natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Basisrenten for Letland den 13. december 2011 var 2,2 %.
It is therefore clear that measure 1 entails State resources and that it is imputable to the State.
Til dette tal skal der lægges en margin alt efter støttemodtagerens rating og sikkerhedsstillelsen for lånet.
Latvia does not contest this point.
Som anført i det foregående punkt er sikkerhedsstillelsesniveauet lavt.
In order to assess whether measure 1 entailed an undue selective advantage to airBaltic, the Commission first observes that the first State loan and the BAS loan were agreed on 3 October 2011, i.e. the date of signature of the Agreement.
På baggrund af airBaltics vanskeligheder på det tidspunkt følger det af meddelelsen om referencesatsen, at der skal lægges en margin på 1000 basispoint til basisrenten, hvilket giver en sats på 12,2 %.
At that moment in time, Latvia and BAS were the major shareholders of the company and the loans were provided in proportion to their shareholding (52,6 % and 47,2 % respectively), and with identical and linked conditions.
Det ser derfor ud til, at rentesatsen på [9-11] % for den første rate af det andet statslån ikke kan anses for at være i overensstemmelse med markedet.
As indicated in recital 45 above, the Commission had observed in the opening decision that BAS' decision to invest in airBaltic may have been influenced by the willingness of the public authorities to financially support the company.
Den anden rate af det andet statslån blev stillet til rådighed for selskabet den 14. december 2012 til en rente på [6-8] %.
However, while it is true that the Latvian Government had expressed its interest in maintaining airBaltic as the national carrier, [31] the Commission observes that the support of the Latvian State was under negotiation and was still undetermined and subject to conditions.
Letland anfører, at denne rentesats ligger over den, der følger af meddelelsen om referencesatsen, og derfor er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
On this basis, the Commission cannot exclude that the first State loan and the BAS loan were provided concomitantly, thereby excluding the presence of aid.
Ifølge meddelelsen om referencesatsen var den gældende basisrente for Letland 1,91 % den 14. december 2012.
As the General Court has clarified, ‘simultaneity cannot in itself, even where significant private investments have been made, suffice for a finding that there has been no aid within the meaning of Article [107(1) TFEU] without taking into consideration the other relevant facts and points of law’ [32].
Den margin, der skal lægges til basisrenten, afhænger af støttemodtagerens rating og sikkerhedens størrelse.
The Commission has therefore also assessed whether the agreed interest rate of [11 — 13] % for the first State loan (and the BAS loan) can be considered to be at market level.
Som forklaret i afsnit 7.1 ovenfor mener Kommissionen, at airBaltic havde været en kriseramt virksomhed siden i hvert fald 2011.
During the course of the formal investigation procedure, Latvia submitted evidence regarding the value of the collateral (trademarks and receivables) which was assessed by the independent auditor […] as part of an audit of the company initiated in the summer of 2011.
Den deraf følgende referencesats ville derfor blive 11,91 %, noget over de [6-8] %, som faktisk blev anvendt.
In order to determine the liquidation value of the collateral, Latvia applied a […] % discount rate in accordance with the Latvian Treasury's internal collateral valuation methodology, which the Commission considers to be adequate in view of the nature of the collateral.
Under henvisning til ovenstående finder Kommissionen, at en forsigtig operatør under markedsøkonomiske vilkår ikke ville have ydet det andet statslån til airBaltic.
On this basis, the liquidation value of the collateral was LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million) which was [15 — 25] % higher than the amount of the first State loan.
På det grundlag konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltning 2 gav airBaltic en uberettiget fordel.
In addition, the Commission observes that in view of the significant collateral on the first State loan, applying an interest rate of [11 — 13] % would be in line with the Reference Rate Communication.
Denne fordel var af selektiv art, eftersom den eneste, som nød gavn af den, var airBaltic.
The assertion that an interest rate of [11 — 13] % was market confirm is moreover reinforced by the fact that BAS (a private investor) had waived its right to have the BAS loan collateralised (see recital 26 above): the BAS loan was therefore more risky than the State loan but was granted at the same interest rate.
Kommissionen skal også overveje, om foranstaltning 2 kunne fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne ved at give airBaltic en fordel i forhold til konkurrenter, der ikke modtager offentlig støtte.
Bearing in mind the level of collateralisation and the interest rate applied, the Commission concludes that measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and that the presence of state aid can be excluded, without it being necessary to assess further whether the rest of the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU would be met [34].
Det synes klart, at foranstaltning 2 kunne påvirke samhandelen i EU og konkurrencevilkårene, da airBaltic konkurrerer med andre EU-luftfartsselskaber, især efter ikrafttrædelsen af det tredje trin af liberaliseringen af lufttrafikken (»tredje pakke«) den 1. januar 1993.
The reduction of the interest rate of the first State loan from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] %
For rejser over relativt kortere afstande i EU er flytransport desuden i konkurrence med vej- og jernbanetransport, og derfor kunne vej- og jernbanetransportvirksomheder også blive påvirket.
On 13 December 2011, i.e. once Latvia's shareholding in airBaltic had increased to 99,8 % (see paragraph (21) above), the Latvian Government decided to authorise a cut in the interest rate on the first State loan — and thus also of the BAS loan — of [9 — 11] percentage points corresponding to the risk premium, from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] %.
Foranstaltning 2 gjorde det således muligt for airBaltic at fortsætte driften, således at virksomheden ikke skulle håndtere de konsekvenser, dens finansielle situation normalt ville have.
Latvia considers that the reduction of the interest rate was justified because the loan was risk-free, given that the liquidation value of the collateral was estimated to be LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million), i.e. [15 — 25] % higher than the amount of the first State loan (see recital 101 above).
Baseret på ovenstående overvejelser kommer Kommissionen til den konklusion, at foranstaltning 2 udgjorde statsstøtte til gavn for airBaltic i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
The Commission is not convinced by the arguments of Latvia when it claims that by lowering the interest rate, the State reduced the funding costs of airBaltic (since the interest rate of the BAS loan was also reduced), which at the time was almost exclusively owned by the State at 99,8 %.
Kapitalforhøjelsen, der blev aftalt den 22. december 2011 (foranstaltning 3)
This was — according to Latvia — a rational decision for the State since the foregone revenues for the State in the form of interest were compensated by the advantage that the State, as a majority shareholder of airBaltic, derived from the company having to pay lower interest.
Som anført ovenfor udgør det første statslån og første rate af det andet statslån statsmidler og kan tilregnes staten.
On the other hand, the Commission recalls that at the time the first State loan and the BAS loan were granted, the Agreement stipulated that the conditions of both were identical and linked, and therefore any change in one of the loans would result in an identical change on the other loan.
Konvertering af disse lån til egenkapital blev besluttet af det lettiske transportministerium, som således har været 99,8 % aktionær i airBaltic siden den 30. november 2011.
The reduction of the interest rate is therefore mirrored for both loans and the very significant level of collateralisation of the loan and the fact that the BAS loan was not collateralised remain unchanged.
Derfor udgør foranstaltning 3 også statsmidler og kan tilregnes staten.
Since BAS had agreed up front to link the conditions of the BAS loan to those of the first State loan, the Commission has no reasons to consider that this would not be a market-conform decision.
Kommissionen deler ikke de lettiske myndigheders opfattelse af, at foranstaltning 3 ikke udgør statsstøtte.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that even taking into account the reduction of the interest rate, measure 1 did not entail a selective advantage to airBaltic and the presence of state aid can be excluded.
For det første gentager Kommissionen, at konklusionerne, jf. afsnit 7.2.1 ovenfor, gælder for foranstaltning 3.
The second State loan (measure 2)
Desuden mener Kommissionen, at foranstaltning 3 ikke blev iværksat den 22. december 2011 (dvs. datoen for airBaltics generalforsamling), men den 29. december 2011, hvor staten konverterede sine lån.
The second State loan was provided directly by Latvia through the State Treasury, by means of a decision of the Latvian Government of 13 December 2011 authorising the Ministry of Finance to provide in the State budget for a convertible loan to airBaltic of LVL 67 million (EUR 94,86 million).
Ifølge oplysningerne fra de lettiske myndigheder under den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure havde BAS og staten i henhold til de gældende regler nemlig indtil den 30. januar 2012 til at formalisere den konvertering, som blev besluttet på airBaltics generalforsamling.
Therefore, measure 2 entails State resources and is imputable to the State.
Kommissionen bemærker også, at Letland den 29. december 2011 kunne have haft rimelig tvivl om, hvorvidt BAS var villig til at opfylde sine forpligtelser.
The Commission observes that at the time when the second State loan was provided, i.e. 13 December 2011, BAS had lost its entire shareholding in airBaltic, with the exception of one share, and the State now owned 99,8 % of the company.
BAS havde nemlig allerede givet udtryk for, at selskabet ikke ville konvertere sit lån.
Therefore, the State and BAS were no longer in a comparable position as shareholders.
Således indrømmer Letland selv, at den anden rate af det andet statslån, som blev besluttet den 13. december 2011, netop var fastsat for at tage højde for, at BAS eventuelt ikke ville opfylde sine forpligtelser.
Latvia argues that pursuant to Article 7.2 of the Agreement, which states that Latvia would provide a loan to airBaltic ‘in proportion to its shareholding’, BAS was obliged to provide funds to airBaltic in an amount corresponding to its number of shares.
Endvidere havde staten og BAS siden den 30. november 2011 ikke længere været i en sammenlignelig position som aktionærer, eftersom BAS havde mistet hele sin aktiebeholdning i airBaltic med undtagelse af én aktie, og staten ejede 99,8 % af selskabet.
This was to be done by BAS at the time of the capital injection of December 2011 in the form of cash.
I betragtning af denne udvikling burde staten, før den faktisk konverterede statslånene, have udledt — eller som følge af BAS' handlinger i det mindste have haft begrundet mistanke om — at BAS ikke havde til hensigt at opfylde sine forpligtelser (se betragtning 35 ovenfor).
The Commission notes, however, that on 13 December 2011 BAS only had one share in airBaltic.
Da BAS desuden havde mistet alle sine aktier i airBaltic undtagen én, havde retsmidlet i artikel 7, stk. 4, i aftalen — dvs. statens ret til at købe alle BAS' aktier i airBaltic for 1 LVL fra BAS — mistet sin betydning, idet staten havde mistet det middel, hvormed den kunne have tvunget BAS til at overholde det, selskabet havde aftalt.
It follows that the State should have adopted the position of a prudent market economy investor and assessed whether, given the change in circumstances concerning the shareholdings, BAS had any incentive to inject cash into the company at the time of the capital increase.
På baggrund af ovenstående oplysninger kommer Kommissionen til den konklusion, at en forsigtig operatør under markedsøkonomiske vilkår ikke ville have konverteret sine lån til egenkapital, før han var sikker på, at den anden part ville konvertere sit lån og indskyde kapitalen, og ville i den forbindelse nøje have vurderet den anden parts incitamenter til at opfylde sine forpligtelser.
In fact, the State had foreseen this possibility and included in the Agreement several contingency measures — in particular in Article 7.4 — in case BAS failed to fulfil its commitments.
Endvidere konstaterer Kommissionen, at selv om den pågældende havde overholdt aftalen, der blev indgået på generalforsamlingen, ville BAS ikke have genvundet sin tidligere aktiebeholdning i airBaltic.
Moreover, as Latvia acknowledges, the second tranche of the second State loan was to be released in the event that BAS failed to provide additional funds.
For at nå en aktiepost på 47,2 % ville BAS have skullet investere meget mere end de beløb, som blev aftalt på generalforsamlingen.
Article 7.4 of the Agreement gave the State the right to purchase from BAS all its shares in airBaltic for LVL 1.
Derfor er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at staten, hvis den havde handlet i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, nøje burde have overvejet, om BAS ville investere betydelige beløb — BAS-lånet og kontante beløb på 37,7 mio. LVL (53,38 mio. EUR) — for at få en mindretalsaktiepost i airBaltic.
At the time the Agreement was signed, this meant a guarantee for the State that BAS would fulfil its commitments or else would lose all its shares in airBaltic.
Som supplerende argument forklarer Letland, at BAS' forpligtelse til at indskyde kapital og konvertere BAS-lånet blev bekræftet ved, at der fandtes en garanti fra en russisk erhvervsdrivende, Vladimir Antonov, som gik med til at foretage de nødvendige indbetalinger på BAS' vegne [35].
However, the situation changed radically on 30 November 2011, when Latvijas Krājbanka sold all except one of the airBaltic shares owned by BAS to the Latvian State (see recital 21 above).
Det fremgår dog af de oplysninger, Kommissionen har til rådighed, at garantien faktisk aldrig blev stillet.
In this new context, Article 7.4 was deprived of its meaning.
Letland anfører også, at forudsætningerne for kapitaliseringen af statens lån, jf. aftalens artikel 7, stk. 2, blev opfyldt den 13. december 2011, da den fik forelagt en forretningsplan, der viser en genoprettelse af airBaltics rentabilitet i 2015 og tyder på, at beslutningen om at konvertere statslånene til egenkapital derfor var i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Indeed, with only one share, BAS had little incentive to fulfil its obligations: the consequence of not doing so would simply mean losing its only share in airBaltic.
Kommissionen er dog fortsat ikke overbevist af Letlands argumenter, eftersom planen ikke var fuldstændig og ikke ville have været troværdig for en rationel privat operatør med henblik på at indskyde betydelige beløb i en kriseramt virksomhed.
A prudent market operator would have carefully considered providing additional funds to airBaltic under those new circumstances and, at the very least, would have asked the other party (i.e. BAS) for assurance that it would indeed commit funds to the company.
På grundlag af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at Letland ikke handlede på samme vilkår ved konvertering af sine lån og dermed forhøjede airBaltics kapital.
The Commission notes in addition that it seems unlikely that such assurance would have been given since BAS would have needed to inject a very high amount of money — much more than it could have originally estimated — in order to regain its former shareholding of 47,2 % or any other meaningful level of shares in airBaltic.
Statens adfærd var desuden ikke i overensstemmelse med den markedsøkonomiske investortest (MEIP-testen).
Latvia also indicates that the second State loan was granted at market terms, thereby excluding any undue advantage to airBaltic.
Derfor fik airBaltic en uberettiget fordel som følge af foranstaltning 3, som er selektiv, da selskabet var den eneste støttemodtager.
As regards the collateral, Latvia noted that the second State loan had the same collateral as the first State loan, i.e. receivables and the trademarks of airBaltic.
Kommissionen skal også overveje, om foranstaltning 3 kunne fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne ved at give airBaltic en fordel i forhold til konkurrenter, der ikke modtager offentlig støtte.
As explained in paragraph (101) above, the liquidation value of the collateral was estimated at LVL [15 — 25] million (EUR [21,3 — 35,5] million).It thus appears that the level of collateralisation available for the second State loan would be low.
Konklusionerne i betragtning 120 ovenfor gælder tilsvarende.
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that a private market operator would accept that security already in place on the first State loan would be reduced below at least 100 %.
Kommissionen konkluderer således, at konverteringen af det første statslån og den første rate af det andet statslån til egenkapital udgjorde statsstøtte til airBaltic efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
In order to ascertain the market conformity of the rate applied to the first tranche of the second State loan, the Commission will use as the best available proxy the rate resulting from the application of the Reference Rate Communication.
Nulkuponobligationer (foranstaltning 4)
The base rate for Latvia on 13 December 2011 was 2,2 %.
Det er derfor klart, at foranstaltning 4 udgør statsmidler, og at den kan tilregnes staten, hvilket Letland heller ikke anfægter.
To this figure, a margin should be added depending on the rating of the beneficiary and the collateralisation of the loan.
I løbet af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure fremlagde Letland beviser for, at både staten og BAS erhvervede obligationer i forhold til deres aktiebeholdning i airBaltic og på de samme betingelser.
As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the level of collateralisation is low.
Endvidere fremgår det, at staten ikke ydede finansiering til airBaltic før april 2010, mens BAS faktisk havde investeret betydelige beløb i selskabet før den dato.
Given the difficulties of airBaltic at the time, it follows from the Reference Rate Communication that a margin of 1000 basis points should be added to the base rate, resulting in a rate of 12,2 %.
Endelig fremgik det af undersøgelsen, at aftalen om obligationsudstedelsen blev vedtaget på initiativ af BAS og airBaltics ledelse, som allerede i april og juni 2009 havde foreslået staten en kapitalforhøjelse i selskabet i forhold til deres aktiebeholdninger.
It therefore appears that the interest rate of [9 — 11] % on the first tranche of the second State loan cannot be considered to be market conform.
Som understreget i indledningsafgørelsen er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at købet af nulkuponobligationer ikke var en forsigtig markedsoperatørs typiske investering.
The second tranche of the second State loan was made available to the company on 14 December 2012 at an interest rate of [6 — 8] %.
Imidlertid bemærker Kommissionen, at Letland og BAS på det tidspunkt var storaktionærer i airBaltic, og deres investeringsbeslutning bør vurderes ud fra den synsvinkel og ikke ud fra en rent ekstern investors perspektiv.
Latvia argues that this interest rate is above the one resulting from the Reference Rate Communication and is therefore MEIP-conform.
Det virker nemlig rationelt at konkludere, at ejerne af airBaltic ikke var ude efter en kortsigtet fortjeneste på det tidspunkt, men var interesserede i at holde selskabet flydende.
According to the Reference Rate Communication, the applicable base rate for Latvia on 14 December 2012 was 1,91 %.
På grundlag af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at Letland handlede som en forsigtig markedsoperatør ved købet af nulkuponobligationer sammen med den private investor BAS.
The margin to be added to that base rate depends on the rating of the beneficiary and the level of collateralisation.
Kommissionen udelukker derfor, at der er tale om en uberettiget fordel i forbindelse med foranstaltning 4, og en vurdering af de øvrige kumulative betingelser, som er fastsat i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF vedrørende tilstedeværelsen af statsstøtte, er overflødig.
As explained in section 7.1 above, the Commission is of the view that airBaltic was a firm in difficulty since at least 2011.
Latvijas Krājbankas udbetaling af 2,8 mio. EUR (foranstaltning 5)
In addition, the second tranche had as collateral the receivables and the trademarks of airBaltic.
Foranstaltning 5 vedrører Latvijas Krājbankas udbetaling af 2,8 mio. EUR til airBaltic den 21. og 22. november 2011.
The arguments about the insufficiency of the collateral would apply mutatis mutandis, and thus a margin of 1000 basis points should be added.
Letland har forklaret, at overførslen af midler havde sin oprindelse i betalingspåkrav, airBaltic havde sendt, før FCMC beordrede Latvijas Krājbankas aktiviteter suspenderet den 21. november 2011.
The resulting reference rate would therefore be 11,91 %, well above the [6 — 8] % actually applied.
Latvijas Krājbanka udførte transaktionerne den 25. og 30. november 2011.
Bearing all of the above in mind, the Commission considers that a prudent market economy operator would not have provided the second State loan to airBaltic.
I henhold til loven om FCMC af 1. juni 2000 træffer FCMC endvidere sine beslutninger uden at skulle tage hensyn til krav eller instrukser fra nogen anden offentlig myndighed.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that measure 2 conferred an undue advantage on airBaltic.
Desuden er finansieringen af FCMC ikke afhængig af staten, da FCMC's aktiviteter finansieres via betalinger fra parter på de lettiske finans- og kapitalmarkeder.
This advantage was selective in nature given that its sole beneficiary was airBaltic.
Det fremgår også af de gældende love, at staten ikke er involveret i udøvelsen af FCMC's håndhævelsesbeføjelser og -rettigheder i forbindelse med dets tilsyn med kreditinstitutioner.
The Commission must also consider whether measure 2 was likely to distort competition and affect trade between Member States, by providing airBaltic with an advantage over competitors not receiving public support.
Kommissionen er på grundlag af den dokumentation, den har fået forelagt, af den opfattelse, at de administratorer, FCMC havde udpeget, handlede uafhængigt af staten, hvilket ville udelukke, at deres handlinger kunne tilregnes Letland.
It seems clear that measure 2 was able to affect intra-EU trade and competition as airBaltic competes with other EU airlines, in particular since the entry into force of the third stage of liberalisation of air transport (‘third package’) on 1 January 1993.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltning 5 ikke udgjorde statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
In addition, for travel of relatively shorter distances within the EU, air travel is in competition with road and rail transport, and therefore road and rail carriers might also be affected.
Taurus fordring på 5 mio. EUR mod airBaltic (foranstaltning 6)
Measure 2 thus enabled airBaltic to continue operating so that it did not have to face the consequences normally deriving from its difficult financial situation.
Den opfølgende klage, der indkom den 18. juli 2012, omhandler investorernes forpligtelse i henhold til artikel 7, stk. 4, i aftalen til — under visse omstændigheder — at overdrage de udestående fordringer hidrørende fra syndikeret lån 2 til staten eller dets udpegede selskab for 1 LVL (se betragtning 42 ovenfor).
Based on the considerations set out above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that measure 2 involved state aid for the benefit of airBaltic within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
I overensstemmelse med aftalens artikel 7, stk. 4, overdrog Taurus en fordring på 5 mio. EUR, det havde mod airBaltic, til Letland for 1 LVL.
The capital increase agreed on 22 December 2011 (measure 3)