natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Slovenien mener endvidere, at vurderingsrapporten fra april 2010, hvori AAT's værdi som Adrias flyserviceselskab blev sat til mellem 14,4 mio. og 14,9 mio. EUR, ikke kan betragtes som forældet, og at der ikke er noget, der tyder på, at der i vurderingsrapporten blev taget højde for synergierne med Adria.
When examining the report fixing the value of ATT's shares, the Commission noted that it valued AAT as being part of Adria's maintenance unit (it was at the time SVL) and that it took into account the synergies derived from this when assessing the value of AAT.
Slovenien hævder endvidere, at det fremgår af referaterne af bestyrelsesmøderne i PDP og Aerodrom Ljubljana, at beslutningen om at overtage AAT blev truffet på grundlag af økonomisk rationelle overvejelser.
However, the Commission considered that the report should have assessed the value of SLV/AAT as a stand-alone entity discarding intra-group synergies, since AAT was spun-off from Adria in 2010 and sold as a separate entity.
Forekomsten af statsstøtte i foranstaltning 5 kan derfor udelukkes.
In addition, the Commission also expressed concerns about the considerable gap between the time of the valuation and the time of the sale of the shares of AAT.
Slovenien bestrider ligeledes, at Adria blev betragtet som en kriseramt virksomhed, og mener, at Adria først var kriseramt fra januar 2011, dvs. da foranstaltning 4 blev tildelt.
The Commission also expressed doubts on the compatibility with the internal market of the five measures under assessment, in particular since the Slovenian authorities did not provide any possible grounds for compatibility.
Hvad angår foranstaltning 4, udelukker Slovenien forekomsten af statsstøtte og anfører, at NLB's konvertering af sine tilgodehavender til aktier ikke kan tilregnes staten.
In view of the nature of the measures at issue and of the fact that Adria could be considered a firm in difficulty at the time of the granting of the measures, the Commission noted that the compatibility of the measures could only be assessed under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, and in particular in the light of the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [16] (‘the R&R Guidelines’).
Slovenien mener endvidere, at der var fuld sikkerhed for de udestående lån konverteret til aktier gennem pant i fly og bygninger, og at bankerne påtog sig en ny forretningsrisiko ved at konvertere disse lån til aktier.
The Commission first noted that the conditions for rescue aid laid down in Section 3.1 of the R&R Guidelines did not seem to be met.
I denne forbindelse kan konverteringen af gæld til aktier sidestilles med en kapitalindsprøjtning.
In relation to restructuring aid as defined in Section 3.2 of the R&R Guidelines, the Commission highlighted that the measures identified had been granted before notification to the Commission and in the absence of a credible restructuring plan satisfying the conditions laid down in the R&R Guidelines, a circumstance that in itself would be sufficient to exclude compatibility of the measures with the internal market [17].
Slovenien bemærker endvidere, at bankerne og staten påvirkede hinanden i forbindelse med investeringsbeslutningen, der efter Sloveniens opfattelse var baseret på en pålidelig omstruktureringsplan, og konkluderer, at investeringsbeslutningerne var samtidige, og at Adria således ikke fik en uretmæssig fordel.
The Commission also expressed doubts on the restructuring plan, since it appeared not to be sufficiently solid to restore the long-term viability of Adria, as some of its predictions are based on non-quantified, uncertain or unclear assumptions.
Da Slovenien ikke mener, at foranstaltning 1, 2, 3 og 5 indebar statsstøtte, fremførte Slovenien ingen begrundelse for foranstaltningernes forenelighed.
The Commission also considered doubtful whether the compensatory measures foreseen in the restructuring plan could be considered appropriate and/or sufficient, given that they appeared to be necessary to restore the viability of Adria.
Slovenien fremførte imidlertid en begrundelse for foreneligheden af foranstaltning 4, i det tilfælde at Kommissionen kom frem til, at den udgjorde statsstøtte.
Regarding the sale of AAT, it took place several months before the restructuring plan was approved, at a time — end of 2010, beginning of 2011 — when Adria apparently was in dire need of financing.
Da Adria ifølge Slovenien først var kriseramt fra januar 2011 (se betragtning 48), udgør foranstaltning 4 forenelig omstruktureringsstøtte i henhold til afsnit 3.2 i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte på grundlag af den indgivne omstruktureringsplan.
Also, the cancellation of scheduled routes did not appear to be acceptable as compensatory measures given that most of these routes (27 out of 31) were reported in the restructuring plan to be loss-making and their termination would in any case be required to ensure viability of the company.
Med hensyn til genoprettelse af rentabiliteten mener Slovenien, at omstruktureringsplanen sikrer Adrias langsigtede rentabilitet, og understreger, at omstruktureringsplanen i overensstemmelse med rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte omfatter en markedsanalyse og en analyse af de forhold, der har forårsaget vanskelighederne, og at det planlægges at nedlægge alle aktiviteter, som efter omstruktureringen ville blive ved med at være tabsgivende af strukturbestemte årsager.
The Commission also had doubts on whether the proposed own contribution from Adria of EUR […] could be fully accepted, in particular, since it is unclear whether the amounts from the sale of AAT and the debt-to-equity conversion of bank loans could be counted as own contribution.
Som angivet i betragtning 31 fremsendte Slovenien en række opdateringer af omstruktureringsplanen, og i den nuværende plan løber omstruktureringsperioden indtil 2015, og den omfatter en række yderligere omstruktureringsforanstaltninger, der skal sikre en mere bæredygtig rentabilitet.
Given that Adria seemed to be in difficulty at the time the measures were granted and that firms in difficulty can only receive rescue and/or restructuring aid, the Commission also raised doubts on whether the ‘one time, last time’ principle would be respected, notably as regards the 2011 capital increase.
Slovenien fremhæver ligeledes, at den opdaterede omstruktureringsplan vil sikre virksomhedens langsigtede rentabilitet ved udgangen af 2015, selv i et pessimistisk scenarie med et afkast af egenkapitalen (ROE) på […] % i 2014 og på […] % i 2015, hvilket er højere end accepteret af Kommissionen i Air Malta-afgørelsen [18].
COMMENTS ON THE OPENING DECISION
Efter Sloveniens opfattelse er indskrænkningen af kapaciteten (i form af lukning af ruter) på […] % og […] % i vinter- og sommersæsonen, frigørelsen af ankomst- og afgangstidspunkter i visse lufthavne, herunder i koordinerede (trafiktætte) lufthavne, og afhændelsen af AAT hensigtsmæssige og forholdsmæssige kompenserende modydelser.
Comments from Slovenia
Slovenien hævder ligeledes, at de lukkede ruter rent faktisk var rentable på grundlag af det såkaldte »dækningsbidrag« (positivt C1-dækningsbidrag), som Kommissionen havde accepteret i Air Malta- og Czech Airlines-sagerne [19].
In its comments on the Commission's opening decision, Slovenia maintains that measures 1, 2 and 3 did not entail State aid because the decisions of KAD and PDP cannot be deemed imputable to the State.
Med hensyn til begrænsning af støtten til et minimum (egetbidrag) påpeger Slovenien som anført ovenfor, at afhændelsen af AAT ikke omfatter støtte, og at provenuet på 14,7 mio. EUR således bør accepteres som egetbidrag.
In particular, Slovenia noted that a 100 % shareholding of the State is not sufficient to conclude that the measures are imputable to the State.
Tillagt provenuet fra afhændelsen af en række aktiver […] vil egetbidraget overstige [50-54] % på grundlag af den opdaterede omstruktureringsplan.
Slovenia moreover notes that the valuation reports determining the value of the shares were appropriate and that on that basis the market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’) was met, thereby excluding an advantage to Adria.
Endelig mener Slovenien, at princippet om engangsstøtte blev overholdt, da foranstaltning 1, 2, 3 og 5 — der blev tildelt før foranstaltning 4 — ikke indebar statsstøtte til Adria.
Concerning in particular measure 3, Slovenia argues that the pari passu subscription of 20 % of the shares by two private tourist agencies alongside PDP was significant and showed that the market did not doubt about Adria's viability, which would exclude the presence of State aid.
Bemærkninger fra interesserede parter
In relation to measure 5, Slovenia reiterates that the actions of PDP cannot be deemed imputable to the State.
Under den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure modtog Kommissionen kun bemærkninger fra Ryanair, der er enig i Kommissionens foreløbige konklusioner om, at de omhandlede foranstaltninger indebar støtte, som var uforenelig med det indre marked.
As regards Aerodrom Ljubljana's actions, Slovenia considers that the State influence on its decision to purchase AAT cannot be inferred from the fact that certain members of the Supervisory Board were proposed by the State, KAD and SOD.
Ryanair gjorde imidlertid gældende, at Kommissionens vurdering af MEIP ikke var fuldstændig i indledningsafgørelsen, da Kommissionen burde have vurderet, om en privat investor ville have likvideret Adria med det samme i stedet for at indskyde yderligere kapital [21].
Slovenia furthermore considers that the valuation report dated April 2010,which had set the value of AAT as Adria's maintenance unit at a range between EUR 14,4 million and EUR 14,9 million, cannot be deemed outdated and that there is no indication that the valuation report took into consideration the synergies with Adria.
Ryanair påpeger, at Kommissionen i indledningsafgørelsen burde have vurderet, om det var mere rentabelt for staten at likvidere Adria i stedet for at tilføre yderligere kapital.
In addition, Slovenia claims that the minutes of the boards of both PDP and Aerodrom Ljubljana demonstrate that the decision to acquire ATT was taken on the basis of economically-rational considerations.
Selv om Ryanair ikke mente at have tilstrækkelige oplysninger til at kommentere omstruktureringsplanen, var Ryanair i tvivl om, hvorvidt Adria ville blive rentabel igen.
For these reasons, the presence of State aid in measure 5 would be excluded.
Ryanair anførte endvidere, at enhver støtte til Adria ville være til skade for Ryanairs markedsposition, da støtten modarbejder Ryanairs indsats for at udvikle sine markeder og påfører Ryanair et indtægtstab.
Slovenia also contests the qualification of Adria as a firm in difficulty and considers that Adria would be in difficulty only as of January 2011, i.e. at the time of measure 4.
Sloveniens kommentarer til de interesserede parters bemærkninger
Concerning measure 4, Slovenia excludes the presence of aid arguing that the debt-to-equity swap of NLB is not imputable to the State.
Slovenien gennemgik de argumenter, som Ryanair havde fremsat i sine bemærkninger, i detaljer.
Moreover, Slovenia is of the opinion that the outstanding loans converted into equity were fully collateralised with pledges on aircraft and buildings and that, by converting them into equity, the banks assumed new business risk.
Slovenien bemærkede navnlig, at det ikke kun var staten, der havde deltaget i kapitaltilførslerne til Adria, men også private investorer samt enheder, hvis handlinger efter Sloveniens opfattelse ikke kan tilregnes staten.
In this sense, the debt-to-equity conversion would be equivalent to a cash injection.
Slovenien mener derudover, at Ryanair har fortolket retspraksis forkert, når Ryanair hævder, at staten burde have valgt en konkurs i stedet for en omstrukturering af Adria for at sikre selskabets langsigtede rentabilitet.
Slovenia also notes that the banks and the State influenced each other in order to take the investment decision, which — in Slovenia's view — was based on a reliable restructuring plan, and concludes that the investment decisions were concomitant, thereby excluding any undue advantage to Adria.
Endelig anførte Slovenien, at påstanden om, at støtten skadede Ryanairs markedsposition, ikke var dokumenteret.
Since, according to Slovenia, Adria would be in difficulty only as of January 2011 (see recital 48), measure 4 would constitute compatible restructuring aid under Section 3.2 of the R&R Guidelines on the basis of the submitted restructuring plan.
VURDERING AF FORANSTALTNINGERNE
As regards return to viability, Slovenia considers that the restructuring plan ensures the long-term viability of Adria and highlights that, in accordance with the R&R Guidelines, the restructuring plan includes a market survey and an analysis of the causes that led to the company's difficulties, and that it foresees the abandonment of activities which would remain structurally loss-making after restructuring.
Denne afgørelse behandler indledningsvis spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Adria er en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte (afsnit 7.1 nedenfor).
As indicated in recital 31, Slovenia submitted a number of updates to the restructuring plan, which currently foresees duration of the restructuring until 2015 and includes several additional restructuring measures in order to ensure a more sustainable viability.
Det undersøges, hvorvidt de omhandlede foranstaltninger udgør statsstøtte til Adria i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF (afsnit 7.2 nedenfor), og herefter hvorvidt denne eventuelle støtte er lovlig (afsnit 7.4 nedenfor) og forenelig med det indre marked (afsnit 7.5 nedenfor).
Slovenia also highlights that the updated restructuring plan ensures the long-term viability of the company by end of 2015 even in the worst-case scenario with a return on equity (ROE) of […] % in 2014 and of […] % in 2015, higher than the levels accepted by the Commission in the Air Malta decision [18].
Adrias vanskeligheder
Slovenia is of the view that the capacity reduction (in the form of cancellation of scheduled services) of […] % and […] % in winter and summer seasons, the release of slots at certain airports, including coordinated (congested) airports, and the sale of AAT are appropriate and proportionate compensatory measures.
Nedenfor angives Adrias finansielle nøgleparametre for perioden 2007-2011 ifølge oplysningerne fra de slovenske myndigheder:
Slovenia also claims that the routes cancelled were actually profitable on the basis of the so-called ‘gross margin’ (positive C1 contribution) which the Commission had accepted in the Air Malta and Czech Airlines [19] cases.
Tabel 6
In relation to aid limited to the minimum (own contribution), in line with what has been explained above, Slovenia claims that the sale of AAT is free of aid and therefore its proceeds, amounting to EUR 14,7 million, should be accepted as own contribution.
Adrias finansielle nøgletal for perioden 2007 — juni 2011 (mio. EUR)
Slovenia also considers that the debt-to-equity swaps of the banks should count as own contribution for their entire amount, i.e. EUR 19,7 million.
Juni 2011
Slovenia has also submitted the values of the aircraft pledged for the loans in question, together with the relevant AVAC report [20] demonstrating the values of those aircraft.
Omsætning
Adding to this the sale of a number of assets […] the amount of own contribution would exceed [50-54] % on the basis of the updated restructuring plan.
Nettoresultat
Finally, as regards the ‘one time, last time’ principle, Slovenia is of the view that it was respected since measures 1, 2, 3 and 5 — which predated measure 4 — did not entail State aid to Adria.
3,2
Comments from interested parties
14,0
During the formal investigation procedure, the Commission only received comments from Ryanair, who supports the Commission's preliminary findings that the measures under assessment entailed aid and were incompatible with the internal market.
63,1
Ryanair however argued that the Commission's assessment of the MEIP was not complete in the opening decision, since the Commission should have considered whether a private investor would have opted for liquidating Adria upfront instead of providing it with additional capital.
2,2
Ryanair argues that the Commission should have assessed in its opening decisions whether the liquidation of Adria was more profitable for the State than the provision of additional funds.
50,9
Although Ryanair considered that it had no sufficient information to comment on the restructuring plan, it noted its doubts that Adria would return to profitability.
Tegnet kapital
Ryanair also argued that any aid to Adria would harm Ryanair's market position, since it frustrates Ryanair's efforts at developing its market and inflicts loss of revenue on Ryanair.
Egenkapital
Observations from Slovenia on the comments of interested third parties
35,4
Slovenia addressed in detail the arguments raised by Ryanair in its observations.
35,9
In particular, Slovenia noted that not only the State had participated to the capital injections in favour of Adria, but also private investors as well as entities whose actions, according to Slovenia, cannot be imputed to the State.
Gæld/egenkapital-(forhold)
In addition, Slovenia considers that Ryanair misinterpreted the case-law when it claims that the State should have favoured bankruptcy over Adria's restructuring and long-term viability.
3,9
According to Slovenia, the test advanced by Ryanair was flawed since it would only be applicable to Adria's creditors but not investors: since Slovenia had no credits against the company, it could not ask for its liquidation.
3,6
Slovenia noted that the Commission had addressed the assumption of Adria's restructuring plan and highlighted that Ryanair's doubts whether Adria could return to viability are unfounded.
Cash flow fra driften
Finally, Slovenia argued that the alleged harm to Ryanair's market position was not substantiated.
21,6 [23]
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
Adria afsluttede regnskabsåret 2011 med et tab på 12 mio. EUR [24].
This decision addresses as a preliminary point the issue of whether Adria is a firm in difficulty in the sense of the R&R Guidelines (Section 7.1 below).
I 2012 var tabet 10,8 mio. EUR [25].
It then analyses whether the measures under scrutiny entail State aid to Adria in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (Section 7.2 below) and then whether such aid, were it to be present, is lawful (Section 7.4 below) and compatible with the internal market (Section 7.5 below).
Det fremgår ligeledes, at Adria reducerede tabet til 3,1 mio. EUR i 2013 [26].
Difficulties of Adria
Det præciseres i punkt 10, litra a), i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte, at et selskab er kriseramt, når »over halvdelen af den tegnede kapital er forsvundet, og over en fjerdedel af denne kapital er gået tabt i løbet af de sidste 12 måneder«.
Adria's key financial parameters between 2007 and 2011 were as follows, according to the information provided by the Slovenian authorities:
Denne bestemmelse afspejler antagelsen om, at en virksomhed, der oplever et massivt tab af sin tegnede kapital, vil være ude af stand til at dæmme op for tab, der næsten med sikkerhed vil medføre virksomhedens ophør på kort eller mellemlang sigt (som angivet i punkt 9 i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte).
Table 6
Som anført i indledningsafgørelsen var den tegnede kapital ikke tabt i perioden mellem 2007 og juni 2011, men steg rent faktisk.
Adria's key financial data 2007 — June 2011 (EUR million)
I tidligere sager [27] har Kommissionen vurderet, at når en virksomhed har negativ egenkapital, må det på forhånd antages, at kriterierne i punkt 10, litra a), i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte er opfyldt, og det forekommer at have været tilfældet med Adria siden 2010.
June 2011
Retten har også i en nylig dom [28] konkluderet, at en virksomhed med en negativ egenkapital er en kriseramt virksomhed.
Turnover
Det kan ligeledes konstateres, at det så sortest ud for Adria ved udgangen af 2010.
Net result
Pressen skrev på daværende tidspunkt, at der var risiko for, at Adria ville gå i betalingsstandsning eller indgive konkursbegæring [29].
3,2
Dette kan ses som et tegn på, at Adria i hvert fald på daværende tidspunkt efter slovensk ret opfyldte betingelserne for konkursbehandling mv., jf. punkt 10, litra c), i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte.
14,0
Af ovennævnte grunde og i overensstemmelse med indledningsafgørelsen konkluderer Kommissionen, at Adria var en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til punkt 10, litra a) og/eller litra c), i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte i 2010 og 2011, dvs. da foranstaltning 3, 4 og 5 blev tildelt.
63,1
Det angives endvidere i tabel 6 i betragtning 61, at Adria i 2010 og 2011 ligeledes kunne anses som kriseramt i henhold til punkt 11 i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte, hvor det hedder, at en virksomhed kan anses for kriseramt »hvis de sædvanlige tegn […] er til stede, såsom voksende underskud, faldende omsætning, voksende lagerbeholdninger, overskudskapacitet, faldende cash flow, stigende gældsætning, stigende finansieringsudgifter og faldende eller opbrugt nettoformue«.
2,2
Kommissionen er imidlertid af den opfattelse, at Adria ikke viste de sædvanlige tegn på, at en virksomhed er kriseramt, jf. punkt 11 i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte, i perioden 2007-2009.
50,9
I 2008 blev Adria påført et tab på 3,2 mio. EUR for første gang i den betragtede periode.
Registered capital
Som Slovenien ganske rigtigt påpeger, steg Adrias indtægter og cash flow i 2008 sammenlignet med året før (fra 179,2 mio. EUR til 205,4 mio. EUR og fra 16,9 mio. EUR til 18,5 mio. EUR).
Own equity
Derudover forblev den tegnede kapital stabilt på 6,8 mio. EUR.
35,4
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at Adria havde et nettoresultat før skat på henholdsvis 3,2 mio. EUR og 14 mio. EUR i 2008 og 2009.
35,9
I samme periode var virksomhedens økonomiske resultat før afskrivning positivt, og EBT + DA nåede op på henholdsvis 10,9 mio. EUR og 1,6 mio. EUR (se tabel 6 i betragtning 61).
Debt/Equity (ratio)
Da foranstaltning 2 blev besluttet i januar 2009 og alle aktierne var blevet tegnet i juli 2009, kan Kommissionen ikke med sikkerhed konkludere, at der på daværende tidspunkt var en klart identificerbar negativ udvikling, der gjorde det muligt for Kommissionen at konkludere, at Adria var en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte.
3,6
Kommissionen er derfor af den opfattelse, at Adria ikke kunne betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed i 2007-2009, dvs. da foranstaltning 1 og 2 blev tildelt.
Cash flow from operating activities
Forekomst af statsstøtte
21,6 [23]
I henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med det indre marked, i det omfang den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Adria closed the financial year 2011 with losses of EUR 12 million [24] while in 2012 the losses reached EUR 10,8 million [25].
For at vurdere, om der forekommer statsstøtte, skal Kommissionen vurdere, om de fem omhandlede foranstaltninger hver især opfylder de kumulative kriterier i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF (dvs. overførsel af statsmidler, potentiel konkurrencefordrejning og påvirkning af samhandelen i EU).
It also appears that in 2013 Adria narrowed the losses to EUR 3,1 million [26].
Foranstaltning 1 og 2: Kapitalforhøjelserne i 2007 og 2009
Point 10(a) of the R&R Guidelines stipulates that a company is in difficulty when ‘more than half of registered capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 months’.