natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen bemærkede også, at der var megen dokumentation — af samme type som den dokumentation, der henvises til i Stardust Marine-dommen — for, at de offentlige myndigheder var involveret i de foranstaltninger, som SEA traf med hensyn til sit datterselskab SEA Handling.
The Commission considered that the measures were selective, since they concerned only SEA Handling, giving the company an economic advantage which it would not have had under normal market conditions.
Kommissionen fandt foranstaltningerne selektive, eftersom de kun gjaldt SEA Handling og gav selskabet en økonomisk fordel, som det ikke ville have haft på normale markedsvilkår.
To determine whether, in covering SEA Handling’s losses, SEA had acted as a prudent investor operating in normal market conditions, the Commission took various factors into consideration.
For at fastslå, om SEA ved at dække SEA Handlings tab havde optrådt som en fornuftig privat investor, der handler på normale markedsvilkår, tog Kommissionen forskellige faktorer i betragtning.
In a preliminary phase, the Commission found that the business plan approved in 2001 envisaged that SEA Handling would see its profits grow by 2005.
Indledningsvis konstaterede Kommissionen, at SEA Handling ifølge forretningsplanen, som blev godkendt i 2001, ville få en stigende indtjening inden 2005.
It had been said that the decision to continue operating in the ground handling sector after 2002, and not to sell SEA Handling immediately after the break-up of the two companies, was justified by the predicted upturn in profits within a three-year period.
Det var blevet nævnt, at beslutningen om at fortsætte driften i ground handling-sektoren efter 2002 og undlade at sælge SEA Handling umiddelbart efter opsplitningen i to selskaber var begrundet i den forventede stigning i indtjeningen inden for en treårig periode.
However, the 2001 business plan did not contain a detailed strategy that would allow SEA to guarantee that SEA Handling would be profitable, and that plan covered all of SEA’s activities.
Imidlertid indeholdt forretningsplanen for 2001 ikke en detaljeret strategi, som kunne sætte SEA i stand til at garantere, at SEA Handling ville blive rentabelt, og at planen dækkede alle SEA's aktiviteter.
No other detailed business plan relating specifically to SEA Handling was submitted to the Commission.
Der var ikke fremsendt en anden detaljeret forretningsplan, der særligt vedrørte SEA Handling, til Kommissionen.
The Commission also found that between 2003 and 2005, SEA Handling saw limited progress or even negative results, with annual losses exceeding EUR 40 million, while labour costs remained stable, total costs fell by around 3 %, turnover dropped 4,5 % and costs per unit of labour rose 7,6 %.
Kommissionen konstaterede også, at SEA Handling i 2003-2005 gjorde begrænsede fremskridt eller endda havde negative resultater med årlige tab på over 40 mio. EUR, mens personaleomkostningerne forblev stabile, de samlede omkostninger faldt ca. 3 %, omsætningen faldt 4,5 %, og omkostningerne pr. arbejdskraftenhed steg 7,6 %.
The Italian authorities had argued that the coverage of SEA Handling’s losses had to be looked at from a group perspective;
De italienske myndigheder havde anført, at dækningen af SEA Handlings tab skulle ses i et koncernperspektiv.
the Commission took the view that this did not explain why, at the group level, it should have been regarded as more advantageous to cover the losses of SEA Handling rather than to sell or restructure it.
Kommissionen mente, at dette ikke forklarede, hvorfor det på koncernplan skulle anses for mere fordelagtigt at dække SEA Handlings tab frem for at sælge eller omstrukturere selskabet.
The Commission considered that the deficit situation of SEA Handling was too protracted to fall within the meaning of the term ‘a limited period’ in the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission and that the recurrent nature of the coverage of losses since 2002 confirmed that SEA was not operating as a prudent investor.
Kommissionen mente, at SEA Handlings underskudssituation var for langvarig til at falde ind under begrebet »en begrænset periode« i henhold til EU-Domstolens dom i sag C-303/88, Italien mod Kommissionen, og at den tilbagevendende dækning af tabene fra 2002 bekræftede, at SEA ikke optrådte som en fornuftig privat investor.
The Commission found that […] or other operators would have been able to enter the market; that the loss of image that the Italian authorities had invoked to justify SEA’s withdrawal from ground handling was not quantified, and was presented in terms that were too vague; and that the obligation to provide ground handling services did not require SEA to provide such services direct, given that the presence of other providers constituted a practical and valid alternative.
Kommissionen mente, at […] eller andre operatører ville have kunnet komme ind på markedet, at imagetabet, som de italienske myndigheder havde påberåbt sig for at begrunde SEA's tilbagetrækning fra ground handling-området, ikke var blevet kvantificeret og kun forelagt i vage vendinger, og at forpligtelsen til ground handling-ydelser ikke krævede, at SEA skulle levere disse ydelser direkte, idet andre tjenesteyderes tilstedeværelse var et praktiserbart og gyldigt alternativ.
Finally, the Commission judged that the measures undoubtedly had an impact on trade between Member States and on competition.
Endelig vurderede Kommissionen, at foranstaltningerne utvivlsomt havde en indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og på konkurrencen.
The effect on trade was clear, given the objectives of Directive 96/67/EC, which regulated access to the ground handling market at Community airports that reached the levels of traffic that the Directive specified.
Virkningen for samhandelen var tydelig i betragtning af målene i direktiv 96/67/EF, som regulerer adgangen til ground handling-markedet i de af Fællesskabets lufthavne, som nåede det trafikniveau, som var angivet i direktivet.
There was also a presumed impact on competition, since the measures significantly strengthened the position of SEA Handling to the detriment of its competitors.
Der var også en formodet indvirkning på konkurrencen, eftersom foranstaltningerne gav SEA Handling en betydelig bedre stilling til skade for konkurrenterne.
The Commission considered for the time being that the coverage of losses constituted State aid, and expressed doubts regarding the compatibility of the aid in question with the internal market.
Kommissionen mente foreløbig, at dækningen af tabene var statsstøtte, og udtrykte tvivl om den pågældende støttes forenelighed med det indre marked.
The Commission communication ‘Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to airlines departing from regional airports’ (‘the Aviation Sector Guidelines’), referring to Directive 96/67/EC, states that Above the threshold of two million passengers, ground-handling services must be self-financing and must not be cross-subsidised by the airport’s other commercial revenue or by public resources granted to it as airport authority or operator of a service of general economic interest.
I Kommissionens meddelelse »EF-retningslinjer for finansiering af lufthavne og statslig startstøtte til luftfartsselskaber, som operer fra regionale lufthavne« (»retningslinjerne for luftfartssektoren«), hvori der henvises til direktiv 96/67/EF, hedder det: Over tærsklen på 2 millioner passagerer skal ground handling-aktiviteterne være selvbærende uafhængigt af lufthavnens andre kommercielle indtægter eller offentlige midler, som lufthavnsoperatøren har modtaget som lufthavnsmyndighed eller udbyder af en tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse.
The Commission found that the subsidising of such activities by public authorities was contrary to the objectives established by Directive 96/67/EC and could therefore have a negative effect on the liberalisation of the market.
Kommissionen mente, at offentlige myndigheders subsidiering af sådanne aktiviteter var i strid med målene i direktiv 96/67/EF og derfor kunne have en negativ virkning for liberaliseringen af markedet.
Consequently, the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure to remove all doubts as to the classification of the measures as State aid up to the most recent period, and as to their compatibility with the internal market.
Derfor besluttede Kommissionen at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure for at fjerne al tvivl om kategoriseringen af foranstaltningerne som statsstøtte frem til den seneste periode og om foreneligheden heraf med det indre marked.
OBSERVATIONS OF THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES
DE ITALIENSKE MYNDIGHEDERS BEMÆRKNINGER
The period under investigation
Den omhandlede periode
The Italian authorities were puzzled by the decision primarily because of the chronology of the claims made by the Commission.
De italienske myndigheder undrede sig over beslutningen, primært på grund af rækkefølgen af de krav, som Kommissionen stillede.
The Italian authorities argued that the observations of the Commission referred to the period 2006-2008, which was later than the period that formed the basis of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, of the requests for clarification that they had received regarding the period 2002-2005.
De italienske myndigheder hævdede, at Kommissionens bemærkninger henviste til perioden 2006-2008, som lå efter den periode, der dannede grundlag for den indledende undersøgelse og derfor også for de anmodninger om præcisering, som de havde modtaget vedrørende perioden 2002-2005.
The Municipality therefore asked the Commission to amend the timeframe covered by the proceedings, and to send the Italian authorities a regular request for information for the later period (from 2006 onwards).
Kommunen bad derfor Kommissionen om at ændre tidsrammen for undersøgelsen og sende de italienske myndigheder en almindelig anmodning om information vedrørende den senere periode (2006 og fremefter).
The imputability to the public authorities of the measures for the coverage of losses
Tilregnelse til offentlige myndigheder af foranstaltningerne til dækning af tab
The first indication of imputability identified by the Commission consisted of excerpts from the agreement of 26 March 2002 signed by the Municipality of Milan, SEA and union representatives, excerpts from the record of the union agreement of 4 April 2002, subsequently confirmed on 15 May 2002, between SEA and the industrial and confederated union organisations, and excerpts from the minutes of the union agreement concluded by SEA, SEA Handling and the industrial and confederated union organisations of 9 June 2003;
Den første indikation på tilregnelse, som Kommissionen fandt, bestod i uddrag af aftalen af 26. marts 2002 undertegnet af Milano kommune, SEA og fagforeningsrepræsentanter, uddrag af protokollen over fagforeningsaftalen af 4. april 2002, siden bekræftet den 15. maj 2002, mellem SEA og branchefagforeningerne og fagforbundene samt uddrag af protokollen over fagforeningsaftalen mellem SEA, SEA Handling og branchefagforeningerne og fagforbundene af 9. juni 2003.
the Italian authorities asked the Commission to reconsider the probative value of these documents.
De italienske myndigheder bad Kommissionen om at genoverveje disse dokumenters bevisværdi.
In this regard, the Italian authorities argued that the measures could be imputed to the State only on the basis of objective findings showing that the Member State had intervened in SEA’s decision in such a way as to determine or influence it, in the sense that SEA would have adopted different behaviour had it been able to make an independent decision;
I den henseende hævdede de italienske myndigheder, at foranstaltningerne kun kunne tilregnes staten på baggrund af objektive forhold, der viste, at medlemsstaten havde grebet ind i SEA's beslutning for at bestemme eller påvirke den, og at SEA ville have valgt en anden fremgangsmåde, hvis selskabet havde kunnet træffe sin beslutning uafhængigt.
they contended that this was not the case for the Municipality of Milan.
De hævdede, at dette ikke var tilfældet for Milano kommunes vedkommende.
The Municipality argued that it had had no involvement whatsoever in the signing of the union agreements, and had had nothing to do with the commitments given by SEA to union representatives in the agreements in question.
Kommunen hævdede, at den ikke havde været involveret på nogen som helst måde i underskrivelsen af fagforeningsaftalerne og intet havde haft at gøre med SEA's løfter til fagforeningsrepræsentanterne i de pågældende aftaler.
The Municipality had participated only in the meeting of 26 March 2002, and had protected the interests of workers as the majority shareholder and particularly as the responsible authority in the local community.
Kommunen havde kun deltaget i mødet den 26. marts 2002 og havde beskyttet arbejdstagernes interesser som majoritetsaktionær og især som ansvarlig myndighed i lokalsamfundet.
As such it had not entered into any commitment, but had given the unions ‘confirmation’ at political level of SEA’s business decisions, and in particular its strategy of saving jobs, with the intention of supporting the unions in overseeing the implementation of those decisions.
Den havde som sådan ikke indgået nogen forpligtelse, men havde givet fagforeningerne en politisk »bekræftelse« af SEA's forretningsbeslutninger og især selskabets jobbevaringsstrategi med det formål at støtte fagforeningerne i at tilse gennemførelsen af disse beslutninger.
The agreement, which was clearly of a socio-political nature, had no value in law, and served only to reassure the unions as to the trustworthiness of SEA’s commitments.
Aftalen, som tydeligvis blot var af samfundspolitisk karakter, havde ingen retslig værdi og tjente kun til at forsikre fagforeningerne om SEA's pålidelighed med hensyn til de indgåede forpligtelser.
From the documents taken into consideration by the Commission, it could not be inferred that the Municipality of Milan had played a determining role in the decision to cover SEA Handling’s losses, or that it had assumed any obligation in that respect.
Af de dokumenter, som Kommissionen havde taget i betragtning, kunne det ikke udledes, at Milano kommune havde spillet en afgørende rolle i beslutningen om at dække SEA Handlings tab, eller at den havde påtaget sig nogen forpligtelse i den forbindelse.
SEA therefore took its own business decisions in complete freedom and independence.
SEA traf derfor sine egne forretningsbeslutninger fuldstændig frit og uafhængigt.
In general, the correspondence from 2002 to 2005 between company management and certain members of the Municipal Council, who were denied access to certain SEA internal documents which they had requested, in particular the business plan, provided proof of a lack of interference by the administration in the activities of SEA.
Generelt var korrespondancen fra 2002 til 2005 mellem selskabets ledelse og visse medlemmer af byrådet, som blev nægtet adgang til visse af SEA's interne dokumenter, som de havde udbedt sig, især forretningsplanen, bevis for manglende indgriben fra forvaltningens side i SEA's aktiviteter.
According to the Italian authorities, there was additional proof in the fact that SEA had specifically asserted its independence from the administration, for example in response to a question submitted by a municipal councillor.
Ifølge de italienske myndigheder var det endnu et bevis, at SEA specifikt havde bekræftet sin uafhængighed af forvaltningen, f.eks. som svar på et spørgsmål stillet af et byrådsmedlem.
The Italian authorities also stated that the Municipality could not legitimately enter into valid and effective commitments without formal acts adopted by its competent bodies giving specific indications of financial coverage.
De italienske myndigheder anførte også, at kommunen ikke lovligt kunne indgå gyldige og faktiske forpligtelser uden formelle retsakter, der var vedtaget af dens kompetente instanser med specifik angivelse af den finansielle dækning.
The second indication of imputability identified by the Commission was the particular dependency of the directors and managers of SEA on the Municipality of Milan:
Den anden indikation på tilregnelse, som Kommissionen fandt, var SEA's bestyrelsesmedlemmers og direktørers afhængighed af Milano kommune.
here the Italian authorities disputed the Commission’s elevation of claims made in newspaper articles to the level of evidence.
Her anfægtede de italienske myndigheder Kommissionens fremgangsmåde med at tillægge påstande i en avisartikel bevisværdi.
They also put forward the following observations.
De fremsatte også følgende bemærkninger.
First, regarding the SEA directors’ signing of ‘blank resignations’ that were submitted to the mayor of Milan before the end of their term of office, the Italian authorities maintained that such resignations did not show the existence of a situation of particular dependency of SEA directors on the Municipality.
For det første fastholdt de italienske myndigheder med hensyn til SEA's bestyrelsesmedlemmers underskrivelse af hver sin »blankoopsigelse«, der blev sendt i et brev til Milanos borgmester før udløbet af deres mandat, at disse opsigelser ikke påviste en situation, hvor SEA's bestyrelsesmedlemmer var særlig afhængige af kommunen.
As acknowledged by the chairman of the board of directors at the ordinary meeting held on 24 February 2006, this was a common practice ‘used specifically to take timely steps to remove directors alleged to have acted improperly’.
Som bestyrelsesformanden erkendte på det ordinære møde den 24. februar 2006, var dette en almindelig metode, der blev brugt »specifikt til rettidig fjernelse af bestyrelsesmedlemmer, hvis adfærd hævdedes at være angribelig«.
The chairman ruled out the use of such letters in cases where the shareholder disagreed with managerial decisions made by the board of directors:
Formanden udelukkede, at sådanne breve blev brugt i tilfælde, hvor aktionæren var uenig i ledelsesbeslutninger truffet af bestyrelsen.
the board had exclusive responsibility for such decisions.
Bestyrelsen havde nemlig alene ansvaret for sådanne beslutninger.
He stressed that ‘in any case, nobody has ever applied any pressure with reference to this letter or to other documents’, and that such letters had ‘moral value, but no legal value’.
Han understregede, at »ingen alligevel nogen sinde havde lagt pres på nogen under henvisning til dette brev eller til andre dokumenter«, og at sådanne breve havde »moralsk værdi, men ikke retslig værdi«.
According to the representative of the Municipality at the same SEA ordinary meeting, such letters ‘would be entirely unlikely to influence the conduct of board members.
Ifølge kommunens repræsentant på det samme ordinære møde i SEA ville det være »fuldstændig usandsynligt, at sådanne breve kunne påvirke bestyrelsesmedlemmernes adfærd.
The members of the board are subject only to the general meeting of shareholders: only by that body can they be appointed and dismissed, and only to that body are they responsible for company management’.
Bestyrelsesmedlemmerne er kun underlagt generalforsamlingsbeslutninger, idet kun dette organ kan udnævne og afsætte dem, og det er kun dette organ, de står til ansvar over for med hensyn til selskabets ledelse«.
According to the Italian authorities, the only effect of the abovementioned letters was that a director dismissed by the shareholders’ meeting would lose entitlement to compensation for unfair dismissal.
Ifølge de italienske myndigheder var den eneste virkning af førnævnte breve, at et bestyrelsesmedlem, som på generalforsamlingen var blevet afsat, ville miste retten til kompensation for at være blevet uretmæssigt afsat.
Second, still with regard to the relationship of particular dependency of SEA on the Municipality of Milan, the Italian authorities observed, contrary to the claims of the Commission, that in its supervisory role the Municipality of Milan did not appoint representatives to the board of directors, but merely designated them: board members were appointed only by the general meeting, in accordance with the ordinary rules of private law governing limited companies under the Italian Civil Code.
For det andet bemærkede de italienske myndigheder med hensyn til SEA's særlige afhængighedsforhold af Milano kommune i modsætning til Kommissionens påstand, at Milano kommune i sin egenskab af tilsynsførende ikke udnævnte repræsentanter til bestyrelsen, men blot udpegede dem, idet bestyrelsesmedlemmer kun blev udnævnt af generalforsamlingen i overensstemmelse med de privatretlige regler for aktieselskaber i den italienske civillovbog.
They also argued that in line with the ordinary legal rules, as was often the case, the constitution of SEA gave the board of directors the power to select the names of directors to be submitted for the meeting’s approval.
De hævdede også, at SEA's vedtægter i overensstemmelse med de almindelige retsregler, som det ofte er tilfældet, gav bestyrelsesmedlemmerne beføjelse til at vælge navnene på de bestyrelsesmedlemmer, som skulle godkendes af generalforsamlingen.
The Italian authorities affirmed that other indicators that might tend to demonstrate the imputability of a State measure, and in particular the classes of evidence identified by the Court of Justice in the Stardust Marine case, likewise led to the conclusion that the measure under examination in this case was not imputable to the State.
De italienske myndigheder hævdede, at andre tegn, der kunne tyde på, at foranstaltningen kunne tilregnes staten, og især de typer dokumentation, som Domstolen havde kategoriseret i Stardust Marine-sagen, ligeledes førte til den konklusion, at den omhandlede foranstaltning i dette tilfælde ikke kunne tilregnes staten.
SEA was not integrated into the structures of the public administration in any way, either locally or at the national level.
SEA var ikke integreret i den offentlige forvaltnings strukturer på nogen måde, hverken lokalt eller nationalt.
Turning to the nature of its activities and the exercise of the latter on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators, the Italian authorities stated that SEA always acted as an ordinary private firm.
Med hensyn til arten af selskabets aktiviteter og udøvelsen heraf på markedet på normale vilkår i konkurrence med private erhvervsdrivende anførte de italienske myndigheder, at SEA altid handlede som et almindeligt privat firma.
The legal status of the undertaking could not demonstrate that the measures were imputable to the State either, because SEA was in every respect a private company.
Selskabets retlige status kunne heller ikke påvise, at foranstaltningerne kunne tilregnes staten, idet SEA i enhver henseende var et privatretligt selskab.
Finally, in reference to the last kind of evidence identified by the court, namely the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, they contended that the Municipality exercised no influence whatsoever and that the company had itself proclaimed its independence from the administration, which demonstrated that the administration was not involved in the adoption of any corporate decisions.
Endelig bestred de italienske myndigheder med hensyn til den sidste type dokumentation, som Domstolen identificerede, nemlig intensiteten af de offentlige myndigheders tilsyn med selskabets ledelse, at kommunen overhovedet ingen indflydelse øvede, og at selskabet selv havde erklæret sin uafhængighed af forvaltningen, hvilket beviste, at forvaltningen ikke var inddraget i vedtagelsen af ledelsesbeslutninger overhovedet.
Application of the private investor test
Anvendelse af princippet om den private investor
With regard to the application of the private investor test, the Italian authorities argued that the factual evidence (economic and other data) which the Commission had assembled during the course of its preliminary investigations, but which related to a time after the disputed acts were decided, could be used where necessary to evaluate the compatibility of the measures with the rules of the Treaty, if they were classified as aid;