natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den blev kun ignoreret af den rumænske lovgiver ved vedtagelsen af EGO 75 i strid med bestemmelserne i lov nr. 143/1999 om statsstøtte og dermed i strid med forpligtelserne i henhold til Europaaftalen og afgørelse nr. 4/2000 truffet af Associeringsrådet EU/Rumænien.
First, the costs of raw materials, as inputs for final products, constitute ordinary operating expenses of undertakings, and relieving them of a part of their ordinary operating expenses grants them a distinct advantage.
Unionen insisterede derefter i tiltrædelsesforhandlingerne på, at Rumænien skulle efterkomme afgørelsen, sine forpligtelser i henhold til Europaaftalen og fællesskabsretten, hvilket Rumænien gjorde ved at ophæve EGO 24.
Second, granting the claimants compensation for lost profits because they had to bear their own operating expenses themselves likewise constitutes an economic advantage not available under normal market conditions and in absence of the Award; under normal market conditions, the undertaking would have had to bear itself the costs inherent in its economic activity and would therefore not have generated these profits.
Af ovenstående grunde konkluderer Kommissionen, at udbetaling af den erstatning, voldgiftsretten tilkendte sagsøgerne, ved gennemførelse eller fuldbyrdelse af kendelsen udgør en økonomisk fordel for sagsøgerne, som de ikke ville have opnået under sædvanlige markedsbetingelser.
Third, paying interest to the claimants on payments that were allegedly due in the past, but which themselves must be qualified as conferring an advantage, confers a separate and additional advantage.
Selektivitet
Again, under normal market conditions and in the absence of the Award, the undertaking would have had to bear its ordinary operating expenses, would have not generated the allegedly lost profits, and would therefore not have been able to draw an interest on this capital.
Det er ikke alle foranstaltninger, som giver en virksomhed en økonomisk fordel, der udgør statsstøtte, men kun foranstaltninger, som selektivt giver visse virksomheder eller kategorier af virksomheder eller visse økonomiske sektorer en økonomisk fordel.
In fact, by repealing the EGO 24 scheme, Romania re-established normal conditions of competition on the market on which the claimants operate, and any attempt to compensate the claimants for the consequences of the revocation of the EGO 24 incentives grants an advantage not available under those normal market conditions.
Kendelsen giver kun sagsøgerne erstatning.
The claimants’ attempts to separate the award of compensation from the revocation of the EGO 24 incentives are unconvincing.
Ved at betale den erstatning, enten ved gennemførelse eller fuldbyrdelse af kendelsen, giver Rumænien derfor kun sagsøgerne en fordel.
The claimants argue: ‘[I]n the present case the ICSID Tribunal concluded that the decision to comply with EU State aid rules complied with Romania’s obligations under the BIT and did not award damages to the Claimants on this basis.
Foranstaltningen er derfor selektiv.
Instead, the ICSID Tribunal awarded damages for the Romanian state’s wrongdoing consisting in maintaining obligations imposed in relation to EGO 24 after the withdrawal of the scheme and non-transparent behaviour towards the investors’.
Ifølge Asteris-dommen vil erstatning for tab ikke selektivt være til fordel for en enkelt virksomhed, i det omfang erstatningen tilkendes i henhold til en generel lovregel om statens erstatningsansvar, som alle enkeltpersoner kan støtte ret på, så den udelukker, at erstatning, der ydes, giver en selektiv fordel til visse grupper i samfundet.
This description of the Award is inaccurate and in any event fails to consider the effects of implementing/executing the Award.
Den anfægtede foranstaltning, som følger af anvendelsen af bestemmelserne i investeringsaftalen, opfylder af alle ovenstående årsager ikke dette krav.
It has been already pointed out that the Tribunal considered that the alleged breaches of the BIT all resulted from ‘the premature revocation of the incentives or in direct connection with that premature revocation’ [63], and awarded damages for losses resulting directly from the revocation of the incentive scheme.
For det første giver investeringsaftalen kun denne erstatningsret til en vis gruppe investorer, dvs. investorer i de to medlemsstater, der er omfattet af investeringsaftalen, nemlig Sverige og Rumænien.
The Tribunal was also already quoted as stating that [64]: ‘[B]y repealing the EGO 24 incentives prior to 1 April 2009, Romania did not act unreasonably or in bad faith (except that [Romania] acted unreasonably by maintaining investors’ obligations after terminating the incentives).
Dermed var det ikke EU-investorer i en tilsvarende stilling, som kunne kræve erstatning på grundlag af den investeringsaftale svarende til de incitamenter, der var blevet lovet i den ophævede EGO 24-støtteordning, men kun investorer af en bestemt nationalitet.
The Tribunal, however, concludes by majority that Romania violated the Claimants’ legitimate expectations that those incentives would be available, in substantially the same form, until 1 April 2009.
I det omfang betaling af erstatning tilkendt en investor i medfør af en bilateral investeringsaftale giver en fordel, er fordelen dermed selektiv.
Romania also failed to act transparently by failing to inform the Claimants in a timely manner that the regime would be terminated prior to its stated date of expiration.
Hvad angår sagsøgernes påstand om, at Kommissionen tidligere havde anerkendt fordele, som gives i medfør af bilaterale investeringsaftaler (se betragtning 66), er den udtalelse, som sagsøgerne henholder sig til, slet ikke fra Kommissionen, men et uddrag fra en undersøgelse udført af en ekstern leverandør for temaafdelingen i Europa-Parlamentets Generaldirektorat for Eksterne Politikker.
As a result, the Tribunal finds that Romania failed to “ensure fair and equitable treatment of the investments” of the Claimants in the meaning of Article 2(3) of the BIT’.
For det andet, for at fjerne enhver tvivl om ophavet til de holdninger, der udtrykkes i denne undersøgelse, indeholder den en ansvarsfraskrivelse, som angiver, at de kun kan tilskrives forfatteren, og at de ikke afspejler Europa-Parlamentets officielle holdning.
In light of this conclusion, it cannot be maintained, as the claimants do, that the Tribunal found Romania’s decision to comply with Union State aid rules by revoking EGO 24 not to have been in breach of the BIT, or that it did not award damages on that basis [65].
Udtalelsen fra rapporten kan ikke tilskrives Kommissionen og er irrelevant for den foreliggende sag.
The Commission notes that in justifying its decision to award compensation for increased prices and the loss of the ability to stockpile, as well as lost profits, the Tribunal referred only to damages incurred by the claimants as a result of the revocation of the EGO 24 incentives [66].
For det andet kompenserer den anfægtede foranstaltning sagsøgerne for ophævelse af investeringsincitamenter, som i sig selv er selektive.
Notably, the Tribunal did not refer to, or award additional damages on the basis of, its finding that Romania acted unreasonably in maintaining the investors’ obligations under EGO 24 and failed to act transparently.
De incitamenter, der blev givet med EGO 24, var kun tilgængelige for virksomheder, som investerede i visse regioner.
Economic advantage (2): damages and State aid
Derfor bør den erstatning, voldgiftsretten tilkendte sagsøgerne, i sig selv betragtes som selektiv, eftersom den svarer til de fordele, der blev lovet i den ophævede EGO 24.
The presence of an advantage is, contrary to the submission of the claimants, furthermore not precluded by the fact that the payment of the compensation awarded to the complainants by the Tribunal through the implementation or execution of the Award entails a payment of compensation for damages.
Kommissionen mener under alle omstændigheder, at den investeringsaftale, som voldgiftsretten tilkendte erstatning på baggrund af, blev ugyldig, da Rumænien tiltrådte Unionen, hvilket betyder, at den ikke kan anses for at danne grundlag for en generel retsregel vedrørende statens erstatningsansvar, som alle investorer kan støtte ret på.
The central question in this regard is whether the principles laid down in the CJEU’s Asteris [67] judgment are applicable to the case at hand.
Af alle ovenstående grunde konkluderer Kommissionen, at gennemførelsen eller fuldbyrdelsen af kendelsen giver sagsøgerne en selektiv fordel.
In its judgment in Asteris, the CJEU set out that State aid ‘is fundamentally different in its legal nature from damages which the competent national authorities may be ordered to pay to individuals in compensation for the damage they have caused to those individuals.’ [68] The claimants argue that the present case falls squarely under this case-law, and that any attempt by the Commission to distinguish the Asteris case from the one at hand is unconvincing.
Statsmidler
The Commission disagrees with this position.
Kun fordele, der tildeles direkte eller indirekte gennem statsmidler, kan udgøre statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
The Commission observes, first, that the Asteris case arose out of a very different context than the present case.
Direkte betalinger fra statsbudgettet, afkald på statslige indtægter ved at afskrive skyldig skat eller overførsel af andre statslige aktiver (såsom aktier i andre virksomheder eller overførsel af beslaglagte aktiver) til sagsøgerne, uanset om disse er frivillige eller påbudt af retten, skal alle betragtes som værende finansieret med statsmidler.
In the former case, the CJEU rendered a judgment in response to a reference for a preliminary ruling by a Greek court by which the CJEU was asked to pronounce itself on the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States to entertain claims for damages brought by individuals against national authorities in respect of non-payment of aid under the Union’s common agricultural policy.
Tilregnelse til staten
The non-payment of aid was not the result of a broken promise by the Greek authorities to grant that aid, but rather the consequence of the inclusion of technical errors by the Commission in a regulation.
Hvis en selektiv fordel skal udgøre støtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, skal den kunne tilregnes staten [76].
The affected undertakings had already brought an action for damages against the Commission before the CJEU, which had rejected it as unfounded.
I den foreliggende sag gør sagsøgerne gældende, at eftersom gennemførelsen af kendelsen er »en automatisk og ufrivillig konsekvens af Rumæniens forpligtelser i medfør af ICSID-konventionen, kan den helt klart ikke tilregnes staten og dermed ikke udgøre statsstøtte«.
In response to the reference for a preliminary ruling, the CJEU specified in its judgment that since it had previously dismissed the action for damages against the Commission, any action for damages against the Greek state would have to be on different grounds from the action against the Commission it dismissed, that is to say a wrongful act of the Greek authorities themselves.
Det centrale i sagsøgernes argument er, at fordi Rumænien er underlagt en forpligtelse i henhold til folkeretten til at gennemføre kendelsen, kan det ikke tilregnes staten.
Notably, the CJEU did not state that an award of damages equal to an amount of illegal State aid promised but not paid out would not amount to State aid itself.
Kommissionen er ikke enig i denne argumentation og mener af følgende grunde, at foranstaltningen kan tilregnes Rumænien.
Thus, it does not follow from the Asteris judgment that every award of damages is automatically outside the scope of Union State aid law, as the claimants seem to argue.
Kommissionen bemærker først og fremmest, at Rumæniens frivillige indgåelse af investeringsaftalen, og navnlig artikel 7 deri, skabte betingelserne for den selektive fordel, der følger af kendelsen, som forklaret i betragtning 110 ff.
Rather, in cases of liability based on the wrongful conduct of national authorities, no advantage is granted to an undertaking where such liability merely ensures that the damaged party is given what it is entitled to, just as any other undertaking would be, under the general rules of civil liability in that Member State.
Det er også tilfældet med Rumæniens frivillige betaling af den udestående erstatning tilkendt af voldgiftsretten.
Compensation granted under those general rules of civil liability differ from State aid to the extent that they cannot result in the damaged individual being better off after receiving compensation.
Endelig kan enhver handling foretaget af Rumæniens statslige organer tilregnes Rumænien.
Second, for compensation to fall outside the Union State aid rules under the Asteris case-law it must be based on a general rule of compensation [69].
Disse statslige organer omfatter medlemsstatens regering og andre offentlige myndigheder.
In the present case, the compensation has been awarded to the claimants on the basis of an intra-EU BIT which the Commission considers invalid as of Romania’s accession to the Union.
En stats nationale domstole samt eksekutorer udpeget af retten og fogeder betragtes også som statslige organer og er derfor i henhold til EU-traktatens artikel 4, stk. 3, forpligtet til at samarbejde loyalt med Unionen.
The Commission has consistently taken the view that intra-EU BITs, such as the BIT upon which the claimants base their claim [70], are contrary to Union law since they are incompatible with provisions of the Union Treaties and should therefore be considered invalid [71].
I det tilfælde udspringer foranstaltningen af en retsakt vedtaget af EU-lovgiveren og kan ikke tilregnes staten.
The Commission has repeatedly made this view known to the Member States, including the Member States in question.
Det bestrides imidlertid ikke, at Rumænien ikke i henhold til EU-retten er forpligtet til at gennemføre kendelsen.
Third, the Commission notes that the purpose of the Award is to compensate the applicants for the incentives which Romania had promised them under EGO 24 (modified by EGO 75) but had been required to abolish by the Union to complete the negotiation process for its accession to the Union.
En beslutning om at gennemføre eller fuldbyrde kendelsen, uanset om den er truffet af den rumænske regering eller Rumæniens nationale domstole, kan dermed tilskrives den rumænske stat.
Thus, in contrast to the Asteris case, the reason the applicants claim compensation in this case is because they were denied the incentives Romania promised to grant them in violation of its obligations under Article 64 of the Europe Agreement and Law No 143/1999 as interpreted by Decision No 244/2000 of the Romanian Competition Council not to grant unlawful State aid.
I lyset af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltningen kan tilskrives Rumænien.
However, as Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has explained [72], an award of damages equal to the sum of the amounts of aid that were envisaged to be granted would constitute an indirect grant of State aid found to be illegal and incompatible with the internal market.
Konkurrencefordrejning og påvirkning af samhandelen
Following that line, the General Court has considered indemnification clauses for the recovery of State aid to constitute State aid [73].
Statsstøtte anses for at fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene, når det er sandsynligt, at den vil forbedre støttemodtagerens position i forhold til andre virksomheder, som den konkurrerer med [77].
Moreover, in the judgment in Lucchini, the CJEU held that a national court was prevented from applying national law where the application of that law would have the effect to ‘frustrate the application of Community law in so far as it would make it impossible to recover State aid that was granted in breach of Community law’ [74].
Af praktiske grunde antages der således at være tale om konkurrencefordrejning i henhold til artikel 107 i traktaten, når staten giver en virksomhed en økonomisk fordel i en liberaliseret sektor, hvor den er eller kan være i konkurrence.
The attempts by the claimants to distinguish those cases from the present case are unconvincing.
En fordel, som gives til en virksomhed, og som fordrejer konkurrencen, vil normalt også kunne påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
What matters is not that the precise facts underlying those cases differ from those of the present case, but the principle informing those cases, which is that national law, including liability arrangements under national law, cannot be applied where doing so would frustrate the application of Union State aid law and thus ultimately result in the grant of illegal State aid.
Samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne påvirkes, når en foranstaltning styrker den støttemodtagende virksomheds stilling i forhold til andre virksomheder, som den konkurrerer med i samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet [78].
In this light, the Asteris case does not exempt damages awarded as compensation for the recovery of illegal State aid or the failure to receive illegal State aid.
Kommissionen har også konkluderet, at betaling af erstatning til sagsøgerne, enten ved at gennemføre eller fuldbyrde kendelsen, ville styrke deres stilling i forhold til andre virksomheder, som de konkurrerer med, og som ikke har modtaget tilsvarende kompensation for inddragelse af ulovlig statsstøtte.
The claimants’ contention that there has never been a valid formal decision establishing that EGO 24 constitutes illegal State aid nor that those incentives were incompatible with the internal market is irrelevant in this respect, since it is the implementation/execution of the Award and not the investment incentives promised under EGO 24 which constitute the contested measure and form the basis of the present Decision.
Den erstatning, der tilkendes i kendelsen, er baseret på et beløb, der svarer til den told, der blev opkrævet på råmaterialerne, tab af fortjeneste og rente på det samlede erstatningsbeløb.
Indeed, considering EGO 24 was abolished on 22 February 2005 and no aid was disbursed under that legislation after that date, neither the Romanian Competition Council nor the Commission could conclude in a formal decision that EGO 24 gave rise to incompatible State aid in the period 22 February 2005 to 1 April 2009, which is the period for the which the Award grants compensation to the claimants.
Omkostningerne til råmaterialer som input til færdigvarer udgør almindelige driftsudgifter for virksomheder.
For that very reason, there is also no need for the Commission to adopt a formal decision finding the existence of State aid in cases where a national court or an arbitral tribunal awards compensation against a Member State for the withdrawal of an aid measure.
At fritage dem for en del af deres almindelige driftsudgifter giver dem en særlig konkurrencemæssig fordel, ligesom at godtgøre sagsøgerne for tab af fortjeneste og betaling af rente.
Article 107(1) of the Treaty contains a general prohibition on the grant of State aid ‘in any form whatsoever’.
Sagsøgerne beskæftiger sig med fremstilling af fødevareprodukter, mølleriprodukter og plastemballage.
The precise form of the measure is thus irrelevant in establishing whether it confers an economic advantage on the undertaking [75].
Der findes et liberaliseret marked for alle disse produkter, så hvis sagsøgerne får en fordel, er det sandsynligt, at det vil fordreje konkurrencen.
Thus, if the State aid is granted through the implementation or execution of a judgment or an award, which the Commission considers to be the case in relation to the Award, it is in relation to that implementation or execution that the Commission must show that the cumulative conditions of Article 107(1) of the Treaty are fulfilled and that that aid is incompatible with the internal market.
I betragtning af at de produkter, som sagsøgerne primært fremstiller, kan og bliver handlet mellem medlemsstaterne, er det klart, at hvis sagsøgerne får en fordel, er det sandsynligt, at det også vil påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
In any event, the Commission recalls that the Romanian Competition Council, several Union Common Positions and the Romanian Government upon repealing EGO 24 all concluded that EGO 24 gave rise to unlawful State aid under the Europe Agreement, Decision No 4/2000 of the EU-Romania Association Council, Law No 143/99 and the acquis communautaire.
Konklusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission concludes that payment of the compensation awarded to the claimants by the Tribunal through the implementation or execution of the Award constitutes an economic advantage in favour of the claimants that they would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
Af ovenstående grund mener Kommissionen, at betaling af den erstatning, voldgiftsretten tilkendte sagsøgerne, udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
Selectivity
Anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne påvirker ikke rettigheder og forpligtelser, som er beskyttet af traktatens artikel 351
Not all measures which grant an undertaking an economic advantage constitute State aid, but only those which confer an economic advantage in a selective manner upon certain undertakings or categories of undertakings or to certain economic sectors.
I traktatens artikel 351 hedder det, at »[d]e rettigheder og forpligtelser, der følger af konventioner, som (…) for tiltrædende medlemsstaters vedkommende er indgået mellem på den ene side en eller flere medlemsstater og på den anden side et eller flere tredjelande, berøres ikke af bestemmelserne i traktaterne«.
The Award awards compensation only to the claimants.
Derfor påvirker anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne i denne sag ikke rettigheder og forpligtelser, som er beskyttet af traktatens artikel 351.
Moreover, as follows from the Asteris judgment, compensation for damages will not selectively benefit an individual undertaking only insofar as that compensation follows from the application of a general rule of law for government liability which every individual can invoke, so that it excludes that any compensation granted confers a selective benefit on certain groups in society.
I denne forbindelse minder Kommissionen om, at der er forskellige EU-regler, der gælder for bilaterale investeringsaftaler mellem EU-medlemsstater på den ene side og bilaterale investeringsaftaler mellem en EU-medlemsstat og et tredjeland på den anden side.
The contested measure, which follows from the application of the provisions of the BIT, does not comply with this requirement for all of the reasons in the present case.
Med hensyn til bilaterale investeringsaftaler mellem EU-medlemsstater mener Kommissionen, at disse aftaler er i strid med EU-retten, uforenelige med bestemmelserne i traktaterne og derfor bør betragtes som ugyldige.
First, the BIT only confers this right of compensation to a certain group of investors, that is, to investors of the two Member States covered by the intra-EU BIT, i.e. Sweden and Romania.
I modsætning dertil er bilaterale investeringsaftaler mellem en EU-medlemsstat og et tredjeland underlagt Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1219/2012 [79] om indførelse af overgangsordninger for bilaterale investeringsaftaler mellem medlemsstaterne og tredjelande, indtil disse aftaler gradvis erstattes af EU-aftaler om samme genstand, i lyset af Unionens enekompetence med hensyn til den fælles handelspolitik, som direkte udenlandske investeringer falder ind under [80].
Accordingly, not every similarly situated Union investor could rely on that BIT to claim damages corresponding to the incentives promised under the abolished EGO 24 aid scheme, but only investors of a certain nationality.
Rumænien er også part i den multilaterale ICSID-konvention, som den tiltrådte før tiltrædelsen til Unionen.
Thus, to the extent that paying compensation awarded to an investor pursuant to a BIT amounts to granting an advantage, the advantage is selective.