentants manglende tilstedeværelse ikke, forudsat at vedkommende er blevet behørigt underrettet om retsmødet, at sagen behandles, medmindre pligten til at deltage følger af bestemmelser i loven.
This represents a constraint on the decision-making process of the Constitutional Tribunal.
Ifølge § 30, stk. 5, skal generalstatsadvokaten eller dennes repræsentant deltage i sager, der behandles af domstolen i plenum.
The number has been reduced compared to the 13 which was required by the amending Act of 22 December 2015.
I praksis forekommer kombinationen af § 61, stk. 6, og § 30, stk. 5, at give generalstatsadvokaten, som desuden er justitsminister, mulighed for at udsætte eller ligefrem forhindre behandlingen af visse sager, herunder sager, der behandles i plenum, ved ikke at deltage i retsmødet.
However, in particular as the Constitutional Tribunal currently has only 12 judges to handle cases, the attendance quorum might on occasion not be reached, which would then leave the Tribunal at least temporarily unable to judicate.
Det ville indebære utilbørlig indblanding i domstolens virkemåde og ville således krænke den dømmende myndigheds uafhængighed og være i strid med magtadskillelsesprincippet.
In addition, according to Article 26(1)(g) the Tribunal adjudicates as a full bench, inter alia, in cases in which three judges file an application thereto.
Udsættelse af voteringer
These judges do not have to be judges designated to an adjudicating bench in a given case.
Ifølge § 68, stk. 5, kan mindst fire dommere under voteringer i plenum gøre indsigelse mod den foreslåede afgørelse, hvis de finder, at spørgsmålet er af særlig relevans for statens organisering eller den offentlige orden, og hvis de ikke er enige i domskonklusionen.
The Law does not provide that their application needs to be justified or meet any particular conditions.
Ifølge § 68, stk. 6, udsættes voteringen med tre måneder i tilfælde af en indsigelse efter stk. 5, og ved de efterfølgende voteringer efter denne periode fremsætter de dommere, der gjorde indsigelse, et fælles forslag til afgørelse.
Such a provision permits for an unforeseeable number of cases to be considered by a full bench and could hamper the efficient functioning of the Tribunal and consequently the effectiveness of the constitutional review.
I henhold til § 68, stk. 7, kan mindst fire dommere ved den nye votering efter stk. 6 atter gøre indsigelse, hvorved voteringen udsættes i yderligere tre måneder.
Article 69 provides: ‘Rulings shall be adopted by a simple majority of votes’.
Ved udgangen af denne periode finder en ny votering og afstemning sted.
This is an improvement as compared to the amending Act of 22 December 2015 in so far as it no longer contains the unconstitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority for adopting decisions and thus addresses this concern previously raised by the Commission.
Ved sager, der behandles i plenum — hvilket risikerer at være et større antal, se ovenfor — giver loven af 22. juli 2016 mulighed for, at mindst fire dommere ved forfatningsdomstolen gør indsigelse mod et forslag til afgørelse.
Article 38(3) provides that ‘The dates of the hearings at which applications are examined shall be set in accordance with the order in which cases arrive at the Tribunal’.
Dette kan føre til, at voteringen i en sag udsættes i mindst tre måneder og i visse tilfælde i seks måneder, efter at forfatningsdomstolen er nået til voteringsstadiet.
Article 38(4) lists a limited number of cases in which the order in which an application arrives shall not be relevant.
Loven indeholder ingen undtagelsesbestemmelser, som giver mulighed for en hurtigere behandling af sager.
Article 38(5) provides that ‘The President of the Tribunal may set the date for the hearing setting aside condition foreseen by paragraph 3 [above] in cases where it is justified by protection of the citizen's rights and freedoms, security of state or constitutional order.
Virkningerne af disse bestemmelser på effektiviteten af den forfatningsmæssige prøvelse giver anledning til betænkeligheder set i lyset af reststatsprincippet, eftersom de forhindrer forfatningsdomstolen i at sikre en reel forfatningsmæssig prøvelse og garantere en effektiv og rettidig domstolsprøvelse i alle sager.
On an application from 5 judges the President of the Tribunal may consider again his decision to set the date for the hearing.’
Overgangsbestemmelser for verserende sager
The ‘sequence rule’ according to which the Tribunal must hear cases at which applications are considered in the sequence in which they have been registered was introduced in the amending Act of 22 December 2015 and has already been ruled by the Tribunal to be inconsistent, inter alia, with the Constitution, on the grounds that the said provision interferes with the judiciary's independence and its separateness from other branches of government.
Ifølge § 83, stk. 1, finder alle lovens bestemmelser anvendelse på sager, der allerede var blevet indledt, men ikke afsluttet på datoen for lovens ikrafttrædelse.
According to Article 38(3), the sequencing rule applies to ‘applications’ and does not relate to ‘constitutional complaints’.
I henhold til § 83, stk. 2, skal domstolen afslutte de sager, der er omhandlet i stk. 1, inden for et år efter lovens ikrafttrædelse.
Even if the sequencing rule applies only to applications, it will affect the capacity of the Tribunal to render rapidly decisions on the constitutionality of laws at the request of institutional actors.
Den etårige frist finder ikke anvendelse for sager nævnt i § 84.
Article 38(5) does foresee a possibility for the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to derogate from the sequencing rule.
I henhold til § 84, stk. 1, skal domstolen stille sager vedrørende anmodninger fra myndigheder omhandlet i forfatningens § 191, stk. 1, nr. 1-5, som verserede forud for lovens ikrafttrædelse, i bero i seks måneder og bede de anmodende myndigheder om at komplettere deres anmodninger i overensstemmelse med betingelserne i § 33, stk. 2-5.
However, this possibility is limited to specific cases and may give rise to delays, considering that five judges may file an application to reconsider the decision of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal to set the date for the hearing.
I henhold til § 84, stk. 2, skal domstolen anordne sagen genåbnet ved udløbet af den frist, der er omhandlet i stk. 1, når anmodningen omhandlet i samme stykke er kompletteret i overensstemmelse med betingelserne i § 33, stk. 2-5.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the conditions would allow the President of the Tribunal to diverge from the sequencing rule in all cases requiring urgent decision.
I modsat fald henlægges sagen.
Therefore, even if the law adopted on 22 July 2016 constitutes an improvement over the law adopted on 22 December 2015, the impact of the sequencing rule on the effectiveness of the Tribunal still may give rise to certain concerns.
Ifølge § 85, stk. 1, skal retsmødet udsættes, hvis datoen herfor blev fastsat før lovens ikrafttrædelse, og det kompetente dommerpanel skal tilpasses i overensstemmelse med loven.
Article 61(1) provides that ‘The hearing may not take place earlier than 30 days after notice of the date of the hearing is served.’
Ifølge § 85, stk. 2, fastsættes der en ny dato for retsmødet.
Article 61(3) provides that ‘In cases concerning legal questions, constitutional complaints and disputes on jurisdiction between central constitutional authorities of the state, the President of the Tribunal may order the time limit laid down in paragraph 1 to be halved, unless the complainant, court referring a legal question or applicant concerned expresses opposition within seven days of service of the President of the Tribunal's order’.
Retsmødet skal finde sted i overensstemmelse med loven.
The fact that the President of the Tribunal may order to halve the period of 30 days is an improvement as compared to the law adopted on 22 December 2015, even if the complainant, the court referring a legal question or the applicant can object to the shortening of the period.
I henhold til § 86 skal kundgørelsen af afgørelsen udsættes, hvis datoen herfor blev fastsat før lovens ikrafttrædelse, og det kompetente dommerpanel og afgørelsens betingelser skal tilpasses i overensstemmelse med loven.
The law adopted on 22 July 2016 does not provide for the involvement of other institutions of the State in disciplinary proceedings concerning judges of the Tribunal.
På den ene side fastsættes der i § 83, stk. 2, en frist på et år fra datoen for lovens ikrafttrædelse til at behandle verserende sager.
This is an improvement as compared to the law adopted on 22 December 2015 and therefore this matter no longer raises concerns.
På den anden side fastslås det i § 84, som en delvis ophævelse af § 83, stk. 2, at verserende anmodninger (dvs. anmodninger fra institutionelle aktører om forfatningsmæssig prøvelse af love) skal fastfryses i en periode på seks måneder.
Possibility of Public Prosecutor-General to prevent examination of cases
Domstolen skal anmode ansøgerne om at komplettere deres anmodninger, så de lever op til de nye formalia, og kan først genoptage sit arbejde med disse anmodninger, efter at perioden på seks måneder er udløbet (selv om ansøgerne kompletterer deres anmodninger inden da).
Article 61(6) provides that ‘Absence from the hearing of the Public Prosecutor-General, who has been properly notified thereof, or his/her representative shall not prevent examination of the case unless the obligation to participate in the hearing results from the provisions of the Act.’
Loven indeholder ingen undtagelsesbestemmelser, som giver mulighed for en hurtigere behandling af sager.
Article 30(5) provides that ‘The Public Prosecutor-General or his/her deputy shall participate in cases examined by the Tribunal sitting in full bench’.
§§ 85 og 86 har karakter af et lovgivningsmæssigt indgreb i verserende sager, navnlig dem, der allerede har nået et fremskredent stadie, og kan hæmme domstolens rette funktion.
In practice, the combination of Articles 61(6) and 30(5) would appear to give a possibility to the Public Prosecutor-General, who is also the Minister of Justice, to delay or even to prevent the examination of certain cases, including cases handled by the full bench, by deciding not to participate at the hearing.
Samlet set giver disse overgangsbestemmelser anledning til bekymring, idet de i betydelig grad vil forsinke domstolens arbejde med anmodninger og forhindre den i at sikre en effektiv forfatningsmæssig prøvelse.
This would allow for an undue interference with the functioning of the Tribunal and would violate the independence of the judiciary and the principle of the separation of powers.
Det er særlig relevant i forbindelse med alle de kontroversielle nye love som omhandlet i Kommissionens udtalelse (se afsnit 4.3 nedenfor).
Postponement of deliberation
Ifølge § 92 i loven af 22. juli 2016 træder loven i kraft 14 dage efter kundgørelsen.
Article 68(5) provides that ‘During deliberations of the full Tribunal, at least four judges may object to the proposed settlement if they consider that the matter is particularly important for State organisational reasons or reasons of public order and they do not agree with the tenor of the settlement.’
Medmindre der træffes foranstaltninger til en forebyggende forfatningsmæssig prøvelse af loven, er vacatio legis-perioden på 14 dage for kort til at kunne foretage en effektiv forfatningsmæssig prøvelse af loven.
Article 68(6) provides that ‘In the event of an objection under paragraph 5, the deliberations shall be postponed for three months and, at the subsequent deliberations after the end of that period, the judges that made the objection shall present their joint proposed settlement.’
Af hensyn til retssikkerheden er det vigtigt, at forfatningsdomstolen gives tilstrækkelig tid til at prøve lovens forenelighed med forfatningen, før den træder i kraft.
Article 68(7) stipulates that ‘If, during the new deliberations referred to in paragraph 6, at least four judges again object, the deliberations shall be postponed by a further three months.
I den forbindelse bemærkes, at Venedigkommissionen i sin udtalelse af 11. marts 2016 påpegede, at forfatningsdomstolen skal have mulighed for at prøve den lovgivning, der regulerer domstolens funktion, før lovgivningen træder i kraft.
At the end of that period, new deliberations and voting shall take place.’
Konsekvenser af den manglende effektivitet af den forfatningsmæssige prøvelse af ny lovgivning
For cases examined by a full bench, which could imply a large number of cases (see above) the law adopted on 22 July 2016 allows at least four judges of the Tribunal to raise an objection to a draft determination.
Sejm har vedtaget en række særlig kontroversielle nye love, ofte ved hjælp af hasteprocedurer, bl.a. navnlig en medielov [41], men også en ny tjenestemandslov [42], en lov om ændring af politiloven og visse andre love [43] og love om den offentlige anklagemyndighed [44] samt en ny lov om ombudsmanden og om ændring af visse andre love [45].
This could lead to the postponement of deliberations on a case for at least 3 months and in some instances for 6 months following the moment the Tribunal reaches the stage of deliberation.
I sine breve af 1. februar og 3. marts 2016 forhørte Kommissionen sig hos den polske regering om status for og indholdet af disse lovændringer, men den har endnu ikke modtaget oplysninger herom.
The Law does not provide for an exception to deal with urgent cases more rapidly.
Derudover har Sejm vedtaget en række andre kontroversielle lovforslag, bl.a. loven om det nationale medieråd [46] og en ny lov om terrorbekæmpelse [47].
The impact of these provisions on the effectiveness of the constitutional review is a matter of concern in respect of the rule of law, as it prevents the Constitutional Tribunal from fully ensuring an effective constitutional review, and grant effective and timely judicial redress in all cases.
I den forbindelse sætter Kommissionen navnlig spørgsmålstegn ved, hvilke retsmidler de personer, der berøres af den nye lov, har adgang til.
According to Article 83(2) ‘The Tribunal must settle cases referred to in paragraph 1 within one year of this Act's entry into force.
Love som den nye tjenestemandslov [49] er ligeledes relevante set ud fra retsstatsprincippet og grundlæggende rettigheder.
The time-limit of one year shall not apply to the cases specified in Article 84.’
I sine breve af 1. februar og 3. marts 2016 spurgte Kommissionen i den forbindelse den polske regering om, hvilke retsmidler, de personer, der berøres af loven, har adgang til [50].
Article 84(1) states: ‘In the case of applications filed by the entities referred to in Article 191(1), subparagraphs 1 to 5, of the Constitution pending before the date of this Act's entry into force, the Tribunal shall (…) suspend proceedings for six months and call on the applicants to supplement their applications in accordance with the requirements of Article 33(2) to (5).’
Den polske regering har indtil videre ikke besvaret Kommissionens spørgsmål.
Article 84(2) provides: ‘If an application referred to in paragraph 1 is supplemented in accordance with the requirements of Article 33(2) to (5), the Tribunal shall order the resumption of the suspended proceedings on expiry of the time-limit referred to in paragraph 1.
Loven om ændring af politiloven og af visse andre love [51] kan også give anledning til spørgsmål med hensyn til dens forenelighed med de grundlæggende rettigheder, bl.a. beskyttelse af privatlivet og af personoplysninger.
Otherwise the proceedings shall be discontinued.’
Den nye lov om terrorbekæmpelse kan desuden give anledning til spørgsmål vedrørende dens forenelighed med de grundlæggende rettigheder [53] og er genstand for forfatningsmæssig prøvelse.
Article 85(1) states: ‘If the date of a hearing has been set before this Act's entry into force, the hearing shall be postponed and the competent panel shall be adjusted to this Act.’
Det giver anledning til alvorlige betænkeligheder for så vidt angår retsstatsprincippet, navnlig i betragtning af, at Sejm for nylig har vedtaget en række særlig kontroversielle nye love, som bør kunne underkastes forfatningsmæssig prøvelse.
The hearing shall take place in accordance with this Act.’
Disse betænkeligheder kommer så meget desto mere til udtryk ved, at loven af 22. juli 2016 som nævnt i det foregående vil medføre, at en række verserende sager stilles i bero.
Article 86 provides: ‘If the date of publication of a ruling has been set before this Act's entry into force, publication shall be postponed and the competent panel and the requirements concerning the ruling shall be adjusted to this Act.’
KONSTATERING AF EN SYSTEMISK TRUSSEL MOD RETSSTATEN
On the one hand, Article 83(2) fixes a deadline of 1 year from the date of entry into force of the Act to deal with pending cases.
Af ovennævnte årsager finder Kommissionen, at den polske retsstat er udsat for en systemisk trussel.
However, on the other hand, Article 84 provides, by derogation to Article 83(2), that pending applications (i.e. applications by institutional actors for constitutional review of legislation) shall be frozen for a period of 6 months.
Det forhold, at forfatningsdomstolen forhindres i at foretage en effektiv forfatningsmæssig prøvelse har negative konsekvenser for dens integritet, stabilitet og korrekte funktion, hvilket er blandt de vigtigste garantier for retsstaten i Polen.
The Tribunal would request the applicants to supplement their applications in order to comply with the new procedural requirements, and would be able to resume its work on these applications only after this period of 6 months has lapsed (even if the applicants have supplemented their application before).
Når der findes et forfatningssikret retssystem, er dette systems rette virkemåde et centralt element i retsstaten.
The Law does not provide for an exception to handle urgent cases more rapidly.
Respekten for retsstatsprincippet er ikke alene en forudsætning for beskyttelsen af alle de grundlæggende rettigheder, der er omhandlet i artikel 2 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Union.
Articles 85 and 86 amount to legislative interference with pending cases, in particular with those which are already at an advanced stage, and could hamper the functioning of the Tribunal.