natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Meromkostninger (kontrakter indgået med Ryanair og AMS)
In conclusion, it is clear from the above that the only benefit that a prudent MEO would expect from a marketing services agreement, and that it would take into account and quantify when deciding whether or not to enter into such an agreement, together with an airport services agreement, would be that the marketing services would have a positive effect on the number of passengers using the routes covered by the agreements in question for the operating period of those routes, as set out in the agreements.
De meromkostninger, som en markedsøkonomisk investor, der forvalter lufthavnen i forvalternes sted, på forhånd kunne forvente ved hver transaktion (omfattende i givet fald en kontrakt om lufthavnstjenester og en marketingkontrakt) falder inden for følgende tre kategorier:
Any other benefits would be deemed too uncertain to be taken into account and quantified, and there is nothing to suggest that they were taken into account by the Operators.
omkostningerne ved køb af marketingydelser
Relevance of comparing the terms of the airport services agreements covered by the formal investigation procedure with the airport charges invoiced at other airports
økonomiske incitamenter svarende til, at lufthavnsforvalteren ifølge kontrakten om lufthavnstjenester tilbagebetaler en del af provenuet af lufthavnsafgifterne til Ryanair efter kriterier som trafikniveau
Under the new Guidelines for applying the MEO test, the existence of aid to an airline using a particular airport can, in principle, be excluded where the price charged for the airport services corresponds to the market price or it can be demonstrated through an ex ante analysis, that is to say one based on information available when the aid is granted and on developments foreseeable at that time, that the airport/airline arrangement will lead to a positive incremental profit contribution for the airport and that it forms part of an overall strategy intended to lead the airport to profitability at least in the long term.
de driftsmæssige meromkostninger, nemlig driftsomkostninger (personale, diverse indkøb osv.), som kan påløbe ved gennemførelsen af transaktionen.
However, under the first approach (comparison with a ‘market price’), the Commission seriously doubts that, at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for services provided by airports and considers an ex ante incremental profitability analysis to be the most relevant criterion for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines.
Med hensyn til omkostninger til marketingkontrakter og »økonomiske incitamenter« har Kommissionen taget hensyn til de beløb, der er fastsat i de forskellige marketingkontrakter, og de økonomiske incitamentsordninger, som er fastsat i de forskellige kontrakter om lufthavnstjenester.
The Commission considers it appropriate to reiterate in the context of this analysis that, following the adoption of the new Guidelines, both France and the interested parties were invited to submit comments on the application of those guidelines to the present case.
Som for trafikprognosernes vedkommende er de forventede marketingomkostninger ikke nødvendigvis faktisk betalte beløb, idet visse begivenheder, der lå senere end indgåelsen af kontrakterne, har kunnet medføre en afvigelse fra de oprindeligt forventede beløb.
In the event, neither France nor the interested parties disputed the substance of the Commission’s approach according to which, where an appropriate benchmark cannot be identified to establish a true market price for the services provided by airports to airlines, the most relevant criterion for assessing the arrangements concluded between these two parties is an ex ante incremental profitability analysis.
Det er bl.a. tilfældet, når kontrakten er blevet ophævet før udløbet.
It should be noted that, in general, the application of the MEO test based on an average price observed in other similar markets may prove helpful where a market price can be reasonably identified or deduced from other market indicators.
Men disse begivenheder skal ikke tages i betragtning ved anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, eftersom de ligger senere end indgåelsen af kontrakterne.
However, this method may not be as relevant in the case of airport services.
Der er ikke taget højde for de gradvist stigende investeringsudgifter, da det ikke fremgår af oplysninger i sagen, at en markedsøkonomisk investor skulle forvente at foretage visse investeringer som følge af en eller flere kontrakter af dem, der er omfattet af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
This is because the costs and revenues structure tends to differ significantly from one airport to another.
Med hensyn til de meromkostninger til driften, der kunne forventes ved indgåelsen af de forskellige kontrakter, udgør disse i mangel af en forretningsplan for hver kontrakt den vanskeligste kategori.
These costs and revenues depend on the airport’s state of development, number of airlines operating from/to the airport, available capacity in terms of passenger traffic, state of the infrastructure and related investments, regulatory framework, which may vary from one Member State to another, and historical debts and obligations of the airport.
Navnlig kan man til driftsomkostningerne ikke bruge den samme metode som den, der blev valgt til indtægter fra andet end luftfart, og som for perioden før 2007 bestod i at tage udgangspunkt i lufthavnens samlede kommercielle indtægter fra andet end luftfart og derfra trække indtægterne pr. passager.
Moreover, the liberalisation of the air transport market complicates any purely comparative analysis.
En sådan metode ville nemlig være ensbetydende med at anse lufthavnens samlede driftsomkostninger fordelt på passagertallet for at være ydelsesspecifikke omkostninger.
As the present case amply demonstrates, commercial arrangements between airports and airlines are not necessarily based on a list of public prices for individual services.
Men en stor del af en lufthavns driftsomkostninger er kapacitetsomkostninger, hvilket vil sige, at de samlede driftsomkostninger pr. passager i de fleste tilfælde vil være klart højere end meromkostningerne.
Rather, these commercial relationships vary widely.
For at kunne beregne de ydelsesspecifikke driftsomkostninger skal Kommissionen basere sig på de oplysninger, som forvalteren for lufthavnen har haft til sin analyse, idet den ikke selv er i stand til at vurdere, hvordan en given kontrakt kan influere på lufthavnens forskellige omkostningsposter.
They include sharing risks with regard to passenger traffic and any related commercial and financial liability, standard incentive schemes and changing the spread of risks over the term of the agreements.
Men de eneste forhåndsskøn, Kommissionen kan basere sig på, findes i VTAN's forretningsplan, der danner grundlag for VTAN's undersøgelse, som resulterede i en samlet meromkostning til drift pr. passager på [2-4] EUR.
As a result, it is difficult to compare transactions based on a price per rotation or per passenger.
I mangel af bedre mener Kommissionen, at dette tal er et acceptabelt udgangspunkt for virkningen af ekstra trafik for lufthavnens driftsomkostninger.
Ryanair considers that the MEO test can be applied using certain European airports as a benchmark.
Dette tal er da også fastlagt på grundlag af VTAN's forretningsplan, som af de allerede anførte årsager udgør en kilde til oplysninger, der som udgangspunkt er pålidelige, og VTAN-undersøgelsen.
In this respect, it believes that certain European airports are substitutable for Nîmes airport due to their similarities and has provided a study comparing the airport charges paid by Ryanair at Nîmes airport with the airport charges paid at those airports regarded as comparable.
Som tidligere forklaret indeholder VTAN-undersøgelsen en præcis og plausibel vurdering af, i hvilket omfang lufthavnens forskellige driftsomkostningsposter varierer i forhold til trafikken.
It concludes that the charges paid at Nîmes are not significantly lower.
Kommissionen har derfor brugt denne oplysning i sin vurdering af de kontrakter, der blev indgået med Ryanair og AMS.
However, the method adopted by Ryanair is ineffective in so far as it limits itself to the services and payments resulting from the airport services agreements without taking into account the marketing services agreements.
De kontrakter, som blev indgået af VTAN, blev det mellem 2007 og 2010, dvs. efter udarbejdelsen af VTAN's forretningsplan og i en ret begrænset periode herefter.
As previously indicated, the two types of agreement are indissociable and must be considered together when applying the MEO test.
Anvendelsen af førnævnte skøn over meromkostningen til drift pr. passager er derfor særdeles velegnet til disse kontrakter.
Accordingly, the findings of the comparative analysis provided by Ryanair cannot be accepted.
Det er ligeledes acceptabelt i mangel af bedre for kontrakter indgået af CCI, selv om VTAN's forretningsplan blev udarbejdet efter disse.
Moreover, Ryanair has not shown how the airports mentioned in the study are sufficiently comparable in terms of traffic volume and type of traffic, type and level of airport services, presence of a large city in the vicinity of the airport, number of inhabitants in the catchment area, prosperity in the surrounding area, and existence of other geographical areas likely to attract passengers.
Det er bl.a. tilfældet for kontrakter fra oktober 2005, som blot blev indgået nogle få måneder før udarbejdelsen af VTAN's forretningsplan.
What is more, neither France nor any interested third party has proposed any comparison airports with evidence that they are sufficiently comparable to Nîmes airport in terms of these various criteria.
Kommissionen finder dog også, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ikke ville have vurderet meromkostningerne pr. passager til driften i oktober 2005 og i september 2006 meget anderledes, for det er meget lidt sandsynligt, at en investors omkostningsstruktur ændrer sig væsentligt i løbet af en periode på under et år.
Under these circumstances, the Commission considers that the approach generally recommended in the new Guidelines for applying the MEO test to relationships between airports and airlines, namely the ex ante incremental profitability analysis, must be applied to the present case.
Vedrørende kontrakter indgået mellem 2000 og 2004 ligger de tidsmæssigt længere fra udarbejdelsen af VTAN's forretningsplan.
This approach is justified by the fact that an airport operator may have an objective interest in concluding a transaction with an airline where it may reasonably expect this transaction to improve its profits (or reduce its losses) compared with a counterfactual situation in which this transaction is not concluded, regardless of any comparison with the conditions offered to airlines by other airport operators, or even with the conditions offered by the same airport operator to other airlines.
Da der mangler et bedre alternativ, finder Kommissionen dog, at meromkostningen til drift pr. passager på [2-4] EUR korrigeret for inflation på anslået 2 % om året på grundlag af skøn også er passende til analyse af disse ældre kontrakter.
On this last point, as the Commission noted in the new Guidelines, ‘price differentiation is a standard business practice, as long as it complies with all relevant competition and sectoral legislation.
Det bør bemærkes, at meromkostningen til driften, som Frankrig foreslog for hver kontrakt indgået med CCI ([5-7] EUR pr. passager), beregnet som et gennemsnit af de driftsomkostninger pr. passager, der kunne iagttages i perioden 2000-2006, er klart højere end den meromkostning pr. passager, som Kommissionen har valgt, og som denne finder mere relevant ud fra ovenstående betragtninger.
Nevertheless, such differentiated pricing policies should be commercially justified to satisfy the MEO test’ (footnotes omitted).
For hver kontrakt er den ydelsesspecifikke driftsomkostning pr. passager således blevet ganget med den forventede forøgelse af trafikmængden for at bestemme den samlede ydelsesspecifikke driftsomkostning, der år for år affødes af kontrakten.
It should also be noted that France and the Operators have stated that Nîmes airport was the first regional airport operated by Veolia Transport.
Analyse af de forskellige kontrakter
If this argument were taken into account, it would mean ignoring the incremental profitability approach recommended by the guidelines and accepting that VTAN could have entered into agreements leading to negative incremental profitability, without this conduct implying any economic advantage for Ryanair.
Kommissionen vil i det følgende fremlægge resultaterne af sin analyse af de forskellige kontrakter, som er udarbejdet efter den ovenfor beskrevne metode.
However, that argument must be rejected.
De særlige karakteristika ved hver kontrakt af relevans for denne analyse vil ligeledes blive præsenteret.
Firstly, as previously indicated, neither France nor VTAN have provided any analysis showing that the ‘net incremental cost’ caused for Veolia Transport by the agreements signed with Ryanair/AMS, as indicated further on, would have been offset by future benefits resulting for the Veolia Transport group from this initial airport operation experience.
Kontrakten af 11. april 2000
There is also nothing to say that Veolia Transport could not have acquired this initial experience at another airport where the net cost would have been lower.
Denne kontrakt vedrørte driften af en daglig rute til London med en Boeing 737-200 med 130 pladser.
Moreover, it should be noted that VTAN’s conduct towards Ryanair/AMS must not be assessed in isolation, but in conjunction with the SMAN’s conduct.
Ifølge Frankrig havde Ryanair mundtligt over for CCI forpligtet sig til at have en belægningsgrad på 70 %.
This is all the more relevant as the ‘net incremental cost’ of the agreements signed with Ryanair and AMS should not actually have been borne by VTAN, but by the SMAN through the flat-rate contribution ensuring financial stability and a reasonable profit for VTAN.
Kommissionen finder, at en markedsøkonomisk investor kunne have forventet en lidt højere belægningsgrad og opstillet den rimelige hypotese, at Ryanair kunne forvente en »sikkerhedsmargin« mellem denne mundtlige forpligtelse og den reelt forventede grad.
However, in terms of its profitability, the SMAN did not have any interest in encouraging the signature of agreements allowing the Veolia Transport group to acquire some initial airport operation experience in order to develop its activity in this area.
Kommissionen bemærker, at denne faktor i alt væsentligt svarer til den faktor, der blev konstateret i 2000-2002.
Veolia Transport’s interest in developing this activity cannot therefore lead to the conclusion that the SMAN behaved, in conjunction with VTAN, in the way that an MEO motivated by the prospect of profits would have done.
Kommissionen har i sin analyse indarbejdet den trafikforøgelse, der følger af belægningsgraden på 75 % anvendt på en daglig forbindelse drevet med et fly med 130 pladser, samt de merindtægter og meromkostninger til driften, der er forbundet hermed, efter ovenstående principper.
It should also be noted that, in their comments on the application of the MEO test to the various agreements in question, certain interested third parties referred to the fact that the conditions offered to Ryanair may or may not have been offered to other airlines likely to want to use Nîmes airport.
Tabel 6 i denne betragtning viser resultaterne af denne analyse.
This argument is without merit.
Tabel 6
For an airport operator motivated by the prospect of profits, objective factors can justify different conditions being offered to different airlines.
Status over rekonstruktionen af den forudgående rentabilitetsanalyse af kontrakten af 11. april 2000
These factors may include the expected volume of traffic, the number and type of routes and associated frequencies, or even the nature of the services requested by the airline.
Kontrakt af 2000 (London) — prognoser for trafik, merindtægter og meromkostninger
The extent to which the conditions offered to Ryanair by the CCI and VTAN were or could have been offered to other airlines is therefore irrelevant in the context of the MEO test.
Antal afrejsende og ankommende pasagerer i alt
In the light of all the above, the Commission considers that the approach generally recommended in the new Guidelines for applying the MEO test to relationships between airports and airlines, namely the ex ante incremental profitability analysis, must be applied to the present case.
[0-50000]
This approach is justified by the fact that an airport operator may have an objective interest in concluding a transaction with an airline where it may reasonably expect this transaction to improve its profits (or reduce its losses) compared with a counterfactual situation in which this transaction is not concluded, regardless of any comparison with the conditions offered to other airlines or with the conditions offered by other airport operators.
[50000-100000]
Conclusion on the terms for applying the market economy operator test
Antal rotationer om året
It is clear from all the above that, in order to apply the MEO test to the agreements in question, the Commission must analyse each marketing services agreement together with the corresponding airport services agreement, and must assess whether a hypothetical MEO, motivated by the prospect of profits and operating Nîmes airport, would have signed these agreements.
Landingsafgift
To this end, it is necessary to determine the incremental profitability of the agreements as it would have been assessed by the MEO at the time of their signature, by estimating, for the entire period of application of the agreements:
Passagerafgift
the future incremental traffic expected from the implementation of these agreements, possibly taking into account the effects of the marketing services on the load factors of the routes covered by the agreements,
Groundhandlingindtægter
the future incremental revenues expected from the implementation of these agreements, including revenues from airport charges and ground handling services, generated by the routes covered by these agreements, as well as non-aeronautical revenue from the additional traffic generated by the implementation of these agreements,
Indtægter fra luftfart i alt
the future incremental costs expected from the implementation of these agreements, including operating costs and any incremental investment costs generated by the routes covered by these agreements, as well as the costs of marketing services.
Indtægter fra andet end luftfart
These calculations should provide the future annual flows corresponding to the difference between incremental revenues and costs, to be discounted, if necessary, by a rate reflecting the cost of capital for the airport operator.
Indtægter i alt
A positive net present value indicates in principle that the agreements in question do not confer an economic advantage, whereas a negative net present value reveals the presence of such an advantage.
Driftsomkostninger (personale, diverse indkøb osv.)
It should be noted that, in this assessment, the arguments of Ryanair and the Operators that the price of the marketing services purchased by the Operators is equivalent to or less than what may be regarded as a ‘market price’ for such services are without merit.
Marketingomkostninger
A hypothetical MEO motivated by the prospect of profits would not be prepared to purchase such services, even at a price at or below ‘market price’, if it were predicted that, despite the positive effect of such services on passenger traffic on the air routes concerned, the incremental costs generated by the agreements would exceed the incremental revenues at present value.
Omkostninger i alt
In such a scenario, the ‘market price’ would be higher than the hypothetical MEO was prepared to pay, and the services in question would therefore logically be rejected.
Ydelsesspecifikke pengestrømme (indtægter minus omkostninger)
For the same reasons, the fact that the prices set in the airport services agreement may be equivalent to or higher than the prices invoiced by even slightly comparable airport operators would be irrelevant in this assessment if these prices were not expected to generate sufficient incremental revenues to cover the incremental costs.
[100000-150000]
Application of the market economy operator test
Tabel 6 i forrige betragtning viser, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have forventet positive årlige ydelsesspecifikke pengestrømme hvert år indtil udløbet af kontrakten af 2000 og dermed en positiv stigende rentabilitet.
During the procedure, the Commission invited France to submit incremental cost, revenue and profitability estimates for the various agreements, which may have been produced prior to the signature of these agreements.
I 2000 drev Air France i øvrigt stadig ruter med afgang fra Nîmes lufthavn.
The only information provided by France in response to this invitation appears in a business plan prepared by Veolia Transport in September 2006 (‘the VTAN business plan’), a few months before it became the new airport operator, in order to assess the financial stability of the new public service delegation.
Ifølge Frankrig søgte CCI på det tidspunkt at diversificere lufthavnens erhvervsmæssige virksomhed og indledte i den forbindelse drøftelser med flere lavprisselskaber efter også at have analyseret fragt- og chartervirksomhed.
This business plan was not linked to one or more specific agreements, but detailed the projected costs and revenues for the entire airport operation for the whole term of the new public service delegation (2007-2011).
Kommissionen konkluderer i den forbindelse, at kontrakten af 11. april 2000 kan anses for at være en del af gennemførelsen af CCI's overordnede strategi, som forventes at gøre lufthavnen rentabel i hvert fald på lang sigt.
France has also provided the contents of a study conducted for VTAN by an economic adviser (‘the VTAN study’), which aims to estimate, based on the VTAN business plan, the extent to which the additional traffic generated by a new agreement would influence the various cost and revenue items, except for the costs incurred by the marketing services agreements.
Det følger af ovenstående, at kontrakten af 11. april 2000 ikke har givet Ryanair en økonomisk fordel og derfor ikke udgør statsstøtte til selskabet.
With regard to the airport operator’s revenues, it is clear from the VTAN study that, due to its very nature, the aeronautical revenue, which stems from airport charges and ground handling services, varies according to the additional traffic, just like the commercial non-aeronautical revenue (associated with the activity of shops, restaurants and car parks situated within the airport zone).
Brevvekslingen fra slutningen af 2001 til begyndelsen af 2002
On the other hand, the property-related non-aeronautical revenue (typically, fixed rents received by the Nîmes airport operator from various businesses present at the airport site) is not influenced by traffic variations and should not therefore be taken into account in an incremental analysis.
Kontrakten af 11. april 2000 blev ændret ved brevveksling mellem CCI og Ryanair af 28. november 2001, 11., 18., 21. og 24. december 2001, 2., 5. og 15. februar 2002 (»i det følgende benævnt brevvekslingen fra slutningen af 2001 til begyndelsen af 2002«).
As regards costs, the study indicates that certain items of expenditure, such as office and structural costs, are not influenced by traffic variations, whereas others, such as purchases, are directly linked to traffic.
Ifølge Frankrig svarer denne anden ekstra afgang til 185 mulige ekstra flyvninger i løbet af sommersæsonen 2002, hvilket på grundlag af et fly med 148 passagerer og en belægningsgrad på 75 %, som nogenlunde svarer til de tidligere gennemførte flyvninger, kunne føre til en ekstra trafikmængde på anslået 41070 passagerer.
However, according to the study, a limited part of this expenditure (estimated at 8 % of the total servicing and maintenance expenditure) can be imputed to Ryanair.