natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne formulering viser utvetydigt, at kontrakten om marketingydelser højst sandsynligt ikke ville være blevet indgået uden Ryanairs drift af de i kontrakten om lufthavnstjenester omtalte ruter.
This is true in both legal terms and in other respects.
I præamblen til marketingkontrakten står der desuden: »Airport Marketing Services Limited er det eneste selskab, der har potentiale og teknisk kapacitet til at fokusere på Ryanairs potentielt meget store antal passagerer med henblik på at fremme turist- og forretningsattraktioner i regionen«.
An undertaking that sets objectives and makes commitments in response to an invitation to tender organised by a local authority and that subsequently acts in a manner contrary to those objectives and commitments runs the risk of its reputation being compromised among local authorities.
Denne sætning bekræfter, at det væsentlige mål i kontrakten om marketingydelser ikke er fremme af Nîmes og regionen generelt, men langt mere specifikt at maksimere salget af Ryanairs billetter til destinationen Nîmes gennem fremme af denne region.
An undertaking such as Veolia Transport, which in 2007 was looking to establish itself in the airport operation market, would not have run such a risk.
Desuden består de ydelser, som AMS ifølge marketingkontrakten skal levere, i at indsætte budskaber og links på websiden for Nîmes på Ryanairs websted og at indsætte et link til det websted, der er udpeget af CCI, på Ryanairs websteds engelske velkomstside.
As a result, VTAN’s conduct towards Ryanair/AMS from 2007 was fundamentally influenced by the traffic development objective set by the SMAN and by the fact that the latter had selected, to operate the airport, an undertaking that had submitted a tender clearly designed to respond to that objective.
Men websiden for destinationen Nîmes på Ryanairs websted henvender sig primært til personer, som allerede har besluttet, eller som sandsynligvis planlægger, at flyve med Ryanair til Nîmes.
This influence is evident from the fact that Veolia Transport knew, during the invitation to tender process, that the commercial relations with Ryanair were likely to harm the profitability of the airport’s operation.
Hvad angår webstedets velkomstside, henvender den sig ganske vist til et meget bredere publikum, men kun den engelske version er omfattet af marketingkontrakten.
The documents that Veolia Transport has submitted in this procedure indicate for example: ‘Moreover, in the long term, the replacement of Ryanair’s activity (company benefiting from particularly favourable conditions at the airport) could be positively offset by the arrival of companies likely to accept less economically burdensome conditions for the airport operator …’; ‘The transfer of the risk, above […] %, by the Delegating Authority is justified by the strategic nature for the Gard economy of the tourist traffic brought by Ryanair; in fact, as we explained in our tender, the arrival of this company (under particularly advantageous conditions) has negative economic implications for the airport’s operation, but quite clearly positive implications for the local economy’; ‘Ryanair typically chooses small or medium-sized airports, particularly in France, with which the company negotiates extremely advantageous material and/or financial conditions’; ‘All in all, adding together the main agreement and the Airport Marketing Services agreement, the operations with Ryanair result in a negative turnover (between EUR […] thousand and EUR […] thousand according to the bid and traffic configurations, i.e. an average cost to the airport per outbound passenger of around EUR […] to EUR […] excluding tax per head)’.
Dette er endnu et tegn på, at marketingydelserne i alt væsentligt er beregnet til at reklamere for Ryanairs forbindelser mellem Nîmes og London og ikke i lige så høj grad besøgstallet i Nîmes og omegn.
These various statements tend to confirm that, if VTAN had been free to operate the airport with the sole aim of maximising its profits, it would not have been prepared to pursue with Ryanair/AMS a commercial relationship such as that established by the CCI and that it regarded as a net cost to the airport.
Hvis de skulle fremme Nîmes og omegn over for alle turister og forretningsrejsende, der kunne tænkes at have interesse i regionen, er det da også sandsynligt, at CCI havde forlangt, at linket til et websted, det selv valgte, skulle placeres på alle eller i det mindste flere sprogversioner af velkomstsiden på Ryanairs websted og ikke kun den engelsksprogede.
It may therefore be concluded that VTAN was prepared to pursue this relationship under similar conditions only in the light of the SMAN’s traffic development objectives, VTAN’s commitments made to the latter in this respect in order to win the airport operation concession, and the flat-rate contribution ensuring the concession’s financial stability.
Endelig præciseres det i kontrakten om marketingydelser af 10. oktober 2005 vedrørende kontrakten selv: »Da grundlaget for denne kontrakt er Ryanairs tilstedeværelse i Nîmes lufthavn, vil kontrakten blive ophævet, hvis Ryanair ophører med at være til stede i Nîmes lufthavn uanset af hvilken grund, eller hvis kontrakten om lufthavnstjenester af 10. oktober 2005 mellem Ryanair og [CCI] ophæves«.
It should be recalled that the profitability of the concession for VTAN relied on the flat-rate operating subsidy paid by the SMAN, which therefore participated directly in financing the airport’s operation.
Denne bestemmelse kæder klart anvendelsen af de to kontrakter sammen og fremhæver således forbindelsen mellem dem.
The existence of this subsidy, granted by the SMAN, demonstrates the latter’s influence over VTAN’s commercial relations with Ryanair/AMS.
Det fremgår af tillægskontrakten af 30. november 2010, af den elektroniske brevveksling mellem Ryanair og VTAN, som gav anledning til dette tillæg, og af forklaringerne fra Frankrig, at Ryanair havde gjort driften af tre ugentlige afgange i stedet for to på ruten Nîmes-Liverpool i løbet af sommersæsonen 2011 betinget af en supplerende betaling for marketing på [35000-65000] EUR, jf. tillægget.
Without this subsidy, it is likely that no operator would have agreed to operate the airport under a concession for which the economic model was based on a traffic development objective and relations with an airline that were likely to result in a negative margin for the airport’s operation.
Denne dokumentation vedrørende de forskellige marketingkontrakter viser, at de i de forskellige kontrakter indeholdte marketingydelser ved såvel deres varighed som deres art er tæt forbundet med de luftfartstjenester, som Ryanair tilbyder i form af flyruter, som nævnes i marketingkontrakterne, og som er omfattet af de tilhørende aftaler om lufthavnstjenester.
The granting of this subsidy, which is imputable to the SMAN, was therefore one of the elements that allowed the various agreements covered by this investigation to be signed from 2007.
Det fremgår endda af marketingkontrakterne, at de har rod i Ryanairs forpligtelse til at drive de pågældende lufttransporttjenester.
It should be noted in this respect that the amount of the contribution was calculated (and accepted by the SMAN) based on a provisional budget drawn up by Veolia Transport, which incorporated the costs and revenues associated with the agreements in force between the CCI and Ryanair/AMS, and VTAN’s best estimates as regards their renegotiation.
Marketingydelserne er i væsentlig mindre grad beregnet til generelt og bredt at øge turisters og forretningsrejsendes besøg i Nîmes og omegn end til specifikt at nå ud til personer, som sandsynligvis vil benytte de af Ryanairs lufttransporttjenester, der er omfattet af marketingkontrakterne, idet marketingydelsernes primære formål et at fremme disse lufttransporttjenester.
The SMAN therefore granted VTAN a contribution that was designed to allow Ryanair’s activity to continue under similar conditions to those under which this airline had offered its services from Nîmes airport when the CCI was operating the airport.
Marketingkontrakterne er således uløseligt forbundet med kontrakterne om lufthavnstjenester, som er indgået på tilsvarende vis, og de lufttransporttjenester, som er genstand for dem.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the CDSP provided for the flat-rate contribution to be adjusted to a certain extent according to Ryanair’s activity.
Den faktuelle dokumentation i foregående betragtninger viser endvidere, at marketingkontrakterne i mangel af de pågældende ruter (og dermed de kontrakter om lufthavnstjenester, som angår dem) ikke ville være blevet indgået.
As a result, the sum of EUR 1,3 million per year envisaged in the ‘reference scenario’ was to be reduced to EUR 1,1 million in a ‘downturn scenario’ corresponding to a reduction in Ryanair’s activity likely to allow the airport’s second staff team to be axed.
Som angivet i betragtning 321 står der da også udtrykkeligt i marketingkontrakterne, at de har rod i Ryanairs forpligtelse til at drive bestemte flyforbindelser og i øvrigt indeholder marketingydelser, som i alt væsentligt skal fremme disse forbindelser.
Two lessons can be drawn from this adjustment.
I den henseende er forvalternes argument om, at disse to typer kontrakter burde analyseres hver for sig, eftersom de »har forskellige formål, og betingelserne for den ene på ingen måde afhænger af betingelserne for den anden«, irrelevant.
Firstly, this adjustment illustrates the fact that, in 2007 and in the light of the CCI’s experience, Veolia Transport and the SMAN expected that a reduction in Ryanair traffic would result in an improvement in the airport’s profitability.
Det fremgår da også klart af det ovenstående, at marketingkontrakterne sammen med kontrakterne om lufthavnstjenester udgør en integreret del af Ryanairs og forvalternes forretningsforbindelser som ramme for driften af de flyforbindelser, der er genstand for disse to typer kontrakter.
Otherwise they would have planned to increase the flat-rate contribution, and not reduce it, in the downturn scenario.
I øvrigt fremgår det, at forvalterne ikke iværksatte et udbud før underskrivelsen af de pågældende marketingkontrakter og end ikke indhentede tilbud fra forskellige leverandører for at sammenligne deres tilbud.
This once again illustrates the fact that the SMAN’s objectives and the terms of the CDSP led VTAN to adopt a commercial policy towards Ryanair that it would have regarded as aberrant and would not have pursued if it had been entirely free to determine this policy.
Overordnet set har de ikke haft andre leverandører i tankerne end AMS til de pågældende tjenesteydelser.
The second lesson to be drawn from this adjustment is that, for the SMAN, this represented a further way of influencing VTAN’s conduct towards Ryanair, by reducing the incentives for VTAN to adopt decisions likely to result in a reduction in Ryanair traffic.
Dette underbygger, at der er en tæt forbindelse mellem marketingkontrakterne og de forbindelser, som Ryanair drev med udgangspunkt i Nîmes lufthavn.
In the light of all the above, it is clear that, through the invitation to tender process, the objectives set in the CDSP and the flat-rate contribution established by the latter, the SMAN exerted a decisive influence over the decisions taken by VTAN with regard to Ryanair and AMS.
Det kan derfor konkluderes, at der for hver marketingkontrakt bør foretages en analyse af denne og af den tilsvarende kontrakt om lufthavnstjenester som én og samme foranstaltning med henblik på at fastslå, om kontrakten udgør statsstøtte.
In fact, it cannot be clearly established, in the light of the facts on record, that the SMAN made specific decisions on the contents of the various agreements.
Vedrørende den måde, hvorpå man kan anvende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip på forvalterne med henblik på at analysere kontrakterne om marketingydelser
Moreover, as underlined in substance by France, the Operators and Ryanair, there was no automatic link between the amount of the flat-rate contribution and the parameters of the agreements negotiated with Ryanair and AMS, such that VTAN was not deprived of any incentive to limit the ‘net costs’ caused by the agreements signed with Ryanair.
For at anvende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip på marketingaftalerne er det nødvendigt at fastslå, hvilken hypotetisk markedsøkonomisk investor der bør bruges som reference til at analysere forvalternes handlemåde.
However, in view of the facts presented in this section, the framework laid down by the SMAN through the invitation to tender process, the objectives set in the CDSP and the flat-rate contribution had a sufficiently decisive influence on VTAN’s conduct towards Ryanair and AMS that the agreements in question can be regarded, pursuant to the State aid case-law, as imputable to the state, even though, in terms of its ownership, VTAN forms part of a privately owned group.
I første omgang kunne man vælge den løsning, at forvalterne har indgået marketingkontrakterne i egenskab af lufthavnsforvalter og derfor bør sammenlignes med en hypotetisk lufthavnsforvalter, som i sin handlemåde lader sig lede af rentabilitetsudsigter.
France and the Operators have stated that Nîmes airport was the first regional airport operated by Veolia Transport.
En anden løsning kunne være, at forvalterne handlede som enheder, der havde fået overdraget varetagelsen af en almennyttig opgave, nemlig den økonomiske udvikling af Nîmes og omegn, og at de uafhængigt af deres egenskab af lufthavnsforvalter af Nîmes lufthavn købte disse marketingydelser for at udføre denne almennyttige opgave.
They consider that this position as a new entrant justified the need for VTAN to ensure Ryanair’s presence and develop the airport, if necessary through an initial loss, in order to allow it to acquire the experience needed to develop its airport operation activity.
Denne anden løsning ville være baseret på det forhold, at CCI har fået pålagt denne økonomiske udviklingsopgave ifølge lovgivningen, mens VTAN ifølge Frankrig har fået den pålagt af SMAN gennem CDSP.
However, this argument does not invalidate the conclusion that, without the flat-rate contribution or the traffic objective set by the SMAN and transcribed into commitments made by Veolia Transport in response to the invitation to tender, Veolia Transport would not have agreed to become the airport operator or, if it had agreed to do so, to sign the agreements in question with Ryanair/AMS.
Som anført ovenfor ifølge Frankrig og forvalterne fik VTAN nemlig ifølge CDSP til opgave at sikre »økonomisk og turistmæssig udvikling af lokalområdet«.
Neither France nor VTAN have provided any analysis showing that, in such a scenario, the ‘net cost’ caused by the agreements with Ryanair/AMS would have been offset by future benefits resulting for the Veolia Transport group from this initial airport operation experience.
I forbindelse med denne anden løsning bør man ifølge retspraksis kontrollere, dels om de pågældende ydelser opfylder den offentlige indkøbers »faktiske behov«, dels om de blev indkøbt til en pris, der var lig med eller lavere end »markedsprisen«, eller med andre ord om en markedsøkonomisk investor, der lader sig lede af rentabilitetsudsigter, og som måtte have brug for tilsvarende ydelser (uden nødvendigvis at være lufthavnsforvalter), ville have været villig til at acceptere sådanne vilkår, som forvalterne gik ind på.
Furthermore, neither France nor VTAN have explained why, in such a scenario, VTAN could not have chosen to acquire similar experience at other airports where the ‘net cost’ would have been lower, or even negative.
Visse tredjeparters bemærkninger underbygger den anden løsning, om end implicit.
The argument put forward by France and the Operators regarding Veolia Transport’s position as a new entrant at Nîmes airport does not therefore alter the fact that there is a clear link between, on the one hand, the objectives set by the SMAN in the invitation to tender and in the CDSP and the flat-rate contribution and, on the other hand, the agreements signed by VTAN with Ryanair and AMS.
Navnlig fremlagde Ryanair, bl.a. i sin undersøgelse af 20. december 2013, dokumentation for, at priserne for AMS' marketingydelser ikke oversteg, hvad der anses for at være markedsprisen for sådanne ydelser, og bemærkede til støtte for dette argument, at lufthavnsforvaltere ikke adskiller sig fra andre af AMS' kundetyper.
Added to the above considerations are three more minor and non-essential elements that reinforce the merits of this conclusion.
Forvalterne fremlagde oplysninger for perioden efter den 31. december 2006, som går i samme retning, idet de bl.a. bemærker: »det skal erindres, at alle eller dele af AMS' udgifter i VTAN's driftsperiode i realiteten gik til fremme af lokalområdet og den økonomiske og turistmæssige udvikling inden for rammerne af VTAN's public serviceopgave«.
Firstly, according to France, in its proposals submitted to the SMAN in the invitation to tender process, ‘VTAN indicated that, if it were delegated the public service, it would remain in close contact with the SMAN during the negotiation phase with Ryanair in order to inform the SMAN about the progress of the discussions, and proposed that, if necessary and at the SMAN’s discretion, the latter could also participate directly in the negotiation’.
Kommissionen mener, at den anden af de to løsninger, der blev gennemgået i ovennævnte betragtninger, skal afvises, fordi den ikke tager højde for den karakter af indbyrdes afhængighed, der kendetegner kontrakterne om lufthavnstjenester og de tilsvarende marketingkontrakter, som allerede er fastslået.
According to France, the SMAN never expressed a desire to become involved in these negotiations.
Denne løsning indebærer da også den antagelse, at forvalterne har underskrevet marketingaftalerne uden hensyntagen til de forbindelser, som Ryanair tilbyder fra den lufthavn, selskabet forvaltede, og at de endog ville have underskrevet disse kontrakter, uden at de pågældende forbindelser og tilhørende kontrakter om lufthavnstjenester fandtes.
However, the simple fact that it had the option to do so gave it a certain degree of influence over these negotiations.
Af de i ovennævnte betragtninger anførte grunde er en sådan hypotese højst usandsynlig.
For example, it could have intervened if VTAN had tried to impose conditions on Ryanair that may have prompted the latter to reduce its traffic at Nîmes airport.
Hvis man alligevel skulle vælge denne anden løsning, ville den desuden ikke føre til den konklusion, at marketingkontrakterne ikke giver Ryanair og AMS en økonomisk fordel.
Secondly, it was the SMAN that was responsible for setting the airport charges, pursuant to Article 28 of the CDSP.
At anvende den i betragtning 332 omhandlede anden løsning ville derfor føre til den konklusion, at marketingkontrakterne indebærer en økonomisk fordel for de virksomheder, der har leveret disse ydelser, samt de luftfartsselskaber, som har direkte gavn af marketingydelserne.
The advantages conferred by these agreements, the existence of which shall be proven in the following section, were therefore financed through this flat-rate contribution, and consequently through state resources.
Denne betragtning bekræfter, at den anden løsning er uhensigtsmæssig.
This involves determining whether a hypothetical MEO acting in place of the Operators and motivated by the prospect of profits would have entered into similar agreements.
Med henblik på anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip bør man derfor sammenligne henholdsvis CCI og VTAN's handlemåde med de handlinger, som en hypotetisk markedsøkonomisk investor, der lader sig lede af rentabilitetsudsigter, i deres sted ville vælge at udføre i sin forvaltning af Nîmes lufthavn.
In order to correctly apply this test, a number of questions should be answered first, particularly the following:
Vedrørende det udbytte, som en markedsøkonomisk investor kunne forvente at få af marketingkontrakterne, og den pris, en sådan investor ville være villig til at betale for disse ydelser
Should the conduct of the CCI-Airport be assessed in isolation, or should its conduct in fact be assessed together with that of the CCI as a whole?
Af det ovenstående fremgår, at man for at anvende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip på de omhandlede marketingkontrakter bør analysere disse sammen med de tilsvarende kontrakter om lufthavnstjenester som én enkelt transaktion, og at forvalternes adfærd bør analyseres i forhold til den, der udvises af en hypotetisk markedsøkonomisk aktør, som forvaltede Nîmes lufthavn i deres sted.
Likewise, should the conduct of VTAN be assessed in isolation, or should its conduct in fact be assessed together with that of the SMAN?
Ved analysen af hver enkelt af de således identificerede transaktioner skal det fastslås, hvilke gevinster denne hypotetiske markedsøkonomiske investor, som lader sig lede af rentabilitetsudsigter, kunne forvente sig af marketingydelserne.
Should a marketing services agreement and an airport services agreement that were signed at the same time be analysed separately or together?
I den forbindelse skal de generelle virkninger af sådanne ydelser for turismen og den økonomiske aktivitet i regionen ikke som sådan tages i betragtning.
In applying the MEO test to the marketing services agreements, should the CCI and VTAN be regarded as having respectively acted as operators of Nîmes airport or as entities purchasing marketing services in the context of a local economic development mission, regardless of their function as airport operator?
Det er kun virkningerne af disse ydelser for lufthavnens rentabilitet, der skal tages hensyn til, eftersom det kun er dem, en hypotetisk markedsøkonomisk investor i denne analyse kunne have forholdt sig til.
What benefits could a hypothetical MEO have expected from the marketing services agreements?
Marketingydelserne kan stimulere passagertallet på de flyruter, som er genstand for marketingkontrakterne og de tilhørende kontrakter om lufthavnstjenester, eftersom de er beregnet til at fremme disse ruter.
What, for the purposes of applying the MEO test, is the relevance of comparing the terms of the airport services agreements covered by the formal investigation procedure with the airport charges invoiced at other airports?
Selv om denne virkning først og fremmest gavner luftfartsselskabet, gavner den også lufthavnsforvalteren.
After answering these questions, the Commission will apply the MEO test to the various measures in question.
For lufthavnens forvaltningsorgan kan en stigning i passagerantallet være ensbetydende med en stigning i indtægterne fra visse lufthavnsafgifter samt i indtægter fra andet end luftfart, som stammer fra parkeringsgebyrer, restauranter og andre forretninger.
Joint assessment of the conduct of the CCI-Airport and the CCI as a whole
Det kan derfor ikke benægtes, at en hypotetisk markedsøkonomisk investor som forvalter af Nîmes lufthavn kunne have taget denne positive virkning i betragtning ved indgåelsen af marketingkontrakten og den tilhørende kontrakt om lufthavnstjenester.
In applying the MEO test, the conduct of the CCI as a whole, and not just that of its arm operating the airport, should be taken into account.
Vedkommende ville have gjort det ved at vurdere de pågældende flyforbindelsers virkning for kommende indtægter og omkostninger og ved i den forbindelse at forvente et passagertal på disse forbindelser, som ville være udtryk for den positive virkning af marketingydelserne.
As explained above (see footnote 69), the CCI-Airport did not have its own legal personality distinct from that of the CCI and the various agreements were signed by the CCI president or under his control.
Vedkommende ville have taget denne virkning i betragtning for hele varigheden af driften af de pågældende ruter som angivet i kontrakten om lufthavnstjenester og marketingkontrakten.
The CCI-Airport was not a distinct entity with its own decision-making autonomy, other than with regard to the day-to-day operation of the airport.