natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Med hensyn til princippet om den private investor hævdede de italienske myndigheder, at den faktuelle dokumentation (økonomisk og andre data), som Kommissionen havde samlet undervejs i sine indledende undersøgelser, men som relaterede sig til tiden efter, at de omstridte handlinger blev besluttet, kunne bruges, hvor det var nødvendigt, til at evaluere foranstaltningernes forenelighed med traktatens regler, hvis de var klassificeret som støtte.
but such evidence was of no help in determining whether the financial measures in question were compatible with the private investor test.
Men denne dokumentation hjalp ikke med hensyn til at bestemme, om de omhandlede finansielle foranstaltninger var forenelige med princippet om den private investor.
The Commission’s entire reasoning was vitiated by an erroneous application of the private investor test, which derived from an inaccurate assessment of the background to the case.
Hele Kommissionens argumentation blev undergravet af en fejlagtig anvendelse af princippet om den private investor, som hidrørte fra en upræcis vurdering af baggrunden for sagen.
With regard to the context that had to be taken into consideration, the Italian authorities observed, first, that the Commission had taken no account of the fact that, as part of the liberalisation of the European ground handling services market following the adoption of Directive 96/67/EC, transposed into Italian legislation by Legislative Decree No 18/99, SEA had decided not simply to separate its accounts, but to spin off the activities in question and transfer them to a new legal entity.
Med hensyn til den sammenhæng, der skulle tages i betragtning, bemærkede de italienske myndigheder for det første, at Kommissionen ikke havde taget hensyn til, at SEA som led i liberaliseringen af det europæiske marked for ground handling-ydelser efter vedtagelsen af direktiv 96/67/EF som gennemført i italiensk ret ved lovdekret nr. 18/99 havde besluttet ikke bare at opsplitte sine regnskaber, men også at udskille de pågældende aktiviteter og overføre dem til en ny juridisk enhed.
This break-up was instrumental in the group’s strategic aims of finding an industrial partner to provide ground handling services and identifying measures to improve the efficiency of ground handling services at Linate and Malpensa airports.
Denne udskillelse var et af midlerne til at nå koncernens strategiske mål om at finde en forretningspartner til at levere ground handling-ydelser og om at identificere foranstaltninger til forbedring af effektiviteten i ground handling-ydelserne i lufthavnene Linate og Malpensa.
According to the Italian authorities, as part of the liberalisation process, airport management companies had generally reorganised ground handling services after having considered the two viable commercial models: ground handling services might be provided not directly by the airport manager but instead by outside companies operating on an international scale (‘outsourcing’, e.g. airports in London, Copenhagen, Spain or Dublin), or they might be provided directly by the airport manager with only the accounts being separated (e.g. Frankfurt or Vienna) or through the formation of a separate company (SEA or Paris) (‘direct management’).
Ifølge de italienske myndigheder havde lufthavnsledelsesselskaberne som led i liberaliseringsprocessen generelt omorganiseret ground handling-ydelserne efter at have overvejet to rentable forretningsmodeller, nemlig at ground handling-ydelserne i stedet for direkte af koncessionshaveren kunne leveres af eksterne selskaber, der driver international virksomhed (dvs. udlicitering som f.eks. i London, København, Spanien og Dublin), eller de kunne leveres direkte af koncessionshaveren og regnskabsføres separat (som f.eks. i Frankfurt og Wien) eller gennem dannelse af et separat selskab (SEA og i Paris) (direkte forvaltning).
Each of the two models had its advantages and disadvantages, which the airport management companies had looked at carefully, particularly given the different regulatory circumstances in each country.
Hver model havde sine fordele og ulemper, som lufthavnsledelsesselskaberne havde gransket nøje, især fordi landene har hver sine retlige rammer.
Outsourcing allowed resources to be focused on core business, and benefited the profit and loss account immediately, because in most cases ground handling services operated at a loss, unless they were provided on a large scale and not only at the airport managed by the company.
Udlicitering gjorde det muligt at fokusere på kerneforretningen og gavnede umiddelbart driftsregnskaberne, fordi ground handling-ydelser som oftest gav underskud, medmindre de blev ydet i stor målestok og ikke kun i den lufthavn, som selskabet varetog ledelsen af.
But keeping ground handling activities allowed airport managers to exercise greater control over the quality of the service, which, leaving the regulatory aspects aside, had knock-on benefits on group profits, particularly in the medium to long term.
Men hvis de beholdt ground handling-aktiviteterne, kunne koncessionshaverne udøve større kontrol over kvaliteten af ydelserne, hvilket ud over de lovgivningsmæssige aspekter havde en afledt positiv indvirkning på koncernens indtjening, især på mellemlangt til langt sigt.
This second model, which had been chosen by SEA, enabled the airport manager to protect the role of the airport centre and the transfer processes, to retain control over the level of quality of the service provided, to provide select ground handling services at airports in which no other operators were able to supply them and, finally, to maintain a strong influence over airport security.
De italienske myndigheder understregede derfor, at denne anden model, som SEA havde valgt, satte koncessionshaveren i stand til at bevare lufthavnscenterrollen og transferprocesserne, fastholde kontrollen med servicekvaliteten, levere udvalgte ground handling-ydelser i lufthavne, hvor ingen andre selskaber kunne levere dem, og endelig at fastholde en stærk indflydelse på lufthavnssikkerheden.
This option necessitated high operating costs which were inherent in the direct provision of ground handling services.
De hævdede, at denne model krævede store driftsomkostninger, som hang uløseligt sammen med den direkte levering af ground handling-ydelser, og at produktiviteten på området ikke kunne måles udelukkende finansielt.
Productivity in this area could not be measured in exclusively financial terms.
De italienske myndigheder hævdede, at denne strategi fra SEA-koncernens side var fuldstændig rationel, fordi den tillod SEA at fastholde ground handling-ydelserne og regne med en gradvis stigning i produktiviteten og servicekvaliteten samt indtjening i koncernen på mellemlangt til langt sigt.
The Italian authorities argued that this strategy of the SEA group was perfectly rational, because it enabled SEA to retain ground handling services, counting on a gradual increase in productivity and on the quality of services and medium- to long-term benefits to the group.
Samtidig ville SEA ved at udskille aktiviteterne og overflytte leveringen af ydelserne til et separat selskab (SEA Handling) kunne kapitalisere på enhver mulighed for partnerskab med andre selskaber i sektoren med det formål at genvinde rentabiliteten i kraft af synergieffekten ved integration i et internationalt netværk og erhvervelsen af yderligere driftsmæssig viden.
At the same time, by spinning off the activities and transferring the provision of services to a separate company (SEA Handling), SEA would be able to capitalise on any opportunities for partnership with other operators in the sector, with the aim of recovering profitability thanks to the synergies achieved through integration into an international network and the acquisition of further operational know-how.
SEA agtede derfor indledningsvis at bære de tab, som dets datterselskab fik, med henblik på den senere indtjening til koncernen, der ville følge af en gradvis forbedring af SEA Handlings indtjening og rentabilitet (som ifølge den oprindelige prognose ville være realiseret efter tre års aktivitet, dvs. i 2005), som man ville opnå gennem foranstaltninger beskrevet i omstruktureringsplanen, der også gav mulighed for i givet fald at åbne for en strategisk partner, som skulle købe en betydelig minoritetsaktiepost i SEA Handling.
SEA, therefore, intended to bear the losses initially recorded by its subsidiary with a view to the benefits that would ensue for the group, along with a gradual improvement in SEA Handling’s revenue and profitability (which was initially forecast to happen after three years of activity, i.e. by 2005), to be achieved through measures set out in a restructuring plan which also provided, if possible, for the entry of a strategic partner which would acquire a significant minority share in SEA Handling.
I maj 2001 igangsatte SEA en udbudsprocedure med henblik på at finde en strategisk partner til en minoritetsandel af SEA Handling, og selskabet fandt […]s bud mest fordelagtigt.
In May 2001, SEA launched a competitive bidding procedure aimed at identifying a minority strategic partner in SEA Handling, at the end of which the offer submitted by […] was found to be the most advantageous.
SEA's forhandlere nåede næsten frem til en aftale med […], især i kraft af en relanceringsplan.
The negotiations undertaken with […] came very close to signature, particularly thanks to a relaunch plan.
Men derefter gik forhandlingerne i stå, primært på grund af uenighed om værdiansættelsen af selskabet.
But thereafter the negotiations ran aground, owing mainly to disagreement over the valuation of the company.
Foranstaltningerne i SEA-koncernens konsoliderede forretningsplan for 2002-2006 fokuserede på en forøgelse af arbejdsproduktiviteten på 20 % i denne periode.
The measures set forth in the SEA group’s consolidated business plan for 2002-2006 (‘the 2002-2006 consolidated business plan’) focused on a recovery of labour productivity of 20 % in that period.
Disse foranstaltninger blev vurderet at være hensigtsmæssige og tilstrækkelige til at berettige det trufne valg af forretningsmodel.
These measures were judged appropriate and sufficient to validate the choice of business model that had been made.
Selv om målet om genopretning af rentabiliteten ikke blev nået, var de finansielle resultater opmuntrende og bekræftede SEA's mening om, at den valgte forretningsmodel var i koncernens og aktionærernes økonomiske interesse.
While the objective for the recovery of profitability was not met, the financial results were encouraging, and confirmed SEA’s view of the suitability of the business model chosen, in the economic interests of the group and its shareholders.
De italienske myndigheder hævdede, at det forhold, at SEA Handling ikke fik genoprettet sin rentabilitet inden den oprindeligt forventede frist, skyldtes en markedssituation, som adskilte sig markant fra prognoserne som følge af to internationale faktorer, der påvirkede udviklingen i flytrafikken i denne periode betydeligt, nemlig SARS og Irakkrigen, og medførte økonomiske konsekvenser og udfordringer for de internationale luftfartsselskaber, der led under en brat stigning i olieprisen og derfor måtte acceptere et fald i priserne i et marked, hvor konkurrencen var blevet meget skarpere end forventet.
The Italian authorities argued that the fact that SEA Handling saw no recovery in profitability within the term initially proposed was due to a market scenario that differed greatly from what had been forecast, as a result of two international factors which significantly affected the development of air traffic in that period, namely SARS and the Iraq war, and the consequent economic challenges faced by international airlines, which suffered a sharp rise in oil prices and consequently had to accept a drop in prices in a competitive environment that was far more aggressive than expected.
De italienske myndigheder bad Kommissionen genoverveje sin indsigelse mod SEA's beslutning om fortsat at dække tabene i sit datterselskab, selv da det kunne se på den økonomiske udvikling i de to første hele års aktivitet (2003 og 2004), at en genopretning af rentabiliteten inden tre år ikke ville være mulig.
The Italian authorities asked the Commission to reconsider its objection to SEA’s decision to continue to cover the losses of its subsidiary even when, in its view, economic developments in its first two full years of activity (2003 and 2004) showed that an upturn in profitability within three years would be impossible.
De italienske myndigheder hævdede, at denne indsigelse byggede på en forenklet anvendelse af princippet om den private investor, nemlig især blot kortsigtet indtjening.
The Italian authorities argued that this objection was based on a simplistic application of the private investor test, essentially in terms of mere short-term profit.
Kommissionen havde overset det faktum, at der i det foreliggende tilfælde var andre faktorer, der også skulle tages i betragtning foruden de pengestrømme, der blev genereret direkte af investeringen, især fordi moderselskabet var vertikalt forbundet med sit datterselskab, og en betragtelig del af dets forretning afhang af kvaliteten af den service, som datterselskabet leverede.
The Commission had overlooked the fact that, in the case in point, there were other factors be taken into account, in addition to the financial flows generated directly by the investment, especially because the parent company was vertically connected to its subsidiary, and that an appreciable part of its business depended on the quality of the services the subsidiary provided.
Kommissionen havde nøjedes med at se på foranstaltningens manglende rentabilitet i de første to driftsår og havde set helt bort fra den specifikke karakter af sektoren, hvor en koncessionshaver kan have interesse i at fortsætte en ground handling-forretning eller støtte den finansielt, uanset den umiddelbare rentabilitet.
The Commission had confined itself to looking at the lack of profitability of the measure in first two years of operation, and had completely ignored the specific nature of the sector, in which an airport manager might have an interest in carrying on a ground handling business, or supporting it financially, irrespective of its immediate profitability.
De italienske myndigheder leverede også en kontrafaktisk analyse udført af en ekstern konsulent med det formål at bevise, at hypoteserne bag dokumentet fra SEA, nemlig præsentationen af SEA Handlings forretningsplan 2003-2007 (»Presentazione del piano aziendale 2003-2007 di SEA Handling«) var realistisk og rimelig, og at en række uforudsete omstændigheder havde haft alvorlige, negative virkninger for SEA Handling med større tab til følge end dem, der med rimelighed kunne være forudset, da beslutningen om at dække tabene blev truffet.
The Italian authorities also provided a counterfactual analysis conducted by an external consultant with the aim of proving that the hypotheses behind the document supplied by SEA, ‘Presentazione del piano aziendale 2003-2007 di SEA Handling’ (Presentation of the SEA Handling 2003-2007 business plan, hereinafter ‘the 2003-2007 business plan’) were realistic and reasonable, and that a number of unforeseen circumstances had had serious negative effects on SEA Handling, resulting in losses greater than those reasonably foreseeable when the decision to cover the losses was made.
Det primære resultat af denne analyse var, at hovedårsagen til, at de realiserede tal var ringere end de forventede i forretningsplanen, var faldet i den håndterede trafik og i priserne.
The primary finding of this analysis was that the main reason that the results recorded fell short of those forecast in the business plan was the fall in traffic handled and in prices.
Med andre ord var det lykkedes SEA Handling at nå sine mål med hensyn til at nedbringe enhedsomkostningerne, men det havde ikke nået sine finansielle mål i henhold til forretningsplanen på grund af det betydelige indtægtstab fra faldet i trafikken og i priserne sammenlignet med de forventede niveauer.
In other words, while SEA Handling had managed to achieve its objectives in terms of reducing unit costs, it had not reached the financial targets set in the business plan owing to the significant loss of revenue due to the drop in traffic and in prices by comparison with the levels forecast.
Kommissionen havde også undladt at tage ordentligt hensyn til den specifikke karakter af sektoren i Italien i lyset af gældende italiensk lovgivning.
The Commission had also failed to give proper consideration to the specific character of the sector in Italy in light of the applicable Italian regulations.
For det første var koncessionshaveren i henhold til paragraf 3, stk. 3, i lovdekret nr. 18/99 og paragraf 705, stk. 2, litra d), i loven om sø- og luftfart forpligtet til at sikre, at lufthavnen var forsynet med alle de nødvendige ground handling-ydelser, som koncessionshaver selv leverer direkte eller koordinerer med aktiviteter leveret af selskaber, som leverer dem selv eller gennem eksterne parter.
First, pursuant to Article 3.3 of Legislative Decree No 18/99 and Article 705.2(d) of the Sea and Air Navigation Code, the airport manager was required to ensure that the airport had all the necessary ground handling services, either providing them directly or coordinating the activities of operators who provided such services themselves or through outside parties.
Yderligere blev der med specifik henvisning til Linate og Malpensa lufthavne i punkt 4 i aftalen mellem ENAC (den italienske myndighed for civil luftfart) og SEA af 4. september 2001 stillet et specifikt krav om, at SEA skulle garantere ground handling-ydelser og sikre, at alle køretøjer, udstyr og systemer og alt andet, der er nødvendigt for den fortsatte, regelmæssige og effektive levering af disse ydelser, var til rådighed og fungerede effektivt.
Additionally, with specific reference to Linate and Malpensa airports, Article 4 of the agreement signed between ENAC (the Italian Civil Aviation Authority) and SEA on 4 September 2001 specifically required SEA to guarantee ground handling services and to ensure the availability and efficiency of all vehicles, equipment and systems and anything else necessary for the continued, regular and effective provision of such services.
De italienske myndigheder hævdede, at denne lovgivning ikke tillod SEA blot at overføre eller udlicitere ground handling-aktiviteterne.
The Italian authorities argued that this legislation did not allow SEA simply to transfer or outsource ground handling activities.
Selv om SEA skulle beslutte at bevæge sig i den retning, ville selskabet stadig skulle indgå relevante kontrakter og påtage sig de nødvendige omkostninger for at betrygge sig om, at servicen levede op til efterspørgslen og lovkravene eller de bestemmelser, som var forankret i den foranstaltning, der gav det mandatet som koncessionshaver.
Even if it were to decide to move in that direction, it would still have to conclude the appropriate contracts and bear the necessary costs in order to satisfy itself that the services met the demands and requirements imposed by the legislation or deriving from provisions laid down in the measure entrusting it with the management of the airport.
Koncessionshaveren var fortsat ansvarlig over for den offentlige myndighed for den regelmæssige og effektive levering af ground handling-ydelser.
The airport manager continued to be responsible to the public authority for the regular and effective provision of ground handling services.
Endelig med hensyn til den korrekte anvendelse af princippet om den private investor på det foreliggende tilfælde bemærkede de italienske myndigheder, at den private investor, hvis adfærd den offentlige virksomhed skulle sammenlignes med, ifølge den etablerede retspraksis skal være af en tilsvarende størrelse og art, og at beslutningen om investeringen bestående i dækning af SEA Handlings tab blev truffet og gennemført af SEA-koncernen, som var aktionær i SEA Handling og indehaver af koncessionen til forvaltning af Malpensa og Linate.
For the correct application of the private investor test to the case, lastly, the Italian authorities observed that according to established case-law, the private operator with which the conduct of the public enterprise was to be compared must be of a comparable size and nature, and that the investment consisting of the coverage of the losses of SEA Handling was decided and carried out by the SEA Group, shareholder in SEA Handling and holder of the concession for the management of Malpensa and Linate airports.
For det første betød dette, som Kommissionen også havde påpeget i sin indledningsbeslutning, at SEA's adfærd ikke kunne sammenlignes med en almindelig investor, der investerer med henblik på en gevinst på forholdsvis kort sigt, men i stedet skulle sammenlignes med et privat holdingselskab eller en privat koncern af selskaber med en strukturpolitik — generel eller sektorbestemt — og en forventning om rentabilitet på længere sigt.
First, this meant, as the Commission had indeed pointed out in its decision, that the conduct of SEA could not be compared to that of an ordinary investor laying out capital with a view to realising a profit in the relatively short term, but instead had to be compared to the conduct of a private holding company or a private group of undertakings pursuing a structural policy — whether general or sectoral — and guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term.
For det andet skulle der også tages hensyn til de specifikke træk ved den pågældende regulerede sektor og de normale dynamikker i den forbindelse i de økonomiske relationer mellem moder- og datterselskab.
Second, consideration must also be given to the specific features of the regulated sector in question, and to the normal dynamics, in that context, of the economic relations between the parent and the subsidiary.
Derfor mente de italienske myndigheder, at Kommissionen burde have vurderet de omhandlede foranstaltninger ud fra et koncernperspektiv, dvs. undersøgt SEA's konsoliderede balance.
Consequently, the Italian authorities considered that the Commission should have evaluated the measures in question from a group perspective, that is, examining SEA’s consolidated balance sheet;
Hvis den havde gjort det, ville den have fundet, at koncernen havde haft en betydelig bruttoindtjening og været fuldt i stand til at absorbere tabene fra ground handling-divisionen internt og samtidig genereret værdi for sine aktionærer.
if it had done so, it would have found that the group had received substantial gross revenue, and had been well able to absorb the losses of its ground handling division internally while creating value for its shareholders.
Ud over sandsynligheden for at opnå indirekte materielle fordele ved dækningen af SEA Handlings tab, var der også andre hensyn at tage, således:
Besides the probability of deriving indirect material profit from the coverage of SEA Handling’s losses, there were other considerations to be taken into account, including:
mulighed for at opnå indirekte økonomiske fordele ved forretningsrelationer til datterselskabet, b) vanskeligheder med at udlicitere i en international referenceramme på grund af de økonomiske forpligtelser og tilsagnene til de offentlige myndigheder, c) beskyttelse af koncernens image og d) overholdelsen af de forpligtelser over for staten, der er forankret i aftalen og lovgivningen.
the possibility of obtaining indirect economic advantages from commercial relations with the subsidiary; (b) the difficulties of outsourcing in the national context of reference, given the economic obligations undertaken and the commitments made to the public authorities; (c) the protection of the image of the group; and (d) the fulfilment of obligations towards the state deriving from the agreement and from the law.
I den treårige periode 2003-2005 havde SEA-koncernen opnået betydelige resultater med hensyn til kvaliteten af den service, den leverede til brugerne.
In the three-year period of 2003-2005, the SEA group had achieved significant results with regard to the quality of the service provided to users.