natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen vil først undersøge, om foranstaltning 1 og 2 gav Adria en uretmæssig selektiv fordel.
This provision reflects the assumption that a company experiencing a massive loss in its registered capital will be unable to stem losses that will almost certainly condemn it to go out of business in the short or medium term (as stipulated in point 9 of the R&R Guidelines).
I indledningsafgørelsen bemærkede Kommissionen i denne forbindelse, at den kurs, som KAD betalte for aktierne, lå under den værdi, der var fastsat i to vurderingsrapporter.
As indicated in the opening decision, between 2007 and June 2011, the registered capital was not lost but it actually increased.
KAD erhvervede de nye aktier i Adria i februar 2007 til kurs 27 EUR pr. aktie, hvilket lå under den værdi, der var fastsat i en vurderingsrapport, på […] EUR pr. aktie pr. […] (se betragtning 15).
However, the Commission notes that the company's equity turned negative in 2010 and 2011.
I januar 2009 erhvervede KAD aktierne til kurs 22 EUR pr. aktie, hvilket lå under den kurs, der var fastsat i en vurderingsrapport, på […] EUR pr. aktie pr. […] (se betragtning 18).
At the same time, the company did not adopt appropriate measures in order to tackle the decrease of its own equity.
Kommissionen var imidlertid i tvivl om rapporternes pålidelighed, bl.a. fordi der var en betydelig tidsforskel mellem gennemførelsen af kapitalforhøjelserne (henholdsvis februar 2007 og januar 2009) og vurderingen af selskabets aktier (henholdsvis […] og […]).
In earlier cases [27], the Commission concluded that, where a company has negative equity, there is an a priori assumption that the criteria of point 10(a) of the R&R Guidelines are met, which would be the case for Adria since at least 2010.
Kommissionen har vurderet de data og den dokumentation, som Slovenien har indsendt om disse rapporter efter indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
The General Court also concluded in a recent judgment [28] that a company with negative equity is a company in difficulty.
Hvad angår foranstaltning 1, har Slovenien anført, at de data, som rapporten var baseret på, er fra den 30. september 2006, og at de var de senest tilgængelige data på tidspunktet for valuarens udarbejdelse af rapporten.
In addition, it also appears that by the end of 2010 the difficulties of Adria were at its peak.
Hvad angår foranstaltning 2, blev vurderingsrapporten bestilt efter beslutningen truffet på Adrias generalforsamling om en kapitalforhøjelse.
The press at that time mentioned the possibility of Adria's going into receivership or even filing for bankruptcy [29].
Kommissionen har endvidere ingen grund til at tro, at valuaren (P&S Capital) ikke var fuldstændig uafhængig.
This could be seen as a sign that, at least at that time, Adria fulfilled the criteria for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings under Slovenian law in the sense of point 10(c) of the R&R Guidelines.
Selv om det er korrekt, at der var en tidsforskel på […] måneder mellem vurderingen af aktierne og gennemførelsen af kapitalforhøjelsen, har Kommissionen ikke fundet dokumentation for, at denne forskel rent faktisk havde indvirkning på den anslåede værdi af Adrias aktier.
For the reasons above, in line with the opening decision, the Commission concludes that Adria was a firm in difficulty in the sense of point 10(a) and/or point 10(c) of the R&R Guidelines in 2010 and 2011, i.e. at the time when measures 3, 4 and 5 were granted.
Kommissionen bemærker, at den anvendte vurderingsmetode i rapporterne (nettonutidsværdi af forventede frie cash flow [30]) er almindeligt anerkendt i forbindelse med opkøb af virksomheder.
In addition, Table 6 in recital 61 suggests that in 2010 and 2011 Adria could also be deemed to be in difficulty in the sense of point 11 of the R&R Guidelines, which states that a firm may be considered to be in difficulty ‘where the usual signs […] are present, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value’.
Det fremgår endvidere af en detaljeret analyse i rapporterne, at de anvendte formler var tilstrækkelige med henblik på vurderingen og korrekt anvendt, og at antagelserne og prognoserne for omsætningsvækst og rentabilitet forekom realistiske.
However, the Commission is of the view that Adria did not show the usual signs of firms in difficulty as per point 11 of the R&R Guidelines between 2007 and 2009.
I vurderingsrapporten om kapitalindsprøjtningen i 2007 (foranstaltning 1) ligger den forventede gennemsnitlige indtjeningsvækst og rentabilitet således inden for tidligere intervaller.
With regard to 2008, Adria incurred losses of EUR 3,2 million for the first time in the period under consideration.
I vurderingsrapporten om kapitalindsprøjtningen i 2009 (foranstaltning 2) ligger den forventede indtjeningsvækst og rentabilitet under tidligere intervaller på grund af: a) den hurtige økonomiske vækst i 2008, der navnlig skyldtes det slovenske EU-formandskab, b) den langsomme globale økonomiske vækst og c) den vanskelige økonomiske situation på de finansielle markeder.
As Slovenia correctly points out, in 2008 Adria's revenues and cash flow increased when compared to the previous year (from EUR 179,2 million to EUR 205,4 million and from EUR 16,9 million to EUR 18,5 million, respectively).
De øvrige antagelser i rapporterne forekommer ligeledes realistiske.
In addition, its registered capital remained stable at EUR 6,8 million.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at KAD allerede før kapitalforhøjelserne [31] var majoritetsaktionær i Adria, og at kapitalforhøjelserne havde til formål at finansiere en eksisterende (og rentabel) investering for KAD.
The Commission also observes that in 2008 and 2009, Adria had net EBT of EUR 3,2 million and EUR 14 million.
På baggrund af ovenstående bemærker Kommissionen, at kapitalforhøjelserne i 2007 og 2009 kan anses for at være i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene og ikke gav Adria en uretmæssig fordel.
In the same years, when excluding depreciation, the company's economic result was positive, reaching EBT+DA of EUR 10,9 million and EUR 1,6 million, respectively (see Table 6 in recital 61).
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at foranstaltning 1 og 2 udgjorde investeringer, som en privat investor på tilsvarende vilkår [32] ville have foretaget, og at forekomsten af statsstøtte således kan udelukkes, uden at det er nødvendigt at foretage en nærmere vurdering af, om de øvrige kumulative betingelser i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF var opfyldt.
From 2010 onwards, Adria's EBT+DA turned negative.
Som anført i betragtning 73 er en af de nødvendige betingelser for forekomsten af statsstøtte, at foranstaltningen giver støttemodtageren en uretmæssig selektiv fordel.
Since measure 2 was decided in January 2009 and the shares were fully subscribed in July 2009, the Commission cannot conclude with certainty that at the time there was a clearly identifiable trend of negative results allowing it to conclude that Adria was a firm in difficulty in the sense of the R&R Guidelines.
Kommissionen vil i det følgende vurdere, om foranstaltning 3 opfylder denne betingelse.
Accordingly, the Commission is of the view that Adria would not qualify as a firm in difficulty in 2007-2009, i.e. when measures 1 and 2 were provided.
Kommissionen bemærkede i sin indledningsafgørelse, at den kurs på 12 EUR pr. aktie, som PDP og de private turistbureauer betalte for aktierne i Adria, lå under den kurs på […] EUR pr. aktie, der var fastsat i en vurderingsrapport.
Existence of State aid
Som det gjorde sig gældende i forbindelse med foranstaltning 1 og 2, var Kommissionen i tvivl om rapportens pålidelighed, primært fordi der var en betydelig tidsforskel på […] måneder mellem gennemførelsen af kapitalforhøjelsen (september 2010) og vurderingen af aktierne ([…]).
By virtue of Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
De oplysninger, som de slovenske myndigheder har fremsendt, har til en vis grad mindsket Kommissionens tvivl på dette område.
In order to conclude whether State aid is present, the Commission must assess whether the cumulative criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU (i.e. transfer of State resources, selective advantage, potential distortion of competition and affectation of intra-EU trade) are met for each of the five measures under assessment.
Kommissionen minder imidlertid på trods heraf om, at to private rejsebureauer (Kompas d.d. og Palma d.o.o.) deltog i kapitalforhøjelsen i 2010 med 20 %, og at PDP indskød de resterende 80 %.
Measures 1 and 2: the 2007 and 2009 capital increases
De private rejsebureauer og PDP deltog på samme vilkår og tegnede aktierne samme dato.
The Commission will first analyse whether measures 1 and 2 conferred a selective undue advantage to Adria.
De private investorer og PDP foretog endvidere begge en kapitalindsprøjtning.
In its opening decision, the Commission noted in this respect that the price of the shares paid by KAD was below the value determined by two valuation reports.
Kommissionen understregede i indledningsafgørelsen, at en privat deltagelse på 20 % i princippet kunne ses som et tegn på, at markedet støttede den pågældende investering, selv om foranstaltningen skulle ses i en bredere sammenhæng, nemlig Adrias situation på daværende tidspunkt og det forhold, at foranstaltning 3 var den tredje kapitalforhøjelse inden for ca. 3,5 år.
KAD acquired the new shares of Adria in February 2007 at a price of EUR 27 per share, below the value determined by a valuation report of EUR […] per share as of […] (see recital 15).
Kommissionen bemærker for det første, at Slovenien har forelagt dokumentation for, at Kompas d.d. og Palma d.o.o. er rent private virksomheder helt uden for statens kontrol eller indflydelse.
In January 2009, KAD acquired the shares at a price of EUR 22 per share, below the value determined by a valuation report of EUR […] per share as of […] (see recital 18).
Som anført i betragtning 79 indebar foranstaltning 1 og 2 desuden ikke statsstøtte.
However, the Commission expressed doubts on the reliability of these reports, inter alia, because there was a significant time gap between the moment at which the capital increases took place (February 2007 and January 2009, respectively) and the time at which the shares of the company were valued ([…] and […], respectively).
På denne baggrund tyder det på, at investeringsbeslutninger, som en privat investor ville have truffet, ikke kan anses for at have påvirket de private turistbureauers beslutninger om at investere i Adria.
The Commission has assessed the data and evidence submitted by Slovenia about these reports after the opening of the formal investigation procedure.
Kommissionen bemærker ligeledes, at de private turistbureauer tegnede aktierne i Adria samme dato som PDP, kursen var den samme, investeringen blev foretaget på samme vilkår, og PDP og de private turistbureauer foretog begge et kapitalindskud.
As regards measure 1, Slovenia has explained that the data on which the report was based dates from 30 September 2006 and was the latest available data at the time the valuer prepared the report.
Selv om Kommissionen konkluderede, at PDP's deltagelse indebar statsmidler og kunne tilregnes staten (se betragtning 89-91), kan en privat deltagelse på 20 % under alle omstændigheder ikke betragtes som ubetydelig sammenholdt med den offentlige intervention i henhold til fast retspraksis [33].
As regards measure 2, it results that the valuation report was commissioned at the same time as the general assembly of Adria had decided to proceed to a capital increase.
I lyset af ovenstående kan Kommissionen desuden ikke konkludere, at PDP's adfærd rent faktisk påvirkede de private turistbureauers beslutning om at investere i Adria.
In addition, the Commission has no reason to believe that the valuer (P&S Capital) was not fully independent.
Det forhold, at Adria blev betragtet som kriseramt i 2010 (se afsnit 7.1), ændrer ikke denne konklusion.
In addition, although it is true that there was a time gap of […] months between the moment at which the shares of the company were valued and the moment at which the capital increases took place, the Commission has found no evidence proving that this gap actually had an impact on the estimated value of the shares of Adria.
Det fremgår endvidere ikke af den dokumentation, som Slovenien har forelagt, at de private turistbureauer havde andre grunde til at investere i Adria end at opnå en fortjeneste.
The Commission observes that the valuation method used in the reports (net present value of expected free cash flows [30]) is widely accepted for cases of acquisitions.
Kommissionen henviser i denne forbindelse til en rapport forelagt af Slovenien om Adrias strategi i perioden 2009-2014 — som investorerne tilsyneladende havde adgang til, da de traf deres investeringsbeslutning — hvor det anføres, at Adria forventes at skabe overskud i perioden 2010-2014 på grundlag af en kapitalindsprøjtning på ca. 2,5 mio. EUR og Adrias gennemførelse af en række foranstaltninger, herunder med henblik på at opnå højere gennemsnitlige passagerindtægter og omkostningsbesparelser.
Moreover, it results from a detailed analysis of the reports that the formulas used therein were adequate for the purposes of the valuation and had been adequately applied, and that the assumptions and the projections on turnover growth and profitability seemed realistic.
Denne rapport kan ses som et yderligere tegn på, at de private turistbureauer rent faktisk var overbevist om, at deres investering var rentabel.
In particular, in the valuation report for the capital injection of 2007 (measure 1), the projected average rates of revenue growth and profitability are within the range of the observed past ones.
Kommissionen er derfor af den opfattelse, at de private turistbureauers beslutning om at investere i Adria blev truffet på samme vilkår som PDP, og at deres investering var betydelig.
In the valuation report for the capital injection of 2009 (measure 2), the projected rates of revenue growth and profitability are lower than the observed past ones, because of: (a) the high economic growth in 2008 was mainly the result of the Slovenian EU Presidency; (b) the slow world economic growth; and (c) the strained situation of the financial markets.
Kommissionen har desuden ingen grund til at betvivle, at de private turistbureauer besluttede at investere i Adria for at opnå overskud.
The rest of the assumptions used in the reports also seem realistic.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at foranstaltning 3 ikke gav Adria en uretmæssig fordel, og at forekomsten af statsstøtte således kan udelukkes, uden at det er nødvendigt at foretage en nærmere vurdering af, om de øvrige kumulative betingelser i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF var opfyldt.
Moreover, the Commission notes that KAD was majority shareholder of Adria already before the capital increases [31] and that the capital increases aimed at financing an existing (and profitable) investment for KAD.
Den 30. september 2011 foretog Slovenien et kapitalindskud på 70 % (49,5 mio. EUR) af kapitalforhøjelsen i Adria i 2011.
On the basis of the above, the Commission observes that 2007 and 2009 capital increases can be considered market-conform and did not entail an undue advantage to Adria.
Slovenien investerede pengene via Capital Assets Management Agency of Slovenia (AUKN).
Therefore, the Commission concludes that measures 1 and 2 constituted investments that a market economy investor in comparable circumstances [32] would have undertaken and therefore excludes the presence of State aid, without it being necessary to assess further whether the rest of the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU would be met.
Derudover foretog PDP et kapitalindskud på yderligere 1 % (0,5 mio. EUR).
As noted in recital 73, one of the necessary conditions for State aid to be present is that the measure confers an undue selective advantage to the beneficiary.
Resten af kapitaludvidelsen (dvs. 19,7 mio. EUR) tog form af, at flere banker konverterede deres tilgodehavender til aktier: NLB konverterede 20 %, Abanka Vipa d.d. konverterede 5 %, Unicredit Bank of Slovenia d.d. konverterede 2 %, og Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank d.d. konverterede 2 %.
In what follows the Commission will assess whether this condition is met in relation to measure 3.
AUKN blev etableret ved lov om selskabsledelse af kapitalinvesteringer i Republikken Slovenien [34], bestyrelsen blev udpeget af nationalforsamlingen, agenturet var direkte finansieret via Republikken Sloveniens budget, og personalet var offentligt ansatte [35].
In its opening decision, the Commission noted that although the price of EUR 12 per share that PDP and the private tourist agencies paid for the shares of Adria was below the price of EUR […] per share determined by a valuation report.
Det er således tydeligt, at AUKN's handlinger kunne tilregnes staten, og at de indebar statsmidler, hvilket Slovenien desuden ikke bestrider.
As in measures 1 and 2, Commission expressed doubts on the reliability of this report, mainly because there was significant time gap of […] months between the moment of the capital increase (September 2010) and the moment for which the report valued the shares ([…]).
Kommissionen henviser endvidere til en pressemeddelelse af 23. juni 2011 fra det slovenske statsministerium: »Under samlingen i dag besluttede regeringen […], at [AUKN] indskyder 49,5 mio. EUR i Adria Airways d.d., og at aktieselskabet [PDP] indskyder 500000 EUR […].
The information submitted by the Slovenian authorities, has to some extent alleviated the doubts of the Commission in this respect.
Med sin aktive deltagelse i denne proces ønsker Republikken Slovenien også fremover at pleje sine interesser inden for ruteflyvninger varetaget af et flyselskab med hjemsted i Slovenien« [36].
However, irrespective of this, the Commission recalls that on the basis of the same information and valuation, two private tourist agencies (Kompas d.d. and Palma d.o.o.) participated in the 2010 capital increase in a proportion of 20 %, while PDP injected the remaining 80 % of the capital.
Med hensyn til PDP mener Kommissionen, at der er en række omstændigheder, jf. retspraksis i Stardust Marine-sagen [37], der gør det muligt for Kommissionen at konkludere, at PDP blev etableret for at gennemføre politikker fastlagt af de slovenske offentlige myndigheder, og at PDP's beslutning om at investere i foranstaltning 4 kan tilregnes staten og indebærer statsmidler.
The private tourist agencies and PDP participated under the same conditions and subscribed the shares on the same date.
Kommissionen bemærker for det første, at den slovenske stat indirekte ejer 100 % af PDP (gennem KAD, SOD og DSU).
Moreover, the private participation and the contribution of PDP were both carried out by injecting cash.
I denne forbindelse minder Kommissionen om sin beslutning i ELAN-sagen [38], hvor den konkluderede, at to af ejernes, KAD og PDP, foranstaltninger kunne tilregnes staten.
In its opening decision, the Commission highlighted that a private participation of 20 % could in principle be seen as a sign that the investment in question was supported by the market, although the operation was to be seen in the broader context of the situation of Adria at the time and the fact that measure 3 was the third capital increase within a time spam of approximately 3,5 years.
Derudover har staten stemmemajoriteten i aktionærrepræsentantskabet, der udpeger virksomhedens bestyrelse.
The Commission first observes that Slovenia has provided evidence showing that Kompas d.d. and Palma d.o.o. are fully private companies in which the State did not exercise any type of control or influence.
I henhold til artikel 19 i PDP's vedtægter skal bestyrelsen give tilladelse til køb af værdipapirer, når transaktionsværdien overstiger 500000 EUR.
In addition, as indicated in recital 79, measures 1 and 2 did not amount to State aid.
I overensstemmelse med indledningsafgørelsen minder Kommissionen endvidere om den tidligere slovenske finansministers udtalelse ved sin afgang den 28. oktober 2011 (dvs. efter gennemførelsen af foranstaltning 4): »Med etableringen af det særlige omstruktureringsselskab (PDP) sikrede vi slovenske virksomheder nye finansieringskilder, knowhow og ekspertise baseret på god praksis for omstrukturering af virksomheder.
On this basis, it seems that investment decisions which a private investor would have taken cannot be seen as having an influence on the decisions of the private tourist agencies to invest into Adria.
Endelig henviser Kommissionen endvidere som et yderligere indirekte bevis til pressemeddelelsen af 23. juni 2011 fra det slovenske statsministerium (se betragtning 88), hvoraf det fremgår, at den slovenske regering havde besluttet, at PDP skulle indskyde 0,5 mio. EUR i forbindelse med kapitalforhøjelsen i 2011.
The Commission also notes that the private tourist agencies subscribed the shares of Adria on the same date as PDP, they paid the same price, their investment was made under the same terms and conditions, and the increase from PDP and the private tourist agencies was done in cash.
På baggrund af ovenstående mener Kommissionen, at PDP's deltagelse i kapitalforhøjelsen i 2010 indebar statsmidler, og at PDP's handlinger kan tilregnes staten.
In any event, even if the Commission were to conclude that PDP's participation would entail State resources and be imputable to the State (see in this sense recitals 89 to 91), a private participation of 20 % cannot be considered negligible by comparison to the public intervention in the sense of settled case-law [33].
Med hensyn til bankerne bemærker Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med indledningsafgørelsen, at Abanka Vipa d.d., Unicredit Bank of Slovenia d.d. og Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank d.d. er rent private enheder.
Moreover, bearing in mind the above, the Commission cannot conclude that the decision of the private tourist agencies to invest into Adria was actually influenced by the conduct of PDP.
Med hensyn til NLB havde staten på tidspunktet for gennemførelsen af foranstaltning 4 aktiemajoriteten i NLB, enten direkte (45,62 % af aktierne) eller indirekte gennem SOD (4,07 %) og KAD (4,03 %), [40] med KBC Bank som den eneste anden betydelige aktionær (25 %).
The fact that Adria was considered as being in difficulty in 2010 (see Section 7.1) does not alter this conclusion.
Statens aktiemajoritet i NLB og således stemmemajoritet i bankens bestyrelse og tilsynsråd viser, at foranstaltningerne kan tilregnes staten.
In addition, from the evidence submitted by Slovenia it does not appear that the private tourist agencies had motivations to invest in Adria other than profit-seeking.
Kommissionen kan imidlertid ikke ud fra NLB's vedtægter med sikkerhed konkludere, at NLB's beslutning om at investere i Adria kunne tilregnes staten.
In this respect, the Commission points out to a report provided by Slovenia on the strategic orientations of Adria for the period 2009-2014 — which apparently was at the disposal of the investors at the time of taking their investment decision — according to which Adria was expected to make profits between 2010 and 2104, on the basis a capital injection of approximately EUR 2,5 million and the implementation by Adria of certain measures, including higher average income on passenger and cost reductions.
Kommissionen har endvidere heller ikke ud fra NLB's ledelsesstruktur konstateret nogen indblanding fra de offentlige myndigheders side.
This report could be seen as an additional indication that the private tourist agencies were indeed convinced of the profitability of their investment.
Kommissionen fandt heller ingen indirekte beviser herfor, jf. retspraksis i Stardust Marine-sagen.
Therefore, the Commission is of the view that the decision of the private tourist agencies to invest in Adria was made pari passu with that of PDP and that their investment was significant.