natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Eftersom de omstridte foranstaltninger blev indført i perioden umiddelbart efter vedtagelsen af direktiv 96/67/EF, som skulle liberalisere sektoren, og gennemførelsen heraf i national ret, påpegede SEA imidlertid, at koncernen siden 1996 havde tilladt en ekstern leverandør af ground handling-ydelser (ATA Handling) at operere i sine lufthavne.
SEA submitted that the Commission could not neglect to consider the regulatory context in which the compensation of losses took place.
SEA påpegede også, at Italien havde valgt fuld liberalisering på ground handling-markedet på den ene betingelse, at tilsynsmyndigheden ENAC var berettiget til at indføre midlertidige begrænsninger på antallet af serviceydere, forudsat at de var korrekt begrundet.
The regulatory framework generated the competitive pressure under which SEA operated and the obligations by which it was bound, and had an impact on its industrial decisions and on the results obtained as a result of such decisions.
ENAC havde godkendt 246 leverandører, hvoraf de 84 var godkendt til at drive forretning i Linate og Malpensa, og SEA mente, at ENAC derved havde overfyldt ground handling-markedet i visse italienske lufthavne.
However, since the contested measures were implemented in the period immediately after the adoption of Directive 96/67/EC, which sought to liberalise the sector, and its transposal at domestic level, SEA pointed out that from 1996 it had allowed an outside provider of ground handling services (ATA Handling) in its airports.
Italiens valg gjorde det muligt for utallige operatører at komme ind på markedet, mens markedstendensen gik i retning af færre leverandører af ground handling-ydelser i hver lufthavn.
It also pointed out that Italy had opted for a complete liberalisation of the ground handling services market, the only proviso being that the supervisory authority ENAC was entitled to impose temporary restrictions on the number of service providers provided it had proper grounds.
Dette blev bekræftet af ENAC's nyligt vedtagne regler, hvormed der indførtes strengere krav end de tidligere anvendte til certificering af leverandørerne af disse ydelser for at sikre en mere omhyggelig udvælgelse af de operatører, som så måtte forventes at garantere et højere service- og sikkerhedsniveau.
ENAC had certified 246 providers, 84 of which were authorised to operate at Linate and Malpensa, and SEA considered that ENAC had thereby congested the ground handling services market at certain Italian airports.
SEA fremhævede, at de valg, der blev truffet i andre europæiske lande, gik i den modsatte retning for at undgå uforholdsmæssig stor konkurrence og dermed en ubalance i de økonomiske vilkår for leverandørerne som følge af presset på deres priser.
The option chosen by Italy favoured the entry of numerous operators, but the market trend was towards a reduction in the number of ground handling service providers operating at each airport.
I en konkurrencesituation i udvikling mente SEA, at beslutningen om at splitte selskabet op blev truffet i lyset af koncernens strategiske forretningsmodel, som på det tidspunkt byggede på brugen af Malpensa lufthavn som en hub med behov for kontrol, overvågning og styring af ground handling-ydelser (efter en model som i Frankfurt og Wien).
This was confirmed by the rules recently approved by ENAC, which introduced requirements stricter than those previously applying to the certification of providers of such services, in order to ensure more careful selection of operators, who would then be expected to guarantee services with higher levels of quality and security.
SEA insisterede på, at der ved analysen af den økonomiske logik i dens beslutninger skulle tages hensyn til ground handling-markedets karakter.
SEA argued that the choices made in other European countries went in the opposite direction, in order to avoid excessive competitive pressure and thus an imbalance in the economic conditions of providers due to pressure exerted on their prices.
For det første havde ground handling-forretningen en meget lille indtjeningsmargin, hvilket blev forstærket af liberaliseringen af markedet, idet rentabiliteten på levering af ydelserne var ringe, måske oven i købet tabsgivende.
In a developing competitive context, SEA stated that the decision to split the company was taken in the light of its strategic commercial model, which at that time was based on the use of Malpensa airport as a hub, with a need for control, monitoring and management of ground handling services (following a model similar to those at Frankfurt and Vienna airports).
De operatører, der lettest kunne generere en indtjening, om end beskeden, var sædvanligvis dem, der havde et netværk, sommetider internationalt, hvorved de var i stand til at fordele forretningsrisikoen på forskellige driftssteder.
SEA insisted that in analysing the economic logic of its decisions, consideration had to be given to the nature of the ground handling services market.
F.eks. gav tilstedeværelsen i flere lufthavne operatøren mulighed for at udligne omkostninger i lande med strengere lovklima eller kontraktlige krav vedrørende personaleforvaltning med lavere omkostninger i lande, hvor reglerne var mere fleksible.
First, the ground handling business had a very low profit margin, a factor amplified by the liberalisation of the market: profitability was poor when the service was not actually provided at a loss.
De operatører, som det lykkedes at opnå en samlet positiv margin, var dem, som havde et internationalt netværk og opnåede væsentlige synergieffekter gennem globale eksklusive aftaler, en samlet centraliseret forvaltning, stordriftsfordele i deres investeringsportefølje, markedsandele, som var små, men ofte forbundet med et enkelt luftfartsselskab eller bestemte arbejdstider, og stordriftsfordele opnået ved at betjene et bestemt luftfartsselskab i flere forskellige lufthavne.
The operators that found it easiest to make a profit, if only a modest one, were usually those that had a network, oftentimes international, through which they were able to distribute business risk across various sites of operation.
Markedet var sammensat set ud fra et forsyningsperspektiv, idet ground handling-ydelserne kunne leveres af enheder af forskellig type, kapacitet, ansvar og aktivitetsområde, således koncessionshavere med separate regnskaber, koncessionshavere med separate forretningsstrukturer, eksterne tjenesteydere (som igen kunne være opdelt i nationale eller internationale netværk og SMV'er) og luftfartsselskaber, som leverede deres egne ground handling-ydelser.
For example, a presence at multiple airports enabled the operator to offset costs incurred in countries that had stricter regulatory or contractual requirements concerning workforce management against lower costs incurred in countries where the rules were more flexible.
Kommissionen måtte derfor ikke undlade at tage hensyn til, hvordan ground handling-markedet fungerede og udviklede sig generelt, og at sammenligne SEA Handlings fremgang med sammenlignelige operatørers udvikling.
The operators that managed to obtain positive margins overall were those that had an international network and achieved substantial synergies through exclusive global contracts, a single, centralised administration, economies of scale in their investments, market shares that were small but often linked to one reference carrier or specific working hours, and economies of scale achieved by serving a particular carrier in multiple airports.
I henseende til den generelle udvikling på markedet mente SEA, fordi indtjeningsmarginerne var meget små, at en rentabilitetsstigning ikke kunne ske mirakuløst eller pludseligt, og at en forlængelse af den oprindelige tidshorisont ville være alt andet end overraskende set på baggrund af en situation med et alvorligt produktivitetsunderskud i forretningsdivisionen og en bred ubalance i omkostningsstrukturen i en særlig vanskelig markedssituation og et generelt vanskeligt økonomisk klima.
The market was heterogeneous from a supply perspective as ground handling services could be provided by entities of different types, capacities, responsibilities and areas of activity: airport managers with separate accounts, airport managers with separate business structures, outside service providers (which in turn could be divided into domestic or international networks and SMEs), or airlines which provided their own ground handling services.
SEA bestred derfor argumentet om, at SEA burde have ændret sin strategi og løsrevet sig fra sin ground handling-division, fordi det var umuligt for SEA at absorbere SEA Handlings tab inden for den forventede treårige periode.
The Commission consequently must not fail to consider the functioning and general development of the ground handling market and to compare the progression of SEA Handling with that of comparable operators.
SEA understreger, at den ikke kunne sætte sine beslutninger til fornyet diskussion hvert år, idet ground handling som alle andre lufthavnsrelaterede økonomiske sektorer var flerårige forløb, og gyldigheden af en given beslutning kun kunne evalueres ordentligt over et længere forløb.
From the point of view of the general development of the market, given that profit margins were very low, SEA considered that coming from a situation of severe deficit in terms of productivity of the business division, and a wide imbalance in terms of its cost structure, with a particularly difficult market situation and general economic climate, a gain in profitability could not be miraculous or sudden, and an extension of the timeframe initially established would be anything but surprising.
Med hensyn til sammenligningen mellem SEA Handlings økonomiske resultater og andre operatørers foreslog SEA, at en reelt sammenlignelig operatør skulle være en koncessionshaver, der leverer ground handling-ydelser gennem et separat selskab, og den eneste, der fandtes, var […].
SEA therefore contested the argument that given the impossibility of absorbing SEA Handling’s losses within the forecast three-year period, SEA should have revised its strategy and detached itself from its ground handling division.
I perioden 2004-2006 havde […] rapporteret om tab på sin ground handling-forretning, og de negative resultater var fortsat i de efterfølgende år og syntes at ville vedblive at præge den nærmeste fremtid.
SEA stresses that it could not reopen discussion of its decisions every year: ground handling, like all airport-related economic sectors, reckoned in periods of years, and the validity of decisions could be properly evaluated only over the long term.
Med sin forretningsmæssige stilling som hub skulle SEA sikre sig en operatør, som var i stand til at levere alle nødvendige ground handling-ydelser af høj kvalitet.
Regarding the comparison of the economic performance of SEA Handling with those of other operators, SEA suggested that a truly comparable operator had to be an airport manager providing ground handling services through a separate company, and the only such operator was […].
Kun SEA Handling kunne opfylde disse krav, eftersom ingen af de andre på markedet havde de materielle, økonomiske eller frem for alt personalemæssige ressourcer til at garantere levering af alle de tjenesteydelser, som denne model krævede.
In the period 2004-2006, […] had reported losses in its ground handling business, and the negative results had continued in subsequent years and seemed destined to continue in the near future.
Ud over sine egne interesser havde SEA en lovfæstet forpligtelse, i og med at de nationale regler gjorde koncessionshaveren ansvarlig for manglende levering af ground handling-ydelser.
Given its commercial model as a hub, SEA had to have an operator which was capable of providing all the necessary ground handling services at high quality standards.
Desuden lagde den fulde liberalisering af markedet i Italien tungere byrder på koncessionshaveren, end denne ville have skullet bære i et kun delvist liberaliseret marked.
Only SEA Handling was able to meet those requirements, since none of the others on the market had the material resources, economic resources and above all staff resources needed to guarantee provision of all the services called for under this model.
Koncessionshaveren havde en forpligtelse og et ansvar over for tilsynsmyndigheden for at opretholde særlige indsatsgrupper, der kunne sikre fortsat service i nødsituationer eller i tilfælde af uforudsete hændelser.
Leaving aside its own interests, SEA had a legal obligation, in that the national regulations held the airport manager responsible in the event of any failure in the provision of ground handling services.
Koncessionshaveren havde ingen mulighed for at pålægge nye operatører pligt til ubrudt levering af ydelser, mens disse pligter kunne forventes at optræde i udbudsspecifikationer i forbindelse med en udvælgelsesprocedure som led i en delvis liberalisering.
Moreover, the complete liberalisation of the market in Italy imposed heavier burdens on the airport manager than it would have had to bear in a market that was only partially open.
Den økonomiske fornuft i SEA's adfærd
The airport manager had an obligation and a responsibility towards the supervisory authority to maintain special task forces capable of ensuring continued service in case of emergencies or unforeseen events.
SEA hævder, at udskillelsen og den efterfølgende overflytning af ground handling-aktiviteten til et datterselskab, SEA Handling, blev gennemført i overensstemmelse med EU-retten og med henblik på at gå med i liberaliseringen på de bedst mulige vilkår for at få det mest mulige ud af de langsigtede udviklingsmuligheder derved.
It had no way of imposing continued service obligations on new operators, whereas such obligations could be envisaged in tender specifications used in a selection procedure as part of a partial liberalisation.
Udskillelsen skulle sætte SEA i stand til bedre at gennemføre de politikker, der var nødvendige for at forbedre effektiviteten og produktiviteten i begge selskaber og samtidig gribe enhver chance for at indgå alliancer med eksterne partnere.
The economic rationality of SEA’s conduct
SEA anfører, at udskillelsen af ground handling-aktiviteterne førte til en stigning i koncernens omkostninger som følge af dens pligt til at forvalte nødsituationer og uforudsete hændelser.
SEA argues that the separation and subsequent transfer of ground handling activity to a subsidiary, SEA Handing, were conducted in compliance with European Union law and with a view to engaging with liberalisation on the best possible terms, making the most of the long-term development openings it offered.
Til illustration heraf beløb besparelserne, som SEA opnåede ved stordriftsfordele gennem sin evne til at udnytte marginalomkostningen til SEA Handling-ansatte til ubrudt levering af tjenesteydelser, sig til 10,7 mio. EUR i 2003 og 8,7 mio. EUR i 2010.
The separation was intended to enable SEA to better implement the policies needed to improve the efficiency and productivity of both companies, while at the same time seizing any opportunities to secure alliances with external partners.
SEA hævdede, at SEA Handling fra begyndelsen havde en meget tung omkostningsstruktur med ekstraordinære byrder og den specifikke opgave gradvis at bringe ground handling-ydelserne op på først et bæredygtigt niveau og siden sikre deres rentabilitet.
SEA states that the spin-off of ground handling activities led to an increase in its costs, due to the obligation on it with regard to the management of emergencies and unforeseen events.
Fra begyndelsen havde SEA derfor gennemført et intensivt omstrukturerings- og genopretningsprogram med det formål om muligt at identificere en strategisk partner, som kunne bidrage til at forfølge disse mål.
By way of illustration, the savings it obtained from economies of scale deriving from its ability use the marginal cost of SEA Handling personnel for continued service, rather than incurring the cost of setting up and maintaining a specialised group, amounted to EUR 10,7 million in 2003 and EUR 8,7 million in 2010.
I maj 2001 igangsatte SEA en udbudsprocedure med henblik på at vælge en eller flere operatører, som gerne ville købe en minoritetsandel af aktierne i SEA Handling, og der indkom et stort antal bud fra førende operatører i branchen.
SEA contended that from the outset SEA Handling had a very heavy cost structure, with extraordinary burdens and the specific task of gradually bringing ground handling services first to sustainability and then to profitability.
Efter en analyse af oplysninger og bud fra de interesserede selskaber indledte SEA samme år forhandlinger med […], som havde indgivet det mest fordelagtige partnerskabsbud.
From the beginning, therefore, SEA had implemented an intense restructuring and recovery programme with the aim, if possible, of identifying a strategic partner that could contribute to the pursuit of those objectives.
Selv om man nåede langt med forhandlingerne, og en plan blev udarbejdet for relancering af SEA Handling, besluttede SEA's bestyrelsesmedlemmer på bestyrelsesmødet den 10. september 2002, at man ikke ville acceptere buddet, da man fandt det […].
In May 2001 SEA launched a competitive bidding procedure with a view to selecting one or more operators looking to purchase a minority share in SEA Handling — a procedure in which a large number of leading operators in the industry participated.
SEA anerkendte, at de forliste forhandlinger kompromitterede sandsynligheden for at bringe SEA Handling tilbage til rentabilitet inden for den først foreslåede frist, fordi man til opnåelsen af dette mål anså udvælgelsen af en strategisk minoritetspartner som et vigtigt middel.
Following an analysis of the credentials and bids of interested companies, in the same year, SEA entered into negotiations with […], which had submitted the most advantageous partnership proposal.
I april 2008 igangsatte SEA en ny procedure for delvist salg af SEA Handling, som endnu ikke er afsluttet trods indledende interesse fra en førende international operatør.
Although the negotiations reached an advanced stage, and a plan was drawn up to re-launch SEA Handling, the SEA board of directors, at its meeting on 10 September 2002, decided not to accept the operator’s bid, considering it […].
SEA understregede, at SEA Handlings genopretningsprogram primært byggede på den forretningsmodel som hub, som koncernen havde valgt, og havde en mellemlang til lang tidshorisont, som ville gøre det muligt at opnå et tilstrækkeligt økonomisk afkast på de finansielle forpligtelser, der var nødvendige at indgå for at drive den type virksomhed.
SEA acknowledged that the failure of those negotiations compromised the viability of its target to return SEA Handling to profitability within the term initially proposed, a target for which the identification of a strategic minority partner was considered an important tool.
SEA påpegede, at det i direktiv 96/67/EF hedder, at når antallet af leverandører af ground handling-ydelser var begrænset, skulle leverandørerne udvælges gennem en passende procedure for syv år, idet det implicit anerkendtes, at en kortere periode ikke ville være tilstrækkelig til den organisatoriske ændring, der skulle til, og den deraf følgende økonomiske genopretning.
In April 2008 SEA launched a new procedure for the partial sale of SEA Handling, which has yet to reach a conclusion, despite initial interest from a leading international operator.
Nærmere bestemt bestod programmet af foranstaltninger til forbedring af arbejdsproduktiviteten og en gradvis nedskæring af personaleomkostningerne.
SEA emphasised that the SEA Handling recovery program was based primarily on the hub airport commercial model chosen by the group, and had a medium/long term timeframe that would allow an adequate economic return on the financial commitments required to undertake such activity.
Disse målsætninger skulle opfyldes ved at træffe både kvalitative foranstaltninger i form af måden at udføre ground handling-aktiviteter på og kvantitative foranstaltninger i form af personalenedskæringer.
SEA pointed out that Directive 96/67/EC stated that where the number of ground handling service providers was limited providers were to be selected, by an appropriate procedure, for seven years, implicitly acknowledging that shorter periods of time would be insufficient to achieve adequate organisational scheduling and the consequent economic return.
I første omgang hang omstruktureringsplanen sammen med SEA-koncernens konsoliderede forretningsplan for 2002-2006, som indeholdt koncernens strategi og målsætninger og de foranstaltninger, der skulle vedtages for at bringe ground handling-ydelserne op på et rentabelt niveau.
Specifically, the program consisted of measures to improve labour productivity and gradually to reduce staff costs.
Dernæst indeholdt SEA Handlings forretningsplan for 2003-2007, som blev vedtaget den 29. juli 2003, et omstruktureringsprogram med sigte på at forbedre effektiviteten i alle de tjenesteydelser, strukturer og menneskelige ressourcer, der var relateret til ground handling.
These objectives were to be achieved by taking both qualitative measures, addressing the way ground handling activities were carried out, and quantitative measures, looking at staff numbers.
SEA håbede, at koncernen kunne vende sin ground handling-forretning til en rentabel forretning inden tre år, hvilket vil sige inden 2005, og i hvert fald inden 2007.
In the first place the restructuring plan interlocked with the SEA group’s 2002-2006 consolidated business plan, which outlined the group’s strategy and objectives and the measures to be adopted to return its ground handling services to profitability.
SEA bestred derfor Kommissionens påstand om, at koncernens konsoliderede forretningsplan ikke indeholdt en detaljeret beskrivelse af de foranstaltninger, som SEA havde tænkt sig at træffe for at omorganisere SEA Handling, og at der ikke fandtes en detaljeret forretningsplan specifikt for SEA Handling, som indeholdt strategien om at redde selskabet og de enkelte trin heri.
Thereafter, SEA Handling’s 2003-2007 business plan, adopted on 29 July 2003, provided for a restructuring program aimed at improving the efficiency of all services, structures and human resources pertaining to ground handling.
SEA mente, at forbedringen i de økonomiske nøgletal fra 2003 til 2004 var opmuntrende og viste, at SEA's tiltag var begrundede.
SEA hoped it could return its ground handling business to profitability within three years, that is, by 2005, or at the latest by 2007.
Genopretningen af rentabiliteten inden 2005, som forventedes ifølge forretningsplanen for 2003-2007, hæmmedes af en række faktorer, som havde negativ indvirkning på SEA Handlings økonomiske situation.
SEA therefore disputed the Commission’s claims that the group’s consolidated business plan did not give a detailed description of the measures that SEA intended to adopt to reorganise SEA Handling, and that there was no detailed business plan specifically for SEA Handling that set out the strategy for saving the company and the steps by which the strategy was to be implemented.
Bl.a. nævner SEA spredningen af SARS i 2002-2003, Irak-krigens udbrud i 2003 og den voksende terrortrussel på globalt plan, skærpet pres på ground handling-priserne i 2006 efter tilkomsten af nye operatører i Malpensa, især Aviapartner, hvilket førte til en ændring i retning af lavere priser i en række kontrakter, herunder med Alitalia (-6 % på enhedsprisen), Alitalias beslutning i 2007 om at »de-hubbe« Milano-lufthavnen Malpensa, hvis fulde virkning mærkedes fra april 2008, samt askeskyen fra den islandske vulkan Eyjafjallajökull i 2010.
SEA considered that the improvement in the key economic indicators between 2003 and 2004 was encouraging and showed the validity of SEA’s actions.
I lyset af SEA Handlings forværrede situation i 2006-2007 og efter Alitalias de-hubbing måtte SEA beslutte, hvorvidt koncernen skulle opretholde sin forretningsmodel, i hvilket tilfælde den ville skulle tilpasse og opdatere programmet for relancering af SEA Handling.
The return to profitability by 2005 envisaged in the 2003-2007 business plan was stifled by a series of factors that had a negative impact on SEA Handling’s economic situation of SEA Handling.