natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Landet anfører mere specifikt, at det ikke havde været muligt for Citadele at fremskaffe efterstillede lån fra tredjepartsinvestorer i 2013 som følge af de lettiske myndigheders tilsagn om at frasælge Citadele inden for en kort tidsramme (dvs. inden den 31. december 2014).
In particular, on 1 March 2013, Citadele was informed by the Latvia's Financial and Capital Market Commission (‘FCMC’) that the Group's capital adequacy ratio was required to reach 10 % minimum in absolute terms by the end of 2013, whereas the recommended ratio for addressing existing and potential risks was […].
Usikkerhed med hensyn til den potentielle køber og dennes fremtidige strategi ville have fået efterstillede långivere til at kræve en salgsoption i forbindelse med ethvert efterstillet lån til Citadele (klausul om kontrolændring) [25].
Prior to March 2013, the minimum required capital adequacy ratio had been 8,4 %.
Det ville reelt have betydet, at man ved udstedelsen af sådanne efterstillede lån ville have anset den faktiske løbetid for at være under fem år.
Latvia submits that the Second Measure was adopted in good faith, as the Latvian authorities considered that Measure as being in line with the market economy investor principle, and as it does not result in pecuniary losses of the State.
Derved kunne lånene ikke betegnes som supplerende kapital.
Latvia further declares that at the time of the adoption of the Second Measure, it along with Citadele considered in good faith that the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated loan in question had been provided for under the relevant Commission Decisions and the Restructuring Plan.
De gentager her, at den anden foranstaltning skulle vedtages for at undgå, at Citadele i nær fremtid ikke ville leve op til de nye, strengere kapitalkrav.
Latvia argues that any market investor, being in the position of the majority shareholder of Citadele, would have made its best efforts to maintain, to the extent possible, the value of its investment and would have been inclined to adopt and implement the measures necessary in order to prevent the book value of its shareholding from being diminished as a result of the bank failing to meet its capital requirements.
Letland hævder, at man straks måtte iværksætte forlængelsen af løbetiden for statens efterstillede lån til Citadele og ikke forhandlede en tilsvarende forlængelse af EBRD's efterstillede lån til Citadele.
Had Citadele failed to comply with the more stringent capital adequacy requirements imposed by the FCMC at that time, the bank's stability, viability and marketability would have been jeopardized, ultimately affecting possibility of a sale in good financial conditions.
Letland tilkendegiver, at denne beslutning var baseret på tre punkter:
Latvia also presents a counterfactual scenario, in which the Second Measure had not been granted.
Denne forskel skyldtes, at hovedstolen af denne indskudskapital var lavere, og at dens indvirkning på Citadeles kapitalposition ville have været betydeligt lavere.
Latvia also argues that alternative measures to strengthen the capital adequacy of Citadele (i.e. a capital increase or issuance of new subordinated loans) were not feasible.
Letland anfører videre, at forlængelsen af løbetiden for EBRD's efterstillede lån ville have krævet forhandlinger med EBRD herom.
More specifically, it states that it would have been impossible for Citadele to obtain subordinated loans from third party investors in 2013 given the commitment of the Latvian authorities to divest Citadele within a short timeframe (i.e. by 31 December 2014).
Som følge af reguleringsmæssige forskelle og den generelle juridiske struktur, man skulle have etableret for at forlænge løbetiden for de efterstillede lån, som EBRD var part i, samtidig med at løbetiden for Letlands efterstillede lån blev forlænget, ville det have krævet omfattende juridiske arrangementer.
Uncertainty regarding the potential acquirer and its future strategy would have prompted subordinated loan providers to demand a put option on any subordinated loan granted by them to Citadele (change of control clause) [25].
Letland understreger, at man på tidspunktet for forlængelsen endvidere fandt, at en forlængelse af løbetiden for EBRD's efterstillede lån ville have gjort frasalget af Citadele mere besværligt, da der så ville foreligge flere indbyrdes forbundne kontrakter om efterstillede lån på salgstidspunktet.
It effectively would have meant that the actual maturity of such subordinated loans at issuance would have been considered of less than five years and hence the loans would have not qualified as Tier 2 capital.
Man vurderede, at en sådan mulighed ville komplicere salget af Citadele, da det kunne få følger for de relevante salgsbetingelser og sandsynligvis ville forhøje transaktionsomkostningerne.
In response to an information request from the Commission as to whether Latvia had approached the EBRD regarding a possible extension by it of the maturity of subordinated loans regarding Citadele, the Latvian authorities provided a submission on 23 June 2014.
Letland bemærker desuden, at EBRD's status over for Citadele kunne have betydet, at det ville være endnu vanskeligere for EBRD at tilslutte sig forlængelsen.
In it, they confirm that before they granted the Second Measure they did not approach the EBRD to propose to the latter to extend the maturity of subordinated loans it held.
I sin meddelelse af 23. juni 2014 anfører Letland, at man var overbevist om, at EBRD ville have tilsluttet sig en forlængelse af løbetiden for det omhandlede instrument.
In that context, they reiterate that the Second Measure had to be adopted in order to prevent Citadele's impending breach of the new, more stringent, capital requirements.
Letland anerkender dog også, at EBRD's position adskilte sig fra Letlands, idet sidstnævnte var majoritetsaktionær i Citadele og som sådan havde bestemmende indflydelse på salgsprocessen, hvor Letland kunne forhandle forskellige muligheder med hensyn til betaling af de efterstillede lån med budgiverne.
Latvia argues that it had to proceed with the extension of the maturity term of the subordinated debt it held in Citadele without delay and did not negotiate a comparable extension in relation to the subordinated debt also held by the EBRD.
Letland vurderede derfor, at EBRD's manglende indflydelse på salget af Citadele kunne være et argument mod at forlænge løbetiden for indskudskapitalen eller i det mindste ville have ført til langvarige forhandlinger.
Latvia submits that its decision in that regard was shaped by the following three points.
Vedrørende ikke-anmeldt likviditetsstøtte til Reverta (den tredje foranstaltning)
The necessity of addressing effectively the impending breach of the new capital requirements: Citadele had calculated its needs for qualifying Tier 2 capital and had concluded that, in contrast to the adoption of the Second Measure which would involve a maturity prolongation of 18 months, any potential maturity change to the subordinated debt in which the EBRD was also a party would have required a considerably longer extension.
Letland og Reverta anerkender, at Letlands likviditetsstøtte til Parex banka (og derefter til Reverta) siden december 2010 har oversteget det godkendte likviditetsloft, der er fastsat i betragtning 55 i den endelige afgørelse om Parex.
That difference was due to the fact that the principal of that loan was lower and consequently its impact on the capital position of Citadele would have been significantly lower.
I indledningsafgørelsen anføres det, at den udestående likviditetsstøtte til Reverta pr. 31. december 2013 beløb sig til 362,52 mio. LVL, hvilket var 55,52 mio. LVL mere end det likviditetsloft på 307 mio. LVL, der var fastsat for det værst tænkelige scenarie.
Latvia also states that an extension of the subordinated debt held by the EBRD would have presupposed negotiating with the EBRD in that respect.
Letland hævder, at Kommissionen i sin endelige afgørelse om Parex godkendte konverteringen af 218,7 mio. LVL til kapital til brug for likviditetsstøtte til Parex banka.
Furthermore, in view of differences as to the governing law and of the overall requisite legal structure that would have to be put in place extending the subordinated loan to which the EBRD was also a party while at the same time extending a part of the subordinated debt held by Latvia alone would have required convoluted legal arrangements.
Beløbet til konvertering blev senere reduceret til 118,7 mio. LVL i den ændrede afgørelse.
Latvia underlines that at the time of the extension, it also considered that a maturity extension of the subordinated debt held by the EBRD would render the divestment of Citadele more burdensome, as more interrelated contracts on the subordinated debt would exist at the time of the sale.
Hvis likviditetsstøtten på 118,7 mio. LVL på daværende tidspunkt var blevet konverteret til kapital, ville likviditetsstøtten have været mindre og ville have været inden for de godkendte grænser.
It considered that such a possibility would complicate the sale of Citadele as it could have repercussions on the relevant closing conditions and could probably increase the relevant transactional costs.
Kun 49,5 mio. LVL ud af likviditetsstøtten på 118,7 mio. LVL blev rent faktisk konverteret til kapital.
Furthermore, Latvia notes that the EBRD's status vis-à-vis Citadele could have made it a more complex decision for the EBRD to consent to the extension.
Dette er i henhold til Letland hovedårsagen til det høje likviditetsniveau.
It states in its submission of 23 June 2014 that it firmly believed that, in principle, the EBRD would have been inclined to agree to the maturity prolongation of the relevant instrument.
Letland hævder endvidere, at den for høje støtte også skyldtes forsinkelser i tilvejebringelsen af likvide midler i forhold til det forventede på tidspunktet for den endelige afgørelse om Parex.
However, it also acknowledges that the EBRD's position differed from Latvia's in that the latter was the majority shareholder of Citadele and in that capacity it could exercise decisive influence over the sale process and could negotiate various options with respect to the payment of the subordinated loans with the bidders.
Dårlige betalere har betalt for sent, og det har medført mere end to års forsinkelse for inddrivelsen af likvide midler.
Therefore, Latvia recognized that the EBRD's lack of control over the sale of Citadele could have constituted a disincentive for extending the maturity term of the respective loan or in any event lead to lengthy negotiations.
Letland vurderer, at fænomenet er midlertidigt, og forventer, at den for høje likviditetsstøtte ophører i 2015-2016.
Regarding the un-notified liquidity support granted to Reverta (the Third Measure)
Letland og Reverta erkender dog afvigelsen fra de godkendte støttebeløb, der følger af de vanskeligheder, de oplevede i forbindelse med fordelingen af statsstøtten mellem godkendt likviditetsstøtte og kapitalbidrag efter vedtagelsen af afgørelsen om ændringer.
Latvia and Reverta recognize that since December 2010 the liquidity support granted by Latvia to Parex banka (and then to Reverta) has exceeded the authorized liquidity cap set forth in recital 55 of the Final Parex Decision.
De lettiske myndigheder forklarer videre, at hvis Parex banka (nu Reverta) havde beholdt sin banklicens, skulle Letland have foretaget endnu større kapitalindskud i Parex banka end oprindeligt forventet (den krævede minimumskapital i henhold til solvensreglerne oversteg det maksimale støttebeløb på 218,7 mio. LVL, som var godkendt i medfør af den endelige afgørelse om Parex).
The Opening Decision indicated that the outstanding liquidity support to Reverta as of 31 December 2013 was LVL 362,52 million, which exceeded by LVL 55,52 million the LVL 307 million liquidity cap set forth for the ‘worst case’ scenario.
På grundlag af den oprindelige omstruktureringsplan, som var indgivet til Kommissionen, ville den økonomiske værdi, der blev realiseret ved salget af aktiver og konverteringen, på 218,7 mio. LVL have været utilstrækkelig til, at Parex banka (Reverta) kunne efterleve de lovbestemte kapitalkrav.
Latvia contends that the Commission had originally authorized in the Final Parex Decision the conversion into capital of LVL 218,7 million liquidity support to Parex banka.
Hvis Parex banka (Reverta) havde beholdt sin licens, ville banken således have haft brug for yderligere kapital.
That amount to be converted was later reduced in the Amended Decision to LVL 118,7 million.
Efter tilbagetrækningen af banklicensen var den yderligere støtte begrænset til det beløb, der var nødvendigt for at gennemføre afviklingen.
Had LVL 118,7 million of liquidity support been converted into capital, then the liquidity support would have been reduced and would have complied with the authorized limits.
Ifølge Letland var det ikke nødvendigt at konvertere yderligere likviditetsstøtte til kapital efter den 31. december 2011, fordi Revertas banklicens var blevet trukket tilbage.
However, only LVL 49,5 million out of LVL 118,7 million of liquidity support were actually converted into capital.
Letland havde anmeldt sin plan om ikke at konvertere likviditetsstøtte til kapital til Kommissionen efter den 31. december 2011 i forbindelse med udveksling af oplysninger inden vedtagelsen af afgørelsen om ændringer, selv om Letland ikke bekræftede sin hensigt om rent faktisk at gøre det og ikke udtrykkeligt beskrev og meddelte de tekniske følger af den manglende konvertering til Kommissionen.
That factor is brought forward by Latvia as the main cause for the excessive level of liquidity.
Letland nævnte f.eks. ikke, at de midler, der allerede var blevet indrømmet i likviditetsstøtte, ikke ville falde så hurtigt, som de skulle i henhold til den endelige afgørelse om Parex, som følge af den manglende konvertering til kapital.
In addition, Latvia contends that the excess support was also caused by delays in cash generation compared to rates of cash generation envisaged at the time of the Parex Final Decision.
Eftersom kun likviditetsstøtte på 49,5 mio. LVL rent faktisk var blevet konverteret til kapital pr. 31. december 2011, og likviditetsstøtte på 69,2 mio. LVL ikke var blevet konverteret til kapital, var likviditetsstøtten stadig omkring det dobbelte af den godkendte støtte.
Bad debtors have delayed payments and hence cash recovery has been delayed by about two years.
Ifølge Letland var den mindst belastende foranstaltning for de lettiske myndigheder at bevare likviditetsstøtten og undgå at konvertere den til kapital, hvilket faktisk reducerer statsstøtten til det nødvendige minimum.
Latvia considers that phenomenon to be temporary and expects the excessive liquidity support to cease in the years 2015-16.
Letland og Reverta bekræfter, at Reverta ikke længere har brug for »frisk kapital«.
Nevertheless, Latvia and Reverta recognize the deviation from the authorized aid amounts resulting from the difficulties they encountered in appropriately allocating the State support between the authorized liquidity support and capital contributions following the adoption of the Amendment Decision.
I medfør af den lavere konvertering af likviditetsstøtte til kapital forventer Letland, at Reverta vil have [300-350] mio. LVL i likviditetsstøtte ved udgangen af 2014, [250-300] mio. LVL ved udgangen af 2015 og [200-250] mio. LVL ved udgangen af 2016 og 2017 (efter likvidation af Reverta).
Further the Latvian authorities explain that had the banking license of Parex banka (now Reverta) been maintained, Latvia would have had to inject more capital into Parex banka than was originally envisaged (indeed the minimum level of capital required under the solvency rules was more than the maximum capital support of LVL 218,7 million authorized by the Final Parex Decision).
Denne likviditetsstøtte vil derfor i henhold til Letland overstige det loft, der oprindeligt var godkendt, fordi i) mindre likviditetsstøtte er blevet konverteret til kapital, og ii) afviklingen af Reverta forventes at give et lavere kontant overskud end oprindeligt planlagt.
On the basis of the original restructuring plan submitted to the Commission, the economic value realized from asset disposals and the conversion of LVL 218,7 million would have been insufficient for Parex banka (Reverta) to comply with the regulatory capital adequacy requirements.
Ifølge de nye likviditetsprognoser, der afspejler vanskelighederne med at inddrive aktiver, forventer Letland, at Reverta vil have en negativ kapitalposition på [250-300] mio. LVL efter likvidationen (31. december 2017).
Therefore, had the licence been maintained, Parex banka (Reverta) would have needed additional capital.
Vedrørende den manglende efterlevelse af tilsagnet om at frasælge formueforvaltningsaktiviteten (den fjerde foranstaltning)
Following the withdrawal of the banking license, the level of additional aid was limited to the amount necessary for the winding down process.
Letland indledte salget af Citadele i 2011 med henblik på at overholde statens tilsagn, som var anført i den endelige afgørelse om Parex.
According to Latvia, it was no longer necessary to convert further liquidity support into capital after 31 December 2011 because the banking licence of Reverta had been withdrawn.
Det første salgsforsøg blev gennemført med Nomura International som rådgiver, men som følge af betydelig uro i euroområdet forårsaget af den økonomiske og finansielle krise i Grækenland og sammenbruddet af Snoras og Krajbanka i Litauen og Letland var dette forsøg ikke vellykket.
Latvia had communicated its plan not to convert liquidity support into capital to the Commission after 31 December 2011 during exchanges preceding the adoption of the Amendment Decision, though it did not confirm its intention to actually do so and did not expressly identify and share with the Commission the technical consequences of the non-conversion.
I februar 2013 bestilte Letland en specifik undersøgelse hos en uafhængig ekspert […] vedrørende bl.a. virkningen af salget af formueforvaltningsaktiviteten på den dato, der er anført i tilsagnene.
In particular, Latvia did not mention that as a result of their ‘non-conversion’ into capital the funds that had already been granted as liquidity support would not fall as fast as they were required to do by the Final Parex Decision.
Eksperten påviste, at værdien af de to enkelte enheder (formueforvaltningsaktiviteten og den resterende del af Citadele) var mindre end værdien af Citadele som helhed.
Since only LVL 49,5 million of liquidity support had been actually converted into capital by 31 December 2011 and LVL 69,2 million of liquidity support was not converted into capital, the level of liquidity support remained higher than approved by approximately the same amount.
Som følge deraf ville Citadeles bogførte værdi blive lavere, hvis formueforvaltningsaktiviteten blev solgt, og værdien ville således blive forringet for aktionærerne.
According to Latvia, keeping the liquidity support and avoiding converting it into capital was therefore the least onerous measure for the Latvian authorities and in fact reduces the State aid to the minimum necessary.
Via forskellige prognoser godtgjorde eksperten, at bankens »driftsresultat ville styrtdykke […]«, og at dens […] ville være blevet endnu lavere uden formueforvaltningsaktiviteten.
Latvia and Reverta confirm than Reverta no longer needs ‘fresh money’.
På grundlag af ekspertundersøgelsen anfører Letland, at Citadeles levedygtighed i 2013 og dermed bankens salgbarhed ville være blevet forringet, hvis formueforvaltningsaktiviteten blev frasolgt separat i forhold til resten af banken.
Given the lower amount of liquidity support converted into capital, Latvia expects that Reverta will retain LVL [300-350] million in liquidity support at the end of 2014, LVL [250-300] million at the end of 2015, and LVL [200-250] million at the end of 2016 and 2017 (upon liquidation of Reverta).
Det ville i væsentlig grad have reduceret bankens evne til at tiltrække private investorer til Citadele til en rimelig pris.
According to Latvia that liquidity support will therefore exceed the originally authorized cap, because: (i) less liquidity support has been converted into capital; and (ii) the running off of Reverta is expected to yield fewer cash proceeds than initially planned.
En anden salgsproces for hele Citadele blev derfor indledt i 2013 med assistance fra Société Générale og Linklaters LLP som eksterne rådgivere.
Following the new cash projection reflecting the difficulties in the assets recovery Latvia expects Reverta to have a negative capital position of LVL [250-300] million at the end of the liquidation process (31 December 2017).
De to salgsmetoder, der i øjeblikket er under overvejelse, er en fusion og overtagelse eller en introduktion på børsen.
On the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business (the Fourth measure)
Kompensationsforanstaltninger foreslået af Letland
Latvia started the sale process of Citadele in 2011, to respect the commitments it had undertaken which were recorded in the Final Parex Decision.
For at sikre, at de yderligere støtteforanstaltninger, som Letland har ydet til Parex banka, Citadele og Reverta gennem den første, anden og tredje foranstaltning, og det manglende frasalg af Citadeles formueforvaltningsaktivitet inden den fastsatte tidsfrist (den fjerde foranstaltning), er forenelige med EU's statsstøtteregler, har Letland foreslået en række tilsagn, der er anført i betragtning 64-73.
The first sale attempt was undertaken with Nomura International as advisor but due to significant turmoil in the Eurozone caused by the economic and financial crisis in Greece, as well as collapse of Snoras and Krajbanka in Lithuania and Latvia, that attempt was not successful.
Tidsfrist for salg af Citadele og frasalg af formueforvaltningsaktiviteten
In addition, in February 2013 Latvia ordered a specific study by an independent expert […] on, inter alia, the impact of the sale of the Wealth Management Business at the date specified in the commitments.
Letland og Citadele forpligter sig til at yde deres bedste for så hurtigt som muligt og under alle omstændigheder før den […] at indhente bindende bud på salget af Republikken Letlands samlede andel i Citadele (herunder formueforvaltningsaktiviteten).
The expert demonstrated that the value of the two single entities (Wealth Management Business and the remaining part of Citadele) was worth less than the value of Citadele as a whole.
Salget skal være afsluttet senest den […].
As a consequence, depriving Citadele of its Wealth Management Business would diminish the book value of the bank and would thus impair shareholders' value.
Det overlades til Republikken Letland (og dens rådgiver) at fastlægge strukturen og metoderne for gennemførelsen af salgstransaktionen (f.eks. et handelssalg eller en børsintroduktion), såfremt Letland i sidste ende frasælger hele sin andel i Citadele senest den […].
Through different projections the expert demonstrated that without the Wealth Management Business the bank's ‘operating profit would tumble, […]’ and that its […] would have deteriorated.
Ved en børsintroduktion forpligter Letland sig til at fastlægge et bindende prospekt i samarbejde med FCMC inden den […].
According to Latvia, on the basis of the expert's study, the divestment of the Wealth Management Business separately from the rest of Citadele within 2013 would have impaired the viability of Citadele, and consequently, its marketability.
I dette tilfælde vil Letland træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre, at frasalgsadministratoren er udpeget og kan påbegynde sit arbejde med virkning fra den […].
It would have significantly reduced the bank's ability to attract private players to invest in Citadele at a reasonable price.
Det bekræftes, at den finansielle rådgiver i forbindelse med salget af Citadele også kan udpeges som frasalgsadministrator med virkning fra den […].
Therefore, a second sales process for the whole Citadele commenced in 2013 with the assistance of Société Générale and Linklaters LLP as external advisors.