natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efterhånden accepterede staten investeringen på strenge betingelser, der blev fastsat i aftalen.
Therefore, the conversion made little economic sense for BAS, who — in order to regain its former shareholding — was requested not only to convert into capital the BAS loan but also to inject LVL 37,7 million (EUR 53,38 million) in cash, all this with limited possibilities that the equity would provide any return in the short- to medium-term in view of the difficulties of the company.
Et af de centrale elementer i aftalen var et kapitalindskud fra staten og BAS på omkring 100 mio. LVL (141,58 mio. EUR) i to trin: i) 30 mio. LVL (42,47 mio. EUR) i form af det første statslån og BAS-lånet og ii) ca. 70 mio. LVL (99,1 mio. EUR), der skal ydes af staten og BAS i forhold til deres aktiebeholdning.
Moreover, the Commission expressed doubts on the date at which measure 3 was actually granted.
Derfor var BAS ifølge Letland kontraktligt forpligtet til at indskyde supplerende kapital i airBaltic i forhold til selskabets aktiebeholdning.
The Commission also noted that BAS and the State had a certain period of time — presumably until 30 January 2012, i.e. the end of the first stage of the subscription implementation period for the capital increase — to inject the capital in airBaltic.
Letland drager denne konklusion af artikel 7, stk. 2, i aftalen, hvori det fastsættes, at staten ville yde et andet lån til airBaltic »i forhold til sine stemmerettigheder«, hvilket efter Letlands mening betyder, at BAS også skulle indskyde penge i forhold til sin aktiepost.
The State however did so on 29 or 30 December 2011, while BAS eventually never converted its loan or injected the cash.
Letland anfører også, at aftalen indeholder en række beredskabsforanstaltninger med det formål at beskytte statens finansielle interesser i tilfælde af, at BAS skulle undlade at opfylde sine forpligtelser: i) statens ret til at købe aktier fra BAS for 1 LVL, ii) pligt for de private investorer, som ydede syndikeret lån 2 til airBaltic, til under visse betingelser at overdrage deres fordringer mod airBaltic til staten og iii) pligt for investorerne til at kompensere airBaltic for visse ikkebalanceførte passiver til omkring […] mio. EUR [24].
According to the Commission, before converting the loans, Latvia should have waited until it was reasonably assured that BAS would also do so.
Den kendsgerning, at BAS og investorerne accepterede disse beredskabsforanstaltninger, er efter Letlands mening bevis for, at investorerne havde tillid til, at BAS ville opfylde sine forpligtelser.
On this basis, the Commission was of the view that measure 3 did not appear to be MEIP-conform.
På dette grundlag finder Letland, at foranstaltning 1, 2 og 3 var samtidige og i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
In relation to the acquisition of LVL 30 million (EUR 42,47 million) of 0 %-coupon bonds from airBaltic in April 2010 (measure 4), the Commission highlighted that these bonds, in view of their characteristics, were comparable to a capital injection.
Da foranstaltning 6 endvidere var en naturlig følge af beredskabsforanstaltningerne hævder Letland, at denne foranstaltning heller ikke udgør støtte.
Given that profitability was excluded from the outset since no interest was attached to the bonds and that future profitability upon conversion appeared unlikely in view of the difficulties of the company, the situation of the airline industry, and the absence at the time of a plan for bringing the company back to profitability, the Commission raised doubts about the market-conformity of measure 4.
Endvidere tilføjer Letland med hensyn til foranstaltning 1, at rentesatsen var i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip og meddelelsen om referencesatsen [25] og hævder, at nedsættelsen af rentesatsen fra [11-13] % til [2-4] % var økonomisk rationel for staten med henblik på at nedbringe finansieringsomkostningerne for airBaltic (hvoraf den på det tidspunkt allerede ejede 99,8 %).
In addition, the Commission was not able to exclude that BAS acquired the bonds because of the strong interest shown by Latvia in airBaltic before the bond issuance.
Vedrørende foranstaltning 2 er Letland af den opfattelse, at rentesatsen var i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Concerning the EUR 2,8 million payments by Latvijas Krājbanka (measure 5), the Commission could not conclude with certainty whether — at the time these payments occurred — the actions of Latvijas Krājbanka, being a 100 % State-owned bank as, were independent of those of the State.
Vedrørende foranstaltning 6 tilføjer Letland, at det var en naturlig følge af de i artikel 7, stk. 4, i aftalen fastsatte foranstaltninger at overdrage fordringerne til airBaltic.
Finally, regarding the EUR 5 million claim attributed to airBaltic (measure 6), the Commission explained in its opening decision that by virtue of Article 7.4 of the Agreement, Latvia had decided that a claim of EUR 5 million towards airBaltic for syndicated loan 2 — the part granted by Taurus, of a total of EUR 35 million — was to be assigned to airBaltic for a price of LVL 1.
Ifølge Letland sikrer dette, at hele aftalen gælder tilsvarende, eftersom overdragelsen af fordringen til airBaltic garanterer, at de private investorer yder et forholdsmæssigt bidrag til kapitalindsprøjtningen i airBaltic.
The Commission highlighted that in economic terms this operation was very similar to a debt waiver, by means of which Latvia was freeing airBaltic from its obligation to pay interests and to reimburse part of syndicated loan 2 to the bearer of the claim.
Vedrørende foranstaltning 4 er Letland af den opfattelse, at udstedelsen af nulkuponobligationer blev foretaget samtidigt af staten og BAS på identiske betingelser og derved udelukker tilstedeværelsen af statsstøtte.
In addition, the Commission concluded that measure 6 was not MEIP-conform since airBaltic was not entitled under the Agreement to get the credit in exchange of LVL 1.
Letland forklarer også, at beslutningen om at udstede obligationer blev truffet på initiativ af BAS.
In relation to the rest of the claims under syndicated loan 2 totalling LVL 30 million (EUR 42,47 million) (see recital 42 above), the Commission noted that the reasoning above would apply mutatis mutandis to these claims.
Med hensyn til at disse obligationer ikke gav nogen fortjeneste, hævder Letland, at Kommissionen bør tage hensyn til den såkaldte »ejervirkning« og finder, at staten som aktionær i airBaltic havde andre incitamenter end en udenforstående investor.
The Commission therefore came to the preliminary conclusion that the six measures under assessment entailed unlawful state aid, since they had been granted in breach of the notification and stand-still obligations established in Article 108(3) TFEU.
Endelig mener Letland vedrørende foranstaltning 5, at der ikke var statslige ressourcer involveret, og at FCMC's handlinger under alle omstændigheder ikke ville kunne tilregnes staten.
The Commission also expressed doubts on the compatibility with the internal market of the six measures under assessment, in particular since the Latvian authorities did not provide any possible grounds for compatibility.
På baggrund af sin opfattelse af, at der ikke var tale om statsstøtte, argumenterede Letland ikke i begyndelsen for foranstaltningernes forenelighed med det indre marked.
Of the possible compatibility grounds, the Commission preliminarily considered — in view of the difficulties of airBaltic — that they only applicable criteria were those concerning aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU on the basis of the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [23] (‘the R&R Guidelines’).
I løbet af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure fremsatte Letland dog argumenter herfor og bemærkede, at hvis der var tale om statsstøtte, ville det være forenelig omstruktureringsstøtte i henhold til rammebestemmelserne.
In this respect, on the basis of the information available at the time, the Commission was of the view that the conditions for rescue aid did not seem to be met, and that the reShape plan did not include any of the necessary elements for it to be considered a restructuring plan in the sense of section 3.2 of the R&R Guidelines.
På dette grundlag fremsendte Letland i december 2013 en omstruktureringsplan ifølge hvilken omstruktureringen af airBaltic begyndte i april 2011, da en første udgave af planen blev indsendt til selskabets ledelse.
COMMENTS ON THE OPENING DECISION
I dette dokument afdækkedes nogle af airBaltics svagheder, og det blev fastlagt, at der var behov for [175-185] mio. EUR i kapital.
COMMENTS FROM LATVIA
Denne første udgave af planen blev udviklet til reShape-planen fra marts 2012, som ifølge Letland blev et foreløbigt skridt til den omstruktureringsplan, som blev indsendt i december 2013.
In its comments on the Commission's opening decision, Latvia notes that measures 1, 2, 3 and 6 were interdependent and that they derive from the Agreement, thus constituting essentially one and the same financial transaction which must be assessed at the time when the Agreement was entered into, i.e. 3 October 2011.
I omstruktureringsplanen er der fastsat tre typer af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger: i) optimering af indtægter og omkostninger for eksisterende transaktioner, ii) rekonfiguration af netværk, der fører til justering af destinationer, afgange og tidspunkter samt iii) netværks- og flådeoptimering.
Latvia argues that BAS was the initiator of the Agreement and actually asked the State to participate in the capital increase.
Planen indeholder også en række kompenserende modydelser: i) flådereduktion med 27 %, ii) afståelse af 14 rentable ruter og iii) afståelse af […] ankomst- og afgangstidspunkter (slots) i koordinerede lufthavne.
One of the key elements of the Agreement was an injection by the State and BAS of around LVL 100 million (EUR 141,58 million) in two stages: (i) LVL 30 million (EUR 42,47 million) in the form of the first State loan and the BAS loan, and (ii) approximately LVL 70 million (EUR 99,1 million) to be provided by the State and BAS according to their shareholding.
Mellem 2011 og 2016 vil airBaltic reducere sin kapacitet med [17-20] % målt i ASK [26] ([7-10] %, hvis man kun ser på rentable ruter).
Therefore, according to Latvia, BAS was under a contractual obligation to inject additional capital into airBaltic in proportion to its shareholding.
Ifølge Letland ville en sådan nedbringelse af kapaciteten være i overensstemmelse med tidligere tilfælde.
Latvia derives this conclusion from Article 7.2 of the Agreement, which establishes that the State would provide a second loan to airBaltic ‘in proportion to its voting rights’, which in Latvia's view means that BAS had to inject money also in proportion to its shareholding.
Endvidere omfatter omstruktureringsplanen frigivelse af […] sæt slots som følge af lukningen af flere ruter.
Latvia also notes that the Agreement provides for a number of contingency measures aimed at protecting the financial interests of the State in case BAS would fail not fulfil its obligations: (i) the right for the State to acquire the shares from BAS in exchange of LVL 1, (ii) the obligation for the private investors that granted syndicated loan 2 to airBaltic to attribute their claims against airBaltic to the State under certain circumstances, and (iii) the obligation for the investors to compensate airBaltic for certain off-balance sheets liabilities amounting to approximately EUR […] million [24].
Ifølge omstruktureringsplanen skønnes omstruktureringsomkostningerne at blive [150-170] mio. LVL ([214-242] mio. EUR), som vil blive brugt til at tilbagebetale lån fra tredjemand, godtgøre tab som følge af udfasning og bortskaffelse af visse fly, fratrædelsesgodtgørelser, køb af nye fly osv.
The fact that BAS and the investors accepted these contingency measures is, in Latvia's opinion, proof that the investors were confident that BAS would fulfil its obligations.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DE INTERESSEREDE PARTER
On this basis, Latvia considers that measures 1, 2 and 3 were concomitant and MEIP-rational.
Under den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure modtog Kommissionen bemærkninger fra Ryanair og airBaltic samt tre privatpersoner på vegne af airBaltics kreditorer.
In addition, since measure 6 was a corollary of the contingency measures, Latvia claims that this measure does not entail aid either.
Ryanair er enig i Kommissionens foreløbige konklusioner om, at de omhandlede foranstaltninger ikke er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip og er uforenelige med det indre marked.
In addition, as regards measure 1, Latvia adds that the interest rate was in line with the MEIP and the Reference Rate Communication [25] and argues that the lowering of the interest rate from [11 — 13] % to [2 — 4] % was economically rational for the State in order to reduce the funding costs of airBaltic (which at time it already owned at 99,8 %).
Ryanair hævder imidlertid, at Kommissionens vurdering af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip ikke var fuldstændig i indledningsafgørelsen, eftersom Kommissionen burde have overvejet, om en privat investor på forhånd ville have valgt at likvidere airBaltic i stedet for at forsyne det med supplerende kapital [27].
Concerning measure 2, Latvia is of the opinion that the interest rate was in line with the MEIP.
Ryanair hævder også, at Kommissionen i sin indledningsafgørelse burde have vurderet, om likvideringen af airBaltic var mere rentabel for staten end tilvejebringelsen af supplerende midler.
Concerning measure 3, the Latvian authorities argue that the conversion into capital of the first State loan and the first tranche of the second State loan was done on the basis of the concomitant decision by BAS to convert the BAS loan and to inject LVL 37,7 million (EUR 53,38 million) in cash, reached at airBaltic's shareholders meeting of 22 December 2011.
Skønt Ryanair finder, at selskabet ikke havde tilstrækkelig information til at kommentere reShape-planen, giver selskabet udtryk for tvivl om, hvorvidt airBaltic ville blive rentabelt igen og fandt, at selskabet burde være blevet likvideret.
The Latvian authorities reiterate that measures 1, 2 and 3 should not be assessed in isolation but only in conjunction with the wider transaction they form an inseparable part of.
Ryanair anfører også, at enhver støtte til airBaltic ville skade selskabets markedsposition, eftersom Ryanair driver 13 ruter fra Riga, hvoraf over halvdelen er i direkte konkurrence med airBaltic.
Since this transaction was agreed by BAS and the State in full concomitance, Latvia excludes the presence of aid.
Når Letland besluttede at deltage og opfylde aftalen, handlede myndighederne — også ifølge airBaltic — som en rationel privat investor. airBaltic bemærker, at Letlands investering faldt sammen med BAS', og at det havde krævet store ofre fra BAS og andre private investorer.
Latvia further argues that the fact that BAS did not fulfil its commitment within the maximum deadline (i.e. 30 January 2012) is irrelevant and that the State had no option but to convert the first State loan and the first tranche of the second State loan into capital — it did so on 29 December 2011.
Aftalen indeholdt endvidere tilstrækkelige beskyttelsesforanstaltninger til at sikre, at Letlands interesser var fuldt beskyttede mod BAS.
Moreover, Latvia explains that the State took all possible steps towards forcing BAS to fulfil its commitment.
På dette grundlag konkluderer airBaltic, at Letlands beslutning om at indgå aftalen ikke indeholder elementer af statsstøtte.
According to Latvia, this ensures that the entire Agreement is pari passu, since the assignment of the claim to airBaltic guarantee that the private investors make a proportionate contribution to the financial injection into airBaltic.
For så vidt angår statens overtagelse af nulkuponobligationer fra airBaltic i april 2010 (foranstaltning 4), er airBaltic af den opfattelse, at det var økonomisk rationelt og en fuldstændigt sammenfaldende investering fra staten og BAS og konkluderer dermed, at den ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
Concerning measure 4, Latvia is of the opinion that the issuance of 0 %-coupon bonds was carried out concomitantly by the State and BAS under identical conditions and thereby excludes the presence of state aid.
I forbindelse med Latvijas Krājbankas udbetaling af 2,8 mio. EUR til airBaltic den 21. og 22. november 2011 (foranstaltning 5) finder airBaltic, at der her var tale om beslutninger truffet som led i driften af airBaltic, og at de vedrører private midler og dermed udelukker tilstedeværelsen af statslige ressourcer.
Latvia also explains that the decision to issue bonds was taken at the initiative of BAS.
Endelig fremhæver airBaltic sin rolle med at sikre Letlands forbindelse med resten af EU og giver nogle oplysninger om selskabets nye ledelses gennemførelse af reShape-planen.
As regards the fact that these bonds offered no profit, Latvia claims that the Commission should take into account the so-called ‘owner effect’ and consider that the State, as shareholder of airBaltic, had different incentives than an outsider investor.
Bemærkningerne fra tre privatpersoner på vegne af airBaltics kreditorer havde en lignende opbygning.
Finally, as regards measure 5, Latvia is of the opinion that no State resources were involved and that in any event the actions of the FCMC would not be imputable to the State.
Desuden henviste de til visse ubetalte gældsposter i airBaltic, som tilsyneladende havde deres oprindelse i aftalen, og som angiveligt havde gjort nogle af kreditorerne insolvente.
However, during the course of the formal investigation procedure, Latvia provided arguments in this respect and noted that if state aid was present, it would be compatible restructuring aid under the R&R Guidelines.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA LETLAND TIL BEMÆRKNINGERNE FRA DE INTERESSEREDE PARTER
On this basis, Latvia submitted in December 2013 a restructuring plan according to which the restructuring of airBaltic started in April 2011, when a first version of the plan was submitted to the company's management.
I sine bemærkninger til de interesserede parters bemærkninger var Letland enig i airBaltics synspunkter, at de omhandlede foranstaltninger ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
This document identified some of the weaknesses of airBaltic and established that EUR [175 — 185] million in capital were needed.
I forbindelse med Ryanairs bemærkninger konstaterer Letland, at den af Ryanair fremhævede retspraksis — om at staten burde have likvideret airBaltic i stedet for at tilføre selskabet midler — ikke finder anvendelse, da staten på det pågældende tidspunkt ikke var en stor kreditor i airBaltic, men blot aktionær.
This first version of the plan evolved into the reShape plan of March 2012, which according to Latvia was a preliminary step to the restructuring plan submitted in December 2013.
Ifølge Letland er den »private kreditortest« ikke tilstrækkelig til at vurdere, om statens investeringsbeslutninger i dette tilfælde er rationelle.
The restructuring plan foresees a 5-year restructuring period from April 2011 to April 2016 and total restructuring costs of LVL [150 — 170] million (EUR [214 — 242] million).
Endvidere anfører Letland, at staten — da den besluttede at indgå aftalen — valgte den at lide tab på kort sigt med henblik på at genoprette rentabiliteten på lang sigt, og disse investeringsbeslutninger blev truffet på initiativ af BAS.
The restructuring plan foresees three types of restructuring measures: (i) optimisation of revenues and costs for the existing operations; (ii) network reconfiguration, resulting in adjustment of destinations, frequencies and timing; and (iii) network and fleet optimisation.
Letland bemærker også, at airBaltics tab var blevet reduceret og afviser Ryanairs argumenter som grundløse.
The restructuring plan includes a total of 26 initiatives addressing revenue and costs, coupled with additional initiatives in the area of network reconfiguration and fleet renewal.
Denne afgørelse behandler indledningsvis spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt airBaltic er en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til rammebestemmelserne (punkt 7.1 nedenfor).
The plan also puts forward a number of compensatory measures: (i) fleet reduction by 27 %; (ii) the surrender of 14 profitable routes; and (iii) the surrender of […] slot pairs in coordinated airports.
Den indeholder herefter en analyse af, om de undersøgte foranstaltninger udgør statsstøtte til airBaltic efter EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1 (punkt 7.2 nedenfor), og om en sådan støtte er lovlig (punkt 7.3 nedenfor) og forenelig med det indre marked (punkt 7.4 nedenfor).
Between 2011 and 2016, airBaltic will reduce its capacity by [17 — 20] % in terms of ASK [26] ([7 — 10] % when considering profitable routes only).
AIRBALTICS VANSKELIGHEDER
According to Latvia, such capacity reduction would be in line with past cases.
Som allerede anført i indledningsafgørelsen forklarer de lettiske myndigheder selv, at airBaltics vanskeligheder begyndte i 2008 på grund af den globale økonomiske recession og den dramatiske stigning i oliepriserne.
In addition, the restructuring plan includes the release of […] slot pairs as the result of the closure of several routes.
Som følge heraf led airBaltic i 2008 tab på 28 mio. LVL (39,64 mio. EUR).
The restructuring plan estimates the restructuring costs at LVL [150 — 170] million (EUR [214 — 242] million), which will be used for repayment of third-party loans, to compensate losses resulting from the phase-out and disposal of certain aircraft, redundancy payments the purchase of new aircraft, etc.
I 2009 havde selskabet et overskud på 6 mio. LVL (8,49 mio. EUR).
In view of total restructuring costs, the proposed own contribution of airBaltic according to the restructuring plan amounts to LVL [100 — 110] million (EUR [141 — 155] million), i.e. [60 — 70] % of the total restructuring costs.
Tabel
According to the restructuring plan, the own contribution would results from several injections from private parties (including a liquidity facility and advance payments), private loans, a lease agreement for new aircraft and a partial write-off of debt with two banks.
AirBaltics økonomiske nøgletal 2007 — juni 2011 (i tusind LVL)
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
Nettoresultat
During the formal investigation procedure, the Commission received comments from Ryanair and airBaltic, as well as three individuals on behalf of creditors of airBaltic.
Driftsomkostninger
Ryanair agrees with the Commission's preliminary findings that the measures under assessment are inconsistent with the market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’) and incompatible with the internal market.
Finansielle omkostninger
Ryanair however argues that the Commission's assessment of the MEIP was not complete in the opening decision, since the Commission should have considered whether a private investor would have opted for liquidating airBaltic upfront instead of providing it with additional capital [27].
Aktiekapital
Ryanair also argues that the Commission should have assessed in its opening decisions whether the liquidation of airBaltic was more profitable for the State than the provision of additional funds.
I henhold til punkt 10, litra c), i rammebestemmelserne anses et selskab for at være kriseramt, når det »efter de nationale regler opfylder betingelserne for insolvensbehandling«.
Although Ryanair considers that it had no sufficient information to comment on the reShape plan, it notes its doubts that airBaltic would return to profitability and considered that the company should have been liquidated.
Dette syntes at være tilfældet for airBaltic, i hvert fald fra den 21. september 2011 — om ikke tidligere — da selskabet anmodede om retsbeskyttelse mod sine kreditorer.
Ryanair also argues that any aid to airBaltic would harm its market position since Ryanair operates 13 routes from Riga, of which more than half in direct competition with airBaltic.