natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efterfølgende overdrog Letland fordringen til airBaltic.
As indicated above, the first State loan and the first tranche of the second State loan entail State resources and are imputable to the State.
I forbindelse med de resterende fordringer, der beløb sig til 30 mio. LVL (42,47 mio. EUR), som efter planen skulle omlægges inden for rammerne af syndikeret lån 2, anmodede de lettiske myndigheder pr. brev af 9. februar 2012 investorerne om at overdrage selskabet deres respektive fordringer for 1 LVL hver.
Their conversion into capital was decided by the Ministry of Transport of Latvia, i.e. 99,8 % shareholder in airBaltic since 30 November 2011.
Desuden anlagde Letland sag ved Rigas regionale ret mod tre af investorerne med henblik på at håndhæve aftalens artikel 7, stk. 4.
Therefore, measure 3 also entails State resources and is imputable to the State.
Letland har oplyst, at staten også har til hensigt at overdrage disse fordringer til airBaltic.
The Commission does not share the views of the Latvian authorities that measure 3 does not entail aid.
Letland anfører, at overdragelsen af fordringen på de 5 mio. EUR til airBaltic var en beredskabsforanstaltning med det formål at beskytte statens finansielle interesser og skulle opfattes som en tilsvarende foranstaltning i henhold til aftalen og skulle således udelukke statsstøtte.
In the first place, the Commission reiterates that the conclusions reached in section 7.2.1 above are applicable to measure 3.
Det kom frem i løbet af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, at aftalerne om de syndikerede lån aldrig blev underskrevet.
The Commission also notes that on 29 December 2011, Latvia could have had reasonable doubts as to the willingness of BAS to fulfil its commitments.
Det fremgår dog af den dokumentation, Letland har fremlagt, at domstolene anerkendte aftalens gyldighed for så vidt angår de private investorers forpligtelse til at overdrage fordringerne som følge af syndikeret lån 2 til staten eller dens udpegede selskab.
Indeed, BAS had already given indications that it would not convert its loan: Latvia itself admits that the second tranche of the second State loan, decided on 13 December 2011, was foreseen precisely to account for the eventuality that BAS would not fulfil its commitments.
I den henseende anfører Letland, at ejeren af fordringen på de 5 mio. EUR i henhold til flere domme fra lettiske domstole ikke har ret til at kræve tilbagebetaling af dette beløb, men kun kan kræve aktier i airBaltic svarende til et forskud på 5 mio. EUR i selskabets aktiekapital.
Moreover, since 30 November 2011 the State and BAS were no longer in a comparable position as shareholders since BAS had lost its entire shareholding in airBaltic with the exception of one share and the State owned 99,8 % of the company.
Da staten allerede ejede 99,8 % af airBaltics aktier, hævder Letland, at retten til ekstra aktier ikke har nogen meningsfuld økonomisk værdi for staten.
In view of those developments, the State, before actually converting the State loans, should have inferred — or at least had reasons to suspect — from BAS' actions that it did not intend to fulfil its obligations (see recital 35 above).
Selv om domstolene kan have anerkendt statens ret til at overtage fordringerne som følge af syndikeret lån 2 i overensstemmelse med aftalens artikel 7, stk. 4, bemærker Kommissionen, at dette ikke betyder, at Letland havde pligt til at overdrage denne fordring til airBaltic i modsætning til, hvad Letland anfører.
Moreover, since BAS had lost all its shares in airBaltic except one, the remedy provided for in Article 7.4 of the Agreement — i.e. the right for the State to purchase from BAS all its shares in airBaltic for LVL 1 — had been deprived of meaning: the State had lost the means by which it could have forced BAS to abide by what it had agreed to.
Kommissionen bemærker, at en forsigtig operatør under markedsøkonomiske vilkår ikke ville have overdraget fordringen til airBaltic for 1 LVL.
Bearing the elements indicated above in mind, the Commission comes to the conclusion that a prudent market economy operator would not have converted its loans into capital before being sure that the other party would convert its loan and inject the cash, and in that context would have carefully assessed the incentives of the other party to fulfil its commitments.
Letland har ikke ført bevis for, hvorfor det var bedre for staten at give fordringen til airBaltic end at beholde den eller bruge den til et andet formål.
Moreover, the Commission observes that, even if it had respected the agreement reached at the shareholders meeting, BAS would not have regained its former shareholding in airBaltic.
Som følge af overdragelsen satte Letland selskabet i en gunstigere situation end dets konkurrenter.
In order to reach a 47,2 % stake, BAS would have had to invest much more than the amounts agreed to at that meeting.
Endvidere er Kommissionen ikke enig i de lettiske myndigheders argumenter og understreger, at en ekstra aktie i airBaltic ville have ekstra værdi for staten, selv om den var lille, således at tilstedeværelsen af støtte ikke kan udelukkes [36].
Therefore, the Commission is of the view that the State, had it acted in accordance with the MEIP, should have carefully considered whether BAS would invest significant amounts of money — the BAS loan and cash amounting to LVL 37,7 million (EUR 53,38 million) — in order to get a minority shareholding in airBaltic.
Ved at give fordringen til airBaltic opgav staten ikke bare fordringen, men også enhver ret til rente heraf i størrelsesordenen [5-7] %.
As an additional argument, Latvia explains that BAS' obligation to inject the cash and convert the BAS loan was confirmed by the existence of a guarantee by a Russian entrepreneur, Mr Vladimir Antonov, who agreed to make the necessary payments on behalf of BAS.
Endelig anfører Letland, at foranstaltning 6 med henblik på statsstøtteloven skal anses for at være blevet bevilget den 3. oktober 2011, dvs. på datoen for underskrivelse af aftalen, sammen med foranstaltning 1, 2 og 3.
However, it appears from the information available to the Commission that the guarantee was never in fact provided.
Endelig konstaterer Kommissionen, at Letland ikke har underbygget sin påstand om, at formålet med aftalens artikel 7, stk. 4, var at beskytte statens investering i airBaltic ved at forebygge enhver skade for staten i tilfælde af misligholdelse fra BAS' side.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that Latvia did not act on pari passu terms when converting its loans and therefore increasing airBaltic's capital.
Kommissionen konkluderer således, at staten ved at iværksætte foranstaltning 6 ikke handlede som en investor under markedsøkonomiske vilkår, og transaktionen var heller ikke ligestillet med foranstaltning 1, 2 og 3.
The State's behaviour was moreover not in line with the MEIP test.
Derfor er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at foranstaltning 6 gav airBaltic en uberettiget fordel.
Therefore, airBaltic received an undue advantage resulting from measure 3, which is selective as the company was the sole beneficiary.
Af de i betragtning 120 ovenfor anførte grunde ville foranstaltning 6 sandsynligvis fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
The Commission must also consider whether measure 3 was likely to distort competition and affect trade between Member States, by providing airBaltic with an advantage over competitors not receiving public support.
På baggrund af ovenstående argumenter kommer Kommissionen til den konklusion, at foranstaltning 6 udgjorde statsstøtte til gavn for airBaltic i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
The conclusions reached in recital 120 above apply mutatis mutandis.
Konklusion vedrørende forekomsten af statsstøtte
The Commission thus concludes that the conversion into capital of the first State loan and the first tranche of the second State loan entailed State aid to airBaltic within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at foranstaltning 1, 4 og 5 af ovenstående grunde ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
The 0 %-coupon bonds (measure 4)
Kommissionen mener dog, at foranstaltning 2, 3 og 6 udgjorde statsstøtte til airBaltic.
As already indicated in the opening decision, it follows from the 30 April 2010 agreement formalising the purchase of the 0 %-coupon bonds that the purchaser LVRTC (see recital 38 above) acted on behalf of the Latvian State.
Med henblik på at afgøre, hvor meget der allerede var udbetalt i støtte til airBaltic, konstaterer Kommissionen, at foranstaltning 3 bestod af 16 mio. LVL (22,65 mio. EUR) og den første rate af det andet statslån af 41,6 mio. LVL (58,89 mio. EUR).
In addition, Latvia has argued that bonds were purchased by the LVRTC for budgetary reasons.
Den anden rate af det andet statslån på 25,4 mio. LVL (35,96 mio. EUR), der blev stillet til rådighed for airBaltic den 14. december 2012 — dvs. den resterende del af foranstaltning 2, som ikke var blevet kapitaliseret — skulle lægges til det beløb sammen med de 5 mio. EUR, der blev tildelt airBaltic som foranstaltning 6.
It is therefore clear that measure 4 entails State resources and that it is imputable to the State, points which furthermore Latvia does not contest.
Det samlede statsstøttebeløb til airBaltic er derfor ca. 86,53 mio. LVL (122,51 mio. EUR).
In the course of the formal investigation procedure Latvia provided evidence demonstrating that both the State and BAS acquired the bonds in proportion to their shareholding in airBaltic and on the same conditions.
STØTTENS LOVLIGHED
In addition, it appears that the State did not provide funding to airBaltic before April 2010, while BAS had actually invested significant amounts in the company before that date.
I henhold til artikel 108, stk. 3, i TEUF må en medlemsstat ikke gennemføre en støtteforanstaltning, før Kommissionen har truffet en afgørelse om godkendelse af denne foranstaltning.
Finally, it emerged from the investigation that the bond issuance agreement was adopted at the initiative of BAS and airBaltic's management, which had already suggested to the State in April and June 2009 a capital increase in the company in proportion to their shareholdings.
Kommissionen konstaterer, at Letland bevilgede foranstaltning 2, 3 og 6 til airBaltic uden at anmelde dem til Kommissionen med henblik på godkendelse.
As highlighted in the opening decision, the Commission is of the opinion that the purchase of 0 %-coupon bonds was not a typical investment by a prudent market operator.
Kommissionen beklager, at Letland ikke overholdt standstill-forpligtelsen og derfor misligholdt sin forpligtelse ifølge artikel 108, stk. 3, i TEUF.
However, the Commission notes that Latvia and BAS were at the time major shareholders of airBaltic and their investment decision should be assessed from this perspective and not from that of a purely external investor.
Hvad angår de lettiske myndigheders intention om at bevilge airBaltic 30 mio. EUR fra syndikeret lån 2 og i forbindelse med foranstaltning 6, minder Kommissionen om de lettiske myndigheders forpligtelse i henhold til artikel 108, stk. 3, i TEUF til at underrette Kommissionen så betids om enhver påtænkt indførelse af støtteforanstaltninger, at den kan fremsætte sine bemærkninger hertil.
Indeed, it appears rational to conclude that the owners of airBaltic were not looking for short-term profit at the time but were interested in keeping the company afloat.
STØTTENS FORENELIGHED
On the basis of the above, the Commission comes to the conclusion that Latvia acted as a prudent market operator when purchasing 0 %-coupon bonds together with the private investor BAS.
Da foranstaltning 2, 3 og 6 udgør statsstøtte i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF, skal deres forenelighed med det indre marked vurderes på baggrund af undtagelserne i denne artikels stk. 2 og 3.
The Commission therefore excludes the presence of an undue advantage in relation to measure 4, and assessment of the other cumulative conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU concerning the presence of state aid is superfluous.
På baggrund af foranstaltningernes art og airBaltics vanskeligheder ser de eneste relevante forenelighedskriterier som anført i indledningsafgørelsen ud til at være dem, der vedrører støtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 3, litra c), i TEUF på grundlag af rammebestemmelserne og især bestemmelserne om omstruktureringsstøtte.
The EUR 2,8 million payments by Latvijas Krājbanka (measure 5)
De lettiske myndigheder var oprindelig af den opfattelse, at ingen af foranstaltningerne udgjorde statsstøtte.
Measure 5 relates to the payment of EUR 2,8 million by Latvijas Krājbanka to airBaltic on 21 and 22 November 2011.
På grundlag af den tvivl, Kommissionen gav udtryk for i sin indledningsafgørelse, har Letland dog argumenteret for støttens forenelighed og hævdet, at foranstaltningerne udgør forenelig omstruktureringsstøtte.
As explained in recital 39 above, airBaltic submitted three payment orders to Latvijas Krājbanka prior to the decisions of the FCMC of 17 November 2011 to limit banking operations above EUR 100,000 and of 21 November 2011 to halt all operations of Latvijas Krājbanka.
I denne første plan, som blev sendt til Kommissionen, afdækkedes nogle af airBaltics svagheder, og det blev fastslået, at der var behov for ca. [175-185] mio. EUR i aktiekapital, så selskabet kunne forny sin flåde og få mulighed for at konkurrere effektiv med lavprisselskaberne.
Latvia considers that no State resources were involved given that the operations concerned three payment orders of airBaltic to IATA Clearing House, Riga International Airport and an alternative bank account of airBaltic in a different bank (see recital 39 above).
Letland anfører, at der blev truffet flere foranstaltninger fra april 2011, bl.a. lukning af airBaltics hovedlufthavn i Vilnius og nedlæggelse af ruter for dermed at starte airBaltics omstruktureringsproces.
These were, according to Latvia, mere common banking operations concerning private funds of airBaltic.
For at genoprette airBaltics rentabilitet blev der på et senere tidspunkt udviklet en omfattende række initiativer, som dækker indtægter, transaktioner, netværk, flåde og overordnet organisation (reShape-planen).
Latvia also argues that the decisions of the FCMC were not imputable to the State.
Den første plan blev udarbejdet i 2011 og omfattede de vigtigste finansielle aspekter af omstruktureringen.
Latvia has explained that the transfer of funds had their origin in payment orders submitted by airBaltic before the FCMC ordered the suspension of the activities of Latvijas Krājbanka on 21 November 2011.
Ifølge Letland førte dette til indgåelse af aftalen og resulterede efterhånden i reShape-planen i marts 2012.
Latvijas Krājbanka executed the transactions on 25 and 30 November 2011.
Letlands argumenter vil blive vurderet i de følgende afsnit.
Moreover, pursuant to the Law on the FCMC of 1 June 2000, the FCMC takes its decisions without having to take account of any requirement or instruction of any other public authority.
Støtteberettigelse
In addition, the funding of the FCMC is not dependent upon the State, as the FCMC's activities are financed through payments by parties active on the Latvian financial and capital markets.
Ifølge punkt 33 i rammebestemmelserne er kun kriseramte virksomheder, jf. punkt 9-13 i rammebestemmelserne, berettigede til at modtage omstruktureringsstøtte.
It also appears from the applicable laws that the State is not involved in the execution of the enforcement powers and rights of the FCMC relating to its supervision of credit institutions.
Kommissionen har allerede konkluderet, at airBaltic var en kriseramt virksomhed, i hvert fald fra 2011 (se betragtning 87 ovenfor).
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Commission is of the view that the trustees appointed by the FCMC acted independently of the State, which would exclude imputability of their actions to Latvia.
Det fastsættes i punkt 12 i rammebestemmelserne, at en nyoprettet virksomhed ikke er berettiget til rednings- eller omstruktureringsstøtte, selv om virksomhedens finansielle stilling fra begyndelsen er vanskelig.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that measure 5 did not entail state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at airBaltic er berettiget til omstruktureringsstøtte.
The EUR 5 million claim from Taurus attributed to airBaltic (measure 6)
Omstruktureringsplanens gyldighed
The follow-up complaint received on 18 July 2012 refers to the obligation of the investors under Article 7.4 of the Agreement to hand over to the State or its nominated company — under certain circumstances — the outstanding claims stemming from syndicated loan 2 in exchange for LVL 1 (see recital 42 above).
Kommissionen bemærker, at omstruktureringen af airBaltic begyndte i april 2011, da selskabets ledelse udarbejdede en første omstruktureringsplan.
In accordance with Article 7.4 of the Agreement, Taurus assigned to Latvia a EUR 5 million claim it had against airBaltic for LVL 1.
Denne plan fokuserede primært på flådeoptimering og behovet for at erstatte selskabets fly med mere effektive fly, hvilket også er en hjørnesten i den senere reShape-plan.
Subsequently, Latvia assigned the claim to airBaltic.
Samtidig blev hovedlufthavnen i Vilnius lukket.
In relation to the remaining claims, amounting to EUR 30 million (EUR 42,47 million), which were supposed to be novated within the framework of syndicated loan 2, the Latvian authorities requested the investors by letter of 9 February 2012 to assign to it their respective claims in exchange for 1 LVL each.
Efter en revision flere uger senere af […] inkluderede airBaltics ledelse en nedskæring af antallet af ansatte med [8-12] % i planen.
Furthermore, Latvia brought an action before the Riga Regional Court in relation to three of the investors in order to enforce Article 7.4 of the Agreement.
Kommissionen bemærker, at omstruktureringsplanen fra april 2011 opridser airBaltics største behov.
Latvia has indicated its intention to also attribute these claims to airBaltic.
Skønt planen ikke var færdigudviklet, udgjorde den et første grundlag for at fastslå airBaltics omstruktureringsbehov og sikre, at selskabet ville blive rentabelt igen.
Latvia argues that the assignment of the EUR 5 million claim to airBaltic was a contingency measure aimed at protecting the State's financial interests and should be seen as a pari passu measure under the Agreement, and thus exclude State aid.
Den udgjorde endvidere grundlaget for reShape-planen, som var under udarbejdelse på det tidspunkt, hvor aftalen blev undertegnet (dvs. den 3. oktober 2011), og blev færdiggjort i marts 2012.
The Commission notes that it follows clearly from Article 7.4 of the Agreement that the relevant claims were to be assigned or handed over ‘to the State or its nominated company for the sum of LVL 1’.
I sin hidtidige praksis har Kommissionen accepteret, at omstruktureringsplaner defineres over tid og har betragtet de oprindelige planer som omstruktureringsperiodens udgangspunkt.
Therefore, since the decision to attribute the EUR 5 million claim to airBaltic was taken by the State, this decision is imputable to it and entails State resources.
I f.eks. Varvaressos-afgørelsen [37] fandt Kommissionen, at de foranstaltninger, denne virksomhed fik bevilget mellem 2006 og 2009, skulle vurderes som led i et kontinuerligt omstruktureringsforløb på grundlag af omstruktureringsplanen fra 2009 (som dækker perioden 2006-2011).
It emerged during the course of the formal investigation procedure that the agreements for the syndicated loans were never signed.
I lighed med airBaltic-sagen var Varvaressos' omstruktureringsplan fra 2009 resultatet af udviklingen af en »strategi- og forretningsplan« fra 2006.
However, it appears from the evidence submitted by Latvia that the courts recognised the validity of the Agreement as regards the obligation of the private investors to assign to the State or its nominated company the claims resulting from syndicated loan 2.
Genoprettelse af rentabiliteten på lang sigt
In this respect, Latvia indicates that, according to several judgments of the Latvian courts, the owner of the EUR 5 million claim is not entitled to request repayment of this amount but only to claim shares in airBaltic reflecting a EUR 5 million advance payment into the share capital of the company.
Ifølge punkt 34 i rammebestemmelserne skal omstruktureringsstøtten tildeles med det vilkår, at der gennemføres en omstruktureringsplan, som skal godkendes af Kommissionen i alle tilfælde af individuelle støtteforanstaltninger.
Since the State already owned 99,8 % of the shares of airBaltic, Latvia argues that the entitlement to additional shares does not represent any meaningful economic value for the State.
I henhold til punkt 35 skal omstruktureringsplanen, der skal strække sig over en så kort periode som muligt, inden for en rimelig tidshorisont og på grundlag af realistiske forventninger om de fremtidige betingelser for driften genoprette virksomhedens langsigtede rentabilitet.
The Commission notes that contrary to what Latvia suggests, while the courts may have recognised the right of the State to take over the claims resulting from syndicated loan 2 in line with Article 7.4 of the Agreement, this does not mean that Latvia was obliged to attribute this claim to airBaltic.
I henhold til punkt 36 skal planen indeholde en beskrivelse af de omstændigheder, der førte til virksomhedens vanskeligheder, og tage hensyn til den nuværende situation og de forventede markedsudsigter med scenarier baseret på optimistiske, pessimistiske og neutrale hypoteser.
The Commission notes that a prudent market economy operator would have not assigned the claim to airBaltic for LVL 1.
Planen skal omfatte foranstaltninger til en vending af udviklingen, så virksomheden efter omstruktureringen vil kunne dække alle omkostninger, herunder afskrivninger og finansieringsomkostninger.
Latvia has not provided evidence as to why the State was better off granting the claim to airBaltic than keeping it or using it for some other purpose.
Den omstrukturerede virksomheds afkast af egenkapitalen skal være tilstrækkeligt til, at den kan klare sig i konkurrencen ved egen hjælp (punkt 37).
As a result of the assignment, Latvia placed the company in a more favourable position than its competitors.
Kommissionen konstaterer, at omstruktureringsplanen beskriver de omstændigheder, der førte til airBaltics vanskeligheder, som hovedsagelig var forårsaget af den verdensomspændende økonomiske krise i 2008-2009, som havde en betydelig indvirkning i Østersøregionen og også påvirkede luftfartssektoren.
Furthermore, the Commission does not agree with the arguments of the Latvian authorities and highlights that any additional share in airBaltic would have an additional value to the State, even if small, such that the presence of aid cannot be excluded.
Endvidere forklares det i omstruktureringsplanen, at den forretningsstrategi, man fulgte tidligere, samt en række beslutninger truffet af airBaltics tidligere ledelse bidrog yderligere til selskabets vanskeligheder.
In addition, by granting the claim to airBaltic, the State gave up not only to the claim but also any right to interest at a rate of [5 — 7] % thereon.
Omkostningerne blev desuden kraftigt øget på grund af flåden, der omfattede fire forskellige flytyper, samt høje udgifter til leasing af fly.
The Commission reiterates the conclusions reached in section 7.2.1 above, that is, when the Agreement was entered into on 3 October 2011, the State did not know whether it would need to make use of Article 7.4 of the Agreement.
Ruter blev åbnet uden en tilstrækkelig vurdering af deres rentabilitet, og mange af dem gav underskud.
In addition, the State was not obliged to assign to airBaltic the claims affected by the application of that provision.