natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For det første påpeger Kommissionen, at SEA med urette formoder, at det tilgængelige udbud af ground handling-ydelser er begrænset til det udbud, som de eksterne operatører på ethvert givet tidspunkt tilbyder i Malpensa og Linate, og ikke omfatter det potentielle udbud fra andre leverandører, som også er godkendt til at operere der.
Additionally, neither that statement nor the more specific claim that potential outside operators are interested only in certain more profitable services (‘cherry picking’) is based on a firm observation of a manifest disinterest, for example following a tender procedure initiated by SEA for the provision of the services in question.
SEA's noget vage udtalelser om den angiveligt negative økonomiske situation hos andre udbydere i Milanos lufthavne eller den mængde ressourcer, de faktisk bruger i de lufthavne, er på ingen måde relevante.
In other words, this claim is not supported by any specific evidence, while a number of operators are authorised to offer their services in Italy and in particular at Malpensa and Linate airports.
Den marginale tilstedeværelse af leverandører, der faktisk opererer i Milanos lufthavne, er kun ét eksempel på det potentielt tilgængelige udbud, der vil kunne komme ind på markedet.
Regarding the capacity of outside operators, the Italian authorities have insisted that there were no operators capable of guaranteeing the level of quality required by SEA’s commercial model, namely that of a ‘hub’ or ‘self-hub’ airport.
Desuden betyder det forhold, at de eksterne leverandører, som aktuelt opererer i Milanos lufthavne, ikke dækker alle ground handling-ydelser, ikke, at man kan bedømme deres kapacitet til at gøre det.
SEA considered that it needed a provider that was able to provide all of its ground handling services, and that this was impossible because the other operators on the market did not have the material resources, the economic resources or especially the human resources required to ensure the entire range of services.
For det andet har de italienske myndigheder og SEA ikke klarlagt, hvorfor SEA var nødt til at overføre alle sine ground handling-ydelser til én operatør.
First, the Commission points out that SEA is wrong to suppose that the available supply of ground handling services is limited to that of outside parties present at any given moment in Malpensa and Linate airports, and does not include potential supply by any other providers also authorised to work there.
Selv om det kan accepteres, at nogle aktiviteter er mindre rentable, kunne disse aktiviteter med rimelighed være blevet overflyttet til en operatør, som kunne drage fordel af stordriftsfordele på internationalt plan.
SEA’s somewhat vague statements concerning the allegedly negative economic situation of other providers active at the Milan airports or the level of the resources they actually use at those airports are in no way relevant.
For det tredje afviser Kommissionen med hensyn til eksterne operatørers faktiske kapacitet til at levere alle ground handling-ydelser påstanden om, at ingen operatør havde de nødvendige ressourcer.
The marginal presence of providers actually working at the Milan airports is only one example of the supply potentially available and able to enter the market.
Ifølge SEA er 84 leverandører godkendt til at operere i Linate og Malpensa.
In addition, the fact that the outside providers currently operating at the Milan airports do not cover all ground handling services does not mean judgments can be made as regards their capacity to do so.
Og som allerede nævnt var det bestemt muligt at udlicitere dele af aktiviteterne og ikke kun alle på én gang.
Second, the Italian authorities and SEA have not clarified why SEA needed to transfer all of its ground handling services to one operator.
For det fjerde har SEA ikke specifikt vist, at en ekstern operatør ikke ville kunne opfylde kvalitetskravene, som SEA finder afgørende for den korrekte drift af sin forretningsmodel.
While it may be accepted that some activities may be less profitable, these activities could reasonably have been transferred to an operator that could take advantage of international economies of scale.
Kommissionen deler ikke den holdning, at servicekvalitetskravet i henhold til direktiv 96/67/EF og den italienske lovgivning ville gælde i denne sammenhæng.
Third, regarding the actual capacity of outside operators to provide all ground handling services, the Commission rejects the claim that no operator had the necessary resources.
Med hensyn til SEA's økonomiske begrundelse, hvormed koncernen forsøger at påvise, at det ikke var tilstrækkeligt at udlicitere visse ground handling-ydelser, fordi koncessionshaveren har det endelige ansvar for at garantere ubrudt levering af ydelserne i nødstilfælde og i tilfælde af uforudsete begivenheder, har Kommissionen taget forbehold på visse punkter.
According to SEA, 84 providers are authorised to operate at Linate and Malpensa.
For det første har SEA fremlagt tvivlsomme beregninger til støtte for sin teori.
And, as already mentioned, it was certainly feasible to outsource part of the activities, rather than all of them.
Heri blev antallet af fuldtidsækvivalenter (årsværk) i SEA Handling, som var afsat til nødforanstaltninger, sat meget højt.
Fourth, SEA has not specifically shown that an outside operator would not be able to satisfy the quality requirements judged essential for SEA’s commercial model to function correctly.
I 2003 vurderer SEA tallet til ikke mindre end 336 årsværk og til i alt 9,9 mio. EUR svarende til 8 % af SEA Handlings samlede antal årsværk.
The Commission does not share the opinion that the quality of service requirement cited in Directive 96/67/EC and in the Italian legislation would apply in this context.
Tydeligvis var den faktiske omkostning, som SEA Handling bar, langt mindre, eftersom de årsværk også — hvis ikke primært — var afsat til andre opgaver.
Concerning SEA’s economic justification, which seeks to demonstrate the inadequacy of outsourcing certain ground handling services, because the airport manager has ultimate responsibility for guaranteeing continued services in cases of emergency or unforeseen events, the Commission has reservations on various points.
Men for at beregne den samlede omkostning, som SEA ville skulle bære som koncessionshaver i 2003 for at dække denne aktivitet, foreslog SEA at gange det antal årsværk, som var afsat til ubrudt tjeneste og nødforanstaltninger, med en faktor 1,7 og nåede dermed den konklusion, at koncernen havde brug for 569 fuldtidsansatte til en samlet omkostning på 20,6 mio. EUR.
First of all, SEA has submitted dubious calculations to support its theory.
SEA konkluderede, at forskellen mellem disse to beløb (20,6 og 9,9 mio. EUR) udgjorde den faktiske gevinst ved ikke at overdrage SEA's aktiviteter.
These put the number of full time equivalent (FTE) staff units at SEA Handling assigned to emergency management at a very high level.
Kommissionen mener, at faktor 1,7 er arbitrær, eftersom der ikke er givet en begrundelse, mens det var op til SEA at vise, at denne hypotetiske omkostning var beregnet korrekt.
In 2003, SEA estimates that the figure was no less than 336 FTE, at a total cost of EUR 9,9 million and equivalent to 1,8 % of SEA Handling’s total FTEs.
Kommissionen vurderer også, at antallet af årsværk, der blev brugt til at beregne den samlede omkostning for SEA, er fuldstændig urealistisk.
Clearly the actual cost incurred by SEA Handling was far less, since those staff were also — if not primarily — assigned to other tasks.
Kommissionen mener snarere, at skønnet over SEA Handlings omkostning bør omfatte den faktiske omkostning, der normalt faktureres SEA af SEA Handling, og en mere realistisk vurdering af det antal årsværk, som er afsat hos SEA Handling til sådanne pligter, baseret på det gennemsnitlige antal nødsituationer, uforudsete begivenheder og tilfælde af ubrudt tjeneste, som fandt sted i løbet af et år.
However, to calculate the total cost which SEA would have to bear as airport manager in 2003 to cover this activity, SEA suggested multiplying that number of FTEs assigned to continued service and emergency management by a factor of 1,7, thus reaching the conclusion that SEA required 569 full-time workers costing a total of EUR 20,6 million.
For det andet tages der i beregningen ikke hensyn til de væsentlige omkostninger for SEA som følge af dækning af tabene, som kunne være undgået ved at udlicitere nogle eller alle ground handling-ydelser til en mere konkurrencedygtig operatør.
SEA concluded that the difference between these two amounts (EUR 20,6 million–EUR 9,9 million) represented the effective gain from the non-transfer of SEA’s activities.
Udlicitering af nogle af de ubrudte serviceaktiviteter kan have medført potentielt større omkostninger for SEA på grund af de synergieffekter, der kan opnås som følge af kombinationen af disse tjenesteydelser med andre interne aktiviteter, men den samlede gevinst ved en sådan udlicitering var potentielt positiv, så det argument viser ikke i sig selv, at der ikke fandtes nogen anden løsning end at dække SEA Handlings tab, sådan som SEA hævder i sine bemærkninger.
The Commission considers the factor of 1,7 to be arbitrary, since no justification has been provided, whereas it was up to SEA to show that this hypothetical cost had been calculated correctly.
[…] forudså en investeringsafvikling i SEA Handling i 2010 som følge af Alitalias de-hubbing.
The Commission also estimates that the number of FTEs used to calculate the total cost incurred by SEA is completely unrealistic.
Ifølge […] var SEA's primære målsætning at udvikle Malpensa som hoved-hub (s. […]) og at finde et nyt luftfartsselskab inden fem år (s. […]).
The Commission considers, rather, that the estimate of the cost incurred by SEA Handling should take into account the actual cost usually billed by SEA Handling to SEA, and a more realistic estimate of the number of SEA Handling FTEs assigned to such duties based on the average number of emergency situations, unforeseen events and cases of continued service that took place over the course of a year.
Investeringsafvikling i SEA Handling var afgørende for opfyldelsen af denne målsætning og udgjorde en milepæl i omorganiseringen af SEA med henblik på at placere koncernen blandt de mest rentable luftfartsoperatører (s. […]).
Second, the calculation takes no account of the substantial costs incurred by SEA as a result of the coverage of losses, which could have been avoided by outsourcing some or all of the ground handling activities to a more competitive operator.
SEA så derfor ikke selv noget behov for at beholde SEA Handling i koncernen, hverken til forvaltning af Malpensa som hub eller til forbedring af SEA's samlede finansielle stilling.
The outsourcing of some of the continued service activities might have entailed potentially higher costs to SEA, on account of the synergies that may be achieved as a result of the combination of those services with other in-house activities, but the overall gain from such outsourcing was potentially positive, so that this argument does not by itself show that there was no solution available other than covering SEA Handling’s losses, as SEA contends in its comments.
I lyset af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at mens SEA synes at have gjort en indsats for at oprette en alliance med en strategisk partner, som var i stand til at få en betydelig indvirkning på genopretningen af SEA Handlings rentabilitet, var udliciteringen af alle eller dele af aktiviteterne til eksterne operatører en økonomisk fordelagtig mulighed, som en privat investor nødvendigvis ville have overvejet og i givet fald have forfulgt frem for at fortsætte med at betale for tunge driftstab år efter år.
[…] envisaged disinvestment from SEA Handling in 2010 following the de-hubbing of Alitalia.
Dog viser ingen af de fremsendte dokumenter, at der foregik nogen overvejelser om SEA Handlings fremtid i løbet af hele den omhandlede periode.
According to […], SEA’s primary objective was to develop Malpensa as a main hub (p. […]) and to identify a new airline within five years (p. […]).
Udvælgelsen af SEA-koncernens forretningsmodel
Disinvestment from SEA Handling was crucial to the attainment of this objective, and represented a milestone in the reorganisation of SEA in order to place it among the most profitable air transport operators (p. […]).
Ud over de italienske myndigheders generelle udtalelse om, at SEA's beslutning om at fastholde et hub-lufthavnssystem kræver, at disse tjenesteydelser leveres direkte af koncessionshaveren, synes dette argument ikke at blive underbygget af en analyse af, hvorfor det var økonomisk fordelagtigt for SEA at kompensere tab på ca. 360 mio. EUR frem for de potentielle indtægter fra hub-modellen.
SEA itself therefore saw no need to keep SEA Handling in the group, either for managing Malpensa airport as a hub or for improving the overall financial standing of SEA.
Ud over de generelle påstande har de italienske myndigheder ikke fremsendt et enkelt dokument, der viser, hvordan man nåede frem til det valg.
In light of the above, the Commission concludes that while SEA seems to have made efforts to establish an alliance with a strategic partner capable of having a significant impact on restoring SEA Handling’s profitability, the outsourcing of all or part of its activities to outside operators was an economically advantageous option which a private investor would necessarily have considered, and, if appropriate, pursued, rather than continuing to pay heavy operating losses over many years.
Angående det argument, at dækningen af SEA Handlings tab gav det mest effektive grundlag for SEA's valgte hub-model på grund af komplementariteten mellem ground handling- og lufthavnsforvaltningen, mener Kommissionen — uden at dømme om fornuften i SEA-koncernens beslutninger — mere specifikt, at denne begrænsning på SEA Handlings strategi (ud over at blive modsagt af den bemærkning, at de store lufthavne/hubs i Europa, der lavede de bedste resultater, havde overført deres ground handling-ydelser, og af forretningsplanerne som omtalt i betragtning 281-282 og 283-286) i alt væsentligt kun er baseret på den antagelse, at ingen ekstern operatør ville kunne levere en tilstrækkelig kvalitet.
Yet none of the documents submitted shows that there was any reflection on the future of SEA Handling over the course of the entire period in question.
SEA har ikke præciseret det krævede kvalitetsniveau eller den virkning, som en utilstrækkelig servicekvalitet kunne have fået på lufthavnens funktion og indtægter.
The selection of the SEA group’s commercial model
Dette er endnu mere overraskende i betragtning af SEA's påstand om, at et utilstrækkeligt udbud af ground handling-ydelser fra eksterne parter ville have skadet SEA's omdømme som lufthavnsledelsesselskab, hvilket let ville kunne være blevet bekræftet af en markedsundersøgelse (punkt 106 i SEA Handlings brev af 21. marts 2011).
The Italian authorities have made the general statement that SEA’s decision to maintain a hub airport system requires that these services be provided directly by the airport manager, but this argument does not seem to be supported by an analysis aimed at determining why, when set against the potential earnings from the existence of the hub, it was economically advantageous to SEA to compensate some EUR 360 million in losses.
På grund af manglen på en klar vurdering af den skade, der måtte være påført SEA's image eller omdømme, hvis alle eller dele af ground handling-ydelserne var blevet udliciteret, kan Kommissionen ikke godtage det argument, at SEA's adfærd — med systematisk at dække SEA Handlings tab — var økonomisk rationelt og nødvendigt for at undgå en sådan skade.
Apart from general claims, the Italian authorities have not submitted a single document showing how that choice was arrived at.
Desuden kan en medlemsstat ved anvendelse af artikel 15 i direktiv 96/67/EF indføre en adfærdskodeks for leverandører af ground handling-ydelser for at sikre lufthavnens korrekte drift (på forslag fra lufthavnen, hvis relevant), selv om disse leverandører er eksterne i forhold til lufthavnen.
More specifically, regarding the argument that covering SEA Handling’s losses provided the most efficient possible basis for SEA’s chosen hub model, because of the complementary nature of ground handling and airport management activities, the Commission observes that, without judging the wisdom of the decisions taken by the SEA group, this constraint on SEA Handling’s strategy (besides being contradicted by the observation that Europe’s best-performing large airports/hubs have transferred their ground handling services, and by the business plans mentioned in paragraphs 281-282 and 283-286) is essentially based only on a presumption that no outside operator would be able to provide sufficient quality.
Under alle omstændigheder har hverken SEA eller Italien leveret konkrete beviser for, at hub-modellen ikke kunne være blevet gennemført ved at udlicitere alle eller dele af ground handling-ydelserne.
SEA has not clarified the level of quality it required, or the impact that an insufficient level of quality might have had on the functioning of the airport and its revenues.
Snarere bekræfter […] SEA's intention om ikke at foretage yderligere investering i SEA Handling, eftersom den betragtede sin investering som en ikkestrategisk andel med det formål at sikre, at Malpensa fik sin status af hub tilbage efter Alitalias de-hubbing.
This is even more surprising considering SEA’s claim that inadequate provision of ground handling services by outside parties would have damaged SEA’s reputation as an airport operator, a fact which could easily have been confirmed by a market study (paragraph 106 of SEA Handling’s letter of 21 March 2011).
Omstrukturering af SEA Handling og SEA's målsætninger
Given the lack of a clear assessment of the damage that might have been caused to SEA’s image or reputation if all or part of its ground handling services had been subcontracted, the Commission cannot accept the argument that SEA’s conduct — in systematically covering SEA Handling’s losses — was economically rational and necessary in order to avoid such damage.
De italienske myndigheder citerer ENI-Lanerossi-dommen, hvori det afgøres, at en privat virksomhed rimeligvis kan fremskaffe den nødvendige kapital for at sikre, at en virksomhed, der er kommet i forbigående vanskeligheder, kan overleve og på ny blive rentabel.
Moreover, in application of Article 15 of Directive 96/67/EC, a Member State may impose rules of conduct on suppliers of ground handling services in order to ensure the proper functioning of the airport (where appropriate on a proposal from the airport), even if those suppliers are from outside the airport.
Det må derfor også anerkendes, at et moderselskab i et begrænset tidsrum kan påtage sig at dække tabene i et af dets datterselskaber, således at datterselskabet kan standse driften på de bedst mulige betingelser.
In any case, neither SEA nor Italy has provided any concrete proof that the hub model could not have been implemented by outsourcing all or part of the ground handling services.
Sådanne beslutninger kan være begrundet ikke blot i muligheden for herved at opnå en indirekte økonomisk gevinst, men også i andre overvejelser, f.eks. ønsket om at bevare koncernens image eller omlægge dens virksomhed.
Rather, […] confirms SEA’s intention to make no further investment in SEA Handling, since its investment is considered a non-strategic holding for the purpose of ensuring that Malpensa will return to its hub status following the de-hubbing of Alitalia.
Når en offentlig investors kapitalindskud foretages uden skelen overhovedet til selv langsigtede rentabilitetsmuligheder, må der imidlertid antages at være tale om støtte efter betydningen i Traktatens artikel 92, og sådanne indskuds forenelighed med fællesmarkedet må vurderes alene ud fra de i denne bestemmelse fastlagte kriterier.
The restructuring of SEA Handling and SEA’s objectives
De italienske myndigheder hævder navnlig, at Kommissionen burde vurdere beslutningerne om at dække datterselskabets tab på grundlag af ikke alene sandsynligheden for en umiddelbar fortjeneste, men også af andre hensyn, som kunne berettige dækningen af tab i et datterselskab, som er i stand til at blive rentabelt igen efter en omstruktureringsproces.
The Italian authorities cite the ENI-Lanerossi judgment, which states that a private shareholder may reasonably subscribe the capital necessary to secure the survival of an undertaking which is experiencing temporary difficulties but is capable of becoming profitable again, possibly after a reorganisation.
SEA hævder, at udligningen af tabene i SEA Handling berettiges af for det første, at der foreligger en strategisk plan og et omstruktureringsprogram med gode udsigter til rentabilitet på langt sigt, og for det andet af andre hensyn end blot finansiel rentabilitet.
It must therefore be accepted that a parent company may also, for a limited period, bear the losses of one of its subsidiaries in order to enable the latter to close down its operations under the best possible conditions.
Vedrørende det første argument mener Kommissionen, at forretningsplanerne for SEA Handling, som den modtog, ikke er tilstrækkeligt detaljerede til at berettige en sådan beslutning truffet af en privat investor under normale markedsvilkår.
Such decisions may be motivated not solely by the likelihood of an indirect material profit but also by other considerations, such as a desire to protect the group’s image or to redirect its activities.
Mere specifikt gælder planerne ikke en »turnaround«, som en fornuftig privat investor ville kræve, førend vedkommende ville foretage betydelige tilførsler til kapitalen i et selskab, som har været i økonomiske vanskeligheder, siden det blev stiftet.
However, when injections of capital by a public investor disregard any prospect of profitability, even in the long term, such provision of capital must be regarded as aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty, and its compatibility with the common market must be assessed on the basis solely of the criteria laid down in that provision.
Planerne er ikke baseret på en tilbundsgående undersøgelse af årsagerne til vanskelighederne og de foranstaltninger, der er nødvendige for at afhjælpe dem.
The Italian authorities submit in particular that the Commission should assess decisions to cover a subsidiary’s losses on the basis not only of the likelihood of an immediate profit, but on other considerations that may justify covering the losses of a subsidiary which is capable of becoming profitable again after a process of restructuring.
De er ikke baseret på realistiske prognoser for udviklingen i SEA Handlings aktiviteter eller i sektoren, og de indeholder heller ikke en analyse af alternative scenarier, som en fornuftig privat investor ville have forventet i en lignende situation.
SEA contends that offsetting the losses of SEA Handling is justified, first, by the presence of a strategic plan and restructuring programme with good prospects of long-term profitability, and, second, by considerations other than mere financial profitability.
Den konsoliderede forretningsplan for 2002-2006
Concerning the first argument, the Commission considers that the business plans for SEA Handling that were supplied to it are not sufficiently detailed to justify such a decision by a private investor in a market economy.
Specifikt stod der i den konsoliderede forretningsplan for 2002-2006, som blev vedtaget i 2001, at SEA Handling ville vende tilbage til rentabilitet inden 2005.
More specifically, the plans are not the ‘turnaround’ plans that a prudent private investor would require before undertaking such substantial injections into the capital of a company that had been in economic difficulties since it was set up.
Men den plan omfattede samtlige SEA's aktiviteter og indeholdt ikke en detaljeret beskrivelse af de foranstaltninger, som SEA burde træffe for at garantere SEA Handlings rentabilitet.
The plans are not based on an in-depth audit of the causes of the difficulties and of the measures needed to resolve them.