natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De involverede offentlige myndigheder, navnlig forbundsnetagenturet og forbundskontoret, overholder deres begrænsede beføjelser og forvalter ingen midler.
In contrast, the German Association of Energy Consumers (Bund der Energieverbraucher), which initially complained to the Commission about the EEG-Act 2012, argued that the reductions in the EEG-surcharge do indeed constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, to energy-intensive users and that they harm those German undertakings and consumers that have to pay a higher EEG-surcharge without benefiting from similar reductions.
Ifølge Tyskland har disse myndigheder ingen skønsbeføjelser.
The Association further contended that the reductions cannot be found compatible on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty.
Desuden bemærker Tyskland, at EEG-afgiften ikke fastsættes af staten, men er baseret på en markedsmekanisme, idet den afhænger af indtægterne fra salget af EEG-el på spotmarkedet.
These arguments were also made by several German citizens.
Endelig understreger Tyskland, at EEG-loven af 2012 ikke pålægger leverandørerne at vælte afgiften over på forbrugerne, hvilket betyder, at dette afhænger af elleverandørens prispolitik.
The arguments submitted by interested parties are addressed in more detail in Section 7.
Desuden er ingen af de operatører, der er omfattet af ordningen, tillagt særlige beføjelser, som udspringer af offentlig ret.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY ON THE OPENING DECISION AND ON THIRD PARTY COMMENTS
Derimod skal de gå gennem det civile retssystem for at håndhæve deres betalingskrav over for hinanden.
Germany points out that most of the actors in the system established by the EEG-Act 2012 are private, something which was already the case under PreussenElektra, and that those actors are not part of public administration.
Tyskland har påberåbt sig følgende retlige argumenter, som minder om dem, de interesserede parter har gjort gældende, nemlig
The only State involvement is in the adoption of the legislation and the strict control of its implementation.
fraværet af selektive økonomiske fordele, på baggrund af, at støtte til EEG-elektriciteten opfylder kriterierne i Altmark-dommen [19], og at nedsættelserne af afgiften for energiintensive brugere udelukkende afbøder en eksisterende ulempe for tysk industrifraværet af statsmidler og statskontrol, på grundlag af, at de retlige og de faktiske omstændigheder i EEG-loven af 2012 ikke kan sammenlignes med de omstændigheder, Domstolen undersøgte i sagerne Essent [20] og Vent de colère [21] den omstændighed, at betalingerne foretaget i henhold til EEG-loven af 2012, såfremt de overhovedet udgør statsstøtte, vil udgøre eksisterende støtte set i lyset af Kommissionens beslutning i sag NN 27/2000 om statsstøtte
The public authorities involved, notably the BNetzA and the BAFA, are said to strictly comply with their limited attributions, without managing any funds.
foreneligheden af ydet støtte med det indre marked på grundlag af artikel 107, stk. 3, litra b) og c)
According to Germany, those authorities have no discretion.
fraværet af en overtrædelse af traktatens artikel 30 og 110, idet importeret EEG-el ikke kan sammenlignes med indenlandsk produceret el, navnlig på baggrund af dommen afsagt for nylig i sagen Ålands Vindkraft [22].
Further, Germany notes that the EEG-surcharge as such is not set by the State, but is based on a market mechanism, given that it depends on the revenues made from the EEG electricity sales on the spot market.
(58) Tysklands argumenter behandles og tilbagevises mere indgående i afsnit 7.
Finally, Germany stresses that the EEG-Act 2012 does not require suppliers to pass on the surcharge to consumers, which means the pass-on is a matter of the electricity suppliers' pricing policy.
TILSAGN AFGIVET AF TYSKLAND
Moreover, none of the operators involved in the system have special powers originating in public law; rather, they have to rely on the civil courts to enforce their payment claims against each other.
Som nævnt ovenfor i betragtning 19 har Tyskland afgivet nedenstående tilsagn om geninvestering af 50 mio. EUR i samkøringsforbindelser og europæiske energiprojekter.
Germany made the following legal arguments, which are similar to those submitted by interested parties, namely
»For så vidt angår EEG-loven af 2012, kunne der udtænkes en samlet løsning på problemstillingen vedrørende privilegiet for grøn elektricitet og problemstillingen vedrørende artikel 30 og artikel 110.
the absence of selective economic advantages, on the grounds that the support for EEG electricity meets the criteria of the Altmark judgment [19] and that the reductions for energy-intensive users merely amount to mitigating an existing disadvantage of the German industry;the absence of State resources and of State control, due to the incomparability of the legal and factual situation in the EEG-Act 2012 with the situations examined by the Court in cases Essent [20] and Vent de colère [21];the fact that, if they constitute State aid at all, the payments made under the EEG-Act 2012 would constitute existing aid in the light of the Commission's decision in State aid case NN 27/2000;
Denne løsning består af geninvestering det anslåede beløb, der udgør den påståede forskelsbehandling, i samkøringsforbindelser og europæiske energiprojekter.
the compatibility of any aid granted with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) and (c);
Geninvesteringen kan foretages parallelt med udviklingen i det relevante projekt.
the absence of an infringement of Articles 30 and 110 of the Treaty due to the fact that imported EEG electricity cannot be compared with that which is domestically produced, notably in view of the recent Ålands Vindkraft ruling [22].(58) Germany's arguments are examined and rebutted in more detail in Section 7.
På baggrund af de af Tyskland indsendte tal bør geninvesteringen for perioden januar 2012 til juli 2014 udgøre 50 mio. EUR.
COMMITMENTS PROVIDED BY GERMANY
Tyskland afgiver dette tilsagn for at sikre sin retsstilling (ingen forskelsbehandling).«
As mentioned above in recital 19, Germany provided the following commitment concerning the reinvestment of EUR 50 million into interconnectors and European energy projects:
Desuden har Tyskland afgivet følgende tilsagn vedrørende den i betragtning 27 ff. nævnte tilpasningsplan:
‘For the EEG 2012, a global solution could be conceived for both the Grünstromprivileg and the Article 30/110 issue.
»En given virksomheds tilbagebetaling [af det inddrivelige beløb] skyldes forskellen mellem de relevante EEG-omkostninger som fastlagt på grundlag af retningslinjerne for statsstøtte til miljøbeskyttelse og energi 2014-2020 (»2014-retningslinjerne«) og EEG-omkostningerne som fastlagt på grundlag af EEG-loven af 2012.
The solution would consist of the reinvestment into interconnectors or similar European energy projects of the estimated amount of the alleged discrimination.
I denne forbindelse begrænser tilpasningsplanen den betaling, der skal foretages på grundlag af 2014-retningslinjerne, til maksimalt 125 % (for 2013) og maksimalt 150 % (for 2014) af betalingen for 2013 i henhold til EEG-loven af 2012.
The reinvestment could be made in parallel to the progress of the relevant project.
Der tages ikke højde for negative tilbagebetalingspligtige beløb.«
On the basis of the figures communicated by Germany, the reinvestment should amount to EUR 50 million for the period January 2012-July 2014.
VURDERING AF STØTTEFORANSTALTNINGEN
Again, Germany offers this commitment by safeguarding its legal position (no discrimination).’
Statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1
In addition, Germany provided the following commitment concerning the adjustment plan mentioned in recitals 27 et seq.:
I traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, hedder det, at »bortset fra de i traktaterne hjemlede undtagelser er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
‘Recovery [the recoverable amount] in respect of a given undertaking results from the difference of the relevant EEG costs as determined on the basis of the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-20 (“2014 Guidelines”) and of the EEG costs as determined on the basis of the EEG-Act 2012.
Ved vurderingen af, hvorvidt en foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, skal Kommissionen anvende følgende kriterier: Foranstaltningen kan tilregnes staten og omfatter brugen af statsmidler.
In that respect, the adjustment plan limits the payment to be made on the basis of the 2014 Guidelines to a maximum of 125 % (for the year 2013) and to a maximum of 150 % (for the year 2014) of the payment made in respect of the year 2013 according to the EEG-Act 2012.
Den giver bestemte virksomheder eller visse sektorer en fordel, der fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og kan påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Negative recovery amounts are not taken into account.’
Selektive fordele, der påvirker handelen og konkurrencen
ASSESSMENT OF THE AID
I åbningsafgørelsen konkluderede Kommissionen, at EEG-loven af 2012 omfattede to former for selektive fordele, der påvirker handelen og konkurrencen.
Existence of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty
Den første fordel gives til producenter af EEG-el.
According to Article 107(1) of the Treaty, ‘save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’.
Kommissionen fastslog, at feed-in-tarifferne og markedstillæggene sikrer producenterne af EEG-el en pris for den el, de producerer, der er højere end markedsprisen.
In determining whether a measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty, the Commission has to apply the following criteria: the measure must be imputable to the State and involve State resources, it must confer an advantage on certain undertakings or certain sectors which distorts or threatens to distort competition and is liable to affect trade between Member States.
Det samme gør sig gældende for det direkte salg af EEG-el, som fører til en ret til en nedsat EEG-afgift i medfør af § 39 i EEG-loven af 2012, idet denne bestemmelse gør det muligt for producenterne af EEG-el at opnå en pris for deres elektricitet, der er højere end markedsprisen.
Existence of selective advantages affecting trade and competition
Foranstaltningen er selektiv, fordi den kun gør sig gældende for producenter af EEG-el.
In its Opening Decision, the Commission found that the EEG-Act 2012 involved two types of selective advantages affecting trade and competition.
Desuden er elmarkedet blevet liberaliseret, og elproducenterne opererer inden for sektorer, hvor der foregår samhandel mellem medlemsstater (betragtning 76 til åbningsafgørelsen).
The first advantage was conferred on producers of EEG electricity.
Den anden fordel består i nedsættelsen af EEG-afgiften for bestemte energiintensive brugere i henhold til den særlige kompensationsregel.
Indeed the Commission found that the feed-in tariffs and premiums guaranteed the producers of EEG electricity a higher price for the electricity they produce than the market price.
Kommissionen konstaterede, at energiintensive brugere i produktionssektoren nyder en fordel af begrænsningen på deres EEG-afgift.
The same was true for direct marketing of EEG electricity that resulted in a right to a reduced EEG-surcharge under § 39 of the EEG-Act 2012, as that provision enabled the producers of EEG electricity to obtain a higher price for their electricity than the market price.
§§ 40-41 i EEG-loven af 2012 fritager dem fra en byrde, som de normalt ville være pålagt.
The measure was selective because it only benefited producers of EEG electricity.
Begrænsningerne forhindrer transmissionsnetoperatørerne og elleverandørerne fra at søge tilbagebetaling af de yderligere omkostninger til støtte for EEG-el fra de energiintensive brugere.
Moreover, the electricity market had been liberalised and electricity producers were active in sectors where trade between Member States took place (recital 76 of the Opening Decision).
Foranstaltningen blev tillige betragtet som værende selektiv, fordi den udelukkende gør sig gældende for energiintensive brugere fra produktionssektoren.
The second advantage consisted in the reduction of the EEG-surcharge for certain EIUs under the BesAR.
Endelig kan foranstaltningen fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, idet modtagerne er producenter af energiintensive varer (f.eks. producenter af jernholdigt og ikke-jernholdigt metal, papirindustrien, kemiindustrien og cementproducenter) og opererede inden for sektorer, hvor der foregår samhandel mellem medlemsstater (betragtning 77-80 til åbningsafgørelsen).
The Commission found that EIUs in the manufacturing sector enjoyed an advantage because their EEG-surcharge was capped.
Tyskland er af den opfattelse, at der ikke er tale om en økonomisk fordel, hverken for producenterne af EEG-el eller for de energiintensive brugere, som drager fordel af den særlige kompensationsregel, af følgende årsager.
§§ 40 to 41 EEG-Act 2012 relieved them from a burden that they would normally have to bear.
Producenter af EEG-el opnår ingen økonomiske fordele som følge af EEG-afgiften, selv hvis den betragtes som et statsmiddel, idet feed-in-tarifferne, i henhold til hvilke producenterne betales, er adskilt fra EEG-afgiften.
Indeed, the cap prevented TSOs and electricity suppliers from recovering the additional costs for the support of EEG electricity from EIUs.
Derimod godtgør EEG-afgiften blot det tab, som transmissionsnetoperatørerne lider.
The measure was also considered to be selective because only EIUs from the manufacturing sector could benefit from it.
Desuden opfylder betalingen til producenterne af EEG-el angiveligt kriterierne i Altmark-dommen [23].
Finally, the measure was liable to distort competition and affect trade between Member States because the beneficiaries were producers of energy-intensive goods (for example ferrous and non-ferrous metal producers, paper industries, chemical industry, cement producers) and were active in sectors in which trade between Member States took place (recitals 77 to 80 of the Opening Decision).
Vedrørende energiintensive brugere gør Tyskland gældende, at den særlige kompensationsregel ikke giver en økonomisk fordel, men derimod kompenserer for en konkurrencemæssig ulempe for disse virksomheder sammenlignet med deres konkurrenter i andre medlemsstater (som har lavere finansielle omkostninger i forbindelse med vedvarende energi) [24] og tredjelande (som oftest ikke er pålagt lignende byrder).
Germany takes the view that there is no economic advantage either at the level of EEG electricity producers, or at the level of EIUs which benefit from the BesAR, for the following reasons.
Nogle interesserede parter har stillet spørgsmål ved konstateringen af, at nedsættelsen af EEG-afgiften udgør en økonomisk fordel, der kan fordreje konkurrencevilkårene.
EEG electricity producers are said not to receive any economic advantage resulting from the EEG-surcharge in itself even if it were to be considered a State resource given that the feed-in tariffs at which they are remunerated are independent from the EEG-surcharge.
De mener derimod, at foranstaltningen genskaber lige konkurrencemæssige vilkår i EU, da industriens elektricitetsudgifter er højere i Tyskland end noget andet sted.
Rather, the EEG-surcharge merely compensates the losses incurred by the TSOs.
Desuden bemærker visse interesserede parter, at modtagere, der forbruger mere end 10 GWh om året, påløber finansielle omkostninger i forbindelse med obligatoriske energisyn.
Moreover, the remuneration of the EEG electricity producers allegedly satisfies the criteria of the Altmark ruling [23].
Tyskland og interesserede parter har desuden stillet spørgsmål ved konstateringen af, at de økonomiske fordele er selektive og kan påvirke konkurrencen og handelen, navnlig fordi den særlige kompensationsregel kan finde anvendelse på alle virksomheder i produktionssektoren og virksomheder af enhver størrelse.
Concerning EIUs, Germany argues that the BesAR does not grant an economic advantage, but rather compensates for a competitive disadvantage suffered by those undertakings in comparison with their competitors in other Member States (which have lower RES financing costs) [24] and third countries (which mostly face no comparable burdens).
Visse interesserede parter anfører, at nedsættelserne ikke er selektive, da modtagerne ikke befinder sig i en situation, der kan sammenlignes med andre virksomheder, idet de vigtigste kriterier for støtteberettigelse er elektricitetsintensitet og elforbrug, og da elektricitetintensive virksomheder står over for en langt større trussel i form af EEG-afgiften end andre virksomheder.
Some interested parties have disputed the findings that the reduced EEG-surcharge constituted an economic advantage liable to distort competition.
Desuden hævder de, at selv hvis de nedsatte EEG-afgifter ved første øjekast er selektive, er de uadskilleligt forbundet med EEG-støtteordningens karakter og logik.
Rather, the measure was said to restore the competitive level-playing field in the Union, given that the industrial electricity costs were higher in Germany than elsewhere.
Uden nedsættelserne ville det ikke være muligt at finansiere støtten til EEG-el, da de energiintensive brugere ville flytte ud af Tyskland.
In addition, some interested parties note that beneficiaries consuming more than 10 GWh per year incur financial costs associated with mandatory energy efficiency audits.
De argumenter, som Tyskland og de interesserede parter har påberåbt sig, er ikke overbevisende.
Germany and interested parties have also challenged the finding that the economic advantages are selective and liable to affect competition and trade, notably because the BesAR is said to apply to all undertakings in the manufacturing industry and to undertakings of all sizes.
Lige vilkår for virksomheder i forskellige medlemsstater
Some interested parties argue that the reductions are not selective as beneficiaries are not in a comparable situation to other undertakings, given that the principal eligibility criteria are electro-intensity and electricity consumption and given that electro-intensive undertakings face a much bigger threat from the EEG-surcharge than undertakings that are not.
Den omstændighed, at en virksomhed kompenseres for omkostninger eller udgifter, den allerede har afholdt, udelukker for det første ikke, at der kan være tale om en økonomisk fordel [25].
Further, they argue that even if the reduced surcharges were prima facie selective, they would be inherent to the nature and logic of the EEG electricity support system: without the reductions, EEG electricity support could not be financed as EIU would relocate outside Germany.
Det kan heller ikke udelukkes, at der er tale om en fordel, blot fordi konkurrerende virksomheder i andre medlemsstater er i en mere favorabel stilling [26], for fordelsbegrebet er baseret på en analyse af en virksomheds finansielle situation i dens egen retlige og faktiske situation med og uden den pågældende foranstaltning.
The arguments submitted by Germany and interested parties are unconvincing.
Hvis der ses bort fra skatter og afgifter er elpriserne for industrielle forbrugere ikke desto mindre gennemsnitligt lavere i Tyskland end i andre medlemsstater.
Level playing field between undertakings in different Member States
Retten har for nylig genbekræftet princippet om, at vurderingen af, hvorvidt der er tale om en fordel, skal ske uden skelen til konkurrencevilkårene i andre medlemsstater [27].
First, the fact that an undertaking is compensated for costs or charges it has already incurred does not in principle exclude the existence of an economic advantage [25].
Retten konstaterede, at selve karakteren af særprisen — dvs. at Alcoa Transformazioni blev kompenseret af for forskellen mellem den elpris, som ENEL anvender over for fabrikkerne, og den i dekretet fra 1995 fastsatte pris — i sig selv er tilstrækkelig til at konstatere, at den pågældende virksomhed ikke bar alle de omkostninger, som normalt ville have belastet dens budgetter [28].
Nor is the existence of an advantage ruled out by the mere fact that competing undertakings in other Member States are in a more favourable position [26], because the notion of advantage is based on an analysis of the financial situation of an undertaking in its own legal and factual context with and without the particular measure.
Retten konkluderede desuden, at eksistensen af en fordel følger af den blotte beskrivelse af ordningen vedrørende prisdifferentiering, dvs. en kompensationsordning, som skal fritage en virksomhed for en del af de el-udgifter, som kræves til fremstilling af de produkter, som markedsføres på Unionens område [29].
Nevertheless, if one excludes taxes and levies, electricity prices for industrial consumers are lower in Germany than in other Member States on average.
Ydermere gentog Retten [30] princippet om, at en statsstøtte skal vurderes i sig selv og ikke i forhold til formål, som f.eks. vedrører afhjælpningen af et marked med ufuldstændig konkurrence.
The General Court has recently reconfirmed the principle that the existence of an advantage has to be assessed irrespective of the competitive playing field in other Member States [27].
På samme måde forbedrer nedsættelserne af EEG-afgiften i henhold til den særlige kompensationsregel modtagernes økonomiske situation ved at fritage dem for en byrde, som de normalt ville være pålagt.
The General Court found that the very nature of the preferential tariff, that is to say, the fact that Alcoa Transformazioni was reimbursed the difference between the electricity prices charged by ENEL and the rate provided by the 1995 decree, is enough to conclude that the undertaking concerned was not bearing all the charges which should have normally burdened its budget [28].
Hvis det ikke var for den særlige kompensationsregel og forbundskontorets afgørelse, skulle de betale den fulde EEG-afgift lige som alle andre elforbrugere.
The General Court went further to conclude that the existence of an advantage results from the simple description of the price differentiation mechanism, that is to say, a compensation mechanism, the purpose of which is to exonerate a company from the payment of a part of the price for electricity necessary for producing goods that are sold on the territory of the Union [29].
Tyskland har lagt vægt på, at nedsættelserne er nødvendige for at opretholde modtagernes konkurrenceevne i forhold til energiintensive brugere i andre medlemsstater og tredjelande.
Moreover, the General Court restated [30] the principle that State aid must be assessed on its own merits and not in the light of its objectives, such as the remediation of imperfect competition on a certain market.
Hermed anerkender Tyskland indirekte, at modtagerne opnår en økonomisk fordelagtig behandling.
Similarly, the reductions of the EEG-surcharge granted under the BesAR improve the beneficiaries' financial situation by relieving them from a cost burden they would have to bear under normal conditions.
Selektivitet
Indeed, if it was not for the BesAR and the decision of the BAFA, they would have to pay the full EEG-surcharge like any other electricity consumer.
Dette er allerede tilfældet her, idet kun produktionssektoren drager fordel af støtten (dermed er der ikke behov for, at Kommissionen undersøger yderligere begrundelser for, at der er tale om selektivitet).
In doing so, Germany implicitly acknowledges that the beneficiaries receive an economically advantageous treatment.